Proposal for a New African Growth Support Initiative

GRIPS Development Forum
Secretariat for the Multi-stakeholder Discussion Group on“African Growth Support Initiative”

August 20081

Preface
This proposal for a “New African Growth Support Initiative” was compiled by the National
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) Development Forum, based on intensive
discussions by a multi-stakeholder group aimed at concretizing Japan’s growth support to Africa
in the context of the Fourth Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD
IV), which was held on May 28–30, 2008, in Yokohama, Japan. The participants of themulti-stakeholder group were professionals interested in enhancing Japan’s growth support toAfrica. They included government officials, staff of aid implementing agencies and internationalorganizations, researchers, and businesspersons.1 The group met four times between April andJune 2008, with each member participating in a personal capacity. The proposal also benefited
from discussions at a GRIPS Development Forum workshop held in late July 2008, which
gathered African perspectives on Japan’s contribution to African development, with theparticipation of prominent African professionals and African ambassadors in Tokyo.2
In initiating the multi-stakeholder discussions, we referred to the following recent policy
initiatives aimed at reactivating Japan’s support to Africa.
・ “Report of the Stocktaking Work on the Economic Development in Africa and the Asian
Growth Experience” by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), May 2008
・ “Interim Report by the Advisory Council on International Cooperation” submitted to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 2008
・ “ODA Manifesto—30 Proposals for Enhanced International Cooperation” by the Group for
Renovating Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA), October 2007 (with the
GRIPS Development Forum serving as secretariat)
In formulating this proposal, we have given due consideration to renewed interest in the growth
agenda on the part of the international aid community in recent years. We have analyzed current
international efforts to support African development to determine how they can be enhanced byincorporating East Asian perspectives and what kind of actions should be taken by Japan in thisendeavor, in collaboration with other development partners.
We hope that this proposal will be useful for policy makers, aid practitioners, researchers, andprofessionals in the business and civil society sectors who are responsible for implementing the
Yokohama Declaration and the Yokohama Action Plan adopted at the TICAD IV. We also hope

1 For the activities and meeting minutes of the multi-stakeholder discussion group, please see the African
Growth Support Initiative websites as follows: http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/af-growth/index.htm(Japanese), http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/af-growth/index.htm (English).
2 GRIPS Development Forum workshop “How Can Japan Effectively Support Economic Growth inAfrica—The African Perspective,” July 25, 2008.

2

that the proposal will serve as policy input to the new JICA—which will be established in
October 2008 through the merger of the current JICA and the ODA loan operations of
JBIC—when it concretizes country-specific assistance packages related to “Boosting Economic
Growth” (one of the priority pillars of the TICAD IV), in selecting target countries andidentifying entry points and specific activities for Japan’s engagement.
This proposal consists of the following contents:
1. Basic principles
2. Enhancement of growth support by incorporating East Asian perspectives
3. Target countries and selection criteria
4. Entry points for Japan’s engagement
5. Requests for the Japanese Government and the new JICAGRIPS Development Forum
Secretariat for the Multi-stakeholder Discussion Group on “African Growth Support Initiative”
August 2008

3

Proposal for a New African Growth Support Initiative

In May 2008, the Government of Japan co-hosted the Fourth Tokyo International Conference
for African Development (TICAD IV) with the World Bank, the United Nations, and the United
Nations Development Programme, around the theme “Towards a Vibrant Africa.” The TICAD
IV adopted the Yokohama Declaration and the Yokohama Action Plan, which call for continued
and intensified international efforts to support African development, outlining the actions to betaken in the next five years under the TICAD process. As the main organizer of the TICAD IV,
the Japanese Government made a strong commitment to intensify its engagement in African
development. In particular, to support growth acceleration (corresponding to one of the TICAD
IV priority pillars, “Boosting Economic Growth”), the Japanese Government announced a series
of initiatives including: (1) increasing Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)(providing ODA loans up to US$4 billion in the coming five years, and doubling grant aid andtechnical cooperation) and private investment in Africa; (2) increasing infrastructure ODA
through co-financing with the World Bank and the African Development Bank and the
expansion of technical cooperation in related areas; and (3) utilizing other official flows to
encourage foreign investment to Africa (setting up the Japan Bank for International Cooperation[JBIC] Facility for African Investment to offer equity investment, guarantees, and local currency
financing, and promoting public-private partnerships). The Japanese Government also indicatedits willingness to strengthen policy dialogues with African governments by “support[ing]African countries to plan and implement industrial development strategies and policies, drawing
on Asian experiences as appropriate” (TICAD IV, 2008b, p. 4). In light of today’s economic
dynamism and rising interest in East Asian development experiences among African countries,
we consider these initiatives timely and highly relevant.
To follow up on the TICAD IV and effectively implement the Yokohama Declaration and the
Yokohama Action Plan, Japan should immediately formulate overall and country-specificassistance visions for African development. Especially, there is a need to package individual
initiatives for each country, with due consideration to the combination of various components(e.g., agriculture and rural development, private sector development, infrastructuredevelopment) to achieve sustainable growth and poverty reduction in African countries.
Our proposal for a “New African Growth Support Initiative” (hereinafter referred to as a “newgrowth support initiative”) aims to reactivate Japan’s support to Africa by sharpening the focusof the support, enhancing the current international efforts by incorporating East Asian
perspectives, and strengthening Japan’s engagement in partnerships with relevant actors.

4

1. Basic Principles
The three basic principles of Japan’s new growth support to Africa are:(1) Making a firm commitment to establishing long-term development partnerships with
African countries, with sustained policy dialogue as a key ingredient;(2) Selecting a few target countries and producing “success stories” (the concept of “target
countries” could be extended to specific regions/areas overlapping into neighboring
countries), and restructuring and concentrating human and financial resources in theselected countries; and(3) Mobilizing cooperation by other donor agencies, emerging donor countries (for example,
under the framework of South-South cooperation), and the private sector (Japanese andnon-Japanese firms) and putting Japan’s growth support into the partnership context.
Let us discuss these points in greater detail. First, without a strong policy commitment, Japan’s
ODA to Africa faces difficulty when it comes to putting together assistance packages thatcombine sustained policy dialogue, financial cooperation, and technical and intellectual
support—with the exception of a limited number of annual ODA loan recipients with whom theJapanese government and aid agencies have more opportunities for comprehensively discussing
national development priorities over the longer term, including macroeconomic management,
infrastructure development, and public service delivery. This is the fundamental difference
between Japan’s aid to Africa and its experiences in Asia, where Japan has fostered long-term
partnerships and provided assistance packages based on shared visions with partner countries.
Therefore, for Japan to engage itself in the new growth support initiative in Africa, it is criticallyimportant that Japan make a firm commitment to building long-term partnerships with recipient
countries, learning from the lessons of its past aid to Africa. The scope of Japan’s engagement
could vary, ranging from overall development policies, sector-specific policies, and master plans
for regional development to the prioritization of development projects and so on. This scopeshould be decided according to country-specific circumstances, but sustained policy dialogue
should be a key ingredient of all of Japan’s assistance packages, including measures to promote
public-private partnerships.
Second, it is necessary to focus the initial efforts on a few countries in order to produce “successstories.” We expect that these “success stories” will motivate other countries to follow Japan’s
new growth support initiative. Although the Japanese Government announced an increase of its
ODA to Africa at the TICAD IV, the amount remains small relative to that of other donors.
Furthermore, the size of Japan’s country-based ODA task forces (primarily composed of thestaff of the Embassy of Japan and JICA offices) is small if measured by the number of aid
professionals. Therefore, it is crucial to select a small number of target countries andconcentrate or reallocate human and financial resources in these countries.

5

Third, in view of strong development partnerships and the limited presence of Japan’s aid andbusiness in Africa, Japan must make efforts to mobilize resources of other donors anddeveloping countries (for example, under the framework of South-South cooperation) and
explore the possibility of attracting non-Japanese private firms as well. Rather than unilaterally
launching the new growth support initiative, Japan should actively participate in ongoingdevelopment partnerships and multi-donor initiatives at the country level, such as growth
diagnostics and infrastructure support by the World Bank, the United Kingdom (UK)’s
Department for International Development (DFID), and others (see section 2). Specifically,
Japan should complement the Western approach with the East Asian approach and takeintellectual leadership in a small number of African countries. Furthermore, Japan should
mobilize East Asian professionals who have been directly involved in formulating andimplementing development policies in their own countries and provide opportunities to share
their accumulated experiences with African countries. In light of the difficulty of establishingindustrial agglomeration only by Japanese firms, Japan should consider collaborating with
non-Japanese firms (for example, those of Europe, United States, and emerging countries).
Variousoptionsshouldbe

explored,includingapossibilityoftakingphasedapproaches—inviting non-Japanese firms first and preparing for the attraction of Japanese firms
in the medium and long term.

2. Enhancement of Growth Support by Incorporating East Asian Perspectives
Following a decade of focus on poverty reduction, the growth agenda has recently returned tothe center of global development debates. Typical examples of this new focus are intensified
efforts to apply analytical tools such as growth diagnostics (which identifies a few binding
constraints to growth; see below), expand donor assistance to infrastructure development, andpromote public-private partnerships. The recent World Bank report, “Challenges of African
Growth: Opportunities, Constraints and Strategic Directions” (Ndulu et al., 2007), and “TheGrowth Report: Strategies for Sustained and Inclusive Development” (Commission on Growthand Development, 2008) also stand as examples of the new focus on growth. Since theintroduction of the first generation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) by the WorldBank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1990s, Japan has insisted on theneed to pay greater attention to growth and infrastructure development, so that developing
countries could attain self-reliance and overcome aid dependency. Japan should seize theopportunity provided by the change in focus of global development debates by taking concrete
actions to realize its development vision.

6

Infrastructure Development
Under the poverty reduction drive, donor assistance for infrastructure declined sharply in thelatter half of the 1990s; however, there has been a sign of change in recent years. According to
the World Bank, the share of infrastructure in total sector-allocable ODA to low-income
countries fell from 33 percent in 1990–94 to 22 percent in 2000–04, and the share of the social
sector in total sector-allocable ODA increased from 29 percent to 52 percent in thecorresponding period. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the share of infrastructure ODA decreased from
29 percent to 19 percent during this decade (International Development Association [IDA],
2007). 3 Nevertheless, especially since the Gleneagles G8 Summit was held in 2005,
international efforts to expand infrastructure support in Africa have been intensified, as shownby the establishment of the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa and other initiatives. The WorldBank announced its intention to place a special emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa and scale up
regional projects, especially those located in Sub-Saharan Africa, as part of the IDA 15
Replenishment (which mobilizes resources for World Bank operations in low-income countries
during the period of July 2008 to June 2011). In 2007, the DFID formulated the “Growth andInfrastructure Policy Paper” and announced its strong interest in promoting growth throughinfrastructure development, private sector development, and trade. The United States (US)’s
Millennium Challenge Corporation, since its establishment in 2004, has also been engaged ininfrastructure support.
In principle, we should welcome the recent renewed interest in infrastructure development on
the part of the international aid community. However, we should give due consideration to thepossible debt burden on recipient countries, because large infrastructure projects often involve
external borrowing. It is necessary to ensure that infrastructure development contributes togrowth promotion and eventually strengthens the debt sustainability of those African countries.
To this end, it is vitally important to identify and formulate high-quality projects and thenimplement policy measures that enable the infrastructure to be utilized to reactivate regional
economies. The World Bank, DFID, and the US Agency for International Development(USAID) regard infrastructure support as an integral part of growth support packages and aremaking efforts to combine related measures, such as industrial development, trade promotion,and investment climate improvement.
Growth Diagnostics
The growth diagnostics framework is a systematic methodology for undertaking country
diagnosis and identifying the most binding constraints to growth. It is often referred to as the“HRV” approach after the Harvard economists who pioneered it, Ricardo Hausmann, Dani

3

All the figures cited above are commitments and period averages.

7Rodrik, and Andres Velasco. This framework has been pilot-tested by aid agencies including theWorld Bank and DFID in a number of countries and is increasingly being incorporated in theireconomic reports. The framework attempts to remove a limited number of key constraints togrowth (i.e., focused intervention) specific to each country by using a decision tree methodology.
This

is

in

sharp

contrasttothetraditional

approachofdirecting

the

same

Washington-Consensus-style reforms at all countries, based on a long list of interventions.
Nevertheless, for the following reasons, room remains for improving the growth diagnostics
framework: (1) The diagnosis is driven by economic analyses, with limited attention paid to thepolitical feasibility of proposed measures. The framework’s prime concern is to identify “whatshould be done” to initiate growth (desirability question), rather than “what can be done” given
the existing political and institutional constraints (feasibility question). (2) The structure of
problem setting is too narrow, and the decision tree treats the low level of private investment as
the key problem. (3) It is neither realistic nor desirable to identify weaknesses of developing
countries in terms of international standards and to try to remove them. This implies thatdeveloping countries should be “average” on all scores (for example, Worldwide GovernanceIndicators and Doing Business Indicators, proposed by the World Bank) before formulating andimplementing their growth strategies. (4) While focusing on short-run constraints, theframework does not indicate the sequence of measures to be adopted over the long run. Even if
one constraint is removed, another is likely to emerge in the complex growth processes. For allthese reasons, whether the growth diagnostics framework will become a truly useful instrument
for policy makers in developing countries remains to be seen. If the growth diagnostics
framework is not carefully designed, there might be a risk of its becoming an additional
donor-driven instrument.
Therefore, we consider it useful to complement the growth diagnostics framework by
incorporating East Asian perspectives, such as a goal-oriented, problem-solving approachcombined with a long-term policy dialogue for strategy formulation.
The East Asian Approach—Continuous Policy Dialogue for Joint Strategy Formulation,
Goal Orientation, and Concrete Thinking
Transferability of East Asian lessons to Sub-Saharan Africa is a popular topic in development
economics, but investigation into this matter needs to go deeper than is currently being
undertaken to be truly useful for policy makers. We believe that the “East Asian experiences” donot mean a standard “model” applicable to all African countries. Rather, it is the process (or amethodology in a broad sense) by which countries enhance their capabilities through trial anderror, by applying a goal-oriented approach and concrete thinking. It is important to note thattoday’s successful East Asian countries did not necessarily have strong institutional capabilities
at the outset.

8Japan should enhance the current international efforts by incorporating the two factors thatcharacterize the East Asian approach. The first factor is concerned with engagement inlong-term, open-ended policy dialogue for strategy formulation. This involves sharing adevelopment vision with top leaders and policy makers in partner countries, jointly drafting
development policies and strategies through trial and error processes, and developing them into
concrete action plans. Such a “think together” approach should help identify both desirable andfeasible policy measures for each country. Since development is both a political process and an
economic process, policy formulation is inseparable from political and institutional reforms. We
believe that “what should be done” (desirability question) should not be equated with “what canbe done” (feasibility question). The optimal solution from an economic rationale is notnecessarily implementable in a developing country faced with various political and institutional
constraints. Even if the growth diagnostics framework identifies key binding constraints togrowth for each country, the recommendations will not be useful if they conflict with politicalreality.
The second factor in the East Asian approach is concerned with goal orientation and concrete
thinking. The East Asian approach pays greater attention to discovering positive aspects andidentifying break-through opportunities for growth promotion, rather than correcting general
weaknesses, compared to international standards. In this approach, growth constraints are
viewed as specific obstacles blocking efforts to build the country’s unique strengths. Japan andother East Asian countries have identified their own strengths and made efforts to hone them by
preparing concrete actions designed to make full use of their growth (such as promoting specificindustries and regions/areas, developing road and communication networks based on atime-bound plan). Typical examples include coastal area development in China (Special
Economic Zones), Eastern Seaboard Development Program in Thailand (port development
combined with industrial zones), and highway and port development linked with foreign direct
investment (FDI) attraction in Northern Vietnam.
In applying the East Asian approach, conflicts may arise between the current international drive
toward “result-orientation” and open-ended, continuous policy dialogue because the latter caseis likely to require more time to produce tangible results. Furthermore, some African countries
may expect quick results from donor assistance. Given the need to consider both short- andlong-term results, an option for donor engagement might be to aim to produce concrete results
within the first three to four years of a longer timeframe (for example, by sharing a development
vision up to 2020 and formulating time-bound action plans).

9

3. Target Countries and Selection Criteria
To implement the new growth support initiative and produce “success stories,” we propose that
the Japanese Government select target countries based on the following criteria. As aprecondition, the eligible countries must attain and keep macroeconomic and political stability.
(1) Strong will for and solid understanding of implementation of growth strategies by theleaders in the political and administrative systems (including the country’s leader);(2) Existence of central government administration capable of consistent policy design andimplementation;(3) Possibility of continuous financial support from Japan (preferably, budget support and ODA
loans);(4) Interest by the Japanese private sector in investment (including large-scale investment
projects);(5) Potential for economic development (including labor quality and geographical conditions
such as coastal areas and islands); and(6) Accumulation of country knowledge and experience and the capacity of Japan’scountry-based, ODA task forces.

Partner countries

Japan・ Leadership・ Possibility of financial

・ Govt. administration for

Targetpolicy implementation

countries

・ Economic potential

support・ Business interest・ Capacity of countrybased team(ODA Tas

Among the six selection criteria, (1) and (2) are prerequisites for building a long-term
relationship between a partner country and Japan. While (3), (4), and (5) are not prerequisites,
their existence would facilitate the building of long-term partnerships between the two countries.
If policy dialogue is conducted in parallel to the ODA-supported projects and/or private
investments (including resource-based large-scale projects), the two countries will be better able
to share a development vision and expected results. Criterion (6) is important. It is indispensable
to assign human resources capable of conducting dynamic aid diplomacy and undertaking
policy implementation in a consistent manner (staff of the Embassies of Japan, JICA offices,long-term experts, and so on). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily require a large staff
equivalent to that of the Embassies and JICA offices in Asian countries. We believe that theassignment of a few competent professionals in the target countries will suffice to bring10

dramatic changes. Such resource reallocation and concentration should be possible if theJapanese side (especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA) has a strong political will to
do it.
These suggested criteria for narrowing down target countries for Japan’s enhanced support
relate to the pillar of “Boosting Economic Growth.” However, it is also possible to select target
countries in relation to the other pillars of the TICAD IV, such as “Consolidation of Peace andGood Governance”, “Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)”, andaddressing “Environmental Issues and Climate Change”. The target countries for the new
growth support initiative do not have to be the largest recipients of Japan’s ODA; there is noneed to explicitly link the size of Japanese ODA with the selection of target countries.

4. Entry Points for Japan’s Engagement
In implementing the new growth support initiative, Japan should identify entry points for its
engagement, giving due consideration to country-specific circumstances. Specifically, we
propose the following four entry points for Japan’s enhanced growth support to Africa.
(1) If the country already has a valid development vision and strategy, provide policy support
for their further improvement (if necessary) and align aid activities to realize them, forexample, in the areas of human resource development, technology transfer, quality andproductivity improvement, and infrastructure development.
(2) If not, the country should engage itself in continuous policy dialogue for joint strategy
formulation with partner countries (like a “mini” Ishikawa Project4) and align various aid
activities around the new strategy. The scope of the strategy can vary; some examples are
overall development policies, development of specific industries and geographicalregions/areas, and prioritization of development projects.
(3) Build core infrastructure with ODA and align various aid activities around it, such as theformulation of master plans for regional and/or industrial development, One-Stop Border
Posts, local small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) development, human resource
development, and “One Village One Product (OVOP)” programs.
4This project was formally named “Study on the Economic Development Policy in the Transition towarda Market-Oriented Economy in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” The project was officially agreed toby the two governments when former Communist Party General Secretary Du Muoi visited Tokyo in
April 1995. Shigeru Ishikawa, professor emeritus of Hitotsubashi University, was appointed as the leader
on the Japanese side. The “Ishikawa Project” was implemented jointly by the Vietnamese and Japanese
teams over six years (1995–2001) as part of JICA technical cooperation. The unique characteristics of the
Ishikawa Project are that comprehensive and thorough analyses were conducted by a joint research team,
involving Japanese academics and their Vietnamese counterparts, and that the research examined issues
related to the formulation and implementation of Vietnam’s long-term development plans and madepolicy proposals to address them.

11(4) If the country has attracted (or is likely to attract) large FDI projects by the Japanese private
sector, mobilize ODA to create an enabling business environment through infrastructuredevelopment, regional and local SME development, human resource development,
corporate social responsibility (CSR), and so on. However, it is important to ensure thatsuch ODA mobilization for FDI-led projects benefits the local economy and society, notonly particular firms.
Regarding the above (1) and (2), policy dialogue precedes specific ODA projects, while in (3)and (4), ODA projects or large FDI projects could come first. These two approaches are notconflictive, and several activities and projects could go together and complement each other. For
example, regarding (3), if Japan and partner countries could share the vision for regional
development and prioritization of various ODA projects through policy dialogue, it would be
more likely that the benefits of infrastructure development could be spread to the wider
segments of the population. Regarding (4), it is expected that the existence of large FDI projects
would facilitate the conduct of policy dialogue with partner country governments.
Among the four entry points, (1), (2), and (3) are not entirely new for Japan. Japan has alreadyaccumulated experiences and expertise in extending support to these areas. For example, astandard menu of Japan’s technical cooperation in East Asia includes the development of a“shindanshi” (enterprise evaluator) system for SMEs, support to quality and productivity
improvement, and training for specific skill development. In Africa, JICA has recently provided
technical cooperation to assist in the formulation of a master plan for quality and productivity
improvement in Tunisia, where activities aimed at improvement of the production processes
were implemented. These activities included factory diagnosis, guidance on quality andproductivity improvement on the factory floor of model companies, and training of counterparts.
The Ethiopian government has shown strong interest in this JICA assistance, and discussions areunderway for possible industrial support from Japan. Regarding (2), Japan has been intensively
involved in policy dialogue and has assisted in the formulation of development strategies inseveral East Asian countries. Examples include the “Ishikawa Project” in Vietnam (formally,“Study on the Economic Development Policy in the Transition toward a Market-Oriented
Economy”), an “Economic Policy Support Program” in Indonesia, which provided policy
advice for economic recovery after the East Asian financial crisis (supported by six Japanesescholars, including Prof. Takashi Shiraishi, who was at Kyoto University at that time, and Prof.
Shinji Asanuma of Hitotsubashi University), and “Macroeconomic Policy Support forSocio-Economic Development” in Laos (led by Prof. Yonosuke Hara, who was at Tokyo
University at that time). All these projects were based on agreements between the top leaders ofpartner countries and Japan. In Africa, JICA is conducting a “Triangle of Hope” project,mobilizing a Malaysian consultant to provide policy advice to improve the investment climate(an example of South-South cooperation). Based on this work, investment promotion initiatives
are underway, targeting Indian and Malaysian firms. Also, a master plan and a feasibility study

12for the establishment of Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ) are being conducted.
Regarding (3), there are many examples, including the Eastern Seaboard Development Programin Thailand to create industrial zones around a port infrastructure; the development of a
Hanoi-Haiphong transport corridor combined with Haiphong Port improvement in Vietnam,
which aims at FDI attraction; and the development of Sihanoukville Port and power andtelecommunication networks combined with a special economic zone in Cambodia. In addition,
as a non-Asian example, Japan’s ongoing initiative in El Salvador deserves special attention(see below).
The above (4) is a new initiative, based on Japan’s commitment at the TICAD IV to promote
public-private partnerships. We expect its fuller development in the future.
Japan’s Initiative in El Salvador
Since 2001, the Japanese Government has been supporting the development of La Union Port in
El Salvador through an ODA loan and aligning various aid activities with port development,
aimed at promoting the development of El Salvador’s less developed Eastern Region andstrengthening the country’s economic competitiveness. This is a good example of the above (3):building core infrastructure with ODA and aligning aid around it. We consider Japan’s initiativein El Salvador noteworthy in the following three aspects.
First, this initiative is based on the East Asian approach to perfecting the country’s strengths,
rather than correcting its general weaknesses (the aim of the growth diagnostics framework). In
El Salvador, by international standards, infrastructure is not the major binding constraint togrowth. But the Government of El Salvador embraces a vision for reactivating the Eastern
Region, raising the country’s productivity and competitiveness, and eventually promoting tradein Central America as a regional transport hub, through the upgrading of the La Union Port. For
El Salvador, the La Union Port Development Project is a key entry point to realize this national
vision. Second, in parallel to the infrastructure project, the Japanese Government assisted in theformulation of a master plan for the development of the Eastern Region and is providing
technical and financial cooperation to realize priority activities proposed by this master plan,such as human resource development, water resource management, agriculture and industrial
development, SME promotion, formulation of trade and investment promotion strategy, and soon. Furthermore, this master plan is expected to serve not only as JICA assistance, but also as acoordinating framework for other donor assistance to the Eastern Region. Third, the initiative
has been implemented by a dynamic country-based ODA task force, 5 building on close
5 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially established ODA task forces in March 2003 in the
majority of developing countries. This was a new attempt to set up an all-Japan coordinating body in thefield that can foster internal Japanese coordination around a common vision and build synergies amongagencies dealing with grants (Embassy of Japan), technical cooperation (JICA), loans (JBIC), and private

13collaboration between the Embassy of Japan and the JICA office. The Japanese Ambassador
was actively engaged in policy dialogue with the President and economic ministers on a regularbasis, discussing the prioritization of Japanese assistance in light of the country’s development
needs. The size of the ODA task force in El Salvador is not as large as that in Asia, but thisexperience suggests that if clear assistance vision exists, it is possible to build a dynamic
country-based team necessary for implementing the new growth support initiative.

5. Requests for the Japanese Government and the new JICA
The new JICA, to be established in October 2008, will be the largest bilateral aid agency
responsible for technical cooperation, grant aid, and loan aid (ODA loans). There is a highexpectation that the new JICA will make important contributions to African development. It is
our strong desire and request that the Japanese Government support this proposal for the “New
African Growth Support Initiative” and, in collaboration with the new JICA, select target
countries based on our suggested selection criteria (described in section 3), and take necessary
actions including resource mobilization and allocation. We also request that the new JICA, as amain actor to implement the new growth support initiative, assume full responsibility for
implementing assistance packages in the selected countries, with due consideration to the four
entry points mentioned above (see section 4). Below, we list specific issues to be considered in
the implementation of the initiative.
First, it is important to build professional teams to provide intellectual aid by forging newalliances among the public, private, and academic circles. Based on the lessons learned frompast experiences, we suggest that serious efforts be made to form a consortium of universities,
consulting firms, and local research institutes (in partner countries) to undertake policy dialogue
and provide necessary intellectual support for formulation and implementation of development
policy.
Second, it is important to build a theoretical basis for growth support with East Asian
perspectives and to vigorously disseminate Japan’s messages to the international aid communityand developing countries. On this point, we have a high expectation on the role of the research
institute of the new JICA and its collaboration with universities and other research institutes. We
also believe that the message of Japan’s new growth support initiative should be disseminated to
the Japanese taxpayers and electorate.
Third, it is necessary to devise innovative approaches and instruments, particularly ininfrastructure development, to ensure the formulation of high-quality projects. More specifically,

sector development (Japan External Trade Organization, or JETRO).

14

there is a need to mobilize technical cooperation at the early stage of project formulation,enhance the content of feasibility studies, and implement technical cooperation to support
capacity development for operation and maintenance systems and so on. It is also important tostrengthen collaboration with regional development organizations such as the Development
Bank for Southern Africa, which is recognized for its ability and experience in project
formulation, appraisal, and implementation.
Fourth, it is necessary to introduce instruments to support local private sector development.
These may include microfinance, equity investment, and guarantees. Implementing them should
allow the benefits arising from ODA-supported infrastructure projects and privately-financed
large-scale investment projects to contribute to local SME promotion and regional development.
It is also important to make efforts to link the micro-level information obtained from local SME
support and other assistance to the macro-level policy dialogues.

15

Bibliography
Policy Documents Formulated in Japan
Advisory Council on International Cooperation. (2008). Interim Report, submitted to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 2008.
Fourth International Conference for African Development (TICAD) IV. (2008a). Yokohama
Declaration—Towards a Vibrant Africa. Retrieved May 30, 2008, fromhttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/doc/declaration.pdf———. (2008b). Yokohama Action Plan. Retrieved May 30, 2008, fromhttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/doc/actoin.pdf (main text) andhttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/doc/appendix.pdf (appendix).
Group for Renovating Japanese ODA. (2007). ODA Manifesto—30 Proposals for Enhanced
International Cooperation. Retrieved October 24, 2007, fromhttp://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/pdf_e08/ODA%20Manifesto_English.pdf
Japan International Cooperation Agency and Japan Bank for International Cooperation. (2008).
Report of the Stocktaking Work on the Economic Development in Africa and the Asian GrowthExperience.

Other References
Commission on Growth and Development. (2008). The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained
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