Postwar Japan as State of Exception:Law, Territory, and National Integrity
Jason Morgan
Reitaku University Associate Professor
INTRODUCTION: JAPAN AS A NORMAL COUNTRY?
Former Prime Minister of Japan Abe Shinzō’s efforts to reform the postwar Japaneseconstitution renewed a wide-ranging discussion among Japanese and overseas pundits, analysts,
historians, and legal scholars over whether Japan should become a “normal country”.1 In
December of 2013, for example, a year after Abe acceded to the prime minister position for thesecond time, Lionel Pierre Fatton—reflecting on the first military budget increase in eleven years
for FY 2014, the passage of a “state secrecy bill” in November of 2013, and the standing-up of
the National Security Council that same month—asked in The Diplomat whether Japan could
now be considered a “normal country.”2 In an August 28, 2020 editorial, the Wall Street Journal
averred of the departing prime minster that “Japan’s longest-serving leader tried to make hiscountry more normal”.3 The New York Times and the Bangkok Post, among other outlets, also
pondered the meaning of Abe’s prime minister-ship in the context of his quest for normalcy as astate.4 The drive, under Abe’s watch, to make Japan “normal” has become, for many, the key
feature of the former prime minister’s legacy.
However, the dream of rendering Japan a “normal country” did not begin with Abe Shinzō. The“normal Japan” discourse reached another high-water mark some three decades ago with the
publication of opposition politician Ozawa Ichirō’s 1993 book, Nihon kaizō keikaku, translated
into English in 1994 as Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation.5 Troubled by theembarrassing political consequences of Japan’s constitutionally-mandated sideline role in theFirst Gulf War (1991), Ozawa proposed a new, forward-leaning Japan joining the emerging
1 Shigenori Matsui, “Fundamental Human Rights and ‘Traditional Japanese Values’: Constitutional

Amendment and Vision of the Japanese Society,” Asian Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 13 (2018), pp. 5986.
2 Lionel Pierre Fatton, “Is Japan Now Finally a Normal Country?” The Diplomat, Dec. 27, 2013, andSebastian Maslow, “Japan’s Evolving Security Architecture,” The Diplomat, Dec. 3, 2013
3 The Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 28, 2020
4 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Abe Legacy is Japan as ‘Normal’ Nation,” Bangkok Post, Sept. 4, 2020, and“What’s at Stake for Shinzo Abe’s Successor,” The New York Times, Sept. 2, 2020. See also Doug Bandow,“A New ‘Normal’: Time for Japan to Defend Japan,” The National Interest, Aug. 6, 2014.
5 Ichiro Ozawa, tr. Louisa Rubinflen, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo:

Kodansha International, 1994), originally published as Ozawa Ichirō, Nippon kaizō keikaku (Tokyo: Kodansha,
1993).

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globalist international order. His view was widely recommended by other globalists andinternationalists and was a major impetus to serious debate about the role of Japan’s postwar
constitution. Ozawa even proposed revising Article Nine to allow Japan to take part ininternational peacekeeping operations, which had been the subject of a bitter disappointment
during the First Gulf War.
Questions about Japan’s constitution, sharpened by Ozawa’s critique, never really disappeared
after his salient.6 The terrorist attacks on the United States in September of 2001 renewed andamplified debates about the military impotency of America’s staunch ally, Japan.7 In 2011, theyear before Abe began his second term, Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro, and David A.
Welch edited Japan as a ‘Normal Country’? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World, a
collection of essays by scholars in Singapore, Canada, South Korea, the People’s Republic ofChina, Japan, and the United Kingdom on the prospects of Japan’s regaining “normalcy” as acountry with the same unfettered defense capabilities that other countries enjoy.8 Thus it was thatthe debate about Japan’s becoming a “normal country” fully possessed of all the prerogatives ofsovereignty like any other nation predated even the first term of Abe Shinzō as prime minister.9
While debates about Japan’s “normalization” are certainly welcome, these debates are often
narrowly framed as questions over the deployment of military force.10 This narrow framing
obscures the much deeper and more far-reaching consequences of Japan’s loss of “normalcy” inthe postwar.11 It is not only that Japan was stripped, in the constitution which the victorious
Allies imposed upon their new client state, of her sovereign right of war in the ninth article of the1946 constitution.12 The scope of Japan’s debilitation by the Allies goes far beyond Article
6 “Japan’s Constitution: The Call to Arms,” The Economist, vol. 350, iss. 8108 (Feb. 27, 1999), pp. 23-25.
7 See, e.g., Michael Heazle, “Japan Post-9/11: Security Policy, Executive Power and Political Change in an‘Un-Normal’ Country,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 63, iss. 4 (Dec., 2009).
8 Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro, and David A. Welch, eds., Japan as a ‘Normal Country’? A Nation in

Search of Its Place in the World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011). See also Alexei Senatorov,“Japan: From ‘Single-Country Pacifism’ to a ‘Normal Country’?” Far Eastern Affairs, vol. 32, iss. 1 (Jan.Mar., 2004), 55-75, and Soeya Yoshihide, Anzen hoshō wo toinaosu: ‘kyūjō, anpo taisei’ wo koete (Tokyo:
NHK Books, 2016).
9 See Bhubhindar Singh, “Japan’s Post-Cold War Security Policy: Bringing Back the Normal State,”

Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 1 (Apr., 2002), pp. 82-105.
10 See, e.g., Yanagisawa Kyōji and Ushio Masato, “Gekitotsu taidan 2: Goken ka kaiken ka,” Seiron, no. 547(Jun., 2017), pp. 72-81.
11 See “Datsu ‘sengo reji-mu’ wo,” special series, in Seiron, no. 591 (Dec., 2020), esp. Sakurai Yoshiko,“Genkō kenpō namini yūgai mueki,” pp. 27-35.
12 The constitution was promulgated in November of 1946, and went into effect in May of 1947.

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Nine, forbidding belligerency and hamstringing Japan into reliance upon the United States forsecurity guarantees. Taking as touchstone the “state of exception” theories of Italian philosopher
Giorgio Agamben and other political thinkers, I understand all of postwar Japan as living under aprolonged “state of exception,” an age in which the normal business of the state and the nation
has been suspended.13
Agamben and others understood the “state of exception” as the mysterious, disjointed origin of
the political out of what Agamben called “bare life”. The sovereign, for Agamben and others,
stands outside the law and gives shape to the polity from a position not limned by theconstitution. On this reading, the United States is the Agambenian “sovereign,” the omnipotent
leader imposing his will onto a polity, in this case in the form of Japan’s postwar constitution.
But Japan’s state of exception manifests in a different sense, too. This second “state of
exception” is an indelible reminder that Japan lost sovereignty in 1945 and is incapable of
returning to being a “normal country” until this state of exception is brought to an end.
Japan’s state of exception is therefore unique in two ways. First, the ultimate sovereignty inJapan’s case—the power of military command—is held by a foreign power which claims not tobe the sovereign. Second, Japan’s state of exception has created civilization-wide aporia.14 The
entire Japanese postwar is a lacuna, a departure from the past, a long present without a political
future. Japan is not a “normal country”. It is an occupied country, militarily as well as
psychologically, and without taking this into full account nothing of Japan’s postwar, ahistoricalhistory will make sense.
In this paper, I examine the twofold “state of exception” of postwar Japan in three broad areas,
providing specific examples illustrating how Japan is not only not a “normal” country militarily,
but in many other ways as well. First, I investigate the state of exception in the field of law. This
first section will feature a prominent discussion of Japan’s postwar constitution, but will also
include other aspects of the postwar legal regime. Second, I will show how the enforced
abnormality of postwar Japan results in an unwillingness to mount a defense of even its own
territory. Third, and perhaps most important, I will illustrate Japan’s postwar state of exception
through examples of how this nearly eight-decade drought of normalcy has affected Japan’s
citizens. Japan as an abnormal country is very often understood from the perspective of outside
observers, particularly those with a vested interest in maintaining Japan’s weakness. This
13 Giorgio Agamben, “The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government,” in Giorgio Agamben, tr. Kevin

Attell, State of Exception, collated in Giorgio Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2017), pp. 167-192.
14 On the state of exception, see, for example, Carl Schmitt, tr. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, Political

Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of any Political Theology (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008).

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outside-in, top-down view erases the people of Japan, who have been, by far, the most adversely
affected by their country’s exile in abnormalcy during the postwar.
ONE: LAW
THE 1946 CONSTITUTION
The most immediately apparent distortion caused by Japan’s state of exception is Japan’s
postwar constitution.15 Sometimes hailed as the “peace constitution,” the postwar Japaneseconstitution is in fact a permanent surrender document imposed upon an erstwhile enemy tosecure American dominance of the Asia-Pacific.16 While many scholars downplay the fact, there
are none who deny that the “Japanese” constitution was imposed on a defeated country by avictorious one. There are few works in any language other than Japanese which even begin toreckon with the cataclysm and civilizational trauma brought about by the fall of the Japanese
Empire in 1945 and the top-down re-formation of the entire Japanese polity by a foreign power,
namely the American Empire. The plain historical truth is that the prewar Japanese constitution,
promulgated in 1889, was overhauled by the American occupiers to the point of being discarded,
and an entirely new constitution written and adopted in its place, due to what might best be
described as a species of force majeure in the form of the postwar Occupation of Japan.17 The
postwar constitution remains as a kind of mark or brand on the nation of Japan, a declaration of
inverted sovereignty and the condition of being beholden to a conqueror.
To be sure, the fact of the American Occupation’s having imposed the current Japaneseconstitution on its ersatz client state does not mean that this imposition was uncomplicated. The
postwar Japanese constitution is not Japanese, but this does not mean that it was a one-off swapout for the 1889 Meiji Constitution. The postwar constitution is partly the product of far-left
American political activists, New Deal radicals, and other white liberals eager to maintaincommunist and Anglo-Saxon control of the Far East. But it is also indicative of a deep divide
within the American government—reflected to an arguably greater degree within the Occupation
than anywhere else—between indifference or even affinity toward communism and socialism as
ideologies, on the one hand, and rejection of those ideologies on the other. In other words, if the
15 On the Japanese constitution in general, see Hasegawa Masayasu, Nihon no kenpō, 3e (Tokyo: Iwanami

Shoten, 1994), esp. “Kenpō towa nanika,” pp. 2-9, and “Sengo kenpō no rinen to genjitsu,” pp. 17-24, and Satō
Tsukasa, ed., Gendai kenpōron (Tokyo: Yachiyo Shuppan, 1986), esp. “Kenpō no seitei to hendō,” pp. 7-8,
and “Kenpō hendō no sho ruikei,” pp. 9-10.
16 Takahashi Shirō, Nihon ga nidoto tachiagarenai yō ni Amerika ga senryōki ni okonatta koto (Tokyo: Chichi,

2014)
17 On “force majeure” and the American occupation of foreign countries, see Douglas Porch and George

Cornewall Lewis, “Occupational Hazards: Myths of 1945 and U.S. Iraq Policy,” The National Interest, iss. 72(Summer, 2003), pp. 35-47.

5postwar Japanese constitution is schizophrenic, seeming to institute a state while undermining its
sovereignty, it is largely because the American Empire was, and remains, the product of deep
divisions within the American polity. At the time of World War II and shortly thereafter, theinternationalist-socialist wing of the United States—the imperialists, by no coincidence, andthose also, by no coincidence, deeply enamored of communism—was represented by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Soviet operatives and fellow travelers surrounding him, suchas Alger Hiss, Harry Hopkins, Henry Morgenthau, and Harry Dexter White. Hostility to theseforces, meanwhile, and yet inability to resist the imperialist juggernaut pushing the American
experiment out to the Pacific and beyond, was represented by Gen. Douglas MacArthur.18 The
Japanese postwar constitution is not just a contradictory document for Japan. It also reveals theinternal contradictions proprietary to the United States.19
What is dispositive in the historical record is that without the surrender of Japan, and inparticular her apparent acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, there
would never have been a new Japanese constitution.20 It was sheer force of arms which enabled
the imposition of American will on Japan, ideology notwithstanding. As Shioda Jun details in
The Birth of the Japanese Constitution: The Unknown Backstage, it was the GHQ authorities,
especially the forceful personality of MacArthur, who leveraged this force to pressure Shidehara
Kijūrō to go far beyond the scope of constitutional revision which many within the Japanese
government had originally been considering.21 The Potsdam Declaration was a watershed
moment for both Japan and for the United States. With it, the door to pre-war anti-imperialism in
the United States was closed. America was committed to total dominance of Japan. As with the
opening gambit of the Pacific War, the Japanese side found itself mired in a political standoff
emanating from within the United States. This standoff, in turn, made it more expedient for theAmericans to exercise sovereignty over Japan than to tend to the constitutional crisis within the
18 See John Dietrich, The Morgenthau Plau: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy (New York, NY:

Algora Publishing, 2002), Watanabe Sōki, Dai ni ji sekai taisen Amerika no haiboku: Beikoku wo ayatsutta
Sobietto supai (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2018), Nishio Kanji, GHQ funsho tosho kaifū, vol. 9: Amerika karano ‘sensen fukoku’ (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2014), Watanabe Sōki, Sensō wo hajimeru no wa dareka: rekishi
shūsei shugi no shinjitsu (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2017), James J. Martin, “Pearl Harbor: Antecedents,
Background and Consequences,” in The Saga of Hog Island: And Other Essays in Inconvenient History(Colorado Springs, CO: Ralph Myles, 1977), pp. 114-131, and Mitamura Takeo, Dai TōA sensō to Suta-rin nobōryaku: sensō to kyōsanshugi (Tokyo: Jiyu-sha, 1987).
19 Patrick A. Swan, ed., Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, and the Schism in the American Soul (Wilmington,

DE: ISI Books, 2003)
20 See Satō Tsukasa, ed., Gendai kenpō ron, op. cit., pp. 37-42.
21 Shioda Jun, Nippon koku kenpō tanjō: shirarezaru butai ura (Tokyo: Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2008),

esp. pp. 12-23.

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United States. Potsdam was, in this sense, perhaps even more significant for Washington, D.C.,
than for Tokyo. But the pertinent fact for Japan is that it was with Potsdam that the Americans
gathered the full power of their military juggernaut and directed it squarely at Japan, a movewhich would made possible the wholesale refabrication of Japan in the postwar.
And yet, here we must remark a feature of the Japanese constitution which at first seems tocontradict its having been imposed by a foreign conqueror. As Marxist scholar Karatani Kōjin
explicates in his 2016 book on “constitutional unconsciousness,” the postwar Japaneseconstitution was not only imposed by the American Occupation forces, but also accepted by thepoliticians and people of Japan. Karatani relies heavily on a Freudian analysis which need notdetain us here. What is compelling for our purposes is that Karatani links the infamous ninth
article of the Japanese constitution, the article renouncing “the right of belligerency of the state,”with the lesser-known Article One, dealing with the position of the Japanese Emperor.22 For
Karatani, these two articles, One and Nine, are linked, because they reflect a deal struck between
MacArthur and Shidehara according to which the Shōwa Emperor would be spared prosecution
in exchange for Japan’s renouncing wartime capabilities.23 The often overlooked link between
Articles One and Nine is, for Karatani, part of the “unconscious” acceptance by at least someJapanese people of the constitution imposed upon them by those who had only recently been
incinerating helpless civilians in bombing raids.
Karatani helps us to see the controversy surrounding Article Nine as derivative of the heart of theconstitutional debate, the Emperor. The Japanese Emperor, and the sovereignty which herightfully wields, is the nub of the constitutional question in Japan. It was, in many different
ways, the loss of imperial sovereignty in 1945, later ratified in the constitution itself, which
uprooted Japanese society and alienated it against itself.24 Karatani’s “unconscious” is, in myview, therefore best interpreted as a disorientation caused by acute civilizational dissociation. As
Jesuit Peter J. Herzog observed in the early 1950s:
Implicitely [sic], the new constitution [i.e., of 1946] repudiates the former Japanese
doctrine of the Emperor as the bearer of national sovereignty (統治權の總攪者[tōjiken nosōhakusha]), who, in the theory of the Meiji constitution, grants the constitution out of the

22 On Article Nine, see, e.g., Kobayashi Naoki, Kenpō dai kyū jō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982). On Article

One, see Mieda Shigetomo, Shin kenpō dai ichi jō wo meguru kyokō to shinjitsu (sono ichi) (Tokyo: KenpōGakkai, 1965), and Itō Akira, “‘Nihonkoku kenpō’ dai ichi jō no shisōshi (tokushū: shōchō tennōsei hihan no
shiza),” Impaction, vol. 196 (2014), pp. 62-72.
23 Karatani Kōjin, Kenpō no muishiki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2016), pp. 20-28, 36 ff.
24 On the blended nature of Japan’s constitutional position, see Norikazu Kawagishi, “The Birth of Judicial

Review in Japan,” International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 5, iss. 2 (Apr., 2007), pp. 308-331.

7fulness of his power and pledges himself to use his authority only in the way laid down in
it.25
The total cancellation of imperial sovereignty rendered prostrate Japan a virtual terra nullius forpsychological reconfiguration. This psychological disfiguring, even dismantling, is one of thekeys to understanding the “state of exception” in, and as, postwar Japan. As Herzog further
explains:
The defeat [of Japan in 1945] was not only a military debacle, but also implied theevacuation of the traditional political and social order. It left the nation without a spiritual
foundation for its political fabric, so that reorientation towards Western democracy became
not only an obligation assumed by the surrender, but also a pressing exigency for the sakeof political survival.26
The civilizational breakdown which Herzog describes was not a byproduct of the American
onslaught, but the carefully planned consequence of it. Ultimately, Washington waged war
against Japan for no other purpose but this: to psychologically destroy every single person in
Japan. As the Americans themselves put it in a 1945 newsreel:
What does a conquering army do with 70 million people? […] Our problem’s in the brain
inside of the Japanese head. There are 70 million of these in Japan, physically no different
than any other brains in the world. Actually all made of the same stuff as ours. Thesebrains, like our brains, can do good things. Or, bad things—all depending on the kind ofideas that are put inside.27
Pundits who see in former Prime Minister Abe’s attempted constitution reform a return of the
Meiji Constitution are therefore not entirely off-base.28 Indeed, if anything, these admonitions
are much more prescient than their advocates realize.
The current constitution of Japan, although adopted on procedural grounds provided for in the
Meiji Constitution of 1889, is nothing short of an inversion of the sovereign prewar Japanese
25 Peter J. Herzog, S.J., “Political Theories in the Japanese Constitution,” Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 7, nos. 1

and 2 (1951), p. 19
26 Peter J. Herzog, S.J., “Political Theories,” op. cit., p. 2.
27 “Our Job in Japan” (1945 U.S. newsreel), quoted in Sharalyn Orbaugh, “How the Pendulum Swings:

Kamishibai and Censorship under the Allied Occupation,” in Tomi Suzuki, Hirokazu Toeda, Hikari Hori, andKazushige Munakata, eds., Censorship, Media, and Literary Culture in Japan: From Edo to Postwar (Tokyo:
Shin-yo-sha, 2012), p. 161.
28 See Carl F. Goodman, “Contemplated Amendments to Japan’s 1947 Constitution: A Return to Iye, Kokutaiand the Meiji State,” Washington International Law Journal, vol. 26, iss. 1 (Jan., 2017), pp. 17-74.

8state which the Meiji Constitution ratified. The heart of this inversion, the central victim of theAmericans’ psychological campaign, was and remains the Imperial Household. It was the Meiji
Emperor who granted the Meiji Constitution to his subjects. True to Agamben’s theory, theprewar Emperor stood outside the state and formed a system of government out of his sovereignauthority.29 The 1946 constitution used this system of government, rooted in imperial
sovereignty, to deny both the government and the sovereignty undergirding it. As legal historian
Adam Sterling writes, “Broadly speaking, the 1946 Constitution overwrote the Meiji
Constitution in its entirety—including its primary structural pillar of placing the Emperor as thesovereign—while nominally following the procedures in Article 73 [for constitutional
amendment].”30 This “overwr[i]te” is not a reform of the 1889 Constitution, but a millstone
designed to keep Japan in thrall to the United States and permanently alienated from its national
essence. The 1946 Japanese constitution is an anti-constitution, one which does not set up asovereign state but which contains an article—Article Nine—guaranteeing Japan’s dependency
on a foreign power, and another article—Article One—evacuating the font of Japan’s
sovereignty, the Emperor. It is a truism of American jurisprudence and political discourse that“the Constitution is not a suicide pact”.31 The Japanese constitution, by contrast, is a suicide
note. It marks the death of a polity and provides nothing but a reminder of what once existed inits place.
In the 1946 constitution, the Emperor was forced to renounce claims to divinity and was reduced
to a “symbol” of state. This achievement of the long-held desire by Minobe Tatsukichi to reducethe Emperor to an “organ of state”—Minobe was part of the 1946 deliberations—was achieved
only by using the residual imperial sovereignty in the Meiji Constitution to delegitimize thesovereign himself. This auto-immolation of a sovereign’s sovereignty was the supreme act of a“state of exception”. It is the key to understanding postwar Japan. It is not the emperor who is the
symbol, but the constitution which becomes a lasting symbol of forced imperial abdication. The
1946 constitution of Japan attempts to establish a state of exception as constitutional bedrock by
first destroying the Japanese polity and then proclaiming its rebirth. The destruction is real, but
the rebirth is impossible so long as the Imperial Household remains in a neutered state. The“unconscious” acceptance of Article Nine which Karatani notes is not a Freudian oddity, but arealization by the Japanese people that Japan today exists in a slipstream of anti29 See Ogawa Eitarō, “Kunigara wo mamoru kutō no nisen nen,” Rekishitsū (Nov., 2019), pp. 132-145.
30 Adam Sterling, “Implicit Limits on Amending the Japanese Constitution,” Washington International Law

Journal, vol. 28, no. 1 (Jan., 2019), p. 258. I depart from Sterling’s conclusions here, as he argues that otherfactors necessitated the wholesale redoing of the Meiji Constitution.
31 The meaning of this phrase within American jurisprudential fora has shifted greatly over time. See George P.

Fletcher, “The Cliché that ‘The Constitution Is not a Suicide Pact’: Why It Is Actually Pro-, not Anti-, Civil
Liberties,” FindLaw Legal Commentary, Jan. 7, 2003.

9constitutionalism, apparently guaranteed and bonded by the Japanese constitution itself. Strippedof their national identity, the people of Japan are left, psychologically, with no choice but to cry
out to Americans for protection. This is precisely as the American occupiers planned.
No constitution is a suicide pact. Even more so, no constitution can be a mere symbol. Either asovereign state is established by the constitutional act, or it is not. Because of Japan’s uniquesmall-c constitution of harmonious intercourse between the Imperial Household and the Japanesepeople—the gestalt of Japan’s civilization which prewar thinkers had tried to express with theterm “kokutai”—the 1946 Japanese constitution, by reducing imperial sovereignty to a vestigial
legal fiction, establishes no state at all, only the trace of the legitimate state which preceded it.32
It is in the aporia, or vacancy of doubt, opened up by this state of exception that the United States
has operated in Japan since the Occupation. It is also in this aporia that the Japanese state has
persisted in a postwar limbo. The negative sovereignty which the 1946 constitution engenders isalways-already at the mercy of the sovereign state which imposes it.
INTELLIGENCE AND DEFENSE AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS
The postwar state of exception—the broadly-conceived abnormality of postwar Japan—extends
far beyond the most-often-cited example of Japan’s loss of sovereignty, namely Article Nine andthe 1946 Japanese constitution overall. Japan’s loss of sovereignty—or, to put it precisely,
Japan’s impossible attempt to discard sovereignty by sovereign imperial decree—has had
disastrous consequences for the legal and governmental make-up of Japan far beyond the 1946
constitution. The National Security Council and anti-espionage law cited in the introduction
above are good examples. The 1946 constitution rendered Japan psychologically unable toengage in even basic national self-defense, not just militarily but also by exercising thelegitimate police power against domestic enemies and invaders.
As Richard Samuels details in Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community,
it was not until “the late 2010s” that “the Japanese intelligence community was finally the objectof comprehensive institutional reform”.33 Much of the postwar was taken up, Samuels avers, in“accommodating defeat,” and it wasn’t really until the reform efforts of former prime minister
Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotōda Masaharu in the mid 1980s that Japanbegan to shore up its intelligence defenses.34 The protection of citizens and government from
32 For an analogous view, see Yi Tae-Jin, “Treaties Leading to Japan’s Annexation of Korea: What Are the

Problems?” Korea Journal, vol. 56, no. 4 (Winter, 2016), pp. 5-32.
33 Richard J. Samuels, Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 2019), p. 238
34 The contrast with Japan’s prewar and wartime intelligence capabilities is striking. See, e.g., Kinoshita

Kenzō, Nihon no bōryaku kikan: rikugun Noborito kenkyūjo (Tokyo: Bungeisha, 2016).

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foreign attack is the most basic duty of a state, and yet Gotōda found that Japan’s intelligencecommunity was “‘reckless’ (nonki), ‘insubstantial’ (hinjyaku), and ‘incompetent’ (muryoku).”35
For a country neighboring the communist dictatorships of North Korea, the Soviet Union, and
the People’s Republic of China, and ringed by thousands of miles of undefended coastline, it isinconceivable that postwar Japan should have had nothing but “‘the world’s worst intelligenceunit’ (sekai saitei no jōhō kikakan) [sic: kikan],” which observers found to be “‘a laughingstock’(waraigusa)”.36
This apparent inability to understand what a state is for extends even to the use of the so-called
Self-Defense Forces to defend the people of Japan from internal attack. Not only spies slip easily
through the postwar psychological fog—criminals do, too. As scholar of Japan’s postwar defense
and legal system Sheila A. Smith points out in Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power,
when terrorists from the Aum Shinrikyō cult unleashed mass sarin gas poisonings and carried out
other chemical weapons attacks in Japan in 1994 and 1995, “the National Police Agency began
an investigation of the Aum group at all of its facilities.”37 As part of the response to thisdomestic terrorism, “chemical units from the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) were put onalert across Japan.”38 However, even though sarin gas had been “outlawed under the Chemical
Weapons Convention of 1993,” the law of Japan prevented cooperation between the SelfDefense Forces and the police.39 Japan was under attack by a violent criminal organization, but
the Self-Defense Forces idled uselessly while local authorities struggled to respond to theterrorists’ plots. “The constitution is not a suicide pact” may not be as axiomatic as American
scholars tend to assume.
So great is the aversion among Japanese politicians to making use of military forces to protect
Japanese people and property that when a devastating earthquake struck the Kobe area in Januaryof 1995 (the Awaji-Hanshin Earthquake), “the mayors of Kōbe and Ōsaka cities never requested
the assistance of the SDF, and under the SDF Law, the Japanese military could not provide
35 Richard J. Samuels, Special Duty, op. cit., p. 94, citing Gotōda Masaharu, Jō to ri: Gotōda Masaharu

kaikoroku, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kenkyūsha, 1998), p. 237.
36 Richard J. Samuels, Special Duty, op. cit., p. 94, citing “‘Naikaku jōhō chōsashitsu’ kaitai no susume,”

Sentaku, Dec., 2011. Samuels quotes the title, but the actual citation reads “Seiken ga chokkatsu suru jōhōkikan to shite wa sekai saitei”. On the danger of a postwar revolution in Japan, see Ezaki Michio, Nihon senryō
to ‘haisen kakumei’ no kiki (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2018), and Hayashi Chikatsu, Konoe Fumimaro, yabō tozasetsu (Tokyo: WAC, 2017), esp. “Haisen kakumei,” pp. 247-251.
37 Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 2019), p. 94
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.

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assistance to municipalities without a mayor’s request for their help.”40 Even though governor
Kaihara Toshitami of Hyōgō Prefecture, where the city of Kobe is located, “formally requested
SDF assistance at 10:00 AM, four hours after the quake had struck,” the response was tepid.
“The SDF hesitate to assert authority where no explicit permission had been given and thus sent
forces only to locations that it knew had been approved.”41 The 1995 Awaji-Hanshin Earthquake
which leveled parts of major cities was, perhaps, one of the first national stirrings of therealization within Japan that the postwar constitution was not issued for the sake of the Japanesepeople.
Nonetheless, while the law was later amended to allow for greater flexibility in allowing the
Self-Defense Forces of Japan to act in Japan’s defense, such as in times of emergency, thereflexive paralysis in the face of crises clearly calling for military assistance on the ground would
be unthinkable in a “normal” country. To be sure, the Posse Comitatus Act prevents the militaryfrom intervening in police activities within the United States. However, because there is a
National Guard in America at the disposal of state governors for emergencies, but not such anentity in Japan, the Posse Comitatus restrictions would not apply in the latter country.42 And
there are also “states of emergency,” in effect “states of exception,” which authorities may
declare in order to bypass the usual procedural hurdles blocking direct government action indemocratic polities. But because Japan is in a limbo of “exception,” it is unable to exercise thesovereign prerogative of declaring exceptions. The state of exception was declared once, in theimmediate postwar, and has frozen Japan in place ever since. The 1946 constitution is thus
“utopian” in the sense that it produces a no-country which is possible “nowhere” else.
TREATIES AND SPECIOUS LEGAL CLAIMSThe legal nowhere precipitated by the 1946 constitution has left Japan helpless to defend evenwhat are clear and nearly-universally accepted (with apparently the sole exception of the
Republic of Korea) doctrines of international law. For example, in February of 2021, a South
Korean appellate court issued a ruling against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in a case arising from“forced labor” claims by Koreans.43 This is despite the fact that the Republic of Korea did notexist at the time that the alleged incidents occurred, and also despite the fact that the Korean
Peninsula, where said incidents are alleged to have taken place, was under the jurisdiction of the
Empire of Japan. The courts of the Republic of Korea therefore, doubly, have no jurisdiction in
40 Ibid.
41 Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed, op. cit., pp. 94-95
42 See Mark R. Mullins, “The Political and Legal Response to Aum-Related Violence in Japan: A Review

Article,” The Japan Christian Review, vol. 63 (1997), pp. 37-46.
43 “Korea’s Appellate Court Rejects Mitsubishi Heavy’s Appeals Against Asset Seizure Order,” The Korea

Times, Feb. 16, 2021

12
this matter. In addition, the principle of sovereign immunity, a bedrock of international law,holds that no state may be brought to trial in another state’s legal system.44 Furthermore, the1965 treaty normalizing diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) settled “completely and finally” all outstanding claims arising against either Japan or theRepublic of Korea by either side.45 By any measure, the South Korean side is raising specious,
even fraudulent and scurrilous, legal issues intended to harass and embarrass Japan. The
government of Japan is today faced with a phantom set of rulings grounded in neither
international nor national law, nor in precedent, nor in historical fact, nor in treaty stipulation,
nor in common sense.46 It is only because Japan is not a “normal country” and exists in an
unsovereign state of exception that it must countenance jurisprudential phantasms such as these.
Any other state would rightly ignore such frivolities, and would eventually take aggressive steps
to retaliate against the state which persisted in bringing them.
The 1965 Treaty also prevents all claims from the Republic of Korea side regarding the comfort
women, contracted and licensed prostitutes who worked at “comfort stations” for military clientsduring the Greater East Asia War .47 Despite repeated attempts to rectify the situation, such as
by apologizing to South Korea on numerous occasions and paying out large sums of money for
those claiming to have been comfort women (even though said women were contract employees
and worked at a legal profession largely by choice), the South Korea side continued to press its
specious claims—often accompanied by demands for additional remuneration.48 The harassmentby the Korean side reached such a degree that it was deemed prudent by the government of Japanto enter into yet another bilateral agreement with the Republic of Korea, in December of 2015, in

44 For a nuanced view, see Anthony J. Colangelo, “Jurisdiction, Immunity, Legality, and Jus Cogens,” Chicago

Journal of International Law, vol. 14, iss. 1 (Summer, 2013), pp. 53-91.
45 “No. 8473: Japan and Republic of Korea, Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property

and Claims and on Economic Co-operation (with Protocols, Exchanges of Notes and Agreed Minutes), Signed
at Tokyo, on 22 June 1965”.
46 For the ideological interpretation, see, e.g., Seokwoo Lee and Seryon Lee, “Yeo Woon Taek v. New Nippon

Steel Corporation, 2013 Da 61381,” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 113, no. 3 (2019), pp.
592-599.
47 For a complicating view see Tom Phuong Le, “Negotiating in Good Faith: Overcoming Legitimacy

Problems in the Japan-South Korea Reconciliation Process,” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 78, no. 3(Aug., 2019), pp. 621-644.
48 For more on the relationship between politics, historical debates, and money in South Korea, see Joseph Yi,

Joe Phillips, and Wondong Lee, “Manufacturing Contempt: State-Linked Populism in South Korea,” Society,vol. 56 (2019), pp. 494-501. A brilliant overview of the comfort women system is at J. Mark Ramseyer,“Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War,” International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 65 (2021).

13order to allow for a return to diplomatic normalcy.49 Such normalcy, however, is impossible, asJapan is in a state of exception and is not a normal country. In any event, South Korea’s
government-level harassment of Japan, in open violation of treaty and diplomatic accord,
continues.
The 2015 agreement reached between Japan and South Korea, like the 1965 Treaty before it,cannot “completely and finally” resolve the question of the comfort women, because Japan’s
sovereignty was usurped in 1946 and Japan therefore lies vulnerable to just such strategies as theSouth Korean side now pursues to great international fanfare, including acclamations fromwithin the United States by the same group—Anglo-Saxon liberals and socialists-communists—
who imposed the 1946 constitution in the first place. It is no wonder that the very same people
working from within the American academy on behalf of North Korean agents write glowing
essays supporting the nomination of Article Nine for a Nobel Peace Prize. Japan’s endless aporia
is apparent in the enemies which occupy the “state of exception” in order to continue thecivilizational, race war against Japan. The 1946 constitution and the treaties entered into on thebasis of surrendered sovereignty have left Japan open to legal attacks, many of them due to Japan
having been infiltrated by a false representation of history and her government and legal
structure co-opted by a regime of animosity.50
TWO: TERRITORY
OKINAWAThe constitution and law are not the only fields wherein “state of exception” postwar Japan fails
to behave as a “normal country” would. I mentioned above that protecting citizens is one of themost basic functions of any nation-state. Concomitant with that is protecting a delineatedterritory, a geographical area where the sovereignty of the state holds sway.51
The most salient example of Japan’s loss of territorial sovereignty in the postwar is Okinawa. In
the spring of 1945, the American military gained control of Okinawa, partly in anticipation of amuch more extensive military operation entailing the invasion of Kyushu. The American side
retained control over Okinawa until 1972, when the territory was ceded back to Japan. While
Japan was clearly in no position to defend its territorial integrity in the immediate aftermath of
the Second World War or throughout the American Occupation which followed, the 1951 San
49 See also Sakurai Yoshiko et al., “Nikkan gōi tekkai no oroka, Moon Jae-in Seiken no ayausa,” Voice, no.

475 (Jul., 2017), pp. 46 ff.
50 See Yamazaki Masahiro, Rekishisen to shisōsen: rekishi mondai no yomitokikata (Tokyo: Shūeisha Shinsho,2019).
51 See Mary L. Dudziak and Leti Volpp, “Introduction: Legal Borderlands: Law and the Construction ofAmerican Borders,” American Quarterly, vol. 57, no. 3 (Sept., 2005), pp. 593-610.

14Francisco Peace Treaty concluded between Japan and the United States was supposed to havereturned Japanese sovereignty to Tokyo.52 Without this, Japan was unable to assert even basic
territorial control, long after sovereignty was said to have been returned to Japan.
However, the United States continues to occupy certain areas of Okinawa in the form of militarybases. While there are American military bases elsewhere in the world, the forward deploymentof American troops and equipment in Okinawa is rivaled only by that in the Republic of Korea,
which, in historical context, should be considered a part of the Empire of Japan which the AlliedPowers, under the leadership of the United States, conquered in 1945. After this conquest, theUnited States and the other Allies carved up the former Japanese Empire, allotting certain
portions to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Japan, too, was nearly broken up
into various zones, akin to what eventually became West and East Germany. In this sense, theAmerican bases in South Korea and in Okinawa (and the rest of Japan) are part of a much larger
realignment from Japanese to American control of territory in the immediate postwar, with thiscontrol being cemented by American involvement in ongoing wars in Asia. American bases in
Okinawa are an artifact of 1945, and also of 1946. A fully sovereign Japan would obviate theneed for Americans in Okinawa.
THE NORTHERN TERRITORIESApart from Okinawa, the most nettlesome instance of sustained territorial encroachment by aforeign power against Japan is at the opposite end of the Japanese archipelago, the Northern
Territories stretching out to sea north from the large island of Hokkaido. The four islandgroupings comprise, from the Russian perspective, the southern reach of the Kuril Islands:
Shikotan, Kunashiri, Etorofu, and the Habomai islands. However, Japan disputes whether theislands in question should be included under the “Kurils” rubric, which has led to discrepancies
between Japan and the Soviet Union, and now Japan and Russia, over the islands’ treatydesignated ownership.53 Japan is trapped in a catch-22. Without obtaining the return of its
sovereign territory, Japan is unable to conclude a peace treaty with Russia, the stand-in for theformer Soviet Union. But without a peace treaty, Japan is unable to negotiate the return of theNorthern Territories as a sovereign power.54
52 On the treaty, see Kurayama Mitsuru, Baka yosaraba puropaganda de yomitoku Nihon no shinjitsu (Tokyo:

Wani Books, 2019), pp. 137-141.
53 See, e.g., Sankei Shimbun Editorial Board, “Editorial: Putin’s Press Secretary Lashes Out at Sankei

Shimbun over Stolen Territories Article,” JAPAN Forward, Mar. 16, 2021.
54 The 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration was more of an armistice with a provision for the exchange of

diplomats. See Matthew J. Ouimet, “The Stalemate North of Hokkaido,” The SAIS Review of International
Affairs, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 93-108, and Olga Puzanova, “Whose Kurils?” The National Interest,iss. 168 (Jul.-Aug., 2020), pp. 66-75.

15

Despite these seemingly intractable obstacles, a diplomatic solution to the ownership of theNorthern Territories has been attempted in earnest in the postwar on at least four occasions. First,
in 1956, a Soviet delegation suggested that of the four island groupings, Habomai and Shikotan
should be returned to Japan. Second, during the late Soviet era, foreign minister Eduard A.
Shevardnadze and Uno Sosuke, working under then-prime minister Takeshita Noboru, also
discussed the issue.55 Third, as scholar of Russia and the Soviet Union Prof. Takizawa Ichirō
argues, in 1997, during the tumultuous administration of Boris Yeltsin during the early days of
the Russian Federation, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō camevery close to obtaining a commitment from Yeltsin on a specific deal on the islands.56 Fourth,
Russian President Vladimir Putin has discussed the Northern Territories question at length
during his time in office, including during the interregnum when Putin’s deputy Dmitry
Medvedev was serving as what many saw to be Putin’s stand-in as president. As in 1956, theRussian side under Putin again proposed returning two of the four islands to Japan. However, as
Prof. Takizawa points out, by the time Prime Minister Abe had returned to office, the situation
had been stalemated for so long that Abe was anxious to end the standoff, finalize control over
the Northern Territories, and clear the way for a peace treaty with Russia some seven decades
after the end of World War II. Takizawa attributes the failure of the Putin-Abe round to Abe’s
having committed the error of revealing to the press his hoped-for timeline for a resolution to theNorthern Territories dispute, thus providing the Russian side with a chronometer they could use
for drawing out negotiations, extracting concessions and aid, and running out the clock without
having provided Japan with anything in return.57
Considered in light of the “state of exception” typifying postwar Japan, the lack of a peace treaty
between Japan and Russia (and, before that, between Japan and the Soviet Union), noted above,is the overarching obstacle to resolving the Northern Territories issue, and not the other way
around. There are territorial disputes among other countries, of course. These territorial disputes
can be serious, sometimes precipitating war. In June of 2020, for instance, Indian and Chinese
forces engaged in deadly clashes along the Ladakh borderline in the Himalayas, with possibly

55 See “Japanese and Soviet Officials Discuss a Territorial Dispute,” New York Times (Late Edition), Dec. 20,

1988, p. A-10.
56 See Ichirō Takizawa, “Behind the Curtains: How Soviet Intelligence Masters and Japanese Journalists

Brought About Soviet-Japan Diplomatic Normalization—Without the Return of the Northern Territories,” inJason Morgan, ed., Information Regimes during the Cold War in East Asia (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2020), pp.
13-29.
57 Takizawa Ichirō, “Kesshite isoguna! Tai-Ro ryōdo kōshō,” Gekkanshi Hanada, Aug. 2016, 236-245.

16dozens of soldiers having died in the fighting.58 Territorial disputes are emphatically not uniqueto postwar Japan. But in the case of postwar Japan, it is the initial loss of sovereignty to theUnited States in 1945, exacerbated by the “sovereign renunciation of sovereignty” and theinversion of the small-c constitution (kokutai) of Japan with the replacement of the 1889 Meiji
Constitution with the 1946 American constitution, which is the true obstacle to the resolution of
the Northern Territories dispute. Japan and Russia are negotiating at multiple removes from thereal issue, and Japan is furthermore operating from a false position—one of unsovereign
sovereignty which is the end product of the constitution imposed upon it by a foreign aggressor.
The fundamental problem is that Japan is not the same country which engaged with the Russian
Empire, and then the Soviet Union, in the prewar and wartime periods. The agreements which
Japan and her Russian counterparts entered into prior to World War Two could conceivably
guide the negotiations between Japan and Russia today. However, the situation has been
hopelessly muddled by the intervention of the United States, especially by the San Francisco
Peace Treaty of 1951. The San Francisco Peace Treaty is in turn tangled up with the Yalta,
Cairo, and Potsdam conferences, where apparently conflicting and even contradictory
pronouncements were made about Japan’s territorial status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in
anticipation of Japan’s increasingly likely military defeat. Japan was a pawn of the emerging
Cold War powers even before the Cold War began. Because of this jockeying for position in
anticipation of Japan’s defeat in World War II, it is not clear what islands Japan by moral andlegal right ought to possess. Because the position of Japan as a nation-state is in limbo—because
Japan, in other words, is not a “normal country” but lingers in a “state of exception”—it is
impossible to untangle the threads of past pronouncements and treaties and rectify the
disagreements between Japan and her Russian neighbor. There is always a hidden element, like afield of dark matter, which throws the normal course of negotiations and diplomacy off track andupsets the machinery of interactions between nominally sovereign states.
TAKESHIMA
The problem of hidden forces at work in diplomatic affairs is compounded when one considers
the territorial dispute between Japan and the Republic of Korea over Takeshima, known inEnglish as the Liancourt Rocks. Takeshima comprises two very small islets and some threedozen tiny rocks jutting out of the Sea of Japan. As Prof. Lee Young-hoon and his research teamconclusively proved in Han-Nichi Shuzokushugi (Anti-Japan tribalism), Takeshima is not and58 Paul D. Shinkman, “Deadly Skirmish Was Part of a Larger Plan by China, India Believes,” U.S. News andWorld Report, Jul. 17, 2020. See also Jagannath P. Panda, “Infrastructure Build-Up at the Core and IndiaChina Border Tensions,” Japan Forum for Strategic Studies Kihō, vol. 86 (Oct., 2020), pp. 76-81.

17
has never been part of any polity on the Korean peninsula. Takeshima is a part of Japan.59 Old
maps from both Korea and Japan attest to the ownership of Takeshima by Japan. The only
“dispute” over Takeshima is one that has been willfully conjured up by South Korean politicians
and activists.60
However, since the 1950s South Koreans have illegally occupied Takeshima. In 2012, South
Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited Takeshima in a bid to shore up support at home, and in2016 then-candidate for the presidency of South Korea, the North Korea sympathizer Moon Jaein, visited Takeshima in a theatrical display of get-tough-ness against Japan. In Lee’s andMoon’s political performances we can see limned the real issue of Takeshima. South Korea wasonce a part of the Japanese Empire, and in the postwar South Korea has come to define itself
largely negatively, in opposition to Japan. South Korea is, in many ways, a state of exception
dependent upon the state of exception of its former Japanese co-nationals. As outlined in HanNichi Shuzokushugi, this understanding of South Korea as the photographic negative of Japansways the politics and cultural identity of South Korea to an alarming degree.61 Politicians who
do not commit to living out this double state of exception can expect no future among the South
Korea electorate. The irony of the situation is that both Japan and South Korea are unable tosolve the Takeshima dilemma which South Korean politicians use to win votes because of thesame, deeper dilemma outlined above: namely, that Japan is not a “normal country,” having
effectively renounced sovereignty in the postwar. Compounding the difficulty is that South
Korea is not a normal country either, but a shadow of the non-sovereign “state of exception”
which is postwar Japan.
As many within South Korea and in the United States and elsewhere have argued, South Korea isin many ways an appendage of American empire, a holdover from the 1945 haphazard
dissolution of the Japanese Empire, and a creature of the Cold War conflict between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union.62 South Korea and Japan are thus locked in an intractable standoff
over Takeshima, with South Korea tacitly affirming the impossibility of resolution by illegally
occupying, but not daring further to develop, the outcroppings. Takeshima is useful for South
Korea only insofar as it allows South Korean politicians to stage displays of defiance against
59 Watanabe Toshio, Nishioka Tsutomu, Katsuoka Kanji, Shimokawa Masaharu, Shimojo Masao, and Kimura

Mitsuhiko in “Complete Analysis of Anti-Japan Tribalism,” Historical Awareness Research, no. 6 (Spring andSummer, 2020), pp. 9-54.
60 Lee Young-hoon, et al., Han-Nichi shuzokushugi: Nikkan kiki no gensen (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2019), pp.

140-160. See also Lee Young-hoon, et al., Han-Nichi shuzokushugi to no tōsen (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2020).
61 See also Matsumoto Kōji, Kankoku ‘han Nichi shugi’ no kigen (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 2019).
62 See, e.g., Bruce Cumings, “Dominion from Sea to Sea: America’s Pacific Ascendancy,” The Asia-Pacific

Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 10, iss. 7, no. 1 (Feb. 11, 2012), pp. 1-11.

18
Japan, which ironically only reinforces the contingent, negative nature of South Korea as acountry defined solely in contrast to its purported existential rival. In these performances we see
the double nature of the tragedy of South Korea, which is not a normal country precisely because
its nemesis, Japan, was not a normal country first.
THE SENKAKUS AND OTHER OUTLYING ISLANDS
Nowhere is the territorial porosity of un-sovereign Japan more apparent than in her increasing
battle—it is the right word—with the People’s Republic of China over the Senkaku Islands.63
The Senkakus, part of Ishigaki City in Okinawa Prefecture, were brought under Japanese control
in 1895. The name that the Chinese side uses for the Senkakus makes clear that the Senkakus
were seen by passing Chinese fishermen as shoals where they could increase their catch. No
attempt was ever made by the Chinese to occupy, develop, or administer the Senkakus.64 The
Japanese duly annexed the Senkakus, having first mapped the area, and the Senkakus were
included in the documents rendering sovereignty over Okinawa to the United States in 1945 andthen again in the documents returning sovereignty over Okinawa to Japan in 1972, although
without confirming or denying Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkakus.65 Taken in particulars orin the sweep of modern history, however, there can be no doubt that the Senkakus belong toJapan.
But in 1947 the Republic of China (ROC) produced a map bearing a line, comprising eleven
undulating dashes, which was issued without explanation but which is now cited by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China’s mortal enemy, as indicating possession of all
territory falling within this arbitrary line.66 While the Senkaku Islands do not fall within the
Nine-Dash Line, the PRC nevertheless has used the Nine-Dash Line as a carte blanche forpushing out ever-farther into the western Pacific, without regard for the sovereignty of other
63 See Yayama Tarō, Shū Kinpei no ‘sansen’ wo abaku!! Senkaku shotō wa kōshite nusumarareru (Tokyo:

Kairyusha, 2017), pp. 63-66, and Kerry Gershaneck, Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan
to “Win without Fighting” (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020).
64 On the Senkakus and Japan, see, e.g., Takashi Inoguchi and Ankit Panda, “Japan’s Grand Strategy in theSouth China Sea: Principled Pragmatism,” in Anders Corr, ed., Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New
Game in the South China Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), pp. 199-223.
65 See Robert C. Watts, IV, “Origins of a ‘Ragged Edge’: U.S. Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovereignty,”

Naval War College Review, vol. 72, no. 3 (2019), pp. 101-138. See also Robert D. Eldridge, “It’s Time for the
U.S. to Re-recognize Japan’s Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands,” JAPAN Forward, Jul. 23, 2020, and The
Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa's Reversion and the Senkaku Islands(New York: Routledge, 2014).
66 See Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, andImplications,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 107, iss. 1 (Jan., 2013), pp. 98-123.

19
states. In effect, the PRC unwarrantedly co-opted an arbitrary cartographic exercise and used it
as one of the bases for claims against the original and only owner of the Senkakus, Japan. The
map, and the now-infamous string of dashes, now contains nine dashes instead of eleven—hence
the “nine-dash line” problem often referenced in the literature on the territorial disputes between
Japan and the PRC.
Based partly on the fictitious cartography of the “nine-dash line map,” the PRC has been steadily
escalating its attacks on the Senkakus. These attacks are now nothing short of belligerent, acts ofopen aggression in Japanese territory. In 2010 a Chinese “fishing trawler” rammed a Japanese
Coast Guard vessel in the waters off the Ishigaki island group. The Chinese side escalated its
aggression from there. In 2020, the People’s Republic of China issued a draft version of new
guidelines for its coast guard, authorizing the use of force against “foreigners found infringing
Chinese ‘sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdictional rights’” in what China falsely claims
are its territorial waters around the Senkakus.67 This encoding into law of the arming of Chinese
coast guard vessels shocked international and maritime law experts around the world, and manyargue that it represents a test-run for what could be a war over the Senkakus and the wider Eastand even South China Seas in the near future.68 In reality, however, the change to the coast guard
regulations was predated by persistent flouting of both international and maritime law and thestate laws of the PRC. Oftentimes, the “coast guard” vessels which the People’s Republic ofChina dispatches to harass Japanese vessels around the Senkakus are actually People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels painted coast guard white. The ruse of legal
proceduralism on the Chinese side did not fool anyone and was not meant to. In the very act ofpretending to adhere to the laws and norms of the seas, China was indicating that it did notintend to play by the rules on the Senkakus.69
Consider an analogy to help understand what is at stake in the Senkakus dispute and the nature of
China’s conduct in that dispute. Off the coast of southern California lies Santa Catalina Island,some eight miles across and twenty-two miles long and known for its beautiful scenery. With the
exception of a minor insurrection in 1972 related to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, there
have never been any armed conflicts in modern history over or around Catalina Island. If there
67 Ryan D. Martinson, “The Real Risks of China’s New Coastguard Law,” The National Interest, Mar. 3, 2021.

See also “Japan Expects Deterrence to Keep China in Check over Senkakus,” Mainichi Japan, Mar. 17, 2021.
68 See Ralph Jennings, “China’s Tough New Coast Guard Law Takes Aim at U.S.-Backed Southeast AsianStates,” Voice of America News, Feb. 18, 2021, and Saibal Dasgupta, “China’s Move to Empower Coast Guard
Stirs Tensions,” Voice of America News, Feb. 11, 2021.
69 See Monika Chansoria, China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands: Conflict in the East China Sea amid an

American Shadow (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2018) and Senkaku zettai zetsumei, Bessatsu Seiron 36 (Mar.,2021).

20
were ever, for example, an attempt by the Mexican coast guard or navy to harass American
vessels in American waters around an American island, even on the basis of the 1848 treaty
entered into between Mexico and the United States, the offending vessels would be issued one
warning and then would be sent to the bottom of the sea.70 No American politician who
suggested that Santa Catalina Island be ceded to Mexico in order to appease the aggressor would
be taken seriously. If the governments of Washington, D.C., and the State of California refused
to protect Santa Catalina, armed militias and civilian flotillas would swarm the small island andconfront even the Mexican navy in the island’s defense. Islands are not disposable assets, but
integral parts of any sovereign nation which possesses them.
A look at recent history confirms this fact. For example, the British navy undertook a perilous
and highly risky voyage to the Falkland Islands in 1982 in defense of an outpost of the largely
defunct British Empire.71 United Nations and other troops engaged in a conflict over the small
island polity of East Timor in 1997. In the 1950s, the sovereign nations of the Republic of China
and the People’s Republic of China squared off in bloody combat over control of tiny islands
such as Quemoy and Matsu, risking the outbreak of World War III to decide which state would
control the territory.72 It is unknown to me that there is any other sovereign nation which would
suffer, without retaliation, encroachment on its territory even once. In the case of Japan, this has
been happening on virtually a daily basis.73 Incredibly, it happens despite the law’s being entirelyon the Japanese side. And not just in the case of the Senkakus, but more broadly as China’s
island aggression campaign has metastasized to the rest of the East and South China Seas.74
But in the very pattern of Chinese aggression and the legal challenges mounted against it we cansee the lynchpin of Japan’s loss of sovereignty and the reason for its strange paralysis in the faceof invasion. For instance, the People’s Republic of China lost a 2016 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) case over island disputes with the Philippines, which is

70 Lalo Lopez, “Legacy of a Land Grab,” Hispanic, vol. 10, iss. 9 (Sept., 1997), pp. 22-28.
71 See Cesar N. Caviedes, “Conflict over the Falkland Islands,” Latin American Research Review, vol. 29, iss.

2 (1994), pp. 172 ff.
72 See Xiao Ruping and Hsiao-Ting Ling, “Inside the Asian Cold War Intrigues: Revisiting the Taiwan Strait

Crises,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 52, no. 6 (2018), pp. 2109-2136.
73 See Isobe Kōichi, “Tatakai wa sudeni hajimatteiru,” in “Tokushū: Kokka, kokudo wo mamore,” Seiron, no.

592 (Jan., 2021), pp. 42-49.
74 Sheila A. Smith, “A Sino-Japanese Clash in the East China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations,Contingency Planning Memorandum no. 18 (Apr., 2013), pp. 1-8

21
indicative of the shadow of the United States in this dispute.75 The Philippines, like Japan, is a
traditional ally of the United States, and so any dispute over Philippines territory could implicate
the United States Navy or other armed forces into a much bigger war with the PRC. The
presence of the United States, even in the background, ups the ante of any potential conflict.
Sometimes alliances are the most potent enemies of all. Japan’s “state of exception” shows
through in the fact that the United States is a party to the conflicts with China and her neighbors
in the maritime zone around Southeast and East Asia.76
However, Japan has no objective need of American protection. The highly capable and wellequipped Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force could have fended off encroachments by the
PRC when they first began.77 Instead, Japan has tolerated the encroachments, emboldening the
PRC while allowing China time to upgrade its military capabilities. With the full commissioningof the Liaoning aircraft carrier in 2012 and China’s having obtained anti-ship missile systems,
including anti-carrier missiles, Japan’s position in the East China Sea has rapidly deteriorated to
one of parity, if not disadvantage.78 After decades of laboring in the shadow of the Seventh Fleet,Japanese forces find it difficult to stir from the torpor of dependency which the 1946 constitution
was specifically written to produce.
Japan’s “state of exception” fogginess over its own territorial sovereignty extends beyond thesurface of the land and sea, to the seabed. Even under the waves, Japan is subject toencroachment by hostile powers. For example, East Asia security expert Dr. Monika Chansoria
reported in 2018 that a rich trove of rare-earth elements was discovered around MinamiTorishima, part of the Ogasawara Islands situated in the Pacific Ocean nearly 2,000 kilometersfrom the main island of Honshu.79 In February of 2021, Julian Ryall wrote that “the Japan Coast
75 “United States Continues to Challenge Chinese Claims in South China Sea; Law of the Sea Tribunal Issues

Award against China in Philippines-China Arbitration,” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 110,
no. 4 (Oct., 2016), pp. 795-802
76 June Teufel Dreyer, “China’s Two Sessions—and What they Mean for the United States,” Foreign Policy

Research Institute, Mar. 12, 2021.
77 See Sakurai Yoshiko, “Isoge Jieitai no daikibo kaikaku,” in “Utsukushiki tsuyoki kuni e” series, Sankei

Shimbun, Sept. 5, 2016.
78 For a detailed overview of Chinese naval buildup, see Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, “China’s Bluewater Navy

Series: China’s Blue Water Navy Strategy and its Implications,” Center for a New American Security (Mar.,2017). See also Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez A. Cooper, III, “China’s Aircraft Carrier
Program: Drivers, Developments, Implications,” Naval War College Review, vol. 68, iss. 4 (Autumn, 2015),
pp. 65-79.
79 Monika Chansoria, “Newly-Discovered 16 Million MTs of Rare Earth Minerals Can Make Japan

Independent of China,” JAPAN Forward, Jun. 1, 2018.

22
Guard announced it would deploy the 180-ton patrol vessel Mikazuki to the Ogasawara Islands inthe coming months and will also increase the number of officers stationed there.”80 The reason
for the increased presence of the Japan Coast Guard is believed to be connected to the People’s
Republic of China’s encroachments on Japanese rare-earth deposits around another island,
Okinotorishima farther south in the Pacific than the Ogasawaras. Not only rare-earth elements,
but also coral: in 2014 alone, Ryall reports, more than 1,000 Chinese vessels were identified
around Okinotorishima, stealing valuable and environmentally precious coral from Japanesewaters. China has also been carrying out illegal surveys in Japanese waters, no doubt scouting
for other mineral deposits that it can poach.81 China is making it clear that it has no respect forJapan’s territorial waters, and Japan is struggling to come up with a viable response to thisinvasion.

THREE: PEOPLE
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, THE WAR GUILT INFORMATION PROGRAM (WGIP), AND OTHER
METHODS OF MASS PSYCHOLOGICAL DISMEMBERMENT
The surrender by Japan to Allied forces in September of 1945 was a military surrender. At least,
this is what the Japan side at first understood it to be. The Greater East Asia War, of which the
Pacific War was just a part, had been a military conflict, and when Japan surrendered it did so inaccordance with the laws of war. The Potsdam Declaration and other pronouncements by theAmerican and Allied forces and governments prior to the surrender by Japan indicated that thesurrender would include restructuring the Japanese government and political system to a great
extent. But while this much was clear even without the Potsdam Declaration and other such
documents—while it was obvious that, given the ferocity of the fighting and the “total war”
character of the fight, Japan would be doing more than simply laying down its arms when thesurrender was effected—what few if any in Japan expected was that the Allies, and in particular
the Americans, had in mind the dismantling of Japan as a civilization.
Blindsiding notwithstanding, the destruction of Japanese culture and the reprogramming of theJapanese people had become, by war’s end, the main objective of fighting for the American
elites. As Gen. Douglas MacArthur put it, the war between Japan and the United States had been

80 Julian Ryall, “Japan to Station Coastguard Vessel at Ogasawara Islands to Counter Chinese Ships,” South

China Morning Post, Feb. 8, 2021
81 Ryan D. Martinson and Peter A. Dutton, “China’s Distant-Ocean Survey Activities: Implications for U.S.

National Security,” China Maritime Studies Institute, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War
College, China Maritime Report, no. 3 (Nov., 2018). See also June Teufel Dreyer, “China’s Monopoly on Rare
Earth Elements and Why We Should Care,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Oct. 9, 2020.

23“basically theological”.82 It was not battleship versus battleship, tank versus tank, man versus
man—it was the post-Enlightenment Christian God versus the premodern Shintō deities, theentire force of modern, Protestant capitalism and liberal democracy arrayed against the Japanese
race and history. The leveling of Japanese cities by fire and atom bomb was merely a precursor
to the equal leveling of the Japanese psyche by American propaganda in the postwar.83 It does
not matter, as Jolyon Baraka Thomas points out in Faking Liberties, that the Americans had toinvent the grounds for their holy war against Japan after arriving victorious in Tokyo. Before thewar had been brought to a fiery end the American side had decided that Japan’s civilization
would not survive Japan’s eventual surrender. The physical war of planes and napalm wasmerely the means to the real end: the psychological, cultural-level surrender of the Japanesepeople to American absolutism under cover of “freedom” and “democracy”.84
This surrender would have devastating consequences. Fundamentally, one can point to the War
Guilt Information Program (WGIP) as the vehicle by which the Occupation authorities
inculcated Japan into becoming a permanent vassal state of the American Empire. As historian
Takahashi Shirō has detailed, the WGIP was a massive psychological-operations campaign
carried out in order to instill a sense of historical masochism (jigyaku shikan) in the Japanesepeople.85 The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, often seen in the United States as counterparts to the
Nuremberg Trials against the defeated National Socialists of the Third Reich, is best understoodas an extension of the WGIP, a didactic tool for searing into the Japanese psyche the sting of
defeat and and invented shame for having fought against “rightful” American hegemony in Asiaand the Pacific.86 The logic behind the Trial was, as Indian justice Radhabinod Pal pointed out,
irreparably flawed, and the procedures followed were transparently pre-arranged. Some
European and American scholars at least partly concur. Referring to the hanging of Gen.
Yamashita Tomoyuki, American scholar Noam Chomsky writes that “the Tokyo tribunal was
82 Jolyon Baraka Thomas, Faking Liberties: Religious Freedom in American-Occupied Japan (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2019), p. 150. See also James Cogwell, letter in The Christian Century, vol. 128,
iss. 17 (Aug. 23, 2011), p. 6.
83 A minority view contesting MacArthur’s pieties is Helen Mears, Mirror for Americans: Japan (New York,

NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1948). GHQ censored Mears, too.
84 “Napalm killed more Japanese in World War II than did the two atomic bomb blasts.” “Napalm in WorldWar II: Invention, Test, the Bat-Bomb, and Incinerating Japan,” University of California-Berkeley, Center for
Science, Technology, Medicine, and Technology. https://cstms.berkeley.edu/current-events/napalm-in-worldwar-ii-invention-test-the-bat-bomb-and-incinerating-japan/
85 See, e.g., Nakanishi Terumasa, Nihonjin toshite koredake wa shitte okitai koto (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2006),

and Sakurai Yoshiko, GHQ sakusei no jōhō sōsasho ‘shinsōbako’ no jubaku wo toku (Tokyo: Shogakukan,2002).
86 See Ezaki Michio, Amerikagawa kara mita Tōkyō saiban shikan no kyomō (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2016).

24
simply a farce.”87 And yet, the farce continued, because the point of the Trial was not justice, but
psychological domination.
It was in this atmosphere of psychological warfare following the cessation of military hostilities
that the Japanese constitution was crafted. As Karatani Kōjin reminds us, Etō Jun’s work on the“closed discursive space” of occupied Japan helps to contextualize the work of the postwar
constitutional remodeling of Japan. As a programmatic Marxist, Karatani disputes Etō’s overall
assessment and arrives at conclusions different from Etō’s. But Karatani does not dispute thefacts Etō cites. During the American Occupation of Japan there was massive censorship ofmaterials and rewriting—overwriting—of the Japanese recent and more distant past.88 This was
not an adjunct to the Occupation but the very point of it. Total civilizational disorientation was
the goal of the American presence in Japan.89 Etō compares the Japanese postwar, and especially
the American manipulation of information to instill a false sense of self and of history in Japan,
to a “hall of mirrors,” which Karatani explicates as a metaphor for the invisibility of thecensorship, in sharp contrast to the prewar censorship regime.90 It was not just that the Japanese
were being censored, but also that they did not realize it. Their entire world was beingtransformed, and yet it was done in large part furtively, stealthily, thus adding the additional
psychological trauma of the unheimlich to the postwar assault of Japanese civilization.
This cultural and civilizational lobotomization of Japan left the nation and her people in what can
only be described as a state of postwar paralysis.91 The normal police powers of a state werelargely abandoned in this haze which many in Japan refer to as “heiwa boke,” or the mental
disengagement from one’s surroundings which occurs when pacifism is taken as excuse towithdraw into athymotic isolation and reliance on foreign powers to protect one’s own nation.92

87 David Barsamian and Noam Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions: Conversations with Noam Chomsky on the

Post-9/11 World (London, UK: Hamish Hamilton, 2005), p. 67.
88 See, e.g., Kawakubo Tsuyoshi, “Sengo no seiji to bungaku: gendai hoshu no genten toshite no Etō Jun,” in

Handobukku: Kindai Nihon seiji shisōshi: bakumatsu kara Shōwa made (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2021), pp.
282-287. See also Etō Jun, 1946nen kenpō: sono sokubaku (Tokyo: Bunshun Gakugei Library, 2015), andTozasareta gengo kūkan: senryōgun no ken’etsu to sengo Nihon (Tokyo: Bunshun Bunkō, 1994).
89 Aoyagi Takehiko, Nihonjin wo seishinteki busō kaijo suru tameni Amerika ga nejimageta Nihon no rekishi(Tokyo: Heart Shuppan, 2017)
90 “Kagamibari no heya ni tojikomerareta yō,” in Karatani Kōjin, Kenpō no muishiki, op. cit., p. 6, citing EtōJun, 1946nen kenpō: sono sokubaku, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
91 See Fukuchi Atsushi, “Haisenkoku taisei no honshitsu wo kangaeru,” jō, ge, Japan Forum for Strategic

Studies Kihō, vol. 76 (Apr., 2018), pp. 113-119, and vol. 78 (Oct., 2018), pp. 118-124.
92 See Izawa Motohiko, “Shinpū shinwa to heiwa kenpō kara dakkyaku wo: naze ima, Kamakura bushi na noka,” Seiron, no. 571 (May, 2019), pp. 108-113.

25
It is also taken as an excuse to dismiss those who died protecting Japan as “war criminals” and toneglect remembering them, as can be seen in the next section.
YASUKUNI SHRINE
Western history is replete with examples of what appears to be an axiom of warfare in the West:when one polity wishes to destroy another, the first polity must uproot and humiliate the otherpolity’s gods. So it was in 1945 and after in Japan. Separation of church and state has an evenmore virulent anti-religious valence in Japan than in the U.S.A., indicative of the religious
violence which Anglo-Saxon American liberals visited upon a prostrate Japan. The most salient
example of this religious insistence on the complete divorce between metaphysics and thesecular state—a distortion of human nature found nowhere in Japanese history prior to 1945—isprobably Yasukuni Shrine, where are enshrined the souls of those who gave their lives in service
to Japan. Among the enshrined are Taiwanese, Koreans, and non-military personnel such as
nurses. Also remembered are the souls of animals who helped the men in their most difficult
hour, from horses and dogs to the passenger pigeons which carried messages in dangerous
warzones. However, this place where the souls are gathered—this resting shrine of souls which isitself, in many ways, the soul of Japan—has been subjected to a prejudicial and historicallyunfounded attack. It was, ultimately, to desecrate Yasukuni that the American liberals committed
mass murder in Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and many other cities besides.
Since 1945, Yasukuni has been ground zero for the hypocrisy of “American exceptionalism”.
Critics of Yasukuni Shrine say that it is an accessory to Japanese “militarism”. Those critics do
not make the same charges about places of rest for those in other countries. For example, Curtis
LeMay, responsible for the firebombing campaign of Tokyo and other Japanese cities in thespring of 1945, is buried in the United States Air Force Academy Cemetery. Dropping
incendiary devices on a defenseless civilian population could serve as the very definition of awar crime, but one hears little if any objection when American war criminals are interred withmilitary honors. President Truman, who decided to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima andNagasaki, lies in honored rest at his eponymous library and museum in Missouri. And yet eventoday, Yasukuni continues to be viewed by many Americans as a place of reactionary militarism,
a dangerous powder-keg of nascent extremism which might at any time spark the overthrow ofJapan’s democratically-elected government. It is difficult to determine which is more striking insuch accusations, their anti-religious bias or their nationalistic chauvinism.
Nowhere is the jealousy of the American liberals’ idols and the anti-religious thrust of theAmerican Enlightenment more apparent than at Yasukuni. Fr. Bruno Bitter, a Catholic priest in26
Japan, encouraged Catholics to visit Yasukuni and pray for the war dead enshrined there.93 It was
only the Evangelical Liberals who demanded that Yasukuni be shut down, with some going so
far as to insist that it be made a mockery of by being turned into a dog-racing park. As with theTokyo War Crimes Trial, which was an attempt to convince Japan that its political and militaryendeavors prior to the arrival of the conquistadors in khaki had all been irrevocably evil, theattack on Yasukuni, in the new “constitution” and in the general turning of Japanese against theirnative religion, was the imposition of Evangelical Liberalism to eradicate Shintō deities.
CHŌSEN GAKKŌ
Thoroughly demoralized, the people of Japan lost their ability to make the primary Schmittian
distinction between friend and enemy. Without even a religious character left to succor and guide
them, the people of Japan lay open to ideological enslavement by even the worst and mosthostile invaders. Japan is home to some six dozen Chōsen Gakkō, which are schools run bypartisans of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (There are also pro-South Korean
schools, which are run by a separate entity.)94 At the Chōsen Gakkō the North Korean
dictatorship is presented as a paradise on earth, and the dictator dynasty of the Kim family islauded as a kind of peninsular tribal pantheon.95 Students are taught distorted and hateful
untruths about history, and a contempt for Japan and other free countries is carefully instilled inthem from the earliest age. Students bow to portraits of the Kim dictators and sing songs about
the motherland of North Korea. As Geoffrey Cain writes:
Some 10,000 children at schools all over Japan have been known to goose-step in thepresence of portraits of the former dictators Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung, marching
patriotically to revolutionary music. School field trips typically include excursions to
Pyongyang to learn about North Korean history and ideology. Alongside a regularcurriculum of math, literature and science, these ‘Chongryon schools,’ as they’re called,
teach North Korean ideologies of nationalism and socialism.96“Chongryon” refers to the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, one of the twomain groups for residents of Japan who identify as Korean (despite Japanese citizenship being
freely available to them). Incredibly, these schools are not only tolerated in Japan, but local and
93 See John Breen, “Popes, Bishops and War Criminals: Reflections on Catholics and Yasukuni in Post-War

Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 8, iss. 9, no. 3 (Mar., 2010), pp. 1-15.
94 See Chung Dae-kyun, “Japan’s Korean Community in Transition,” Japan Echo, vol. 30, iss. 2 (Apr., 2003),

pp. 30-33.
95 See Esteban Flores, “Indoctrination or Education? Inside North Korean Schools in Japan,” Harvard

International Review, vol. 39, no. 1 (Winter, 2018), pp. 9-12.
96 Geoffrey Cain, “Although they live freely in Japan, these Koreans still support Kim Jong Un,” TheWorld,

Jul. 10, 201427
prefectural governments provide funding for these factories of hate. While the present-day antiAmerican American educational system presents many outrages comparable to this, and while
American students are also taught to attempt violent revolution against their government, it isdifficult to imagine that a school with open ties to a terrorist network—imagine a Taliban
University or an ISIS kindergarten—would be able to operate in the United States, much lessreceive monies from the public fisc.97
Warping minds through education is only part of the mission of the Chōsen Gakkō. These
schools also helped facilitate a massive human trafficking operation from within Japan on behalfof the communist North.98 Beginning in 1959, the Chōsen Gakkō and the pro-North Korean
organizations in Japan which supported them—in particular the Chongryon—oversaw therepatriation of Koreans (some of whom had been born in Japan and never been to Korea before)
via specially commissioned ships. The most notorious of these was called the Man Gyong Bong92, which entered operation as a North Korea-Japan ferry vessel in the fall of 1971. Before
departing for North Korea, Korean residents of Japan were often required to hand over most of
their assets to the Chongryon. (Many who stayed in Japan also either voluntary gave money andother valuables to the Chongryon, or had them taken by force.)99 The Chongryon became
wealthy on the confiscated belongings and cash of those essentially being sold into slavery on
the peninsula.100 The Man Gyong Bong was, in fact, a smuggling and kidnapping vessel which
the North Korean government was using to take Koreans away from Japan in order to populate
the North with slaves for the socialist economy and replace the people lost to brutal treatment by
the Kim dictatorship and famines caused by communist ideology.101 The Man Gyong Bong was
also smuggling drugs into Japan for cash and dropping off spies to roam Japan gathering
information and probing the Japanese state for weaknesses. As Niigata Chongryon head office
vice committee chairman Jang Myong-su (張明秀) said, ”At first the objective [of running theferrying program] was to support the repatriation of Korean residents of Japan, but in the 1960s
97 To be sure, there is definitely resistance in Japan against the Chōsen Gakkō. See, e.g., “North Korea Losing

Support in an Angry Japan,” New York Times (Online), Sep. 8, 2003, and Matthew Carney, et al., “Japan’s
Government Cuts Funding for Ethnic Korean Schools, Claiming They Teach North Korean Propaganda,” ABCNews (Australia), Jun. 30, 2014.
98 This was hardly the first instance of communists cooperating between Japan and North Korea. See Hyōmoto

Tatsukira, “Busō hōki no jidai (ichi),” Seiron, no. 370 (May 1, 2003), pp. 236-245.
99 Hiroshi Matsubara, John Feffer, and Mayuko Tokita, “Japan’s Korean Residents Caught in the Japan-North

Korea Crossfire,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 5, iss. 1 (Jan. 2, 2007), pp. 1-11.
100 Kano Tadao, “Tai Kita Chōsen seisaku: ‘supai sen’ Man Kei Hō gō ni kibishii me wo,” Kankai, May, 2003,

pp. 129-130
101 Yokota Sakie, et al., “‘Rachi wa tero da’ 5gatsu 7nichi dai5kai kokumin daishūkai kiroku (ge),” Gendai

Korea, June, 2003, pp. 42-52

28
the directive came from North Korea: ‘Round up repatriates so that the ship can keep shuttlingback and forth.’ Along the way, [the program] changed into espionage.”102 Chongryon, aclearinghouse for North Korean espionage inside of Japan, nevertheless continues to contributeto the operation of Chōsen Gakkō, which in turn feed the “anti-Japan tribalism” which is a stapleof “education” in both North and South Korea.
In 2018, five people sued the North Korean government over the human trafficking campaign
which North Korea carried out with the help of pro-Korea organizations in Japan. A Human
Rights Watch report summarizes the allegations:
Between 1959 and 1984, approximately 93,000 ethnic Koreans (Zainichi) and Japanesemigrated from Japan to North Korea under the program’s auspices. The North Korean
government, mostly through the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan(Chongryon), a pro-Pyongyang organization, propagandized that North Korea was a‘Paradise on Earth,’ and ‘anything needed for life including housing, food, clothes are fully
guaranteed.’ The governments of both North Korea and Japan (through a cabinet
resolution) endorsed the program at the highest levels. But given the absence of diplomatic
relations between the two, it was largely carried out by Chongryon, with support from theJapanese and North Korean Red Cross Societies and facilitation by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs demand damages fromthe North Korean government for luring ethnic Koreans in Japan on false premises. The
plaintiffs maintain that North Korea intended to attract ethnic Koreans, especially skilledworkers and technicians, to meet its labor shortage. While victims quickly realized that
North Korean promises were false, often even when they first arrived at the port of entry,
the authorities never allowed them to return to Japan.103
The North Korean state took full advantage of the “state of exception” and loss of sovereignty inpostwar Japan to prey upon even ethnic Koreans living in Japan.
ABDUCTIONS OF JAPANESE CITIZENS

102 “Man Kei Hō gō ‘nyūkō tomeru beki’, rachi higaisha kazoku renrakukai,” Yomiuri Shimbun, Jan. 29, 2003,

Tokyo Morning Edition, p. 35
103 “Japan: Protect Victims Enticed to North Korea: Historical ‘Paradise on Earth’ Campaign a Rights

Disaster,” Human Rights Watch, Aug. 21, 2018. See also Satō Katsumi and Kojima Harunori, “Kokuhatsu
taidan: tōjisha ga kaikon komete shidan suru ‘shitsurakuen’ Kita Chōsen kikoku jigyō no suisensha tachi,”Seiron, no. 370 (May 1, 2003), pp. 50-67.

29
In the 1970s, not only Korean residents of Japan but also Japanese citizens began disappearing
from Japan.104 Such was the state of cultural anomie which followed in the train of Japan’s
psychological dismantling that for years the Japanese police did not even realize that Japan’s
citizens were systematically disappearing, largely from a stretch of coastline on the Sea of Japan
across which lay the communist dictatorship of North Korea.105 When one young girl, Yokota
Megumi, was abducted from Niigata in November of 1977, her parents frantically searched forher and then kept up the search for twenty years before being finally informed by the Japanese
government that she had likely been taken by agents from North Korea. The Yokotas’
determination to bring their daughter and sister back home safely provided the impetus to makethe conceptual leap between the hundreds of disappearances since the 1970s being all unrelated,to the sickening realization that North Korea had possibly been carrying out a massive humantrafficking ring right under the noses of the Japanese authorities.106
It was not just Japan. The horrors of the North Korean kidnapping program have affected thevictims and their families in Lebanon, France, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the United States, South
Korea, and elsewhere.107 But parallel to this, and to the nightmares faced by those who also had
loved ones abducted from Japan, is the damning statement this large-scale crime makes about theJapanese postwar state. It is inconceivable that any other country could suffer such outrages
against its population and not have the civilizational awareness to piece together the facts to see
the alarming whole picture. It is one thing not to have the wherewithal to effect the return ofabductees, but another entirely not to notice the pattern of abduction in the first place, especiallywhen the obvious suspect presents itself in the form of one of the most sinister regimes on earth
right next door. And yet, this is what happened in Japan.108 When just one American—David
Sneddon—disappeared from rural Yunnan Province in the People’s Republic of China in 2004,
his family, like the Yokotas, tracked down the last known movements of their missing loved one
104 See “Bookmark: Megumi Yokota Film Premiere A Push for the Return of North Korean Abduction

Victims,” JAPAN Forward, Sep. 19, 2020.
105 Anthony DiFilippo, “Still at Odds: The Japanese Abduction Issue and North Korea’s Circumvention,”

UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 32 (May, 2013), pp. 137-170.
106 Hideko Takayama and Evan Thomas, “Lost, without a Trace; Talks on Normalizing Relations with JapanAre Spotlighting Just How Vast Pyongyang’s Kidnapping Scheme Was,” Newsweek (International Edition),
Feb. 20, 2006
107 See Brad Williams and Erik Mobrand, “Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions

Issue in Japan and South Korea,” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 69, no. 2 (May, 2010), pp. 507-536, andRichard J. Samuels, “Kidnapping Politics in East Asia,” Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 10 (Sep.-Dec.,
2010), pp. 363-395.
108 Araki Kazuhiro, “Imakoso hangyaku seyo, ‘Chōsen Sōren’ shokun!” Seiron, no. 370 (May 1, 2003), pp. 76-

87

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and arrived at the probable conclusion that David had been kidnapped by North Koreans andtaken to North Korea.109 It took hundreds of such disappearances before Japan under the spell of
heiwa-boke was able to make the connection between human misery and the human capacity tocommit evil.110 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the postwar “constitution” hasreprogrammed the people of Japan to live in a fantasy world where denying the existence of evil
by an act of constitutional will is sufficient to eradicate evil from the cosmos. The tragic case of
Yokota Megumi and the many other abduction victims proves the fallacy of Article Nine, and of
the entire postwar constitutional system.
CONCLUSION: ESCAPING THE “ARTICLE NINE TRAP”
In 2017, Harvard Kennedy School professor Graham Allison published a book titled Destined for
War in which he outlined what has come to be known as the “Thucydides Trap”.111 The premiseof the Thucydides Trap heuristic is that rising states tend to start wars with established states.
The obvious real-world corollary to this paradigm today is the People’s Republic of China,
which in its reckless expansionism is daily edging closer to a global war. However, there isanother kind of trap, namely the trap into which fall states which have been defeated by
Colossuses. Let us call this kind of snare the Article Nine Trap. The Article Nine Trap is the trapof heiwa-boke, of complacency, of buying in to the propaganda by which a conqueror
demoralizes a population and coming to agree—even to insist, as though the propaganda were areligious article of faith—that one’s country is uniquely bad and that one’s leaders cannot be
trusted with the police power accruing to all governments by dint of the nature of the state.
The Article Nine Trap is the inverse of the Thucydides Trap. Under the Article Nine Trap, adefeated state becomes unable to break out of its enslavement to its conqueror. It adopts a newkind of constitution, one of passivity and pathological political masochism. The Article Nine
Trap is the trap of those who prefer to act as permanent collaborators and who tell themselves
and others that a given civilization need have no organic connection to a form of government.
The historical masochism and indifference to culture and tradition which are the necessary
conditions for an Article Nine Trap are, in the final analysis, a betrayal of one’s country. A
nation stuck in an Article Nine Trap—and of this writing there is no other nation in such a trap
but Japan—is a political phantasm, a projection through a distorting prism of the endless postwar
present into a kind of hologram of pure politics governing depoliticized and brainwashed
109 See “Tokyo Symposium Pushes for Resolution of North Korean Abductions, Human Rights Violations,”

JAPAN Forward, Dec. 27, 2018
110 See Nishioka Tsutomu, “Keizai seisai de Kim Jong Il tero seiken wo datō seyo,” Gendai Korea, June, 2003,

pp. 29-37.
111 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York, NY:

Houghton Mifflin, 2017)

31
citizens. The Article Nine Trap is the root of the anomie of the conquered, the permanent state of
defeat which festers in the heart long after the flags have gone back up and the various organs ofgovernment have been put back into working order.112
The author of the Article Nine Trap is none other than America, which imposed Article Nine ona defeated Japan and continues to operate on the tacit assumption that Anglo-Saxon liberals, and
not Japanese patriots, are the rightful rulers of the western Pacific. The roots of this chauvinism
and resulting Japanese psychological dismemberment are deep. The United States of America
has long claimed to be exceptional. American exceptionalism is the very color palette of the Cold
War and surrounding postwar, and is the premise upon which the ongoing American presence inJapan is rooted. The shadow of this exceptionalism has been, indeed, Japan’s “state of
exception,” the odd inversion of American supremacy in which Japan has languished as an
adjunct to the Washington juggernaut. The vehicle for this “state of exception” is the 1946
Japanese constitution, the surrender document which also documented the intentional
psychological dismemberment of the Japanese people, as well as the polity which their forebears
had built up over a history of thousands of years.
Japan languishes in the Article Nine Trap still. It is not, by any measure, a normal country.113
Japan has been deracinated from without and also from within, and the proximate instrument ofJapan’s perennial surrender is the document which purports to have created the Japanese stateanew from the ashes of the Second World War: the 1946 constitution. The Japanese postwar“constitution” is a negative image of all other constitutions, the undoing of the very meaning of
the verb “to constitute”. Japan’s constitution does not constitute a polity, it records the death ofone. Article Nine, and the Japanese “constitution” as a whole, do not set up a state, as
constitutions in normal countries do, but rather a continuously perpetuating state of exception, ananti-constitution on the reading of Giorgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt, and other scholars ofconstitutional law. Even Karatani Kōjin, if read in a certain light, seems to agree in principle that
the Japanese constitution, and in particular the oddly-twinned Articles One and Nine, is not a
normal document, not a normal utterance. Karatani assigns an almost mystical power to Article
Nine which helps show why the reform of the 1946 constitution—the only modern constitution
never to have been revised—remains inconceivable for so many in Japan. The Article Nine Trap
is, indeed, deep and confounding, resting largely in the “unconscious,” just as Karatani says.

112 A scholar who understands the postwar constitution and its surrounding cultural and historical context

perfectly is Momochi Akira. See, e.g., Momochi Akira, Kenpō to Nihon no saisei (Tokyo: Seibundo, 2009),
and Kenpō no jōshiki, jōshiki no kenpō (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2005).
113 See, e.g., Linus Hagström, “Normalizing Japan: Supporter, Nuisance, or Wielder of Power in the North

Korea Nuclear Talks?” Asian Survey, vol. 49, iss. 5 (2009), pp. 831-851.

32
However, there are tailwinds which may help move Japan in the direction of sovereign recovery.
One of the biggest changes to occur these past few years, accentuated especially by the tenuresof realist political leaders such as Abe Shinzō and Donald Trump, is a turn away from
ideological globalism and toward the strong national state. Yoram Hazony’s landmark 2018
book The Virtue of Nationalism picked up the various threads of the return to the country as thebasic unit of government, and set the tone for rethinking patriotism, not as a disorder, as so many
supporters of the Japanese “constitution” seem to believe, but as a strength. The nation-state, andeven more so for Japan, a country with an extraordinarily rich and long history, is the past andfuture of political ordering.114 To become a leader in Asia and also to protect and unify theJapanese people—homeless since 1945, a proud national grouping without a government to calltheir own or a nation to correspond to the need for political belonging felt by all human beings—
the way forward for Japan lies in nationalism.
But to recover national consciousness and assume its natural position as leader of Asia, Japan
will first have to recover the true history of the postwar.115 The postwar “history” of Japan which
has been taught in schools and imbibed as a cultural given is a lie.116 The truth is that Japan
sacrificed its own sovereignty in the middle of the twentieth century in order to help other states
break free of colonial domination by Europeans and Americans.117 Japan is not the aggressor ofWorld War II, but the liberating hero. Once the history of Japan is recovered, the project ofrecovering national sovereignty can commence.118 The road ahead, however, will be long andfilled with psychological shocks at just how badly the Americans, and their communist Japanesecollaborators, have deceived generations of Japanese people.
While the 1946 constitution claims the sovereignty of the people and purports to have been
issued in their name, it is manifestly founded on the psychological manipulation of those verysame people and, as a matter of historical fact, was written not by the people of Japan, nor evenunder their advisement, but by a foreign conqueror. The shutaisei (autonomy) vaunted bypostwar liberals such as Maruyama Masao is, ironically, the facilitator of Japan’s ongoing
114 See Yoram Hazony, The Virtue of Nationalism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2018). Unfortunately,

Hazony has little understanding of Japanese history. See, e.g., p. 120.
115 See Ono Kōsuke, “Kijiku no nai sengo Nihon,” Kokutai Bunka, no. 1162 (Mar., 2021), pp. 18-21.
116 Arai Mitsuo, Sengo Nihon no kyogi, kyokō wo tadasu (Tokyo: Bungeisha, 2021)
117 A flawed but serviceable overview of independence movements and their relation to Japan is at Rōyama

Yoshirō, “Shokuminchi dokuritsu no jidai to Nihon,” in Iwanami kōza gendai 4: shokuminchi no dokuritsu(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963), pp. 303-369.
118 See also Mizoguchi Ikuo, “Biruma dokuritsu sensō to Nihongun no taigi,” in Nishio Kanji, GHQ funsho

tosho kaifū, vol. 10: chikyū shinryaku no shuyaku, Igirisu (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2014), pp. 377-399, andAnno Yutaka, Dai TōA sensō no kaisen mokuteki wa shokuminchi kaihō datta (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2017).

33
dependency on its conqueror. The Article Nine Trap does not spring if the Japanese people nolonger believe the propaganda that they are weak and uniquely bad among the nations. The real
shutaisei for the Japanese people lies in a re-appreciation of their ancestors’ heroism andsacrifice.
And that heroism and sacrifice was possible only because of the Emperor. The heart of Japan is
the heart of her sovereign, who is a man, not a piece of paper. The Emperor’s sovereignty
cannot be erased by any document.119 It is a pre-political, civilizational fact. And the Imperial
Household will surely emerge as the final victor of World War II, having survived all attempts
by Americans and their anti-Japanese allies to destroy it, and having thereby kept alive the flameof hope for a new Japan, with the “state of exception” of the long postwar finally behind it.

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