History of radiation and nuclear disasters in the former USSR
M.V.Malko
Institute of Power Engineering
National Academy of Sciences of Belarus
Akademicheskaya Str.15, Minsk, 220 000, Republic of Belarus
E-mail: m.malko@tut.by
Abstracts. The report describes the history of radiation and nuclear accidents in the former USSR.
These accidents accompanied development of military and civilian use of nuclear energy. Some ofthem as testing of the first Soviet nuclear, Kyshtym radiation accident, radiation contamination of
the Karachai lake and the Techa river, nuclear accidents at the Soviet submarine on August 10,1985 in the Chazhma Bay (near Vladivostok) as well as nuclear accidents on April 26, 1986 at the
Chernobyl NPP were of large scale causing significant radiological problems for many hundreds
thousands of people. There were a number of important reasons of these and other accidents. The
most important among them were time pressure by development of nuclear weapon, an absence of
required financial and material means for adequate management of problems of nuclear andradiation safety, and inadequate understanding of harmful interaction of ionizing radiation onorganism as well as a hypersecrecy by realization of projects of military and civilian use of nuclear
energy in the former USSR.
Introduction.
The first nuclear reactor in the USSR reached the critical state on the 25 December 1946 [1] or 4
years later than reactor constructed by Enrico Fermi [2]. The first Soviet reactor was developed at theLaboratory N2 in Moscow (later I.V.Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy). This was a very important
step in a realization of the Soviet military atomic program that began in September 1942. The Soviet
intelligence service could receive in a previous year the secret information about the beginning of studiesof the possibility to make a nuclear bomb in Great Britain and the USA [3]. As a result of an analysis of
this information the Soviet government decided to begin similar activity in the USSR. On September 28,
1942 the Chairmen of the State’s Council of Defense of the USSR I.V.Stalin signed the Decree N 2352,
that had the title “On organization of the work on uranium” [3]. This decree ordered the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR to set up a special laboratory for carrying out the necessary scientific work fordevelopment of nuclear weapon. The other decree of the State Council of Defense of the USSR appointed
professor I.V.Kurchatov as a scientific supervisor of the Soviet uranium project and a head of a special
laboratory named the Laboratory N2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in February 1943 [3,4].
Construction of the reactor F-1 was accompanied by development of project of plutonium
production on an industrial level. On March 23, 1946 the Government of the USSR issued a Prescription
about construction of a special enterprise (Complex 817) for producing of fissionable materials for nuclear
weapon as well as a city for employers of this enterprise [5]. The most important facilities of the Complex
817 were a plutonium-production reactor (Reactor “A”), a radiochemical facility (Facility “B”) and a
metallurgical facility (Facility “C”). The Complexs 817 and the city for its employers (the city Ozersk orChelyabinsk-40) had to be constructed in the South Ural (approximately 1200 km in east direction from
Moscow) in the Chelyabinsk oblast (region) approximately 100 kilometers in northwest direction from thecity Chelyabinsk and not far from the city Kyshtym .
The Complex 817 was renamed later as “Chelyabinsk 65” (“Chelyabinsk 40). Now it is known
under the name Production Association “Mayak” or in short form as PO “Mayak” [6].
Up to the middle of 1949 the Complex 817 produced plutonium enough for development of thefirst nuclear device that was exploded at the Semipalatinsk Test Site on August 29, 1949 [1]. Its power
was equal to 22 kiloton TNT [1,7].
The first Soviet nuclear device was made only 13 months after beginning of operation of thereactor “A” of the Complex 817. This was an outstanding achievement of the Soviet science and industry.
However, this success was achieved by continuous disregard for environmental and public safety. Three
specific radiation incidents that have their origin in the operation of Complex 817 or PO “Mayak” standout even at present. They are: intentional dumping of radioactive wastes in the Techa river: an explosion ata radioactive waste storage in 1957 (Kystym accident); and a transfer of radioactive sediments from Lake
Karachay in 1967 caused by a wind storm. These and other accident are described in more details in thepresent report.
Plutonium production reactor of the USSR
The first Soviet industrial reactor began its operation at the full power equal to 100 MW in June
22, 1948 [1]. It was constructed in Chelyabinsk oblast near the lake Kyzyl-Tash (Production Association“Mayak”). By construction of this reactor the Soviet specialists changed the arrangement of the active
zone developed in the USA by construction of Hanford production reactors. They designed a verticalarrangement of the active core instead of the horizontal scheme used by American specialists. This wasmade in order to improve thermo-hydraulic parameters of the reactor.
The first Soviet production reactor was a heterogeneous thermal neutron channel-type reactor, inwhich graphite was used as the moderator and light water as the coolant. The reactor core took the shapeof a vertical cylinder. The graphite stack consisted of blocks assembled into columns. They had axial
openings into which the fuel channels were inserted. The total number of fuel channels was 1,200 [1]. The
channels were made from aluminum. The aluminum alloy was also as a cladding material for fuelelements. The natural metallic uranium was used as a fuel. The water for cooling of the active core wastaken from deep horizons of the lake Kyzyl-Tash [1]. It was then purified at a special chemical factory andled to the topic of the active zone. After passing of it, the water was brought back to the lake Kyzyl-Tash.
As can be seen from here, the open cycle of cooling was used in case of the first plutonium reactor. The
project plutonium output of this reactor was established as 36 kg for 1949 [1]. Plutonium that was
produced by this industrial reactor was used for construction of the first Soviet atomic device [1,5,7]. In
1950 the second production reactor of the same type was constructed at the Production Association“Mayak” [8]. Later a number of other plutonium production reactors were constructed at the Production
Association “Mayak” and at other weaponry facilities.
Table 1 presents information about plutonium production reactors constructed in the USSR. It canbe seen from this table that tree different types of plutonium production reactors were used in the USSR:
channel type reactors with natural uranium, graphite as a moderator, light water as a coolant; reactor of2

vessel type with enriched uranium and light water as moderator and coolant and heavy water reactor ofvessel type. However, the main role in production of weapon-grade plutonium played in the USSR
channel type reactor with graphite as moderator. Three generation of plutonium production reactors ofsuch type were developed in the USSR. Reactors A and AI-IR constructed at the Production Association“Mayak” belonged to the first generation of plutonium production reactors. Their beginning power was
100 MW thermal. After reconstruction it was increased up to 900 MW thermal [9].
Reactors of the second generation, for example Reactor-AB, that was putted into operation at theProduction Association “Mayak” in 1950, was simply a further improvement of the Reactor A. It had
higher power and was safer in operation than reactors of the first generation. However reactors of thesecond generation had also an open cycle. This means that water after passing the active core was pumped
out directly into a water reservoir.
The first channel reactor for plutonium production of the third generation was constructed at theSiberian Chemical Combine [10]. This was the reactor EI-2. By designing of this reactor a closed circuitof the active core cooling was provided. The thermal energy generated in the active core were transferredfrom the first circuit to the non radioactive water of the second circuit for generation of water steam. This
allowed using thermal power generated in the active core for generation of the electricity. Development of
this scheme required increase of water‘s pressure in the first circuit above atmospheric pressure specificfor channel reactors of the first and second generations. The thermal power of channel reactors of the third
generation were increased up to 2,000 MW [11]. They produced annually 500 kilograms of weapon-grade
plutonium.
Table 1. Plutonium production reactors of the USSR [8]Facility,
ReactorType of
Reactor
Locationreactorgeneration
PO «Мayak»,Ozersk(Chelyabinsk-65)

Sibirian
Chemical
Combine (СChC),
Seversk(Tomsk-7)
Mining andChemical Combine(MChC)
Яру (г.Красноярск26)

А
АI-IR
АB-1
АB-2
АB-3
ОV-180ОV-190ОV-190М«Ruslan»«Lyudmila»
I-1
EI-2
ОК-140ОК-204
ОК-205ОК-120

UGCh
UGCh
UGCh
UGCh
UGCh
HWV
HWV
HWV
WWR
UGCh
UGCh
UGChT
UGChT
UGChT
UGChT
UGCh

I
I
II
II
II
I
I
I
I
II
I
III
III
III
III
II

1948
1951
1950
1951
1952
1951
1955
1966
1979
1987
1955
1957
1961
1963
1965
1958

Shut
down
1987
1987
1989
1990
1991
1966
1965
1986
1989
1990
1992
1992

ОК-135

UGChT

III

1962

1992

1969

ОК-206

UGChT

III

1964

-

1970

3

Start

Year
Reconstruction
1963
1973
1972
1975
1962
1979
1967, 1980
1967
1967
1969
-

Notices: UGCh – uranium channel reactor with graphite as moderator; HWV – heavy water reactor ofvessel type; UGChT– two purposes uranium channel reactor with graphite as moderator уран-графитовый; WWR – water-water reactor.
Channel reactors of the third generation were two-purposes reactors. They were developed for
production of weapon-grade plutonium and electricity. They became prototypes of the first Soviet power
nuclear plant putted into operation in June 1954 in Obninsk. This NPP had the electrical power only 5,000
kWt [12]. Later channel power reactors of high power (from 1,000 to 1,500 Mw) were developed andconstructed in the USSR. This is so-called RBMK reactors.
Parallel to the development of the plutonium bomb great efforts were made in the USSR for
development of uranium bomb. Two different processes were studied for enrichment of uranium: gaseous
diffusion process of uranium isotopes separation and electromagnetic separation process [13]. The
experimental study of these processes began in 1946. It was carried simultaneously with construction of
the industrial plants for separation of uranium isotopes began. The plant for the industrial gaseous
diffusion process was erected near to the Ural city Nevjansk. The industrial plant for the electromagnetic
processes of the uranium isotopes enrichment was constructed near to the Ural’s city Verkhnyaya Tura.
Weaponry facilities of the USSR
The Production Association “Mayak” (PA “Mayak”) was one of three facilities for weapons-gradefissile materials erected in the USSR.
On March 23, 1946 the Government of the USSR adopted decision about construction of a special
enterprise (Complex 817) for production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapon as well as a city for
employers of this enterprise [5].
The Central Direction of Industrial Construction Direction of the Peoples Commissariat ofInternal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD) was appointed to construct the Complex 817 and the city
Chelyabinsk-40 [5]. Later the NKVD was renamed as the Ministry of State Security of the USSR (Russian
abbreviation MGB), that later was renamed as the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Russian
abbreviation MVD),
Approximately 45,000 thousand of construct builders and installers as well as many thousands ofprisoners were involved in realization of this secret project [5].
A big area (approximately 100 km2) including the industrial site of Complex 817 and the city
Ozersk located 10 kilometers from Complex 817 was fully isolated from surrounding world in order toprevent any information leakage that could expose character of the project. This was achieved byinstalling a special borderland and cordons of soldiers. The NKVD internal troops fulfilled this task [14].
The convoy troops of the NKVD were used as a security guard of prisoners that worked by erecting ofdifferent objects of the Complex 817. Divisions of firemen of the NKVD were responsible for the fire
security. Divisions of militia were responsible for public security in restricted zone. The life of employersof the Complex 817 and inhabitants of the city Ozersk was under full control of the NKVD. Nobody frommilitary or civilian personal could leave the restricted area without a special permission. A very stringent
pass control was established since beginning of the Complex 817 construction. It excluded fully an entryof any outsiders to this restricted zone. At the same time members of military stuff or civilian persons
4

could leave the restricted area only in case of official necessity [15]. The restricted area was not shown on
any open geographical map or plan as it not existed at all.
The Kystym accident characterizes stringency of security regulations applied in the restricted areaof the Complex 817 (PO Mayak). Solders and officers of the MVD participated at the mitigation of directconsequences of the Kyshtym accident. However, even not all deputies of the Minister of MVD of the
USSR were informed about this accident [16]. Only a very limit number of the highest authorities of the
USSR knew about the Kystym accident. It was unknown for party functionaries and States authorities of
the highest rank [17]. For example, the majority members of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union did not receive any information about it [18]. No information was also given to
executives of the military-industrial establishment of the USSR as well as administration of biggest
enterprises of this establishment [16].
Also very stringent security regulations were in force in case of two other Soviet facilities for
production of fissile materials. Construction of them began a couple years after the Second World War.
Decree about erecting the Siberian Chemical Combine (Complex 816) was adopted by the Soviet
Government on March 26, 1949 (Decree № 1252-443) [19]. This facility had to product weapon-grade
plutonium and high enriched uranium for military use. It was erected in the Tomsk oblast not far from thecity Tomsk. The city for employers of this facility was constructed approximately 15 kilometers in northdirection from the city Tomsk [20]. It primary names was Tomsk-7, now the city Seversk.
Here one example of the regime regulations in the Siberian Chemical Combine. In accordancewith regulations adopted on April 2, 1957 the entry to the city Tomsk-7 was forbidden for persons thatworked outside of the USSR as well as citizen of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and west regions of
Ukraine [21]. Many other categories of Soviet citizen were also forbidden to entry the restricted area of
the Siberian Chemical Combine.
The third Soviet weaponry facility, Mining and Chemical Combine, was constructed in the
Krasnoyarsk oblast. Start of its construction began in 1950 on the basis of the Decree of the Central
Committee of Kommunist Party and the Council of ministers of the USSR № 326/302ss/op from February
26, 1950 [22].
This enterprise was constructed at the right bank of the Enisei River 60 kilometers downstream
from the city Krasnoyarsk. It was constructed 200 meters underground in rocks in order to protect theenterprise from attacks from air. The total volume of underground rooms of the combine reached 7 millionof cubic meters or 3.5 times large than the volume of the pyramid of Cheops [23]. 70 thousand of
prisoners and 135 thousand of military construction builders worked 6 years long by construction of the
Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Combine [23]. It was erected only for production of weapon-grade
plutonium and produced before crush of the USSR 45 tons of it.
Radiological problems of nuclear weaponry tests in the Smipalatinsks polygon.
Significant radiological problems in the former USSR were caused by conducting of nuclear
weaponry testing. There were two test sites in the USSR: the Semipalatinst Test Site (STS) and theNovaya Zemlya Test Site (NZTS) [24]. The NZTS is situated in the island Novaya Zemlya in the northernpart of Russia that has very low density population. The Semipalatinsk Test Site lies in north-east part ofKazakhstan with also quite low density population [25]. The STS includes the east part of the Karaganda
5

oblast (region) of Kazakhstan and the south part of the Pavlodar oblast of the Russian Federation. The firsttest of the Soviet nuclear device was conducted in the Semipalatinsk Test Site. This occurred on August29, 1949 at 7: a.m. [2]. Its power achieved 22 kilotons. The second testing follows on September 24, 1951
[26]. This time a atomic bomb was dropped from an airplane. The first Soviet thermonuclear test was also
carried out in the Semipalatinsk Test Site. This happened on August 12, 1953 [26]. The power of the firstthermonuclear device achieved 400 kilotons. Later hydrogen bombs of the megaton class were also
exploded at the STS. Bombs of this class were tested since 1957 only in the Nowaya Zemlya Test Site[25].
456 nuclear tests were conducted in the Semipalatinsk Test Site between 1949 and 1989 including
116 atmospheric nuclear and thermonuclear explosions (26 of them near the ground) [24,27].
The test of the first nuclear device of the USSR carried out on August 29, 1949 caused the mostserious radiological problems. This device was installed on a metallic tower at the altitude 33 m [25]. By
its explosion the fireball touched the ground. This caused formation of radioactive particles from soil anddebris of the metallic tower and other constructions. They were carried downwind together with productsof fission. The wind velocity at test time was 40-50 km/h [28]. Therefore within 2 hours radioactive
clouds reached densely populated areas inside a 100-km from the hypocenter. According to report [28]exposure dose rates at some places exceeded the background by millions of times.
Table 2. Exposure characteristics of populations affected by nuclear tests performed in the
Semipalatinsk Test Site [29].
ExposedNuclear test
settlements
leading to
main exposure
Cheremushki
Dolon
Kanonerka
MostikKainar
KaraulKaskabulak
Kundyzdy
SarzhalZnamenka
Combined

August 29, 1949
August 29, 1949
August 29, 1949
August 29, 1949
September 24, 1951
August 12, 1953
August 12, 1953
August 12, 1953
August 12, 1953
August 24, 1956

Average cumulativedose
estimate, 1949 - 1960
(mSv)
1,746
1,590
718
448
451
455
225
233
665
302
634

Number of
person incohort
538
941
1,239
485
718
2,836
515
613
1,013
913
9,850

Person-years
at risk
14,74027,67022,31037,08081,41015,35016,91013,49028,71026,590284,260

The radioactive fallout affected territories located up to a distance of 2,000 km from the
hypocenter of explosion. About 500, 000 people lived in these territories. They all received quite highdoses of irradiation because no countermeasures of radiation protection were undertaken at this test.
Significant radiological problems arose also after nuclear tests carried out at the Semipalatinsk region on
September 24, 1951 (atomic bomb), on August 12, 1953 (thermonuclear test) and on August 24, 1956
(atomic bomb).
Table 2 (Table 2 from the report [29]) presents mean external doses of the whole body irradiationof inhabitants of the most affected by these tests settlements of Kazakhstan. The main contribution to6

irradiation of them as well as inhabitants other contaminated settlements gave shot-living gamma- andbeta-irradiators. They were received during quite long time beginning from the time of test (about 1 year).
Table 3. Doses of the whole body irradiation of most affected populations received in the firstday after explosions of the first Soviet nuclear device.
ExposedNuclear test
Average dosesettlements
leading toin the first day (mSv)main exposure
Cheremushki
August 29, 1949
698
Dolon
August 29, 1949
636
Kanonerka
August 29, 1949
287
MostikAugust 29, 1949
179

Dose of critical group
irradiation in the firstday(mSv)
2095 - 3492
1908 - 3180
862 - 1436
538 - 896

According to assessment [28] approximately 40% of doses shown in Table 2 formed during thefirst day after explosions. Using this finding as well as data presented in the third column of Table 2
allows to assess doses of the whole body irradiation received by inhabitants of contaminated settlements inthe first day after test. Such data evaluated in this report for inhabitants of settlements Cheremushki,
Dolon, Kanonerka, Mostik are presented in the third column of Table 3.
It is well known that some members of irradiated group accumulate doses that are 3-5 times higherthat the mean dose of this group. Such high irradiated persons form so-called critical group. The fourthcolumn of Table 3 presents assessment of doses of the whole body irradiation received by members ofcritical groups of inhabitants of settlements Cheremushki, Dolon, Kanonerka, Mostik accumulated in thefirst day after explosion of the first Soviet nuclear device. They were evaluated simply by multiplying ofdata given in the third column of Table 2 with factors 3 and 5.
As can be seen from the fourth column of Table 3, doses of the whole body irradiation ofmembers of critical groups are in the range of doses that causes acute radiation syndrome [30]. This meansthat at least members of critical groups in settlements Cheremushki, Dolon, Kanonerka, Mostik had toexperience acute radiation disease as a result of the first atomic test in the USSR.
There are data that allows assuming that manifestation of acute radiation disease could be possible
not only in mentioned settlements of Kazakhstan but also in other settlements of this country as well as insome settlements of Altay Region (Russian Federation). Now it is known that radioactive clouds formedby explosion of the first Soviet nuclear device reached also this region. According to report [31], the meandose of the whole body irradiation of inhabitants of the Uglovsky district of the Altay Region caused by
the first Soviet nuclear exploding reached 800 mSv. The main contribution to total irradiation of
inhabitants of the Uglovsky district as in case of irradiation of inhabitants of affected populations of
Kazakhstan gave shot-living gamma- and beta-irradiators.
The collective equivalent dose of the whole body irradiation of the Uglovsky district population
irradiation is estimated as 16,5103 челЗв [31]. However radioactive substances deposited also in threeother districts of the Altay Region with the population 200,000 people. The collective equivalent dose of
the whole body irradiation in affected people of the Altay Region is assessed equal to approximately
28103 PSv and the mean dose of irradiation equal to 142 mSv. 90% of the irradiation dose in affected
population of the Altay Region was received in the first year.

7

The very high doss of acute and sub-acute irradiation of people in Kazakhstan as well as in the
Russian Federation (Altay Region) could cause also so-called chronic acute disease among irradiatedpeople. According to Soviet specialists [32] it develops if annual irradiation doses are about 100 mSv
annually and the total accumulated dose of the whole body irradiation exceeds 700 mGy.
However there is no any documentation that can give reliable evidence indicating manifestation of
acute and chronic radiation diseases among populations of Kazakhstan and the Altay region of the RussianFederation affected as a result of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk Test Site. Detailed study ofradiological problems of nuclear explosions at the STS began only at the end of eighties. These studies
demonstrated reliable data about manifestation of different cancers among affected populations (leukemia,
lung, stomach, female breast cancers etc) [33]. In accordance with findings of the last report the excess
relative risk per sievert for all solid cancers combined was 1.77/Sv. This is by some factors higher thanexcessive relative risk of cancers established for atomic bomb survivors. The last finding indicates thatradiation risk of chronic irradiation is higher than radiation risk observed for acute irradiation (atomic
bomb survivors).
Techa River radiation problems.
Reprocessing on the industrial scale of uranium irradiated in the first plutonium production reactorof the PA “Mayak” (Reactor A) began in March 1949 [5].Because of the absence of reliable technology
for reprocessing and storing of radioactive wastes liquid radioactive effluents of reprocessing were piped
directly into the near Techa River [34]. Approximately 76 million cubic meters of liquid radioactive
wastes with total activity of -emitters approximately 3 MCi (~1017 Bq) came as a result of this practice
into the river Techa in 1949-1956. This was a mixture of the radionuclides 89Sr, 90Sr, 137Cs, 95Zr, 95Nb,
103

Ru, 106Ru and isotopes of rare-earth elements. Isotopes 90Sr and 137Cs determined about 25% of the total

activity of this mixture. About 95% of the waste was discharged into river from March 1950 to November
1951 [35].
The Techa River is a medium-size river that flows from a small lake located near the Production
Association “Mayak” [35]. Its length is about 240 km. It flows through rural areas of Chelyabinsk andKurgan oblasts before merging with the Iset River that is a tribute of the Tobol River a tribute of theEnisey River. 41 rural settlements were located along its riverside. Inhabitants of these settlements were
not informed about discharge of radioactive wastes in the river and kept the normal habit of life. They
used water from the Techa Rive as drinking water, they cultivated their contaminated pieces of land andused contaminated flood lands as a pasture for their cattle etc. This caused an exposition to external radiation and internal irradiation from consumption of locally produced food and river water. The skeleton
and bone marrow were critical organs of irradiation [34].
In 1951 or 2 years after beginning of radioactive wastes discharge into river medical examinationsof the health status of residents of settlements located along riverside of the Techa River started [34].
Visiting teams of specialists from the Biophysics Institute of the USSR Ministry of Health Care and from
Medical-Sanitary Department carried out the exams. These visits were not able to perform regularexamination and treatment of affected persons. Therefore special dispensaries No 1 and No 2 wereorganized in Chelyabinsk and the city Shadrinsk of the Kurgan oblast [34].

8Medical examinations demonstrated that a fraction of inhabitants of settlements located in the
Techa River riverside had changes in their hemopoietic, immune and other systems. These findings led todiagnosis of chronic radiation sickness (СRS) and other radiation-induced reactions. According to archive
data [36] 935 cases of chronic radiation sickness were diagnosed primarily among of residents of affected
settlements located along riverside of the Techa River. This number was decreased after more detailed
examinations to 66 cases [34].
There were a number of reasons for overestimation of the incidence in chronic radiation sickness
among residents of settlements affected as a result of the discharge of radioactive wastes into the Techa
River [34]. Firstly, doctors did not know doses of irradiation. Secondly, residents of affected settlements
did not know anything about reasons of their illness and regular aminations of their health status. Thirdly,
there was no correct understanding of possible health effects of combined chronic irradiation (external andinternal irradiation).
Establishing of different health effects was the reason for resettlement of residents of highcontaminated settlements to clean areas of the Chelyabinsk and Kurgan oblasts. This action wasundertaken after 1956 when people received quite significant doses of external and internal irradiation.
Approximately 10,200 persons including children were resettled to clean areas of the Chelyabinsk andKurgan oblasts.
As can be seen from Table 4 this were mostly residents of rural settlements of the Chelyabinsk
oblast located in a head of Techa rive. They received the highest external and internal doses of bone tissue
and bone marrow.
Table 4. Techa riverside settlements, distances and the number of inhabitants [3]Village of first exposure
Distance from release Evacuateda
1950 populationb
point
Chelyabinsk oblast
Metlino7
Yes
961
Techa-Brod
18
Yes
77
Asanovo33
Yes
787
Maloye Taskino
41
Yes
114
Gerasimovka
43
Yes
268
GRP
45
Yes
49
Nadyrov Most
48
Yes
155
Nadyrovo
50
Yes
149
Ibragimovo
54
Yes
136
Isayevo60
Yes
366
Farm of Trust nj.42
70
Yes
379
Muslyumovo station
71
No
432
Muslyumovo
78
No
1,958
Kurmanovo
88
Yes
914
Karpino96
Yes
169
Zamanikha
100
Yes
299
Vetroduika
105
Yes
134
Brodokalmak
109
No
3,095
Osolodka
125
Yes
330
Panovo128
Yes103
Cherepanovo
137
Yes
181
Russkaya Techa
138
No
1,170
9

Baklanovo
140
Yes
396
Nizhnepetropavlovskoye
148
No
766
Chelaybinskaya oblast total
13,388Kurgan oblast
Beloyarka-2
155
Yes
319
Lobanovo
163
No
578
Anchugovo
174
No
1,010
Verkhnaya Techa
176
No
869
Skilyagino
183
No
426
Bugayevo
186
No
1,028
Dubasovskoye
190
Yes
650
Biserovo
202
No457
Shutikhinskoye
203
No
1,081
Progress
207
Yes
186
Pershino
212
No
1,016
Klyuchevskoye
223
No
1,226
Markovo230
No
134
Ganino234
No
1,039
Kurgan oblast total
10,101
Chelyabinsk and Kurgan oblasts together
23,489a
Indicates whether residents of the village were moved to another location as a result of theradioactive contamination.
b

Population estimates taken from 1950 official estimates.
This can be seen from Table 5 that contains results of an assessment of irradiation doses of bone

tissue and bone marrow accumulated during first 25 years after beginning of radioactive wastes discharge
into the Techa river.
Table 5. Doses of bone marrow and bone tissue accumulated during 25 years by resients ofsettlements along the riverside of the Techa accident [37]Settlement
Distance from
Status,Population,“PA Mayak”,
evacuated persons
km
Chelyabinsk oblast
Metlino7
Yes
1242
Techa-Brod
18
Yes
75
Asanovo33
Yes
898
Maloye Taskino
41
Yes
147
Gerasimovka
43
Yes
357
Geologorazvedka
45
Yes
238
Nadyrov Most
48
Yes
240
Nadyrovo
50
Yes184
Ibragimovo
54
Yes
184
Isayevo60
Yes
434
Farm of Trust №42
64
Yes
487
Muslumovo
78
No
3,230
Kurmnovo
88
Yes
1,046
Karpino96
Yes
195
Zamanikha
100
Yes
338
Vetroduika
105
Yes
163
Brodokalmak
109
No
4102
10

Bone
Marrow(mSv)

Bone
tissue
(mSv)

1640
1270
1270
1100
980
750
700
950
950
590
630
610
380
480
360
440
140

2260
1480
1900
1680
1630
1220
1180
1800
1800
1190
410
1430
880
1150
850
1060
310

Osolodka
PanovoCherepanovo
Russkaya Techa
Baklanovo
Nizhnepetropavlovskoye

125
128
137
138
141
148

Beloyarka-2
Lobanovo
Anchugovo
Verkhnaya Techa
Skilyagino
Bugayevo
Dubasovskoye
Biserovo
Shutikhinskoye
Progress
Pershino
Ganino +Markovo
Klyuchevskoye
Zatecha

155
163
170
176
180
186
200
202
203
207
212
215
223
237

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Kurgan oblast

362
129
222
1472
480
919

340
380
250
220
75
280

830
910
590
530
170
680

386
626
1093
979
492
1074
703
465
1109
205
1143
220
1309
1135

310
220
260
290
400
250
160
260
80
170
150
120
80
170

750
530
630
700
900
600
370
630
180
400
340
290
170
400

Data of Table 5 show that even people in settlements located about 200 kilometers from the headof the Techa River accumulated doses of the bone marrow and bone tissue in hundreds of millisievert.
This demonstrates that significant amount of radioactive substances released in the Techa river at its head
were transferred up to the Iset River located 200 kilometers from the PA “Mayak”. This transfer meantthat radioactive substances could be transferred through rivers Iset, Tobol and Enisei up to the Arctic
Ocean increasing possibility to discover the place of the Soviet plutonium production facility. In order toprevent such possibility release of radioactive wastes of the PO “Mayak” was practically stopped in
November 1951.
Very high irradiation doses of the bone marrow and bone tissue received residents of thesettlement Muslumovo that was not resettled. Examination performed in this settlement in 1993
demonstrated that exposure dose rates in some areas with lengths about 100 meters were 6-7 microsievert
per hour [37]. Areas with the enhanced exposure dose rates were also found in personal subsidiary plots ofresidents of this settlement. It was established that radioactive contamination of personal subsidiary plots
was caused by using of dung of the cattle that grazed on flood lands of the Techa River. It was found thatdung emitted -radiation at the exposure dose rates about 0.5 – 3 microsievert per hour [37].
Last time a number of reports with results of radioepidemiological studies of the mortality fromcancers among residents of settlement located in the riverside of the Techa River were published[34,38,39]. These studies were performed for the cohort of evacuated and remined residents of settlements
located in the riverside of the Techa River. The mean dose of the whole body irradiation of this cohort wasassessed equal to 0,31 Gy [34]. According to the report [34] 46 fatal solid cancers and 31 fatal cases ofleukemia (excluding chronic lymphoid leukemia) occurred in the cohort containing 29,873 persons up to
the end of 1999. Similar results were observed also in reports [38, 39].
Studies of the cohort of residents of settlement located in the riverside of the Techa River [34,38]
allowed to establish very important data in respect of chronic irradiation of normal population with low
11doses and low dose rates. It was established that no threshold exists for carcinogenic impact of such kindof irradiation. It was also found that excessive relative risks of mortality from solid cancers and leukemia
in members of the cohort of residents of settlements located in the riverside of the Techa River are byapproximately 2 times higher than by atomic bomb survivors. This means that coefficient of radiation
risks observed for atomic bomb survivors can not be transferred for chronic irradiation of normal
population.
It is clear that data on numbers of additional fatal solid cancers and leukemias presented here do
not express all possible health effects caused by release of radioactive wastes into the Techa River in
1949-1956. One needs to remember that the cohort studied in reports [34,38] comprises only residents ofsettlements located in the riverside of the Techa River. However, the total number of persons that wereaffected through release of radioactive wastes is much higher. It is approximately 142 thousands [40]. This
number includes also residents of settlements that located near to settlements of located in the riverside of
the Techa River. It is also necessary to remember that detailed studies of health effects of this releasebegan practically at the end of the USSR existence. This means that a lot of data important for assessmentof the impact of radioactive wastes on health was lost. This does not allow to describe full picture ofhealth effects in population suffered from release of radioactive wastes into the Techa River.
Kystym radiation accident
At the beginning of fifties special storage for radioactive wastes originated from reprocessing of
irradiated uranium was erected at the PA Mayak. It consisted a number of tanks made from stainless steel
and installed in concrete canyons embedded partly in the ground [41]. They were located about 2
kilometers from the radiochemical plant (Plant “B”). The volume of each tank was 300 cubic meters. Eachtank had a water cooling system placed on the internal wall. Construction of cooling systems did not allow
their repair. The cooling system of one tank was out of operation in 1956 due to corrosion of metallic
tubes caused by an impact of mixture of radioactive salts. Specialists of radiochemical plant assessed thepossible consequences of a complete failure the defect cooling system. According to performed
assessments such failure could not influence a safe storage of radioactive wastes. Considering these
conclusions nothing was made during a year after establishing of problems with the cooling system. It
turned out later that these conclusions were incorrect. The failure of the cooling system caused expulsionof water, warming and concentration of highly explosive nitrates and acetates containing in the tank. An
occasional spark from defective control equipment initiated chemical reactions between these components.
This caused a powerful detonation and destruction of a tank. The energy of explosion was assessed later
equal to 5 – 10 tons of trinitrotolulol (TNT) [42]. This accident occurred at 16:30 on September 29, 1957.
Approximately 20 Millions Curie of radioactive substances was there in the tank before explosion.
Approximately 18 Millions Curie (90%) fell on the territory of radioactive wastes storages and otherobjects of the industrial are [43]. Approximately 2 Millions Curie (10%) formed a radioactive cloud thatmoved in north-east direction from the place of accident because of strong wind from south-west direction.
It reached the altitude of 1 kilometer. Falling of radioactive substances by passing of radioactive cloudcontaminated some territories of Chelyabinsk, Serdlovsk and Tyumen oblasts of the Russian Federation.
Table 6 gives information about composition of radioactive substances released to theenvironment as a result of explosion [43]. It can be seen from it that short-living radioisotopes 144Ce, 144Pr,
12

95

Zr and 95 Nb made the main contribution to the initial activity of released radioactive substances. They

fully determined radiation situation in a first year after accident. However, the long-term radioactive
situation in contaminated areas was determined by isotope 90Sr that gave together with isotope 90Y only
5.4% of the initial activity. Therefore the isotope 90Sr was chosen as a quantitative indicator of radioactive
contamination. It was found that approximately 15,000 km2 were contaminated with this isotope to thelevel higher than 3.7 kBq/m2 (0.1 Ci/km2). Approximately 1000 km2 had the level of contamination with90

Sr  2 Ci/km2 (74 kBq/m2).

Table 6. Composition of radionuclides in damaged tank of the PA “Kystym” [43].
Radionuclide
Half-life
Irradiation typeSpecific
contribution
priamarytotal activity, in %89
Sr
51 dayTraces, 9090
Sr + Y28.6 years
5.4

95
Zr + 95Nb
65 days
24.9
, 
106
Ru + 106Rh
1 year
3.7
, 
137
Cs
30 years
0.036
, 
144
Ce + 144Pr
284 days
66
, 
147
Pm
2.6 years
Traces, 155Eu
5 years
Traces, 239,240
Pu
TracestoThe level of contamination decreased monotonically in direction of the radioactive cloud passing
and had quite sharp boarders in a crosscut axes [43]. The maximal total contamination reached 15,000
Ci/km2 and maximal contamination with the isotope 90Sr was approximately 4,000 Ci/km2. The
contaminated area had a form of a strip that crossed Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Tyumen oblasts ofRussia that went through rural areas of these oblasts of Russia. This strip, “Kyshtym footprint”, received
the official name of “East Urals Radioactive Trace” (EURT) [43]. 217 settlements with approximately 272
thousands of residents were located at the time of explosion in the area with the isotope 90Sr 3.7 kBq/m2
and higher [44].
Because the Kystym accident was the topic secret of the USSR it was unknown even for highparty functionaries and for high rank of the Soviet State authorities [45]. Nothing was also known in West.
The first information about the Kystym accident appeared in West only in 1974 when the Soviet dissident
biologist Zhores Medvedev published at the end of fifties his article about a radiological accident in theSouth Ural [46]. Zhores Medvedev did not known exactly when it happened and what the reason of it was.
He had drawn his conclusions about the accident on the basis of an analysis of some published articles in
the open Soviet scientific literature about incidence of ionizing radiation on animals and plants in the Ural
Region. According him a radiological accident occurred in the Kystym area at the end of 1957 or at the
beginning of 1958 with release of approximately 50 MCi (1.851018 Bq) radioactive substances.
Report of Zhores Medvedev [46] caused a number of different of hypotheses on origin of theaccident including very exotic. For example, it was proposed that Soviets dropped an atomic bomb withequivalent of 22 TNT in order to examine the strengths of radiochemical plant and its infrastructure [47].
Controversial debates in Western about the Kyshtym are described in details in the book of
Rosalie Bertell [48].
13

Correct information about this accident became available only after crush of the USSR. It is
known today that this accident occurred at 4:25 p:m on September 29, 1957 and that it was caused by
explosion of radioactive waste in a defect storage [43,49].
The power of explosion was so high that the upper cover, a heavy concrete plate, was thrown off
in the distance of 200 meters. In a building located in 200 meters from the waste‘s tank not only all
windows but even one wall made from bricks were damaged. Windows of all buildings in a radius of morethan 1,500 meters were also crushed. Eyewitnesses of explosions told later that a column of smoke anddust formed over the damaged waste‘s tank. It shimmered with red and orange light that was similar to theaurora borealis [50].
The radioactive cloud contaminated different buildings of industrial area, military quarters, fire
department, location of military construction builders and the prisoner’s camp [50].
According to [49], the commander on-duty ordered all officers and solders to go to quarters, toocclude all destroyed windows using all available materials and wet floors in quarters. A dark radioactive
cloud overhung the location of troops soon after the military staff reached its quarters. It became very dark.
Outside of quarters big flakes began to drop from the cloud. Smaller particles were dropping also on thenext day. Specialists in dosimetry appeared soon in the location of the military stuff. After measurement of
exposures doses they told to commanders that all people had to be evacuated immediately fromcontaminated quarters to clean areas of the restricted zone. However, the commanders could not undertake
this action without permission from Moscow. It came at the beginning of night of September 30, or 8hours after the accident. The evacuation of the military stuff began at 2 in the night. The trucks that evenhad no tents were used for evacuation. Some solders and officers had to walk because there was no place
enough in trucks. After evacuation all solders and officers undertaken the sanitization and received clean
clothing. However nobody understood how to perform the sanitization. Therefore all solders and officers
simply washed themselves some during some hours with hot water. That such method could not assure
required decontamination of hair and skin.
Significant deposition of radioactive substances was registered also in location of the prisoner
camp where there were 1,100 prisoners and 80 persons of the guard [51]. The head of guard was informed
about radiological situation only at 2 in the night of September 30. All prisoners together with their guard
were evacuated in the period from 4 to 8 in the morning to clean area. After evacuation they had
sanitization that lasted 3 days.
General Ptashkin, the Division Commander of Internal Troops of the MVD that guarded therestricted area informed in a secret report to Moscow, that as a result of the explosion a fraction ofindustrial area and area of military quarters were significantly contaminated. It reported that exposure dose
rates achieved in some places 5,000 – 6,000 microroentgens per second [52]. This was approximately 1
million times higher than the exposure rate of background irradiation.
Many rural settlements outside of the restricted area were contaminated to high levels of radiation
too. Therefore, authorities in Moscow decided to evacuate residents of the most contaminated settlements
such as Berdyants, Saltykovo, Galikaevo and Russkaya Karabolka (Kasli district, Chelyabinsk oblast) [53].
Practical realization of this decision began 7-10 days after the accident when inhabitants of contaminatedsettlements received quite high doses of irradiation. Measurements performed in the rural settlement
Berdyants before evacuation demonstrated that exposure dose rates were about 40-50 microroentgens per
14

second close to stomach of children [54]. Anserine droppings emitted radiation with the exposure rate
about 50-70 microroentgens per second.
Later another contaminated settlements were evacuated too, so the full number of evacuatedsettlements reached 23 [43]. All residents of contaminated settlements were evacuated or resettled to near
districts of the Chelyabinsk oblasts. This was made on the cost of the State.
The evacuation and resettlement of affected residents were performed in 5 steps. Table 7 shows
number of evacuated or resettled persons and other relevant data.
The total number of all residents evacuated or resettled in 5 phases was 10,800. The highest dosesof irradiation received residents of settlements Berdyants, Saltykovo, Galikaevo and Russkaya Karabolka.
The mean arithmetic effective dose of their irradiation was 52 rem (520 mSv). This value was estimatedon the basis of the mean external dose, 17 rem, and the mean dose of stomach irradiation equal toapproximately 160 rem.
Table 7. Dynamic of evacuation and doses of irradiation received before evacuation [43].
Evacuated groups and Average density of Timeof Average dose received before
number of evacuated 90Sr deposition,
evacuation
after evacuation
persons, thousands
Ci/km2
accident, days
External dose, Effective
remequivalent dose,remI; 0.60500
7 - 10
1752
II; 0.28
65
250
14
44
III; 2.0
18
250
3.9
12
IV; 4.2
8.9
330
1.9
5.6
V; 3.1
3.3
670
0.68
2.3
Only residents of settlements with the level of contamination by the isotope 90Sr  2 Ci/km2 (74kBq/m2) were evacuated or resettled as a result of the Kystym accident [43]. The mean contaminationlevel of remaining settlements where about 270,000 residents lived was approximately 1 Ci/km2 (37kBq/m2) with 90Sr. Despite of quite high irradiation doses of evacuated and resettled residents no reliable
evidences of such radiation-induced health effects as cancer were observed among them during 30 years
after accident [43]. The possible reasons of such finding could be quite low collective doses of irradiationand quite low follow-up. For example, the collective effective dose of the whole body irradiation ofevacuated and resettled residents is only approximately 980 PSv. This value was estimated on the basis ofdata presented in Table 7. It is quite small in order to established statistical significant health effect ofirradiation.
According to the report [43] only decrease of leucocytes in peripheral blood, decrease0f thenumber of platelets as well as functional neurological disturbances. The most possible reason of such
results of medical examinations can be late and not adequate observation of affected people.
Evacuation of residents of high contaminated settlements was performed by troops of the Ministryof Internal Affairs of the USSR. It was forbidden to explain the real reason of evacuation. It was forbidden
even using the word “radiation”. The people in settlements foreseen for evacuation were said that it was
dirty in their settlements [55]. They did not want to leave their houses, their asset and graves of their15parents. In order to avoid evacuation they have undertaken a general cleaning of their houses. They asked
authorities to see that their houses were very clean and therefore there were no necessity for evacuation.
All persons that were involved into performing of evacuation and mitigation of directconsequences of the accident or that knew about accident were enforced to sign a special document that
required keeping the secrecy about the accident and its consequences. A very serious punishment expected
those persons that did not fulfilled this requirement.
This policy of the hypercecrecy became later a serious handicap for many people affected by theaccident. Many of them became ill as a result of significant irradiation. However they were not allowed totell their doctors the reasons of their illness. This made impossible for doctors to establish correct diagnose
and apply correct treatment of illness [56]. Such policy caused loosing of very important data about healtheffects of ionizing radiation and makes impossible correct estimation of health effects in all groups
affected by the Kyshtym accident.
Deputy Head of the Department of Special Troops of the MVD General-Leutnant G.I.Aleinikov
prepared a special report on the Minister of the Interior of the USSR about reasons and consequences of
the Kystym accident [57]. He sugested to carry out a full analysis of the accident and made a number of
proposals regarding the necessity activity in affected areas. He suggested also making familiar all otherdivisions of the MVD with experience accumulated by direct mitigation of the Kystym consequences.
Unfortunately last proposal of General-Leutnant was no accepted by authorities and all experience
accumulated in Kystym was newer used in the USSR. According to the General-Leutnant (in resignation)of the MVD of the USSR N.I.Demidov [58] by mitigation of the Chernobyl accident were made practical
the same errors as in Kystym. And this aggravated significantly its consequences.
Karachai Lake radioactive contamination
The Karachai Lake located near to the radiochemical plant (Plant “B”) of the Production
Association “Mayak”. This lake was used since autumn of 1951 for storage of liquid radioactive effluents.
The total activity of radioactive wastes loaded into this lake is assessed equal to approximately 120
Millions Curie [59].
The water level in the Karachai Lake decreased very significantly in 1962-1967 outcropping thelake shore contaminated with radioactive substances. The wind storm that happened in 1967 caused
significant transfer of radioactive substances and contamination of the environment. Approximately 0.6
Millions Curie were transferred from Karachai Lake on this way [60]. This caused a significant
contamination of 63 rural settlements located on the territory of 2,700 km2 with 41.5 thousands ofinhabitants. Some of these settlements were contaminated in 1957 as a result of the Kyshtym radiation
accident.
In order to prevent the further transfer of radioactive sediments it was decided at the end ofnineties to lay hollow concrete blocks on the opened bottom of the Karachai Lake. This decision was
realized some years ago. However it did not solve problems of the Karachai Lake. Very serious problemof radioactive wastes loaded into the Karachai Lake causes penetration of radioactive substances into asubsurface waterbearing formation. Assessment show that about 4 Millions cubic meters of radioactive
substances already penetrated up to the depth 100 m [59]. They migrated slowly into direction of the16

Chelyabinsk city water intake. Therefore a very serious problems has to expect in the future in respect ofwater supply of this city.
Nuclear accident in the Chazhma Bay.
A serious accident occurred on 10 August 1985 at a Soviet submarine K-431 by fuel reloading[61]. The submarine belonged to the first generation of Soviets atomic boats. Such submarines were
supplied with 2 identical pressurized water reactors that had the power 70 MW and used enriched uranium(21% of 235U) [62]. Their design was similar to design of western pressurized nuclear reactors (PWRs).
The submarine was moored at the pier of shipyard in the Chazhma Bay (not far from the city
Vladivostok). It was discovered by finishing of a fuel reloading that the gasket of the cover of the port
side’s reactor was untight. By elimination of this defect a compensation grid was withdrawn out the active
core. This initiated a chain reaction on prompt neutrons and powerful explosion that damaged the reactor.
One fuel assembly was thrown out the active core. Its metallic construction dropped into VI partition ofsubmarine near the cover of the reactor of starboard.
Witness of the accident observed rich flash of white color up to 6 meters in the height. It was
followed by orange-grey fume that was rising up to 20 meters in the height. Immediately after explosion afire began in the VI partition. 4 hours were required for its suppression. Explosion damaged also strong
hull of the submarine. There were other serious damages of the submarine.
The active core at the moment of explosion contained only a fresh fuel. This was a reason that
released radioactive substances were mostly short-living radionuclides with negligible contribution ofsuch isotopes as 90Sr and 137Cs [63]. The total activity of released radioactive nuclides was only about 5
millions Ci. Decay of short-living radionuclides caused a rapid decrease of the activity of radioactive
substances discharged to the environment. Assessment carried out in the report [63] showed that it fell up
to approximately 0.8 Ci to days after the accident.
The significant fraction of fission products and dispersed particles as well as substances formed by
the fire fell around the submarine in the area with the radius 50-100 meters. The exposure dose rate in thisarea was about 250-500 milliroentgens per hour 7.5 hours after the accident [64].
Another fraction of released radioactive substances deposited in some kilometers from peer in an
empty area. Thus, only stuff members of fleet as well as fireman suppressed the fire developed at thesubmarine were affected of this accident.
Immediately after explosions naval specialists and specialists of the enterprise that served
submarines organized dosimetric measurements, localization of high contamination and liquidation of
direct consequences of the accident [64]. Military personnel as well as personnel of the enterprise that was
not involved in this activity were evacuated from the zone of accident. Different other countermeasures
were also undertaken. This was made in order to decrease a number of persons that could be irradiated as aresult of the accident.
Approximately 2,000 persons were involved in liquidation of direct consequences of it [64]. The
mean dose of the whole body irradiation of this group was about 5 rem. Approximately 290 persons fromthis group received higher doses of irradiation. The symptoms and signs of acute radiation diseases wereregistered by 39 persons. However, acute radiation diseases developed only by 10 persons. 10 persons (817officers and 2 other persons from military personnel) died from injuries gotten during the explosion. These
data show that the accident in the Chazhma Bay caused quite serious health effects.
The primary reason of the Chazhma Bay accident was inserting of an additional positive reactivity
to the active core. This caused a development of an uncontrolled chain reaction. It means that it had acharacter of a nuclear explosion. It demonstrated that a water-pressurized reactor can explode like a small
nuclear bomb after inserting of a positive reactivity into active core.
The accident in The Chazhma Bay was some kind of a general repetition of similar accident of alarge scale. Careful analysis of this accident could be very important for Soviet specialist in the field of
nuclear safety. Unfortunately, the information about the accident in the Chazma was kept in the USSR likesome topic secret. Ten months later the Chernobyl accident occurred. Its primary physical reason was also
the inserting of a positive reactivity into active core [65].
Chernobyl accident
The Chernobyl NPP accident has become the most severe technical accident in the history ofhumankind. It took place on April 26, 1986, during an electromechanical experiment. The aim of theexperiment was a determination of the amount of electrical energy produced by the electrical generator in
the process of an idle turbine rundown. The program of the experiment did not take into account a numberof important physical and thermal-hydraulic features of the reactor and the whole reactor unit. This caused
some wrong operations of the personal and as a result the total destruction of the active core of the forthunit of the Chernobyl NPP as well as considerable damage of the third unit of the plant [65]. The
witnesses of the Chernobyl NPP accident claim that destruction of the Chernobyl reactor occurred as aresult at least of two consecutive explosions. Specialists believe that the first explosion was caused by an
explosion-like formation of vapour in the active core of reactor. This caused complete displacement ofwater from reactor and nuclear explosion in the drained active core [66]. The power of this second
explosion is estimated to be approximately 0,28 kilotons TNT [67], which is in 50 times less than the
power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
The damage of the Chernobyl reactor caused the release of a huge amount of radioactive
substances into the environment. They spread far beyond the borders of the nuclear plant [68, 69]. These
substances where deposited in many countries of the northern hemisphere including Japan [70], causing
considerable radioactive ecological problems. However, Belarus suffered most severely from the
Chernobyl NPP accident than any other country of the world. Such conclusion can be drawn by comparing
densities of the isotope 137Cs deposition in the different countries of the world. This isotope was chosen
after the Chernobyl NPP accident as a quantitative indicator of radioactive contamination. According todata [68], the maximal contamination with 137Cs beyond the borders of the former USSR has not exceeded
185 kBq/m2 (5 Ci/km2). In Belarus the maximal density of 137Cs fallout reached 59,200 kBq/m2 (1600
Ci/km2) [71] or about 300 times more than maximum contamination beyond the former USSR.
Approximately 23% of the total amount of the isotope 137Cs deposited on the territory of Belarus[69,72]. Assessment carried out in the report [73] show that doses of the whole body irradiation reached insome rural settlements 300 mSv. The maximal doses of the whole body irradiation could reach in Belarus
1,500 mSv. Similar results were established by authors [74]. Doses of the thyroid gland irradiation in

18

Belarus were one order in magnitude higher than doses of the whole body irradiation. In some cases theyexceeded 50 Gy [75]. Similar irradiation arisen also in affected regions of Ukraine and Russia [72].
As a result of an extensive irradiation additional thyroid cancers in children and adults [76-85],
leukemias in children and adults [86-91], stomach cancers [92], lung cancers [93], female breast cancers[94, 95] as well as nonmelanoma skin cancers [96] manifested in Belarus after the Chernobyl accident.
Statistical reliable data indicating manifestation of radiation-induced stomach, colon, lung, thyroid andurinary bladder cancers in the Belarusian liquidators as well as of all malignant neoplasms combined
together have been established [97,98].
An increase in the incidence of thyroid cancers was also established in children of Ukraine andRussia affected at the Chernobyl accident [99, 100]. In case of Russian liquidators radiation-induced
thyroid cancers and leukemias as well as cancers of digestive and other systems were also found [101-103].
It was established in reports [84, 90-95, 98, 102] that radiation risks of the incidence in malignant
neoplasms manifested in affected regions of the former USSR as a result of the Chernobyl accident are
higher by some factors than radiation risks established for atomic bomb survivors.
Additional to malignant neoplasms a significant increase in the incidence in general somatic
disease was established in affected populations of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia as well as in liquidators ofthese countries [104-111]. Data of the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian specialists about link between
the incidence in general somatic diseases correspond qualitatively with findings observed by survived
inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for which higher incidence in cerebrovascular and other somatic
diseases in comparison with no irradiated Japanese population was [112-115]. It was found that radiationinduced general somatic diseases in case of atomic bomb survivors gave the similar contribution to theadditional mortality as radiation-induced cancers.
An assessment of the incidence in radiation-induced malignant neoplasms in Belarus was
performed for the period 1986 – 2056 in report [116] based on the analysis of medical data registered in
Belarus. Published data of the Belarusian Cancer Registry were used for the assessment. It was estimatedthat approximately 28,300 solid cancers other than thyroid cancers, about 31,400 thyroid cancers as well
as approximately 2,800 additional leukemias can be expected in Belarus in 1986-2056 as a result of theChernobyl accident. According to performed assessment the excessive absolute risk, EAR, of radiationinduced solid cancers averaged for 1986-2056 will be about 230 cases per 10,000 PYSv. This value is in aqualitative agreement with the value of EAR established for the incidence in radiation-induced solidcancers in the cohort of atomic bomb survivors in 1958-1998 (52 cases per 10,000PYSv) [117]. A
qualitative assessment of excessive absolute risk of the incidence in thyroid cancers and in leukemias was
carried out in the report [116]. Estimated values are also higher by some factors than radiation risks ofthyroid cancers and leukemias established for atomic bomb survivors.
An assessment of additional incidence in cancers in affected European countries that can be
expected in the period 1956-2056 as a result of the Chernobyl accident was performed in the report [118].
It was carried out by indirect transition of radiation risks estimated for Belarus. The estimated results arepresented in Table 8.

19

Table 8. Predicted numbers of excess cases, 1986-2056, in European countries after the
Chernobyl accident.[118].
Cancers
and countries
Cases

Excess cases
90%CI

RR

Relative risk
90%CI of RR

Share,
in %%Thyroid cancers
Belarus31,40015,400÷47,500

2.625

1.797÷3.460

33.9

Belarus, Russia
and Ukraine
65,80031,800÷99,900

1.151

1.073÷1.230

71.1

Other countries ofEurope26,80011,500÷42,200

1.019

1.008÷1.030

28.9

All countries

44,000÷141,200

1.050

1.024÷1.077

100

92,600Solid cancers other than thyroid and non-melanoma skin cancers
Belarus28,30011,800÷44,800

1.015

1.008÷1.023

21.7

Belarus, Russia
and Ukraine
82,00030,900÷133,100

1.002

1.001÷1.004

62.9

Other countries ofEurope48,4004,300÷92,500

1.000

1.000÷1.001

37.1

All countries ofEurope130,400

42,900÷217,900

1.001

1.000÷1.001

100

Leukaemia
Belarus2,800

1,000÷4,600

1.047

1.017÷1.078

21.7

Belarus, Russia
and Ukraine
8,100

2,400÷13,800

1.008

1.002÷1.014

62.8

Other countries ofEurope4,800-870÷10,470

1.001

1.000÷1.003

37.2

All countries

2,800÷23,000

1.003

1.001÷1.005

100

12,900It gives excess cancers estimated for Belarus, for Belarus, Russia and Ukraine combined together,
for all other European countries combined together as well as for all European countries including Belarus,
Russia and Ukraine combined together. The last column of Table 8 gives contribution of country or ofgroup of countries to the total number of assessed malignant neoplasms that can manifest as a result of theChernobyl accident.
As can be seen from data of this table 92,600 additional thyroid cancers (90% CI from 44,000 to141,200 cases), 130,400 additional solid cancers other than thyroid and non-melanoma skin cancers (90%CI from 42,900 to 217, 900 cases) and 12,900 additional leukaemia cases (90% CI from 2,800 to 23,000

20cases) are expected in all affected countries of Europe as a result of the Chernobyl accident during 19862056. Approximately two thirds of all excess cancers will occur in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Belarus
alone will contribute approximately 34% of thyroid cancers and about 20% of all other excess solidcancers and leukaemia that can be expected in countries of Europe affected as a result of the Chernobyl
accident.
Data presented in Table 8 show those health effects of the Chernobyl accident are more significant
that is recognized by the International Radiation Community that rejects even possibility to establish
statistical reliable manifestation of radiation-induced cancers caused by this accident. Data presented inTable show that such possibility exists at least for Belarus.
The accident at the Chernobyl NPP has affected all spheres of the man’s activity in Belarus [119].
As a result of this accident 2,640 km2 of agricultural lands have been excluded from the agriculture
turnover. 54 collective farms and sovkhoses have been liquidated, 9 processing industrial plants for the
agroindustrial complex have been closed down. Arable lands and gross agricultural crop yield reduced
sharply, the cattle stockhas decreased considerably.
Great damage has been incurred by the Chernobyl accident on the forestry of Belarus [119]. Morethan a quarter of the forest resources of Belarus - 17.3 thousand km2 of forest were subjected toradioactive contamination. In the middle of nineties the annual losse3s of wood resources exceeded 2
Millions of cubic meters.
22 layers of mineral and raw resources of building sand, sandy-gravel materials, clays, chalk andpeat were brought out of use [119]. The territory of Pripyat oil and gas bearing field whose resources were
evaluated in 52 millons tons of oil has been excluded from the geological exploration plans.
The accident at the Chernobyl NPP caused significant economical problems for Belarus, Ukraine
and Russia.

According to assessment [119], economical loses of Belarus in 1986-2015 caused byovercoming of the Chernobyl consequences will be 235 Billions of US dollars or equal to 32 annual
budgets of Belarus in 1985. 81.6% of this sum or 171 Billion of US dollars will be connected with thesupport of production functioning and realization of protection measures [119].
Protective measures include resettlement of residents of high contaminated settlement(contamination level with the isotope 137Cs higher than 555 kBq/m2) and providing safe living conditions
for population living in areas with the contamination level with the isotope 137Cs less than 555 kBq/ m2.
The accident at the Chernobyl NPP was simply devastating for Belarus. It caused the relocation ofa large number of people in Belarus. According [120], 24,725 persons were evacuated from May to
September 1986. During 1991-1998, another 110,000 persons were resettled from highly contaminatedareas to clean territories of Belarus [120]. Evacuation and resettlement were performed with financial andmaterial support of the Belarusian State. Additionally, up to the end of year 2000, approximately 200,000
persons moved from contaminated areas without any state’s assistance [121]. On the whole, at least
335,000 persons in Belarus lost their place of living and their property. It is clear that such extensive
evacuation and resettlement fully destroyed the social life of the most contaminated areas of Belarus andcaused significant psychological tensions and stresses.
Similar problems and similar financial and material loses arisen as a result of the Chernobyl
accident in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. According to assessments of the Ukrainian specialists
performed in nineties of the last century summary loses of Ukraine in the period 1986-2015 will be 178.7
21

Billions of US dollars (on the state of currency rate for 1984) [122,123]. Approximately 116 thousands ofresidents of contaminated settlements of Ukraine were evacuated in 1986 days after the accident [122,123].
This number includes about 50 thousands of inhabitants of the city Pripiat that were evacuated on April 27,
1986. In 1990-1998 approximately 100 thousands of residents of high contaminated settlements of
Ukraine were resettled to clean areas.
The economical loses of the Russian Federation in 1986-2015 were assessed to approximately 200
Billions of USA dollars [124]. 186 persons were evacuated during summer and autumn of 1986. Only verysmall area in the 30-km zone belonged to the Russian Federation. And this is a reason of a small numberof evacuated persons in this country because only residents of 30-km zone were objects of evacuation. The
30-km zone is a kind of orbicular area around the Chernobyl NPP. Its radius is approximately 30
kilometers.
Information presented here shows summary loses of Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation
as a result of the Chernobyl accident will be about 600 Billions of US dollars in 30 first years. This
accident caused evacuation and resettlement of many thousands of persons and devastated big territories
that were affected as a result of the Chernobyl accident.

I was the reason of significant social-

psychological tensions and stresses. All these consequences made the accident at the Chernobyl NPP themost sever technical accident in the modern history of humankind.
Discussion and conclusions
This report does not pretend to give the full picture of nuclear and radiation accidents as well asradiation situations in the former USSR. It gives only description of some large radiation accidents andsituations such as Semipalatinsk polygon, radiation situation of the Techa River, Kyshtym radiation
accident, radiation contamination of the Karachai Lake, nuclear accidents at the Soviet submarine on
August 10, 1985 in the Chazhma Bay (near Vladivostok) as well as nuclear accidents on April 26, 1986 at
the Chernobyl NPP. These accidents caused irradiation of many hundreds of thousands of persons,destroying of normal life on big territories of the former Soviet Union, significant economical loses
significant social-psychological and medical consequences. However, there were much more otherradiation accidents in the former USSR that occurred at nuclear power plants with channel graphite
reactors and pressurized water reactors, at weaponry facilities and mining enreprises as well as at otherenterprises of the nuclear industry [126]. The Soviet policy of hypersecrecy was the reason that all these
accident and situation were unknown not only for western specialists but also for the Soviet citizen andspecialists. This caused additional aggravations of accidental situations and unnecessary suffering of many
people.
Many of these accidents have their historical roots in realization of the Soviet military project in
the field of nuclear energy. It required an allocation of huge financial and material means at the time when
the whole European part of the territory was in ruins as a result of the German aggression. Development of
the nuclear weapon at such conditions aggravated immensely the life conditions of Soviet people.
However, the Soviet leaders were oppressed to concentrate all economic means for construction of nuclear
weapon because they knew that a number of plans of nuclear attacks on the USSR were developed in
Washington. Possessing of own nuclear weapon reduced the threat of such attacks. Existence of this threat
influenced fully the Soviet nuclear project. All efforts of Soviet specialist were directed only on receiving
22

of fissionable materials and construction of nuclear weapon. Problems of possible harmful influence ofradiation on specialists and workers involved in realization of these tasks as well as possible irradiation ofgeneral public did not play an important role in the USSR. And this caused a number of large accidents
with significant irradiation of many hundreds thousands of people in the USSR. Some of these accidents
were discussed in the present report.
The USSR could solve the problem of nuclear weapon development in very short time despite
very big economical, material and civilian causalities during the Second World War. The first nuclear
device was exploded at the Semipalatinsk Test Site on August 29, 1949. This was a very significant
achievement of Soviet science and industry. However, the practice of hypersecrecy installed in the firstyears of development of the Soviet military roots became a normal practice of all activity in the field of
nuclear energy in the former USSR including the field of peaceful use of it. This made impossible thetransfer of experience accumulated by mitigation of radiation accident that occurred at different
enterprises and nuclear power plant.
The accident at the Chernobyl NPP gives telling information of negative influence of the regimeof hypersecrecy adopted in the former USSR on safety of nuclear objects. In 1975 an accident of theChernobyl type accident happened at the Unit No1 of the Leningrad NPP [65]. As a result of this accident
some technological channels were damaged and a big amount of radioactivity was released to theenvironment. This accident happened as a result of an inserting of positive reactivity in some adjacenttechnological channels. Critical analysis of this accident by specialists in reactor safety could be very
useful for abolishing the most negative features of the RBMK reactor. It could be very useful for operating
personal of nuclear power plants with such reactors. However all information about this accident wasclassified and therefore not inaccessible.
A lot of important information about effectiveness of different countermeasures in case of large
radiation accidents was accumulated at the Kystym accident. However this important information was
fully inaccessible for Soviet specialists in mitigation of radiation accidents. And as a result of this policy
many errors suffered by mitigation of consequences of the Kystym accident were repeated after theaccident at the Chernobyl NPP. The hypersecrecy and totalitarian system of the former USSR are more
important reasons that have been turned big areas of its territory in the main polluted areas on our planet.
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