新学術領域研究「グローバル関係学」
オンライン・ペーパー・シリーズ：ワーキングペーパー

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Innovative Areas“Relational Studies on Global Crises” Online Paper Series : Working Paper

Dai Yamao
Associate Professor, Kyusyu University

The Conflict in Iraq andits Impact on
Perception toward
Statehood:
Based on Poll Surveys
Online Paper Series No.8: Working Paper No.4
May 1, 2019文部科学省 科学研究費補助金 新学術領域研究（研究領域提案型）「グローバル秩序の溶解と新しい危機を超えて̶関係性中心の融合型人文社会科学の確立」

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Innovative Areas (research in a proposed research area):
RELATIONAL STUDIES ON GLOBAL CRISESRelational Studies on Global Crisis: Online Paper Series No.8 May. 1, 2019

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood:
Based on Poll Surveys
YAMAO, Dai(Kyushu University)

Introduction
Iraq faced a major regime change in 2003. The U.S. invasion of Iraq ended the Ba’thist
regime led by Saddam Hussein at the time. The U.S. led Coalition Provisional Authority(CPA) purged the executive members of the Ba’th Party and dissolved all security
apparatus, such as armies and polices. Subsequently, Shi’ite Islamic parties took controlof the regime through elections.
The introduction of elections brought about an expansion of violence all over thecountry. Radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaida rushed into Iraq where they could fightagainst the U.S. In addition, the purged party’s former executive members and former
military professionals joined their war against the U.S., as well as against the newly
formed Iraqi regime. This ended in a deadly civil war that killed several thousand Iraqis
every month. Subsequently, the U.S. insurgency and local tribe-based vigilante group,
Awakening Council, successfully restored public order.
Nonetheless, the security situation deteriorated after the so-called Arab Spring at
the end of 2011. The self-styled Islamic State (IS) returned to Iraq from Syria andoccupied its second-largest city, Mosul, in June 2014. As a result of this, it is widelybelieved that sectarian conflict intensified, as did antipathy toward the former regime’s
supporters. Sectarian conflict intensified due to the IS’s claim of having killed Shi’ites.
Because of this, various Shi’ite militia groups became mobilized in order to protect theircommunity. The former regime began to be viewed more negatively after the rise of IS,
as it was the purged former regime members who made a strategic alliance with the IS.
Most of these executives were professional soldiers of the former Iraqi army.
So far, widespread sectarian conflict and antipathy toward the former regime
were commonly accepted impacts of the IS. However, no academic research has been
conducted on the impact of the IS on the opinions of the people of Iraq. What kind of
impact did the IS bring about to Iraqi politics as well as in the Iraqi perception toward
statehood?
Thus, this paper aims to clarify the impacts of the conflicts in Iraq, brought about
by the IS, by analysing survey data.
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RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

Section I outlines the Iraqi political process in the post-war era and presents two
commonly accepted impacts of the IS, namely sectarianism and antipathy toward theformer regime. Section II explains the data set used in this paper. Section III confirms thetwo impacts on Iraqi perspective with the help of the descriptive statistics of the 2017
survey. Consequently, section IV analyses whether these two impacts can be understoodas the impacts of the IS, using the two regressions of the pooled data set of the four poll
surveys conducted in Iraq.

I．Overview of Iraqi Politics
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the most important policies that the U.S.-led CPA
introduced were the dissolution of all Iraqi armies and the so-called ‘De-Ba’thification’policy that purged executive members of the Ba’th Party. These two policies caused anumber of problems in the process of state building.
First, the policies caused the unemployment of around 600,000 people who had
supported state organizations as public officers, police officers, or military officers[Stover et al 2005; Stansfiled 2007]. When they lost their jobs, they became critical ofboth the U.S. policy and the newly formed Iraqi government. Second, frustrated with thepolicies, those who were purged, formed alliances with illegal opposition groups/radical
jihadists, such as al-Qaida, at the beginning and with the IS later on. Third, the policies
created a critical juncture for establishing sectarian conflict in Iraqi society. This isbecause the De-Ba’thification policy was continued in a radical manner under the new
Shi’ite Islamist regime that was formed through elections. To put it simply, the Shi’ite
Islamists had been in exile under the former regime, and therefore the supporters of theformer regime were considered to be enemies by them and were to be excluded from thebuilding of the new state1. This purge policy resulted in a conflict between Sunni and
Shi’ite Iraqis, as many of the executive members of the former regime happened to beSunni and the majority of the new regime were Shi’a. All these factors, along with theintroduction of the electoral process, resulted in bringing Iraq to a civil war.
Security conditions improved after the U.S.’s initiation of counter insurgency
and the formation of the local tribe-based vigilante group, Awakening Council2. However,after the Arab Uprising at the end of 2011, the security situation in Iraq drasticallyworsened with the return of the IS from Syria, who occupied the second-largest city,
Mosul, in June 2014. The purged ruling class of the former regime, most of whom wereNeedless to say, this sentence can be criticized as oversimplification. For details on this criticism,see [Yamao 2013]2
For details on the Awakening Council, see [Yamao 2012].
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The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood

soldiers of the former Iraqi army, made a temporary strategic alliance with the IS during
this process.
It is well known that the IS claimed to have killed the Shia as they virtuously
considered them to be kāfirs (unbelievers). Against this claim, a large number of Shi’ite
militia groups mobilized and formed the Popular Mobilization Unit (al-Ḥashd al-Shaʻbī,
PMU) in order to protect the Shi’ite community. In the process, sectarian conflict between
the Sunni and Shia intensified. Moreover, negative opinions about supporters of theformer regime is considered to be increased as they formed alliances with the IS to occupy
various cities, such as Mosul3. Regrettably, since the members of the IS and most of thepurged former regime executives were Sunni, and most of the PMU were Shia, sectarian
conflict was further mobilized. Foreign intervention by Saudi Arabia, who indirectly
supported the former, and by Iran, who openly supported the latter, further provoked thissectarian conflict.
The overview of the above-mentioned political process led to two important
observations: First, the rise of the IS brought about serious sectarian tension and sectarian
conflict among Iraqis, because the IS agitated sectarian conflict and the PMU responded
to it. Second, the rise of the IS brought about a critically negative perception toward the
supporters of the former regime, because they made strategic alliances with the IS 4 .
Therefore, the question arises: Are these assumptions valid?

II. Data Set
In order to examine the suitability of these assumptions and to check whether theseassumptions are accepted by ordinary Iraqis, this paper uses the data of poll surveys
conducted in Iraq by my research team and I.
The first data is that of a 2017 poll survey conducted in Iraq. This survey was
conducted as a part of the research project, ‘Relational Studies on Global Crises’. We
conducted an opinion poll in Iraq during June to September 2017 in order to grasp how
Iraqi people perceive statehood and the socio-political and economic situation in the postconflict society. The questionnaire used was similar to that used in Syria, Bosnia, andHerzegovina, and was developed by the researchers of Group B02 ‘Cross-border NonState Networks’ [Yamao 2019]. The survey was conducted using a two-stage stratified
random sampling, detailing the percentage of the prefecture and the percentage of the

A large number of criticism and negative attitude/ antipathy could be observed in Iraqi media as tothe alliance between the IS and former regime supporters [Masala 2 Jul 2014].
4 For the two assumptions and the IS impact on the Iraqi socio-political situation, see [Eriksson and
Khaleel eds. 2018].
3

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RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

ethnic/sectarian groups. The details of the sampling are shown in Figures 1 and 2 5.
In this paper, I will use the data set in order to verify the above-mentioned
assumptions – the spread of sectarian conflict and the negative perception toward the
supporters of the former regime – observed in the post-IS era of Iraq. I will tackle thisissue in section III.
【Figure 1: Sample Size in the 2017 Poll】
Prefecture
Kurd
majority
Sunni
majority(mixed)Shia
majority

Dohuk
Irbil
Sulaymaniya
NinawaKirkukSalah al-Din
DiyalaAnbar
BaghdadBabil
Wasit
Karbala
Najaf
Qadisiya
MaysanDhi QarMuthanna
Basra
Total

Sample Size
n.d
70
70
n.d
50
70
60
80
380
n.d
n.d
n.d
80
n.d
n.d
n.d
n.d
140
1000

% of Total
Sample
n.d
7
7
n.d
5
7
6
8
38
n.d
n.d
n.d
8
n.d
n.d
n.d
n.d
14
100.00TargetPopulation
1252343
1797708
2095851
3612339
15482121544081
1584948
17151497877888
1999034
1335230
118054514257231250166
107808620293457882622818804
36933714% of Total
Population
3.39
4.87
5.67
9.78
4.19
4.18
4.2
4.6
21.33
5.41
3.62
3.20
3.86
3.38
2.92
5.49
2.13
7.63
100.00Source: Target population is cited by estimated population in 2015, available the website of the Iraqi
Ministry of Planning (http://www.cosit.gov.iq/ar/).

For the details of the sampling method, questionnaire, result, and descriptive statistics, see [Yamao
2019].
5

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood【Figure 2: Sample size by ethnic/sectarian groups】
Ethnic/Sectarian Groups
Sunni Arab Shi’ite Arab Christian
Kurd
Size
1
0
6
54
Irbil
%
1.4
0.0
8.6
77.1
Size
0
0
0
66
Sulaymaniya
%
0.0
0.0
0.0
94.3
Size
10
10
0
10
Kirkuk
%
20.0
20.0
0.0
20.0
Size
57
0
0
0
Salah al-Din
%
81.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
Size
22
25
0
0
Diyala
%
36.7
41.7
0.0
0.0
Size
57
2
1
1
Anbar
%
71.2
2.5
1.2
1.2
Size
106
257
3
8
Baghdad
%
27.9
67.6
0.8
2.1
Size
1
78
0
0
Najaf
%
1.2
97.5
0.0
0.0
Size
8
99
0
2
Basra
%
5.7
70.7
0.0
1.4
Size
262
471
10
141
Total
%
26.2
47.1
1.0
14.1

Others
9
12.9
0
0.0
20
40.0
3
4.3
0
0.0
1
1.2
6
1.6
1
1.2
31
22.1
71
7.1

Refused
0
0.0
4
5.7
0
0.0
10
14.3
13
21.7
18
22.5
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
45
4.5

Total
70
100
70
100
50
100
70
100
60
100
80
100
380
100
80
100
140
100
1000
100

Source: Made by author.

The second data set comprises of pooled data of the poll surveys that my teamand I conducted in the country, in the years 2011, 2016, 2017 (same data as mentioned
above), and 2018. This data set was constructed by combining these four surveys. The IS
occupied Mosul in 2014, thus the 2011 data can be understood as pre-IS era (basecategory). The sample size of each survey and the allocation of the sample to eachethnic/sectarian group is shown in Figure 3.
Furthermore, in order to analyse the impact of the IS, a new variable called‘Intensity of Conflict’ has been added to this data set. Intensity of Conflict is recorded
based on the number of casualties caused by the IS from 2014 to 2017, the period it had
control in some cities in Iraq. The number of casualties are cited from the Iraq Body Count
website. It provides the most reliable, well documented, and non-affiliated records ofviolence [Al-Tamimi 2012]. As shown in Figure 4, the larger the casualty number, thehigher the conflict intensity and influence of the IS.
I will use this data set to examine whether the above-mentioned assumptions –the spread of sectarian conflict and the negative perception toward the supporters of theformer regime – were impacts of the IS, or at least influenced the Iraqi society. I will
tackle this issue in section VI.

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RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

【Figure 3: Sample Size by Ethnic/Sectarian Groups and Survey Year】
Ethnic/ Sectarian Groups
Survey year
Total
I.C.
Sunni Shia Kurd others refused
2011 2016 2017 2018
1
0
232
41
15
289
Irbil
1
〇
〇
〇
〇
0.3% 0.0% 80.3% 14.2%
5.2% 100.0%
0
0
177
0
13
190
Sulaymaniya〇〇〇
1
0.0% 0.0% 93.2% 0.0%
6.8% 100.0%
33
28
45
46
3
155
Kirkuk
14.5〇〇〇
21.3% 18.1% 29.0% 29.7%
1.9% 100.0%
35
0
5
5
5
50
Ninawa133.1〇
70.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0%
112
33
1
4
62
212
Salah al-Din
〇
〇
〇
38.8
52.8% 15.6% 0.5% 1.9% 29.2% 100.0%
46
47
33
10
64
200
Diyala8.4〇〇〇
23.0% 23.5% 16.5% 5.0% 32.0% 100.0%
84
2
1
2
71
160
Anbar
52.9
〇
〇
52.5% 1.3% 0.6% 1.3% 44.4% 100.0%
287
744
50
67
278 1426
Baghdad
〇
〇
〇
〇
13.7
20.1% 52.2% 3.5% 4.7% 19.5% 100.0%
2
264
0
1
9
276
Najaf
1
〇
〇
〇
〇
0.7% 95.7% 0.0% 0.4%
3.3% 100.0%
66
311
4
2
110
493
Basra
1
〇
〇
〇
〇
13.4% 63.1% 0.8% 0.4% 22.3% 100.0%
671 1436
551
213
630 3501
701
800 1000 1000
Total
19.2% 41.0% 15.7% 6.1% 18.0% 100.0% 20.0% 22.9% 28.6% 28.6%
Note: I.C. stands for intensity of conflict (see Figure 4).
Source: Made by author.

【Figure 4: Casualties of IS Attack and Code of the ‘Intensity of Conflict’】Irbil Sulym Kirkuk Ninawa
SD
Diyala Anbar Baghd
2014
11
90
2596
2186
311
1330
160
2015
5
4
477
4112
1165
337
3175
253
2016
3
801
5910
464
174
757
816
2017
0
0
80
695
58
19
22
137
Total
19
4
1448
13313
3873
841
5284
1366
Code
1
1
14.48 133.13 38.73
8.41 52.84 13.66
Source: Iraq Body Count (https://www.iraqbodycount.org/).

Najaf

Basra

9
9
1

14
5
0
19
1

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood

III. Sectarianism and the Antipathy toward the Former Regime
Through descriptive statistics of the 2017 poll survey data set, this section attempts toshow that the above-mentioned assumptions can be observed in the post-IS era of Iraq.
【Figure 5: Greatest External Threat】
100%
90%
80%

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Shia

Sunni

U.S

Kurd

Saudi Arabia

Other

Iran

Refuse to reply

Other

First, sectarian inclination can be clearly observed in the Iraqi perception of
external threat. As shown in Figure 5, the Shi’a tend to consider Saudi Arabia, which isperceived as the leader of Sunni countries, as the greatest threat after the U.S. On theother hand, the Sunni tend to consider Iran, perceived as the leader of the Shi’a, as thegreatest external threat. This reflects sectarianism.
As for the attitude toward the former regime, Figure 6 shows that the Sunni
consider reconciliation with the former regime as ‘very important’, while the Shi’abelieve otherwise. Even though around 40% of Shia consider reconciliation as ‘very
important/important’, and a certain number of people in each group answered ‘do notknow’, it cannot be denied that the attitude toward reconciliation with the former regime
can be different among ethno-sectarian groups.

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RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

【Figure 6: Reconciliation with the Former Regime】
100%
90%
80%
70%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Sunni

Shia

Very Important/Important

Kurd

Other

not important/not at all

Refuse to Answer
not Know

This difference in attitude becomes much clearer with the perception of ethnosectarian groups toward the exclusion of the former regime. As shown in Figure 7, theSunni show a negative attitude to the exclusion, whereas the Shia consider the exclusion
to be positive. This is not surprising, considering that the Shi’ite Islamist groups had been
excluded from the government in the former regime. Thus, they tend to see the former
regime in a negative light. In short, sectarianism and the negative attitude toward theformer regime can be observed in the post-IS period.

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood【Figure 7: Exclusion of the Former Regime】
100%
90%
80%
70%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Sunni

Kurd

Shia

Very Important/important

Other

Not important/not at all

Refuse to Answer
not Know

Although sectarianism and the negative attitude toward the former regime canbe observed, each ethno-sectarian group considers the cohesion of the people as Iraqis, as‘very important/important’, as shown in Figure 8. In addition, these politically sensitive
issues are not the main concern for most Iraqis. As Figure 9 shows, most Iraqis consider
issues that are connected directly with their daily life, as most important, such as anticorruption, functional government, and security.
To summarise, the descriptive statistics of the data set of the 2017 poll survey
shows that our two assumptions can be observed in the post-IS era in Iraqi society.

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RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

【Figure 8: Cohesion of the People as Iraqis】
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Sunni

Shia

very important/important

Kurd

Other

not important/not at all【Figure 9: Most Important Policy】
300

250
200
150
100
50
0

most important task

Refuse toAnswerNot Know

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood

IV. Impact of the IS
Thus, the question that arises, is whether these two assumptions were impacts of the IS,or were at least an influence on Iraqi society.
1. IS Impact on the Spread of Sectarian ConflictThis section first analyses how Iraqis perceive national integration overcoming sectarian
conflict, before and after the rise of the IS. In other words, I will try to analyse whether
the spread of sectarianism can be understood as an impact of the IS, based on the pooleddata set.
The dependent variable includes the extent to which Iraqis give importance tonational integration overcoming sectarian conflict. Therefore, the answer to the question,‘To what extent do Iraqis consider national integration overcoming sectarian conflict
important for Iraqi politics?’ is used as the variable. As this is an orderly variable (1=not
at all important, 2=not important, 3=neutral, 4=important, and 5= very important), it isappropriate to apply the ordered logistic regression model in the analysis.
For the independent variable, I used an ethno-sectarian dummy variable (Shia,
Sunni, and Kurd) and the variable, Intensity of Conflict. In addition, the regression
includes those who vote for Shia parties (dummy variable, 1=support for Shi’ite party,
0=support for other parties). I also included ideology (Arab nationalism, Iraqi nationalism,
and Islamism; 1=do not support at all/do not support much, 2=neutral, 3=support/strongly
support). In order to examine the change before and after the rise of the IS, I included
year dummy variables (2011, 2016, and 2017), and the dummy variables for theinteraction term of year and the Sunni (2011_Sunni, 2016_Sunni, and 2017_Sunni). The
control variables are sex (1=male and 2=female), age, education (1=illiterate, 2=can read,
3=primary school, 4=secondary school, 5=high school, 6=vocational school, 7=university,
8=university graduate, and 9=post-graduate), and income (1=under US$100, 2= US$100–
500, 3= US$500–1,000, 4= US$1,000–1,500, 5= US$1,500–2,000, 6=over US$2,000).
The results are shown in Figure 10. Model 1 is a basic model that analyses only
the impact of the IS (intensity and year dummy variables). In this model, only the year
dummy variables are statistically significant. Model 2 deals with the ethno-sectarian
influence (ethno-sectarian dummy variables, interaction terms of the year, and Sunni
dummy variables), in addition to the variables of Model 1. I included ideologies in Model
3. Finally, Model 4 deals with all the variables, including the control variables.

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RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

【Figure 10: IS Impact on National Integration Overcoming Sectarian Conflict】
Model 1
Coef.

Model 2
Coef.

Sunni

0.006

Shia

Model 3

Std. Err.

Coef.

0.189

0.053

0.039

0.108

-1.530 ***-0.0020.000

Model 4

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

0.191

0.027

0.203

0.071

0.109

0.136

0.115

0.117

-1.343 ***0.120-1.328 ***

0.125

0.002

-0.004 **0.002-0.004 *

0.002

0.099

0.006

0.100

0.039

0.108

Arab Nationalism

0.063

0.052

0.105 *

0.054

Iraq Nationalism

0.528 ***

0.063

0.580 ***

0.068

Islamism-0.223 ***0.048-0.248 ***0.051

Std. Err.

Kurd
Intensity-0.001

0.002

Vote for Shia Party

2011-0.607 ***0.097-0.396 ***0.110-0.381 ***0.111-0.339 ***

0.121

2016

0.283 ***

0.102

0.399 ***

0.115

0.335 ***

0.116

0.361 ***

0.118

2017

0.767 ***

0.103

1.053 ***

0.123

1.025 ***

0.125

1.023 ***

0.133

2011_Sunni-0.584 **0.259-0.651 **0.262-0.619 **0.285

2016_Sunni-0.077

0.293

0.000

0.296

0.043

0.304

2017_Sunni-0.684 ***0.245-0.691 ***0.248-0.699 ***

0.263

Sex

0.072

0.080

Age

-0.002

0.003

Education-0.014

0.018

Income0.155 ***

0.041

Cut1

-3.5320.121-3.8850.148-2.8630.228-2.489

0.332

Cut2

-2.6020.093-2.9240.125-1.8810.216-1.420

0.321

Cut3

-1.8070.081-2.0820.116-1.0090.212-0.486

0.319

Cut4

-0.5750.072-0.962

0.109

0.348

0.211

0.898

0.319

3431

3431

3431

3123

LR Chi2

192.570451.650545.730

536.110

Pseudo R2

0.028

0.066

0.079

0.086

N

* P<0.1 ** P<0.05 ***P<0.01

From the results listed in Model 4 of Figure 10, we can see that the variables
Kurd, intensity of conflict, Arab nationalism, Iraq nationalism, Islamism, 2011, 2016,2017, interaction terms of Sunni and the year 2011, Sunni and the year 2017, and income
have a statistically significant relationship with the Iraqi perception of the importance ofnational integration in overcoming sectarian division.
These results can be more clearly visualised in Figure 11, which shows the effectof the coefficient of each variable. If the coefficients are on the red line, it means thevariable is not statistically significant. The horizontal bar shows 95% confidential
intervals.

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood【Figure 11: Significance of Each Coefficient: National Integration】

As indicated in Figure 11, regression reveals that the variable Kurd has asignificantly negative relationship with national integration in each model. The intensityof the conflict negatively contributed to the Iraqi perception of national integration
overcoming sectarian division. While the perception of Iraqi nationalism has a positive
relationship with national integration, Islamism has a significantly negative relationshipwith it. All dummy variables of the survey years (2011, 2016, and 2017) have astatistically significant relation with the Iraqi perception of the importance of national
integration in overcoming sectarian division: the year 2011 has a negative relation, theyear 2016 has a positive relation, and the year 2017 has an even more positive relation.
As for the interaction terms of the year and Sunni, ‘2011_Sunni’ and ‘2017_Sunni’negatively affect the national integration perception. In addition, those who have moreincome are more likely to support national integration.
Simulating the predicted probabilities of important variables provides moreinsight on the substantive meaning of these results.
First, Kurds are less likely to be supporters of national integration overcoming
sectarian conflict. Figure 12, based on Model 4, shows that the probability of Kurds
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RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

considering the national integration overcoming sectarian conflict as ‘very important’, isnearly half as compared to non-Kurds. This is not surprising as Kurds are disinterested in
sectarian conflict. Rather, they are keen to solve the various problems between the central
government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as well as the
problems within the KRG.
【Figure 12: Probability of Kurds and Non-Kurds】

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

-0.2

not at allimportant

not importantneutralKurd

importantvery important

Non-Kurd

Second, as shown in Figure 13, based on Model 4, the more intensified theconflict, the lower the probability of the respondent considering national integration in
overcoming sectarian conflict as ‘very important’. On the other hand, the probability ofboth Shia and non-Shia considering national integration as ‘important’ increased, as theintensity of the conflict increased. This means that the IS had a negative impact on the
Iraqi perception of the national integration overcoming sectarian conflict, in general.
Nonetheless, the IS’s impact cannot be understood as completely negative as the numberof those who considered this polity ‘important’ increased.
Third, the attitude toward national integration among all Iraqis turned positive,
year after year, following the rise of the IS as shown in Figure 14, based on Model 4. Thiscan be understood by the fact that Iraqis came to consider national integration as ‘more
important’, especially after the widespread sectarian conflict caused by the rise of the IS.
On the other hand, Figure 14 also indicates that the Sunni considered national integrationas ‘less important’ in 2017 as compared to 2016.

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood【Figure 13: Probability based on the Intensity of Conflict】

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

0
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Intensity
Important (Shia)

Important (non-Shia)

very importantn (Shia)

very importantn (non-Shia)【Figure 14: Change of Probability for those who consider National Integration ‘Very Important’】

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
2011

2016
All Iraqis(year)

2017
Suuni (year*Sunni)

15

RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

In summary, the regression reveals that, although the IS generally had a negative
impact on national integration, as indicated by the negative relation with the intensity ofconflict, the rise of the IS made Iraqis reconsider the importance of national integration
overcoming sectarian conflict, as shown in Figure 14. This is, in a sense, the opposite ofwhat we observe in the daily political scene. Nevertheless, the regression proved that thistype of reaction against the spread of sectarian conflict as well as a crisis of national
division, forced ordinary Iraqis, and not socio-political leaders, to realize the importanceof overcoming sectarian conflict.
2. IS Impact on the Negative Attitude toward the Former Regime
This section analyses how Iraqis perceive reconciliation with the supporters of the former
regime, before and after the rise of the IS. In other words, based on the pooled data set, I
will aim to analyse whether the negative attitude toward the former regime can beunderstood as an impact of the IS.
The dependent variable is, to what extent do Iraqis give importance toreconciliation with the supporters of the former regime? I will use the answer to thequestion, to what extent do Iraqis consider the reconciliation important for Iraqi politics,
as the variable. As this is an orderly variable (1=not at all important, 2=not important,
3=neutral, 4=important, and 5= very important), it is appropriate to apply the orderedlogistic regression model in the analysis.
For the independent variable, I have used the same variables of the former
regression model listed in Figure 10. Model 1 to 4 are constructed in the same manner as
the previous regression. The results are shown in Figure 15.
As we can see from the results listed in Model 4 of Figure 15, the variables Shia,
Kurd, intensity of conflict, vote for Shia party, Arab nationalism, Islamism, 2011, 2016,2017, interaction terms of Sunni and 2016, sex, and income have a statistically significant
relationship with the Iraqi perception of reconciliation with the former regime supporters.
These results are more clearly visualised in Figure 16, which shows the effect of
the coefficient of each variable. If the coefficients are on the red line, it means the variable
is not statistically significant. The horizontal bar shows 95% confidential intervals.

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood【Figure 15: Impact on Reconciliation】
Model 1
Coef.

Std. Err.

Model 2
Coef.

Model 3

Std. Err.

Model 4

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Sunni-0.1370.159 -0.121

0.161-0.161

0.169

Shia

-0.545 ***0.092 -0.423 ***0.093-0.423 ***0.097-0.911 ***0.107 -0.642 ***0.111-0.661 ***0.115-0.008 ***0.002 -0.008 ***0.002-0.008 ***0.002-0.283 ***0.083 -0.289 ***0.083-0.272 ***0.089

Arab Nationalism

0.519 ***

0.045

0.525 ***

0.047

Iraq Nationalism-0.0740.058-0.0890.062-0.187 ***Kurd
Intensity-0.002 **0.002

Vote for Shia Party

Islamism

0.041-0.193 ***

0.043

2011

0.625 ***

0.088

0.695 ***

0.098

0.697 ***

0.099

0.622 ***

0.108

2016

-0.523 ***0.092-0.766 ***0.102 -0.738 ***0.104-0.807 ***

0.106

2017

0.169 ***

0.082

0.180 *

0.095

0.096

0.174 *

0.101

-0.3240.239 -0.310

0.241-0.2860.265

2016_Sunni

0.763 ***

0.249

0.780 ***

0.253

0.781 ***

0.259

2017_Sunni-0.017

0.200

0.000

0.201

0.054

0.214

Sex

0.132 *

0.068

Age

-0.002

0.003

Education

0.005

0.015

2011_Sunni

0.180 *

Income0.083 **

0.035

Cut1

-1.5740.071-2.1900.102-1.5190.192-1.265

0.281

Cut2

-0.9290.066-1.5240.098-0.8350.190-0.570

0.280

Cut3

0.015

0.064

-0.550

0.095

0.175

0.190

0.420

0.280

Cut4

1.020

0.067

0.480

0.095

1.238

0.192

1.482

0.281

3214

3214

3214

2929

LR Chi2

140.100

271.920420.320412.610

Pseudo R2

0.014

0.027

0.042

0.045

N

* P<0.1 ** P<0.05 ***P<0.01

17

RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

【Figure 16: Significance of Each Coefficient: Reconciliation】

As indicated in Figure 16, the regression reveals that the Shia and Kurds have asignificantly negative relationship with reconciliation in each model. The intensity of theconflict negatively contributed to the Iraqi perception of reconciliation. While the Arabnationalism had a positive relation with reconciliation, Islamism showed a significantly
negative relationship with it. All dummy variables of the survey year (2011, 2016, and2017) have a statistically significant relation with the Iraqi perception of thereconciliation; while the years 2011 and 2017 show positive relations, the year 2016shows a significantly negative relation. As for the interaction terms, ‘2016_Sunni’positively affected the reconciliation. In addition, men, and those with more income, aremore likely to support reconciliation.
Simulating the predicted probabilities of important variables provides moreinsight on the substantive meaning of these results.
First, the Shia and Kurds are less likely to support reconciliation with the former
regime. Figure 17, based on Model 4, shows that the probability of the attitude toward
reconciliation became low when one is Shia. This is because a large number of politicalelites in the former regime were Sunni and a majority of the new regime (Shia) had been

The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood

exiled under the former regime.
【Figure 17: Probability of Shia and Non-Shia】

0.35
0.3
0.25

0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
not at allimportant

not importantneutralShia

importantvery important

Non-Shia

Second, the more intense the conflict, the lower the probability of the
respondents supporting reconciliation with the former regime. Figure 18, based on Model4, shows that the probability to consider the reconciliation ‘not at all important’ increases
as the intensity of the conflict increases, regardless of which sectarian group one may
belong to (both Shia and non-Shia in this figure). On the other hand, 23.3% of Shia
consider reconciliation ‘very important’ if the intensity of conflict is at the lowest level,and 9.5% of Shi’a consider the same if the intensity is the highest (roughly 13.8 points
decrease). This shows that the attitude toward the former regime was considered to be
more severe after the rise of the IS, as alliances were formed with the IS and sectarian
conflict was triggered. Although it is not statistically significant, the interaction of
intensity and the Sunni dummy variable has the same outcome. This means that the more
intense the conflict, the lower the probability of the respondent supporting reconciliation
with the former regime. Thus, the IS’s impact is considered to be negative toward
reconciliation with the former regime.
However, it is very important to note that the crossing point of the probability to
reply ‘not at all important’ and ‘very important’ is different among ethnic groups (seeFigure 18). For the Shia, the probability to reply ‘not at all important’ exceeds ‘very
important’, when the intensity of the conflict is more than 23 point (see the crossing point
19

RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8of blue and grey lines in Figure 18). On the other hand, for the non-Shia, the probability
to reply ‘not at all important’ exceeds ‘very important’, when the intensity of conflict ismore than 76 point (see the crossing point of orange and yellow lines in Figure 18).
Furthermore, for the Shia, the crossing point for the number of IS-related casualties wasaround 2300, and for the non-Shia, the crossing point for the number of IS-related
casualties was around 7600. This means that the Shia tend to be more negative evenduring less intense conflict, whereas the non-Shia remain more positive until the intensity
increases. In other words, the same IS impact had different meanings within each ethnosectarian group.
【Figure 18: Probability based on the Intensity of Conflict】

0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05

0
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Intensity
Not at all important (Shia)

Not at all important (non-Shia)

very importantn (Shia)

very importantn (non-Shia)

Third, the attitude toward reconciliation among all Iraqis and the Sunni reversed
after the IS’s control, as compared to the attitude before. As shown in Figure 19, theprobability that all Iraqis consider reconciliation to be very important after the rise of IS,
decreased by half in 2016 (36.7%→15.9%, roughly 20.8 points decrease) and increased
again in 2017 (15.9%→28.5%, roughly 12.6 points increase). However, the probability
that the Sunni considered reconciliation to be very important increased by more than
twofold in 2016 (21.0%→42.7%, roughly 21.7 points increase) and decreased again in2017 (42.7%→27.0%, roughly 15.7 points decrease). Although not all the variables withregard to the above-mentioned change are statistically significant, the difference inThe Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood

attitude toward reconciliation among the Sunni and other groups is obvious. All things
considered, the Sunni are more likely to consider reconciliation more important in orderto overcome the influences of the IS.
【Figure 19: Change of Probability for those who consider the Reconciliation ‘Very Important’】

0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2

0.15
0.1
0.05
0
2011

2016
All Iraqis(year)

2017
Suuni (year*Sunni)

In summary, although the IS had a generally negative impact on reconciliation,
as shown by the negative relation to intensity of conflict, the degree of this impact iscontextually dependent, differing from on ethno-sectarian group to another. All the
discussions relating to Figures 17, 18, and 19 show that the Shia and the Kurds are moresensitive to the influence of the IS, while the Sunni are more resilient to the impact of the
IS. The regression reveals that the Sunni are more likely to attempt to overcome its
influence especially from a change of attitude to the reconciliation (Figure 19).
Finally, since the number of observations used in Model 4 of the regression listed
in Figure 15 is 2929, with 572 missing data (16.34% of the whole dataset), the result
might be biased because of this relatively large percentage of missing data (omitted
variable bias). Thus, multiple imputation based on the multivariate normal (MVN) of
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) was applied in order to check the result of theoriginal regression6. The result of the multiple imputation is shown in Figure 20. In thisfigure, all variables have a similar coefficient score, significance, and positive/negative
6

The multiple imputation analysis was conducted by the Stata (ver.15).
21

RSGC-Online Paper Series No.8

direction. Thus, this proves that the result of the regression shown in Figure 15 is freefrom omitted variable bias.
【Figure 20: Multiple Imputation: Reconciliation】
Model 1
Coef.

Model 2

Std. Err.

Coef.

Model 3

Std. Err.

Coef.

Model 4

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Sunni-0.1040.159 -0.107

0.161 -0.108

0.161

Shia

-0.526 ***0.091 -0.418 ***0.092 -0.401 ***

0.093

Kurd

-0.880 ***0.105 -0.629 ***0.110 -0.613 ***0.110

0.002 -0.008 ***0.002 -0.008 ***0.002 -0.008 ***0.002-0.289 ***0.084 -0.287 ***Intensity-0.002

Vote for Shia Party

0.085 -0.268 ***0.085

Arab Nationalism

0.510 ***

0.045

0.046

Iraq Nationalism-0.0670.059 -0.072

0.059

Islamism-0.187 ***0.040 -0.182 ***0.041

0.698 ***

0.098

0.672 ***

0.101

0.692 ***

0.097

0.515 ***

2011

0.621 ***

0.087

2016

-0.556 ***0.091 -0.777 ***0.101 -0.742 ***0.103 -0.736 ***

0.103

2017

0.151 *

0.081

0.176 *

0.094

0.094

0.095

2011_Sunni-0.3380.238 -0.317

0.240 -0.329

0.240

2016_Sunni

0.766 ***

0.247

0.252

0.779 ***

0.253

2017_Sunni-0.0370.199 -0.007

0.200

0.002

0.200

Sex

0.075

0.064

Age

-0.001

0.003

Education

0.005

0.015

Income0.076 **

0.035

0.170 *
0.775 ***

0.169 *

3501

3501

3501

3501

Average RVI

195.8697

191.3216

189.5387

187.088

Largest FMI

0.99580.99460.988

0.9801

DF min

49.43

49.55

50.24

51.09

avg

25,800,000

1,418,741

19,231

7,610

max

3,510,000,000

195,000,000

1,637,264

543,824

37.32024.67028.75022.460

N

F* P<0.1 ** P<0.05 ***P<0.01

Conclusion
This paper aimed to clarify the impact of the IS conflict in Iraq.
With an overview of the political process and the descriptive statistics of the2017 poll survey, we observed two widely accepted assumptions: First, the rise of the ISbrought about serious sectarian tension and sectarian conflict among Iraqis; Second, therise of the IS brought about a critically negative perception toward the supporters of theThe Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood

former regime.
With regard to the first assumption, the rise of the IS made Iraqis reconsider theimportance of national integration overcoming sectarian conflict, although the IS had agenerally negative impact on national integration as shown in the negative relation to theintensity of conflict. The widespread sectarian conflict and crisis of national division
forced ordinary Iraqis to realize the importance of overcoming sectarian conflict.
As for the second assumption, the Shia and the Kurds are more sensitive to the
influence of the IS, while the Sunni are more resilient to the impact of the IS. In otherwords, the degree of these impacts is contextually dependent, differing from one ethnosectarian group to another, although the IS had a generally negative impact onreconciliation, as shown in the negative relation to the intensity of conflict. The regression
reveals that the Sunni are more likely to attempt to overcome the IS’s influence especiallyfrom a change of attitude to the reconciliation.
In general, the two assumptions – the spread of sectarian conflict and theantipathy toward the former regime – are basically proved as the impact of the IS, in the
regression analysis. However, opposite inclinations have also been observed: for thesectarian conflict, considering national integration overcoming sectarian conflict as ‘very
important’ increased after the rise of the IS; as for the reconciliation with the supportersof the former regime, the degree of the impact differs from one ethno-sectarian group toanother, with the Sunni being more likely to consider reconciliation in the era of the IS
rule. Hence, time period, differences in ethno-sectarian groups, and the intensity of theconflict, all have an important impact on the Iraqi perception of nation and state.

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York: Routledge.
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The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood

Appendix
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

National Integration

3,431

4.436316

0.9715839

1

5

Reconciliation

3,214

3.341319

1.425674

1

5

Sunni

3,501

0.1916595

0.3936628

0

1

Shia

3,501

0.4101685

0.4919344

0

1

Kurd

3,501

0.1573836

0.3642141

01Intensity

3,501

13.71757

19.318031

133.13

Vote for Shia Party

3,501

0.2730648

0.4455975

01Arab Nationalism

3,501

2.389889

0.8164036

1

3

Iraq Nationalism

3,501

2.742931

0.6202851

1

3

Islamism

3,501

2.255927

0.8319838

1

3

2011

3,501

0.2002285

0.4002284

0

1

2016

3,501

0.2285061

0.4199303

0

1

2017

3,501

0.2856327

0.4517798

01

2011_Sunni

3,501

0.0328478

0.1782635

01

2016_Sunni

3,501

0.0322765

0.1767587

01

2017_Sunni

3,501

0.0748358

0.2631637

0

1

Sex

3,491

1.488112

0.4999303

1

2

Age

3,436

35.33178

12.87221

16

94

Education

3,492

5.918958

2.381543

1

9

Income3,223

2.329196

1.1043791

625