Technical Note of
PWRI No. 4153

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST JOINTMEETING OF U.S.-JAPAN PANEL ON
WIND AND SEISMIC EFFECTS
UJNR
Edited by
Keiichi Tamura, Secretary-General
Japan-side Panel on Wind and Seismic Effects

Synopsis
This publication contains the proceedings of the 41st Joint Meeting of the U.S.-Japan Panel on Wind andSeismic Effects, UJNR. The meeting was held at the National Institute for Land and InfrastructureManagement, Tsukuba, Japan during May 18-20, 2009. Twenty-two technical papers were authored for the
meeting, which were organized into seven themes; Next-Generation Building and Infrastructure Systems,
Dams, Wind Engineering, Transportation Systems, Storm Surge and Tsunami, Sustainable Design for
Buildings and Infrastructure - Focus on Natural Disaster Prevention, and Disaster Resilient Buildings andInfrastructure.
Keywords: wind engineering, earthquake engineering, sustainable design, natural disaster prevention,UJNR

PREFACE
This publication contains the proceedings of the 41st Joint Meeting of the U.S.-Japan Panel on Wind andSeismic Effects, UJNR. The meeting was held at the National Institute for Land and InfrastructureManagement, Tsukuba, Japan during May 18-20, 2009. The proceedings include the program, list ofmembers, task committee reports, and technical papers submitted to the Joint Panel Meeting, and asummary of the technical site visits.

BACKGROUND
Responding to the need for improving engineering and scientific practices through exchange of technicaldata and information, research personnel and research equipments, the United States and Japan created the
U.S.-Japan Cooperative Science Program in 1961. The U.S.-Japan Cooperative Program in Natural
Resources (UJNR) was created in January 1964. The objective of UJNR is to exchange information on
research results and scientists and engineers in natural resources of benefit of both countries. UJNR is of 18
Panels each responsible for specific technical subjects.
The Panel on Wind and Seismic Effects was established in 1969. Twenty-one U.S. and seven Japaneseagencies currently participate to develop and exchange technologies aimed at reducing damage from highwinds, earthquakes, storm surge, and tsunamis. This work is produced through collaboration between U.S.
and Japanese member researchers working in five Task Committees. Each Task Committee focuses on
specific technical issues, e.g., next-generation building and infrastructure systems. The Panel provides thevehicle to exchange technical date and information on design and construction of civil engineering
infrastructures, buildings, and to exchange high wind and seismic measurement records. Annual Joint Panel
Meetings alternate in the U.S. and Japan. These one-week technical meetings including technical site visits
provide the forum to discuss on-going research and research results.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides the U.S.-side chairman and secretarygeneral. The Public Works Research Institute (PWRI) provides the Japan-side chairman and secretarygeneral.
These annual Joint Panel Meetings provide the mechanism for interaction with U.S. and Japanese
researchers in wind and earthquake engineering which provides opportunities to gain valuable informationand to engage in cooperative research. Through these opportunities the Panel member organizations haverealized important advances in building and structure technology.
The Panel provides the vehicle to exchange technical data and information on design and construction ofcivil engineering lifelines, buildings, waterfront, and coastal structures. The data produced by the Panelinfluence on-going structural engineering research and contribute to the revision and creation of U.S.

ibuilding codes and standards. Examples of Panel benefits include:• Created and exchanged digitized earthquake records used as the basis of design and research for Japanand the U.S.
• Produced full-scale test data that advanced seismic design standards for buildings.
• Translated into English a Port and Harbour Research Institute handbook on Liquefied Remediation of
Reclaimed Land, A. A. Balkema, The Netherlands, publisher that provided general guidance for the US
design profession on remediation of liquefiable soils.
• In collaboration with Japan's Geotechnical Society translated into English a report from the Port andHarbour Research Institute, Remedial Measures Against Soil Liquefaction: From Investigation and
Design to Implementation, A. A. Balkema, The Netherlands, 1998, publisher that served as backgroundand guidance for the Corps of Engineers in performing dam remediation at Clemson University.
• Developed a protocol for testing bridge columns subjected to earthquake loads that facilitated theexchange of experimental data between both countries. The protocol serves as a basis for FHWA'sdevelopment of new seismic design criteria for bridge columns.
• Facilitated an USACE Team to Kobe within days after the Kobe Earthquake that allowed access to dataand information through performing post disaster investigations. This investigation would not have beenpossible without the Panel's endorsement.
• Performed joint post disaster investigations whose findings influenced revisions to and development of
new seismic design and rehabilitation criteria in the US.
• Accessed a large US and Japan database that helped develop an USACE Guidance Criteria in
Geotechnical Engineering.
• Provided access to data to help characterize gravely soils in determining the seismic instability ofgravely soils for dams and were used to improve USACE construction criteria.
• Through a Japan Guest Researcher from the Port and Harbour Research Institute working at
ERDC/WES, Vicksburg geotechnical research findings were transferred into USACE documents.
• Created a database comparing Japanese and US standard penetration tests to improve prediction of soilliquefaction.
• Influenced the creation of a NIST base isolation research program using data from translated Japan
reports into English on base isolation systems.
• Increased awareness of wind engineering practice, problems, and breakthroughs in Japan and the U.S.
• Improved cross-discipline research among wind engineers/meteorologists/sociologists in each country.
• Increased the dissemination of latest research findings in wind engineering, especially post-storm events(typhoons/hurricanes) to each country.
• Stimulated interest to create Joint quick-response storm survey teams with interdisciplinary researchthrusts to examine storm damage in both countries.
• Developed field test data for use in aerodynamic retrofit of bridge structures.
• Produced data that advanced retrofit techniques for bridge structures.
• Advanced technology for repairing and strengthening reinforced concrete, steel, and masonry structures,
improved in-situ measurement methods for soil liquefaction and stability under seismic loads.
• Created database on storm surge and tsunamis and verified mathematical models of tsunami and stormii

surge warning systems.
• Established a library resource of current research on wind and earthquake engineering and on storm
surge and tsunamis.
• Exchanged more than 250 guest researchers between Japan and the US that has resulted in advancing
their respective organizations mission research, advanced the state-of-technology, and provided career
growth opportunities for these guest researchers.
• Performed joint research in more than 10 collaborative research projects that resulted in new US seismic
design criteria for buildings and bridges.
• Published proceedings of Panel meetings, Task Committee Workshops, and special publications such as
List of Panel Publications, translated two-volume series on earthquake resistant construction using baseisolation systems, newsletter, website of Panel activities, and more.
• Gained better knowledge of both countries research, design and construction capabilities from in-depth
visits to host country's laboratories and building and public works projects. Results of such visits
contribute to creation of new Task Committees, agendas for Joint Panel meetings and task committee
workshops, special visits of US-Japan researchers, and joint collaborative research.
The Panel's efforts are exemplary of effective joint research and of technology delivery between researchers
in the U.S. and Japan. Since its creation, about 2000 papers were presented in 40 Joint Panel Meetings andTask Committee Workshops and over 250 guest researchers were exchanged. The Panel provides important
information about the U.S. and Japan's civil engineering thrusts which influence both countries' researchand provide the basis for improvements in building and structure codes and standards.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTSPREFACE ............................................................................................................................................ i
AGENDA OF JOINT MEETING AND TECHNICAL SITE VISITS ........................................... 1
LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS ........................................................................................................... 9
RESOLUTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 27
STRATEGIC PLAN ......................................................................................................................... 31
PAPERS ............................................................................................................................................ 43
THEME 1. Next-Generation Building and Infrastructure Systems ............................................ 45
Continuity and/or Resiliency of Building Function after Disasters
Hiroshi Fukuyama*, Koichi Morita, Tomohisa Mukai, Taiki Saito, Hitomitsu Kikitsu,
Yoshihiro Iwata, Yoshio Wakiyama and Seitaro Tajiri .................................................................. 47
THEME 2. Dams .............................................................................................................................. 61
Improvement of Distance Attenuation Formula of Acceleration and Lower Limit Acceleration
Response Spectrum to Evaluate Seismic Performance of Dams
Shinya Mitsuishi, Tomoki Otani*, Yoshikazu Yamaguchi and Tomoya Iwashita ......................... 63
Developing Regional Exercises Involving Multiple Dams
Enrique Matheu, Yazmin Seda-Sanabria and Robert Hughes* ..................................................... 76
Damage to Dams due to the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake in 2008
Yoshikazu Yamaguchi*, Tomoya Iwashita and Shinya Mitsuishi ................................................. 86
THEME 3. Wind Engineering ......................................................................................................... 95
Experimental Studies on Internal Pressure and Debris Strike for Improved Tornado Induced
Loads of Low-Rise Buildings
Partha Sarkar* and Hitomitsu Kikitsu .......................................................................................... 97
Damage to Buildings by EF5 Tornado in Iowa, U.S. on May 25, 2008
Hitomitsu Kikitsu* and Partha Sarkar ......................................................................................... 110
New Scales for the Destructive Potential of Tropical Cyclones
Mark Powell and Timothy Reinhold (Presented by John Gaynor*) ............................................124
THEME 4. Transportation Systems ..............................................................................................133
Damage Investigation of Matsurube Bridge during the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake
Shigeki Unjoh*, Takashi Tamakoshi, Koichi Ikuta and Junichi Sakai.........................................135
The Lessons Learned from Wenchuan Earthquake on Highway Bridges
Phillip Yen*, Genda Chen and Mark Yashinski ...........................................................................148
Quick Earthquake Damage Detection System for Bridges

ivJunichi Sakai* and Shigeki Unjoh ...............................................................................................165
Shake Table Testing of Bridge Reinforced Concrete Columns under Combined Actions
Juan Arias-Acosta and David Sanders* .......................................................................................180
Shake Table Experiment on RC Bridge Columns Using E-Defense
Kazuhiko Kawashima*, Tomohiro Sasaki, Koichi Kajiwara, Hiromichi Ukon, Shigeki Unjoh,
Junichi Sakai, Kenji Kosa, Yoshikazu Takahashi, Masaaki Yabe and Hiroshi Matsuzaki ...........188
Outline of the Damage of Transportation Facilities and Geotechnical Structures by the 2009
L'Aquila, Italy Earthquake
Kazuhiko Kawashima*, Omer Aydan, Kazuo Konagai, Atsushi Yamashita and Sven-Peter
Teodori .........................................................................................................................................202
THEME 5. Storm Surge and Tsunami...........................................................................................215
Decision Making on Evacuation from the Tsunami Following the Earthquake off Kuril Islands in2006
Yoshio Suwa and Fuminori Kato* ...............................................................................................217
Practical Model to Estimate Behavior of Tsunami-Drifted Bodies
Takashi Tomita* and Kazuhiko Honda ........................................................................................227
Manual for Forecasting Earthquake and Tsunami Damage to Public Civil Engineering Facilities(Proposal)
Osamu Okamoto, Kentaro Kumagai and Katsuya Oda ...............................................................235
THEME 6. Sustainable Design for Buildings and Infrastructure - Focus on Natural
Disaster Prevention .........................................................................................................................243
Earthquake Disaster Management in Japan
Koji Ikeuchi* and Masamitsu Waga ............................................................................................245
Study on Landslide Orientation Bias Triggered by 1994 Northridge Earthquake
Hiroshi P. Sato*............................................................................................................................260
THEME 7. Disaster Resilient Buildings and Infrastructure .......................................................269
On the Variation of Fundamental Frequency (Period) of an Undamaged Building - A Continuing
Discussion
Mehmet Celebi*...........................................................................................................................271
System Dynamics Modeling and Simulation of Disaster Recovery Process of Interdependent
Infrastructure Systems
Shojiro Kataoka* .........................................................................................................................282
Modal-Pushover-based Ground Motion Scaling Procedure for Nonlinear Analysis of Structures
Erol Kalkan* and Anil Chopra .....................................................................................................289
Climate Change Adaptive Strategies for Buildings and Public HealthFuyuen Yip, Josephine Malilay, George Luber and Paul Garbe ..................................................310
APPENDIX ......................................................................................................................................317
TASK COMMITTEE REPORTS ......................................................................................................319v

TECHNICAL SITE VISITS..............................................................................................................333vi

AGENDA OF JOINT MEETING ANDTECHNICAL SITE VISITSJOINT MEETING
May 17 (Sunday)
Arrival of U.S.-side Delegation
Hotel: Okura Frontier Hotel Tsukuba Epochal
Phone/Fax: +81-(0)29-860-7700/+81-(0)29-860-7701
May 18 (Monday)
10:00

Opening Ceremonies[8F Conference Room]Call to order by Keiichi Tamura, Secretary-General, Japan-side Panel
Opening remarks by Hiroaki Taniguchi, Vice-Minister for Engineering Affairs,
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Remarks by Bart D. Cobbs, Unit Chief, Environment, Science and Technology Unit,
Economic Affairs, Embassy of the United States of America
Remarks by Masanobu Morita, Director, International Science and Technology Affairs
Division, Science and Technology Policy Bureau, Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology
Remarks by Tadahiko Sakamoto, Chairman, Japan-side Panel on Wind and Seismic
Effects, Chief Executive, Public Works Research InstituteRemarks by H. S. Lew, Acting Chairman, U.S.-side Panel on Wind and Seismic Effects,
Building and Fire Research Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Department of Commerce
Introduction of Japan-side Members by Japan-side Panel Chairman
Introduction of U.S.-side Members by U.S.-side Panel Chairman
Elect Joint Panel Meeting Chairman
Adopt Agenda
Adjourn
11:10

Group Photograph3

11:30Technical Session 1 - Transportation Systems
Chairman - Dr. H. S. Lew

11:30

Damage Investigation of Matsurube Bridge during the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku
Earthquake, Shigeki Unjoh*, Takashi Tamakoshi, Koichi Ikuta, NILIM; and Junichi
Sakai, PWRI

11:50

The Lessons Learned from Wenchuan Earthquake on Highway Bridges, Phillip Yen*,
FHWA; Genda Chen, MUST; and Mark Yashinski, CALTRANS

12:10

Discussion

12:20

Lunch

13:20

Technical Session 2 - Transportation Systems[1F Conference Room]

Chairman - Dr. H. S. Lew
13:20

Quick Earthquake Damage Detection System for Bridges, Junichi Sakai*, PWRI; andShigeki Unjoh, NILIM

13:40

Shake Table Testing of Bridge Reinforced Concrete Columns under Combined Actions,
Juan Arias-Acosta and David Sanders*, UNR

14:00

Shake Table Experiment on RC Bridge Columns Using E-Defense, Kazuhiko
Kawashima*, Tomohiro Sasaki, Tokyo Institute of Technology; Koichi Kajiwara,
Hiromichi Ukon, NIED; Shigeki Unjoh, NILIM; Junichi Sakai, PWRI; Kenji Kosa,
Kyushu Institute of Technology; Yoshikazu Takahashi, Kyoto University; Masaaki
Yabe, Chodai; and Hiroshi Matsuzaki, Tokyo Institute of Technology

14:20

Outline of the Damage of Transportation Facilities and Geotechnical Structures by the2009 L'Aquila, Italy Earthquake, Kazuhiko Kawashima*, Tokyo Institute ofTechnology; Omer Aydan, Tokai University; Kazuo Konagai, University of Tokyo;
Atsushi Yamashita, Gifu University; and Sven-Peter Teodori, Nippon Koei Co., Ltd. /Highlights of the L'Aquila, Italy Earthquake of April 6, 2009, Mehmet Celebi*

14:45

Discussion

15:05

Break

15:20

Task Committee Meetings

17:00

B: Next-Generation Building and Infrastructure Systems[Room #524]

C: Dams[Room #532]

D: Wind Engineering[Room #616]

G: Transportation Systems[Room #617]

H: Storm Surge and Tsunami[Room #601]

Conclusion of Day 1

4

18:30Japan-side Panel Hosted Reception(Okura Frontier Hotel Tsukuba)

May 19 (Tuesday)
9:00

Technical Session 3 - Sustainable Design for Buildings and Infrastructure - Focus
on Natural Disaster Prevention, and Disaster Resilient Buildings andInfrastructure
Chairman - Dr. Tadahiko Sakamoto

9:00

Earthquake Disaster Management in Japan, Koji Ikeuchi* and Masamitsu Waga,
Cabinet Office

9:20

On the Variation of Fundamental Frequency (Period) of an Undamaged Building - A
Continuing Discussion, Mehmet Celebi*, USGS

9:40

System Dynamics Modeling and Simulation of Disaster Recovery Process ofInterdependent Infrastructure Systems, Shojiro Kataoka*, NILIM

10:00

Modal-Pushover-based Ground Motion Scaling Procedure for Nonlinear Analysis of
Structures, Erol Kalkan*, USGS; and Anil Chopra, UCB

10:20

Discussion

10:40

Break

10:55

Technical Session 4 - Wind Engineering
Chairman - Dr. Tadahiko Sakamoto

10:55

Experimental Studies on Internal Pressure and Debris Strike for Improved Tornado
Induced Loads of Low-Rise Buildings, Partha Sarkar*, ISU; and Hitomitsu Kikitsu,
NILIM

11:15

Damage to Buildings by EF5 Tornado in Iowa, U.S. on May 25, 2008, Hitomitsu
Kikitsu*, NILIM; and Partha Sarkar, ISU

11:35

New Scales for the Destructive Potential of Tropical Cyclones, Mark Powell, NOAA;
and Timothy Reinhold, IBHS (Presented by John Gaynor*)

11:55

Discussion

12:10

Lunch

13:10

Technical Session 5 - Next-Generation Building and Infrastructure Systems, and[1F Conference Room]

Sustainable Design for Buildings and Infrastructure - Focus on Natural Disaster
Prevention
Chairman - Dr. Tadahiko Sakamoto
13:10

Continuity and/or Resiliency of Building Function after Disasters, Hiroshi Fukuyama*,

5

Koichi Morita, Tomohisa Mukai, Taiki Saito, BRI; Hitomitsu Kikitsu, NILIM;
Yoshihiro Iwata, Yoshio Wakiyama and Seitaro Tajiri, BRI
13:30

Study on Landslide Orientation Bias Triggered by 1994 Northridge Earthquake,
Hiroshi P. Sato*, GSI

13:50

Discussion

14:00

Break

14:15

Strategic Planning Session

17:00

Conclusion of Day 2

18:30

Individual Japan-side Members Hosted Dinners

May 20 (Wednesday)
9:00

Technical Session 6 - Dams
Chairman - Dr. H. S. Lew

9:00

Analysis of Remediation Alternatives for Success Dams, Michael Sharp*, USACE

9:20

Improvement of Distance Attenuation Formula of Acceleration and Lower Limit
Acceleration Response Spectrum to Evaluate Seismic Performance of Dams, Shinya
Mitsuishi, NILIM; Tomoki Otani*, Japan Water Agency; Yoshikazu Yamaguchi andTomoya Iwashita, PWRI

9:40

Developing Regional Exercises Involving Multiple Dams, Enrique Matheu, DHS;
Yazmin Seda-Sanabria, USACE; and Robert Hughes*, DHS

10:00

Damage to Dams due to the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake in 2008, Yoshikazu
Yamaguchi*, Tomoya Iwashita, PWRI; and Shinya Mitsuishi, NILIM

10:20

Developing Structural Performance Criteria for Concrete Hydraulic Structures, Robert
Hall, USACE (Presented by Michael Sharp*)

10:40

Discussion

11:05

Break

11:20

Technical Session 7 - Storm Surge and Tsunami
Chairman - Dr. H. S. Lew

11:20

Decision Making on Evacuation from the Tsunami Following the Earthquake off Kuril
Islands in 2006, Yoshio Suwa and Fuminori Kato*, NILIM

11:40

Practical Model to Estimate Behavior of Tsunami-Drifted Bodies, Takashi Tomita* andKazuhiko Honda, PARI

12:00

Discussion

6

12:10Lunch[1F Conference Room]

13:10

Workshop and Task Committee Reports
Chairman - Dr. Tadahiko Sakamoto

14:30

Break

14:50

Adoption of Final Resolutions
Chairman - Dr. Tadahiko Sakamoto

15:50

Break

16:00

Closing Ceremonies
Call to order by Keiichi Tamura, Secretary-General, Japan-side Panel
Remarks by H. S. Lew, Acting Chairman, U.S.-side Panel on Wind and Seismic Effects
Remarks by Tadahiko Sakamoto, Chairman, Japan-side Panel on Wind and Seismic
Effects

16:30

Conclusion of 41st Joint Panel Technical Sessions

18:30

U.S.-side Panel Hosted Reception(Restaurant ESPOIR, Epochal Tsukuba International Congress Center)

7

TECHNICAL SITE VISITS
May 21 (Thursday)
8:12-9:05

Move to Akihabara from Tsukuba by TX

9:20-10:00

Move to Ariake by bus

10:00-10:30

Visit Ariake Yard for fabrication of main truss span of Tokyo Rinkai Oh-hashi Bridge

10:30-12:00

Visit construction site of Tokyo Rinkai Oh-hashi Bridge, Tokyo Bay by ferry

12:00-12:30

Move to Tokyo International Airport (Haneda)

12:30-13:30

Lunch at meeting room of Tokyo International Airport Development Office

13:30-15:30

Visit construction site for new runway at Tokyo International Airport (Haneda) by ferry

15:30-16:00

Move to Ariake by bus

16:00-17:30

Visit Disaster Management Center (DMC) at Ariake

17:30-18:00

Move to hotel by bus
Stay at Mitsui Garden Hotel Ginza Premier (Shimbashi, Tokyo)

May 22 (Friday)
9:20-10:00

Move to Tokyo Main Office, Takenaka Corporation at Toyo-cho by bus

10:00-12:00

Introduction of sustainable works and Tokyo Main Office (sustainable building) at
Tokyo Main Office, Takenaka Corporation

12:00-12:30

Move to Shimizu Institute of Technology at Etchujima by bus

12:30-13:30

Lunch at meeting room of Shimizu Institute of Technology

13:30-16:30

Introduction of sustainable building concept, floating isolation, wind tunnel facility, etc
at Shimizu Institute of Technology

16:30-17:00

Move to hotel by bus
Stay at Mitsui Garden Hotel Ginza Premier (Shimbashi, Tokyo)

May 23 (Saturday)
9:10-9:30

Move to Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) Headquarters at Ohtemachi by bus

9:30-10:30

Introduction of earthquake early warning system of JMA

10:30-10:45

Move to Japan Life Insurance Corporation Building at Tokyo by bus

10:45-12:00

Introduction of sustainable building and advanced seismic response controls system

12:00-13:00

Lunch around Tokyo Station

May 24 (Sunday)
Departure of U.S.-side Delegation

8

LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS

9U.S.-SIDE DELEGATION
Dr. H. S. Lew
Acting-Chairman, U.S.-side Panel
Senior Research Structural Engineer
Materials and Construction Research Division
Building and Fire Research Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive Stop 8611
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-861(T) 301-975-6060 (F) 301-869-6275
hls@nist.gov

Mr. Noël Raufaste
NIST Guest Researcher/Engineer Emeritus
Building and Fire Research Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8611
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8611(T) 301-975-6062
noel raufaste@nist.gov
Dr. David H. Sanders
Professor
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
University of Nevada
Reno, NV 89557(T) 775-784-4288 (F) 775-784-1390
sanders@unr.edu

Dr. Mehmet K. Celebi
Research Civil Engineer
U.S. Geological Survey
U.S. Department of the Interior
345 Middlefield Road, MS 977
Menlo Park, CA 94025(T) 650-329-5623 (F) 650-329-5163
celebi@usgs.gov
Mr. John Gaynor
Director, Office of Weather and Air Quality
Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Silver Spring, MD 20910(T) 301-734-1178 (F) 301-713-3515
john.gaynor@noaa.gov

Dr. Partha P. Sarkar
Professor and Wilson Chair
Director of Wind Simulation and Testing Laboratory
2271 Howe Hall, Rm. 1200
Department of Aerospace Engineering
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011-2271(T) 515-294-0719
ppsarkar@iastate.edu

Mr. Robert Cris Hughes
Dams Sector Branch
Sector Specific Agency Executive Management Office
Office of Infrastructure Protection
US Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528(T) 703-235-2838
C.Hughes@dhs.gov

Dr. Michael K. Sharp
Technical Director, Civil Works Infrastructure
Geotechnical and Structures Laboratory
US Army Engineer Research and Development Center
3909 Halls Ferry Road
Vicksburg, MS 39180-6199(T) 601-634-4127 (F) 601-634-4894
michael.k.sharp@erdc.usace.army mil

Dr. Erol Kalkan
Senior Research Engineer
Earthquake Hazards Team
U.S. Geological Survey
U.S. Department of the Interior
345 Middlefield Road, MS 977
Menlo Park, CA 94025(T) 650-329-5146 (F) 650-329-5163 U.S.
ekalkan@usgs.gov

Dr. W. Phillip Yen
Program Manager
Seismic Hazard Mitigation Program
Office of Infrastructure, R&D
Federal Highway Administration
6300 Georgetown Pike
McLean, VA 22101(T) 202-493-3056 (F) 202-493-3442
Wen-huei.Yen@fhwa.dot.gov

11

U.S.-SIDE PANEL ON WIND AND SEISMIC EFFECTS
MEMBERSHIP LIST
Mr. Stephen A. Cauffman
Secretary-General, U.S.-side Panel
Deputy Chief, Materials and Construction Research
Division
Building and Fire Research Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8611
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8611
301-975-6051 (F) 301-869-6275
stephen.cauffman@nist.gov

Washington, DC 20520
703-875-6207 (F) 703-875-6204
chency@state.gov
Dr. Anjana Chudgar
Structural Engineer
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
550 Main Street, RM 10-031
Cincinnati, OH 45202
513-684-6210 (F) 513-684-2460 (C) 5020345-0743
anjana k.chudgar@hq02.usace.army.mil

Mr. John Baals
Seismic Safety Coordinator
P.O. Box 25007 (D-8110)
Bureau of Reclamation
U.S. Department of the Interior
Denver, CO 80225
303-236-9129 x304 (F) 303-236-9099
jbaals@do.usbr.gov

Dr. Amr Elnashai
Director, Mid-America Earthquake Center
Professor of Civil Engineering
University of Illinois
1245 Newmark Laboratory
205 North Mathews Avenue
Urbana, IL 61801
217-265-5497 (F) 217-333-3821
aelnash@uiuc.edu

Dr. Eddie N. Bernard
Director, Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce
7600 Sand Point Way, NE
BIN C15700/Building 3
Seattle, WA 98115-0070
206-526-6800 (F) 206-526-4576
Eddie.N.Bernard@noaa.gov

Mr. John Gaynor
Director, Office of Weather and Air Quality
Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Silver Spring, MD 20910
301-734-1178 (F) 301-713-3515
john.gaynor@noaa.gov

Dr. David M. Boore
U.S. Geological Survey
345 Middlefield Road MS 977
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-329-5616 (F) 650-329-5163
boore@usgs.gov

Dr. Hamid Ghasemi
Bridge Safety, Reliability and Security
Office of Infrastructure and Security
Office of Infrastructure R&D
Federal Highway Administration
6300 Georgetown Pike
McLean VA 22101
202-493-3042 (F) 202-493-3443
hamid.ghasemi@fhwa.dot.gov

Dr. Roger D. Borcherdt
U.S. Geological Survey
U.S. Department of the Interior
345 Middlefield Road, MS 977
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-329-5619 (F) 650-329-5163
borcherdt@usgs.gov

Dr. John Gross
Research Structural Engineer
Materials and Construction Research Division
Building and Fire Research Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8611
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8611
301-975-6068 (F) 301-869-6275
john.gross@nist.gov

Dr. Mehmet K. Celebi
Research Civil Engineer
U.S. Geological Survey
U.S. Department of the Interior
345 Middlefield Road, MS 977
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-329-5623 (F) 650-329-5163
celebi@usgs.gov

Dr. Robert L. Hall
Chief, Geosciences and Structures Division
Geotechnical and Structures Laboratory
US Army Engineer Research and Development Center
CEERD-GS
3909 Halls Ferry Road
Vicksburg, MS 39180-6199
601-634-2567 (F) 601-634-3412(C) 601-618-0644

Dr. C. Y. Chen
Senior Civil/Geotechnical Engineer
Office of Foreign Buildings
Department of State
Code SA-6, Rm. 347

12

Robert.L.Hall@erdc.usace.army mil

Dr. Enrique E. Matheu
Chief, Dams Sector Branch
Sector Specific Agency Executive Management Office
Office of Infrastructure Protection
US Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528
703-235-2863 (F) 703-235-3053
enrique matheu@dhs.gov

Dr. Mary Ellen Hynes
Director of Research, Infrastructure, and GeophysicalDivision
Science and Technology Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528
1499 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Apt 113A, Washington,
DC 20005
202-254-5807
Maryellen hynes@dhs.gov

Mr. Noël Raufaste
NIST Emeritus/Guest Researcher
Building and Fire Research Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8611
301-975-6062
noel raufaste@nist.gov

Dr. Nicholas P. Jones
Dean, Whiting School of EngineeringJohns Hopkins University
Baltimore, MD 21218
410-516-4050 (Jeannie Pugh) 443-834-3740
npjones@jhu.edu

Dr. Andrei M. Reinhorn
Clifford C. Furnas Professor of Structural Engineering andDirector, Structural Engineering and Earthquake
Simulation Laboratory (SEESL)
University at Buffalo, State University of New York231 Ketter Hall, Buffalo, NY 14260
716-645-2114 X2419(F) 716-645-3733
Reinhorn@buffalo.edu

Mr. Michael Keever
Chief, Earthquake Engineering Office
California Department of Transportation Division ofEngineering Services, MS9-2/7J
P.O. Box 168041
Sacramento, CA 95816
916-227-8806 (F) 916-227-8242
mike_keever@dot.ca.gov

Dr. William E. Roper
School of Computational Sciences
Center for Earth Observing and Space Research
George Mason University
4400 University Drive, MS 5C3
Fairfax, VA 22030
703-993-1648 (F) 703-993-1521
wroper@gmu.edu

Dr. George C. Lee
Task Director, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research (MCEER)
University at Buffalo
122 Red Jacket Quad
Buffalo, NY 14261
716-645-3391 x111 (F) 716-645-3399
716-645-2039 716-310-1078 (C)gclee@mceermail.buffalo.edu

Dr. Michael K. Sharp
Technical Director, Civil Works Infrastructure
Geotechnical and Structures Laboratory
US Army Engineer Research and Development Center
3909 Halls Ferry Road
Vicksburg, MS 39180-6199
601-634-4127 (F) 601-634-4894
michael k.sharp@erdc.usace.army mil

Dr. H. S. Lew
Senior Research Structural Engineer
Materials and Construction Research Division
Building and Fire Research Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive Stop 8611
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-861
301-975-6060 (F) 301-869-6275
hai.lew@nist.gov

Dr. M. P. Singh
Program Director
Structural Systems and Hazard Mitigation of Structures(SSHM)
Room 550 S
National Science Foundation
4201 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22230
703-292-7081
mpsingh@nsf.gov

Mr. Michael MahoneyPhysical Scientist
Federal Emergency Management Agency
500 C Street, SW
Washington, DC 20472
202-646-2794 (F) 202-646-4387
mike mahoney@dhs.gov
Dr. Josephine Malilay
Associate Director for Science (Acting)
Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects
National Center for Environmental HealthCenters for Disease Control and Prevention
4770 Buford Hwy., NE (Mail stop F-52)
Atlanta, GA 30341
770-488-3465 (F) 770-488-3460
JMalilay@cdc.gov

Dr. Charles E. Smith
Senior Technical Advisor
Accident Investigation Board
U. S. Minerals Management Service
381 Elden Street, MS 4021
Herndon, VA 20170-4817
703-787-1561 (F) 703-787-1549
smithc@mms.gov or Charles.E.Smith@mms.gov

13Dr. W. Phillip Yen
Program Manager
Seismic Hazard Mitigation Program
Federal Highway Administration
Office of Infrastructure, R&D
6300 Georgetown Pike
McLean, VA 22101
202-493-3056 (F) 202-493-3442 (C) 202-468-6113
Wen-huei.Yen@fhwa.dot.gov

Dr. Solomon C. Yim
Professor
Structural and Ocean Engineering
Oregon State University
202 Apperson Hall
Corvallis, OR 97331-2302
541-737-6894 (F) 541-737-3052
solomon.yim@oregonstate.edu

14

JAPAN-SIDE PANEL ON WIND AND SEISMIC EFFECTS
MEMBERSHIP LISTSTEERING COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Dr. Tadahiko Sakamoto
Chairman, Japan-side Panel on Wind and Seismic Effects
Chief Executive, Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6700
Fax: 029-879-6741
E-mail: sakamoto@pwri.go.jp

Dr. Jun-ichi Hoshikuma
Chief Researcher, Bridge and Structural Technology
Research Group
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6793
Fax: 029-879-6739
E-mail: hoshikuma@pwri.go.jp

Dr. Keiichi Tamura
Secretary-General, Japan-side Panel on Wind and Seismic
Effects
Research Coordinator for Earthquake Engineering
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6721
Fax: 029-879-6739
E-mail: ke-tamura@pwri.go.jp

Dr. Masanori Iiba
Director, Department of Structural Engineering
Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-6633
Fax: 029-864-6773
E-mail: iiba-m@kenken.go.jp
Dr. Takashi Iijima
President, Civil Engineering Research Laboratory
1-18 Kanda Suda-cho Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0041
Tel: 03-3254-9481
Fax: 03-3254-9448
E-mail: iijima@crl.or.jp

Mr. Tomonori Abe
Director, Hydraulic Engineering Research Group
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6723
Fax: 029-879-6737
E-mail: to-abe@pwri.go.jp

Mr. Munehiro Igarashi
Director, Disaster Risk Management OfficeRiver Bureau
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
2-1-3 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8918
Tel: 03-5253-8111
Fax: 03-5253-1608
E-mail: igarashi-m2ag @milt.go.jp

Mr. Yoshikazu Fukushima
Director, Geographic Department
Geographical Survey Institute
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Kitasato, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0811
Tel: 029-864-1111
Fax: 029-864-1804
E-mail: fukushima@gsi.go.jp

Mr. Koji Ikeuchi
Director for Earthquake, Volcanic and Large-scale Flood
Disaster Management
Disaster Management Bureau
Cabinet Office
1-2-2 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8969
Tel: 03-3501-5693
Fax: 03-3501-5199
E-mail: koji.ikeuchi@cao.go.jp

Dr. Hiroshi Fukuyama
Chief Research Engineer and Research Coordinator
Department of Structural Engineering
Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-6647
Fax: 029-864-6773
E-mail: fukuyama@kenken.go.jp

Mr. Yasuo Katsumi
Director for International Building Code Coordination
Housing Bureau
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
2-1-3 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8918
Tel: 03-5253-8513
Fax: 03-5253-1630
E-mail: katsumi-y2ym@milt.go.jp

Dr. Hiromichi Higashihara
Director, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Research Center
National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster
Prevention
1-5-2 Wakinohama Kaigandori, Chuo-ku, Kobe-shi,
Hyogo-ken 651-0073
Tel: 078-262-5520
Fax: 078-262-5526
E-mail: higashi@edm.bosai.go.jp

Dr. Naohito Kawai
Chief Research Engineer, Department of Structural

15

Engineering
Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-6753
Fax: 029-864-6773
E-mail: kawai@kenken.go.jp

1 Asahi, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0804
Tel: 029-864-2868
Fax: 029-864-1527
E-mail: nakayasu-m92ta@nilim.go.jp
Mr. Yoshiaki Nanami
Director, International Policy Unit for Infrastructure
Policy Bureau
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
2-1-3 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8918
Tel: 03-5253-8111
Fax: 03-5253-1562
E-mail: nanami-y2qp@mlit.go.jp

Dr. Kazuhiko Kawashima
Professor, Department of Civil Engineering
Tokyo Institute of Technology
2-12-1 O-okayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552
Tel: 03-5734-2922
Fax: 03-5734-3810
E-mail: kawasima k.ae@m.titech.ac.jp

Dr. Isao Nishiyama
Director, Building Department
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-4277
Fax: 029-864-6774
E-mail: nishiyama-i92ta@nilim.go.jp

Mr. Naoki Kawashima
Director, Disaster Risk Management Office
Coast Administration and Disaster Reduction Division
Ports and Harbors Bureau
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
2-1-3 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8918
Tel: 03-5253-8111
Fax: 03-5253-1654
E-mail: kawashima-n2jv@mlit.go.jp

Mr. Akihiko Nunomura
Director-General
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Asahi, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0804
Tel: 029-864-2210
Fax: 029-864-2148
E-mail: nunomura-a2ij@nilim.go.jp

Dr. Shuzo Murakami
Chief Executive, Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-2151
Fax: 029-864-2989
E-mail: murakami@kenken.go.jp

Dr. Hisashi Okada
Director, Testing and Research Laboratory
Japan Housing and Wood Technology Center
3-4-2 Shinsuna, Koto-ku, Tokyo 136-0075
Tel: 03-3589-1788
Fax: 03-3589-1766
E-mail: h-okada@howtec.or.jp

Mr. Jun Murakoshi
Chief Researcher, Bridge and Structural Technology
Research Group
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6792
Fax: 029-879-6739
E-mail:murakosi@pwri.go.jp

Dr. Izuru Okawa
Senior Research Fellow, Department of StructuralEngineering
Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-6627
Fax: 029-864-6773
E-mail: okawa@kenken.go.jp

Dr. Masayoshi Nakashima
Director, Hyogo Earthquake Engineering Center
National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster
Prevention
1501-21, Mituta, Nishikameya, Shijimi-cho, Miki-shi,
Hyogo-ken 673-0515
Tel: 0794-85-8211
Fax: 0794-85-7994
E-mail: naka@bosai.go.jp

Dr. Yasuo Okuda
Chief Research Engineer, Department of StructuralEngineering
Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-6618
Fax: 029-864-6773
E-mail: y_okuda@kenken.go.jp

Dr. Shinsuke Nakata
Professor, Infrastructure System Engineering Course
Kochi University of Technology
185 Miyanokuchi, Tosa-Yamada-cho, Kochi-ken 782-8502
Tel: 0887-53-1040
Fax: 0887-57-2420
E-mail: nakata.shinsuke@kochi-tech.ac.jp

Dr. Hiroshi Sato
Professor, Graduate School of Systems and Information
Engineering
University of Tsukuba
1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8573
Tel: 029-853-5549
Fax: 029-853-5549
E-mail: hsato@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp

Mr. Masaaki Nakayasu
Director, Planning and Research Administration
Department
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

16

Tel: 029-864-2926
Fax: 029-864-0598
E-mail: unjoh-s92ta@nilim.go.jp

Dr. Koji Sekiguchi
Head, Outreach Division
Strategic Planning Department
National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster
Prevention
3-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0006
Tel: 029-863-7768
Fax: 029-851-1622
E-mail: ksekigut@bosai.go.jp

Mr. Atsushi Watanabe
Director, Office of Reduction Research
Research and Development Bureau
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology
3-2-2 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8959
Tel: 03-6734-4134
Fax: 03-6734-4139
E-mail: watanabe@mext.go.jp

Dr. Hideki Sugita
Team Leader, Soil Mechanics and Dynamics Research
Team
Material and Geotechnical Engineering Research Group
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6770
Fax: 029-879-6735
E-mail: sugita@pwri.go.jp

Mr. Kazushige Watanabe
Director, Division of Road Risk Management
Road Bureau
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
2-1-3 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8918
Tel: 03-5253-8111
Fax: 03-5253-1620
E-mail: watanabe-k22av@milt.go.jp

Mr. Morito Takahashi
Director, Cold-Region Construction Engineering Research
Group
Civil Engineering Research Institute for Cold Region
Public Works Research Institute1-3-1-34 Hiragishi, Toyohira-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido
062-8602
Tel: 011-841-1698
Fax: 011-841-3502
E-mail: morito@ceri.go.jp

Dr. Yoshikazu Yamaguchi
Team Leader, Dam Structure Research Team
Hydraulic Engineering Research Group
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6780
Fax: 029-879-6737
E-mail: yamaguti@pwri.go.jp
Mr. Yoshiji Yokote
Senior Coordinator for Research and Development,
Planning Division, Administration Department
Japan Meteorological Agency
1-3-4 Ote-machi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8122
Tel: 03-3212-8341
Fax: 03-3211-2032
E-mail: yokote@met kishou.go.jp

Dr. Susumu TakamiyaHead, Earthquake Prevention Division
Research Center for Disaster Risk Management
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Asahi, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0804
Tel: 029-864-3244
Fax: 029-864-0598
E-mail: takamiya-s92tc@nilim.go.jp

Dr. Koichi Yokoyama
Professor, Department of Urban and Civil Engineering
Ibaraki University
4-12-1 Nakanarusawa, Hitachi-shi, Ibaraki-ken 316-8511
Tel: 0294-38-5161
Fax: 0294-38-5268
E-mail: yokoyama@mx.ibaraki.ac.jp

Dr. Takashi Tomita
Tsunami Research Director, Tsunami Research CenterPort and Airport Research Institute3-1-1 Nagase, Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa-ken 239-0826
Tel: 046-844-5052
Fax: 046-844-1274
E-mail: tomita@pari.go.jp

Dr. Sumio Yoshikawa
Director, Seismology and Volcanology Research
Department
Meteorological Research InstituteJapan Meteorological Agency
1-1 Nagamine, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0052
Tel: 029-853-8675
Fax: 029-851-3730
E-mail: syosikaw@mri-jma.go.jp

Mr. Mitsuru Ueno
Director, Typhoon Research Department
Meteorological Research InstituteJapan Meteorological Agency
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1-1 Nagamine, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0052
Tel: 029-853-8663
Fax: 029-853-8735
E-mail: mueno@mri-jma.go.jp

Mr. Atsushi Yoshioka
Director, Bridge and Structural Technology ResearchGroup
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516

Dr. Shigeki Unjoh
Research Coordinator for Earthquake Disaster Prevention,
Research Center for Disaster Risk Management
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Asahi, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0804

17

Tel: 029-879-6726
Fax: 029-879-6739

E-mail: yoshioka@pwri.go.jp

18

SECRETARIES COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Dr. Keiichi Tamura
Secretary-General, Japan-side Panel on Wind and Seismic
Effects
Research Coordinator for Earthquake Engineering
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6721
Fax: 029-879-6739
E-mail: ke-tamura@pwri.go.jp

Dr. Shin Koyama
Chief Research Engineer, International Institute of
Seismology and Earthquake Engineering
Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-6677
Fax: 029-864-6777
E-mail: skoyama@kenken.go.jp
Mr. Jun Murakoshi
Chief Researcher, Bridge and Structural Technology
Research Group
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6792
Fax: 029-879-6739
E-mail:murakosi@pwri.go.jp

Mr. Tatsuya AzuhataHead, Structural Standard Division
Building Department
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-4299
Fax: 029-864-6774
E-mail: azuhata-t92ta@nilim.go.jp
Dr. Hiroshi Fukuyama
Chief Research Engineer and Research Coordinator
Department of Structural Engineering
Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-6647
Fax: 029-864-6773
E-mail: fukuyama@kenken.go.jp

Mr. Shoichi Nakatani
Chief Researcher, Bridge and Structural Technology
Research Group
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6794
Fax: 029-879-6739
E-mail: nakatani@pwri.go.jp

Dr. Jun-ichi Hoshikuma
Chief Researcher, Bridge and Structural Technology
Research Group
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6793
Fax: 029-879-6739
E-mail: hoshikuma@pwri.go.jp

Dr. Tetsuo Nakazawa
Head, The Second Research Laboratory
Typhoon Research Department
Meteorological Research InstituteJapan Meteorological Agency
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1-1 Nagamine, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0052
Tel: 029-853-8671
Fax: 029-853-8735
E-mail: nakazawa@mri-jma.go.jp

Mr. Hiroyuki Ishikawa
Team Leader, Structures Research Team
Cold-Region Construction Engineering Research Group
Civil Engineering Research Institute for Cold Region
Public Works Research Institute1-3-1-34 Hiragishi, Toyohira-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido
062-8602
Tel: 011-841-1698
Fax: 011-841-3502
E-mail: hi-iskw@ceri.go.jp

Dr. Yasuo Okuda
Chief Research Engineer, Department of StructuralEngineering
Building Research Institute1 Tachihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0802
Tel: 029-864-6618
Fax: 029-864-6773
E-mail: y_okuda@kenken.go.jp
Dr. Koji Sekiguchi
Head, Outreach Division
Strategic Planning Department
National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster
Prevention
3-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0006
Tel: 029-863-7768
Fax: 029-851-1622
E-mail: ksekigut@bosai.go.jp

Mr. Toshio KitaharaHead, Planning Division, Geographic Department
Geographical Survey Institute
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Kitasato, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0811
Tel: 029-864-5917
Fax: 029-864-1804
E-mail: kitahara@gsi.go.jp

Dr. Hideki Sugita

19Team Leader, Soil Mechanics and Dynamics Research
Team
Material and Geotechnical Engineering Research Group
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6770
Fax: 029-879-6735
E-mail: sugita@pwri.go.jp

Research Coordinator for Earthquake Disaster Prevention,
Research Center for Disaster Risk Management
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Asahi, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0804
Tel: 029-864-2926
Fax: 029-864-0598
E-mail: unjoh-s92ta@nilim.go.jp

Dr. Susumu TakamiyaHead, Earthquake Prevention Division
Research Center for Disaster Risk Management
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
1 Asahi, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0804
Tel: 029-864-3244
Fax: 029-864-0598
E-mail: takamiya-s92tc@nilim.go.jp

Dr. Yoshikazu Yamaguchi
Team Leader, Dam Structure Research Team
Hydraulic Engineering Research Group
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6780
Fax: 029-879-6737
E-mail: yamaguti@pwri.go.jp
Mr. Atsushi Yoshioka
Director, Bridge and Structural Technology ResearchGroup
Center for Advanced Engineering Structural Assessment
and Research (CAESAR)
Public Works Research Institute
1-6 Minamihara, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516
Tel: 029-879-6726
Fax: 029-879-6739
E-mail: yoshioka@pwri.go.jp

Dr. Takashi Tomita
Tsunami Research Director
Tsunami Research CenterPort and Airport Research Institute3-1-1 Nagase, Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa-ken 239-0826
Tel: 046-844-5052
Fax: 046-844-1274
E-mail: tomita@pari.go.jp
Dr. Shigeki Unjoh

20

TEMPORARY MEMBERS
Dr. Shojiro Kataoka

National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management

Mr. Fuminori Kato

National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management

Dr. Hitomitsu Kikitsu

National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management

Mr. Tomoki Ootani

Japan Water Agency

Dr. Junichi Sakai

Public Works Research InstituteDr. Hiroshi P. Sato

Geographical Survey Institute21

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
Mr. Tomomitsu Fujii

Foundation of River Basin Integrated Communications

Dr. Minoru Fujiwara

Formerly, Nippon Slag Association

Dr. Masami Fukuoka

Management System Assessment Center

Dr. Masaya Hirosawa

Professor Emeritus, Kogakuin University

Dr. Shiro Ibukiyama

Professor Emeritus, Kogyokusha College of Technology

Dr. Kaoru Ichihara

Public Works Research Center

Dr. Takashi Iijima

Civil Engineering Research Laboratory

Mr. Yasutake Inoue

Fukuda Corporation

Dr. Toshio Iwasaki

Public Works Research Center

Mr. Shunichiro Kamijo

KICTEC Inc.

Mr. Takashi Kaminosono

Center for Better Living

Mr. Kenji Kawakami

Kubota Corporation

Dr. Kazuhiko Kawashima

Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Dr. Eiichi Kuribayashi

Professor Emeritus, Toyohashi University of Technology

Dr. Kiyoshi Nakano

Professor Emeritus, Tokyo Denki University

Dr. Shinsuke Nakata

Professor, Kochi University of Technology

Dr. Kazuto Nakazawa

Formerly, Public Works Research InstituteDr. Nobuyuki Narita

Public Works Research Center, Japanese Technical Association for Steel Pipe Piles

Dr. Setsuo Noda

Coastal Development Institute of Technology

Dr. Hisashi Okada

Japan Housing and Wood Technology Center

Dr. Michio Okahara

Advanced Construction Technology Center

Dr. Shin Okamoto

Japan Association for Building Research Promotion

Mr. Kei-ichi Ohtani

Formerly, National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention

Mr. Yoshijiro Sakagami

Formerly, Japan Development Construction Corporation

Dr. Yasushi Sasaki

Japan Institute of Construction Engineering

Dr. Yukihiko Sumiyoshi

Central Consultant Inc.

Mr. Jiro Taguchi

Sakurada Co., Ltd.

Dr. Masateru Tominaga

Public Works Research Center, Central Consultant Inc.

Dr. Hajime Tsuchida

Echo Corporation

Mr. Seizo Tsuji

Japan Utility Subway Company Inc.

Dr. Hiroyuki Yamanouchi

The Building Center of Japan, Inc.

Dr. Koichi Yokoyama

Professor, Ibaraki University

22

TASK COMMITTEE MEMBERS* denotes Task Committee Chair.
B. Next-Generation Building and Infrastructure Systems
George C. Lee*
Douglas Foutch*
Fu-Kuo Chang
Mete A. Sozen
B. F. Spencer
K. Thirumalai
Ming Wang

MCEER
NSF
Stanford University
Purdue University
University of Illinois
DOT
University of Illinois

Hiroshi Fukuyama*
Masayoshi Nakashima*
Tatsuya Azuhata
Namihiko Inoue
Yoshihiro Iwata
Takashi Kaminosono
Hitomitsu Kikitsu
Koichi Kusunoki
Chikahiro Minowa
Koichi Morita
Akiyoshi Mukai
Isao Nishiyama
Taiki Saito
Hitoshi Shiohara
Masaomi Teshigawara
Shigeki Unjoh
Akira Wada

Building Research InstituteNational Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Building Research InstituteCenter for Better Living
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Yokohama National University
National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention
Building Research InstituteNational Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Building Research Institute
University of Tokyo
Nagoya University
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Tokyo Institute of Technology

C. Dams
Robert L. Hall*
Enrique E. Matheu*
Anjuna Chudgar
Richard C. Dove
Ziyad H. Duron
Larry K. Nuss
Richard S. Olsen
Rick Poeppelman
Donald E. Yule

USACE-ERDC
DHS
USACE
USACE-ERDC
Harvey Mudd College
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
USACE-ERDC
USACE
USACE-ERDC

Yoshikazu Yamaguchi*
Tomonori Abe
Noriaki Hakoishi
Takashi Ikeda
Tomoya Iwashiita
Tatsuo Ohmachi
Yoshio Ohne
Tsutomu Sakurai
Hiroyuki Satoh
Choshiro Tamura
Yasuya Watanabe

Public Works Research InstitutePublic Works Research InstitutePublic Works Research InstituteJapan Dam Engineering Center
Public Works Research InstituteTokyo Institute of Technology
Aichi Institute of Technology
Japan Water Agency
Public Works Research Institute
University of TokyoJapan Institute of Construction Engineering

D. Wind Engineering
John Gaynor*
Nicholas P. Jones*
Earl J. Baker
Bogusz Bienkiewicz
Harold Bosch
Donald Burgess

NOAAJohns Hopkins University
Florida State University
Colorado State University
FHWA
NOAA

23

Ahsan Kareem
Joseph Main
Mark D. Powell
Liz Ritchie
Partha Sarkar
Emil Simiu

University of Notre Dame
NIST
NOAA
University of New Mexico
Iowa State University
NIST

Jun Murakoshi*
Yasuo Okuda*
Hiroshi Katsuchi
Hiromasa Kawai
Hitomitsu Kikitsu
Kichiro Kimura
Masao Mikami
Hisashi Okada
Hiromichi Shirato
Tetsuro Tamura
Yukio Tamura
Yasushi Uematsu
Mitsuru Ueno
Hitoshi Yamada
Ikuo Yamada

Public Works Research Institute
Building Research InstituteYokohama National University
Kyoto University
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Kyushu Institute of Technology
Meteorological Research InstituteJapan Housing and Wood Technology Center
Kyoto University
Tokyo Institute of Technology
Tokyo Institute of Polytechnics
Tohoku University
Meteorological Research InstituteYokohama National University
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Expressway Company Limited

G. Transportation Systems
W. Phillip Yen*
Harold Bosch
Michel Bruneau
Peter Chang
Hamid Ghasemi
Nicholas P. JonesDavid H. Sanders

FHWA
FHWA
MCEER
University of Maryland
FHWA
Johns Hopkins University
University of Nevada

Atsushi Yoshioka*
Yozo Fujino
Susumu Fukunaga
Yoshihei Horie
Jun-ichi Hoshikuma
Yasuo Inokuma
Hiroyuki Ishikawa
Yasushi Josen
Kazuhiko Kawashima
Motoki Kazama
Jun Murakoshi
Shoichi Nakatani
Atsushi Nozu
Takeshi Suzuki
Katsuya Ogihara
Masasumi Okada
Masahiro Shirato
Takahiro Sugano
Junichi Sakai
Hideki Sugita
Shunsuke Tanimoto
Takashi Tamakoshi
Keiichi Tamura
Shigeki Unjoh
Koichi Yokoyama

Public Works Research Institute
University of Tokyo
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Expressway Company Limited
Hanshin Expressway Company Limited
Public Works Research InstituteCentral Nippon Expressway Company Limited
Public Works Research InstitutePublic Works Research InstituteTokyo Institute of Technology
Tohoku University
Public Works Research InstitutePublic Works Research InstitutePort and Airport Research InstituteNational Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Expressway Company Limited
Metropolitan Expressway Company Limited
Public Works Research InstitutePort and Airport Research InstitutePublic Works Research InstitutePublic Works Research InstitutePublic Works Research InstituteNational Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Public Works Research InstituteNational Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
Ibaraki University

H. Storm Surge and Tsunami
Solomon C. Yim*
Eddie Bernard*
Michael Briggs
Frank Gonzalez
Laura Kong

OSU
NOAA
USACE
NOAA
ITIC

24

Harry Yeh
Philip Liu

OSU
Cornell University

Takashi Tomita*
Koji Fujima
Fumihiko Imamura
Hiroyasu Kawai
Nadao Kohno
Takeshi Suzuki
Yoshio Suwa

Port and Airport Research InstituteNational Defense Academy of Japan
Tohoku University
Port and Airport Research InstituteJapan Meteorological Agency
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management

25

RESOLUTIONSRESOLUTIONS OF THE FORTY-FIRST JOINT MEETING
U.S.-JAPAN PANEL ON WIND AND SEISMIC EFFECTS (UJNR)National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, Tsukuba, Japan
18-20 May, 2009

The following resolutions are hereby adopted:
1.

The Forty-first Joint Panel Meeting provided the forum to exchange valuable technicalinformation that is beneficial to both countries. In view of the importance of cooperative
programs on the subject of wind and seismic effects, the continuation of Joint Panel
Meetings is considered essential. Both sides agreed to follow the recommendations of the
Panel‟s 2nd Five-Year Strategic Plan and will give emphasis to identifying opportunities,
primarily through its Task Committees, and to share and develop technologies that lead to
new design and construction practices, and provide users with improved procedures.

2.

The following activities have been conducted since the Fortieth Joint Meeting:a.

Technology Exchanges. Technical experts and technical documents have been
exchanged. These exchanges have contributed to the development of new researchand enhanced ongoing research programs in both countries.

b.

Task Committee Workshops. The Panel held two workshops:
1.
Task Committee (H), 5th International Workshop on Coastal Disaster
Prevention, 22 July 2008, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
2.
Task Committee (G), 24th U.S.-Japan Bridge Engineering Workshop, 2224 September 2008, Minneapolis, MN, U.S.

c.

Major Products. The Panel members produced or made significant contributions
to advancing the Panel‟s mission through its Task Committees:
1.
Task Committee (C) continued to conduct collaborative research on nonlinear response analysis of concrete dams.
2.
Task Committee (H) members contributed to conducting experimental
research and developing various numerical models to simulate tsunamis incoast areas in the U.S. and Japan.

3.

The Panel accepted the Task Committee reports presented during the Forty-first Joint
Panel Meeting. Each report included objectives, scope of work, accomplishments andfuture plans.

4.

The Panel continues to work toward streamlining its structure, encouraging andexpanding the collaboration of researchers in both countries.

5.

The Panel conducted its annual Strategic Planning Session. Based on its 2nd Five-Year
Strategic Plan, the Panel evaluated its accomplishments and Task Committees activities
and recommended the following actions:

29

6.

a.

The Panel recognizes the importance of disaster resilient buildings andinfrastructure, and encourages conducting the related research.

b.

The results of the Panel‟s work should be widely disseminated to improve thequality of life globally. The Panel encourages greater use of e-mail, the Panel‟seNewsletter, and the Panel‟s Web Site to share and disseminate data andinformation to Panel members and other researchers.

c.

The Panel encourages partnering opportunities identified by respective Task
Committees.

d.

The Panel encourages each Task Committee to develop methods to evaluate
progress of their respective Task Committee.

The Panel endorses the following two proposed Task Committee Workshops during thecoming year:a.
b.

Task Committee (G), 25th U.S.-Japan Bridge Engineering Workshop, 19-21
October 2009, Tsukuba, Japan
Task Committee (H), 6th International Workshop on Coastal Disaster Prevention,late 2009, Japan

In the event that T/C co-chairs recommend conducting a joint meeting or workshop prior
to the next annual meeting, that is not included in the above list, the T/C co-chairs will
make a request to conduct the meeting through their respective Secretary-General for
approval by the Joint Panel Chairmen.
7.

The U.S. and Japan sides will plan, conduct, and share as appropriate, joint investigations
following earthquake and wind disasters in the U.S., Japan and other countries.

8.

The Forty-second Joint Panel Meeting of the UJNR Panel on Wind and Seismic Effects
will be organized by the U.S.-side Panel, to be held in the U.S. in May 2010. The U.S.side secretariat will propose dates, program, location, and itinerary with the concurrenceof the Japan-side Panel.

30

STRATEGIC PLAN

ADDENDUM 1
Panel Expectations During 2006-2010
STRATEGIC PLAN
U.S.-JAPAN JOINT PANEL ON WIND AND SEISMIC EFFECTS
1. Introduction
This document is Addendum 1 of the Strategic Plan for the US-Japan Panel on Wind and Seismic
Effects 2001-2005 (attachment). The Panel‟s 2001 Strategic Plan serves as the base of the Panel‟s
operations and structure. This Addendum 1 provides a roadmap of outlined technical approaches
for the Panel‟s operations during the next five-year period 2006-2010. As background, thePanel‟s Charter, developed in 1987 at the 19th Joint Panel Meeting, is to:a. Encourage, develop, and implement the exchange of wind and seismic technology
between appropriate US and Japanese organizations to share scientific and technologicalknowledge.
b. Develop strong technical links of scientific and engineering researchers between the twocountries and encourage exchanges of guest researchers.
c. Conduct joint research in areas of winds and seismic technology including exchange ofavailable research equipment and facilities in both countries. Publish findings from joint
research efforts.
d. Conduct cooperative programs to improve engineering design and construction practices
and other wind and earthquake hazard mitigation practices. Publish results fromcooperative programs.
2. Panel Approaches During 2006-2010
The Panel‟s operational procedure is defined in the attached Strategic Plan (2001-2005).
Annually the Panel performs a self-evaluation during a Strategic Planning session held during its
May Joint Panel Meeting. Based on the Panel‟s evaluation, incremental modifications are carriedout to enhance the Panel‟s operations and to bring „value-added‟ to its users.
2.1. Panel Mission and Vision for 2006-2010
1. Continue performing post disaster investigations and reconnaissance and sharing findings
with Panel members and others as was carried out for:a) Earthquakes: (2004 Niigata, 2004 Indonesia, 2005 Pakistan, and others)b) Typhoons and Hurricanes: (2005 Katrina and Rita, 2004 Typhoon)
2. Share US and Japan National Disaster Mitigation Plan among the Panel members suchas:a) USA. NSTC/SDR: Grand Challenge for Disaster Prevention- a 10-year strategy fordisaster reduction through science and technology; Windstorm Impact Reduction
Implementation Plan; the NEHRP Annual Plan.
b) Japan. Central Disaster Prevention Council: Reduction by half of human damage andeconomic damage in coming 10 years, Technology Development Plan at “Council for
Science and Technology”
3. Identify methods that support each countries efforts in disaster mitigation throughcooperation between the US and Japan and explore opportunities for joint research
projects.

33

4. During 2006-2010 the Panel will focus on topics such as:a) Continue to understand causes and effects of wind and seismic hazards and pursue theaccumulation and interpretation of datab) Evaluate and estimate risk of natural hazardsc) Improve/develop disaster mitigation technology and methodology, and disseminationof disaster response technology into practical applicationsd) Promote attention to increase research that considers societal implications of natural
disasterse) Integrate technology development and the viewpoint of social/civil engineering byincreasing the importance of the cooperative works between related UJNR Panels, thePanel‟s Task Committees, and the private sector and academiaf) Create methods to better integrate comprehensive technology information as a basefor transmitting information throughout the Panel member‟s organizationsg) Contribute to dissemination of cooperative products that will facilitate global
standardization of related civil engineering technologies
2.2. Evaluate Task Committees. The Panel operates under seven Task Committees; an optimum
number for Panel management and productivity. The Task Committees serve as the heart of the
Panel‟s operations:Task Committee A. Geotechnical Engineering and Ground Motion
Task Committee B. Next Generation Building and Infrastructure Systems
Task Committee C. Dams
Task Committee D. Wind Engineering
Task Committee G. Transportation Systems
Task Committee H. Storm Surge and Tsunami
Task Committee I. Fire Performance of Structures
Findings from Task Committees‟ evaluations will help the Task Committees 1) measureachievements, productivity, and impact on contributions to improving design and construction
practices, 2) identify opportunities for making contributions and addressing emerging technicalchallenges, and 3) assess when they completed their mission and are ready for retirement. Task
Committee Evaluation Criteria includes: 1) one or more workshop conducted at least every
three-years, 2) implementing recommendations from workshops, 3) publications and otheroutreach, and 4) collaborations beyond their Task Committee.
The Panel will encourage its respective Task Committees to identify thematic focuses requiring
technology sharing and joint collaborations. These Themes will be discussed at annual Panel
Meetings. The Panel will consider the merits of creating new Task Committees that meet special
needs and eliminating Task Committees that have completed their mission or can be strengthened
through consolidation with other Task Committee(s).
2.3. Partnering Opportunities. Identify partnering opportunities through clustering appropriate
Panel‟s Task Committees, collaborating with other UJNR Panels, and working together with theprivate sector and academia. Clustering provides Task Committee optimization of resources(human and financial). Partnering and clustering will be discussed at annual Panel Meetings
including increasing participation from the private sector and academia.

34

2.4. Joint Research. Perform joint research initiated by the Panel and its Task Committees. The
Task Committees are encouraged to identify key joint-research opportunities to improve thestate-of-knowledge or to consider engaging in a significant long-term research funded from one
or more sponsoring organizations. For the latter, below are the Panel Cooperative Research
Projects performed during the past 27-years that improved design and construction practices forboth countries.
1. Reinforced Concrete Structures (1979-1987); accomplishments include testing six-story
full scale buildings which led to improve seismic design methods of reinforced concretebuildings.
2. Seismic Performance of Lifeline Facilities (1982-1989); accomplishments included
development of improved seismic design methods of bridge columns.
3. In-situ Testing Methods for Soil Liquefaction (1983-1986); accomplishments include
development of rationale for Standard Penetration Test (SPT) data based on energy ratio.
4. Masonry Structures (1984-1988); accomplishments include development of strengthbased design guidelines for reinforced masonry buildings.
5. Steel-Frame Structures (1985-1987); accomplishments include testing of a full-scale fivestory building to confirm prediction of performance based on components andsubassemblages.
6. Bridge Hybrid Control Systems (1990-1994); accomplishments include development ofhybrid control algorithms that require less energy for controlling bridge response.
7. Precast Seismic Structural Systems (1991-1992); accomplishments include developmentof strength-based design guidelines.
8. Seismic Performance of Composite and Hybrid Structures (1993-1998); accomplishments
include development of design guidelines for composite and hybrid system, anddevelopment of new materials.
9. Countermeasures for Soil Liquefaction (1994-2004); accomplishments include
contributions on the revision of design guidelines for building foundations andformulation of soil experiment plans using E-Defense.
10. Development of Smart Structural Systems (1998-2003); accomplishments include
development of structural performance detection technology and structural members
using intelligent materials.
11. Develop Comparative Analysis of Seismic Performance Testing Guidelines for Bridge
Piers (1999-2006); accomplishments included a joint publication on the comparative
analysis of US and Japan bridge piers.
The respective Task Committees will identify candidate joint research for discussion at annual
Panel meetings.
2.5. Panel Communications. More broadly disseminate Panel‟s activities, accomplishments, andimpacts including findings from post-disaster investigations using the Panel‟s eNewsletter, amore active Web Site, Task Committee publications, and identify Panel accomplishments andimpacts. The Panel will increase information sharing among its member organizations andinclude links to related organizations in both countries. Task Committees will serve as aknowledge base of information on their respective themes and share their information to users
following methods described above.

35

3. Conclusion
This Addendum represents the Panel‟s focus to address panel‟s activities of the next five-years.
The strategic plan is annually evaluated during its annual May Meetings.

36

U.S.-Japan Joint Panel on Wind and Seismic Effects
Strategic Plan
1. Introduction
1.1 Context
The U.S. and Japan must maintain an awareness of international developments in earthquake andwind mitigation technology. The international exchange of information is achieved through a
combination of formal and informal mechanisms, including: attendance at conferences andworkshops; cooperative research projects and programs; and exchange of scientists andengineers. There is a long-established tradition of joint research activities between Japan and theUnited States. The U.S.-Japan Cooperative Program in Natural Resources (UJNR) Panel on
Wind and Seismic Effects (WSE Panel) provides a formal government-to-government
mechanism for cooperation between the two countries in the area of earthquake and wind
mitigation technology.
At the 32nd Joint Panel Meeting, a resolution was passed to establish a joint Ad-Hoc Committee
for the purpose of developing a strategic plan for the WSE Panel. The catalyst for this effort was
the need to address immediate issues related to cost and participation. While the Panel
recognized the importance of addressing these immediate issues, it also realized that an
opportunity existed to strengthen the WSE Panel‟s focus on its core mission and foster greatercollaboration between researchers in the U.S. and Japan while streamlining the overall operationof the Panel. It was with this goal in mind that the ad-hoc committee developed the strategic plancontained in this document.
1.2 Approach
Before meeting to develop the strategic plan, each side held domestic panel meetings andconducted one-on-one meetings with participating agencies to identify issues that needed to beaddressed by the strategic plan and to understand which features of the Panel and its operation
should be retained and which needed to be changed or adapted to meet current and future needs.
Each side developed a concept paper to capture these ideas. The concept papers, however, tended
to focus on addressing the immediate issues rather than positioning the Panel to address theneeds and challenges of the future. Through the exchange of the concept papers and subsequentdiscussion, the two sides moved close to agreement on near-term changes to the Panel‟s
operation. Thus, the strategic plan emphasizes longer-term goals for the operation and growth of
the Panel and a time-phased approach to implementation of steps to achieve these goals.
The strategic plan is intended to establish a course for the WSE Panel over the next 5-10 years. It
recognizes that there are many ways in which the Panel may work to achieve the goals identified,and so while some steps in the implementation process are clear, others are left open to be
determined through experimentation. However, the Panel believes working toward the goals
identified will strengthen its role in engineering and scientific communities of the U.S. and Japanand will allow our countries to make more efficient use of resources to conduct research anddisseminate results to the benefit of both countries.
2. Role of the Panel37

2.1 Guide Research Agendas
As a government-to-government mechanism for collaboration, the WSE Panel is in a uniqueposition to guide the development and execution of each country‟s research agenda. Currently,
each country defines its own research priorities, projects are formulated in a fragmented manner,and results are reported through vehicles such as the Annual Joint Panel Meeting. By
strengthening its ties to industry and academia, the Panel will be able to identify specific researchneeds and align those with government priorities. The Panel shall work toward a coordinatedresearch agenda that permits the efficient use of human resources, funding, and research facilities
to achieve mutual research objectives.
The new Task Committees formed through implementation of this strategic plan shall work to
identify areas where joint research projects can be established and conducted as a part of acoordinated research agenda. Joint research projects may include participation by university or
industry researchers in addition to member agency researchers.
2.2 Leverage Resources
The U.S. and Japan each possess significant expertise in the fields of earthquake and windengineering and have a substantial investment in equipment and facilities to perform testing andmeasurements in support of research in these fields. Historically, the WSE Panel has facilitatedthe exchange of researchers between the U.S. and Japan but has not made a concerted effort toleverage the resources of the two countries. There is an opportunity for the Panel to coordinate
research activities to efficiently utilize testing and measurement facilities in both countries toaddress mutual research needs and avoid duplication. This is an area in which the Panel cansignificantly strengthen its efforts and provide a tangible benefit to each country by working toestablish strong partnerships for coordinated research.
2.3 Foster Cooperation
From its founding, the WSE Panel has promoted cooperation between the U.S. and Japanthrough annual Joint Panel Meetings, Task Committee activities, and exchange of researchers.
One of the hallmarks of success for the WSE Panel through the years has been the high level ofcooperation. The model these cooperative efforts have been built around, however, is one of
information exchange. While the exchange of information and research results is an important
facet of the WSE Panel‟s work, there is the opportunity to greatly expand the scope andimportance of cooperative efforts to leverage resources (people, funding, facilities) through joint
research projects of bilateral importance. Additionally, the Panel should look beyond thegovernment agencies that participate to be more inclusive of universities and the private sector.
At a minimum, this will include broadening participation in the Joint Panel Meetings to include
industry and university participants. As industry and universities become more engaged,
exchanges of researchers among government, university, and industry participants may bepossible. Joint programs that include participation by government, industry, and university
partners shall also be considered. These activities would broaden the reach of the Panel andprovide a means for more rapid diffusion of research results into practice.
2.4 Technical Exchange
The WSE Panel has, throughout its history, been an effective mechanism for the exchange of38

technical information between Japan and the United States. Further, the WSE Panel has provided
a means for disseminating measurements and research results to other nations affected byearthquake, wind, tsunami, and storm surge hazards. Annual Joint Panel Meetings, Task
Committee Meetings and Workshops, researcher exchange programs, and personal relationships
among researchers have fostered this exchange. The Panel recognizes this as one of its strengths
and should seek to broaden its reach to include participation by researchers in other nations. The
Panel should explore means of increasing collaboration with other countries through inclusion ofrepresentatives from other nations in Joint Panel Meetings, encouraging joint projects throughthe Task Committees that include partners outside the U.S. and Japan, and through the exchangeof researchers with other countries.
2.5 Engage Private Sector
The WSE Panel has engaged the private sector to a limited extent in its activities during its
history, although the work of the Panel and the participating agencies can have a direct benefit toindustry and ultimately the public in our respective countries. Further, some larger companies
have research capabilities and programs that could enrich the Panel. More actively engaging theprivate sector will provide a means for obtaining input in setting priorities and for more rapidly
diffusing the results of research activities into practice within Japan and the United States. The
involvement of the private sector may include participation in the development of coordinatedresearch agendas and dissemination of information perhaps through special sessions at the annual
Joint Panel Meetings. The Panel should also consider involving the private sector in research
projects coordinated at the Task Committee level that will have broad-based benefits to industry
in both countries. Longer-term, the involvement of the private sector will facilitate dialogue
between practicing engineers and builders in Japan with their counterparts in the U.S. The Joint
Panel will examine ways to increase industry participation, initially by inviting key industry
representatives to participate in Joint Panel Meetings and to speak about the work of theircompany or organization and explore possibilities for greater collaboration.
2.6 Web Page Development
The Joint Panel will explore ways to increase utilization of the Internet as a means ofcommunication both among Panel members and with outside organizations. The Japan-side hasoffered to take the lead in developing an Internet presence for the Joint Panel and has begun
work on an initial concept for the site. Once the site is established, the Task Committees will be
relied on to provide, maintain, and update content related to their activities. The Joint Panel will
also explore ways of using Internet resources as a means of facilitating communication among
researchers as well as the exchange and dissemination of information and research results.
3. Implementation
3.1 Strategic Plan Development and Approval
This strategic plan was prepared through the efforts of the Joint Ad-Hoc Committee appointed by
the Chairmen following the 32nd Joint Panel Meeting. The Joint Panel shall work toward
approval of the Strategic Plan during the 33rd Joint Panel Meeting May 28-30, 2001. The
approved document will reflect comments received from Panel members on the draft.
Implementation of the strategic plan will begin with approval and require 12-24 months for full
implementation.

393.2 Task Committee Charters and Recommended Committees
The US- and Japan-side Panels have agreed on the following seven themes around which Task
Committees may be formed:
Theme A: Geotechnical Engineering and Ground Motion
Theme B: Buildings
Theme C: Dams
Theme D: Wind
Theme E: Lifelines
Theme F: Seismic Information and IT
Theme G: Transportation
Theme H: Storm Surge and Tsunami
Theme I: Public Health
Task Committee formed to address one of these themes will be approved by the Joint Panel on
annual basis, provided that the Task Committee remains active. The criteria for active Task
Committees are following:a) Conducts joint workshops or technical meetings on a regular basis for the purpose of
exchanging technical information, research results, or data for the mutual benefit of bothcountries.
b) Engages in frequent exchange of researchers for the purpose of technical interchange andcollaboration on research.
c) Conducts one or more joint research projects having clearly defined technical objectives,
finite duration, and shared responsibility for producing technical results.
Task Committees will report results through papers presented during the joint panel meeting andthrough task committee reports. The Joint Panel will review task committee results and futureplans on an annual basis and will approve task committees for the next year based on thisinformation.
For this year, new task committees may be established by requesting approval through theSecretary-Generals at any time before the 34th Joint Panel Meeting.
3.3 Transition to New Annual Panel Meeting Format
A number of alternative formats for the annual Joint Panel Meeting were considered. Based upon
the input received from Panel members, the basic format of the Joint Panel Meeting be retained.
Session topics will be principally driven by the Task Committees. Each Task Committee would
be given one session during which it would be able to present research results. This Task
Committee-driven format should strengthen the role of the Task Committees and is intended tostimulate greater cooperation among researchers in each country. This format will foster theexchange of information that many have expressed is a desirable feature of the Joint Panel
Meeting.
The Joint Panel meeting will be shortened by one day (from 4 days to 3 days). The shorter
meeting, coupled with a shorter Technical Site Tour will reduce the time commitment for40

participants to one week. This is intended to encourage greater participation in the Panel
Meetings and Site Tours, particularly by members of the visiting Panel.
Finally, the Joint Panel will explore streamlining the Joint Panel Meeting to maximize theopportunity for technical exchange.
The shortened Panel Meeting/Technical Site Tour format is implemented for the first time at the33rd Joint Panel Meeting. The Task Committee-driven technical meeting format will be
implemented at a later date when the revised Task Committee organization is in place.
4. Conclusion
The plan outlined above represents a strategic plan for positioning the Joint Panel to meet thechallenges of the future, while retaining those aspects that have contributed to its success throughit 32 year history. This plan is intended to address the current realities of the Panel, as well as
increase the value and contribution of the Panel to the U.S. and Japan. Full implementation of thestrategic plan will take approximately two years.

41

PAPERSTHEME 1
Next-Generation Building andInfrastructure Systems

Continuity and/or Resiliency of Building Function after Disasters
byHiroshi Fukuyama 1, Koichi Morita 2, Tomohisa Mukai 2 , Taiki Saito 1, Hitomitsu Kikitsu 4,
Yoshihiro Iwata3 , Yoshio Wakiyama 3, and Seitaro Tajiri3of achievement rate of earthquake-resistant
structures, in order to decrease the amount ofdamages by about half at the expected Tokai
Earthquake, Tonankai Earthquake, Nankai
Earthquake, strong local earthquake in theTokyo metropolitan area, etc.
Building Research Institute (BRI) began the
3-year research and development project“Development of Performance-based Structural
Design System for Evaluating Continuity and/or
Resiliency of Building Function after Disasters”
in 2007, aiming at not only the safety evaluationin disasters but also the difficulty evaluation insocial, economic, and human activities after
disasters. A Framework and a database system
for structural design, and guidebooks fordissemination information for general users, etc.
will be developed as useful outputs of building
design allowing functional continuity anddisaster resilience. This paper describes theoverview of the research project and theindividual research subjects.

ABSTRACT
Building Research Institute (BRI) has started
research project on “Development of
Performance-Based Structural Design System
for Evaluating Continuity and/or Resiliency of
Building Function after Disasters” in 2007 as a
3-year research project. The expected final
results of the project are research anddevelopment of (1) Structural design frameworkand (2) Structural design data base for
evaluation of “Continuity and/or Resiliency of
Building Function, and (3) Guidebook fordissemination of the concept on “continuity
and/or resiliency of building function after
disasters” .
KEYWORDS: Functional Continuity, Disaster
Resiliency, Structural Performance Evaluation,
Structural Design Framework, Database,Accountability
1. INTRODUCTION

2. BACKGROUND OF PROJECT RESEARCH

Securing human life in disasters is one of themost important objectives of the design ofbuildings, and the Building Standard Law ofJapan which specifies the minimal requirements
contains the provisions to be observed for
securing the human life in disasters.
Inearthquake disasters in recent years, however,there occurred serious damages of losing thefunctions of buildings as the dwelling and as thefield of human activities. Thus, adding to thesafety viewpoint, the design has recognized thenecessity of the viewpoint of “how to maintainthe building functions” or “how rapidly recover
the deteriorated functions”. The recognition also
relates to the request of the Central Disaster
Prevention Council of the Cabinet Office for thebusiness enterprises to establish their BusinessContinuity Plan (BCP), along with the increase

The Southern Hyogo Earthquake (KobeEarthquake) occurred in 1995 resulted incollapse of large number of buildings, killed
many people, and also paralyzed variety of city
functions to force citizens to live at emergency
evacuation areas outside their home for a long
period.
This is because many residentialbuildings lost their functions as the “dwelling”.
In addition, there appeared not a small numberof cases that, although the buildings designed
1 Chief Research Engineer, Building Research Institute,
Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-0802, JAPAN2 Senior Research Engineer, ditto
3 Research Engineer, ditto
4 Senior Research Engineer, National Institute for Landand Infrastructure Management, MLIT, Tsukuba,
Ibaraki 305-0804, JAPAN47

Continuity Plan (BCP)” has drawn attention
inside and outside Japan. The BCP is a
strategy of protection of business enterprisefrom critical profit loss and from deterioration ofenterprise rating by avoiding stop operation ofimportant business in disaster and by, even when
the business operation is stopped, resuming theimportant function within a target restoration
period.
In Japan, “Special Field Survey
Committee relating to the Disaster Preventive
Power Improvement utilizing Private Sector
Power and Market Power”, organized under theCentral Disaster Prevention Council of the
Cabinet Office, published the 1st edition of theBusiness Continuity Guidelines and the Check
List in August 2005, and the Committee
requested all the business enterprises to prepare
their own BCP. Not limited to the activities of
the government, the general constructors haverecently begun practical application ofearthquake risk evaluation system which
supports BCP of, for example, semiconductor
production facilities.
In this manner, thedevelopment of structural design technology
proceeds targeting not only the damage
evaluation but also the evaluation of restoration
period and of cost-effectiveness. Many of theabove activities, however, use the statistical dataof past earthquake damages, and do not reachthe level of evaluation in depth to the responseof individual buildings and to the relation
between the damages and the deterioration offunctions.

according to the current seismic code did notcollapse as requested by the codes and protected
the human life, the damages of structural frame
were serious, which needed very large
restoration cost, thus the damaged buildings
were finally tore down and reconstructed, (refer
to Photo 1 as an example.) The cases show theimportance of design to have a viewpoint ofdamage control and of functional resilience. The
Geiyo Earthquake in 2001, the Tokachi-Oki
Earthquake in 2003, and the Southern Miyagi
Earthquake in 2005 generated damages causedby dropping large scale space ceiling. The
West-Off Fukuoka Earthquake in 2005
generated damages of window glass of officebuildings and of walls and fittings ofcondominiums (Photo 2). Thus, there appeared
the cases that also the damages of thosenonstructural members induce danger of humanlife similar to the cases of damages of structural
framework, and that the loss of building
function and of dwelling ability results in the
difficulty of continuous use of the buildings
after disasters.
Review of the cases of building damages inthe earthquakes occurred in recent years clearly
showed the actual state that owners andresidents of buildings do not expect theconditions of disasters, and they do not prepare
action plan after the disasters. On that matter,
the suppliers of buildings might also lack theefforts to convey information and special fieldknowledge to the owners and the residents.
The Kobe Earthquake drew attention about thedamages of nonstructural members andequipment and fixtures, whose damages wererelatively not recognized in the past hidden by
the serious damage or collapse of structural
framework. Furthermore, the Kobe Earthquake
showed a feature that the residents of damagedbuildings emphasized not only the direct loss ofthe building structure but also the indirect
economic loss resulted from the disaster.
Through the experiences of above earthquake
damages,businessenterprises
stronglyrecognized the importance of preventive
measures to enable the business to continue indisaster and to enable the core business
operation to rapidly recover to the level before
the disaster. In this regard, the “Business3. PERFORMANCE DESIGN SYSTEMBASED ON THE “FUNCTIONALRESILIENCY”
3.1 Definition of “Functional Resiliency”
On the background of Chapter 2, this section
newly defines the “Functional Resiliency” as theperformance indicating the easiness of disaster
resilience of building function after disasters,
especially earthquakes.
BRI selected three basic structural
performances of buildings in the performance
design,“Serviceability”,“Safety”,
and“Reparability”, in the “Development of New
Building Structural System (hereinafter referred
to as the “New Structural System Project”) as48

applied structural methods and specifications ofevery position of the building depend on theuses, the design verification based on the“Functional Resiliency” positively counts thebuilding uses.

one of the Comprehensive Technological
Development Project of the Ministry ofConstruction, and promoted the practicalapplication of the design process based on thesethree basic structural performances. The conceptof the “Functional Resiliency” defined in the
research, however, is the one with an extensionof the concept of “Reparability” defined in the
New Structural System Project. Therefore, those
two concepts differ from each other on thefollowing points.
∙ The concept of “Reparability” in the New
Structural System Project: The main object isthe “property preservation” for buildings after
earthquake; the easiness of restoration ofbuildings after the earthquake is secured bysuppressing the building damages within aphysical restoration limit of the building
specified in each performance evaluation article.

ii) Process up to the 1st level verification
The cross sectional dimensions of structuralmembers are firstly determined. Then, themodel of structural members is prepared, andthe earthquake motion is determined. Next, theresponse evaluation is given to thus preparedmodel to calculate the response values ofengineering indexes (such as maximum story
drift and response acceleration) necessary to thedamage evaluation. Also to the nonstructuralmembers and the building equipment andcontents, detail specifications are prepared, andtheir response values of engineering indexes
required in the damage evaluation are calculated
based on the values of maximum story drift andof response acceleration derived from theresponse evaluation of the structural members.
Finally, using the database relating to thedamage conditions, the physical restoration limit
state of individual positions of the building,determined at the target performance level, isconverted into the limit value of corresponding
engineering index, thus comparing the limit
value with the response value to complete the
1st level verification of the Reparability. The
1st level verification is a verification based on
the performance evaluation article of theconventional Reparability.

∙ The concept of “Functional Resiliency” in thisresearch: Easiness of functional resilience ofbuildings after earthquake is secured by, adding
to the concept of “Reparability” of the New
Structural System Project, keeping therestoration cost and the restoration period of thebuilding after the earthquake within the target
restoration cost and the target restoration period,
respectively, determined by the owner (with anagreement with the designer) in view offunctions of the building.
Although theBusiness Continuity Plan (BCP) expects thedamages of surrounding area of the building andthe damages of lifeline, the concept of“Functional Resiliency” of the research deals
with the controllable range in the design ofindividual buildings, and the influence causedby the variables other than those of the building
is considered afterward as an additional
conditioniii) Process up to the 2nd level verification
On the basis of the damage condition of eachposition of the building, revealed up to the 1stlevel verification, firstly the restoration target of
entire building is determined, and the method
for restoration is determined.
Then, therestoration cost and the restoration period,
corresponding to the determined restoration
method, are calculated using the database
relating to the restoration method. Finally, thesevalues are compared with the target restoration
cost and the target restoration period expectedby the owner and the resident in their BusinessContinuity Plan, etc. to complete the 2nd level
verification. If the result of the 2nd level

3.2 Design Verification Flow Scheme Based on
the “Functional Resiliency”
The design verification flow scheme based on
the “Functional Resiliency” is illustrated in Fig.
1. Main articles of the flow are outlined below.
i) Uses of buildings (“Occupancy category” in
Fig.1)
Since the functions of buildings have close
relation mainly with their uses, and since the49records are effective reference materials in the
research.

verification gives NG, the preparation ofrestoration plan is executed again, and the sameprocedure is applied again. (If the second timeof the 2nd level verification gives NG, and if thesole change of the restoration plan is judged as
non-effective, the design itself has to be changed
from the beginning.)

4.2 Time history response analysis
The applied vibration analysis model was anequivalent shear model with seven mass points,
giving the 1st floor as the fixed end. The
viscosity damping was assumed as an
instantaneous stiffness proportional type of 3%
to the primacy natural period. The earthquake
motion for the study was selected to thesimulated earthquake motion 3 wave which was
prepared using the phases of EL CNTRO NS(1940), TAFTEW (1952), and HACHINOHE
NS (1968), in accordance with the “extremely
rarely occurring earthquake motion” specified in
the Notification No. 1461.
The maximum response acceleration and the
maximum drift at each floor are given in thefollowing, (Figs. 3 and 4). The response
acceleration distributes in a range from 300 to
700 gal. The maximum story drift angle isalmost 1/200 or less, though it gives about 1/140
at the maximum in the Y direction at lower
floors.

iv) Indication of performance
The evaluation result of the “Functional
Resiliency” of the building, confirmed throughthe 1st and the 2nd level verifications, isexplained to the owner and the resident in anunderstandable format. The “database relating
to the damage condition corresponding to theoccupancy category of building” given in theflow was prepared gathering experimental dataand other findings to give a total image of therelation between [the damage conditions of eachposition of structural members, nonstructuralmembers, and equipment and fixtures] and [theengineering indexes describing the damages,
based on the experimental data, etc.] The“database relating to the restoration method” isthe collected data relating to the restoration cost
and the restoration period for each restoration
method, based on the existing findings andknowledge.

4.3 Evaluation of Functional Resiliency(1) Evaluation of damage conditions
Degree of damages is evaluated for structural
frame, exterior/interior, building equipment, lift
facility, and medical equipment and devices.
As of these, the medical equipment and devices
were subjected to on-site sampling survey
focusing on the fixing conditions, and confirmed
6 units of fixed-to-floor type, 21 units ofdirect-positioned (nonfixed) type, and 19 unitsof mobile type.
If only the fixed typeequipment and devices were designed according
to the Design and Construction Guidelines of
Building Equipments (2005) published by the
Building Center of Japan, etc., they are judged
not to induce sliding or falling at the response
acceleration of this research.
For theequipment and devices of direct-positioned type,the possibility of falling is calculated based on
the equipment dimensions and the maximum
response acceleration, (adding 0.30 of verticalseismic intensity), to give the possibility offalling of 17 units among 21 units. Therefore,
the direct-positioned type equipment and4. APPLICATION EXAMPLE OF
EVALUATION SYSTEM BASED ON“FUNCTIONAL RESILIENCY”
4.1 Buildings for Evaluation
The target building is an existed hospital in
Niigata Prefecture. Table 1 shows the outline of
the building. The room arrangement of eachfloor is: 1st and 2nd basement for machinery ofcore equipment; 1st and 2nd floor for diagnostic
and treatment departments; 3rd floor for
operation of each medical section; 4th and upper
floors for wards; and roof top for elevated watertank and cooling tower. The building suffereddamage due to the Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake
in 2004, and the restoration was conducted, thus
the building is still in operation as hospital. Afterthe earthquake, a survey of building damages
was given, and detail records exist including theanalysis of restoration work. The hospital was
selected as the target building because these50

devices and the mobile type equipment anddevices presumably suffer damages.
Toestimate the amount of damages, there areneeded materials relating to the characteristics
and the purchased price of the equipment anddevices, which materials are however difficult toobtain at present. Accordingly, the medical
equipment and devices are limited to obtain theabove damage estimation, and the expectedamount of damages is left as an issue. Thus,
the targets of the research are limited to thebuilding and the building equipment. The
damages of targets other than that of medical
equipment and devices were evaluated based on
the vibration analysis result, the report ofdamage survey, and the above literature.
Responding to the degree of damage, thenecessary restoration period was speculated.
The result is given in Table 2.

That is, the damage is determined to that of
5.2% of the initial investment. Based on thecurrent building price level, if the total
construction work (including miscellaneous
expenses and temporary work expenses) is
assumed to 2,114,000,000 yen, the restoration
work cost is estimated to 109,900,000 yen.
(3) Period of restoration
As shown in Table 2, the restoration period
can be determined mainly by the period forrestoring the structural frame. The period ofcomplete restoration of the hospital from the
Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake was slightly morethan 5 months. The level of the earthquake
under research is presumably lower than thelevel of the Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake, thus
the expected restoration period of 3.5 months is
considered reasonable.

(2) Estimated amount of damages
The fractional damages of building caused byearthquake, (the ratio of the restoration work
cost for the damage to the initial investment), is
calculated by the following equation.
LT =

∑p ⋅L
i

i

5. DATABASE FOR EVALUATING THE“FUNCTIONAL RESILIENCY”
The database developed in the project has astructure largely classifying the building
elements, relating to “Functional Resiliency”,
into four: (structural members, nonstructuralmembers, equipment (including piping), andfurniture). To obtain necessary data, individual
positions are further grouped in detail, and thedata relating to the following articles arecollected for each of thus grouped in detail.

(1)iwhere Li ：the fractional damage at each position
based on the vibration analysis result
pi ：the fraction of work cost at eachposition to the total work cost
Table 3 shows the breakdown of cost ratio foreach work article at the initial construction. The
table does not contain temporary work expenses
and miscellaneous expenses.
The fractional damage (Li) corresponding to
the degree of various damages for each article isdefined corresponding to the five damage
stages: large damage; medium damage; small
damage; slight damage; and non-damage.
The values used in the damage evaluation are
assumed as given in Table 4. From the above
assumptions, the fractional damage is expectedto:i) Engineering (response) quantity contributing
to the damagesii) Quantity of damages generated from a certain
response, (specifically the damage relating toReparability)iii) Restoration method corresponding to thequantity of damageiv) Cost and period for the restoration methodv) Period and cost of functional resilience taking
into account the restoration cost andrestoration period
Next, for structuring the database, the data ofdamage evaluation relating to the Reparability
are collected from a vast amount of data, andthus collected data are reviewed to pick up the

LT ＝0.185×0.200＋0.078×0.125＋0.187×
0.010＋0.366×0.010＝0.052

(2)

51

5.3 Equipment and Devices
Similar to the nonstructural members, aquestionnaire survey is given to the related
manufacturers to collect data relating to thedamage evaluation, which collected data arethen arranged in the work sheet. In addition,
investigation on papers, academic guidelines
and standards collected data are also conducted.

articles necessary for the “Functional
Resiliency”. To this point, among the threestages of data, “Collection”, “Review”, and“Pick up”, the research conducts the “Review”
by a work sheet, and the data reflecting theresult of the “Pick up” are positioned to the“Database”, (refer to Fig. 5). The following isthe description about the investigation method
and the progress of the investigation relating to
the database structuring for evaluating damages
at each position.

5.4 Furniture (Contents)
On the existing papers, guidelines andstandards are reviewed to collect the data having
clear indication of the input magnitude and the
response value, which are then arranged in thework sheet.

5.1. Structural Members
In principle, the target data are those fordamage evaluation, which satisfy the following
two requirements.
i)
The damage article which allows
estimating the restoration period andcost shall be clearly given: for example,
an RC member has the description ofdamage information about the quantityof cracks and the yield of reinforcing
bars.
ii)

6. OCCURRENCE OF EARTHQUAKEDAMAGE AND MEANS OF FUNCTIONALRESILIENCE
According to the research articles, the object is
to review the information relating to the building
damages of earthquake and to the functional
resilience after earthquake, and to investigate thepreparation of explanation and expression tool
to convey the information to general users in anunderstandable format.
In the first fiscal year of the research project,
there was reviewed the expectedly occurring
damages of earthquake and means of functional
resilience on the examples of houses, hospitals,
and offices. Since the functions required tobuildings differ with the uses of buildings, theresearch assumed the three uses of buildings:
houses, hospitals, and offices.
Then thepossible damages on earthquake and the meansof functional resilience were reviewed. As themethod of review, the damage phenomena weredivided along the time axis into I (immediately
after the earthquake), II (within several days
after the earthquake), and III (afterward), andthere were reviewed the influence of eachphenomenon on the functions, the hardware
measures, and the software measures including
human actions.
In addition, the software
measures were further divided into thepre-measures applying before appearing theearthquake damages and the post-measuresapplying immediately after the earthquake.

The article which allows calculating
stiffness (including stiffness reduction
ratio) and proof stress shall be given: forexample, there shall be described crosssection, reinforcement arrangement,
strength of applied material, and loading
conditions (degree of end-fixation andloading history).

To prepare the work sheet, there is specificallynecessary the information of damages required
for the restoration. Furthermore, the degree of
influence of the damages of structural memberson the other positions and on the building
functions will be considered.
5.2 Nonstructural Members
A questionnaire survey was conducted on
manufacturers and suppliers of nonstructuralmembers to collect data for the damage
evaluation. The collected data are then arrangedin the work sheet. In addition, investigation on
papers, academic or related guidelines andstandards is also conducted.

52

the preliminary measures, the BusinessContinuity Plan (BCP) in disaster is preparedassuming the use of substitute facilities. Sincemany kinds of business rely on computers, it isnecessary to secure the earthquake resistance ofcomputer facilities and to attain early
restoration.

6.1 Earthquake Damage of Houses and Meansof Functional Resilience
The function requested for houses wasdetermined as the maintaining of living, thus therecovery from the condition of difficulty inliving after earthquake was determined as thefunctional resilience.
Table 5 shows thegeneration of earthquake damages and outline of
the means of functional resilience.
The
characteristics of houses include that the citizens
suffered from earthquake are forced to live in an
emergency evacuation area or temporary houses
owing to the lack of substitute facilities, and that
restoration cost becomes a heavy economicalload. In the initial period of living in an
emergency evacuation area, washroom is notavailable, and other damages of lifeline
seriously affect the maintaining living

7. CONCLUSION
As a new requirement of society aiming at
safety and security, the rapid functional
resilience of buildings after earthquake disasters
is discussed. As described in Chapter 2,
considering the problems recognized in theearthquake damages of recent years, and thedisaster-preventive strategy at national level, it
is expected that the necessity of technology
development relating to the functional continuity
and disaster resilience should be emphasized
more than ever. Continuing the technology
development is expected under sustainable
cooperation of organizations relating to thesubject.
The research project promotes the activity
organically and effectively under the same senseof purpose among Japan Structural Consultants
Association (JSCA), NPO Japan Aseismic
Safety Organization(JASO), university
members, and many relating organizations.
Toward the structuring a performance-based
design system which has a true significancerequested by the society, we strongly hope tohave cooperation of relating sectors in wide
fields.

6.2 Earthquake damages in hospitals and meansof functional resilience
The function requested to hospitals wasdetermined as the continuity of medical
activities, thus the recovery of medical activities
was determined as the functional resilience.
Table 6 shows the generation of earthquake
damages and outline of the means of functional
resilience. Since the assurance of life ofpatients and medical treatment take the priority,
the characteristics of hospital include thattransfer of patients to an emergency evacuation
area or to other hospital is requested after theearthquake, and that, if dialysis patients exist,
water stoppage becomes a critical problem.
Furthermore, many of medical equipment anddevices have casters, which need special care forthe transfer under earthquake.

8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was conducted as a part of“Development of Performance-Based Structural
Design System for Evaluating Continuity and/or
Resiliency of Building Function after
Disasters”” of a research subject of BRI,
(Chairman: Dr. Hitoshi Shiobara, Associate
Professor of the University of Tokyo). We
would like to express our appreciation to therelated persons and organizations.

6.3 Earthquake Damage of Offices and Meansof Functional Resilience
The function requested to offices wasdetermined as the continuity of business, thus
the recovery of the business was determined as
the functional resilience. Table 7 shows thegeneration of earthquake damages and outline of
the means of functional resilience.
The
features of office buildings include that
substitute facilities for the head office building
and the branch building are relatively easily
available. Consequently, it is important that, as

53Table 5 Earthquake-induced damage and means of functional resilience (Houses)
Phase

Damage phenomena

Influence on functions

Hardware measures

I

Collapse, half collapse, part
damage of building

Occurrence of killed andinjured citizens

Increase in the earthquake
resistance of building

Difficult for
opening/closing door
Falling and dropping
furniture and fixtures

Interference
withevacuation
Injury by direct earthquake
attackInterference with
evacuation
Interference withcollecting information
Inconvenience in living(especially at night)
Interference
withevacuation
Inconvenience in living(drinking water, toilet,
face wash, bath)
Poor living condition

Making door earthquake
resistant
Fixation and support offurniture and fixtures

Occurrence of killed andinjured citizens
Psychological stress
Psychological stress

Increase in the fire proofof buildingofElectric power failure

Stop of lift
I - II

Water stoppage, gas stoppage

II

Unserviceable building
Fire

III

Worsened living environment
Elongation of period of living
in an emergency evacuation
area
Poor economical condition

Delay
of
restoration

Software measures(preliminary action)
Diagnosis of earthquake
resistance of building

Room safety check

Preparation of portable
radio
Preparation of flashlightand candle
Storing drinking water
Storing water for toilet

building

Software measures (after
earthquake)
Confirmation of safety offamilyRescue operation

Request for restoration oflift

Moving to an emergency
evacuation area
Fire fighting
Psychological careMoving to temporary
housesJoining
insuranceearthquake

Contribution,
aid

emergency

Table 6 Earthquake-induced damage and means of functional resilience (Hospitals)
Phase

Damage phenomena

Influence on functions

Hardware measures

I

Collapse, half collapse, part
damage of building

Occurrence of killed andinjured citizens

Increase in the earthquake
resistance of building

Falling medical equipment anddevices, etc
Break of glass

Injury by direct earthquake
attackInterference
withevacuation
Interference with
evacuation

Fixation and support of
medical equipment anddevices

Stopping functioning of
medical equipment anddevices
Deletion of computer data
Inconvenience in living(especially at night)
Inconvenience in living(drinking water, toilet,
face wash, bath)Interference with medical
treatment(dialysis
patients)
Stopping
medicaltreatment activities

Securing
power source

Stop of lift
Electric power failure

I - II

Water stoppage

II

Unserviceable building
Increase in the number ofsufferers
Shortage of drugs andmedicines

III

Worsening hospitalenvironment
Lump of waste

Stagnant medical
treatment activities
Shortage of acceptancearea

Software measures(preliminary action)
Diagnosis of earthquake
resistance of building
Room safety check

Acceptance of seriously illpatients at lower floors
emergency

Securing emergency water
source (groundwater, etc )Backup of data

Storing daily life waterPreparation of temporary
tents
Structuring network withother hospitals
Cool storage of drugs andmedicines

Stress of patients
Hygienic problems

Securing
drugs
andmedicines which can be
stored in cool space
Establishing cooperation
schemewithlocal
government

59

Software measures (after
earthquake)
Confirmation of safety ofpatients and staffs
Rescue operation
Guiding evacuation of
inpatients
Guiding
throughstaircases

evacuation
emergency

Use of water tank trucks
Moving patients to otherhospitals

Emergency
medicaltreatment at temporarytents
Gathering staffs
Request for other hospitals
to accept patients

Psychologicalpatients

care

for

Table 7 Earthquake-induced damage and means of functional resilience (Offices)
Phase

Damage phenomena

Influence on functions

Hardware measures

I

Collapse, half collapse, part
damage of building

Occurrence of killed andinjured citizens

Increase in the earthquake
resistance of building

Drop of ceiling
Break and scattering of
window glass
Difficult for opening/closing
door
Damage of sprinkler

Injury by direct earthquake
attackInjury of passers-by
Interference with
evacuation
Fireextinguishing
unavailable

Moving and falling of heavyequipment such as copying
machineFailure of computer network

Injury by direct earthquake
attackPreventive measureagainst falling of ceilingProtective film against
scattering of glass
Making door earthquake
resistant
Makingequipment
earthquake resistantFixation and support ofequipment

Stopping communication,
deletion of data
Interference with
evacuation

Making computers seismic
isolation

Electric power failure

Deletion of computer data

I - II

Water stoppage

II

Unserviceable building

Inconvenience in living(drinking water, toilet,
face wash, bath)Interference with medical
treatment (dialysis
patients)
Stopping sales activity

Securing
emergency
power source
Securing emergency water
source (groundwater, etc )Stop of lift

Securing
facilities

substituteSoftware measures(preliminary action)
Preparation
of
BCP,
Diagnosis of earthquake
resistance of building

Software measures (after
earthquake)
Confirmation of safety ofstaffsRescue operation

Room safety check
Backup of data

Request for restoration of
network
Evacuation throughemergency staircases
Request for restoration oflift

Storing daily life water

Use of water tank trucks
Moving patients to otherhospitals

Preparation of BCP

Continuation
activityatfacilities

of salessubstitute

I: immediately after the earthquake
II: within several days after the earthquake
III: afterward

60

THEME 2
Dams

Improvement of Distance Attenuation Formula of Acceleration and Lower Limit Acceleration
Response Spectrum to Evaluate Seismic Performance of Dams
byShinya Mitsuishi1, Tomoki Otani2, Yoshikazu Yamaguchi3 & Tomoya Iwashita4
the minimum level of the earthquake motions to
be considered for seismic performance
evaluation. This spectrum is set on the basis of
the distance attenuation formula for dams.

ABSTRACTIn 2005, River Bureau of Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)
issued “Guidelines for Seismic Performance
Evaluation of Dams during Large Earthquakes(Draft) [1] (hereinafter referred to as the "Draft
Guidelines") as new technical guidelines
systematically explaining the evaluation
methods for seismic performance of dams
during large earthquakes.

In the trial implementation, the distanceattenuation formula for dams has been used todetermine Level 2 earthquake motions. The
evaluation using models dams conducted as atrial application of the Draft Guidelines foundseveral problems originating from the distanceattenuation formula for dams to determine
earthquake motions. To deal with these
problems, the distance attenuation formula fordams was revised. This was followed by thereview of the lower limit acceleration response
spectrum for dam evaluation using the revised
distance attenuation formula for dams.

The Draft Guidelines show a standard regulation
to evaluate of the seismic performance of damsfor Level 2 earthquake motions. The definitionof “Level 2 earthquake motions” is “Motions
having the maximum-scale level of intensity
conceivable at the dam site, at the present and in
the future”, which is equivalent to the Maximum
Credible Earthquake.

KEYWORDS: Distance Attenuation Formula,
Lower Limit Acceleration Response Spectrum,
Seismic performance evaluation

The Draft Guidelines show three importantmatters to evaluate the seismic performance ofdams against large earthquakes.

1. IMPROVEMENT OF THE DISTANCEATTENUATION FORMULA FOR DAMSi) The definition of earthquake motions thatshould be taken into consideration in
evaluationsii) The concepts of the required seismic
performance of dams.
iii) The methods of seismic performance
evaluation of dam bodies and appurtenant
structures

1.1 Setting of Level 2 Earthquake Motions
Based on the Draft Guidelines, Level 2
earthquake motions should be determined bythoroughly
investigating
andcollecting
information about past earthquakes, near thedam site. Level 2 earthquake motions for eachdam are determined as the estimated earthquake
1 Head, Water Management and Dam Division, River
Department, National Institute for Land andInfrastructure Management, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT),
Tsukuba 305-0804 Japan
2 Former Researcher, ditto(Kansai Regional Bureau, Japan Water Agency)
3 Team Leader, Dam Structure Research Team,
Hydraulic Engineering Research Group, Public
Works Research Institute, Tsukuba 305-8516 Japan
4 Deputy Team Leader, ditto

The Draft Guidelines were applied as a “trial
implementation” to verify the applicability inthe technical viewpoint. Verification was
conducted at several existing dams to find out
various problems in working-level and solvethem.
The Draft Guidelines provide the lower limit
acceleration response spectrum for evaluation as63and of the characteristics of the propagationfrom the source fault to the dam site. For thesereasons, the empirical method of the distanceattenuation formula for dams is used todetermine Level 2 earthquake motions for dams,in the present trial implementation of the Draft
Guidelines.

motions at each dam site and caused by selectedearthquakes that could have the largest impact
on the dam (Scenario Earthquakes). For
determination of the Scenario Earthquakes foreach dam, information such as location andmagnitude of past earthquakes, active faults andplate boundaries that might suggest to theoccurrence of future earthquakes, should begathered from reports provided by various
earthquake research organs. For determinationof the Scenario Earthquakes for each dam,
information such as location and magnitude ofpast earthquakes, active faults and plateboundaries that might suggest to the occurrenceof future earthquakes, should be gathered from
reports provided by various earthquake researchorgans.

1.2 Concerns of the Distance Attention Formulafor Dams
In the trial implementation of the Draft
Guidelines, the distance attenuation formula fordams prepared in 2001 (hereinafter referred to as
the "2001 Formula") was used to determine
Level 2 earthquake motions. Two types ofequation were produced as the distanceattenuation formula for dams as shown below.

The Scenario Earthquakes for each dam should
be selected by comparing the estimatedearthquake motions at the site caused bypotential earthquakes that might occur near thedam site. The effects of individual potential
earthquakes is basically estimated bycomparison of acceleration response spectra
evaluated using the Distance attenuation
formula for dams on acceleration response
spectrum [2], which is a set of empiricalequations derived from earthquake motions
observed at rock foundation or dam basement of
numerous dams in Japan.

▪ Shortest distance equation
logSA(T)=Cm(T)M+Ch(T)Hc-Cd(T)log{R+0.334exp(0.653M)}+Co(T) .
.............(1)▪ Equivalent hypocentral distance equation
logSA(T)=Cm(T)M+Ch(T)Hc-Cd(T)Xeq-logXeq+Co(T).............(2)Where, T is period (seconds), SA(T) is theacceleration response spectrum, M is the Japan
Meteorological Agency Magnitude, Hc is thedepth at the center of the source fault plane (km),R is the shortest distance to the source fault
plane (km), Xeq is the equivalent hypocentral
distance (km) and Cm, Ch, Cd, Cdh and Co are theconstants.

The largest acceleration response spectrum
calculated by the formula is applied for thetarget spectrum. The acceleration time history ofLevel 2 earthquake motion for a dam is
produced by fitting the acceleration response
spectrum of the original earthquake motion to
the target spectrum.

These equations were established by the
regression analysis of the relationship between
the scale of the earthquake, distance to the fault
plane and depth at the center of the fault plane
and acceleration response spectrum for eachperiod based on seismic data recorded by theseismographs installed at the inspection gallery
at the bottom of a dam in Japan in the period
from 1974 to 2000.

In addition to the empirical method of using the
distance attenuation formula for dams,
earthquake motions could be determined by thesemi-empirical methods such as the empiricalGreen's function method and the statisticalGreen's function method or the theoreticalmethod. However, these methods still haveproblems in regard to their application,
including the need for appropriate modeling of
the rupture process at the source fault surfaces

The earthquake motions prepared by theapplication of the 2001 Formula to the dams forevaluation in the trial implementation showed64

Table 1

2001 Formula
2008 Formula

Number of Regression Analysis Data for Distance Attenuation Formula for Dams
Number of
Number of
Subject
NumberObservation
Observation
Data Period
Earthquakes
of Dams Data (Horizontal
Data (Vertical
Motions)
Motions)
1974 to 2000
63
91
293
－
1974 to 2008
88
213
642
318

that there was a major discrepancy in theestimation results of the earthquake motions
between the shortest distance equation and theequivalent hypocentral distance equation in thecase where the source fault plane of the Scenario
Earthquake was located near the dam site andalso in some other cases.
The reason for such discrepancy was thought tobe the application of the distance attenuation
formula for dams to different ranges of the
distance to the source fault and the earthquake
magnitude of earthquake observation data used
as regression analysis data for the distanceattenuation formula for dams. The number ofearthquake observation data close to the source
fault is quite few. While the maximum
magnitude observed of an inland fault
earthquake was 7.3, a larger earthquake wasestimated in the evaluation.

Table 2Main Earthquakes for Which Data Was Added
Newly for Regression Analysis to Produce
Distance Attenuation Formula
Name ofDate of
JMA
Earthquake/Epicenter
Occurrence
Magnitude
Miyagiken-oki
26/05/2003
7.1
Tokachi-oki
26/09/2003
8.0
Niigataken-Chuetsu
23/10/2004
6.8
Fukuoka-ken Seiho-oki
20/04/2005
7.0
Noto Hanto
25/03/2007
6.9
Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki
16/07/2007
6.8
Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku
14/06/2008
7.2

it was decided to prepare new distanceattenuation equations for vertical motions as partof the review of the distance attenuation
formula.
1.3 Improvement of Distance Attenuation
Formula for Dams
1.3.1 Acceleration Record Data Used for
Analysis

In view of these issues, the equation structure of
the distance attenuation formula for dams was
modified. In addition, observation data on
earthquakes which have occurred since 2001
was added as regression analysis data. The
modification of the equation structure also
incorporated the latest research developments onearthquake motion estimating equations.

The earthquake observation data used to decide
the values of the constants for the distanceattenuation formula for dams was that observedat the dam foundation with an epicentral
distance of not more than 200 km in the caseof earthquakes of which the magnitude and the
hypocenter depth are at least 5.0 and not deeper
than 100 km respectively. The number ofobservation data used for the 2001 Formula andthe latest formula suggested in this paper(hereinafter referred to as "the 2008 Formula")
is shown in Table 1. The main earthquake of theobservation data newly added as regression
analysis data is listed in Table 2.

The 2001 formula is applied to estimate theacceleration response spectrum only forhorizontal earthquake motions. There was no
formula to estimate the vertical motions. In thepast of the trial implementation, the latter wasdetermined by multiplying the acceleration
response spectrum of horizontal earthquake
motions determined by the distance attenuation
formula for dams by the ratio between thehorizontal acceleration response spectrum andthe vertical acceleration response spectrum foreach frequency. As consideration of the verticalmotions is needed to be more appropriate for
evaluation of the seismic performance of dams,

1.3.2 Modification of Formula Structure
Because of the issues of the distance attenuation
formula described in Section 1.2, the structure of
the equations was modified and the resulting
equations are given below.

65square root term for the magnitude into theequation. The impact of this square root term isconsidered when the earthquake magnitude
exceeds a certain level. It was, therefore,
determine the value which best conforms to theobservation data for the minimum magnitudeof which the impact must be taken into
consideration. The adequate magnitude
determined is Mo=5.0 for the shortest distanceequation and Mo=6.0 for the equivalent
hypocentral distance equation.

▪ Shortest distance equation
logSA(T)=Cm1(T)M+Ch(T)Hc-log(R+C1(T)･100 5M)-(Cd(T)+Cdh(T)Hc)R+C0(T)(M≤M0) ..........................(3)logSA(T)=Cm1(T)M+Cm2(T)(M0-M)2
+Ch(T)Hc-log(R+C1(T)･100 5M)-(Cd(T)+Cdh(T)Hc)R+C0(T)(M>M0) .......................... (4)▪ Equivalent hypocentral distance equation
logSA(T)=Cm1(T)M+Ch(T)Hc-log(Xeq＋C(T))-(Cd(T)+Cdh(T)Hc)Xeq+Co(T)(M≤M0) ...........................(5)logSA(T)=Cm1(T)M+Cm2(T)(M0-M)2
+Ch(T)Hc-log(Xeq+C(T))-(Cd(T)+Cdh(T)Hc)Xeq+C0(T)(M>M0) .......................... (6)• Modification of the distance attenuation termin the shortest distance equation
The characteristic of the distance attenuation ofearthquake motions is expressed as the sum of
the effect of geometric attenuation and theeffect of internal attenuation in the equivalent
hypocentral distance equation of the 2001
Formula. In the shortest distance equation,
however, it is collectively expressed in theform corresponding to the internal attenuation,
making the effect of geometric attenuationunclear. Therefore, the modified shortest
distance equation has both a geometricattenuation term and an internal attenuation
term to express the characteristic of the
distance attenuation of earthquake motions as
the sum of the effects of these two types ofattenuation.

Where, T is period (sec), SA is the acceleration
response spectrum, M is the Japan
Meteorological Agency magnitude, Hc is thedepth at the center of the fault plane (km), R is
the shortest distance to the fault plane (km), Xeq
is the equivalent hypocentral distance (km) andCm1, Ch, C1, Cd, Cdh, Co and C are the constants.
The 2001 Formula was modified in thefollowing manners.

• Modification of the restricting term for the
shortest distance in the shortest distanceequation.

• Adding of restricting term for considering
against overestimate for large magnitude
Although the number of the observation data isquite few, in the case of an earthquake with anextremely large magnitude the earthquake
motions estimated by the 2001 Formula tend to
be quite larger than the observation data. In the2001 Formula, a linear relationship is assumed
between the logarithm for the amplitude of theearthquake motions and the earthquake
magnitude. Therefore, it has been pointed outthat the estimation of earthquake motions
appropriately reflecting the characteristics ofearthquake motions near the source fault basedon the scaling rules of the hypocenter is quitedifficult in the 2001 Formula. In considerationof these points, it was decided to innovate a

The correction term in order to consider the
restriction dependent on the earthquake
magnitude for distance attenuation was addedin the term expressing the geometricattenuation. The constant value for the
restriction of earthquake motions relating to the
distance attenuation was newly calculated by
the latest regression analysis. The constantvalue for the magnitude was set to 0.5 based on
the past research findings.
• Adding of a restricting term for the equivalent
hypocentral distance to the equivalent
hypocentral distance equation

661.4

Verification of Improved
Attenuation Formula for Dams

2.

EVALUATION OF LOWER LIMITACCELERATION RESPONSE SPECTRUM
FOR DAM EVALUATION
2.1 Theory for Determination of Lower Limit
Acceleration Response Spectrum for Dam
Evaluation

Distance• Decrease of deviation of both the calculation
results by the shortest distance equation andequivalent hypocentral distance equation

The Draft Guidelines provide “Lower-limit
acceleration response spectrum for Dam
evaluation”
that should be considered as the
mandatory minimum Level 2 earthquake
motions. The reason for stipulating thisminimum spectrum is that the earthquake
motion used for seismic performance evaluation
should be determined taking into consideration
the possibility of an earthquake occurring
directly at an active fault under the dam siteeven when no active fault is identified by theinvestigations.

Figure 5 shows the relationship between the
maximum acceleration calculated by theshortest distance equation and equivalent
hypocentral distance equation. Compared to
the results between the 2001 Formula and the2008 Formula, the overall deviation is much
more compact.
• Improved compatibility for deep earthquakes
Figure 6 shows the observation data andcalculation results of the distance attenuation
formula for dams at the dam foundation for
the Miyagiken-oki Earthquake (M7.1, Hc=77km) occurred on May, 2003. Modification of
the term expressing the distance attenuation to
the term dependent on the depth of the
hypocenter has improved the compatibility of
the calculation results with the observation
data at a dam foundation.
• Verification by comparison withobservation data for actual earthquakes

The Draft Guidelines determine the earthquake
magnitude based on the following theories toprepare the lower limit acceleration response
spectrum for evaluation and the same method
was used for the present review.
•
•

dam

•

Figure 7 shows the horizontal maximum
acceleration observed at the dam foundation
during two major earthquakes and theattenuation curve of the horizontal
acceleration response spectrum at the periodof 0.02sec using the distance attenuation
formula for dams (the 2001 and 2008
Formulas). The attenuation curves ofmaximum acceleration (acceleration response
spectrum at the period of 0.02sec) calculatedby the 2008 Formula agree well the
maximum acceleration data observed at thedam foundations.

•

•

71

Few earthquakes of M6.5 or smaller
produce surface earthquake faults.
Many earthquakes of M6.8 or greater
produce surface earthquake faults.
The number of earthquakes of M6.6 or M6.7
is much smaller compared to M6.5 orsmaller, or, M6.8 or greater. This is notcoincidental as a discontinuous scale ofmagnitude occurs due to the effect of thecausative fault plane piercing through theground surface.
In exceptional cases, earthquakes exceeding
M6.5 may not produce surface earthquake
faults. The damage caused by theseearthquakes little differs from the maximum
damage caused by earthquakes of M6.5 orsmaller.
A surface earthquake fault may not be
producedbyearthquakesuptoapproximately M7.3. In the case of the
Tottori-ken Seibu Earthquake (M7.3) on
October, 2000, the causative fault was not
identified prior to the earthquake.

Large Earthquakes(Draft) , 2005
2. Matsumoto, N., Ohmachi, T., Yasuda, N.,
Sasaki, T. and Annaka, T.: Acceleration
Response Spectra at Dam Foundations,
Proceedings of the 22nd Congress of ICOLD,
2006
3. Annaka, T., Morita, M., Aikyo, Y. and Harada,
M.: An Attenuation Model for 5 % damped
Acceleration Response Spectra Considering
the Effect of Earthquake Type, JSCE
Earthquake Engineering Symposium, 2005
4. Japan Society for Civil Engineers: Guidelineof Seismic Design for Infrastructures, 2001
5. Matsumoto, N., Yoshida, H., Sasaki, T. andAnnaka, T.: Response Spectra of Earthquake
Motion at Dam Foundations, Proceedings ofthe 21st Congress of ICOLD, 2003

75

DEVELOPING REGIONAL EXERCISES INVOLVING MULTIPLE DAMS
by
Enrique E. Matheu, PhD 1, Yazmin Seda-Sanabria 2, and Robert C. Hughes, PE 3
KEYWORDS: HSEEP methodology;
emergency preparedness; resilience; exercise
series; regional perspective; emergency action
plan.

ABSTRACT
Owners and operators of dams across the UnitedStates are focused on enhancing protection
efforts against natural or manmade disasters andimproving preparedness, response, and rapid
recovery in the event of dam failures or otheremergencies. In a collaborative effort led by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
multiple dam owners are actively participating
in several exercise efforts aligned with theHomeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP). This performance-based
exercise program provides a standardized
methodology for exercise design, development,
execution, evaluation, and improvement
planning, and can be adapted to a variety of
scenarios and events.

1.0 INTRODUCTION
Comprehensive emergency management
planning is the most effective approach toprepare for, prevent, respond to, and recoverfrom catastrophic emergency situations. This isespecially important for dam owners in the eventof a dam failure. Although emergency
management efforts for dams in the U.S.
officially began over thirty years ago, efforts
have intensified in recent years due to terrorist
attacks against the U.S. in 1993, 1995, and 2001.
Since 2001, officials in all areas of emergency
management, at all levels of government, and in
all types of communities have been focused onenhancing protection efforts against both naturaland manmade disasters. These efforts include
the creation of the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) in 2002, anddedicated efforts by the dam safety and security
communities toward improving preparedness,
response, and rapid recovery in the event of dam
failures or other emergencies.

The HSEEP framework is particularly useful for
exercise efforts involving multiple dams, whichhave dominant regional and multi-jurisdictional
characteristics when the corresponding scenarios
trigger significant cascading impacts affecting
extended areas. These types of exercises provide
an effective mechanism to identify any required
improvements to the Emergency Action Plans(EAPs) of the facilities involved. An example ofthese types of regional initiatives is a recently
conducted effort that tested communications
protocols between government and nongovernment entities facing a catastrophic event
involving two dams located along the same river
basin in the Midwest. Another example is acurrent series of exercises involving significant
flooding in the Pacific Northwest, affecting
several dams along the Columbia River Basin.
This paper describes these efforts and theirrelevance as an important vehicle to increase
preparedness and resilience at the regional level.

Developing and maintaining a comprehensive
emergency exercise program plays a crucial rolein these efforts. Conducting emergency
exercises provides opportunities for emergency
responders and officials to practice notification
and response actions and assess their collective
capabilities. Conducting emergency exercises is
one of the primary activities that help safeguard
against the loss of life and property damage thatcan result from the failure of a high-hazard
potential dam.

1

Chief, Dams Sector Branch, Sector-Specific Agency Executive Management Office, Office of Infrastructure Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Washington DC, 20528, enrique matheu@dhs.gov
2
Program Manager, Critical Infrastructure Security Program, Office of Homeland Security, Directorate of Civil Works, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Headquarters, Washington DC, 20314, yazmin.seda-sanabria@usace.army mil
3
Civil Engineer, Dams Sector Branch, Sector-Specific Agency Executive Management Office, Office of Infrastructure
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington DC, 20528, c hughes@dhs.gov

76

conducted as part of the NEP. It is also being
used at the State, regional, county, and citylevels, in addition to usage by private company
and other organizations.

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP) was developed by DHS toprovide exercise policy and program guidance
that constitutes a national standard for exercises.
During the past two years, the DHS Dams Sector
Branch has utilized the HSEEP framework as
part of joint exercise efforts developed incollaboration with the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers (USACE), other federal agencies,
State and local agencies, and private damowners/operators.

2.1 Exercise Program Management
The HSEEP methodology provides the user withinformation and guidance to promote effective
exercise program management. The functions
required for a user to sustain a variety of
exercises targeted toward preparedness priorities
on an ongoing basis are provided within the
HSEEP framework. These include project
management, multi-year planning, budget
development, grant management, staff hiring,funding allocation, and expenditure tracking.

2.0 THE HSEEP METHODOLOGYThe HSEEP methodology was developed by
DHS in response to the need for acomprehensive and consistent emergency
exercise program. It is a capabilities- andperformance-based exercise program thatprovides standardized methodology andterminology for exercise design, development,
conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.
It can be adapted to a variety of scenarios andevents from natural disasters to manmade
incidents. HSEEP promotes the use of
consistent terminology that can be used by all
exercise planners, regardless of the nature andcomposition of their sponsoring agency ororganization. It provides tools to help exercise
managers plan, conduct, and evaluate exercises
to improve their overall emergency
preparedness. HSEEP also provides guidance
and resources to facilitate the management ofself-sustaining exercise programs.

Effective exercise program management should
function as a cyclic process. To support this, thedevelopment of a Multi-Year Training andExercise Plan is recommended by considering
the user’s preparedness priorities. As a first step,a Training and Exercise Plan Workshop should
be conducted. During the workshop, participants
typically review priority preparedness
capabilities and coordinate exercise and training
activities that can improve and validate thosecapabilities. Next, specific training and exercise
activities are planned and conducted according
to the multi-year plan’s schedule. Finally,
exercise planners consider post-exercise After
Action Reports / Improvement Plans(AARs/IPs) when developing priorities for the
next multi-year plan, as well as updating plansand procedures, acquiring new equipment, andconducting additional training.

Development of the HSEEP methodology
incorporated lessons learned and best practices
from existing exercise programs. HSEEP
integrates language and concepts from the
National Response Plan, National IncidentManagement System, National Preparedness
Goal, Universal Task List (UTL), Target
Capabilities List (TCL), existing exercise
programs, and prevention and response
protocols from all levels of government. It has
been accepted as the standardized policy andmethodology for the execution of the National
Exercise Program (NEP). The NEP is the
Nation’s overarching exercise program
formulated by the National Security Council /Homeland Security Council. All interagency
partners in the U.S. have adopted HSEEP as themethodology for all exercises that will be

2.2 Exercise Project Management
Exercise project management is an importantcomponent of exercise program management. It
is used to carry out the activities needed to
execute an individual exercise. Exercise project
management involves five phases, which arecollectively known as the exercise cycle.
Exercises conducted in accordance with thephases of the exercise cycle lead to tangible
preparedness improvements.
The five phases of the exercise cycle, as
provided by HSEEP, are as follows:771. Foundation: The following activities must be
accomplished to provide the foundation for aneffective exercise: create a base of support (i.e.,establish buy-in from the appropriate entities
and/or senior officials); develop a project
management timeline and establish milestones;
identify an exercise planning team; and schedule
planning conferences.

small scale seminar style events to full scale
events (see Figure 1). Each of the exercises is
considered to be either discussion-based or
operation-based activities.
Discussion-based exercises are used tofamiliarize participants with current plans,
policies, agreements and procedures, or may be
used to develop new plans, policies, agreements,
and procedures.

2. Design and Development: Building on theexercise foundation, the design and development
process focuses on identifying objectives,
designing the scenario, creating documentation,
coordinating logistics, planning exercise
conduct, and selecting an evaluation andimprovement methodology.

Types of discussion-based exercises include:
Seminar. An informal discussion, designed
to orient participants to new or updated
plans, policies, or procedures (e.g., aseminar to review a new Evacuation
Standard Operating Procedure).

3. Conduct: After the design and development
steps are complete, the exercise takes place.
Exercise conduct steps include setup, briefings,
facilitation/control/evaluation, and wrap-up
activities.

Workshop. Resembles a seminar, but isemployed to build specific products, such asa draft plan or policy (e.g., a Training andExercise Plan Workshop is used to develop
a Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan).

4. Evaluation: The evaluation phase for all
exercises includes a formal exercise evaluation,
an integrated analysis, and an AAR/IP that
identifies strengths and areas for improvement inan entity’s preparedness, as observed during theexercise. Recommendations related to areas for
improvement are identified to help develop
corrective actions to be tracked throughout the
improvement planning phase.

Tabletop Exercise (TTX). Involves key
personnel discussing simulated scenarios in
an informal setting. TTXs can be used toassess plans, policies, and procedures, and isprobably the most utilized of all exercise
types.
Games. A simulation of operations that
often involves two or more teams, usually in
a competitive environment, using rules, data,and procedure designed to depict an actualor assumed real-life situation.

5. Improvement Planning: During
improvement planning, the corrective actions
identified in the evaluation phase are assigned,with due dates, to responsible parties; tracked to
implementation; and then validated during
subsequent exercises.

Operation-based exercises are used to validate
plans, policies, agreements and procedures,
clarify roles and responsibilities, and identify
resource gaps in an operational environment.

2.3 Exercise Options
HSEEP is a very versatile tool that allows theuser to tailor an exercise to address specificobjectives and meet the particular user needs.
Integral to this versatility are the multiple
exercise options, documentation capabilities,
and planning and after action report options thatare defined within the HSEEP methodology.

The types of operation-based exercises include:
Drill. A coordinated, supervised activity
usually employed to test a single, specificoperation or function within a single entity(e.g., a fire department conducts adecontamination drill).
Functional Exercise (FE). Examines and/or
validates the coordination, command, andcontrol between various multi-agency

Seven types of exercises are defined within the
HSEEP methodology along with guidance for
their application. The exercises range from78

Master Scenario Events List (MSEL). A
chronological timeline of expected actions
and scripted events (i.e., injects) to beinserted into operation-based exercise playby controllers in order to generate or prompt
player activity. It ensures necessary events
happen so that all exercise objectives aremet.

coordination centers (e.g., emergency
operation center, joint field office, etc.). A
functional exercise does not involve any"boots on the ground" (i.e., first responders
or emergency officials responding to an
incident in real time).
Full-Scale Exercises (FSE). A multi-agency,
multi-jurisdictional, multi-discipline
exercise involving functional (e.g., joint
field office, emergency operation centers,etc.) and "boots on the ground" responses(e.g., firefighters decontaminating mock
victims).

Player Handout. A 1-2 page document,
usually handed out the morning of an
exercise, which provides a quick reference
for exercise players on safety procedures,
logistical considerations, exercise schedule,
and other key factors and information.

2.4 Exercise Documentation

Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEGs). Helpevaluators collect and interpret relevant
exercise observations. EEGs provide
evaluators with information on the tasks
they should expect to see accomplishedduring an exercise, space to record
observations, and questions to address after
the exercise as a first step in the analysis
process. In order to assist entities in exercise
evaluation, standardized EEGs have beencreated that reflect capabilities-basedplanning tools, such as the TCL and UTL.
The EEGs are not meant to be interpreted asreport cards. Rather, they are intended to
guide an evaluator's observations so that theevaluator focuses on capabilities and tasks
relevant to exercise objectives to support
development of the AAR/IP.

Documentation is a very important part of any
exercise. HSEEP provides information andguidance for seven important document types
that can be used for most exercises. The list
below briefly describes each of these documents.
Situation Manual (SitMan). A participant
handbook for discussion-based exercises,
particularly TTXs. It provides backgroundinformation on exercise scope, schedule, andobjectives. It also presents the scenario
narrative that will drive participant
discussions during the exercise.
Exercise Plan (ExPlan). Typically used for
operation-based exercises. Provides asynopsis of the exercise and is published anddistributed to players and observers prior to
the start of the exercise. The ExPlan
includes the exercise objectives and scope,
safety procedures, and logisticalconsiderations such as an exercise schedule.
The ExPlan does not contain detailed
scenario information.

After Action Report/Improvement Plan
(AAR/IP). The final product of an exercise.
The AAR/IP has two components: an AAR,
which captures observations andrecommendations based on the exercise
objectives as associated with the capabilities
and tasks; and an IP, which identifies
specific corrective actions, assigns them toresponsible parties, and establishes target
dates for completion. The lead evaluator andexercise planning team draft the AAR and
submit it to conference participants prior toan After Action Conference (see below).
The draft AAR is distributed to conference
participants for review no more than 30 days
after exercise conduct. The final AAR/IP isan outcome of the After Action Conference

Controller and Evaluator (C/E) Handbook.
Supplements the ExPlan for operation-based
exercises. Contains more detailed
information about the exercise scenario, anddescribes exercise controllers' andevaluators' roles and responsibilities.
Because the C/E Handbook contains
information on the scenario and exercise
administration, it is distributed only to thoseindividuals specifically designated ascontrollers or evaluators.

79

development. This helps to ensure that all
aspects of emergency planning are covered ineach plan. Uniform EAPs and advancecoordination with local and State emergency
management officials and organizations should
facilitate a timely response to a developing or
actual emergency situation.

and should be disseminated to participants
no more than 60 days after exercise conduct.
2.5 Planning and After Action Conferences
The HSEEP methodology defines a variety ofplanning and after action conferences. The needfor each of these conferences varies dependingon the type and scope of the exercise. They
include:3.1 EAP Structure
The following guidelines are provided for
preparing or revising EAPs for all high andsignificant hazard potential dams. Ownershipand development of the floodplain downstream
from each dam varies; therefore, the potential
for loss of life as a result of failure or operationof a dam will also vary. It is very important that
the EAP for a given dam be tailored to theparticular needs and site-specific conditions thatexist at that dam.

- Concepts and Objectives Meeting- Initial Planning Conference- Mid-Term Planning Conference- Master Scenario Events List Conference- Final Planning Conference- After Action Conference

3.0 EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS
The EAP constitutes an essential component of acomprehensive emergency management
framework for dam owners and operators, as it
plays a crucial role in preventing the loss of lifeand property damage that can result from thefailure of a high-hazard potential dam. The
document identifies potential emergency
conditions at a dam and specifies pre-planned
actions to be followed in order to minimize
property damage and loss of life. It is essential
because it identifies the area below a dam thatwould be flooded as a result of a failure;establishes communication between the damowner and State/local emergency responders;provides for notifications and evacuations
conducted by police, fire, and rescue teams; andpredicts the timing of the impending flood wave.

An EAP generally contains six basic
informational elements:
1. Notification Flowchart
2. Emergency Detection, Evaluation, andClassification
3. Responsibilities
4. Preparedness
5. Inundation Maps
6. Appendices
While the dam owner is responsible for thedevelopment or revision of the EAP, it must be
done in coordination with those having
emergency management responsibilities for theaffected areas at the State and local levels.
Emergency management agencies need and will
use the information in a dam owner's EAP tofacilitate the implementation of their
responsibilities. Brief descriptions of the six
basic elements of an EAP are listed below.

It is essential that dam owners develop thiscritical information and provide it to appropriate
responders to effect safe and successful
evacuations, save lives, and help keep
responders out of danger. An EAP contains
procedures and information to assist the damowner in issuing early warning and notification
messages to responsible downstream emergency
management authorities of the emergency
situation. It also contains inundation maps toshow emergency management authorities thecritical areas for action in case of an emergency.

1. Notification Flowchart. Shows the priority
chain of notification. The information on the
notification flowchart is necessary for thetimely notification of persons responsible
for taking emergency actions.
2. Emergency Detection, Evaluation, andClassification. Early detection andevaluation of the situation(s) or triggering
event(s) that initiate or require an emergency

The effectiveness of an EAP can be enhanced byusing uniform guidelines during its

80

responsibilities for warning, evacuation, andpost-flood actions. The finished product should
be user friendly as it realistically takes into
account each organization's capabilities andresponsibilities.

action are crucial. The establishment ofprocedures for reliable and timely
classification of an emergency situation isimperative to ensure that the appropriate
course of action is taken based on theurgency of the situation. It is better toactivate the EAP while confirming theextent of an emergency than to wait for theextent of the emergency to be confirmed.

Coordination with State and local emergency
management officials at appropriate levels ofmanagement responsible for warning andevacuation of the public is essential to ensurethat there is agreement on their individual andgroup responsibilities. Participation in the
preparation of the EAP and in exercises where
the EAP is tested will enhance confidence in the
EAP and in the accuracy of its components.
Coordination will provide opportunities fordiscussion and determination of the order inwhich public officials would be notified, backup
personnel, alternate means of communication,and special procedures for nighttime, holidays,
and weekends.

3. Responsibilities. A determination of
responsibility for EAP-related tasks must be
made during the development of the plan.
Dam owners are responsible for developing,
maintaining, and implementing the EAP.
State and local emergency management
officials having statutory obligation are
responsible for warning and evacuation
within affected areas. The EAP must clearlyspecify the dam owner’s responsibilities toensure that effective, timely action is taken
should an emergency occur at the dam. The
EAP must be site-specific because
conditions at the dam and downstream of alldams are different.

The tasks and responsibilities of the dam ownerand emergency management officials during
dam emergencies need to be as compatible aspossible. To facilitate compatibility, the damowner should coordinate emergency response
actions with local emergency management
officials who have the responsibility to provide atimely warning and evacuation notice to the
population at risk. This should help prevent
over, or under, reaction to the incident by
various organizations.

4. Preparedness. Actions taken to moderate or
alleviate the effects of a dam failure oroperational spillway release and to facilitate
response to emergencies. This section
identifies actions that should be taken before
an emergency.
5. Inundation Maps. Delineate the areas thatwould be flooded as a result of a dam
failure. Inundation maps are used both by
the dam owner and emergency management
officials to facilitate timely notification andevacuation of areas affected by a dam failure
or flood condition. These maps greatly
facilitate notification by graphicallydisplaying flooded areas and showing travel
times for flood peaks at critical locations.
6. Appendices. Contain information that
supports and supplements the material usedin the development and maintenance of theEAP.

4.0 APPLICATION TO REGIONALLYBASED, MULTIPLE DAMS EXERCISESThe HSEEP framework is particularly useful for
exercise efforts involving multiple dams, whichhave dominant regional and multi-jurisdictional
characteristics when the corresponding scenarios
trigger significant cascading impacts affecting
extended areas. These types of exercises provide
an effective mechanism to identify any required
improvements to the EAPs of the individual
facilities and the local, State, and Federal
agencies involved. They are an importantvehicle to increase preparedness and resilienceat the regional level.

It is vital that development of the EAP becoordinated with all stakeholders, jurisdictions,and agencies that would be affected by a dam
failure and/or flooding as a result of large
operational releases, or that have statutory

DHS has utilized HSEEP for conducting two
separate exercise efforts involving multiple
dams and cascading impacts with regional and81to all-hazard, dam emergencies to improve
Truman Dam and Bagnell Dam EAPs, andreadiness of associated critical infrastructure andkey resources (CIKR). Exercise participants
successfully exercised the EAPs in workshop
and FE forums that validated the plans and will
guide refinements to established procedures. The
FE scenario involved a response to terrorist
attacks. The FE scenario facilitated participants’review of roles and responsibilities, coordinate
and integrate capabilities, examine planning
processes, identify issues and seek solutions.
The FE included agency participation from
Missouri and Washington DC, as well as
representatives from the Dams Government
Coordinating Council and the Sector
Coordinating Council, who participated fromtheir respective locations across the US (seeFigure 2).

multi-jurisdictional effects. The first effort was
conducted in 2008 in collaboration with USACE
and other partners across the Dams Sector. It
consisted of as a series of exercises focused onenhancing protection efforts against manmade
attacks and improving preparedness, response,
and rapid recovery in the event of an attack,natural disaster, or other emergency. The
second effort is currently underway and involves
significant flooding of several dams andcommunities along the Columbia River Basin in
the Pacific Northwest. It also consists of a seriesof exercises and is a collaborative effort with
USACE and other partners across the Dams
Sector.
4.1 2008 Dam Security Exercise Series–
Bagnell/Truman (DSES-08)
The 2008 Dam Security Exercise Series–
Bagnell/Truman (DSES-08) was a series of
exercises designed to test existing
interoperability and communications protocols
between government and non-government
entities facing a catastrophic security-related
event involving two dams located along thesame river basin. DSES-08 was comprised ofmultiple events, including a series of workshops,
a tabletop exercise, and a functional exercise.

DSES-08 provided many valuable lessons
learned in five functional areas: Exercise
Organization Planning and Execution;
Communications, Information Sharing andInteroperability; EAP Scope; Inundation
Modeling and Mapping; and Interaction with
Local and State Agencies. In particular,
challenges in communication protocols faced
during the exercise underscored the critical needto ensure that plans incorporate redundant meansof communications, and that users receive
adequate training on the use of incident
management communications systems.

The events associated with DSES-08 involved
Bagnell Dam, owned by AmerenUE, and Harry
S. Truman Dam and Reservoir, owned by the
USACE Kansas City District. Additional
participants included DHS, the Missouri State
Emergency Management Agency, and other
Federal, State, local agencies, and private
entities. DSES-08 was developed by an Exercise
Planning Team comprised of representatives
from all participating entities. The exercise
series consisted of four main activities: an EAPWorkshop, an Inundation Modeling and
Mapping Workshop, a Security TTX, and a
Functional Exercise (FE). The first three
activities were conducted on August 7, 2008 in
Lake of the Ozarks, Missouri. The fourth
activity was conducted on September 17, 2008
in Jefferson City, MO. A total of 311 personnel
from 64 organizations attended all DSES-08
events.

DSES-08 successfully utilized the HSEEP
program in achieving exercise objectives,
including exercising interagency interoperability
and communications in response to almostsimultaneous security-related incidents at
multiple dams. These efforts clearly assisted in
improving the readiness conditions at theparticipating projects, as well as the information
dissemination framework established across thesector.
4.2 2009 Dams Sector Exercise Series–
Columbia River Basin (DSES-09)
The 2009 Dams Sector Exercise Series–
Columbia River Basin (DSES-09) consists of aseries of exercises involving significant floodingin the Pacific Northwest, affecting several dams
along the Columbia River Basin. Participants inthis effort include the Pacific Northwest
Economic Region, DHS, USACE, and various

DSES-08 sought to exercise interagency
interoperability and communications in response82stakeholders in the Pacific Northwest region.
The primary objective of DSES-09 is tofacilitate the development of an Integrated
Regional Strategy to improve disaster resilienceand preparedness initially for the Tri-Cities areaof Washington State (Kennewick, Pasco, andRichland) and ultimately for the broader
Columbia River basin.

Track 4 - Long-term Restoration/Economic
Resilience. Address issues related toassessing consequences of a major flood
event on CIKR and associated regional
infrastructure interdependencies, duration of
disruptions, impacts on recovery and longerterm restoration, and potential prevention
and mitigation measures.

The DSES-09 effort consists of pre-exercise
training seminars, a series of TTXs, and followup after action/strategy workshops. DSES-09 iscurrently underway and is utilizing the HSEEP
methodology as the framework for all exercise
components. The versatility of HSEEP isproving integral to achieving the primaryobjective of the exercise series, which is thedevelopment of an Integrated Regional Strategy
to improve disaster resilience and preparedness
across multiple sectors and jurisdictions.

Track 5 - Integrated Regional Strategy.
Develop an Integrated Regional Strategy
that leverages lessons learned from theseries of exercises in order to improve
regional disaster resilience.
Track 1 entailed the creation of a Modeling and
Mapping Workgroup to address modelingapproaches and capabilities that can beleveraged from other efforts. The initial focus
was on updating inundation maps and refining
the scenario, which is being used during Tracks
2, 3 and 4. The workgroup conducted a
Modeling and Mapping Workshop to assist with
exercise development.

DSES-09 is being conducted with a somewhat
unique approach. The effort has been divided
into five tracks. Each track is being conducted
separately with completion scheduled tocomplement the other tracks as the overall effort
progresses. Each track is briefly described
below.

Tracks 2, 3, and 4 consist of a concepts andobjectives meeting, training seminar, TTX, andpost-exercise workshop for each track. These
tracks are designed to help build the Integrated
Regional Strategy. The workgroups for Tracks
2-4 are being tailored to include additional
stakeholder organizations beyond those in Track
1, as appropriate.

Track 1 - Modeling and Mapping. Use
existing models to estimate hydrological andhydraulic conditions based on weather anddam operations, update inundation maps,
and identify additional modelingrequirements.

Finally, Track 5 will include development of an
AAR/IP to identify lessons learned and assign
responsibilities for areas that require
improvement. The results of the first 4 tracks aswell as the AAR/IP will be integrated into a
regional strategy for the Columbia River basin in
the Pacific Northwest region.

Track 2 - Pre-Disaster Operational
Response. Examine the effectiveness ofplans and procedures for dams with regards
to communication, coordination, roles andresponsibilities, information-sharing, andresponse and mitigation procedures
associated with cascading events that could
create a potentially catastrophic inundation
scenario in the Tri-Cities area.

5.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
EAPs and exercises are essential components ofcomprehensive emergency management
planning for dam owners and operators. An
EAP is essential for major dams in order to save
lives and reduce property damage in areas thatwould be affected by dam failure. Exercises are
the primary tool for dam owners to test EAPs
and other emergency procedures, assess
emergency response capabilities, and identify

Track 3 - State and Local
Preparedness/Emergency Response. Identify
disaster management challenges during amajor regional flood within multiple highly
populated communities that consist of
CIKR, some of which pose uniqueenvironmental concerns.

83areas for improvement. The HSEEP
methodology is a capabilities and performancebased tool that provides guidance for exercise
design, development, conduct, evaluation, andimprovement planning. The HSEEP frameworkis scalable and easily applied to regionallybased, multi-dam scenarios that involve multijurisdictional and multi-agency components. It
is an invaluable tool for dam owners andoperators for improving their preparedness,
response, and recovery capabilities. Large scale
exercises such as DSES-08 and DSES-09
provide an excellent opportunity for building
coordination and compatibility.
6.0 REFERENCES
1. “Homeland Security Exercise andEvaluation Program, (HSEEP), Volume 1:
Overview and Exercise Program
Management,” Federal Emergency
Management Agency, National
Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Departmentof Homeland Security.
2. Seda-Sanabria, Yazmin, Norton, Douglas J.,
Matheu, Enrique E., Empson, William B.,
and Hunter, John W., “Application of theHomeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP) Framework to the 2008
Dam Security Exercise Series (DSES-08),”
29th USSD Annual Meeting and Conference,
Nashville, TN.
3. “Emergency Action Planning for State
Regulated High-Hazard Potential Dams,
FEMA 608,” Federal Emergency
Management Agency, August 2006.
4. “Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety:
Emergency Action Planning for Dam
Owners, FEMA 64,” Interagency Committeeof Dam Safety, U. S. Department ofHomeland Security, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 1998.

84

Damage to Dams due to the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake in 2008by
Yoshikazu Yamaguchi1, Tomoya Iwashita2 and Shinya Mitsuishi3
ABSTRACTAgency, 2008) [1]

The large earthquake, the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku
Earthquake in 2008 mainly struck the mid
Tohoku Region in northeastern Honshu Island,
Japan on June 14, 2008. The magnitude of theevent was estimated as 7.2 in the JMA scale.
Based on the results of the emergency
inspections of 134 dams by the site officers
immediately after the earthquake, on June 15
and 16, dam engineering experts carried out site
investigation at the five dams where damage had
been found. This paper described the outlines of
the results of the preliminary investigations of
the five dams. According to the investigation, no
problems severe enough to threaten the
structural safety of any of the five dams were
found. This verified the high level of seismic
resistance of the dams in Japan.

No nuclear power plant was shut down
following this earthquake, unlike the case of
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant after
the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in 2007.
Several sections of express highways in the
Tohoku Region were closed, then all werereopened by nightfall, except for one section
where a traffic restriction was maintained
because of repair works. Some JR East train
services were suspended on Shinkansen,
Japanese superexpress, and local lines, thenresumed from the first trains on the following
day. (Cabinet Office, 2008) [2]
The Technical Emergency Control Force(TEC-FORCE) organized by Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)
dispatched many experts to the event area toinvestigate damage to infrastructures and houses
and provide technical support for emergency
countermeasures on the day of the earthquake.
To conduct emergency investigations of dams,
the authors, all dam engineering experts, weredispatched to five dams damaged by thisearthquake from June 14 through 16, 2008. This
paper reports the results of the on-site survey ofdamage to and safety evaluation of the dams
which were surveyed.

KEYWORDS: Dam, Damage, Deformation,
Earthquake, Investigation, Leakage
1. INTRODUCTION
The large earthquake, the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku
Earthquake in 2008 mainly struck the mid
Tohoku Region in northeastern Honshu Island,
Japan at 8:43 am on Saturday morning, June 14,
2008. The strongest shaking was measured in
Oshu City, Iwate Prefecture and Kurihara City,
Miyagi Prefecture, both at 6 Upper of the Japan
Meteorological Agency (JMA) seismic intensity.

2. PROFILE OF THE EARTHQUAKEThe earthquake occurred at 8:43 am on June 14,
2008. The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA)
named the event the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku

Landslides triggered by this earthquake crushedstructures, buried people, cut off road traffic,
and isolated local communities. Mud fromlandslides dammed up rivers to form lakes, so
called "quake lakes", which could threaten thesafety of their downstream areas. By 13:30, July
30, 13 people were confirmed dead, 450 injured,and 10 still missing. A total of 28 homes weredestroyed, 99 partly destroyed, and 1,382 partly
damaged. (Fire and Disaster Management

1 Team Leader, Dam Structure Research Team, HydraulicEngineering Research Group, Public Works ResearchInstitute (PWRI), Tsukuba City, 305-8516 Japan
2 Deputy Team Leader, ditto
3 Head, Water Management and Dam Division, River
Department, National Institute for Land andInfrastructure Management (NILIM), Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Tsukuba
City, 305-0804 Japan86

under the River Act. The special safety
inspections consisted of primary and secondary
inspections; the former were visual inspections
immediately after the earthquake, and the latter
were detailed visual inspections and safety
checks using data measured by installed
instruments.
The primary emergency inspections wereconducted at 134 dams, with secondary
inspections performed at 77 of these dams. The
results of the emergency inspection confirmed
damage to the dam bodies and the slopes arounddam reservoirs at 12 dams.
4. EMERGENCY INVESTIGATIONDAMS BY TEC-FORCE EXPERTS

OF

As a result of emergency inspections by damsite officers, of those dams reported to bedamaged, the authors who were expert membersof TEC-FORCE, performed site surveys of dams
managed and operated directly by the national orprefectural government which were reported
damaged, in response to requests by site officers
to perform surveys. The on-site surveys were
performed on June 15 and 16 at five dams
operated by MLIT, Miyagi Prefecture, and Akita
Prefecture. The locations of five dams surveyed
are shown in Figure 2. The following are
outlines of the results of the surveys of the fivedams. Note that because this paper reports theresults of the preliminary investigation, theinformation and the observed data could becorrected afterwards.

Fig.1 Peak ground acceleration contour map
based on KiK-net and K-NET operated by
NIED (NIED, 2008) [3]
Earthquake in 2008. Here, the term of “Nairiku”
means inland. The magnitude of the event wasestimated as 7.2 in the JMA scale and its
epicenter was located at 39°01.7’N, 140°52.8’E,
about 85 kilometres north of Sendai City andabout 385 kilometres north-northeast of Tokyo.
The depth of the epicenter is estimated at about
8km. The fault is a thrust fault in thecompression in the WNW to ESE direction.
National Research Institute for Earth Scienceand Disaster Prevention (NIED) operates thestrong motion instrumentation networks, K-NETand KiK-net. Strong motions were recorded at
330 and 325 stations respectively. Based on theirdata, a peak ground acceleration contour map
was drawn as shown in Figure 1. The KIK-net
station, IWTH25 almost on the earthquake fault
recorded over 1g of peak acceleration at thelocation of underground level -260m where
S-wave velocity is 1.8km.

4.1 Ishibuchi Dam
Ishibuchi Dam is a concrete faced rockfill dam(CFRD) with a dam height of 53m completed in
1953, and managed by Tohoku Regional Bureau,
MLIT. Figure 3 is the cross section andlongitudinal section of the dam. The upstream
concrete face maintains the watertightness of
dam body of this type of dam. No severe
damage was found in the concrete face and its
joints shown in Photo. 1.

3. SPECIAL SAFETY INSPECTION OFDAMS BY SITE OFFICERS

At the crest of the dam, the pavement was
waved and cracked shown in Photos. 2 and 3.
And gaps appeared on the boundary between the

Immediately after the earthquake, special safety
inspections of dams were made by the site
officers within the river reaches administered87railing and pavement on the shoulder of theslope at the crest. On the downstream slope
surface of the dam, projections were observedon the rock materials at the protruding parts of
the wave on the crest pavement shown in Photos.
4 and 5, but damage of this kind was limited tohigh elevations. This dam was constructed by
the dumped rock construction method as shownin Photo. 6 taken during construction. The piersfor the railroad from where trucks dropped rockmaterials were left buried in the dam body. It ishypothesized that the whole dam body settled
due to the earthquake, while the areas near theburied piers only settled a little. The maximum
differential settlement is supposed to be about
50cm.

Leakage through the upstream concrete face andthe shallow foundation, which is measured at thedownstream slope toe, has increased since theoccurrence of the earthquake. However, its
amount was below the maximum amount which
had ever been observed at the dam and has
performed a stable behavior with a dependence
on the reservoir level. Turbid leakage water was
also observed after the earthquake, but it
returned to normal after a few days.

Photo.1 Concrete faced upstream slope on
which no damage was found (Ishibuchi Dam)
(Photographed by Public Works ResearchInstitute (PWRI) on June 15, 2008)

Photo.2 Overview of the crest anddownstream
slope(Ishibuchi
Dam)(Photographed by PWRI on June 15, 2008)

Photo.3 Cracks and waving of the crest
pavement (Ishibuchi Dam) (Photographed by
PWRI on June 15, 2008)

Photo.4 Gaps between the railing andpavement on the crest (Ishibuchi Dam)
(Photographed by PWRI on June 15, 2008)

A seismometer installed on the top of thedownstream slope (elevation of the crest)
recorded the maximum acceleration of 1,461 gal
in the stream direction and 2,070 gal in thevertical direction, but this record might include

89

Photo.5 Projection of the riprap rocks aroundthe top of the downstream slope (IshibuchiDam) (Photographed by PWRI on June 15,
2008)

Photo.6 Ishibuchi Dam under construction by
the dumped rock method in 1950’s (The piersof tramway were buried.) (Courtesy by
Kitakami River Integrated Dam Management
Office, MLIT)

local shaking of the large size rock on which theseismometer was installed, so further analysis isnecessary.
Based on the results of emergency investigation,
it was decided that no serious problems
threatened the safety of the dam, but carefulmonitoring has been continued and the technicalcommittee has been established to make adetailed survey to prepare for restoration of thedam.
4.2 Aratozawa Dam
Aratozawa Dam is an earth core rockfill dam(ECRD) with a dam height of 74.4m completed
in 1998. It was constructed by Tohoku Regional
Agricultural Administration Office, Ministry ofAgriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) andis managed by Miyagi Prefecture.

Photo.7 Huge landslides around the reservoir of
Aratozawa Dam (Photographed by PWRI on
June 15, 2008)

measured at the upstream slope shoulder of thedam crest. The surveying target was installed on
the rock zone surface. Because the pipe of acrossarm gauge protruded about 40cm shown in
Photo. 8, it is hypothesized that the large
settlement occurred at the core zone in thecenter of the crest rather than at the rock zone.
Regardless of the large settlement, noconspicuous cracks were found on the crest
pavement surface shown in Photo. 9. In addition,
no deformation of the riprap on the upstream

Huge landslides occurred around the reservoir
on the left bank upstream from the dam. The
largest landslide was 1.3km long, 0.8km wide,
and approximately 67 million m3 in volume asshown in Photo. 7 of an aerial photograph.
Approximately 1.5 million m3 of this landslide
soil flowed into the reservoir. This corresponds
to about 10% of the reservoir capacity of 14.13
million m3.
Maximum settlement of about 20cm was90

Photo.8 The pipe of a crossarm gauge
protruded, as a result of the settlement of thedam body (Aratozawa Dam) (Photographedby PWRI on June 16, 2008)

Photo.9 Few cracks in the crest pavement inspite of the dam body settlement (AratozawaDam) (Photographed by PWRI on June 16,2008)

and downstream surfaces was found.
In the inspection gallery beneath the impervious
core zone, a small amount of leakage wasdiscovered through fine cracks in its ceiling andfrom the boundary between the upstream sidewall and invert. And small openings caused by
the earthquake were observed at the joints ofblocks of the gallery.

66.5m completed in 1963. The surface concrete
facing had already been repaired with asphalt
paving for the appropriate watertightness. It wasconstructed by MILT (then Ministry ofConstruction (MOC)) and is managed by Akita
Prefecture.
No cracks were confirmed on the pavement at
the crest. Crest settlement of about maximum
14cm was observed, and at the connection of thespillway and the rockfill dam body, a level
difference of about 15cm formed shown in
Photo. 10. No deformation was confirmed on the
upstream facing and the downstream rock slope
surface.

The measured leakage through the dam bodyand shallow foundation increased immediately
after the earthquake, but it was steadily
declining by the time of our survey on June 16,
2008.
A seismometer installed in the dam foundation
recorded earthquake motion dominant in thehigh frequency domain and maximum
acceleration of about 1g in the stream direction.
At the crest, a maximum acceleration of 525gal
was recorded in the stream direction.

The amount of leakage through the upstream
concrete face and shallow foundation increased
until 210L/min on the day after the earthquake,but after then it decreased with falling thereservoir level.
At the time of the investigation, it was decided
that its condition was not in a state that would
immediately threaten the safety of the dam.

Based on the results of emergency investigation,
it was judged that no serious problems
threatened the safety of the dam at the time of
our investigation. MAFF has established atechnical committee and started a detailed
survey to prepare for restoration of the dam.

4.4 Kamiohsawa Dam
Kamiohsawa Dam is an earthfill dam with adam height of 19m completed in 2003. It wasconstructed and is managed by Miyagi
Prefecture.

4.3 Minase Dam
Minase Dam is a CFRD with a dam height of91

which must not fail. This earthquake caused themost severe damage to dams of any earthquake
which has occurred in Japan in recent years. In
the seismic acceleration observed at the dams,
although the high frequency range was dominant,the maximum acceleration level was the highest
ever recorded. Based on these facts, in the future,
we plan to perform detailed surveys of the effectof this earthquake to dams and reflect thefindings in development of future seismic
research and technology for dams.

earthquake to a maximum of 194.4L/min. after
the earthquake, but at the time of our survey onJune 16, 2008, it was gradually decreasing. The
turbidity of the leakage rose after the earthquake,
but was tending to decline by the time of oursurvey.
It was judged that there were no conditions
which could threaten the safety of the dam.
5. CONCLUSIONS

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake of 2008
did not cause any damage to dams which weresevere enough to possibly threaten their safety.
This verifies the high level of seismic resistanceof the dams.

This survey was conducted with the generous
cooperation of River Bureau and Tohoku
Regional Bureau of MLIT, and Miyagi
Prefecture and Akita Prefecture. The authors are
deeply grateful to members of theseorganizations for their kind assistance.

Based on the results of the emergency
inspections of the dams by the site officers
immediately after the earthquake, dam
engineering experts carried out site investigation
at the five dams where damage had been found.
According to the preliminary investigation, no
problems severe enough to threaten the
structural safety of any of the five dams were
found. At present, repair works for damaged
dams have already been started or finished basedon the results of detailed inspections andsurveys.

7. REFERENCES
1. Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Government of Japan (2008): The
Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake in 2008,
72nd edition, http://www.fdma.go.jp/detail/8
11.html (in Japanese)
2. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2008):
About the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake
in 2008, http://www.bousai.go.jp/kinkyu/iwat
e/2008-iwate-cao-027.pdf (in Japanese)
3. National Research Institute for Earth Scienceand Disaster Prevention (NIED) (2008):
Strong Motions due to the Iwate-Miyagi
Nairiku Earthquake in 2008, http://www.hinet.bosai.go.jp/topics/iwate-miyagi080614/ (inJapanese)

In Japan, dam sites are selected after a detailed
geological survey. The dams are designed by
performing careful structural analyses based on
the design criteria, and are constructed understrict management with high quality materials.
These careful survey, design and construction
efforts help to ensure the safety of the dams.
However, dams are large, important structures

93

THEME 3
Wind Engineering

Experimental Studies on Internal Pressure and Debris Strike for Improved Tornado Induced Loads
of Low-Rise BuildingsbyPartha P Sarkar1 and Hitomitsu Kikitsu2
pressures were measured to evaluate the loads
on a low-rise cubic building. The importance ofinternal pressure inside a building in modifying
the resultant uplift force on the roof of thebuilding was recognized in this study but not
explored because of some limitations in themodel. It is known that the internal pressure
inside a building is a function of air leakages
through the building envelope because of
intrinsic porosity that is present in the envelope
and any dominant opening that could betriggered by a puncture in the envelope bywind-borne debris. This paper studies the role ofinternal pressure in producing the resultant windloads in a tornado-like vortex as a function ofporosity and dominant opening in a building
envelope and attempts to find the strike
probabilities of wind-borne debris that could
create these dominant openings as a function of
their relative location to the building. This work
will improve the predictions of wind loads on
low-rise buildings in a tornado and contribute toa probability-based design framework.

ABSTRACTThis paper presents the results of experimental
studies on transient wind loads on a low-risebuilding induced by a tornado. The ISU Tornado
Simulator at Iowa State University was used forthese experiments. The internal pressure and riskof wind-borne debris strike was considered for
improved prediction of these dynamic windloads. It is shown that the magnitude of internalpressure determines the total wind uplift force
on the roof and that its characteristics depend on
the extent of natural leakage in the building
walls as well as location of dominant openings
on any of these walls. Further, the laboratory
experiments show that the risk of wind-borne
debris strike in a tornado increases withdecreasing
distance
betweenpotential
wind-borne debris and target building and thecharacteristic of this risk depends on whether the
potential debris is located within or outside theregion defined by a distance of one tornado-coreradius from the target building.

2.0
ISU
TORNADOPARAMETERS USEDKEYWORDS: Tornado, Tornado simulator,
Wind loads, Internal-pressure, Wind-borne
debrisSIMULATOR

Laboratory experiments in this study werecarried out using the ISU tornado simulator at
Iowa State University (ISU). Figure 1 illustrates
the concept of the simulator with a schematic
diagram. The details of this facility are given in
Haan, et al. (2008). In these experiments, thetranslation speed of the tornado was fixed at
0.15m/s. The other tornado simulator parameterssuch as fan speed, vane angle and floor height
were the same as those of “Vane 5” test case in
the study by Haan, et al. (2008). A tornado-likevortex with a swirl ratio of 1.14 and radius of thetornado core of 0.53 m, where the maximum
tangential velocity (= 9.7 m/s in this case)occurs, was obtained by fixing these parameters.

1.0 INTRODUCTION
Tornadoes produce rotating winds with updraft
and downdraft and radial flows that intensify
significantly near the ground. In most commonlyoccurring tornadoes that are EF-2 or of lessintensity on the newly implemented Enhanced
Fujita Scale, winds could reach 60 m/s (135 mph,3-sec gust) near the ground. As a result of
passage of a tornado directly over a building,transient loads are produced that peaks when thecenter of the tornado is within one core radius,
where maximum tangential wind speed occurs,from the center of the building (Sengupta et al.,2008). In this study, only external surface97

3.0 EVALUATION OF
CHARACTERISTICS

WIND

the porosity that naturally occurs in the building
material.

FORCE

3.1 Pressure Model Details

3.2 Wind Pressure Measurement

Tornado-induced surface pressures were
measured on a low-rise building model with
152.4mm by 97.5mm (6.0in. by 3.8in.) in plan
dimensions and an eave height of 48.8mm(1.92in.). The shallow roof angle of the model
was 1/12 (4.76ο) with the roof ridge parallel tothe longer dimension. The configuration of thismodel is the same as that used in the study by
Oh et al. (2007). The model was made out of
plexiglass and contained 20 pressure taps on theroof surface and 16 pressure taps on the four
walls to measure the external pressure
distribution and a single pressure tap to measure
the internal pressure.

High speed electronic pressure scanner(Scanivalve ZOC33/64Px) was used to measure
the pressure distribution on the building model.
Data were sampled for 24 seconds at the rate of
500Hz (12,000 data points). The initiation ofdata acquisition and the crane movement weresynchronized using a common external trigger.
The overall forces acting on the model were
estimated by integrating the surface pressures.
Wind pressure coefficients, as shown in the next
section, were normalized using the respective
maximum tangential velocity, Vθmax, and thenensemble averaged over 10 identical data runs.
3.3 Results of Wind Pressure Experiments

The geometric and velocity scale ratios were
1/250 ( λL ) and 1/10 ( λVel ), respectively. Theinternal volume of the model was scaled also tomaintain similarity of the dynamic response of
the volume at model scale to that in full scale.
The internal volume scale (λVol), as defined
below, was calculated as follows:λVol =

λL 3
1
=
2
156
,250
λVel

3.3.1 Characteristics of wind force on the roof
(z-direction)
Figures 3 and 4 show the results of wind force
coefficients in z direction as obtained from thepressure coefficients. Horizontal axis is the
distance between the center of the tornado
vortex and the center of the building model, x,
normalized by the diameter of the tornado core,D.

(1)(1) Experimental cases where there are only
leakages on walls (see Figure 3)

In order to achieve this scale, a sealed volume
chamber was installed at the bottom of themodel so that its internal volume was increased
proportionately based on the scaling law above.

Absolute value of external wind pressure
coefficient, Cpe, increased as the simulator
approached the model. It became maximum
when x/D was ≈ ±0.5 and minimum when x/D
was zero. In contrast, absolute value of internal
wind pressure (suction) coefficient, Cpi, became
maximum when x/D was zero where themaximum value increased with the opening ratio(r) of leakage which resulted in the maximum
value of wind force coefficient, CFz, at x/D of ≈±0.5; these values were around 2.6 in the case of
r=0.04% and around 1.8 in the case of r =0.13%.

Dominant openings and leakage through thebuilding envelope were taken into consideration
to evaluate the characteristics of internalpressure during the passage of a tornado with thebuilding placed along the centerline of thetornado path. The building was oriented with its
shorter wall normal to the translation directionof the tornado. Table 1 shows the geometry andopening ratio of dominant openings and leakage,where the opening ratio (r) is defined as the areaof the opening to the total surface area of thebuilding walls. Leakage in a real building will be
distributed uniformly on the building envelope,comprising of walls and roof, and is a result of(2) Experimental cases where there are leakages(r=0.13%) on walls and a dominant opening on

98

one wall (see Figure 4)(2008), where internal pressures were notconsidered, proving that internal pressure does
not influence the overall loads on the walls that
occur because of leakage.

In the experimental cases where there were not
only distributed leakages but also a dominant
opening on one wall, it was found thatcharacteristics of the wind force on the roof
depend on the location of the dominant opening.
First, for the cases of dominant opening on wall
#1 or #4, the value of CFz became maximum
when x/D was ≈0.5, since the absolute value of
Cpi was bigger when x/D was negative. In
contrast, for the cases of dominant opening onwall #2 or #3 the characteristics of CFz showed
different tendency from those above and it
became maximum when x/D was ≈ −0.5. Theinternal pressure helped to reduce the peak uplift
force on the roof significantly with a dominant
opening present on wall # 1 or # 3 but not somuch when the opening was on wall # 2 or # 4.
The rotating wind enters the building throughthe opening on walls # 2 or # 4 and induces apositive internal pressure that reduces themagnitude of the internal pressure (suction)
inside the building as induced by the staticpressure drop inside the tornado core.

4.0 PROBABILITYDEBRIS STRIKE

OF

WIND-BORNE

4.1 Experimental Setup
The low-rise building model and its orientation
with respect to the tornado’s translation axis, as
used for the experiments discussed in thissection of the paper, are the same as those ofexperiments discussed earlier in Section 3.1.
Models of most commonly occurringwind-borne debris, i.e. 2 x 4 timber components,
were made out of thick paper. Mass andreference area of the debris model were chosen
to match those of the full scale based on
Tachikawa number, K, as defined here:K=ρ aV 2 A
2 Mg(2)where ρa is air density, V is tornado windvelocity, A is reference area, M is mass, and g isacceleration due to gravity, respectively, where
velocity scale was calculated as 1/7. Table 2
shows the values of V, A, and M used here.

The value of CFz in each case discussed above
was zero, when the center of vortex reached thecenter of model. The value of Cpi in each case
had high correlation with the value of Cpe of the
tap that was nearest to the dominant opening.

4.2 Method for Evaluation of the Strike Risk

3.3.2 Characteristics of wind force on the wall
(x- and y-direction)

For the case where the tornado approaches thebuilding along its centerline, the probability ofwind-borne debris striking the building walls
was estimated in the following way. Figure 6
shows the number of each wall and location ofpotential wind-borne debris in normalized
coordinates (x*, y*) as normalized by the radiusof the vortex core, R .

Figure 5 shows the results of wind force
coefficients in both x and y directions for thecase where there are only distributed leakages(r=0.13%). As the tornado moves from thenegative to the positive x direction, the value of
CFx shows that the model was pulled first in thenegative direction and then in the positive
direction. The value of CFy follows the pattern of
the tangential velocity component of the vortex.
The tangential velocity exerted a positive CFy as
the vortex first encountered the model, and thenthe value changed sign as the opposite side of
the core passed over the model. The maximumof both CFx and CFy occurred very close to x/D =±0.5 (i.e. at the radius of the vortex). This result
is similar to those reported in Sengupta et al.

Two hundred debris models were put at eachlocation of potential wind-borne debris and thenforced to scatter through the passage of thetornado simulator. By counting the number ofthe debris models which entered the modelthrough the opening on the target wall (#k), theprobability (pk) of wind-borne debris striking
the target wall #k were generated for each99

location (x*, y*) = (i, j), as follows:npk (i, j ) = k(k = 1,L,4)
n0
=

t
1 ⎡
⎤
⋅ N k (i, j ) + α ⋅ S k (i, j )⎥
n0 ⎢⎣
3
⎦

which is located on the other side of this region.
Probabilities of debris strike based on Equation(4) are summarized in Figure 9. With respect tothe potential debris locations in the region of x*<-1, all the probabilities shows a trend of inverse
proportionality to the value of x* raised to somepower (1/x*n). The power exponent (n) of x* wascalculated as 0.51 for y* = 0, and 0.30 for y*=±1.
In contrast, in the region of -1≤ x*≤ 0,probabilities for different y* follows different
trend from one another. While the value for y* =-1 is constant, approximately 0.45, the value for
y*=1 had a gap at x* = -1, which is seen in Figure8(b). Further, the probability for y* = 0, thevalue for -1 < x*< 0 can be estimated byinterpolating values between x*= -1 and 0.

(3)

where n0=200, N k and Sk are mean and standard
deviation of the sample number of debris models
entering through the target opening in three trials,
and tα is 4.3 as listed in the Table of T
distribution. Based on Equation (3) and theassumption that the strike of wind-borne debris
on each wall are mutually independent,
probability of wind-borne debris striking thebuilding as a function of its location (x*, y*) = (i,j), P, can be obtained by the following equation:
4

P (i, j ) = ∑ pk (i, j )According to the results as discussed above, it isconcluded that the characteristics of the risk ofwind-borne debris strike on a building depends
on whether or not the potential debris are locatedwithin a distance equivalent to the radius of
tornado core from the center of the target
building.

(4)

k =1

4.3 Results of Experiment and Risk Evaluation
Figure 7 shows a snap shot of debris models
flying around the building model and Figure 8
shows the probability of strike by wind-borne
debris on each wall, pk. The dark-gray filled
circles in Figure 8 indicate the locations where
the highest five probabilities were obtained.

5.0 CONCLUSION
This paper summarizes the results ofexperimental studies related to wind hazards to
low-rise buildings posed by tornadoes. The ISU
tornado simulator at Iowa State University wasused for these experiments. With respect to theresults of wind pressure experiments, it wasobserved that the magnitude of internal pressure
determines the total wind uplift force affecting
the roof and that its characteristics depend on themagnitude of the distributed leakage andlocation of a dominant opening on the wall.
Further, with respect to assessing risk ofwind-borne debris strike, the experimental
results show that the probability generally
increases with decreasing distance between
potential wind-borne debris and target building
and the characteristics of the probability depends
on whether the location of the potential debris iswithin or outside the region defined by one core
radial distance of the tornado from the building
center.

Compared with the probability of strike on wall
#2 or #4, probability corresponding to wall #1
was very small. This is because the direction oftangential wind velocity at y*=0 is not
perpendicular but parallel to that of wall #1.
Strike probability corresponding to wall #3 was
the same as that of wall #1. Strike probability
corresponding to wall #2 or #4 increased withdecrease in distance between potential locationof debris generation and target building model.
Moreover, while distribution of probabilities ofstrike on wall #4 was symmetric with respect tox* axis, strike probabilities corresponding to wall
#2 was not symmetric in the region of -1 < x*. It
is noted that probability was quite small in theregion, defined by the dotted line -1 < x* and 0 <y*, because as the tornado simulator passes overthe building model the debris models within thedotted region are picked up and thrown awayfrom the model instead of striking wall # 2

100

6.0 REFERENCES
Haan, F.L., Sarkar, P.P. and Gallus, W.A. (2008).
"Design, Construction and Performance of a
Large Tornado Simulator for Wind Engineering
Applications." Engineering Structures, Vol. 30(4), 1146-1159.
Oh, J.H., Kopp, G.A. and Inculet, D.R. (2007).
"The UWO Contribution to the NIST
Aerodynamic Database for Wind Load on Low
Buildings: Part 3. Internal pressures." Journal ofWind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics,
Vol. 95, 755-779.
Sengupta, A., Haan, F.L., Sarkar, P.P. andBalaramudu, V. (2008). "Transient Loads on
Buildings in Microburst and Tornado Winds.”
Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial
Aerodynamics, Vol. 96 (10-11), 2173-2187.
Tachikawa, M. (1983). "Trajectories of Flat
Plates in Uniform Flow with Application toWind-Generated Missiles." Journal of Wind
Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics,
Vol.14, 443-453.

101

Table 1: Geometry and ratio of dominant openings and leakage
Description of opening

Dimension(model scale)Openingratio, r

Two holes~0.04%
oneach d=1.0mm
Distributed wall #1, 3
leakage
Four holes~0.13%
oneach d=1.8mm
wall #2, 4
20.8mm x 7.6mm(wall #1, 3)
3.3%
Dominant opening
32.5mm x 7.6mm(wall #2, 4)

Table 2: Parameters related to V, A, and M
Full scale (f)Model scale (m)

V

68m/s

9.7m/sA

53cm x 10cm

3cm x 1.7cm

Mg

910g

0.2g

102

Figure 7: Debris models flying around building model

107

Damage to Buildings by EF5 Tornado in Iowa, U.S. on May 25, 2008
byHitomitsu Kikitsu1 and Partha P Sarkar2
major damage and 162 had minor damage.
There were eight casualties, six at Parkersburg
and two at New Hartford. These casualties
contributed to the rising national death toll fromtornadoes in 2008 (111 to date) which has
already proven to be the worst year in a decadein terms of number of tornado occurrences (605
total to date).
1)
Of the 1,691 tornado occurrences in 2008 ,207 or ~12% of the total were rated EF2 orhigher - 148 EF2, 49 EF3, 9 EF4 and 1 EF5. The
Parkersburg-New Hartford tornado is the only
EF5 tornado to occur in the US this year and theonly EF5 tornado to occur in Iowa in last 32
years; the last F5 tornado occurred in the Boone
and Story counties of Iowa in 1976 in which 88
houses were destroyed but there were no serious
injuries.
The co-authors of this paper carried out afield survey of the damaged area and buildingson May 26-27 and May 30 at Parkersburg and
New Hartford. Assistance during the fieldsurvey from the office of National Weather
Service at Johnston, Iowa is acknowledged.

ABSTRACT
A major tornado struck the towns ofParkersburg and New Hartford, located in thenorth-central region of Iowa in United States, on
May 25, 2008. This is the only EF5 tornado tooccur in 2008. This paper summarizes the extent
of the structural damage to buildings induced bythis tornado. Results of field survey show theregion where there were lots of seriously
damaged buildings and typical modes of damageof these residential, public and commercial
buildings. Further, based on the post disastersurvey, rates of progress in recovery andreplacement of damaged houses are shown.
KEYWORDS: Tornado,
Enhanced Fujita Scale

DamageSurvey,1. INTRODUCTION
A major tornado struck the towns ofParkersburg and New Hartford, located in thenorth-central region of Iowa in United States, on
May 25, 2008 (Sunday) around 5 pm (CST).
These towns are located slightly north of
highway US-20 and east of Interstate I-35.
Parkersburg, a town of 1,900, is about 80 miles
northeast of Des Moines, the capital of Iowa.
The counties that were affected by this natural
disaster were Black Hawk, Buchanan, Butler
and Delaware. The tornado touched down at
4:48 pm (CST) two miles south of Aplington
near the Butler-Grundy county line, and moved
43 miles to the east until it lifted off at 5:58 pm(CST). The 43-mile damage path was 0.5 mile
(800 m) wide near Parkersburg, ¼-mile wide
east of New Hartford and 1.2 miles wide northof Dunkerton before the tornado dissipated.
As per the clarification on damage assessment
by Iowa Homeland Security and FEMA releasedon May 30, 621 houses were estimated to bedamaged of which 394 were destroyed, 65 had

2. TORNADO INTENSITY AND RELATEDDAMAGE
Information on the tornado intensity andrelated damage as it appeared in the press
2)
releases of State of Iowa , the local newspapers
3)(e.g. the Des Moines Register ), and US
National Weather Service is summarized below.
The US National Weather Service has rated
this tornado as EF5 on the newly adopted
Enhanced Fujita Damage Scale or EF-Scale withan estimated wind speed of 205 mph (92 m/s).
Although EF5 is the highest rating on the
1 Senior Researcher, National Institute for Land andInfrastructureManagement,
MLIT,
Tsukuba-shi,
Ibaraki-ken 305-0804 JAPAN2 Professor, Iowa State University, IA, USA

110

Photo 4 View of collapsed wall
Photo 1 Collapse of wall of classroom

Photo 5 Failure of structural elements reinforced
with bars

Photo 2 Collapse of wall and roof of classroom(2) Bank Buildings
Damage to Bank A and Bank B buildings isshown in Photos 6, 7, and Photo 8, respectively.
These were regular timber constructions with abrick veneer. The structural damage to Bank A
building such as collapse of a wall resulted inmuch more devastation than that of Bank B
building. It is surprising to note that although
Bank A building, in spite of its location rightalong the tornado path, was the only buildingthat stood and was not completely demolished.
It should be noted that this was a newer
construction.

Photo 3 Collapse of wall and roof113

structure with metal cladding and steel frame.
This building was not in the direct tornado pathand is located close to the water tank on thesouthern side of the tornado path.

Photo 6 View of damage from the south (BankA)

Photo 9 West side of fire-station

Photo 7 View of south west corner showing
collapse of a portion of south wall (Bank A)
Photo 10 North side of fire-station(4) Industrial Building
An industrial steel framed building with gable
roof and a large roof span took the first hit fromthe tornado as it was located at thesouth-western corner of the town where thetornado first approached Parkersburg. The entire
building was destroyed and only the concreteslab remained. The twisted steel frame andcorrugated sheet metal are seen in Photo 11 andfailed steel components and sheared welded
joints are seen in Photo 12. All the columns of
the building were sheared from their base.

Photo 8 Damage to roof canopy (Bank B)(3) Fire Station
Damage to a fire station is shown in Photos 9– 10 below. The fire station sustained minor
damage but all seven out of its eight overhead
shutters on the western side were completely
lost (Photo 9). This is a typical metal building114

cover, shutter and wall of all the threewarehouses in plan view. This shows marked
contrast of damage states between east and west
sides in each warehouse: there are severe
damage to roofing systems and not so muchdamage to shutters in east side of eachwarehouse, while there are severe damage toshutters in west side of each one. Moreover,with respect to damage to shutters, almost all thedamaged shutters in east sides were pulled
outward as shown in Photo 14, while all thedamaged ones in west side were pushed inward.
Damage to a vehicle garage is shown in
Photos 16 – 17. The roof cover on the west sideof the vehicle garage is lost. This building has agable roof with its ridge oriented along theeast-west direction. It is observed in Photo 16
that the damage to the roof and its gable end
occurred at the west end which was the leadingedge of the rotating flow. The overhead shuttersthat were on the north side performed very well,
as seen in the photo. Photo 17 shows flying
debris impact on the west wall.

Photo 11 Destroyed structural elements

Photo 12 Failed steel component(5) Warehouses and Garage Building
There were three warehouses (A, B and C) on
Figure 1. Each of three warehouses has
individual compartment rooms attached withshutters, which are arranged in line in both east
and west sides. Damage to Warehouse A isshown in Photos 13 – 15. This one is located on
the eastern-most end of the three warehouses
that were built side by side and is the largest
amongst the three warehouses. The end-mostroof truss of this warehouse on the north side
(Photo 15) and most of the roof on the east side
are lost (Photo 13).
This warehouse sustained much more damage
to its roof and shutters compared to the garage.
This could be because it was closer to the pathof the tornado than the garage. It is evident thata few of the shutters in the warehouse were
pulled outward that is consistent with theloading produced by suction in the tornado
vortex (Photo 14).
Figure 3 shows distribution of damage to roof

Photo 13 Damaged shutters and roof frames

Photo 14 Pulled-out shutters

115

Photo 19 Severe buckling of the cylindricalshellsPhoto 17 Flying debris impact on the west wall(6) Grain Bins and Tanks
Damage to grain bins and tanks is shown
below. This grain bin complex is locatedapproximately two miles east of the mostdamaged area of Parkersburg along the tornado
path. All the grain bin structures lost its
dome-shaped roof (Photo 18). Severe bucklingof the cylindrical shell (Photo 19) andoverturning of the smaller tanks (Photo 20)
could be observed. The bucking of the shell
usually occurred in the top third or in the upper
half portion of the structure. It was unclear
whether these grain bins or tanks were empty or
full or partially full.

Photo 20 Overturning of smaller tanks
3.3 Damage to Residential Buildings
Severe damage was observed in residentialbuildings not only to non-structural elements
such as roofing material and cladding but also to
the structural elements. These buildings are
typically timber houses. Damage to structuralelements can be categorized under several
modes as follows:z Partial or complete loss of roofing systemz Partial loss or collapse of wallsz Lateral shifting of entire house fromfoundationz Partial loss or collapse of the entire housewith basement exposed
Examples of these damage modes, as observedin this tornado damage survey, are given below.

Photo 18 Loss of dome-shaped roof117Photo 25 Collapse of walls

Photo 27 Lateral shifting of entire house

Photo 26 Intact small room

Photo 28 Collapse of continuous footing(3) Lateral shifting of entire house fromfoundation
The entire house in Photo 27 is seen shifted
off to the west direction. Another view of thishouse is shown in Photo 28. Entire house in
Photo 29 is observed to be shifted in the east
direction. This is consistent with thecounterclockwise rotational direction of thewind where winds to the south of the path are in
the east direction causing damage to buildings in
Photo 29 and winds to the north of the path arein the west direction causing damage to buildingin Photo 27.

Photo 29 Lateral shifting of entire house(4) Partial loss or collapse of the entire housewith basement exposed
Loss of entire house can be categorized into
two damage modes ⎯ one where the floor slab
remains on the foundation (Photo 30) and theother where the floor slab is swept clean (Photo
31).

119

Photo 33 Scattered timber components
Photo 30 Loss of entire house
4. COMMENTS
DISASTERRELATED

TO

THE

Based on the press releases by State of Iowa
and the news in the local newspaper (e.g. theDes Moines Register), comments related to thedisaster are summarized as follows. CNN news
related to this disaster is also shown in Photo 34.
z Gov. Chet Culver declared Butler, Buchanan,and Black Hawk counties on May 25 andDelaware County on May 26 to be statedisaster areas, respectively. President Bushdeclared Butler County a federal disasterarea on May 27, which will help bringfederal assistance to residents of theParkersburg area. He also declared
Buchanan, Black Hawk, and Delaware
counties federal disaster area on May 30.
z Casualties in this disaster contribute to therising national death toll by tornadoes thisyear and this year is the worst in a decade.
z The weather service issued a tornado
warning that specifically mentioned
Parkersburg at 4:46pm. The Butler County
sheriff’s office said sirens wailed in the
town for at least five minutes before thetornado struck at about 4.53 pm. In
Parkersburg, an additional siren was
installed a few days before the storm. Thisaction reduced the number of fatalities.
z In New Hartford, the siren began 15 minutes
before the tornado, but lasted only a few
minutes before power was knocked out.
Firefighters drove through the streets, using
their truck sirens to alert residents.
z Wisconsin residents have been finding

Photo 31 Loss of entire house and swept-clean
floor slab
Moreover, in partially damaged houses,
impact of flying debris on walls or glasses could
be seen in Photo 32. Most of the debris is timber
structural component from failed homes (Photo
33).

Photo 32 Damage of wall by wind-borne debris
impact120

These figures show that the recovery ofdamaged houses did not occur in the firstmonth since the disaster struck, and that new
construction has not started since two months
after the disaster struck. At the elapsed time offour months, new construction of approximately
half of the seriously damaged houses has been inprogress, but construction of just only 10% of
those has been completed.
This post disaster survey also revealed thatnew construction method in all the seriously
damaged houses chose continuous footing madefrom reinforced concrete as shown in Photo 35,
because continuous footing that were damageand exposed, as shown in Photo 28, showed
inadequate reinforcement.

debris from a tornado more than 100 miles
away in Iowa. Most of them are lightweightmaterials such as photographs, personal
papers and check stubs.

Photo 34 CNN News (Evening, May 25)
5. POST DISASTER SURVEY
The author carried out post disaster survey toobtain the status of residents’ activities related to
the recovery from the disaster. This survey was
carried out on June 17, July 18, August 24, andSeptember 19, approximately every one monthafter May 25.
Progress in recovery of houses damaged by
the tornado is shown in Figure 4. Figure 5
shows the recovery progress of houses whichsuffered serious damage. Vertical axis in thisfigure indicates the ratio of recovery orcompletion, calculated as follows:
N rec (DOD ≥ 5, t )N (DOD ≥ 5)
N (DOD ≥ 5, t )Rcom (t ) = com
N (DOD ≥ 5)
R rec (t ) =

(1)
(2)

where Rrec(t): ratio of recovery, Rcom(t): ratio ofcompletion, t: elapsed time from the date ofdisaster, N (DOD ≥ 5) : number of damaged
houses with DOD of five or more,
N rec (DOD ≥ 5, t ) : number of damaged houses
with DOD of five or more whose recovery has
been already in progress at t, N com (DOD ≥ 5, t ) :number of damaged houses with DOD of five or
more which has been replaced by new
construction at t, respectively.

1214) http://www.wind.ttu.edu/EFScale.pdf
5) Damage Survey Report on Saroma, Japan,
Tornado of 2006 (in Japanese),
http://www.kenken.go.jp/japanese/contents/
activities/other/disaster/kaze/2006saroma/2006saroma.pdf

123provide a robust estimate of surge damage
potential.

2. IKEAs numerical modeling of tropical cyclones
progresses, it is important to validate model
forecasts objectively based on observations. It isalso important that critical natural hazard
information be based on an objective assessmentof the available observations. The recent
development of air-, space-, land-, and sea-based
measurement systems now provide sufficient
observations to depict the horizontal distributionof tropical cyclone wind fields in the Western
Atlantic and Caribbean basin. The Integrated
Kinetic Energy (IKE) takes into account thedestructive potential of the wind field. IKE iscomputed from the surface wind field byintegrating the kinetic energy per unit volume(V) over the storm domain (or the contribution
over specific wind speed (ws) thresholds) for a 1
m thick air layer of unit density centered at the
10 m level.

IKE = ∫1
ρws 2 dV2

3. H*Wind GRIDS and IKE
Measurement of IKE in a hurricane requires
sufficient observations for an analysis of the windfield. The NOAA Hurricane Research Division
Hurricane Wind Analysis System (16,17)(H*Wind) provides an objective analysis of allavailable observations and since 1999, these havebeen available in a gridded format to facilitate
research and experimental use in storm surge andwave models, as well as for validation of
remotely sensed winds and numerical weather
prediction models. Analyses are conducted on an
experimental basis when a tropical cyclone ismonitored by reconnaissance aircraft.
Uncertainty of the analysis maximum sustained
wind speed depends on data coverage and thequality of the individual platforms contributing to
the peak wind measurement, but is estimated at
10% when the peak wind is sampled at thesurface (8), or 20% if the peak wind is estimatedby a simple flight level reduction factor (6).
Outside the eyewall where radial gradients are
weaker, more plentiful in-situ observations areavailable and wind uncertainty is probably closer
to 10%. While estimates of the maximum
sustained wind in a landfalling hurricane can varyby agency, the IKE depends on the spatial
characteristics of the tropical cyclone and is notvery sensitive to changes in the maximum wind.

(1)

Kinetic energy scales with wind loads on
structures (14) since it correlates with the windpressure acting on a vertical structure. However,weighting of IKE is generally necessary forassessing wind damage potential because
damage to most of the built environment at riskincreases almost exponentially with increased
wind speed once damage is initiated. Waves andstorm surge are generated by shear stress of thewind on the ocean surface, which also scaleswith IKE. While the initial dependence of sea
surface drag coefficient is linear with windspeed, supporting a cubic dependence for stress,
recent analysis of wind profiles in hurricanes(15) find that the drag coefficient levels off orslightly decreases at winds above 33 m/s,
suggesting a continued dependence on thesquare of the wind speed. It is clear from recent
storms such as Opal, Ivan, Katrina and Rita thatthe potential for storm surge is correlated withthe size and intensity of the storm in the hours
and days before landfall as well as the actual
wind field characteristics during landfall.
Consequently, the history of IKE components in
the hours and days before landfall are likely to

In order to better differentiate between intense
but small tropical cyclones such as Camille andAndrew and broader but less intense storms suchas Hugo and Katrina it is necessary to further
refine the IKE analysis. Analysis options were
explored by evaluating several threshold windspeed values for a selection of 22 hurricanes
comprising large and small wind fields in the
H*Wind archive 4 over an 8 degree latitude
domain. A wind speed of 10 m/s was selected forthe low end (IKE>10), with additional thresholds
chosen to relate to storm surge and wave damage(VMS > 18 m s-1, the highest one-minute averagewind at an elevation of 10m: tropical storm
4125

www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/data2.html

forcing rather than some peak value that canmisrepresent the severity of the event.

force IKETS, > 33 m/s: IKEH), light (25-40 m/s,
IKE25-40) and moderate (41-55 m/s, IKE41-55)
wind damage and severe building envelope winddamage (IKE>55) for winds > 55 m/s. After
experimenting during the 2006 and 2007
hurricane seasons, the IKETS was the most
relevant quantity for assessing Surge and Wave
Damage Potential (SDP) and continuous
multiplier approach was formulated for Wind
Damage Potential (WDP).

5. WIND DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL
From a direct wind damage perspective, it isimportant to develop a meaningful way to relate
the IKE values to damage experience. The
response of residential structures to wind is ahighly non-linear process, as evidenced byresidential insurance losses (17) (by zip code)
compared to H*Wind analyses of open terrain
wind speeds in Hurricanes Andrew, Hugo, andOpal (Fig. 2). The kinetic energy per unit volume(KEV in Joules) for a wind field analysis grid cell
was related to the co-located damage data (Fig.
3). A multiplier was fit based on a reference
value corresponding to the kinetic energy per unit
volume associated with the initiation of light
structural damage in winds of ~ 25 m s-1 (Fig. 4).

4. SURGE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL
Based on the largest and most intense hurricanes
observed since 2000, a continuous spline fit
relationship was assigned between IKETS andSDP (Fig. 1) based on the familiar 0-5 range of
the SS scale.
Ultimately the damage scale should be based on
an objective measure of damage realized but
such depends on the infrastructure andpopulation of an affected area and the difficultyof attributing damage to wind, wave or surge.
The SDP is an objective measure of the forcing
available from the wind field. Based on simple
scaled storm surge modeling results (private
communication, Jennifer Irish, Texas A&M) the
SDP has a strong relationship to the extent ofcoastal inundation greater than 1 m, but a poor
relationship to peak surge. Given thatbathymetric and coastline orientation details are
missing from SDP, the relationship to
inundation is useful for emergency management
and storm preparedness applications. The
strength of the SDP scale is that it provides anobjective means to compare a current storm tohistorical storms in the same area based on alevel playing field. When decisions need tomade regarding evacuation and warnings 1-2days before expected landfall, forecast
uncertainty is such that the precise landfall
location (and associated local bottom slope andcoastline shape factors that ultimately affectsurge) is unknown. Although peak surge isimportant, it usually covers a very small area so
the extent of inundation levels known to threaten
safety or encumber evacuation take on an
increased importance. Its practical to base thedamage potential rating on an integrated wind

MG = 3.45 ( 49.785 * [ 1+ TanH (0.002469 * (KEV - 1602.94 ) ) ] )The weighted IKE for a tropical cyclone (IKEWT) is found by summing each grid cell’s product of
MG * KEV, for all grid cells with winds in excess
of 25 m s-1.
Since the concept of a damage scale with a 1-5
range is familiar to the public, we evaluated IKE
threshold contributions and assigned a 1-5 rating
scale. For wind damage, categories 4-5 are basedon a prerequisite of winds > 55 m s-1.
The Wind Damage Potential (WDP) is definedas:WDP>4: VMS >= 55.0 m s-1
WDP>4 = 3.974 -0.0002 IKEWT + 0.0373(IKEWT) 5 + 0.085 Log10 (IKEWT)
where IKEWT is in TJ.
WDP<4: VMS > 55.0 m s-1
WDP<4 = .8828 + 0.0183 (IKEWT) 5 + 0.802
Log10 (IKEWT)

126

6. HURRICANES KATRINA AND IKE

hurricane), the scale could also be applied to nontropical storms. IKETS may be compared toobjective measures of earthquake Seismic
Moment Magnitude (SMM) (18,19), whichconveys earthquake size in terms of radiatedenergy. A SSM 7.0 earthquake corresponds to anenergy release of 2000 TJ. However, unlike
SMM, with 103 increases in energy between two
integer gradations, the entire range in IKETS
between a selection of the smallest and largest
hurricanes in the H*Wind archive is on the orderof 200 TJ. Considering that we are focusing here
on a 1 m thick layer of air near the surface, the
IKETS values would increase by a factor of ~ 103104 if we integrated to the top of the tropical
cyclone, which would approach the energy
release of severe earthquakes 6 .
The influenceof bathymetry, coastline shape, surface
topography, and roughness could be used as
modifiers for the surge estimation, much thesame as soil modification factors are used toestimate site specific ground motions. A
limitation of IKE as a damage potential indicator
include the inability to account for localized areas
susceptible to storm surge and waves due tocoastline shape and bathymetry. During the 2009
Hurricane Season we will continue to issue windfield analysis research products containing IKETS,
IKEH, SDP, and WDP as shown in Fig. 5c.
With future advances in satellite and airborne
monitoring of ocean surface wind vectors, we
envision that all tropical cyclone basins will
eventually contain sufficient observations for
global assessments of tropical cyclone intensity
by IKE, and more meaningful measures of basinwide tropical cyclone destructiveness from one
season to the next.

As an example, consider two stages of Hurricane
Katrina's wind field as depicted in post-storm
analysis of all available observations during two~ 6 h periods on 28 and 29 August, 2005. Whenconsidered to be a SS Category (Cat) Five (Fig.
5a) the day before landfall, Katrina's wind fieldcontained maximum winds estimated at 71 m/s
with an IKE of 117 TJ over an 8 degree domain.
At landfall in Southern Louisiana andMississippi, Katrina had weakened to Cat 3
status (52 m/s) but the wind field had expanded(Fig. 5b) with an IKE of 112 TJ. Therefore,
based on the IKE, Katrina at landfall was ofsimilar destructive capacity to when it was an SS
Cat 5 in the central Gulf of Mexico, and about
twice as destructive as the prior standard ofdestruction for the Gulf of Mexico coast (SS Cat
5 Hurricane Camille of 1969 with max winds
near 67 m s-1 and IKE of ~ 63 TJ). The
tremendous wave and storm surge related
destruction of Katrina at landfall was not well
represented by the SS scale 5 .
In 2008 Hurricane Ike passed over western Cubaand emerged into the Gulf of Mexico as amarginal hurricane. Ike gradually developed ahuge wind field despite maximum winds < 50 m
s-1. The day before landfall Ike’s IKETS values(Fig 5c) were comparable to those for Katrina(Fig. 5a,b) despite being rated as an SS Category
2 storm. There is some evidence that therelatively low SS rating of Hurricane Ike, during
this critical period for undertaking evacuationand preparation activities, may have influenced
some coastal residents to stay rather thanevacuate, with catastrophic results in the vicinityof the Bolivar Peninsula.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

7. DISCUSSION

This research was supported by NOAA 2005
hurricane supplemental and the U.S. Army Corpsof Engineers IPET Project.

An advantage of using an IKE-based approach isthat it makes no distinction on whether a tropical
cyclone is classified as a hurricane or tropicalstorm ( a large, strong tropical storm could havemore damage potential than a small, weak6

The energy release associated with the Magnitude
9.2 Alaska earthquake of 1964 has been estimated as
6
3.9 x 10 TJ.

5

Many people on the Mississippi based theirevacuation plans on comparing Katrina to 1969 Cat 5
Hurricane Camille, a destructive but much smallerstorm.

127

REFERENCES
1. National Hurricane Operations Plan, FCMP12-2005, OFCM, Silver Spring, MD.
http://www.ofcm.gov/nhop/05/nhop05.htm,(2005).

13. Emanuel, K., Increasing destructiveness oftropical cyclones over the past 30 years.
Nature, 436, 686-688, (2005).
14. ASCE 7-02: Minimum design loads forbuildings and other structures. American
Society of Civil Engineers, 1801 Alexander
Bell Dr., Reston, VA 20191, (2006).

2. Saffir, H. Low Cost construction resistant toearthquakes and hurricanes. ST/ESA/23,
United Nations, 149-162, (1975).

15. Powell, M.D., P.J. Vickery, and T.A.
Reinhold, Reduced drag coefficient for highwind speeds in tropical cyclones, Nature,422, 279-283, (2003).

3. Weatherwise, The hurricane disaster potential
scale. Weatherwise, 27, 169-186, (1974).
4. Dvorak, V. F., Tropical cyclone intensity
analysis using satellite data. NOAA Tech.
Memo. NESDIS-11, 47 pp. (1984).

16.Powell, M. D., S. H. Houston, and T.
Reinhold, Hurricane Andrew's landfall insouth Florida. Part I: Standardizing
measurements for documentation of surface
wind fields. Wea. Forecasting., 11, 304328, (1996).

5. Kraft, R. H., The hurricane's central pressureand highest wind. Mar. Wea. Log., 5, 157,
(1961).
6. Franklin, J.L., M.L. Black, and K. Valde.
GPS dropwindsonde wind profiles inhurricanes and their operational
implications. Wea. Forecasting, 18, 32-44(2003).

17. Powell, M. D., S. H. Houston, L. R. Amat,and N Morisseau-Leroy, The HRD real-timehurricane wind analysis system. J.Wind
Engineer. and Indust. Aerodyn. 77&78, 5364, (1998).

7. Uhlhorn, E. and P. G. Black, Verification of
remotely sensed sea surface winds inhurricanes. J. Atmos and Ocean Tech., 20,
99-116, (2003).

18. Kanamori, H., The energy release in greatearthquakes, J. Geophys. Res., 82, p.29812987, (1977).
19. Hanks, T. C., and H. Kanamori, A moment
magnitude scale, J. Geophys. Res., 84, 23482350, (1979).

8. National Hurricane Center, National
Hurricane Center Forecast Verification,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/verification/index.
shtml? (2006).
9. National Hurricane Center, The SaffirSimpson Hurricane Scale.
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml(2006).
10. Bell, G. D. & coauthors, a. Climate
assessment for 1999. Bull. Amer. Meteor.
Soc., 81, 1328 (2000).
11. Weatherford, C. L., and Gray, W. M.,
Typhoon structure as revealed by aircraft
reconnaissance. Part I Data analysis andclimatology. Mon. Wea. Rev., 116, 10321043, (1988).
12. Croxford, M. and G. M. Barnes, Inner corestrength of Atlantic tropical cyclones. Mon.
Wea. Rev., 130, 127-139, (2002).

128

Fig. 1 Spline fit of IKETS (in TJ) vs. SDP.

Fig. 2 Residential damage (claim to insured
value ratio) as a function of 10 m open -terrain
maximum sustained wind speed in Hurricanes
Andrew, Hugo, and Opal. The 25-41, 42-55,
and >55 m/s thresholds are shown by verticallines and mean damage by blue circles.

129

Fig. 3 Fit of damage ratio to grid cell kinetic
energy per unit volume.

Fig. 4 Grid cell multiplier factor for computing
weighted IKE in the WDP calculation.

130

THEME 4
Transportation Systems

Damage Investigation of Matsurube Bridge during the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi-Nairiku Earthquake
byShigeki Unjoh1, Takashi Tamakoshi2, Koichi Ikuta3, and Junichi Sakai4
ABSTRACT

order to technically support the Iwate prefectural
government. The team reported their investigation
result to the Iwate prefectural government and the
media for the early recovery of the national highway
route #342.

The Matsurube Bridge on National Highway Route#342
wascollapsed
duringthe2008
Iwate-Miyagi-Nairiku Earthquake. The slope, which
supported the abutment and pier foundations,displaced about 10m to the bridge center because of
the landslide caused by the strong ground motion. The
bridge was moved with the landslide, and one piercompletely failed and overturned, and finally thebridge superstructure fell down to the ground. This
paper presents the results of damage investigation of
the Matsurube Bridge, and the damage mechanism
and the lessons learned from this particular type ofdamage is discussed.

The superstructure of the Matsurube Bridge was a
3-span continuous steel girder with total length of
94.9m. The superstructure was supported by twopiers in the middle spans and two abutments at bothends. The strong earthquake shaking caused
landslide at the slope where the abutment and pierwere located, and the abutment and pier moved byabout 10m to the opposite side. One pier wascompletely failed and overturned and finally thesuperstructure fell down to the ground as a jackknife.
This particular type of damage has not been found in
the past earthquakes.

KEYWORDS:
Collapse,
Iwate-Miyagi-Nariku
Earthquake, Landslide, Matsurube Bridge
1. INTRODUCTION

This paper presents the results of damage
investigation of the collapsed Matsurube Bridge, andthe damage mechanism and the lessons learned fromthis particular type of damage is discussed.

The
Iwate-Miyagi-Nairiku
Earthquake
withmagnitude of 7.2 occurred on June 14, 2008 at theborder between Iwate and Miyagi prefectures, Tohoku
region. There were serious damage including about
500 casualties and damage to about 2,500 houses.
During the earthquake, large-scale landslides occurredin mountain areas and caused river closures which
resulted in the development of natural dams, and roadclosures. Although bridge structures in the area were
not affected so much by the strong ground motion, theMatsurube Bridge on national highway route #342
was collapsed during the earthquake. The bridge wasmanaged by the Iwate prefectural government. MLIT
dispatched the emergency investigation teamincluding the experts of bridge structures to the site of
the Matsurube Bridge just after the earthquake in

1 Research Coordinator for Earthquake Disaster
Prevention, National Institute for Land andInfrastructure Management (NILIM), Ministry ofLand, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT),
Asahi-1, Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0804 Japan
2 Head, Bridge and Structures Division Engineering,
Road Department, NILIM, MLIT
3 Researcher, Bridge and Structures Division
Engineering, Road Department, NILIM, MLIT
4 Senior Researcher, Bridge and Structural Technology
Group, Center for Advanced Engineering Structural
Assessment and Research (CAESAR), Public Works
Research Institute (PWRI), Minamihara 1-6,
Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-8516 Japan

135

2.
DAMAEGINVESTIGATION
MATSURUBE BRIDGE

OF

2.2 MLIT TEC-FORCE
MLIT has established TEC-FORCE (Technical
Emergency Control Force) in April 2008 [2].
Objectives of the TEC-FORCE are to provide
technical emergency supports to the local
governments where the large scale disasters occur orwhere the risk of disasters is high. The TEC-FORCE
operates in order to make the local governments’countermeasures quicker and more effective. The
TEC-FORCE teams are established at MLIT
Headquarters Office, NILIM, Geographical Survey
Institute (GSI), MLIT Regional Bureau and JMA, andconsist of several units including advance unit, field
support unit, information communication unit, hightech leading unit, damage investigation unit,
emergency operation unit, transport support unit,
geographic information unit, meteorological andterrestrial information unit. When a large scale natural
disaster occurs, MLIT dispatches the TEC-FORCE
and they work to support the local governments
through the damage investigation, prevention ofdamage expansion, and early recovery works.

2.1 Iwate-Miyagi-Nairiku Earthquake [1]The Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake occurred ataround 8:43AM on June 16, 2008. The magnitude ofthe earthquake was 7.2 and the depth of epicenter
was 8km. Japan Meteorological Intensity (JMA
Intensity) was the 6 Upper in the epicentral area. The
high intensities were observed in the wide area in
Iwate and Miyagi prefectures.
Damage extended to the 5 prefectures in the Tohoku
region, in particular heavy damage was reported in the
Iwate and Miyagi prefectures. Casualties of 23 (dead:13, missing: 10), injured: 451, damage to houses:
2557, were reported. The total damage was evaluatedas 152 billion Yen. Since the earthquake occurred in
the mountain area, large landslides and slope failuresoccurred and caused river closures and road closures.
The National Research Institute for Earth Science andDisaster Prevention (NIED) reported the strong
motion observation data. The strongest ground motion
was observed at the IWTH25 station which was
located by just a distance of 1.3 km from thecollapsed bridge site. The maximum PGA was
1,143gal in NS, 1,433gal in EW, 3,866gal in UD, and
4,022gal as a combined value of these 3 components.
It should be noted here that very strong UD
acceleration with a very short period, which has not
yet observed in the past earthquakes, was recorded.
Fig.1 shows the response acceleration spectrum of the
IWTH25 record. It is found that the ground motion
was very strong in the short natural period range lessthan 0.3s, but the shaking intensity decreases inlonger natural period range than 0.3s. That means thatthe earthquake seriously affected on the short natural
period structures but not so much on the longer
natural period structures. For example, typical bridge
structures with general spans and general height ofsubstructures have the natural period of 0.5 to 1.0s,
therefore, it was estimated that the shaking was not sostrong effect on such bridge structures.

During the Iwate-Miyagi-Nairiku Earthquake, total
number of days and engineers are about 1,400 in thefirst month after the earthquake. As for this bridge
collapse, 5 engineers including bridge experts weredispatched as TEC-FORCE team just after theearthquake to investigate what happened at this bridge[3].
2.3 Bridge Design Condition
The Matsurube Bridge was constructed in 1978 andmanaged by the Iwate prefectural government. It was
3-span continuous steel girder bridge with length of
94.9m (27m+40m+27m) as shown in Fig.2. The
width of deck is about 10m. Two piers in the middle
spans were RC wall type piers with height of 25m,
and both abutments were an inverted T-shaped RC
wall type. Ground condition is Type I (Stiff)
according to the JRA highway bridge design
specifications and therefore all foundations of piers
and abutments were a spread type. Seismic coefficient136bottom to the direction of A2 abutment.
4) P2 Pier (Photo 7)
P2 pier failed in the particular failure mode. The
column was broken and separated into 3 parts. Twoparts fell down just around the bottom of originalcolumn. Top part of the column just fell down in the
A2 abutment side and stood just along the bottom partcolumn. The middle part of column fell down andoverturned in the opposite A1 abutment side. The
bottom part still remained at the original position.
5) A2 Abutment (Photo 8, 9)
The particular failure mode was also found at the A2
abutment. Parapet wall was failed and pushed into thebackfill soil. The push-into distance was about 4m.
The evidence to show the impact between the deckend and the parapet wall was recognized at the surfaceof the parapet wall and the end section of the steel
girders.
6) Measurement of Geometry of the Bridge
The distance between the locations of substructures
was measured by using simple method at the site.
Although it is necessary to measure more accurate
manner, Fig.3 shows the measured values. The
distance between A1 abutment and A2 abutment
shortened to about 85m. Since the original distance
was about 95m, so the distance shortened by about
10m. The distance between A1 abutment and adjacentP1 pier was about 26m. Original distance was 27m, sosome shortening was found. On the other hand, thedistance between P1 pier and A2 abutment was 59m.
Since original distance was about 68m, therefore,
about 9m shortened. The distance between A1
abutment and P1 pier was not so much change but the
distance change between P1 pier and A2 abutment
was about 10m. That means that the A1 abutment andP1 Pier moved toward P2 pier and A2 abutment.

employed in the original design was 0.15 withallowable stress design method. The superstructure
consisted of 4 steel plate girders with concrete slab
deck. The fixed steel bearing was provided at the A1
abutment and others on two piers and A2 abutment
were movable steel bearings in the longitudinal
direction. In the transverse direction, all bearings had
side stoppers to constraint the transverse movement.
2.4 Damage to Matsurube Bridge
Photo 1 shows an aerial photo of the collapsed
bridge. The photo was taken and provided by the
Pasco Corporation and the Kokusai Kogyo Co., Ltd. It
is understood that P2 pier was collapsed and a part ofsuperstructure between A2 and P1 fell down to theground. Deck end at A1 abutment also fell down fromthe seat of the A1 abutment. Looking at the mountainarea at the back of A1 abutment, some large cracks
and slope deformation were recognized. It wasestimated that the landslide in the part of mountainslope occurred and that the slope moved to the bridge
and affected on the collapse.
The detailed damage situation of the bridge members
is shown in the followings.
1) Superstructure (Photo 2, 3)
As wrote in the above, the superstructure between A2
abutment and P1 pier fell down to the ground as a
jackknife. Deck end also fell down from the seat of
the A1 abutment. At P1 pier, the steel girders werebroken and overturned laterally because of the falling
down of the superstructure between A2 abutment andP1 pier.
2) A1 Abutment (Photo 4, 5)
Road surface at the backward of A1 abutment failed
heavily and large cracks and slips of the soils weredeveloped. Significant cracks from parapet wall to theabutment wall were also found at the side of abutment.
3) P1 Pier (Photo 3, 6)
Small cracks were observed at the mid-height sectionof the column, they were possibly at the section of theconcrete placement joint. But the columns itself was
not damaged remarkably. The pier was inclined sothat the pier top is close to A1 abutment and the

2.5 Estimation of Damage Mechanism
Based on the detailed damage investigation and themeasurement of the distance between substructures,the damage mechanism was estimated. The moredetailed measurement and investigation including theboring of soils was needed but the failure wasestimated to be developed in the following

137

mechanism. Fig.4 shows the estimated sequences of
the collapse of the bridge.
1) The failure and slide of the mountain slope wasdeveloped by the earthquake shaking and theabutment and pier which were supported by theslope moved with the landslide.
2) In particular, considering the evidence of theheavy damage and cracks at the backside soil of
A1 abutment, A1 abutment and P1 pier moved tothe direction of A2 abutment. At the same time,
the superstructure was pushed to the direction of
A2 abutment and P2 pier. That resulted in thecollapse of P2 pier and damage to the parapet
wall of A2 abutment, then the superstructure fell
down like a jackknife.
3) P1 pier was separated into 3 parts. The column
had two termination sections of longitudinal
re-bars at mid-height. It was estimated that theterminated section became relative weak sections
when the column was subjected to the extreme
large displacement. The upper section withtermination of longitudinal re-bars of P2 pierfirstly failed because of the large displacement ofsuperstructure, the top part fell down to the A2
abutment side. Then the superstructure wasbroken and settled down because of dead weightwith losing the support from P1 pier and thecontinuous displacement from the slope, finallythe superstructure fell down as a jackknife. Whenthe falling down of the superstructure to theground, the middle part of column of P2 pier was
overturned to the P1 side with the fallingsuperstructure.

pier. Therefore it was estimated the damage wascaused by the displacement rather than the groundshaking. This estimation corresponded to the response
spectrum of observed data. Therefore, the pushover
analysis method applying the displacement to thefoundations of A1 abutment and P1 pier was
employed in this study. Dynamic analysis was also
made using the observed strong motion data but inthis preliminary study the pushover analysis is shown
here.
Fig.5 shows the mathematical model of the bridge.
The superstructure was modeled as concrete slab and4 steel girders considering the nonlinear behavior ofmaterials. Movable bearing was modeled as nonlinear
spring element considering the strength and fail ofside stoppers. RC columns were modeled using fiber
element model. The termination sections of thelongitudinal re-bars were also considered. Abutments
were modeled as linear element but the parapet walls
were modeled as nonlinear fiber element model. Also
to simulate the push-out failure of the parapet wall,the nonlinear shear spring element was provided at
the bottom of the parapet wall. Backfill soil wasmodel as spring element and the general soil stiffness
was assumed because of the lack of the accurate soil
data. Since foundations were spread type on the stiff
ground, they are model as fixed to the ground.
In the pushover analysis, the displacements were
given in the 3 dimensional directions. The
displacement at A1 abutment and P1 pier used in thisanalysis was by the detailed measurement of thebridge by the Iwate prefectural government [4].

3. ANLYTICAL SIMULATION
3.2 Preliminary Analytical Results
3.1 Bridge Model
Fig.6 shows the preliminary results obtained from thepushover analyses. Upper section of the terminationof longitudinal re-bars was found to be failed firstly
and the top part of P2 pier pushed to the direction of
A2 abutment. It is estimated from the analyses thatthe failure and falling down of the top part of the P2
pier was caused by the large displacement of thesuperstructure. The failure of the parapet wall of A2

To simulate this particular bridge collapse mode, thepreliminary analytical study was conducted. There
were discussions that the damage was caused by theground shaking, ground displacement or both. But thecritical damage was developed only at P2 pier but
almost no damage to P1 pier which had completely
the same dimensions and re-bar arrangement with P2

138

abutment also found because of the push-into of theend of the superstructure. Therefore, the failure modein the first stage was almost reproduced by thesimulation analysis.

5. REFERENCES
1.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND DISCUSSIONS
The damage mode of the Matsurube Bridge wasparticular. The landslide of the backward slope of thebridge caused the large displacement of about 10m
and the abutment and pier were displaced with thelandslide. Then the pier failed and the superstructure
broken as a jackknife. The collapsed pier was
separated into 3 parts and the parapet wall pushed into
backfill soils by the superstructure. These damage
modes had not found in the past earthquakes.

2.

3.

4.
The preliminary lessons and discussions are
summarized as follows.
1) The damage was basically caused by the landslide.
Therefore, it is important to investigate thepossibility of the occurrence of landslides aroundthe bridge construction sites.
2) At this moment, it is very difficult to evaluate theearthquake shaking intensity accurately when thelandslides occur at each slope. It is important tostudy and to accumulate the data in order toimprove the slope investigation method and thestability evaluation method.
3) It is impossible to stop the movement of large
slope by a bridge structure. In the structuraldesign point of view, it is essential to select theroute carefully and to study the design
consideration on the placement of foundations.
Also, it is important to study the methods toimprove the redundancy of road networks.
It should be noted here that Iwate prefectural
government established the investigation committee
to study the damage mechanism of the Matsurube
Bridge (Chairman: Prof. Motoyuki Suzuki, Tohoku
University) more in detail. The final report will be
published soon. The interim report already can be
downloaded from the Iwate prefecture web site as [4].

139

MLIT: Press Release on the establishment of
TEC-FORCE (In Japanese)(http://www.mlit.go.jp/kisha/kisha08/05/050425_
4_.html)
NILIM: Report of Damage Investigation of 2008
Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake, Augsust 26,
2008 (In Japanese)(http://www.nilim.go.jp/engineer/index.html)
MLIT TEC-FORCE
Team: Report ofInvestigation of Matsurube Bridge on National
Highway Route #342, Reported to the Iwate
Prefectural Government and Media, June 18,
2008 (In Japanese)
Iwate Prefectural Government : Committee
Report on Damage Investigation of Matsurube
Bridge on natibal Higway Roure #342 (InJapanese)(http://www.pref.iwate.jp/view.rbz?of=1&ik=0&
pnp=14&cd=17790)

The Lessons Learned from Wenchuan Earthquake on Highway Bridges
byW. Phillip Yen 1 , Genda Chen 2 , Mark Yashinski 3 ,ABSTRACT

University of Science and Technology, Dr. Youssef
Hashash from Geo-Engineering Earthquake
Reconnaissance (GEER), and Mr. Curtis Holubfrom the Mid-America Earthquake Center (MAE).
The reconnaissance team was hosted by Dr. Kehai
Wang of the Research Institute of Highway from
the Ministry of Communication of China and Mr.
Xiaodong Guo of the Sichuan Province Highway
Planning, Survey, Design, and Research Institute.

A strong earthquake of M7.9 occurred in the
Wenchuan County in Sichuan Province, China, on
May 12, 2008. Shortly after the earthquake, theTurner-Fairbank Highway Research Center ofFederal Highway Administration led areconnaissance team, partnering with Chinesecounterpart, the Research Institute of Highway
from the Ministry of Communication of China, toconduct a post-earthquake bridge performance
investigation in the earthquake affected areas oftransportation system. The U.S. transportation
system reconnaissance team visited the earthquake
affected areas on July 20 – 24, 2008. This report isa briefing of the findings and lessons that the teamlearnt from the earthquake event.

2.0 EARTHQUAKE AND SURFACE RUPTURE
The May 12, 2008, Wenchuan Earthquake:
The M7.9 Wenchuan earthquake occurred at
06:28:01 (UTC) on May 12, 2008 in the LongmenShan thrust zone. Its epicenter is located at 30.989°
N /103.329° E near a town called Yingxiu in
Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province. The focal
depth of the earthquake is approximately 10 km.
The highest recorded peak ground acceleration is
0.65g (Xie et al., 2008). At least 35 aftershocks
with magnitudes equal to or greater than M5.0 wererecorded within the first three months after themain shock with the strongest aftershock of M6.4
(M6.5 according to CEA). This region has
continually experienced large earthquakes as
indicated in Table 1 & Figure 2. The largest
earthquake over M7.0 prior to the Wenchuan
earthquake occurred in 1973.

KEYWORDS: bridge engineering, earthquake
engineering, post earthquake investigations.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
A team of five U.S. engineers was invited by the
Ministry of Communication of China to study
bridge damage from the M7.9 (M8.0 according to
China Earthquake Administration or CEA)
Wenchuan earthquake of May 12, 2008. The teamincluded Dr. Phillip W. Yen (Team Leader) fromthe Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center ofFederal Highway Administration (FWHA), Mr.
Mark Yashinsky from the California Departmentof Transportation representing the Earthquake
Engineering Research Institute (EERI), Dr. Genda
Chen from the Center for Transportation
Infrastructure and Safety (CTIS), a national
University Transportation Center at Missouri

The Longmen-Shan thrust zone was formed by theEastern Tibetan Plateau pushing against the
Sichuan Basin (Burchfiel et al., 2008). The thrustzone has three faults: the front fault (GuanxianJiangyu-Guangyuan), the center fault (YingxiuBeichuan-Chaba-Linjueshi), and the back fault

1 Seismic Research program Manager, Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center of Federal Highway
Administration (FWHA)
2 Professor, the Center for Transportation Infrastructure and Safety (CTIS), a national University Transportation
Center at Missouri University of Science and Technology
3 Senior Bridge Engineer, California Department of Transportation representing the Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute (EERI)

148

(Wenchuan-Maoxian-Qingchuan). Based on the
distribution of aftershocks, approximately 300 kmof the faults was estimated to have ruptured,
breaking the ground surface along the YingxiuBeichuan segment of the center fault (210 km) and
the Guanxia-Jiangyu segment of the front fault (70km). According to Xie et al. (2008), the verticalfault displacements measured were over 5 m.

sudden change was also evidenced as shown in
Figure 5 on the slope of the mountain behind thebuilding. A closer look at the old DujiangyanWenchuan highway in front of the building
indicated that the vertical dislocation isapproximately 1.5 m as illustrated in Figure 4.
3.0 OBSERVED BRIDGE DAMAGESThe M7.9 Wenchuan earthquake andseveral strong aftershocks resulted in massive
landslides and rockfalls. These events caused
approximately 70,000 fatalities and economic lossof over $110B. They damaged more than 1,000
bridges, approximately 20 of which had to be
replaced. The severity of bridge damage greatly
increased with proximity to the fault, with theworst damage occurring in mountainous terrains.
This made the recovery more difficult. Most
mountain roads are switchbacks with steep grades
over narrow passes with little rooms for detour.
Massive landslides covered or undermined theroads, making it difficult to bring in equipment
and supplies.

Although many bridges performance were
inspected, only the three most severely damaged
and collapsed bridges are discussed due to thelimitation of the paper size. More discussions onother bridges will be published soon.
3.1 Bridges in Nanba Town
Three bridges crossed a river (river’s name was notknown) near Nanba Town as shown in Figure 5.
The west structure was a concrete and masonry
three-span arch bridge built in the 1970s. The oldarch bridge completely collapsed during theearthquake as shown in Figure 6. Immediately
downstream of the arch bridge was a 10-span rivercrossing (on a 10° skew) that was underconstruction during the earthquake, as shown in
Figure 7. Each 6 m long span was simply supportedon two-column bents and seat-type abutments with
560 mm seats. As shown in Figure 8, each spanconsisted of eight precast box girders with a crosssection of 1067 mm by 1520 mm. Each girder was
supported on two 200 mm round elastomericbearings at each end. The girders were in place but
the concrete deck had not yet been poured at thetime of the earthquake as seen from Figure 5.

2.1 Surface Feature of Fault Rupture at the
Earthquake Epicenter
The epicenter of the May 12 Wenchuan
earthquake is located near Yingxiu in WenchuanCounty, Sichuan Province. The surface rupture of
the center fault in the Longmen-Shan fault zone
was observed in Yingxiu as illustrated in Figure 5.
The thrust fault appeared to cross the Ming River
in right angle. As shown in Figure 5, theearthquake left behind a distinct dislocation on theriver bed at the northeast (NE) end of the surface
rupture. The northwest (NW) side of the fault on
the upstream of the River moves upward against
the southeast (SE) side of the fault. The fact that
one deck panel along the expressway elevatedbridge was still supported by one pier in Figure 3
indicated the sudden push by a near-field pulsing
effect.
On the other side of the Ming River was a fivestory building with a construction joint between
two similar parts. The right side of the building as
shown in Figure 5 was completely collapsed while
the left side of the building only lost the second
story and suffered structural damage in walls. A

As shown in Figures 7 and 8, most of the box
girders of the new bridge dropped into the river andthe two-column bents were distorted. The end box
girders were transversely displaced byapproximately 760 mm. The deck hadn’t beenpoured, there wasn’t any real transverse bracing or
shear keys, and girders were on a slight skew, all ofwhich contributed to the damage. Also, many ofthe bents were leaning or distorted, but with nodamage visible above the waterline.
There was no indication that the ten-span bridge
suffered any damage due to a fault crossing. As

149

such, the three-span arch bridge must have beendamaged by ground shaking, perhaps exacerbatedby soil movement. Liquefaction, lateral spreading,or other soil movement may have been also
responsible for the distortion of the two column
bents. The reconnaissance team was not able todiscern what type of foundation system the bents
were supported on, but apparently they were notsufficiently embedded into good material.

spans of 50 m long, supporting ten RC girders. All
girders are simply supported on the bents for deadload but the bridge deck is continuous for live load.
The bents are as tall as 105 m. In some locations,they are 40 m deep into water in the Zidingdu
reservoir of the Dujiangyan Dam in the main spanof the bridge. Expansion joints are used between
the parts and between the approach and main
bridge.

On the east side of the old and new bridges is atemporary structure that was being constructed bylaunching Bailey Bridges onto new RC pier walls
at the time of field reconnaissance. As shown in
Figure 9, vehicles were driving across the river onfill material laid over culverts in the meantime.

The construction of the bridge was near completion
except for the installation of expansion joints at thetime of the earthquake. The most severe damage
was to the end span of a five-span T-girder segmentthat became unseated at the expansion joint end,
fractured in the continuous deck at the other end
due to gravity load, and fell off the supporting bent
caps during the earthquake. The bent seats wereapproximately 300 mm in length but the bridge
experienced at least 500 mm of longitudinal
movement due to earthquake shaking. Since thecolumns of each bent are approximately 105 m tall,
the accumulated displacement at the bent cap was
likely significant during the earthquake. There
were other indications of large longitudinal
movement. The barrier rails were overlapped byabout 300 mm at the southeast expansion joint. The
barrier
also
displacedtransverselyforapproximately 250 mm. Divers found cracks at thebottom of the main span columns due to earthquake
shaking. Shear key failure was also observed asshown in Figure 50. After the earthquake, thebridge deck was jacked back into place withhydraulic jacks.

3.2 Miaozhiping Bridge
Miaozhiping Highway from Dujiangyan to
Wenchuan was under construction during theearthquake. It consists of a tunnel at Zhipingpu
and a bridge over the Ming River as schematicallyshown in Figure 10. The Tunnel is shown in
Figure 11 and experienced little damage during
the earthquake. The highway was scheduled toopen in October, 2008. Near the highway is thewell-known Dujiangyan Dam. The bridge ofapproximately 1.4 km long consists of three parts:
a main span and two approach spans as shown in
Figure 12.
As shown in Figure 13, the approach span near thetunnel is a two-span, RC girder structure with 50
m span length each. The bridge deck is supported
on five RC girders and two-column bents withseveral cross struts. As indicated in Figure 13, thebridge deck is continuous but the girders are
simply supported on the bents. The main bridge isa continuous, non-prismatic, three-span structure
supported on two intermediate wall piers with 125
m, 220m, and 125m length, respectively. The
superstructure is a single-cell box girder structure.
The depth of girders varies to a maximum depth of
4.0 ~ 4.5 m.

The end of the Miaozhiping Bridge near the tunnel
is divided into two parallel elevated structures inorder to guide two ways of traffic in alignment withthe twin tunnels as indicated in Figure 16. Over thesoutheast approach is a four-span RC girder bridge
built in 2004. The bridge supports the old highway
from Dujiangyan to Wenchuan and Juzhaigou. The
old highway was built along the mountain terrain,
perpendicular to the Zhipingpu Highway at
Zhipingpu Town. The bridge showed shear key
failures and embankment cracking as shown in
Figure 17.

The approach bridge on the other side of the main
span has three parts of 250 m, 250 m, and 100 m,
respectively. Any of the first three parts has fiveIn the vicinity of Miaozhiping Bridge there areseveral RC girder bridges as shown in Figure 18.

150

These bridges appeared to suffer little damage. No
weight limits were posted on these bridges.

several locations. A detour had been graded along
the side of the damaged bridge. Considering thehigh risk of a further collapse during an aftershock,endangering people using the detour, the rest of thebridge was demolished with dynamite as illustrated
in Figure 25.

3.2 Baihua Bridge
Baihua Bridge is part of a Class 2 Highway from
Dujiangyan to Wenchuan. It was built in 2004 by
the owner of a nearby hydroelectric plant to bringin workers. As schematically shown in Figure 19,
the bridge is an 18-span, RC structure with a total
length of 450 m. The bridge superstructure was
supported on two-column bents of varying heights
as it climbs over the hilly terrain. The tallest bents
have one or two struts to provide transverse
restraint between the columns. The bridge hasboth straight and curve spans. For convenience,
the bridge structure can be divided into six
sections as summarized in Table 2. The
superstructure was a prestressed box girder with adrop-in T-girder span between Bent 9 and Bent
10. There were expansion joints at Bents 2, 6, 9,
10, 14, and at the two seat-type abutments. For thedrop-in span, the bridge deck just rested on thebent cap at its both ends.

Similar to the previously described Xiaoyudong
Bridge, this bridge could have been damaged bysurface faulting though there is no clear surface
fault feature that the reconnaissance team has everfound near the bridge site. Considering the complex
vibration system of the irregular structure withvarying column heights and lack of continuity
between the substructure and superstructure, severe
shaking alone could result in collapse. Still, thebridge is very close to the fault and several photos(taken immediately after the earthquake) show whatlooks to be a surface fault under the bridge. During
the field reconnaissance after nearly three months
later, all signs of the fault were gone and the bridge
was lying on the ground.
4.0 LEASSONS LEARNED FROM
EARTHQUAKE RECONNAISSANCE

During the earthquake, the more highly curved
section of the bridge completely collapsed as
illustrated in Figure 20. The rest of the bridge
suffered varying degrees of damage, including
shear cracks and failure at columns and struts,
shear key failure, and bearing failure as shown in
Figures 21-24 for Bents 3, 9, 15, and 18,
respectively. At Bent 3, typical damage occurred
between the strut and columns in the form of
spalling and cracks. At Bent 9 with expansion
joints, the superstructure had significant transverse
displacement, knocking off the shear key. At Bent
15, the bridge section was completely collapsed
due likely to the shear and flexural failure ofcolumns. At Bent 18, in addition to cracks
between column and strut, significant spalling
occurred underneath the bridge deck.

The bridge damage observed during the May 12,
2008, Wenchuan Earthquake reminded us of what
California suffered during the February 9, 1971 San
Fernando Earthquake. The U.S. in the 1960’s and1970’s was expanding their highway network
similar to China’s efforts today. Before the San
Fernando earthquake, Caltrans’ maximum seismic
coefficient was 0.10g, similar to China’s current
maximum seismic coefficient of 0.10g. After the
San Fernando earthquake, Caltrans greatly
increased the seismic hazard used to design
California’s bridges, similar to how Japan increased
the hazard for its bridges following the 1995 Kobe
earthquake. It is hoped that this earthquake will
have the same significance for China’s bridge
engineers and the seismic hazard for areas near
known faults will be greatly increased. Also, thebridges we studied had few seismic details such as
long seats, large shear keys, or tightly-spacedtransverse reinforcement. These details would
greatly reduce bridge damage during futureearthquakes. The various fault traces through theregion need to be carefully identified and bridges
should be designed for the seismic hazards at theAt the curve part of the bridge, the bridge is likely
subjected to higher deformation and stress underthe earthquake, resulting in collapse. Even for thestraight part of the bridge, due to tall columns, thedamage in various sections under the earthquake
results in tilting of the columns that would push
the superstructure almost off their support at151

bridge site, based on a low probability of thehazard being exceeded during the life of thebridge.. This would ensure that China could relyon its highway infrastructure during the frequent
earthquakes that strike this and other regions.

Stone, R., 2008, Landslides, flooding poses
threats as experts survey quake’s impact, Science,
320, p. 996-997.
Wang, Z. M., 2008, “May 12, 2008, Sichuan
China Earthquake Reconnaissance.” Presentation
posted at
http://www.uky.edu/KGS/geologichazards/Sichu
an_Earthquake.pdf, Kentucky Geological Survey,
228 MMRB, University of Kentucky, Lexington,
KY 40506, zmwang@uky.edu .

4.1 Based on the field reconnaissance, thefollowing are the observations:
o

o

o
o

o

o

The collapse of most arch and girder
bridges is associated with surface
rupturing of the faults in the LongmenShan Thrust Zone. A significant portionof roadways and bridges were pushed
away or buried by overwhelming
landslides in the mountainous terrain ofsteep slopes.
The representative damage types in bridge
superstructure include unseating ofgirders, longitudinal and transverse offset
of decks, pounding at expansion joints,
and shear key failure.
The bearings of several girder bridges
were either crushed or displaced
significantly.
The substructure and foundation ofbridges were subjected to shear andflexural cracks, concrete spalling, stirrup
rupture, excessive displacement, and lossof stability.
More damage occurred in simplysupported bridges in comparison with
continuous spans. The curve bridges
either collapsed or suffered more severe
damage.
The directivity effects on the bridges near
the earthquake epicenter were evidenced
during the earthquake.

Xie, F.R., Z. M. Wang, Y. Du, and X.L. Zhang,2008, Preliminary observations of the faulting
and damage pattern of M8.0 Wenchuan, China,
earthquake, submitted to a journal for possible
publication.

5.0 REFERENCES
Burchfiel, B.C., L.H. Royden, R.D. van der
Hilst, B.H. Hager, Z. Chen, R.W. King, C. Li, J.
Lü, H. Yao, and E. Kirby, 2008, A geologicaland geophysical context for the Wenchuan
earthquake of 12 May 2008, Sichuan, People's
Republic of China, GSA Today, 18, p. 4-11.

152

Table 1: Longmen-Shan Significant Earthquake M≥7.0
Year

Month

Day

Time

Latitude

1917
1923
1933
1947
1948
1950
1955
1967
1973

07
03
08
03
05
08
04
08
02

30
24
25
17
25
15
14
30
06

2354
1240
0750
0819
0711
1409
0129
0422
1037

29.00030.55331.81033.00029.50028.50029.98131.63131.361Longitude
104.000
101.258
103.54199.500100.500
96.500101.613100.232100.504

Depth

Magnitude

0
25
25
0
0
0
10
8.1
6.6

7.3
7.2
7.3
7.5
7.2
8.6
7.5
7.0
7.4

Table 2: Parameters of the Baihua Bridge
Section
1
2
3
4
5
6

No. of Span
5
4
1
3
5
2

Span Length (m)
25
25
50
25
20
25

Section Length (m)
125
100
50
75
100
50

Figure 1: Bridge Sites Investigated by Reconnaissance Team153

(a)Plan and Elevation(b) Cross Section of Main Span and Approach Bridge

Figure 10: Schematic View of the Miaozhiping Bridge

157

Figure 16: End of the Miaozhiping Bridge and its Overpass for the Old Highway

Figure 17: Damage to Shear Key and Embankment of the Overpass

Figure 18: Bridges in the Vicinity of Miaozhiping Bridge

160

Figure 21: Damage at Bent 3

Figure 22: Damage at Bent 9(a) Column Shear and Flexural Failure162

(b) Column Shear Failure and Section 5 Collapse
Figure 23: Earthquake Damage at Bent 15

Figure24: Damage at Bent 18(a)Blast Demolition

163

(b) After Demolition
Figure 25: Post-Earthquake Demolition of Baihua Bridge

164

Quick Earthquake Damage Detection System for Bridges
byJunichi Sakai1 and Shigeki Unjoh2
method for quick detection and evaluation ofsevere damage that affects the structural safety
and serviceability, and also a method for
subsequent rapid repair works. The authors havebeen conducting research projects fordeveloping these methods for bridge structures,and have proposed rapid repair methods [1] forthe latter part of the project.

ABSTRACT
When an extreme earthquake occurs, roads andbridges are fundamental infrastructures toevacuate the affected people and to transport the
emergency equipment and materials. For theseemergency activities, it is essential to detect
immediately after the earthquake the severe
structural damage that affects the performanceof structures. This paper proposes a method forquick earthquake damage detection/evaluationof reinforced concrete bridge columns, which
has been developed through investigations ofdynamic response properties of reinforced
concrete bridge columns obtained from shake
table tests. An intelligent sensor unit wasdeveloped that captures changes of response
period of a bridge column. Field measurementsof traffic induced vibrations of bridges were also
conduced to evaluate the efficiency and to
improve the applicability of the proposed
method.

In terms of the earthquake damage detection,
detection/evaluation of the degree of damage
and structural safety of bridge structures are
currently done by visual inspection of experts;
however, there are various problems on thisprocedure, such as: the lack of uniform
standards for quantitative evaluation of thedegree of damage, the difficulty of visualinspectionforunderground/underwater
structures, and the time-consuming process forgathering and analyzing the information with alimited number of personnel. Therefore, it isnecessary to develop a method for accurate andspeedy determination of the degree of damage
without experts’ inspection.

KEYWORDS: Earthquake Damage, Damage
Detection, Intelligent Sensor Unit, Reinforced
Concrete Bridge Column

For detecting and evaluating the seismic damage
without visual inspections, research projects
have been conducted to develop sensing
technologies in two approaches. One is amethod to evaluate the change of the global
dynamic response, and the other is a method todetect a local damage. Kiremidjian et al. haveproposed statistical pattern recognition based
damage detection algorithms, and verified its
efficiency by analyzing the data from a real
three span prestressed concrete frame typebridge [2]. Some researchers proposed detection

1. INTRODUCTION
When an extreme earthquake occurs, it issignificant to ensure the emergency road
network to evacuate the affected people and totransport the emergency equipment andmaterials. In particular, bridges are fundamental
structures in the network because the damaged
bridges are likely to result in long-term closer ofthe road.

1 Senior Researcher, Bridge and Structural Technology

For these emergency activities, it is essential toobtain the information of the structural safety
and serviceability of bridge structures
immediately after the event and to conduct
repair works as soon as possible if needed.
Therefore, there is a strong need to develop a

Research Group, Center for Advanced Engineering
Structural Assessment and Research, Public Works
Research Institute, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8516, Japan
2 Research Coordinator for Earthquake Disaster
Prevention, Research Center for Disaster Risk
Management, National Institute of Land andInfrastructure Management, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-0804,
Japan

165

No. Spec. ID., Shape
00S,
1
1
Saure
2
01C,
3
2
Circular
402R,
53
Rectangular
6
7
8
03R,
9
4
Rectangular
10
11
12
13
04R,
14 5
Rectangular
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

6

05R,
Rectangular

7

05C,
Circular

8

9

06F,
Circular

06ED,
CircularTable 1 Shake Table Tests Analyzed

Input GMJR Takatori,
2 Horizontal
JR Takatori,
2 Horizontal
JR Takatori,
2 Horizontal

JR Takatori,
1 Horizontal

JR Takatori,
3 Dimensional
JR Takatori,
1 Horizontal
K-NET
Chokubetsu,
3 Dimensional
Tsugaru Ohhashi,

JR Takatori,
3 Dimensional

JR Takatori,
3 Dimensional

Case
00S-020x, y
00S-100x, y
01C-015x, y
01C-080x, y
02R-015x, y
02R-090x, y
03R-015
03R-050
03R-060
03R-080a
03R-080b
03R-080c
04R-015x, y
04R-090x, y
04R-050x, y

Amplitude Time SF
Reference
20%
50%
100%
[12] (2004)
15%
50%
Nishida & Unjoh
80%
15%
50%
90%
15%
50%
[10] (2005)
60%
50% Kobayashi & Unjoh
80%
2005
80%
80%
15%
[13] (2006)
50%
90%
Nishida & Unjoh
50%

05R-015-1x

15%05R-015-2x, y
05R-040x, y
05R-170x, y
05C-020x, y
05C-400x, y
06F-010x, y
06F-020Mx, y
06F-020Ax, y
06F-030Mx, y
06F-030Ax, y
06F-050Mx, y
06F-050Ax, y
06F-060Mx, y
06F-060Ax, y
06ED-F010x, y
06ED-F080x, y

15%
40%
170%
20%
400%
10%

50%

[14] (2006)
Nishida & Unjoh

50%[15] (2006)
Sakai & Unjoh

50%[16] (2008)
Sakai & Unjoh

60%[17] (2008)
Sakai, Unjoh & Ukon

20%
30%
50%
60%
10%
80%

3. QUICK EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE
DETECTION METHOD FOR COLUMNTHAT FAILES IN FLEXURE AT BOTTOM

optional), a microcomputer, a D/A converter, amemory, a wireless transmitter and a battery.
The dimension of the sensor is 200 mm square,the height is 100 mm and the weight is 2.9 kg.
The prototype sensor unit is small and lightenough for easy installation. The cost to
manufacture the unit is about 1.5 million yen.
The cost is yet high because servo
accelerometers are used to ensure the accuracyof measurements. If large amounts of the sensor
units are produced, the cost can be reduced.
Although the use of less expensive
accelerometers such as MEMS sensor can also
reduce the cost, further research is needed toensure the accuracy of measurements.

3.1 Test Specimens and Conditions
To develop the damage detection method, resultsfrom shaking table tests for reinforced concrete
bridge column specimens [10] [12] [13] [14][15] [16] [17] were investigated. Table 1
summarizes the tests analyzed in this study.
Figure 3 shows cross sections of the specimens.
The size of the cross section was about 0.6 m.
The height from the bottom of the column to thecenter of gravity of the top mass was about 3 m.
The aspect ratio of the specimens was larger
than 4, and no cutoff of longitudinal167

Acceleration(m/sec2)

10Input Ground Motion

Input Ground Motion

Input Ground Motion

Response
Acceleration

Response
Acceleration

Response Acceleration

Response
Displacement

Response
Displacement

Response Displacement

0-10

Acceleration(m/sec2)

100

Displacement
(mm)

-10
200

0

Acceleration (m/sec2)

-200
0

10
20
Time (sec)

-6

0

30

10
20
Time (sec)

30

10

20
30
Time (sec)

40

50

0

-6
-200

Response
Hysteresis
0200
Lateral Disp.(mm)(a) 01C-080y

Response
Hysteresis
-200
0
200
Lateral Disp.(mm)Response
Hysteresis
200
-200
0
Lateral Disp.(mm)(b) 02R-090y(c) 05C-400y
Figure 5 Dynamic Response of Specimen

Duration of FFT Analysis

Period (sec)0

2.5 sec

5 sec

2
1
0
0

10
20
Time (sec)

30

0

10
20
Time (sec)

30

0

10

20
30
Time (sec)4050(a) 01C-080y(b) 02R-090y(c) 05C-400y
Figure 6 Changes of Response Period Due to Flexural Damage
3.2 Dynamic Response and Change of Response
PeriodFigure 5 shows the time histories of the input
ground motion, response acceleration anddisplacement at the center of gravity of theinertia mass, and acceleration versus lateralcommonly used as a near-field ground motion,
was used in the most cases of the tests. Far field
ground motions that have longer duration wereused in some tests.

169

stiffness of the system, respectively. The changeof natural period before and after the damage iscaptured by the following equation:

displacement hystereses. Flexural damage, suchas spalling of the cover concrete and bucklingand fracture of the longitudinal reinforcement
were observed at the bottom after the test. The
time histories of the response indicate that the
response natural period elongates after the
flexural damage occurred due to the large lateral
response displacement.

Td

T0

Assuming an elastoplastic skeleton curve of therestoring force versus deformation relation, as
shown in Figure 8, the virgin stiffness K 0 is
given as

K0 

Py

(3)

dy

The damaged stiffness K d is given as a secant
stiffness of the point at the maximum response
displacement d r max for simplicity sakealthough K d is dependent on the hysteretic
characteristics of the structure.

Kd 

Py

(4)

d r max

By substituting Equations (3) and (4) for
Equation (2), the maximum response ductility
QEDDM can be given as

3.3 Algorithm Estimating Earthquake Damage
To predict the degree of earthquake damage
based on the changes of response period, abridge column is idealized as a single-degree-offreedom (SDOF) system shown in Figure 7.

T dQEDDM  r max   d dy2

 T0 

(5)

The response ductility is estimated from thefollowing equation using the empiricalcoefficient for structural properties  , which isdetermined based on hysteretic characteristics.

The natural period T of the SDOF system isgiven asM
K

(2)

where T0 and K 0 are the natural period andstiffness of the system before damage, and Td
and K d are the natural period and stiffness ofthe damaged structure.

To evaluate such changes of vibration
characteristics due to the seismic damage,
response period of the column in certain
duration was calculated by the Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) analysis of the response
acceleration. Figure 6 shows the time historiesof the changes of response period for the
specimens. Here the duration of the FFTanalysis of 2.5 seconds and 5 seconds were used.
Considering the time scale factor (= 2), thedurations used are equivalent to 5 and 10
seconds, respectively, for real size columns. Theband path filter with the cutoff frequencies of
0.333 and 10 Hz was used in the FFT analyses
to eliminate the effects of the vibration
characteristics of the shake table and test setup.
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, when the response
displacement increases during the main pulsesof the ground motion, the response period
increases from the initial value, which indicatesthe seismic damage. Change of response period
is minor after the main pulses. Some case shows
large response period during the main pulses of
input ground motions such as the response of
Case 02R-090y. This is because the response
acceleration included the effects of the dominantnatural period of the input ground motions.

T  2

K0
Kd(1)

    QEDDM
Because the maximum response ductility 

where M and K are the inertia mass and

170

(6)

Acceleration(m/sec2)

10Input Ground Motion0

Acceleration(m/sec2)-105

a r max

Response Acceleration

0-5
End Trigger

Response Ductility

Acceleration (m/sec2)

Delay Time (10 sec)

No Exceeding of Trigger (20 sec)

1

0
Start Recording
Start Trigger

Response Acceleration (Close-up)-1
4

Response Lateral Displacement0-4

d r maxdy-8Period (sec)

1.5
1
0.5
T0
0

Td . end

Td . amax

Change of Response Period
0

10

20

30
40
Time (sec)

50

60

70

Figure 11 Definitions of Virgin Period and Damaged Period
measurements of vibrations that would be done
when the sensor unit is installed at a site.

response point view, it is unnecessary to record
response acceleration smaller than 0.5 m/sec2(50 gals) because such small acceleration would
not affect the structural serviceability, much lessstructural safety. Therefore, 0.5 m/sec2 shall be
used as the standard value for the start trigger.
When the response acceleration induced bytraffic is larger than 0.5 m/sec2, special
consideration should be made to determine theappropriate trigger.

The start trigger should be set to a value that islarger than the acceleration induced by traffic
vibrations because frequent start of the sensor
unit will shorten the service life of the sensor.
The value of the trigger may be dependent of thebridge structural type, bearing conditions,
ground conditions, etc. From the seismic173

to 0.43, and 0.61 of the empirical coefficient forstructural properties  is obtained.

is because the response includes thecharacteristics of the input ground motion. If 0.5
m/sec2 and 0.25 m/sec2 are used for the end
trigger, Equation (5) provides almost similar
accuracy for the estimated ductility, whichindicates
that
input
groundmotioncharacteristics do not have significant effects
when the trigger of smaller than 0.5 m/sec2 isused. Consequently, the end trigger is set to thesame value of the starting trigger, 0.5 m/sec2 (50gals). This can be used as the standard value forthe start and end triggers unless the traffic
vibration induces larger response acceleration.

Based on this investigation, the empiricalcoefficient for structural properties  equal toabout 0.6 is recommended. When the empiricalcoefficient  is preset for installation to a realcolumn, the importance of the bridges in an
emergency road network should also be
considered. For example,  = 1 may be used if
a target bridge has an important role in theemergency road network and underestimation of
the degree of seismic damage can not beallowed.

The duration of the FFT analysis does not havesignificant effect on the accuracy. Because
smaller duration captures changes of response
periods better, the smaller duration, which is 5
seconds, is recommended.

4. FIELD MEASUREMENT OF TRAFFICINDUCED VIBRATIONS BY MEANS OFINTELLIGENT SENSOR UNIT
4.1 Bridges Measured
As described in 3.4, it is important topredetermine the start trigger to warrant thelonger service life of an intelligent sensor unit. It
is also important how the proposed method
estimate the virgin period T0 under the effectof traffic induced vibrations. To investigate
these matters, a series of field measurements
were conduced using a prototype of theintelligent sensor unit on two reinforced
concrete bridge columns supporting three-spancontinuous bridge that are in-service.

Figure 13 shows the accuracy of the estimatedductility that is computed when 0.5 m/sec2 and 5
seconds are used for the end trigger and theduration of the FFT analysis, respectively, andalso shows the lines for the empirical coefficientfor structural properties  equal to 0.5, 1 and
1.5 for comparison. Values under these lines
overestimate the response ductility by the
proposed method while those over the lines
underestimate. Figure 13 shows that the
proposed method tends to estimate 2 times
larger response ductility than the measured.
Based on the regression analysis, 0.64 is
obtained as the empirical coefficient forstructural properties  , and the coefficient of

Figure 14 shows the target bridges and thedimensions of the bridge columns. Both bridges
have one fixed/others free boundary condition.
The fixed columns were selected formeasurements. Column A has a rectangularcross section with a dimension of 2.5 m by 2.2
m. The bridge was constructed in 1988 and thecolumn was retrofitted by steel jacketing. The
bottom portion about 1.1 m from the bottom isembedded in the ground, and the column is
supported by a pile foundation.

determination R 2 is 0.22.

Figure 13 also shows that the method tends tounderestimate the response ductility for thestronger axis of the columns of the rectangularsection. This is because the effect of stiffnesschanges due to the seismic damage would be
relatively small in stronger axis, which indicatesthe response of the column with the considerable
earthquake damage tends to occur in the
response in the weaker axis. Therefore, theregression analysis was conducted for the results
excluding the response of the stronger axis of
the rectangular columns. Consequently, theThe cross section of Column B is a rectangularwith a half-round at both ends. The dimensions
in longitudinal and transverse directions are 14.4
m and 5.4 m at the bottom and the section size
reduces to 12.6 m by 3.6 m at the height of 6 m
from the bottom. The bridge was constructed incoefficient of determination R 2 was improved

175

(a) Column A(b) Column B
Figure 13 Bridges Measured
1971, and the column was retrofitted byreinforced concrete jacketing. The bottom half
portion is embedded in the ground, and thecolumn is supported by a caisson foundation.

Figure 15 shows the maximum difference of the
maximum and minimum response accelerations
induced by the traffic vibrations. Here themaximum difference is defined as the double
amplitude of response acceleration. The
maximum double amplitude was 0.18 m/sec2
and 0.06 m/sec2 for Column A and B,
respectively. These results also show thebaseline drift due to traffic induced vibrations
could be about 0.2 m/sec2 at most, and thus thepossible maximum response acceleration may be
about 0.2 to 0.3 m/sec2. Base on these
considerations, the start trigger of 0.5 m/sec2,
which is the standard value for the start and end
triggers, can be used for these bridges.

Two horizontal (longitudinal and transverse ofbridge axis) accelerations were measured. The
sensor was manually started for measurements.
The duration of measurement and the sampling
frequency were set to 120 seconds and 100 Hz,
respectively, and 40 times of measurements
were conducted for each column. The baseline
shifting due to traffic vibrations included in therecorded data was eliminated in data processing.
4.2 Double Amplitude of Response Acceleration
Figure 14 shows time histories of response
acceleration. The results after baseline
correction are shown here. Figure 14 also shows
the change of natural period calculated from the
FFT analysis with the duration of 5 seconds.

4.3 Virgin Period
As shown in Figure 14, the response periodchanges due to traffic conditions in 120 seconds.
To determine the virgin period of the column forthe proposed damage detection method, all the176needed because some scattering is included due
to traffic conditions and this may depend on thebridge structural type, bearing conditions,
ground conditions, etc. If the sensor unit isinstalled for an important bridge, and the scatterof the periods obtained from preliminary
measurements is relatively large, special
attention may be paid for predetermination of
the virgin period. Smaller virgin period may be
used in such a case to prevent underestimationof the damage because smaller virgin period
results in larger estimated response ductility as
shown in Equation (5).

4) Field measurements verified that the 0.5
m/sec2 for the start and end triggers areappropriate. It is also found that the virgin
period can be predetermined by statisticalanalysis, but hundreds of datasets may beneeded because some scattering is included due
to traffic conditions.
6. REFERENCES
1. Sakai, J. and Unjoh, S.: Shake Table Tests forDevelopment of Rapid Repair Method forDamaged Reinforced Concrete Bridge
Columns, Proc. 6th International Conference
on Urban Earthquake Engineering, pp.
601-606, Tokyo, Japan 2009.
2. Kiremidjian, A. S., Cheung, A., Sarabandi, P.
and Nair, K.: Application of Damage
Detection Algorithms to Bridge Filed Data,
Proc. 23rd US-Japan Bridge Engineering
Workshop, pp. 337-350, Tsukuba, Japan,
2007.
3. Seki, M., Nishimura, A., Sano, H. andNakano, S.: Study on The Evaluation of
Damage Levels of RC Rigid Frame Railway
Bridges in The Case of Earthquake, J.
Structure Mechanics and. Earthquake
Engineering., JSCE, 731/I-63, 51-64., 2003.
(in Japanese)
4. Uehan, F. and Meguro, K.: Experimental
Research on Inspection Method for Damaged
Structure Using Microtremor Measurement,
Proc. of 11th Japan Earthquake Engineering
Symposium, pp.1975-1980, Tokyo, Japan,
2002. (in Japanese)
5. Uehan, F. and Meguro, K.: Development of
Non-Contact
Microtremor
Measuring
Method for Vibration Diagnoses of Railway
Structure, JSCE Journal of Earthquake
Engineering, Vol. 27, CD-ROM No. 272,
2003. (in Japanese)
6. Nihei, T., Sogabe, M., Tanimura, Y., Sasaya,
T., Hirano, K., Miyamoto, N. and Hamada,H.: Development of Damage Level Sensor
System for Railway RC Rigid-frame Viaduct,
J-RAIL 2007, pp. 183-186, 2007. (inJapanese)
7. Wu, Z. S. and Takahashi, T.: Damage
Detection with Hybrid Sensors of Fiber

5. CONCLUSIONSTo develop a quick detection system of
earthquake damage for structures, an algorithm
estimating changes of natural period has been
proposed. The method estimating the earthquake
damage was investigated through the analyses of
shake table test data of reinforced concrete
bridge column models. The field measurements
were conducted to evaluate the efficacy and theapplicability of the proposed method. Below are
the conclusions determined from the study:1) The response natural period increases after
the flexural damage due to the large deformationof the columns. Seismic damage of reinforced
concrete bridge columns can be evaluated using
natural period change.
2) The method estimating the response ductility
using response period before and after damage
was proposed. The relation between the degreeof damage and response ductility depending on
the applied specifications, and the sequence ofdata processing were also proposed. Thismethod can be used for any structural type bydetermining the empirical coefficient forstructural properties.
3) Through the analyses of shake table test
results, the empirical coefficient for structuralproperties for reinforced concrete bridge columnthat fails in flexure at the bottom wasdetermined to be 0.6. The start and end triggers
and the duration of FFT analyses were also
determined to be 0.5 m/sec2 and 5 seconds.

178

Optics and Composite Fibers, Proc. of theJapan Concrete Institute, Vol/24, No.1,
pp.1647-1652, Vol.24, 2002. (in Japanese)
8. Chen, G., Mu, H., Pommerenke, D. andDrewniak, J. L.: Damage Detection of
Reinforced Concrete Beams with Novel
Distributed Crack/Strain Sensors, Structural
Health Monitoring, Sage Publications, Vol.3(3), pp. 225-243, 2004.
9. Sonehara, K., Yokoyama, K., Harada, T. andTanabe, K.: Laboratory Test on Seismic
Damage Detection Using PVDF Film Sensor,
Proc. of 9th Motion and Vibration Control
Symposium, JSME, Vol. 2005, No.9,
pp.444-448, 2005. (in Japanese)
10. Kobayashi, H. and Unjoh, S.: Developmentof an earthquake damage detection systemfor bridge structures, Proc. 20th US-Japan
Bridge Engineering Workshop, pp. 125-132,
Washington D.C., USA, 2004.
11. Sakai, J., Kobayashi H. and Unjoh, S.: Quick
earthquake damage detection method forbridge structures, Proc. of World Forum on
Smart Materials and Smart Structures
Technology, Chongqing, China, 2007.
12. Nishida, H. and Unjoh, S.: Dynamic response
characteristic of reinforced concrete column
subjected to bilateral earthquake groundmotions, Proc. of 13th World Conference on
Earthquake Engineering, CD-ROM No. 576,
Vancouver, Canada, 2004.

13. Nishida, H. and Unjoh, S.: Shake Table Test
for Rectangular RC Column Subjected toThree Dimensional Excitation, Proc. of 9th
Symposium on Ductility Design Method for
Bridges, pp. 327-330, 2006. (in Japanese)
14. Nishida, H. and Unjoh, S.: Applicability offiber Model Analysis for Dynamic Responseof Rectangular RC Column Subjected toThree Dimensional Excitation, Proc. of 12th
Japan Earthquake Engineering Symposium,
No. 0196, Tokyo, Japan, 2006. (in Japanese)
15. Sakai, J. and Unjoh, S.: Earthquake
Simulation Test of Circular Reinforced
Concrete Bridge Column under Multidirectional Seismic Excitation, Earthquake
Engineering and Engineering Vibration,
Vol.5, No.1, pp. 103-110, 2006.
16. Sakai, J. and Unjoh, S.: Shake Table Test forDevelopment of Quick Repair Method for
Seismic Damage of Reinforced Concrete
Bridge Columns, Civil Engineering Journal,
Public Works Research Center, Vol. 50, No. 9,
pp. 30-35, 2008.
17. Sakai, J. and Unjoh, S.: Earthquake
Simulation Tests of Bridge Column Models
Damaged during 1995 Kobe Earthquake,
Proc. of 14th World Conference on
Earthquake Engineering, CD-ROM No.
S17-02-001, Beijing, China, 2008.

179

Shake Table Testing of Bridge Reinforced Concrete Columns under Combined Actions
byJuan G. Arias-Acosta 1 and David H. Sanders 2
ABSTRACTexperimental data and a lack of behavioral
understanding.

Combined loadings (axial, shear, bending andtorsion) can have significant effects on the force
and deformation capacity of reinforced concrete
bridge columns (RCC); these loads can result in
unexpected large deformations and extensive
damage. To study the impact of different loadings
on both circular and non-circular sections(interlocking spirals), eight large-scale cantilevertype RCC specimens will be tested on thebidirectional shake table facility at University of
Nevada, Reno (UNR). As part of the study, an
inertial loading system was developed to test on
shake table single RCC under biaxial groundmotions. Two sets of circular and interlocking
RCC will be subjected to different levels of
biaxial, torsion and vertical loads through realtime earthquake motions. The performance of thespecimens will be assessed in terms of strength,
deformation, and failure mode.

In order to address the complex behavior of bridge
members under combined loadings and its impact
on system response, a comprehensive projectsponsored by the National Science Foundation wasestablished in 2006. This project includes
researchers from six institutions, and the objectives
are to develop a fundamental knowledge of the
impact of combined actions on column
performance and their implications on system
response through analytical and experimental
research.
The work at UNR focuses on the developmentof refined analysis and shaking table tests of smallscale models of bridge columns subjected todifferent levels of biaxial, torsion and vertical loads
through real time earthquake motions. The
performance of the specimens will be assessed interms of strength, deformation, energy dissipationand failure mode. These results will be used tovalidate analytical tools, developing new inelastic
models for RCC under combined loadings and to
propose new design methodologies. This paper
highlights some of the preliminary work underway
at UNR.

KEYWORDS: bridge engineering, reinforced
concrete columns, combined loadings, shake table
test
1.0 INTRODUCTION
During moderate to large earthquakes, reinforced
concrete bridge columns are subjected to
combinations of actions and deformations, causedby spatially-complex earthquake ground motions,structural configurations and the interaction
between input and response characteristics. As aresult, the seismic behavior of RCC will be
seriously affected, and that in turn influences theperformance of bridges as critical components oftransportation systems. In addition, current
analysis methods, behavior theories and design
practices do not take into consideration the fullrange of interactions, due to the scarcity of
1
2

2.0 SPECIMEN DETAILSTwo sets of specimens of circular and interlocking
columns were constructed using current bridge
design details typical of bridges in California in
accordance with the Seismic Design Criteria(CALTRANS, 2006). The structural configuration
selected was similar to previous columns tested at
UNR (Laplace et al., 1999 and Correal et al.,2004). For circular columns the scaling factor
selected was 1/3. The diameter of the specimens
was 406 mm (16 in) and the height 1830 mm (72Graduate Student, Dept. of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Univ. of Nevada, Reno, NV89557, USA
Professor, Dept. of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Univ. of Nevada, Reno, NV89557, USA

180in), thus the aspect ratio was 4.5, which allows for
flexural dominated behavior. The columns were
reinforced with 20 No.4 (D13) deformed
longitudinal bars, distributed uniformly around theperimeter and fully developed with 90 degree
hooks in the footing. This resulted in alongitudinal reinforcement ratio of 2%. The
confinement consisted of a continuous spiral madefrom galvanized steel wire with a diameter of 6.25
mm (0.25 in) and a pitch of 38 mm (1.5 in). The
clear cover was set to 19 mm and the resulting
volumetric ratio of the spiral reinforcement was
0.92%. Details of circular specimens are shown in
Fig. 1.

(superstructure weight) but allows transfer theinertial forces from the structure to the specimen. A
similar structure that allows dynamic excitation in
one direction was developed at UNR ten years ago(Laplace, 1999). The new system is composed by a
3D four columns frame and a platform that sets onball bearings located at the top of the columns. The
platform is connected to the RCC specimen throughlinks in two perpendicular directions, whichtransfer shear and torsion but not axial load (Fig.
3a). Additional mass is set on the platform tosimulate the weight of a portion of the bridge
superstructure and this can be distributed in an
asymmetric configuration to induce torsion in thesystem. In addition, a safety system was designed
to catch the platform in the event of large
displacements or specimen collapse.

For interlocking columns a scale factor of 1/4 wasused. Consequently, the height was 1800 mm (72in) and the width in the short side was 305 mm (12in), while that in the long dimension was 445 mm(17.5 in). The longitudinal reinforcement
consisted of 32 No. 3 (D10) deformed bars, spaced
evenly in two circular patterns and fully developedin the footing. The resulting reinforcement ratio
was 2%, while the volumetric ratio of the spiralreinforcement was 1.0%. The confinement foreach of the circular sections consisted of acontinuous spiral made from galvanized steel wirewith a diameter of 4.9 mm (0.192 in) and a pitchof 25 mm (1.0 in). The clear cover was set to 13
mm (0.5 in). Details of the interlocking specimens
are shown in Fig. 2.

The axial load is applied directly to the specimen
through a center-hole ram equipped with a servovalve. The ram is connected to the specimen
throughout an unbonded prestressed bar placed in
an ungrouted conduit at the middle of the column
and anchored at the footing. It is important to notethat the main purpose of the prestressed bar is toinduce the required level of axial load in thecolumns rather than increases its displacement
capacity as has been found in other studies (Sakai
et al., 2006).
Since the designed system does not induce
secondary moments (PD-effects) in the specimen
and the unbonded prestressed bar inside the column
would generate restoring lateral forces, additional
dynamic actuators will be located at the top of thespecimen to induce the equivalent force to have PD
effects and to compensate the restoring force
throughout hybrid simulation (Fig. 3b).

The design compressive strength of the concrete
was set as 30 MPa (4.5 ksi), while the nominal
yielding strength of the steel was 447 MPa (64ksi) for deformed bars and 420 MPa (60 ksi) for
steel wire. Table 1 shows the real properties ofsteel and concrete based on coupons and cylinders
tests. The superstructure mass was defined as 356
kN (80 kips), which is equivalent to an axial loadof 8% of Agf’c.

In view of the complexity of the system in terms of
the active control of dynamic actuators, the test
program was divided in two phases. At the
beginning a set of two circular and two interlocking
columns will be tested without any axial load or PD
effects. A second phase will incorporate all theeffects.

3.0 EXPERIMENTAL TEST SETUP
As part of the project a new inertial loading
system was developed at UNR to test single
cantilever-type columns on shake table under
biaxial excitations. The aim of the test setup is tohave a supporting structure that carries safely thevertical component of the inertial mass

4.0 ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION
Analytical models were developed to anticipate theseismic performance of the specimens and to181

determine the appropriate input loadings to be
used during the tests. Time history inelastic
analysis have been performed using OpenSees(Mazzoni et al.,2006). Analytical models of single
cantilever-type columns with lumped mass as wellmodels of the specimens including the inertial
loading system were studied under different levelsof earthquake excitations and mass distribution todetermine limit states in the behavior of thecolumns during the tests. Fig.5. shows theanalytical models used in this study.

five cases of mass distribution at the top of theinertial frame.
4.1 Ground Motions
The two horizontal components of the 1940
Imperial Valley earthquake (El Centro), the 1994
Northridge earthquake, the 1992 Cape Mendocino
earthquake and the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu
earthquake (Kobe) were used as the input motions.
The earthquake records for Northridge and Cape
Mendocino were scaled to have a hazard level of
2% of exceedence in 50 years (Zhang and Xu,
2008).

The biaxial flexural behavior of the columns was
simulated using a lumped plasticity modelthroughout uniaxial fiber elements (element beamwith-hinges in OpenSees). The stress-strain
properties of the unconfined and confined concrete
were simulated using the Mander’s model(Mander et al., 1988). For that, the actual strengthof the concrete measured from cylinders at 28
days was used. Likewise, the longitudinal
reinforcing steel was idealized using the uniaxial
steel material model developed by Chang and
Mander (1994). The actual stress-strain backbone
curve measured from coupons was used as the
input parameter for the steel material model.
Also, the reinforcement slippage was included in
the models in the form of additional rotation at theplastic hinge location.

The amplitude of the records was increased until
the maximum capacity of the analytical model wasachieved. Also, the time axis of the input motions
was compressed to account for the specimen scale
factor.
From the dynamic analysis, it was found that therecord at Cape Mendocino amplified by a factor of
1.4 will induce the maximum displacement
ductility demand on the specimens without
exceeding the shake table capacity. The maximum
accelerations imposed in both horizontal directions
were 0.8g and 0.95g, respectively.
5.0 ANALYTICAL RESULTS

Since inelastic fiber models for torsion are still
under development (Mullapudi et al., 2008), a
reduction factor of 20% the elastic torsional
stiffness (GJ) was used to take in account thetorsional cracking of the concrete in agreementwith the Seismic Design Criteria (CALTRANS,
2006).

Fig. 6 compares the displacement history andhysteresis (base shear-displacement) curves for themodels of a single column and the specimen with
the inertial load system, without taking inconsideration the axial load. From the figure isclear that the inertial loading system does notchange the behavior of the specimen.

To estimate the lateral load and displacement
capacities of the specimens moment-curvature
analysis were performed. Table 2 summarizes thecapacities of the circular and interlocking
columns. Once the capacity was estimated, a seriesof nonlinear time history analysis were conducted
to select the input motion to be simulated in the
shake table test.

In terms of the torsion, it was found that the loadcase 2 induces the largest demand on the circularspecimen (64 kN-m), which is in between thevalues at cracking (26 kN-m) and ultimate (80 kNm) calculated using the ACI code (ACI, 2008).
6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKSThe new inertial mass system to be used on
bidirectional shake table tests at UNR represent asignificant advance in the simulation of single RCC

As was mentioned before, five cases of mass
distribution were studied to determine the largest
torsional demand on the specimen. Fig. 4 shows182

under simultaneous loads induced by real timeearthquake motions. One of the most importantcharacteristics of this system is that it allows theinteraction between bending and torsion with orwithout axial load.

Zhang, J. and Xu, S.Y. (2008). " Seismic Response
Simulations of Bridges Considering Shear-Flexural
Interaction of Columns. " Proceedings of the 6th
National Seismic Conference on Bridges &Highways, Paper No. P29, Charleston, South
Carolina, USA.

Preliminary analytical and experimental results
found at UNR and by researchers from otherinstitutions involved in the project have shownthat the interaction between loads have asignificant effect in the capacity of reinforced
concrete bridge columns under seismic loads.
These results are being used to develop analytical
tools and new inelastic models for reinforced
concrete columns that in turn will assist in thedevelopment of new design methodologies.

Mander J.B., Priestley, M.J.N. and Park, R. (1988).
"Theoretical Stress-Strain Model for ConfinedConcrete." Journal of Structural Eng. 114 (8), pp
1804-1826.
Laplace, P., Sanders, D.H., and Saiidi, M.S. (1999).
"Shake Table Testing of Flexure DominatedReinforced Concrete Bridge Columns." Report No.
CCEER-99-13, Center for Civil Engineering
Earthquake Research, Department of Civil
Engineering, University of Nevada-Reno, USA,438 pp.

7.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Mazzoni, S., McKenna, F., Scott, M., and Fenves,
G.L. "Open System for Earthquake Engineering
Simulation (OpenSees), 2006." User manual,version 1.7.3, Pacific Earthquake Engineering
Research Center, University of California,
Berkeley,California,USA,
http://opensees.berkeley.edu/OpenSees/manuals/us
ermanual/index.html

The research presented in this paper was foundedby The National Science Foundation under Grant
No.EMS – 0530737. The Assistance of Ian
Buckle, Patrick Laplace and Chad Lyttle of theLarge Scale Structural Laboratory at University of
Nevada Reno is gratefully acknowledged.
8.0 REFERENCES

Mullapudi, T.R., Ayoub, S. and Belarbi, A. (2008).
"Effect of Coupled Shear-Bending Deformations on
the Behavior of RC Highway Structures Subjected
to Extreme Seismic Loading." Proceedings of the
6th National Seismic Conference on Bridges &Highways, Paper No. P19, Charleston, South
Carolina, USA.

ACI Committee 318 (2008), "Building CodeRequirements for Structural Concrete (ACI 31808) and Commentary." American Concrete
Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan, USA, 465
pp.
California Department of Transportation. (2006)"Bridge Design Specifications." Engineering
Service Center, Earthquake Engineering Branch,
California, USA, 250 pp.

Sakai, J., Jeong H. and Mahin, S.A. (2006).
"Reinforced Concrete Bridge Columns that ReCenter Following Earthquakes." Proceedings of
the 8th U.S. National Conference on Earthquake
Engineering, Paper No. 1421, San Francisco,California, USA.

Chang, G. and Mander, J. (1994). "Seismic
Energy Based Fatigue Damage Analysis of Bridge
Columns: Part I – Evaluation of Seismic
capacity." NCEER Technical Report 94-0006.
Correal, J.F., Saiidi, M.S., and Sanders, D.H.
(2004). "Seismic Performance of RC Bridge
Columns Reinforced with Interlocking Spirals."
Report No. CCEER-04-6, Center for Civil
Engineering Earthquake Research, Department ofCivil Engineering, University of Nevada-Reno,
USA, 438 pp.

183

a: Without axial load.

b: With axial load (prestressed bar + actuators)

Figure 3: Inertial loading system.

78 kN

78 kN

88 kN

88 kN

38 kN

88 kN

78 kN

78 kN

38 kN

88 kN

88 kN

88 kN

Case 2

Case 1Case 3

88 kN

38 kN

88 kN

88 kN

88 kN

88 kN

88 kN

38 kN

Case 4

Case 5Figure 4: Mass distribution cases studied.

186        
         
                       
                          
      


       
           
                 
     
       
       
            
        
           
     
              
                
      
                   
 

       
     
                       
             
           
                
                        
                                        
             
      
               
     
            
          
         
          
    

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              


 


  



     







     







  







           













    







              







            







 

 

                 
          
                                         


   

 

             


  



             
     
              
      
                              
                                                               
            
                                                                                             

       
       
       

190

                                         
      
  









    


    







 



         
                     
     
              

 
 








 

 
                                    
     

    
   
       
                
                 
                             
          
                 
        
     
         

      
                            
                                 
      
                              
              
     
                                    
           
         


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            

                               
      
            
             
     

                                         
             
     
                    
                  
       
       
    
       
                    
                    
             
                                   

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        

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
    

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    
    

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                  

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                                                                 
              
                                
 

                

        
                 
                                                  
     
              
                
                 
                
      

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 

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

 

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 
         

                 
                 
                                    
                                 
            
                               
    
       
                           
              
     

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  






 

  












 

 













  

 


 

 


 











 










  







  










   







 














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
 


 

    
              
 

                          
     
   
                                       
     
     
    
     

                   
            
     
     

199

     
                     
      
     
              
     
        
     
     


                
          
           
    
                 
     
    
     
    
                             
        
       
      
             
                                         
 
                  
    
    
    
    
      
        
                
     



    
            
                  
    
                            

201

Outline of the Damage of Transportation Facilities and Geotechnical Structuresby the 2009 L’Aquila, Italy Earthquake
byKazuhiko Kawashima1, Omer Aydan 2, Kazuo Konagai 3, Atsushi Yamashita 4, and Sven-Peter Teodori 5

ABSTRACTThis is a reconnaissance report on the damage totransportation facility and geotechnical structurescaused by the 2009 L’Aquila, Italy earthquake.
Site investigation was conducted by the authors
during the period of April 18-21, 2009. Presented
is a discussion on the damage of transportation
facilities. Geotechnical damage and groundmotions are also presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
A strong earthquake with ML=5.8 and MW=6.2
occurred near L’Aquila, Central Italy, at 03:32
local time on April 6, 2009 as a result of 15 kmlong NW-SE striking normal fault. The fault dips
southwest and the city of L’Aquila is located on
the hanging wall of the causative fault. Damage in
L’Aquila and its vicinity was extensive with about
10,000-15,000 buildings heavily damaged.
Approximately 294 people were killed, with over
1,000 injured.
The population of L’Aquila was about 70,000.
The city center spreads over terrace of calcareous
conglomerates while Aterno River cuts throughthe terrace down to lower elevations. The terrace
is about 100 m higher than the elevations oflowland along Aterno River.
A joint reconnaissance damage investigation teamconsisting of ten members from Japan Society of
Civil Engineers, Japanese Geotechnical Society,
Architectural Institute of Japan and Japan
Association for Earthquake Engineering was sent.
The authors conducted a field investigation on thegeotechnical and geological damage as well as
investigation on the damage to transportation
facilities and other structures in the regions of
L’Aquila and its vicinity including Ocre, Onna,

Paganica and Coppito during April 18-21, 2009.
Based on the field investigation, feature of thedamage including their damage mechanisms arepresented here.
It should be however noted that since the field
investigation was conducted without priorinformation on design drawings and analysis, it ishighly possible that the interpretation of the
failure mechanism by the authors might not be
accurate. Moreover, because access to theextensively damaged regions including the oldcity of L’Aquila, Onna and Paganica wasrestricted, there were a number of structures
which could not be investigated thoroughly.
2. GEOLOGICAL AND SEISMOLOGICALCONDITIONSThe stratigraphy of L’Aquila consists of schists,
limestone, lacustrine deposits, conglomeratic
deposits and Holocene deposits from bottom totop. Schists are best seen at the east portal ofGran-Sasso tunnel. Schists are overlain by
limestone, which is the main rock unit constituting
Gran-Sasso Mountain ridge. The basin of
L’Aquila consists of lacustrine clayey deposits.
Conglomeratic deposits cover these deposits. The
inclusions of conglomeratic deposit originate fromlimestone and other rocks from nearby mountains.
Matrix of conglomeratic deposits is clayey orcalcareous, which can be easily dissolved by
1: Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo,
Japan
2. Professor, Tokai University, Shimizu, Japan
3. Professor, Institute of Industrial Science,
University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
4: Professor, Gifu University, Gifu, Japan
5: Researcher, Nippon Koei Consultants Company,
Tsukuba, Japan

(a) CL1(b) CL2(c) CL3(d) CL4
Photo 1 Surface ruptures in the area of Aterno River to the west of Onnna town
(refer to Fig. 3 for locations of CL1-CL4))
Table 1 Main strong motion records

Station name
Aquil Park
V. F.AternoColle Grilli
V.&F. Aterno

Station
code
AQK
AQV
AQG
AQA

Latitude Longitude Type of ground42.34542.37742.37642.34513.401
13.33713.33913.401

Conglomerate
FluvialLimestone
Fluvial

Re
(km)
5.6
5.8
4.3
4.8

Vs30
(m/s)
455
475
1000
475

PGA
(m/s2)
3.66
6.46
5.05
4.78

close vicinity of L’Aquila City, there are fourstrong motion stations as shown in Table 1; AQV(GX066-B), AQG (FA030-B), AQA (CU104-B)
and AQK (AM043-C). They were all on the
hanging wall side of the earthquake fault. The
equivalent shear wave velocity between the
ground surface and 30 m from the ground surface,
Vs30, is in the range of 455-1000 m/s. The largest
peak ground acceleration of 6.46 m/s2 wasrecorded at AQV.

Acceleration spectra at some selected strong
motion stations (AQV, AQK, AQA, AQG, MTR,
FMG, GSA and GSG) are shown in Fig. 6. The
predominant periods of the recorded accelerations
range between 0.05s and 0.4s in the lateralcomponents. The predominant period of about 0.8
s at AQG station is noted as was pointed out by
Luca et al. (2005). The spectral accelerations ofvertical component are high at natural periods
ranging between 0.05s and 0.1s.

Fig. 4 shows the acceleration records at AQV andAQK stations. It is of great interest that theamplitude of ground accelerations are notsymmetric and their forms are different each otheralthough the epicentral distances and theequivalent shear wave velocity Vs30 of ground arealmost the same.

4. GEOTECHNICAL DAMAGE
1) Horizontal movements and cracking in the areaof Aterno River
Horizontal movements and cracking wereobserved in the area of Aterno River to the west of
Onna town. The embankments on both sides ofAterno River moved towards the river creating
separation cracks as well as some compression
cracks in the vicinity of the damaged bridge on
Aterno River as shown in Fig. 7 and Photo 2. The
cracks and movements on the east side of the river
were more intensive as the ground was inclined
towards west. Nevertheless, any sand boiling was
not observed in the area. It would be quite
speculative on the cause of these movements.

Fig. 5 shows the acceleration records at GSA and
GSG stations, which are reportedly founded on
Eocene limestone with a shear wave velocity of 1
km/s. The GSA station is at Assergi and the GSG
station is located in an underground gallery.
Although the epicentral distances and groundconditions are the same, the acceleration at groundsurface is amplified almost 15 times that in theunderground gallery.

204

Fig. 4 Acceleration records at AQV and AQK stations

Fig. 5 Acceleration records at GSA and GSG strong motion stations

205

Fig. 6 Acceleration response spectra of selected strong motion stations
Based on InSAR evaluation, ground movements
are large in the close vicinity of Aterno River near
Onna town. Tectonic movements, groundliquefaction or both might cause the movement inthis area. If ground liquefaction is involved, it islikely that there is a thick impermeable silty andclayey layer on top of the liquefiable groundbelow.

(a)

(c)

(b)

(d)

Photo 2 Surface cracks on the east side of AternoRiver (Refer to Fig. 7 for locations)Fig. 7 Cracks in the vicinity of a damaged
bridge on Aterno River (Refer to
Photo 2)206Photo 18 Damage of a frame reinforced concretepierPhoto 15 Top of a pile-bent pierA 2 m long, 2.5 m tall stone masonry arch culvert
collapsed and was temporarily repaired by fillingcrushed lime stone into the culvert as shown in
Photos 19 and 20. How the arch culvert suffereddamage was not known because it was alreadyrepaired. However it is likely that a part of stone
masonry arch members lost the equilibrium andcollapsed during the earthquake. Because theembedment of the arch was shallow without
covering masonries on the arch, the arch members
had less stability.

Photo 16 Failure of a pile-bent pierA 20 m long 4 m wide three-span continuous
bridge located in the suburbs of Onna Village
suffered damage at the top of frame piers asshown in Photos 17 and 18. Plastic hinge did notform at the beam-column connection. The damage
which was developed prior to the earthquake
progressed during the earthquake. Embankment
right behind the abutment settled and a cast-ironwater pipe attached on the bridge suffered damage
at the connection between the bridge and theembankment. Several cracks occurred on the riverdyke due to soil sliding.

Photo 19 Emergency repair of a stone masonryarc culvert (SR261)

Photo 17 A 20 m long bridge near Onna Village

Photo 20 Road temporarily repaired by fillingcrashed limestone211

A part of the A24 viaduct in L’Aquila as shown in
Photo 21 also suffered damage. The viaduct is a
37 m long simply supported PC box-girder
bridges supported by 11-20 m tall reinforced
concrete columns. It is supported by steel fixed(sliding) and movable (roller) bearings orelastomeric bearings. The viaduct was separated
in the upper and lower bound bridges. Verticalgaps as large as 200 mm were seen at numerous
expansions as shown in Photo 22. A number ofdecks drifted by nearly 200 mm in thelongitudinal and transverse directions as shown in
Photo 23. The bearings where gaps occurred at
expansion joints or decks drifted could hardly be
investigated, but it is likely that the gaps at
expansions were developed by failure of bearings.
Drift of the decks is generally developed due toresidual deformation of elastomeric bearings. A
part of the covering concrete spalled as shown in
Photo 24 at the bottom of a pier. It is likely thatthe pier nearly yielded. Photo 25 shows damage ofa shear connector at the end of a deck.

Photo 23 Residual drift of two bridges in thelongitudinal direction

Photo 24 Spalling of a part of covering concrete

Photo 21 A viaduct of A24 in L’Aquila

Photo 25 Damage of a shear connector

2) Damage of retaining wall
Settlement of road surface occurred at a numberof locations in the lowland along Aterno River.
One of the two lanes of SS17 at the intersection
with SR615 was partly restricted for traffic
because the road embankment locally subsided by
350mm and the upper part of the stone masonry
retaining wall leaned as shown in Photos 26 and27. The retaining wall was propped by wood bars
for resisting the earth pressure. The detour lane
was being constructed adjacent to the affectedlane.

Photo 22 Gap at an expansion joint212

As was apparent from the lessons in the past
events, old unreinforced masonry buildings were
extremely vulnerable to earthquake. In particular,
unreinforced masonry buildings with soil joint
suffered extensive damage.
Extensive corrosion of steel bars in reinforced
concrete structural members was widely observed
not only in bridges but also in buildings. Concrete
cover was so thin for preventing corrosion. There
were even cases when concrete cover was not
virtually provided. Corrosion of bars resulted indirect loss of tension strength as well as loss ofbond strength between concrete and bars.

Photo 26 Subsidence of a road embankment at theintersection of Route SS17 and Route
SR615

A local and probably old three-span continuous
short-span bridge collapsed, and several bridges
suffered damage. At A24 viaduct in L’Aquila,
residual drift of decks and vertical gaps of
expansion joints occurred at number of spanspossibly due to damage of bearings. Failure ofshear connectors was also observed. However
damage of bridges was generally less significant
because most of bridges in the damaged area were
small supported by short columns.

Photo 27 Emergent repairing of damaged
embankment

ACKLOWLEDGEMENTS

6. SUMMARY

The authors express their sincere appreciation toProfessor Giovanni Barla, Torino Polytechnic
University for hosting the JSCE/JGS/JAEE/AIJ
joint Reconnaissance Team. Special appreciation
is extended to Professor Mauro Dolce,
Department of Civil Protection, Professor Michele
Calvi, University of Pavia, and Professor Paolo
Pinto, University of Rome, "La Sapienza".
Without the kind support of a number of personnel,
the reconnaissance damage survey could not be
successfully conducted.

The L’Aquila earthquake provided valuablelessons on how transportation facilities behaved
under an Mw=6.2 low probability and highconsequence event. Historically L’Aquila and its
vicinity were subjected to at least eight
earthquakes since the 14th century. During thisearthquake, extensive damage was developed in
the old city of L’Aquila and the surrounding
towns and villages including Onna, Paganica,
Fossa and Ocre. The L’Aquila basin was coveredby conglomeratic clayey or calcareous deposits
underlay by lacustrine clayey deposits.

REFERENCES
1. Bagh, S., L. Chiaraluce, P. De Gori, M. Moretti,
A. Govoni, C. Chiarabba, P. Di Bartolomeo, M.
Romanelli, (2007), “Background seismicity inthe central Apennines of Italy: The Abruzzo
region case study,” Tectonophysics, 444, 80-92.
2. Bigi, G., Cosentino, D., Parotto, M., Sartori, M.,
and Scandone, P., (1990), “Structural model of
Italy and gravity map, CNR – Progetto

Inherent to the unique soil condition, settlements
and sliding of ground and soil structures occurredat numerous locations in the lowland along AternoRiver, and a number of sliding and rock falloccurred in the nearby mountainous regions. Twosinkholes were found in the old city of L’Aquila
due to collapse of thin roofed caves in
conglomeratic calcareous deposits.

213

7. CEN, Eurocode 8, (1994), “Design provisions
for earthquake resistance of structures,
European ENV 1998,” Comite Eurpeen deNormalisation, Brussels.
8. Italian Strong Motion Network (RAN managed
by the Italian Department of Civil Protection,
DPC. (http://www.protezionecivile.it/minisite/).
9. Luca, G. D., Marcucci, S., Milana, G., and Sano,T., (2005), “Evidence of low-frequency
amplification in the city of L'Aquila, central
Italy, through a multidisciplinary approach
including strong- and weak-motion data,
ambient noise, and numerical modeling,”
Bulletin of Seismological Society of America.,95, 1469 -1481.

Finalizzato Geodinamica, Quaderni de “La
Ricerca Scientifica” No. 114, 3.
3. Dramis, F. and Blumetti, A.M., (2005), “Someconsiderations
concerningseismic
geomorphology
andpaleoseismology,”
Tectonophysics, 408, 177-191.
4. Institute for Environmental Protection andResearch, (2006), “Geologic Map of Italy, scale
1:50.000, Sheet No. 359-L'Aquila,” S.EL.CA.
Firenze, Italy.
5. Lew, H.S. (editor), (1990) “Performance ofstructures during the Loma Prieta earthquake ofOctober 17, 1989,” NIST Special Publication
778, National Institute of Standars andTechnology, Gaithersburg, MD, USA.
6. Port and Harbor Research Institute, Japan,(1997), “Handbook on liquefaction remediationof reclaimed land,” Balkema, 312p.

214

THEME 5
Storm Surge and Tsunami

Decision Making on Evacuation from the Tsunami
Following the Earthquake off Kuril Islands in 2006by
Yoshio Suwa1 and Fuminori Kato2
characteristic, it is important to hand down thelessons learned from past disasters andcommunicate a picture of expected damage toresidents in disaster prevention. It is necessary
to have neighbors call out to each other toevacuate and to support mobility-impaired
residents during evacuations, and to engage in
local
efforts
towardrestoration
andrehabilitation after damage has been suffered.
These actions cannot be easily realized without
residents’ having close ties with their neighbors
and enthusiasm for participation in disaster drills.
Accumulation of social capital is thus required.

ABSTRACTThis paper builds and examines a model ofdecision making on evacuation from the tsunami
in November 2006. A questionnaire survey on
actions etc. after the evacuation order was
conducted in Kushiro City, and the model was
examined through a structural equation
modeling. The results show that intention toevacuate was related to concern over inundation,
resources on evacuation, and experiences oftsunami damage and evacuation, and that social
capital had close relation to interest in disasterprevention.
KEYWORDS: Evacuation, Social
Structural Equation Method, Tsunami

For evacuation from a tsunami, it has been notedthat people excessively depend on evacuation
information or tsunami warnings when they
make decisions about evacuation, that people
tend to have too optimistic a view about danger,
and that people's impressions of tsunami tend tobe fixed based on their past experience [1]. A
report from the Tokachi-oki Earthquake in 2003
indicates that those who, immediately after theyfelt a big tremor, clearly understood that they
were in danger unless they evacuated wereactually able to evacuate swiftly [2]. The
Cabinet Office conducted a nation-wide survey
on social capital [3] and reported somenoteworthy findings about its relationship withdisaster prevention. However, there are noreports where the action of evacuation from atsunami was analyzed out of the need toconsider social capital.

Capital,1. INTRODUCTION
Storm surge disaster has frequently occurredboth in and out of Japan in the past several years,
and large-scale tsunami disasters are expected tooccur in the future. However, in reality, there aremany residents who do not evacuate despite
their recognition of the need to do so due tonormalcy bias and other factors, even when atyphoon approaches or a tsunami warning isissued.
On the other hand, social capital is drawing
attention in the context of disaster prevention,
togetherwithvolunteers,
community
development activities, and international
cooperation. Social capital is a characteristic ofsocial organization, with others being "trust,""norms of reciprocity," and "network of civic
engagement," and is known to enhance theefficiency of society by activating people's
cooperative action.

In this research, which views social capital as
the basis for local people's historically formed
disaster prevention capability, we surveyed
evacuation decision-making factors for the
purpose of reviewing measures to promote
1 Head, Coast Division, National Institute for Land andInfrastructure Management, Asahi 1 Tsukuba-shi,
Ibaraki-ken 305-0804 Japan
2 Senior Researcher, Coast Division, ditto

In general the occurrence of tsunami ischaracterized by long intervals. Given this217

about 0.9 meters at Kushiro City, damage by theearthquake itself was greater. Tsunami damage
was minor following the Chile Earthquake that
occurred on May 24, 1960. The Kushiro-oki
Earthquake on January 15, 1993, shook the city
at a seismic intensity of about 6, and damage
caused by the seismic motion was serious. When
the Tokachi-oki Earthquake struck on September
26, 2003, the city was severely jolted, and 193
residents evacuated voluntarily.

evacuation.
2. SURVEY METHOD
2.1 Outline of Survey
On November 15, 2006, a tsunami warning wasissued in the area of Hokkaido facing the
Okhotsk Sea and the eastern coast facing the
Pacific following an earthquake that occurred
off the Kuril Islands. All local governments
located in the concerned coastal areas issued anevacuation directive and order (to 130,804
residents). Kushiro City, where the seismic
intensity was recorded to be only 1, issued anevacuation order, simultaneously with thetsunami warning (8:29 pm), to 2,561 households(4,675 residents) in the areas in which
evacuation is necessary when a tsunami of 3
meters or less is expected based on the Tsunami
Hazard Map of Kushiro City [4] and theOnbetsu area (i.e., the area seaward from thetrack of the Nemuro Main Line). The firsttsunami waves hit the coast at a height of 0.2
meters at 9:43 pm; however, the waves neverexceeded 0.3 meters in height, and no damage
was done. At 11:30 pm. when the tsunami
warning was switched to a tsunami advisory, theevacuation order was cancelled.

As stated above, Kushiro’s citizens have almost
never experienced tsunami damage. Nonetheless,
the Central Disaster Prevention Council predicts
that major earthquakes with epicenterssomewhere in the Kuril Trench occur at intervalsof 500 years. In response, Kushiro City
distributed a new hazard map based ontsunami-inundated areas predicted by Hokkaido
Government in 2007. In addition, voluntarydisaster prevention and mitigation activities areaggressively conducted, including surveys on
citizens' awareness of tsunami evacuation anddisaster “desk drills” by the Kushiro City
Federation of Disaster Prevention Promotion
Councils (a federation of voluntary disasterprevention organizations). However, these
activities are experiencing some problems,
including falling participation in disasterprevention efforts as well as fewer people taking
the lead in disaster prevention due to hollowing
out of the city center.

To clarify what factors differentiated those who
evacuated from those who did not, aquestionnaire survey was conducted thattargeted residents in the area of Kushiro City,
Hokkaido, that was subjected to the evacuation
order.

2.3 Survey Method
A questionnaire survey was conducted andrecovered answers from respondents toquestions on the following: the number of
co-inhabitants; presence or absence ofmobility-impaired people and car drivers; typeof housing and number of stories; fear ofseismic motion; anticipation of inundation andrelated danger; recognition of warnings andevacuation orders; intention to, preparation for,and action concerning evacuation; presence orabsence of mutual alerting to evacuate;
experience of disaster or evacuation; status ofparticipation in disaster prevention drills;
recognition of the circulated hazard map(Kushiro Anshin Map), shelters, and expected
inundation areas; recognition of past disasters

2.2 Past Tsunamis in Kushiro and Present
Measures
Kushiro City faces the Pacific Ocean. The
Kushiro River, New Kushiro River and Akan
River flow through the city area and drain into
the sea. Learning from a flood of the Kushiro
River that occurred in 1920 and inundated thecity area, the government started excavation of a
new water channel (to become the New Kushiro
River in 1931). When the Tokachi-oki
Earthquake occurred on March 4, 1952,
Hamanaka Town, east of Kushiro City, were
inflicted with serious damage by a resulting
tsunami. While the height of this tsunami was218

stay the longest, the first floor accounts for
56.5%, 2nd floor 20.9%, 3rd floor 4.7%, 4thfloor 5.3%, 5th floor 9.3%, and 6th floor or
higher 2.3%.

and memories of past disasters; desire to live in
the neighborhood permanently; and social
capital (trust of others, neighborhoodsocialization, activities based on community
bonds, individual activity, etc.). Questions aboutsocial capital included the same questions asked
by the Cabinet Office survey [3] for comparison.
The questionnaire also clearly stated that the
subject earthquake, which occurred in
November 2006, is different from anotherearthquake that occurred off the Kuril Islands on
January 13, 2007, after which a tsunami warningand evacuation order were also issued, so that noconfusion between them should occur.

3.2 Information on Respondents' Locations
Information on the respondents' locations,loudspeaker car routes, and the locations of PA
radio facilities were input into a geographicalinformation system, and then the elevations of
the residents' homes, expected inundation depth(in the case of a once-in-500-years earthquake),
distance from the coastline, distance from thewaterfront (i.e., the closest coastline or river),distance from the evacuation area, distance fromloudspeaker car routes, and distance fromdisaster PA radio facilities (outdoor speakers)
were measured. An outline of the results isprovided below:- For the elevation of the respondents' homes,
homes below 1 meter in elevation account for
1.7%, 1 to 2 meters 60.5%, and 2 to 3 meters29.2%.
- For the expected inundation depth, homes
expected to be inundated to a depth of less than
0.5 meters account for 37.2%, 0.5 to 1.0 meters42.9%, and 1.0 to 1.5 meters 11.0%. Of all
respondents’ houses, 5.6% have an expected
inundation depth of zero meters.
- For distance from the coastline, 48.2% are over
1,000 meters away, meaning a relatively highnumber of homes are located away from thecoastline. This is because it is expected to be
flooded by tsunamis through the Kushiro River.
- For the distance from the waterfront, 19.9%
are less than 100 meters away, 33.6% are 100 to
200 meters, and 28.2% are 200 to 300 meters.
No households are beyond 1,000 meters.
- For the distance from the designatedevacuation area, 88.0% are less than 400 metersaway.
- For the distance from a loudspeaker car route,
91.0% are less than 100 meters away.
• For the distance from a disaster information
PA radio facility, 27.6% are less than 100 meters
away, 37.5% for 100 to 200 meters, and 17.3%
for 200 to 300 meters.

In order to prevent biasing of samples by
location or type of housing, the number ofhouseholds to be candidate subjects of thequestionnaire survey was allocated by a unit set
by combining such attributes as the zone ofelevation (below 2 meters and 2 meters or
higher), expected inundation depth (below 1
meter and 1 meter or higher), and type of
housing (detached or collective) for each blockin the areas to which an evacuation order is to beissued, and the households to be surveyed wereselected from those at random.
The questionnaire was handed in person to 557
households and delivered to 93 households from
December 15 to 17, 2007. Questionnaireanswers were returned by mail, postage collect.
The recovery ratio was 46% (302 households);
however, one questionnaire was left blank.
3. SURVEY RESULTS
3.1 Attributes of Respondents
The sizes of the respondents' households wererelatively small, as shown by the ratio ofhousehold size, or 31.2% for single-personhouseholds, 34.9% for two-person, and 18.6%
for three-person. The survey revealed that
18.2% are households with residents who cannot
easily evacuate on foot. As for types of housing,detached houses occupy 58.7%, while collective
housing accounts for 42.2%. For the number ofstories, flat houses occupy 5.0%, two-storied
65.4%, three-storied 4.3%, and four-storied or
higher 24.9%. For the floor where respondents

3.3 Simple Summation of the Responses
3.3.1 Fear of Tremor

219

greater.

As shown in Figure 1, the tremor of the subject
earthquake was no more fearful than that of an
ordinary earthquake for over two-thirds of the
respondents.

3.3.4 Intention and Preparation for Evacuation
The respondents were asked if they intended toevacuate following the subject earthquake
regardless of whether or not they knew of theevacuation order. As shown in Fig. 4, those who"thought I must evacuate" and "thought I should
evacuate" together accounted for about 30%.

3.3.2 Expectation of Inundation and Danger toLife
As shown in Fig. 2, the respondents who
thought their homes "would surely beinundated" or "would probably be inundated" inthe subject earthquake together occupy only
about 5%. Asked the depth to which they
thought their homes would be inundated, 1.0%of the respondents answered "up to the 2nd
floor," 2.3% "to the level of the floor," 5.3%
"below the floor level," 24.9% "around thehouse," and 61.1% answered they "neverthought the house could be inundated." For
danger to life, as shown in Fig. 3, 5% of the
respondents "thought I would not be safe unlessI evacuate" or "thought I could die unless I
evacuate." Thus, only a small number of
respondents anticipated inundation or danger tolife due to the earthquake.

Answering another question about whether they
prepared for evacuation or not, 16.6% ofrespondents "checked the location of theevacuation area and prepared items to take,"
26.9% "checked the location of the evacuation
area but did not prepare items to take," and50.8% "did not prepare for evacuation."
3.3.5 Evacuation, Starting Time, and Means ofTransportation
Of all of the respondents, 28.6% evacuated and67.8% did not; 3.7% gave no answer. The ratioof those who evacuated roughly agrees with thepreviously mentioned ratio of people wholeaned toward evacuation.

3.3.3 Recognition of Warning and Evacuation
Order
Of the respondents, 72.4% knew a tsunami
warning was issued, and 23.9% did not. Those
who knew were asked how they learned of thewarning, with multiple answers allowed; ofthem, 85.3% said TV, 46.8% said loudspeaker
car or fire engine, 14.2% said outdoor speaker,
14.2% said radio, and 4.6% said neighbors. The
fact that many chose loudspeaker car, fire engine
or outdoor speaker is probably due to the factthat many respondents lived near a loudspeaker
car route or PA radio facility.

Eighty-six respondents who evacuated wereasked at what time they did so. As shown in Fig.
5, over three-fourths of the evacuees left theirhomes for an evacuation area by the time
immediately after the issuance of the evacuation
order.
For the means of transportation, 67.4% used cars,
24.4% walked, and 4.7% used bicycles. Thus,
many respondents used cars for evacuation.
3.3.6 Motivating Factor for Evacuation andReason not to Evacuate
The 86 evacuees were asked what motivatedthem to evacuate. As shown in Fig. 6, many ofthem gave the issuance of the tsunami warning
or evacuation order. In addition to calls forevacuation from TV and radio stations, the city
hall or fire department, a relatively large
percentage of respondents said they decided toevacuate because neighbors called on them toevacuate together.

Of the respondents, 65.8% knew that anevacuation order was issued, while 26.6% did
not. When those who knew were asked how theylearned of the order, with multiple answers
allowed, 82.8% indicated TV, followed by
56.1% for loudspeaker car or fire engine, 18.7%
for outdoor speaker, 9.6% for radio, and 5.6%
for neighbors. This trend is similar to that ofwarning, but compared with the case of warning,
the ratio for TV is smaller, while those foroutdoor speaker and neighbors were slightly

The 204 respondents who did not evacuate were220

Kushiro Anshin Map was 75.4%, which is far
greater than the ratio of those who had not(20.6%).

asked why they did not. As shown in Fig. 7, themost common answers were, in descendingorder, "did not think a big tsunami would occur,""monitored the situation on TV," and "noneighbors evacuated." Some answered "I havefamily members who are physically disabled" or"I could not evacuate by myself." This suggests
the need to support residents who require care inevacuation.

Asked about the evacuation area, 76.7%
answered it is "within walking distance," 5.3%
said it is "beyond walking distance," and 12.6%"don't know where it is."Asked if their home is in the expected
inundation area or not, many respondents, or
77.1%, indicated that they know their home is in
the expected inundation area, while those who
did not know account for 13.6%.

3.3.7 Mutual Calls for Evacuation
Of the respondents, 9.6% were called on toevacuate by neighbors, while 62.8% were not.
Conversely, 10.0% called on their neighbors toevacuate, while 79.1% did not.

When subject residents were asked about serious
damage caused by a devastating flood in
Kushiro in 1920, many of them, or 59.8%, had"never heard of it." Those who "know about it indetail" and "heard of it" only accounted for 3.3%
and 34.6%, respectively.

3.3.8 Experience of Disaster and Experience of
Evacuation
Respondents were asked about their experience
with tsunami disasters, and 74.1% said they
"had not experienced any tsunami damage,"
5.3% "experienced tsunami damage caused by
the Tokachi-oki Earthquake in 1952," and 5.0%
"experienced tsunami damage caused by the
Chile Earthquake in 1960." Asked about
experience with damage other than tsunami,
40.9% "had not experienced any damage otherthan tsunami," and 27.6% "experienced damage
caused by the shaking of an earthquake."
Although few residents had suffered tsunami
damage, a relatively large number of people had
experienced earthquake damage other thantsunami.

3.3.10 Social Capital
When asked about their trust of others, 9.6%
answered they "can trust most people," 40.9%
think "there are more trustworthy people thannot," 38.2% "cannot say either way," 6.3% said
"there are more untrustworthy people thantrustworthy people," and 1.7% "can't trust mostpeople." Compared with the nation-wide survey
done by the Cabinet Office, the sense of trust inothers is higher in this survey.
When asked about degree of socialization with
their neighbors, 13.6% said they "cooperate withneighbors in daily living; for example, in mutual
consultation or lending/borrowing of daily
commodities," 36.2% "socialize with neighborson daily chatting terms," 42.2% "engage in aminimum level of socialization; e.g., are just on
greeting terms," and 5.6% "do not socialize withneighbors." As for their desire to live in theneighborhood permanently, 33.6% "want to live
permanently," 15.3% "would rather live
permanently," "25.2% "can't say either way,"
8.0% "would rather not live permanently," and15.9% "don't want to live permanently." The
results for degree of socialization with neighbors
and desire to live in the neighborhood
permanently are slightly lower than those of the

To a question about their experience inevacuating from a tsunami, the majority of
respondents, or 46.5%, answered they "hadnever evacuated from a tsunami." But 11.0 to
17.9% had evacuated following earthquakes,
including the Hokkaido Toho-oki Earthquake in
1994, Tokachi-oki Earthquake in 2003,
Kushiro-oki Earthquake in 1993, andTokachi-oki Earthquake in 1952.
3.3.9 Interest in Disaster Prevention
Of the respondents, 70.8% had neverparticipated in disaster drills, while 8.6%
participate in them every year.
The percentage of respondents that had seen

221the model is still considered appropriate enoughto estimate the relationship between factors.

Cabinet Office's nation-wide survey.
Asked about participating in activities that are
based on community bonds, many respondents,
or 52.5%, "don't participate in such activities,"
24.6% "participate a few times a year," and7.0% "participate about once a month." Theratio of respondents who participate in volunteer
activities, NPO, or civil activities is about 20%.

Focusing on the path coefficients, we can clearly
see a path leading from concern over inundation
to intention to evacuate and from intention toevacuate to evacuation action; however,recognition of evacuation information has little
to do with concern over inundation or intention
to evacuate. While the part of the result whereconcern over inundation is connected tointention to evacuate agrees with thecorresponding result of the survey made by
Yoshii et al. [2], it is understood that concern
was affected by previous experience and fear of
tremors. Unlike the answers on motivating
factor for evacuation, a certain tendency issuggested whereby recognition of a tsunami
warning or evacuation order has little effect on
evacuation action. Although recognition of thehazard map and evacuation areas and experienceof participation in disaster drills are important, it
is possible that interest in disaster prevention
alone will not directly lead to evacuation.

4. ANALYSIS OF DETERMINING FACTORSIN EVACUATION DECISION-MAKING
4.1 Analytical Method
The questionnaire survey asked questions about
what made residents decide to evacuate or why
they didn't evacuate. It is recognized that theiranswers may contain some bias that justifies
their action. To clarify the relationship between
various factors, including recognition of theevacuation order, and evacuation action, a
covariance structure analysis was conductedusing AMOS with such observed variables as
the respondents’ answers and locational
information of the respondents compiled by thegeographical information system.

Intention to evacuate has a relatively strongly
relationship with previous experience andresources on evacuation as well as concern ofinundation. This finding puts importance on
sharing of disaster and evacuation experience,measures to support people who requireassistance, and development of neighborhood
evacuation areas when promoting evacuation.

As shown in Fig. 8, the hypothesis used in thisverification was established based on theprevious research results, with evacuation action
separated from intention to evacuate, and thefactors concerning intention to evacuate set as
latent variables (surrounded by ovals). To
increase the appropriateness of the model, thefinal path diagram of Fig. 9 was obtained bynarrowing down the observed variables of thelatent variables (surrounded by squares in Fig.
9) based on the results of factor analysis andeliminating the paths that lead to inappropriate
solutions.

Social capital is greatly related to interest in
disaster prevention. Separately conducted factor
analysis on all of the observed variables foundthat the observed variables related to social
capital, excluding trust of others, (i.e.,
participation in activities based on community
bonds, socialization with neighbors, and desire
to live in the neighborhood permanently) are
greatly affected by the same factors as theobserved variables related to interest in disasterprevention, such as participation in disaster
drills. This finding indicates that the part ofsocial capital that is related to the local
community may probably encourage recognitionof evacuation information or evacuation action
by enhancing residents' interest in disaster

4.2 Analysis Results
As indicated in Fig. 9, the path coefficients(arrow subscripts) indicate the correlation
between factors. Since this figure is astandardized solution, the closer the absolutevalue of the path coefficient is to 1, the greater
the correlation between factors. Since GFI and
AGFI of the model are below 0.9, the model’s
appropriateness is not sufficiently high; however,222

Division, Bureau of Crisis Management,
Department of General Affairs, Hokkaido
Government, provided us with the topographicaldata and expected tsunami data. Professor
Hirotsugu Sato of Kushiro Junior College’s
Lifetime Education Center informed us of thehistory of Kushiro City. Assistant Professor
Keiko Tamura of Niigata University’s ResearchCenter for Natural Hazards & Disaster Recovery
provided us with advice on the design of thequestionnaire. We received the cooperation of
KCS Co., Ltd., in summation and analysis of thequestionnaires. We would like to thank all of theabove for their cooperation as well as the subject
residents who answered the questionnaires
during the busy year-end season.

prevention. Note that large path coefficients arealso derived from calculation by reversing thearrows from social capital to interest in disasterprevention, suggesting close ties between thembilaterally.
5. CONCLUSIONSAs discussed above, our survey suggests thepossibility that the evacuation information
provided when the evacuation order was issued
had little connection with concern overinundation or evacuation action. This indicates adisassociation between recognition of a tsunami
warning or evacuation order and recognition ofinundationrisk.
Eliminationofsuchdisassociation or reinforcement of factors related
to intention to evacuate based on the assumptionof such disassociation should work to encourage
evacuation action. One step toward eliminating
the disassociation would be thoroughcommunication of the importance of tsunami
warnings and evacuation orders. Promisingactions to reinforce the factors related tointention to evacuate include simulated disaster
experience through visualization of past or
expected damage or participation in evacuation
drills and improvement of the evacuation
environment, including support for people whoneed assistance and reduction in evacuation
distance. It is also important to accumulatesocial capital to enhance people's interest in
disaster prevention.

6. REFERENCES
1. Katada, T., Kodama, M., Kuwasawa, T., andKoshimura, S.: Issues of Residents'
Consciousness and Evacuation from the
Tsunami - from Questionnaire Survey in
Kesennuma City, Miyagi Pref. after the
Earthquake of Miyagiken-oki, 2003, Journalof Japan Society of Civil Engineers, No.
789/II-71, 2005 (in Japanese).
2. Yoshii, H., Tanaka, A., Nakamura, I.,
Nakamori, H., and Mikami, T.: Questionnaire
Survey to Citizens on Evacuation fromTsunami, 2003, the Emergency Research
Report on the Tokachi-oki Earthquake(edited by Tadashi Hirata), 2004 (inJapanese).
3. Quality-of-Life Policy Bureau, Cabinet
Office: Survey entrusted by the Cabinet
Office in 2002, "Social Capital: Toward Rich
Human
RelationshipandFavorable
Circulationof
Citizen
Activities,"
http://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/data/report9_1.html., 2003 (in Japanese).
4) General Affairs Section, Kushiro City:
Once-in-500-Years Earthquake Tsunami
HazardMap,
http://www.city.kushiro.
hokkaido.jp/www/contents/1141823239893/
files/tsunami1.pdf, etc. (in Japanese).

Acknowledgements: This study was conductedunder the guidance of Professor Haruo Hayashi
of Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto
University. We gratefully acknowledge thecooperation of the General Affairs Section,
General Affairs Department, Kushiro City, andthe Fire Headquarters of Kushiro City in ourquestionnaire survey. The Kushiro Municipal
Federation of Disaster Prevention Promotion
Councils provided us with questionnaire results
as well as plenty of information on related local
efforts. The Fire and Disaster Prevention

223

Practical Model to Estimate Behavior of Tsunami-Drifted Bodies
byTakashi Tomita1 and Kazuhiko Honda2
or not. Therefore, it is important that each
person images tsunami disasters which he/she
may suffer, before encounter of the tsunami.

ABSTRACT
Historical records of tsunami damage haveshown us that tsunamis cause various damages:
inundation, destruction of houses, drift ofvessels and others. If vessels are drifted by atsunami, they have the potential to collide withhouses and buildings and then to cause
secondary damage to them in addition to thedamage by tsunami fluid force. To control andmitigate the damages by the drifted-bodies, weshould understand and predict the damages atfirst.
We have, therefore, developed anumerical model to estimate behavior of
multiple tsunami-drifted bodies practically.
The present model calculates drift motion ofeach body in terms of drag and inertia forces
acting on the body, and furthermore considers
collision between drifted bodies and between thedrifted body and any structure. After thepresent model is implemented into the STOC
system which calculates tsunami damages inoceans and coastal areas, it is validated
qualitatively in comparison with some simple
test runs and applied to the calculation in amodel area with actual bathymetry andtopography.
KEYWORDS: Collision, Drifted
Numerical Modeling, Tsunami

To help the enhancement of people’s
imagination of tsunami disasters, we havedeveloped
numerical
simulation
andvisualization system on tsunami damage, whichis named the STOC system [1]. As introducedin the 40th panel meeting in the NIST, the STOC
system consists of the numerical simulation
model named STOC (Storm surge and Tsunami
simulator in Oceans and Coastal areas) and adisplay tool which shows easily numericalresults such as the variation of water surface
elevation and water particle velocity as well as
damage occurrence areas by using the moving
images. Another feature of the display tool isthat users of the tool can see the results from any
viewpoint they want.
As shown in historical damage records, tsunamis
cause inundation, destruction of houses as wellas drift of many vessels and others. If vessels
are drifted by a tsunami, they may collide withhouses and buildings, and then cause secondary
damage to them in addition to the damage bytsunami fluid force. To control and mitigate
damages by the drifted bodies, we should
understand and estimate their behavior. A new
numerical model is, therefore, developed andimplemented in the STOC system to estimate
the behavior of tsunami-drifted bodies. The
attractive features of the model are as follows:
1) it can deal with a large number of bodies, 2)calculate not only translational motion of each
body but rotational motion in the horizontal
plane, and 3) consider collision between thedrifted bodies and between the body and any
structure

Body,

1. INTRODUCTION
Japan has good system to issue tsunami warning.
The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) is theorganization in charge. Local governments
also issue evacuation order and advisory if
happen of tsunami damage is estimated in theirregions. However, even if the tsunami warningand evacuation order are issued, many residents
stay at their houses and offices to get further
information of tsunami and do not evacuate
actually. Is this good behavior? Each person
decides finally whether he/she should evacuate

1 Research Director, Tsunami Research Center, Port andAirport Research Institute, 3-1-1 Nagase Yokosuka
239-0826, Japan
2 Researcher, ditto.

227

With reference to Ikeya et al. [5], horizontal
forces in the surging and swaying directions, Fx
and Fy, respectively, and momentum around thez-direction, Mz, are determined by the following
equations:
FX  (1   ) FDX 1  FDX 2  FMX  (1   ) FDY 1  FDY 2  FMY  (1)FY
M Z  (1   ) M DZ1  M DZ 2  M MZ 

example, a resident may want to see the result oftsunami damage estimation in the whole area of
their city as well as in his/her residential area.
To satisfy such a demand of each resident anddisaster mitigation officer, the display tool of the
STOC system has the function of showing theresults from any viewpoints. Furthermore, thedisplayed results are not only inundation area
and its depth but fluid velocity and wave
pressure, which are calculated by the STOC
system. Figures 2 and 3 show examples oftsunami inundation and tsunami-damaged areas
indicated by the display tool. Actually the toolshows the results by the moving images,
although the figures indicate snapshots.

in which0.95  hh1.0  0.2  D  1.0  : 1  D  1.2



 (2)
h
0.05 :

1.2 
D 



FDX 1    C DX 1, smU sm U sm dYdZ sm2  C DX 1, snU sn U sn dYdZ 
2 sn
FDY1    C DY1, psV ps V ps dXdZ 

2 ps


  C DY1, sbVsb V sb dXdZ  (3)

sb
2


M DZ1    C DX 1, smU sm U sm YdYdZ
2 sm



  C DX 1, snU sn U sn YdYdZ sn2  C DY1, psV ps V ps XdXdZ 
2 ps  C DY1, sbVsb V sb XdXdZ 

2 sb

U


FDX 2 C DX 2 U G2  VG2 G BD
2
UG



2
2 VG
(4)
FDY 2 C DY 2 U G  VG
LD 
2
VG

2
2

M DZ 2  l FDX
F

2
DY 2



U
U





sm
sn

3. NUMERICAL MODEL TO ESTIMATEDRIFT MOTION OF BODIES BYTSUNAMIS
3.1 Drift Motion Model
To calculate drift motion of many bodies by aseries of tsunami waves with less computational
efforts, the numerical model to solve drift
motion of bodies does not calculate water
surface elevation and water particle velocity oftsunami directly, and utilizes the results on themwhich are calculated by the other numericalmodels of tsunami.
Then, each body ishorizontally moved by the tsunami-induced dragand inertia forces acting on each body.
For practical calculation, the shape of eachdrifted body is approximated by a rectangularsolid. Three modes of motion are calculated in
the model: surging, swaying and yawing, asshown in Fig. 4. It should be noted that thevertical motion of heaving is considered so as tokeep draft of the body on the water surface.
Therefore, the vertical motion is induced by thebuoyancy force of the body.
heave









C M LD 
dY  
dY 
sn t sm t V psVsb

FMY  C M BD 
dX  
dX 
ps t
sb t
2


FMX 







U sm
U sn



M MZ   C M LD  Y
dY   Y
dY  
sn
2
t
t
 sm


V ps


Vsb

dX   X
dX 
 C M BD  X
ps
sb
2
t
t



yaw
sway

surge

Fig. 4 Considered motion of drifted body

2

(5)

229

L, B and D are the length, width and draft depthof floating body, and h the water depth, asshown in Fig. 5. In Eq. 3, Usm, Usn, Vps and Vsb
are the distributed flow velocities on the side
faces of body, as shown in Fig. 6. It isnecessary that these velocities should be
calculated in the situation of no drifted body.
In Eq. 4, UG and VG are the flow velocities in thesurging and swaying directions at the position of
the center of gravity of the body as shown in Fig.
6. The first and second terms in the right-handside of Eq. 1 mean drag forces induced by theflows going under the bottom of body andrunning through the sides, respectively. The
third terms are for inertia force.
In thecalculation of FDX1, FDY1 and MDZ1, velocity
distribution in the horizontal plane is considered,because eddies shedding from the bottom may
not be uniform horizontally depending on the
non-uniform velocity. It should be noted that
MDZ1 is modified because a drifted body withrotational motion and the same drift speed as thesurrounding flow makes rotations indefinitely
using the original MDZ1 by Ikeya et al.
Horizontal
Plane

Vertical
Plane

Fig. 5

Definition of size of bodyFig. 6 Definition of flow velocities to calculate
fluid forces

The coefficients such as CDX1,sm and others are as
follows:
 0.4 : U sm  0
C DX 1, sm   0.8 : U sm  0
 0.8 : U sn  0 
C DX 1, sn  (6)
 0.4 : U sn  0 
 0.4 : V ps  0 
C DY1, ps  
 0.8 : V ps  0 
 0.8 : Vsb  0 
C DY1, sb  
 0.4 : Vsb  0 
C CX 2  2.0 cos2  s  1.2 sin  s cos s 
 (7)C CY 2  2.0 sin 2  s  2.2 sin  s cos s (8)C M  2.0

 0.09 L sin(2 s ) 1 2 : sin(2 s )  0l
12 0.09 L sin(2 s ) : sin(2 s )  0




(9)

3.2 Collision Model
For easily searching a contact point of a driftedbody to another body or a structure, it isassumed that a contact face is set so as to cover
all main parts of the body, as shown in Fig. 7,
which shows an example of a fishing boat.
The horizontal shape of a ship which is
inscribed in the rectangular indicated by theactual body length of LC and actual body widthof BC is surrounded by a contact face line withcircular curves with the radius of RC (m) andparallel lines with the spacing of 2RC (m). The
vertical section of contact face is the rectangular
to covers main parts which may collide withanybody. It should be noted that the volume
formed by the contact face is different from thevolume for calculation of drift motion, which isindicated in terms of L, B and H in Fig. 5. The
values of L and B are determined by Eq. 10,
considering Eq. 11. Eq. 10 expresses thebalance of mass and buoyancy of the body, inwhich M is the mass of body, D the draft depthof body and w the density of water. In deedM   w LBH(10)

L  LC B  BC 
H  D (11)

The breakwaters have another function tocontrol tsunami damage. In this trial, they
delay the start of tsunami inundation 90 seconds
in residential area near the coast line. This
time duration provides evacuating people withadvantages.

Fig. 12elevation

The reduction of water surface elevation andfluid velocity also provides reduction of thenumber of drifted vessels. Figure 14 shows thesituations just before inundation starts and 3
minutes after the start of inundation. Both ofthem are of the case of no breakwaters. In thecase of no breakwaters, the tsunami with highwater surface elevation and fast fluid velocity
drifts 56 vessels: 49 vessels broken the mooring
system, and 7 vessels settled on the land. Allboats are not necessarily swept by the tsunami inthe case of no breakwaters. However, if the
breakwater is installed, the first tsunami wave
sweeps only 7 vessels on the land.

Time variations of water surface

The fluid velocity is also reduced from 3.5 m/s
to 2.1 m/s, as shown in Fig. 13 by the
installation of the breakwaters. However, it
should be noted that at the opening section of
breakwaters (at Point A) the fluid velocity isfastened depending on narrowing of the opening
section. Therefore, we should consider such afast fluid velocity for design of the breakwater.

(1) Just before inundation starts(2) 3.6 minutes after the start of inundation
Fig. 13 Time variations of fluid velocity

Fig. 14 Snapshots of drifted vessels in the caseof no breakwaters, using STOC’s display tool233

REFERENCES

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. Tomita, T., K. Honda, and T. Kakinuma. 2007.
Application of three-dimensional tsunami
simulator to estimation of tsunami behavioraround structures. Proceedings of the 30th
International Conference on Coastal Engineering,
ASCE, 1677-1688.
2. Sakakiyama, T., and R. Kajma. 1992. Numericalsimulation of nonlinear wave interacting withpermeable breakwater, Proceedings of 23rd
International Conference on coastal Engineering,
ASCE, 1517-1530.
3. Fujima, K., K. Masamura, and C. Goto. 2002.
Development of the 2d/3d hybrid model fortsunaminumerical
simulation,
CoastalEngineering Journal, JSCE, 44(4), 373-397.
4. Tomita, T. and K. Honda. 2009. Tsunami
inundation simulation by three-dimensionalmodel, Proceedings of the 31st International
Conference on Coastal Engineering, ASCE (inpress).
5. Ikeya, T., R. Asakura, N. Fujii, M. Ohmori, T.
Takeda and K. Yanagisawa. 2005. Experiment on
tsunami wave force acting on a floating body anddevelopment of an evaluation method,
Proceedings of Annual Journal of Coastal
Engineering, JSCE, 52, 761-765 (in Japanese).
6. Shuto N. 1993. Tsunami intensity and disasters.
In Tsunamis in the world, edited by Tinti, S.,
Kluwer Academic Press, 197-216.

The new numerical model is implemented in the
STOC system to calculate the drift behavior ofvessels and others by tsunamis. The model candeal with their collision with structures andanother drifted body.
Validation of the model is conducted in the very
simple test runs, and it is confirmed that themodel gives us good results. Furthermore, weneed to validate the model quantitatively.
As a trial to show how damage estimation we doby the STOC system including the drift model,
the system is applied to a model area with actual
bathymetry and topography.
Existence of
breakwaters, on which the STOC system isalready validated in comparison withexperimental results quantitatively, reduces
inundation depth, fluid velocity in the harborarea and the number of drifted vessels, anddelays the start of inundation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We express sincere thanks to the Geographical
Survey Institute Japan for supplying the airborne
laser scanning survey data of the model area.

234

Manual for Forecasting Earthquake and Tsunami Damage to Public Civil Engineering Facilities(proposal)
byOsamu Okamoto1, Kentaro Kumagai2 ,Katsuya Oda3
2.1 Forecasting damage
Forecasting damage by earthquake and tsunami
requires data on the various external forces ofphenomena (maximum acceleration, flood depth,etc.). In many cases, the earthquake motion andtsunami simulation results conducted by theCentral Disaster Prevention Council and local
governments are stored as numerical data, and it
is possible to determine these external forcesfrom this numerical data. In recent years, it is
becoming relatively easier to conduct tsunami
numerical simulations and detailed collection ofelevation data for low-lying seaside areas is
being conducted. Therefore, if the results ofpreviously implemented simulations for use as
reference cannot be obtained, implementing new
tsunami simulations and determining external
forces can be considered.
As well, other data required for damage
forecasting will include strength of seismic
movement, tsunami height, and facilities
structure, among others. Provision of this data
can be requested from the body implementing
earthquake and tsunami damage forecasting, or a
new estimation of strength of seismic movement
and tsunami height can be performed.
2.2 Damage to facilities from earthquake motion
Damage to port facilities from earthquake
motion will be forecasted based on the Technicalstandards and description of port facilities‖
revisedin
2007[1].
Until
now,earthquake-resistant design of port facilities has
involved the application of a seismic coefficientmethod which replaces the dynamic action ofearthquake motion with static inertia force. In
dynamic analysis, earthquake response analysis
employed seismic waveforms measured atpoints different from the points targeted for des-

ABSTRACT
In order to reduce damage from earthquake andtsunami, while it is effective to forecast damage
andtoformulateandimplement
countermeasures based on such estimations, amethod of forecasting earthquake and tsunami
damage to public civil engineering facilities has
not been established. This is a report on our
proposal for a method of forecasting damage toport facilities and a policy manual for applying
the damage forecast results.
KEYWORDS: Damage forecasting, Earthquake ,Port facilities, Tsunami
1. INTRODUCTION
It is feared a large-scale earthquake
accompanied by tsunami will occur within thenext 30 years, such as a Tokai earthquake, aTonankai earthquake, and Nankai earthquake.
For this reason, the Central Disaster Prevention
Council and local governments are forecastingdamage from large-scale earthquakes which arepresumed will occur in the future. While thesedamage forecasts estimate building damage andhuman damage caused by earthquakes andtsunami, a policy for the comprehensiveplanningofearthquake
andtsunamicountermeasures which assumes damage to
public civil engineering facilities does not
currently exist as a reference to prevent suchdamage and handle emergency goods transport.
This manual presents methods for forecasting
earthquake and tsunami damage and application
guidelines as a reference. The details of thesemethods should conform with these guidelines,
among other standards.

1 Senior Researcher, Coastal and Marine Department,

National Institute of Land and Infrastructure Management,
Yokosuka-city, Kanagawa-ken 239-0826 Japan
2 Senior Researcher, Coastal and Marine Department,ditto
3 Head, Coastal and Marine Department, ditto

2. FORECASTING DAMAGE TO PORTFACILITIES

235

1. With respect to level 1 earthquake motion(earthquake motions with the probability ofoccurring once or twice during the operation offacilities), the stochastic time history wave formshould be appropriately determined based on
measured values of earthquake motion, andconsidering source properties, propagation path
properties, and site properties.
2. With respect to level 2 earthquake motion(earthquake motions possessing the maximum
intensity imaginable at the targeted points fromthe present to the future), the time history wave
form should be appropriately determined basedon measured values of earthquake motion andassumed earthquake source parameters etc., andconsidering source properties, propagation path
properties, and site properties.
Figure 1 shows methods of forecasting damage
to port facilities from earthquake motion.

ign such as by Hachinohe and Kobe. However,
earthquake motion was dependent on the source
properties, propagation path properties, andground characteristics of target points, andearthquake response of facilities was dependent
not only on the vibrational amplitude of input
earthquake motion, but on the frequency
characteristics of earthquake motion, ground,and structures. For this reason, when checking
the aseismic capacity of port facilities, a methodof calculating the action of earthquake motion is
employed which considers the properties ofsubsurface ground and structures, based on thetime history wave form of earthquake motion in
the engineering bedrock derived by considering
source properties, propagation path properties,
and ground characteristics (site characteristics).
The following points are described for port
standards.
Static analysis methods

Seismic coefficient method
Modified seismic coefficient method
Response displacement
Ultimate earthquake resistance method

Dynamic analysis method

Response spectrum method
Time history response analysis

Time history modal analysis
Direct integration method
Frequency response analysis

Fig.1 Methods of forecasting damage to port facilities from earthquake motion
the necessity of checking aseismicity is judged
from the relationship between cross-sectional
data determined by the external force of ocean
waves and level 1 earthquake motion. The
checking of aseismicity is conducted if it isjudged necessary according to port standards
shown in the ―necessity judgment diagram ofaseismicity checking.‖ When checking sliding
and toppling capacity is deemed necessary, suchmethods will be conducted in accordance withport standards.
Damage to breakwaters from tsunami consists ofdeformation due to tsunami wave force,

As well, Table 1 shows the results ofconsidering the adaptive flexible of methodsof forecasting earthquake damage to various
port facilities.
2.3 Damage to breakwaters by earthquake
motion and tsunami
The cross-section of breakwaters is generally
determined according to the external force of
ocean waves, a consideration of level 1
earthquake motion is often omitted. However, incases where the installation water depth is deep
and design wave height is small, considerationof external force due to level 1 earthquake
motion becomes predominant. For this reason236

Table 1 Adaptive flexibility port facility earthquake damage forecasting methods
Damage forecasting methods
Target facilities
Structural format
Simple forecasting method
Pier, embankment
Gravity structureearth fill
Seismic coefficient method
Pier, embankment,
Gravity structure,
flood gate, land
sheet-pile type structure, earth filllock, drainage pumpstation,shed, warehouse
Ultimate earthquake
Pier,
Vertical pile pierresistance method
road bridge
Response displacement
Tunnel lifeline
Shield tunnel
methodWater supply, sewage line, common
ducts, etc.
Response spectrum method
Railroad facility
Dynamic response analysis Tunnels
Submerged tube
(total stress)
All structures
Almost all structural formats
Dynamic response analysis All structures
Almost all structural formats(effective stress)(when liquefaction is considered)An evaluation formula regarding the scatteringof wave breaking works due to tsunami does notexist. Thus, scattering experiment results
relating to deformed block levees due to tsunami
soliton fission[3] will be useful as reference.
The results of these experiments show that thedestructive force of tsunami is dramaticallygreater than normal ocean waves.

deformation due to ocean flow, and deformation
due to a combination of wave force and ocean
flow, and is similar to deformation chainarchitecture by ocean waves. In particular,
problematic damage from tsunami can beevaluated according to items 1)–3) below.
1) Stability of breakwaters in the event oftsunamiTsunami wave force and uplift pressure areconsideredtheexternal
forceswheninvestigating breakwater dislocation due tosliding, breakwater dislocation due to toppling,
and breakwater dislocation due to lack of moundbearing capacity. The tsunami wave pressure
formula proposed by Tanimoto et al. is used forthis investigation.[2]2) Scattering of the breakwater covering rockTo investigate the scattering of breakwater
covering rock on the port side (leeward side)
and on the ocean-facing side, the relationshipbetween current drift in the mound vicinity andthe weight stability limit of the covering rock etc.
is considered utilizing the Isbash formula[1] toderive the stable mass of covering materials in
relation to current velocity. Scattering is judged
will occur in the event that the weight of thecovering rock used is less than stable mass.
3) Movement and scattering of breakwater wave
breaking works

2.4 Embankment deformation due to earthquake
motion and tsunami
To quantitatively check the volume of structuraldeformation such as slanting of the embankment,
it is necessary to employ Time History Response
Analysis methods as indicated in Figure 1. Time
History Response Analysis methods can bedivided into the total stress analysis method andthe effective stress analysis method. Typicalanalysis programs for the total stress analysis
method include ―SHAKE‖ and ―FLUSH,‖ andtypical analysis programs for the effective stressanalysis method include ―FLIP‖ and ―LIQCA.‖
It is necessary that they be chosen according to
the amount of excess hydrostatic pressure which
occurs.
As shown in Figure 2, tsunami damage toembankments can be categorized into 3 types:
damage due to wave force; damage fromscouring of the frontal side; and damage fromscouring of the leeward side. In estimating

237

StartDetermination of fault modelCalculation of water level and velocity through tsunami analysis

Setting added mass and drag etc.

Calculation of driftage travel distance and colliding forceN

Calculation step complete

ＥＮＤ

Fig.3 Flowchart of driftage behavior forecasting due to tsunami
facilities), but to consider measures for
mitigating
damagebyapplying
soft
infrastructural measures (information provisionand improvement of initial response system).
As an example, Figure 4 shows a damage
forecast map focused around Susaki Port in
Kochi prefecture. In addition to the results ofassessing damage to various facilities andflooded areas etc., the map indicates tsunami
arrival time, flooded regions, the position of
government facilities and hospitals, damage tohumans and buildings evaluated based on bridge
reinforcement methods etc., which will be usefulas reference in formulating earthquake andtsunami countermeasures. As for tsunami
protection facilities such as tidal barrier, creating
maps of damage to flooded areas and hinterland
areas
beforeandafter
implementing
reinforcement and new facilities construction
countermeasures will serve as reference for
judging the necessity of implementing suchcountermeasures.
By creating such maps, it will be possible toconsider specific measures relating to theimplementation of emergency drills, theprovisioning of information, evacuation routes,
evacuation space, preliminary plans to carry out

tsunami numerical simulation with a shape
representation and collision analysis of driftage
employing a distinct element method. Whenchecking the safety etc. of structures, it isdesirable that an appropriate calculation method
be adopted based on the results of conducting
trial calculations using these various calculation
methods. [5][6][7][8]3. Policy course for applying damage forecast
results
3.1 Creation of a damage forecast map
By creating a damage forecast map showing theresults of forecasting damage to public civilengineering facilities and flooded areas due toearthquake and tsunami, and upon considering
geographical conditions etc. according to area, itwill be possible to consider specific earthquake
and tsunami countermeasures in collaboration
with related agencies. As well, by indicating thelocations of important bases in the event ofdisasters and public agencies on the map, it will
be possible not only to consider hard
infrastructural countermeasures (development
and reinforcement of public civil engineering239

N., Nagao, T., Hosoyamada, T., Shimosako, K.,
Goto, M., and Asai, T.
Characteristics and Damage of the 1993
Hokkaido Southwest Offshore Earthquake andTsunami. Port and Harbour Research Institutematerials, No.775, pp.225, 1994.
3. Tomikashi, H., Hirayama, K., and Sugiyama,
M. Destructive machanism of soliton fission
tsunami run-up on concrete armor unit levee.
Coastal Engineering collected papers, volume
34, pp517–521, 1987.
4. Okamoto, O., Oda, K., and Kumagai, K.
Study on scour by tsunamis—example of port
and harbor structures. ICSE-4, 2008.
5) Matsutomi, H. and Ikeda, H. Evaluation
method of driftwood collision force based onlarge-scale experiments. Coastal Engineeringcollected papers, volume 43, pp.781–785, 1996.
6) Mizutani, N., Takagi, Y., Shiraishi, K.,
Miyajima, S., and Tomita, T. Study relating totsunami power and driftage colliding force on
berth containers. Coastal Engineering collected
papers, volume 52, pp.741–745, 2005.
7) Kumagai, K., Oda, K., Fujii, N. Applicabilityof container drift behavior simulation model due
to tsunami. Coastal Engineering collected
papers, volume 53, pp.241–245, 2006.
8) Kumagai, K., Oda, K., Fujii, N. Evaluation ofcontainer drift and collision simulation andcolliding force due to tsunami. Coastal
Engineering collected papers, volume 54,
pp.236–240, 2007.

may be changed depending on the disaster
activities included within countermeasure plans,
it is surmised that damage forecast results will
also be effective as basic materials for
explaining the necessity of the positioning ofsuch activities within the plan. As the level ofdamage as a result of developing facilities or notdeveloping facilities can be estimated byapplying the damage forecasting method
indicated in this manual, it can also be applied
when evaluating public works.
4. CONCLUSIONSThis manual has organized and systematizedvarious research results relating to earthquakes
and tsunamis. While research relating toearthquakes has made great headway, muchprogress in research relating to tsunamis can be
anticipated from future research by relevant
parties.
5.ACKOWLEGEMENTS
In compiling this paper, we received a great dealof cooperation from the people at the Coastal

Development Institute of Technology, as well as from
related consultants in this field. As well, we

received valuable opinions from Professor Shutoof Nihon University regarding tsunami damage
forecasts on concrete armor units. We would liketo extend our warmest regards and appreciation
to all involved.
6. REFERENCES
1. Japan Port and Harbor Association. Technicalstandards of port facilities and explanations.
2007.
2) Tanimoto, K., Matsutomi, H., Tsuruya, H.,
Takahashi, S., Goto, C., Nagai, T., Hashimoto,241

THEME 6
Sustainable Design for Buildings andInfrastructure - Focus on Natural
Disaster Prevention

Earthquake Disaster Management in Japan
by
Koji Ikeuchi1 and Masamitsu Waga2
ABSTRACT

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper presents the earthquake disastermanagement in Japan.
General disastermanagement has been promoted in an integrated
and well-planned manner by the central,
prefectural and municipal governments, andpublic utilities in their capacity according toDisaster Countermeasures Basic Act. In addition,building and improvement of facilities of highpriority which help reduce damage by earthquakes
have been promoted according to 5 year plans
based on Act on Special Measures for Earthquake
Disaster Countermeasures to prepare forearthquakes that occur anywhere at anytime. On
the other hand, countermeasures have beenformulated individually against devastatinglarge-scale earthquakes. One of the examples isTokyo Inland Earthquakes, which is outlined indetail. There have been some developments inearthquake disaster management policy for Tokyo
Inland Earthquakes.
Following, “Policy
Framework”, “Earthquake Disaster Reduction
Strategy” and “Guidelines for Emergency
Response Activities”, “Specific Plan for
Emergency Response Activities” was formulated
by “Central Disaster Management Council(CDMC)” chaired by the prime minister.
Specific measures for massive evacuees and thestranded generated by Tokyo Inland Earthquakes
were also formulated and proposed measures havebeen further considered and pursued.
Current situation of several other initiatives arealso outlined in this paper such as building
quake-proofing, Early Earthquake Warning(EEW) and Disaster Management Information
Systems.

Japan has suffered from frequent natural disastersof almost all kinds due to its geographical,
topological and meteorological conditions and has
undergone losses of human lives and properties inyears.
Protecting lives and properties fromnatural disasters is a high priority and one of themost important responsibilities of the central
government.
This paper presents the earthquake disastermanagement in Japan. Section 2 summarizes theearthquake proneness of Japan.
Section 3
outlines policy frameworks for earthquake
disastercountermeasures,
DisasterCountermeasures Basic Act, Act on Special
Measuresfor
Earthquake
DisasterCountermeasures
andframeworkforcountermeasures against devastating large-scale
earthquakes.
The Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Act sets a general framework for disastermanagement to be organized and implemented in
an integrated and well-planned manner, and the
Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster
Countermeasures is to encourage local
governments to build and/or improve facilities ofhigh priority while countermeasures against
devastating large-scale earthquakes have been
considered and formulated individually. Section
4 and Section 5 detail countermeasures against
Tokyo Inland Earthquakes and measures forevacuees and the stranded as a result of Tokyo
Inland Earthquakes respectively.
Section 6
details
current
situationofbuilding
quake-proofing. Section 7 outlines the Early
Earthquake Warning and lessons learnt fromrecent earthquakes. Section 8 presents Disaster
Management Information Systems, IT systems
developed to estimate damage using only data

KEYWORDS: Building quake-proofing, Early
Earthquake
Warning(EEW),
Large-scale
earthquakes, Measures for evacuees and thestranded, Tokyo Inland Earthquakes

1 Director for Earthquake, Volcanic and Large-scale

Disaster Management, Disaster Management Bureau,
Cabinet Office, 1-2-2 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
100-8969 Japan
2 Deputy director, ditto245which are available beforehand or readily
available when earthquakes occur and, streamline
information flow and strengthen information
sharing.

2005.

2. EARTHQUAKES IN JAPAN

1) Earthquakes generated near convergent
boundaries
Earthquakes occur when the continental plates,i.e.) Eurasian Plate or North American Plate
bounce back from the tension by the subduction ofoceanic plates, i.e.) Philippine Sea Plate or PacificPlate.

There are mainly two different mechanisms thatcause earthquakes in Japan;

Japan is located on and near plate boundaries of
the North American plate, Eurasian plate,Philippine Sea plate and Pacific plate as illustrated
in Fig.1 [1]. This explains why Japan is one of
the most earthquake-prone countries in the world.
Fig. 2 [2] shows the distribution of focuses ofearthquakes measuring 5.0 or greater from 1996 to
2005, which illustrates that a large number ofearthquakes have occurred around Japan. In
addition, Japan accounts for 20% of earthquakes
with magnitude of 6.0 or greater from 1996 to2)Earthquakes generated by active faults
Should these earthquakes occur right under cities,
they cause enormous damage even if theirmagnitudes are insignificant.
3. FRAMEWORKS OF EARTHQUAKEDISASTER COUNTERMEASURES
3.1 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
The act was enacted in 1961 and has reflectedlessons learnt in earthquakes since then. It states
obligations, authorities and/or responsibilities of
the central government, local governments, public
utilities and citizens. It mandates that central
government should establish CDMC comprising
the prime minister as chairperson, other ministers
and several other members, and that local
governments should establish similar councils sothat disaster management is organized in an
integrated manner.
Furthermore, it requires
CDMC to formulate Basic Disaster Management
Plan and disaster management entities such as
central government ministries and agencies, local
governments and public utilities to formulate
Disaster Management Operation Plan or Local
Disaster Management Plan to promote disastermanagement in a well-planned manner.

Fig.1 Plates around Japan

3.2 Act on Special Measures for Earthquake
Disaster Countermeasures
In 1995, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
occurred and caused devastating damage. As aresult, the Act on Special Measures for
Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures wasenacted to promote preparation for earthquakesthat occur anywhere in Japan.
The act
encourages governors of local prefecturalFig.2 Earthquake Focus Distribution
Magnitude 6.0 or Greater

246

intensity distribution is estimated. With theseismic intensity distribution as an input, thenumber of collapsed buildings, death toll andeconomic loss are estimated. Based on thedamage estimates, Policy Framework which
serves as a master-plan covering disaster
preparedness, emergency response and recovery is
formulated. Following the Policy Framework,
Earthquake Disaster Reduction Strategy andGuidelines for Emergency Response Activities areformulated. The former stipulates quantitative
disaster reduction objectives and specificmeasures to achieve them. The latter is a set of
guidelines for emergency response activities byorganizations concerned.
Specific Plan for
Emergency
Response
Activities
specifies
emergency response activities such as dispatch of
search and rescue units, and shipment ofemergency goods of predetermined quantity
region by region based on the damage estimates.
This enables emergency response activities to be
implemented as soon as devastating earthquakes
occur even when no detailed information on thedamage is available. The emergency response
activities will be adjusted as more information
becomes available.

governments, in consultation with mayors ofmunicipal governments to formulate a 5 year planof building and/or improving facilities of urgent
priority in view of earthquake disastermanagement. All prefectural governments havebeen pursuing further improvements since 2006,
the beginning of 3rd 5 year plan. Financial
assistance from the central government isavailable to certain types of facilities scheduled in
the 5 year plans.
3.3
CountermeasuresagainstLarge-scale
Earthquakes
Measuresagainstdevastatinglarge-scale
earthquakes are considered individually by the
CDMC according to the flowchart depicted in
Fig.3 [3]. Measures against the following
earthquakes, illustrated in Fig.4 [3] were or havebeen considered;・ Tokai Earthquake
・ Tonankai and Nankai Earthquakes
・ Trench type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of theJapan and Chisima Trenches
・ Tokyo Inland Earthquakes
・ Chubu and Kinki Inland Earthquakes
Firstly, things that determine characteristics ofearthquakes are determined, such as earthquake
focuses and earthquake models. Then, seismic

Fig.4 Large-scale Earthquakes

Fig.3 Flowchart of Formulation ofCountermeasures against Large-scale
Earthquakes

247

Policy Framework which serves as amaster-plan covering disaster preparedness,
emergency response and recovery wasformulated in 2005 and sets policy direction to
reduce the influence of the disruption offunctions as the political, administrative andeconomic center, and the influence of enormous
damage.
Earthquake Disaster Reduction
Strategy was formulated in 2006 and stipulates
quantitative disaster reduction objectives, which
are to reduce the estimated death toll by 50%
and economic loss by 40% in 10 years. It also
stipulates specific measures to achieve thedisaster reduction objectives.

4. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST TOKYOINLAND EARTHQUAKES
The largest earthquake which struck Tokyo
metropolitan area within a century is the Great
Kanto Earthquake in 1923 measuring 7.9
magnitude. This caused tremendous damage,totaling more than 100,000 deaths and missing
persons combined.
Earthquakes withmagnitude of around 8 occur periodically atintervals of 200 to 300 years in the area. It is
unlikely that an earthquake of this magnitude
will occur in 100 years however inland
earthquakes of magnitude 7 class occur several
times between two magnitude 8 class
earthquakes.
Therefore, countermeasuresagainst Tokyo Inland Earthquakes of magnitude
7 class have been considered according to theflowchart outlined in 3.2.

Specific Plan for Emergency Response
Activities was recently formulated in 2008
following Guidelines for Emergency Response
Activities formulated in 2006 which is a set of
guidelines for emergency response activities byorganizations concerned.
Specific Plan for Emergency Response
Activities specifies emergency response
activities such as the dispatch of search andrescue units, and the shipment of emergency
goods of predetermined quantity, region byregion based on the damage estimates. This
enables emergency response activities to be
implemented as soon as devastating earthquakes
occur even when no detailed information on thedamage is available. The emergency response
activities will be adjusted as more information
becomes available. Fig. 6 and 7 [5] show theSpecific Plan for Emergency Response
Activities.

An earthquake was selected, out of 18 simulated
earthquakes as a target to consider
countermeasures against because it is relatively
imminent, it strikes central Tokyo heavily andthe impacts widespread as illustrated in Fig. 5[4]. As a result of the earthquake, it isestimated that 850,000 buildings could collapse
or burn down, and that 11,000 people could diein the disaster. Economic loss is estimated toreach 112 trillion yen (approximately 1.12
trillion US dollars).

Fig.5 Seismic Intensity Distribution
Tokyo Inland Earthquake

Fig.6 Reinforcement Dispatch Plan,
Specific Plan for Emergency Response
Activities248

5.1 Measures for Evacuees
There will be shortage of shelters for 600,000
evacuees in total provided that each Ward ofTokyo needs to accommodate evacuees from its
residents. A first thing to be considered tocope with the shelter shortage is to reduce thenumber of evacuees needing shelters. One ofthe proposed measure is to examine promptly if
the buildings are safe from collapse by
aftershocks and to encourage evacuees to returnhome whose housing is proved to be safe. It isalso proposed that evacuees be encouraged tofind shelters at parents’, relatives’ or places
offered outside of the area if possible. For the
supply side, it is proposed that each Ward makeuse of public and private facilities to ensure
capacity in its district and to coordinate
evacuation with other Wards. Furthermore,measures related to the supply of essentials,
operation of shelters and provision of useful
information for evacuees are referred to in the
Policy Framework.

Fig.7 Procurement Plan,
Specific Plan for Emergency Response
Activities
5. MEASURES FOR EVACUEES AND THE
STRANDED
The Tokyo Inland Earthquake is estimated todevastate the area forcing up to 7 million people
to evacuate home, 4.6 million of them needshelters, and affecting 14 million people certain
distance away from home, 6.5 million of themwould find it difficult to walk such a long
distance home. The Policy Framework forTokyo Inland Earthquakes referes to thisproblem leaving specific measurs for evacuees
and the stranded to be considered. A committee
to work on problems as a result of the massive
evacuees and the stranded was established andproduced a report which anylizes problems
quantitatively and proposes measures.

5.2
Measures
Concerning
Temporary
Emergency Dwellings
If the Tokyo Inland Earthquake occurs, it isestimated that up to 1.62 million temporary
emergency dwellings is demanded in the region.
It is estimated that housing for about 1.35
million households can be arranged 6 months
after the earthquake, 120,000 of them bytemporary housing, 310,000 by repairingdamaged dwellings, 2,000 by public housing,and 920,000 by undamaged private houses andapartments for let in the region, which falls short

Fig.8 Supply of Temporary Emergency Dwellings249

this terrible congestion for more than 3 hours.
This naturally leads to concerns that not a few
people may need medical attention and that
there will be huge demand for rest rooms andplaces for rest on their way home. Some policy
implications are also derived from thesimulations. The number of people stranded in aheavy congestion for more than 3 hours is
reduced to;-50% or 25% respectively if 1/3 or half of thestranded commence returning home next day,
-80% or 2/3 respectively if staggered return isarranged within 3 hours or 6 hours,- 90% if the information on the family isavailable in 6 hours instead of 24 hours,- 40% if the information on the road congestion
is available,- 30% if there is no fire or building collapse.

of the demand by 270,000 households. Thus, it
seems difficult to meet the demand in the region
alone. Capacity for 330,000 households found in
the neighboring regions could fill the gap as
illustrated in Fig. 8 [6]. Thus, it is important tomake arrangements such that damaged
dwellings
willberepaired
promptly,
provisionally or permanently so that evacuees
could return home, vacant capacity, public or
private will be made available, and emergency
temporary housing will be provided.
5.3 Measures for the Stranded
As for the stranded, simulations were
implemented to understand their behaviors,
degree of road congestion caused by thestranded, time it takes for the stranded to returnhome on foot, and the like. The simulation
model was developed using a random utility
model and road network model. The random
utility function assumes that people choose theoption which gives the highest expected utility,i.e.) either to stay where they are, to go home onfoot, to take a rest at a shelter, or to keep
walking. The model also incorporates factors
such as the availability of information about thefamily and their safety, distance to home, anddegree of congestion. The utility function wasderived from answers to 24,500 questions from
200 examinees.

Based on the findings, measures for the stranded
are proposed. It is extremely dangerous for the
stranded to head home at once as thisovercrowds roads and places near railway
stations, and increases chances of being
involved in mass falling and of dying from fireand falling objects. Also, this clogs roads and
impedes emergency response such as search andrescue, fire fighting, emergency shipment andmedical transfer. It should become widely
known that it is important that people refrainfrom heading home immediately and things be
arranged so that family safety could be
confirmed promptly when disasters occur. It isalso proposed that companies and schools be
prepared for and arrange things for theiremployees and students to stay there for a while
to allow for their return on the following day
and staggered return. It should be arranged
such that information on roads is readily
available for the stranded.
In addition, assistance for the stranded returninghome on foot is proposed including traffic
restricting and directing at dangerous and/or
congested areas, provision of information on
roads, medical assistance, and places for rest on
their way home. Local authorities areencouraged to coordinate the assistance.

The simulation was implemented to see theeffects of the following factors;- types of available roads, trunk roads
with/without semi-trunk roads- weather- bottlenecks of roads- building collapse- fire- availability of information on roadcongestion- time taken to obtain information on family- time to commence returning home
The simulation suggests that without any
measures to alleviate, roads will be terribly
crowded (more than 6 people / ㎡ which isalmost as crowded as trains during rush hours inJapan) as illustrated in Fig. 9, 10 [6] and as
many as 2 million people will have to undergo

250

Fig.11 Shortage of Rest Rooms
in response to major earthquakes. The
epoch-making amendments to the Standards
which have served as a basis of the current
Standards were introduced in 1981 and havebeen called “New Earthquake ResistanceStandards”.
Standard was introduced thatbuildings must be designed so as not to collapse
completely after being struck by an earthquakeof seismic intensity 6+ to 7, to the then-existing
standard that buildings must be designed tomaintain sound structure after being struck by anearthquake of seismic intensity 5+.

6. BUILDING QUAKE-PROOFINGIn Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, it wasreported that 83.3% of 5,500 [8] deaths
immediately after the earthquake were causedby building collapse and/or furniture falling. It
is estimated that 4,200 people die due tobuilding collapse in a Tokyo Inland Earthquake
provided that the earthquake occurs at 5 o’clockin the morning according to damage estimation
undertake by CDMC. It became clear fromseries of damage estimations that building
collapse not only causes deaths but also
facilitates outbreak and spread of fire, generates
evacuees, impedes search and rescue, andgenerates
debris.
Thus,building
quake-proofing has been considered andpromoted as a high priority in earthquake
disaster management.
Objectives of building quake-proofing aresummarized in table1 [9], [10].

Table1 Objectives of Quake-proofing
Use
Proportion of Objective
buildings
withearthquake
resistance
Buildings
75%
Raisingthe(2003)
proportion to
90% by 2015
Public
58.6%
Quake-proofing
elementary(2007)
10,000 schools
andjuniorwithhighhigh schools
possibility ofcollapse
by
FY2011
Hospitals
43%
Quake-proofing(2005)
50%
ofhospitals withinsufficientearthquake
resistance by
FY2010

6.1 Acts Related to Earthquake Resistance of
Buildings
In addition to the Act on Special Measures for
Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures outlined
in 3.2, following acts are also related toearthquake resistance of buildings;a) Building Standard Law
The law stipulates minimum standards onbuilding sites, structures, facilities and use toprotect lives, health and properties of thecitizens. The law was enacted in 1950 and has
been amended. The Earthquake ResistanceStandards based on the law have been amended

252

The law also stipulates that buildings must be
examined before the commencement of, during
the construction of and after the completion of
the buildings to ensure that the buildings arebuilt in conformity with related acts.

evaluation and building quake-proofing. It wasalso stipulated that local governments may
announce that owners of designated buildings
instructed to have them examined and/or
quake-proofed fail to do so.

b) Housing Quality Assurance Act
This act was enacted in 2000 to assure thequality of housing, to protect the interests ofhousing purchasers and to settle disputes related
to housing swiftly and properly by introducing
the following schemes;

6.2 Assistance
Financial assistance available to earthquake
resistanceevaluationandbuilding
quake-proofing has been expanded as in table 2[11].
Table2 Assistance Scheme for Building Quake
Proofing
Measures
Subsidy rates and conditions
Evaluation-Undertaken by private sector
2/3-Undertaken by public sector
Residence 1/2, Others 1/3(Buildings on emergency
transportation roads 1/2)
Quake-proofing ・Entitled buildings-Single family homes in built
up areas whose collapse may
cause road blocks-Collective
housingandnon-residential buildings indensely inhabited areas-Single family homes withincome less than 40 percentile-Warranty against defects
Contractors and vendors of new housing areheld liable for warranty against defects affecting
the structural performance for at least 10 years.
-Housing Performance Indication System
Housing Performance Indication Standards havebeen introduced to enable would-be purchasers
to compare housing performance before contract
and third party institutions have been establishedto evaluate the performance indicators.
-Dispute settlement schemec) Act for Execution of Defect Warranty
Liability under Housing Quality Assurance Act
This act was enacted to mandate that contractors
and vendors of new housing should either
deposit the sum according to the number ofhousing supply or contract insurance to ensure
funding necessary to redeem warranty against
defects for 10 years stipulated in the Housing
Quality Assurance Act.

・Subsidy rate
15.2% (undertaken by private
sector)
The rate is increased to-2/3
forbuildings
onemergencytransportation
roads-2/3 for buildings used as
shelters-1/3 for Collective housing on
evacuation routes- 23% for single family homes
with income less than 40
percentiled) Act on Promotion of the Earthquake-proof
Retrofit of Buildings
This act is to enhance building safety bypromoting earthquake-proof retrofit of building
to protect lives, safety and properties of thecitizens from building collapse.
The act was amended in 2006 to promote
quake-proofing buildings further. One of the
major amendments was the introduction of ascheme that the central government formulates
basic guidelines and each local government
formulates a plan based on the guidelines topromote the building earthquake resistance253

-30% for seismic isolated buildings defined in
Housing Quality Assurance Act,
-10% for buildings proved to meet Earthquake
Resistance Standards stipulated in BuildingStandard Law.
Furthermore, insurance premium is deductible
from income tax (up to 50,000 yen) and
residential tax (up to 25,000 yen) [12].

Quake-proofing promotion tax incentives arealso in effect [11].
Residential buildings-10% of expense up to 200,000 yen (approx.
2,000 USD) is deductible from income tax
subject to certain conditions-Real estate tax (up to 120m2 equivalence) is
reduced to 50% for the duration of;
3 years if the building is quake-proofed
between 2006 and 2009
2 yeas if the building is quake-proofed
between 2010 and 2012
1 year if the building is quake-proofed
between 2013 and 2015

6.4 Public School Quake-proofing
Act on Special Measures for Earthquake
Disaster Countermeasures presented in 3.2 wasamended in 2008 and subsidy rates have beenraised from 1/2 to 2/3 for reinforcing publicschools and from 1/3 to 1/2 for rebuilding publicschools if inevitable. It has been mandated thatmunicipalities evaluate the earthquake resistanceof schools and announce the results.
In addition, 280 billion yen (approx. 2.8 billion
USD) in total was appropriated in the first andsecond supplementary budgets for FY2008 andinitial budget for FY2009. Quake-proofing
10,000 building with high possibility of collapse
have been rescheduled to be completed by
FY2011, one year earlier than previous schedule[10].

Commercial buildings
10% of expense for quake-proofing may be
added to tax depreciation for the initial year forincome and corporate taxes.
6.3 Earthquake Insurance System
Fire insurance does not cover losses by firecaused by earthquakes and losses expanded byearthquakes. Earthquake insurance optional
rider to fire insurance is necessary for theselosses to be covered. The central government
reinsures part of the risk borne by insurers ofearthquake insurance and manages funds in a
special account to pay insurance in casedevastating earthquakes occur which private
insurers alone are unable to insure.
Earthquake insurance only covers residentialbuildings and household goods.
Insurance
premium is calculated according to thestructures and locations of insured buildings andbuildings accommodating insured household
goods.
Insurance premium per insurance
payment of 10 million yen is from 5,000 yen(approx. 50 USD) to 31,300 yen (approx. 313
USD) per annum. Discount is available asfollows:-10% for buildings built after June 1st 1981,-10%, 20%, 30% for buildings of earthquake
resistance grade 1, 2 and 3 respectively
according to the Housing Performance
Indication Standards stipulated in Housing
Quality Assurance Act or guidelines forearthquake resistance evaluation formulated by
MLITT,

6.5 Hospital Quake-proofing
Financial assistance for hospital quake-proofing
has been increased as follows;- Private hospitals designated as a disasterbase hospital: from 1/3 to 1/2- Other private hospitals scheduled in 5 year
plans based on the Act on Special Measuresfor Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures:from 1/3 to 1/2- Public hospitals designated as a disasterbase hospital: from 60% to 65%- Other public hospitals scheduled in 5 year
plans based on the Act on Special Measuresfor Earthquake Disaster Countermeasuresfor earthquake disaster countermeasures:from 30% to 65%
7. EARTHQUAKE EARLY WARNING
7.1 Purpose and Mechanism of EEWEarthquake Early Warning (EEW) is to provide
the public with the warning of earthquakes sothat the public could take precautions before the254the perception of and actual response to EEW.

secondary wave arrives. First, a seismographnear the earthquake focus, out of 1,000
seismographs all over Japan detects quakes by
the primary wave. The wave is then analyzed toestimate the location of the earthquake focus andits magnitude. Then, the distribution of seismic
intensity is predicted. EEW is issued for thegeneral public if the maximum predicted seismic
intensity reaches 5- and more than one
seismograph detect the earthquake. EEW is also
issued for Specific Users who wish to receive
the warning as soon as possible and understandits limitation if the predicted magnitude isgreater than or equal to 3.5 or the maximum
predicted seismic intensity is greater than orequal to 3.
Fig. 12 illustrates how EEW works [13].

In the case of Iwate-Miyagi inland earthquake,
EEW was issued for the Specific Users and forthe general public 3.5 seconds and 4.5 seconds
after the earthquake was first detected
respectively.
Fig. 13 illustrates the time
between the issue of EEW and the arrival of thesecondary wave. The EEW did not arrive
before the secondary wave in regions near theearthquake focus however it was in time in otherregions. Precautions were taken in response to
EEW such as halting machines or elevators infactories, alerting employees, and having
children under desks at a kindergarten.
In the case of Iwate northern coast earthquake,

Fig.12 Outline of Earthquake Early Warning

Fig.13 Time between the issue of EEW andthe arrival of the secondary wave
in Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake

7.2 User Response to EEW in Actual
Earthquakes
EEW has been in operation for Specific Users
since August 2006 and for the general public
since October 2007 respectively. EEW has
been issued for the general public against 9
earthquakes and for Specific Users against morethan 1,600 earthquakes respectively.

the percentage of people who took precautions
was slightly less than Iwate-Miyagi inland
earthquake as Iwate northern coast earthquake
occurred at midnight. EEW was issued for theSpecific Users after 4.1 seconds however EEW
was not issued for the general public until 20.8
seconds after the earthquake.
This wasbecause maximum predicted seismic intensity
did not reach the criterion, seismic intensity of
5- until then.

A survey was conducted against offices locatedin Tohoku area where two large earthquakes
struck in 2008, Iwate-Miyagi inland earthquakewith magnitude 7.2 and maximum seismic
intensity 6+ and Iwate northern coast earthquakewith magnitude 6.8 and maximum seismic
intensity 6-. This is undertaken to understandJMA has established a working group to
improve EEW so that EEW would be moreaccurate and issued sooner.

255

Fig.14 Ocean-bottom Seismographs and Tsunami Gauges
lack of framework to report and share
informationmadeitdifficultandtime-consuming to collect and share informationnecessary for effective emergency response
activities.
Various initiatives have been
undertaken to improve disaster management
since then. One of such initiatives is thedevelopment of an IT system to estimate
damage with only the data available beforehandand observed seismic intensities transmitted
soon after earthquakes occur to help organize
and initiate emergency response activities.

7.3 Ocean-bottom Seismographs and Tsunami
Gauges
Ocean-bottom seismographs and tsunami gauges
have been installed in assumed focal areas of
Tokai Earthquake, and Tokai and Tonankai
Earthquakes as in Fig.14. The ocean-bottom
seismographs are to detect earthquakes which
occur under the ocean at the depth of 1-2 km
and the tsunami gauges are to detect tsunamis
generated by earthquakes measuring thedifference in the water pressure coming from thefluctuation of the ocean surface at the bottom.
This is expected to detect earthquakes
immediately and facilitate more accurate andprompt EEW against earthquakes under the
ocean
and
tsunamiwarnings/advisories
respectively. Also, this is expected to help
understand details of earthquakes under theocean, enhance the capacity to watch the signsof Tokai Earthquake, and contribute to theunderstanding of the mechanism of Tokai and
Tonankai Earthquakes.

When an earthquake occurs, seismic inteinsities
observed by seismographs of about 4,300 all
over Japan are transmitted to DIS. If the
maximum seismic intensity reaches 4, DIS is
initiated automatically.
Firstly, observed
seismic intensities are transformed into
velocities of the secondary waves on the surface,which are in turn transformed into velocities atthe seismic bedrock with site amplification
calculated beforehand from geological data.
Then, distribution of velocities at the seismic
bedrock are estimated for areas of 1 square
kilometers based on the transformed velocities.
The distribution of seismic intensities are
estimated from the disitributon of velocities atthe seismic bedrock backwards. Then, thenumber of collapsed buildings is estimated fromthe distribution of seismic intensities and therelation between rate of collapsed buildings and

8.
DISASTERMANAGEMENTINFORMATION SYSTEMS
8.1 Disaster Information System
The development of Disaster Information
System (DIS) dates back to 1995 when the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck Japan. In
addition to the extensive damage and disrupted
means of communication and transportation, the256seismic intensity derived from past earthquakes.
Lastly, death toll is estimated from the estimatednumber of collapsed buildings and the relation
between the number of collapsed buildings andthe death tolls derived from past earthquakes.
Although it depends on the scales of earthquakes,
the estimation is completed about 10 minutes
after the earthquakes occur. The results arethen transmitted to central government
ministries and agencies.

consolidate disaster informaiton gathered byorganizations
responsiblefordisastermanagement on a base map using Geographical
Information System and share the information
among central government ministries andagencies. It has been developed since 2005.
Differenct pieces of informaiton from different
organizations are stored on different layers. This
enables users to choose layers of their interestsand have them overlaid and displayed. In thisway, information is used and shared easily andgraphically.
The information is transmitted to the Platform
automatically without data entry by integrating
systems wherever possible.
Keeping theworkload of information transmission such asdata entry minimum releases valuable resources
for other activities in time of emergency, which
is one of the main objectives of the Platform.
Information on the following items is currently
available on the Platform.
- Weather- Estimated distribution of seismic intensities
and damage- Satellite images- Disruption of electricity and gas supply incertain regions- Rivers

Fig.15 Distribution of seismic intensities
estimated by DIS
8.2 Disaster Information Sharing Platform
Disaster Information Sharing Platform is toFig.16 Information currently available on Disaster Information Sharing Platform257

issues to be worked on. For example, measures
should be coordinated by the central government,
local governments and media to gather, shareand provide information for those who need itsuch as the evacuees and the stranded. Also,
schemes should be arranged for organizations
concerned to coordinate wide-area evacuation.

In addition, the number of casualties anddamaged buildings, and disruption ofcommunication facilities can be entered in the
Platform.
Other information will be further consolidated
on the Platform automatically by integrating IT
systems managed by other organizations as far
as possible.

While all levels of governments play importantroles in disaster management, the disastermanagement also requires for every single
member of the society to be involved, play its
part and help each other for better respond todisasters.
Specifically, each person should prepare for andtake actions against disasters by doing things
such as quake-proofing the home, fixing
furniture to prevent it from falling to avoid
being hurt, stockpiling emergency goods, foodand water enough for the first few days, andexamining ways to shelters.
Actions should be taken to encourage local
communities to restore and strengthen thesolidarity, to facilitate involvement of volunteers
in disaster management, to expand andstrengthen voluntary disaster prevention units oflocal communities, to encourage privatecompanies to provide assistance for local
communities and to encourage those individuals
and groups to coordinate their initiatives tomaximize disaster management capacity.
In addition to its disaster management, thecentral government has arranged measures tosupport these activities by arranging things suchas various assistance scheme for building
quake-proofing and EEW. It is extremely
important that these activities should befurthered to strengthen disaster resistance of thecountry.

9. CONCLUSION
This paper presented earthquake disastermanagement in Japan. Japan has suffered fromearthquakes as large earthquakes occur
anywhere at anytime in Japan.
Disastermanagement has been promoted in an integrated
and well-planned manner according to theDisaster Countermeasures Basic Act and facility
improvement in preparation for earthquakes has
been furthered according to 5 year plans basedon the Act on Special Measures for Earthquake
Disaster Countermeasures. On the other hand,comprehensive measures have been considered
and undertaken against imminent devastatinglarge-scale earthquakes individually. Tokyo
Inland Earthquakes above all, striking Tokyo, isestimated to cause tremendous damage.
Reducing the damage and maintaining political,
administrative and economic functions as the
Capital are two pillars of disaster management
stated in the Policy Framework. Measuresagainst Tokyo Inland Earthquakes have beenpromoted according to Earthquake Disaster
Reduction Strategy. In addition, continuity ofoperation plans and business continuity plans,Specific Plan for Emergency Response
Activities have been formulated to ensureadministrative and business operation, andprompt and efficient emergency response toearthquakes.
The central government has institutionalizedbuilding earthquake resistance by legislation,
increasedsubsidyrates
appropriating
supplementary budget for FY 2008 in addition
to initial budget, and has arranged tax incentives
to strongly promote building quake-proofing.
In addition to the measures proposed for
massive evacuees and the stranded generated by
Tokyo Inland Earthquakes, there are still some258

8. National Institute for Land and InfrastructureManagement:
GuidelinesforSpecialPermissions in the Zoning Code under the
Building Standard Law, Technical Note of
National Institute for Land and InfrastructureManagement,
No.368,2007,
http://www.nilim.go.jp/lab/bcg/siryou/tnn/tnn03
68pdf/ks0368.pdf
9. Cabinet Office: Comprehensive Plan toAchieve Zero Victims in Natural Disasters, 2008,
http://www.bousai.go.jp/chubou/22/shiryo4-2.pdf
10. Ministry of Education, culture, Sports,
Science and Technology: Acceleration of School
Facility
Quake-proofing
accordingtoComprehensive
Emergency
Measures,http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/soshiki/daijin/shionoya/08101606.htm
11. Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism: Assistance Scheme for Building
Quake-proofing,
http://www.mlit.go.jp/jutakukentiku/build/taisins
ien1.pdf
12. Ministry of Finance: Summary of
Earthquake Insurance,
http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/seisaku/jisin.htm
13. Japan Metrological Agency: Earthquake
Early
Warning,
http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/Activities/how.pdf,

10. REFERENCES
1. Cabinet Office: Earthquake in Japan,
http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/taisaku_gaiyou/pdf/hassei-jishin.pdf
2. Cabinet Office: Disaster Management inJapan, 2007
3. Ikeuchi, K. and Isago, N.: Natural Disaster
Mitigation Policy in Japan, Proc. 40th Joint
Meeting of U.S. – Japan Panel on Wind andSeismic Effects UJNR, 2008.
4. Cabinet Office: Results of damage estimation
concerning Tokyo Inland Earthquakes, 2005,
http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/taisaku_s
yuto/pdf/higaisoutei/gaiyou.pdf
5. Cabinet Office: Summary of Specific Planfor Emergency Response Activities concerning
Tokyo
InlandEarthquakes,
2008,
http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/taisaku_s
yuto/pdf/081212/081212_01.pdf
6. A Technical Committee on Measures for
Evacuees and the Stranded concerning Tokyo
InlandEarthquakes,
CentralDisasterManagement
Council:Report,2008,
http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/shutohina
n/081027/siryo03.pdf
7. Cabinet Office: Summary of Estimates ofSupply and Demand Gap of Toilets Based on the
Simulation for Behaviors of the Stranded, 2008,
http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/shutohina
n/081027/siryo06.pdf

259

Study on Landslide Orientation Bias Triggered by 1994 Northridge Earthquake
by
Hiroshi P. Sato1
Clara River Valley. Since no rain had fallen forseveral month before the earthquake; hence,pore-pressure effect were not a factor intriggering landslides [3][4].

ABSTRACTPrevious studies reported that the 1994
Northridge earthquake triggered 11,000
landslides in 10,000 km2; however, no study has
investigated the landslide orientation bias in thewider area than the Santa Susana quadrangle
map, i.e., 124 km2. I selected 3,200 km2 on themountain slope and found that the bias shows
the direction from south to west. I also
investigated the relation between the landslide
slope orientation and ground acceleration
direction of initial and peak sliding acceleration(ISA and PSA), using simulated horizontal andvertical ground acceleration data. As a result, it
was found that PSA gives better explanation
than ISA for the landslide orientation bias ofsouthwest; however, since north-facing slopes
also showed the highest accumulated PSA, I
could not state the reason why many landslides
did not occur on the north-facing slopes.

Harp and Jibson [3][4] also reported that theearthquake induced-landslide were concentrated
more on south (S)- than north (N)- slope aspect(the direction which the slope faces) in Santa
Susana Mountains. Parise and Jibson [5] also
said that the landslides have Southeast(SE)~Southwest (SW) orientation bias in the
124 km2 area using 10-m-resolution digital
elevation model (DEM) prepared by U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS).
Such the bias was also shown in the other casesof earthquakes; e.g., the bias of SW [6] in the2005 Northern Pakistan earthquake (M7.6), thebias of S [7] in the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake(Mw 7.6) in Taiwan, and the bias of SE [7] inthe 1993 earthquake (Mw 6.9) in Finisterre
Mountain, Papua New Guinea. It is thought thatthe relation between slope aspect and groundacceleration direction has close relation to
trigger landslides. However, previous studies
have not investigated the relation between themenough.

KEYWORDS: Aspect, California, GroundAcceleration, Landslide, Northridge Earthquake,
Slope
1. INTRODUCTION
On 17 January 1994, Northridge earthquake(Mw 6.7) occurred 18 km beneath theNorthridge,
Southern
California[1],neighborhood in the city of Los Angeles. The
earthquake resulted from more than 3 m ofreverse slip on a 15-km-long south-dipping
thrust fault that raised the Santa Susana
Mountains by as much as 70 cm [2].

Time-series ground acceleration shows different
directions in each measurement time, and slope
aspect is variable among the different sites.
Furthermore, steep slope angle is an importantfactor to induce landslides. Since time-series
sliding acceleration [8] in each site is also
calculated from the ground acceleration, I
investigated the relation between slope aspect
and the time-series sliding acceleration,inducing landslides.

Northridge earthquake triggered 11,000
landslides over 10,000 km2 [3][4]. They
described that deep landslide was rare andalmost all of the landslides were shallow
disrupted rock slide, and tell that the landslides
were concentrated primarily in the Santa Susana
Mountains and the mountains north of the Santa

2. STUDY AREA
1 Senior Researcher, Geography and Crustal Dynamics

Research Center, Geographical Survey Institute,
Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki-ken 305-0811 Japan

260

geologic unit does not control the landslideorientation bias in the whole study area.

2.1 Topography
Study area is shown in Fig.1a, where elevation
ranges from 0 m, at the coast facing Pacific
Ocean, to the summit 2,248 m at the site A.
Figure 1a also depicts the model fault plane [9]whose upper edge is shown as D. The position
B-B’ in Fig. 1a shows the Susana Mountains.

3. METHOD
3.1 Simulated Ground Acceleration Data
Jibson and Jibson [11] showed the 84
seismometer instruments in and around thestudy area. I drew the instrument-centered2-km-radius sampling circles on the landslide
polygons; however, almost all of the sampling
circles did not have the enough numbers oflandslide polygon because the instruments are
not always installed in the mountains. Only thefour instruments of FSD, WPI, PDD, and PDA
in Fig.1c (PDA is in the same place as PDD)
showed over 1% landslide area ratio in eachsampling circle.

Figure 1b shows the mapped landslides [3][4] as
red dots. The site C in Fig.1a shows Simi Hills
where Cretaceous hard sandstone lies, and thelandslide density in the Simi Hills was smaller
than in Santa Susana Mountains [3][4][5].
Figures 1c and 1d depict slope angle and aspectcalculated from 40-m-resolution DEM. In thisstudy I deal landslides occurred on mountainslope, therefore, I limited the study area where
slope angle is 5º and more; Figures 1c and 1dshows just the area, 3,200 km2. Furthermore, I
selected the landslide whose area is more than
40 m by 40 m, this is because I thought thatlarge landslides clearly shows their orientation(the directions that the landslides face on theslopes).

However, the number of the sampling circles is
not enough to consider landslide orientation bias
in the whole study area. Therefore, in this study
I did not use the real ground acceleration data
[11] but I used the simulated groundacceleration data at the 4-km-spacing 144 sites,from the site #1 to #144. The data have northing,easting, and up components and whose samplingtime and period is 0.04 second and 50 seconds,
respectively. Since the simulated data [12]originally provides ground velocity, I calculated
the acceleration from the velocity data. In
calculating the velocity Wald et al. [12]considered substrate stiffness differences
between hard and soft rock; however, they did
notconsidertopographic
seismic-wave
amplification
effect;hence,
calculated
acceleration does not contain this effect.

2.2 Landslide Orientation Bias
I overlaid the slope aspect in Fig.1d on the
mapped landslides in Fig.1b; I calculated thelandslide area ratio among eight orientations.
As a result, the radar chart in Fig.2a showed the
SW orientation bias.
To confirm slope steepness effect on the bias, I
overlaid the slope angle in Fig.1c on the mapped
landslides; I calculated the average slope angle
among eight orientations. As a result, Fig.2b
does not show remarkable slope angle changes
among them and it means that slope steepness
does not control the landslide orientation bias in
the whole study area.

On the mapped landslides I overlaid 2-km-radus
sampling circles whose centers are the 144 sites,
and I investigated landslide area ratio within thesampling circles. As a result, I selected 12
sampling circles where the landslide area ratio isover 1%. Figure 1d shows these 12 sampling
circles of #64, #65, #76~#78, #81, #89,
#98~#101, and #112. Within the 12 sampling
circles I overlaid the slope aspect on the mapped
landslides, calculated 2,072 landslide DEM cells
number ratio among eight orientations (Fig.3a).
Again, I could find the S~SW orientation bias.

Next, to confirm geologic unit effect on the bias,
I overlaid the geologic map [10] on the mapped
landslides; I calculated the landslide area ratio
among both eight orientations and the 18 kindsof geologic unit, from Pre-Cambrian granite to
Holocene sediments. All units except Miocene
continental sedimentary rocks showed S, SW,
and west (W) orientation bias and it means that261

Figure 3b shows the whole DEM cells
distribution ratio in the 12 sampling circles;
however, no orientation bias was found in theradar chart.

coefficient of static friction, effective cohesivestrength across the sliding surface, and area ofthe sliding surface, respectively. The coefficientof static friction μ s was calculated from μ s=tan(φ’), where φ’ is effective friction angle. The
values of φ’ and c’ in each geologic unit [10]were determined by Jibson et al. [13] referringto the lithologic facies of the geologic units.

3.2 Sliding acceleration calculation
In this study we assumed that any DEM cells ineach sampling circle have the same groundacceleration. In each sampling circle I calculated
sliding acceleration [8] using the simulated
ground acceleration data. As an example, at theDEM cell (SW slope aspect in a landslide
polygon, within the sampling circle #77), I show
the easting aE, northing aN, and up aVcomponents of the ground acceleration in
Figs.4a, 4b, and 4c, respectively.

3.3 Initial and Peak Sliding Acceleration (ISAand PSA) Selection
Time-series sliding acceleration was calculated
at each DEM cells, whose number is 2,072
landslide cells and 54,289 no-landslide cells. In
each DEM cell slope aspect was calculated. If
original aE and aN in Figs.4b and 4c are referred
to, I can calculate the ground acceleration
direction from aE and aN in any time in Fig.4f.
Therefore, in each cell I selected the two kindsof positive sliding acceleration and comparedslope aspects with ground acceleration directionin each case.

For calculating sliding acceleration, in Fig.5
Huang et al. [8] assumed free landslide bodywhose mass is m on the basement. Relative tothe inertial frame of reference, the basement
moves with acceleration an in the direction of
normal to the slide surface (positive away fromthe slope), ad tangential to the slide surface
along the dip (positive down dip), and as
tangential to the slide surface along the strike.
In Fig.5, as is not written because it is vertical tothe page (positive up-away from the page).
Eqs.(1) and (2) shows how to calculate an and ad[8].

First, I selected the ISA that moves slope surface
for the first time; e.g., in Fig.4f, initial positive
Sa is 0.03 m/s/s and the recorded time is 4.84
second. This is because I expected that groundacceleration direction of ISA would determine
the landslide orientation. Next, I extracted PSA;
e.g., in Fig.4f, PSA is 0.99 m/s/s and therecorded time is 8.72 second. This is because I
thought that ISA may be small to move slope
surface in practice and PSA is effectively
working to move it. In the both cases, I recorded
not only the ISA and PSA but also whose
original ground acceleration direction at the timeand slope aspect at the cell.

an  a E sin  cos s  a N sin  sin  s  aV cos  (1)ad  a E cos cos s  a N cos sin  s  aV sin  (2)Where, δ and φs is slope angle and slope
strike direction from north measured clockwise,
which is equal to slope aspect minus 90°,
respectively. The an and ad calculated from aE,
aN, and aV is shown in Figs.4d and 4e.
Finally, sliding acceleration Sa was calculated by
Eq.(3). The Sa calculated from an and ad isshown in Fig.4f. If Sa is positive, it will movethe slope surface; if not, the surface will stay.

However, in the two cases, it is not efficient toconsider the relation between the slope aspectand ground acceleration direction at each DEM
cell, because the number of DEM cells is totally
56,361; therefore, I accumulated the ISA andPSA among the slope aspect and groundacceleration directions in the whole sampling
circle.

S a  ( g sin   ad )   s ( g cos   an )  c' / mA (3)4. RESULTS

Where, g,δ,μs, c’, A is gravity, slope angle, the

4.1 Initial Sliding Acceleration (ISA)262

ground acceleration direction S.

Figure 6a shows the accumulated ISAs at 2,072
landslide DEM cells among slope aspects andground acceleration directions. Generally
speaking, high accumulated ISAs areconcentrated on and around the diagonal line
between slope aspect N, ground acceleration
direction S and slope aspect NW, groundacceleration direction SE. The highest
accumulated ISA recorded 19.3 m/s/s in theslope aspect SW, ground acceleration direction
NE. The fourth highest accumulated ISA
recorded 10.0 m/s/s in the slope aspect N,
ground acceleration direction S. Since thelandslide DEM cells face more SW than N(Fig.2a), I thought that more ISAs wereaccumulated on the SW-facing DEM than on the
N-facing DEM.

Figure 6e shows the accumulated PSAs at the all
56,361 DEM cells. The highest accumulated
PSA recorded 341.4 m/s/s in the slope aspect N,
ground acceleration direction S. The second
highest accumulated PSA recorded 289.2 m/s/s
in the slope aspect SW, ground acceleration
direction NE. And it also shows two peaks ofaccumulated PSA around the first and second
highest accumulated PSA.
Figure 6f shows the normalized accumulated
PSA by dividing Fig.6d by Fig.6e; it was foundthat the slope aspect SW tended to experience
relatively higher ratio than the other slope
aspects, regardless of ground acceleration
direction. Comparing Fig.6f with Fig.3a, I foundthat landslide orientation bias is closely relatedwith the normalized accumulated PSA among
the slope aspects. However, if we focus on theslope aspect N and SW in Fig.6e, we cannot
state the reason why landslides did not occur atthe slope aspect of N.

Figure 6b shows the accumulated ISAs at both
2,072 landslide DEM cells and 54,289
no-landslide DEM cells, i.e., at the all 56,361
DEM cells within the whole sampling area. The
highest accumulated ISA recorded 138.6 m/s/s
in the slope aspect N, ground acceleration
direction S. The second highest accumulated
ISA recorded 84.3 m/s/s in the slope aspect SW,
ground acceleration direction NE. And it looks
like two peaks of accumulated ISA around theslope aspect N, ground acceleration S, and slope
aspect SW, ground acceleration NE.

5. CONCLUSIONSIn this study I revealed that the 1994 Northridge
earthquake-induced
landslides
havetheorientation bias of SW over the whole mountainarea, 3,200 km2. Next, I stated that the bias is
not controlled by the slope steepness andgeologic units. I also stated that PSA (peaksliding acceleration) gives better explanation
than ISA (initial sliding acceleration) for the SW
landslide orientation bias. However, we could
not state the reason why landslides did not occur
at the N-facing slope where the highest
accumulated PSA recorded in Fig.6e.

To normalize Fig.6a, I divided Fig.6a by Fig.6b.
The result is shown in Fig.6c; it shows 100% in
the slope aspect SW, ground acceleration
direction SW, and in the slope aspect W, groundacceleration direction S. Furthermore, 99.4%
recorded in the slope aspect N, groundacceleration direction NW; however, Fig.6c does
not show that higher accumulated ISAs wereadded on the landslide SW-facing slope,regardless of ground acceleration direction.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Support for my research at the U.S. Geological
Survey facilities in Golden, CO was provided bya grant from the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology of Japan.

4.2 Peak Sliding Acceleration (PSA)
Figure 6d shows the accumulated PSA at 2,072
landslide DEM cells among slope aspects andground acceleration directions. The highest
accumulated PSA recorded 83.3 m/s/s in theslope aspect SW, ground acceleration direction
NE. The seventh highest accumulated PSA
recorded 40.0 m/s/s in the slope aspect N,

7. REFERENCES
1. Wald, D.J., Heaton, T.H.: A Dislocation of
the 1994 Northridge, California Earthquake

263

Surface-Normal Ground Acceleration on theInitiation of Jih-Feng-Erh-Shan Landslide
During the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan,
Earthquake, Bulletin of the SeismologicalSociety of America, Vol.91, 953-958, 2001.
9. Wald, D.J., Heaton, T.H., Hudnut, K.W.: The
Slip History of the 1994 Northridge,
California, Earthquake Determined from
Strong-motion, Teleseismic, GPS, andLeveling Data, Bulletin of the SeismologicalSociety of America, Vol.86(1B), S49-S70,
1996.
10.Jennings, C.W.: Geologic Map ofCalifornia (Scale 1:750,000), State ofCalifornia, 1977.
11.Jibson, R.W., Jibson, M.W.: Java Programsfor Using Newmark’s Method and Simplified
Decoupled Analysis to Model Slope
Performance During Earthquakes, U.S.
Geological Survey Open-File Report,
No.03-005, 2003.
12.Wald, D.J., Hudnut, K.W., Heaton, T.H.:
EstimationofUniformlySpaced,Near-source, Broadband Ground Motions forthe 1994 Northridge Earthquake from
Forward and Inverse Modeling, Proceedingsof the CUREe Northridge Earthquake
Research Conference, Los Angeles, 1997.
(http://pasadena.wr.usgs.gov/office/wald/CU
REe.html)
13.Jibson, R.W., Harp, E.L., Michael, J.A.: A
Method for Producing Digital Probabilistic
Seismic Landslide Hazard Maps: an Example
from the Los Angels, California, Area, U.S.
Geological Survey Open-File Report,
No.98-113, 1998.

Determined from Strong Ground Motions,
U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report,
No. 94-278, 1996.
2. U.S. Geological Survey and the Southern
California
Earthquake
Center:The
Magnitude 6.7 Northridge, California,
earthquake of January 17, 1994, Science,
Vol.266, 389-397, 1994.
3. Harp, E.L., Jibson, R.W.: Inventory oflandslides triggered by the 1994 Northridge,
California earthquake, U.S. Geological
Survey Open-File Report, No. 95-213, 1995.
4. Harp, E.L., Jibson, R.W.: Landslides
triggered by the 1994 Northridge, California
earthquake, Bulletin of the SeismologicalSociety of America, Vol.86(1B), S319-S332,
1996.
5. Parise, M., Jibson, R.W.: A Seismic
Landslide Susceptibility Rating of Geologic
Units based on Analysis of Characteristics ofLandslides Triggered by the 17 January, 1994
Northridge,
California
Earthquake,
Engineering Geology, Vol.58, 251-270, 2000.
6. Sato, H.P., Hasegawa, H., Fujiwara, S.,
Tobita, M., Koarai, M., Une, H., Iwahashi, J.:Interpretation of Landslide Distribution
Triggered by the 2005 Northern Pakistan
Earthquake
using
SPOT5
Imagery,
Landslides, Vol.4, 113-122, 2007.
7. Meunier, P., Houvius, N., Haines, J.A.:
Topographic Site Effects and the Location ofEarthquake Induced Landslides, Earth
Planetary Science Letters, Vol.275, 221-232,
2007.
8. Huang, C.C., Lee, Y.H., Liu, H.P., Keefer,
D.K.,
Jibson,R.W.:
Influenceof264Fig.5 Free Landslide Body Diagram about Mountain Body under Earthquake Ground Motion andCritically Balanced Conditions ([8] was simplified)267

Fig.6 Accumulated Initial Sliding Acceleration (ISA) between Slope Aspects and Ground Acceleration
Direction in (a) 2,072 Landslide Cells, (b) Whole Cells (2,072 Landslide Cells + 54,289 No-landslide
Cells), (c) Normalized Accumulated ISA. Accumulated Peak Sliding Acceleration in (d) 2,072
Landslide Cells, (e) Whole Cells, (f) Normalized Accumulated PSA.

268

THEME 7
Disaster Resilient Buildings andInfrastructureOn the Variation of Fundamental Frequency (Period) of an Undamaged Building – A
Continuing Discussion
byM. Çelebi1
ABSTRACT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Variation of fundamental period (frequency) ofundamaged structures has been the subject matterof numerous studies. Recently, this topic isrekindled with the premise but repeat of the wellknown conclusion that fundamental period(frequency) varies with amplitude of shaking.
Some researchers appropriately called this“wandering” of the natural frequencies of astructure. Although due to various sources of
excitation and time-varying environmental
conditions, variation of the fundamental period(frequency) of even an undamaged structure
should not be a surprise to many, it is important tounderstand why such variation is important forpractical purposes. In this paper, we investigate thefundamental frequencies of an undamagedbuilding for which there are numerous studies ofseveral sets of vibration data, including forced
vibration testing, strong shaking due to a distantlarge earthquake, and low-amplitude shaking due
to ambient excitations as well as several small
nearby earthquakes. It is shown that thefundamental frequency “wanders” in a consistent
way with the level of shaking, and that thesignificant difference between low-amplitude andstrong shaking is attributed to soil-structureinteraction during stronger shaking

1.1 General
Reasonably accurate assessment of fundamental
period (frequency) of a structure is an essential
part of design and analysis processes. It is also
known that variation of fundamental period(frequency) of undamaged structures has been
subject matter of numerous studies – too long tocite herein. Recently, with advanced technologies
and methods to acquire and analyze vibration datafrom structures excited by natural and man-madesources, study of the subject matter is rekindledwith the premise that fundamental period(frequency) varies with the amplitude of shaking(e.g. Calvi et al , 2006, Dunand et al, 2006,
Todorovska et al, 2006). Clinton and others (2006)
appropriately called this “wandering” of thenatural frequencies of a structure. While due tovarious sources of excitation and time-varying
environmental conditions, variation of thefundamental period (frequency) of even an
undamaged structure should not be a surprise to
many, but nonetheless it is important to understandand dwell upon as to whether such variation isimportant for practical purposes. It is also
important to mention that accurate assessment offundamental frequency is important to establish abaseline linear elastic behavior of a structure inorder to interpret its nonlinear elastic or nonlinear
inelastic behavior that may be observed in future
events. The objective of this paper is to investigate
the fundamental frequencies of the undamaged
Pacific Park Plaza Building in Emeryville, CA, forwhich there are numerous studies of numerous setsof vibration data, including forced___________________
1
Earthquake Hazards Team, USGS (MS977),
345 Middlefield Rd., Menlo Park, Ca, 94025

KEYWORDS: fundamental frequency (period),
accelerations, earthquake response, spectra,
building,

271

vibration testing, strong shaking due to a far
distance large earthquake, and low-amplitude
shaking due to ambient excitations as well as
several small nearby earthquakes. It is repeateddesigned to capture (a) the translational motions of
the wings of the building relative to its core, (b)the vertical motions of the mat foundation slab at
the ground floor level, and (c) free-field motions at
the surface and at a downhole depth of 200 ft (61m). The South Free-field (SFF) station is often
referred to as the Emeryville (EMV) ground site.
This building is selected for this study because
there is a variety of old and new data and because
there is no evidence that it experienced any
damage during the various levels of shaking
described in this paper.

herein that the particular building being
studied has not been damaged but, as shownin this study that its fundamental period(frequency) is observed to “wander” in aconsistent way with the level of shaking. The
scope of the paper is based on findings using
actual data and does not include mathematicalmodeling of the building (except in reference
to existing analyses by others). In the case ofthis building, the significant change in thevalue of fundamental period (frequency)
between low-amplitude and strong shaking is
attributed to soil-structure interaction (SSI)
during stronger shaking. However, detailed
SSI investigation of the building is beyond thescope of this paper but has been reported
elsewhere (Kagawa et al, 1993a, b, Aktan etal, 1992, Kambhatla et al, 1992, Çelebi, 1992,
1998). This paper introduces additional resultsfrom new data that reinforces this argument.

1.3 Site Conditions
Based on a relatively recent geologic log andshear-wave velocity profile (Gibbs et al, 1994), thesoils at the site consist of artificial fill, soft silty
clay (Holocene Bay Mud), and stiff to very stiff,
undifferentiated deposits composed of numerous
layers of clay, loam, sand, and gravel. The layer of
Holocene Bay Mud, clearly evident on the shearwave velocity profile shown in Figure 2, begins at
about 16 ft. (5 m) depth and is approximately 10
ft. (3 m) thick. Stiff deposits with shear-wave
velocity (Vs) of approximately 820 ft/s (0.25 km/s)
extend from below the Holocene Bay Mud to adepth of approximately 80 ft. (24 m). Very stiff
Pleistocene deposits with Vs approximately equal
to 1300 ft/s (0.4 km/s) extend to a depth of about
155 ft (48 m). The computed site transfer function,corresponding to the shear-wave velocity profile in
Figure 2, using Haskell’s shear-wave propagation
method (Haskell, 1953, 1960) and coded by
Mueller (pers. comm. 2002) is also provided in
Figure 2, and indicates a site frequency at
approximately 0.7 Hz.

1.2 The Building, Design Spectra andInstrumentation
The Pacific Park Plaza (PPP) Building is anequally-spaced three-winged, cast in place, thirtystory, 312 ft. (95.1 m) tall, ductile reinforced
concrete moment-resisting frame building. The
three wings of the building are constructedmonolithically and are equally spaced at angles of120 degrees around a central core. Shear walls in
the center core and wings extend to the second
floor level only, but column lines are continuousfrom the foundation to the roof. The foundation is
a 5-foot-thick concrete mat supported by 828 (14inch-square) pre-stressed concrete friction piles,
each 20-25 m in length, in a primarily soft-soil
environment that has an average shear-wave
velocity between 250 and 300 m/s and a depth ofapproximately 150 ft (~50 m) to harder soil. A
three-dimensional schematic of the building andits seismic instrumentation is shown in Figure 1.
The instrumentation integrates arrays for the
structure, surface, and downhole, and comprises a
30-channel accelerometer deployment uniquely

1.4 Design Spectra and Significant Shaking
Experienced
To date, the most significant shaking recorded by
the building arrays was during the 1989 Loma
Prieta (LPE), CA earthquake (Ms=7.1). The data
set from LPE is extensively used in several studies
as well as in this investigation that specificallydwells upon the variation of fundamental periodwith level of shaking. As previously mentioned,
the building was not damaged.
Responses of the building and the surface freefield recorded during the strong shaking caused by272

the LPE earthquake exhibit distinct amplificationof motions (Figures 3a) at the site of the building
as compared to the motions at Yerba Buena Island,
both approximately 100 km (and at similarazimuths) from the epicenter of the LPE. The eastwest components of acceleration recorded at theroof and the ground floor of the structure and at
the associated free-field station (SFF in Figure 1)
are shown in Figure 3a. The motion at Yerba
Buena Island (YBI), the closest rock site, had apeak acceleration of 0.06 g, and is also shown forcomparison. The response spectra (Figure 3b)
clearly demonstrate that the motions at Emeryville(SFF) were amplified by as much as five times
when compared with YBI. This is also inferredby the amplitude of the peak accelerations (0.26 g
for SFF and 0.06 g for YBI). Furthermore, thedifferences in peak acceleration at SFF (0.26 g)
and at the ground floor of the building (0.21 g)(Fig. 3a) suggest the possibility of significant soilstructure interaction. Figure 3c shows acomparison of actual response spectra with sitespecific design response spectra (based on theprobabilistic earthquakes related to levels of
performance) used in the design of the building:(a) the maximum probable earthquake (50 %probability of being exceeded in 50 years with 5 %damping) anchored at zero period acceleration(ZPA) of 0.32g. [curve A in Figure 3c], and two
maximum credible earthquakes both with 10 %damping but 10 % probability of being exceededin (b) 100 years (ZPA of 0.63 g) [Curve B in Fig.
3c] and (c) 50 years [ZPA of 0.53 g]2 . The spectraof the EW components of recorded motions at the
ground floor and SFF are also shown in Figure 3c.
At 100 km from the epicenter, even though therecorded EW peak acceleration at SFF (0.26 g) issmaller than the ZPA of the postulated maximum
probable earthquake (0.32 g), the spectral
accelerations of the EW component of SFF isconsiderably higher than the maximum probable
earthquake for periods >0.6 seconds – that is,practically the first three modes of the building.
This implies that, when large earthquakes occur
closer to the structure, the level of shaking and the
response spectra of motions are likely to be higher(for some period bands) than the design response
spectra, and, in many cases, the code design2

response spectrum (e.g. the 1979 Uniform
Building Code).
2.0 SUMMARY OF STUDIES RELATED TO
THE BUILDING
2.1 Data Sets
Extensive data sets from this building include
not only the Loma Prieta earthquake response
data but also those from smaller earthquakes andfrom forced and ambient vibration tests (Stephen
et al, 1985, Çelebi et al, 1993). Table 1
summarizes the events (including LPE) thathave been recorded by the building array and areused in this study. Those related to LPE and test
data are summarized in Table 2.
2.2 Pre-1991 Data sets including LPE and Studies
The building has been studied in detail or as partof a larger investigation by several researchers(Çelebi and Safak, 1992, Safak and Çelebi,
1992, Anderson et al, 1991, Bertero et al, 1992,
Kagawa et al, 1993a, b, Aktan et al, 1992,
Kambhatla et al, 1992, Çelebi, 1992, 1998).
Using different methods, including spectral
analyses, system identification techniques(Çelebi, 1998), and mathematical models, themajority of the investigators are in agreement
that, for the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake data,
the predominant three response modes of thebuilding and the associated frequencies (periods)
are 0.38 Hz (2.63 s), 0.95 Hz (1.05 s), and 1.95
Hz (0.51 s). These three modes of the building
are torsionally-translationally coupled (Çelebi,1998) and are depicted in the cross-spectra (Sxy)of the orthogonal records obtained from the roof,
ground floor and SFF (the south free-field site)
and the normalized cross-spectra of the orthogonal
records (Figure 4). The site frequency at 0.7 Hz(1.43 s) observed in the cross-spectrum of the roof
(Figure 4a) appears as the dominant peak in the
cross-spectra of the ground floor and the south
free-field (SFF) (Figure 4b and 4c). This site
frequency has been also confirmed by the wave
propagation method using site borehole data by
Gibbs and others (1994) as shown in Figure 2.
Justification of the site frequency as determinedfrom this set of records are reported in Çelebi(2003).

not shown in the figure273

Dynamic characteristics of the building extracted
from the data sets are summarized in Table 2 andshow considerable differences in the fundamental
frequency determined from strong shaking versus
low-amplitude shaking and analyses. The
differences are attributed to SSI effects duringstrong shaking (Çelebi, 1998, Kagawa et al,
1993a, b, Aktan et al, 1992, Kambhatla et al,1992), and frequencies from recorded motions canbe matched when SSI is incorporated into themathematical models (Kagawa et al, 1993a, b).
Furthermore, a study of the building for dynamicpile-group interaction (Aktan et al, 1992,
Kambhatla et al, 1992) indicates that there issignificant interaction. The study shows thatcomputed responses of the building using state-ofthe-art techniques for dynamic-pile-groupinteraction compares well with the recorded
responses. Clearly, the mathematical models
developed at that time needed improvements(Stephen et al, 1985). This conclusion could only
be reached because we have recorded on-scale
motions.

LPE, the fundamental frequency (period) is
significantly lower (longer) than that determinedusing the LPE record. In Figure 5, for each of the1998, 2000, 2003 and 2006 earthquakes (Table 1),
plots of acceleration time history andcorresponding amplitude spectra are shown for the
30th floor and ground floor of the building.
Consistently, a structural fundamental frequency(period) of ~ 0.48 Hz (~2.08 s) is identified. This
identified frequency is also confirmed by system
identification method. For the sake of brevity,
only a sample system identification plot ispresented for the 2006 event (Figure 6) whichclearly shows the fundamental frequency at 0.48
Hz. For all events and tests to date, Table 3
summarizes the level of shaking (acceleration ing’s) and identified dynamic characteristics(frequencies and damping ratios). These results arealso graphically depicted in Figure 7. Both Table 3
and Figure 7 complements and reinforces theargument that the fundamental frequency varies
significantly with the level of shaking even if thebuilding may not be damaged. In the case ofPacific Park Plaza Building, the variation is
attributable to SSI.

In addition, system identification techniques, whenapplied to the records of this building, yielded verylarge damping ratios corresponding to the 0.38-Hz
first-mode frequency. These are 11.6 percent(north-south) and 15.5 percent (east-west) [Table2] (Çelebi, 1996, 1998). Such unusually highdamping ratios have been attributed to radiation
damping that commonly occurs for buildings withlarge mat foundations in relatively soft
geotechnical environment (Çelebi, 1996).

As noted in this paper, there is significant
difference between the 0.38 Hz and 0.48 Hz
frequencies (approximately 20% less for LPE if
0.48Hz is considered as the baseline and evenmore if 0.59 Hz is considered). In many studies,
establishment of baseline frequency can be anissue and therefore ought to be carefully assessedto prevent erroneous interpretation. Another point
to be made is that, in reaching the conclusions inthis paper, most of the data analyses were madewith data with time increments of 0.005 seconds.
It was observed during the data analyses that
overdecimating and oversmoothing the data canlead to significant differences in the assignmentsof values to the fundamental frequencies.

Anderson and others (1991) compared the design
criteria, code requirements, and the elastic andnonlinear dynamic response of this building due tothe earthquake. They also found the fundamental
frequency of the building to be ~ 0.37-0.39 Hz.
However, contrary to others, but based only oncomparison of ground level motions with those at
the free-field, they concluded that soil-structureinteraction was insignificant for this building
during this earthquake.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS
Recorded responses of structures serve to expose
unusual and unexpected response characteristics
that require detailed analyses in order to improveor validate analytical models and design
processes and to identify possible methods for
retrofit of the structure if necessary. Significant

2.3 Recent Data, Analyses and Discussion
Analyses of subsequent data sets listed in Table 1
show that for shaking much lower than caused by274

findings, although not limited by the list below,
are summarized as:

encouraged since records obtained during
futureeventsrevealresponsecharacteristics that are not always
envisioned or taken into account during
design and analysis processes.

1. It is shown that there are significant
differences in the fundamental frequencies
of Pacific Park Plaza Building determinedfrom strong shaking as compared to lowamplitude shaking. Thus, the variation of
fundamental frequency (period) is
dependent on the amplitude of shaking.
2. System identification procedures are very
useful in extracting the dynamic
characteristics; in particular, the modal
damping ratios (for the defined level ofshaking) which otherwise are difficult todetermine as they are not constant andincrease with the level of shaking.
3. Soil-structureinteraction,althoughneglected in the design-analysis processof this building and as is also neglected
for most non-critical buildings, plays asignificant role in altering dynamic
characteristics and therefore the responseof buildings. For this building, thevariation of the fundamental period(frequency) is quite substantial.

5.0 REFERENCES
Aktan, H., Kagawa, T., Kambhatla, A., andÇelebi, M.(1992). “Measured and analyticalresponse of a pile supported building,” inProceedings, Tenth World Conference on
Earthquake
Engineering:
A.A.Balkema,
Rotterdam, v. 3, p. 1791-1796.
Anderson, J.C., Miranda, E., and Bertero, V.V.,
and Kajima Project Research Team. 1991,”Evaluation of the seismic performance of athirty-story RC building”, Earthquake
Engineering Research Center, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley, Report: UCB/EERC91/16, 254 p.
Bertero, V.V., Miranda, E., and Anderson,
J.C.(1992).”Evaluation of seismic response of
two RC buildings,” in Structures Congress‘92 compact papers: American Society of
Civil Engineers, New York, p. 408- 411.
Calvi, G. M., Pinho, R., and Crowley, H., 2006,“State-of-the-knowledge on the period
elongation of RC buildings during strong
ground shaking”, PROC (CD) First European
Conference on Earthquake Engineering andseismology, Geneva, Switzerland, 3-8 Sept.
2006.
Çelebi, M.(1992). “Highlights of Loma Prieta
responses for four tall buildings”, inProceedings, of the Tenth World Conf. on
Earthquake Engineering, A.A. Balkema,
Rotterdam, v. 7, p. 4039-4044.
Çelebi, M., and Şafak, E.(1992).``Recorded
Seismic Response of Pacific Park Plaza: Part
I--Data and Preliminary Analysis.'' ASCE
Journal of Structural Engineering, June 1992.
Çelebi, M., Phan, L. T., and Marshall, R.
D.(1993). “Dynamic characteristics of fivetall buildings during strong and lowamplitude motions,” Journal of the Structural
Design of Tall Buildings (John Wiley &Sons), v. 2, 1-15, 1993.
Çelebi, M.(1996). “Comparison of damping inbuildings under low-amplitude and strong
motions”, Journal of Wind Engineering andIndustrial Aerodynamics, 59, pp. 309-323.
Çelebi, M., 1998, “Performance of Building
structures - A Summary”, in The Loma Prieta,
California, Earthquake of October 17, 1989 -Additional conclusions may also be stated as:
4. As expected, higher modes are excited forthis building during the earthquake
events.
5. It is shown in this paper (as also in
previous papers) for this building that thetranslational and torsional responses arecoupled. This conclusion may begeneralizedforbuildings
withirregularities.
6. In certain cases, as for this building,response spectra of recorded motions
exceed design response spectra withinsome (lower) frequency bands that
include structural frequencies. In
determination of design response spectra,
effect of lower frequency ground motions
must be taken into account.
7. Finally, particularly in areas of highseismicity, deployment of seismic
monitoring systems particularly forcomplex and irregular buildings and othertypes of structures are strongly

275

Building Structures (M. Çelebi, editor),
USGS Prof. Paper 1552-C, p. c5-c76.
Çelebi, M., 2003, “Identification of Site
Frequencies from Building Records”, Journalof EERI, Earthquake Spectra, v.19, Issue 1,
pp.1-23.
Clinton, J. F., Bradford, S. C., Heaton, T. H.,
and Favela, J., 2006,“The Observed Wanderof the Natural Frequencies in a Structure”,
Bull. Seism. Soc. of Am. , v.96, no.1, pp 237257, Feb. 2006.
Dunand, F., Guegen, P., Bard, P-Y, Rodgers, J.,
and Celebi, M., 2006, “Comparison of the
dynamic parameters extracted from weak,moderate and strong motion recorded inbuildings”, PROC (CD) First European
Conference on Earthquake Engineering andseismology, Geneva, Switzerland, 3-8 Sept.
2006.
Gibbs, J. F., Fumal, T. E., and Powers, T.
J.(1994). Seismic velocities and geologic logs
from borehole measurements at seven strong
motion stations that recorded the 1989 Loma
Prieta,California,
earthquake:
U.S.
Geological Survey Open-File Report 94-222,
104 p.
Haskell, N. A.(1953). “The dispersion of surface
waves on multilayered media”, Bulletin of the
Seismological Society of America, v. 43, no.
1, p. 17-34.
Haskell, N. A.(1960). “Crustal reflection ofplane SH waves”, Journal of GeophysicalResearch, v. 65, no. 12, p. 4147-4150.
International Conference of building Officials(1979), Uniform Building Code [1979
Edition]: Whittier, California.
Kagawa, T., Aktan, H., Çelebi, M.(1993).
“Evaluation of soil and structure model using
measured building response during the Loma
Prieta earthquake”: Report of the Dept. of
Civil Engineering, Wayne State University,
Detroit, Michigan, 169 p.
Kagawa, T., and Al-Khatib, M. A.(1993).
“Earthquake response of a 30-story building
during the Loma Prieta earthquake”, in Third
Int’l Conf. On Case Histories of GeotechnicalEngineering, Univ. of Missourin-Rolla, p.
547-553.
Kambhatla, A., Aktan, H. M., Kagawa, T. andÇelebi, M.(1992).”Verification of simple soilpile
foundation-structure
models,”in
Structures Congress ’92, ASCE, NY, p.721724.
Şafak, E., and Çelebi, M. (1992).``Recorded
Seismic Response of Pacific Park Plaza: Part
II--System Identification.'' ASCE Journal of
Structural Engineering, June 1992.
Stephen, R., M., Wilson, E.L., and Stander, N.,
1985, Dynamic properties of a thirty-story

condominium tower building: Univ. of
California, Berkeley, EERC Report 85-03,
100p.
Todorovska, M., Trifunac, M., and Hao, T-Y,
2006, “Variation of apparent Building
Frequencies - Lessons from Full-Scale
Earthquake Observation,” PROC (CD) First
EuropeanConferenceonEarthquake
Engineering and seismology, Geneva,
Switzerland, 3-8 Sept. 2006.

276

Table 1. Events that have been recorded by the PPP arrays
Event/
Date
Loma Prieta
10/18/1989
El Cerrito
12/04/1998
Yountville
09/03/2000
Piedmont
09/05/2003
Berkeley
03/02/2006

UTC
04:15
12:16
08:36
01:39
06:08

Lat. (N)/Long. (E)37.036-121.883
37.920-122.290
38.379-122.413
37.845

Dist.
(km)
96

Azim.
(deg)
157

Depth
(km)
18.0

Ms 6.994

6.8

Mw 4.0

61

350

10.1

Mw 5.0

7

85

12.4

Mw 3.937.863-122.245

5

96

11.4

Md 2.8-122.222

Mag.

Table 2. Peak Accelerations and System Identification Results for (Pre-1991) PPP Data

Roof
Gr. Fl.
FFfo (Hz)To (s)
ξ(%)

Peak Accelerations (A[g]))Loma Prieta Eq. (1989)
Low-Amp. Tests & Analyses [See[See Refs]
Refs]
NS
EW
NS
EW
0.24
0.38
<0.01
<0.01
0.17
0.21
<0.01
<0.01
0.21
0.26
Dynamic Characteristics (System Identification)
0.38
0.38
0.48-0.59
2.63
2.63
1.69-2.08
11.6
15.5
0.6-3.4

Table 3. Summary - Events, Levels of Shaking (in g’s) and Identified Dynamic Characteristics
Tests, Analyses or Events
1985
Tests/
analyses

1989 LPE

1990
Tests

1998 EQ.
2000 EQ.
2003 EQ(1204_(0903(0905_
1216)
0836)
0139)
Peak Accelerations (A[g]) [NS & EW represents 350o and 260o respectively]

NS/EW

NS

NS/EW

Roof
Gr.Fl.
SFF

<0.01
<0.01
-

0.24
0.17
0.21

fo(Hz)To (s)
ξ(%)

0.59
1.69
.6-3.4

0.38
2.63
11.6

EW

NS

EW

NS

EW

0.38
<0.01
.025
.016
.01
.007
.056
0.21
<0.01
.016
.037
.005
.004
.037
0.26
.022
.028
.039
Dynamic Characteristics (System Identification & Spectral Analyses)

.067
.041
.031

.004
.003
.003

. 003
.003
.006

0.48
2.08
.5-2.

0.48
2.08
.5-2.

0.48
2.08
.5-2.

0.38
2.63
15.5

0.48
2.08
.6-3.4

NS

.48
2.08
-

EW

.48
2.08
-

277

NS

.48
2.08
-

EW

2006 EQ(0302_
0608)

0.48
2.08
-

0.48
2.08
.5-2.

Figure 1. A three-dimensional schematic of the building array with integrated surface and downhole
array. Red arrows indicate sensor locations and orientations. The tri-axial downhole accelerograph wasadded after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.

278

25

30

35

40
TIME (S)40

00COMPUTED

5FREQ (HZ)

55

60

10
5
RECORDED
5FREQ (HZ)

RECORDED: GROUND FL. CENTER CORE [260]

20
100

15

0
0

10

50

PPP:GROUND FL [350]20RECORDEDAMPLITUDE(CM/S)AMPLITUDE(CM/S)

.48

45

COMPUTED: 30TH FL. CENTER CORE [260]

10

25

30

35

40
TIME (S)PPP 30TH FL.[260]RECORDED

80
60
40
20
0
0

COMPUTED
5FREQ (HZ)

45

10

50

55

60

PPP:GROUND FL [260]

25

.48

AMPLITUDE(CM/S)

RECORDED: GROUND FL. CENTER CORE [350]

PPP 30TH FL.[350]20

ACCEL. (CM/S/S)COMPUTED: 30TH FL. CENTER CORE [350]2060

PPP EVENT 2006-0302-0608
RECORDED: 30TH FL. CENTER CORE [260]

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2

AMPLITUDE(CM/S)ACCEL. (CM/S/S)

PPP EVENT:2006-0302-0608
RECORDED: 30TH FL. CENTER CORE [350]

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2

20
15
10
5

RECORDED

005FREQ (HZ)

10

Figure 6. System identification for 2006 event using 40-second window of acceleration data. Groundlevel motions are used as input and 30th floor motions are used as output.

0.3

~
~

0.38

X

0.01

0.05

0.10

0.10

0.20

2.0

2.5

3.33
0.25

LEVEL OF SHAKING (IN G's)

Figure 7. Plot showing variation of fundamental frequency with level of shaking (in g’s).

281

PERIOD (S)1989 EQ.[LPE]

0.48

2006 EQ.
2003 EQ.

0.4

X X

~
~

0.5

1.67

0.59

1985 TESTS
2000 EQ.
1990 TESTS
1998 EQ.

FREQUENCY (HZ)

0.6 X

VARIATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FREQUENCY (PERIOD)
WITH LEVEL OF SHAKING

System Dynamics Modeling and Simulation of Disaster Recovery Processof Interdependent Infrastructure Systems
by
Shojiro Kataoka1and developed a damage propagation model
based on matrix equation [1]. Though the casestudy simulation using the model successfully
demonstrated the earthquake damage spreading
among infrastructures, dynamic behavior suchas recovery process of the infrastructure system
was not investigated.

ABSTRACT
A simulation model is developed for disasterrecovery process of infrastructure systems.
The model is based on the system dynamics andthe interdependency among infrastructures istaken into account. Disaster recovery processof the infrastructure system in the Tokyo
metropolitan area, where the infrastructures arehighly interdependent, is simulated using themodel and the effects of the interdependency are
investigated.
KEYWORDS: Infrastructure System, Influence
Diagram, System Dynamics, Interdependency

In this study, the disaster recovery process of theinfrastructure systems is modeled based on thesystem dynamics and the time history of therecovery process from a hypothetical earthquake(M7.3) in the Tokyo metropolitan area issimulatedtakingaccount
oftheinterdependency.

1. INTRODUCTION

2. SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELINGInfrastructures such as roads, railroads, electric
power, gas, and water supplies, sewerage, andtelecommunications are vital for our daily lives
and industrial activities. Natural and humandisasters, however, have damaged theinfrastructures and the damage has caused socialand economic losses from time to time. The
longer the disaster recovery takes, the larger thelosses become; thus, prompt recovery isimportant to mitigate the losses.

First, the functions and components ofinfrastructures and their relationships areorganized as influence diagrams.
A basemodel that shows relationships among facilities,
resources, and infrastructures necessary fordisaster recovery is developed for each of
infrastructures. Then the base models areassembled into a system dynamics model ofdisaster recovery process of the infrastructure
system.
The details of the modeling aredescribed in Kataoka et al. (2009).

Since the infrastructures are interdependent andcompose a highly complex system, especially inurban areas, damage to one of the infrastructures
may affect the others (damage spreading). For
example, if the electric power supply isdamaged, the road traffic capability isdeteriorated until the electric power recovers
traffic lights. If the gas supply and the road
network are damaged, the recovery of the gas
supply is delayed because road traffic isnecessary for the recovery works.

The influence diagrams illustrate the functions
and components of infrastructures and theirrelationships; the diagram of the gas supply
system is shown in Fig. 1 as an example. The
gas supply system consists of many facilities but
only the low pressure pipes are assumed to bedamaged during earthquakes. Not only thefacilities managed by gas suppliers but also theelectric power are necessary to maintain the gas
supply function.

Tsuruta et al. (2008) surveyed interdependencyof the infrastructure system during past disasters

1 Senior Researcher, Earthquake Disaster Prevention
Division, National Institute for Land and InfrastructureManagement, Tsukuba 305-0804, Japan

282

through disaster areas.
Thus, the initialinterrupted ratios are assumed as follows:- 100% for the railroad network (all lines areonce halted for inspection of the damage),- 0% everywhere for emergency vehicles,- 100% in “the road traffic prohibited area” and50 % in the other area with seismic intensity of
6 upper for non-emergency vehicles.

Then, based on the influence diagrams, the basemodels are developed taking account offacilities, resources, and infrastructures that arenecessary for disaster recovery. For example,
the base model of the gas supply system isdeveloped as shown in Fig. 2. The road traffic
and telecommunication functions are considerednecessary for the disaster recovery of the gas
supply function. Since the electric power isrequired to maintain the gas supply function,either backup electric power or physicalrecovery of substations is necessary for therecovery of the system.

Once a Tokyo metropolitan earthquake occurs,
Metropolitan Police Department regulates the
traffic so that non-emergency vehicles areprohibited to pass through “the road trafficprohibited area”, which covers 75% of the areaof the 23 special wards. In this study, thetraffic regulation is assumed to last for 10 days.

The system dynamics model is constructed byassembling the base models of all infrastructures.
Given the initial damage to the infrastructures,the disaster recovery process of the whole
infrastructure system can be simulated using themodel.

3.2 Recovery Rate without Interdependency
CDMC surveyed the recovery rates of theinfrastructures based on interviews and obtained
the following results [3]:- 95% of electric power recovers in 6 days,- 95% of telecommunications recovers in 14
days,- 80% of gas supply recovers in 55 days,- 95% of water supply recovers in 30 days,- 95% of sewerage pipes recover in 30 days.

3. SIMULATION CASE STUDY
Disaster recovery process of the infrastructure
system in the Tokyo metropolitan area, where
the infrastructures are highly interdependent, issimulated using the system dynamics model.

The recovery rates for railroads and roads are
assumed as follows:- 100% of railroads are available in 1 day in thearea with seismic intensity of 5 upper (nodamage and only inspection),- 90% of railroads are available in 1 day, then
95% recover in 5 days in the area with seismic
intensity of 6 lower,- 80% of railroads are available in 1 day, then
95 % recover in 15 days in the area withseismic intensity of 6 upper,- 95% of roads recover in 18 days in the areawith seismic intensity of 6 upper.

3.1 Initial Damage and Interruption
Central Disaster Management Council (CDMC)
announced the estimated damage due to Tokyo
metropolitan earthquakes in 2005 [3]. The
most disastrous one is the hypothetical northern
Tokyo Bay earthquake (M7.3), which causes
strong ground motion with JMA seismic
intensity of 6 upper in the eastern half area ofthe 23 special wards of Tokyo as shown in Fig. 3.
Following
CDMC,
Tokyo
Metropolitan
Government (TMG) also conducted estimationof damage caused by the earthquake [4]. In
this study, the damage to the infrastructures
estimated by TMG is used as the initial damage
in the simulation. Table 1 shows the damage in
Chiyoda and Sumida wards and the 23 wards intotal.

These rates are assumed to be those when therecovery process is not influenced by theinterdependency among infrastructures and used
as initial recovery rates. For example, the“recovery rate of low pressure pipe” in Fig. 2 isset to be the recovery rate of the gas supply
mentioned above.

Railroads are ordered a halt for inspection justafter earthquakes even though no damage isreported. Road traffic is also controlled andonly emergency vehicles can be admitted to path283

study shows the importance of smooth traffic ofemergency vehicles for prompt disaster recoveryof the highly interdependent infrastructure
systems.

3.3 Simulation Results
Fig. 4 shows the time histories of recovered
ratios of the infrastructures in Chiyoda andSumida wards. In this simulation, 10% of thevehicles used for the disaster recovery work areassumed to be the emergency vehicles. Thus,
90% of them are affected by the traffic
regulation or interruption. The recovery of theinfrastructures is delayed significantly comparedwith the recovery rates mentioned in 3.2. The
delays are longer in Sumida wards because it
suffers greater damage than Chiyoda wards(Table 1).

Further research and investigation are needed to
improve accuracy and actuality of the simulation
model and data in order to discuss thesimulation results quantitatively.
5. REFERENCES
1. Tsuruta, M., Goto, Y., Shoji, Y. and Kataoka,
S.: Damage propagation caused byinterdependency
amongcriticalinfrastructures, 14th World Conference on
Earthquake Engineering, 2008.
2. Kataoka, S., Tsuruta, M. and Shoji, Y.:
Model development of interdependency
among critical infrastructures and simulationof earthquake damage spreading, Technical
Note of National Institute for Land andInfrastructure Management, No. 510, 2009.
3. Central Disaster Management Council:
Documents of the 15th Tokyo metropolitan
earthquake disaster management council,
2005.
4. Tokyo Metropolitan Government: Estimateddamage in Tokyo due to the Tokyo
metropolitan earthquakes, 2006.

Fig. 5 is the same as Fig. 4 but 90 % of thevehicles used for the disaster recovery work areassumed to be the emergency vehicles. In Fig.
5, the delays still exist but much shorter thanthose in Fig. 4. To achieve this improvement,road facilities must not collapse during
earthquakes so that the road networks maintainthe traffic at least for emergency vehicles.
4. CONCLUSIONS
A simulation model is developed to investigate
the effects of the interdependency among
infrastructures on the recovery process of theinfrastructure system. The simulation case284Modal-Pushover-based Ground Motion Scaling Procedure
for Nonlinear Analysis of Structures
byErol Kalkan1 and Anil K. Chopra2
ABSTRACT

on nonlinear static (or pushover) analysis
procedures, but nonlinear response history analysis(RHA) is now being increasingly used. In the latterapproach, the seismic demands are determined by
nonlinear RHA of the structure for several groundmotions. Procedures for selecting and scaling
ground motion records for a site-specific hazard aredescribed in building codes and have been thesubject of much research in recent years.

Earthquake engineering practice is increasingly
using nonlinear response history analysis (RHA)
to demonstrate performance of structures. Thisrigorous method of analysis requires selection
and scaling of ground motions appropriate todesign hazard levels. Presented herein is amodal-pushover-based scaling (MPS) method toscale ground motions for use in nonlinear RHA
of buildings. In the MPS method, the groundmotions are scaled to match (to a specified
tolerance) a target value of the inelastic
deformation of the first-mode inelastic SDF
system whose properties are determined by firstmode pushover analysis. Appropriate for firstmode dominated structures, this approach isextended for structures with significant
contributions of higher modes by considering
elastic deformation of higher-mode SDF
systems in selecting a subset of the scaled
ground motions. Based on results presented forthree actual buildings—4-story, 6-story, and 13story—the accuracy and efficiency of the MPS
procedure are established and its superiority
over the ASCE-7 scaling procedure isdemonstrated.

Current performance-based design and evaluation
methodologies prefer intensity-based methods toscale ground motions over spectral matching
techniques that modify the frequency content
and/or phasing of the record to match its response
spectrum to the target spectrum. In contrast,
intensity-based scaling methods preserve theoriginal non-stationary content and only modify its
amplitude. The primary objective of intensity-based
scaling methods is to provide scale factors for asmall number of ground motion records so that
nonlinear RHA of the structure for these scaled
records is accurate, i.e., it provides an accurate
estimate in the median value of the engineering
demand parameters (EDPs), and is efficient, i.e., it
minimizes the record-to-record variations in the
EDP. Scaling ground motions to match a target
value of peak ground acceleration (PGA) is theearliest approach to the problem, which produces
inaccurate estimates with large dispersion in EDP
values for structures responding in nonlinear range[Nau and Hall 1984; Miranda 1993; Vidic et al.
1994; Shome and Cornell 1998]. Other scalarintensity measures (IMs) such as: effective peakacceleration, Arias intensity and effective peakvelocity have also been found to be inaccurate and

KEYWORDS: nonlinear analysis; seismic effects;
drift; performance-based earthquake engineering.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The maximum span of long-span bridges has been
Seismic evaluation of existing structures and of
proposed design of new structures is usually based
1
2

Senior Research Engineer, United States Geological Survey, Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA
Professor, Dept. of Civil and Env. Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA289

inefficient [Kurama and Farrow 2003]. None ofthe preceding IMs consider any property of thestructure to be analyzed.

spectra for a set of scaled motions is not less thanthe design response spectrum over the period range
from 0.2T1 to 1.5T1. For structures having plan
irregularities or structures without independent
orthogonal lateral load resisting systems, where
three-dimensional analyses need to be performed,
ground motions should consist of appropriate
horizontal components.
All the preceding scaling methods utilize IMs basedon elastic response of the structure, but do not
explicitly consider its inelastic response. They leadto scale factors that depend only on the structural
period(s), independent of the structural strength.
The elastic-response-based IMs may not beappropriate for near-fault sites where the inelastic
spectral deformation can be significantly larger
than corresponding elastic spectral deformation[Bozorgnia and Mahin 1998; Alavi and Krawinkler
2000; Baez and Miranda 2000; Chopra andChintanapakdee 2004]. This limitation has been
overcome in recently proposed IMs based on the
inelastic deformation spectrum, leading to
improved estimate of the median EDPs, andreduced dispersion of EDPs [Bazzurro and Luco
2004; Luco and Cornell 2007]. Based onincremental dynamic analyses response of genericframes to different intensity levels of near-fault
ground motions demonstrated that scaling records
with the IM defined as the inelastic deformation of
the first-mode inelastic SDF system is accurate,
efficient and sufficient compared to elasticresponse-based IMs [Tothong and Luco 2007;
Tothong and Cornell 2008]. Required in thisapproach are attenuation relationships for the
inelastic deformation with given ground motion
properties (magnitude, closest fault distance, site
condition, etc.) and mean rate of occurrence of thathazard level [Tothong and Cornell 2008].

Including a vibration property of the structure led
to improved methods to scale ground motions,e.g., scaling records to a target value of the elastic
spectral acceleration, A T1  from the code-based

design spectrum or PSHA-based uniform hazard
spectrum at the fundamental vibration period of
the structure, T1, provides improved results forstructures whose response is dominated by theirfirst-mode [Shome et al. 1998]. However, thisscaling method becomes less accurate and lessefficient for structures responding significantly intheir higher vibration modes or far into theinelastic range [Mehanny 1999; Alavi andKrawinkler 2000; Kurama and Farrow 2003]. To
consider higher mode response, a scalar IM thatcombines the spectral accelerations A T1  andA T2  at the first two periods and vector IM

comprised of A T1  and the ratio of A T1  / A T2 

have been developed [Bazzurro 1998; Shome andCornell 1999]. Although this vector IM improves
accuracy, it remains inefficient for near-fault
records with a dominant velocity pulse [Baker andCornell 2006].
To recognize the lengthening of the apparent
period of vibration due to yielding of the structure,a scalar IM defined as a combination of A T1  andA  cT1 

where c  1 , has been considered[Mehanny 1999; Cordova et al. 2000];
alternatively, scaling earthquake records tominimize the difference between its elastic
response spectrum and the target spectrum has
been proposed [Kennedy et al. 1984; Malhotra
2003; Alavi and Krawinkler 2004; Naeim et al.
2004; Youngs et al. 2007].

The objective of this paper is to develop a new
method for selecting and scaling earthquake groundmotion records in a form convenient for evaluating
existing structures or proposed designs for new
structures. The procedure presented explicitly
considers structural strength and is based on thestandard IM of spectral acceleration that isavailable from the USGS seismic hazard maps,
where it is mapped for periods of 0.2 s and 1.0 s forthe entire U.S. to facilitate construction of site-

International Building Code (IBC) [ICBO 2006]
and California Building Code (CBC) [ICBO 2007]
require that earthquake records be scaled
according to the ASCE-7 provisions [ASCE2005]. For two dimensional analyses of regularstructures, ground motions are scaled such that the
average value of the 5%-damped elastic response

290specific design spectrum [Petersen et al. 2008], orit can be computed from the uniform hazard
spectrum obtained by probabilistic seismic hazard
analysis (PSHA) for the site.

For first-mode dominated structures, scaling
earthquake records to the same target value of theinelastic deformation is expected be sufficient.
Because higher vibration modes are known tocontribute significantly to the seismic response of
mid-rise and high-rise buildings, the MPS
procedure checks for higher-mode compatibility ofeach record by comparing its scaled elastic spectral
displacement response values at higher-mode
vibration periods of the structure against the target
spectrum. This approach ensures that each scaled
earthquake record satisfies two requirements: (1)the peak deformation of the first-mode inelastic
SDF system is close enough to the target value ofthe inelastic deformation; and (2) the peak
deformation of the higher-mode (i.e., second-mode)
elastic SDF system is not far from the target
spectrum.

Based on modal pushover analysis, the procedure
presented herein explicitly considers the strengthof the structure, obtained from the first-mode
pushover curve and determines scaling factors foreach record to match a target value of thedeformation of the first-mode inelastic SDF
system estimated by established procedures.
Appropriate for first-mode dominated structures,
this approach is extended for structures withsignificant contributions of higher modes. Basedon results presented for three actual buildings—4-,
6-, and 13-story—the effectiveness of this scaling
procedure is established and its superiority interms of accuracy and efficiency over the ASCE-7
procedure is demonstrated.

2.1 MPS Procedure: Summary

2.0 MODAL-PUSHOVER-BASED SCALINGThe MPS procedure is summarized below in a stepby-step form:

In the modal pushover-based scaling (MPS)
procedure, each ground motion record is scaled bya scale factor selected to ensure that the peak
deformation of the first-mode inelastic SDF
system due to the scaled record is close enough toa target value of the inelastic deformation. The
force-deformation relation for the first-mode
inelastic SDF system is determined from the firstmode pushover curve. The target value of theinelastic deformation is the median deformation of
the inelastic SDF system for a large ensemble of(unscaled) earthquake records compatible with thesite-specific seismic hazard conditions. Nonlinear
RHA of the inelastic SDF system provides thepeak deformation of the system to each record in
the ensemble, and the median of the data set
provides the target value. Alternatively, themedian deformation of the inelastic SDF system
can be estimated as the deformation of thecorresponding linearly elastic system, known
directly from the target spectrum, multiplied by
the inelastic deformation ratio; empirical equations
for this ratio are available for systems with known
yield-strength reduction factor [e.g., Ruiz-Garcia
and Miranda 2002; Chopra and Chintanapakdee
2004].

1. For the given site, define the target pseudoacceleration response spectrum either as
the PSHA-based uniform hazard spectrum,
or code-based design spectrum, or the
median pseudo-acceleration spectrum for alarge ensemble of (unscaled) earthquake
records compatible with the site-specificseismic hazard conditions.
2. Compute the frequencies n (periods Tn )and n of the first few modes of elastic
vibration of the structure.
First-mode Dominated Structures
3. Develop the base shear-roof displacement
Vb1-ur1 relation or pushover curve by
nonlinear static analysis of the structure
subjected to gradually increasing lateralforces with an invariant force distribution
s1* = m1, associated with the first-mode,
where m is the structural mass matrix.
Gravity loads, including those present on
the interior (gravity) frames, are applied
before starting the pushover analysis.

291

multiplied by a scale factor SF, to be
determined to satisfy Step 8, by solving

4. Idealize the pushover curve and select ahysteretic model for cyclic deformations,both appropriate for the structural system
and materials [Han and Chopra 2005;
Bobadilla and Chopra 2007]. Determine
the yield-strength reduction factor R y  2  D  F  D , D  / L  ( SF )u (t )
D
1
1 1 1
s1  11
1
g(1)
8. Compare the normalized difference
between the target value of thedeformation D1I of the first-mode inelastic
SDF system (Step 6) and the peak
deformation D1I , determined in Step 7
against a specified tolerance, (2)1  D1I  D1I / D1I  (equals strength required for the structure
to remain elastic divided by the yieldstrength of the structure) from:R y  M1* A1 Vb1 y , where M1* is theeffective modal mass and Vb1 y is theyield point value of base shear determinedfrom the idealized pushover curve.
5. Convert the idealized pushover curve totheforce-deformation
Fs1 L1  D1 relation of the first-mode
inelastic SDF system by utilizing Fs1/L1=
Vb1 / M 1* and D1 = ur1 / 1r1 in which
L1  1m , r1 is the value of

9. Determine the scale factor SF such that thescaled record (SF) ug  t  satisfies thecriterion of Eq. (2). Because Eq. (1) is
nonlinear, SF cannot be determined apriori, but requires an iterative procedure
starting with an initial guess. Starting with
SF = 1, Steps 7 and 8 are implemented andrepeated with modified values of SF until
Eq. (2) is satisfied. Successive values of SF
are chosen by trial and error or by aconvergence algorithm, e.g., NewtonRaphson iteration procedure. For a given
ground motion, if the Eq. 2 is satisfied bymore than one SF, the SF closest to one
should be preferred.

1 at the roof,1  ( m )/( m1 ) and each elementof the influence vector  is equal to unity.
6. For the first-mode inelastic SDF system,
establish the target value of deformation
from
where
D1I  CR D1 ,
D1I
T
1

T
1

D1 = T1 2  A1 and A1 is the target2

pseudo-spectral acceleration at period T1 ,and CR is determined from an empiricalequation (shown in the next section) fortheinelastic
deformation
ratio
corresponding to the yield-strength
reduction factor R y , determined in Step

Repeat Steps 7 and 8 for as many records
as deemed necessary; obviously the scaling
factor SF will be different for each record.
These scaling factors will be shown to beappropriate for structures that responddominantly in the first-mode.

4.
7. Compute

the
peak
deformationofthefirst-mode
inelasticD  max D1 (t )I
1Higher-mode Considerations

SDF system defined by the force
deformation relation developed in Steps 4
and 5, and damping ratio 1. The initialelastic vibration period of the system is T1= 2 (L1D1y / Fs1y)1/2 . For a SDF systemwith known T1 and 1, D1I can becomputed by nonlinear RHA due to oneof the selected ground motions ug (t )10. Establish target values of deformation ofhigher-mode SDF systems, treated aselastic systems, from the target spectrum
2
Dn = Tn 2  An , where the mode number n= 2. We have found that the second-mode
is mostly adequate for buildings
susceptible to higher-mode effects.

292

distance so long as it exceeds 10 km [Ruiz-Garcia
and Miranda 2002]. Regression analysis of thesedata led to an equation for the inelastic deformation
ratio as a function of Tn and Ry; this equation isrestricted to elastoplastic systems.

11. By linear RHA, calculate the peak
deformation D2  max t D2 (t ) of the nthmode elastic SDF system with known T2
and 2 due to a selected ground motionug (t ) multiplied by its scale factor SF

Median values of CR have been presented for nondegrading bilinear hysteretic systems subjected toseven ensembles of far-fault ground motions (eachwith 20 records), representing large or small
earthquake magnitude and distance, and NEHRP
site classes, B, C, or D; and for two ensembles ofnear-fault ground motions. Regression analysis ofthese data led to the empirical CR equation[Chopra and Chintanapakdee 2004]:

determined in Step 9.
12. Compute the normalized difference
between the target value of deformation
D2 (Step 10) and the peak deformation
determined in Step 11.
 2  D2  D2 / D2

(3)

and rank the scaled records based on their
 2 value; the record with the lowestd a  T1  
1CR  1  ( LR  1)   b  c    
R
 T 

 y
 c  

average  2 is ranked the highest.
13. From the ranked list, select the final set ofrecords with their scale factors determinedin Step 9 to be used in nonlinear RHA ofthe structure.

1

(4)

in which, the limiting value of CR at Tn  0 is:LR 

3.0 ESTIMATING SDF-SYSTEM INELASTIC
DEFORMATION

1  Ry  1 
1 

Ry 
 

(5)

where  is the post-yield stiffness ratio and Tc is theperiod separating the acceleration and velocitysensitive regions of the target spectrum; theparameters in Eq. (4) are: a=61, b=2.4, c=1.5, andd=2.4.

The inelastic deformation ratio CR is required in
Step 6 to estimate the deformation of the inelastic
SDF system. Such equations were first developed
by Veletsos and Newmark [1960] as a function ofelastic vibration Tn and ductility factor  .
However, in selecting and scaling ground motion
records for nonlinear RHA of an existing building
or of a proposed design of a new building, theinelastic deformation ratio should be expressed asa function of Tn and the yield-strength reduction

Equations (4) and (5) and values of their parameters
are valid for far-fault ground motions, independentof (1) earthquake magnitude and distance; and (2)NEHRP site class B, C, and D; and also for nearfault ground motions.
4.0 CODE-BASED SCALING PROCEDURE

factor R y ; these quantities are determined in
Steps 7 and 4, respectively. The inelastic
deformation ratio can be expressed as a functionof elastic vibration period and yield-strength
reduction factor Ry. Response data for 216 groundmotions recorded on NEHRP site classes B, C,
and D demonstrated that the mean inelastic
deformation ratio is influenced little by soil
condition, by magnitude if Ry < 4 (butsignificantly for larger Ry), or by site-to-fault

The procedures and criteria in the 2006 IBC and2007 CBC for the selection and scaling of groundmotions for use in nonlinear RHA of structures are
based on the ASCE-7 provisions [ASCE 2005].
According to ASCE-7, earthquake records should
be selected from events of magnitudes, fault
distance and source mechanisms that comply withthe maximum considered earthquake. If therequired number of appropriate records is not293available, appropriate simulated ground motions
may be included to make up the total number
required.

presented next in Fig. 1b as a four-way logarithmic
plot, together with its idealized version (dashedline). The idealized spectrum is divided logicallyinto three period ranges: the long-period region to
the right of point d, Tn > Td, is called thedisplacement-sensitive region; the short-period
region to the left of point c, Tn < Tc , is called theacceleration-sensitive region; and the intermediateperiod region between points c and d, Tc < Tn < Td,
is called the velocity-sensitive region [Chopra
2007; Section 6.8]. Note that the velocity-sensitive
region is unusually narrow, which is typical ofnear-fault ground motions.

For two-dimensional analysis of symmetric-planbuildings, ASCE-7 requires intensity-based
scaling of ground motion records using
appropriate scale factors so that the average valueof the 5%-damped response spectra for the set ofscaled records is not less than the design response
spectrum over the period range from 0.2T1 to
1.5T1. The design value of an EDP—member
forces, member deformations or story drifts—istaken as the average value of the EDP over seven(or more) ground motions, or its maximum value
over all ground motions, if the system is analyzed
for fewer than seven ground motions.
The ASCE-7 scaling procedure does not insure aunique scaling factor for each record; obviously,
various combinations of scaling factors can be
defined to insure that the average spectrum of
scaled records remains above the design spectrum(or amplified spectrum incase of 3-D analyses)
over the specified period range. Because it isdesirable to scale each record by the smallest
possible factor, an algorithm is developed andused in applying the code-scaling procedure in theevaluation section. This algorithm is provided at
Kalkan and Chopra (2008).
5.0 GROUND MOTIONSANALYZED&The buildings selected to evaluate the efficiency
and accuracy of the MPS method are existing four-,
six-, and thirteen-story steel special moment
resisting frame (SMRF) buildings representative of
low-rise and mid-rise building-types in California.
The six and thirteen-story buildings are
instrumented, and their motions have been recorded
during past earthquakes. The first three natural
vibration periods and modes of each building areshown in Fig. 2 and the first-mode pushover curves
in Fig. 3, where P- effects are included. A
description of these buildings and complete detailsof their analytical models are reported at Kalkan
and Chopra (2008).
6.0 EVALUATION OF MPS PROCEDURE

SYSTEMSThe efficiency and accuracy of the MPS and
ASCE-7 scaling procedures will be evaluated. A
scaling procedure is considered efficient if thedispersion of EDPs due to the scaled records are
small; it is accurate if the median value of the EDPs
due to scaled ground motions is close to thebenchmark results, defined as the median values of
EDPs, determined by nonlinear RHA of thebuilding to each of the 21 unscaled ground motions.
In this section, the median values of EDPs
determined from a set of 7 ground motions, scaled
according to MPS and ASCE-7 scaling procedures,will be compared. The median value x̂ , defined as
the geometric mean, and the dispersion measure, of n observed values of xi are calculated from

A total of twenty one near-fault strong earthquake
ground motions were compiled from the Next
Generation of Attenuation project earthquake
ground motion database [Power et al. 2006]. Thesemotions were recorded during seismic events with
moment magnitude, M ≥ 6.5 at closest fault
distances, Rcl ≤ 12 km and belonging to NEHRP
site classification C and D. The selected groundmotion records and their characteristic parameters
are listed in Table 1. Shown in Fig. 1a are thepseudo-acceleration response spectrum for eachground motion and the median of the 21 response
spectra. The median spectrum is taken to be thedesign spectrum for purposes of evaluating the
MPS and ASCE-7 scaling procedures. The medianspectrum of the ground motion ensemble is

294

 n

  ln xi xˆ  exp  i 1
 n 



1/ 2

 n
2
  (ln xi  ln xˆ ) 
i 1

 
n 1





Chopra 2008].

(4)

These results identifies that the median values of
EDPs due to every small (7) subset of scaled
ground motion closely match the benchmark
results, which were determined from a large (21)set of ground motions. The dispersion of the EDP
values due to the 7 scaled records about their
median value is much smaller compared to the data
for the 21 unscaled records in Fig. 4. These results
collectively demonstrate that the concept
underlying the MPS procedure is accurate andefficient in scaling records for nonlinear RHA ofbuildings.

The EDPs selected are peak values of story drift
ratio, i.e., peak relative displacement between two
consecutive floors normalized by story height;
floor displacements normalized by buildingheight; column and beam plastic rotations. Fig. 4
shows the benchmark EDPs for all three buildings;
results from individual records are also included todemonstrate the large dispersion. Almost all of theexcitations drive all three buildings well into theinelastic range as shown in Fig. 3 where the roof
displacement values due to 21 ground motions are
identified on the first-mode pushover curve. Also
shown is the median value.

6.2 Evaluation of MPS and Code-Based Scaling
Procedures
The preceding implementation of the MPS concept
is the same as the MPS procedure described earlier,except for how D1I was computed. Previously, theexact value of D1I was determined by nonlinear
RHA of the first-mode inelastic SDF system, but it
will now be estimated according to Step 6, using anempirical equation for CR , in accordance with the
MPS procedure. In utilizing CR equation, zero postyield stiffness is assumed, although the idealized
first-“mode” SDF systems have negative post-yield
stiffness. This choice is dictated by the fact that theoriginal CR equation was determined for stablesystems with non-negative post-yield stiffness ratio[Chopra and Chintanapakdee 2004]. In CR
equation, using zero post-yield stiffness seems tobe plausible, because the variability in the peak
displacement demand is not affected significantly
by the hysteretic behavior (Kurama and Farrow,
2003; Gupta and Kunnath, 1998). Fig. 6 comparesthe “exact” target value of deformation D1I(continuous horizontal line) with estimated target
value of deformation D1I (dashed horizontal line)
using the CR equation with zero post-yield
stiffness; D1I values from individual records foreach of the three buildings are also included. The
difference between the “exact“ and estimatedvalues of D1I is 4, 9, and 12% of “exact” D1I values
for the 4-, 6-, and 13-story buildings, respectively.

6.1 Evaluation of MPS Concept
As a first step in evaluating the concept underlying
the MPS procedure, the target value of
deformation D1I is computed not as described in
Step 6 of the procedure, but as the median value ofpeak deformation of the first-mode inelastic SDF
system due to 21 ground motions determined by
nonlinear RHA. The MPS method utilizing thisD1I value is denoted henceforth as MPS*. The 21
ground motions are divided into 3 sets eachcontaining 7 records (Table 1). The records ineach set are selected randomly from at least 3
different earthquakes to avoid any dominant
influence of a single event on the ground motion
set. An appropriate scale factor for each record isdetermined by implementing Steps 1-8 of the MPS
procedure.
Efficiency and accuracy of the MPS* procedure
are evaluated for each ground motion set,
separately by comparing the median values of
EDPs determined by nonlinear RHA of thebuilding due to the 7 scaled records against thebenchmark EDPs. Representative comparisons are
depicted in Fig. 5 for the three buildings
considering Ground Motion Set 1. Included are the
EDPs due to each of the 7 scaled ground motions
to show the dispersion of the data. Ground Motion
Set 2 and 3 yield identical results [Kalkan and295

An appropriate scale factor for each record is thendetermined in accordance with two procedures:
Steps 1-8 of the MPS procedure and the ASCE–7
procedure. The EDPs determined by nonlinear
RHA of the structure due to a set of 7 groundmotions scaled according to MPS and ASCE-7
procedures are compared against the benchmark
EDPs. Figs. 6-8 present such comparisons for thethree buildings considering Set 1 ground motions.
The other two sets provide visually identicalresults [Kalkan and Chopra 2008].

methods. Comparing these  values against 1.0, it
is apparent that the MPS* method is most accurate(least biased), the MPS method is only slightly lessaccurate. The bias in the MPS methods is generally
less than 20%. The ASCE-7 method is leastaccurate generally overestimates the EDPs, with theoverestimation exceeding 50% in some cases.
Fig. 10 presents the dispersion of the EDP ratio forstory drifts determined from records scaled
according to the MPS*, MPS, and ASCE-7 scaling
methods. It is apparent that the MPS* scaling
method leads to the smallest dispersion, and it
becomes only slightly larger in the MPS method.
Dispersion is largest in the ASCE-7 scaling
method, becoming unacceptably large for somecombinations of buildings and ground motion sets.

These results demonstrate that the MPS procedure
is much superior compared to the ASCE-7
procedure for scaling ground motion records. This
superiority is apparent in two respects: First, foreach building and each ground motion set, theground motions scaled according to the MPS
procedure lead to median values of EDPs that aremuch closer to the benchmark values than thecorresponding results based on the ASCE-7
procedure. Second, the dispersion in the EDP
values due to the 7 scaled records around the
median value is much smaller when the records
are scaled according to the MPS procedurecompared to the ASCE-7 scaling procedure.
However, even with MPS scaling, the dispersionof EDPs for the upper stories of 6- and 13-story
buildings is noticeable (particularly for Ground
Motion Set 2 as shown later), indicating that thehigher-mode contributions to the seismic demands
are significant. These factors will be consideredlater in Steps 10-13 of the MPS procedure.

7.0 MULTI-MODE CONSIDERATIONSAs demonstrated in preceding section, the MPS
method based solely on the first-mode inelastic
SDF system (steps 1-9 of the method) is superior
over the ASCE-7 scaling method. Considering thehigher modes of vibration is expected to improvethe method further for mid-rise and high-risebuildings [Tothong and Cornell, 2008; Tothong andLuco, 2007; Luco and Cornell 2007].
The 21 records scaled based on the first-mode
response only (steps 1-9 of the method) are ranked
by accounting for higher mode response according
to steps 10-13 of the method. Only one higher
mode, the second mode, was considered for the 6
and 13-story buildings. The seven records with thehighest ranks (see step-12) were defined as Ground
Motion Set 4. Note that this set is different for eachbuilding.

An alternative way of comparing MPS and ASCE7 scaling methods is based on the ratio of the EDP
value due to a scaled record and the benchmark
value. The deviation of the median  of this ratio
from unity is an indication of the error or bias inestimating the median EDP value, and thedispersion  of this ratio is an indication of thescatter in the individual EDPs, determined fromthe scaled ground motions. Included also in thecomparison is the MPS* procedure based onI“exact” values of D1 instead of Step 6.

Considering higher modes in selecting groundmotions in the MPS method provides accurate
estimates of the median EDPs and reduces therecord-to-record variability (compared to the results
achieved by Ground Motion Sets 1-3). This
improved accuracy and efficiency is demonstrated
in Figure 11, where the  and —the median valueof the ratio of the estimated story drift to its
benchmark value, and dispersion of this ratio—areFig. 9 presents the median  of the EDP ratio forstory drifts determined from records scaled
according to the MPS*, MPS, and ASCE-7 scaling296

plotted for the four set of ground motions. It isapparent that Ground Motion Set 4 is moreaccurate and efficient than Ground Motion Sets 1
though 3.

scaled by the MPS method is much smaller
compared to the ASCE-7 scaling method; inthe latter method, dispersion is unacceptably
large for some combinations of buildings andground motions sets. Thus, the MPS method ismuch more accurate, as well as efficient (asdefined earlier) compared to the ASCE-7
scaling method.

The improvement achieved for these buildings ismodest because the higher-mode computations are
not especially significant in the response of
selected buildings. Such improvement is expected
to be more pronounced in the case of tallerbuildings responding significantly in their higher
modes.

2. Using the exact value of target deformation (asin MPS*), defined as the median deformationof the first-mode inelastic SDF system for alarge ensemble of unscaled records determinedby nonlinear RHA, leads to the most accurate
and efficient version of the MPS method.
Because this rigorous approach is not suitablefor practical application, the target deformation
may be estimated from the deformation of thecorresponding linear system, available from thedesign spectrum, and empirical equations forthe inelastic deformation ratio. The increase inbias and dispersion resulting from thisapproximation is small. The resulting practicalversion of the MPS method uses attenuation
relations for elastic spectral ordinates that are
currently available; new attenuation relations
for inelastic spectral deformation are notrequired.

8.0 CONCLUSIONS
A modal-pushover-based scaling (MPS) method
has been developed to scale ground motions foruse in nonlinear response history analysis (RHA)of buildings. In the MPS method, the groundmotions are scaled to match (to a specified
tolerance) a target value of the inelastic
deformation of the first-mode inelastic SDF
system—its properties determined by first-mode
pushover analysis—and the elastic deformation ofhigher-mode SDF systems are considered inselecting a subset of the scaled ground motions.
The median values of engineering demandparameters (EDPs)—floor displacement, story
drifts, and plastic rotations—due to three sets of 7
ground motions scaled by two methods—MPS and
ASCE-7—were computed by nonlinear RHA ofthe building and compared against the benchmark
values of EDPs, determined by nonlinear RHA ofthe building for 21 unscaled records. Presented for
4-, 6-, and 13-story existing steel–SMRF
buildings, such comparison led to the following
conclusions:

3. For first-mode dominated structures, scaling
earthquake records to the target value of theinelastic deformation is sufficient in producing
accurate estimates of median EDPs and in
reducing the dispersion of EDPs due toindividual ground motions. For mid-rise andhigh-rise buildings where higher vibration
modes are known to contribute significantly tothe seismic response, the MPS method requires
an additional step to rank the scaled groundmotions based on the closeness of the elastic
deformation of higher-mode elastic SDF
systems to their target values. Selecting a
subset of highest-ranked ground motions leads
to a method that is more accurate and efficientfor estimating seismic demands for tallerbuildings.

1. Even for the most intense near-fault groundmotions, which represent a severe test, the
MPS method estimates the median value ofseismic demands to a good degree of accuracy(within 20%t of the benchmark value). In
contrast, the ASCE-7 scaling method
overestimates the demand by 20 to 50% for 4, and 6-story building, and its overestimation
exceeds 50% for 13-story building. The
dispersion of responses due to ground motion

This study has focused on developing the MPS
method for scaling ground motions and its initial
evaluation, which has been limited to low- andmid-rise steel SMRFs; stable force deformation

297

Eng., Stanford University, CA. (Available online at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/rms/Thesis/index.ht
ml; last accessed on 06/2008).

relations were considered and P- effects were
excluded.

Bazzurro, P., and Luco, N. (2004).
“Parameterization of Non-Stationary Acceleration
Time Histories. Lifelines Program Project 1G00
Addenda. Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research(PEER) Center, University of California: Berkeley,CA, 83 p.

9.0 ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Dr. Kalkan wishes to acknowledge the generous
support of the Earthquake Engineering ResearchInstitute for providing him the 2008 EERI/FEMANEHRP Professional Fellowship in Earthquake
Hazard Reduction for the research study“Preparation of practical guidelines to select andscale earthquake records for nonlinear response
history analysis of structures”.

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Proceedings of the 6th U.S. National Conf. on Eq.
Eng., Seattle, WA.

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Ruiz-Garcia, J., and Miranda, E. (2002). “Inelastic
displacement ratios for evaluation of existing
structures,” Eq. Eng. and Str. Dyn., Vol. 31, No. 3.
pp. 539-560.

Malhotra, P. K. (2003). “Strong-Motion Records
for Site-Specific Analysis,” Earthquake Spectra,
Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 557-578.

Shome, N., and Cornell, A. C. (1998).
“Normalization and scaling accelerograms fornonlinear structural analysis,” Prof. of the 6th U.S.
National Conf. on Earthquake Engineering, Seattle,
WA.

Mehanny, S. S. F. (1999). “Modeling andAssessment of Seismic Performance of Composite
Frames with Reinforced Concrete Columns andSteel Beams,” Ph.D. thesis, Dept. of Civil andEnv. Eng., Stanford University, California.

Shome, N., Cornell, C. A., Bazzurro, P., andCarballo, J. E., 1998. Earthquakes, records, andnonlinear responses, Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 14,
No.3, pp. 469–500.

Miranda, E. (1993). “Evaluation of site-dependent
inelastic seismic design spectra,” J. of Str. Eng.
(ASCE), Vol. 119, No. 5, pp. 1319–1338.

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Seismic Demand Analysis of Nonlinear Structures,
Reliability of Marine Structures Program Report
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ml; last accessed on 06/2008).

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“Selection and scaling of ground motion time
histories for structural design using genetic
algorithms,” Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 20, No. 2,
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Tothong, P., and Cornell, A. C. (2008). “Structural
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like ground motions using advanced groundmotion intensity measures,” Eq. Eng. and Str.
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300Climate Change Adaptive Strategies for Buildings and Public Healthby
Fuyuen Yip, Josephine Malilay, George Luber, and Paul Garbe1

climateassociated with reducing climate change,
especially GHG emissions, and adaptation,
which includes designing, implementing,monitoring, and evaluating strategies toreduce the effects of climate change. Bothstrategies address technological, institutional,
and behavioral options.1 While mitigation
approaches to reduce GHG are oftenemphasized, a concomitant effort to work on
public health adaptation to climate change
will also be important to help prepare thepublic for ongoing changes.5 Thus, it iscritical to consider both mitigation andadaptation activities for reducing long-term,
potentially hazardous effects on humanhealth.
We attempt to describe theimportant role that buildings and the built
environment, collectively, should also be
considered within this public health andclimate change framework.

1.0
INTRODUCTION
The accumulation of greenhouse gases(GHGs) has been a dominant cause ofclimate change.
The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change’s recent Fourth
Assessment Report1 shows that there is
growing evidence that global warming is
associated with changes in the climate.
These changes include increased frequencies
of natural disasters, more extreme weather
events, and rising sea levels from thewidespread melting of snow and ice.1 These
climactic changes can affect public health inmany ways.2, 3, 4 Accordingly, societies needto prepare for, and effectively respond to,the changing climate. Two strategies arecommonly identified to manage the effects
of climate change: mitigation, which is______________________________
1
National Center for Environmental Health,Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Atlanta, GA, USA

Mitigation strategies are continually being
developed to reduce GHG from the built
environment, yet there are opportunities tosimultaneously
integrate
adaptation
strategies (e.g., material selection, energyuse, building design, etc.). These efforts canassure the resilience of the building sector tomore effectively respond to increasingclimate variability. Furthermore, as thebuilding
sectorandoverallbuilt
environment influence human health andwelfare both in the indoor and outdoor
environment, they are an integral part of theprocess.6
The anticipated health effects to climacticchanges can include morbidity and mortality
associated with temperature extremes andair pollution-related exposures. Effects ofvector-borne and zoonotic diseases,
especially on those organisms that are
sensitive to and disrupted by climactic
factors, may also emerge in areas where they
had been limited.2 The implications andthreats of climate change to the overall

ABSTRACT
Reducing the impact of climate change onbuildings and public health will requireongoing preparation and action. Much effort
thus far has emphasized mitigation activities
to decrease a building’s greenhouse gas
emissions into the environment. However,buildings need to also adapt to accommodate
the growing effects of heat waves and urban
heat islands, and subsequent energy
demands, especially cooling. While thepublic health effort to adapt to climatechange will be critical, the building sector
will also be instrumental in helping to
reduce the impact of climate change onbuildings and the built environment, and toensure that the needs of occupants are met.
KEYWORDS
Built environment, buildings,
change, public health, adaptation

310

two weeks in August, and many were among
persons >75 years of age.9 During this timein France, peak temperatures of 104°F(40°C) were recorded and remained elevatedfor two weeks.10
Vulnerable populations, which often include
the elderly, young children, those with
underlying medical conditions, and those
without
air
conditioning,aredisproportionately affected during heatwaves as they may be more sensitive totemperature extremes.11,12, 13
With agrowing elderly U.S. population, thesetrends suggest that temperature-related
morbidity and mortality are likely toincrease in the future.

infrastructure, including the building sector,
are also becoming better understood. The
estimated global anthropogenic GHG
emissions (in carbon dioxide [CO2]equivalents) contributed by residential andcommercial buildings was 7.9% in 20041
and efforts have primarily focused on
reducing GHG from buildings. However,
the impact of global warming over time on
physical structures and their ability to adapt
to changing climactic conditions should also
be considered. With the increasing numberof heat waves and the effect of the urban
heat island, for example, the building sector
will need to adapt to rising energy demands
for cooling while maintaining indoor
comfort and a healthy environment.

Vulnerability can also vary by geographic
area, especially among those expected toexperience the greatest changes in averagetemperatures.13 As in Europe, these changes
may be the most significant among residents
in more temperate zones who may not be as
acclimated to high temperatures and may be
at greater risk.14 In addition, these regions
may also have increased concentrations ofozone and other air pollutants that are
influenced by rising temperatures.15 Highlevels of ozone can exacerbate existing
respiratory and cardiovascular diseases.

2.0
EFFECTSOF
CLIMATECHANGE ON HUMAN HEALTH: HEATWAVESThere has been considerable research on thehealth effects associated with extreme heat.
These health effects, along with periods ofelevated temperatures outside the normal
range of climate variability are projected toincrease in frequency throughout the worldand become more intense in the future.7
Therefore, heat-related health effects are
increasing in public health significance. In
fact, many cities have reported excess
mortality that has been attributed to extreme
heat. Heat wave events are typically marked
with sustained high temperatures that areoften hotter than those to which the
population is accustomed. These exposures
can cause mild symptoms, such as heatstress or exhaustion, or exacerbate existing
respiratory and cardiovascular conditions,which can lead to more severe health effects
or be fatal. In the United States, heat waves
kill more people than other natural disasters
including hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, andearthquakes combined.

3.0
EFFECTSOF
CLIMATECHANGEON
URBAN
ENVIRONMENTS:
URBAN HEAT ISLAND EFFECT
The urban ―built‖ environment adds to theclimatechange-driven
increases
in
temperature. Cities and climate are evolving
together in a manner that will intensify boththe effect of heat and the vulnerability ofurban populations to heat-related death.
More than 50% of the world now lives incities, and urban areas are gaining an
estimated 67 million people per year.
Further estimates suggest that approximately
5 billion people, or 60% of the projected
global population, will be living in urban
areas by 2030.16 This rapid urbanizationtransitions communities to engineered

In 2003, Europe reported experiencing
abnormally high temperatures in the summer
and observed an unprecedented number ofdeaths—35,000 in the region.8 In France
alone, 14,800 deaths were reported between

311

infrastructures that increase thermal-storage
capacity, resulting in significant changes in
the urban climate compared to neighboring
rural regions. This is known as the urban
heat island (UHI) effect. There is growing
concern that the UHI effect can intensify
and prolong the duration of extreme heat
events.16

The Fourth Assessment Report1 detailed
mitigation-related activities to reduce GHG
emissions from the building sector. Energy
use in buildings is typically high andinefficient, so efforts to reduce carbon
emissions have often targeted buildings.
Various design strategies have beendeveloped to reduce carbon emissions, suchas changing the building stock, using naturalventilation20, and better insulation andwindows to improve thermal performance.
Integrating approaches to increase energy
efficiency and renewable energy, such as
adopting the Leadership in Energy andEnvironmental Design (LEED) standards
into building design, can reduce annual
average carbon dioxide emissions by 350
metric tons (385 tons) in the United States.21

UHI has increased air temperatures in cities
2°F–8°F compared to surrounding suburban
and rural areas, often due to solar energy
absorbed by dark paved surfaces andbuildings, fewer vegetation and trees, heatemitted from buildings and vehicles, andreduced air flow around buildings. UHI
absorbs heat during the daytime, causing thesurface temperatures of urban structures tobecome 50°F–70°F (10°C–21°C) warmer
than ambient air temperatures.16 In theevening, the energy is radiated out, raisingnighttime minimum temperatures in theurban environment and keeping them
relatively high.17 This phenomenon makes it
more difficult for the population to recover,which contributes to general discomfort,
respiratory difficulties, heat cramps andexhaustion, nonfatal heat stroke, and heatrelated mortality. Harlan et al. (2006),14
found that Phoenix, Arizona residents livingin warmer neighborhoods experienced
increased health risks from heat stress.

However, there has been less discussion in
the Fourth Assessment Report about
adapting residential and commercial
buildings to climate change.
Futureapproaches should therefore consider theability of the building sector to adapt toclimate variability and also to protect thehealth of the occupants and the public.
After the heat wave in 2003, French
researchers indicated that the quality of thebuilt environment was an important factor inunderstanding the causes of excess
mortality.10 These adaptations can include
modifying the building’s energy use, peakdemand, equipment life, and building
stock.22

Rising temperatures are likely to increase
the demand for air conditioning and othersources of cooling. Research has shown thatfor every 1°F (0.6°C) increase in air
temperatures (starting from 68°F–77°F[20°C–25°C]), cooling increases the demandfor electricity by 1.5%–2.0%. This suggeststhat 5%–10% of community-wide demandfor electricity is used to compensate for the
UTI effect.18 Demand may also increase
pollutant emissions from regional power
plants and other power sources that cancontribute to the formation of ozone andother air pollutants,20 thereby affecting
public health.

Thus, when selecting technologies tomitigate the effects of GHG, it is important
to consider adapting building regulations,materials, and construction techniques toongoing events associated with climatechange. Smith and Levermore (2008)23
suggested that approaches such as altering abuilding’s façade (e.g., use of highreflectivity materials), green roofs, urban
greening, and design to allow cooling winds,
can help lower the temperature in the urban
micro-environment by reducing its heatabsorption and emission. Adapting building
codes, for example, to address these changes

4.0
ADAPTATION AND
MITIGATION: BUILDINGS SECTOR

312

can help to guide better building practices
and can also lead to public health benefits.
Further, the changing pattern of energy use
and rising energy demand will likely
continue to influence the design andefficiency of building services, especiallythose supporting the increasing need forcooling and heating.23,24

Great complexity surrounds climate change.
In order to effectively plan for these events,
increased efforts to develop, mitigate andadapt strategies at the urban level requires amulti-disciplinary
approachthroughcollaborating with engineering, architecture,
construction, community/urban planning,and public health professionals.

A growing body of technology helps
maintain the thermal comfort of people inurban environments.
Other existing
technology, such as sensor arrays have often
been used to monitor the health of buildings,
and may also serve as a useful tool to help
assess the ability of the building sector towithstand climate variability over time andthe resiliency of the building materials.

The health effect of extreme weather eventsis influenced by the vulnerability of theenvironment, the population, and its ability
to recover from them. These factors rely on
the resiliency of the building sector and its
ability to protect the health of the population.
Therefore, the challenge is to support thedesign, development and growth of new andexisting urban environments in a sustainable
manner that promotes public health. Further,policy and planning should be implemented
and maintained to reduce the future
vulnerability of urban populations to events
such as extreme heat.23

5.0
BUILDING
INFRASTRUCTURE
HEALTHAND

SECTOR
PUBLIC

Several heat-related events, such as the 1995
heat wave in Chicago25 and 2003 heat wave
in Europe revealed that the existing
infrastructure lacked the capacity to deal
with the impact of these disasters. The
failure to adapt, such as reducing UHIs,
meeting electricity and cooling demands,
and reducing population vulnerability toheat stress, may leave a community poorly
prepared to cope with adverse changes,
which can lead to severe consequences.2,5Building design, its impact on local climate,and its ability to maintain human comfort—
both short- and long-term changes, and on a
micro- and macro-scale—will therefore be
significant.

The building community has an importantrole in adapting to climate change for there
are co-benefits of better designed buildings
for sustainability and health. Advancing
efforts for adaptation will be challenging,but essential and require ongoing assessment
and action. Thus, the building community
will need to be engaged in and aware of thedesign, implementation, and monitoring ofbuilding resiliency and indoor comfort. This
will be important in not only assuring thesustainability of the buildings and thecommunity over time, but this will also
protect public health and overall population
vulnerability from events such as extremeheat.

A driving force for adapting to climatechange is to ensure basic public healthprotection. Adaptation is a process, so it isimportant to understand local and regional
vulnerability, the adaptive capacity of the
population, and future potential climate
risks.5
6.0
COLLABORATIVE
AND NEXT STEPS

7.0

REFERENCES

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induced urban health island effect inrapidly urbanizing arid regions—asustainableurban
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315

APPENDIXTASK COMMITTEE REPORTS

Report of Task Committee B
NEXT-GENERATION BUILDING AND INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS
Date:

18 May 2009

Place:

National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, Tsukuba, Japan

Attendees:

U.S. Side --H. S. Lew
Mehmet Celebi
Erol Kalkan
M. P. Singh (Co-Chair) (by e-mail)

NIST
USGS
USGS
NSF

Japan Side --Hiroshi Fukuyama (Co-Chair)
Takashi Kaminosono
Koichi Morita
Yoshihiro Iwata

BRI
CBL
BRI
BRI

1. Objective and Scope of Work
(1) Objective
The objectives of the Task Committee are to enhance the development and implementation of innovative andnew 1) structural and non-structural materials; 2) enabling technologies such as structural health monitoringand multi-hazard performance based engineering; 3) evaluation, analysis, design, construction, andmaintenance methods through cooperative analytical and experimental approaches for the next-generationbuilding and infrastructure systems. Opportunities during the next five years include topics on multi-hazard
resilient buildings, embedded systems for the health and productivity of occupants, sustainability, andcollaborations with other researchers and practitioners.
(2) Scope of Worka)
Conduct joint workshops and meetings to identify research opportunities and new projects
including multi-hazard risk reduction strategies and measures.
b)
Encourage the development and application of new technologies, smart sensors, intelligent
materials, and sustainability to improve the health, safety, and productivity of construction
workers and building occupants.
c)Develop new materials and technologies for condition assessment, retrofit of existingbuildings, and design of new buildings.
d)Coordinate development of databases, test procedures, and guidelines for interpretation of test
results and their applications.
e)Coordinate joint research including the utilization of experimental facilities.
f)Enhance the exchange of information and personnel.
2. Accomplishments
Task Committee B developed a five-year strategic research plan in February 2007 that addresses highperformance buildings' abilities to better resist the effects from extreme wind, earthquakes, and fire loads andto effect informed decisions about design procedures that incorporate environmental quality and sustainabilityof occupant health and life cycle systems. However, final achievements through joint research are not clearly
defined since this plan covered very wide area.
3. Future Plans
Current research interests and activities in both sides will be compiled and presented for exchange information
to find particular topics appropriate for collaborative research. Possible topics for collaboration will be disaster

321

Report of Task Committee C
DAMS
Date:

18 May 2009

Place:

National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, Tsukuba, Japan

Attendees:

U.S. Side --Michael Sharp (Acting Chair)
Robert Cris Hughes

USACE
USDHS

Japan Side --Yoshikazu Yamaguchi (Chair)
Tomoya Iwashita
Hiroyuki Satoh

PWRI
PWRI
PWRI

1. Objective and Scope of WorkTo develop technical insights into better understanding of the response of dams to seismic effects, the T/C willplan, promote, and develop research initiatives to assist in assuring seismic safety and economical protective
countermeasures against earthquake loading for these critical structures.
The scope of work includes:(1)
Develop methods of analysis for seismic design of dams including outlet works.
a)Comparative analysis of design methods and evaluation criteria used by U.S. and Japan.
b)
Development of "Design Earthquake Ground Motions" for analysis and evaluation of dams.
c)Assessment of models and numerical procedures used for seismic dynamic analysis.
(2)
Perform research to better understand the dynamic characteristics of dam construction materials andsite conditions.
a)Strength and deformation characteristics of concrete, soil and rock materials during
earthquakes.
(3)
Evaluate observed performance of dams and outlet works during earthquakes.
a)Develop a database that contains measured ground accelerations and dynamic response ofdams and outlet works during earthquakes, and other related information necessary toevaluate their seismic behavior, such as experimental and/or analytical data with descriptionof test and analysis procedures used.
b)
Investigation of damage mechanisms due to earthquake loading.
c)Application of the analysis of the observed dynamic behavior to the improvement of design
criteria.
2. Accomplishments
(1)

(2)

Technical exchange and collaborative research on "Non-linear response analysis of concrete dams"
has been conducted between the U.S. (U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center) andJapan (Public Works Research Institute). The shaking table experiments for crack-segmented concrete
specimens considering the uplift pressure in a crack were made at PWRI in 2008. The U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation is continuing to conduct shaking table tests at different scales and non-linear response
analyses, and the joint comparison and evaluation of test and analysis results will be extremely
beneficial to advance the state of the art in constitutive modeling of mass concrete structures.
Technical exchange and collaborative research on "Experimental characterization of non-linear
tensile behavior of mass concrete" has been conducted between U.S. (U.S. Army Engineer Researchand Development Center & U.S. Bureau of Reclamation) and Japan (Public Works Research Institute).

3. Future Plans

324

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

The Proceedings of the "4th U.S.-Japan Workshop on Advanced Research on Dams" will be
published in 2009. In view of the importance of cooperative research programs on earthquake
engineering for dams, the Task Committee will hold the "5th U.S.-Japan Workshop on Advanced
Research on Dams" in USA in autumn of 2010. Specific location and time of the Workshop will
finally be determined through correspondence between the Chairs of the Task Committee on Dams.
The Task Committee will continue the current efforts focused on the development of improved
mechanisms to facilitate the continuous exchange of results of research activities and general technicalinformation related to dam earthquake engineering.
The Task Committee will coordinate exchange visits of scientists and engineers from the U.S. andJapan. A series of case histories of mutual interest will be identified and prioritized and they will serveas the focus for this exchange program.
The Task Committee will promote the development of joint research programs. The following topics
have been identified as areas for future collaborative research:a)Non-linear response analysis of concrete dams:
The Task Committee will continue their collaboration in this research to include bothanalytical and experimental data.
b)Global stability analysis of concrete dams:
The Task Committee will conduct a review of the minimum requirements for sliding andoverturning stability currently in use in the U.S. and Japan. The Task Committee recognizes
the importance of this collaborative effort, as the corresponding guidelines are currently
subject to revision and update both in the U.S. and Japan. The results of this effort will besummarized and published. "Engineer Manual No. 1110-2-2100: Stability Analysis ofConcrete Structures" published by The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in December 2005 (4.
(2)) contains this problem.
c)
Criteria for seismic analysis progression:
The Task Committee will review and compare the state of practice in the U.S. and Japan
regarding current recommendations for progression of seismic analysis based on stages ofincreasing complexity. The results of this effort will be summarized and published.
d)
Seismic evaluation of embankment dams:
The Task Committee will review criteria and guidelines for post-earthquake stability anddeformation analysis of embankment dams. The results of this effort will be summarized andpublished.
e)Dam-foundation interaction:
The Task Committee will develop collaborating research efforts to review and develop
improved numerical models for dam-foundation interaction.
The activities corresponding to the four areas indicated above will be addressed sequentially and thecorresponding schedule will depend on the progress of the corresponding guidance documents, someof which are currently under discussion, development and/or review in the U.S. and Japan.
Following large earthquakes in the U.S. or Japan, the Task Committee will assemble a jointreconnaissance team to investigate the performance of concrete dams, earth and rockfill dams, andoutlet works.

4. Related Activities
(1)

(2)

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT), Japanese Government completed the"Guidelines for Seismic Safety Evaluation of Dams (Draft)" in March 2005. This document wasapplied to four existing dams during the fiscal year of 2005 and three other existing dams during the
fiscal year of 2006 to 2008 in order to verify and revise it. The final draft of the revised version of theguidelines is now being reviewed by the headquarters of the MLIT for the final approval.
Japanese dam engineers travelled to China in order to investigate the damage to dams and repair
works of the damaged dams due to Wenchuan Earthquake, which occurred on 12 May 2008.

325

Report of Task Committee D
WIND ENGINEERING
Date:

18 May 2009

Place:

National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, Tsukuba, Japan

Attendees:

U.S. Side --John Gaynor (Co-Chair)
Partha Sarkar

NOAA
ISU

Japan Side --Yasuo Okuda (Co-Chair)
Jun Murakoshi (Co-Chair)
Hitomitsu Kikitsu
Hiroshi Katsuchi
Mitsuru Ueno

BRI
PWRI
NILIM
YNU
MRI

1. Objective and Scope of WorkTo exchange technical information and to jointly plan, promote, and foster research and dissemination, in orderto improve understanding of wind and its effects on structures, to establish more rational wind-resistant design
procedures for structures, and to contribute collaboratively and synergistically to wind hazard mitigation.
Specific objectives for the Task Committee include:(1)
Strategically and collaboratively, identify research needs in wind hazard mitigation in the areas of newtechnology, basic and applied research in wind and structural engineering, and in social and economic
impacts of wind events.
(2)
Facilitate cooperation and collaborative research between U.S. and Japanese researchers in windengineering.
(3)
Identify and exchange successes in wind engineering and wind hazard mitigation.
The scope of the US-Japan collaboration includes:(1)
Characterization of strong wind, especially boundary layer extreme winds.
(2)
The study of wind effects including wind loading on and wind-induced response of structures.
(3)
Performance of experimental and analytical research to predict wind effects.
(4)
Sharing damage surveys, and wind hazard and risk assessments.
(5)
Development of new technologies for wind hazard mitigation.
2. Accomplishments
(1)

(2)

The results of an international comparison of wind-tunnel based wind effects on a typical low-riseindustrial building were published ("International Comparison of Wind Tunnel Estimates of Wind
Effects on Low-Rise Buildings: Test-related Uncertainties", W. P. Fritz, B. Bienkiewicz, B. Cui, O.
Flamand, T. C. E. Ho, H. Kikitsu, C. W. Letchford, and E. Simiu, J. Struct. Engrg. 134, 1887 (2008)).
In addition to NIST and BRI, other participants included the Univ. of Western Ontario, Colorado State
Univ., Clemson Univ., TTU, and the Centre Scientifique et Technique du Batiment, Nantes, France.
The ratios between maximum and minimum wind-induced internal forces in building frames were ashigh as three.
In March 2008 conducted joint experiments on the simulation of transient loads on buildings using
Miyazaki multi-fan wind tunnel are underway under the collaboration between the University of Notre
Dame, COE, Tokyo Polytechnic University, and Miyazaki University. A paper was recently presented
at an international Fluid Mechanics Conference and Sixth International Colloquium on Bluff Body
Aerodynamics and Applications in Milan, July 2008. A benchtop multi-fan wind tunnel and a windtunnel with a flat plate to simulate transient events are being used at the University of Notre Dame tobetter capture the aerodynamics in transient conditions to assess their impact in downbursts.

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(3)

(4)

(5)

Professor Tetsuro Tamura, Tokyo Institute of Technology and Dr. Y. Okuda, BRI are preparing
numerical simulation of the LES model to evaluate wind environment of the urban area, Tokyo andChicago, as a joint research with Professor A. Kareem, University of Notre Dame. Trial calculations
using hybrid method of LES model and meso-meteorological model (MM-5) for several examples inTokyo were carried out. The difference of urban shape based on buildings and streets between Tokyo
and Chicago were clarified.
Several papers and reports have resulted from the US-Japan collaboration between Professors P.
Sarkar, F. L. Haan Jr. et al. in Iowa State University (ISU) in the US and Drs. H. Kikitsu, H. Sato, J.
Murakoshi in BRI/PWRI/NILIM in Japan within the last year, April 2008 to May 2009. They areincluded in Appendix A.
Professor Jones, Dr. Delong, and Professor Shirato exchange data on stay cable vibrations.

3. Future Plans
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)

A wind engineering symposium for meteorologists and wind engineers led by Iowa State University
and NOAA that was originally scheduled for 2009 will be held in conjunction with the Fifth
International Symposium on Computational Wind Engineering (CWE2010) to be held from May 24 29, 2010 at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA. More details will be posted soon on the CWE2010
website. It is suggested that the symposium will include storm surge in collaboration with TC-H.
The Fifth US-Japan Workshop on Wind Engineering will be held in second half of 2010 subject toavailability of support from the US NSF.
As opportunities arise, seek additional opportunities to pursue collaborative research on the following
topics:a)Wind effects on buildings and wind energy systemsb)Wind effects on bridgesc)Evolving Technologies
Exchange technical information on the following topics.
a)Wind characteristics and wind hazardsb)Wind pressures, loadings and performance of buildingsc)Wind-induced response of flexible, cable-suspended bridges and their componentsd)
New prediction and mitigation techniques for wind effectse)
Share data base of storm damage assessments.
Engage in more regular interaction and communication among Task Committee members. Use email
and exchange visits between full Panel meetings were suggested as a means of facilitating andcoordinating collaborative activities.
Strategically and collaboratively construct a vision and plan for wind engineering research needs forthe next decade, and formulate collaborative activities around those plans.

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Appendix A:
Papers and reports from the US-Japan collaboration between Iowa State University (ISU) in the US andBRI/PWRI/NILIM in Japan within the last year, April 2008 to May 2009
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

A damage survey of the Parkersburg EF-5 Tornado of May 25, 2008 was conducted by Dr. Hitomitsu
Kikitsu, BRI, Japan and Dr. Partha Sarkar, ISU, USA along with personnel from the Office of National
Weather Service, NOAA, Des Moines, IA on May 26-27, 2008. Both English and Japanese versions of
the damage survey report are available on request from its co-authors. The Japanese version of thereport "Damage to Buildings by EF5 Tornado in Iowa, U.S., on May 25, 2008" by H. Kikitsu and P. P.
Sarkar is published in the Journal of Wind Engineering, JAWE, Vo. 33 (4), October 2008.
A paper "Comparative and sensitivity study of flutter derivatives of selected bridge deck sections, Part
1: Analysis of inter-laboratory experimental data" by P. P. Sarkar, L. Caracoglia, F. L. Haan, Jr., H.
Sato and J. Murakoshi, was published in Engineering Structures (Elsevier) 31 (2009), pp 158-169.
Another paper "Comparative and sensitivity study of flutter derivatives of selected bridge deck
sections, Part 2: its Implications on the aeroelasticity of slender- bridges aeroelasticity", by L.
Caracoglia, P. P. Sarkar, F. L. Haan, Jr., H. Sato and J. Murakoshi is accepted for publication in
Engineering Structures (Elsevier) and soon be available online (in press).
A paper "United States-Japan Benchmark Study of Flutter Derivatives of Selected Bridge Decks" by P.
P. Sarkar, L. Caracoglia, F. L. Haan, Jr., H. Sato and J. Murakoshi, was presented by Prof. Caracoglia
at the 40th Joint Panel Meeting held at NIST, May 19-21, 2008.
A paper titled, "Experimental study of internal pressure and debris strike for improved tornadoinduced loads of low-rise buildings" by Partha Sarkar, ISU and Hitomitsu Kikitsu, BRI will bepresented by Partha Sarkar at the 41st Joint Panel Meeting of the UJNR Wind and Seismic Effects at
Tsukuba, Japan from May 18-20, 2009.
A paper titled (tentative), "Damage to Buildings by EF5 Tornado in Iowa, U.S. in May, 2008" by H.
Kikitsu and P. P. Sarkar will be presented by Hitomitsu Kikitsu at the 41st Joint Panel Meeting of the
UJNR Wind and Seismic Effect at Tsukuba, Japan from May 18-20, 2009.
A paper, "Characteristics of Tornado-induced wind load on low-rise building using tornado simulator"
by Hitomitsu Kikitsu, Partha Sarkar, and Fred Haan will be presented by Dr. Kikitsu at the Annual
Meeting of the Japanese Association for Wind Engineering (JAWE) in May 2009.
A paper, "Evaluation on Structural Risk by Wind-Borne Debris Using Tornado Simulator" byHitomitsu Kikitsu and Partha Sarkar will be presented by Dr. Kikitsu at the 58th National Congress ofTheoretical and Applied Mechanics in Japan, June 2009.

328

Report of Task Committee G
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
Date:

18 May 2009

Place:

National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, Tsukuba, Japan

Attendees:

U.S. Side --W. Phillip Yen (Chair)David Sanders

FHWA
UNR

Japan Side --Atsushi Yoshioka (Chair)
Shoichi Nakatani
Jun-ichi Hoshikuma
Junichi Sakai
Masahiro Shirato

PWRI
PWRI
PWRI
PWRI
PWRI

1. Objective and Scope of Work
The objectives of work include:(1)
To plan, promote and foster research on the behavior of transportation facilities when subjected towind and seismic forces, and(2)
To disseminate research results and provide specifications and guidelines based on the Task
Committee's findings.
The scope of work includes:(1)
To investigate existing and new bridges design, the behavior of whole bridge systems and/or single
component of a bridge without limitation on their size and function.
2. Accomplishments
(1)

(2)
(3)

The 24th US-Japan Bridge Engineering Workshop was held during 22 - 24 September 2008, in
Minneapolis, MN, US. 19 U.S. and 25 Japanese participants attended the workshop. 42 technicalpapers were presented and discussed on the following main topics: a) Seismic design/retrofit and b)
Maintenance.
The proceedings of the 24th US-Japan Bridge Engineering Workshop will be printed and will be
distributed soon. The program and papers of the workshop will be posted on the web-site of the UJNR
at the PWRI (http://www.pwri.go.jp/eng/ujnr/tc/g/tc_g.htm) and FHWA.
Both side conducted post earthquake damage evaluation studies, and the information has been
exchanged.

3. Future Plans
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The 25th US-Japan Bridge Engineering Workshop will be held in October 19-21, 2009, in Tsukuba,
Japan. Specific program and itinerary will be proposed by the Japan-side Task Committee G with theconcurrence of the US-side Task Committee.
Following a devastating earthquake or hurricane (typhoon) in the US or Japan, the committee will
form a joint reconnaissance team to investigate the performance of transportation systems.
With increasing concerns over structural member fractures of older bridges in the US and Japan, thecommittee will conduct joint efforts to investigate detection methods, causes and repairs. The joint
efforts should be initiated by the hosting side.
Both sides agreed to conduct joint researches on the following topics.
a)Strategy to determine design criteria, design loads, and load factors that consider ductility andredundancy for multiple hazards

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b)

(5)

Collaboration to develop feasible and practical non-destructive test techniques for bridge
inspection
Both sides agreed to conduct information sharing on the following topics.
a)Best and poor practices in bridge design and maintenanceb)
Post earthquake response and repairc)Study on policy making to set different performance levels of routes and allocate resources
for seismic upgrading/retrofit, bridge inspection, and rehabilitation based on the assigned
characteristics

4. Related Activities(1)

Both side's committee members participate a NIED/NEES cooperative experimental research in fullscale Bridge Column shaking table tests.

330

Report of Task Committee H
STORM SURGE AND TSUNAMI
Date:

18 May 2009

Place:

National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, Tsukuba, Japan

Attendees:

U.S. Side --Solomon Yim (Co-Chair)(via e-mail correspondence)

OSU

Japan Side --Takashi Tomita (Chair)

PARI

1. Objective and Scope of Work
The objectives of work include:(1)
To exchange scientific and technical information(2)
To jointly plan, promote and foster research and dissemination of knowledge(3)
To develop measures to prevent and mitigate damages from storm surges and tsunamis
The scope of work includes:(1)
Perform joint research on storm surge and tsunami occurrences, generation, propagation, and coastal
effects. Develop database on storm surge, tsunami and wave measurements.
(2)
Improve coordination of strategies and systems for observations of storm surges and tsunamis by fieldsurveys, satellites, and in-situ measurements.
(3)
Exchange results and status of storm surge and tsunami mitigation activities including analysis of the
problem, planning, warning, and engineering approaches.
(4)
Exchange information on development of technologies including numerical models to predictpropagation processes, land-fall locations, inundation and run-up heights, and wave characteristics,
improved instrumentation, and use of satellite communication for detection and warning.
(5)
Facilitate research result and technology development disseminations through exchange of literature,technical reports at joint meetings, special workshops, joint projects, and direct interaction among
participants.
(6)
Develop planning, design and construction guidelines in storm surge and tsunami flooding zones toserve as a model for international standards.
(7)
Provide technical support to develop storm surge and tsunami mitigation programs worldwide.
(8)
Encourage conduct of joint investigation following storm surge and tsunami events.
2. Accomplishments
(1)

(2)

The 5th International Workshop on Coastal Disaster Prevention was held on July 22, 2008 in
Jogjakarta, Indonesia in cooperation with Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI), Coastal
Development Institute of Technology, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan,
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Indonesia, and University of Gadjah Mada. Participants
include not only T/C H members of this panel but engineers, natural and social scientists and NGO
members. The number of participants was 220. Both Japan and US side chairs, Drs. Tomita and Yim,
gave invited presentations on recent research activities on tsunami and storm surge effects on coastal
structures.
Professor Daniel Cox of Oregon State University (OSU) and Japan side chair, Dr. Tomita, arecollaborating on an experimental project on tsunami inundation of an Oregon coastal city. OSU willconduct the physical experiment at the Hinsdale Wave Research Laboratory (HWRL) and Dr. Tomita
will use numerical models at PARI to simulate the results. Other numerical researchers in the US andEurope including Professors Solomon Yim of OSU and Patrick Lynett of Texas A & M University also
are conducting numerical simulations for comparison and evaluation of their models.

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3. Future Plans
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)

Create joint research between the US and Japan to develop and improve numerical models of storm
surge and tsunami dynamics and to exchange experimental and field data. The following topics havebeen identified as areas of future research collaboration on storm surges and tsunamis:a)field observationb)
characterizationc)physical experiment models
d)numerical simulation models
e)effects on coastal structures and damage estimations
f)design of protective structures for different levelsg)hazard maps development and warning system designh)storm surge and tsunami information communication and warning systems developmenti)risk assessment including hazard beyond designed levels
Develop database for existing and planned experiments including description and parameters ofexperiments to maximize overall available experimental data for understanding of physical behavior,
numerical model validation and structural design.
Include the effects of global warming on atmospheric and oceanographic environmental conditions
leading to changes in the probability of occurrence and intensity of typhoons, cyclones and hurricanes,
and sea level rise. These changes in typhoon and sea level characteristics will directly influence thecharacteristics and induced damages of future storm surges and tsunamis.
Plan to hold the 6th International Workshop on Coastal Disaster Prevention in Japan, in late 2009.
The US side co-chair, Professor Solomon Yim, will contact the co-chair, Dr. Eddie Bernard and the
US side co-chair of T/C D, Mr. John Gaynor, regarding the study of storm surge, and the US side chairof T/C G, Dr. Phillip Yen, regarding storm surge and tsunami effects on bridges.

4. Related Activities
(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)

Both Japan and US side chairs, Drs. Tomita and Yim, partially wrote "Recommendations with regard
to the design and construction of maritime structures in tsunami prone areas," which was the report ofWorking Group 53 of Maritime Navigation Commission of the International Navigation Association(PIANC).
US side researchers at OSU are conducting numerical and experimental modeling of storm wave
effects on coastal bridges. A series of experiments of a 1/5-scale highway bridge section subjected tostorm waves have been conducted at the Large Wave Flume at the HWRL. Final tests were completed
in July 2008. The experimental results are being used to help develop design guidelines and calibrate
numerical models developed in house.
The third and fourth Japan-U.S. seminars on Tsunami Disasters were held at PARI on October 28,
2008 and March 4, 2009, respectively, welcoming Professors Harry Yeh and Daniel Cox of OSU.
Many engineers and researchers participated in the both seminars.
Japan side T/C members have cooperative research activities in Technical Committee on Technologies
to Estimate and Reduce Tsunami Damages, Japan Society of Civil Engineers.
US side T/C members have several on-going research projects on tsunami and storm surge numericalmodeling and experiments at the HWRL of OSU. OSU will hold a training workshop on 8-10 July
2009.

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TECHNICAL SITE VISITSHIGHLIGHTS OF THE TECHNICAL SITE VISITS
During the 41st Joint Panel Meeting the delegation visited seven sites. Highlights follow:
1. Tokyo Rinkai Oh-hashi Bridge
The Tokyo Rinkai Oh-hashi Bridge also tentatively named the Tokyo Port Seaside Bridge is 1,618 m longover the water and 2,933 m long in its entirety. It connects reclaimed land outside the central breakwaterand the Wakasu area of Tokyo. When it is opened in 2011, the Tokyo Port Seaside Road will facilitatecommercial highway transportation in and around the Tokyo Port easing traffic congestion in roads serving
the Tokyo Bay area.
The uniqueness of this bridge design is its requirements not to interfere with the flight patterns of Haneda
Airport and yet be high enough over the shipping channel to accommodate cargo ships. If this bridge‟sheight was not controlled by the flight limits, a suspension-type design would have been the most economic
choice. The selected design was a high strength steel (70 ksi) truss bridge with structural height of 87.8 m
and headroom (distance below substructure) of 54.6 m. The bridge‟s lower foundation is the main pier that
supports the bridge‟s 760 m composite box truss (160 m end spans and 440 m center span). Soft clay covers
the bottom of the Tokyo Bay where the pier is located. This continuous and composite bridge poses a hugechallenge of its substantial self weight and high corrosion resistance requirement area. Steel coating andwelding standards are much higher than required. The clay layer is about 30 m thick. A “steel pipe sheet
pile well foundation,” was used in which temporary steel pipe sheet pile cofferdams serve as the foundation.
Truss members are installed by various cranes (land and floating). The truss will be transported by barge
using one of Japan‟s three largest floating cranes. When in place the upper deck truss will be installed using
a 450 ton crane to lift members to the deck. Sliding bearings are installed for seismic isolation and the piers.
The bridge is orthotropic steel to limit the fatigue with 0.5 m steel expansion finger joints. The bridge isdesigned for a 100 year life. The bridge cost is estimated to be 98 B yen ($1 B).

Group Photograph of the Delegation at Tokyo Rinkai Oh-hashi Bridge335

2. Tokyo International Airport (Haneda) New Runway Design and Construction
Haneda Airport is constructing a fourth runway (off shore) to accommodate the spiraling increase indemand for air mass transportation. A new Passenger Terminal 2 was conducted in February 2007. This
fourth runway (Runway D) will serve domestic and international flights easing congestion at Narita
International Airport about 60 km northeast of Tokyo. The new 2,500 m runway is a combination of land
fill reclamation and a bridge. The landfill is located in Tokyo Bay and its adjoining bridge is in the TamaRiver estuary at Tokyo Bay. The runway elevation ranges from 14 m to 17 m above sea level. This runway
is connected to Haneda Airport by a 260 m bridge section.
The bridge pier jackets are 1.6 m diameter by 80 m long. Bridge deck sections are prefabricated in sets ofsix piers each with its superstructure measures 63 m by 45 m with cross bracing to resist the flow of theTama River. These sections are floated to site. When placed, the weight of the sections sinks about 20 m
into the sea bed. They are then vibrated to a depth of 70 m. The piers are aluminum with stainless steel
jackets starting 1.5 m below the splash zone and to the deck steel substructure that is covered with titanium
plates. The superstructure runway is super high strength precast fiber concrete. One hundred eighty ninejackets make up the bridge. The expected life of the bridge is 100 years.
The landfill consists of sand compaction piles in alluvium clay layer, riprap perimeter serves as wave
dissipaters, and 12 m to 20 m deep dredged earth mixed with cement is placed over a sand mat withcompacted sand around the perimeter. The landfill is expected to sink about one meter over its life time.
The runway connection to the bridge is by a roller leaf connection. The cost of the runway is about 600
trillion yen (about $6 trillion at May 2009 conversion).
3. Disaster Management Center (DMC)
The new national disaster management center at Ariake, Tokyo, is a regionally based, state-of-the-art,
multi-function emergency management facility. When a disaster strikes, such as a major earthquake, theDMC functions as a disaster management center and a medical treatment-shelter facility. The facility
includes an evacuation zone, evacuation center, stockpiling base, relief goods collection location, debris
yard, emergency/restoration operation center, emergency headquarters facility, and a “spare” facility. Here,administrative agencies gather information and direct regional operations. The operation room is equippedwith large-screen monitors, terminal devices, and communication equipment. The facilities include a
meeting room, a napping room, and rooms for staff on standby. The design of the DMC site includes anumber of features such as a water collection and reuse system that uses permeable pavement (green
technology), plantings of large trees strategically positioned in the overflow area of the grounds that willserve as a field hospital in temporary tents, and decorative fountain that recedes into the ground to provide
a level pathway for access to and from the field tent hospital and to the new Cancer Hospital locatedadjacent to the DMC.
The DMC coordinates disaster relief efforts with the Tokyo Metropolitan Area and with the Tokyo
Metropolitan Disaster Relief Center in Shinjuku, Tokyo. The Center uses dedicated communication systems336

to communicate with its officials and staff during emergencies. Pagers worn by staff are triggered withseismic intensity of 5 or greater on the Japan Meteorological Agency intensity scale. The Center operates
with three contingency plans to assist the disaster relief staff get to their offices - 1) through designatedroads, 2) designated metro trains, and 3) helicopters from its rooftop heliport respectively. The DMC servesa dual function during the non disaster periods as a learning center for general public disaster awarenessabout earthquake disaster education and demonstrations on a day-to-day basis that help prepare local
residents for disaster response. The DMC provides outdoor recreation space in the surrounding park(evacuation zone).
4. Takenaka Corporation Tokyo Main Office, Tokyo
Takenaka Corporation‟s Tokyo seven story main office building opened in 2004 as a sustainable officebuilding. Wall mounted monitors display the building‟s energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Thisbuilding uses natural light and wind for ventilation. Its HVAC ducts are made of used and recycled
cardboard materials with an added aluminum coating. Its rooftop is designed with greenery, a large raintank is located in the basement as a water source for toilet flushing and as emergency water supply, and an
IT-based energy use management system records CO2 emissions that are 25 percent lower than an average
office building today. The building is designed to allow north-south winds to bring air into the building
with greenery around the base of the building. Their “Comprehensive Assessment System for Building
Environmental Efficiency (CASBEE)”, akin to the US LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design) environmental efficiency rating scheme, awarded this building an environmental efficiency ratingof 4.9 (5.0 is the highest rating). The office spaces on the 2nd story and above have open layout and its
three center cores allows sunlight into the building‟s interior through its cathedral glass ceiling. The
building incorporates solar collectors on the building exterior for heating and ventilation and features a
hybrid air conditioner using conditioned air with natural ventilation that flows through louvers in the outerwalls and through a porous floor. The conditioned air is cooled during the day using ice produced during
evenings in its roof top thermal storage units. The cafeteria accommodates 350 persons and can be used asa general purpose room for large meetings and conferences. Building temperatures are maintained near 24
degrees Celsius. The building is designed to be operational for a one week period following a majordisaster and serves as a disaster relief center for its staff.
The structural framing system consists of an outer braced structure and a universal floor beam withbuckling resistant braces. The steel beams are coated with fire resistant calcium silicate sheets. Building
equipment is tightly fixed to the building‟s structural system permitting the building to be operational after
an earthquake. The structure uses a uniform span measuring 10.8 m by 10.8 m made up of CFT columns
with a diameter of 500 mm, an “external bracing structure” with buckling-restrained braces laid out, and“universal floor beams” made up girders and beams of a uniform beam depth of 450 mm. With a disperse
layout of air conditioners in the exterior brace sections, outside air is directly drawn in from the exteriorwall louvers, exhausting through the light wells, the building uses a four-mode hybrid air-conditioning
system using natural ventilation. With the universal floor beams, the air-conditioning ducts do not penetrate
the beams, but are hung under the beams, so with a standard office building floor height of 4.1 m, a337

minimum 3 m ceiling height has been maintained. The direct ceiling “new ceiling system” consists ofpunching metal underneath covers and lighting fixtures.
5. Shimizu Institute, Shimizu Corporation
The Shimizu Corporation‟s Research Institute Headquarters was built in 2003 using Green Building
Concepts that demonstrated a 43% savings in energy costs and a 35% reduction in CO2 emission during thebuilding‟s first 5 years of operation. The research institute is designed in a campus like setting with various
testing facilities. For example, its structural testing laboratory is equipped with a 6 MN testing machine, areaction floor, and vibration testing systems. The wind tunnel testing laboratory is a return boundary-layer
wind tunnel 3.5 m wide, 2.5 m high, and 20.3 m long that generate wind up to 35 m/s. Included are a multipoint wind velocity and direction measuring system, a 512-point simultaneous pressure measuring system,
and various simulation systems. Also the tunnel is equipped to simulate snow drift on the roofs and aroundbuildings. A 1,940 m biotope (pond with fish and birds) is located in the foundation space of the original
building that was demolished for construction of the campus of individual research laboratories.
The main office building adjacent to its labs was designed for energy savings technologies. Air is supplied
through the floor carpets reducing the need for ducts. The office work space incorporates “personal air
diffusers” under desks to help cool the workers legs. Room air temperatures average 24 degree celsius.
Task and ambient lighting and information systems optimizes energy use and electricity. The ice storage
system cools water in the evening for use during warm summer days for cooling. Gradation blinds help
reflect the sunlight away from the building. The building‟s CASBEE rating is 3.2. Paper waste and biomass
are used to generate electricity through an energy conversion system. The building is installed on seismic
isolators installed in an underground reservoir that isolates the building through buoyancy. The six maincolumns are installed with rubber bearing base isolators. The core suspended system on one of its buildings
employs isolators on the roof with the building suspended around a central core. This technique is similar
to those used for pagodas.
Of particular interest is Shimizu‟s research into a Green Float Botanical Future City. This concept involves
erecting a series of 1000 m towers (inverted cones) where residents live in about 150 m2 - 200 m2 units
starting at the 700 m level and research and plant factories are located below the residential level. The
towers are constructed on 3 km diameter floating artificial islands located in the equatorial Pacific Ocean. A
waterside resort is at the oceanfront. A cluster of islands could accommodate 1 million persons. Thisbotanical city design concept is aimed at the 2025 time frame having the intent to: provide living spaces forthe increasing population; reduce CO2; conserve energy; reduce waste products; and preserve theenvironment. Ocean thermals and solar energy is expected to be the primary energy source. Cooling will befrom several thousand meter high pipes in the atmosphere and also in deep ocean water. CO2 will be
dumped into the ocean using a 1 km to 1.5 km deep pipe. The inverted cone tower is proposed to beconstructed of honeycomb materials using magnesium from the sea. Shimizu philosophy in developing
their proposed living base addresses Albert Einstein‟s quote, “We can not solve problems using the samekind of thinking we used when we created them”.

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6. Japan Meteorological Agency
The visit was divided into three topics: seismic, tsunami, and volcano warnings.
Seismic Warnings. Japan experiences about 100,000 earthquakes per year - most of them small.
Earthquakes which can be felt by the population average about 2,000 per year. There are in excess of 4,248
seismic intensity observing stations in Japan operated by JMA, local governments (the majority of stations),
and NIED. Seismic warnings are sent out through multiple communication channels within 2 minutes after
the event for earthquakes estimated to be equal to or greater than 3 on the Japanese intensity scale. The
levels of response are scaled with the intensity of the earthquakes. A simple shake map of the predicted
timing and intensity of the earthquake is used for the forecasts and seismic stations are used for verification.
Currently, there is a project called the Tokai Earthquake Prediction Project designed to provide early
prediction of a possible 8 or greater magnitude earthquake in a region west of Tokai that would severely
impact the Tokyo region. The project is attempting to simulate pre-seismic strain rates 1 or 2 days prior to amajor event using a large array of strain gages in the region. If the strain indicates that an earthquake isimminent, this information is given to high level government authorities.
Tsunami Warnings. If the estimated height of the tsunami exceeds 3 m, a warning is given within 2 or 3
minutes of the seismic event. For estimated heights below 3 m, a tsunami advisory is given. JMA also
provides tsunami information for the Northwest Pacific region and to most Asian countries.
Volcano Information Service. There are currently 108 active volcanoes in Japan. They are monitored by
combinations of seismic sensors, TV cameras, and GPS monitoring (for large ground motion). Warnings
are provided if necessary. There are 5 levels of warning, with level 5 being the highest, meaning a large
eruption is imminent or underway and evacuation is necessary. JMA also provides volcanic ash advisories
to civil aviation for aircraft safety. JMA is one of only nine stations in the world offering such advisories.
7. Nippon Life Insurance Company, Marunouchi BuildingThis headquarters building of Nippon Life Insurance recently received an award for its energy andenvironmental savings. Its façade (the base of the building‟s front) corresponds to Tokyo‟s historic 31 mheight line with the main building office tower body set back. Seismic vibration control is by “w-pairMullions” installed in the exterior walls. These paired precast columns (w-paired mullions) are hinged attheir connections to the top and bottom structural beams with vibration control panels installed between the
granite precast columns. The building‟s seismic damping system is located in the top floor. The building is
not designed against terrorist attacks or for fire loads. During disasters occupants either descend to street or
ascent to the roof for evacuation by helicopters. Sunshine heat gain is reduced by auto blinds and mullions
and eves in the façade. Energy savings are through greater use of natural lighting and light control sensors.
The building achieved a 34 percent energy savings during 2006-2007 over the standard value calculated fora typical office building. The building‟s CASBEE rating is 3.2. The building was designed for a 100 yearlife.

339