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Page iElements of nuclear safety, radiologicalprotection and security series

Elements of security
and non-proliferation

Jean Jalouneix

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Cover image: mosaic of photographs related to the subjects dealt with in the different
volumes of the Elements of nuclear safety, radiological protection and security series. The
photographs illustrating the subjects covered in this ﬁrst volume of the series are highlighted,
outlined in yellow.

Printed in France
ISBN: 978-2-7598-2071-9
DOI: 10.1051/978-2-7598-2071-9

All rights relative to translation, adaptation and reproduction by any means whatsoever are
reserved, worldwide. In accordance with the terms of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 41 of theFrench Act dated March 11, 1957, “copies or reproductions reserved strictly for private use andnot intended for collective use” and, on the other hand, analyses and short quotations forexample or illustrative purposes, are allowed. Otherwise, “any representation or reproduction whether in full or in part – without the consent of the author or of his successors or assigns, isunlawful” (Article 40, paragraph 1). Any representation or reproduction, by any means
whatsoever, will therefore be deemed an infringement of copyright punishable under Articles
425 and following of the French Penal Code.
© IRSN 2017FM

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Preface

As part of IRSN’s Science and Technology Series, the aim of the “Elements of nuclear
safety, radiological protection and security” (Éléments de sûreté nucléaire, de radioprotection et de sécurité) series is, like the 1996 publication entitled “Elements of nuclear
safety” (Éléments de sûreté nucléaire), to provide all those whose work involves ionizing
radiation, primarily in the nuclear industry, with information regarding the technologicalculture relative to prevention and management of the related risks. This new series is theresult of the desire — and the necessity — not only to update the 1996 publication, butalso to extend its scope to areas previously not covered or only touched upon.
In its collection of scientiﬁc works, IRSN promotes the most advanced knowledge
acquired either within the Institute or as part of national or international collaboration,
focusing particularly on the educational value of its presentation. With this in mind, the“road map” for this new series include clear explanations through recounting the history ofdevelopments in techniques, ideas, approaches, organizations and regulations, or throughquestions raised and lessons learned from accidents and operating feedback in general.
The series also aims to provide access for all those interested in these issues totechnical knowledge and information that has been properly established and that can bechecked in the subject areas referred to, thereby applying IRSN’s three core values,
Knowledge, Independence, and Accessibility, as deﬁned in its Code of Ethics andProfessional Conduct.
We hope that this “Elements of nuclear safety, radiological protection and security”
series, coordinated by Jean Couturier, will contribute disseminating knowledge, especiallyas a new generation of nuclear scientists and technicians takes over from the old.
*
**

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Elements of security and non-proliferation

This volume, on security (in the sense of protection against malicious acts) and nonproliferation (in the sense of the “safeguards” undertaken by States within the frameworkof international treaties), is, in terms of the schedule, the ﬁrst in the series.
At a time when a signiﬁcant share of the electricity used within the European Union is
produced by nuclear power plants, and given the international context of a serious
terrorist threat, controlling nuclear and radiological security, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are major issues for society.
Without disclosing any sensitive information, this work describes and explains thedevelopment and monitoring of the measures taken in France, Europe and internationallyto protect nuclear material, the most hazardous radioactive sources and nuclear facilities
themselves against malicious acts, whether these involve attempted sabotage ordiversion. A publication covering in an overall picture the history, concepts, regulations,international agreements and the roles of the different players involved in these issues
will undoubtedly prove invaluable.
IRSN’s central position as provider of technical support to the French authorities in
the areas of safety, security and radiological protection means that it has an integral view
over all nuclear risks and can correlate expertise and knowledge in these different areas
with a view to assessing security issues in relation to safety and radiological protection
issues.
In the conclusions of the third nuclear security summit held in The Hague on
March 25, 2014, the Heads of State reiterated that nuclear safety and security initiatives
should be mutually supportive and work towards the common goal of protecting humanhealth, society and the environment. As the public expert in these two ﬁelds, IRSN plays acentral role in this initiative.
In particular, I would like to thank Jean Jalouneix, of IRSN’s Defense, Security and
Non-Proliferation Division, for writing this ﬁrst work in the series.
Jacques Repussard
IRSN Director-General

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The author

Jean Jalouneix, advisor on nuclear security to the Deputy Director General in chargeof Defense-related missions, worked for around 14 years in the ﬁeld of nuclear safety,
notably on safety studies for the SUPER-PHENIX reactor, and was involved in deﬁning thesafety options for the EPR. He then worked for around 16 years in the ﬁeld of nuclear
security. He has been involved in drawing up the French regulations in this area, as well asinternational texts, including the revised version of the Convention on the PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material and nuclear facilities, and has been a contributing author
to fundamental texts in the IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Series”.

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Foreword

This work on nuclear security and non-proliferation draws on the knowledge andexpertise developed at the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear
Safety (IRSN), which provides technical support in these ﬁelds to the French authorities.
The Institute shall not, however, be held liable for its contents.
It is based on the collective work carried out in the areas of nuclear security and nonproliferation by all the staff at IRSN and, more speciﬁcally, the staff belonging to the
IRSN’s Nuclear Defense Expertise Division.
Jean Jalouneix, who works for IRSN, is the key author of this work and also acted as
project coordinator. The following authors contributed to the work:– Chapters 1 and 2, Jacques Aurelle and the staff of the Technical Support and Study
Department, including Pierre Funk and David Ladsous in particular;– Chapters 3 and 4, the staff of the International Inspections Escort Department,
including Romuald Bon Nguyen in particular.
Georges Goué and Odile Lefèvre prepared the work for publication.
Jean Couturier, Michel Brière and Daniel Quéniart were active contributors in
proofreading the entire work.

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Contents

Preface ..................................................................................................................................................

III

The author ..........................................................................................................................................

V

Foreword .............................................................................................................................................

VII

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................

XIII

Chapter 1
Security of nuclear material, nuclear facilities
and the transportation of nuclear material
1.1.

Background ...............................................................................................................................

1

1.1.1. Some deﬁnitions ......................................................................................................

1

1.1.2. Interface between nuclear safety and nuclear security.........................

2

1.1.3. Security culture ........................................................................................................

4

1.1.4. Historical background ............................................................................................

5

1.1.5. International context .............................................................................................

6

1.2. Guidelines regarding the French nuclear security system ..................................

10

1.3. Risk management approach ..............................................................................................

11

1.4. The government bodies involved ...................................................................................

13

1.4.1. French General Secretariat for Defense and National Security ........

14

1.4.2. Minister for Energy .................................................................................................

14

1.4.3. Minister of the Interior .........................................................................................

14

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1.4.4. Prefect of the department ..................................................................................

15

1.4.5. French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) .......................................................

15

1.4.6. IRSN, the French Institute for Radiological Protection
and Nuclear Safety .................................................................................................

15

1.5. Regulatory framework .........................................................................................................

16

1.6. The Protection and Control System .............................................................................

18

1.6.1. Measures adopted for planning security activities...................................
1.6.1.1. Protecting activities of vital importance ...................................
1.6.1.2. Vigipirate ..................................................................................................

18
18
20

1.6.2. Measures relative to the operator’s obligations .......................................
1.6.2.1. Licenses .....................................................................................................
1.6.2.2. Control ......................................................................................................
1.6.2.3. Sanctions ..................................................................................................

20
21
37
40

1.6.3. Emergency response management and exercises relative
to security ...................................................................................................................

41

1.6.4. Interrelation between safety and security measures ..............................

44

Chapter 2
Security of radioactive sources
2.1. Background ...............................................................................................................................

47

2.1.1. The speciﬁc case of radioactive sources .......................................................

47

2.1.2. Theft and loss of sources ....................................................................................

48

2.1.3. Historical background ............................................................................................

49

2.2. International framework .....................................................................................................

50

2.2.1. Categorization of sources ....................................................................................

50

2.2.2. “Code of Conduct”..................................................................................................

51

2.2.3. Euratom Directive....................................................................................................

51

2.3. French organization ...............................................................................................................

51

2.3.1. Regulatory framework ...........................................................................................

51

2.3.2. France’s national register of sources ..............................................................

53

Chapter 3
Non-proliferation in the nuclear field
3.1. Historical background ..........................................................................................................

55

3.1.1. IAEA................................................................................................................................

55

3.1.2. Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community).............................

58

3.1.3. Some deﬁnitions ......................................................................................................

60

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Contents

XI

3.2. Declarations ..............................................................................................................................

61

3.2.1. General approach ....................................................................................................
3.2.1.1. Notiﬁcation of imports/exports of nuclear materials .........
3.2.1.2. Other types of declaration ..............................................................

61
61
63

3.2.2. Declarations required under the Additional Protocol.............................

64

3.3. Inspection procedure ............................................................................................................

65

3.3.1. General approach ....................................................................................................

65

3.3.2. Complementary access .........................................................................................

68

3.4. French organization ...............................................................................................................

69

3.4.1. Regulatory framework ...........................................................................................

69

3.4.2. Government bodies ................................................................................................

69

3.4.3. IRSN, the French Institute for Radiological Protection
and Nuclear Safety .................................................................................................

70

Chapter 4
Non-proliferation in the chemical field
4.1. Historical background ..........................................................................................................

73

4.2. International context............................................................................................................

75

4.2.1. Chemical Weapons Convention ........................................................................
4.2.1.1. The prohibition of chemical weapons
and their destruction ..........................................................................
4.2.1.2. Non-proliferation ..................................................................................
4.2.1.3. Assistance and cooperation .............................................................
4.2.1.4. Schedules of chemicals......................................................................

75
75
76
78
78

4.2.2. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons .......................

79

4.3. French organization ...............................................................................................................

80

4.3.1. Regulatory framework ...........................................................................................

80

4.3.2. Government bodies ................................................................................................

[184_TD$IF]81

4.3.3. IRSN, the French Institute for Radiological Protection and
Nuclear Safety ..........................................................................................................

82

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Introduction

During the second half of the twentieth century, France actively pursued thedevelopment of a large-scale nuclear program. This civil and military program now
encompasses the entire nuclear fuel cycle, the majority share of electricity production(Figure 1), and numerous test and research facilities. Alongside this nuclear program, weshould also mention the widespread use of radioactive sources in a very broad range ofactivities, including industry, medicine, research, the agri-food industry and education.
All these facilities and activities have one thing in common: they involve the use of ﬁssile
or fertile materials. The risks associated with such activities are managed within theframework of the French State’s responsibility toward its citizens and also toward theinternational community.
Nuclear facilities and activities carry speciﬁc risks since, by deﬁnition, they all involvethe use of various quantities of radioactive products. Moreover, these products can cause
exposure to ionizing radiation and its consequences to workers, the public and theenvironment.
In the nuclear energy sector, protecting workers, members of the public and theenvironment is primarily based on safety and radiological protection measures. These
measures are designed to prevent events within facilities resulting from human error or
equipment failure and events occurring outside facilities, and to mitigate the consequences of any event that does occur in spite of the preventive measures implemented.
In addition to prevention and mitigation measures, there are security provisions designed
to prevent any action by terrorists or malicious persons and, if necessary, to reduce theconsequences. Implementation of all these security provisions is based on the publicauthorities and the nuclear operators sharing responsibilities.
The international community now considers terrorism to be a major concern.
Managing nuclear and radiological security in view of the risk of terrorism or malicious

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Elements of security and non-proliferation

Figure 1. Tricastin nuclear site and the surrounding area, France. © Geneviève Baumont/IRSN.

acts, together with ensuring the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, aresubjects of prime concern for our society. Given the changing nature of the threat atinternational level, the multiplication of international instruments designed to protect
against these risks, and the revision of France’s security regulations in 2011, these aresensitive issues, which are subject to change and must be tackled. In this context, it isessential to note that nuclear security concerns should be seen in relation to nuclear
safety concerns since the risk to the public and to the environment is the same regardlessof whether the initiating event leading to a radiological release is due to natural causes,
equipment failure or a malicious act.
There are in fact two aspects to protection against terrorism and malicious acts: ﬁrst,
the measures taken to ensure nuclear security, and second, the measures taken toprevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Bearing this in mind, when we
speak of nuclear security, we mean protecting nuclear and radioactive material, nuclear
facilities and the transportation of nuclear material, against malicious acts, a concept thatencompasses the theft and diversion of nuclear materials and acts of sabotage.
Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction implies security in the
nuclear and chemical ﬁelds.
Rather than merely describing current approaches to security and non-proliferation,
this work gives a partly historical account which emphasizes how these approaches havechanged and the dynamics involved. It contains four chapters dealing, in order, with:– security of nuclear material, nuclear facilities and the transportation of nuclear
material,

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Introduction

XV– security of radioactive sources,– non-proliferation in the nuclear ﬁeld,– non-proliferation in the chemical ﬁeld.
Each chapter is structured as follows:– context and historical background,– the international framework,– organization in France,– the speciﬁc role played by IRSN, the French Institute for Radiological Protection
and Nuclear Safety.
Deﬁnitions needed to understand the different subjects are given, together with theprinciples and rationale underlying the approaches to security and non-proliferation.
Particular emphasis is laid on risk management. Details of the national and international
regulatory organizations are also given, together with information on the bodies andentities involved in these areas. Diagrams and photographs are included to illustrate thedifferent chapters, together with some speciﬁc developments intended to clarify certain
technical points. IRSN’s input in these areas is presented in a “Focus” section.

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Chapter 1
Security of nuclear material, nuclear
facilities and the transportationof nuclear material

1.1. Background1.1.1.

Some definitionsFirst, it is important to give some deﬁnitions which are widely accepted within theinternational community, based on various IAEA glossaries:– “nuclear safety” is the set of technical provisions and organizational measures –related to the design, construction, operation, shutdown and decommissioning ofbasic nuclear facilities, as well as the transport of radioactive materials – which are
adopted with a view to preventing accidents or limiting their effects;– “nuclear security” is the whole range of measures intended for the prevention
and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegaltransfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material1, other radioactive
substances or their associated facilities;

1.

The IAEA takes into consideration only three types of nuclear material, all of which are radioactive.
The deﬁnition used in France is broader and includes non-radioactive material.

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Page 2Elements of security and non-proliferation– “malicious acts” refers to the theft or diversion of nuclear material, as well as actsof sabotage or attacks that may impact on human health or the environment,
primarily through the release of radioactive substances.
French regulations are based on a broader deﬁnition of nuclear security than that ofthe IAEA; it includes nuclear safety, radiological protection, prevention and protection
against malicious acts, as well as civil defense actions in the event of accident (French
Nuclear Security and Transparency Act of June 13, 2006). Nonetheless, the more
technical deﬁnition used at international level will be used in this document.
Furthermore, under French regulations, “nuclear material” includes plutonium,
uranium, thorium, deuterium, tritium and lithium 6, i.e. materials which could be
used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. This is the deﬁnition used in thisdocument. Note that the deﬁnition of nuclear material used for the purposes ofinternational control refers to only three elements: plutonium, uranium, and thorium.

1.1.2.

Interface between nuclear safety and nuclear security2

The deﬁnitions above show that, while the common aim of safety and security is toprotect humans and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, safety isgeared more toward controlling the risks inherent in any nuclear facility, while security
aims to protect against acts of malicious intent liable to result in radiological consequences or have devastating effects as a result of using nuclear materials.
Different initiating events are taken into account when considering safety andsecurity. In the case of nuclear safety, the postulated initiating events are either external
natural events or events related to industrial activity, or internal events caused byequipment failure or human error. In the case of nuclear security, the postulated initiating
events are the result of deliberate acts carried out with the intent to cause damage. Such
events are therefore based on “intelligent” or “deliberate” actions, carried out for the
speciﬁc purposes of theft, diversion or sabotage, and are likely to involve actions aimed atsubverting the protective measures designed to counter them.
Given the differences in the type of initiating events that must be taken into
consideration, there are substantial differences in the approaches implemented to deal
with safety and security. The need for transparency was recognized very early on withregard to nuclear safety, mainly with a view to sharing experience and ensuring that any
incident or accident that might occur in one facility should not be allowed to occur
again elsewhere. Conversely, and even if the need to share know-how and experience
regarding events that have occurred also applies in the case of security, the deliberate
and malicious nature of the events to be taken into account implies a need to develop
measures to protect conﬁdentiality. Protecting information makes it possible to prevent
potential saboteurs from ﬁnding out about the protective measures that they would
have to overcome, and avoids disclosure of any possible weakness in a facility or activity.

2.

Read “A comparative approach to nuclear safety and security”, J. Jalouneix, IRSN 2009/117,
Reference Documents series, © IRSN/2009, available at www.irsn.fr.

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Security of nuclear material, nuclear facilities and the transportation of nuclear material

3

It is also necessary to prevent knowledge of malicious acts that have actually been
perpetrated leading to similar copycat actions. Nuclear security implies deterrence andconﬁdentiality regarding classiﬁed national defense matters, concepts that do not apply tonuclear safety.
The ﬁelds covered respectively by safety and security are also distinct to a certain
extent. The aim of nuclear safety being to protect people and the environment withregard to radiological risks, this ﬁeld obviously covers certain aspects related toprotection against ionizing radiation. The aim of nuclear security, on the other hand,is to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear material, and to prevent any risk ofsabotage targeting nuclear facilities and radioactive materials. With regard to the risk oftheft or diversion of nuclear material, security is based on a system for nuclear material
accountancy and control developed, either at national level or within the framework ofinternational controls whose interface with safety is limited. Thus, it is mainly inprotecting against the risk of sabotage that the areas of safety and security have any
common ground and reinforce each other.
There are also different approaches to the allocation of responsibilities between
the various entities involved in the ﬁelds of safety and security, even though there aresome similarities. Nuclear operators have prime responsibility for the safety andsecurity of their facilities and under no circumstances whatsoever can this responsibility be delegated. This prime responsibility is based on the same principle in the areasof safety and security alike, i.e. the operator is best placed to identify the risks
associated with its activities, to detect any deviation in relation to safety or security
requirements, and to take appropriate corrective action at any time. The State ensuresthat the responsibilities of each party (operators, authorities, etc.) are clearly deﬁned
in terms of safety and security. Protection against malicious acts, however, requires adifferent approach as well as broader and more direct involvement of the State insecurity than in safety. In particular, an operator alone cannot protect a site or a facility
against every form of malicious action, and the State plays a decisive role in security
matters:– ﬁrstly, the State is directly involved in gathering intelligence and assessing the riskof malicious action that may impact nuclear facilities and radioactive materials;
this type of risk changes constantly, and the State must check that the security
measures are constantly adapted to the current situation;– the State deﬁnes the design basis threat that must be used to design and assess
physical protection systems;– the State also plays a determining role in the response to be given to counteract
certain malicious acts by means of intervention by law enforcement agencies(police or gendarmerie);– managing a nuclear security event resulting from a malicious act requires input
from a greater number of State bodies than managing an emergency related
purely to safety issues. For example, law enforcement agencies, the judicial
authorities (involved to a lesser extent in the event of a safety emergency)
and mine-clearing services, may all be involved;

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– lastly, the State deﬁnes the rules relative to conﬁdentiality and the protection of
information and sets up a security check for anyone requiring access to sensitive
activities or information.
As a result, the State safety and security authorities have different positions. In
France, the safety authority is independent of the government, whereas the security
authority is more closely attached to the State’s sovereign activities. IRSN’s position as
technical support to the French authorities in the ﬁelds of safety and security means thatit has an integral view over all nuclear risks and can provide the safety and security
authorities with assessments factoring in matters of concern in both ﬁelds.
In addition, safety and security requirements may potentially be contradictory. For
example, providing access for operations conducted by emergency teams (ﬁre-ﬁghters,etc.) must be facilitated for safety reasons, but access to certain areas in the facility must
be controlled continuously. Likewise, certain security-sensitive zones are subject tospecial protection systems (ID badges, etc.), but it must be possible to evacuate
personnel from these areas quickly in the event of ﬁre or a risk of criticality. Complying
with safety procedures may also imply longer transportation times as it is necessary totake precautions designed to prevent trafﬁc accidents, whereas security requirements
may stipulate that transportation times should be kept to a minimum.
Another example involves measures implemented to track nuclear materials. In termsof safety and security, it is necessary to know the amount of materials held as accurately
as possible, but safety rules apply safety margins, primarily to guard against criticality
risks, whereas security principles demand that the exact amount of nuclear materials heldbe accounted for precisely to guard against the risk of diversion.
Operating procedures and rules must therefore take account of the respective safety
and security requirements and implement measures that are satisfactory in terms of both
safety and security.

1.1.3.

Security culture3

Security culture is a set of characteristics and attitudes which, in organizations and at
individual level, ensure that issues relating to protection against, ﬁrstly, the loss, theft ordiversion of nuclear material and, secondly, deliberate malicious acts in nuclear facilities
or during the transportation of nuclear material, receive the attention warranted by theirsigniﬁcance.
Security culture has three major components. The ﬁrst concerns the policy implemented by the State, in particular in relation to the national and international contexts.
The second relates to the structure of each body involved, particularly in application of thepolicy deﬁned by the State: in this component, a distinction must be made between what
is related to the body itself and what concerns its managers; it is the managers’ role to3.

Read – “Security culture in the nuclear ﬁeld”, D. Winter, IRSN 2005/54, Reference Documents Series,© IRSN/2010 (re-published), available at www.irsn.fr.

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5

Figure 2. The players involved in security culture.

establish and promote good practice and set a good example in the area of security culture.
The third component is the attitude adopted by the various individuals at all levels to
implement this policy within the framework of the structure in which they operate and toincorporate it into their work. Figure 2 shows the various players involved in security
culture.
It is also crucial to ensure that security culture is not conﬁned to the bodies involved
and their employees. Everyone, in their work, must make an effort to raise awarenessamong the general public of security culture in the nuclear ﬁeld. The general publicshould view security culture as a sign of professionalism, skill and responsibility on thepart of all the bodies and individuals involved in the protection of nuclear material,
nuclear facilities and the transportation of nuclear material.

1.1.4.

Historical background

France has actively pursued the development of a large-scale nuclear program forover 40 years. This program has entailed construction of the facilities required tocover the entire nuclear fuel cycle, producing the majority share of France’s
electricity, as well as developing tests and related research and managing waste
storage. All these different facilities have one thing in common: the use of ﬁssile or
fertile materials. The risks associated with this program are managed within theframework of the French State’s responsibility toward its citizens and also toward theinternational community.

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Elements of security and non-proliferation

This led France to develop a general approach to protection against malicious acts.
The ﬁrst legislative texts on this subject date back to the 1980s insofar as regards
protection and control relative to the theft of nuclear materials and, prior to that, an
ordinance passed in 1958 relative to protecting facilities from sabotage. A review of theentire regulatory system was conducted between 2005 and 2011 with a view toextending and reinforcing protection for nuclear material, nuclear facilities and thetransportation of nuclear material. As a result, new or more detailed texts have been
introduced which, regarding their legislative and regulatory aspects, bring them within
the legal framework of the French Defense Code.
This reform of the regulations, largely completed in 2011, had the following
objectives:– to respond to international requirements (UN resolutions relative to nuclear
terrorism, in particular UNSCR 1373 and UNSCR 1540, the amendment to theConvention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and nuclear facilities,
and evolutions of ideas and practices in nuclear security promoted by thedevelopment of the IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Series” publications;– to align and harmonize the regulations relative to nuclear security, particularly
those relative to, respectively, the theft and diversion of nuclear material (nuclear
proliferation) and to the protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage (consequences for people and the environment) with a view to having the full beneﬁt ofpotential synergy in their implementation;– to factor in the interrelated aspects of nuclear safety and nuclear security in thearea of protection against malicious acts (sabotage);– to update design basis threat (more serious threats given developments in theinternational context), in particular by deﬁning protection objectives for each threat;– to reinforce the legal framework, in particular to deal with the growth in thenumber of private operators now holding nuclear material and with regard towhom it was not possible to enforce certain provisions in ministerial instructions;– to specify and grade the different types of offences and the sentences to be
imposed under the regulations;– to enhance the performance-based approach by means of a combined approach
imposing, in certain cases, compliance with minimum requirements (i.e. the socalled “obligation of means”).
As the technical support organization to the French authorities, IRSN contributed tothis evolution of the regulations, proposing policy and technical elements based on
feedback and new international approaches.

1.1.5.

International context

Since the early 1970s, the IAEA (Figure 3) has served as a forum where experts havebeen able to compare national experience in the physical protection of nuclear material.

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7

Figure 3. View of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), located in Vienna, Austria. © DR.

This experience was ﬁrst gathered together in 1972 in the form of technicalrecommendations, in a booklet entitled “Recommendations for the Physical Protectionof Nuclear Material” (INFCIRC 225). These recommendations were followed bynegotiations under the aegis of the IAEA for the Convention on the PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature by the Member States in 1980.
In July 2005, an amendment to this Convention signiﬁcantly extended the scope of
the Convention, with a view to ensuring the protection of nuclear materials and facilities
from malicious acts and terrorist action. This amendment was ratiﬁed by France inDecember 2012. It entered into force on 8 May 2016.
The main amendments made in July 2005 to the original convention were as
follows:– the scope of the Convention was signiﬁcantly extended. Prior to the revision, theConvention primarily covered the protection of nuclear material during international transport. The revised Convention also includes domestic use of nuclear
material (at facilities, in storage and during transport). It also includes theprotection of nuclear material and facilities to prevent sabotage;– the revised Convention highlights the State’s prime responsibility in the physicalprotection of nuclear material and facilities to prevent theft and sabotage. It does,
however, require that the quality of physical protection implemented in eachState must meet minimum criteria;

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Page 88Elements of security and non-proliferation– each State signing the Convention must set up a physical protection regime based,in particular, on the existence of a legislative and regulatory framework and on thedesignation of competent authorities;– twelve fundamental principles of physical protection are set down in the amended
Convention (Figure 4);– new offences are listed to reinforce deterrence and the prevention of theft andsabotage. Similarly, mutual legal assistance mechanisms between States havealso been reinforced.
Alongside this, the IAEA has been developing a “Nuclear Security Series”, structured
similarly to the “Nuclear Safety Series”. Figure 5 shows the “security wheel”. This series of
documents is structured as follows:– a document presenting the “Fundamentals”, including the objectives, concepts
and principles applying to the protection of nuclear material, facilities andtransport. It makes a bridge with international instruments relative to nuclear
security (international conventions, UN resolutions, etc.);– three documents presenting Recommendations on:the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and transport (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5);Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities;



Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control.

– guides to implementing the recommendations;– technical guidance publications describing protection measures related to speciﬁctechnical subjects.
France, and IRSN in particular, have been actively involved in revising the abovementioned Convention and continue to make proposals for the development of the
IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Series”.

Figure 4. The IAEA’s 12 fundamental security principles.

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Figure 5. The IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Series”. © IAEA.

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1.2. Guidelines regarding the French nuclear
security system
France’s nuclear security system is based on the following guidelines:– the public authorities draw up a series of legislative and regulatory texts on theprotection of nuclear material, nuclear facilities and the transportation of nuclear
material against malicious acts. This system encompasses the protection of
nuclear material with regard to the risks of theft and diversion as well as theprotection of facilities and transport with regard to the risk of sabotage;– the designation of an authority with competence in the ﬁeld of nuclear security,
the Minister of Energy. It should be noted that this authority is distinct from thenuclear safety regulator, French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN);– three interlinked pillars, namely the prior authorization (license) to exercise any
activity involving the use of nuclear material, control by the public authorities tocheck compliance with the authorization procedures and the establishment ofcriminal and administrative sanctions in the event of breach;– risk analysis leading to the deﬁnition by the State of a series of threats that must
be taken into consideration for the protection of nuclear material, nuclear facilities
and the transportation of nuclear material, together with the protection objectives
associated with each threat; operators and the relevant State departments mustthen implement the appropriate measures to achieve these objectives;– the prime responsibility of operators in designing and implementing a protection
system which complies with the obligations imposed on them;– responsibilities are shared between the State and the operators, where the State is
responsible for continuing assessment of the threat, mainly by means of intelligence gathering; it is also the State’s responsibility to organize local and national
intervention means to assist the operator in managing malicious acts;– an integrated approach including physical monitoring and accountancy measuresdesigned to track with accuracy the quantities of nuclear material present at
facilities and its location, together with physical protection measures; these two
sets of measures complement each other ensuring that the system is effective;– a system to be deployed by the operators, mainly based on a performance based
approach complemented in some cases (mainly in transport) with prescriptive
measures deﬁning a minimum level of protection measures;– a system based on the notion of defense-in-depth, encompassing measures fordeterrence, prevention, detection, delay and response which, depending on thecase, come under the responsibility of either the operator or the relevant State
departments;– a graded approach speciﬁc to the sensitivity of the nuclear material or the possible
radiological consequences of sabotage which could impact on such material, anuclear facility or transport of nuclear material.

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1.3. Risk management approach
In the ﬁeld of nuclear energy, protecting people and the environment relies:– ﬁrst, on nuclear safety and radiological protection measures. These measures aredesigned to prevent internal or external events at facilities (resulting from natural
events or equipment failure or human error) and, when necessary, to mitigate theconsequences;– second, on security measures designed to prevent malicious acts and, whennecessary, to mitigate the consequences in the event such acts are perpetrated inspite of the prevention measures.
With regard to this second point, a distinction is made between two categories of risk:– the theft or diversion of nuclear material for the purpose of manufacturing a
nuclear explosive device;– sabotage or attack on nuclear material, facilities or during transport liable toimpact human health or the environment due to the release of radioactive
substances, irradiation or contamination or due to toxic releases associated with
nuclear activities.
In order to deﬁne and organize measures to protect and control nuclear material,
nuclear facilities and the transport of nuclear material, security needs must ﬁrst be
assessed and then appropriate security systems must be deployed.
The approach to designing, scaling, implementing and assessing the security system
for a facility where nuclear material is held or for the transport of nuclear material entails
the following key stages:– deﬁne the design basis threat based on scenarios involving the theft or diversion of
nuclear material or sabotage;– determine, for each facility or transportation operation, the equipment and thematerials to be protected based on assessment of the potential consequences ofmalicious acts arising from the design basis threat; i.e. this entails identifying thepotential targets of malicious acts;– design the security system suitable for countering the design basis threats;– assess the security system deﬁned, bearing in mind the measures implemented
and the design basis threat.
The ﬁrst stage is the responsibility of the public authorities while the subsequent
stages are performed by the operators, under the supervision of the competent authority
supported by expertise provided by IRSN. At the second stage, the operators should
identify all the potential targets of a malicious act and prioritize them according to their
attractiveness.
The process of deﬁning the threats requires the involvement of various State
departments (civil and military intelligence, the police, the gendarmerie, the authorities
in charge of nuclear security and safety, etc.), together with the major operators in theC01

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nuclear sector. It starts with gathering all the information known on the subject of
threats. All reliable sources are taken into consideration.
The threats are analyzed for their relevance to the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear
material or of sabotage. They can be divided into two main categories:– internal threats, related to the action of people who have authorized access to thefacility and nuclear material;– external threats, including actions carried out by an attacker or group of attackers fromoutside the facility, who have more or less sophisticated resources at their disposal.
Identifying the potential targets is based on:– safety studies and analysis of the most sensitive zones and related equipment(in terms of the potential consequences of a malicious act targeted at them), in
the case of sabotage against a facility or in transport;– the categorization of nuclear materials (see 1.6.2) in the case of theft of suchmaterials.
The targets thus identiﬁed are then prioritized according to the seriousness of theestimated consequences of the acts that could be perpetrated against these targets.
The security system is based on an approach which factors in threats, sensitivity,
vulnerability and an assessment of the potential consequences. It is designed on the basisof measures of vigilance, deterrence, prevention, protection, response to any type of
threat and mitigation of the consequences. Protective measures can be divided intomeasures of detection, alert and delay.
The security system is designed in accordance with a defense-in-depth approach andfactors in two key aspects:– the sensitivity of each target in the facility or during transport must be determined; sensitivity is characterized by the level of the potential consequences of amalicious act affecting a target;– the vulnerability of the different targets to different types of attack must be
assessed, i.e. an assessment of the degree of difﬁculty in carrying out a given
attack on the target in question.
It is important to note that implementing the security system presupposes that therespective responsibilities of the public authorities and the nuclear operators have beenclearly deﬁned. Figure 6 summarizes the assignment of responsibility.
In particular, the public authorities are responsible for:– assessing threats based on research, gathering and processing intelligence anddeﬁning the design basis threat based on this information and notifying the operators;– informing operators of any threats to their facilities or activities;– ensuring the availability of adequate intervention and response capabilities thanks
to the available local, regional and national law enforcement agencies;

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Figure 6. Assignment of security-related responsibilities between the public authorities and nuclear
operators.

– deﬁning the regulations required to ensure conﬁdentiality and the protection ofsensitive information.
Operators are mainly required to implement measures:– to detect malicious actions, intrusion or attempted intrusion;– to alert and inform the public authorities and, when necessary, the relevant bodies(for example, the IRSN operations center in the event of an event involving thetransportation of nuclear material); the alert must be accompanied by an initialassessment of the situation;– to delay or obstruct the action of any person attacking a facility or transportation
operation.
The measures to be implemented to mitigate the consequences of a malicious act aredeﬁned through close collaboration between the operators and the public authorities,
particularly within the framework of emergency response plans developed by thesedifferent entities, and dealing with safety and security aspects respectively.

1.4. The government bodies involved
The public authorities include a number of entities which play a role in the nuclear
security system. They work in close collaboration with one another and have complementary responsibilities.

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1.4.1.

French General Secretariat for Defense andNational Security

The French General Secretariat for Defense and National Security (SGDSN) is a
department of the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce. It plays a general role in interministerial
coordination regarding defense and security policy and, in particular, is in charge of
emergency response planning in the nuclear sector. As such, the SGDSN is in charge ofdrawing up and revising the regulations relative to activities of vital importance, which include
deﬁning the threats that must be taken into account. In addition, the SGDSN is responsiblefor deﬁning policy on conﬁdentiality and drawing up the related application regulations.

1.4.2.

Minister for Energy

Responsibility for nuclear material control is assigned by the French Defense Code to
the Minister for Energy in the case of nuclear materials for civil use. This Minister istherefore in charge of:– drawing up and amending the regulations applicable in this area to nuclear
material, facilities and the transportation of nuclear material;– issuing the licenses required by operators to engage in activities involving nuclear
material and updating these licenses;– exercising control over the operators’ implementation of the measures stipulated
in the licenses issued to them; in particular, the Minister is in charge of inspectionsat nuclear sites and during transport;– the application, in the nuclear sector, of the regulations relative to activities ofvital importance;– organizing national emergency response drills and exercises.
To exercise these responsibilities, the Minister for Energy is supported by a speciﬁc
department which is in charge of assessing ﬁles, inspections and drawing up the regulations.
This department comes under the responsibility of the Senior Defense and Security Ofﬁcial(HFDS) of the Ministry of Energy; the HFDS is the competent authority for nuclear security.
In the exercise of his duties, the HFDS calls on IRSN, a French public body with industrial andcommercial activities, for technical support (see 1.4.6).

1.4.3.

Minister of the Interior

The Minister of the Interior has authority over all local and national law enforcement
agencies likely to be called on in the event of a malicious act. Depending on the locationof a nuclear facility or a transport operation, the law enforcement agencies having
competence are either the Gendarmerie nationale or the National Police. In all cases,
relations between these response forces supervised by the public authorities and thoseestablished by operators are subject to protocols. In addition, the intelligence services
which come under the Minister of the Interior play a key role in preventing malicious acts
and assist in threat assessment.

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Also, the Prime Minister may decide to confer interministerial management of theoperational response to a nuclear crisis to this Minister.

1.4.4.

Prefect of the department

In each of France’s administrative départements, the State’s action is managed by aPrefect. The Prefect is responsible for local management of any crisis situation that may
arise in the department, particularly if they are accidental or the result of a malicious act
that could impact a nuclear facility or the transportation of radioactive material. This
central role played by the Prefect of the department in the event of an emergency has led
to the Prefect being tasked with approving the speciﬁc protection plan (plan particulier deprotection, or PPP) — drawn up by each operator — and implementing the external
protection plan (plan de protection externe, or PPE), as set out under the regulations
relative to activities of vital importance (see 1.6.1).

1.4.5.

French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN)

As part of its duties as regulator, ASN analyzes the risks and disadvantages that nuclear
facilities and the transportation of radioactive material may present to security, publichealth and hygiene or to the protection of nature and the environment, regardless of thecause (malicious or otherwise) of such risks. Where necessary, ASN notiﬁes operators of therequirements regarding the protection of the public and the environment.
ASN is consulted on draft decrees and ministerial orders relating to nuclear security.
In the event of a radiological emergency situation, regardless of its cause, ASN
provides advice to the public authorities (mainly the Prefect, the Minister in charge ofcrisis response management and the Prime Minister) on matters relative to populationand environment protection. ASN also ensures that operators take the appropriate
measures to restore a facility subject to a malicious act to a safe state.

1.4.6.

IRSN, the French Institute for Radiological Protection
and Nuclear Safety

IRSN, a public body with industrial and commercial activities set up in 20024, provides
technical support to all the government authorities involved in the [185_TD$IF]security of nuclear
material, nuclear facilities and the transportation of nuclear material. In particular, on
behalf of the HFDS at the Ministry for Energy and within the framework of an agreement
made with this ministry, IRSN’s responsibilities are as follows:– it analyzes situations and ﬁles with a view to preparing decisions made by the
HFDS;– it provides the HFDS with qualiﬁed and trustworthy certiﬁed personnel to carryout inspections at nuclear facilities and for the transportation of nuclear material;
4.

IRSN came into being as the result of the merger between the IPSN (Institute for Nuclear Safety andProtection), which belonged to the CEA, and the technical branch of the OPRI (Ofﬁce for Protection
against Ionizing Radiation).

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– it takes part in drawing up regulations and assists the HFDS’ departments inactivities conducted to this end at international level;– it manages the centralized accountancy of all nuclear material used for civil
purposes in France;– it manages and processes agreements to transport nuclear material, monitorstransport operations and pass on the alert to the authorities;– it conducts studies and experiments to support its technical assessments or fortests that may be required for during inspections.

1.5. Regulatory framework
France’s regulatory framework applicable to nuclear material, nuclear facilities andthe transportation of nuclear material includes legislative texts (laws), and regulatory
texts (decrees and implementation orders). These texts are mainly contained in orderived from the French Defense Code; the key references are:– the legislative parts (Articles L. 1333-1 and following of the Defense Code) and theregulatory parts (Articles R. 1333-1 and following) relative to the protection andcontrol of nuclear material;– the legislative parts (Articles L. 1332-1 and following of the Defense Code) and theregulatory parts (Articles R. 1332-1 and following) relative to the protection offacilities of vital importance (see 1.6.1);– the national security directive (DNS) relative to the nuclear sector adopted inapplication of the Defense Code (a classiﬁed document not available to the publicwhich details the design basis threat);– the orders implementing Articles L. 1333-1 and following of the Defense Code:the order relative to license application procedures and to the form of thelicenses (implementing Article L. 1333-2 of the Defense Code);the order relative to the physical protection of facilities where nuclear material
is kept and the possession of which requires a license;

the order relative to the procedures for conducting the study provided forunder Article R. 1333-4 of the Defense Code for the protection of nuclear
material and facilities;the order stipulating the conditions for implementing physical tracking andaccountancy of nuclear material the possession of which requires a license;

the order relative to the protection and control of nuclear material duringtransport;the order relative to the physical tracking, accountancy and physical protection measures applicable to nuclear material subject to declaration and on theform and procedures of the declaration.

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Figure 7. Diagram explaining France’s nuclear security regulatory framework.

The provisions set out under Articles L. 1332-1 and R. 13321 and following and thoseunder Articles L. 1333-1 and R. 13331 and following of the Defense Code are interconnected in a coherent whole, which is a key part of the system designed to ensure that
nuclear material, nuclear facilities and transport are adequately protected against
malicious acts. All these measures and the texts adopted for their implementation
form a coherent framework that must be implemented both by the public authorities andby the operators of the nuclear sector. Figure 7 shows the structure of the nuclear
security regulatory framework. These measures are described below in sections 1.6.1 and1.6.2 respectively.
Furthermore, the legislative and regulatory texts relative to nuclear safety also referto nuclear security, namely:– the French Act of June 13, 2006 relative to Transparency and Security in the
Nuclear Field, known as the “TSN Act”;– the Decree of November 2, 2007, relative to regulated nuclear facilities and to thecontrol, in the nuclear safety ﬁeld, of the transport of radioactive substances,
known as the “Procedures Decree”.

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Last, the corpus of French legislative and regulatory texts includes other texts which,although not speciﬁcally relative to nuclear security, must also be taken into consideration in the ﬁeld of protection of nuclear material, nuclear facilities and the transport ofnuclear material, in particular those texts relative to the protection of sensitive
information, the use of weapons and the protection of scientiﬁc and technical assets.
We should also mention the French Penal Code in which the measures applicable to all
crimes and offences are listed.

1.6. The Protection and Control System
The public authorities’ objective is to establish, within the framework of the
security posture, an appropriate system to counter malicious acts targeting nuclear
material and facilities designed for their protection and that of the transport of suchmaterial. This system has two major parts which are intrinsically interrelated. The ﬁrst
covers the measures adopted for planning security activities, based on the design basis
threat and on developing and implementing security plans. The second more speciﬁcally covers the security measures deployed to prevent the risks of theft or diversion of
nuclear material or of sabotage liable to result in radiological releases into theenvironment.

1.6.1.

Measures adopted for planning security activities

1.6.1.1. Protecting activities of vital importance
Articles L. 1332-1 and R. 1332-1 and following of the French Defense Code stipulate
the approach applicable to planning, vigilance, prevention, protection and response to
any threat liable to impact on operators and activities of vital importance.
The planning approach is also based on national security directives (DNS) which
specify, for each sector of activity, the risk analysis and the principles to be implemented
to protect against the design basis threat. These directives are aimed at setting therequirements applicable to the protection of sites, buildings and facilities (which areconsidered as points of vital importance) which, if damaged, unavailable or destroyed,
would, directly or indirectly risk:– seriously encumbering the Nation’s military and economic capabilities, and its
security and ability to survive;– seriously impacting on the health or lives of the population.
The DNS relative to the nuclear sub-sector of the energy sector sets out the approach
for analyzing security needs to counter the risks mentioned above. It also presents thedesign basis threat specifying the means and the characteristics of possible attacks fromwithin or outside the facility.
In addition, this DNS explains the manner in which operators must take into accountthe attack scenarios related to each different threat. The nature of these threats can vary
greatly (for example: demonstration by a hostile crowd, attack by one or more individuals
equipped and armed to varying degrees, etc.) and the scale of potential consequences can

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Figure 8. Diagram showing the allocation of the responsibilities assigned to the State and the nuclear
operator depending on the severity of the threat.

be very different. The scenarios are prioritized according to the feasibility or simplicity ofcarrying out the act in question and according to the severity of the potential consequences. In particular, requirements are set out according to the level of the attack inquestion, ﬁrst, in terms of acceptance of the consequences and second, in terms of thedesign of the protection system. Figure 8 shows the allocation of the responsibilities
assigned to the State and the operators depending on the severity of the threat. These
requirements are deﬁned in relation to safety requirements.
This directive also deﬁnes the basic design and assessment criteria of the security
system, distinguishing between a constant security posture and temporary, gradedmeasures designed to be tailored to the threat (Vigipirate [see 1.6.1.2]). For each threat,
general protection objectives are set for the operator and for the public authorities. The
protection of facilities and material is ensured by a series of consistent measures agreed
between the State and operators in the nuclear sector, thus forming an overall,
integrated design. This security system includes:– internal protection measures, applying within sites and facilities and under the
responsibility of the operators;– external protection measures, under the responsibility of the public authorities.
Along the same lines, the French Defense Code introduces three kinds of security
plan:– the Operator’s Security Plan (PSO), in which each operator of vital importancedeﬁnes its overall security policy and a list of the points of vital importance it runs;

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– the Speciﬁc protection plan (PPP), which describes the protection measures foreach point of vital importance;– and the External protection plan (PPE), which describes the security measures
under the responsibility of the public authorities, in addition to the speciﬁc
protection plans.
The operator’s security plan and the speciﬁc protection plan stipulate deadlines bywhich the operator has to implement the protection measures. These plans are
periodically reviewed and updated.

1.6.1.2. Vigipirate
The French General Secretariat for Defense and National Security (SGDSN) carriesout risk analysis, plans prevention and intervention measures relative to the terrorist
threat and monitors the application thereof. One of the key measures in this system is
Vigipirate, the government’s plan establishing vigilance, prevention and protection
measures. Conceived in 1978, the plan has since been updated and redesigned several
times, in particular following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and again in 2014, toimprove the State’s capabilities for protecting the population and activities of vital
importance and ensuring the continuity of national vital activities.
The Vigipirate plan has two objectives: to protect the population, infrastructure andinstitutions, and to plan the response in the event of an attack. The most recent version of
the plan is based on the premise that the terrorist threat must now be considered
permanent. It deﬁnes a set of operational measures that can be applied under any
circumstances, even if there are no speciﬁc signs of a threat.
For each point of vital importance, the operators must, in particular, deﬁne security
measures and procedures applicable to each different level of the Vigipirate plan.

1.6.2.

Measures relative to the operator’s obligations

The protection of nuclear material is based on physical protection measures andphysical tracking and accountancy measures, where the latter are mainly intended for the
purpose of detecting any theft or diversion of nuclear material as quickly as possible. A
signiﬁcant development in the approach deployed by the public authorities is theextension of the protection of nuclear material, nuclear facilities and the transportationof nuclear material from acts of sabotage. It should be noted in fact that the initial
regulatory protection measures deployed with regard to nuclear material primarily
covered the risks of theft and diversion.
Measures designed to protect nuclear material from the risks of theft or diversion andmeasures designed to protect nuclear material, the associated nuclear facilities andtransportation of nuclear material from acts of sabotage obviously work in complement
to and in synergy with each other, resulting in the design of a consistent protection
system which covers both types of risk.
Articles L. 1333-1 and R. 1333-1 and following of the French Defense Code describe
the obligations involving nuclear material and related to certain activities (possession,

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use, transportation, etc.). These articles provide for the protection and control of nuclear
material against theft or diversion or any act of sabotage aimed at tampering with,damaging or dispersing nuclear material.
These regulations provide for:– a license issued by the public authorities following examination of the measurespresented by the operator and a security study designed to demonstrate theeffectiveness of those measures; the study must demonstrate how the aforementioned measures meet the protection requirements assigned to the operator;– a control approach based on a system of inspections carried out by trustworthy
personnel;– criminal and administrative sanctions where necessary.
The regulations also provide for the set up of two advisory committees, one to advise
the public authorities on questions relative to security during the transportation of nuclear
material and the second to advise on facility protection. Made up of experts from thecompetent ministerial services and the bodies and operators involved, these committees
provide, upon request, advices and recommendations to the Minister for Energy and, where
needed, to the Defense Minister. IRSN is tasked with ensuring the secretariat and logistics
for these committees, and acts as rapporteur before these committees, presenting reports
and assessments on the studies carried out by the operators.

1.6.2.1. Licenses
The import, export, production, possession, transfer, use and transport of nuclear
material is, above certain limits, set under the regulations, subject to a license that mustbe issued by the Minister for Energy prior to engaging in any such activity. The license isissued together with administrative requirements (mainly regarding the quantities ofnuclear material in question and the period of time for which they will be held) andappropriate technical requirements. A license may be suspended or revoked in the eventof any breach or failure to comply with the relevant requirements. Each license speciﬁes
the measures that must be implemented by the operator to ensure that nuclear material
is protected, tracked and accounted for. The license applies to nuclear material held, usedor transported.
In accordance with the graded approach, the activities that make use of quantities ofnuclear material below the limits set under the regulations are not subject to the license
regime but rather to a declaration regime. This less restrictive declaration regime requires
the annual declaration of the quantities of nuclear material held and the activities carriedout, together with the implementation of physical protection measures. Figure 9 shows
the limits associated with the different regimes set out in the French Defense Code.

1.6.2.1.1. Licensing procedure
The license application submitted by an operator includes administrative information,a description of the planned activities, a description of the facilities, and speciﬁes theC01

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Figure 9. Limits regarding quantities of nuclear material applicable under the different regimes set out in
the French Defense Code.

nature and the quantities of the materials in question, together with the measures thatthe applicant proposes implementing to ensure nuclear material tracking and accountancy and physical protection. Figure 10 summarizes the steps involved in completing or
updating applications for a license and control ﬁle. All license applications must be
accompanied by a security study, as described above. The licensing procedure is an
iterative process involving the nuclear security authority, IRSN as its technical support
and the operator. Figure 11 shows the security dialogue and Figure 12 represents theprinciples governing dialogue between the different stakeholders.

Figure 10. Procedure for preparation and renewal of a license and control ﬁle (HFDS: Senior Defense andSecurity Ofﬁcial).

1.6.2.1.2. Nuclear material physical tracking and accountancy
With regard to the physical tracking and accountancy of nuclear material, theoperator must implement all measures required to precisely know the quantity andC01

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Figure 11. Security dialogue between the security authority and the operators.

Figure 12. Principle governing dialogue between the different stakeholders.

characteristics of all nuclear material entering or leaving the facility and to know at
all times where it is located, and its uses, movements and any change to the nuclear
material. In addition, the operator must check, by conducting regular inventory
checks, that the physical state of the nuclear material held complies with thephysical tracking and accountancy records kept at the facility. These measures
are designed to ensure that any anomaly is detected as rapidly as possible. The
operator must immediately inform the police or the gendarmerie with competence inthe region if it appears that any nuclear material has gone missing, or been stolen or
diverted.
An Order deﬁnes the measures that must be taken by an operator regarding
nuclear material accountancy management, particularly with regard to any quantitative or qualitative variation in the inventory of materials held. This Order requiresthat the operator notify IRSN’s national centralized nuclear material accountancy ofC01

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Elements of security and non-proliferation

any such variation. It also introduces a mechanism for information-sharing between
shippers and receivers, with cross-veriﬁcations by both parties, together with asystem for materials acceptance upon reception by the receiver. In the case of themost sensitive materials, the order requires that the partners involved ﬁrst draw up
protocols, approved by the competent authority, relative to dealing with any
nonconformance liable to arise during material transfer (e.g. regarding the precisionof measurements taken by the shipper and those taken by the receiver). Last, it
requires each operator to conduct an annual inventory check, in addition to theregular inventory checks.

1.6.2.1.3. Physical protection of facilities
For the physical protection of nuclear material, the regulations require each operator
to identify possible targets and classify them using the graded approach. Thus:– nuclear material is divided into three categories (categories I to III) deﬁned
according to the nature and the quantity of the material, in line with theCategorization of nuclear material table given in INFCIRC 225, revision 5; themost sensitive materials are classiﬁed in Category I, i.e. those which are most
likely to be directly used to make nuclear explosive devices. For each category,
physical protection measures, designed for the operations to which the material issubjected and to local operating conditions, are deﬁned;– nuclear material which if altered, damaged or dispersed, together with equipment or functions which, if they fail, are damaged or malfunction, could resultin signiﬁcant radiological consequences, must be located in areas which areprotected in compliance with the response levels for radiological emergencies
set by the ASN in application of the provisions of the French Public Health
Code.
The requirements that must be complied with regarding physical protection are set
out in an Order. In particular, in the case of facilities, this Order deﬁnes the protection
zones to be set up in application of the defense in depth approach. Depending on the typeof target to be protected, the operator must set up one or more lines of protection, fromamong the following:– a limited access area;– a protected area;– a high security area;– an inner area;– a vital area;– a storage area, or “strong room”.
A protected area and a high security area are areas located inside a limited accessarea. An inner area and a vital area are areas located inside a high security area. A storage

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Figure 13. Diagram showing the layout of the different lines of protection in a nuclear facility incompliance with the defense in depth principle.

area is contained inside an inner area. Figure 13 shows the layout of the different areas ina nuclear facility.
The Order deﬁnes the key capabilities required for the systems protecting thedifferent areas. Each area is thus deﬁned by a physical barrier separate from the barriers
surrounding other areas, unless otherwise speciﬁcally provided for. This physical barrier(Figure 14) has a limited number of openings and access points (Figure 15). Each such area
is protected with detection, intrusion and delay systems.

Figure 14. Physical protection barrier, Cadarache, France. © Olivier Seignette/Mikaël Lafontan/IRSN.

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Figure 15. Access control system at the Fessenheim site, France. © Noak/Le Bar Floréal/IRSN.

1.6.2.1.4. Security study
The organization and resources implemented for the physical tracking, accountancy
and physical protection of nuclear material subject to a license are described in detail in astudy drawn up by the operator, demonstrating how the organization and resources
ensure appropriate protection against the risks that have been identiﬁed. The proceduresfor drawing up and revising this study are speciﬁed in an Order. Figure 16 shows themethod to be applied when developing a security study.
With regard to physical protection, this study entails analyzing the sequences ofactions involved in acts of theft, diversion or sabotage, assessing, at each step in the

Figure 16. Method to be applied when developing a security study.

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attack scenario, the opportunities for detection and access delay, and relating the time it
would take to carry out each step to the time needed to deploy an appropriate response
after detection. With regard to physical tracking and accountancy, it entails analyzing thecapabilities of the tracking and accountancy systems to detect any loss or theft of nuclear
material, and also any possible fraud within these systems designed to conceal any illegal
operation.
The study, which is a classiﬁed document under the protection of secret national
defense information, is based on the design basis threat deﬁned by the State. It is
structured around internal and external attack scenarios. The nature and the number ofattackers are speciﬁed, as are the objectives and means at their disposal. These scenarios
involve either the theft or diversion of nuclear material, or sabotage liable to result inradioactive releases to the environment or impact on human health.
The threats to be covered in a facility security study are identiﬁed on the basis of thereference set of the design basis threat given in the appendix to the national security
directive (DNS) relative to the nuclear sector; this reference set can be adapted or added
to in order to factor in characteristics speciﬁc to the entity or facility in question.

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IRSN’s approach based on sensitivity
and vulnerability assessments
Objective
There are several stages involved in examining how well a nuclear facility isprotected against malicious acts liable to result in radioactive releases. First, thefacility’s level of protection from the design basis threat deﬁned by the State must be
assessed. Once this level is known, it may appear that the protection system needs tobe improved to correct any weaknesses or reinforce protection to adapt it to emerging
threats.

Organization
To demonstrate its facility’s protection level, the operator, with prime responsibility for the facility’s security, draws up a security study. This study is submitted for
examination by IRSN, provider of technical support to the nuclear security authority.
The results of the operator’s study and its examination by IRSN are then presented tothe authority, either directly in the simplest cases, or within the framework of anadvisory committee for larger-scale or more complex cases. When called upon, theadvisory committee will provide the authority with an advice and recommendations
relative to the facility’s security level and to the requirements that should be imposedon the operator (including further assessments). The authority, on the basis of the
proposals made by IRSN and, depending on the case, the advisory committee, takes a

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decision regarding the license application, and, if necessary, notiﬁes the operator of
any requirements to reinforce facility protection.

Analysis method
In France, a speciﬁc approach to the security studies has been developed by
IRSN for many years. This is known as the “sensitivity-vulnerability” approach andcan be summarized as follows:– First, the sensitivity of each area or potential target in the facility isdetermined; sensitivity is characterized by the level of the radiologicalconsequences likely to result from a malicious act in the area or to the target
in question.
– Second, the vulnerability of the areas or targets presenting the highest level ofrisk is assessed in relation to each type of attack, i.e. the degree of difﬁculty incarrying out a given attack in the area or to the target in question is assessed.
– If it seems that additional measures are necessary to enhance the protection ofareas or targets, in view of the estimated consequences of an attack, a reviewof the study is required in order to ensure that the measures implemented areappropriate and effective. Such measures are designed either to reduce thelevel of sensitivity or increase the degree of difﬁculty involved in carrying out
a given attack.

1.1 Determining sensitivity
Analyzing the sensitivity of a facility entails identifying, based on the available
safety analyses, possible accident sequences liable to result in signiﬁcant consequences for people and the environment.
An “accident sequence” is a series of events, triggered by one or more initiating
events (failure of one or more components or functions, human error), which places
the facility in a degraded situation and may, in spite of backup systems and the means
implemented to mitigate the consequences, lead to the release of radioactive
substances or toxic chemicals. Conventional safety analyses examine suchsequences and the related protective measures, mainly based on a conventional
list of design basis incidents and accidents.
Analyzing the sensitivity of a facility entails, ﬁrst, examining the safety-related
equipment and functions at the facility and identifying any for which a failure or loss,
assumed in this case to result from a malicious act, could result in a degradedsituation.
It is also necessary to examine the initiating events of degraded situations
speciﬁcally related to malicious acts. To do this, speciﬁc failures liable to result froma malicious act and result in the loss of functions or equipment that have not been
covered in the safety case are examined.

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The method is thus used to identify the most sensitive elements within thefacility (components, systems and functions), and the areas in which they are located.
These targets or areas are then classiﬁed using a graded approach according to theseverity of the consequences of a malicious act within that area or to that target. In
particular, an area or target is said to be critical if an act leads to signiﬁcant radiologicalconsequences which are, however, deemed admissible in the safety case, and an area ortarget is said to be vital if an act is likely to result in radiological or toxic consequences
which are more signiﬁcant than those compatible with the operating conditions deﬁned
in the safety case.
To illustrate this in reference to reactors in France’s nuclear power plant ﬂeet,
safety analyses used to determine sensitivity are mainly those used in the “deterministic” approach based on the study of postulated incidents and accidents. The
lessons learned from probabilistic safety analyses, drawn up either by Électricité deFrance or developed by IRSN, can also be used. It should also be remembered that,in the case of nuclear reactors, three basic safety functions must be ensured:– control of reactivity;– residual-heat removal;– and containment of radioactive material.

1.2 Assessing vulnerability
Two points are addressed in assessing the vulnerability of the areas or targets thathave been identiﬁed:– an estimation of the means required to destroy or damage equipment or afunction (e.g. the amount of explosives needed);– the identiﬁcation of the pathways to reach the sensitive area or target.
The second point can be addressed by identifying all the paths leading to eachsensitive area or target, and, for each one, estimating the difﬁculties and therefore theaverage amount of time required to breach obstacles, and the possibilities ofdetecting the attackers.
The former approach, which should be assessed in relation to the response
capabilities of on site and off site security forces, provides at least a qualitative
assessment of how vulnerable a sensitive area or target may be, and demonstrates theneed to implement additional measures (design modiﬁcations, additional physicalprotection measures, etc.). This analysis should make it possible to reconcile theneed for adequate physical protection and the constraints related to facility operating
conditions, nuclear safety and the response conditions in the event of an emergency.
It should be noted that the measures to be adopted to reduce the vulnerability ofequipment or a function are generally not the same, depending on whether the threat
comes from inside or outside the facility.

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1.3 Acceptance criteria
Admissible consequences are deemed to be consequences resulting from radioactive releases lower than or equal to the levels taken into consideration in thefacility’s safety case. This kind of approach implies that the vulnerability of vitalareas is reduced to such an extent as to ensure an excellent level of protection forthese areas. For critical areas, the level of protection is assessed on a case by casebasis according to the consequences of a malicious act and the degree of difﬁculty incarrying out such an act.
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1.6.2.1.5. Protection during transport
Protection measures for the transport of nuclear material are, in principle, designed toensure a level of physical protection equivalent to that deployed in facilities. Suchequivalence is achieved through the design and manufacturing of transportation devices
and through the conditions under which nuclear material is transported. As in the case of
facilities, strict conﬁdentiality must be kept to ensure that protection measures are effective.

1.6.2.1.5.1. Physical protection
The choice of route and the planned dates for transporting the most sensitive
materials (namely, Category I and II nuclear material) must remain conﬁdential to meetthe stated objective of protecting nuclear material.
Prior to the transport operation, routes and dates are examined by the operator witha view to minimizing risks. Various factors serve to determine the possible routes:– give priority to fast roads, primarily highways;– avoid densely-populated residential areas and urban areas where trafﬁc is liable tobe congested;– as far as possible, avoid dangerous roads.
The routes are selected following reconnaissance in the ﬁeld, giving preference toroutes involving minimal risk of accident or of stopped vehicles. For the same points ofdeparture and arrival, the operator selects several different routes so as not to use thesame one each time.
Furthermore, the dates scheduled for transport are chosen at propitious times,
avoiding peak travel days (for example, days when people depart on vacation). Weather
conditions which could cause certain transport operations to be delayed in the event of
bad weather (storms, snow, black ice, etc.) are also taken into account.
Last, it should be recalled that the transport of nuclear material is a transport ofhazardous material and is therefore subject to the relative regulations and the various
trafﬁc restrictions and prohibitions pertaining to such transport.
Nuclear material can only be transported by companies authorized to do so by the
Ministry of Energy (see Figures 17 and 19).

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Figure 17. Truck transporting uranyl nitrate in an ISO standard LR 65 container. Manche. © EURODOCCENTRIMAGE, AREVA.

In particular, transport is carried out by drivers who have completed special training
which includes knowledge of the regulations applicable to the transport of dangerous
materials, driving in extreme situations and responding to attack.
Transporting the most sensitive nuclear materials (Category I and II nuclear material)is carried out under escort. This is provided by the French national gendarmerie. It entails
monitoring trafﬁc ﬂow to ensure that the convoy can progress in good conditions.
Transport packages containing nuclear material are designed to limit the radiologicalimpact of transport operations, including during accident situations deﬁned under thesafety regulations. The more serious the potential consequences for people and theenvironment, the more robust they must be. Tests are carried out under severe conditions
to test their resistance, as per the international regulations (especially the European
Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road [ADR]).
In addition to the nuclear safety measures implemented, experiments and studies havebeen carried out by IRSN in conjunction with the operators in question and with the nuclear
security authority, with a view to assessing the strength of transport packages to withstandconditions related to malicious acts. In particular, the ultimate strength of several different
types of package when subject to different types of weapons has been tested.
All means of transport used to transport nuclear material must be approved by the
Ministry of Energy. More particularly, this approval, which is subject to meeting
requirements set by orders which are not public, covers the means implemented toprotect the load from attempted theft, to protect the crew, and to alert the law
enforcement agencies so that they can respond to the attack. Within this framework,
IRSN monitors and controls the design and manufacture of all transport vehicle equipment on behalf of the nuclear security authority.

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In addition, transport operations are kept under constant surveillance, primarily by
the drivers and the escort provided by the gendarmerie. In particular, at the end of a leg,the vehicle must park overnight at a site selected in advance, called a “stopping place”,
which must be approved by the Minister for Energy.
In addition to protecting the nuclear material being transported, the vehicle musthave speciﬁc systems to protect the drivers in the event of attack.

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Studies carried out by IRSN on protection against
malicious acts during transport
Safety during the transport of nuclear or radioactive material mainly relies on thedesign and suitability of the transport packages in relation to the quantity of materialtransported and related hazards. The accident situations predeﬁned in the regulations
relative to transport safety are taken into consideration in the design of transport
packages. The higher the level of radioactivity contained in the packages, the morerobust they must be. Tests are carried out under severe conditions to test their strength(resistance to impact, perforation, ﬁre and immersion).
In addition to these safety provisions, the packages’ resistance to a certain numberof security-related attacks is also tested. The behavior of the packages to the effects ofan explosive charge or of a penetrating or cutting weapon must be assessed and, if
necessary, additional protection must be implemented to limit the radiological consequences that could result from such attacks. Within this framework, IRSN has initiateda large-scale program aiming to assess the resistance to acts of sabotage displayed byvarious packages used to transport nuclear materials. It should be remembered that, by
deﬁnition, an act of sabotage is carried out with intent to disperse radioactive material at
the scene of the act and in the immediate environment, unlike attempted theft ordiversion, where the aim is to appropriate the nuclear material.
As part of this program, IRSN has developed an approach for assessing thepotential consequences of an attack on a transport package (i.e. on the container andits contents) divided into four stages and certain number of actions.

Stage 1: description of the packagea. The material transported in the package is characterized by the quantity containedin the package, its location, its physical-chemical form, its state and the radionuclides in its composition. In the event of dispersion, this material can cause doses
either by direct irradiation or by inhaling the suspended fraction, or by ingestion.
b. A package is made up of several successive protective casings, some of which
serve as containment barriers and are designed to ensure a level of leak tightness.
Nonetheless, in the case of protection against sabotage, it is important to examine
not only the containment barriers but also all the casing layers through which a

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penetrating weapon, for example, would have to penetrate to reach the radioactive material (see Figure 18). The characteristics (thickness, materials, etc.) of
the different casings are crucial to the assessment of the vulnerability of a
package inside its means of transport.

Stage 2: description of the attack
a. The characteristics and the means of the attack are determined using the reference
set of the design basis threat which speciﬁes the means attributed to attackers (theequipment they may use, types and quantities of explosives, types and calibers of
weapons, etc.).
b. Any aggravating factors are thus determined: the material contained may, incertain conditions, react upon contact with the device used for sabotage, inparticular due to the energy released. Such a reaction and the resulting changes inthermodynamic conditions can make any damage to the package worse andincrease the possibility of radioactive releases from the package.

Stage 3: assessment of damages caused by the attack
a. The factors contributing to resistance to attack are assessed using theoretical
approaches, digital simulation and experiments, which serve to assess mechanical and heat damage to the package and its different casing layers, likely to leadto loss of integrity or loss of leak tightness and thus result in the release ofradioactive material.
b. The quantities of material impacted by the attack. In general, it is unlikely that all
the nuclear material contained in a package would be impacted by the attack.
Only a fraction of the material would be impacted and likely to be released to theenvironment. It is therefore important to estimate the quantity and quality of sucha fraction, as accurately as possible.

Stage 4: radioactive releases
a. The quantity of radioactive material likely to be released into the environment,
partly or entirely and over time, must be precisely calculated, albeit with a certain
degree of conservatism.
b. The reduction factors, thanks to which the quantity of radionuclides actually
released is reduced in relation to the quantity theoretically likely to be released into
the environment, either naturally or by design, must be assessed. An example of anatural reduction factor is the adhesion of particles to surfaces. Design-related
reduction factors include all the means and measures implemented to reduceradioactive releases.
c. Possible leakage paths must be listed and characterized in order to estimate thekinetic of the releases. Leaks are characterized by the number and the dimensions ofbreaches made in the last containment barrier when it is damaged. By relating theseto known pressure and temperature conditions inside the package, it is possible toestimate the leak rate.

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d. Releases to the environment. To determine the fraction of material released from thepackage, it is necessary to know certain intrinsic characteristics of the material inquestion, for example, the rate of resuspension for a powder. It is also necessary to
determine the duration of the release, which may vary depending on the scenario
under consideration. It may be short (a puff) or prolonged; in the latter case, it isimportant to know if the concentration of radioactive products is constant over timeor if it is variable.
All the information obtained using this approach is then used to calculate theradiological or chemical consequences which may include contamination of theenvironment or radiation doses to people.

Figure 18. Modeling the impact of a hollow charge on a fuel assembly.
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1.6.2.1.5.2. Monitoring transport
The Gendarmerie nationale escort team remains in constant radio and visual contact
with the vehicle transporting sensitive nuclear material and also in radio contact with the
Gendarmerie nationale’s operations centers. In the event that an incident occurs duringtransport, the escort intervenes immediately and puts out the alert.
The transport of sensitive nuclear material is kept under constant surveillance by aspecial IRSN operations center. This includes telephone contact at regular intervals and in
the event of an incident with or possibly having consequences on the progress of thetransport operation. In addition, the exact location of the vehicle is known at all times
thanks to a satellite positioning system. Any abnormal movement of the shipment canthus be detected in real time; if those responsible for transporting the materials fail to
respond a fast alert and response is triggered.
In the event of an incident affecting a transport operation, the escort is the ﬁrst-level
response team. The local law enforcement agencies — police or gendarmerie — respondto reinforce this level and, if needed, to serve as a second level of response. To this end,
the services involved are systematically informed beforehand of any movement of
nuclear material within the area under their jurisdiction.

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Figure 19. Ship transporting nuclear material. © Arnaud Bouissou/MEDDE-MLET.

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IRSN Transport Operations Center
IRSN has a special operations center for monitoring nuclear material transport,
called IRSN Transport Operations Center (EOT).

Responsibilities
The EOT has three main responsibilities which it carries out on behalf of thenuclear security authority as part of nuclear material protection and control. It
manages and monitors nuclear material transport operations in real time, performs
technical controls on the means of transport (tractors and trailers) to check forcompliance with regulatory requirements relative to nuclear security and performs
inspections during transport operations. These activities are called technical support
responsibilities, since they are technical activities that come under the State’s
sovereign functions carried out on behalf of the competent authority. All the different
modes of transport used for transporting nuclear material are monitored (road, rail,
sea and air) and this at national and international levels.

Organization
Managing and monitoring nuclear material transport operations relies on constant communications between the State services involved, the carriers and all theother stakeholders (national police and gendarmerie, customs, port authorities, etc.)
and also including those involved in obtaining transport licenses. To manage this

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activity, the EOT has its own premises equipped to ensure the conﬁdentiality andsecurity of all information held and communicated (e.g. premises within a limitedaccess area monitored by an alarm system, secured communications, protectedcomputer network, etc.), and to ensure the availability of the service (e.g. emergency
power backup, redundant communication networks, etc.). The EOT also uses
transport management and monitoring software specially developed in-house. A
team of around twelve people (engineers and technicians) work 2 x 8-hour shifts.

Some figures for 2014 (Figures 20 and 21)– 1,318 nuclear material transport operations were carried out in France;– 66 technical controls and 42 inspections during transport operations.

Figure 20. Breakdown of nuclear material transport operations monitored by IRSN by mode andby type of activity in 2014.

Figure 21. Histogram of nuclear material transport operations monitored by IRSN from 1982 to2014.
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1.6.2.1.6. Reporting anomalies and events relative to malicious acts
Any event liable to affect the protection or control of nuclear material must bereported to the Minister for Energy. In particular, any anomaly affecting the physicalprotection system and requiring implementation of compensatory measures not deﬁned
in the license, together with the detection of any event liable to affect the protection oftargets and corroborated by more than one sign, must immediately be reported to the
Minister for Energy. This information must be followed, within 48 hours, by a reportdetailing the measures taken by the operator.
Within two months of the date of the event, the operator must submit a detailed
analysis report to the Minister for Energy, unless the latter releases him from thisobligation, specifying in particular the characteristics of the anomaly detected and themeasures taken to deal with it, the lessons learned and measures taken to prevent any
future occurrence of the anomaly.

1.6.2.2. Control
Under the French Defense Code, control covers the administrative and technicalaspects of licensed activities. The operator has prime responsibility for implementing thiscontrol (ﬁrst-level control).
Nonetheless, the system deployed, mainly based on a performance based approach,is reinforced by a mechanism for inspection by the competent authority of the operator’s
application of the regulations and fulﬁllment of the undertakings contracted. This
inspection mechanism is part of second-level control. This entails the inspection ofcompliance and can result in ﬁnding deviations from the license reference documents andall the documents drawn up to support the license application.
The personnel in charge of control and of application of the protection measures are
speciﬁcally and individually vetted for this purpose by the Minister for Energy, inapplication of Article L.1333-5 of the French Defense Code. They are certiﬁed anddesignated by name by Order of the Minister for Energy. The personnel work either for
the Senior Defense and Security Ofﬁcial (HFDS) of the Ministry of Energy or for IRSN.
Prior to every inspection, the Minister for Energy notiﬁes the operator of the date andpurpose. In the case of an unannounced inspection, notiﬁcation may be given on the sameday.
The general purpose of inspections is to ensure that licensees comply withregulations and fulﬁll their undertakings. They can also be more targeted, in whichcase they may focus on speciﬁc points such as nuclear material inventories, possiblywith measurements of the materials concerned, performance and reliability checks on
the different physical protection equipment used, the examination of procedures
governing alarms, response, or access to nuclear material storage areas, checks on theoperator’s accountancy system and exercises to check the operator’s behaviors. Other
inspections may focus on a particular operating phase of a facility (for example,
reception or shipping of nuclear material, or checking that there is no more material
held at the facility).

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Figure 22. Gamma spectrometry system used to measure nuclear material at IRSN, Fontenay-auxRoses, France. © Noak/Le Bar Floréal/IRSN.

Two main types of measurement are used on nuclear material during an inspection:(active and passive) neutron measurements and gamma spectrometry measurements(see Figure 22). IRSN has developed speciﬁc tools and methods for certain applications(material contained in waste, containers that are difﬁcult to move, etc.). The aim here isto develop measuring instruments that are both portable and as accurate as possible.
Any deviation from the license terms and conditions and any failure to meet theregulatory obligations must immediately be reported by the inspection personnel to the
Minister for Energy.
The Minister for Energy notiﬁes the operator which has undergone an inspection of
any requirements to remedy the deviations or failures observed and invites it to present
any observations it may have in writing.
Nuclear material transport inspections are carried out to check compliance withregulations. Unlike inspections of nuclear material hold at facilities, transport inspections
are always unannounced. This is because they primarily involve checking in real time thatthe carrier, through its employees’ actions, commits no fault or error relative to theapplicable texts.
Inspection of a transport operation involving the most sensitive nuclear material
includes, in particular, checking the information given in the prior notice and theconditions regarding going through motorway tolls and crossing borders, or gendarmerieescort reliefs, and checking the conditions regarding reception and protected parking for
convoys at stopping places when breaking for meals or overnight. In the case of lesssensitive material, the inspection checks that vehicles are locked and kept undersurveillance during stops.

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Inspections may also include checking a speciﬁc point in the regulations. For example,
examining the conditions under which packages are protected in ports and at airports
when a stage of the transport operation is by sea or by air. In the case of road transport,
inspectors intercept road convoys carrying nuclear material only at points where theconvoy has to stop (stopping place, border, escort relief, etc.).
As in the case of facilities, IRSN draws up a report on each inspection of a nuclear
material transport operation, which is sent to the competent authority which thennotiﬁes the operator of its conclusions, together with any corrective active that may berequired. Future inspections will check compliance with any requirements requested by
the competent authority.
It should also be mentioned that inspections are carried out on vehicles that must be
approved. Such inspections aim to ensure compliance with technical requirements set out
in the license.

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Measurements of nuclear material during inspections
The measurements of nuclear material carried out by IRSN during inspections onbehalf of the nuclear security authority mainly involve uranium and plutonium.
Before carrying out any measurement of nuclear material during an inspection, thecontrol objectives are speciﬁed, thereby indicating the type of measurement required.
The objectives may include:– identifying the nuclear material;– determining its isotopic composition;– estimating the relevant mass.
In all cases, the results are checked against the information provided by theoperator to ensure that they are consistent.
Most of the measurement methods developed and used by IRSN are based onconventional non-destructive measurement methods adapted to the speciﬁc constraints imposed by the inspection context. These constraints are as follows:– the measuring devices used must be transportable. The equipment used must be
robust, reliable, easy to transport and deploy, and afford excellent performance;– inspection measurements are non-destructive and generally indirect measurements, since the nuclear material is enclosed in containers that create ascreen between the material and the measuring device;– the measurements must be performed as quickly as possible. During aninspection, the aim is to check a large number of items within a limited
amount of time. A compromise must therefore be found between the time
taken to perform the measurement and the level of accuracy required.

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The simplest measurement is that of the mass of the nuclear material. The best
method is to weigh it to obtain the mass, once the material has been correctly
identiﬁed. The mass is determined using weighing scales whose accuracy andprecision are known. Periodic certiﬁed checks must have been made on the scales
and the results of such checks archived. In addition to weighing, it is obviously
essential to ensure that the item does contain nuclear material and to know what thatmaterial is.
Exhaustive and precise control of all the products held at a facility would requirevery lengthy inspections. The controls are therefore usually limited to quick controls
to verify that the material being controlled is in fact nuclear material and to determine
its nature. The term “foolprooﬁng” is used for this type of control.
IRSN uses various types of measurements to perform a quantitative control of
nuclear material from a batch from which a certain number of items have beenpreselected (sampling):– passive neutron measurement, consisting in measuring the neutrons naturally
emitted from the material. This type of measurement is suitable for quantifying plutonium;– active neutron measurement, consisting in detecting the neutrons emitted
from ﬁssion induced in the material by an external source of radiation. This
type of measurement is suitable for quantifying uranium and can also be used
to measure plutonium;– gamma spectrometry measurements, used to determine the isotopic composition of plutonium and to quantify the mass of plutonium and uranium.
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1.6.2.3. Sanctions
Certain activities involving nuclear material are punishable offences and can be subject
to severe sanctions. Such offences include the undue appropriation of nuclear material, theunauthorized exercise of activities regulated by the law, the abandonment, dispersion oralteration of nuclear material, together with the destruction of any structural elements ofpremises in which such material is processed. It should be noted that the same sanctions
apply to any attempt to commit the above-mentioned offences. Obstructing the exerciseof control and failing to declare the disappearance, loss, diversion or theft of nuclear
material within 24 hours of detection are also considered offences.
Furthermore, within the framework of application of the International Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the French Defense Code allows for any
person who has held, used or transported, outside French territory, any nuclear material
without authorization by the foreign competent authorities, to also be sanctioned.
Last, French law also provides for sanctions in the event of intrusion into or
degradation to the site of a nuclear facility, as for any sensitive facility, with a view

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to protecting the site itself, establishing a graded sentencing system in relation to thedangerousness of the behavior and the motive of the author or authors.

1.6.3.

Emergency response management and exercises
relative to security

The approach described above is supported by exercises, or drills, designed to verify
the suitability and sustainability of the system implemented, particularly with regard to
implementation of emergency response plans in the areas of safety and security. There
are three levels of security exercise:– local exercises organized by the operator in which the public authorities are not
involved. This includes alert or mobilization exercises, testing speciﬁc proceduresor the performance of security teams;– local exercises organized by the operator with the participation of local publicauthorities, namely to test their alert and mobilization procedures and to checkcoordination with the operator;– national exercises organized by the authorities, testing the overall organizationand coordination between operators and public authorities (safety and security
authorities, the judicial authority, the nuclear operator, local and national law
enforcement agencies, etc.) to manage a serious attack on a nuclear facility.
Such exercises are carried out at intervals deﬁned in agreement with the nuclear
security authority.
It should be emphasized that managing an emergency resulting from a malicious act
implies the involvement of many different stakeholders to deal with all the different
aspects inherent in such an event. Carrying out an exercise that would cover every aspect
may be complex, expensive and difﬁcult to implement. This is why several different typesof mutually complementary exercise have been developed at national level. We thus
distinguish the following:– protection and security assessment exercises (EPEES), testing the overall organization of the response to a malicious attack at a nuclear facility which could leadto signiﬁcant releases of radioactivity to the environment. In particular, these
imply implementing the safety and security emergency response plans and testing
the coordination and interaction of all the entities involved. These exercises are
based around attacks deﬁned in the design basis threat. They are especiallycentered on the deployment of the various response forces involved; the safety
aspects are simulated;– safety drills where the initiating event is a malicious act. The objective of thesedrills is to assess the decision-making processes between the safety and security
authorities and to specify the allocation of responsibility between the authorities
and the operator at national and local levels. The security aspects are simulated.
This type of exercise does not require communicating sensitive information about
the threat or the facility’s possible vulnerabilities;

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– table-top exercises, allowing for a great deal of ﬂexibility and providing a forum
for discussion in which all the stakeholders can train and discuss issues without
divulging sensitive information. These are based around an attack scenario at aﬁctional nuclear facility, requiring the involvement of all the local and national
stakeholders. The objective is to identify and develop good practices in crisis
management to respond to such an attack and thereby facilitate interfacing anddecision-making.
In addition, the competent authority can order a physical inventory of the nuclear
material held at a facility or several facilities and compare the results with nuclear
material accountancy data. Within this framework, emergency situation inventory
control exercises are regularly organized by the Minister for Energy in conjunction
with IRSN and an operator. In particular, operators are required to have establishedemergency situation inventory control procedures.
Last, nuclear material transport security exercises are also held regularly. The
scenarios for these exercises involve either the theft of material or sabotage targetingthe transport operation.

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Nuclear security table-top exercises
Security exercises are primarily carried out to ensure that smooth and effective
running of the entire organization needed to respond to a malicious act at a nuclear
facility liable to cause signiﬁcant releases of radioactivity into the environment.
Table-top exercises developed by IRSN in addition to ﬁeld exercises provide an
excellent forum for discussion of the safety and security aspects of crisis management, enabling all the stakeholders to get to know one another, train and learn towork together, without divulging any sensitive information.
Such exercises are based on a predeﬁned scenario, divided into stages designed
to train and stimulate discussion leading to decision-making. The scenario is deﬁned
assuming a serious attack on a nuclear power plant, inspired by the design basis
threat; it therefore requires the involvement of all the stakeholders affected. Thismeans the security and safety authorities, their technical support units, the local andnational operators, the local and national law enforcement agencies, the judicial
authorities and mine-clearing services, among others. The scenario is designed togenerate a series of safety function failures intended to trigger implementation of
coordinated and appropriate responses to counter the attack and restore the facility toa satisfactory safe state. The objective is to identify and manage the crucial aspects ofmanaging such a situation through information-sharing and discussion. The scenario
is divided into stages and sequences of actions, used by the facilitators to stimulate
discussion of the viewpoints and opinions of those participating in the exercise. A
ﬁnal debate serves to identify good practices and recommendations.

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Table-top exercises are a useful tool to take into account in a comprehensive way
two major issues related to manage a nuclear security crisis:– nuclear facility safety (failure or loss of safety functions and management of adegraded situation);– and security (presence of a terrorist group at a site, hostage taking, impossibility
for the local response operators to repair damaged equipment, etc.).
The threat level and the scenario are chosen to require that the attackers be
neutralized before the situation at the facility becomes irreversible (for example,
serious damage to a nuclear reactor core) with the various levels of law enforcement
progressively becoming involved as the situation deteriorates at the facility site.
The exercise is structured around four phases that have been identiﬁed for anuclear security emergency:– the reﬂex action phase, during which emergency response procedures are
initiated in the areas of safety and security;– the reﬂection phase, during which the situation is assessed, including
implementation of safety and security emergency response plans;– the response phase, which generally leads to an assault by the law enforcement agencies to neutralize the attackers;– the recovery phase, aiming to restore satisfactory safety and security conditions at the site.

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Nuclear material inventory in an emergency situation
At the request of the public authorities, IRSN regularly organizes exercises ininventory taking in an emergency relative to the nuclear material present in a facility
or facilities.

Principles
A nuclear material inventory in an emergency situation may be triggered at a
facility (or several facilities) in the event of a suspected malicious act involving
nuclear material (theft or diversion of nuclear material, act of sabotage) in order to
conﬁrm or rule out such an act. Any facility in which nuclear material is held may be
the target of this type of event and must be prepared to manage it. The approachentails drawing up a physical inventory of all items containing nuclear material
suspected of being the target of the attack, and comparing this inventory with thelocal and national accountancy records, and, if necessary, performing precise
measurements of the material and analyzing the information from the physical

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protection system of the facilities affected. Inventory taking must take no longer thana few hours. To ensure this, exercises are held regularly.

Aims of the exercises
The main objective of such exercises is to test the decision-making channels andcoordination between the various entities involved (operators and public authorities)
to clarify the role and responsibilities of each. More speciﬁcally, these exercises arealso held to train the emergency response teams, test procedures, check theeffectiveness of the system implemented and assess how much time is needed tocarry out each stage.

Organization
Exercises are organized jointly by the operator(s) of the facilities in question, thesecurity authority and IRSN, and are based on scenarios (theft, substitution,
sabotage, etc.) proposed by IRSN. A protocol sets out the procedures for the
exercise, the entities involved, the objectives to be achieved and the existence or
not of media pressure. Exercises are carried out annually and have served to test the
emergency response procedures applicable at the major nuclear operators in France.

Key results
In particular, these exercises have served to clarify the roles and interfaces
between the different emergency response organizations, and the measures to betaken to transmit, when necessary, classiﬁed information regarding the quantities andlocation of sensitive nuclear material. They have demonstrated the importance of
afﬁxing seals after characterizing nuclear material and having emergency instructions for carrying out an inventory in an emergency situation.
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

1.6.4.

Interrelation between safety and security measures

It is, of course, essential to ensure that safety and security approaches are interlinked.
This is ensured as follows. First, the Nuclear Security and Transparency Act (TSN Act)
stipulates that the construction and operation of a regulated nuclear facility (INB) is subject
to authorization. The license granting such authorization comes in addition to that provided
for in the French Defense Code relative to the protection and control of nuclear material,
nuclear facilities and the transportation of nuclear material. Any operator planning tooperate a regulated nuclear facility which also comes under the provisions of the French
Defense Code relative to holding nuclear material must therefore hold two licenses.
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45[see 1.1.1]), and the “Procedures” Decree (see 1.5) speciﬁes that the safety analysis reportfor a regulated nuclear facility must describe accidents liable to affect the facility,
whether the initiating event comes from inside or outside the facility, and including
malicious acts. This information must be included in the preliminary safety analysis
report. Similarly, during a facility’s ﬁnal shutdown and dismantling phases, safety andsecurity aspects must be managed in conjunction, with the operator required to apply for
authorization from the French Nuclear Safety Authority and, where required, update thesecurity study. A similar approach applies to managing any signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to afacility and to periodic safety reviews.
A regulated nuclear facility can, therefore, only be licensed to operate following
examination and approval by the competent authorities of the measures adopted by theoperator to protect against and counter malicious acts. The French Nuclear Safety
Authority therefore consults with the nuclear security authority with regard to these
aspects.
To take account of the sensitive nature of security-related information, a separate
application, not available to the public, is drawn up containing the security information
required for the safety analysis reports of the facilities in question.

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Chapter 2
Security of radioactive sources
2.1. Background2.1.1.

The specific case of radioactive sources

Radioactive sources (see Figures 23 and 24) are widely used all over the world, inmany different sectors including industry, medicine, research, the agri-food industry andeducation. There are risks involved in activities which use radioactive sources due to thepotential for excessive exposure to ionizing radiation. The possibility of excessive
exposure as a result of a malicious act cannot be ruled out. Misappropriate use ofradioactive sources must therefore be prevented in order to protect people and theenvironment. The approach must take account of the huge number of existing sources,
their diversity (in terms of activity, radioactive half-life, the type of radiation, physical andchemical form, packaging, etc.) and the many different sectors in which they are used.
Strengthening security for radioactive sources with regard to malicious acts implies ﬁrst
identifying the sources that may be dangerous to humans and the environment if used withmalicious intent and, secondly, taking measures to protect these sources in view of thepotential consequences of such use. This approach entails prioritizing the sources according
to the hazard presented and applying protection and control measures factoring in the risk ofmalicious use (in line with the principle of a graded approach) during their use, transport orstorage. Within this framework, IRSN conducted a program aiming to better assess the risksof any potential malicious use of radioactive sources. The program was structured as below:– listing radioactive sources and grouping them into different types or families;– assessing the sensitivity of the different types or families of radioactive sources interms of the level of the consequences of a malicious act involving their use;

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– analyzing the vulnerability of the most sensitive radioactive sources;– determining the technical and organizational measures to ensure the security ofthe most sensitive and the most vulnerable radioactive sources.

Figure 23. Reconditioning radioactive sources at IRSN, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France. © Olivier Seignette/Mikaël Lafontan/IRSN.

The results of these studies were then used in an international framework and also to
draw up French regulations in this area.

2.1.2.

Theft and loss of sources

One of the difﬁculties in the radioactive source security approach is the huge numberof existing sources (around 47,000 sealed sources in France in 2014), the huge number ofplaces where they are located and the huge number of movements of these sources.
In France, the theft or loss of high-activity sealed sources is extremely rare. On theother hand, the theft or loss of unsealed sources or low-activity sources is more common.
Loss mainly occurs during transport, sometimes due to delivery error or when sources are
not disposed of through the correct channels.
Worldwide, the theft or loss of high-activity sealed sources is also relatively
uncommon and decreased in 2014, but can have dramatic consequences for workers
and the population; they are the result of negligence or inadequate control. As in France,
the main sources lost or stolen involve mobile devices and incidents usually occur duringtransport, sometimes as a result of a delivery error.
Two signiﬁcant events which occurred in France in 1999 can be described here. The
ﬁrst involved a gamma radiography projector (Figure 25) containing a high-activity

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49

source which was found on a beach, while the second involved a van also containing a
gamma radiography unit which was stolen. In the ﬁrst case, the police investigation
pointed to a suspected malicious act by an employee of the company in question; in thesecond case, the vehicle and the source were found at a non-ferrous metal wasteconditioning plant, leading one to think that the thieves did not intend using the source
for malicious purposes but rather that they were more interested in the equipment in
the van.
These cases serve to remind us of the importance of early detection when a source
goes missing, reporting its loss or theft and the need to recover it as quickly as possible.

2.1.3.

Historical backgroundIn 1995, the IAEA launched a broad program aimed at combating the illicit trafﬁckingof radioactive material and, more generally, reinforcing security for radioactive sources.
This program resulted in the implementation of an action plan, approved in 1999 by the
IAEA Board of Governors, and the organization of several international conferences on
this subject. This all led to publication of the “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Securityof Radioactive Sources”, together with technical guides presenting, in particular, acategorization of radioactive sources and setting up a database of incidents involving
radioactive sources.
The “Code of Conduct” was approved by the IAEA in September 2003 after
reinforcing its scope, bearing in mind the attacks of September 11, 2001 which, although
they did not involve radioactive material, demonstrated the level of preparation achievedby certain terrorist organizations.

Figure 24. Sealed radioactive sources in their lead box, Université Toulouse III - Paul- Sabatier (France).
© Albin Millot/IRSN.

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At the same time, following a case of atmospheric radioactive pollution due to theaccidental incineration of sources in Europe, the European Commission drew up a text
aimed at stricter control over radioactive sources. This text, adopted in December 2003,
is the Euratom Directive on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources andorphan sources (see 2.2.3).

2.2. International framework
2.2.1.

Categorization of sources

To provide guidance for Member States in their approach to protection against themalicious use of radioactive sources, the IAEA has developed speciﬁc documents as partof its “Nuclear Security Series” mentioned above (see 1.1.5). These include Recommendations and a number of guides to implementing the recommendations and technicalguidance manuals.
In one of these guidance manuals, the IAEA proposes classifying radioactive
sources into ﬁve categories numbered from 1 (the most dangerous) to 5 (the least
dangerous) based on the concept of the “D value” (D for danger), i.e. the activity
value causing severe deterministic effects. A severe deterministic effect is deﬁned
as a health effect due to radiation which is inevitably fatal or life threatening or
results in a permanent injury that reduces quality of life. From this is derived theconcept of dangerous source; this concept is implemented in terms of operationalparameters by calculating the quantity of radioactive material which, for a humanorganism, causes severe deterministic effects in human exposure scenarios and forgiven dose criteria.

Figure 25. Gamma radiography projector containing a radioactive source, France. © Nedim Imré/IRSN.

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2.2.2.

51“Code of Conduct”

The aim of the IAEA’s “Code of Conduct” on the safety and security of radioactive
sources is to attain a high level of safety and security for the most dangerous sealed
sources. To this end, it presents guidelines on the principles of protection to be
implemented and on the regulations relative to the safety, radiological protection
and security of radioactive sources (physical protection). It is intended as a guide toMember States, particularly in drawing up and harmonizing their policy and regulations
regarding the safety and security of radioactive sources. In this Code, only the ﬁrst three
categories out of the ﬁve mentioned above are subject to recommended security
measures, excluding unsealed sources, nuclear material and defense-related sources
which come under speciﬁc regulations.
In addition to the “Code of Conduct”, the IAEA guidance relative to imports andexports of radioactive sources recommends a system for notiﬁcations between States toimprove tracking of Category 1 and 2 sources.

2.2.3.

Euratom Directive

The EU directive known as the “Euratom Directive” on the control of high-activity sealed
radioactive sources (HASS) and orphan sources makes certain sources subject to speciﬁc
requirements. This directive, the main purpose of which is not the security of radioactive
sources with regard to malicious acts but radiological protection, nonetheless includes
general measures related to security, such as the obligations regarding labelling sources,
the need for holders of radioactive sources to obtain prior authorization, the need for acompetent authority in charge of keeping a register of all holders and the sources held, etc.

2.3. French organization
2.3.1.

Regulatory framework

The French regulations relative to the use of ionizing radiation are primarily containedin France’s Public Health Code and Labor Code. The regulations factor in the recommendations contained in the IAEA’s “Code of Conduct” on the safety and security ofradioactive sources and the provisions of the Euratom Directive on the control of highactivity sealed radioactive sources (HASS) and orphan sources.
The Public Health Code has been extended, in addition to radiological protection
concerns, by provisions relative to the security of radioactive sources. This Code speciﬁes,
for every radionuclide, the activity level above which a sealed source is a high-activity
sealed source and provides for general measures for tracking such sources:– identiﬁcation and labeling;– submission to the competent authority of an annual inventory of sources held andthe capability of the holder to conduct an emergency inventory at any time;– a control system for transfers of sources with submission to the competentauthority of a source movement report by suppliers.

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These measures are supplemented by general provisions also relating to the securityof sources:– a system of authorization licenses for manufacturers, suppliers and users, and also
for the transport of radioactive material;– recovery by the suppliers, by an approved entity or by another licensed holder, ofsources at end of life or after 10 years, with the supplier under obligation to informthe competent authority of any source not returned within the set periods;– the implementation of security measures at storage sites (a locked room with
controlled access).
Based on the IAEA’s categories of sources and the measures mentioned in the “Codeof Conduct” and the Euratom Directive, it can be observed that, of the 47,000 sources
registered in the French national inventory in 2014, approximately 10% (4,600 sources)
are HASS in the meaning of the Euratom Directive, liable to cause severe exposure toionizing radiation. Figure 26 shows the breakdown of sealed sources registered in France
by activity, by radionuclide and by type of use. The security measures deployed in France
mainly apply to these high-activity sources in accordance with the principle of a gradedapproach and based on the IAEA’s categories. The approach adopted is primarilyprescriptive (as opposed to a performance based approach developed for the protectionof nuclear material) insofar as it applies to a diverse range of operators, some of which(hospitals and universities, for example) do not have the necessary resources to design a

Figure 26. Range of activities in which sealed sources are used in France, broken down by activity,
radionuclide and type of use.

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53

protection system for their sources and manage sensitive information specifying, forexample, the threats against which they need to be protected.
To ensure the desired level of consistency between safety, radiological protection andsecurity requirements, a single authority, the French Nuclear Safety Authority is in chargeof enforcing these regulations in France.
In addition, the regulations impose requirements for the radiological protection ofworkers which may be useful in ensuring security of sources, such as the technical controlof sources and the conditions in which they can be used and stored or the existence ofinternal procedure to be followed in the event that a sealed source is lost or stolen.
The regulations also provide for improved security training for personnel who haveaccess to high-activity radioactive sources.
An implementing order specifying the tracking and physical protection measures forradioactive sources according to a graded approach will soon be added to this system.
Within the framework of implementing these new regulatory measures designed totighten security of radioactive sources, IRSN will be providing technical support to the
French Nuclear Safety Authority.

2.3.2.

France’s national register of sources

One of the key measures recommended in the IAEA texts is to keep records of andtrack radioactive sources, particularly of Category 1, 2 and 3 sources, by means of anational register of sources.
In France, IRSN is responsible for national tracking of sources. It requires that:– anyone responsible for a “nuclear activity” as deﬁned in the Public Health Codeshall provide information to IRSN on the characteristics of the sources, identiﬁcation of the places where they are held or used and details of their suppliers andbuyers. The procedures for maintaining the inventory of ionizing radiation sources,
including keeping an up-to-date national register of radioactive sources, aredeﬁned in the regulations;– all holders of radionuclides in the form of radioactive sources, or of products ordevices containing them, must be able to demonstrate at all times the origin anddestination of the radionuclides present on their premises for any reason
whatsoever. For this purpose, they shall set up a tracking system on their premises
to ensure that the inventory of products held is available at all times.
To track radioactive sources at national level, IRSN has developed a management tool
and an Internet portal accessible to all source holders. For every holder, the following
information is registered using this management tool: the source reference, the radionuclide, its activity, its source number where available, the source supplier and also thedevice reference and number if the source is contained in a device. No source can be moved
unless the required information has been recorded in the management tool. Furthermore,
IRSN receives annual inventories submitted by the source holders and users, compares
these data with any movements of sources registered in the management tool, analyzes
any differences and regularly updates the national inventory of ionizing radiation sources.

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Chapter 3
Non-proliferation in the
nuclear field
With regard to international control of nuclear material, there are two organizations
which oversee control in France: the International Atomic Energy Agency [187_TD$IF](IAEA)(international control) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (regional
control). This control comes within the framework of France’s undertakings regarding
non-proliferation.

3.1. Historical background3.1.1.

IAEA

On December 8, 1953, when the President of the United States set out his “Atoms for
Peace” plan, he laid the foundations for what was to become the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). It was also the ﬁrst step toward the international initiative toensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In October 1956, the Statute of the IAEA was adopted in New York, on the fringes of a
UN conference. In July 1957, after 26 Member States had deposited their instruments of
ratiﬁcation, the IAEA Statute (Figure 28) entered into effect. The Statute sets forth two
fundamental and complementary principles: ﬁrst, the aim of the Agency is to promote
the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and second, it must ensure that nuclear material said
to come under international safeguards is not used for military purposes. The IAEA’s
headquarters are in Vienna, Austria (Figure 27).

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Figure 27. IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria. © Rodolfo Quevenco/IAEA.

From 1959 to 1961, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a number ofresolutions relative to non-proliferation and, during the 1960s, several draft treaties weredebated. In the end, on July 1, 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened forsignature in Moscow, Washington and London. It came into force on March 5, 1970,
following ratiﬁcation by the three depositary powers and forty other Member States.
According to the Treaty, Nuclear-Weapon States, known as NWS (States that exploded
a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967), must not assist any Non-Nuclear Weapon State,or NNWS, to acquire nuclear weapons. There are ﬁve NWS as deﬁned in the NPT (the UnitedStates, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and the People’s Republic ofChina). According to the terms of the NPT, all other States are non-nuclear-weapon States.
Every NNWS which becomes party to the NPT undertakes not to acquire nuclear
weapons or any other nuclear explosive device. It also agrees to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which provides for the application of safeguards to its present or future nuclear activities, with a view to verifying compliance with
the State’s obligations under the terms of the Treaty.
In return, the Treaty recognizes the Party’s right to the fullest possible exchange ofequipment, nuclear material and scientiﬁc and technological information for the peacefuluse of nuclear energy. The Parties also undertake to pursue negotiations regarding
nuclear disarmament in good faith, meaning full and comprehensive disarmament, and, inthe preamble, reafﬁrm their determination to stop nuclear weapons testing.
On August 2, 1992, France was the last of the ﬁve nuclear-weapon States to join the
NPT, regarding which, up to then, it had declared that it would comply with the provisions
therein.

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Non-proliferation in the nuclear field57

In New York, on May 11, 1995, the NPT was extended for an unlimited period of time.
To date, three States have not signed the NPT: India, Israel and Pakistan. It should be
mentioned that North Korea has announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT.
The fundamental objectives of the NPT are the timely detection of diversion ofsigniﬁcant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, anddeterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. IAEA control is focused on theend use of nuclear material. Control is exercised over the body regulating the use of nuclear
material, namely the State. It is based on a system of safeguards.
The IAEA’s international safeguards “are applied to verify a State’s compliance with its
undertaking to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all its peaceful nuclear
activities”. The safeguards system for non-proliferation was created in 1957, at thesame time as the adoption of the IAEA Statute, but the system did not really come into its
own until 1970 when the NPT came into effect, particularly Article III. There are threemain types of safeguards agreement:
1. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Affording an appropriate and identicallegal framework for all signatories, a model comprehensive safeguards agreement
was drawn up in 1971. It is mainly based on the veriﬁcation by the IAEA of nuclear
material accountancy and physical monitoring for all declared nuclear material.
2. Voluntary Offer Agreements. France, like the other four NWS, was not obliged tosign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It did, however, sign, on a voluntarybasis, and as did the other four recognized nuclear powers, a safeguards agreement
inspired by the model comprehensive safeguards agreement signed between the
IAEA and the NNWS, but adapted to the speciﬁc status and interests of France.
Under this agreement, signed on July 27, 1978, France notiﬁes the IAEA’s
safeguards system of all the nuclear material it designates, in selected facilities
or parts of facilities. To factor in the security control exercised by the European
Atomic Energy Community (see below), the safeguards agreement signed by
France is trilateral, with Euratom also party to the agreement.
3. Item-speciﬁc Safeguards Agreements. Certain States (India, Israel and Pakistan),which have not signed the NPT, have signed more limited agreements with the
IAEA, applicable only to nuclear material, equipment and facilities speciﬁed in theagreement.
The discovery that Iraq was developing a clandestine military nuclear program andthe difﬁculties encountered by the IAEA in North Korea have since revealed theinadequacy of the measures applied under the safeguards agreements, even in thecase of the comprehensive safeguards agreements. With a view to mitigating theseinadequacies, the IAEA Secretariat began, in 1993, working on an ambitious program tostrengthen the safeguards system. The fundamental objectives of this program were,ﬁrst, to improve the IAEA’s capabilities for detecting clandestine activities and, second, toimprove the effectiveness and the results of the safeguards. This program was divided
into two parts. The ﬁrst focused on measures that could be implemented without altering
the existing legal framework. The second focused on measures whose implementation

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would require giving the IAEA new legal powers. The result of these new measures has
been a model additional protocol to the existing safeguards agreements. This was
adopted at an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, on May 15, 1997.
On September 22, 1998, France signed an Additional Protocol, also inspired by themodel drawn up for NNWS. Like the agreement to which it is an addition, this protocol
also involves Euratom. France must therefore comply with new undertakings andregularly submit declarations to the IAEA, including:– research and development activities relative to the fuel cycle conducted incooperation with NNWS;– operations relative to the manufacture of non-nuclear material or equipment that
could potentially be used in nuclear programs, conducted in cooperation withpersons or companies in a NNWS;– the import and export of medium- and high-level radioactive waste containing
plutonium, uranium 235 or uranium 233, from or to a NNWS;– the export to a NNWS of certain non-nuclear material or equipment that could be
used in a nuclear program;– activities planned in cooperation with a NNWS for the ten years to come which
are related to developing the nuclear fuel cycle.
On behalf of France, Euratom also declares to the IAEA all production from uranium
mines and ore concentration plants, together with any transfer of such ore.
It should also be mentioned that the IAEA can require additional information(clariﬁcations) relative to these declarations and, under certain conditions, perform
veriﬁcations (“complementary access”) at any site in France.
France’s implementation of the Additional Protocol is managed by the Euratom
Technical Committee (CTE, see 3.4.2) and its technical support, IRSN, which is more
speciﬁcally tasked with preparing declarations (see below).
Since the 2000s, the IAEA has also been developing the concept of “Integrated
Safeguards”. Integrated Safeguards are deﬁned as the optimum combination of all
safeguards measures available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreements
and additional protocols. Only when the IAEA has drawn a conclusion of the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in that State does it develop for that State a
speciﬁc control approach based on higher level of trust, leading to a reduced number ofinspections and more unannounced veriﬁcations.

3.1.2.

Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community)

The Euratom Treaty, signed by France in Rome on March 25, 1957, founded theEuropean Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Membership of the European Union
implies ratiﬁcation of this treaty. The history, drafting and entry into force of this treaty
coincide with the treaty founding the European Economic Community. The objectives of
the Euratom Treaty are to contribute to the development and growth of nuclear industries

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Figure 28. Key dates in the implementation of the Euratom Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

in Europe, ensuring that all EU Member States may beneﬁt from the development of atomic
energy for peaceful ends, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, and to ensure
security of supply regarding ore and nuclear fuel. Figure 28 shows the key dates in theimplementation of the Euratom Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Under the Treaty, Euratom is speciﬁcally responsible for:– developing research and disseminating technical knowledge;– setting harmonized security standards to protect the health of the population andof workers, and oversee their application;– facilitating investment and ensuring that the basic facilities essential to thedevelopment of nuclear energy in the European Union are built;– ensuring the regular and fair supply to all users in the EU of ore and nuclear fuel(Euratom Supply Agency set up);– by means of appropriate control measures, ensuring that nuclear material is notdiverted and used for purposes other than those intended. This control could beconsidered as a conformity control;– promoting progress in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by working with non-EU
countries and international organizations;– setting up joint companies.
The key provisions of the Euratom Treaty have not changed since it came into force
on January 1, 1958. The above-mentioned responsibilities are set out in ten chapters of
the Treaty. Implementation of Chapters VI and VII directly concerns French industry.
Chapter VI is about supply. “The supply of ores, source materials and special ﬁssile
materials (see below) shall be ensured […] by means of a common supply policy on theprinciple of equal access to sources of supply. For this purpose […]: b) an Agency [theC03

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Supply Agency] is hereby established; it shall have a right of option on ores, source
materials and special ﬁssile materials produced in the territories of Member States and an
exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply of ores, source materials andspecial ﬁssile materials coming from inside the Community or from outside.”
Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty establishes safeguards in the Community Member
States. These safeguards are based on a system of declarations and inspection
procedures.
Under the terms set out in this Chapter, “the Commission shall satisfy itself that, in the
territories of Member States:
a. ores, source materials and special ﬁssile materials are not diverted from theirintended uses as declared by the users;b. the provisions relating to supply and any particular safeguarding obligations
assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third Stateor an international organisation are complied with.”Technical developments in the nuclear industry in general, and in the area of
safeguards in particular, together with the Additional Protocol entering into force in
EU Member States, have made it necessary to publish a series of regulations which takeaccount of such developments. The most recent, Regulation 302/2005 on the applicationof Euratom safeguards, was signed on February 8, 2005. It came into force 20 days after
its publication on February 28, i.e. on March 20, 2005.
In addition to the application of additional protocols (trilateral agreements between
EU Member States, Euratom and the IAEA), Regulation 302/2005 updates all theobligations applicable under previous regulations. It enables the European Commission
to extend safeguard provisions to technological developments in the nuclear industry.
There are three changes of particular note: safeguards applicable to waste treatment andwaste storage installations (the previous regulation stopped safeguards once nuclear
material was considered waste), changes to the format of declarations, and the morewidespread transmission of information in electronic form.
The European Commission also set out recommendations, which are not legallybinding, as guidance for operators in the application of this Regulation.

3.1.3.

Some definitions

The Euratom Treaty and Article XX of the IAEA Statute give the internationaldeﬁnition of nuclear material, which applies only to uranium, plutonium and thorium,
whereas French regulations extend the deﬁnition to deuterium, tritium and lithium 6(see 1.1.1). In Regulation 302/2005, four categories of nuclear material are deﬁned:– “special ﬁssile materials”, i.e. plutonium 239, uranium 233, uranium enrichedin uranium 235 or uranium 233, and any substance containing one or more of
the foregoing isotopes and such other ﬁssile materials as may be speciﬁed by theCouncil, acting by a qualiﬁed majority on a proposal from the Commission; theexpression “special ﬁssile materials” does not, however, include source materials;

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61– “uranium enriched5 in uranium 235 or uranium 233” means uranium containing
uranium 235 or uranium 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratioof the sum of these isotopes to isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of isotope 235
to isotope 238 occurring in nature;– “source materials” means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in
nature; uranium whose content in uranium 235 is less than the normal; thorium;
any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound orconcentrate; any other substance containing one or more of the foregoing insuch a concentration as shall be speciﬁed by the Council, acting by a qualiﬁed
majority on a proposal from the Commission;– “ores” means any ore containing, in such average concentration as shall be
speciﬁed by the Council acting by a qualiﬁed majority on a proposal from theCommission, substances from which the source materials deﬁned above may beobtained by the appropriate chemical and physical processing.
It should be mentioned that neither the IAEA nor the French regulations consider ores
to be nuclear material but that they are subject to Euratom safeguards.

3.2. Declarations
3.2.1.

General approach

3.2.1.1. Notification of imports/exports of nuclear material
The effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime depends largely on the system ofdeclarations made to Euratom and the IAEA of operations involving nuclear material,
together with onsite veriﬁcation by independent inspectors (from Euratom or the IAEA).
According to that, any movement of nuclear material is strictly controlled. This is why
nuclear operators are required to declare any transfer of the materials mentioned in the
Euratom Treaty and the IAEA safeguards provisions. Figure 29 shows the principle ofnuclear material control in France.
In practice, the notiﬁcation of nuclear material transfers has ﬁve main objectives:– to plan veriﬁcation operations covering nuclear material upon being removed
from a facility or upon arrival at a facility;– to apply for authorization to transfer nuclear material to another State within theframework of certain agreements undertaken by France or Euratom;– to receive information on transfers prior to such transfer;– to monitor the ﬂow of material and verify that States comply with theirinternational undertakings;– to detect any problems during transport.
5.

Enrichment is the ratio between the combined mass of uranium 233 and uranium 235 isotopes andthe total mass of the uranium in question.

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Figure 29. Illustration of the principle of nuclear material control in France.

All French operators that import or export nuclear material are subject tothe regulatory obligation to notify all such transfers to the European Commission.
Under the agreements signed by France, these notiﬁcations are, where necessary,transmitted to the IAEA, and possibly to the authorities in certain third countries
within the framework of agreements between France or Euratom and said third
countries.
Nuclear material cannot be transferred before contracts have been signed, information shared and authorization granted (trade contracts, export licenses, notiﬁcation of
nuclear material transfer, customs declarations, etc.).
Any transfer of nuclear material from one country to another (whether or not it
belongs to the EU) implies that the nuclear material in question comes under theprovisions of one or more treaties or agreements. Have to be distinguished the agreements signed by the European Commission, those relative to the application of IAEA
safeguards and the bilateral agreements undertaken by two countries:– application of Euratom Regulation 302/2005 requires notifying the European
Commission of any transfer of nuclear material. This Regulation speciﬁes theconditions relative to exports and imports;– some international IAEA agreements, published in the form of information
circulars (INFCIRC), cover, among other points, application of safeguards during
the transfer of material from one country to another. In this context, France has

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63

signed undertakings that provide for the transmission of prior notiﬁcation before
any transfer of nuclear material;– intergovernmental agreements between France and other countries — including
Australia and Japan — provide the framework for nuclear cooperation and set out
the undertakings of each party.
Several government entities are involved in managing France’s various non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation undertakings at international level. Nonetheless, tosimplify entry points, all import and export notiﬁcations are transmitted to the Euratom
Technical Committee (CTE) and IRSN, which processes them on behalf of the operatorsand the authorities in charge.
To assist French operators in drawing up their nuclear material transfer notiﬁcations,
IRSN provides an internet portal for industry players to transmit the required information
as simply as possible. IRSN has also developed a handbook setting out the main
regulatory obligations and describing how to use the tools for transmitting notiﬁcations
to the French authorities. This handbook is widely disseminated to the industry players inquestion.

3.2.1.2. Other types of declaration– any person or company which uses nuclear material is required to declare to theCommission the “basic technical characteristics” of the installation in which it isintended to hold nuclear material at least 200 days prior to the initial delivery of
nuclear material to this installation. This means general information on the
installation which must specify the purpose and the nuclear material tracking
and accountancy methods implemented. A speciﬁc guide is provided in theRegulation for each type of installation (energy generation in reactors, research
activities, storage, waste treatment, etc.);– for each installation in question, a general activity program for the coming year
must be transmitted annually to the European Commission, via the CTE, so that
inspections can be scheduled. This document must include the date scheduled by
the operator for the annual inventory and the date scheduled to verify thisinventory by Euratom inspectors;– for each area in which nuclear material is held, or MBA (Material Balance Area),
the people and companies subject to Regulation 302/2005 must send theCommission reports of any inventory change for all the nuclear material held.
These reports must include identiﬁcation of the material, the types of inventorychange, the dates of inventory changes and, where applicable the shipper’s MBA
and the recipient’s MBA or the recipient. The reports must also mention end-ofmonth stock and, where applicable, stock on the date that the inventory is taken;– for each MBA, a “Material Balance Report” must be sent to the Commission. This
report is drawn up after a physical inventory to validate the physical inventorywith the accounting inventory for the MBA and balancing any accounting
inventory changes since the previous inventory;

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– for each MBA, a physical inventory report must be sent to the Commission. This isa document drawn up by the operator, stating the inventory of the batches ofnuclear material held in each MBA;– the transfer of conditioned waste to an installation located within or outside theterritory of a Member State must be declared to the Commission every year;– in exceptional circumstances (loss or discovery of nuclear material), a special
report must be sent to the Commission, via the CTE. This special report must be
drawn up immediately;– operators may be required by IRSN to submit other information, not required
under the Regulation or the Euratom Treaty, on an exceptional and occasional
basis, for example, to clarify any inconsistency.
The French authorities regularly ask IRSN to analyze the above-mentioned information before it is transmitted to the European Commission.

3.2.2.

Declarations required under the Additional Protocol

The Euratom Technical Committee (CTE) is in charge of drawing up the Frenchdeclaration to submit to the IAEA under the terms of the Additional Protocol. IRSN, as
technical support to the CTE, contacts French industry players, informs them of their
obligations and collects their declarations. To do this, IRSN has drawn up a guide to
declarations, enabling industry players to determine whether they are affected by the
Additional Protocol and, if so, to draw up their declarations. An online declaration
portal was also developed in 2014 to enable industry players to submit theirdeclarations online.
An annual declaration is required for:– public research and development activities conducted in cooperation with a
NNWS;– private research and development activities conducted in cooperation with a
NNWS;– cooperation with a NNWS planned within the coming 10 years;– imports from a NNWS and exports to a NNWS of high- and intermediate-level
conditioned waste;– activities relative to the manufacture of equipment that could potentially be usedin nuclear programs, conducted in cooperation with a NNWS.
The annual declaration serves to describe a new activity or update the description ofactivities submitted in the initial declaration or in the preceding annual declaration(modiﬁcation, no change in activities, activities stopped, etc.).
A quarterly declaration is required for exports from or to a NNWS of equipment or
non-nuclear material (which could potentially be used in nuclear programs) during thepreceding quarter.

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3.3. Inspection procedure
3.3.1.

General approach

The procedure for inspections by the European Commission or the IAEA begins whenthese entities send advance notiﬁcation of inspection. In the case of inspection by theEuropean Commission or the IAEA, it is France which is inspected, even if the inspection
actually is held at the site of a French nuclear operator (AREVA or EDF, for example)(Figure 30). Inspections are carried out by European inspectors or IAEA inspectors who are
certiﬁed by the French authorities. What follows mainly describes the procedure adopted
for European Commission inspections, by far the most numerous carried out in Francecompared to those carried out by the IAEA. These inspections are deﬁned in the Euratom
Treaty, other than which there are no speciﬁc documents regulating this activity.

Figure 30. Intermediate storage building, AREVA La Hague site, Cherbourg. France. © AREVA, Philippe Lesage.

There are several types of inspection:– routine inspections (or systematic inspections). This is the most common type of
inspection. The main checks made during this type of inspection include veriﬁcation of accountancy, physical veriﬁcations and checking measurements andautomated recordings since the last inspection (if cameras or recording equipment
belonging to Euratom are installed at the site);– inventory veriﬁcations. This consists in verifying a physical inventory and comparing it with the material accountancy system;– high frequency inspections, held at installations for which the provisions stipulate
special safeguards measures and which contain signiﬁcant quantities of special
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Elements of security and non-proliferation– veriﬁcations of imports and exports declared by prior notiﬁcation. These mainly
focus on physical veriﬁcation of declarations of nuclear material imports/exports
outside the EU;– special inspections in the event of loss or accidental discovery of nuclear material,
subject to special reports, or of accidentally breaking a seal, or in an emergency;– unannounced inspections (with no advance notice sent to the Member State
specifying the installation to be inspected) or short notice inspections; this type of
inspection is carried out as a result of the EC’s desire to harmonize inspection
practices across the European Union. Short notice inspections are associated with
the implementation of new containment and surveillance measures and aim to
reduce the Commission’s burden of inspection;– veriﬁcations limited to “basic technical characteristics”, aimed at verifying thatthe information submitted is consistent with physical reality.
Since 2005, the Commission has introduced what it calls new control approaches.
In addition to physical veriﬁcations and accountancy veriﬁcations, the Commission
inspectors now examine the practices and quality assurance systems implemented by
the operators, especially in the area of nuclear material accountancy, through anapproach similar to an “audit”.
Since the early 2000s, and all the more so since the enlargement of the European
Union since 2005, the number of inspections performed by the European Commission in
France, and their length, has decreased for ﬁnancial reasons.
In 2002, in France, veriﬁcations necessitated a total of over 2,700 person-days (oneperson-day means one inspector spending one day at a facility); this ﬁgure fell to only
1,389 person-days in 2010. Since then, the number of person-days spent on inspections inFrance by the European Commission has stabilized (Figure 31).

Figure 31. Histogram of inspections performed in France by Euratom from 2004 to 2014.

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An inspection is usually based on three phases:
1. A preparatory phase, mainly involving Euratom inspectors since it consists in planning
the inspection, collecting information on previous inspections, deﬁning objectives
and then sending notice as required to give the inspectors access to the site.
2. An in situ phase, at the facility, which usually consists in (accountancy andphysical) veriﬁcations. Depending on the size of the facility, the type of inspection
and the sensitivity of the material to be controlled, this phase can take from one toten days. It entails physical veriﬁcations, measurements based on the list of items
in stock, and veriﬁcations on the accountancy system implemented at the site
(Figure 32).
3. A “post-inspection” phase, enabling the Euratom Commission to draw conclusions
based on the inspection’s ﬁndings and to transmit any observations it may have,and enabling IRSN people, in cooperation with the operator, to then implement
any actions required as a result of the Euratom Commission’s observations.
Following an inspection, the operator must draw up a report for the national
authorities so that they can monitor Euratom’s actions.
At the site, inspectors may be escorted by the French authority (the CTE) or its
representative, usually someone from IRSN. It should be mentioned that IRSN does not
escort every inspection held; priority is given to inspections held to verify the annual inventory.
However, if any difﬁculties are foreseen, an operator may request support from IRSN for an
upcoming inspection. The escort (from CTE or IRSN) is tasked with enabling the inspectors to
perform their veriﬁcations correctly while protecting the operator’s interests (to protect
manufacturing secrets and industrial know-how, etc.). More speciﬁcally, the escort must:– assist and advise the operator on the behaviors during the inspection and the
responses given to the inspectors;

Figure 32. Samples for Euratom inspection. © European Community — Directorate-General for Energy
and Transport.

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– ensure that inspections at French facilities proceed smoothly;– ensure the application of French authority directives negotiated with the Commission’s services;– ensure that the inspectors do not overstep the prerogatives deﬁned in theirinspection mandate.
Following an inspection, the escort must draw up an escort report to be submitted to
the CTE and the operator.

3.3.2.

Complementary accessComplementary access is dealt with by the IAEA in accordance with the provisions set
out in France’s Additional Protocol. Such access may be required for:– case 1: sites declared by the operator under the Additional Protocol and regarding
which a declaration has been submitted to the IAEA;– case 2: any other site in France.
A complementary access inspection is held on the decision of the IAEA:– in case 1, to verify that a declaration is accurate and exhaustive or to resolve any
inconsistency;– in case 2, to enhance its ability to detect any clandestine nuclear activities in a
non-nuclear-weapon State.
The IAEA shall send notice by fax to the French authorities (the CTE) that such accesshas been decided at least 24 hours in advance. This document speciﬁes:– the site and purpose of complementary access;– the objective of complementary access and the activities likely to be performed by
the inspectors (e.g.: visual observations, collection of environmental samples,utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices, examination of
production and shipping records);– the date and time that complementary access will start;– the names and nationalities of the inspectors who will visit the site.
An escort team, led by a person representing the French State to the IAEA inspectors
and the operator, shall take part in complementary access. Its role is to ensure thatcomplementary access proceeds smoothly and to ensure that the veriﬁcation operations
performed comply with the provisions of France’s Additional Protocol. It is important tomention that the operator or its representative is required to be present throughout thecomplementary access.
Upon receiving advance notice, IRSN analyzes the request for complementary accessto assess its compliance with the requirements of France’s Additional Protocol. The CTE(or IRSN, as technical support to the CTE) then informs the operator, mainly to determine

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all the formalities required to enable access to the site for the various people involved
and any equipment that may be used. This contact with the operator also serves as anopportunity to specify site access procedures, give instructions regarding protecting
sensitive information and to organize the workload.
To perform their veriﬁcation operations, the inspectors use their own equipment. The
use of this equipment must be agreed in advance by the French authorities.
As soon as the activities related to complementary access have been completed,the head of the escort team draws up a report relating the result of veriﬁcation
operations, which must be signed by the operator’s representatives and the head of theescort team. A list of any documents consulted by the inspectors is appended to thisreport.

3.4. French organization
3.4.1.

Regulatory framework

The responsibilities of government bodies involved in nuclear non-proliferation are
speciﬁed by decree. In addition, the regulations relative to nuclear material import andexport operations are speciﬁed in special documentation.

3.4.2.

Government bodies

The General Secretariat for European Affairs (SGAE) was set up in 2005, replacing
the General Secretariat for the Interministerial Commission on European economic
cooperation (SGCI). Reporting directly to the Prime Minister, the SGAE examines anddrafts France’s positions expressed within EU institutions, including Euratom. An advisorycommittee provides technical support to the SGAE as required for the exercise of its
remit regarding issues relative to application of the Euratom Treaty (except in the case of
security control). This advisory committee is called the Euratom Technical Committee(CTE).
The Euratom Technical Committee (CTE), reporting directly to the Prime Minister, ismade up of experts from the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission(CEA). It monitors implementation of international controls on nuclear material in France
by the European Commission under Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty and by the IAEA
under the safeguards agreement signed between France, the IAEA and Euratom. It also
oversees France’s implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement. The CTE is also the European Commission’s and the IAEA’s points of contact
regarding these issues.
Also, within the framework of asset management of nuclear materials required for
defense purposes, the CTE authorizes nuclear material transfers between activities
subject to Euratom safeguards and activities which are not subject to these safeguards.
The French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) advises thegovernment on international policy in the nuclear ﬁeld. The CEA monitors scientiﬁc,

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technical and economic developments with a view to clarifying the government on thesesubjects, notably in its negotiations on international agreements.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for deﬁning foreign policy, under theauthority of the government, and conducting and coordinating France’s international
relations. With regard to those aspects related to international veriﬁcations in the
nuclear ﬁeld, the Ministry is backed by its permanent representations to the European
Union in Brussels, to the United Nations in New York and to the internationalorganizations based in Vienna (notably the IAEA).
The Governor for France at the IAEA: a diplomat attached to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Director of International Relations at CEA, the Governor for France oversees
the IAEA’s entire scope of competence and the implementation of certain multilateralagreements. He represents France on the IAEA’s Board of Governors.
The Directorate-General for Energy and Climate (DGEC), part of the Ministry ofEnergy, contributes to deﬁning French nuclear policy. In particular, the DGEC drafts
France’s positions for international and EU discussions, and takes part in negotiatinginternational agreements. It manages stocks declarations relative to highly-enricheduranium and to plutonium used in civil activities.
Other institutions: other ministries, particularly the Ministry of Defense, are involvedin nuclear material controls, speciﬁcally of material used in defense activities.

3.4.3.

IRSN, the French Institute for Radiological Protection
and Nuclear Safety

IRSN provides technical support to the public authorities and to operators for
implementing international non-proliferation safeguards within France. IRSN, providing
technical support to the government authorities, holds a special position in this ﬁeld
insofar as it advises operators on the declaration procedure and on the inspection
process. An agreement signed by IRSN with the CEA and the CTE stipulates the Institute’s
remit in the ﬁeld of nuclear material control, namely:– to manage France’s declarations as provided for under treaties and agreements;– to prepare, escort and monitor international inspections. Within this framework,
IRSN must both ensure that France complies with its international undertakings
made to the relevant bodies (IAEA and Euratom) and protect the interests ofFrench operators (protecting sensitive information and industry secrets, etc.);– to analyze technical documentation required of entities subject to international
control bodies and provide assistance and advice to entities subject to suchcontrol within the framework of implementation for treaties and agreements;– to analyze and monitor developments or planned developments within thenational and international judicial framework;– to provide training to French industry;– to participate in certain international working groups.

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Non-proliferation in the nuclear field#FOCUS...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................

IRSN, providing support to operators in theirrelations with the international bodies in chargeof non-proliferation control
In endorsing the two key non-proliferation systems, one relative to nuclear
weapons and the other to chemical weapons (see Chapter 4), France has made strong
commitments to the international community and to the organizations tasked with
implementation of these treaties (the International Atomic Energy Agency — IAEA —and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons — OPCW). Further,
France’s membership of the European Union also implies Euratom controls on the
nuclear industry.
These undertakings imply submitting declarations to and receiving inspections
by these organizations in French territory.
In light of their control activities, inspectors from the OPCW, the IAEA and
Euratom can have access to sensitive information relative to:– trade secrets, through access to lists of products, customers and material
quantities;– industrial property, through access to drawings, industrial processes, chemical formulae, etc.;– non-proliferation, for the Georges Besse II plant, access to certain areas may
entail disclosing information which, if disseminated, could result in thedissemination of centrifuge enrichment technology;– national defense, through access to sites which, apart from industrial
activities and civil research, also carry out activities on behalf of national
defense.
As provider of technical support to the French authorities, IRSN is tasked with
defending France’s interests when escorting international inspections in France.
IRSN therefore ensures that inspectors have access to information within the limits of
the requirements set forth in an international or multilateral treaty, agreement orconvention; or it will seek compromise solutions to allow the inspectors to performtheir tasks without disclosing any information deemed conﬁdential by the industrial
operator.
As a result, IRSN regularly ﬁnds itself in the position of providing support oradvice to an operator. Thus, as the interface with the inspectors, IRSN advises theoperator on the interpretation and implementation of the applicable texts, indicating,for example, cases where inspectors may go beyond their prerogatives or where theirquestions are warranted but inappropriately formulated (in terms of methods rather
than objectives). In all cases, IRSN makes every effort to facilitate relations between

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the operator and the inspectors, recalling to the latter the limits of their mandate or
its objectives, and proposing, for example, alternative solutions to those planned
initially.
This position of providing advice and support to French industrial operators in
the chemical and nuclear ﬁelds, within the context of international non-proliferation
inspections, is rather an original feature in the remit of IRSN, which traditionallyprovides technical support to the authorities.
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

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Chapter 4
Non-proliferation in thechemical field

4.1. Historical backgroundThe ﬁrst “chemical weapons” appeared during various conﬂicts in Greek/Roman
antiquity. Although rudimentary to begin with (simple poisons made out of plants), they
were perfected over the centuries — as were weapons in general — and used withincreasing frequency, particularly during the First World War.
Toward the end of the twentieth century, States had become aware of the need toban the use of chemical weapons. A certain number of conventions and agreement
protocols therefore came into existence. The most recent and most important of thesetexts is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which came into force on April 29,
1997.
As for other weapons of mass destruction, the international community has
long sought to prevent the military use of chemicals. The earliest international
agreement dates back to 1675 and was signed in Strasbourg by Germany and France.
This treaty prohibited the use of poison bullets. In 1874, the Brussels Convention on
the Law and Customs of War prohibited the employment of poison or poisoned
weapons, and the use of arms, projectiles or material to cause unnecessary suffering.
This convention was added to in 1899 with an agreement that prohibited the use of
projectiles ﬁlled with poison gas, signed during an international peace conference in
The Hague.

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In spite of these agreements, the First World War saw the ﬁrst use of chemical
agents on a massive scale on the battleﬁelds. Growing awareness across the world of
the risks entailed in the use of such weapons, for soldiers and civilians alike, led theinternational community to intensify its efforts to prohibit their use. The outcome ofthese discussions was the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibitionof the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare.
Nonetheless, this Protocol had some serious shortcomings: it only prohibited theuse of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It did nothing to ban thedevelopment, production or possession of such weapons. In addition, the determination of the signatory countries to ban chemical weapons did not go very far: many
countries were to sign the Protocol with reservations allowing them to use chemical
weapons against countries that had not signed the Protocol or to respond in kind if
attacked with chemical weapons.
Attitudes changed and the emergence of new kinds of weapons of mass destruction
led, in 1971, to negotiations by the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (nowknown as the multilateral Geneva disarmament conference) regarding the text of theConvention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling ofbacteriological (biological) or poisonous weapons, commonly known as the Biological
Weapons Convention. This prohibits the States Party to this Convention fromdeveloping, producing or possessing biological weapons, but includes no mechanism
for verifying compliance with the prohibitions on the part of the States Party to theConvention. The Convention also states that the signatory States undertake tocontinue negotiations with a view to attaining an international prohibition of chemical
weapons.
In 1988, negotiations were held in Geneva with a view to signing a credible treaty
on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons. At the Paris Conference in
1989, negotiations were taken up from the Conference on Disarmament and pushedahead.
In 1992, the text of the Convention for the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction,
more commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was submitted before the Conference on Disarmament. The CWC, which, for the ﬁrst
time, includes a veriﬁcation regime, was opened for signature in Paris on January
13, 1993. It was then deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General in
New York.
According to the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention, it would enter into
force 180 days after the 65th country ratiﬁed the treaty. At the end of 1996, Hungary
became the 65th country to ratify the Convention and on April 29, 1997, with
87 States Party to the Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into
force and became binding under international law. At the end of 2014, 190 States
were Parties to this Convention. Figure 33 shows the key dates in the implementationof the CWC.

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Figure 33. Key stages in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

4.2. International context
4.2.1.

Chemical Weapons Convention

The CWC has a preamble, 24 articles and annexes on chemicals, on veriﬁcation of
application of the Convention and on conﬁdentiality. It is structured around three major
subjects:
1. prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons,
2. non-proliferation,
3. assistance and cooperation.

4.2.1.1. The prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction
The CWC provides for:– the destruction by the States Parties, within a period of 10 years, of all chemical
weapons held within their territory or abandoned by them in the territory of otherStates Parties, together with the destruction of facilities intended for their production; this deadline can be extended up to 15 years in exceptional circumstances;– the undertaking by the States Parties not to use riot control agents as weapons of war;
– the possibility of converting, under very strict conditions, certain facilities used forthe production of chemicals into facilities for civilian use;

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– a declaration regime and a systematic veriﬁcation regime by means ofinspections performed onsite and by surveillance systems at all locations
where chemical weapons are stockpiled or destroyed (see Figures 34, 35
and 36).

Figure 34. Illustration of the chemical weapons veriﬁcation regime. © OPCW.

4.2.1.2. Non-proliferation
The Convention stipulates that:– the States Parties may develop, produce, acquire, stock, transfer and use
chemicals subject to the Convention provided that activities related to theiruse are carried out for purposes not prohibited under the Convention (including
medical, pharmaceutical, research or protection);– toxic chemicals and their precursors6 are classiﬁed according to four categories(three schedules and the additional category of discrete organic chemicals)
depending on the level of toxicity and the uses to which they can be put. Carryingout any activity in relation to these chemicals implies that the State agrees to be
subject to the veriﬁcation regime. This regime is based on the annual declarationof all activities and facilities related to these chemicals and on inspections which
are more or less stringent and intrusive depending on the nature of the activity
and the quantities of chemicals used;

6.

“Precursor” means any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production bywhatever method of a toxic chemical.

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Non-proliferation in the chemical field77– the transfer, as part of commercial activities, of any chemical listed in
Schedules 1 and 2 to States which are not Parties to the CWC (States whichhave not signed or ratiﬁed the Convention) is prohibited. Any chemical listedin Schedule 3 which is transferred, for purposes not prohibited under the
CWC, to any country which is not Party to the CWC, cannot be transferred asecond time.

Figure 35. Histogram of inspections performed in France by the OPCW from 1998 to 2014.

In addition to the measures relating to veriﬁcation at declared facilities, designed tocontrol the chemical industry and trade, the CWC provides for various tools to detect andsanction any violation of the provisions of the treaty. It provides for:– the possibility for a State Party to request a challenge inspection of any facility, or
place, even if it has not been declared, in the territory of another State Party, toresolve any doubt about possible non-compliance with the Convention;– the possibility of implementing coercive measures against a State Party whichfails to comply with the terms of the Convention and, if necessary, to refer thematter to the General Assembly of the United Nations or the UN Security
Council;– the possibility of holding an inquiry into allegations that chemical weapons or riot
control agents have been used as weapons of war, in the territory of any State
Party (at the request of a State Party).

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4.2.1.3. Assistance and cooperation
The Convention provides for:– assistance and protection against chemical weapons;– measures aimed at promoting international trade, technological development andeconomic cooperation in the chemical industry.

4.2.1.4. Schedules of Chemicals
As mentioned above, the chemicals subject to the CWC are classiﬁed into four
categories according to the risk they pose to the object and purpose of the Convention:– Schedule 1 lists chemical weapons and structurally-related chemicals (maincharacteristics: lethal or incapacitating toxicity, high risk to the object and purposeof the Convention, little or no use for purposes not prohibited under thisConvention);– Schedule 2 lists precursors to Schedule 1 chemicals (main characteristics: lethal orincapacitating toxicity, signiﬁcant risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, is not produced in large commercial quantities);– Schedule 3 lists chemical weapons that have been used in the past and precursors
to Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals (main characteristics: lethal or incapacitating

Figure 36. OPCW inspection of a chemical warehouse in the USA under the terms of the Chemical
Weapons Convention. © DTRA/SCC-WMD.

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toxicity, a risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, may be produced inlarge commercial quantities);– Schedule 4 lists discrete organic chemicals (DOC), i.e. any chemical not listed on
Schedules 1, 2 or 3 belonging to the class of carbon compounds.

4.2.2.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW’s mandate is “[…] toachieve the object and purpose of the […] Convention, to ensure the implementation of its
provisions, including those for international veriﬁcation of compliance with it, and toprovide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.” The OPCW
headquarters are located in The Hague, in the Netherlands (Figure 37).

Figure 37. The headquarters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The
Hague, the Netherlands. © OPCW.

The OPCW has three main organs:– the Conference of the States Parties. This is the principal organ of the OPCW.
Major decisions relative to implementation of the CWC are taken at the annual
meetings of the Conference. As its name suggests, the Conference brings together
all the States Parties to the Convention. The Chairman of the Conference isappointed by the representatives of the States Parties;– the Executive Council. The OPCW’s Executive Council takes decisions relative tothe functioning of the OPCW. It is made up of 41 members elected for a term of
two years by the Conference, in accordance with a principle of rotation among thesix regional groups and taking into account the importance of the chemicalindustry, as well as the political and security interests of each State Member. The

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Executive Council meets four times a year and its Chairman is appointed by themembers of the Council;– the Technical Secretariat. With a staff of around 500 people, the Technical
Secretariat assists the Conference and the Council. It is tasked with implementing
the CWC in all areas of veriﬁcation (around 180 inspectors), international
cooperation, protection and assistance. It also assists the States Parties in
implementing the provisions of the CWC at national level. The Technical
Secretariat is headed by a Director General appointed by the Conference upon
the recommendation of the Executive Council.
The Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties are the decisionmaking bodies. Their main task is to make general policy decisions and settle any
differences between States Parties regarding technical issues or interpretation of the
CWC. The Technical Secretariat is in charge of day-to-day management and implementation of the Convention, and of inspections in particular. Under the Convention, threesubsidiary bodies are established to assist the three principal organs:– the Scientiﬁc Advisory Board (SAB). The SAB is a group of independent
experts tasked with assessing scientiﬁc and technical innovation in the ﬁeld ofchemistry and reporting to the Director General. It also renders expert
opinions on any proposed amendment to the Schedules of Chemicals andany other opinion that may be needed, mainly on issues such as veriﬁcation
practices;– the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF). The ABAF
meets regularly to advise the Technical Secretariat and the States Parties onmatters pertaining to the OPCW budget and programs. It examines draft budgets
drawn up by the Technical Secretariat before they are presented to the Council
and the Conference for approval;– the Conﬁdentiality Commission. It main function is to settle any disputes
between States Parties and the OPCW related to conﬁdentiality.
At the beginning of 2015, 190 States had ratiﬁed the Convention, two States had
signed but not yet ratiﬁed it and four States still remain outside the Convention.

4.3. French organization
4.3.1.

Regulatory framework

Articles L. 2342-1 and following and D. 2342-1 and following of the French Defense
Code deal respectively with the legislative and regulatory aspects of implementationof the Convention of January 13, 1993 for the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction.
Implementing orders stipulate the procedures for application of these texts withregard to completing declarations, carrying out inspections, and the conditions relative
to taking samples, etc.

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4.3.2.

81

Government bodies

Presided over by the French Prime Minister or his representative, the Interministerial
Committee for implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CICIAC)
brings together the Ministers of Justice, of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, of Defense,
and the ministers (or their representatives) for Research, Industry, Agriculture, theEnvironment, Overseas France, Health and Customs.
Its main function is to monitor implementation of the Convention, propose measures
to improve its implementation and contribute to deﬁning France’s position in relation to
the OPCW.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs is the National Authority, as deﬁned in Article VII-4 of
the CWC. S/he serves as the national focal point for effective liaison with the OPCW andother States Parties, maintains an up-to-date list of OPCW inspectors who may come toinspect facilities in France, transmits national declarations to the OPCW, acknowledges
receipt of any notice of inspections and immediately transmits them to the relevant
ministers.
France’s permanent representation to the OPCW is based at the French Embassy in
the Netherlands. This representation informs the OPCW of France’s ofﬁcial positions on
the subject of implementation and undertakes any other procedure requested by the
National Authority, including the submission of declarations.
The Minister of Defense is responsible for implementation of the Convention atsites placed under his/her authority. S/he protects defense interests at sites where
defense activities are or have been carried out, in particular classiﬁed national defense
contracts.
The Minister of the Interior is responsible for the collection, transportation andintermediate storage of former chemical munitions. Pending commissioning of the site
for dismantling and destroying such munitions, this Minister is responsible for the storageof existing chemical munitions and those still to be collected. The Minister of the Interior
is also responsible for declarations relative to the riot control agents held, to former
chemical munitions and the facilities in which they are stored.
The Minister for Industry is responsible for implementation of the Convention at all
civil facilities save where jurisdiction is conferred under Articles D. 2342-95 throughD. 2342-102 of the French Defense Code to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, theInterior, Overseas France and Local and Regional Authorities, Immigration and Customs.
As such, the Minister:– oversees administrative control and policing of implementation of theConvention;– maintains an up-to-date list of facilities subject to declaration and internationalveriﬁcations;– advises the organizations subject to the obligations provided for under theConvention;

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Elements of security and non-proliferation– collects, formats and sends the declarations provided for under the Convention to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs;– organizes and ensures escorts for inspectors performing internationalveriﬁcations.
The Minister is supported by IRSN in dealing with all the technical tasks incumbent
upon him/her.
The Senior Defense and Security Ofﬁcial (HFDS) of the Ministry of Industry ensuresnational implementation of the implementing texts of the CWC in all sectors relating tocivil activities. S/he has a speciﬁc department for this.
The Minister for Customs is responsible for implementation of the provisions of theConvention relative to imports and exports. A special ofﬁce is in charge of customs
regulations applicable to dual-use items (goods and technologies that may have both
civil and military uses).

4.3.3.

IRSN, the French Institute for Radiological Protection
and Nuclear Safety

IRSN provides technical support to the Ministry of Industry on industrial issues
related to implementation of the CWC. Within the framework of an agreement signedwith this Ministry, IRSN has the following duties:– advice and assistance: IRSN informs and advises the representatives of theestablishments affected by implementation of the CWC (advising on drawing up
declarations and preparing for inspection, etc.). IRSN assists the authorities bytaking part in its area of competence in various international working groups andadvisory committees organized by the OPCW. At the request of the Ministry ofIndustry, IRSN takes part in interministerial meetings tasked with drawing up
instructions given to France’s representatives to the Conference of the States
Parties and the Executive Council of the OPCW. Last, IRSN organizes training on
the CWC and its implementation for industrial operators and ofﬁcials at therelevant ministries;– document analysis: IRSN analyzes all the national and international documents
sent to the Ministry of Industry within the framework of the CWC and national
implementation texts;– obligations management: IRSN receives directly from the establishments
affected by implementation of the CWC all documents and declarations containing information to be submitted to the OPCW and analyzes, controls andprocesses all these declarations. IRSN transmits to the National Authority all
declarations to be submitted to the OPCW, drawn up using the basic declarations
sent by the establishments, together with the aggregated data after processing.
IRSN draws up and updates the list of establishments affected by implementationof the Convention;

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Non-proliferation in the chemical field83– inspection monitoring: IRSN prepares for the inspections carried out by the
OPCW at establishments which come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry ofIndustry and ensures a system of on-call personnel with a view to responding
within the deadlines set for inspection requests. It monitors inspections in France,
managing the logistics for these inspections (reception of the inspectors, controlof material likely to be used during an inspection, transfer to the sites, etc.) andprovides an escort for all OPCW inspections at said facilities. It monitors “postinspection” actions, where applicable. In the event of a challenge inspection, aprocedure that has not been implemented to date, IRSN would join the escort
teams in accordance with the organization deﬁned in an interministerial circular
dated September 26, 2012.

#FOCUS...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................

The history of chemical weapons
Greek/Roman antiquitywells poisoned with rye ergot (Assyrians and Persians, 6th and 4th centuries
B.C.);

hellebore roots used to poison the River Pleistos (Solon of Athens, 600 B.C.);

incendiary devices and sulfur dioxide gas blown by the wind to cities undersiege (e.g.: by Demosthenes at Sphacteria against the Spartans – Peloponnesian War, 428-424 B.C.);

Roman equestrian soldiers wielded suffocating smoke and caustic ash in theair (siege of Ambracia, 187 B.C.);

“Greek ﬁre”: toxic fumes from an incendiary paste invented by the Greek
Kallinikos (673). For ﬁve centuries, “Greek ﬁre” was the secret weapon usedby the Byzantines against the Turks. The Turks were later to use it themselves
for their conquest of the Greek Empire in the 14th century.

Middle Ages and the Renaissance

toxic and sleep-inducing vapors (Hassan Abrammah, late 11th century);barrels of blinding quick lime catapulted by the English ﬂeet at French ships(mid-13th century);bombs, grenades and rags soaked in arsenic and set on ﬁre (used against theTurks by the defenders of Belgrade in 1456, weapons factory in Berlin in 1457);

poisoned arrows dipped in curare (used by Amazonian Indians up to the 20th
century), batracyotoxin from frog venom (in Hawaii), aconitine (used by theMoors in Spain in 1483);

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





various devices made using sulfur, mercury, turpentine and even nitrates andother “stratagemae” cited in many military treatises. They were only used forlimited objectives;
cluster cannonballs that “poisoned” assailants from the tops of city walls(15th century);“stink pots” and toxic bombs, used in large quantities by the Imperial army
(Thirty Years War, 1635-1648).

18th century
More advanced devices were made using arsenic, orpiment (or yellow arsenic),
lead, white lead, minium, vert-de-gris, antimony with added belladona, euphorbia,
hellebore, aconite, nux vomica and venom (!) (cited by German military author,
Flemming, 1726). We do not know if these were ever used or not.

19th century
Projects which never came to fruition since priority was given to ballistics, guns
and cannon and because some discredit was attached to “poisoned” weapons:a British plan to fatally ﬁll the Russian garrison at Sebastopol with smokefrom 500 tonnes of sulfur and 200 tonnes of coke (Crimean War, 1854-1855);
this plan was never executed, and nor were the plans to use bombs ﬁlled with
“Cadet de Gassicourt” liqueur;development of chlorine shells to use against the Confederates (United States –War of Secession, 1861-1865); the plan was rejected.

Contemporary era: the Great War (1914–1918)


April 22, 1915: near Ypres, 6,000 containers (30,000 according to somewriters) containing 180 tonnes of chlorine were dispersed by two battalions
across six kilometers at the Front. Blown by the wind, the cloud of gas caused
the deaths of 5,000 soldiers and put 1,500 out of combat, causing intense
panic;

May 31, 1915: further and more deadly attacks were made using a mixture ofchlorine and phosgene on the Russian Front: 12 km at Bsura-Rumka. There
were 9, 000 casualties, including 6,000 dead, after 12,000 canisters of the gas
were used;July 1915: 100,000 “T-Stoff” shells (benzyl bromide) were shot using 155 mm
guns in Argonne;March 1916 in Verdun: 75 mm shells containing phosgene ware used causing
instantaneous death;July 1916, for the Somme Offensive: shells containing hydrogen cyanide
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Non-proliferation in the chemical fieldMarch 1917: phosgene sprayed from aircraft, causing signiﬁcant and deadly
concentrations of phosgene;July 1917: chemical warfare reached its apogee with the use of yperite, or“mustard gas” (dichloroethyl sulﬁde [see Figure 38]) in the area of Ypres —hence its name. Its toxic effects do not only act on the respiratory system. It is apersistent and insidious blistering agent, causing agonizing burns. Its psychological effects are disastrous. 9,500 tonnes of mustard gas were produced;

September 1917: the ﬁrst use of “Clark 1 agents” based on arsines, which
induce nausea and vomiting and which are not blocked by gas mask ﬁlters;
1918: large-scale use of shells ﬁlled with aggressive gases by all the warring
parties; during attacks, around 25% of the projectiles used by both sides werechemical shells.

Figure 38. Chemical formula of yperite C4H8Cl2S (mustard gas).

Number of deaths
The total number of lives lost due to combat gases — mainly yperite —, althoughsubstantially reduced thanks to improved gas masks and other immediate protective
equipment, was 1,300,000 men (including nearly 100,000 killed in battle), while
losses due to other types of weapons are estimated to be 26,700,000 men (including
6,800,000 killed in battle). The survivors, suffering from lesions of varying degrees
of severity caused by the use of gas, subsequently often fell victim to fatal infectious
diseases. These estimates seem much lower than the actual number of lives lost.
It should be noted that it was the Russian troops who suffered the heaviest losses
caused by gas, accounting for 11% of deaths by gas, compared with an average 7%
all sides combined.

Between the wars

1920: in Russia, chemical weapons were used during the civil war;

1925 (the year that the Geneva Protocol was signed): yperite was used in the
Rif War;85

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1935-1936: large-scale use of yperite against the Abyssinians, leading to thefall of Ethiopia;1937 to 1941, Japan, a huge producer of yperite and arsines on OkinoshimaIsland, used toxic gas against China, particularly in the attack on Yichang(yperite and Lewisite; use of these chemicals subsequently came to an end
after B.A.L. antidote was discovered).

The Second World War
Except in the Far East, practically no chemical weapons were used by the warring
parties, for a number of reasons:the new nature of the campaigns: the “Blitzkrieg”, wars of movement
instigated by the Axis forces and then by the Allied forces who quickly
gained supremacy in the air;the deterrent effect of the type of chemical weapons that the Allies pretended
to have compared to those of the Germans, notably the large-scale production
and stockpiling of new toxic gases — including tabun and sarin, with similar
efforts having been made by the Russians, even while Hitler’s armies wereadvancing on Stalingrad (1942).

However, it is doubtful that there was any actual “balance” in the potential
chemical weapon resources held by any side.

The Post-war period
During the 1950s, the Cold War years, a decisive turning point was reached. The
United States and NATO forces on the one hand, and the USSR and the Warsaw Pactcountries on the other, tried to out-rival each other in their research and large-scale
production of increasingly sophisticated and effective chemical weapons:from 1963 to 1968: Egypt used yperite in Yemen, and the USA used dioxin in
Vietnam;in 1973, during the Arab–Israeli War, the Israelis intercepted various Soviet
devices which revealed the USSR’s new chemical warfare capabilities;

this development was conﬁrmed during the War in Afghanistan (1979-1983),
which afforded the Russians a test ﬁeld for new chemicals that were difﬁcult
to detect;from 1975 to 1983, Vietnam used a huge quantity of toxic chemicals andtoxins against the rebel forces in Laos, and especially in Cambodia (Haig
Report);from 1982 to 1988, Iraq used chemical weapons on various occasions:a. the Iran-Iraq War: Iraq used yperite, cyanide and tabun against Iranian
troops, who suffered heavy losses (10,000 seriously injured and an

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unknown number of deaths). The Halabja affair (1988), a “simple”
policing operation which resulted in the deaths of 5,000 demonstrators;b. the Gulf War (1990), “a major event in the history of chemical warfare”
when the threat posed to the international community by Saddam
Hussein’s arsenal of chemical agents reached its peak. Iraq’s stocks
were then the third largest in the world, including nearly 50,000 shells
and bombs containing yperite, sarin and cyclohexyl sarin;c. similarly, there is no longer any doubt that tabun gas and yperite were used
on a massive scale against the Kurds and Shi’ites in the south, killingthousands;

December 1987 to December 1990, the USA, after a break of 19 years, again
started to produce chemical weapons to catch up with the Russians.

Some accidents… and incidents

1968: USA, VX nerve agent accidentally spilled from a Phantom ﬁghter jet
ﬂying out of Dugway air base (Utah), killing 6,000 sheep;
1969: Belgium, one or two barrels of yperite leaked offshore; seals and ﬁshwere killed and some ﬁshermen and children (on the beaches) suffered burns;



1972: at Fort Greely (Alaska), 50 reindeer were killed by sarin gas(200 canisters that had been stored on the frozen lake sank as the ice melted);

1979: near Hamburg (Germany), a child was killed by tabun (stored
canisters);

1990: in Libya, in the desert in Tarhuna (65 km from Tripoli), the chemicalplant in Rabta, thought to be the largest chemical weapons factory in theworld, was destroyed by a mysterious ﬁre;

1995: a terrorist attack released sarin gas in the Tokyo metro, causing dozens
of victims (and eight deaths);

2007: chemical attacks using chlorine gas were made against the populationin Iraq.

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