Suggested citation

IPBES (2020) Workshop Report on Biodiversity andPandemics of the Intergovernmental Platform on
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Daszak, P., Amuasi,J., das Neves, C. G., Hayman, D., Kuiken, T., Roche, B.,
Zambrana-Torrelio, C., Buss, P., Dundarova, H., Feferholtz,
Y., Földvári, G., Igbinosa, E., Junglen, S., Liu, Q., Suzan,G., Uhart, M., Wannous, C., Woolaston, K., Mosig Reidl, P.,
O’Brien, K., Pascual, U., Stoett, P., Li, H., Ngo, H. T., IPBES
secretariat, Bonn, Germany, DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4147317.

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The report of the IPBES workshop on biodiversity andpandemics was made possible thanks to a contribution
from the Federal Ministry for the Environment,
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DISCLAIMER
The IPBES Bureau and Multidisciplinary Expert Panel(MEP) authorized a workshop on biodiversity andpandemics that was held virtually on 27-31 July 2020 inaccordance with the provisions on “Platform workshops”
in support of Plenary-approved activities, set out insection 6.1 of the procedures for the preparation of
Platform deliverables (IPBES-3/3, annex I).
This workshop report and any recommendations or
conclusions contained therein have not been reviewed,
endorsed or approved by the IPBES Plenary.
The workshop report is considered supporting material
available to authors in the preparation of ongoing or
future IPBES assessments. While undergoing a scientificpeer-review, this material has not been subjected to formal
IPBES review processes.

IPBES WORKSHOPON BIODIVERSITY
AND PANDEMICS
WORKSHOP REPORTCONTENTS
Preamble1

Executive Summary

2

Introduction

8

Sections
1:

The relationship between people and biodiversity underpins disease
emergence and provides opportunities for pandemic prevention,
control and response measures11

2:

Land use and climate change as drivers of pandemic risk and biodiversity loss

18

3:

The wildlife trade, biodiversity and pandemics

23

4:

Controlling pandemics relies on, and affects, biodiversity

33

5:

Policy options to foster transformative change towards preventing pandemics

41

Appendix

53

References

54

Annex
I:

Scientific Steering Committee

80

II:

List of participants

81

III: Workshop agenda

84

IV: Glossary85

PREAMBLE
The IPBES Bureau and Multidisciplinary Expert Panel,in the context of the extraordinary situation caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic, and considering the role that
IPBES can play in strengthening the knowledge baseon biodiversity, decided that IPBES would organize a“Platform workshop” on biodiversity and pandemics, inaccordance with the procedures for the preparation of
IPBES deliverables, in particular decision IPBES-3/3,
annex I, section 6.1. on the organization of
Platform workshops.
This workshop, held virtually on 27-31 July 2020, provided
an opportunity to review the scientific evidence on theorigin, emergence and impact of COVID-19 and otherpandemics, as well as on options for controlling andpreventing pandemics, with the goal to provide immediate
information, as well as enhance the information IPBES canprovide to its users and stakeholders in its ongoing andfuture assessments.
This workshop report supports IPBES Plenary-approved
activities, and is considered supporting material toauthors in the preparation of ongoing or future IPBES
assessments, and, in particular, in the preparation of thescoping report for a future thematic assessment of theinterlinkages among biodiversity, water, food and health(decision IPBES-7/1, II).
The workshop brought together 22 experts from all
regions of the world, to discuss 1) how pandemics
emerge from the microbial diversity found in nature;2) the role of land-use change and climate change indriving pandemics; 3) the role of wildlife trade in driving

pandemics; 4) learning from nature to better control
pandemics; and 5) preventing pandemics based ona “One Health” approach.
The workshop participants selected by the IPBESMultidisciplinary Expert Panel included 17 experts
nominated by Governments and organizations following acall for nominations and 5 experts from the ongoing IPBES
assessment of the sustainable use of wild species, theassessment on values and the assessment of invasive alien
species, as well as experts assisting with the scoping of
the IPBES nexus assessment and transformative change
assessments. In addition, resource persons from theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), theSecretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
the Secretariat of the Convention on International Tradein Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification(UNCCD) and the World Health Organization (WHO)attended the workshop.
This workshop report has been prepared by all workshop
participants and been subjected to several rounds ofinternal review and revisions and one external peer
review process.
Technical support to the workshop has been provided by
the IPBES secretariat.
IPBES thanks the Government of Germany for the provisionof financial support for the organization of the workshop andproduction of the report.

WORKSHOP REPORT1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pandemics represent an existential threat to the healthand welfare of people across our planet. The scientificevidence reviewed in this report demonstrates that
pandemics are becoming more frequent, driven bya continued rise in the underlying emerging disease
events that spark them. Without preventative strategies,
pandemics will emerge more often, spread more rapidly,
kill more people, and affect the global economy withmore devastating impact than ever before. Current
pandemic strategies rely on responding to diseases
after their emergence with public health measures andtechnological solutions, in particular the rapid designand distribution of new vaccines and therapeutics.
However, COVID-19 demonstrates that this is a slow
and uncertain path, and as the global population waits
for vaccines to become available, the human costs aremounting, in lives lost, sickness endured, economic
collapse, and lost livelihoods.
Pandemics have their origins in diverse microbes carriedby animal reservoirs, but their emergence is entirely
driven by human activities. The underlying causes ofpandemics are the same global environmental changes
that drive biodiversity loss and climate change. These
include land-use change, agricultural expansion andintensification, and wildlife trade and consumption.
These drivers of change bring wildlife, livestock, andpeople into closer contact, allowing animal microbes
to move into people and lead to infections, sometimes
outbreaks, and more rarely into true pandemics thatspread through road networks, urban centres and global
travel and trade routes. The recent exponential rise in
consumption and trade, driven by demand in developed
countries and emerging economies, as well as bydemographic pressure, has led to a series of emerging
diseases that originate mainly in biodiverse developing
countries, driven by global consumption patterns.
Pandemics such as COVID-19 underscore both theinterconnectedness of the world community and the rising
threat posed by global inequality to the health, wellbeing
and security of all people. Mortality and morbidity due
to COVID-19 may ultimately be higher in developing
countries, due to economic constraints affecting
healthcare access. However, large-scale pandemics can

2

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

also drastically affect developed countries that dependon globalized economies, as COVID-19’s impact on the
United States of America and many European countries iscurrently demonstrating.

Pandemics emerge from the microbial
diversity found in nature•••

The majority (70%) of emerging diseases (e.g.
Ebola, Zika, Nipah encephalitis), and almost all
known pandemics (e.g. influenza, HIV/AIDS,COVID-19), are zoonoses – i.e. are caused by
microbes of animal origin. These microbes‘spill over’ due to contact among wildlife,
livestock, and people.
An estimated 1.7 million currently undiscovered
viruses are thought to exist in mammal and avian
hosts. Of these, 631,000–827,000 could have theability to infect humans.
The most important reservoirs of pathogens withpandemic potential are mammals (in particularbats, rodents, primates) and some birds(in particular water birds), as well as livestock(e.g. pigs, camels, poultry).

Human ecological disruption andunsustainable consumption drive
pandemic risk••

The risk of pandemics is increasing rapidly, withmore than five new diseases emerging in people
every year, any one of which has the potential
to spread and become pandemic. The risk of apandemic is driven by exponentially increasing
anthropogenic changes. Blaming wildlife for the
emergence of diseases is thus erroneous, because
emergence is caused by human activities and theimpacts of these activities on the environment.
Unsustainable exploitation of the environment due
to land-use change, agricultural expansion andintensification, wildlife trade and consumption,and other drivers, disrupts natural interactions
among wildlife and their microbes, increases
contact among wildlife, livestock, people, and theirpathogens and has led to almost all pandemics.

•

•

•

Climate change has been implicated in disease
emergence (e.g. tick-borne encephalitis in
Scandinavia) and will likely cause substantial
future pandemic risk by driving movement ofpeople, wildlife, reservoirs, and vectors, andspread of their pathogens, in ways that lead tonew contact among species, increased contact
among species or otherwise disrupts natural
host-pathogen dynamics.
Biodiversity loss associated with transformationof landscapes can lead to increased emerging
disease risk in some cases, where species that
adapt well to human-dominated landscapes arealso able to harbour pathogens that pose a highrisk of zoonotic transmission.
Pathogens of wildlife, livestock and people canalso directly threaten biodiversity, and emerge
via the same activities that drive disease risk inpeople (e.g. the emergence of chytridiomycosis inamphibians worldwide due to the wildlife trade).

Reducing anthropogenic global
environmental change may reduce
pandemic risk

•

•

1

Pandemics and other emerging zoonoses cause
widespread human suffering, and likely more thana trillion dollars in economic damages annually.
This is in addition to the zoonotic diseases thathave emerged historically and create a continued
burden on human health. Global strategies toprevent pandemics based on reducing the wildlife
trade and land-use change and increasing One
Health1 surveillance are estimated to cost between
US$22 and 31.2 billion, decreased even further(US$17.7 – 26.9 billion) if benefits of reduced
deforestation on carbon sequestration arecalculated – two orders of magnitude less thanthe damages pandemics produce. This provides
a strong economic incentive for transformativechange to reduce the risk of pandemics.
The true impact of COVID-19 on the global
economy can only be accurately assessed once
vaccines are fully deployed and transmission
among populations is contained. However, its costhas been estimated at US$8-16 trillion globallyby July 2020 and may be US$16 trillion in the US
alone by the 4th quarter of 2021 (assuming vaccines
are effective at controlling it by then).

••Pandemic risk could be significantly lowered bypromoting responsible consumption and reducing
unsustainable consumption of commodities fromemerging disease hotspots, and of wildlife andwildlife-derived products, as well as by reducing
excessive consumption of meat from livestock
production.
Conservation of protected areas, and measuresthat reduce unsustainable exploitation of highbiodiversity regions will reduce the wildlifelivestock-human contact interface and help preventthe spillover of novel pathogens.

Land-use change, agricultural expansion
and urbanization cause more than 30% of
emerging disease events

•
•
•
•
•
•

Land-use change is a globally significant driver ofpandemics and caused the emergence of morethan 30% of new diseases reported since 1960.
Land-use change includes deforestation, humansettlement in primarily wildlife habitat, the growthof crop and livestock production and urbanization.
Land-use change creates synergistic effects withclimate change (forest loss, heat island effects,
burning of forest to clear land) and biodiversity loss
that in turn has led to important emerging diseases.
Destruction of habitat and encroachment of
humans and livestock into biodiverse habitats
provide new pathways for pathogens to spill overand increase transmission rates.
Human health considerations are largely
unaccounted for in land-use planning decisions.
Ecological restoration, which is critical for
conservation, climate adaptation and provisionof ecosystem services, should integrate healthconsiderations to avoid potential increased
disease risk resulting from increased
human-livestock-wildlife contact.

The trade and consumption of wildlife is a
globally important risk for future pandemics••

Wildlife trade has occurred throughout humanhistory and provides nutrition and welfare forpeoples, especially the Indigenous Peoples andLocal Communities in many countries.
About 24% of all wild terrestrial vertebrate species
are traded globally. International, legal wildlife
trade has increased more than five-fold in value inthe last 14 years and was estimated to be worth
US$107 billion in 2019. The illegal wildlife trade isestimated to be worth US$7-23 billion annually.

One Health is an approach that integrates human health, animal health and environmental sectors.
WORKSHOP REPORT

3

•

•
•
•
•
•

Wildlife consumption patterns vary markedly
among countries, with North America, Europe andsome parts of Asia being net importers, and theEuropean Union and the United States of America
being leading consumers of legally traded wildlife
for pets.
Wildlife farming has expanded substantially in thelast few decades, with international legal wildlife
trade having increased 500% in value since 2015.
The farming, trade and consumption of wildlife
and wildlife-derived products (for food, medicine,
fur and other products) have led to biodiversity
loss, and emerging diseases, including SARS and
COVID-19.
Illegal and unregulated trade and unsustainableconsumption of wildlife as well as the legal,
regulated trade in wildlife have been linked todisease emergence.
The trade in mammals and birds is likely a higher
risk for disease emergence than other taxa
because they are important reservoirs ofzoonotic pathogens.
Regulations that mandate disease surveillancein the wildlife trade are limited in scope,disaggregated among numerous authorities, andinconsistently enforced or applied.

Current pandemic preparedness strategies
aim to control diseases after they emerge.
These strategies often rely on, and canaffect, biodiversity

•

•
•
•

4

Our business-as-usual approach to pandemics
is based on containment and control after adisease has emerged and relies primarily on
reductionist approaches to vaccine and therapeutic
development rather than on reducing the drivers of
pandemic risk to prevent them before they emerge.
Vaccine and therapeutic development rely on
access to the diversity of organisms, moleculesand genes found in nature.
Many important therapeutics are derived fromindigenous knowledge and traditional medicine.
Fair and equitable access and benefit sharing
derived from genetic resources, including
pathogens, have led to more equitable accessto vaccines and therapeutics, and broader
engagement in research, but some access andbenefit sharing procedures may impede rapid
sharing of microbial samples.

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

•
•
•
•
•
•

Intellectual property is an incentive for innovation,
but some have argued it may limit rapid access tovaccines, therapeutics and therapies, as well as todiagnostic and research tools.
Pandemic control programmes often act underemergency measures and can have significant
negative implications for biodiversity, e.g. cullingof wildlife reservoirs, release of insecticides.
Introduction of travel restrictions to reduce
COVID-19 spread has severely reduced
ecotourism and other income.
Reduced environmental impacts from economic
slowdown during the ‘global COVID-19 pause’(e.g. reduced oil consumption) are likely temporary
and insignificant in the long term.
Diseases that emerge from wildlife and spreadwidely in people may then threaten biodiversity
outside the pathogen’s original host range.
Pandemics often have unequal impacts on
different countries and sectors of society(e.g. the elderly and minorities for COVID-19).
The economic impacts (and disease outcomes)
are often more severe on women, people inpoverty and Indigenous Peoples. To betransformative, pandemic control policies andrecovery programmes should be more gender
responsive and inclusive.

Escape from the Pandemic Era requires
policy options that foster transformativechange towards preventing pandemics
The current pandemic preparedness strategy involves
responding to a pandemic after it has emerged. Yet, theresearch reviewed in this report identifies substantial
knowledge that provides a pathway to predicting andpreventing pandemics. This includes work that predicts
geographic origins of future pandemics, identifies key
reservoir hosts and the pathogens most likely to emerge,
and demonstrates how environmental and socioeconomicchanges correlate with disease emergence. Pilot
projects, often at large scale, have demonstrated that
this knowledge can be used to effectively target viral
discovery, surveillance and outbreak investigation. The
major impact on public health of COVID-19, of HIV/AIDS,
Ebola, Zika, influenza, SARS and of many other emerging
diseases underlines the critical need for policies that will
promote pandemic prevention, based on this growing
knowledge. To achieve this, the following policy options
have been identified:Enabling mechanisms:

•

•
•
•
•

Launching a high-level intergovernmental council
on pandemic prevention, that would provide forcooperation among governments and work at
the crossroads of the three Rio conventions to:1) provide policy-relevant scientific information on
the emergence of diseases, predict high-risk areas,
evaluate economic impact of potential pandemics,
highlight research gaps; and 2) coordinate thedesign of a monitoring framework, and possibly
lay the groundwork for an agreement on goals andtargets to be met by all partners for implementing
the One Health approach (i.e. one that links humanhealth, animal health and environmental sectors).
Ultimately the work of the high-level council may
lead to countries setting mutually agreed goals
or targets within the framework of an accord or
agreement. A broad international governmental
agreement on pandemic prevention would
represent a landmark achievement with clear
benefits for humans, animals and ecosystems.
Institutionalizing One Health in national
governments to build pandemic preparedness,enhance pandemic prevention programmes, and toinvestigate and control outbreaks across sectors.

••

Enabling transformative change to reduce thetypes of consumption, globalized agricultural
expansion and trade that have led to pandemics(e.g. consumption of palm oil, exotic wood,
products requiring mine extraction, transport
infrastructures, meat and other products ofglobalized livestock production). This could include
modifying previous calls for taxes, or levies onmeat consumption, livestock production or otherforms of high pandemic risk consumption.
Policies to reduce pandemic emergence related to thewildlife trade:•••

Integrating (“mainstreaming”) the economic costof pandemics into consumption, production,and government policies and budgets.
Generating new green corporate or sovereign
bonds to mobilize resources for biodiversity
conservation and pandemic risk reduction.
Designing a green economic recovery fromCOVID-19 as an insurance against future
outbreaks.

Policies to reduce the role of land-use change
in pandemic emergence:••

Developing and incorporating pandemic andemerging disease risk health impact assessments
in major development and land-use projects.
Reforming financial aid for land-use so that
benefits and risks to biodiversity and health arerecognized and explicitly targeted.
Assessing how, effective habitat conservation
measures including protected areas and habitat
restoration programmes can reduce pandemics,
and trade-offs where disease spillover risk may
increase. Developing programmes based onthese assessments.

•

Building a new intergovernmental health andtrade partnership to reduce zoonotic diseaserisks in the international wildlife trade, building on
collaborations among OIE, CITES, CBD, WHO,
FAO, IUCN and others.
Educating communities from all sectors inemerging infectious diseases hotspots regarding
the health risks associated with wildlife use andtrade that are known to pose a pandemic risk.
Reducing or removing species in wildlife tradethat are identified by expert review as high-riskof disease emergence, testing the efficacy of
establishing market clean-out days, increased
cold chain capacity, biosafety, biosecurity
and sanitation in markets. Conducting disease
surveillance of wildlife in the trade, and of wildlife
hunters, farmers, and traders.
Enhancing law enforcement collaboration on all
aspects of the illegal wildlife trade.

Closing critical knowledge gaps on:

•
•
•
•
•

Supporting One Health scientific research todesign and test better strategies to prevent
pandemics.
Improving understanding of the relationshipbetween ecosystem degradation and restorationand landscape structure, and the risk ofemergence of disease.
Economic analyses of return-on-investment
for programmes that reduce the environmental
changes that lead to pandemics.
Key risk behaviours – in global consumption,
in rural communities on the frontline of disease
emergence, in the private sector, in national
governments – that lead to pandemics.
Valuing Indigenous Peoples and Local
Communities’ engagement and knowledge inpandemic prevention programmes.

WORKSHOP REPORT

5

•
•
•
•

Undiscovered microbial diversity in wildlife thathas potential to emerge in future, or to be used todevelop therapeutics or vaccines.
Analysing the evolutionary underpinnings of hostshifts that are involved in zoonotic disease
spillover and the adaptation of emerging
pathogens to new host species.
Climate change impacts and related extreme
weather events (e.g. flooding and droughts) on
disease emergence, to anticipate future threats.
Obtaining data on the relative importance of illegal,
unregulated, and the legal and regulated wildlife
trade in disease risk.

Foster a role for all sectors of society to engage in
reducing risk of pandemics:

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

6

Educating and communicating with all sectors ofsociety, and especially the younger generations,about the origins of pandemics.
Identifying, ranking, and labelling high pandemic
risk consumption patterns (e.g. use of fur fromfarmed wildlife) to provide incentives
for alternatives.
Increasing sustainability in agriculture to meetfood requirements from currently available land,and subsequently reduced land areas.
Promoting a transition to healthier and moresustainable and diverse diets, including
responsible meat consumption.
Promoting sustainable mechanisms to achieve
greater food security and reduce consumptionof wildlife.
Where there is a clear link to high pandemic
risk, consideration of taxes or levies on meat
consumption, production, livestock production
or other forms of consumption, as proposed
previously by a range of scientific organizations
and reports.
Sustainability incentives for companies to avoid
high pandemic-risk land-use change, agriculture,and use of products derived from unsustainable
trade or wildlife farming identified as a particular
zoonotic disease risk.

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

Conclusion

This report is published at a critical juncture in the courseof the COVID-19 pandemic, at which its long-term societal
and economic impacts are being recognized. People inall sectors of society are beginning to look for solutions
that move beyond business-as-usual. To do this will
require transformative change, using the evidence fromscience to re-assess the relationship between people andnature, and to reduce global environmental changes thatare caused by unsustainable consumption, and which
drive biodiversity loss, climate change and pandemic
emergence. The policy options laid out in this report
represent such a change. They lay out a movement
towards preventing pandemics that is transformative: ourcurrent approach is to try to detect new diseases early,
contain them, and then develop vaccines and therapeutics
to control them. Clearly, in the face of COVID-19, withmore than one million human deaths, and huge economic
impacts, this reactive approach is inadequate.
This report embraces the need for transformativechange and uses scientific evidence to identify policy
options to prevent pandemics. Many of these may seem
costly, difficult to execute, and their impact uncertain.
However, economic analysis suggests their costs will betrivial in comparison to the trillions of dollars of impact
due to COVID-19, let alone the rising tide of future
diseases. The scientific evidence reviewed here, and thesocietal and economic impacts of COVID-19 provide
a powerful incentive to adopt these policy options andcreate the transformative change needed to prevent
future pandemics. This will provide benefits to health,biodiversity conservation, our economies, andsustainable development. Above all, it will provide avision of our future in which we have escaped the current‘Pandemic Era’.

INTRODUCTION
The emergence of COVID-19 in late 2019 as a major
global pandemic is part of a pattern of disease emergencethat highlights linkages among biodiversity, global
environmental change and human health. COVID-19
and other pandemics are rooted in biodiversity. They arecaused by micro-organisms that are themselves a criticalpart of biodiversity and are hosted and transmitted bydiverse animal species, including humans1. COVID-19
is the latest in a series of diseases that are caused
by wildlife-origin viruses and have emerged due toanthropogenic environmental changes that bring wildlife,
livestock and people into closer contact2. These diseases
include SARS, Ebola and Nipah virus disease, Zika andinfluenza, and reflect a predominance of zoonotic(animal origin) viral diseases among the emerging
infectious diseases affecting people over the last few
decades. Over the past few years, a series of scientificpapers have been published that suggest the sameenvironmental changes that threaten biodiversity loss ona global scale (e.g. land use change, such as deforestationor encroachment into wildlife habitat; climate change;
unsustainable trade and consumption of wildlife;
agricultural intensification; globalized trade and travel)
are also driving the increasing spillover, amplification andspread of these novel viral diseases.
COVID-19 is a pandemic: a disease that has caused
epidemics of sustained community transmission in
multiple countries on two or more continents3. Its
significance cannot be overstated. It is the first,
high-mortality (>0.5% case fatality rate), truly global
pandemic since the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the
1970/80s. In efforts to curtail its spread, social distancing
and travel bans have led to a significant economic
impact (trillions of US$ of global market loss), and the
pandemic has disrupted normal life for many months inmost countries on the planet, with societal and economic
impacts lasting years ahead. The precise chain of events
leading to the emergence of COVID-19 is not yet fully
known. However, the virus that causes it (SARS-CoV-2)
almost certainly originated in (and recently spilled overfrom4) insectivorous bats because it is part of a clade ofclosely-related SARS-related CoVs found almost solely
in Rhinolophus spp. bats in nature5. SARS-CoV-2 is able
to infect other mammals, including mustelids

8

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS(e.g. mink, ferrets), viverrids (e.g. civets), felids (including
lions and tigers in a zoo and domestic cats), raccoon dogs
(Nyctereutes spp.), pangolins (Manidae), domestic dogs,
a range of lab animals and people. Substantial evidence
points to a likely origin in South China or neighbouring
countries, where the greatest diversity of SARS-related
coronaviruses is found6, where contact among people
and bats is common7,8, and where human populations
are expanding and encroaching into a rapidly changing
landscape9. Epidemiological evidence suggests that
SARS-CoV-2 was transported either in people, or animals,
or both, into a live animal market in Wuhan in late 20195,10.
The involvement of live animal markets and the wildlife
trade in the emergence and spread of both SARS and
COVID-19 have led to public calls for efforts to reduce thistrade in an effort to prevent future pandemics.
Pandemics are a subset of emerging infectious diseases(EIDs) that are caused by pathogens that have recently
infected people for the first time, or are showing a
trend of increasing frequency of infection or geographic
spread3,11,12. Pandemics are EIDs that have spreadinternationally and seeded epidemics of human-to-humantransmission in different continents. EIDs tend to
originate first in rural regions of tropical or subtropicalcountries with high wildlife diversity (and therefore
likely high viral diversity), human populations that are
growing rapidly, and where land use change is driving
closer contact among people and wildlife13. Therefore,rural communities in developing countries are often on
the frontline of disease emergence. Additionally, thesecountries may have less resources for early detection ofoutbreaks, and to combat spillover and spread. Oncea new pandemic has developed sustained community
transmission in people, global emergence is intimately
tied to urbanization, domestic trade networks, globalized
trade and international travel patterns. Thus, richer andmore developed countries that are highly dependenton globalized trade and travel are often rapidly affectedonce a pathogen spreads in people, as happened with
COVID-19. There is also growing evidence that pathogen
spillover, amplification and spread is largely driven by the
consumption patterns set up by globalized production andtrade that drive encroachment into tropical ecosystems,
particularly forested regions (e.g. for crop and livestockproduction, timber, mining and manufacturing of goods),
and exponentially rising rates of international trade andtravel. Thus, efforts to identify ways to prevent pandemics
will likely need to understand the whole system ofinteracting drivers and policy options that would affectpoints along these cycles and pathways.
This workshop was launched to review the scientificevidence behind the origin, emergence and impact
of COVID-19 and other pandemics as it relates tobiodiversity and the changes that are affecting both.
The goals of the workshop were to provide a scientificbasis on which to identify potential policy options, andimplementation pathways that could reduce pandemic risk
and ultimately prevent their emergence, while at the sametime having a positive impact on biodiversity conservation.
To do that, the experts reviewed scientific evidence
on the known pandemics, and the 500 or so EIDs forwhich there are data on origins, underlying causes,
reservoir hosts and impact11,14. Almost all pandemics,
and the majority of EIDs, are caused by wildlife-origin
pathogens. This means that areas with high wildlife
diversity that are important for biodiversity conservation
are also places where pandemic origins are most likely
to occur. This report therefore provides an assessmentof trade-offs between the goals of pandemic prevention
and control and biodiversity conservation. This includes
evidence that the anthropogenic environmental changes
that drive pandemics also drive biodiversity loss. Thus,

reducing human impacts on the environment to benefit
conservation, may also reduce pandemic risk andbenefit health.
This report is published at a critical juncture in the
COVID-19 pandemic, and in the Great Acceleration of
the Anthropocene15: a point at which governments inmost countries are beginning to realize the long-termsocietal and economic impacts of COVID-19, and many
people are looking for solutions rather than hoping tocontinue business-as-usual. A movement towards
preventing pandemics would be a transformativechange: the current approach to dealing with pandemics
is to try to detect them early, contain them, and rapidly
develop vaccines and therapeutics. Clearly, in the faceof COVID-19, this is inadequate, with no vaccines widely
available eleven months after emergence, and at leasta million people dead16. This report fully embraces theneed for transformative change and uses scientificevidence to identify policy options to prevent
pandemics, and the organizations and agencies thatmight implement them. These options aim to reduce
pandemic risk, and provide benefits to human health,biodiversity conservation, economies and sustainable
development. Above all, they recognize that the current
strategy of waiting for diseases to emerge, then hoping
for vaccines and therapeutics to be developed, is not arealistic way to escape from what has been termed the‘Pandemic Era’17,18.

Figure 1: The Huanan Seafood Market, Wuhan in January 2020. This is the site where some of the earliest cases of
COVID-19 were identified, although it is likely that the disease first emerged elsewhere (Photo: REUTERS).
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9

SECTION 1
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEOPLE
AND BIODIVERSITY UNDERPINS DISEASEEMERGENCE AND PROVIDES OPPORTUNITIESFOR PANDEMIC PREVENTION, CONTROL ANDRESPONSE MEASURES
Disease emergence is rooted in humaninteraction with the biodiversity of microbes andtheir reservoir host species
There are clear links between pandemics and biodiversity.
New pathogens usually emerge from a ‘pool’ of previously
undescribed, potentially zoonotic microbes that haveco-evolved over millions of years with their wildlife hosts14.
The diversity of microbes likely increases proportionallywith the biodiversity of their hosts. RNA viruses are
particularly important as emerging pathogens because
they have high mutation rates, undergo recombination andhave other characteristics allowing them to evolve diverse
assemblages over time19-21. An estimated 1.7 million
viruses occur in mammals and water birds (the hosts mostcommonly identified as origins of novel zoonoses), andof these, 631,000-827,000 could have the ability to infecthumans22. This far exceeds the current catalogued viral
diversity from these hosts of less than 2,000 (even if lower
estimates of viral diversity prove correct23) and suggeststhat less than 0.1% of the potential zoonotic viral risk has
been discovered22. Previous authors have concluded
that this results in a high potential for the emergence ofnovel viral pathogens from wildlife, if the current trajectoryof environmental change continues, and pushes closer
contact among people, livestock, wildlife and the diverse
assemblage of potential pathogens they are hosts to14.
On a global scale, the emergence of new zoonoses
correlates with wildlife (mammalian) diversity, humanpopulation density and anthropogenic environmental
change11,13. There is also evidence that biodiversity loss
may increase transmission of microbes from animals
to people under certain circumstances. The potential
mechanisms are complex. For some microbes withmultiple reservoir host species, certain hosts may

play a more important role than others, i.e. have high‘competence’. This may be because they are preferentially
infected, produce and excrete more microbes, have higher
contact rates, or otherwise contribute more to pathogen
dynamics than low competence hosts24. Thus, in regionswith high biodiversity a “dilution effect” may exist forsome pathogens, whereby highly competent reservoirs
represent a small proportion of the available reservoirs,
and transmission risk to people is reduced25-27. This theory
has potential importance for conservation because it
suggests that biodiversity loss due to anthropogenic
environmental changes may lead to higher zoonotic
disease risk, and that conserving biodiversity may benefit
public health by reducing this risk. Evidence of the dilution
effect has been observed for the West Nile virus28,29,
Hantavirus30,31 and plant microbes32. It has also beenwell-studied for Lyme disease32,33, but also widely
disputed34,35. In particular, evidence suggests that thedilution effect is not generalizable across different disease
and host systems36, and scales37,38, and that some of theevidence provided to support its generalizability is weak39.
Large-scale analyses suggest that emerging disease risk
may be highest in regions of human-alteredlandscapes11,13,40-42. However, rather than this being due
to a broadly effective dilution effect43,44, the mechanistic
drivers of risk include increased contact among wildlife,
livestock and people driven by settlement and land
conversion and specific high-risk activities(e.g. occupational exposure to wildlife, increased huntingof disease reservoirs).

Environmental changes that drive biodiversity
loss also drive disease emergence
Disease emergence has followed each step of society’s
development. The domestication of wildlife beginning in

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the Neolithic provided the contact required for pathogens
to spill over into people, and coincided with the formationof dense human populations in early cities that allowed
their continued circulation45. Measles and smallpox viruses
likely evolved from domestic herbivore viruses through thisprocess45-47, while another ancient disease, tuberculosis,
appears to have begun as an environmental microbe that
infected people, then cycled back into domestic animals
and other wildlife48. Some diseases, like the viral disease
mumps, or the bacterial diseases leprosy and plague
appear to have their origin as wildlife microbes that spilledover directly to humans over the last few millennia49-52.
These diseases have, over historical time become
endemic in human populations and are no longer referred
to as ‘emerging’, which is a phrase that usually applies todiseases that have increased in frequency or impact in thelast few decades53.
There is substantial evidence that the underlying driversof almost all recent EIDs are anthropogenic environmental
changes, and socioeconomic changes, that alter contact
rates among natural reservoir hosts, livestock and people,
or otherwise cause changes in transmission rates11,13,41,42,54(Figure 2). More than 400 microbes (viruses, bacteria,
protozoa, fungi and other microorganisms) have emergedin people during the last five decades, over 70% ofthem originating in animals (i.e. are classed as zoonotic
pathogens), and the majority of those having wildlife as
their natural reservoir hosts11. Many cause little or no
illness in their natural reservoirs. While some zoonotic
pathogens are unable to spread from person-to-person
and cause limited outbreaks, many have evolved capacity
for transmission among people. In many cases, the further
expansion of these emerging infectious diseases does not
require animal reservoirs but occurs due to community
spread through rapidly urbanizing landscapes, megacities
and travel and trade networks, as occurred with
COVID-19. These emerging infectious diseases have led
to a series of outcomes including small clusters of cases,
and in some cases significant outbreaks (e.g. Ebola,
MERS, Lyme disease) that don’t quite reach the pandemic
scale. The transmission (‘spillover’) of pathogens fromwildlife to people can occur directly via high risk activities
like hunting, farming and butchering wildlife (e.g. Ebola
virus); or indirectly from wildlife through livestock to people(e.g. influenza viruses, Nipah virus). Some pathogens
have multiple reservoir hosts (e.g. West Nile virus) andmay circulate among those in closer contact with people
when the environment is encroached upon. They may also
have multiple transmission routes from wildlife to humans(e.g. Nipah virus in Malaysia via pig intermediate hosts, in
Bangladesh directly from bats to people).

Microbes are a key part of wildlife diversity& often drive population dynamics

Spillover among wildlife, livestock, and people

Anthropogenic environmental changes

Habitatloss

Microbe communities
alteredIncreased interaction
among animals & species

Microbe spilloverLand
degradation

Zoonotic
spilloverSpreadAdaption

Zoonotic
spilloverFigure 2: The origins and drivers of emerging zoonotic diseases and pandemics. Microbes have evolved within speciesof wildlife over evolutionary time (left). They undergo complex life cycles of transmission among single or multiple
host species, and often have significant impacts on host population dynamics55. These microbes become emerging
infectious diseases (EIDs) when anthropogenic environmental changes alter population structure of their reservoir hosts,
and bring wildlife, livestock and people into contact (centre). These interactions can alter transmission dynamics of
microbes within their hosts, lead to interspecies transmission of microbes, spillover to livestock and people and theemergence of novel diseases (right). While many outbreaks are small scale or regional, some EIDs become pandemics
when zoonotic pathogens transmit easily among people, and spread in rapidly urbanizing landscapes, megacities andtravel and trade networks. Pandemics are a subset of EIDs, and this report reviews the scientific evidence of linkages
to biodiversity for EIDs that did not become pandemic (e.g. Ebola), as well as those that did (e.g. COVID-19), so thatpatterns affecting both can be used to identify policy options to reduce the opportunities for future EID andpandemic emergence.

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Truly global pandemics are catastrophic events that are
rare relative to initial spillover, or small-scale outbreaks(Box 1). However, the frequency of the emerging infectious
disease events that lead to pandemics is increasing11,56.
COVID-19 has been likened to the Great Influenza
pandemic of 1918 in its impact, but pandemics occur more
frequently than once per century1,2. Since 1918, at leastsix other pandemics have affected public health including
three caused by influenza viruses, the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
SARS and now COVID-1916. These represent the tip of theiceberg of potential pandemics. Today, a global populationof 7.8 billion people has driven medical, industrial andagricultural progress, coupled with rapid demographic,
land use, and climate change, replacement of wildlife withlivestock and environmental degradation that define the
Anthropocene15,57,58. The result is increased frequency ofwildlife-livestock-human interactions especially in tropicaland subtropical regions (low latitudes) rich in diversity ofwildlife and their microbes, as shown in field studies ofprimate, human and livestock interactions and bacterial
infections, for example59,60. The increased risk of spilloveris compounded by land use change and encroachmentthat bring increasing numbers of people into rural regions
and provide a mechanism for disease amplification andspread. The spillover risk is also enhanced by climatechange that perturbs wildlife population dynamics
and distribution61 and disrupts the services humans
derive from them62. Anthropogenic environmental andsocioeconomic changes have been linked empirically tothe emergence of dozens of novel zoonotic pathogens,including: Hendra virus in Australia (land use change);
Nipah virus in Malaysia (agricultural intensification); Ebola
virus and Marburg virus in central Africa (wildlife hunting
and butchering, land use change and mining respectively);flaviviruses such as Zika and Yellow Fever in SouthAmerica (land use change, travel and trade) and Dengue
in Southeast Asia (urbanization); vector-borne diseases
in northern latitudes such as tick-borne encephalitis(climate change); and coronaviruses causing SARS,MERS and COVID-19 (wildlife trade, livestock production
and trade and encroachment and/or land use change
respectively)9,63-70.
There is also a large number of emerging infectious
diseases affecting livestock and wildlife that are driven
to emerge by the same factors that drive EIDs infecting
people53. This includes the wildlife disease amphibian
chytridiomycosis that spread globally through theBox 1: Pandemics begin as spillover events that cause small outbreaks which grow in scale.
Almost all pandemics start with a single infection event. For zoonoses from wildlife, this is a person, or group ofpeople that made contact with an animal infected by a pathogen that infects them, replicates in their cells andthen is transmitted to others. Surveillance data suggest that spillover events happen frequently around the world,but most infections are unable to cause further transmission among people (the burning match in the figure
below). Sometimes, pathogens spill over and are able to transmit to a handful of people, undergoing a few
cycles of transmission before the outbreak dies out (the shrub fire below). Where pathogens spread into dense
human communities (e.g. COVID-19 within the live animal market and city of Wuhan10), and when they are able toeasily transmit from person-to-person, they can become pandemics (the forest fire in the schematic). Preventing
pandemics will require efforts to reduce the risk each of these stages occurring, through measures that diminish
the underlying drivers of spillover, their spread among people and their ability to move globally through rapidly
urbanizing landscapes, megacities and travel and trade networks.

Burning match

Early spillover

Shrub fire

Localized transmission

Forest fire

Pandemic
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trade in wildlife for food, pets, as lab animals and theintroduction of invasive alien species71-76; and the avian
disease highly pathogenic avian influenza, that emerged
due to intensification of poultry production and spreadthrough the global trade in poultry, as well as through wild
bird movement and the illegal pet trade77,78. On a global
scale, the origins of emerging diseases correlate withenvironmental change (in particular land use change),
human population density and wildlife diversity11,13,14,38,42.
These global changes increase the risk of repeatedspillover of microbes from wildlife to people, and may
explain why most emerging infectious diseases andalmost all pandemics have been caused by zoonoses3.
Exceptions include the emergence of drug-resistantstrains of microbes and some food-borne infections,for example.

Rising demand for meat consumption andthe globalized food trade drive pandemic risk,
through land use change and climate change
The rising demand for meat, particularly in developed
countries and emerging economies, has continued tobolster an unsustainable globalized system of intensive
production that threatens biodiversity through a rangeof mechanisms (e.g. land use change, eutrophication),and contributes to climate change79. For example,
global demand for meat has indirectly and directly led
to deforestation, forest degradation and expansion of
pasture in Brazil and other parts of the Amazon80-82.
By forming unnaturally dense assemblages of often
closely related individuals, livestock farming has
historically driven the emergence of pathogens within
the domesticated species. However, the increasing
expansion of livestock and poultry production, theincrease in the size and acreage of farms, and in thenumber of individual animals at a site have led toincreasing potential for transmission of pathogens topeople, e.g. the emergence of salmonellosis83, bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD)84-86 and some strains of
antimicrobial resistant pathogens87-89. It has also led topathogen emergence across the wildlife-livestock-humaninterface90-92. For example, the emergence of novel
strains of influenza has been linked to reassortment ofviral genes following viral transmission among large
poultry flocks mixing with wild birds, pig herds andpeople93-95. Rabies cases in Latin America are linked tovampire bats feeding on cattle hosts96-98. The emergenceof Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in
people was due to transmission of a coronavirus thatis likely of bat origin99-105, but became recently endemic
in domesticated camels106,107, allowing repeatedtransmission to people108-110.
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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

The intensification of livestock production has also been
linked to disease emergence. For example, a lethal
zoonotic disease caused by Nipah virus emerged in
Malaysia in 1998 when the virus spilled over from fruitbats into pigs111,112. The emergence of this virus wasenhanced by specific intensive methods of pig productionthat led to extended transmission of the virus for a
two-year period68. Outbreaks of a novel bat-origin
coronavirus (SADS-CoV) caused the death of over
25,000 pigs in southern China in 2017113. This virus is able
to infect human airway cells in the lab, and represents a
potential zoonotic disease114. The expansion of wildlife
farming for food and fur led to civets, raccoon dogs andother mammals becoming infected by SARS coronavirus
in Guangdong, China, and potentially acting as anamplification host that allowed the virus to emerge in
people in 2002115. It is unknown if captive bred animals
played a role in the emergence of COVID-19, but after
the virus spread globally through movement of people,
it infected mink farmed for fur in the Netherlands,
Denmark and the USA, and in the Netherlands was able
to then cause further human cases116,117.
Linkages among consumption, livestock farming, health,
habitat destruction, climate change and emerging
diseases have led to a number of calls for taxation toact as an incentive to reduce consumption and provide
resources to tackle these negative consequences. These
include calls for: a ‘meat tax’ on traded meat or meatproducts to fund zoonotic disease surveillance andprevention from a US Institute of Medicine Committee118,
and analysis of taxation options119; a tax on meat
consumption to provide incentives to reduce climatechange120,121; a tax on red and processed meat to reducethe direct health consequences of meat
over-consumption122; and a review of a ‘livestock levy’
option to tackle infectious disease threats including therise of antimicrobial resistance and climate change123.

Unsustainable consumption drives
environmental change, leading todisease emergence
The proximate causes, or direct drivers, of biodiversity
loss and disease emergence include changes to land use(e.g. environmental degradation, deforestation and land
conversion for agricultural production), direct exploitationof organisms, climate change, pollution and invasionof alien species, among others124. They are caused byeconomic incentives, new patterns of production andconsumption, population pressures, culture, ethics andvalues124-126. Cultural, economic, and political aspects ofglobalization have created new patterns of consumption,
contributing to social and economic inequality127. Global
demand for specific commodities such as meat, timber,wildlife products (e.g. fur) and others can be linked
directly to disease emergence and in some cases may be
preferentially driven by consumption in developed
countries. For example, the global demand for palm oil
drives substantial deforestation and other land usechanges in many tropical developing countries that havebeen linked to increased mosquito abundance indisturbed land and rising cases of malaria128,129. During
the SARS outbreak, raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes
procyonoides) in live animal markets were found to be
infected, and are also receptive to SARS-CoV-2
infection130. Raccoon dogs are legally bred in many
countries including China, mainly for fur that is exported
to supply the fashion industry in countries with highGross Domestic Product in Europe, North America andother regions.

Invasive alien species introduction has been
linked to disease emergence
The anthropogenic introduction of invasive alien species
has been recognized as a cause of disease introduction
to new regions131, and transmission to new hosts
including wildlife132,133, livestock134,135 and people136.
The globally significant wildlife disease, chytridiomycosis,
has led to amphibian declines and extinctions, and has
been definitively linked to a series of introductions andescapes137,138 of amphibians moved internationally forthe pet trade, laboratory use, farming71, or as biologicalcontrol agents. Substantial efforts have been made to
reduce the risk of introduction or control invasive alien
species to reduce their conservation impact, and there
are increasing efforts to focus on the risk of disease
introduction139,140.

Investing in conservation may avoid
exponentially rising economic loss due topandemics
In addition to widespread suffering and loss of human
life, the global economic losses from infectious disease
outbreaks in the last decades have been significant141,with the most vulnerable economic sectors being theworst affected142. Assessments of the economic impactof emerging diseases vary in their methodology and likely
accuracy, but point to often significant economic shocks,
even for short, relatively regional outbreaks. In West
Africa alone, the 2014 Ebola outbreak had an estimatedeconomic impact larger than US$53 billion143. The UNDP
in 2017 calculated that the societal and economic costof the Zika virus in South America and the Caribbean
was between US$7 and US$18 billion between 2015
and 2017144. Estimates from the Asian Development
Bank suggest that the cost of a 3-6 month social
distancing and travel restrictions due to the COVID-19
pandemic could cost the global economy between
US$5.8 and US$8.8 trillion (6.4-9.7 per cent of globalGDP)145. While the economic damages from COVID-19
are already substantial, they are likely to continue to risesignificantly until vaccines are widely available to containtransmission and reduce costly deaths and economic
impacts. The overall cost of pandemics will likely also risesignificantly in the future due to the projected increase infrequency of emerging infectious disease events13, andthe exponential increase in economic costs associatedwith them56,146-148. The true impact of COVID-19 on the
global economy can only be accurately assessed once
vaccines are fully deployed and transmission among
populations is contained. However, it is likely to be in

Figure 3: Airports around the world are putting in place measures amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Left,
Social distancing measures in place at Heathrow Airport, London, where passenger traffic fell by 97% in April 2020in comparison to the same month of the previous year. Right, Airport staff in protective gear walk through a quiet
uncrowded airport terminal with a few tourists travellers at John Fitzgerald Kennedy Airport, New York.
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15

the tens of trillions of dollars, with estimates of US$8-16
trillion globally by July 2020141 and US$16 trillion in the US
by a presumed containment due to vaccination by the
4th quarter of 2021149. If we assume similar costs for otherpandemics during the last 102 years (1918 influenza,
HIV/AIDS and others) and add the annual burden oflarge-scale emerging diseases (e.g. SARS, Ebola146
and others), as well as the US$570 billion estimatedannual cost of moderately severe to severe influenza
pandemics150, the cost of zoonotic disease emergenceis likely to exceed US$1 trillion annually.
The economic damages from emerging diseases are
similar in magnitude to those from climate change151,
and can be used to provide a rationale for investing inconservation programmes. For example, real options
modelling of the rising cost of pandemics was used to
identify an urgent (by the year 2041) need to launch a
global One Health strategy152 to prevent pandemics56.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) estimated that the total annual
financial allocation for global biodiversity conservation
was between US$78 and 91 billion per year (2015-17
average)153, an investment that represents a fraction of
the impact of zoonotic emerging diseases. Estimates of
the cost of global strategies to prevent pandemics
based on the underlying drivers of the wildlife trade andland use change, and increased One Health surveillance,
are between US$22 and 31.2 billion, decreased
even further (US$17.7 – 26.9 billion) if benefits ofreduced deforestation on carbon sequestration arecalculated141 – two orders of magnitude less than thedamages pandemics produce. This provides a strong
economic incentive for transformative change to reduce
pandemic risk.

Reducing anthropogenic impacts in emerging
disease hotspots could reduce pandemic risk,
protect biodiversity and ecosystem services
Wildlife and microbial diversity, human populations,domestic animals and landscapes are stronglyinterconnected, with complex dynamic feedbacks thatcan drive or reduce pathogen transmission. Microbesthat exploit these interactions can infect any of these
populations separately, and sometimes more than one53.
Their emergence begins with anthropogenic drivers, andtheir impacts can be exacerbated by human activities.
For example the introduction of cattle infected with thedisease rinderpest into Africa led to infection of a wide
range of wildlife species, ecosystem disruption at acontinental scale and disruption to human settlement154.
The geographic concentration of disease emergence
events in specific high biodiversity regions suggests that

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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

a key way to control pandemic risk could be to reduce
anthropogenic environmental changes specifically inemerging infectious disease hotspots. This would benefit
global health, as well as conservation53,141,155,156. However,there are significant challenges. The business case fornature conservation as a protection against emerging
diseases needs to be made in all regions, with a major
focus on countries that are under highest risk of disease
emergence and have high biodiversity, including many
developing countries. It will be critical to better quantify
the economic costs of pandemic prevention, andthe potential economic benefits, as has been done
for biodiversity conservation157. Efforts to reduce
environmental drivers might affect poorer countries
disproportionately through a larger requirement forconservation and restoration thus reducing land use
options. This could be addressed by a mechanism
to compensate biodiverse developing countries foravoiding anthropogenic environmental change. Recent
analysis shows that on average, the economic benefits ofprotecting 30% of the earth’s natural assets outweighs theopportunity costs of alternative land uses158. Furthermore,
reducing pandemic risks substantially through better
management of environmental resources would cost 1-2
orders of magnitude less than estimates of the economic
damages caused by global pandemics141.

Protected area systems to conserve biodiversity
could also reduce risk of disease emergence
The cross species transmission that may lead topandemics depends on contact among wildlife, livestockand humans14,159-161, and is increased when land usechange drives encroachment of communities into new
regions, or livestock farms are set up in new areas, forexample13,68,162. The reverse is also likely, that the formationof protected areas that prevent increased human activities,
settlement, encroachment or introduction of livestock
farming, reduce contact and therefore the risk of disease
emergence44,77,163. Yet, how to systematically prevent
increased human activities in or near protected areas
remains a challenge given the diversity of social andpolitical contexts in which they are implemented163,164.
There may be risks for increasing the flow of pathogens
in some landscape conservation approaches. For
example, some modelling studies suggest that corridor
building strategies to improve wildlife movement
may inadvertently increase the flow of pathogens
among wildlife leading to disease outbreaks that area conservation threat163,165. However other analyses
suggest that for different pathogen-host parameters,
the benefits of conservation outweigh the impact of
disease spread among endangered species166,167.

Efforts to design landscape conservation programmesthat allow for increased wildlife movement, or patterns ofagriculture mixed with human settlements and wildlife
conservation zones (‘mosaic’ landscapes) may driveincreased human-livestock-wildlife contact and zoonotic
disease risk77,168. Collaboration among conservation
biologists and epidemiologists should be strongly
encouraged to provide scientific guidance for measures

to reduce risk in these cases, such as culling of
non-native species that host zoonoses169, or launchingdisease surveillance programmes. Furthermore, empirical
data that test hypotheses on how different landscapeconservation strategies affect pathogen transmission
are scarce, despite their potential value in informing
conservation policy170.

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SECTION 2LAND USE AND CLIMATE CHANGE AS DRIVERS
OF PANDEMIC RISK AND BIODIVERSITY LOSS
Here, land use change is defined as the full or partial
conversion of natural land to agricultural, urban and otherhuman-dominated ecosystems, including agriculturalintensification and natural resource extraction, such as
timber, mining and oil. Land use and climate change
are two of the five most important direct drivers of
biodiversity loss124, and are projected to cause significant
future threats to biodiversity and to continue driving the
emergence of infectious diseases124,171-173. Changes in land
use practices have benefited people through economic
and social development, but have also damaged humanhealth, driven biodiversity loss and impaired ecosystem
functions and the provision of ecosystem services124.
Land use change has increased exponentially since theindustrial revolution, and through a ‘Great Acceleration’of Earth System indicators that is considered to mark the

beginning of the Anthropocene15. Between 1992 and 2015,
agricultural area increased by 3% (~35 million ha), mostly
converted from tropical forests124. By 2015, human use
directly affected more than 70% of global, ice-free land
surface: 12% converted to cropland, 37% to pasture and
22% as managed or plantation forests. The remaining landwith minimal human use consisted of 9% intact or primary
forests, 7% of unforested ecosystems and 12% of rocky
or barren land174. With continued growth in global humanpopulation (a 30% increase from 6 billion in 1999 to 7.7
billion in 2019175) and global consumption (a 70% increasein global GDP from US$84 trillion in 1999 to US$142
trillion in 2019), the trend of increased land use change is
expected to continue, with potentially 1 billion ha of land
cleared globally by 2050176.

Figure 4: Illegal logging on Pirititi indigenous Amazon lands on May 8, 2018 (Photo: quapan/CC BY 2.0).
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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

Figure 5: Drone photo of an oil palm plantation in Sabah, Malaysian Borneo. Trees are removed periodically forre-planting, revealing the monoculture nature of palm oil production. Land use change for palm oil in Borneo is linked
to the emergence of zoonotic malaria129 (Photo: EcoHealth Alliance).

Land use change is a major global driver ofpandemic risk

Land use change is a significant driver of the transmission
and emergence of infectious diseases41,177-179. Land usechange is cited as the cause of over 30% of emerging
infectious diseases, and correlates significantly with the
emergence of novel zoonoses globally13,180. However, themechanisms by which diseases emerge arecontext-specific and scale-dependent. Land usechange leads to the loss, turnover and homogenizationof biodiversity181-183; it causes habitat fragmentation,
creates novel ecosystems and promotes the expansionof human populations into landscapes where Indigenous
Peoples and Local Communities have often lived since
historical times at relatively low density. These activities
create new opportunities for contact between humans
and livestock with wildlife, increasing the risk of diseasetransmission and the emergence of pathogens34,59,60,184.
Land use change has been linked to outbreaks of EIDs,
including Ebola67 and Lassa fever185 in Africa, Machupo
virus in South America186, zoonotic malaria in Borneo129,
malaria in Brazil128 and the emergence of SARS-CoV-2
in China9. Wildlife hosts of human pathogens occur at
higher levels of species richness and abundance in areas
with secondary forest, agricultural and urban ecosystems
compared to undisturbed areas, with the strongest effects
found in bats, rodents and passerine birds41,42. Human
dominated habitats favour the invasion and expansion ofrodents that are reservoirs for plague, Bartonella spp.
bacteria, hantaviruses and other zoonotic
pathogens40,187-190. Populations of reservoirs for Hantavirus

Pulmonary Syndrome have increased following
deforestation in the Americas191 and at regional andlandscape levels in Central America192. Similarly, land usechange is linked to increased transmission of vector-borne
diseases (albeit some of which are not pandemic threats)such as Dengue fever (with increasing urbanization),
Chagas disease193, yellow fever, leishmaniasis194,195,
Brazilian spotted fever196-198 and malaria128,199. Even thelegacy of anthropogenic disturbance can serve as amechanistic driver of emergence by altering habitat andcommunity structure in ways that shift disease dynamics
in wildlife creating novel scenarios for pathogens to jumpfrom wildlife to people200,201.
Land use change leads to the loss of animal habitat anddeforestation-related activities such as road building
contribute to the spread of disease vectors, lead toincreased contact among wildlife, people and livestock,and provide pathways for novel diseases to spread128.
The economic drivers of land use change in tropicalregions are often clearing of land for crop or livestock
production, or expansion of human settlements andillegal activities such as gold mining or logging which
affect traditional territories202. This process brings people,
livestock and wildlife into closer proximity, increases therisk of spillover and spread of zoonoses203,204 and has
been linked to specific emerging infectious diseases, e.g.
Nipah virus112. Global expansion of livestock farming has
been linked to the emergence of influenza, salmonellosisand bovine tuberculosis205. Intensive livestock or poultry
production can act to reduce overall animal-human

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19

contact because of lower number of workers per animal,
however intensive production systems are linked tooutbreaks of some diseases (e.g. influenza, Nipah
virus) and dense animal populations can amplify theseoutbreaks68,94,206. The trade-offs between low intensity
production (larger area used, more connectivity, lower
density) and high intensity (smaller area, higher density)
are important but are often disease-specific. Reductionof this risk in the short-term will likely rely on bettersurveillance and biosecurity around intensive farms, andefforts to distance domestic animals from wildlife.
Longer-term policy options that involve reducing
consumption and expansion of livestock production are
addressed in section 5.

Urbanization and emerging diseases
More than 50% of humanity now resides in cities, and by
2050, this may rise to 70% of the human population207.
Urban dwelling, a form of land use, provides technological,
social and economic advantages to people, yet cities –no matter how protected, wealthy and powerful they seem– may be particularly vulnerable to disease and climate
impacts. Urban heat islands, exacerbated by climatechange, provide high-risk habitats for mosquito vectorsof dengue in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America
and have driven cycles of significant outbreaks208-212. In
northern latitudes vertebrate reservoirs in city parks andgardens such as hedgehogs, rats and squirrels usually
live in high densities in close proximity to people andpresent known zoonotic disease or other health risks213-220.
In South America, urban areas represent a high risk forautochthonous canine and human visceral leishmaniasis
due to the presence of both the sand fly vectors and large
feral populations of dog hosts221. Overlapping distributionof urban and forest mosquitoes at the park edge increases
the risk of arbovirus exchange via multiple bridge vectors
in Brazilian urban forest parks222, perhaps explaining
the local expansion of disease in urban parks and moreregional expansion223. These risks are often countered byenhanced disease control systems to protect, treat andhelp urban residents to recover from infectious diseases
in urban regions. However, despite this, the high densityof people in urban centres represents an intrinsic risk for
disease outbreaks. For example, city apartments andhotels in South China (including Hong Kong) became
superspreading centres during SARS224, urban centres
became a focus of rapid amplification of Ebola virus
infection in West Africa225, and cities emerged as thecentral focus of outbreaks and impact of COVID-19 in the
USA (e.g. New York City), Europe (e.g. Madrid, Stockholm,
Prague) and other regions.

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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

Climate change as a driver of emerging
infectious diseases (EIDs)
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
concluded that human influence on climate has been
the dominant cause of observed warming since themid-20th century, which is unprecedented in rate andscale174. Human and animal movements in response
to climate change226 are likely to allow microbes tomake contact with new hosts, to potentially invade newniches227 and to infect even relatively unrelated hosts
228-231. Microbial species’ capacity to colonize new hosts(ecological fitting) may facilitate the rapid expansion ofhost range even by ecologically specialized pathogens
under climate change232-234. Such climate change-drivenchanges to microbial biogeography may have driven
historical microbial evolutionary diversification234. Despite
a lack of evidence that reports of emerging disease eventsfrom the 1960s to the early 2000s correlate significantlywith measures of climate change11,13, continued climatechange and the development of research focused on
identifying long-term trends in disease cases will likely
identify future impacts234,235. Climate change is projected
to cause shifts in host and vector ranges, alterations tolife cycles of vectors and hosts under altered climaticconditions and migration of people and domestic
animals. Shifts in precipitation may alter abundance ofcrop plants and affect population cycles of herbivores
such as rodents, with potential for shifts in reservoir
distribution, population density and pathogen risk 236.
Simulations of climatically determined geographic range
loss under global warming for >100,000 plant and animal
species indicate that warming of 2°C by 2100 would leadto projected bioclimatic range losses of >50% in 18%(6–35%) of insect species, 8% (4–16%) of vertebrate
species and 16% (9–28%) of the plant species studied237.
Predicted shifts of this magnitude will also likely have
impacts on disease emergence.
Examples of diseases that have emerged due to climatechange are few, likely because of the intensive long-term
ecological research needed to demonstrate this. Climatechange has driven latitudinal and elevational shifts ofbiomes in boreal, temperate and tropical regions238.
This likely led to the recent spread of bluetongue disease
throughout Europe due to climate-induced migration of its
biting midge vector239,240, the expansion of some species ofticks and tick-borne diseases, e.g. the northern migrationof tick-borne encephalitis in Scandinavia69,70,229,241-244, andmigration to higher altitudes in mountains245. Range
expansion of several North American tick species has
also been observed, including the recent genetic evidenceof the northern expansion of the most important vector

species for Lyme disease, the blacklegged tick
(Ixodes scapularis)246,247. Climate change has also been
implicated in increased hantavirus incidence in Western
Europe248 and South America249.
Temperature changes also allow occasional immigrationof vectors to lead to persistence of disease. For example,
tick vectors of Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fevervirus, often carried by migrating birds from Africa andMediterranean countries to temperate Europe213 andScandinavia250 have been observed for the first timedeveloping to adult stages in northern Europe, likely
due to milder winters242,251. In tropical and temperateregions, rising temperatures can lead to increased vector
abundance, density, biting rates and decreased time
between new generations of vectors maturing, all driving
increasing disease risk 252-254. The tick Ixodes ricinus(the vector of Lyme disease and tick-borne encephalitis)
has increased its rate of development (oviposition,
moulting and incubation rates) in northern Europe since
the mid-20th century255. Changes in climate have also been
implicated in the increasing impact and emergence ofsome wildlife diseases256-258.

Land use change can act together with climatechange to exacerbate disease emergence
Both land use and climate change will likely create novel
wildlife communities259, new relationships among wildlife,
human and livestock populations and increased potential
for cross-species transmission184. Arthropod vectors suchas mosquitoes and ticks have been shown to extend theirgeographical range as a consequence of both changing
climate and land use. They can enhance transmission ofpathogens locally, lead to diseases spilling over, and help
spread them globally when mosquitoes are transportedby ships and planes260. The identification of geographic
regions, degraded ecosystems and species assemblages
where these drivers overlap41, may provide a strategy tomonitor for indicators of biodiversity change that could
lead to disease emergence234. Shifts in host species
ranges due to land use and climate change could also bemonitored to help better predict outbreaks.

Ecological restoration, land planning,
green spaces and trade-offs amongconservation and healthConservation programmes that aim to conserve intact
habitat, reduce land use change by sustainably managing
land and reverse ecosystem degradation by restoring
forest and other intact habitats may reduce the risk of
disease emergence if they also reduce contact amongpeople, livestock and wildlife. However, analysis of spatial
patterns of emerging infectious disease (EID) origins
demonstrates that both deforestation and reforestation
are correlated with heightened disease emergencerisk globally13, suggesting that it is the disruption oflandscape ecology that drives changes in pathogentransmission dynamics and leads to disease emergenceacross landscapes184. Restoration programmes that aredesigned to increase wildlife movement among patchesof landscape (e.g. formation of wildlife corridors), or tocreate ‘mosaic’ landscapes of wildlife, livestock andhuman communities, could increase zoonotic diseaserisk by increasing contact and microbial transmission
among animals and people163,168,169,261. This is supported
by modelling studies of corridor building and forest
fragmentation165,262,263, as well as empirical studies offragmented habitat mosaics13,38,264,265. However, detailed
empirical research on specific conservation programmes
is largely lacking, and urgently needed266,267. It may bethat the increased risk as habitat is lost, is due to the lossof predators and the dominance of synanthropic species
that also are reservoirs for specific diseases (e.g. Lyme
disease)24,41,268,269. It may be possible that efforts tointroduce previously extirpated predators as part ofconservation programmes, may have beneficial effects
on disease risk by reducing reservoir abundance269,270.
Analyses of the trade-offs and synergies between
infectious disease risk and conservation in theselandscapes need to be undertaken urgently163,271.
The risk of infectious disease spillover could be
addressed substantially by increased healthcare
provision and community education around behaviouralrisk of spillover in these landscapes. Conservation
programmes could also be designed to include disease
testing and monitoring to help reduce risk of negative
impacts through disease emergence.
The creation of green spaces in urban and peri-urbanzones afford people areas for recreational activities, help
regulate climate and reduce the urban heat island effect,
in some cases regulate floods, and benefit welfare andmental health272-274. These areas may also provide habitatsthat support increased types and, or, prevalence of
pathogens. Examples include urban hedgehogs and ticks
maintaining several tick-borne pathogens in a Budapest
city park 213,214, ticks in southern England which may
support urban Borrelia transmission cycles and urban
landscapes with more aquatic plants and water in eastern
China have higher mosquito densities275,276. Mosquito
assemblages in species-poor urban green spaces in São
Paulo, Brazil, are composed largely of species considered
vectors of human pathogens277. Finally, there is substantial

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21

evidence that suburban forest fragmentation in the USA,in the absence of top predators of the vertebrate reservoir
hosts for Lyme disease, has led to increased diseaserisk for people24,269,278. Analysis of trade-offs may provide
strategic guidance to maximize the benefits of green
spaces, and heightened disease surveillance and publichealth education programmes may help reduce risk.
Economic assessments of ecosystem services related
to the maintenance of human health may allow analysisof trade-offs that help achieve the UN 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development commitment of balancing“the three dimensions of sustainable development:
economic, social and environmental”279,280.
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that societal
impacts of a disease are driven by urban and suburban
planning and individual space available to sociallydistance while accessing green space281. Some countries
have already begun to witness a move out of cities
to escape perceived risk of COVID-19 transmission.
As countries recover from this pandemic, land use
planning, adaptive management of ecosystems andadequate conditions for human life may become a key topreventing disease spillover in the future282.

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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

There is a critical role for scientists to identify possible
precautionary steps for decision makers to prevent novel
EID outbreaks including by standardized protocols to
document, assess, monitor and act to reduce risk 234.
A cooperative effort of Indigenous Peoples and Local
Communities, citizen scientists, ecologists, virologists,
physicians, veterinarians, social scientists and decision
makers is needed to switch from reactive to proactive
behaviour. This is, in essence, the approach called for by
advocates of One Health (Figure 10) which aims to foster
close collaboration among human, animal, environmental
health agencies, researchers and practitioners156,283-286.
Some key organizations have begun the process ofcoordinating their programmes around a One Healththeme, including: the ‘Tripartite’ comprising WHO(World Health Organization), FAO (Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations) and OIE(World Organization for Animal Health)93,287;
the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity)288,289;
the World Bank152,285; and a wide diversity of civil society
organizations172,290-297. There have also been calls
for a One Health approach to COVID-19 control andresponse290,298. However, a great deal of further work is
required to mainstream this approach297,299.

SECTION 3
THE WILDLIFE TRADE, BIODIVERSITY
AND PANDEMICS
The consumption of wild animals has occurred throughout
human history, and is a critical source of nutrition andwelfare for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities
and many rural communities in developing countries300-303.
It is also a source of wild meat for consumption and of
acquisition of animal products (fur, trophies etc.) in many
developed countries304,305. Regulation of and governmental
support for sustainable harvesting of wild products havebeen successfully used as a way to alleviate poverty
in many countries and increase the sustainability of
the wildlife trade (https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/
livelihoods). Sustainable trade has led to better living
conditions, welfare and health in some cases306. There issignificant evidence that the wildlife trade is involved in
the emergence of a range of diseases, particularly where
the trade is poorly regulated, and concerns mammals or
birds (the most important reservoir hosts for emerging
zoonoses)5,307-310. The legal regulated trade in wildlife has
also led to the spread and emergence of diseases andthere is little comparative data with the health risks of theillegal trade to date311-313. For these reasons, and becauseof the links between COVID-19 and live animal markets10,
there is a great deal of current interest in policy measures
to reduce risk of infectious disease in the wildlife trade.
This section reviews existing information about trade(legal, illegal, international and domestic) in live wildlife
and wildlife commodities (including farming of wildlife)
in relation to their role in disease emergence and spread.
It lays out evidence that can be used by decision makers
in assessing trade-offs between the clear conservation,
economic and welfare benefits in supporting awell-regulated and sustainable trade in wildlife, with therisk of disease spread and emergence via trade pathways.
Where available, scientific analyses of data on the relativeroles of legal and sustainable trade, versus unregulated
and illegal trade in the emergence of disease are provided.
The goal is to inform a discussion of trade-offs that may
be timely and important given ongoing calls for, andeffort to, change policy on the wildlife trade following the
emergence of COVID-19314-321.

Trends in the wildlife trade
The trade in wild animals, their parts and products
is common around the world through local networks(e.g. a hunter trading directly with restaurants), throughtransport to urban centres (e.g. live animal markets), via
trade routes that cross national borders, or distribute to
global destinations (e.g. the international trade in wildlife
as pets, driven largely by markets in Europe and North
America)309,322. In line with the increase in land use change(Section 2), the wildlife trade has expanded significantly inthe last few decades. Although data are not fully available
for domestic trade, the international legal wildlife trade
has increased 500% in value since 2005, and 2,000%
since the 1980s322,323 (Figure 6), albeit that a proportionof this increase may reflect enhanced sustainable captive
breeding or ranching324. This information, case study data
and analysis of trends suggest that the legal wildlife tradeis, in many cases, unsustainable and a continuing threat
to biodiversity conservation325,326. About a quarter of all
wild terrestrial vertebrate species are traded globally327.
Although data are incomplete, it has been estimated thatthe global illegal trade in wildlife is worth ~US$7–23 billion
per year, equivalent to nearly 25% of the value of thelegal market328, (https://www.traffic.org/about-us/illegalwildlife-trade/)329 327,330. This may be an underestimate
because illegal wildlife trade data are based on customs
seizures that do not account for domestic trade331,332.
Finally, the continued globalization of trade routes, lackof sufficient reporting333, the links between poverty andillegal hunting334 and insufficient or inadequate regulation
throughout many trade pathways, suggest that the wildlife
trade will become more unsustainable in future335.
Regulation of the wildlife trade is challenging due to its
breadth, scale and the myriad species and products
involved. Since 1975, international trade in many wild
species has been regulated by the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES)336, a multilateral treaty with
183 signatory Parties (182 countries and the EU) that

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23

provides a mechanism to regulate the legal trade of about
36,000 species of animals and plants. CITES has had
demonstrated success in reducing wildlife trade, driving
up value of sustainably traded species and products
and promoting captive-breeding, ranching or farming as
alternatives to wild capture (https://www.cites.org/eng/
prog/livelihoods). For example: CITES listing of seahorses(Hippocampus spp.) led to reduced trade and an increasein their value in the trade337; CITES listing of eels (Anguillaspp.) and an EU ban dramatically reduced the trade,
although it then shifted to Indonesia338 and North Africa339.
However, the international trade in a large number of wild
species – principally fisheries and forestry resources– are not regulated under CITES, while the domestic
use and trade of wildlife falls outside the purview of theConvention.
A number of countries have additional measures toregulate trade in wildlife—particularly exports. National orregional (e.g. the European Union – EU) level controls for
trade in native and exotic species have been enacted forconservation purposes (e.g. the US Endangered SpeciesAct); to promote animal welfare (e.g. EU import bans on
young Harp Seal Phoca groenlandica and Hooded Seal
Cystophora cristata skins, and on species trapped inways that do not meet “international humane trapping
standards”); for public or agricultural health concerns(e.g. EU ban on wild bird imports to reduce spread ofhigh pathogenicity H5N1 avian influenza); and to reduce
the risk of invasive alien species322. The Balai directive(https://lawlegal.eu/balai-directive/) has been enacted

Trade value (billion US dollars)

1.2

in the European Union to deal with some health risks
for some of the international trade in wildlife. However,law enforcement, legislation and policing efforts arechallenged by a rise in e-commerce342-344, expansion of
trade routes343,345,346 and apparently increasing involvementof violent criminal elements in the illegal trade347-349.
Wildlife consumption patterns vary markedly among
countries, with North America, Europe and some partsof Asia being net importers and consumers, whereas
countries in South America, Africa, Southeast Asiaand Oceania tend to be net suppliers, or may have alarge domestic trade, added to traditional consumption
patterns350-353. Domestic trade dominates in some regions,e.g. West and Central Africa302,354,355, the Neotropics356-358
and some Southeast Asian countries301,359. Demand inEurope and China includes products for fashion(e.g. fur, leather). In China, a growing wealthy middle classis often the main consumer of fashion products, of wildlife
for traditional Chinese medicine or of food with perceived
health benefits360,361. The EU and USA are leading
consumers of legally traded wildlife for pets312,342,352,362.
The USA is one of the largest legal importers of wildlife
globally with 10-20 million individual wild animals imported
each year, largely for the pet trade309,312. The number of
shipments rose from around 7,000 to 13,000 per monthfrom 2000 to 2015362. This trade has led to the introductionof monkeypox virus (See Box 2) and the tick vector andcausative agent of heartwater disease of cattle363, among
other emerging disease threats.

Live animals

Animal productsPlants

Year
2005

0.9

2019

60
10
40

0.6
5

20

0.3

0.0

0

0
Live
birds

Live
ornamental
fish

Live
primatesLive
reptilesandamphibians

Aquatic
animalproducts

Ediblesnails

Mammalfurs andfur
products

Mammalgame meat

Reptileandamphibianproducts

Medicinal
plantsOrnamental
plantsFigure 6: Monetary value of legally traded wildlife commodities has increased more than 500% between 2005
and 2019 for all categories. Figures above bars = values in billions of US dollars. Data for 2005 from322; for 2019
from323. Data for frog legs (‘reptile and amphibian products’ category) are from 2014. Data for plants included forcomparison, and because trade in plants has led to introduction of disease vectors (e.g. tiger mosquitoes into USA,
Netherlands340,341). Data do not include timber or commercial fisheries.

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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

In many regions, rural communities have traditionallydepended on wild animal protein to supplement their diet.
In some regions, increased demand from the international
trade, coupled with poverty have resulted in growth of
hunting and trade in illegal or legal wildlife300,312,334,364-369.
Increased domestic trade in some countries is driven
by rapid human population growth, growing wealth,migration to urban centres, increased connectivity andtransportation routes, appreciation of wild meat for its
taste, cultural connotations and as a luxury item andglobalization. Links have been reported between the illegal
wildlife trade with Asia-driven organized crime in SouthAmerica in the last decade370. In the USA, the legal wildlife
trade doubled between 2000 and 2013312, and wild meatseizures in passenger baggage are common in airports in
the USA and Europe312,331,368,369.

Wildlife farming
Wildlife farming is defined as the captive breeding oftraditionally undomesticated animals in an agricultural
setting, for profit, to produce: animals to be kept as pets;
commodities such as food and traditional medicine; andmaterials like leather, fur and fibre371 372,373. Wildlife farming
may offer an alternative source of wildlife products,
particularly wild meat, economic development in rural
areas and biodiversity conservation by reducing huntingpressure on free-living populations. This has led to a
reduced consumption of wild individuals in some cases(e.g. American alligators), and has alleviated poverty andimproved health and welfare (https://www.cites.org/eng/
prog/livelihoods). However, surveys have reported that inmany regions wildlife farms are stocked repeatedly withwild-caught individuals that are largely indistinguishable
from those that are captive-bred, record keeping isoften lax or non-existent and enforcement of laws often
poor373,374. The increased availability of wild animals due
to captive breeding may increase consumer demand,
put pressure on free-living populations for founder stock
because breeding capacity is unable to meet demand373,375
and create opportunities for laundering illegally-caught
animals376. A 2014 census in Vietnam documented overfour thousand wildlife farms producing nearly one million
individuals of 182 wildlife species. However, many farms
had a high proportion of wild-caught animals (e.g. doves
and bears) or their stock was nearly all wild-caught(e.g. tiger, rabbit, squirrel)377. Wildlife farming has
expanded substantially in China378, where ‘non-traditional
animal’ farming generated US$77 billion dollars andemployed 14 million people in 2016141,379.

The wildlife trade has led to a series ofhigh-profile emerging diseases
The hunting and consumption of wildlife has been
integral to human survival throughout history and has
developed as part of most community’s cultural heritage.
The hunting, trading, butchering and preparation of wildlife
for consumption has led to a significant proportion of
known zoonoses, EIDs and pandemics such as Ebola
virus disease, HIV/AIDS, Monkeypox, SARS and COVID-19(Box 2). These likely include many of the zoonoses now
endemic in the human population308,380. The trade inwildlife is a particularly important risk factor for disease
emergence because it provides intimate contact among
wildlife, livestock and humans, facilitating the spillover ofnovel or known pathogens, their amplification and spread.
Increased numbers and density of farmed animals (bothdomestic and wild) allow infections to spread more easily
and drive bigger outbreaks. Increased volume of tradeand efficiency of long-distance transport along the wildlife
trade supply chain drive the movement of pathogens
across large distances to contact populations that may
not have had prior infection by them.
The logistics involved in the wildlife trade supply chain
may be a risk for increasing the prevalence (percentage ofanimals infected) and the diversity of microbes, andallowing viral recombination in animals that are intransit381. A ten-year study of pangolins (Manis javanica)
seized at the country of origin revealed a complete lackof potentially zoonotic viruses318, whereas two different
groups seized at the end of the trade route were foundto contain coronaviruses with genetic elements closely
related to SARS-CoV-2, and others likely of pangolin
origin315,382,383. Analyses of viral genetic data suggest thatthese animals were infected with recombinant viruses
that may have evolved due to contact with other species
during prolonged trade pathways6,318. Detailed studies
have not been conducted, but transmission studies on
captive animals demonstrate that many of the necessary
logistical demands of the wildlife trade likely enhancedisease risk. For example, at different stages of a tradesupply chain, individual animals may be held at unnaturallyhigh densities, which can increase the risk of microbial
transmission among them. Individuals from different
geographic locations are often housed together or close
to each other in holding pens and containers, some inmixed species assemblages, all of which increases theopportunity for microbial transmission. Stress due tohandling and the many other unnatural conditions in the
trade, are likely to reduce fitness, increase the likelihoodof infection (i.e. prevalence), increase the shedding of
microbes and increase the risk of illness which may leadto enhanced transmission. All of these are inevitable

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25

aspects of the logistics of trading animals, and likely
can’t be completely eliminated by guidelines on care,hygiene and welfare considerations. The factors thatenhance likelihood of pathogen shedding, transmission,
cross-species spillover and illness are intensified in live
animal markets, where animals are often held for long
periods of time in overcrowded conditions, with poor
hygiene practices, mixed with diverse species and in close
contact with large groups of people who travel regionallyto purchase often live animals301,384,385 359,381,386,387. Thus,
when SARS emerged from a likely bat origin through thelive animal markets of southern China in 2002, it infected
a range of other wild mammal species (raccoon dogs,
civets, etc.) as well as people10.
The wildlife trade may also lead to increased humanactivity in rural or uninhabited regions to capture often
increasingly rare species, driving new contact amongpeople, animals and their microbes. These activities
are linked in many cases to land use change and theprocesses of deforestation and forest degradation,
timber extraction, mining, settlement and agricultural

expansion50,388. The industrialization of the trade also
puts increasing pressure on Indigenous Peoples andLocal Communities who have nutritional dependence
on wildlife, when hunting pressure to supply the trade
reduces populations to unsustainable levels. Because
live animal markets are often a place where people
congregate, the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 appears tohave been amplified among people within a live animal
market in Wuhan, suggesting that live animal markets
may provide a mechanism for wildlife-to-humanspillover of previously undescribed pathogens and also
their amplification10.
The increasing complexity of wildlife trade networks,
including wildlife farms, live animal markets with mixed
livestock and wildlife, long-distance bulk transport
and international trade will likely increase future risk of
disease emergence. The industrialization of the wildlife
trade provides substantial opportunity for cross-species
microbial transmission when diverse wildlife species andlivestock are held in close confinement for significant
periods of time, with often little surveillance, poor

Figure 7: Masked palm civets (Paguma larvata) were farmed for sale as a food item in the live animal markets of South
China. Civets were found to be infected with SARS-CoV at the live animal markets where some of the earliest known
human cases of SARS were identified, in Guangdong, China, 2002 (Right photo: EcoHealth Alliance).

26

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

regulatory framework and poor law enforcement389.
Despite few studies of the mechanisms that drive risk,
recent data demonstrate that the percentage of bamboo
rats infected by coronaviruses increases through thewildlife trade value chain in Vietnam, from 6% in rat
farms, to 21% in large live animal markets, to 56% at the
point of slaughter in restaurants381. Similarly, the tradeappears to have enabled SARS-related coronaviruses
to recombine among species, leading to infections inpangolins by viruses with genes closely related to
SARS-CoV-2315,318,382,383. These studies, taken together,suggest a role for the wildlife trade in Southeast
Asia in driving the emergence of SARS, COVID-19,
and potentially a growing number of future zoonotic
coronaviruses and other zoonotic pathogens. Somebat-origin CoVs are known to infect both people andlivestock, e.g. MERS-CoV (bats, camels, people),
SARS-CoV (bats, farmed raccoon dogs and civets,
people), SARS-CoV-2 (bats, people, farmed mink,
raccoon dogs) and SADS-CoV (bats, pigs, high potential
for human infection)99,117,130,390,391. Some elements of thewildlife trade also increase the risk of emergence ofdiseases that affect animals farmed for food,highlighting their potential impact on food security
as well as public health.

There are significant gaps in policies to control
disease emergence through wildlife trade
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) is theprimary international agency with a remit to protect animal
health globally by providing a mechanism to reduce riskof disease spread through animal trade (Box 3). OIE
has established a list of notifiable terrestrial and aquatic
animal diseases that are considered as specific hazards
to livestock health, human health and the environment.
The OIE list is the reference for international sanitation foranimal diseases by the World Trade Organization under
its Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures(SPS), making adherence to trade measures based on thislist internationally enforceable428,429. OIE member countries
are obliged to report semi-annually and annually on OIE
listed diseases and immediately on the new occurrenceof an OIE listed disease or an unusual epidemiologicalevent in animals, regardless of the species affected,
whether domestic, wild, captive wild or feral, and on themeasures taken to reduce risk. Between 1900 and 2014,
73 OIE-listed terrestrial animal diseases were reported
in wildlife (defined as wild animals, captive wild animals
and feral animals313), with 528 wild animal species
that are documented hosts of at least one of these313.

Figure 8: Carcasses of confiscated frozen pangolins illegally imported into Indonesia in 2015 are buried for safe
disposal. Pangolins, which are threatened with extinction due to the illegal wildlife trade, have recently been identified as
hosts of coronaviruses closely related to SARS-CoV-2 (Photo: Earth Tree Images).
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27

Box 2: Five emerging infectious diseases linked towildlife trade and consumption
Ebola virus disease
Since its discovery in 1976, several epidemics of Ebola virus
have been reported in Central and West Africa, the largestof which began in Guinea in 2014 and lasted until 2016225.
Some Ebola outbreaks are thought to have begun with aninfected wildlife host (e.g. a gorilla, chimpanzee, duiker, or
fruit bat) that was either killed for food or harvested after
dying of the disease392. Community transmission amongpeople is associated with intimate contact with infectedindividuals or bodily fluids during burial practices, caregiving,or habitation393. Many Ebola virus outbreaks have been limited
to rural communities and therefore have remained small,usually involving less than 400 cases225. In the 2014 outbreak,failure to control transmission in the early phases led to large
numbers of infected people in two adjacent countries becauseof high population mobility, strong connectivity of distantrural communities and densely populated urban centresin the region225. Hospital care and burials were important

amplifiers of transmission394. The identity of the wildlife
reservoir host of Ebola virus is uncertain. However, based onpartial sequences of Ebola virus genome detected in tissue
samples and on antibodies to Ebola virus in blood, the likely
original host reservoirs are one or more bat species66,395,396.
This is supported by the fact that a related filovirus, Marburg
virus, has a fruit bat species (Egyptian rousette, Rousettus
aegyptiacus) as original host reservoir397.

HIV/AIDS
HIV-1 and HIV-2 were identified as causes of HIV/AIDS in
1983398,399 and 1985400, respectively. Their origin is thought
to be hunting and butchering a chimpanzee or gorilla (HIV-1)
or sooty mangabey (HIV-2) infected by related viruses inCentral or West Africa401. Such infections have likely happened
repeatedly throughout human history, and this is supported
by analysis of sequence data comparison from HIV andthe related simian immunodeficiency viruses. However, inthe late 19th or early 20th century, human communities incentral and west Africa were expanding and becoming moreconnected due to land use change and road construction.
These circumstances probably allowed rapid spread within
the region402. Global spread was facilitated by increased
airline and ship travel and the outbreak achieved pandemic
status403. Analysis of viral gene sequences suggests the dateof transmission that led to the pandemic is the early yearsof the twentieth century for HIV-1 404 and the middle of thetwentieth century for HIV-2405.

Monkeypox
Monkeypox is caused by a poxvirus originally described ina colony of captive non-human primates, and is endemic inWest and Central Africa where it causes serious outbreaks
with a case fatality rate as high at 10%406,407. In 2003, 71
cases of human monkeypox were reported in five states of

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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

the USA311. This was the first known report of monkeypox in
the Western Hemisphere. The virus was imported into the
US within a shipment of Gambian pouched rats (Cricetomys
gambianus) for sale as pets, and these also infected captive
prairie dogs, an endemic USA rodent, although the disease
did not become endemic in the USA408,409. No deaths werereported. No human-to-human transmission was found,although it is known in Africa409,410. All cases involved directcontact with infected prairie dogs. The presence of thispotentially serious infection within the wildlife trade led to
the USA Centers for Disease Control and Prevention using
emergency authority to ban the trade in rodents from Africancountries and the USA Food and Drug Administration to ban
the sale of prairie dogs, despite there being uncertain legal
authority to do either411. The ban on African rodent importation
into the USA is still in place (https://www.cdc.gov/poxvirus/
monkeypox/african-ban.html).

SARS
SARS emerged in the Guangdong province, China, inNovember 2002. That province had shown 38% population
growth in the previous 10 years (the most rapid in China) anda 138% increase in GDP per capita in previous 10 years(5th highest in China). As a result, consumption of wildlife had
increased in the province in the previous 20 years, with 95%
of the inhabitants of the major city in Guangdong province,
Shenzhen, having eaten wildlife, and wild-caught or
farm-raised masked palm civets (Paguma larvata) being a
popular meal. The first case clusters included restaurant
owners and chefs who bought wildlife from large live animal
markets in Guangzhou412,413. Evidence of infection was
found in masked palm civets (Paguma larvata), Chinese
ferret badgers (Melogale moschata) and raccoon dogs
(Nyctereutes procyonoides) in one live animal market414.
However, these animals were likely infected during transit
in the wildlife trade, and the true reservoir hosts are
insectivorous bats (Rhinolophus spp. and others) that arecommonly eaten in South China, and were traded widely
in live animal markets at the time415. Initial spread was
mainly to family members and to medical staff at hospitals
where they were cared for412, then via an infected doctor
to Hong Kong416. Subsequent global spread resulted injust under 8,000 confirmed cases, about 10% of whom
died. Due to strict public health measures and most viraltransmission occurring after noticeable symptoms, thepandemic was stopped by July 2003417. A temporary banof wildlife hunting and trade in southern China was issued,
with particular focus on the quarantine of farmed or tradedcivets. Additionally, some of the larger live animal markets
were temporarily closed. In January 2004, when new SARS
cases were diagnosed again and linked to the wild animals
in Guangzhou418, the authorities ordered culling of wildlife in
the markets419. In total, 838,500 wild animals were reported
being confiscated from the live animal markets in Guangzhou
city420. These measures were relaxed months following
the outbreak.

COVID-19
The timing, geography and source of infection for the firsthuman cases of COVID-19 are still not fully known, but theearliest known cases occurred in November 2019 in Hubei
province, China. The majority (27/41, 66%) but not all of an
initial cluster of infected people visited a seafood market in
Wuhan and it is probable they either were infected by wildlife
traded there, or from other people who were already infectedin another part of China10,421,422. The animal species fromwhich people contracted the causative agent, SARS-CoV-2,
is not known, but the closest relatives are found in horseshoebats (Rhinolophus spp.) from Yunnan province 6. SARS-CoV-2
spread among family members and hospital staff in Wuhan
and disseminated rapidly to other provinces in China, partly
due to extensive travel for Chinese New Year and because
Wuhan is a major transport hub423. Subsequently, it spreadby travellers to Southeast Asia, then the Middle East, Europe,
the USA and elsewhere. COVID-19 has since become a verysignificant pandemic, largely because of its relatively highmortality compared to seasonal flu or recent outbreaks ofpandemic flu (e.g. H1N1, 2009)424.
The live animal market that was considered being associatedwith the first cluster of cases was closed down in December
2019425, and Chinese authorities issued national urgent

These include zoonotic diseases caused by Japanese
encephalitis virus, Nipah virus, Coxiella burnetii, Rift valley
fever virus, Francisella tularensis and West Nile virus.
Trade in wildlife has been cited as causing the spreadof OIE-listed pathogens responsible for zoonoses or
livestock outbreaks in 30 peer-reviewed papers430.
This included spread through the wild meat trade,the introduction of non-native or invasive alien species,
human encroachment or habitat alteration, migration
or expansion of habitat, trade in wild animal parts, ora combination of these430. Despite the OIE’s provenreporting system and legal framework, regulatory
responsibility for wildlife is often unclear313. In many
countries, wildlife is regulated by agencies dedicated tothe management of natural resources and is not under
the purview of human or agricultural health officials.
This leads to lack of health expertise in managing
wildlife and exotic animals, making it difficult to organise
appropriate health surveillance and risk assessment
protocols. Most trade in wildlife had no veterinary
oversight, compared to that for domesticated animals
and their diseases (e.g. foot and mouth disease)309,312.
As a result, there is a lack of organization and funding
for wildlife health policy in many countries, and policies
that are reactionary rather than precautionary, leading toincreased risk and costs of mitigation and control308,309.

notices to strengthen wild animal market supervision,
enforce the law on illegal wildlife trade and prohibit thetrade of wild animals in January 2020. In February 2020,
the central government issued a permanent ban on wildlife
consumption for food314. As a result, many wildlife farms
across the country were closed, and animals were ordered
to be culled, transferred to be used for medicine, or released
into the wild as instructed by the government. Revisions ofmajor state laws for wildlife protection and animal epidemic
prevention are also undergoing. A survey among 74,040
Chinese citizens (largely from urban centres) after the main
outbreak of COVID-19 in China showed 94% were supportiveof more stringent policy and legislation on wildlife trade,and the majority of respondents intended to cease wildlife
consumption for food316. Similar public opinion was reported
in Japan, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam317. Similar changes
in attitude were observed in China after outbreaks of SARS
and avian influenza during 2002-2004426, however there is no
published evidence that this led to a long-term reduction in
the number of live animal markets or to a change in wildlife
consumption patterns. A deeper understanding of cultural
incentives for wildlife consumption would likely be required
to implement long-term behaviour change and successfully
reduce wildlife trade427.

Unsustainable and illegal wildlife trade has
multiple implications for health
The loss of biodiversity due to unsustainable or
unregulated wildlife trade may directly affect the healthof communities who rely on wildlife as a source of food,nutrition and traditional medicine172. Indirect healtheffects may also occur due to replacement of declining
species by others that may carry disease risks, or withprocessed food. Analyses of how sustainable the wildlife
trade is depend on the quantification of its impacts onwild populations. However, data are lacking, particularly
for domestic trade. For example, in Brazil, commercial
hunting is illegal and subsistence hunting, hunting forcontrolling wildlife populations, hunting for scientificpurposes, and recreational/sport hunting are regulated
and require a permit, which is costly and time-consuming
to obtain432. Most non-commercial hunting therefore
occurs without license, and 70% of wild animals aretraded domestically433, through informal networks andnot documented or captured in government statistics364.
Secondly, data on shipments and annual reports
submitted by member states to the CITES Secretariat
concern only species listed in the appendices, which
comprise a small percentage of traded wildlife. Data
for importation of non-CITES listed species are often
incomplete, for example rarely including the species nameor number of specimens shipped434. Over 50% of live

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29

Box 3: International mechanisms and organizationsof potential importance in regulating the role ofwildlife trade in zoonotic disease spread
The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)The OIE was originally created as the Office International
des Epizooties through an international Agreement
signed in 1924. It was renamed in 2003 as the World
Organisation for Animal Health but kept its historicalacronym OIE. OIE is the intergovernmental organisation
responsible for providing a mechanism and guidelines
to track, monitor and control disease threats to animal
health that arise through trade in animals and theirproducts. It is focused primarily on livestock trade andhealth but has a remit to include diseases that threaten
the environment and covers many diseases that are
zoonotic by nature. OIE is recognized as a reference
organisation by the World Trade Organization (WTO) andits 182 Member Countries (2018 data) and has regionaland sub-regional offices on each continent.
OIE operations are managed through headquarters
based in Paris, that implement resolutions passed byan international committee and developed with thesupport of Commissions elected by OIE Delegates.
Work is supported by annual contributions from Member
Countries, supplemented by voluntary contributions.
The OIE provides the rationale, and detailed mechanism
for countries to monitor and control the risk of disease
spread in wildlife trade via the setting up of groups ofexperts. These groups assess whether a disease shouldbe ‘notifiable’ by countries due to the threat it represents
to the trade, to animal health (primarily livestock,captive-bred or ranched species) in a country and to theenvironment. Signatory countries are then mandated
to report annually on the presence of the disease in
the country, whether the disease is absent within theircountry and on measures they are taking to control thedisease. At the time of writing (2020), it is mandatory toreport on 117 animal diseases, infections and infestations,and voluntary to report on another 55 diseases that affectwild animals. Countries can designate disease-free zones
within their national boundaries that they can trade fromand into, but trade is restricted or blocked for notifiablediseases outside these zones.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)CITES is a multilateral treaty that provides a mechanism
for countries to monitor and control international trade in
species covered by the Convention. Its aim is to ensurethat international trade in specimens of wild animals andplants does not threaten their survival. It entered into
force in 1975 and is legally binding for all 183 signatory
Parties (182 countries and the EU). CITES regulatesinternational trade in species covered by the Convention

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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

and requires Parties to enforce the provisions of theConvention by requiring them to adopt measures thatprohibit trade that would violate the Convention, penalize
illegal trade and the possession of illegally tradedspecimens; and provide for the confiscation of suchspecimens. International trade is managed by the national
management authority, designated by each Party to theConvention, typically a ministry or agency responsible forenvironment, forests, wildlife or agriculture. The trade ismonitored through the submission of annual reports to
the Secretariat by each Party. CITES secretariat activities
are supported by national contributions. The Review of
Significant Trade monitoring mechanism monitors thesustainability of international trade. CITES does notconduct the monitoring of domestic (within-country)
trade, and this is funded and organized by national
governments, usually working through their wildlife,
environment or forestry ministries or agencies.
Procedures for addressing compliance matters havebeen established under the Convention with the Standing
Committee responsible for overseeing such matters byadopting recommendations, aimed to assist the Party tocome into compliance. As a last resort, the Committee
may recommend that trade be suspended with theconcerned Party until the Party has addressed the matter.
CITES Parties agree to controls (both export and import)
on international trade in species that are listed in one of
the Convention’s three Appendices: Appendix I species
are considered to be threatened with extinction andinternational trade for primarily commercial purpose isalways prohibited; non-commercial trade can be allowed
for certain purposes under certain conditions only (e.g.,zoos, scientific research, movement of personal effects),
and the trade in sport-hunted trophies is allowed because
it is considered not primarily for commercial purposes.
Appendix II species are species that are not necessarily
threatened but may become so unless trade is subject
to strict regulation. It also includes species that are sosimilar when traded to other CITES-listed species, that
their trade must also be regulated. Appendix III species
are those that require the co-operation of other countries
to prevent unsustainable or illegal trade in native
species322. CITES Appendix I currently lists
687 animal species (325 mammals, 155 birds) and
395 plant species; Appendix II contains 5,056 animal
species (523 mammals, 1,279 birds) 32,364 plant species;
and Appendix III lists 202 animal species (46 mammals,
27 birds) and 202 plant species431. A number ofpandemics and emerging diseases have originated in
species that are included in the Appendices of CITES(Table 1, appendix). At the time of writing, CITES
Parties have not yet discussed how the Convention may
contribute in reducing risks posed by zoonotic diseases,
but this could include the adoption of dedicatedResolutions and Decisions and new or strengthened
partnerships with relevant organizations.

wildlife imports and exports in the USA between 2000
and 2006 were identified only to animal class(e.g. birds, fishes)309,435. Thirdly, most of the importation
data available for analysis do not account for illegal trade,which has been documented as a risk for importation of
zoonoses436,437. Illegal trade intercepted by enforcement
officials provides a crude and unreliable measure of overall
illegal activity438. Finally, there have been significant
reported discrepancies between data reported to different
agencies and with survey data439-441.
It is challenging to assess how sustainable the global
trade in wildlife is, because the population dynamics ofmany traded taxa are understudied, and there is a lack of
coordinated, systematic data collection within the trade442.
In Southeast Asia for example, ~30 million individuals of~300 wild-caught species were traded over a 10-year
period, while population numbers for many taxa werelacking333. The effectiveness of CITES is underminedby non-compliance, overreliance on regulation, lack ofknowledge and monitoring of listed species, challenges
from overwhelming market forces, and influence among
CITES stakeholders336,443. Consideration of the totalityof wildlife trade, including domestic and international,
legal and illegal trades suggests that much of it isunsustainable, i.e. with demonstrated evidence that
it is driving the loss of abundance, biodiversity andincreasingly threatened status of traded species. For
example, analysis of CITES and IUCN databases showthat traded wildlife species are in higher threat categories
than non-traded species (especially among mammals andbirds)327. Of those listed as threatened or near-threatened,
72% (6,241) have been over-exploited for commerce,recreation or subsistence125. This has occurred historicallythroughout much of North America and Europe andother regions that were deforested and modified overthe preceding centuries444. More recently, hunting has
led to documented local extirpations and ecologicalextinctions in West and Central Africa, Southeast Asia
and Neotropical forests303,333,445,446. Hunting for meat alone
has placed 113 wildlife species at risk in Southeast Asia
(13% of all threatened mammals occur to the east ofIndia and to the south of China), 91 in Africa (8%), 61 in
the rest of Asia (7%), 38 in Latin America (3%) and 32 in
Oceania (7%)446. Hunters are now increasingly targetingsmaller species, following declines in nearly 60% of larger
biomass mammals446, that has led to ecosystem-wide
effects in Central African rainforests447, with impacts
particularly significant among primates448,449. Africanelephants have declined by 30-fold over the last century(from 12 million to ~400,000), with more than 100,000
elephants killed by poachers between 2010 and 2012450,451.
Rhino poaching in South Africa increased 77-fold between

2007 and 2013 (https://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/
illegal-wildlife-trade), and seizures of pangolin scales
increased 10-fold between 2014 and 2018452. The rapid
expansion of the Belt-and-Road Initiative that links China
through land and sea trade routes to Europe, the restof Asia and Africa, has led to calls for strengthening of
biodiversity safeguards453, and strategies to reduce riskof microbial spread454. In a study of wildlife seizures inCentral and South America representing 1,038 individual
wild felids, the numbers of jaguars seized annually
increased by an estimated 200-fold between 2012 and2018455. In Latin America, the illegal wildlife trade isconsidered the primary threat to the survival of several
endangered large felids, parrots, primates and other taxa
366. Increasing numbers of confiscations of high-value
neotropical species such as jaguar, Andean bear andanteater have been reported366,455.

Programmes to reduce wildlife trade demand
may also reduce disease risk
The majority of interventions implemented to combat
illegal wildlife trade and support sustainable trade inwildlife are conservation-driven. However, some measures
specifically target public health risk. For example,
research demonstrates that live animal market closure
effectively reduces the risk of zoonotic transmissionof highly pathogenic avian influenza456,457. A temporary
ban was imposed on hunting, trading and transportingwild animals in South China after the SARS outbreak,and quarantine procedures have been proposed for the
wildlife trade following the emergence of COVID-19 toreduce risk of zoonotic pathogen emergence, and to
improve biosecurity in live animal markets458. Designingeffective policies is hindered by the diversity of motivating
factors behind wildlife trade and consumption and thecomplexity of zoonotic disease emergence319. A blanket
ban in a country or region is unlikely to stop the spilloverof zoonotic pathogens, because it may stimulate thetrade in bordering countries, or encourage illegal tradeand consumption. Blanket bans may also threaten
food security, nutritional welfare and the livelihood andeconomic development of local communities reliant on
wildlife, which are often Indigenous Peoples and Local
Communities459.
Targeted interventions to reduce disease risk in the wildlife
trade value chain have been designed mainly for farms
and live animal markets to reduce avian influenza risk
from poultry456,457. Measures include increased numbers ofdays with live animal market closures, increased cleaningout of live animal cages, increased testing at intensive
farms and backyard production facilities and promotionof other sanitation measures93,94,206. Few programmes to

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31

specifically target interventions around wildlife trade havebeen implemented, despite numerous calls for research,
intervention design and policy measures308,359,389.
Efforts to reduce unsustainable trade include
programmes to identify underlying motivating factors inculture and tradition and use these to promote behaviourchange427. Campaigns against overconsumption or illegal
wildlife trade have been implemented globally, regionallyand nationally (e.g. a relatively successful campaign tocombat the ivory trade in China460,461). However, theirimpact on changes of consumption behaviour or species

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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

conservation has been evaluated for only a few ofthese462. Furthermore, the lack of detailed understandingof incentives for wildlife consumption likely undermines
their efficacy463. Even with demonstrated success andeffectiveness, community engagement programmes
face challenges in engaging high-level policy for
implementation464. Community-based ecotourism
that uses a “Payments for Ecosystem Services”
approach has successfully reduced local wildlife tradein Laos and Cambodia465,466, but outcomes were mixed
in other contexts that required improved institutional
basis for implementation467,468.

SECTION 4CONTROLLING PANDEMICS RELIES ON,
AND AFFECTS, BIODIVERSITY
An understanding of the biodiversity of microbes
in nature is critical to controlling pandemics
Substantial aspects of the development of modern
medicine are historically and currently dependent on
biodiversity. The 3.5 billion years of evolution of lifeon Earth have led to tens to thousands of genes, eachproducing proteins that serve specific functions469,470.
Microbial diversity is extraordinary471: for instance, it
moderates infection in plant ecosystems472 andfree-living viruses drive species composition dynamics
in marine ecosystems473. Microbes compete among
each other for space and nutrition, leading to selection
for strategies to kill or inhibit other microbes, replicate,and respond to chemical and physical stimuli, allof potential benefit to fighting infection. Natural or
naturally derived compounds account for around 75%
of approved antimicrobial drugs474. For example, there
may be 12 million fungal species475, one of which was thesource of penicillin used to control bacterial infections
and revolutionize medicine476. The antiparasitic drug

ivermectin was derived from the bacterium Streptomyces
avermitilis and the antimalarial artemisinin from theplant Artemisia annua, sweet wormwood477. Diagnosis
of infectious agents with polymerase chain reactions(PCR), now being used to detect hundreds of thousandsof SARS-CoV-2 infections daily, is dependent on theheat-resistant Taq polymerase enzyme discovered in athermophilic bacterial organism Thermus aquaticus fromhot springs478. CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced
short palindromic repeats) is a family of DNA sequences
discovered in bacterial and archaeal genomes479. These
sequences are derived from bacteriophages, viralparasites of bacteria, and used to detect and destroy
subsequent bacteriophage infections along with
Cas-protein enzymes. CRISPR-Cas systems are now
utilized to engineer probiotic cultures for yogurts, toimprove crop yields and drought tolerance, and to
produce malaria-resistant mosquitoes480. CRISPR has
been used for diagnostic testing with high levels of
sensitivity481,482, including for SARS-CoV-2483.

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33

The health sector also uses digital sequence information
on genetic resources, for example, for the design ofdiagnostic tests for infectious disease agents, detectionof pathogens in contaminated food for disease prevention
and discovery of new therapeutics484. Given that lessthan 1% of known species have been utilized by people,
discovery of further compounds that help develop
therapeutics and diagnostic agents is highly likely485.
Genomic advances are now bringing insights into how
other species, such as bats, may resist or tolerate
infections, potentially leading to mechanisms of infection
control486-488. Biodiversity is therefore a fundamental
resource for health. However, it is difficult to predict whichgenes, species, or ecosystems will become valuable forbioprospecting in the future489 highlighting the need toconserve as much biodiversity as possible490. Similarly,
the rapid and comprehensive scientific sharing of thewide array of pathogens found in animals and humans
is crucial for public health preparedness491. However,there is limited capacity to predict which pathogens may
cause outbreaks and may be used in the developmentof necessary life-saving (and, potentially commerciallyvaluable) countermeasures, such as vaccines14.

Therapeutics to fight pandemics have their
origins in biodiversity and have been identified
through indigenous and local knowledge andtraditional medicine
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities have had along relationship with nature that has had a lasting impact
on the landscapes people live in today492-494. They havealso demonstrated that nature can provide a source of
medicines with significant benefits to public health495.
Common therapeutics, such as aspirin, can be dated
back to traditional knowledge in ancient Egypt496. The first
effective modern treatment for malaria came from quininefrom the bark of the cinchona tree497. Tu Youyou’s Nobel
winning artemisinin malaria discovery was possible
because Artemisia annua is an herb employed in
traditional Chinese medicine477,495,498. Traditional medicine
products are being used as potential therapeutics against
COVID-19499 and the pandemic has increased demand
for traditional medicine. Traditional knowledge systems
highlight the importance of equitable “access and benefit
sharing” (ABS)500. Of around 270,000 known terrestrial
plants, 10,000 are used medicinally498,501. There are manypotential benefits (medicinal and others) that remain to
be discovered within plant species474, and the genetic
information present in wild species thus represents
substantial ‘future opportunity’. Natural products havebeen the source of more than 50% of therapeutics
approved by the USA Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
over the past three decades502. Given that only a fraction

34

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICSof the world’s biodiversity has so far been tested for its
biological activity, the challenge remains how to accessthis natural chemical diversity and how to do so ethically,equitably and sustainably.

Understanding access and benefit sharing
policies is critically important to the supply of
vaccines and therapeutics that rely on sampling
the diversity of pathogens in the wild.
The sharing of the benefits from biodiversity must be
equitable, but equally, if such benefits are to be realized
globally, frameworks for sharing benefits need to also
protect nature and enable access to genetic resources.
The development of diagnostics, drugs and othertherapeutics, and vaccines from biological resources,
including pathogen and cell cultures and genetic or tissue
samples from people, livestock and wildlife all typicallyrequire international material transfer agreements tosource and move. The accessing and transfer of thesegenetic resources are also governed by international law,in particular, the Convention on Biological Diversity andits Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources andthe Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising fromtheir Utilization [The Convention on Biological Diversity of
5 June 1992 (1760 UNTS 79)]503. The CBD and the Nagoya
Protocol both recognize states’ sovereignty over the
genetic resources within their borders and were adopted
to address the inequitable exploitation of biodiverse
countries’ genetic resources491. The Convention and
the Nagoya Protocol provide for states to require priorinformed consent to accessing their genetic resources
and, through bilateral arrangements negotiated on
mutually agreed terms, aim to ensure that state receives
the equitable sharing of benefits from the use of such
resources. In addition, the Nagoya Protocol contains
provisions to ensure prior informed consent for accessing
genetic resources held by Indigenous Peoples andLocal Communities, and equitably sharing the benefitsof Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities’ genetic
resources and their traditional and local knowledge503.
With the exception of resources covered by specializedinternational instruments, such as the International Treaty
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,
the CBD and Nagoya Protocol both default to bilateralarrangements for access and benefit sharing. However,
the time required to negotiate these agreements has led
to the unintended consequence of sometimes hamperingresearch in biodiversity hotspots504, while the evidenceof financially significant benefits to local and traditional
owners is lacking504. Furthermore, this has led toreported delays in the sharing of pathogens for outbreak
response505.

With the exception of pandemic influenza (discussed
below), there is no specialised international instrumentthat streamlines accessing pathogen samples and theequitable sharing of benefits arising from their use. The
WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR)506 require
states to notify the WHO within 24 hours of events thatare a potential Public Health Emergency of International
Concern (PHEIC), and following notification, must
continue to share timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed
public health information relating to the notified event.
However, neither pathogen samples nor their genetic
sequences are expressly included in the definition of
public health information required to be shared under the
IHR491. While the CBD and Nagoya Protocol expressly
acknowledge the IHR, and the Nagoya Protocol contains
provisions for special considerations such as publichealth emergencies, the sharing of genetic resources
for therapeutic development, including compounds andpathogens, is subject to the bilateral arrangements, with
one notable exception. In 2011, WHO Member States
adopted the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP)
Framework507, to ensure access to influenza viruses withhuman pandemic potential and the sharing of benefits
arising from their use, including vaccines. The PIP
Framework is a nonbinding resolution adopted while
parallel negotiations under the CBD’s Conference ofParties for the Nagoya Protocol were occurring, and it
expressly acknowledges state sovereignty over genetic
resources and incorporates access and benefit sharing491.
Although the PIP Framework has not yet been formallyrecognized as a specialised international instrument, there
is ongoing formalised collaboration between the WHO andthe CBD Secretariat on these issues.
Increasingly, the development of diagnostics, therapeutics
and vaccines relies upon the use of genetic sequence
data from biological materials. However, the CBD, Nagoya
Protocol, and as noted above, the IHR, do not currently
expressly cover genetic sequence data (digital sequence
information)508. Increasing reliance on sequence data will
reduce the need to access physical samples of biologicalmaterials, which may undermine the equitable sharingof benefits from biological resources, while imposing
similar access and benefit sharing arrangements on
sequence data has been criticised as potentially imposing
unnecessary and inefficient burdens509. Despite the lack ofclear legal obligation, China publicly shared full genomic
data for SARS-CoV-2 within two weeks of the reported
date of sample acquisition (https://virological.org/t/novel2019-coronavirus-genome/319). There are public andvoluntary initiatives to encourage immediate sharing,such as GenBank and the Global Initiative on the Sharingof All Influenza Data (GISAID). However, it is clear thatissues relating to intellectual property (IP), access andbenefit sharing, microbial genomes and therapeutic andvaccine development have and may further hamper
pandemic control efforts if they lead to delays in data
sharing (Box 4).

Policies implemented to control outbreaks candirectly affect biodiversity conservation
Infection control policies have the potential to benefit
or harm biodiversity and conservation. Some historicalmeasures to reduce disease risk to people or livestock
have led to substantial, global impacts on biodiversity.
Wetland drainage has been a long-used method of
infection control, despite its detrimental environmental
impacts519,520. To control sleeping sickness in Africa in the
1950s and 60s wildlife was killed, including endangered
black rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis)521. However, control
methods were not only physical: the application of
Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) provides a classic
example of the impacts of chemicals used to control
insect vectors for infections like malaria. DDT and
its metabolites not only ultimately had human healthissues, but seriously impacted aquatic systems andbioaccumulated in animals to cause the massive declineof many birds, causing serious population declines in
species such as the iconic bald eagle(Haliaeetus leucocephalus)522.
Identifying the wildlife reservoir of an emerging viraldisease, for example, may lead to efforts to control themas pests, ultimately leading to population declines andbiodiversity loss. Bats are hosts to a high diversity ofcoronaviruses, including the closest relatives of
SARS-CoV, SARS-CoV-26,415 and other highly pathogenic
zoonotic viruses64,66,395,523. Evidence has emerged ofbats being targeted for roost removal or culling in aneffort to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2, despite
the virus spreading globally among people524-528. Thereis a substantial literature that suggests culling is usuallyineffective in reducing, and may actually increase diseaserisk to people or livestock (e.g. bovine tuberculosisand badgers529-531), may lead to immigration of animals
from nearby populations, or otherwise increase thetransmission or prevalence of pathogens, leading toincreased risk to people and livestock532,533. Bats play a
critical role in ecosystems, including providing ecosystemservices such as pollination and pest control534, andthese services are under pressure from anthropogenic
change535. Culling of vampire bats occurs regularly in Peru
in an effort to control rabies and Rousettus spp. fruit bats
have been culled to control Marburg virus, a relative ofEbola virus, in Uganda, both leading to increased viralprevalence and risk of disease transmission96,536. Similar
disturbance, habitat destruction and killing have been

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Box 4: Intellectual property, biodiversity and global
vaccine development and distribution

related knowledge, intellectual property and data.

Intellectual property

The political, economic and social demands on vaccine
development and manufacture during pandemics
highlight the fragility and discriminatory nature of vaccine
development510,511. Prior to the Ebola Virus Disease epidemicin West Africa in 2013-2016, the existing R&D environment
delayed manufacture of vaccination because of a perceived
lack of profitability512. This delay in manufacturing isparticularly critical when the affected population is largely
within developing countries512-514. In 2003, more than 95%
of the world’s influenza vaccines were produced in only
nine countries and more than 65% of all doses came fromfive Western European countries. Overall, the nine vaccine
producing countries used 62% of the world’s vaccines,
yet they accounted for only 12% of the world’s population.
The remaining 38% of all doses were used in countries thathave little or no capacity to produce influenza vaccines on
their own515. There is no global organisation responsible

Intellectual property (IP) rights are critical to any discussion
about benefits arising from the use of genetic resources,
as research and development (R&D) based on genetic
resources and associated traditional knowledge may
eventually be subject to some form of IP protection, suchas patents. While ABS regimes recognize states’ sovereign
rights over genetic resources, intellectual property rights
recognize inventors’ rights to exclusively control the use of
an invention for a period of time. IP rights may be expressly
included as benefits shared in mutually agreed terms under
Nagoya Protocol compliant material transfer agreements,or they may be asserted completely separately to any
sovereignty claim. This may result in conflicts between
claims and perceptions of ownership over genetic resources,delaying access to genetic resources or products developed
using them.
IP laws such as patents purport to incentivise R&D by
granting inventors exclusive rights to control the use of a
product or method developed for specific period of time,
typically 20 years depending on domestic laws. However,this exclusivity may limit the amount of a product available
and its affordability. While the patentability of genetic
resources may differ between jurisdictions, patents may
claim genetic resources or a part of their composition,
including as part of a therapeutic, diagnostic, or vaccine.
This may prevent or delay vaccine development from genetic
resources, while cost may make distribution inequitablebetween and within countries.
Domestic laws may also permit governments to issue
compulsory licenses over patented medicines, so that
additional manufacturers can produce the medicine. Under
the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) theseflexibilities are codified as minimum standards, however
there are additional processes that generally must be first
fulfilled. These flexibilities were reaffirmed in the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,recognizing the importance of access to essential medicines,
including during emergencies.
Scientists may facilitate keeping technology and medicines“open” without IP restrictions by sharing their researchand data openly. The voluntary uptake of open sciencearound a COVID-19 vaccine has been immense, with many
global companies having pledged to keep their science free
and open (https://opencovidpledge.org/). Other initiatives
facilitate the sharing of IP through pooling and licensing
to permit certain uses while retaining underlying IP rights.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has launched the
COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) to compile
pledges of commitment made under the Solidarity Call to
Action to voluntarily share COVID-19 health technology
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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

Vaccines

for financing or organising vaccine manufacture for any
communicable disease leading to barriers to development511,
including during a pandemic513. This inequality is mirroredin other areas, such as OIE Reference laboratories thatcharacterise wildlife-related infections516.
The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations(CEPI) is a public-private partnership focused on selecting
and funding vaccine R&D projects in an effort to prevent
outbreaks of infectious diseases. In January 2020, CEPI
entered into agreements to provide financial support forthe development of three different types of vaccines for
SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19). The financial commitment cameless than two weeks after Chinese scientists first made asequence of COVID-19 available through a public database.
CEPI supports the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT)
Accelerator, a consortium organized through WHO thathas raised US$58 billion.

Even if a vaccine or a number of vaccines were to be
manufactured, it is unclear if supply will meet demand at
low and sustainable prices. Mobilizing public funds forpharmaceutical development has not yielded clear pricing
guidelines517. These issues are compounded by other global
inequalities including the lack of manufacturing plants indeveloping countries and, in some cases, unequal accessto constant refrigeration and temperature control518.
The pharmaceutical industry appropriately states that thehigh price of new therapeutics reflects the cost of R&D
for those and the other candidates that failed during themany, expensive stages of research, clinical trials andmanufacturing. However, the inequities between developing
countries and the countries that pay for R&D in theavailability and affordability of vaccines and therapeutics are
striking, and have relevance for biodiversity when samples
collected in developing countries ultimately lead to novellines of R&D.

reported for birds after influenza outbreaks, including
wetland drainage and killing of nesting birds537,538.
Disinfection of environmental surfaces was used in thefirst few months of the COVID-19 pandemic, to attempt
reduction in transmission and spread of SARS-CoV-2 via
contaminated surfaces. As a result, countries across theworld have extensively used disinfectants on “high-touch”
surfaces in non-health care settings, both in indoor andoutdoor spaces, and in urban and rural areas, including
homes, schools, businesses, streets. However,disinfection has also included public beaches anddisinfectants are used in biodiversity rich areas such asurban parks, wetlands and green spaces. This approachto disease control often takes place without guidelines formonitoring its effects on either human or environmental
health and with limited evidence for its efficacy. Basedon available evidence, WHO clearly advises that inindoor spaces, routine application of disinfectants toenvironmental surfaces by spraying or fogging is notrecommended for COVID-19, nor is it recommended
to spray or fumigate outdoor spaces, such as streetsor marketplaces, to kill the SARS-CoV-2 virus or otherpathogens539. Nevertheless, many countries continue tospray disinfectants not following the scientific evidence.
The overuse of disinfectants poses a significant threat tothe urban environment and wildlife. There are documented
toxicological effects of disinfectants on terrestrial andaquatic animals540, potentially contaminating food andwater resources541 or roosting habitats of free-living
animals542,543. However, limited information exists on
the ecological consequences of disinfectants in urban
environments and on biodiversity544.
Finally, there is evidence that poor control of pandemics
can impact biodiversity. For example, HIV/AIDS has led
to increased poaching, morbidity and death of park
rangers and conservation workers and reduction offunds for conservation545. The impact of disease on
households can lead to food insecurity and increased
reliance on and use of natural resources546-548. Similarly,
non-pharmaceutical interventions adopted to combat
COVID-19 such as social distancing and travel restrictions
have significantly reduced ecotourism demand, leading
to lay-offs of park rangers and guides and anecdotally
reported increase in poaching.

Pandemic diseases can move from people
into wildlife
Microbes or pathogens of people have been reported
to cause disease in wildlife, leading them to be called
anthroponoses or reverse zoonoses549. These can havesignificant impact550. The global pandemic of H1N1
influenza virus in 2009 involved a strain derived froma recombination among human, pig and avian strains,
indicating regular movement of influenza strains amongpeople and these groups of animals95,551. During the
H1N1 pandemic, there was virus spread from humans
to farmed pigs, turkeys, and mink, to pet dogs, cats,
and ferrets, and to both captive and free-living wild
animal species, including cheetah, American badger,
giant panda and striped skunk552,553. Human respiratory
infections have infected great apes, leading tosignificant illness554,555. Yellow fever virus has spreadfrom wildlife in Africa to people and back to wildlife inSouth America, causing regular outbreaks and die-offs
in primates556-559. Cross-species transmission is not
limited to viruses, for example a Salmonella subtype
in New Zealand infected multiple species, including
wild birds560. Wild non-human primates have also been
infected by parasites of human origin561,562. Thus, failure
to control human disease can lead directly to wildlife
health issues. The panglobal spread of COVID-19 has
led to concerns that it may spread to and possibly
become endemic in other animal species. SARS-CoV-2
has caused die-offs in farmed mink, which have in turninfected people, leading to large-scale culling116,117. The
virus has also been reported from domesticated andzoo animals, all thought to be infected by close contact
with people116,563,564. It is also possible that SARS-CoV-2
will be able to infect bats outside its natural host range,leading to measures to reduce human-bat contact in
the USA and other countries565. There have also been
concerns about potential infection by COVID-19 of wildrodents,566, non-human primates567, following infectionof related species in the laboratory.

Measures to control outbreaks can indirectly
affect biodiversity conservation
The response to COVID-19 has led to a global “pause”
in human activity, as a partial or full movement
restriction for large parts of the world are being
imposed568. Like previous disasters, the impacts on
biodiversity can be many and complex569. On amacroeconomic scale, the global economic slowdown
has decreased the demand for many industrially
produced commodities and thus reduced direct
extractive pressures on the environment569. In Peru
commercial fishing dropped 80% following the onset ofthe pandemic570. High seas commercial fishery landings
were reduced by just 6.5%, with the highest impact on
small scale fisheries, potentially affecting livelihoods ofmore poor people571. Reduction in travel and pollution
may have increased turtle breeding success568, andanecdotally have allowed increased abundance andshort-term population recovery for some wildlife
species572. Environmental pollution may have declined
by up to 30% due largely to travel restrictions and
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37

reduced oil demand573. Limitations to social andeconomic activities574 improved air quality noticeably in
China575, and by 30-60% in India576, Malaysia577, Italy578
and Brazil579, although these are likely temporary
effects. Continued restrictions in power demand fromindustry, aviation, transport and residential activities
may lead to measurable reduction in global CO2
emissions trends580. However, these changes are likely
temporary, with the advent of a vaccine likely to allow
relatively full employment and industrial production575.
They are also likely to lead to a negligible decreasein global climate change, albeit that an economic
recovery tilted towards green stimulus and reductions
in fossil fuel investments could avoid future warming of
0.3 °C by 2050581. The restrictions also highlight thehuman value of green space in cities, essential forphysical and mental health and wellbeing ofpeople582,583 and that rapid behaviour change arepossible if people are convinced of its value to theirhealth and wellbeing.
On the other hand, movement and work restrictions,as well as illness-related work absences, have reduced
conservation work and enforcement against illegal
resource extraction584,585, severely reduced incomes andemployment, leading to increased hunting and poachingof wildlife, including of endangered species like tigers
and leopards586. The global economic impact of H1N1
on tourism was around US$55 billion587. The Ebola virus
disease epidemic reduced tourism to East Africa forover two years after the epidemic ended588. Tourism fees
are the principal source of funding for national parks
worldwide589. They are also particularly important for
low-income countries where, for example, US$142
million of park fees were paid in Africa alone in 2013589.
Indeed, low-income countries with high biodiversity
tourism and hotspots are particularly vulnerable.
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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

Nature-based tourism represents more than 10% of theeconomies of Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa andNamibia569, while nineteen small island nations source
more than 20% of their GDP directly from tourism590.
The sudden loss of income has forced the loss of
employment of rangers in Zimbabwe and othercountries585,591. Loss of tourism has been linked toincreased illegal logging in Tunisia 592, and poaching inIndia593 and Africa, including rhinoceros and elephantpoaching594,595. The use of dried bear bile for COVID-19
as having potential health benefits is untested byappropriate clinical trials and, even if farmed, has ethicaland conservation implications596.
Preventive measures to control the spread of infectious
diseases include the use of disposable masks and gloves
and other equipment. During the COVID-19 pandemic,
global surges in the use of disposable plastic equipment
has led to a rise in medical waste597. This represents
a significant source of microplastic fibres in theenvironment598 that threatens wildlife and contaminates
the human food chain599. The increase in plastic wastewith the temporary relaxation on use of single-use
plastic may also alter consumer behaviour on recycling
and banning single-use plastics600. Proper medical andplastic waste management treatment during and after
COVID-19 crisis, along with social responsibility andcorporate action will be critical601.

Strategies to recover economically fromCOVID-19 could have significant effects
on biodiversity
Efforts to stimulate national and global economies andtrade after COVID-19 shutdowns569 may reinforce theactivities that drive pandemic emergence and spread,such as air travel, construction and road building602-604.
Governments have so far deployed US$9 trillion globallyin financial support to compensate for financial losses
during the pandemic, including stimulus packages605.
Funds could be used to support communities affectedby COVID-19 in biodiversity hotspots. For example,
the EU recovery plan was agreed on 21 July 2020,
comprising €1,824.3 billion to help to rebuild societies
and economies in the region and will support investmentin the green and digital transitions. Of this budget, €750
billion is allocated for recovery efforts606. The biodiversity
strategy, in line with the European Green Deal, is acentral element of this recovery plan and provides
immediate business and investment opportunities forrestoring the EU’s economy post COVID-19 crisis607.
Building ‘green’ and resilient economic systems in which
the value of nature is included, will be a vital element forhuman health and wellbeing as well as environmental
health. To achieve this, several international organizations
and the IPBES Global Assessment recognized the roleof nature-based solutions for contributing to biodiversity
conservation and overall climate change adaptation andmitigation effort in addition to providing other substantial
benefits to people and nature124. Nature-based solutions
are defined by the IUCN as “actions to protect,sustainably manage and restore natural or modified
ecosystems that address societal challenges effectively
and adaptively, simultaneously providing humanwell-being and biodiversity benefits”608. Nature-based
solutions have been included in the draft of the post-2020
Global Biodiversity Framework to be considered by theParties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its
15th meeting, with measuring the trend and use ofnature-based solutions suggested as part of nationallydetermined contributions609. The role of nature-based
solutions in the prevention of pandemics has not yet been
calculated, but is likely to be significant, through informed
environmental management and dedicated conservation
efforts that reduce pandemic risk.

Impact of COVID-19 control policies on womenand Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities
Women are disproportionately affected by climate change,
environmental degradation and biodiversity loss, lowering
their ability to adapt–in particular in developing countries
where it is often their responsibility to provide water, foodand fuel for their families, usually from the surrounding
environment. Pandemic control measures also have ahigher negative impact on women, who are already at
greater risk of COVID-19 impact. Women represent 70%of health care and social workers globally, exposing
them to a greater risk of infection from COVID-19, andincreasing societal reliance on them in the workforce
during this pandemic610. Additionally, COVID-19 has
exposed layers of social, political and economic

vulnerability and intensified pre-existing inequalities anddiscrimination confronted by women611.
Non-pharmaceutical interventions (restriction on
movement, social distancing etc.) mean that women facemultiple challenges including accessing reproductive
and sexual health services, and bigger risks for labourand domestic abuse and gender-based violence612.
Women also encounter increased burden of care workfor household and childcare duties due to school andworkplaces closure613 that may negatively affect theirability to work from home and influencing their academic
productivity614. Seventy per cent of the world’s poor are
women, and many women live in crowded spaces withpoor ventilation, or have limited or lack access to cleanwater and food, which puts them at elevated risk of
COVID-19 infection in developing countries and within
marginalized communities in high income countries611.
Pandemic control policies and recovery programmes to betransformative should be gender responsive and inclusive
and ensure women are equally represented in decision
making processes, so that gender is not neglected andthat decisions made adequately address the impediments
women face in pandemics.
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities are underparticular threat from COVID-19615,616. Past pandemics andemerging disease outbreaks have had a disproportionately
higher impact on Indigenous Peoples, often because, due
to geographical isolation, there is a lack of herd immunity
to diseases that emerge in urban centres of Europe andother developed countries617. The 1918 influenza
pandemic killed Māori at seven times the rate ofEuropeans 618, and this disproportionate impact has been
repeated through history, with the 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic causing four-times greater mortality in Native
Americans (including indigenous Alaskans) than thegeneral USA population619. Much of this imbalance is dueto health and social inequity that are a legacy of invasion
and colonization, driven by intergenerational concentrationof poverty, transport and housing inequities, domestic
and family violence and poor access to healthcare andin particular to culturally-relevant healthcare615. This
precariousness is amplified by the frequent brutality ofcontacts with national society, inappropriate policies
such as the distribution of food or financial aid that have
led the Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities totravel to the cities where they are infected, and the sharp
distinctions between their community-based model of lifeand social distancing measures that help avoid infection.
These impacts are heightened by travel restrictions
under COVID-19, wherein smaller communities,
separated from urban centres and living in remote,rural settings are at even higher risk due to reduced
access to primary healthcare clinics. These impacts on
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39

Figure 9: Drone photo of deforestation in the Bolivian Amazon. Forest has been cleared for the production of soybeans.
There has been a significant increase in demand for soybeans as part of a globalized system of livestock production andtrade (photo: Rhett A. Butler).
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities demonstrate
the interconnectedness of pandemic causes andimpacts: Pandemics are driven largely by unsustainableconsumption of richer developed and emerging countries,
but their impacts are particularly felt by the Indigenous
Peoples, and those living in poverty who cannot afford to
avoid work to social distance.

Pandemic control measures and human values
Human dimensions research is essential for managing
biodiversity and understanding the societal consequencesof pandemic control and response620,621. In some respects,
the current pandemic has had a positive impact on
people’s values towards nature. For example, it has been
estimated that outdoor recreational activity increased by
291% in Norway during lockdown622, and there has been
anecdotal evidence of similar increases around the world.
Time in nature can increase a person’s understandingof human interconnectedness with all other living things(‘Nature Relatedness’) and contribute to positive values
towards nature and biodiversity623. However, numerous
reports have been published of reduced physical activity
due to closure of schools, universities and offices624,625.
This has resulted in efforts to increase access to green
spaces and countryside during the pandemic626,627. Human
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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

dimensions research for zoonoses of pandemic potential
is sparse620. Values vary geographically, so that pandemic
control and response polices may have unpredicted
impact on people’s attitudes towards biodiversity628.
On the other hand, top-down laws and policies prioritizing
conservation can perpetuate negative attitudes towards
biodiversity, decreasing meaningful implementation629-632.
Lack of trust can reduce compliance with management
strategies and disease risk alone may be insufficient tofoster behaviours that promote compliance620, andenforceable laws may not be complied with when they
are implemented with little community support633. Suchan approach can also create knowledge gaps andother discrepancies on the ground. Top-down policies
can, particularly in developing countries, ignore local
conditions around poverty, food insecurity, drought andother issues that affect local ability to implement policy.
Policies that make the human-environment connection to
zoonotic transmission and pandemics clear can increase
support for biodiversity conservation, especially foremotive subjects like the commercial trade in wildlife anddeforestation634. For example, surveys conducted during
the COVID-19 pandemic in China showed that the desire
to eat wild meat in the future was significantly reduced
among respondents, particularly younger cohorts635.

SECTION 5
POLICY OPTIONS TO FOSTER TRANSFORMATIVECHANGE TOWARDS PREVENTING PANDEMICS
Transformative Change: Preventing Pandemics
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the term ‘pandemic
preparedness’ has been highlighted as a critical approachfor governments to deal with the threat of pandemics.
However, despite its forward positioning, pandemic
preparedness in most countries involves traditional
public health measures, e.g. building surge capacity in
hospitals, stockpiling personal protective equipment, bulk
purchasing of antibiotic and antiviral therapeutics. These
are all actions that involve responding to a pandemic after
it has emerged. Yet, the research reviewed in sections
1-3 suggests that there is growing knowledge available
that provides a pathway to predicting and preventing
pandemics. This includes work that predicts geographic
origins of future pandemics11,13, identifies key reservoir
hosts and the pathogens most likely to emerge307,636-639
and demonstrates how environmental and socioeconomicchanges correlate with disease emergence13,41,42,178,232,380.

Pilot projects, often at large scale (e.g. PREDICT14,
VIZIONS640, ProMED641-643) have demonstrated that
this knowledge can be used to effectively target viral
discovery, surveillance and outbreak investigation. The
urgency of the public health impact of COVID-19, and of
HIV/AIDS, Ebola, Zika, influenza, SARS and many otheremerging diseases; suggest a critical need for policies
that will promote pandemic prevention, based on thisgrowing knowledge.
In this section, potential policy options are put forwardthat represent fundamental transformative change toaddress the Pandemic Era by preventing pandemics.
These build on the evidence from sections 1-3, andtherefore many of the citations and data are not repeated
here. Scientific proof-of-concept for some of the policy
options is also cited here, and in the preceding sections.
In some cases, agencies and organizations are identified

Figure 10: One Health is a system of tackling key health issues (e.g. the emergence of pandemics) by recognizing thatthe health of people, animals and the environment are often inextricably linked; and by leveraging work in all threesectors to better address the proximal and underlying causes of health issues. Figure left from644. Figure right shows
how disease emergence across wildlife, livestock and people are linked through anthropogenic drivers that involveglobal environmental changes which also drive biodiversity loss, from53.
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41

that already conduct some of the activities or that might
be involved in these policy options. In most cases, a
One Health approach is used as a guiding principle
for pandemic prevention policy options. One Healthleverages work across the animal health, human healthand environmental health landscapes (Figure 10). The
goal of this section is to identify solutions that could takeus beyond the business-as-usual approach to pandemics,
so that even while still in the throes of COVID-19, thehard work can begin to prevent the next pandemic.
Furthermore, these policy options should be consideredin light of all dimensions of health and cognizant of
the multiple interlinkages between biodiversity andhealth288,289. The section begins with policy options that
could: 1) provide critical high-level enabling mechanisms
to assess, set targets for and reduce pandemic risk;2) increase sustainability and reduce pandemic risk due
to land use change and agricultural expansion; 3) reduce
pandemic risk through the wildlife trade; 4) bridge criticalknowledge gaps; and 5) foster the involvement of all
sectors of society in reducing pandemic risk.

1) Enabling mechanisms
Launching a high-level intergovernmental
council/panel on pandemic prevention:
Pandemic prevention is a complex and multidisciplinary
One Health challenge that will likely require coordinationand collaboration among sectors and agencies
nationally and internationally. However, these agencies
are separated by their mandates and their funding
mechanisms, which may fragment efforts to coordinate
pandemic prevention. One option to enhance such
coordination could be the establishment of a high-levelintergovernmental council or panel that would provide
for cooperation among governments to: 1) provide
policy relevant scientific information on theemergence of diseases, predict high risk areas, evaluate
economic impact of potential pandemics, highlightresearch gaps; and 2) coordinate the design of amonitoring framework, and lay the ground work foran agreement on goals and targets to be met by all
partners for implementing the One Health approach283,
and reducing the activities that drive pandemic risksuch as land use change, unsustainable consumption,
expansion and intensification of livestock production
and the wildlife trade.
A high-level coordinating structure that is stable overtime, funded by country contributions, and with a clear
mandate to use One Health approaches to prevent
pandemics, could ensure the necessary synergies toinstitutionalize a global strategy to break free of thePandemic Era. This “high level council” could workat the crossroads of the activities and actions of the
42

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

three Rio conventions, while having strong links withthe other biodiversity conventions, including CITES andthe Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat. An
international registry of commitments and actions
taken by countries to reduce pandemic risk could help
drive common action. This council could act as a focal
point to alert governments, the private sector, andcivil society, on near-term pandemic risks to human,livestock and environmental health. It could act as acentral coordinating mechanism or clearing house of
information to identify critical changes that forecast
pandemic risk and inform the targeting of pandemic
prevention, outbreak investigation and intervention andcontrol measures. It could provide annual One Healthassessments that include evaluation of the economic
impact of potential pandemics, the cost of prevention
programmes and data on how One Health has leveraged
actions, providing a key incentive for support. It could
provide a pathway for work on antibiotic resistance,
endemic zoonoses like rabies and known threats likeavian influenza.
Over a longer timeframe, this approach might lead tocountries setting mutually agreed goals or targets
within a multilateral framework, similar to the Paris
Agreement. A broad intergovernmental agreementon pandemic prevention and the underlying drivers of
pandemics could provide benefits for humans, animals
and ecosystems.
Nascent intergovernmental One Health collaborations
have been formed, e.g. the WHO-OIE-FAO tripartite,
the OIE Wildlife Working Group and the WHO-CBD
partnership. However, true complementarity has notbeen fully achieved, and a clear mandate for pandemic
prevention not given. The Global Health Security Agenda(GHSA) initiated Joint External Evaluations (JEE) of acountry’s capacity to achieve goals of the WHO
International Health Regulations645,646. However, apossible high-level intergovernmental council could
provide a more specific focus on risk reduction
programmes that address environmental change andsocioeconomic drivers and go beyond the animal-humanhealth agenda of the JEE. The high-level council could
work in conjunction with multilateral environmental
agreements and intergovernmental platforms, andbring together key intergovernmental organisations
for each One Health sector (e.g. WHO and the Global
Health Security Agenda for human health; OIE, FAO,
IUCN Wildlife Health Specialist Group for animal health;
UNEP for environmental health), UNDP, with those of
relevance for trade (e.g. CITES, OIE, WTO), land usechange (e.g. the Global Environment Facility, WorldBank), pandemic control (e.g. WHO R&D blueprint) andbiodiversity (e.g. CBD). It could act to raise awarenessof policy recommendations already adopted under the
CBD (on, among other things, promoting interagency
cooperation, health impact assessments, monitoring)and help advance their implementation. Financing could
be through earmarked contributions to participatingorganizations or via a special fund directly supplemented
by voluntary contributions.
Institutionalizing One Health within national governments:
The One Health approach calls for cooperation among
human, wildlife, livestock health and environmental
sectors. Within national governments, agencies tasked
with each of these are usually separate and funded byseparate budgets. This has led to poor uptake of the One
Health approach in most countries. Notable exceptions
exist, and One Health platforms are active in Rwanda647,
Bangladesh648, Bhutan293, Uganda649, Tanzania650, Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Liberia651 and others. National governments
could form One Health taskforces or cross-cutting
working groups focused on pandemic prevention, that
foster collaboration among ministries of health,agriculture, and environment, with strong interaction withministries of finance. They could have a key role inalerting national agencies to upcoming pandemic threats,
identifying research gaps, liaising with the private sector
to ensure appropriate supply of diagnostics, acting as
national focal points for an intergovernmental high-leveltaskforce or council on pandemic prevention (above).
Critically, they could build capacity within the agencies
for practical, on-the-ground surveillance and outbreak
investigation in the face of an emerging disease.
Coordination of One Health pandemic prevention could
be managed at the central government level, to ensure
effective collaboration.
Mainstreaming the economic cost of pandemics into
consumption, production and government policies
and budgets: Integrating the externalities fromfuture pandemics into consumption, production andgovernment budgets could also be an important
way to reduce future pandemic risk. For example,
mainstreaming pandemic costs within the financesector, via assessments of dependencies, could help
to reduce risks and subsequent costs. Mainstreaming
pandemic costs into government budgets and policies
across a range of economic sectors could ensure
co-benefits which result in increased resources forbiodiversity. Mainstreaming pandemic costs into national
development plans could provide a strong argument forachieving greater policy coherence and correspondingly
higher efficiency of resource use.

Generating new green corporate or sovereign bonds:
New investment tools like green corporate or sovereign
bonds, and blended finance to support resource
mobilization for biodiversity conservation and pandemic
risk reduction could increase fund allocation forbiodiversity and pandemic risk. These bonds could link
the cost of the debt to progress in protecting biodiversity
and reduce pandemic risk. They could help reduce theeconomic impact from the crisis produced by Covid-19
and simultaneously be consistent with environmental
and health global ambitions. It has been noted thatzoonotic outbreaks also threatened the stability of thefinancial system. Central banks could therefore target
and buy debt that supports biodiversity conservationand pandemic risk reduction programmes as part oftheir objectives652.
Designing a green economic recovery from COVID-19:
Emerging infectious diseases are not easily contained byborders. More efficient global mechanisms could help toprovide the necessary funds to invest not only in recovery
response after disease outbreaks (e.g. the Pandemic
Emergency Financing Facility)653 but also in increasing
capacity for disease prevention based on global risks(e.g. the Global Environment Facility)654. These global
mechanisms could serve as an insurance to provide an
immediate response during outbreaks while mobilizing
more resources to developing countries. Investing in
post-COVID-19 economic and social recovery efforts in
low-income countries could be a priority, and these funds
would help to lower the risk and economic impact tohigh-income countries from future pandemics.

2) Increasing sustainability and reducing
pandemic risk due to land use change andagricultural expansion
While the global community concentrates its effortson the immediate health and economic threats fromCOVID-19, it is critical to take into account the long run
risks and economic costs arising from future pandemics.
To date many of the economic policies launched torecover from COVID-19 have not included synergistic
biodiversity conservation or climate change goals655.
A good starting point could be to include in any recovery
efforts the necessary investments in biodiversity
conservation and sustainable use to reduce the risk
and build human and economic resilience from future
pandemics656. In order to accomplish this, support for
a new post-2020 global biodiversity framework that
promotes a transition to One Health, and implementationof an ambitious strategic approach that includes theefficient allocation of funds and resource mobilization
would be vital657. The following measures are identified as

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having potential to generate benefits for both pandemic
prevention, economic development and biodiversity
conservation:
Incorporating considerations of health impacts into
protected area policies, restoration programmes andland use planning: Programmes to conserve intact
habitat, reduce land use change by sustainably managing
land, and reverse ecosystem degradation by restoring
forest and other intact habitats may also affect diseasetransmission dynamics by altering wildlife-livestockhuman contact. This is both a risk and an opportunity.
Where planning specifically identifies a likely reductionof disease risk, these positive linkages to human healthcould be used to identify added societal and economic
value to the policy. These benefits could inform the work
under multilateral environmental agreements, such as
the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification(UNCCD), the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its associatedagreements, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands288,658. Somehave already incorporated ecosystem health reviews,
e.g. Ramsar Convention on Wetlands77,659,660. Ambitious
global targets have been set to restore degradedecosystems (e.g. 350 million ha of forest restoration by2030), and these may leverage the public health benefitsof reduced EID risk to promote their uptake. Similarly,
efforts to drive sustainable agricultural practices, reduce
negative impacts of conventional agriculture practices on
biodiversity and improve the provisioning of ecosystemservices could be leveraged to balance the needs offood security for local communities and improve human,
animal and ecosystem health.
More directly, the consequences of programmes that
restore habitat, create corridors, or otherwise alter
landscapes include changes in human-livestock-wildlife
contact that may promote or reduce disease
emergence40,77,154,184,280,661. Such programmes could
include efforts to monitor disease prevalence and thepotential for emergence of novel pathogens. This isparticularly relevant for protected area policies that
include “mosaic” strategies that encourage juxtapositionof agriculture and conservation zones, green corridors
to enhance wildlife movement, patterns of land use thatallow increased human activity in or near protected areas
and others267. Where large programmes are planned,
resources to build healthcare provision, and community
education around behavioural risk of spillover in theselandscapes could reduce risk. They could also be
designed to include health surveillance and disease
monitoring in wildlife, livestock and people in theselandscapes to enable modifications that reduce disease
44

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

risk and increase conservation benefits. Surveillance
could be considered one of the benefits of conservation
programmes to local communities, offsetting perceived
loss of capacity to develop land. Enforcement ofregulations that avoid human encroachment would likely
also have a benefit in reducing disease risk, as
recommended by the CBD288,289.
Reforming financial aid for land use so that benefits tohealth are recognized and explicitly targeted: The
Global Environment Facility (GEF), Green Climate Fund
(GCF), World Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB), other multilateral development banks andrelevant international financing funds and agencies could
incorporate in their current programmes measures tosimultaneously reduce pandemic risk and biodiversity
loss. Grantees, contractors and national focal
points could work with these agencies to encourage
programmes that affect land use to be redesigned toreduce pandemic risk among wildlife, livestock andpeople (e.g. by better enforcement of hunting bans or
reducing encroachment of settlements in protectedareas). National governments could consider removing
subsidies for activities that involve deforestation, forest
degradation and land use change.
Mandating pandemic risk health impact assessments
for major development projects: Major development
projects often require environmental impact
assessments, and some require health impact
assessments before being allowed to begin. Agencies,
national governments and international organizations
could draft guidance on pandemic risk impact
assessments, and enforce a requirement for projects
greater than a certain size, cost or geographic range,
to conduct this assessment, roll out measures that would
simultaneously reduce pandemic risk and biodiversity
loss, and monitor and evaluate disease emergence risk
and biodiversity maintenance throughout the life of the
project. This could be considered a high-priority issue,
considering the continued expansion of agriculturalland, human settlements, urban sprawl, coupled withexponential growth of road-building, high-speed rail
connections, air travel and shipping trade. EID risk
assessments could also determine the risk for impact on
wildlife and livestock, providing a One Health approachthat might give a greater return-on-investment due to thepotentially high cost of agricultural and environmental
health impacts.
Enabling transformative change in the types ofconsumption, globalized agricultural expansion andtrade that have led to pandemics: Unsustainable patternsof global consumption drive globalized agriculturalexpansion and trade, and are linked to pandemic
risk, as well as land use change, biodiversity loss andclimate change. Increasing available knowledge on theeconomic benefits of more sustainable consumption
and agricultural development could be used todrive an added incentive in a shift to agriculture that
focuses on provisioning of ecosystem services, while
responding to the needs of food security for local
communities and encouraging human, animal andecosystem health. Developing a better understandingof the specific links between consumption patterns
in developed and developing countries; demand formeat, products of mining and expansion of agriculture
in EID hotspots; and the risk of disease emergence,
could drive transformative change to reduce
pandemics. Efforts could include:

•
•

•
•

Identifying, ranking and labelling highpandemic risk consumption patterns to provide
incentives for alternatives
Designing certification programmes for
low-pandemic risk consumption, e.g.
programmes to label products that
reduce dependency on land use change
from agriculture to re-established natural
ecosystems
Steps to increase efficiency of agriculturalprocesses, while balancing with sustainability,
to meet food requirements from currently
available land and subsequently reduced land
areas
Promoting a transition to healthier and moresustainable and diverse diets, including
responsible meat consumption.

••

Promoting food security to reduce the ad hoc
consumption of wildlife
Where there is a clear link to high pandemic
risk, consideration of taxes or levies on meat
consumption, production, livestock production
or other forms of consumption, as proposed
previously by the USA Institute of Medicine
Committee118, UK Royal Institute of International
Development122, academic reports119-121
and others123.

These activities will need to balance the commitmentsof developing countries for economic development,
the nutritional requirements for Indigenous Peoples
and Local Communities that depend on natural foodsources, the need to maintain, restore, or sustainably
use biodiversity and the need to protect global health by
reducing pandemic risk.

3) Reducing pandemic risk due to thewildlife trade
Building a new intergovernmental health and trade
partnership to identify zoonotic disease risks in theinternational wildlife trade: Despite examples of domestic
and international trade in wildlife driving known(e.g. monkeypox introduction to the USA in the pet trade)and novel (e.g. emergence of SARS) zoonotic diseases,
surveillance for potentially zoonotic or other threatening
pathogens in the wildlife trade is woefully inadequate toprotect against future disease emergence. The task of
conducting disease surveillance in animal trade(e.g. livestock) falls on agencies within the importing
nation, unless pre-border surveillance protocols havebeen agreed. For livestock, countries’ ministries of

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45

agriculture usually have a clear mandate and budget for
disease testing, shipment seizure, quarantine and control
measures including culling during outbreaks. For wildlife,
there is often no mandate for ministries of environment,
forestry, or fish and wildlife, to conduct health tests on
animals within a shipment of wildlife, whether for the pet
trade or consumption.
Two international mechanisms have been used effectively
for different aspects of this challenge: CITES has raised
the profile of the wildlife trade as a threat to biodiversity,
enabled a system of checks and balances to identify
species that should not be traded, that should be tradedunder a quota system, or are free to be traded. The
system works and has been widely adopted. However,the convention does not currently provide a mechanism
for health testing. In fact, CITES requirements may
delay the movement of emergency diagnostic samples
from Appendix I & II species, thus preventing timely
identification of causes of disease outbreaks andresponse activities662. Detailed proposals on how CITES
could be amended to monitor the risk of disease spreadthrough the wildlife trade have been published(https://endwildlifecrime.org/cites-amendments/), andother papers have proposed an expansion of CITES tocover health issues141,663. The OIE provides assessmentsof pathogens in animals in the context of the health ofanimals, humans and the environment as well as the
distribution and potential spread of the pathogen.
Diseases that threaten animal or human health, or theenvironment, can be listed as ‘notifiable’, whereby the
OIE member countries are mandated to then reportsemi-annually and annually on OIE listed diseases andimmediately on the new occurrence of an OIE listed
disease or an unusual epidemiological event in animals.
They are also requested to identify measures of its
impact and plans for its control. Importantly, OIE
provides for countries to designate internal regions as‘disease-free’ so that trade into and out of these regions
is allowed. This mechanism might have relevance formonitoring disease risk to domestic trade in wildlife that
otherwise is not covered by existing rules under CITES.
Effective surveillance for known and potential zoonoses(and diseases that threaten livestock and wildlife) in
the wildlife trade is crucial. The building of strong
national wildlife health programmes would increase
surveillance capacity and enhance reporting to OIE664.
For international trade, a strong partnership between
OIE and CITES could provide a legal mandate toinspect shipments, take biological samples, and test for
presence of high-risk pathogen groups in internationallytraded species. Nations could expand their protocols

46

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

for inspections currently conducted under CITES and
use the reporting mechanisms in place through the OIE
to report annually on the level of disease importation
found. For wide surveillance to control pandemics,
this could include species listed in CITES appendicesas well as all other traded species, and measuresthey are taking to reduce it, as is mandated for OIE
notifiable diseases. An expert group set up as an ad
hoc group under the OIE could be established, which
could provide guidelines on monitoring and testing.
This partnership could provide a legal basis for seizure,culling or quarantine during outbreaks and for banning
the trade in high-risk species. It could be linked to the
WTO through OIE. An umbrella partnership among
representatives of OIE, CITES, the International Air
Transport Association, the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, the IUCN Species Survival
Commission Wildlife Health Specialist Group, CBD,WHO and other agencies of relevance, could provide
expert guidance and act as a key intergovernmental
focal point. Funds would need to be raised, likely fromcountry contributions, for the work that the partnershipwould do, and for the expanded mandates for OIE,CITES and others. To effectively contribute to pandemic
risk reduction, this partnership would need to include
coverage of species not regulated by CITES. In addition,
funds would be required for staff, logistics and materials
for the sampling, testing and reporting of infectious
disease monitoring programmes. While these would
represent new expenditures for countries, the costsavings when outbreaks are prevented, are likely tobe substantial, perhaps with an order of magnitude or
higher return on investment, as calculated recently141.
A similar proposal to designate a global authority forwildlife disease that would have a remit to include
traded species has been made by the IUCN SSC
Wildlife Health Specialist Group co-chairs(https://www.iucn.org/crossroads-blog/202009/it-timea-global-wildlife-health-authority).
Reducing the volume of high EID-risk wildlife in the
trade: Birds665, mammals11,666, and in particular bats,rodents and primates are a key risk for viral
spillover 307,667. Reducing their traded volume orbanning specific high-risk taxa from the trade could
be considered as a simple and rapid way of reducing
risk. Defining these high-risk taxa would need to be
based on expert advice, but they would likely include
species known to harbour high diversity and prevalenceof potentially or known zoonotic RNA viruses that are ahigh risk for potential zoonotic emergence307. Reducing
the overall diversity of animals within live animal markets
could also reduce the risk of future disease emergence,but further research is needed on how diversity inthe trade relates to risk, and how policies to increase
biosecurity could work synergistically with selectivebans to reduce risk and provide for sustainable trade.
Enhancing welfare and sanitation in farms, traders andlive animal markets: A range of tactics are available toreduce disease transmission risk at live animal markets,and have been proposed in reports by FAO, WHO andOIE. They include combinations of live animal market
closure and clean-out days, education programmes
to highlight the risk of pathogen exposure to workers
butchering and handling meat, improving and increasing
sanitary regulations at all stages of the supply chain,separating butchering and sale of meat to consumers,
biosecurity enhancements in wildlife trade like thetesting of wildlife hunters, farmers, traders for known
and novel pathogens. Disease surveillance of high-risk
people like wildlife traders would likely provide
information on viruses currently in the process of
beginning to spill over.
Analysing incentives to consume wildlife, designing
behaviour change programmes: Educational activities
to reduce consumption of wildlife or domestic animals
that is unsustainable or has a high risk of leading
to zoonotic spillover depend on understanding the
incentives that lead people to consume wildlife. Analysesof these incentives are needed to provide baseline
data to develop behaviour change programmes thatnudge towards adoption of more sustainable use of
wildlife, and the avoidance of consumption patterns
that have a particularly high-risk of zoonotic spillover.
These could be co-designed with the support of local
communities, based on scientific principles and data andan understanding of cultural practices and norms.
Reducing high-risk international wildlife trade: Efforts
to better regulate international trade from the point ofview of pandemic risk are urgently required. While CITES
focuses solely on species that are, or may, becomethreatened by international trade, the OIE has a partial
mandate, and the experience, to include international risk
assessment of the emergence of diseases from wildlife.
Providing cold chain infrastructure: One perceived
rationale behind the habit of purchasing live animals at
market to be taken home and butchered, is to maintainfreshness in the absence of adequate cold storage.
The development of cold chain infrastructure that leads
to large-scale refrigeration at wildlife markets may help
foster a cultural shift from live to killed and refrigerated/frozen meat, and a significant reduction in pandemic

risk. Potential impacts of refrigeration on climate change
could be offset by using Liquefied Natural Gas cold chain
facilities. Educational programmes that push and nudge
behaviour change away from the purchase of live
animals or those killed and butchered at point of sale
could begin with the younger generation in somecountries where they have been found to be lessinterested in wildlife consumption.

4) Bridging knowledge gaps:
There are fundamental knowledge gaps on the linkages
among biodiversity, anthropogenic environmental
changes, and pandemic risk that will be critical toenacting policy changes to prevent pandemics.
These are compounded by uncertainties due to theinherent complexity of the socio-ecological systems
through which diseases emerge, and the value laden
and stakeholder dependent nature of solutions. Thissection proposes some of the key knowledge gaps but
does not consider health research goals such as dataon prevalence of disease, spillover rates and disease
incidence, that are already addressed in this reportaround enhancing surveillance, for example.

Social sciences and humanities:

Assessing economic cost and benefits of preventing
pandemics: Efficient policy decisions could be enabled
by measures of how much a specific policy would cost,
how much it would reduce disease risk, the savingsin morbidity, mortality, days off work or school thesewould lead to, as well as reductions in economic
impact. National agencies could support analyticalresearch supported by field-based ground truthing ofassumptions for economic damages during outbreaks.
Trials of policies/measures could be set up to test theirefficacy, cost and the savings and then scaled up for an
estimate of return-on-investment. Measurable healthindicators could include reduction in disease incidenceor seroprevalence of spillover pathogens in a high-riskcohort over time.
Analysing behavioural risk in communities, co-designing
programmes to reduce risk: Key drivers of disease
spillover are activities and behaviours that provide
opportunities for increased contact among people,
wildlife and livestock. The risk for spillover varies widely
within all communities, with some exposed more heavily
than others due to occupation, habits and behaviours(e.g. wildlife market workers359,668). These are often deeply
embedded in cultures around the world, particularlyaround food or medicine (e.g. butchering of wildlife669,
drinking of uncooked blood as a health measure670).
They represent not only a pathway for disease

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47

emergence, but also an opportunity for risk reduction.
Qualitative and quantitative social science research into
these behaviours would help to identify the incentives
that drive high-risk activities, so that programmes toreduce risk can be designed, trialled and rolled out.
Valuing Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities’
engagement and knowledge in pandemic prevention
programmes: EID hotspots are primarily in countries withrelatively high biodiversity, often in remote regions that
may also be managed by Indigenous Peoples and Local
Communities. The development of successful strategies
and policies may therefore benefit from collaboration with
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities to bridge
the knowledge gap across cultures. There is an extensive
accumulated knowledge in these communities that canplay a much bigger role in the future prevention andprediction of pandemics671. Collaborating with
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in thedevelopment of strategies and policies in the respect ofequitable “access and benefit sharing” (ABS) or other
instruments as the Consultation Protocols establishedby the Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities,
would enhance their success. Linking the different levelsof management (from international organizations tonational governments, local authorities, NGOs, research
institutions, citizen scientists, local communities etc.)
is also considered crucial. Developing effective
pandemic prevention programmes in these regions will
be enhanced by efforts to enhance secure land tenure
and ownership rights for Indigenous Peoples andLocal Communities.

48

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

Biological, ecological and evolutionary sciences:

Increasing knowledge of microbial diversity in wildlife:
Pandemics emerge due to the spillover of diverse
microbes in wildlife reservoirs, driven by anthropogenic
change. Estimates of microbial diversity suggest lessthan 0.1% of microbes available for future emergencehave been discovered to date22. Discovery of the
background microbial diversity in wildlife is urgently
needed, particularly for viruses and antimicrobial
resistant microbes. National agencies from EID hotspot
countries could work with donor countries to fundprogrammes that aim to identify, triage, characterize,
and monitor the high-risk microbes in wildlife that havehigh potential to act as zoonotic reservoirs. A seriesof programmes to identify country-level viral diversity
in wildlife (“National Virome Projects”)22 could becoordinated to assess the global potential for future
disease emergence, and target funds to the regions,communities and pathogens of highest risk. These
programmes would need to be matched with research
projects that assess the risk of emergence for newly
discovered viruses, as was done for SARS-related
coronaviruses prior to COVID-19638,639. While much of thework on microbial diversity has focused on their risk for
disease, there have been repeated calls for conservation
programmes that include microbial biodiversity in theirgoals672-674. Microbial diversity surveys could enhancetheir effectiveness by assessing which microbes should
be prioritized for conservation.

Mapping within-country EID hotspots: The risk of
disease emergence has been mapped at a global scale13,
but within-country production of risk maps are hinderedby unequal surveillance and reporting, and are currently
lacking. Accurate, high-resolution mapping of risk would
allow resource allocation to the regions and communities
most likely to be at the frontline of a novel emerging
disease. Efforts to quantify fine scale hotspots of
disease emergence could be supported by donor
countries, the WHO and others, to identify regions forenhanced surveillance.
Analysing the role of pathogen evolution in disease
emergence: Research to better understand theevolutionary underpinnings of host shifts that are
involved in zoonotic disease spillover and the adaptationof emerging pathogens to new host species may
provide key strategies to predicting patterns of spilloverrisk. Prior work on viral emergence in particular could
be enhanced and used to better focus viral discovery,
research and surveillance20,21,675,676.
Analysing EID risk within freshwater and marine
ecosystems: As people turn to marine ecosystems
in the future for food and energy resources, tourism,
and transportation pathways, people will likely comeinto increasing contact with aquatic species, leading
to disease emergence that could affect public healthand food security. Examples include influenza strains
in seals with zoonotic potential, diseases of marine fish
driven by human activity, or conservation threats due
to livestock diseases moving into aquatic ecosystems,
including antimicrobial resistant pathogens.
Analysing the importance of vector-borne disease risk
and migratory species in disease spread: Emerging
disease spread across continents can be enhancedby the mobility of arthropods (including their capacity
for anthropogenic spread due to air travel and climatechange) and by migratory species. Risk analysesof potential for future spread of arthropod-borne
pathogens and those carried by migratory species
would provide potentially critical information inpandemic prevention. This is particularly importantbecause of the relatively recent international spread ofWest Nile and Zika viruses and avian influenza throughthese mechanisms.
Identifying evidence of climate change impacts on
disease emergence: There is a paucity of evidence thatclimate change has already driven the emergence of
infectious diseases, and this is often limited tovector-borne diseases that have clearly shifted in range,rather than increased in incidence. Policies to build

knowledge on further incursions of novel diseases or
expanding cases of known diseases due to climatechange would help drive policy changes to anticipate
and reduce further health impacts.

Transdisciplinary knowledge:

Obtaining and disseminating critical data on the wildlife
trade and disease risk: There is a striking paucity of dataon certain important aspects of the wildlife trade that
could be used directly to enable policies to reduce risk of
disease emergence and spread, including:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The relative risk of disease emergence andspread in illegal, unregulated and regulated tradein wildlife
The relative risk of disease emergence and spreadin international vs. domestic (within-country trade)
The relative importance of farmed wildlife in theemergence and spread of infectious diseases
How the wildlife trade supply chain alters
disease risk, from capture through to market
and slaughter, and how this differs depending on
diversity of wildlife and livestock, and density ofanimals in the trade
Species, number, diversity and time spent foreach species in the wildlife trade
Analysis of how risk alters across the value chain
Maps of live animal markets within countries
Volume of trade within-country
Volume of illegal wildlife trade
Attitudes to consumption of wildlife among
different age classes and social structures andover time

Analysing trade-offs between biodiversity conservation anddisease transmission within landscape conservation andrestoration programmes: There is a paucity of empirical
data on how large-scale conservation programmesthat restore habitat, create corridors, or otherwise alter
landscapes affect disease transmission, despite evidence
from limited studies and modelling that they can promoteor reduce disease risk77,154,184,280,661,677. Long-term studies
of how changing land use patterns in conservation
programmes affect host-microbe species assemblages,
and transmission among species and into humans andlivestock may provide vital knowledge that could be used tobetter assess the impact of corridors, mosaic landscapes,
and other conservation tools on health. It will be criticalto conduct studies at multiple scales, relevant to thetransmission dynamics, ecological changes and behaviours
and activities that drive emergence, as well as the scales
targeted by conservation and restoration programmes.

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49

Supporting One Health science: The promotion of One
Health science would provide an overarching mechanism
to enable closing of knowledge gaps. This would likely
need to begin with transdisciplinary academic training infaculties of medicine, veterinary medicine, public health,and social, ecological and environmental sciences, bothin develop and developing countries. In many countries,
an overwhelming proportion of the infectious diseaseresearch budget is allocated to vaccine and therapeutic
development, rather than preventative approaches thatinvolve collaboration among animal, human andenvironmental sectors. A One Health framework could beconsidered to provide research and collaboration amongprogrammes on ecological interactions of wildlife,
livestock and people across gradients of land use; social
science of behavioural risk for pandemics; pathologicalanalyses of wildlife disease outbreaks to identify potential
zoonotic pathogens in wildlife. This work is particularly
important in biodiverse countries which are often
relatively resource-poor. Donors from developed
countries could support research in these key
EID hotspots.

5) Foster a role for all sectors of society toengage in reducing risk of pandemics
Sharing knowledge among all communities in EID
hotspots of the health risks associated with somewildlife trade: Culturally sensitive knowledge sharing andbehaviour change programmes could be co-designedby the communities that are engaged in occupationalrisk of exposure (e.g. wildlife traders) and other experts,
based on the behavioural risk surveys described in theknowledge gaps section. Trials of specific, targeted,single-issue behaviour change programmes could beenacted to measure success. For example, programmes
to share knowledge with hunters on the risk of Ebola bypicking up dead primates for consumption, or on how
to reduce contact with bats. Programmes could begin
with information on how important wildlife is in driving
contributions to people’s welfare and other ecosystemservices in the local region.
Enhancing a focus on education and communication
with the next generation on the drivers of pandemics:
It is essential that future leaders understand theimportance of biodiversity and the risks thatanthropogenic activities have on this diversity and theecosystem services it provides, and how these if left
uncontrolled can lead to more recurrent pandemic
episodes. International organizations such as
UNESCO, UNEP, IUCN and the International Science
Council (ICS) could, with the necessary resources,
lead and coordinate education strategies in countries

50

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

that have the fewest resources and are often at thefrontline of disease emergence. Education and publicawareness campaigns in developed countries could betargeted around the consumption practices that drive
pandemic risk, as laid out in section 2 and 3. Education
programmes in all countries could tackle the growing
misinformation and conspiracy theories around theorigins, impact and treatment of infectious diseases,
including racially-motivated accusations around thegeography of pandemic origins and the cultural or
ethnic identities of the people first affected.
Building partnerships among the public, private sector
and civil society to reduce anthropogenic change thatdrives pandemics: Many of the companies involvedin land use change in EID hotspots (e.g. mining,
palm oil producers, timber extraction, agriculturaldevelopment) have a global customer base that could
be leveraged to push for corporate social responsibility
by engaging in public, public-private and civil society
partnerships. Another leverage point would be thosecommercial sectors most directly affected by pandemic
risk either positively (e.g. information technology (IT),pharmaceutical, insurance) or negatively (airlines,
tourism, hotels). Programmes to reduce risk, increase
profits in the face of pandemics, or identify key risks
to specific industries would help provide economic
incentives for the private sector to support resilienceand sustainability. Transformative change in agriculture
and food systems, health research and development
and consumer needs will require strong involvementof the private sector. Goal 17 of the SDGs actively
advocates for countries to “Encourage and promote
effective public, public-private and civil society
partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing
strategies of partnerships”678. Some partnerships
have successfully addressed agricultural 679,680 and
health challenges681. Unitaid is a hosted partnership of
WHO and has leveraged over US$3 billion since 2006
for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria innovations forprevention, diagnosis and treatment. Funding for Unitaid
has come mainly from the solidarity levy on airline
tickets implemented first by France and later several
other countries682.
Reducing high pandemic-risk consumption in developed
countries: Unsustainable consumption of palm oil, sugar
cane, tropical forest hardwood, rare earth elements forelectronic equipment, meat and other livestock products,
wildlife products (e.g. fur for the fashion industry) andwild animals for the pet trade, all play a role in driving
land use change and the wildlife trade, and increasing
pandemic risk. More sustainable consumption indeveloped countries could be promoted by better
labelling of products, and campaigns to raise awarenessof the connections between consumption and emerging
disease risk, biodiversity loss, and climate change.
For example, labelling fur trims in the fashion industry
with the species name and origin may provide a nudge
towards alternative consumption. Likewise, governments
could enforce the labelling of captive wildlife for saleas pets as either “wild-caught” or “captive-bred” withinformation on the country it was bred or captured in.
Campaigns for shade-grown coffee, sustainable palmoil, and deforestation-free beef, have been successful indriving sustainable consumption, and could be adapted
for pandemic risk. A significant step could be to establish
internationally accepted and required processes for
tracing the sources of these consumer-driven products.
Success in this area could eventually eliminate
clandestine, illegal and environmentally destructive
activities which threaten biodiversity as the market andtrading platforms supporting these would eventually not
be viable.
Raising global awareness of the nexus between
biodiversity, health and pandemic risk: Concerted
efforts could reinforce the findings of this report thatanthropogenic environmental change drives pandemics.
This may encourage reduced consumption, use ofsustainable alternatives and reduction in people’s global
ecological footprint as a way of combatting pandemic
risk. Individual behaviour could be leveraged throughmedia campaigns, for example by highlighting the
major role of tourists in consuming wildlife. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, trusted voices in many countries
such as medical doctors, civil and religious leaders
have led the campaign to gain public support for healthmeasures. These leaders could play a role in heightening
awareness of the linkages to global environmental
change and biodiversity loss and help promote pandemic
prevention programmes.

Concluding comments
Pandemics represent an existential threat to the healthand welfare of people across the planet, and theiremergence, impact and control are deeply embedded
in biodiversity and the major causes of biodiversity loss.
New diseases emerge largely in tropical or subtropicalcountries with high wildlife biodiversity. The first people
to be infected are often from communities in remoteor rural regions, in developing countries with lower
capacity to rapidly diagnose and treat novel diseases,
and control and contain pandemic spread. Land usechange and the wildlife trade (especially unsustainable,
illegal or poorly regulated wildlife trade) are key drivers of

pandemic emergence, including the recent emergenceof COVID-19. Pandemics, such as COVID-19, underscore
both the indivisible interconnectedness of the worldcommunity and the rising threat posed by global
inequality to the health, wellbeing and security of all
people: Exponential growth in consumption of products
from land use change and globalized trade, often
driven by developed countries, have led to the repeatedemergence of diseases from developing countries withhigh biodiversity, and thus conditions that increase
potential for zoonotic emergence. Mortality and morbidity
may ultimately be higher in developing countries, due
to economic constraints affecting healthcare access.
However, for large-scale pandemics such as COVID-19,
economic impacts can be severe in the developed
countries that depend on globalized economies.
Furthermore, without effective vaccines or therapeutics,
per capita mortality rates from COVID-19 appear to behighest at this point in some of the developed countries
such as the USA and others in Europe, perhaps reflecting
data inconsistencies as well as differences in theabundance of predisposing conditions683.
Pandemics are becoming more frequent, driven bya continued rise in the underlying emerging disease
events that lead to them13,56. The continued rise in
human population density, consumption, encroachment
into wildlife habitat, degradation of ecosystems,
industrialization of the wildlife trade, climate change
and intensification of agricultural production are
driving the current Pandemic Era. Without predictive
and preventative strategies, pandemics will emerge
more often, spread more rapidly, kill more people andcrash the global economy more often and with moredevastating impact than ever. The current pandemic
strategy relies largely on responding to pandemics after
they have emerged with public health measures andtechnological solutions, in particular the rapid design androllout of novel vaccines and therapeutics. However, the
COVID-19 pandemic has progressed along a slow anduncertain path, and as the world waits for vaccines tobecome available, true pandemics cost societies dearly,
in lives lost, sickness endured, unemployment andeconomic collapse. All of these affect the global poorand Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities far
greater than most.
Reducing the frequency and impact of pandemics will
require the types of transformative changes called on
for conservation and restoration of nature (biodiversity
and ecosystem processes) and its benefits to people124.
These include shifts in societal paradigms, goals andvalues that replace unsustainable consumption and

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51

overuse of biodiversity and strategically reduce theunderlying drivers of pandemics. The IPBES Global
Assessment of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
concluded last year124 that such transformative changes
were necessary to reach global biodiversity conservationand sustainability goals for 2030. While many of thesepotential policies are costly, difficult to execute, and theirsuccess uncertain, their cost is dwarfed by the impact ofjust the current COVID-19 pandemic, let alone the risingtide of future diseases. In fact, the cost of implementing
these measures is likely to be between US$22 and31.2 billion, decreased even further (US$17.7 – 26.9

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IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

billion) if benefits of reduced deforestation on carbon
sequestration are calculated, while the annualized costof emerging diseases (including COVID-19) is likely to
exceed US$1 trillion of dollars annually141. All of theevidence in this report demonstrates that the spillover ofnovel pathogens is accelerating, just like the impacts ofclimate change. For both issues, there is an optimal timeto initiate new global policies for prevention, after which
it becomes extremely difficult to mitigate. Researchdemonstrates that the optimal time is now56, and thatthese policy options may provide a pathway fortransformative change to prevent pandemics

APPENDIX
Table 1: Animals identified as hosts of pathogens that have emerged through the wildlife trade in Box 2, with their
CITES431 or IUCN684 status
Animal Host

IUCN Red List**Threats

CITES List

Zoonotic pathogens

Chimpanzee
Pan troglodytes

EN

Poaching, habitat loss
and degradation, disease

Appendix I

HIV-1; Ebola virus

GorillaGorilla gorilla;
Gorilla beringei

CR

Poaching, disease,
habitat degradation anddestruction, climatechange, civil unrest

Appendix I

HIV-1; Ebola virus

Sooty mangabey
Cercocebus atys

VU

Poaching, habitat loss

Appendix II

HIV-2

Gambian pouched rat
Cricetomys gambianus

LC

None known

None

Monkeypox virus

Prairie dog
Cynomys spp.

LC

Some species
endangered due tohabitat loss

None

Monkeypox virus

DuikerCephalophus spp.
Philantomba spp.
Elaphodus cephalophus

EN (2); VU (2);NT (4); LC (10);Poaching, habitat loss

Appendix I (1);Appendix II (5)Ebola virus

Fruit bats
Myonycteris spp.;
Hypsignathus
monstrosus;
Eidolon helvum

EN (1); LC (3)LC
NT

Habitat loss, hunting
and trapping

None (onlyAcerodonspp. and
Pteropus spp.
on the list)

Ebola virus

Masked palm civets*
Paguma larvata

LC

Overharvest, habitat
reduction

Appendix III(India)SARS-CoV

Raccoon dog*
Nyctereutes
procyonoides

LC

Hunting and trapping

None

SARS-CoV;
Rabies virus

Pangolin
Manis spp.

CR (3); EN (3);
VU (2)

Hunting and poaching

Appendix I

SARS related-CoVs

Horseshoe bats
Rhinolophus spp.

CR (1); EN (13);
VU (4); NT (9);LC (57); DD (15)Habitant loss, in-cavedisturbance

None

SARS related-CoVs* Animals that are known to be captive and/or bred for commercial use.
** IUCN Categories (from most to least threatened): Extinct (EX); Extinct in The Wild (EW); Critically Endangered (CR;) Endangered (EN);
Vulnerable (VU); Near Threatened (NT); Least Concern (LC); Data Deficient (DD).

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Host Shifts. PLoS Pathog. 10, e1004395, doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1004395 (2014).

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ANNEX ISCIENTIFIC STEERING COMMITTEEThe Scientific Steering Committee of the workshop was composed of the following members of the IPBESMultidisciplinary Expert Panel:–

Luthando Dziba
Co-Chair of the Multidisciplinary Expert Panel, South African National Parks, South Africa–

Isabel Sousa Pinto
University of Porto, Portugal and Interdisciplinary Centre of Marine and Environmental Research (Ciimar)–

Judith Fisher
Fisher Research Pty Ltd and Institute of Agriculture, University of Western Australia, Australia–

Katalin Török
Centre for Ecological Research, Hungary

Procedural oversight was provided by members of the IPBES Bureau Douglas Beard (United States of America)and Hamid Čustović (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

80

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ANNEX II
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
EXPERTS
Name

Role

Nominating
Government
Organization

Nationalities

Affiliation

Peter Daszak

Workshop
Chair

United Statesof America

United Statesof America

EcoHealth AllianceJohn Amuasi

Expert

Ghana

Ghana

Kwame Nkrumah University of
Science and Technology SPH and
Kumasi Centre for Collaborative
Research in Tropical MedicinePeter Buss

ExpertSouth Africa

South Africa

South African National Parks

Carlos das Neves

ExpertNorwayPortugal

Norwegian Veterinary InstituteHeliana
Dundarova

ExpertBulgaria

Bulgaria
Czechia

Institute of Biodiversity andEcosystem Research, the Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences

Yasha Feferholtz

Expert

Chile

Chile

Resource Mobilization Panel of
the Convention on Biological Diversity(CBD), EcoHealth Alliance

Gabor FoldvariExpertHungary

Hungary

Institute of Evolution, Centre
for Ecological Research, Hungary

David Hayman

Expert

Massey University

United Kingdomof Great Britain
and Northern
IrelandMassey University,
New Zealand

Etinosa Igbinosa

Expert

University of Benin,
Nigeria

Nigeria

University of Benin,
Benin City, Nigeria

Sandra Junglen

ExpertGermany

Germany

Institute of Virology, Charité
Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Germany

Thijs Kuiken

ExpertNetherlands

Netherlands

Department of Viroscience, Erasmus
University Medical Centre, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands

Qiyong Liu

Expert

China

China

Chinese Center for Disease Control
and Prevention

Benjamin Roche

ExpertFranceFranceFrench National Research Institutefor Sustainable Development (IRD)

Gerardo Suzan

ExpertMexicoMexicoSchool of Veterinary Medicine
and Husbandry (FMVZ ), National
Autonomous University of Mexico(UNAM)

WORKSHOP REPORT81

EXPERTS
Name

Role

Nominating
Government
Organization

Nationalities

Affiliation

Marcela Uhart

Expert

University ofCalifornia One
Health InstituteArgentina
United Statesof America

University of California, Davis,
United States of America

Chadia Wannous

ExpertFuture Earth

SwedenSyrian Arab
Republic

Towards A Safer World Network( TASW ) and Future Earth Health
Knowledge Action Network

Katie Woolaston

ExpertQueensland
University ofTechnology

Australia

Queensland Universityof Technology, Australia

Carlos Zambrana
Torrelio

ExpertBolivia(Plurinational
State of )Bolivia(Plurinational
State of )Institute of Molecular Biology andBiotechnology, Bolivia; Bolivian
Bat Conservation Program, Bolivia;
EcoHealth Alliance

Paola Mosig Reidl

LiaisonexpertIPBES Sustainable
use of wild species
assessment

MexicoCONABIO, Mexico

Karen O’Brien

LiaisonexpertIPBESTransformativechange assessment
scoping process

NorwayUniversity of Oslo, Norway

Unai Pascual

LiaisonexpertIPBES Values
assessment

Spain

Ikerbasque (Basque Foundationfor Science), Basque Centre for
Climate Change, Bilbao, Spain

Peter StoettLiaisonexpertIPBES Invasive Alien
Species Assessment

CanadaUniversity of Ontario Institute ofTechnology, Canada

RESOURCE PERSONS

82

Name

Role

Affiliation

David Cooper

Resource person

Convention on Biological Diversity Secretariat (CBD)

Tom De Meulenaer

Resource person

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora Secretariat (CITES)

Hans-Otto Pörtner

Resource person

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

Cristina Romanelli

Resource person

World Health Organization Secretariat ( WHO)

Nichole Barger

Resource person

United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification Secretariat(UNCCD)IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICSBUREAU AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY EXPERT PANEL (MEP)
Name

Role

Nationalities

Affiliation

Douglas Beard

BureauUnited Statesof America

U.S. Geological Survey, National Climate Change and Wildlife
Science Center

Hamid Čustović

BureauBosnia andHerzegovina

University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Agriculture and Food Science– Institute of Soil Science, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Luthando Dziba

MEP

South Africa

South African National Parks (SANParks)

Judith Fisher

MEP

Australia

Fisher Research Pty Ltd/Institute of Agriculture University ofWestern Australia, Australia

Isabel Sousa Pinto

MEP

Portugal

University of Porto, Portugal and Interdisciplinary Centre of
Marine and Environmental Research (Ciimar)

Katalin Török

MEP

Hungary

Centre for Ecological Research, Hungary

WORKSHOP REPORT

83

ANNEX III
WORKSHOP AGENDA
Day (CEST )SESSIONDESCRIPTION (Topic)

Mon July 27

Plenary –opening/introduction

Pandemics and Biodiversity

Tues July 28

Breakout group discussion

How pandemics emerge from the microbial diversity foundin nature

Breakout group discussion

The role of wildlife trade in driving pandemics

Breakout group discussion

Learning from nature to better control pandemics

Breakout group discussion

The role of land use change and climate change in driving
pandemics

Breakout group discussion

Preventing pandemics based on a “One Health” approach.

Thurs July 30

Plenary

Pandemics and Biodiversity Plenary

Fri July 31

Final Plenary

Pandemics and Biodiversity Plenary Final

Wed July 29

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ANNEX IV
GLOSSARY
The following definitions have been assembled for the purpose of this workshop report only

● Abundance (ecological): The size of a population of a particular life form in a given area. (IPBES, 2019)● Agent (of disease): In the report’s context, an agent is a microorganism (e.g., bacteria, viruses, protozoa, fungi,
parasites, and prions) whose presence or excessive presence is essential for the occurrence of a disease orother adverse health outcome. (Dicker, Coronado, Koo, & Parrish, 2006)● Agricultural intensification: An increase in agricultural production per unit of input (which may be labour, land,time, fertilizer, sees, feed or cash). (IPBES, 2019)● Animal welfare: Animal welfare means the physical and mental state of an animal in relation to the conditions
in which it lives and dies (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2019). It comprises the state of the animal’s bodyand mind, and the extent to which its nature (genetic traits manifest in breed and temperament) is satisfied(Hewson, 2003).

● Anthropocene: A proposed term for the present time interval, which recognizes humanity’s profound imprint on androle in the functioning of the Earth system. Since it was first proposed in 2000 (Crutzen, 2002; Crutzen & Stoermer,
2000), the term has evolved in breadth and diversely, now ranging from a proposed definition of a new geologicalepoch, a widely-used metaphor for global change, a novel analytical framework, a meme about the relationship ofsociety to nature, and the framing for new and contested cultural narratives. Different starting periods have been
proposed for the geological definition of the Anthropocene, including early agriculture and domestication, colonial
species exchange, the onset of the industrial revolution, nuclear bomb deployment in 1945, and the post-WWII
period characterized by the great acceleration of global changes and the spread of techno-fossils (Brondizio et al.,2016). A proposal to formalize the ‘Anthropocene’ as a defined geological unit within the Geological Time Scaleremains under discussion by the ‘Anthropocene’ Working Group for consideration by the International Commission
on Stratigraphy (The Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy (SQS) Working Group on the ‘Anthropocene’, 2019)● Anthropogenic: Caused or produced by humans. (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Antibiotic: Class of substances that can kill or inhibit the growth of some groups of microorganisms. Used in thisreport to refer to chemicals active against bacteria. Originally antibiotics were derived from natural sources(e.g., penicillin from molds), but many currently used antibiotics are semisynthetic and modified with additions ofman-made chemical components. (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Antibody: Any of a variety of proteins in the blood that are produced in response to an antigen as an immune
response. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Antimicrobial resistance (AMR): Antimicrobial resistance happens when microorganisms (such as bacteria, fungi,
viruses, and parasites) change when they are exposed to antimicrobial drugs (such as antibiotics, antifungals,
antivirals, antimalarials, and anthelmintics). Microorganisms that develop antimicrobial resistance are sometimes
referred to as “superbugs”. As a result, the medicines become ineffective and infections persist in the body,increasing the risk of spread to others. (World Health Organization, 2020)● Arbovirus: Any of a group of viruses that are transmitted between hosts by mosquitoes, ticks, and other arthropods.
(Dicker et al., 2006)● Arthropod: An organism that has jointed appendages and segmented external skeleton (e.g., flies, mosquitoes,
ticks, or mites). (Dicker et al., 2006)● Bacteria: Microscopic, single-celled organisms that have some biochemical and structural features different fromthose of animal and plant cells. (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Benefits: Advantage that contributes to wellbeing from the fulfilment of needs and wants. In the context of nature’s
contributions to people (see “Nature’s contributions to people”), a benefit is a positive contribution. (There may also
be negative contributions, dis-benefits, or costs, from Nature, such as diseases). (IPBES, 2019)● Biodiversity: The variability among living organisms from all sources including terrestrial, marine and other aquatic
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are a part. This includes variation in genetic, phenotypic,
phylogenetic, and functional attributes, as well as changes in abundance and distribution over time and spacewithin and among species, biological communities and ecosystems. (IPBES, 2019)

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85

● Biodiversity conservation: The management of human interactions with genes, species, and ecosystems so
as to provide the maximum benefit to the present generation while maintaining their potential to meet the needs
and aspirations of future generations; encompasses elements of saving, studying, and using biodiversity.
(World Resources Institute (WRI), The World Conservation Union (IUCN), & United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP), 1992)● Biodiversity hotspot: A generic term for an area high in such biodiversity attributes as species richness orendemism. It may also be used in assessments as a precise term applied to geographic areas defined according
to two criteria: (i) containing at least 1,500 species of the world’s 300,000 vascular plant species as endemics, and(ii) being under threat, in having lost 70% of its primary vegetation. (Myers, Mittermeier, Mittermeier, Da Fonseca,& Kent, 2000)● Biodiversity loss: The reduction of any aspect of biological diversity (i.e. diversity at the genetic, species andecosystem levels) in a particular area through death (including extinction), destruction or manual removal; it can referto many scales, from global extinctions to population extinctions, resulting in decreased total diversity at the same
scale. (IPBES, 2019)● Bioprospecting: Bioprospecting is defined as a systematic and organized search for useful products derived frombioresources including plants, microorganisms, animals, etc., that can be developed further for commercializationand overall benefits of the society. (Oyemitan, 2017)● Biosecurity: Biosecurity means a set of management and physical measures designed to reduce the risk of
introduction, establishment and spread of animal diseases, infections or infestations to, from and within an animal
population. (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2019).

● Captive (wild animal): In the report’s context, this term is applied to an animal whose phenotype is not significantly
affected by human selection but that is captive or otherwise lives under direct human supervision or control,
including zoo animals and pets (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2019), or wild animal species in circus
facilities and wildlife farms/ranches. (El Masry et al., 2020)● Case fatality rate (also called case-fatality ratio): The proportion of persons with a particular condition(e.g., patients) who die from that condition. The denominator is the number of persons with the condition;
the numerator is the number of cause-specific deaths among those persons. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Climate change: As defined in Article 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,“a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the
global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”.
(IPBES, 2019)● Community/communities (ecology): An assemblage of populations of at least two different species which coexist,
and to various degrees interact directly and indirectly within a defined local geographic area and in a particular time;
it is characterized in terms of taxonomic and functional composition (the species and functional types present) andrichness (e.g. richness, abundance, dominance and distribution of species, or phenotypes). (Stroud et al., 2015)● Community/communities (public health): A specific group of people, often living in a defined geographical area,
who share a common culture, values and norms, are arranged in a social structure according to relationships which
the community has developed over a period of time. Members of a community gain their personal and social identity
by sharing common beliefs, values and norms which have been developed by the community in the past and may
be modified in the future. They exhibit some awareness of their identity as a group, and share common needs anda commitment to meeting them. (World Health Organization, 1998)● Compulsory license: The term is used for patents when the authorities license companies or individuals otherthan the patent owner to use the rights of the patent — to make, use, sell or import a product under patent(i.e. a patented product or a product made by a patented process) — without the permission of the patent owner.
Allowed under the WTO’s TRIPS (intellectual property) Agreement provided certain procedures and conditions
are fulfilled. See also government use. (World Trade Organization, 2020)● Control (disease): as a reduction in the incidence, prevalence, morbidity or mortality of an infectious disease toa locally acceptable level. (Dowdle, 1998)● Culture: A commonly accepted definition of culture refers to the system of shared beliefs, values, customs,
behaviours, and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and with one another, and thatare transmitted from generation to generation through learning. (Bates & Plog, 1990)● Deforestation: Human-induced conversion of forested land to non-forested land. Deforestation can be permanent,
when this change is definitive, or temporary when this change is part of a cycle that includes natural or assisted
regeneration. (IPBES, 2019)● Degraded land: Land in a state that results from persistent decline or loss of biodiversity and ecosystem functions
and services that cannot fully recover unaided. (IPBES, 2019)86

IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS

● Dilution effect: The “dilution effect” implies that where species vary in susceptibility to infection by a pathogen,higher diversity often leads to lower infection prevalence in hosts. For directly transmitted pathogens, non-host
species may “dilute” infection directly and indirectly. Competitors and predators may alter host behavior to reduce
pathogen transmission or reduce host density. (Khalil, Ecke, Evander, Magnusson, & Hörnfeldt, 2016)● Distribution (epidemiology): The frequency and pattern of health-related characteristics and events in a population.
(Dicker et al., 2006)● Disturbance (ecology): An event that can disrupt any ecological level, environmental component as well as theorganizational status of a biological cycle of organisms. Disturbances are an important aspect in the natural
selection and the whole biological evolution, as they modify the environment in which every living being performs its
vital functions. (Battisti, Poeta, & Fanelli, 2016)● Diversity: A measure of how much variety is present in a community, irrespective of the identities of the organisms
present; consists of richness and evenness. (Forum on Microbial Health, Board on Global Health, & Institute ofMedicine, 2014)● Domestication: Evolutionary process driven by human (whether conscious or unconscious) selection but
also involving natural processes applied to wild plants or animals and leading to adaptation to cultivation andconsumption or utilization. Domestication can be complete, whereby organisms become entirely dependent on
humans for their continued existence or can be partial or incipient, whereby they still reproduce independently ofhuman intervention. (Gepts, 2014)● Driver (direct and indirect): In the context of IPBES, drivers of change are all the factors that, directly or indirectly,
cause changes in nature, anthropogenic assets, nature’s contributions to people and a good quality of life.
(1) Direct drivers of change can be both natural and anthropogenic. Direct drivers have direct physical(mechanical, chemical, noise, light, etc.) and behaviour-affecting impacts on nature. They include, inter alia,
climate change, pollution, different types of land use change, invasive alien species and zoonoses, and exploitation;(2) Indirect drivers are drivers that operate diffusely by altering and influencing direct drivers, as well as other indirectdrivers. They do not impact nature directly. Rather, they do it by affecting the level, direction or rate of direct drivers;(3) Interactions between indirect and direct drivers create different chains of relationship, attribution, and impacts,
which may vary according to type, intensity, duration, and distance. These relationships can also lead to different
types of spill-over effects; (4) Global indirect drivers include economic, demographic, governance, technological andcultural ones. Special attention is given, among indirect drivers, to the role of institutions (both formal and informal)
and impacts of the patterns of production, supply and consumption on nature, nature’s contributions to people andgood quality of life. (IPBES, 2019)● Ecological restoration: Ecological restoration is the process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has
been degraded, damaged, or destroyed. (Society for Ecological Restoration International, 2004)● Ecosystem health: Ecosystem health is a metaphor used to describe the condition of an ecosystem, by analogy
with human health (IPBES, 2019), defined as “an ecological system is healthy and free from ‘distress syndrome’ if itis stable and sustainable”. It is described as a comprehensive and multiscale measure of system vigor, organization
and resilience, closely linked to the idea of sustainability, which implies the ability of the system to maintain its
structure (organization) and function (vigor) over time in the face of external stress (resilience). Healthy ecosystems
provide a range of ecosystem services. A focus on the design, protection, and restoration of healthy ecosystems
will help to sustainably provide the ecosystem services that underlie all human well-being. (Costanza, 2012;
Costanza & Mageau, 1999)● Ecosystem services: The benefits people obtain from ecosystems. In the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,
ecosystem services can be divided into supporting, regulating, provisioning and cultural. This classification,
however, is superseded in IPBES assessments by the system used under “nature’s contributions to people”.
This is because IPBES recognises that many services fit into more than one of the four categories. For example,
food is both a provisioning service and also, emphatically, a cultural service, in many cultures. (IPBES, 2019)● Ecosystem: A dynamic complex of plant, animal and microorganism communities and their nonliving environment
interacting as a functional unit. (IPBES, 2019)● Ecotourism (also known as wildlife tourism): Sustainable travel undertaken to access sites or regions of uniquenatural or ecological quality, promoting their conservation, low visitor impact, and socio-economic involvement oflocal populations. (IPBES, 2019)● Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs): An infectious disease that has recently increased in incidence, impact orgeographic range. One that is caused by a pathogen that has recently evolved or entered the human population for
the first time, or which has occurred previously, but is increasing in incidence or expanding into an area in which
it has not previously been reported, or which has significantly changed its pathological or clinical presentation.
While many definitions exist, this report follows that of (Jones et al., 2008), and use a timeline of 1940-present,
to coincide with the database published in that paper.
● Encroachment: Encroachment is the spread of humans, transportation systems, utilities, buildings, and otherdevelopment into natural areas. Encroachment leads to loss of habitat or changes in the natural ecology for plants,
animals, and other living organisms that live in the area.

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● Endangered species: A species at risk of extinction in the wild. (IPBES, 2019)● Endemic: Endemic refers to the constant presence and/or usual prevalence of a disease or infectious agent ina population within a geographic area. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Epidemic (disease): The occurrence of more cases of disease, injury, or other health condition than expected ina given area or among a specific group of persons during a particular period. Usually, the cases are presumed tohave a common cause or to be related to one another in some way. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Eutrophication: An enrichment of water by nutrients that causes structural changes to the ecosystem, such as:increased production of algae and aquatic plants, depletion of fish species, general deterioration of water quality
and other effects that reduce and preclude use. (Vollenweider & Kerekes, 1982)● Evaluation: systematic and objective examination of activities to determine their relevance, effectiveness,and impact. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Exposure (expose to pathogen): Having come into contact with a cause of, or possessing a characteristic that isa determinant of, a particular health problem. e.g., in contact with a zoonotic pathogen as the cause of disease(Dicker et al., 2006)● Extinction: A population, species or more inclusive taxonomic group has gone extinct when all its individuals
have died. A species may go extinct locally (population extinction), regionally (e.g., extinction of all populations in acountry, continent or ocean) or globally. Populations or species reduced to such low numbers that they are no longerof economic or functional importance may be said to have gone economically or functionally extinct, respectively.
Species extinctions are typically not documented immediately: for example, the IUCN Red List categories andcriteria require there to be no reasonable doubt that all individuals have died, before a species is formally listed as
Extinct (see IUCN Red List) (International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 2020).
● Extirpation (species): The local extinction of a species. (IPBES, 2019)● Food security: The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing “when all people at all times haveaccess to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life”.
● Forest(s): A vegetation type dominated by trees. Definitions of forest vary according to the use of parameterssuch as biogeography, physiognomy, biomass, human management, species dominance and composition,
among others, therefore affecting estimates of extent and type of change. (IPBES, 2019)● Frequency: The amount or number of occurrences of an attribute or health outcome among a population.
(Dicker et al., 2006)● Gene: The gene is the basic physical unit of inheritance. Genes are passed from parents to offspring and containthe information needed to specify traits. Genes are arranged, one after another, on structures called chromosomes.
A chromosome contains a single, long DNA molecule, only a portion of which corresponds to a single gene.
(National Human Genome Research Institute, 2020)● Genetic recombination: Genetic recombination refers to the rearrangement of DNA sequences by thebreakage and rejoining of chromosomes or chromosome segments. It also describes the consequences of suchrearrangements, that is, the inheritance of novel combinations of alleles in the offspring that carry recombinant
chromosomes. (Carroll, 2013)● Genetic resources (GRs): Genetic resources (GRs) refer to genetic material of actual or potential value. Genetic
material is any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity. Examples
include material of plant, animal, or microbial origin, such as medicinal plants, agricultural crops and animal breeds.
(World Intellectual Property Organization, 2020a)● Genome: The genome is the entire set of genetic instructions found in a cell. (National Human Genome ResearchInstitute, 2020)● Green corporate: Companies or business that with continuous application of an integrated environmental strategy
to processes, products, and services to increase efficiency and reduce risks to humans and the environment.
(Guo et al., 2015)● Habitat: The place or type of site where an organism or population naturally occurs. Also used to mean theenvironmental attributes required by a particular species or its ecological niche. (IPBES, 2019)● Hazard: Anything with the potential to cause adverse health effects (e.g., virus, bacterium, chemical, flood,earthquake, venomous snake); may be referred to as a threat. (World Health Organization, 2019)● Health sector: The health sector consists of organized public and private health services (including healthpromotion, disease prevention, diagnostic, treatment and care services), the policies and activities of healthdepartments and ministries, health related nongovernment organizations and community groups, and professional
associations. (World Health Organization, 1998)● Homogenization: Homogenization means a decrease in the compositional dissimilarity between sites. It is used
to describe the outcome of land-use change that leads to similar features of microbial, plant and animal groups.
(Gossner et al., 2016).

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● Host (disease): Person or other living animal that affords subsistence or lodgment to an infectious agent undernatural conditions. (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Human-animal interaction/interface: A continuum of contacts and interactions among people, animals,
and their products; in some cases, facilitating transmission of zoonotic pathogens or shared health threats.
(World Health Organization, 2019)● Hunting (see “Poaching” below): The capture by humans of wild mammals, birds, and reptiles, whether dead or
alive, irrespective of the techniques used to capture them or the reasons to do so (Bennett & Robinson, 2000).

● Hygiene: Hygiene refers to conditions and practices that help to maintain health and prevent the spread of diseases.
Medical hygiene therefore includes a specific set of practices associated with this preservation of health, forexample environmental cleaning, sterilization of equipment, hand hygiene, water and sanitation and safe disposal of
medical waste. (World Health Organization)● Immunity: Resistance developed in response to an antigen (i.e., an infecting agent or vaccine), usually characterized
by the presence of antibody produced by the host. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Incidence: A measure of the frequency with which new cases of illness, injury, or other health condition occurs
among a population during a specified period. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs): A term used internationally by representatives,
organizations, and conventions to refer to individuals and communities who are, on the one hand, self-identified asindigenous and, on the other hand, are members of local communities that maintain inter-generational connection
to place and nature through livelihood, cultural identity and worldviews, institutions and ecological knowledge.
The term is not intended to ignore differences and diversity within and among Indigenous Peoples and between
them and local communities. (IPBES, 2019)● Infection: Invasion of the body tissues of a host by an infectious agent, whether or not it causes disease.
(Dicker et al., 2006)● Intellectual property (IP): Intellectual property refers to creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary andartistic works; designs; and symbols, names and images used in commerce. IP is protected in law by, for example,
patents, copyright and trademarks, which enable people to earn recognition or financial benefit from what they
invent or create. By striking the right balance between the interests of innovators and the wider public interest,
the IP system aims to foster an environment in which creativity and innovation can flourish. (World Intellectual
Property Organization, 2020b)● Invasive species: Species whose introduction and/or spread by human action outside their natural distribution
threatens biological diversity, food security, and human health and well-being. “Alien” refers to the species’ having
been introduced outside its natural distribution (“exotic”, “non-native” and “non-indigenous” are synonyms for“alien”). “Invasive” means “tending to expand into and modify ecosystems to which it has been introduced”.
Thus, a species may be alien without being invasive, or, in the case of a species native to a region, it may increase
and become invasive, without actually being an alien species. (IPBES, 2019)● IUCN Red List: The IUCN Red List is an indicator of the health of biodiversity. It provides taxonomic, conservation
status and distribution information on plants, fungi and animals that have been globally evaluated using the IUCNRed List Categories and Criteria. This system is designed to determine the relative risk of extinction, and the main
purpose of the IUCN Red List is to catalogue and highlight those plants and animals that are facing a higher risk ofglobal extinction. (International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2020)● Land use: The human use of a specific area for a certain purpose (such as residential; agriculture; recreation;industrial, etc.). Influenced by, but not synonymous with, land cover. (IPBES, 2019)● Land use change: A change in the use or management of land by humans, which may lead to a change in land
cover. (IPBES, 2019)● Livestock: Domestic animals belonging to poultry, rabbit, ovine, caprine, bovine, equine, camelid and swine
species. (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1994)● Microbe: A microorganism or biologic agent that can replicate (including bacteria, viruses, protozoa, fungi, andprions). (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Migration: The regular, usually seasonal, movement of all or part of an animal population to and from a given area.
(Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Monitoring (disease): The repeated observation of a system in order to detect signs of change in relation to apredetermined or expected standard. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Morbidity (disease): Any departure, subjective or objective, from a state of physiological or psychological healthand well-being.
● Mortality: Death, epidemiology uses mortality rate a measure of the frequency of occurrence of death among adefined population during a specified time interval. (Dicker et al., 2006)

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● Mutation: Genetic change that can occur either randomly or at an accelerated rate through exposure to radiationor certain chemicals (mutagens) and may lead to change in structure of the protein coded by the mutated gene.
(Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Nagoya Protocol: The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing ofBenefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS) is a supplementary agreement to the 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity. It provides a transparent legal framework for the effective implementation of one of the three objectivesof the CBD: the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, thereby
contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. The Nagoya Protocol aims to create greater
legal certainty and transparency for both providers and users of genetic resources by establishing more predictableconditions for access to genetic resources and helping to ensure benefit-sharing when genetic resources leave thecountry providing the genetic resources. The Nagoya Protocol on ABS was adopted on 29 October 2010 in Nagoya,Japan and entered into force on 12 October 2014. (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010; IPBES, 2019)● Native species: Indigenous species of animals or plants that naturally occur in a given region or ecosystem.
(IPBES, 2019)● Nature-based Solutions (NbS): Actions to protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural or modified
ecosystems, that address societal challenges effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being
and biodiversity benefit. (Cohen-Shacham, Walters, Janzen, & Maginnis, 2016)● Nexus: Nexus is defined as a perspective which emphasizes the inter-relatedness and interdependencies of
ecosystems and humans across spatial and temporal scales. Instead of just looking at individual components,
the functioning, productivity and management of a complex system is taken into consideration. (IPBES, 2019)● One Health: One Health is not strictly defined, and is interpreted slightly differently depending on the organisation
involved. According to the WHO, One Health is an approach to designing and implementing programmes, policies,
legislation and research in which multiple sectors communicate and work together to achieve better public healthoutcomes (World Health Organization, 2017). According to CBD, it is an interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral
approach that seeks to examine holistically interconnections among human and environmental or ecosystem
health (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2017). According to AVMA, One Health is the integrative effort of multiple
disciplines working locally, nationally, and globally to attain optimal health for people, animals, and the environment(American Veterinary Medical Association).

● Outbreak (disease): The occurrence of more cases of disease, injury, or other health condition than expected ina given area or among a specific group of persons during a specific period. Usually, the cases are presumed to havea common cause or to be related to one another in some way. Sometimes distinguished from an epidemic as more
localized, or the term less likely to evoke public panic. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Pandemic: An epidemic occurring over a widespread area (multiple countries or continents) and usually affecting
a substantial proportion of the population. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Patent: A patent is an exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or a process that provides,
in general, a new way of doing something, or offers a new technical solution to a problem. In order to be patentable,
the invention must fulfill certain conditions. (World Intellectual Property Organization)● Pathogen: Organism capable of causing disease. (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Payment for ecosystem services (PES): Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) deals are emerging whereverbusinesses, public-sector agencies, and nonprofit organizations have taken an active interest in addressing
particular environmental issues. These schemes provide a new source of income for land management, restoration,conservation, and sustainable use activities, and by this have significant potential to promote sustainable ecosystemmanagement. (Waage, Bracer, & Inbar, 2008)● Planetary sustainability: The term was first coined by NASA in 2014 as a vision with three main objectives:
1) A world in which all people have access to abundant water, food and energy, as well as protection from severe
storms and climate change impacts; 2) Healthy and sustainable worldwide economic growth from renewableproducts and resources; 3) A multi-planetary society, where the resources of the Solar System are available to thepeople of Earth (NASA, 2014). The concept denotes an application of sustainability that explicitly considers the
Earth as a planet, and combine the requirements for a sustainable development. (Galli & Losch, 2019)● Poaching (see “Hunting” above): Animal killing or trapping without the approval of the people who control or own
the land (Survival, 2018).

● Polymerase chain reaction (PCR): A scientific technique in molecular biology to amplify a single or a few copies ofa piece of DNA across several orders of magnitude, generating thousands to millions of copies of a particular DNA
sequence. (Forum on Microbial Health et al., 2014)● Poverty: Poverty is a state of economic deprivation. It entails more than the lack of income and productive
resources to ensure sustainable livelihood. Its manifestations include hunger and malnutrition, limited accessto education and other basic services, social discrimination and exclusion as well as the lack of participation indecision-making. (IPBES, 2019; United Nations)● Prevalence: The number or proportion of cases or events or attributes among a given population. (Dicker et al., 2006)

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● Prevention (of a disease): Disease prevention covers measures not only to prevent the occurrence of disease,such as risk factor reduction, but also to arrest its progress and reduce its consequences once established.
Primary prevention is directed towards preventing the initial occurrence of a disorder. Secondary and tertiary
prevention seeks to arrest or retard existing disease and its effects through early detection and appropriate
treatment; or to reduce the occurrence of relapses and the establishment of chronic conditions through,for example, effective rehabilitation. (World Health Organization, 1998)● Prophylaxis: Measures designed to preserve health (as of an individual or of society) and prevent the spread of
disease. (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Protected area: A protected area is a clearly defined geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed,
through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystemservices and cultural values. (IPBES, 2019)● Protozoa: An informal term for a group of single-celled eukaryotes, either free-living or parastic, which feed onorganic matter such as other microorganisms or organic tissues and debris. (Bertrand et al., 2015; Panno, 2014)● Public health: Public health is a social and political concept aimed at the improving health, prolonging life andimproving the quality of life among whole populations through health promotion, disease prevention and other formsof health intervention. Public health also recognizes the need to mobilize resources and make sound investments inpolicies, programmes and services which create, maintain and protect health by supporting healthy lifestyles andcreating supportive environments for health. (World Health Organization, 1998)● Public-private partnerships (PPPs): Public-private partnerships are seen as an effective way to capitalize on
the relative strengths of the public and private sectors to address problems that neither could tackle adequately
on its own, in particular in respect of diseases that particularly affect developing countries where research by theprivate sector is deemed insufficient. Thus the public sector contributes both basic science and funding, and theprivate sector has strengths in drug discovery and bringing candidate drugs through the trials process to regulatory
approval. The lack of incentive is addressed by creating a PPP entity with a well-defined objective relating to thedevelopment of a particular product or technology required by developing countries. (World Health Organization)● Quarantine: the separation of well persons who have been exposed or are suspected to have been exposed to
a communicable disease, to monitor for illness and to prevent potential transmission of infection to susceptible
persons during the incubation period. Quarantine refers to separation of potentially exposed but well persons;isolation refers to separation of ill persons. (Dicker et al., 2006)● Reservoir (of pathogens): Any animal, person, plant, soil, substance – or combination of any of these –in which a disease agent normally lives and multiplies, and for which it primarily depends on for its survival.
It is from the reservoir that the infectious substance is transmitted to human, animal, or other susceptible host.
(World Health Organization, 2019)● Resilience (ecology): The level of disturbance that an ecosystem or society can undergo without crossing
a threshold to a situation with different structure or outputs. Resilience depends on factors such as ecologicaldynamics as well as the organizational and institutional capacity to understand, manage, and respond tothese dynamics. (IPBES, 2019)● Resource mobilization: Resource mobilization has come to replace the more traditional and narrow term
“fundraising”, where “resource” refers not only to duns, but also human resources, goods and services(Food and Agriculture Organization, 2012). It focuses on forging partnerships built on trust and mutual accountability
so as to attract adequate and more predictable contributions, with the long-term goal of sustainability(Food and Agriculture Organization & International Plant Protection Convention, 2017).
● Response (to a disease): Those activities undertaken to react to a disease event anywhere on the spectrum fromincreased monitoring to full emergence response. (World Health Organization, 2019)● Restoration: Any intentional activities that initiates or accelerates the recovery of an ecosystem from a degradedstate. (IPBES, 2019)● Reverse zoonosis (plural: zoonoses): This term is commonly used to describe infectious diseases that originate inhumans and move into other animals. (Lipkin, 2015)● Richness: The number of biological entities (species, genotypes, etc.) within a given sample. Sometimes used assynonym of species diversity. (IPBES, 2019)● Risk: Probability that an event will occur; a measure of the degree of loss expected by the occurrence of a loss.
(Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Risk assessment: In the report’s context, risk assessment is defined as the systematic processes of gathering,assessing and documenting information to estimate the level of risk and associated uncertainty related to a zoonotic
disease event, during a specific period of time and in a specific location. (World Health Organization, 2019)● Risk factor (disease): An aspect of personal behavior or lifestyle, an environmental exposure, or a hereditarycharacteristic that is associated with an increase in the occurrence of a particular disease, injury, or other healthcondition. (Dicker et al., 2006)

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● Risk reduction: The identification and implementation of policies and activities designed either to prevent
zoonotic disease agents from creating health risks or lessen their frequency, distribution, intensity or severity.
In practice, typically refers to avoidance or decreasing current ongoing or further risk and/or impact.
(World Health Organization, 2019)● Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS): The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures entered into force with the establishment of the World Trade Organization on 1 January 1995. It concerns
the application of food safety and animal and plant health regulations, and sets out the basic rules for food safety
and animal and plant health standards. (World Trade Organization)● Sanitation: Sanitation generally refers to the provision of facilities and services for the safe disposal of humanurine and faeces. Inadequate sanitation is a major cause of disease world-wide and improving sanitation is known
to have a significant beneficial impact on health both in households and across communities. The word ‘sanitation’also refers to the maintenance of hygienic conditions, through services such as garbage collection and wastewaterdisposal.(World Health Organization)● Sensitivity: The ability of a test, case definition, or surveillance system to identify true cases; the proportionof people with a health condition (or the proportion of outbreaks) that are identified by a screening test or casedefinition (or surveillance system). (Dicker et al., 2006)● Species: An interbreeding group of organisms that is reproductively isolated from all other organisms, although
there are many partial exceptions to this rule in particular taxa. Operationally, the term species is a generally agreed
fundamental taxonomic unit, based on morphological or genetic similarity, that once described and accepted isassociated with a unique scientific name. (IPBES, 2019)● Spillover: Transmission of a pathogen from its original host species to animal species, including human.
(El Masry et al., 2020)● Stakeholders: Any individuals, groups or organizations who affect, or could be affected (whether positively or
negatively) by a particular issue and its associated policies, decisions and action. (IPBES, 2019)● Subsistence: A minimum consumption level of a subsistence good characterizing individual preferences.
(Baumgärtner, Drupp, & Quaas, 2017)● Surveillance (active, passive): An active surveillance is regular and planned visit to public health, livestock,
and animal facilities that are conducted systematically to collect information or samples; passive surveillance relyon the cooperation of health-care providers such as laboratories, hospitals, health facilities and private humanand veterinary medical practitioners, to report the occurrence or detection of a zoonotic disease.
(World Health Organization, 2019)● Sustainability/sustainable: A characteristic or state whereby the needs of the present and local population canbe met without compromising the ability of future generations or populations in other locations to meet their needs.
(IPBES, 2019)● Sustainable agriculture: Sustainable agriculture is agricultural production that is economically viable and does notdegrade the environment over the long run. Definitions differ as to the period over which sustainability is intended
to be achieved; whether sustainability should relate only to localised effects on the environment or also to effects on
the environment caused by the production of farm inputs; and whether the environment in this context should
be defined only to include the physical environment (soil, water, plants and animals) or also the environment createdby agriculture, such as landscape amenities. (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020)● Sustainable use (of biodiversity and its components): The use of components of biological diversity in a way andat a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meetthe needs and aspirations of present and future generations. (IPBES, 2019)● Syndromic surveillance: (1) the monitoring of the frequency of illnesses with a specified set of clinical features
among a given population without regard to the specific diagnoses, if any, that are assigned to them by clinicians.
(2) A system for early detection of outbreaks whereby health department staff, assisted by automated acquisitionof data routinely collected for other purposes and computer generation of statistical signals, monitor disease
indicators, particularly those associated with possible terrorism-related biologic and chemical agents, continuallyor at least daily to detect outbreaks earlier than would otherwise be possible with traditional public health methods.
(Dicker et al., 2006)● Taxon (plural: taxa): A category applied to a group in a formal system of nomenclature, e.g., species, genus,
family etc. (IPBES, 2019)● Traditional medicine: Traditional medicine is the sum total of the knowledge, skill, and practices based on
the theories, beliefs, and experiences indigenous to different cultures, whether explicable or not, used in themaintenance of health as well as in the prevention, diagnosis, improvement or treatment of physical and mental
illness. (World Health Organization)● Transformative change: A fundamental, system-wide reorganization across technological, economic and social
factors, including paradigms, goals and values. (IPBES, 2019)

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● Transmission (disease): Any mode or mechanism by which an infectious agent is spread to a susceptible host.
It includes direct immediate transfer of an agent from a reservoir to a host by direct contact or droplet spread; andindirect transfer of an agent from a reservoir to a host either by being suspended in air particles (airborne), carriedby an inanimate objects (vehicle borne), or carried by an animate intermediary (vector borne). (Dicker et al., 2006)● Urbanization: The increase in the proportion of a population living in urban areas; the process by which a large
number of people becomes permanently concentrated in relatively small areas forming cities (OECD, 2001c)● Vaccine: A preparation of living, attenuated, or killed bacteria or viruses, fractions thereof, or synthesized orrecombinant antigens identical or similar to those found in the disease-causing organism that is administered toraise immunity to a particular microorganism. (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Value chain: A value chain is defined as the full range of activities that is required to bring a product or service fromconception, through the different phases of production, delivery to final customers, and final disposal after use.
In the context of food production, these activities include farm production, trade and support to get foodcommodities to the end-consumer. (Kaplinsky, Morris, & Readman, 2002)● Vector: Invertebrate (e.g., insect) or non-human vertebrate species which transmit zoonotic disease agents fromone host to another. (World Health Organization, 2019)● Vector-borne disease: (1) Mechanical: This includes simple mechanical carriage by a crawling or flying insect
through soiling of its feet or proboscis or by passage of organisms through its gastrointestinal tract. This does
not require multiplication or development of the organism. (2) Biological: Propagation (multiplication), cyclic
development, or a combination of these (cyclopropagative) is required before the arthropod can transmit theinfective form of the agent to humans. An incubation period (extrinsic) is required following infection before thearthropod becomes infective. The infectious agent may be passed vertically to succeeding generations(transovarian transmission); transstadial transmission indicates its passage from one stage of the life cycle toanother, as nymph to adult. Transmission may be by injection of salivary gland fluid during biting, or by regurgitation
or deposition on the skin of feces or other material capable of penetrating the bite wound or an area of trauma fromscratching or rubbing. This transmission is by an infected nonvertebrate host and not simple mechanical carriage
by a vector or vehicle. However, an arthropod in either role is termed a vector. (Mack & Choffnes, 2015)● Virus: A virus is a small collection of genetic code, either DNA or RNA, surrounded by a protein coat. A virus cannot
replicate alone. Viruses must infect cells and use components of the host cell to make copies of themselves.
(National Human Genome Research Institute, 2020)● Well-being: A perspective on a good life that comprises access to basic resources, freedom and choice, healthand physical well-being, good social relationships, security, peace of mind and spiritual experience. Well-being isachieved when individuals and communities can act meaningfully to pursue their goals and can enjoy a good qualityof life. The concept of human well-being is used in many western societies and its variants, together with living inharmony with nature, and living well in balance and harmony with Mother Earth. All these are different perspectives
on a good quality of life. (IPBES, 2019)● Wild meat (also known as bushmeat): Meat derived from wild animals (IPBES, 2019). Wild meat harvested fromwild animals in tropical and sub-tropical countries are used for food and non-food purposes, including for medicinaluse (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011).
● Wildlife trade: In the report’s context, wildlife trade can be described as the sale or exchange by people of wildlife
resources, including live specimens and their derivatives. Wildlife trade can be differentiated in legal and illegal
trade, in both cases wildlife can be sold and used local or transported for sale in urban centres (local or domestic
trade), sent across national borders to markets in neighbouring countries or shipped half way around the world(international trade).

● Wildlife: Wildlife is usually defined as wild animal, plant and fungal species, terrestrial and aquatic, that having aphenotype unaffected by human selection and continue to occur in the wild regardless of whether or not domestic
varieties have been developed or being captive (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2019), or as living things thatare neither human nor domesticated (International Union for Conservation of Nature). For the purposes of this report,
wildlife usually refers to animal species, because no emerging infectious diseases and no single pandemic has its
origins in plant or fungi (Jones et al., 2008).
● Wildlife/live animal/market: A market where food is sold, including items such as fresh produce, dry foods,
raw and preserved animal products. This may include the selling of live animals or fresh animal products, andslaughtering of animals may happen on the premises. (El Masry et al., 2020)● Wildlife products: Products derived from any wild species and any part or derivative of a wild species.
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; United Nations Information
Portal on Multilateral Environmental Agreements)

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● Zoonotic disease/Zoonosis (plural: zoonoses): A zoonosis was originally defined by the WHO in 1951 as any
disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from vertebrate animals to humans. It may be bacterial, viral,or parasitic, or may involve unconventional agents, and animals play an essential role in maintaining zoonotic
infections in nature (World health Organization). The term is also considered to include both ‘anthropozoonosis’(animals to humans) and ‘zooanthroponosis’ (humans to animals) based on the prevailing direction of transmission
between humans and animals (Chomel, 2009; World Health Organization, 2019)● Zoonotic pathogen: A pathogen or hazard causing a zoonotic disease. (World Health Organization, 2019)

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Baumgärtner, S., Drupp, M. A., & Quaas, M. F. (2017). Subsistence, substitutability and sustainability in consumption.
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The Intergovernmental SciencePolicy Platform on Biodiversity
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)

is the intergovernmental body which assesses the state of biodiversity andecosystem services, in response to requests from Governments, the private
sector and civil society.
The mission of IPBES is to strengthen the science-policy interface forbiodiversity and ecosystem services for the conservation and sustainable
use of biodiversity, long-term human well-being and sustainable
development.
IPBES has a collaborative partnership arrangement with UNEP, UNESCO,FAO and UNDP. Its secretariat is hosted by the German government andlocated on the UN campus, in Bonn, Germany.
Scientists from all parts of the world contribute to the work of IPBES on a
voluntary basis. They are nominated by their government or an organisation,and selected by the Multidisciplinary Expert Panel (MEP) of IPBES. Peerreview forms a key component of the work of IPBES to ensure that a rangeof views is reflected in its work, and that the work is complete to the highest
scientific standards.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCIENCE-POLICY PLATFORM
ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (IPBES)IPBES Secretariat, UN Campus
Platz der Vereinten Nationen 1, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
Tel. +49 (0) 228 815 0570
secretariat@ipbes.net
www.ipbes.net