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Philosophy as Competence and Art of Self-creation: Bringing Habermas and Foucault Together
GLOBAL CONVERSATIONS: An International Journal in Contemporary Philosophy and Culture
Volume III, Number 01 (2020): 81-95

PHILOSOPHY AS COMPETENCE AND ART OF SELF-CREATION:
BRINGING HABERMAS AND FOUCAULT TOGETHER
Rossen I. Roussev

Abstract
In the perspective of the notion of modernity advanced by Jürgen Habermas, thedynamics of our contemporary world can be identified along the terms of expert
knowledge, critical thought, and practical application. While a high-quality
expertise is necessary for the solution of any challenging particular problem, an
additional type of knowledge associated with critical thinking is indispensable for
its adequate application in practice. In line with Habermas’ view of the role ofphilosophy in modernity as a “mediator” between the spheres of theory andpractice, we can identify this additional knowledge as being in its naturephilosophical. Furthermore, in distinction from the knowledge of the specialized
expertise, this philosophical knowledge can be described as having the characterof competence. In this sense, I maintain that thinking critically consists in utilizing
philosophical competence, alongside expert knowledge, in solving particular
problems. I link this notion of modernity with Michel Foucault’s investigations onwhat he calls “technologies of the self.” Foucault has traced various forms of selfcare and self-knowledge, and has indicated their importance in “the art of living"(tekhne tou biou) from Antiquity onwards. He has emphasized their productive
relationship in self-cultivation and social life adding a voice to Nietzsche’s concernthat the modern Westerners have neglected the “great and rare art“ of self-creation
for the sake of self-knowledge. In my view, this Foucauldian sense of the art ofliving as self-creation can supplement the Habermasean notion of the mediatingrole of philosophy in modernity, as they can be both seen as forming distinctive
aspects of what was termed philosophical competence. I maintain that in thegeneral case one’s philosophical competence is essentially self-knowledge poweredby one’s background of humanistic knowledge and that – in a line with a long
tradition of thought – it is a subject of cultivation and active self-creation.
The present paper 1 is an attempt to put into perspective the role and place of philosophy in the
dynamics of our contemporary world. Today it passes for a cliché that this dynamics is startling1

The idea of this article was first discussed at the international academic seminar Modern Philosophy and Politics
in Continental Europe at the China Center for Comparative Politics and Economics in Beijing, PR China, on
December 15, 2009. It was then presented in a more developed form at the international conference The Affect of

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by its breadth, pace, and complexity of relations along which it unfolds. What seems to beoverlooked, though, is that despite the fact that the contemporary scientific-technologicalculture has greatly facilitated the bulk of activities associated with the human condition, ourtime has not relented in posing challenges to our both socio-cultural and individual existence –and in various ways. In this sense, the question of “the art of living” attains a distinctive
contemporary flavor of both existential unavoidability and epistemic insufficiency. It demands
time and again to be addressed in its most general and basic form: How can we cope with thechallenges of our time in the best and most promising ways?
Being at once philosophical and trivial, this question may at first seem to be the unlikely
candidate to guide us in situating philosophy in our contemporary world. However, its
philosophical triviality allows it to be asked and actualized equally well on both socio-culturaland individual level. In this way, our investigative perspective will seek to make compatible
and incorporate the modern and postmodern perspectives, by transposing its subject-matterwithin both of them inclusively; that is, with view to the whole in terms of universalistic
metanarrativity, as much as with view to the plurality of unique singularities. 2 Thus, being
metaphilosophical in focus, our investigation will aim at specifying the socio-cultural presenceof philosophy, as well as its presence in the life of the single individual.
With regard to the question we asked, a most preliminary answer would be that if wehave a sufficient knowledge of the challenges of our time and if we know how to use thatknowledge, we would be able to cope with them optimally well. Such an answer, however,remains very general and in need of elaboration in more specific terms. Here I shall endeavor
to secure them by drawing primarily on the thought of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault,
two thinkers whose investigators most commonly see in opposition to one another 3 but
sometimes also as compatible and complementary. 4 For the purpose of this paper, I shallthe Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) at The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia,
December 3-5, 2010.
2
On the differentiation modern-postmodern in this sense, see Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition:
A Report on Knowledge, translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University Of
Minnesota Press, 1984), especially pp. xxiii-xxvff, 27-37ff, 46ff, 59ff, 79ff; cf. La condition postmoderne: rapport
sur le savoir (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1979), pp. 7-9ff, 49-63ff, 75ff, 97ff.
3
Samantha Ashenden and David Owen, Foucault contra Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue between Genealogy
and Critical Theory (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1999); David Ingram, “Foucault
and Habermas,” in Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Bent Flyvbjerg, “Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society?,” The
British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 210-233; Stephen Kemmis, “Foucault, Habermas
and Evaluation,” Curriculum Studies, Volume 1, No. 1 (1993), pp. 35-54; John Brocklesby and Stephen
Cummings, “Foucault Plays Habermas: An Alternative Philosophical Underpinning for Critical Systems
Thinking,” Journal of the Operational Research Society, Volume 47 (1996), pp. 741-754; Annemiek Richters,“Modernity-Postmodernity Controversies: Habermas and Foucault,” Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 5 (1988), pp.
611-643; Thomas L. Dumm, “The Politics of Post-Modern Aesthetics: Habermas Contra Foucault,” Political
Theory, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1988), pp. 209-228; Thomas Biebricher, Selbstkritik der Moderne: Foucault und
Habermas im Vergleich (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag GmbH, 2005).
4
Jessica J. Kulynych, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation,” Polity, Vol. 30,
No. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 315-346; Amy Allen, “Discourse, Power, and Subjectivation: The Foucault/Habermas
Debate Reconsidered,” Philosophical Forum, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2009), pp. 1-28; Nancy S. Love, “Foucault &Habermas on Discourse and Democracy,” Polity, Vol. 22, No.2 (Winter 1989), 269-293; Ehrhard Bahr, “In

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position myself into the latter group and shall seek to identify in the philosophical outlooks ofthese two thinkers connecting points of compatibility and complementarity. I shall thus sideline
the so-called Habermas-Foucault debate on issues such as modernity, rationality, knowledge,
and power.
I shall elaborate on the first part of our preliminary answer, which concerns theknowledge of the dynamics of our time and of the challenges it poses, using Habermas’
discussion of modernity, in whose perspective this dynamics can be apprehended in the termsof expert knowledge, critical thought, and practical application. While I shall address its second
part, which concerns the human capacity to use that knowledge, drawing mainly on Foucault’s
investigations on what he calls “technologies of the self,” in which the “art of living” can beapperceived in the terms of self-knowledge, self-care, and self-creation.
Thus, the exposition of this paper will move along two main steps: the first will be todelineate a working specification of the meaning of the term “modernity” and to situate the roleand place of philosophy within its structure; the second will be to lay down the indispensability
and pertinence of ”the art of living” to the single individual in the postmodern human condition.
1. Situating Philosophy in Modernity: Philosophy as Competence
In the contemporary philosophy and socio-cultural theory, the term “modernity” is used verybroadly, most typically in reference to the socio-cultural world and its most generalcharacteristics as identifiable within the eponymous period in the history of the West. The
beginning and the putative end of that period have been a subject of debate, but the term
standing for it has been involved in setting the general frame, horizon, or context ofunderstanding for a good many discussions in contemporary philosophy and cultural theory,
including the one of its delimiting sister term “postmodernity.” Here, I shall not delve into thedifferentiation of these two terms, which has been very convincingly conveyed by JeanFrançois Lyotard amongst others.5 I shall instead speak of “our contemporary world with its
most general characteristics” in the broadest sense, as spreading over and encompassing thesenses of both of them, even if to a varied extent, with “our” here understood as including both“socio-cultural” and “individual.” I acknowledge that the concept of “modernity” as understood
Defense of Enlightenment: Foucault and Habermas,” German Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 97109; Matthew King, “Clarifying the Foucault – Habermas Debate: Morality, Ethics, and ‘Normative
Foundations’,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 287-314; Christian Lavagno, Rekonstruktion
der Moderne: eine Studie zu Habermas und Foucault (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003).
5
Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, translated by Frederick
Lawrence (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1996), especially pp. 3ff, 83ff; cf. Der Philosophische Diskurs derModerne: Zwölf Vorlesungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), SS. 11ff, 104ff; Maurizio Passerind'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib (eds.), Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); Anthony Giddens, “Modernism
and Post-Modernism,” New German Critique, No. 22, Special Issue on Modernism (Winter, 1981), pp. 15-18;
Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), especially pp. 110, 45-53; David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change(Cambridge, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991), especially pp. 10ff, 327ff; Agnes Heller, A Theory of Modernity(Malden, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), especially pp. 1-18; Okwui Enwezor, Nancy Condee,
Terry Smith (eds.), Antinomies of Art and Culture: Modernity, Postmodernity, Contemporaneity, (Durham,
London: Duke University Press, 2009).

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in the last century already included the sense of “our contemporary world with its most generalcharacteristics,” which was consequently passed by extension to that of “post-modernity.”Thus, while “our world” has certainly changed overtime, much of what characterizes modernity
has in all actuality come to characterize post-modernity as well, including such socio-culturalfeatures as: division of labor; politically democratic (even if also some totalitarian) societies;
predominantly market economies; interdependence between theory and practice (knowledgeeconomy); national, ethnic, cultural, and spiritual plurality; intensive cultural and intercultural
exchange; global integrations and polarizations; concerns for human rights, social justice, andenvironmental safety, among still others. In this sense, the term “modernity” appears so generalthat any attempt at making it more specific risks ending up with an arbitrary characterizationthat may falter when related to particular contexts of its usage, more often than we wish. Thissurely poses a challenge to our metaphilosophical task of situating philosophy in ourcontemporary world as a peculiar blend of features of both modernity and post-modernity.
Nevertheless, some of the features of modernity identifiable in Habermas’ perspective on it can
specify its meaning to an extent that will serve the purpose of this paper sufficiently.
Habermas has paid a great deal of attention to the notion of “modernity” throughout his
works, including in his magnus opus, The Theory of Communicative Action, 6 and has
contributed to and inspired the debates on it, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. It will not be
an exaggeration to call that notion substantive for his socio-cultural and metaphilosophicalperspectives, as they appear to be elaborated on and specified by way of its critical analysis andreconstruction. He sees the beginning of modernity in the Enlightenment and in the work of
Kant in particular,7 whereas his reconstructive analysis of Max Weber’s view of rationalizationand disenchantment of the Western religious consciousness8 forms the basis of his own concept
of it.
According to Habermas, “modernity” is characterized by “division of labor,” marked
by an increasing “compartmentalization” along the lines of professional specialization ofvarious domains, subfields, vocations, and activities.9 He identifies two distinctive levels of6

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, translated by Thomas McCarthy, Vol. 1, Reason andthe Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); Vol. 2. Lifeworld and System: A Critique ofFunctionalist Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). Cf. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns: Band I:
Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung; Band II: Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1981). Jürgen Habermas, “Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter,” Moral
Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1990); cf. Jürgen Habermas, “DiePhilosophie als Platzhalter und Interpret,” Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983); Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge MA;
London, England: MIT Press, 1992); cf. Jürgen Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken: Philosophische Aufsätze(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988).
7
Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, p. 260; cf. Der Philosophische
Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen, S. 306.
8Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, pp.
148ff, and especially 230-242; Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns: Band I: Handlungsrationalität undgesellschaftliche Rationalisierung, SS. 225ff, 317-331.
9Jürgen Habermas, “Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter,” рр. 13-14, 17-8; cf. “Die Philosophie als Platzhalter
und Interpret,” SS. 20-21, 25.

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modernity – the level of “expert cultures” and the one of “everyday communication.” 10 The
former, which includes “science, technology, law and morality,” 11 is the level of theory andproduces what he calls expert knowledge; the latter is that of practical application of theexpertise produced on the level of culture. Thus, every area of knowledge on the level of culture
works in its own specialized compartment to produces the expertise that serves certain
specialized practices on the level of everyday communication.
In this grand stage of exchange of expertise between and along the levels of theoreticalculture and everyday practice of modernity, the main actors are the humans in their specificroles of problem-solvers. Armed with expert knowledge produced on the level of culture theysolve problems on the level of everyday communication by way of its practical application.
Every problem solver, working in a particular compartment of modernity, needs to acquire theexpertise associated with specific problems arising in his or her specialized occupation in order
to be able to solve such problems in practice. In this sense, the acquisition of expert knowledge
and its practical application are two necessary conditions for successful problem solving, withwhich no problem solver can dispense. The question that arises now is Is there anything elsethat one needs to know in order to be successful in solving problems in practice? Or, to put itotherwise, Does an adequate transfer of expertise from the level of culture to that of everyday
communication require any additional knowledge? Or What else, if anything, a problem solverneeds to know in order to successfully complete the transition of expert knowledge from theory
to practice?
We can find an answer to this question in some of Habermas’ further analyses of thestructure of modernity. According to him, there are certain “problems of mediation” that arisein the exchange of expertise in modernity, both among the different fields on the level of culture,and between the levels of culture and everyday communication, for which these fields do nothave sufficient expertise. 12 Because these problems arise despite the fact that the expert fields
have already divided and appropriated all issues that can be reasonably addressed in particularareas of investigation, Habermas maintains that they are to remain in the scope of philosophy
as their most legitimate “interpreter,” one that – throughout its long tradition – has acquired an“eye trained on the topic of rationality.” 13 Thus, for Habermas, although philosophy – in thecourse of its history – has given up its traditional metaphysical aspirations and its claim to aprincipal status among the other areas of knowledge, it still has a role to play in addressing the
problems of mediation arising in the exchange of expertise in modernity – the role of mediatinginterpreter. With regard to philosophy’s relation to the scientific areas of knowledge, he writes,
Once it renounces its claim to be a first science or an encyclopedia, philosophy can maintain its
status within the scientific system neither by assimilating itself to particular exemplary sciences nor
by exclusively distancing itself from science in general. Philosophy has to implicate itself in the
Ibid., рр. 17-8; cf. SS. 25.
Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. p. 39; Nachmetaphysisches Denken:
Philosophische Aufsätze, S. 46.
12Jürgen Habermas, “Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter,” pp.17-18; cf. “Die Philosophie als Platzhalter undInterpret,” S. 25.
13
Ibid., pp.17-18; cf. S. 25.See also Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, pp. 3839; cf. Nachmetaphysisches Denken: Philosophische Aufsätze, S. 45-46.
10
11

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fallibilistic self-understanding and procedural rationality of the empirical sciences; it may not lay
claim to a privileged access to truth, or to a method, an object realm, or even just a style of intuition
that is specifically its own. Only thus can philosophy contribute its best to a nonexclusive divisionof labor, namely, its persistent tenacity in posing questions universalistically, and its procedure ofrationally reconstructing the intuitive pretheoretical knowledge of competently speaking, acting, andjudging subjects yet in such a way that Platonic anamnesis sheds its nondiscursive character. This
dowry recommends philosophy as an indispensable partner in the collaboration of those who areconcerned with a theory of rationality. 14

In this its role, philosophy has given up its claims ‘to be a first science’ and to have ‘a privileged
access to truth, or to a method’, but this does not mean that it has to ‘assimilate itself to aparticular science’, or to ‘distance itself from science in general’. It means only that philosophy
needs to adopt a ‘fallibilistic self-understanding and the procedural rationality of the empiricalsciences’, in terms of which it can help reaching understanding by ‘posing questions
universalistically’ and ‘rationally reconstructing the intuitive pretheoretical knowledge ofcompetently speaking, acting, and judging subjects’. And as it appears, it is only its ‘dowry’,gathered in its long history, that entitles philosophy to this mediating role, which makes of it‘an indispensable partner’ in the exchange of expert knowledge in the structure of modernity.
Yet, for Habermas, not only does philosophy have a role to play with regard the expert
areas of knowledge on the level of culture. Its mediating role extends also to the ‘lifeworld’ andeveryday communication:
In everyday communication, cognitive interpretations, moral expectations, expressions, andevaluations cannot help overlapping and interpenetrating. Reaching understanding in the lifeworld
requires a cultural tradition that ranges across the whole spectrum, not just the fruits of science andtechnology. As far as philosophy is concerned, it might do well to refurbish its link with the totality
by taking on the role of interpreter on behalf of the lifeworld. It might then be able to help set inmotion the interplay between the cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive
dimensions that has come to a standstill today like a tangled mobile.15

On the level of everyday communication, philosophy’s focus is on the intermixture of‘cognitive interpretations, moral expectations, expressions, and evaluations’. Here too, its goalis that of ‘reaching understanding’, but again the expertise of ‘science and technology’ will not
suffice for its achieving. What is needed is a broader all-encompassing knowledge – ‘a cultural
tradition that ranges across the whole spectrum’ – which can serve as a common ground for andthus ensure an adequate cross-communication. For Habermas, philosophy’s capacity is wellversed in this regard because of its traditional focus on and ‘link with the totality’. Thus,
philosophy is well-qualified and could enter ‘the role of interpreter on behalf of the lifeworld’in order to mediate, interpret, and thus ensure a smooth exchange between its ‘cognitiveinstrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive dimensions’.

14

Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, pp. 38-39; cf. Nachmetaphysisches
Denken: Philosophische Aufsätze, S. 45-46.
15 Jürgen Habermas, “Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter,” pp.18-19; cf. “Die Philosophie als Platzhalter undInterpret,” SS. 25-26.

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In this way, Habermas situates philosophy in the structure of modernity by assigning to
it a role that the expert cultures (science and technology, ethics and law, aesthetics and art)cannot play on their own. This is the role of mediating interpreter which facilitates the exchangeof expertise within and between modernity’s compartmentalized levels of culture and everyday
communication. What falls into the scope of philosophy in particular are the so-called‘problems of mediation’, which arise in the due transfer of expert knowledge between thespecialized compartments in the grand division of labor of modernity, where this transfer isessentially the practical application of that knowledge.
Here I shall elaborate a bit further on the character of the role of philosophy assigned
by Habermas, by drawing attention to one of its aspects, which is attestable and identifiable intackling the ‘problems of mediation’ and is closely related to their status. What I have in mind
is that, whereas within the grand picture of exchange of expertise in modernity these problems
can be seen as problems of communication, in the sense in which we think of them as remaining
in the scope of philosophy, we can also think of them as philosophical problems which the
problem solvers face in their various applications of expert knowledge in practice. 16
Traditionally, the philosophical problems have been characterized as being of epistemic or
cognitive nature, as they concern the acquisition, retention, actualization, and application ofknowledge. Such problems have already been signaled in various areas of theoretical andpractical endeavor, including education 17 and social policy,18 and it seems indeed legitimate tothink that one can search for knowledge on them in the philosophical tradition. But if
philosophy is to have the capacity to tackle such problems, as Habermas suggests, it will haveto supplement the expertise of science with a knowledge that is of a different kind. To
distinguish the character of this knowledge from that of the scientific expertise, here we
designate it with the term competence.
The term played a key role in Habermas’ earlier work in which he develops his theoryof communicative competence – basically his own socio-cultural perspective on language andcommunication, 19 developed in relation to Noam Chomsky’s concept of linguistic
Rossen Roussev, “Philosophy and the Transition from Theory to Practice: A Response to Recent Concerns for
Critical Thinking,” Telos, No. 148 (Fall 2009), pp. 91-92.
17
Martin V. Covington, “Strategic Thinking and the Fear of Failure,” in Thinking and Learning Skills, Judith W.
Segal, Susan F. Chipman, and Robert Glaser (eds.) (Hillside NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1985); Jack Lochhead, “Teaching
Analytic Reasoning Skills Through Pair Problem Solving”, Thinking and Learning Skills, Judith W. Segal, Susan
F. Chipman, and Robert Glaser (eds.) (Hillside NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1985); Richard Paul, Critical Thinking: What
Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World, (Rohner Park, CA: Sonoma State University, 1990);
Mathew Lipman, “Thinking Skills Fostered by Philosophy for Children,” in Thinking and Learning Skills, E Judith
W. Segal, Susan F. Chipman, and Robert Glaser (eds.) (Hillside NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1985); Matlin, M.W., Cognition,(Geneseo NY: Harcourt Brace Publishers, 1994).
18
W. T. Jones, The Sciences and the Humanities: Conflict and Reconciliation (Berkeley, Los Angeles: Universityof California Press, 1967), p. 5ff.
19
Jürgen Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse. Suhrkamp (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968); “Towards
Theory of Communicative Competence” and “On systematically distorted communication,” both in Inquiry: An
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 1-4 (1970), respectively pp. 360-375 and pp. 205-218; “DerUniversalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik,” in Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik: Theorie-Diskussion, mit Beiträgen
von Karl-Otto Apel, Claus v. Bormann, Rüdiger Bubner, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hans-Joachim Giegel, Jürgen
Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971); Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Theorie derGesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. Was leistet die Systemforschung? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971).
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competence,20 the speech act theory developed by John Austin and John Searle,21 and the latterwork of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Summing up the view he advances there, Thomas McCarthy
writes,Habermas argues that our ability to communicate has a universal core-basic structures andfundamental rules that all subjects master in learning to speak a language. Communicativecompetence is not just a matter of being able to produce grammatical sentences. In speaking we
relate to the world about us, to other subjects, to our own intentions, feelings, and desires.22

We can note here that this Habermas’ sense of competence with regard to speaking language
includes an access to a universalistic, common-to-all-speakers basis, which ensures thepossibility for reaching understanding. This basis, however, is not merely grammatical, as it
also involves a sense of relation of the speaker to oneself, other speakers, and the world.
This sense of competence is also retained in his later work, notably in his theory ofcommunicative action, where he uses the term quite extensively in various statements andexpressions, which more or less convey implicitly the aspect of philosophy I designatedabove.23 Here I will draw particular attention to a few of his usages which most directly point
to that aspect. On one occasion, when he writes that “the social scientist has to draw on acompetence and a knowledge that he has intuitively at his disposal as a layman,”24 Habermas
associates ‘competence’ with knowledge and ability available to every person. In anotherstatement where he defines “personality” he says that “competences ... make a subject capableof speaking and acting, [and] put him in a position to take part in processes of reachingunderstanding and thereby to assert his own identity.”25 Elsewhere he speaks of the “generalcompetences of knowing, speaking, and acting” and of “a preponderance of competence (of20

Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, I965).
John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University
in 1955, edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I962); John R. Searle, Speech Acts:
An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, I969).
22
Thomas McCarthy, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.
I, p. x.
23
For instance, in The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I, he uses expressions as ‘reflective competence’ (p.
2), ‘competent speaker(s)’ (pp. 25, 138, 286)//15, 30, 135 ‘competence to speak and act’ (p. 112), ‘interpretive
competence’ (pp. 118, 130), ‘judgmental competence (pp. 119, 135), ‘action through competences and motives’(p. 174), ‘general competency’ (p. 261), ‘theory of competence’ (p. 328), ‘competence to represent’ (p. 366),‘cognitive competence’ (p. 384); in The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II, expressions as again ‘competent
speakers’ (pp. 15, 30, 135), ‘competence to follow a rule’ (pp. 17, 18, 19, 22), ‘competence to judge/decide’ (pp.
18, 19/269), ‘competence for rule-governed behavior’ (p. 18), ‘competence for role behavior’ (pp. 31, 32),‘interactive competence’ (p. 40), ‘competences for speech and interaction’ (p. 43), ‘competences forcommunicative action’ (p. 91), ‘competently acting reference persons’ (p. 137), ‘generalized competences foraction’ (p. 141), ‘formal competences’ (p. 146), ‘competence to act’ (p. 171), ‘competence to carry out decisions’(p. 180), ‘competence for purposive-rational choice’ (p. 212), ‘acquired competences’ (p. 225), ‘competencesdeveloped through socialization’ (p. 255), competence of "initiates;' of experts in matters of knowledge or of
morality 276, ‘sovereign exercise of competence’ (p. 308), ‘legal competence’ (p. 309), ‘professional competence’(p. 363), ‘social competence’ (p. 399).
24
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I, p. 112.
25
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II, p. 138.
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knowledge, moral-practical insight, persuasive power, or autonomy).” 26 Whereas
characterizing his own theory of communicative action, Habermas says that it “describes
structures of action and structures of mutual understanding that are found in the intuitive
knowledge of competent members of modem societies.”27
If we are to sum up the sense-associations made in these examples, ‘competence’ relates
to knowledge, ability, scientist, layman, capacity for speech and action, personality, identity,
intuition, moral-practical insight, persuasive power, or autonomy, membership in society. In
other Habermas’ usages we find it as reflective, interpretative, cognitive, formal, interactive,
judgmental, generalized. Within this broad semantic range of its usage, the sense of‘competence’ is most aptly delimited as knowledge and ability. As knowledge it is a very
general sense of one’s relation to oneself and to the world, which thus has the transcending
universalistic character of a common basis for understanding, but which also remains
indeterminate and thus very different from expertise. As an ability, it involves the capacity foror the power to utilize that knowledge in terms of reflection, cognition, speech, and action,
which is at the disposal for every human person from scientist to layman.
Here I shall use this sense of competence to further specify Habermas’ notion ofphilosophy as mediating interpreter. I would like to link the knowledge-aspect of competence
to the knowledge of philosophy, different as it is from that of expertise, and its ability-aspect tothe role which Habermas envisions for philosophy in modernity. Understood in this way,philosophy becomes a competence having the aspects of a general universalistic knowledge andthe ability to utilize that knowledge, which constitute its capacity to play its mediating role in
the grand division of labor of modernity. Philosophical competence is thus an indispensable
aspect of any thinking that applies expertise to solve problems, whereas every problem solver,in addition to their being a certain expert, needs to be also a philosopher.
In this sense, we can identify the philosophical competence as the third condition
necessary for the successful transfer of expertise from the level of culture to that of everyday
communication. Along with expert knowledge and its practical application, it makes thistransfer possible; whereas its actual utilization in problem solving aiming to ensure that transfer
is exercised as a reflective critical thought. Thus, we can complete the picture of situating
philosophy in modernity within our perspective here: in the grand division of labor of thedifferent areas of knowledge and practice, the role of philosophy now reappears as competence;
whereas the philosophical competence ultimately manifests itself as critical thinking whichbrings expert knowledge from the level of theoretical culture to that of practical application.
2. The Self and the Art of Living: Philosophy as Self-creation
Habermas’ notion of the mediating role of philosophy in modernity – a role whose
manifestation we specified as critical thought and competence – can be linked with Foucault’s
investigations on what he calls “technologies of the self.” 28 Although Habermas has voiced his
26

Ibid., pp. 250, 276.
Ibid., p. 383.
28
Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault, Vol.
1, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997); cf. “Les techniques de soi,” Dits et Ecrits (19541988), tome IV (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1994), pp. 783-813.
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critical objections to postmodernism, including to the philosophical perspective of Foucault as
strongly associated with it,29 for our purpose here it will suffice to find a point of compatibility
that would allow for an alignment of the perspectives of the two thinkers in complementarity.
At the same time, even as we sideline the modernity-postmodernity debate in situating
philosophy in our contemporary world, our re-focusing on the status of the self will very muchresemble what Lyotard has characterized as key shift of attention between modernity andpostmodernity – from legitimating holistic metanarratives to incommensurable unique
singularities.30 This is precisely what we want to emphasize here by associating the perspectivesof Habermas and Foucault together – that judging about the philosophy’s role in the life of theindividual from the viewpoint of metanarrative is different from one from a vantage point thatis recognizably unique and incommensurable. Elsewhere we have indicated the need of abroader background of humanistic knowledge, which is in an important sense self-knowledge,
as a prerequisite for critical philosophical thinking on individual level. 31 Now we will endeavor
to apperceive that need with view to the unique singularity of the individual, in which it
manifests itself as individual’s own concern with self-knowledge and self-creation.
Foucault has traced various forms of self-care and self-knowledge, and has indicatedtheir importance in the “art of living” (tekhne tou biou) from Antiquity onwards. His researchhas been very much anthropological – what he calls “hermeneutics of the self” – and has
focused on practices of late Antiquity and early Christianity, which have been indicative ofself’s basic motivation for self-knowledge. While he found that self-knowledge was largely
associated with self-cultivation and socialization, a key observation that he makes is that formuch of the Antiquity these practices place self-knowledge as part of a more fundamental
concern – that of “the care of the self.” In the Greco-Roman culture, the motto of the Delphic
temple, gnothi seauton or “Know yourself”, was the principle of self-knowledge, and was
subordinated to epimeleisthai sautou, “to be concerned, to take care of yourself,” which was
the principle of self-care.32 Foucault regards the relationship between these two principles as
underlaying the Ancient “art of living,” but he also emphasizes the changes in their statuses inthat art throughout the history of Western culture.
He finds the first indicative discussions of the relation of the two principles in Plato’s
Apology and Alcibiades I. In the Apology, Socrates advices his co-citizens to “concern
yourselves with yourselves,” which for him meant to be concerned with “wisdom, truth, andthe perfection of the soul,” pointing also that it is “his mission” and service to the city to remind

Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity: An Unfinished Project,” in Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib(eds.), Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 53; cf. “Die Moderne- ein unvollendetes Projekt,” Kleine
Politische Schriften, I-IV (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981), S. 460; Jürgen Habermas, The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, pp. 53, 97, 239ff; cf. Der Philosophische Diskurs derModerne: Zwölf Vorlesungen, SS. 67, 129, 280ff.
30
Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, pp. xxiii-xxvff, 27-37ff, 46ff, 59ff,
79ff; cf. La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir, pp. 7-9ff, 49-63ff, 75ff, 97ff.
31
Rossen Roussev, “Philosophy and the Transition from Theory to Practice: A Response to Recent Concerns for
Critical Thinking,” especially pp. 93-96, 104ff.
32
Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault, Vol.
1, p. 226; cf. “Les techniques de soi,” Dits et Ecrits (1954-1988), tome IV, pp. 786-787.
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them about that. 33 In Alcibiades, the discussion of the two principles is more detailed, spreadingover the relations of the care of oneself with political and erotic life, with self-cultivation andpedagogy, with the knowledge of oneself, and with the love of wisdom in relation to one’s
master. As Foucault sees it, the care of the self is the driving force in all these relations but its
relation with the knowledge of oneself is pivotal. An important observation that he makes inthis regard is that, unlike most of the thinkers of the Hellenistic and imperial periods, Plato
gives priority to the second principle, a priority which found its way through modernity – firmly
binding the care of the self to the knowledge of oneself.34 Either way, we can note here that thetwo principle form a productive relationship which – regardless of how it has been construed
in the cultural traditions – functions as a formative power in the “art of living” and manifests
itself as art of self-creation.
In the Ancient and early Christian cultures, the care of oneself remained a principle “forsocial and personal conduct and for the art of life,” and thus most fundamentally motivated theuse of what Foucault calls “technologies of the self.”35 These “‘technologies’, each a matrix ofpractical reason,” are different kinds and “permit individuals to effect by their own means, orwith the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts,
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state ofhappiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”36 To clarify the sense of this term andits relation to the art of living as self-creation, we need to draw attention to a common elementthat all technologies of the self share, which is designated with the Greek word askesis. As
Foucault writes,
No technique, no professional skill can be acquired without exercise; nor can the art of living, thetekhne tou biou, be learned without an askesis that should be understood as a training of the self by
oneself. This was one of the traditional principles to which the Pythagoreans, the Socratics, theCynics had long attached a great importance.37

Meaning ‘exercise’, ‘practice’, and ‘work’, askesis was an important aspect of the life andculture of the ancient Greeks ultimately amounting to a value system. It played a part inindividual’s cultivation and socialization likely in not such a drastic but more routine way thanits modern-day image of anachronistic self-denial suggests. What is important for Foucault andfor us here is that its key sense of a ‘training of the self by oneself’ bears on the relevance ofself-knowledge for the ‘art of living’. More particularly, as it broadly applies to various of thecitizens’ daily activities, askesis, the ‘training of the self by oneself’, provides for individual’s
self-cultivation and self-creation by use of truth and knowledge, including self-knowledge.
Askesis in this sense applies to a number of cultural practices of Antiquity and early
Christianity that address the ‘concern and relationship of the self with oneself’ and thus function
as ‘technologies of the self’. Foucault finds notable examples of it in the Stoic ascetic practices,33

Ibid., pp. 226-227; cf. p. 787.
Ibid., pp. 228-231; cf. 789-792.
35
Ibid., pp. 225-226; cf. pp. 785-786.
36
Ibid., p. 225; cf. p. 785.
37
Michel Foucault, “Self Writing,” Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault, Vol. 1, p. 208;
cf. “L'écriture de soi,” Dits et Ecrits (1954-1988), tome IV, pp. 417.
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which include self-training and self-deprivation in the anticipation of difficult life
circumstances, 38 as well as in the Christian monastic confessional practices, which include
examination of the purity of one’s own thoughts in the end of every day, or public confession(exomologesis) of sins and sinful thoughts.39 As cases in point on the role of askesis in the artof living, here I shall draw attention to two practices of purposive writing and reading that
Foucault discusses in this regard – those of maintaining diary notebooks hupomnemata andepistolary correspondence. They are specific technologies of the self that are indicative of a
special discursively mediated ‘concern and relationship of the self with oneself’ and thus of amore immediately identifiable use of self-knowledge in the art of living as self-creation.
Hupomnemata, which could refer to “account books, public registers, or individual
notebooks serving as memory aids,” were used to record “quotes, ... extracts from books,
examples, and actions that one had witnessed or read about, reflections or reasonings that one
had heard or that had come to mind” that later on served as a food for “rereading andmeditation.” 40 As Foucault writes,
Inside a culture strongly stamped by traditionality, by the recognized value of the already-said, by
the recurrence of discourse, by “citational” practice under the seal of antiquity and authority, there
developed an ethic quite explicitly oriented by concern for the self toward objectives defined as:withdrawing into oneself, getting in touch with oneself, living with oneself, relying on oneself,
benefiting from and enjoying oneself. Such is the aim of the hupomnemata: to make one’s
recollection of the fragmentary logos, transmitted through teaching, listening, or reading, a meansof establishing a relationship of oneself with oneself, a relationship as adequate and accomplishedas possible.41

Hupomnemata in this sense stand for a form of writing which is very much constitutive of theperson in one’s own life. It involves discourse and knowledge to fuel one’s thinking in one’s
day to day activities. It helps one ‘get in touch with oneself’ and make what one does bear on
oneself. It is a form of self-writing expressive of one’s concern with oneself and knowledge of
oneself. It is ‘a means of establishing a relationship of oneself with oneself’, which is utilized
in one’s care of oneself.
The practice of reading is involved in the use of hupomnemata but it also plays a roleof a technology of self on its own in general. Like hupomnemata, it invokes the resource of thecultural tradition to bear on one’s life but it can go further and be practiced for its own sake.
Foucault’s reference to a Seneca advice is particularly indicative in this regard: while readingis necessary to “arm oneself by oneself with the principles of reason that are indispensable forself-conduct,” when overdone one is “liable to spread oneself across different thoughts, and toforget oneself”; it is thus better to “have alternate recourse” of reading and writing, and to“blend one with the other.”42 Apparently, what Seneca’s advice aims is to preserve the relationof the self to oneself in one’s life; in excessive reading that relation could be lost, and then what
one does no longer bear on oneself – one no longer knows oneself, one ‘forgets oneself’. Hence,
Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” pp. 238ff; pp. 799ff.
Ibid., pp. 242ff; 804ff.
40
Michel Foucault, “Self Writing,” p. 209; cf. p. 418.
41
Ibid., p. 211; cf. pp. 419-420.
42
Ibid., p. 211; cf. p. 420.
38
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one needs to balance and ‘blend’ reading with writing. In this sense, for Foucault, the alternate
reading-writing technology produces an embodied appropriation of the truth that preserves
one’s concern with oneself in one’s life intact; it can thus serve as a “principle of rational action”
for the individual, which helps “constitute one’s own soul” and “form an identity.” 43
A technology of the self that is exemplary for an alternate reading and writing iscorrespondence. For Foucault, correspondence is not just “a training of oneself by means ofwriting,” nor simply aiming at “counsel and aid”; it is also “a certain way of manifesting oneself
to oneself and to others,” or “an objectification of the soul.” 44 It allows for a certain examinationof one’s self, which can be done by writer and reader alike, as well as by other potential
observers. It re-assures oneself that one maintains one’s inner dispositions; that is, one’s relation
to oneself, which is thus attested as if by an ‘inner god’:Through the missive, one opens oneself to the gaze of others and puts the correspondent in the placeof the inner god. It is a way of giving ourselves to that gaze about which we must tell ourselves that
it is plunging into the depths of our heart (in pectis intimum introspicere) at the moment we arethinking. 45

In this way, correspondence assumes the role of a self-formative technique for the individual,
be they in the position of writer or reader. It deploys discourse, knowledge, and truth in a way
similar to the one hupomnemata does to uphold the concern of the self with oneself throughout
one’s life. The difference with hupomnemata is that correspondence is additionallycharacterized by an anticipated concordance with other individuals. The letters by Seneca andMarcus Aurelius, which Foucault gives as examples, convey descriptions and discussions, oftenvery detailed, of various events of higher and lesser significance taking place in the life of thesingle individual. They point to the manner and considerations by which these events areappropriated in one’s life; that is, within the concern of the self with oneself, and constitute atonce training, cultivating, and examining oneself. Correspondence thus reappears as atechnique of one’s continuous self-discovery, self-affirmation, and self-creation along thelasting concern of the self with oneself.
While both hupomnemata and correspondence may utilize mundane, advisory,
moralistic, consoling or other content, they present us with the specific manner in which one’s
way of thinking mediates one’s actions within one’s concern with oneself throughout one’s life.
Foucault’s discussion of the technologies of the self shows that the manner of thinking inquestion utilizes self-knowledge and is rooted in self-care. These two principles, which weinherit from Antiquity, come along in a relationship that has been frequently revised throughout
the history of culture, (as in the above-mentioned Stoic ascetic and Christian confessional
practices). However, regardless of the manner of its construction, the relationship in questionis indispensable for the art of living and needs to be maintained continuously. It is thus the core
and the moving force of the art of self-creation as the condition for self’s relation to an everchanging world.

43

Ibid., pp. 213-214; cf. pp. 422-423.
Ibid., pp. 216-217; cf. pp. 425-426.
45
Ibid., p. 217; cf. p. 426.
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Foucault’s investigations on the art of living fit easily within the perspective of ourinvestigation on the role of philosophy in our contemporary world. In the concern of the selfwith oneself – in re-focusing on oneself – the self withdraws from the world to make oneself aunique object of knowledge. This knowledge, which is essentially self-knowledge and uniqueon its own, is utilized in one’s relation to the world by way of thinking. For its part, this thinking
is essentially a philosophical thinking, and at once critical and creative thinking. It is thethinking of a concernful self-knowing self, which only thus relates to the world in a mannermost fitting. Overall, Foucault’s investigations have focused more on practices than on‘expertise’ and have indicated that what is important for the single individual in bridging thelevels of their world are the principles of self-knowledge and self-care in the unity of selfcreation.
In conclusion
In this paper we endeavored to situate the role and place of philosophy in our contemporary
world with the help of the work of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault. Issuing from
Habermas’ notion of modernity we apprehended the dynamics of our contemporary world in
the terms expert knowledge, critical thought, and practical application. In Habermas’ view, therole of philosophy in modernity is one of a mediating interpreter, which facilitates the transferof expert knowledge from the level of theoretical culture to its practical application on the levelof everyday communication. We elaborated further on this philosophy’s role to identify thepeculiar character of philosophy as competence – an additional kind of knowledge-capacity
which supplements the expertise to make its exchange between the levels of theoretical culture
and everyday practice possible. In this sense, we affirmed the philosophical competence as an
indispensable asset for all problem solvers in the grand division of labor of our contemporary
world pointing that its utilization is exercised as critical thought.
Whereas Habermas’ notion of modernity helped us situate philosophy in an sociocultural perspective, we used some of Foucault’s investigations to focus attention on its role in
the life of the particular individual. Foucault’s analyses of various “technologies of the self”
practiced primarily in Western Antiquity and early Middle Ages uncovered self-knowledge andself-care as fundamental principles of what back then was considered “the art of living.”
Identifying self-care as the more fundamental principle driven by one’s concern with oneself,
Foucault emphasizes its inseparability form that of self-knowledge for purposes of selfcultivation and socialization. In this sense, the unity of the two principles, as maintained within“the art of living,” can be seen as powering one’s continuous self-creation which – utilizing
self-knowledge within self-care by way of reflective thinking – affirms one’s relation withoneself and with the world. And similarly, the thinking of self-creation, at once critical andcreative, can be seen as being in its essence philosophical and as effectively mediating one’s
knowledge in practice.
Drawing on Habermas and Foucault, our investigation identifies the role and place ofphilosophy in our contemporary world at once as competence and self-creation. Thoughinitially associated with different philosophical perspectives, these two senses of philosophy
are complimentary and convergent, and ultimately overlap, as each of them is an inevitableaspect of the other. The philosophical competence, as critical thought, always utilizes self-

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knowledge in self-care, which is effectively self-creation – at the very least as a successful
problem solver. Self-creation, as drawing on self-knowledge in self-care, is always reflectively
mediated by critical and creative thinking, which is essentially a philosophical competence
utilizing a general sense of one’s relation to oneself and to the world.
Elsewhere we have indicated that in the general case one’s philosophical competence
cannot be separated from one’s background of humanistic knowledge, which is a knowledge ofhumanity, of humanities, as well as self-knowledge.46 In this sense, one’s utilization of thatcompetence; that is, one’s self-creation, or otherwise put, one’s critical and creative thinking,is ultimately dependent on knowledge of the self as human person. Philosophers may not be
surprised by this assertion, for they know that the human self in its capacity of knowing subject
has been the central motif of the philosophy of modernity, as much as in its capacity of aparticular living subject it has become a focal point for the postmodern philosophy. Either way;that is, in the perspective of our contemporary world, the guiding maxim of the human self
remains the same: it needs to know itself to be able to manage itself, apply itself, care of itself,
or – otherwise put – create itself, both theoretically and practically.
In relevance to it, we sum up, Habermas has pointed to the rationalistic training ofphilosophy; whereas Foucault has signaled its capacity for creativity within “the art of living.”
On a final note, as Foucault has pointed that the modern time has given precedence to selfknowledge over self-care to the detriment of the art of self-creation, he has also added his voice
to that of Nietzsche’s who calls for integration of art and reason in the creation of one’s own
person:
One thing is needful. – To "give style" to one's character – a great and rare art! It is practiced bythose who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic
plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. . . In
the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governedand formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than
one might suppose, if only it was a single taste! 47

Rossen Roussev, “Philosophy and the Transition from Theory to Practice: A Response to Recent Concerns for
Critical Thinking,” pp. 93ff.
47
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, translated by Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), §290, p. 232; cf. Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. La gaya scienza
Berlin: Edition Holzinger, 2016), §290, S. 161.
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