KATRINA- WhatWent
KATRINA:
What Went
Wrong?
– AndWrong?
How to Fix it‘Lessons& How to Fix
it – Learned’
Lessons Learned
ICHARM
Commemorative Symposium
United Nations University/PWRI
Tokyo, Japan
14 September, 2006

Eugene Z. Stakhiv

Institute for Water Resources
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Outline Summary/preview of current status of

HPS (Hurricane Protection System)

recovery Evolution of HPS in Louisiana
 Characteristics of Katrina – Design Criteria
 Summary Findings of Major Studies
 Lessons Learned for ICHARM & IHPCorps Interagency Performance Evaluation Team
(IPET) Report: Press Reviews“Levee Design, building system failed on many levels,
report says” N. Orleans Times Picayune 6/2/06
 “Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding” NewYork Times, 6/2/06“Army Corps Admits Design Flaws in New Orleans”
Flooding”, Los Angeles Times , 6/2/06
 “Corps Faults Itself for Levee Breaks in New Orleans”,
Associated Press, 6/2/06
 “Katrina’s Unlearned Lessons: A government agency
admits error, and Congress wants to reward it”

Washington Post editorial, 6/7/06

Four Main Points
 Hurricane Protection System was a‘system’ in name only – highly fragmented& built incrementally over 40 years
 Safety and reliability traded off foreconomic efficiency
 Hierarchy of agency decision processes
poorly coordinated; insufficient resources New integrated management frameworkneeded + new decision rules & procedures A mission for ICHARM?

Some Facts$110B federal funds for recovery and reconstruction- $44B spent so far $10B for repair/replacement of levees, pumps,
floodgates Insured damage ~ $55B
 90,000 sq mi affected by Katrina – size of UK Orig pop. of New Orleans 455,000 – now ~210,000
 19,000 businesses & 125,000 apartments/homes
destroyed/damaged throughout Gulf Coast FEMA spent $900M on mobile homes that cannot be
used in floodplains (FEMA regulations)Federal Flood Insurance Programs not sustainable- need restructuring
45% of Katrina victims did not have flood insurance
 65% of 58,000 flooded homes in NO had insurance Floodplain defined as > 1% chance flood
 $25B claims from Katrina, $2.2B fees collected in 2005
 FEMA began in 1969 - $15B paid out before Katrina
 Insurance mandatory in flood zones with federally
regulated mortgages
 Typical insurance policy ~ $300-400/yr - subsidized
 4.8M have policies, <50% in floodplains Congress plans to raise maximum insurance coverageon homes from $250K to $337K
New Orleans Levee System

Lak
e

Po
ntc
h

r
Rive

s
M is

City ofNew Orleans
GroundElevations

ar t
rai
n

B
A

New
Orleans

FLOODWALL ALONGMISSISSIPPI RIVER
23 FT
20 FT PROJECT FLOWLINE
AVG ANNUAL HIGHWATER 14 FT

SPH DESIGN ELEV 11.5 FT

20
10NORMAL LAKE 1.0 FT LEVEL

0PONT LAKCS H HA E
OR RT
E RA
IN

UNO SIDE OF
WAINRIGHT DR-10

WAINRIGHT DR
AT L.C. SIMONGENTILLY BLVD
AT ALLEN

DERBIGNY AT II--10

MI
SS

I SS

IPP

I

-20

B

30

UNO

ESPLANADE AT
ST. CLAUDE

RI V E-10

GENTILLY
RIDGE
ST. LOUIS CATHEDRAL

0

R BA
NK
CANAL ST AT RIVER

10

17.5 FT

ST. ANTHONY AT
WILDAIR DR

A

20

From Canal St.
at Mississippi
River to theLakefront
at U.N.O.
HURRICANEPROTECTION LEVEE& FLOODWALLDILLARD UNIVCAMPUS

30
ELEVATIONS IN FEET NGVD

iss

i
ip p

-20

Congressional Directives to Corps ofEngineers for emergency response to andrecovery from hurricanes of 2005….
 Secr Army “…is directed to restore the flood
damage reduction and hurricane and storm
damage reduction projects, and related works,

to provide the level of protection for which
they were designed, at full federal expense…”

 Also, levee system performance analysis
 Also, a study of options

for future Category 5
protection for New Orleans and area

Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection
 Restore:

Damaged Components to Pre-

Katrina Design Standards – 1 June 2006
 Restore: Undamaged Levees/Floodwalls to
Authorized Design Levels – Sep 2007
 Complete: Unconstructed Portions ofAuthorized Projects – Sep 2007
 Better and Stronger: Complete proposed
additional improvements by Sep 2009
Higher Levels of Protection (Category 5):South Louisiana Hurricane Protection and
Restoration Report-June 2006; December 2007

Levees / Floodwalls
Not At Authorized Elevation
Due to Subsidence and Elevation Changes
Total Length of
System*Levee Length Below
Authorized

Floodwall Length
Below Authorized

Orleans East Bank

19 miles

5.2 miles

14.4 miles

IHNC

12 miles

0.8 miles

7.6 miles

New Orleans East

39 miles

5.8 miles

6.0 miles

St. Bernard Parish

30 miles

5.2 miles

0.1 miles

Plaquemines Parish

109 miles

27.0 miles

0.0 miles

East Jefferson

16 miles

4.3 miles

0.5 miles

West Jefferson

66 miles21.0 miles

6.0 miles

St. Charles

10 miles

6.0 miles

0.2 miles

Totals301 miles

75.3 miles

34.8 miles

Levee System* Includes Mississippi River Levees

Subsidence and datum errors
reduced protection levels

12.62
12.35
12.61
12.76

12.65

Authorized Protection = 15 ft.

New Orleans Outfall Canal
Interim Closure Plan
• Three locations on
Lake Ponchartrain•Protection by 1 June
2006
•Provide New Orleans
with rainwater drainage• Prevent storm surge• Pumps permit drainage
while closed

Southeast Louisiana HPSEmergency Improvements
Outfall Canal Closures• Three locations on
Lake Ponchartrain•Provide New Orleans
with rainwater andovertopping drainage• Prevent storm surge
into canals•Removes 14 miles offloodwalls from primary
HPSSoutheast Louisiana HPSEmergency Improvements
Navigable Flood Gates• Two Locations:•Seabrook•GIWW/MRGO•Precise location
GIWW/MRGO yet to be
determined•Prevents storm surge
from Industrial Harborarea•Removes 20 miles oflevees and floodwalls
from primary HPSSoutheast Louisiana HPSEmergency Improvements
Selective Armoring• Levees and floodwalls
will be armored at
critical points to resist
damage fromovertopping•Transitions points
between levees,
floodwalls, and otherstructures will also bearmoredSoutheast Louisiana HPSEmergency Improvements
Storm Proof Pump Stations• Dozens of pumpstations in Orleans,
Jefferson, St. Bernard, &Plaquemines Parish•Each station is unique.
Study underway todetermine specific needs•Potential improvements
include emergency
power supplies, raising
critical equipment,waterproofing, andhardeningLondon Canal: June, 2006

17 Street Canal: June, 2006

17 Str. CanalPump/pipes – 17 Str Canal

Workers Assisting in Reconstruction of New OrleansLevee Reconstruction-Lower Ninth Ward

Levee Repair – T-WallHurricane Protection System (HPS)

Restoration Program Summary Repairs to Damages (to Cat 2+ level)• Restore pre-Katrina
protection by 1 Jun 06(now July 1, 2006)• 269 miles (430km)
exposed• 164 miles (262 km)
damaged (60%)• 71 Pump Stations – 34
damaged• Estimated Program Costs- $2.9 Billion~ 95% Complete

Restore Navigation Mission

Gulfport 36’,
open to 30’(4.0 mcy)
Inner Harbor Nav Canal
restricted @ 12’, 1700 –
0700 hours until drydock
removed this week

Biloxi 12’,
open to 9’(0.8 mcy)

Mobile 45’, open to 43’(4.3 mcy)
Pascagoula
38/44’, open
To 36/42’ (2.5 mcy)
GIWW
12’ open (0.8 mcy)

Mississippi River Gulf Outlet
36’, open to deep draft 23’
GIWW open

LegendOpen
Restricted, but
operational(dredging requirements)

Revised 14 Nov 05
Port Fourchon
21’, operational

Mississippi River – Entire river is green.
Dredging Underway: GIWW - Inland Dredging; Tenn-Tom WW - Inland Dredging; Mobile River - Inland
Dredging; Pascagoula Harbor - Hooks; Mobile Bay - Columbia, B&B, Manson; Panama City Beach - Weeks
Marine; Gulfport Bar – USACE, Dredge McFarland (arrived 5 Nov for 2 weeks dredging); Gulfport Sound –Hooks (arrived 9 Nov)

Arthur Maass – “Muddy Waters”(1951)“Public policy is being
formed as it is being
executed, and it isexecuted as it is being
formed”

Current Status
 Mar 3, 2006 : Levee repair costs have tripled

to almost $10B – $3.2B (billion) original cost
 Flood Insurance Program (FIP) requires higher
level of protection – FEMA would not certify
rebuilt levees – less than 100-year protection.
 Of the extra $6B, half would go to protect
2.4% of the population, while the remaining
half would protect 50% of the population
 Are less than fully-certified levees acceptablein low density population areas?
 Full cost of Category 5 protection ~ $30-50 B
 Show map

Some recent events
May 21, 2006 – Mayor Ray Nagin gets reelected : “We’regoing to bring back all the citizens who want to come back to
New Orleans” Mayor Nagin has no plan for rebuilding New
Orleans (What does ‘subsidiarity’ mean in this case?) Senate Report White House Report House Report May 22 - National Science Foundation Report on Levees,
 May 25 – ‘practice’ Hurricane “Alicia” exercise in Loiusiana
cancelled in middle of drill - disagreements over
responsibilities for evacuation between NO, LA, FEMA ASCE Report released May, 2006
 NSF Report released May, 2006
 Corps IPET Report Released June 1, 2006
‘Integrated (?)’
Institutional Response

DHS FEMA: Department ofHomeland Security / Federal
Emergency Management Agency
HUD: Department of Housing
and Urban Development
HEW: House Education and theWorkforce (HEW) Committee
DOT: Department ofTransportation

White House

DOD Corps: Department of
Defense, U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers

Congressional Committees
DHS
FEMA HUD» FAQs

NSF
New
Orleans

ASCE

HEW

NRC

DOD
DOT
Corps
WhiteUrban
ASFPM Institute
House

Levee
MS CWPRRA LCA Boards

LA

TX

NSF: National Science
Foundation
ASCE: American Society of Civil
Engineers
NRC: National Research Council
ASFPM: Association of State
Floodplain Managers
CWPRRA: Coastal Wetland
Planning, Protection and
Restoration Act (task force)
LCA: Louisiana Coastal Area
(restoration study)
States of MS, LA, TX

Gilbert White – “Human
Adjustments to Floods”(1945)“Floods are Acts of God, but
flood losses are largely
acts of man”
(who’s in charge of land use planning?)

Do we aim for perfection?
(Integrated Water Resources Management)or… do we adjust incrementally?
(or Adaptive Management?)
Institutional (legislation, legal, regulatory)
 Economic incentives, cost-sharingEngineering design standards, criteria



Water Management/Administration

Enhanced effective response and coordination¾ Providing cost-effective services¾ Efficient resource use¾ Access and availability to services¾ Compliance with rules & regulations¾

1849 Inundation Map of New Orleans(& Cypress Swamp)

New Orleans Losses
Losses were concentrated in low residential areas,
and with those unable to self evacuate
Loss of Life = 1300+(75 % > 60 yrs)

Direct Property =$20BSocial and Cultural
Losses = Staggering
Migration, Slow
Recovery
Total Loss ~ $200B% of Value Lost

The Consequences
Design deficiencies resulted in 2/3 of flooding, and ½
of losses in some areas

Total Flooding

Flooding No BreachingThoughts on Comprehensive
Planning & IWRM
1958-61 Harvard Water Program 1962 Design of Water Resources
Systems (Maass, et.al.) 1965 Water Resources Planning Act
 Basin Planning Commissions
 Principles and Standards
 Water Resources

CouncilUS Flood Policy Development &Non-Structural Floodplain Management
Gilbert White, 1942 Dissertation
 Executive Order 11988, Floodplain Mgmt (1977)
 P&S requirement for nonstructural plan (1980) Water Resources Development Act (WRDA1986)
 Unified Nat’l Prog for Floodplain Mgmt (1992)
 Upper Miss R. Flood (1993)
 “Galloway Committee” Report (1994)
 “Challenge 21” Legislation (WRDA 99)
 Response to Katrina (2005- ?) – not good so farPRINCIPLES: Unified National Flood Plain
Management Program Modify Human Susceptibility to Flood Damage(relocation, flood warning forecasting, disaster
preparedness, assistance, land acquisition, etc.)

 Modify Impact of Flooding on People andCommunities (emergency response, flood recovery) Preserve and Restore Natural Floodplain
Resources (land acquisition, restore habitats) Modify Flooding (dams, dikes, detention basins)

Netherlands Storm Surge Barrier Protection System ~ $16B;
Built to 10,000yr return period, 1965-2005

Netherlands Storm Surge Barrier Protection System

Proposed Venetian Storm Barrier Protection System

Thames River Storm Surge Barrier

New Orleans Levee System(so how did this happen?)Evolution of New Orleans HPS(GAO Report, Congressional Testimony 28/9/05)
Congress authorized projects in 1965; $85M;
estimated completion 1979
Designed for NWS-SPH, ~ Cat 2+ today, return
period of about 200-300 yrs. Basically twoalternatives:
PLAN 1 -Two rings of protection: inner ring of 9-13’
levees; + outer storm surge barrier with floodgates (similar to “Dutch Plan”)
PLAN 2 - Inner ring of high levees, 16-18.5’
Public opposition (1975), and environmental lawsuits(1977) over two-ring plan; Plan 1 abandonedEvolution of New Orleans HPS (Cont’d)

By 1982, the costs rose to~$800M; est. 2015

completion
 PL 101-640 (WRDA 1990) House Conf Rpt
No 101-966
By 2005, 60-90% of 125 mi levees complete inproject areas
 From 1995-2005, Congressional appropriations
declined from $15-20M/yr to $5-7M/yr
 2002 Corps requested funds for a study tostrengthen HPS
 2006 appropriation of $2.8B, est completion

2006/2007

Corps ofEngineers
Budget
Allocations
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1979
96 9719
98 99212000 23
01 02 25
03 04 2705
1 80 81
3 82 83
5 84 85
7 86 879 88 89
1190 911392 93
1594 9517

House Conf Report 101-66 (Oct 27, 1990)
As originally authorized by Section 204, PL 89-298:“…high level levees plan was substituted for the barrier plan.”“Local authorities have raised concerns about floodgates that will
impede drainage of canals during hurricanes”“The conferees do not believe it was the intent of Congress inauthorizing this project to compound flooding or drainage
problems in New Orleans.”“It was not necessary for the original barrier plan to provide
drainage of storm waters into L. Ponchatrain”“…the conferees direct the Corps to treat the outfall canals as
part of the overall hurricane protection project… and tofavorably consider a plan that raises the levees along the entire
length of the London Ave and N.O. Ave. Canals… sufficient for
a SPH…”Katrina Path from August 23 - 31, 2005

Mon. Aug 29

Tropical depression
Tropical storm
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4
Category 5

Sun. Aug 28
Sat. Aug 27

August 23

Hurricane Saffir-Simpson Scale
Category 1: Wind Speed 74-95 mph
Storm Surge 4-5 ft above normal
 Category 2: Wind Speed 96-110 mph
Storm Surge 6-8 ft above normal
 Category 3: Wind Speed 111-130 mph
Storm Surge 9-12 ft above normal
 Category 4: Wind Speed 131-155 mph
Storm Surge 13-16 ft above normal
 Category 5: Wind Speed >155 mph
Storm Surge > 18 ft above normal

Hurricane vs. River Flooding
Storm surge (+waves) is the relevant physicalforce for levees; wind is for roofs and structures
 Katrina (Cat 3+ wind speed) had equivalentCategory 5 storm surge
 Frequency of hurricanes (magnitude, duration,
fetch, pressure) cannot be calculated in samemanner as floods – need a comparable method
 Standards-based design vs risk-based design(PMH, SPH, Cat 3, Cat 5, 200-yr, 500-yr, 10K-yr,
select design that minimizes risk-cost ?) What else goes into the risk calculation? (Health,trauma damages, dislocation/disruption, job loss,
education, etc.)Authorized Protection Levels Vary
-No clear attempt to integrate
Saffir-Simpson Scale (1970)

Design Hurricanes
Project
Location

Date
AuthorizedCentralPressure
Index
27.6
inches

Wind

Speed

100
mph

At
Radius
of
34.5
miles

ForwardSpeed

5.75 –
12.66
mph

Lake
Pontchartr
ain &Vicinity

October
1965

Grand Isle
& Vicinity

1965 –
1976

28.15
inches

87
mph

35
miles

13 mphNew
Orleans to
VeniceOctober
1962

28.1
inches

90
mph

34.5
miles

11 mphWest Bank& Vicinity

1986

27.4
inches

115
mph

34.5
miles

12.6 mph

Scale
#

Winds
(mph)

1

74 – 952

96 -1103

111 – 1304

131 – 155

5

155 +

Katrina at LA Landfall

Congress currently authorizes protection from flood
waters resulting from winds of 90-115 MPH.

Category 3
127 mph wind27.17 inches centralpressure
15 mph forward speed
90 miles – extent of
hurricane force winds
230 miles – extent of
tropical force winds

Why Difference in Standards?
• Influence of cost

MR&T Project

LP&VHP Project
considerations• Loss of system~ 100 – 200 Year
perspective
Design Level• Lack of considerationof residual risk &30
HURRICANE
consequences
PROTECTION LEVEE~ 700 – 1000 Year
Design Level
FLOODWALL ALONGMISSISSIPPI RIVER

23 FT
20 FT PROJECT FLOWLINE
AVG ANNUAL HIGHWATER 14 FT

SPH DESIGN ELEV 11.5 FT

20
10NORMAL LAKE 1.0 FT LEVEL

0

UNO SIDE OF
WAINRIGHT DRCity of New Orleans
Ground ElevationsPO
NT LAKCS H HA E
OR RT
E RA
IN

-10

WAINRIGHT DR
AT L.C. SIMONGENTILLY BLVD
AT ALLEN

DERBIGNY AT II--10

I SS

IPP

I

-20

B

UNO

ESPLANADE AT
ST. CLAUDE

RI V E-10

GENTILLY
RIDGE
ST. LOUIS CATHEDRAL

0

R BA
NK
CANAL ST AT RIVER

10

17.5 FT

ST. ANTHONY AT
WILDAIR DR

20& FLOODWALLDILLARD UNIVCAMPUSAMISSELEVATIONS IN FEET NGVD

30

-20

Hurricanes & Global Warming?
“An Inconvenient Truth” – Al Gore
 2004, 2005 Atlantic hurricane seasons broke manyrecords
 2006 predicted to have 15 named storms; 10
hurricane strength; 4-5 making landfall in US Debate among US meteorologists:
A. 25-40 year cycle? (e.g. Landsea & Gray) or
B. part of global warming cycle? (e.g. Emmanuel) 80% increase in Cat 4-5 cyclones worldwide since1970. Doubling in N. Atlantic.
or POOR DATA ?
30

Total number of tropical cyclones
Number of hurricanes

25

Number of hurricanes which center's madeU.S. landfall
20

Cycle of Hurricanes* (James O’Brien)
15

MANY

STRONGMANY

WEAKERWEAKERSTRONG

10

5

Source: National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration

Note: Prior to 1970, tropical cyclones were not monitored by satellites; meaning that those
cyclones that did not hit the land of the United States were not systematically recorded.

2002

1998

1994

1990

1986

1982

1978

1974

1970

1966

1962

1958

1954

1950

1946

1942

1938

1934

1930

1926

1922

1918

1914

1910

1906

1902

1898

1894

1890

1886

1882

1878

1874

1870

1866

1862

1858

1854

0

Most Damaging Hurricanes
Year

Cat

Cost

Katrina (FL, LA, MS)
2005
 Andrew (FL, LA)1992
 Charley (FL)2004
 Ivan (AL, FL)
2004
 Hugo (SC)1989
 Agnes (FL, GA, SC, PA) 1972
 Betsy (FL, LA)1965
 Frances (FL)2004
 Camille (MS, LA, VA)
1969
 Diane (East Coast)
1955
 Jeanne (FL)
2004

3+
5
4
3
4
2
3
2
5
1
3

$ 120.0 B +43.6 B
15.0 B
14.2 B
12.2 B
11.3 B
10.8 B
8.9 B
8.9 B
6.9 B
6.9 B



Calculating Damages/Impacts:(What should be used for BCA?) Direct damages to infrastructure, homes
 Indirect economic damages (jobs, economy,

production, agriculture, fisheries, oil/gas
production, transport, etc.)
 Loss of life, health, psychological trauma
 Cultural, social, community cohesion, etc.
 Other vulnerability measures ?
(Economists, planners, engineers have been
debating these issues for the past 100 years)

Flood Damages as Percent of GDP(Based on damages and GDP data in 2000 dollars)
25%

0.5%

0.4%

Mississippi
River Valley

61%

Hurricane
Agnes

99%

15%

Hurricane
Diane

0.3%
0.2%

20%

Kansas &Missouri Rivers

0.4%
0.3%

Total damages as percent of GDP

Midwest Floods
Teton Dam
Failure

10%

0.2%
0.1%

5%

0.1%
0.0%

0%

Total flood damages as percent of GDP

138%

Direct damages as percent of GDP

Ohio & Lower
Mississippi River
Basins

1900
1903
1906
1909
1912
1915
1918
1921
1924
1927
1930
1933
1936
1939
1942
1945
1948
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005

Direct flood damages as percent of GDP

0.5%

Recent REPORTS/REVIEWS
 Gov’t Accounting Office Reports (numerous) Congress. Research Service Reports (numerous) Urban Land Institute (Nov 12-16, 2005)
 Gulf of Mexico Alliance Governor’s Action Plan (2006)
 House Report – “A Failure of Initiative”
 White House Report – Feb 2006 ‘The Federal

Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned’ ASCE, IPET, NRC, NSF “Forensic Analysis” (whatwent wrong, why, how to improve the designs)
 Corps Cat 5 SE Louisiana protection study Independent Working Group (IWR): “A New
Framework for Planning the Future of Coastal LA”

Forensic Analysis of Hurricane Protection System(causes & modes of failure, damages)

LA State
Commission

IPET

ASCE

NSF
UC-Berkeley
NAFSMA

NAS/NRC

Congressionally Authorized& funded Studies?

Corps/IWR
Decisions, designs& policies:
Evolutionof levee system

Interagency Performance Evaluation
Task Force (IPET)
Input

Response

Output1 May 06

Storm
Forces

Structural
Response

Storm
Environment
Rain

Pump
Response

Structure
Performance
Risk andReliability

Interior
Flooding
Consequences

1 Jun 06

Data and Information
Integrated Data Base

Vertical Datum

IPET Team: >150 experts; >50 organizationsFederal Agencies

Corps of Engineers (Lead agency)

MVD/MVN/MVK/MVS
Task Force GuardianEngineer Research and Development Center
Huntington District (Task Force CoCo-Lead)Louisville DistrictTulsa DistrictJacksonville DistrictPortland District, Hydropower Design CenterInstitute for Water Resources / HEC
FEMA (Team member)NOAANGS (Team CoCo-lead)

COOP
(Team
CoCO
Co-lead)

NWS

HRD

USBR (Team coco-lead)
USDA Economic Research Service (Team CoCo-lead)
USGS (Team member)
NIST
State and Local Agencies
Louisiana DOTNew Orleans Levee and Drainage DistrictsSouth Florida Water Management District (TeamCoCo-lead)Harris County Flood Control District, TX (Team CoColead)International
River Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure andTransportation, Japan
GeoGeo-Delft, Netherlands

Academia
University of Maryland (Task Force Lead)Louisiana State UniversityJackson State University

Utah State UniversityPenn State University
University of Florida (Team CoCo-lead)
University of Delaware
University of North Carolina
University of South Carolina
University of Norte Dame (Team CoCo-lead)
University of Texas
Stanford UniversityTexas A&M U

University of WyomingGeorgia Institute of Technology

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Oklahoma State University
Virginia Polytechnical Institute and State
University (Team CoCo-lead)
Villanova University
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
University of MissouriUniversity of Illinois
Industry
Steedman,
Steedman, Ltd., UK (Team CoCo-lead)
Ocean Weather, Inc
ARA, INC

CH2M Hill

RAC EngineeringStorm Surge and Wave Modeling
What surge and waves did the levees andfloodwalls experience from Katrina?

High resolution coupledstorm surge and wave models

Wave Height = 8.2 ft
Wave Period = 6.7 sec

12.7

9.7

11.7
10.5
11.4
12.8 12.4

Wave Height = 10.5 ft
Wave Period = 9 sec
15.3

13.4 13.5

15.5

17.2
18.3

15.0
17.4
Storm Surge = 20.8 ft
Wave Height = 10.8 ft
Wave Period = 16 sec

Physical Performance Analysis
What forces were the structuresdesigned and built to withstand?

Surge and Waves

Design & Intent

As-built andCondition

Static & Dynamic
ForcesBehavior
Insights

Observed
Performance
Expected
Performance

Flooding

Risk and Reliability Methodology

HPS Definition in Risk Model
N6
Lake Pontchartrain
N5
N7
New Orleans East (N)

N4
N3

N25
N12 to
N17
N11

N2
C1
O1

C4

C5,
O17

St. Charles (C)

N1

O4

O3

New Orleans East (N)

N21
O5

O19

C3

C11

O2
O18

C2

N19
N20

C6 O16
C10
C7
O15
C9

O6
B1

Orleans East Bank (O)B3

Lake Borgne
B4

B19
B20

St. Bernard (B)

O7
B18

O8

C8

N10

N18

B2

Mississippi River

N8

N24

N9

Lake Pontchartrain

Lake Pontchartrain

N22 N23

St. Bernard (B)

B5

B21

B17

O14

B16
B15
Mississippi River B14

O9
O13

O12
O11
Mississippi River

O10

B6

B22
B13

B7
B12

Point in-between reaches

Note: Plaquemines not shown but isin the risk model

B25

B24

Reach
Pumping station

B29 B23
B30

B11

St. Bernard (B)

B10
B9

B26

B27
B28

B8

Geotechnical Factors and Behavior
How did the structures perform and why?

Combination of numericaland physical modeling
Sophisticated soil-structure
analysis will use theArmy and RPI centrifuges
with support from Geo-Delft

Army Centrifuge

Overtopping & Scour
Piping and Uplift

Key Response analyses
Weak soil layer

Consequence and Risk Analysis
What were the consequences of Katrina?
What is the risk for the future?

Risk Relationship by Polder
Probability of Failure

Flooding Exposure by Polder

De
c

is
i

on

Zo
ne

Consequences

Losses by Zip Code and census blockRemarks of LTG Strock
Chief of Engineers
US Army Corps of Engineers‘building resilient systems is difficult becauseof complicated rules of Congress…”
 “…we have to look beyond economic criteria.”
 “…top of the list reforms is requiring
independent peer review of our projects…”
 “We can’t simply look at engineering
independent of political and social issues…”
6/2006 Louisiana Coastal Protection and
Restoration Interim Report to Congress –Options for Category 5 Hurricane Protection
Hurricane risk reduction Decision Framework Restoring the first line of defense – coastal & marsh
restoration – an integral part of plan
 Characterizing hurricane threat Develop new risk-based assessment methodology
 Formulate initial set of plans/strategies that provide
alternative risk reduction strategies and measures Upgrade/update technical analysis (storm surge, wetlands,
ecosystem, social impacts, economic impacts, etc.
 The “Dutch Approach” considered, rejected FINAL REPORT to Congress – December, 2007


South Louisiana Hurricane Protection
and Restoration TEAM (Category 5 Study)
National – International Expert TeamFederal - State
Corps, USGS, FWS, EPA, NOAA, NRCS, NMFS, MMS
 LA CPR Authority, DNR, DOTD


Private sector

Academia

LSU, U Colorado, Notre Dame, Ohio State, UNO, MIT, manyothersInternational experts


Numerous private firms and expert consultants

Netherlands, JapanNGOs

DU, Lake Pont. Foundation, CRCLA, many othersAnalytical, Technical & Engrg Failures
Datum and subsidence issues
 Dynamic information on hurricane intensity andfrequency Technology advances for modeling storm surge
 Contemporary consideration of structural reliability
 Emerging information on implications of Gulf wetlands
loss





Risk & Reliability. Neither a system-wide considerationof residual risk, or a deliberate treatment of system
reliability issues are evidenced in record. Little focus on:

 Considering and evaluating implications of risk andreliability during iterative design changes
 Communicating residual risk and potential
consequences to stakeholders/publicImplications for IHP-VII/ICHARM ?


¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾

What are the scientific/technical issues that jumpout of the Katrina event? For ICHARM ?
Flood warning/evacuation/recovery planning
Risk-cost based standards vs. deterministic
standards (PMF, PMH, SPF or .01, .001, .0001)?
Risk and reliability analysis & communicationRole of public participatory processes in decision
making and setting of safety standards
Role of governance/institutions/consensus
Ethical standards and obligations of engineers
Basic Geotechnical engineering technology

Questions?

Independent Working Group for PostHurricane Planning for Coastal LA (IWR)“A New Framework for Planning the Future of Coastal

Louisiana after the Hurricanes of 2005” Jan 26, 2006

Protection for NO can only be secured from combo oflevees and sustainable coastal landscape Most coastal landscape can be maintained thru endof 2100 with efficient mgmt of sediment resources Must integrate planning, investment and mgmt
decisions under a new multiobjective framework
 Priority ecorestoration choices of LA should be
revised to support storm damage reduction
 Develop a spatially explicit vision of a future coastal
LA that includes long-term goals and opportunitiesCont’d“Dutch’ protection model may not be applicable in
LA – focus on strong inner defenses, marsh restoration and barrier island maintenance Integrated planning should account for disruption ofcoastal dynamics from navigation projects
 Independent, joint federal-state body should have
responsibility and fiscal support for guiding planningand implementation
 Authorization and financing should be separate from
Water Resources Development Act process Employ innovative planning and decision analysis,
engage stakeholders and agencies, resolve conflictsCharles Perrow (1999)“Normal Accidents: Living With High Risk Technologies”
Most high-risk systems have characteristics that make failuresinevitable – almost “normal”
 Systems with many components (‘interactive complexity’) arelikely to fail from unanticipated combinations of failures ‘Tightly coupled” systems are those that have high interactive
complexity and operate/move very fast – time-dependent reducing reaction time to detected failures ‘System accidents’ are rare, but usually catastrophic
 Organizational and technological fixes usually exacerbate
complexity
 ‘Katrina’ is an example of a system failure: both the HPS
and the evacuation plan are tightly coupled and have a highdegree of complexity
Fiering & Kindler: a taxonomy of surprises
Structural surprise - collapse of a component
 Embedded surprise -system errors
 Hydrologic surprise- change in catchment
 Institutional surprise – shift in system operation
 Informational surprise - disruption of crucial info
 Mechanistic surprise - not understanding responseto stresses Demand surprise - outside the range of expectation


Minimize likelihood of surprise and/or optimize
system design characteristics ?