PAJ 2010 -Australian Arrangements and Recent Spills
Petroleum Association of Japan
2010 Symposium
W.J. Skibinski
General Manager
Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre(Acknowledgment to AMSA for data on National Plan, Pacific Adventurer and Montara detail)

Australian Oil Spill Arrangements and Recent Responses
This paper is presented in three sections, each section dealing with specificsubject matter relevant to the system and capability of Australian oil spill
response arrangements.

Section 1 – provides an outline of the organisation and intent of oil spill

arrangements in Australia and the relationship between Government andindustry.

Section 2 – outlines the response to the Pacific Adventurer spill which

occurred on 11 March 2009 and resulted in approx 270 tonnes of fuel oil
contaminating shoreline adjacent to the Queensland capital, Brisbane.

Section 3 – highlights the response strategies used to combat the Montara oil
spill in which over 6,000 tonnes of oil were estimated to flow into the Timor
Sea to the North-West of Australia.

Section1 – Australian Arrangements

The essence of oil spill response arrangements in Australia is CO-OPERATION.
The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response andCooperation (OPRC) requires signatory countries to embrace the same
principle in developing local and regional capacity.
In Australia the requirement for this cooperative relationship was reinforced in1970 when an oil spill (Oceanic Grandeur 1270 tonnes) highlighted
inadequacies in National arrangements.
The Oceanic Grandeur spill was the catalyst for the development of interGovernment agreement between the National and State authorities whichbecame the National Plan:

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PAJ 2010 -Australian Arrangements and Recent Spills“The National Plan is a national integrated Government and industry
organisational framework enabling effective response to marine pollution
incidents. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) manages theNational Plan, working with State/Northern Territory (NT) governments, theshipping, oil, exploration and chemical industries, emergency services tomaximise Australia's marine pollution response capability. The National Plan
Management Committee (NPMC) provides strategic management of theNational Plan while the National Plan Operations Group (NPOG) handles
operational functions.”
Courtesy AMSA Website

Importantly, the Australian response strategy is a Cooperative arrangement
and envisages all stakeholders having some involvement in a response
operation dependent on location and severity.
As a result of the ongoing commitment of all participants in the National Plan,
Australia has maintained a competent level of response capability in the years
since the development of the National Plan.
However, it is difficult to ascertain at any given time if the arrangements will
actually work. Notwithstanding local and national exercises, there are somany variables associated with oil and oil spill incidents, not least of those thephysical nature of Australia with over 50,000kms of coastline and 12,000
islands, which means that each potential spill can be dramatically different
and potentially requires very different strategies and resources.
The two spills which occurred in 2009 and are highlighted later in this paper
provide excellent examples of the enormous diversity in conditions andenvironments which can be encountered.
The National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and other Noxious
and Hazardous Substances defines the responsibilities associated with oil spill
response in Australia.
From a practical response perspective the important component is theCombat Responsibility which is the responsibility for the direct managementof the response activities; the National Plan assigns this role in the event of aspill from an off-shore oil operation or from oil refineries and terminals to thecompany operating the facility.
In the case of spills from ships, either the State government (if spill is within 3
nautical miles of shore) or National government (if more than 3 nautical miles
distance from shoreline) are required to provide the necessary resources andlead the response.

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PAJ 2010 -Australian Arrangements and Recent Spills

These nominations are intended to ensure an immediate and effective
response, however if a spill escalates in size, additional resource or support isavailable from regional or national stockpiles.
This last point is critical as it is possible for spill dynamics to be beyond thecapability of the resources and expertise of even a well-prepared organisation,
especially if the volume spilt or contamination is high or the response is longterm.
Australia has had an improvement in performance with significant reductionsin spill events and volumes in recent years as have many other countries andregions.
Higher standards in ship construction and selection, crew training,navigational arrangements and Port State Control have been major
contributors to this improved performance.
As a consequence there has been less opportunity to assess the true
capability of response arrangements in real conditions.
As the periods between spills extends there is an increased opportunity forexperienced personnel to move on to new roles, careers or indeed retire fromthe oil spill response workforce.
The absence of this experience and knowledge makes vulnerable every spill
response organisation, be it Government or industry.
This is the result of new personnel and management not having experienced
anything other than exercise and risk assessment. Even the calculation of ahigh risk scenario or circumstance does not engender the level of preparation
and response capability that is readily acceptable immediately following a spill
event.
No amount of desk-top exercises and deployment drills fully prepare a teamfor an actual oil spill situation.
It is only in the real spill scenario that every strategy from slick identification,
chemical treatment, containment and recovery, tracking and modelling, NEBA,
sampling (oil and water), waste storage and the myriad of other pollutantspecific activities are taken to the end point.
In Australia the activity associated with the pollutant is often preceded by theneed to establish access to remote environments where there are no facilities
for responders and by that I mean roads, camps or airstrips.
Notwithstanding earlier comment, oil spills do continue to happen and 2009
was a bad year for Australia with two significant incidents, however a numberof lessons will be learnt from these incidents which can be used to ensure
better preparedness in the future.

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PAJ 2010 -Australian Arrangements and Recent Spills

Section 2
Pacific AdventurerPacific Adventurer, Cape Moreton, March 2009
At 3.12 am (Queensland Time) on 11 March 2009, the 1990 built, 23,737 dwt,
Hong Kong China registered general cargo ship Pacific Adventurer lost 31
containers of ammonium nitrate overboard some 7 nautical miles east of Cape
Moreton while en route to Brisbane from Newcastle. The ship reported laterthat it was holed on its port side near its engine room and a fuel service tank
had been breached with the loss of some oil before the remainder waspumped from the damaged tank. The ship later estimated that up to 270
tonnes of heavy fuel oil was lost into the sea. However, there also wasdamage to one of the ship’s starboard bunker fuel tanks below the waterline.
After an independent audit of the oil aboard in Brisbane, it was estimatedmore than 270 tonnes was lost.
The oil impacted significant portions of the south-east Queensland coast, inparticular the eastern and northern beaches and headlands of Moreton Island(a National Park), the eastern beaches of Bribie Island (north of Brisbane),the beaches and foreshores of the Sunshine Coast (north of Brisbane) andsmall areas of the Brisbane River. Under the National Plan response
arrangements, the Queensland Government through Maritime Safety
Queensland was responsible for management of the oil spill response. The
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) as manager of the National Plan
provided specialist and logistical support.
While the majority of oiling occurred on sandy beaches, the clean-up
operations were complicated by the large amounts of oil buried by sand being
deposited back on the beaches because of the weather and sea conditions. As
all areas have high tourism and community amenity value, a high standard ofclean-up was required to support the recovery of the tourism industry andrestore previous levels of amenity.
Clean-up operations continued for two months. A total of about 2,500 people
were deployed for the entire clean-up including workers from many agencies,
amongst them Maritime Safety Queensland, the Department of Environment
and Resource Management, local regional councils, Emergency Management
Queensland, as well as workers from QR, Road Tek, Skilled and private
contractors, the State Emergency Service, Queensland Police Service and theQueensland Fire and Rescue Service. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority(AMSA) personnel as well as 72 members of the National Response Teamfrom all States/NT, the oil industry and contractors also provided assistanceduring the period. At the height of the response operation 400 response
personnel were working on Moreton Island each day.

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PAJ 2010 -Australian Arrangements and Recent Spills
Approximately 3,000 tonnes of sand contaminated with oil was removed fromMoreton Island. The work was mostly manual labour using shovels and rakes
to fill about 8,000 bags each day to achieve this result. Specialised sandsieving equipment was also used to assist the clean-up operations on Bribieand Moreton Islands.
Considering the size of the oil spill, a very small number of wildlife wasaffected. Birds, turtles and sea snakes were captured, rehabilitated andreleased by Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service.
Montara Wellhead Oil Spill 2009
At approximately 5.30am. WA time (7.30am Australian Eastern StandardTime) on Friday 21 August 2009, the Montara Wellhead mobile drilling unit
located 140 miles offshore from the NW Australian coast, had an uncontrolled
release of hydrocarbons from one of the platform wells. Consequently oilescaped to the surface and gaseous hydrocarbons escaped into theatmosphere.
Initial estimates provided by the operator (PTTEP Australasia) were that 64
tons per day (400 barrels) of crude oil were being lost. It should be noted,
however, that this estimate could not be confirmed at any time during theincident, nor was it possible to provide any more accurate assessment. The
leak continued until 3 November 2009 and response operations continued
until the well was successfully capped on 3 December 2009 (105 days).
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) was advised of the oil leak atapproximately 10.00am, and within 15 minutes implemented the National
Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and Other Noxious and Hazardous
Substances (the National Plan). The Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre(AMOSC) in Geelong was advised and activated at 10.35am.
Over 130 surveillance flights were conducted throughout the duration of theoperation commencing on the first day of the incident. These flights gathered
oil spill intelligence, environmental data, and directed the surface vessels anddispersant spraying aircraft to heavy concentrations of oil.
At around 7.00pm on the first day, the Northern Territory DesignatedAuthority for the platform formally passed responsibility for the clean up toAMSA, in accordance with agreed National Plan arrangements.
Throughout the incident, the majority of observed oil remained within 35
kilometres of the platform with patches of sheen and weathered oil reported
at various distances in different directions from the platform as wind,temperature and currents varied. The benign conditions experienced during
most of this period permitted containment and recovery operations, however
to some extent also hampered the natural breakup of oil. Sheen was reported
at Ashmore, Cartier and Hibernia Reefs by observers on board aircraft onseveral occasions, however there was no reported impact on any shoreline orreef.

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Immediate response actions included deploying aircraft (including a Hercules
C-130 aircraft from Singapore), Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
personnel and additional dispersant (initially approximately 50 tonnes) tosupplement stocks at the AMSA Darwin equipment stockpile.
AMSA’s operational response was reviewed daily based on observations frommorning surveillance flights. Equipment from oil industry stockpiles inAMOSC/Geelong, supplemented from Singapore, as well as AMSA stockpiles inDarwin and other States were utilised in the clean-up operation.
Response personnel were provided by the oil industry through AMOSC andAMSA as well as through National Response Team arrangements. This
included assistance from all States and the Northern Territory. Assistance wasalso provided by New Zealand personnel in accordance with formal
arrangements between Australia and New Zealand. In total, 247 personnel
were involved in the response, with many undertaking more than one rotation
through at least one of the positions in the response organisation.
Dispersant spraying operations commenced on 23 August 2009 and continued
until 1 November 2009:•The Hercules C-130 sprayed a total of 12,000 litres of dispersant on 23and 24 August;•Aircraft contracted to AMSA (co-funded by AMOSC) as part ofAustralia’s Fixed Wing Aerial Dispersant Capability continued spraying
operations based out of Truscott aerodrome from 25 August until 2September, spraying 32,000 litres of dispersant; and•

Vessel spraying operations were carried out from 30 August to 1
November, with 118,000 litres of dispersant sprayed.

Observations and sampling indicated that the use of dispersant was highly
effective in assisting the natural process of degradation and minimising therisk of oil impacts on reefs or shorelines. The six types of dispersant used Slickgone NS, Slickgone LTSW, Ardrox 6120, Tergo R40, Corexit 9500 andCorexit 9527 - were approved for use within Australian waters, having passedlaboratory acute toxicity testing requirements applied under the National Planarrangements.
Containment and recovery operations commenced on 5 September 2009 andcontinued until 30 November 2009, although no recoverable oil was locatedafter 15 November 2009. These operations involved two vessels working
together joined by a 300 metre containment boom, with a skimmer operatingin the boom “pocket” to recover the oil. For much of the response, two pairsof vessels undertook these operations. A total of 844,000 litres of product wasrecovered. It is estimated that some 493,000 litres of this oil-water mixture
was oil.

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The Department of the Environment, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA)
reported one confirmed report of an oil-affected sea snake and 29 oil-affectedbirds found in the region affected by the oil spill. Of these, 22 birds died as aconsequence of being oiled. No confirmed reports of oiled whales or othercetaceans were received. No other confirmed reports of affected wildlife werereceived despite extensive aerial and water-based patrols in the area.
Overall the response operations were successful in achieving the objective toprevent oil from impacting on sensitive marine resources, in particular themarine parks of Cartier and Ashmore Reefs, and the NW Coast of Western
Australia.
Conclusion:
Australia is a committed and diligent member of the International maritime
community and through its involvement with the IMO continues to strive for
ongoing improvements in many facets of maritime activities.
The National Plan is an excellent strategic commitment by all stakeholders(Government and industry) to ensure that preparedness and response
capability is maintained in and around Australian waters.
However oil spills do occur and it is at these times that even with a solid
agreement and well defined (and exercised) strategy that the vagaries ofindividual responses create the ‘real time’ challenge.
Whether it is trying to get equipment into a remote location, only several
kilometres from a major city or the need to conduct aerial operations and at
sea recovery 150 nautical miles from shore, the detail of these activities must
be developed ‘on the day’ and require a team of personnel with access toresources and an open mind to potential solutions.

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