A comparative
approach tonuclear safety andnuclear security
Published on April 21, 2009

doc referencedoc référence
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safety and nuclear
security
04/2009•IRSN 2009/117

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A comparative
approach tonuclear safety andnuclear security
First published on April 21, 2009IRSN Report 2009/117
ISRN/IRSN-2009/117 FR+EN© IRSN/2009 --- All rights reserveddoc référence
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IRSN
// in brief
The French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety(IRSN) was founded by Act No.2001-398 of May 9, 2001. Its tasks
and organization were defined by Decree No.2002-254 of February
22, 2002. The IRSN is a public establishment that carries out bothindustrial and commercial activities. It is jointly supervised by the
Ministers for Defence, Environment, Industry, Research and Health.
IRSN employs over 1,700 specialists, including engineers,
researchers, doctors, agronomists, veterinarians and technicians,
experts in nuclear safety and radiological protection and in thecontrol of nuclear and sensitive materials.
The Institute performs expert assessments and conducts research in
the following fields:•

nuclear safety;•

safety relative to the transportation of radioactive and fissile
materials;•

protection of human health and the environment from ionizing
radiation;•

protection and control of nuclear materials;•

protection of facilities and transports dealing with radioactive
and fissile materials against malicious acts.

Documents de référence
Editions Property of IRSN
31, avenue de la Division Leclerc
92260 Fontenay aux Roses
Tel.:+33(0)1-58-35-88-88
Website: www.irsn.org
This document may not betranslated, adapted or reproduced
by any means or for any purpose
whatsoever without written
authorisation. For further
information, please contact:
IRSN
Odile Lefèvre
BP 1792262 Fontenay aux Roses cedex
Fax: +33(0)1 58 35 79 62

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Foreword
The Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety
develops research programs and conducts studies on nuclear andradiological risks. It is responsible for public service initiatives aimed
at prevention and provides technical support to the publicauthorities in charge of ensuring nuclear safety and security,
together with radiological protection. In fulfilling these various
duties, the Institute is called upon to define its position on certain
scientific and technical issues.
In line with its policy of transparency and its desire to make quality
information available to all partners and stakeholders for use indeveloping their own views, the IRSN publishes "Doctrine andSummary" documents, which present the Institute's position on
specific subjects.
These documents are drafted by IRSN specialists, with the help ofoutside experts if necessary. They then undergo a quality assurance
validation process.
These texts reflect the Institute's position at the time of publication
on its website. It may revise its position in light of scientificprogress, regulatory changes or the need for more in-depth
discussion to satisfy internal requirements or external requests.
This document may be used and quoted freely on condition thatthe source and publication date are mentioned.
We welcome your comments. These may be sent to the address
given in the margin above and should include the reference to therelevant document.

www.irsn.org

Documents de référence
IRSN
B.P.1792262 Fontenay-aux-Roses cedex
Fax:+33 (0)1 58 35 79 62

doc.syn@irsn.fr

Jacques Repussard
Director General© IRSN/2009 --- All rights reserveddoc référence
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5/23//Members of theWorking group
Jean Jalouneix(Submitter) Nuclear Defense
Expertise Division

Patrick Cousinou

Safety of Plants, Laboratories,
Transport and Waste Division
Reactor Safety Division
Nuclear Defense
Expertise Division

Jean Couturier
Denis Winter© IRSN/2009 --- All rights reserveddoc référence
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Introduction
The operators in charge of nuclear facilities or activities have to deal
with nuclear and radiological risks, which implies implementing twocomplementary approaches - safety and security - each of which
entails specific methods. Targeting the same ultimate purpose,
these two approaches must interact to mutually reinforce eachother, without compromising one another.
In this report, IRSN presents its reflections on the subject, drawing
on its expertise in assessing risks on behalf of the French safety andsecurity authorities, together with the lessons learned from sharing
experience at international level.

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Contents
1/ Purpose and context
1/1 Definitions
1/2 Similar risks but different causes
1/3 Transparency and confidentiality
1/4 Synergy in dealing with sabotage
1/5 A common purpose: protecting Man and the environment

2/ Organizational principles

8
8
8
9
10
10

11

2/1 A legislative and regulatory framework relative to safety as well as
security11
2/2 The competent nuclear safety and security authorities
11
2/3 A difference in the distribution of responsibilities between theoperators and the State12
2/3/1 Prime responsibility of operators
2/3/2 A different involvement of the State

2/4 Safety culture and security culture

3/ Principles for the application of safety and security
approaches
3/1 Similar design principles
3/1/1 The graded approach
3/1/2 Defence-in-depth
3/1/3 Synergy between safety and security

3/2 Similar operating principles

12
13

14

15
16
16
16
17

18

3/2/1 The same requirement regarding constant monitoring18
3/2/2 The same need to take account of feedback
18
3/2/3 The same need to update the baseline18
3/2/4 Sharing good practices is more restricted in the area of security19
3/2/5 The need to deal with the respective requirements of safety andsecurity19

3/3 Similar emergency management
3/3/1 Developing emergency and contingency plans
3/3/2 Carrying out exercises

3/4 Activities subject to quality requirements

4/ Conclusion

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1/

Purpose and context
1/1

Definitions
The international community uses the following definitions fornuclear safety and security (taken from the IAEA safety glossary):−

nuclear safety: "The achievement of proper operating
conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of
accident consequences, resulting in protection ofworkers, the public and the environment from undueradiation hazards." This definition of safety includes
radiological protection.

−

nuclear security: "The prevention and detection of, andresponse to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access,illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear
material, other radioactive substances or theirassociated facilities."

These definitions show that, while the common aim of safety andsecurity is to protect man and the environment from the effects ofionizing radiation, safety is geared more toward controlling the risks
inherent in operating nuclear equipment and facilities or thetransportation of radioactive materials, while security is targeted atproviding protection against malicious acts that may lead toradiological releases or devastating effects resulting from the use ofradioactive or nuclear materials .
Every nuclear operator must therefore concern itself as much with
the issue of safety as that of security.

Nuclear materials are materials
subject to specific regulations
within the context of
nonproliferation agreements

1/2

Similar risks but different causes
Different events are taken into account depending on each of thetwo cases. In the case of safety, this involves events that may entail
radiological risks as a result of:© IRSN/2009 --- All rights reserveddoc référence
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external natural events (earthquakes, serious weather
conditions, etc.) or events related to industrial
activities;

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or internal events caused by equipment failure (fire,pipe break, loss of electricity supply, etc.) or humanerror (wrong interpretation of a procedure, incorrectly
configured system, etc.).

In the case of security, on the other hand, the feared events are theresult of deliberate acts carried out with the intent to cause
damage. Such events are therefore based on "intelligent" or‘‘deliberate’’ actions, carried out for the specific purposes of theft or
sabotage, and are likely to involve actions aimed at countering
protective measures (by pass of controlled access system or barrier,etc.).
1/3

Transparency and confidentiality
Given the differences in the type of events that must be taken into
consideration, the approaches implemented to deal with safety andsecurity differ substantially. The need for transparency wasrecognized very early on with regard to safety, mainly with a viewto sharing experience and ensuring that any incident or accident
that might occur in one facility should not be allowed to occur
again elsewhere. Transparency in the area of nuclear safety is also
explicitly mentioned in France's Nuclear Transparency and Security
Act of June 13, 2006. The aim is to inform as wide a public as
possible, as well as all the social players involved in nuclear safety
and radiological protection. Conversely, and even if the need toshare know-how and experience applies also in the case of security,
the deliberate and malicious nature of the events taken into
account implies a need to develop confidential measures. Protecting
information makes it possible to limit the risk of potential saboteurs
finding out about the protective measures that they would have toovercome, and also avoids disclosing any possible weakness in a
facility's protection system. It is also necessary to prevent
knowledge of malicious acts that have actually been perpetrated
from leading to similar, copycat, actions.
Security encompasses the concepts of deterrence andconfidentiality of protective measures, which do not apply in thecase of nuclear safety. In addition, in the case of security and safety
alike, constraints related to industrial, commercial or even national
defense confidentiality may also have to be dealt with.

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1/4

Synergy in dealing with sabotage• 1/Purpose andcontext

The fields covered respectively by safety and security are also
distinct to a certain extent. The aim of safety is to protect Man andthe environment against radiological risks, whatever the cause(natural events or malicious acts, etc.). The aim of security is toprevent the theft or hijacking of nuclear materials, and to prevent
any risk of sabotage targeting nuclear or radioactive materials in
facilities or transit. With regard to the risk of theft or hijacking of
nuclear materials, security and the related physical protection
measures are based on physical monitoring and accountancy of thenuclear materials developed, either at national level or within theframework of international controls. Thus, it is mainly in protecting
against the risk of sabotage that the measures implemented in theareas of safety and security complement and reinforce each other.
1/5

A common purpose: protecting Man and theenvironment
With regard to protection against sabotage, i.e. malicious acts that
may result in radiological releases, safety and security share thesame common aim to protect human health and the environment.
The measures adopted are exactly the same and involve preventive
measures and mitigation measures, which are associated with acertain number of fundamental principles (defence-in-depth, gradedapproach, safety and security culture, etc.), relative to which there isa considerable amount of similarity between safety and security. In
both cases, priority is given to the definition of preventive measures.
It should be noted that the principles on which the assessment of a
facility's design and its operating procedures is based are the samein the case of both safety and security (robust design, reducing therisks, etc.). Also, the way in which the consequences of an initiating
event resulting in a given radiological release are dealt with is thesame regardless of whether it is due to a natural event, equipment
failure, human error, or a malicious act. Of course, measures
implemented to protect against malicious acts are specificallyrelated to physical protection , but are also based on the safetymeasures adopted.

All the physical and organizational
measures deployed to prevent
malicious acts targeting nuclear
materials or facilities.

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principles

2/

Organizational
principles
2/1

A legislative and regulatory framework
relative to safety as well as security
Insofar as regards legislation and regulation, the principles applied
are the same in terms of safety and security: the State establishes,in each country, the legislative and regulatory frameworks settingout the prime responsibility of the operators and providing for acontrol system to ensure compliance with the regulations regarding
nuclear facilities and related activities (including transportation).
These regulatory frameworks, for both safety and security, cover thefollowing points:−

designation of a competent authority;−

implementation of a licensing system;−

assessment of the provisions implemented by nuclear
operators;−

implementation of an inspection system;and serve toagreements.

demonstratecompliancewithinternational

These provisions may depend upon the same legal vector or, as is
more often the case, be the subject of laws and regulations specificto the separate fields of safety or security.
2/2

The competent nuclear safety and security
authorities
The State designates the authorities with competence in the fields
of nuclear safety and nuclear security; a single authority may also

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be responsible for both safety and security. Regarding both safety
and security, within the framework of a strict liability to perform,
the competent authority defines the objectives that must be
achieved and, in particular, assesses and controls the activities ofnuclear operators, while the State is responsible for certain
decisions. In general, they must have the authority, competence andthe financial and human resources required to carry out their duties.
Moreover, they must be independent of the nuclear operators andother government bodies responsible for promoting nuclear poweror the use of radioactive material.

• 2/Organizational
principles

The authorities responsible for safety and security may come under
different government bodies (ministries, etc.) in view of the specificnature of the various fields covered by safety and security. Where
this is the case, they may have specific organizational structuresand may implement different control procedures. Consultation andcoordination between the two authorities is essential to avoid any
conflict between requirements that may be contradictory. Lastly,
the authorities may draw on the support of an independent
organization specializing in the fields of security and safety.
2/3

A difference in the distribution of
responsibilities between the operators and the
State
2/3/1

Prime responsibility of operators
Nuclear operators have prime responsibility for the safety andsecurity of their facilities and under no circumstances whatsoever
can this responsibility be delegated. This prime responsibility isbased on the same principle in the area of safety and security alike,i.e. the operator is best placed to identify the risks associated with
its activities and to detect any deviation in relation to safety or
security requirements and take appropriate corrective action. In thiscontext, the operators:−

design, implement and maintain technical solutions
designed to achieve satisfactory standards of safety
and security and, in particular, to comply with theregulatory requirements;−

implement a quality system in the fields of safety andsecurity and, in particular, ensure first level of control;© IRSN/2009 --- All rights reserveddoc référence
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ensure that their personnel have the required skill,
mainly by providing the appropriate training;−

inform the competent authority of any event likely tocompromise the safety or security of their facilities;• 2/Organizational
principles

if necessary, implement compensatory measures in order to attainsatisfactory safety and security standards.
2/3/2

A different involvement of the StateThe State sees to it that the responsibilities of each party(operators, authorities, etc.) are clearly defined insofar as concerns
safety and security. Protection against malicious acts, however,requires a different approach as well as broader and more direct
involvement of the State in security than in safety.
An operator cannot protect a site or a facility against every form of
malicious action on its own, and the State plays a decisive role insecurity matters:•

Firstly, the State is directly involved in gathering intelligence
and assessing the risk of malicious action that may impact on
nuclear facilities and radioactive materials. Since such riskchanges all the time, the State must check that the security
measures are constantly adapted to the current situation;•

The State defines the design basis threats that must be used todesign and assess the physical protection systems;•

The State also plays a determining role in the response to begiven to counteract certain malicious acts by means ofintervention by the law enforcement agencies (police or the
Gendarmerie);•

Managing a crisis resulting from a malicious act also requires
input from a greater number of State bodies than managing acrisis related purely to safety issues. For example, law
enforcement agencies, the judicial authorities (even though thelatter may be involved to a lesser extent in the event of a safety
crisis) and mine-clearing services, may all be involved;•

Lastly, the State defines the rules relative to confidentiality andthe protection of information and sets up a screening systemfor everyone requiring access to sensitive activities orinformation.

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necessitate compliance with harmonized objectives (without whichinternational and multimodal transportation would be
problematical), together, where appropriate, with specific provisions
at national level. International Conventions relative to nuclear
safety and security, aiming to develop common principles, take asimilar approach.

• 2/Organizational
principles

2/4

Safety culture and security culture
Every nuclear operator develops a safety culture and a security
culture within the company. Safety culture and security culture arebased on very similar principles (an explicit commitment made byManagement of every operator to promote these cultures, provide
training and raise awareness, etc.). Both are evident in three key
areas. The first concerns the policy that the State wants toimplement. The second involves the organization set up by thedifferent operators. The third concerns the attitude of the personnel.
The fact that a large number of State bodies are involved in security
matters implies the need to organize communication, informationand exchange systems enabling the bodies concerned to understandand complement each other in dealing with sensitive information.
As regards the individual employees concerned by safety culture,they are mainly required to share information with a view toensuring dialogue, vigilance and improvement. Security culture alsoentails information sharing, albeit limited to authorized personnel.
Furthermore, although security issues concern everyone, only
certain people are in charge of applying security requirements andsome information must be protected. The two cultures require aprudent and questioning attitude, and, when needed, an immediate
response to deal with certain events. Nonetheless, these measures,
although similar in their expression, cover quite different areas ofapplication in practice.
The two cultures must not be pitted against each other and neither
one should have ascendancy over the other. However, it is notpossible to merge the two cultures into one. They must co-exist,
mutually consolidating and enhancing each other. Synergy between
safety and security and between the cultures underlying themshould be developed and encouraged.

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the approaches

3/

Principles for theapplication of safety
and security
approaches
Insofar as regards both the design and the operation of nuclear
facilities, a number of similarities and differences appear in theapplication of safety and security principles.
In general, nuclear safety and security provisions are examined at as
early a stage as possible in the design of nuclear facility. Designing
nuclear equipment, facilities or transportation packages is, in fact,subject to restrictive safety and security requirements, especiallyrelative to the regulation. A certain number of general safety
principles have an especially strong impact on the overallarchitecture of a system, its level of redundancy or diversificationand on system or equipment layout. Similarly the general security
principles may impact on the general layout of the site buildings,
their design (physical divisions, etc.), and on the building andstructural design.
It should be pointed out that the different types of nuclear facility(nuclear power plants, plants used for training and research, fuelcycle processing facilities, fuel or waste storage or disposal facilities)
have specific features that must be taken into account at the design
stage. For example, in the case of research reactors and, whereappropriate, power reactors, the risks related to access to thereactor buildings when they are under operation must be taken into
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safety and security. In addition, the risks linked to experimental
units must be dealt with in the design and safety analysis for such
units (especially by examining the events liable to occur at such
units, given their operating rules), as well as in the analysis ofmeasures to prevent malicious acts (for example, damage to thereactor core caused by wrongful use of the facility).

• 3/Application of
the approaches

In the case of power reactors, the large amount of energy released
when in operation, and even during outage and, depending on thecase, the high pressure contained within certain equipment, is oneof the features that must be taken into account.
In the case of transportation packages, the robust design required
for safety purposes serves to protect against malicious acts,
together with special measures if required.
3/1

Similar design principles
Certain design principles apply in exactly the same way insofar as
regards safety and security.
3/1/1

The graded approach
One of the fundamental principles retained during design of a
facility, both for safety and security, is the graded approach. Thisapproach entails analyzing the risks to Man and the environment interms of the potential consequences of accidents or malicious acts,with a view to defining appropriate and proportional measures in
the fields of prevention and mitigation.
3/1/2

Defence-in-depth
Defence-in-depth is another general safety and security principle
used at design level. However, slightly different methods area used
to applying this fundamental principle in each of the two cases. A
diverse series of measures of different nature, both physical andorganizational, are implemented in a balance way to counter therisk of malicious action and the risk of accident. The physical safety
defence lines are often directly integrated in the plant itself(systems, circuits, components, etc.), while security measures apply
to the entire site, or beyond.
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attackers. Deterrence means all the measures that can be
implemented with a view to discouraging attackers from carryingout a malicious act. For example, this means making it difficult toaccess information required to mount an attack, highlighting thepenalties applicable to potential attackers, and setting up
monitoring and intelligence-gathering systems. The safety approachis not based on this concept.

• 3/Application of
the approaches

Furthermore, insofar as regards defence-in-depth, the safety
approach takes a deterministic approach based on analysis ofpotential events, generally supplemented by probabilistic
assessments. Insofar as regards security, the approach taken isbasically deterministic since it is extremely difficult to quantify
malicious acts perpetrated by people in probabilistic terms. The
design basis threats are the equivalent of the postulated events
defined in the safety analysis.
3/1/3

Synergy between safety and security
In addition, certain design principles relative to safety considerably
improve the effectiveness of the protection of a facility with regard
to malicious acts. Thus, the safety approach largely depends on
satisfying the ‘‘single failure criterion’’. This criterion is used toensure that the facility is designed to perform certain functions
even if a system or piece of equipment within a system fails or isunavailable. In particular, thanks to application of this criterion, an
attacker would have to damage several targets in the facility inorder to cause an accident situation. Furthermore, the attacker's
task may be hampered by the implementation of redundancy,
diversification, physical or geographical segregations integrated in
the facility design for safety purposes. These technical features
reduce the relative sensitivity of each item of equipment andmitigate the impact of sabotage perpetrated by people withinadequate means or limited time to carry out their action.
In addition, the designers of new-generation nuclear units use theprinciple that an aggression in the meaning of the safety analysis,
such as fire, explosion or flooding, etc., cannot result in an accident
situation (reactivity insertion accidents, break in the residual heatremoval system, etc.). The designers are thus expected to integrate
provisions which, in certain cases, serve to improve security forthese units.

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3/2

Similar operating principles
The key principles governing operation of nuclear facilities andassociated equipment and transportation systems are identical asregards safety and security.
3/2/1

The same requirement regarding constant monitoring
The operator has to be fully aware at all times of every aspect of
the facility, including the systems used both for safety and security
purposes, with rigorous monitoring of equipment availability, any
modifications to or changes affecting the facility, together with any
temporary palliative measures implemented, etc.
Safety and security systems availability have to be checked
regularly and preventive maintenance performed. If necessary,compensatory measures have to be taken in the event that any
system is found to be unavailable.
These operating provisions, aimed at checking facility complianceand availability, help to reduce the risk of malicious damage causedby surreptitious degradation of the facility's safety level.
3/2/2

The same need to take account of feedback
Events concerning equipment failure, identified anomalies, humanerror, and sabotage attempts are recorded and processed mainlywith a view to prevent them from reoccurring. However, identifying
the malicious origin of an event precisely may be a delicate matter.
In all cases, the operator must analyze every incident, whether
related to safety or security, and include an appropriate analysis of
any aspects related to human factors.
The lessons learned from incidents occurring at the facility or atother similar facilities can be used to improve safety and protection
against malicious acts.
Feedback on operating must gathered and processed on a regularbasis in the areas of both safety and security.
3/2/3

The same need to update the baseline
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systems and rules and, more generally, the facility's baseline, taking
into account feedback and evolutions in scientific and technicalknowledge, and in the regulations relative to safety and security.
Insofar as regards the latter, in the area of security, it is essential toperiodically update the baseline of threats and the related studies.

• 3/Application of
the approaches

3/2/4

Sharing good practices is more restricted in the area of
security
Notwithstanding, the daily operation of a facility draws on the rulesof good practice, entailing different conditions of implementation in
the areas of safety and security.
Thus, insofar as regards safety, personnel are expected to share
information as widely as possible. This requirement applies equallyin the area of security, but with the proviso that the rules regarding
confidentiality are not violated. Less restricted sharing may apply
solely in the case of the methods used.
It should nonetheless be noted that different population groups(operating personnel and applied scientists, for example) work side
by side at facilities set up for training operators or for research
purposes (the use of neutrons for fundamental research, R&D on
fuel cycle processes, etc.). These population groups generally comefrom different entities with different cultures (operators,
laboratories, universities, etc.), with potential conflicts of interests.
Given this, in the areas of safety and security alike, particular caremust be taken when sharing information between these different
population groups.
Similarly, the fact that operators use external service providers
implies a need to establish appropriate measures in the area ofsafety, where any loss of vigilance can be identified, especially inthe event of incident, as well as in the area of security, where theoperator in charge is required to control such service providers.
3/2/5

The need to deal with the respective requirements ofsafety and security
In addition, some operating arrangements related to safety or
security requirements may potentially be contradictory. For
example, access and operations by emergency teams (fire-fighting,etc.) must be facilitated for safety reasons, but access to certain
areas of the facility or to transportation systems must be
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subject to special protection systems (ID badges, etc.), but it must
be possible to evacuate personnel from these areas in case of fire or
criticality emergency. Complying with safety procedures may
increase transportation times in order to adhere to a principle ofprudence, whereas security requirements may stipulate reducing
transportation times to a minimum.

• 3/Application of
the approaches

Another example relates to nuclear materials monitoring. In thecase of safety and security, it is necessary to know the quantities ofthe materials held as precisely as possible, but the safety rules
require maintaining a conservative margin, mainly to guard against
criticality risks, whereas the security approach is concerned toaccount as precisely as possible for the actual quantity of nuclear
materials held in order to guard against the risk of diversion.
The operating procedures and rules must, therefore, take account of
the respective safety and security requirements and implement
measures that are satisfactory in terms of safety and security.
It should be noted that physical protection must take account ofsafety requirements such as accessibility to equipment for the
purposes of in-service monitoring and maintenance, together withrequirements relative to safety in the workplace or to theeffectiveness of an operation, aimed at facilitating the evacuationof or access to premises in the event of an incident or accident.
3/3

Similar emergency management
Preparation for managing a downgraded situation at the facility
concerns both safety and security.
3/3/1

Developing emergency and contingency plans
The operators and the public authorities draw up emergency
response plans to limit, in a downgraded situation, any releases andtheir impact. These plans must cover equipment failure and humanerror, as well as malicious acts. Facility protection plans aredesigned, in terms of security, to stop malicious attack and secure
the premises so that the operators can initiate mitigation
operations. Protection plans are thus implemented prior to
emergency response plans related to safety and are a line ofdefence specifically aimed at preventing malicious acts. It isespecially important for the people in charge of safety and those incharge of security to liaise in drawing up these plans (protectionand emergency plans) and that they are complementary and© IRSN/2009 --- All rights reserveddoc référence
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consistent. There is also a need that arrangements be made tocoordinate emergency response operations. This approach applies tofacilities and also to transportation.

• 3/Application of
the approaches

3/3/2

Carrying out exercises
It is essential to carry out exercises at regular intervals. Safety andsecurity exercises have similar aims; they both involve ascertainingthat the plans developed by the operators and public authorities areadequate and are necessary to train various emergency response
services specialized in ensuring safety or security.
During safety or security exercises, the following points must, inparticular, be tested:−

the overall functioning of the entire decision-making
chain involving the public authorities and the operator;−

coordination between the different entities involved, toensure coherent action;−

the response times and the means deployed for
emergency action;−

the responsiveness of the people involved in decisionmaking and implementation.

In the two fields, different levels of exercises are organized toachieve this:−local exercises, organized by the operator, and not
involving the public authorities. This includes alert ormobilization exercises, specific procedures tests or
emergency response team exercises;−

local exercises, organized by the operator, with theparticipation of local public authorities, especially totest the latter's alert and mobilization procedures andhow well they can coordinate with the operator;−

national exercises involving all the stakeholders(operators and the various public authority services, at
local and national level for each).

It is also essential to carry out general exercises combining safety
and security aspects so that coordination between all those
involved in the two areas can be tested (case of a group of attackers
entering a facility and causing an accident).

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Activities subject to quality requirements
Activities related to the safety or security of a facility ortransportation system are subject to quality requirements.
Consequently, operators set up organizations which make no
distinction between safety principles and security principles, and inwhich the management of the involved entities are implicated in asimilar manner. These organizations serve to assess the overallsituation concerning safety and that concerning security in a
distinct manner, for example, based on monitoring appropriate
performance indicators, in such as way as to define possibilities for
improvement in each area.
Deploying a quality management system relies on information
sharing, by means of feedback, for example. Nonetheless,information sharing implies specific measures insofar as security isconcerned, especially for managing classified information.

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Conclusion
Nuclear safety and nuclear security have many similarities in termsof aims and approach, and are mutually complementary in the fieldof protection against the risk of sabotage. Nonetheless, each has
specific characteristics which imply different operational
requirements:−

greater and more direct involvement of the State in thearea of security than in safety;−

a certain confidentiality regarding security issues.

A coordinated approach serves to promote synergy between safety
and security, ensuring protection against the risk of sabotage and, if
necessary, managing contradictory requirements.
In addition, safety and security requirements must be taken into
account as far upstream in the design of nuclear facilities andrelated activities.
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that, given the wide diversityof nuclear activities and facilities (power reactors, reactors built fortraining or research, fuel cycle facilities, etc.), all the players
involved (public authorities, designers and operators, etc.) must
adapt the safety and security measures to each individual caseaccording to the specific characteristics and risks inherent in each.

© IRSN/2009 --- All rights reserved