The End of Coal Mining
in South Wales:
Lessons learned fromindustrial transformation
GSI REPORT

Travers Merrill
Lucy Kitson
May 2017© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development© 2017 International Institute for Sustainable Development | IISD.org/gsi

The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation© 2017 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales:
Lessons learned from industrial transformation

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Executive Summary
This case study of coal mining in South Wales in the United Kingdom is a contribution to project
undertaken by the International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD) and the Chinese Energy
Research Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission. The case study explores
the impact of actions taken by government and civil society to mitigate the consequences of the coalindustry’s contraction, and to identify lessons that might be applicable to the planned transition awayfrom coal mining in Shanxi Province, China.
The case study reviews the economic and political context of coal mining in South Wales, also known
as “the Valleys.” It outlines the contemporary challenges by briefly describing the origins of coalmining, its rapid growth from the 1880s during the industrial revolution, its severe contraction during
the economic depression of the 1930s, its resurgence during the Second World War, and its gradual
but irreversible decline and eventual disappearance in the 1990s. It then examines the pronounced
social and community consequences of mining and the closure of collieries, the significant impactof unionized labour and the efforts of government to counter unemployment and economic decline
through regional policy. It examines the work of institutions, including the Welsh Development
Agency, to mitigate the consequences of pit closure and reviews the contribution of European Union
funds for this purpose.
Despite the inability of policy to offset the social impacts of industrial decline in South Wales, the casestudy does provide some indication of how mitigation options can be developed in other mining areas
facing major industrial change and realignment. A key finding is the need to develop a comprehensive
response that includes measures that generate economic activity, improve infrastructure, maintainsocial cohesion and establish effective institutions to implement the response.
The experience of government and its many delivery bodies gave rise to considerable lessons
regarding the challenges of transforming the economy of former mining communities in South Wales.
But perhaps the overarching lesson is the powerful influence of global economic factors and the needto establish a critical mass of local skills and resilience to respond to both the closure of collieries andsubsequent economic changes.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Box ES1. Key lessons learned in South Wales from the end of coal mining
Strengthening the local economy requires• Ensuring that strategic programs are precisely tailored to the communities they are intended
to benefit.
• Building on existing economic activity, however modest, to anchor recovery in the local
community.
• Adopting a clear and deliverable plan to diversify the economic base of former mining
communities at all levels.
• Replacing mining with new manufacturing activity.
• Ensuring that local suppliers benefit from new economic activity.
• Supporting individual entrepreneurs to develop products and services and bring them tomarket.
• Retraining the workforce.
• Establishing a strong connection between higher education and business.
• Adopting new technology, which requires significant planning and resources to overcome thelegacies of coal mining and to generate a new approach to economic prosperity.
Improving the physical infrastructure and environment requires• Identifying and prioritizing investment to counter the infrastructure deficit.
• Appreciating that the natural landscape is a significant asset and provides a foundation for
future economic prosperity through tourism, outdoor activity and sport.
• Building, maintaining and improving the housing stock, which delivers better health andwell-being, and provides an opportunity for training, employment, increased civic pride, andincreases people’s desire to remain in the area and investing in its future.
Strengthening community cohesion and support for economic transformation requires•

Devising and delivering adequate forms of welfare protection.

•

Understanding the supported communities through high-quality and adequately resourced
research.

•Appreciating that economic renewal is greatly strengthened by the existence of a robustand dynamic cultural identity, and that community participation in the process of economictransformation is an important factor in determining success.

•Acknowledging that communities are not responsible for their own economic decline andare not equipped to bring about change without strategic government.

Establishing effective delivery institutions involves•

Transforming the economy of former mining areas through a long-term politicalcommitment to strategic objectives and allocation of sufficient resources.

•

Delivering economic transformation through the interaction of many interests at all levels
in a dynamic process of renewal. Clear institutional roles and responsibilities are required,together with agreed and robust linkages and communications.

•

Placing the overall responsibility for regional economic regeneration in a specialist bodyworking with government and other institutions and charged with driving partnerships andcollective progress forward.

•

Arranging that civil servants involved in economic regeneration possess the financial andcommercial competencies to support and advise business, and to engage educational
institutions and with local communities.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................................1
1.1 South Wales and Shanxi Province......................................................................................................................................1
1.2 Case Study Framework and Methodology..................................................................................................................2
1.3 The Geography of the South Wales Coalfield ........................................................................................................2
1.4 Terminology..........................................................................................................................................................................................3
2.0 The Political and Economic Context of Coal Mining in South Wales................................................... 4
2.1 The Great War and Economic Depression................................................................................................................. 5
2.2 The Second World War and Post-War Reconstruction.................................................................................. 6
2.3 Growing Unrest..................................................................................................................................................................................7
2.4 Recession, Confrontation and Closure......................................................................................................................... 8
3.0 The Social Impact of Mine Closure......................................................................................................................10
3.1 Outmigration....................................................................................................................................................................................10
3.2 Educational Attainment and Skills Acquisition..................................................................................................10
3.3 Health and Well-Being.............................................................................................................................................................. 11
3.4 State Welfare Support ............................................................................................................................................................12
3.5 Housing..................................................................................................................................................................................................13
4.0 The Impact of Regional Policy. .............................................................................................................................. 14
5.0 Economic Regeneration and the Contribution of the Welsh Development Agency (WDA),
European Funding and Non-Governmental Organizations..................................................................... 18
5.1 The Welsh Development Agency.....................................................................................................................................18
5.2 European Union Funding........................................................................................................................................................20
5.3 Non-governmental Organizations..................................................................................................................................21
6.0 Lessons Learned From the South Wales Coalfield....................................................................................... 22
6.1 Strengthening the Local Economy.................................................................................................................................22
6.2 Improving the Physical Infrastructure and Environment.............................................................................23
6.3 Strengthening Community Cohesion and Support for Economic Transformation............... 24
6.4 Delivering Policies and Practices.................................................................................................................................... 24
7.0 Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................................................26
References.................................................................................................................................................................................28
Appendix ................................................................................................................................................................................... 32© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

1.0 Introduction
1.1 South Wales and Shanxi ProvinceThis case study is one of three produced by the International Institute on Sustainable Development(IISD) to inform Shanxi Province, China, of the experience and lessons learned elsewhere on
the phasing out of coal mining and interventions to address the resulting economic and social
consequences.
At first glance there would appear to be few similarities between the former coalfields of South
Wales, an area of just 2,500 square kilometres (km2) with a present population of around 757,000,(International Centre for Regional Regeneration & Development Studies, 2003) and the Shanxi
Province of China, which covers an area of 155,000 km2 with a population of over 36 million, andwhich mines 10 per cent of the world’s coal. Despite the enormous disparity of scale, the experienceof South Wales in confronting the closure of pits and the end of its mining industry delivers some
useful insights for governments and collieries elsewhere that are facing industrial transformation.
In both South Wales and Shanxi Province coal mining began with the exploitation of easily accessible
deposits of coal by local communities, which then became intricately connected with the manufactureand evolving technology of iron. The rate at which industrialization progressed and the resulting
demand for coal during the late 18th and 19th centuries is different, but both areas became reliant on
this single extraction industry and on moving coal by rail—south to the ports on the coast for exportin the case of South Wales, and east to Pukou for shipment along the Yangzi (Thompson, 2003) in thecase of Shanxi Province.
The geopolitical contexts in which the mining industry then progressed in these two parts of theworld are very different, but both grew according to the level of available investment, both drew inrural labour to provide the manpower necessary to extract the coal and both witnessed extreme anddangerous working conditions and low wages. When demand for coal was high, mining companies
prospered and their workforce and families survived albeit often at subsistence levels. When the
demand for coal declined, the pits closed, workers were laid off and, as in South Wales during the
1930s, there was severe poverty, destitution and outward migration.
Whereas coal mining in Shanxi Province expanded exponentially after 1949, coal production inSouth Wales experienced just a short period of growth after the Second World War due to the postwar construction effort. Over the second half of the twentieth century, the industry declined as
domestic use of coal fell away due to clean-air legislation and the discovery of North Sea oil. Despitea temporary reprieve following industrial action in the 1970s, the ongoing unprofitability of theindustry and the recession of the 1980s led to official recommendations for pit closures. Renewed
and intensified industrial action by miners only delayed the program of closures and by the end of the20th century, coal mining in South Wales had all but disappeared.
Shanxi Province is now facing intense contraction as the government addresses the need to reduce
production. The impact on the local economy and the workforce is challenging and painful. The
consequences of both closing unofficial pits and capping the production targets of official enterprises
is understandably compounded by the challenge of investing in the most viable collieries until they
too are closed, to replace lost employment through the establishment of new industries, and to retrain
the existing workforce to ensure their productivity and continued contribution to the nation’s wealth.
South Wales faced all these challenges alongside a complex political and economic structure.
Numerous programs and interventions were adopted, with varying degrees of success. Lessons were
frequently learned the hard way, and were sometimes able to make the schemes that followed more
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

1.2 Case Study Framework and Methodology
The South Wales experience is broad and was acquired over a long period of time, and because it
is likely that there are many disparate lessons that may be useful in the discussion around plans for
Shanxi Province, a correspondingly wide approach is taken in this case study.
An evaluation of policies and programs in South Wales to support the industry and its mining
communities through its industrial transition requires a review of the political and economic
controversies surrounding coal in recent years. The history of the South Wales coalfield has helped
determine and shape past and contemporary policies and initiatives to counter the economic andhuman impact of mine closure. Accordingly, the case study sets out the political and economic
context in which the mining industry in South Wales was created and then collapsed, before
examining the range of interventions designed to ameliorate the impact of pit closures. These
interventions are examined under four headings: Strengthening the local economy; Improving thephysical infrastructure and environment; Revitalizing community cohesion and support for economictransformation; and Delivering policies and practices.
This evaluation is based on the premise that policies are directed toward existing coal mining areas
and the population that remain there, and not toward moving surplus labour out to regions where
job opportunities are more prevalent. Encouraging surplus labour to move was entertained by British
governments during the 1920s1 and led to increased migration which in turn only depleted mining
areas of the social capital necessary for their survival (Pitfield, 1973). It was soon understood thatthe industrial base of these communities needed to be revitalized, and the overall problem was only
magnified by encouraging workers to disperse to uncertain employment prospects elsewhere. A
proposal to move the entire population of Merthyr Tydfil, a town in the Heads of the Valleys, wassoundly rejected (Rowlands, 2002). The expectation that miners would relinquish their sole (thoughdiminishing) source of income and willingly sever all family and community networks and move to adifferent industry and lifestyle in the southeast was regarded as impracticable and as unrealistic—aswas meeting the costs of such a migration. In China, the imperatives and mechanisms may allow
the relocation of communities and leave behind a residual population sufficient to maintain an
economically and socially sustainable community, but after the 1940s the British government nevercontemplated or adopted policies designed to depopulate the South Wales valleys or other coal mining
areas in Britain.
The methodology adopted includes an extensive review of the literature and a number of interviews
with key civil servants responsible for the delivery of programs in South Wales and a small numberof Welsh politicians—including a former First Minister—who were responsible for economic
development policies related to South Wales. A number of academics with expertise and experience inthe history of the South Wales’ coalfields and strategic interventions were also interviewed.2

1.3 The Geography of the South Wales Coalfield
The South Wales coalfield has an east-west length of nearly 145 kilometres and an average width of
24 kilometres in an elongated basin, with a rim of millstone grit and carboniferous limestone with an
up-fold in the centre which brought coal deposits comparatively near the surface. Deep north-southvalleys cut through these formations providing access to coal seams through their sides and deep
vertical shafts, producing bituminous coal in the east, high-grade steam coal in the central coalfield,
and anthracite in the west. Faults in coal seams were numerous throughout the geological formations,and extraction could be complex, expensive and dangerous.
Through the provisions of the Special Areas (Development and Improvement Act) 1934 and its Industrial Transference Board. See http://discovery.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3057005.
2
See list in Appendix A
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Mining communities were—and remain—tucked into the floors of these inaccessible valleys aroundthe pit heads, precisely reflecting the pattern of mining activity.
The South Wales coalfield is synonymous with the term “the Valleys” but care needs to taken in using
this term because it would be convenient to regard the coalfield as a homogeneous area, whereas
the level of deprivation was not entirely uniform. The southern mouths of the valleys are closer tothe coastal strip and the key ports of Port Talbot, Swansea, Cardiff and Newport and benefited
accordingly. The most isolated and inaccessible northern reaches of the Valleys, known as the “Headsof the Valleys,” have always fared far worse from depopulation and the economic consequences ofcolliery closure.

1.4 Terminology
The term “South Wales coalfield” refers to the area covered by numerous individual collieries. As
these collieries are to be found strung out along a number of valleys, the South Wales coalfield iscolloquially called “the Valleys,” and this term is also used when appropriate. Where these valleys open
out onto the coastal plain, the term “mouths of the Valleys” is used, and the upper reaches of thesevalleys where they terminate in the uplands are called the “Heads of the Valleys,” and this term is also
used.

Figure 1. Map of coal mines in South Wales.
Source: Northern Mine Research Society, n.d.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

2.0 The Political and Economic Context of Coal Mining
in South WalesThe history of South Wales from the mid-19th to the late 20th century is in great part the storyof coal mining, but it is worth remembering that before the prominence of “King Coal” Wales’s
industrial revolution had begun much earlier with slate quarrying, and copper and iron-ore mining.
By 1827 the South Wales iron industry furnished half of Britain’s iron exports (Jones, 2014), which
generated a corresponding boom in coal production—thus, initially the coal industry served theiron industry. Coal owners made huge profits, employment grew, inward migration soared and newpits spread along the Valleys. The particular qualities of Welsh coal for domestic heating and the
production of steam for the railways and steamships (including battleships of the Royal Navy) was
widely acclaimed and resulted in an ever-increasing exploitation of coal reserves, particularly inthe central Rhondda valleys (Davies, 2015). By 1891 30 million tonnes of coal was mined in South
Wales, which rose to 57 million tonnes by 1913 (Jones, 2014)—one fifth of British coal production—
employing over a quarter of a million miners (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. South Wales Output and Employment as a % of the UK (1874-1944)
Source:Welsh Government, 1985.

Toward the end of the 19th century, the industry was characterized by rapid and uncontrolled growth.
Matters of health and safety were of little importance in the race for increased productivity and profit,
and this race had profound consequences (Curtis, 2014). Just a hint of what was to come was revealedin 1898 following a strike of workers demanding higher wages from mine owners, which resulted in
the formation of the South Wales Miners Federation (the “Fed”) and its locally organized colliery“Lodges” (Curtis, 2013). On this occasion the Fed lost its fight to keep the colliery open, but miners
were now organized, and they displayed a determined and confrontational approach to industrial
relations (Gower, 2012).
Increasing dissatisfaction at conditions and low wages prompted a deep questioning of capitalism
among miners and extensive support for “syndicalism”—bringing the means of production under
workers’ control (Curtis, 2013). Political energy was repeatedly ignited by miners’ pay and conditions,and by the deaths of miners in numerous pit disasters (see Figure 3). Over 6,000 people lost theirlives in pit disasters in the years up to 1970 excluding those who died of injuries or from mining© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
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4The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

related diseases (Welsh Mining Disasters, nd). Anger erupted in 1910, when a strike of 11,000 miners
seeking higher wages and improved safety conditions and South Wales became a focus of industrial
unrest organized by the Fed involving violent battles with the police (Evans & Maddox, 2010).

Figure 3. Deaths in South Wales and UK Mining (1874-1915)
Source:Welsh Government, 1985.

2.1 The Great War and Economic Depression
The start of the Great War of 1914 led to an increased demand for coal (notwithstanding that theRoyal Navy had moved from coal to oil at the turn of the century) and increased profits for the mineowners. In consequence, miners demanded higher wages. Mine owners refused to concede, and astrike of all collieries in South Wales was called in 1915 (NUM, nd). In 10 days the government
backed down and was forced to assume temporary control of the industry to support sufficient
production to sustain the war effort. By 1918 the pay of miners had doubled (Miners’ Federation ofGreat Britain, 1920).
1920, however, proved to be a turning point for the South Wales coal industry. The mines were takenback under private ownership and wage agreements were abandoned; simultaneously global recession
and declining use of coal led to a fall in demand for, and the price of coal (Supple, 1989). The
depression was catastrophic for a community that relied entirely on coal extraction: wages plummeted
and miners were laid off, with unemployment in Wales rising over 25 per cent at certain times during
the depression (Constantine, 1983). Extreme poverty gripped the South Wales valleys and daily
survival relied on self-reliance and local welfare support organized by the Fed. By 1922 the Labour
Party had won all parliamentary seats in South Wales (Curtis, 2013).
The inter-war depression resulted in a major exodus of miners from the South Wales coalfield thatserved to strengthen the militancy of those who remained. When coal owners closed a colliery in 1925
(rather than allow existing practices to continue) miners responded by taking control of the local town
for several days until police were able to re-establish authority (Hywel, 1973). As conditions in themines deteriorated, the Trades Union Council (which represented all trade unions in Britain) called
a general strike in 1926 to defend the miners (Renshaw, 1975). It took just nine days for the striketo collapse, but the impact on mining communities in South Wales was profound. The already strongsocial cohesion of colliery communities was increased and became inextricably linked to a form ofclass struggle whose consequences were to be felt until the 1980s.

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5The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Figure 4. Output and employment in Mining (All Wales, 1874-1975)
Source:Welsh Government, 1985.

Between 1921 and 1936, 241 mines in South Wales closed and the number of miners fell from
270,000 to 130,000 (see Figure 4). The impact of the depression decimated every facet of life in thecoalfield, resulting in three hunger marches from South Wales to London in 1927, 1934 and 1936.

2.2 The Second World War and Post-War Reconstruction
Rearmament and the Second World War dramatically increased the demand for coal, and wages
gradually rose. The government took control of mines in 1942 to boost production, and fullnationalization—under a “National Coal Board”—became Labour Party policy and was duly
introduced in 1947 following the Party’s victory in the 1945 election (Millward & Singleton, 2002).
As a result of nationalization, pits were updated, wages increased and working conditions improved.
Coal remained in demand, and annual output from mines in South Wales reached 24 million tonnes
in 1952 (Government of Wales Statistics & Research, various dates). However, over the course of the
1950s increased use of oil, gas and nuclear as energy sources, and the limitations placed on coal use
by the 1956 Clean Air Act, led to declining demand for coal and an impetus to close uneconomic
pits (Curtis, 2013). Between 1953 and 1959, 25 coal mines closed in South Wales, and the numberof jobs fell by over 15,000, or 14 per cent of the workforce (See Figure 5). In the early 1960s, policy
focused on closing the small uneconomic mines and concentrating resources on fewer and larger pits
and between 1960 and 1965, 35 collieries closed with the loss of 15,000 jobs. However, increased
investment in Wales had brought with it manufacturing and steel-working jobs and miners generally
had no problem securing alternative employment; indeed, given relatively low wages and an insecure
future, many miners chose to exit the industry (Curtis, 2013). Consequently, industrial action in theface of these closures was relatively muted in the 1950s and into the early 1960s.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Figure 5. Production, Employment and Total Number of Collieries in South Wales (1953–74)
Source:Welsh Government, 1985.

Despite the election of a Labour government in 1964, the program of pit closures continued,
accelerated by a further drop in demand precipitated by the discovery of North Sea oil. The National
Union of Mineworkers, supportive of the Labour government, elected to mitigate the effects of thisclosure rather than challenge the policy altogether. However, increasing dissatisfaction among themembership led to spates of industrial action throughout the 1960s. However, over the course of the
1960s, were 50,000 job losses in South Wales mining and a fall in the number of collieries from 121
to 52 (See Figure 5).

2.3 Growing Unrest
Whereas the National Union of Mineworkers’ leadership was resigned to the contraction of theindustry, many South Wales Lodges retained their radicalism and opposition to pit closures—theywere more than ready to confront the new 1970 Conservative government in defence of the industry.
A strike over wages in the early years of the 1970s quickly collapsed due to the lack of national union
recognition, but the radicalism of South Wales’ miners reached new heights (Curtis, 2013). The
government, meanwhile, pursued its Industrial Relations Bill which sought to reduce trade union
power (Whittingham & Towers, 1971).
The National Union of Mineworkers declared an official strike in early 1972 which, with the aid of
the transport unions, quickly succeeded in paralyzing the production and movement of coal across
Britain. A Court of Enquiry recommended substantial wage increases for miners, and the strike
ended in victory and a brief reaffirmation of the continuing importance of coal (Phillips, 2006).
However, the improved wages expected from the 1972 strike failed to materialize, and continued
pit closures led to a haemorrhaging of mine workers from South Wales’ collieries, with employment
falling by 10 per cent (from 40,000 to 36,000) between 1970 and 1972. Miners introduced an
overtime ban as a challenge to government pay restraint policies, which rapidly resulted in coalrationing. This coincided with an increase in oil prices caused by the Yom Kippur war which led
to electricity cuts, a declaration of a government state of emergency and a three-day working week
(National Union of Mineworkers, n.d.). The government was obliged to call a General Election toendorse its draconian handling of the strike, and lost. From this point onwards the problem of union© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

power became a central issue in British politics, and miners from South Wales were regarded as theprimary protagonists (Richards, 1996).
The position after 1974 was improved by the official position of the new Labour government.
Many collieries were upgraded, technological improvements were introduced and new coal seams
exploited. In South Wales only a handful of collieries pits closed and these were for good reason anduncontested. The introduction of the Coal Mines (Respirable Dust) Regulations 1975, led to an
improvement in the health of miners, and those suffering from pneumoconiosis due to the inhalationof coal dust were compensated (McIvor & Johnston, 2016). Voluntary early retirement schemes wereintroduced and pension provisions improved. The social fabric mining areas was strengthened, andunion membership increased as miners returned to the industry.
The new Labour government wished to expand the role of the coal industry in delivering energy
independence and improved many collieries. However, it soon struggled with the challenging
economy and proposed a “Social Contract” to contain wages to support its economic policies(Martin, Sunlep, & Wills, 2012). This stretched—but did not quite—break the relationship between
the National Miners Union and the Labour government, but South Wales miners persistently voted
against the social contract and in favour industrial action not least because in the face of declining
profitability, and the future of the industry again looked bleak.

2.4 Recession, Confrontation and Closure
The recession of the 1980s was the worst in Britain since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Unemployment tripled, from one million to over three million workers (Office for National Statistics,n.d.). Acts of Parliament clipped union bargaining powers and restricted the legality of strike action.
Government support for the industry fell away, productivity declined, pits increasingly encounteredcoal seams that were difficult to exploit and colliery closures began again (see Figure 6). The
government accepted a Commission report to close 27 out of the remaining 33 collieries in South
Wales and put an embargo on hiring (Gudgin, 1984).

Figure 6. Production, Employment and Total Number of Collieries in Wales (1974-96)
Source: Government of Wales, 1998.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

South Wales miners voted for immediate strike action which took the government by surprise and,realizing the low level of U.K. coal stocks, it retreated from confrontation and adopted the gradualapproach of withdrawing investment from the mining industry, reducing manpower and relying on
economic pressures to close collieries one by one. At the same time it redirected its national energy
policy away from coal and toward nuclear power, building up coal stocks in anticipation of a future
showdown with the mineworkers unions (Pearson & Watson, 2010).
A Conservative government was returned in 1983 and the National Coal Board launched adetermined program of pit closures. In March 1984, the National Union of Miners, confronted
with the end of coal mining in Britain, called a national strike to secure the future of the industry.
Thousands of miners picketed the more reluctant collieries to join strike action. The police undertook
surveillance and road blocks to halt “flying pickets” reaching electricity generating plants, andconfrontations on picket lines became violently ugly (Phillips, 2016).
One coal mining area in northern England, Nottinghamshire, refused to join the strike, as did South
Wales’ steel workers, and these blows to unity were accentuated by the large reserves of imported coalstockpiled by the government and replenished through small ports around Britain. At one coke works,
Orgreave, 6,500 miners, including 1,000 from South Wales, clashed with 4,000 police in a brutal
and uncontrolled brawl, and violence reached a level unprecedented in Britain’s industrial history(National Coal Museum, 2009).
The government removed welfare benefits from strikers, offered a bonus to those willing to return towork, and secured a High Court order banning picketing at a South Wales steelworks. The National
Union of Mineworker’s bank account was frozen and South Wales’ Lodges rushed to safeguard theirfunds. Although very few miners from South Wales returned to work, the strike collapsed at thenational level (Curtis, 2013; Phillips, 2016). The ensuing program of colliery closure rapidly ended
coal mining in South Wales, and by 2003 the United Kingdom had become a net importer of coal.
This very brief history of the South Wales coal industry shows its rapid growth and gradual collapse.
It illustrates the all-important impact of global economic pressures on the sustainability of mining
and the political struggle to limit union activism. In these circumstances, the long-term strategies tosupport, save or manage the decline of the industry proved fruitless. The final closure of collieries hada heavy and detrimental impact on the prosperity, health, and well-being of those remaining in theValleys which Fothergill (2008, p. 3) describes as “one of the most intractable development problemsof any older industrial area in the whole of Britain.”© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
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9The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

3.0 The Social Impact of Mine Closure
As might be expected the social impact of the closure of mining in South Wales was profound,and this impact persists, despite being repeatedly addressed over the last 30 years by all levels ofgovernment and civil society.
Five factors in particular have characterized the persistent challenge of economic and social
regeneration in The Valleys;• Outmigration• Educational attainment and skills acquisition• Health and well-being• State welfare support• Housing

3.1 Outmigration
The population of the Valleys has always fluctuated significantly, depending on the economic
performance and profitability of the mines. Between 1851 and 1911 it is estimated that 366,000
people moved into South Wales due to the growth of coal mining, first from rural Wales and then fromEngland, Ireland, Italy and Spain. In the two Rhondda valleys, the population stood at just 1,998 in
1851. By 1911 it had risen to 152,781 and by 1921 the South Wales coalfield employed 250,000 men(Bloor, 2002). The flow was reversed between the wars due to the Great Depression, and from 1950
onwards the outmigration continued, primarily among those with the skills and ability to command
the highest wages, leaving behind those with fewer or no skills.
In recent years the population has stabilized—and to a small degree increased—in the mouthsof the Valleys where access to employment in the city of Cardiff and the coastal plain is easiest.
However, depopulation has continued in the Heads of the Valleys, albeit at a slowing annual rate.
This population loss is centred on the departure of those aged up to 24 and between 40 and 49,
who constitute a major portion of the employable workforce (Foden, Fothergill, & Gore, 2014).
Accordingly, the challenge is to generate enough employment to retain a population size that does
not fall below the tipping point at which the local economy is no longer sustainable and a spiral isgenerated in which economic collapse and social deprivation outstrip the resources and capacity toadequately respond.
To date, regional policy objectives to generate new business and employment throughout the Valleys
have not succeeded in counteracting the loss of employment or staunching overall population decline.
There remains a need to precisely target communities and ensure that they benefit from strategic
regional policy.

3.2 Educational Attainment and Skills Acquisition
Historically, South Wales’ coal mining communities had a high reputation for self-improvement
and education, using libraries and study rooms built and run by local Union Lodges (Egan, 1987).
Education was seen as a means of personal betterment, providing the best and only means of avoiding
working at the coal face. Although these aspirations have declined in importance, it is still the casethat those who achieve qualifications are those most likely to leave the Valleys in order to secure
employment and improved opportunities overall.

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Young people in the Valleys perform less well than young people elsewhere in Britain, but academic
success necessarily turns the sights of high achievers beyond the confines of home (Foden,
Fothergill, & Gore, 2014). Accordingly, the Valleys have a high proportion of workers with few
or no formal qualifications and a correspondingly high proportion of the population engaged inmanual occupations, which reflects the low economic base of the area and the existence of fewer job
opportunities and diminished expectations.
The Welsh government has adopted numerous measures (in part funded by the European Union),designed to counter the consequences of child poverty and poor educational performance throughpre-school provision, improving teaching for 14 to 19 year olds, and engagement with young people
through mentoring (Egan, 2013).
In 2000 The University of Wales established the Community University of the Valleys delivering
higher education courses on three sites in the heart of the Valleys designed to be easily accessible
and to attract students who would otherwise be unable or disinclined to take their education further(Cook & Rushton, 2009). The greater connection between universities in Wales and manufacturing,
information technology and innovation has proved to be successful but has not noticeably affected theValleys because of their distant location and the educational attainment of levels of those living in theValleys.
Links between education and further education, industry and civil society are regarded as increasingly
important in connecting opportunities for personal development to academic and vocational
achievements leading to employment.

3.3 Health and Well-Being
Much has been written about the health and well-being of South Wales’ miners and their self-helpclubs that eventually led to the formation of the National Health Service (see, for example, Jewell[2007] and Tudor Hart, [2010]). Yet in the Valleys life expectancy is currently lower, and the incidenceof ill health is higher, than elsewhere in Britain and compared with all other former mining regions in
Britain.
The prevalence of poor health is illustrated by the numbers claiming Disability Living Allowance(DLA) a benefit provided to offset some of the costs of care and mobility. DLA is paid to those inwork and those not working, and to those of pensionable age. In 2013 10.7 per cent of the South
Wales population were recorded as claiming DLA (Gore et al., 2014). The reason for this is theresidual prevalence of heart disease, respiratory illness, mental ill health, back pain and arthritis within
the coal mining community. However, poor health now extends beyond former miners to subsequent
generations, and here the connection must be made with the poverty and deprivation that persist in
the Valleys.
During the 1970s and 1980s considerable emphasis was placed on health promotion (Michael, 2008).
With devolution and the establishment of the Welsh Assembly, attention shifted to health inequalities
and encouraging better lifestyle choices as part of a strategy to confront the escalating cost ofhealth services and the contraction in government funding. Nevertheless, the health of residents
in the Valleys continues to be a severe and persistent challenge. Figure 7 represents the total social
expenditures by the Welsh Government between 1981 and 1995, compared with the evolution of the
population in the same period, showing the increase of the social spending.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Figure 7. Government social expenditures in Wales (including social security, health and personalsocial services) and population, 1981 to 1995.
Source: Government of Wales, 1998.

3.4 State Welfare Support
A compulsory national health insurance scheme has existed in Britain since 1911 and it has expanded
ever since becoming fully government-funded in 1931. (Thane, 2011). Since then the welfare system
has been transformed many times, and now supplements the income of those without employment,
those unable to gain employment, those in low-paid employment, and those incapable of sustaining
employment due to illness, injury or other circumstances.3
Identifying and tracking the annual contribution of welfare benefits to any one area, such as theValleys, is not possible primarily because of changes over time in the definition of those entitled
to receive benefits and the amounts of benefits available. Benefit reforms introduced in 2012 in
Housing Benefit, Disability and Incapacity benefits, Child Benefit and Tax allowances make any suchassessment extremely difficult (Feikert-Ahalt, 2012). However, it is revealing that recent reductions
in welfare benefits are adjudicated as likely to remove almost £430 million a year from the economyof the Valleys (and an average of £670 a year for every adult of working age)—four times the annual
EU budget for regional development allocated to the whole of Wales (Beatty & Fothergill, 2014),
an observation that illustrates the continuing contradictions within government policies toward theValleys.
Whatever the figures, the importance of welfare benefits to those in the Valleys cannot be overemphasized. Many unemployed miners in the 1980s decided to take early retirement or to claim
Sickness Benefit, and in time they received their state pension. Younger miners became economicallyinactive, and many ended up on benefits (Beatty, Fothergill & Powell, 2007). Overall, barely halfof the coal mining jobs lost in the last 30 years in South Wales had been replaced by 2008, despite
the many and various attempts to reconfigure and revive the local economy, hence the continuing
importance of welfare support to individuals and the local economy as a whole (Foden, Fothergill, &Gore, 2014)
3 There is no single definition of “welfare benefits.” In 2015/16 the UK government spent £217 billion on core benefits including: £92.1 billion on the State
Pension, £36.7 billion on disability benefits, £29.9 billion on child and working tax credits, £26 billion on housing benefit, £11.7 billion on Child benefit and2014 The£2.4 billion on Unemployment benefit ©
(Fullfact.org,n.d.).International Institute for Sustainable Development

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

3.5 Housing
Providing and maintaining adequate and good-quality housing underpins strategies to tackle poverty
and maintain a population level sufficient to sustain and grow the local economy. In 1975 theNational Housing Condition Survey showed that a quarter of houses in the Valleys were built by mineowners before 1870 during the rapid expansion of the mining industry, and half were built before
1914. All were built to very basic standards entirely unrelated to regulations adopted for houses built
after 1945 (Doling & Thomas, 1982). However, over the years many small terraced houses have beenpurchased and steadily improved and extended, and now constitute sound low-cost owner-occupied
housing for the majority of those living in the Valleys.
It was not until after the First World War that the poor condition and lack of housing became anissue in Britain, and the government empowered local authorities to build rental houses under theprovisions of the 1919 Housing and Town Planning Act. This coincided with economic depression in
the Valleys and little changed, although large cities in Britain embarked on slum clearance programsand “Council House” building (James, 2014). It was not until after the Second World War that
council houses were built in significant numbers in South Wales and many remain, notwithstanding
their enforced sale during the 1980s (Institute of Welsh Affairs, 2006). Those remaining in local
government ownership are now subject to significant upgrading to new standards set by the Welsh
government, a program that provides training and employment opportunities in the community.
In the late 1960s estates of system-built flats were constructed, some of which were on exposed andinaccessible mountainsides. They soon became highly unpopular and attracted a very poor reputation
as housing the most deprived citizens and families with difficulties. Many have been demolished whileothers have been refurbished. Housing Associations have now taken over ownership and managementof much of the public housing stock and are able to follow a more holistic approach to housing andrenewal.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

4.0 The Impact of Regional Policy.
Between the wars the devastation caused by industrial change and collapse fell heavily on the South
Wales coalfield, but the government left such regions to address their problems with minimum directgovernment intervention. By the mid-1930s, however, these laissez faire principles became untenable(Rowlands, 2002), and positive efforts were regarded as necessary to generate alternative industries
where working collieries once stood (Community Development Projects, 1977). The regional policies
adopted since 1934 are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of regional policies supporting transition from coal mining.
Policy / SchemeYear

Government

Industrial Transfer Board

1934

Labour

Provide retraining, grants and loans forminers wishing to move south

Special Areas (Development
and Improvement) Act

1934

Labour

Job creation by improving infrastructure andencouraging industrial development

1960s–1970s

LabourTax incentives, subsidies and grants designed
to support new and relocating firms andincrease employment

1964

LabourAssumed responsibility for the promotion ofindustry

1967/68

LabourPromote development and subsidize labourfor companies in these areas (REP)

Community Development
Project Programme

1969

LabourPromote development by supporting poor
communities

Decentralization of government
offices away from London toregional conurbations

1974

LabourFoster development and employment inperipheral depressed areas

Establishment of the Welsh
Development Agency (WDA)

1976

LabourPromote development

Publication of White Paper on
Regional Industrial Policy

1983

Cardiff Bay Development
Corporation

1987

Valleys Initiative Regeneration
Programme

1989

Communities First Programme
The Heads of the Valleys
Programme

National Plan
Establishment of the Welsh
OfficeThe Valley’s categorised asSpecial Development Areas andRegional Employment Premium(REP)

Jobs Growth Wales

Main objective

Promotion of greater cost efficiency andConservative redirecting attention toward job creation
attached to capital projects
Welsh
Government

Deliver solutions on a wider scale to areas
with greater critical economic mass

2001

Welsh
Government

Foster grassroots community development tocombat poverty

2006

Welsh
Government

Exclusively directed toward former mining
communities

Ongoing

Welsh
Government

Foster employment by providing six-monthplacements with firms at the minimum wage

The Labour government of 1934 established the Industrial Transfer Board to provide retraining,
grants and loans for miners wishing to move south. Across Britain over 200,000 people relocated overthe next 10 years, but financial support was minimal (£12 for a family with six children plus removal
expenses, equivalent to approximately £780 in 2016). In South Wales the take up was relatively low
and four training camps were established to retrain young men. They were located in very isolatedrural areas far away from the Valleys and the temptations of towns, and became so unpopular thatthey were eventually closed (Hill, 2003).
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

A more important government intervention to bring jobs to the Valleys rather than relocating workers
to areas of higher employment was the 1934 Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act(Turvey, 1991). The Act provided for the appointment of Commissioners with the power to improve
the infrastructure and acquire land for industrial development. Estate companies were established tobuild factories and to direct financial aid to industry in the form of rates, rent and income tax relief
and loans (Cullingworth, 1999). In reality the impact of these measures was very modest in South
Wales, but the same approach of providing incentives for industrial diversification continues to thepresent day.
After the War the government introduced a requirement for an Industrial Development Certificate(IDC) to be secured for the location of any new factory. IDC approvals favoured areas of higher
unemployment; however, although the principle was sound, it was a cumbersome and ineffective tool
for regional development (Ashcroft & McGregor, 1989). The post-World War Two boom relieved
unemployment and collieries, including those in South Wales, began to prosper—the instruments ofregional policy fell into misuse until unemployment rose again in the mid-1950s when regional policy
was reactivated.
Labour governments during the 1960s and 1970s introduced a National Plan with tax incentives,
subsidies and grants designed to support new and relocating firms and increase employment. These
were regularly introduced, revised and replaced, but overall proved beneficial in South Wales. In 1964
the government established the Welsh Office, a new department of government with a cabinet-level
Minister, which assumed responsibility for the promotion of industry, and in 1967/68, a number ofSpecial Development Areas were announced, including the South Wales’ valleys, which carried with it
a Regional Employment Premium (REP) as a labour subsidy for companies in these areas.
As economic conditions in the Valleys continued to deteriorate over the course of the decade, thegovernment issued a White Paper (Wales–The Way Ahead) that sought to identify measures to address
this decline. The White Paper, however, reflected a fundamental contradiction that had steadily
emerged since 1946, namely that while there was a very obvious need to support former mining
communities to adapt and reformulate their local economies, it was equally clear that the geographyof the Valleys was so difficult that inward investment and job creation could only succeed if locatedat the mouths of the Valleys and not in the Valleys themselves. This meant building starter units andnew premises for manufacturing plants in the southern coastal strip and along the M4 motorway. As aresult the Valleys lost out and received only secondary help and benefit.
A government initiative that illustrated the significant difficulties of renewing communities—but
this time from the bottom up—was the (1969) Community Development Project Programme whichassumed that the deprived members of these areas were the cause of their own deprivation, and that
progress would be made if they could be engaged and turned away from their “apathy” toward selfhelp. The Programme that was opened in the Valleys (at Glyncorrwg) soon recognized, like the other11 across Britain, that the cause of poverty was determined by macroeconomic factors and not by any
problems of the communities themselves (Dennis & Clout, 1980).
The Conservative government of 1970 denounced interventionist regional policies but rising
unemployment and the deepening recession forced its hand and it was obliged to support larger
employers (Howarth, 1983). The returning 1974 Labour government introduced a policy to disburse
central government offices away from London to regional conurbations (following the successful
relocation of the Royal Mint from London to north Cardiff in 1968) and to increase support where
there was a high level of poverty, which in effect covered 20 per cent of the British population and allcoal mining areas including South Wales (Howarth, 1983).
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

The economic recession experienced by Britain in the 1970s and 1980s produced redundancies in
the factories that had been built to counter unemployment by previous rounds of regional policy.
The shortfall in jobs in the Valleys has never been overcome notwithstanding outward migration andcommuting to jobs in Cardiff, Swansea and Newport and their hinterland.
In 1983 the government published a White Paper on Regional Industrial Policy requiring greater
cost efficiency and redirecting attention toward job creation attached to capital projects (Young,
Hood, & Hammill, 2017). This was followed by a recalibration of regional policy to take into accountmanagement training, supporting small and medium enterprises, and the provision of business andinnovation grants.
At this time, tackling poverty in Wales became synonymous with what was regarded as a growing“democratic deficit” which, despite the establishment of the Welsh Office, was felt to increasingly
frustrate economic revival and social cohesion. A referendum on devolution for Wales was held in
1979 and failed to pass, but another in 1997 narrowly succeeded and led to the formation of the
National Assembly of Wales (McAllister, 1998).
The renewed efforts of the Welsh Assembly Government were complemented by numerous Welsh
advisory and renewal bodies, including Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (1987) and the Valleys
Initiative Regeneration Programme (1989). Although Wales certainly benefited from these schemes,
and the Valleys indirectly benefited, the very particular needs of former mining communities became
increasingly subsumed into what was rather nebulously identified as the “South East Capital Region”(Welsh Assembly Government, 2008). This concept was used in the Assembly Government’s SpatialPlan, and was later driven by EU and governmental pressures to deliver solutions on a wider scale toareas with a greater critical economic mass. Unfortunately, approach further relegated the particularcharacter and needs of areas such as the Valleys and perpetuated their isolation by diverting attention
away from them and their continuing disadvantages (Industrial Communities Alliance, 2015).
The lack of effective renewal in the Valleys had increasing local political consequences, and locally
based measures were regarded as necessary. Accordingly, in 2001 the Welsh government established
the Communities First Programme, reviving the notion that grassroots community development could
make a significant difference in combating poverty. It set up 52 neighbourhood-based partnerships
with existing community organizations in support of the most vulnerable; however, the Programme
proved to be costly and was reduced in scale, although it still exists.
An example of government investment being directed to South Wales but outside the Valleys was
Cardiff Bay Development Corporation, which was commissioned to build a barrage across the mouthof Cardiff Bay to increase the land values of abandoned docks and thereby renew the waterfront. This
had no discernible impact on the Valleys and generated considerable disapproval from its communities
and politicians. A later initiative, The Heads of the Valleys Programme (2006), was exclusively directed
toward former mining communities in the most remote portion of the Valleys and was tasked witha complete agenda for renewal to be delivered in partnership with local authorities and community
organizations (Welsh Assembly Government, 2006). However, it was allocated a minimal budgetof just £10 million a year, and its achievements were limited by its structure and resources (Bevan
Foundation, 2009). Its intended 15-year lifespan was cut short by the Welsh government in 2014.
A key measurement of the success or failure of regional policy is the share of the job shortfall formen that regional intervention is able to eliminate (Osmond, 2008). In the Valleys this figure wasalways disappointing.4 In addition, the replacement jobs were not necessarily of equal value to those4

Between 1981 and 2004 5,200 non-coal related replacement jobs are recorded as having been generated, just 19 per cent of a full replacement target and thelowest percentage among all British coalfields.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

lost (Beatty, Fothergill, & Powell, 2007). Miners were regarded as well-paid manual workers andalternative part-time or full-time jobs in factories or call centres could not be regarded as providing
equivalent employment. In addition, new jobs accessible from coal mining areas were increasingly
available to men and women, and whereas former miners were reluctant to do work that they did notregard as appropriate, younger miners and their wives did not share their attitude (Beatty, Fothergill,& Powell, 2007).
It is not possible to determine with precision to what extent local circumstances in the Valleys were
impacted by variations in national economic growth as opposed to Regional policy and renewal
initiatives designed to activate revival. More will be said about the efforts of the Welsh Development
Agency and the contribution of European Union funding. What is apparent is that the South Wales
coalfield has not managed to progress as successfully as other mining areas in Britain due to its
inaccessible geography and the failure to establish an alternative economic base within its mining
communities or within easy reach of their diminished population.
The current approach to regional development is based on the belief that the national economy is the
key to future prosperity and this might—but only possibly—eventually lead to increased industrial
investment and employment in the Valleys. Locally, the emphasis can only be on encouraging local
procurement and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) while endeavouring toincrease educational attainment and improved skills. The “Jobs Growth Wales” program provides
six-month placements with firms at the minimum wage, and is proving to be beneficial. There issome recognition that the Valleys has significant potential to generate wind power from which local
communities might benefit, but there is significant local opposition in the Valleys to turbines locatedon hillsides. There are currently no major planned infrastructural projects that would have a direct
and transformational impact on the Valleys, and the investment in upgrading public housing is the
only initiative with the potential to deliver local economic added value. The Industrial Communities
Alliance (2014), a pioneering body representing local authorities in industrial areas across Britain,
advocates the reinstatement of Enterprise Zones similar to those in the 1980s to provide incentives for
new companies to locate to the Valleys, but the likelihood of this idea gaining traction is low becauseof the current absence of a strategic and funded program to regenerate the Valleys.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

5.0 Economic Regeneration and the Contribution of the
Welsh Development Agency (WDA), European
Funding and Non-Governmental Organizations
5.1 The Welsh Development Agency
In the 1970s political interest grew in the establishment of an agency explicitly charged withovercoming the impact of unemployment caused by the collapse of coal mining, the parallel rundownof agriculture and the contraction of the fishing industry in Wales. The idea found expression in
the Labour Party’s October 1974 manifesto as part of its industrial strategy and was implemented
following election victory (Eirug, 1983).
The Welsh Development Agency (WDA) was based on economic regeneration delivered throughspecific industrial sectors (food, the motor industry, new technology etc.), and was charged withpromoting industrial efficiency and competitiveness, safeguarding and generating employment
and improving the environment. Initially it saw itself as doing this by drawing up a comprehensive
economic and industrial strategy for Wales in consultation with local authorities, but this conflicteddirectly with the role of the Welsh Office (run by the central government) and the confusion aroundthe roles of each was contested for several years. Eventually the WDA became what is best describedas “an industrial property developer: a kind of merchant bank-cum-investment house: and a major
land re-claimer” (Powell, 1979).
The WDA was charged with both safeguarding and generating employment while securing aminimum return on business investment of 15 per cent. Local political and community interests werealways in favour of intervening to save small firms despite their questionable prospects, but the WDA
sought only to support businesses with long-term futures that could provide stable employment. It
provided loans, joint loan and equity investment, and equity purchase amounting to £24.3 million inits first three years (Eirug, 1983).
In 1981 the WDA was appointed as an agent of the European Coal and Steel Community with a£5 million loan facility over three years (Council of the European Union, 1981). This enabled small
firms in Wales to borrow up to £50,000 at 10 per cent a year which was important because of the highincidence of small businesses employing 50 or fewer workers. The overall impact of these measureson unemployment can be regarded as valuable but insufficient to stem rising unemployment rates in
Wales which rose by 133 per cent—from 77,000 to 180,000—between January 1976 and September
1982. The Valleys fared even worse (Office for National Statistics, n.d.).
The WDA concentrated its greatest efforts on continuing an existing government program of land
reclamation of derelict colliery sites (almost 1,700 acres) (Eirug, 1983). Old pits were cleared andlandscaped for development and advance infrastructure and factory buildings were built, whichtransformed the topography of the South Wales coalfield. In its first three years (1976 to 1981) the
WDA spent on average 17 per cent of its budget on land reclamation and an average 72 per cent on
industrial sites, premises and infrastructure (Eirug, 1983). Over time it built an increasing number ofsmaller units in support of local companies and smaller inward relocating firms.
However, by 1982 the 812 advance factory units built by the WDA (it actually owned 1,225) were in
100 locations that did not coincide with the areas of greatest unemployment, i.e., the Valleys. Rather,
they were constructed either at the mouth of former mining valleys or close to the motorway (M4)and key communication routes (see Figure 8 for distribution between South Wales and the rest of
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

on former coal mining communities, and many units remained or became vacant. In 1982 only 40
per cent (348) of WDA units were tenanted and only 5,125 people were employed in them (Hansard,1982). However, it has since been recognized that the construction of advance factories did have an
invaluable impact on the most deprived areas and became invaluable in later efforts to attract inward
investment.

Figure 8. WDA: Advance Factories Completed (Selected Years)

The 1980 Select Committee on Welsh Affairs expressed concern that there were still no fewer thaneight bodies in Wales charged with addressing unemployment; the WDA, Development Board for
Rural Wales, Welsh Office [Industry Department], Manpower Services Commission, Land Authority
for Wales, British Steel Corporation, local authorities and the European Community (HM Parliament,
1980). The result was the persistent absence of a truly integrated economic development strategy
for Wales and a more disjointed approach to economic regeneration than might otherwise have beenachieved.
Where the WDA is regarded as having excelled in the 1980s and 1990s was in securing inward
investment. Between 1983 and 1991 it secured investment totalling over £4 billion, includingSony and Align-Rite (to Bridgend), Bosch (to Cardiff), and Hitachi (to Hirwaun), and numerous
companies in the automotive components sector; Ford, Toyota Rover, Jaguar, Mercedes and BMW,and in the electronics sector such as Panasonic (WDA, 1991). It attracted the maintenance facilities
of British Airways to Cardiff Airport and supported Admiral Insurance plc to locate in Wales. It
invested in the building of the Cardiff Millennium Stadium and the National Botanic Gardens ofWales, but here again the impact on the Valleys was modest.
In 1992 the WDA Chairman and a number of Directors were condemned by the Government Public
Accounts Committee for numerous financial irregularities and relations between the Welsh Assembly
and the WDA deteriorated, resulting in its sudden merger with the Welsh Assembly Government
in 2006 (Halkier, Danson, & Damborg, 2002). Key staff left the merged body—removing theexpertise and institutional memory necessary to continue its functions—and the agency was in effectdismembered. The House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee (2011) published a report on theclosure of the WDA expressing grave concern at the reduced performance of economic renewal in
Wales since the winding up of the agency.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Care needs to be taken in an assessment of the WDA’s success during its 30-year existence in relation
to its impact on the Valleys. It did build advance factory units in support of inward investment andrenewal but these were primarily located just outside the Valleys or far beyond them. The impact onopportunities in the Valleys was, however, marginal. Infrastructure projects were also geared primarily
to South East Wales, and hence it is difficult to identify the impact of regional policies delivered by the
WDA to any strengthening of the Valleys’ economy.
The Welsh government was not able to replicate the success of the WDA after 2006 (Great Britain
Parliament: Welsh Affairs Committee, 2012). For example, investment from a major inward funder,
Korea’s Lucky Goldstar (LG) electronics manufacturer, originally attracted by the WDA, failed tomaterialize and firms previously attracted to Wales began to leave as a result of greater inducements
and lower wages elsewhere (Cato, 2004). In recent years the Welsh government has relied on
supporting the 22 local government areas to deliver economic and social renewal programs in part
because public funds have shrunk drastically and because it no longer has the manpower or expertise
to devise or orchestrate major renewal projects.

5.2 European Union Funding
European structural funds have supported economic development across EU member states andtheir constituent regions since the 1970s with the aim of reducing economic and social inequalities
between the EU’s regions and nations. They are composed of five funds; the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF); Cohesion Fund; European AgriculturalFund for Rural Development; and European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) (Sheffield
Political Economy Research Institute [SPERI], 2016). The majority of EU structural funds to theUnited Kingdom are from ERDF and ESF. A number of specialist programs are available; to increasebusiness competitiveness with assistance to; improve access to finance and markets (COSME); to
provide opportunities to teach, study and volunteer abroad in Europe (Erasmus), and to employment,social policy and labour mobility across the EU (Programme for Employment and Social Innovation[EaSI]), etc.
Structural Funding is allocated to projects in seven-year funding rounds to regions of member
states that are categorized according to their per capita gross domestic product. In the case of West
Wales and the Valleys, no fewer than three cycles of funding amounting to £5.19 billion has been
allocated since 2000 (Dickins, 2016). This repeated entitlement of the Valleys illustrates its continuing
deprivation and the lack of progress made toward economic transformation.
Over the years, there have been hundreds of extremely varied EU-funded projects under numerous
EU programs.5 They include: the Working Skills for Adults Scheme (£2.7 million) to develop new
skills and improve career prospects of 1,700 people in the Valleys; Bridges Into Work Scheme (£5.5
million) to support 2,000 out-of-work residents of the Valleys by providing training and mentoring;
Refurbishment of Merthyr Tydfil Town Centre (£6.6 million); Torfaen Business and Innovation
Centre (£1.7 million) to support new businesses; and upgrading the Heads of the Valleys road(£79 million) to improve travel times and open up land for new start-up businesses and increased
employment opportunities.
From the commencement of the 2007–2013 programs to the end of February 2016, EU projects
funded through ERDF in Wales are estimated to have created 36,970 new jobs, strengthened 11,900
new businesses, helped 72,700 people into work and supported 229,110 people to gain qualifications(Welsh European Funding Office, 2016). However, inconsistent project oversight and reporting has
given rise to challenges over such figures, and it is generally acknowledged that funds were directed
toward large prestige projects that did not maximize the generation of employment opportunities, and© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
For a full list see Welsh Government, 2016.
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformationthat insufficient investment was directed toward Valley communities to encourage economic activity.
As a result, the public perception in Wales of the use of EU funding was always poor, and in 2016 theresult was a strong vote in the Valleys to leave the EU.

5.3 Non-governmental Organizations
Very little research has taken place on the contribution of civil society to renewal in the Valleys.
Historically, the strength of the community was central to sustaining the health and well-being of
its members. Today the chapels, miners’ institutes and welfare buildings that made up this extensive
pattern of faith and mutual support lie derelict or have been converted into living accommodations
or warehouses. Community cohesion has become splintered along the line of past union activism,
the separate villages in which people live, and particularly along generational lines, with antagonism
between the elderly and the young (Bennett, Beynon & Hudson, 2000). Such dysfunction makes
united community action difficult to initiate and sustain, and what initially succeeds can becomecomplicated by local rivalries and competition for resources.
Regional policy, so far as it supported the renewal of the Valleys, was concerned with pit clearance andthe construction of small business units and not strengthening the social fabric through community
projects. European Social Funds have been available for specific interventions, but Valley communities
have not proved adept in organizing, planning and generating projects sufficiently to secure suchfunds. Many community groups that were able to renovate buildings for community use and youth
schemes under the governments Urban Aid Programme (1968) subsequently faltered because of the
reduction in funding sources and a failure on the part of small mining communities to sustain them.
A Coalfields Regeneration Trust covering all former mining communities in the United Kingdom
was established in 1999 and has since supported small scale community projects in mining areas witha United Kingdom budget of £4.7 million (UK Charity Commission, 2016) (2014/15); however,
although this has been a rare source of funding for community groups in the Valleys, its impact has
been valuable in encouraging self-help but negligible in terms of economic transformation.
The Heads of the Valleys Programme mentioned above did support a small number of high-end
community initiatives such as Rhondda Life (Rhondda Life Limited, 2015)—the building of acomplex of facilities designed to employ local people from the Valleys and provide employment in the
tourism industry. However, political priorities changed, revenue commitments were redirected andRhondda Life, like other community-based initiatives fell victim to wavering political support andthe lack of civil service expertise. The Heads of the Valleys Programme was “subsumed” into anotherinitiative entitled “Vibrant and Viable Places” with a reduced budget directed toward the physicalrefurbishment of town centres by local authorities.
In the Valleys some community groups have sought to address local problems, particularly aroundyouth disillusion and drug abuse, and the health and well-being of the elderly. Few have attemptedto address underlying economic problems by delivering training and employment and generating job
opportunities. Most funding programs have failed to incorporate robust mechanisms for consultationand participation and have tended to relegate community initiatives below statutory economic
development projects. The lack of a broad long-term (and coherent) economic and social renewal
strategy for the Valleys has made it uncertain how and where civil society can contribute to addressing
the persistent challenges of poverty and deprivation (Bennett, Beynon, & Hudson, 2000).

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

6.0 Lessons Learned From the South Wales Coalfield
The lessons learned from South Wales can be usefully identified under four distinct headings;
Strengthening the local economy; enhancing community cohesion and support for economictransformation; improving the physical infrastructure and environment, and delivering policies andpractices.

6.1 Strengthening the Local Economy
6.1.1 Ensuring That Strategies and Interventions Are Specifically Directed Toward DesignatedTarget Areas
Regional policy in Britain has always been directed toward large regions, and, while it was always
intended to benefit small former coal mining areas such as the South Wales valleys, interventions in
Wales were not specifically targeted at them. As a result, investment was too frequently not to thebenefit of the Valleys, supporting job opportunities that, because of inadequate public transport, could
not be accessed by those living there, and particularly by those in the Heads of the Valleys. The mostprominent example of this was the construction of industrial units for new manufacturing and inward
investment being located at the mouths of the Valleys rather than in their heart. This problem was
mirrored in the use of EU-funded programs that, although concerned with addressing the economic
problems of the Valleys, found it difficult to locate initiatives within these communities.
6.1.2 Supporting Existing Local Economic Activity
Economic renewal based on existing local enterprises proved to be an effective strategy for the Valleys.
Small loans and grants to local industry for capital, for retraining labour and taking on the long-term
unemployed have had a markedly beneficial impact and have delivered significant added value by
maintaining local networks of social cohesion.
6.1.3 Diversifying the Economic Base
Diversifying the economic base of mining communities has proved difficult, as new small andmedium-sized enterprises are seldom in themselves strong drivers of local economic recovery. Largemanufacturing industries relocating into mining areas can have a major impact if matched withretraining the local workforce. Diversification requires a clear plan and progress at all levels.
6.1.4 Attracting Inward Investment
Attracting inward investment requires the provision of financial and material inducements to securebusinesses from another part of the region or further afield. The difficulty is that designated areas
may be competing for consideration by companies planning to relocate. In addition, the relocationof industry and commerce to a designated area may simply deprive another area of employment. In
South Wales, the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) successfully concentrated its efforts on bothdrawing in investment from elsewhere in Britain and, importantly, securing inward investment fromabroad with significant subsidies for capital, labour and buildings.
6.1.5 Developing Local Supply Chains
A key lesson from initiatives in South Wales is that economic transformation is most rapid and robust
when all levels of the local economy are involved in and benefit from renewal. Connecting local supply
chains through local procurement policies (Industrial Communities Alliance, 2014) and proceduresto support manufacturing enterprises and start-ups strengthens the local economy and supports the
local circulation of wealth.
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

6.1.6 Encouraging Entrepreneurship
A former Welsh government First Minister, Rhodri Morgan (Personal interview, November 2016),
recounts that a group of students were provided free workshop space in a decommissioned collierybuilding from which they established a new electronics company (SPTS Technologies Ltd.) thatnow employs several hundred workers. He points out that new start-up companies are an essential
component for economic transformation. The WDA pioneered the encouragement of entrepreneurs
and has continued to do so.
6.1.7 Delivering Skills Training
The mining and ancillary skills of miners are invariably manual, and those involved in manual labour
are often poorly equipped to move into intellectual and precision industries. The need to retrain
the workforce to meet labour market requirements of a restructured economy were understood andaddressed by the British government in the 1930s. Numerous government and EU-funded programs
have pursued this policy, which has been most successful when designed to account for the skills andpotential of the individual worker and are linked to training and employment opportunities. The EUfunded Job Match Programme was an excellent example of a well-run and effective initiative
6.1.8 Improving Educational Standards
Establishing and sustaining a long-term economic base in former mining communities requires
increasing educational and intellectual attainment levels. Investment in higher education is required
to establish a workforce that can take advantage of employment opportunities, particularly those in
new technology and innovation. Linking higher education institutions together and directly with thebusiness community to their mutual benefit has proved invaluable in South Wales to sharing expertiseand knowledge (WDA, 2001) and generating employment.
6.1.9 Adopting New Technology and Innovation
In South Wales the adoption of new technology and innovation required significant effort to shake off
the legacy and attitudes of coal mining and to redirect the mindset of local institutions, communities
and individuals toward new industrial practices. Education and the arrival of new training andemployment opportunities played a major part in gradually moving new technology and innovation
forward.

6.2 Improving the Physical Infrastructure and Environment
6.2.1 Constructing New Infrastructure and Roads
Investment in infrastructure lays the foundations for future economic growth. It is essential toattract new business, but this requires integrated planning and very significant resources. In South
Wales substantial funds were successfully directed toward improving roads and telecommunications
networks.
6.2.2 Undertaking Colliery Restitution and Environmental Improvements
The WDA invested many millions of pounds removing industrial dereliction and decay, landscaping
slag heaps and scarred mountain slopes, returning biodiversity and improving town centres.
Demolishing old collieries and bringing the land back into safe economic use and into a safe
condition for recreational use not only delivers a rejuvenated environment—it constitutes anexpression of confidence in the future. South Wales has excelled at this task.
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

6.2.3 Improving the Housing Stock
Good-quality housing has always been one of the most important factors in the lives of miners
and their families. Early housing in the Valleys was soon replaced with sound terraced houses that,
although initially very basic, were easily improved and maintained. Later, public housing, in mostcases built to high standards, added significantly to the housing stock and it is the availability of
housing in the Valleys that has contributed to maintaining population levels in the face of outward
migration pressures.

6.3 Strengthening Community Cohesion and Support for Economic Transformation
6.3.1 Providing Welfare Benefits
In Britain and certainly in South Wales nothing compares to the value and importance of state
welfare benefits in sustaining the living standards and community cohesion of those residing informer coalfields. Changes in welfare benefits introduced by national government are a permanent
preoccupation of the British body politic. The provision of a wide variety of individual and family
welfare benefits is a matter of immediate and daily concern for many due to the continuing lack of
employment opportunities and their necessary reliance on state support.
6.3.2 Understanding the Community
A robust social and economic analysis of the mining communities needs to be in place and regularly
updated to facilitate the formulation and improvement of strategic plans and their monitoring andevaluation. Numerous research documents and reports exist on the challenges faced in South Wales—
these are available together with feasibility studies and strategic proposals; however, the translation ofthese into effective policies with measurable outcomes has been modest.
6.3.3 Reinforcing Community Identity and Culture
Inhabitants of the Valleys possessed and continue to possess distinct characteristics that they regard as
their collective identity. This identity reflects the depth and resilience of community networks and canbe engaged to great effect in support of economic and social transformation. History and heritage,
culture and the arts, are all invaluable components of mining communities and worthy of support inorder to maintain social cohesion, increase participation (Kumar, Americo, & Billingham, 2016), andengender enthusiasm and support for renewal. In South Wales it is well understood at all levels that
coherent strategies have proved difficult to orchestrate and deliver.
6.3.4 Acknowledging That Communities Are not Responsible for Economic Decline
Former miners and their families are not responsible for the economic position in which they now
find themselves, and local effort alone is insufficient to overcome the macroeconomic problems
resulting from the closure of collieries. This is understood and acknowledged in South Wales, but
local political imperatives still demand local remedial programs that can incorporate unrealistic
macroeconomic and social objectives.

6.4 Delivering Policies and Practices
6.4.1 Adopting Long-Term Strategies Supported by Adequate Resources
The fortunes of the coal industry in South Wales have fluctuated over a long period of time.
Government policy changed regularly over relatively short timescales in response to new politicalcircumstances and variations in the world market. The radicalism of trade mining unions helped© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

conceal the declining economic sustainability of coal mining in the Valleys. After 1990, government
focus remained on transforming the economic base of the Valleys but its policies and programs were
irregular, short-term, often inadequately resourced and frequently revised or abandoned well ahead of
meeting their planned objectives. Although this lesson has been learned in South Wales, it remains achallenge to initiate joint action when public funds are shrinking.
6.4.2 Insisting on a Robust Connectivity Between Policy and Implementation
The experience of South Wales reveals a frequent disconnect between national politicians deciding
on overall policy objectives, regional politicians carrying the policies forward, those responsible for
implementing strategies and programs, and members of the community affected by activity on the
ground. This separation heightens the hurdles that continue to be encountered in South Wales indelivering effective and efficient solutions.
6.4.3 Establishing a Dedicated Delivery Mechanism
Notwithstanding the process of political devolution that occurred in Wales there is strong evidence
to support the view that the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) provided an excellent example ofa lead body charged with delivering the many facets of economic renewal. It was obliged to work in
partnership with all levels of governmentand other institutions, but possessed
the knowledge, skills and commercial
flair to orchestrate funding, co-ordinate
efforts and drive initiatives forward.
Today, the landscape of renewal andeconomic development funding andresponsibility has reverted to a wide
diversity of government and nongovernment agencies and initiatives withdifferent policies, priorities and budgets(Department for Communities andLocal Government, 2007). Whereas thispartnership work is a strength, it does not
replicate the focus and achievements of
the WDA.
6.4.4 Ensuring the Capacity of Civil
Servants to Deliver
Civil servants responsible for advisingand overseeing the implementation of
any strategic economic plans must by
sufficiently experienced and accomplishedin economic development, businesspractice and community engagement.
Due to reduced budgets and the shrinkingof the Welsh government, the renewal
skills of civil servants have diminished,which continues to present a significant
challenge to sound policy development
and program implementation.
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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

7.0 Conclusion
The gradual decline and eventual end of coal mining in South Wales is characterized by locationspecific economic and political factors. The role of the trade unions (and the political attitude tothese unions), the geological and geographical conditions, and the changing energy profile of theUnited Kingdom are factors that combined in a narrative that will remain unique to that particularcoalfield. Nevertheless, there are many factors in common with other coalfields, and many policy
lessons that can be drawn from the Welsh experience and usefully applied elsewhere.
In terms of commonalities, the South Wales mining communities were built around and largely
dependent upon mining for economic and social prosperity. Compounding this dependence, thecommunities were typically relatively isolated, with limited or difficult access to centres of populationthat could have been a source of alternative employment. Given these two factors, the communities
were extremely vulnerable to changes in economic, political and environmental realities. As coalproduction became increasingly uneconomic, and as political opposition to subsidies heightened, theindustry and those who were dependent upon it were increasingly exposed. Many of these factors
characterize coalfields across the world, and the decline of coal mining in South Wales is a usefulexample for policy-makers in these other communities.
In general terms, South Wales illustrates the vital importance of resilience in securing a smootheconomic and social transition. Resilience is fostered, at least in part, by economic diversification
and by ensuring education and skill levels among the local population are such that the community
can adapt to changing economic and political environments. Other important factors include
physical capital such as roads (which enable individuals to travel to other jobs and businesses to set
up in a wider range of locations thus bring jobs to communities) and facilities for businesses such as
office, factory and warehouse space. Here, the record of policy-makers is mixed. Undoubtedly, theyrecognized acquisition of skills and knowledge as important, but even today educational attainment
levels trail those in the rest of the country. While South Wales secured inward investment frommanufacturing companies, its record with respect to more advanced industries—which require higher
levels of skills and knowledge—is more questionable. For policy-makers elsewhere, attention to skills
among not only miners, but the community more broadly is an obvious lesson to be learned from theWelsh case.
This case study has examined the importance of inward investment in supporting the economictransition in Wales, and in particular the role of the Welsh Development Agency (WDA). It concludes
that the inward investment secured by the agency had a significant impact in generating jobs inthe post-mining period, and in broadening participation in the workforce. On a macroeconomic
level, and in the short and medium terms, available evidence suggests that WDA was an extremely
successful intervention. However, at the level of individual mining communities, the success of the
WDA was more muted: the majority of investment was located on the coastal strip rather than inmining communities of the Valleys, and although opportunities were opened up for women andyounger men, the jobs created through WDA investment were not necessarily suited to former miners.
Similarly, inward investment by the EU, although significant, was not necessarily directed at projects
and interventions that would have been the most beneficial to miners. While policy-makers could
conclude that inward investment can be a valuable strategy—particularly when agencies are working
with a clear mandate and sufficient resources—they can also conclude that the precise design of thisstrategy is crucially important.

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The End of Coal Mining in South Wales: Lessons learned from industrial transformation

Over the longer term, the effects of the WDA are less clear-cut. Once the incentives for incoming
investors dried up and competition from other low cost destinations increased, the rate of investment
dropped and companies withdrew. Once again, the resilience of the economy to deal with changing
economic structures—this time the shift to knowledge-based industries—was proven to be somewhat
lacking. Again, for policy-makers elsewhere, this suggests that inward investment strategies need tobe complemented by long-term policies aimed at educational attainment and skills development, andthat they need to be tightly defined with respect to economic and social objectives.
Given the economic and social dislocation that characterized the decline of mining in South Wales,social safety networks were crucial in alleviating poverty in the short term. The presence of social
welfare payments allowed former miners and their families to cover household expenses and boughttime during which a transition to a post-coal economy could be organized. However, continued
reliance on these social safety nets two decades after the end of mining points to the need to reassess
policies aimed at addressing economic transition in South Wales. Government support—throughwelfare payments and inward investment schemes to bring jobs to the region—provided a short- andmedium-term response to a sudden loss of employment; however, in the case of South Wales this
support has not proven sufficient to create a resilient and diverse economy in the longer term.

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Appendix
List of Case Study Interviewees
John Asquith 		Former Mid Glamorgan Council government advisor and historian

Gareth Beer		

Senior Economic Advisor. Welsh Development Agency

Dr. Ben Curtis

Lecturer in Modern Welsh History. Cardiff University

Patrick Lewis 		

Chief Executive, Heads of the Valleys ProgrammeProf. Brian Morgan

Professor of Entrepreneurship. Cardiff Metropolitan University

Rhodri Morgan

Welsh Government First Minister (2000–2009)

Derek Vaughan

Member of the European Parliament for Wales© 2014 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
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© 2017 The International Institute for Sustainable Development
Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development.
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