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KEEPING SECRETS AT A DISTANCENEW APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR MONITORING & VERIFICATION

Alex Glaser
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University
Exzellenzcluster Cyber Security in the Age of Large-Scale Adversaries (CASA), Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Bochum, June 24, 2022
Revision 3b

Sara Al-Sayed

Robert Goldston

Sharon Weiner

Ernesto Mané

Laura Kahn

Frank von Hippel

Zia Mian

Ray Acheson

Igor Moric

Tamara Patton

Christopher Chyba

Geralyn McDermott

Jihye Jeon

Alex Glaser

Eric Lepowsky

Sébastien PhilippeHarold Feiveson

Hossein Mousavian

Ryo MorimotoAnne Stickells

A. H. Nayyar

Stewart Prager

Nancy Burnett

Pavel Podvig

NUCLEAR

sgs.princeton.edu

VERIFICATIONFISSILE
MATERIALSREGIONSSPACEEMERGINGTECHNOLOGIESBIOTECHNOLOGYBACKGROUND
Nuclear weapons in 2022

5,5006,000

There remain about
13,000 nuclear weapons
in the world today
Based on Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, Nuclear Notebook, Federation of American Scientists and thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/A modern nuclear weapon has
a destructive power tens tohundreds of times greater thanthe Hiroshima bombff

Credit: S. Glasstone and Philip Dolan, The E ects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd Edition, Washington, DC, 1977 and nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap

PLAN A

www.youtube.com/watch?v=2jy3JU-ORpo

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There never has been a moment’s
justi cation for having the capability
to destroy humanity.
Daniel Ellsberg

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M. Göttsche and A. Glaser (eds.), Toward Nuclear Disarmament: Building Up Transparency and Veri cation
German Federal Foreign O ce, Berlin, May 2021, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/about-us/foreignservice/brochures

Germany is currently planning to acquire 35
F-35A; these aircra are certi ed to carryand deliver U.S. B61 nuclear bombs

The upgraded B61 bomb (Mark 12) will
replace all currently in Europe deployed U.S.
nuclear weapons in 2022–2024

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www.bmvg.de/de/tornado-nachfolger-bescha ung-neue-kamp ugzeuge-fuer-truppe
nsarchive.gwu.edu/brie ng-book/nuclear-vault/2022-03-28/natos-european-nuclear-deterrent-b61-bombtechnical

WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES ?
(How to enable reductions in the nuclear arsenals)

THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD
ON AVERAGE, A MODERN NUCLEAR WARHEAD MAY CONTAIN
3–4 KG OF PLUTONIUM AND UP TO 25 KG OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
Primary
Typically contains plutonium(and/or highly enriched uranium)

SecondarySource: fas.org; U.S. Department of Defense

A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

Typically contains highly enriched uranium(and lithium-deuteride as fusion fuel)11

“THE PEANUT”

September 2, 2017, Source: KCNA/EPA
North Korea tested a nuclear weapon with an estimated yield of 250 kt(TNT) on September 3, 2017
A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 202212NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE UNIQUE
RADIATION SIGNATURES
BUT THEY ARE SENSITIVE AND CANNOT BE REVEALED TO INSPECTORSScience, 248, 18 May 1990, pp. 828-834

U.S. Scientists on the Soviet Cruiser “Slava” (later renamed “Moskva”) in the Black Sea, 1989
A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 202213

DEALING WITH SECRETS(in nuclear arms control and disarmament)

EARLY INFORMATION BARRIERS(RESEMBLED RUBE-GOLDBERG MACHINES)

Readout display

David Spears (ed.), Technology R&D for Arms Control, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC, 2001
Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration (FMTTD), Los Alamos, August 2000
A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

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“All I see is a green LED
with a battery connected to it.”
Russian nuclear weapons expert during technology demonstration
at a U.S. national laboratory in the early 2000s

WHY ARE WARHEAD INSPECTIONS SO HARD?
(AS SEEN FROM INSPECTOR’S PERSPECTIVE)
VERY LITTLE (IF ANY) INFORMATION ABOUT THE INSPECTED ITEM CAN BE REVEALED
Some information may be shared in advance, but no additional information during inspection

ADVERSARY/COMPETITOR HAS (DE FACTO) INFINITE RESOURCES

ADVERSARY/COMPETITOR MAY BE EXTREMELY MOTIVATED (TO DECEIVE INSPECTOR)
Stakes are very high (especially when the number of weapons drops below ~1,000)

HOST HAS LAST OWNERSHIP OF INSPECTION SYSTEM BEFORE THE MEASUREMENT(and inspector never again has access to system a er the measurement is complete)

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A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

HOW NOT TO GIVE AWAY A SECRETCONTINUE IMPROVING TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHESWork on information barriers with a particular focus on certi cation and authentication;in particular, identify joint hardware and so ware development platforms

REINVENT THE PROBLEM: NEVER ACQUIRE SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO BEGIN WITH
Explore radically di erent veri cation technologies and approaches; for example, avoid need fortrusted hardware or seek alternatives to onsite inspections at certain sensitive facilities

REVEAL THE SECRET
Requirement to protect sensitive information is typically the main reason for complexity ofveri cation approaches; for example, mass of ssile material in a nuclear weapon
Source: Author (top and bottom) and Johannes Tobisch (middle)
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A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

“SOMETHING OLD”
Example 1: Zero-knowledge Verification

SUPERHEATED DROPLET DETECTORS MAY OFFERA WAY TO IMPLEMENT SECURE INSPECTIONSBY AVOIDING DETECTOR-SIDE ELECTRONICS
Superheated C-318 uorocarbon (C4F8)
droplets suspended in aqueous gel
Tailor-made by d’Errico Research Group, Yale University
Sensitive to neutrons with En > Emin
Designed to be insensitive to γ-radiation

Active volume .…...… : 6.0 cm3
Droplet density …...… : 3500 cm–3
Droplet diameter …… : ~100 µm
Absolute E ciency … : 4 x 10–4flffi

A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 202220

Collimator slot

Test object

Detector array

14 MeV neutron generator(Thermo Scienti c P 385)

Zero-knowledge neutron radiography setup at PPPL

Collimatorfi

S. Philippe, R. J. Goldston, A. Glaser, F. d’Errico, Nature Communications, 7, September 2016, www.nature.com/articles/ncomms12890

ZERO-KNOWLEDGE NEUTRON RADIOGRAPHY
WITH PRELOADED, NON-ELECTRONIC (BUBBLE) DETECTORSDetector array (each pixel corresponds to one bubble detector)

Valid item

Invalid item

A. Glaser, B. Barak, R. J. Goldston, “A Zero-knowledge Protocol for Nuclear Warhead Veri cation,” Nature, 510, 26 June 2014
S. Philippe, R. J. Goldston, A. Glaser, F. d’Errico, Nature Communications, 7, September 2016
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A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

really“SOMETHING OLD”
Example 2: Vintage Verification(skip)

VINTAGE VERIFICATION“TRUST THROUGH SIMPLICITY AND OBSOLESCENCE?”IDEA
Use simple, quasi open-source hardware from 1970s
Hardware designed in the distant past may drastically reduce concerns
about the existence of backdoors or hidden switches

CHOOSING THE HARDWARE & ALGORITHM
MOS 6502 (8 µm technology, 3,500 transistors, 1 MHz) and an Apple IIe,
combined with a low-resolution sodium-iodide detector
Template-matching approach using standard chi-squared test
Source: Author
A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

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“EXTENSION CARDS” FOR THE APPLE IIfi

M. Kütt and A. Glaser, “Vintage Electronics for Trusted Radiation Measurements and Veri ed Dismantlementof Nuclear Weapons,” PLOS ONE, October 30, 2019

34th Chaos Communication Congress
December 27–30, 2017, Leipzig, Germany

SOMETHING NEW
Toward Secure Virtual Inspections

FROM ONSITE TO REMOTE INSPECTIONSPROS & CONS OF ONSITE INSPECTIONS
Onsite inspections remain the “gold standard” for IAEA safeguards
and nuclear arms-control veri cation
Inspections tend to be costly and are o en considered intrusive,
especially in the arms-control context

CAN WE (PHYSICALLY) “SEPARATE” HOST & INSPECTOR?
Many concerns could be addressed and resolved if inspectors
were not “physically” present onsite
The host performs the prescribed activities onsite, while the inspector
follows, in uences, or directs the activities remotely
Source: ukni.info (top) and microso .com (bottom)

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A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

FINDINGS FROM A 2021 NATIONAL ACADEMIES STUDY
3.4 MDV FOR ARMS CONTROL
3.4.1 Capability Needs…
Treaties that include weapons in storage or weapons
designed for shorter-range delivery systems areanticipated to require new MDV techniques. As aminimum, such treaties would likely require accessto storage areas either directly or remotely, andcon rmation of warhead count (either a baseline
con rmation or through routine/challenge inspections).

Jill Hruby, Corey Hinderstein, et al., Committee on the Review of Capabilities for Detection, Veri cation, and Monitoring of Nuclear Weapons
and Fissile Material, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, 2021, doi.org/10.17226/26088

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A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022fifi

Can we remotely con rmthat a declared con guration
remains unchanged?

Art storage
Source: montel.com

Gold storage
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Experimental setup, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP), Bochum, Germany
Source: Johannes TobischSECURE VIRTUAL INSPECTIONSWITHOUT TRUSTED HARDWARE
SETUP & INSPECTION PROTOCOL• Room contains a “challenge-response generator”
that emits and receives radio-wave signals• Complex multi-path propagation provides aunique and reproducible ngerprint of thecon guration• During a setup phase, the inspector creates aprivate “dictionary” of challenge-response pairs• From then on, the inspector queries the room
remotely; correct answers can only be provided
if the con guration remains unchanged

J. Tobisch, S. Philippe, B. Barak, G. Kaplun, C. Zenger, A. Glaser, C. Paar, and U. Rührmair, manuscript in preparation
fififiA. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

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SECURE VIRTUAL INSPECTIONSFINDINGS & RESULTS
WHAT THE TECHNIQUE & PROTOCOL ACCOMPLISH• Room can’t be manipulated (without detection, ~ 3 mm displacements)• Challenge space is large (~ 1022) and can’t be exhaustively measured• All communication channels are public; no trusted hardware• Only a single inspector visit is required during the initial setup phase

ROBUSTNESS AGAINST ATTACKS• Room can’t be simulated• Room can’t be cloned• Machine-learning attacks (aimed at predicting challenge-responsepairs) fail … and would require very large training sets
J. Tobisch, S. Philippe, B. Barak, G. Kaplun, C. Zenger, A. Glaser, C. Paar, and U. Rührmair, manuscript in preparation(Photos: Johannes Tobisch)
A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

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SOMETHING NEW
Toward Virtual Inspections(another example)

Can we remotely followcertain (allowed) activities
that the host performs ?

VIDEO BROADCAST
KEY REQUIREMENTS
SECURITY & PRIVACY
How to follow relevant activities without also capturing additional informationthat is considered sensitive but irrelevant for the task at at hand?

DATA TRANSMISSION & INTEGRITY
How to transmit the footage to an o site location, especially from the interior of ahardened and highly secured building? (Can it be done in real-time?)

LIVE VERIFY & LOCAL VERIFY (Johnston and Warner, 2010)
How to ensure that the footage is recorded in real-time? (How to preclude replay attacks?)
How to ensure that the data is transmitted from the correct location?
Source: IAEA (top and middle) and author (bottom)
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A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

Recorded at TU Berlin, June 2022, courtesy of Guillermo Gallego

Recorded at TU Berlin, June 2022, courtesy of Guillermo Gallego

“SILICON RETINA”

Misha Mahowald (1963–1996)
For a documentary on Mahowald’s work, see www.dailymotion.com/video/x28ktma

Dynamic Vision SensorSource: Posch et al., 2014

Misha Mahowald, VLSI Analogs of Neuronal Visual Processing: A Synthesis of Form and Function
PhD Thesis, California Institute of Technology, May 1992, www.ini.uzh.ch/~amw/publicat/mishathesis.pdf
Guillermo Gallego et al., “Event-based Vision: A Survey,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, July 2020
A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

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EVENT-BASED VISIONFEATURES• Extremely low bandwidth, no redundant data
• Very low power consumption (~ 100 mW)• Asynchronous, fast data acquisition (µs-scale)• High-dynamic range (> 120 dB)• Sensitive to relative changes, not absolute values• Commercially available since early 2010s• Resolution: originally ~ 320 x 240 pixels
Currently moving to megapixel designs
iniVation DAVIS346

A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

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“NOTHING TO SEE HERE”
EVENT-BASED VISION FOR INTRINSIC INFORMATION SECURITY“Secret” information visible at inspected site

Event-based camera

Traditional (frame-based) camera

Recorded at TU Berlin, June 2022, courtesy of Guillermo Gallego
A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

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EVENT-BASED VISIONCHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES FOR SECURE REMOTE MONITORINGOPPORTUNITIESRemote monitoring of speci c activities in sensitive facilities
for example, to read unique identi ers, to con rm integrity of tags
and seals, and perhaps even to follow some radiation measurements

CHALLENGES
Can one design CONOPS that can take full advantage of the features?
(i.e., preclude subliminal or accidental release of information)
Note: Most R&D e orts are aimed at image reconstruction (fromsparse event data) leveraging advanced machine-learning techniques
Source: IAEA (top) and UZH Robotics and Perception Group (bottom, www.youtube.com/watch?v=eomALySSGVU)

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A. Glaser, Keeping Secrets at a Distance, Bochum, June 2022

CALL TO ACTION(IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS)PERSISTENT AND EMERGING VERIFICATION CHALLENGES
25 years of research and development have not produced
the technologies needed to verify future arms-control agreements
Virtual inspection techniques could play an increasingly important role infuture arms-control veri cation and safeguards

BRINGING COMMUNITIES TOGETHER & THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX
Advanced concepts from the (hardware & so ware) security community
could help address important challenges in nuclear security
Unique circumstances: hardware cost is irrelevant; only few units are needed
An opportunity for “exotic” approaches to state-of-the-art security?
Source: Sandia National Laboratories (top) and Wikipedia/Tobias Klenze (30c3 audience, bottom)

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