GCOE Discussion Paper Series
Global COE Program

Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics
Discussion Paper No. 317

English as a Gateway? Immigration andPublic Opinion in JapanDavid Green and Yoshihiko Kadoya

September 2013

GCOE Secretariat
Graduate School of Economics

OSAKA UNIVERSITY

1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043, Japan

English as a Gateway? Immigration andPublic Opinion in Japan*
David Green†

Yoshihiko Kadoya‡

Abstract
Japan, like most of the developed world, faces potentially extreme demographic shortfalls
brought on by a rapidly aging society with a long life expectancy and low birthrate. Whereother western countries have utilized greater levels of immigration to help fight thesetendencies, immigration levels in Japan are comparatively much lower. Increasing
immigration to Japan is one suggested solution to the demographic problem, yet research
examining public opinion on higher levels of immigration in Japan is surprisingly rare.
Rather, public opposition to immigration is often unquestioningly taken as a given. This
paper, utilizing nationally-representative data from the Japan General Social Survey, digs
deeper into public opinion on immigration at the national and regional levels, consideringfactors that can influence respondents’ perceptions. In addition to some regional variation,
we find that English conversation ability is most strongly associated with favorable
perceptions of immigrants in Japan.

Key words: immigration, population studies, demographic changes, survey analysis
JEL Cord: F22, O1, R23*

This research uses the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS). The Japanese General Social
Surveys (JGSS) are designed and carried out by the JGSS Research Center at Osaka University ofCommerce (Joint Usage / Research Center for Japanese General Social Surveys accredited by
Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), in collaboration with the Instituteof Social Science at the University of Tokyo.

†

Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University. Address: Furo-cho, Chikusa, Nagoya 4648601
JAPAN. Email: david.green@law.nagoya-u.ac.jp‡

Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University. Address: Furo-cho, Chikusa, Nagoya
4648601 JAPAN. Email: yoshi.kadoya@soec.nagoya-u.ac.jp1Japanese opposition to immigration is often taken as a given. Particularly in western
scholarship, but even in the Japanese language literature on immigration policy, it is often
first assumed that the Japanese remain largely against immigration ahead of any subsequent
analysis. Yet to what extent is this in fact the case? Do the Japanese truly oppose
immigration? If so, to what degree? What factors influence this opposition? Such questions
have been investigated surprisingly rarely. This article seeks to do just that: look at macrolevel public opinion on immigration and consider factors that may both positively andnegatively influence public opinion toward immigration in Japan. We do this utilizing
large-scale, nationally-representative survey data obtained through the Japanese GeneralSocial Survey.
Our analysis will consider the various regions of Japan, as well as the country as awhole, arguing that public sentiment toward immigration is more complex than typicallyascribed. While the majority of the public may not be in favor of increased immigration, asignificant minority is comfortable having a larger foreign population take up residency.
We aim here to shed some light on the factors that help contribute to these positive andnegative perceptions of immigration, looking to see possible practical actions government
can take if it in fact wants to improve public opinion toward immigration.
Theory and Context
Much of the research considering immigration in the developed world looks to thecountries that have historically received comparatively large numbers of immigrants, suchas the United States (Brader et al 2008; Ha 2010), Canada (Bilodeau et al 2012) andAustralia (Mughan & Paxton 2006). To a lesser extent, literature is also available on newer
countries of immigration, primarily in Western Europe, including Germany (Martin 2004),
France (Fassin 2005) and Italy (Caponio 2008; Trinci 2004). The literature typically
identifies “competitive threat” as being one of the main driving forces in public opinion
against immigration, where rational actors may perceive threats to their livelihoods,
religion, or culture coming from influxes of foreign labor. (Ceobanu & Escandell 2010).
These threats, real or imagined, compel a wide-ranging negative public sentiment towards
immigrants and immigration.
It is somewhat difficult to apply the notion of “competitive threat” to the Japanesecase. The economic argument certainly does not hold up, where the country is experiencing
a severely aging society and badly needs additional labor. Religion also plays less of a role,as Japanese citizens typically do not maintain active religious affiliations (Kobayashi 2005).
Likely the real underlying threat is the perception of cultural difference and the effect it
could have on “homogenous” Japanese society. A recent public opinion survey by theJapanese Government Cabinet Office (2013) on ethnic Japanese residents from Latin
America shows that while only a slim majority of respondents are even aware of their
existence (52.9%), the vast majority (87%) feel that special immigration policy
considerations should be continued or expanded for this group. This likely speaks to theconcern over cultural difference, where most people feel if foreigners are brought into
Japan, the ideal would be to have someone with a similar cultural background.
In one of the few academic studies of Japanese public opinion on immigration inrecent years, Ikeda and Richey (2009) found that homogenous interaction, or interaction
2

with only Japanese citizens in this context, decreased tolerance for immigration. Indeed, in
the Cabinet Office survey cited above, given that most respondents were unaware of ethnic
return migration to Japan, few of the respondents likely had any interaction with theseimmigrants. Diversity of social interactions helped to increase tolerance, a finding
consistent with other countries and with another significant school of thought: the “contact
hypothesis”.
Contact hypothesis stipulates that continuous exposure to outside groups will help
to reduce tensions and ultimately promote more favorable attitudes between native andimmigrant groups (Escandell & Ceobanu 2009; Pettigrew 1998). While perceptions ofJapanese homogeneity have been well noted (Burgess 2010; Rosenbluth & Thies 2010), we
will see if it is in fact the case here that cultural perceptions form the base of Japanese
hesitancy toward immigration, or if any other factors come to the fore based on our
analysis of public opinion.
That most of the literature on immigration and public sentiment toward immigration
is based around predominantly American or European examples further speaks to our
purpose here. The literature available on Japanese immigration policy, especially in English,
is surprisingly lacking. Even less research looks at public opinion toward immigration in
Japan in any critical way. While some scholars are very much concerned about immigration
policy in Japan and the changes it can bring, public sentiment toward immigrants andimmigration is at best assumed to be negative, and more typically given only brief mention
before moving on to some other topic.
However, the debate on immigration in Japan is an important one, as the country
faces significant demographic hurdles. A postwar baby boom in tandem with a very low
birthrate and one of the world’s longest life expectancies have combined to give Japan the
dubious distinction of being one of the world’s fastest aging societies (UN Population
Division 2001). Compared to other developed countries, the Japanese government
acknowledges that it has one of the highest concentrations of elderly residents, with the gap
expected to grow in the coming years. Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate this trend. As mostother developed countries are experiencing similarly aging societies, it is useful to see theJapanese response, particularly because Japan has not utilized immigration in any way
approximating that the US, Australia or Europe thus far.
Figure 1: Age Structure of Population by Country3Figure 2: Proportion of Elderly Population by Country (Aged 65 years and over)

Immigration has been suggested as one of the means of combating the negative
demographic tendency facing Japan (Asakawa & Sakanaka, 2007; Komai, 2001).
Additionally, immigration has been presented as at least one way of “internationalizing” thecountry, where greater exposure to foreign neighbors, for instance, could help foster a more
outwardly-focused orientation (Hibino, 2009; Pak, 2000), as well as a means of maintaining
4

Japanese prosperity in the wake of pronounced labor shortages and two decades of
economic stagnation (Vogel, 2005). All of these facets are important, as a major portion of
the Japanese economy remains the manufacturing of export goods. Labor is needed, as is
the ability to sell products abroad. In any case, immigration is touted by some as one
potential way of improving at least some of the problems that Japan faces. Yet in order toseriously consider immigration policy as a means of addressing social and economic
shortfalls, two important factors need to be considered: what has already been achieved interms of policy, and public sentiment toward changes in policy. This will point to future
directions the government can ultimately take and how it can get there.
Japanese Immigration Policy
Putting public opinion aside for the moment, we first consider immigration policy
developments. It has been well documented that Japanese government policy has, for muchof the country’s history, been strict with regards to immigration. Although Japan has had
foreign residents in some sense for a very long period of time, the country remained largely
closed to foreign residents through the Meiji restoration (Akashi 2010; Kashiwazaki2000).The Tokugawa government made significant efforts to open the country up, passingcommercial trade treaties with the US, Russia, the United Kingdom and France in 1858 andforeign settlements were established in designated areas of the country, typically near major
ports (Yamawaki, 2000). With Japanese expansion and the annexation of Korea andTaiwan, migrants began flowing into the country as well. At the height of the Japanese
empire in 1945, over two million Korean and Taiwanese workers were living in Japan,
many of them conscripted laborers. At the time, as Korea and Taiwan were consideredJapanese territory, these workers were considered Japanese citizens. However, they were
declared foreigners when Japan regained its independence at the end of the US occupation(Tsutusi & Shin, 2008).
Soon after the restoration of Japanese independence, the government passed the
Immigration Control Act in 1952, legislation that would serve as the basis for postwar
immigration policy. The law was modeled after the American immigration system to someextent, but was not intended to permit immigrants to settle in the country permanently or toacquire Japanese nationality (Kashiwazaki & Akaha, 2006). An alien registration system
was also established with the law, which has been one of the primary means used by theJapanese government to track foreign residents. Both long-term and more recent foreign
residents have been required to sign up with the alien registration system since its inception(Kondo, 2002). Foreign residents all receive a “residence card” on arrival in the country(previously a foreign resident registration card) and are required to register at their local
city office within 90 days of arrival and give notification of any change in address. All
foreign residents must do so in order to be eligible to receive benefits like public healthinsurance and other social services (Ministry of Justice, 2010; Takao, 2003).
Although the Immigration Control Act established Japan’s modern immigration
system in the 1950s, immigration from other countries did not become a salient politicalissue until the 1980s with the continued expansion of the economy (Mori 1997; Kingston2011). Up until this time, Japan was able to account for the increased demand for labor
domestically through the combination of internal migration from the countryside to the5cities, automation of production processes, utilizing part time workers such as students,
housewives and the elderly, and by keeping famously long working hours. Immigration
into Japan remained low for the most part. As the Japanese economy continued to develop,
along with the rising yen and more pronounced labor shortages, Japan became anincreasingly attractive destination for foreign labor in spite of its restrictive policy.
Transnational labor networks developed, with “brokers” responsible for bringing ever more
foreign manual labor into the country (Liu-Farrer 2011; Yamanaka 1993). Much of theforeign manual labor entering Japan during the 1980s was technically illegal, although lax
enforcement of regulations made it relatively easy to enter and work.
With the rapidly expanding economy and the growing numbers of foreigners
already entering the country, some revision to the Immigration Control Act began to appear
increasingly necessary. Beginning in the late 1980s Japan started adopting differentiatedentry categories for foreign labor, culminating in passage of the revised Immigration
Control Act of 1990 (Usui 2006). The Immigration Control Act had two major facets: onthe one hand it instituted strict penalties on employers and brokers of illegal immigrants.
On the other hand, it opened the door to Nikkeijin, Japanese descendants typically fromSouth America, to enter the country freely (Coulmas 2007). Unprecedented numbers of
Latin American workers of Japanese descent consequently took up residency in Japan,
often concentrating in manufacturing hubs.
Immigration policy has further developed in recent years with revisions to the
Immigration Control Act in 2004 and 2009. These revisions were meant to ease the process
for skilled labor to enter the country and make it more difficult for unskilled labor to do so(Komai). Newer measures have included more detailed review of residence applicants, astricter review of employee training programs, scrutiny on entertainment visa applicants,
and a revision to the residence management system (Kashiwazaki & Akaha). With the 2009
revisions, the government has also implemented a point-based system for recruiting andretaining “highly skilled” foreign labor. Those who meet the government’s threshold are
given preferential immigration-related benefits, such as permission to bring a parent undercertain conditions, a longer period of residency for their visa, and simplified rules forestablishing more long-term residency, among others (Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2012;
Le Bail, 2013).
While these are official channels primarily aimed at increasing the number skilled
foreign workers in Japan, the government has also quietly been increasing the number of
unskilled laborers through less direct means. Perhaps the most apparent of these is the large
increase in foreign students studying in Japan. International students are given permission
to work, officially part time, as a part of their visa. Many international students, the vast
majority from China and other Asian countries, find their way into low-paying service andmanufacturing jobs (Liu-Farrer 2011). Along with the efforts of some local governments torecruit Asian brides into depopulated rural areas (Chung & Kim 2012) and the maintenanceof foreign “trainee” programs (Coulmas 2007), the size of the unskilled labor pool, whilestill small compared to other developed countries, has gradually expanded.
What we have thus seen in regards to national immigration policy is a gradualincrease in both the skilled and unskilled categories of foreign labor in Japan. The officiallyregistered foreign population of Japan stands at 2.1million people as of 2010, the largest
6foreign population on record. While an immigrant population of this size is unprecedented
in Japan, it constitutes only 1.25% of the total population (Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications Statistics Bureau, 2013) and remains the smallest ratio of immigrants inthe developed world.
The national government has been making inroads toward increasing the foreign
population in recent years, including both skilled and unskilled laborers. Coupled with theincrease in foreign residents, there have been ramped up efforts to incorporate foreign
residents into Japanese society. These efforts are typically initiated by local governments incombination with NGOs and can involve anything from providing free or low cost Japanese
language courses, all the way to granting local voting rights (Chung 2010; Fujimaki 2013).
Some localities have indeed taken strong initiative in addressing their foreign resident
populations, such as Kawasaki in Kanagawa Prefecture (Green 2013), Hamamatsu in
Shizuoka Prefecture (Sharpe 2008) and Oizumi Machi in Gunma Prefecture (Isago 2001),
among others.
By the same token, the Ministry of Education Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (abbreviated hereafter as the “Ministry of Education”) has made efforts to try
and incorporate foreign children into the Japanese education system. It acknowledged theneed for Japanese as a second language courses as a consequence of the 1990 revision to
the Immigration Control Act and has been actively partnering with municipalities toimprove the education programs offered to foreign children (Okano 2006; Suzuki 2009).
The intention is to try and integrate foreign residents, as well as their children, moresmoothly into Japanese society, hoping to bridge gaps in linguistic and cultural
understanding. However, such efforts have not been implemented in a uniform way. Where
some regions and municipalities may prove quite progressive in regard to trying to integrate
their foreign populations into their new locale, others may be highly exclusionary. If thegovernment truly aims to “internationalize”, improve the economy and address
demographic problems through increased immigration, immigration-related policies willneed to be addressed in a more uniform, national way.
This is where public opinion comes in. To truly change Japan in any sense public
opinion matters. Like any democracy, the opinions of the Japanese voting public areparamount to politicians’ political futures. National government initiatives require national
level support. Government would not able to implement these kinds of uniform policychanges in a highly unfavorable environment. Likewise, a strong public sentiment could
induce significant government action. We thus aim to test here whether and to what extent
public sentiment is in fact opposed to increases in immigration, and what factors may
influence these opinions.
Methodology
To test Japanese public opinion toward immigration, we utilized data from theJapanese General Social Survey (JGSS), the Japanese version of the General Social Survey
implemented in the United States by the University of Chicago and the National Opinion
Research Center. The Japanese counterpart is conducted annually or semi-annually andasks a nationally representative sample of people their opinions on a broad range of topics.
The Japanese survey is conducted by Osaka University of Commerce, with the questions
7

accredited by the Ministry of Education. Data from the JGSS is deposited in English at theInter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, housed at the University ofMichigan, and is available in Japanese from the University of Tokyo’s Institute of Social
Science. Here, we utilize data from the 2010 survey, the most recently available (ICPSR
2012; Osaka University of Commerce 2012).
The JGSS 2010 consists of visit-placement surveys of individuals throughout Japan
from February to April 2010. The respondents were male and female, aged 20 to 89 years
old. Two-stage stratified random sampling was applied. First, the prefectures of Japan weredivided into five regional blocks: Hokkaido/Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Chugoku/Shikoku, andKyushu. Then, according to the population size, each of the five regions was subdivided
into four strata by city type: large city as designated by the central government, city withmore than 200,000 residents, city with less than 200,000 residents, and town or village. The
response rate was 96.41 percent (2,417 responses out of 2,507 trials). From the data set, weselected the 1,680 respondents who had no missing answers on any of the variables
included.
The variables used in this research are shown in Table 1. Our dependent variable
was obtained from a question that asks whether the respondent is for or against an increasein the number of foreigners in his or her community. The respondent could choose either“for” or “against.” From this, we created a binary variable that takes the value unity if theanswer is favorable to the increase in foreigners and zero otherwise. We labeled thisvariable acceptance and applied a probit estimation.
Table 1: Variable Definition
Variable
AcceptanceMale
AgeMarriage
Educ
HincomeSatisarea
Child
Hoktohoku
Kanto (base)
Chubu
Chushikoku
KyushuLarcity (base)City200000
Cityless200000
Townvilla
Engtalk

EngreadDefinition
View on increasing foreign population (1=positive, 0=negative)
1=male, 0=femaleAge
1=currently married, 0=otherwise
Years’ of schoolingYearly household income (unit: million yen)
Satisfaction with are of residence (5=satisfied, 4,3,2,1=dissatisfied)
1=have child(ren), 0=otherwise
1=Hokkaido/Tohoku, 0=otherwise
1=Kanto, 0=otherwise
1=Chubu, 0=otherwise
1=Chugoku/Shikoku, 0=otherwise
1=Kyushu
1=Large city, 0=otherwise
1=city with more than 200,000 population, 0=otherwise
1= city with less than 200,000 population, 0=otherwise
1=town/ village, 0=otherwise
English conversation proficiency level (5= “I can speak sufficiently for daily life,”
4=”I can manage to make myself understood for daily life,” 3=”I can ask fordirections or order at restaurants,” 2=”I can greet,” 1=”I can hardly speak English.”English reading comprehension level (5=”I can read English books andnewspapers without trouble,” 4=”I can manage to read English books and8newspapers,” 3=”I can read short sentences in English,” 2=”I can understand easy
words,” 1=”I can hardly read English.”Results
First, some consideration of the dependent variable, being “for” or “against” anincrease in the number of foreigners in their communities, on its own is warranted. In thissurvey, 37% of the respondents were “for” an increase in the number of foreign residents,
whereas 63% of respondents were “against” it. The respondents thus showed a rather
negative view of increasing the foreign population in their communities. This result has
been relatively consistent over the last eight JGSS surveys. Figure 3 below shows thebreakdown of the same JGSS survey question from 2000 to 2010. We can see that in thecase of the 2010 data, respondents tend to be “against” increasing the foreign population inslightly higher numbers, but well within the same general range. Descriptive statistics for
all variables are shown below in Table 2.
Figure 3: View on Increasing the Foreign Population, 2000-2010

View on Increasing Foreign Population
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2005

For

Against

2006

2008

2010

Source: compiled from JGSS Surveys, 2000-2010
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
AcceptanceMale
AgeMarriage

Mean
0.37
0.47
52.95
0.78

Std. Dev.
0.48
0.50
15.40
0.42

Min
0
0
20
0

9

Max
1
1
89
1

Obs
1680
1680
1680
1680

Educ
HincomeSatisarea
Child
Hoktohoku
Kanto (base)
Chubu
Chushikoku
KyushuLarcity (base)City200000
Cityless200000
Townvilla
Engtalk
Engread

12.67
55.73
3.78
0.82
0.13
0.29
0.21
0.09
0.13
0.24
0.25
0.41
0.11
1.71
1.95

2.47
32.66
1.02
0.39
0.34
0.45
0.40
0.28
0.33
0.43
0.43
0.50
0.31
0.86
0.88

6
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

18
168
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
5

1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680
1680

In order to minimize the possibility of sampling bias, we organized the sample
using a sampling weight provided by the JGSS. By dividing the Japanese population into
14 universes according to sex (two categories) and10-year age groups (seven categories),
this study calculated the sampling weight based on the national census of 2009.
The estimation results are illustrated in Table 3. Model 1 shows the result with nosampling weight, whereas Model 2 shows the result with the sampling weight.
Table 3: Estimation Results (Overall)(1)
Acceptance(not weighted)-0.00757***(-3.06)(2)
Acceptance(weighted)-0.00766***(-3.08)male

0.0188(0.29)

0.0150(0.22)

marriage-0.0573(-0.62)-0.0367(-0.38)educ0.0251(1.48)

0.0283(1.61)

hincome

0.000155(0.14)-0.000443(-0.39)satisarea

0.00884(0.28)

0.00346(0.11)

child-0.176*(-1.75)-0.185*(-1.83)hoktohoku

0.221**(2.08)

0.197*(1.83)

chubu-0.243**(-2.56)-0.233**(-2.38)age

10

kinki-0.0717(-0.72)-0.0948(-0.93)chushikoku-0.304**(-2.39)-0.327**(-2.51)kyushu0.0680(0.63)

0.0639(0.58)

city200000

0.102(1.11)

0.102(1.10)

cityless200000

0.0119(0.14)-0.0227(-0.26)

townvilla-0.0332(-0.27)-0.0427(-0.35)

engtalk

0.145***(2.60)

0.133**(2.40)

engread0.0272(0.47)

0.0338(0.58)_cons-0.406(-1.35)1680-0.373(-1.21)1680

Nt statistics in parentheses*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Based on the results, we find that age and child are significantly associated with thelikelihood of the respondent holding a negative view on increasing the foreign population,
whereas engtalk is significantly associated with a positive perception. As for regional
differences, compared with respondents from Kanto, those from Chubu andChigoku/Shikoku held significantly negative views, whereas people from
Hokkaido/Tohoku held significantly positive views. The results differed little between
Model 1 and Model 2.
Table 4 further indicates the factors that make people view an increase of foreign
population positively or negatively by region. In Hokkaido/Tohoku, engtalk positively
affects peoples’ views. In Kanto, engtalk also positively affects their views, while age
negatively affects their views. In Chubu, city20000 has a positive effect, whereas marriage
has a negative effect, and in Kinki, educ and townvilla have positive effects, whereas childhas a negative effect. In Chugoku/Shikoku, engtalk has a positive effect, while in Kyushu,
age has a negative effect.
Table 4: Estimation Results by Regionage(1) HokkaidoTohoku
acceptance
0.00261(0.37)(2) Kanto(3) Chubu(4) Kinki

acceptance-0.0149***(-3.17)

acceptance-0.00224(-0.38)acceptance-0.00549(-0.83)11(5) Chugok
uShikoku
acceptance-0.00948(-1.03)(6) Kyushu

acceptance-0.0177***(-2.62)

male

0.302
(1.64)-0.0909(-0.74)0.103(0.68)-0.196(-1.09)-0.173(-0.72)

0.0979(0.53)

marriage

0.216(0.86)-0.151(-0.91)-0.456**(-2.15)0.225(0.82)

0.130(0.39)-0.0565(-0.21)educ

0.0575(1.25)

0.00619(0.20)

0.0225(0.54)

0.0936**(2.16)-0.00304(-0.05)-0.00222(-0.04)hincome-0.000780(-0.24)-0.00233(-1.15)0.00263(1.13)

0.00141(0.52)-0.00700(-1.55)0.00355(1.09)

satisarea-0.0655(-0.76)0.0105(0.17)-0.0316(-0.44)0.118(1.39)-0.0474(-0.45)0.0106(0.12)

child-0.105(-0.40)-0.0705(-0.39)0.0308(0.13)-0.634**(-2.21)-0.0367(-0.10)-0.198(-0.64)city200000-0.193(-0.71)-0.0138(-0.09)0.401*(1.72)

0.166(0.74)

0.206(0.58)

0.181(0.60)

cityless200000-0.199-0.03960.08260.342-0.1650.0321(-0.78)(-0.28)(0.40)(1.59)(-0.47)(0.11)

townvilla-0.236(-0.84)-0.131(-0.47)-0.0707(-0.24)0.590*(1.68)-0.311(-0.75)-0.146(-0.40)engtalk

0.329**(2.07)

0.220**(2.21)-0.0735(-0.51)0.110(0.80)

0.401*(1.83)

0.00480(0.03)

engread

0.0506(0.30)

0.0143(0.14)

0.151(1.01)-0.103(-0.67)-0.279(-1.26)

0.0717(0.45)-1.3780.336(-1.60)(0.62)
N
226
482
t statistics in parentheses*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

-0.776(-1.07)346-1.579**(-2.24)262

0.368(0.32)
153

0.470(0.54)
211_cons

Discussion – English Ability?
Based on the preceding results, we can see that public perception of immigrants inJapan indeed remains negative overall. Explanations for this perception are unfortunately
less clear, although a number of the variables that we considered do provide associations.
Of these, English conversation ability seems to have the greatest impact. Individuals who
self-assess at higher proficiency levels of English appear to have a more positive
disposition to increasing the foreign population in their communities. This is arguably themost important result of the analysis and should ideally induce further research. If English
conversation ability can increase the positive perceptions of immigrants, the government
may want to pursue additional English language education programs, either in schools or in12the community, should future policy preferences continue to support increased immigration
It is interesting that the strongest of associations in the data are oriented around
English conversation ability alone, rather than also including English reading ability,
another of the variables we examined. While English reading ability is also positively
associated with perceptions of immigrants, the relationship is not a statistically significant
one. The Japanese public education system offers English language instruction to students,
although the curriculum is typically concentrated around English reading in order toprepare for college entrance examinations. Coursework is typically light, with only an hourof class time devoted to English each week as of 2011 (Fukuda 2010). The result is thatwhile most Japanese residents are at least minimally proficient in reading English, they tend
to be much less proficient at English conversation (Aiga 1990). Perhaps this at least
partially explains why someone with reading proficiency alone may not be as favorable toincreased immigration: they do not feel comfortable communicating in another language
and have more limited exposure non-Japanese language and experiences.
Ahead of the next round of planned revisions to public school curriculum guidelines
in 2017, the Ministry of Education has begun considering increasing the amount of English
language instruction offered to primary school students and starting English lessons froman earlier age (Ishii & Asakuno 2013). This could represent a shift toward a greater
emphasis on English conversation, or at least comprehension, and among other more
explicitly stated goals could potentially influence Japanese perceptions of foreigners. Thesechanges in English education policy do represent, at least to some extent, the national
government’s desire to extend Japan’s internationalization, either as a part of domestic
policy in being able to better integrate the foreign born population, or foreign policy inimproving Japanese communicative abilities with the rest of the world.
In lieu of interaction with actual foreign residents, emphasis on English competency
in schools may work as a substitute. As immigration levels to Japan remain relatively low
for the time being, the “contact” necessary for the contact hypothesis can be relatively
difficult for many Japanese to obtain, particularly those outside of the urban areas where
immigrants tend to concentrate. Based on our results, English language proficiency instead
seems to be a means of inducing a more favorable sentiment toward immigrants in Japan.
Currently low English proficiency levels also seem to be associated with the generally
unfavorable perception of immigrants in Japan.
Regional Differences, Other Associations and Limitations
There do appear to be significant regional differences in favorability to immigration
as well. With the Kanto (greater Tokyo) area as a baseline, Chubu and Chugoku/Shikoku
have overall more negative perceptions, while Hokkaido and Tohoku are more positive andKinki and Kyushu show no significant differences. This result may be interesting in and of
itself, but it also merits further research. There is no discernible trend based on this data as
to why these regions maintain positive or negative views toward the foreign population.
Kanto and Kinki tend to be the major stores of immigrants in Japan and it is understandable
that they would have similar levels of approval. Yet Chubu is also a major manufacturing
center and an immigrant hub, but maintains a more negative opinion. One may also
consider the size of the municipality, as immigrants in Japan tend to congregate in the13larger cities. Looking at the regions individually, we can see that the smallest municipalities(townvilla) are almost universally against increased levels of immigration. Using the major
cities (largecity) as a baseline, it also appears that the larger cities (largecity andCity200000) are the most favorable to increased immigration, while mid-sized cities(cityless200000) are somewhere in the middle. However, these results are for the most partnot statistically significant.
Although preliminary and requiring further research, these results also seem tosupport the contact hypothesis. Immigrants in Japan tend to congregate in cities and city
residents, being the most likely to have had contact with them, generally seem to have morefavorable dispositions toward immigrants. The smallest towns, with typically less exposure
to immigrants, rate them more negatively. A major exception here is the Kinki area, where
all municipal classifications show a more positive orientation to immigrants compared tothe major cities – in this case Osaka and Kobe. It would be worthwhile for future research
to consider factors that may influence such opinions in this region, for example if the Kinki
area’s distinction of being the base of some of Japan’s largest organized crimeorganizations plays a role, or if the general conservatism of the area or the region’s unique
history as an early designated locale of immigration in Japan provide some influence.
Where we did not find an association also merits some discussion. For the most part,
demographic variables including income, education and gender did not have any relation toperceptions of immigrants in this case. Typically studies of immigration attributedifferences in favorability to demographic factors like education and income (Burns &Gimpel 2000; Espenshade & Calhoun 1993). This does not appear to apply in our analysis ofJapan. Additionally, there is no association with one’s satisfaction with their area ofresidence, and marriage is significant only in the case of Chubu. The only demographic
variable that seems to play any factor is whether or not the respondent has children. Perhaps
concerns over crime or security induce those with children to be less favorable to increased
immigration in their communities. That the vast majority of demographic indicators are notassociated with perceptions of immigrants is a result not commonly considered or expected
in Japan.
One demographic variable that does remain strongly significant and almost
universally negatively associated is age. In this survey, older individuals tend to be lessfavorable to increases in immigration. This finding does coincide with the conventional
wisdom on immigration and age in that older individuals are generally more conservativeand favorable to a stricter immigration regime (Dunaway et al 2010; Quillian 1995).
While we have considered the connections between immigration and these
explanatory variables, we should also discuss the limitations to this study. The data wehave utilized is representative of Japan at both the national and regional levels, with great
pains being taken to provide accurate, unbiased results. However, we are limited by thetypes of questions asked, particularly on the dependent variable. In this survey, the question
as to whether or not the respondent is favorable to an increase in the foreign population of
their community elicits only a yes or no response. We are limited in the types of analyses
available when the dependent variable only has a binary answer. Something like a “feelingthermometer”, where the respondent rates their opinion on a 0 to 100 scale, could havepotentially been more useful. Although feeling thermometer ratings are subjective, we
14

could better gauge the degree to which respondents support or oppose increased
immigration in Japan.
Additionally, the wording on our dependent variable question is vague. When one
thinks of “increased immigration” it is unclear what sorts of immigrants are being referred
to. The interpretation is left to the respondent, where one may be more favorable toincreased levels of highly skilled immigrants, for example, but more hesitant to bring in
more unskilled manual laborers. In the case of Japan, the nationality of potential
immigrants may also play a role. Some respondents may be more accepting of, say, larger
numbers of Americans but more strongly against increased levels of Chinese immigrants.
The interpretation of what constitutes “immigrants” may also vary by region. For example,
Latin Americans of Japanese descent are much more prevalent in the Chubu area, while theimmigrant population in Kanto is much more diverse. These sorts of distinctions are notexplicitly stated and in so doing an important opportunity for additional clarification anddistinction is not available. Further research on public opinion toward immigration in Japan,
perhaps along with analysis of other representative surveys, can help to clarify these points.
Conclusions
Immigration in Japan remains a somewhat elusive topic in the English language
scholarship, and quantitative analysis on the subject is rare even in the Japanese literature.
Rather than taking public opposition to immigration in Japan as a given, this article has
endeavored to examine some of the factors influencing public opinion toward immigration.
With historic changes occurring within Japan and the country slowly opening itself up to
increased levels of immigration, the time is ripe to look at what factors influence public
sentiment.
We have found that while the perception of immigrants in Japan is still generally
negative, a number of variables are associated. Of the variables that we considered, English
conversation ability appears to have the greatest effect. Those with higher levels of English
conversation skills are significantly more favorable to having more foreign residents intheir communities. Should the government be interested in eliciting more favorable
attitudes toward immigrants in Japan, further examination of this connection should beundertaken. As the government ponders increased English language education in primaryschools, will a more proficient spoken English ability work to change domestic attitudes
toward more immigration? This is important to consider given the low birthrate and longlife expectancy Japan is currently grappling with.
There is also regional variation in favorability toward increased immigration, as
well as differences according to the size of municipality. Our findings generally support thecontact hypothesis of immigration, which stipulates that as native residents have actual
contact with immigrants they will become more favorably disposed to them. Japanese cities
tend to have greater numbers of immigrants and are more favorably disposed to them in thissurvey. Likewise, if one uses English conversation ability as a substitute for actual
immigrant interaction, given that immigrant numbers in Japan remain low, those with ahigher ability also tend to be more favorable.
These findings represent an early attempt to apply quantitative analysis to Japanesesurvey data on immigration. While the results may inspire more questions than they answer,15

it provides a path for future research on the topic. It is worthwhile to consider where thepublic actually stands on this controversial policy and what factors influence this perception.

16

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