Ownership in Cambodia
Review of process of preparing Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Masashi Nagasu
Ritsumeikan University

November 2004

Ownership in Cambodia
Review of process of preparing Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Table of Contents

1.

A Donor-driven Country?...............................................

1

2.

Why a Donor-driven Country?.......................................

1

3.

Strategy for Donor Management—“Leave the Matterto the Donors”…………………………………………

3

Management of Two Competing Donors—Processing
PRSP and SEDPII……..................................................

4

Consideration………………………………………….

9

References……………………………………………………

11

4.

5.

Ownership in Cambodia
Review of process of preparing Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Masashi Nagasu

This chapter reviews Cambodia’s strive for restoring ownership from donors, as the country
moves on to the development process after the reconstruction period. It focuses on the processof the preparation of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (the Cambodian version of
PRSP)—which was characterized as two competing and conflicting initiatives by two
Banks—and the government’s coping strategy for donor management. Building capacity for
donor management is the first challenge faced by Cambodia.

1. A Donor-driven Country?
Cambodia is a country heavily dependent on external assistance. An official of aninternational institution once described as a “donor-driven country.”1 This somewhat impolite
expression refers to the country’s dependence not only on external assistance funds but also
on foreign technical assistance in designing development policy, programs, and development
projects.
Cambodia has received a large amount of external assistance from a number of donors.
These include international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), theWorld Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), as well as bilateral donors such as Japan, France, U.S. and Australia. In
2001, the total amount of external assistance approximated US$243 million, corresponding to
38% of the government’s annual budget (MEF data). Japan, the World Bank, and the ADB are
the three largest donors in Cambodia. The external assistance covers both capital andtechnical assistance, as in the case of other recipient countries. Technical assistance usuallyrefers to technical advice to the government officials. But, here in Cambodia, the assistance islargely comprised of the provision of services substituting for those of government officials:
the preparation of laws and regulations, government documents and negotiation with donors.
That is, in Cambodia, the most of foreign advisors and consultants substitute or supplement
the work of governmental officials. As a result, many of development policies and programs
are conceived, prepared and proposed essentially by foreign donors in Cambodia. This is what
the above “donor-driven country” refers to.

2. Why a Donor-driven Country?
Cambodia’s heavy dependence on external assistance—not only in terms of funds but also
development policy and programs—comes mainly from its historical and political background.
Three issues are worth noting.
1

A UNDP study (2002) also notes that the situation in Cambodia would normally be described as a classic caseof donor-driven, and to a certain extent, inefficient, and overlapping use of resources. [UNDP 2002] Also, see
Godfrey, M. et. al. (2000).
1

First, since its independence from France in 1953, Cambodia experienced frequent, unusually
dramatic changes in its political and economic regimes: market economy under the Kingdomof Cambodia led by Prince Sihanouk from 1953 to 1970; market and war economy under the
Khmer Republic led by Lon Nol from 1970 to 1975; agrarian centrally planned economy
under Democratic Kampuchea controlled by Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979; Soviet-style
centrally planned economy under the People’s Republic of Kampuchea controlled by
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) from 1979 to 1989; liberalized centrally planned economy
under the State of Cambodia controlled by CPP from 1989 to 1993; and transition to a market
economy under the Kingdom of Cambodia led by coalition of CPP and FUNCINPEC (United
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) from 1993 topresent.[Kato et. al. 2000, see also Table 1]
It is not surprising that the government under each regime was unable to develop thenecessary institutions and human resources, due to frequent change in the political andeconomic systems. In particular, the total destruction of institutions and human resources by
Khmer Rouge left devastative impact over the country. The regime not only abolished market
mechanism, but also killed many citizens. They executed large numbers of educated civil
servants and professionals.[Kato et. al. 2000] This even now leaves large scarves in the

Table 1: Change in Political and Economic Systems in Cambodia
Era(Name of State)
Pre 1953
1953 – 1970
(The Kingdom of
Cambodia)1970 – 1975
(The Khmer
Republic)
1975 – 1979
(Democratic
Kampuchea)

Legal System

Political System

French based Civil
Code and judiciary
French based Civil
Code and judiciary

Under the FrenchProtectorate
Constitutional
Monarchy

French based Civil
Code and judiciary

Republic

Legal system
destroyed

All previous
systems abolished,extreme Maoist
agro-communism
Communist party,
central committee,
and local
committees
Communist party,
central committee,
and local
committees
Constitutional
Monarchy

1979 – 1989
(The People’s
Republic of
Kampuchea)
1989 – 1993
(The State of
Cambodia)

Vietnamese-oriente
d model1993 – present(The Kingdom of
Cambodia)

French based Civil
Code combinedwith common law
in certain sectors

Greater economic
rightsPolitical Power

Economic System

Held by French

Colonial type

Held by Prince
Sihanouk as Prime
MinisterHeld by Lon Nol

Market and thennationalization
Market, wareconomyKhmer Rouge

Agrarian, centrally
plannedCambodianPeople’s Party

Soviet-style central
planning

CambodianPeople’s Party

Liberalized central
planning

Shared between
FUNCINPEC and
CPP

Transition to amarket economy

Source: Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development, Toshiyasu Kato et. al., AsianDevelopment Bank, 2000, p6.

2

Box 1: History of Aid Infusion without Control
・・

When Cambodia started economic liberalization in late 1980s, multi- and bilateral donors used
NGOs as substitutes for Cambodian institutions to channel increasing humanitarian assistance toCambodia. One long-term expert of Cambodia’s development noted that “this served to shift
control of reconstruction process and agenda out of Cambodian hands to the donors and aid
agencies, and virtually excluded many Cambodians from participation in the process.”[Mysliwiec, E 2003]
The new government established under the 1993 Constitution operated in a fragile politicalenvironment where former conflicting parties formed a coalition government while the civil war
against Khmer Rouge continued along the Thai border. As a result, the government was not fully
prepared to take leadership of development cooperation at a time when donors were sending
hundreds of missions to Cambodia to develop their projects. Real commitment to coordination
among donors did not take root, and many donors have missed opportunities to tap in local
knowledge, experiences and institutions that Cambodians in fact had had in the pre-UNTAC
period. [Mysliwiec 2003]
Quoted from the Council for the Development of Cambodia [2004], pp.1-2.

society and vacuum of human resources. You find in the present government only limited
number of qualified officials of the generation who were at high education then. In addition,
the international embargo and enforced isolation of the country from the international society
stunted its development and ability to recover from the mass destruction wrought by the
Khmer Rouge regime. [Kato et. al. 2000]
Second, aid infusion during the post-war, reconstruction period has made the government
extremely reliant on donors. Between 1992 and 1993, the United Nations Transition Authority(UNTAC) served as the temporary government and held election. Such UN operation tocreate a new government led to massive assistance by the UN agencies and bilateral donors tosustain this newly-born government. From 1992 to 1995, Cambodia received US$1.72 billion
in UNTAC funds and US$1.3 billion in emergency relief and development assistance. These
are huge aid flows into a single country in a four-year period. [CDRI 1996] It is natural that agovernment has tried to learn the manner of its existence from those who provide basis ofexistence.
Third, the fragile political basis of the government compelled its employees to act
opportunistically not making decision by themselves and leaving the matters in the hand offund providers. The new government was that of coalition of CPP and FUNCINPEC, the twolarger parties, and for the first 5 years the top of the two parties shared the power as co-prime
ministers. Each ministry has had representatives from both of them as co-minister or statesecretaries. Therefore, it is safer for government officials not to make decision by themselves
and to leave matters in the hands of donors.

3.

Strategy for Donor Management – “Leave the Matter to the Donors”

As explained above, the government had not been equipped with adequate institutions andhuman resources when massive aid started to flow into the country. But, the government had
to deal with a number of donors to earn funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the3country. The donors were willing to provide lots of funds for the projects of this poor country
which had survived massive massacre by leftist extremists and long-period of civil war;
however, the funds would be delivered only when the government follows the practices thedonors consider appropriate. Unfortunately the government officials were not familiar withsuch practices. Furthermore, an official’s mistake in handling foreign-assisted projects could
be fatal for him (or her) to survive in the ministry in the fragile political environment. Under
such circumstances, the best approach is to leave the matter to the donors, those who
determine which are appropriate practices.
Thus, in Cambodia, foreign donors have conceived the ideas of most projects (of course basedon the needs formulated through consultation with Cambodian officials), proposed them to thegovernment, prepared them, and financed them. Only the involvement of the government has
been consultation made by donors from time to time and approval for the project before thefinal decision of finance. Therefore, in Cambodia the discretion of donors is much greater, andthat of government much smaller, than in other neighboring countries. Consequently, it is notthat the government decides which donor should finance certain projects, but that the donor(s)decide which projects should be financed, and design them. The government respects theinterest and initiative of donors, and let the donor process the project. Under this approach,certainly the government’s discretion is smaller, but the government can receive much more
funds because donors are willing to finance projects prepared under their initiative. As a result,reliance on donors in selecting and designing projects becomes the government’s strategy. In asense, this might be rational behavior by the government for “aid maximization.”

4.

Management of Two Competing Donors – Processing PRSP and SEDP II

As mentioned above, reliance on donors in designing projects has been a compelled strategyof the Cambodian government. The government adopted the same strategy for the preparationof a national development framework such as Five-Year Development Plans. Donors, inparticular international institutions, are strongly interested in sponsoring and taking initiativefor formulating such development framework. This is because the sponsoring institutions can
exercise significant influence over the direction and contents of the strategic plans, andconsequently the projects to be prioritized under the plans (including ones to be financed byother donors). In this regard, the process of the preparation of two planning documents—theSecond Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan 2001–2005 (SEDP II) and the Poverty
Reduction Strategy (PRSP)—are important examples. In the preparation of these two
documents, the government followed, as usual, the donor-reliance approach, by respecting thedonor initiative and not taking its own initiative in order to maximize the receipt of external
assistance. We will see below how the Cambodian government has handled the formulation of
SEDP II and PRSP.

Institutional Setting and a Variety of Programs and Plans
We will start by explaining the current institutional setting related to national development
planning.
The Ministry of Planning (MOP) is in charge of national development planning. In addition to
the preparation of SEDP, the important task of this ministry is the preparation of Public
4Investment Program (PIP), which is a list of candidate investment projects submitted by eachline ministry. PIP constitutes a part of the government’s documents submitted for theConsultative Group Meetings, on which basis donors examine and align their assistance. PIP
is attached to the national budget. The ADB has supported the MOP and provided technicalassistance to reinforce the capacity, including the elaboration of PIP.
The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) is in charge of the national budget. The MEF
organizes and implements the national budget with the oversight of Council of Ministers andthe Parliament. MEF is a powerful ministry because government funds, domestic or external
origin, become available for each investment project only when the ministry approves the useof the fund for that project. The inclusion of an investment project in PIP does not mean thatthe national budget (both domestic and foreign assisted) can be used for the project. In thelight of the power and importance of MEF, international institutions provided technicalassistance to this ministry, such as Technical Cooperation Action Plan (TCAP), Mid-term
Expenditure Framework Program (MTEF) and Priority Action Plan. Since MEF handles loanaid, the IMF, the World Bank, and the ADB have been particularly interested in supporting theministry. But, IMF is the most influential in terms of the number of technical advisors andlending operations directly related to the national budgeting.
The Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) within the Council for theDevelopment of Cambodia (CDC) is responsible for requesting foreign assistance, inparticular technical assistance and grants, and handling the relationship with donors.
Designated as partnership focal point within the government, the CDC/CRDB manages
annual Consultative Group Meetings and makes arrangements of the meetings and prepares
documents necessary to this end. More recently, the CDC/CRDB is involved in the issues on
harmonization of aid procedures. UNDP has assisted CDC as the center of aid coordination
and receipt in the government.
The above three organs of the government play important roles in national development
planning, implementation of development projects, and receipt of foreign assistance. Under
such fragmented institutional setting, coordination and cooperation among the three has notbeen good. Different organs deal with loans and grants. More fundamentally, they have threedifferent foreign donor guardians—the ADB (for the MOP), the IMF and the World Bank (forthe MEF), and the UNDP (for CDC/CRDB). Also they have three different programs or
instruments that dictate national planning.

SEDP II vs. PRSPThe Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) is a comprehensive national development
plan over medium-term, aiming at socio-economic development. The SEDP needs to bedeliberated and approved by the National Assembly. In 1996, Cambodia issued its first SEDP
(SEDP I) covering five years from 1996 to 2000. MOP has responsibility for preparing SEDP
with oversight from the Council of Ministers. Since MOP had limited capacity at that time,
substantial support was provided by ADB and UNDP in preparing SEDP I. The ADB
expatriate consultants did much of the writing, and the drafting was done in English. [WorldBank OED] SEDP II is the second version following SEDP I. ADB has continued to assist
MOP to prepare SEDP II by providing technical assistance. SEDP II focuses on poverty
reduction, reflecting the recent discussions among development partners. It also emphasizes
5the participation as a principle of preparation. [Royal Government of Cambodia 2002, p.2]
The PRSP is a document that describes a strategy aiming at poverty reduction in a country.
In 1999, the IMF and the World Bank (the Breton Woods Institutions: the BWIs) proposed
this new document. It was originally introduced to serve as a condition for debt relief under
the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. PRSP was intended to guidethe allocation of those resources freed by debt relief into poverty-reducing activities. Then, it
became requirements for providing the BWIs’ concessional loans. Furthermore, “PRSPs are
now envisaged as the centerpiece for policy dialogue and negotiations in all countries thatreceive concessional financing from the BWIs.” [Chavez Malaluan and Guttal 2002, p.2]
Therefore, Cambodia had to go through the PRSP process in order to receive concessionalloans from the BWIs and to maintain the relationship with the two institutions.
According to the World Bank’s guidelines for PRSP preparation, a PRSP is a document that
describes strategies which should be: (i) country driven involving broad-based participation;(ii) results-oriented focusing on benefiting the poor; (iii) comprehensive in recognizing themultidimensional nature of poverty; (iv) partnership-oriented involving participation ofdevelopment partners; and (v) based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction.
Recognizing the not-preparedness of many recipient countries to elaborate such a complete
PRSP, the World Bank and IMF allow those countries to prepare an Interim PRSP (I-PRSP)
outlining the country’s existing poverty reduction strategy and providing road-map for thedevelopment of the full PRSP. [World Bank 2004b]

Two Competing and Conflicting Initiatives
In late 1999, the ADB had already started assisting MOP in the preparation of SEDP II.
Being the leading donor for Cambodia and in the light of their support to the previous SEDP,ADB naturally considered it essential to sponsor and influence the coming overall
development framework for the country. On the other hand, since Cambodia is one of thepoorest countries and qualified for concessional loans of the BWIs, the two institutions
identified Cambodia as qualified for a PRSP initiative. [World Bank 2004a, p.6] In early May
2000, the government launched the PRSP process. At that time SEDP II preparation had been
already underway. [see Table 2]
PRSP and SEDP II have similar characters in many respects. Both provide overall frameworkfor development, aim at poverty reduction, and emphasize participatory process in their
preparation. Because of this duplication of the two initiatives, during Consultative Group
Meeting in Paris in May 2000, the government expressed preference for only single strategicplan. [NGO Forum on Cambodia 2002, p.9]
Apparently, coordination efforts were made between the World Bank and ADB, but theyfailed. Since SEDP is mandated by the national constitution, SEDP cannot be replaced by
PRSP. ADB insisted that SEDP II should be considered to be the Cambodia’s PRSP. On theother hand, for the BWIs, a PRSP, which has to be approved by the Board of the BWIs andwill be the basis of their lending operations, cannot be prepared under the control of any otherinstitution than the BWIs themselves2; it is extraordinary that ADB sponsors the preparation
2

The recent World Bank’s OED review suggests that the decision was made to launch the PRSP process inparallel with the preparation of SEDP II. The BWIs felt that the ongoing SEDP II did not provide a credible
6

Table 2: Timeline of SEDP II and PRSP preparation
Event
Joint letter of World Bank and IMF proposes I-PRSP schedule.

Date
March 2000

National Workshop was held to launch preparation of SEDP II.
Plan to introduce PRSP was announced at informal meeting prior
to Paris CG Meeting.
The government declared its wish for just one process at Paris CG
Meeting.
1st drafts of the I-PRSP were completed and circulated amongsome embassies and donor institutions
6th draft of the I-PRSP is circulated among donors and NGOs in
English8th draft of the I-PRSP was translated into Khmer and past by theCouncil of Ministers
World Bank and IMF boards accepted the I-PRSP

May 2000
May 2000

Key Actors
World Bank,
IMF
MOP, ADBWorld Bank

24 May 2000

The government

July 2000

MEF

August 2000

MEF

27
October Council of
2000
Ministers
January 2001 World Bank and
IMF
January 2001 MEF
5 March 2001 ADB, MOP
22March ADB, MOP
2001
31March ADB, MOP
2001
25 April 2001 World Bank,MOP

The I-PRSP was released in Khmer for the first time
1st draft of SEDP II was released to donors and NGOs in English
The SEDP II was presented at a workshop for government, donors
and NGOs.
2nd draft of the SEDP II was completed. Translation of the
document into Khmer began.
Workshop to launch the full PRSP was held. ADB suggested thatthe deadline for the SEDP II be extended to October. World Bankand IMF announced flexibility on the timing and content of the full
PRSP.
Tokyo CG Meeting urged the government to ensure consistency July 2001
between PRSP and SEDP II.
MOP distributed to donors and NGOs the 2nd draft of the SEDP II 23 July 2001
in English and Khmer, and requested comments.
SEDP II was approved by Council of Ministers
December
2001
Consultations for the full PRSP began.
April 2002

Consultative
Group
MOP

Council of
Ministers
World Bank,
MOP
1st draft of the full PRSP was released at the third National PRSP August 2002
World Bank,
WorkshopMOP
2nd draft of the full PRSP was discussed at the final National November
World Bank,PRSP Workshop.
2002
MOP
The full PRSP was submitted to Bank and IMF boards.
January 2003 The government
World Bank and IMF boards accepted the full PRSP.
February 2003 World Bank,
IMF
Source: The World Bank, OED Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Process – Cambodia Case
Study (combining Table 2. “Timeline of key steps in the SEDP/PRSP processes and WB/IMF Operations” (p9)and Annex 2. “Timeline of SEDP and PRSP preparations” (p35) with some modification of expression.

of a PRSP. It appears that the World Bank and ADB wished that Cambodian government
make decision (in favor of the World Bank or ADB, respectively). [NGO Forum 2001]
alternative to the PRS process and could not be retrofitted within the required timeframe to comply fully within aminimum set of requirements, including broad government ownership and NGO participation. [World Bank
OED: 25-26, 2004]
7

However, it was impossible for the government, which relies heavily on donors’ initiatives, tomake such a decision. The World Bank and ADB are the two leading donors in Cambodia,
therefore, the government could not be on the either side. No coordination or compromise
was made.
Two processes continued to parallel. With the ADB’s assistance, MOP and consultants teamcontinued preparing SEDP II and completed its English draft in March 2001. MEF started
preparing I-PRSP and completed it in October 2000. The World Bank held a PRSP workshop
in April 2001, and this was considered to be the formal start of preparation of full PRSP.
Apparently the World Bank and ADB had continued their efforts to coordinate the two
strategy and plan. But the workshop discussions revealed the failure of this attempt because
the ADB representative expressed in public strong dissatisfaction with the launch of full PRSP
process without ADB’s consent. The Finance Minister was embarrassed and asked for
coordination between the World Bank and ADB.
After this workshop, no news on coordination was reported for some time, but coordinationand negotiation among the World Bank, ADB and the government appeared to continue; bylate July 2001 it was reported that agreement was reached that: (i) SEDP II should becompleted by October 2001; and (ii) the full PRSP should be prepared using SEDP II as the
key building block [Royal Government of Cambodia 2002, p.8] and be completed sometimein 2002. [NGO Forum 2001]
Actual work was behind this schedule. The Khmer version of SEDP II was completed in July
2001, and SEDP II draft was approved by the Council of Ministers in December 2001, and by
the National Assembly in June 2002. [Royal Government of Cambodia 2002, p.8] As for full
PRSP (now renamed as the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS), the Council for
Social Development (CSD), an inter-ministerial body chaired by the Minister of Planning,
was appointed as the body responsible for NPRS, to be assisted by a General Secretariat(GSCSD), which was established in August 2001. The first draft of the NPRS was released inAugust 2002, and the second in November 2002. NPRS was presented and approved by the
Board of the World Bank in February 2003.3

Contents of SEDP II and NPRSThis paper does not intend to analyze and compare the contents of SEDP II and NPRS indetail, but a quick review of the two documents suggest that there is not much essential
difference in their contents, although the documents vary in their style and structure.
SEDP II has simple structure: consisting of main volume and annexes. The main volume isrelatively brief (50 pages) and contains abstract discussions and arguments. It consists of fourparts: Vision, Objective, Strategies and Policies. After describing a development vision of
Cambodia is “a socially cohesive, educationally advanced and culturally vibrant Cambodia
without poverty, illiteracy and disease” SEDP II defines national development objectives to
3

I-PRSP was coordinated by MEF, while SEDP II was prepared under the supervision of MOP. Later,
responsibility for the full PRSP was transferred to CSD, an inter-ministerial body chaired by MOP. [NPRS 2002]
But, it should be also noted that the SEDP process is managed by a different Under-Secretary in MOP with adifferent support group. Another group has been responsible for the monitoring aspects of the PRSP—the
Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Technical Unit (PMATU), assisted by UNDP. [World Bank, OED:11]
8

Box 2: Two Banks, Two Processes, Two Documents
The recent World Bank’s OED review contains the critical assessment of the Bank’s role in Cambodia’s
PRSP process as follows:
What is less obvious, however, is the relevance of the preparation of a PRSP document for Cambodia in
2001 and 2002. The PRSP was awkwardly timed in the Cambodian context. Work on the SEDP II(supported by ADB, added) had already started and by law had to be presented to Parliament within a
specified time-frame. Once it appeared that the time-frames would overlap, the PRSP became in effect arival strategy processes competing for the time and attention of the limited group of seniorpolicy-makers in Cambodia. Instead of working to ensure that the PRSP principles were applied
effectively over time, the main priority in Cambodia was preparation of a PRSP document. An
alternative approach would have allowed a significant start in all the key areas of the PRSP framework
and putting in place the building blocks for a properly owned PRSP document as part of the SEDP III
cycle. However, the perception of Bank staff was that given the demands of the PRGF this was not an
option. [p.11, OED]
Source: World Bank[2001].
Note: The title is taken from “Rapid Assessment of the PRSP Process in Cambodia: Two Banks, Two
Processes, Two Documents,” September 2001.

be: (i) economic growth; (ii) social and cultural development; and (iii) sustainable use ofnatural resources. Then, after emphasizing the importance of economic growth for poverty
reduction and macroeconomic stability, it enumerates priority areas to realize the development
objectives such as decentralization, and agricultural and rural development. Detailed
discussions and data are contained in annex volume (approximate 240 pages), which consistsof important background papers and sectoral analyses.
The NPRS has a different structure of discussions and arguments. It has seven chapters andrelatively short annexes: As SEDP II does, NPRS starts with describing a vision for poverty
reduction, which is the same as SEDP II; then, reviews the process of participation. The
document analyzes the poverty situations in Cambodia, presents priority actions for poverty
reduction, and discusses financial requirements for the actions and finally monitoring andevaluation. Compared with the structure of SEDP II, NPRS places poverty reduction as thecore objective and stresses the process of participation and monitoring and evaluation.
However, in terms of contents, there are no significant differences. Both documents refer tothe same vision and strategies, deal with most sectors with stressing poverty reduction, andenumerate almost the same list of priority actions. That is to say, using the same materials,
NPRS simply changes the order of the items of discussions and arguments and stresses
different points.

5.

Consideration

In spite of advocating ownership in processing the national plan and strategy, it is clear that
ADB and the World Bank have controlled the process. From the beginning, the World Bank
and ADB failed to respect the government’s wish to have a single process of poverty
reduction strategy. It is well known that a consultant team financed by ADB prepared the draft
9

of SEDP II. With regard to PRSP (with the exception for I-PRSP which was prepared by atalented MEF official), after reading the second draft presented for their comments, NGOs
and other donors suspected that there must have been major inputs from the World Bank or its
experts/consultants into the second draft of NPRS.4 This is because the second draft was
totally different from the first one, in terms of the structure of the document and the quality ofEnglish language. The simpler evidence of donor neglect of Cambodia’s ownership is that theoriginal text of both SEDP II and NPRS was written in English, not in Khmer.5
Also it was unfortunate that two similar initiatives went in parallel because of the rivalry of
the large donors. Indeed, this caused extra time and human resources of the government.
Ideally, the World Bank and ADB should have cooperated to produce a single national
strategy. However, in the real world each institution has objectives, principles, agenda andpractices of its own. It was impossible to have different institutions to act jointly disregarding
the different objectives, etc.
The problem is that ownership principle was advocated by these initiatives, in particular for
PRSP. PRSP is the initiative of the BWIs. It was proposed as a part of reform of the BWIs
when they were criticized and called for reform. To the recipients of assistance from these
institutions, PRSP is not a genuine initiative proposed by the recipients, but is rather theconditions imposed by the BWIs to access to their assistance (debt relief and new financial
support). Therefore, by nature, it is almost impossible to advocate ownership for suchinitiative. In particular, demanding ownership of such capacity-weak recipients as Cambodia
is very counterproductive. Any practitioners involved in development of Cambodia know thatthe government is still young and has weak capacity to exert ownership for such initiatives.
Campaigning ownership for such government with weak capacity tends to lead to pretenseownership and concealment of inability of the government to exert ownership. This eventually
results in ambiguity of responsibility for the result of initiative and neglect of need for
improvement of capacity.
Under these difficult conditions, Cambodian government has acted at best they can. With its
two largest donors competing and conflicting each other, the government cannot be on eitherside. What it can do is to respond to the requirements imposed by the two donors within thescope it can afford, and to make efforts to mobilize as much funds as possible from them. The
government has implemented this maneuver, and has achieved the goal. In prospect, however,
the government should insist on its position more clearly to the donors as its voice andcapacity increase. As declared in the current NPRS, “the next Socio-Economic Development
Plan and the corresponding NPRS will be merged,” and the government should takeadvantage of such arrangement to exert genuine ownership over poverty reduction andeconomic development policy and strategy.6 [Council for Social Development 2002, p.165]

4

Even OED Review suggests that NPRS was drafted at least partially by consultants financed by the World
Bank, and influenced by advice from the World Bank staff (World Bank 2004a, p12).
5
Language is an important issue in Cambodia. But, both the I-PRSP and the SEDP II were drafted in English.
The I-PRSP was drafted in English and a Khmer copy was not released to the public before the document was
passed by the Council of Ministers in October 2000. SEDP II was also drafted in English and a Khmertranslation was not released until July 2001. (NGO Forum 2001)
6
In this regards, the recent study by the Government-Donor Partnership Working Group (2004) finds
encouraging signs in a paradigm shift in the thinking and practices of development cooperation in Cambodia,
from a decade-long, dominant Donorship to a new National Ownership. These are particularly evident in the
education and health sectors.
10References

Chavez Malaluan, Jenina Joy and Shalmali Guttal [2002], “Structural Adjustment in the Nameof the Poor,” the PRSP Experience in the Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam.
Council for Social Development [2002], National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003 – 2005,
22 December 2002.
Council for the Development of Cambodia [2004], “Practices and Lessons Learned in theManagement of Development Cooperation: Case Studies in Cambodia,” prepared
for Government-Donor Partnership Working Group, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Kato, Toshiyasu, Jeffrey A. Kaplan, Chan Sophal and Real Sopheap [2000], Cambodia:
Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development, Manila: Asian Development
Bank.
McAndrew, John P. [1996], “Aid Infusions, Aid Illusions: Bilateral and Multilateral
Emergency and Development Assistance in Cambodia, 1992-1995.” Phnom Penh:
CDRI.
NGO Forum [2001], “Rapid Assessment PRSP Process in Cambodia: Two Banks, Two
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