Discussion Paper No. 954

THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM
AND
SOCIAL PREFERENCES

Takahiro Ito
Kohei Kubota
Fumio Ohtake

December 2015

The Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan

The Hidden Curriculum and Social Preferences†
Takahiro Ito,a Kohei Kubota,b and Fumio Ohtakec
Abstract:
This paper examines the effects of school curricula on subsequent preference
formation. The estimation results, using Japanese data, show that the actual
curriculum at public elementary schools varies widely from area to area and isassociated with preference formation. Specifically, pupils who have experienced
participatory/cooperative learning practices are more likely to be altruistic,cooperative with others, reciprocal, and have national pride. In contrast, theinfluence of education emphasizing more on anti-competitive practices isnegatively associated with these attributes. Such contrasts can also be seen forother preferences regarding government policies and a market economy. The
findings imply that elementary school education, as a place for early socialization,
plays an important role in the formation of life-long social preferences.
Keywords: cultural transmission, socialization, preference formation, hidden
curriculum, elementary education, JapanJEL codes: D83; I21; Z13†

This study was supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research A (Grant No.
26245041) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, and the Joint
Usage/Research Center at ISER/Osaka University. We owe thanks to Daniel S. Hamermesh,
Hirokazu Ishise, Takehiko Kariya, Takao Kato, Daiji Kawaguchi, Katsuo Kogure, Hisaki
Kono, Hodaka Morita, Wataru Nakazawa, Yasuyuki Sawada, Kotaro Tsuru and numerous
participants at various seminars at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry(RIETI), Kobe University, and the 7th Trans-Pacific Labor Seminar (TPLS) for helpfulcomments.
a
Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University, 2–1, Rokkodai-cho,Nada-ku, Kobe 756-8501.
b
Faculty of Education, Art and Science, Yamagata University, 1-4-12, Kojirakawa-machi,
Yamagata 990-8560.
c
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki
567-0047.

1

The Hidden Curriculum and Social Preferences
1. Introduction
An increasing number of social scientists are interested in how culture istransmitted between people within a society. In the so-called cultural transmission(or socialization) field, many studies have documented the socialization
mechanisms of preferences, beliefs, and/or norms.1 Such mechanisms can bebroadly classified into two channels: direct vertical socialization (through family)
and horizontal and oblique socialization (through, for example, friends, neighbors,
teachers, or mass media). Among the latter’s mechanisms, school education isconsidered an effective measure for social integration by promoting a common
culture in society (Gradstein and Justman, 2005; Alesina and Reich, 2013).
History also tells us that education has been a device to unify people in both theEast and West.2
Despite such academic interests and historical evidence, few empiricalstudies have identified the causal linkage between education and preference
formation. This might be ascribable to empirical difficulties associated with theestimation of the causal impact of school education. For instance, when
examining the role of educational content/practices, it is possible that thecontent/practices that the students receive at school are an endogenous outcome of1
2

See Bisin and Verdier (2011) for an extensive review of the literature in this field.
A typical example is wartime education. See, for instance, Anderson (1959) for education in
Japan during the Second World War.

2

their (or their parents’) school choice. This potential self-sorting makes it difficult
to isolate the effects of school education. In addition, sufficient variation in
educational content/practices might not be available in a particular country
because school education content, especially at public schools, is usually
regulated by a national education policy. In this case, distinguishing the effects ofeducation from other macro factors is very difficult, unless education policy
varies within a country or data covering multiple countries are available.
Against this backdrop, however, several studies deal well with thisdifficulty. Algan et al. (2013) examined whether teaching practices at school
affect students’ beliefs by exploiting within-school variations in educational
practices using school-survey data covering multiple countries. They found apositive causal relationship between “working-in-groups” practices and students’beliefs about cooperation and trust. Cantoni et al. (2014) utilized cohort-regionalvariations in educational content at senior high schools in China. They studied therole of school curricula upon students’ beliefs and found that changes in Politics
curriculum alter students’ ideological beliefs. In addition, Aspachs-Bracon et al.
(2008) and Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) explored the effect of language
education on national identity, exploiting reforms in language educational policies
in an autonomous community in Spain. Their results indicate that language
education exerts an influence on national identity formation.3
3

Some indirect evidence also exists regarding the role of educational content/practices. For

3

This paper also examines the causal impact of school curricula on theformation of preferences and beliefs, focusing on the “hidden curriculum.” Theterm “hidden curriculum” refers to beliefs, attitudes, or values that underlie
educational content/practices, and which are transmitted to students consciously
or subconsciously. In other words, the hidden curriculum is what mainly
influences students’ non-cognitive or non-academic abilities and is usuallycontrasted with the official academic curriculum, which aims to develop students’cognitive abilities such as literacy and numeracy. 4 To examine the hidden
curriculum’s influence on preference formation, we exploit “exogenous”
variations in actual educational content/practices in Japanese elementary schools.
In Japan, educational content/practices at elementary schools are
stipulated by the curriculum guideline set out by the Japanese government, and all
public schools aim to provide uniform education based on these guidelines.
However, the actual curriculum, particularly the non-academic curriculum, differswith the area. This situation provides a desirable basis for identification. Because
instance, several authors have found that number of years of education (quantity ofschooling) is associated with civic participation (Milligan et al., 2004; and Helliwell andPutnam, 2007) or political preferences (Friedman et al., 2011). In addition, Hryshko et al.
(2011) found a relationship between parents’ education and the risk attitude of theirchildren.
4 In education literature, the term “hidden curriculum” is not necessarily used in the same
sense as our definition. For instance, some studies define hiddenness based on degree ofintentionality. In this regard, however, the fact remains that the hidden curriculum, whether
a clear intention underlies it or not, is related to non-cognitive/non-academic outcomes suchas beliefs, attitudes, values, or norms (Giroux and Purpel, 1983; Kelly, 2009). In addition,from an empirical perspective, any non-cognitive education cannot be clearly identified
whether it was set intentionally, or whether its results are exactly as intended. Therefore,
our definition makes no distinction regarding the presence or the absence of intention.

4

people believe that curricula at public elementary schools are uniform,
educational content/practices should not serve as a consideration for parents inchoosing a school. In fact, as will be shown later, between-school disparities inacademic achievements at elementary education are surprisingly smaller in Japan
than in other developed countries, suggesting that Japanese public elementary
schools offer a homogeneous academic curriculum.
In addition, the similarity of educational content/practices acrossneighboring schools also reinforces the situation. In Japan, each prefectural
education board in principle administers educational provision independently, andprefectural education boards have final approval in recruitment, transfer, anddismissal of all public school teachers and principals. As a consequence, actual
educational content/practices become similar among neighboring schools in aprefecture, and this makes it difficult for parents to recognize that educational
content/practices do in fact vary between schools. Furthermore, almost allelementary schools are operated publicly (about 99%), and a zoning rule that
automatically assigns pupils to the school in their school district is strictly applied
to all public elementary schools. Therefore, exploiting variations in actual
educational content/practices within elementary education enables us to avoid aself-sorting problem and identify schooling’s effects on preference formation.
In addition to the identification issue, this study contributes to theexisting literature in three ways. First, the actual curriculum we explore includes a5

wide range of educational content/practices: aside from group learning practices(Algan et al., 2013) and political education (Cantoni et al., 2014), other moral,
character, peace, and economic lessons are also examined in our analysis.
Furthermore, the outcomes in this study cover a broad range of social, economic,
and political preferences/beliefs, including components of social capital such as
beliefs in trust and cooperation, and reciprocity. Thus, this study can provide a
better understanding of the role of education in socialization from a broad
perspective.
Second, we focus on educational content/practices during elementary
education, whereas our main references, Algan et al. (2013) and Cantoni et al.
(2014), documented evidence on the role of secondary education in socialization.
Recently, non-cognitive skills such as attitudes, beliefs, and personalities havegained attention in the empirics of human capital theory, and several studies
emphasize the importance of childhood in the formation of such skills. 5
Therefore, stages of education also matter in preference formation, andelementary education, as an early stage of socialization, could play a decisiverole.
Third, this study examines people’s preference/belief formation years or
decades after the completion of education, using a sample of people in their 20s to
50s. Algan et al. (2013) quantified contemporaneous effects of teaching practices
5

For instance, James J. Heckman, among others, is a leading advocate for this view
(Heckman and Krueger, 2003).

6

using a sample of early-teen students,6 and Cantoni et al. (2014) examined theinfluence of educational content at senior high schools on ideology among
university students. Consequently, their works are completely silent on what
would happen after completing education, after entering the labor market, or aftergaining a wide variety of experience in life. Whether, and to what extent, theeffect of education on preferences/beliefs persists is of high interest forpolicymakers as well as social scientists, and we tackle this question.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe
educational content/practices in Japan and the dataset used in the analysis. Section
4 presents the empirical framework and discusses the validity of its identification
assumptions. Section 5 reports the estimation results, which show that great
regional differences exist in actual educational content/practices in Japan, and thatthe actual curriculum has a non-negligible influence on social preference
formation. In particular, education emphasizing participatory and cooperative
learning is effective for cultivating positive social preferences, and various checks
show that the findings are robust after eliminating possible confounding factors or
potential reverse causality. Section 6 concludes the paper.

6

Algan et al. (2013) also conducted a cross-country macro analysis in which dependent
variables are country-averaged values (the sample mainly comprises an adult population).
However, because the teaching practices they exploited are those used for younger
generations, their estimates might not capture the direct influences of past education on
subsequent preference formation, and might also confound reverse causality between
beliefs held by older generations and recent educational policies.

72. Educational Content and Practices in JapanThe content and practices of school education in Japan are basically stipulated in
the school curriculum. For elementary through high school, the curriculum isbased on the School Curriculum Guidelines (Gakushu Sidou Youryou) of the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). 7
However, while all public schools seem to provide uniform education based on
the same guidelines, actual educational content/practices are not identical.
For instance, while elementary schools, almost without exception, hold aschool sports meet every year in which pupils are separated into two teams andcompete in several athletic sports, regional or generational differences exist in theactual activities. Usually, pupils compete in a 50-meter footrace with five or six
peers, and some points are added to the teams of the pupils who win the first andsecond prizes. However, in some cities, there are no footraces at school sports
meets. Even if there are footraces, teachers do not rank pupils’ finishing order.
Another example is peace and anti-discrimination education. Almost allelementary schools in Japan offer a school trip for sixth-grade pupils, consistingof multi-day tours, to broaden their knowledge. In western Japan, the destination
tends to be Hiroshima or Nagasaki (cities on which the atomic bombs were
dropped) to learn the misery of war and importance of peace. Similarly, schools inwestern Japan tend to provide anti-discrimination education (dowa kyoiku) and7

Private schools, as well as public schools, are supposed to follow the guidelines, but it ismore strictly applied to public schools.

8have school assemblies on the atomic bomb day (August 6 or 8). However, nosuch tendencies are found in other regions.
Besides these practices, there are several region- or generation-specificcontent/practices, as listed in Table 1. In our original survey, as explained in thenextsubsection,

weinvestigatedpeople’s

experience

of

these

17

contents/practices.
[Table 1]
Note that we focus on these region- and generation-specific educational
content/practices, not on nationwide content/practices, because it is impossible toidentify the effects of a variable that exhibits no variation. This is merely apractical issue and does not mean that such nationwide practices are of noimportance. For instance, greetings while saying “Stand up. Bow. Sit down.”
before/after class and everyday school cleaning by pupils8 as well as the school
sports meets and school trips are well-known nationwide content/practices inJapan and definitely have an influence on pupils’ socialization. A cross-country
analysis focusing on such nation-specific educational content/practices may
provide interesting insights, enabling us to investigate differences in national
character or culture, but such a task is beyond the scope of this study.

8

Greetings before/after class are a sequence of actions that pupils perform, such as standingup, bowing, and sitting down to show their respect for teachers. Daily school cleaning by
students is also a common practice in Japanese schools. Usually, students clean theirclassroom, school playground, or gymnasium for about 20 minutes before afternoon classes
every day.

9

3. Data
To investigate people’s experiences of school education and determine theirpreferences and beliefs, we carried out an original survey in October 2012. The
survey was conducted online by a Japanese market research company9 under theauthor’s directions. Given the size of our research budget, we set the target
number of respondents as 4,500. Then, considering average response rates, thesurvey company sent invitation e-mails to 14,628 panelists. To ensure sufficientvariations among respondents’ past educational experiences, we employed
quota-sampling based on age, gender, and region (five age categories, twogenders, and nine regions),10 and we obtained 4,709 survey responses. In theanalysis, we use a sampling weight so that our sample’s age-gender-region
distribution is proportional to the actual age-gender-region distribution in Japan.
The actual distribution of the Japanese population is calculated from the 2010
Population Census of Japan.
Table 2 reports sample features such as marital status and education level.
9

The survey company is MyVoice Communications Inc. It started undertaking Internet
surveys in 1998 and had more than one million registered survey panelists as of November
2013. It has a rigorous data quality control system to obtain highly reliable data. For
instance, all registrants are checked strictly by examining their registration information,
and about one-fourth of new registrants are eliminated beforehand due to inconsistentcharacteristics or double registration. In addition, the survey panelists are regularly
monitored, and the number of surveys in which one panelist can participate is controlled(average frequency in one year is about 13).
10
The nine regions comprise Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Hokuriku, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku,
Shikoku, and Kyushu.

10The table also presents the same information calculated from national
representative data for comparison (Panel B). As can be seen from the table,
respondents in our survey are more likely to have a college degree (or higher)
than Labor Force Survey respondents. This is because our survey was conducted
online, and highly educated people have a high tendency to use the Web
frequently. In particular, elderly cohorts seem to be more skewed toward thehighly educated.
In our empirical analysis, out of the 4,709 respondents, 894 individuals
aged 60 and older were excluded. This is partly due to the sample bias concern
mentioned above, but mainly due to their educational background: individuals
aged 60 and older received their elementary education in wartime or postwar
turmoil. The education system has changed significantly during the postwar
occupation by the Allied Powers (1945–1952). In addition, 125 respondents who
graduated from a private elementary school (3.3% of the sample) and 69
respondents with missing information on some characteristics (1.8%) were also
excluded from the analysis. Thus, the sample used in the analysis consists of
3,621 respondents.
[Table 2]
Regarding the content of school education, respondents were asked
whether they had experienced the 17 educational contents/practices shown in
Table 1. These contents/practices have been employed in some regions (for some11generations) but not in other regions (for other generations), and the regional(generational) disparities are considered to reflect differences in the actual
curriculum.
It should also be mentioned that a non-negligible number of respondents
answered “do not remember,” as shown in the table. However, this may not be aserious problem. The contents/practices with high rates of “do not remember”
answers are those with large regional differences. For example, “school assemblyon atomic bomb day” is practiced mainly in western Japan. This is because
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are in western Japan, and the school assembly is held
during summer vacation to prevent the terrible lessons of the war from being
forgotten. Therefore, memories of the school assembly are strongly connectedwith the date for those who experienced it. Likewise, “emergency drill on
September 1” is associated with the Great Kanto Earthquake, which struck on
September 1, 1923, and therefore it is mainly practiced in eastern Japan, including
the Kanto region. Thus, answering “do not remember” to a content/practicereflects the fact that the respondent received education that placed less emphasis
on such content/practice. Therefore, it is reasonable enough to have more than a
few respondents answering “do not remember” to such contents/practices, andthus treating “do not remember” the same as “No” seems highly plausible. The
potential problem due to such answers will be discussed further in Section 5.2.

12

4. Empirical Framework
4.1. Empirical Specification
In the analysis, we quantify the impacts of the hidden curriculum of elementary
school education () on the subsequent formation of social preferences ().

Specifically, we estimate(1),

where i indexes individuals,

is a vector of controls (individual, household,and community/school characteristics),
preference formation, and

,

, and

is an unobserved component affecting
are the parameters to be estimated.

The outcomes of interest are social preferences () such as altruism,

beliefs in cooperation and trust, and reciprocity. These variables range from one tofive, based on respondents’ answers to the standard questions to measure these
preferences/beliefs (see Table A1).
Regarding the hidden curriculum (), we employ factor analysis to

extract factors comprising the hidden curriculum that lie behind actual educational
content/practices. The result is shown in Table 3: reported figures are rotatedfactor loadings obtained by polychoric factor analysis using the principle
component factor (PCF) method with an orthogonal Varimax rotation.
Considering the Kaiser criterion and the Scree test, five factors are retained. The
sensitivity of analysis for the measurement of the hidden curriculum will bechecked in Section 5.2.

13

[Table 3]
The first factor has large loadings for “no display of the national flag”
and “no singing of the national anthem.” These practices are thought to be basedon reflection of the last world war and to be associated with leftist politicalthoughts such as anti-war and anti-nationalism. “Teachers’ strike” is also
associated with leftist thoughts. Thus, the first factor is referred to as “leftist
political thought.” The second factor is strongly related to “no footrace” and “nofinishing order.” These practices aim to turn pupils away from competition, andtherefore we call this factor “anti-competition.” The third factor mainly consistsof “group learning,” “reading before class,” “emergency drill on September 1,”
and “target-based evaluation.” We refer to it as “participation & cooperation,”
because most of these contents/practices require pupils’ active participation and/or
cooperation among pupils. Regarding “target-based evaluation,” it often includes
pupils’ behaviors such as compassion toward others and cooperation with others,
as well as academic achievement, in the list of evaluation items. The fourth factor
is related to “Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz,” “scale evaluation,” “kid’s bank,” and “statueof hard work.” Because these educational contents/practices aim to teach theimportance of industriousness, we call this factor “hard work & effort.” The final
factor is strongly related to “anti-discrimination education,” “school trip to
Hiroshima or Nagasaki,” and “school assembly on atomic bomb day,” and isreferred to as “human rights & peace.” Note that “gender-segregated class number”

14has small factor loadings for all five factors. Segregating by gender is related to
traditional Japanese thought, and this might be the reason why this practice has arelatively large positive loading for Factor 4 (“hard work & effort”) and negative
loading for Factor 2 (“anti-competition”) because industriousness is also related to
traditional values in Japan.
Figure 1 maps average scores of the five factors by prefecture. As seen in
the figure, our proxies for the hidden curriculum vary widely between prefectures.
While “leftist political thought” (Panel A), “anti-competition” (Panel B), and“hard work & effort” (Panel D) appear dispersed nationwide, both “participation& cooperation” (Panel C) and “human rights & peace” (Panel E) have a regionaltendency whereby the former is more practiced in central Japan and the latter inwestern Japan. We also observe generational differences for some factors (Table4). For instance, Factor 4 (“hard work & effort”) varies from generation to
generation: elder generations are more likely to receive education emphasizing“hard work & effort.” On the other hand, the average factor scores for Factor 3(“participation & cooperation”) are higher among younger generations. Thisimplies that a nationwide shift of educational content/practices occurred from“hard work & effort” to “participation & cooperation.”[Figure 1][Table 4]
Regarding other controls () in Equation (1), guided by empirical15

literature, we employ individual characteristics (five-year birth cohort dummies,
education dummies, female dummy, interactions between the five-year birthcohort and education dummies, marital status dummies, income category
dummies, and household size), family background (parents’ education dummies,
number of books at home, dummies for living with grandparents at age 15, andnumber of siblings at age 15), school (or school district) characteristics (class size,
dummy for experience of classroom chaos, dummy for teachers’ active
intervention with bullying, and number of high schools that can be chosen in aschool district),11 and prefecture dummies (current and at the age of 12).

4.2. Identification Issues
A key source of variation used to identify the effects of the hidden curriculum
stems from the fact that actual educational content/practices that students
experience at public elementary school are exogenous to them. This is mainly due
to the following two reasons.
First, in Japan, people believe that educational content/practices provided
by public elementary schools are uniform, and hence they do not take educational
content/practices into account when choosing a school. While this reflects the factthat all public schools are regulated by the same curriculum guidelines asmentioned in Section 2, it may also be due to the educational administration
11

Note that school (district) variables are retrospective data directly surveyed from
respondents in the same survey.

16

system. In Japan, public schools are operated on a city/town/village basis inprinciple and are supervised by education boards (kyouiku iinkai). Education
boards are organized at two levels (prefecture and city/town/village), and eachprefectural education board has the final word on personnel affairs (recruitment,
transfer, and dismissal) of all public school teachers and principals in theprefecture.12 In particular, all personnel transfers in a prefecture are made withina certain region of the prefecture, and therefore, actual educational
content/practices in neighboring schools within the prefecture tend to be similar.
As shown later in this section, this is confirmed by a simple test using our data.
Thus, parents have great difficulty in recognizing the fact that educational
content/practices do in fact vary from school to school.
Second, parents generally have no choice over elementary schools inJapan, even if they observe differences in school curricula. This is due to theschool district system (zoning rule): all school-age children can enter a publicschool without examination, but each district has only one public school andchildren must attend the only school in their school district. 13 Moreover,
12

The only exceptions are 12 major (government-decreed) cities, where city education
boards have authority over personnel issues.
13 In 1997, the Ministry of Education issued a notice that municipal education boards areallowed to relax the school districts and introduce a school choice system in elementary andjunior high schools. As of 2013, about 16% of municipalities have adopted some sort ofschool choice system in elementary schools. In this regard, our sample consists of people intheir 20s to 50s in 2012, and peopled aged 20 (and part of people aged 21) might enter
elementary school under a new system. However, the municipalities that have adopted aschool choice system by 1998 (the year of elementary school entrance for people aged 20 inour sample) account only for less than 3% of the total municipalities, and the policy change

17competition based on entrance examinations generally starts from high school.
While public schools constitute about 74% of high schools, 99% of elementary
schools are publicly operated. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that parents
selectanelementary

schoolinconsiderationofactualeducational

content/practices.
However, for those unfamiliar with Japanese elementary education, it
may sound far-fetched that educational content/practices students receive atschool are not a result of self-selection. In many developed countries, theachievement gap between socioeconomic groups has been an issue of social
concern. In Japan as well, various social scientists point out that the disparity inacademic achievement among elementary students has been increasing. In thisregard, however, this achievement gap is often attributed to differences in family
backgrounds, rather than school education (Kariya and Shimizu, 2004; Shimizu,
2007; and Matsuoka et al., 2014). In fact, between-school disparities in academic
achievements at the elementary-education level are surprisingly small in Japan,
compared with other developed countries (see Table A2 in Appendix II).
Considering together with the fact that the percentage of people choosing a
private school is negligible, self-sorting into elementary schools (and therefore
educational content/practices) is very unlikely in our context. Thus, exploiting
variations in the actual curriculum between elementary schools in Japan enables

has little influence on our analysis.

18

us to avoid potential bias due to a self-sorting problem.
On the other hand, we must also consider the possibility that ouridentification framework fails. One major concern is recall bias, which is acommon pitfall when using retrospective data. A typical example is that more
recent experiences might remain in respondents’ memory. Moreover, when people
hold two conflicting cognitions, they might distort one to mitigate the dissonancefrom the other (issue of cognitive dissonance). In other words, there is apossibility that current preferences distort memories of the past. These issues
potentially create another reverse causality problem.
To check this possibility, we conducted a simple test. Given that theformation of preferences/beliefs is strongly affected by experience andenvironment, it is expected that those who migrated from their places of origin are
more likely to change their preferences than those who stayed at their places oforigin. This being true and given the issue of cognitive dissonance, answers on
past school experience might differ between respondents with migration
experience and those without such experience. Using the two-level nested
analysis of variance (ANOVA), we compare factor scores between those who arestill living in the prefecture where they lived at the age of 12, and those who havemigrated out (Table 5). The “group” in the analysis is defined based on theprefecture respondents lived in at the age of 12, and the “subgroup” reflects
whether the current prefecture is the same as the prefecture at the age of 12.

19

[Table 5]
The table shows that for all five factors, the between-group (prefecture at
the age of 12) variation in column 1 is always larger than the between-subgroup(same/different prefecture as/from that at the age of 12) variation in column 2, andthe F statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that no differences exist
among factor scores between groups. In contrast, the between-subgroup variationin column 2 is close to the within-subgroup variation in column 3. These results
have two important implications. First, the actual curriculum seems to differ
greatly with each prefecture but not so much within prefectures. This is consistent
with our previous arguments that parents and students do not observe differencesin educational content/practices between neighboring schools within a prefecture.
Second, living in a different prefecture from that at age 12 bears no relation to thepast educational experience respondents reported, implying that memory
distortion is less likely. This issue will be further checked in Section 5.2.

5. Empirical Results
5.1. Effect of Education on Social Preferences
We start by estimating the basic specification in Equation (1). Empirical variables
used in the analysis are summarized in Table 6, and the estimation results arereported in Table 7. All estimations are implemented with ordinary least-squares(OLS) controlling individual characteristics, family background, school (school

20

district) characteristics, and prefecture dummies (current and at age 12), as
explained in Section 4.2. In addition, we adjust the sampling weight to make ourobservations proportional to the overall Japanese population distribution.
[Table 6][Table 7]
From the estimation results, we see sharp contrasts between“anti-competition” (row 2) and “participation & cooperation” (row 3). T hose who
experienced education that implemented participatory/cooperative learning
practices are more likely to favor altruistic behavior (column 1), cooperation withothers (columns 2 and 3), and reciprocal behavior (column 6). On the other hand,those who experienced education that implemented anti-competitive practices areless likely to favor altruistic behavior (column 1), cooperation with others(column 2), and reciprocal behavior (column 6). Interestingly, the sign of thecoefficient differs between the case of positive reciprocity (column 6) andnegative reciprocity (column 7), suggesting that those who experienced
anti-competitive education prefer to not repay an obligation but to make acountercharge. In addition, a contrast between the two can be seen in the result for“national pride” (the last column): “anti-competition” is negatively associatedwith national pride, whereas “participation & cooperation” is positively associatedwith it.
Regarding the magnitude of these influences, coefficient estimates show

21

that an increase by one standard deviation in “anti-competition” decreases scoresof “altruism” by 0.032 (4.2% of the standard deviation), “cooperation: outcome”
by 0.031 (4.3%), and “positive reciprocity” by 0.048 (6.6%); and that an increaseby one standard deviation in “participation & cooperation” increases the scores of“altruism” by 0.086 (11.2% of the standard deviation), “cooperation: outcome” by
0.042 (5.8%), “cooperation: satisfaction” by 0.061 (7.6%), and “positive
reciprocity” by 0.041 (5.7%). For comparison, coefficient estimates on the
dummy for college graduates aged between 20 and 24 (not reported here) indicatethat there are about 0.3- to 0.6-point statistically significant differences in thescores of these social preferences between junior high-school graduates (referencegroup) and college graduates, holding other characteristics constant. Thus, theeffects of a standard deviation increase in “participation & cooperation” areapproximately one-eleventh to one-fifth of these influences, implying relatively
small effects of the hidden curriculum. However, in comparison with the results of
Algan et al. (2013), our estimates are not too small; rather, they show that anincrease in the “students work in groups” variable by one standard deviation
increases the belief in cooperation among students by about 2% of the standard
deviation.
Regarding the results for “anti-competition,” one might wonder why it
has the opposite influence from that of “participation & cooperation,” eventhough they seemingly aim at a similar goal, i.e., egalitarian education. In this22

regard, Kariya (1995) pointed out that in “anti-competition” education, the rank ofpupils’ achievements in the class or school is not revealed to pupils because
differences in pupils’ achievements are considered to be attributed to differencesin teachers’ teaching skills rather than differences in pupils’ natural abilities. In
this case, pupils who had anti-competitive education tend to think that people are
equal in terms of natural ability and that performing poorly should be attributed tolaziness or lack of effort. As a consequence, anti-competitive education may leadpeople to value self-responsibility and be less concerned about others.
Another explanation can be provided in terms of self-esteem. In the
United States, fostering self-esteem has become a major concern in school or athome based upon the belief that self-esteem causes positive outcomes including arise in academic performance and better social development. However, several
studies have found contradictory results: high self-esteem does not improve
grades or career achievement nor does it reinforce pro-social behavior(Baumeister et al., 2003). Given that practices such as not declaring a winner in a
footrace lead to pupils boosting their self-esteem by giving trophies forparticipation instead of for winning, inflated belief in own superiority may lead toan uncooperative and nonreciprocal individual, as indeed found in the results
given in Table 7.
Turning to the other factors of the hidden curriculum, the coefficientestimates are statistically insignificant except for the effect of “hard work & effort”

23

on “cooperation: satisfaction” (row 4, column 3) and the effect of “human rights& peace” on “competition” (row 5, column 4). This may not necessarily imply
that these factors do not affect the formation of preferences and beliefs. Instead, it
may be a result of a lack of variation after eliminating birth cohort or prefecture
fixed effects.

5.2. Robustness Checks and Discussion
To check the possibility that the coefficients on the hidden curriculum confoundother mechanisms, we run several estimations employing different specifications.
For reasons of space, we report only the results for the impacts of “participation &cooperation” and “anti-competition” on altruism (column 1), beliefs incooperation (columns 2 and 3), and reciprocity (columns 4 and 5). This is because
Table 7 shows striking contrasts between the two factors regarding the impact onthese preferences and beliefs.
First, in addition to the explanatory variables already controlled for,versions of the School Curriculum Guideline are controlled. Since the end of theSecond World War, the Ministry had revised the guidelines nine times (in 1947,
1951, 1956, 1961, 1971, 1980, 1992, 2002, and 2011). These revisions to theguidelines might be correlated with the hidden curriculum, and omitting details of
the specific guideline version might cause the coefficient estimates to be biased.
Accordingly, we try several specifications including dummies for each version, or24years under each version of the guidelines. Estimation results of the specification
with dummy variables (and their interactions with prefecture dummies at the ageof 12) are presented in Panel A of Table 8. The results show that coefficientestimates remain virtually unchanged in magnitude. Thus, unobserved
heterogeneity among generations due to the revision of the guidelines is lesslikely to influence our estimates.
[Table 8]
Second, as we saw in Table 1, more than a few respondents answered “donot remember” to several educational content/practices. If such forgetfulness
occurs in a non-random manner due to recall bias, it is possible that our proxies
for the hidden curriculum are correlated with unobserved individual preferences
or beliefs. We check this possibility by estimating several specifications
controlling for the percentage of “do not remember” answers to the 17 educational
content/practices, or 17 dummy variables that take unity if the answer is “do notremember” and zero otherwise. Panel B shows estimation results based on the
dummy variables’ specification. Although the statistical significance of someestimates disappears, the magnitude is almost unchanged. Thus, controlling forthese variables does not affect our main findings.
We conduct further checks for the possibility of recall bias. In Table A3
in Appendix III, we run regressions where dependent variables are “do notremember” dummies, and explanatory variables are eight social preferences and25other controls (see Appendix III). If answering “do not remember” is associatedwith recall bias, we may observe that people with some kind of social preferences
are more or less likely to answer “do not remember” to a specific educational
content/practice. The estimation results, however, mostly show no evidence of thelinkage between current preferences and “do not remember” answers. Even for
the exceptions, no convincing evidence exists pointing to recall bias as aconvincing explanation of our main findings in Table 7. Thus, it is unlikely thatpeople intentionally forgot the educational content/practices they received, or thatpeople strongly affected by an educational content/practice are more likely toremember that content/practice.
Third, we check the sensitivity of our results to the measurement of thehidden curriculum. Panel C shows the results using group-averages of dummy
variables on the 17 educational contents/practices. We divide the 17 educational
content/practice dummies into several groups according to their correlation
coefficients and calculate the average by group (see Appendix IV). Because thestandard deviation of factor scores used in Table 7 is unity, the group-averages arealso standardized so that their standard deviation becomes unity for ease ofcomparison. As can be seen from the results, the magnitude of coefficientestimates is remarkably stable. In addition, as shown in Appendix IV, employing
polychoric factor analysis with the principle factor (PF) method instead of the
PCF method used in Table 7 does not affect the results. Therefore, our findings

26

are not sensitive to the measurement of “hidden curriculum” variables.
Fourth, to eliminate any influence of unobserved heterogeneity among
municipalities within prefectures, we control city/county dummies (at the age of
12). The results in Panel D show that coefficients on “anti-competition” shrink insize and in statistical significance. This might be due to a lack of variation after
controlling city/county fixed effects because the city/county dummies may“over-control” for the variation in “anti-competition” within prefecture. However,the coefficient estimates for “participation & cooperation” are either almost
unchanged or increase in magnitude, and contrasts still exist between“anti-competition” and “participation & cooperation.” Therefore, we conclude
that unobserved heterogeneity within prefecture is less likely to influence ourresults.
Fifth, we check for potential bias due to endogenous school choice. As
already discussed in Section 4.2, parents are unlikely to consider the school
curriculum when choosing a public elementary school. However, there may be
another possibility wherein this is not the case. For example, after observing theschool curriculum via the schooling of a first-born child, parents who consider
this curriculum as unfavorable may move to a school in which a more preferrededucation is provided. In this case, our estimates are subject to having
overestimated magnitudes. To check this possibility, we estimate the basic
specification (as in Table 7) using the sub-sample of first-born people, a sample

27

size of 2,005. Given that education-related migration would occur after parental
observationof the education

that

the

first-bornchildreceived,

thecontent/practices for children born later would be endogenous outcomes.
Therefore, excluding the sub-sample of second- or later-born people may
attenuate the coefficient estimates in size. The estimation results are reported inPanel E, showing that our estimates are mostly unchanged or rather increase in
their magnitude. The statistical significance of some estimates diminishes, but thisis mostly due to the decrease in the sample size. Thus, there is no evidence of bias
due to endogenous school choice. Logical reasoning also implies that aself-sorting bias is unlikely. Assuming that our results are affected by endogenous
school choice, this would mean parents must know exactly the influences of thehidden curriculum beforehand: positive effects of participatory/cooperativeeducation on pro-social preferences and negative effects of anti-competitive
education. However, it is not convincing to assume that people know exactly thatseemingly similar educational practices, i.e., participatory/cooperative andanti-competitive practices, have opposite influences.
Finally, we would like to mention the possibility of omitted variable bias
due to unobserved teacher characteristics. One might doubt that unobserved
teacher characteristics affect the selection of educational content/practices andthat our estimates capture the influence of such teachers’ personal qualities rather
than the hidden curriculum. Fundamentally, we do not rule out the possibility of28such influences through teachers because the hidden curriculum, as explained in
Section 2, is considered to be based on preferences, beliefs, and/or norms ofteachers, a school, or a community.
At the same time, however, we believe that, in our context, it is unlikelythat our estimates confound the influence of unobserved teacher characteristics forthe following reasons. First, pupils do not have the same teacher for all years ofprimary education, and therefore, the influence of a particularly influential teacher
would be “smoothed out” by teachers with different levels of influence in otheryears. In addition, an influential teacher would not have the same level ofinfluence on all pupils in a class or year (i.e., what some people find engaging
would not be the same for everyone else). Moreover, our educational
content/practices used in the analysis (as listed in Table 1) cannot be determinedat the class (teacher) level but at the school level. Given also that teachers (andpupils) cannot choose the schools in which they work (and in which to enroll),
educational content/practices at schools are expected to be independent ofteachers’ personal characteristics. In fact, Table 5 suggests that our proxies for thehidden curriculum vary by prefecture: within-prefecture variations are muchsmaller than between-prefecture variations. This is mainly due to the educational
administration system in Japan, implying that actual educational content/practices
are determined at some community level. Furthermore, our estimations in Tables
7 and 8 include several controls that capture the quality of a teacher or a school29

(school district), such as class size, dummies for experience with classroom chaos,teachers’ active intervention with bullying, and the number of high schools thatcan be chosen in a school district. We also control for current individual income
level, which might partially capture the quality of education. Thus, our estimates
are unlikely to suffer from unobserved teacher characteristics.

5.3. Effect of Education on Economy-Related Preferences
So far, we investigated the impact of the hidden curriculum on the formation ofsocial preferences. The results indicate that participatory and cooperativeeducation nurtures pupils’ social skills while anti-competitive education has thereverse effect.
In this subsection, we further investigate whether the hidden curriculum affects
economy-related preferences.
Columns 1 to 5 of Table 9 report the results for preferences forgovernment redistributive policy, and columns 6 to 8 report those for preferences
for market institutions (see Tables A1 and 6 for the definitions of dependent
variables and their summary statistic). The table shows that the hidden curriculum
also influences the formation of economy-related preferences. Here again, we seea contrast between “participation & cooperation” and “anti-competition.” When“participation & cooperation” has a statistically significant positive coefficient,“anti-competition” has a negative coefficient, and when “anti-competition” has a30

significant negative coefficient, “participation & cooperation” has a positivecoefficient, except for the result in column 1.
The results indicate that those who experienced participatory/cooperative
learning (“participation & cooperation”) are more likely to approve ofredistributive policies: they endorse government policies to impose heavier taxes
on big companies and the rich (columns 3 and 4). In contrast, those who
experienced anti-competitive education (“anti-competition”) are more likely to
oppose government redistribution policies (column 1), social security (column 5),
and the market economy (column 7). While the negative effect of“anti-competition” on the belief in the market economy (column 7) is plausible,
the negative effect on redistributive policies (column 1) and social security(column 5) may be contrary to intuition because an anti-competitive view seems
to be on the opposite side of inequality, which may be a result of market
competition. However, in light of our results in Section 5.1, which indicate thatanti-competitive education nurtures an asocial outlook, the results here can beinterpretable. In this sense, the results in Table 9 are consistent with the results forsocial preferences given in Table 7.
[Table 9]

6. Conclusion
This paper examines the role of elementary school education in the formation of31

social preferences. In the analysis, we extract proxy factors comprising theso-called “hidden curriculum” and investigate their impact on the formation ofsocial preferences. Our main findings are summarized as follows.
First, educational content/practices at public elementary school show
great regional differences despite a national educational policy and curriculum.
Although widely believed that public elementary schools in Japan provide
undifferentiated education, schools in different areas in fact do employ different
educational content/practices. Second, the hidden curriculum exerts a significant
impact on pupils’ subsequent social preferences. In particular, education valuing
student participation and cooperation is associated with positive social
preferences: those who experienced participatory/cooperative learning practices
are more likely to be altruistic, cooperative with others, reciprocal, and proud of
their nationality. On the other hand, educational practices emphasizing
anti-competition are associated with negative social preferences: those educatedwith anti-competitive practices are more likely to be non-altruistic, uncooperativewith others, vengeful, and unpatriotic.
On the whole, our results indicate that elementary school education plays
an important role in the preference formation. Thus, in line with Algan et al.
(2013) and Cantoni et al. (2014), this study provides evidence ofhorizontal/oblique socialization mechanisms through elementary education.
Furthermore, our results indicate prolonged influences of elementary schooling on

32

subsequent preference formation, implying that education shapes the future ofsociety through preference formation, not just through human capital formation.
At the same time, however, this study is silent on the role of nationwide
educational content/practices in Japan. To better understand the role of educationin cultural transmission, further studies should be conducted. One direction would
be to explore the causality between cross-national heterogeneity in educational
content/practices and cultural diversity using a cross-national dataset with richinformation on the school curriculum.

33

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36

Tables
Table 1: Informal Educational Content and Practices
Content/Practices
1) Reading before class2) Statue of hard work
3) School assembly on atomic bomb day4) Gender-segregated class numbers
5) Teachers’ strike6) No display of national flag7) Kids’ bank8) Emergency drill on September 19) Group learning10) Antidiscrimination education
11) No singing of national anthem
12) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz
13) School trip to Hiroshima or Nagasaki
14) Scale evaluation

15) Target-based evaluation
16) No footraces17) No finishing orderStatement in the questionnaire

Yes

There was time for reading before class.
There was a statue of Kinjiro Ninomiya reading a book while walking and carrying firewood
on his back.
August 6 or 9 during summer vacation was a school day.a)Student class numbers (attendance numbers) were gender segregated.b)Sometimes, there was no classroom lesson due to a teachers’ strike.
There was no display of the national flag at some entrance/graduation ceremonies.
The school had a kids’ bank (kodomo ginko).c)
The school conducted an emergency drill on September 1.d)There was a task in which students worked together as a group.
The school conducted antidiscrimination education (dowa kyoiku).e)
There was no singing of the national anthem at some entrance/graduation ceremonies.
We studied Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz in a class.f)
We visited Hiroshima or Nagasaki on a school trip.
Educational achievement was evaluated on a several-point scale, e.g., on a scale of one to
five.
There were specific targets for achievement in each subject, and grades were evaluated on thebasis of “achieved” or “not.” In addition to academic achievement, pupils’ behaviors such ascompassion toward others and cooperation with others are also included in the list ofevaluation items.
There were no footraces at school sports meets.
There were footraces at school sports meets, but teachers did not rank the finishing order.

0.272

Do notremember
0.189

0.382

0.082

0.245
0.619
0.118
0.065
0.108
0.304
0.754
0.339
0.089
0.265
0.381

0.427
0.165
0.149
0.252
0.113
0.468
0.126
0.243
0.165
0.250
0.051

0.715

0.059

0.437

0.198

0.060
0.020

0.041
0.054

Notes: The order of educational content/practices is the same as in the questionnaire. a) August 6 and 9 are dates marking the dropping of atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. b) Class (attendance) numbers are student ID numbers in a class, and when teachers call the roll of pupils,
the order in which pupils’ name is called is based on the number. c) Kids’ bank (kodomo ginko) is a student-centric bank in which bankers
come to school regularly and students can save/withdraw money to/from their accounts. It was established by the Finance Ministry and
Education Ministry directly after the war to encourage students to learn the fundamental structure of the banking system. d) September 1 is theday on which the Great Kanto Earthquake occurred in 1923. e) Antidiscrimination education (dowa kyoiku) provides opportunities for students
37to study discrimination against outcasts that dates back to the Edo era or before. f) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz are collective farms in the Soviet era.

38

Table 2: Sample Characteristics
A. Our survey (2012)

Unmarried

Graduates/
Post graduates

Total (age 20 or older)

37.2%

47.5%

Ages 20 to 24

94.5%

39.8%

Ages 25 to 34
Ages 35 to 44

68.6%
37.4%

55.3%
45.5%

Ages 45 to 54

20.1%

45.6%

Ages 55 to 64

9.3%

45.9%

Age 65 or older

4.0%

37.7%

B. Labor Force Survey (2012)

Unmarried

Graduates/
Post graduates

Total (age 15 or older)
Ages 15 to 24

25.8%
96.5%

20.9%
21.8%

Ages 25 to 34

52.0%

34.4%

Ages 35 to 44

22.8%

26.7%

Ages 45 to 54
Ages 55 to 64

13.7%
7.9%

25.8%
19.3%

Age 65 or older

3.3%

9.0%

39

Table 3: Result of Polychoric Factor Analysis

6) No display of national flag11) No singing of national anthem
5) Teachers’ strike17) No finishing order16) No footraces9) Group learning
1) Reading before class8) Emergency drill on September 115) Target-based evaluation
12) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz
7) Kids’ bank14) Scale evaluation
2) Statue of hard work10) Antidiscrimination education
13) School trip to Hiroshima or Nagasaki
3) School assembly on atomic bomb day4) Gender-segregated class number

Factor 1: Leftist
political thought

Factor 2: Anticompetition

0.921
0.898
0.546
0.317
0.065
0.033
−0.024
0.095
0.040
0.202
0.009
0.087
−0.263
0.184
0.031
0.238
0.157

0.146
0.107
0.127
0.848
0.832
−0.1910.225−0.0100.283−0.0270.333−0.093
0.182
0.055
0.135
0.108
−0.391

Factor 3:
Participation &cooperation
0.052−0.0400.224
0.074−0.027
0.745
0.689
0.628
0.545
−0.1260.156−0.0210.089
0.021−0.0400.221
0.240

Factor 4: Hard
work & effort
0.046
0.009
0.333
0.103
0.006
0.134
−0.1240.066−0.067
0.701
0.643
0.594
0.505
0.022
−0.0560.269
0.399

Factor 5:
Human rights &
peace
0.105
0.083
−0.022
0.110
0.071
0.107
0.060
−0.154−0.010−0.0520.063−0.060
0.267
0.777
0.754
0.513
0.321

Note: Reported figures are rotated factor loadings estimated by polychoric factor analysis using the PCF method with an orthogonal Varimax rotation.
Shaded cells indicate a factor loading larger than 0.5.
Table 4: Factor Scores by Age GroupAge group:
F1: Leftist political thought
F2: Anti-competition
F3: Participation & cooperation
F4: Hard work & effort
F5: Human rights & peace20‒29 (N = 918)30‒39 (N = 924)

40‒49 (N = 908)50‒59 (N = 871)

−0.102−0.425
2.042
0.761
0.945

0.092
−0.870
1.452
1.176
1.111

0.075
−0.933
1.369
1.555
0.978

0.033
−0.810
1.280
1.957
0.800

40

Table 5: Checks on Heterogeneity of the Hidden Curriculum between/within Prefectures

Factor 1:
Leftist political thought
Factor 2:
Anti-competition
Factor 3:
Participation & cooperation
Factor 4:
Hard work & effort
Factor 5:
Human rights & peace

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Between groups(prefectures at the ageof 12)

Between subgroups(stayers/movers)
within groups(prefectures at the ageof 12)

Within subgroups(stayers/movers)

Total

DoF

46

47

3,589

3,682

MS

0.376***

0.046

0.062

0.069

F-stat.

6.05

0.75

MS

0.143***

0.058

0.054

0.055

F-stat.

2.66

1.08

MS

0.647***

0.193

0.152

0.160

F-stat.

4.24

1.27

MS

0.296***

0.120

0.138

0.143

F-stat.

2.13

0.87

MS

4.288***

0.116

0.116

0.197

F-stat.

36.89

0.99

Note: “Group” is defined here as prefecture at the age of 12, and “subgroup” is defined on the basis of respondents’ current prefecture: 0 = current
prefecture differs from the prefecture at the age of 12, 1 = otherwise. “DoF” stands for degree of freedom, “MS” stands for mean square, and“F-stat.” is F statistic. F statistic in column 1 tests the null that the mean squares in columns 1 and 3 are equal, and that in column 2 tests thenull that the mean squares in columns 2 and 3 are equal.

41

Table 6: Summary of Statistics on Empirical Variables
Variable

NOBs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Altruism

3,621

3.581

0.768

1

5

Cooperation: outcome

3,621

3.421

0.728

1

5

Cooperation: satisfaction

3,621

3.414

0.805

1

5

Trust

3,621

2.952

0.868

1

5

Competition

3,621

2.922

0.87

1

5

Positive reciprocity

3,621

3.745

0.592

1

5

Negative reciprocity

3,621

2.723

0.774

1

5

National pride

3,621

3.69

0.883

1

5

Income redistribution: poor

3,621

3.184

0.861

1

5

Income redistribution: inequality

3,621

3.325

0.879

1

5

Government tax: companies

3,621

3.417

0.886

1

5

Government tax: wealthy individuals

3,621

3.823

0.931

1

5

Social security

3,621

3.732

0.843

1

5

Deregulation

3,621

3.370

0.782

1

5

Market economy

3,621

3.134

0.756

1

5

Labor union

3,621

3.350

0.883

1

5

F1: Leftist political thought

3,621

0.024

1

−1.725

4.589

F2: Anti-competition

3,621−0.7591−2.797

4.584

F3: Participation & cooperation

3,621

1.54

1

−0.641

4.068

F4: Hard work & effort

3,621

1.354

1

−0.946

4.442

F5: Human rights & peace

3,621

0.961

1

−1.04

3.581

3,621

39.53410.881

20

59

3,621

14.37

2.123

9

21

3,621

0.501

0.5

0

1

Divorced

3,621

0.042

Bereaved

3,621

0.004

Unmarried

3,621

0.371

Age

a)

Schooling yearsb)Female dummy
Marital status dummies

42

Income (million yen) b)
Household size

b)

3,419

273.062293.118

0

1500

3,389

2.867

1.15

1

5

b)

3,089

12.387

2.703

9

21

b)

3,107

11.799

2.032

9

21

50 to 99 books

3,621

0.122

10 to 49 books

3,621

0.407

1 to 9 books

3,621

0.152

No books

3,621

0.019

Do not remember

3,621

0.138

Less than a year

3,621

0.027

Less than 5 years

3,621

0.066

Less than 10 years

3,621

0.058

More than 10 years

3,621

0.284

# of elder siblings

3,621

0.601

0.795

0

6

# of younger siblings

3,621

0.742

0.769

0

7

Class size

3,621

36.043

8.094

1

80

2 to 4 schools

3,621

0.238

5 to 9 schools

3,621

0.267

More than 10 schools

3,621

0.146

Do not remember

3,621

0.225

Class size

3,621

36.043

8.094

1

80

Classroom chaos

3,621

0.257

Teachers’ active intervention

3,621

0.263

3,621

0.174

0.167

0

1

Father’s schooling years

Mother’s schooling years# of books at home

Living together with grandparents# of high schools

Percentage of “do not remember” to the 17
educational questions

Note: a) “Age” is controlled as five-year age group dummies. b) All variables arecontrolled as dummy variables. In case of missing values, a dummy for
missing values is controlled.

43

Table 7: Impacts of Hidden Curriculum on Social Preferences(1)
Dependent variable:
F1: Leftist political thought
F2: Anti-competition
F3: Participation & cooperation
F4: Hard work & effort
F5: Human rights & peace
Observations
R-squared(2)
Cooperation:
outcome(3)
Cooperation:satisfaction−0.008(0.016)−0.032*(0.019)0.086***(0.020)0.015(0.020)−0.003(0.020)−0.017(0.019)−0.031*(0.018)0.042**(0.020)−0.019(0.017)0.015(0.022)−0.014(0.020)−0.023(0.020)0.061***(0.021)−0.034*(0.020)0.034(0.024)0.003(0.021)−0.003(0.021)
0.023(0.022)−0.014(0.020)0.047*(0.025)

3,621
0.155

3,621
0.156

3,621
0.160

3,621
0.152

Altruism

44(4)Competition

Table 7 (continued)

Dependent variable:
F1: Leftist political thought
F2: Anti-competition
F3: Participation & cooperation
F4: Hard work & effort
F5: Human rights & peace
Observations
R-squared

(5)

(6)

(7)
Negativereciprocity

(8)

Trust

Positive reciprocity−0.005(0.022)−0.001(0.021)−0.005(0.027)0.037(0.023)0.015(0.023)0.001(0.017)−0.048***(0.016)
0.041**(0.019)0.009(0.016)0.016(0.016)−0.028(0.023)0.034*(0.020)0.014(0.019)0.022(0.019)−0.012(0.025)−0.015(0.024)−0.049**(0.024)0.067**(0.026)0.012(0.024)0.026(0.023)

3,621
0.158

3,621
0.199

3,621
0.152

3,621
0.164

National pride

Note: “Hidden curriculum” variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of unity
for ease of interpretation. All estimations are implemented by OLS with othercontrols such as five-year birth cohort dummies, education dummies, female dummy,
interactions between birth cohort and education dummies, marital status dummies,
income category dummies, household size, parents’ education dummies, number ofbooks at home at school age, dummies for living with grandparents at the age of 15,
number of siblings at the age of 15, class size at elementary school, dummies forexperience with classroom chaos and teachers’ active intervention with bullying,number of high schools that can be chosen in a school district, and prefecturedummies (current and at the age of 12). In addition, we adjust the sampling weight tomake our observations proportional to the overall Japanese population distribution.
Numbers in parentheses are Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at 10-year
age cohort, gender, and prefecture level.

45

Table 8: Robustness Checks on Impacts of Hidden Curriculum
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Cooperation:
Cooperation:
Positive
Negative
Altruism
Dependent variable:
outcomesatisfaction
reciprocity
reciprocity
A) Eliminating unobserved heterogeneity among versions of the formal curriculum guideline
F2: Anti-competition−0.032*−0.032*−0.023−0.049***0.033*(0.018)(0.018)(0.020)(0.016)(0.019)F3: Participation &0.086***
0.041**
0.060***
0.041**
0.015
cooperation(0.020)(0.020)(0.021)(0.019)(0.019)B) Partialling out the possible effect of recall bias
F2: Anti-competition−0.026−0.040**−0.031−0.042**0.033(0.020)(0.018)(0.022)(0.017)(0.021)F3: Participation &0.086***
0.032
0.060**
0.056**
0.001
cooperation(0.024)(0.021)(0.026)(0.022)(0.025)C) Employing alternative “hidden curriculum” (group-averages of educational content/practice dummies)
G2: Anti-competition−0.025−0.042***−0.016−0.0170.040**(0.018)(0.015)(0.019)(0.015)(0.017)
G3: Participation &0.092***
0.049**
0.062***
0.053***
0.010
cooperation(0.020)(0.019)(0.022)(0.018)(0.019)D) Controlling municipality fixed effects
F2: Anti-competition−0.030−0.016−0.030−0.043**0.027(0.020)(0.019)(0.022)(0.017)(0.020)F3: Participation &0.097***
0.067***
0.091***
0.055***−0.009cooperation(0.024)(0.018)(0.022)(0.018)(0.022)E) Checking bias due to endogenous school choice using the sample of first-born people (NOBs = 2,005)
F2: Anti-competition−0.040*−0.025−0.033−0.048**0.026(0.024)(0.025)(0.028)(0.022)(0.025)
F3: Participation &0.108***
0.071***
0.062**
0.081***−0.004
cooperation(0.027)(0.026)(0.028)(0.025)(0.026)

Note: See the note in Table 7. Taking the results in Table 7 as the base specification, we include
additional controls in the estimations reported in Panels A through E. In Panel A, we include
dummies for versions of the curriculum guideline and interactions with birth-cohort dummies. In
Panel B, we include “do not remember” dummies for the 17 questions regarding educational
content/practices. In Panel C, we employ alternative variables for the hidden curriculum (for thedefinitions of the variables, see Appendix IV). In Panel D, we include municipality (city/county)
dummies (at the age of 12). In Panel E, we use the sub-sample of first-born people.

46

Table 9: Impacts of Hidden Curriculum on Preferences for Government Policies and Market Institutions(2) Reducing income(3) Heavy taxes on big

inequality

companies−0.024−0.019−0.0120.009(0.021)(0.025)(0.027)(0.021)−0.045**−0.008−0.031−0.012(0.022)(0.021)(0.023)(0.022)−0.0040.023

0.057**

0.038*(0.021)(0.022)(0.026)(0.022)0.039*−0.030−0.014−0.021(0.021)(0.022)(0.023)(0.023)−0.017

0.013

0.015

0.067***(0.024)(0.031)(0.027)(0.025)Observations

3,621

3,621

3,621

3,621

Adjusted R-squared

0.164

0.173

0.132

0.150

Dependent variable:
Leftist political thought
Anti-competition
Participation & cooperation
Hard work & effort
Human rights & peace(1) Taking care of the poor

47(4) Heavy taxes on the rich

Table 9 (continued)
Redistributive policy:

(6)

(7)

(8)

(5) Social security

Deregulation

Market economy

Labor unions

0.012

0.005

−0.0170.035(0.024)(0.024)(0.023)(0.023)−0.0720.002−0.047−0.027(0.020)***(0.021)(0.019)**(0.022)

0.020

0.019

0.006

0.000

(0.022)(0.019)(0.020)(0.025)−0.0050.014−0.0210.016(0.023)(0.020)(0.019)(0.022)−0.008

0.010

0.028

0.044*(0.026)(0.025)(0.023)(0.024)

Observations

3,621

3,621

3,621

3,621

Adjusted R-squared

0.152

0.152

0.146

0.129

Dependent variable:
Leftist political thought
Anti-competition
Participation & cooperation
Hard work & effort
Human rights & peace

Note: See the note in Table 7. The control variables are the same as in Panel D of Table 8.

48

FiguresB) Anti-competition

D) Hard work & effortC) Participation & cooperationE) Human rights & peace

Figure 1: Factor Scores by PrefectureA) Leftist political thought

49

Appendix I: Empirical Variables
The definitions of dependent variables are in Tables A1.
[Table A1]

Appendix II: Achievement Gap among Elementary Students between Schools
Table A2 reports the results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) for checking
how large the between-school achievement gap during elementary education is inJapan. The data used in the analysis are test scores in mathematics and science forelementary students (fourth grade) from the Third International Mathematics andScience Study (TIMSS 1995). For comparison, results for the United States,
England, and Norway are also reported.
[Table A2]
The table shows that between-school disparities in test scores are
surprisingly small in Japan in both mathematics and science, compared with thosein the United States and England. The mean square for “between schools” is about
6 times larger than that for “within schools” in the United States, and 3 times
larger in England. In contrast, the mean square for “between schools” is smaller
than that for “within schools” in Japan. Notice also that the relative size of
between-school variation in Japan is smaller than that in Norway, which isconsidered a country with one of the smallest education gaps.

50Appendix

III:

ChecksonIntentional

Forgettingof

Educational

Content/Practices
To address the recall bias issue, we run regressions where “do not remember”
dummies are dependent variables and eight social preferences are now
explanatory variables, controlling the percentage of “do not remember” answers
to the other 16 educational content/practices, five year birth cohort dummies,
prefecture dummies (at the age of 12), their interactions, female dummy, andeducation level dummies.
In Table A3, we report the estimation results for the variables“anti-competition” and “participation & cooperation.” The results show nolinkages between current stated preferences and “do not remember” answers foreducational content/practices, aside from a couple of exceptions. Even for these
exceptions, no convincing evidence arises that recall bias can explain our main
findings in Table 7. Thus, it is less likely that people intentionally forget theeducational content/practices they received, or that people who were more
affected by educational content/practices are more likely to remember thecontent/practices.
[Table A3]

Appendix IV: Alternative Measures for the Hidden Curriculum51

In Section 5.2, we use alternative “hidden curriculum” variables to check therobustness of our results. The first alternative measure is, as in Panel C of Table 8,group-averages of dummy variables on the 17 educational contents/practices: we
divide the 17 educational content/practice dummies into several groups according
to their (Pearson) correlation coefficients, and calculate the average by group.
Correlation coefficients between the 17 dummy variables are reported in Table A4.
Twelve out of 17 variables are classified into four groups based on whether thecoefficient is greater than 0.15: the first group (“leftist political thought”) is
educational content/practices (5), (6), and (11); the second (“anti-competition”) is(16) and (17); the third (“participation & cooperation”) is (1), (8), (9), and (15);and the fourth (“human rights & peace”) is (3), (10), and (13). Because fiveeducational contents/practices (2), (4), (7), (12), and (14) are not classified into
any group based on this criterion, these dummy variables are directly controlled in
the estimation.
[Table A4]
The second alternative measure is the factor scores obtained bypolychoric factor analysis with the principal factor (PF) method. In Table 7, we
use the factor scores obtained by polychoric factor analysis with the PCF method,
and the PF method is an alternative one. The result of polychoric factor analysis
based on the PF method is reported in Table A5, indicating that the pattern offactor loadings is very similar to those derived by the PCF method as shown in52

Table 3. Although estimation results using the factor scores based on the PF
methods are not reported here (available from the authors on request), we alsofind similar results regarding the influences of the “hidden curriculum” variables
as in Table 7, implying again that our main findings are not sensitive to themeasurement of “hidden curriculum” variables.
[Table A5]
Summary statistics of these alternative measures are reported in Table A6.
For ease of comparison, all variables are standardized to have a standard deviationof unity.
[Table A6]

53

Tables in Appendix
Table A1: Definitions of Dependent Variables
Variable
Altruism
Cooperation: outcome
Cooperation: satisfaction
Competition
Trust
Positive reciprocity

Negative reciprocity
National pride
Redistributive policy:
Taking care of the poor
Reducing income inequality
Heavy taxes on big companies
Heavy taxes on the richSocial security
Deregulation
Market economy
Labor unions

Statement in the questionnaire
I feel happy when I do a good deed that I think is beneficial for others (such as picking up trash in a park).
Working as a group results in greater achievements than working individually.
I am more satisfied when I achieve a goal by cooperating with others than only by myself.
I enjoy competing with others.
In general, you can trust most people.
Average of answers to the following three questions: (1) If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it;(2) I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before; and (3) I am ready to undergo
personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.
Average of answers to the following three questions: (1) If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back;(2) If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her; and (3) If I suffer a serious
wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost.
I am proud of being Japanese.

Answer1 (strongly
disagree) to 5
(strongly agree)

It is the government’s responsibility to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves financially.
It is the government’s responsibility to reduce the disparity between high-income and low-income individuals.
Government should impose a heavier tax on big companies.
Government should impose a heavier tax on high-income individuals.
Government should make maximum efforts to protect people against illness, injury, or unemployment byenhancing social security.
Government should actively promote privatization and deregulation.
Although the economy regulated by market forces widens the income gap between the rich and the poor, it
makes people wealthier in general.
1 (strongly agree)
to 5 (strongly
disagree)Labor unions are not necessary.

Note: Regarding the definitions and measurements of positive and negative reciprocity, we follow Dohmen et al. (2009).
54

Table A2: Disparities in Educational Achievements between/within Schools at Elementary Education
(1)

Japan
UnitedStatesEngland

NorwayDoF
MS
F-stat.
DoF
MS
F-stat.
DoF
MS
F-stat.
DoF
MS
F-stat.

(2)
Mathematics
BetweenWithinschools
schools
141
4,164
49.5
81.2
0.61
181
7,114
425.3
68.0
6.26***
126
2,999
190.2
63.9
2.97***
138
2,218
67.2
59.6
1.13

(3)
Total
4,305
80.2

(4)
Betweenschools
141
33.3

(5)
Science
Withinschools
4,164
55.2

(6)

4,305
54.5

7,114
51.5

7,295
58.2

2,999
53.6

3,125
56.7

2,218
51.9

2,256
51.8

Total

0.60
7,295
76.8

181
321.7
6.24***

3,125
69.0

126
130.5

2,256
60.1

138
50.4

2.43***

0.97

Note: “DoF” stands for degree of freedom, “MS” stands for mean square, and “F-stat.” is F statistic. F statistic tests thenull that the mean square for “between schools” and that for “within schools” are equal.

55

Table A3: Checks on intentional forgetting
F2: Anti-competition(1) E16:(2) E17: No
No footraces
finishing order
Altruism
0.001−0.005(0.005)(0.006)
Cooperation: outcome−0.0010.001(0.005)(0.005)
Cooperation: satisfaction
0.003
0.006
(0.004)(0.005)Competition−0.0000.000(0.004)(0.005)Trust
0.002−0.004(0.004)(0.005)
Positive reciprocity−0.002−0.006(0.006)(0.008)
Negative reciprocity
0.008
0.011*(0.006)(0.006)
National pride
0.000−0.007(0.004)(0.005)
Ratio of “do not remember”
0.386***
0.434***
answers(0.046)(0.045)
H : social preference variables have no effects
F-statistic and p-value
0.41 (0.918)
0.85 (0.557)
R-squared
0.341
0.330
Dep. Var.: Dummy for“do not remember” answer(3) E1: Reading
before class
0.006(0.012)−0.030**(0.013)−0.002(0.011)
0.002(0.010)0.012(0.009)−0.016(0.015)−0.015(0.011)
0.005(0.010)0.772***(0.056)
1.69 (0.096)
0.298

F3: Participation & cooperation(4) E8: Emergency(5) E9: Groupdrill
learning−0.001−0.013(0.014)(0.010)−0.003−0.005(0.015)(0.010)−0.007−0.006(0.014)(0.008)0.006
0.004(0.012)(0.008)−0.0020.002(0.012)(0.007)0.022−0.005(0.019)(0.012)−0.016−0.003(0.014)(0.009)−0.0010.001(0.012)(0.008)1.099***
0.788***(0.056)(0.045)0.37 (0.935)
0.330(6) E15: Targetbased evaluation−0.018(0.012)0.001(0.012)−0.012(0.011)
0.015(0.010)0.020**(0.010)−0.012(0.014)−0.002(0.011)
0.002(0.010)0.822***(0.052)0.78 (0.619)
0.320

Note: All regressions are implemented by OLS with five-year birth cohort dummies, prefecture dummies (at the age of12), their interactions, female dummy, and education level dummies.

56

1.57 (0.127)
0.301

Table A4: Correlation Matrix of Dummy Variables for Educational Content/Practices
1) Reading before class2) Statue of hard work
3) School assembly on
atomic bomb day4) Gender-segregated classnumber5) Teachers’ strike6) No display of nationalflag7) Kids’ bank8) Emergency drill on
September 19) Group learning10) Antidiscrimination
education11) No singing of national
anthem12) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz
13) School trip to Hiroshima
and Nagasaki
14) Scale evaluation
15) Target-based evaluation
16) No footraces17) No finishing order

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

1.000
0.060

1.000

0.032

0.082

1.000

0.017

0.101

0.115

1.000

0.039

0.036

0.096

0.059

1.000

0.035

−0.004

0.091

0.043

0.181

1.000

0.043

0.143

0.101

0.075

0.080

0.061

1.000

0.115

0.036

0.085

0.074

0.060

0.014

0.070

1.000

0.198

0.055

0.072

0.121

0.060

−0.002

0.046

0.164

1.000

0.026

0.106

0.179

0.092

0.016

0.075

0.063

0.026

0.115

1.000

−0.018−0.044

0.069

0.047

0.165

0.530

0.023

0.032

0.008

0.053

1.000

−0.097

0.100

0.061

0.117

0.149

0.079

0.126

0.004

0.034

0.049

0.080

1.000

0.038

0.048

0.154

0.034

−0.007

0.023

0.058

0.008

0.040

0.285

−0.010

0.001

1.000

−0.052
0.165
0.043
0.041

0.088
0.047
0.017
0.033

0.026
0.024
0.028
0.068

0.097
0.040
−0.036−0.007

0.030
0.041
0.013
0.072

0.015
0.057
0.042
0.150

0.075
0.029
0.051
0.085

0.018
0.090
0.034
0.051

0.041
0.157
−0.009−0.018−0.016
0.055
0.029
0.039

−0.009
0.030
0.045
0.139

0.138
−0.014−0.010
0.032

0.024
0.016
0.061
0.042

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

1.000
−0.016
0.001
0.004

1.000
0.060
0.077

1.000
0.251

1.000

Note: Reported figures are correlation coefficients. The shaded cells indicate that the correlation is greater than 0.15.

57

Table A5: Result of Polychoric Factor Analysis (Principal Factor Method)6) No display of national flag11) No singing of national anthem
5) Teachers’ strike17) No finishing order16) No footraces9) Group learning
1) Reading before class8) Emergency drill on Sep. 115) Target-based evaluation
12) Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz
7) Kids’ bank14) Scale evaluation
10) Antidiscrimination education
13) School trip to Hiroshima or
Nagasaki
3) School assembly on atomic
bomb day2) Statue of hard work
4) Gender-segregated classnumber

F1:
LPT
0.915
0.875
0.419
0.299
0.070
0.036
0.012
0.060
0.059
0.154
0.057
0.085
0.198

F2:
AC
0.139
0.113
0.121
0.815
0.743
−0.095
0.178
0.047
0.219
0.014
0.258
−0.032
0.097

F3:
P&C
0.050
−0.0270.178
0.046−0.019
0.649
0.549
0.428
0.391
−0.045
0.143
0.025
0.057

F4:
HW&E
0.024
0.043
0.277
0.071
−0.0190.141−0.141
0.059−0.034
0.566
0.491
0.392
0.056

F5:
HR&P
0.058
0.055
−0.014
0.066
0.048
0.104
0.014
−0.092
0.006
0.025
0.080
−0.012
0.608

F6

F7

F8

F9

F10

0.116
−0.1200.327
0.065−0.047−0.0370.231−0.027−0.068−0.0390.124
0.001−0.0650.082−0.083−0.011−0.042
0.051
0.002
0.031
−0.025−0.0430.022−0.051
0.318−0.053−0.016
0.034
0.014
0.015
−0.0220.019−0.053
0.200
0.018
0.014
0.008
0.025
−0.0160.015−0.0230.029
0.050−0.047−0.0260.076−0.011
0.062−0.040
0.100
0.024
0.041

0.027
−0.0290.001
0.039−0.0490.005−0.048
0.033
0.146
0.011
−0.010−0.007
0.024

0.067

0.153

−0.002−0.031

0.513

0.077

0.083

0.000

−0.047−0.046

0.213

0.148

0.163

0.191

0.370

0.210

0.026

0.175

0.075

0.009

−0.095

0.117

0.069

0.292

0.184

0.083

0.035

0.034

0.286

0.011

0.128

−0.194

0.188

0.290

0.227

0.027

0.102

0.216

0.060

−0.020Note: Reported figures are rotated factor loadings estimated by polychoric factor analysis using the principal factor
method with an orthogonal Varimax rotation. The shaded cells indicate the factor loading larger than 0.3.

58

Table A6: Summary Statistics of Alternative “Hidden Curriculum” Variables
Variable

NOBs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Average of dummy variables on educational content/practices
G1: Leftist political thought

3,621

0.658

1.000

0.000

4.614

G2: Anti-competition

3,621

0.251

1.000

0.000

6.861

G3: Participation & cooperation

3,621

1.624

1.000

0.000

3.660

G4: Human rights & peace

3,621

1.014

1.000

0.000

3.138

Factor score (obtained by the polychoric factor analysis using the principle factor method in Table A5)
F1: Leftist political thought

3,621

0.153

1.000

−0.8494.563

F2: Anti-competition

3,621−0.2111.000−2.312

7.634

F3: Participation & cooperation

3,621

1.741

1.000

−0.4683.945

F4: Hard work & effort

3,621

1.357

1.000

−1.192

4.617

F5: Human rights & peace

3,621

1.044

1.000

−0.797

3.435

F6

3,621

−0.5951.000−4.914

4.997

F7

3,621

1.035

1.000

−3.738

5.113

F8

3,621

0.756

1.000

−2.800

3.861

F9

3,621

0.304

1.000

−2.436

3.269

F10

3,621

0.002

1.000

−4.556

3.858

Notes: All variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of unity, for ease ofcomparison. Because variables regarding “Hard work & effort” have low correlation
coefficients (Table A4), they are controlled directly without grouping and averaging.

59