Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (2021) 116–135

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp

Emotional acknowledgment: How verbalizing others’ emotions fosters
interpersonal trust
Alisa Yu a, *, Justin M. Berg a, Julian J. Zlatev bab

Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States
Harvard Business School, Wyss House, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163, United States

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords:
EmotionCostly signaling
Interpersonal trust
Emotional valenceInterpersonal relationships
Empathic accuracy

People often respond to others’ emotions using verbal acknowledgment (e.g., “You seem upset”). Yet, little is
known about the relational benefits and risks of acknowledging others’ emotions in the workplace. We draw
upon Costly Signaling Theory to posit how emotional acknowledgment influences interpersonal trust. We hypothesize that emotional acknowledgment acts as a costly signal of the perceiver’s willingness to expend personal
resources to meet the needs of the expresser. Across six studies, we found convergent evidence that emotionalacknowledgment led to greater perceptions of costliness, and in turn, to higher evaluations of trust. These effects
were stronger for negative than positive emotions because acknowledging negative emotions involved a greater
perceived cost. Moreover, inaccurate acknowledgment fostered greater trust than not acknowledging when
positive emotions were mislabeled as negative, but not when negative emotions were mislabeled as positive.
These findings advance theory on key dynamics between emotion and language in work-related relationships.

1. Introduction
Emotions are integral to the development of social relationships andthus, to the functioning of organizations (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; vanKleef, 2016). Social theories of emotions suggest that emotions provide
rapid insight into the goals and needs of others, thereby informing how
perceivers should respond (Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006, van Kleef,2009). In short, emotions are powerful communication devices. Given
our capacity to glean how others may be feeling based on theirnonverbal emotional displays (Ekman & Keltner, 1997; Fridlund, 1994),
people often face important choices about whether or not to explicitly
acknowledge the emotions they see others express. Consider thefollowing example. An employee has a meeting with her manager, inwhich she is berated for her slow progress on a project. She is feeling
distraught. When the employee returns to her desk, she takes a deepsigh. Two coworkers notice her emotional expression. One pauses for a
moment, and then goes back to work. The other acknowledges heremotions by saying “Hey, you seem upset.” We call this ubiquitous, but
potentially meaningful, response emotional acknowledgment—verbal
communication by which a perceiver signals the recognition of an expresser’s emotional display.
Despite the role of emotional sharing and responsiveness instrengthening interpersonal relationships (Greenberg, 2004; Reis &Shaver, 1988; Rimé, Finkenauer, Luminet, Zech, & Philippot, 1998),
surprisingly little is known about how verbally acknowledging others’
emotions affects relationships. The scant attention paid to emotionalacknowledgment is particularly noticeable when juxtaposed with thewealth of research on the psychological and physiological benefits ofusing language for processing one’s own emotions (e.g., Brooks, 2014;
Pennebaker, 1997, 2018; Torre & Lieberman, 2018; Wolf, Lee, Sah, &Brooks, 2016). Furthermore, research on active listening and partner
responsiveness typically focuses on responses to someone’s verbal accounts of their personal events (Jones, 2011; Maisel, Gable, & Strachman, 2008; Weger, Bell, Minei, & Robinson, 2014), yet responses totheir nonverbal expressions have largely been ignored. What are the risks
and rewards of explicitly surfacing our interpretations of others’
nonverbal emotional expressions using language? In this paper, we
advance theory on this largely overlooked question by examining how
emotional acknowledgment shapes interpersonal trust—a universal andcore pillar of well-functioning social relationships (Rempel, Holmes, &Zanna, 1985; Simpson, 2007).
We adopt the framework of Costly Signaling Theory (Zahavi, 1995)
to suggest that emotional acknowledgment is a costly signal that reveals
the willingness of a perceiver to allocate personal resources (time,* Corresponding author at: Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States.
E-mail address: alisay@stanford.edu (A. Yu).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.02.002
Received 21 May 2020; Received in revised form 2 February 2021; Accepted 4 February 2021
Available online 8 March 2021
0749-5978/© 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (2021) 116–135

A. Yu et al.

energy, and attention) to the emotional needs of an expresser (Dovidio,
Piliavin, Shroeder, & Penner, 2006). Specifically, we examine contexts
in which the emotions being expressed are neither caused by nor
directed at the perceiver, and in which the two parties already have an
established relationship. We hypothesize that individuals who
acknowledge others’ emotions will be seen as more trustworthy thanthose who do not, because acknowledgment may be costly and conflictwith their own interests to protect and conserve resources (Murray &Holmes, 2009). Furthermore, we hypothesize that acknowledging
negative emotions will be a stronger driver of trust than positive emotions, as acknowledging negative emotions will be seen as costlier.
Across six studies examining the perspectives of both expressers andthird-party observers, we found support for our hypotheses.
The present research offers important theoretical contributions.
First, whereas social theories of emotions predominantly focus on inferences drawn about the expresser (van Kleef, 2009; Keltner & Haidt,
1999; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994), we focus instead on inferences drawn
about the perceiver, based on their response to the expresser’s emotions.
We suggest that representing the influence of emotions as bidirectional,
rather than unidirectional, provides a more accurate depiction ofemotional sensemaking and communication. Second, by integratingsocial theories of emotions with Costly Signaling Theory, we introduce anovel theoretical perspective for understanding the role of emotions ininterpersonal relationships. Third, we complement research on labelling
one’s own emotions (e.g., Brooks, 2014; Wolf et al., 2016) by exploring
the consequences of labeling the emotions of others. Finally, we add toresearch on active listening and responsiveness, which focuses on responses to what a speaker states verbally in a conversation. Supplementing this perspective, the current research examines responses towhat an expresser displays nonverbally (Jones, 2011; Maisel, Gable, &Strachman, 2008; Weger, Bell, Minei, & Robinson, 2014), which may be
more ambiguous and therefore, potentially riskier to acknowledge.
Overall, our research sheds light on how the explicit acknowledgment ofemotions can be used as a powerful tool for shaping and understandingsocial relationships.

responsiveness. For example, active listening includes displaying
nonverbal involvement (e.g., nodding, eye contact), paraphrasing the
speaker’s message without judgment, and asking questions prompting
the speaker to elaborate on their story (Bodie, 2011; Weger, Bell, Minei,& Robinson, 2014). Similarly, responsiveness can be conveyed byproviding perspective on the situation, offering encouragement andreassurance, or validating the person’s effort or identity (Maisel et al.,2008). Generally, these responses lead to positive interpersonal evaluations (e.g., asking follow-up questions increases liking; Huang et al.,2017). However, research in these domains often makes an implicit
assumption that the listener responds only to what the speaker communicates explicitly and verbally in the conversation. In reality,
nonverbal channels also play a critical role in interpersonal communication. Emotional acknowledgment complements this body of work byfocusing on responsiveness to nonverbal displays. Because nonverbal
displays tend to be more ambiguous and difficult to decipher than verbal
remarks, perceivers may have greater latitude in how they choose torespond. For example, it may be easier to ignore a coworker wearing afrown, than a coworker who says, “I’m feeling really frustrated rightnow.” Thus, the decision to acknowledge others’ emotions may beperceived as riskier, but also more discretionary and volitional thanother potential responses.
Emotional acknowledgment is related to, but conceptually distinct
from, other emotion-relevant constructs, such as empathic accuracy(Ickes, 1993) and emotional understanding (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, &Sitarenios, 2001). Table 1 provides two dimensions by which to compare
these constructs: (1) whether the construct refers to an intrapersonal orinterpersonal phenomenon, and (2) whether the construct refers to an
ability or behavior. Critically, many of the constructs arising from theliterature on emotional intelligence focus on personal abilities (Mayer &Salovey, 1997). However, possessing the ability to decode and regulateemotions is conceptually distinct from the decision to act on theseabilities. For example, a perceiver may notice when an expresser starts
crying, and may accurately infer that the expresser is experiencing
emotional distress, yet choose not to intervene. Indeed, research suggests that empathic accuracy alone does not predict whether a partner
will be perceived as responsive (Winczewski, Bowen, & Collins, 2016).
Rather, empathic accuracy only leads to perceptions of responsivenesswhen coupled with high motivation to act compassionately toward
others. As such, studying responses to others’ emotions may shed uniqueinsight into the process of emotional communication that examining
personal abilities alone cannot.

1.1. Conceptualizing emotional acknowledgment in organizations
Whereas past research has examined emotional labelling, or verbal
appraisals of one’s own emotions (e.g., “I feel excited”, Brooks, 2014),
emotional acknowledgment refers to verbal appraisals of others’ emotions. Emotional acknowledgment is directed at the expresser and conveys information about the perceiver’s interpretation of the emotional
display. For example, in response to noticing a coworker’s enthusiastic
grin, an employee might acknowledge this coworker’s emotion bysaying, “You seem excited.” Emotional acknowledgment communicatesboth (1) the perception of an emotional expression (“I picked up on anemotion”), and (2) the content inferred from the expression (“Theemotion I perceived was excitement”).
Conceptually, emotional acknowledgment belongs to a larger category of responses that convey active listening and partner

1.2. Perception of emotional acknowledgment as a costly signal fortrustworthinessWe draw upon Costly Signaling Theory to explore the signaling valueof emotional acknowledgment. Costly Signaling Theory (Zahavi, 1995)
originated from the field of evolutionary biology, but has since been
adapted by psychologists to explain how people interpret costly behaviors that seemingly violate norms of self-interest. The theory asserts

Table 1
Constructs that relate to emotional acknowledgment.
Interpersonal

Intrapersonal

Ability

Behavior

Emotional management:
The ability to manage emotions and emotional relationships for personal and interpersonal
growth (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001).
Empathic accuracy:
The ability to accurately infer the thoughts and feelings of another person (Ickes, 1993).
Emotional Perception:
The ability to identify emotions through nonverbal emotional expressions (Mayer, Salovey,
Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001).
Emotional Understanding:
The ability to comprehend emotional information about relationships, transitions from one
emotion to another, and linguistic information about emotions (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, &Sitarenios, 2001).

Emotional acknowledgment:
An externally-directed communication by which the perceiversignals the recognition of an expresser’s emotions.

117

Emotional labeling:
A statement about one’s own experience of emotion (e.g., Brooks,
2014; Pennebaker, 1997, 2018; Wolf et al., 2016).

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (2021) 116–135

that it is difficult for people to ascertain whether someone has potential
as an ally, mate, or competitor because their underlying qualities areoften hidden (Smith & Bird, 2000). Consequently, people rely on
behavioral signals to infer these underlying qualities indirectly. The
theory suggests that the costliness of the signal helps distinguish those
who possess desirable qualities from those who lie about them because
presumably only individuals who can afford to bear the burden of thesignal would choose to engage in it. For example, adhering to strict
religious rituals is perceived as a costly signal and, thus, an indicator oftrustworthiness because presumably only the truly devout would be
willing to make the costly sacrifices (Hall, Cohen, Meyer, Varley, &Brewer, 2015). To this end, costly signals should convey higher-quality
information about the underlying attributes of the person sending thesignal.
Viewed through this lens, emotional acknowledgment may beperceived as a costly signal that reveals the trustworthiness of theperceiver. To be considered a costly signal, the behavior must be seen as“expensive” for the signaler in terms of personal resources (Smith &Bird, 2000; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). Responding to others’ emotions,especially in organizational contexts, may be viewed as costly. Perceivers have a finite pool of personal resources (time, energy, andattention; Hobfoll, 2002). When perceivers direct their scarce personal
resources toward the emotional needs of others through emotionalacknowledgment, others are likely to recognize that this effort may
come at the expense of perceivers’ own needs or goals (e.g., meeting anapproaching deadline). Specifically, perceivers may face tradeoffs between expending their personal reserve of cognitive, psychological, andemotional resources to advance their own goals, or attend to the needs ofthe expresser (Bono & Vey, 2005; Morris & Feldman, 1996; Zaki, 2014).
Furthermore, compared to everyday life, emotions in organizations canbe more difficult to interpret (DePaulo, 1992; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008)
because they are not always authentically expressed. Organizational
display rules prescribe which emotions employees should display for
their roles (Grandey, 2000; Hochschild, 1979; Van Maanen & Kunda,
1989), but these emotions may not reflect their internal affective states.
For this reason, verbally acknowledging these “noisy” emotional signals
may be seen as reputationally risky because it could expose a norm
violation or faulty interpretation of an expresser’s emotion (e.g., mislabeling an expresser’s emotion). To this end, we expect expressers (andthird-party observers bearing witness to the interaction) to view those
who acknowledge emotions as possessing a higher capacity to respondto others’ emotional needs.
By verbally calling on others’ emotions, emotional acknowledgment
can facilitate an open dialogue, providing permission for the expresser toengage in subsequent self-disclosure (Antaki, 1988; Rempel, Ross, &Holmes, 2001). When a perceiver says, “You look distressed”, not only
might this act imply a momentary resource investment (i.e., noticing theemotion), it also implies the perceiver’s willingness to invest additional
resources in the future (e.g., listening to the expresser’s explanation orproviding social support). Because nonverbal expressions tend to be
more ambiguous and more easily ignored, the decision to engage inacknowledgment may be perceived as more volitional, conveying theperceiver’s voluntary desire to understand and construct a shared
meaning of the expresser’s experience (Rossignac-Milon & Higgins,
2018; Weick, 1995). To this end, emotional acknowledgment may act asa catalyst for opening the emotional “floodgates”, licensing theexpresser to share their underlying needs. Because this process may
require the expenditure of scarce personal resources, emotionalacknowledgment should signal that the perceiver is willing to incur costs
for the sake of the expresser.
Insofar as emotional acknowledgment signals a readiness to accommodate and sacrifice personal resources, emotional acknowledgment
should advance the formation of interpersonal trust, a cornerstone ofhigh-functioning and high-quality relationships (Balliet & Van Lange,
2013; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Simpson, 2007). Although many
conceptualizations of interpersonal trust exist, we focus on a

benevolence-based definition: the expectation that an individual will
demonstrate care for the interests and welfare of the trustor (Holmes &Rempel, 1989; Levine & Schweitzer, 2015; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman,
1995). Past research suggests that trust often emerges when a conflictarises between the partner’s personal interests and the interests of therelationship, putting the partner’s true goals and motives to the test
(Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Holmes and Rempel, 1989). When a partner
voluntarily sacrifices their own interests to prioritize the relationship,
this behavior provides unambiguous evidence of the partner’s benevolent intent (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999), thereby
facilitating trust. Similarly, emotional acknowledgment may demonstrate a perceiver’s costly willingness to prioritize an expresser’s needs
over their own. In turn, emotional acknowledgment should increase
perceptions of trustworthiness (see Fig. 1 for visual of hypotheses).
Hypothesis 1. When individuals engage in emotional acknowledgment, they are seen as more trustworthy than if they do not engage inemotional acknowledgment.
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between emotional acknowledgment
and interpersonal trust is mediated by perceptions of costliness.
1.3. Valence as a moderator: the costliness of acknowledging negative vs.
positive emotions
According to Costly Signaling Theory, the costliness of the signal
should enhance the credibility of the signaler’s desirable qualities, andsubsequently incur greater benefits for the signaler. For example, Hardy
and Van Vugt (2006) showed that the most altruistic members in a group
achieve the highest levels of social status because they are seen as
bearing the greatest costs for their generosity to the group. Applying thissame logic, we expect seemingly costlier forms of emotional acknowledgment to be rewarded with greater interpersonal trust.
Specifically, we suggest that the valence of the expresser’s emotions
may influence the link between emotional acknowledgment and trust
because negative emotions often signal greater underlying needs, which
subsequently places higher social, cognitive, and affective demands on
the perceiver than positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001; Staw & Barsade, 1993; Zaki, 2014). Consequently, the decision of whether toengage in emotional acknowledgment may be more influential on perceptions of trust in the wake of negative than positive emotions. To
unpack this logic, we start by reviewing the evolutionary functions ofnegative emotions.
The expression of negative emotions alerts others to problems that
require attention and potentially threaten survival (Frijda & Mesquita,
1994). As such, negative emotions should subsequently recruit valuable
resources and responses from the community (Baker, McNulty, &Overall, 2014). Indeed, negative emotions communicate the unmet andheightened needs of the expresser and compel perceivers to engage inactions that alleviate or solve the problem (e.g., provide social support
or compassion; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). However, for perceivers,
responding to negative emotions may come at a price. Because negative
emotions typically signal a greater underlying need, addressing negative
emotions may be more demanding and “expensive” for the perceiver.
For example, attending to the negative emotions of others may require
the perceiver to engage in emotional regulation, which over time canbecome depleting and harmful to the perceiver’s own well-being(Grandey & Gabriel, 2015). Additionally, confronting others’ negative
emotions potentially obligates perceivers to help expressers, which may
require subsequent expenditure of personal resources (Zaki, 2014).
Furthermore, studies show that through contagion, perceivers often“catch” the negative emotions of others (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield,
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993), which can even increase the perceiver’s
own risk for depression (Rosenquist, Fowler, & Christakis, 2011).
Because negative emotions convey the heightened needs of theexpresser, and therefore make them potentially more challenging andpersonally costly for the perceiver, acknowledging negative emotions
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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (2021) 116–135

H2

Valence of Expresser’s
Emotions

Perceptions of Costliness

H3b
H3a

Emotional
Acknowledgment

Perceptions ofInterpersonal Trust

H1
Fig. 1. Theoretical model of hypotheses.

should be seen as highly diagnostic of the perceiver’s capacity to nurture
the expresser’s needs. Thus, the effect of acknowledging emotions ontrust should be stronger when responding to negative emotions.
In contrast, the acknowledgment of positive emotions may beperceived as less costly. Positive emotions are used to build and broaden
personal resources for the long term (Fredrickson, 2001). They
encourage expressers to engage in approach behaviors toward others,
which procure social resources for the future. However, the call to action
for perceivers is less immediate and clear for positive emotions (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998). Positive emotions largely arise in theabsence of problems, and therefore do not necessarily compel perceivers
to deliver a specific momentary response. For positive emotions, because
there are no pressing needs requiring immediate assistance, the decision
to respond may be lower stakes and therefore, less resource-depleting or
demanding. Furthermore, even though responding to positive emotions
may still require an expenditure of one’s own personal resources, doing
so may reap some personal benefits. For example, perceivers may“catch” the positive emotions of others, thereby elevating their own
affective experiences (Barsade, 2002; Morelli, Ong, Makati, Jackson, &Zaki, 2017). Research on capitalization suggests that the sharing of
positive emotions can strengthen existing social bonds (Gable & Reis,
2010). Because responding to positive emotions can potentially provide
benefits to the perceiver, the act may be perceived as more compatible
with self-interest than responding to negative emotions. Consequently,
the allocation of resources required to acknowledge positive emotions
may be interpreted as relatively “inexpensive”. Thus, althoughacknowledging positive emotions should increase trust more than not
acknowledging, we expect a weaker effect for positive, relative tonegative, emotions.

that emotional acknowledgment led to greater trust than non-emotionalacknowledgment. In Study 4, we show that the relationship between
emotional acknowledgment and trust is attenuated when perceivers areseen as acknowledging out of concern for their own reputation. In Study
5, we examine our hypotheses from a third-party perspective using
videos of two coworkers interacting in a breakroom. In Study 6, we
examine situations in which perceivers acknowledge an expresser’s
emotions inaccurately and test empathic accuracy as an alternative
explanation. See Table 2 for an overview of each study (i.e., study
purpose, sample, design, perspective, and hypotheses tested).
For the five experiments (Studies 2–6), we set a fixed rule prior todata collection to collect approximately 100 participants per cell andthen exclude any participants who failed the comprehension checks thatwere included in each experiment (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn,2011). See the Online Supplement for details on the exclusions andcomprehension checks, which showed that the manipulations wereeffective in each of the five experiments (Studies 2–6). Data and materials for all studies are available at: https://osf.io/dn3wh/
3. Study 1: Examining emotional acknowledgment and trust in
the field
This study examined the link between emotional acknowledgment
and trust in a field sample of healthcare providers working in two
intensive care units of a children’s hospital. As initial tests, we explored
the association between emotional acknowledgment and trust (H1) andinvestigated whether the relationship depended on the valence of theexpresser’s emotions (H3a).
3.1. Participants and procedures

Hypothesis 3a. The relationship between emotional acknowledgment and interpersonal trust is moderated by the valence of the expresser’s emotion, such that the relationship is stronger when theemotions expressed are negative as opposed to positive.
Hypothesis 3b. This moderation occurs because negative emotions
are seen as costlier to acknowledge than positive emotions.

As part of an organizational development initiative, all healthcare
providers in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) and the Cardiovascular Intensive Care Unit (CVICU) of a large children’s hospital in
California were invited to participate in this study. The study was conducted in two phases. The hospital sent the survey to a subset of employees in the PICU during the first phase (n = 92; response rate of
25.3%), and to all CVICU and remaining PICU employees during thesecond phase (n = 154; response rate of 42.3%). We capitalized on the
staggered rollout by administering a general measure of emotionalacknowledgment during the first phase and measures of negative andpositive emotional acknowledgment during the second phase. This
allowed us to examine the main effect of emotional acknowledgment
and the differential effects of acknowledging positive and negative
emotions, respectively.
Overall, we surveyed 246 healthcare employees. The employees inthe sample occupied several different roles: 54.5% were nurses, 14.6%

2. Overview of studies
Employing a diverse set of methodologies, we examine the relationship between emotional acknowledgment and interpersonal trustfrom the perspective of the expresser (Studies 1–4) and third-party observers (Studies 5–6). In Study 1, we surveyed a field sample of hospital
employees, providing preliminary support for the link between
emotional acknowledgment and trust in a high-stakes organizational
context. In Study 2, we provide causal evidence for our hypotheses using
an experiment involving work-related scenarios. In Study 3, we show119

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (2021) 116–135

Table 2
Summary table of all studies.
Study

Main Purpose

SampleDesignPerspective

Hypotheses Tested

12
3

To establish external validity
To find causal evidence
To compare emotional vs. non-emotionalacknowledgment
To examine moderation by reputational concern
To test hypotheses from third-party perspective
To examine the role of acknowledgment accuracy

N = 246
N = 374
N = 195

Field survey with hospital employees
Between-subject experiment using vignettes
Mixed-design experiment using vignettes

First-party (expresser)First-party (expresser)First-party (expresser)

H1, H3aH1, H2, H3a, H3b
H1, H2, H3a

N = 395
N = 541
N = 581

Between-subject experiment using vignettes
Between-subject experiment using video stimuli
Between-subject experiment using video stimuli

First-party (expresser)
Third-party
Third-party

H1, H2
H1, H2, H3a, H3b
H4, H5, H6a, H6b(outlined on pg. 33–34)

4
5
6

were respiratory therapists, 12.2% were physicians, 2.8% were nurse
practitioners, 2.4% were social workers, 3.7% were rehabilitation
therapists, and 9.8% occupied other roles. Most (79.3%) employees
worked in full-time positions, 18.3% worked part-time, and 2.4% had
other working arrangements. The majority (65.9%) worked day shifts,
27.2% worked night shifts, and 6.9% worked approximately equal
numbers of night and day shifts. Lastly, 82.9% worked weekdays andweekends, while 16.7% worked weekdays only. In line with the hospital’s wishes to increase participation by protecting the employee’s
identifying information, we did not collect additional demographic
information.

satisfaction (α = 0.91) was measured using three items adapted fromCammann, Fichman, Jenkins, and Klesh (1983; e.g., “I have enjoyedworking as a member of this care team”). Perceived stress (α = 0.59) was
measured using four items adapted from Cohen, Kamarck, and Mermelstein (1983; e.g., “I felt difficulties were piling up so high at workthat I could not overcome them”). Perceived team functioning (α = 0.71)
was measured using three items adapted from the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (2006; e.g., “My unit operates at a high level of
efficiency”).

3.2. Measures

To examine the association between emotional acknowledgment andinterpersonal trust, we used our sample from the first phase and conducted a series of linear regression models (Table 3). We found thatparticipants were more likely to trust coworkers when their emotions
were acknowledged, β = 0.59, SE = 0.09, p < .001. This relationshippersisted when we controlled for demographic variables, β = 0.63, SE =0.10, p < .001, and when additional controls were included for job
satisfaction, perceived stress, and perceived team functioning, β = 0.30,
SE = 0.11, p = .006. Consistent with H1, these results provide preliminary evidence of a relationship between general emotionalacknowledgment and interpersonal trust in an organizational context.
To examine the differential effects of positive and negative emotionalacknowledgment on interpersonal trust (H3a), we used our sample fromthe second phase. Using a series of linear regression models (Table 4),
we found that participants were more likely to trust coworkers when
their positive emotions were acknowledged, even after controlling for
demographic variables, β = 0.23, SE = 0.08, p = .004. However, therelationship did not persist when we included additional controls for job
satisfaction, perceived stress, and perceived team functioning, β = 0.12,
SE = 0.08, p = .12. Likewise, we found that participants were more likely
to trust coworkers when their negative emotions were acknowledged,
even after controlling for demographic variables, β = 0.34, SE = 0.08, p< .001. Moreover, this relationship persisted even when we included the
additional controls, β = 0.23, SE = 0.08, p = .004. When we added
positive and negative emotional acknowledgment to the same modelwith all covariates, negative emotional acknowledgment persisted as asignificant predictor of trust, β = 0.20, SE = 0.08, p = .01, but positive
emotional acknowledgment did not, β = 0.07, SE = 0.08, p = .36,
indicating that only negative emotional acknowledgment accounted for
unique variance in trust. These findings provide suggestive evidence insupport of H3a that acknowledging negative emotions has a stronger
effect on trust than acknowledging positive emotions.
This first study provides initial evidence in support of H1 and H3a ina high-stakes organizational context. However, the cross-sectional nature of this study precluded us from drawing inferences about causality,
and we did not test our proposed mechanism of perceived costlinessdirectly (H2 and H3b). We address these limitations in Study 2.

3.3. Results and discussion

Participants were asked to answer all survey items based on theirattitudes and behaviors during the past two weeks. The survey included
measures of interpersonal trust, emotional acknowledgment, and additional control variables. All items were rated on a 5-point Likert-type
scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”).
3.2.1. Interpersonal trust
Interpersonal trust (α = 0.78) was measured using a four-item scale
adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999): “My coworkers look out for what
is important to me”, “My coworkers would not knowingly do anything tohurt me”, “My coworkers are concerned about my welfare”, “My coworkers think my needs and preferences are important”.
3.2.2. General emotional acknowledgment
During the first phase of the study, general emotional acknowledgment (α = 0.88) was measured using a four-item scale: “When my coworkers notice my emotions, they will bring them up”, “When mycoworkers see that I am experiencing an emotion, they will mention it.”,“My coworkers do NOT refer to my emotions” (reverse-scored), “Whencoworkers see that I am feeling an emotion, they do NOT say anything
about it” (reverse-scored). The pre-registered validation of this scale canbe found in Appendix A.
3.2.3. Negative/positive emotional acknowledgment
During the second phase of the study, negative (M = 3.24, SD = 0.71,
α = 0.85) and positive emotional acknowledgment (M = 3.41, SD =0.69, α = 0.87) were measured using the following eight items: “Whenmy coworkers notice my negative [positive] emotions, they will bringthem up”, “When my coworkers see that I am experiencing a negative[positive] emotion, they will mention it.”, “My coworkers do NOT refer
to my negative [positive] emotions” (reverse-scored), and “When coworkers see that I am feeling negatively [positively], they do NOT say
anything about it” (reverse-scored).
3.2.4. Control variables
Based on recommendations provided by Becker et al. (2016), we
included three control variables that were empirically and theoreticallyrelated to interpersonal trust, our main dependent variable (De Jong,
Dirks, & Gillespie, 2016; Guinot, Chiva, & Roca-Puig, 2014): job satisfaction, perceived stress, and perceived team functioning. Job

4. Study 2: Experimental tests of H1-H3 from the expresser’s
perspective
In Study 2, we build on our cross-sectional field study using an
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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (2021) 116–135

Table 3Standardized OLS regression models for first phase of Study 1.
Dependent variable:
Interpersonal Trust
Emotional Acknowledgment
Role: Physician

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.59***(0.09)

0.63***(0.10)−0.01(0.36)
0.57(0.54)
0.06(0.31)
0.44(0.38)
0.36(0.24)−0.22(0.52)−0.27(0.33)−1.24(0.88)−0.19(0.26)−0.54(0.54)

0.05(0.09)
82
0.34
0.33
0.82 (df = 80)
41.65*** (df = 1; 80)

0.01(0.15)
82
0.41
0.31
0.83 (df = 70)
4.38*** (df = 11; 70)

0.30**(0.11)−0.26(0.30)
0.42(0.45)
0.24(0.27)
0.04(0.32)
0.21(0.20)−0.14(0.44)−0.35(0.28)−1.00(0.75)−0.18(0.22)−0.44(0.45)
0.33**(0.12)−0.16(0.12)
0.15(0.10)
0.09(0.13)
82
0.61
0.52
0.69 (df = 67)
7.39*** (df = 14; 67)

Role: Rehab. Therapist
Role: Resp. Therapist
Role: Other
Shift: Night
Shift: Both Day and NightDays on Duty: Weekdays only
Days on Duty: Weekend only
Full-Time Status: Part-Time
Full-Time Status: Other
Job Satisfaction
StressTeam Functioning
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

experimental design. Participants imagined themselves in a hypotheticalscenario with a coworker. We varied the description of how theparticipant was feeling at the time (either positively or negatively) andhow the coworker responded (either by acknowledging their emotions
or not). In addition to interpersonal trust and emotional acknowledgment, we also measured perceived costliness, thereby allowing a test of
our full theoretical model (H1-H3b).

talking about the report.” Next, participants answered questions about
their perceptions of this coworker and filled out a set of demographic
questions.
4.2. Measures
4.2.1. Interpersonal trust
Interpersonal trust (α = 0.88) was measured using adapted versionsof the four items from Study 1 (e.g., “This coworker is concerned about
my welfare”).

4.1. Participants and procedures
Participants included 374 individuals recruited through Mechanical
Turk (35.3% female; Mage = 37.08, SDage = 12.71). The sample was
12.0% African-American, 7.5% Asian, 71.1% Caucasian, 5.3% Hispanic,and 4.0% other. The experiment employed a 2 (valence of expressed
emotion: positive, negative) × 2 (emotional acknowledgment: yes, no)between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one offour scenarios, in which they imagined themselves interacting with acoworker. The scenarios were described as follows:

4.2.2. Perceived costliness
Perceived costliness was measured using a five-item scale that
captured potential costs associated with emotional acknowledgment in
the focal context (α = 0.96): “This coworker is willing to spend [attention]/[effort]/[time]/[energy]/[personal resources] on the relationship.” Specifically, we constructed these items based on previous
conceptual definitions of costliness in Costly Signaling Theory (Smith &Bird, 2000; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006), focusing on the forms of costlinessthat are relevant in workplace relationships.

You just finished a meeting with your boss, and it went very poorly [verywell].
You are feeling upset [happy].
Your coworker nearby is flipping through a report and then says to you, “Ijust talked to the team about the new deadline and they’re okay with it.”Your coworker looks up at you and pauses for a moment.

4.3. Results and discussion
4.3.1. Interpersonal trust
In support of H1, we found a main effect of emotional acknowledgment on interpersonal trust. Specifically, participants trusted theperceiver significantly more in the acknowledgment (M = 5.09, SD =1.06) than the no acknowledgment condition (M = 4.44, SD = 1.30), F(1, 370) = 29.27, p < .001, η2 = 0.07. Consistent with previous research

In the acknowledgment condition, participants then read: “Then,
your coworker says, “You seem upset [happy].” In the no acknowledgment
condition, participants instead read: “Then, your coworker continues
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Table 4Standardized OLS regression models for second phase of Study 1.

Positive Emotional Acknowledgment
Negative Emotional Acknowledgment
Role: Nurse Practitioner
Role: Physician
Role: Rehab. Therapist
Role: Resp. Therapist
Role: Social Worker
Role: Other
Shift: Night
Shift: Both Day and NightDays on Duty: Weekdays only
Full-Time Status: Part-Time
Full-Time Status: Other
Job Satisfaction

Dependent variable:
Interpersonal Trust
(1)

(2)

0.23**(0.08)

0.12(0.08)

0.63(0.44)
0.65*(0.28)
0.67(0.53)
0.26(0.23)
0.96*(0.46)
0.30(0.30)
0.42*(0.19)
0.04(0.37)−0.14(0.27)−0.14(0.22)
0.79(0.57)

0.59(0.40)
0.41(0.26)
0.41(0.49)
0.06(0.22)
1.05*(0.42)
0.12(0.28)
0.27(0.18)
0.10(0.33)−0.25(0.25)−0.23(0.20)
0.73(0.52)
0.30**(0.09)−0.03(0.08)
0.20*(0.08)−0.18(0.15)
151
0.31
0.24
0.88 (df = 135)
4.10*** (df = 15; 135)

StressTeam Functioning
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

−0.34*(0.16)
152
0.14
0.07
0.96 (df = 139)
1.93* (df = 12; 139)(3)

0.34***(0.08)
0.85(0.44)
0.73**(0.28)
0.76(0.53)
0.36(0.24)
0.89(0.46)
0.24(0.29)
0.49*(0.20)−0.11(0.36)−0.04(0.27)−0.16(0.22)
0.29(0.69)−0.39*(0.16)
146
0.19
0.12
0.95 (df = 133)
2.63** (df = 12; 133)

(4)

(5)

0.23**(0.08)
0.74(0.40)
0.48(0.26)
0.51(0.49)
0.15(0.22)
1.01*(0.42)
0.07(0.28)
0.34(0.18)−0.0005(0.33)−0.18(0.25)−0.23(0.20)
0.33(0.63)
0.26**(0.09)−0.06(0.08)
0.21*(0.08)−0.22(0.15)
145
0.35
0.27
0.87 (df = 129)
4.54*** (df = 15; 129)0.07
(0.08)
0.20*(0.08)
0.71(0.40)
0.51(0.27)
0.55(0.49)
0.16(0.22)
1.01*(0.42)
0.08(0.28)
0.35(0.18)
0.01(0.33)−0.18(0.25)−0.20(0.20)
0.33(0.63)
0.25**(0.09)−0.05(0.08)
0.20*(0.08)−0.23(0.15)
145
0.35
0.27
0.87 (df = 128)
4.31*** (df = 16; 128)

Fig. 2. Interactive effects of emotional acknowledgment and emotional valence on first-party trust perceptions (Study 2). Note: The depicted bars represent meanvalues of interpersonal trust, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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showing that positive emotions make people more trusting than negative emotions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), we also found a main effect ofemotional valence—participants trusted the perceiver more in the positive (M = 4.99, SD = 1.13) than negative emotion condition (M = 4.51,
SD = 1.29), F(1, 370) = 16.73, p < .001, η2 = 0.04.
In support of H3a, we also found a significant interaction between
emotional acknowledgment and valence on trust, F(1, 370) = 8.96, p =.003, η2 = 0.02, indicating that the effect of emotional acknowledgment
depended on the valence of the simulated emotion—see Fig. 2. Participants trusted the perceiver more when the perceiver acknowledged theirpositive emotion (M = 5.15, SD = 1.05) than when they did not (M =4.83, SD = 1.19), t(2 0 0) = 2.00, p = .047, d = 0.28. However, in thewake of experiencing negative emotions, differences in trust evaluations
were even more pronounced. That is, participants trusted the perceiverto a greater extent when the perceiver acknowledged their negative
emotions (M = 5.03, SD = 1.07) than when they did not (M = 4.00, SD =1.29), t(1 7 0) = 5.70, p < .001, d = 0.87.

hypotheses for Study 3 were pre-registered on AsPredicted.org (https://
aspredicted.org/i6tz7.pdf).
5.1. Participants, procedures, and measures
The sample included 195 participants recruited through Prolific(53.8% female; Mage = 31.47, SDage = 9.78). The sample was 7.2%
African-American, 14.5% Asian, 67.1% Caucasian, 6.2% Hispanic, and5.1% other.
This experiment used a mixed design, with valence of expressed
emotion (positive, negative) manipulated between-subjects andemotional acknowledgment (yes, no) varied within-subjects. Participants read the same scenario stimuli as in Study 2. However, at the endof the scenario, each participant read about two possible responses (i.e.,emotional or a non-emotional acknowledgment) from the coworker,
presented in random order:
Now, we’d like for you to consider two possible responses from yourcoworker:
Response 1: Then your coworker says, “You looked upset [happy] after
the meeting. How are you feeling about it?”Response 2: Then your coworker says, “It looked like the meeting went
poorly [well]. How are you thinking about it?”

4.3.2. Mediation and moderated mediation
Next, we conducted mediation analyses (Hayes, 2013) to test
whether perceived costliness mediated the relationship between
emotional acknowledgment and interpersonal trust (H2), and whether
this mediation was moderated by the valence of the expressed emotions(H3b). Using 5000 bootstrapped samples, we found a significant mediation pathway from emotional acknowledgment to interpersonal trust
through perceived costliness (indirect effect = 0.86, SE = 0.11, 95% CI= [0.66, 1.08]), which supports H2. We also found evidence in supportof H3b (index of moderated mediation = 0.28, SE = 0.10, 95% CI =[0.08, 0.48]). Specifically, the effect of emotional acknowledgment oninterpersonal trust through perceived costliness was stronger for negative (indirect effect = 0.54, SE = 0.08, 95% CI = [0.38, 0.69]) thanpositive emotions (indirect effect = 0.25, SE = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.13,
0.38]).
In sum, Study 2 provides causal evidence in support of H1-H3. Expressers deemed perceivers as more trustworthy when the perceived
costs of acknowledging were heightened (i.e., responding to negative
rather than positive emotions). Correspondingly, the effect of emotionalacknowledgment on trust through perceived costliness was significantly
stronger in response to an expresser’s negative than positive emotions.

Next, participants answered questions about their perceptions of the
coworker based on each of these two responses and then completed a setof demographic questions. We used the same items as Study 2 to measure interpersonal trust (αnon-emotional = 0.90; αemotional = 0.88) andperceived costliness (αnon-emotional = 0.95; αemotional = 0.92).
Finally, to complement our general measure of perceived costliness,
we also included three items capturing the specific resource costs thatparticipants may anticipate in the interaction. These items asked participants to compare how they thought the conversation would unfold if
their coworker engaged in emotional vs. non-emotional acknowledgment. First, we presented participants with a sliding scale ranging from0 to 30 min and asked, “How much longer (in minutes) would thiscoworker stay in a conversation with you?” Second, we presented participants with a sliding scale from 0% (minimal attention) to 100%
(maximal attention) and asked, “How attentive would this coworker bein the rest of this conversation?” Third, we presented participants with asliding scale from 0% (minimal effort) to 100% (maximal effort) andasked, “How much effort would this coworker put into the rest of thisconversation?”

5. Study 3: Comparison of emotional and non-emotional formsof acknowledgment
Studies 1 and 2 leave open the possibility that the results could be
attributed to the general act of acknowledgment, as opposed toacknowledgment of emotions in particular. In Study 3, we modified ourdesign to compare emotional and non-emotional acknowledgment. Thatis, we used non-emotional acknowledgment, rather than no acknowledgment, as our control condition. We predicted that perceivers who
engage in emotional acknowledgment, which signals openness toemotional self-disclosures from expressers, would be seen as moretrustworthy than those who engage in non-emotional acknowledgment.
Past research suggests that when people reveal information about theiremotions (as opposed to factual or descriptive information), they feelgreater intimacy and closeness to their listening partners (Laurenceau,
Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998). Indeed, emotional self-disclosures may
foster more social closeness than factual self-disclosures because emotions and feelings tend to be more central to one’s own self-definition(Bosma & Kunnen, 2001; Kristjansson, 2010). As such, to the extent
that emotional acknowledgment prompts and licenses emotional selfdisclosures, we expect emotional acknowledgment to be seen as costlier—and thus increase trust more—than non-emotional acknowledgment. Furthermore, to complement our measure of perceived costliness,
which captures the general willingness to expend future resources into
the relationship, we explored the specific resource costs that participants
anticipate will be expended in the interaction. The design, analyses, and5.2. Results and discussion
5.2.1. Interpersonal trust
To analyze these data, we conducted a 2 (Acknowledgment:
Emotional, Non-Emotional) × 2 (Emotional Valence: Positive, Negative)
mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. As predicted
in H1, we found that participants trusted the perceiver significantly
more in the emotional acknowledgment (M = 5.32, SD = 0.95) than the
non-emotional acknowledgment condition (M = 4.48, SD = 1.03), F(1,193) = 117.45, p < .001, η2 = 0.38. We did not find a main effect ofemotional valence—participants did not trust the perceiver more in thepositive (M = 4.93, SD = 0.08) than negative emotion condition (M =4.91, SD = 0.08), F(1, 193) = 0.01, p = .91, η2 = 0.00.
As predicted in H3a, we found a significant interaction between
emotional acknowledgment and valence on trust, F(1, 193) = 31.23, p =.00, η2 = 0.14, indicating that the effect of acknowledgment depended
on the valence of the simulated emotion—see Fig. 3. For the positive
emotion condition, participants trusted the perceiver more when theperceiver engaged in emotional (M = 5.13, SD = 1.09) than nonemotional acknowledgment (M = 4.70, SD = 0.96), paired-t(96) =4.23, p < .001, d = 0.43. However, for the negative emotion condition,differencesin
trust
evaluations
were
even
more
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Fig. 3. Interactive effects of type of acknowledgment and emotional valence on first-party trust perceptions (Study 3). Note: The depicted bars represent mean valuesof interpersonal trust, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

pronounced—participants trusted the perceiver to a greater extent when
the perceiver engaged in emotional (M = 5.59, SD = 0.74) than nonemotional acknowledgment (M = 4.26, SD = 1.05), paired-t(97) =10.50, p < .001, d = 1.06.

6. Study 4: Moderation by reputational concern
In Studies 1–3, we found that emotional acknowledgment increased
trust because the perceiver was presumably seen as acting in the interests of the expresser, rather than the self. However, reputational
concerns may also drive emotional acknowledgment, especially inorganizational contexts. In Study 4, we manipulate whether theperceiver has high or low motivation to engage in impression management (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Prior research suggests that people
make attributions based on the perceived motives of the actor (Abele &Wojciszke, 2014). When impression management motives are salient,
we expect that acknowledgment would still be seen as costlier than no
acknowledgment. However, the attribution that expressers make about
the costs may change. Specifically, expressers may believe that perceivers are willing to bear the costs of acknowledgment in part to serve
their own self-interest, not just to help the expresser, thereby weakening
the positive relationship between acknowledgment and trust. In sum, wehypothesize that the relationship between emotional acknowledgment
and trust will be attenuated when the perceiver is highly motivated toengage in impression management.
Furthermore, in addition to perceived costliness, we explore twoalternative mechanisms in this study: response importance andempathic concern. We consider the possibility that emotionalacknowledgment increases trust because, in the eyes of the expresser,
this response is more useful for having their emotional needs met. For
example, to the extent that expressers experiencing negative emotions
require greater social support and intervention, emotional acknowledgment should be a more meaningful response to the expresser because
it creates an impression that the perceiver is prepared to meet theirneeds. We also consider the possibility that acknowledgment increases
trust because it signals that the perceiver demonstrates empathic
concern, or the tendency to respond to others with tender andcompassionate feelings (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). Although
the pathways from emotional acknowledgment to trust are likely to be
multiply determined, we hypothesize that perceived costliness will be astronger mediator than response importance or empathic concern, andthat it will still remain a significant mediator even after controlling forthese other two mechanisms. The design, analyses, and hypotheses forStudy 4 were pre-registered on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.
org/if4ij.pdf).

5.2.2. Mediation
Next, we conducted mediation analyses (Hayes, 2013) to test
whether perceived costliness mediated the relationship between
emotional acknowledgment and interpersonal trust (H2). Using 5000
bootstrapped samples, we found a significant mediation pathway fromemotional acknowledgment to interpersonal trust through perceived
costliness (indirect effect = 0.67, SE = 0.08, 95% CI = [0.52, 0.84]),
which supports H2.
5.2.3. Anticipated costs in the interaction
As an exploratory analysis, we examined the specific resource costs
participants anticipated from coworkers who engaged in emotional vs.
non-emotional acknowledgment. Participants expected the coworker tocontinue the conversation longer when they engaged in emotionalacknowledgment (M = 10.12 min, SD = 6.17) than non-emotionalacknowledgment (M = 6.96 min, SD = 5.15), paired-t(1 9 4) = 8.48, p< .001, d = .611. Similarly, participants expected the coworker to
expend more attention when they engaged in emotional acknowledgment (M = 67.98%, SD = 24.06) than non-emotional acknowledgment(M = 50.46%, SD = 23.33), paired-t(1 9 4) = 10.01, p < .001, d = 0.72.
Finally, participants expected the coworker to expend more effort when
they engaged in emotional acknowledgment (M = 66.71%, SD = 22.46)
than non-emotional acknowledgment (M = 48.07%, SD = 23.27),
paired-t(1 9 4) = 9.75, p < .001, d = 0.70. In sum, when acknowledgment
was emotional in nature (as compared to non-emotional), participants
expected their coworker to expend significantly more time, attention,and effort.
Overall, these findings replicate the results from Study 2 and provide
evidence that emotional acknowledgment leads to greater levels of trust
than non-emotional acknowledgment, because emotional acknowledgment tends to be perceived as costlier for the perceiver.

1This analysis was conducted using a log-transformation of this variable toaccount for positive skew.

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6.1. Participants and procedures

6.2.2. Perceived costliness
Perceived costliness (α = 0.97) was measured using the same items as
Studies 2 and 3.

Participants included 395 individuals recruited through Prolific(49.6% female; Mage = 34.58, SDage = 12.13). The sample was 7.8%
African-American, 13.7% Asian, 65.3% Caucasian, 7.8% Hispanic, and5.3% other. This experiment employed a 2 (impression management
motive: high, low) × 2 (emotional acknowledgment: yes, no) betweensubjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
scenarios, in which they imagined themselves interacting with acoworker. The scenarios were described as follows:

6.2.3. Response importance
Response importance (α = 0.90) was measured using a four-item
scale that captured how participants viewed the significance of theperceiver’s response (α = 0.96): “This coworker’s response was[important]/[significant]/[meaningful]/[useful]”.
6.2.4. Empathic concern
Empathic concern (α = 0.87) was measured using the seven-item
scale from Davis (1980; e.g., “This coworker often has tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than him/her.”)

You were working on a presentation for work when your computercrashes. The changes to your presentation were not saved, so you have tostart over.
You are feeling angry.
One of your coworkers is sitting nearby.
[In the high impression management condition: This coworker knows thatyou need to fill out a performance review for them soon. Your performance review will determine whether they get a job promotion. Because ofthis, they have been acting in ways to get on your good side.]6.3. Results and discussion
6.3.1. Interpersonal trust
Replicating results from Studies 1–3, we found a main effect ofemotional acknowledgment on trust (H1). Participants trusted theperceiver significantly more in the acknowledgment (M = 4.26, SD =1.10) than the no acknowledgment condition (M = 2.92, SD = 1.25), F(1, 391) = 130.36, p < .001, η2 = 0.25. We also found a main effect ofimpression management: participants trusted the perceiver more in thelow (M = 3.72, SD = 1.38) than high impression management condition(M = 3.48, SD = 1.33), F(1, 391) = 4.24, p = .04, η2 = 0.009.
As hypothesized, we also found a significant interaction between
emotional acknowledgment and impression management, F(1, 391) =7.19, p = .008, η2 = 0.02, indicating that the effect of emotionalacknowledgment depended on whether the perceiver had high or low
impression management motives (Fig. 4). When the perceiver did nothave a salient motive to engage in impression management, participants
trusted the perceiver who acknowledged their emotion (M = 4.53, SD =1.00) more than the one who did not (M = 2.87, SD = 1.20), t(1 9 3) =10.52, p < .001, d = 1.51. However, when the perceiver was highly
motivated to engage in impression management, these differences wereattenuated. Participants still trusted the perceiver who acknowledged
their emotions (M = 4.00, SD = 1.14) more than the one who did not (M= 2.97, SD = 1.31), but the effect was significantly smaller, t(1 9 8) =In the acknowledgment condition, participants then read:In this moment, your coworker sees you and says, “You look angry. Did
something happen?” This coworker has never acknowledged your emotions before.
In the no acknowledgment condition, participants instead read:In this moment, your coworker sees you, but then goes back to doing theirwork. This coworker has never acknowledged your emotions.
Next, participants answered questions about their perceptions of thiscoworker and filled out a set of demographic questions.
6.2. Measures
6.2.1. Interpersonal trust
Interpersonal trust (α = 0.87) was measured using the same items as
Studies 2 and 3.

Fig. 4. Interactive effects of emotional acknowledgment and impression management motive on first-party trust perceptions (Study 4). Note: The depicted bars
represent mean values of interpersonal trust, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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5.93, p < .001, d = 0.84.

another control to compare against emotional acknowledgment:
directing the conversation to a topic unrelated to emotions (i.e.,
distraction). Past work on interpersonal emotion regulation suggest thatpeople can manage an expresser’s emotions by either facilitating
engagement or disengagement from the emotional situation (Pauw,
Sauter, van Kleef, & Fischer, 2019). Whereas emotional acknowledgment presumably facilitates engagement, distraction should facilitate
disengagement from the emotional situation. As such, we included a
distraction condition to compare the efficacy of an engagement anddisengagement approach. Additionally, the distraction condition facilitates a fairer comparison than the no acknowledgment condition, as theamount of verbal interaction in the distraction and emotionalacknowledgment conditions are more similar (Cooper & Richardson,1986). We hypothesized that emotional acknowledgment would increase trustworthiness more than no acknowledgment or distraction,
because engaging with emotions directly should be a costlier signal of
the perceiver’s willingness to help the expresser.

6.3.2. Mediation including alternative mechanisms
As stated in our preregistration, we conducted our mediation analyses only within the low impression management condition, whichmore closely resembled the context in our previous studies. Using 5000
bootstrapped samples, we found a significant mediation pathway fromemotional acknowledgment to interpersonal trust through perceived
costliness (indirect effect = 1.47, SE = 0.16, 95% CI = [1.16, 1.79]),
supporting H2. Furthermore, as expected, we found that when enteredinto the same model, perceived costliness (indirect effect = 1.19, SE =0.17, 95% CI = [0.87, 1.56]) was a significantly stronger mediator thanresponse importance (indirect effect = 0.08, SE = 0.08, 95% CI =[−0.07, 0.25]) or empathic concern (indirect effect = 0.31, SE = 0.10,
95% CI = [0.13, 0.51]). Finally, we hypothesized and found thatperceived costliness persisted as a mediator, even after controlling for
response importance and empathic concern (indirect effect = 0.36, SE =0.13, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.63]).
The findings from Study 4 suggest that the perceiver’s motives influence the interpretation of emotional acknowledgment. When theperceiver was highly concerned with his/her own reputation, the effectof emotional acknowledgment on trust was weakened, but did not fully
disappear. This was presumably because the act was perceived as more
self-, rather than other-oriented. Additionally, we found that empathic
concern, but not response importance, also mediated the relationshipbetween emotional acknowledgment and trust. However, perceived
costliness was a significantly stronger mediator than these alternative
mechanisms.

7.1. Participants and procedures
The sample included 541 participants recruited through Mechanical
Turk (38.4% female; Mage = 36.40, SDage = 10.24). Our sample was
25.0% African-American, 4.4% Asian, 63.5% Caucasian, 5.7% Hispanic,and 2.4% other. This experiment employed a 2 (valence of expressed
emotions: positive, negative) × 3 (emotional acknowledgment:
acknowledgment, no acknowledgment, distraction) between-subjects
design.
All participants read the same background story about Daniel and
Brandon, who were purportedly two employees working at a publishingcompany. Then, to provide context, participants were told: “You will see
a video of Daniel and Brandon’s interaction in the breakroom. Specifically, Brandon receives an email with some good [bad] news when
Daniel walks into the breakroom”. Next, participants were randomly
assigned to watch one of six videos (see Online Supplement), each
representing one of the six conditions.
To create the six videos, we hired two professional actors to play twocolleagues interacting at work. The actors were instructed to dress inbusiness attire and to thoroughly memorize and rehearse the script
before arriving on set. We recorded the videos in a workplace breakroom. All six videos start with Brandon (the expresser) eating lunch andchecking his email. As he reads his email, he either displays a happy or
angry emotional expression. Then, Daniel (the perceiver), walks into thebreakroom, and grabs his lunch. He sits down next to Brandon, looks at
Brandon, and pauses for a moment. In the emotional acknowledgment
condition, Daniel acknowledges Brandon’s emotions by saying, “Youseem happy [upset]”. In the no acknowledgment condition, Daniel says
nothing. In the distraction condition, Daniel redirects attention awayfrom the emotional expression by saying “Did you catch the game lastnight?” Each video was about 40 s in length. Following the video, participants were asked about their perceptions of Daniel and to fill out
demographic questions.

7. Study 5: Experimental tests of H1–H3 from a third-party
perspective
Thus far, the studies have demonstrated the potential benefits ofemotional acknowledgment on the expresser’s perceptions (i.e., firstparty perceptions) of interpersonal trust. However, solely examining
first-party perceptions of acknowledgment on interpersonal trust may
introduce confounds. Past research has documented the effect of various
emotional states on trust perceptions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Gino &Schweitzer, 2008). These studies find that emotions affect our cognition(Schwarz & Clore, 2007)—negative emotions, such as anger, decrease
trust, whereas positive emotions, such as happiness and gratitude, increase trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Indeed, in Study 2, we found amain effect of valence: participants trusted the perceiver significantly
more in the positive (vs. negative) emotion condition. As such, the firstparty perspective makes it difficult to disentangle whether the effects ontrust are due to emotional acknowledgment or the subjective experienceof the emotion. Additionally, first-party expressers may be particularly
sensitive to the costliness of emotional acknowledgment because theystand to receive direct benefits from the act. However, according to
Costly Signaling Theory, because emotional acknowledgment is anobservable response that signals important underlying qualities, thecosts of the act should also be discernable by third-party observers.
Moreover, the fact that third-party observers have little or no “skin in thegame” may make tests of the hypotheses from a third-party perspective
more conservative than a first-party perspective.
Thus, in Study 5, we investigated the relationship between emotionalacknowledgment and trust (H1- H3) from a third-party perspective to
mitigate these potential confounds and strengthen our empirical evidence. In particular, we hired two professional actors and created videosof two coworkers interacting in a workplace breakroom. In the videos,
one actor played the role of expresser, and the other the role ofperceiver. We created a separate video to represent each condition of theexperiment—the scene depicted in each video was altered to manipulateemotional acknowledgment and valence. Participants were randomly
assigned to watch and respond to questions about one of the videos.
Furthermore, in addition to no acknowledgment, we included

7.2. Measures
7.2.1. Interpersonal trust
Similar to the prior studies, interpersonal trust (α = 0.89) was
measured using a four-item scale adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999):
e.g., “Daniel looks out for what is important to other people”.
7.2.2. Perceived costliness
Perceived costliness (α = 0.95) was measured using adapted versionsof the five items used in Studies 2–4: “Daniel is willing to spend[attention]/[effort]/[time]/[energy]/[personal resources] on therelationship”.
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Fig. 5. Interactive effects of emotional acknowledgment and emotional valence on third-party trust perceptions (Study 5). Note: The depicted bars represent meanvalues of interpersonal trust, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

7.3. Results and discussion

significant difference between acknowledgment (M = 5.55, SD = 0.84)
and distraction (M = 4.57, SD = 1.32) for the negative emotion condition, p < .0001. In contrast, there was virtually no difference between
acknowledgment (M = 5.25, SD = 1.12) and distraction (M = 5.26, SD =1.12) for the positive emotion condition, p = 1.00. In sum, these results
support H3a, as acknowledging negative emotions was a more potent
driver of trust than acknowledging positive emotions.

7.3.1. Interpersonal trustFirst, we examined the effect of emotional acknowledgment andvalence on interpersonal trust. In line with H1, we found a main effect ofemotional acknowledgment on trust, F(2, 535) = 27.97, p < .001, η2 =0.09. Specifically, emotional acknowledgment (M = 5.39, SD = 1.01) led
to greater perceptions of trust than no acknowledgment (M = 4.47, SD =1.34), t(3 6 3) = 7.51, p < .001, d = 0.79, and distraction (M = 4.95, SD= 1.26), t(3 6 0) = 3.73, p < .001, d = 0.39. We also found a main effectof emotional valence, F(1, 535) = 4.34, p = .04, η2 = 0.007. Participants
trusted the perceiver more in the positive (M = 5.04, SD = 1.19) thannegative emotion condition (M = 4.83, SD = 1.34). However, the size of
this main effect was relatively small (η2 = 0.007), considerably smaller
than the equivalent effect size from Study 2 (η2 = 0.04). This makes
sense, as we would expect the effects of positive and negative emotion
on trust found in past research (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005) to be weakerfrom a third-party than a first-party perspective.
Furthermore, using a two-way ANOVA, we found a significant
interaction between emotional acknowledgment and valence on trust(Fig. 5), F(2, 535) = 7.85, p < .001, η2 = 0.03. Using contrast coding, weprobed the interaction by comparing the acknowledgment vs. no
acknowledgment, and acknowledgment vs. distraction for the negativeand positive emotion conditions. The effect of acknowledgment (vs. no
acknowledgment) on trust was significantly greater for negative thanpositive emotions, B = 0.59, SE = 0.25, t = 2.37, p = .02. Tukey-HSD
multiple comparisons revealed a significant difference between
acknowledgment (M = 5.55, SD = 0.84) and no acknowledgment (M =4.31, SD = 1.45) for the negative emotion condition, p < .0001. For the
positive emotion condition, the difference between acknowledgment (M= 5.25, SD = 1.12) and no acknowledgment (M = 4.61, SD = 1.12) was
significant but weaker than in the negative emotion condition, p =.0005.
Likewise, the effect of acknowledgment (vs. distraction) on trust wassignificantly greater for negative than positive emotions, B = 0.98, SE =0.25, t = 3.93, p < .001. Tukey-HSD multiple comparisons revealed a

7.3.2. Mediation and moderated mediation
Next, we conducted mediation analyses to test H2 and H3b. Using
5000 bootstrapped samples, we found a significant mediation pathway
from emotional acknowledgment to interpersonal trust throughperceived costliness for acknowledgment vs. distraction (indirect effect= 0.34, SE = 0.09, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.53]), as well as acknowledgmentvs. no acknowledgment (indirect effect = 0.77, SE = 0.10, 95% CI =[0.57, 0.97]). These results provide additional support for H2.
Next, we used moderated mediation models to test H3b. When
comparing acknowledgment and no acknowledgment, moderated
mediation was supported (index of moderated mediation = 0.55, SE =0.20, 95% CI = [0.17, 0.96]). The effect of emotional acknowledgment(vs. no acknowledgment) on interpersonal trust through perceived
costliness was stronger for negative emotion (indirect effect = 1.06, SE= 0.16, 95% CI = [0.76, 1.39]) than positive emotion (indirect effect =0.51, SE = 0.13, 95% CI = [0.25, 0.77]). These results support H3b.
When comparing acknowledgment and distraction, moderated mediation was also supported (index of moderated mediation = 0.79, SE =0.18, 95% CI = [0.43, 1.16]). The effect of emotional acknowledgment(vs. distraction) on interpersonal trust through perceived costliness was
significant for negative emotions (indirect effect = 0.77, SE = 0.14, 95%
CI = [0.49, 1.05]), but not positive emotions (indirect effect = −0.02,
SE = 0.12, 95% CI = [−0.25, 0.22]).
The results from Study 5 suggest that the effects of emotionalacknowledgment on trust posited in H1–H3 replicate when using evaluations of the perceiver from a third-party perspective. Participants
rated the perceiver as more trustworthy when they engaged inacknowledgment rather than no acknowledgment or distraction (H1)127

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because acknowledgment was seen as costlier (H2). Additionally,
consistent with Studies 2 and 3, we found that the relationship between
emotional acknowledgment and trust was moderated by the valence ofthe expresser’s emotions (H3a). The effect of emotional acknowledgment was stronger when the expresser displayed negative than positive
emotion, because participants perceived acknowledging negative (vs.
positive) emotions as costlier (H3b). Interestingly, in the case of positive
emotions, perceivers who engaged in distraction were seen as equallytrustworthy as perceivers who acknowledged the emotion. However, inthe case of negative emotions, distraction was less effective—participants rated perceivers who distracted as less trustworthy
than those who acknowledged the emotion directly. These results
highlight that third-party observers may be more vigilant of how perceivers respond to emotions in the wake of witnessing negative, as
opposed to positive, emotional displays. This may be because responses
to negative emotions, which come at a greater cost to the perceiver’s
self-interest, are more diagnostic of the perceiver’s benevolent motives.
Until this point, the language and design of our studies have impliedthat when perceivers acknowledged the expressers’ emotions, they areaccurate in their assessment of expressers’ emotions. However, people
differ widely in their abilities to accurately perceive emotions (Mayer &Salovey, 1997), and even people relatively high in emotional intelligence still make mistakes. Because we have only explored accurate
forms of emotional acknowledgment, it is unclear whether accuracy is anecessary condition to reap the benefits of emotional acknowledgment.
In Study 6, we explore this potential boundary condition by examining
how acknowledgment accuracy influences perceptions of trust. In sodoing, we address the possibility that our results were driven solely by
the perceiver’s ability to accurately infer others’ emotional states (Ickes,
1993), rather than the perceiver’s decision to acknowledge the emotion.

labeling them as positive), should signal a lack of ability or will toprovide for the expresser, even when the expresser’s needs are relatively
high. As such, inaccurately acknowledging an expresser’s negative
emotions should receive a greater penalty than inaccurately acknowledging an expresser’s positive emotions.
Hypothesis 6a. The relationship between emotional acknowledgment accuracy and interpersonal trust is moderated by the valence ofthe expresser’s emotion, such that the relationship is stronger whenthe emotions expressed are negative as opposed to positive.
Hypothesis 6b. This moderation occurs because negative emotions
are seen as costlier to acknowledge than positive emotions.
Our second goal was to explore whether empathic accuracy—the
ability to infer the thoughts and feelings of others (Ickes, 1993)—could
serve as an alternative theoretical account for our findings. Because
perceivers in our previous studies accurately acknowledged the expresser’s emotions, it is plausible that the relationship between
emotional acknowledgment and trust was driven not by the costly act
itself, but by the perceiver’s accurate identification of the emotion.
However, if a perceiver acknowledges an expresser’s emotions inaccurately, then the predictions made by costly signaling and empathic accuracy diverge, thereby allowing us to more clearly delineate themechanism. By comparing the effects of inaccurate, accurate, and no
acknowledgment, we were able to compare costly signaling against
empathic accuracy.
Our third goal was to test whether results held across different
negative and positive emotions, complementing the focus on anger andhappiness in Studies 2–5. Thus, in Study 6, we used a different pair of
discrete emotions: anxiety and excitement. We selected these emotions
because anxiety and excitement are comparable on arousal level, but
opposing in valence (Russell, 1980). Furthermore, because the behavioral and physiological manifestations of anxiety and excitement are
similar (Brooks, 2014), it would be more plausible for perceivers to
mistake one emotion for the other.

8. Study 6: Examination of the role of accuracy
In Study 6, we compare the effects of accurate, inaccurate, and noemotional acknowledgment. We used a similar paradigm and set ofvideo stimuli as Study 5, but we built on the prior studies with theintention of accomplishing three goals.
First, whereas our prior studies examined the decision to acknowledge (or not), here we also tested the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of
emotional acknowledgment. Overall, we predicted accurate acknowledgment would increase trust more than inaccurate acknowledgment
because accuracy signals greater attentiveness, thereby indicating awillingness to expend resources, as well as a greater capacity to provide
helpful support to the expresser. Following a similar logic, we also expected inaccurate acknowledgment to foster greater trust than no
acknowledgment, because inaccurate acknowledgment, although misdirected, would still signal greater effort by the perceiver (Goldstein,
Vezich, & Shapiro, 2014). Thus, we still expected perceived costliness tomediate the relationship between inaccurate acknowledgment and trust,
but we also expected the effects to be stronger overall for accurate thaninaccurate acknowledgment.

8.1. Participants, procedures, and measures
Participants included 581 individuals who were recruited throughMechanical Turk (37.6% female; Mage = 38.36, SDage = 11.92). The
sample was 10.0% African-American, 10.3% Asian, 69.7% Caucasian,
6.9% Hispanic, and 3.1% other.
This experiment employed a 2 (valence of expressed emotions: positive, negative) × 3 (emotional acknowledgment: accurate, inaccurate,no acknowledgment) between-subjects design. As in Study 5, participants were randomly assigned to watch a video of two colleagues
interacting in a breakroom at work. However, in these videos, Brandon
either shows anxiety or excitement. Daniel responds by saying, “Youseem anxious [excited]” in the acknowledgment conditions, or nothingat all in the no acknowledgment condition. Still shots of the videos areshown in Fig. 6, and links to the full videos are in the Online Supplement. We operationalized accurate acknowledgment as a match between the expresser’s emotions and the perceiver’s verbal
acknowledgment, and inaccurate acknowledgment as a mismatch.
Specifically, we coded acknowledgment as inaccurate if Brandon looked
anxious, but Daniel said, “You seem excited”, or if Brandon looked
excited, but Daniel said, “You seem anxious”. We used the same items as
Study 5 to measure interpersonal trust (α = 0.89) and perceived costliness (α = 0.96).

Hypothesis 4. When individuals acknowledge others’ emotions
accurately, they are seen as more trustworthy than when they
acknowledge inaccurately.
Hypothesis 5. The relationship between emotional acknowledgment accuracy and interpersonal trust is mediated by perceptions ofcostliness.
Consistent with the logic of H3, we expected the advantage of accuracy over inaccuracy to be especially strong when the emotion
expressed is negative (as opposed to positive). Inaccurately acknowledging an expresser’s positive emotions (by verbally labeling them as
negative), signals an eagerness and readiness to provide resources to theexpresser, even when the expresser’s needs are relatively low. However,inaccurately acknowledging an expresser’s negative emotions (by8.2. Results and discussion
8.2.1. Interpersonal trustFirst, we examined how the accuracy of emotional acknowledgment
and emotional valence influenced perceptions of trust. We found that thethree acknowledgment conditions (accurate, inaccurate, no) significantly
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Expresser displays excitement

Expresser displays anxiety

Perceiver acknowledges emotion

Perceiver does not acknowledge emotion

Fig. 6. Still shots from video stimuli (Study 6).

differed in ratings of trust, F(2, 575) = 29.62, p < .001, η2 = 0.09.
Consistent with H1 and Study 5, accurate emotional acknowledgment (M= 5.04, SD = 1.06) led to significantly higher ratings of trust than no
acknowledgment (M = 4.16, SD = 1.22), t(3 9 1) = 7.61, p < .001, d =0.77. In support of H4, we also found that accurate emotional acknowledgment led to significantly higher ratings of trust than inaccurate
emotional acknowledgment (M = 4.63, SD = 1.20), t(3 8 2) = 3.55, p <.001, d = 0.36, and that inaccurate acknowledgment led to significantly
higher ratings of trust than no acknowledgment, t(3 8 3) = 3.81, p < .001,
d = 0.39. In contrast to Study 5, we did not find a significant main effectof emotional valence on trust, F(1, 575) = 1.79, p = .18, η2 = 0.003.
Participants did not trust the perceiver significantly more in the positive(M = 4.67, SD = 1.17) than negative emotion condition (M = 4.55, SD =1.26), t(5 7 9) = 1.25, p = .21, d = 0.10. Given that the size of this main
effect was fairly small in Study 5 (η2 = 0.007), it is not surprising that theequivalent main effect was not significant in Study 6 (η2 = 0.003). As
expected, both of these main effects were much smaller compared to thatof the first-party perspective in Study 2 (η2 = 0.04).
Using a two-way ANOVA, we found a significant interaction between
emotional acknowledgment and valence on trust (Fig. 7), F(2, 575) =13.44, p < .001, η2 = 0.04. To test H3a in the same fashion as Study 5, we
conducted planned contrasts. When comparing accurate vs. no
acknowledgment, the effect of acknowledgment on trust was significantly greater for negative than positive emotions, B = 0.73, SE = 0.23, t= 3.19, p = .001. Tukey-HSD multiple comparisons revealed a significant difference between accurate acknowledgment (M = 5.29, SD =1.00) and no acknowledgment (M = 4.04, SD = 1.21) for the negative
emotion condition, p < .001. The difference between accurate
acknowledgment (M = 4.79, SD = 1.07) and no acknowledgment (M =4.27, SD = 1.24) was also significant but weaker for the positive emotion
condition, p = .005. These results provide additional support for H3a.
Next, consistent with H6a, the advantage of accurate (vs. inaccurate)acknowledgment in increasing trust was significantly greater for negative than positive emotions, B = 1.19, SE = 0.23, t = 5.13, p < .001.
Tukey-HSD multiple comparisons revealed a significant difference between accurate and inaccurate acknowledgment (M = 4.28, SD = 1.22)
for the negative emotion condition, p < .001. In contrast, we did not finda significant difference between accurate and inaccurate acknowledgment for the positive emotion condition (M = 4.97, SD = 1.07), p = .78.
These results support H6a.
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Fig. 7. Interactive effects of acknowledgment accuracy and emotional valence on third-party trust perceptions (Study 6). Note: The depicted bars represent meanvalues of interpersonal trust, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

As exploratory analyses, we also compared the inaccurate and no
acknowledgment conditions by valence. In the negative emotion condition, the difference between inaccurate and no acknowledgment was
not significant, p = .44. However, in the positive emotion condition,
inaccurate acknowledgment led to higher perceptions of trust than no
acknowledgment, p < .001.
In sum, these results suggest that accuracy mattered more in
response to negative than positive emotions. When negative emotions
were expressed, perceivers needed to acknowledge accurately in orderto reap a significant benefit. However, when positive emotions wereexpressed, perceivers benefitted from acknowledgment regardless ofwhether it was accurate or not. This is consistent with a costly signaling
explanation. When the needs of the expresser were higher, as was thecase for negative emotions, participants may have looked for costlier
signals that the perceiver was willing to allocate resources to theexpresser, and thus acknowledgment had to be accurate in order toincrease trust. However, when the needs of the expresser were lower, as
was the case for positive emotions, the less costly signal of inaccurate
acknowledgment was enough to significantly increase trust.
8.2.2. Mediation and moderated mediation
We conducted mediation analyses to test H2 and H5. Using 5000
bootstrapped samples, we found a significant mediation pathway fromemotional acknowledgment (accurate vs. no) to interpersonal trust
through perceived costliness (indirect effect = 0.80, SE = 0.10, 95% CI= [0.62, 1.00]). This replicates the results for H2 from Study 5.
Furthermore, we also found a significant mediation pathway fromacknowledgment accuracy (accurate vs. inaccurate) to interpersonal
trust through perceived costliness (indirect effect = 0.30, SE = 0.09,
95% CI = [0.13, 0.49]). These results support H2 and H5, respectively.
Next, we tested H3b and H6b. When comparing accurate and no
acknowledgment, moderated mediation was supported (index ofFig. 8. Additive effects of content and accuracy of emotional acknowledgment on third-party trust perceptions (Study 6). Note: The depicted bars represent meanvalues of interpersonal trust, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The interaction was not significant.
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moderated mediation = 0.54, SE = 0.18, 95% CI = [0.17, 0.89]).
Replicating previous findings, the effect of emotional acknowledgment
on interpersonal trust through perceived costliness was stronger for
negative (indirect effect = 1.06, SE = 0.13, 95% CI = [0.82, 1.32]) thanpositive emotions (indirect effect = 0.52, SE = 0.13, 95% CI = [0.26,
0.79]), supporting H3b. When comparing accurate and inaccurate
acknowledgment, moderated mediation was also supported (index ofmoderated mediation = 0.70, SE = 0.18, 95% CI = [0.35, 1.04]). The
effect of acknowledgment accuracy on interpersonal trust throughperceived costliness was significant for negative (indirect effect = 0.65,
SE = 0.13, 95% CI = [0.40, 0.89]), but not positive emotions (indirect
effect = −0.05, SE = 0.12, 95% CI = [−0.28, 0.20]), supporting H6b.

and anger for excitement and anxiety, respectively. This hints that therelationship between emotional acknowledgment and valence may not
be confined to specific emotions, but rather, may generalize acrossmultiple positive and negative discrete emotions.
9. General discussion
Despite the importance of responsiveness and using verbal languagein emotional communication, the topic of emotional acknowledgment
has received relatively scarce attention. We utilize Costly Signaling
Theory to posit that emotional acknowledgment increases interpersonal
trust by acting as a costly signal that demonstrates the willingness ofperceivers to expend personal resources to meet the needs of expressers.
We found convergent support for our hypotheses across six studies. Our
results suggest that costlier forms of emotional acknowledgment (i.e.,
acknowledging negative rather than positive emotions) increased trust
to a greater extent. When positive emotions were expressed, eveninaccurate emotional acknowledgment was better for fostering trust
than no acknowledgment. But when negative emotions were expressed,
emotional acknowledgment needed to be accurate to increase trust.

8.2.3. Examining empathic accuracy as an alternative theoretical accountFinally, we wanted to examine whether empathic accuracy could
serve as an alternative explanation. According to an empathic accuracy
account, accurate acknowledgment should lead to higher levels of trust
than inaccurate acknowledgment, regardless of emotional valence,
because perceivers are generally evaluated more favorably when they
are able to take the perspective of others (Goldstein et al., 2014; Ickes,
1993; Klein, 2019). However, our results suggested otherwise. Inaccurate acknowledgment incurred a penalty only for negative, but notpositive emotions. To shed insight into why that might be the case, we
recoded our manipulations to focus on the content of the acknowledgment itself (i.e., the words that the acknowledger used), rather than thevalence of the expresser’s emotional displays. According to a costly
signaling account, acknowledgment using negatively-valenced content(i.e., “You seem anxious”) should lead to higher levels of trust thanacknowledgment of positively-valenced content (i.e., “You seem
excited), even if the acknowledgment is inaccurate—acknowledgmentof negatively-valenced content should still imply an eagerness andwillingness to expend resources on the expresser. Therefore, by examining the content of the acknowledgment, we can distinguish the effectsof empathic accuracy from costly signaling.
To test this, we excluded the no acknowledgment condition because
it could not be coded for accuracy or content. Then, we examined how
the accuracy and content of the acknowledgment influenced trust perceptions (Fig. 8). As aforementioned, accurate acknowledgment led tohigher ratings of trust than inaccurate acknowledgment, F(1, 380) =28.41, p < .001, η2 = 0.03. However, acknowledgment using negativelyvalenced content (M = 5.13, SD = 1.05) also led to higher ratings of trust
than using positively-valenced content (M = 4.54, SD = 1.17), F(1, 380)
= 28.4, p < .001, η2 = 0.07. The interaction between accuracy andcontent was not significant, F(1, 380) = 0.79, p = .38, η2 = 0.002.
Overall, these results suggest that empathic accuracy is necessary,
but insufficient, in explaining our results. Inaccurately acknowledging
others’ emotions signals inattention, but inaccurately acknowledging
positive emotions (by saying, “You seem anxious”) may not incur apenalty because the perceiver is still demonstrating a willingness toprovide resources to the expresser, even if the expresser does not have aneed for them. On the other hand, inaccurately acknowledging negative
emotions (by saying, “You seem excited”) incurs a significant penalty
because the perceiver appears ill-prepared to meet the expressers’heightened needs. As such, empathic accuracy and costly signaling
appear to have additive effects on perceptions of trust.
By examining the role of accuracy in emotional acknowledgment inStudy 6, we found support for H4–H6, as well as additional support for
H1–H3, that bolsters our costly signaling account. Differences in trustlevels between acknowledging inaccurately (vs. accurately) was stronger for negative emotions than positive emotions. In line with ourtheorizing, we also found that acknowledgment containing negativelyvalenced content led to higher ratings of trust than acknowledgment
containing positively-valenced content, even when the acknowledgment
was inaccurate. These results suggest that empathic accuracy alone
could not explain our pattern of results. Finally, our findings wereconsistent with those in Study 5, even though we substituted happiness9.1. Theoretical contributions
This research makes key contributions to theory and research on
emotions and relationships in organizations. First, existing work on social emotions predominantly highlights how the emotions of expressers
affect the inferences drawn by perceivers (e.g., EASI; van Kleef, 2009).
Our investigation extends social theories of emotions by focusing on theinferences that are made about perceivers based on their responses to theemotion of expressers. We contend that this perspective is critical tounderstanding the role of emotions in social interactions and relationships. Existing social theories of emotions conceptualize the influence ofemotions as unidirectional (i.e., expresser → perceiver; van Kleef, 2009,2016). Building on this view, we suggest that emotional communication
requires sensemaking by both parties, and may be better conceptualized
as bidirectional (i.e., expresser ⇄ perceiver). We focus on this perspective by illuminating how responding verbally to emotions shapes
interpersonal relationships.
Second, we integrate Costly Signaling Theory with social theories of
emotions to elucidate the process by which emotional acknowledgment
shapes social relationships. This novel perspective illuminates why
perceivers reap asymmetric rewards for the acknowledgment of negative and positive emotions. Signaling a willingness to attend to others’
needs, especially if it comes at a greater personal expense, helps foster
the development of trust. Costly Signaling Theory sheds light on how
people infer relationship quality using acknowledgment and offers new
predictions in social emotions that diverge from existing theories, suchas empathic accuracy (Ickes, 1993) and self-verification theory (Swann,2012). These theories suggest that people seek information that accurately validates their thoughts and feelings, whereas our results suggestthat emotional acknowledgment can increase trust even when it isinaccurate (as was the case for positive emotions). Thus, Costly
Signaling Theory offers a new and valuable framework for understanding how people draw inferences about one another in emotional
communication.
Third, this research extends previous work on emotional labelingthat focuses almost exclusively on using language to express or manage
one’s own emotions at work (e.g., Brooks, 2014; Wolf et al., 2016).
Although interpersonal emotion labelling techniques are used in psychotherapy and clinical settings (Greenberg, 2004), our research documents the effects of verbally acknowledging others’ emotions onimportant relational outcomes in the workplace (i.e., interpersonal
trust). Furthermore, the asymmetric costs of inaccurately acknowledging negative versus positive emotions suggest that when perceivers
are uncertain about what emotions are being expressed, it may be
strategically advantageous for them to use negatively-valenced (“You131

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seem upset”) than positively-valenced (“You seem happy”) forms of
acknowledgment. This prescription stands in contrast to research onlabeling one’s own emotions, which suggests that relabeling negative
emotions as positive emotions leads to more favorable outcomes (Wolfet al., 2016). In this way, our research highlights the importance ofdistinguishing between emotional labeling at the intrapersonal andinterpersonal levels.
Fourth, we extend research on active listening and partner responsiveness by focusing on acknowledgment of nonverbal displays. This
complements prior research, which relies heavily on analyzing conversations, and thus, focuses predominantly on responses to what was
explicitly and verbally communicated by the speaker (Jones, 2011;
Maisel, Gable, & Strachman, 2008; Weger, Bell, Minei, & Robinson,2014). Our research highlights the importance of distinguishing between responses to nonverbal displays and verbal remarks. Because
nonverbal displays tend to be more ambiguous and diffuse than verbal
remarks, acknowledgment of nonverbal displays may be perceived as
riskier and more volitional, and thus a better indicator of the perceiver’s
benevolent intent. Whereas responses to verbal remarks are welldocumented, future research may benefit from organizing and classifying responses to nonverbal displays.
Lastly, we contribute to the literature examining how and whenpeople draw inferences about others’ trustworthiness in the workplace(Schilke & Huang, 2018; van der Werff & Buckley, 2017). By identifying
emotional acknowledgment as a previously unexplored behavioral indicator of trust, we heed the call by previous researchers to further
explore the role of emotions in trust formation (Schoorman, Mayer, &Davis, 2007). Whereas scholars have found positive associations between trust and emotional expressivity (Boone & Buck, 2003), positive
emotion (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), and situationally appropriate
expression of emotion (Kang & Schweitzer, 2020), we extend beyond therole of emotional states and expressions to examine the role of labelingemotions on the formation of trust.

be inaccurately acknowledged. For example, perceivers may misidentify
a specific discrete emotion (i.e., mistaking anger for disgust) or over- or
under-estimate the intensity of the displayed emotions (Klein, 2019).
Future research can examine whether various forms of inaccuracy
differentially impact trust perceptions.
In Study 4, we explore reputational concern as it pertains to theperceiver’s relationship with the expresser. However, perceivers may
strategically engage in emotional acknowledgment as a way to bolster
how they are viewed, not only by the expresser, but by third-party observers. For example, perceivers may choose to acknowledge in thepresence of others rather than in private. Similar to Study 4, we expect
public acknowledgment to be viewed less favorably than private
acknowledgment, because people may have difficulty distinguishingwhether the act was motivated by self- or other-interest. A promisingavenue for future research may be to explore how reputational concerns
involving third-parties affect perceptions of acknowledgment.
In our studies, we examine contexts where the expresser andperceiver already have an established relationship. However, past
research suggests that people are more likely to express and sharenegative emotions with friends and family (Fischer & Manstead, 2008).
As such, when a perceiver and expresser already have a standing history,
the normative expectation may be for perceivers to acknowledge theexpresser’s negative emotions. This may help to explain why we found agreater penalty for not acknowledging negative emotions than a reward
for doing so. However, if the expresser and perceiver are merely acquaintances or strangers, the normative expectations may shift such thatperceivers would not be expected to acknowledge negative emotions.
But if they do, we suspect that they might receive a greater reward for
acknowledging negative emotions than penalty for not acknowledging.
Future research can explore how the nature of the relationship maychange expectations around emotional acknowledgment.
Although our studies portray emotional acknowledgment in a largely
positive light, many contextual and individual factors may increase therisks associated with emotional acknowledgment. For example, organizations often impose display rules that encourage positive emotional
expressions and discourage negative ones (Hochschild, 1983; Van
Maanen, 1991). We suspect that in organizations with strong norms tosuppress negative emotions, acknowledgment of negative emotions may
backfire because it may be seen as insensitive or inappropriate, preventing the expresser from “saving face”. For example, if a coworker has
an inadvertent outburst of emotion during a meeting, it may actually bemore beneficial to feign ignorance than call greater attention to it(Elfenbein, 2007). Indeed, one study finds that employees with a higher
ability to “eavesdrop” on others’ negative emotions received worse
performance ratings from peers, presumably because people prefer tokeep their negative emotions hidden at work (Elfenbein & Ambady,2002). As such, unpacking organizational norms on emotional expressivity may be critical for understanding the influence of emotionalacknowledgment.
An expresser’s willingness to accept the perceiver’s interpretation of
their emotion may also heighten the risk of emotional acknowledgment.
Employees may feel ambivalent (Rothman & Melwani, 2017) or wear
expressions that differ from their internal feeling states (Hochschild,1983). As a starting point, our studies portray a simplistic view of an
expresser’s emotions—the emotions they display are congruous withhow they feel. How might the consequences of acknowledgment change
when expressers’ internal states and external displays are misaligned, orwhen they experience ambivalent emotions? We suspect that the
self-presentational goals of the expresser may be important to consider.
For example, if a coworker attempts to conceal their grief by looking
cheerful, perhaps acknowledging their negative emotions may lead tonegative consequences because it conflicts with the coworker’s
self-presentational goals. We also suspect that when expressers are unaware of their own nonverbal displays or internal feelings, they are more
likely to challenge the perceiver’s acknowledgment, potentially viewing
it as threatening or offensive. As such, future research may benefit from

9.2. Limitations and future directions
Our investigation into the relationship between emotionalacknowledgment and interpersonal trust can be strengthened in several
ways. First, our experimental studies focus on immediate judgments
formed about those who acknowledge others’ emotions. However,emotional acknowledgment can also foster trust, not only directly
through the act itself, but also indirectly through self-disclosure. Specifically, we theorize (but do not directly test) that when perceivers
acknowledge the emotions of expressers, it is likely to prompt theexpresser to disclose information about their internal affective states. As
past research suggests, engaging in self-disclosure of emotions may be
more influential for closeness and social connection than self-disclosureof facts (Laurenceau et al., 1998). Future research could examine theextent to which emotional acknowledgment licenses expressers to talkabout their emotions, and whether this emotional self-disclosure shapes
downstream perceptions of trust.
In our experimental studies, it is possible that when perceivers fail toacknowledge others’ emotions, participants infer a lack of ability to
encode others’ emotional expressions. Research suggests that perceived
deficits in emotional intelligence and empathic accuracy may lead tonegative social consequences (Elfenbein, Barsade, & Eisenkraft, 2015;
Zickfeld, Schubert, Seibt, & Fiske, 2017). As such, differences in trust
between acknowledgment and no acknowledgment may be attributed tothis lack of ability, rather than the decision to verbally call out theemotion. Future research can more explicitly delineate the effects ofnoticing versus acknowledging others’ emotions by exploring contexts
in which perceivers are able to make accurate judgments about the otherperson’s emotions but choose not to acknowledge it verbally.
The current investigation only examines one type of acknowledgment inaccuracy—perceivers mislabeling the valence of the expresser’s
emotions. However, there are many other ways in which emotions can132

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (2021) 116–135

examining how the preferences, goals, and abilities of the expresser
shape perceptions of emotional acknowledgment.
Finally, although we focus on emotional acknowledgment from theperspective of expressers and third-party observers, it is also important
to consider the factors contributing to a perceiver’s decision toacknowledge. Research suggests that people choose not to ask sensitive
questions because they (inaccurately) predict that they will make others
feel uncomfortable and harm their own interpersonal reputations (Hart,
VanEpps, & Schweitzer, 2021). As such, although acknowledging
negative emotions leads to greater increases in trust, perceivers may beless willing to do so because negative emotions are presumably moresensitive in nature. Future studies can examine the contexts and processes under which perceivers acknowledge others’ emotions.

acknowledging others’ negative emotions. Contrary to the view thatemotions should be downplayed, constrained, and concealed (Ashforth& Humphrey, 1995), our research highlights the value of acknowledging
emotions openly and explicitly at work. Moreover, our work suggeststhat expressers and third-party observers are sensitive to the capacity ofperceivers to attend to others’ emotional needs. This hints thatemotional acknowledgment may produce benefits beyond the focal
dyad—acknowledging others’ emotions may help build trust with thosewitnessing the interaction as well. Broadly, this research sheds new lighton emotional acknowledgment as a powerful informational signal thatshapes the construction and understanding of our social relationships.

10. Practical implications and conclusion

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding
agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Funding

Our research illuminates how emotional acknowledgment may serve
as a useful tool for individuals to build and strengthen connections withothers. Given the prevalence of emotions in everyday life, employees
and managers likely have numerous opportunities to acknowledge
others’ emotions in a typical workweek. Our research helps unpack thepotential benefits and risks of acting on these opportunities. Althoughemotional acknowledgment may be riskiest in response to negative
emotions, people also stand to benefit the most from (accurately)

CRediT authorship contribution statement
Alisa Yu: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Validation,
Investigation, Resources, Writing - original draft, Writing - review &editing, Visualization. Justin M. Berg: Conceptualization, Writing original draft, Writing - review & editing, Supervision. Julian J. Zlatev:
Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing - review & editing.

Appendix A. Validation study of emotional acknowledgment scale
We conducted a pre-registered study (https://aspredicted.org/qw2qc.pdf) to demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity of our emotionalacknowledgment scale, which was originally devised using our conceptual definition of the construct.
As stated in our preregistration, we hypothesized that emotional acknowledgment would show convergent validity with facets of emotional intelligence that are relevant to noticing and responding to others’ emotions (i.e., perception, understanding, and management of others’ emotions), as
well as empathy, warmth, interpersonal responsiveness, and agreeableness. We also hypothesized that emotional acknowledgment would show
discriminant validity with less relevant facets of emotional intelligence (i.e., use of emotions, management of one’s own emotions), as well as
emotional expression, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and competence.
Descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and zero-order correlations for the convergent and discriminant constructs are shown below. As expected, thecorrelations between emotional acknowledgment and the convergent constructs were relatively stronger (r’s ranged from 0.31 to 0.61), and correlations between emotional acknowledgment and the discriminant constructs were relatively weaker (r’s ranged from −0.07 to 0.44). There were,
however, two minor exceptions. Contrary to what we expected, emotional acknowledgment correlated relatively strongly with positive affect (r =0.44, p < .001) and use of emotions (r = 0.42, p < .001), but these two correlations were lower than all but one of the correlations for the convergent
constructs (EI – Understanding), which was r = 0.31. Thus, the emotional acknowledgment scale generally performed as expected.
Descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and zero-order correlations with convergent measures.

1. Emotional Acknowledgment
2. EI - Perception
3. EI - Understanding
4. EI – Managing of others’ emotions
5. Empathy
6. Warmth
7. Responsiveness8. Agreeableness

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

4.62
4.73
4.59
4.71
4.74
5.48
5.02
4.95

1.35
0.93
1.35
1.21
0.88
1.09
1.13
1.23

(0.90)
0.48***
0.31***
0.49***
0.60***
0.49***
0.53***
0.55***(0.68)
0.49***
0.59***
0.63***
0.54***
0.58***
0.56***(0.92)
0.51***
0.48***
0.47***
0.52***
0.46***(0.84)
0.70***
0.69***
0.70***
0.69***(0.90)
0.74***
0.69***
0.79***(0.86)
0.78***
0.71***(0.95)
0.70***(0.86)

6

7

8(0.82)
0.56***−0.30***(0.76)−0.33***(0.72)

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and zero-order correlations with discriminant measures.
1. Emotional Acknowledgment
2. EI – Use of Emotions
3. EI - Managing one’s own emotions
4. Positive Affect
5. Negative Affect
6. Competence
7. Conscientiousness
8. Neuroticism

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

M

SD

1

2

4.62
4.08
4.85
5.22
2.75
5.58
4.99
3.24

1.35
0.84
1.18
0.87
1.06
0.93
1.14
1.10

(0.90)
0.42***
0.14**
0.44***−0.13**
0.21***
0.14**−0.07(0.46)−0.03
0.25***
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.01

133

3

4

5

(0.81)
0.36***−0.58***
0.45***
0.45***−0.64***(0.87)−0.30***
0.61***
0.49***−0.22***(0.90)−0.43***−0.43***
0.61***

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 164 (2021) 116–135

Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.02.002.

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