［政策議事録 バックナンバー］
No.１ グローバルトレンドと日本

発行：2002 年 6 月

日本の開発研究（朽木昭文、川辺英一郎）
CDF・PRSP を超えて――開発戦略における日本の付加価値（朽木昭文）
世界銀行と日本の関係は如何にあるべきか（吉村幸雄）

No. 2 2002 年春季世界銀行・IMF 会合

発行：2002 年 6 月

世界銀行・IMF2002 年春会合の評価と今後の課題（吉田正紀、柳瀬護）

No. 3 ドナー間調整

発行：2002 年 6 月
技術協力の課題と今後の方向性（窪田博之）
ドナー調整会合――日本のより良き開発協力支援のために・世界銀行現場の視点（泉泰雄）
ある JICA 在外事務所員の懺悔録――ドナー調整会合はかくも難しい（山田浩司）

No. 4 開発資金

発行：2002 年 6 月

民間資金と開発――民間投資のダイナミズムと開発政策（畑島宏之）
世界銀行実務の問題点と日本が提示できる付加価値（豊島俊広）
開発におけるローンとグラントの役割（中村隆司）

No. 5 NGO と ODA

発行：2002 年 6 月

政府と NGO が抱える問題（杉原ひろみ）
NGO とドナーとのパートナーシップ――米国の政策と経験から考える（杉原ひろみ）

No. 6 知的 NPO の役割

発行：2002 年 6 月

開発分野の政策研究・発信とネットワークの強化に向けて（大野泉）
開発潮流積極関与のための日本提案の模索――批判・発信から提言・行動へ（大野健一）

No. 7 開発援助の戦略化

発行：2002 年 6 月「声が聞こえる援助」を目指して（上田善久）
日本の「開発外交」は如何にあるべきか――ワシントン DC の視点（紀谷昌彦）
バングラデシュ開発援助ネットワーク――国別援助政策強化の新たな試み（岡崎克彦）

No. 8 ベトナムの鉄鋼業・貿易政策

発行：2002 年 10 月

ハノイ鉄鋼集中セミナー （2000 年 10 月）
ハノイ・ワークショップ （2000 年 12 月）＜付録＞ 鉄鋼業・貿易政策に関する日本側見解の要約（2000 年 12 月）

No. 9 Steel Industrial and Trade Policies of Vietnam

Issue: October 2002

Intensive Steel Seminar (Oct 2000)
Second Intensive Steel Seminar (Oct 2001)<Supplement> Summary of the Japanese Views on Steel Industry and Trade Policy
Produced by Japanese members of Trade and Industry Group (Jan 2001)

No.10 A Symposium on Industrial and Trade Policies of Vietnam
Under International Integration (Mar 29-30, 2002)

Issue: October 2002

：ワシントン DC 開発フォーラム：日越共同研究プロジェクト©GRIPS Development Forum

裏表紙に続くContact:
GRIPS Development Forum
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan
Phone: 03-6439-6337 / Fax: 03-6439-6010
Email: forum@grips.ac.jp
URL: http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/
Publication of this volume was supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)．

Foreword
This policy minutes compile the presentations and main points discussed at the
GRIPS-ODI-JICA Joint Seminar on “African Growth in the Changing Global
Economy—How to implement the TICAD IV promises for sustained growth?”, held on
November 27, 2008. The seminar was organized by the GRIPS Development Forum and the
JICA Research Institute, in collaboration with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in
UK and African embassies in Tokyo.
The launch of the new JICA on October 1, 2008 gives an important impetus to the effective
implementation of the promises made at the TICAD IV and the Toyako G8 Summit, held inJapan earlier this year. On the other hand, the global economy faces shocks triggered by
US-originated financial crisis. What are the lessons African countries could learn from Asiaand Latin America to sustain their growth? How should international partners—including
Japan—follow-up the Yokohama Declaration and support “Vibrant Africa”? Based on theseperspectives, this seminar discussed the current global environment and its impacts on the
African economy, issues to be considered by the relevant parties in Africa, and the role ofdonors, especially Japan, in supporting sustained growth in Africa.
The seminar greatly benefitted from the participation of Simon Maxwell, Director of ODI and
H.E. Ambassador Elly E. E. Mtango, Tanzania Embassy in Japan. We are also grateful for
active participation by African Ambassadors and diplomats, researchers, private sector, NGOs,
policymakers and aid practitioners who are interested in African development.
The more detailed information on this seminar can be obtained from the following website of
GRIPS Development Forum:
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/events/pastevents.htm
Please also refer to “Proposal for a New African Growth Support Initiative” compiled by the
GRIPS Development Forum, based on multi-stakeholder discussions, and presented at thisseminar.
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/pdf08/PN4.pdf (Japanese)
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/pdf_e08/PN5.pdf (English)
We sincerely hope that the information will contribute to sharpening the focus of Japan’s
growth support to Africa.
February 2009
GRIPS Development ForumGRIPS-ODI-JICA Joint Seminar
African Growth in the Changing Global Economy—How to implement the TICAD IV promises for sustained growth?—‫ع‬Organizers: The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) Development         Forum and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research      Instituteʊʊin collaboration with the Overseas Development Institute      (ODI) and the African Diplomatic Corps in Tokyo‫ع‬Date and Time: November 27, 2008 (Thursday), 9:30-12:00‫ ع‬Venue: GRIPS Roppongi Campus, Tokyo‫ع‬Program:
Part I: How should Africa cope with global financial crisis?  9:30-10:40(Moderator: Izumi Ohno, Professor, GRIPS)
Presentation 1 “Shaping the future, Two faces of African Development”
Simon Maxwell, Director, ODI
Presentation 2“Coping with Crisis: Lessons from Latin America and Asia”
Akio Hosono, Professor, GRIPSOpen Discussions
Part II: How to implement the TICAD IV promises for sustained growth in Africa?
10:40-12:00(Moderator: Hiroshi Kato, Deputy Director, JICA Research Institute)
Presentation 1 “African Growth, Financial Crisis, and Implications for TICAD IV
Follow-up”
H.E. Elly E.E.Mtango, Ambassador extraordinary andplenipotentiary
Presentation 2 “Proposal for Japan’s New Growth Support Initiative”
Izumi Ohno, Professor, GRIPS
Presentation 3 “Industrialisation in Africa and Donor’s Functions as Facilitator”
Matsuo Watanabe, Visiting Senior Advisor, JICA
Comments and JICA’s Response “Accelerating Economic Growth in Africa’’
Kazunori Oshiyama, Director General, JICA Africa Dept.
Open Discussions

GRIPS-ODI-JICA Joint Seminar

African Growth in the Changing Global Economy—How to implement the TICAD IV promises for sustained growth?—

Contents

ProgramSeminar Report xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx1
Annexes xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx13
Presentation materials of Part I (PPTs)
Annex 1 “Shaping the future, Two faces of African Development’’by Simon Maxwell, Director, ODI xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx14
Annex 2 “Coping with Crisis: Lessons from Latin America and Asia’’by Akio Hosono, Professor, GRIPS xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx25
  Presentation materials of Part II (PPTs)
Annex 3 “African Growth, Financial Crisis, and Implications for TICAD Φ Follow-up’’by H.E.Elly E.E.Mtango, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiaryxxxx52
Annex 4 “Proposal for Japan’s New Growth Support Initiative’’by Izumi Ohno, Professor, GRIPS xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx61
Annex 5 “Industrialisation in Africa and Donor’s Functions as Facilitator”
by Matsuo Watanabe, Visiting Senior Advisor, JICAxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx72
Annex 6 “Accelerating Economic Growth in Africa’’by Kazunori Oshiyama, Director General, JICA Africa Dept. xxxxxxxxxxx79

GRIPS-ODI-JICA Joint Seminar
African Growth in the Changing Global Economy—How to implement the TICAD IV promises for sustained growth?—
Seminar Report
The GRIPS-ODI-JICA Joint Seminar was held on November 27, 2008, with over 100
participants from diverse background—African Ambassadors and diplomats, researchers,
private sector and NGOs, policy makers and practitioners who are interested in the African
development. The seminar was organized by the GRIPS Development Forum and the JICA
Research Institute, in collaboration with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)—British
leading think-tank on international development—and African embassies in Tokyo.
As opening remarks, on behalf of the Joint Seminar Secretariat, Prof. Izumi Ohno greeted
participants and explained the background for the seminar. She stressed the importance andrelevance of this seminar to confirm and advance Japan’s commitment to Africa development
made at the TICAD IV and the G8 Summit earlier this year, especially at the time when the
global economy faces uncertainty. The establishment of new JICA is an important push to
Japan’s effective support to African development.
Part I:How should Africa cope with global financial crisis?

Presentation 1: Simon Maxwell, Director, ODI, UK“Shaping the future, two faces of African development”
Mr. Simon Maxwell began by celebrating UK-Japan collaboration, especially the
relationships between ODI, JICA and GRIPS. He assessed that Japan has made considerable
contributions to the development agenda at the TICAD IV and the G8 Hokkaido Toyako
Summit held earlier this year, especially the emphasis on Africa, the commitment to growth,and the over-arching intellectual framework provided by Mrs. Ogata’s work on humansecurity. Japan had also taken a leadership role on climate change. There was a challenge,
however: He wondered whether Japan needed to make the case for development more
powerfully, given the current inward-looking attitude towards development among Japanesepoliticians and bureaucrats.
He explained that Africa has two different futures—“happy” and “sad” — and that research
institutes such as ODI, JICA Research Institute, and GRIPS, would need to change thecontent of their research programmes in either scenario. Beginning with the less optimistic1

scenario, the current financial crisis will lead to recession rolling out to developing countries,
including Africa, through “transmission belts” (trade, FDI, portfolio flows, remittance, aid,etc.). To tackle these challenges, research institutes should quickly offer stories/scenarios,
learning from the hard lessons from the Structural Adjustment experiences. It took ten years
to change the policy direction of the Bretton Woods institutions. At that time, a story about
the need for “Adjustment with Human Face” was very important. A similar emphasis wasneeded during the current crisis.
There are more optimistic views. Africa has undergone transformation over the last decade,supported by a wide array of initiatives such as MDGs, NEPAD, debt relief, good governance,
aid effectiveness. Certainly we need to invest more in good governance in Africa, and donors
need to respect their commitments made at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 2005. (Donor
pledges are below 30% of the targets, and Italy, which will host the 2009 G8 Summit, alreadyannounced a 58% cut in its aid budget.) Still Africa’s recent growth (averaging at 5-6% peryear) is good and a significant step toward achieving poverty reduction. The recent growth
has also enabled some countries—Senegal, Ghana, and Uganda for instance—to approach
middle-income country status. Thus, important progress is being made.
In this more optimistic scenario, the development agenda changes and again presents
challenges to research institutes. There are three big challenges, over and above the MDGs.
First the entry of China into the world economy requires analysis of a new globalization,
especially the manufacturing prospects for poor countries. Second, development, security andforeign policy are increasingly linked, especially in fragile states where aid is most likely to
be concentrated. Third, attention has begun to shift from national development policy toregional and global public goods: the financial crisis and climate change are two examples.
Each of these themes presents new research challenges.
To put this in context for research institutes and think-tanks, they should be mindful of threeCs: (1) extend the coverage; (2) strengthen the capacities of developing countries andresearchers; and (3) communicate and disseminate quickly the outcomes of their work. On
the latter, ODI encourages the staff to use the Policy Brief rather than conventional
instruments, for example, lengthy research papers.
In concluding his presentation, Mr. Maxwell emphasized his belief that Africa would havepositive future despite the current difficult situations.

2Presentation 2: Akio Hosono, Professor, GRIPS“Coping with Crisis: Lessons from Latin America and Asia”
With his long academic and practical experiences in Latin American and Caribbean countries(LAC), Prof. Hosono shared the Latin American and Asian experiences on financial crises,with specific reference to how these regions/countries coped with the crises and what arelessons and insights for African development. He briefly explained the macroeconomic
situation before and after the crises in Latin America and Asia: both regions undertook aseries of macroeconomic reforms to overcome the financial crises, which contributed to
improving their fundamentals, thus reducing the vulnerability to adverse external shocks.
In the process of post-crisis reforms, competitive sectors and enterprises have emerged inboth regions, thanks to the government’s strong supportive policies to promote economic
efficiency. Prof. Hosono emphasized that supporting the real-economy sector and enterprises
is also important to reduce the vulnerability against external shocks. Regional integration was
also crucial in reducing the vulnerability as well as enhancing the competitiveness, especiallyin the East Asian context. While LAC had also worked for strengthening regional integration,
the result was rather mixed. Prof. Hosono stressed that the de-facto regional integration in
Asia—especially, FTA, regional cooperation such as Cheng Mai Initiative, and physicalintegration by regional or sub-regional infrastructure—proved to be effective, and Africancountries can learn from the Asian experiences. Regional integration in Asia is market-led,compared to that of LAC which has been driven by the formal process.
He concluded that the Yokohama Action Plan, one of the major outcomes of the TICAD IV
process (whose implementation status will be monitored on an annual basis), is significant
not only to attain sustainable economic growth but also to cope with crisis. He stressed theimportance of highlighting a regional aspect in promoting infrastructure projects in Africa.
Open Discussions
Two faces of Africa
Regarding African future, many African participants commented that Africa has both “happy”
and “sad” faces. While there is a tendency to highlight the latter aspect (“sad” face), Africa
also has a bright face, as witnessed by the successes of Mauritius and Botswana. In thiscontext, it is important to deepen the understanding of what have been the drivers of growth.
On the other hand, an African participant reminded that “big elephant” issues also residewithin Africa itself and that Africa must address the cases of Congo-Kinshasa, Sudan, and3

Zimbabwe.
Coping with the financial crisis
Concerning Prof. Hosono’s presentation, a Japanese researcher added that political stability isalso crucial in managing and overcoming the financial crisis. An African participant
commented that economic development/management is closely linked to politicalmanagement and asked how such aspect could be addressed in the TICAD IV follow-up.
Another African participant emphasized the importance of integrating African countries into
the global production system such as value chains, although current development debates do
not fully address such business aspects.
Prof. Hosono agreed on the importance of political stability. Regarding global production
system, he stated that it is necessary to change our way of thinking and that in this respect,
the newly launched WDR 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography (World Bank) provides aninteresting framework. He suggested the need to introduce new analytical tools.
There were comments on how to prioritize development challenges, especially what are
immediate solutions for coping with the current economic crisis, especially for Africancountries, and the role of various stakeholders. Prof. Hosono responded that a “happy” facesolution needs a couple of measures, but that the recipe cannot be generalized. Even the
short-term impacts differ among countries (food importing countries, resource-rich countries,etc). Nevertheless, it is necessary to assist those countries that are seriously hit by the crisis.
On this point, Mr. Maxwell said that some observers thought the crisis would be long-lasting(even as long as twenty years in some cases) and would derail growth prospects. He urged
the African governments immediately to start scenario planning exercises so that they could
better navigate development processes under the uncertain global environment.
Growth and inequality
Some participants shared their concerns about the distributional effects of the current growth:according to an aid practitioner lived in Zambia, growth benefitted only a small part of the
population living in the capital city, and the poor people will be seriously hit by the current
financial crisis. He stressed that the donor community should take actions under such a
circumstance. Another participant commented that the current GDP growth is pushed by thedevelopment of natural resources, which could possibly be another field of exploitation andmight aggravate the existing disparities among the population.
4

To sum up the discussions, Mr. Maxwell shared his view that Africa has achieved important
progress. Growth is important to poverty reduction, and many institutions and professionals(the World Bank, the Commission on Growth and Development, Prof. Paul Collier, etc.) havebeen working hard to identify the drivers of growth. Especially Collier’s book offers a very
good insight into this issue, laying out four factors that impede growth. Although every
country is different and a country-specific approach is necessary, it seems that infrastructureis one of the important drivers of growth, as the experiences of LAC and Asian countries
suggest. On inequality, he stressed that investment in social protection is important and that
donors should also help to manage inequality in the country.
Part II: How to implement the TICAD IV promises for sustained growth in Africa?
Presentation 1: H. E. Elly E.E. Mtango, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary“African Growth, Financial Crisis, and Implications for TICAD IV Follow-up”
H. E. Elly E. E, Mtango, Ambassador to Tanzania, began by noting the current situation in
Africa. He said that in the period before the global financial crisis, Africa enjoyed 10 years ofsustained growth during which GDP grew by an average 5% per annum. However, thefinancial crisis arose just as African economies were turning the corner. Ambassador Mtango
went on to say that although African banks, in general, are not suffering from the credit crisis(since they are less exposed to the global credit system), economic slowdown in Europe andAmerica, the so-called secondary effect, has had a significant impact on African countries.
The overall growth forecast for the continent has already been lowered from 6.5% to 5%.
Tanzania also downgraded growth forecast to 7.5% down from 7.8%. He explained theeffects on the economy and trade, foreign direct investment, capital and equity markets, thebanking system, ODA, the tourism industry, remittances from the African diaspora, foreign
reserves, and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
In closing, Ambassador Mtango referred to the implications of the current financial crisis for
TICAD IV. TICAD IV is considered a great success because of its enhanced focus on
economic growth. The global financial crisis, however, puts in jeopardy the implementationof commitments of TICAD IV. He urged donor countries to uphold their commitments to
Africa.
Presentation 2: Izumi Ohno, Professor, GRIPS“Proposal for a New African Growth Support Initiative”
Prof. Izumi Ohno’s presentation began by focusing on TICAD IV and the current global
5environment. She asserted that TICAD IV can be taken as a departure from previous
conferences, in that it demonstrates Japan’s serious engagement in Africa and its willingness
to share East Asian experiences. The current global financial crisis is testing Japan’scommitment to African development. Prof. Ohno introduced some points from “the Proposal
for a New African Growth Support Initiative” published by GRIPS Development Forum inAugust 2008. The proposal is for Japan to immediately formulate overall and country-specificassistance visions for African development. Regarding the incorporation of East Asian
perspectives, she asserted that a standard “East Asian model” does not exist, and that dynamic
capacity development—which has been long practiced in Asia—is also important for Africa.
She explained “four entry points” for Japan’s deeper and long-term engagement in Africa (i.e.,
mobilizing aid to realize the existing vision, continuous policy dialogue, building core
infrastructure and aligning aid and other programs, mobilizing aid to facilitate FDI projects)
and gave some examples of the provision of Japanese ODA. She made four requests for theJapanese government and the new JICA and emphasized the importance of a new initiative
for public-private partnerships, which is based on the TICAD IV commitment.
Presentation 3: Matsuo Watanabe, Visiting Senior Advisor, JICA
“Industrialisation in Africa and Donor’s Functions as Facilitator”
For Africa to realize the decades-long issue of economic diversification and sustained growth,
Dr. Watanabe argued industrial policy (IP) could be a viable means. He summarized the key
principles in pursuing IP: e.g. local context matters; and selection of target sectors needs clear
criteria. To address the traditional problems of IP (e.g. rent-seeking and corruption), entire
process has to be transparent, and an institution of significant public-private partnership is ofhelp. He stressed international community allow broader role of government (depending on
institutional capacities of individual countries), diverse development strategies, and inevitable
experimental failures in the trial-and-error process—which contributes to improving social
institution through the leaning-by-doing. He then introduced a hypothetical framework forconsidering the role of external actors in IP process with particular reference to a JICA’s
investment promotion project in Zambia. He presented donor’s roles as a facilitator in
Africa’s IP process: (1) information management; (2) consulting; and (3) serving as catalyst
and back-ups. He criticized past donor practices which simply told developing countries“what to do”, but did not necessarily work with these countries to find “how to do”. As suchhe advocated “Consulting Aid” in the way business consulting services works for clients. Dr.
Watanabe concluded by noting that Zambia’s experience suggests a possibility that donor
assistance could fill some of the gaps faced by Africa (e.g. the gap intention andimplementation; inter-regional income/capacity gaps) and that donor assistance could help
African countries to unleash their own dynamic potentials.
6Comments and JICA’s response: Kazunori Oshiyama, Director General, Africa
Department, JICA
“Accelerating Economic Growth in Africa”
Mr. Oshiyama stated that as a practitioner, he is optimistic about African development andoutlined JICA’s four strategies for Accelerating Economic Growth for Africa. These are: (1)regional infrastructure development (roads, ports, and electricity networks); (2) strengthening
public-private partnerships: (3) partnerships with international financial institutions; and (4)focusing on activities for economic growth. He introduced some of JICA’s projects, forexample, assistance for major development corridors such as Nacara (northern Mozambique),the energy sector for infrastructure assistance, and the Toamasina Port in Madagascar (as an
example of public-private partnerships). In terms of promoting economic growth in Africa, healso spoke on the other JICA activities such as One Stop Border Posts (OSBP), Michi-no-Eki(roadside stations), the Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD), One Village One
Product (OVOP), Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA) which is based on
the collaboration with the African Development Bank, and the Techno Park in Tunisia.
Open Discussions
TICAD IV follow-up
Several African ambassadors commended the TICAD IV results and its uniqueness from theprevious conferences, stating that it encompasses the African perspective on the importanceof private sector engagement. In this regard, the Yokohama Action Plan is a crucial document,
and its follow-up is essential. While Japan should keep its promise of doubling ODA to
Africa, it is vitally important to increase Japanese private sector investment. This is a key
element of the Yokohama Action Plan. It is right that TICAD IV focused on infrastructuredevelopment (e.g., road network, power) and cross-border posts because these facilitate
intra-regional trade. In this sense, it is important to ensure that a country-specific program canbe extended to the regional level.
Regarding potential negative effects of the financial crisis on the TICAD IV promises asstated by Ambassador Mtango, a Japanese participant reminded that the implementation of
TICAD IV will be monitored every year. This should serve as opportunities not only tomonitor, but also to improve the agenda so that both African governments and donors
including Japan could cope with the changing environment surrounding African countries.
An African ambassador shared his concern that in Africa, growth often leads to rural-urban
7

gaps. It is important to ensure that the rural people benefit from the fruits of growth. The rural
people have no investment stock, with 70% of them living below the poverty line. It is rightthat Japanese ODA puts infrastructure in place; at the same time, FDI investment is verymuch needed. While the Japanese business sector tends to consider Africa far away, thisperception needs to be changed with the support of the academia.
Proposal for a New African Growth Support Initiative
There is broad support to the thrust of the proposal compiled by the GRIPS Development
Forum, which served as the secretariat for the multi-sector discussion group on Japan’s New
African Growth Support Initiative. One of the African ambassadors gave his concurrencewith Prof. Ohno’s views that each individual country needs a country-specific policy, but
noted that it is difficult for African countries to benefit only from Japanese ODA. Japan
should place greater emphasis on the role of the private sector. In relation to this, he showedinterest in the growth experiences in Asia and the role of Japanese private sector in theprocess. Speaking of Japan’s “entry points” in Africa, he stressed that Japan should rather join
up with other partners who have been supporting African development for long.
Another ambassador concurred that the GRIPS proposal is very good. Since Ethiopia has along-term development vision (ADLI: Agricultural Development Led Industrialization) andindustrial policy, Asian experiences are very relevant to the country. He welcomed Japanesesupport to realize the vision and policy.
Prof. Ohno thanked African ambassadors for their general support to the GRIPS proposal.
Regarding the question on “entry points,” she agreed that Japan is a newcomer and a modest
donor in terms of aid volume, compared to the other donors. Therefore, Japan’s engagementin Africa must be put in a partnership context. In fact, this is one of the basic principles of the
GRIPS proposal.
Policy coherence
One of the African ambassadors raised the issue of policy coherence between ODA andagricultural policy: JICA provides new rice support (NERICA: New Rice for Africa), andconsequently, the rice will be exported as well as consumed locally. However, Japan takes adifferent stance at the WTO negotiations, and its rice imports are strictly regulated. Under
such circumstances, there is no market for African countries.
On this point, Mr. Oshiyama responded that since Africa’s rice production is still low, it is8

premature to link Japan’s new rice support to the WTO negotiations. Prof. Ohno admitted
problems associated with policy consistency in Japan. For example, EPA negotiations always
come to a standstill because of the agricultural issues. Strong leadership and inter-ministerial
coordination are essential to improve policy coherence in Japan. Japan scores poorly in theCommitment to Development Index (CDI) devised by the Center for Global Development (aUS think tank). This is primarily due to its immigration and agricultural policies, rather thanODA itself.
Learning from UK experiences
A participant acknowledged that the UK has a long experience of supporting Africa, and theJapanese development community would have to learn from this. He questioned how the UK
thinks of JICA’s assistance compared to its development assistance experiences.
Mr. Maxwell responded that he was impressed by today’s presentations by Japanese experts
and practitioners, all of which are very professional and concrete. Nevertheless, he felt that
there exists a “missing element” throughout today’s discussions—i.e., policy environment.
Such perspective should serve as a link between the global financial crisis, the GRIPS
proposal, and Japanese ODA.
Prof. Ohno commented that there is ample scope for fruitful collaboration between the UK
and Japan. The UK has rich experiences in terms of providing development assistance toAfrica, compared to Japan, which has more extensively worked in Asia. Their assistanceapproaches are also different: the UK excels in policy dialogue while Japan is good atfield-based, process-oriented work. Because of such diversity, the two countries cancomplement each other and work together to support African development.
Coordination with China and South Korea
An African researcher asked Mr. Oshiyama his views on policy coordination between Japanand China in African development. Mr. Oshiyama replied that currently there exists nocoordination between the two countries, but that the time has come to start discussing thismatter. In light of China’s important role in African development, Japan should positively
collaborate with the country.
In connection with the TICAD IV follow-up, an African ambassador proposed a possibility ofsetting up a coordination mechanism among China, South Korea, and Japan. Such donor
coordination and engagement—not rivalry—are crucial and beneficial for Africa.
9

State capacity building and Asian experiences
Another African ambassador stressed the importance of paying attention to the role of thestate and suggested the need for capacity building for a developmental state. Regarding
industrial development, education and skills are important; but in Africa, they do not translate
into industrial development, especially in rural areas. Highly-educated people are unable tofind proper jobs. Rural areas in Asian countries are much better than those in Africancountries (for example, small-and medium-enterprises, supporting services), and he wasparticularly attracted by “Michi-no-Eki”. He stressed the importance of learning ruraldevelopment from Asian experiences.
Prof. Hosono explained that the Japanese approach to capacity building is process-oriented
and based on joint work. In various cooperation activities, the Japanese and their counterparts
have worked together and learned through practices.
Concluding Remarks
Mr. Hiroshi Kato, Deputy Director of the JICA Research Institute, thanked ambassadors andthe other participants for their giving valuable comments throughout the seminar. He reflected
the discussions as follows.
With reference to a statement by an African ambassador about the importance of paying
greater attention to the people, Mr. Kato stressed that this precisely corresponds to theconcept of “Human Security” which Mrs. Sadako Ogata, JICA President, emphasizes.
Regarding the role of ODA, he concurred with the participants that while ODA can play animportant role, it is only a limited part of the development process. Thus, the relation between
Africa and Japan should be amplified, going beyond ODA. Nevertheless, as manyambassadors stressed, it is important to monitor how Japan keeps the promise of TICAD IV.
He also thanked an ambassador who highlighted the importance of state building andindustrial development.
Mr. Kato also thanked the GRIPS team, including Prof. Ohno for sharing her insights for
ideas on new possibilities Japan can export in extending support to African development, andProf. Hosono for his valuable contributions to highlighting the importance of regional
economic integration and industrial competitiveness, with infrastructure development as a
key entry point.
Lastly, he concluded that while this seminar started with the discussions on the current global
10

financial crisis and all the partners are urged to act quickly, it is also important not to lose
sight of medium-and long-term economic development in Africa.

11

ANNEXES

Annex 1
Slide 1GRIPS-JICA Seminar
Simon Maxwell
27 November 2008

Slide 2• Partners in development• Two possible futures for our work in Africa• Implications for our programmes• Coda: the three Challenges for our
Institutes
14Mr. Simon Maxwell’s slide
Slide 3

Learning from Japan
Human security
Private Sector
GrowthInfrastructure
Cool earth
Vibrant Africa

Slide 415

Annex 1
Slide 5

Two possible futures: both very
different

Slide 6

Facing the current crisis
Projections

World output
Advanced
Sub SaharanDeveloping Asia
China
India
WHemisphere

2008
3.7
1.4
5.4
8.3
9.7
7.8
4.5

Difference fromWEO of October
2009
2008
2009
2.2
-0.2
-0.8
-0.3
-0.1
-0.8
5
-0.7
-1.3
7.1
-1
-0.6
8.5
-0.1
-0.8
6.3
-0.1
-0.6
2.5
-1
-0.7

Transmission
belts:
Price and quantityof exports
FDI
Portfolio flows
Remittances
Aid?

16

Mr. Simon Maxwell’s slide
Slide 7

What is our ‘narrative’?
• Recognise risks and vulnerabilities• A principled response• Make the case for development• Micro and macro instruments• A holistic response• The importance of collective action

Slide 8

Two possible futures: both very
different17Annex 1
Slide 9Global Economic Prospects; Technology Diffusion in the Developing World (2008), World Bank –Figure A.21 , p194

Slide 10

The rise of middle income
countries
With per capita growth at 3%
p.a.:With per capita growth at
5% p.a.:• India is a MIC by 2010
• Senegal by 2010
• Pakistan by 2013

• India is a MIC by 2008
• Pakistan and Senegal by2009• Bangladesh by 2017
• Uganda by 2028

N.B. Low income = per capita
income <$ US 825 p.a. (2004)

18

Mr. Simon Maxwell’s slide
Slide 11

Poverty projections to 2015

Actual Data

1600
1400

Projections

1200
Other

1000

China

800
600

South Asia

400
200
0
1981

Sub-SaharanAfrica
1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

Source: DFID

Slide 12Chronic Poverty in the world

19

2011

2015

Annex 1
Slide 13The 20% Club and the 0.2%
Club
By 2015:
No of IDA eligible
countries down from49 to 38
No of people inthose countries
down from 2.5 bn to
1.1 bnSlide 14

Three elephant issues• China and the analytics of globalisation• Security and development• The shift from national development to global
public goods

20Mr. Simon Maxwell’s slide
Slide 15

Net barter terms of trade, selected
countries, 2000–2007

Slide 16

Connecting development and foreign
policy21

Annex 1
Slide 17

A wider perspective on
development cooperation

Slide 18

Using aid differently• From:• To:

22

Mr. Simon Maxwell’s slide
Slide 19

Implications• Messaging• Spending• Institutions

Slide 20

Messaging• Recognise risks and vulnerabilities• A principled response• Make the case for development• Micro and macro instruments• A holistic response• The importance of collective action23Annex 1
Mr. Simon Maxwell’s slide
Slide 21

Content• Better
instruments• Bettergeographies

Slide 22

Coda: the three Cs• Coverage• Capacities• Communications

24

Annex 2
Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 1

Coping with Crisis: Lessons
from Asia and Latin America

Akio Hosono
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Slide 2

1. Introductiony Both Asia and Latin America experienced

serious financial crises.
y Both regions recorded high rate of growthwith sound macro-economic conditions after
financial crisis and reforms
y Common and different lessons Asia and Latin
America learned from their crises andreforms could give us useful insight for African
development

25

Annex 2
Slide 3

2. Latin America:
Repeated Crises and Recovery
y 1982: Debt Crisis in most of Latin Americancountriesy Reforms in 80s and 90s
y 1994: Financial crisis in Mexico
y 1998: Financial crisis in Brazil
y 2001: Financial crisis in Argentine
y 2003-07: Recovery (6% growth per year, thehighest rate since 70s) with lower inflation ratey LAC 7 (Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru
and Venezuela) account for 91 % of LAC’s GDP

Slide 4

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 2008

26

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 5

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 2008

Slide 6

Latin America:
Lessons learned from crises
y Improvement in fundamentals made Latin

America less vulnerable to adverse
external shocks and financial crisis.
y Improvement in fundamentals allowed
Latin America to sustain high levels of
growth in last five years 2003-07.
(Together with favorable external factors:
strong world growth, high commodity
prices and benign financial conditions)27Annex 2
Slide 7

LAC: Sound Economic and Financial
Policiesy Fiscal position: regions’ overall surplus of

1.5% of GDP in 2007y At the peak of the previous expansionary
period LAC 7 exhibited a fiscal deficit of
0.9% of GDP
y Brazil: a sizable primary surplus (overall
deficit due to a high debt burden)y Other LAC 7: in balance or a surplus

Slide 8

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 2008

28

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 9

LAC: Lower debt levels andless risky debty Significant reduction in public debt levels: from

51 % of GDP in 2003 to 35% in 2007y Debt riskiness has been reduced (Risky debt
includes foreign- currency debt, short-term debt
and variable interest rate debt)
y Major improvement in debt composition:
Foreign-currency debt in total public debt fell
from 65 % in 1998 to 38 % in 2007y Maturity has been lengthened: Public debt
maturing in the next twelve months has declined
from 6.9 % of GDP to 4.8% of GDP

Slide 10

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 200829

Annex 2
Slide 11

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 2008

Slide 12

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 200830

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 13

LAC: Reduced Exposure
to External Shocky Improvement in the current account: LAC 7

from a deficit of 3.0% of GDP in 1997 to asurplus of 2.2% of GDP in 2007y Strong build-up of international reserves
y Pre-crisis: Previous expansions wereassociated with large current account deficit
and thus, heavily dependent on a steady flowof external financingy Post-crisis: Exposure to sudden stops incapital flows has been mitigatedSlide 14

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 200831

Annex 2
Slide 15

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 2008

Slide 16

IDB, All That Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin America’s Recent
Macroeconomic Performance, 200832

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 17

Impact of the current financial
turmoil to Latin Americay As mentioned, improvement in fundamentals

made Latin America less vulnerable toadverse external shocks and financial crisis.
y However,y LAC have not “decoupled” themselves fromadvanced nations: Some of them are still fragile
and affected by the current financial turmoil(According to Sebastian Edwards, Ex-chief
economist for LA, WB), and thereforey Price of stocks lowered in LAC stock exchanges
y LAC’s currencies depreciatedy In some of LAC, cost of external financing soared

Slide 18y Some of LAC “need to create a robust

economy with a high and sustainablegrowth rate.” “Agility, dynamism,
productivity and economic policies
that promote efficiency andenterprises are required.” (Sebastian
Edwards, Ex-chief economist for LA, WB)
y LAC need to strengthen regional
integration and cooperation to reduce
their fragility

33

Annex 2
Slide 19

Competitive sectors andenterprisesy In the process of reforms after crises,

competitive sectors and enterprises haveemerged in Latin America such as:
y Car and electronics industries in Mexico(due to NAFTA and other FTA or EPA)
y Car, steel, electronics, agro-industry, etc. inBrazily Natural resource related sectors, nontraditional export sectors in Chiley However, as mentioned above, economic
policies that promote efficiency andenterprises are required

Slide 20

2. Asia: 1997 Financial Crisis andRobust Recoveryy The East Asian Miracley 1997 Financial Crisisy Reforms
y Robust Recovery

34

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 21

East Asian Miracle

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 2008

Slide 22

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 200835

Annex 2
Slide 23

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 2008

Slide 24

Asia: Lessons Learned from the
Crisisy Reforms
y Regional Cooperation and Integrationy In this process, competitive sectors andenterprises have been expanded in Asia

36

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 25

Asia: Reforms
y Sound Macroeconomic managementy Sound fiscal policyy Limit public debt
y Limit current account deficity Other measures to prevent or reduce

the risk of crises

Slide 26

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 200837

Annex 2
Slide 27

Asia: Macro-economic Soundness
Attained by post-crisis reforms
y Low inflation ratey Lower fiscal deficity Low public debt
y Current account surplus
y Increase of foreign exchange reserves
y Lower non performing loans(Improvement of bank efficiency)

Slide 28

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 2008

38

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 29

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 2008

Slide 30

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 200839

Annex 2
Slide 31

Asia: Regional Cooperation andIntegration as Another Measure to
Reduce Vulnerability to External Shockand Enhance Competitivenessy Trade policy coordinationy Macroeconomic links
y Intraregional tradey Intraregional foreign direct investmenty Equity market
y Tourismy In this processy FTA and regional integration
y Regional cooperation (such as Chang Mai Initiative)y Physical integration by regional or sub-regional

infrastructure

Slide 32

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 200840

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 33

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 2008

Slide 34

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 200841

Annex 2
Slide 35

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 2008

Slide 36

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 200842

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 37

Source: ADB, Emerging Asian Integration, 2008

Slide 38

Expansion of competitive sectors andenterprises after crisis both in Asiaand Latin America
y Economic Reforms made private enterprises

more competitive in both regionsy In Asia, in addition, market-led regional and/or
sub-regional integration made private
enterprises more competitive. (Strengthened“Flying Geese”)

43Annex 2
Slide 39

Slide 40

44

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 41

Slide 42

4. Implications for Africa
y Africa compared with Asia and Latin Americay Recent growth rate: Africa’s growth rate

is higher than Latin America’s growth andlower than Asia’s growth during 2003-07

45

Annex 2
Slide 43

Causes of African Growthy The good news: many of the factors that havecontributed to growth collapses in Africa have
improved (Page, John, “Hunting for Leopards:
Perspectives on Africa’s Recent Growth” 2008)y – Better economic management (lower inflation,etc.; however economic fundamentals remain
weak)y – More competitive exchange ratey – Better institutionsy – Better governancey – Fewer conflicts

Slide 44

Africa still remains vulnerable
y In spite of high growth rate in last five

years: The region remains vulnerable tooutside shocks and changes incommodity prices (Page, John,“Hunting for Leopards: Perspectives on
Africa’s Recent Growth” 2008)

46

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 45

Then, How to Reduce Vulnerability
to External Shocks
In order to reduce vulnerability to external shocks:
Lessons from Asia and Latin America suggest theimportance of:y Sound macro-economic management (Common
factors of growth in Asia and Latin America inpost crises period; certain progress in Africa)
y Regional integration and cooperation (Speciallyrelevant in Asia; some progress in Latin America)y Promotion of competitive sectors andenterprises (Specially relevant in Asianexperience; some progress in Latin America)

Slide 46

Asia has been successful in regional
integration and cooperation:
Implications for Africay World Development Report 2009 mentions

regarding Africa: “……transport links can help
domestic markets grow. And regional and global
integration can promote trade. Regional
integration, labor mobility, investments in trade,
communication and transport infrastructure,peace and stability should remain high on theagenda. They can create good neighborhoods,
and better neighborhoods will facilitate
investment, trade, and factor mobility in a cycleof prosperity” (p.285)
47

Annex 2
Slide 47

Yokohama Action Plan (TICAD IV
Process) is important not only toattain self-sustainable economic
growth but also to cope with crisisy TICAD IV process will promote a “Vibrant

Africa” and its accelerated economic growthand diversification through support ofinfrastructure development, trade,investment and tourism, and agriculture.
(Yokohama Action Plan, p.1)

Slide 48

Infrastructure in Yokohama A.P.
y Regional transport infrastructurey Regional power infrastructurey Water-related infrastructurey Enhanced involvement of regional

institutionsy Promotion of public private partnership in
infrastructure48

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 49

Trade, investment and tourism in
Yokohama A.P.
y Promote and expand tradey Encourage foreign investmenty Assist private sector developmenty Promote tourism

Slide 50

Agriculture and rural development
in Yokohama A.P.
y Enhance capacity to increase foodproduction and agricultural productivity
y Improve access to markets andagricultural competitivenessy Support sustainable management of water
resources and land use

49

Annex 2
Slide 51

Thank you very muchSlide 52

Referencesy World Bank, World Development Report2009y Asian Development Bank, Japan Bank forInternational Cooperation and World
Bank, Connecting East Asia: A New
Framework for Infrastructure, 2005
y Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asia
Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared
Prosperity, 2008
(continued)

50

Prof. Hosono’s Slide
Slide 53

References (continued)
y Inter-American Development Bank, All That

Glitters May Not Be Gold: Assessing Latin
America’s Recent Macroeconomic Performance,
2008
y TICAD IV Yokohama Action Plan, 2008y Edwards, Sebastian, “The financial Hurricane
hits Latin America”, Los Angels Times (Nov.
13, 2008)
y Page, John, “Hunting for Leopards:
Perspectives on Africa’s Recent Growth”
2008

Slide 54

References (continued)y Devlin, Robert and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis,

Towards an Evaluation of Regional
Integration in Latin America in the 1990s,
IDB/INTAL, 1998
y Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo, Rodolfo
Manueli and Juan S. Blyde (ed.) , Sourcesof Growth in Latin America: What is Missing?,
IDB 2005

51

Annex 3
Slide 1PRESENTATION BY H.E. MR. E.E.E. MTANGO,AMBASSADOR OF TANZANIA AND DEAN OF THE
AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN JAPAN AT
GRIPS-ODI-JICA JOINT SEMINAR: AFRICANGROWTH IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMY
Topic: African Growth, Financial Crisisand Implications for TICAD IV

Slide 2OUTLINE1䋮Anatomy of African Growth, pre-crisis period
2. Global Financial Crisis and its effects on:- African Economy and Trade- Foreign Direct Investments- Capital and Equity Markets- Banking System- ODA- Tourism Industry- Remittances from Africans in Diaspora- Foreign Reserves- Achievement of MDGs
3. Implications on TICAD IV
4䋮What to do.

52Ambassador. Mtango’s Slide
Slide 3

AFRICAN GROWTH(Pre-Financial Crisis Period)- Africa has enjoyed 10 years of sustained growth averaging 5% GDP
growth per annum.
- Early 2008 average GDP forecast at 6.5% p.a.
- Growth due to strong demand for Africa’s exports, high commodity
prices, widened markets into Asia (China, India, South Korea),diversified sources of finance (investments from China, India,
Middle East), and remittances from Africans in diaspora.
- Many African countries spent decades gearing economic growth toattract more private capital to dispel the reputation of unreliable
investment destination.

Slide 4

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.1. General Observations-The financial crisis came as African economies were turning
the corner.
- Effect of global financial crisis is already being felt;
e.g. – Tanzania downgraded growth forecast to 7.5% downfrom 7.8%. AfDB forecast average growth of 5% down from
6.5%.
- However, the effect is to the Economies of African countries,
in general. African Banks are not suffering from credit crisis as
such since they are less exposed to the global credit system.

53Annex 3
Slide 5

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.2. Effect on African Economy and Trade:If factories and supermarkets close in U.S.A., Europe, etc., thiswill lead to less demand for goods from Africa and consequently,- Commodity prices fall, exports decline and many exporters lose
markets (e.g. markets for garments for South Africa, Mauritius,
Kenya, Swaziland, etc.)- Foreign currency income slump due to reduced demand and low
prices.
- Factories may close down, jobs lost resulting to unemployment
increase.
- The health of banking sectors will be affected and defaulters buildup.
- Economic slow down inevitable consequence.
- Balance of payments will be negatively affected.
- Importers would rush to hoard foreign currency leading to free
fall of local currency.

Slide 6

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.3. Effect on Foreign Direct Investments- Fall of inward investments affecting important sectors such as
agriculture, infrastructure development, health and education.
- Banks including World Bank (especially the commercial arm ofIFC) will fail to raise capital from the Stock Exchange or fromother banks to invest in Africa,- Reduced or reversed portfolio inflows as investors flee to safer
assets; Investors will sell securities causing local currencies todepreciate,54

Ambassador. Mtango’s Slide
Slide 7

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.3. Effect on Foreign Direct Investments- Roads, energy and utility projects which need foreign capitalwill be affected,- Money will be moved out of new projects to shore up balance
sheets,- Trade finance that is essential to export reliant countries may
dry up,- Planned issue of infrastructure bonds by African countries (e.g.
Kenya, Tanzania) in international markets will have to bedelayed as risk has become very high.

Slide 8

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.4. Effect on Capital Markets/Equity Markets- Countries with liberalized capital accounts (Nigeria, S.
Africa and Kenya) will be the first to suffer due to thetendency for investors to withdraw to safer markets.
- Lower portfolio inflows and lower FDI inflows,- Reverse portfolio inflows as investors flee to safer
markets,- Equity markets may fall sharply,- Investors may sell securities and depreciate local
currencies (already happening in Uganda, Zambia).

55

Annex 3
Slide 9GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

2.5. Effect on Banking System- Decline of quality of Banks’ credit portfolios- Losses in other financial assets (e.g. those deposited withforeign correspondent banks),- Capital repatriation by private banks (which are usuallyforeign-owned).

Slide 10

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.6. Effects on ODA- Due to recession, rich countries may be tempted to cut
down on ODA,
- Concessional loans may be reduced,- Transaction costs are likely to rise,- Roads, energy and utility projects will be affected,- Countries usually receiving larger share of ODA (Uganda,
Ghana, Tanzania) likely to suffer.

56

Ambassador. Mtango’s Slide
Slide 11

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.7. Effects on Tourism Industry- African tourism industry depends mainly on arrivals fromoverseas, As people’s savings decline, there is little money
to spend on luxury; some want to stay put to see how thecredit crisis will go,-

Tourism industry, transport companies, tour operators,
hoteliers will feel the pinch (in Tanzania, reservations
from U.S.A., Europe cancelled. Some hotels suffered
60% of cancellations in October 2008!)

Slide 12

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

2.8. Effect on remittances from Africans in diaspora:-Due to economic recession in USA, Europe, Japan,
remittances from diaspora will decline.

57

Annex 3
Slide 13

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.9. Effect on Foreign Reserves- Countries’ foreign reserves usually invested abroad will
most likely be affected.
-

Banks with high foreign currency exposure will beaffected.

Slide 14

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
2.10. Effect on Achievement of Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs)- Slow down of economic growth, foreign currency income
slump, unemployment increase, reduced ODA,
depreciation of local currency, etc.
will result in a setback in achieving the MDGs.

58

Ambassador. Mtango’s Slide
Slide 15IMPLICATIONS IN TICAD IV
3.1. TICAD IV is considered a great success because of:- Enhanced focus on economic growth,- Focus on infrastructure and agricultural development,- Support, encouragement or incentivization for Japanese private
sector to look more seriously at trade and investment opportunities
in Africa- Funding support mechanisms which GOJ promised to put in place(for infrastructure development and private sector support,- Insurance cover against political risk to be extended by NEXI,- Doubling of ODA in 5 years,- Various interventions in Health, Education and support to achieve
MDGs.

Slide 16IMPLICATIONS IN TICAD IV

3.2. The Global Financial Crisis endangers the implementationof all above commitments.

59Annex 3
Ambassador. Mtango’s Slide
Slide 17

WHAT TO DO.

- Donor countries should honour their commitments on ODA to
Africa.
- International Financial Institutions (IMF, WB, AfDB, etc.) should
adopt remedial measures to mitigate the risks to African countries.
- Central Banks should exercise prudential regulation and supervisionand have early warning system.
- African Governments should exercise strict control of money
laundering and insider trading.

Slide 18

WHAT TO DO.
- Central Banks should regulate issue of foreign exchange tocompanies during this time of crisis.
- Non-bank financial sector such as Pension Funds should also be
regulated.
- African countries should strengthen domestic and regional markets
and boost intra-african trade.
- It is important to promote domestic tourism.
- There is a need for new stability of the global financial system inwhich the voice of every nation, every continent is heard and theirconcerns taken into account.

60Annex 4
Prof. Ohno’s Slide
Slide 1

Proposal for a New
African Growth Support Initiative

Nov. 27, 2008
Izumi Ohno & Kenichi Ohno
GRIPS Development Forum:
Secretariat for Multi-stakeholder Discussion Group

Slide 2

TICAD IV and the Current Global
Environmentz

TICAD IV (May 2008)-- regarded as “departure” from previous conferences,
communicating Japan㵭s serious engagement in Africa andwillingness to share East Asian experiences

Yokohama Action Plan (May 2008) – Boosting Economic Growth –Trade, Investment and Tourism – 3. Assist Private Sector Development:“Support African countries to plan and implement industrial
development strategies and policies, drawing on Asianexperiences as appropriate.”z

Global financial crisis-- reminding the importance of strengthening the real economy andindustrial competitiveness-- Japan㵭s commitment to African development to be tested

61Annex 4
Slide 3Concretizing the TICAD IV
Growth AgendazJapan must immediately formulate overall andcountry-specific assistance visions for African
developmentÎMulti-stakeholder discussion group (April-June, 2008)ÎWorkshop to gather African perspectives (July, 2008)ÎProposal for a New African Growth Support
Initiative (Aug. 2008)
9
9
9
9
9

Basic principles
Incorporating East Asian perspectives
Target countries and selection criteria
Entry points for Japan
Requests for the Japanese government and the new JICA

Slide 4

Basic Principles(1) Making a firm commitment to long-term
partnerships with African countries, with sustained
policy dialogue as a key ingredient(2) Selecting a few target countries and producing
㵰success stories㵱(3) Putting Japan’s growth support into thepartnership context—mobilizing cooperation byother donor agencies, emerging donor countries,
and private sector

62Prof. Ohno’s Slide
Slide 5

Incorporating East Asian
Perspectives
No standard “East Asian model” exists
z It should be the methodology (in a broad sense) to
design and implement policies unique to eachcountryz Japan should complement the current international
growth support, with East Asian perspectives suchas:zContinuous policy dialogue for joint strategy formulation
Goal orientation with concrete thinking, building on yourstrengthszzÎDynamic capacity development:
Improve ability through selective hands-on experience䊷clear
goals, focused efforts, trials and errors, cumulative sense ofachievement

Slide 6

Select Target Countries for㵰Success Stories㵱
<Selection Criteria>
Japan

Partner countrieszzz

Leadership
TargetGovt. administration forpolicy implementation countries
Economic potentialzzz

Possibility of financial
supportBusiness interest
Capacity of countrybased team-- Prerequisite: macroeconomic and political stability-- Respective TICAD IV pillars could have their target countries.
-- 㵰Target countries㵱 do not need to correspond to largest ODA recipients(e.g., no need to be annual Yen loan recipients); but long-term policy
engagement is vitally important.

63

Annex 4
Slide 7

Four Entry Points for Japan’sEngagement in Africa(1) If the country already has valid national development
vision, strategies and action plans, mobilize aid torealize the existing vision(2) If not, engage in continuous policy dialogue for selfdiscovery and strategy formulation (preferably followedby specific ODA and other assistance)(3) Build core infrastructure and align aid & investments
around it through donor coordination & public-private
partnership (e.g., development corridors, OSBP, OVOP)(4) If the country has attracted (or likely to attract) large FDI
projects by the Japanese private sector, mobilize aid tocreate an enabling business environment

Slide 8(1) Mobilize Aid to Realize the
Existing National Vision
The case of Ethiopia
z Ethiopia’s industrial vision (ADLI, Ind. Dev. Strategy)
and strategies (Leather M/P, etc) are largely valid
and clear.
z Donors should support Ethiopia’s vision rather thancreating a new one.
z Japan has many aid tools for industrial support:- Production and technology management- Industrial human resource training- Efficient logistics and marketing- Infrastructure (esp. transport and power)- Regional development planning- Creating necessary laws, standards, institutions- Removing negative impacts of industrialization

64

Prof. Ohno’s Slide
Slide 9(2) Japan’s Policy Dialogue with
Developing Countries
Argentina – Okita Mission 1985-87; 1994-96 (follow up)z Vietnam – Ishikawa Project 1995-2001
z Thailand – Mizutani Report for upgrading SMEs andsupporting industries, 1999
z Indonesia – Continuous Government-Business Policy
Dialogue; Urata Report for SMEs, 2000; Prof. Shiraishi& Asanuma, 2002-04 (post-Asian crisis)z Laos – Prof. Hara for overall development strategy,
2000-05z Myanmar – Prof. Odaka,1999-2002 (but failed)z

Slide 10

Ishikawa Project in Vietnam
1995-2001
z

z

z

z

z

Communist Party General Secretary Do Muoi requested Prof.
Shigeru Ishikawa to study the Vietnamese economy. The
bilateral project was agreed between two prime ministers.
JICA mobilized a large number of scholars and consultants.
Prof. Ishikawa emphasized the spirit of mutual respect andjoint work (and a lot of patience).
Topics covered: macro, budget & finance, industry, agriculture,trade, SOE reform, Asian financial crisis.
Continued dialogue—New Miyazawa Plan (1999), VietnamJapan Joint Initiative for improving investment climate (2003-).
Now under preparation—Vietnam-Japan Partnership for
Supporting Industry Development.

65Annex 4
Slide 11

Ishikawa Project in Vietnam
Vietnam = Transition economy+ Underdevelopment

Advise on the drafting
process of the 6th FiveYear Plan

Phase 1 (95.8-96.6)¾Macro-economy¾Fiscal and monetary
policy¾Industrial policy¾Agricultural and ruraldevelopment

Tasks:•Macroeconomic stabilization•Structural adjustment (systemic transition
to market economy)•Long-term development strategy

Advice on theimplementation issues of
the 6th Five-Year Plan,
including participation in
AFTA/APEC/WTO andindustrial policy
Phase 2 (96.7-98.3)¾Fiscal and monetary
policy¾Participation in AFTA/
APEC/ WTO andindustrial policy¾Agricultural and ruraldevelopment¾SOE reform

Advice on the emerging
issues arising from theEast Asian crises and theeconomic integration
process

Advice on theformulation of the 7th
Five-Year Plan

Follow-up Phase(98.7-99.7)¾General commentary¾Fiscal and monetary
matters¾Industry and trade¾Agricultural and ruraldevelopment

Phase 3 (99.9-01.3)¾General commentary¾Fiscal and financial
Follow
reformup¾Trade and industry¾Agricultural and ruraldevelopment¾SOE reform and private
sector development

Joint research (2001- )¾Agriculture and rural development (livestock, vegetable,
fruits and industrial crops, etc.)
Source: MPI and JICA, Study on the Economic Development Policy in
the Transition toward a Market-Oriented Economy In the Socialist Republicof Viet Nam (Phase 3) Final Report Vol. General Commentary, 2001, pp.iii-vi.

¾Monetary policy under partial dollarization

JICA Vietnam Office, Executive Summary of 㵰Ishikawa Project㵱 Phase 3,
March 29, 2002.

¾Trade and industrial policies in the age of integration(NEU-JICA joint research program ÎGRIPS-VDF)¾Fiscal policy (introduction of personal income tax)

Slide 12

Continuous Policy Dialogue in
the Partnership Context
The case of Tanzania (development partnership)MKUKUTA (2nd PRSP) – Govt.㵭s vision for broad-based
growthz Active development partnerships underway
z Japan: focused assistance plan (i.e., infrastructure andagriculture), participating in budget support, co-chairing
the Growth Cluster Group, dispatching policy advisers(industrial development, PRSC), etc.
z Active discussions on “growth drivers” (e.g., corridor & port
development; special economic zones)
Î the next step would be to forge consensus on theirprioritization with coherencyz66Prof. Ohno’s Slide
Slide 13

Continuous Policy Dialogue in
the Partnership Context
The case of Zambia (South-South cooperation)
JICA is conducting “Triangle of Hope” Project 2006-09(improving investment climate), mobilizing a Malaysian
expert (ex-MIDA official).
z Task forces organized within GoZ, with the involvementof Presidentz Investment promotion initiatives – targeted at Malaysia
and India
z JICA support to the development of Multi-facility
Economic Zone (MFEZ)z As a next step, Zambia wants Japan to help formulate along-term industrial strategy.
z

Slide 14(3) Japanese Assistance for Core
Infrastructure
Greater Mekong Subregion – East-West andNorth-South Corridors for development of Indochinaz Thailand – Eastern Seaboard: creation of industrial
zones around a port infrastructurez Vietnam – Highway No.5 (Hanoi – Haiphong Port)
for FDI attraction (industrial clusters)z Cambodia – Sihanoukville Port, power and telecom
networks, special economic zone
z El Salvador – La Union Port + regional developmentz Mozambique (planned) – Nacala Port and Corridor
for regional developmentz67Annex 4
Slide 15

El Salvador: Growth Diagnostics
vs. Japan’s ODAzzz

Hausmann-Rodrik Growth Diagnostics 2003: The largest
constraint in El Salvador is the lack of self-discovery caused
by market failure (low appropriability). Infrastructure is not abinding constraint.
Local Report 2008 (FUSADES): Our infrastructure is best inCentral America and we are already a regional hub, but wecan do even better by handling trade more efficiently. This willraise our productivity and competitiveness. For this purpose,
infrastructure, especially La Union Port, is essential.
Japanese ODA in El Salvador: Upgrade La Union Port as
key infrastructure. Additional support for social & HRD,
productive sectors, Eastern Region development, andregional integration.

Slide 16

The Vision: Strengthening El Salvador’s
Position as a Regional Transport Hub
z

z
z

z

Airport already aregional hub (built by
Japan 28 years ago)
Central American
Highway link
Pacific-Atlantic link via
Panama Canal – El
Salvador as a regional
feederHowever, La Union Portis low capacity
Î Build a new port with
sufficient capacity andservices68Prof. Ohno’s Slide
Slide 17

Components of Japan’s ODA in
El Salvador (ongoing)
KEY INFRASTRUCTURE- Construction of La Union Port- Rebuilding an old bridge (Honduras border)- Digital map technology for efficient planning- Urban development planning for La Union City
Social & Human RD- MEGATEC La Union(training center)- Primary schools & math- Clean water- Rural electrification- Solid waste control

Support for
Productive Sectors

Eastern Region
Development- SME promotion- Aquaculture- Small-scale agriculture- Reservoirs & irrigation- Small-scale livestock- La Union Port
- Plan Puebla Panama- CAFTA & other FTAs
- Cent. Amer. integration- M/P for Eastern Region

Slide 18

Build Core Infrastructure and Align Development
Programs
Nacala Development CorridorÎ
(Source: CPI, Govt. of Mozambique)a

The Case of Mozambique (planned)
Regional development around Nacala port
and corridor-- Nacala-Nampula: paved-- Namupla-Cuamba: ODA loan planned (by JICA
with AfDB)

69

Annex 4
Slide 19(4) Mobilize Aid to Facilitate FDI
ProjectszUsing ODA to mitigate risks for private sector
investments in Africa (e.g., infrastructure, HRD, CSR)-- In East Asia, ODA played a catalytic role in promoting Japanesetrade & investment.

New initiative, based on TICAD IV commitment topromote public-private partnershipsz Public-private joint missions to promote trade &investment in Africa (Sept. 2008)
z Follow-up activities by MOFA, METI, JICA, JETRO to
conduct preliminary surveys on port and transport
infrastructure development (e.g., Ghana, Tanzania,
Madagascar)z New JICA -- the Office for Private Sector Partnershipz

Slide 20

Requests for the Japanese Govt.
and the New JICA
z

z

z

z

Build professional teams for intellectual aid -- newalliances among the public, private/NGOs & academic
circles
Build a theoretical basis for growth support with East
Asian perspectives and disseminate (i.e., the role of new
JICA research institute)Devise innovative approaches to facilitate theformulation and implementation of high-quality
infrastructure projects (e.g., faster process, link with TC,
collaboration with regional development institutions)Introduce instruments to support local private sector
development (e.g., microfinance, equity investment &guarantees), to ensure the broader benefits from ODA or
privately-financed large-scale projects

70Prof. Ohno’s Slide
Slide 21Thank You Very Much !
z For details, please visit the websites of

GRIPS Development Forum
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/ (Japanese)
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/ (English)z Publication

http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/pdf08/PN4.pdf(Japanese)
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/pdf_e08/
PN5.pdf (English)

71Annex 5
Slide 1

Industrialisation in Africa
and Donor's Functions
as Facilitator
Matsuo WATANABE

Visiting Senior Advisor
Japan International Cooperation Agency

Slide 2

Contents• Key principles of industrial strategy• A JICA assistance in Zambia• Donor's role in industrial policy

72

Dr. Watanabe’s Slide
Slide 3

Industrial strategy: Keys
• More than labour intensive manufacturing – services and agriculture
also considered• Clear and objective criteria to discover the industries through trialtrialandand-error process• Maintain transparency in the process• Establish a process of PP-P dialogue• Support with discipline (punishment and exit strategy) and applycompetition• Policy measures can be scaledscaled-up as institutional capacity develops

Slide 4

What are missing for
African industrial policy execution?
• Role model to emulate• Policy space -- narrow visvis-a-vis Asia in 19701970-80s• Diverse development strategies (local context)• Institutional capacities to implement 'full'full-scale'industrial policy• Significant publicpublic-private partnership73

Annex 5
Slide 5A JICA assistance in investment promotion in Zambia(as until July 2008)

Objectives• To transfer Asian experience to Africa• To substantialise a countrycountry-led trade & investment promotion
initiatives (and industrial development) through intensive facefacetoto-face dialogues• To materialise actual investments to Africa rather than justgiving advises or recommendations• To address "We know the problem and what to do, but not
how to do"

Slide 6

Approach• JICAJICA-sponsored advisor—
advisor—the former vice president of
the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority• Coordination and sharing of vision among threepartners of development – political leaders, private
sector and civil service• Selected 12 priority sectors based on country’country’s
existing and latent potentials – even the landlocked isconceived to be an advantage (sub(sub-regional air cargo hub)
• FDIs from Malaysia and India and joint ventures havealready takes place: mobilemobile-phone factory, telecom,
ICT college and specialised hospital …

74

Dr. Watanabe’s Slide
Slide 7

Donor's function (1)Information management
1. Ex ante information of client country: what are needed• First hand country study (qualitative & quantitative)• inputs for designing plausible attsitance strategy
2. Information of supply side: who can supply what
• Complehensive knowknow-how (on different stages ofdevelopment process)• Applicable to client country
3. Matching information: not just matching service• WorldWorld-wide network• Lessons from past experience (successes & failures)

Slide 8

Donor's function (2)Consulting'Consulting Aid‘Aid‘, like Business consulting service• insight: the way the client country realise FDIFDI-led
industrialisation and economic growth• to construct taylortaylor-made strategies and pursue fortangible results• to encourage client to develop better insights andfurther actions by producing continual results

75Annex 5
Slide 9

Donor's function (3)Catalyst and Back-ups
1. Catalyst to enhance the effect of project• financial support: infrastructure, industrial estate• technical support: operational knowknow-how, business forum

2. Logistics and 'Authority'• JICA with diplomatic resources (with EoJ endorsement)• Contacts with investors• logistical support by JICA to reduce 'transaction cost' by giving
givingauthority and credibility• lobby for investment environment• PlayPlay-up at international arena

Slide 10

Not so sure about the donor's functions?
• 2nd generation PRSPs: a wish list with no priority, budgetary
corroboration, consistency between the purposes and means.
• Gaps between:(a) the proponents and opponents of the Washington Consensus
policies in the failures of market and government(b) Asia and Africa in industrialisation performance(c) intention and implementation in industrial policy in many
many Africancountries(d) in donor practices bet/ 'telling what to do'do' and 'working withclients to show how to do'do' .
• Mere removal of market distortions do not bring substantial, tangible
industrial development by its own• Why did past industrial policy initiatives in developing countries
countries fail,if the donor functions would have not needed?
needed?

76

Dr. Watanabe’s Slide
Slide 11

Note: 12 selected areas
1. agriculture
2. cotton
3. mineral extraction
4. health and medical service
5. ICT
6. tourism
7. education (higher &specialised)
8. air and land transport hub
9. economic zone
10.SME
10.SME
11.streamlin
11.streamlin administrative
procedures
12.finance12.finance

Points• Landrocked 㸢 No labour
intensive manufacturing• Quick result 㸢 smallersmaller-scale FDI• KnowledgeKnowledge-intensive, regional
center of excellence 㸢 education(BA, Master) /medical (fortests/treatments, e.g. magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI),
angiograms, angioplasty)• Existing potential 㸢 geographical,
spare capacity of Lusaka airport

Slide 12

Note: Initial Acheivements
1. Policies, laws, regulations, government services•
12 sector analyses and policy proposals have been duly filed byZambian themselves, o/w 8 approved and implemented.
•
The progresses are monitored by the respective ministries andreported to the President every month.
2. Information for investors has been publicised•
GoZ put out a project bulletin and profiles of Zambian companies
and disseminated to investors.
•
With these, GoZ dispatched investment promotion missions to
Malaysia (2006) and India (2007 & 2008)•
Business forums for Asian investors in Zambia. These efforts
materialized as the actual investment projects.
3. Public administration system is being consolidated.
•
GoZ is working to establish an EE-governance system, agovernmental Clients Charter and Integrated Approval Systems .

77

Annex 5
Dr. Watanabe’s Slide
Slide 13

Note: Relevance of Asian Experience;
No magic formula,formula, but...
1. Commonality: toptop-down style political process and British
public administration system.
2. Effort to unite the people and national vision with a longlongterm planning. Vision 2020 Vision 2030
3. Development path: formerly a resource depended
economy to transform to leading exporters of electronics
products by FDIFDI-led industrialization
4. Peer counseling: Sharing the colonial legacy and has
achieved a remarkable success in a game where the rule
was set by others.
5. WellWell-versed in various operations: comprehensive andpractical knowknow-how relevant to the economies at theearlier stage of development today78Annex 6
Mr. Oshiyama’s Slide
Slide 1

Accelerating Economic
Growth in Africa
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Africa Department
Director General

Kazunori Oshiyama

Slide 2Strategies for Accelerating
Economic Growth㩿㪈㪀㩷㪩㪼㪾㫀㫆㫅㪸㫃㩷㪠㫅㪽㫉㪸㫊㫋㫉㫌㪺㫋㫌㫉㪼㩷㪛㪼㫍㪼㫃㫆㫇㫄㪼㫅㫋㩷㩿㪩㫆㪸㪻㫊㪃㩷㪧㫆㫉㫋㫊㪃㩷㪜㫃㪼㪺㫋㫉㫀㪺㫀㫋㫐㪀㩿㪉㪀㩷㪪㫋㫉㪼㫅㪾㫋㪿㪼㫅㫀㫅㪾㩷㪧㫉㫀㫍㪸㫋㪼㪄㪧㫌㪹㫃㫀㪺㩷㪧㪸㫉㫋㫅㪼㫉㫊㪿㫀㫇㩷㩿㪧㪧㪧㪀㩿㪊㪀㩷㪧㪸㫉㫋㫅㪼㫉㫊㪿㫀㫇㩷㫎㫀㫋㪿㩷㪠㪝㪠㫊㩿㪋㪀㩷㪝㫆㪺㫌㫊㫀㫅㪾㩷㫆㫅㩷㪘㪺㫋㫀㫍㫀㫋㫀㪼㫊㩷㪽㫆㫉㩷㪜㪺㫆㫅㫆㫄㫀㪺㩷㪞㫉㫆㫎㫋㪿

79

Annex 6
Slide 3Major Corridors and Japan’s Assistance
TAH: Trans African Highway
OSBP: One Stop Border Post

Tunisia
MoroccoAG ADIR

CAIRO
Egypt

Libya

Algeria

Western
Sahara
Mauritania
Mali
DAKAR
SenegalGambiaGuineaBissauGuineaSierra Leone
Liberia

KHARTOUMChadN’DJAMENA

Niger

Eritrea

Sudan
Djibouti

Burkina Faso
Benin Nigeria
Togo
Ghana
Cote
LAGOS
D’Ivoire
Cameroon
TAKORADIADDIS ABAB A
Ethiopia

CentralAfrican R.

Somalia
UgandaRep.
Gabon Congo

Kenya

RwandaD.R.
Congo

MOMBASA

Burundi䃂OSBP (Namanga)

TanzaniaBlue䋺Major Economic Corridors
Red䋺Japan’s projects(on-going/recently completed)
䃂䋺T/A䃩䋺Grant
䃨䋺LoanDAR ES SARAAM

LUANDA

MTWARA
LOBITO
ZambiaLUSAKA

AngolaNAMIBE

Malawi
NAKARA
HAR ARE

Zimbabwe
Namibia
WALVIS B AY

BEIRA

Botswana

Mauritius

Mozambique

WINDHOEKMadagascar

Swaziland

JOHANNESBURG Lesotho
DURBA
N

South Africa

䃂OSBP (Chirundu)

Map is edited based on NEPAD STAP and TAH

Slide 4

One Stop Border Post (OSBP) projects
TAH: Trans African Highway
OSBP: One Stop Border Post

Tunisia
MoroccoAGADIR

CAIRO
Egypt

Libya

AlgeriaBlue䋺Major Economic Corridors
Red䋺Japan’s projects(on-going/recently completed)

Western
Sahara
Mauritania

OSBPᾉMoussaleMali
DAK AR
SenegalGambiaGuineaBissauGuineaSierra Leone
Liberia

OSBPᾉ

Ekok

Chad
N’DJAMENANiger

KHARTOUM

Eritrea

Sudan
Djibouti

Burkina Faso
Benin Nigeria
Togo
Ghana
Cote
LAGOS
D’Ivoire
Cameroon
TAKORADIADDIS ABABA

OSBPᾉ

Ethiopia

CentralAfrican R.

Namanga

Somalia
UgandaRep.
Gabon Congo

D.R.
Congo

Kenya

Rwanda

MOMBASA

BurundiTanzania

LUANDADAR ES SAR AAM
MTWAR A

OSBPᾉOshikango

LOBITO
AngolaNAMIBE

ZambiaLUSAKAOSBPᾉMalawi

RusumoNAK ARAHARARE

Zimbabwe
Namibia

OSBPᾉ

Katima Mulilo
OSBPᾉ

Kazungula

WALVIS BAY

Botswana

WINDHOEKBEIRA
Mozambique
Swaziland

JOHANNESBURG Lesotho
South Africa

Map is edited based on NEPAD STAP and TAH

80

DURBA
N

Mauritius
Madagascar

OSBPᾉ

Mandimba
OSBPᾉ

ChirunduMr. Oshiyama’s Slide
Slide 5

Japan’s Assistance for Energy Sector in Africa
Eastern Africa

WestWest-Central Africa
GHANA¾Rural Electrification (V) (On-going)¾Power Distribution System Master Plan Study (On-going)¾Human Resources Development Project for Disseminating PV
Systems (On-going)

UGANDA¾Bujagali Interconnection Project(ACFA) (On-going)*L/A signed ’07,Oct

CAPE VERDE¾Power Supply, Transmission and Distribution Lines Project inSantiago Island䋨ACFA䋩(On-going) *L/A signed ’08,Mar¾Rural Electrification Project Phase II (On-going)¾Hydro Power Electrification Advisor (On-going)

SIERRA LEONE¾Project for Urgent Improvement of Electric Power Supply
System in Freetown (On-going)

KENYA

NIGERIGA¾Project for the Rural Electrification in Cross River and Akwa
Iborn States (I-III) (On-going)

Sondu-Miriu Hydropower Project II (On-going)*L/A signed ’07,Jan

West Africa
Power Pool

Southern Africa

TANZANIA

Central Africa
Power Pool

Malawi¾Project of Reinforcement of Transmission and distribution
Facilitation in Oysterbay Station (On-going)¾The Rural Electrification Promotion Project (MAREP Phase IV)(On-going)¾Technical Support Project for the Stable Power Supply
System (On-going)

ZAMBIA

East Africa
Power Pool

¾Increasing Access to Electricity Services Project 䋨Co-financing
with WB䋩(On-going)

Southern Africa
Power Pool

¾Rural Electrification Master Plan Study (REMP) (On-going)¾Electrification Development Master Plan (On-going)

Loans

Grant

T/A

*Only on-going/candidate projects are shown in this sheet䇼Power Pool䇽 The free trade of power within regions
There are 4 power pools in Sub-Sahara Africa, SAPP (South African Power Pool), EAPP (East African P P),
WAPP (West African P P), CAPP (Central African P P). Exceptionally, in the case of significant power
shortage within a pool, power has been traded among pools.

Slide 6

ᵡᵿᶑᶃᴾᶍᶄᴾᵮᵮᵮᾉᵲᶍᵿᶋᵿᶑᶇᶌᵿᴾᵮᶍᶐᶒ ᵆᵫᵿᶂᵿᶅᵿᶑᶁᵿᶐᵇᴾ
Toamasina Port
Development ProjectṠ ᵲᶍᵿᶋᵿᶑᶆᶇᶌᵿṞ ᵟᶌᶔᵿᶒᶍᶀᶗ

ᵲᶆᶇᶑᴾᶎᶍᶐᶒᴾᶇᶑᴾᶁᶍᶔᶃᶐᶇᶌᶅᴾᵕᵎᵃᵋᵖᵎᵃᴾ
ᶍᶄᴾᵿᶊᶊᴾᶁᵿᶐᶅᶍᶑᴾᶇᶌᴾᵫᵿᶂᵿᶅᵿᶑᶁᵿᶐᵌᴾᵲᶆᶃᴾᶐᶃᶏᶓᶃᶑᶒᴾᶍᶄᴾᶎᶍᶐᶒᴾᶂᶃᶔᶃᶊᶍᶎᶋᶃᶌᶒᴾᶇᶑᴾ
ᶃᶖᶎᵿᶌᶂᶇᶌᶅᴾᵑᴾᶎᶇᶃᶐᶑᵊᴾᵟᵊᴾᵠᴾᵿᶌᶂᴾᵡᵌᴾ

ṟ ᵠᶐᶇᶁᶉᵿᶔᶇᶊΆᶃ

ᵨᵣᵲᵰᵭᾉᵤᵍᵱᴾᶇᶋᶎᶊᶃᶋᶃᶌᶒᶃᶂᴾᶄᶍᶐᴾᵐᵌᵓᴾᶋᶍᶌᶒᶆᶑᴾᶄᶐᶍᶋᴾᵢᶃᶁᵊᴾᵐᵎᵎᵕᵌᵨᵧᵡᵟᾉᶐᶃᶁᶃᶇᶔᶃᶂᴾᶐᶃᶏᶓᶃᶑᶒᴾᶄᶍᶐᴾᵱᶒᶓᶂᶗᴾ
ᶍᶄᴾᵢᶃᶔᶃᶊᶍᶎᶋᶃᶌᶒᴾᶇᶌᴾᵐᵎᵎᵖᴾᵿᶌᶂᴾᵿᶂᶍᶎᶒᶃᶂᵌ

ᵟᶋᶀᵿᶒᶍᶔᶗᴾᵬᶇᶁᶉᶃᶊᴾᶎᶐᶍᶈᶃᶁᶒ

ᶀᶇᶍᶋᵿᶑᶑᴾᶎᶊᵿᶌᶒᵿᶒᶇᶍᶌᴾᶎᶐᶍᶈᶃᶁᶒ

ᵨᵧᵡᵟᾉᶓᶌᶂᶃᶐᴾᶁᶍᶌᶑᶇᶂᶃᶐᵿᶒᶇᶍᶌᴾᶍᶄᴾ
ᵭᵢᵟᴾᶊᶍᵿᶌᶑᴾᶇᶋᶎᶊᶃᶋᶃᶌᶒᵿᶒᶇᶍᶌᴾᵿᶄᶒᶃᶐᴾ
ᵨᵣᵲᵰᵭ ᵤᵍᴾᵱᴾᵿᶌᶂᴾᵨᵧᵡᵟᴾᶑᶒᶓᶂᶗᵌ
ᵨᵿᶎᵿᶌᶃᶑᶃᴾᶎᶐᶇᶔᵿᶒᶃᴾᶁᶍᶋᶎᵿᶌᶗᾉ
ᶎᶊᵿᶌᶌᶇᶌᶅᴾᶐᶃᶎᵿᶇᶐᴾᶍᶄᴾᶍᶌᶊᶗᴾᶎᶇᶃᶐᴾᵠᴾᶄᶍᶐᴾᵬᶇᶁᶉᶃᶊᴾᶎᶐᶍᶈᶃᶁᶒᵌ

81

Annex 6
Slide 7

ᾋMadagascarὉ
MadagascarὉToamasina port> Economic
Growthᵨᵿᶎᵿᶌᶃᶑᶃᴾᶎᶐᶇᶔᵿᶒᶃᴾᶁᶍᶋᶎᵿᶌᶗ

ᵭᵢᵟίᶎᶐᶍᶈᶃᶁᶒᴾᶇᶌᴾᵫᵿᶂᵿᶅᵿᶑᶁᵿᶐὸ

ᵱᶒᶓᶂᶗᵊᴾᵪᶍᵿᶌᶑᴾᶃᶒᶁ

Ambatovy nickel project

Expansion
project

Biomass plantation project
Eucalyptus afforestationḶProcessing

Toamasina port
ὉBiggest port in Madagascar
ὉCovering 75% of all cargoᾋᵮᶐᶃᶑᶃᶌᶒᴾᶁᶍᶌᶂᶇᶒᶇᶍᶌᾍᵤᶐᶃᶇᶅᶆᶒᴾᵿᶋᶍᶓᶌᶒᾉ
ᵐᵐᵎᵊᵎᵎᵎᴾᶒᶍᶌ
ᵡᶍᶌᶒᵿᶇᶌᶃᶐᾉ
ᵏᵏᵎᵊᵎᵎᵎᴾᵲᵣᵳ

ExportDevelopment nickel mineḶ
SmeltingὉproductionᵣᶖᶎᶍᶐᶒᴾᶓᶎᴿᴿ

ᵪᶇᶋᶇᶒᴾᵿᶋᶍᶓᶌᶒᴾᵐᵑᵎᵊᵎᵎᵎᵲᵣᵳᶇᶌᴾᵐᵎᵏᵑ

Slide 8

Activities for Promoting Economic Growth• One Stop Boarder Post (OSBP) and Michino-Eki (Roadside Station)• Coalition for African Rice Development(CARD): in 21 rice producing countries• Investment Promotion: in Zambia andTunisia• One Village One Product: in Malawi andten countries82Mr. Oshiyama’s Slide
Slide 9Thank you83

［政策議事録 バックナンバー］
発行：2002年12月

No.11 2002年IMF・世界銀行年次総会
2002年IMF・世界銀行年次総会の評価と今後の課題（吉田正紀、三好敏之）

No.12 世界銀行と日本

発行：2002年12月

世界銀行と日本の関係強化に向けて――現状報告および今後の方向性（吉村幸雄）
日本の開発問題への知的貢献について（日下部元雄）
発行：2002年12月

No.13 MDGs、PRSPとパートナーシップ
日本はミレニアム開発目標（MDGs）に対して如何に取り組むべきか（戸田隆夫）
PRSP プロセスの改善に向けて――本フォーラムでの議論を総括する（緒方健太郎）
開発パートナーシップにおける日本のリーダーシップ――日本・UNICEF事業協力を例に考える（久木田純）

No.14 途上国の債務問題

発行：2002年12月

途上国の債務問題と日本の役割（玉木林太郎）
国家破産制度を巡る議論の現状と今後の課題（保井俊之）

No.15 開発の諸側面

発行：2002年12月

貿易・環境・開発の相互連関と日本にとっての意味合い（吉野裕）
国際教育協力の課題と日本の役割（岡谷重雄）
開発におけるICTとナレッジ・エコノミー――各ドナーのアプローチから考える（田中啓之、泉泰雄）

No.16 人間の安全保障

発行：2002年12月

人間の安全保障と日本の国際協力を考える（緒方貞子）
紛争と開発に関する今後の取り組みについて――世界銀行の活動枠組みを参考としつつ（黒田和秀）
発行：2003年6月

No.17 ODA大綱を考える
開発問題における日本の役割を考える（小和田恒）〈付論〉「開発問題における日本の役割を考える」に対する意見（服部則夫）〈付論〉「開発問題における日本の役割を考える」に対する服部則夫氏の意見への返答（小和田恒）

ODA大綱はいかにあるべきか――DC開発フォーラムからの貢献（紀谷昌彦）〈付論〉新 ODA 大綱 私案（大野健一）

No.18 アフリカ援助の再考

発行：2003年6月

アフリカ支援再編成への提言（大野健一・高橋基樹）〈付論〉Renovating Japan’s Aid in Africa （Kenichi Ohno & Motoki Takahashi）

サブサハラ･アフリカ援助の現状マッピング調査――聞き取り調査結果の概要（榎木とも子）
アフリカへの対応と日本（橘田正造）

No.19 GRIPS-ODI Joint Feedback Seminar

Issue: May 2005

Good Donorship and the Choice of Aid Modalities
̶Matching Aid with Country Needs and Ownership—

No.20 GRIPS-ODI Joint Seminar

Issue: July 2005

The Impact of PRSPs: Achievements, Challenges and the Role of Aid

No.21 Seminars on East Asian Development Experiences and the Role ofEmerging Donors
No.22 Seminar on Aid for Self-Reliance and Budget Support for Educational
Development
No.23 GRIPS-ODI-JICA Joint Seminar
African Growth in the Changing Global Economy
̶How to implement the TICAD IV promises for sustained growth?̶

Issue: January 2007

Issue: January 2008
Issue: February 2009

：ワシントン DC 開発フォーラム:GRIPS 開発フォーラム