Contemporary

India Forum
Quarterly Review

No.38

現代インド・フォーラム2018 年 夏季号

https://www. japan-india. com/

特集 インド太平洋
インド太平洋海域の含意とその将来―インドの視点―
Implication of the Maritime Area of the Indo-Pacific and its Future―An Indian Perspective―
アビジート・シン（オブザーバー研究財団（ニューデリー）上席研究員・海洋政策研究部門長）
Abhijit Singh (Senior Fellow and Head, Maritime Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundationin New Delhi)

日米豪印 4 カ国枠組みの現状と今後―「安全保障のダイヤモンド」構想はどこまで実現したか―
The Future of Indo-Pacific Cooperation:
Could we see the emergence of a “security diamond”?
長尾 賢（ハドソン研究所 ビジティング・フェロー）
Dr. Satoru Nagao (Visiting Fellow at Hudson Institute)

インド太平洋時代の日印関係
India-Japan Relations in the Age of Indo-Pacific
ティトリー・バス（防衛研究分析研究所（ニューデリー）研究員）

Dr. Titli Basu (Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in New Delhi)

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第 38 号2018 年 夏季号

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Implication of the Maritime Area of the Indo-Pacific and its Future―An Indian Perspective―
インド太平洋海域の含意とその将来―インドの視点―
Senior Fellow and Head, Maritime Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundationin New Delhi
オブザーバー研究財団（ニューデリー）上席研究員・海洋政策研究部門長

Abhijit Singh
アビジート・シン

Abstract: The increasing mention of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ in geopolitical discourse
today is evidence of the growing prominence of the region as a strategic entity. While
the term signifies a fusion of Asia’s two large oceanic littorals -- both politicallysensitive and economically vibrant spaces –its regional dynamics are likely to beaffected by the future trajectory of political and military interactions between the
key maritime powers. Going forward, like-minded and law-abiding Indo-Pacificstates will need to act as a community of stakeholders, jointly tackling the region’s
emerging threats, with particular attention to challenges arising from a lack ofstrategic trust.

【要旨】 今日の地政学の論考で「インド太平洋」が盛んに言及されるようになったことは、戦略的存在としてこの海域が持つ高まる存在感の証左である。本用語はアジア
における二つの大洋沿岸地域の融合―政治的にデリケートで経済的に活況を呈している空間―を意味する一方、地域的な力学は主要海洋大国間の政治的・軍事的な相互作用の将来的な方向性によって左右されるように見える。今後を展望すれば、志を同じくする遵法的なインド太平洋諸国は、戦略的信頼性の欠如から問題が生じるということに特に留意しつつ、地域で出現しつつある脅威に対しては、利害当事国の共同体として、協働して取り組むことが求められる。

2

I.

Introduction
Over the past few years, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ has entered the strategic discourse

as a substitute for the more established term ‘Asia-Pacific’. Defined as an integrated
strategic system that best captures the shift in power and influence from the West to
the East, the concept has dominated strategic debates and discussions, gaining
rapidly in currency and acceptance. While the term’s strategic context andunderlying logic remains a matter of debate, |many Indian analysts and policy
makers have embraced the idea, albeit with qualifying caveats.1
For a significant section of India’s strategic community, the Indo-Pacificrepresents a theatre of great-power competition, witnessing the rise of traditionaland non-traditional maritime security challenges. Besides issues of disputed
maritime territory, contested sovereignty and resources, the region is beset withirregular challenges like piracy, terrorism, gunrunning, illegal fishing, trafficking,global warming and natural disasters. Many of these threats have a transnational
nature, where dynamics in one part of the system influence events in another,necessitating integrated operational plans and strategic relationships between thevarious stakeholders.
At its core, however, the “Indo-Pacific” concept symbolizes a geopoliticalconvergence of two strategic subsystems – the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.2
It implicates a developing security dynamic in which future Asian geopolitics willplay out in the integrated Eastern Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.
Increasingly, these interactions will be mediated by developments in the continent’s
littorals, a locus of critical trade routes for the transfer of natural resources that fuelmajor regional economies, and an area where more than half the world’s population
resides.
Many of Asia’s major maritime powers have recognized the importance of the
Indo-Pacific. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first to espouse theconcept when he spoke of the “confluence of the two oceans” during an address to a
joint session of India’s parliament in Oct 2007.3“The Pacific and the Indian Oceans
are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity” hesaid, “a broader Asia that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning totake on a distinct form.” More recently, Abe has spoken avidly of his vision of a “freeand open Indo-Pacific”, and of his intension to assist many Southeast Asian states in3

building up their defensive capabilities. Australia, meanwhile, has become one of
the first to officially recognize the Indo-Pacific as a valid political construct, using it
as a geopolitical frame of reference its 2016 Defense White paper and 2017 Foreign
Policy White Paper.4

II. A New Strategic System for Security, Stability andProsperity
While the Indo-Pacific has been in discussion for over a decade, it is US
President Donald Trump who has brought increased attention to the idea by
positing it as a strategic frame of reference for security and stability in Asia. During
his maiden Asia trip in November 2017, President Trump repeatedly referred to the“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in his speeches, describing it as a region whereindependent nations could “thrive in freedom and peace” and all states “play by therules.”5 Not surprisingly, many skeptical observers saw it as a calculated effort tocounter China’s ever-expanding clout through a maritime alliance with Japan,
Australia and India.
Others saw it as heartening that President Trump’s Indo-Pacific blueprint
harped on a rules-based order, giving particular attention to security ties withdemocratic powers, particularly India, which many in Washington regard as a
strategic lynchpin in the Indian Ocean. In a defining speech on India-US relations,at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in October, Rex
Tillerson, the US Secretary Of State, spoke of the U.S. elevation in ties with India aspart of an effort to shore up security in the Indo-Pacific region.6
Senior U.S. Administration officials say a key consideration in legitimizing
the Indo-Pacific’s official usage was to highlight India’s importance to Asia
geopolitics. Not only does the concept recognize the rise of India, it confers New
Delhi central status in the strategic affairs of South and Southeast Asia.7 That the
popularity of the Indo-Pacific terminology has coincided with the growth of India’s
economic and strategic weight, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statedambition to translate the ‘Look East policy’ into one of ‘Act East’, involving a greater
Indian presence and influence east of Malacca, has only given US stated objectives
greater credibility among Indian maritime analysts.

4

1.

China and the Indo-PacificEqually important to the Indo-Pacific discussion is China’s growing interestsand expanding presence in the integrated littorals. Far from excluding China fromthe regional order, observers say the Indo-Pacific highlights the expansion ofChina’s interests, diplomacy and strategic reach into the Indian Ocean. Advocates of
the concept say it is not at all about excluding or downplaying Asia or any particular
Asian country, such as China. It is, in fact, a reminder that the international
sea-lanes of the South China Sea are central to the regional economic and strategic
system, and therefore most certainly every nation’s business.8
Moreover, with over 80 per cent of China’s oil imports being transported
across the Indian Ocean, with one million of its citizens now said to be living or
working in Africa (where it is also a principal foreign investor) and a growing naval
presence in the Indian Ocean, including a permanent military facility in Djibouti, it
is China, and not India, that is seeming to be the quintessential Indo-Pacific power.
Indeed, many observers say Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road, aimed at creating a
network of China-funded ports in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, isnothing but an Indo-Pacific vision with Chinese characteristics.9
Yet, many Chinese policy thinkers believe the term is a not-so-subtle code for
China-containment.10 Commenting on President Trump’s repeated invocation of the
Indo-Pacific, during his recent visit, China’s Global Times said that the conceptreflects an alliance mindset aimed at countering Chinese influence through theformation of an “Asian-NATO”. 11 The reference is presumably to the recently
revived Quadrilateral grouping comprising India, Japan, Australia and the US that
met on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila in 2017 to discuss ways ofenhancing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific space.
Indeed, the expansion of China’s Belt and Road (B&R) initiative inmaritime-Asia and China’s growing role in global governance has been a source ofgrowing concern for Indo-Pacific powers. But it is Beijing’s rising ability shape theinternational order that has been driving the allied Indo-Pacific strategy. Not
surprisingly,

Westernanalystssee

China-centric

infrastructureinAsian-African littorals, as part of an ambitious Chinese Indo-Pacific initiative.

5

the

2.

A Nexus of Security Challenges
As things stand, the Indo-Pacific region is confronted by significant security

and economic challenges. In the maritime domain, the portents are clearly
discernable. Regional states today are confronted with both conventional andirregular threats. The most worrisome of traditional challenges is China’s military
assertiveness in Southeast Asia, and its latent power projection in the Indian Ocean.
China’s reclamation of maritime features on the South China Sea, and the setting
up of significant military and civilian infrastructure on the constructed facilities isreflective of Beijing’s desire for control over the regional littorals.12 Not only does
China want to dominate the near-seas, it seems intent on establishing a favorable“rules-based order” to define national interactions in this regional commons.
More significant, however, is China’s growing influence in the Indian
Ocean13As the BRI gathers momentum, Beijing’s political sway among Indian Ocean
rim states is on the rise. China needs the cooperation of the regional elites to allow
the PLAN access to critical Indian Ocean littorals for the protection of Chinese
investments Its military base in Djibouti promises to offer Beijing geopolitical heftand economic stakeholder ship in the Indian Ocean.14The facility’s location, next tothe new port terminal at Obock, ensures Chinese military forces can be rapidly
mobilized to protect China’s commercial investments.
Djibouti, for many Indo-Pacific states, is a template for future Chinese basesin the Indian Ocean Region. In recent days, reports have surfaced suggesting China
could be in talks with Pakistan to set-up up a naval base at Jiwani on the Makran
coast close to the Iranian port of Chabahar. Analysts suggest that if a Chinese
facility near Gwadar is used to dock and maintain civilian vessels and provide otherlogistical support services, the PLAN would need another base for its warships.15
Regardless of the report’s veracity, there is something to suggest the PLAN islooking to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean, and is scouting for military
deployment sites from where it can project naval combat power.16
China’s shifting strategic profile in Africa -- where Beijing has moving awayfrom its traditional role as a resource extractor and investor with primarily
commercial interests, towards a more security-centric presence – is a model Beijing
would likely employ in South Asia. As China embeds itself into the geopolitics of the
Indian Ocean, Indian observers worry Chinese dual-use commercial-military6facilities (a 'string of pearls') in maritime-South Asia might begin to hurt Indian
interests.
Of equal concern in the Indo-Pacific Region are non-traditional security
challenges. Over the past decade, threats such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking,
IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing and climate change havetroubled regional states. The IN has already been at the forefront of Somalia
anti-piracy and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in
the IOR, including the 2004 Tsunami, Cyclone SIDR (2007), Cyclone Nargis (2008),
and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) as part of Op Rahat in Yemen(2015). In May 2017, Indian Naval ships engaged in rescue operations in cyclone-hit
Bangladesh, and provided relief in Sri Lanka where major floods and landslides
killed over 200 people.17 These human security commitments are only likely to growin the future.

III.

Opportunities for Collaboration

1.

Cooperation with Quad Powers
For India, its partnership with the United States and Japan constitutes asignificant avenue for regional collaboration. New Delhi’s nautical relationshipwith the US has been riding a crest since the signing of the Joint Strategic Vision
document and renewed a 10-year defense framework agreement in June 2015. In
May 2016, India and the US held their first maritime security dialogue in the 2 + 2
format, following up with a Logistics Support Memorandum of Understanding(LEMOA), a crucial agreement that allows the Indian Navy and the US Navy toaccess logistics on a reciprocal basis. Washington's proposal for joint developmentof India's next-generation aircraft carrier—in particular, the transfer ofelectromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) technology—has deepened
strategic trust, generating further momentum in maritime ties.18
But India and the United States will need to expand their economic
engagement to find alternative financing mechanisms to China’s Belt and Road
initiative, which New Delhi fears is leading smaller South Asian states into a
Chinese debt-trap. If regional democracies could collaborate to co-develop financing
mechanisms to compete with OBOR, they could effectively inoculate small IOR

7

states from many have described as the “predatory economics” of OBOR. Such apartnership would need the establishment of a capital base expansion of the WorldBank and direct financing for Indian-led connectivity initiatives like theIndia-Japan Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. The future could also witness India’s
entry into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.19
Washington could expand the authorities and capacity of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, the U.S. agency that aids American businesses
investing in developing economies. Indeed, during Trump’s inaugural visit to Japan,
there appeared to be some progress on this front with OPIC and Japanese partners
committing to offering “investment alternatives in the Indo-Pacific region.”
Expanding such an initiative from a bilateral U.S.-Japan effort to a trilateralmechanism (perhaps through the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor) would be a prudent
step.20
Anotherarea

forcollaborationisinfrastructurebuilding

where

Indo-Japanese collaboration has been leading the way. New Delhi and Tokyo arecollaborating not only in the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, but also in Northeast
India and Bay of Bengal countries, including Sri Lanka, Myanmar and
Bangladesh.21 In the past whenever Indian leaders have highlighted the need forconnectivity initiatives to be based on “universally recognized international norms,
prudent financing” they have had Japan’s example in mind. During her recent visit
to Tokyo in April 2018, India’s minister of external affairs, Sushma Swaraj
reiterated India’s need for a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.22
India’s policy elite realize that Japan, like every other country in the Quad group,
brings a certain comparative advantage to the table. Tokyo possesses a capitalsurplus and large-scale project finance experience. The United States, meanwhile,
has influence over the banking industry and experience in coordinating multilateralfinancing. India too possesses skills in services, and historical and civilizational
links with countries in South and Southeast Asia.
New Delhi is also keen to work with Australia, another Indo-Pacific power,with which maritime ties have been growing. A case from greater cooperation also
exists with France, which has stepped up its cooperation in both the Indian Ocean
and the Pacific.23 India recently signed a agreement with France enabling reciprocal
access to naval bases for logistical purposes. But Indo-Pacific democracies would

8also be keen to find ways to build security capacity of smaller regional states, as well
as alternative funding mechanisms for infrastructure creation in smaller littoral
states, many of who find themselves sliding into Beijing’s “debt-trap”.24
If there is one actor whose security role in the integrated Asian space has still
not been amply explored, it is ASEAN. Southeast Asian states have been wary of theidea of the Indo-Pacific, which they believe detracts from the centrality of theASEAN. With New Delhi enhancing its engagements with Southeast Asia under its
Act East Policy, India recently called for the waters of the Indo-Pacific region to bebetter connected and free of traditional and non-traditional threats, highlighting inparticular the region’s importance as a connectivity pathway.25
It is instructive that the principal precepts of the Indian Navy’s 2015
maritime strategy are ‘cooperative security’ and ‘integrated operations’ in theregional littorals. In keeping with the policy of fashioning a favorable and positive
maritime environment, as laid out in maritime strategy document, the Indian navy
has been willing to improve cooperation with the littoral navies in the EasternIndo-Pacific region.26
The priority for India is to evolve a regional architecture based on the twin
principles of shared security, and shared prosperity. In this, New Delhi would bekeen to collaborate with ASEAN, with whom it shares a common vision for global
commerce and maritime domain. Beyond shared respect for the United Nations
Convention for the Law of the Sea, New Delhi recognizes the importance of working
with ASEAN in the Blue Economy, coastal surveillance, capacity building, inparticular off-shore patrolling capabilities, hydrographic services, and information
sharing for increased maritime domain awareness.
Importantly, deeper integration with ASEAN will allow India to be better
prepared to counter Chinese assertion in South Asia. New Delhi will also need tolook to integrate the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium (IONS), with the wider security architecture in the Indo-Pacificregion, which will help foster a positive and cooperative operational environment.

9

2.

Future Interactions
The increasing influence of its regional dynamics on international

geo-politics in the Indo-Pacific region is more than clear. While some exciting‘possibilities’ exist, the prevailing ‘portents’ are bound to act as dampeners. In mainpart the security challenges arise from a lack of trust and differing nationalistic
perceptions. It is for regional states to resolve the contradictions and find ways todoing business with each other. The answer for India lies in enhancing strategic
engagement and interaction with its closest partners.
For the evolution of viable maritime governance structures, what regional
states need is a combined approach towards resolving maritime threats andchallenges. There is a requirement to strengthen the existing frameworks andempower them. These could prove immensely useful in articulating measures,
through mutual consultations, which can ensure that nations of the region act ascapable and adaptive partners rather than argumentative tense competitors.
Regional maritime forces will need to enhance functional cooperation
throughgreater

operational

exchanges,

personnel

exchanges

andinformation-sharing, inculcating a sense of collective responsibility and ownership.
With its central geographical status in the Indo-Pacific, India might be well placed
to play a key role in the Indo-Pacific. Alongside strategic deterrence, security
cooperation and capacity building will be the key elements of India’s maritime
strategy.
In charting a course forward, like-minded and law-abiding Indo-Pacific willneed to strive to create a secure maritime environment, conducive for sustained
economic growth in the region. The need of the hour is to create a community ofcommitted stakeholders, with a sincere approach to jointly tackling the region’s
emerging threats. Indo-Pacific partners will have to forge a political consensus in
dealing with challenges to the rules-based order, with the potential to reduce
strategic trust.

（2nd July, 2018）10

End Notes
Pradeep Kaushiva and Abhijit Singh (eds), Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific (KW
Publishers: New Delhi, 2014)
2 Rory Medcalf, “Pivoting the Map, Australia’s Indo-Pacific System”, Strategic&Defense Studies Centre, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, The Australian
National University, 2012https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175987/COG1_Medcalf_Indo-Pacific.pdf
3 “Confluence of the Two Seas”, Speech by Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan
at the Parliament of the Republic of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan,
August 22, 2007, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html
4 “Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper”, East Asia Forum, at
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/11/27/australias-foreign-policy-white-paper/
5 Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit, US Embassy and Consulate in
1

Vietnam, November 10, 2017, athttps://vn.usembassy.gov/20171110-remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit/“Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century”, Remarks by US
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. US Department of State, October 18, 2017, athttps://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/10/274913.htm
7 “India at center-stage as ‘Indo-Pacific’ gains currency”, The Indian Express,
November 14, 2017 at
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-at-centre-stage-with-the-phrase-indo-p
acific-asean-summit-2017-manila-philippines-pm-modi-duterte-trump-us-australiajapan-4936346/
8 Rory Medcalf, “Why The Sudden Buzz over Indo-Pacific?”, The South China Sea
Post, December 31, 2017 at
http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2126210/goodbye-asia-pacific-wh
y-sudden-buzz-over-indo-pacific
9 Ibid
10 “Indo-Pacific? Not from where China is sitting...”, Reuters, November 10, 2017, athttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-indo-pacific/indo-pacific-not-from-whe
re-china-is-sitting-idUSKBN1DA1YH
11 “Trump promotes Indo-Pacific for US benefits”, Global Times, November 15, 2017,at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1075383.shtml
12 China Is Still Building on Disputed Islands in the South China Sea, The Time,
December 15, 2017, at http://time.com/5065632/south-china-sea-islands/
13 For a detailed description of India-China strategic rivalry in the Indo-Pacific see
C Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan – Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific(Carnegie Endowment: Washington DC, 2014)14 Abhijit Singh, “China’s Military Base In Djibouti: Strategic Implications for
India”, War on the Rocks, August 21, 2017, athttps://warontherocks.com/2017/08/chinas-military-base-in-djibouti-strategic-implic
ations-for-india/
15 “First Djibouti ... now Pakistan port earmarked for a Chinese overseas navalbase”, The South China Morning Post, January 5, 2017, at
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2127040/first-djibouti-n
ow-pakistan-port-earmarked-chinese
6

11

16

David Scott, “Chinese Maritime Strategy for the Indian Ocean”, Center forInternational Maritime Security, November 28, 2017 at

http://cimsec.org/chinese-maritime-strategy-indian-ocean/34771
17 “Indian Navy ship rescues 27 in cyclone-hit Bangladesh”, First post, May 31,
2017
http://www.firstpost.com/india/indian-navy-ship-rescues-27-in-cyclone-hit-banglade
sh-one-more-vessel-with-relief-material-on-its-way-3500857.html
18Nilanthi Samaranayake, Michael Connell, and SatuLimaye, “The Future of
U.S.-India Naval
Relations”, Center For Naval Analyses, February 2017, athttps://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DRM-2016-U-013938-Final2.pdf
19 Sameer Lalwani, “Take Small Steps to Advance the US-India Relationship:,
Defense One, December 21, 2017, at
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/12/take-small-steps-advance-us-india-relationship/144750/
20 Ibid
21 Titli, Basu, “India-Japan and ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’: Ten years on”,
Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, September 13, 2017 athttps://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-japan-and-confluence-of-the-two-seas_tbasu_130917#footnote2_axh7ddc
22 “India and Japan call for free and open Indo-Pacific”, NDTV, March 29, 2018, athttps://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-japan-call-for-a-free-and-stable-indo-pacific1830394
23 C Raja Mohan, “New ripples in the Oceans”, The Indian Express, November 21,
2017, athttp://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indo-pacific-quad-india-maritimesecurity-cooperation-united-states-japan-australia-france-raja-mandala-new-ripple
s-in-the-oceans-4946840/
24Chinese exploitative ploy to grab assets in smaller, less-developed countries is
simple. It gives them loans on high rates for infrastructural projects, gets equity
into projects, and when the country is unable to repay the loan, it gets ownership of
the project, See “How Pakistan it is sliding into the Chinese debt trap”, The
Economic Times, December 11, 2017 athttps://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/a-grim-remin
der-for-pakistan-how-it-is-sliding-into-the-chinese-debt-trap/articleshow/62022335.
cms
25 “Sushma Swaraj calls for deeper economic ties with ASEAN”, The Hindu,
January 06, 2017 at
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sushma-swaraj-calls-for-deeper-economic-t
ies-with-asean/article22384203.ece
26 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Indian Naval
Strategic Publication, Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defense (Navy),
October 2015 at https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/
files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf

12Bio-brief Abhijit Singh
A former naval officer, Abhijit Singh, is Senior
Fellow, and head of the Maritime Policy Initiative at ORF.
A maritime professional with specialist and commandexperience in front-line Indian naval ships, he has been
involved the writing of India's maritime strategy (2007). He
is a keen commentator on maritime matters and has
written extensively on security and governance issues in
the Indian Ocean and Pacific littorals. His articles and commentaries have been
published in the Asian Bureau for Asian Research (NBR), the Lowy Interpreter, theHindustan Times, World Politics Review, War on the Rocks, the Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative and the CSIS Pacific Forum.
Editor of two books on maritime security — Indian Ocean Challenges: A
Quest for Cooperative Solutions (2013) and Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific (2014),
Abhijit has published papers on India’s growing maritime reach, security of
sea-lines of communication in the Indo-Pacific region, Indian Ocean governanceissues and maritime infrastructure in the Asian littorals.

13日米豪印 4 カ国枠組みの現状と今後―「安全保障のダイヤモンド」構想はどこまで実現したかー
The Future of Indo-Pacific Cooperation:
Could we see the emergence of a “security diamond”?
ハドソン研究所 ビジティング・フェロー
Visiting Fellow at Hudson Institute
長尾 賢
Dr. Satoru Nagao

Abstract:

Furthering

cooperationinsecurity

relationsamong

Japan-US-India-Australia has been more and more plausible and achievements havealready been made. Why have these four countries sought security cooperation? Fromthe view of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “Asia’s Security Diamond”, China iscertainly

a decisive factor

whenassessingJapan-US-India-Australia

security

cooperation. However, what can Japan-US-India-Australia cooperation do to adjust thesituation to counter China’s security advances in the region? Firstly, we should focus on
the linkage of Indo-China border area and the East China Sea. Secondly, in the Indian
Ocean, if India has the will and capability, Japan-US will be able to release themselvesfrom the heavy burden to safeguard security in the Indian Ocean and deploy moremilitary force in the East China Sea and South China Sea to maintain the militarybalance. Thirdly, Japan-US-India-Australia can collaborate to support Southeast Asian
countries around the South China Sea. In these cases, Japan-India-US-Australia
cooperation holds its key. To ensure prosperous stability in the whole of Indo-Pacific,
Japan-US-India-Australia should overcome any difficulties to form “Asia’s Security
Diamond.”はじめに
2007 年以来中断していた 4 カ国の外交当局者の会議が 2017 年に再び開かれるようになり、日米豪印 4 カ国の協力関係は以前よりも進みつつある。ただ、こうした動きの一方で、4 カ国の協力関係は、少し見え難い部分もある。例えば、この４カ国の内、日米、米豪は条約を結んだ正式な同盟国だが、あとの日印、日豪、
印米、印豪関係は正式な同盟ではない。だから、この 4 カ国の協力関係が当初考14えていたようなレベルに到達した、いわば「成功」した事例といえるのかどうか、
不明確な状態になっている。そこで、本稿では、大きく 3 つに分けて検討することにした。まず、そもそもこの 4 カ国枠組が目指したところはなにか、登場の背景を検証し、その中で、この 4 カ国の枠組がどのような目標を持っていたのか、考察する。その上で、その目標について実現できた部分、そして今後の課題になる部分について分析するのである。

Ⅰ. 4 ヵ国枠組み登場の背景とその可能性
1.

米中のミリタリー・バランスの変化を受けて登場

日米豪印という枠組みが表立って登場するようになったのは、2007 年に安倍晋三首相が推し進めたことに始まる。2007 年にインド国会で「二つの海の交わり」という演説を行った安倍首相は、首相に返り咲く直前の 2012 年 12 月 27 日、日
米豪印について内容をまとめた論文 “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond（アジアの安全保障のダイヤモンド）”を発表した 1。この論文で安倍首相は、この 4カ国の連携がなぜ必要なのか、背景的な状況を説明している。
その背景として強調されているのは、日米豪印の構想は、もともと対中国戦略としての意味合いがあることである。では、対中戦略として、日米豪 印が連携した場合、どのような事が可能なのだろうか。病気を治すには病気の原因を考えて初めて予防法もわかるわけであるから、対中国戦略を考える際は、中国の海洋進出の原因について考えなければならない。安倍政権になり、防衛省のホームペー
ジに掲載されている「南シナ海情勢（中国による地形埋立・関係国の動向）」が、中国の海洋進出の原因をわかりやすく説明している 2。
この資料では、中国が、ミリタリー・バランスが中国側に有利になったとき、つまり 1950 年代にフランスがベトナムから撤退し、1970 年代にアメリカがベト
ナムから撤退し、1980 年代にソ連がベトナムにおける軍事的存在感を低下させ、1990 年代にアメリカがフィリピンから撤退したときに、中国は、いつも島々、環礁などを攻撃、占領してきたと指摘している。だから、昨今の中国の海洋進出も、
ミリタリー・バランスの変化によるものと考えているわけである。
実際、2000 年から 2017 年までにアメリカは潜水艦 15 隻を新規に建造・配備したのに対し、中国が 44 隻以上の潜水艦を新規に建造して配備したことを考えると、過去に比べれば、米中のミリタリー・バランスは変化している。つまり、

15

そこから考えられる日米豪印の連携とは、アメリカの軍事力の不足分を、日印豪が補う体制を意味している。
過去、アジアの安全保障体制は、「ハブ・アンド・スポーク」とも呼ばれるアメリカとの 2 国間同盟によって成り立ってきた（図 1 参照）。この体制は、日米、米豪、米韓といったアメリカとの同盟で構成されているが、日豪は 極めて親密な関係を構築してきたものの同盟国ではなかった。だから、アメリカに極端に依存した体制だったといえる。新しく構想されている西太平洋とインド洋にまたがる
日米豪印の連携では、西太平洋から南太平洋さらにインド洋をカバーする、より
ネットワーク型の体制を目指す。日米豪印主導で、それぞれの二国間関係を強化
するとともに東南アジア諸国や、さらには英仏も含めた他の国も参加可能な多国間ネットワークを構築することによって、アメリカの力の不足を補おうという構想である。
図 1：新旧安全保障構想の違参照：長尾賢「日印「同盟」時代第 11 回：日豪印「同盟」で日本の安全保障が変わる！」『日経ビジネス Online』（日経 BP 社）2015 年 8 月 19 日(http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/atcl/opinion/15/261283/081700001/)

2.

焦点となる 3 つの地域

では、このような連携は具体的にどのように中国の進出を抑えることにつながるのだろうか。4 カ国の連携がアメリカの軍事力の不足を補う状態とは、少なくとも次の 3 つの場合が想定される。1 つは、中国が東シナ海や南シナ海で使う予定の予算や軍隊を、他の地域に分散させる事ができるかどうかである。例えば、

16

中国が印中国境に大きな予算をかける必要が生じた場合や、大規模な航空戦力を配置しなければならない場合、中国は東シナ海や南シナ海で大きな軍事行動に 移ることが難しくなる可能性がある。ここから考えると、インド軍の印中国境における防衛力増強を支援することは、日米豪にとって国益になる。
また、中国はインド洋への進出も活発化させており、2017 年 12 月にインド海軍のスニル・ランバ参謀長が指摘したところによると、常時 8 隻程度の中国海軍艦艇がインド洋に展開している状態になっている。その対応のために日米豪 印各国は艦艇を配置しなければならないが、もし印豪がより多くの役割を担ってくれ
れば、日米は東シナ海や南シナ海により多くの戦力を集中させることができ、中国とのミリタリー・バランスの維持に貢献するだろう。つまりインド洋において
印豪の軍事力増強と、日米豪印の動きを連動させることが、日米の国益になる。
さらに、中国の海洋進出が著しくなっている東南アジア地域においては、東南
アジア各国自身の防衛力増強を支援する必要がある。これまではアメリカ中心だ
ったが、日印豪が東南アジア各国に装備品・訓練・情報などの提供を通じて支援すれば、アメリカの軍事力の不足を補うことにつながる。また、中国が核ミサイ
ル搭載型潜水艦を配備できないように、「航行の自由作戦」やその他の艦艇や航空機による航行を通じて、南シナ海における監視活動をすることも重要だ。アメ
リカの艦艇以外に日印豪がどの程度、監視活動に参加できているか問われる。
つまり、3 箇所、印中国境における連携、インド洋における連携、東南アジア諸国における連携、において日米豪印 4 カ国の連携がどの程度まで進展しているか、どのような課題があるのか、その点が、この連携の成果を定める上で、重要なポイントなのである。

Ⅱ. どこまで実現したのか
1.

印中国境における連携

では、どの程度まで実現したと言えるのだろうか。まず、印中国境における連携は、特に日印米の連携となって大きく 3 つの連携が実現してきた。インド軍の増強、インド軍の増強を支えるインフラの増強、危機が起きたときの支援の 3 つである。現在インド軍は対パキスタン戦用の部隊を中国方面へ移動する作業を行っている。その中で最も注目されるのが、インド陸軍第 17 軍団である。この第17 軍団は、9 万人の大規模部隊で、中国から攻撃を受けた場合に、輸送機などの

17

空中機動でチベット方面へ反撃するための攻撃能力をもった部隊である。そのため、中国は、この第 17 軍団を迎え撃つために、チベットに防衛部隊を配置しなければならなくなる。中国が本来、東シナ海や南シナ海で使うはずだった予算を、チベット方面で使う必要が生じる可能性があるとしたら、この第 17 軍団は要になる。そこで、アメリカは今、第 17 軍団が使う銃や大砲からヘリコプターや輸送機まで、大規模に輸出している。インド軍は装備の 7 割近くを旧ソ連製・ロシア製が占める軍隊であるが、第 17 軍団だけアメリカ装備なのは、特徴的である。
また、インド軍の展開を支えるインフラ建設においては、日本がインド北東部
で道路建設を支援している。インド北東部には、印中がお互い領有権を主張しているアルナチャル・プラデシュ州（中国名：南チベット）があり、インド軍が印中国境に展開する際は役に立つことになる。
危機が起きたときの支援についても連携が進みつつある。特に 2017 年のドグ
ラム危機において、初めて実例が生じた。ドグラム危機は、中国軍がブータンと領有権を争っている地域に中国軍が侵入し道路建設を始めたため、ブータンの安全保障を支援するインドが介入、印中国境全域の両軍のにらみ合いに発展したものである。その最中、日印米 3 か国によるマラバール海軍共同演習が実施され、
日印米それぞれが空母（ないしヘリ空母）をインド洋に派遣した。8 月 15 日に印中両軍が石を投げあって衝突し、危機感が高まった直後には、日本の平松賢司駐印大使が力による現状変更を非難し、事実上インドの立場を支持した。しかも危機は 8 月 28 日に緊張緩和に向かったが、これもまた日本と関係する時期であった。9 月初頭の印国防相訪日、9 月半ばの安倍首相の訪印の直前だったため、危機が継続していると日印の協力が進展しすぎることを、中国側が嫌った状態となっている。このように危機において、日本がインド支持を明確にした行動を示したことは、それだけ日印間の信頼が深まったことを示すものであった 3。

2.

インド洋における連携

日米豪印の連携は、インド洋における連携でも明確な形で現れている。マラバール演習では日印米が、リムパック演習では日米豪印が、印豪間でも海上共同演
習が実施されるようになった。南シナ海からベンガル湾に至る地域での対潜水艦協力も進みつつある。このように連携が進みつつあるため、2 つの協定が結ばれるようになっている。軍事に関わる機密情報共有の協定と、補給品を融通し合う兵站支援の協定である 4。例えば、中国の潜水艦を探知した情報を共有したりする
際は機密情報の協定が役立つ。また、2017 年のマラバール演習では、インドの補18給艦から日本の護衛艦に対して給油が行われたが、こういった時に燃料をどこが準備していつ支払うかといったことを定めるのが兵站支援の協定である。共同演
習などが増加して連携が深まってくると、いちいち演習のたびに個別の協定を結
ぶのではなく、こういった協定を予め結んでおいて共同演習やお互いの基地への訪問をしやすくする動きが起きる。つまり協定の存在そのものが、連携が深まっている証拠になるのである。機密情報共有の協定はすでに日印、日米、印米間では結ばれている。兵站支援の協定も日豪、印米間で結ばれ、日印間でも協議が進んでいる。印仏間でも兵站支援の協定が結ばれた。
日印間では、インド洋周辺のインフラ開発でも協力が進んでいる。中国が東南アジアからインド洋周辺で行う港湾開発に対して懸念があるからだ。特に中国が建設した港が中国の海軍展開の補給拠点となることが懸念されている。また、「一帯一路」構想に基づいて行われた中国の投資は金利が 6～8％と非常に高く、世界銀行や日本が主導するアジア開発銀行の 0.25～3%に比べ非常に高い。そのため債務を返却できない国が中国側の意向に沿った形で外交を展開する事例、またはスリランカの場合のように港の運営権を 99 年分引き渡す事例が確認されている。
そのため途上国に中国とは別の選択肢を与えるために、日米豪印間でのインフラ建設における協力が進められ、2018 年 6 月、日本は今後 3 年で 5 兆円を超える規模の投資を発表している。そのようなインフラ建設の中には、中国のインフラ建設に直接的な影響を与え得るものが含まれている。例えばバングラデシュで中国が提案したソナディア港建設の提案に対しては、日本は 25km しか離れていな
いところでマタバリ港建設を提案し、結局、バングラデシュ政府はマタバリ港を採用した。同じような方式で、今、日印が連携し、スリランカではトリンコマリ
ー港の近代化計画を提案しており、計画が進めば中国のハンバントタ港の重要性を下げる可能性がある。また、日印が進めるイランのチャーバハール港のプロジ
ェクトは、中国がパキスタンで進めるグワダル港の重要性を相対化する効果がある 5。日印の「アジア・アフリカ成長回廊」計画も中国のアフリカにおける影響力を下げる効果がある（図 2 参照） 6。

19

図 2：日印がインド洋で進めるインフラ開発の位置関係
図参照：筆者作成

このように、日米豪印が進めるインドとの連携は進んでおり、インドはインド洋で活発に存在感を示すようになっている。特にナレンドラ・モディ政権の成立
以後、図のようにその海洋国家としての存在感を急速に増しつつある（図 3 参照）。
図 3：インド洋におけるインド軍の活動状

参照：筆者作成

20

3.

南シナ海における連携

南シナ海における連携についても進展しつつある。特にマラッカ海峡近くにあるインドのアンダマン・ニコバル諸島における動きは注目である。インドは 2000
年代に入り、ここの基地を増強し、司令部の設置、空港、艦艇の整備能力も進めてきた。そして、ここ数年、大型艦艇の配備、戦闘機配備の決定に至っている。
ここでは、公式には発表されていないものの、日米がレーダーや、対潜水艦用センサー、光ファイバー網の設置などで支援しているとの報道があり、本格的な対潜水艦探知網の整備に連携して取り組んでいるとの報道がある。インドが戦闘機や対潜哨戒機が配備した場合、中国のインド洋への進出に備えるだけでなく、南
シナ海まで展開することが可能になる。それは、インドが連携を深めているベト
ナムなどを支援し、南シナ海問題に介入する基盤ができることを意味している。
実際、南シナ海にインド海軍艦艇が活動するケースが増加しつつある。インド
はベトナムだけでなく、マレーシア、シンガポール、タイ、フィリピンとの連携を深めており、2018 年に、インド海軍は、インドネシアのサバング港へのアクセ
ス権について協議を始めた。ここはアンダマン・ニコバル諸島と同じようにマラッカ海峡の出入を抑える要衝であり、インドの東南アジアとの連携の深まりを示している。日本も、このようなインドの東南アジア進出を活発化させるため、イ
ンド北東部の道路を東南アジアの道路と連結させ、陸路・海路両方でインド －東南アジア連携を促進し、中国の東南アジアに対する経済的栄養力を緩和させようとしている。

Ⅲ. 今後の課題
このように、日米豪印の連携は進みつつある。特に、インドの能力を強化し、
印中国境、インド洋、東南アジアの全てでインドの存在感を高めることは、この4 カ国連携の特徴となっている。ただ、いくつか課題がある。特に大きなものは、
この構想では日印の動きが早いのに対し、アメリカの動きが鈍いことである。これはアメリカのアジアへの関心が不十分なことが背景にある。また、インドがオーストラリアとの協力意義について疑いを持っていることも連携を妨げている。
さらに、今年 2 月に起きたように、中国がモルディブに向けて艦隊を派遣した際に日米豪印はどのように連携するのか、詰める必要もある。こういった課題を解決するには、日印が主導的に連携を深めて、戦略の全体像を描き、米豪英仏と東21

南アジア諸国に対して具体的な提案を積極的に売り込んでいく姿勢が求められているといえよう。
（2018 年 7 月 2 日）

Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, Project Syndicate, 27
December 2012(https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japanand-india-by-shinzo-abe?barrier=accesspaylog)
2 防衛省「南シナ海情勢（中国による地形埋立・関係国の動向）」2018 年 2 月 2日、スライド１－１(http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d-act_20180202.pdf)
3 「印中対立でみせた日本の大きな存在感」『カレントトピックス』（(鹿島平和研究所委託事業) 安全保障外交政策研究会）2017 年 10 月
(http://ssdpaki.la.coocan.jp/topics/6.html)
4 これらの協定は主にアメリカの同盟国が結ぶ協定をもとにしたものである。日米間の場合は軍事情報包括保護協定(G-SOMIA)、物品役務相互提供協定(ACSA)とよばれている。ただし、インドと結ぶ場合は、より制限の多い協定になっている。
5
資源豊かな中央アジア諸国が、その資源を輸出する際にインド洋への出口を探す場合、現状では中国・パキスタンを経由するルートしかないが、チャーバハー
ル港とつなぐルートの開発が進むと、2 つの選択肢をもつことになる。つまり中央アジア諸国の中国依存を緩和する効果が期待できることになる。
6 長尾賢「日印「同盟」時代第 20 回：「「一帯一路」に対抗する日・インドの戦略構想」『日経ビジネス Online』（日経 BP 社）2017 年 6 月 1 日(http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/atcl/opinion/15/261283/053100010/)
1

執筆者紹介

長尾 賢（ながお さとる）

現在、ハドソン研究所 ビジティング・フェロー。
2011 年、学習院大学にて博士（政治学）取得。博士論文は『検証 インドの軍事戦略―緊張する周辺国とのパ
ワーバランス―』として発刊（2015 年）。
ハドソン研究所の個人紹介ページ
https://www.hudson.org/experts/1220-satoru-nagao

22

India-Japan Relations in the Age of Indo-Pacific
インド太平洋時代の日印関係
Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in New Delhi

防衛研究分析研究所（ニューデリー）研究員
Dr. Titli Basu

ティトリー・バス

Abstract: Indo-Pacific, a geostrategic construct treating the Indian Ocean andPacific Ocean as an integrated theatre, has emerged as the pivot of global
geopolitical and geo-economic dynamism. Aimed at upholding a rules-based
liberal Indo-Pacific order, maritime democracies like India and Japan ateither end of the spectrum are working towards an action-oriented partnershipfounded on mutuality of strategic interests, shared universal values andcommonality of vision furthering principles of rule of law and freedom ofnavigation. With the objective of securing an open and equitable Indo-Pacific,
India and Japan is not only working bilaterally but also with like-minded
partners in trilateral, quadrilateral, multilateral designs. As Indo-Pacific has
been mapped by Prime Minister Modi and Abe to widen the scope of
India-Japan cooperation, this article assesses the prospects of pursuing theshared strategic interests on themes of maritime security and regional
connectivity and infrastructure. While navigating the complexities of thismaritime super-region, the article draws attention to the importance ofenhancing India-Japan cooperation in key sub-regions including the Bay of
Bengal, Southeast Asia and Africa and concludes by offering modest policy
recommendations. While fluidity in regional geopolitics and geo-economics is
unfolding greater uncertainty today, India and Japan as two major Asian
powers have aligned in forward thinking while navigating the challenges andtapping the opportunities that the Indo-Pacific construct has to offer.

【要旨】 インド太平洋はインド洋と太平洋を一体的な活動舞台として扱う地理的戦略概念であり、グローバルな地政学・地政経済学的なダイナミズムの中核となりつつある。ルールに基づく自由な秩序の確立を目指し、インド太平洋の両端23に位置する海洋民主主義国としてのインドと日本は、戦略的利益の相互性、普遍的な価値の共有、法の支配と航行の自由の原則の促進という共有するビジョンに基づき、行動志向型のパートナーシップの形成に向けて協力している。日印両国は、開かれた衡平的なインド太平洋を実現すべく、二国間だけでなく、同士 的な三カ国間、4 カ国間、多国間のパートナーとも協働している。
インド太平洋はモディ首相と安倍首相が日印協力の範囲を拡大するために構築されたことから、本稿は海洋安全保障、地域的なコネクティビティ（連結性）・
インフラといった問題について共有する戦略的利益の実現性について評価を加える。さらに敷衍すれば、この海洋地域が持つ複雑性を検討する一方、ベンガル湾、
東南アジア、アフリカを含む各地域における日印協力の強化の重要性に着目した
うえで、結論として若干の政策的オプションを提示したい。現在、この地域における地政学・地政経済学的な流動性は不確実性をもたらしているが、主要なアジ
ア勢力である日印両国はインド太平洋という構造がもたらす課題への対処と機会の有効活用を図りつつ、前向きな思考で結ばれているのである。

Ⅰ.

Introduction
Indo-Pacific, a geostrategic construct treating the Indian Ocean andPacific Ocean as an integrated theatre, has emerged as the pivot of global
geopolitical and geo-economic dynamism. This maritime super-region,
connecting the Indian Ocean highways to those of the Pacific through thecritical Straits, houses some of the fastest growing economies at the epicentre
of international political economy, hosts some of the world’s busiest trade andenergy routes in addition to being a repository of natural resource s including
energy.

More importantly, some ofthe sub-regions

constituting the

Indo-Pacific hosts critical flashpoints of great power rivalry including theSouth China Sea.
The conceptualisation of Indo-Pacific germinated with Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe’s celebrated speech Confluence of the Two Seas , delivered in the
Indian Parliament a decade ago, where he argued for dynamic coupling ofPacific and the Indian Oceans as “seas of freedom and of prosperity”. In thesubsequent years, as the concept gained currency in the power corridors ofWashington, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton underscored the critical24

importance of translating the increasing inter-connectedness between the two
Oceans into an “operational concept”. 1
Since there is a shift from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, major
powers are adapting their strategies in pursuit of their national interests inthis maritime space. President Trump has prioritised Indo-Pacific in his 2017
National Security Strategy (NSS) where “revisionist powers” are shaping anorder “antithetical to US values and interests”. Prime Minister Abe has
designed his Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIPS) underpinned byuniversal values as Japan steered its course towards value-oriented foreign
policy conceptualised by thinkers like Nobukatsu Kanehara 2 and Shotaro
Yachi. Meanwhile, situated at the nucleus of this maritime strategic space,India’s vision for a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific based on principledcommitment to rule of law has been articulated by Prime Minister Modi at the2018 Shangri La Dialogue.
India’s primacy as one of the key anchors of stability in the
Indo-Pacific has been welcomed by both the US and Japan. President
Trump’s NSS has encouraged India’s advent as a leading global power andstronger strategic and defense partner and further indicated its support for
India’s “leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader
region”. 3 As natural allies, India is one of the key partners in Abe’s latest
FOIPS. The key objective of India-Japan Vision 2025 is securing strategic
stability and economic prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, the
US-Japan Security Consultative Committee has argued in favor of nurturing“partnership with India” since India’s development is “inextricably tied to theprosperity, freedom, and security of the region”. 4
As Tokyo started weaving universal values -oriented strategies,
India has been rendered space as an important player in Tokyo’s
strategic designs including Taro Aso’ s Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,
Abe’s Quadrilateral Initiative and subsequently Asia’s Democratic
Security Diamond. India has also become a part of Tokyo’s security
discourse. Japan’s first NSS outlined in 2013 articulates that Japan willbolster cooperative ties with countries

like South Korea,

Australia,

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India, with whom Japan
shares universal values and strategic interests.

25

Aimed at upholding the rules-based liberal international order andrealising a free and open Indo-Pacific, maritime democracies like India andJapan at either end of the spectrum, in addition to the US, are working
towards an action-oriented partnership founded on mutuality of strategicinterests, shared universal values and commonality of vision together withlike-minded countries in the region. 5 While Japan has a strong maritime
thinking since it has long been a maritime power, India has graduallywidened its strategic thought process beyond the traditional continental
orientation. India is now harnessing its natural geographic advantages in the
Indian Ocean, where Alfred Thayer Mahan envisioned that the destiny of the
21 st century will be decided in these waters. As India stretches its focus
beyond the Indian Ocean theatre and expands its horizon to the Pacific with
its Act East Policy (AEP), safeguarding openness of critical sea-lanes andshaping maritime behaviour in terms of compliance with the internationallaws has become a priority. India’s embracing of the 2014 Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA) verdict in settling its maritime dispute with Bangladesh
reflects India’s character as a nation and resolve.

Ⅱ.

A Shared Vision for the Indo-PacificIndia-Japan Vision 2025 is mooted on the firm commitment of

upholding universal values and international norms furthering principles ofrule of law and freedom of navigation while securing an open, equitable,
rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. To this end, India and Japan is not only
working bilaterally but also with like-minded partners in trilateral,
quadrilateral, multilateral frameworks. Aligning Modi’s AEP with Abe’s
FOIPS and keeping ASEAN’s centrality as one of the central pillars forsecuringastableIndo-Pacific,

like-mindedcountries

arefurthering

cooperation on maritime security issues including enhancing maritime
domain awareness and disaster response capabilities and strengthening
regional connectivity and infrastructure development.
India-Japan-US and India-Japan-Australia frameworks reflect robust
mechanisms of such strategic convergence and a shared commitment inshaping a rules-based Indo-Pacific order. Additionally, the return of Abe’s
Quadrilateral following a hiatus of a decade in 2017 with a loosely formed26

India-Japan-US-Australia Consultations also pursue shared objectives ofstrengthening connectivity and maritime security cooperation underpinned byshared vision of a peaceful, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. 6
As the Indo-Pacific has been mapped by Prime Minister Modi and Abe towiden the scope of India-Japan cooperation, this article assesses the prospectsof bilateral cooperation in pursuing the shared strategic interests while
steering the complexities of the Indo-Pacific theatre. The subsequent sections
will evaluate India-Japan cooperation on themes of maritime security andregional

connectivity

andinfrastructure.

Additionally,

India-Japan

cooperation will be situated within the regional and multilateral frameworks
aimed at shaping a rules-based Indo-Pacific order.

1.

Keeping the Indo-Pacific Sea-Lanes free and Open:Figure 1: Major LNG Trade Flow through South China Sea in 2016

Source: Created by GIS Lab, IDSA based on data from EIA

Dependence on the Indo-Pacific sea-lanes hosting critical transit routes
and chokepoints for trade and energy movement is a shared challenge forresource scarce countries like Japan and India. Rapid militarization of South
China Sea and growing Chinese inroads into the Indian Ocean have led to adebate on strategic importance of Sea lanes of communications (SLOCs). In
addition, the ambiguity concerning the strategic connotations of China’s
grand design—Belt and Road Initiative, particularly its Maritime Silk Road
component is a common conundrum. Any interruption in the shipping netw ork

27

would adversely impact the industrial production having a negative influenceon the economy.
Energy consignments shipped through SLOCs linking Persian Gulf,
Strait of Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Malacca-Singapore Straits, the South andthe East China Sea are of enormous significance not just for Japanese
economy but the regional economy. 7 The Higuchi Report pertinently reasoned
the case of maritime shipping as an issue of “life or death” for Japan. 8
Various Admirals including Akimoto Kazumine and Kawamura Sumihiko andprevious MSDF chiefs of staff Hayashizaki Chiaki and Yoshida Manabu
articulated the importance of SLOCs for “survival and prosperity” of nations
including Japan.
Figure 2: Japan’s Reliance on Middle East Crude Oil of Total Imports

Source: Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC)As Indo-Pacific is emerging as the centre of gravity both in terms of
geo-economics and geo-strategy, maritime security including managing
maritime hotspots has become a priority. Since no one nation can maintainpeace and security and requires a cooperative approach in safeguarding the
global commons, Japan has stepped up its role with Proactive Contribution to
Peace. India and Japan has convergence of interest and ‘shared responsibility’in securing the SLOCs as a “public good” for the region. 9 India-Japan28

cooperation bears the onus to “secure peace and stability along sea-lanes”. 10
Given the enormous importance of the Indo-Pacific sea-lanes especially theSouth China Sea for regional energy security and trade and as countries who
have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
India and Japan has urged for peaceful settlements of territorial disputes
without use or threat of use of force and underscored the significance ofdialogue rather than relying on unilateral actions.
With Japan’s Vientiane Vision aimed at bolstering Tokyo’s defense
cooperation with ASEAN and India’s AEP, both countries are invested in theirown way in promoting regional security. Tokyo is engaged in developing
maritime capabilities of the Southeast Asian nations in areas like Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea
and air space. Furthermore, Japan is engaged in capacity building in
numerous fields for instance Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief(HADR),

Peace-keeping

Operations(PKO),

landmineand

unexploded

ordnance (UXO) clearance and cybersecurity. India contributes through
ASEAN-led frameworks in addition to cultivating its strategic partnerships
with regional actors focusing on naval diplomacy and maritime safety andcapacity building.
As maritime democracies, India, the US and Japan are building
interoperability and sharing the best practices between navies in terms ofprocedures and technical capabilities through annual Malabar Exercise
focusing on anti-submarine warfare, aircraft carrier operations, air defense
and surface warfare. The June 2018 edition of the Malabar exercise is held off
the coast of Guam in the Western Pacific signifying the expansion of not just
operational but also geographical scope. Besides, Japan’s 2013 NDPG
categorically argues that “Japan will strengthen its relationship with India ina broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training
and exercises as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping
activities.” Meanwhile, the US has invested in buttressing India’s maritime
capabilities as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region andbeyond. 11 As the US renamed its Pacific Command as Indo-Pacific Command,the objective is to build robust capabilities to deal with maritime challenges in
the region amid increasing militarization of the South China Sea.

29

In addition to the assertive maritime behaviour of China, Indo-Pacific
SLOCs are susceptible to numerous security threats such as piracy, illegal
fishing, maritime terrorism, trafficking and natural disasters. The credibilityof Indian naval prowess during the Indian Ocean Tsunami and India’s
contribution in the Tsunami Core Group in 2004-05 was favorably perceived
by the US and Japan. Moreover, both India and Japan cooperate against
piracy and armed robbery under Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).
Meanwhile, both coast guards have worked towards augmenting capacity
building in areas of search and rescue, pollution response and maritime law
enforcement. Japan has experienced a number of incidents including the 2010
Abdullah Azzam Brigade’s attack on the M Star super tanker in the Strait of
Hormuz in the same fashion as tankers were attacked during the Iran-Iraq
war of the 1980s. India helped during the 1999 M/V Alondra Rainbow piracy
incident. Ensuring maritime security is vital for India and Japan since any
disruption will entail accelerating cost of trade and energy. In this regard,
signing of white shipping agreements is essential to advance data sharing on
merchant navy ships or cargo ships.

2.

Connecting the growth poles in the Indo-Pacific:
Figure 3: IMF World Economic Outlook Update, April 2018

2018

9
7.4

8

2019

7.8
6.7 6.8

6.6 6.47

5.3 5.56
53
2
1

3.9 3.8

3.4

4
2.7 2.5

5.3

3 3.1
2.2 2
1.2

0.9

0

Source: prepared by author based on IMF data

30

5

6.6 6.5

IMF projects that economic growth in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa will
stand at 5.6 and 3.4 percent respectively in 2018. Between 2007 and 2016,
emerging and developing Asia has contributed 56 percent to global growth.
IMF has argued that owing to its robust economic development, India’s role in
the economic development of Indo-Pacific will continue to increase. To tap thefull potential of the region, it is vital to connect the dynamic sub-regions
constituting the Indo-Pacific and promote robust regional connectivity which
in turn will enable development of regional value chains, industrial corridors
and robust production networks across Asia and Africa. Connectivity andinfrastructure development lies at the heart of Modi’s key foreign policy
initiatives including the Neighborhood First, AEP, Africa Policy and ThinkWest Policy. Convergence of India’s regional connectivity goals with Japan’s
FOIPS and Abe’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) is a
win-win construct since it presents an opportunity for “coordinating,bilaterally and with other partners, for better regional integration andimproved connectivity as well as industrial networks”. 12 In addition, theIndia-US-Japan trilateral cooperation also targets to make best use ofcollective capacities in supporting regional economic linkages. The Trilateral
Infrastructure Working Group meeting in Washington in February 2018
underscored the need to collaborate in promoting Indo-Pacific connectivity.
Japan has emerged as an indispensable partner and a “key player inIndia’s modernization”. Expanding footprint of Japanese ODA has not only
facilitated the development of key industrial corridors such as the Delhi
Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), bring Shinkansen technology to India in
its first ever High Speed Railway project connecting commercial hubs like
Mumbai and Ahmedabad and build Urban Rapid Transport Systems inmega-cities, but Japan is also heavily invested in building infrastructure in
strategically significant Northeast India and building smart islands inAndaman and Nicobar. While Northeast India is indispensable to the successof India’s AEP, New Delhi has long struggled to connect this region withindustrial hubs of India on the one hand and the dynamic regional value
chains of Southeast Asia on the other. Japan has stepped up as the leading
donor to help India reboot its Northeast region with the institution of the
India-Japan Coordination Forum (JICF) for Development of North-Eastern
Region in 2017 where the key focus is connectivity and road network
development, especially inter-state roads and major district roads. Japan has

31

invested in North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project(Phase 1) NH-51 in Meghalaya and NH-54 in Mizoram. Additionally, tapping
opportunities to work together on strengthening regional connectivity,
India-Japan Act East Forum has been instituted in 2017 with the aim todevelop specific projects for economic rejuvenation of Northeast including
those pertaining to connectivity, developmental infrastructure, industrial
linkages as well as people-to-people links.
Advancing Regional connectivity both within India and beyond
constitutes one of the central pillars of India-Japan relations. Connectingwith the growth poles of Southeast Asia is one of the key strategic priority ofModi’s AEP. For improving connectivity in the Indo-Pacific and consolidating
cooperation with Southeast Asia, India-Japan Dialogue on ASEAN was
instituted in 2017. India has invested in strengthening its connectivity
through Thailand-Myanmar-India (TMI) Trilateral Highway which can beused as an economic corridor and extended to Cambodia, Lao PDR and
Vietnam since strong ASEAN-India connectivity is expected to boost business
opportunities for Southeast Asian 13 and Indian companies, as well asJapanese companies given that the supply-chain networks are also linked toJapan.
In 2009, the Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa (TKK) part of the road for TMI wasconstructed by India. Currently, India is engaged in construction of 69 bridges
including approach roads on TKK section and road upgradation of the
Kalewa-Yargi section of the trilateral highway in Myanmar. 14 In addition, theKaladan Multimodal Transport Transit Project (KMTTP) is being pursued
with India’s grant assistance under “Aid to Myanmar”. 15 KMTTP will enable
alternative connectivity between the Northeast India through Mizoram andeastern ports like Haldia and Kolkata through Kaladan River in Myanmar
and augment economic connections between coastal Indian commercial hubs
and Myanmar. While Japan is heavily invested in supporting Master Plan on
ASEAN Connectivity by developing the East-West and Southern Economic
Corridor through hard infrastructure development in Mekong region thatconnects the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, India ca n be abeneficiary in terms of reaching the Southeast Asian markets.
Prospects of bilateral cooperation in South Asia and the neighbouring
region including Iran and Afghanistan has been prioritised in the 2016 Joint

32

Statement stressing on connectivity and infrastructure development in
Chabahar. For India, Chabahar is the critical link to Central Asia, throughAfghanistan. While, Iran has shown a positive attitude towards India-Japan
cooperation in developing Chabahar, 16 but Trumps’ Iran Policy is making
Japan weigh the implications of such cooperation. Meanwhile, India andJapan are cooperating in Sri Lanka, one of the strategic hubs straddlingIndian Ocean shipping lanes. They are developing Sri Lanka’s first LNG
terminal in a joint venture. 17 Both India and Japan are helping Sri Lanka in
Trincomalee and Colombo port development.
The scope is not restricted to Southeast and South Asia alone. India
and Japan have conceptualised the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)
aiming to develop joint projects on capacity building, infrastructure andconnectivity. While the continent featured in the bilateral framework since2010 with India-Japan Dialogue on Africa, with AAGC the focus is on fourpriority areas including development projects, quality infrastructure andinstitutional connectivity, skill development and capacity building, andpeople-to-people cooperation aligning with development priorities of Africa
and the Sustainable Development Goals. Merging India’s experience andunderstanding of the African market with Japan’s technological leadershipand funding capabilities is a win-win formulation for realizing the growthprospects in Africa. While Japan has promised $30 billion investment into
Africa by 2018 in TICAD, including $10 billion for infrastructure devel opment,
India engages with Africa through its India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS).

Ⅲ.

Nurturing Coordinated Partnership in Regional andMultilateral Frameworks
Advancing India-Japan partnership in the Indo-Pacific, both aremobilizing their energies towards synchronizing their strategic convergencein a number of regional and multilateral arrangements including theASEAN-led frameworks like the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), andExpanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
and the United Nations. On pertinent regional security and strategic issues
such as terrorism, defending UNCLOS or UNSC Resolutions on North Korea,

33

India and Japan have performed a sincere role. In addition, Japan’s support
for India’s membership at APEC and NSG, and cooperation towards crafting
the mega regional free trade framework, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, further develops the mutual
confidence in the “special” strategic global partnership.
Japan performed an instrumental role in incorporating India in the
EAS and presently both effectively utilise EAS for furthering constructive
dialogue on regional issues. For instance, in 2016, India and Japan together
with other member states designed the Vientiane Declaration on Promoting
Infrastructure Development Cooperation in East Asia with the objective todeveloping cooperative projects and employing financial and technicalassistance from Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), Japan’s EPQI, and India’s Credit Line of US$ 1
billion. 18 Another such framework is the ADMM-Plus where India and Japan
articulated the importance of freedomofnavigation andoverflight,

unhindered commerce and access to resources in keeping with theinternational law. 19 Indian Navy along with the Japanese Maritime
Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and other participating navies cooperate inmaritime exercises such as Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism (Ex MS& CT) in May 2016. At the Indian Ocean, Japan is a dialogue partner at the
IORA. India as a member is coordinating with Japan and other partners in
reinforcing the shared commitment to build a secure and connected Indian
Ocean by managing security challenges like terrorism and extremism andadvancing the Blue Economy and improving disaster risk management. At the
global stage, India and Japan have joined force within the framework of G-4 inreforming the UNSC enabling it to better reflect the complex realities ofinternational politics.

Ⅳ.

Charting the Course Ahead

While fluidity in regional geopolitics and geo-economics is unfolding
greater uncertainty today, India and Japan as two major Asian powers havealigned in forward thinking while navigating the challenges and tapping theopportunities that the Indo-Pacific construct has to offer. As this maritime
super-region takes on greater space in policy designs and in order to ac hieve

34

the objective of making the Indo-Pacific an “artery for growth andprosperity”, 20 it is imperative for both India and Japan to prioritize theiraction oriented partnership towards each sub-regions.


As Bay of Bengal is emerging as an economic and strategic pole, India
and Japan will do well in identifying opportunities for developing
robust regional economic and connectivity corridors, especially in
Bangladesh and Myanmar. Japan has heavily invested in the Bay of
Bengal region with developmental aid. In Bangladesh, while Japan ispursuing the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth-Belt, India has assisted
in developing coastal shipping and inland waterways. India has also
engaged in the development of Sittwe port in Myanmar.
While enhancing Northeast India’s connectivity through Bangladesh
and Myanmar is critical for economic development, sometimes
trust-deficit between India and its neighbours or the federal structureof Indian polity eclipse the greater good. In this regard, seeking
Japanese participation may neutralise some concerns for host countries.
India-Japan collaboration in Bay of Bengal has the potential toaugment the economic viability and strategic value of concerted
projects on cross-border infrastructure development.
However, it is important to note that while there is alignment ofstrategic interests for India and Japan, the success of any collaboration
would depend on how their different approaches in terms ofprofessional culture are synergised. In addition, India should weigh inthe option of brining in Japan at the Bay of Bengal Initiative forMulti-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) sooner
than later given Japan’s robust bilateral relations with the member
states and commonality of India-Japan strategic interests in theregion.



In addition, since Southeast Asia is the strategic space where Abe’s
FOIPS and Modi’s AEP converge, India and Japan will do well to design
new trilateral frameworks with countries like Vietnam, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore for greater coordination on specific issues of35

common interest including maritime issues. However, there should be arealistic expectation of what these proposed and the existing trilaterals
can achieve.
Furthermore, Japan has clearly demonstrated its will to assume
greater responsibilities in the Indian Ocean region. As India and Japan
conceived the AAGC, the focus should be on East Africa in terms ofgeographical scope. India and Japan will do well to explore joint
projects on infrastructure, capacity-building and human resource
development in East African countries like Mozambique, Tanzania,
Kenya, Sudan and elsewhere given common energy interests. Private
sector will have to take the lead in initiating infrastructuraldevelopment programs in the region. While doing collaborative
developmental projects, India and Japan should consider involving the
local stakeholders to understand the needs and sensitivities of the hostcountries instead of imposing projects unilaterally.

The Indo-Pacific has different sub-regions each of which are driven by adifferent set of security dynamics. Indo-Pacific should not be divided in termsof spheres of influences and should not be dominated by any one or two great
powers. Since a power transition is unfolding in the region with the arrival of
China as a major actor in the international system, both Japan and India has
stepped up as the guardian of global commons and leading promoter ofinternational norms. How India and Japan will utilize their bilateralrelationship against the backdrop of the power shift in Asia will hold criticalimportance 21 as major powers are realigning to shape the broader
Indo-Pacific order. For realizing a stable Indo-Pacific, India and Japan bothhave to work individually, bilaterally and at a regional level to make China
constructively engage in maintaining the liberal order and shaping the
evolving regional architecture underpinned by universal values.
（2nd July, 2018）36

Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, October 11,2011
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/
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Delamotte (ed.) Japan’s World Power: Assessment, Outlook and Vision,
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ukatsu_Kanehara.pdf
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1

States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation”, Secretary of State
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ment+during+the+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Japan
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MULTIMODAL_TRANSIT_TRANSPORT
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http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82250772/
17 “India Gets Loi from Sri Lankan Govt. To Set-Up LNG Terminal in Sri
Lanka”, Petronet LNG Limited, 6-Sep-2017https://www.petronetlng.com/NewsContent.php?newsid=440
18 “Vientiane Declaration On Promoting Infrastructure Development
Cooperation in East Asia Vientiane”, ASEAN, 8 September 2016
http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Vientiane-Declaration-on-Promoting-Infrast
ructure-Development-Cooperation-in-East-Asia-Final.pdf
19 “Third ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting - Plus and Bilateral Talks”,
Japan Defense Focus No. 71, Ministry of Defense , December 2015; “India
Favours Early Conclusion of Code of Conduct on South China Sea byConsensus”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of
Defence, November4, 201520 Kenji Hiramatsu, “What is Certain in an Age of Uncertainty”, Embassy ofJapan in India, March 10, 2017
http://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/00_000286.html
21 Takenori Horimoto, “Japan-India Rapprochement and Its Future Issues”,
Japan’s Diplomacy Series, Japan Digital Library,
http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/japan_s_diplomacy.php

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Bio-brief Titli Basu
Dr. Titli Basu is Associate Fellow at theInstitute for Defence Studies and Analysis(IDSA) in New Delhi. Her research interests
include great power politics in the Indo-Pacific;
East Asian security architecture with special
focus

on

Japanese

security,

strategy

andforeign policy; and India-Japan relations. Her recent publication includes aco-edited book titled China-India-Japan in the Indo-Pacific: Ideas, Interests

and Infrastructure published in 2018. This book analyses the competing
policies that exist between the three major Asian powers – China, India andJapan on infrastructure development and explores the commonalities andcontradictions shaping their ideas and interests in the Indo-Pacific. She has
published several research articles on these issues including in the India
Quarterly:A

JournalofInternational

Affairs,

Tamkang

JournalofInternational Affairs, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Journal of Defense
Studies and Asian Journal of Public Affairs. In addition, she has written in
East Asia Forum, The Diplomat, The Asan Forum and Asia-Pacific Bulletin.
Dr. Basu was a Visiting Fellow at The National Institute for Defense Studies,Japan in 2017. Earlier, she was associated with the University of Tokyo as a
Visiting Fellow and a recipient of the Japan Foundation fellowship in 2010.

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