BCG Global Advantage & Financial Institutions Practice Areas
Prepared: 24 March 2022

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
View on Financial Institutions
ImpactPrepared: 24 March 2022

The war in Ukraine is above all a politicaland humanitarian crisis…

… but it is driving disruption acrossbusinesses

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to a serious
humanitarian crisis. BCG condemns this attack
and the violence that is killing, wounding, anddisplacing so many people.

It is the duty of political, societal, and businessleaders to navigate through this crisis. The intent of
this document is to inform discussions anddecisions on the global economic impact as wellas the Financial Institutions impact of the war
in Ukraine.

The top priority in moments like these must be thesafety and security of people. Corporates,
governments, and non-for-profit organizations should
focus on supporting the people in Ukraine, Russia,
Europe, and globally affected (physically andmentally).

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Introduction to this document

The situation surrounding Ukraine is dynamic andrapidly evolving - this document reflects information
and analysis as of 24 March 2022.
It is not intended as a prediction of future events andis shared only as a resource for BCG and client
conversations.
2

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IMPACT
Financial sanctions will harshly impact Russia’s banks—and could very well force thecountry to default on its foreign debts. These sanctions are also pushing Russia’s
economy, which was earlier in the year on track for modest growth, into recession. Yet,because of their limited exposure to Russia, most international financial institutions are

IN THIS DOCUMENT

account for less than 0.2% of the $100 trillion in assets held by all global banks.

Depending on the war’s duration and how it unfolds, however, the indirect and mediumterm implications for international financial institutions could be quite material.
Persistently high interest rates, inflation, and market volatility would slow economic
growth worldwide. These forces could hit the top and bottom lines of commercial banks,
investment banks, asset managers, payment platforms, and other firms. A more extreme
scenario is that the global financial system decouples, with separate cross-border
payment systems emerging for Eastern and Western economies. Global institutions
should therefore go beyond assessing first- and second-order risks across their value
chains. They should also begin to reassess their portfolios, global operations, and growthstrategies based on various scenarios.

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

BCG Executive
Perspectives

likely to experience only minimal impact. For example, at $170 billion, Russian loansPrepared: 24 March 2022

AGENDA

Deep-dive: View on Financial Institutions impact
Direct impact
Indirect & medium-term impact
Implications across industries
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Financial Institutions
Impact4

Prepared: 24 March 2022

Directimpactfor FIs

Russian Financial institutions represent ~1% of global financial institution revenue
Limited direct impact on global FIs and investors, apart from few which are overexposed
No immediate evidence of disruption on global liquidity, or systematic financial shock
High compliance & conduct risks1 in capital markets & wealth management (arising from complex & evolving sanctions)Indirect andmediumterm
Impactfor FIs

Rising interest rates | High uncertainty – potential short-term benefit; balance sheet & liquidity review required
Recession risk | Risk of material impact on FIs' profitability – similarities to 1970's, yet more room for policy action today
Market volatility | Continued spikes in volatility likely to heighten counterparty risk and defaults
Global financial decoupling | Extreme scenario which would require new portfolio strategy
Cyber-attacks | Heightened risk of cyber-attacks, with FIs being a typical target
Supervisors' scrutiny | Expected stricter controls and acceleration of new regulations (e.g., cryptoassets)

Financial
implications
for otherindustries

Hedging strategy | Risk management hedging on rates, FX, commodities
Balance sheet strategy | Review structure, short vs. medium term debt, deposit / financial investment strategy
Cyber-attacks | Prepare for risk of payment disruptions (e.g., FI cyberattacks) and increased compliance scrutiny from banks
Payments | Reassess payment currencies and assess alternatives (e.g., crypto)
M&A, IPO, debt issuance | Potential slow down, expecting clarity on scenarios; specific opportunities with exposed players

1. Risks associated with any activity by a financial institution which could threaten consumer protection or market integrity/stability.
Sources: BCG analyses and experience

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

FI: Direct impact limited; indirect & medium-term impact potentially material

5Prepared: 24 March 2022

AGENDA

Deep-dive: View on Financial Institutions impact
Direct impact
Indirect & medium-term impact
Implications across industries
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Financial Institutions
Impact6

Prepared: 24 March 2022

Context: Russian Financial institutions represent ~1% of global FI revenue… but overall, they represent
low share of global sector

Russian bank stocks collapsing

Challenging market conditions

Share of global banking revenue($ Trillion, %)5(79%)

decline in Russian bank index
across L6M1

Potential Russian sovereign
debt default$4.7B

Outstanding payments for
Russia between now & year end
despite $117M repaid Mar 163

7

Banks delisted from SWIFT(representing ~25% Russia
banking sector's revenue2);
Sberbank, Gazprom exempt

Acceleration of cash withdrawals

58

Fold increase in demandfor cash in Russia since firstsanctions4

5.0
RussiaTop 5
countries
by revenue

1%

China

25%

US
Brazil
UK
Japan

24%

RoW

40%

3%
3%
3%

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Russia's FIs are under severe stress…

2021E

1. Russia MSCI Financial Index (Aug – Mar 14 2022) 2. FY20 Revenue; in B for 7 banks: VTB, Otkritie, VEB, Novikombank, Gazprombank, Bank Rossiya, Sovcombank) / FY20 Russia banking
revenue (Retail + corporate + other banking revenue); 3. Reuters, March 21 2022; 4. As of February 28 2022, NYTimes; 5. In-country (domestic) revenue (Retail + corporate + other banking revenue)
Source: BCG Banking Pools Model, MSCI, Press; BCG analysis

7Prepared: 24 March 2022

FIs | Limited direct impact on global FIs, apart from few which are overexposed<0.2%

total exposure1 of all global
banks (~$170B out of $100T2
total assets)

4 European banks with material exposure3

ASSET MANAGERS:Limited impact
Russia comprises small share of total Assets
under Management for most Asset Managers

0.2%
0.5%

~1.4%

of cross border transaction
flow value attributed to Russia7

7banks currently de-listed fromSWIFT; largest banks (Sberbank,Gazprombank) exempt7

BlackRock exposure to
Russian assets5(i.e., >5% of group profits from Russia)

Low liquidity risk | Pricing of funding between
banks (overnight borrowing rate4) stable,suggesting bank's liquidity expectations
have not changed

PAYMENTS:
Minimal global effect from SWIFT ban

Fidelity's exposure to
Russian assets5

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

BANKING:
Low exposure & limited liquidity risk

Specific strategies and funds more at risk6

So far, global FIs' stock prices perform in line with or better than other industries(e.g., 2.3% reduction in Financial index8 vs 8.0% reduction in World Index9 between Jan 3 & Mar 17 2022)
1. As of Sep '21: ~$120B in direct exposures & ~$50B in derivatives, credit guarantees and credit commitments 2. $100T is total assets across all bank nationalities as of Sept '21 from BIS 3. Material exposure based on Russia as a % of group profit >5% for2021 per company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates; banks with following exposure as % of profit: 6%, 7%, 7%, 39% 4. Europe overnight borrowing rate 5. Russian Exposure AuM ($B)/ Global AuM 2020 (P&I) 6. E.g., EM funds of GQG Partners 7. 2019 data;
based on outbound global payments only, excluding credit cards; value of Russia x-border payments / value of x-border global payments BCG Trade Finance Model 8. As of Mar 21 2022; exempt banks incl: VTB, Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank,Rossiya Bank, Sovcombank, VEB; represent ~25% banking sector 8. MSCI World Financial Index % change YTD Non-normalized Jan 3 '22 to Mar 17 '22; 9. MSCI World Index Non-normalized % change Jan 3 '22 to Mar 17 '22; Source: Press, Bloomberg, BCG
Center for Macroeconomics, BIS, GSIB; MSCI; J.P. Morgan; BCG Analysis

8Prepared: 24 March 2022

Type of investor

First order effects

Second order effects

Sovereign wealthfunds (SWFs)
Mostly Gulf funds
are exposed1

Decline of asset value (Ruble & Russian stocks
depreciation, asset write-downs)

Likely rebalancing of capital
allocation away from higherrisk regions

Yet, SWFs willing to hold position through crisis(and maintain government-to-government
contacts to limit asset devaluation)
Opportunity to buy assets at discountPublic Pension funds
Mostly in US, EU, UK

Limited exposure (~1% of assets1 in Russia)
Divesting to avoid reputational and sanctions risk

Risks of Russian retaliations
through nationalization offoreign-owned assets (lessimpact for SWFs4)

PrivateDifficulty in finding counterparts unless large
discount

Private equity firms

If exposed: Asset devaluation, declining revenues
Difficulty to repurpose portfolio given lower
liquidity – yet secondary market exists

Increased compliance burden
to vet investors and partners(and their exposure) - lessrelevant for SWFs5

1. Holding 69% of Russian assets owned by state-investors (source: Wall Street Journal); 2. Financial Times, Wall street Journal; 3. Forbes; 4. Less impact forSovereign Wealth Funds given their Government-to-government contacts & relationships; 5. Which are not compliance-driven; Source: Press search; BCG analyses

Case studies
Qatar Investment Authority(QIA), the Sovereign fund of
Qatar has stakes in Russian
entities targeted by sanctions(e.g., VTB). QIA has taken$6B loss to its Russian
holdings valued at $16B2

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Institutional

Investors | Limited impact for most pension funds, large losses on moreheavily exposed sovereign funds

California Public Employees'
Retirement owns $1B in
Russian assets.
A bill is pending in the Statelegislature mandating
divestment from Russia39Prepared: 24 March 2022

AGENDA

Deep-dive: View on Financial Institutions impact
Direct impact
Indirect & medium-term impact
Implications across industries
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Financial Institutions
Impact10Prepared: 24 March 2022

RisingInterest rates

Recession
riskMarketvolatility

Global decouplingof financial systems

Cyber-security
threats

Supervisors'
scrutiny

Increase in interest rates
will benefit FIs in the
short-term. Yet, whencombined with potential
economic slowdown (e.g.,
due to inflationarypressures), it can
introduce challenges tobalance sheet of banks(especially if used variable
rates) and have impact ofincreased loan defaults

Increased risk of global
economic slowdown
driven by rising energy
and commodity prices
and erosion of
consumer confidence. Inthat case, major impact
across business areas
for FIs

Prolonged volatility andmarket 'swings' could
create multiple default
events (e.g., asset
gatherers, collaterals)

Extreme scenario offurther disentanglement
between Western andnon-Western financial
ecosystems – would
require deep review offootprint strategy (clients,
front office, operations)

Increased risk ofcyberattacks in uncertain
geopolitical environment
such as the Ukraine war,with FI traditionally being
one of the first targets forhackers – increasing levelof financial, operational &reputational risks

Heightened scrutiny,
increasing compliancemobilization & costs,
and conduct risk

More details on next pages
Source: BCG experience and analysis

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Greatest risks are indirect and depend on a wide range of scenarios

More stringent
regulations to come(e.g., cryptoassets)

More detail in next edition11

Prepared: 24 March 2022

Rising interest rates | Potential short-term benefit from increasing
interest rates for FIs; balance sheet & liquidity review requiredMarkets expect interest rates toincrease and stabilize at 2-3% by 2024

FIs will benefit in the short-term,
yet risk if economy slows

Implied interest rate1

In the short run, banks could benefit fromincreasing interest rates (IR)Companies to slow down borrowing
and investment as cost of capitalincreases

Growth in net interest income
from 1% interest rate increase2

Strong money flow to large-cap
equities(less susceptible to inflation) as fixedincome investments have lower real
returns

Yet, lower economic activity would harm FI
profitability & equity performance

Investment in innovation to
decline – given higher discount rate oflong-term cash flow

2%
1%

03/21/2022

6%

02/23/2022
Repricing since last year
12/07/2021

0%
Mar 2022

Mar 2026

Mar 2030

Interest rate expectation reflects current market
view that high inflation is transient and will
gradually fall to ~2-4% by end of 2023

(12.5%)

Decrease in Dow Jonesfor 1% decrease in GDP3

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

3%

Second-order impact

Increase in consumers' savings in FIs
to decrease consumer disposable
income1. Future expected short rate as priced by markets; 2. Averaged. BCG 2020 Treasury Benchmark, as estimated by Europe and North American participants 3. Dodd Frank 2021 stress test. Data is for Dow
Jones Total Stock Market Index; Note: Review BCG's Center for Macroeconomics' publications for the latest projection on inflations and interest rates.
Source: Company Disclosures, Press reports; JP Morgan; US FDIC; US FED; BCG Analysis

12Prepared: 24 March 2022

Recession risk | Risk of material negative impact on FIs' profitability

Risk: US Federal Reserve expected toincrease interest rates, but rate-hikeovershoot risks triggering recession

EuropeRetail & Commercial

Capital Markets

Asset Managers

Reduce volume of credit
issued, reducing revenue

Less affordable borrowing
given higher rates, less new
debt issued

Increased demand foralternatives, countercyclical investments,
including infrastructureand select commodities(e.g., gold)

Default rate may increase asrates grow & economy slows
Further possible default
cyclesRisk: European dependency on Russianenergy is a strategic vulnerability – potential
for recession if Russia withholds energy

Asia
Risk: Low risk of recession, but potential for
economic slowdown as higher commodity
prices compound shutdowns from Covid-19

Fixed-rate debt devalued andhigher probability of floating
rate debt default
Equity correction likely

Wealth Managers

Payment Platforms

Wider Impact

Increased demand forcounter-cyclical investments

Recession to drive fewer
total transactions andreduce fees for payment
platforms

Higher unemployment

More investments held ingovernment bonds and cash

1. NBER, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, BCG Analysis

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

United States

Decreased purchasing power
Reduced availability ofcredit13

Prepared: 24 March 2022

Case study | Parallels to 1970s stagflation

Similarities:
Commodities-driven inflation

Differences:
Situation and macro-fundamentals

1970s insights for banks

Similarities in oil spike, but 1973 much worse1

Federal Funds Rate: Extremely low rate now
means more policy flexibility to tame inflation

Bank stocks lagged recovery fromstagflation

12

140

8

100
80

4

0

0

Similar trends in inflation(US CPI)

1973/4 - Jan start
2021/2 - May start

12
8
4
Ukraine War
OPEC embargo

Dec 2022
Aug 1974

S&P 5008

4

60

May 2021
Jan 1973

Bank index / S&P 500 rebased to 100

12

120

0

16

1973/4 - Jan start

May 2021
Jan 1973

6.5%

Ukraine War
OPEC embargo

100

2021/2 - May start90

Dec 2022
Aug 1974

80

Expected yield on 10Y gov. bond in Jan
1973, (market expected lasting inflation) –vs. 2.35% now (transient inflation expected)

70

10%
lag

Banks

60
Dec 1972

Dec 1976

proven crude reserves impacted
4.8% Global
now vs. >50% in 1973

In 1970s, inflation reduced
purchasing power and consumer
sentiment

Banks have strongest capital position onrecord, giving flexibility to respond to crisis

FIs were especially impacted, but
the whole economy suffered

1. Oil prices smoothed via averaging. Source: EIA, OPEC, FED data, DataStream, Bloomberg Finance L.P., BEA, & J.P. Morgan; BCG analysis

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

US Crude ($)

14

Prepared: 24 March 2022

Volatility | Continued spikes likely to heighten counterparty risk & defaults

Volatility indices spiked…

… creating FI risks & opportunities

Case study: Tsingshan

Rapid changes in prices can drive
significant counter-party risk

Tsingshan Holding, a Chinese
steel producer, disrupted
global nickel market with"short" positions

VIX index~2x since
Jan 2022

20
0

Some
commodity
prices ~2x
since Jan 2022

Mar 2021

60,0001,000

40,000500

20,0000

Mar 2021
NickelMOVE index~1.5x since
Jan 2022

Mar 2022

1,500

150

Bonds

15yr
avg.

100

Mar 2022
Wheat

0

0 Mar 2021

• Banks providing margin exposed tocounterparty risk
Opportunity to generate higher-returns(e.g., larger trading volumes)

As nickel prices rallied with thewar in Ukraine, Tsingshan
financial position waschallenged, requiring banks
interventions

Crude Oil

Variability high vs. recent
past, but 0.5x vs 200850

• Asset managers and investment banks
directly exposed to market risk

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Commodities

Equities

40

15yr
avg.
Mar 2022

High bond prices variability createssignificant risk for banks, impacting ability to:• Properly price loan book• Accurately perform debt origination

1. Mar 4 (28,919 end-of day) – trading high on Mar 8 2022 (100,000), LME; Source: Press reports; VIX, MOVE,
Commodity market data Mar '21 – Mar 7, '22; BCG Analysis

LME forced to halt trading
and cancelled transactions+246% In Nickel price1over 4 days

15

Prepared: 24 March 2022

Decoupling | Limited but increasing signs of global financial decoupling– an extreme scenario would require new portfolio strategy
Today, limited evidence of decoupling between
East and West payments systems

Extreme scenario: Risk of significant impact to FIs

Example: Payments still dominated by SWIFT globally

Company behavior impacts
Lending: Chinese companies could prioritize local banks; Westernbanks could revisit portfolio allocation considering geo risks

11,000+1

Countries &territories

200+1

1034

Payments
facilitated$140T2$13T5

1,2883(of which, only 76 direct participants)

Yet some signs of increasing trend
80% reduction in Western Banks' exposure to Russia after 20146
China and Russia settle their trade in own currencies, not in USD

Forex: Renminbi could become a new reference currency in sometrade corridors
High net-worth individuals: Splitting or moving liquid assets
between systems to ensure wealth security
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Participant
institutions

System impacts
Operational model: FIs likely to create more localized or remoteservice models for non-core markets
Payments: National/regional payment systems likely to emerge/grow
Regulatory burden: Increased cost of doing business; multiple
regulatory and compliance requirements

1. As of Mar 2022, SWIFT 2. Economist, 2021 3 CIPS. 76 Direct and 1201 Indirect institutions 4. CIPS as of Mar 2022 5. Reuters as of Jan 2022 6. Post annexation of Crimea by Russia
Source: FT, Bloomberg, WSJ, Brookings Institute, wider press search, BCG Analysis

16Prepared: 24 March 2022

Summary | Impact varies across the different FI businesses
ImpactHigh impact

Indirect/medium-term

Retail &commercial• Default risk | Increasing lending default risk for individuals and SMEs
• Limited impact | Low impact in the short-term, mostly related
impacted significantly by commodity and energy prices
to offshore direct/indirect credit exposure• Counterparty risk | Exposed/Russian counterparts in value chain
might not be able to operate, reducing repayment ability

Capital markets& investmentbanking• High volatility | Creating market risk (& trading opportunity)• Counterparty risk | Increased risk of trading partners' default(directional positions)Assetmanagement(AMs)• Exposure | Russia is a low share of total AuM for most AMs• Portfolio | Some AMs to maintain some exposure given
difficulty of exit and long-term investment potential• Revenue | Negative impact from market underperformance• Revenue | Prolonged impact if continued market losses
2• Contagion risk | Reassessing governance and non-Western markets
geopolitical, reputational risk, and contagion risk (e.g., in currencies,
equities)

Payments• Limited impact | Low impact as no local player is significant
in global value chain or global volume; payers with exposure
may be more significantly impacted• Alternatives | Potential increase in alternatives (including use ofrenminbi, crypto)• Regulations | Increasing regulatory scrutiny for alternatives• Sovereignty | Shift focus from international to domestic systems

Wealthmanagement(WMs)• HNWI | Potential for knock on effects as Russian HNWI3,
particularly UHNWI4, impacted by sanctions, seek to reduce
exposure to western WMs, and other UHNWI clients following• Service model | Evaluating operating model for clients exposed to
Russia (e.g., reallocation of relationship managers)

1• Liquidity risk | Difficult to exit some asset classes (e.g., nickel)• Climate | Continued financing of fossil fuels to address energy gap vs.
Net Zero commitments and banks' roadmap• M&A | Fewer, more complex deals given risk profiles

1. AuM - Assets under management 2. Governance as part of ESG scoring 3. HNW – high net worth individuals 4. UHNW – ultra high net worth individuals
Note: BCG does not provide legal advice; Source: BCG experience and analysis

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

DirectMinimal impact

17

Prepared: 24 March 2022

AGENDA

Deep-dive: View on Financial Institutions impact
Direct impact
Indirect & medium-term impact
Implications across industries
Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

War in Ukraine:
Financial Institutions
Impact18

Prepared: 24 March 2022

FIs | Potential action plan

Short-term

Review Emerging Markets
portfolio and strategy for the
medium and long term – identify
potential risk profile changes

Source: BCG experience & analysis

Implement sanctions andreinforce screening capabilities
across business divisions

Reinforce screening controls in
Trade Finance and Capital Markets
operations to ensure all parties are
subject to screening throughout
relationship

Enhance stress tests with new
scenarios, determine new limits andnew business decision criteria

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Review client portfolio andbalance sheet in light of risks andsanctions, including analyzing firstand second-order effects across the
supply chain

Mid-to-long-term

Enhance operational resilience forcyber attacks: invest in third party IT
outsourcing capabilities, train further
incident response teams, enhance IT to
improve internal network segregation

19

Prepared: 24 March 2022

Non-FI corporations | Potential finance-related action plan

Balance sheet
strategy

Cyber-attacks

Rethink hedging
strategies as near-term
market volatility (e.g.,
foreign exchange, bonds)
impacts prices

Re-evaluate allocation of
surplus cash on
investments by analyzing
updated risk and returnoutcomes

Scenario plan forpotential impacts ofcyber-attacks on financial
operations (e.g., diversify
banks used)

Analyze positions in 'atrisk' areas (i.e.,commodities, emerging
markets) and hedge
operationally andfinancially for priceincreases

Reduce counterparty
and credit exposure:minimize open positions;do not over-expose in new
positions

Invest in third party IT
sourcing capabilities toavoid operational
disruptions

Source: BCG experience & analysis

Secure long-term capital
now when able, at lower
cost

Enhance IT infrastructure
to be able to quickly
segregate impacted
infrastructure

Payment
disruptions
Diversify payment
methods including new
types of currency (e.g.,
cryptocurrency)
Assess robustness of
payment solutions andscenario plan for
disruption e.g., back-up
alternatives
Re-assess supply chain
in light of disruptions inpayments and expanding
trade compliancerequirements

M&A, IPOs,& DebtReassess expectations
for timing and volume
within the business andbanking partners – given
potential market slowdown
as uncertainty and caution
continue

Copyright © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rights reserved.

Hedging
strategies

Scan for opportunities
depending on risk-return
profile considerations,accounting for alternatives
to pre-war investments

20

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Teams across BCG are monitoring impact

Financial Institutions Practice Area

Nikolaus Lang
Practice Area Leader, Global Advantage
Managing Director & Senior Partner
E: Lang.Nikolaus@bcg.com

Kilian Berz
Practice Area Leader, Financial Institutions
Managing Director & Senior Partner
E: Berz.Kilian@bcg.com

Marc Gilbert
Managing Director & Senior Partner
Global Lead, Geopolitics & Trade Impact
E: Gilbert.Marc@bcg.com

Gwenhaël Le Boulay
Managing Director & Senior Partner
Financial Institutions Practice
E: LeBoulay.Gwenhael@bcg.com

Michael McAdoo
Partner & Director,
Global Trade & Investment
E: McAdoo.Michael@bcg.com

Vassilis Antoniades
Managing Director & Senior Partner
Financial Institutions Practice
E: Antoniades.Vassilis@bcg.com

Kasey Maggard
Global Practice Management Director
E: Maggard.Kasey@bcg.com

Rodolphe Charme di Carlo
Partner, Financial Institutions Practice
E: CharmediCarlo.Rodolphe@bcg.com

Ken Carlstedt
Associate Director, Global Trade & Investment
E: Carlstedt.Ken@bcg.com

Carlo Bravin
Partner, Financial Institutions Practice
E: Bravin.Carlo@bcg.com

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Global Advantage Practice Area

22