Perspectiveon the\\Future of Trade
BCG Global Advantage and Energy Practice Area
Prepared: 3 Nov 2022

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Introduction to this document

Moreover, the continuity of the war has
resulted in profound economic impact, notonly within Ukraine but globally — assupply chains face disruption, commodity
prices rise, and unprecedented levels of
sanctions take holdWe continue to examine the most pressing
issues and questions on the minds of ourclients and teams
This edition shares the latest update on the
global economic impact of the war, as well
the future of global trade based on theconflict and other factors. The document
outlines our perspective on the future of trade,
key sector impacts (particularly to energy),
and implications for business leaders2

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

The war continues to be first andforemost a humanitarian crisis, and the
top priority for all continues to be the safety
and security of peoplePrepared: 03 Nov 2022

AGENDA

Perspective on Future of Trade
Context and current situation
Focus on energy
Implications for leaders
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Global Update &Perspective on the
Future of Trade

Appendix3

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022 – Confidential: Limited Distribution

Summary | Future of Trade affected by Ukraine crisis, other geopolitical forces
Futureof
trade

Future of Trade (FoT) perspective grounded in global geopolitical scenarios for 2030
Three major drivers underlie shifting trade flows:•1 Russia-West fall-out: EU-Russia trade sees massive decline as Western allies place sanctions on Russia; trade
moves from Russia-EU to Russia-East (China, India), with most disruptive impacts in Energy•2 China trade dynamics: Slower US / EU trade with China, as increased focus on trade resilience in face ofgeopolitical risk drives trade growth with ASEAN, India, Mexico, and increasing "near-shoring" and "friend-shoring"

Impacts
onenergyEnergy trade changes drive near-term price increases; high prices to persist into 2023-24, particularly in EU.
Reduced economic growth requires measures (e.g., subsidies) to manage immediate energy shocks

Implications

In short-term, businesses need to understand trade flow risks across value chain, prioritize no-regrets moves, andintensify contingency planning

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

•3 ASEAN trade growth: Region to benefit from strong growth with China, US, and EU; push (e.g., geopoliticaltensions, higher cost structure in China) and pull (e.g., trade connectivity) factors drive growthLonger-term policies to sustainably support EU phase-out of Russian energy could have significant trade
implications (e.g., reoriented energy supply chains, accelerated shift to renewable energy build)

In long-term, businesses must build capabilities to manage volatility and apply scenario planning for resilience4

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

AGENDA

Perspective on Future of Trade
Context and current situation
Focus on energy
Implications for leaders
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Global Update &Perspective on the
Future of Trade

Appendix5

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

FoT 2031 outlook | Geopolitical tensions contribute to reshaping of trade flows
Change in trade of goods, major corridors1
2031 vs. 2021, constant 2021 Billion USD

80
-10
-26

Total global goods trade value
Trillion USD

17

6

Canada

UK
338

55

217

21.1

Russia

39

China

172

Japan/
Korea

32
70

GCC

93

42

90

20

83

Mexico

26.6

-262

-63

US

+2.3%

-38 EU

272

India

438

236

35

137
73

136

ASEAN

59

21

74

Mercosur
AfricaAustralia

Width of arrow represents total change in
2021
2031
trade flows 2031 vs 2021, Billion USD
Color of arrow represents
1. Corridors in the map above represent ~46% of global trade.
<0%0-2.3 >2.3%
Note: EU Intra-trade estimated to grow by 1.5T USD by 2031 CAGR 1.8%; inflation adjusted; BCG does not provide legal or regulatory advice.
CAGR 2021-2031, %Source: UN Comtrade, Oxford Economics, IHS, WTO, BCG Global Trade Model 2022, BCG analysis

6Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Three significant corridor shifts; one new, other two are trend accelerations
Change in trade of goods, major corridors1
2031 vs. 2021, constant 2021 Billion USD

80
-26

6

1

55

-63

US
217

-38 EU

338

2

1

17

-262
39

2

83

Russia

90

20

2

42

China tradedynamics

70
438

India

3

236
137

136

ASEAN

73

0-2.3

>2.3%

Color of arrow represents
CAGR 2021-2031, %

21

59

3
74

<0%

Japan/
Korea

32

272
172

35

New

China

93

Mexico2

Russia-Westfall-out

1-10

ASEAN trade
growthWidth of arrow represents total change intrade flows 2031 vs 2021, Billion USD

1. Corridors in the map above represent ~46% of global trade.
Note: EU Intra-trade estimated to grow by 1.5T USD by 2031 CAGR 1.8%; inflation adjusted; BCG does not provide legal or regulatory advice.
Source: UN Comtrade, Oxford Economics, IHS, WTO, BCG Global Trade Model 2022, BCG analysis

7Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Ukraine crisis directly led to Russia-West fall-out & accelerated other trends
Immediate impact (new)Key
impact1

Accelerated trend

Russia-West fall-out

China trade dynamics

Significant Russia & West (primarilyEU) trade decline

Uncertainty of geopolitical outcomes
drive friend-shoring of supply chains

Russian exports to shift from Westto East (e.g., China, India)

Relative decline US/EU-China trade,
nuanced impact on sectors driven bypolicy action choices

2031 trade value
Δ vs. 2021 trade

2-way
trade
flow
shifts2- $311B1+$110B+$338B

2031 trade value
Δ vs. 2021 trade- $63B+$72B+$546B

3

ASEAN trade growth

ASEAN trade increases; region gains
from geopolitical tensions, low-cost
structure & good trade connectivity
ASEAN exports continue to increase
2031 trade value
Δ vs. 2021 trade+$1,118B2

1. Russia-Japan trade flows not included 2. Figure includes ASEAN-US trade (+$236B) that is also counted under China Trade Dynamics
Note: Above figures quoted in constant 2021 USD; country trade flows utilized in above calculations include RU-EU (-$262B), RU-UK (-$26B), RU-US (-$23B), RU-CN (+$90B), RU-IN (+$20B), US-EU(+$338B), US-CN (-$63B), US-ASEAN (+$236B), US-IN (+$93B), ASEAN-CN (+$438B), ASEAN-JP & KR (+$272B), ASEAN-EU (+$172B)

8

Russia-West fall-out

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

1

Russia→West | Most disruptive impacts in energy given sector's export share

Russia-West

Key sectors

Russian exports to Western allies
could shift East to China & India
Russian exports to West, by sector(constant 2021 billion USD)

Energy

$251B
$223B
56%

48%

14%
2% 5%
38%

24%
6%

3%

20%

2017

2021

EnergyChemicals

Metals & Mining

Agribusiness

Future of trade

Example• Decreased trade flows given Russian energy
sanctions and EU's drive to energy
independence• Reallocation to other energy sources andproducing nations
Decreasing

Focus offollowing section• Early shocks from material shortage, mostly
short-term as firms finding alternative supply$8B
2031F1

Metals &mining• Diversification of key suppliers, though
limited for some rare materials(e.g., palladium)Other

1. Breakdown is as follows: Energy (28%), Metals & Mining (26%), Chemicals (8%), Agribusiness (2%), Other (35%)
Note: 2017 chosen as base year as year when trade tensions began (e.g., Trump came into office, Brexit negotiations began)
Source: UN FAO Information Note, SP Global, UN Comtrade, BCG Global Trade Model, BCG analysis

EU expediting energy
imports (e.g., LNG, lowcarbon ammonia) from
Western Allies,
Middle East

Development of new
smelters and mines(e.g., nickel in Indonesia,
Philippines)

Decreasing

9

Russia-West fall-out

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

1

Russia→West | EU aiming to end dependency on Russian energy by 2030

Two main EU plans to reduce importdependence…
6th Sanctions Package
focuses on oil, petroleum

RePowerEU aims to reduce
import of Russian gas

Target reduction in
Russian oil imports
by end of 2022

Target reduction in
Russian natural gas
supply by end of 2022

92%

Further sanctions enacted by
the EU in June '22 focus on oiland petroleum
The EU's aim is to minimize
seaborne crude oil imports
and cut other refined
petroleum products over next
6-8 months

66%

Requires strong coordination to realize,
given risks (e.g., intense competition for
LNG from Asia, pace of Net-Zerotransition)

95%

Long-term (~2030)
reduction target of gas
consumption requires
front-loading of alreadyaggressive plans…plan to reduce gas dependence requires
fossil fuel diversification & renewables
Target levers for reduction of Russian gas dependence
Billion cubic meters equivalent, for year 2022
Fossil fueldiversification

50

10

4

150

Energy efficiency& Renewables

14

2

3
20
47

Russianimports(est. 2022)

LNG
diversification

Pipeline
diversification

Biomethane

EnergyHeat
Solar PV Renewableefficiency
pump
decentralenergy
measures deployment
ization acceleration

Russianimports
Post
RePowerEU(end of2022)

Source: Aurora Energy Research; IEA; Oxford Institute for Energy Studies; ENTSOG Transparency Platform; Eurostat; Gas Infrastructure Europe; Rystad; Dentons; Broker reports; BCG analysis

10Russia-West fall-out

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

1

Russia→Others | China & India set to benefit most from trade fallout
Russia-China & India

Russian exports to China & India, by sector(constant 2021 billion USD)

Key sectors

Future of trade

Example

$116B
$65B
55%
9%
2017

$78B

37%

57%

19%

• Given sanctions, potential for China & India to
continue buying discounted Russian energy

15%
2021

Energy2031F

Russian exports to RoW, by sector(constant 2021 billion USD)

$188B
26%
21%
11%

$180B
22%
24%
13%

2017

2021

$221B
19%
23%

Agribusiness

11%
2031F

Russia & China discussing
potential major gas
pipeline project, thePower of Siberia 2

Future of trade

ExampleIncreasing

Key sectors

Russia-RoW• China & India well-positioned to capture
decline in Russian sales to West; however, value
offset by lower forecasted prices

EnergyMetals & Mining• Emerging countries susceptible to food pricing
shocks, especially where Russia has outsizedmarket share (e.g., Wheat)
India, Canada &• Uncertain current & long-term impacts for grain Australia emerging as
alternatives to& fertilizer exports; need for countries with highRussian wheat (IN) &dependence on RU to seek alternate suppliers
rapeseeds (CA, AUS)
Chemicals

Agribusiness

Other

Mixed

Note: 2017 chosen as base year as year when trade tensions began (e.g., Trump came into office, Brexit negotiations began); RoW = Rest of World excluding Western Allies, China, and India
Source: UN Comtrade, BCG Global Trade Model, BCG analysis

11

Russia-West fall-out

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Russia→Others | Post-conflict trend in trade from West to East to continue

Russia's monthly total trade by partners
Relative to 2021 monthly average('21 – '22 Jun, 10 = 2021 monthly average)40

30

Shifts from West to East
Absolute basis('21 – '22 Jun, USD B)

Conflict50

Monthly average Russia trade value by tradegroups ('21 vs '22 post-conflict to Aug '22, USD B)
Conflict

40

-4

28

Significant
growth inIndianpurchases of
Russiancommodities

24

30

18
20

15

10

2022
China

0

Jun

2021
EU27

India

10

16
9

0

13
5

10

2021

+5

12

20

Ø 10.6

1

UK

2022
US

8

8

Jun

EU & UK & US
Hydrocarbons

Note: Trade data based on China, EU, India, UK and US's reported trade with Russia from Jan 2021 to June 2022; The inflation is not captured in the analysis
Source: IHS Markit; BCG analysis

China & India
All other goods

12China trade dynamics

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

2

China→US | China still core partner, nuanced sectoral impact from tensions

Key sectors

China-US

Sectors exposed to US policy action
more vulnerable than others
US imports from China, by sector(constant 2021 billion USD)
$555B
13%
12%
19%
7%
7%

Consumerelectronics

Future of trade

Example• Complex trade impact as firms diversify from
China while retaining China capacity• So far, most consumer electronics have not
attracted tariff policy action in US-China
Mixed

Chinese laptop OEM
maintains #3 sharein US market

$505B
23%

14%
15%
8%
8%

$384B
24%
14%
15%
9%
9%

32%

38%

2021

2031F

42%
2017
Consumer Electronics

Machinery1

DurablesApparelAutomotive

Other

ApparelAutomotive &Machinery1• Trade continues to decrease driven by rising
Chinese costs and trade concerns• Chinese industrial policy seeking to exit low
value-add manufacturing

Decreasing• Trade reduction in sectors subject to policy
actions (e.g., Trump-imposed Sect. 301 tariffs)• US policy drives near- / friend-shoring(e.g., US IRA, USMCA tariff preferences)
Decreasing

1. Includes electrical and mechanical machinery
Note: 2017 chosen as base year as year when trade tensions began (e.g., Trump came into office, Brexit negotiations began)
Source: SCMP, Area Development, Foreign Policy, UN Comtrade, BCG Global Trade Model, BCG analysis

Major sport fashion
apparel co. movingfrom China to ASEAN

Major EV manufacturer
locating battery
production in Great
Lakes Region

13China trade dynamics

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

2

US→China | US exports to China forecast to growKey sectors

US-China

Exports to China continue to grow,assuming no further policy action
US exports to China, by sector(constant 2021 billion USD)

Agribusiness

Future of trade

Example• Uncertain trade impact given growing Chinese
consumption, but subject to policy actions• Under Jan 2020 "Phase 1" deal, China agreed tobuy US agricultural goods2, leading to 112% inc. vs.
2019; deal expired Dec 31, 2021
Mixed

$232B
18%
$143B
15%
11%
10%
5% 6%

$151B
20%

10%
10%
9%
8%

11%
11%
4%
9%

Machinery1• Uneven trade impact by machinery type
• US aircraft deliveries to China collapsed in
midst of COVID; uncertainty on rebound• US remains leader in machinery; despite innovation
efforts, China will continue to rely on US

44%

2017

2021

2031F

Agribusiness

Machinery1

Semiconductors

Chemicals

EnergyOther~140 unfilled Chineseorders from major US
aircraft manufacturer

Mixed

45%

53%

High Chinese demand
for soybean imports
persist, despite Chinese
domestic production

Semiconductors• Uneven trade impact based on tech sensitivity• More sensitive technologies at higher risk of
US government action given national security
concerns; could hurt Chinese goals of innovation• Less sensitive tech so far unaffected
Mixed

1. Includes electrical and mechanical machinery; 2. However, China only purchased ~58% of agreed-upon US exports (~83% of agricultural goods) in the deal
Note: 2017 chosen as base year as year when trade tensions began (e.g., Trump came into office, Brexit negotiations began)
Source: US Farm Bureau, Reuters, US-China Business Council, SCMP, Leeham, PIIE, UN Comtrade, BCG Global Trade Model BCG analysis

New US export
controls on advanced
chips & tech to China

14

ASEAN trade growth

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

3

Favorable conditions driving significant growth in ASEAN trade

Push factors are driving some trade
growth away from existing partners…

…while pull factors make the ASEAN region
attractive to international trade connections

Geopolitics
Shifting Trade

China relatively
more expensive

Large Fastgrowing Economy

SectoralDiversity

Good Trade
Connectivity

Greater concern overgeopolitical risk
disrupting existing
trade routes

ASEAN labor now
priced 10-15% lower
than Chinese labor

ASEAN will be 4thlargest economy by2030; high economic
growth to continue

Strong manufacturing,tech, consumer,
mining, agriculture &construction sectors

Strong market accessfrom membership inboth RCEP & CP-TPP
trade blocs

Source: Nikkei; BCG analysis

15

ASEAN trade growth

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

3

ASEAN→World | ASEAN becoming an attractive trading partner globally

ASEAN-World

Key sectors

ASEAN exports continue to grow, driven
by strong push & pull factors
ASEAN exports1, by sector(constant 2021 billion USD)

Semiconductors

Future of trade• Growing production due to competitive costs,
geopolitical diversification (e.g., relative to China)• Diversification of sourcing benefits ASEAN
producers incl. Thailand and Malaysia
Increasing

$3.2T
16%
11%
$1.4T
12%
10% 8%
9% 8%
8%
45%

$1.7T
15%
11%
8% 9%
8% 8%
41%

2017

2021

9%
10%

4%
9%

Metals & Mining

39%
2031F

Semiconductors

Chemicals

Machinery1

ApparelMetals & Mining

Cons. Electronics

ExampleOther

Other sectors• Growing production with high FDI (e.g., Malaysia,
Indonesia, Philippines), value offset byforecasted decline in commodity prices• Given critical mineral reserves, ASEAN wellpositioned to grow & potentially attract
downstream value chains
Increasing• Growing, well-diversified economy (e.g.,
consumer, manufacturing, agriculture)• ASEAN trade to grow in virtually all sectors withevery major trading bloc

1. Intra-ASEAN trade is included in these figures;Note: 2017 chosen as base year as year when trade tensions began (e.g., Trump came into office, Brexit negotiations began)
Source: Nikkei Asia, UN Comtrade, BCG Global Trade Model, BCG analysis

Increasing

Leading semiconductor
manufacturer considers
Singapore expansion

Automotive giants addingIndonesian nickel tobattery supply chain

Leading consumer
electronics firm partiallymigrating flagshipgoods to Vietnam16

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

AGENDA

Perspective on Future of Trade

Context and current situation
Focus on energy

Implications for leaders
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Global Update &Perspective on the
Future of Trade

Appendix17

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

In near-term, high energy prices to persist,leading to inflation & lower economic growthMultiple policy levers in response to Russianenergy trade fall-out, with varied trade impact

Natural gas TTF, € per MWh

Shorter term

Risks associated with Russian energy phase-out must be carefully managed

Historical data

Futures implied price

400

200
100
0
2020

2022

2024

2026

Key drivers of tight energy market:• Supply: Sanctions on Russian energy, OPEC+ cuts
• Demand: Impending winter demand
Source: Eikon; BCG analysis

Shift in energy mix: Increased use of fossil fuels andnuclear power given affordability & accessibility

2028

Reoriented energy supply chains: Investments inalternative infrastructure, shift to allied energy suppliersLonger term

300

Energy reduction measures: Restrict consumption ofenergy, potentially reduce demand and energy trade

Potential levers

Prices remain elevated innext ~12-24 months, muchhigher than pre-conflict

Direct user subsidies: Support for high consumer energy
bills, could potentially drive higher energy demand and trade

Accelerated renewable shift: Investments in renewablesupply chains and producers to accelerate green transition18

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Tight markets continue to drive high EU energy costs, economic ripple effects

High energy prices
expected to continue…

…reducing competitiveness of energy
intensive industrial production in Europe…
Case example: Germany production costs
for industrial goods uncompetitive
Largest industrial producer within EU(~27% as of 2021)

Restricted supply fromsanctions on Russian energy
and OPEC+ production cuts…

Production costs for energy-intensive industrial goods, €/t…the impact of impending
winter demand…

2020
Ammonia…and limited alternative
supply beyond gas storage
to meet EU energy demand

230

410

Steel

560

Aluminum

1,700 1,900

670

Global Average
Source: IHS; Nexant; ICIS; World Steel Dynamics; Wood Mackenzie; Europa; BCG analysis

Sep. 2022
560

660

2,270

German cost is~3x global
average…

870

2,300 3,900… and ~1.7x
global average…with long term
economic impacts
Industrial slowdown from
Europe energy crunch could
risk long-term damage tofuture growthSome companies are
redirecting industrial
investment to more energysecure locales
Consumer wallets
constrained; decline in
consumer spending could
further slow economic
growthGermany19

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Many levers can support phase-out; longer-term ones likely to impact trade

Shorter term policies manage shocks
as they occur, mixed trade impact…
Direct usersubsidies…longer-term structural changes support phase-out of
Russian energy, could significantly alter trade routes

Energyreduction

Shift inenergy mix

Reoriented energy
supply chains

Accelerated
renewable shift

PolicyIntentReduce energy costs
paid by consumers

Reduce aggregate
energy usage

Improve energy
accessibility via
existing facilities

Improve energy security,
accessibility with new
infrastructure

Improve energy security,
accessibility via
sustainable energy

Potentialtrade
impacton EU

Minimal: Increasepurchases along
existing energy trade
networks

Minimal: Decreasepurchases along
existing energy trade
networks

Large: Decreased
trade with Russia,
replaced with existingsources of coal,
nuclear, etc.

Large: "Friend-shoring"& shift in energy
imports from friendly
countries, high strain on
global LNG supplies

Large: Shift from focus
on hydrocarbon
imports to renewableenergy build (e.g.,materials, resources)

ExamplesPolicies to cap portionof payments for homeheating

Voluntary EU goal of a
15% reduction inenergy usage

Germany extending
operating life of coaland nuclear plants

Poland, Bulgaria using
LNG imports fromneighboring countries

REPowerEU efforts toaccelerate green
transition

At any stage in phase-out, need to ensure sufficient energy flow among countries
20

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

AGENDA

Perspective on Future of Trade
Context and current situation
Focus on energy
Implications for leaders
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Global Update &Perspective on the
Future of Trade

Appendix21

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Implications for leaders as Future of Trade continues to evolve undergeopolitical tensions and dynamics

Understand key value chain risks to better respond
E.g., What key commodities impact operations, where bizops take place, and who are key/alternative suppliers
Prioritize no-regrets moves to bolster supply chain
resilience
E.g., Build up buffer inventory of at-risk key commodities,
pre-qualify alternative suppliers
Begin contingency planning for any at-risk key
commodities identified in value chains
E.g., Fund R&D for alternatives of rare minerals, develop
supplier relationships across multiple continents

Source: BCG case experience & analysis

Longer Term
Embed scenarios planning into capital allocationand strategic planning processes
E.g., Test against range of scenarios incl. trade, geopolitics
and pandemic impact to build contingency plans
Leverage scenario plans to develop a long-term
supply chain resilience plan that best fits strategy

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Shorter Term

E.g., Utilizing more regionally-based or diversified
sourcing given geopolitical tensions in key trade corridors
Build control tower capabilities to gain visibility ofemerging disruptions or external shocks
E.g., Put in place people and systems with ability to
rapidly detect shocks & respond and adjust quickly
22Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Teams across BCG are actively monitoring impact
Energy Practice Area &Center for Energy Impact

Nikolaus LangManaging Director & Senior Partner
Global Practice Area Leader,
Global Advantage
E: Lang.Nikolaus@bcg.com

Marc Gilbert
Managing Director & Senior Partner
Global Lead, Geopolitics & Trade Impact
E: Gilbert.Marc@bcg.com

Pattabi Seshadri
Managing Director & Senior Partner
Global Practice Area Leader, Energy
E: Seshadri.Pattabi@bcg.com

Michael McAdoo
Partner & Director
Global Trade & Investment
E: McAdoo.Michael@bcg.com

Kasey Maggard
Global Practice Management Director
Global Advantage
E: Maggard.Kasey@bcg.com

Anders Porsborg-Smith
Managing Director & Senior Partner
Global Energy Leadership Team
E: Porsborg-Smith.Anders@bcg.com

Ken Carlstedt
Associate Director
Global Trade Risk & Compliance
E: Carlstedt.Ken@bcg.com

Tania Law
Project Leader
E: Law.Tania@bcg.com

Jamie Webster
Partner and Associate Director,
Center for Energy Impact
E: Webster.Jamie@bcg.com

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Global Advantage Practice Area

23

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

AGENDA

Global economic impact of the war in Ukraine
Perspective on Future of Trade
Context and current situation
Focus on energy
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Global Update &Perspective on the
Future of Trade

Implications for leaders
Appendix24

Prepared: 03 Nov 2022

Russian Energy | EU, UK, US decreasing while China & India picking up
Hydrocarbons total trade by estimate volumes1 and major trade partners
United Kingdom

EU27

India

China

-29%

Natural Gas(2021 Q2 vs 2022 Q2,million mmbtu)
562

399

2021 Q2
Crude & petroleum prod.
(2021 Q2 vs 2022 Q2,million bbl)

United States

2022 Q2

-100%

32

0

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

0.02021 Q2+45,431%

+5%

-100%

0.0

70

73

0.0

1.6

2022 Q2

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

-20%
304

242

2021 Q2
Coal & other(2021 Q2 vs 2022 Q2,million mt)

2022 Q2

+12%

-84%

-73%
20

6

73

12

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

-38%

-43%

+557%

134

150

2021 Q2

2022 Q210632021 Q2

2022 Q2

-35%

-88%

+43%

21

13

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

16

10

2.3

3.3

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

2021 Q2

2022 Q2

1. Estimate volumes calculated by quarterly average commodity prices reported from World Bank; Note: Hydrocarbons based on HS chapter 27
Source: World Bank, IHS Markit; BCG analysis

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