Dr. Marcus' Room No. 2

2. What a Waste! or Why We Need Plan B
Gail H. Marcus, Consultant, USA

Profile (January 2008)
Dr. Gail H. Marcus is presently an independent consultant on nuclear power technology and policy.
She recently completed a three-year term as Deputy Director-General of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency(NEA) in Paris. In this position, she was responsible for the program of work and budget for the agency.
From 1999 through 2004, Dr. Marcus served as Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology. There she provided technical leadership for DOE’s nuclear energy programs
and facilities, including the development of next-generation nuclear power systems. Other responsibilities included production and distribution of isotopes for medical treatment, diagnosis andresearch, and oversight of DOE test and research reactors and related facilities and activities.
From 1998-1999, Dr. Marcus spent a year in Japan as Visiting Professor in the Research Laboratory
for Nuclear Reactors, Tokyo Institute of Technology. She conducted research on comparative nuclear
regulatory policy in Japan and the United States.
Previously, Dr. Marcus had been in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). She served in a varietyof positions including Deputy Executive Director of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards/Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste; Director of Project Directorate III-3, providing
regulatory oversight of seven nuclear power plants in the Midwest; and Director of the Advanced
Reactors Project Directorate, where she was responsible for technical reviews of advanced reactor
designs.
She also served as technical assistant to Commissioner Kenneth Rogers at the NRC for over four years,
providing advice and recommendations on a broad range of technical and policy issues of interest to
the Commission. From this position she was detailed for five months to Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, where she was NRC’s first assignee to Japan, studying Japan’s
licensing of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor.
Prior to her service at NRC, Dr. Marcus was Assistant Chief of the Science Policy Research Divisionat the Congressional Research Service (1980-1985). In this position, she was responsible for policy
analysis in support of Congress covering all fields of science and technology, and played a lead rolein policy analysis and development for energy, nuclear power, and risk assessment and management.

Organization:
From 2001-2002, Dr. Marcus served as President of the American Nuclear Society (ANS), an 11,000 member
professional society. She is a Fellow of the ANS and of the American Association for the Advancementof Science (AAAS). She is a former member of the National Research Council Committee on the Future
Needs of Nuclear Engineering Education, and served three terms on the MIT Corporation Visiting
Committee for the Nuclear Engineering Department. She is just completing a term as the elected Chairof the Engineering Section of AAAS.

Publication:
Dr. Marcus has authored numerous technical papers and publications. Her research interests include
nuclear regulatory policy, energy technology and policy, risk assessment and management, international nuclear policy, and advanced nuclear technologies.

Education:
Dr. Marcus has an S.B. and S.M. in Physics, and an Sc.D. in Nuclear Engineering from MIT. She is thefirst woman to earn a doctorate in nuclear engineering in the United States.

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Dr. Marcus' Room No. 2

One of the major impediments to the future of thenuclear option has long been the perception thathigh-level radioactive waste disposal is an intractable problem. Recently, with growing interest in
new reactors to combat global warming and improve energy security, this perception has become amore serious concern. Perhaps as a result, national
plans for waste disposal are receiving heightenedlevels of public attention in some countries. It isparticularly noteworthy that this issue has beenraised by both candidates during the 2008 US
presidential campaign.

I am prompted to say, “What a waste that wouldbe!”

It is therefore important that we explore the issues involved and revisit some of the national
strategies for nuclear waste disposal.

Today’s problems have their roots in a decision
Congress made in 1987. At that time, the UnitedStates was in the process of characterizing threesites as possible sites for a U.S. high-level waste
repository. Congress narrowed the effort before thecharacterization of the three sites was completed
and declared Yucca Mountain the sole site for future efforts. The United States had, in essence,“put all its eggs in one basket.”Background
Even though the volume of nuclear waste is small
compared to the wastes from some other energy-producing technologies, and very small compared to wastes from many common industrial activities, the public impression is that the disposalof nuclear waste is both a big problem and an unsolvable one. The long half-lives of some of the radioisotopes in nuclear waste and recent concerns
about terrorist attacks or diversion of materials
have put nuclear wastes in a class by themselves in
the public perception.
To date, no nation has actually completed theconstruction of a permanent high-level repository
for wastes from commercial nuclear power plants.
This situation has been cast as a failure to “solve”
the waste problem, and as a reason that nuclear
power is not a viable alternative to help address
our future energy needs.
This widely perceived “failure” could well provethe most significant stumbling block to the anticipated nuclear renaissance. Even though it is nottrue that the waste problem is insoluble, and eventhough substantial progress is being made in somecountries, most notably Sweden and Finland, thesefacts have gone largely unnoticed by the generalpublic. The difficulties some of the bigger countries,
such as the United States, have encountered indeveloping a viable approach to dealing with nuclear waste have dominated the news and coloredpublic opinion. Sometimes “perception is reality.”
If we can’t develop a robust approach to nuclear
waste disposal―and more important, if we can’t
convince the policy makers and the public that theapproach is robust―the “waste” will be more than
the spent fuel rods from the nuclear power plants.
All the time and money that has been spent trying
to develop viable waste repositories will be wasted.

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Yucca Mountain
Let’s look first at the primary reason for the perceived problem―Yucca Mountain. Because of thesize and visibility of the U.S. nuclear program, thefate of its efforts at high-level waste disposal has
been watched closely. The long and sometimes
tortuous path Yucca Mountain has followed should
provide a number of lessons learned, both for theUnited States and for other countries.

This decision had two immediate effects. First,
the lack of any other options created a strong appearance that the site characterization would haveto result in a positive conclusion, as there was no
fallback. This did not improve public confidence
that the decision reached would be an objective,
science-based one.
Second, the decision galvanized the State of Nevada. It is not hard to see why they regarded theCongressional action as arbitrary and unfair
treatment of their State. They became a powerfuland persistent opponent of the Federal Yucca
Mountain Project. The ensuing 25 years have seen
considerable time and money invested in a protracted political and legal battle between the State
of Nevada and the Federal government. Given that
there should have been another way, I am again
prompted to say “What a waste!”
While the legal and political wrangling has undoubtedly diverted resources and slowed progress,
technical work has continued during this period.
For a long time, it appeared that the overall technical findings were positive. In fact, five years ago,
when the decision on whether to proceed with the
Yucca Mountain project was before Congress, I was
personally convinced that the preponderance oftechnical evidence showed that the repository
would be licensable. I was equally convinced thatthe political problems could be resolved.
Today, I am convinced of neither. During the intervening years, questions have been raised about
the seismicity of the site and the possibility of wa-

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Dr. Marcus' Room No. 2

ter infiltration in the long term. These questions
have not been adequately addressed in the publicarena. On the political side, no progress has been
made toward reconciling the interests of the State
of Nevada and the nation.
I am more and more convinced that we havepassed the point where the science is the primaryconsideration. Even if further investigation should
prove that the site unequivocally meets the technical criteria established, the long and acrimonious
history has left a very difficult public acceptanceenvironment as a legacy.

Other Experiences
Of course, I am most familiar with the details of
the waste program in my own country, but in following what has been happening elsewhere, I am
struck by the fact that the public concerns are
similar everywhere. The United States is far fromalone in experiencing public opposition to the ideaof disposing of a waste product with a very long
half-life. Nearly every country has experienced
some degree of difficulty in finding a site for a repository that is both technically suitable and thathas the support of the public, particularly the local
residents in the area of the proposed site. The recent reports of leaks at the Asse site in Germany
are just one more example of the degree of scrutiny
these sites receive.
It is instructive to look to the countries that have
had the greatest success so far. At the moment,
Sweden and Finland stand out from the crowd.
These two countries have chosen a staged approachto repository development that allows more timeand flexibility in decision-making and increases
public awareness of the implementation process. In
particular, these countries have engaged the publicin the site selection process to try to assure that
there will be local support for a repository, andhave interacted with the communities in an open
and transparent way to develop a reciprocal dialogue among equals.
It should be remembered that the United States,
too, has had one major success―that is, the Waste
Isolation Plant Project (WIPP) site in New Mexico.
While this site is not designated for the disposal ofwastes from commercial nuclear power plants, it isnevertheless a repository with similar requirements for long-term storage, transportation to thesite, etc. that have proved difficult for Yucca
Mountain and other proposed sites. While WIPP
was not without its opponents, the overall successful experience demonstrates that not every
proposed repository project will end at an impasse.

3“Plan B”―A Viable Backup
It is useful to explore the successes and the failures so far for lessons learned. Of course, there arelimitations to relying on such “models,” because thedetailed circumstances always vary. National laws
and public attitudes differ; circumstances varyover time; and the details of one proposal can’t
necessarily be duplicated at other sites. Nevertheless, the fact that there are several successfulmodels suggests that the time has come to revisit
Yucca Mountain and other stalled projects.
In short, what has been seriously lacking in mostof the national programs that have stalled is a“Plan B,” a backup plan. It is now time for countries to develop a Plan B.
Plan B should be based on three fundamental
premises:・ That a long-term repository is ultimately
needed, but that the urgency to “solve” thelong-term waste problem immediately has
been overstated; and・That a robust approach must explore multiple
technical and siting options.
・That public acceptance is critical.
With that in mind, here are the basic elements ofPlan B:
Interim storage: In the short term, the delays inbringing a repository on line are not critical. The
total volume of discharged fuel generated from nuclear power plants is small and can be stored safely
for decades in temporary facilities at reactor sites
or other interim locations. Therefore, it is not asimportant to have immediate action as it is to havea viable path forward.
I say this with full understanding that countries
like the United States have not successfully resolved interim storage either. In most countries,
the high-level waste remains on site, and there arevarious reasons why some of those sites may not bedesirable or feasible for waste storage for extended
periods beyond the lifetime of the plants. Nevertheless, siting interim storage facilities opens up
many more options than are possible for a permanent repository, and Plan B should make provisions for interim storage.
A staged approach: The development plan for along-term project as a waste repository should be
use a staged approach so that adjustments can bemade as the project proceeds based on scientific
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Dr. Marcus' Room No. 2

advances and operational experience.

a coherent Plan B.

A second site: For the United States, Plan B also
should include starting now to identify and characterize at least one additional long-term site.
Even if Yucca Mountain were to move forward, thiswould not be wasted effort, because a second repository will ultimately be needed. And if the Yucca
Mountain project is terminated for any reason, theUnited States will have taken some steps toward
an alternative. It is imperative that a different
process be developed for selection of another site.
The experiences of Sweden and Finland may prove
useful in this regard.

In the Meantime…

Reprocessing: Furthermore, reprocessing could
result in substantial changes to how Yucca Mountain, or any other site, can be used and the characteristics it needs to have. Plan B should therefore
include greater consideration of how to integrate
recycling and waste disposal. Other countries, including Japan and France, have already recognized
the importance of this linkage.
Long-term retrievable storage: Further, options
other than “permanent” disposal should be considered. Much has already been said about the casefor long-term retrievable storage, particularly before reprocessing is implemented. It may well be abetter approach to disposal for many reasons, andcould provide greater assurance of the long-term
safety of the site.
Other options: Other options for high-level nuclear waste disposal have been proposed, particularly (but not exclusively) for countries withsmaller nuclear power programs. These options
range from other technical solutions, such as disposing of waste in boreholes that potentially can besited in more locations or shooting it into outerspace, to regional or international waste repositories. The latter option was recently proposed by
one of the U.S. presidential candidates. Some ofthese alternatives could be promising, but much
more needs to be done to determine their viability.
For alternatives like boreholes or disposal in space,
the issues are both technical and economic; for analternative like a multinational repository, thequestion of what country will take the waste isparamount.
Public acceptance: As the models of Sweden and
Finland suggest, the public must be engaged early
and openly, and measures that address their concerns must be incorporated into how the site isdeveloped.
All these features have been talked about separately. It is time to put them together in the form of
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For the case of Yucca Mountain, at this point, it isunclear whether the technical review of the application recently submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Department of Energy willcontinue in a new Administration. Whatever happens, an immediate, transparent, and ongoing dialogue with the public has been lacking. Such a
dialogue must be started, and should cover bothtechnical and political issues associated with thesite. On the technical side, questions that havebeen raised about the technical suitability of thesite are of concern.
It is equally important that the State of Nevada
receive a fair response. The state’s view that thepolitical process treated it unfairly should be oflong-term concern to everyone. The immediate issue is nuclear waste disposal, but the principle
applies to the myriad needs of society. The common
good must be balanced against the interests of regions, states and individuals. None should automatically trump the others, but all must be addressed in an open and equitable way.
The development and discussion of Plan B shouldbe part of the dialogue. Even though this may seem
yet another way to slow the project, the UnitedStates may need to back up a step before it canmove forward. The sooner that fact is recognized,
the sooner the deadlock can be broken and progress
can begin.

Conclusion
I have cast this discussion mostly in terms of
Yucca Mountain. However, the principles apply
more broadly. More and more countries will have to
face the issue of waste disposal in the coming years.
Just as in many other pioneering efforts, the “first
adopters” inevitably set the stage for others, bothby their successes and by their mistakes. The successes can be used, where possible, as a model; themistakes can prove equally valuable in demonstrating what not to do.
Plan B could become an important part of a newmodel for the future. It has the advantage of assuring that there are both interim storage options
and backup options for a long-term disposal site, it
provides the basis for a process in which the public
can have confidence, and it allows for adaptation tochanges such as the development of reprocessing.
There are, of course, no easy answers. The Plan B
I have outlined is easy to describe, but muchharder to put into practice. Nevertheless, the preCopyright © JAPAN NUS CO., LTD. All Rights Reserved

Dr. Marcus' Room No. 2

sent approach in the US and other countries has
proven faulty. A change is clearly needed, and Plan
B provides the multiple options and variations thatshould help avoid the kind of impasse that canarise when everything depends on only one option.
It is not just a way out of the deep hole Yucca
Mountain has become. It is a robust approach toassure that other countries do not encounter theirown Yucca Mountains.

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As before, I would welcome any comments or
feedback.
My e-mail address is: ghmarcus alum.mit.edu.
（ An image charactor is used intentionally for@-sign. Please cut the image and put a keystroke@-sign.)September 2008

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