Demographic Research a free, expedited, online journalof peer-reviewed research and commentaryin the population sciences published by the
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
Konrad-Zuse Str. 1, D-18057 Rostock · GERMANY
www.demographic-research.org

DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH
VOLUME 22, ARTICLE 35, PAGES 1097-1142
PUBLISHED 24 JUNE 2010
http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol22/35/
DOI: 10.4054/DemRes.2010.22.35

Research Article

A fish stinks from the head:
Ethnic diversity, segregation,and the collapse of Yugoslavia
E. A. Hammel
Carl Mason
Mirjana Stevanović© 2010 E. A. Hammel, Carl Mason & Mirjana Stevanović.
This open-access work is published under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution NonCommercial License 2.0 Germany, which permits use,
reproduction & distribution in any medium for non-commercial purposes,
provided the original author(s) and source are given credit.
See http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/Table of Contents
1

Introduction

1098

2

Historical background

1099

3
3.1
3.2

The Yugoslav Censuses
Ethnicity in the Yugoslav Censuses
Territorial organization in the Yugoslav Censuses

1101
1102
1102

4

Ethnic classification in this analysis

1103

5
5.1
5.2

Methods
Diversity
Segregation

1109
1109
1110

6

Caveats

1115

7
7.1
7.2

Results
Diversity (HS)
Segregation (HT)

1116
1116
1118

8

Statistical significance

1120

9

Implications of opština boundary changes

1124

10

Some supplemental evidence

1124

11

Summary, reflections, and conclusion

1125

12

Acknowledgements

1128

Notes

1129

References

1139

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35
Research Article

A fish stinks from the head 1 :Ethnic diversity, segregation, andthe collapse of Yugoslavia iE. A. Hammel ii
Carl Mason iii
Mirjana Stevanović iv

Abstract
Demographic analysis clarifies political issues in the collapse of Yugoslavia. In mostregions, 1961-1991, ethnic diversity (estimated by informational entropy) increased andsegregation (estimated by Theil’s H) decreased. In a few regions there was a reversal in1991 as migration flows or presentations of self perhaps changed in anticipation of war.
The analysis strengthens refutations of the view that long standing ethnic hatreds were
the root cause of the Yugoslav collapse and supports analyses that attribute collapse to
general economic crisis, economic competition between regions, and failures at thepeak of government.

iHammel was responsible for final preparation of the data sets for analysis. Mason, and secondarily Hammel,
were responsible for the statistical analysis. Stevanović was responsible for initial preparation of the data sets
and for contacts with demographers in Belgrade. Hammel and Mason wrote the paper.
iiii
Emeritus Professor of Demography and Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley
iii
Director of the Computing Laboratory at the Department of Demography, University of California,
Berkeleyiv
Visiting Scholar, Archaeology Center, Stanford University

http://demographic-research.org

1097

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

1. Introduction
We seek here to throw some demographic light on the collapse of Yugoslavia in the
1990s. We include data as late in time before the collapse as possible and thus
incorporate information from the census of 1991, although its form and scope are lessthan ideal. 2 We extend the analysis as early as we can where the data are reasonably
consistent in ethnic classification and territorial organization, namely to the census of
1961. We use data at the lowest level of aggregation in the census, namely the village orurban neighborhood, because we feel that ethnic diversity is most important sociallyand psychologically to individuals at that level. 3 However, we extend the analysis
upward to higher levels as well. The paper makes use of work in sociology, history,
ethnography, and political science as background to the demographic analysis.
What can demographic analysis tell us that other studies have not? This paper willshow that, with some illuminating exceptions, ethnic diversity was increasing, andethnic segregation decreasing at all census administrative levels 1961-91, but that there
were even in these trends some prophetic local reversals between 1981 and 1991. Theseobservations raise a series of interpretive questions that go beyond demographic
analysis. Nevertheless, the demographic analysis is embedded in and motivated bythem, so that they must be addressed. At the same time it is not our intention nor within
our competence to offer a complete analysis from the viewpoints of sociology orpolitical science. There already exist other analyses from those and other perspectives. 4
Our intent is to supplement them with a statistical analysis of ethnic distributions.
•••

Can the ethnic violence and collapse of Yugoslavia be attributed simply to
long-standing and pervasive ethnic hatreds? This notion is the usual
journalistic explanation.
Can the violence be attributed to the processes of ethnic diversification anddesegregation themselves? Could the inhabitants of Yugoslavia simply notendure the increasingly cosmopolitan character of their environment?
Can the violence and separatism instead be attributed to a loss of control by the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia, weakened by the economic crises of the
1980s and the rise of competition and dissatisfaction between constituent
republics defined by dominant ethnicities? Did regional politicians seize on
ethnicity as a device in quest of power?

In short, did Yugoslavia split from the bottom up or from the top down?

1098

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

2. Historical backgroundYugoslavia was cobbled together at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as part of an
attempt to unite similar ethnic groups as a cordon sanitaire around a defeated GermanAustrian alliance. 5 Like many regions of southeastern Europe, it held a congeries of
ethnic groups, the jetsam of tribal and imperial waves that had swept across the Balkans
for millennia. In the several centuries before World War I three major empires had heldsway: the Venetian along the Adriatic, the Austro-Hungarian in the northwest, and the
Ottoman in the southeast. Their boundaries did not coincide with divisions between
ethnic groups. Many of these groups, especially pastoral ones, had been traditionallymobile. Many had scattered from southeast to northwest in flight from the Ottoman
advance, and Serbs in particular fled or were invited into Habsburg territory to serve as
frontier guards. Local relationships between these groups were often economically
symbiotic, not always cordial, but not necessarily hostile unless poisoned by the
influence of imperial masters. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of theprincipal ethnic groups in majority across the territory in 1991. 6 The map is a roughguide. It does not tell us much about areas in which no group had a majority but may
have had a plurality, especially in Bosnia. 7 It does not tell us how diverse a region was
ethnically, no matter which group was in majority. We seek here to draw a moredetailed picture statistically if not cartographically.
This ethnic diversity is illustrated in some ways by the multiplicity of distinct
languages natively spoken in the region, that is by groups with long historical depth. 8
One authoritative count lists 22. 9 Of the non-Slavic languages, only Albanian andHungarian had large numbers of native speakers within Yugoslavia. Of the Slavic
languages, Bulgarian and Slovak had few, leaving the major languages of the former
Yugoslavia, from northwest to southeast: Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian.
The disappearance of “Serbo-Croatian” and its replacement by Serbian, Croatian, andnow Bosnian confirms the classic quip of linguists, “A language is a dialect with anarmy.”
Language, or at least speech, however, are not perfect predictors of ethnicity in thepolitical sense. It is often difficult to distinguish the ethnicity of Bosniaks (Muslim
Slavs in Bosnia) from that of Bosnian Serbs or Croats residing in the same local area bylistening to their speech. Indeed, it is often only their names that give a clue, showing
those with names of Arabic-Turkish derivation to be Muslims, or those named after
saints in the Orthodox or Roman churches to be, respectively, Serbs or Croats. Someother baptismal names and patronymics are also typically Serbian or Croatian. Persons
might also be distinguished by vocabulary differences, with Muslims using more wordsof Turkish/Arabic origin, or phrases from the Koran, with Catholic Croats andOrthodox Serbs relying on their own sacred texts. Otherwise, dialect differences

http://demographic-research.org

1099

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

throughout the former Yugoslavia are geographically rather than politically defined,even though the several standard languages are politically defined. Ethnicity can also be
signaled by items of traditional costume. 10,11
Figure 1:

Majority ethnic distributions in Yugoslavia at the municipal levelaccording to the 1991 census

Source: Created at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1992. Image currently maintained through the University of Texas Libraries,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg. See http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yugoslavia_ethnic_map.jpg

1100

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

3. The Yugoslav Censuses
Our analysis is based on the published tabulations contained on the CD issued by theFederal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia 1998). This source is unusual inthat it is not only machine-readable but also provides preliminary tabulations on several
demographic variables for the census of 1991 and also a series of tables of ethnic
distributions in prior censuses back to 1921. For the later censuses, the tables provide
data at the lowest level of aggregation (see below). While these data are essential for an
historical overview of ethnic distributions, they have limitations that must be kept inmind. These stem from the nature of the census process itself.
1.

The first step in the process is the interaction between the census taker and the
respondent. Not until 1971 were the data on the question of ethnicity based entirelyon the voluntary declaration of the respondent (including the declaration of theethnicity of children under age 15 by their parents). Before that date, the censustaker played some role in offering examples, or in the earlier post-war censuses(1948, 1953), simply assigning ethnic membership. 12

2.

The second step is the reduction of a large number of ethnic groups to a smaller
number of categories, including a residual “Other”. It is important to note that
“Other” is not the only residual category. A second residual category is “Yugoslav– unallocated”, often tabulated simply as “Yugoslav”, that is, persons of Yugoslav
citizenship or heritage (poreklo) who did not declare or were not assigned to a
specific ethnic group. The degree of residuality of “Yugoslav”, however, differs in
different censuses. In 1953 Yugoslav ethnic Muslims (thus not Muslim ethnic
Turks, or Albanians, etc.), whether or not they practiced Islam, were allocated to
the “Yugoslav” category.

3.

The third step is the tabulation of the data into an even smaller number ofcategories for purposes of publication. As with most census data in all countries,
the degree of specificity is greatest at the highest levels of aggregation and viceversa. For example, the tables of ethnic membership for the historical censuses of
Yugoslavia in the data source for this analysis provide much more detailed
specifications of ethnic affiliation at the municipality level than they do for the
lower, settlement, level.

4.

A fourth limitation of the data is the loss of uniform formats across the different
regions of Yugoslavia in the published data for the 1991 census. This regionalism

http://demographic-research.org

1101

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

even affected the conduct of that census; some regions did not participate in the
pre-test, some omitted questions, some apparently did not report the results at thelowest level of aggregation to the Federal Statistical Office (Mrdjen 2002). Indeed,
insurgency had already begun in Serbian majority regions of Croatia when thecensus was taken on March 31, 1991, as a result of Croatia’s declaration of
independence and legislative changes that would have altered the historical status
of Serbs in Croatia. 13

3.1 Ethnicity in the Yugoslav Censuses
Ethnicity or its plausible indicators have been tabulated in the censuses of Yugoslavia
since the first national count in 1921. In 1921 and 1931 mother tongue and religious
affiliation were tabulated but unfortunately not cross-tabulated. Thus, the data fromthose years cannot be easily transformed into the ethnic categories used later because
the fit between language, religion, and ethnicity is not clear cut. For example, Serbs andCroats were both listed as speakers of “Serbo-Croatian” and cannot be distinguished on
linguistic grounds. All Orthodox in a region are not necessarily Serbs, nor are all
Catholics necessarily Croats. Neither are all Muslims Muslim Slavs. 14 Although it
would have been interesting to examine data on ethnicity beginning with the first
postwar census (1948), the published data do not permit it. It is difficult to create aconsistent data set from 1948 onward because the system of ethnic classification in thetabulations did not stabilize until the census of 1961. Indeed, it is consistent only 19611981 across all segments of the territory. In 1991 it continues in almost consistent form
for Serbia and Montenegro (who jointly formed the rump Yugoslavia after thesecessions), but the categorization employed in the published tables at the lowest levelof aggregation is drastically simplified in Bosnia and Croatia. There are no useful data
for Kosovo and two municipalities of Central Serbia in 1991, and there are no data in
our source at the lowest level of aggregation for Slovenia and Macedonia in that year. 15

3.2 Territorial organization in the Yugoslav Censuses
From 1961 onward the lowest level of aggregation in the census tables was the naselje(pl. naselja). 16,17 The next higher level was the opština (pl. opštine, approx.
“municipality”). Opštine were typically named after the naselje that was their seat andalso appear in the tabulations as naselja; thus they are listed twice, once as a naselje andonce as the summary of their constituent naselja, but they are easily distinguished in the
published tables. Opštine were not just census units but important administrative units.

1102

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

The next higher level was the republic, although Serbia itself was divided at anintermediate level into Central Serbia and two other regions with a degree of autonomy
that had varied over time – the Voyvodina in the north and Kosovo in the south. In thisanalysis we treat all of these entities above the opština as equivalent in level, i.e., therepublics other than Serbia and the three sections of Serbia as described, and call them
all regions.
Before 1961 data were not published at the naselje level, and the lowest level
fluctuated in scope and name but was higher than the naselje. We do not use censuses
before 1961 not only because they do not have data at the naselje level but also, as
noted, because their classifications of ethnicity are not consistent with those 1961-1991.
The geographical boundaries of census units above the naselje and below the region are
also rather volatile over time, so that these units form a time series with changing
content. Naselja are more consistent, but they, too, pose problems. Some naselja
disappear from the census; these seem often to be small villages that were abandoned,
but they may also be urban neighborhoods that were renamed. Some naselja appear in
the middle of the census series; these appear to be genuinely new settlements, although
they, too, may be old naselja renamed. While the renaming of naselja is not as frequent
as the politically driven ubiquitous renaming of streets, it does occur. 18 Moreproblematic than renaming is the varying spelling in the different censuses of the namesof naselja that seem almost surely to be the same places. 19
It is important to note, however, that the analysis presented here is not one of atime series of the naselja themselves but rather a time series of cross-sections of naselja.
Each observation that we examine is a naselje at a point in time, located in its opština
and its region at that point in time, and we do not rely, in our main analysis, on whether
these points, even if identically named, are the same across the four censuses. Similarly,
analysis of opštine over time is one of a time series of cross-sections. These caveats do
not apply to regions, the borders of which appear to be quite stable over the time span
1961-1991. 20

4. Ethnic classification in this analysis 21
The underlying data on ethnicity consist of the census taker’s judgment of a
respondent’s ethnicity or of a respondent’s declaration of ethnic affiliation (narodna
pripadnost) to the census taker. There was an evolution of these methods over time,
described below, but they appear to have been relatively consistent in 1971-1991. By
1971 respondents could declare an ethnicity as such (e.g., “I am a Serb”), or they could
claim an ethnicity on grounds of residence in a republic (e.g., “I am Serbian because I
live in Serbia”), or they could decline to state an ethnicity. In the latter case, they would

http://demographic-research.org

1103

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

presumably be classified as “Yugoslav – unallocated” if they were Yugoslav citizens orof Yugoslav heritage, or as “Other” if they were not.
Yugoslav political philosophy was very sensitive to issues of ethnicity, especiallyto the history of conflict between the major ethnic groups. Under the Yugoslav
constitution(s) after 1945 there were five “constitutive ethnicities”, called narodi 22 ,each associated with one of the republics, which was its historical homeland, if not theresidence, of all its members: Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, andSlovenian. Serbs, for example, also formed large minorities in Croatia and Bosnia anddecreasingly so over time in Kosovo. Serbs resident in Croatia were also a constitutive
ethnicity in Croatia, since they had formed a large portion of the population of Croatia
since the 16th century. There were, in addition, a number of other recognized ethnic
groups, called narodnosti 23 , living in Yugoslavia but having a recognized homeland
outside Yugoslavia (or no recognized or uncontested homeland, such as Roma, Cincari,
Bunjevci, Vlachs, and others) and thus not having a republic that was ethnically,
historically, and constitutionally their own. The largest of these groups were theAlbanians, mostly concentrated in Kosovo, and Hungarians, mostly concentrated in
Voyvodina. Although a republic, Bosnia did not have a constitutive ethnicity. 24 The
central problems of Yugoslav ethnic politics are that some narodi had a large presence
in a region not their own, and some very numerous narodnosti had no constitutional
home. 25
Two other “ethnicities” are of particular interest, and they are interrelated. One isthat of “unallocated Muslims” (neopredeljeni Muslimani). These are persons who
identify themselves as Muslim in the ethnic sense, but who are not necessarily
observant Muslims. 26 These would include Muslims of Yugoslav origin 27 , such as thosein Bosnia or the Sandžak (the territory between Kosovo, Montenegro, andHercegovina). In theory, persons of Muslim faith who were not of Yugoslav origin
could not claim to be Muslims in the ethnic sense. Persons of Muslim faith who had
declared another ethnicity, such as Albanian, would not be included in this “unallocated
Muslim” category. The other category of interest is “Yugoslav”, or more precisely“unallocated Yugoslav.” It can be construed as a residual category of Yugoslav citizens
who did not declare any ethnic tie, or who declared an ethnicity that was not separately
tabulated, or of those who chose “Yugoslav” because it superceded previous ethnic
divisions.
There are some subtle shifts in the counting of (ethnic) Muslims. Muslims of
Yugoslav heritage were politically recognized as a separate nationality in first postwar
census (1948) but not tallied as such. In that census the census taker was given a list of
example categories, and instructed to tally Muslims who had declared no other ethnicity(e.g., Albanian), as Serb-Muslims, Croat-Muslims, or “unallocated Muslims”. In 1953
the census-taker was again given a list of example categories and directed to write down1104

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

the ethnicity of the respondent, but there was no “unallocated Muslim” category
published in the tables. The census taker was also instructed to write “Yugoslavunallocated” for respondents “of Yugoslav origin … who had not been ethnically moreclosely allocated.” In 1961 the designation, “Muslim”, was defined as “in the ethnic
sense” and applied only to persons of Yugoslav origin, i.e., not to Albanians, Turks, etc.
and further not to ethnic Serbs, Croats, and others who were of Islamic faith. These
allocations, according to the instructions, were apparently determined by the census
taker, presumably after querying the respondent.
In 1971, there was a marked change in the instructions, namely that the respondent
was to be recorded according to his or her own declaration, with the ethnicity ofchildren under age 15 declared by their parents. The instructions explicitly state that
respondents who do not wish to declare their ethnicity need not do so. Throughout theseries of censuses, various terms, such as “ethnic membership”, “ethnic minority”,“nationality”, etc., were used interchangeably and without definition. The term,“minority”, was eventually dropped because it might be thought derogatory.
The second category of special interest is “Yugoslav”. In the earlier censuses
before 1961 it appears to have been a residual category for persons of Yugoslav origin
or citizenship for whom the census taker could not determine an ethnic category, or
those respondents who did not respond with an ethnic category. The number of persons
in Yugoslavia listing Yugoslav as their ethnicity (or having it determined for them) isnever large, except in Bosnia, although its proportional fluctuations may be. There may
be a categorical equivalent of “Muslim” and “Yugoslav” in some censuses (see below).
Otherwise, “Yugoslav” appears to have been a response of members of the League ofCommunists, of military officers, or of dedicated supporters of the national unity of
Yugoslavia even if they were not members of the League, or, as suggested above,
especially of Muslims or others who did not wish to identify themselves in traditional
ethnic terms. 28 It may also have provided an opportunity for the children of ethnically
mixed marriages or spouses in such marriages to choose a neutral ethnic alternative. 29
This declaration (“Yugoslav”) is of special interest because it is unambiguously apolitical statement. However, it is important to note that all declarations of ethnicity in
Yugoslavia (and perhaps universally) are in some sense political statements. 30 (See also
Urdal 2001.)
Using the published tables on which our analysis is based, we observe that in 1961
eighty-seven percent or 842,000 of the 973,000 tabulated (ethnic) Muslims in
Yugoslavia resided in Bosnia. Eighty-seven percent or 276,000 of the 317,000 tabulated“unallocated Yugoslavs” in Yugoslavia were also resident in Bosnia. If the persons
tabulated as “Yugoslav” had all really been Muslims, there would have been 1.1 millionof the latter. In the next census (1971) 86 percent or 1.5 million of the 1.7 million
Muslims in Yugoslavia resided in Bosnia, but only 16 percent or 44,000 of the 273,000

http://demographic-research.org

1105

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia“unallocated Yugoslavs” did. Muslims in Bosnia increased by 640,000 or 76 percent;“Yugoslavs” decreased by 232,000 or 84 percent. Even if all of the increase in Muslims
was simply an “ethnic migration” of “Yugoslavs” into “Muslims”, there are still about
400,000 people unaccounted for. Assuming (and not unreasonably) that crude death
rates were about the same for Muslims and non-Muslims, and also that Muslim crude
fertility rates were as much as double those of non-Muslims (also not unreasonable), thenumbers still do not balance. There may have been other trading partners in thisnetwork. Serbs and Croats, the other two major ethnic groups in Bosnia, show almost
no change in number between 1961 and 1971. It is possible that they actuallyexperienced some population growth but that some proportion of their population,
having reported as non-Muslim in 1961, elected to report as Muslim in 1971. It is also
possible that some non-Yugoslav Muslims (ethnic Albanians, ethnic Turks, etc.) may
have claimed Yugoslav Muslim ethnicity. 31
The usual “balance equation” for demographic analysis contains three terms:
births, deaths, and net migration. The balance equation for ethnic groups in Yugoslavia(and doubtless elsewhere) contains four: births, deaths, net geographical migration, andnet ethnic redefinition. Even if good data were available for births and deaths by
ethnicity by fairly small regions, we would still need accurate data on geographicalmigration to net out the “migration” by ethnic redefinition. We do not have thenecessary data to solve this puzzle.
We should also note that ethnic redefinition is not a new phenomenon, historically,
either for individuals or for populations. For example, some tribes of old Montenegro,
such as the Klimenti, are reputed to be of “Albanian” (Gheg) origin. Thus at somehistorical point, perhaps about the same time as the introduction of Orthodox
Christianity or later during the hegemony of the Serbian Empire, they and some otherGhegs adopted Orthodox Christianity and the Klimenti were Slavicized. One may
speculate that they had already been bilingual. 32 Other, small but distinct ethnic groups
such as the Bunjevci, Šokci, Torlakians, Vlachs, and others, fragments of the migrations
triggered by the Ottoman advance and the Habsburg counteradvance, or simply those ofancient transhumance, often struggle politically and culturally to maintain their identity.
Our point here is that ethnicity is not absolute. It is subject to more mutability thanbiological race and its DNA. Ethnicity can change by acculturation, by individual
inclination, and transactionally and inconsistently by individuals. Just as individuals
may present themselves in alternative ways (for example, classically, by linguisticcode-switching), groups can negotiate their social boundaries, for example by religious
conversion. It is not identity but a statement about membership. (See for example theclassic presentation of this issue by Barth (1969) and recent work on bilingualism in
Wei (2000).) However, with no apology for this recitation of issues from the softersocial sciences like sociolinguistics or transactional analysis, we press ahead,1106

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

cautiously, to see what demography can contribute. In sum, we may say that thedemographic picture obtainable from these censuses is like that from many otherexcellent censuses. It shows a population responding to rates of birth and death, people
moving across landscapes, and people oozing in and out of social categories. We accept
those ambiguities, for what interests us is how people viewed themselves and how theymight think their neighbors viewed them.
Ambiguity does not end with this recitation. Although shifts in the count of
persons by ethnicity can occur by self-definition, changes in self-definition can reflect
either confidence or fear, acceptance of diversity, or the rise of defensive nationalism.
Further, the census counts of persons by ethnicity may suffer from nonrandom error.
(We address random error in a later section.) Such errors are commonplace in thecensuses of other countries, where they have been detected by post-enumeration
surveys. Different segments of the population are counted with differing degrees ofaccuracy; minorities and the poor are often undercounted, the rich may be counted morethan once if the census is residence-based. We are not aware of accessible postenumeration survey data that would allow us to take undercounts and overcounts into
consideration for the censuses that we analyze here. 33 In fact, such errors make ourinterpretations conservative. Correction of undercounts of minority populations would
increase our measure of diversity. 34 Note also that the enumerations of persons by
ethnicity include the population of Yugoslav citizens living abroad. The ethnic
distribution of Yugoslavs living abroad differs by region, by ethnicity, and by point intime. If the enumeration of such persons is subject to nonrandom error, the reported
ethnic proportions will be biased in some unknown direction and degree. The issue iscomplicated not only by errors in the reporting of departures and returns, but also by thereporting of births and deaths in the population living abroad. We have no way toestimate these errors. If a population living abroad is undercounted and also themajority population in its home area, correction of the error will decrease our measureof diversity; if that undercounted population is not the majority population in its homearea, correction of the error will increase our measure of diversity.
The censuses are all we have. We must interpret them with caution. In the end, we
can only fall back on philosophical statements, for example, that “statistics is the blind
man’s cane”, or quote 1 Corinthians 13 to remark that “for now we see through a glass,darkly”.
Table 1 shows the ethnic classifications published for the censuses of Yugoslavia
1961-81 at the naselje level and in those of the reporting successor states in 1991. 35 We
discuss how to accommodate the diversity of these classifications in a later section.

http://demographic-research.org

1107

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

Table 1:Ethnic categorization at the naselje level 1961-1991(in English alphabetical order)
1961

1971

1981

1991SMV

1

Albanian

Albanian

Albanian

Albanian

2

Croat

Croat

Croat

Croat
Hungarian

1991BOS

1991CRO

Croat

Croat

3

Hungarian

Hungarian

Hungarian4

Macedonian

Macedonian

Macedonian

5

Montenegrin

Montenegrin

Montenegrin

Montenegrin

6MuslimMuslimMuslimMuslimMuslimMuslim7(Other)(Other)(Other)

Other

Other

Other

8

Roma

Roma

Roma

Roma

Serb

Serb

Serb

Serb

Serb

12

SloveneSloveneSlovene13

Yugoslav

Yugoslav

Yugoslav

Yugoslav

Yugoslav

9
10

Romanian

11

Serb
SlovakYugoslav

Note: SMV = Central Serbia, Montenegro, Voyvodina“(Other)” is implicit, calculated by subtraction of all other categories from the total population. “Other” is explicitly given in thecensus. The order of the categories in this table is not the same as their order in the published data or in Mrdjen’s summary(2002) but is uniformly alphabetical (in English); the ordering in the source tables, where alphabetic, is sometimes in the
Cyrillic rather than the Latin alphabet. The historical ordering of ethnic categories in the published tables is both complex andpolitical. In 1948-1961 the tables list “Narodnost” (“Nationality”). In 1971 they list “Narodnost ili Etnička Pripadnost” (“Nationality
or Ethnic Membership”). In 1981 they list “Narod, Narodnost ili Etnička Pripadnost” (“Nation, Nationality or Ethnic
Membership)” (Mrdjen 2002). In 1948 all groups were listed in order of numerical preponderance. Subsequently, groups of
Yugoslav origin were in a first sublist, all others in a second sublist. The Yugoslav groups in 1953 and 1961 were ordered bynumerical preponderance except that “unallocated Yugoslavs” were placed last in the sublist; all non-Yugoslav groups wereunordered in the second sublist. In 1971 there were three sublists. The first was of narodi (the constitutive nations). The
second was of narodnosti (the non-constitutive nationalities), and the third was of all other reported groups. In all censuses
except 1953, Muslims (in the ethnic sense) are listed specifically; in 1953 they were part of the “(unallocated) Yugoslav”
category. In 1948 Jews are not listed separately. In 1953 they are listed as Židovi. Subsequently they are listed as Jevreji(“Hebrews”) in the “foreign” sublist, and in 1971 in the third or “most foreign” sublist, despite the fact that Romaniote Jews had
been resident in the Yugoslav lands probably at least since the destruction of the Second Temple, and other Jews certainly
since the expulsion of the Sephardim from Spain in the 15th Century. Like Mrdjen, we see a lot of political nuance in thesedetails, in a struggle to accommodate diversity and unity at the same time.

It is also important to note that in the end the published data are tabulated in a
fixed form reflecting the political importance of the major ethnic groups. This politicalsensitivity is clearly apparent in Table 1, where the available tables in 1991 at thenaselje level for Croatia and Bosnia are limited to the locally most important groups,
and the collective of Central Serbia, Voyvodina, and Montenegro dropped Macedonianand Slovenian and added Slovak and Romanian. There are few Macedonians or1108

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

Slovenians in the three-member collective but substantial numbers of Slovaks andRomanians in the Voyvodina. Montenegro conformed in this, as a member of the rump
Yugoslavia at the time of census publication. Our task would have been simpler and theresults more useful if the available machine-readable data were consistently structured
in 1991, as they were in the previous three censuses. It is important to stress again that
our analysis is based on the published tabulations at the naselje level (Yugoslavia
1998). More detailed specification of ethnic distributions is available in that source for
1991, but only at the opština level and above, and not for all regions. The tables at the
opština level for Bosnia in 1991 show only five categories, Croatia 29, Montenegronine, Macedonia six, Slovenia 29, and all three regions of Serbia 22. A separate analysis
of diversity and segregation at the opština level and above would still be limited by the
five-category structure reported for Bosnia.

5. Methods
Following the lead of Fischer et al. (2004) and predecessors (e.g., Theil 1967) we
examine two measures, one of diversity, the other of segregation. 36
5.1 Diversity
The diversity measure, applied to all levels of census aggregation from the naselje tothe region, is one of informational entropy, first proposed by Shannon in 1949
(Shannon and Weaver 1949). In this application it expresses the uncertainty (HS) about
the ethnic identity of a person chosen at random. Imagine, for example, an individual,
blindfolded, in a room full of other persons. Suppose that one of these other persons isbrought before the blindfolded one, and the latter is asked to guess the ethnicity of theformer. The blindfolded person only knows the number of ethnic groups in the roomand their proportional representation. If the blindfolded person knows there is only one
ethnic group in the room, her uncertainty about the identity of the person before her iszero. The larger is the number of ethnic groups in the room, the greater is her
uncertainty about the identity of the person before her. Further, the more equal is the
proportional representation of the ethnic groups, the greater is her uncertainty. Thus forexample, if there are two ethnic groups, and their proportional representation is 99:1,
her uncertainty is lower than if their proportional representation were 50:50. If there arethree groups, and they are distributed 1/3:1/3:1/3, her uncertainty is higher yet, and soon. The following formula expresses these relationships:

http://demographic-research.org

1109

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavian

H S = −∑ pi ln( pi )

(1)

i =1

where Hs is Shannon’s entropy, pi is the proportion of the population in category i andln is the natural logarithm. 37 We use Hs to distinguish Shannon’s entropy from the Theilmeasure described below.
Where p=0, the value of p*ln(p) is assumed to be zero. Thus an empty category
contributes nothing to the sum. If one category contains all of the observations so that
all other categories are empty, the value of Hs is 0, and there is no uncertainty about theidentity of an observation. While Hs always has a lower bound of zero, its upper boundis a function of the number of non-empty categories. Hs is maximized for any numberof categories when the distribution across them is equal. The circular points (o) in
Figure 2 show how Hs increases with the number of categories under conditions ofperfect equality between the categories. The dashed points (-) show a very simple
scenario of variable inequality for a two-category system. In this, the first category has,successively, shares of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, and the second category has the residual,
thus 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5. Entropy increases with equality of sharing and is thus
maximal with perfect equality. The topmost dashed point has the same value as thecircular point for a two-category system with equal shares. The plus marks (+) show theresult of a distribution in which only one of the census ethnic categories has any
members in a given community, regardless of the number of categories in the census;
entropy, i.e. diversity, in such circumstances is zero, since ln(0) is by definition zero.
Thus, although entropy has a lower bound of zero, it has no fixed upper bound, since it
depends on the number of groups as well as on their proportional distribution.

5.2 Segregation
The segregation measure (HT, Theil 1967) is applied to any superordinate level ofcensus aggregation, that is, from the opština to the region. It expresses the degree towhich units of the immediately subordinate level differ in their entropy (Hs) one fromanother, analogous to a measure of the variance between subsamples. The lower andupper bounds of HT are [0,1]. (Our notation attempts to keep the relationship between
formulae (1) and (2) transparent.) Note especially that HT cannot be calculated for thelowest level of aggregation; thus here it cannot be calculated for naselja. That restrictionis unfortunate, because some naselja in some censuses are relatively large and arealmost surely ethnically diverse, divided into traditional subunits, such as the mahala(ward) or komšiluk (neighborhood), and with some degree of segregation.
Segregation is defined as follows:1110

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35)
Nk ⎛ H S − H S ⎞⎟⎜HT = ∑)⎟⎜
HSk =1 N
⎝
⎠
m

k

(2)

where m is the number of subordinate units (for example naselja in an opština), N is thetotal population of the superordinate unit (for example the opština), Nk is the total
population of subordinate unit k (for example each constituent naselje), Ĥs is the overall
entropy of the superordinate unit, and HSk is the entropy of each subordinate unit. HT isthus a weighted average of the relative differences of the diversity (entropy) of naseljafrom the diversity of their opština.
Figure 2:

Entropy as a function of number of categories and equality of
distribution

A simple hypothetical example will suffice to illustrate the difference between HS
and HT. Suppose two opštine, A and B, each with two naselja, X and Y. AX, AY, BX,
and BY are of equal size. The population of AX is half of ethnicity E1 and half of E2.
That of AY is half E1 and half E2. The population of BX is entirely of E1, and that of
BY is entirely of E2. Both opštine are half E1 and half E2, but in very different ways. A
is minimally segregated, while B is maximally segregated. Figure 3 illustrates thesedifferences. While the mean naselje level entropy of A is higher than that of B,

http://demographic-research.org

1111

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

calculation of HT is more revealing than simple comparison of means and isconveniently bounded on [0,1]. HT is also additive across aggregation levels. 38
Figure 3:

Diversity vs. segregation

Note: Note that E1 and E2 are equally represented in AX and AY. The value of HS in AX and AY is 0.69 in both, as calculated fromthe formula given for HS. It can be simply represented in this case as -1*([0.5*ln(0.5)]+ [0.5*ln(0.5)]). (See also the value shownfor two groups equally represented, in Figure 2.) This is the maximum attainable value for two ethnic groups. Since AX and AY
have the same distribution of ethnic groups, the value of HT is at its minimum, namely zero. On the other hand, each ethnic
group is represented in only one village in the set consisting of BX and BY. Since there is only one group in each of BX and BY
the value of HS in each of them is zero (since ln(0) is here by definition zero), and in consequence the value of HT is at its
maximum, namely 1.

To give a quick sense of ethnic distributions in Yugoslavia, Table 2 shows that
despite the great diversity of ethnicities, monoethnicity, i.e., all inhabitants of a naselje
reported to have the same ethnicity, was sometimes the mode, usually the second mostfrequent pattern, and that having only two ethnic groups in a naselje was usually themode. Only the Voyvodina diverges from this predominance at the lower numbers of
ethnicities present. 39 Indeed, monoethnicity is the historical norm at the level of thevillage or of the mahala or komšiluk. This tendency to monoethnicity is in part an
outcome of the traditional cycle of household formation. Household formation among
most ethnic groups in the Balkans was typically patrilocal; on marriage, a bride and1112

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

groom resided in the household of the groom’s father. Other brothers (if any) would
coreside, so that on the death of their father a patrilineally extended household withmore than one married son would become a fraternal joint one. As the sons (if any) of
this joint household matured, they would marry (almost always endogamously inrespect of ethnicity), bringing in their wives, and the adult sons of these brothers would
be co-resident cousins. Eventually such a household might divide, but its constituent
sections might continue to live in close proximity. Thus, with any degree of
demographic growth, the village or mahala would become populated with patrilineallyrelated kin, thus of the same ethnic group. Longer range migration might involve suchcomplex family units, which would re-establish a monoethnic residential microregion.
Households of different origin would on migration tend to seek out co-ethnics asneighbors even if only on grounds of common religion, a lower potential forinterhousehold violence, and facilitation of the ethnic marriage market. 40 Table 2
presages what we will learn in more detailed analysis later: the decline inmonoethnicity, sometimes ragged, the increase in just a few areas, and the increase in1991 in a few of those in which it had previously declined, as the clouds of war began
to gather. The decline in monoethnicity was driven especially by internal migrationfrom diverse monoethnic locations to urban centers, and by the disappearance of small
villages as the young migrated to cities and the older generation died. To some extent
this trend was offset at the higher level geographical units, since migrants to the cities
tended to stay within territories dominated by their own ethnicity – Serbs in Serbia
tended to relocate within Serbia, and so on (Hoffman 1973, Sharp 1975, Thomas 1979).
Of course, several demographic processes may play a role in effecting changes indiversity and segregation. Migration was probably the most important force just afterWorld War II, especially in the deliberate policy to encourage population transfers fromsome so-called “passive” rural areas (notably Hercegovnina) to others, notably to the
Voyvodina after the expulsion of ethnic Germans. Deliberate restrictions on reverse
migration limited diversity in Kosovo when Serbs who had left the region during the
war were for some period not permitted to resettle. It was also important in the 1990s as
refugee flows changed the ethnic landscape. Differential rates of natural increase also
have an effect, but the data are difficult to incorporate in analysis. Ethno-specific rates
of fertility and mortality are not available at the low levels of aggregation at which wewish to analyze the data, and they are not easily acquired in machine-readable form for
censuses before 1991. Nevertheless, it is probably reasonable to assume that the rate ofnatural increase is higher in rural than in urban locations, higher for Albanians, Roma,and Muslims-in-the-ethnic-sense, and for other ethnic groups such as Turks that are
predominantly observant Muslim. Changes in ethnic self-definition may have been
important. These same processes play a role in more complex measures, such as
segregation.

http://demographic-research.org

1113

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

Table 2:
Region:Date

Proportion of naselja with n ethnic groups,
by region and census year
1

2

BOS:610.213 0.236
BOS:710.208 0.264
BOS:810.169 0.223
BOS:910.282 0.229
CRO:610.248 0.281
CRO:710.219 0.255
CRO:81
0.113 0.181
CRO:910.1330 0.289
KOS:610.168 0.227
KOS:710.273 0.278
KOS:810.334 0.233
KOS:91*
MAC:610.279 0.332
MAC:710.340 0.330
MAC:810.344 0.263
MAC:91*
MNT:610.388 0.275
MNT:710.175 0.261
MNT:810.206 0.222
MNT:910.149 0.236
SLV:610.564 0.271
SLV:71
0.548 0.269
SLV:81
0.463 0.259
SLV:91*
SRB:610.419 0.280
SRB:710.158 0.302
SRB:810.119 0.219
SRB:910.134 0.196
VOY:610.000 0.022
VOY:710.002 0.018
VOY:810.004 0.009
VOY:910.002 0.006
N Naselja 26481 24908

5N Ethnic Groups
6
7

3

4

8

9

10

11

0.021
0.016
0.024

0.013
0.010
0.012

0.008
0.004
0.008

0.011
0.009
0.006

0.001
0.003
0.006

0.022
0.025
0.037

0.013
0.017
0.020

0.008
0.012
0.013

0.010
0.012
0.013

0.001
0.005
0.008

0.015
0.009
0.021

0.007
0.007
0.009

0.007
0.007
0.008

0.005
0.008
0.008

0.007
0.009
0.009

N
Naselja
6078
5873
5851
5488
6756
6675
6623
6293
1437
1435
1444

0.216
0.218
0.202
0.165
0.203
0.188
0.210
0.214
0.236
0.193
0.168

0.159
0.146
0.169
0.152
0.123
0.145
0.216
0.227
0.177
0.134
0.110

0.086 0.036
0.083 0.039
0.116 0.065
0.171 *
0.058 0.033
0.075 0.046
0.124 0.065
0.137 *
0.097 0.054
0.061 0.020
0.064 0.034

0.186
0.164
0.177

0.104
0.083
0.090

0.039
0.041
0.050

0.027
0.018
0.029

0.012
0.007
0.021

0.009
0.004
0.007

0.002
0.003
0.005

0.009
0.010
0.013

0.000
0.000
0.000

1696
1643
1629

0.142
0.226
0.205
0.233
0.104
0.099
0.121

0.092
0.156
0.147
0.160
0.032
0.040
0.069

0.044
0.072
0.095
0.108
0.013
0.017
0.038

0.016
0.044
0.054
0.048
0.005
0.010
0.020

0.016
0.019
0.023
0.030
0.004
0.006
0.010

0.008
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.003
0.004
0.008

0.010
0.014
0.015
0.007
0.003
0.006
0.009

0.007
0.014
0.011
0.006
0.000
0.001
0.003

0.002
0.003
0.006
0.007
0.000
0.000
0.000

1259
1259
1231
1172
6034
6004
5933

0.120
0.219
0.235
0.229
0.033
0.018
0.017
0.004
18048

0.070
0.129
0.149
0.182
0.086
0.035
0.030
0.030
13170

0.035
0.062
0.103
0.111
0.109
0.060
0.045
0.065
7946

0.021
0.037
0.061
0.059
0.140
0.089
0.130
0.112
3425

0.014
0.022
0.034
0.032
0.135
0.135
0.098
0.110
1926

0.010
0.017
0.025
0.017
0.140
0.122
0.105
0.125
1280

0.012
0.018
0.014
0.013
0.151
0.160
0.145
0.134
1057

0.010
0.014
0.017
0.011
0.118
0.153
0.158
0.209
1050

0.009
0.022
0.024
0.015
0.067
0.208
0.259
0.203
834

4101
4101
4154
4122
451
451
468
464
100125

Note: BOS=Bosnia, CRO=Croatia, KOS=Kosovo, MAC=Macedonia, MNT=Montenegro, SLV=Slovenia, SRB=Central Serbia,
VOY=Voyvodina* Modal values are italicized. BOS and CRO reported a maximum of five groups in 1991. Macedonia and Slovenia did notreport at the naselje level in 1991. Data for Kosovo were unusable in 1991.

1114

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

6. Caveats
A caveat on this and later interpretations of the data, is our inability to assess theseparate effects of fertility, mortality, migration, and ethnic self-definition on ethnicbalances. We have no ethnospecific data on fertility and mortality at the lower levels ofcensus aggregation, let alone such information that indicates urban versus rural
settlement. Thus, although we know in general at the national level that Albanianfertility rates are higher than Serbian rates, we do not know how great these
discrepancies are within urban and rural contexts, or within lower level census units.
Nevertheless, historical observations suggest that although fertility decline in someethnic groups may shift the ethnic balance in some regions (for example, perhaps
among Serbs in Kosovo), a major driving force in these balances has been migration,
especially at lower levels of aggregation where occupational diversity is less and social
conditions more similar among inhabitants (Allcock, op.cit., Ch. 6). 41
Because of the minor changes in ethnic tabulation in Serbia and Montenegro in the1991 census and the drastic changes in Bosnia and Croatia in that year, and since wewish to include what we can of data from 1991, we are obliged to modify the system of
ethnic classification for analysis. There is no perfectly satisfactory way to do that. Table
1 shows that the standard 11-category system employed 1961-81 was altered in SerbiaMontenegro in 1991 to add Romanians and Slovaks but transferred to Yugoslav the
Slovenes and Macedonians. 42 In Bosnia and Croatia in 1991 there were only fivecategories published at the naselje level, and these transferred to Yugoslav or Other
some groups numerically preponderant in other regions but minor in Croatia andBosnia, such as Albanians and Montenegrins. Thus it is impossible to compare diversity
or segregation across all census years and regions based on particular ethnic groups,
since they are not consistently listed. Our solution was to reduce all of the 11-categorysystems to five categories, taking the four most numerous named categories in eachregion separately, and putting all other persons in a fifth category, Other. Note that
selection of the four most populous categories in each region means that the ethnicities
so chosen are not the same across the regions. 43 The different nominal identity of thefive categories has no effect on the calculation of the two indices (HS, HT), although it
may affect their interpretation. Of the 100,125 observations of naselja across the four
censuses, 26,481 or 26 percent were monoethnic. Of the remainder, 64,072 or 64
percent contained from 2 to 5 ethnic groups. Thus for 90 percent of the naselja, thereduction to a 5-category system has no effect. 44 Only the remaining 9,572 or 10
percent contained more than 5 groups. 45 Sixteen percent of these were in the Voyvodina
and constitute 85 percent of the naselja in that region. The Voyvodina is an outlier. In
all other regions an average of 9 percent of naselja report more than five groups in any
census year.

http://demographic-research.org

1115

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

7. Results
7.1 Diversity (HS)Figure 4 is a series of boxplots showing the levels of ethnic diversity (entropy) at thelevels of naselje, opština, and region, for each region, by census year. 46 “Serbia” in thisanalysis means Central Serbia (sometimes called in the literature “Serbia Proper”), buthere not including in any year the opštine of Bujanovac and Preševo because of the data
deficiencies already noted. 47 Each segment of the series can have up to four boxes, one
for each census. There is no fourth box for Slovenia, Macedonia, or Kosovo because of
the absence of useful data.
Note that each location at the regional level has only one observation, and the plot
contains only the dot for the median. The variability and skewness of the distributions
below the region vary inversely with administrative level, greatest for naselja and lessfor opštine. Although the diversity within regions changes over time, roughly speaking
Voyvodina has the greatest diversity 48 , followed closely by Bosnia, then Montenegro,
then the roughly equivalent Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, then Serbia, then the least
diverse, Slovenia. It is worth noting that the major element of diversity in Voyvodina is
the number of ethnic groups reported, while the major element of diversity in Bosnia is
the near-equal balance between the major groups.
At the regional level, diversity in Bosnia fell between 1961 and 1971, rebounded
in 1981, then declined slightly in 1991. The drop in 1971 may be related to the change
in census protocol, with self-declaration becoming the norm. In Croatia, diversity rosesteadily 1961-81, then fell slightly in 1991. In Kosovo, diversity fell steadily 1961-81.
In Macedonia, it did just the reverse. In Montenegro, diversity increased substantially
1961-91, with a slight dip in 1981. In Slovenia, diversity increased steadily 1961-81. In
Serbia, it increased 1961-81 with a slight decline in 1991. In Voyvodina, it was steady
1961-71, increased slightly in 1981, then fell slightly in 1991. Overall, there wasdiscernible although irregular increase in six of the regions, no clear change in one, anda decline in one.
At the opština level, the patterns of the medians in most regions are almost
identical to those at the regional level. However, in Kosovo, there is little change in the
medians, and the the distributions are more skewed downward over time, with more
obvious outliers where lessening of diversity was stronger.
At the naselje level, patterns again mimic those at the regional and opština levels,with some exceptions. There is discernible but sometimes irregular increase in five
regions, no overall change in two, and decline in one. In Kosovo at the naselje level,
diversity declined just as it did at the regional level. In Macedonia, there is little or nochange at the naselje level, in contrast to the pattern of increase at higher levels.

1116

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

Figure 4:

Diversity by census level by census year

Note: REG = region, OPS = opština, NAS = naselje BOS = Bosnia, CRO = Croatia, KOS = Kosovo, MAC = Macedonia, MNT =Montenegro, SRB = Central Serbia, SLO = Slovenia, VOY = Voyvodina

The anomalous pattern at the opština level in Kosovo suggests that persons weremoving out of naselja where they were in the minority to naselja where they were not,but still within the same opština. 49 From Table 2 it is evident that, uniquely among theregions of the former Yugoslavia, the percentage of monoethnic naselja in Kosovo rose
steeply and continuously between 1961 and 1981. Diversity at the opština level would

http://demographic-research.org

1117

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

not be changed by intra-opština migration. The downturns in 1991 in most of theremaining regions suggest that migration anticipating the wars may have already begun,and that inhabitants were leaving locations where they were in the minority. It is also
possible that individuals were identifying themselves differently as tensions increased.
Overall, in 17 of the 24 observational frames, the pattern is one of increase in diversity,
even if slight. Change is negative in only two, and these are both in Kosovo. Fiveframes show effectively no overall change.
The terminal drop in Bosnia may only be part of a fluctuating pattern of diversityof varying cause. The underlying raw data show that the proportion reporting Muslim
ethnicity was 0.26, 0.40, 0.40, 0.44 in the successive censuses. There appears to be no
simple trade-off with the reporting of Yugoslav identity, which appears as 0.08, 0.01,
0.08, 0.05. Nevertheless, some shift in ethnic identification must have played a role (seeMrdjen 2002). The proportions reporting as Croat or Serb both show steady decline,
while the proportions reporting as Other (which would include some persons declining
to identify an ethnicity) show a steady but slight increase. We have no direct
information on internal migration rates by ethnicity, but unknown changes in rates ofnatural increase in the different ethnic groups may play a role. Similarly, we have no
direct information on the propensity to report alternative ethnicity.

7.2 Segregation (HT)Figure 5 examines segregation patterns. Note that only two levels are examined –opština and region, since segregation cannot be calculated at the lowest (naselje) level.
As before, there is only one observation per region and thus only the median dot isshown at that level.
Fischer et al. (2004) 50 suggest that changes in HT as small as 0.02 are substantively
important. Whether they are statistically significant we address in a later section. We
focus on the period 1961-1981, with separate comments on any shifts 1981-1991,
because of the lack of adequate data after 1981 for some regions (Kosovo, Slovenia,
Macedonia). Figure 5 shows that segregation had a fairly consistent downward trend in
15 of the 16 observational frames (eight regions at the regional and opština levels), withthe exception of Kosovo and Montenegro at the opština level. However Montenegro
does show a stronger decrease 1971-1981 than does Kosovo. Of the 24 intercensal
changes (3 intercensal periods in 8 regions), three, as noted, have no data in 1991. (SeeTable 3 where the observed median differences 1961-1981 are tabulated). Of theremaining 21 frames, all observed changes in the medians are negative, and they are
negative by more than 0.02 except the small positive shift in 1981 at the opština level in
Kosovo and Montenegro and the regional level in the latter. Both Croatia and Serbia

1118

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

show small increases in segregation 1981-1991. These shifts in Croatia and Serbia may
reflect changes (in residence or reporting habits) of members of the Serb minority in
Croatia or of the Croatian minority in the Voyvodina county of Srem. Large numbers of
Serbs were displaced from Croatia after 1991, but some anticipatory changes may haveoccurred and may have involved reciprocal property exchanges and relocations (seeČapo-Žmegač 2007 on such changes after 1991). Despite these sorts of irregularities,
the overall trend toward decreased segregation is striking.
Figure 5:

Segregation by census level by census year

http://demographic-research.org

1119

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

8. Statistical significanceHow significant are the patterns that we observe? Could they be the result of chancealone? The question is complex.
1.

The data examined here are not a sample but the universe of data collected. We
should not ask the question of significance in the usual framework of assessmentof sampling error.

2.

We can, however, rephrase the question as one about measurement error and try toapproach it by bootstrapping (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). We decided to ask thesimplest and most fundamental question: did the observed change in the medianentropy (segregation) between 1961 and 1981 exceed a level that could reasonably
be attributed to random variation? We did not include 1991 for two reasons: (1) the
absence of useful data for three regions in 1991 and (2) the clear change in slope
from 1981 to 1991 in some regions and the complexity that would be introducedby trying to test a nonmonotonic pattern. It is important to note that this test ofchange from 1961 to 1981 examines only those two time points and does notaddress any nonlinearity, such as can be seen in the more informative boxplots.
Nevertheless, this limited test does address the issue of the reliability of ourinterpretations by focusing on a subset that reflects the general problem of thereliability of the census and the sensitivity of interpretations to random error. Our
procedure is as follows:
The data set contains 100,125 observations of naselja in four census years.
We draw 1,000 samples with replacement from this universe of observations.
By drawing with replacement we create 1,000 “bootstrap samples” each ofwhich has 100,125 observations. In each such bootstrap sample, some naselja
in that region and that year will appear once, some will be repeated perhaps
several times, others will be left out, because we sampled randomly andrepeatedly with replacement. (Think of this sampling with replacement asfishing in a pond, catching a fish, throwing it back, and fishing some more.
You are unlikely to catch every fish in the pond, but you are likely to catchthe same one more than once.) We can use the standard deviation of thedifferences of the medians calculated from the bootstrap samples as an
estimate of the true standard deviation. 51 For analysis of each census (region xyear) we discard observations that are not in the region and the census year
we are testing. In this way the structure of the bootstrap parallels that of theboxplots. Further, by making the tests region and time specific, we avoid the1120

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35-

introduction of irrelevant variance between regions and censuses at thedifferent dates.
We generate Z statistics for the difference between median naselje level
entropy in each republic in 1961 and 1981 as well as differences in opština
and regional level entropy and segregation over the same period. (Recall that
segregation cannot be examined at the naselje level.)

3.

Table 3 shows the results. We ask whether the observed difference is likely to haveoccurred by chance alone, and we judge that likelihood as described above.
Because our interpretations are directional, we double the usual critical value ofalpha (0.05) to 0.10, and we accordingly mark as “significant” (in italics) those pvalues that are less than 0.10.

4.

Naselje Diversity: The p-values for naselje diversity are all vanishingly close to
zero. None of the observed differences between the median diversity of naselja in
1961 and 1981 in any region are likely to have occurred by chance alone. Note,however that Figure 4 is more informative. The overall pattern for Bosnia is one offluctuation that is, on average, flat. Croatia, Serbia, and Voyvodina show aflattening or downturn in 1991. While the decline in Macedonia is unlikely to be
the result of chance alone, it is quite small on average, and the overall pattern overtime is flat.

5.

Opština diversity: All but two results are unlikely to have occurred by chancealone. The two exceptions are Bosnia and Kosovo. In neither of these regions do
the boxplots show any important change between the two census dates, hence thehigh p value, since what we see in the differences between medians is estimates of
zero.

6.

Opština segregation: In five of the regions the difference between the observed
median difference and the bootstrapped median difference has a p-value close to
zero. In Kosovo and Montenegro the pattern between 1961 and 1981 is irregular orflat, meaning effectively no change. The observed differences in medians are
insufficiently different from zero to exclude chance alone as their cause,
confirming our judgment. The situation for Macedonia is different. The boxplot
shows segregation to have declined, but the bootstrapping shows that the observed
median difference (which is negative) had a probability of 0.1006 of occurring by
chance alone, thus implying that change in Macedonia may have been flat, if westrictly interpret the alpha level. On the other hand, if we were to bet money on our

http://demographic-research.org

1121

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

interpretation of the graphical result, we would enjoy odds of 9:1; that is not a bet
we would refuse.
7.

Examining regional diversity we see that in all regions but Bosnia the p values are
below 0.10. In Bosnia again, the pattern of fluctuation means that there was
effectively no difference between 1961 and 1981, which is just what the bootstrap
shows.

8.

Examining now regional segregation, we see that all but two p values are less thanalpha. The exceptions are Kosovo and Montenegro. Both of these slopes from1961 to 1981 are very small. If the comparison in Montenegro had been 1961-1991
the difference, seen from the boxplots, would have been steeper. While we would
have judged both cases to have shown decline, we must admit that at these modest
declines, a small drop is not far from zero.

9.

The upshot of this testing between 1961 and 1981 is that although we could not
apply a general test across all four censuses in all eight regions, bootstrappingshows that where we could conduct a reasonable inferential test, our judgments
were on the whole reliable. The doubtful cases are those in which a very slightdecline cannot be easily distinguished from no decline, at the chosen alpha level.
But in our view, art trumps probability theory. That our interpretations of theboxplots were clearly correct in almost all cases strengthens our view that in themarginal cases we were probably not far off target.

Table 3:

Bootstrap results 1961 vs. 1981

RegionObserved Median
Difference

BOS
CRO
KOS
MAC
MNT
SLV
SRB
VOY

0.06050.1543-0.1101-0.00800.10800.03440.06640.15881122

Bootstrap Mean SD Bootstrap
Difference
Mean Difference
Naselje Diversity
0.06010.00980.15390.0040-0.1105
0.0145-0.0079
0.00300.10830.00910.03420.00230.06610.00170.16120.0499Zp6.158638.5852-7.5688-2.6654
11.9290
15.104438.4875
3.18270.00000.00000.00000.00380.00000.00000.00000.0007

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

Table 3:

(Continued)

RegionObserved Median
Difference

BOS
CRO
KOS
MAC
MNT
SLV
SRB
VOY

0.02910.3123-0.0128
0.10750.33340.14690.22940.1677

BOS
CRO
KOS
MAC
MNT
SLV
SRB
VOY

-0.0981-0.0671
0.0039-0.0590-0.0331-0.0420-0.0302-0.0911

BOS
CRO
KOS
MAC
MNT
SLV
SRB
VOY

0.01080.1866-0.13100.17730.30540.20400.25160.0806

BOS
CRO
KOS
MAC
MNT
SLV
SRB
VOY

-0.0458-0.1474-0.0218-0.1000-0.0212-0.0879-0.1513-0.0675

Bootstrap Mean SD Bootstrap
Difference
Mean Difference
Opština Diversity
0.01380.02900.30910.0306-0.0467
0.06910.11940.04490.29280.07380.14440.01720.21330.01560.16130.0379Opština Segregation-0.0933
0.0227-0.05150.01230.01880.0557-0.03840.0462-0.0584
0.0353-0.0384
0.0129-0.02190.0080-0.0567
0.0320Regional Diversity
0.01060.02160.1881
0.0226-0.13480.04960.17640.06220.31000.07260.20270.02400.24900.04290.07930.0533
Regional Segregation-0.04620.0172-0.1537
0.0184-0.0167
0.0261-0.0906
0.0418-0.01930.0482-0.0901
0.0251-0.1551
0.0379-0.0768
0.0284Zp1.0046
10.2135-0.1850
2.39414.51798.538414.7072
4.42300.15750.00000.42660.00830.00000.00000.00000.0000-4.3287-5.46560.0707-1.2783-0.9355-3.2502-3.7831-2.8495

0.00000.00000.47180.10060.17480.00060.00010.00220.49998.25152.64082.84834.20838.48975.86241.51230.30860.00000.00410.00220.00000.00000.00000.06522.65928.02830.83532.39130.43873.49683.98732.38080.00390.00000.20180.00840.33040.00020.00000.0086

Note: Observed Median Difference is the observed difference between the medians of this variable in 1961 and 1981 at this census
level (see figures 4 and 5). Bootstrap Mean Difference is the mean of the differences of the medians in 1961 and 1981 in the1000 bootstrap resamplings, and SD Bootstrap Mean Difference is the standard error of this mean. Z is the Z-score for thedeviation of this mean from zero. p is the probability of that deviation by chance alone. Since our interpretation of the boxplots
is specifically directional, by region, a p-value of < 0.10 might be interpreted as statistically significant (shown in italics).

http://demographic-research.org

1123

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

9. Implications of opština boundary changes
As already noted, naselja that are almost surely the same places in different censuses
are sometimes located in different opštine. The extent of these changes varies greatly
across regions, and changes are most frequent in the first decade. Preliminary analysis
shows that a common outcome of opština boundary shifts is to increase the measure ofsegregation. There are two plausible conjectures to explain the changes. The first is thatthey reflect ethnic gerrymandering, strongest in the earliest period but diminishing. The
second is that they are an inevitable result of combining relatively monoethnic but
ethnically different opštine side by side in a new opština, as improvements incommunications allowed simplification of the administrative structure of government. 52
We defer exploration of this question, since it requires detailed geographical analysis. 53

10. Some supplemental evidence
Botev (1994) offers a sophisticated analysis of ethnic endogamy and exogamy in
Yugoslavia from about the beginning of our data up to a few years before its end.
Marriage event data are not recorded in the censuses; only marital status is. Botev uses
event data from annual statistical reports, at the regional level. He is skeptical about
journalistic reports that focus on the disruption of interethnic marriages by interethnic
conflict (as are we) and sees no consistent trend in the incidence of interethnic
marriages. There is an apparent contradiction between his results and ours. Botev seesno consistent trend in the degree of exogamy by region. We do see trends in the ethnic
diversity of regions. Indeed, our results on ethnic diversity at the regional level are inrough agreement with Botev’s basic data on proportions of exogamic marriage in six ofthe eight regions. What we describe is the local residential population at various levels,
approximately the structure of supply in the marriage market. Our results (on residence)are in rough concordance with Botev’s raw data on marriage events; the simple
conclusion from this concordance is that the structure of supply was changing but
demand was relatively constant. In an interesting log-linear analysis, Botev identifies
the structure of marital preferences. Given those preferences, marriage events are still
conditioned by the supply of potential spouses, which we show to be moving toward
greater local diversity. A caveat on this discussion, and on Botev’s results, is that themarriage market in the former Yugoslavia was not strictly local and may havetranscended regional boundaries. See also Mrdjen’s discussion of interethnic marriages(Mrjden 1996).
Kuzmanović (1994) summarizes surveys of “social distance” between particularethnic groups in Yugoslavia. The surveys asked respondents of ethnicity A whether1124

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

they would accept a person of ethnicities B…X in particular social relationships,
ranging from coresidence in the same country to marriage with a close relative of the
respondent. Surveys of this kind had been carried out in Yugoslavia between 1960 and1990 (see Bogardus 1926 on the fundamental concepts of social distance). The surveys
are not identical in the ethnic structure of their samples, the questions are not identical,
and there are other formal differences between them, so that close comparison is notpossible. One must also take the veracity of responses with a grain of salt; almost
surely, given official government attitudes toward ethnic relations, respondents werelikely to give politically safe answers. Nevertheless, the results are illuminating.
According to Kuzmanović the earlier surveys manifest perceived distance between
ethnic groups in Yugoslavia that is relatively low in comparison to that found in other,modern, multi-ethnic countries. Even in the time of economic and political crises in the
1980s, the level of ethnic intolerance (as expressed in the survey responses) was
relatively low. By 1990, with the outbreak of violent rebellion in the Serb-dominatedareas of Croatia, surveys show much higher perceived distance. Kuzmanović concludes
that the political quarrels and economic rivalries between the republics led to anincrease in expressed inter-ethnic antagonism that peaked especially after the outbreakof open hostilities between the Serbian-controlled JNA (Yugoslav National Army) andbreakaway forces in Slovenia and Croatia. Prior to that, the data appear to show thatinterethnic antagonism was usually lower in the more diverse republics than in the morehomogeneous ones. One might then expect that in the absence of armed conflict, thehistory of increasing diversity would have led to a diminution of interethnic social
distance.

11. Summary, reflections, and conclusion
Using two commonly employed measures of ethnic diversity and segregation, we
examined the censuses of Yugoslavia 1961-91. We did not attempt coverage before
1961 because the systems of administrative organization and the categorization of
ethnicity varied too much from those employed 1961-91. Even inclusion of data from1991 posed problems, requiring a simplification of ethnic classification.
Our interpretations of the data are subject to an important caveat about themeaning of data on ethnicity. These data can be regarded as information on the true
ethnic origins of persons or as information on how persons wished to present
themselves. The first alternative presupposes that persons know what their “true ethnic
origins” are, a difficult task even for obsessive genealogists, given the history ofintentional or fortuitous mixture of ethnic groups in the region. The second alternative
presupposes that persons respond to questions about their ethnic identity in a way that

http://demographic-research.org

1125

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

furthers their political interests, especially in a country in which census takers may be
regarded as agents of the police. Under the first alternative, our data show that
coresidential ethnic mixture was on the whole objectively increasing. Under the second,
our data show that respondents felt increasingly at ease in representing themselves as
members of other than the regionally dominant ethnic group. The political implicationsof the two alternatives are the same.
The extraordinary ethnic diversity of the territory of Yugoslavia was historicallyone of local mono-ethnicity, expanding to multi-ethnicity in ever larger geographicalunits. Imperial conquest, refugee flight, and more recently urbanization and thedisappearance of small, usually monoethnic, rural settlements over time resulted ingreater mixture of the population. Over the period 1961-91 diversity at all levels mostly
increased, and segregation mostly decreased. Where exceptions appear, such as in
Kosovo, there is a longer recent history of severe ethnic conflict, leading to separation,rather than integration, of rival ethnic groups. While we do not yet have detailed data at
all local levels to support the assertion, it is apparent from general information that the
refugee flows during, following, and to some extent before the wars of separation havereversed the trends toward integration seen in the census data 1961-91. Indeed, eventsin Kosovo even during that period suggest that political rivalry and separatist politics
were instrumental in triggering ethnic separation.
There can be no question that ethnic hostility has a long history in the region, bredof conflicts between empires and their ethnic surrogates. There can be no question butthat these conflicts have erupted with sufficient frequency over historical time so thatevery generation has been subject to atrocity or tales of it. Nevertheless, two factors
seemed to dampen such resurgence. One was state policy, perhaps most draconian in
Yugoslavia after 1945, in which even telling or collecting ethnic jokes was subject topenalty. 54 The other was the inexorable march of industrialization and urbanization that
mixed together populations that had previously lived in isolation, sometimes achieving
diversity by deliberate encouragement of internal migration, as in the replacement of
expelled German-speaking (Volksdeutsche) populations of the Voyvodina byinhabitants from distant Yugoslav areas. General measures of social distance between
ethnic groups appear also to have increased as hostilities intensified, but are inversely
correlated with local diversity. 55
Let us revisit the broader questions raised at the outset. How do we understand our
puzzle: the eruption of violence in the 1990s that dismembered Yugoslavia along ethniclines into its separate republics, that has split Kosovo from Serbia, and that may yet
split Bosnia into three parts? Although our interest in this analysis is carefulmeasurement of diversity and segregation, we cannot avoid this political question, eventhough it is not within our competence to answer it. The literature on ethnic relations,
ethnic politics, and the organization of polities is vast, even if focused just on1126

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

Yugoslavia. We cannot attempt to review it but simply proceed to consider the obvious
alternatives.
Perhaps the most discouraging interpretation of the flow of historical events is that
increasing diversity itself led to interethnic antipathy. Although direct evidence fromsurveys of interethnic attitudes is not as strong as we might wish, that explanation
seems unlikely. Antipathy as expressed in the surveys appears to decrease withincreased diversity. Further, strong evidence of interethnic antipathy seems to haveappeared only after the outbreak of open conflict.
An alternative explanation would be that ethnic dissension was held in check by anauthoritarian government until the discipline of the League of Communists wasundermined by economic and constitutional crises after Tito’s death in 1980. This is themost plausible of the alternatives. 56 Economic rivalry between the republics, andresentment over large transfers from the wealthier regions (Slovenia, Croatia, and tosome extent Serbia) to the poorer ones (Kosovo, Macedonia) grew during the 1980s.
Since the 1970s the central government had pursued a path of decentralization andfederalization, granting virtual autonomy even to the regions of Serbia that did not havethe status of republics (Kosovo, Voyvodina). This course proved impossible to reverse
and aroused secessionist tendencies simply on a regional basis but easily transformed
into inter-ethnic resentment. 57 Playing the ethnic card may simply have been aconvenient option for politicians seeking broad support.
Other actors, European and American, dithered until it was too late. It has been
said that the alacrity of German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia after theirsecession, contrary to the position of the European Union, brought to mind thealignments of 1914 and 1941 (Crawford 1996). The United States and NATO werereluctant to protect the populations of Yugoslavia from nationalist frenzy until the
military situation was hopeless. Why? By 1991 there were tectonic shifts in the power
relationships of European states. Exhausted by the war in Afghanistan, plagued byeconomic difficulties, Party hegemony weakened by glasnost, the Soviet Union wascollapsing. The Berlin Wall had come down in 1989. Yugoslavia was no longer
important to the West as a client and entry point to the socialist and Third worlds, as an
example of a socialist state independent of the USSR. Burdened by foreign debt,
challenged by demands from the International Monetary Fund for repayment andrecentralization of its banking system, suffering from hyperinflation andunemployment, unable to control its otherwise laudable efforts toward federalism,
Yugoslavia would have needed firm support from the EU and NATO. Efforts to createa customs union or arrange entry into the European Union would have helped. That
support was not forthcoming. 58
Given the notion of constitutive ethnicities, Yugoslavia tore apart on lines
established in its own charter. With the authority and solidarity of the League of

http://demographic-research.org

1127

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

Communists diminished, with an ideology that denied class distinctions and thus analternative scenario for alignment, and with a one-party system, ethnicity as a politicalmobilizer was the only convenient organizational alternative (Allcock op. cit., Lipset
and Rokkan 1967).
There is nothing in the demographic record to suggest that ethnic separatism wasinevitable, absent the emergence of economic and political rivalry at the highest levelsof government. Although Yugoslav society had its share of ethnic intolerance, there isnothing in the population record to suggest that intolerance by itself would have led tomass separatism. Our contribution has only been to add to the evidence information on
population distribution that has not been part of the debate. That information supports
the arguments put forth by Allcock, Denitch, and Woodward, among others, that thecollapse of Yugoslavia was from the top. As the Serbian proverb prophetically informs
us, this fish did stink from the head.

12. Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by the Peter N. Kujachich Fund of the Center for
Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies and by the Committee on Research, of the
University of California, Berkeley. We are indebted to personnel at the former Federal
Statistical Institute and the current Serbian Statistical Institute in Belgrade, to Mr.
Goran Penev in the Demographic Section of the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade,for their advice and cooperation, to Michael Hout, Ronald Lee, and Gretchen
Donehower for comments, and to Kenneth Wachter and Sean Reardon for statisticaladvice. The authors of this paper are solely responsible for its content andinterpretation. A preliminary report on diversity but not including segregation was
published in Serbian in Hammel, Mason, and Stevanović (2007).

1128

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

Notes
1

Translation of the Serbian proverb, “Riba smrdi od glave”. This proverb is
widely known in other European languages and is often attributed to the philosopher
Erasmus (c.1466-1538) as Piscis primum a capite foetet, although it may have an older
Greek origin.
2
Later censuses for some successor states exist but vary even more in coverageand format and are not all at the same date. A carefully controlled comparative
examination of the data after 1991 is not feasible at this time. There is also a richliterature on the social, political, and humanitarian outcomes of the violent collapse of
Yugoslavia, especially regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, and the Serbian exodus
from Croatia. These works are primarily from a political science or humanitarian
perspective, and we do not discuss them here because they fall outside of our time
range.
3
Ethnic relations in the workplace are also important especially given the
Yugoslav practice of workers’ self management. However the census gives us noinformation on workplace ethnic distributions.
4
The literature on this topic is enormous. Excellent overviews from sociology,
political science, and anthropology are: Allcock (2000), Denitch (1994), Woodward(1995) and Halpern and Kideckel (2000). For an extensive view of similar issues inwhat have been called the wars of the communist succession, see Kaufman (2001). For
problems in state formation in the Balkans, see Weiner (1971). For a general theory ofgeographical factors in ethnic violence, see Toft (2003). See also Goldstone (2002),
Hammel (1993, 1997, 2000), Hayden (1996), Kertzer and Arel (2002), Slack andDoyon (2001), Urdal (2001), and Weiner and Teitelbaum (2001).
5This first “Yugoslavia” was initially named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats andSlovenes. By virtue of its status as a large independent state rather than a part of any
empire in 1914 (Croatia and Slovenia were part of Austria-Hungary, Macedonia part of
the Ottoman Empire, Montenegro was small), and as an independent combatant against
Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans, Serbia was given pride of place. Thus the seeds ofdissension were sown.
6
Presumably, these majority stakes were calculated at the level of the municipality
in order to show differences within the superordinate level of the republic orautonomous region.
7
For brevity we use the word, Bosnia, throughout to mean Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Similarly, we use the word Kosovo throughout to mean Kosovo and Metohija.

http://demographic-research.org

1129

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

8

Indeed reliance on language as ethnic identifier was an important aspect of thedecisions of the Paris Peace Conference, although ironically it stemmed from theGerman Romanticist trend initiated by Herder, Goethe, and the brothers Grimm.
9
Some of these are spoken of course only by small populations. Some are related
to one another at a more general level. Even at that higher level there is extraordinary
diversity, with representation from Slavic (Serbian, Croatian, Bulgarian, Bosnian,
Macedonian, Slovenian, Slovak), Romance (Italian, Venetian, Istriot, and various
Romanian languages), Albanian, Indo-Aryan (several Romani languages), Caucasian(Circassian), Ugric (Hungarian), and Altaic (several Turkic languages). Most of thoselisted are Indo-European but sometimes distantly related, while others are not related to
one another or to the Indo-European set. German is not included in this list. Before theend of World War II there were substantial populations of German speakers in the
Voyvodina who had settled there when the region was under Austro-Hungarian control.
Jews are not included; there were Sephardic populations of considerable depth in
Bosnia and Serbia prior to World War II, speaking Ladino as well as the local Slavic
language. Some Ashkenazim lived in Croatia and surrounds, speaking Yiddish as wellas the local Slavic language. See www.ethnologue.com.
10
For example, the qeleshe, a white felt skullcap worn by Albanian men, thecrnogorska kapa worn by Montenegrin men, the šajkača, a military cap like the U.S.
garrison cap or French bonnet de police worn by Serbian men, the fez worn by Muslim
men. Muslim women in the countryside often wear dimije , “harem pants”, but in urban
contexts may simply wear a head covering. Ethnic differences of costume between nonMuslim women are more subtle and found mostly in the countryside .
11
The complexity of interethnic relations and of the Yugoslav people to theirimperial overlords can be illustrated anecdotally. In 1961, Ivo Andrić was awarded theNobel Prize in Literature for a work entitled, in English, A Bridge on the Drina. The
Drina River is the border between Bosnia and Serbia. In the book, the bridge is a
metaphor for interethnic relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Interestingly,
Andrić does not use the usual Serbo-Croatian word for “bridge” (most) in his title, but
the word ćuprija. Ćuprija is the Turkish word for bridge. The bridge is an historicalone, at Višegrad, and still stands, having been blown up by the Austrians in World War
I, by the Germans in World War II, and by paramilitaries in the war of the 1990s, but
subsequently repaired each time. It was commissioned and financed by Mehmed Paša
Sokolović in the 16th century. Mehmed Paša Sokolović was the Grand Vizier of the
Ottoman Empire, who served three sultans, including Suleiman the Magnificent. One
may wonder at his surname: he was also a Serb, who had been conscripted as a young
boy into the Janissaries. It is this bridge, built by a Serb in Ottoman clothing, that
Andrić celebrates as a metaphor of ethnic relations. As if this were not enough, we notethat Andrić has often been identified as a Bosnian Serb. He was in fact born a Bosnian1130

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

Croat and was an observant Catholic. In his student days before World War I, heassociated with radical Serbian organizations fighting against Habsburg rule,organizations that had among their members Gavrilo Princip, who assassinatedArchduke Ferdinand in 1914. Andrić served some time in prison for his politicalactivities. So much for simple views of ethnic nationalism.
12
Yugoslavia exhibits a transition process from the “fixed ethnicity” notion typicalof some European states to the more flexible and situational view now exemplified in
the United States. See for example Simić (2007).
13
It is not within the scope of this paper to chronicle the collapse of Yugoslavia,
but we give some interesting details. The collapse may be said to have begun with the14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugslavia. At that Congress, thedelegates of Croatia and Slovenia walked out on January 20, 1990, frustrated by the
maneuvers of Slobodan Milošević, who had gained control of the votes of Serbia,
Kosovo, Voyvodina, and Montenegro, thus 4 of 8. Separatist politicians in all regions
began to advance their own agendas. Ultimately even Milošević adopted a Serbiannationalist position rather than the hegemonic Yugoslav one that he held originally. See
especially Allcock (2000), Denitch (1994), and Woodward (1995).
14
For example, while most Albanians are Muslim, some are Catholic and a few are
Orthodox. Some Muslims are ethnic Turks. A few Serbs in Dubrovnik are Catholic.
15
A large proportion of the Albanian population in Kosovo and the twomunicipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo in Central Serbia refused to participate in thecensus. We omit Kosovo in 1991 from the analysis, so that our results for that region
describe only its characteristics 1961-1981. We omit Bujanovac and Preševo from theanalysis 1961-1981 as well as in 1991, because to include them before 1991 would
misrepresent comparisons for Central Serbia across the range 1961-1991. Similarly, we
omit Slovenia and Macedonia from analysis in 1991 because the tabulations available
are only at the opština level.
16
From the verb seliti, “to settle”, thus “settlement”. Cf. selo, “village”. We use
the nominative case (singular or plural, as appropriate) of Serbo-Croatian nouns
throughout. On pronunciation, render š as English sh in shoe, č as English ch in church,
ć as the exaggerated palatalized ct in English picture, ž as the voiced form of š,
approximately as ge in French fromage.
17
That naselja were the smallest administrative units does not imply that they werealways small demographic units. Many naselja are tiny villages. On the other hand, thenaselje of Novi Sad, seat of the opština of Novi Sad in the Voyvodina, had almost
180,000 inhabitants in 1991.
18
For example, by 1991 most or all of the locations named for Tito (e.g., Titograd,
Titovo Užice, or heroes of the revolution, e.g., Ivangrad, had reverted to their earlier

http://demographic-research.org

1131

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

denominations, e.g. Podgorica, Užice, Berane, respectively. It is not always easy,
without local political knowledge, to know what the predecessor names were.
19
The problems of consistent identification of a given geographical location overtime could be easily solved if the censuses contained information on latitude andlongitude or if they assigned a unique identifier to each naselje. No such list exists, atleast not in public form, except a list with unique numerical identifiers for Serbia in
2001. There do exist gazetteers of geographical place names, including populated
places, and giving latitude and longitude, but they are not easy to use (e.g., http://earthinfo.nga.mil/gns/html/index.html). First, they are the result of the scanning of maps
issued by different governments, in different languages, at different dates. Second, they
do not indicate the opština to which a naselje belongs administratively. The first defectmeans that it would be very difficult to decide how to include information from maps inEnglish, German, Hungarian, Italian and Albanian and whether the names listed in themwere the equivalents of the Serbo-Croatian names in the censuses. The second defectmeans that it would be difficult to decide whether two identically spelled naselje nameson the lists were the same place or two different places with the same name, because theopština names for the naselje are not given. Naselje names are apparently never
duplicated within an opština but they are often duplicated across different opštine.
Finally, the naselje names given on the maps may vary in spelling both among
themselves or from those in the census, just as those names differ across censuses. GIS
data (points and polygons) are now available for locations in the former Yugoslavia, but
their use in our work demands prior careful articulation of the place name data with thecensus name data (which cover a longer time span than the geographical names data).
That is an arduous task that we have not yet undertaken.
20
We did attempt provisional assignment of unique identifiers for naselje names.
These were catenations of the region name, the opština name, and the naselje name. We
call
this
constructionacname.
For
example,thecname
CRN:IVANGRAD:IVANGRAD depicts (reading right to left) the naselje of Ivangrad
in the opština of IVANGRAD in CRNA GORA (Montenegro). We then compared thecnames within each region across censuses. Minor differences could be detected inmany comparisons. For example, the abbreviation for “Saint” in a place name might
differ. Where such minor differences were detected, we changed the cname in theearlier census to the form observed in the later census. Our confidence in these matches
was high if the difference in names was minor and had an easy explanation, as in theexample just noted, and especially so if the two naselje names were in the same opština
in both censuses. These simple cases are the most common. Some instances were moredifficult, for example if an opština seat itself was renamed, as was the case with
CRN:IVANGRAD:IVANGRAD
1961-1981
anditstransformation
to
CRN:BERANE:BERANE in 1991. There is no linguistic clue to the fact that these are1132

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

the same place on the ground. We did not use the renamed cnames as identifiers tocreate time series of places across the four censuses for our main analysis.
21
See Mrdjen 2002 for a perceptive review of ethnic classification in the Yugoslav
censuses.
22
narod, “folk, a people, cf. German Volk”, pl. narodi.
23
narodnost, “ethnicity”, pl. narodnosti. The difference between narod andnarodnosti is approximately that in English between nation and nationality.
24
Albanians have been the majority population in Kosovo in modern times andarguably for much of the later Ottoman period. Serbs displaced from Kosovo during
World War II were initially forbidden to return after 1945 in order to placate theAlbanian population. The lower Serbian birth rate and Serbian emigration out ofKosovo have intensified the Albanian majority. (See Hammel and Stevanović 2004
Petrović and Blagojević 1989,1992.) Serbs have a majority in the Voyvodina, but the
Hungarian minority is large. The population of Bosnia was approximately 20 percent
Croatian, 30 percent Serbian, and 40 percent Muslim in 1981. Thus, Muslims had only
a plurality, and their designation as the constitutive ethnicity would have been difficult.
As of this writing the official Bosnian position is that Croatian, Serbian, and Bosniak
are now all constitutive ethnicities. However, Bosniak politicians appear to be resisting
the reporting of ethnicity in any census (http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Boshnjacipolitizuju-popis-stanovnishtva-u-BiH.sr.html, 27 August 2009.) (We are obliged toProf. Andrei Simić for this reference.) It is also important to note that the revision of the
Yugoslav constitution in 1974 paid special attention to issues of ethnic identity, partly
by granting greater autonomy to Kosovo and the Voyvodina, where there were large
non-Serbian populations. At the same time the particular ethnic consciousness of
Bosnian Muslims was increasing, so that a particular Bosnian Muslim identity,“Bosniak”, began to emerge out of the formerly residual category of “unallocated”
Muslims. We are obliged to an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point. We
speculate that any previous attempt to designate Muslim Slavs in Bosnia as a particularethnic group might have met determined and potentially violent opposition from
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, who together amounted to between half and twothirds of the Bosnian population. Indeed, that is just what happened after the League ofCommunists lost political control in 1990.
25
King Alexander I of the first Yugoslavia attempted to deal with the problems ofregional ethnic predominance by re-establishing new administrative regions (banovine)that crosscut the traditional regions. He was assassinated for his pains in 1934 by acoalition of Macedonian and Croatian separatists (IMRO and Ustaše).
26
The constitution and the census instructions are very explicit in their emphasisthat Muslim is to be understood “in the ethnic sense” and not in the religious sense.

http://demographic-research.org

1133

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

27

The phrase, jugoslovensko poreklo (Yugoslav origin) is not to be understoodonly in the territorial but also in the ethnic sense. It refers to southern Slavs of
Yugoslavia, but not to persons of other ethnicity from that same territory, e.g.,
Albanians.
28
It is interesting to observe that major urban cemeteries are often divided into
separate sections by religion. There is a section for Catholics, one for Orthodox, one forMuslims, one for Jews. There is also a section for Communists, presumably so that theywould not be obliged to declare a religious affiliation in order to be buried, or because
their political affiliation was regarded as an alternative orthodoxy.
29
We are obliged to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that “Yugoslav” mightprovide a convenient alternative to specification of a single identity.
30
We may reflect on what it would mean for a resident of the U.S. to respond to
the race or ethnicity questions of the census with “American”. See the careful treatmentof the political meanings of ethnicity by Allcock (2000), especially Ch. 10, 11, 12, 14 etpassim. Note also the specific manipulation of ethnic declaration, as for example in theclaim that some Muslim Albanians reported that they were ethnic Turks, in order toenhance the possibility of their emigration/ “repatriation” to Turkey.
31
In 1961 the Yugoslav category ranked in the top 5 ethnic categories (including
Other) only in Bosnia, not in any of the other seven regions. Since the purported
Yugoslav-Muslim tradeoff was probably important only or at least primarily in Bosnia,
it is unlikely that the lack of this tradeoff played a role anywhere else in 1961.
In 1971 the Yugoslav category ranked in the top 5 in all but 3 regions (Kosovo,
Macedonia, Slovenia), thus in 5 regions. Since the Yugoslav-Muslim tradeoff was
primarily a Bosnian phenomenon, the emergence of the Yugoslav category in theremaining 4 regions (excluding Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Slovenia) can only be
explained by some other mechanism.
In 1981 the Yugoslav category ranked in the top 5 in all but Kosovo andMacedonia, thus in 6 regions. The same arguments apply in 1981 as in 1971, withSlovenia included.
In 1991 the Yugoslav category ranked in the top 5 of all 5 reporting regions.
Probably if Slovenia, Kosovo, and Macedonia had reported the required data, theYugoslav category would have ranked in the top 5 categories of 6 regions (adding
Slovenia since Slovenia had that result in 1981). We may assume that Kosovo andMacedonia (both with large Albanian populations, and both with a history of separatist
tendencies) would not have included the Yugoslav category in the top 5 even if they
had reported data at the proper level in 1991.
What we see is an intensification of the popularity of the Yugoslav category in thetime span in which ethnic definition was primarily by self-identification (1971-91). We
cannot really evaluate the mechanisms by which these changes took place with the data1134

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

we have. Ideally we would like to have an adequate sample of the raw data at theindividual level and be able to link those records across censuses, but such anundertaking is beyond our resources and perhaps those of the census facilities in theformer Yugoslavia.
32
See for example http://www.rastko.rs/rastko-al/zbornik1990/mbarjaktarevicpredanja_l.php and references therein.
33
We are obliged to one of our reviewers for stressing this point.
34
In theory, time trends in the rate of undercount could give the appearance oftime trends in underlying ethnic distributions, net of any real changes in those
distributions. An explanation of this phenomenon would require complex arguments
about the changes in the undercount rate that might create the trends in ethnic
distribution that we describe here. Our explanation is more parsimonious.
35
Readers should note again our dependence on the electronic data employed inthis analysis. These tables give us the detail we need for analysis at the settlement level,
but they do not give us full detail on the ethnic identities subsequently published at
higher levels. We have not had access to the full range of ethnicity data at thesettlement level, and such tables may not exist, either in printed or electronic form.
36
There is a plethora of measures to describe diversity and segregation. See
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.html. We selectthose used in this analysis because we find the diversity measure intuitively appealing,
and because the segregation measure is based on it.
37
In information theory the logarithm to base 2 is used; here we use the natural
logarithm, which is more commonly employed in studies of diversity and segregation.
38
As attractive as these measures are, they cannot tell us anything about
populations that are not explicitly listed in the censuses. A striking example of this is in
Bosnia, where the three dominant ethnicities are irregularly distributed across thelandscape. Their distribution is “lumpy”. However, the broad areas in which each isdominant are not formal categories in the census. They lie between the level of the
opština and the republic. Thus the measure, HT, cannot capture the segregation they
demonstrate without remapping and creation of clusters of opštine that could be inserted
into our analysis between the level of the formally recognized bounds of the republic
and its opštine.
39
Settlement patterns have a hidden and important effect on diversity andsegregation. The Voyvodina offers an important lesson in interpretation. Even rural
naselja in Voyvodina are often quite large, being rural towns rather than villages. Oneof the major cities in Voyvodina, Novi Sad, appears as a single naselje in one of thecensuses. Voyvodina is historically diverse, partly because immigration of non-Slavs
was encouraged under Austria-Hungary and partly because it was a refuge area for
Slavic populations fleeing the Ottomans. Yet ethnic neighborhoods exist within these

http://demographic-research.org

1135

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

naselja even if they are invisible in the census, because the naselje is the lowest level ofcensus aggregation. Although exploration of the subject is beyond the scope of thispaper, entropy and segregation both tend to increase with size of settlement. Changes inthe size of very small settlements are mostly a function of natural increase or decrease
and of in- and outmigration. Small settlements experience more outmigration thaninmigration, and this outmigration consists mostly of persons in or below thechildbearing ages. Small settlements tend to be monoethnic, but large settlements draw
on an array of settlements of varying monoethnicities.
40
Although not essential to our arguments in this paper, it is important to note thatprohibitions on marriage with kin varied by religion and folk custom. Among Orthodox
Serbs, intermarriage within the patriline, even at its most distant reach, was in theory
prohibited. The restriction was less strong, perhaps, among Catholics. Among Muslims
there was a preference for marriage between persons whose fathers were brothers, a
traditional preference in the Near East, and not only among Muslims. Thus one wouldfind that a rapidly expanding patriline in some ethnic groups, especially those of
Orthodox faith, could within a few generations saturate its territory and exhaust the
local marriage market, creating pressures for emigration and thus seeding an adjacenttarget area with the same ethnicity. See Hammel (1968) and citations therein.
41
Some comparative information on fertility by ethnicity in 1991 is available inmachine-readable form on the 1991 census CD (Yugoslavia 1998). It is a table ofchildren ever born, by age of women over 15, by region, by ethnicity, by religion. The
filename on the CD is POPIS/KNJ13.HTM. It opens as a text file. The most difficult
part about using it is that you must format the column headers to make it intelligible.
Since the column headers are uniform across the pages of the table, it is only necessary
to format the first one and then delete all the others, then save the result to a different
file in a different directory.
42
We presume the transfer was to the “unallocated Yugoslav” category, based on
the definitions of these categories in the census protocols. Similar tables are available inprint for earlier censuses.
43
It is interesting to note that the “Yugoslav” category appears in the first four in
six of the eight regions -- all but Macedonia, where it is sixth, and Kosovo, where it isseventh. Both Macedonia and Kosovo have large Albanian populations.
44
By “no effect” we mean that a location truly containing only five ethnic groups
would yield the same measures of diversity and segregation whether the computations
were done based on an 11 category system or on a 5 category system, since the five
most populous groups would be the same, and the remaining six under an 11-categorysystem would contribute zero to the calculations.
45
The estimate for more than 5 groups is a lower bound, because in Bosnia andCroatia in 1991 only 5 groups were reported. Where a location contained more than five1136

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

groups, the effect of truncation to five lowers the diversity measure, but the inclusion of
the omitted population in the category Other, increases it and to some extent offsets the
reduction in number of categories.
46
Each box of the boxplot contains observations in the central half of the
distribution, i.e. the interquartile range, from the 25th to the 75th percentile. The dot
within the box is the median. The dashed lines extend to 1.5 and 3 times theinterquartile range. The circles denote extreme outliers. (See for example
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Box_plot).
47
Since the data for Bujanovac and Preševo in 1991 were unreliable, their
inclusion 1961-81 would have created a biased comparison across time for Central
Serbia as a whole. Since Kosovo was an integral and separable census unit, it could
simply be dropped in 1991 without affecting its comparison across 1961-81. Note thatthe published data for these locations or including them at higher levels in 1991 are
estimates, not counts and are clearly marked as such in the source data.
48
Voyvodina has been historically diverse because under the Habsburgs it wasdeliberately settled with peasants from other Habsburg lands, notably Hungarians,
Slovaks and Germans. The Germans were expelled after 1945, and replaced by internalmigrants from impoverished regions such as Hercegovina. The Serbian presence in
Voyvodina is largely a consequence of refugee flows from the Ottoman advance.
49
See Hammel and Stevanović 2004 for an analysis of ethnic migration at the
opština level in Kosovo.
50
See http://ucdata.berkeley.edu:7101/project_record.php?recid=28.
51
For readers unfamiliar with the bootstrap or similar techniques, imagine that ourdata represent the true Yugoslavia but that census takers vary in their competence anddiligence. We conduct 1,000 censuses of Yugoslavia at the two census dates. Some
census takers in each census fail to visit an assigned naselje. Some lose their notes.
Some visit the same place more than once, without realizing it. Some cannot spell. The
results of these 1,000 imaginary censuses will differ randomly, and we use thesedifferences to estimate the random variability in the underlying, actually reported
census of Yugoslavia on the two census dates in this exercise.
52
See Klemenčić (1996) for a history of boundary changes and comments thatwould refute an hypothesis of gerrymandering.
53
An adequate combination of census and geographical data, necessary to
determine the geographical boundaries of opštine, requires a list of populated places,
each place with latitude and longitude. As of this writing, such lists have become
available and include both central points and border polygons for the named locations.
Difficulties in using such data still remain. First, the geographical (GIS) data are notfirmly attached to calendrical dates, so that while central points may be reliable, border
polygons may not be. Second, we do not know how dependent such data are on the

http://demographic-research.org

1137

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

origin and date of the maps from which data were scanned. Third, we would need toreconcile disparities between maps of different date and different origins. Fourth, wewould need to standardize the spelling of place names. Fifth, we would have to matchthe names of populated places in the geographical databases to the names of naselja inthe census data. This is not a simple enterprise, since the geographical databases give no
indication of the borders of administrative units above the level of the populated placeand below the level of the former republic (now country). Where naselje names are
duplicated across distinct populated places, we would have to pick the nearest
populated place named as an opština to decide to which opštine the several naselja
belonged. We have not yet embarked on this arduous analysis. Nevertheless we claimthat its outcome, that might allow us to speculate more closely on political intent, issecondary to our findings in this paper.
54
In all fairness we acknowledge that telling ethnic jokes or making disparaging
remarks about ethnic groups in some other countries (such as the United States) canlead to accusations of political incorrectness, apologies, and even resignations.
55
See Allcock’s discussion of surveys of social distance (2000:198).
56
See Allcock’s careful dissection of these complex questions (2000:417-431).
57
See for example Slack and Doyon (2001) on interethnic tension in Bosnia,
centering on shifting demographic balances, political power, the allocation of jobs, andinterethnic violence. Their focus was at the opština level, which at least in Bosnia,
provided a microcosm of the national dilemma. For a detailed description of theeconomic crisis of the 1980s and its political consequences see Allcock (2000:89 ff.),and Woodward (1995:47 ff.).
58
After almost two decades, over 300,000 deaths, and as many as five million
displaced persons (Leonard 2005:33), the former republics appear to be establishing a
regional trade network on their own (The Economist, August 22-28, 2009, pp. 45-46).

1138

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

References
Allcock, J.B. (2000). Explaining Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press.
Barth, F. (ed.). (1969). Ethnic groups and boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown andCompany.
Bogardus, E.S. (1926). Social distance in the city. Proceedings and Publications of theAmerican Sociological Society 20: 40-46.
Botev, N. (1994). Where East meets West: Ethnic intermarriage in the former
Yugoslavia, 1962 to 1989. American Sociological Review 59(3): 461-480.
doi:10.2307/2095944.
Čapo-Žmegač, J. (2007). Strangers either way: The lives of Croatian refugees in their
new home. New York: Berghahn Books (European Anthropology in Translation
Vol. 2).
Central Intelligence Agency (2010). [electronic resource]. Formerly posted athttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/Yugoslavia.html(Downloaded 2010).
Crawford, B. (1996). Explaining defection from international cooperation: Germany's
unilateral recognition of Croatia. World Politics 48(4): 482-521.
doi:10.1353/wp.1996.0015.
Denitch, B. (1994). Ethnic nationalism: The tragic death of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis
and London: University of Minnesota Press.
Efron, B. and Tibshirani, R.J. (1993). An introduction to the bootstrap. New York:
Chapman & Hall/CRC. (Monographs on Statistics and Applied Probability; 57).
Fischer, C.S., Stockmayer, G., Stiles, J., and Hout, M. (2004). Distinguishing thegeographic levels and social dimensions of U.S. metropolitan segregation, 19602000. Demography 41(1): 37-59. doi:10.1353/dem.2004.0002.
Goldstone, J.A. (2002). Population and security: How demographic change can lead toviolent conflict. Journal of International Affairs 56(1): 3–23.
Halpern, J. and Kideckel, D. (eds.). (2000). Neighbors at war: Anthropologicalperspectives on Yugoslav ethnicity, culture, and history. University Park, PA:
The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Hammel, E.A. (1968). Alternative social structures and ritual relations in the Balkans.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

http://demographic-research.org

1139

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

Hammel, E.A. (1993). Demography and the origins of the Yugoslav civil war.
Anthropology Today 9(1): 4-9. doi:10.2307/2783334.
Hammel, E.A. (1997). Ethnicity and politics: Yugoslav lessons for home. Anthropology
Today 13(3): 5-9. doi:10.2307/2783131.
Hammel, E.A. (2000). Lessons from the Yugoslav labyrinth. In: Halpern, J.M. andKideckel, D.A. (eds.). Neighbors at war: Anthropological perspectives on
Yugoslav ethnicity, culture, and history. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania
State University Press: 19-38.
Hammel, E.A., Mason, C., and Stevanović, M. (2007). Pitanja nastala analizom etničke
strukture stanovništva u SFR Jugoslaviji [Questions arising from analysis of theethnic structure of the population in the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia]. Stanovništvo 45(2): 7-24.
http://scindeks.nb.rs/article.aspx?
artid=0038-982X0702007H.
Hammel, E.A. and Stevanović, M. (2004). The migration of Serbs and Albanians within
and between Kosovo and Inner Serbia. In: Brunet, G., Oris, M., and Bideau, A.
(eds.). Les minorités – minorities. New York: Peter Lang: 145-174.
Hayden, R.M. (1996). Imagined communities and real victims: Self-determination andethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia. American Ethnologist 23(4): 783-801.
doi:10.1525/ae.1996.23.4.02a00060.
Hoffman, G.W. (1973). Migration and social change. Problems of Communism 22(6):16-31.
Kaufman, S.J. (2001). Modern hatreds: The symbolic politics of ethnic war. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Kertzer, D.I. and Arel, D. (2002). Censuses, identity formation, and the struggle forpolitical power. In: Kertzer, D.I. and Arel, D. (eds.). Census and identity: The
politics of race, ethnicity, and language in national censuses. London:
Cambridge University Press: 1-42.
Klemenčić, M. (1996). Promjene upravno-teritorijalnog ustroja Hrvatske 1918-1992[Changes in the legal-territorial organization of Croatia 1918-1992].
In: Mirošević, F. (ed.). Hrvatske županije kroz stoljeća [Croatian districts
through the centuries]. Zagreb: Školska Knjiga: 123-149.
Kuzmanović, B.R. (1994). Socijalna distanca prema pojedinim nacijama [Social
distance toward particular nationalities]. In: Lazić, M. (ed.) Razaranje društva:1140

http://demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35

Jugoslovensko društvo u krizi 90-ih [The collapse of society: Yugoslav society inthe crisis of the 90’s]. Beograd: Filip Višnjić: 225-244.
Leonard, E.K. (2005). The onset of global governance: International relations theory
and the International Criminal Court. Burlington: Ashgate.
Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.). (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Crossnational perspectives. New York: The Free Press.
Mrdjen, S. (1996). La mixité en ex-Yougoslavie. Intégration ou ségrégation desnationalités? Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest 27(3): 103-145.
Mrdjen, S. (2002). Narodnost u popisima: promenljiva i nestalna kategorija [Ethnicity
in censuses: a changeable and inconstant category]. Stanovništvo 40(1-4):
77-103. http://scindeks.nb.rs/article.aspx?artid=0038-982X0201077M.
Petrović, R. and Blagojević, M. (1989). Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca sa Kosova i iz
Metohije – rezultati ankete sprovedene 1985-1986. godine [The migrations ofSerbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija. Results of a scientificsurvey conducted 1985-1986]. Beograd: Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti.
(Demografski Zbornik, edited by M. Macura)
Petrović, R. and Blagojević, M. (1992). The migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from
Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the survey conducted in 1985-1986 (English
edition). Beograd: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Department of Social
Sciences. (Demographic Studies, Vol. III, edited by M. Macura).
Shannon, C.E. and Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of communication.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Sharp, S.L. (1975). Ethnicity and migration in Yugoslavia. Studies in Comparative
International Development 10(3): 63-70. doi:10.1007/BF02803675.
Simić, A. (2007). Understanding hyphenated ethnicity: The Serbian-American case.
Serbian Studies 21(1): 37-54. doi:10.1353/ser.0.0040.
Slack, J.A. and Doyon, R.R. (2001). Population dynamics and susceptibility for ethnic
conflict: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Peace Research 38(2):139-161. doi:10.1177/0022343301038002002.
Theil, H. (1967). Economics and information theory. Amsterdam/Chicago: NorthHolland/Rand McNally (Studies in mathematical and managerial economics; 7).

http://demographic-research.org

1141

Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia

Thomas, C. (1979). Internal migration in Yugoslavia 1961–1971. Tijdschrift voor
economische en sociale geografie 70(3): 177-181. doi:10.1111/j.14679663.1979.tb01438.x.
Toft, M.D. (2003). The geography of ethnic violence. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Urdal, H. (2001). Nasjoner som kategorier. En analyse av folketellingene i BosniaHercegovina [Nations as categories. An analysis of the population censuses of
Bosnia-Hercegovina]. Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning 42(4): 571–589.
http://www.prio.no/Research-and-Publications/Publication/?oid=49586.
Wei, L. (2000). The bilingualism reader. London and New York: Routlege and KeganPaul. doi:10.4324/9780203461341.
Weiner, M. (1971). The Macedonian syndrome: An historical model of international
relations and political development. World Politics 23(4): 665-683.
doi:10.2307/2009855.
Weiner, M. and Teitelbaum, M.S. (2001). Political demography, demographic
engineering. New York: Berghan Books.
Woodward, S.L. (1995). Balkan tragedy: Chaos and dissolution after the Cold War.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Yugoslavia (1998). Popis 1991 - Elektronsko izdanje knjiga popisa 1991 [The census of1991 – electronic edition of the census books of 1991]. Beograd: Savezni Zavod
za Statistiku.

1142

http://demographic-research.org