PALGRAVE MACMILLAN STUDIES ON
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA
SERIES EDITOR: MIKYOUNG KIM

Refugees and Asylum
Seekers in East Asia
Perspectives from Japan and Taiwan
Edited byLara Momesso · Polina Ivanova

Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia

Series Editor
Mikyoung Kim, Hiroshima, Japan

This Palgrave Macmillan book series addresses the rising interest in humanrights topics in Asia. It focuses on the largely underexplored territoryof Asian human rights topics highlighting its empirical manifestations,
historical trajectory and theoretical implications. It also goes beyond
the problematic dichotomy between “East” and “West” by engaging
in rigorous case-specific as well as cross-regional comparisons within
South–South context. China’s rise in world politics and its emergence
as a massive donor, for example, has significant yet troubling implications. The member countries of ASEAN and Northeast Asia, on theother hand, would have different preoccupations and priorities calling forcontext-sensitive diagnosis and prognosis to promote human right causes.
The series is multidisciplinary in nature and open to submissions
focusing on international organization, ethics, criminology, development, freedom of expression, labour rights, environment, human/sex
trafficking, democratization, governance studies, disability, reproductive
rights, LGBT, post-/colonial as well as post-/authoritarian critiques andsocial movement, among others.
The series publishes full-length monographs, and edited volumes.

Lara Momesso · Polina Ivanova
Editors

Refugees and Asylum
Seekers in East Asia
Perspectives from Japan and Taiwan

Editors
Lara Momesso
School of Psychology and Humanities
University of Central Lancashire
Preston, UK

Polina Ivanova
Institute of International Relations
and Area Studies
Asia-Japan Research Institute,
Ritsumeikan University
Kyoto, Japan

ISSN 2752-4310
ISSN 2752-4329 (electronic)
Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia
ISBN 978-981-97-2866-4
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Foreword

Conflict frequently occurs worldwide, which forces numerous people
to move out from their places of origin. Thus, the questions of how
a country reacts to refugees, and how it should react to refugees, arenothing new. However, what about a case in which people try totake refuge in a country that is culturally homogeneous, geographicallyisolated, and considered to have restrictive policies with regard to inward
immigration? This book examines one of the most severe and complex
humanitarian challenges currently faced by two island nations, namely,
Japan and Taiwan.
In particular, Japan has been attracting media and scholarly attention with the amendment of its Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Act in 2023, which introduced a complementary protection scheme for refugees. Meanwhile, the amendment has been designed
to promote the deportation of asylum seekers despite strong protests.
Taiwan, a neighbouring country of Japan, has its own issues regarding
displaced people and their protection. The country’s increasing interest in
humanitarian concerns such as refugee protection may echo its unstableinternational status.
This book is timely, well grounded, and highly valued as factual material. It elucidates the mechanisms and experiences of refugee acceptanceand rejection in Japan and Taiwan, convincingly explaining the commonalities and differences between the two. Towards this end, it addressesv

vi

FOREWORD

three indispensable and interconnected elements relating to the presence of refugees and asylum seekers, namely, legal and policy frameworks,
media representation, and lived experiences.
Critical but hopeful, the chapters in this book provide an alternative
view, where refugees and asylum seekers are considered as resourcefulmembers in host societies rather than as threats or burdens. Although
the mass media often stereotypically frames them as vulnerable entities, this study explores their identities and their manners of action; thevulnerability of refugees and asylum seekers is not the whole story.
This research project has provided a deep understanding of the factthat Japan, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries are, more than ever,in need of innovative and effective policy instruments and civil societybased inclusive support networks to accommodate refugees and asylum
seekers.
This book is not just about them. It leads readers to rethink thedesign of a liberal and democratic society which accommodates increasing
numbers of migrants, in particular, refugees and asylum seekers, withdiverse backgrounds. I am hopeful that this passionate work will influence
our thinking in a manner that prioritises human security among otherissues and that East Asia can be transformed into a safer place for those
who flee for their survival.
Junichi Akashi
Professor
University of Tsukuba
Tsukuba, Japan

Acknowledgements

First, the editors would like to thank all the contributing authors for theirpatient and skilful work in revising their manuscripts. The publication ofthis volume would not have been possible without the expertise and dedicated efforts of our commissioning editor Vishal Daryanomel and all theeditorial team of Palgrave Macmillan. We also wish to thank anonymous
reviewers for their relevant suggestions.
Our sincere gratitude is extended to the University of Central
Lancashire (UCLan) for providing generous funding to finance the Open
Access of the entire book. We would also like to thank the ResearchCentre for Migration, Diaspora and Ethnicity (MIDEX) for offering us
both a platform for collaboration and the funding for proofreading, andDr Simon Green for his efficient and accurate proofreading services. We
also wish to thank Dr Moises de Souza (UCLan) for actively contributing
to a pre-conception phase of this volume when we co-organised aroundtable on refugee and asylum seekers in East Asia on 24 January2022 and published a special issue of the policy brief “Refugee protection in East Asia: Taiwan and Japan in comparison” (2022/01) with theNorthern England Policy Centre for the Asia Pacific (NEPCAP). A special
thank you goes to Professor Niki Alsford (UCLan) for asking “Why don’t
you put these contributions into an edited volume?”
We owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Kenki Adachi (Ritsumeikan
University) and Dr Maja Vodopivec (Leiden University) for taking thetime to read our introductory chapter and for providing their insightful

vii

viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

comments. Our sincere thanks are due to Professor Junichi Akashi(Tsukuba University) for writing a foreword to this book.
Finally, we must express our deepest gratitude to our families andfriends for being supportive and patient with us throughout the creationof this volume.
Lara Momesso
Polina Ivanova

Praise for Refugees and Asylum
Seekers in East Asia

The impressive array of well-researched case studies on the policies andpractices for refugees, asylum seekers and foreign students in Japan andTaiwan amply illuminate the value and relevance of applying the analyticalframework of human security that consists of protection and empowerment with the emphasis on human dignity. I hope their findings willcontribute to improving policies and conditions for migrant workers.
—Yukio Takasu, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General on Human
Security, President of NPO “Human Security Forum”
This edited volume extends the research attention to democratic Asia byoffering an in-depth look into the politics of asylum seekers in Japan andTaiwan. Both used to accept refugees on an ad-hoc basis and are now
amid the process of liberalising their regulations. As both countries are
rapidly ageing with declining fertility rates, migrant workers have madeup a substantial source of labour supply—thus contributing to a more
liberal attitude toward refugees. This book provides a fine-grained analysis
on policy, public, and personal levels of migration politics in Japan andTaiwan.
—Ming-sho Ho, Professor of Sociology, National Taiwan University
Thoughtfully curated, showcasing a variety of methods and case studies,and genuinely interdisciplinary, with contributors from fields ranging
from sociology, anthropology, legal studies, media studies, as well asix

x

PRAISE FOR REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EAST ASIA

activists and professionals, Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East Asia:
Perspectives from Japan and Taiwan will be indispensable to specialists, students, policymakers and readers interested to know more about
migration and refugee issues in Taiwan and Japan—Isabelle Cheng, Senior Lecturer in East Asian and International
Development Studies, University of Portsmouth,Secretary-General of theEuropean Association of Taiwan Studies (2022–2025)

Contents

1

Introduction
Lara Momesso and Polina Ivanova

1

Part I Legal and Policy Frameworks of the Refugee
Regimes in Japan and Taiwan
2

3

4

5

Refugee Protection in Japan and Taiwan: Common
Challenges and Ways Forward for Human Security
Bonny Ling and Mariko Hayashi
Examining Refugee Protection in Non-Signatories
to the Refugee Convention and Protocol: Lessons
Learned for the Taiwan Context
Christine Lin
The Legal Framework for Refugee Acceptanceand Protection in Japan
Yingjiao Zhu
From Non-existence to Unrecognised Existence: The
Evolution and Limitations of Taiwan’s Hong Kong
Asylum Mechanism After 2019
Min-yen Chiang and Candia Tong

29

61

93

119

xi

xii

CONTENTS

6

Refugees by Another Name: Displaced Learners
in Japanese Higher Education
David Green, Lisa Unangst, and Eriko Tomita

149

Part II Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Japan andTaiwan: Media Representations and Public
Opinion
7

8

9

10

Media Political Leanings: Polarised Depictionsof Hong Kong Migration in Taiwan
Cody Wai Kwok Yau
The Role of Nationalism and Political Identity
in Shaping Japanese People’s Perceptionsof Immigrants and Refugees
Zdenka P. Kyselova and Kristina Kironska

177

203

Formosa as a Safe Haven? Taiwan’s Public Opinion
on Potential Asylum Mechanisms and Refugees
Kristina Kironska

235

Kurdish Diaspora in Japan: Navigating Kurdish
Identity and Activism on Social Media
Sohrab Ahmadian

257

Part III Lived Experiences of Refugees and Asylum
Seekers in Taiwan and Japan
11

12

13

The Lived Experience of Tibetan Refugees in Taiwan:
Contesting Rights to Work, Residence, and Citizenship
Mei-Lin Pan and Dolma Tsering

283“I Am Still a Refugee!” Displacement
and Transnational Activism
Shu-Fen Lin

311

Japanese and Taiwanese Approaches to Future
Climate Displaced People
Kate Hannah Martin

333

CONTENTS

14

15

Asylum Seeking as Survival Strategy: The Narrativesof Indonesian Work Seekers in Japan
Firman Budianto and Yusy Widarahesty
Conclusion
Polina Ivanova and Lara Momesso

xiii

365
389

List of Contributors

Sohrab Ahmadian Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, Japan
Firman Budianto National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN),
Jakarta, Indonesia
Min-yen Chiang Flow HK, Taipei, Taiwan
David Green Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan
Mariko Hayashi Southeast and East Asian Centre (SEEAC), London,
UK
Polina Ivanova Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan
Kristina Kironska Department of Asian Studies, Palacky University
Olomouc, Olomouc, Czech Republic
Zdenka P. Kyselova Department of Asian Studies, Palacky University
Olomouc, Olomouc, Czech Republic
Christine Lin Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, University ofCalifornia College of the Law, San Francisco, CA, USA
Shu-Fen Lin National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu,
TaiwanBonny Ling Work Better Innovations, Portsmouth, UK;
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
xv

xvi

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORSKate Hannah Martin University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
Lara Momesso University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
Mei-Lin Pan National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu,
TaiwanEriko Tomita Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan
Candia Tong Flow HK, Taipei, Taiwan
Dolma Tsering National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu,
TaiwanLisa Unangst Empire State University, Saratoga Springs, NY, USA
Yusy Widarahesty Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan
Cody Wai Kwok Yau Department of Political Science, Soochow
University, Taipei, Taiwan
Yingjiao Zhu Yamaguchi University, Yamaguchi, Japan

List of Figures

Fig. 7.1
Fig. 7.2
Fig. 7.3
Fig. 7.4
Fig. 7.5
Fig. 7.6
Fig. 8.1
Fig. 8.2
Fig. 8.3
Fig. 9.1
Fig. 9.2
Fig. 9.3
Fig. 9.4
Fig. 9.5

Fig. 9.6

Trend of news articles in our dataset
Changing thematic proportion trends
The effect of NSL on topic proportion
The effect of “Blue/Green” on topic proportion
Sentiment analysis of the pro-Green and pro-Blue news
outlets
Diagnostic values by number of topics in the candidate
modelsMeasuring nationalism in Japan—item 1
Measuring nationalism in Japan—item 2
Attitude towards a hypothetical resettlementof the Rohingya to Japan
Public opinion on adopting (different kinds of) an asylum
law
Public opinion on the consequences of passing an asylum
law
Feelings towards selected groups of people—Muslims,
immigrants, Africans, Rohingya, Uyghur, and Tibetans
Feelings towards different groups of Chinese people
Willingness to accept refugees from selected
countries—China, Hong Kong, Tibet, and war refugees
from other countries
Public opinion on resettlement of the Rohingya people
in Taiwan

182
185
187
188
194
198
209
209
225
244
245
246
248

249
250

xvii

xviii

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 9.7
Fig. 10.1

Fig. 10.2
Fig. 10.3
Fig. 10.4
Fig. 10.5
Fig. 10.6
Fig. 10.7
Fig. 10.8

Public opinion on the likelihood of a Chinese invasionin the next ten years
Distribution of targeted audiences in the Facebook postsof the Kurdish diaspora in Japan (calculations and graphmade by the author)
List of institutional groups and pages on Facebook
associated with the Kurds in Japan
Distribution of selected Facebook accounts/pages by types
The frequency of publication dates of Facebook posts
Distribution of content categories in Facebook posts
Frequency of identity variables in Facebook posts
Frequency of languages used in Facebook posts
Frequency of activism variables within Facebook posts

251

262
264
265
266
268
269
271
273

List of Tables

Table 5.1
Table 5.2
Table 7.1
Table 8.1
Table 8.2

Table 8.3
Table 8.4

Implementation status of the Humanitarian Assistance
Scheme (as of February 2022)
Index of names of organisations in Taiwan
Categories and topics
Data about the survey respondents
Japanese people’s attitudes towards various groupsof people on a scale 0 to 100 (with 0 representing
cold, negative feelings; 50 representing neutral; and 100
representing warm, positive feelings), depicting the meanvalue (rounded up)
Agreement or disagreement with various statements
related to immigrants and refugees
Attitude towards a hypothetical resettlementof the Rohingya to Japan through the lens of party/
voting preference, measured by the mean value (on a 1–7
scale, where 1 means total disagreement and 7 total
agreement), ordered from lowest to the highest mean
value

132
134
184
208

221
223

226

xix

CHAPTER 1

Introduction
Lara Momesso

and Polina Ivanova

Refugee and Asylum Seeker Acceptance,
Protection, and Integration in East Asia
With major ongoing refugee crises in Gaza, Ukraine, Yemen, Afghanistan,
Syria, Sudan, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Iraq, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Venezuela, Ethiopia, and Myanmar, no other issue
seems as timely as refugee protection, both in the affected areas and in thehost countries involved. Much research has been published on the presence, protection, management, and experiences of refugees in Europe,
while the same cannot be said with regard to the other regions of theworld. This edited book focuses on the East Asian region.
The literature shows that most Asian states have failed to integrateinternational refugee laws and regional protection instruments in theirnational laws, in this way limiting refugees’ and asylum seekers’ security

L. Momesso
University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
e-mail: lmomesso@uclan.ac.uk
P. Ivanova (B)Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japane-mail: 21v00202@gst.ritsumei.ac.jp© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_1

1

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L. MOMESSO AND P. IVANOVA

and access to international and regional protection mechanisms (Choi,
2019, pp. 161–162). Indeed, in this region, most states are not signatories of the magna carta of international refugee law, the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (henceforth, the Convention) andthe 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (henceforth, theProtocol).
In a culturally and politically diverse region, characterised by a lack ofa coherent approach to refugee protection, the literature seems to focus
on state security as a crucial feature in refugee and asylum seeker matters(see, for instance, Ali Ashraf, 2021; Chatterjee & Das, 2022; Choi, 2019;
Rana & Riaz, 2022). In this collective work, we emphasise how state
security is not sufficient to fully understand the complexity behind refugee
and asylum seeker acceptance, protection, and integration in Asia. A mix
of other factors, including socio-cultural concerns, historical legacies aswell as more recent debates about human security, are crucial in shaping
current patterns and practices linked to asylum seekers and refugees.
Taiwan and Japan, to some degree, represent the complexity of the
Asian region, where geopolitical factors linked to national security andinterests intersect with other spheres to shape the acceptance, protection, and integration of refugees and asylum seekers. Taiwan, due toits unsolved sovereignty issue in the context of the “one China” policy,
experiences limited international recognition and participation in international organisations. For this reason, Taiwan is among those states thatare not signatories of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. In
this politicised context, not only the presence of certain groups of immigrants, such as citizens from China, Hong Kong, and Macao, is moresensitive than others, but the overall formulation of a domestic refugee
law has been hampered due to national security concerns. The result isthat the presence of asylum seekers and stateless people has been dealt ona case-by-case basis, on the principle of humanitarian concerns.
Japan holds a different geopolitical position: it enjoys internationalrecognition and participation in international organisations. It signed theConvention in 1981 and the related Protocol in 1982, and for years,
the country has been one of the largest donors to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Though its refugee recognition rates have been remarkably low. In the case of Japan, socio-cultural
factors have been crucial in shaping this outcome. Its current ethnocentric
identity, which has emerged since the end of the Second World War, has

1

INTRODUCTION

3

served as a basis for its exclusive citizenship and strict immigration policies. Similar to Taiwan, claims for asylum in Japan are normally consideredon an individual basis, with a few exceptions in recent decades.
Exploring beyond the realm of domestic affairs, the two cases reveal
intricate connections to broader issues, such as human rights, international law, global governance, international organisations, local andtransnational activism, and public opinion. This book questions to what
extent refugee and asylum seeker acceptance, protection, and integration
can be understood from a narrow perspective of national security interests.
In this collective work we suggest that to understand the complex
matrix of interests shaping refugee acceptance, protection, and integration in Taiwan and Japan, and more generally in Asia, it is important tointegrate analyses of territorial interests with more nuanced accounts thatplace the individuals and their security at the centre. With this in mind,
we bring into our discussion the notion of human security.
Moving away from state-based, traditional security, human security
focuses on people’s lives and the protection of their fundamental freedoms, and calls for governments and civil societies to create political,
social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural processes that“give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity”(Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4). In other words, emphasising people-centred policymaking, human security calls for a paradigm
shift in the way refugee protection is framed, not solely as part of a state’s
strategy to promote its interests, but also as a sphere that involves andaffects a series of other actors.
Along the same line, and framing human security as a two-way process
in which state structures interact with social actors and affect one another(Ruggie, 1983), this volume argues that the Japanese and Taiwanesestates do not operate in a vacuum but interact with a series of stateand non-state actors, including civil society, media outlets, internationaland regional organisations, local communities, and individual migrants.
In light of this argument and by focusing on three different areas, namely
legal and policy frameworks, media representation and public opinion,
and lived experiences of refugees and asylum seekers, the 14 chaptersof this book provide a sophisticated understanding of refugee issues
in Asia, where the multiplicity of interests behind the management ofrefugee security depend on the dissimilar geopolitical context in which
the phenomenon occurs, as well as on factors that go beyond a state’sinterests and intervention.

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L. MOMESSO AND P. IVANOVA

The chapters of this volume lie at the crossroads of disciplines including
sociology, anthropology, legal studies, and media studies, and build on
qualitative and quantitative data aiming to demonstrate the constructivist nature of refugee protection, media representation, and experiencesin Taiwan and Japan, when national interests forge and are forged bysocial actors’ concerns and actions. Rather than only comparing Japanand Taiwan, the chapters of this volume aspire to offer an in-depth,
diverse, and manifold picture of how the two East Asian nations have dealt
with the protection, acceptance, and integration of refugees and asylum
seekers. More specifically, this volume aims to show how, in these twonations, traditional notions of security operate alongside human security
concerns generating complex pictures of interests. Aware that the chapters of this volume cannot be exhaustive, we hope that this work could
inspire further research on a much-needed topic.
On a practical level, with this book, we collectively advocate for Japanand Taiwan to embrace a human security agenda in their way of framing
and responding to the challenges brought by the presence of noncitizens. Bellamy and McDonald (2002, p. 376) introduce the concept of“sovereignty as responsibility”, used to evaluate whether particular statesand policies are in accord with the responsibility for humane governanceand human security. In line with this, this edited book collectively argues
that both Japan and Taiwan should take on the responsibility to protect
not only citizens but also non-citizens residing in their territory.
Before moving on to the next section, an explanation of our choice of
key terms is crucial. The Convention’s definition of the refugee, whichis “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country oforigin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons ofrace, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion” continues to be used by the UNHCR (UNHCR, n.d.d; UNHCR, n.d.-b). The organisation further delineates asylum seekers
from recognised refugees in their glossary, stating that an asylum seeker issomeone whose claim for refugee status “has not yet been finally decided
on by the country in which the claim is submitted” (UNHCR, 2005,
p. 441). In its current and continuously updated master glossary of terms,
the UNHCR expands its definition of asylum seekers to those who have“not yet submitted an application but may intend to do so, or may be inneed of international protection” (UNHCR, n.d.-c).
Despite the revisions in recent years, these definitions have been criticised for their narrow scope, their Eurocentric underpinnings, and their

1

INTRODUCTION

5

temporal and geographical specificity (Davies, 2008; Ho et al., 2015).
Indeed, the integration of the 1967 Protocol aimed to eliminate thetemporal and geographical limitations of the Convention but it did notrevise the problematic definition of “refugee”. A definition that delimits
the boundaries of refugee status to a state’s persecution of individuals,
neglecting a series of other issues specific to the contemporary period,
such as terrorism, climate change, or natural disasters (Betts & Collier,2017; Ho et al., 2015). Furthermore, ratification (or lack thereof) of the1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol seems to be more of a matter ofpromoting and protecting national interests rather than protecting therights of refugees, generating what Betts and Orchard refer to as an “institutionalisation–implementation gap” (Betts & Orchard, 2014, as cited in
Choi, 2019, p. 164).
In light of these criticisms, and recognising legal definitions as a usefulcommon basis, this book employs a broader view on refugees and asylum
seekers since, in practice, the lines between these two groups of people
and other migrant categories, such as economic migrants, undocumented
migrants, international students, and marriage migrants may be blurred.

Human Security
Human security is a concept that emerged within the field of international
development studies in the 1990s, when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) declared “human security” as its primarydevelopment goal, stressing the necessity to develop a “people-centred
development” for the twenty-first century (Morrissey, 2018, p. 226). It
was the first attempt to move away from the framework of traditional
security, which was focused on state-based and interest-based approaches
and revolved around the territorial state. Instead, the new focus was on
people’s lives, making an important switch (or at least claiming so) tode-territorialised and values-based approaches (Chandler, 2008, p. 427).
More specifically, a human security approach calls for “investing in,
and resourcing, interventions of a different kind: in protecting humanrights; in insisting upon humanitarian law; in supporting civil society;and in enabling locally attuned rather than top-down security measures”(Morrissey, 2018, p. 227). These considerations are particularly important for migrant populations, whose security is often at risk because they
may experience abuse, exploitation, and human rights violations.

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L. MOMESSO AND P. IVANOVA

Building on the idea that securing people would be the best way tosecure states, human security became a fashionable paradigm in international policy circles in the 1990s and early 2000s (Chandler, 2008,
p. 428). Human security seemed to offer solutions to global problems
that could endanger state security, yet that could not be addressed effectively within a security system based on the Westphalian order, suchas poverty, environmental change, global epidemics, natural disasters,
gender-based violence, and the transnational mobility of people (EstradaTanck, 2016, p. 1). With the aim of addressing these global challenges,
after the UNDP declared “human security” as its primary development
goal, governments around the world have been asked to take responsibility for, and think cooperatively about, human security in holistic andsustainable ways (Morrissey, 2018, p. 227).
Scholars of different schools and approaches overwhelmingly agree
that human security is a practically and academically valuable concept
in refugee studies. Indeed, by switching the attention from notionsof sovereignty, border control, and citizenship specific to other security paradigms, human security may offer “new ways to think about
and to conceptualise protection concerns as well as the perception of
non-citizens, may strengthen strategies of protection and empowerment,
and in turn reinforce the foundational principles of international humanrights law of dignity, quality and justice for all” (p. 5). Within thesedebates, human security has become a tool for promoting the empowerment of more vulnerable or ignored individuals and communities byaddressing a series of intersecting factors beyond that of state sovereignty
and non-interference. For instance, Hossain and colleagues (2016, p. 4)
argue that a human security framework integrates subjective experiences in the discussion of security and “offers an inclusive framework
for an expanded understanding of security that identifies vulnerabilities,
self-perceived threats, and ignored risks that affect collective security”.
Furthermore, it also offers a narrative for civil society and individual
actors to challenge existing ways of framing security. Other scholars also
believe that human security can complement the earlier notion of humanrights (Estrada-Tanck, 2016; Song, 2012). Along this line, Song (2012)
views human security as the securitisation of human rights, showing
how the former often correlates with the latter: for instance, “personal
security is in parallel with freedom from death, violence, exploitation,
arbitrary arrest or detention”, or community security correlates with “theright to preserve ethnic identity, religious practices or cultural heritage,

1

INTRODUCTION

7

or not to be discriminated against based on ethnicity, social origin,place of birth, nationality or religion” (Song, 2012, p. 7). Analytically,
human security offers scope to explore not only how states and intergovernmental organisations adapt their policies to include broader humansecurity principles in their agenda, but also how society, through theworld of non-governmental and non-profit organisations, associations,and networks, shape governmental policies through “bottom-up” initiatives (den Boer & de Wilde, 2008, pp. 9–11). Although the concept ofhuman security has been celebrated for its focus on human safety andthe “‘added value’ of normative people-centred policymaking” (Chandler,
2008, p. 428), it has become a highly contested concept, often criticisedfor a vagueness that makes it impractical for policymaking (Chandler,
2008, p. 428; de Simone, 2020, p. 169). Also, governments of the Global
South have widely criticised the idea of human security for imposing
universality and liberal norms and promoting human rights according
to values that are not necessarily compatible with non-Western social,
cultural, and political realities (Christie, 2018; Takizawa, 2011). Interestingly, however, as Tow (2013, p. 2) argues with regard to the Asia
Pacific, a series of major non-traditional security contingencies over the
past two decades, as well as the forces of globalisation, have pushed Asian
governments to integrate, to a certain extent, human security principles
in their domestic and international governance.
An important example is Japan, which has introduced a “broader”
interpretation of human security, in opposition to the Canadian “narrow”
model. Canada’s understanding of human security emphasised “freedom
from fear”, in the military conflict, and gradually developed into a newconcept of “responsibility to protect”. In contrast, Japan emphasised“freedom from want” and therefore de-militarised the concept (Adachi,
2023, pp. 205–206). This interpretation of human security brought itcloser to the overseas development assistance which led to some criticisms of Japan’s version of human security being a mere “rebranding ofinternational development” (Mahmud, 2023) or “social welfare” (Mineet al., 2019). Furthermore, some scholars believe that a “broader”
understanding of human security might “inadvertently undermine theinternational human rights regime” (Howard-Hassmann, 2012, p. 88) for
two reasons: firstly, because human rights become reduced to “a subset ofhuman security concerns” (p. 103), and secondly because the individual
standing in the human security discourse is less strong compared to the8

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human rights agenda (p. 111). According to Hynek (2012) both interpretations of human security were shaped by domestic factors (in Canada,
the liberal model of governance and, in Japan, the bureaucratic authoritarianism) further emphasising how state interests, rather than the securityof individuals, could be at the centre of political choices linked to humansecurity.
Due to these critiques and due to a changing world shaped by “risingnationalism” and the resurgence of “traditional security concerns andactors”, human security began to lose momentum in the second decadeof the twenty-first century (Newman, 2020, p. 33). It is time to revisit
and possibly reinvent human security in academic and policy circles toreturn the focus to individual safety in the face of complex environmental,socioeconomic, and military crises. Reflecting this complexity, this volume
will explore the complementarity between human security and traditional
security, when state interests intersect with those of civil society groups,
local citizens and refugees and asylum seekers.
The literature shows that in the Asian region refugee issues are often
treated as a traditional security issue (Ali Ashraf, 2021; Chatterjee & Das,
2022; Choi, 2019; Rana & Riaz, 2022). This does not mean that weshould look at refugee protection in Asia solely as a state responsibility
or a traditional security matter. The issue of complementarity between
human security and the traditional security of the state is an aspect ofhuman security that this book will attempt to address. Sadako Ogata, oneof the biggest proponents of human security in the international arena,
believed that human security and state security complement each other(Ogata, 2013). Contemporary East Asians express even more nuanced
views: most would welcome foreign support during a natural disaster but
not political unrest (Mine et al., 2019, p. 15). There is also an emphasis
on improved coordination between various state and non-state actors in
the region to ensure the security of individuals (Mine et al., 2019, p. 17).
In this collective work, we suggest that, to understand refugee experiencesin Taiwan and Japan, it is important to integrate analyses of territorialinterests with broader considerations linked to human security.
Furthermore, by building on the idea that different countries interpret
human security differently due to their dissimilar historical experiencesand domestic politics (Lam, 2006, p. 146), and by being endorsed byvarious actors in a range of contexts (Marhia, 2013, p. 32), this volume
suggests that human security should not be seen as a coherent and monolithic project. Instead, a diversity of positionalities and interests, hence

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INTRODUCTION

9interventions, may emerge with regard to human security. This means thatthe security challenges generated by and for refugees and asylum seekers
in Taiwan and Japan vary depending on a series of factors, such as abroader geopolitical context, existing policies in each country, civil society
actions, specific refugee/migrant groups’ needs, the time the refugee
enters the host country, and the locality where they settled.
Finally, this volume suggests that the notion of human security, by
stressing a people-centred approach to policymaking, calls for a paradigm
shift not only in the way policymakers and states manage security issues,
but also in the way they interrogate the very social structures that determine access to protection (Marhia, 2013). Indeed, human security may
be distributed unequally, especially for marginalised and systematicallydiscriminated groups. For instance, certain migrants, such as undocumented migrants and refugees who challenge the legal boundaries
between citizens and non-citizens, may be neglected in domestic discussions on human security and, even worse, may be seen as a source ofinsecurity. As Morrissey (2018) argues, refugees are often represented asa threat and a source of insecurities for states, rather than as a consequenceof unsafe life conditions elsewhere, serving to reinforce the appropriateness of biopolitical governmental measures to manage such threats.
Within this logic, refugees’ and asylum seekers’ vulnerabilities are neither
recognised nor acknowledged, generating, in some cases, human insecurity for these groups. As Newman (2020) argues, refugees “suffering
human rights abuse, deprivation and exclusion” are the “embodiment of
human insecurity in extremis” (Newman, 2020, p. 36).
In light of these points, Japan and Taiwan constitute two significant
cases to discuss the complexity of human security in relation to the problems linked to refugee and asylum seeker protection, integration, andacceptance in the Asian region. Both countries have integrated humansecurity into national and international agenda. However, both governments have failed to extend this principle to the refugees and asylum
seekers present in their territory. The next two sections will explore themain issues linked to refugee and asylum seeker presence and protectionin Taiwan and Japan, and how these issues intersect with concerns ofterritorial and human security.

10

L. MOMESSO AND P. IVANOVAJapan: Chequebook Diplomacy?
Japan signed the Convention in 1981 and the related Protocol in 1982.
Among possible reasons behind the country’s decision to join both
treaties during that time, scholars state pressure from the international
community, particularly the United States, to create a legal framework
for accepting boat people from Indochina, and Japan’s concern about
its international reputation (Akashi, 2006; Arakaki, 2004; Hatcher &Murakami, 2020; Tarumoto, 2018).
For years, the country has been one of the largest donors to the
UNHCR, ranking second after the United States until 2013 and fourthor fifth from 2014 to 2022 (UNHCR, n.d.-a; UNHCR, 2015). Japan
has also been one of the most vigorous promoters of a human security agenda in East Asia (Evans, 2004, p. 271). However, it also seems
to use human security mainly as a foreign policy objective to increase
its bilateral, regional, and global political and economic influence, rather
than as a tool to promote domestic policies (Kim, 2010, p. 94). In
contrast to the country’s generous financial contribution to the refugee
cause, Japan’s refugee recognition rates have remained remarkably low:
only 915 applicants out of the total 87,892 between 1982 and 2021
received refugee status (MOFA, 2022). Out of a record number of
19,629 applicants in 2017, Japan granted refugee status to only 20
people, namely 0.1% of applicants (Hatcher & Murakami, 2020, p. 71).
Due to this contrast of a high financial contribution with an extremely
low refugee acceptance, the country has been repeatedly criticised byacademics and practitioners for its chequebook diplomacy, both domestically and internationally (Ogata, 2002 as cited in Akashi, 2006, p. 221;
Takenaka, 2015; Slater & Barbaran, 2020). In addition, Japan’s treatment of asylum seekers has attracted severe criticism with regard to thecountry’s detention practices, including indefinite detention periods, alack of transparency regarding detention at ports of entry, and humanrights violations (GDP, n.d.; Slater & Barbaran, 2020).
Intolerant policies towards refugees are seen as a direct consequenceof the country’s postwar concept of ethnocentric identity, which served
as a basis for its citizenship and immigration policies (Tarumoto, 2018).
Similar to other East Asian countries, citizenship in Japan is based on
jus sanguinis (right of blood), rather than jus soli (right of birthplace)which practically denies access to citizenship to non-Japanese, even if they
were born in Japan, let alone first-generation immigrants or refugees.

1

INTRODUCTION

11

Similar to Taiwan, claims for asylum in Japan are normally consideredon an individual basis, with a few notable exceptions being: (1) acceptance of Indochinese refugees in 1978–2005, particularly the first wave,(2) resettlement of Myanmar refugees in 2010–2013, and (3) reception of
Ukrainian evacuees during the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022 (UNHCR,
2010; Yamagata, 2021).
Around the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, communist regimes
were established in the three Indochina countries (Vietnam, Laos, andCambodia), and those who could not fit in with these systems started
fleeing abroad. These Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian refugees
are collectively called “Indochinese refugees”. Being the second largest
economy in the world during that time, Japan felt pressure to follow
the example of Western liberal democracies who opened their borders
to Indochinese refugees (Akashi, 2006). Some went as far as stating thatthe decision to accept refugees from Indochina was imposed on Japan(Takizawa, 2011, p. 31). Between 1978 and 2005, Japan accepted 11,319
Indochinese refugees, mostly through the Orderly Departure Plan tofacilitate family reunion (MOFA, 2022). This did not mean, however, thatJapan eased its refugee policies. During the same time, Japan acceptedclaims from only 376 “Convention refugees”, i.e. those from outside
Indochina applying within the Convention framework (Akashi, 2006).
Moreover, a different screening procedure was applied to the second waveof Indochinese boat people in the 1980s, recognising them as economic
migrants and therefore rejecting their claims for asylum (Akashi, 2006).
With regard to Myanmar refugees, Japan was the first Asian country
to launch its own resettlement programme, in 2010. The programme,
which aimed to resettle Myanmar families from refugee camps in Thailand, was made permanent in 2014 and expanded in 2020 (Akashi,
2021; UNHCR, 2010). Some scholars severely criticised Japan’s resettlement programme as highly ineffective (Hatcher & Murakami, 2020). The
authors pointed out that the programme was based on restrictive selection criteria, systematically failed to meet its targets, and that “humanrights and social conditions of refugees were not prioritised” (Hatcher &Murakami, 2020, p. 71). Substantial weaknesses were identified in theareas of employment, housing, and language support; other hinderingfactors included social isolation from fellow countrymen, absence of information from the central government, and absence of long-term planning(Yamashita, 2015). In the absence of active support from the government,
the effectiveness of the programme largely depended on local non-profit

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organisations and their ability to act as an intermediary between the stateand municipalities (Akashi, 2021).
Overall, acceptance of Indochinese refugees and the third-country
resettlement programme for those from Myanmar did not lead to theJapanese government adopting more flexible refugee policies and immigration policies in general (Akashi, 2014). More recently, soon after theoutbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022, Japan announced
its decision to open its doors to refugees from Ukraine, cautiously referring to them as “evacuees” and providing temporary visas. Similar toprevious instances of Japan’s refugee acceptance, some experts expressedhope that this initiative could be a turning point for the country’s
refugee policies (Nagy in McElhinney, 2022), while others remained sceptical (Slater, 2022). Granting access to Ukrainians rather than asylum
seekers from Afghanistan or Syria was believed to be a “political decision
linked to Japan’s foreign policy on Ukraine, rather than a decision basedon humanitarian considerations and needs” (Ryall, 2022). Also similar
to previous cases, the Japanese government failed to provide adequatesocioeconomic integration to newcomers: in December 2022, over 60%
of newly accepted Ukrainians remained unemployed despite looking forjobs (Kyodo News, 29 December 2022).
Previous studies on intolerant refugee policies in Japan have highlighted the role of the Ministry of Justice, which, in the absence of constitutional protection for asylum seekers or a strong parliament, became asole decision-maker on immigration and refugee issues, pursuing restrictive policies and largely ignoring pressures from civil society groups(Tarumoto, 2018). A 2023 amendment to the Immigration Control andRefugee Recognition Act, a domestic law regulating the entry and residence of immigrants and refugees in Japan, made some improvements.
However, major issues still remain. Human rights’ experts express concernthat the bill provides even less protection to asylum seekers as it allows
them to be deported after the third unsuccessful asylum claim, thus
exposing them to harm and violating the international principle of nonrefoulement (Kasai, 2023; UNGA, 2023). As long as the government sees
refugees and migrants in general as a threat and continues to endorse
the myth of a socio-culturally homogeneous society, it risks prioritisinga restrictionist agenda. This agenda, marked by its inconsistencies with
contemporary challenges and evolving societal norms, may come at theexpense of the human security of vulnerable minorities, conflicting with

1

INTRODUCTION

13

the country’s international agenda supportive of the principles of humansecurity.

Taiwan: National Security and the Refugee Law
According to Kironska (2022), Taiwan receives asylum seekers on aregular basis, both self-identified and already recognised by the UNHCR.
For instance, it admitted ethnic Chinese refugees from Indonesia during
the ethnic tensions between Indonesian Chinese and indigenous groups inIndonesia in the 1960s (Wang, 2011, p. 171), Vietnamese boat people in
the period 1976–1990, and, more recently, Hong Kong political refugees.
Also, a community of Tibetans, who arrived in Taiwan in the 1980s and1990s and overstayed their visa, are presently residing in Taiwan andhave either obtained Taiwanese identity cards or are still undocumented(Pan, 2015). Since 2019, Taiwan has also been active in international
cooperation related to refugee protection in the Middle Eastern and theMediterranean region, offering humanitarian assistance with trilateral aid
cooperation (Wu & Chien, 2022). In Taiwan, such migrants are notprotected by a formal law and their applications are often dealt with on acase-by-case basis, with rather inconsistent outcomes.
Taiwan is not a signatory of the Convention and Protocol and does
not have a refugee law. The fact that Taiwan has not ratified the refugee
Convention and Protocol is linked to its international status. Since theRepublic of China was replaced in the UN China seat by the People’s
Republic of China in 1971, Taiwan has not officially been able to accede
to international conventions and UN treaties, and this also includes theConvention and Protocol. Despite this, there have been a few occasions
in which Taiwan has actively integrated international convention principles into its legal system. For instance, in 2007, it joined the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women to improve thestandard of gender rights in the country and advance gender equality;
in 2009, it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). However, there does not seem to be
the same degree of openness regarding the integration of the principles
included in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Political sensitivity surrounding China–Taiwan relations seems to be the main issue ofconcern in this regard.

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Under the “one China” policy, Beijing sees Taiwan as one of its
provinces. Although Taiwan operates as a de facto state, with a democratically elected government, and independent military and monetarysystems, it has not yet formally challenged Beijing’s “one China” claims.
Doing so could lead to a conflict, an option that a majority of Taiwanesepeople do not seem to want. In light of this, the presence of immigrants from China has often posed challenges to Taiwanese lawmakers,
as treating them as international citizens would challenge Beijing’s“one China” claims. Migrants from China have been regulated by aseparate document, a decision that has generated the much criticised
two-tiered citizenship system that discriminates against migrants from
China (Friedman, 2010). The presence of refugees from China, especially in the last decade, has raised similar concerns. Indeed, as Kironska(2022) argues, one significant point of contention is to what extent an
asylum law should also include people from controversial countries suchas China, Hong Kong, and Macau. Legally, a refugee law that includes
residents of China, Hong Kong, and Macau, could be problematic as it
would challenge the sovereignty claim regarding Beijing’s “one China”
policy. Indeed, extending the refugee status to citizens from China, Hong
Kong, and Macao would mean formalising their international status in
Taiwan. There also are matters linked to public opinion. For instance,
the Taiwanese public might be concerned that the formalisation of a
refugee law that includes citizens from China, Hong Kong, and Macao,
could lead to an uncontrollable flow of Chinese people taking advantageof this opportunity to escape their homeland. More importantly, in thispoliticised context, there is a belief that such an uncontrollable flow ofpeople from the mainland could also bring Chinese spies (Kironska, 2022,
pp. 18–19). National sovereignty and security are the main concerns inthis legal and public debate. These issues have frozen the development ofa refugee law, a much-contested matter in the parliamentary and publicdebate.
Indeed, a first draft of an asylum law was submitted to the Parliament in2005, followed by other drafts in 2011, 2012, and 2016 (Kironska, 2022,
p. 5). None of these drafts has successfully passed parliamentary review.
Independent human rights experts, regularly invited by the government
to review the country’s progress regarding the ICCPR and the ICESCR,
put forward the recommendation to set up refugee protection and political asylum mechanisms in 2013 and 2017; yet, no steps have been taken
in addressing these points so far (Kironska, 2022, p. 2). The refugee law

1

INTRODUCTION

15

in Taiwan remains anchored to national security concerns, as Taiwanese
claims of independence could lead to military action from Beijing.
Pressure from civil society has been significant, especially after theprotests in Hong Kong. In January 2017, during the national reviewof the ICCPR and the ICESCR, various NGOs urged the government
to move away from its case-by-case approach and protect refugees’ andasylum seekers’ basic human rights (Choi, 2019, p. 172). The problem
became even more pressing after the outbreak of socio-political unrestin mid-2019. The implementation of the National Security Law in mid2020, in Hong Kong, resulted in an increasing flow of Hong Kong
citizens and residents seeking protection in Taiwan. In the first instance,
President Tsai Ying-wen showed support towards Hong Kong citizens
who fled to Taiwan, though this, as Hung (2021, p. 175) argues, wasmainly rhetorical. Article 18 of the Act Governing Relations with Hong
Kong and Macau states that, if Hong Kong and Macao residents’ freedom
and safety are under threat, the government should provide adequate
assistance. However, the absence of procedural details in the document
does not ensure real protection for the asylum seekers. In other words,
most of the responsibilities are transferred to civil society, which, in turn,helps asylum seekers with visas or extensions of residence permits, withaccommodation searches, and with other kinds of support. In many cases,
Hong Kong residents searching for long-term protection in Taiwan, areadvised to enrol in a course of study to obtain a student visa, to invest
in a start-up to obtain an entrepreneur’s visa, or to work in Taiwanesecompanies or organisations (Kironska, 2022, p. 8).
As of September 2023, Taiwan still did not have a refugee law, leaving
refugees and asylum seekers who landed in its territory unprotected.
Clearly, security is an important matter in this conversation. In a context
in which Taiwanese claims of independence could lead to Beijing’s military action, refugee protection in Taiwan remains anchored to national
security concerns. Hence, caution and ambiguity with regard to refugeeprotection seem to be the answer. This approach, though, does not always
assure the protection of refugees’ basic human rights and physical security, staining, in this way, Taiwan’s image as a democratic, open, and safecountry. The debate on human security in Taiwan developed later than inother East Asian societies (Evans, 2004, p. 271). Despite this late evolution, human security has been integrated into governmental debates, seen
as a means to promote Taiwan’s global image and participation in international organisations. However, the discussion seems to remain focused on

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the human security of Taiwanese citizens, whereas that of non-Taiwanesemigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees does not seem to be a priority inthe island (Atkinson, 2018, p. 15).

Organisation of the Book
Japan has been celebrated as “the oldest and most affluent liberal democracy in Asia”, “a champion of the global liberal order”, and a “prestigious
leader in humanitarian support” (Kalicki, 2019, p. 360). Taiwan, after thetransition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic political system,has made significant steps in the promotion of the human rights of its
citizens. Considered as one of the leading democracies in East Asia, it
has created the necessary conditions for the establishment of a rightsbased regime (Brysk, 2021). For both governments, human security has
been a core principle of their diplomacy, much less of their domestic policies. Despite their great overall political, social, and economic successsince the mid-twentieth century, both nations have come under severe
domestic and international criticism for failing to offer suitable protection
to refugees and asylum seekers, and for their inadequate refugee policies. Clearly, both Japan and Taiwan aspire to stand with their democratic
peers with regard to the admission and treatment of refugees and asylum
seekers. Yet, both face significant challenges in implementing their aspirations. Regional and domestic geopolitical interests make this goal hard toachieve. Indeed, in a region characterised by a series of territorial disputes
and by highly regulated immigration regimes, a defensive concept ofsovereignty may also shape the way refugees and asylum seekers are integrated, protected, and perceived. Furthermore, in a region that lacks adegree of consistency with regard to refugee protection, national interests
may prevail over the security of non-citizens. The literature suggests thatnational security is an important matter shaping the approaches used by
Japan and Taiwan to manage the presence of refugee and asylum seekers
and create related policies.
This volume problematises this view and shows how concerns
about national and territorial security intersect with a series of othermatters, above all, human security. Human security, however, can entail
different meanings and implications. Indeed, dissimilar historical experiences, socio-cultural conditions, and domestic politics may also shapecontrasting interpretations and applications of human security. To show
this complexity, this volume, through different case studies, explores three

1

INTRODUCTION

17

main features linked to refugee and asylum seekers, that of legal andpolicy frameworks, media representation and public opinion, and lived
experiences of refugees and asylum seekers.
Part I explores legal and policy-oriented aspects linked to refugee andasylum seeker protection in Taiwan and Japan. International pressures,and domestic debates and concerns often influence how human security
is approached with regard to refugee and asylum seeker management andprotection. The five chapters of this part will shed light on the intricaciesof these debates.
Chapter 2 by Bonny Ling and Mariko Hayashi explores the gaps
between international standards in the protection of refugees and asylum
seekers, and domestic policies, both in Taiwan and Japan. As previously explained, despite the different legal contexts, both countries haveadopted an ad hoc approach to refugee protection resulting in inadequate
security for refugees and asylum seekers. Interestingly, this comparison
allows readers to understand how a legal framework, a missing feature
in Taiwan yet existing in Japan, is not the only condition to promote
refugees’ and asylum seekers’ protection. As the authors argue, unlessthere is broad acceptance and implementation of the responsibility toprotect refugees in society, it will be hard to offer a secure and safe
environment to these vulnerable groups.
The following two chapters delve deeper into the legal framework forrefugee acceptance and protection. Chapter 3 by Christine Lin stresses
the importance of developing a unitary legal framework for refugee andasylum seeker acceptance and protection in Taiwan, rather than using
the current model based on separate legislation for different groups. By
exploring how the UNHCR has previously operated in non-UN members
and non-signatory states around the world, Lin argues that a potential
collaboration between Taiwanese institutions and the UNHCR should besought. Distinguishing this chapter from the others of this section, Lin
concludes with policy recommendations for the government of Taiwan
and the UNHCR. Chapter 4 by Yingjiao Zhu explores the weaknesses of
the Japanese legal framework related to refugees and asylum seekers. By
drawing upon legal documents and judicial practices, this chapter argues
that the structural problems of the current refugee law include a narrowinterpretation of refugee, a heavy burden of proof on asylum seekers, anda lengthy refugee application procedure, which together affect refugees’
and asylum seekers’ security. Hence, the author calls for a thoroughreform of the refugee law.

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Chapter 5 by Candia Tong and Min-yen Chiang, building on theevents in Taiwan following the political unrest in Hong Kong, sheds lighton how the absence of a transparent and accountable legal framework
for asylum in Taiwan has led to significant risks for the security of Hong
Kong asylum seekers. This chapter offers an overview of Taiwan’s ad hoc
policy measures and their limitations. It also analyses the contribution thatcivil society has offered to fill the gaps, which has led to what the authors
defined as a quasi-asylum mechanism.
Chapter 6, co-written by David Green, Lisa Unangst, and Eriko
Tomita, lies at the intersection of displacement and higher education
policies. This chapter draws upon exploratory interviews with Japanese
university officials and explores how “student evacuees” have been
admitted and supported by Japanese universities since 2017. The authors
argue that, despite the positive reception and generous financial supportof this new programme, more support and expertise is needed from both
local and national government as well as civil society actors to enhanceprecarious humanitarian protection.
Part II delves into media representation and the public perception of
the presence of refugees in Japan and Taiwan, examining how media
coverage and public opinion can influence policymaking. Indeed, both
Taiwanese and Japanese governments are accountable to the international
community and their own nationals, and this is the perspective that Part
II brings in.
By building on a text-mining analysis, Chapter 7 by Cody Waikwok
Yau explores how the Taiwanese media has portrayed immigrants from
Hong Kong, including asylum seekers, in the context of recent political instability. In a bi-partisan political environment shaped by the issue
of independence from, and unification with, China, Hong Kong asylum
seekers’ media coverage has revolved around the issue of security. Whose
security, though? According to the author, media outlets have emphasised
concerns over both national security and immigrant security, highlighting
the complexity of this matter in Taiwanese public debates.
Chapter 8 by Zdenka Kyselova and Kristina Kironska explores public
opinion on refugees and asylum seekers in Japan. Drawing from quantitative data collected through a wide-ranging project, the Sinophone
Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey, conducted in 2022, this chapter examines a mixed and diverse range of opinions and attitudes held by theJapanese public towards foreigners, asylum seekers, and refugees. Interestingly, this study’s findings contradict the assumption that Japanese people

1

INTRODUCTION

19

are a priori anti-refugee. Chapter 9 by Kristina Kironska turns the focus to
Taiwan. Mirroring the previous chapter, Kironska also draws from quantitative data collected through the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-PacificSurvey and explores Taiwanese opinions with regard to refugees andasylum seekers. The chapter shows that, while there is a lack of discussion
about an asylum law in Taiwan, Taiwanese people hold generally positive
attitudes towards refugees and support the development of a formal legal
framework to regulate their access to Taiwan and protect their rights.
Chapter 10 by Sohrab Ahmadian explores the role of social media
in expressing and negotiating Kurdish cultural and political identities inJapan. The fact that Kurdish people, unlike many other displaced communities, do not possess a recognised sovereign territory, intensifies theirquest for identity. This distinct feature influences their political actions
and motivations. By building up a content analysis of Facebook posts by
Kurdish users in Japan, this chapter shows how Kurdish nationalism isat the core of Kurdish refugees’ social media activism, helping to foster
public awareness, producing and disseminating a coherent and inclusive
political discourse on behalf of the Kurdish diaspora, and providing a valuable platform for public diplomacy between Kurdish political elites andJapanese politicians and activists.
Part III brings the perspectives of refugees and asylum seekers into thediscussion. Clearly, it is not possible to understand the impact of public
opinion or a weak or absent legal framework without taking into consideration the experiences of refugees and asylum seekers. Through their
voices, everyday experiences, and collective actions, it is possible to appreciate not only the weaknesses of immigration policies and the impact of astigmatising media on the public debate, but also how broader social andpolitical changes could eventually be achieved.
Chapter 11 by Mei-lin Pan and Dolma Tsering explores the lived experiences of Tibetan refugees in Taiwan. Drawing on in-depth interviews
and government reports, this chapter offers a detailed account of thechanging status of Tibetans in Taiwan in light of Taiwan’s political transformation over the past few decades. The authors argue that different
state interests shaped the status of Tibetan refugees in Taiwan during theperiods of authoritarian rule and of democratisation. Chapter 12 by Shufen Lin brings attention to the presence of the Vietnamese refugees whoarrived in Taiwan after the end of the Vietnam War. Building on the life
history of Father Nguyển Văn Hùng, a Vietnamese refugee who later
became a human rights advocate in Taiwan, this chapter explores how

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the politics of colonisation, civil war, the Cold War, and globalisation haveshaped the lives of Vietnamese refugees dispersed around the world, andtheir transnational activism.
Chapter 13 by Kate Hannah Martin brings into the discussion a timely
issue, namely displacement due to climate change. Pacific Islands havebeen highly impacted by climate change and many of their inhabitants
have emigrated. Building on secondary sources on migrant experiences
and looking at potential legal protection offered to climate refugees, thischapter explores whether Taiwan and Japan could be a viable option forrelocation. This chapter argues that although both Taiwan and Japan havethe capacity to accept climate-displaced people from the Pacific Islands,
this should be seen as a complex process involving not only financial
considerations but also integration patterns, and ensuring that displaced
people can become active, valuable members of society.
Chapter 14 by Firman Budianto and Yusy Widarahesty, looks at thepresence of Indonesian work seekers who have left their country in hopeof gaining a refugee status in Japan. Drawing on ethnographic field notes
and in-depth interviews with Indonesian migrants, this chapter highlights the existence of various subjective rationales behind a request for
asylum. In the case of Indonesian workers in Japan, it could be motivated by broader structural conditions in the sending and host countries,
and it could also be a survival strategy for those who aspire to improvetheir life and economic opportunities. Chapter 15, co-written by theeditors, concludes the volume by summarising its main findings and theirimplications for research and policy.

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PART I

Legal and Policy Frameworks of the Refugee
Regimes in Japan and Taiwan

CHAPTER 2

Refugee Protection in Japan and Taiwan:
Common Challenges and Ways Forward
for Human Security
Bonny Ling

and Mariko Hayashi

Introduction
Contemporary discourse on international migration reflects its status asa volatile political issue. This is the case in various countries and acrossregions, where metaphors such as “a flood” or “an invasion” of migrants
heading to “fortressed” borders have conveniently over-simplified thecomplex issues of migration (Musolff, 2011; Shariatmadari, 2015). Japanand Taiwan are not exceptions in this political discourse. Concerns of

B. Ling (B)Work Better Innovations, Portsmouth, UKe-mail: bonny.ling@wbi.org.uk
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
M. Hayashi
Southeast and East Asian Centre (SEEAC), London, UK
e-mail: mariko@seeac.org.uk© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_2

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national security, financial insecurity, and discrimination, in largely ethnically homogeneous populations, make rigorous and objective examinationand implementation of migration policies difficult in both Japan andTaiwan. At the same time, an honest and critical examination of refugeeprotection in both countries is neither a mere academic exercise nor is a
topic relating to issues relevant only outside of their borders. For example,
in February 2023, reports emerged of local residents of Japan’s Okinawa
Prefecture, the island groups closest to Taiwan, planning to undergo evacuation drills in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. In such a scenario,
official plans indicate that authorities would evacuate around 20,000 local
residents to Japan’s main southern island of Kyushu each day, by air
and sea (United Daily News, 2023). Evacuation would begin from the
Sakishima Islands, which include the country’s westernmost inhabitedisland located just over 100 km away from Taiwan. Although the news
report does not raise this explicitly, it can be assumed that while local residents of Sakishima are evacuated, Taiwanese refugees would seek safety bysea, potentially trying to reach Sakishima.
The international protection regime for refugees is in many respects
accepted in Taiwan and Japan as a diplomatic sign of being a responsible global player. To fully align with the protection regime, this chapter
concludes that Japan and Taiwan must go deeper to the foundational
aspects of society, offering genuine protection and creating an environment where displaced individuals can thrive. This means creating anenvironment where individuals are not only free from fear and the politicalpersecution that forms the current definition of a refugee in internationallaw, but also one where the person is free from want and enjoys freedomof speech and belief—the Four Freedoms that conceptually underpin the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). On 10 December
1948, member states of the newly formed United Nations (UN) General
Assembly met in Paris and adopted the UDHR. The declaration’s Article
14(1) sets out that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in othercountries asylum from persecution”.
The Refugee Convention of 1951 (the “Convention”), as an international treaty, gives legal effect to this right for individuals to seek
asylum. It defines, in Article 1(A)(2), a refugee as someone who needs
to access this international protection system “owing to well-founded fearof being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membershipof a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail

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himself of the protection of that country”. A tension is presented in thatwhile an individual has the right to seek asylum, the state is not obliged
to grant it (Goodwin-Gill, 1982). This is certainly also true for statesthat have ratified both the Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees (the “Protocol”) that broadened the Convention’s scope of application by removing the geographical and temporal
limits that restricted it to post-war Europe. States parties can also, in
reality, not accept a significant number of refugees, as in the case of Japan.
In this context, the Convention and Protocol, despite their universal
applicability, exemplify that ratification “seems to be more of a matterof promoting and protecting national interests rather than protecting
the rights of refugees … in an ‘institutionalisation-implementation gap’”(Betts & Orchard, 2014, as in Choi, 2019, p. 164).
Asia–Pacific is not only the world’s most populous region, but it also
has the largest regional refugee population. In 2019, according to theUN (2020), the Asia–Pacific hosted 7.8 million refugees and people inrefugee-like situations, accounting for 38% of the global refugee population. However, the region also has the lowest percentage of countries
that have ratified the Convention and Protocol—only 20 out of 48(Venturi, 2021). Non-ratification countries include Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, North Korea, and Mongolia, whose current governments have not shown any plan towards an eventual ratification. Anothercommon approach in the region is for states to ratify and formally become
state parties to the Convention, but then to restrict the domestic implementation of the Convention in such a manner as to offer little protection
in reality for those seeking asylum. Japan ratified the Convention andProtocol in October 1981 and January 1982 respectively, and is oneof the most important donors to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).
Japan, however, has adopted a strict definition of refugees in its asylum

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process and has granted refugee status to just over 1% of asylum applications during the 40 years from the ratification of the Convention until
2021.1
The road forwards for Taiwan in its relationship with the Convention is less clear than either of the options above. Since 1971, Taiwan
has existed outside the UN system. It cannot formally become a stateparty to international treaties, but this doesn’t preclude the possibility
that Taiwan may hold itself bound to the Convention and commit to
the implementation of the treaty domestically, as if it were a state party.
Taiwan used a unique procedure for incorporating the two international
human rights covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), into its domestic law in 2009 (Chen,
2019). Taiwan can do the same for the Convention. In May 2022, theadministration of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Tsai
Ing-wen released the country’s first National Human Rights Action Plan
(NHRAP). Among the eight major human rights priorities identified by
the plan was the goal for the government to review Taiwan’s refugeeprotection policies and establish legislative and administrative asylum
procedures by 2024 (Executive Yuan, 2022a; Executive Yuan, 2022b;
Focus Taiwan, 2022). As it currently stands, the plan does not stipulate
if the commitment is to eventually lead to Taiwan legally incorporating
the Convention into a national asylum law, or whether it would remain
outside the international framework for the protection of refugees.
This chapter examines the current situation of refugee protection inboth Japan and Taiwan through an analysis of primary sources (lawand policy documents), civil society reports, academic articles, and news
reports. For the Taiwanese context, because the island lacks formalised
procedures for dealing with asylum seekers, our analysis benefits fromdetailed discussions with one former member of the Taiwan Associationfor Human Rights (TAHR) who was engaged in refugee work in Taiwan.
For the discussions on Japan’s refugee protection regime, a particular

1 Calculation made by the authors based on official data released by the Immigration

Services Agency (ISA, n.d.a) of Japan at https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/content/001393
014.pdf on the total number of asylum applications per year from 1982 to 2021 andthe number of positive decisions each year. Over the near 40 years, the total number ofapplicants was 87,892, from which a total of 915 asylum applications resulted in a positive
decision. This represented a percentage of 1.04%.

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focus is the gap between the international standards in the protectionof asylum seekers and refugees and its domestic implementation. These
challenges are also present in the Taiwanese context. Since promoting
human security is an important aspect of Japan’s foreign aid policy andofficial development assistance (ODA), this chapter uses a human security
lens to examine some common challenges in both of these jurisdictions.
The chapter concludes with reflections on the potential and the limits oflaw, if state parties like Japan do not implement the spirit of the Convention domestically, and if countries like Taiwan continue to address refugeeprotection without an established legislative framework. Implementing ahuman security lens for refugee protection that promotes equitable andhuman-centric solutions in Japan, Taiwan, and elsewhere, requires strong
public support.

Externalisation of Refugee Protection in Japan
Japan’s relationship with the international refugee protection regime
is marked by dichotomy. Japan, a state party of the Convention andProtocol, contributed US$167.7 million in 2022 alone, making it the
fourth largest government donor to the UNHCR, after the US, Germany,and the European Union (UNHCR, n.d.a, n.d.b). UNHCR (n.d.c)stated that the consistent support of Japan over the years to global
initiatives, such as the Sustainable Development Goals, human security, and the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, made the country“unquestionably … a key supporter of refugees and displaced people”.
The generosity of the Japanese government in providing funding to the
UNHCR, however, stands in sharp contrast to its poor record of granting
refugee status to those who seek asylum in Japan. Refugee protection isfrequently treated by the government as a distant issue. In his speech at
the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants, held in New York in 2016,
then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe highlighted Japan’s efforts in assisting
Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan through the country’s ODA. He
announced Japan’s commitment, “as an advocate of human security”, inproviding a humanitarian package of about US$2.8 billion in assistanceto refugees, migrants, and host communities in the Middle East (MOFA,
2016). It was notable in these remarks that Abe did not once mention
refugees and asylum seekers in Japan. In the following year, the UNHCR
criticised Japan for its low asylum acceptance numbers and urged thecountry to do more for refugee protection (Wilson, 2017).

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Refugee Definition “by the letter, if not [the] spirit”
Behind Japan’s strict asylum process is a unique definition of refugees.
Following a very narrow interpretation of the Convention, the asylum
process requires applicants to prove that they are individually targeted andpersecuted in order to be recognised as refugees (JAR, 2017). Belonging
to a persecuted group or fleeing a war or conflict alone is often not considered as a basis for refugee recognition. Japan’s narrow definition of theterm refugee means that individuals who would have been recognised as
refugees by other countries or the UNHCR might not be granted refugee
status in Japan. Providing evidence of individual persecution is extremely
difficult or impossible for many people who flee their home countries
in crisis situations, resulting in poor success rates of asylum applications(JAR, 2017). Therefore, as Saburo Takizawa, the former representativeof UNHCR Tokyo Office, described, most refugees are excluded fromJapan’s very narrow definition of refugees, underscoring that Japan abides“by the letter, if not [the] spirit” (Chan, 2018) of the Convention.
The strict definition of refugee means that Japan does not recognise individuals fleeing the Russian invasion of Ukraine as refugees. In
Japan, Ukrainian people who fled the war are officially referred to as
hinanmin, literally meaning “evacuees” instead of nanmin, the term used
for refugees. Compared to individuals fleeing wars and conflicts in othercountries such as Syria and Myanmar, the Japanese government showed
generous support to Ukrainian hinanmin. Just over a month after Russia’s
invasion began, in February 2022, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa
Hayashi visited Poland and came back to Japan with 20 Ukrainian “evacuees” on a government plane to show Japan’s support for the war-torncountry (Nikkei Asia, 2022). The government made a number of special
arrangements to speedily admit evacuees from Ukraine to Japan and toallow them to switch their visa to ones that permit work and study. Local
authorities, businesses, and educational institutions joined the government initiatives to assist Ukrainian evacuees, offering a wide range of
support, including help with language learning, employment, and freeor subsidised accommodation.
As of March 2023, over 2360 Ukrainians had arrived in Japan,
according to official information from the Japanese government (ISA,
n.d.b). To place Japan’s low asylum acceptance numbers into a comparative perspective, the number of Ukrainian “evacuees” who were acceptedin less than one year is more than double the total number of refugee

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statuses granted by Japan since it ratified the Convention in 1981.
Ukrainian evacuees were admitted to Japan without going through thelengthy and complex refugee application process. Conditions for entryof Ukrainian evacuees were relaxed, for example, compared to those
for Afghans seeking asylum after the Taliban’s takeover in 2021. Naoko
Hashimoto, an academic and a refugee examination counsellor for the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ), explained that “there are political and geopolitical factors behind this special treatment”, with the Prime Minister
Fumio Kishida committing to work alongside other Group of Seven (G7)countries on supporting Ukraine (Itakura, 2022).
Similar to the arrangement with Ukrainian evacuees, there was anothertime when Japan opened its doors to those fleeing a conflict. Following
the Vietnam War, in the late 1970s over 11,000 Indochinese refugees
from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia resettled in Japan (Koike, 2011).
With the outbreak of the Indochina refugee crisis, there was increasing
international pressure on Japan as the world’s then-second richest
country, along with domestic public support, to help refugees (Havens,
1990). In response to this pressure, the Japanese Cabinet made an agreement, specifically for accepting Indochinese refugees in 1979, rather thancoming up with a comprehensive policy on the treatment of asylum
seekers fleeing any wars and conflicts (Flowers, 2008). This experienceof accepting Indochinese refugees led Japan to become a state party to
the Convention in 1981 and to amend its immigration law to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (the “Immigration ControlAct”) in the following year.
To understand the rationale behind these policy decisions, Flowers(2008) analysed the conflict between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA) and the MOJ, the two state departments deeply involved in
discussions on the ratification of the Convention. While the MOFA
strongly recommended Japan’s ratification to promote good relationships with Western governments who were diplomatically importantto Japan, the MOJ strongly resisted, based on an objection to abolishing citizenship requirements for social welfare programmes and owing
to potential social disruption to the “homogeneous nation” (Flowers,
2008). Ratifying the Convention and amending domestic immigration
law, however, did not mean that Japan would continue to open its
doors to people who sought asylum, the same way it did for Indochinese refugees. Even after becoming a state party to the Convention in36

B. LING AND M. HAYASHI

1981, the MOJ, as the responsible ministry for the asylum determination process, continued to operate with its traditional attitude of control
towards foreign nationals, based on its primary responsibility to protect
Japan from irregular immigration, rather than embracing the norms andspirit of the Convention.
Control Over Protection
Under the Immigration Control Act, all asylum applications are handled
by the Immigration Services Agency (ISA) under the MOJ. Although
the agency uses the term “immigration services” in its English name,the original Japanese name Shutunyukoku Zairyu Kanri-cho literally translates to “immigration and residence control agency”. The names of thelaw and the competent authority that govern the asylum process imply
Japan’s predominant focus on the “control” of foreign nationals enteringand residing in the country, viewing refugees as subjects to control rather
than as rights holders to protect. Some argue that Japan’s ratification of
the Convention followed the country’s strategy to strengthen immigration control and that this strategy has largely succeeded. Koike (2011)
contends that Japan, in fact, used the Convention to strengthen its
border control by applying the strict interpretation of the Convention
to define refugees. This “control over protection” approach is perpetuated in the restrictive asylum process despite a number of amendments tothe domestic law and the asylum process.
Since the Immigration Control Act came into force in 1982, and until
the first amendments of the asylum process in 2004, the so-called “60-day
rule” prevented displaced individuals from applying for asylum 60 days
after arriving in Japan or after learning of a change in circumstances intheir home countries. This meant that even those who were recognised
as refugees would not automatically be granted legal status to reside inJapan, if they did not comply with the rule (Ishikawa, 2021). It was only
when the rule was abolished in 2004 that the “permission for provisional
stay” was introduced to allow asylum applicants without legal residency
in Japan to temporarily remain, so they would not be subject to deportation before their cases concluded. While some improvements were made,Japan’s asylum process continued to lack key elements to ensure fairness,such as access to legal support, high-quality and independent interpreters,
transparency on decision-making, and an independent appeal process(Flowers, 2008). The Japan Association for Refugees (JAR) (n.d.) has

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criticised current practices on the grounds that the asylum determination
process is highly opaque in comparison to international standards.
From Control to a Rights-Based Policy?
A clear opportunity to further strengthen the control came when theDiet, Japan’s national legislature, passed an immigration reform bill toamend the Immigration Control Act in June 2023. The controversial bill
was enacted after the Cabinet submitted it to the Diet in March 2023.
The amended law allows the government to deport asylum seekers withpending third applications or subsequent appeals if the ISA does notrecognise adequate justification. It also makes deportation of first-time
asylum applicants possible if they have been sentenced to imprisonment
for three or more years or are suspected of being involved in terrorism or
similar activities (ISA, n.d.c). The provisions of this amended law mirrors
a similar bill debated in the Diet in 2021 which was withdrawn afterfacing strong criticism from the opposition, civil society, and the international community. This followed the high-profile in-detention death ofa Sri Lankan undocumented woman who was denied adequate medicalcare (Amnesty International, 2023). The UNHCR (2021) had criticised
the earlier bill and now the amended Immigration Control Act for contravening both international norms for refugee protection and the principleof non-refoulement, whereby states are prohibited from forcibly returning
any individual who would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return.
As the amendment bill made its way through the Diet, several UN
human rights experts, including the Special Rapporteur on the humanrights of migrants, raised concerns that “the new amendment bill would
maintain a system based on a presumption of detention”, and that detention is considered to be arbitrary without a maximum period of detention
and periodical judicial reviews of continued detention (Morales et al.,2023). Another concern raised by the UN human rights experts, membersof the opposition, and civil society organisations is the introduction of“monitoring measures” that would permit asylum seekers who are given
detention orders to live outside detention centres but under monitoringand supervision of private actors, such as NGOs, supporters, and family
members (Human Rights Now, 2023). These new measures include
penalties for those who supervise individuals on release, if they fail toreport as required by the ISA, creating and normalising citizen-to-citizen
surveillance (Tokyo Shimbun, 2023).

38

B. LING AND M. HAYASHIAs the debate over the immigration reform bill increasingly attracted
public attention in late March 2023, the Japanese government released
guidelines on refugee recognition for the first time. The guidelines
included gender and sexuality related persecution as terms for consideration and noted that fear of persecution cannot be denied only because
the individual is not personally persecuted, while “realistic risks” of persecution must be proved in order for the individual to be considered forrefugee recognition (ISA, 2023). While the efforts for improved transparency and what appears to be a possible change in Japan’s narrow
definition of refugees were welcome, it is notable that the Justice Minister
Ken Saito stated in a press conference that the handbook “does not
expand the scope of recognition” and is not aimed to “increase thenumber of people granted refugee status” (MOJ, 2023). Whether thegovernment will re-consider asylum seekers whose applications were
rejected prior to the introduction of the guidelines remains unclear.

Taiwan: Civil Society’s Longstanding
Quest for an Asylum Law
As noted by the editors and other authors in the book, Taiwan currently
does not have a national asylum law. Taiwan also operates without anestablished legislative or administrative framework for refugee protection
or for asylum determination. Procedures concerning refugee protection
are ad hoc, with official support services rarely provided for those seeking
asylum in Taiwan (Former TAHR representative, personal communication, February 2, 2023). Nevertheless, the history of modern Taiwan is
not removed from a history of population displacement and resettlement.
For example, individuals of Myanmarese origin or descent represent oneof Taiwan’s largest minority groups, estimated at around 40,000 (Prentice, 2017). After the Chinese Civil War, in the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese
Nationalist troops who retreated to Thailand and Myanmar continued
to fight against the Chinese Communists by launching periodic borderincursions (Chang, 2001; Clymer, 2014; Qin, 2015). While some soldiersand their families were eventually evacuated to Taiwan, others stayed inSoutheast Asia and did not enjoy the rights of citizenship of their adopted
lands (Cheung, 2019; Qin, 2015). Their descendants, however, could
come to Taiwan for language and cultural exchange programmes and,
until 1999, could be granted Taiwanese citizenship. When this policy

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39

was changed, civil society organisations in Taiwan, including the Thai–
Myanmar Chinese Refugee Rights Association, strongly criticised themove. Civil society was subsequently successful in advocating for thisstateless population, with its close ties to Taiwan, to be allowed to stayand obtain Taiwanese citizenship after a residency of three years (Cheung,2019).
Refugees and National Security
In Taiwan, concerns over national security vis-à-vis China, facilitatedby a perceived backdoor of espionage through a humanitarian refugeeprogramme—especially as Beijing intensifies its rhetoric of invasion—havelong stymied efforts to establish a national asylum system. While theseconcerns are often raised in contemporary domestic discussions on Taiwan
offering some form of protection for individuals fleeing China and Hong
Kong, they are not new. Taiwan, owing to its status outside the UN
system and under threat of takeover by China, exists under a heightened
sensitivity to national security. A significant part of Taiwan’s population
has vivid family histories of forced migration, with families arriving in
Taiwan from mainland China in difficult post-conflict situations broughton by the Chinese Civil War. For Taiwan, the issue of refugee protection,
especially for individuals who come from communities that have somelink to mainland China, however removed, has a historical background of
conflict, mistrust, and questions of political loyalty. This was seen in thetreatment of exiled Tibetans decades ago, along with political dissidents
from China and the recent arrivals of Hong Kongers.
Exiled Tibetans in Taiwan present a thorny category for the government. Because the Chinese Nationalist leadership that retreated to Taiwan
harboured ambitions of retaking China and considered Tibet to be a partof China, many Tibetans viewed the early Taiwanese policies, towards
them and towards the Tibetan Government in Exile, with little enthusiasm (Tethong, 2018, p. 64). A small number of exiled Tibetans cameto Taiwan and settled during the Cold War, but the vast majority of exiled
Tibetans arrived under a state-sponsored programme for vocational andeducational training from 1980 to the late 1990s (Pan, 2015, pp. 47–48).
This programme provided short-term training for exiled Tibetans aged
16 to 35, with the aim of improving their economic situation, while also
showcasing Taiwan as an ally of Tibet (Pan, 2015). During this time, thecompetent authority for processing the applications of exiled Tibetans for40

B. LING AND M. HAYASHI

training was moved from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs, and Tsering (2022b) noted that treating exiled Tibetans
as foreigners or refugees in Taiwan, instead of being overseas Chinese, wasa significant policy development. Nevertheless, reflecting their ambiguous
status in Taiwanese society, Tibetans in Taiwan are often described as
being treated as “neither compatriot nor refugee” (Kironska, 2022; Pan,
2015; Tsering, 2022b).
The cases of the neither-compatriots-nor-refugees Tibetans in Taiwan,
the former soldiers of the Chinese Nationalists in Myanmar and Thailand, and their stateless descendants are complex legacies of the Chinese
Civil War. Chinese Nationalists lost to the Chinese Communist Party
and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, but the ripples of the loss have had
a far reach. To fully understand the localised refugee context for Taiwan,
one must recognise that the legacy of the Chinese Civil War runs to thepresent day. Concerns over the national security of Taiwan are not rhetorical but are the ever-present undercurrents that have long stymied efforts
to set up a national asylum system. In May 2021, a man from Fujian
Province in Southern China sailed through the heavily patrolled Taiwan
Strait in his claimed pursuit of freedom and equality in Taiwan. In theimmediate aftermath of the crossing, Taiwan’s military leaders were quick
to doubt the man’s intentions and version of events, while assuring the
public that the man’s successful crossing did not reveal shortcomings in
the island’s maritime defences (Davidson, 2021). This case exemplifies
the challenge of refugee protection for Taiwan, particularly in the way
perceived national security breaches took top billing in the news reportsof this crossing from China.
It is not unexpected that Taiwan’s attention on political asylum, while
being framed by national security, is heavily focused on China. National
security concerns for the survival of Taiwan have long complicateddomestic discussions on granting asylum, whether or not the measures
are rational and justifiable. For instance, security concerns and distrustof individuals seeking political asylum from China have remained, despite
marriages between Taiwanese and Chinese nationals representing morethan 60% of all registered marriages between a Taiwanese national and a

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41

foreign spouse from 1987 to 2022.2 Taiwan started to receive applications of Chinese nationals seeking asylum via irregular migratory routes
after 2000, with the first of such asylum cases received by TAHR beingthat of Tang Yuanjun who was later resettled in the US (Chiu, 2018,p. 157; TAHR, 2002). After Tang, other Chinese dissidents, such as Chen
Rongli and Yan Peng, who sought asylum in Taiwan after 2004, were notable to be resettled in a third country and stayed in Taiwan on a succession of three-month visas (Chiu, 2018). During this time, they could notwork or enrol for national health insurance. After ten years of waiting,they received their permanent residency and their right to work in Taiwan(Chiu, 2018).
In recent years, Hong Kong residents arriving in Taiwan to escapepolitical crackdowns have brought awareness of the issue of refugeeprotection to the forefront in Taiwan. While many Hong Kongers may
have been attracted by the geographical and cultural proximity of Taiwan
to Hong Kong, many were eventually left disappointed by the difficultyof meaningfully integrating into Taiwanese life and society. When individuals fleeing political crackdowns in Hong Kong first arrived in Taiwan
in 2019, the Taiwanese government relied on ad hoc measures, such as
extending their residency visa on a monthly basis, which severely limited
their ability to integrate into Taiwanese life (Nachman & Hioe, 2019).
While the situation improved in 2020, the same year that Hong Kong’s
National Security Law was introduced, Taiwan set up a dedicated Taiwan–
Hong Kong Service Exchange Office to assist individuals from Hong
Kong and Macau to resettle by making it easier for them to study andwork in Taiwan (Hale, 2023).
Serious problems and sensitivities remain. Foremost is the concern overirregular entries into Taiwan, as underscored by separate cases of Hong
Kong activists trying to reach Taiwan via boat crossing. While Article 14
of Taiwan’s Laws and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong and Macao
2 Calculation made by the authors based on official data released by the
Executive Yuan, Gender Equality Committee of Taiwan and collected by the
National Immigration Agency of the Ministry of Interior (Executive Yuan, 2023),
and at https://www.gender.ey.gov.tw/GecDB/Stat_Statistics_DetailData.aspx?sn=lJvq%
2BGDSYHCFfHU73DDedA%3D%3D, on the number of registered marriages between
a Taiwanese and Chinese national, excluding individuals from Hong Kong and Macau(355,124) out of the number of all registered marriages between a Taiwanese national
and a foreign spouse (577,900) from January 1987 to December 2022. This represented
a percentage of 61.45%.

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B. LING AND M. HAYASHI

Affairs requires legal entry into Taiwan or residency of valid duration(i.e. no overstay), this strict prohibition is difficult to maintain in lightof the humanitarian imperative and the deteriorating political situationin Hong Kong. The Taiwanese government is walking a tightrope on
asylum seekers from Hong Kong, not wanting to escalate tensions with
China while seeking to uphold its democratic values. In recent years,
more legislative voices have stressed the advantages of a low-key andunofficial system to provide refuge and assistance to political dissidents
from China and Hong Kong. Legislator Wang Ting-yu of the DPP in
Taiwan stressed in 2020 that Hong Kong activists have already reached
Taiwan through “unofficial” channels, without “need[ing] to beat a bigdrum” and put the government in the spotlight (Jennings, 2020). While
discussions on how Hong Kongers can seek asylum in Taiwan remainunresolved—obstructed and complicated by national security concernsthat mark all matters—the prolonged unclarity and Taiwan’s immigration
labyrinth have driven some Hong Kongers to leave, citing the impossibility of integration. Others have stayed in “an imperfect exile” in Taiwan(Lai & Wu, 2022).
National Human Rights Action Plan and Refugee Protection
Reacting to persistent civil society criticism that Taiwan needs a formalised
asylum system, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan released the country’s first
NHRAP in May 2022, which identified eight key human rights priorities.
Among these priorities was an official commitment on refugee protection. The plan called on Taiwan to codify legal mechanisms for refugees
to seek asylum and to clarify related application procedures (Executive
Yuan, 2022b). This development was a significant moment for Taiwan
civil society’s longstanding advocacy for a national asylum law, to betterset out the legislative and policy framework for refugee protection. Nevertheless, the NHRAP does not commit Taiwan to legislate an asylum law.
It also does not indicate if the official commitment is to eventually lead
Taiwan to legally incorporate the Convention and Protocol into a national
asylum law, in the same way that both the ICCPR and the ICESCR wereincorporated into Taiwan domestic law in 2009 (Chang, 2019). Current
advocacy by Taiwanese civil societies for the government to abide by theprinciple of non-refoulement and the Convention on Torture—without
specifically pushing for Taiwan to incorporate the Convention into thedomestic legal framework—suggests that the Convention is not regarded

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as an advocacy priority (Former TAHR representative, personal communication, July 12, 2023). Though important as an international legal
instrument, the Convention is seen by some advocating organisations as
outdated (Former TAHR representative, personal communication, July12, 2023).
However Taiwan evolves regarding its relationship with the Convention and the broader issue of addressing the challenge of protection for
individuals exercising their fundamental right to seek asylum, the country
cannot ignore the urgency for reform. Its current asylum situation isalready more complicated than the established landscape of national security and refugee protection that Taiwan is perhaps more attuned to.
Beyond cases from China and Hong Kong, Taiwan has already received
asylum seekers from Syria, Turkey, Uganda, South Korea, and Egypt,
but there are no official statistics released on asylum seekers and applications (Kironska, 2022). For instance, TAHR only finds out about asylum
seekers who have arrived in Taiwan from the media or through government contacts. From 2013 to 2017, TAHR counted 40 such cases in
Taiwan but this information is not confirmed by the government (Former
TAHR representative, personal communication, April 13, 2023). A firstdraft asylum law was sent for reading in the Taiwanese legislature in 2005.
Since then, other versions were also submitted in 2011 and 2012 andwere discussed in public hearings but did not proceed further under theprevious administration. The latest attempt was in 2016, under the new
DPP administration of President Tsai Ing-wen, but that too failed togain traction within the Parliament past initial readings (Kironska, 2022,
p. 246).

Common Challenges for Integrationand Human Security
Notwithstanding the fact that Japan and Taiwan are in different situations with respect to the Convention—one is a state party while theother is not and has made no indication that it will consider holding itself
bound by the Convention—the most notable point of comparison is theimportance of refugee assistance in the foreign policy of both countries.
Besides its significant contributions to the UNHCR, Japan’s foreign aid
assistance to humanitarian projects supporting the protection and integration of displaced populations, refugees, and internally displaced people,
is a central prong of its overseas development strategy. This is largely a44

B. LING AND M. HAYASHI

legacy of Sadako Ogata, the Japanese diplomat and respected academic
who served as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 1991 to
2000 and continued to be a strong advocate for human security after stepping down from leading the UNHCR. She later served as the Co-Chairof the UN Commission on Human Security and the President of Japan
International Cooperation Agency, and supported the use of ODA to help
solve the problems of displacement, reconstruction, and reintegration.
Compared to Japan’s ODA, Taiwan’s overseas development work does
not have the same emphasis on human security, with the theme of humansecurity scarcely featuring in Taiwan’s annual International Cooperation
and Development Reports. In the latest report by Taiwan’s Ministry ofForeign Affairs, called the International Cooperation and Development
Report of 2020, human security appeared twice and only in the context
of material donations to a policy research centre and funds on humansecurity (MOFA Taiwan, 2021). Taiwan’s ODA for work with refugees
only appeared in Turkey, Jordan, and Thailand (MOFA Taiwan, 2021,
pp. 18, 26, 29, 33). Taiwan simply does not prioritise human security to
the same degree as Japan in its ODA. This, however, does not mean thatrefugee protection does not feature in Taiwan’s foreign policy or is absent
from considerations about how Taiwan wants to be seen domestically andexternally. For example, the draft asylum law that was previously read in
the Taiwan legislature in 2016 spoke of this desire for Taiwan to be seen
as a responsible global player on human rights and refugee protection,
citing the asylum procedures and laws of the US, UK, Canada, Japan,
and South Korea and other countries to support the case that Taiwan
should also have a national asylum law (Legislative Yuan, 2016).
Ad hoc Refugee Protection, with or without the Refugee Convention
Beyond the external layer of diplomacy, however, is a more complicatedsituation concerning domestic support for refugee protection. Both Japanand Taiwan appear to prefer an ad hoc approach to refugee protection,and the Convention features lightly in both contexts. In the case ofJapan, this has allowed it to decide which group can receive preferential
treatment, while the asylum determination for others must adhere to avery strict interpretation of a refugee under the Convention. In contrast,
Taiwan’s process on asylum determination and refugee protection is bydefault ad hoc and is not established by any law or administrative procedure. While Taiwan’s inaugural NHRAP commits the government to2

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45

codify legal mechanisms for refugees to seek asylum and to clarify related
application procedures, it is not clear on whether the government willconsider holding itself bound as a state party to the Convention.
The externalisation of the refugee problem by both Japan and Taiwan
means that, when refugee protection becomes a domestic issue, policysetting around this topic, from debates over the ratification of theConvention (as in the case of Japan) or whether to legislate a national
asylum law (as in the case of Taiwan), is driven by domestic politicalconsiderations and influences. Practically, this means that, like any foreign
nationals in most countries, asylum seekers are not part of the electorate
at the national level and their rights protection does not dominate press
coverage. Politicians are rarely incentivised to speak up on issues of migration, especially during election years. This tension is underscored by thefact that discussions on the protection of refugees, even though the issue
is one out of the eight human rights priorities set by Taiwan’s inaugural
NHRAP that was only released in 2022, hardly featured in the midterm
election that took place later in the same year. Likewise, a 2017, 300-pageedited volume of academic studies on the Taiwan voter contained not one
reference to refugees or asylum seekers (Achen & Wang, 2017). This is
not unexpected. Affirming the benefits of migration is often not a popularelectoral issue, in Taiwan, Japan, or other countries of destination.
The tension between refugee protection as an external diplomatic
tool and domestic implementation of the spirit of the Convention is
exemplified by Japan’s efforts on refugee resettlement. In 2010, Japanacknowledged the importance of “burden sharing” refugee resettlement
worldwide and launched a pilot refugee resettlement programme, thefirst in Asia to do so (MOFA, n.d.). The programme, however, was only
open to a specific preferred group of refugees deemed to be best suitedfor Japan. As recorded by the Cabinet Secretariat of Japan (2008), thegovernment set a requirement that refugees resettling in Japan must be
Karen refugee families in Thailand’s Mae La camp, who supposedly “havethe ability to adapt to Japanese society and would be able to have a job toearn their own living”. The government planned to resettle 90 refugees
over three years. In reality, however, only 45 refugees were involvedin the three-year pilot programme due to a limited interest from the
Karen group in question; some initially considered resettlement in Japan
but withdrew as they felt uneasy about their future in Japan (Takizawa,
2015). After the pilot period, the Japanese government later changed thetargeted groups to Myanmarese refugees in Malaysia and the relatives of

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those who had resettled from Thailand in the pilot programme. A totalof 250 refugees have resettled in Japan over 13 years, as of April 2023
(MOFA, 2023).
Ager and Strang’s (2004) “Indicators of Integration” describe employment, housing, education, and health as markers and means for theachievement of integration. Depending on the groups of refugees (orevacuees) or individual cases, refugees experience these four indicators very differently in both Japan and Taiwan, especially comparedto Ager and Strang’s ideal scenario of integration. A comprehensive
integration support system—informed and co-produced by all stakeholders, including national and local authorities, NGOs, experts in
refugee protection, local communities, and refugees themselves—must
be provided to asylum seekers. UNHCR’s (2002) guideline clearly statesthat “‘integration potential’ should not play a determining role in theconsideration of protection resettlement cases”. The criteria set by theJapanese government for the resettlement programme, which emphasises cultural adaptability and employability, reflects the government’s
desire to minimise both social and economic costs (Takizawa, 2015)
while improving Japan’s image in the international community (Koike,2011). It overlooks the state’s responsibility to ensure a comprehensive
support system for refugees, regardless of their abilities and qualifications,to integrate into their host society.
Human Security Risks for Asylum Seekers
The integration process is made even more difficult for refugees, in
Taiwan, owing to the absence of a national asylum law. Asylum applications and related services are considered on an ad hoc basis and are notframed as a state duty in Taiwan. This can give rise to varying outcomes in
the asylum determination process, ranging from receiving some support
and temporary residency to deportations that potentially violate the principle of non-refoulement (Kironska, 2022). While the asylum cases are
pending and considered on a case-by-case basis, Kironska (2022) notedthat the majority of asylum seekers in Taiwan need to rely on civil society
groups for assistance, such as for accommodation, medical treatment,
and psychological counselling. The same point was made by Pan (2015,
pp. 41–42) who noted, in the broader context of the protection of
refugees and displaced people worldwide, that they “are also subjected toarbitra[ry] and discriminatory treatment through government policy [or2

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47

the absence of such policy], even though they are entitled to fundamental
human rights under international law”.
In contrast to Taiwan, Japan has an established legislative and administrative framework to deal with asylum applications. It, however, focuses
more on immigration control than on refugee protection, negatively
impacting the human security of individuals seeking asylum. From thepoint of arrival in Japan, asylum seekers often face financial difficulties
and lack of access to daily necessities, such as food, clothing, shelter, oraccess to health care. Those facing destitution while their asylum cases arebeing assessed can apply for welfare assistance, which is around two-thirdsof the usual welfare benefits available to long-term residents or Japanesecitizens, and it is often a time-consuming process (JAR, n.d.). Asylum
seekers with legal status can switch their status to be permitted to work
temporarily only when their cases are considered to have a “high likelihood” of refugee recognition (MOJ, n.d.). Precarity and uncertainty cancontinue for many years, since the asylum process, on average, takes up to
three years to be determined and, in some instances, ten years (Tamura,2020). Additionally, welfare assistance for asylum seekers is now limited
to only those who are first-time applicants (Ishikawa, 2021).
The situation is much more difficult for those who are seeking asylum
as undocumented migrants in Japan, because they are not allowed towork, do not have access to social protection—including national healthinsurance—and can be subject to detention. Although some are given
provisional release from detention depending on their circumstances,
without access to work or welfare assistance they must rely on their social
network and charitable civil society assistance, as in the case of asylum
seekers in Taiwan. The strict and lengthy asylum process, combined withlack of access to work and social welfare, means that many asylum seekers
in Japan are highly vulnerable to destitution, poor health, and exploitation. In 2021, a Japanese NGO surveyed 141 individuals, who were given
provisional release from detention, on their life conditions (Kitakanto Iryo
Sodan Kai (AMIGOS), 2022). Results showed that 65% of those surveyed
said they felt it was “very difficult” or “difficult” to afford meals. Healthcare was also raised as a very serious concern. Survey results indicatedthat 84% experienced having to give up visiting medical facilities due tofinancial constraints (AMIGOS, 2022).
Arbitrary and indefinite detention of asylum seekers, and detention
conditions, also present significant risks of human rights violations. In

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2023, Amnesty International reported that the organisation had interviewed some migrants and asylum seekers in Japan who were held in
detention for several years. The detainees reported that they were “treatedlike animals” and “the only way to get out of the immigration detention
centre was to get sick or go on a hunger strike to the point of death”(Amnesty International, 2023). Previously, in August 2020, the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention of the UN’s Human Rights Council
adopted opinions recognising two cases of asylum seekers from Turkey
and Iran who were detained several times—with the longest detention
period of three or more years in the examined cases—stating that thedetention was arbitrary and in violation of the fundamental human rightsof the asylum seekers. One of them experienced physical abuse and both
did not receive adequate medical care in detention, resulting in thedeterioration of their physical and mental health. The Working Group
concluded that the asylum seekers had the right to receive compensationand that Japan had breached its state duty to respect human rights (UNHuman Rights Council, 2020).
Dasgupta (2022) highlights that Japan’s immigration policy, including
its refugee policy, is a typical example of a utilitarian-functional typeof policy that looks at foreign nationals through a cost–benefit analysis, treating groups of migrants differently based on their “usefulness”
to society, and placing most refugees in the least desirable ranks. The
response of Japan to Indochinese refugees, the resettlement programme,or Ukrainian “evacuees” implies that the government prefers to apply ad
hoc asylum arrangements to particular groups when it suits the country’s
political and diplomatic agenda, while continuing to impose strict controls
on other asylum seekers. The same criticism can be levied against Taiwan.
The situation of Tibetan refugees in Taiwan exemplifies this complexity
for Taiwan, which contrasts the government’s intent to be seen as a globally progressive, human rights-abiding country, with political concerns ofnational security. This is combined with the weight of historical baggage
from the Chinese Civil War, which resulted in population displacementand distrust amidst groups that once fought. This led one Tibetan scholar
in Taiwan to openly ask, “Who are [the Tibetan diaspora in Taiwan] andwhy they are invisible?” (Tsering, 2022a, 2022b).
Tsering (2022a, 2022b) points to the case of Tibetans who entered
Taiwan for vocational and educational training from 1980 to the late
1990s as the most disadvantaged minority group in Taiwan. While
Tibetans who arrived in Taiwan under this vocational and educational

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scheme could be an example of yet another utilitarian-functional typeof policy that assesses foreign nationals based on their perceived “usefulness” to the host society, such recognition of their “utility” is nota constant, immune from policy changes, and does not qualify as afulfilling and safe vocational and employment situation. In 1993, Taiwan’s
vocational and educational training programme for Tibetans came to an
abrupt end as Taiwan formally excluded exiled Tibetans from the status oflegal workers under the Employment Services Act (Pan, 2015). Already,before the change in the law that excluded exiled Tibetans from the scopeof the Employment Services Act, many of the Tibetan vocational andeducational scheme participants in Taiwan absconded from their assigned
vocational training due to arduous and unsafe working conditions (Pan,2015). They became undocumented migrants and faced difficulties in
Taiwan that made their lives more precarious than their refugee period
in South Asia.
In 1999, a group of undocumented Tibetans petitioned the Taiwanese
government and described their lives of insecurity:
Although we did not have nationality in India or Nepal, we were refugees
and at least were admitted as legal foreigners. In Taiwan, however, we still
do not have nationality and even worse have become illegal. We cannot
go back to our family in India or Nepal because we have no passports.
Thus we are trapped and have to live the past decade in fear and with little
protection. We can only do odd jobs; we cannot ask for medical help evenwhen we need it; we are afraid of the police in the streets, as we cannot
explain to people clearly our absurd situation. We cannot seriously develop
a relationship because it is impossible to have a legal marriage under suchcircumstances. (Pan, 2015, pp. 49–50)

This testimony underscores how immigration policy, including refugee
policy, that leans on utilitarian-functionality to assess the usefulness offoreign nationals, can bring about significant human insecurity and rights
violations. When government acceptance of their usefulness shifts, orwhen the label of usefulness is a mere cover for an exploitative labour
reality, this can bring economic hardship and human rights abuses forthe affected individual. Stating the obvious, human rights abuses canhappen even in hosting countries, such as Japan and Taiwan, which are
not conflict-affected areas.
Despite the external appearances of both jurisdictions being very
different when it comes to refugee protection—one is a party to the50

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Convention while the other is not (nor considers itself bound to theConvention despite being outside the international intergovernmental
system)—there are more similarities than differences. For both countries, refugee assistance serves a diplomatic purpose, by promoting thecountry’s contribution to externalised refugee issues, rather than implementing the international norms and spirit of refugee protection in theirown territories. There are, however, differences. Human security features
officially and prominently in Japan’s ODA in a way that is not seen for
Taiwan. Diplomatic concerns in terms of national security are also more
pronounced for Taiwan than they are for Japan, since the issue of refugeeprotection for Taiwan is tied to the thorny question of how to address
genuinely those fleeing political unrest from Hong Kong and Mainland China, without being perceived as opening a backdoor to facilitate
espionage.

Conclusions
Japan and Taiwan, two countries connected by geography and history,
are at an intersection for how they want to engage domestically withrefugee protection, beyond it being an issue of humanitarian assistanceand foreign aid. In March 2023, Japan released national guidelines onrefugee recognition. This is a notable first for Japan, which has consistently faced criticism that it accepts a much lower number of refugees
than it should. Similarly, the question of how Taiwan will offer asylum
has become ever pressing, with a growing international spotlight on theisland’s lack of a national asylum law and its acceptance of very few
refugees in reality. The deterioration of the political situation in neighbouring Hong Kong, the continuing unrest in Myanmar, and regressions
on democracy and human developments in the Asia–Pacific, have highlighted the positive roles that Japan and Taiwan could play to raiseawareness and respect for human rights across the region.
The experiences of Japan, both positive and negative, in its domestic
engagement with the issues of refugee protection, can provide a useful
guide for Taiwan. The current push from civil society for Taiwan to havean asylum law will set normative expectations for the country to abide
by international standards, rules, and practices for refugee protection.
The Convention, which addresses the specific vulnerability of refugees
and people seeking asylum, should be the foundation for refugee protection. Even though Taiwan is outside the UN system, any additional

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state support for the Convention will be a positive regional development. Despite global challenges of security, and economic downturns thathave contributed to population displacement and human insecurity, there
are opportunities that lie ahead. Japan and Taiwan do not operate in a
vacuum; both can choose to lead the discourse on refugee protection in
the Asia–Pacific that historically has seen low support for the Convention.
Looking at the experiences of Japan, ratification of the Convention
is not enough. Without a wide base of public awareness and support,
there is no meaningful refugee protection that aligns with the spirit of
the Convention. Absence of a national law on asylum, as in the caseof Taiwan, is detrimental to a transparent, predictable, and consistent
channel for asylum determination. However, this too, is not enough.
Japan has had the Immigration Control Act since 1982 as the administrative framework for the country’s asylum process, but the legislation
has not led to meaningful domestic protection of asylum seekers inJapan. The current act focuses on immigration control, and its limitations in protecting refugees are clear, so many human rights and refugee
experts have highlighted a need for a separate asylum law focusing on theimplementation of a fair asylum process by a specialised institution independent from immigration control (JAR, 2023). The establishment of an
independent institution for refugee protection was called for by the opposition in early 2023, but this proposal was not included in the amended
Immigration Control Act passed in June 2023 (Kyodo News, 2023).
Without a broad acceptance of the responsibility to take in refugees,
refugee protection will continue to be externalised. This calls for a
multitude of solutions to build and sustain public support for refugeeprotection, where gaps in law can be amended and realities can bereimagined to become ones based on respect for human dignity. A
glimmer of hope outside of the Convention was when Indonesia releaseda Presidential Regulation in 2016, setting an operational framework on
the treatment of asylum seekers, even though it is not a party to theConvention. With this regulation, asylum seekers in Indonesia are nottreated under the immigration act that stipulates the arrest and detention of migrants without documents (Missbach et al., 2018). Limitations,however, are still seen in a lack of resources and political will to implement
effective refugee protection under the regulation (Missbach et al., 2018).
Jones (2014) examines another alternative for Southeast Asia, a “lawof asylum” that guarantees “rights to individuals rather than refugees”
by arguing that many of the civil and political rights guarantees in the

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B. LING AND M. HAYASHI

Convention are already provided by major international human rights
treaties.
While criticisms of both approaches are valid—in that they, forexample, present options for states to sidestep the Convention by moving
to ad hoc systems—nevertheless, recent developments have illustrated that
there is no straightforward path for international refugee protection, as
seen in Western countries also backsliding on commitments to protect
refugees in search of safety. A practical solution may be to look at soft
law instruments, such as the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees and the
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, to build up
broad community support to offer real assistance to individuals seeking
sanctuary. The problem, however, is that soft law instruments emphasise the role of state cooperation, without concrete legal commitments.
They cannot completely fill the space of the international legal regime
for refugee protection. At the same time, the reverse can also be said of
the Convention. State ratification alone does not offer effective or meaningful protection if domestic laws render it inapplicable in reality—as in
the case of Japan. In the case of Taiwan, it is unclear what the impact of
Taiwan holding itself as a state party to the Convention would be if theisland continued to operate without an established national mechanism
for asylum determination.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution. It calls for us to use all the tools
available to foster greater refugee protection, for a region of the worldthat sees very high displacement risks and no regional human rights
treaty. In Japan and Taiwan, civil society has taken the lead in providing
refugees with essential lifelines and assistance. In both countries, there
is a small but increasingly visible group of migrants and refugees themselves speaking out for their own rights, leading to more meaningful
and rights-based debates. Hope lies in this space of active and dedicated civic engagement. The collaborative advocacy of many national andinternational NGOs, community groups, bar associations, academics, andopposition lawmakers played a pivotal role in bringing significant publicattention to the situations of refugees and asylum seekers in Japan during
parliamentary debates on the amended Immigration Control Act in 2023.
It is the longstanding and constant advocacy by Taiwan’s civil society
groups that has kept alive the dream for a national asylum law, while thecountry hopes to balance the duty to protect those fleeing from persecution with measures to ensure its political survival. In both Japan and2

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53

Taiwan, as it is in many countries, it is the strength of this civic engagement in democratic societies that sustains our hope for the future, of amore inclusive society where our Four Freedoms meet.
Acknowledgements The authors thank the book editors and the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on earlier versions of themanuscript. In addition, Bonny Ling is grateful to a former civil society representative who worked with refugees and asylum seekers in Taiwan for very helpful
discussions that informed the parts of this chapter that focused on the situationin Taiwan.

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Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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CHAPTER 3

Examining Refugee Protectionin Non-Signatories to the Refugee
Convention and Protocol: Lessons Learned
for the Taiwan Context
Christine Lin

Introduction
Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China (ROC), is not a memberof the United Nations (UN) and cannot officially accede to the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees (“Convention”) and the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) due to its
current status internationally. However, it is widely recognised that theconcept of non-refoulement is a principle of customary international lawthat binds all states (Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, 2003, p. 149). Even
though Taiwan is a non-signatory and does not have domestic refugee

C. Lin (B)Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, University of California College of theLaw, San Francisco, CA, USAe-mail: linc@uclawsf.edu© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_3

61

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C. LINlegislation, the government has an obligation under customary international law to ensure that non-citizens arriving on the island are notrefouled to places where they could face persecution. Additionally, Taiwan
has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Whileneither instrument directly refers to non-refoulement, Article 7 of the
ICCPR and Article 37 of the CRC have been interpreted to prohibit thereturn of individuals to a country where they may be subject to tortureor cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.1
Since Taiwan is not a UN member, it is unable to formally participate
in the UN treaty body review process. Instead, Taiwan has created its
own review process, which involves international experts, the Taiwanese
government, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Covenants
Watch, n.d.; National Human Rights Commission, n.d.). During boththe 2013 and 2017 review processes, the review committee recommended that Taiwan adopt a refugee act that includes the principle ofnon-refoulement (International Review Committee, 2017, p. 11). Draftsof the refugee act in Taiwan mention cooperation with the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in refugee statusdetermination (RSD) and refugee resettlement (Executive Yuan, 2016,
pp. 358, 360; Legislative Yuan, 2016, June 1). While the enactment of a
refugee legislation remains stalled, there are individuals seeking protection
from persecution on the island who remain in limbo and could benefit
from greater cooperation between the Taiwanese government and the
UNHCR.
Critics have voiced concern that the UNHCR, which was createdin 1950 to respond to the European refugee crisis in the aftermathof the Second World War, and the Convention are Eurocentric andnot protective of the needs of individuals displaced from other continents (Hathaway, 1990, p. 132; Janmyr, 2021, pp. 192–193; Madokoro,2022). For decades, the UNHCR has pushed for comprehensive regional
approaches to handle displacement, including in Asia (UNHCR, 1994;
1 The practice of refugee protection and adherence to non-refoulement principles varies
amongst non-signatories to the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Some non-signatories
have signed other international treaties with explicit non-refoulement provisions, such as
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and Article 16 of the International Convention for theProtection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, or complementary protection
such as in the ICCPR and CRC.

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Watkins, 2022, pp. 663–666). However, regional approaches have had
mixed results with regard to responsibility-sharing and protection. In
some instances, they have facilitated containment undermining the rightof individuals to move freely and seek safety beyond regional borders(Watkins, 2022, p. 667). While regional mechanisms and frameworks have
utility and are important, refugee protection remains a global responsibility (UNGA, 2016; United Nations, 2018). As such, the UNHCR,
which has over 70 years’ experience working in 137 countries, including
in non-UN member states and non-signatories to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, is well-placed to work with the government of Taiwan
to ensure that asylum seekers and refugees on the island receive protection(UNHCR, n.d.-b; n.d.-e).
This chapter examines the UNHCR’s role in non-UN member states,
as well as non-signatories in the Asia Pacific region, to draw lessons
learned for the Taiwan context. It concludes with recommendations toboth the Taiwanese government and the UNHCR to enhance cooperation and establish processes to increase protection for asylum seekers andrefugees on the island.

Methodology
To better understand the gaps in protection for asylum seekers, the challenges in adopting a refugee act, and whether the UNHCR could playa role in Taiwan, I spoke with advocates in Taiwan working with asylum
seekers and refugees or who have familiarity with the draft legislation.
Comparing different drafts of the refugee act over the years provided
context for its intended scope and helped highlight points of contention.
A literature review of relevant sources also provided additional background.
The UNHCR has coordinated with other non-UN member states:
Palestine, Puerto Rico, and Western Sahara. However, these non-member
states differ contextually from Taiwan. Puerto Rico’s asylum proceduresare governed by the United States, which is a signatory to the 1967
Protocol and has a domestic framework for adjudicating asylum claims
and refugee resettlement (USDOJ, n.d.; USCIS, n.d.). Whereas Palestine and Western Sahara tend to be refugee-producing, Taiwan is an area
where people are seeking protection, and the UNHCR’s roles in thosecontexts make it difficult to draw parallels for Taiwan. In Western Sahara,
the UNHCR supports family visits between Sahrawis living in refugee

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camps in Algeria and individuals in the territory (UNHCR, 2014). With
respect to Palestine, the UNHCR’s role is limited because, in 1949,prior to the existence of the Refugee Convention, the UN General
Assembly established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to provide humanitarianassistance and protection to refugees and displaced persons fleeing Palestine (UNRWA, n.d.). UNHCR is only mandated to protect Palestinian
refugees who are outside of the UNRWA’s area operations (UNHCR,
2017).
I also examined the context of Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong
does not have its own seat in the UN, it differs from Taiwan andother non-UN members as it is a Special Administration Region of thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) and enjoys international recognition.
Under Article 153 of the Basic Law (1997), the PRC government determines whether to extend its international obligations to Hong Kong; theHong Kong government cannot decide to become a party to international instruments on its own. This chapter considers Hong Kong to bea non-signatory as the PRC has not extended the Refugee Convention
and Protocol to Hong Kong (UNHCR, 2018, July). In Hong Kong,
the UNHCR conducted RSD before the adoption of a domestic refugee
framework and assisted the Hong Kong government in its transition
to a Unified Screening Mechanism (USM) to consider non-refoulement
claims under local law. To identify lessons learned for Taiwan, I interviewed academics and practitioners familiar with both the RSD and USM
contexts and drew upon my own personal experience representing individuals in RSD claims before the UNHCR while serving as Legal Directorof the Hong Kong Refugee Advice Centre2 in 2009–2011.
Since there are a limited number of non-UN members receiving
asylum seekers, I expanded the scope of comparative locales to include
UN members who are non-signatories to the Refugee Convention andProtocol in the Asia Pacific where the UNHCR operates, including
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. I primarily consulted UN and secondary sources to research thesecontexts.

2 In 2014, Hong Kong Refugee Advice Centre relaunched as Justice Centre Hong
Kong.

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Taiwan’s Lack of Official Diplomatic
Relationships and the UNHCR Mandate
The ROC, led by the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) Party, was one of
the founding members of the UN and the Security Council in 1945 whenit governed mainland China. During the civil war, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Nationalists and established the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. In 1949, the Nationalists
re-established the ROC on the island of Taiwan and continued to holdthe “China” seat in the UN until 1971 when, led by Albania, the UN
General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, replacing the ROC with the
PRC as the only lawful representative of China to the UN (UNGA, 1971;
USDOS, n.d.). Although Taiwan has transitioned from Nationalist rule toa democratic system, the ROC Constitution still governs the island. As a
non-UN member state, Taiwan has faced challenges in garnering UN andinternational support, and only has official diplomatic relationships with
12 UN member states and the Holy See (MOFA, n.d.).
Historically, the majority of UN members have opposed Taiwan’s
efforts to apply for UN membership because UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognises that the PRC is the only lawful representative ofChina to the UN (Worsnip, 2007). However, in 2021, United States
Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly urged other UN members to
support Taiwan’s participation, highlighting that “Taiwan’s meaningful
participation in the UN system is not a political issue, but a pragmatic one” to combat the numerous complex and global issues facedby the international community (Blinken, 2021). For example, although
the international community could learn from Taiwan’s “world-class”
response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Taiwan was not at the World Health
Assembly (Blinken, 2021).
The forced displacement of 89.3 million people worldwide, including
27.1 million refugees, 4.6 million asylum seekers, and 53.2 million internally displaced people, is another critical issue (UNHCR, 2022, p. 2).
As the number of conflict-affected countries has doubled during the past
decade, the cost to human, state, and international security is significant(UNHCR, 2022, p. 5).
While there are no publicly available statistics on refugees and asylum
seekers in Taiwan, Hong Kong citizens began fleeing to Taiwan in 2019
in response to the PRC’s extradition law; the number leaving increased
in 2020 when the PRC imposed a national security law in Hong Kong

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C. LIN(Leong, 2022; Watt, 2020). From 2020 to April 2022, 28,219 Hong
Kongers lived in Taiwan (Leong, 2022). However, it is unclear how
many Hong Kongers fear return because of their political opinion or
another of the Convention’s protected grounds, but obtained residency
on a different basis. There are also an estimated 1000–2000 Tibetans
with residence visas or permanent residence in Taiwan, but there areno accurate statistics how many would have met the Convention definition of a refugee (Hale, 2023; Kironska, 2022). Additionally, individuals
from the PRC and Xinjiang, as well as those from Afghanistan, Ukraine,
Myanmar, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan, and several African countries,
have sought protection from persecution in Taiwan (Amnesty International, 2022). According to NGO representatives assisting asylum seekers,
the reasons for fleeing their countries of origin generally involved fearof persecution due to political opinion, sexual orientation, or gender
identity.
In the absence of a refugee law, Taiwan has provided asylum
temporarily on an individualised, case-by-case basis that lacks a clear
process. For example, in 2009, Lai Chien-chung, the former ambassador of Taiwan to Honduras, granted temporary political asylum tothe daughter of ousted Honduran President Jose Manual Zelaya Rosales
on humanitarian grounds and “based on the fact she was not directly
involved in politics” (SB, 2009). However, to avoid a political standoff,
the Taiwanese government denied asylum to his wife, the current
Honduran President Xiomara Castro (SB, 2009).
Drafts of Taiwan’s refugee act explicitly include cooperation with
the UNHCR, whose mandate is “to lead and coordinate international
action for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of
refugee problems” (Legislative Yuan, 2016, June 1; UNHCR, n.d.c). However, the UNHCR has not had a presence in Taiwan eventhough there are asylum seekers on the island in need of protection.
Historically, the UNHCR has supported other non-UN members, suchas Palestine and Western Sahara, with refugee or returnee populations(UNHCR, 2002). Additionally, the UNHCR has partnered with othernon-signatory governments to the Convention and Protocol to assist in
refugee protection.

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Disparate Treatment of Different Population
Categories in Existing Domestic Legislation
Existing domestic legislation has special provisions for individuals who
are from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau as well as certain
stateless people including Tibetans and non-citizen nationals of the ROC
who resided in Thailand, Myanmar, and Indonesia. People from otherareas are considered foreigners. This has resulted in the disparate treatment of individuals depending on their place of origin and their ability toremain in Taiwan without being refouled to an area where they may facepersecution.
The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) may grant long-term residency
to individuals from mainland China on a case-by-case, special projectapproach out of political, economic, social, educational, science-tech,or cultural considerations (Mainland Relations Act, 2022, art. 17(4)).
However, this provision does not apply to mainlanders who enter Taiwan
without permission or stay beyond the duration authorised, which has
resulted in the repatriation of mainland Chinese in need of protection(Chiu, 2018, p. 158). “Political” considerations include the immediate
threat of being persecuted for one’s noteworthy role in leading democracy
movements, but this case-by-case, special project approach is not equivalent to a pathway or mechanism for seeking asylum or refuge in Taiwan(Mainland Rules, 2021, art. 18(1); Chiu, 2018, p. 158).
Residents of Hong Kong and Macau whose safety and liberty are
immediately threatened for political reasons shall be provided necessary assistance (HK & Macau Laws, 2022, art. 18). The term “politicalreasons” is not defined in the legislation and regulations governing Hong
Kongers and Macanese (Lin, 2018, p. 148). Such cases are referred to
the Executive Yuan for “special handling” (HK & Macau Enforcement
Rules, 2016, art. 25). However, certain categories of individuals may
not be granted assistance, including those who enter Taiwan without
permission, use a false identity or fraudulent documents, enter withpermission, but overstay, or are believed to be involved in criminal acts
(HK & Macau Residency Regulations, 2022, art. 22). In June 2020, in
response to the CCP imposing a nationality security law in Hong Kong,
the Taiwanese government launched the Hong Kong Humanitarian Aid
Project to “provide needed assistance to Hong Kong citizens” and “touphold universal values and support the Hong Kong people’s fight for
freedom and democracy” (MAC, 2020, p. 1). Due to the absence of a

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refugee law in Taiwan, certain Hong Kongers may apply for a “special
project status” to study and work in Taiwan without a residence permit,
but the mechanisms and standard for receiving this type of protection lackclarity (Leong, 2022).
Certain stateless individuals, including exiled Tibetans and descendants of KMT soldiers who were left behind on the Thai-Myanmar
border in the 1960s, may apply for residency in Taiwan (Immigration
Act, 2022, art. 16). In 2009, Article 16 of the Immigration Act, whichgoverns this population, was amended to allow stateless individuals from
India or Nepal, who entered Taiwan between 21 May 1995 and 31
December 2008, to apply for residency and to be issued Alien Resident Certificates—after the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission
has confirmed their Tibetan identities (Loa, 2009). In 2016, this provision was further amended, extending the time period to cover those whoentered before 29 June 2016 (Hsiao, 2016; Immigration Act, 2022, art.
16). Such amendments have received criticism for creating exceptions fordifferent groups of people and a refugee act has been proposed as a more“reasonable solution” (Loa, 2009).
Non-citizens who do not fall into the categories above are considered
foreigners. Although foreigners who enter Taiwan without permission
or overstay their visit or residency could face deportation, the MOI’s
National Immigration Agency may temporarily suspend deportation ona case-by-case basis under certain conditions (Foreigners’ Regulation,
2016, art. 6). However, there is no mention of non-refoulement orsuspending deportation for foreigners who fear return to their countriesof origin. In 2022, the MOI amended legislation allowing foreigners
whose deportation order was suspended to be granted a provisional
registration permit (Alien Residency Regulations, 2022, art. 24).

Legislative History of Taiwan’s Draft Refugee Act
Since 2002, during the administration of Chen Shui-bian, the firstpresident representing the Democratic Progressive Party, the Taiwanese
government has recognised the need for a refugee act. However, over two
decades later, Taiwan still has not passed any refugee legislation (Huang,
2010, p. 1). Earlier drafts of the refugee act explicitly included people
from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, noting that the mechanisms in Article 17(4) of the Mainland Relations Act, Article 19(3) of
the Mainland Rules, Article 18 of the HK & Macau Laws, and Article

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16(1)(12) of the Regulations Governing Permits for Hong Kong and
Macau Residents Entering the Taiwan Area and Setting up Residence orRegistered Permanent Residence do not provide for refugee status determination (Legislative Yuan, 2007, 2008). Recognising that the existing
framework treated people from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macaudifferently from foreigners and stateless people, these drafts also sought
to equalise the periods of time to apply for residency, long-term residency,
or citizenship with those of foreigners.
In 2009, the MOI submitted an amended refugee act to the Executive
Yuan, who then submitted it to the Legislative Yuan for consideration.
The 2009 draft eliminated people from mainland China and residentsof Hong Kong or Macau from its applicable scope. Their inclusion wasviewed as incompatible with the ROC Constitution and existing legislation, would be unlikely to reach societal consensus, and would potentiallycause adverse impacts on cross-straits relations (Huang, 2010, pp. 54–
56). Since then, the Executive Yuan has not included these three groups
in subsequent versions of proposed legislation, suggesting that existinglaws already govern people from those areas. Including these groups as
foreigners would likely be controversial and could aggravate cross-strait
relations (Huang, 2021).
The March 2016 draft of the refugee act proposed by Hsiao Bi-khim
and other members of the Legislative Yuan included people from thoseareas (Hsiao, 2016). However, the Internal Administration Committee
and Foreign and National Defense Committee rejected the inclusion,noting that the applicable laws governing mainland Chinese and residentsof Hong Kong and Macau are the Mainland Relations Act and the Hong
Kong & Macau Laws, respectively (Legislative Yuan, 2016, February 1,
pp. 210–211, 217).
Article 3 of the Executive Yuan’s, 2016 draft refugee act adopts theConvention definition of a refugee. This provides that foreigners or stateless people may apply for refugee status in Taiwan if they have left
their country of citizenship or residence because of a well-founded fearof being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, and are unable
to avail themselves of protection from that country or are unwilling
to return for reasons of such fear. The definition also includes individuals who have been forced to flee their homeland for reasons of war
or large-scale natural disaster, and is more expansive than the Convention. Drafts from members of the Legislative Yuan proposed that the70

C. LINdefinition explicitly include gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity, but the Executive Yuan found it unnecessary to enumerate them as
separate protected grounds because they fall under the particular socialgroup ground (Legislative Yuan, 2016, February 1, p. 211). Article 4 of
the Executive Yuan’s, 2016 draft included provisions allowing foreigners
and stateless individuals to apply for asylum from outside of Taiwan, at
Taiwan’s border, airports, or ports, prior to entering Taiwan, and after
entering Taiwan (Executive Yuan, 2016, p. 358). Since 2016, there has
been little movement or political will to pass the refugee act.
Based upon publicly available information from the MOI, interviews
with NGOs involved with the drafting of the refugee act, and a reviewof the UNHCR’s comments on national legislation on Refworld, it does
not appear that the government of Taiwan has worked with the UNHCR
during the drafting process (UNHCR, n.d.-a.). Former Deputy Foreign
Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wu Chih-hung confirmedthat the Taiwanese government did not contact the UNHCR from 2008
to 2016, but it is unclear whether the Taiwanese government communicated with the UNHCR before or after that time period (Legislative
Yuan, 2016, June 1, p. 197). The MOI report from 2010 mentions that
the Taiwanese government would welcome assistance from the UNHCR
in conducting RSD and receiving support for refugee resettlement in
the event there is a mass influx of refugees in Taiwan (Executive Yuan,
2016, pp. 358, 360; Huang, 2010, pp. 19, 29, 57). All drafts of the
refugee legislation in 2016 contemplated cooperation with the UNHCR,
including Article 3 of the Executive Yuan’s, 2016 draft which called for
the MOI to request the UNHCR’s assistance in conducting RSD in
Taiwan (Executive Yuan, 2016, p. 358; Legislative Yuan, 2016, June 1).

Challenges for Asylum Seekers
and Refugees in Taiwan
Taiwan’s exclusion from UN membership and its lack of diplomatic relations with other governments is an obstacle to effective refugee protection. As a practical matter, it is challenging for Taiwan to assist individuals
in third country resettlement whether they arrive after being recognised
as a refugee by the UNHCR elsewhere, or are seeking protection fromthe Taiwanese government, which lacks a domestic RSD framework.
During joint deliberation meetings of the draft refugee act in 2016,
several members of the Legislative Yuan raised the feasibility of requesting3

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the UNHCR’s assistance given that Taiwan is not a UN member state(Legislative Yuan, 2016, June 1, p. 187). When asked how the Taiwanese
government could handle RSD applications if the UNHCR did not
respond to the Taiwanese government’s request for assistance, the former
Minister of the Interior Yeh Jiunn-rong reaffirmed the necessity of seeking
the UNHCR’s assistance in processing RSD applications in Taiwan,
believing it was possible for Taiwan to receive international assistanceas refugee issues are universal human rights concerns (Legislative Yuan,
2016, June 1, p. 191).
In addition to the lack of a formal asylum adjudication process, individuals who find themselves in need of protection in Taiwan face barriers
to obtaining work authorisation, accessing health care, and securing stablehousing. Since most are not able to work, they rely on NGOs or churches
to assist with basic needs. Without a residence permit, asylum seekers are
not able to open bank accounts in Taiwan. For example, one Tibetan, who
lived in Taiwan for over 20 years before being granted residency, worked
without authorisation during that time but could only receive his salary
via other people’s accounts (Deng, 2016). Additionally, children born toasylum seeking or undocumented women in Taiwan frequently are notregistered at birth and become de facto stateless as nationality in Taiwan
is based on jus sanguinis rather than jus soli (Chen, 2022, p. 7). Withouthousehold registration, these children have limited access to educationand health care. Additionally, according to local NGO representatives,
language access is a challenge in Taiwan if the asylum seeker or refugee isunable to communicate in either Mandarin or English.

Observation and Lessons Learned
from Hong Kong and Non-Signatory States
For decades, the UNHCR has operated in non-UN member and nonsignatory states, often conducting RSD and facilitating refugee resettlement; its mandate allows this with the host’s consent. In practice, the
UNHCR’s role in these areas varies significantly, signing a Memorandumof Understanding (MOU) with some, but not others; moreover, there
is no standard approach to the MOUs (Janmyr, 2021, p. 40). Since
Hong Kong has a lengthy history with the UNHCR and has developed its own system for non-refoulement protection, there are numerous
lessons learned applicable to the Taiwan context. This section also examines the UNHCR’s operations in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,

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Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. While not an exhaustive review, it
draws upon common themes to derive lessons learned for Taiwan.
Expanding the Refugee Act to Include All Populations
To avoid disparate treatment of different populations, a refugee act thatis inclusive of mainlanders, Hong Kongers, and Macanese, as proposedin the drafts by the Legislative Yuan before 2009 and by Hsiao Bi-khim
in 2016, would enhance protection. NGO representatives in Taiwan havevoiced the importance of an inclusive refugee act covering all non-citizens
rather than a special project approach. Currently, there are special projects
for different populations, such as the Hong Kong Humanitarian Aid
Project, but a refugee act that includes all non-citizens would provide
greater transparency for accessing fear-based protection and to streamline
existing protection mechanisms for all groups.
As including mainland Chinese, Hong Kongers, and Macanese inrefugee legislation is controversial and politically sensitive, there may bealternate ways to frame who qualifies for protection. For example, Palestinian refugees have primarily been dealt with outside of the confinesof the Convention (Mathew, p. 55). The UNRWA, which operates in
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, defines Palestinian refugees as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestineduring the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both homeand means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict” (UNRWA, n.d.).
Pursuant to Article 1(D), the Convention “shall not apply to persons
who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United
Nations other than the [UNHCR] protection or assistance”. Therefore,
the UNHCR does not have a mandate over Palestinian refugees within
UNRWA’s area of operations and is involved in conducting RSD in somenon-signatory states receiving Palestinian refugees (UNHCR, 2017).
However, defining protection needs by specific events would perpetuate
the disparate treatment of different populations in Taiwan. It could also
result in amending legislation based on political and other events that leadto displacement of these populations and could complicate the processes
for protection.

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Centralising RSD and Related Non-Refoulement Claims
A centralised and unified process for adjudicating asylum, nonrefoulement, and related humanitarian claims results in greater efficiency
and fewer disparities in adjudication. Hong Kong and India are twocontexts where bifurcated processes have existed, with the UNHCR
determining certain types of cases and the government others, showcasing
the complexities cause by non-centralised and non-unified processes.
Between 1996 and 2014, the UNHCR conducted RSD in HongKong. The UNHCR and the Hong Kong government signed an MOU toallow Hong Kong immigration officials to be seconded to the UNHCR
to increase RSD capacity. The Law Society of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Bar Association, and refugee rights advocates criticised the UNHCR’s
RSD process for numerous deficiencies, including problematic interview
procedures, substandard interpretation, insufficient access to evidence orreasoning for negative RSD decisions, lack of an independent appeal
mechanism, and limited legal representation (Lee et al., 2012). The Courtof Final Appeal’s judgements3 recognising that high standards of fairness
apply to torture claims, as well as an independent inquiry on persecution claims prior to removing an individual to their country of origin,prompted the government to adopt the USM (UNHCR Hong Kong,n.d.).
Before Hong Kong established the USM, the government adjudicatedtorture claims under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) while the
UNHCR conducted RSD. The existence of these dual, but parallel paths
for protection was “procedurally inefficient, unfair and prone to abuse”(Justice Centre, 2014, p. 7). In many instances, claimants made both
refugee and CAT claims in tandem or subsequently lodged a separate
claim after the failure of the first claim. This prolonged the processing
time of applications, caused significant backlogs, and left claimants inlimbo for many years. Since the UNHCR did not share the rationale of anegative RSD claim with the Hong Kong government and there was noprocess for the government to assess an individual’s risk of persecution,

3 Sakthevel Prabakar v Secretary for Security 2004 7 HKCFAR 187; FB & Ors v Directorof Immigration and Secretary for Security (HCAL 51/2007); Ubamaka Edward Wilson v
Secretary for Security (FACV 15/2011); and C & Ors v Director of Immigration (4HKC
563/2013).

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that person could be refouled to a country where they faced persecution. Additionally, this dual system was not trauma-informed, as claimants
who experienced past harm were forced to undergo two separate proceedings detailing what happened to different adjudicators. Interpreters werealso necessary for both sets of proceedings. Recognising these inefficiencies, Hong Kong launched the USM system. Though the USM has been
met with criticism for other reasons, legal professionals and experts in thefield had recommended a unified system for considering non-refoulement
claims (Daly, 2014).
In India, the government adjudicates refugee claims from neighbouring countries, such as Sri Lanka and Tibet, whereas the UNHCR
conducts RSD for individuals from Myanmar and non-neighbouring
countries. As the UNHCR is not allowed to set up registration centres inborder areas, asylum seekers need to learn about the process and travel
to New Delhi, where the only UNHCR office is located, to make aclaim (Shanker & Vijayaraghavan, 2020, p. 24). Although the UNHCR
provides recognised refugees with identity cards, not all state authorities in India recognise the UNHCR cards, whereas they accept identity
documents provided to refugees by the Indian government (Shanker &Vijayaraghavan, 2020, p. 25). This leads to inadequate protection andinsufficient access to health care, education, and other basic rights forrefugees recognised by the UNHCR.
The contexts of Hong Kong and India demonstrate that using separate processes and laws for people from different areas may lead todisparate treatment amongst groups and can leave more room for protection pitfalls. As such, a cohesive system where one body performs RSD
is not only more efficient but enhances refugee protection. It conserves
resources, such as interpretation, legal representation, and adjudication,
but also helps minimise re-traumatising individuals.
As discussed above, Taiwan has separate legislation for different groups
of non-citizens. Although initial drafts of the refugee act included individuals from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, they are omitted
from the Executive Yuan’s most recent draft in 2016. Excluding thesegroups could lead to complexities in the future, and the government
would be wise to examine other contexts with disparate laws to better
understand potential challenges and to contemplate the benefits ofcentralising RSD for all groups.

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Access to Publicly Funded Legal Representation
Lack of access to legal services has been identified as a concerning gap
in the implementation of the Hong Kong Humanitarian Aid Project in
Taiwan, limiting awareness of the screening criteria and documentationnecessary to establish individualised protection (Leong, 2022). Whether
an individual is proceeding before the UNHCR or government-mandated
RSD, access to publicly funded legal representation is critical to navigate the complexities of the legal processes in a foreign jurisdiction,
often in a foreign language. The UNHCR recognises the right to legal
representation, acknowledging its importance in establishing fairness andtransparency in the RSD process, as well as strengthening decision-making(UNHCR, 2020, p. 64).
In Hong Kong, the Court of Final Appeal in C & Ors determined
it was unfair and unlawful to: (1) refuse legal representation during
screening interviews and oral hearings for torture claims, and (2) failto provide publicly funded legal representation (Daly, 2014). This case,along with others,4 clarified what constitutes high standards of fairness
in assessing non-refoulement cases and the duties required by the Hong
Kong government prior to removing an individual to their country oforigin. Under the USM, applicants in theory have access to publicly
funded legal assistance, but from 2014 to 2020, only 8% of legal aid
applications were approved; the majority of claimants proceeded without
counsel (Justice Centre, 2020). Moreover, there are two options for
publicly funded legal assistance: (1) the Legal Assistance Scheme for
Non-refoulement Claimants independently operated by the Duty Lawyer
Service (DLS) or (2) a Pilot Scheme (PS) administered by the Hong
Kong government’s Security Bureau who selects and pays for lawyers
representing applicants (DLS, n.d.; Melwani, 2021, p. e). Under thePS, there is a clear conflict of interest as lawyers are paid for by thesame government bureau responsible for removing their clients (Melwani,2021, p. 2).
The existence of publicly funded legal aid is not enough; it must beaccessible and the criteria to receive representation through any suchprogramme should not be so stringent that the majority of applicants end
up proceeding without legal counsel. With the enactment of a refugee act
in Taiwan, it is paramount that publicly funded legal representation be
4 Prabakar; FB & Ors; and Ubamaka.

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C. LINavailable to assist applicants with navigating the new procedures and tohelp them understand the types of evidence required to obtain protectionin Taiwan.
Establishing an Appeals Process
When the UNHCR conducted RSD in Hong Kong, it did not initiallyprovide written decisions and reasoning for negative RSD determinations,which hindered an applicant’s ability to make a meaningful, independent
appeal (Hong Kong Human Rights Commission Society, 2006, p. 3).
Under the UNHCR’s Procedural Standards (2020, p. 270), applicants
have the right to appeal a negative RSD decision. The scope of appeal
should also take into consideration any new information relevant to theclaim, including any changes in the applicant’s personal circumstances
or in their country of origin. An independent appeal mechanism, which
includes meaningful access to legal representation, is necessary to safeguard the protection of individuals who may be returned to persecution
in their country of origin.
In Taiwan, any refugee legislation should include a clear process forappealing a case that includes publicly funded legal representation during
the appeal. To ensure fairness in the appellate process, the applicant must
be provided with a written decision detailing the reasons for the denial.
Designing Trauma-Informed, Context-Specific Training
Although Hong Kong transitioned to the USM, the UNHCR still
continues to provide a consultative and supportive role to the Hong
Kong government. Before the start of the USM in Hong Kong, the
UNHCR conducted trainings for decisions-makers (Security Bureau,
2014, p. 7). The UNHCR has provided technical advice and capacitybuilding for officers and decision-makers involved in the USM and has
given recommendations on screening procedures (UNHCR, 2018, Oct.
para. 10). Additionally, the UNHCR has sought durable solutions forrefugees.
In Hong Kong, a shortcoming identified was the poor quality of USM
decisions, reflecting a low comprehension level of non-refoulement law bydecision-makers, including key legal and factual concepts. Some decisionmakers also displayed cynicism or hostility towards applicants and lacked
gender-sensitivity, reducing sexual and gender-based violence to private

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matters and dismissing the possibility that they could constitute protected
reasons for non-refoulement protection (Justice Centre, 2020). A lesson
derived from the Hong Kong context is that regular, ongoing training
in both substantive law and the practical considerations in interviewing
asylum seekers is necessary for adjudicators, lawyers, and others working
on such claims.
In Taiwan, robust, context-specific training regarding the intricacies ofthe legal requirements and applicable standards for a new domestic legal
refugee framework would be critical. Opportunities for additional, issuespecific topics that arise along with ongoing trainings would be importantto support a transition to a domestic refugee framework. Training
on topics including trauma-informed representation and adjudication,
gender-sensitivity, cultural-competency, and working with interpreters
would be crucial to communicating with asylum seekers from different
backgrounds. Such training should be tailored to the role the attendeeis playing in the RSD process, e.g. decision-maker, legal representative,
interpreter, social worker, etc. To share lessons learned and enhancecollaboration amongst those involved in refugee protection within the
Asia Pacific region, refugee advocates in Taiwan have suggested that
the UNHCR could also consider convening regional training and invite
relevant stakeholders from Taiwan who are involved in the RSD process.
Providing Identity Documents and Registering Births
A common theme emerging from the contexts examined is the importance of providing asylum seekers and refugees with a legal identity
document in the country where the RSD process occurs. If the UNHCR
issues an identity document to a recognised refugee, a MOU or otheragreement with the local government to accept the document as a valid
form of legal documentation is critical (Islam et al., 2021, p. 22). For
example, the UNHCR in India conducts RSD, facilitates the resettlement of recognised refugees, and has the sole responsibility for granting
refugee status certificates (UNHCR India, n.d.). However, the domestic
law regarding these certificates and the rights associated with them aresubject to the political will of the government and can hold little tono legal authority even though some courts have recognised the legal
validity of these certificates (Kaul, 2021). In Malaysia, the government
has criticised the UNHCR for independently issuing identity documents

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to asylum seekers or refugees registered with the agency without their
input and approval (Peter, 2022).
Whether the UNHCR or the Taiwanese government conducts RSD in
Taiwan, it is critical that any refugee certificate issued be a legally valid
form of identity recognised throughout the country. Identity documents,
including refugee certificates, are often the primary means to access basic
rights, such as housing, health care, and education; they also facilitate theability to attain banking and other services (Islam et al., 2021, pp. 15–
19, 22). As children in Taiwan born to asylum seekers and undocumented
mothers face challenges in accessing services, universal birth registration,
allowing for the children of non-citizens to be registered, would help
prevent issues of statelessness and legal limbo and effectuate access to
education, social assistance, and health care (Islam et al., 2021, p. 21).
Allowing Employment Authorisation
In many situations of forced migration, individuals remain in limbo foryears before a decision is made on their case. This process may be
prolonged in the event of an appeal, a global pandemic, or anothercircumstance beyond an individual’s control. The ability to obtain work
authorisation and have meaningful access to employment opportunities in
the country where the RSD claim is being processed is critical to achieving
self-sufficiency. In the absence of employment authorisation, individuals
are often forced to find work in the informal sector and may be more
likely to experience exploitative working conditions (Islam et al., 2021,
p. 34). Being able to work contributes to personal security, empowers
displaced individuals to seek a livelihood, and enables them to contributeto the local economy.
Learning from the experiences described above, although Taiwan has
not passed refugee legislation, the Employment Service Act allows for “arefugee who has been permitted to stay” in Taiwan to engage in certain
types of work and exempts them from several conditions or requirements
imposed on other foreigners (2018, art. 51(1)). Neither the Employment Service Act nor any other laws in Taiwan define or discuss theterm “refugee” and there is no formal mechanism for refugees or asylum
seekers to obtain employment authorisation (Yang, 2022). However, theMinistry of Labor (2021) has allowed stateless and non-citizen ROC
nationals from Thailand or Myanmar who obtained residency under
Article 16(3) of the Immigration Act to apply for a work permit with

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the Central Competent Authority without their employer initiating theprocess, under this provision. As employment authorisation for a refugee
is explicitly contemplated in existing law, the Taiwanese government
should clarify who qualifies as a refugee and establish clear processes toobtain such permission.
Accessing Social Services
Access to social services is also critical for asylum seekers. Many individuals
have experienced trauma, in their countries of origin, en route to, andinside, the country of reception. Re-traumatisation also may occur during
the RSD process. Having access to health care, including mental healthservices, is an important protection concern.
In addition to conducting RSD in Thailand, the UNHCR provides
emergency and life-saving health care, legal and social counselling, andpsycho-social support, as well as facilitating access to education, financial
and other material support, and seeking durable solutions for vulnerable cases (UNHCR, 2022, December 31). In Sri Lanka, the UNHCR
handles all forms of refugee protection in Sri Lanka, including RSD,
refugee resettlement, connecting vulnerable refugees with legal resources
on housing as well as land and property documents, and assisting withreintegration (UNHCR, n.d.-d).
In Taiwan, asylum seekers have had to rely on NGOs, churches, andothers for food, housing, and other basic needs. Looking at the experiences in other countries, in implementing a domestic refugee framework,
the Taiwanese government must also consider access to social services,
including health care and psych-social support, as a holistic approach torefugee protection. Consulting with the UNHCR regarding its work toconnect individuals to such services in Thailand and Sri Lanka could be
beneficial.
Re-Thinking Durable Solutions
Asylum seekers and refugees worldwide often remain in limbo for years,
without any ability to integrate locally, while waiting a protracted period
for third country resettlement. Although host countries are often reluctant for local integration to be a permanent solution, in reality, many
individuals are forced to remain in the host country for years and even
decades while they await a durable solution. As such, opportunities

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C. LINfor local integration, including access to language classes, employment
opportunities, and pathways to residency, are important for Taiwan’s
domestic refugee framework. To combat xenophobia, anti-immigrantrhetoric, concerns about “losing” job opportunities to non-citizens, andperceived misconceptions about national security issues, public education
campaigns to allay these fears are strategically necessary in Taiwan for citizens to provide a welcoming environment to asylum seekers and refugees(Amnesty International, n.d.).

Recommendations
After examining the contexts in other non-UN member and selectnon-signatory states described above and discussing with local refugee
advocates in Taiwan what gaps in protection remain, the following recommendations are made to the government of Taiwan and the UNHCR:
To the Government of Taiwan
1. Contact the UNHCR to request consultation on the draft refugeeact, determine the UNHCR’s capacity to be involved in RSD andresettlement, and explore other potential collaborations to achieve
refugee protection in Taiwan.
2. Pass a refugee act that includes an expansive definition of who qualifies for protection, which not only incorporates the Convention
definition, but also includes those forced to leave because of war or
large-scale natural disaster. Review the refugee definitions includedin the Bangkok Principles, Organization of African Unity Convention, and the Cartagena Declaration, which enumerate additional
circumstances for extending protection.
3. Include people from the mainland area, Hong Kong, and Macau in
the refugee act for inclusive legislation that does not differentiate
between different groups of people.
4. Develop clear procedures for RSD rather than an informal ad hoc
system decided on a case-by-case basis.
5. Regularly train decision-makers on the correct legal standards andevidentiary considerations for adjudicating asylum claims, to effectuate consistent decisions. Include training on the impact of trauma
and working with an interpreter as well as cultural and genderconsiderations.

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6. Establish an independent appeal process for refugee claims.
7. Provide publicly funded legal aid to allow asylum seekers access torepresentation during first instance and on appeal.
8. Issue identity documents for asylum seekers and refugees tominimise hurdles to accessing housing, health care, and otherservices.
9. Allow work authorisation for asylum seekers and refugees under
Article 51(1) of the Employment Service Act so that they cancontribute to the local economy and become self-sufficient. The
government has used this provision to allow stateless individuals
from Thailand and Myanmar to work, showing that they have
employed a broad definition of “refugee” in granting employment
authorisation.
10. Extend universal access to health care to asylum seekers andrefugees in Taiwan.
11. Increase language access to asylum seekers and refugees by
providing interpretation during the asylum process as well as offer
opportunities to learn the local language to enhance communication.

To the UNHCR
1. Be open to engaging with the government of Taiwan, local NGOs,
and other organisations working with asylum seekers and refugees.
This could include connecting the government of Taiwan with otherregional and international organisations to provide support. The
global protection of human beings who fear for their life transcends
the politics of the UN and the “One China Policy”.
2. Review, comment, and consult on Taiwan’s draft refugee act andencourage its enactment.
3. In the absence of domestic refugee legislation in Taiwan, consider
assisting with RSD in Taiwan with the intention to train and build
local capacity to conduct RSD.
4. Be available as a resource to provide technical assistance andsupport, including verifying individuals who have undergone the
RSD process in a third country, but find themselves in Taiwan.
5. Assist with resettling recognised refugees to third countries and facilitating connections to other countries that may not have diplomatic

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relations with Taiwan to ensure that refugees receive appropriate
protection.
6. Provide support for public education campaigns framing refugee
narratives, including debunking myths related to national security
risks and the displacement of locals from employment opportunities.
7. Convene regional trainings for decision-makers involved in the RSD
process in the Asia Pacific region and invite decision-makers from
Taiwan to participate.
8. Support Taiwan’s transition to a domestic framework if refugee
legislation is enacted and engage in capacity-building to train immigration officers and decision-makers.

Conclusion
The UNHCR’s involvement in refugee protection in Hong Kong, as
well as other non-signatories to the Convention, provides context for
informing potential collaboration between the government of Taiwan andthe UNHCR. Cooperation between the Taiwanese government and the
UNHCR would help increase protection for individuals seeking asylum in
Taiwan as well as facilitate resettlement for recognised refugees who findthemselves in Taiwan. As proposed in the draft refugee act, the government of Taiwan has contemplated assistance from the UNHCR in RSD
and resettlement. A first step for the Taiwanese government is to seek
input from the UNHCR on Taiwan’s draft refugee act and explore areasfor potential coordination in protecting asylum seekers and refugees on
the island. If the Taiwanese government approaches the UNHCR for
assistance, as the lead refugee agency, the UNHCR would fall short ofits mandate if it rejected the request, and asylum seekers and refugees on
the island would fail to receive protection and could be refouled to places
where they have a well-founded fear of persecution.
Acknowledgements My deep appreciation goes to the refugee rights advocates in Taiwan for taking the time to speak with me and provide criticalcontextual background: Wang Si, Deputy Secretary-General and Lai Yen-rong,
Commissioner on Refugees at the Taiwan Association for Human Rights; Chiu
Eeling, Executive Director, Amnesty International Taiwan; Lin Hsinyi, Executive
Director, Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty and Huang Yibee, CEO3

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Covenants Watch, both on the Board of the Human Rights Network for Tibet
and Taiwan.
This chapter would not have been possible without the stellar research contributions in English and Mandarin of an individual to whom I am immensely
grateful; you know who you are—thank you for all your incredible work. I
appreciate Micah Lesch, Giulia Marchi, and Talia Harrow at the University ofCalifornia, College of the Law, San Francisco, for their research support. I also
appreciate everyone who spoke with me about the Hong Kong context.

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Peter, S. (2022, November 1). Malaysia mulls closing UN Refugee Agency Office,sparking refoulement fears. VOA News. https://www.voanews.com/a/mal
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LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=Q0020008
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mechanism: Key issues. OpinioJuris. http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/28/tha
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Security Bureau. (2014, May). Panel on security of the legislative council—Implementation of the unified screening mechanism. LC Paper No. CB(2)1621/
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Shanker, R., & Vijayaraghavan, H. (2020, November). Refugee recognition challenges in India. Forced Migration Review, 65, 24–26. https://www.fmreview.
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Teng, H. (2016). Táiwān yěyǒu xı̄zàng rén [What? There are Tibetans in
Taiwan?]. Humanistic Education Journal, 326, 84–88.
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United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (1971, October 25). Resolution
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Comments on national legislation. Refworld. https://www.refworld.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=type&skip=0&type=NATLEGCOMMENTS
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (n.d.-c). Mission
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (n.d.-d). Sri
Lanka. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/sri-lanka.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (n.d.-e). Where wework. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/where-we-work.html
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3). Comprehensive and regional approaches to refugee programs. EC/1994/
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prehensive-regional-approaches-refugee-problems.html#:~:text=UNHCR’s%
20interest%20in%20comprehensive%20regional,in%20promoting%20and%20i
mplementing%20measures
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
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CHAPTER 4

The Legal Framework for Refugee
Acceptance and Protection in Japan
Yingjiao Zhu

Introduction
Being one of the biggest donors to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (henceforth, UNHCR) over the years, Japan isconsidered to have made significant financial contribution to supporting
refugees, despite accepting very few refugees to its territory as a hostcountry (Betts & Collier, 2017, p. 208). Nevertheless, the exceptionally low refugee recognition rates in Japan have been criticised for
not conforming to international norms of refugee protection (Wolman,2015), and its restrictive immigration and refugee policies, based onnationalism and ethnic discrimination against foreign nationals, can belinked to many incidents in the immigration administration, such as
long-term detention of asylum seekers, hunger strikes, the death of immigration detainees, and the suicide of international students (Onozuka,
2022, pp. 255–256).

Y. Zhu (B)Yamaguchi University, Yamaguchi, Japane-mail: zhuyinjiao888@icloud.com© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_4

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Although Japan has acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Japanese government
has not regarded refugee protection as an important human rights issue
until recently. The domestic law regulating the entry and residence ofimmigrants and refugees in Japan, namely the Immigration Control andRefugee Recognition Act (henceforth, ICRRA), provides a strict legal
procedure for asylum seekers to obtain refugee status under a narrowinterpretation of the definition of refugee. As a result, the law and its
implementation have brought about an extremely low refugee acceptanceas well as other problems in Japan’s refugee recognition process. Additionally, a lack of safeguard for asylum seekers from the judicial system
can also be counted as a reason for Japan’s inadequate contribution to
refugee acceptance and protection within its territory. As the JapaneseSupreme Court and inferior courts following the precedent set by theSupreme Court have wrongly ruled on the constitutional guarantees offoreigners’ fundamental human rights,1 the judicial system helps to justify
governmental negativism about necessary accommodations for refugees
and asylum seekers.
This chapter firstly analyses human rights violations or possible violations in the Japanese refugee recognition procedure, through an examination of ICRRA’s existing provisions relating to refugee applications,and explains the legal basis for Japan’s negative immigration and refugee
policies, especially the judgment and reasoning of the Supreme Court
in McLean v. Minister of Justice (henceforth, McLean Case), whichshould be deemed highly outdated in light of the development of international human rights law. This chapter will then explore recent efforts
and progress in Japan’s legislation and judicial practice, including two
government proposals for revising ICRRA in 2021 and 2023, and aremarkable judicial decision made by Tokyo High Court in September
2021. It can be argued, however, that these recent developments do
not drastically improve the situation of refugee acceptance and protection in Japan because some of them are not essentially aimed at providing
better safeguard to asylum seekers. Finally, based on the above findings,
this chapter will conclude with a brief evaluation of the amendments to
1 For example, Tokuji Izumi, former justice of the Japanese Supreme Court, has strongly
criticised the Court’s reasoning in the McLean Case and other lower-court decisions citing
this case, for making a huge mistake in the protection of foreigners’ rights in compliancewith the Japanese Constitution (See Izumi, 2021).

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ICRRA which were eventually enacted in June 2023, in order to highlight the remaining tasks and challenges for Japan to help it construct a
more inclusive immigration and refugee system.

Current Refugee Recognition Procedureand Human Rights Concerns Under ICRRA
After Japan’s accession to the Refugee Convention and the related
Protocol, the former Immigration Control Order was amended to allow
accommodation for refugees and was renamed as ICRRA in 1982
(Buschmann, 2021, p. 81). The current version of ICRRA, which has
undergone two main revisions, in 1990 and 2018, stipulates the competence of the Minister of Justice to grant refugee status and the basic
structure of the refugee recognition procedure in Chapter 7.2 (from art.
61-2 to art. 61-2-14).2
In accordance with the provisions of ICRRA, asylum seekers need togo through a hard and lengthy application for refugee recognition toacquire the refugee status and a long-term resident visa in Japan. Specifically, those who seek refugee recognition must make an application to
the Minister of Justice (art. 61-2) and submit documents or materials
to prove that they are refugees at the time of application. The Ministerof Justice will determine whether or not to grant refugee status basedon the facts in the submitted documents and materials. If necessary, aninvestigation of the facts may be conducted by a refugee investigator at
the request of the Minister of Justice (art. 61-2-14). When the applicant
is recognised as a refugee, a refugee recognition certificate will be issued(art. 61-2, para. 2) and the various rights and benefits stipulated in the
Refugee Convention will be conferred, including a long-term resident
visa (art. 61-2-2). When the refugee application is rejected, however, awritten statement with the reasons for the inadmissibility will be issued(art. 61-2, para. 2). If the applicant is dissatisfied with the decision, they
may request a review by the Minister of Justice (art. 61-2-9, para. 1)

2 Although the Japanese parliament passed a bill to amend ICRRA on 9 June 2023,

the new law has not yet come into effect at the time of writing this paper (the effective
date will be prescribed by a subsequent cabinet order within a year) and the specificprovisions about refugee application remain largely the same. Therefore, articles mentioned
in this chapter are still based on the currently effective version of ICRRA, and certain
supplementary information about the new law will be provided if necessary.

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within seven days of receiving the statement, which is different from thecommon provision for the period for requesting a review in the Administrative Complaint Review Act (according to art. 18, para. 1 of this Act,a request for review of a disposition should be filed within three monthsof the day following the day when the party became aware of the disposition). The applicant can also file an action challenging the final decision of
the Minister of Justice afterwards. The waiting time from refugee application to final decision following the review request tends to be several
years. For instance, according to the data from the Immigration Services
Agency of Japan (henceforth, ISA), it was about three years and elevenmonths on average in 2022 (ISA, 2023b, p. 6). The time can be evenlonger if a lawsuit comes after the final decision.
Since ICRRA simply uses the terminology in the Refugee Convention and Protocol without giving any specific definition of refugee (art.
2), the interpretation of refugee in practice becomes an essential part of
the refugee recognition process. From a legal and practical perspective,
several problems can be observed in the currently adopted interpretation of the word refugee in Japan. Firstly, due to the individual-based
examination of the refugee application, asylum seekers have to provide
sufficient evidence to show the risk of being persecuted personally, notsimply a collective fear of persecution. It is also necessary for them tohave a realistic risk of being persecuted rather than an abstract one,though facts of actually being persecuted at the time of application are
not required. Whether there is a realistic risk will be determined basedon the specific circumstances of each individual applicant (ISA Guide,2023a, p. 4). Obviously, these requirements narrow down the range of
people who can be recognised as refugees to a great extent. Secondly,
the meaning of persecution tends to be interpreted in a limited way. In
the practice of refugee status determination, the persecution is usually
understood as “an infringement or oppression of life or physical liberty
by an attack or coercion that causes unbearable suffering to an ordinary
person”,3 which means that serious violations of human rights other than3 This understanding has been repeatedly affirmed in a number of judicial decisions

concerning refugee applications, for example, the Tokyo District Court’s decision on 5
July 1989 (Tokyo District Court, 1989), and more recently, its decision on 15 April 2014
(Tokyo District Court, 2014). However, in the recently issued guideline, it is clearly statedthat “other serious violations of human rights or discriminatory measures, such as deprivation of livelihood or violence against the mind, may also constitute the ‘persecution’”,4

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the threats to life and physical liberty, such as forced labour, denial ofreligious freedom, and deprivation of education and employment opportunities, may not have been given proper consideration in the judgment
about whether a well-founded fear of persecution exists. Thirdly, while
there is an alternative measure for granting special permission for residence out of humanitarian considerations to asylum seekers who havefailed to obtain the refugee status,4 the practice of this special permission
has possibly obscured the real need of asylum seekers to have the morestable and reliable protection that comes with refugee status. Indeed,those who are granted the special permission for residence under humanitarian protection will be protected from refoulement and will receive
certain benefits, such as access to work, health care, and free primaryeducation. However, they are not eligible to receive settlement support,
public housing assistance, publicly funded language training, or financial
aid for secondary and post-secondary education, nor are they able to bringfamily members to Japan, in contrast to the benefits and services available for refugee status holders (Obi, 2013, pp. 14–15). The legal status
granted is also considered to be too precarious for asylum seekers to live
settled and secure lives in Japan, because the residence permit in this situation is a short-term one and needs to be renewed at least annually. In
addition, the grants of special permission for residence are highly discretionary in the immigration administration (Arakaki, 2008, p. 101). Even
though a guideline released by ISA has listed some positive and negative
factors in the determination of the special permission (ISA Guide, 2009),
it is not binding on the Minister of Justice. These facts have indicated thenecessity of granting refugee status more generously to those who reallyneed it rather than merely offering low-level humanitarian protection, as
well as the importance of providing a more comprehensible and effective
guide to distinguish humanitarian protection from refugee status when
whereas the common understanding of persecution will continue to be valid (ISA Guide,2023a, p. 2).
4 Based on art. 61-2-2, para. 2 of the ICRRA, the Minister of Justice can liberally
decide on whether to grant special permission for residence in lieu of refugee status when
the refugee application itself has been rejected. But the ICRRA itself does not provide any
concrete criteria for granting this special permission until the 2023 revision. The new law
will include a provision about considerations in the decision for giving special permission
for residence, such as reasons for wishing to stay in Japan, family relationships, behaviours,
legal status during the stay, and the necessity for humanitarian protection, to limit theadministrative discretion of the Minister of Justice.

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Y. ZHUapplied in practice. It has been argued that legislators should make clear
the standards or requirements of special permission for residence in law
instead of allowing the administrative power to set its own rules (Kondo,
2023, p. 249).
Furthermore, the burden of proof on asylum seekers in litigations
relating to refugee status determination seems to be problematic as well.
When a refugee application is rejected, the asylum seeker receiving thedisposition of non-recognition may file an action in the court to seek
revocation of the disposition, to confirm the invalidity of not granting
special permission for residence when refugee status itself is denied, or
to confirm the invalidity of the written deportation order by immigration authorities (Kawamura, 2022, p. 66). Nonetheless, it is by no means
easy to obtain judicial remedies due to the strict requirements for asylum
seekers regarding the burden of proof. There is a general understandingin Japan’s practice that, in order to be identified as a person having awell-founded fear of being persecuted, there need to be objective circumstances that would cause an ordinary person in the same position to have asimilar fear of persecution, in addition to subjective circumstances that theperson is feeling the fear of being persecuted (ISA Guide, 2023a, p. 4).
Consequently, even in the court, asylum seekers are expected to submit
objective evidence as much as possible, in which both their personal
conditions and the situation of their countries of origin are supposed
to be included, to fully prove the risk of persecution. In other words,
asylum seekers need to prove a realistic risk of persecution as they do in
the refugee application, with objective evidence that shows the absenceof possible solutions to avoid persecution in the country of origin. The
reasons why asylum seekers should take the primary responsibility forproving the risk of being persecuted are often suggested as follows: (1)the legal system requires the asylum seeker to submit documents at the
moment of the refugee application; (2) due to the nature of the matter,
the asylum seeker who has directly experienced the fear is in the best position to know the circumstances needed for determining refugee status;(3) refugee status is a beneficiary disposition that confers favourable legal
status on the asylum seeker, such as the status of long-term resident(Bando, 2018, p. 199).
Certainly, asylum seekers should bear the burden of proof in the
refugee application as the UNHCR has already prescribed (“It is a general
legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the person submitting aclaim” (UNHCR Handbook, 2019, p. 43)). On the other hand, whether

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this principle can be basically valid in the case of litigation as well is highly
questionable. Refugees forced to flee their countries because of persecution often do not have sufficient materials to prove their sufferings.
Besides, even if they can prove their personal conditions regarding the riskof persecution, they may not have the ability to collect enough objective
evidence showing the situation of their countries of origin, or to present
the evidence completely and perfectly in Japanese. In light of thesecircumstances, it is inappropriate to impose the burden of proof whollyon asylum seekers. For the same reason, the UNHCR has suggested that“in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his
disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application”,
and even if such independent research turns out to be unsuccessful, or
there are statements that are not susceptible of proof, “if the applicant’s
account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to thecontrary, be given the benefit of the doubt” (UNHCR Handbook, 2019,p. 43). Thus, at the very least, judges in charge of refugee recognition
cases should pay attention to the sharing of burden of proof between
asylum seekers and the government, acknowledging that the government
is liable for investigating and collecting evidence as well, particularly, theevidence concerning the situation of asylum seekers’ countries of origin.
Apart from the enormous difficulties in the refugee application procedure, the current legal framework contains other serious human rights
concerns that must be dealt with in earnest, such as the lack of public
assistance for refugee applicants and insufficient medical assistance forthose granted a provisional release from detention (Kan, 2022). One of
the most critical issues relating to human rights is the detention of asylum
seekers during the refugee application. Asylum seekers who have cometo Japan and are in the process of applying for refugee status fall into
“refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge” who are conferred certain
rights under the Refugee Convention (art. 31 to art. 33), including thefreedom of movement. Accordingly, ICRRA has introduced some specificmeasures, such as special permission for residence (art. 61-2-2, para. 2),
permission for provisional stay (art. 61-2-4), and suspension of deportation procedure (art. 61-2-6, para. 2) for the purpose of implementing
the Convention. Nevertheless, it is a prevailing rule in Japan that foreign
nationals without legal status of residence will, in principle, be detained
until the deportation starts or until they obtain a legal status (Kan, 2022,
p. 120).

100

Y. ZHUIn fact, ICRRA has no provisions on detention specific to refugees. It
lists a number of illicit acts that would bring about a deportation order(art. 24) and stipulates that anyone who is suspected of having committed
one of the said acts, including unlawful stay or residence, may be detainedby a written detention order from the immigration authorities (art. 39).
There is a big question about juxtaposing the unlawful stay of asylum
seekers with serious crimes in the same provision regarding detention. In
August 2020, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted
an opinion to express concerns about two asylum seekers’ long-termand repeated detention in Higashi-Nihon Immigration Detention Centre(Opinion 58/2020, WGAD). The opinion stated that seeking asylum is
not a criminal act but is a universal human right enshrined in art. 14 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, the deprivationof liberty in the immigration context must be a measure of last resort
and alternatives to detention must be sought to meet the requirementof proportionality. In light of this point, the rules of ICRRA allowing
for indefinite immigration detention could not be reconciled with theinternational norms, and the repeated detention of the relevant asylum
seekers under ICRRA should be deemed arbitrary. The opinion, as aresult, requested the Japanese government to take necessary measures toremedy the situation of the two asylum seekers without any delay, andurged the government to review ICRRA so as to ensure its compatibility
with those obligations Japan has undertaken under the international law(Opinion 58/2020, WGAD, pp. 13–16).
Due to the low refugee recognition rate and the unlimited chance ofmaking refugee applications in Japan, there tends to be a large number of
repeated applications following previously failed attempts, which consequently result in longer and repeated detention for those lodging several
applications. Considering due process of law, however, the issuance ofdetention orders and the repeated application of detention orders by
the immigration authorities should never be conducted without judicial
approval or review. It is also pointed out in the aforementioned opinion
that, “judicial oversight of any form of detention is a fundamental safeguard of personal liberty and is essential in ensuring that detention has alegal basis”, therefore, any asylum seeker undergoing detention must be
given the chance to challenge the legality of their detention before a judicial authority (Opinion 58/2020, WGAD, pp. 12–13). The courts shouldtake charge of conducting approvals and reviews of detention, as wellas provisional release from detention, based on legal requirements rather

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than leaving these decisions open to the administrative discretion. This isa requirement of art. 33 of the Japanese Constitution, which intends toprevent abuses of administrative power (Kawamura, 2022, p. 79).

Judicial Precedents Underpinning
Japan’s Immigration and Refugee Policies
In a liberal democracy, the justice system is expected to play an essential
role in protecting human rights, and the courts need to equally safeguard the individual liberty of anyone within its jurisdiction, including
both nationals and foreigners. However, the Japanese judicial system has
been acting passively for years in safeguarding human rights, especiallythe rights of foreigners. The leading case on the issue of foreigners’
rights in Japan is the infamous McLean Case (Supreme Court, 1978).
The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case, which was largely negative about constitutional guarantees towards foreigners, has so far had along-standing influence on the subsequent judicial decisions concerning
rights of foreign nationals. More disastrously, it offers a legal basis forthe government to justify and maintain its restrictive immigration andrefugee policies, as well as the problematic legal framework for refugee
status determination under ICRRA.
In 1970, when an American citizen who was teaching English in Japanlodged an application to renew his visa, the Minister of Justice declined
his application on the grounds that he failed to notify the immigration
authorities of his change in workplace, and he participated in anti-war
demonstrations and other political activities frequently during his stay.
Thus, the American citizen, Ronald Alan McLean, brought an action
against the Minister of Justice in Tokyo District Court and received adecision in favour of his claims. The decision ruled that the dispositionof the Minister of Justice in this case had significantly erred in its evaluation of the substance of McLean’s job change and political activities,
both of which did not constitute a legal grounding for refusing to renew
the period of stay. Therefore, it was considered an illegal disposition thatexceeded the scope of discretion granted to the Minister of Justice inview of the constitutional principles of international cooperation and theprotection of fundamental human rights. However, when this case cameto Tokyo High Court and then to the Supreme Court, the judicial decisions made by those courts, unexpectedly, dismissed McLean’s claim to
renew his visa.

102

Y. ZHUThe Supreme Court’s decision on the McLean Case, on 4 October
1978, indicated the following three propositions. Firstly, the Court statedthat “under customary international law, a state is not obligated to accept
foreigners and can liberally decide whether or not to accept them into
its territory, and what kind of conditions to attach to such acceptance,
unless there is a special treaty”. That is to say, a state has the discretion to decide on the admission and residence of foreigners based on
its own judgment (henceforth, Proposition 1). Secondly, “art. 22, para.
1 of the Constitution merely guarantees the freedom of residence andmovement inside Japan and does not provide any regulation regarding
foreigners entering Japan”. Based on this point and Proposition 1, theCourt ruled that “under the Constitution, foreigners are not guaranteed
the freedom to enter Japan for sure, nor are they guaranteed the right toreside or continue to reside in Japan”. In other words, foreign nationals
are considered to have no constitutional guarantees of the right to enter
Japan as well as the right to reside in Japan according to the JapaneseConstitution (henceforth, Proposition 2). Thirdly, “the guarantees offundamental human rights contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution
should be interpreted as equally applying to foreigners residing in Japan,
except for the rights that by their nature must be limited to Japanesenationals”. Combined with Proposition 2, however, the third propositionby the Court affirms that “the protection of fundamental human rights
for foreign nationals, under the Constitution, is provided only within
the framework of the immigration control system, and cannot be interpreted as a safeguard that could bind the discretion of the government
to determine whether or not to grant residency, that is, the safeguard
to prevent the acts during the stay – which are regarded as fundamental
human rights guaranteed by the Constitution – from being taken into
account as negative factors at the time of renewing the residency”. Therefore, even though the acts of foreigners are constitutional and lawful,
the Minister of Justice can still “deem these acts to be unfavourable to
Japan from the perspective of appropriateness and inappropriateness andpresume that the foreign national is likely to commit acts detrimental tothe interests of Japan in the future”. In light of this statement, while thefundamental human rights guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution apply
equally to foreigners, except in cases where the rights, by their nature, areunderstood to apply only to Japanese nationals, they are merely protected
within the framework of the immigration control system and are subject

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to administrative discretion (henceforth, Proposition 3) (Kondo, 2021,
pp. 1–2).
These propositions, essential to the ruling of the McLean Case, havebeen broadly criticised by academics and practitioners. It is worth noting
that, even though the decision in the McLean Case could possibly bejustified at the time it was rendered, there is a huge doubt about its
validity in a globalised world in the twenty-first century. With regard to
Proposition 1, it should be admitted that there were actually no international laws and norms that could specifically bind Japan on the issue of
foreigners’ rights when the Supreme Court ruled on the McLean Case.
But, soon after this judgment, Japan ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1979, and has acceded to mostof the core international human rights treaties since the 1980s. Certainly,
these treaties have imposed considerable international legal obligations
on Japan. In this respect, the situation concerning international norms
itself has changed significantly since the McLean Case (Sogabe, 2022,
p. 13). It is no longer simply the principle of national sovereignty,
allowing states to freely determine the acceptance of foreigners, that
constitutes the customary international law. Nowadays, the principles
of non-refoulement, family reunification, the prohibition on arbitrary
detention, and non-discrimination are also considered to be part of thecustomary international law. That is to say, the customary internationallaw in the contemporary world does not provide unlimited discretion
for the state to decide liberally on the entry and residence of foreigners,
but rather it asserts a competence of free determination to the extent
that it does not violate the basic principles stated above (Kondo, 2021,
pp. 2–3). Accordingly, Proposition 1, that asserts an unlimited powerof the Japanese government to decide on the admission and residenceof foreigners, should be deemed invalid in view of the developments ofinternational human rights law.
Regarding Proposition 2, while art. 22, para. 1 of the Japanese Constitution may be interpreted as a constitutional guarantee of the freedom ofresidence, limited by the unwritten requirement of being in Japan—thus
excluding foreigners newly entering Japan—it is definitely unreasonable
to argue that, for those foreigners who have been living in Japan, theirright to reside in Japan has no relation to the freedom of residence guaranteed by the Constitution. It seems to be arbitrary to judge that the
freedom of residence for foreigners does not require respect, and that the104

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expression of political opinions as an exercise of the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution can be used as a legal basis for
restricting another constitutional right, the freedom of residence (Kondo,
2021, pp. 3–4). For this reason, Proposition 2 should also be regarded as
manifestly inappropriate and invalid.
As for Proposition 3, there are many more debates due to its ambiguity.
With this proposition, the Court simply set aside some fundamental rights
under the Constitution that by their nature do not extend to foreigners,
but it did not specifically tell what those rights are, leaving the criteria
for identifying the “nature” of rights blank (Kondo, 2021, p. 4; Webster,
2006, p. 450). Since there is no specific standard, any interpretation will
be possible. In recent judicial practice, with reference to Proposition 1
and Proposition 3, many courts are inclined to assume a logical relation
between the state discretion to decide on the acceptance of foreigners
and the administrative power to generally control their residence afterwards, which appears to be a plausible explanation for the judgment of
the McLean Case to support an immigration control system that caneasily exclude constitutional guarantees of human rights when dealing
with foreigners. Proposition 3, on this occasion, plays an important rolein providing a legal basis for the government to control the residence of
foreigners inside Japan within its immigration administration by granting
or withholding the Status of Residence. However, legal scholars haveargued against this idea, stating that the competence of deciding on
admissions does not necessarily lead to the power of unfettered control
over the residence of foreign nationals, because there was a common
understanding of international law in post-war Japan, even before thetremendous progress in international human rights that has been achievedsince, that foreigners were equally granted certain minimum rights andthe legal capacity to lead a normal private life. That is to say, the rightto life, body, and honour, the right to own and acquire materials necessary for living, and the capacity to make contracts needed for daily life
must naturally be granted to foreigners as well as Japanese citizens (Obata,2021, p. 83). In the meantime, the Status of Residence, namely the qualification enabling foreign nationals to live and carry out certain activities
in Japan, is merely supposed to stipulate the conditions of entry in thefirst place, rather than functioning as a legal concept with which theadministrative power is able to regulate every aspect of the foreigners’
lives inside Japan. Considering the actual practice that has extended the
Status of Residence to generally regulate the lives of foreign nationals,

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it is necessary to emphasise that residence control over foreigners in theimmigration administration should be exercised within the limits derived
from the conditions of entry, instead of being exercised arbitrarily due
to the existence of these conditions. The judicial practice above, which
wrongly backs up an exceedingly powerful immigration control system,
is considered to be a serious consequence of the “expansion of Status ofResidence”, that is, the overusing of Status of Residence, and has further
exacerbated this problem at the same time (Obata, 2021).
Additionally, it seems to be a critical mistake to follow the logic of
Proposition 3, which has made the immigration control law a higher
norm than the Constitution in the legal system. Because of this inversion,
the guarantees of fundamental human rights for foreigners are entirely
dependent on whether entry and residence are granted (Annen, 1993).
In other words, the granting of Status of Residence itself has become
the key criteria for protecting human rights. However, a significant question would be raised if the Minister of Justice was allowed to makedecisions about the Status of Residence based on his political beliefs
under the immigration control system. If the Minister of Justice could,
when addressing the admission and residence of foreigners, freely evaluate
their acts from the perspective of appropriateness and inappropriatenesseven though these acts are constitutional and lawful, then all kinds of
discrimination against foreigners would probably be constitutional in theimmigration administration (Kondo, 2021, p. 4). In terms of this evident
error, the logic of Proposition 3 turns out to be highly problematic,
making this proposition invalid as a result.
Needless to say, the judgment of the McLean Case can be interpreted
in many ways and its reasoning concerning the three propositions may
be justified in some particular interpretations. Contrary to the critiques
mentioned above, some legal scholars conceive of the reasoning in the
McLean Case as an appropriate explanation, at least partly, for the relationship between international obligations and rules of domestic laws.
They insist on the predominance of domestic laws and contend that legal
obligations in international treaties or customary international law do nothave the same binding effect as rules of domestic laws. For example, it isargued by constitutional law scholars that a state that has ratified humanrights treaties makes a commitment to the international community toguarantee the human rights enshrined in these treaties—namely the international human rights—of those who are under its jurisdiction. Therefore,
the state has an obligation to protect international human rights, but

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it is an obligation only owed to the international community, not tothe people in the state. And, more importantly, this international obligation is understood to be an obligation to create a condition in which
the protection of international human rights is realised as an end result,while the process through which the protection is achieved is fundamentally a domestic matter (Takahashi, 2003, p. 74). From this pointof view, the international obligations will not be directly applicable inJapan but need to be transformed into specific stipulations in domestic
implementing legislation before they become effective. Accordingly, thereasoning of Proposition 3 to prioritise the immigration control system
can be supported as long as the distinction between rules of domestic
laws and international obligations exists. On the other hand, even scholars
holding this view do not agree to interpret the Proposition 3 in a mannerthat would exclude other legal norms while applying the domestic laws
and to provide safeguards for foreigners solely within the framework of
immigration control system. Instead, they suggest that judges should
embrace a higher level of scrutiny in the judicial review when it comes
to issues of international human rights and should offer procedural guarantees equivalent to those of criminal procedure in the case of detention,
since it will also cause a serious restriction on physical liberty (Sogabe,
2022, pp. 15–16).
In fact, it is necessary to note that the Supreme Court did not makeany ruling about detention in the McLean Case. Some inferior courts,
however, have extended the judgment and reasoning of the McLean Caseto other cases where the detention of foreigners without legal status ofresidence is concerned. For instance, the Tokyo District Court, rulingagainst a Nigerian’s request for provisional release from detention, in adecision on 6 October 2020, has affirmed the state’s discretion to determine the system of deportation, including detention, with reference tothe McLean Case. It stated that the provisional release under ICRRA isan exceptional measure to allow temporary release accompanied by certain
conditions to ensure appearance and prevent escape, as an alternative todetention. Since the law does not stipulate any specific requirement forprovisional release, it should be understood that the decision on whether
or not to grant the provisional release is left to the broad discretion of
the directors in the immigration detention centre. Such a decision will beillegal only when it is clear that the decision lacks any basis in fact or isextremely inappropriate in terms of socially accepted viewpoints, whichmeans that the decision deviates from the scope of discretionary power or

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is an abuse of this power. Thus, the court dismissed the detainee’s claimthat deprivation of physical liberty must be an exception and the unconditional and indefinite detention based solely on the fact that deportation
proceedings are underway falls under the category of arbitrary detention,
rashly confirming the legality of the disposition not to grant provisional
release in this case.
In summary, as described above, the McLean Case and the subsequent judicial decisions regarding foreigners’ rights have raised a numberof problems rather than giving sufficient and appropriate safeguards toforeigners in Japan. Meanwhile, the expansion of Status of Residence
in the immigration administration, which is legally underpinned andsupported by the judicial practice, has problematically blurred the limitsof the administrative power to control the entry and residence of foreign
nationals, and can partly account for the restrictive immigration andrefugee policies under which only foreigners whose activities are deemeduseful to Japan will be accepted and granted legal status. However, it
must be clearly emphasised that with the development of international
human rights, the judgment and reasoning in the McLean Case is significantly out of date and can no longer be maintained in the contemporary
world. Instead of supporting an immigration control system with dominant power to exclude other legal norms, the Japanese courts are expected
to interpret the domestic laws in conformity with the international norms,
including the direct application of these norms, in order to better fulfil
the role of protecting human rights under the international obligations(Matsuda, 2022).

Recent Developments in Legislation
and Judicial Practice
Whether on a voluntary basis or under international pressure, recent years
have witnessed some efforts in Japan’s legislation and judicial practice
to reform the current immigration control system and offer stronger
protection to foreigners. Therefore, changes and new developments are
happening indeed in Japanese society, though slowly and gradually.
To solve the broadly criticised problem of long-term detention, an
expert group on detention and deportation was established in October
2019, under the 7th Immigration Control Policy Discussion Panel, aprivate gathering led by the Minister of Justice. The group held ten meetings to discuss issues during 2019–2020, and ultimately compiled a report

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Y. ZHUtitled “Recommendations for resolving the issues of deportation evasion
and long-term detention” in June 2020. This report has emphasised ashared understanding that the following four points should be taken into
consideration as the basic premise for subsequent recommendations in thereport. First, in order to identify deportees who need to be deported fromJapan, it is necessary that those who should be deported due to the deportation order and those who should be permitted to stay or be granted
asylum be properly distinguished and recognised in the preceding deportation proceedings. Thus, improvements in the deportation system andits applications should be made from this perspective. Second, for those
who need to be deported, deportation proceedings should be facilitated.
Third, the detention period should be as short as possible. Therefore,
measures should be taken to eliminate long-term detention and alternatives to detention should also be considered. Fourth, in the event ofdetention, the treatment of detainees should be carried out in an appropriate manner, with due consideration for human rights and humanity(Expert Group Recommendations, 2020, p. 21). In addition, to prevent
prolonged detention, it is suggested that enhancements and improvements to the legal procedure for deciding whether to issue a deportation
order should be achieved, in order to appropriately consider the circumstances of each person. Meanwhile, further clarification of factors andcriteria for special permission for residence should be considered, in termsof improving the transparency of decisions about granting or denyingthat permission (Expert Group Recommendations, 2020, pp. 22–24).
However, the report has also advocated establishing a new system toincrease the effectiveness of deportation proceedings, in which an orderwould be issued to deportees who refuse to be deported without justifiable reasons, requiring them to apply for a travel document necessary
for their deportation or to leave Japan by a certain date, and a penalty
would be imposed for violation of such an order. An examination of theappropriateness of the refugee application process, which currently allows
repeated applications without limitation, is required as well. The reportstated that, in the case of repeated applications, it would be appropriate
to consider legal measures to provide exceptions to the suspensive effecton deportation during refugee application procedures (Expert Group
Recommendations, 2020, pp. 26–39).
Based on this report, and in response to the aforesaid opinion by the
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Japanese government
submitted a bill to revise ICRRA to the Diet on 19 February 2021.

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The bill contained several important amendments to the current legal
framework, including instituting an application procedure for the special
permission for residence, creating a system of monitoring measures as
an alternative to detention, developing procedures and provisions related
to the treatment of detainees, introducing a complementary protection
system for asylum seekers who are regarded as equivalent to refugees,
reviewing provisions with regard to the suspensive effect on deportation
during the refugee application procedure, and establishing an expulsion
order system that can demand deportation from Japan for those who haveevaded deportation.
Part of the proposed amendments will, admittedly, contribute toproviding better protection for asylum seekers. For example, a group ofprovisions concerning the treatment of detainees are going to be newly
introduced, ranging from the rights of detainees to perform religious
acts and to read books, magazines, newspapers, as well as other publications, to the liabilities of officers in the immigration detention centres andthe necessary measures to ensure health and medical care for detainees.
Regarding the granting of special permission for residence, it is proposedthat considerations formerly presented in the guideline should be includedin the new law. That is to say, it will be explicitly stipulated in ICRRA that
the Minister of Justice shall, when determining whether or not to grant
the special permission for residence, take into consideration the reasons
why foreign nationals wish to stay in Japan, their family relationships,
their behaviours, the circumstances leading to their entry into Japan, theperiod of their stays in Japan, their legal status during the period of stay,
the facts that result in their deportation, the necessity for humanitarianconsideration, as well as the various circumstances in Japan and abroad,and the expected impact on other unlawful residents in Japan. This provision is thought to be of great importance and deserving of a positive
reception, since it makes clear the considerations in the law and thus,
with its help, judicial review in accordance with the above considerations
would be possible (Hasegawa, 2022, pp. 187–188; Sogabe, 2022, p. 15).
Despite these favourable changes, this amendment bill has also introduced many provisions that would put foreigners or asylum seekers at
a greater disadvantage. For this very reason, it has received plenty of
opposition and critiques ever since it was submitted to the Diet. On
the day of its submission, the Japan Association for Refugees (henceforth, JAR) announced an opinion outlining the various problems withthe bill with respect to refugee protection (JAR Opinion, 2021). A week

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Y. ZHUlater, on 26 February, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (henceforth, JFBA) also released a statement to express its opposition to thebill, saying that it would reject the bill unless fundamental changes weremade to address the issues pointed out in the statement (JFBA Statement, 2021a). Moreover, a joint letter from three Special Rapporteurs of
the UN Human Rights Council and the Vice-Chair of the UN Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention was sent to the Japanese government on
31 March, indicating the bill’s violation of international human rights law(Morales et al., 2021). The UNHCR also expressed concerns about the
newly proposed procedures and measures relating to the status and treatment of asylum seekers in its comments on the bill (UNHCR Comments,
2021).
Overall, the bill was mainly criticised for the following reasons. First,
it would include new provisions in ICRRA with regard to the lifting of
the automatic suspensive effect on deportation in certain cases. Under
the currently effective law, deportation is uniformly suspended during the
refugee application process, which means that the applicant for refugee
status can avoid deportation through repeated applications. Therefore,
the amendment bill prescribed that in the case of the third or subsequent application, or applications from persons who have served a prison
sentence of three years or more, the suspensive effect on deportation does
not apply. It has been contended by several organisations, however, thatremoving automatic suspensive effect of refugee applications will increase
the risk of persons who are in need of international protection being
returned, contrary to the principle of non-refoulement (JFBA Opinion,
2021a, pp. 19–20; UNHCR Comments, 2021, p. 10). Second, there
would be an expulsion order system, accompanied by penalties, for notcomplying with such orders, so as to promote the execution of deportation. According to the formal opinion of the JFBA, this system andits penalties are difficult to justify, because they may violate deportees’
rights to court access and because there is no need to use criminal penalties to enforce deportation (JFBA Opinion, 2021a, p. 21). Besides, as
the UNHCR has noted in the aforementioned comments, for asylum
seekers who are normally unable or unwilling to approach the authorities of their countries of origin, the order to apply for a travel document,
which forces them to approach the consulates of their countries of nationality, might heighten their risk of being persecuted upon return, or giverise to sur-place refugee claims. For stateless persons or persons of undetermined nationality, in the meantime, there need to be special provisions

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that grant them an exemption from those orders (UNHCR Comments,
2021, p. 37). Third, the bill intended to introduce a system of monitoring measures as an alternative to detention. Under the current ICRRA,
the only way of being released from detention is to obtain a permit
for provisional release. However, the measures for managing provisionally released detainees are so insufficient that prevention of their escape
becomes impossible, making it a difficult decision to grant the provisional
release. In light of this situation, the system of monitoring measures canbe regarded as a method to prevent escape as well as to avoid prolonged
detention (Hasegawa, 2022, p. 187). Nonetheless, it has been stressedthat the proposed monitoring measures in the bill would be no lessproblematic than detention. While monitors are obliged to notify thesupervising immigration inspector of the living conditions of the monitored person, the status of compliance with the conditions attached tothe monitoring measures, along with other requested matters, these obligations would be a major detriment in building a trusting relationshipbetween the monitor and the monitored person. Thus, in reality, very
few supporters and lawyers would be willing to assume the obligationsof notification, making the system largely infeasible (Hasegawa, 2022,
p. 187; JFBA Opinion, 2021a, pp. 11–12).
Influenced by the widespread opposition and more crucially, by thedeath of a Sri Lankan woman at the immigration detention facility in
Nagoya, the bill to revise ICRRA was finally discarded in May 2021.
Two years later, however, the Japanese government prepared a new bill,
similar to the former one to a large extent, and officially submitted it
to the Diet again on 7 March 2023. The new bill has made a minor
modification to the old one by deleting the controversial provisions forthe periodic notification obligations of monitors in the system of monitoring measures, and introducing a new process of reviewing the necessity
for detention of those who are being detained every three months andtransferring detainees who need not be detained any more to the monitoring measures. On the other hand, the bill still retained numerous
provisions relating to the formerly criticised procedures and measures,
thus bringing about an opposition movement, with broad participationin Japanese society against its passage. Like its predecessor, the 2023 bill
was strongly opposed by JAR and JFBA since it contained few perceived
improvements in fact. Furthermore, over four hundred scholars fromdifferent areas in Japan signed a joint statement to express their objections to the bill, due to concerns about the human rights violations

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it contained. A number of civil action groups and student associations
joined in the opposition movement by organising protest rallies, holding
press conferences, and engaging in information sharing and support
seeking via social networking sites, for the purpose of preventing law
revision based on the 2023 government bill. In parliament, opposition
parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and theJapanese Communist Party spared no effort in opposing the government
bill, submitting another amendment bill, joined by several opposition
parties, that suggested creating a Refugee Protection Commission as athird-party organisation to grant refugee status in accordance with international norms. Nevertheless, the government pushed its bill throughthe Diet on 9 June 2023, defying the huge dissatisfaction and massive
criticism from opposition parties and the public.5
In addition to the latest changes in legislation, there are some new
trends in judicial practice that are worth mentioning. As more and morecases related to the human rights of asylum seekers or foreigners come tocourt, judges are gradually changing their stances and are trying to make
improvements in refugee acceptance and protection. Legal scholars havenoted that, in recent years, judicial decisions that seem to have taken into
account the Handbook by UNHCR are emerging. In reference to the
Handbook, judges are more likely to ease the burden of proof on refugee
applicants, thus leading to greater inclusion of refugees (Hasegawa, 2022,
p. 177).
Among the developments of judicial practice, a remarkable decision
rendered by Tokyo High Court on 22 September 2021 must be highlighted (Tokyo High Court, 2021). The court offered recognition of
the right to court access in its judgment to two Sri Lankan men, whowere deported before they could file an action against the administrative decisions rejecting their applications for refugee status. Considering
constitutional guarantees of fundamental human rights, the court specifically ruled that officers in the Immigration Bureau had delayed thenotification of the final decision regarding the review request of the

5 In the legislative process, the government proposed some minor changes to its 2023

amendment bill to include several provisions about due considerations for human rights in
refugee status determination and decisions concerning the monitoring measures and theprovisional release. The finally enacted amendments to ICRRA included these changes
as well. But these provisions are nothing more than abstract ideas, lacking the power toguide actual practice.

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disposition of rejecting the grant of refugee status until just before thedeportation, on the premise that the parties concerned were subject tomass deportation, and had directly deported them without allowing forcontact with any third party after the notification. In light of these facts, it
should be deemed that the officers had deprived them of the opportunity
to undergo judicial review of their refugee status, thus it is a violation of
the right to court access guaranteed by art. 32 of the Constitution, as wellas the guarantee of due process provided in art. 31 of the Constitution.
The judgment of Tokyo High Court in this case has marked a stark
departure from the McLean Case. By recognising foreigners’ right ofaccess to courts under the Japanese Constitution, Tokyo High Court has
provided a framework free from the McLean Case which would makeit possible to broadly protect the human rights of foreigners, including
those without legal status of residence in Japan. In fact, when discussing
the constitutional guarantee of due process in art. 31, Tokyo High Court
has combined it with art. 13, which contains the right to the pursuit ofhappiness, a right underlying all other human rights in the Constitution.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that stronger protection of humanrights in the refugee application process will be made available to foreign
nationals in the future, especially in the case of detention, the deprivationof physical liberty.

Conclusion
Today, with the development of international human rights law, thepredominance of domestic laws that pose a great threat to the humanrights of foreigners based on the doctrine of national sovereignty can nolonger be justified unconditionally. As discussed in this chapter, the legal
framework for refugee acceptance and protection in Japan has structuralproblems with regard to the narrow interpretation of the word refugee,
the heavy burden of proof on asylum seekers, and the lengthy refugee
application procedure, which cause not only the low refugee recognition
rate, but also various human rights violations. The current refugee law,thus, has been proven to be inadequate and inappropriate in protecting
the fundamental rights of asylum seekers, and needs to be thoroughlyreformed. Even though the 2023 law revision has tried to deal with someproblems, there will probably be no great improvement in the quality ofhuman rights protection in Japan. It is necessary to note that, without
fully reviewing the refugee application procedure and the criteria for

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refugee status determination, the newly enacted amendments to ICRRA,
aimed at reducing or eliminating long-term detention, will merely raise
new problems of asylum seekers’ rights, rather than ameliorating thesituation of refugee acceptance and protection.
Therefore, a great number of measures are still needed to reform thelegal framework under ICRRA and to construct a more inclusive immigration and refugee system. For example, setting a maximum time limit
for detention, introducing judicial review of decisions relating to detention, and reviewing the criteria for granting refugee status. Accordingly,
the courts are expected to play a more significant role in the implementation of international norms to further promote human rights. In viewof the faithful observance of international treaties (art. 98, para. 2) andthe parliamentary approval of these treaties (art. 73) that are explicitly
stipulated in the Japanese Constitution, it can be assumed that the rulesof international human rights law have direct legal effect in Japan and are
directly applicable in judicial practice (Ejima, 2021, pp. 148–149). Judges
should take on greater responsibility in judicial review to motivate policymakers to establish an immigration control system in conformity with theinternational norms.

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CHAPTER 5

From Non-existence to Unrecognised
Existence: The Evolution and Limitationsof Taiwan’s Hong Kong Asylum Mechanism
After 2019
Min-yen Chiang and Candia Tong

Introduction
In 2019, Taiwan implemented a policy of providing humanitarian aid to
Hong Kong citizens in response to the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment
Bill Movement (Anti-ELAB Movement) generated in Hong Kong. Thissocial resistance movement emerged through combined public support,
operating without a centralised leadership structure. Frontline participants, often strangers to one another, relied on ad hoc consensus to resist
the armed police, who acted under the authority of the Chinese government (Li, 2021). Violent clashes and bloody suppression were frequently
reported on social media and mainstream news outlets. Within protester
circles, there occasionally surfaced unverifiable reports of police sexual

M. Chiang (B) · C. Tong
Flow HK, Taipei, Taiwan
e-mail: mychiang@flowhongkong.net© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_5

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violence towards movement participants in enclosed spaces, unidentified bodies found floating on the sea or suspected of having fallen fromhigh-rise buildings, and organised workers being stalked and harassed byindividuals with Chinese accents. As a result of facing threats of politicalviolence and living under a high-pressure terror rule, many protesters havesought help from civil society organisations (CSOs) and the governmentin Taiwan.
In addition to the police violence, China, at the time, was in theprocess of systematically constructing an oppressive regime in Hong
Kong (Fong et al., 2020). In early 2020, Covid-19 swept the world
and many countries implemented measures such as border closures andrestrictions on gatherings, significantly reducing social activities. The
pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong, having learned from the painful
experience of the SARS outbreak in 2003, self-regulated and initiatedanti-pandemic actions, such as organising purchases of masks from foreigncountries and reducing gatherings (Tsui, 2023). However, the Chinese
government took advantage of the situation and implemented the Hong
Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) in response to months-long social
protests. This law completely destroyed the remaining space for civic
freedom and political autonomy in Hong Kong, rendering the “onecountry, two systems” framework meaningless. Organisers of the Hong
Kong democracy movement faced systematic and comprehensive suppression, and traditional civic organisations, autonomous student groups,
and public media were forced to disband (Wu, J., 2022). The effectsof the HKNSL have triggered a new wave of emigration from Hong
Kong, including many civic organisation workers who have chosen to seek
political asylum in Taiwan.
The plight of Hong Kong protesters seeking asylum in Taiwan differsfrom that of typical refugees, as they continue to face the threat ofcross-border oppression by the Chinese regime. Some activists advocating for Hong Kong issues have been subjected to harassment andviolent intimidation while in Taiwan, and the heightened cross-border
law enforcement by the Chinese police has raised concerns among democratic countries regarding China’s authoritarian expansionism (Safeguard
Defenders, 2022). The provision of protection to Hong Kong protesters
in Taiwan is complicated by Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, which stems
from China’s suppression of Taiwan’s international status.
Taiwan’s policy towards China is critical to maintaining peace in East
Asia. A conservative and stable policy towards China is in Taiwan’s

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Western allies’ interest, to avoid overstimulating China. However, Hong
Kong’s young protesters, who grew up after Hong Kong’s sovereignty
was transferred to China in 1997, have solidified their sense of an independent identity in response to Beijing’s violation of the promises madein the Sino-British Joint Declaration, its suppression of Hong Kong’s
cultural identity, and its blatant police violence (Tsui, 2023). In theeyes of the Chinese government, these protesters, seeking national selfdetermination, pose a tangible national security threat; any civil action
challenging China’s territorial claims or the authority of the Chinese
Communist Party must therefore be absolutely prohibited. The Taiwanese
government, which chooses to provide protesters with protection, isviewed as an outright hostile force. Therefore, a human rights-based aid
policy immediately escalates to a national security-sensitive issue.
Due to national security sensitivity and cross-border pressure from
China, Taiwan-based Hong Kong protesters often live “unrecognised
existences”, making it difficult for the public to know anything about thepractical implementation of humanitarian aid policies for Hong Kong in
Taiwan. One reason for the lack of clear guidance on Taiwan’s policy of
sheltering Hong Kongers is that Taiwan has never established a complete
refugee policy framework. Its refugee law has been stalled in the legislative process for decades, with no political momentum to move it forward.
Despite the emergence of a need to provide asylum to Hong Kongprotesters in the aftermath of the Anti-ELAB Movement, this political opportunity has not been able to effectively drive the advancementof refugee legislation. Without a clear legal framework, the Taiwanese
government bureaucracy could not prepare for the immediate needs offleeing Hong Kong protesters. The inefficiency of the bureaucratic systemand the absence of legal institutionalisation have resulted in the need
for CSOs to bear the cost of accommodating and facilitating the social
integration of protesters.
This chapter addresses the primary question of how Taiwan cancontinue to develop a substantive aid policy for Hong Kong while
protesters are “unrecognised”. From this perspective, what are the limitations of Taiwan’s aid policy towards Hong Kong, and what are theprospects for future development?
The authors of this chapter were key participants in the development process of Taiwan’s aid policy towards Hong Kong. We previously
served in a local non-governmental organisation in Taiwan, the Taiwan
Economic Democracy Union (t’ai wan ching chi min chu lian hê). We

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worked with CSOs such as the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (t’ai
wan jên ch’üan ts’u chin hui) and the Judicial Reform Foundation (minchien ssu fa kai kê chi chin hui) to urge and supervise the government
in gradually implementing its aid policy towards Hong Kong. Therefore,
the essential perspectives of this chapter, and most of the data, come fromour first-hand operational experience, as well as our interviews with civilsociety partners and relevant individuals within the government. We also
cite publicly available information from media or government reports tocorroborate information that we cannot publicly disclose due to secrecy.
This research approach provides an insider’s view but, as well as being a
positive factor, such a viewpoint can in itself be said to limit the research
perspective of this chapter. Nevertheless, our position remains consonant
and perspicuous. Hitherto, we have steadfastly advocated for the formulation of a refugee legislation or an equitably structured legal frameworkby the Taiwanese government, with an ardent commitment to proactively ensuring the protection and well-being of Hong Kong refugees
residing in Taiwan. Through our analysis, we hope to provide a morecomprehensive public discussion foundation for this policy area.
This chapter reviews the various stages of Taiwan’s aid policy towards
Hong Kong during its critical turning points and further expands related
analysis and discussions through crucial concepts such as national security, public–third sector cooperation, and the institutionalisation of shelter
policies.

Three Stages of Taiwan’s Aid to Hong Kong
From July 2019 to June 2020: Civilian Guarantees and Case-by-Case
Project Review
On the night of 1 July 2019, Hong Kong protesters occupied the Legislative Council chamber for the first time in history, demanding immediate
implementation of universal suffrage in both the executive and legislative
branches. At midnight, a large number of riot police stormed the Legislative Council and violently cleared the area. Based on past experiences,the Hong Kong government was highly likely to charge the protesters
with the “riot” offence, which carries a maximum sentence of up to ten
years. Moreover, the judicial system in Hong Kong lacked the spirit of therule of law. Therefore, many protesters began considering fleeing overseas,with Taiwan being the primary option due to its close geopolitical ties.

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On 12 August 2019, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan expressed her
willingness to provide humanitarian assistance to Hong Kong protesters
through her party spokesperson (Ye, 2019). Tsai’s statement motivatedmany young Hong Kong protesters. During the peak of the movement,
we found that many young protesters faced despair due to high-pressure
political violence and even experienced family breakdowns due to theirdiffering political views with their family members. The commitment of
Taiwanese politicians was like a lifeboat in the ocean, providing a briefhope for survival amidst the stormy seas. However, the then administrative bureaucracy in Taiwan had yet to gain systematic experience in
implementing political refugee protection, let alone proposing any policy
implementation guidelines. In the absence of any policy and institutional
preparation, the government was unable to promptly establish any public
ways to receive applications from refugees seeking assistance. Consequently, these political refugees, who had just arrived in Taiwan, had no
official channels to seek help from the authorities.
We noticed that, faced with the imminent political crackdown by theHong Kong government, the first wave of protesters fleeing to Taiwan
acted quickly. They initially obtained short-term stay permits throughtourist visas and then tried to seek assistance from familiar social networks
in Taiwan. Due to the lack of an official coordination mechanism, aplethora of urgent requests for asylum flooded human rights groups,
political parties, as well as organisations or individuals who had establishedpersonal connections with Hong Kong’s social activist circle. As we experienced, in response to this urgent situation, several CSOs came together
to organise humanitarian aid for Hong Kong refugees, leveraging their
networks of people with similar backgrounds, who were dealing with thesame issues, and building on the trust they had developed thanks to pastcollaboration with social activists.
As we encountered, under the political mandate of President Tsai, theTaiwanese government had maintained a friendly attitude towards Hong
Kong refugees. However, officials had become accustomed to relying on
the past case-by-case review model for handling foreign refugees. Government agencies could only offer temporary solutions within the limited
legal framework, while applicants awaiting official responses had to rely on
the assistance of CSOs. The previous legal framework was not easily applicable given the circumstances at that time. This was primarily due to theoverwhelming influx of people arriving in Taiwan within a short period,
and the tendency of individuals involved to seek assistance discreetly and124

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in secrecy. Despite frequent interactions between Taiwanese CSOs andHong Kong activists, they still faced difficulties in verifying the identities
of a significant number of asylum seekers through their existing networks.
The absence of a structured leadership core in the Hong Kongprotests effectively shielded protesters in the short term, as the Hong
Kong government was unable to concentrate its efforts on arresting
leaders within a specific area. However, this outcome posed an immediate challenge in terms of identifying the participants involved in theprotests. Moreover, most young protesters might face economic difficulties, but the Taiwanese government had yet to establish a refugee
resettlement institution that provided emergency living assistance. Most
significantly, owing to the spectre of Chinese government infiltration
into overseas democratic societies, Hong Kong political refugees faced
safety risks that prevented them from openly seeking media interviews
or making widespread appeals to the community for assistance. Instead,they had to rely on existing social networks and cautiously communicate their difficulties and needs. We learned that these specific contextual
factors constrained CSOs from making immediate and extensive efforts
to develop feasible operational models.
Based on our findings, initially, the government proposed several
short-term measures to address the pressing needs caused by the rapidly
evolving situation in Hong Kong. The Taiwanese government expresseda clear willingness to assist the protesters; however, it encountered challenges due to a lack of basic administrative procedures and the necessary
human resources to undertake further protection efforts. The initial
proposals put forth by the government were also deemed impractical anddifficult to implement. In light of the chaotic situation, CSOs had totentatively establish mechanisms to provide assistance to the substantial
number of protesters who arrived in Taiwan in early July. During that
period, the civilian shelter mechanism was roughly divided into threesteps:
i. Attempting to understand the background of each case from thefragmented network of original information.
ii. Establishing a standard interview procedure to build the necessary
information file for each case to apply for residency.
iii. Negotiating with the government to obtain residency status(Chiang, 2020).

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Based on our understanding, many civil society workers were fully
dedicated to building the mechanism individually and commenced casemanagement, resulting in the formation of a temporary collaboration
for civilian refugee resettlement. This was achieved under the highly
mobilised configuration of CSOs, overcoming practical difficulties suchas identity confirmation, emergency resettlement, and protecting asylum
seekers’ privacy. The government passively endorsed the civilian mechanism. If applicants were assisted by the specific and reliable alliance ofCSOs, there was a high likelihood of receiving administrative assistancefrom the government, such as extending short-term visas and mitigating
administrative obstacles during the residency application process. In our
analysis, we have summarised this model as the “civilian guarantees andcase-by-case project review” mentioned in the title of this section, which
had led to a preliminary consensus on public–third sector cooperation.
During this stage, CSOs were the actual implementers of President Tsai
Ing-wen’s humane policies towards Hong Kong protesters. In our experience, the civil society-led shelter mechanism often encountered financial
and human resource constraints. Additionally, as CSOs lacked official
power, individuals seeking help from them could not receive official guarantees through the third-sector procedures. Consequently, we noticed
that some individuals were unwilling to trust, and refused to join, thecivil shelter mechanism, leaving them in a vulnerable situation where theTaiwanese government could not provide further assistance.
However, we found that Tsai’s verbal commitment gave protesters
confidence that official assistance would be available, which increased
their willingness to flee to Taiwan. This further intensified the burden on
CSOs responsible for providing shelter, as they had to raise funds whilerefining the civil mechanism based on the lessons learned from implementation. After several months of trial and error, CSOs developed a stableintervention mechanism. This mechanism included strengthened casemanagement for refugee placement, provision of emergency accommodation, psychological support, medical services, insurance coverage, legal
aid, assistance in applying for residency in Taiwan, and career development planning. Furthermore, regular monitoring of the living conditionsof these individuals was conducted by CSOs to help them achieveself-sufficiency. Other civic resources were gradually integrated into the
network, such as the “Taiwan Volunteer Lawyers Group Supporting
Hong Kong Protesters”, which was officially launched during the 29
September “Taiwan with Hong Kong” rally (Lu, 2019). The lawyer’s

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group established a public Telegram (a social media platform widely usedby Hong Kong protestors for secret communication during the AntiELAB movement) account to help Hong Kong protesters inquiring about
the basics of the civil shelter mechanism in Taiwan through social media.
From July 2020 to July 2022: Establishment of a Semi-Official Project
OfficeAfter nearly a year of refugee resettlement efforts led by CSOs, theMainland Affairs Council (MAC) finally announced the “Hong Kong
Humanitarian Assistance and Care Action Scheme” (the Scheme) on 18
June 2020, gradually taking over the management of individual cases
and related administrative tasks from civil society organisations (Mainland Affairs Council, 2020). This Scheme was established under the“Taiwan–Hong Kong Service and Exchange Office” (t’ai kang fu wu
chiao liu pan kung shih, Exchange Office) under the Taiwan–Hong Kong
Economic and Cultural Cooperation and Promotion Council (t’ai kangching chi wên hua hê tso ts’ê chin hui, ECCPC). This council was initiallyestablished with government funding and maintained relationships with
Hong Kong’s political and civil society sectors in a semi-official capacity,
often hosting cultural exchange events. Taiwan’s government chose asemi-official, culturally oriented institution to manage the refugee asylum
work, demonstrating its desire to downplay the political nature of the
Scheme. At the time, as the HKNSL was preparing to be implemented,
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government also responded
strongly, stating its determination to “provide necessary assistance tothe people of Hong Kong, showcasing the government’s commitment
to upholding universal values and supporting Hong Kong’s pursuit of
freedom and democracy” (Mainland Affairs Council, 2020).
While Taiwan’s support for Hong Kong’s position was evident, thewording of official documents was consistently subjected to scrutiny,
strictly adhering to soft language to avoid any perception of being overly
politicised. This approach involved the use of terms such as universal
values, cultural exchange, and caring, which were carefully chosen toconvey the message without raising unnecessary political sensitivities. We
knew that CSOs who were involved in the previous stage of the shelter
work spent several months carefully monitoring whether the Scheme’s
assistance mechanisms would be fully integrated into the government’s
internal processes. Due to the CSOs’ effort, on the date of the Scheme’s

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announcement, the Exchange Office opened a formal online application
window, allowing Hong Kong protesters to seek assistance by phone oremail. Most relevant expenses related to the care and resettlement ofprotesters were borne by the government, and CSOs’ resources were redirected to a few financial items that the government was unwilling to bear.
This allowed CSOs to focus more on monitoring the effectiveness of the
Exchange Office’s operations. It is worth noting that the Exchange Officehas never publicly disclosed its work details. Even the relevant public
information section of the government’s financial budget did not show its
financial scale. There have been legislators’ inquiries regarding the 2021
budget of the ECCPC, questioning officials from the MAC. The official
response only mentioned that the ECCPC allocated NT$31.42 million as
the total annual expenditure amount (Chen, 2021).
The Taiwanese government chose to keep the operational detailsof their Scheme undisclosed, citing the need to protect the safety ofprotesters and other widely accepted reasons. Among these reasons, twostood out: First, publicly disclosing the application process may makeit easier for Chinese-affiliated intelligence agents to infiltrate and obtain
sensitive information about protesters’ identities; second, publicising thedetails of the Scheme’s execution may allow the Chinese government or
its local collaborators in Taiwan to gain a complete understanding of the
Scheme, which could potentially jeopardise the safety of protesters. In
our advocacy experience, we often encountered opposition from someindividuals from Hong Kong who, due to these two security concerns,
opposed the legislation of the asylum mechanism.
Given the cross-border oppression tactics of the Chinese regime, CSOs
did not dispute the importance of protecting the identity of protesters.
However, they repeatedly called on the government to examine the rationale for not making the details of the Scheme transparent (TNL, 2020).
In the absence of an official mechanism that was transparent and accountable, the potential costs and risks were shifted to the asylum seekers.
At this stage, several everyday tensions between the government andapplicants had emerged:
i. Applicants were unable to discern the application process and had
no clear information on when they would receive notification andfeedback from the government.

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ii. Applicants were unaware of the criteria for review and were unsure
how to prepare their documents to increase their chances of passing
the inspection.
iii. Some applicants who had not received official responses faced theissue of their passport expiration. As a result of unclear procedures,
they did not have enough information to determine whether theyshould leave Taiwan early and seek refuge in a third country.
To gain insight into the logic of the official system, civilian actors andpublic media utilised case interviews and incomplete information to piece
together the government’s internal review process, while also offeringsuggestions and criticisms. The following is a model of the review process
by officials, pieced together from the information available:
i. Asylum seekers apply for a general stay visa to enter Taiwan (usually
holding a tourist visa).
ii. Applicants call or email the Exchange Office and submit preliminary identification information, as well as a description of theirinvolvement in the protests.
iii. Exchange Office staff arrange an interview to clarify and document
the applicant’s protest participation and the legal risks associatedwith returning to Hong Kong.
iv. Exchange Office personnel consult with third-sector experts andscholars for evaluation of the individual case.
v. A government review committee composed of officials decides
whether to provide the applicant with assistance and care. Onceapproved, the Exchange Office continues to provide care andassistance in daily living, including most of the support services
designed by CSOs in the first stage.
vi. Due to other government regulatory procedures, applicants may berequired to undergo further interviews with border or immigration
agencies.
vii. Finally, interdepartmental government personnel form a joint
review committee to decide whether to grant the applicant“Scheme-based status” (Liu, 2021).
From the perspective of CSOs, one of the criticisms of the process
was that even if an applicant successfully obtained the “Scheme-based

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status”, it did not necessarily mean that they were granted refugee status
or any other valid residency rights (Liu, 2021). The government did notprovide applicants with any official documentation to attest to the receiptof the “Scheme-based status”, nor did it offer any other opportunities forresidency outside of the usual channels. Therefore, applicants who hadcompleted the screening process typically received only verbal notification from personnel at the Exchange Office that they had obtained the“Scheme-based status”. Subsequently, these individuals had to consider
whether to pursue higher education, which was the most feasible pathway
for young protesters to gain eventual citizenship in Taiwan’s existing legal
framework.
During this stage, the official application process had not been
subjected to a thorough examination due to the curtailment of personnel
mobility stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic. At the outset of thepandemic, the Taiwan government promptly implemented quarantine
measures for individuals from China, Hong Kong, and Macao andsuspended all entry of foreign nationals from 19 March 2020 (Bureauof Consular Affairs, 2020). With the exception of foreign nationals withresidency status, individuals with general tourist visas were unable toenter Taiwan. The border ban on Hong Kong nationals persisted until
20 February 2023, for a period of almost three years. Many Hong Kongprotesters chose to obtain student status in Hong Kong and enter Taiwan
with a student visa (Bureau of Consular Affairs, 2020).
However, these protesters faced a predicament when they reached out
to the Exchange Office to express their intention to apply for assistance, as the staff seemed to provide vague reasons for not accepting
their cases, leaving them perplexed (Liang, 2022). “Not accepting thecase” did not mean rejecting the application. We had several instanceswhere we accompanied the applicants during phone calls to the Exchange
Office. These conversations often resulted in a logical impasse, as theperspectives of the applicants and the Exchange Office staff could notalign. From the government’s viewpoint, successful entry into Taiwan
for students meant that they did not necessarily require special assistancesince they had already obtained residency status. As a result, the Exchange
Office staff indicated their limited ability to offer further legal protectionor assistance. Instead, they offered consultation services and encouraged
the applicants to seek help if they encountered any future difficulties.
However, from the applicants’ standpoint, this rhetoric appeared as adisingenuous and tactful refusal. They firmly believed that they needed130

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government assistance, as their involvement in the protests could expose
them to harassment or arrest by the Hong Kong government if they
were to return. They expected a more straightforward approach fromgovernment employees who, operating within an official capacity andwielding the mechanisms of public power, they thought should not
employ ambiguous language.
During this stage of Taiwan’s aid to Hong Kong, we observed twolevels to the role of the Exchange Office:i. At the level of resettlement and care, it was true that the Exchange
Office faced significant challenges in immediately handling all thecases of protesters sent by CSOs, given its recent establishment. Thissituation was worthy of criticism as the government took nearly ayear to establish concrete financial planning and personnel structures
to implement President Tsai Ing-wen’s promise of providing humanitarian assistance to Hong Kongers. Within the public sector, theExchange Office gradually developed a systematic workflow, albeit
at a slow pace.
ii. At the level of legal protection, the Exchange Office, as a semiofficial agency, did not have the power to resolve the long-term
residency issues of applicants comprehensively. In other words, while
the Exchange Office had replaced CSOs, the ruling party had yet topresent a residency application mechanism specifically designed forHong Kong protesters. The resulting legal and regulatory impassesignificantly affected the mental and physical health of applicants, asa lack of legal identity made it challenging for them to feel secure in
Taiwan and develop their personal lives (Chen et al., 2019). Therefore, at this level of legal protection, the Taiwanese government had
yet to make a clear statement, and the mechanism for sheltering
Hong Kong protesters had been stalled.
The non-disclosure of information might, in specific circumstances, bedisadvantageous to the ruling party’s interests. If the government’s assistance was effective, the confidentiality of information might prevent themfrom promoting their achievements. In February 2022, after approximately a year and a half of operation, a veteran journalist from the Liberty
Times, who was well-versed in the business of the MAC, publisheda report stating that the Scheme had assisted over 130 Hong Kong

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protesters seeking refuge in Taiwan due to “political reasons” since 2020.
The government anticipated that 400–500 Hong Kong residents would
continue to seek shelter through this channel in the future. Among these
individuals, the youngest protester was not even 18 years old, while theoldest was in their 40s (Chen, 2022a).
The number of 130 was slightly larger than the figures collected by
CSOs. Through multiple interviews with limited sources of information,
CSOs had learned that as of February 2022, the total number of individuals in the Scheme was approximately 110, with the majority consistingof those directly assisted during the stage one accounting for around
76%. Furthermore, despite the border restrictions imposed during the
pandemic, the Taiwanese government still accepted approximately 20–25
individuals to enter with a visa due to exceptional humanitarian grounds,
who subsequently became part of the Scheme. It was evident that the telephone and email application window announced by the Exchange Office
had only seen around two to three successful applications. Without legal
refugee status, most applicants chose to study, with approximately 60–
70 applicants holding student visas. These Hong Kong individuals withstudent visas faced strict restrictions, resulting in many being unable towork full-time legally to earn income. Thus, they fell into financial hardship due to high tuition fees and academic pressure. Through private
networks, we learned that some Hong Kong communities in Taiwan had
initiated fundraising campaigns to share the burden of tuition fees forthese youth protesters, easing the issue to a certain extent. Nevertheless,according to Table 5.1, approximately 16% of protesters who chose to
study ultimately failed to adapt to campus life and shifted to employment. However, those who chose employment faced another difficulty.
They could only obtain a short-term residency of up to three years,
and although the residency could be extended, they could never obtain
Taiwanese citizenship, which also prompted some protesters to consider
the possibility of leaving Taiwan and moving to the UK. Regarding the
Scheme-based status review process, more than 80% of applicants, shownin Table 5.1, successfully completed the final joint review and obtained
the Scheme-based status, while the minority were still awaiting processing.
Approximately one to three individuals did not pass the review due tounclear legal risks of returning to Hong Kong.

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Table 5.1 Implementation status of the Humanitarian Assistance Scheme (as ofFebruary 2022)
Category

NumberDescription

Total number ofparticipants in the
SchemeApproximately
110

This refers to the total number of Hong
Kong protesters who came to Taiwan andwere being cared for by the Exchange Office.
Approximately 84 individuals (76%) were
those who were directly assisted by CSOs in
the stage one. Around 20–25 individuals(18–22%) entered Taiwan during the
pandemic through special channels based onhumanitarian assistance reasons. Additionally,
approximately two to three individuals directly
submitted their applications to the Exchange
Office and were granted assistance

Career planning
Employee

40–45Student

60–70

Some protesters chose employment as ameans of obtaining residency and striving forself-reliance. This approach could only grant
residency rights for up to three years, atime-span which was subject to renewal, but
did not lead to citizenshipStudents could not work full-time and reliedsolely on private resources to support theireducation, which created a financial burden.
Some students lacked the motivation to study
but were unable to settle throughemployment. About ten protesters could not
adapt to the school environment and ended
up dropping out to pursue employment

Application status
Successfully passed
final joint review

92–99

Pendingadministrative
procedures, not yet
entered final joint
reviewFailed to pass final
joint review after
submission

10–15

1–3

Individuals who had completed the Scheme
procedures and obtained the Scheme-based
statusIndividuals who had not yet entered the final
joint review

Individuals who did not pass the final joint
review, likely due to unclear legal risks intheir applications

Source Interviews by the authors. The statistics are up to February 2022

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After July 2022: The “Quasi-Asylum Mechanism” Not Publicly
Disclosed
In July 2022, the Taiwan government internally drafted administrative
documents to address the issue of Hong Kong protesters who lacked legal
asylum residency status. However, the government did not amend any
existing laws or regulations publicly. Instead, all changes were communicated verbally to applicants by personnel from the Exchange Office.
The media later summarised the full details of the mechanism frominformation obtained from Scheme applicants:
i. Applicants who pass the final joint review and obtain the Schemebased status are eligible to apply for a one year “personal work
permit” from the Ministry of Labour.
ii. With this “personal work permit”, applicants can apply to the
National Immigration Agency (NIA) for a work residency permit,
which will be renewed annually along with the personal work
permit. The residency permit will also be extended.
iii. From the day of obtaining the Scheme-based status, applicants canapply to become Taiwanese citizens if they have resided in Taiwan
for five years and have an average monthly income of 1.5 times theminimum wage in the fifth year.
iv. During the five-year residency period, applicants can participate
in the labour market and enjoy national health insurance just like
Taiwanese citizens. There are also no restrictions on studying andpursuing further education while working (Chun, 2022b).
At this stage, the general application channels of the Exchange Office
were no longer the narrow gateways they used to be, with vague languageand difficult access. At the time of writing this chapter, we found thatmany protesters’ applications had been successfully accepted and they
had entered into the subsequent interview processes. Under the continuous supervision of CSOs, the Exchange Office had started assigningeach protesting applicant a unique case number for tracking the progressof their case review. A responsible government official confirmed thisnew measure in a phone call with the authors. Although the government has not openly explained whether the aforementioned rule changes
have affected the operating standards for case acceptance, it is evident
that when the government proposed a superior institutional framework,

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M.-Y. CHIANG AND C. TONG

providing applicants with the opportunity to obtain a dedicated legal residency status through a Scheme-based process, the operational efficiencyof the government’s front-end execution units functioned seamlessly
as anticipated. In terms of the strict refugee legal framework in theinternational community, Taiwan’s humanitarian aid measures for Hong
Kong protesters cannot be considered complete. However, in terms of
their substantive content, they have already covered the various needs
and regulatory support required by asylum seekers in a foreign land
(Table 5.2).
Hong Kong protesters now had the right to submit Scheme applications to the Exchange Office, which, after specific review procedures,
might offer the opportunity to obtain social rights such as work permits,
health insurance, residency rights, and the chance to become a citizenof Taiwan. During the application period, applicants could receive rental
subsidies, living allowances, and, when necessary, apply for psychological counselling services or emergency medical care. As such, Taiwan’s
assistance to Hong Kong protesters could be considered a “quasi-asylum
mechanism”, but the government was reluctant to openly disclose thecontent of this mechanism due to its own safety concerns and othernational strategic considerations, and was also unwilling to appeal to
explicit laws. Under this restriction, long-standing problems persisted:
Table 5.2 Index of names of organisations in Taiwan
English

Wade–Giles (Pinyin)

Traditional Chinese

Taiwan Economic Democracy
Union
Taiwan Association for
Human Rights
Judicial Reform Foundation

t’ai wan ching chi min chu
lian hê
t’ai wan jên ch’üan ts’u chinhui
min chien ssu fa kai kê chi
chin huit’ai kang fu wu chiao liu pankung shiht’ai kang ching chi wên hua
hê tso ts’ê chin hui

台灣經濟民主連合

Taiwan–Hong Kong Service
and Exchange OfficeTaiwan–Hong Kong
Economic and Cultural
Cooperation and Promotion
Council

台灣人權促進會
民間司法改革基金會
臺港服務交流辦公室臺港經濟文化合作策進會

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i. If there is a change in the ruling party, and Taiwan is governedby a pro-China party, the Kuomintang (KMT) or Taiwan People’s
Party may be quite likely to suspend the aid mechanism throughinternal procedures directly. External parties will find it challenging
to supervise the amendment without explicit legal provisions as an
advocacy lever.
ii. Even if the DPP continues to govern in the coming years, President
Tsai Ing-wen’s second term will end in 2024. The question remains
whether future leaders will still be willing to support this quasiasylum mechanism.
iii. Applicants must reside in Taiwan for five years before acquiring
citizenship, during which any unforeseen circumstances lack legal
provisions.

The Legal Challenges of Taiwan’s
Assistance to Hong Kong
The Use of Regular Immigration to Conceal Political Refugees
At the moment of writing this article, the Taiwanese government has notofficially designated its assistance to Hong Kong as “political asylum”, anddue to the absence of a comprehensive refugee law, protesters seeking
refuge in Taiwan are unable to obtain legal refugee status. In the official definition, the assistance provided by the Taiwanese government toHong Kong protesters seeking help is not heavily politically motivated“asylum”, but rather “humanitarian assistance” based on universal values
and human rights concerns. Even after the establishment of a “quasiasylum mechanism” in July 2022, the Taiwanese government had not
officially acknowledged any protesters receiving official asylum throughproper channels.
Compared to the previous KMT government, the Tsai Ing-wen administration had taken a more definitive stance, refusing and resisting China’s
intention to annex Taiwan’s territory and making significant breakthroughs in foreign relations with democratic countries such as theUnited States and Japan to elevate Taiwan’s actual national sovereignty
status. However, President Tsai Ing-wen had consistently shown atendency not to modify any legal frameworks related to Taiwan’s policies
towards China, not just concerning Hong Kong but also in issues related

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to economic security. Despite many international allies’ legal adjustments
to defend or sanction China in response to its threats, the DPP government had only made minor administrative and regulatory adjustments ina small scope (Chiang, 2022). Regarding policies towards Hong Kong,
the Taiwanese government has been unwilling to amend laws, let alone
propose legal orders granting administrative agencies the authority tomake changes on their own (Chiang, 2022). In the face of China’s
military threats and diplomatic pressures on Taiwan, President Tsai Ingwen’s cautious and conservative attitude has fundamentally limited thedevelopment space for legalising Taiwan’s assistance to Hong Kong.
Within the confines of this policy, Taiwan’s government formulated
a basic strategy during the stage one and two, which aimed to extend
humanitarian assistance to protesters for a limited duration, with the
expectation that they would opt for the regular immigration channels
rather than pursuing the path of asylum or refugee status in Taiwan. Oneof the quintessential cases illustrating this policy was the predicament of
Mr. Lam Wing-kee, the proprietor of Causeway Bay Books, who hailed
from Hong Kong. Mr. Lam and his Hong Kong associates operated a
specialised bookstore offering publications banned or censored by the
Chinese government, many of which divulged accounts of illicit or unethical activities of officials affiliated with the Communist Party. In 2015,
Mr. Lam and his fellow shareholders went missing in Hong Kong, andMr. Lam subsequently confirmed that they had been kidnapped by clandestine Chinese law enforcement personnel and transported to mainland
China for trial. This event dealt a severe blow to the confidence of Hong
Kong’s civil society in the political freedom milieu of their city. Pressured
by the increasingly repressive atmosphere for free speech in Hong Kong,
Mr. Lam sought refuge in Taiwan in 2019 and founded a new bookstore bearing the same name, “Causeway Bay Books (Taiwan)” (Chen &Chiu, 2022). The Taiwanese government had repeatedly welcomed Mr.
Lam’s decision to sustain his publishing business in Taiwan, with senior
government officials, including the president and the foreign minister,
paying visits to the bookstore to unequivocally demonstrate Taiwan’s
unwavering support for Hong Kong. Bolstered by this strong government
endorsement, Mr. Lam undoubtedly satisfied the criteria of being vulnerable to the Chinese government’s intimidation and deserved Taiwan’s
official protection. However, Mr. Lam availed himself of the aid and guidance of government personnel. He first attempted to apply for a start-up
visa, but his application failed. Subsequently, he pursued a professional

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immigration visa, which ultimately culminated in him attaining Taiwanesecitizenship (TNL, 2020).
In general, even for those who have fled their homeland or cannot
return due to safety concerns, it is not necessary to apply for refugee
status. Choosing whether to apply for refugee status or immigration status
can be a strategic consideration based on one’s own interests. If someone
like Lam Wing-kee has sufficient resources and social support, becominga Taiwanese citizen through the immigration pathway would naturally
eliminate the need to go through the arduous process of seeking asylum,
which increases their own security risks. However, not every Hong Kongprotester who came to Taiwan has had the opportunity to meet theimmigration policy standards and successfully obtain residency.
Taiwan’s policy towards Hong Kong immigrants has differed from thatof other foreigners. Prior to 2019, Taiwan adopted a lenient attitude
towards Hong Kong immigrants, with low review thresholds and diverse
application channels. The reason for this is that Taiwan was using theRepublic of China constitutional framework, whose backbone was createdin 1946 in China. Under this constitutional framework, many authoritarian legacies remained, and still remain to this day. Taiwan is unlikely
to change this framework until it is able to gain widespread international
support and declare de jure independence. Under this framework, the past
KMT government stood on the “free and democratic” side of the Cold
War binary opposition and hoped that overseas Chinese would choose
to come to Taiwan and refuse to join the People’s Republic of China.
In addition, with the basic policy of ethnic nationalism, the Republicof China government previously identified all people of Chinese descentaround the world as its quasi-citizens. Therefore, although Hong Kong
Chinese were under British colonial rule, they were viewed by the KMTgovernment as part of a temporary political state. In the long run, thecolony of Hong Kong was still to be returned to the Republic of China.
At the time of writing this article, foreigners in Taiwan typically obtaina residency permit before applying for permanent residency. To naturalise as Taiwanese citizens, they must renounce their original nationality.
In contrast, the immigration process for Hong Kong residents is fundamentally different. As quasi-citizens of the Republic of China, they canapply for citizenship without naturalisation if they meet specific criteria

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after obtaining residency. They do not have the option to obtain a noncitizen permanent residency status.1 There have been various pathwaysfor Hong Kong immigrants to come to Taiwan, including five common
categories: “student immigration”, “marriage immigration”, “investment
immigration”, “professional immigration”, and “entrepreneurial immigration”. “Student immigration” was a popular pathway for protesters
during the first and second stages of the aid for protestors coming to
Taiwan. To become Taiwanese citizens, they were required to study ata Taiwanese college or university, work in Taiwan for at least five years
after graduation, earn an average monthly income that was at least twice
the minimum wage in the fifth year, and have no gaps in their work
history during this period. Additionally, each employer must be willing
to apply for a work permit from the Ministry of Labour. In recent years,
many economic immigrants from Hong Kong have chosen the “marriage immigration” and “investment immigration” pathways. The former
required being married to a Taiwanese citizen for at least three years,
while the latter required investing at least NT$6 million in Taiwan for one
year. “Professional immigration” and “entrepreneurial immigration” were
options that Lam Wing-kee tried. The former required recognition from acompetent authority in the professional field and residence in Taiwan for
at least one year, while the latter had more complicated criteria, higher
thresholds and required residing in Taiwan for at least five years before
applying for citizenship.
The Conservative Legislation Strategy
During the Anti-ELAB Movement, Hong Kong youths repeatedly urged
the Taiwanese government to confront the unresolved issue of the lackof a formalised asylum mechanism. The ruling party leaders remained
conservative and continued to guide protesters through the regular immigration channels. In September 2019, the internationally renowned Hong
Kong activist Joshua Wong (2019) wrote a letter of opinion to Taiwanese
media, pointing out that a refugee law or other legal mechanisms basedon the Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau would be
1 At the time of writing this article, the Taiwanese government has attempted topromote amendments to convert the Hong Kong immigration system into a status thatis closer to that of ordinary foreigners, but it has not yet become the government’s final
approved policy (See Chen, 2022b).

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an excellent foundation for the DPP’s Scheme legislation. Wong addedthat without solving this issue, many practical difficulties would arisefor protesters coming to Taiwan. At that time, Premier Su Tseng-chang
immediately denied the legitimacy of Wong’s questioning, affirming that
Taiwan’s then mechanisms were complete and that there was no need torevise the refugee law (Chiao, 2019). In December 2019, violent clashes
broke out as the police forcibly entered the campuses of several universities in Hong Kong, causing many injuries and turning the tide of theAnti-ELAB Movement towards a more pessimistic state of affairs (BBCNews, 2019). The then president of the Hong Kong Baptist University Students’ Union commented on the DPP government’s failure toestablish a legal basis for an asylum mechanism, which was then spunby Taiwan’s pro-China media as the DPP’s exploitation of Hong Kongprotesters to gain votes. The negative effects of this incident continued
to ferment in Taiwan’s media, and the Taiwanese government proved
unwilling to address the core problem, resulting in a decline in the qualityof public discourse. Eventually, the former president of the Students’
Union publicly apologised, putting an end to the chaotic situation(Huang, 2019).
Premier Su’s notion of a “comprehensive legal system” referred to
Article 18 of the Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macauand Article 25 of the Enforcement Rules of the Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau, which provided a legal basis for thegovernment to assist Hong Kong protesters facing political emergencies (Mainland Affairs Council, 2017). However, these two provisions
contained only one sentence each, without regulating any procedures,
working frameworks, or the legal rights of applicants. In June 2020, CSOs
proposed a civilian version of the Enforcement Rules of Article 18 of theHong Kong and Macao Relations Act, based on previous advocacy experiences, with the aim of improving the then weak and ineffective legal
framework design (Taiwan Association for Human Rights, 2020). Thisversion emphasised the supervision and participation of civilian experts
and scholars. Former chairman of the MAC, Chen Ming-tong, accepted
the group’s opinion and proposed amending the enforcement regulationin the Legislative Yuan, prepared to institutionalise the existing shelter
work system. Despite Premier Su’s public opposition, the MAC persisted
on its opinion, and the implication at that time was that the MAC would
further strengthen the legal system of shelter in response to the HKNSL(Chen, 2020). However, after the establishment of the Exchange Office,140

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Premier Su again publicly opposed the regulative amendment, citing the“completeness of existing laws and regulations” (Liu, 2020). He did not
proactively explain how the government would operate a project without
a legal basis, nor did he explain how previous practical difficulties would
be solved in the new model of the Exchange Office. Premier Su’s toughstance also suppressed public discussion of the issue within government
departments, and even the DPP-dominated Legislative Yuan adopted aconsistent stance, blocking all possibilities for amendment. However, thesuppression of public discussion did not mean that social conflicts andpractical difficulties no longer existed (Chiang, 2020).
Due to the practical difficulties encountered in its work, the MAC had
to seek temporary solutions within the existing legal framework. In thesecond stage, in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, the MAC
invoked Article 51 of the Employment Service Act to exempt protesters
who had obtained the Scheme-based status from work restrictions. This
new administrative measure was not officially announced or implemented,
but its implementation was verified through interviews with the protesters
and direct contact with employers hiring these protesting individuals. The
Employment Service Act has been the primary regulation relating to theemployment of foreigners in Taiwan since it was enacted in 1992. Article
51 clearly stipulates that refugees with residency permits can join the job
market under the same conditions as ordinary citizens. The concept of“refugee” was already included in the law when the Employment Service
Act was enacted in response to the trend at the time of various countries
enacting refugee laws. However, a Taiwanese version of a refugee law has
never been enacted, being consistently delayed in the Legislative Yuan.
Ironically, the existence of Article 51 served as evidence supporting theclaim made by Su Tseng-chang regarding the “completeness of existinglaws and regulations”. While it was difficult to ascertain Su’s thoughts,
from our perspective, this evidence actually highlighted the necessity of
having a legal basis for asylum work. If there had been no Article 51,
the influx of a large number of asylum seekers could have led to adverse
consequences. The case-by-case processing approach failed to provide
protesters with legal rights to participate in the labour market, instead
placing a significant burden on public resources to cover their various
living expenses, rather than facilitating their self-reliance. Taiwan’s reluctance to amend its legal system to enhance its Hong Kong policy might
have achieved geopolitical stability, but it also intensified the administrative burden on government agencies and CSOs. Moreover, the question

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remained as to whether the geopolitical consideration holds logical andsubstantial significance.

Troubling National Security Considerations
The Taiwanese government has consistently avoided public discussion ofits support for Hong Kong and has refrained from making legislativechanges, often citing the need for discretion. This approach is groundedin three analytical perspectives. Firstly, the government seeks to protect
the safety of Hong Kong protesters by avoiding public disclosure of details
regarding the aid projects. Secondly, the government aims to avoid thecomplex geopolitical issues that may arise from enacting asylum policies.
Lastly, since existing legislation has been deemed sufficient, the government sees no need for further action. These perspectives seemed to be
widely accepted in Taiwanese society, as evidenced by Lam Wing-kee’s
affirmation of the official position that “actions are more important thanwords” when evaluating Taiwan’s aid to Hong Kong (Chung, 2020).
However, the term “Taiwanese government” does not denote a homogeneous entity with identical interests. Even the disagreement between
the MAC and the premier exposed the fragility of the “actions are more
important than words” approach. The modalities of executing the Scheme
have remained contentious, revealing considerable debate within government agencies. Consequently, President Tsai Ing-wen’s circumspection on
the topic of legalising such initiatives for national security purposes might
result in inconsistencies due to divergent interpretations and definitionsof “national security” across various government and societal domains.
In August 2020, the MAC issued a regulatory order to amend existinglaws in order to enhance national security screening. Under the new regulations, all Hong Kong residents applying for residency or citizenshipin Taiwan were required to declare whether they were born in China,
whether they had ever worked for a Chinese-funded institution, andwhether they had any connections to the Communist Party or the Chinese
government. The government did not explicitly state what direct effects
would result if the answer to the aforementioned question were “yes”. At
the time of its announcement, the amendment did not attract opposition,
but rather was seen as a necessary response to China’s continued military
intimidation of Taiwan. However, when the first batch of immigration
applications was processed under the new regulations, many Hong Kong

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investment immigrants found their applications rejected due to reasons
such as “harmful to national interests” and “likely to engage in terrorist
activities” (Lin, 2022). One widely publicised case involved an applicant
who had worked at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CHHK),
which was deemed by the Taiwanese government to be a governmentfunded institution, and was therefore deemed to have connections to theHong Kong government (Executive Yuan, 2022). This decision was difficult to understand, as staff at CUHK were not government officials, andmany of them were even supporters of the pro-democracy movement.
Some applicants who were dissatisfied with the government’s screening
opinions, questioned the NIA about the national security considerations
underlying its decision-making. However, according to what applicants
told us, the NIA’s response admitted that due to the overwhelming
volume of applications, the execution of its operations was not always
adequate, and that there had been misunderstandings caused by theimprecision of details in the administrative documents. From the end of2021 to the beginning of 2022, many media outlets reported on thesefailed immigration cases, exposing the chaos of the government’s national
security screening (Chun, 2022a; Kuo & Chen, 2022; Lee, 2023). The
MAC clarified that the government rarely rejected applications based
solely on the applicant’s Hong Kong identity background, and that the
majority of rejections were due to the applicant’s failure to meet theinvestment immigration requirements (Shen, 2022).
In a parallel timeline, in April 2022, the MAC unveiled a plan toestablish a new immigration route aimed at tackling the residency predicament faced by Hong Kong protesters residing in Taiwan. This initiative
provided a plausible chance for these individuals to gain citizenshipfollowing their employment in Taiwan. Despite the apparent disconnect with political asylum, this move by the Taiwan government wasconsistent with their long-standing approach of sidestepping sensitive
terminologies such as “political asylum” by embedding humanitarian aid
within broader immigration frameworks (Shen & Chen, 2022). Surprisingly, members of the same political party opposed this bill. The DPPlegislators castigated the MAC’s officials for their lack of adherence tonational security duties, citing China’s total control over Hong Kong.
Thus, they argued that to ward off Chinese infiltration, Taiwan must
eschew the creation of new immigration channels for Hong Kong residents and instead restrain them. The ruling party’s “national security”
discourse was confounding, as the head of the Executive Yuan claimed

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the extant legal framework for the humanitarian Scheme was comprehensive, thus rejecting the MAC’s initial amendment proposal in mid-2020.
Concurrently, DPP legislators cooperated in circumventing any policy
discourse in the Legislative Yuan while abiding by the national security
concerns of their superiors. However, the MAC twice proposed amendments that enfolded political refugees within immigration policies while
taking into account national security considerations, only to be criticisedby DPP legislators for their alleged lack of national security awareness(Wu, J., 2022). The convoluted discourse on national security emanatingfrom the ruling party left many protesters feeling uneasy, according toour observation. The national security concerns have not brought about
a sense of security; instead, they have led to troubling consequences. Afterseveral months of political negotiations and manoeuvring within the DPP,
the Taiwanese government ultimately decided to transform the proposed
legislative amendments into internal documents that would not explicitly
alter existing laws, thus commencing the third stage of its Hong Kongaid policy.

Conclusion
Returning to the initial question of how Taiwan can continue to develop
substantial assistance policies towards Hong Kong activists without being
formally recognised, the lack of legal recognition of these activists is due
to Taiwan’s national strategic considerations. However, the operational
definition of national security is riddled with flaws, resulting in many
internal contradictions within the government system and the DPP. In
other words, the government, even if it aims to prioritise national security concerns, lacks a consistent operational method to fully conceal thelegal existence of activists and to convincingly demonstrate the effective
upholding of national security. Therefore, under these circumstances, thegovernment has difficulty completely denying the existence of politicalasylum for Hong Kong activists. By avoiding the root of the problem,
the government misses the opportunity to foster good public discourse
within a democratic society.
On the other hand, the critical factor for the existence of Taiwan’s assistance policy towards Hong Kong lies in the substantial presence of Hong
Kong exiles on Taiwanese land. The real presence of the exiled community inevitably brings urgent livelihood needs that require the government
to use legal tools to intervene and protect their social rights, as well as to144

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plan long-term citizenship pathways. The actual need for asylum makes
the government have to consider how to create an effective mechanism
within the system. In this process, advocacy actions initiated by CSOs
and participation in assistance networks have played a significant role. It
is precisely because of the flexibility and initiative of civil society that the
government opened up to assistance work early on and created the foundation for subsequent public–third sector cooperation. At least within thescope of resettlement and care services, the government considers civilsociety opinions highly. Moreover, this foundation of public–third sector
cooperation has led the MAC to propose further policy proposals forlegalising asylum.
The result of the interaction of various factors has led Taiwan’s
assistance policy towards Hong Kong to be divided into three development stages since 2019. The common background that runs throughthe three stages is the consideration of national security and the realneed for asylum. However, different actors in the process of developing
humanitarian assistance continued to negotiate and to push for solutions,
ultimately resulting in Taiwan developing its quasi-asylum mechanisms.
This has successfully given hundreds of Hong Kong activists the opportunity to pursue a free life with government assistance, starting a newstage of their lives in Taiwan.

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CHAPTER 6

Refugees by Another Name: Displaced
Learners in Japanese Higher Education
David Green, Lisa Unangst, and Eriko Tomita

Introduction
Genocide, environmental crises, and armed struggles during the last ten
years have resulted in the highest ever recorded number of displaced
people worldwide: over 100 million (UN News, 2022). Waves ofdisplaced learners—this intentionally broad grouping including thosewith refugee, asylee, and a variety of temporary protected statuses—havecatalysed a suite of relevant services at Higher Education Institutions(HEIs). Those initiatives include credential/prior learning evaluation,
bridging or pathway programmes providing language training, mentorship programmes, legal clinics, and so forth (e.g., Hartley et al., 2018;
Sontag, 2019). Moreover, regional compacts have been established which
are relevant to higher education access (e.g., Sarmiento, 2014).

D. Green (B) · E. Tomita
Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japane-mail: david.green@law.nagoya-u.ac.jp
L. Unangst
Empire State University, Saratoga Springs, NY, USAe-mail: lisa.unangst@esc.edu© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_6

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Japan is a country known for being largely closed to immigration andnotorious for admitting very few refugees (Horiuchi & Ono, 2022). The
admission of displaced learners is a new phenomenon in Japan, beginningwith only a handful of institutions in 2017 and expanding considerablywith the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
As of 2022, Japan’s foreign population stood at just 2.4% of its overall
population, and the country admitted only 44 out of 10,375 asylum applicants in 2019 (ISA, ). However, more Japanese HEIs have begun tohost displaced learners, reflecting a possible moderation of refugee policy.
Specifically, HEIs appear to be admitting learners who would otherwise
qualify as refugees outside of Japan, providing a place for them to live,
complete their studies, and potentially to find a job.
This chapter considers HEI supports for displaced learners in Japan, a
topic on which there is a dearth of scholarship and a lack of comprehensive data. We analyse how international officers at Japanese HEIs
describe the enrolment of and support for displaced learners. To ourknowledge, this work is the first of its kind to consider the intersection of
migration policy, higher education administration, and the internationalisation of higher education. Drawing from a thematic analysis (Saldaña,
2021) our findings show a willingness on the part of Japanese HEIs tohost displaced learners and provide generous financial packages to them,as well as the prevalence of short-term and precarious legal statuses inJapanese humanitarian protection. Furthermore, we identify differential
treatment of displaced learners based on nationality. We conclude that
local and national government can do more to assist displaced learners
and the HEIs hosting them; we recommend harnessing the momentum of
support given to Ukrainian evacuees any applying it to other nationalities,
and we probe the implications, on Japanese refugee policy, of admitting
displaced learners. This conclusion is connected to an expansive understanding of security as discussed by Rothschild (1995) among others,
moving beyond a construction of security as relevant to nation states andconsidering the security of people, itself involving economic, social, andpolitical security.
We begin by examining extant refugee policy in Japan before turning to
the internationalisation of higher education in comparative and Japanesecontexts. A discussion of research methodology follows, along with apresentation of our findings. We conclude the chapter noting the implications of our project for future research and for migration policy inJapan.

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Refugee Resettlement in Japan
While Japan, alongside other comparatively wealthy countries, serve as
primary funders of the supranational architecture supporting refugees,
refugee resettlement in Japan by number of displaced persons lags far
behind most other countries. Japan was the fourth highest governmental
donor to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 2022
(UNHCR Global Focus, 2022), yet the country remains strongly against
admitting refugees. To illustrate this, in 2020 the Ministry of Justicereceived 3936 asylum applications, yet only recognised 47 applicants as
refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Japan’s refugee recognition rate
was just over 1% for 2020, a rate that was in fact higher than previous
years.
In comparison, three fellow Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) member states hosted more than one million
refugees in 2019: Colombia, Germany, and Turkey (Amnesty International, 2022). Given this state of play, it is useful to briefly parse thelegal and policy framework limiting refugee resettlement in the Japanesecontext, identifying ways in which displaced people experience policy liminality (Unangst & de Wit, 2021). By policy liminality, we refer to learners
being “positioned between [policy] discourses rather than being centered
within a cohesive suite of federal, state, and institutional-level policy initiatives” (Unangst et al., 2022a, 2022b, p. 44), a circumstance with importfor future policy iteration. Policy liminality may be perceived (reported)by learners, and, we argue here, it may also be identified by policy actors
such as university administrators closely connected to the development
and implementation of relevant policy levers.
Dean and Nagashima (2007) argue that Japan “did not become a party
to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (the Protocol) until 1981 … [and it was]not until the mid-1970s, when Indo-Chinese refugees began to arrive
on its shores, [that Japan had] to face the issue of refugees within its
national boundaries” when absent legal and social welfare frameworks
became clear (p. 482). In comparison with other OECD states where
civil society has played an active role in supporting refugee resettlement,
Flowers (2008) observes that “there was a noticeable absence of JapaneseNGOs until 1989” and that those emergent NGOs have, broadly, hadrelatively positive relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and antagonistic relations with the Ministry of Justice, a circumstance that again

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has inhibited the further development of policy at the nexus of migration and protection, perpetuating “Japan’s pattern of low compliancewith the Refugee Convention’s norm of protection” (pp. 335, 339).
This resulted in refugee status being granted in 330 cases from 3544
overall applications for asylum between 1982 and 2004 and “although it
became possible to grant a form of humanitarian status after 1991, thishas happened in only 284 cases” (Dean & Nagashima, 2007, p. 482).
Akashi (2021) notes that through 2019, Japan’s national yearly quota forresettled refugees was 30.
Tarumoto (2019), among others, has connected constrictive policy
around displacement to an exclusionary, ethnonationalist construction ofJapanese identity:
A myth is that Japan is (and/or should be) a racially homogeneous country
without having immigrants … The myth is based on, and is enforced
by, Japanese essentialist ethnonational identity: Japanese must share thesame origin of race along blood lineage. As a result, Japan holds fewer
foreigners and immigrants within for a highly industrialized country. Asof the end of 2016, foreign residents comprised only 1.9 per cent to thewhole population, that is 2,382,822. (Ministry of Justice [MOJ], 2017,
p. 8)

Public perception of immigration also remains largely negative (e.g.,
Green, 2017). Indeed, “in Japan, the definition of ‘immigration’ or‘immigrants’ is highly elusive. There is no public consensus or official definition of the terms” (Endoh, 2019, p. 326). Immigration as an umbrella
concept tied to displacement illuminates possibilities and limitations
around humanitarian protection specific to the national context.
What does the process of obtaining protection in Japan look like fromthe perspective of the applicant? As summarised by the Japan Association
for Refugees (JAR) in 2017, key challenges include that the interpretation of “persecution” is extremely narrow and typically limited to threats
on a person’s life or personal freedom. Additionally, asylum seekers must
provide objective proof that they cannot return to their home country,
which is very difficult for displaced individuals to provide. In terms of theprocess itself, all relevant documents are available in Japanese only, neutralinterpreters may not be available for interviews, and rejected applicants are
not given an explanation as to the grounds for rejection (JAR, 2017).

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In all, Japan has one of the lowest concentrations of immigrants inthe developed world and admits very few refugees. Yet despite these low
numbers, the government has been slowly opening the door to increased
immigration and the foreign population has been gradually increasing,largely due to concerns over the rapidly aging population. These efforts toincrease the foreign population have been made quietly and largely awayfrom the public eye (Green, 2021). The admission of displaced learners
could represent a similar attempt on the part of the government to quietly
admit refugees through a different means. Rather than having to directly
change the very strict refugee admissions criteria, admitting refugees as“displaced learners” or “evacuees” may work to achieve similar humanitarian goals while being more palatable to the public. At the same time,
admitting individuals as displaced learners rather than refugees places theburden of teaching Japanese, providing housing, and basic necessities
on the host institutions rather than the government. Before we delve
further into the Japanese higher education system we will first look to
the comparative context.

Higher Education Access: A Comparative View
How, in a comparative, trans-national context, may higher education
access and support structures for displaced learners be categorised? Asa first step, it is important to emphasise that more economically developed contexts host a minority of the world’s displaced people (e.g., Ergin,2020), while countries that account for just 1.3% of the global GDP
hosted 40% of all refugees in 2021 (International Rescue Committee,2021). Higher education systems and institutions in those settings
respond in distinct ways informed by national specificities and a rangeof resource streams. In the Turkish setting, for example, federal-level
policy, developed as millions of Syrians entered the country, facilitated
new Arabic-language degree programmes on the Syrian border, with atuition-free status and scholarships available to Syrian learners. This policy,
offered in a higher education system with limited student places allocated through exam scores, generated a backlash (Ergin et al., 2019).
In Ethiopia, as described by Woldegiyorgis (2020), refugee-backgroundstudents from neighbouring countries account for the largest proportion of degree-seeking international students in the country. Tamrat and
Habtemariam (2020) outline that Ethiopia’s Out-of-Camp Scheme has,since 2010, enabled “self-sponsored refugees among the 20,000 Eritreans

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who live in Addis Ababa to attend local private higher education institutions on a fee-paying basis” with many of those fees being funded throughremittances from the Ethiopian diaspora.
A variety of more and less supportive policy approaches are in evidence
across OECD member states. A recent Eurydice report concluded
that 22 national systems analysed reflected “top-level steering documents covering higher education [that] mention asylum seekers andrefugees, while an almost equal number (19 systems) say nothing”(European Commission et al., 2019, p. 13). The most comprehensive
policy approach was identified in Germany where “a number of actions
addressing recognition of qualifications and prior learning, bridging
programmes, guidance and counselling services and financial support”
were in place alongside a “clear budget allocation” (European Commission et al., 2019, p. 13).
Across national settings, there is often a gap between policy supports
for approved refugees and asylees and those with pending status or
temporary status. In the United States, even states with the highest
concentration of refugees infrequently offer in-state tuition to asyleeswith pending cases (Unangst & de Wit, 2021). There are no establishedfederal sources of funding for higher education among displaced learners,
though eligible learners might eventually be able to access sources offunding aimed at lower-income learners, individuals leaving the foster
care system, or other pools of money supporting established student
equity groups. In Australia, asylum seekers “are treated as international
students and are ineligible for Federal Government financial assistanceprogrammes” (Hartley et al., 2018; Webb et al., 2019)”, leaving 23 of 43
Australian HEIs to offer stopgap institutional scholarships (Dunwoodie
et al., 2020, p. 248). Thus, a range of policy responses is evident acrossmore economically developed systems, though the most coordinatedefforts have supported the degree-course enrolment of tens of thousandsof recently arrived refugees.

Displacement Alongside Internationalisation
How can we understand the alignment of Japanese internationalisation
policy with refugee policy? Internationalisation here refers to—as definedby Knight (2003)—“the process of integrating international, interculturalor global dimensions into the purpose, functions, or delivery of postsecondary education” (p. 2). A specific avenue for internationalisation has

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been proposed by Leask (2010, 2015): “internationalisation at home”
refers to internationalisation activities that centre on the experiences of
institutional students, staff, and faculty present on the home campus,
and on engaging with international elements via (formal and informal)
curriculum, professional development, and all other institutional activities. As argued by Unangst and Barone (2019), internationalisation
at home frequently engages community actors, who “add capacity anddirection to … college internationalization efforts” (p. 191). Indeed,
there is an entrenched history of coordinated internationalisation activities across the Japanese higher education sphere, with clear government
directives promoting internationalisation in education since the 1980s(Burgess et al., 2010). Billions of yen have been invested in degree
courses offered in English; international student support services are
well-funded; the Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme welcomesinternational teachers; and various excellence schemes including the 2014
Top Global University Project (Nonaka & Phillips, 2017) have been
implemented. Support for international students varies by university type:major public universities as well as some larger private institutions havecourted international students since the 1980s (Burgess et al., 2010).
However, in spite of increased efforts to recruit international students,
Yonezawa (2019) notes that “there is no specific ‘internationalization
expert’ category among the university staff in Japanese universities… [as]departments allocate different types of staff members from both academic
and administrative groups” to engage with specific initiatives (p. 378).
In sum, nationally coordinated internationalisation policy is well established in Japan but generally decentralised at the institutional level.
Furthermore, as Nonaka and Phillips (2017) have argued, internationalisation or kokusaika policies “may be largely driven by the economic or
political desire to compete globally (Ishikawa, 2009; Kariya, 2014), rather
than by the desire to respond to changing economic and population
realities such as Japan’s rapidly aging and diversifying society” (p. 15).
Here, it seems clear that internationalisation conditions contribute towhat we term policy liminality on the part of displaced learners: existing
national and institutional structures do not engage with expansive definitions of internationalisation policy or practice that might problematise
or interrogate what internationalisation means in the context of a global
displacement crisis equivalent to the 14th most populous country in theworld (UN News, 2022).

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Recent Innovations Across Japanese HEIs
As noted by Kuroda (2020), Japanese HEIs are free to develop tailoredadmissions policies and procedures, although all universities require
students to take and pass an entrance examination as a prerequisite foradmission. Japanese HEIs comprise, as asserted by Yonezawa (2019),“777 universities divided into national (86), local public (91), and private(600) institutions” (p. 376). University size and focus can vary considerably in Japan. The former “imperial” universities, founded by the Japanese
Empire starting in the late 1800s, represent the major public institutions
typically hosting the largest numbers of international students. There is
likewise a large range of private universities, with some HEIs, such as
Waseda and Keio universities, representing the elite of Japanese institutions and similarly admitting a relatively larger number of international
students, while others can be quite a bit smaller and more parochial.
Broadly, limited engagement with displaced learners is evidenced across
the Japanese higher education system. Some of that engagement is taking
place under the auspices of initiatives spearheaded by various non-profit
groups. For example, the Syrian Scholars Initiative was a scholarshipprogramme developed by a foundation associated with International
Christian University to support Syrian students impacted by the conflictin that country, this work being done in collaboration with the Japan
Association for Refugees (JAR). This effort has been relatively small scalein terms of students enrolled. Six students were admitted to Japan in
2016, and per a 2017 JAR report, the second iteration of the programmegarnered 1091 applicants with the goal of admitting eight (JAR, 2017).
Kalicki (2019) has described how JAR, during the first year of thisinitiative, framed it as partly inspired by the success of private refugeesponsorship in the Canadian setting, where private donors, religious
groups, and businesses sponsored Syrians fleeing conflict. The six Syrians
initially selected were exempt from tuition fees and benefitted from privatesponsorship of travel costs and language training. Students paid for living
expenses via part-time jobs and were made aware that working visas would
be available to them upon graduation.
Similarly, the Japanese Initiative for the future of Syrian Refugees(JISR) operated by the Japanese International Cooperative Agency
announced that up to 150 master’s level Syrian students would be
accepted over five years, with this programme developed in collaboration
with the UNHCR. Participants were living in Lebanon and/or Jordan

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at the time of application, were required to be 22–39 years of age, andattended one of seven participating universities in Japan.
Most recently, the Japanese government began admitting Ukrainian
nationals in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February
2022. Where the Syrian Scholars Initiative and JISR have been smallscale precedents in admitting displaced learners to Japan, the Ukraine
crisis represents a clear expansion of these initiatives. As of March 2023,
Japan has admitted a total of 2211 Ukrainian nationals since the onsetof the conflict (MOJ, 2023). Data on the exact numbers of displaced
learners among Ukrainian evacuees are not readily available, but listings published by the Japan Student Services Organization, under thejurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT), show 52 Japanese universities hosting approximately 200 displaced Ukrainian students, and another 66 Japanese
language schools hosting approximately 250 Ukrainians as of March 2023
(JASSO, 2023).
Given the expansion of academic institutions in Japan sponsoring andsupporting displaced learners with the onset of the Ukraine crisis, it isnecessary to understand in more detail the activities of Japanese hostinstitutions, the kinds of services and financial support they provide todisplaced learners, how these institutions interact with government andother non-governmental organisations, and the types of challenges they
face.

Methodology
To understand how Japanese HEIs have been supporting displaced
learners, the authors conducted in-depth interviews with individuals
charged with assisting international students at both public and private
institutions. Given the focus on HEIs, we have excluded Japanese
language schools although, as noted above, Japanese language schools
host a reasonably large number of displaced learners and are important sites for future inquiry. The authors contacted most of the 18
universities participating in the Japan Educational Pathways Network(JEPN), a network of private universities, and the Pathways Japan nongovernmental organisation. Eight of the former imperial public universities, including Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Nagoya, Hiroshima, Kyushu,
Tohoku, and Hokkaido universities were additionally contacted for interviews.

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There were eight interviewees in total, including staffers based at four
private universities, three public universities, and the Pathways Japan
NGO. Owing to the sensitive nature of the topic and the sometimes rigid
rules in place for administrators when discussing university activities, interview subjects and their university affiliations are kept confidential in order
to allow administrators to freely express their opinions. Pathways Japan
had no objections to being named directly. Interviews were conductedboth in-person and online, between 1 December 2022 and 16 January
2023. Interviews were semi-structured, with a number of common questions and also the ability to transition onto other topics or issues asnecessary. Discussions were conducted in either English or Japanese, atthe discretion of the interview subject. Japanese language interviews weretranslated into English and checked for accuracy. Interviews lasted 45
minutes to one hour on average.
To organise and analyse the interviews, transcripts were subjected toa thematic analysis (Saldaña, 2021, p. 175). Each of the authors independently reviewed the interview transcripts, coding for recurrent topics
and issues, grouping interview details into several broad themes and thennoting the subcomponents for each theme. The authors’ thematic notes
were then compared and compiled, leading to the establishment of ourcategories and subtopics of discussion.
Given the study’s small sample size, broad generalisations about
displaced learners and relevant administrative coordination are notpossible. However, despite these limitations, some general trends in thereception of displaced learners are apparent. Japanese HEIs, according toour data, confront similar challenges as they admit and seek to support
displaced learners and likewise anticipate similar issues going forward,
particularly regarding the long-term residence of displaced learners andthe procurement of resources to support them.

Results
Displaced Learner Support
In discussing university support, we narrow our terminology, referring
specifically to “student evacuees” as this is the term used by HEI-based
interview participants. Student evacuees are students admitted to Japanese
HEIs who could make a credible case for status as an asylum seeker
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to escape conflict or persecution, rather than students in Japan at thetime a crisis unfolded. It is worth noting that while a small number ofstudent evacuees from Syria and Afghanistan came to Japan before the
Ukraine crisis, the vast majority of student evacuees to Japan are now
from Ukraine. The discussion around admissions, visa status, and benefits
is therefore oriented around Ukrainian evacuees except where noted.
Our data indicate, with respect to international student support, thatmany departments in national universities have specifically appointed
faculty members to assist international students with daily-life issues, andthat many offer degree programmes in English. Private universities are
more variable: the relevant HEIs in our sample ranged from the highlyinternationalised with classes and administration entirely in English, tothose having a very small international student population with classes
and administration almost completely in Japanese.
Differences between public and private universities also extend to how
they support student evacuees. All of the private universities represented
in our study are members of JEPN, a group of 18 universities operating intandem with the Pathways Japan NGO, to receive and support Ukrainianevacuees. All of the public universities sampled were acting independentlyof any organisation or network. That is, the public universities exhibitedvery little pooling of information or resources. Even within public universities, our participants note that there can be very little cooperation acrossinstitutional units (or silos). At least some of this independent streak
can be attributed to strict rules and operating procedures in Japanesepublic universities, where budgetary and administrative hurdles impede
collaboration and coordination.
Apart from an outlier HEI, the Ukraine invasion was the first instanceof student evacuee enrolment at all universities sampled. However, there isprecedent for universities to receive displaced students as all of the public
universities included in this study enrolled a small number of students
from Myanmar, those students becoming displaced with the 2021 coupd’état. However, these Myanmarese nationals were admitted as regularstudents and only “became” displaced after arriving in Japan. Several
Japanese universities likewise hosted Afghan civil servants and university teachers from 2011 to 2019 as a part of a government programme,
but these individuals were admitted as regular, short-term students andrequired to return to Afghanistan on the completion of their studies(Japan International Cooperation Center, 2021).

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Of the universities analysed, overall international student population
size ranged from about 1.5% to over 50% of the total student population,or from a low of 36 international students to a high of approximately
2500 students. Each university had admitted a relatively small numberof Ukrainian evacuees, between one and nine, and it was most common
for the universities to admit no more than three evacuees. Similar ratesof evacuee admissions are confirmed by the available statistics (see, e.g.,
Pathways Japan, 2022).
Our interviews reflect that university admissions processes highly
prioritised some connection to Japan, particularly familiarity with theJapanese language. If Japanese proficiency was low, a high level of English
was required, and all universities had the expectation that student evacuees would work hard to improve their Japanese abilities during the initialperiod of admission. Across the universities we studied, all evacuees who
gained admission were female and of typical college age; one university
administrator noted that college-age males are most likely involved in thefighting in Ukraine. University administrators uniformly reported positive
feelings toward hosting student evacuees, such as “I am happy to be able
to provide these opportunities to them. They are all very good students”(Public-4), and “I’ve told them I’ve worked with thousands of students,
but I think this has been the most meaningful and impactful projectthat I’ve worked on in my career. I’m happy that I’ve been able to helpthem” (Private-1). We will address a number of points concerning student
evacuees below: admissions, visa status, public and private funding, andchallenges with student evacuee hosting efforts.
Admissions
All universities sampled initially admitted Ukrainian evacuees as nonmatriculated auditing students for up to one year. One significant
difference between public and private universities was the possibilityof extending students’ stay. One public university, for example, only
admitted Ukrainian evacuees coming from home universities having an
exchange agreement with the Japanese institution. Much like a typical
study abroad programme, the Ukrainian students could receive course
credit for their classes in Japan and would be expected to leave thecountry after their one year stay. Private universities, by contrast, demonstrated more willingness for extension: after an initial six month–to one
year period, student evacuees seeking to continue study could, upon6

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passing an entrance exam, be admitted as matriculated degree-seeking
students and continue to receive identical financial benefits for theduration of their studies.
The short initial period of student evacuee enrolment is partly
attributed to the timing of the Ukraine crisis. Ukrainian evacuees began
to enter Japan in May 2022. The Japanese academic year usually starts
in April, with entrance exams several months earlier, typically in January
or February. All universities accepted Ukrainian students in an expedited
manner due to the emergency situation, opting to evacuate the students asquickly as possible rather than waiting until the start of the next semester.
As such, the universities were not able to admit the evacuees as a part of
the regular admissions cycle.
The other justification behind the short initial period of enrolment
related to language study. In that first period of admission, language
learning is vital for evacuees, a good understanding of Japanese being
required for university entrance exams, themselves a prerequisite for study
in programmes offered exclusively in Japanese. These entrance examinations are notoriously difficult to pass, with admissions to many universities
being highly competitive even for Japanese nationals (Kuramoto &Koizumi, 2018). University administrators in our study made no mention
as to whether any special allowances would be given to evacuees taking
the examinations; admitting any such special allowances could be controversial. Moreover, very strict admissions rules at most institutions indicatethat any special considerations for student evacuees will be minimal.
Should the evacuee be unable to pass the entrance examination,a distinct possibility given the difficulty of obtaining strong Japanese
proficiency in such a short period of time, according to our interview
participants their fate would be unclear. One option for the host university would be to extend the duration of the evacuee’s stay under thesame status, giving them the opportunity to re-take the entrance exam
again the following year. Alternately, facilitating the evacuee’s transfer toanother institution might be another option. In a worst-case scenario,
the evacuee might forego an academic path and instead try to find workin Japan. Having intensively studied the Japanese language, the idea,
according to Pathways Japan, is that the evacuee should be better placed
to obtain a position. Among private university staffers, the assumption
is that the evacuees will not be returning home in the near future, andthat universities will potentially be supporting them for several years. In
the case of the public staffers interviewed, we learned that evacuees were162

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only admitted on a short-term basis with no clear possibility of enteringa degree programme. Discussions regarding the continuation of student
evacuees’ status were ongoing at public universities, but no decisions had
been made at the time of the interviews.
Visa Status
All student evacuees were admitted to Japan on short-term visas without
recognition of refugee status by the Japanese government. In the official parlance, these students are referred to as “evacuees” (hinanmin),rather than “refugees” (nanmin) (Takahara, 2022). This is an importantdistinction, where “refugee” implies long-term, potential permanent residence in Japan, while “evacuee” denotes a short-term stay. There is also
an important distinction between evacuees and refugees in terms of thebenefits available. Officially recognised refugees are entitled to permanent
residency in Japan, are able to bring their immediate families with them,can participate in a government-sponsored resettlement programme withJapanese language and cultural instruction, and can obtain vocational
support at no cost (Akashi, 2021). Student evacuees are entitled to noneof these benefits, are not permitted to bring their families, and are theresponsibility of their sponsoring institutions rather than the government.
After entering Japan on a short-term visa, according to study participants, almost all evacuees changed their status to a “designated activities”
visa, rather than a student visa. “Designated activities” is a broad designation that has been used in several different contexts, including as a work
visa for highly skilled professionals (MOFA, 2015a), a stopgap measurefor university graduates engaged in paid internships, and for individuals
on a working holiday in Japan with financial reserves of at least 30 million
yen (MOFA, 2015b). The designated activities visa is usually given for aperiod of six to twelve months, with the possibility of renewal before thevisa expires.
According to the interview participants, designated activities statuscarries with it both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage
is that it provides more flexibility than a student visa. Under designatedactivities, a student is not required to maintain a full-time courseload.
Unlike a student visa, should a displaced learner on a designated activities
visa drop below full-time status they are not required to leave Japan. Thiscan be especially helpful for learners adjusting to life in Japan or experiencing mental health problems stemming from their earlier experiences in6

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conflict zones. By the same token, if academic life proves too challenging
for any reason, evacuees can easily transition to work without having to
immediately change their visa status.
Although the designated activities visa affords a reasonable degree of
flexibility to students, the main disadvantage is its short period of validity
and the accompanying instability. Student evacuees must renew their visas
annually, with the criteria necessary for renewal being unclear and subject
to the discretion of immigration agency officials. Evacuees’ residency is
not guaranteed unless they are able to switch to a more secure, longerterm visa such as a student or working visa. Considering its advantages
and disadvantages, most university administrators had a favourable assessment of the designated activities visa, commending its flexibility overinstability concerns; we note that student-focused research might well
produce different results. Only one university helped change Ukrainianevacuees to student visas, although another university was planning on
having evacuees change to student visas if they were admitted to a degree
programme.
Discussion of the designated activities visa also indicates the differences between Ukrainian, Syrian, and Afghan evacuees. All three groupsof evacuees have used the designated activities visa, but it has been applieddifferently to Syrians and Afghans. According to the Pathways Japan
representative we spoke with and one of the university officials, Ukrainians
are encouraged by the immigration agency to maintain the designatedactivities visa, while Syrians and Afghans are discouraged from using it.
Syrians and Afghans are asked to maintain either a student or working
visa and are only permitted to obtain a designated activities visa as astopgap measure, for example, if they graduate from a Japanese university
and are trying to find a job. If Syrians or Afghans apply for a designatedactivities visa, the processing time is reportedly around six months, witha heavy burden of proof to justify the application. Ukrainians, on theother hand, are reportedly able to obtain the designated activities visa
in a matter of hours with little apparent difficulty. University administrators are also confident that Ukrainians’ designated activities visas will berenewed without much trouble from immigration officials, at least for theforeseeable future.
One administrator (Private-1) believes the differential treatment of
Ukrainians is a conscious government decision: Ukrainians are the victims
of international aggression, which is a breach of international law. Thisis fundamentally different from the civil wars or internal instability that164

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Syrians and Afghans have encountered, and, as such, Ukrainians areentitled to favourable treatment. Another administrator was much more
direct (Private-2), attributing favourable Ukrainian treatment to racial
preferences on the part of the Japanese public. In this view the Japanese
government exhibits a distinct racial bias, likely because of ingrained
racist tendencies in Japanese society, which has resulted in more positive media coverage of Ukrainian evacuees and more favourable treatment
by government. As the international literature has reflected on the racist
migration and education policies to which displaced learners are subjected(e.g., Villegas & Aberman, 2019), Japan seems to be implicated alongside other more economically developed countries and this issue must be
interrogated further.
Public and Private Funding
Past refugee support in Japan has exclusively been in the public sphere,with national and local government responsible for refugees’ expenses
and integration until they are able to work and sustain themselves inJapanese society. Student evacuees are different in that the HEI, either
public or private, is responsible for evacuees’ wellbeing. Evacuee support
often blends the public and the private, where a public university might
use taxpayer money to finance an evacuee’s stay but could also solicit
private donations. Likewise, private universities have in some cases utilised
local government funds to underwrite the cost of supporting evacuees.
In both scenarios, however, government has little direct involvement inevacuee support.
According to our respondents, there is not much variation in funding
packages for student evacuees across public and private universities, where
all universities sampled provide free tuition and housing, as well as amonthly stipend of 60,000–80,000 yen per month for Ukrainian evacuees. Travel expenses to Japan are usually covered as well. All universities
bear some amount of the burden in housing and educating student evacuees, although there are some differences in how funds are obtained.
One of the private universities we studied exclusively utilised its own
internal budget (Private-3), one underwrote evacuees’ costs with its own
budget and donations from its alumni association (Private-2), and anotherhad a more layered approach, securing additional funding from the local
government, a corporate sponsorship, and through the Nippon Foundation (Private-1), a philanthropic organisation that has been donating

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funds to universities hosting Ukrainian evacuees as well as to evacuees
directly (Kageyama, 2023).
Public university staffers, by contrast, indicated a much higher level of
instability in funding and were more likely to utilise donations to underwrite the cost of hosting student evacuees. Three of the public universities
created specific “Ukrainian disaster relief funds” to solicit donations—
aimed at supporting Ukrainian evacuees alone—but all relevant staffers
observed that long-term financial support for evacuees is an ongoingchallenge. One public university official was explicit that, despite donations, evacuees’ funding packages could be guaranteed for only one year
(Public-4). Moreover, just one of these HEIs received additional support
from their local government and none received financial support fromother organisations.
While public and private universities generally appear to eschew majorcollaborations with outside organisations, Pathways Japan is much morecollaborative. Funding is secured through donations and crowdfunding,various domestic philanthropic foundations, religious organisations, andcorporate sponsors. In December 2022, Pathways implemented its own
scholarship for student evacuees, looking to support four to five evacuees
annually, regardless of nationality, admitted to undergraduate or graduate
degree programmes in Japan for up to four years. In addition, Pathways maintains direct communication with various government officials,
including contacts in the immigration agency, MEXT and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs. Reportedly, MEXT officials have been participatingin JEPN meetings regarding Ukrainian evacuees. None of the universities, by contrast, report any direct collaboration with national government
agencies or ministries. Private universities affiliated with the JEPN and
Pathways Japan may be able to indirectly access government officials
through links with Pathways Japan, although this does not appear to be
the case with public universities.
Challenges
University officials outline a number of challenges in supporting student
evacuees. One of the primary issues is the instability students face inadmission and funding. Private universities are able to at least offer the
possibility of a longer-term stay, but residency beyond one year is notguaranteed at any of the institutions interviewed. Programme admission remains a problem for student evacuees, where there are significant

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hurdles to passing university entrance examinations in Japanese after only
one year of study. Student evacuees may have a comparatively easier time
gaining admission to English-language programmes, which are offered
for a limited range of degrees at major public and private institutions, but
the problem of limited space and highly competitive admissions remains.
If evacuees are unable to pass entrance examinations, what is the next stepavailable for them? Will they be able to acquire enough language skill totransition into working in Japan instead? Will they be able to stay in Japan
under a different type of visa? The universities sampled did not have anyanswers to these questions.
Insecure funding appears to go hand-in-hand with the short initialperiod of enrolment at public universities, where despite soliciting donations and occasionally collaborating with local government, public universities simply lack the financial ability to make long-term commitments
to student evacuees. Along the same lines, with limited funds, limited
expertise, and little prior experience hosting evacuees, public and private
universities lack the capacity to address some of the problems evacuees face, particularly Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and othermental health issues. According to one subject, “These students are struggling, and yet there are very few resources for them to seek help … There
aren’t very many therapists or counsellors who can help them in English,
much less Arabic or Ukrainian” (Private-2). The lack of resources acrossmultiple sectors thus remains an ongoing challenge for university officials.
One respondent pointed to minimal government involvement withstudent evacuees as exacerbating the problem of limited resources.
Although the national government has not prohibited universities fromsponsoring evacuees, it has not been actively helping them. Pathways
Japan similarly criticises government response to evacuees as being decentralised and lacking integration across departments. According to thisperspective, there is a need for better communication across government,
as well as for government to collaborate more closely with the private
sector. With universities playing the central role in receiving student
evacuees, a significant question is to what extent national and local
government should be involved in supporting evacuees. For the mostpart, university officials would like to see additional government support.
In discussing the challenges of supporting student evacuees, several
HEI officials mentioned the differential treatment of Ukrainians. Though
the conflict galvanised support for some evacuees, acknowledgementof and support for displaced learners of other nationalities has been

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less forthcoming. The number of admitted Ukrainian evacuees is muchlarger than all other categories of displaced learners, in spite of the factthat Ukrainians only started being admitted to Japan in 2022. Media
attention, donations, visa flexibility, and general support have skewed
disproportionately in favour of Ukrainian evacuees. Pathways Japan notes,
for example, that their crowdfunding efforts for Syrian and Afghanevacuees brought in 3.5 million yen in 2021, while similar efforts for
Ukrainian evacuees reached a total of 8 million yen in 2022.

Discussion
Overall, we find a positive attitude toward admitting and hosting student
evacuees among Japanese HEI constituents. University administrators
almost unanimously report that students, faculty, and staff have a positive
impression of hosting student evacuees. However, while evacuee hosting
efforts have increased, student evacuees still make up a very small portionof most universities’ student bodies, with usually no more than threeevacuees at any given institution. The student evacuee experiment has
gradually grown in scale and appears likely to continue expanding given
the positive assessments so far, but limited financial resources, relevant
training for staff and minimal government support could impede thestability of HEI support going forward.
Support for student evacuees is generally the same across public andprivate universities studied, although both appear to be much more
likely to support Ukrainian evacuees than other nationalities. Neither
type of institution is able to guarantee long-term residence, but private
universities are at least able to offer the possibility of an extended
stay. Public universities, by contrast, appear only able to accommodate
Ukrainian evacuees for one year, after which their situation is unclear.
Public universities may have good intentions, but instability after evacuees’ initial period of residence could be potentially harmful as they
try to navigate their next move without any certainty. Overall, Japanese
universities appear to have successfully evacuated some, mostly Ukrainian,
students out of conflict zones and have been generous in their initialfunding but need to consider the longer-term implications of hostingevacuees. Greater involvement with, or collaboration from, local andnational government could potentially help universities in securing more

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long-term accommodation for evacuees and overcoming some of the limitations in expertise and resources HEIs are grappling with. This relates tode facto and de jure migration and education policy.
Incongruities in the treatment of evacuees of different nationalities
at national and local government levels should also be given attention.
There is a perception on the part of some university administrators that
racial biases play a factor in the favourable treatment of Ukrainian evacuees. Racial bias is frequently covert, and public approval of Ukrainianevacuees compared to displaced learners or refugees of other nationalities likely plays an important role in the favourable treatment Ukrainianevacuees receive. This comparative privilege may be the result of positive
media coverage, broader systems of racism/racialisation in Japan, or somecombination of these factors. One challenge for government and university administrators is to extend the momentum and positive sentiment for
Ukrainian evacuees to other nationalities, admitting and serving comparable numbers of displaced learners and thereby contesting exclusionary
policies. This would serve to further internationalisation at Japanese HEIs
and would offer an opportunity for those HEIs to (re)consider theirraison d’être.
The Ukraine conflict and the subsequent expansion of student evacuee
reception represents a subtle but significant shift in Japanese immigration
and refugee policy. The student evacuee pathway is a new avenue for theJapanese government to evacuate refugees from conflict zones to a safer
environment. For a country like Japan that admits very few refugees, theevacuee route appears to be more palatable to both the public and government. Indeed, the number of admitted evacuees in 2022 alone was alreadyfar greater than the number of all refugees admitted between 2000 and
2022. However, these evacuees are not given an acknowledged refugee
status and are unable to receive a similar level of benefits. Their stay isinherently short-term and precarious, likely with consequences for individual wellbeing. The reception of student evacuees thus represents a shift
toward a perhaps greater level of openness to refugees, but Japan still lags
far behind other countries, and questions over the longevity of displaced
learners’ residency in Japan remain.
Limitations to this study should additionally be noted. Our sample
size was small and was not necessarily representative of Japanese HEIs
as a whole, but the depth of the interviews does raise some interesting
points regarding the reception and treatment of student evacuees. Moreresearch is needed on this topic, especially as evacuees settle in Japan6

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for longer periods of time. While this project focuses mainly on university outreach to student evacuees, interviews with evacuees themselves
regarding their experiences in Japan will provide important data and will
help identify areas for improving evacuee policy/programmes. In focusing
exclusively on Japanese HEIs, we did not address language schools; as
there are a reasonably large number of student evacuees and displaced
learners at those institutions, future work might examine how they havebeen received and compare levels of support between HEIs. Additionally,
research on displaced students residing in Japan at the time of a crisis in
their home country is called for as those individuals will likely have someJapanese proficiency and already be enrolled in a degree programme.

Conclusion
Japan has one of the lowest rates of refugee admissions in the world,
typically approving less than 1% of asylum applications in a given year.
However, its higher education sector has been gradually internationalising. Located at the intersection of these phenomena, a side door tostudents displaced from conflict areas appears to be slowly opening inJapan, starting in a limited capacity in 2017 and expanding considerablywith the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Althoughthese displaced learners are not given official refugee status, hundreds
were admitted in 2022 alone. This chapter has looked to this new category of displaced learners or “refugees by another name” coming toJapan to study, asking how and to what extent Japanese Higher Education
Institutions are able to support this newly-defined and dynamic group.
Based on exploratory interviews with university administrators, we findthat a small number of student evacuees have received a positive reception and generous financial support. However, admissions decisions werein most cases made on a short-term time horizon, with student evacuees only being guaranteed residency for a maximum of one year. Moresupport and expertise from local and national government as well as civilsociety actors could go a long way in stabilising the situation of displaced
learners and alleviating some of the burden faced by HEIs at present,
which are grappling with policy liminality as institutions, just as learners
grapple with liminality at the individual level. In addition, that investmentof resources would bolster human security in Japan and beyond.
There are two major challenges going forward. On the researchside, more information about government plans and priorities regarding

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displaced learners is needed, as is a comprehensive understanding of how
HEIs address displacement. This chapter has attempted to take an initial
step in this direction by interviewing university officials, discussing theiractivities, and identifying the problems they face, but quite a bit morework is needed. On the policy side, the Japanese government and publicmust contend with the question of what exactly humanitarian protection entails. Should displaced learners in Japan be considered refugees?
Should they be admitted on a short-term basis under the responsibilityof universities and language schools, which is not the predominant modelin economically developed settings? Are the displaced learners coming toJapan refugees by another name, or do they reflect a new category of
temporary, precarious humanitarian protection?

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in International Education, 21(4), 375–390.

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PART II

Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Japanand Taiwan: Media Representations
and Public Opinion

CHAPTER 7Media Political Leanings: Polarised
Depictions of Hong Kong Migrationin Taiwan
Cody Wai Kwok Yau

Introduction
Immigrant and political asylum issues in Taiwan have become more
prominent since the protests in Hong Kong as growing numbers ofHong Kong’s residents seek life opportunities or protection in Taiwan.
According to the data from Taiwan National Immigration Agency, thenumber of Hong Kong people in residency and settlement with citizenship in Taiwan increased from 8203 in 2014 to 10,240 in 2022 (National
Immigration Agency, n.d.). There were a total of 76,245 successful cases
through various investment, dependent, and asylum channels.
The growing trend of Hong Kong migration has sparked contentious
debates within Taiwanese society because of the China factor (the PRC
recovered Hong Kong in 1997 and Taiwan is the next in line for Chinese
unification). The two major political camps in Taiwan exhibit contrasting

C. W. K. Yau (B)Department of Political Science, Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan
e-mail: codyyau@scu.edu.tw© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_7

177

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C. W. K. YAUviewpoints, despite both initially claiming to support Hong Kong residents based on their humanitarian stances. The Green Camp is inclined
towards Taiwan’s independence, Taiwan’s nativist values, and resisting
the influence of the PRC. The leading party in this camp is the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, the ruling party). The Blue Camp is
inclined towards unification with the mainland China and making mitigating gestures to the PRC. The leading party in the Blue Camp is theKuomintang (KMT). Due to the current DPP government’s view towards
China, the Hong Kong immigration issue has become intertwined with
Taiwan’s national security. Thus, Article 12 (for residency applicants) and
Article 18 (for political asylum seekers) of Regulations Governing theRelations with Hong Kong and Macao (hereafter, the Hong Kong &Macao Regulations) are stringent and are implemented with caution. This
circumstance is further reflected in a petition case to Control Yuan (aconstitutionally mandated authority with a supervisory and auditory role)over Hong Kong residency in Taiwan.
As part of this case, the authorities, including the Immigration Agency,
were criticised not only for the opaque, time-consuming, case-by-casereview process but also for frequently rejecting applications for reasonsof national security (by Article 22 (1) of Hong Kong and Macao Residents Entering Taiwan and Residence and Settlement Permit Measures ).
In addition, the petition blamed the government for drastically andunexpectedly raising the threshold of the applications for residency andsettlement with citizenship. This places petitioners in a dilemma: whether
to return to Hong Kong or wait without a definite date for their case to
be settled in Taiwan. The Control Yuan’s press release about this petitioncase stated that the matter of petitioners involves the protection of humanrights because it stems from the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment
Bill Movement (the 2019 Protests) (Chi et al., 2022). Arguably, this press
release shows the tension between human rights when they are related
to migration (the human rights of Hong Kong immigrants seeking life
prospects and protection in Taiwan), and national security (such as alleged
Chinese spies entering through immigration), in Taiwan. What, however,exactly are the specific security interpretations of Hong Kong immigrants
in both the Blue and Green Camps?
Media outlets frequently play an active role in framing migration
coverage, using a particular political perspective (Caviedes, 2017). This
coverage includes editorials, letters, and columns, which look at the security and human rights aspects of migration from different points of view.

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Some studies imply that all media outlets are complicit in the securitisation of migration (referring to a process of threat identification thatis declaratory in nature, in which referent objects became securitised,
which in turn legitimises urgent measures to tackle that perceived threat),and that the media’s political leanings, such as those of conservative
newspapers, tend towards greater securitisation (Benson, 2013).
This is the case in Taiwan because the political environment of Taiwan’s
media is mainly made up of two political camps, the “Green Camp”
and the “Blue Camp” (Sullivan et al., 2018). Most studies on Taiwanese
media representation, with regard to migration, focus on migrants’ identities (Chung, 2000), media framing (Liu, 2021), and discrimination (Chu,2007), while factors relating to the media’s partisan leanings on migration
are collectively an issue which has not received as much attention.
To fill this research gap, this chapter argues that Taiwanese media’s
partisan leaning towards the Blue Camp or the Green Camp plays amain role in shaping the portrayal of the migration issue. To address
the questions, this chapter examines the perspectives of the GreenCamp and the Blue Camp on the subject of Hong Kong migrationin Taiwan by analysing news articles from the major pro-Blue/Green
printed media. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The
second section presents the context of Taiwanese media’s partisan politicalleanings, which encourage media politicisation on the subject of Hong
Kong migration. The third section presents the data and methods. The
fourth section illuminates the results of the structural topic modelling(STM) (Roberts et al., 2016), including STM-identified topics, thetrends, the proportions, conceptual categorisations, and the factorial
effects on topic proportion. In the fifth section, the results of the sentiment analysis are highlighted. Concluding remarks and implications forHong Kong migration are provided in the concluding section.

Partisan Leaning in Taiwanese Media
Since political liberalisation in the 1980s lifted the ban on opening media
such as newspapers in Taiwan, independent newspapers have been allowed
to open, shaping two major partisan media camps (Chen, 1998). One
typical example of independent newspapers is the Liberty Times. The
Liberty Times was founded in 1987. Its political stance is anti-KMT andanti-authoritarian rule, it emphasises Taiwan’s nativist value and affirms
Taiwan’s independence. These are all compatible with the DPP’s political

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position on Taiwan. For example, the Liberty Times arranges the China
news in the international section, as opposed to the pro-Blue newspapers,
who put such news in the national section. In contrast, the pro-Blue newspapers, the United Daily News and the China Times were both founded
in 1950. The launch year implies that both newspapers met the KMT’s
requirement, and, in actual fact, for example, the founder of the United
Daily News was a mainland Chinese man and also a core member ofthe KMT Central Committee (Guo, 2012, p. 4). Therefore, the proBlue newspapers generally empathise with a revival of Chinese culture andreunification with mainland China. As a result of Guo’s study (2012), it
was found that the news narrative in Taiwan exhibited ideological bias. In
this regard, it can be said that party-leanings have always fuelled Taiwan’s
media polarisation, particularly when China-related issues arise.
One typical case of this polarisation is embodied in the issue of migration from mainland China. With the increase in transnational marriage(National Security Council, 2006), the issue of marriage migrants became
a talking point in Taiwan. The media outlets in the pro-Blue Camp media
tended to view mainland spouses through a lens of human rights, such as
the right to residency in Taiwan. In contrast, the pro-Green Camp media
tended to report on the spouses negatively, for example, suggesting thatthey were United Front conspirators (referring to those who assist the
CCP in politically infiltrating the target countries by establishing friendly
networks of groups and key individuals, Chao, 2004). For instance, one
editorial in the Liberty Times (2008) stated that the increase in thenumber of mainland China spouses was equivalent to increasing the risk of
the PRC’s United Front in Taiwan. The United News Daily (Lin, 2007)
criticised the then-DDP government’s strict quota of mainland spouses,
which drew criticism from human rights groups.
As mass media can shape the linkage between immigration and security, a comparison of the two main media camps’ depictions of Hong
Kong migration can unpack the security concerns surrounding Hong
Kong migration, as detailed in the next section.

Data and Methods
The primary textual data in this chapter was derived from news articles
published in the five major Chinese newspapers in Taiwan (Renli Aikman
Company, 2022): the Liberty Times (LT, Ziyou shibao); the United Daily
News (UDN, Lianhe bao); the China Times (CT, Zhongguo shibao);

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181

the Economic Daily News (EDN, Jingji ri bao); and the Commercial
Times (CTEE, Gongshang shibao). This study chose these five newspapers because they are issued throughout Taiwan and have a clear
political leaning towards the Blue and Green Camps. As such, they
are able to situate the national political debate on Hong Kong migration. Data collection was accomplished using the digital news media
database of the Parliamentary Library, Legislative Yuan (https://nplnews.
ly.gov.tw/). The search was conducted using the terms “Hong Kong”(Xianggang ), “migrants”, (yimin) and “Taiwan” from 1 January 2014
to 5 December 2022. This period covered the political turbulence fromthe 2014 Hong Kong Occupy Central Movement (OCM), and included
the 2019 Protests, and the implementation of Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL) in 2020. There were 259 pieces of news articles left
after duplicates were removed, composing the corpus used in this study.
Figure 7.1 shows the yearly number of news stories after the OCM, whichpeaked following the 2019 Protests. The news articles reached 31.6% (82pieces) in 2020. Figure 7.3 illustrates the distribution of the news articles of our dataset. The LT represents 45% (117), the UDN 21% (55),the CT 14% (37), the EDN 11% (29), and the CTEE 8% (21). The LT
represents the Green Camp with 45% (117 pieces), while the other four
newspapers represent the Blue Camp with 55% (142 pieces), according to
the classification of Sullivan et al. (2018, p. 114).
Data analyses were performed in STM. STM, which assumes that every
document (including every news article) is a mixture of topics, is a wordclustering technique to identify latent topics. The benefit of STM is that
it is able to extract a discursive structure comprised of exclusive andsemantically coherent clusters of topics from unstructured textual datafrom within a period of investigation. For the objectives of this study,
the term “topics” refers to particular discursive frames (Van Atteveldt
et al., 2014). The topics include information on the topic’s proportion(which is the summed prevalence of each topic selected in this study), alist of FREX terms (referring to terms or phrases in a topic that appeared
frequently and with exclusivity relative to other terms in other topics),
and the top-ranking news of each identified topic. Moreover, STM can
include metadata, document-level variables such as the date of publication and author (one variable in this study is pro-Blue/Green) for topic
analysis (Grimmer et al., 2022, p. 153). With these variables for analysis,
STM can present an identifiable trend, an examination of event effects on
a topic’s patterns, and can form the basis of a comparison of pro-Blue

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90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Fig. 7.1 Trend of news articles in our dataset

and pro-Green media content. All these advantages are not only helpful
for finding evidence of the selected media’s political leanings on the Hong
Kong migration issue, but also present the general trends relating to thisissue.
This study settled on a 12-topic model after processing the aforementioned corpus in STM. This study further selected and labelled theseven identified topics related to our research tasks for interpretation
by carefully reading the top ten news articles about each topic (a totalof 70 articles; for details of the topic model selection, see Appendix A,
and see Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). The last step is to engage in topic
interpretation, as elaborated in the following section.

The Results of STM
Table 7.1 shows the seven topic names used in this analysis and their
proportions. By thoroughly examining the FREX terms and the top
news stories, this study categorised the selected topics into two primarycategories: “Migration Safety” and “Political Security”. Three topics

7

MEDIA POLITICAL LEANINGS: POLARISED DEPICTIONS …

183(38.47%) fell in the category of Migration Safety, made of Political Migration (Topic 2, hereafter, T represents Topic), Insincere Assistance (T9),
Conditions Imposed on Migration (T1). The three topics in this category
relate to human security, with protection of life opportunities (Persaud,
2022, p. 141) being a central requirement of Hong Kong migrants. The
topic with the largest proportion in the category of Migration Safety is
Political Migration (T2), devoted to describing the lives of Hong Kong
migrants in Taiwan and their reasons for migration. The four topics in the
Political Security category (26.35%) include Empty Promise of OCTS (T4),Soft Penetration (T3), Blur Jurisdiction (T8), and Population Replacement(T12). Here this study adopts a wide definition of Political Security thatrefers to threats to both political stability and collective identity (Buzan
et al., 1998, p. 141).
The Empty Promise of OCTS topic (OCTS means One Country, Two
Systems, which was a unification model posed by the PRC for Taiwanthat was used in Hong Kong first, and in which also promised that Hong
Kongers can enjoy a high degree of autonomy that will remain unchanged
for 50 years). It refers to the Hong Kong immigration issue and signifies the demise of OCTS in reality, implying that Taiwan has definitely
rejected this political arrangement. The Blur Jurisdiction topic represented the conflict between Taiwan and Hong Kong over the question ofjurisdiction or juridical sovereignty related to a Taiwan murder case thatinvolved Hong Kongers. Soft Penetration and Population Replacement
concerned the notion that the abrupt increase in Hong Kong immigrants
posed a threat to Taiwan’s political stability and social resource allocation.
The topic with the largest proportion is Empty Promise of OCTS, which
presents the political root of Hong Kong migration in Taiwan: Hong
Kong’s freedom is dramatically dwindling.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the thematic trend in Taiwanese mainstream
media coverage that follows the two categories, Migrant Safety (the solidline) and Political Security (the dashed line), through the investigation
period. It can be observed that the Political Security trendline decreased
from a high point in 2014 (7.29%), shortly after the 2014 OCM, to a low
point in 2015 (7.29%). Similarly, the Migrant Safety line went downward
from the year of OCM (18.22%) to its lowest point in 2016 (12.80%).
This implies that the media outlets’ handling of the Hong Kong immigration issue became less intense after the OCM. Since then, however,the Political Security and the Migrant Safety trendlines rebounded, withfluctuations, respectively. The upward trends were maintained in both

184

C. W. K. YAUTable 7.1 Categories and topics
Conceptual
categories

Topic nameTopic
proportion (%)

FREX terms (translations from
Chinese)Migration
SafetyPolitical Migration(T2)
Insincere
Assistance (T9)
Conditions
Imposed on
Migration

14.99
11.92
11.56

Political
Security

Empty Promise of
OCTS (T4)Soft Penetration(T3)
Blur Jurisdiction(T8)
Population
Replacement
(T12)

7.20
6.47
6.35
6.33

emigration, young people, today,
migration, Hong Kong National
Security Law, movement, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, decision, living
MAC, Project, assistance,
humanitarian, related, Chen
Ming-Tong, rescue, scheme,
ordinance, service residence,settlement, application, permit,
number of people, residents,
passport, acquisition, this year,
review
Kaohsiung, mayor, democracy,
Han Kuo-Yu, Chief Executive,
Beijing, One Country, Two
Systems, parliamentarian,Kuomintang, today
China, bookstore, Lam
Wing-Kee, peace, infiltration,
CCP, freedom, Xi Jinping,
control, change
Chen Tong-Jia, justice, police,
Hong Kong Government, ourside, immigration, operation,
personnel, sovereignty, legislators
refugee, UK, acceptance,
Extradition Bill, CCP, incident,
movement, local, extradition to
China, asylum

trendlines until the 2019 Protests. Since then, the Political Security trendline has slumped, but the migrant security trendline has continued toboom to its peak (43.84%) in 2020, the year of the NSL legislation, andthe gap between the two lines has been increasing. It shows that the NSL
was probably the main driver of the re-politicisation of the issue of Hong
Kong migrants.

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MEDIA POLITICAL LEANINGS: POLARISED DEPICTIONS …

185

70.00%

60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00%

10.00%

0.00%
2014

2015

2016

2017
Migrate Safety

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Political Security

Fig. 7.2 Changing thematic proportion trends

Factors Affecting Topic Proportions
This section identifies the differences in news portrayals with a baseline offactors, including the implementation of NSL and Blue/Green as covariates, in order to observe any effects on the topic patterns. The NSL factor
was established on the date the NSL went into implementation, 1 June
2020. This is when the trendline for migrant security attained its peak in2020 (see Fig. 7.2). Blue/Green party affiliation was also considered inorder to investigate the media’s inclinations between Migrant Safety and
Political Security.
The Effect of NSL on Topical Proportion
The result of the NSL effects on the topical patterns is shown in Fig. 7.3.
The left plot and the right plot of the figure represent before and after
the NSL’s execution, respectively. This figure has two highlights. One is
Conditions Imposed on Migration (T1), which ranked third on the left

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C. W. K. YAU

plot, but climbed to the top in the right plot after the NSL’s implementation. Another, Soft Penetration (T12), ranked in fourth place in theright plot, a change from last place in the left plot. All in all, most of
the discussion was focused on Migration Safety topics rather than Political Security. But look in depth: after the NSL’s implementation, thefocal point subtlety shifted to Conditions Imposed on Migration, while
the Political Security topic, Soft Penetration, also gained attention.
The Effect of “Blue/Green” on Topic Proportion
Figure 7.4 illustrates the effect that the “Blue/Green” divide has on the
topic pattern. In the pro-Blue Camp news outlets, on the left plot, Political Migration (T2), Insincere Assistance (T9), Conditions Imposed on
Applicants (T1) occupy the top three spots. In contrast, the right plot,
which represents the pro-Green Camp media, shows that the Political
Security topics moved up. One is Soft Penetration (T3), which occupies
the second position but is ranked last in the pro-Blue Camp plot. Similarly, another one, Population Replacement (T12), advances one ranks to
the fifth position in the pro-Green Camp plot, compared to the one in
the pro-Blue Camp plot.
Topic Content
This section closely examines the content of the high-ranking topics
between pro-Green and pro-Blue media coverage. Both outlooks strongly
engaged with the Migration Safety topics, that is, Political Migration,
Insincere Assistance, and Conditions Imposed on Migration. We will lookat these topics first.
Political Migration
First, regarding the topic of Political Migration, the two camps had
no differences in their news report stances. Both emphasised that thepolitical situation in Hong Kong in the aftermath of the OCM was theprimary reason for Hong Kongers’ emigration. Both camps’ news outlets
believed that Hong Kong immigrants desired to live in a liberal democracy, particularly after the NSL’s implementation in July 2020. Moreover,the news articles on this topic reported on Hong Kong immigrants’ living
circumstances and exposed the risks of migrating to Taiwan, including
low salaries, homesickness, and the sincerity of their loyalty to Taiwan

1 The number below the plot is the mean score of topic prevalence. Here, the total of the topic prevalence is 1.

MEDIA POLITICAL LEANINGS: POLARISED DEPICTIONS …

Fig. 7.3 The effect of NSL on topic proportion1

7

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Fig. 7.4 The effect of “Blue/Green” on topic proportion

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C. W. K. YAU

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being doubted by local Taiwanese. In the interviews with Hong Kong
immigrants, Chen, X.-Y. (2020) stated :Following the passage of the NSL, Alan and Joys [respondents] decided to
speed up their actions [referring to emigrating to Taiwan]. Joys stated thatthey are looking forward to receiving their national ID cards soon in order
to vote for the [Taiwan] president in 2024, and that ‘this is a democratic
experience that Hong Kong has never had before’. They also expressed
concern about the situation in Hong Kong.
Stella [another respondent] stated that the low salary is the main barrier
to living in Taiwan, and that she must work multiple part-time jobs andinvest in order to maintain her income levels.

In other interviews, a Hong Kong illustrator expressed anxiety about
the Taiwan identity issue by asking “if a Hong Kong person falls in lovewith or marries a Taiwanese after coming to Taiwan, will it be consideredthat they are trying to save the six million dollars immigration fees?” (Lu,2022).
Insincere AssistanceThis topic mainly reflected the pro-Blue news media criticisms of the
DPP’s governmental assistance for Hong Kong migrants and politicalasylum seekers. News articles by the critics of the government’s Hong
Kong Humanitarian Assistance Action and Caring Project (hereafter,
Assistance Project) referred to it as “old wine in new bottles”, having
no new or helpful mechanism for political asylum seekers, rather justintending to “handle them ambiguously”. In a view presented in anews article in the China Times (Ji et al., 2020), the KMT Member ofthe Legislative Yuan, Chen Yu-Jen, stated that “the whole Project does
not appear to differ from current regulations [targeting political asylum
seekers]” (because the current regulations had been available throughgeneral immigration channels such as investment immigration). In thesame news article, another KMT legislator, Chen I-Hsin, also questioned
whether the Project only targeted legal immigrants:
Chen Ming-Tong, Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, stated that
this Project is not for rescue (received political asylum seekers) but rather
assistance provided to those in need after entering the country. The question is, how can we help if there is no rescue plan (referring to taking

190

C. W. K. YAUin political asylum seekers from Hong Kong who entered Taiwan illegallyfirst)? Furthermore, the targets of applicable assistance are confined to legal
immigrants; could it be that we deport or detain Hong Kong and Macao
residents who are under threat due to political factors and have entered
Taiwan illegally? (Ji et al., 2020)

Professor Chen Yi-Xin, in an interview by the China Times (Cai,2020), also stated that the Assistance Project was intended to handle theHong Kong immigration wave in an ambiguous manner (using a caseby-case review) and thus did not detail the rescue targets due to politicalreasons. The reasons for this included an attempt to avoid angering mainland China, so Taiwan could not dramatically widen the definition of
refugee for Hong Kong protesters as that could cause the over-acceptanceof a large number of sensitive political activists. Professor Chen explainedthat the Taiwanese do not want “criminals” to enter, as the radical activists
could undermine social order in Taiwan as they did in Hong Kong andthus would not lead to the government’s public support. He concluded
that the “ambiguous” strategy could somewhat please all parties, but this“narrowly-defined rescue” (termed by Professor Chen) is actually far awayfrom the DPP’s claim—that is, to “stand with Hong Kong”.
Conditions Imposed on Migration
This topic contained news articles about the conditions imposed on immigration applicants as a result of the record number of applications received
during the 2019 Protests. Coverage from both camps agreed that applications for residency in Taiwan had reached a record high, as shown in thenews headlines, Hong Kong people’s residence in Taiwan hits a new high,11,173 last year, in LT, and, The number of Hong Kong people who cameto live in Taiwan increased by 1.5 times in the first four months, in EDN(Chen, 2022a; Cheng, 2020). Nevertheless, there was a subtle distinction between the two media camps on this topic. The pro-Blue news
outlets were likely to criticise the DPP administration’s lack of sincerity
in supporting Hong Kong, and its use of national security concerns as
an for refusing Hong Kong immigrants’ settlement in Taiwan. A UDN
news story (Chen, 2022) raised inquiries regarding the “secret” imposition of a quota on Hong Kong applicants in immigration by the DPPgovernment. The news story suggested that such a measure may havebeen implemented due to apprehensions that the immigration of individuals with affiliations to Chinese party organisations, government, and7

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191

military, who had previously served in Hong Kong, may be utilised forthe purposes of the “United Front” in Taiwan.
The LT does portray apprehension about migration issues. The
phenomenon of “fake investment, true migration” (using investment in
Taiwan as a pathway to residency without actually making the investment) was highlighted (Chen, 2022c). A similar concern also appearedwith reference to applicants for professional migration, as exemplified ina news title, People from Hong Kong and Macau who apply for professionalmigration should engage in business as opposed to retiring and enjoying
medical insurance (Chen, 2021). Furthermore, a news story on migration’s national security implications prompted the DPP administration toreach a compromise (Chen, 2022b). One plan is issuing a permanent
resident identification card to those Hong Kong immigrants in lieu ofgranting them citizenship. In the news article, an official explanation ofthis compromise measure was that it could lower the risks to Taiwan’s
security because the applicants would not have citizenship.
To summarise, the three topics about Migration Safety portrayed therisks for Hong Kongers of living in Taiwan (e.g., low salaries, doubt
about the immigrants’ loyalty to Taiwan), and also looked at the impactthat the large flow of Hong Kong immigrants had on concerns such as
national security, social welfare distribution, and administration resources,
which caused or justified the DPP government’s limited assistance to theapplicants.
Soft Penetration
This subsection examines the difference between pro-Green and pro-Blue
news outlets with regard to Political Security topics, focusing particularlyon the pro-Green media. The Soft Penetration topic raised the possibilityof Chinese cultural penetration through immigration. Most contributors
to this topic took the situation in Hong Kong as an example of how
Beijing took control of the city through immigration from mainland
China. The contributors believed that the Chinese immigrants were filledwith authoritarian beliefs. An LT editorial exemplified this phenomenon
with Australian opinion poll results and discovered that the proportion of
respondents (that is, Australian Chinese migrants) who identified with ademocratic system (36%) was lower than the proportion who identified
with a non-democratic system (41%). In an LT interview (He, 2021),
Lam Wing-Kee, a Hong Kong immigrant and a book seller in Taiwan
who had been detained in mainland China for selling prohibited books in192

C. W. K. YAUHong Kong involving CCP General Secretary Xi Jin-Ping, said that theconcept of the human rights was lacking due to Confucian culture (He,2021). It is, he added in another interview (Yang, 2019), because Confucian ethics do not talk about human rights, being based on the idea thatpeople are born unequally and have different social statuses.
Most articles on this topic suggested that Taiwan had to bewareof Chinese penetration and thus should cut the cultural tie between
Taiwan and China. One solution, as Lin proposed, was to transformthe Confucian-centric perspective in Taiwanese society through education. Another was to prohibit any plan for mainland Chinese immigration.
As a Hong Kong resident claimed in a letter to the LT’s editor (Chen,
M.-Y., 2019), the reasons the notion of human rights should not apply
to China’s “emigration penetration strategy” were because a huge influxof Chinese immigrants would “dilute” Taiwanese minds, and some ofthem could be spies, as happened in Hong Kong. The letter to the LT’s
editor was not only one person’s view; it also projects society’s mindset in
Taiwan regarding Hong Kong immigration, as discussed in the following
section, about the topic Population Replacement.
Population Replacement (Topic 12)
Like the Soft Penetration topic, contributors in this topic examined theHong Kong case; that is, the daily quota of 150 mainland Chinese immigrants entering Hong Kong (Yang, 2011, pp. 10–11), which had resulted
in an estimated more than one million new immigrants entering Hong
Kong from mainland China since the 1997 Hong Kong handover (HongKong Economic Times, 2019). This situation was discussed in a letter tothe LT’s editor (Chen, Z.-G., 2019), stating that, “[the 1.5 million mainlanders] have crammed into a tiny place, Hong Kong, making it like asardine can containing more than seven million individuals. Public facilities, medical resources, and educational resources are depleted. How canany hope for human rights exist?”.
The alert mindset of the contributors regarding the issue of “fakeimmigrant, true Chinese spy” (Chen, Y.-C., 2020) reflected a cautious
stance towards Hong Kong asylum seekers. Lin Pao-Hua (2019), a senior
LT columnist, took a conservative stance on the refugee law for two
reasons, in the news article titled “The refugee law and the spies in the
background”. First, he said it would incur a large-scale influx of Hong
Kong refugees entering Taiwan, potentially exhausting Taiwan’s humanresources and management costs. As Lin pointed out, the worst-case

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193

scenario for Taiwan would be to become like Hong Kong was in the
1980s with the Vietnam refugee issue (also called the Vietnamese boat
people) or as happened with the pre-handover illegal immigrants frommainland China. Second, and even more significantly, Lin believed that
China would use the refugee law to conduct spying. Someone pretending
to be a pro-democracy supporter could intent to incite rebellion—apersonal experience he shared. Lin suggested that Taiwan should handle
Hong Kong immigrants in a different way, by enacting more relaxed
regulations to allow Hong Kong youth to study or work. In addition,
political asylum regulations should be improved, according to Lin, but
taking national security into account to cover investment immigrants.
The examination of topic contents in this section demonstrates that
pro-Blue media tended to report on the situation of Hong Kong immigrants in Taiwan and to criticise the DPP government’s assistance,
whereas the pro-Green media tended to highlight potential national
security and management cost issues related to immigrants.
The Results of the Sentiment Analysis
Sentiment analysis is a dictionary-based text-mining technique forextracting opinions (Lei & Liu, 2021), which has been used to grasp
the public sentiment towards refugees (Backfried & Shalunts, 2016;Öztürk & Ayvaz, 2018) or migration (Heidenreich et al., 2020). This
chapter uses sentiment analysis to identify tendencies in the media’s
partisan leanings and to look at the portrayals related to them.
The technique involves using a sentiment dictionary to count thewords in the news articles that match those in the established dictionary.
To improve the accuracy of word identification, the sentiment dictionary used in this study is a combination of two sentiment dictionaries
created by National Taiwan University and the Dalian University of Technology from mainland China (translating from simplified Chinese into
traditional Chinese when used). The calculation is straightforward. One
word (e.g., “assistance”, yuanzhu) with a positive meaning in the dictionary is counted 1, whereas one word (e.g., “illegal”, feifa) with a negative
meaning in the dictionary is counted -1. When the sum of the positive
and the negative words in a news article is a positive number (i.e., 1 orabove), the document is considered to contain positive sentiment. A negative sum (i.e., −1 or below) indicates that the document is considered to194

C. W. K. YAUcontain negative sentiment. Words are not counted if they are not listed
in the sentiment dictionaries used in the chapter.
To conduct sentiment analysis, the same dataset used in this study was
divided into two subsets: the pro-Blue Camp dataset (composed of UDN,
CT, EDN and CTEE) and the pro-Green Camp dataset (represented byLT). By doing so, we returned 117 and 142 hits, respectively. The resultsof pro-Green and pro-Blue news outlets are depicted in Fig. 7.5. For
the group of pro-Green news outlets, the number of news articles (41of 117, or 35.04%) expressing negative sentiments regarding Hong Kong
immigration was greater than the number of news articles (76 of 117,
or 64.96%) expressing positive sentiments regarding Hong Kong immigration. For the pro-Blue group, only 31 out of 142 (21.83%) expressed
negative sentiments, while 111 out of 142 (78.17%) expressed positive
sentiments. This pattern indicates that the proportion of pro-Green news
outlets having negative sentiments covering Hong Kong migration isgreater (13.21%) than that of the pro-Blue news outlets.
120
111

100

76

80

60
41
40
31

20

0
Green

Blue
Negative

Positive

Fig. 7.5 Sentiment analysis of the pro-Green and pro-Blue news outlets

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MEDIA POLITICAL LEANINGS: POLARISED DEPICTIONS …

195

The most positive and negative news articles from each camp were thenselected based on sentiment scores, with the top ten news articles on each
topic being included in the selection. For the pro-Blue media, the mostpositive (39 marks) news report (in the Insincere Assistance topic) wastitled The Hong Kong Assistance Project has been announced; Chen MingTong: Protesters seeking asylum must enter legally, and the law allows forassistance for Hong Kong students studying in Taiwan (Lu et al., 2020).
This news story, from UDN, positively affirmed that the DPP government
established a “Taiwan-Hong Kong Office for Exchanges and Services toProvide Necessary Assistance to Hong Kong Citizens”. Phrases used in
the news report included, for example, “affirm the government’s specificapproach” and “the information provided to protesters entering Taiwan
has become more specific”.
The most negative news story was a CT editorial within the topic ofEmpty Promise of OCTS titled Hsu Guo-Yong “self-slaps” Hsu Guo-Yong(minus 42 points; Hsu was Minister of the Interior and in charge ofimmigration at the time). This editorial criticises the DPP government for“abandoning juridical sovereignty” in the “Chen Tong-Jia” case (a Hong
Kong citizen suspected of murdering his Hong Kong girlfriend in Taiwan
and then fleeing back to Hong Kong; both Taiwan and Hong Kong had
no agreement for fugitives) in order to win the 2020 ROC presidential
elections. The reason of this criticism is that this case would strengthen
the case for the highly controversial Extradition Law, which was questioned for its violation of human rights and which sparked unprecedented
protests in Hong Kong. If the party’s candidate had claimed supportof the Extradition Law bill, it could have harmed the DPP’s chancesof winning the presidency. Therefore, as the editorial added, the DPPgovernment would not accept Chen’s surrender to Taiwan’s police.
For the pro-Green media, the most positive (23 marks) news report(in the Conditions Imposed on Emigration topic) was titled Hong Kong
people’s residency cases in Taiwan hit a new high of 11,173 last year. This
news story affirmed the DDP government’s effort to assist Hong Kong
people settling down in Taiwan. As stated, “the government is revising
immigration regulations for Hong Kong and Macau residents who wish
to reside and settle in Taiwan, as well as enhancing the policy for assisting
Hong Kong”. As to the most negative news story, it was also mentioned
in Population Replacement, that is, titled the refugee law and the spies inthe background (minus 29 points).

196

C. W. K. YAUConclusion
In contrast to studies either of traditional migration border security orof progressive–conservative media, this chapter’s text-mining findings
contribute to an understanding of how subjective perceptions, that is, theBlue/Green partisan leanings of Taiwanese media, influence the portrayalof the migration issue. It can especially be seen when the migration issue
involves the PRC, which intensified the politicisation of the Hong Kong
migration issue and the divergent portrayal of Hong Kong migration.
It is evident that the pro-Green media outlets offer more of a security
narrative (such as cultural Sinicization and the possibility of Chinese infiltration through Hong Kong migration), which serves to justify the DDP’s
restrictive migration policy.
This chapter contends that while the media may aid in justifying suchgovernment policy actions, it also exacerbates the contradictions between
human rights and national security. In other words, this tension calls
the political legitimacy of the DPP and Taiwan into question, because
they purportedly uphold the value of human rights while disadvantaging
Hong Kong residents (especially those who are without full citizenship)
who wish to reside and settle in Taiwan with ease. The side effect of therestrictive policies on Hong Kongers will impact social coherence in thelong term. This chapter suggests that the matter of Hong Kong migration ought to be de-securitised and efforts by the Control Yuan should
be redirected towards policy implementation concerns, such as administrative efficacy or the authories’ violations of the Hong Kong & Macao
Regulations.
Last but not least, this chapter highlights that fear of the PRC motivates the pro-Green media’s negative portrayal of Hong Kong migration.
However, it must be noted that this chapter has not delved comprehensively into the political roots of what structures the securitisation issue
with regard to the Hong Kong migration. This includes an examination ofGreen Camp’s normative framing and political identity such as Taiwan’s
subjectivity. These need further study but have already exceeded the scopeof this chapter.
Acknowledgements The author thanks Bo-Yu Chen, Department of International Studies and Regional Development, Niigata University, for his warm
collegiality and insightful guidance.

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197

Appendix: A discussionof the topic model selection
We used a package stm (version 1.3.6) operating in R, specificallydesigned to produce the structural topic model used in this chapter. We
worked in R. There are several steps in the two main stages: the preprocessing stage (Stage 1), and the topic model-building stage (Stage
2).
In Stage 1, we pre-processed the news data. First, we retrieved anddownloaded news articles as textual data and converted them into amachine-readable UTF-8 format compatible with the RStudio platform.
Next, we stored the data in a document database, MongoDB, using
Studio 3T, a graphical user interface, to tidy the data according to thenews page, date, title, main text, and so forth. We then underwent
two text processing stages, word segmentation and stop-word removal.
We used the R package jibea (a popular dictionary-based Chinese word
segment module, version 0.11) to segment the news articles into a corpus.
We then removed the stop-words (i.e., common words such as “others”[qi ta]). Once the corpus had been established, we went to the next stage.
In Stage 2, we first used the R package STM to convert the corpus
into a document-term matrix. Our matrix contained 259 documents. We
then had to determine a “correct” number of topics (number of wordclusters) because there is no overarching gold standard. To find the best
and most substantive model, we referred to the methods used by Quinn
et al. (2010, pp. 215–216) and Lucas et al. (2015, p. 264), first narrowing
down the searching scope. We thus set the number of topics, ranging fromfive topics to 40 topics in 5-topic increments.
After referencing the model’s diagnostic scores for “exclusivity” (thetop words in a topic that significantly differ from others) and “semantic
coherence” (the top words in a topic that are most likely to co-occur ina passage) (Fig. 7.6), the author independently close read the top news
articles and top words in each candidate’s topic model to validate thecandidate models.
We chose the 12-topic model for our research task. In the topic
selection step, we chose relevant topics and discarded uninterpretable oruseless topics to avoid overwriting the selected model (e.g., fragmented,
over-low prevalence). For example, Topic 6, Hong Kong Culture, was not
closely related to our research tasks, and Topic 5 was an over-fragmented
topic mixing economic strategy, conflict among generations and tourism,

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C. W. K. YAU

Fig. 7.6 Diagnostic values by number of topics in the candidate models

so the topics dropped. This step resulted in the seven topics used in ourstudy for further interpretation. The author assigned corresponding labelsin accordance with the core meanings of the top ten news articles for each
topic.

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CHAPTER 8

The Role of Nationalism and Political
Identity in Shaping Japanese People’s
Perceptions of Immigrants and Refugees
Zdenka P. Kyselova

and Kristina Kironska

Introduction
While anti-immigration sentiments are on the rise in many parts of theworld, the case of Japan is specific in several aspects. With the world’s
oldest population (European Parliament, 2020), Japanese society will
likely face pressing socio-economic problems, if it does not start accepting
more foreign nationals. On the other hand, a strong sense of culturaluniqueness makes it difficult both for foreigners to integrate but also forJapanese people to accept them. Furthermore, as a democratic country
which ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Japan is among the countries with the lowest rates
of refugee acceptance.

Z. P. Kyselova (B) · K. Kironska
Department of Asian Studies, Palacky University Olomouc, Olomouc,Czech Republic
e-mail: z.kyselova10@gmail.com© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_8

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Z. P. KYSELOVA AND K. KIRONSKA

Japan has been tackling demographic issues related to its ageing society
since the end of the twentieth century. Until that time, words such as
immigration, migrants, or refugees were hardly present in the government discourse. With the ageing population and declining birth rate,
the Japanese government has searched for means to secure economic
and social stability, e.g. by involving more women in the job market,
enhancing childcare facilities, and broadening the range of working visas.
However, domestic issues are not the only reason for accepting immigrants and refugees. Japan has become a vocal promoter of humansecurity and ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees in 1981. Despite all the commitments to international norms and rational reasons to open itself up, Japan continues tostruggle to adapt its internal policy and bureaucratic processes towards
modern immigration and asylum systems. In 2021, only 2.2% of residents are foreign (Statistic Bureau of Japan, 2021), which contributes
to demographic issues and labour shortages. The low rate of refugees
accepted yearly, together with harsh conditions in detention facilities andstrict acceptance rules, has caused the worsening of Japan’s international
reputation.
With regard to Japanese perception of foreigners in general, thetraditional view of Japan as a homogeneous nation prevailed as acommon reason for its unfriendliness towards immigrants (Koizumi,1992). However, in recent decades, the relevance of the notion ofJapanese homogeneity has been questioned (Flowers, 2009; Mukae,2022). The homogeneity of Japan, at least from the Asian perspective,
is regarded by many as a myth, for there are numerous Asian minority
groups of ethnic Koreans and Chinese, but also ethnic groups native toJapanese islands, such as the Ainu and Ryukyuan people. On the other
hand, the period of isolation during the Tokugawa era, the efforts toassimilate ethnic groups such as the Ainu during the Meiji period, and thelimited inflow of immigrants after World War II due to the focus on postwar reconstruction, gave rise to the notion of homogeneity in Japanesesociety. As Burgess (2010) argues, such discourse has influenced Japaneseperceptions of foreigners and the country’s stringent immigration policy.
The adoption of international norms related to human rights protection and refugees was a crucial step for Japan to fit into the global society.
Conformity with such norms is, however, based on domestic standards
and national identity, which have been traditionally anti-immigration

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THE ROLE OF NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL IDENTITY …

205(Flowers, 2009). Public perception is another area where national identity matters. Existing research studies on the Japanese public attitude
towards immigrants have focused on the impact of media framing,
personal contact with foreigners, and the connection with threat perception (Cheng & Fraser, 2022; Green, 2017; Horiuchi & Ono, 2022).
Indeed, mass media and threat framing play a significant role in shaping
public opinion, especially in Japan where public safety is highly valued. As
such, safety can be considered a constituent part of social harmony, which
has historically been a strong element of Japanese national identity.
While considering harmony as an important aspect of Japanese national
identity, it is vital to ask to what extent national identity impacts domestic
discourse and public perception of foreigners. While national identity canbe defined from many perspectives, depending on the field of study, oneof the unifying features is the group’s perception of specific aspects that
distinguish them from others (Münch, 2002; Smith, 2001). In the past
two decades, the discourse of historical revisionism and the endorsementof pride in Japanese society have been on the rise (Yamaguchi, 2017).
The nationalist sentiment was remarkably present under the late Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration. It is therefore our ambition toreveal how such nationalist tendencies determine Japanese public opinion
towards immigrants and refugees. In our study, we have tested whether
Japanese society esteems Japan over other countries and how such feelings impact Japanese views of foreigners. In our study, we have built partof our argument on an experiment to see if there is a correlation between
blind nationalism (see below) and views on immigration and refugees.
Given the general presumption that conservative right-wing ideology
is prone to anti-immigration tendencies (Brooks et al., 2016; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), we also tested attitudes towards immigrants
and refugees against political leanings (conservative v. liberal) and voter/
party preferences. While the definition of conservatism and liberalism
can be blurry in the Japanese context (McCormack, 2008), we hypothesise that the respondents who identify themselves as conservative rather
than liberal also have a sceptical view towards immigration and refugees.
Conservatism in Japan is associated with revisionism, changing the pacifist clause of the constitution, and the support of a more robust defence
policy. In other words, conservatives actually support a change in Japan’s
trajectory, rather than the conservation of the post-war democratic orderin Japan (McCormack, 2008). Because the support for restoring some ofthe pre-war values, which were built on the notion of superiority towards

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others, especially Asian countries, is intertwined with conservatism andnationalism, we have examined how these two types of political identity correlate with anti-immigration sentiments. As scholars have alreadypointed out in their studies of Japanese perception of immigrants andrefugees, the exceptionally low number of the latter makes it difficult tocompletely distinguish between the two categories, although the legislative differences are quite crucial. As Horiuchi and Ono (2021) reflect,
it cannot be presumed that Japanese citizens recognise the difference
between work-related immigrants, refugees, and short-term visitors. Also,
the Japanese legal system does not provide special measures for refugees,
as international law stipulates (Fujibayashi, 2020). Instead, refugee statusis recognised under the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition
Act, which also defines the rights of foreign workers. This can alsostir up legislative differences and can confuse assumptions about foreign
workers and refugees. Due to the relatively small number of non-Japanesegroups in Japan, both foreign workers and refugees might evoke the same
feelings.
To reveal the Japanese views towards refugees, we selected theRohingya as a concrete group (case study). The Japanese so-called special
relations with Myanmar and Japan’s particular efforts to economicallymitigate the refugee crisis might create a surmise that Japan would be
welcoming towards the Rohingya refugees. Nevertheless, only a few
hundreds of Rohingya reside in Japan, despite the generally positive
attitude toward their resettlement (see below in the survey results).
This chapter is organised as follows. In the following section, themethodology is explained. After that, the historical perspective of Japanese
attitudes towards foreigners is introduced, followed by the theoreticalframework, built on national identity, nationalism, and political leaning.
The next section presents the data on how Japanese people feel about thecurrent situation related to immigrants and refugees, with a special focus
on Rohingya refugees, and how nationalism and political identity impact
their views. The last section provides conclusions.

Methodology
This book chapter presents the results of the Sinophone Borderlands
Indo-Pacific Survey (Turcsanyi et al., 2022), co-convened by one of theauthors. The survey investigated global views of China and other issues,
such as people’s stances towards immigration and refugees, through a

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207

series of large-scale representative online public opinion surveys in many
(selected) parts of the world, including Japan. Participants responded
online to approximately 60 questions. Only a subset of the data related
to the goals of the current paper, however, is reported in this research.
We analysed survey statements related to nationalism, such as: The
world would be a better place if people from other countries were more likethe Japanese, and, Generally speaking, Japan is a better country than mostother countries. Furthermore, questions about political identity were analysed, including voting/party preference and conservative/liberal leaning,such as: When it comes to politics, do you consider yourself more liberal orconservative? If there were parliamentary elections this weekend, which party
would you vote for? These questions and statements have been inspired byother surveys, such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).
For assessing Japanese people’s attitude towards immigrants andrefugees (including a case study on the Rohingya), the following statements and questions have been selected and analysed: The presence of
migrant workers is beneficial for Japan; It is difficult for foreigners to
fit into Japanese society; Chinese migrants face discrimination in Japan;
Asian migrants (excluding Chinese) face discrimination in Japan; Japanis open to refugees; The Rohingya people are a persecuted Muslim minority in
Myanmar. Do you support the resettlement of the displaced Rohingya people
in your country? Attitudes towards selected groups of people have also
been considered. Additionally, all these questions have been disaggregatedby socio-demographic data obtained from the survey.
The Japanese sample is national representative (in terms of age, gender,and region) with 1219 respondents. The responses were collected inJapanese from participants registered in national online panels by thesurvey agency Cint between 11 April and 17 June 2022. The main data
about the respondents are shown below in Table 8.1. Most questions use
a 7-point answering scale (in the analysis below sometimes recalculated
into three categories for easier understanding of the results), while someare so-called thermometer questions, where the answering scale goes from0 to 100.
In our research, we focused on people’s attitudes towards immigrants
and refugees in Japan through the lens of political identity, more specifically through voting/party preference, liberal/conservative leanings (seeTable 8.1), and nationalism (see Figs. 8.1 and 8.2).

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Table 8.1 Data about the survey respondents
Gender distribution
FemaleMale
Other
I don’t want to answer
Age distribution
18–25
25–34
35–44
45–54
> 55
Education level
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Voter/party preference
Liberal Democratic Party
Constitutional Democratic Party
KomeitoJapanese Communist Party
Nippon Ishin no Kai
Social Democratic Party
Reiwa Shinsengumi
Democratic Party for the People
NHK Party1
Other political party
I don’t know
I would not vote

47%
52%
0%
1%
20%
21%
24%
22%
13%
1%
28%
71%
27%
4.8%
2.5%
4%
7.2%
0.5%
1.5%
2.2%
0.3%
1.6%
28.7%
19.7%

Liberal/conservative leaning
1 = Very liberal

2

3

4

5

6

7 = Veryconservative

I don’t know

3%

5%

13%

12%

25%

13%

5%

24%

When asked about liberal or conservative leanings, a large portionof the respondents opted for the option “I don’t know” (24%). More

1 Nippon Hosōku Kyōkai. The NHK Party has been renamed to Seijika Joshi 48 Party.

8

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THE ROLE OF NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL IDENTITY …

The world would be a better place if people fromother countries were more like the Japanese (in %)
60
51
50
40
30
19

20
10

4

5

strongly
disagreedisagree

9

8

4

0
somewhat neither agree somewhat
disagreeor disagree
agree

agree

strongly
agreeFig. 8.1 Measuring nationalism in Japan—item 1

Generally speaking, Japan is a better country thanmost other countries (in %)
50

45

45
40
35

30
25
17

20

17

15
10

5

7

6

5

3

0
strongly
disagreedisagreesomewhat neither agree somewhat
disagreeor disagree
agree

agree

strongly
agreeFig. 8.2 Measuring nationalism in Japan—item 2

people see themselves as conservative (43%) than liberal (21%) and 12%
are neutral.
To measure voter/party preference, we asked which political party
people would vote for if parliamentary elections took place the following

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weekend. About 29% of the respondents said they didn’t know whichparty they would vote for, 20% would not vote, 27% would vote for the
Liberal Democratic Party, 7% for the Nippon Ishin no Kai, 5% for theConstitutional Democratic Party, 4% for the Japanese Communist Party,
and the remainder for the other parties (with each 2% or less).
We measured nationalism in Japan with two items (see Figs. 8.1 and
8.2), using the theory developed by Davidov (2009), outlined in thesection “What shapes people’s perception of immigrants and refugees –theoretical framework”. The first item was The world would be a better
place if people from other countries were more like the Japanese, with which
Japanese people slightly more agreed than disagreed (mean 4.1—in which
1 means completely disagree, 4 is in neither agree nor disagree, and 7 iscompletely agree), but the majority of the people chose the midpoint,
signalling that the Japanese do not have very strong opinions on this. To
the second item—Generally speaking, Japan is a better country than mostother countries—the response was slightly more on the disagree side (mean3.9), but again, the majority of the respondents chose the midpoint. To
avoid confusion on what exactly the midpoint means (Chyung et al.,2017), labels have been provided for all anchors on the scale, with the
midpoint marked as “neither agree nor disagree”.

Japanese Society and Accepting
Foreigners---Historical Perspective
While the Japanese government endeavours to increase the number offoreign workers, life in Japan for some of them is not effortless, as they
face racially motivated discrimination in the workplace, and in relation tohousing, shopping, medical services, etc. (Arudou, 2015; Morita, 2015;
Shimoji, 2023). More than 60% of foreigners in Japan have experienced
police control in 2022 (Take, 2022). According to the survey conductedby the Tokyo Bar Association in early 2022, racial profiling based on
appearance was experienced in the past five years mostly by non-Asian
nationals. The fear of a rise in criminality has been a common reason for
xenophobia and anti-immigration tendencies in Japan. To what extent has
Japanese society been welcoming of foreigners? What are Japan’s experiences with accepting refugees and immigrants, and how has the opinion
on these issues evolved?
To better anchor current trends in public opinion towards immigrants
and refugees, as well as the policy debate and legislative framework, this8

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211

part of the chapter presents the main obstacles in Japanese immigration
and refugee policy through selected cases.
Japan and Refugees
As has already been explained in the introduction of this book, Japan
ratified the UN Refugee Convention in 1981 and the related Protocol in
1982. However, Japan has its own legislation that defines the status ofimmigrants and refugees under the Immigration Control and Refugees’
Recognition Act of 1951. The law follows a strict interpretation of the
UN Refugee Convention, meaning that only those in danger of persecution due to religious, national, political, social, and racial reasons canbe considered refugees. Simply put, those fleeing war conflicts are notconsidered refugees according to Japanese legislation. This represents oneof the main reasons why Japan accepts so few refugees.
Nevertheless, there have been a few occasions when Japan showed flexibility and permitted exceptions. In this section, we will address the mostsignificant events and shed light on public opinion towards these cases.
The first event that forced Japan to face a refugee crisis was the Second
Indochina War of 1955–1975. Thanks to exponential economic growthduring the period, Japan was able to financially contribute to the resettlement of refugees from Indochina in third countries (Havens, 1990).
When it came to meeting the refugees’ requests for asylum in Japan,
the situation was much more complicated due to legislative issues, andbecause public opinion towards resettlement was divided between exclusionist sentiments and humanitarian tendencies. At the same time, if there
was any sympathy among the Japanese towards people who were forced
to flee from their homes, it was oriented towards Indochinese, especially those who took the most dangerous way, on the sea (Mizuno,1990). Partly due to international pressure, Japan decided to extend
the scope of aid beyond financial assistance and started accepting people
fleeing the battlefield. According to Strausz (2012), another reason wasthat accepting Indochinese refugees was not seen as a precedent for apotential refugee influx, simply because the Indochinese were not exactly
considered refugees from Japan’s legal perspective.
As for public opinion towards the Indochinese refugees, Japanese
government-commissioned surveys show that while in 1980 only 22.8%
would be in favour of increasing the quota of accepted refugees from
Indochina, in 1982 it was almost 50% (Dasgupta, 2021; Strausz, 2012;

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Z. P. KYSELOVA AND K. KIRONSKA

Takeda, 1998). Interestingly, despite the disapproval of the public in
1980, the government decided to increase the quota for Indochinese
refugees that year and again in 1981, 1983, and 1985. Moreover, in1981 the UN Refugee Convention was ratified. Most of the judiciaryand parliamentarians, along with public supporters of the resettlement
pointed to the low number of Indochinese refugees accepted in comparison with other states, hence arguing for the importance of international prestige. Humanitarian reasons for the support were given muchless emphasis (Strausz, 2012). Furthermore, the governmental surveys
mentioned above only asked about the attitude towards Indochinese
refugees, who were treated in a distinct way from other asylum seekers.
Non-Indochinese refugees and political asylum seekers had to undergo
a complicated process of acceptance following a rigid interpretation of
the UN Refugee Convention. Only 43 officials from the Ministry ofJustice were appointed to the agenda of such refugees, while in the case of
Indochinese people, the intergovernmental committee consisted of several
ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Labour, etc.,
who were involved in establishing the processes. Moreover, number ofNGOs were engaged in the resettlement itself. (Takeda, 1998). Until
2005, Japan only accepted 330 “convention” refugee applicants (Iwasaki,2006), while more than 11,000 Indochinese refugees found their new
home in Japan as of 2009 (Refugee Assistance Headquarters, 2019).
Another example of flexibility in the Japanese legal framework
concerning refugees is the Refugee Resettlement Programme establishedin 2010 in reaction to the Myanmar refugee crisis. The original idea
was to accept 30 refugees each year (150 refugees in total), selected by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) basedon their potential for smooth integration into social and working life inJapan. According to the criteria established by the Japanese Ministry ofJustice, the applicants would have to be members of the Karen ethnic
group, members of a small nuclear family, and have high chances offinding a job (Hatcher & Murakami, 2020). Importantly, the UNHCR
explicitly prohibits any form of discriminatory criteria.
Despite the expectations that the Refugee Resettlement Programme
would represent a breakthrough in Japanese refugee policy, no legal shifts
in the acceptance of asylum seekers happened. Nevertheless, according togovernment statistics, there were more than 37,000 Myanmar refugees
living in Japan as of 2021, comprising the largest group of immigrants with humanitarian and refugee status. Approximately 300 of them

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213

belonged to the Rohingya minority, which has established a large community in Tatebayashi (Gunma prefecture) (Begum, 2021). Not many voices
have been raised during the events related to the Myanmar refugees inJapan. There were protests for a stronger Japanese reaction to the 2021
coup organised by the Myanmar people and students (“Thousands Marchin Tokyo”, 2021), but there was not any strong public voice to support
refugee acceptance.
When the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, millions of people wereforced to leave their homes, resulting in a massive influx of migrants in
Europe. Japan accepted only a handful of refugees. Instead, Japan opted
to provide financial support and emerged as the second-largest contributor to the UNHCR. The late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told reportersthat Japan had to solve the domestic issues of an ageing population anda labour shortage first by engaging more women in the labour market(McCurry, 2015). In 2017, Japan experienced its highest peak of asylum
applications with more than 19,000 applications, while only 20 of theapplicants were successful (UNOCHA—Reliefweb, 2018). As for Syrian
refugees, only seven were granted refugee status in Japan (Yamagata,2017). Instead of refugees, the Japanese government decided to take in
150 Syrian university students in 2016 for a period of five years.
Public opinion polls conducted by news agencies did not show any
strong support during the Syrian refugee crisis. Only 24% of respondents were favourable to refugees’ resettlement, whereas 58% disapproved
according to the Asahi Shinbun 2015 survey (Yamagata, 2017). In the2017 Mainichi Shimbun survey, the proportion of those supporting the
refugee intake was merely 15% (Yamagata, 2017). The results are notsurprising if we look at anti-immigration sentiments in Europe and theterrorist attacks which happened in France, Belgium, and other countries. In his media and political analysis, Yamagata (2017) revealed that
supporters of refugee acceptance generally used Japan’s international
reputation to bolster their arguments, along with the country’s low rate ofrefugee acceptance in comparison with other developed countries. Similar
narratives were present also during the Indochinese refugee crisis.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and millions of people
fled the country, a massive wave of solidarity started to spread worldwide. Hundreds of Ukrainians found refuge in Japan, though they are notreferred to as refugees, but “evacuees”, since they are expected to returnto Ukraine eventually. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian evacuees received
unprecedented support in Japan and a legal status which allowed them

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to stay and work for one year (Immigration Services Agency in Japan,2022). As such, the government’s reaction to the Ukrainian refugees iscomparable to the Indochinese crisis in the 1980s. It reopened the questions around Japanese refugee policy and the country’s double standards
with regard to people from Ukraine compared to other nationals, such as
people from Myanmar, be they Rohingya or from other groups.
In light of the inconsistencies, the Japanese government resumed thedebate over the amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Act in early 2023, with an additional stipulation that would
allow war refugees similar legal rights to “convention” refugees under
supplementary protection. The amendment also aims to put an end to
prolonged detentions, however, by allowing for the deportation of those
who have applied three times or more, even during the process of refugee
status acceptance, which might be considered a violation of internationallaw. The amendment has become a subject of criticism by the UN Officeof the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2023) andseveral Japanese NGOs (Han Hinkon Network, 2023).
Japan and Immigrants
As for immigrants, until the amendment of the Immigration Control andRefugee Recognition Act in 2019, only high-skilled professionals were
eligible to work in Japan, with two exceptions. First, since the 1990s,
the descendants of Japanese emigrants (Nikkeijin) have been allowed towork and reside in Japan. Second, when the Technical Intern Training
Programme (TITP) started in 2004, 75,000 foreign workers were allowedin (Kashiwazaki & Akaha, 2006). The programme allows trainees to havecontracts for three to five years and the official discourse states thattrainees gain new skills which they then use to improve industry backhome. Moreover, the Technical Intern Training Act of 2016 stipulates
that “Technical intern training shall not be conducted as a means ofadjusting labour demand and supply”. However, many foreigners engaged
in the TITP experienced harsh working conditions, exploitation, andharassment, and have clearly been used as a cheap labour force. The
number of complaints received by the Organisation for Technical Intern
Training doubled in 2020 from the previous year (Nara, 2022). At thetime of writing, there has recently been a debate about abolishing TITP
and creating a new system of training programmes, which would prevent
human rights abuse (Tauchi, 2023).

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With the deepening labour shortages, Japan established a new categoryof unskilled workers in 2019. The original aim was to bring 345,000
blue-collar workers within five years (Takizawa, 2021), but only 1621
foreigners came to Japan under the new visa system in the first ten months(Milly, 2020). Meanwhile, public support for the increase of foreign
workers has been growing in the past years. According to a survey by
the Japanese Trade Union Confederation in 2018, 55% of respondents
viewed the increasing number of foreign workers as a positive development, while 22% disagreed. A year later, the approval rate increased to74% (Kono, 2019). In their research on Japanese public opinion towards
immigration, Davison and Peng (2021) conducted in-depth in-person
interviews with 21 participants of higher education and social status. Theirfindings show that most of the interviewees did not have any particular antipathy towards immigrants if they were only short-term workers.
The participants showed significant concerns about long-term or permanent immigrants for fear of losing the Japanese culture (Davison & Peng,
2021).
This section introduced several refugee and immigration issues Japan
has been tackling for decades. Both foreign workers and refugees inJapan face a substantial level of prejudice, discrimination, and humanrights abuse. Japanese public opinion towards the two categories has beenshifting from strictly negative at the beginning of the 1980s to more
accepting. Nevertheless, the Japanese official stance has not improved
significantly over recent years. On several occasions, the Japanese government has acceded to the liberalisation of refugee and immigration policy
but mostly under the combination of domestic and international pressure.

What Shapes People’s Perception of Immigrants
and Refugees---Theoretical Framework
Several researchers have dealt with the question of the driving forces
behind people’s perceptions of immigrants and refugees. Among theapproaches, some researchers have applied contact theory, which hypothesises that contact between the locals and immigrants leads to a positive view towards foreigners (Green & Kayoda, 2017; McLaren, 2003;
Oliver & Wong, 2003). Others have researched “threat” as a factor inperceiving refugees (Blinder & Lundgren, 2019; Semyonov et al., 2004).
In our study, we build our argument on the role of nationalism and political identity in people’s perceptions of foreigners. While Japanese society

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Z. P. KYSELOVA AND K. KIRONSKA

has been regarded as highly homogeneous, which emphasises its culturalvalues, we argue that nationalist sentiments and conservatism have an
impact on anti-immigration sentiments in Japan.
National Identity and Nationalism
In the past few decades, Japan has experienced a revival of nationalist
sentiments. In the early 2000s, a law acknowledging symbols associatedwith the imperial era as national symbols was enacted, despite the opposition. In 1999, a teacher committed suicide in protest against the forceful
singing of the Kimigayo anthem (Tolbert, 1999). Moreover, former
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated in 2022, became almost
a synonym for the term nationalism. His ideology was closely associatedwith the revival of a “beautiful Japan” (“Towards a Beautiful Country:
My Vision for Japan” is the title of Abe’s (2007) book), which ought tobe much more assertive both politically and militarily. The reinterpretation of the Constitution, allowing the dispatch of self-defence forces, wasunderstood by China and South Korea to be a clear indication of the riseof Japanese nationalism, whereas, for the USA, such progress was much
welcomed because it implied a greater self-reliance and less dependence
on protection from Washington (Ali, 2015). Besides political nationalism,
Japan has experienced increasing anti-Korean and anti-Chinese sentimentwith the rise of the ultra-right wing (Martini Grimaldi, 2022).
To better understand the nature of nationalism and national identity in the context of Japan, an introduction to some of the theoretical
approaches is necessary. Both nationalism and national identity, which areoften intertwined, have many possible meanings. The previous paragraphshows some examples of how national identification leads to particularpolitical decisions or beliefs. As Greenfeld (1992) puts it, nationalism
is first and foremost a way of creating identities, and only secondarilya political movement. The concept itself is built on the apprehensionof the nation which, in its modern sense, came to be understood inearly sixteenth-century England (Doak, 2007). Since then, nationalism
has gained various forms depending on the context. Nevertheless, inall contexts, nationalism revolves around a shared sense of community,common history, culture, language, and often a perceived shared destiny
among the people within a nation (Smith, 2010).
In our study, we aim to reveal how a certain level of attachment to
the nation can shape Japanese public opinion towards immigrants and8

THE ROLE OF NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL IDENTITY …

217

refugees. It is thus important to first understand the broader context ofJapanese national identity. In their studies, many political scientists havedistinguished between civic type of national identity, stemming from selfregarding and belonging to one’s nation, and an ethnic type of national
identity, which is represented by shared culture, language, history, andancestry (Brubaker, 1996; Jeong, 2016; Kohn, 1944; Taniguchi, 2021).
In that sense, Tanabe (2021) suggests that Japan as a nation can be
described as an ethnic type and that Japanese society has strong politicaland national pride, which is connected to exclusionism and ethnocentrism. The presumption of Japan as an ethnic type of nation is incontradiction to Sasaki’s research (2004), where he revealed that having
Japanese citizenship and regarding oneself as Japanese are the most significant parameters of national identity as opposed to those notions ofa shared culture, language, history, and ancestry. Furthermore, Jeong(2016) compared the results of a survey conducted in three Westerncountries (the USA, Norway, and Sweden) and three Asian countries(China, Taiwan, and South Korea) and found that in contrast to theWestern countries, neither ethnic nor civic identities were associated withimmigration attitudes in the respective Asian countries.
Because of these contradictions, we decided to build our theoreticalgrounds of nationalism on the approach of political psychology, which
understands nationalism as a pride in one’s nation and a feeling ofsuperiority over other states (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). To distinguish from the type of nationalism connected to people’s identity, which
we introduced above, we address nationalism based on the political
psychology approach as blind nationalism.
Some political thinkers, such as Bunzo Hashikawa, linked this notionof blind nationalism with the ethnic type of nationalism (Doak, 2007).
In contrast to blind nationalism, constructive patriotism is defined as afeeling of love for the country and attachment to its democratic values,
but with the ability to see the country’s drawbacks (Davidov, 2009; Schatz
et al., 1999). There is also a difference in how the blind nationalism
and constructive patriotism correlate with fear of others. According toRaijman et al. (2008), blind nationalism correlates more with antipathy
towards immigrants than constructive patriotism. Based on the above,
to find whether nationalist tendencies play any role in the perception of
immigration and current Japanese political and societal attitudes towards
foreigners, we selected the following questions on nationalism: The world
would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the218

Z. P. KYSELOVA AND K. KIRONSKA

Japanese; and Generally speaking, Japan is a better country than most othercountries.
Lind and Ueki’s survey research (2021) found that while patriotism
has a continuing presence in Japanese society, the sense of superiority
and other nationalist tendencies are rather ambiguous factors (Lind &Ueki, 2021). Around 80% of the respondents in 1995, 2003, and 2013
ISSP surveys agreed that Japan is better than other countries. However,opinion was split in half on the question of whether the world would bea better place if people were more like the Japanese. The results of Lind
and Ueki’s research (2021) are similar to the results of our survey, whichshows that 26% of the respondents agree with the idea that Japan is better
than other countries, 29% disprove this claim, and 45% do not have a firm
opinion. Since the survey was conducted in the spring of 2022, it is likelythat the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian war in Ukraine impacted
Japanese nationalist tendencies. One-third of the respondents think thatthe world would be a better place if more people were like the Japanese,while 18% do not agree with this statement. Over half of the participants
did not specify their feelings.
Political Identity
The Japanese political environment is characterised by stability and longlasting regimes. With short periods of exception, the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) has been ruling Japan since 1955. Shinzo Abe led thecountry for eight years (2012–2020), making him the longest-serving
prime minister in Japanese history. Again, we find a certain amount ofJapanese identity based on harmony. Paradoxically, in a country renowned
for its innovation and ability to evolve rapidly, there is a fairly strong
conservatism on many issues. Even after Abe and his successor Yoshihide
Suga’s resignation, and after strong criticism for failing to manage thepandemic, the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito retained a majority
in the lower house election of 2021 (Obe, 2021).
When looking at the LDP’s politics, there is not much space for discussion about accepting refugees. The government has, however, agreed toraise the financial contribution to mitigate the Rohingya refugee crisisin Bangladesh and has accepted an unusually high number of “evacuees” from Ukraine. In the past, only Indochinese refugees surpassed thenumber of Ukrainian refugees. However, it has done little to counterinternational criticism of its stringent rules for accepting asylum seekers.

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The LDP attempted to enforce a revision of the Immigration Law introduced in 2021 but decided not to submit it officially in 2022. The draft
was a reaction to international criticism of prolonged detentions andit would have stated the number of times one could apply for refugee
status, but it was not generally welcomed by the UNHCR and numerous
NGOs (more on that in the section “Japanese society and accepting
foreigners – historical perspective”). Even with the passing of the bill, themain problem would remain—the strict recognition conditions and thenear-impossibility of proving the legitimacy of someone’s refugee status(Ara, 2021).
At the same time, the party was very interested in dealing with thecountry’s ageing population and its labour shortage. In 2019, the government enacted a new law enabling “Specified Skilled Workers”, promising
to accept at least 345,000 foreign workers in the following five years(Takizawa, 2021). Although business organisations welcomed the step,
human rights and immigration organisations opposed the legislation due
to concerns that the rights of workers would not be protected (Milly,2020).
In contrast to the conservative LDP, the Constitutional Democratic
Party (CDP) with other progressive and left-oriented parties, proposed abill to the government, which should secure the protection of refugees
and prevent them from arbitrary detentions based on decisions of immigration officers (Rikken Minshutō, 2022). The bill was left on the tablewithout any significant debate. In that sense, we expect that voters for the
CDP would be more positive in their views of immigrants and refugees
in Japan.
When considering the Japanese political parties’ programme on
refugees and immigrants, what can we assume from the political leanings
and party/voting preferences of Japanese society? First of all, it is important to shed some light on the nature of Japanese political participation.
As some studies have showed, left-wing citizens tend to be much morepolitically engaged than right-oriented people (Finkel & Opp, 1991;
Torcal et al., 2016). Given the fact that the conservative right-oriented
LDP has repeatedly gained the majority of votes in elections to Japan’sDiet in the last decade, it might explain, why political engagement among
Japanese citizens is usually low (Jou & Endo, 2017).
It is not surprising that the issue of refugees does not resonate much inJapan. If the society is rather conservative (conservatism in Japan is understood rather as traditionalism [Quo, 1966; Tanaka, 1989]) and prefers to220

Z. P. KYSELOVA AND K. KIRONSKA

stick to the proven consensus, then people are more likely to support the
LDP, for whom the main issue is to improve the economic and demographic situation. Moreover, in his study, Strausz (2018) reveals that the
majority of candidates and Diet members, and also respondents of mediaconducted public surveys, did not have any strong opinion on whether
Japan should accept more foreign workers during the elections of 2009,2012, 2014, and 2017. This has already started to change. Mainichi
Shimbun’s opinion poll from 2018 showed, that 47% of respondents agreewith higher numbers of foreigners, while 32% oppose it. A year later,
almost two-thirds of respondents to the Nikkei survey were in favour of
the rising number of foreigners (Kono, 2019). What the Japanese people
think about accepting refugees remains so far uncovered as there have notbeen many surveys on the issue, as the next section will show.
This research draws on the above and measures political identity
through both voting/party preference and liberal/conservative leaning
focusing on how political identity affects public opinion towards immigrants and refugees.
The next section will dive into the specifics of the survey data andwill analyse Japanese people’s attitudes towards foreigners, both immigrants and refugees, based on the two categories described in this section:nationalism and political identity.

Japanese Perceptions of Immigrants
and Refugees---Survey Results
The General Attitude Towards Foreigners
In line with previous studies, the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-PacificSurvey results confirm that Japanese people are not so open towards
foreigners in general. When asked how positively or negatively Japanesepeople perceive certain groups of people (on a scale 0 to 100, with 0
representing cold, negative feelings; 50 representing neutral; and 100
representing warm, positive feelings), the results show that Japanesepeople are most positive about Taiwanese people (mean 64), followedby Americans (mean 62), and Europeans (mean 60) (see Table 8.2),
although the mean values are not very high. On the other hand, theJapanese are least positive towards the Chinese (mean 38), which is not
surprising as there have long been animosities due to wars and historiccompetition between the two countries.

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THE ROLE OF NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL IDENTITY …

Table 8.2 Japanesepeople’s attitudes
towards various groupsof people on a scale 0 to
100 (with 0
representing cold,
negative feelings; 50
representing neutral;and 100 representing
warm, positive feelings),
depicting the meanvalue (rounded up)

221Group of people

Mean value (0–100)

Taiwanese
Europeans
Americans (from USA)
Africans
Indians
UyghurRohingyaImmigrants
Muslims
Chinese (from PRC)

64
60
62
55
54
53
52
50
46
38

The negative stance towards mainland Chinese is not new among theJapanese. In the 2013 Public Survey on Political Participation of Citizens and Internationalization, Chinese were the least favourable foreign
nationals (Zhang, 2018). Anti-Chinese sentiments are common in Japanand usually have direct links to threats that China has come to bring overtime. Chinese military spending is the second largest in the world. Japan
lost its economic primacy in Asia and the US-China rivalry brings newchallenges for the Japanese diplomacy. The disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands add another friction and World War II also remains as an open
wound. Needless to say, the dislike is both-sided. In contrast, Japaneserelations with Taiwan are built on mutual trust, economic partnership,
shared values, a common enemy and a common friend. As the firstJapanese colony, Taiwan was forced to implement some of the Japanesecultural norms including language, but for the country’s economic andtechnological development, the Japanese colonial rule brought muchwelcomed innovations. In this sense, Taiwanese representatives havenever been critical towards the Japanese colonial past and the Japaneseappreciate this form of restraint (Peng-Er, 2004).
This question deliberately contained a mix of various groups—national,
ethnic, and religious—to be able to see which resonated the most. The
groups that most interested us regarding this research were immigrants,
Muslims, Rohingya (refugees in Bangladesh), and Uyghurs (potential
refugees from China). Out of these groups, Japanese people are mostfavourable towards the Uyghurs (mean 53), followed by the Rohingya(mean 52), and immigrants (mean 50). The category of immigrants waschosen because the term labels a group that is usually understood as a

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whole, regardless of nationality, with a certain connotation that can differ
from country to country. In the case of Japan, immigrants are often
understood as temporary workers. As Davison and Peng (2021) foundout in their study, Japanese people have neutral or slightly positive attitudes towards short-term workers. Least favourable feelings among theJapanese are held towards Muslims (mean 46). Towards the Uyghurs andthe Rohingya, Japanese people have a rather positive attitude, towards
immigrants in general a neutral one, while Muslims are seen rather negatively (although not as negatively as the Chinese). Interestingly, the firsttwo groups—the Rohingya and the Uyghurs, who are predominantly
Muslims—are seen much more favourably than the religious group ofMuslims.
Attitude Towards Immigrants and Refugees
To find out Japanese people’s views on foreigners, including immigrants
and refugees, we put forward various statements related to: the presence of immigrants in general; Chinese immigrants (as they are among
the most numerous groups of foreigners coming to Japan for work);other Asian immigrants (there are predominantly Asian migrant workers
in Japan); and refugees in Japan (see Table 8.3). In all these statements,
the midpoint is the most prevalent, again pointing to what has been
mentioned above—that people in Japan tend to not have strong options
on certain issues, views on foreigners being one of them. Nevertheless,more people agree than disagree that the presence of migrant workers
is beneficial for Japan. Also, the majority believe that it is difficult forforeigners to fit into Japanese society. More respondents disagree rather
than agree that Chinese as well as other Asian migrants face discrimination in Japan. On the question of refugees, Japanese people clearly
acknowledge that Japan is not open to refugees (49%).
According to 30% of the survey respondents, the presence of migrant
workers is beneficial for Japan, 22% disagree, and 47% are unsure. Whenlooking at this question through the lens of other variables—voting/party
preference, nationalism, and demographics—only voting/party preference had any effect. Voters for the CDP (mean value 4.6 out of a scale
1–7) and the Democratic Party for the People (mean value 4.4 out of ascale 1–7) had the highest agreement rate, which confirms the hypothesisof the study.

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Table 8.3 Agreement or disagreement with various statements related toimmigrants and refugees

Disagree
Neither
agree notdisagreeAgree

The presence of
migrant
workers isbeneficial forJapan

It is difficult
for foreigners
to fit into
Japanese
society

Chinesemigrants facediscriminationin Japan

Asian migrants Japan is(excluding
open toChinese) facerefugees
discriminationin Japan

22%
47%

19%
39%

27%
52%

26%
50%

49%
38%

30%

42%

21%

24%

13%

Respondents believed it is difficult for foreigners to fit into Japanesesociety—42% agreed, 18% disagreed, and 39% of the respondents did nothave an opinion on this. Those who have been in higher education wereslightly more likely to agree than less educated respondents.
In general, the survey participants did not think that Chinese immigrants in Japan face discrimination. Only about 21% of Japanese thought
Chinese migrants face discrimination in Japan, 27% disagreed, and 52%
were neutral. Women believed more than men that the Chinese facediscrimination. More educated people believed this statement slightly lessthan people with lower education. Also, liberal leaning people tended
to perceive the Chinese as being discriminated against slightly morethan conservative leaning people. Also, the less nationalistic sentiments
someone had (based on the item The world would be a better place if
people from other countries were more like the Japanese), the more theperson tended to believe that Chinese face discrimination in Japan. From
the analysis of attitudes towards various groups of people, we foundthat the Chinese are viewed as the least popular. Not only Chinese but
other Asian nationals, namely Koreans, have reportedly faced some sortof discrimination (Goto, 2021).
Survey participants were divided on whether Asians (excluding the
Chinese) are discriminated against or not. 23% thought they are, 25%
did not think so, and half of the respondents were neutral. Women
agreed slightly more than men that the Asian migrants face discrimination.
Respondents leaning towards liberalism tended to be more convinced224

Z. P. KYSELOVA AND K. KIRONSKA

that Asians are discriminated against in Japan. Moreover, the less nationalist sentiments someone had (based on both items The world would bea better place if people from other countries were more like the Japanese,and, Generally speaking, Japan is a better country than most other countries, the former with a weak correlation and the latter with a very strong
correlation), the more the person tended to believe that Asians facediscrimination in Japan.
Japanese surveyees agreed that Japan is not open to refugees: 49%
agreed, 13% did not believe that to be true, and 38% were neutral on
this. When looking at this statement (Japan is open to refugees ) throughthe other variables, what stood out was that women, young people, lesseducated, and conservative leaning people tended to agree with this more.
Since Japan has a very complicated process of accepting refugees andonly dozens of the applicants succeed yearly, we can argue that thosewith conservative leanings are more satisfied with the number of refugees
and do not wish for Japan to open more. Moreover, the more nationalist
leaning one is (based on the two nationalism items—The world would be abetter place if people from other countries were more like the Japanese, and,
Generally speaking, Japan is a better country than most other countries),
the more he or she agrees that Japan is open to refugees.
Our study demonstrates that, albeit in a limited way, nationalism andpolitical identity affect Japanese nationals’ perception of foreigners andrefugees. At least of the two items of nationalism correlated with threeout of the statements, namely the Chinese migrants face discrimination in
Japan, Asian migrants face discrimination in Japan, and Japan is open to
refugees. As for political identity, we found that voting preferences havean impact on people’s belief in the benefits of having migrant workers inJapan. Liberal-minded people are more likely to perceive that Chinese andAsian migrants face discrimination and that Japan is not open to refugees.
Case Study: Opinion on Rohingya Resettlement
We wanted to expound on Japanese people’s attitudes towards a concretegroup of refugees and chose the Rohingya as a case study. When asked
whether they supported the (hypothetical) resettlement of the Rohingya
people to Japan, about 36% of respondents did not support the idea, 16%chose the midpoint option, and the majority of the survey participants,
about 48%, supported resettlement (see Fig. 8.3.). Since we were not sure
if Japanese people knew who the Rohingya were, we gave an explanation

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225

in brackets in the survey (The Rohingya people are a persecuted Muslim
minority in Myanmar). These findings are very meaningful because theyshow that once a very concrete group is addressed (and their plightdescribed), people tend to be more compassionate (Newman, 2003).
Compared to other questions related to immigrants and refugees in our
survey, the question on Rohingya resettlement had the least number ofneutral responses. Moreover, this directly contradicts the long-held belief
that Japanese people are essentially anti-refugees.
When tested against other variables, we found that none except for
voter/party preference had any effect. Although NHK Party votersseemed to be in favour of resettling the Rohingya to Japan, the results are
not significant (as in our sample we have only three such voters). Those
who said they would not vote (20% of our respondents) oppose the ideaof resettlement (see Table 8.4). Voters for the Liberal Democratic Party(27% of our sample) are somewhere in the middle, with a mean value
4.3 (on a 1–7 scale, where 1 means total disagreement and 7 total agreement); Nippon Ishin no Kai voters (7% of our sample) were slightly morein favour of resettling the Rohingya, with a mean value 4.6; CDP voters(5% of our sample) 4.4; and Japanese Communist Party voters (4% of
our sample) 4.9. There was no correlation with the nationalism items,
meaning that nationalism did not have any influence on people’s choicesin this case.

Fig. 8.3 Attitude towards a hypothetical resettlement of the Rohingya to Japan

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Table 8.4 Attitude
towards a hypotheticalresettlement of theRohingya to Japanthrough the lens ofparty/voting preference,measured by the meanvalue (on a 1–7 scale,where 1 means total
disagreement and 7 total
agreement), orderedfrom lowest to thehighest mean value

Voting/party preference

Mean
value

I would not vote
KomeitoI don’t knowSocial Democratic Party
Reiwa Shinsengumi
Other political party
Liberal Democratic Party
Democratic Party for the People
Constitutional Democratic Party
Nippon Ishin no Kai
Japanese Communist Party
NHK Party

3.7
4.1
4.1
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.3
4.3
4.4
4.6
4.9
5.7

Conclusion
This chapter aimed to investigate Japanese public perception towards
immigrants and refugees. Since the Japanese government only recently
revealed new guidelines for accepting refugees, and new legislation thatwould acknowledge people fleeing conflicts as “quasi-refugees”, theunderstanding of the public’s view is of great importance. More specifically, our goal was to explain how nationalism and political identity
influence people’s opinions in Japan. Nationalism is understood as ablind attachment towards one’s nation, and people with more nationalist tendencies are argued to be more against immigration. Similarly, wesuggested that conservatism would have the same implications.
Our survey results suggest that Japanese people generally have slightly
negative attitudes towards foreigners, with the Chinese being the least
favoured group. Taiwanese people, Americans, and Europeans were themost positively viewed groups, but overall, mean values were not veryhigh. Among the specific groups of interest to the study, Japanese people
were most favourable towards Uyghurs, followed by Rohingya refugees,
and immigrants, and less favourable towards Muslims, although the
Chinese were viewed most unfavourably. Both Uyghurs and Rohingya
are Muslims and potential immigrants, yet they are viewed more positively than the general groups of Muslims and immigrants. This opens
another puzzling question of whether people perceive concrete nationals

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227

and ethnic groups more positively than the same groups when describedby their religion.
The results also showed that Japanese people tend to have a neutral
opinion towards the presence of foreigners in Japan. While more people
agree than disagree that the presence of migrant workers is beneficial for
Japan, Japanese people believe that it is difficult for foreigners to fit into
Japanese society. Additionally, Japanese people acknowledge that Japan is
not open to refugees.
Both nationalism and political identity have an impact, if limited, on
people’s opinions towards refugees and immigrants. As shown in ourstudy, a stronger nationalist sentiment correlates with people thinking
that Chinese and other Asian nationals do not experience discriminationin Japan. People with nationalist and conservative tendencies also believethat Japan is open to refugees. We can interpret this to mean that suchpeople are satisfied with the current refugee policy and with the numberof refugees Japan accepts.
We have also learned that those referring to themselves as liberals
acknowledge that Chinese and other Asian nationals face discriminationin Japan. Voters for the CDP and Democratic Party for the People which
are typecast as progressive centrist parties, agreed most with the statementthat immigrant workers are beneficial for Japan. Still, most of the respondents identified themselves as conservative, which shows that liberal views
on foreigners are not common.
Finally, our research sheds light on people’s perception of the potential resettlement of Rohingya in Japan. While the Japanese government
welcomed Ukrainians fleeing the war, Rohingya people are only rarely
accepted as refugees. However, public opinion towards their resettlement
is rather positive. The study contradicts the belief that Japanese people
are a priori anti-refugee and found that none of the variables except for
voter/party preference had any effect on people’s attitudes towards theresettlement of refugees.
Funding The work on this article was supported by funding from theEuropean Union’s research and innovation programme HORIZON-WIDERA2021-ACCESS-03-01 under grant agreement No. 101079069, entitled “The EU
in the Volatile Indo-Pacific Region” (EUVIP).

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Disclaimer Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are
however those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of theEuropean Union. The European Union cannot be held responsible for them.

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CHAPTER 9

Formosa as a Safe Haven? Taiwan’s Public
Opinion on Potential Asylum Mechanisms
and Refugees
Kristina Kironska

Introduction
Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), is considered to be oneof the most progressive countries in terms of human rights in Asia, but it
has no asylum law. Due to the political status of Taiwan, the challenges
it faces in regard to this topic are quite different from other countries.
Because the ROC was replaced in the United Nations’ (UN) China seatby the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan has not signed UN
treaties on the handling of asylum seekers and refugees. However, notbeing a member of the UN is not a hindrance per se to the adoption ofan asylum law. Taiwan has proven in the past that it can work around thesystem and adhere to international human rights standards.

K. Kironska (B)Department of Asian Studies, Palacky
University Olomouc, Olomouc, Czech Republic
e-mail: k.kironska@gmail.com© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_9

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Although not able to become party to most human rights treaties,
Taiwan has “ratified” five international human rights treaties, among them
are the 2009 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. These
human rights protection provisions (including the non-refoulement obligations, which under international humanitarian law guarantees that noone should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel,inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment) now have domestic
legal status in Taiwan, and the state is bound to respect civil and political rights (such as the rights to life, and freedom of religion or speech)
and to work towards granting people economic, social, and cultural rights(including labour rights, the right to health, education, and an adequate
standard of living). Adopting an asylum law in Taiwan should thus beseen as a continuation of a broader push to bring Taiwan’s legal system
in line with international human rights law.
It is an important topic because although Taiwanese politicians claimthat the regulations currently in place are sufficient, research has shown
they are not. There are several groups that would benefit from anasylum law in Taiwan, from Hong Kong protesters facing persecution,
through Chinese dissidents or descendants of the ROC army from theThailand-Myanmar border region, to Turkish people with revoked passports (Kironska, 2022a). Despite the need for an asylum law, in politicalcircles there is no rush for the adoption of such a law as this is a complex
issue due to Taiwan’s complicated relationship with China.
There are several legitimate and often repeated concerns surrounding
this topic. These concerns have much weight. Firstly, most of the refugees
seeking asylum in Taiwan are from China, Hong Kong, or Tibet, andtechnically they are ROC citizens according to the 1946 Constitution,
which is still valid in Taiwan. Thus, it is unclear whether they would evenqualify as refugees. According to the definition of a refugee under the1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee must have crossed an international
border. Secondly, it is unclear whether designating them non-citizens
would be seen by China as claiming de jure independence, in which case
China could use force against the island. Thirdly, there are national security concerns surrounding the issue of potential Chinese spies being sent
to Taiwan (although there are much simpler avenues to enter the country)
or the fear of “being flooded” by large numbers of people. However,there are clear reasons why having systems to manage such scenarios isbetter than not having them having systems to manage such scenarios is9

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better than not having them. For example, an actual asylum law would
allow for a proper vetting system with clear review mechanisms. To avoid
conflicts with China, a dual system could be introduced. South Korea
could serve as an inspiration, as it deals with North Koreans differently(by their Constitution they are considered citizens) than foreigners fromother parts of the world (Wolman, 2012). This is, however, beyond thescope of this research, and could be examined in future research.
This chapter aims to shed light on Taiwanese public opinion on the
refugee issue—towards refugees and towards a potential asylum law in
Taiwan. In general, there is a very limited discussion on these topics
within Taiwanese society, with many Taiwanese even being unaware of
the absence of an asylum law in Taiwan. To address this gap, this chapter
presents the findings of the first-ever comprehensive, nationally representative survey exploring Taiwanese views on the refugee issue. Whilethe chapter employs mixed methods, the survey results add the mostvalue. The survey covers various aspects—from stances on the eventual
adoption of an asylum law in Taiwan and its potential form (inclusive
or exclusive of Chinese nationals), through the perceived concerns indoing so (including potentially worsened relations with the PRC), to attitudes towards different groups of people facing persecution. While online
forums may be dominated by negative comments about refugees, creating
an impression that Taiwanese oppose granting asylum to refugees in theircountry, the research results paint a different picture.
Why is this important? Firstly, because public perception could havereal-world implications. Some scholars argue that a strong consensus in
public opinion should be enough to ensure a shift in policy (Petry, 1999),
while others have pointed out that issue salience is key (Soroka, 2002).
So, although the direct causal role of public opinion in shaping decisionmaking is disputed, it is still important and (in democratic societies) it
has become part of the public policy-making process (Rouce, 2004). For
political actors, consulting the public and paying attention to its opinions
is an important part of democracy (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). In Taiwan,
political actors heavily depend on public opinion, especially on sensitive
topics that involve Taiwan’s relationship with China, and discussing a
potential asylum law in Taiwan inevitably touches on cross-strait relations.
However, in the case of asylum in Taiwan, increasing its salience is of great
importance, as, until now, there has been a lack of discussion on this issue.
Secondly, the topic of asylum has not been very thoroughly explored in
the arena of Taiwan studies, although with the new draft of an asylum

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law submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review in 2023, it is gaining
relevance.
The chapter is organised as follows. After the introduction, themethodology is explained. In the next section, the lack of social dialogue
on the refugee issue, including the lack of representative surveys on thismatter, is described. It is followed by an analysis of the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey data (2022) on Taiwanese people’s opinion ona potential asylum law and on various groups in need of protection. The
last part sums up the findings of this chapter.

Methodology
This research is based on a mixed method, both quantitative data (survey
questions) and qualitative data (interviews) have been applied.
For the purpose of providing context on the refugee situation in
Taiwan, especially the little social dialogue there has been on the topic,
interviews were conducted with organisations that work on the refugee
issue in Taiwan, namely Amnesty International Taiwan, Refugee Network
Taiwan, and one other organisation that is directly involved in helping
Hong Kongers in Taiwan, which prefers to stay in anonymity. In each ofthese organisations one person has been interviewed. Interviewees wereselected based on purposive non-probability sampling, on the assumption that they represent interesting cases for the study. The interviews
were conducted in the form of open-ended questions, loosely organised,focusing on the participants’ professional opinions and experience withthe asylum topic in Taiwan, be it from an advocacy or activist perspective.
Two of the interviews were conducted before the survey data collection
and one afterwards.
Quantitative data for this research was obtained from the 2022 Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey (Turcsanyi et al., 2022), part of
the wider Sinophone Borderlands Surveys (2020–2022), which investigates global views of China through a series of large-scale representative
surveys of public opinion in many (selected) parts of the world. The
author is one of the conveners of the survey project and herself designed
the Taiwan survey questions on the asylum/refugee issue in Taiwan,
including several experiments using the split ballot technique. The IndoPacific Survey was conducted in 15 countries, with Taiwan as one of thesurveyed countries.

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The Taiwanese part of the survey data was collected by the survey
agency Cint between April and June 2022. The sample is nationally
representative in terms of age, gender, and regions, involving 1350
respondents. Participants registered in online panels operated by theagency responded, in Mandarin Chinese, to an online survey. The author
is aware that there may be differences as a result of using data collected
online rather than if the data had been collected offline (Saloniki et al.,2019). The questionnaire consisted of approximately 60 questions, manyof which investigated people’s views on topics other than China, suchas asylum, the death penalty, and religion (while the overarching theme
was “views on China”). For the purpose of this research, the author
has worked with only a part of the Taiwanese dataset: the refugee issue
questions (described below). In addition, information on a range of key
demographic variables (e.g. age, gender, education, region, and politicalleaning) has also been collected. Data obtained from the survey was analysed in the open-source statistics software JASP and the results visualised
in Infogram, a software which helps with visualising data. The percentage
numbers have been rounded in the text and answers have been grouped
together (on a 5-point scale, answers 1 and 2 are negative and 4 and 5
are positive; on a 7-point scale, answers 1, 2, and 3 are negative and 5, 6,
and 7 are positive) for an easier understanding of the results.
The survey questions related to the topic of asylum in Taiwan included
the stance on the eventual adoption of an asylum law in Taiwan, and inwhat form (including or excluding the Chinese); the perceived drawbacks
in doing so (including potentially worsened relations with the PRC); andfeelings towards different groups of people that are often on the move
due to some form of persecution—Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs,
Syrians, or the Rohingya. Religious and ethnic groups have been groupedin the question on purpose, especially including “highly charged” groupnames (such as “Muslims”), to see if there would be any strong reactions
from the respondents.
Additionally, the data has been analysed by disaggregating it basedon demographic characteristics, which will be further reported in thedata analysis section whenever correlations with gender, age, education,
region, and/or party preference were found.
While the author uses the term “asylum” throughout this chapter, inthe survey data used in this chapter the preferred term in English was“refugee” (in Chinese nanmin), such as, for example, “Refugee Law” (inChinese nanmin fa), on the assumption that the wider public is morefamiliar with this term.

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Lack of Public Dialogue and Opinion
Polls on the Refugee Issue in Taiwan
Taiwan today, with its so-called small nation mentality (“Who would wantto come to Taiwan?”), is not used to having to accept refugees or evendiscussing this issue very widely (Yoshin Wang, Refugee Network Taiwan,
personal communication, March 2023). Most Taiwanese are not evenaware there is no asylum law in Taiwan. It is also not a topic often seenin the media and Taiwanese politicians also refrain from such discussions.
Thus, with the relative lack of experience or knowledge of the topic, it ishard to have any meaningful discussion.
According to the interviewees, what first brought awareness about
people on the move requiring protection was the European refugee crisis
in 2015. There were many articles in the Taiwanese media describing theevents in Europe.
While the European crisis seemed a distant reality, the arrival ofprotesters from Hong Kong in 2019 and 2020 brought the issue somewhat closer. Still, it did not prompt the adoption of an asylum law.
Instead, the Hong Kongers first got visa extensions, as the government
was undecided as to what to do with them before the presidential elections in January 2020 (Taiwanese NGO activist, NGO in anonymity,
personal communication, December 2022). Later, they were encouraged
to seek other pathways to receive residency, such as working, investing,or studying in Taiwan (Davidson, 2022). The work of NGOs in helping
individuals (legal and financial support, as well as counselling) was invaluable as there were no set rules, and Hong Kongers were handled on acase-by-case basis (Nachman & Hioe, 2019).
The refugee topic resurfaced again with the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. Taiwan joined the ranks of Ukraine supporters with substantial financial and medical aid, as well as announcements of easier accessto visas for Ukrainians (for which only a very limited amount of people
were eligible—those who have relatives in Taiwan, whether Taiwanese orforeigners holding a residency certificate) (Kironska, 2022b).
Besides the media covering the refugee topic (mostly on refugee crises
abroad), social dialogue on the refugee issue in Taiwan—small in its
scale—has been led mostly by NGOs, such as the Taiwan Association for
Human Rights, Covenants Watch, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network,
and Amnesty International Taiwan, or by individuals who have hands-on

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experience with the issue (Chiu, 2022). Such is the case for an Egyptian activist and former political refugee who applied for asylum in South
Korea, but then met his future Taiwanese wife, and now lives in Taiwan—
he often speaks about his situation at various events (one such event wasorganised by the author herself in Taipei, “Amnesty Talks: Refugees”,
on 20 February 2020). Also, there is a new platform, Refugee 101
Taiwan, which is educating Taiwanese people about refugees, and there
are other organisations, such as the Refugee Network Taiwan, which
conducts work outside of Taiwan, including providing online teaching ofinternally displaced Syrians. Such organisations, working inside or outside
Taiwan, also have an impact on the domestic Taiwanese audience (YoshinWang, Refugee Network Taiwan, personal communication, March 2023).
Amnesty International Taiwan is also working on the refugee topic, introducing individual cases and educating their supporters. Perhaps the mostvisible and vocal on the topic of asylum and refugees is the Taiwan
Association for Human Rights, which provides accommodation, medical
treatment, and psychological counselling to asylum seekers in Taiwan andis also involved in advocacy work, including drafting an asylum law several
times and submitting it to the Legislative Yuan (without it ever being
passed).
While there has not been a nationally representative survey on theopinions of the general public, the above-mentioned organisations haveencountered some responses from certain segments of the public in
their work. According to Zak Huang (Amnesty International Taiwan,
personal communication, December 2020), who works as a campaigner atAmnesty International Taiwan, there is a tendency among some people tobelieve that refugees would have a negative impact on society. Examples
of such comments can be found in the comments section under Amnesty
International Taiwan’s Facebook posts from summer 2020. Some people
shared concerns about security for such a small island (“Taiwan is too
small, it would be unable to accept a large number of these refugees, andpublic security would deteriorate”.), others about social issues (“Refugees
can go to whichever country they want just because their children are
innocent? Do you realise refugees are illegal and they can easily bringover many social issues?” and “Do not cause any trouble to Taiwan.
These refugees won’t be able to adapt to our culture – this is what caused
the mess in Europe”.) or financial concerns (“Let me ask you, has yourorganisation thought of who will pay for taking care of the refugees?”)(Amnesty International Taiwan Facebook, 2020). Many also referred

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to the European refugee crisis as a comparison (“Stop causing trouble
to more countries. Europe’s public security deteriorated. Every country
should help itself”. And “Look at Paris in France, how dirty and messy it
became due to refugees”.) and suggested refraining from helping refugees(“Everyone has their own destiny, being a busybody means you are taking
up other’s karma. Helping others will get you in trouble”.) (Amnesty
International Taiwan Facebook, 2020). Also frequently observed on social
media platforms are harsh and often racist comments comparing refugees
to criminals (“No. Damn! After Europe accepted a crowd of trashy
refugees the crime and unemployment rate increased. Don’t Taiwaneseknow that?”), along with Islamophobic remarks (Amnesty International
Taiwan Facebook, 2020). However, it should be noted that the prevalence of negative comments on social media cannot necessarily be seen as
representative of society at large, and should be perceived as merely illustrative rather than conclusive. Nevertheless, based on such comments,
one might assume that the Taiwanese people are not very receptive toaccepting refugees in their country. However, the data presented in thenext section contradicts this assumption.
Moving from the general public to Taiwanese elites, the picture
remains somewhat similar. In the past, only a handful of Taiwanese politicians, such as Mei You-nu or Freddy Lim, have been vocal about the
adoption of an asylum law. Also, after the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine,
the Taiwan People’s Party spoke out in favour of the adoption of an
asylum law in Taiwan, but these are exceptions rather than a systematic
approach (Guo, 2022).
Since there is not much discussion on the topic of asylum in Taiwan(neither generated by the grassroots nor by the elites), national sample
surveys on people’s attitudes towards refugees and an asylum policy arealso lacking. In 2016, the Foreign Relations Association commissioned apoll on National Attitudes towards International and Diplomatic Affairs,
which contained questions on people’s attitudes towards refugees. Only
2% of the respondents said they were willing to fully accept refugees,
11% accepted them with conditions, and 40% accepted them with conditions but with less openness. 37% were against accepting refugees (Chen,
2016). With Hong Kongers arriving in Taiwan, there were a few morepolls focusing on the issue. In May 2020, the New Power Party (NPP)
commissioned a poll about whether people supported amending the“Laws and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong and Macao Affairs” tohelp the arriving protesters, with over 60% support (Wu, 2020). However,9

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a July 2020 survey conducted by ETtoday News Cloud showed that halfof the public was not ready to support a significant relaxation of immigration to Taiwan for people from Hong Kong (Zhang, 2020). According
to a 2021 poll, 28% of the people thought Taiwan was doing enough toassist Hong Kongers and 40% believed Taiwan had no obligations in thisregard. 36% of Taiwanese people supported Hong Kongers immigrating
to Taiwan while only 23% opposed it. The largest group, however, at 42%,
was ambivalent (Nachman et al., 2021).
The following section attempts to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive picture of Taiwanese people’s preferences (based on Sinophone
Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey data) when it comes to refugees and apotential asylum law.

Taiwanese People’s Stance on Potential
Asylum Mechanisms and Refugees
According to the data regarding potential asylum mechanisms in Taiwan,
more respondents agreed than disagreed (see specific numbers below)
with having to pass some kind of a refugee act, but most actually did
not have an opinion on this (see Fig. 9.1). This lack of stance wasevident from the respondents’ choice of the neutral midpoint. Including a
midpoint gave respondents the opportunity to express a neutral opinion,
especially on obscure topics (Johns, 2005). However, research has shownthat respondents do not always interpret and use a midpoint in the waythat scale developers intended (Chyung et al., 2017). Labels have been
provided for all the anchors on the scale, with the midpoint marked
as “neither agree nor disagree”. The lack of stance reflects what was
described in the previous section, that discussions about asylum are
missing in Taiwanese society.
The question on the asylum law was split into three groups (split
ballot), with each group having to agree or disagree with a slightly
different statement—about a refugee act in general, about a refugee act
that would exclude the Chinese, and about a refugee act that would
include the Chinese. Interestingly, while the percentual difference inthe answers to these different statements did not differ much: 22–25%
agreed, 30–35% disagreed, and 41–45% neither agreed nor disagreed withadopting an asylum law, there was a clear trend of feeling anxious about
including the Chinese in the refugee law. The answer that explicitly statedthat the refugee act would also include the Chinese prompted the highest

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Fig. 9.1 Public opinion on adopting (different kinds of) an asylum law

number of respondents to disagree (25%), the lowest number of respondents to agree (30%), and ultimately also had the most midpoint answers(45%). The author did not find any correlations with other variables,
meaning that gender, age, education, region, or political leaning did nothave any influence on the people’s opinion.
If Taiwan were to pass an asylum law, 33% of the people believed it
would worsen relations between Taiwan and China, 19% believed it would
not, while 47% did not seem to have an opinion (see Fig. 9.2). There
was no correlation with any other variables. These findings suggest thatcross-strait relations did not seem to be the main issue.
If Taiwan passed such a law, 56% of the people believed it would be
too financially costly for the Taiwanese state budget (see Fig. 9.2). The
older the respondent (slight correlation) and the more educated (somecorrelation) the respondent, the more he or she was convinced of it.
Also, political leaning was found to have slight correlation. This item
was measured on a 1–7 scale from deep green to deep blue, with the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leading the pan-green camp and theKuomintang (KMT) the pan-blue one. The KMT is considered a proChinese party and the DPP a party that wishes to limit Chinese influence
in Taiwan. In this case, the more the respondent was bluer leaning, the9FORMOSA AS A SAFE HAVEN? TAIWAN’S PUBLIC OPINION …

245

Fig. 9.2 Public opinion on the consequences of passing an asylum law

more he or she was convinced that passing such a law would be financiallycostly.
On the other hand, 50% of people also believed passing such a law
would highlight the human rights values of Taiwan and the difference
between Taiwan and China (see Fig. 9.2). Men more than womenthought so (slight correlation), and so did more educated people (slightcorrelation). A strong correlation was found for age and political leaning,with younger people and green-leaning voters more strongly believingthat adopting an asylum law would highlight the human rights values of
Taiwan and show the difference between Taiwan and China.
In all these three questions, the dominant answer was “neither agree
nor disagree”, which can be interpreted, as has been explained above, as
people not really having clear opinions on the issue.
When it came to potential beneficiaries of an asylum law in Taiwan(people who would/could be recognised as refugees under an asylumlaw), we asked Taiwanese citizens to indicate how positively or negatively they felt about various groups of people on a scale of 0 (cold/
negative), through 50 (neutral), to 100 (warm/positive). Higher scoresindicate more positive perceptions. Included were various groups, ethnic

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and religious, as well as known groups of refugees (such as the Rohingya)on the assumption that some of these could trigger a stronger reaction
based on typical stereotypes. The category “immigrant”—which could
potentially overlap with other categories—in Taiwan is mostly understood as migrant workers from Southeast Asian countries (there are about
720,000 of them, representing about 3% of the population) (Yen &Shih, 2023). Nevertheless, most of these groups—Muslims, immigrants,
Africans, Rohingya, Uyghurs, and Tibetans—were viewed rather positively, with immigrants in general viewed most positively (63%), followedby Tibetans (62%), and then Uyghurs (59%). The Rohingya are viewed
more positively than negatively but they had the most neutral answersof all (20%), which may indicate that they are not very well-known in
Taiwan, and that people thus tend not to have an opinion (see Fig. 9.3).
Chinese people from the PRC constituted an exception to the abovementioned predominantly positive views—they were viewed negatively by
49% of the Taiwanese population.
When examining the data in relation to demographic variables, inthe case of the Chinese, Uyghurs, and Tibetans, age was found to be

Fig. 9.3 Feelings towards selected groups of people—Muslims, immigrants,
Africans, Rohingya, Uyghur, and Tibetans

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a predictor of attitude—with older respondents having been more positive about them, especially in the case of the Chinese (strong correlation).
For the latter two, gender was also found to correlate, with men having
been more positive than women, especially about the Tibetans (strong
correlation). Education was found to be factor only in one case—immigrants—with educated people having had a more positive image of them(slight correlation).
When looking at the data through the lens of voter/party preference(measured by the question “If there were parliamentary elections thisweekend, which party would you vote for?”), what stood out was thatthe coldest feelings towards all these groups, with the exception of theChinese, were held by the respondents that said they would not vote.
When not considering those who would not vote or don’t know who tovote for—only looking at the five listed parties (DPP, KMT, TPP, NPP,
and TSP)—then the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) voters were very negative in comparison with other party voters, holding the most negative
views towards Muslims, Africans, Tibetans, and immigrants. On the otherside of the spectrum, in all cases except for the Chinese, it was the Taiwan
Statebuilding Party (TSP) voters who had the warmest feelings towards
the listed foreigners. On the other hand, in the case of the Chinese, it
was the same TSP voters who held the coldest feelings of all (mean value
34, on a scale 0–100 with 0 being very negative and 100 very positive
feelings), followed by DPP voters (mean value 37). Not surprisingly, theKMT voters had the warmest feelings towards the Chinese (mean value
58).
In order to have a more nuanced understanding of the abovementioned negative view of the Chinese people by the Taiwanese respondents, the author looked closely at their attitudes/feelings towards various
segments of the Chinese population. The Taiwanese were most criticalof Chinese politicians (76%), surprisingly followed by Chinese dissidents(57%) and tourists (57%). They were the least critical of Chinese students(33%) and spouses (32%) (see Fig. 9.4). While politicians did not comeas a surprise, the dissidents did—they were not seen as negatively as thepoliticians but still, the majority of the respondents perceived them negatively. When explored further (as the data does not provide an answer
to the “why”), in the interviews and other informal discussions, theword “dissident” (in Chinese yiyi fenzi, direct translation “someone who
disagrees”, which is common vocabulary and is understood as dissident)

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was found to have a negative connotation, as it is connected to politics and politicians. Chinese tourists, while the biggest spenders in the
tourism industry, were not seen positively. On the more receptive side
were students from the PRC (known as lusheng )—increasingly a rare sightsince the Chinese government announced a ban on new degree applicants
to Taiwanese universities (Hayme, 2023)—and spouses from the PRC—
predominantly Chinese women who have migrated to Taiwan throughmarriage over the last two decades. The latter two categories are people
with whom the Taiwanese come in to contact with and may even interact
with (more than with tourists who are confined to some certain touristic
areas).
When asked explicitly about accepting certain groups/nationalities ofrefugees, Taiwanese people were very favourable towards people from
Hong Kong (66%), Tibet (58%), and also towards war refugees (e.g. from
Syria) (55%), but again they were rather unfavourable towards refugees
from China (44%) (see Fig. 9.5). These four categories of refugees werechosen based on the author’s previous research on the refugee topic, highlighting the groups of people that constitute the most common cases in
Taiwan (Kironska, 2022a). This was an experimental split ballot question,with each respondent only answering one question about the four typesof refugees (the full number of respondents, 1350, was divided between
the four categories). Thus, it did not make much sense to disaggregate
the data, as the number of respondents in the disaggregated categories
would be too low to represent a statistically significant case.

Fig. 9.4 Feelings towards different groups of Chinese people

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Fig. 9.5 Willingness to accept refugees from selected countries—China, Hong
Kong, Tibet, and war refugees from other countries

The last question—on the resettlement of the Rohingya—was highly
hypothetical but inspired by real events. It was hypothetical because there
are no Rohingya in Taiwan and Taiwan is a rather impossible destination for them. Besides the fact that Taiwan does not have an asylum
law, most Rohingya would, first of all, not have a legal way to get to
Taiwan as they are stateless and do not possess identification documents
such as a passport. Secondly, even if granted a special entry permit,
according to Taiwanese law stateless persons who enter with a visitor
visa are not eligible to apply for residency (Ministry of the Interior,2018). Thus, Taiwanese people do not have any particular experience
with this group of refugees and the assumption was that they would
not be biased towards them. In one of the previous questions, describedabove, Taiwanese people, while having more positive than negative feelings towards the Rohingya, did not know them well, as evidenced by
the large middle point percentage (see Fig. 9.3). When asked whether
Taiwanese people supported the resettlement of the Rohingya to theircountry (the question contained a short explanation who the Rohingya
were—a displaced minority from Myanmar, currently living in refugee
camps in Bangladesh—in case the respondents were not familiar with the

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Fig. 9.6 Public opinion on resettlement of the Rohingya people in Taiwanname), most Taiwanese (58%) supported their resettlement to Taiwan,
while 29% did not (see Fig. 9.6). When looked at through the lens ofother variables, very clearly younger people were more inclined towards
resettling them than older people (strong correlation), and men a little
more than women (some correlation).

Conclusion
Although Taiwan has accepted international human rights treaties as
domestic law and thus has the obligation of non-refoulement, in theabsence of an asylum system the island has not been able to handle
people coming to Taiwan seeking protection. The International Review
Committee on the Implementation of the International Human Rights
Covenants, that Taiwan has adopted as domestic law, has repeatedly
recommended a “speedy adoption of a refugee act, which should
also include the principle of non-refoulement” (International Review
Committee, 2022). There has, however, been little political will to implement such a system, likely because it is a complex issue involving the issueof cross-strait relations.
At the same time, there has been very little social dialogue on theissue and the political elites might have purposely kept it that way. There
have been only very few surveys on public perceptions of refugees and apotential asylum law in Taiwan. This chapter fills this gap by presenting
nationally representative data on the said issues.
While it is apparent from the data that there has long been a lack of
discussion about asylum (a large part of the respondents chose the neutral
answer, indicating that they do not have strong opinions on the issue),the data has also shown that people tend rather to agree that Taiwan

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251

needs a proper asylum system instead of dealing with incoming people ona case-by-case basis as has been done until now. Also, refugees are seen
rather more positively than negatively—with people from China being
an exception—and Taiwanese people are willing to accept refugees in
Taiwan.
The results from this survey should, nevertheless, be understood in
the context of the political climate in which the data has been collected—
between April and June 2022—which was only a few weeks following theRussian invasion of Ukraine, which fuelled concern over China’s plans for
Taiwan (Lin & Culver, 2022). Many in Taiwan have speculated that theodds of an invasion by China have increased—with more people considering the likelihood of a Chinese invasion in the next ten years possible
than not (61% see it as likely, 31% unlikely, and 8% are unsure) (seeFig. 9.7). With such fears for their own future, people tend to be morecompassionate towards other people who are forced to leave their countryof origin and seek refuge elsewhere (Banulescu-Bogdan, 2022). Moreover, the social desirability bias—the tendency of survey respondents toanswer questions in a manner that is viewed favourably by others—might
have also played its role in such positive-leaning survey results (Phillips &Clancy, 1972). Whether potential refugees in Taiwan would be acceptedby Taiwanese society or not is beyond the scope of this chapter but would
certainly be an interesting topic to explore in a future research project.
At the same time, the relatively low willingness to accept Chinese
people as refugees compared to the other groups brings us back to
the issue of the complicated relations between Taiwan and China, highlighting the need for social dialogue before any solution—an asylum
system either including or excluding Chinese nationals—is accepted.

Fig. 9.7 Public opinion on the likelihood of a Chinese invasion in the next ten
years

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Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Chen Yiju and James
Habersham Iocovozzi for their excellent research assistance.
Funding The work on this chapter was supported by funding from theEuropean Union’s research and innovation programme HORIZON-WIDERA2021-ACCESS-03-01 under grant agreement No. 101079069, entitled “The EU
in the Volatile Indo-Pacific Region” (EUVIP).

Disclaimer Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are
however those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of theEuropean Union. The European Union cannot be held responsible for them.

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CHAPTER 10

Kurdish Diaspora in Japan: Navigating
Kurdish Identity and Activism on Social
Media
Sohrab AhmadianIntroduction
The definition of diaspora is still being debated among academics. Someacademics claim that diasporas are populations that have lived abroadfrom their country for centuries as a result of tragic events, have a strong
national identity, and are involved in active social and cultural activities(Cohen, 1997; Gilroy, 1993). Others, however, propose a broader visionthat includes various transnational groups with fluid identities and hybrid
cultural practices (Brah, 1996; Vertovec, 1999). This ongoing argumentshows the complexities and diversity of diasporic experiences (Brah, 1996;
Cohen, 1997; Gilroy, 1993; Vertovec, 1999).
In recent years, a significant number of Kurds have personally experienced migration, becoming actively engaged in the process of leaving
their homeland and settling in new countries. The study of the Kurdish

S. Ahmadian (B)Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, Japane-mail: ahmadian@tufs.ac.jp© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_10

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diaspora generally is an introduction to understanding transnational relations as well as identity and the desire to return as strategies of immigrants
in relation to the country of origin.
In today’s information era, diasporas are no longer defined solely
by territorial claims, but rather by the preservation and reconstructionof cultural assets, shared imaginations, and the collective consciousness of their members (Cohen, 1997). The advent of the internet
and other modern communication platforms has significantly influenced
the contexts and practices surrounding diasporic identity. Through theinternet, diasporas gain access to a rich and intricate symbolic environment, enabling them to connect, interact, and express their cultural identities in complex ways (Keles, 2015; Kissau & Hunger, 2010). While theinternet provides a platform for diasporas to imagine and establish virtual
homes, it also facilitates the clash of national and transnational political ideologies and cultural expressions, leading to counter-expressions ofidentity (Bucy & Gregson, 2001; Georgiou, 2006).
Online diasporic communities provide an ideal environment for individuals to explore and reassess their cultural identity and political perspectives (Georgiou, 2006). Meanwhile, members of the diaspora may sharecharacteristics such as homeland, language, cultural traditions, history,
ancestry, values, and religious practices (Bernal, 2006; Chuang, 2004).
However, it is critical to recognise that diaspora groups are varied andincorporate distinct identities within these wider categories. Diasporas
are also using cyberspace as a means of voicing political opposition anddeveloping a sense of political identity through participation in political debates (Adamson, 2002; Diamandaki, 2003). There is a growing
recognition, among diaspora activists and political organisations, of theinternet’s pivotal role as a vital tool in fostering the development of
diasporic behaviours within immigrant communities. This is facilitatedthrough the sharing of information and the amplification of politicalclaims (Ekici, 2014). Diasporic societies often have more than one typeof a sense of belonging, involving political, ethnic, and cultural identities, as is evidenced by the prominence of political culture in the diaspora(Aghapouri, 2018). Some diasporas place a higher priority on building apolitical identity due to political concerns, while others place a greater
weight on building an ethnic identity. The weighting of each can bechanged with context and over time (Karim, 2003).
Through this research, the author analysed approximately 200 Facebook posts from public accounts belonging to individuals and civic

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organisations associated with the Kurdish diaspora in Japan. The methodof post-selection involved examining the last five posts for individuals andthe previous ten posts for associations and organisations. Specifically, thischapter analyses the role Facebook plays in the development and representation of Kurdish diasporic identity in Japan and what kind of insightit provides in the transnational space. This chapter argues that everyday
transnational communication on Facebook, as a social media, plays animportant role in fostering cultural and political identity among Kurdish
diasporic community members. This research has been designed basedon several stages, such as general monitoring of public online communications, thematic categorisation, content analysis, and determining thefrequency of topics and variables within the content that has been sharedon Facebook at different times and in response to diverse events.
In summary, the findings presented in this chapter provide evidence
that offers support for the hypothesis that Facebook plays a unifying
role rather than promoting division and conflict within the Kurdish diaspora in Japan, by facilitating communication and fostering a sense of
togetherness.

Kurdish Diaspora in Japan
In the 1990s, Japan lifted visa restrictions for some countries, especiallyfor Iran and Turkey, allowing many young people from these countries
to enter Japan without visas. The visa-free entry for Turkey came at atime when the situation of Kurds in Turkey was deteriorating due topolitical conflicts and unbalanced economic conditions. Japan became adestination for Kurds seeking to improve their situation and find a better
life for themselves and their families. However, Japan did not officiallyopen its labour market to unskilled foreign workers, but instead createdsome “side-doors” to allow them in, such as the status of residence forpermanent residents of Japanese descent from South America and thetrainee and technical intern programmes (Mori, 1997). However, theseside-doors did not apply to Kurds from Turkey, as Turkish citizens andmost of the migrants who came to Japan in the 1990s entered as tourists
or students and overstayed their visas or worked illegally.
1990 was the starting point for Turkish Kurds to migrate to Japan(Nakajima, 2003). The news spread that Japan was full of job opportunities and easy money could be made. Unskilled labour from low-income
Kurdish regions of Turkey travelled to Japan in search of high-paying jobs

260

S. AHMADIAN(Ahmadian, 2020). Looking for a job was one of the common features ofmany immigrants from different countries coming to Japan in that period,
but the situation was more complicated in the case of the Kurds and thereasons for their migration. The Kurds who migrated to Japan duringthat time had previously moved within Turkey due to political pressure
and to escape conflicts between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and theTurkish army. They relocated from regions near the conflict to safer areas.
It was during that period that young people from the rural areas of thecities of Gaziantep and Kahramanmaraş in the southeast of Turkey, who
suffered from many deprivations such as economic and political problems,
tried desperately to get a ticket to Japan (Ahmadian, 2020). Young people
who did not even understand the basics of the Japanese language choseto immigrate to a country with strict refugee laws and entered Japan witha three-month visa-free travel, which was enough to enter Japan.
While Kurds have been present in Japan since the 1990s, their numbers
have experienced significant growth in recent years. As per most estimates, there were more than 2000 Kurds residing in Japan in 2019,with a majority concentrated in the Kawaguchi and Warabi cities ofsouthern Saitama Prefecture (Ahmadian, 2023). Nearly 30 years havepassed since Kurds first arrived in Japan in the 1990s, and, around theregion, young Kurds who were born or raised in Japan can be seen
(Tokizawa, 2019, p. 5). Legal stays in Japan, such as through marriage,
work, or other reasons, have allowed some Kurds to remain in the
country for years. However, some Kurds entered Japan without applying
for asylum and avoided immigration control (Ahmadian, 2023). Previously, asylum seekers could repeatedly renew their applications, extending
their stay and living in uncertainty until a decision was made. But with
the new amendment to the Immigration Control Act, passed on June
9, 2023, deportation is no longer suspended after the third application
unless “sufficient reasons” are provided (Asada & Sendō, 2023).
Kurds in Turkey have had very difficult periods and painful experiences
over the long history of their political struggles and freedom movements.
In the late 1980s, as fighting broke out between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish military, unrest intensified, leaving thesoutheastern part of Turkey in a state of near-civil war (Yilmaz, 2016). In
the 1990s, the Turkish government repeatedly bombed and destroyed
the area with tanks, claiming that towns and villages in the southeast
supported the PKK. Turkish military bombings peaked between 1994
and 1995, displacing more than 3 million Kurds and destroying more

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than 3000 towns and villages (McDowall, 2021). Many Kurds, whose
houses, agricultural lands, and livestock were burned and destroyed, also
were forced to migrate to the cities of Turkey and other countries. Many
refugees fled to European countries, while some Kurds also emigrated toJapan, because was easier for them to enter Japan during that period due
to visa exemptions with the Republic of Turkey (Beşikçi, 2002; Nakagawa,
2001; Nakajima, 2003).
Most Kurds who eventually made it to Japan came from those aforementioned areas of southeastern Turkey. These areas have a history ofpolitical violence, including the tragic Marash massacre in 1978. The
combination of violence, discrimination, and assimilation policies has
contributed to the migration of people from these areas to other partsof the world, including Japan. In rural parts of Turkey, Kurdish communities maintain their tribal, kinship, political, and religious affiliations.
Likewise, the Kurdish community in Japan, which originates from similar
tribes and neighbouring regions in Turkey, also maintains and strengthens
its social bonds over time. The regions they come from in Turkey face
many environmental problems at the same time. Its lands are also almost
uncultivable due to being covered with thick black stones. Preparing
these lands for cultivation is very costly and beyond the means of theresidents there. During my field research trip to some of these areas
around Gaziantep city in February 2022, I obtained detailed information about the demographic characteristics of the regions in Turkey
where the Kurdish diaspora members originated from. During my visit
to rural areas in Kahramanmaraş (Marash) and Gaziantep, specificallyamong the Makhakan (Maxikon) clan, I observed a strong connection
between them and the Kurdish community in Japan. Many members of
the Makhakan clan, who reside in a village complex located 30 kilometres from Gaziantep, have immigrated to Japan, either with their families
or individually. It is worth noting that some of them eventually returnedto their hometowns after their time in Japan. Based on the observations
made during the fieldwork, it was found that even after returning fromJapan, many of the returnees have retained their ability to speak Japanese.
Furthermore, their children, who grew up in Japan and attended Japanese
schools, can still speak Japanese.
Based on fieldwork and exploration of the Kurdish diaspora’s Facebook
usage, the analysis of their posts revealed the intended audiences. Results
show that a notable portion, 53.5%, targeted the Kurds in their homeland (see Fig. 10.1). This suggests successful maintenance of a connection

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Fig. 10.1 Distribution of targeted audiences in the Facebook posts of theKurdish diaspora in Japan (calculations and graph made by the author)

between the Kurdish community in Japan and both their community inJapan and their homeland.
The Turkish government is generally opposed to the presence andexpansion of the Kurdish community in Japan and labels the process ofpolitical mobilisation of the Kurds as terrorism, separatism, and extremism(Kyodo, 2022; Rich, 2016). Until 2022, no Kurds had ever been granted
refugee status in Japan, which would allow them to settle in Japan permanently (Kyodo, 2022; Rich, 2016). However, on 28 July 2022, a Kurd
from Turkey, who was living in Hokkaido, was granted refugee status after
an appeals court ruled in May that he would be at risk of persecution if hereturned to Turkey, according to the lawyer Koji Yamada (Kyodo, 2022).
The dissatisfaction of the Kurds with the political and social conditionsin Turkey, and the numerous conflicts of the Turkish government withthe political factions of the Kurds, led to various waves of migration in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which began with migration toneighbouring countries in the Middle East, followed by a large numberof people emigrating to European countries, North America, and East
Asia, including Japan.
The emergence of the internet and social media has become formembers of the Kurdish diaspora a means of gathering and civic participation at the transnational level (Ekici, 2014). Diasporic Kurds have beenable to attract greater and wider support from international organisations at the governmental and non-governmental levels through online
communication, especially social networks. Social networks have provided
a suitable platform for the voices of political leaders and elites to be10

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better heard among members of the Kurdish diaspora, and to provide
the necessary potential for cultural identity representation and politicalmobilisation (Aghapouri, 2018).
Building upon be background described in this section, the levels andtypes of participation exhibited by members of the Kurdish diaspora on
the Facebook social network platform have been further explored. This
exploration sets the stage for the next section, where a deeper dive into
these aspects will be conducted, and a comprehensive analysis will be
provided.

Methodology
Social media has become an important source of data and methodology
for social research because it allows researchers to access and analyse
the online activities and interactions of many groups and communities(Sloan & Quan-Haase, 2016; Staff et al., 2016). With a focus on thisunderstudied group, this study examines how the Kurdish diaspora inJapan uses Facebook to negotiate their Kurdish identity and activism. As
one of the most well-known and widely used social media sites among theKurdish community in Japan, Facebook was chosen as the focus of thestudy because it provides a rich variety of content types, including text,
images, videos, and links, that can reveal different facets of their online
expression and engagement (Wills, 2016, p. 50).
During the monitoring of the online activities of this community, I
concluded that the TikTok social network is also common among themembers of this community, but preliminary investigations showed thatthe activities of the community members in the TikTok space are notserious enough to answer the questions used to analyse social media posts
created by the Kurdish community in Japan. However, as the primary andpreferred social network within the community, Facebook has a prominent role. The vast majority of Kurds in Japan maintain active Facebook
accounts and regularly engage with the platform, as do civic organisations
associated with the Kurdish community.
In the first stage of this study, ten public pages/groups belonging
to Kurdish civil society organisations and institutions on Facebook wereidentified by searching for keywords such as “Kurds in Japan” in Kurdish,Japanese, English, and Turkish (see Fig. 10.2). This was done in order to
get an overview of the level and sentiment of participation on Facebook
by diaspora members. The number of followers of each Facebook group

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was checked separately. Public pages and group pages that are affiliatedwith Kurdish organisations in Japan, and those that focus more on the
promotion of Kurdish political and cultural identity, were found to be
more followed by Kurds in Japan.
In the context of social media research, snowballing is a technique used
to identify additional participants or sources of information through referrals or connections within a network (Dosek, 2021). In this study, thesnowball method was used to collect a comprehensive list of Facebook
accounts associated with Kurdish individuals and civic organisations inJapan. After the initial set of public Facebook accounts was identified, theauthor searched among the likes, followers, and comments of the initialsources and discovered additional public Facebook accounts and added
them to the list.
In the second stage, in order to gain a comprehensive understandingof the community’s online activities in the Facebook space, the author

Fig. 10.2 List of institutional groups and pages on Facebook associated with
the Kurds in Japan

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selected 100 Facebook posts from personal accounts of Kurdish users
and 100 posts from institutional accounts of Kurdish civil society groups.
However, due to the fact of applying some filters in the selection of pages
and persons, the composition of this selection finally came out as follows(see Fig. 10.3).
One of the filters that was applied in the selection of Facebook accounts
was to select only people and members who were active on Facebook. For
example, individuals whose last Facebook posts were over a year old were
excluded from the study as less active users. Since the aim of this research
was to obtain the latest status of the Kurdish diaspora members’ online
activities in Japan, the publication date of the last Facebook posts was used
as a criterion to distinguish between active and inactive users (Fig. 10.4).
As an additional criterion for selecting Facebook pages belonging to
Kurdish associations and civil organisations in Japan, the frequency of
updates, their popularity, and the number of followers were also considered. In general, the public pages that were selected had 200–3000 likes
and followers. To protect participants’ information and safety, this study
will not disclose names of individual account holders, while the list of
institutional pages and groups on Facebook is provided in Fig. 10.2.

Fig. 10.3 Distribution of selected Facebook accounts/pages by types

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Fig. 10.4 The frequency of publication dates of Facebook posts

The Challenge of Data Collection
This research is based on online content analysis using a qualitative
method, to provide a comprehensive and visual overview of Facebook
activities among the Kurdish community in Japan. Data collection was
conducted through designing a database on the Google Forms platform.
This database included twelve questions. Before designing the database,the author spent some time scanning and skimming the Facebook postsof the community members to obtain the correct categories and themes.
During data entry, after opening each post and checking its quality,
the author answered twelve questions for each post separately. For eachpost, the following information was screened and submitted in Google
Forms: post number, publication date, account owner name, accounttype (personal/institutional), type of shared content (text, image, video,
mixed, etc.), general topic of the post, general impression of the post
(positive/negative), representation of identity in the posts, representationof activism in the posts, the level of interaction with the community, thelanguage in which the post is written and the type of audience of theposts.

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In general, the checkbox field option in Google Forms was used toaddress the main research questions, which encompassed multiple aspects.
This option allows for multiple choices, as each item may not necessarily
fit into a single category, and a category may encompass multiple characteristics that need to be included in the responses at the same time. By
using checkboxes that allow for multiple choices, it is possible to capture
multiple topics, views, languages, or audiences associated with each post.
In addition, drop-down menus were used for certain questions to provide
options for single selections. These structured question formats allowed
for easier and more efficient data analysis, so that responses could be used
and analysed to produce quantitative results.
The data collected from Google Forms was then subjected to qualitative analysis, with visual and quantitative data results presented. It is
important to note that since this research follows a qualitative approach,
the graphs presented below are the result of qualitative data analysis to
give a visual and broader perspective on the Kurdish community in Japan.

Identity Representation on Facebook
Facebook is one of the most influential social networks that, despite
the emergence of other competitors such as Instagram, Twitter, TikTok,
etc., still maintains its position as a main platform for online activities(Meta Platforms, 2023; Statista, 2023a, 2023b). Considering the structural features of Facebook compared to other social networks, at least byobserving the Facebook posts of Kurd users, it became clear that Facebook posts provide more offer more possibilities for analysis with regard
to everyday issues than Instagram and TikTok. The greater freedom that
Facebook has given users to post text, video, and image content simultaneously could be one of the reasons for this. Since Facebook is older thanother social networks, this media has become a centre of nostalgic memories and a place to recover and reread memories (Davalo et al., 2015; Zhao
et al., 2013). Facebook serves as a virtual space for Kurds in Japan toengage with their past, present, and future identities. They repost photos
and videos of their homeland that Facebook has archived and retrieved forthem, such as landscapes, monuments, festivals, or historical events. These
posts illustrate some of the ways that Kurds use Facebook to interact
with their memories and culture. The development of the interactive andnetwork level of this media, along with its other features, has given the268

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users of this media have access to an interactive space where they can
express their sense of belonging to a group.
Since the Kurdish diaspora space is far from the original homeland, Facebook has become a key space in the interaction of diaspora
members with each other and with their hometowns. The meaningsof “being Kurdish” are actively represented in this virtual space. Thissection discusses the distinct manifestations of diasporic identity among
the members of the Kurdish online community in Japan. Examining theFacebook posts of members of the Kurdish diaspora and civil organisations in Japan, first, required a thematic classification to achieve a generaland comprehensive analysis of the content of the posts.
Figure 10.5 shows that about 36% of the posts examined had political content, which is the highest rate, as shown on the chart. In otherwords, 72 out of 200 Facebook posts that were analysed had politicalfeatures, references, and elements. After the posts with political content,
the second place was dedicated to events related to the Kurdish community in Japan with a value of 32% and 64 posts out of 200 posts. The
third position (29.5%) was occupied by posts that represented solidarity,and the largest part of this solidarity was related to events that occurred in
Kurdish regions in different countries. A category named “Neutral” wasincluded among the post types to allow for ranking or categorising posts
that were not directly related to the research topic or did not align withany specific theme.
In another question, the representation of the elements, signs, andfactors that had the closest overlap with the issue of Kurdish identity wasinvestigated. In response to this question, it was possible to choose several

Fig. 10.5 Distribution of content categories in Facebook posts

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options. As can be seen in Fig. 10.6, the content of 84 posts out of 200
posts had identity stimuli. The “identity stimuli” indicate that there were
specific signals, inputs, or factors that influenced or provoked a response
related to identity. It suggests that various elements or aspects play a rolein shaping or triggering identity-related experiences or behaviours among
diaspora members. Some of the identity stimuli are considered below.
• Use of Kurdish language in posts and comments.
• Sharing news and events related to Kurdistan issues.
• Sharing of cultural content such as music, art, and literature.
• Using Kurdish symbols, flags, or other visual elements.
• Participating in online discussions and debates about Kurdish identity and politics.
• Networking with other Kurds on Facebook.
• Sharing stories and personal experiences related to being Kurdish.
• Expressing pride or solidarity with the community.
• Criticism of negative images of Kurds in the media or society.
By posting photos, videos, stories, and news articles that showcase thediversity, richness, and resilience of Kurdish culture and people, Kurds inJapan seek to create a positive image of Kurds in Japan and foster mutual
understanding and respect. Figure 10.6 illustrates the subsets of “Identity Stimuli”, such as: Language, History, Culture, Religion, Symbols,
Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Identity Struggles. The inclusion of theheading category (Identity Stimuli) and its subsets (Language, History,

Fig. 10.6 Frequency of identity variables in Facebook posts

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Culture…) in the database ensured that all possible identity stimuli wereseparately accounted for. Additionally, this allowed for further investigation into the level of engagement with specific subsets of identity stimuli.
The general result of the question about identity shows that “identity
stimuli” were generally observed in 84 posts out of a total of 200 posts(42%). Among the more detailed subsets of identity stimuli, we saw thatthe topic of “ethnicity” (being Kurdish) was visible in 74 posts (37%) andthe topic of “culture” was visible in 69 posts (34.5%), in contrast to a
topic of “religion” which had the lowest value (1.5%). Religion featured inonly three posts out of a total of 200 Facebook posts, two of which introduced positive aspects of religion and one video post related to publishingnegative aspects of religion. Although the majority of Kurds in Turkey
follow Sunni Islam, some Turkish Kurds are Alevis, a religious minority
repeatedly subjected to persecution and discrimination in Turkey (Gezik,2021). Given that some Alevi refugees live in Japan, it would be logicalto expect some religious activism in their Facebook posts; however, nosigns of Alevism in the online activities of the Kurds in Japan have beenfound.
The Role of Language in Maintaining Ethnic Identity
The mother tongue plays a vital role in maintaining ethnic identity, as
it is often the primary means of transmitting cultural values, traditions,and beliefs across generations. Therefore, promoting and supporting theuse of the mother tongue among migrants/emigrants can have positiveeffects on their well-being, integration, and cultural diversity (UNESCO,2022). Research also has shown that emigrants who are able to speak
their mother tongue are more likely to have a strong sense of ethnic
identity and cultural belonging (Giles & Johnson, 1987). Using one’s
mother tongue can create a sense of connection with one’s cultural
heritage and can provide a means of expressing cultural values and beliefs(Baker & Jones, 1998). This highlights the importance of promoting andpreserving the mother tongue to preserve ethnic identity and cultural
heritage. The issue of the Kurdish language and its use among the diaspora Kurds whose origin of migration was Turkey is very challenging.
During this research, attempted to investigate the frequency of languages
used by Japan’s Kurdish diaspora when publishing Facebook posts. As
can be seen in the results of the answers to this question in Fig. 10.7,
the language used in the community’s Facebook posts was Japanese with

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a frequency of 47.4%, followed by Turkish, with a frequency of 25%,
Kurdish with a frequency of 20%, and finally English with a frequency
of 7%.
This chart also includes a column for Arabic, which has a frequency of
0.4% and has the lowest scale.
The Japanese language has the highest percentage (47.4%) of use
in published posts. However, this does not mean that the majority ofmembers of the Kurdish community in Japan are fluent in Japanese. A
field study, as well as a review of Facebook posts, shows that few Kurds
in the diaspora in Japan are fluent in Japanese. The high percentage ofJapanese language in Fig. 10.7 is due to the frequency of use of theJapanese language by Facebook pages related to Kurdish associations andcivic institutions. Most of the Kurdish leaders of civic organisations inJapan can communicate effectively in Japanese, and they publish theirposts in Japanese or in multiple languages to raise awareness of Kurds
among the Japanese community. In contrast, posts published by individuals are usually a combination of photos and videos without text orwith a short text. For this research, the photos and the languages used inFig. 10.7 Frequency of languages used in Facebook posts

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the videos were also recorded, and the most used language by personalaccounts was the Turkish language (25.0%).
The representation of Kurdish ethnic identity is strong among
members of the Kurdish diaspora who are active on Facebook, as shownin Fig. 10.6. But it can be concluded that the emphasis on a collective
responsibility to preserve the Kurdish identity is not manifested in the useof Kurdish language. The author also conducted field studies during thefield research trip to areas of origin of Kurds in Japan, especially Gaziantep
city and its rural areas of Makhakan (Maxikon) in southeastern Turkey, inFebruary 2022. Observations based on the fieldwork showed that Kurds
in Turkey and Kurds from Turkey in the diaspora generally are politicallymobilised.
Kurdish people in Japan have a strong sense of political and national
identity that is distinct from the Turkish state. This is evident from theiruse of Kurdish symbols, culture, and history, as well as their resistanceto assimilation and oppression by the Turkish authorities but the Turkish
language is the dominant language among members of Kurdish society,even for daily conversations. This issue has several reasons that are rooted
in Turkey’s policies in assimilating the Kurdish language throughout
history. The Kurdish language was officially prohibited in Turkey from1937 to 1991 as part of the state’s assimilation policies against the Kurds.
The ban on the Kurdish language was lifted in 1991, but the use of
Kurdish as a language of education in both public and private schools
remains illegal (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2012). This historical background and a
combination of many other factors have caused the transfer of Kurdish
linguistic identity from one generation to the next to continue to moveaway from the Kurdish language. Generally, the Kurdish people’s proficiency in the Kurdish language in Turkey has decreased, and the use of
the Turkish language instead of the Kurdish language has become thedaily habit. Today, we can see a new type of assimilation that the author
named “self-driven assimilation”, which is a voluntary and self-directed
process by which individuals actively adopt the dominant culture while
maintaining their own identity. This process emphasises the independent agency and choice of individuals in incorporating the cultural norms
and practices of the dominant society. However, this process might varydepending on the context and the characteristics of the migrant group.
For example, for Kurdish migrants in Japan, linguistic assimilation in astyle of “self-driven assimilation” has persisted even after they arrived in10

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Japan, because their daily habit of using a native level of Turkish, a prominent language in their homeland, could not be replaced by Kurdish, alanguage that they had not spoken widely before or even in Japan.
In some cases, the Turkish language has paradoxically become thelanguage of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. In general, the issue of
Kurdish language among Kurds in Turkey raises a new question of how or
to what extent it is possible to represent Kurdish identity and reproduce
Kurdish nationalism without the Kurdish mother tongue.

Facebook as a Platform for Political Activism
Facebook groups and pages run by Kurdish non-governmental organisations in Japan have become a central place for discussion of the politicalissues facing Kurdish immigrants. Some of the major political debates
involve: the immigration policies of the Japanese government; criticising
the policies of the Turkish government during various events; expressing
political solidarity with the opposition parties in Turkey; and showing solidarity with the victims of political and ethnic violence and discriminationin the Kurdish regions. They are published and promoted both on Facebook pages and groups by Kurdish organisations and on the personalaccounts of Kurdish community members. As shown in Fig. 10.8, posts
containing political engagement have the highest frequency. In otherwords, 32.5% or 65 of the 200 reviewed posts had content that represented political engagement. In addition, the number of posts thatshowed solidarity was 63, and the number of posts that represented
activities to preserve Kurdish culture was 54.

Fig. 10.8 Frequency of activism variables within Facebook posts

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The online activities of Kurdish users and their Japan supporters also
contribute to creating and spreading a coherent and inclusive political
discourse on behalf of the Kurdish diaspora. One of the reasons for thehigh number of political posts was the publication of posts in support ofthe opposition party and the supporter of Kurdish rights in Turkey called“Left Green Party” which were reposted and shared among membersof the community. Due to the general election in Turkey on 14 May
2023, the advertising campaigns of the Green Left Party (Turkish: Yeşil
Sol Parti, YSP), which were represented by some Kurdish organisations inJapan, increased their political activity on Facebook. Examining the Facebook pages of members of the Kurdish community in Japan showed thatadvertising banners supporting the Green Left Party were published on
the accounts of many members of this community.
The Kurds in Japan showed solidarity with their compatriots in Turkey,
who suffered from a big earthquake in February 2023. They started acampaign on Facebook to help the victims and raised about 30 million
yen in donations. They also got media attention and cooperation fromthe Japanese public and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey(Gulbahçe, 2023). This case shows how the Kurds in Japan used Facebook to mobilise their resources and express their solidarity with theirfellow Kurds in Turkey.
They use Facebook to establish contacts and relations with Japanesepoliticians and activists who are sympathetic or supportive of the Kurdish
cause. Among the pages and groups that are associated with institutions and civil society organisations with Japanese leaders, many posts
are in Japanese, and a significant part of them are related to the launchof campaigns and awareness-raising against the policies of the Japanese
government in the revision of the immigration law, which is targeting
asylum seekers and their situation.
While the current law ensures that asylum seekers are protected fromdeportation during the normal refugee recognition process, the revised
bill means that the protection will no longer apply after the third asylum
claim is closed. For this reason, many issues, including the increased risk offorced evictions, were mentioned in Facebook posts, and campaigns werelaunched against the passage of this bill. This proposal contradicts theprinciple of non-refoulement of major international treaties on refugeesthat Japan is part of, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and theConvention against Torture (Kasai, 2023). Opposition to the new immigration bill intensified when news of the torture of some Kurdish asylum

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seekers in Japanese immigration detention centres and the death of a Sri
Lankan woman were widely reported in the Japanese news and social
media (Slater & Barbaran, 2020; Tauchi, 2023).

Conclusion
This chapter has investigated how and to what extent Facebook can serve
as a useful tool for Kurdish diaspora members to explore and represent their Kurdish identity and political awareness. Many of the Kurdish
community members in Japan originated from rural areas surrounding
the cities of Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, and Adyaman in southeastern
Turkey. For them, social networks such as Facebook provide a way tointeract and connect with their homeland, to negotiate their identities,
and to expand and strengthen their “Kurdishness”. Facebook also facilitates political and cultural mobilisation among the Kurdish community
members and their supporters among Japanese nationals. Kurdish diaspora elites and activists have established Kurdish associations in Japan topromote Kurdish interests and rights, and they have used social media
and mass media simultaneously to influence public spheres and produce
and represent online content that matches “Kurdishness” in Japan.
The findings of this study help to understand how social networks suchas Facebook enable Kurdish diaspora members in Japan to explore andnegotiate their identity and culture online. Although this study reveals
a paradoxical nature of identity stimuli in online interactions, in which“Kurdish language” and “Religion” occupy the last position while “Kurdish ethnicity” and “nationalism” get high scores, this does not imply alack of attachment or commitment to the Kurdish heritage. Rather, analysis of the online content shows that the Kurds in the Japanese diaspora
primarily use the Turkish language as a borrowed tool to represent their
Kurdish identity and nationalism in a context where they face linguistic
and cultural barriers.
Social media influences public opinion in Japan, and it can bring attention to shortcomings within the current system, such as deportations,prolonged detention periods, and the low rates of asylum recognition for
migrants in Japan. Examples from the findings of the case of Kurdish
asylum seekers in Japan clearly show that social media platforms have thepotential to increase public awareness and generate empathy towards thechallenges faced by Kurdish asylum seekers who experience persecution
and violence in Japan as well as their home country (Fujibayashi, 2020).

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Based on the findings, the Kurdish community in Japan exhibits uniquecharacteristics and behaviours compared to many other diaspora communities. Unlike those communities that have their own nation-state, theKurds do not possess a recognised sovereign territory, which intensifies their quest for identity. This distinct feature influences their actions
and motivations within the diaspora. For instance, the case of campaigns
launched on the Facebook pages of the Kurdish community in Japanto aid earthquake victims in southeast Turkey in February 2023 illustrates their strong sense of solidarity. They collected and sent significant
amounts of cash and non-cash donations to support their fellow Kurds inneed. Furthermore, the utilisation of the Facebook platform by membersof the Kurdish diaspora in Japan to rally political support for the Turkish
opposition party, the Green Left Party, during the 2023 general election campaigns showcases their active engagement in virtual campaigns.
Additionally, they leverage Facebook to disseminate information and raiseawareness among opponents of Japan’s immigration law revision bill.
These examples clearly demonstrate how social media has amplified publicawareness and fostered empathy for the challenges faced by immigrantminority groups.
The Kurdish community in Japan stands out due to their circumstancesof being a stateless group, which strengthens their quest for identityand drives their active engagement in social and political activities within
the diaspora. The examples mentioned, such as their support campaigns
and political mobilisation through Facebook, highlight the distinctiveness of their experiences and their concerted efforts to address the issues
impacting their community.
In summary, this study uncovered the various impacts resulting fromthe online activities of Kurdish users and their Japan supporters, whichprimarily revolve around Kurdish cultural identity and political mobilisation in Japan. These activities have three main effects: firstly, they
contribute to fostering public awareness and actively combating discrimination within the host society. Secondly, they produce and disseminate a
coherent and inclusive political discourse on behalf of the Kurdish diaspora. Lastly, these online activities provide a valuable platform for public
diplomacy, facilitating enhanced relations between Kurdish political elites
and Japanese politicians and activists.

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PART III

Lived Experiences of Refugees and Asylum
Seekers in Taiwan and JapanCHAPTER 11

The Lived Experience of Tibetan Refugees
in Taiwan: Contesting Rights to Work,
Residence, and Citizenship
Mei-Lin Pan and Dolma Tsering

Making Tibetan Refugees
On 1 October 1949, the Communist Party of China (CPC) proclaimed
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China and declared theincorporation of Tibet into China. By the end of 1959, The People’s
Liberation Army of the CPC successfully defeated the Tibetan army andhad complete control over Tibet. Thousands of Tibetans were forced toescape to India and Nepal by becoming refugees, including its leader the
14th Dalai Lama (Shakya, 1999).
In India, the Dalai Lama announced the establishment of the Tibetan
government in exile with two key purposes: the first was the rehabilitationof Tibetan refugees and the other was to work for the freedom movement
against the CPC (The 14th Dalai Lama, 1977). According to a demographic survey conducted by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA

M.-L. Pan (B) · D. Tsering
National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan
e-mail: mlpan@nycu.edu.tw© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_11

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aka the Tibetan government in exile) in 2009, the population of Tibetans
outside Tibet stood at 127,935. There were 94,203 in India, 13,514
in Nepal, 1298 in Bhutan, and 18,920 elsewhere (Office of Planning
Commission, 2010, p. 13).
In 1960, upon the request of the Dalai Lama, various countries, suchas Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, provided asylum for the
Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal based on humanitarian reasons(Buchser, 2010; Contenta, 2010). The dispersal of Tibetan refugees
outside India and Nepal began as early as 1959, with Taiwan becoming
the first country to receive Tibetan refugees from India and Nepal.
The first group of Tibetan refugees migrated to Taiwan in September
1959 (Liu, 1996, p. 129). Taiwan received its first group of Tibetan
refugees not at the request of the Dalai Lama but due to politicalmotives, especially those Tibetans recruited by government agencies likethe Mongol and Tibet Affairs Commission (MTAC). We will discuss thisin a following section. Since then, Tibetan refugees from India and Nepal
have continued to enter Taiwan for various purposes including education, marriage, job opportunities, and religion. According to the datasubmitted by the Mongolian and Tibetan Cultural Centre as of December
2022, there were 649 Tibetans in Taiwan, 559 being citizens of Taiwan,
and the rest having residence permits called Alien Residence Certificates(ARC) (Mongolian and Tibetan Cultural Centre, 2022). If we include
those who do not have an ARC residency permit as well as those who
do not have any connection with MTCC, then there currently will beapproximately around 850 Tibetans in Taiwan.1
The number of Tibetans in Taiwan is usually only a few hundred,so they do not receive too much attention from the Taiwanese. Since
the MTAC has been the official agency in Taiwan responsible for
Tibetans, publications from commission including annual reports andpolicy compilation provides the historical accounts and policy guidelines about Tibetans coming to Taiwan through this agency (Hsu, 2001;
Liu, 1996). In early 2000, the MTAC in collaboration with scholars
1 The total number of registered Tibetans in Taiwan is 649 as mentioned above. In
addition to this number, the Office of the Religious Foundation of the Dalai Lama, in
2022, had records of about 200 plus Tibetans in Taiwan, the majority of them beingmonks with Indian ICs. There are also four to five students with Indian ICs. Inshort,
in addition 649, the number provided by Mongol and Tibet Culture Center, there areabout 200 Tibetans with ICs. Based on these data, at the most conservative term, thetotal number of Tibetans in Taiwan is about 850 or more.

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from academic institutions conducted survey to obtain data on the lived
experience of Tibetan refugees in Taiwan through questionnaires andinterviews. The resulting two reports help us to understand the various
challenges encountered by Tibetan refugees living in Taiwan at that time
(Shen & Chen, 2005; Zhang et al., 2002).
Okawa (2007) observed that Tibetan refugees have been in an invisible situation in Taiwan. He studied Tibetans in Taiwan through twopolitical stages: the ideology of Chinese nationalism and democratisation.
According to the time when Tibetan refugees came to Taiwan, he divided
them into six categories, emphasising that Tibetan refugees are not ahomogeneous group in Taiwan. Okawa placed the history of Tibetans
coming to Taiwan in the context of world politics, and emphasised theimportance of continued attention on this issue.
Pan (2015) adopts the perspective of international human rights anduses the concept of “double liminality” to explain the particularity ofTibetan refugees in Taiwan. She points out that the Taiwan government
neither treats Tibetan refugees in Taiwan as compatriots nor accepts theirstatus as refugees, reflecting the ambiguity of the identity of Taiwan.
Placed in this double liminal status, exiled Tibetan refugees in Taiwan
have been discriminated against and have been denied their entitlement
to human rights (Pan, 2015). The policy of denying residence to Tibetan
refugees holding Indian Identity Certificates (ICs) lacks human rights
considerations, while the certificate is recognised by many countries as
a valid travel document (Pan, 2023).
These studies illustrate the particularity of Tibetans in Taiwan and why
they deserve attention. However, the lived experiences of Tibetans in
Taiwan are usually only reported by newspapers and magazines, or by asingle group, such as Taiwanese-Tibetan families in Taiwan (Kung et al.,2020; Pan, 2016), which cannot provide a whole picture of the lived
experience of Tibetan refugees in Taiwan.
This chapter examines the experiences of Tibetan refugees living in
Taiwan, focusing particularly on Tibetans’ rights to work, live, and holdTaiwanese citizenship. The first section explains the history of Tibetan
refugees’ migration from Nepal and India to Taiwan. In the second
section, the chapter looks at Tibetan lives in Taiwan during three distinct
periods. The final section examines human rights issues facing Tibetan
refugees, and shows how Taiwan’s changing politics has been a key factor
in determining Tibetan refugees’ rights, and their status in Taiwan.

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Data were collected from personal experiences, interviews withauthors, and existing scholarship available as secondary sources. The
archives and research reports published by the MTAC provided important
information for understanding the policies. Different experiences wereanalysed and presented through various case studies and authors choosethese cases based on their time of arrival in Taiwan as well as to reflect thedifferent phases. To protect the personal information and privacy of ourinterviewees, pseudonyms are used throughout the chapter to present thevarious case studies.

Historical Connectionof Tibetan Refugees to Taiwan
The relationship between Taiwan and Tibetan refugees began after the
CPC’s occupation of Tibet and the Kuomintang (KMT) relocated to
Taiwan. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang reinstated the ROC (Republic ofChina) government, along with its historical claim over Tibet. Subsequently, the MTAC continued its function to affirm the historical claims
over Tibet.2 According to MTAC websites, it aims:
To defend the aim of the ROC constitution, ensure the equal status ofvarious ethnic groups, promote the regional autonomy of Mongolia andTibet, enhance the economic and educational reforms in Mongolia andTibet, foster Mongolian and Tibetan cultures, and respect their religious
beliefs and social customs, in the hope of achieving harmonious ethnic
relationships and protecting the ROC’s sovereignty. (MTAC, 2011)

The MTAC, therefore, served as an important channel for allowing
Tibetan refugees to move to Taiwan. It also operated as an institution
under the Executive Yuan, the highest administrative organ in Taiwan,
making the MTAC responsible for managing Tibet and Tibetan affairs
in Taiwan until it was transformed into the Mongol and Tibet Culture
Center (MTCC) with the abolishment of the Organisational Act of the

2 Qing Dynasty established Mongol and Tibet Affairs bureau to handle the issue related
to Tibet and Mongolia. The ROC succeeded it and transformed it into Mongol and Tibet
Affairs Commission. After relocated to Taiwan, it reestablished various former government
bodies and the MTAC was one of them.

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MTAC in 2017 (Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China[Taiwan], 2017; Ministry of Culture, Republic of China, 2017).
In the late 1950s, the KMT government in Taiwan proposed thatseveral Tibetan resistance force leaders from Kham and Amdo, who had
become refugees in India, relocate to Taiwan (Gyari, 2022, p. 121).
Since then, different kinds of Tibetan refugees, such as resistance forces,
students, monks, and Tibetan government officials from India and Nepal,
have migrated to Taiwan and continue to travel to Taiwan. The historical trajectories of Tibetan refugees in Taiwan can be divided into
three phases reflecting Taiwan’s transformation from authoritarian todemocratic governance.
The first phase, lasting from 1959 to the mid-1980s, is characterisedby the authoritarian regime. This is an era in which Chinese nationalist
ideology was espoused. Two agendas largely dominated Taiwan’s national
interest during this period, one was to defeat the CPC and unify China,
and another one was to preserve the ROC-Taiwan as the only legitimate
ruler of China.
The second phase, characterised by economic and political transformation, began in the mid-1980s and lasted until the end of the 1990s.
During this period, in light of the realisation that recovering and unifying
mainland China was unfeasible, the government abandoned its military
focus and the political ideology of unifying China, and shifted towards
strengthening the economic prosperity of the island. In these years, amajor democratic transition occurred, involving the lifting of martial law,and the legalisation of the right to freely form political parties and todirectly vote for the president. In the meantime, Taiwan’s manufacturingsector grew, which created a demand for foreign labour. While facing
dramatic political, economic, and social change, Taiwan had to renounce
many outdated laws and enact laws to cope with the new reality, suchas enacting the Employment Service Act to incorporate foreign workers
and the implementation of Immigration Law. The economic and political transformation evolving in Taiwan had a direct impact on Taiwan’s
approach, attitude, and policy towards Tibetan refugees in India and
Nepal. Before the Dalai Lama’s visit in 1997, Taiwan and the CTA sharedhostile relations resulting from the MTAC’s pursuit of policy and activities
that challenged the legitimacy of the CTA. For instance, as we discuss inthe following section, the MTAC recruited Tibetan refugees from India
and Nepal to Taiwan and propagated them as Tibetan ethnic minority
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reconciliation was Lee Tung-hui’s agreement with the Dalai Lama that
the MTAC would not be involved in the further development of Taiwan
and CTA relations (Su & Wei, 2012, p. 186).
The third phase began in the early 2000s and has continued to thepresent time. It is defined as the era of post-democratic transformation.
The Democratic Progressive Party that won the election in 2000 did
not abide by the political ideology and claims of the KMT. In 2000,
Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party was elected as thepresident, becoming the first elected president from an opposition party.
Compared with the KMT’s consistent policy of treating Tibet as an
inalienable part of China, the Democratic Progressive Party advocates forthe recognition of Tibet’s independence and right to self-determination,
and also does not recognise Tibetan refugees as overseas Chinese (President Office of the ROC, 2003). In 2003, to strengthen ties with the
CTA, the DPP government established the Taiwan and Tibet Exchange
Foundation. It was meant to replace the MTAC, however, due to its
constitutional link, the MTAC could not be abolished. From 2003 to
2008, until the election of the KMT government in 2008, the Taiwan
and Tibet Exchange Foundation played a central role in engaging with
the CTA. Another important change witnessed during the Chen Shuibian period was that Tibetan refugees from India and Nepal could directly
apply for visas from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without the supportof the MTAC. Considering that Taiwan does have a refugee law and the
majority of Tibetans who migrated to Taiwan during this period were
those with Indian ICs, Tibetans faced the situation of not being able tosecure rights to residence and work. They encountered more challenges
than people in the previous two phases.
In short, Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal have been migrating
to Taiwan for over 60 years. The lived experiences of Tibetans in
Taiwan, especially in the context of rights to residence, work, and citizenship, are different in these three phases, based on Taiwan government
policy towards Tibet and Tibetan refugees. In the following section,
we will examine how Tibetan refugees have been treated differently ascompatriots, cheap labour, and stateless people, in each of the phases.

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Lived Experiences of Tibetans in Taiwan
Based on Three Different Phases
First Phase, 1949–mid-1980s: Tibetan Refugees as Compatriots
During the era of the authoritarian regime, with its Chinese nationalist
ideology, three sets of Tibetan refugees entered Taiwan via two prominent
institutions: the KMT’s Intelligence Bureau and the MTAC. Their arrivalin Taiwan was driven by a larger political motive to defeat the CPC andto assert Taiwan’s ROC sovereignty over Tibet.
1. Members of the Tibetan resistance force
Soon after the Tibetan uprising on 10 March 1959, President ChiangKai-shek issued a letter to Tibetan compatriots titled “Message to Tibetan
Compatriots” (Gao Xizang Tongbao Shu), which outlined Taiwan’s policy
towards Tibetan refugees in India. The letter reads as follows:
You are now shedding your blood in fighting against the Communist
tyranny. Although I am now in Taiwan, my heart has been always withyou in your war against Communism. The Government of the Republic ofChina is making every possible effort to give you continuous and effectiveaid.
The Government of the Republic of China has always respected Tibet’s
traditional political and social organisation and guaranteed the freedom of
religious belief and traditional life of the Tibetan people. I would now
like to solemnly declare that Tibet’s future political system and politicalstatus will be fulfilled by our government based on the principle of selfdetermination of its people. (Chin, 1984, pp. 222–223)

The letter confirmed that the KMT in Taiwan had not given up thepolicy of claiming sovereignty rights over Tibet. Following the letter,
Taiwan launched a programme called “Support the Tibetan Resistance
Movement against the CPC” and started mobilising resources and thegeneral public to extend support for the Tibetan resistance movement.
Upon the invitation of the KMT’s Intelligent Bureau, in September 1959,
Taiwan received the first group of Tibetan refugees from India. These
included, Chama Samphe, his wife Dolkar and their three daughters, andMingyur Rinpoche’s assistant Thinley Phuntsok, and Asha (Liu, 1996,
pp. 129–130). The Taiwanese government chose this group because
its members were connected with the Tibetan resistance force (Chushi

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Gangdruk). For instance, Chama Samphe was one of the former administrative heads of the resistance force. Mingyur Rinpoche was an influential
Buddhist master from Kham-Lithang,3 the place with the largest membership of the Tibetan resistance forces. The KMT extended invitations tothem solely because of their affinity with the Tibetan resistance force (The
Welfare Society of Dhokham Chushi Gangdru, 2022, p. 110.)
The KMT hoped to use them to influence guerrilla operations undertaken by the resistance force in Nepal (Okawa, 2007). After their arrival,
Chama Samphe was offered the position of Major General within the
Taiwan army and Taiwan also established a branch office of the Tibetan
resistance force in Taiwan (Lin, 1999). Whether the group was efficient in
helping Taiwan against the CPC is not known but their arrival had highpropaganda value for the KMT.
2. Frontier Cadre Training ClassIn 1961, following the first group, the KMT initiated Project“National Glory” (Guoguang ) which was a secret guerrilla war plan
against the CPC. As part of the project, it launched a secret operation
to recruit Tibetans from India and Nepal under the programme called
Frontier Cadre Training Class (Liu, 1996). A total of 32 Tibetans wererecruited for this particular programme. The government abandoned thesecret operation in 1970 after many failures, and trainees were allowed
to join various government units. Among 32 trainees, only ten remainedin Taiwan; some of them returned to Tibet and some returned to India(Wu, 1999). Some of them continued to work as secret service agents for
the Taiwan government in India and Nepal (Wu, 1999). Many of themhas passed on and one of them, aged 87, lives with his Taiwanese family(Pseudonym, personal communication, December 22, 2022).
3. Tibetan Children’s Home
By the end of the 1960s, it was becoming more apparent that the
KMT’s ambition to defeat the CPC was not realistic. The KMT had toterminate Project National Glory; however, it remained committed to the

3 Tibet traditionally has three regions; U-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo. Lithang is part ofKham region, with the Tibetan resistance force originally being founded by a famous
trader from Lithang. As a result, many of the resistance forces were from Lithang.

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Chinese nationalist ideology, holding that the ROC (Taiwan) is the legitimate ruler of China. This led to a shift in the approach towards Tibetan
refugees. The Taiwanese government started a new project of educating
the younger generation of Tibetan refugees in Taiwan as part of a larger
project to create ethnic cadres in Taiwan. In 1970, it implemented a
programme titled “Cultivating Next-generation Tibetan Ethnic Cadres”.
According to the MTAC:
Tibet and Mongolia, given their distinct culture, religion, and ethnic identity, and principally due to geographical location, remained isolated fromthe rest of China. Therefore, recruiting more ethnic cadres from theseregions is crucial to integrating and unifying the country. It further asserted
that ‘these young children must not only learn about their own inherent
culture but should learn about national (Chinese-the KMT) history andlanguage’. (MTAC, 1971, p. 152)

The project was initially undertaken by the China Mainland Famine
Relief Association and only dozens of young Tibetans joined as students
in the programme. However, the project was discontinued in 1978
because many students did not want to remain in Taiwan and could
not master the Chinese language (Liu, 1996, p. 164). The government
realised that it would be easier for children to start learning the Chinese
language from a younger age. The project was transferred from the China
Mainland Famine Relief Association to the MTAC. In 1980, the MTAC
implemented a project called the Tibetan Children’s Home. From 1980
to 1992, about 107 Tibetan refugee children from India and Nepal took
part in this project. According to the programme, once a student was
accepted, all of his or her expenses were guaranteed, including cost-ofliving fees, educational fees from primary school through college, and around-trip ticket to return home every four years. Through this project,on the one hand, the government aimed to enable more Tibetan children to receive a complete modern education in a stable society and tohelp them maintain traditional Tibetan culture and religious beliefs; onthe other hand, through such a programme, the Taiwanese government
aimed to foster nationalistic feelings amongst members of Tibet’s younger
generation, so that they would identify with the ROC and so that Taiwan
could use these educated ethnic cadres to disseminate Taiwan’s influence among Tibetans in exile, as well as in a future Tibet (Liu, 1996,
pp. 164–165).

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An interview report published by Taiwan Panorama, a bilingual magazine run by Taiwan’s government, presents the living conditions of thechildren who came to the Taiwan as apart of the Tibetan Children’sHome at that time,
These Tibetan children range from six to fourteen years old. They go toschool, watch TV cartoons, and go to parks and children’s playgrounds
on holidays, like ordinary children in Taiwan. In addition, they also learn
Tibetan and recite Buddhist scriptures …
Exposed to a new world that is rich in variety and with lots of things to
do and see, these children’s little hearts are full of wonderful excitement,
but their hearts are also sometimes heavy when they think of their parents
far away. "Sometimes when we get homesick, we hug each other and cry",says one little fellow. “But you get used to it after a while”. (Hsu, 1981)

Parents sent their children to Taiwan with the hope that their children could get a better education, and most of the parents who sent
their children were economically less privileged (Pseudonym personalcommunication, March 28, 2021). However, these children were thousands of miles away from their parents and lived in a different linguistic
and cultural environment. Although the aim was to pursue a better
life, these Tibetan children who grew up in Taiwan often had a lonely
and painful childhood, and developed feelings of alienation (Shen &Chen, 2005, pp. 27, 124). They felt alienated both from Taiwanese andTibetan communities because of a lack of language proficiency and due totheir different physical appearance (Pseudonym personal communication,
December 22, 2022).
Tibetan refugees recruited during this phase were treated as compatriots and were provided with Taiwan nationality cards because thegovernment in both principle and practice endorsed a policy of Tibet
as part of China (ROC). The project was implemented without support
from the CTA. As a result, a credibility gap was created, along with ahostile relationship between Taiwan and the CTA. The CTA criticised
the MTAC for manipulating poor Tibetans and buying their influence
through such a programme (Tethong, 2006). Parents of these children
also faced severe criticism from the Tibetan refugee community in India
because of their alliances with the MTAC. A Tibetan in Nepal revealed
that in the 1970s and 1980s, the MTAC officers would visit Nepal andoffer to relocate Tibetans to Taiwan because they were part of the ROC

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and, as such, were citizens of the ROC-Taiwan (Chiu, 2023). However,this was not the case later when the MTAC launched a programme ofvocational training, discussed in the next section (Pseudonym, personalcommunication, April 28, 2023). Therefore, the MTAC’s efforts to advocate for Tibet as part of the ROC were more aggressive during the firstphase.
The TCH project was not successful because many children were notable to master the Chinese language and did not perform well academically, except when studying the English language because it was easierto learn. Moreover, children also suffered discrimination and bullying at
school because of their appearance and their lack of proficiency in the
Chinese language. In addition, many children also forgot the Tibetan
language and gave up on their education, which ended up with themjoining the low-skilled workforce in Taiwan (Shen & Chen, 2005, p. 1).
Since the overall outcome did not meet the original expectation, theproject was discontinued by 1992 (Liu, 1996, pp. 167–168). Some of thestudents returned to India and Nepal while some continued to work infactories and the construction sector, and some graduated from university. They were treated as overseas Chinese and through the overseas
Chinese scheme they were able to obtain Taiwan citizenship after arrivingin Taiwan.
Second Phase mid-1980s–1990s: Tibetan Refugees as Cheap Labour
During this phase, the MTAC was still a major formal channel for
Tibetans in exile to migrate to Taiwan, but the motives of Tibetan
refugees migrating to Taiwan during this phase were more focused on
economic rather than political reasons. Taiwan was also going through amajor political and economic transformation, including the change froman authoritarian to a democratic system.
1. Vocational training programme
In 1983, the MTAC started a project called “Tibetan and Nepalesereturning to home country for vocational training program”. The primary
purpose of this project was to help Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal
gain some skills and training that could eventually help them secure a job
or pursue entrepreneurial opportunities in India and Nepal.

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Even though the Taiwanese government continued to use Chinese
nationalist ideology rhetoric such as “returning to the home country” andidentified Tibetans as “overseas Tibetans” or “Chinese minority nationalities”, it stopped providing citizenship for Tibetan refugees as it had
done in the first phase (Liu, 1996, pp. 187–188). The government
issued a regulation titled “Items governing the occupational training for
Tibetan youths emigrated from India and Nepal”, which clearly statedthe changed status of Tibetans in Taiwan. For instance, the Ministryof the Interior was no longer in charge of matters concerning ethnic
minorities, including Tibetan refugees. The selected candidate’s application for training was to be forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MFA), which would issue a visitor visa. The items also mentioned thatthe duration of the course should not be longer than one year at themost. After finishing the course, trainees must return to India or Nepal
within one week, and they were not eligible to apply for long-term residence in Taiwan under any circumstances (Hsu, 2001, pp. 134–135). The
government also abolished the “regulation of applying for the overseas
certificate” which could potentially help them apply for long-term residence or for the Taiwan national identity card. With this, the government
stopped treating Tibetan refugees as Chinese nationals but as foreigners(Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 2011).
In 1983, MTAC received the first batch of six Tibetans from Nepal fora car repair course, joined by a second batch in the same year for a cooking
course (Hsu, 2001, pp. 134–135). The duration of the first sixteen
batches was limited only to three months, and was later extended to six
months and then to one year. From 1983 to 1989, 235 Tibetans over
16 years old, from India and Nepal, entered Taiwan via this vocational
training programme (Liu, 1996, pp. 186–191). Gradually, when labour
shortages became a serious concern in Taiwan in the 1990s, the MTAC
started providing internships after training was completed. Consequently,
the training period was extended up to one year or more. From 1990
to 1993, in batches 17–20, 179 trainees were sent to work in various
factories. These internship programmes were aimed at helping the government with the labour shortage problem and also at helping Tibetans earnmoney to start businesses in India or Nepal. In 1992, the government
announced the Employment Service Act and, according to the regulation,

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MTAC’s internship programme did not meet requirements.4 Tibetan
refugees working in factories through the internship programme become
illegal. The MTAC found it hard to sustain the internship programmeand had to end it that year (Liu, 1996, pp. 192–194).
However, some Tibetan trainees, after completing the training
programme and working in factories, refused to return to India and Nepal
and stayed in Taiwan in the hope that they could seek asylum there.
There were several cases where Tibetan refugees were forced to become
illegal residents because the MTAC had collected their passports after theylanded in Taiwan and, when it was returned to them after completion of
the course, their visa had already expired (Taiwan Association for Human
Rights, 1999; Zhang et al., 2002, p. 63). Some, furthermore, went on toaccuse the MTAC of forcing them to come to Taiwan with fake promises
to provide jobs and citizenship (Shen & Chen, 2005, p. 18). There arealso the some cases where MTAC rejected Tibetan requests to return toIndia due to labour exploitation.
Tsering was a farmer in one of the Tibetan settlements in South
India. He came to Taiwan in 1989 with his wife, together with 40
other Tibetans, to join the vocational programme. After completing sometraining, he and his wife were sent to a glass factory in Hsinchu towork. They had no experience of working in a factory and did not speak
any Chinese language. They worked long hours at hundreds of degrees
Celsius making glass, earning 7000 NT dollars each as a monthly salary.
At that time, a young Tibetan woman died suddenly by accident in thefactory. This incident caused panic among Tibetan workers, plus there
were some Tibetans who also got sick because of the poor environment
at the workplace. Tsering and other Tibetans did not want to continue
working in the factory anymore and wanted to go back to India. Whenthe MTAC rejected their request, they decided to escape the factory
together (Pseudonym, personal communication, February 13, 2011).
During those years, Taiwan’s economy was booming, and factories
were facing labour shortages. The government opened up Taiwan toforeign labour to solve the problem. The situation was favourable for
Tibetans looking for another job as there was high demand for labour in
Taiwan. Tsering and his wife easily found another job at a motor factory.
4 The Employment Service Act defines only nationals, foreigners, and mainlanders as
being eligible to be employed in Taiwan. The government does not include Tibetan
refugees from India and Nepal in any of these categories.

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They worked ten hour and could earn up to 800 NT dollars a day. This
income was much better than for farming in India. They lived in thefactory’s hostel and seldom went out because they feared that the police
might catch them and send them back to India. They did not have any
residence permit documents. Therefore, they wanted to make the mostof their time in Taiwan to earn money so that they could send their children to a better school to study (Pseudonym, personal communication,
February 13, 2011).
Those overstayed Tibetans had found their way to survive and makemoney in Taiwan. However, for the Tibetan community in exile, coming
to Taiwan with the MTAC was not a sanctioned act and so they
were labelled as traitors (Tsering, 2022). Even though there were good
economic opportunities in Taiwan, the burden of being despised also
weighed heavily on Tibetan refugees.
2. Working illegally in Taiwan
When the MTAC stopped the vocational programme, the official
channel for Tibetans coming to Taiwan to work in factories was also
closed. However, in 1997, Taiwan’s first democratically elected president, Lee Teng-hui, bypassed the MTAC and invited the Dalai Lama to
Taiwan through “The Buddhist Association of the Republic of China”.
On this occasion, the Taiwanese people’s courtesy and respect for the
Dalai Lama contributed to changing the Tibetan exiles’ perception of
Taiwan from suspicion to trust. This reversed the image of Tibetans in
Taiwan amongst the exile community (Bawa, 2020, p. 43). On 16 April
1998, the CTA established the office of Religious Foundation of the Dalai
Lama in Taipei, which was a concrete political achievement resulting fromthe Dalai Lama’s visit to Taiwan (Tsering, 2022). In addition, the visit of
the Dalai Lama to Taiwan also washed away the stigma of those Tibetans
who came to Taiwan through the MTAC. The improvement of the relationship between the Taiwan government and CTA created the illusionthat Tibetan refugees could just take tourist visas to work in Taiwan andearn money (Tashi, 1997, pp. 80–81).
Inspired by the Dalai Lama’s visit to Taiwan, Tsering and other overstayed Tibetans appealed to the MTAC and the Taiwan government for
citizenship rights. In 1999, with the help of the Taiwan Association for
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MTAC to deliver their petition and to ask the MTAC to keep theirpromise of citizenship, which was long overdue. The petition reads asfollows:
From 1989 to 1992, MTAC officials came to South India, North India,
and Nepal to recruit Tibetan refugees to work in Taiwan. They explicitly
said that ’if you wish to come to Taiwan, we will arrange everything foryou, including passports. In Taiwan, we will find a job for each of you
and help you apply for ID cards with permanent residency’. So we left ourparents and family, with only a passport (that was given by the MTAC)
and an immigration certificate in hand, and a dream of a better life in
Taiwan. At that time, only a few of us were told to take the training
programme here. Most of us were informed that we would have a good
job and live a better life. The MTAC even promised to grant us ROC
ID cards. However, our passports and immigration certificates were taken
away by the MTAC after arriving in Taiwan. We were sent to factories towork in poor conditions. From then on, we became cheap labourers andlived an ambiguous life in Taiwan.
Although we did not have nationality in India or Nepal, we wererefugees and at least were admitted as legal foreigners. In Taiwan, however,
we are neither citizens of Taiwan nor refugees, and at worse we became
illegal. We cannot go back to our family in India or Nepal because we haveno passports. Thus, we are trapped and have had to live the past decadein fear and with no protection. We can only do odd jobs; we cannot ask
for medical help even when we need it; we are afraid of the police in thestreets, as we cannot explain to people our absurd situation. We cannot
seriously develop a relationship because having a legal marriage under suchcircumstances is impossible (Taiwan Association for Human Rights, 1999).

In 2001, 139 Tibetans received Taiwan’s ID with the help of local
human rights organisations and official legislators (Hsu, 2001). The
Dalai Lama, during his second visit to Taiwan in 2001, also appealed to
President Chen Shui-bian about these Tibetans. Although protests andpetitions solved the legal problem of Tibetans in Taiwan at that time, itcaused misunderstanding among Tibetan refugees that they could cometo Taiwan to work and earn money. Some people even borrowed money
to apply for passports to come to Taiwan through a human trafficking ring
(Shen & Chen, 2005). After they arrived in Taiwan, they often found outthat the reality was not what they had imagined. It turned out that they
were trapped in Taiwan, living a life hiding from the police by holding

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fake passports or overstaying (Shen & Chen, 2005) (Pseudonym, personalcommunication, May 12, 2023).
Tibetan refugees did not have the required qualifications for higherskilled jobs. Although it was easy for them to find work in factories, it wasdifficult for them to negotiate better wages or benefits because they wereillegal workers. Tibetan workers were often mistaken for foreign workers
or aboriginals due to their appearance, and were assigned to rough or
dangerous jobs (Shen & Chen, 2005, p. 90).
Kalsang’s working experience in Taiwan is a typical case among
Tibetans in the 1990s. He was born in India and his parents sold sweaters
during the winter in an Indian city. He helped with his parents’ businessbefore coming to Taiwan. After the Dalai Lama’s first visit to Taiwan in
1997, Kalsang came to Taiwan in 1998 with an Indian passport boughton the black market and 600 US dollars. His first job was in a textile
factory introduced to him by a Tibetan he knew in Taiwan. However, hefound it too difficult to keep up with the pace of the other workers andquit on the first day. He then worked in another factory but had to leave
because the police came to check. Finally, he worked in another textile
factory and earned 30,000 NT dollars a month(Pseudonym, personalcommunication, February 25, 2011).
In Kalsang’s experience, Tibetan refugees are amongst the hardestworking group in the factory compared to other foreign workers fromSouth Asian countries. Kalsang said, “This is not because Tibetans arenecessarily more diligent, but because we are working illegally. I neverknow when I will be caught, so I try my best to make money every day”
(Pseudonym, personal communication, February 25, 2011). Fortunately,
Kalsang was able to obtain a Taiwan ID in 2001 with the help of a petitiongroup in 19995 (Pan, 2015, pp. 50–52).
After getting the Taiwan ID, the 139 Tibetans could finally live
without fear and with no need to hide when working in Taiwan. While
5 In December 2008, another group of Tibetans came forward to turn themselves
into the police. This group was composed of runaway Tibetans who were not part ofthe petition group in 1999 due to poor dissemination of information. These overstayed
Tibetans came to Taiwan with tourist visas or fake IDs from India and Nepal. This groupof Tibetans was not as fortunate as the group in 1999. There were some new regulationsin applying for ROC citizenship, and this group of Tibetans was treated as foreigners inhaving to obtain an ARC. To obtain ROC ID, they had to provide evidence that they
had stayed for 183 days in Taiwan per year for more than five consecutive years or more
(Pan, 2015, pp. 50–52).

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Tibetan refugees had been actively seeking visas or legal residency in
Taiwan, the MFA pointed out that the situation of Tibetans staying in
Taiwan illegally was becoming quite serious, had “reached the level of
threatening border security and social peace” (Merit Times, 2007), andviolated the original intention of the policy of lenience towards Tibetans.
The government at the time was compelled to re-examine the applicablelaws for Tibetans coming to Taiwan (Merit Times, 2007).
Third Phase, 2000–Present: Tibetan Refugees as Stateless People
The third wave of Tibetan refugee migration to Taiwan occurred in
the post-democratic reform period. The experiences of Tibetans who
migrated to Taiwan during this period were different from those who
migrated during the first two phases, mainly because of the changed political situation in Taiwan. This phase had a number of distinct features.
First the great majority of Tibetans travelled to Taiwan without the
involvement of the MTAC. This meant that they were not recruited by
the MTAC and there was no political agenda behind their migration to
Taiwan. Second, instead of using fake Indian and Nepal passports, they
travelled using ICs issued by the Indian government. Third, since theDalai Lama’s first visit to Taiwan, there was a new demand for Tibetan
Buddhist masters (Fraser, 2018). The total number of Tibetan Buddhist
centres increased from 82 in 1996 to 473 in 2018. Also, the total numberof Tibetan Buddhist followers increased to approximately half a million(Own, 2018, pp. 3–4). The numbers of Taiwanese visiting Dharamsala,headquarters of the CTA and the Dalai Lama’s residence in exile, forboth religious and other purposes such as tourism, also increased, and,as a result, there were growing cases of transnational marriage between
Taiwanese and Tibetan refugees. The Director of the Dalai Lama’s Officein Dharamsala disclosed that every year for the Dalai Lama’s teaching,
about 1000–1500 Tibetan Buddhist followers from Taiwan visit Dharamsala (T. Ngawa, personal communication, October 19, 2020). Earlier on,
visits to Dharamsala from Taiwan were only limited to a few officers
from the MTAC (Tethong, 2006). In addition to monks and marriage
migrants, there are a few students from India who have also migrated to
Taiwan for educational purposes (D. Tsering, personal communication,
January 11, 2020). Therefore, in the post-democratic transformation
period, Tibetan migration to Taiwan largely constitutes monks, marriage
migrants, and students.

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Although Tibetan refugees can visit Taiwan with an IC, the Taiwan
government has tightened its borders for the migration of Tibetan
refugees. When the KMT regained power in the presidential election of
2008, the government amended the “Regulations Governing Visiting,Residency, and Permanent Residency of Aliens” (RGVRPR): The new
Article 6 of the residency regulation stated that
Stateless persons who entered Taiwan with a visitor visa may not apply forresidency. If a particular individual holds a valid visa whose duration of stayis at least 60 days and has not been prohibited from extending the durationof stay or any other restriction, or has special circumstances verified byother government agencies commissioned by competent authorities, thenthis individual shall not be excluded. (Ministry of Interior, 2008)

With this resolution, the status of Tibetan refugees was reduced fromforeigner to stateless. With the exception of staff members of the office ofthe religious foundation of the Dalai Lama, visitor visas that are issued toTibetans with ICs, and also some with Indian and Nepalese citizenship,
contain an additional note which states that the visa cannot be changed toother visas such as those for residence or work. This means that Tibetan
refugees in Taiwan cannot have the right to apply for a residence permit,
which causes complex problems while living in Taiwan (Pan, 2023). In
this section, we will illuminate those challenges.
1. Tibetan refugee students in Taiwan:
We explore the challenges that Tibetan refugee students face in Taiwan
through a personal experience shared by one of the authors of thischapter. We use the auto-ethnography6 method to reflect on Taiwan’s
immigration process and law related to Tibetan refugees who hold IndianICs.
After completing my PhD degree in India, I obtained a scholarshipfrom an NGO in Taiwan for studying the Chinese language. I visited the
Taiwan Economic and Culture Center in New Delhi for a visa application.

6 It is a research method that involves critical observation of a personal or individual
experience and connecting those experiences to study a particular situation or broader
political, cultural, or social concept. More about the method (Reed-Danahay, 2009).

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The office denied my application, reasoning that study visas are not applicable for IC holders according to Article 6 of the residency regulations.
Of course, there is no guideline available on government websites about
Tibetan refugees seeking to travel to Taiwan for education purposes.
Fortunately, I have a friend who had earlier faced the same problem.
With their help, I contacted the Taiwan and Tibet Human Rights
Networks (TTHRN), an NGO that works advocating for human rights
in Tibet and Taiwan. The NGO helps students connect with legislative members in Taiwan who are willing to help Tibetan refugees. The
legislative member will issue a letter of guarantee stating he/she will
be responsible for students while in Taiwan. This letter of guarantee isused by the NGO to apply for a visa for Tibetan refugee students at the
MFA. Based on the letter of guarantee, the MFA will issue a visitor visa.
If the MFA accepts the visa application, the office will notify the applicant, in this case the legislative member, and will provide the visa number.
After securing the visa number, the student can visit the Taiwan’s Taiwan
Economic and Culture Center residency in Delhi to apply for a visa. The
problem here is while some students are aware of the TTHRN, many
are not. Therefore, those who do not have an opportunity to contact
the TTHRN fail to obtain the visa. During one conversation, a Tibetan
student in Taiwan revealed that he wasted six months on a visa application as he was not aware of the TTHRN. The TECC does not provide
any clear guidelines on how to process the visa application, and does notgive reasons for declining a visa (Pseudonym, personal communication,
June 12, 2020).
After securing a visitor visa with the help of the TTHRN, I was able tojoin a Chinese language class. Generally, after three months in Taiwan,
foreigners are eligible to apply for an ARC residence permit, which
provides, in addition to a one-year residence permit, access to the government’s healthcare service, which is probably one of the most affordable
healthcare services in the world (Numbeo, 2019). An ARC also allows theforeign student the right to take a part-time job and it serves as an identification certificate for foreigners in Taiwan. However, the visitor visa that
I obtained had a note stating “This visa is not changeable for a resident
visa”. Based on Article 6 of the residency regulations, I am not eligible forthe right to residency and consequently I am not allowed to have a parttime job and do not have access to affordable medical insurance provided
by the government.

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Additionally, regardless of the duration of the language programme, I
was eligible only for six months visa, which meant I had to leave Taiwan
every six months and come back with a new visa. This costs me about3000 US dollars every year only in travel expenses. Therefore, for people
like me, the Covid pandemic was a blessing in disguise because, after the
closure of the border, I did not have to leave Taiwan every six months.
This saved me huge amount of travel expenses and meant I could avoid
another lengthy bureaucratic process in India for exit permits to travel
outside India. However, the Covid pandemic left stateless people like meamong Taiwan’s most vulnerable groups of foreigners. The ARC, residence permit was a prerequisite for foreigners seeking to apply for vaccinesand even for Covid tests. Taiwan’s government later used the Unique
Identity number to allow foreigners without an residence permit to apply
for a Covid vaccine, but it was delayed for the first few months of theCovid pandemic outbreak.
After completing two years of Chinese language courses, I joined
National Cheng Kung University as post-doctoral researcher. Even after
the Ministry of Labour provided me with a work permit, the immigration office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied me residence
permit, reasoning that I was stateless. After several months petitioning
various institutions, such as Executive Yuan, the MFA, and the immigration office, with the help of the CTA representative office in Taiwan andlegislative members, I became the first Tibetan refugee who was not an
employee of the CTA to be able to work in Taiwan with both a work
permit and an ARC residence permit.
2. Tibetan refugee monks in Taiwan: The case of Geshe Tenzin
In contrast to Tibetan refugee students, the Taipei Economic andCulture Center provides clear guidelines for the application of visas for
Tibetan monks (Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, ROC-Taiwan, 2023). However, they are entitled only to a two to
three months visa. This means, regardless of the duration of their religious
activities in Taiwan, every two months Tibetan refugee monks should
leave Taiwan and come back with a new visa. They are also not eligible toapply for the residence permit. Additionally, monks should go for a visa
interview that is not required for other applicants like students.

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Geshe Tenzin (Tenzin, personal communication, April 25, 2023)
entered Taiwan with an IC in early 2016 to take part in religious
teaching organised by a Taiwanese-Tibetan Buddhist centre. Since then,he continued to receive invitations from various centres and has been
living in Taiwan with a visitor visa that is valid only for two to threemonths. This means that every two months, he has to leave Taiwan andcome back with a new visa. Generally, he travelled to Thailand because
it was cheaper and because this did not require an exit permit from theIndian government, which in itself takes about two months to obtain. It
was financially difficult for Geshe to travel five or six times a year, and also
sometimes caused psychological distress.
As a consequence of these visa troubles, Geshe applied for an Indian
passport in 2019 after surrendering his registration certificate (aka refugeecertificate) and IC issued by the Indian government. Geshe hoped thatafter obtaining Indian citizenship, he would be able to apply for an residence permit as a foreigner, but the government refused to give him
a residence permit. Geshe continued to face similar problems those ofstateless Tibetans in Taiwan.
Taiwan has already granted resident visas for other religious practitioners but Tibetan monks with Indian, Nepalese, and Bhutanese citizenships continue to face the same challenges as stateless citizens (Bureau ofConsular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC [Taiwan], 2017). On
6 June 2023, Tibetan monks launched a press conference which called
for the Taiwan government’s fair treatment of Tibetan Buddhist monks(Taiwan International Tibetan Buddhist Association, 2023). American
Institute in Taiwan publishes annual reports about human rights in
Taiwan and unfair treatment of Tibetan monks was mentioned as oneof the issues (American Institute in Taiwan, 2019).
3. Taiwan-Tibet transnational marriage: The case of Tsai Yung-chingand Lhundup Tsering
In November 2020, a group of non-governmental organisations in
Taiwan including the TTHRN, Students for a Free Tibet (Taiwan), and
the Association of Visual Arts in Taiwan, organised a talk that discussed

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transnational marriage between Tibetan refugees and Taiwanese.7 The
main speaker Tsai Yung-ching, a documentary filmmaker, married her
Tibetan husband Lhundup Tsering. She visited Dharamsala in 2004 tointerview the Dalai Lama. Tsai made her second visit to India in 2005
and met her future husband, Lhundup Tsering, who was living in India asa refugee. After their marriage in 2008, Tsai Yung-Ching and Lhundup
Tsering were preparing to relocate to Taiwan; however, because of his
status as “stateless”, Lhundup Tsering was only able to acquire a visitor
visa to Taiwan, which allowed him to stay with his family for only six
months a year. The lack of a right to residential status for Tibetan refugee
spouses triggered a forceful separation of the family (Pan, 2016).
In 2011, Tsai, along with twelve other Taiwanese-Tibetan families,
formed the Taiwan-Tibet Family Human Rights Alliance (Taiwanese andTibetan Family Rights Association, n.d.), and started petitioning for residential rights for Tibetan spouses. In July 2012, the government set up
guidelines for the review of applications filed by Tibetan spouses who holdIndian ICs, to allow them to apply for residency under certain conditions.
The conditions that holders of Indian ICs must meet to qualify for thistype of visa were: being in a registered marriage of at least three years
and having been in the country for more than 183 days in each of thethree most recent years. Those who have biological children in Taiwan
only needed to meet a two-year condition.8
After seven years of petitions and demonstrations, the Executive Yuan
repealed the regulation for Tibetan spouses with Indian ICs in 2017
(Immigration Services, Ministry of Interior, ROC-Taiwan, 2017). Finally,
Tibetan refugee spouses in Taiwan were eligible to apply for the ARC and,after staying in Taiwan continuously for three years, could apply for citizenship. It was originally a right enjoyed by foreign spouses in Taiwan,
but it took a long time for Taiwan and Tibetan families to obtain it (Kunget al., 2020; Pan, 2016).

7 Dolma Tsering took part in the talk and later published a report of the talk (Tsering,2020).
8 The Executive Yuan has stipulated the “Joint Review Guidelines of the Applicationof Residence by Tibetan Spouse with Indian IC Married with Taiwanese” to deal withthe problem (https://themefile.culture.tw/file/2019-04-17/2259a6ae-f96b-499c-98f59cc6161a95fa/06%20政府放寬持印度IC旅行證之國人藏族配偶在臺居留條件......藏事處.
pdf).

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Conclusion
Tibetan refugees holding Indian ICs can apply for political asylum
following international refugee laws in Europe and the United States,
and can then become citizens of those countries (Hess, 2009). Due tohistorical and political factors, Tibetan refugees have had certain links
with Taiwan. Considering that Taiwan does not have a refugee law andis not a signatory member of the United Nations’ 1959 convention on
refugees and its 1969 protocols, the lived experiences of Tibetan refugees
in Taiwan are unique compared to other countries. This chapter underscores various experiences of Tibetan refugees in Taiwan with a particularfocus on rights to residence, work, and citizenship. Different stages of thepolitical system present different ways in which Taiwan treats Tibetans,and it also directly affects the lives of Tibetans in Taiwan.
As shown in the first phase of Tibetan migration to Taiwan, Tibetan
refugees were able to obtain citizenship rights because of the KMTgovernment’s policy that advocated Tibet as part of the ROC-Taiwan
and Tibetan as one of the ethnic minorities. The first two groups, theTibetan resistance force and the secret 32 guerrilla forces, were recruitedwith the plan to launch a military attack on the CPC. The TCH aimed tocreate an ethnic minority cadre for the future ROC. The Tibetan refugees
were used by the KMT government as propaganda for its anti-communist
missions and also to legitimise the ROC-Taiwan as the sole representativeof China.
When Taiwan entered the stage of democratic transition and economic
development, in addition to propaganda value, Tibetan refugees became
an important source of cheap labour to support labour shortages in
Taiwanese factories. As discussed in the second phase, the government
abandoned the overseas Chinese category for Tibetan refugees and subsequently revoked their right to obtain citizenship. Tibetans recruited by
the MTAC during this phase were treated as foreigners and had toget a visa from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enter Taiwan. Fakepromises to provide jobs and citizenship forced refugees to become illegal
immigrants and cheap labour in Taiwan’s booming factories.
Due to the Dalai Lama’s visit to Taiwan and the democratisationof Taiwan, which have brought a breakthrough in the relationshipbetween Taiwan and CTA, Tibetan refugees no longer need to cometo Taiwan through MTAC. However, the Taiwan government started

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treating Tibetan refugees as stateless. In consideration of national security concerns, the government imposed strict scrutiny and restrictions on
Tibetan refugees entering Taiwan. The government enacted a law thatprohibited Tibetans from obtaining the right to residence, work, and citizenship. With their new status as stateless, Tibetan refugees were denied
residence visas, working rights, and access to healthcare, as showed in theexperiences of Geshe Tenzin, Tibetan students, and marriage migrants.
In conclusion, the Taiwan government has treated Tibetan refugees
as compatriots, overseas Chinese, foreigners, and stateless people indifferent political stages. While Tibetan refugees have gained citizenship by serving the state’s Chinese nationalist ideology, they have also
been considered stateless and unable to obtain a residence visa due tonational security concerns. This chapter illustrated the lived experienceof Tibetan students, economic migrants, and Tibetan Buddhist monks,
who encounter discriminatory treatment by the government. Althoughnational security is an important consideration, human rights protectionis the responsibility of a modern democratic country. Therefore, under
the consideration of national security, it is also necessary to take into
account the protection of human rights. That is a problem that Taiwan,
as a modern democratic country, must face and solve.
Acknowledgements This research is supported by the National Science andTechnology Council, NSTC-112-2811-H-A49-500.

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CHAPTER 12“I Am Still a Refugee!” Displacement
and Transnational Activism
Shu-Fen Lin

Introduction
In the summer of 1979, Nguyễn Văn Hùng, who was born and raised
in a family that had resettled in South Vietnam since 1954, successfully
escaped Vietnam and was ultimately rescued by a Norwegian gas carrierin the treacherous South China Sea. Following his rescue, he resided ina refugee camp in Japan for two and half years before embarking on his
studies at a Columban seminary in Sydney Australia. In 1988, he madehis first visit to Taiwan to participate in a two-year Overseas Training
Programme and returned again upon his ordination in 1991. Since then,he has become a prominent advocate for migrant rights and a respected
community organiser.
Based on Father Nguyễn’s life history, this chapter is divided into twoparts, each delving into different aspects of his journey and activism.
The first part chronicles Father Nguyễn and his family’s experiences as
they navigated a life of constant displacement and precarity in war-torn

S.-F. Lin (B)National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan
e-mail: shufenlin@nycu.edu.tw© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_12

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Vietnam during the late 1950s and 1970s. It illustrates their struggle forsurvival amidst the violence and their perilous sea voyage in search ofa new life. Moreover, it explores Father Nguyễn’s engagement in political activism as a refugee in Japan and Australia, shedding light on his
resilience and determination.
The second part of this chapter shifts its focus to Father Nguyễn’s
dedication to advocating for migrant rights and his involvement incommunity-organising activities in Taiwan. It highlights his encounter
with different waves of Vietnamese migrants, and the emergence ofa Vietnamese diasporic community since the 1990s. Furthermore, it
traces Father Nguyễn’s persistent efforts in transnational networking,which have played a crucial role in fostering collaboration, support, andcollective actions across national borders.
The primary source of material for this chapter is derived from extensive in-depth life history interviews. These interviews spanned 15 sessions,taking place between November 2019 and May 2023, with an average
duration of two hours per session. As a result, approximately 33 hours ofrecorded and transcribed conversations were accumulated. It is importantto acknowledge that while the chapter utilises the life history approachand centres on Father Nguyễn, it does not seek to generalise his individual life experience to represent Vietnamese refugees as a whole. Sucha generalisation would oversimplify the complexities and variations within
refugee communities. However, Father Nguyễn’s life history offers aunique perspective that enables an exploration of the broader social andhistorical contexts in which not only his own journey but also the journeysof others have unfolded and intersected.
As Ken Plummer (1983) aptly argues, the life history approach requires
a continuous interweaving “between the changing biographical historyof the person and the social history of his or her life-span” (p. 70). To
demonstrate how the personal and the social, or the micro and macro,interact and influence each other, and to provide a more contextualised
analysis of Father Nguyễn’s life experience, this chapter enriches thenarrative by cross-referencing and supplementing his personal accounts
with a carefully selected group of scholarly literature on the Vietnam
War, along with research in the fields of refugee studies and migration studies. Additionally, relevant government documents, statistics, andnewspapers are consulted whenever appropriate. By integrating thesediverse sources, the chapter aims to provide a nuanced understanding

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of how the interplay between human agency, and the evolving geopolitical configurations and refugee/migration regimes in different historicalcontexts, has profoundly shaped the trajectory and experiences of FatherNguyễn and his contemporaries.

Displacement and Resettlement
Northern Immigrants in South Vietnam
In addition to the temporary division of Vietnam into the North andthe South, and the agreement to hold national general elections before
July 1956, the Geneva Accords, signed between France, the “Việt Minh”(League for the Independence of Vietnam), and other involved parties,
included a provision that allowed civilians to freely move between the two
Vietnams within 300 days after the signing of the agreement. Despite
the fact that this provision was strongly influenced by the intervention of the Eisenhower administration, motivated by its anti-communist
stance (Catton, 2015), it set off the “Great Migration” (Cuộc Di Cu, Vı̃Ðại), the largest population movement in Vietnam’s history within the
shortest period of time. From 1954 to 1956, with assistance from France,
the United States, the Soviet Union, and Poland, over 800,000 northerners, predominantly Catholics, who later became known as “Northern
immigrants” (Bắc Di Cu,) or the “Northern fifty-four” (Bắc Năm Tu,),
migrated to the South. Simultaneously, approximately 120,000 individuals, mainly Việt Minh members and sympathisers, moved to the North(Goscha, 2016, p. 280; Hansen, 2009, pp. 178–79).
The division and subsequent Great Migration marked the beginning ofan era characterised by what scholars have referred to as “internal transnationalism” (Hardy, 2004; Hansen, 2009, pp. 174–75). The phenomenonof internal displacement was further exacerbated by the direct militaryinterventions of the US beginning in 1964. As the conflict escalated,urban residents in the North sought refuge in rural areas to evadebombing raids, while villagers in the South were displaced due to intensive bombings in mountainous regions and rural areas or were relocatedto cities as part of counterinsurgency tactics (Dang et al., 1997, p. 318).
Samuel Huntington, an American political scientist and proponent of theVietnam War, referred to this process as “forced urbanisation” or “forced
modernisation” through the “liquidation of the countryside”, viewing it
as a form of “creative destruction” (Biggs, 2018, p. 134; Gawthorpe,

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2018, p. 315). Indeed, according to a report by the US Agency forInternational Development, during the peak years of the war between
1965 and 1969, approximately 3.2 million people, accounting for onefifth of the South Vietnamese population, experienced displacement atsome point (Vong, 2020, p. 76). Evidently, the “Operation Passage to
Freedom” implemented by the US during the Great Migration did notshield Northern immigrants from the ravages of the war.
Both of Hùng’s parents were typical Northern immigrants, originatingfrom Nghệ An, a province located in central Vietnam which became partof North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) in 1954. NghệAn had long been under the control of the Việt Minh. To resist theViệt Minh, many local Catholics were enlisted into the militia led bya Vietnamese Bishop, while also serving in the French military, which
had led to accusations of collaboration (Hansen, 2009, p. 179). Hùng’s
father joined the French Navy in 1946 at the age of 16. Following the
French defeat in 1954, he left the navy, briefly worked as a fisherman, andeventually relocated to the South alone.
In contrast to Hùng’s father, Hùng’s mother migrated to the South
with her family. Motivated by the harrowing memory of the famine
during the final days of the Japanese occupation (1940–1945), their
Catholic background, and Hùng’s grandfather’s service in the French
Navy, the family saw an opportunity for a new life in the South. Initially,
Hùng’s grandmother had to travel from Nghệ An to Hải Phòng, themajor French naval base, with three children in tow, to join her husband.
They had to travel at night under the cover of darkness to avoid being
mistaken for Việt Minh members by the French. Despite the challenges,
the family persevered and ultimately was reunited, boarding a French
vessel bound for the South.
Notwithstanding the varied reasons for leaving the North (Hansen,2009) and the mixed reception from the government of South Vietnam(Republic of Vietnam) towards northern Catholic refugees (Biggs, 2012,
pp. 164–67; Nguyễn, 2017), people from the same parishes tended tostick together and provide mutual support. For instance, the family of
Hùng’s mother, along with fellow parishioners, received assistance from
Missions Étrangères de Paris (M.E.P.) upon their arrival in the South andlater established a new parish in the coastal city of Bình Tuy. As for Hùng’s
father, thanks to a connection from his village, he secured employment asa crew member on a transport ship for RMK-BRJ, a construction consortium established by the United States Navy to support military operations

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that involved a simultaneous process of “construction and destruction”
on an unprecedented scale in South Vietnam (Carter, 2008, pp. 157–58).
Hùng was born in 1958 while his family resided in the fishing village of
La Gi. In 1965, Hùng’s father began working for RMK-BRJ, prompting
the family to move to Gò Vấp, on the outskirts of Saigon. Hùng recallsthat the forests surrounding their neighbourhood were teeming with ViệtCộng, an armed communist guerrilla force in South Vietnam, leading
to occasional arrests of villagers suspected of affiliations with the ViệtCộng. Hùng frequently heard gunshots and stray bullets while playing
with other children in the forests. The constant presence of helicoptersand the sounds of falling bullets could also be clearly heard from his
home. Most of the time, Hùng’s school was occupied by allied troops
from the United States, South Vietnam, South Korea, and Australia.
Gò Vấp was one of the targets in the 1968 Tet Offensive, a significant military campaign initiated by North Vietnam and Việt Cộng forces
during the Vietnamese New Year holiday (Goscha, 2016, pp. 331–33).
Around the same time, Hùng’s father and his co-workers were attacked
and narrowly escaped death during one operation. In the aftermath ofthese events, Hùng’s family decided to return to La Gi around 1970.
Unfortunately, even La Gi was not a safe place. Hùng vividly recalls thetense atmosphere during the two or three years leading up to his father’s
passing in mid-April 1975. Gunshots would echo in the sky nearly every
night, and the village was constantly filled with the scent of burning
incense for the deceased. It became commonplace to witness villagers
donning white cloths on their heads as a symbol of mourning. To seek
refuge from air raids, Hùng and his brothers often had to carry their ailing
father to the fields.
Prior to the takeover of their province, Bình Tuy, by the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (1969–1976) in late April 1975, the wealthier relatives of Hùng’s family had
already departed for Nha Trang, Phan Thiết, and other major US militarysites, or had sought safer locations in the South. Although Hùng’s father
had previously worked for the RMK-BRJ, his family did not belong to thegroup of approximately 65,000 Vietnamese with the closest ties to the
US who were “evacuated” in April 1975, nor were they among the other
65,000 Vietnamese who managed to escape on their own (Loescher &Scanlan, 1986, p. 111).
For those who remained or were left behind, life underwent a drasticchange. In Hùng’s case, he was denied the opportunity to attend college,

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likely due to his family’s Catholic background and his father’s “USconnections”. Additionally, his seminary studies were abruptly halted dueto the new policy of household registration. Hùng observed his friends,
one by one, starting to “vanish” as they fled abroad. Despite his own
desire to leave, he lacked the financial means and was deterred by the
terrifying sight of the “shark-man” (sharks that spit out human hands
and legs) at the beach. Moreover, his mother repeatedly warned him
against risking his life. However, driven by the lack of freedom in Vietnam
and his brother’s conscription into the war in Cambodia, Hùng eventually became determined to flee. Over the next two years, Hùng lived alife divided between farming and fishing, all the while making numerous
attempts to escape with close relatives and friends. After seven or eight
failed attempts, Hùng finally succeeded in the summer of 1979.
“Boat People” Across the South China Sea
On 27 July 1979, Hùng joined 55 fellow Vietnamese on a perilous
journey across the South China Sea, desperately seeking freedom anda new life in a new land. They crowded onto a cramped fishing boatthat was a mere eight and a half metres long and two and a half metreswide. With limited supplies of fuel, food, and drinking water, they had
provisions that would last for about a week (“Shi mo kakugo shi ni
shukkoku”, 1979). For maritime Vietnamese refugees, the South China
Sea was a treacherous and life-or-death liminal space they had to navigate.
Regardless of the condition of their vessels, the chosen routes, or the ultimate destination, their survival hinged on safely reaching a neighbouring
Southeast Asian country or being rescued by other ships in time.
As the Indochina refugee crisis unfolded in the late 1970s, the dangersof the sea became a grim reality for those fleeing the country. In responseto the crisis, the International Chamber of Shipping, urged by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), called on shipmasters to fulfil their obligations in undertaking rescue operations at sea(Goodwin-Gill, 2017, pp. 17–18). At the same time, the UNHCR Executive Committee reiterated that “it is the humanitarian obligation of all
coastal states to allow vessels in distress to seek haven in their waters
and to grant asylum, or at least temporary refuge, to persons on board
wishing to seek asylum” (Trevisanut, 2008, p. 210). However, despite
these appeals, the chances of Vietnamese maritime refugees, commonly
known as “boat people”, being rescued by merchant ships were low. It

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was estimated that up to 10% of these refugees perished at sea, neverreaching the shores (Wain, 1981, p. 83). As Patricia Nguyễn (2017)
poignantly underscores, “Vietnamese refugees existed in a state of suspension, where the delicate balance between life and death was governedby the precarious conditions of the ocean and the conflicting claims ofnation-states and multi-state entities” (p. 96).
In Hùng’s case, as they ventured into the open sea, despite theefforts of some on the boat to attract attention by burning clothes,and the boat captain taking the risk of damaging the engine to catch
up with the passing ships, Hùng and other refugees were still disregarded. Fortunately, after drifting at sea for about 36 hours, they were
rescued by a Norwegian liquefied petroleum gas carrier named Mundogas
Atlantic, which had recently departed from Singapore and was en routeto Mizushima Port in Japan. Hùng remembers that when their boat waslifted several stories high by the storm and sank rapidly, they were unawareof the approaching super typhoon. It was an extremely close call. Hùngbelieves that had Mundogas Atlantic not reached out in time, they would
not have survived the second night at sea. Ironically, the typhoon they
narrowly escaped was the super typhoon “Hope”. Just a few days after
their rescue, Typhoon Hope struck Hong Kong and Macau. Reports indicate that five refugee boats were allowed to dock in Hong Kong aheadof the storm, while the Macau government rejected three other boats
seeking refuge. Tragically, around 400 people, along with their hopes,
perished in the storm (NOAA, 1979, p. 370; Ngai, 1979).
It is important to note that sea rescues often triggered a complex
negotiation process involving multiple parties, including the countryof departure, coastal states, port states, destination countries, and thecountries or flag states of the ships carrying refugees. Each country
held different perspectives on search and rescue operations in different
maritime regions, leading to debates regarding the legal authority of individual nations to deny entry to refugees (Trevisanut, 2008, pp. 206–7).
According to Hùng, with 56 Vietnamese refugees on board, Mundogas
Atlantic was initially denied entry to Japan. Hùng and his fellow Vietnamese were only allowed to disembark under the condition that they allleft Japan and resettled in third countries, and the Norwegian government
had to ensure their resettlement.

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Being a de Facto Refugee in Japan and Australia
Due to its geographical distance from Vietnam, the majority of maritime
refugees who arrived in Japan during the Indochina refugee crisis were
rescued at sea by Japanese or other foreign ships before being brought
to Japan, including Okinawa. According to Hashimoto (2019), “theterm ‘refugee’ did not exist in Japanese domestic law until accession to
the Refugee Convention in 1981, and no public entity had the statutory authority, mandate, or budget to provide assistance for refugees ordisplaced persons. Assistance to Indo-Chinese refugees was almost entirely
reliant upon private charities” (p. 134). Also, in the early stages, it wasnoted that refugees rescued by Japanese vessels were relatively more likely
to receive special permission to land in Japan compared to those rescuedby foreign vessels. For the latter, the country of registration of the vessel
had to confirm its willingness to accept the refugees. The situation became
even more intricate in cases involving “flags of convenience” (“Nanmin,
yatto jouriku”, 1977).
Consequently, refugees faced the risk of being denied entry into Japan
without guaranteed resettlement in other countries. This was the caseeven when NGOs like Caritas Japan were volunteering to serve as guarantors and provide asylum facilities. A notable example of this occurredin 1976 when a cargo ship flagged by Malaysia, carrying Vietnamese fishermen and their families, was denied entry by the Yokohama Immigration
Office due to the Malaysian government’s refusal to guarantee it as areceiving country (“Chō no jōriku fukyoka”, 1976). Furthermore, evenin cases where the Japanese government agreed to offer temporary shelter,
refugees were denied “permanent residence” status. This policy, however,began to change in 1978 (“Nanmin, hajimete teijū”, 1978).
Prior to 1978 when the issue of maritime refugees, particularly thoseof overseas Chinese descent, escalated in Southeast Asian countries,
and reports of deterred refugee boats became increasingly common,
neither the United States nor the international community had adequately
addressed the refugee crisis. However, as the internationalisation of the
Indochina refugee problem started to gain momentum, Indochinese
refugees, and the Vietnamese “boat people” in particular, became subjectsof geopolitical and even geo-economic considerations (Loescher &Scanlan, 1986, pp. 102–46). This shift brought about competitions andcollaborations in the realms of international humanitarianism, refugee

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diplomacy, geopolitical deployment, and economic developments, culminating in the UN conference on refugees in Geneva in July 1979. During
this conference, alongside the implementation of the Orderly Departure
Program (ODP), agreements were reached to establish first-asylums andprocessing centres in several Southeast Asian countries. Most notably,
Indochinese refugees were granted an exceptional status. Rather than
individually identifying each person fleeing Indochina as a Convention
refugee, they were collectively recognised as prima facie refugees or“refugees of direct concern to the UNHCR” (Cutts, 2000, pp. 84, 86;
Robinson, 1998, p. 51).
In response to growing international pressure, the Japanese government eventually collaborated with the UNHCR, the United States, and
ASEAN countries to address the refugee crisis. As part of these efforts,
Japan increased its contributions to the UNHCR’s assistance programmes
for Indochinese refugees and provided substantial financial and technical aid for establishing refugee processing centres in Indonesia andthe Philippines (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 144). In addition, the
UNHCR opened a branch office in Tokyo in August 1979 (“Nihon ni
mo shibu kaisetsu”, 1979), and the Japanese government took significant
steps towards resettlement by enacting a series of cabinet approvals andsetting up the Refugee Headquarters in the same year (Hashimoto, 2019,p. 134).
This initiative granted subsidies, allowances, and de facto refugee status
to refugees, and it facilitated family reunification for resettled Vietnamese
under the ODP framework. Between 1975 and 1995, Japan received
11,071 boat people and resettled 8,803 Indochinese refugees (Cutts,
2000, p. 98), bolstering its role as a prominent Asian country in refugee
resettlement. Yet, as Hashimoto (2019) observes, Japan’s refugee policy
created a “stratification of rights and entitlements” (p. 128). Despite
adhering to the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees in 1981, the Refugee Headquarters initially limited support
to refugees from Indochina, only broadening its assistance to include
Convention refugees in 2003 (p. 135).
Upon Hùng’s arrival in Japan in 1979, the Japanese government had
just recently begun adopting a more humanitarian, though still somewhat ad hoc, approach to refugee issues. Shortly after Hùng and theother refugees were transported to Caritas Japan-operated refugee camps
in Fujisawa City and Kamakura, they were prompted to decide on their
future destinations based on an agreement between Japan and Norway.

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As Hùng’s family had no relatives abroad, they were ineligible for the
ODP. By the end of 1979, all of Hùng’s family, except for him, were
resettled in Norway. Hùng, having been accepted into the Missionary
Society of Saint Columban, faced a choice of attending seminary in the
United States, Ireland, or Australia. He ultimately chose Australia, thefirst country to offer him resettlement. Consequently, Hùng remained inJapan for another two and a half years before enrolling at Saint Columban
seminary in Sydney in 1982.
During his time at the Misono refugee camp in Japan, Hùng and otherrefugees received limited support from the Japanese government and had
to rely on their own efforts for livelihood. Hùng undertook various lowpaying jobs, such as welding, machine operation, customer service, grave
digging, and construction work. He faced workplace discrimination andother challenges, but found solace and support among the Vietnamese
community in Japan. This included students who had arrived before 1975
and volunteered at refugee camps, as well as members of advocacy groups
like the Free Vietnamese (Ngu,ời Việt Tu, Do), who championed thehuman rights of Vietnamese people.
Hùng engaged in these community activities, representing his camp,and later discovering that some senior students were part of the National
United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (NUFLVN), a politicalgroup of Vietnamese refugees in the US, advocating for liberation from
communist rule. He actively participated in events organised by the Free
Vietnamese, including protests at the embassy of the Democratic Republicof Vietnam in Tokyo on dates like International Human Rights Day and
30 April, the anniversary of the Fall of Saigon. Additionally, Hùng was
involved in fundraising led by Father Cathal Gallaher, a Columban priest,
to improve the Misono camp. His time in Japan was transformative,
marking the start of his commitment to social and political advocacy.
On 12 April 1982, Hùng left Japan and embarked on his journey toAustralia. At that time, Australia’s refugee policies under Prime Minister
Malcom Fraser, were lauded as proactive, generous, effective, and humanitarian (Stats, 2015, pp. 70–1). However, these policies were also viewed
as “primarily motivated by fear of the political consequences of an uncontrolled refugee influx, and was a reactive rather than principled response”(Stats, 2015, p. 75). Despite its geographical proximity to Vietnam and its
promises to provide “refuge, security, freedom, and hope” (Stats, 2015,
p. 74), Australia had implemented a “forward selection” policy, prioritising refugees from first-asylum camps over those arriving directly at its

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borders. As Michael MacKellar, then Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs, candidly expressed in 1978:
We give first priority to family reunion, second priority to people whohave been associated with or worked with Australians in the region, third
priority to those with skills useable in Australia and fourth priority to
special compassionate cases. (Stats, 2015, p. 80)

As noted, the Geneva conference agreement recognised Indochinese
refugees collectively as de facto refugees, bypassing individual assessments.
Nonetheless, this did not eliminate criteria or processes for transitioning
from temporary to permanent resettlement. It is unclear under which
category Hùng would have fallen for resettlement in Australia. However,
had he not pursued priesthood and been accepted by the Columban
Society, he would have been required to go to Norway with his family.
Australia’s practice of “forward selection” of refugees from first-asylum
camps set a precedent for later policies such as the “outsourcing ofasylums and offshore processing” (Stats, 2015, p. 84), assessing asylum
seekers outside Australia before granting entry. As Jana Lipman accurately points out, “[re]settlement countries like the United States, Canada
and Australia receive disproportionate attention in refugee crises at theexpense of first-asylum sites” (2020, p. 5).
Arriving in Sydney in 1982, Hùng initially resided at the Endeavour
Hotel, a Vietnamese refugee reception centre. Due to his involvement in
the “Free Vietnamese” movement and other political and social activities during his time in Japan, Hùng quickly became a prominent figure
within the Vietnamese community in Sydney. He was invited to speakat an annual commemorative event organised by overseas Vietnamese on
30 April, where he presented the NUFLVN statement. Despite efforts toclarify his role, many still mistakenly perceive him as a representative of
NUFLVN. Nevertheless, these experiences significantly contributed to his
political activism in Sydney.
In Australia, Hùng balanced seminary studies and English courses,
funded by the Australian government, with community involvement. He
helped organise a Vietnamese youth choir that symbolised solidarity andpatriotism, while also participating in fundraising for community causes.
Moreover, Hùng, along with a group of seven or eight friends, regularly contributed articles to The Resistance, a Vietnamese community
newspaper based in the US but circulated monthly in Australia. Their

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articles covered cultural events and protests organised by the Vietnamese
community in Sydney against Vietnam’s human rights violations. Hùngconsistently stressed the importance of remaining politically engaged andfostering unity within the Vietnamese community.
Hùng’s role in building the Vietnamese refugee community andpromoting transnational actions in Australia laid the foundation for his
subsequent activism in Taiwan. He viewed his endeavours in Taiwan as anatural extension of his experiences in Australia, rather than an entirely
new undertaking. However, as the following section will demonstrateHùng’s engagement with the Vietnamese community in Taiwan differednotably from his time in Japan and Australia.

Vietnamese Community Organising
and Transnational Activism
The First Encounter
When Hùng first arrived in Taiwan in 1988 to participate in an Overseas
Training Programme as part of his seminary education, the international community’s stance towards Vietnamese refugees had undergone
a noticeable shift since the consensus reached during the 1979 Geneva
conference. The increasing number of refugees struggling to secure resettlement in third countries led to overcrowding in the first-asylums inSoutheast Asia and a revival of the policy of pushing refugee boats backinto international waters. The challenge was further compounded by thedecision of Hong Kong government to individually screen refugee, effectively reclassifying “boat people” from de facto refugees to asylum seekers.
Consequently, some were repatriated to Vietnam after being “screenedout” (Lipman, 2020, pp. 161–200).
The situation in Taiwan reflected some aspects of these changes.
Despite not being a United Nations member since 1972 and not
directly involved in the international response to the Indochinese refugee
problem in the late 1970s, the government of the Republic of China(ROC) expressed support for Vietnamese refugees and launched ananti-communist propaganda campaign due to its diplomatic setbacks atthat time. While the actual efforts were relatively limited, approximately
15,284 refugees received assistance between 1975 and 1992 (Huang,
2019, p. 180). Among them were 3939 ethnic Chinese Vietnamese who
fled Vietnam from April to July 1975, as well as 2740 overseas Chinese

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students from Vietnam, Burma, and Laos who were already in Taiwan(Huang, 2019, p. 171). They comprised the first group of returning overseas Chinese aided by the ROC government immediately after the war.
Additionally, another group of 6777 Chinese Vietnamese were “repatriated” to Taiwan through chartered flights intermittently under the“Ren Der Project” between 1976 and 1992 (Huang, 2019, p. 173).
The Indochina Refugee Reception Centre in Penghu, operational from1977 to 1988, provided shelter to 2,098 Vietnamese refugees, bothethnic Chinese and Vietnamese, with 231eventually finding resettlement
in Taiwan (Huang, 2019, p. 178).
The ROC government initially established task forces to assist Vietnamese refugees, offering affordable housing, allowances, and employment training to Chinese Vietnamese refugees who were evacuated withgovernment support. Maritime refugees accommodated at the reception
centre in Penghu received daily allowances and assistance for resettlement in third countries (Huang, 2019, pp. 94, 178). However, around
1982, the ROC government implemented the “Pacification Program”
to counter the perceived exploitation of “refugee tactics” by mainland China, altering the perception of “boat people” from symbols ofanti-communism to potential security threats. Unfortunately, this shift
culminated in the tragic killing of 20 Vietnamese refugees by the Little
Kinmen Garrison on 7 March 1987 (Control Yuan, 2022).
The difference in the backgrounds of the Vietnamese refugees Hùngencountered in Taiwan compared to those he met in Japan and Australia
can be attributed to Taiwan’s refugee policy. In Taiwan, a majority of
the resettled refugees who arrived after the Vietnam War and the SinoVietnamese border conflicts were of Chinese descent. However, during
his internship, Hùng still had the opportunity to meet a small groupof non-Chinese Vietnamese boat people from South Vietnam. These
encounters were facilitated by Vietnamese fathers and brothers already in
Taiwan, allowing Hùng to share his experiences of activism and the effortsof Vietnamese communities in the US, France, Japan, and Australia. They
even organised a commemoration event on 30 April 1989. Nevertheless,Hùng observed that this group was less engaged in activism comparedto those he encountered in Japan and Australia, and after returning toAustralia in 1990, he lost contact with them.
In addition to clergymen and refugees, Hùng also came across agroup of Vietnamese workers employed at a towel factory in central
Taiwan. These workers, primarily young men from South Vietnam, had

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been recruited under the pretext of participating in an “internship” bya Taiwanese company that had invested in South Vietnam. However,Hùng soon discovered the harsh working conditions they were subject
to. Deeply concerned for their well-being, Hùng attempted to connect
them with local clergy members to seek assistance. Unfortunately, theclergy members were uncertain about how to effectively address the situation. Taking matters into his own hands, Hùng met with the workers
and reported their plight to the Council of Labour Affairs (the predecessor of the Ministry of Labour). He became their advocate, demanding
improved living conditions and fair wages to rectify the injustices they
were enduring.
Advocating for Migrant RightsHùng returned to Taiwan in 1992 following his ordination. It was also
the year when the Taiwanese government implemented the Employment Service Act in response to labour shortages, rising wages, and theoffshoring of manufacturing operations since the late 1980s. The Act
opened Taiwan’s door to Southeast Asian migrant workers, leading toa steady increase in their numbers.
Hùng, now known as Father Nguyễn, remained committed to advocating for the rights of migrant workers, alongside his work in assisting
the homeless, youth, orphans, and individuals with mental disabilities.
Around 1997, Father Nguyễn assisted a group of exploited Filipino
migrant workers employed at a textile company. He reached out tocompanies that placed orders with the factory for support. Eventually, thecompliance office of the GAP clothing brand in Hong Kong contacted
him and sent representatives to assess the situation. Subsequently, FatherNguyễn established an organisation, Taiwan Independent Monitoring,
conducting regular visits to the two factories to inspect their operations.
Regarding the Vietnam-Taiwan labour migration corridor, while
Taiwan had started to receive migrant workers from Southeast Asian
countries like Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia since theearly 1990s, it was not until 1999 that the bilateral agreement between
Vietnam and Taiwan was finally signed, underscoring the significance of“migrant worker diplomacy” (Tseng, 2004, p. 23). Following the implementation of the agreement, there was a rapid surge in the number ofVietnamese workers in both the manufacturing and social welfare sectors.
Notably, even prior to the signing of the bilateral labour agreement, the12“I AM STILL A REFUGEE!” DISPLACEMENT …

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number of Vietnamese marriage migrants in Taiwan had already surpassed
those from other Southeast Asian countries as early as 1996 (Wang &Chang, 2002, p. 96). As a result, the Vietnamese community has emerged
as the largest diasporic community in Taiwan, with marriage migrants andmigrant workers being the two largest sub-groups within this community(Ministry of Labor, 2023; National Immigration Agency, 2023).
Southeast Asian marriage migrants in Taiwan have faced commodification, discrimination, and social stigma (Hsia, 2001; Wang & Chang,2002). While some choose to migrate through marriage voluntarily forvarious reasons, there are cases of human trafficking victims. Similarly,
while working abroad has been perceived as an opportunity to escapepoverty and unemployment, it has also become a significant and risky
financial investment within an exploitative system. Many migrant workers’
families find themselves trapped in debt after borrowing money from loan
sharks to cover migration expenses, and some workers are deceived into
signing false contracts or loan agreements. Consequently, workers often
endure harsh working and living conditions in their efforts to break freefrom the cycle of debt (Hoang & Yeoh, 2015, p. 289). Many workers
would take further risks of entering “illegal” trajectories for better paid
but no less exploitative jobs (Lan, 2007).
As Hoang and Yeoh accurately put it, “[i]n the race to increase thesupply of labour and expand markets for labour exports, the state inlabour-sending countries is often complicit in lending a helping handto the ‘migration industry’ while failing to pay due attention to theprotection of migrants’ rights” (Hoang & Yeoh, 2015, p. 285). Rather
than addressing the exploitative nature of the broker system, both the
Taiwanese and Vietnamese governments tend to place the burden on
the workers themselves. To tackle issues like worker “runaways” or overstays, workers are subjected to fines and various punishments, including
criminalisation (Li & Cheng, 2014).
Against this backdrop, Father Nguyễn assumed the position of director
at the Hope Workers’ Centre in 2000. The centre, originally establishedby Columban Missionaries in 1986 to assist local Taiwanese workers,
was transformed into one of the pioneering organisations dedicatedto supporting migrant workers as their numbers grew. Moreover, in
response to the increasing population of Vietnamese marriage migrants
and migrant workers and prompted by a distressing incident in 2004
where three young Vietnamese women were advertised for sale on eBay

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Taiwan (“EBay pulls ‘women for sale’ ad”, 2004), Father Nguyễn madethe decision to found the Vietnamese Migrant Workers and Brides Office.
Transnational Networking
Despite facing limited resources, Father Nguyễn actively sought support
from church members and overseas Vietnamese communities during thisperiod. He collaborated with Ms Lê, a Vietnamese refugee who had resettled in the US and volunteered at a refugee camp in Hong Kong, tocombat human trafficking and advocate for anti-trafficking legislation.
Through Ms Lê’s networks, Father Nguyễn established connections with
the Vietnam Alliance to Combat Trafficking (Viet Act), an anti-trafficking
coalition in the US and Canada formed in 2004, as well as media outlets
such as Saigon Broadcasting Television Network and Little Saigon Radio.
With the assistance of Viet Act, Father Nguyễn further engaged with
Vietnamese diaspora groups in the US and Canada, who enthusiasticallyraised funds to aid his work in Taiwan. Thanks to these funds, he wasable to establish a shelter in Taiwan, despite the government’s initial lackof action. Over time, as Father Nguyễn collaborated with local NGOsand effectively advocated for the government to fulfil its responsibilities,
he no longer relied on fundraising support from the overseas Vietnamese
community.
Unexpectedly, while Father Nguyễn received support from the overseas
Vietnamese community for his initiatives, concerns were raised regarding
his work. Some questioned whether it inadvertently supported the Vietnamese government without effectively addressing the fundamental issues
in Vietnam. This controversy reflects the differing visions and practices
within the transnational Vietnamese community regarding the future ofVietnam. On the other hand, initially when Father Nguyễn took on casessuch as the sexual assault of a group of Vietnamese female caregivers bybrokers (Zheng, 2005), he was praised by the Vietnamese media for his
efforts to assist these victims. However, shortly after, due to his connections with the Vietnamese community in the US and his outspoken
comments, he was accused of exploiting these incidents to criticise theVietnamese government.
Controversies aside, it is crucial to highlight that Father Nguyễn’s
initiatives went beyond providing rescue and shelter. He actively encouraged Vietnamese marriage migrants to establish the Vietnamese Women’s
Association, which became the first officially recognised Vietnamese

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organisation in Taiwan with the approval of the local government.
Furthermore, Father Nguyễn played a pivotal role in organising the Vietnamese Migrant Workers’ Union, aiming to support Vietnamese workers
and their endeavours to form industrial unions, as demonstrated by theprotests initiated by workers in two food factories in 2019. While thefull impact of these initiatives may not have been realised, the primaryobjective was to empower Vietnamese migrants in Taiwan.
Notably, some migrant workers who received assistance from FatherNguyễn underwent transformative experiences, leading to an enhancedsocial consciousness and active involvement in organising protests andsupporting others (Jian, 2020). Despite the risk of arrest by the Vietnamese government upon their return to Vietnam, some of them havepersevered in their engagement with social activism. This serves asevidence of the enduring impact of Father Nguyễn’s initiatives and theempowerment of Vietnamese migrants in Taiwan and aligns with recent
scholarship on “social remittances” (Lacroix et al., 2016), which highlights the influence of migrants in transmitting ideas and practices that
contribute to social change in their home countries.
The ongoing efforts to support the victims affected by the Formosa HàTı̃nh steel plant disaster in Vietnam serve as another example of FatherNguyễn’s involvement in transnational activism. The illegal discharge of
wastewater by the Taiwanese corporation resulted in extensive coastal
pollution, devastating fish deaths, and significant impacts on the livelihoods and health of local fishermen. In 2016, Father Nguyễn collaborated
with the Environmental Jurists Association to establish a support platform, forging connections with overseas Vietnamese organisations, as wellas international human rights and environmentalist groups. They also
worked closely with local Catholic organisations and activists in Vietnam,
forming a transnational network of action. Their efforts included pursuingtransnational legal lawsuits to seek compensation for the victims’ losses,
protesting against the Vietnamese government’s arrests of activists, andadvocating for legislative reforms to regulate Taiwanese investments overseas. This initiative has been recognised as indicative of the emergence ofa transnational public sphere (Jobin, 2020, pp. 108–9). However, when
examining Father Nguyễn’s trajectory of practice in Taiwan, it becomes
evident that fostering transnational connections with various organisations, both within the Vietnamese diaspora and in the international
community, has been at the heart of all his actions.

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Conclusion
The life story of Father Nguyễn illustrates the profound impact of colonialism, the entanglement of the civil war and the Cold War, and thesubsequent globalisation on ordinary Vietnamese. His passage throughSouth Vietnam, Japan, Australia, and Taiwan poignantly reveals the politics of humanitarianism and the varied approaches adopted by different
countries towards refugees in different regions and times. Initially viewed
as “de facto refugees”, “good refugees”, “bona fide refugees”, or “anticommunist warriors” (Espiritu, 2014), the Vietnamese “boat people”
later faced stigmatisation as “fake refugees”, “illegal immigrants”, “smugglers” driven by economic motives. They were even perceived as potential
threats to national security, reflecting shifting geopolitical reconfigurations.
By the late 1980s, as Southeast Asian countries started repatriating
Vietnamese refugees, Vietnam experienced a new wave of outmigration,
spurred by the country’s economic reform and the rapid globalisation.
This, in turn, led to the further transnationalisation and transformationof Vietnamese diasporic communities. Father Nguyễn’s activism exemplifies the multifaceted and multidirectional nature of transnationalism,
shaped by evolving migration patterns and border governance. It also
underscores the emergence of transnational spaces and networks thatconnect Vietnamese individuals in their homeland to those overseas andfoster mutual support among Vietnamese diaspora in various regions.
The Formosa Hà Tı̃nh incident is a particularly striking example oftransnational activism that transcends national borders, facilitating collaborations among diverse groups irrespective of their original countries
or national identities, and highlighting the tension between grassroots
transnationalism and top-down transnationalism.
Lastly, as Lê Espiritu (2014, p. 11) reminds us, refugees are “intentionalised beings”, who “possess and enact their own politics as they emergeout of the ruins of war and its aftermath”. Father Nguyễn’s life story is not
merely one of escape and survival, it is a testament to his commitment tofreedom through community organising and transnational activism. His
determination reflects the resilience and agency of refugees in shaping
their futures and challenging systems that perpetuate displacement andinjustice. In Father Nguyễn’s own words “I am still a refugee … I haveno choice but to strive for change. I hope that through this change, I

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can undo and liberate the circumstances that turned me into a refugee …
Only then can I be released from my refugee status”.
Acknowledgements I am grateful to Father Nguyễn Văn Hùng for his unwavering support, trust, and invaluable insights throughout the entire process.
Special thanks are extended to Chihsiung Liu and Hunglin Liao for their collaborative efforts in conducting the interviews. I am also deeply thankful to myassistants, Christine Chow and Lixing Yang, for their meticulous work in transcribing the interviews, and to Zong-Kun Chang for his excellent editing of theinterviews. Additionally, I wish to convey my sincere appreciation to both editors
for their feedback, patience, and ongoing support.
This project received funding from the Ministry of Science and Technology,
Taiwan, under the research project “Refugee Regimes and Biopolitics” (MOST
109-2410-H-009-017-MY3). Additionally, an expanded version of a portion of
the first section of this chapter was previously published in my article titled “Lùdìyǔ hǎiyáng: Yuènán qı̄ngnián Hùng de nànmín lìchéng yǔ lěngzhàn nànmín
zhèngzhì” [Land and Sea: The Refugee Passage of Vietnamese Youth Hùngand Cold War Refugee Politics], in Shu-Fen Lin, Iam-chong Ip, and Lawrence
Zi-Qiao Yang (Eds.). Qiányán yǔ liúdòng: Chóng tàn lěngzhàn yàjì liánjiē [Frontiers on the Move: Revisiting Inter-Asia Connections in the Cold War], National
Yang Ming Chiao Tung University Press, 2024.

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CHAPTER 13

Japanese and Taiwanese Approaches
to Future Climate Displaced People
Kate Hannah Martin

Introduction
Japan and Taiwan do not yet have a defined approach to climate displaced
people. This can be explained by a combination of the perceived slowonset nature of climate change and the reluctance of both nations to
accept displaced populations. This situation is underpinned by bothnations’ current legal definitions failing to recognise such people. Whilst
the discourse surrounding such migrants exists both on an international
scale and within the limited domestic dialogue of Japan and Taiwan,
there is no consensus as to how they should be referenced or what
protections/aid they should be given (Apap & de Revel, 2021). Withouta standardised approach, individual nations are left grappling with theissue of international climate displacement, a challenge which requires awhole new layer of administration, legal frameworks, and financial aid.
As climate induced displacement transforms from a domestic issue into a
global crisis, the Pacific Islands region, just a stone’s throw from Taiwan

K. H. Martin (B)University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
e-mail: kmartin5@uclan.ac.uk© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_13

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and Japan, is set to contribute the first to the climate migrant crisis. It
is for this reason that we must consider possible outcomes, including
those which result in climate displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands
seeking asylum in nations like Japan and Taiwan. As such, this chapter
investigates to what extent these nations are prepared and willing toaccept Pacific Islanders. Learning from positive and negative experiencesof Pacific Island migrants and those international refugees who now residein Japan and Taiwan could help inform the migratory decision-making
process of future climate displaced people from the Pacific Islands.
In a recent legal case brought to the New Zealand High Court by
Ioane Teitiota who attempted to gain refugee status as he argued that hishuman rights were being infringed upon by the impacts of climate change
on Kiribati (Climate Change Litigation Database, 2015), it became clearthat climate induced displacement in the Pacific Island region is leadingsome to search for a more stable home, most likely in a new country. If
the forecasts on climate migration are accurate 1.2 billion people could
be displaced globally by 2050, the UN Human Rights Council and theWhite House is already suggesting a need for some form of protected
status for climate refugees (McAllister, 2023). Developing the kind ofprotections for climate displaced peoples that are reflective of both thedomestic discourse and acclimation requirements of receiving nations
whilst creating attainable options that will provide a balance of community, opportunity and stability would require a unique and balanced
approach. Japan and Taiwan offer an interesting case in this area because,
when it comes to climate migration and asylum seeking, they are relatively
blank slates. Both are highly developed post-industrial nations with thefinancial capacity and sturdy social infrastructure to accommodate climate
displaced communities. However, willingness to offer sanctuary varies
within the domestic discourse, with one showing acceptance coming fromthe top (Taiwan) (Kironska, 2022b) and the other seemingly more agreeable at grassroots level (Japan) (Uji et al., 2021). This chapter argues
that as contributors to the global climate crisis who have the necessary financial capital, Japan and Taiwan have a moral obligation to offer
refuge to climate displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands. This chapter
also hopes to contribute to identifying new migratory pathways whichreflect the changing needs and requirements of climate migrants from the
Pacific Island region. In order to discover viable solutions and substantiate
the given argument, this chapter will analyse secondary source materials,
employing textual analysis to help explore the nature of refugee and13JAPANESE AND TAIWANESE APPROACHES TO FUTURE …

335

migrant experiences and how those experiences could influence migratory decision-making. The use of textual analysis will be focused on boththe accounts and experiences of existing Pacific Island migrants as well as
the discourse within Japanese and Taiwanese society and politics related
to migrants and refugees, whilst framing this within a wider context ofglobal migration to and asylum seeking in Japan and Taiwan. The patterns
revealed in the experiences of existing migrants or the perspectives of
the receiving countries will be translated into constructive recommendations at the end of the chapter conveying the current trends surrounding
climate displacement and displaced populations.

Climate Change and Future Climate Migrants
and Displaced People from the Pacific Islands
Climate change is a concern that the governments and agencies of
the Pacific Islands and beyond are attempting to tackle (Bafana, 2022;
Harding, 2022). Biodiversity loss and extreme weather events are justa few of the ways Pacific Islanders experience climate change and thoseexperiences influence their decisions to remain in place or to migrateabroad (Ferris, 2023; Taylor, 2023). Sea-level rise is often the focal pointof climate discussions related to the Pacific with an “average sea-level
rise of between 25 and 58 centimetres […] predicted to occur by the
middle of the century along the coastlines of Pacific Island countries”(Parsons, 2022). This poses a very real existential threat to those nations
that sit just a few metres above sea level (Merga & Redl, 2023), and evenfor those on higher ground, the displacement and migration of coastal
communities and a drastic reduction in tenable land (Albert et al., 2016;
Singh, 2022) would still have an effect. Even though the Pacific Islands
are responsible for only 0.3% of global carbon emissions (Natano, 2022),
the list of climate-related impacts that threaten island systems, in somecases rendering them unstable during the twenty-first century (Parsons,2022), is too long to detail here. The most serious changes to note
would be the permanent loss of groundwater sources within the next few
decades and the sea-level rise within the next 20 to 40 years (Parsons,2022). Running parallel to one another, these factors will present humancommunities with intolerable levels of risk by 2060 (Parsons, 2022).
Meanwhile, marine resources will continue to be depleted through ocean
warming and acidification (United Nations, 2023a) whilst agriculture iscrippled by higher tides, increasing storm intensity, heatwaves, and soil

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salination and erosion (Salem, 2020a), all leading residents to possiblycontemplate leaving for a more stable and safer life elsewhere (UNUEHS, 2017). In the words of Kausea Natano, Prime Minister of Tuvalu,“This (the impacts of climate change) is how a Pacific atoll dies. This is
how our islands will cease to exist” (Natano, 2022), and though nations
like Tuvalu are not yet in this state, they are heading towards it (Craymer,2022).
For the people of the Pacific Islands “land and sea” are both of significant economic, political, and cultural importance. As US$474 million inrevenue has been brought into the region in the form of fishing licences in2016 alone, the “untouched” nature of Pacific Islands continues to draw
in tourism which makes up to 70% of any given island’s gross domestic
product (GDP) (Salem, 2020a). Tourism is just one area of a nation’s
economy which will be affected by increased extreme weather events anda reduction in natural beauty spots such as coral reefs (Salem, 2020b).
On a community level, climate change is felt acutely, which is clearly
exhibited by a recent UNU-EHS report based on fieldwork in Tuvalu,
Nauru, and Kiribati. Researchers found that “in Nauru, 74% of households experienced one or more impacts of environmental change in thelast decade … drought and irregular rains impacted 61% of the surveyedfamilies”, and in Kiribati 94% of households had been impacted by natural
hazards over the preceding ten years, 81% of which having been affectedby sea-level rise (UNU-EHS, 2015; UNU, 2017). It is clear that without
a drastic reduction in emissions and a significant shift in the behavioursof developed and developing nations, countries across the Pacific willobserve a marked decline in their economy over the coming decades,
thereby further reducing their resilience to climate change and its impacts(IISD, 2019). Every year the region suffers from cyclones, flooding, andheatwaves, and larger and larger proportions of GDP are spent by PacificIsland nations on recovering and rebuilding from climate-related disasters and crises (Fouad, 2021). If such conditions continue unabated,
the world would have to find solutions for the Pacific Island populations displaced by or unwilling to live with the constant bombardmentof climate impacts.
Climate Induced Migration and Displacement in the Pacific Islands
Migration was repeatedly mentioned in the UNU-EHS report, when
discussing climate change across the three islands. In Nauru over a third

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of households believed that “migration will be necessary in the future due
to climate change… however, only a quarter of households believe thatthey would be able to afford to migrate in the future” (UNU-EHS, 2015;
United Nations University, 2017). Meanwhile, in Kiribati migration had
remained internal with people moving to the capital of South Tarawa“intensifying existing overcrowding and water shortages” (UNU-EHS,
2015; United Nations University, 2017). Tuvalu was also experiencing
internal migration as “environmental conditions triggered 9% of recorded
movements in 2005–2015” and the majority of households indicated that
migration may become a necessary survival strategy as climate change
impacts living conditions and quality of life (UNU-EHS, 2015; United
Nations University, 2017). In all nations the combined or individual
factors of “sea-level rise (76% of respondents), saltwater intrusion (74%),
drought (72%) and floods (71%) are the most likely environmental factors
to trigger future migration” (UNU-EHS, 2015; United Nations University, 2017). Most concerning was how 97% of the Tuvaluan households
which were surveyed reported having been impacted by natural disasters between 2005 and 2015, yet just 53% believed that they could
afford to migrate, if necessary, in the future (UNU-EHS, 2015; United
Nations University, 2017). For many people on the ground, migration,or displacement due to climate change, is becoming a fact of life. Even so,
there is a significant gap between those who believe that migration will benecessary and those who, when the time comes, will be financially able tomove. The concern over whether one is able to afford to migrate could
dictate the future patterns of migration decision-making if it proves truethat those with the financial capacity will move voluntarily in advance ofenvironmental disasters whilst those who lack the resources become theforcibly displaced post event.
Unmanaged rural to urban migration in the Pacific Islands is alreadyobserved, and this trend is only set to grow as outlying atoll islands
are no longer able to sustain communities (Campbell & Warrick, 2014).
Unfortunately, urban centres do not necessarily offer safe harbour as bothurban and non-urban atolls are considered to be vulnerable to climatechange’s impacts and the impact of development pressure on the alreadystruggling environment (Campbell & Warrick, 2014). Despite the UN
reports which indicates that climate change is impacting migration trends
and discourse in the Pacific Islands (UNU-EHS, 2015; United Nations
University, 2017), some migration scholars remain unwilling to attribute a338

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significant role in migration decision-making to climate change and environmental drivers (Campbell, 2014). Climate migration as we know ittoday is only just beginning and though there is a growing body of literature on the topic (Ghosh, 2022), we still do not possess enough empiricalevidence for this phenomenon as climate change migration continues
to be interwoven with other forms of migration which are more easily
identified, i.e. escaping war, violence, or persecution.
This hesitancy to accept the looming climate displacement crisis isevident in the failure of international organisations and individual governments to come to a consensus on or provide legal provisions for climate
displaced people (Prange, 2022). It is perplexing, particularly in light ofseveral sovereign Pacific Island nations becoming uninhabitable due toclimate change (Natano, 2022). Nevertheless, Pacific Island governments
are taking radical actions such as launching the Rising Nations Initiative
to fill in gaps in legal frameworks whilst pushing for increased awarenessand political commitment (Natano, 2022).

Pacific Island Climate Migrants---Thoughts
and Perspectives on a Displaced Future
The Pacific Islands are already struggling with the disproportionate
impacts of climate change and for people residing in nations such as
Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, or Nauru, as adaptation options
in situ become inadequate or too expensive in the face of “particularly
severe, frequent or unrelenting” climate impacts (Campbell & Warrick,2014) migration may become the only option. Such circumstances arebeing met with mixed feelings, particularly as migration for economic
reasons is already so prevalent in the region (Tchounwou et al., 2022).
Today, Pacific Islanders are pushing for voluntary, dignified migration
whereby migrants can actively contribute to the social and economic lifeof the country to which they move (ABC News, 2014). Across every levelof society in Oceania, climate change is coming into focus and people,
communities, and governments are taking action. These include national
adaptation plans (Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2018); students
campaigning and taking their message all the way to the International
Court of Justice (PISFCC, 2023); and foreign ministers making impactful
speeches at international conferences (Packham & Singh, 2021). The
Pacific Islands are doing all they can to help stop climate change, primarily
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2050 (IISD, 2022). Meanwhile, the juxtaposition between the islanders’resilience and their understanding of the inevitability of migration, at leastin some quarters (Doherty, 2017), exhibits a clear need for adaptation
strategies which stretch across everything from food security (SPREP,
2023) to new migratory policies and opportunities (Plano, 2022).
The UNU-EHS report on Nauru, Kiribati, and Tuvalu provides one of
the most significant insights into approaches to emigration, whilst tellingvery different stories for the three nations and identifying a common
will to remain on the islands where possible. For those experiencing
climate-related hazards Kiribati saw 1.3% of respondents move internationally (7.7% moved internally), Nauru saw 10% move internationally(no internal migration), and Tuvalu saw 15% move internationally (12%moved internally) (UNU-EHS, 2016). As a one-island state Nauruans
have no choice but to move abroad, whereas I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans
have the option to move to other islands that they perceive to be safer
or more stable within the state (United Nations University, 2017). This
displays their connection to their homeland and a wish to avoid externalmigration where possible, thereby avoiding being disconnected from theirculture, a top concern in the UNU-EHS report (UNU-EHS, 2016).
It can be safely stated that Pacific Islanders prefer to have a choice tomigrate, no matter their reasons, as opposed to being forcibly displaced
and yet current statistics show an average of “50,000 people in the Pacificbeing forced to flee their homes due to the devastating impacts of disasters and climate change” each year (United Nations, 2021). Nauru havealready shared their concerns that resettlement will no longer be a lastresort as it is cheaper for the major polluters to move people than it is
to shift to a green economy (United Nations, 2021), meaning that thereceiving nations will have at least some if not all the input. It is of theupmost importance that the Pacific Island people have the strongest voice
on migration that pertains to themselves; even so, questions remain as tothe balance of power and decision-making when resettlement outside theregion begins to occur.
For those people who are facing displacement, their thoughts, perspectives, and particularly their concerns are already being voiced. The
Carteret Islands of Papua New Guinea play host to around 2500 islanders
who have, until recently, lived relatively peaceful lives (Farrell, 2014).
Unfortunately, the Carterets have experienced significant agricultural
disruption lately as coastal erosion, destruction of sea walls, and inundation of saltwater have led to a rapidly depleting emergency food supply

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and relocation possibly becoming the only option readily available toresolve the situation (Farrell, 2014). The Papua New Guinea administration has since struggled to move the islands’ populations, having
already made several unsuccessful attempts as “many residents say they
are worried about losing their culture and traditions and are uncertain as
to how they will be received by the host community” (Farrell, 2014). For
the Carteret Islanders migration and resettlement are their only choice; insome ways they are lucky in being able to move to land within the samenation state where they can retain, at least in part, their sense of community and their rights as citizens, a privilege other such migrants in Oceania
may not enjoy.
Though Pacific Islands have growing political, economic, and tradeconnections with Japan and Taiwan, this is yet to translate into consistentmigration. This may be due, in part, to linguistic and cultural challenges
posed by migrating to Japan and Taiwan. With the exception of Tonga,
the Japanese language does not appear in the high school curriculum
and to experience Japanese culture one would need to attend events ran
by the Japanese embassy in Fiji (Embassy of Japan in the Republic ofFiji, 2022). Whilst Mandarin and Cantonese speakers can be found inpockets across the Pacific Islands, the opportunities to learn either ofthe core Chinese languages remain limited to universities in countries
such as Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga (JICA, 2009). The linguistic connections between the Pacific Islands and Japan/Taiwan are tenuous at best,
even when taking into account the links between Indigenous Taiwanese
languages and the related languages spoken in the Pacific Islands. The
perceived lack of an existing community is also a barrier to migration,
particularly when compared with Pasifika communities in nations suchas New Zealand and Australia where Pacific Island migrants make up
8% (381,642 people) (New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2023)
and 1.3% (337,000 people) (Liu & Howes, 2023) of the population,
respectively. Without this sense of community, which Pacific Islanders
place so much emphasis upon (PICA-WA, 2022), it is easy to understand why previous trends in migration are linked to regions with anexisting community and cultural connection to Oceania. Nevertheless,there are small grassroots Pasifika communities growing in both Taiwan
and Japan, and the experiences of those migrants, as well as others fromexisting refugees, will be invaluable in informing the migratory decisionmaking process of other Pacific Islanders and in building ties between
the islands and Taiwan/Japan (Schieder, 2021). With a larger community

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base, future displaced people may be able to transition to Japan or Taiwan
more smoothly. Pre-emptive Pacific Islander trans-border mobility within
the Pacific may go a long way to opening Japan and Taiwan up to future
displaced peoples and ensuring that existing policies and frameworks areamended to meet the needs of future climate migrants.

Current Approaches to Migration
and Refugees in Japan and Taiwan
Whilst Japan has a working legal framework to allow for refugees,
Taiwan’s policies remain complex and to an extent dictated by wider
geopolitical constraints. The homogenous nature of Japan has meant thatthe door to migration is opened to a select few. In contrast to this,modern-day Taiwan is a product of continuous migration and colonisation. Its culture today reflects this; however, its difficulty in allowing
larger-scale migration and accepting refugees in significant numbers is due
to its unique political relationship with China.
Japan—Migration and Refugee Policy
Migration between the Pacific Islands and Japan is limited. Japaneseimmigration policy is particularly restrictive towards foreign unskilledworkers, who in 2015 made up only 2.5% of the workforce (Saito, 2022)
a statistic that remained the same five years later (CNBC, 2021). This
practice of discriminating against so-called unskilled workers puts up abarrier to the many potential Pacific Islander migrants who are skilled in
sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, tourism, and business linked
to natural resources (ILO, 2017). On those occasions when Japan does
open its doors opportunities are often limited to specific sectors or for
those willing to work the 3Ks jobs (Saito, 2022). One of the most interesting examples of such a job is that of a care worker. With a rapidly
ageing population Japan has taken to recruiting migrant workers fromSoutheast Asia to fill caring positions. Though these migrant care workers
often find themselves in a paternalistic system of control (Lan, 2022)
prospective migrants from nations such as Indonesia continue looking toJapan for opportunities.
Recently, schools offering a mixture of vocational and Japanese
language training have mushroomed across the region to channel morethan 16,000 Indonesians into the Japanese special skilled worker scheme

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in 2022 alone. This growth in migration, which has “benefited bothcountries” (Matarani, 2023), provides a framework for future migration
which could be copied by other Pacific Island nations (Matarani, 2023).
The Australian Government has already set up a similar Pacific Australia
Labour Mobility scheme to provide training in order to increase thenumber of Fijian aged care workers who can make the transition (APTC,
2022), proving that there is a demand within the Pacific Island region to
train for such jobs and to migrate if the right opportunities exist.
Though adding in a language learning element to such training will
have an added expense, recruiting from nations such as Fiji, where multilingualism is already prominent (Kaur, 2016), should not prove any morechallenging to implement than in the training schools of Indonesia. Theremay be great potential in introducing vocational schools to the PacificIslands which include a Japanese language course, as in 2019 a law tookeffect which introduced a new category of “specified skilled workers”
in 14 sectors such as agriculture, sanitation, and construction, which is
aimed at attracting 345,000 such workers over a five-year period. It is
hoped that this policy will help primarily Vietnamese, Indonesian, andFilipino workers to continue living and working in Japan as well as
offering the opportunity to bring their families with them (Lang, 2023).
There is nothing to say that this could not also benefit Pacific Islanders,even if this still leaves the scope for migration relatively limited. Nevertheless, some business leaders have clearly stated that “if the country wants
to remain competitive, redrafting its immigration policies is inevitable”(Barron, 2017). There is a clear will, at least within the business community, to have Japan open its doors to asylum seekers and refugees aspotential future workers (Lewis, 2017). If Japan were to redirect funds
into language and vocational programmes for communities in the PacificIslands who are most likely to be affected by climate change, such ameasure could give potentially displaced peoples a skillset that would
allow them to apply for work in Japan, provide a fresh start for those
who feel they would otherwise be displaced by climate change, and introduce migrant communities who have a head start in acclimating to theculture, ensuring that Japan retains a level of cultural homogeneity evenin a growing multicultural society.
For refugees looking to find safe harbour in Japan, the path to asylum
and eventual citizenship proves difficult and, for the majority, impossible. Japan still strictly adheres to the 1951 United Nations Refugee
Convention definition (UNHCR, 1951). This means that those who are13JAPANESE AND TAIWANESE APPROACHES TO FUTURE …

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fleeing conflict, natural disasters, or possibly climate change do not qualify
for asylum in Japan. Unfortunately, the measures which are currently inplace have historically fallen short of providing for refugees who are both
waiting in Japan for a visa and to be resettled in country, with reports ofhomelessness among refugees who are struggling to meet basic needs notuncommon (JAR, 2023). Refugees can wait anywhere up to ten years fora decision on their case and in that time the government funds they are
eligible to receive can take several months to materialise and will only
amount to two-thirds of the normal social welfare fund (JAR, 2023).
Those who do not have the status of resident whilst seeking a refugee
status could be seen as illegal (undocumented) and are at risk of being
detained (Japan Association for Refugees, 2023).
Taiwan—Migration and Refugee Policy
Taiwan’s migration and refugee policies are made complex by the strained
relationship with China which has drawn a line in the sand blocking
Taiwan from forming a comprehensive framework for migration andrefugees. That is not to say, however, that Taiwan has become disinterested in or unwilling to act upon the refugee question, “Taiwan cannot
ignore the refugee issue, because there are various groups of people that
require protection and the government is not able to respond effectively
in the absence of an asylum law” (Kironska, 2022a). The country has,in theory, a limited migration policy, and although there are a numberof methods to sidestep its limitations, Taiwan’s inability to effect further
change to its policies even when the will might exist to do so leaves
it at what initially appears to be a dead end. The three most common
long-term categories of visa which are open to non-Chinese foreigners
are “migrant workers, marriage immigrants and skilled workers” (Wang,2011, p. 174). The treatment of migrants can vary depending on theircategory. Skilled workers receive the most favourable treatment, with an
option for permanent resident status after six years, whilst less-skilledmigrants have to leave Taiwan after their contracts expire (Wang, 2011,
p. 174). Similar to Japanese migration policies, Taiwan places importanceon retaining a relatively homogenous society by guarding “population
quality” (renkou suzhi) with the added point of protecting “national security” (Wang, 2011, p. 182–83). However, such entrenched positions on
migrants have been forced to change due to existing labour shortages.

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In order to make up the shortfall in workers, Taiwan has recognisedthat “to maintain Taiwan’s economic growth momentum, the foreign
workforce needs to be increased by a net 400,000 from 2021 to 2030”(Taiwan Economic Forum, 2022) which is just over the total populationsof Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Cook Islands, Tonga,
Niue, American Samoa, Wallis and Futuna, Tokelau and Easter Island(389,255). Attempts to meet the labour shortage are currently limited to“strengthening recruitment of foreign professionals, increasing the attraction and retention of foreign students and overseas compatriot students
and retaining foreign technical manpower” (Taiwan Economic Forum,2022) but is yet to extend to offering provisions for blue-collar workers
to reside long term.
Unfortunately, refugees in Taiwan are often left in a legal grey area,even after Taiwan ratified and adopted sections of the international humanrights convention into national law. Among the five international treatiesthat Taiwan has agreed to is the “International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (ICCPR) which binds its signatories to respecting civil
and political rights, such as the rights to life, freedom of religion or
speech), which introduced the non-refoulement obligation in Taiwan”(Kironska, 2022a). Despite this, Taiwan has previously deported refugees
including those who file an asylum application; various authorities pass
refugees from one organisation to the next, leaving many reliant on
support given by civil society groups to provide basic resources suchas accommodation and medical treatment whilst they wait (Kironska,
2022a). The chasm in Taiwan’s immigration system has the potential
to be filled as soon as the 15-year-old draft refugee law, which recognised environmentally displaced people and is slated to be passed in 2024
(TaiwanPlus News, 2023), comes into force. This could contribute to
Taiwan’s already growing status as a leading regional figure in humanrights (Amnesty International, 2023) and open the nation up a potential
migration option for climate displaced people or environmental migrants
coming from the Pacific Islands. Though this will present new challenges
in providing the necessary infrastructure and aid for incoming refugees,
an issue the nation already grapples with (Davidson & Lin, 2022), it does
present a modicum of hope.

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Experiences of Pacific Island
Migrants Living in Japan and Taiwan
Though there are currently no climate displaced people living in Japan or
Taiwan who originate from the Pacific Islands, we can use the experiencesof those Pacific Island migrants currently living in the two nations. This
chapter will focus on the community-building practices and experiencesof Fijian migrants living in Japan, the highs and lows of life for PacificIsland students studying in Taiwan and Japan, the paternalistic systems
and opportunities which influence the lives of Tongan sportsmen in Japan,
and the transition from island life in Hawaii to the bustling metropolisof Taipei for a Hawaiian-Taiwanese family unit. Finally, this section willconsider experiences of refugees from Myanmar which could inform thefuture policies that may affect displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands.
The literature on the experiences of Pacific migrants in Japan andTaiwan is not extensive; however, through Dominik Schieder’s articles:“Fiji Islander trans-border mobility in the Pacific: The case of Fiji andJapan” (Schieder, 2021) and “Community Life and Discourses among
Fiji Islanders in Kantō, Japan” (Schieder, 2015), we can gain a glimpse of
the true reality of life for such migrants.
According to Schieder the number of Fijian migrants in Japan has
grown steadily since the commencement of diplomatic relations in 1970
and as of 2019 there were 287 Fiji Islanders in Japan. This level ofmigration is significantly lower than the levels we see to New Zealand orAustralia, but it does show that migration is viable, though assuredly moredifficult. The age bracket of these migrants is particularly telling, with thevast majority (65%) being between 20 and 39 years of age, with education and professional rugby being the core reasons behind the decision to
migrate. Between 2012 and 2019 the number of these migrants increased
from 181 to 287, a sharp increase on previous migration levels, whichindicates a strengthening of ties and a corresponding increase in access tostudent visas and engineer/specialist in humanities/international services
visas. In 2021 students made up 74 of the 287 migrants to Japan and theJapanese government is actively encouraging this migration as part of awider aid programme, which funnels Fijian students into degrees in agriculture, environmental conservation, management, pedagogy, and scienceeducation (Schieder, 2021). Fijians, among other Pacific Islanders suchas Samoans, Tongans, and Rotumans, have also appeared in increasing
numbers across sports in Japan such as rugby and to a lesser extent sumo.

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Migration in this sector remains small and though it could grow in asimilar way to sports migration in other parts of the world, it does rely
on youth and possibly the willingness to give up one’s citizenship if the
sportsperson is hoping to compete internationally in events such as the
Olympics. It also appears to be a stream of migration dominated by men,with limited prospects for female sports migration to Japan. This is dueto the core recruitment coming from universities or companies looking tobolster their existing men’s teams. In Schieder’s view, these small migrantcommunities could grow and foster longer-term migration trends fromFiji to Japan. However, the trans-border mobility between the two nations
remains limited and does not appear likely to expand, which calls into
question Schieder’s predictions of long-term migration trends between
Fiji and Japan.
As part of Schieder’s study on this community he took note of thetrends in behaviour and social/cultural discourse that are beginning toform in diaspora communities. In particular, Schieder states that the term“community”, a frequent topic of discussion even when physical social
gatherings are infrequent, is playing a unique role in manifesting social
bonding and creating a sense of belonging to a wider community when
the regular community life which many Islanders are so familiar withis no longer open to them. What is of interest to an outsider is how
Fijian Islanders have transformed their concept of community and built
into their lives in Japan through their retention of the “community”
term whilst disconnecting from the expectations typically associated withthe term. In effect, “community discourses allow Fiji Islanders in Japanto circumvent socio-economic commitments without questioning their
participation in a community as such” (Schieder, 2015). This taps into
something not just of interest to researchers focusing on the changing
perceptions of sociality among Indigenous Fijian migrants but also to
those who are attempting to understand how a wider community ofPacific Islanders may cope if moved to a nation such as Japan. In understanding how Pacific Island migrants approach the discourse surrounding
community” and all that term encompasses, the outcome of further
research in this field could be of significance when contributing to any
new policies linked to both migrants and displaced peoples/refugees fromthe wider Pacific region.
Community can be a crucial part of life for migrant and diaspora
communities, particularly as they can be fed by a flow of new migrants
joining already settled communities. However, that flow of migrants

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either relies on consistent, healthy diplomatic relations between two
nations or on one nation being willing to take in migrants, refugees
or displaced peoples from the other. When relations sour, whether that
be for political, economic, or other such reasons grassroots communities can suffer. This is the case we have seen with new communities andgroups such as the Pacific Islands Students Association (PISA, 2023).
The ill feeling which resulted from the switch in diplomatic relations by
the Solomon Islands and Kiribati has cost students studying in Taiwan
their scholarships (91 being I-Kiribati and 35 from the Solomon Islands)
and led to either repatriation or the decision to continue their academic
journey in mainland China (Quinn, 2019). The “immediate and angry”
response exhibited by Taiwan in light of the diplomatic switch has haddevastating results for the students who found out about the loss of theirscholarships after reading it in the newspaper and were left with sleeplessnights as they tried to quickly organise a new plan and leave Taiwan within
one month. With little to no communication from mainland Chinese
universities or from the Solomon Islands government beyond a vague
commitment to eventually take in these students many have been left
worrying about having to move to universities in China. Some are having
to dip into limited family savings to complete their tuition in Taiwan or tosimply return home having not completed their degrees (Cavanough &Nielson, 2019).
These shifts in diplomatic relations have had ramifications for small
grassroots Pacific Island communities in Taiwan and unfortunately thishas meant that, whether they had a good experience of Taiwan or not,those who do not have the funds to continue will probably leave dissatisfied as they are no longer able to see out their scholarships and could,
through word of mouth, put off other Pacific Islanders from viewing
Taiwan as a future migration option. What we can see from those students
who are attempting to stay is that the overall experience of Taiwan and its
education system is a positive one, particularly as individual institutionsattempt to find new scholarships for their Pacific Island students, whichshows a level of care and acceptance at least from the academic world(Leung, 2019). The previous scholarship funding from the Taiwanese
government will however now benefit other Pacific Islanders as Taiwan
redirects funding into new scholarships for its remaining diplomatic
partners in the region (Leung, 2019).
As mentioned previously the paternalistic system of control overmigrant workers in Japan (Lan, 2022) has also been observed by Besnier348

K. H. MARTIN(Besnier, 2011) whose research on Pacific Islanders in Japan leads us to
the experiences of Tongan rugby players whose treatment in Japan has
recently come under criticism due to the players being controlled by theteam managers, who are employed by the corporation who owns the teamand not looking out for Tongan players best interests. Unfortunately,
these relatively well-paid positions are still considered to be blue-collar
work and so the Tongan migrants are scrutinised in all their actions bothon and off the pitch. If they step out of line, they are often swiftly
deported.
For Tongan rugby players in Japan this has led to a high “burnout”
rate and shows how sport can offer opportunities for employment andmigration but that such forms of migration are a double-edged sword.
What rugby opportunities in Japan do offer to Tongan players, whichgoes beyond a monetary or migration value, is in the reproduction of
the traditional social order and the introduction of possible stardom andwealth, a hope that we see repeated in those Tongans who migrate toJapan to train as future sumo wrestlers (Besnier, 2011).
The experiences of these Tongan sportsmen speak to one of themost prominent issues linked to migration in Japan, particularly forblue-collar workers, migrants coming from low-income countries, andrefugees: Japan’s innate need to control the activities and behaviour ofsuch migrants. Though the system of paternalistic control over migrants
is not necessarily unique to Japan, the simple fact that migrant numbers
coming from the Pacific Islands are so low means that such control is
felt most acutely when struggling with challenges linked to the workplace(Besnier, 2011). Such a feeling is compounded when a migrant does nothave the resource of a community to draw on due to the geographic
distance between existing Pacific Island migrants. This could be a sourceof concern for climate migrants or displaced peoples who do not wish tolive under a microscope, having their choices questioned or risking deportation if they fail to assimilate. However, from Besnier’s research it is also
clear that the opportunities offered by Japan may, for some, outweigh thedisadvantages of the paternalistic system and that such a system can provea welcome reflection of the social norms of Tongan culture with which
Tongan migrants are familiar.
A possible exception to this paternalistic system is in migration for
education. In a series of YouTube video’s documenting life in Japan as aninternational student, Philemon Maiennaka Nangu, originally from Papua
New Guinea, shows his experiences in Japan whilst continuing to post

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videos linked to his home country. Though his videos do not verbalise histhoughts on life in Japan, it is clear from the imagery and content that
there is a small “Pasifica family” (Nangu, 2020) in Nagoya and acrossthe wider expanse of Japan. Nangu’s choice to name another one of hisvideos “Pacific Island Family in Japan” (Nangu, 2020) exhibits a willingness to create a Pacific Island community as opposed to one solely basedon his own nationality. This speaks to the community-building practices
of Pacific Islanders living in Japan and shows that Pacific Islanders can findcommunity connection points beyond Oceania. Even if Japan is unwillingto move on the matter of climate migrants (Kameyama & Ono, 2020),
another possible option could be to filter more Pacific Islanders throughthe higher education system where possible, which will give them time
to put down roots and learn the language before eventually transitioning
into longer-term employment in Japan.
It is particularly important to remember that the Pacific Islands arehome to people from a variety of mixed heritages. An interesting podcast
by the Ka ‘iwakı̄loumoku Pacific Indigenous Institute interviewed a
Hawaiian-Taiwanese family living in Taipei, showcasing the benefits andchallenges of life in Taiwan (Ka‘iwakı̄loumoku, 2021). One of the family’s major challenges came in the form of extreme changes in weather/temperatures as well as the earthquakes which they had not experienced
to such a level before. Though the family were jovial about it the mother
did recognise how such events are dangerous and expressed some concern
for the family’s welfare. The major positives that come through in theinterview were how Taiwan is more conducive to “new things, to new
hobbies, to new experiences in general” and how moving to Taiwan
opened the horizons of the younger generation and gave them a newperspective which they believe has had a positive influence on their lives.
For the mother her experiences were more mixed as she noted how
they missed loved ones in Hawai’i and the overall environment of theislands (Ka‘iwakı̄loumoku, 2021). Arguably the difficulties experienced
by this Hawaiian–Taiwanese family could be the same as those of any
new migrant in Taiwan as they reflect the challenges of daily life linked
to language, education, and acclimating to the environment and culture.
Yet, it is clear from the outset that the availability of opportunities, more
so for the younger generation through improved access to extra-curricular
activities and a multicultural educational experience, can make the move
more bearable.

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Although the migratory experiences of this family do not include
the trauma of forced displacement, it does offer an insight into how
it is possible to make a transition to Taiwan smoother by placing children in international schools, focusing on language training for adults togive them greater access to the society and culture, and also to possiblyconnect incoming Pacific Islanders with Taiwan’s Indigenous community,
which could prove to have some positive outcomes. For the HawaiianTaiwanese family in this interview, beyond the jabs made at their inadequate linguistic skills, the family did not have any further unpleasantexperiences, however, researchers have questioned if the numbers ofPacific Island migrants with no Taiwanese ethnic heritage were to increase
and remain on a more permanent basis, whether they may experiencesuch discrimination. Naturally, questions will arise over the humane treatment of migrants and refugees as findings shed light on such experiences(Phillimore et al., 2021). It is no secret that Japanese and Taiwanese societies and the cultures at large are not as racially or culturally sensitive as
they could be which can lead to misunderstandings and negative experiences being had by those of non-Japanese/non-Taiwanese heritage oreven by those with a mixed heritage (Arudō, 2015; Illmer, 2020; Park,2017).
Moving beyond migration to Japan or Taiwan, it is also crucial toglance at the experiences of those refugees who have settled and madethese nations home. Within the literature it has already been recognised that there is an urgent need to “expand the scale and scope ofrefugee resettlement schemes” in Japan as the current approach focusedon economic self-sufficiency lacks the more holistic aspects of community collaboration and integration (Phillimore et al., 2021). However,in a recent study comparing refugee approaches and experiences in the
UK and Japan conducted by Jenny Phillimore and her team, whichinterviewed refugees from Myanmar currently residing in Japan, the selfsufficiency policy appears to prove more successful than the UK’s more
informal approaches.
The approach of transitioning refugees into paid employment after an
initial settling in period appears to improve self-esteem and self-respect,particularly among men who, through taking financial responsibility for
their families, felt that they were fitting into Japanese society. It is not only
the independence which comes from this income which helps refugees tointegrate but also the opportunity to build social connections and build

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new communities through a multicultural workplace, whilst also experiencing an interest in their own culture from their Japanese co-workers.
These factors make integration feel more like a two-way process.
To strike a balance the study also highlighted the issues which havearisen. For example, some refugees experienced xenophobia, struggles
with the language, and with social integration, particularly for womenwith school age children. Though Japan’s model does offer early financial independence, the difficulty comes later as case workers do not help
refugees access new employment if they do not like their first placement or wish for more social mobility. The dependence on a refugee’s
first employer and colleagues can prove challenging. They have cited thelong working hours as a reason for why they have struggled to makeconnections within the local community (Phillimore et al., 2021).
Phillimore’s study is crucial to understanding the positives and pitfallsof Japan’s approach to refugees and the implications this may havefor possible future climate displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands.
The integration of refugees into any society is a complex and non-linear
process. Japan’s strength in its approach to refugees lies in its provisionof employment opportunities. However, there is room for improvement
in fostering positive community engagement. The community groups ofSchieder’s study, and of Philemon Maiennaka Nangu, as well as thosemany related groups on Facebook which can provide connections to
Chamorro (Guam) dance and cultural exhibitions ran by the Guma’
Famagu’on Tano’ yan I Tasi (Guma’ Famagu’on Tano’ yan I Tasi, 2023)
or other community events organised by Pacific Islanders serving in the
United States military, can all provide a resolution and bridge the gap,
allowing for a smoother, less traumatic transition for climate displaced
peoples from the Pacific Islands.

Public Discourse on Accepting Climate
Displaced People in Japan and Taiwan
Pacific Islanders may prove willing to migrate to Japan or Taiwan, andthe latter countries may have the capacity to take displaced people, but
do they have the willingness to do so? Literature available on the policies and public discourse surrounding climate displaced people arriving inJapan or Taiwan is difficult to attain and could offer a particularly interesting field of research for those who are looking to both understandtheir experiences and contribute to new and existing policies pertaining

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to such peoples. The available information does not shed much lighton how Taiwan will process, provision for, and assimilate future climate
displaced people should the new bill pass, nor does it articulate what
possible actions the Japanese government is planning to take or even
if the issue is on their radar. For both nations, efforts to create policies regarding displaced people will be implemented in preparation forthe displacement of their own people as climate change and sea-level rise
begin to impact upon these nations. In this regard Japan and Taiwan havemuch in common with their Pacific Island brethren as they are all islands,
with limited amounts of tenable living space. All have varying levels of risk
posed by rising seas, by extreme weather events, and by a rapidly changing
climate; the only difference is their capacity to withstand the impacts ofthese events. It would be foolish to approach Taiwan and Japan as nations
which will be untouched by the climate crisis and therefore capable ofspending vast quantities on relief efforts or welcoming in large numbersof refugees without keeping in mind the significant domestic challenges
linked to climate change they must themselves also face. Nonetheless,
we cannot discount the carbon emissions and consumption patterns inthese countries which have made a substantial contribution to the current
climate crisis and that both Taiwan and Japan will need to shoulder someof the responsibility and provide aid to those most affected.
Japan’s Public Discourse
Though awareness and discussions surrounding migration have increasedin Japan, usually the topic is discussed in relation to replacing an ageing
population, not in offering safe harbour to climate displaced people.
Therefore, attempting to gauge locals’ reactions to having a large numberof climate displaced migrants arriving on their doorstep remains somewhat difficult to ascertain. In 2021, a team of researchers released theirdata produced from a survey-embedded joint experiment; the resultsof this experiment highlighted the responses of Japanese participants topossible future climate migrants and considering what has already been
observed from Japan on an international level in relation to providing aid
as opposed to opening its borders, the responses are telling (Uji et al.,2021). The results of the survey suggested that Japanese public opinion
is not so much swayed by previous aid or immigration levels but by the
support a nation gives to Japan whether that be in international forums
or in purchasing Japanese exports to improve their economy. Japanese13JAPANESE AND TAIWANESE APPROACHES TO FUTURE …

353

respondents did not see taking in migrants as an obligation, but they did
show a bias towards taking Asian migrants (Uji et al., 2021). So, what
does this mean for future climate migrants coming from the Pacific? It
could mean for a time that if the affected countries continue to provide
a block of political support to Japan at the international level, there may
be some leverage through which they can open Japan’s doors, however, it
would also mean that when countries start to disappear from the map thatleverage will dissipate, even if Pacific Island nations are able to retain someform of sovereignty without their islands. Their only saving grace may
be in the latter part of the Japanese responses which showed that “sealevel rise and droughts, whose effect is gradual seem to generate more
public support than dramatic events such as floods, typhoons, and wildfires” (Uji et al., 2021); this contrasts with Western support which often
occurs after significant events. Japanese public support appears to rely onsomething that they can see is threatening a person’s safety but does notnecessitate quick and decisive action, in keeping with their slow adoption of refugee policies. This could explain why Japan has shown little tono interest in climate refugees or in how climate displaced people could
present both a security risk to Japan and an opportunity to secure further
economic growth. There is also the matter of how they could lose face
due to their lack of prior action on the subject (World Economic Forum,2021). In a meeting of the United Nations Security Council in Februaryof 2023, the Japanese position on climate migrants became yet clearer asJapan’s delegate likened the threat posed by sea-level rise to that posed byforeign invasion (United Nations, 2023b). The delegate also mentioned
the need to work beyond the council with other entities to handle theseissues (United Nations, 2023) which once again allows Japan to shift
responsibility away from itself in relation to physically taking in displaced
people (United Nations, 2023b). Though a limited number of “general
refugees” have been allowed to enter the country, this poses no real threat
to national security, but it is clear that there are concerns over future
threats and instability caused by climate migrants moving to Japan, eventhough this is not yet something the Japanese government is discussing
publicly (Kameyama & Ono, 2021). Though, for the time being, Japan’s
public discourse, at least within the bounds of the media, does recognise
climate displacement as a burgeoning issue the manner in which media
outlets address this issue shows quite plainly how the Japanese discourse
perceives this to be an international problem which either they can help

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to relieve through finance or which needs to be resolved by the Westernworld (Naidoo, 2018; Uji et al., 2021).
Taiwan’s Public Discourse
Surprisingly, the available information on how Taiwan is approachinginternational climate migration, beyond the possible changes to asylum
law, appears to be thin on the ground. There are two possible reasonsfor this, the first of which is the difficulty in producing a comprehensive
refugee framework and putting it into practice. Though human rights
groups in the nation have consistently lobbied for a change to the law,
this has often been in response to political turmoil in China (TaiwanPlus
News, 2023). There has been no definitive discourse on doing so to aid
climate migrants, which is baffling considering their recognition of suchpeople in the new refugee law. Of course, such a move could possibly
be taken as a sign to China that Taiwan is taking further steps towards
sovereignty and autonomy and would possibly make an already fragile
situation worse. In the knowledge of this, Taiwan may not be in the position to make policies or take in climate migrants at the time of writing(2023). However, any moves from them to do so would certainly senda message not just to China but to the world of their global standing
and their ambitious human rights plans. It could also change the faceof international refugee law, in being the first nation to accept environmentally displaced peoples. The second reason is that Taiwan is alreadybeginning to handle the fallout from climate change as many of theirown low-lying communities come under threat (Yuan Teng, 2022) andthey recently experienced some of the worst droughts in history which
has shown how easily their water supplies can be destabilised (Jensen,2020). With discussions already arising that include Taiwan among thefirst nations that will produce climate refugees (Taiwan Today, 2006),
Taiwan will require a modicum of understanding in any hesitance to takein climate displaced peoples from other nations. If this is the case, thenany expectations one might have for Taiwan to take climate refugees
simply due to its developed status and strong economy would need tobe put aside whilst it directs its finances to protecting its own communities at risk and remaining strong. We cannot criticise Taiwan for notinitiating further action to provide safe harbour for climate migrants but
considering its past history of taking in refugees we also have little cause
to believe that they would turn people away at this time.

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Conclusion
This chapter aims to contribute to the conversations about climate
displaced people from the Pacific Islands, examining the issues aroundpossible migration routes to Japan and Taiwan. It has become clear
through the development of this chapter that any decision to migrate
would not be made lightly due to the existing restrictive and complex
immigration systems of Japan and Taiwan, and that making and pursuingsuch a choice could prove strenuous and inconvenient in comparison withother more well-trodden migration routes to Australia, New Zealand,or the US. Yet, considering the unpredictable nature of climate change
and its impacts on the Pacific Islands it is necessary to prepare for all
possible migratory choices which result from the environmental damage
anticipated.
We have seen how those nations involved retain relatively amicable ties,
making it all the more puzzling as to why those relationships have notresulted in increased rates of migration. This does not necessarily need
to be taken as an indication of Japan or Taiwan’s unwillingness to accept
Pacific Island people or of the Pacific Island people’s lack of interest in
migrating to these nations. Instead, we must look at what triggers migration and why Pacific Island people make the migratory choices that theydo, so as to understand why Japan and Taiwan are not yet viewed as
preferable choices for Pacific migrants. In this chapter, the current trends
in migration from the Pacific Islands have been defined by educationand potential work opportunities, largely in the sporting field. The experiences of these migrants have shown many positive aspects to life inJapan and Taiwan, whilst also recognising the drawbacks of how migrants
can be impacted by changes in diplomatic relations or restricted bypaternalistic systems of control placed on lower-skilled migrants. Meanwhile, the insight into refugee experiences shows how Japan’s systemof ensuring paid work for newly arrived refugees can provide stability
and a sense of self-worth, yet there are challenges in providing refugees
with a community. For Japan and Taiwan to become viable destinations for climate-displaced Pacific Islanders, they must offer language andcultural classes, educational and vocational training, and collaborate withexisting Pacific Island communities to ensure community engagement
and a sense of belonging. This combination would allow newly arrived
people to access their receiving society, Japan or Taiwan, and provide
them with a space to find common ground and community with other

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Pacific Islanders. Pacific Islanders can become active, valuable membersof Japanese or Taiwanese society if they so choose and in being given theability to do so both Japan and Taiwan ensure migration with dignity for
Pacific Islanders whilst also being able to resolve their own internal challenges of a reduced workforce and ageing populations. Time will show
if Japan is able to transform its migratory frameworks and if Taiwan iswilling to commit to its new refugee law in 2024 and set a new precedent
for environmental migration.

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CHAPTER 14

Asylum Seeking as Survival Strategy: The
Narratives of Indonesian Work Seekers
in JapanFirman Budianto and Yusy Widarahesty

Introduction
Dimas first came to Japan in 2012 as a trainee under Japan’s TechnicalInternship Training Programme (TITP). After completion of his three
years’ training and work in Japan, he returned to Indonesia in 2015 andstarted looking for a job. As a high school graduate, he struggled to finda decent job in his hometown, Surabaya, which is the second largest city
in Indonesia. His work experience in Japan did not help him to find ajob in Indonesia. He then decided to continue his education at university, majoring in engineering while working part-time as an online taxi
driver. Since he found his income as a taxi driver insufficient to financially support himself and his family, in 2019, he returned to Japan to

F. Budianto (B)National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: firman.budianto@brin.go.id
Y. Widarahesty
Asia-Japan Research Institute, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_14

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work. This time, he came to Japan via Osaka using a visa waiver for ashort-term visit before ending up as an undocumented worker and an
asylum seeker. Following his arrival in Japan, with the help of an Indonesian friend, Dimas managed to find a broker in Nagoya who introduced
him to a company in need of workers. Not only that, but his friend also
helped him to get a fake residence card and handled everything, from theapartment to the job. Dimas had a job interview with the broker, andeventually secured a job as an operator in a subcontractor company of alarge corporation in Nagoya.
Dimas is only one example of an Indonesian who aspires to work inJapan but ends up seeking asylum status in the country. Many Indonesianyoung people find it hard to find a decent job in the country, especially ifthey do not have a university degree or vocational training. According toan Indonesian government survey in 2021 (Statistics Indonesia, 2021),
about 8 million people in Indonesia were unemployed at that time. Morethan half of them were high school graduates or below and were between
20 and 29 years of age. It is not uncommon that some of these people
would choose to find jobs abroad. In 2019, 277,489 Indonesian migrant
workers went abroad to work in various sectors (BP2MI, 2022).
Emigration is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. It began in the
1970s when the government tried to find overseas work opportunities
for Indonesian people as part of a larger economic development policy(Palmer, 2016; Palmer & Missback, 2022). In its early phase, in the 1970s
and 1980s, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia were the most preferred migration destinations for Indonesians, while Asia–Pacific countries, such as
Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, emerged later. It is undeniable that working abroad can significantly improve the lives of many
Indonesians and their families. As migrant workers provide the largest
source of foreign exchange contributions, they are even referred to by
the Indonesian government as “foreign exchange heroes” for their contributions through remittances to the nation. For many nations, includingIndonesia, remittances from migrant workers have been a major sourceof foreign currency. The influx of funds from migrant workers has helped
to strengthen Indonesia’s current account, notably its secondary income
account. Around US$3.2 billion in remittances were sent by the 3.2
million Indonesians who work abroad in 2021 (Faisal, 2022).
Nonetheless, it can potentially be risky to work abroad. Reportsof mistreatment have led many people to believe that not enough isbeing done to protect Indonesian migrant workers abroad. The concerns

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involved—such as physical and sexual abuse, forced labour, and unpaid
wages—have been highlighted by reported cases, particularly amongfemale domestic employees (Bachtiar, 2011). As a result, the government responded to these problems by imposing a two-year prohibition on
immigration to Malaysia starting in 2009 and by outlawing the mobilityof female domestic migrant workers to Saudi Arabia starting in 2011
(Bachtiar, 2011). Twenty-one nations in the Middle East, North and East
Africa, as well as Pakistan, had their moratoria extended in 2015 (TheWorld Bank, 2017, p. 4). These various conditions eventually stopped
Indonesian migrant workers, with an illegal or undocumented status,
attempting to continue working abroad.
In addition to the numerous cases of violence that migrant workers
encounter in their destination countries, the pre-departure administration
procedure is viewed as a hardship by Indonesian migrant workers whoseek to migrate legally. It can take up to three months to complete someof the arduous administrative steps required to become a legally recognised migrant worker, and there are 22 steps in total, which deter somepotential migrants from choosing this route (The World Bank, 2017).
By looking at the conditions of poverty, unequal education, and highinequality in Indonesia, various alternative strategies are used by Indonesian migrant workers to be able to migrate with the aim of improving
their lives.
Japan is undoubtedly one of the preferred destinations for migrant
workers from Indonesia. For young people in particular, Japan is one of
the most attractive destination countries for Indonesians working abroad,thanks not only to the influence of Japanese pop culture but also due
to Japan’s changing labour market and the emerging migration channels
that affect how they see Japan (Budianto, 2023). Indonesians comprisea significant number of foreign residents in Japan. From 2019 to 2021,
there were, respectively, 486, 753, and 359 Indonesians newly employedin Japan (MHLW, 2023). In June 2016, there were 50,478 Indonesiannationals in Japan, and the number increased to 67,751 in December
2020 and had hiked up to 83,169 by the middle of 2022 (MHLW, 2023).
By June 2022, technical trainees ranked at first place (38,863) among
the group of Indonesian residents in Japan, followed by students (6330),
working professionals (4926), healthcare workers (1618), and other visa
categories (MHLW, 2023).

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The opening up of various opportunities to become migrant workers
in Japan started when Japan expanded its companies to developing countries in the 1960s, which led to work becoming available through the IET(Individual Enterprise Type) Technical Intern Trainee scheme. This development was followed by the emergence of the TITP (Technical InternshipTraining Programme) in 1993, with the goal of transferring technology
and knowledge to developing countries (JITCO, 2017). In the 1980s,
Japan began to face labour shortages that impacted both large corporations and small and medium-sized businesses. Consequently, in the 1980s
and early 1990s, the number of migrants, both documented and undocumented, kept increasing. During the period of 1983 to 1993, the numberof foreign residents rose by 62%, totalling 1.3 million, including around
300,000 undocumented immigrants (Goodman et al., 2003).
Although the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act,
which came into force in June 1990, was a response to increasing migrant
inflows, it was never intended to formally welcome unskilled immigrants
to help with the country’s acute labour crisis. On the contrary, it effectively shuts the door to unskilled immigrants. Migrant workers, however,are only marginally present in policy approaches to Japan’s demographic
change, if it all. On the one hand, Japan does not openly promote a
policy of accepting large, systematic influxes of foreign workers. Thereexists a tension between the notion of Japan as a homogeneous nationstate and the stark need for trans-border labour importation to supply thedemand for a short-term labour workforce, something which also potentially could diversify the Japanese body politic (Onuki, 2015). On theother hand, immigration rules cover the Japanese economy’s requirement
for unskilled labour through side and back doors. First, Nikkeijin, or
descendants of Japanese emigrants, primarily from Brazil but also from
Peru and Bolivia, have been granted the right to long-term residence
without limitations on employment. Second, the 1993 reforms to thetrainee programme made it possible to import unskilled workers by using
the immigration law (Yamanaka, 2004).
Foreign workers who aim to work in Japan face various problems,
even before their departure. They have to pass the rigorous pre-departure
stages, including administrative selection, competency tests, and medical
and physical exams, before going through several months of predeparture training (Widarahesty, 2022). Following their arrival in Japan,
they continue experiencing problems, including human rights violations
that cause Indonesian migrant workers to run away. For instance, there

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was one case of 7000 trainees running away and going missing in 2021
(Uemura, 2023).
As a result of these circumstances—the lengthy pre-departure process,the high departure fees, and the disadvantageous conditions in the destination country—the number of undocumented migrant workers in Japan
has increased; some of these individuals were from Indonesia and they
ended up requesting asylum status. Among them, as of December 2020,
there were 250 Indonesians being considered for asylum status in Japan(MHLW, 2023).
The case of Indonesian asylum seekers is intriguing. On the one hand,
although the country is seen to be economically growing and politically stable, there are not many job opportunities available and theunemployment rate is quite high. On the other hand, the lack of employment opportunities in the home country alone does not necessarily give
grounds for asylum seeking or humanitarian protection in other countries, including Japan. All the influential factors, both in Indonesia and inJapan, should therefore be put into the spotlight.
Thus, this chapter aims to investigate and examine the phenomenonof asylum seeking from Indonesia to Japan, and it does so by discussing
the narratives of Indonesian work seekers aiming to find employment inJapan, who end up seeking asylum status. This chapter explores theirmotivations and the migration routes they had taken. As this chapter
focuses on the narratives of Indonesian work seekers and migrants who
have sought Japan’s asylum seeker status, it takes into account how their
aspirations on asylum status and mobility impact their security. We willanswer these fundamental questions: Why do Indonesian people seek
asylum status in Japan? How do economic motivations affect the decisionmaking process? How do they choose the routes? In order to answer thesequestions this chapter consists of several parts. We examine some previous
studies on precariousness in the context of labour migration to Japan,
followed by an investigation of the various channels that contribute to themobility of Indonesian work seekers to Japan. The next section contains
the narratives of two categories of Indonesian asylum seekers, followed
by a discussion of what asylum seeking in Japan means in the case ofIndonesians, which will lead to the conclusion.

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Methodology
This chapter uses a conceptual tool—namely, the regime of the migrationindustry—to explain the origin and driving force behind the phenomenaof Indonesian asylum seekers in Japan. This chapter makes use of thisconceptual framework to explain the causes and motivations underlying
the phenomenon of Indonesian asylum seekers in Japan. This chapter
draws on qualitative data collected between 2018 and 2023, including
ethnographic field notes and in-depth semi-structured interviews, both inperson and online.
We interviewed five Indonesian nationals who once aspired and applied
for asylum-seeking status, both in Japan and Indonesia. In addition, we
also interviewed fellow Indonesians in Japan from diverse backgrounds,
such as Indonesian workers and members of the Indonesian diaspora inJapan, along with staff from related NGOs, offering a non-elite perspective to reflect the complex conditions and circumstances in the field. The
fieldwork was done in the Kansai and Kanto area of Japan, between April
2018 and March 2023. In Indonesia, we also took part in interviews andobservations in the West Java and Jakarta regions, in 2019 and 2020, in
order to observe the overall effect of the Indonesian labour programme
to Japan. Additional interviews were conducted by Zoom and LINE in
2022. The “snowball strategy” was used to engage the audience. We
followed ethical research guidelines and, to preserve confidentiality, thisproject uses pseudonyms instead of interviewees’ real names. Prior tointerviews, we explained the aim of the research and received the consent
of our interviewees to participate in this study. In the next section, inorder to understand how this research is positioned, the perception of
asylum seekers in academic literature will be considered.

The Precariousness of Labour Migration to Japan
Research on refugees and asylum seekers in Japan “has primarily concentrated on the analysis of legal concerns and the application procedure
itself” (Koizumi, 2015, p. 241). If we look back in history, the end of theCold War brought about significant changes and political unrest aroundthe world, leading to new large-scale migrations, and increasing thenumber of persons seeking political asylum in all developed nations except
Japan (Takeda, 1998, p. 431). While this phenomenon of increasing
refugee numbers was going on, several studies examined the NGOs,

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national and international organisations, and grassroots movements inJapan that support and work with refugees and asylum seekers (Kuroda,
2003). Several studies have also been conducted on some issues related todetention centres, such as detention facilities, detention procedures, anddetainee conditions. The studies on the relationship between refugees anddetention centres have become increasingly important research topics.
This is due to the many reports regarding Japan’s treatment of refugees,
asylum seekers, and migrants within its immigration detention centres,
which, it was found, failed to protect the health of detainees (Kimiko &Wattles, 2019; Ichikawa et al., 2006; Miyauchi, 2015; Niitsu, 2012; Oh,
2017; Ohashi & Kodama, 2009).
Numerous studies have been done on refugees and asylum seekers
in Japan, focussing particularly on the second generation of Vietnamese refugees in Osaka and Kobe. According to Takizawa (2018),
even officially recognised refugees struggle issues relating to identity,
economics, and education. Takizawa’s study emphasises the value ofJapanese language proficiency for overcoming difficulties, particularly
for assimilating into Japanese society. In his ethnographic investigation
exploring what it is like to be an asylum seeker in Japan, Avci (2020)shows how people perceive, deal with, and cope with life while in thisliminal situation. Avci’s study demonstrates how asylum seekers exhibit
constrained but potent subjectivity inside the Japanese asylum procedure by drawing on their experiences in the prison, employment, love,and marriage spheres. Suzuki (2003) analyses Cambodian immigration to
Japan in 1998 and 1999 as a case study to examine the problems thatexist between the first and second generations of immigrants. She claims
that the tragic experiences of war and being a refugee have inhibited
generational communication.
As stated above, the available research has offered helpful insights
concerning the state of Japan’s immigration policy, particularly forrefugees and asylum seekers in Japan. Additionally, the existing researchon refugees and asylum seekers in Japan (e.g., Kalicki, 2019; Kondo,
2015) has primarily focussed on institutional issues, policy changes inimmigration law, demographic changes in the country, the benefits andlimitations of bringing in foreign workers, human rights abuses in detention facilities, and Japan’s low acceptance rate for refugees and asylum
seekers.
However, the existing literature on refugee and asylum seekers has
predominantly looked at the issues as policy, legal, and institutional issues

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that create various problems and demonstrate Japan’s resistance to taking
in refugees and asylum seekers. Such research is indeed crucial to gauge
Japan’s disposition to fulfil its commitments as a developed nation that
accepts refugees and asylum seekers. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore thefact that the asylum application process is extremely complicated, especially when considering the diverse backgrounds and motivations of theasylum seekers as they apply for asylum. These include economic motivations as a result of many factors stemming from conditions in theirrespective countries of origin. Thus, this study aims to further investigate and analyse the topic of asylum seekers who are driven by economic
motivations, which has not been covered significantly in previous research
involving asylum seekers from Indonesia in Japan.
The literature on Indonesian migrants in Japan does not seem to
explore this problem either. There have been several studies on Indonesians in Japan, most of which have focussed on Indonesian migrantlabourers. Indonesians who have visited Japan to participate in the country’s Industrial Training and Technical Internship Programme have been
the subject of some preliminary research (Nawawi, 2010). It is important to categorise the types of Indonesian immigrants who are currently
working in Japan and to look into the well-being and legal rights of such
migrants (Romdiati, 2003). However, according to existing research, thestudies on Indonesian asylum seekers in Japan are still limited. Therefore, it is essential to gain a deeper understanding of the movements androutes of Indonesian asylum seekers in Japan from the perspectives of thetwo nations, and to explore the reasons why people decide to use asylum
seeking as a strategy. The next section looks at the narratives of Indonesianmigrant workers regarding seeking asylum in Japan.

Various Migration Channels into JapanThe trend of asylum seeking in Japan among Indonesians, particularly
among former technical trainees, began in the early 2000s. In the context
of the mid-2000s until the end of the 2010s, the asylum seeing visa
was popular among Indonesians. At that time, it was difficult for former
trainees to re-enter Japan. If they wished to live in Japan longer, theyoften used the strategy of marrying a Japanese national. At that time,
the high skills-based professional visa, for engineers or specialists in thehumanities and international development for example, was not that
popular, and the specified skilled workers (SSW) visa had not yet been

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created. For people from the early batch of technical trainees in the 2000s,
the asylum-seeking status became one of the ways to return to Japan.
The asylum-seeking status is widely known among these people as“visa nanmin”. In that period, the number of Indonesian trainees underJapan’s TITP increased significantly (Yoshida, 2017). The TITP left
trainees with no option but to leave Japan and return to their homecountries after three years of training and working in Japan. However,some of them managed to secure a legal residence permit by marrying
Japanese nationals and remained in the country. Some of them eventually became permanent residents, and a small number became brokers
for fellow Indonesians who wanted to work in Japan. The Indonesiancommunity in Japan established strong social networks, including not
only current trainees but also the former trainees, where they shared
information related to work and life in Japan.
It is therefore not surprising that former Indonesian trainees receive
information from fellow Indonesians in Japan about working opportunities in the country, including information on asylum-seeking status.
Information about working in Japan with an asylum-seeking status iscommonly circulated among Indonesian work seekers, via friends’ recommendations, and through private groups on social media. They choose
who to consult carefully and avoid sharing any plans regarding attaining
asylum-seeking status with any formal organisations, because they do notwant the authorities to know what they are doing.
It is also not uncommon for former technical trainees to become
brokers and to help with fellow former trainees’ returns to Japan, towork either with asylum-seeking status or as an undocumented migrant.
Indonesian asylum seekers usually receive information about working withan asylum seeing visa from friends or via word of mouth on social media.
Such narratives as “He can bring you to Japan”, or “You can contact thisperson and he will take care of everything. You can make a deal withhim directly”, are common in closed online communities among Indonesian former trainees. The brokers usually post the information about work
opportunities in Japan through their private network, on social media
such as Facebook and LINE messenger.
Furthermore, such advertisements as: “There is this so-called visa
nanmin. Want to come to work in Japan? I can help you with visa
nanmin”, were not uncommon among the Indonesian former migrant
workers’ group in 2017 and circulated through social media. Indonesian asylum seekers usually received information about working with an

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asylum seeing visa from friends, brokers, or via word of mouth on social
media. Brokers were usually someone they know, sometimes referred
to as “a friend”. We found that the brokers shared certain characteristics, for example, being an Indonesian married to a Japanese nationaland currently living in Japan. The brokers make job offers to the candidates, referred to as “shoukai” (introductions), an important point in the
recruitment process.
Our study found that brokers involved in the recruitment process camefrom various backgrounds, including Japanese, Indonesians, and peopleof other nationalities. However, one pattern emerged from the brokering
practice, namely that the brokers do not work alone and that they createa transnational network between Indonesia and Japan. We found thatIndonesian brokers have typically lived in Japan for up to twenty years.
They had developed a sufficient network among Japanese people andhad connections with Indonesian brokers in Japan, and people of othernationalities. In addition, they also had a tight connection with theirfellow countrymen in Indonesia, who would serve as local brokers andas the first contact point for aspiring Indonesian job seekers who wanted
to work in Japan.
One interviewee, Wahyu, told us the story of Adi, an Indonesianbroker in Japan, whose business was to help former trainees who wished
to re-enter Japan, even as illegal workers. Adi had long run his business asa broker. He came to Japan as a technical trainee in early 2000s. As oneof the early generations of Japan’s technical trainees, he was quite wellknown among the technical trainee communities in Japan. Upon completion of his training period in Japan, he married a Japanese national andeventually obtained a permanent residency that allowed him to live andwork in Japan freely. The residence permit and the network he createdduring his work life in Japan granted him access to wider Indonesian
technical trainee communities and allowed him to practice his brokeringbusiness until the end of 2017, when the Japanese authorities found out
his about illegal business. He was interrogated and, as consequence, he
was told to stop his business and to report to the local immigration officeonce a year, despite his permanent residence status. At that time, in 2017,
the number of asylum seeker applications had increased significantly. Only
1% of the applications came from Middle Eastern and African crisis zones,
according to a breakdown of the applications by nationality, with morethan 80% coming from the Asia–Pacific region. 4895 applications were
submitted by Filipino nationals, which was three and a half times more

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than in 2016 with 3116 applications. Vietnam came next, closely followed
by Sri Lanka (2226) and Indonesia (2038) (Siripala, 2018). The sudden
increase in asylum seeker applications in 2017 has been confirmed by ourinterviewees.
Brokers in our sample did not work alone. They worked in teams,
solely based on trust. When a broker successfully facilitates and grants
someone’s wish to work in Japan, the broker will gain trust. This makes
it much easier for brokers to find more prospective candidates to work inJapan. In some cases, brokers manage to develop their network by gaining
the trust of former candidates, who then help the broker by finding morepotential candidates and introducing them to the broker.
Brokers play a significant role in equipping job seekers with all documents necessary for living in Japan. One of the most basic documents
for foreign nationals is the residence card. For undocumented migrant
workers, brokers offer a service to create a fake residence card. All theprocedures to make a residence card, such as sending the ID photo, as
well as the name and address verification, are all carried out online. The
payment is made in cash on delivery. Foreign communities in Japan who
provide services to create fake residence cards are not limited to Indonesian brokers but also, according to our interviewees, brokers of othernationalities. Job seekers have to pay a certain amount of money for one
residence card. One of our interviewees said that he had to pay about one
man yen (about US$100) for one ID.
Job seekers who wish to go to Japan for work as undocumented
migrants have to pay a recruitment fee. The fee varies, starting from 30
million Indonesian rupiah (about US$2,500) which includes the airfare,referral or introduction (shoukai) fee, the accommodation fee, or what
they referred to as the “address fee”, etc. All the costs are borne by job
seekers before their departure to Japan. After their arrival, the brokers
will ask for an additional monthly fee, deducted from their monthly
wages. This mechanism is commonly found in the recruitment process
for Indonesian work seekers who aspire to go to Japan (e.g., Azis et al.,2020).
An asylum seeing visa is appealing for Indonesian work seekers because
they can apply for it, for free, at the local immigration office, while they
have to pay several amounts of money to the sending organisations inIndonesia if they wish to come to Japan on a trainee visa. In most cases,
one person has to pay a price which starts from 30 million rupiah (about
US$2,500) so that they can join a local sending organisation and have

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their Japanese language training in order to become eligible to workin Japan as trainee under the TITP. Asylum-seeking status also allows
the applicants to work even when their application is still under review.
In addition to such reasons, there are other factors that make asylumseeking status one of the options for work seekers, and why Indonesians
keep coming to Japan to seek work, even as undocumented workers or as
asylum-seeking workers.
The biggest factor is the demand from companies. Japanese companies
prefer to recruit former technical trainees as they have adequate skills,
such as language skills and cultural skills, to work in Japan. The companies
do not want to take the risk of recruiting new people with no skills. Someof them prefer to recruit experienced workers even if they are staying
illegally in Japan. It means that the employers desperately need foreign
workers, regardless of their legal status. One of our informants said that
he was asked by his employer, “Do you have another friend who canwork here? I need people”. The employer asked if he had friends who
could work in Japan regardless of their legal status.
Both brokers and shacho (employers) ensure that the migrant workers
stay at their work. Dimas shares his experience, “My broker said, ‘Just
don’t resign, you continue working and later the shacho will handle everything—your job, and all administrative procedures in the company. Just
focus on your work. If you work well, I will increase your wage’”. The
company should not hire foreigners without a legal visa; however, ourdata indicates that such companies, employing foreigners without anappropriate visa, exist because of the high demand for labour. In theirsearch for employees, many Japanese companies are desperate enough toaccept illegal foreign workers.
Moreover, in Japan, there can be problems with informal renting andfake address registration, since one address can be used for several people.
Our data shows that the brokers take advantages of these conditions. As
our data indicates, one of our informants lives in a shelter provided by
the broker. It turned out that the broker had two houses. One house wasfor him and the other was for applicants with asylum-seeking status, andundocumented people. Surya recalled, “I live in the same apato (apartment, flat ). The apato is like a shelter for undocumented Indonesians,
either they came on a visa waiver or were runaways from their employer.
One apato can shelter like ten people. It’s an apato with a kitchen, one
living room, and one bedroom. It’s in the countryside”. All these factors
create a perfect environment for undocumented migrants to work and live

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in Japan. They provide a support system and a niche for these people to
make living in the country.
However, since the Japanese government introduced the specified
skill workers (SSW) visa, the number of undocumented foreign workers
decreased, as well as the demand for the asylum-seeking visa. The SSW
visa has been implemented since April 2019 to facilitate the entranceof semi-skilled foreign workers to Japan and to help ease the domestic
labour force. There is no limit to the age of applicants, and this allows
former trainees to come back to Japan again as workers, not trainees. Even
though the SSW visa could be one of the solutions for former trainees tore-enter Japan and work, there are many issues regarding the SSW visa.
One of the biggest issues of the SSW is the limited number of places thatorganise language and competency tests, as well as the limited knowledge
on the jobs under the SSW visa programme.

Narratives of Indonesian Asylum Seekers
We found at least two categories of Indonesians who applied for asylum
seeing visas in Japan. They share different characteristics depending onwhether they have working experience in Japan or not. The first category
is those who have prior working experience in Japan, mostly as technical internship trainees. The work experience provides these people withan understanding of what it is like to work in Japan. However, due tothe TITP rules, they have to return to Indonesia once their internshipcontract ends. In most cases, upon returning to Indonesia, these people
cannot secure a decent job and see working back in Japan as appealing.
Some of them choose to look for opportunities so that they can return
to work in Japan, even when it requires them to go down illegal paths.
They are aware that the procedures are illegal.
The second category is those who have no prior working experiencein Japan. People in this category are job seekers who aspire to work inJapan. They know a little about working in Japan and tend to have a low
awareness of the legal pathways to work in Japan. This could be due torecklessness or simply due to a lack of Japanese language skills. In thissection, we selected two narratives of Indonesian asylum seekers in Japan,
one to represent each of the above categories. In their narratives, we use
the context of the past few years, from 2017 to 2023.

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Becoming Undocumented: The Story of Dimas
Dimas was a technical internship trainee, working in Japan in 2012–2015. As stated in the opening of this chapter, Dimas was one of thoseIndonesian returnees who could not find a decent job in Indonesia after
his first return from Japan. He decided to work in Japan for economic
motives. Dimas shared with us his aspirations and motivations for working
in Japan.
For me, I wish to work in Japan as long as possible. First, I like the country.
I love Japan. In Indonesia, I can do nothing. There is not much to do inIndonesia. It is quite difficult for me, even as a university graduate, to finda job in Indonesia with decent pay, especially when you do not have greatskills. People my age, I will soon turn 34 ... I think it would be difficult
to find work in Indonesian private companies. That’s why I would prefer
to work in Japan, even if it is only a less skilled job. But I think the salaryis worth the effort.

Upon returning to Indonesia, Dimas decided to continue his education
at university. However, he later found that his university credentials did
not help him to find a decent job in his home country. He was struggling
in Indonesia until, in 2018, he first heard about working opportunities
in Japan from his former technical intern community, using a visa waiverand an asylum-seeking visa. He became interested after he heard about
this opportunity.
In 2017–2018, the asylum-seeking visa was very popular among
Indonesian former trainees. “It was 2018 when I first heard about theasylum-seeking visa. Many of my friends were applying for that visa, so I
was thinking, ‘I think I should apply for that visa too!’ But unfortunately,
the Japanese immigration in Nagoya stopped accepting applications forsuch visas, so I followed my friends, becoming an illegal resident”.
Dimas came to Japan for the second time in 2018, using a visa waiverintended for foreign nationals of a few selected countries to visit Japan ona short-term basis—Indonesia being among the countries that granted
visa waivers limited to short stay purposes. Workers and brokers takeadvantage of this visa waiver and make use of it to enter Japan. In Dimas’scase, brokers shared information with him about coming to Japan using avisa waiver, but they did not share any information about work in Japan.
Work-related information was only given after his arrival in Japan. Dimas
shared his experience entering Japan.

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We entered Japan individually, without being accompanied by anyone we
knew. Once we successfully entered Japan, we got in touch with the broker
in Japan through Facebook. He said, ‘Where are you now? You should
contact this person, chat, and go meet him. He will provide you withshelter’. After I arrived in Japan, the broker told me everything.

Initially, Dimas planned to go to Japan as a visitor first, and thento apply for an asylum-seeking visa later when he was already in Japan.
However, Dimas did not know anything about the kind of work thatwould be available in Japan. All his decisions were based solely on mutual
trust with the brokers. Dimas described this as follows, “We enter Japan
like blind people. We did not know where to go. On the initial days, westayed at hotels, while communicating with other Indonesian job seekers
and the broker”. Upon his arrival in Japan, Dimas managed to keep intouch with the broker and to find a place to stay. Initially, Dimas wanted
to apply for an asylum-seeking visa but, in the end, he could not do that
because the local immigration office no longer accepted such applications.
After failing to apply for such a visa, he became undocumented. He
expressed his thoughts on being an undocumented worker and, particularly, on the potential benefits of working illegally. He compared working
illegally to his situation when he was a technical internship trainee.
“Speaking of the economic benefits, I think being an illegal worker is
not that bad. The wage was higher than technical trainee. But when wetalk about the quality of living, I think being legal is way better”.
One of the most important factors why some people choose to be
undocumented workers is the higher wages. When compared to the technical trainee, the wage of undocumented workers can be higher because
the employers do not have to pay tax and so the workers receive the fullamount of wage. This is why some of technical trainees choose to run
away and end up becoming undocumented, while some of them apply
for an asylum-seeking visa. “Even today, there are still many of my friends
remaining in Japan illegally as undocumented migrants”. Those undocumented people who remain in Japan are genuinely in a very vulnerable
and uncertain situation.
From Work Seekers to Asylum Seekers: The Story of Surya
Surya came to Japan in 2018. Back in his village, he was unemployed
and was struggling to find decent work. Back in 2016–2017, he was380

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enrolled in a skill training centre (LPK) preparing himself to learn theJapanese language with the aim of working in Japan as a technical trainee
upon completion of the language training programme. Unfortunately,
after more than one year of training, he was stuck at the training centre.
The centre did not give him an exact date when he could depart for Japan.
He eventually gave up and quit the training centre. In 2022, one of his
friends from the training centre told him that there was an opportunity
to go to Japan with a help of a broker. Surya recalled,
Initially, I wanted to join the internship programme as a technical internship trainee. But the sending organisation in Indonesia kind of gave me afalse hope. I waited like years and they did not process my departure eventhough I had paid the processing fee, about 15 million rupiah. Then, atsome point, I heard from my friend, who I then found out was alreadyin Japan. I contacted him, and asked how he could already be in Japan? I
asked, and he showed me his way. He said: ‘You can apply for visa waiverand contact this person’.

His friend came from the same province and had been at the same
training centre preparing for the technical trainee programme. Despite
having paid the training centre, he and his friend had both given up on
the language training and on the idea of going to Japan. However, as
mentioned, Surya then found out that his friend was already employed inJapan. After that, Surya got in touch with him to ask for advice on how
to get to Japan. He advised Surya to speak with a broker and to enter
Japan with a visa waiver.
The broker promised him some job opportunities with a high salary.
Some brokers would say that the job seekers could even choose the job
they prefer. Surya recalled his experience, “He promised me a job in the
manufacturing industry, but he lied. He said that I would be paid up to2000 yen per hour. But that was all lies. The reality was far from that.
After I came to Japan, he did not even give me any job. I was jobless forabout four months. I had nothing to do”.
Surya had to pay 160,000 yen after arriving in Japan. The broker
promised Surya, when he was still in Indonesia, that he could go to
Japan and work. The broker also promised that the work visa could
be extended over and over. The broker claimed to have contacts witha dispatch company (hakkengaisha) and promised Surya a job. He evensaid that Surya could change job if he wanted. But the reality was that

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381

during the initial four months after his arrival in Japan, he did not have
any job. The broker broke his promise.
I felt disappointed. Disappointed because of a scam. Actually, I did notknow anything about the work visa they promised me. I found out later
after I came to Japan. If only I had known that they scammed me bypromising me some jobs illegally, I would rather have waited and gone
through the legal procedures to get my technical trainee visa. I would
have preferred to use trainee visa because, I think, the asylum-seeking visa
is more for when you need protection. It sounds like something big is
happening in Indonesia when it isn’t. If there were any other choices, I
would not choose the asylum-seeking visa.

Surya not only felt disappointed but also found himself the victim ofa job scam. He expressed his disappointment towards the broker who
scammed him. He also felt embarrassed when people found out he was onan asylum-seeking visa. He told us, “People only know me as kenshuusei(trainee). I keep silent and tell no one. Because I feel ashamed if theyfind out that I am using an asylum-seeking visa. I don’t want to work on
an asylum-seeking visa. If only I had known this from the beginning. I
feel like I am trapped, and I have no choice”. Surya ended up living inJapan on a special activities visa (tokutei katsudou visa) and had to renew
his visa four times, every six months during 2018–2020. At the time ofwriting, he lives in Japan undocumented and told us about his willingness
to return to Indonesia soon.
From the two stories above, we can clearly see how this precarious
circle works. A network that connects former trainee workers and prospective job seekers to Japan gets them caught up in the offers of brokers who
fill the void and provide opportunities. They sell dreams, offering hopesof finding a better life in Japan.

Asylum Seeking in Japan:
Opportunities and Survival Strategies
We have discussed the various channels that shape the phenomenon of
asylum seeking by Indonesian nationals in Japan and have elaborated
the narratives of Indonesian asylum seekers. Two major patterns haveemerged from their narratives. The first pattern involves people who
consciously aspire towards and apply for asylum-seeking status on their

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F. BUDIANTO AND Y. WIDARAHESTY

own. These are usually former technical trainees. For these people, asylum
seeking becomes one of the alternative doors to work and live in Japan.
Our interviewees understand that asylum-seeking status is intended forpeople from countries with conflicts or problems. They are aware thatthey do not have cause to apply for asylum-seeking status, considering
their situation back in Indonesia. They also are aware that many people
misuse the visa for other purposes. Despite being aware of the asylumseeking status, these people still apply for the visa, something which has
drawn the attention of both the Indonesian and Japanese governments.
From the Indonesian government’s point of view, this situation is seen
to be quite problematic. On the one hand, the government considers
that Indonesian people who apply for asylum status in Japan have alreadyabandoned their citizenship (Agustina, 2017) and, therefore, are alreadynot under the Indonesian government’s responsibilities anymore. On theother hand, the Indonesian government cannot neglect their own people
when something happens to them in Japan.
While people were aware of their decision to go with the asylum status,
they were in fact also victims of the migration industry. The fact thatthey were working while undocumented meant that they were technicallybreaking the law, but they should not be viewed as criminals. We foundthat structural factors in Japan, such as the demand for workers, andJapan’s housing regulations, play a role in creating such a niche for undocumented migrants in Japan who want to make living. Legal pathways towork in Japan, such as technical trainees, specified skilled workers, andprofessional workers, mostly require foreign nationals to have a particular credentials and sufficient technical skills, as well as Japanese language
skills. A lack of these requirements may hinder their mobility to Japan.
Therefore, some of these people, with insufficient skills, choose to workin Japan illegally with all the risks, such as being deported and put on a
blacklist, and being barred from entering the country for a specified time.
Some of them end up applying for asylum-seeking status to avoid theserisks, even when they have to abandon their citizenship.
The second narrative pattern involves work seekers who have no choice
but to apply for an asylum-seeking visa so that they can survive in Japan.
They initially received information about working in Japan from agentsand brokers in Indonesia, and for them, asylum-seeking status became
primarily a survival strategy. Our data shows that most Indonesian job
seekers in this category whom we interviewed are victims of the migration industry and are in a vulnerable position. Their decision to seek

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383

asylum status was a part of their survival strategy. Furthermore, since theyalso had to make a living in Japan, asylum-seeking status granted thema temporary legal residence status that allowed them to find a job. Ourinterviewees shared their experience of having to stay in a small apartment with ten other undocumented people from Indonesia. It is notuncommon for undocumented migrants in Japan to create a community
to provide a certain level of security despite their illegal status. They tend
to choose to live in rural areas which are harder to reach by Japanese
authorities. The broker helps them to rent an apartment, buy a car, andlive their life just like Japanese people do, so they are not suspicious.
Our data shows that the Indonesian work seekers we interviewed initiallyentered Japan legally but ended up undocumented. They made the decision to migrate to Japan on their own, wanting to take advantages ofjob opportunities provided by Japan’s changing labour market. However,many actors in the migration industry, including the brokers, contributetowards shaping such opportunities.

Conclusion
Our study reveals that both Japan and Indonesia play an important role inopening the loophole for the surge in demand for asylum-seeking status,
which is driven by economic migration. Japan’s immigration laws were
never designed to formally accept unskilled immigrants to aid with thenation’s severe labour shortage. The decision to accept and open up
Japan to the immigration of unskilled migrant labourers is still being
debated. There is a conflict between the idea of Japan as a homogenous
nation-state and the urgent need for trans-border labour importation.
This, ultimately, requires the acceptance of these workers as temporary
migrants, which Japan continues to resist today. As a result, Japan does
not openly promote a policy of accepting a large, systematic influx offoreign workers. However, these circumstances contrast with the needsof Japanese industry, particularly for small and medium-sized businessowners who rely heavily on the availability of low-paid and productive labour from abroad. Furthermore, the existence of brokers also
contributes to the entrance of foreign workers.
In the meantime, structural poverty and inequality in Indonesia areseen as driving forces for the surge in Indonesian labour migrants.
In Indonesia, employment opportunities, particularly in rural areas, arestill very scarce, social inequality between the rich and the poor is

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very pronounced, and minimum wage conditions are very harsh. These
circumstances can pose a threat due to rising crime, unemployment,
inequality, and human trafficking. Also, the pre-departure procedural
process for migrant workers, which is known to be arduous and complex,
has led to some Indonesian migrant workers seeking work abroad byalternate routes. Hence, this situation creates a space for which the migration industry can exploit. The migration industry’s presence involves therecruitment of people, institutions, and other intermediaries, to facilitate the flow of labour to destinations abroad. This migration industry
is interrelated, including both the sending countries and the receiving
countries, and involves many actors both in Indonesia and Japan. The
situations both in Japan and Indonesia contribute towards creating a gap
which more and more migrant workers fill by coming to Japan in searchof work, regardless of the type of visa, be it documented, overstayed,
undocumented, or asylum seeker.
From the point of view of asylum seekers, their involvement in theindustrial migratory cycle is a very complex issue, which cannot simply
be reduced to a matter of hurt national pride. There are many factors
behind this situation, such as individual factors, community factors, andalso structural factors consisting of political systems, migration policies,and governance. From the stories above, we can see that the experiencesof Dimas and Surya may represent stories of many others. They are clearly
victims whose vulnerabilities are exploited by many actors for money, evenmore so in an increasingly unequal world amid policies that are too statecentred or elitist.
As we have discussed throughout this chapter, this study argues thatasylum seeking becomes a survival strategy for job seekers who aspire
to find work in Japan. We found that several factors, such as the workseekers’ personal motivations and external conditions both in Japan andIndonesia—including the existence of brokers and structural factors suchas inequalities in the socio and political economy—all contribute towards
shaping the conditions that pave the way to the emergence of asylum
seeking as a survival strategy.

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CHAPTER 15

Conclusion
Polina Ivanova and Lara Momesso

Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East Asia
This project set out to examine refugee policies and experiences in two
East Asian nations, Japan and Taiwan, which have received relatively
little scholarly attention compared to Europe and other refugee-hosting
countries and regions of the world. In the introduction, we emphasised the interconnection between human security and refugee policies
and experiences, and we shed light on the similarities in the way humansecurity is approached by Japan and Taiwan, despite the substantial differences between the two countries. This book explored this linkage fromthe standpoints of legal and policy frameworks, media studies, and the
ethnography or phenomenology of individual experiences. As this bookhas shown, none of these aspects should be looked at in isolation, as theyP. Ivanova (B)Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japane-mail: 21v00202@gst.ritsumei.ac.jp
L. Momesso
University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
e-mail: lmomesso@uclan.ac.uk© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East
Asia, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_15

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intersect and shape each other, and, together, they feed into national andinternational human security agendas.
First, Part I showed that the legal framework of refugee acceptance andrecognition plays a direct role in shaping refugees’ experiences, as the legal
rules concerning their entry, stay, freedom of movement, employment,
and social security might aim to foster newcomers’ integration or not.
Those rules will determine what kind of bureaucracy they will encounteron their asylum-seeking journey, what rights and freedoms they can enjoy
or can lack, and to what extent they will be able to satisfy their needs andparticipate in the life of the host society. All those aspects, in turn, will
have positive or adverse effects on their subjective experiences of safety,
care, protection, belonging or, in contrast, on their feelings of loneliness,
insecurity, and unappreciation. The global refugee regime with its “rules,
norms” entrenched in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and “decision-making procedures that govern states’ responses
to refugees” (Betts, 2015) does not apply to Taiwan, as a non-signatory
to the Convention, and does not seem sufficient to ensure refugee protection in Japan. Developing effective legal frameworks at the national andpossibly regional levels therefore seems crucial for refugee human security
and positive integration experiences in both countries.
Next, Part II, which looks at media representation and public opinion,
views human security not as a monolithic and fixed project but as adynamic creative process. The chapters of Part II examine social construction and the perception of images of refugees and asylum seekers in
traditional and new media. On the one hand, media representations reflect
existing images of different groups of foreigners in a host society, while,on the other hand, mass media willingly or unwillingly reshapes andfurther consolidates those images, sometimes projecting on newcomers
unwanted or unacceptable aspects of the host culture. These projections
tend to affect the ways the populations in question are perceived and thetypes of responses they get from host nations, directly influencing theirexperiences in real life.
The average Facebook user may sometimes get the impression thatsociety as a whole is intolerant of refugees, based on numerous aggressive
posts. This is where a scholarly perspective on public opinion becomes
especially valuable. Using carefully designed large-scale survey instruments, researchers obtain a much more nuanced and balanced view of theactual opinion of the wider public on refugee acceptance and integration.
Results of such surveys should form the basis of the evidence informing

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policymakers’ decisions to start accepting and accommodating more anddiverse asylum seekers, and gradually liberalise immigration policies.
Finally, this volume also problematised the idea of human security byconsidering the experiences of specific groups that are marginalised orsystematically discriminated against both in Taiwan and in Japan. Part III,on refugees’ and asylum seekers’ lived experiences, allows the reader to goeven deeper, engaging their imagination and empathy as they grasp theaffected people’s situations beyond mere cognitive understanding. The
editors believe that engaging the feelings and empathy of the wider public
is an essential condition for making a positive change possible. One of
the main strengths of human security as a conceptual framework for thisbook is that it offers a broader and more human-centred understandingof refugee and asylum seeker categories. For instance, Indonesian technical trainees applying for asylum in Japan could be labelled as “bogus
refugees” or “fake refugees” if viewed through the lens of a narrowinterpretation of the Refugee Convention. However, if we consider thecircumstances of abuse and exploitation in their workplace, their lack ofsocial support and of access to reliable information in the host country,
along with the severe scarcity of employment opportunities in theircountry of origin, we can see how filing an asylum claim could become
an act of despair and of last resort, to stay alive and to continue providing
for their families. Viewing similar cases in the light of human security,
Lester (2010) refers to them as “survival migrants”, seeking to avoid
populist and damaging distinctions between “good”/“genuine” refugees
and “bogus” asylum seekers.

The Main Findings and Their Implications
By examining the three distinct yet interconnected areas, namely legal
and policy frameworks, media representation and public opinion, andlived experiences of refugees and asylum seekers in Taiwan and Japan,
this volume collectively contributed to the existing debates on humansecurity. The book showed how both Taiwan and Japan, two East Asian
democracies that aspire to integrate a human security agenda in different
policy areas, fail when it comes to the acceptance, protection, and integration of refugees and asylum seekers in their own territories. The presenceof non-citizens seems to challenge accepted notions of citizenship andperceptions of national security and sovereignty. As a result, national interests and state security end up being prioritised. This means that refugee

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regimes and asylum systems in Taiwan and Japan are often shaped byconcerns linked to traditional security rather than human security.
As part of the major objective of this work, to raise awareness of theplight of asylum seekers in two East Asian island nations, we hope that thebook will help to debunk certain myths and common stereotypes about
migration in East Asia, for example, related to the alleged homogeneityof the Japanese society or the presumed absence of refugee populationsin Japan or Taiwan.
The wide array of case studies and the considerable variety of
approaches make a direct comparison between the chapters impossible.
However, some tendencies and parallels do emerge from the cases investigated throughout the book. First, although asylum policies in Japanand Taiwan are slowly showing signs of improvement, they are overall
still insufficient compared to international standards and inadequate tomeet the needs of existing refugees and asylum seekers, let alone future
displaced populations such as climate migrants. With only a few notable
exceptions due to special political considerations, both countries seem tobe largely closed to the mass immigration of refugees and asylum seekers.
In Noll’s (2003) terms, they are practising passive insulation, that is,they are remaining passive vis-à-vis protection seekers, relying on “natural
impediments” such as geographical distance or seas, as well as active insulation in the form of visa systems, border control, carrier sanctions, bothof which he qualified as the “outright rejection of protective obligations”(Noll, 2003, p. 279).
In response to the overall unwillingness of both countries to provide
asylum, people in refugee-like situations adopt different strategies forgetting into the country and staying there. While some may come asstudents, others attempt to establish themselves as ethnic entrepreneurs
or file an asylum claim to gain precious time. One of the major differences between Japan’s and Taiwan’s immigration policies consists in theirapproaches to importing blue-collar workers. Taiwan has an official guest
worker programme (Tierney, 2007) while Japan runs a similar programme
covertly, disguised as “technical training” (Widarahesty, 2022). However,both programmes are characterised by the precariousness of workers anda lack of long-term integration opportunities, which undermines their
human security and pushes some of them to search for asylum.
Despite the book’s focus on refugees in two East Asian countries—
Japan and Taiwan—some of its ideas may be applicable beyond thisgeopolitical scope. Migration researchers into other areas may easily

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discover parallels with their case studies as refugees in many parts of
the world are experiencing similar uncertainty and ambiguity due to theinadequate policy responses and legal mechanisms in host countries. For
instance, recent studies on Syrian refugees in Turkey also show how thehost country government’s reliance on temporary legislation and policies, ad hoc solutions, and discretionary power contributes to a prolonged
liminality, or in-betweenness, for Syrian refugees (Şahin-Mencütek et al.,2023). In the context of African refugees living in camps for years, Abuya(2010) critically examines situations when “refugees remain in host countries for a prolonged, often unspecified duration of time, with no durable
solution in sight” (Abuya, 2010, p. 127) and concludes that these situations “threaten the human security of refugees as well as the securityof host states, the country of origin and the international community”(p. 125). These “protracted” situations and the uncertainty they bringtend to cause a breakdown in social structures leading in turn to “family
breakdown, violence, socio-economic deprivation and health problems”(Abuya, 2010, p. 125). Uncertainty and the lack of durable solutions forrefugees and asylum seekers, often imposed in the name of the security of
the host nationals, generate insecurities in migrant populations.
Unlike the African continent, characterised by a series of “complex
emergencies” (OCHA, 2003), or Turkey, which is hosting the greatest
number of refugees in the world as of 2023 (UNHCR, n.d.) and is close
to several zones of ongoing military conflicts, Japan and Taiwan have been
enjoying a relative political stability and peacefulness for decades. There
are no refugee camps, and any asylum seekers are spread throughout the
population. Both countries also have relatively high living standards, andboth are dealing with a demographic crisis of ageing and shrinking populations and related labour shortages. In this context, among the threedurable solutions for refugees—voluntary repatriation, local integration,and resettlement in a third country (UNHCR-USA, n.d.)—the second
option would seem the most logical and beneficial for both refugees andthe host societies.
Local integration comprises legal, economic, and sociocultural dimensions (UNHCR, 2003, pp. 23–24). The legal dimension involves progressively granting refugees with a range of rights and entitlements; ideally,
this process should lead to permanent residence and the acquisition of
citizenship in the host country (UNHCR, 2003, p. 25). Article 34 of
the 1951 Convention calls on states to “as far as possible facilitate assimilation and naturalization of refugees” in the host countries (UNHCR,

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2010, p. 30). According to the UNHCR’s estimates, 1.1 million refugees
around the world have acquired citizenship of their country of asylum(UNHCR-USA, n.d.), and both Taiwan and Japan could contribute tothese numbers more actively by offering legal pathways to citizenshipto those refugees who have stayed in their territories for years and haveestablished close links with the host country.
The economic dimension signifies that refugees can become self-reliant
and can contribute to the economy of the host country, instead of being
reliant on state aid or humanitarian assistance. High living standards suchas in Taiwan and Japan also imply a high cost of living and a predominanceof knowledge-intensive jobs. Therefore, refugees who wish to integrate
in such societies typically require better education and greater efforts
to become economically independent. Therefore, they need sustained
support from the state and non-state actors to ensure their inclusion into
the education system and labour market.
Finally, the sociocultural dimension of refugees’ local integration means
living without discrimination or exploitation and the ability to actively
contribute to the social life of their new community in the host country.
The contributing chapters have unanimously agreed that both Taiwan andJapan could do better in these three domains. Our findings show thatboth Taiwan and Japan fail to provide adequate support for the refugees’
local integration and in cases of defining them as “evacuees”, “students”,
or “migrant workers”, they also deny them access to a third-country
settlement. This lack of recognition and access to durable solutions jeopardises their human security both in the short term and in the longrun.

Limitations of this Project
and Recommendations for Further Research
Since the scope of the volume is limited to Japan and Taiwan, generalisations to the rest of East Asia should be made with caution, apartfrom inevitable parallels between refugee situations characterised by highdegrees of uncertainty and a lack of durable solutions as discussed above.
This book has attempted to provide a broad coverage of different
ethnic groups comprising asylum-seeking populations in Japan andTaiwan. As such, it has included entire chapters on Hong Kongers,
Tibetans, Vietnamese, Indonesians, Kurds, and chapter sections on
Afghans, Syrians, and Ukrainians. Nevertheless, the analysis has not been

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comprehensive and information on many important refugee groups is
missing. Adapting to inadequate asylum systems, some groups of asylum
seekers display distinct coping strategies. For example, some Indonesians choose to apply for asylum, whereas Syrians, Afghans, and certain
Hong Kongers enrol as international students, while others may open
ethnic businesses or choose marriage migration routes. Future studies may
uncover more survival strategies among different refugee groups, evaluating their rationale and successfulness and informing policies to be able
to support their integration more effectively.
Being aware that gender is an important dimension shaping migration and related processes, we believe that future research should explore
how gender relations, roles, and hierarchies influence legal and policy
frameworks, media representation, and public opinion, as well as the lived
experiences of male and female refugees and asylum seekers. In line withthis point, and reflecting a growing concern within the literature, it would
be also important to explore the experiences of non-binary and queer
individuals.

Recommendations for Policy and Practice
Since the findings show that the current asylum system is often incapable of protecting the human rights and dignity of asylum seekers,
there is a pressing need/priority to build an efficient, robust, and upto-date refugee reception and recognition system in both Japan andTaiwan. Another repeated recommendation from the chapter authors andhuman rights activists is to abolish detention for visa overstayers, and this
proposal is being supported by some policymakers (Kawarada, 2021).
At the same time, sustainable solutions for refugees and asylum seekers
cannot be achieved without a comprehensive reform of the entire immigration system. Many forced migrants come to the host country under
different visa regimes, for example, students, trainees, workers, tourists,
and marriage migrants. These people may either never seek asylum orchoose to seek it later becoming refugees “sur place” (UNHRC, 2019,p. 26). Improving the human security of vulnerable foreigners in Japanand Taiwan would therefore require a structural reform of the immigration law and practice, making legal pathways for many migrant categories
more transparent. This would include, for instance, facilitating mechanisms for migrants overstaying their visa to legalise their status and getaccess to social security and the official labour market. Additionally, the396

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system for immigrant workers needs to be strengthened. Those who wish
to work in understaffed industries should be allowed to come on a longterm basis, bring their families, be ensured of fair and equal treatment on apar with the local labour force, and be offered opportunities to naturalise
if they desire.
Due to the lack of international recognition, Taiwan cannot join theConvention and the Protocol, and judging from the experience of Japan,
adoption of the international mechanisms does not guarantee the effectiveness of the domestic asylum system. However, this should not stop
Taiwan from creating effective systems of refugee reception, protection,and integration. As Chapter 3 advocates, Taiwan could learn useful lessons
from other non-UN member states and territories. In addition, it may betime to think of alternative mechanisms of refugee protection, based ona regional framework. Several parts of the world have created regional
instruments relating to refugees. A number of regional treaties regulate
the issues of diplomatic and territorial asylum in Latin America, and theOrganisation of African Unity adopted its own convention on refugees
in Africa in 1969, with a refugee definition different from that of theProtocol and the Convention (UNHCR, 2019, p. 15). As consolidated
liberal democracies, Japan and Taiwan could become leaders in creating
an up-to-date and effective regional refugee regime in Asia based on ideasof human rights and human security. Building on the idea of “sovereignty
as responsibility” (Bellamy & McDonald, 2002, p. 376), this volume callson the Taiwanese and Japanese governments to take responsibility for the
security of the non-citizens residing in their territory, to identify factorsthat generate insecurity among these populations, and to develop specificnational strategies to address these issues.

Concluding Remarks
We believe in the continued relevance of the topics of refugee protection and inclusion. At the end of 2022, 108.4 million people worldwide
were forcibly displaced (UNHCR, 2023b) which included over 14 million
in Asia (UNHCR, 2023a). These trends are expected to continue anddisplaced populations will require long-term solutions. For instance, over
2.4 million refugees will be in need of resettlement in 2024, a 20%
increase compared to 2023 (UNHCR, 2023c). Since the root causes offorced displacement are military conflicts, persecution, and human rights

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violations, along with the loss of livelihood due to environmental degradation and climate change, it seems important to connect national andregional refugee regimes with a broader agenda of human security andsustainable development. The practical implementation of human security principles may be realised through reliance on existing internationalframeworks, such as sustainable development goals (SDGs), particularly
SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions, and SDGs 13, 14,
and 15, related to the environment, as well as the Global Compact on
Refugees with its Roadmap to 2030, which aims to ease the burden on
host communities and to enhance refugee self-reliance (UN, 2018).

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