Evaluating Japanese university-led space technology development
and utilisation capacity building programmes in emerging countries

新興国における宇宙技術の開発・利用に関する我が国の大学等による人材育成支援活動の評価

STIG SPACE POLICY REPORT NO.1
Science, Technology and Innovation Governance (STIG) Education Programme
Graduate School of Public Policy
The University of Tokyo

March 2021

The Science, Technology and Innovation Governance (STIG) Education
Programme was established in 2012. It is a University of Tokyo programme thatharnesses specialised graduate school-level education in the humanities and thesciences. STIG fosters human resources who can lead science and technology
governance with knowledge of the science, technology, and innovation (STI)
policymaking process in each field and knowledge of the evidence-building
methods required to draft and implement STI policy. Specifically, the programmeadvances both education and research activities primarily aimed at fostering
policymaking specialists, STI researchers and research and development
management specialists.
In recent years, the STIG Education Programme has developed a strong expertisein international space affairs, including space safety and sustainability, space
security, and space technology development and utilisation in developing
countries.

Funding source
The research presented in this report was funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology’s (MEXT) Science for REdesigning Science, Technology
and Innovation Policy (SciREX) programme.

For More Information
Quentin Verspieren, STIG Education Programme, Graduate School of Public Policy, The
University of Tokyo. q.verspieren@pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp

The report can be cited as:
Verspieren, Quentin, Yuichiro Nagai, and Hideaki Shiroyama. ‘Evaluating Japanese
University-Led Space Technology Development and Utilisation Capacity Building
Programmes in Emerging Countries’. STIG Space Policy Report no. 1. Tokyo, Japan:
Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo, March 2021.

© Copyright 2021 by the Authors. All rights reserved.

FOREWORD
Since its establishment in 2012, the Science, Technology and Innovation
Governance (STIG) Programme has been active in the promotion of evidence-based
policymaking. With this report, providing the first comprehensive assessment of therole of universities in space technology development and utilisation capacity
building programmes with emerging countries, STIG proposes its first major workon space policy, at the crossroads of knowledge management, higher education
policy and science diplomacy.
Funded by the Science for REdesigning Science, Technology and Innovation Policy(SciREX) programme of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT), this study was conducted as a “co-evolutionary”
research project, in which academic researchers work hand-in-hand with MEXT
officials. Beyond producing high-quality academic research, such projects aim tohave a direct impact on the ministry’s activities.
Implementing the ambitious while pragmatic recommendations made in this report,
result of two years of intensive data collection and analysis, would have a great
impact on the ability of Japanese universities to continue to spread spacetechnology development and utilisation knowledge around the world, and would
contribute to maximising the diplomatic and industrial benefits such activities bringto Japan as a whole.
This first STIG Space Policy Report will be followed by many, contributing to STIG’s
vision to become the primary independent academic think-tank on space policy inJapan and in Asia.

Hideaki Shiroyama
Director, STIG Education ProgrammeProfessor, Graduate School of Public Policy,
and Graduate Schools for Law and Politics
The University of TokyoiEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the results of a two-year study on the role of Japanese
universities in space technology development and utilisation capacity building,conducted by researchers of The University of Tokyo in collaboration with officialsof the Office for Space Utilization Promotion of the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). Based on an initial research proposal from
the MEXT, the team of researchers decided to make a detailed research plan toanalyse the role played by Japanese universities, compare them with the bestinternational practices, and propose to the ministry different scenarios for reform.
The project was funded by the MEXT’s Science for REdesigning Science,
Technology and Innovation Policy (SciREX) programme.

Scope and objectives of the projectThis research project studies the central role of universities in the establishment of
space technology development and utilization capacity building programmes forthe benefits of developing countries. In this report, it is defined as the ensemble ofprojects, training programmes, institution-building, enactment of laws, policies andstrategies, facilitating the development of space capabilities in support to theachievement of domestic social and economic goals.
In close coordination with the MEXT officials having proposed the initial research
topic, we identified a number of policy issues that needed to be addressed in order
to meaningfully cover the question of university-led space technology development
and utilisation capacity building. We then derived five initial research questions,answered throughout this report:
1. How to evaluate the success of a space technology development and utilisation
capacity building programme?
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of a “Japanese way” of individual
university-led space technology development and utilisation capacity building?
3. What schemes can be developed at national level to combine the strengths ofeach Japanese university for space technology development and utilisation
capacity building, in a sustainable way embedded in higher education policies?
4. How can these schemes be designed and funded to promote the involvementof small and mid-size universities in space technology development andutilisation capacity building programmes with developing countries?
5. What are the most appropriate institutional layouts and timeframes for such
schemes?

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Activities conducted for the project and outputs
The approach adopted in this study mostly consisted in collecting as much data as
possible from past and current Japanese university-led space technology
development and utilisation capacity building programmes, as well as comparable
foreign initiatives. The data was collected through literature review, offline or online
interviews, participation in international conferences and workshops, as well as
during field visits of universities, laboratories and private capacity building service
providers. Overall, the activities conducted as part of this project were:
▪
▪

▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪

Interviews of Japanese capacity building providers in Tokyo in April-May 2019.
Interviews of Japanese and foreign capacity building providers and recipientsduring the International Symposium on Space Technology and Science, in
Fukui, Japan, in June 2019.
Data gathering field trip to the United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands tointerview capacity building providers in June 2019.
Field visit at the Kyushu Institute of Technology to investigate their flagship
BIRDS programme in August 2019.
Interviews during the International Astronautical Congress in Washington, DC,
in October 2019.
Interviews and a workshop during the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency
Forum in Nagoya in November 2019.
Based on the data collected, a lot of analytical work during most of 2020.
Final workshop to get feedback from experts in January 2021.

Based on this work, we generated the following outputs, mirroring the
aforementioned research questions:
1. A precise mapping of Japanese university-led space technology development
and utilisation capacity building programmes, which was the core request of
the MEXT administrators, most existing programmes being carried out
independently by university laboratories, with minimal coordination with thegovernment.
2. A comparative analysis with equivalent international initiatives, in order toassess the specificities of the Japanese approach, with its strengths andweaknesses.
3. Three thematic chapters analysing (1) the diplomatic role of capacity building
programmes, in a context of rise of Chinese initiatives competing with Japanese
universities’ traditional roles, (2) their educational effectiveness and (3) the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on such activities.
4. Various policy recommendations at national and university levels in order toaddress the weaknesses identified.

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Areas for improvement and final recommendations
Apart from the numerous strengths and benefits of Japanese university-led spacetechnology development and utilisation capacity building, we identified 11 needs,
listed below:
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§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

§
§

Need 1: national coordination mechanism to identify and combine the mostappropriate capacity building providers, according to the needs for the recipient
Need 2: more small satellites testing centres across Japan
Need 3: national point of contact to connect prospective recipients withprospective donors
Need 4: national repository of capacity building know-how
Need 5: extract programmes from their dependency on each professor
Need 6: the government should develop a national strategy on spacecooperation with developing countries, to inspire partnerships
Need 7: the government should not have a too strong direct involvement in
partnerships as it could frighten foreign partners
Need 8: ensure affordable satellite deployment opportunities for all Japanese
universities
Need 9: enhance intra-university coordination leveraging all relevant
departments of the university, to include social sciences in capacity building
programmes
Need 10: ensure that the knowledge transferred will be retained before initiatinga programme
Need 11: facilitate responsibility sharing with private contractors

We then proposed four core recommendations in order to address those needs.
Recommendation 1: national coordination mechanism for capacity building
providers
The first and main recommendation of this report is the establishment of a national
coordination mechanism for capacity building providers, in the form of an
independent non-profit organisation.

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This mechanism would provide a series of benefits by serving as (1) a single pointof contact for prospective recipients, (2) a body of expertise to evaluate the qualityof requests and create appropriate consortia allowing smaller and private providers
to participate, (3) a centralized repository of capacity building knowledge and on
the space development level of foreign countries and (4) an advisory body torecommend a national strategy regarding space partnerships with foreign countries.
However, the main challenge of such mechanism is to promote coordination while
ensuring a healthy competition among potential providers as some projects canlead to very large funding opportunities.
Recommendation 2: internal schemes to foster capacity building
programmes in Japanese universities
This report’s second recommendation is to strengthen internal coordination in
Japanese universities involved in capacity building programmes, in order to (1)reinforce the role of university headquarters in capacity building programmes
usually conducted independently by specific laboratories, (2) leverage all
departments and institutes within the university to provide comprehensive capacity
building packages and (3) foster the development of university spin-off companies.
Recommendation 3: establishing geographic poles for satellite assembly
and testing in JapanThe lack of satellite assembly and testing facilities in Japan is hampering theproliferation of small satellite development programmes and consequently the
emergence of new space technology development and utilisation capacity building
providers. We therefore recommend increased governmental support for theestablishment of satellite assembly and testing facilities, in collaboration with local
universities, with an emphasis on the northern half of Japan, unable to benefit fromthe equipment available at the Kyushu Institute of Technology.

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Recommendation 4: regulatory and/or promotional tools available to the
MEXT
Finally, this report recommends the MEXT to use some of its regulatory andpromotional tools in support to universities providing space technology
development and utilisation capacity building programmes. In particular, we
strongly insist on the necessity to work with JAXA to maintain affordable small
satellite deployment opportunities for Japanese universities. We also recommend
the MEXT to develop funding targeted to international capacity building for spacetechnology development and utilisation, in other words space education official
development assistance.

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概要
本レポートでは、文部科学省研究開発局宇宙開発利用課宇宙利用推進室と東京大学の研究者による 2 年間の共同研究プロジェクトの成果を報告する。本研究プロ
ジェクトでは、宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援活動における日本の大学の役割について検討を行った。研究チームは、文部科学省からの研究提案に基づいて、日本の大学が宇宙分野の人材育成支援活動において果たしている役割を分析し、それらを国際的な成功事例と比較することで、政策再編のためのさまざ
まなシナリオを提案することを目的に詳細な研究計画を作成した。本研究プロジ
ェクトは、文部科学省の科学技術イノベーション政策における「政策のための科学」推進事業（SciREX）によって資金提供されたものである。

研究プロジェクトの範囲と目的
本研究プロジェクトでは、途上国の利益に資する宇宙技術の開発および利用のための人材育成支援プログラムの確立における大学の役割について調査を行った。
本レポートでは、宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援活動を「国内の社会的・経済的目標の達成に資する宇宙分野で活用可能な能力の開発、及び、関連する制度の構築、法律の制定、政策や戦略の策定を促進するためのプロジェクトや研修プログラムの総体」と定義する。
本研究においては、当初の研究トピックを提案した文部科学省の行政官と緊密に連携しつつ、日本の大学による宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援活動が抱える問題に効果的に対処するための多くの政策課題を特定し、次の 5 つのリサ
ーチクエスチョンを導き出した。
1.

どのように宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援プログラムの成功を評
価するか。

2.

各大学による「日本式」の人材育成支援活動に見られる強みと弱みは何か。

3.

大学による宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援活動の強みを日本の高等教育政策の中に持続的なかたちで位置づけていくために、どのような国内スキームを形成することができるか。

4.

途上国への宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援プログラムに中小規模の大学の関与を促進するため、どのような国内スキームを設計することができるか。また、そのような国内スキームのために、どのような資金提供を行うことができるか。

5.

そのような国内スキームにとって、最適な制度設計と期間はどのようなもの
か。

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プロジェクトのために実施された活動と成果
本研究では、主に過去および現在の日本の大学による宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援プログラム、ならびに、諸外国における同様の取り組みについて、可能な限り多くの情報を収集した。これらのデータは、既存の文献のレビュー、
オフラインまたはオンラインでのインタビュー、国際会議やワークショップへの参加、大学や研究所あるいは民間の人材育成支援サービスの提供者などへの現地視察を通じて収集された。このプロジェクトの一環として実施された活動は次のとおりである。
§

2019 年 4 月から 5 月：日本における人材育成支援プログラムの提供者へのイ
ンタビュー（於：東京）§

2019 年 6 月：福井県で開催された宇宙技術と科学に関する国際シンポジウム（ISTS）に参加した際に実施した国内外の人材育成支援プログラムの提供者と受容者へのインタビュー§

2019 年 6 月：イギリス、イタリア、オランダの関係機関への現地訪問、諸外国における人材育成支援プログラムの提供者へのインタビュー§

2019 年 8 月：BIRDS プログラムを実施している九州工業大学への現地視察§

2019 年 10 月：ワシントン DC で開催された国際宇宙会議（IAC）でのインタ
ビュー§2019 年 11 月 ： 名 古 屋 で 開 催 さ れ た ア ジ ア ・ 太 平 洋 地 域 宇 宙 機 関 会 議（APRSAF）でのインタビューとワークショップの開催§

2020 年：収集したデータに基づく分析§

2021 年 1 月：研究成果について専門家からフィードバックを得るための最終
ワークショップの開催

こうした調査分析に基づき、前述のリサーチクエスチョンも踏まえながら、本プ
ロジェクトでは、次のような研究成果を生み出した。
1.

文部科学省の行政官の要請に基づき、日本の大学による宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援プログラムの全体像についてマッピングを行った。それにより、国内における既存のプログラムのほとんどは、大学の研究室が独自に実施しており、政府との調整は最小限にとどまっているという特徴があることを明らかにした。

2.

諸外国における同様の事例との比較分析によって、日本の大学による取り組
みの特徴を明らかにし、その長所と短所を評価した。

3.

次の３つの観点からテーマ別の分析を行った。（1）台頭する中国のイニシアティブも念頭においた日本の大学による人材育成支援プログラムの外交的役

viii

割、（2）教育効果、および（3）このような活動に対する新型コロナウイル
ス感染拡大の影響。
4.

本研究で特定された弱みを改善するための国内および大学レベルでのさまざ
まな政策提言を行った。

改善すべき課題と提言
本研究では、日本の大学による宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援活動の改善に向けた 11 のニーズを特定した。
ニーズ 1： 受容者のニーズに応じて、最も適切な人材育成支援の提供者を特定し、組み合わせるための国内の調整メカニズム
ニーズ 2： 国内における小型衛星の試験のための拠点の拡充
ニーズ 3： 将来の受容者と提供者をつなぐための全国的な連絡窓口
ニーズ 4： 人材育成支援のためのノウハウの蓄積と集約
ニーズ 5： 個々の大学教授に依存したプログラムからの脱却
ニーズ 6： 途上国との宇宙協力に関する政府による国家戦略の策定
ニーズ 7： 海外のパートナーを尻込みさせないよう政府による直接的関与を避けること
ニーズ 8： 国内のすべての大学にとって手頃なコストで利用できる人工衛星の軌道配置の機会を確保すること
ニーズ 9： 人材育成支援プログラムにおいて、社会科学も含め、大学内のすべての関連部門を活用するための学内連携の強化
ニーズ 10： プログラムを開始する前に、移転された技術や知識が適切に保持されることを確認すること
ニーズ 11： 民間業者との責任分担を促進すること
そして、これらのニーズに対応するため、次の４つの政策提言を行った。
提言 1：人材育成支援プログラムの提供者のための国内調整メカニズムの形成

第一に、本研究における最も主要な提言は、人材育成支援プログラムの提供者のため国内の調整メカニズムの確立である。また、そのような調整メカニズムは、独立した非営利団体の形態であることが望ましいと考えられる。

ix

このメカニズムは、次のような機能を果たすことによって、さまざまな利点をもたらすことができると考えられる。すなわち、（1）将来の海外の受容者との対外的な連絡窓口、（2）途上国のニーズを評価するための専門知識の体系化、および、
より小規模な民間の提供者も参加できる適切な枠組みの形成（3）人材育成支援活動および諸外国の宇宙開発レベルに関する一元化された情報の蓄積と集約、そして（4）諸外国との宇宙分野でのパートナーシップに関する国家戦略を勧告する諮問機関としての機能である。ただし、一部のプロジェクトが非常に大きな資金調
達の機会を得る可能性があるため、潜在的な提供者間の健全な競争を確保しながら連携を促進することが大きな課題となる。
提言 2：日本の大学における人材育成支援プログラムを促進するための学内ス
キーム

第二の提言は、（1）従来は特定の研究所が独立して実施してきた人材育成支援プ
ログラムにおける大学本部の役割を強化するとともに、（2）包括的な人材育成支援のパッケージを提供するために、大学内のすべての学部および関係機関の活用を促し、また（3）大学のスピンオフ企業の発展を促進するため、人材育成支援プ
ログラムにおける大学内部の連携を強化することである。
提言 3：衛星の組み立てとテストのための国内拠点の拡充

衛星の組み立ておよび試験のための施設が少ないことは、日本における小型衛星
開発プログラムの発展を妨げる要因の一つとなっており、結果として、宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援活動の発展を妨げている。したがって、第三に、
特に九州工業大学で利用可能な設備の恩恵を受けられない日本北部を中心に、地方の大学と協力して、衛星組み立ておよび試験のための施設を拡充するための政府の支援を強化することを提言する。

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提言 4：文部科学省が大学に提供できる政策ツールの充実化

そして第四に、文部科学省が宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援プログラ
ムを提供している大学を支援するために利用できる政策ツールの充実化を図ることを提案する。特に、JAXA と協力して、日本の大学が低コストで利用できる超小型衛星の軌道放出機会を維持していくことを強く提案する。また、国際的な宇宙技術の開発利用のための人材育成支援を対象とした資金提供、つまり、「宇宙教育のための政府開発援助」について検討することを提言する。

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors of this report and the members of the research team would like toexpress their sincere thanks to the funding entity, the SciREX project office ofMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of Japan
as well as to the distinguished reviewers having recommended the approval of thisstudy and having provided very useful advice along the way.
We would also like to express our utmost consideration to the universities andprivate companies having welcomed us for fields visits: Surrey Satellite Technology
Limited in Guildford, UK, ISIS - Innovative Solutions In Space in Delft, The
Netherlands, The University of Rome La Sapienza in Rome, Italy and the Kyushu
Institute of Technology in Kitakyushu, Japan.
In addition, we are grateful to the Executive Committee of the Asia-Pacific Regional
Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) for inviting us to organise our mid-term review
workshop during the 26th APRSAF, held in Nagoya, Japan in November 2019.
Finally, we thank all the individuals and organisations in Japan and abroad, having
participated in our interview campaigns, having attended our workshops and finallyhaving provided reviews and constructive feedback on our analysis.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSFOREWORD ................................................................................................................. IEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ II
Scope and objectives of the project...................................................................................ii
Activities conducted for the project and outputs .............................................................iii
Areas for improvement and final recommendations ....................................................... iv
概 要........................................................................................................................ VII

研究プロジェクトの範囲と目的 .................................................................................. vii
プロジェクトのために実施された活動と成果 ......................................................... viii
改善すべき課題と提言................................................................................................... ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. XII
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... XIIILIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... XVLIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... XVILIST OF BOXES ....................................................................................................... XVIILIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ XVIII
LIST OF PROJECT MEMBERS AND CONTRIBUTORS ....................................................... XX
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS .............................................................. 1
1. Rationale and purpose of the project ........................................................................... 1
2. Timeline of the project and activities ........................................................................... 5
3. Classifying capacity building programs ......................................................................... 9
4. Outline of the study .................................................................................................... 10
CHAPTER 2: CURRENT STATE OF UNIVERSITY-LED CAPACITY BUILDING IN JAPAN ......... 11
1. Projects analysed in the study .................................................................................... 11
2. Different motivations and philosophies...................................................................... 18
3. The roles of university headquarters .......................................................................... 21
4. The role of the central government ............................................................................ 23
5. Interactions of universities with the private ecosystem ............................................. 27
CHAPTER 3. COMPARISON WITH OTHER DONORS AROUND THE WORLD ........................ 28xiii

1. Overview of non-Japanese donor organisations analysed in the study ...................... 28
2. Lessons and best practices from non-Japanese donors .............................................. 34
CHAPTER 4. DIPLOMATIC EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES .........36
1. Evaluating diplomatic effectiveness ............................................................................ 37
2. Positive impact of capacity building projects .............................................................. 37
CHAPTER 5. EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: KNOWLEDGE RETENTION IN RECIPIENTCOUNTRIES ...............................................................................................................41
1. What do we mean by educational effectiveness? ...................................................... 41
2. Different approaches to knowledge retention............................................................ 42
3. General lessons on knowledge retention.................................................................... 50
CHAPTER 6. IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES .................53
1. Academic and private providers: a very different situation ........................................ 53
2. A few examples ........................................................................................................... 54
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF JAPANESE CAPACITY BUILDING AND POLICYRECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................56
1. Strengths of Japanese university-led capacity building programmes ......................... 56
2. Benefits for universities to engage in the provision of capacity building services ...... 60
3. Weaknesses of Japanese university-led capacity building programmes and areas for
improvement .................................................................................................................. 61
4. Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 67
APPENDIX. DETAILS OF THE FINAL REVIEW WORKSHOP................................................75
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................76xiv

LIST OF FIGURESFIGURE 1-1. TIMELINE OF THE FIRST YEAR (FY 2019) ................................................... 6
FIGURE 1-2. PARTICIPANTS OF THE APRSAF WORKSHOP OF 26 NOVEMBER 2019 ........ 7
FIGURE 1-3. TIMELINE OF THE SECOND YEAR (FY 2020) ............................................... 8
FIGURE 1-4. MAP OF INTERVIEWEES ............................................................................ 8
FIGURE 1-5. CLASSIFICATION MATRIX OF CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECTS ...................... 9
FIGURE 1-6. CLASSIFICATION OF PROJECTS ANALYSED IN THE STUDY ........................... 9
FIGURE 2-1. VNSC SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT ROADMAP. SOURCE: VNSC. ................ 13
FIGURE 7-1. CLASSIFICATION OF JAPANESE UNIVERSITY-LED CAPACITY BUILDINGPROGRAMMES’ STRENGTHS ....................................................................................... 56
FIGURE 7-2. SIMPLIFIED CHART OF THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FORCAPACITY BUILDING .................................................................................................. 68

xv

LIST OF TABLESTABLE 2-1. FIVE GENERATIONS OF BIRDS PROJECTS ................................................17
TABLE 7-1. IMPACT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE NEEDS DERIVED FROM THE
WEAKNESSES OF JAPANESE UNIVERSITY-LED CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES .........74

xvi

LIST OF BOXES
BOX 1 – THE UNIVERSITY SPACE ENGINEERING CONSORTIUM (UNISEC) ................... 15
BOX 2 – UNIVERSITY SPIN-OFF .................................................................................. 28xvii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSACAECentral American Association of Aeronautics and Space

AIT

Assembly, integration and testing

APRSAF

Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum

BIT

Bandung Institute of Technology

DLR

German Aerospace Centre

DOST

Department of Science and Technology

DOST-ASTI

DOST’s Advance Science and Technology Institute

GISTDA

Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency

IAC

International Astronautical Congress

IAF

International Astronautical Federation

ISISPACE

ISIS - Innovative Solutions In SpaceISS

International Space Station

ISSLIntelligent Space System Laboratory

ISTS

International Symposium on Space Technology and Science

J-SSODJEM Small Satellite Orbital Deployer

JAXA

Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency

JEM

Japanese Experimental Module

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

KAIST

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

KHTT

Know How Transfer and Training

KyutechKyushu Institute of Technology

LAPAN

National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (Indonesia)

LaSEINE

Laboratory of Lean Satellite Enterprises and In-Orbit Experiments

METI

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

MEXT

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

MIC

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MUT

Mahanakorn University of Technology

NPO

Non-profit organisation

NSPO

National Space Organization

ODA

Official development assistance

PhilSA

Philippines Space Agency

RESTEC

Remote Sensing Technology Centre of Japan

RSA

Rwanda Space Agency

xviii

RURA

Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority

S&F

Store-and-forward

SaTReC

Satellite Technology Research Centre

SciREX

Science for REdesigning Science, Technology and Innovation Policy

SSC

Surrey Space Centre

SSTL

Surrey Satellite Technology Limited

STI

Science, technology, and innovation

STIG

Science, Technology and Innovation Governance

TEC

Institute of Technology of Costa Rica

TICAD

Tokyo International Conference on African Development

TU Berlin

Technical University of Berlin

TU Delft

Technical University of Delft

UKSA IPP

UK Space Agency International Partnership Programme

UNAH

National Autonomous University of Honduras

UNCOPUOS

United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

UNISEC

University Space Engineering Consortium

UNOOSA

United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs

UP

University of the Philippines

VAST

Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology

VNSC

Vietnam National Space Centre

xix

LIST OF PROJECT MEMBERS AND
CONTRIBUTORS
Disclaimer: Although administrators of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT) have been involved in the design and developmentof this study, the views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the writers
only (underlined below) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or positionof the MEXT or The University of Tokyo.

Project leader
Professor Hideaki Shiroyama, Graduate School of Public Policy, The University ofTokyo

Research team members
Professor Shinichi Nakasuka, Graduate School of Engineering, The University ofTokyo
Dr Quentin Verspieren, Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo
Dr Yuichiro Nagai, College of International Relations, Nihon University
Mr Do Xuan Phong, Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo

Administrators of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT)
Ms Emiko Ishida (FY2019-2020)
Ms Kuniko Takeda (FY2020)
Mr Masahide Kokubun (FY2020)
Ms Seiko Kurisu (FY2019)
Ms Kanae Kurata (FY2019)

Report contributors
Ms Naoko Shimmi, Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyoxx

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONSThis study project was funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT) as part of its Science for REdesigning Science,
Technology and Innovation Policy (SciREX) programme. Every year, under the
SciREX programme, the MEXT issues a call for proposals based on a list of research
topics proposed by various offices in the ministry. Interested universities andresearch institutes can therefore submit research proposals, which are then revised
during joint discussions between the proposing office and interested researchers.
Proposed in the autumn of 2018 by the MEXT’s Office for Space Utilization
Promotion, this project expressed the administrators’ desire to get a precise pictureof the role played by Japanese universities in space technology development andutilisation capacity building and to identify areas of improvement. Based on thisinitial proposal, our team decided to make a detailed research plan to analyse therole played by Japanese universities, compare them with the best international
practices, and propose to the ministry different scenarios for reform.
The official project title was “Empirical research contributing to the examination of
the domestic framework supporting Japanese university-led space technology
development and utilisation capacity building programmes for the benefits ofdeveloping countries” or in Japanese: 新興国における宇宙技術の開発・利用に関する我が国の大学等による人材育成支援活動のための国内枠組みとその展開可能性の検討に資する実証的研究.
This introductory chapter is organised as follows: (1) the rationale and purpose of
the project, (2) the activities conducted as part of the study, (3) the classification ofprojects analysed here and (4) the outline of the report.

1. Rationale and purpose of the projectThis section introduces the overall rationale and goals of the study project andclarifies its scope.

1.1. What is space technology development and utilisation capacity
building?
The core of this study is the role played by Japanese universities in spacetechnology development and utilisation capacity building. But what is it?
There are numerous definitions of capacity building, or capacity development. The
definition used in this report is the one developed by the United Nations Office forDisaster Risk Reduction:

1

The process by which people, organizations and society systematicallystimulate and develop their capacities over time to achieve social andeconomic goals. It is a concept that extends the term of capacity-building toencompass all aspects of creating and sustaining capacity growth over time.
It involves learning and various types of training, but also continuous efforts todevelop institutions, political awareness, financial resources, technology
systems and the wider enabling environment.1

In the field of space technology development and utilisation, capacity buildingmeans the ensemble of projects, training programmes, institution-building,enactment of laws, policies and strategies, facilitating the development of spacecapabilities in support to the achievement of domestic social and economic goals.
Among the projects reviewed in this report, it can include, among many others:
▪

▪

▪
▪

▪

Joint satellite development projects, in order to transfer satellite design,assembly, integration and testing knowledge from established space
powers to aspiring ones.
The installation of satellite ground stations in developing countries in order
to benefit from complimentary data available from advanced foreignsatellites (e.g. Landsat, ALOS), and associated trainings.
The establishment of centres for geospatial data analysis, in support oflocal needs.
The joint drafting of national strategies, policies and laws in order to form
the basis of a sustainable space programme in aspiring spacefaring
countries.
The organisation of space technology development and utilisation
education programmes in the target countries or in universities in the donor
country.

As we demonstrate in this report, capacity building can and should take various
forms, in order to be adapted to the specific situation of the recipient to reach fullefficiency, while also corresponding to the goals and interests of the donor.

1.2. Scope and research goals
This research project investigates the central role of universities in theestablishment of space technology development and utilisation capacity building
programmes for the benefits of developing countries. Our first venture into this topic
was to identify specific policy issues in relations with university-led space capacity
building and to derive research questions from them.
In close coordination with the MEXT administrators having proposed the research
topic, we identified a number of policy issues that needed to be addressed in order1‘Capacity’, United Nations Officer for Disaster Risk Reduction, accessed 26 November
2020, https://www.undrr.org/terminology/capacity.

2to meaningfully cover the question of university-led space technology development
and utilisation capacity building:
o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Japanese university-led space technology development and utilisation capacity
building contributes to emerging and developing countries and their
universities.
While space technology development and utilisation capacity building is an
important activity regarding Japanese space technology exports and moregenerally space business extension, it is also a meaningful educational andresearch activity in terms of international cooperation. In this context, spacecapacity building is worthwhile for Japanese universities themselves based on
the nature of the university while being also effective for Japan as a whole (allJapan strategy). However, existing Japanese university-led space capacity
building programmes with developing countries are seen as independent
initiatives from these universities, not as a comprehensive Japanese
government policy. It is important for the MEXT to give a national coherence tothese various efforts.
However, it has not been identified how space technology development andutilisation capacity building programmes contribute to donor universities
themselves in terms of education and research, and university management.
Moreover, relations between universities headquarters and laboratories
involved in space capacity building are, especially in the case of small and midsize universities having limited resources, critical for the success of the
programmes. In order to promote the involvement of such universities, forexample to improve their international attractivity and to increase their accessto external sources of funding, it is necessary to develop a precise scheme
clarifying role-sharing between all internal actors. It is therefore important forsmall and mid-size universities to develop a strong strategic vision regarding
international cooperation projects.
As for big universities, which are leading most of existing space technology
development and utilisation capacity building programmes in Japan,
laboratories tend to act with a certain freedom. It would be preferable for the
long-term sustainability of such programmes to be integrated in a universitywide strategy, highlighting the important role of university headquarters.
In addition, the actual contributions of such capacity building programmes torecipient countries and to universities have never been evaluated, as well as
their significance compared to similar activities of other countries.
Although there are various practices accumulated over the years, themethodology of space technology development and utilisation capacity
building has not been established yet and such programmes suffer from a lackof sustainability and mid to long-term perspective.
Finally, space capacity building programmes being labour intensive, theyrequire the involvement of many actors in Japanese universities, in particular
students. However, for students in aerospace engineering, participating in suchinternational cooperation programmes does not provide any clear career3

benefit considering the existing aerospace engineer career path in Japan.
Identifying and promoting clear and attractive international cooperation career
paths for Japanese aerospace engineers would contribute to solving this issue.
Based on the aforementioned policy issues, we designed five initial researchquestions, answered throughout this report:
1. How to evaluate the success of a space technology development andutilisation capacity building programme?
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of a “Japanese way” of individual
university-led space technology development and utilisation capacity
building?
3. What schemes can be developed at national level to combine the strengthsof each Japanese university for space technology development and utilisation
capacity building, in a sustainable way embedded in higher education
policies?
4. How can these schemes be designed and funded to promote the involvementof small and mid-size universities in space technology development andutilisation capacity building programmes with developing countries?
5. What are the most appropriate institutional layouts and timeframes for such
schemes?

1.3. Approach for data collection
The approach adopted in this study mostly consisted in collecting as much data as
possible from past and current Japanese university-led space technology
development and utilisation capacity building programmes, as well as comparable
foreign initiatives. The data was collected through literature review, offline or online
interviews, participation in international conferences and workshops, as well as
during field visits of universities, laboratories and private capacity building service
providers. The details of interviews and field trips is provided in section 2 below.
The data collected helped us to understand all the facets of space technology
development and utilisation capacity building programmes: why were they started?
With what resources? How were they appreciated by the recipient organisation?
What was the involvement of the country’s central government? Are these
programmes part of university-wide or government-wide strategies? Is it preferable
to rely directly on university laboratories or establish a dedicated spin-off company?
Etc.
Then, after understanding the subtleties of the issue, we defined and evaluatedscenarios to enhance Japanese efforts in this field, relying on the team members
expertise in public administration, in particular concerning the Japanese
government.

41.4. Outputs
The concrete outputs of this study, mirroring the aforementioned researchquestions, are:
1. A precise mapping of Japanese university-led space technology development
and utilisation capacity building programmes, which was the core request of
the MEXT administrators, most existing programmes being carried out
independently by university laboratories, with minimal coordination with thegovernment.
2. A comparative analysis with equivalent international initiatives, in order toassess the specificities of the Japanese approach, with its strengths andweaknesses.
3. Various policy recommendations at national and university levels in order toaddress some of the weaknesses identified.
4. Finally, additional considerations on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic onspace technology development and utilisation capacity building programmes,
which usually require a high level of hands-on involvement.

2. Timeline of the project and activities
This section briefly summarises the activities that have been conducted by the
research team as part of this study. It includes numerous interviews, field visits ofuniversities or private providers of capacity building services, international
conferences and coordination meetings with MEXT administrators.

First year (FY 2019)
After the study project kick-off in April 2019, we focussed on understanding thecurrent state of Japanese university-led capacity building by conducting interviewsof prominent Japanese professors, both in Tokyo and during the International
Symposium on Space Technology and Science, biennial Japanese international
conference, last held in Fukui, Japan in June 2019. The first-year timeline (April 2019
– March 2020) is shown on figure 1-1.

5

Figure 1-1. Timeline of the first year (FY 2019)

After initial interviews in Japan, we organised a large-scale data gathering field tripin Europe in order to investigate the role played by different capacity building
providers and compare their history, motivations and activities with those ofJapanese providers: Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. in the United Kingdom, theSapienza University of Rome and ISISPACE in the Netherlands.
Then, after a fascinating visit of the Kyushu Institute of Technology, to investigate
their flagship BIRDS programme, we attended two major space conferences: theInternational Astronautical Congress (IAC) in Washington, DC and the Asia-PacificRegional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) in Nagoya, Japan. In both events, we
conducted numerous interviews, mostly with capacity building recipients fromCentral and South Americas, Africa and Southeast Asia.
The APRSAF in Nagoya was a perfect opportunity for us to hold a workshop, on 26
November 2019, titled “Challenges to Academic Space Programs: The Function of
Capacity-building in Promoting International Space Cooperation,” in order to sharethe initial results of our study, and to organise presentations and a panel withprominent experts of the Asia-Pacific region. After an initial keynote address by Dr
Quentin Verspieren on the scope and purpose of the study and on the datacollected so far, the first session, titled “Outcomes and Obstacles in the Existing
Academic Space Programs,” welcomed presentations from Professor ShinichiNakasuka of The University of Tokyo (also member of this study group), Mr Alex Da
Silva of SSTL and Ms Rei Kawashima of non-profit organisation UNISEC. Then,session two, titled “Possible Mechanisms for Coordinating the Roles of Academic
Institute, Government and Industry,” consisted in a panel with Professor Pham Anh
Tuan, Director General of the Vietnam National Space Centre, Professor Joel
Joseph Marciano, Director General of the Philippines Space Agency, Professor
Toshinori Kuwahara of Tohoku University, Japan and Dr Mukund Rao of the
National Institute of Advanced Studies, India.

6

Figure 1-2. Participants of the APRSAF workshop of 26 November 2019

The latter part of the first year was unfortunately impacted by the COVID-19
pandemic, preventing us to conduct additional data gathering field visits. We
therefore focussed on analysing the great amount of data collected up to November
2019.
Throughout the first year, we had four coordinating meetings with the MEXT
administrators in order to share the status of the project and gather their feedback.

Second year (FY 2020)
The second year having been entirely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, we wereprevented from conducting the data gathering trips that we had planned to Africa,
South America and Middle East. Instead, we focussed on providing the best
analysis from the data collected during the first year, which was completed by a
few additional interviews. These interviews provided the bits of missing informationnecessary to complete our analysis. Figure 1-3 displays the timeline of the secondand final year of the study (April 2020 – March 2021).

7

Figure 1-3. Timeline of the second year (FY 2020)

After completing the first draft of the report, we organised a review workshop withexternal experts, some of whom have been interviewed for the study. Based on
their feedback and those of selected reviewers, the final version of this report wascompleted.
In addition to our existing plan, we decided to transform the COVID-19 pandemic
from a challenge into an opportunity: how does such a worldwide situation impact
capacity building programmes? Simple considerations were therefore added in thelatter part of the second year.

Map of interviewees
As part of this study, we interviewed 30 stakeholders from 13 countries. Amongthem, 11 from four countries were on the donor side and 19 from 9 countries wereon the recipient side of a capacity building programme. They are displayed on figure
1-4.

Figure 1-4. Map of interviewees83. Classifying capacity building programs
This study has analysed 13 capacity building projects involving a variety ofrecipients and donors. Among these projects, we identified two types of recipients(universities or government agencies) and three types of donors (universities,
university spin-off/out companies and large established corporations). It allowed us
to classify studied projects using the matrix shown on figure 1-5.

Figure 1-5. Classification matrix of capacity building projects

In addition to this matrix, we classified projects in this study based on our
information source, whether we interviewed only one side (either donor or recipient),
both sides, or a third party. Depending on the project, it was critical to hear fromboth sides to conduct a clear evaluation of its impact. Figure 1-6 displays theclassification of the projects or entities analysed as part of this report anddifferentiate with a colour code the source of the data.

Figure 1-6. Classification of projects analysed in the study9

4. Outline of the study
After the current introductory chapter, the study is organised as follows. First two
chapters present an overview of space technology development and utilisation
capacity building programmes conducted by both Japanese and foreignorganisations.
Chapter 2 presents a detailed overview of the current state of university-led spacetechnology development and utilisation capacity building programmes in Japan.
Through four core examples, this chapter identifies the different motivations andphilosophies of university laboratories providing such services, as well as the role
played by different stakeholders: university headquarters, the central government
and private contractors.
Chapter 3 then introduces the cases of foreign providers of capacity building
services in Europe and Asia and draws lessons from them. One particular featureof foreign capacity building programmes in contrast with Japanese ones is that theytend to be primarily conducted by university spin-off companies rather than by theuniversity laboratories themselves.
These two data-intensive chapters are then followed by three thematic chapters,
focussing respectively on the diplomatic role of capacity building programmes, on
their educational effectiveness and on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic onsuch activities.
Chapter 4 provides a precise analysis of the diplomatic effectiveness of Japanese
university-led capacity building programmes. After defining five specific criteria, thechapter lists the concrete diplomatic benefits provided by international capacity
building for Japan as a whole and therefore the need for the central government tosupport such projects.
Chapter 5 evaluates the educational effectiveness of capacity building
programmes by looking at the long-term retention of the knowledge transferred torecipient countries and draws good practices to be followed by Japanese providers.
Chapter 6 is a short chapter providing preliminary considerations on the impact of
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic on space technology development and utilisation
capacity building activities.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents all the conclusions of the report and the final policy
recommendations of the research team. It starts by outlining the strengths ofJapanese university-led capacity building programmes, as well as the benefits foruniversities to involve in such activities, before providing a fair and transparent
assessment of the weaknesses of Japanese programmes. Finally, after deriving
needs from those weaknesses, it introduces a series of four policy
recommendations to address them.

10

CHAPTER 2: CURRENT STATE OF UNIVERSITYLED CAPACITY BUILDING IN JAPANJapanese universities have been at the forefront of space technology development
and utilisation capacity building in the last five years. From the Kyushu Institute ofTechnology’s (Kyutech) BIRDS programme to The University of Tokyo’s Intelligent
Space System Laboratory’s (ISSL) TRICOM project, numerous initiatives ofJapanese universities – public or private, big or small – have helped developing
countries to acquire their first satellite, capabilities for satellite operations or
geospatial data analysis, a national space development strategy, etc. This chapter
presents the current state of university-led capacity building in Japan by focussing
on different features: nature of service provided, size and type of universities
involved, motivations of professors having initiated the programmes, the roles ofthe private sector and the central government, etc.

1. Projects analysed in the study
In order to get the most precise understanding of the current landscape of Japanese
university-led capacity building, we conducted a thorough evaluation of four
programmes and projects:
▪

▪

▪

▪

The PHL-Microsat programme, in which the Philippines obtained two
remote sensing microsatellites, DIWATA-1 and 2, with the support of
Hokkaido University and Tohoku University.
The MicroDragon project, in which a consortium of five universities – The
University of Tokyo, Keio University, Hokkaido University, Tohoku
University and Kyutech – provided the Vietnam National Space Centre(VNSC) with a remote sensing microsatellite.
The RWASAT-1 project, during which The University of Tokyo’s ISSL
helped Rwanda to develop its first satellite and a national spacedevelopment strategy.
Last but not least, Kyutech’s BIRDS programme, which educated fivegenerations of engineers and provided numerous developing countries with
their first satellite.

These projects and programmes are further introduced below. The specificities ofthe projects and programmes are then developed in other sections and chapterswhen relevant.

11

Focus 1: PHL-Microsat
PHL-Microsat (pronounced Phil-Microsat) was a joint project of the University of thePhilippines (UP) Diliman and the Philippines’ Department of Science andTechnology (DOST) that contributed to the deployment into orbit of two remotesensing microsatellites, DIWATA-1 and 2 and the acquisition of knowledge onsatellite design, operations and geospatial data analysis, in collaboration with
Hokkaido University and Tohoku University.
The programme was initiated by the Japanese side when Professor Yukihiro
Takahashi met DOST Secretary Mario Montejo in 2013 and proposed to him acollaboration in order to support the development of satellite remote sensing
capabilities in the Philippines. Then, in 2014, a Filipino delegation visited Hokkaido
University. An important aspect of this collaboration is that it was initiated by the
mission side, Professor Takahashi being specialised in optical remote sensing anddeveloping cameras in his laboratory. Later, Professor Takahashi reached out to hisformer colleague Professor Kazuya Yoshida of Tohoku University, to ask for his
support for satellite bus development.
The purpose on the Japanese side was primarily to get funding, development anddeployment opportunities for Professor Takahashi’s satellite remote sensing
technologies, and on the Filipino side to build its capacities – in terms of humanresources – in space and geospatial engineering and to obtain two advanced
satellites for various applications such as monitoring the national territory (precise
mapping) and islands (coastal areas), with a focus on disaster prevention and relief(typhoon), agriculture and ocean quality (for fisheries).
The four-year programme was entirely funded by the DOST’s Philippine Council for
Industry, Energy, and Emerging Technology Research and Development (DOSTPCIEERD), for a total of around USD 10 million. Tohoku University received USD 5
million and Hokkaido University USD 3 million (not including students/scholars’
expenses). The programme’s outcomes are the following:▪

The joint development, in Tohoku University, of two 50 kg microsatellites,
DIWATA-1 and 2, equipped with remote sensing instruments (cameras) jointly
developed in Hokkaido University. DIWATA-1 was deployed from theInternational Space Station (ISS) on 27 April 2016 and DIWATA-2 was directly
launched in orbit by a H-IIA rocket on 29 October 2018.

▪

The master’s and doctoral studies of more than 20 Filipino students andengineers in Japanese universities from April 2015. Both Hokkaido University
and Tohoku University welcomed around 10 students each.

▪

On the Filipino side, the development of a research infrastructure at UP Diliman
and at the DOST’s Advance Science and Technology Institute (DOST-ASTI),
both in terms of physical infrastructure and organisational structure withthematic research groups.

12▪

Technology (e.g. star sensor, attitude determination and control system) andknowledge transfer.

Focus 2: MicroDragon
The MicroDragon project was part of the long-term satellite development roadmap
established by the Vietnam National Satellite Centre (VNSC, now Vietnam National
Space Centre), shown on Figure 2-1. VNSC is one of the two Vietnamese entities
involved in space technology development, along with the Space Technology
Institute. Both are under the umbrella of the Vietnam Academy of Science andTechnology (VAST).

Figure 2-1. VNSC satellite development roadmap. Source: VNSC.

The MicroDragon project was part of a larger initiative of VAST called the Vietnam
Space Centre (VSC) project, consisting in three goals: (1) build space technology
development and utilisation facilities in Vietnam, (2) transfer satellite technology toVietnam from advanced space nations and (3) build capacity among Vietnameseengineers. 2 The VSC project is partially funded through an official development
assistance (ODA) loan granted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA) to the VNSC. In order to contribute to the achievement of points (2) and (3),
VNSC Director General Pham Anh Tuan and Professor Nakasuka discussed acomprehensive capacity building package including sending VNSC engineers to
study in Japanese universities and build a 50 kg remote sensing satellite.

2‘Vietnam Space Center Project’, Vietnam National Space Center, 12 October 2015,
https://vnsc.org.vn/en/projects/vietnam-space-center-project/.

13Professor Nakasuka therefore gathered a consortium of five universities, including
his university, The University of Tokyo, as well as Keio University, Hokkaido
University, Tohoku University and Kyutech. This consortium was administered by athird party, alternatively PADECO Co., Ltd. and UNISEC (cf. Box 1). Thirty-six young
engineers were then sent to Japan to follow master’s degrees in partner universities
and work on the design and development of MicroDragon, a 50 kg remote sensing
microsatellite. Contracts were awarded in the form of contract research (委託研究)
from VNSC, not collaborative research (共同研究).
After the launch of MicroDragon on 18 January 2019 as secondary payload on a
Japanese Epsilon rocket, and after initial operations in Japan, the VNSC engineers
returned to Vietnam to work on the LOTUSat radar satellite, developed incollaboration with Japanese satellite manufacturer NEC and final iteration of thenational satellite roadmap.
The various participants of this project had different purposes. While VNSC wasprimarily motivated by education and human resources development, the Japanese
universities involved were pursuing different goals: contributing to space education
beyond Japanese borders, benefitting from the opportunity to join an ambitious
project and receiving associated budgets, or supporting Japanese foreign policy
goals in Vietnam. Although it seems that the participants benefitted from the project
as a whole, issues arose from the handling of the consortium of five large
universities. According to some professors involved in the project, it would havebeen preferable to work with less universities, or at least clarify from the start theexact repartition of responsibilities and authority. In particular, the centralisation inTokyo, at Keio University and The University of Tokyo, of the latest phase of the
project (satellite final integration and testing) was received negatively by partners in
Hokkaido and Tohoku Universities.
Nevertheless, the MicroDragon project has achieved all its capacity building goals,
such as:§§§The design, development, integration and testing of a 50 kg remote sensing
satellite by Vietnamese engineers.
The successful operations of the satellite by Vietnamese engineers.
The obtention of advanced knowledge and master’s degrees by 36
Vietnamese engineers, now forming the backbone of VNSC’s satellite
development efforts (e.g. LOTUSat with NEC).

14

Box 1 – The University Space Engineering Consortium (UNISEC)UNISEC is a non-profit organisation established in 2002 in Tokyo, Japan to“to support practical space development activities in universities andcolleges, such as small satellites and hybrid rockets.” It boasts a
membership of 58 Japanese universities including all those cited in thisreport.3
UNISEC also established in 2013 an international NPO, called UNISECGlobal, composed of 21 local chapters and 70 points of contact, on allcontinents. As explained on its website, “UNISEC-Global’s primary objective
is to help create a world where space science and technology is used byindividuals and institutions in every country, rich or poor, and offers
opportunities across the whole structure of society - whether academic,
industrial or educational - for peaceful purposes and for the benefit ofhumankind.” Since 2017, UNISEC-Global is a Permanent Observer to theUnited Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space(UNCOPUOS).4

Focus 3: RWASAT-15
RWASAT-1 is a joint project of the Intelligence Space Systems Laboratory (ISSL) of
The University of Tokyo through start-up Space Edge Lab. Inc. (now ArkEdge Space
Inc.), of the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA), and later on, of the
Rwanda Space Agency (RSA), which involved the joint development anddeployment of Rwanda’s first satellite, RWASAT-1, as well as numerous forms of
capacity building.
Following initial discussions between the governments of Rwanda and Japan in
2017-2018 with regards to capacity building in space technology development andutilisation, RURA expressed their desire to fund the development of Rwanda’s firstsatellite and the training in Japan of selected Rwandan engineers. The ISSL having
developed around the same time an innovative 3U store-and-forward (S&F)

3‘What is UNISEC?’, UNISEC 大学宇宙工学コンソーシアム, accessed 28 December 2020,
http://unisec.jp/unisecen/abouten.html.
4‘About Us’, UNISEC Global, accessed 28 December 2020, http://www.unisec-global.org/.
5
Quentin Verspieren, one of the authors of this report, was manager of the RWASAT
programme (including the RWASAT-1 project) at the Intelligent Space Systems Laboratoryof The University of Tokyo and is an executive at Space Edge Lab. Inc. (now ArkEdge
Space Inc.). A detailed description of the RWASAT-1 project is provided in: Quentin
Verspieren et al., ‘Store-and-Forward 3U CubeSat Project TRICOM and Its Utilization for
Development and Education: The Cases of TRICOM-1R and JPRWASAT’, Transactions of
the Japan Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences 63, no. 5 (2020): 206–11,
https://doi.org/10.2322/tjsass.63.206.

15

communication satellite, called TRICOM, it was therefore decided to use it as thebasis of RWASAT-1. In addition to the S&F communication system, RWASAT-1 wasequipped with a multispectral camera, as decided during a mission idea contest
held with Rwandan students in early 2018.
The satellite was developed from December 2018 to May 2019 by a joint RwandaJapan team at the facilities of the ISSL in Tokyo, as well as with industrial partners
in Fukui Prefecture. It was then launched to the ISS onboard Japanese resupply
vessel HTV-8 on 4 June 2019 before being deployed from the Kibo module on 20
November 2019. The project was mostly funded by RURA, although the initialtechnology development and diverse activities were supported by the Japanese
government (e.g. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI) and by Space
Edge Lab.
In addition to the development and deployment of RWASAT-1, the outcomes of the
project were:
▪
▪

▪
▪
▪

The training of three Rwandan engineers in Japan, who jointly developed
the satellite with Japanese engineers of the ISSL.
The organisation of diverse capacity building programmes in Kigali,
Rwanda on nanosatellite design, remote sensing data utilisation andsupercomputing.
Joint satellite operations.
Support for the development of a national space strategy, policy and law.
Technology (e.g. bus system and S&F communication system) andknowledge transfer.

Focus 4: Kyutech’s BIRDSThe Joint Global Multi-Nation Birds Satellite programme (colloquially known as
BIRDS programme) is an initiative of the Kyushu Institute of Technology consistingin a series of two-year projects in which teams of three to four students (minimumtwo) design, assemble, test and operate a 1U CubeSat. Each team is related to a
specific country. Table 2-1 shows the list of countries and number of students
involved in the five generations of BIRDS projects organised by Kyutech.
Building on the Space Engineering International Course (SEIC) started by Kyutech
in 2013, the initial BIRDS-1 Project was initiated in October 2015. The idea
originated from a dinner between Kyutech faculty members and the president of
the All Nations University in Ghana, who expressed his willingness to celebrate the60th anniversary of the independence of Ghana with the deployment in space of thecountry’s first CubeSat. After finding three students from Mongolia and three
students from Bangladesh, BIRDS-1 was born. The BIRDS project started for purely
educational purposes with the minimum possible cost: USD 120,000. The cost waslater adjusted, from BIRDS 3, to USD 150,000. This money covers the cost ofsatellite hardware and its launch to the ISS.

16

Table 2-1. Five generations of BIRDS projects
Total numberof students

Generation

Countries

BIRDS-1 (2015-2017)

Japan, Ghana, Mongolia, Nigeria
and Bangladesh

15

BIRDS-2 (2017-2018)

Bhutan, the Philippines, andMalaysia

11

BIRDS-3 (2018-2019)

Sri Lanka, Nepal and Japan

7

BIRDS-4 (2019-2021)

Paraguay, the Philippines and
Japan

14

BIRDS-5 (2020-2021)

Uganda, Zimbabwe and Japan

14

While BIRDS-1 counterparts were only universities, subsequent BIRDS projects
included both universities and government agencies (e.g., Bhutan’s Ministry ofInformation and Communications, Nepal’s Academy of Science and Technology).
Kyutech faculty members stressed the importance of international travels,international conferences (even in Japan) to initiate direct personal contacts withprospective recipients. They gave the example of the Seventh Tokyo International
Conference on African Development (TICAD7), where Professors Cho and Maeda
met high-level representatives from Uganda and Zimbabwe, now part of BIRDS-5.
This was severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic as described in Chapter 6.
BIRDS-5 is currently expected to be the last iteration of the BIRDS programme
under its current format. However, BIRDS is expected to continue by supporting
past recipients for the domestic development of their second satellite and, moregenerally to ensure the long-term sustainability of their nascent domestic space
programme.
Finally, thanks in large part to the BIRDS programme, Kyutech has been identified
by space consulting company Bryce Space and Technology as the No. 1 academic
operator of small satellites.6 As of 2020, Kyutech had launched 18 small satellites
into space – more than any other university.

6‘Smallsats by the Numbers 2020’ (Alexandria, Virginia: Bryce Space and Technology,2020), https://brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/Bryce_Smallsats_2020.pdf.

17

2. Different motivations and philosophies
Based on the four projects and programmes studied, we identified three main
motivations from the points of view of Japanese universities.

2.1. Search for additional sources of funding and project opportunities
For numerous Japanese university laboratories working on innovative satellite
components, it is critical to secure collaborations in order to, either get thenecessary funding to develop a prototype, or benefit from an actual satellite launch
to see their device tested in space.
As explained above, Professor Takahashi of Hokkaido University did not passively
wait for an occasion to appear but created his own opportunity to send his satellite
remote sensing components to space, in collaboration with his former Tohoku
University colleague Professor Yoshida. He therefore obtained considerable
budgets (around USD 3 million for the DIWATA programme) without which he could
not have been able to achieve his laboratory’s goals.
In addition to components and satellite development, Professor Yoshida mentioned
the importance of external projects and associated budgets (around USD 5 million
for the DIWATA programme) in order to hire new researchers as well as retain young
scholars after the completion of their studies. Nevertheless, Professor Yoshida
explained that he did not joined the DIWATA programme because he neededbudget. He was however looking for project opportunities when Professor
Nakasuka proposed to him to join the MicroDragon project.
Finally, to a lesser extent, RWASAT-1 was useful in further spreading an S&F
communication technology developed at the ISSL during a previous project:
TRICOM.

2.2. Involvement in international projects aligning with Japanese foreign
policy goals
Professor Seiko Shirasaka of Keio University, one of the leaders of the MicroDragon
project, explained to us that a collaboration between two countries or two
governments, is more successful when built on existing “people-based”
cooperation. In this context, he believes that educational collaborations, carried out
by universities, are the most effective ways to build the foundations of long-term
bilateral cooperation. He added that, as member of the National Space Policy
Committee, he has to think about how, personally or through his work at theuniversity, he can contribute to Japanese foreign policy objectives. In fact, theMicroDragon project was initiated by Professor Nakasuka, also member of the
National Space Policy Committee, as part of a larger support of Japan to theVietnam Space Centre project via JICA ODA.

18

The RWASAT project also originated from a larger government-to-government
partnership. In fact, RWASAT is one of the numerous initiatives having been
implemented by the Government of Japan to support the socio-economic
development of Rwanda in recent years, seeing it as a key partner in Africa. For thisproject too, JICA has provided support, although much more punctual and modest
than for MicroDragon.
These two examples raise the question of whether the government should provide
more guidance or recommendations to universities on international partnerships.
Interviewees from Keio University, The University of Tokyo and Kyutech have all
expressed their desire to see the government – particularly the Cabinet Office’s
National Space Policy Secretariat – to identify potential partner countries. While
universities are fully autonomous and it is up to professors to decide who theywould like to partner with, Professor Shirasaka pointed out that only the central
government has the knowledge, ability and workforce to see the “bigger picture”,
and to evaluate and classify potential partner countries based on numerous factors,
including both the situation and needs of such countries as well as potential
diplomatic benefits for Japan.

2.3. Primary focus on education
While the two previous motivations may have played a role, Kyutech’s BIRDS
programme was established with a strong focus on advancing space technology
education worldwide. Compared to the other projects studied here, BIRDS is the
only one in which the development and deployment of a satellite is a means, notthe final goal. In fact, the choice to develop a 1U satellite is revealing. Whileapplications of such a small satellite are extremely limited, the learning potentialfrom its development is immense. In addition, the BIRDS programme has efficiently‘industrialised’ the approach to capacity building, being able to accommodate alarge number of teams while not having to sacrifice the quality of the education.
Other projects successfully managed to balance between advanced education andmission objectives, in other words between leaner or more complex satellites. The
DIWATA programme chose to develop two 50-60 kg satellites, big enough toaccommodate advanced payloads such as the remote sensing equipment
developed at Hokkaido University. The complexity of a 50 kg system however
makes satellite design and development education a bit less accessible than with a
CubeSat. The RWASAT-1 project had a symmetrically different approach byfocussing on a lean and accessible 3U CubeSat accommodating an S&F
communication system but much more modest remote sensing equipment.

19

2.4.
Correlation
betweenmotivation
universities/professors’ characteristics

categories

andWhile the three main motivations presented above can be found in each of the
projects studied in this report, in particular their emphasis on education –universities’ primary mission, each carries more or less weight depending on
universities and professors.
In particular, there is a clear distinction between The University of Tokyo and Keio
University on the one hand and Hokkaido University – and Tohoku University to alesser extent – on the other hand, with regards to the relations with the central
government. During our interviews, it appeared that funding and project
opportunities were not the sources of too much concern for the two academic
mastodons that are The University of Tokyo and Keio University, which instead tend
to focus on non-pecuniary benefits such as contributing to Japanese influenceabroad, much in line with the key roles played by both Professor Shirasaka andProfessor Nakasuka at the National Space Policy Committee. These views contrast
heavily with those shared by Professor Takahashi of Hokkaido University, who
believes that too much involvement of the central government can proveoverwhelming in the context of international academic collaboration. According to
his experience, in particular with the Philippines, counterparts in developing
countries enjoy the simplicity of dealing with independent laboratories in Japanese
universities rather than having to spend time and efforts in complex bilateraldiplomatic processes involving Japan’s heavy governmental bureaucracy.
As often mentioned in this report, Kyutech seems to offer the most balanced
approach, carrying out its affordable programme with a great level of selfsufficiency while being in close contact with the Japanese government. In fact,
during our visit of Kyutech’s Tobata campus, Professors Cho and Maeda, architectsof BIRDS, shared with us their desire to see the government providing a certain
level of support, in line with Professor Shirasaka’s comments quoted in 2.2.
Although they do not advocate for a direct control or role of the government incapacity building programmes, they suggest the following form of support:§§§

The Cabinet Office should identify target countries and suggest a high-levelgovernmental strategy on space collaborations with developing countries.
The MEXT, as ministry responsible for higher education, should officiallyrecognise the role of universities for the promotion of Japanese foreign policy,
and support the internationalisation of universities. To this end, it could startby publicly recognising the capacity building projects presented in this reportas significant achievements and help advertise them in the national press.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) should be more active in supporting
the initiation of capacity building projects, in particular through its embassies.
JICA’s involvement could be beneficial, although it could send the wrong
signal that the Japanese government would pay for the project.

20

3. The roles of university headquarters
All the projects studied in this report were initiated in full independence byprofessors and their laboratories but have received some form of support fromuniversity headquarters.

3.1. Independent decisions of university laboratories
While the projects studied in this report are described in terms of which university
they involve, they were in fact initiated and fully carried out by independent
laboratories, and the public or commercial partners that they chose – except for the
BIRDS programme which scale prompted more involvement from Kyutech’s
headquarters. These laboratories are:§

The Intelligence Space Systems Laboratory (ISSL), led by Professor
Shinichi Nakasuka, known in Japanese as Nakasuka-Funase Laboratory (中須 賀 ・ 船 瀬 研 究 室 ), belonging to the Department of Aeronautics and§Astronautics, Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. Apartfrom independently conducting the RWASAT-1 project, it was involved in theMicroDragon project.
The System Design Methodology Laboratory (システムデザインメソドロ§

ジーラボ), led by Professor Seiko Shirasaka, which belongs to the System
Design and Management Research Institute, Graduate School of System
Design and Management, Keio University. It was involved in the MicroDragon
project.
The Space Exploration Lab (宇宙ロボット研究室), led by Professor Kazuya§

Yoshida, belonging to the Department of Aerospace Engineering, Graduate
School of Engineering, Tohoku University. It involved in the MicroDragon and
PHL-Microsat projects.
The Space Mission Center (宇宙ミッションセンター), led by Professor§

Yukihiro Takahashi, belonging to the Department of Earth and Planetary
Sciences, School of Science, Hokkaido University. It was involved in theMicroDragon and PHL-Microsat projects.
The Laboratory of Lean Satellite Enterprises and In-Orbit Experiments(LaSEINE, 革新的宇宙利用実証ラボラトリー), led by Professor Mengu Cho,belonging to the Department of Space Systems Engineering, School ofEngineering, Kyushu Institute of Technology. Apart from independently
conducting the BIRDS programme, it was involved in the MicroDragon and
PHL-Microsat projects.

These laboratories can independently decide to involve in a project. For example,
in the case of RWASAT-1, the project’s agreement had four contracting parties: the
RURA, represented by its director general, Space Edge Lab., represented by its
CEO and two laboratories of The University of Tokyo, including the ISSL,
represented by its director, Professor Nakasuka. Contracting this agreement

21

required the sole signature of Professor Nakasuka and no official involvement of thedepartment, graduate school or university headquarters.

3.2. The role of university headquarters (本部)For what concerns the four projects studied here, university headquarters havebeen providing different forms of support, described below. This part does notinclude obvious contributions of universities, such as the provision of facilities or
the remuneration of tenured faculty and permanent administrative staffs.
3.2.1. Space and university strategies
The importance of space technology development and utilisation varies from one
university to the other. Although it is one department among many others in someof the largest domestic universities like The University of Tokyo, Tohoku University
or Keio University, other universities have given a central role to space studies.
For instance, Kyutech’s strategy and promotional documents put a strongemphasis on space engineering and robotics. Similarly, Hokkaido University
headquarters have recognised space as one of the “main streams” of theuniversity’s educational and research activities.
3.2.2. Administrative support
Although they possess a deep technical expertise on their field, most of Japanese
universities do not have the knowledge and manpower to deal with the legal,
administrative and budgetary complexity of international cooperation programmes.
To this end, university headquarters have been providing the following services:
§
§

§
§

Legal consulting services during contract drafting and negotiation.
Promotion of research achievements in different platforms (e.g. university
website and social network accounts, local or national press) and in multiple
languages by bearing translation costs. This also includes paying the salaries
and expenses of employees devoted to the international promotion of thecapacity building programmes (e.g. Professor George Maeda in Kyutech).
Support the filing of patents.
Handling of the organisation of visits of high-level foreign officials at theuniversity (e.g. DOST Secretary de la Peña in Hokkaido University or
numerous ambassadors in Kyutech).
3.2.3. Support to foreign students and trainees

Universities welcoming foreign students and trainees often provide support tofacilitate their acclimatation into Japanese society. In the case of the MicroDragon
project, Keio University headquarters provided the students with accommodations

22

on Mita campus. In addition, most of universities have free Japanese language
programs run by the headquarters.

4. The role of the central government
Overall, the central government plays a limited role in the initiation or the
implementation of the projects, which often originate from the personal
relationships of Japanese professors with foreign officials or academics.

4.1. Research and project funding
This section provides an overview of the different forms of funding support provided
by various government agencies.
4.1.1. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(MEXT)The MEXT is the core organisation dealing with early technological researchsupport, as well as infrastructure and personnel development, on which capacity
building programmes are based.
First of all, most of the functioning budget of Japanese universities comes from the
MEXT: facilities rental, faculty and researchers’ salaries, equipment cost, etc. In
addition to the annual guaranteed budget, there are numerous forms of projectbased funding provided by the MEXT. In particular, most of the technologies
involved in the projects studied in this report have been developed, at least partially,
through Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (kakenhi) of the MEXT’s Japan Society
for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).
Finally, in the case of Kyutech, the MEXT has been providing funding (委託金) to (1)solidify and expand LaSEINE’s satellite testing facilities, which are being used bynumerous small satellite makers from Japan and abroad (USD 2-300,000 per year
over 2014-2016) and (2) support the internationalisation of Kyutech satellite
engineering education efforts (2017-2019). Finally, the JSPS has been providing
around USD 100,000 per year for the organisation of annual international BIRDS
workshops and other workshops used by Kyutech to continue developing
knowledge among its network of current, past and future BIRDS participating
countries.
4.1.2. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)The METI has been providing two forms of financial support to some of theJapanese university-led capacity building projects reviewed in this report:

23

§

§

The financing of innovative technologies via the New Energy and Industrial
Technology Development Organization (NEDO), for instance for RWASAT-1’s
store-and-forward communication system.
The support to the development of international standards for spacetechnology. In particular, Kyutech is receiving a multiyear support to establish
a worldwide community and organise workshops in order to set up the best
standards for “lean satellites”.
4.1.3. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

In the case of development collaborations with developing countries, ODA provided
by JICA can play a core role in the projects’ funding and overall success. Amongthe four projects studied here, JICA has been providing the following types of
support:
§
§

§
§
§

Sovereign lending to the recipient country to fund the whole capacity building
programme in the case of MicroDragon.
Grant funding for projects related to the development of innovative space data
products, for example as part of the Science and Technology ResearchPartnership for Sustainable Development (SATREPS) in the case of Hokkaido
University, using data from DIWATA-1/2.
Scholarships, for instance as part of the African Business Education Initiative
for Youth (ABE Initiative).
Technical training in Japanese universities like the one received by Malaysianengineers in Kyutech.
Technical assistance missions, for instance regarding the deployment ofground sensors or the drafting of a national space policy during the RWASAT1 project.

4.2. Satellite deployment from the Kibo module of the International Space
StationApart from the excellence and international inclination of its universities, one of thegreatest strengths of Japanese space technology development and utilisation
capacity building is the launch and deployment opportunities provided by theJapanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) to selected universities.
As part of its activities for the promotion of the Japanese Experimental Module(JEM) (“Kibo”) of the ISS, JAXA has established a Strategic Partnership programmewith selected universities. Three strategic partners were selected based on theirpast expertise on microsatellite development: The University of Tokyo, Kyutech andthe couple Hokkaido and Tohoku Universities. Having positioned the Kibo module
as a technological development research base that supports scientific andtechnological innovation, JAXA created a standardised system for the deploymentof microsatellites from Kibo, called the JEM Small Satellite Orbital Deployer (J-24

SSOD). Through the Strategic Partnership, JAXA aimed to promote (1) Japanese
university-led capacity building programmes with foreign organisations in order tosustain the worldwide demand for satellite release from Kibo and (2) to get feedback
from the user side (universities) on the process and service of ISS deployment.
Concretely, under the umbrella of this Strategic Partnership, selected universities
can contract Kibo deployment services at a discounted price, compared to the pricecharged by private companies operating Kibo deployments. The partnership
expires at the end of FY2020 in March 2021, and the only way to deploy a satellite
from the J-SSOD, even for Japanese universities, will be to contract one of the twocommercial providers selected by JAXA: Space BD and Mitsui Bussan Aerospace.
Considerations on the consequences of the expiration of the programme arepresented in Chapter 7, section 3.2.2.
In addition to the discounted rates provided to Japanese universities, JAXA
developed a partnership with the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs(UNOOSA) to organise a competition which prize is the complimentary deploymentof a 1U CubeSat from the J-SSOD for an emerging space nation.7

4.3. Other forms of support
4.3.1. Strategy and diplomacy
As explained throughout section 2, although some universities tend to be wary of
too much government involvement, most agree that a certain level of supportshould be provided, including for strategy and diplomacy.
The Cabinet Office has been providing a basic form of coordination with developing
countries’ governments and has contributed to the inclusion of the promotion of
space technology development and utilisation capacity building in the programmeof important international events such as the 7th Tokyo International Conference on
African Development (TICAD7), during which numerous space actors connectedwith African leaders. For instance, Professors Cho and Maeda initiated first contacts
with two of BIRDS-5’s member countries – Uganda and Zimbabwe – during
TICAD7.
As for “diplomatic” support, a few of the projects reviewed in this report havereceived some form of help from local Japanese embassies. The Japanese
embassy in Manila provided advice but no concrete support for the initiation of the
DIWATA cooperation. The On the other hand, the embassy of Japan in Rwanda has
been very active in organising promotional events (receptions and press
conferences) as well as high-level dinners with relevant officials (including
7‘KiboCUBE: UN / Japan Cooperation Programme on CubeSat Deployment from theInternational Space Station (ISS) Japanese Experiment Module (Kibo) “KiboCUBE”’, United
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, accessed 19 February 2021,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/psa/hsti/kibocube.html.

25

ministers), in part because RWASAT-1 was included in a larger scale bilateral
cooperation. Finally, the role of embassies is sometimes more circumstantial:
having heard about the BIRDS programme, the Government of Bhutan firstcontacted the Japanese embassy in Thimphu, which then connected it withKyutech officials.
4.3.2. Export licences
The METI is the Japanese ministry in charge of export controls and as such,provides export licenses for space-related technologies, in accordance with theForeign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act of 1949. In the case of the capacity
building projects studied in this report, METI Trade Control Department officials
have been providing useful support to universities regarding the complex
administrative process involved. The METI has also been providing trainings inorder to ensure that universities set up their own “security export control” policies.8
4.3.3. Frequency coordination
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC) has supported frequency
licensing and registration for most of the projects evaluated in this report (e.g.
RWASAT-1, BIRDS).
4.3.4. Access to infrastructure
The final form of support provided to university laboratories by the central
government concerns the access to advanced facilities, mostly for satellite
operations and experiments.
The VNSC having issues/delays with the establishment of a satellite ground station
to conduct MicroDragon’s operations from Vietnam, a team of Vietnamese
operators staying in Japan has been allowed to use (for a fee) the ground stationsof the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), the space explorationarm of JAXA.
Similarly, the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology(NICT) of the MIC has been providing experimental equipment and facilities for thelaser communication experiments of Tohoku University. The University of Tokyo
has also benefited from similar facilities for other projects not addressed in thisreport.

8‘METI Launches E-Learning Program in Academic and Research Institutes in the Field ofSecurity Export Control’, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 29 May 2018,https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/0529_003.html.

26

5. Interactions of universities with the private ecosystem
The degree of interaction of university laboratories with private actors varies heavily
from one project to the other, with some having a high level of vertical integration
allowing them to develop, assemble and test satellites in-house (e.g. Kyutech) andthose for which the university has partnered with a private company for the daily
management of the project (e.g. RWASAT-1). A few examples are provided below.
The BIRDS programme is mostly dealt with internally, Kyutech having thecapabilities and infrastructure to cover with all aspects of satellite development andcapacity building. In fact, while other Japanese university-led projects presented inthis report are not the core activities of laboratories involved, BIRDS has been an
integral part of Kyutech’s Laboratory of Lean Satellite Enterprises and In-Orbit
Experiments (LaSEINE). Therefore, Kyutech’s staffs and facilities are primarily
devoted to the design, assembly and testing of the BIRDS CubeSats. Kyutech
however works with private providers for specific components and services (e.g.
Saga Mitsuishin for printed circuit boards, Addnics for communication
components).
In the case of the two DIWATA satellites, their high-performance remote sensing
cameras have been built by a private provider in close collaboration with thelaboratory of Professor Takahashi in Hokkaido University. Specifically, while theearly design of the camera was made at Hokkaido University, the detailed design
and manufacturing were done by a small private company. Tohoku University has
also been relying on Japanese manufacturers for the bus hardware development
and procurement.
Finally, the case of RWASAT-1 is the only one managed by a private company,
namely Space Edge Lab. While the project counted on the great expertise acquiredby The University of Tokyo’s ISSL, the primary Japanese contractor was Space
Edge Lab., a spin-off of the ISSL, which dealt with the project from the beginningto the end.

27

CHAPTER 3. COMPARISON WITH OTHERDONORS AROUND THE WORLD
Although Japan seems to be the most active country in terms of university-led
space technology development and utilisation capacity building with developing
countries, other countries have also witnessed the development of such activities
in their universities, under various formats. In fact, some foreign universities
involving in small satellite-based education have progressively offloaded capacity
building responsibilities to a commercial arm, often a spin-off company, which has
allowed an increase of efficiency and scale. By comparing foreign practices toJapanese ones, we identify the comparative advantages of Japan as well as areas
for improvement.

1. Overview of non-Japanese donor organisations analysed in thestudy
As part of this project, we investigated the case of four donor organisations, one
being a university operating capacity building programmes similar with Japanese
universities’ (the University of Rome La Sapienza), while the three others areuniversity spin-offs (Surrey Space Technology Ltd, ISISPACE and the Satrec
Initiative).
Box 2 – University spin-off

The field of business administration includes various terms with more or lessagreed-upon definitions such as spin-off, spin-out, split-off and carve-out,
which may correspond to some of the cases addressed in this report.
In this report, we use the term university spin-off to describe any commercial
venture created by former employees of a university laboratory, in a very
general sense. It encompasses various formats such as ventures fully or
partially owned by their mother-university (e.g. SSTL before 2008) as well as
ventures which are financially independent but having kept close ties fromtheir mother-university (e.g. SSTL from 2008) or not (e.g. ISIS).

28

Focus 1: University of Rome La Sapienza9
The University of Rome La Sapienza, founded in 1303, is one of the leading Italian
research universities. Its prestigious faculty of engineering as had a long
involvement in aeronautics and astronautics, including through the creation of thefirst aerospace research centre (Centro di Ricerche Aerospaziali) in Italy in 1959,
strengthened by strong ties with the Italian Air Force. In fact, until the 1970s, theItalian law was allowing high-ranking generals to be university professors. For
example, the father of the Italian space programme, Air Force General Luigi Broglio,
head of the AF Engineering Corps (Corpo del Genio Aeronautico) was also the Deanof La Sapienza faculty of engineering. At the time, laboratories were shared between
the air force and universities. Nowadays, La Sapienza can still receive grants fromthe military, but it is highly controlled by a department committee.
Thanks to its expertise in aerospace engineering and its close governmental
connections, La Sapienza played a core role in an ambitious and long-term spacetechnology development and utilisation programme organised by Italy for the
benefit of Kenya. Soon after its independence from the United Kingdom, Kenya
concluded a top-level bilateral cooperation agreement with Italy, ratified by bothparliaments in 1963. This agreement included from the start elements ofastronautical research.
As early as 1963, La Sapienza created and operated, in cooperation with NASA, theSan Marco Equatorial Range in Malindi, Kenya, renamed in 2004 Luigi Broglio
Space Centre (BSC) in honour of the late General Broglio and transferred to the
Italian Space Agency (ASI). However, La Sapienza still retains telemetry andcommunication capabilities (three 2-meter antennas). At the same time, ASI took
over Italian responsibilities with regards to space engineer research and education
collaboration with Kenya. However, recognising its historical experience, ASI
continues to officially delegate the provision of capacity building services to La
Sapienza.
In fact, satellite development capacity building being included in theintergovernmental agreement, La Sapienza proposed to ASI a CubeSat project with
the University of Nairobi, largest public institution in Kenya. This 1U CubeSat
project, named 1KUNS-PF (1st Kenyan University NanoSatellite-Precursor Flight)
resulted in the joint development of the first Kenyan-owned satellite, with alldecisions being made by a joint committee of Italian and Kenyan professors. The
project was then selected for the KiboCUBE programme (cf. Chapter 1, section 4.2
for more details), of which Kenya was the first beneficiary, which provided a goodlaunch opportunity and a fixed timeline (very useful). 1KUNS-PF was deployed into

9
Professor Hideaki Shiroyama and Dr Quentin Verspieren visited the University of Rome La
Sapienza’s Department of Engineering in Rome, Italy, in June 2019 and collected theinformation presented in this section.

29

space on 11 May 2018 from the Kibo module of the ISS by Japanese astronaut
Norishige Kanai.
Professor Fabio Santoni, project leader, described the project as a mutual capacity
building program, for both Kenya and Italy. Students exchanges happened on bothsides, with 18 Kenyans studying in Rome over three years (4+8+6) and seven
Italians going to Nairobi. Finally, in addition to teaching students, La Sapienza
decided to focus on training Kenyan professors, in order to make sure that theknowledge would be retained at the University of Nairobi, and further spread overfuture generations of Kenyan engineers.
Key lessons learned from the case of the University of Rome, and directly applicableto the cases of large Japanese universities, are the following:
§
§
§
§
§
§

University functions as agent (service provider) operating under a top-levelbilateral government cooperation agreement.
Collaboration with foreign government agencies (NASA, JAXA, etc.) is crucial.
Training recipient country’s professors to ensure that local universities retain
knowledge.
Involving recipient country’s professors in decision-making to increaseownership.
Exchanging students on both sides (but difficult to convince Roman students).
Need to foster job opportunities for students in the recipient country/region (ifnot, they will leave the country or change their professional focus).

Focus 2: Surrey Space Technology Ltd. (SSTL)10
When Sir Martin Sweeting (SSTL founder) was PhD student and then research
assistant at the University of Surrey’s (UoS) electrical engineering department, he
was tracking down amateur communication satellites. He decided to start a satellite
programme, which was the first non-US university satellite with a free NASA launch.
It benefitted from lots of small contributions from many companies. Around thistime, the first microprocessors and memory components became available.
Sweeting’s satellite was the first microsatellite with a microprocessor and memory(“first modern microsatellite”), which facilitated worldwide data collection data.
The UoS was interested in the first two satellites but felt “forced” to do a third one.
Therefore, in 1985, at the time of the second satellite, the UoS pushed Sweeting tocreate a spin-off company to make satellites with COTS technologies. SSTL wasborn, with initial investments from both the UoS and Sweeting himself. On the same
year, the UoS started a space study programme.
SSTL quickly reached the same turnover as the UoS, but like for most aerospacecompanies, with irregular – though always positive – benefits. This variable cash
10

Professor Hideaki Shiroyama and Dr Quentin Verspieren visited SSTL headquarters in the
United Kingdom in June 2019 and collected the information presented in this section.

30

inflow created issues with the UoS’s charitable status. It therefore decided to sell
SSTL and finally chose Airbus in 2008, among seven proposals. The shares were
initially owned at 99% by Airbus and 1% by the UoS. Airbus now has full ownershipof the company. A benefit for SSTL to be part of Airbus Group is the ability to relyon Airbus’s “parental guarantee” for big projects – over USD 100 million, which were
impossible with the UoS.
Even after the sale, SSTL maintains strong links with the UoS: Sweeting is executive
chairman of both SSTL and the Surrey Space Centre (SSC), the UoS’s spaceengineering department is partially funded by SSTL and Airbus, SSTL sponsors a
professorship (head of the SSC), keeps a liaison officer at SSC and conducts joint
research meetings. SSTL can therefore get intellectual property from UoS research.
The SSC is currently the largest non-US postgraduate space research centre with
4 faculty members, a few research assistants and 70-80 postgraduate students.
As of the researchers’ visit in June 2019, SSTL had 400 employees, launched 67
satellites (including 15 in commercial use), and 9 constellations. It is verticallyintegrated so everything can be done in-house. It also owns all its satellites’
intellectual property so it can license its satellites/parts. SSTL has mostly two kindsof customers: (1) commercial actors purchasing a turnkey satellite and (2) actors
wanting to learn everything about spacecraft studies, targets of the Know How
Transfer and Training (KHTT) programmes. Other commercial activities of SSTL
(e.g. satellite leasing, data sales, technology demonstration, etc.) are not addressed
here.
SSTL’s KHTT programmes cover all aspects of a space development programme.
Usually targeting groups of 10 to 20 trainees, so project and subsystems
responsibilities can be shared appropriately among them, KHTT programmes also
include soft skills (e.g. project management), very important for the long-termsustainability of the recipient’s future activities. SSTL can house 2 to 3 teams at atime. KHTT programme participations are sometime part of joint bids with Airbus(e.g. Thailand and Kazakhstan). In addition, KHTT programmes are linked with the
SSC for degrees and trainings. The programmes are almost always funded byrecipient countries, with two exceptions: (1) the UK Export Finance (UKEF)
supported Turkey’s BILSAT-1 training programme and (2) the UoS received money
through UK Space Agency International Partnership Programme (UKSA IPP) tosupport Algerian satellite AlSAT-1b.
In terms of governmental support, SSTL tried to use UKSA IPP funding but it proved
too complex. Moreover, IPP only funds 50% of the total cost of the project which
is not adapted to hardware companies with important initial investments. The IPP
is better suited to service companies with smaller costs (e.g. remote sensing data
products). SSTL received small government support at its beginnings (a few £100k
grants). It still does not get much support as SSTL is focussing on a commercial
approach.
Key lessons learned from the SSTL case are the following:

31

§
§
§
§
§
§

The status of private entity allows full vertical integration, intellectual property
licensing and flexible response to customers’ demands.
Joint bidding scheme with Airbus is replicable with large Japanese companies
Series of trainings should be planned, not a one-shot event.
Teams of 10 to 20 trainees are optimal for small satellite capacity building
projects.
Training should include soft skills (in particular project management).
The success of satellite projects is contingent on a good balance among theinterests, needs and capabilities of academia, industry and the government.

Focus 3: ISIS - Innovative Solutions In Space (ISISPACE)11
ISISPACE was established in 2006 as a privately-owned spin-off of the Technical
University of Delft (TU Delft) after student satellite project Delfi-C3. It focusses on
the design and manufacturing of CubeSats, ranging from 1 to 16U (1-25 kg).
ISISPACE is vertically integrated, including launch services, deployers and groundstations. It has working agreements with most of the major launchers in the world(Soyuz, Falcon 9, Vega, Dnepr, Long March, PSLV) and even signed amemorandum of understanding with Japanese commercial company SpaceBD for
Kibo deployment services.
As of 28 June 2019, when we visited ISISPACE headquarters in Delft, The
Netherlands, the company was responsible for 315 CubeSat launches (one third of
all historical CubeSat launches), including 101 on a single PSLV (world record).
ISISPACE provides capacity building and knowledge transfer services on a purelycommercial approach, at three levels:
1. Provide simple toolkits for power, communication, onboard computing, etc.
(e.g. can emulate a full RF chain).
2. Platform development kit: integrated platform with various subsystems,
including more high-end product for larger institutions.
3. Platform and turnkey satellites (1U S&F and 3U Remote Sensing): full satellite
kit, usually for rich universities or state institutions.
Capacity building programmes conducted by ISISPACE include various training
modules for design, assembly, integration and testing (AIT), and operations(including theoretical lectures, workshops and hands-on trainings) with numerous
countries: Jordan, Thailand, UAE, Algeria and Brazil. Programmes are and can beprovided either in ISIS or in the recipient country.
Importantly, ISISPACE does not receive any direct support from the government for
its capacity building programmes, entirely funded by the recipient organisation on

11

Professor Hideaki Shiroyama and Dr Quentin Verspieren visited ISISPACE headquartersin The Netherlands in June 2019 and collected the information presented in this section.

32

a purely commercial basis. It only indirectly benefits from partnerships with publicorganisations and occasional grants, such as:§§§§

ISISPACE has ground stations in TU Delft and several research collaborations(with memoranda of understanding).
Collaborations with Montpellier University (France) and the European Centre
for Nuclear Research (CERN) for radiation studies.
Grant for deployer development with a national institute in Netherlands.
ESA grant for the development of educational kits.

Focus 4: Satrec Initiative12
Satrec Initiative is a major international provider of space technology development
capacity building services based in South Korea. It was established in 1999 as a
spin-off of the Satellite Technology Research Centre (SaTReC) of the Korea
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), following successful
satellite development projects.
KAIST’s SaTReC was responsible for the development of the first Korean satellites.
Established in 1989, it accumulated knowledge on satellite design anddevelopment, space science and remote sensing by sending students andengineers to the US, Japan and the UK (at SSTL). It then initiated a joint project with
the University of Surrey to develop Korea’s first satellite, KITSAT-1. Based on themodel of KITSAT-1, SaTReC engineers developed KITSAT-2, first satellite built in
Korea. Then, after developing KITSAT-3, Korea’s first “indigenous satellite”,
SaTReC engineers founded Satrec Initiative with 100% of private funding.
Since then, Satrec Initiative has grown to become one the leading satellite
manufacturers in Korea, involving in numerous domestic and international satellite
projects, as well as one of the leading worldwide providers of space technology
development capacity building services. In 2005, Satrec Initiative became the first
Korean company to export a satellite, namely RazakSat to Malaysia. It has been
conducting capacity building programmes with numerous countries in Southeast
Asia, Middle East and Europe.
Satrec Initiative is the best example of a former recipient of capacity building having
retained and expended the knowledge acquired to become one of the major
capacity building services donors.

12
A detailed history of Satrec Initiative is available in Sungdong Park et al., ‘Journey of a
Korean Small Satellite Company: From Space Technology Recipient to Donor’, inProceedings of the 70th International Astronautical Congress in Washington, DC (IAC 2019)(Paris, France: International Astronautical Federation, 2019).

33

2. Lessons and best practices from non-Japanese donors
Having provided an overview of capacity building practices from non-Japanesedonors, what lessons can be useful for Japanese universities to enhance theirimpact and effectiveness?
The lessons of the University of Rome, reproduced here, are directly applicable tothe case of Japanese universities, a fortiori large national universities having close
ties with the central government:
University functions as agent (service provider) operating under a top-levelbilateral government cooperation agreement.
Collaboration with foreign government agencies (NASA, JAXA, etc.) is crucial.
Training recipient country’s professors to ensure that local universities retain
knowledge.
Involving recipient country’s professors in decision-making to increaseownership.
Exchanging students on both sides (but difficult to convince Roman students).
Need to foster job opportunities for students in the recipient country/region (ifnot, they will leave the country or change their professional focus).

§
§
§
§
§
§

Apart from the lessons of the University of Rome, the most interesting aspect of thecase studies presented in this chapter is the reliance on university spin-offs toconduct capacity building. It therefore raises the issue of the comparativeadvantages of private providers of capacity building services versus universities
and vice versa. What can and should be done by commercial providers? What canand should be done by universities? Although these questions are touched upon inmost of the following chapters, below are a few good practices from private
providers, directly extracted from the cases of SSTL, ISISPACE and Satrec
Initiative.
The mandate of university laboratories is the education of students and thedevelopment of knowledge. They therefore cannot spend an excessive amount oftime and resources to the provision of capacity building services. In fact, large
projects such as MicroDragon cannot be dealt with by a single laboratory, often
requiring the establishment of consortia including different large universities. Private
ventures, on the other hand, can devote their full attention to customers andpossess personnel and infrastructure adapted even to large-scale projects (e.g.
satellites above 100 kg). Concretely, the comparative advantages of private
providers are:§§Full vertical integration of satellite development capabilities, from design,
manufacturing and testing to the provision of launch and deployment
services.
The presence of in-house legal and administrative experts able to deal with,for instance, international contracts, sensitive technology export licenses,
frequency registration, etc.

34

§

§

§

The ability to procure competitive and fast-tracked launch opportunities. In
the case of ISISPACE, an official interviewed for this study explained that,
thanks to the large number of satellites it produces or for which it procureslaunch services, the company has been able to conclude working
agreements with most launch providers in the world.
Joint-bidding opportunities with large satellite makers. SSTL in particular,
being part of Airbus Group, can propose joint packages with its parent
company: when Airbus Defense and Space sells a large satellite to a
country, SSTL can, via the same agreement, be in charge of training dozens
of local engineers.
The ability to send experts abroad – at the recipient’s facilities – for a long
period of time, which is impossible in the case of university professors,researchers or students.

35

CHAPTER 4. DIPLOMATIC EFFECTIVENESS OFCAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMESThis chapter investigates the benefits generated by Japanese university-led spacetechnology development and utilisation capacity building programmes for Japan asa whole. It starts by defining the criteria used to measure the programmes’
diplomatic effectiveness before presenting their positive impact.
But why should the Japanese government care about the diplomatic impact ofspace capacity building programmes conducted by domestic universities?
Although Japan is and has been the leader in this field, as proven in this report, it isbeing strongly challenged by the rise of Chinese capacity building initiatives. While
the actual extent of Chinese activities is difficult to estimate due to the scarcity of
information, some specific programmes have been under the spotlight. China’s
leading aerospace university, Beihang University (short for Beijing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics) established in 2014 the Regional Centre for Space
Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (China), affiliated to theUnited Nations but fully funded by the Chinese government as the centre of its
politics of influence in the regional space sector. In fact, since the 1990s, Beihang
University has been attracting thousands of international students every year,
primarily from developing countries, thanks to a generous scholarship policy. As
explained on Beihang University’s “International Education” webpage, scholarships
available to international students are plentiful: “Chinese Government Scholarship(CGS), Beijing Government Scholarship, Beihang International Student Scholarship,
Confucius Institute Scholarship, scholarships from enterprises, etc.”.13 Even in nonChinese universities, Chinese students and scholars have largely taken over their
Japanese colleagues: according to a Japanese professor often teaching at theInternational Space University, the number of Chinese registrants grew to aroundthe third of annual cohorts, while Japanese students remain very few.
Without a strong reaction of the Japanese government and commitment to support
domestic universities, China will undoubtedly become the main regional andinternational provider of space technology development and utilisation capacity
building services in the coming years and reap all the benefits currently enjoyed by
Japan. Although on a smaller scale and with less apparent competition with Japan,
India has been advancing in terms of capacity building efforts, for example throughthe creation of a centre similar to the one in Beihang University: the Regional Centre
for Space Science and Technology Education (India), affiliated to the United
Nations.

13‘International Education’, Beihang University, accessed 1 March 2021,
https://ev.buaa.edu.cn/Admissions/International_Education.htm.

36

1. Evaluating diplomatic effectivenessIn order to measure the diplomatic effectiveness of Japanese university-led
capacity building programmes, we defined the following criteria:
Impact on Japan’s image abroad. To what extent the support provided by
Japanese universities contributed to bettering the image of Japan as a whole, forinstance thanks to positive press coverage or the assimilation of ‘university support’to ‘Japanese government support’?
Establishing long-term relationships. What role can play academic relationships
in the development of strong and durable bilateral ties?
Impact on bilateral cooperation beyond space. How can bilateral cooperation forspace technology development and utilisation contribute to the development of ties
in other fields, for instance agriculture, information and communication
technologies (ICT), and disaster management?
Grooming future leaders with ties with Japan. To what extent can the trainings
received from Japanese universities help former trainees to reach a high level of
responsibilities and influence in their home countries, therefore ensuring theexistence of a foreign elite favourable to collaborations with Japan?
Developing new markets for Japanese companies. What is the contribution ofuniversity-led space technology development and utilisation capacity building
programmes in the creation and obtention of new markets for Japanese commercial
companies?

2. Positive impact of capacity building projects
This section identifies the positive impact of the Japanese capacity building
programmes studied in this report, based on the aforementioned criteria.

2.1. Impact on Japan’s image abroad
All the projects studied in this report have contributed to pioneering initiatives,
including for some of them the development of the recipients’ first national
satellites. They were therefore highly publicised in local media. Often, the local
press, while mentioning the name of the university or company having provided
capacity building services, tends to deliver a simple message: ‘Japan helped ourcountry’. It is a typical case in which the independent action a single university
laboratory can contribute to promoting the image of Japan as whole. In addition,
the involvement of the local Japanese embassy or the local JICA office reinforces
the understanding of the recipient country’s population that ‘Japan’ is behind the
support. Below are a few examples.

37

The RWASAT-1 project is a textbook example of such understanding. Although theexisting government-to-government space cooperation between Rwanda andJapan is mostly non-existent (beyond a few signed letters of intents andmemoranda of understanding), the collaboration programme between the Rwanda
Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA) and The University of Tokyo is almost
exclusively described by national and regional news outlets as the “partnership
between Rwanda and Japan”, 14 or merely a project supported by “Japaneseexperts”.15
The exact same demonstration can be made with the PHL-Microsat programme,
the MicroDragon project and even more with the numerous BIRDS projects having
received extensive coverage in numerous countries, in a scale well beyond anyother Japanese university-led capacity building programmes.

2.2. Establishing long-term relationships
The role of academic partnerships in sustaining long-term bilateral relationships isparticularly striking in the case of Japan. Although not the only country following
such practices, the Japanese government is well known by its foreign counterparts
for the high turnover rate of its bureaucrats. Japanese public officers, including
diplomats, tend to follow job rotations of around two years, virtually resetting
relations with foreign partners on a similar time pattern.
Conversely, Japanese university professors, thanks to the tenure system, retain
their positions and responsibilities until retirement and are perfectly impervious toboth the bureaucratic changes described above, and to larger political anddiplomatic shifts in the country.
This is the case for most of the projects studied in this report: Professors Takahashi
and Yoshida are maintaining close and durable relations with their Filipino
counterparts, Professor Nakasuka has been working with Vietnam since the dawnof their satellite development roadmap and the BIRDS programme has eveninstitutionalised the continuation of the relationship among BIRDS participant withan annual workshop and a plan for follow-up after BIRDS-5.
Going a bit further on the case of Philippines, Professor Marciano’s great
achievements with Japan (DIWATA-1/2 and BIRDS) were identified by experts
interviewed for this report as part of the reason why he was appointed director
general of the newly established Philippines Space Agency. The Filipino

14David Oni, ‘Rwanda’s First Satellite In Space Is Set For Release From ISS’, Space inAfrica, 14 October 2019, https://africanews.space/rwandas-first-satellite-in-space-is-setfor-release-from-iss/.
15
Julius Bizimungu, ‘Rwanda on Course to Establish Space Industry’, The New Times |Rwanda, 10 August 2020, https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda-course-establishspace-industry.

38

government apparently valued his role in maintaining close relations with academic
partners in Japan.

2.3. Impact on bilateral cooperation beyond space
Space technology development and utilisation being closely intertwined with otherfields, such as agriculture, disaster management, land management or
environmental protection on the application side, or supercomputing,telecommunications, image processing or big data on the technical side, spacecooperation programmes necessarily generate collaborations in other technical orscientific disciplines.
For instance, from the starting point of developing a small communication andremote sensing satellite, the RWASAT-1 project is responsible for the initiation ofcollaborations between Rwandan and Japanese entities for meteorological andhydrological studies, for the monitoring of infectious diseases, for the developmentof various environmental sensors, etc.
Exactly similar considerations can be found in other projects, such as thecontribution of DIWATA satellites’ data for agricultural (“world’s detection of disease
areas of banana plantations”) or meteorology (“world's first precise 3D cloud modelaround the typhoon centre”).

2.4. Grooming future leaders with ties with Japan
Human resource development is at the core of any capacity building programme.
However, beyond transferring technical knowledge, there could be a benefit inorganising the trainees’ grooming into future leaders in their countries, for instancethrough English language, management or policy courses. In turn, when the former
trainees will naturally be assuming high-level responsibilities in their homecountries, it is likely that they will see in Japan – and Japanese institutions – areliable and trustworthy partner.
This was well understood and implemented by Professor Shirasaka during theMicroDragon project. Apart from the main technical curriculum (engineering, design
thinking, etc.), he set up English lectures and other forms of leadership development
activities. Due, however, to the recent completion of the project, it is too early to
see the concrete results of this initiative.
In the case of RWASAT-1 however, most of the project leaders and trainees werealready appointed to prestigious positions for their pioneering role in the country’s
first satellite programme. The two main counterparts of The University of Tokyo –and Rwandan programme leaders of RWASAT-1, Georges Kwizera and Joseph
Abakunda, were appointed as, respectively, the inaugural Chief Technical Officer
and Chief Strategy Officer of the newly founded Rwanda Space Agency. Although
seeing a direct causation would be excessive, Gaspard Twagirayezu, head of the39

trainee team, was appointed last year Minister of State for Primary and Secondary
Education of the Republic of Rwanda.
The example of PHL-Microsat is also striking. The project leader, Professor
Marciano, was recently appointed as the inaugural director general of thePhilippines Space Agency – although he was already assuming a senior role as the
director of a government agency – and numerous former students of Tohoku andHokkaido Universities are now being promoted to senior scientific or engineering
roles in the agency.

2.5. Developing new markets for Japanese companies
Capacity building programmes conducted by Japanese universities have proved
useful to open new markets for Japanese space ventures, through two processes:(1) the creation of a market by introducing space technology development andutilisation in the recipient country, and (2) by directly promoting partnerships withspecific Japanese space ventures.
As explained in Chapter 2, the MicroDragon project has been specifically designed
as a steppingstone towards the joint development of advanced radar satellites(LOTUSat) by the Vietnam National Space Centre (VNSC) and leading Japanesesatellite manufacturer NEC Corporation. The VNSC was unwilling to simply
purchase satellites from Japan but wanted to include in the package an ambitious
small satellite capacity building programme.
Similarly, different Japanese commercial providers were introduced to Rwanda aspart of the RWASAT-1 project. Apart from the direct involvement of University ofTokyo spin-off Space Edge Lab. Inc, other companies have initiated discussions
with the government of Rwanda such as Axelspace, fast-growing satellite remotesensing start-up based in Tokyo.

40

CHAPTER 5. EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS:KNOWLEDGE RETENTION IN RECIPIENTCOUNTRIES
Setting up a capacity building programme to transfer knowledge and technology is
one thing, retaining the knowledge is another. Through a combination of institutionalbuilding, and human resources and knowledge management measures, recipient
countries can ensure a maximum level of knowledge retention, that would serve as
the basis of future domestic projects. This chapter, after clarifying what we meanby education effectiveness, introduces the different knowledge retention strategies
implemented by the recipients of the capacity building programmes studied in thereport.

1. What do we mean by educational effectiveness?
In our first attempt to provide a definition to the concept of “educational
effectiveness”,16 we focussed on its primary meaning which can summed up as theability to effectively transfer knowledge from an entity that knows to an entity thatwishes to learn. Evaluating this form of educational effectiveness is fairly
straightforward in the cases of the capacity building programmes studied in thisreport: what was taught? How many students were trained? Did the recipientacquire the ability to develop a satellite on its own? Etc.
Based on our review of numerous cases, what appeared to be the most interesting
aspect of educational effectiveness was not the raw quantity of knowledge acquiredby the recipient but rather its ability to retain, employ and further develop thisknowledge. In other words, apart from providing the recipient with new knowledge,
did the capacity building programme empower the recipient, by allowing it toindependently conduct its own space activities?
The cases presented in the next section illustrate the different approaches ofrecipient countries with regards to the long-term retention and development of theknowledge that they acquired. Several elements are analysed, such as:§§

The existence of concrete knowledge retention strategies established by therecipient prior to the start of the capacity building programme.
The inclusion by the donor, in the capacity building programmes, of teachings
related to the long-term sustainability of the recipient’s activities (e.g. policy,
project management).

16
We do not address here the different field of educational effectiveness research, which
focusses on professor-to-student relations in the classroom, and associated teaching
methods.

41

§§The situation of the recipients several years after the programmes.
The transformation from recipient to donor of space technology development
and utilisation knowledge.

2. Different approaches to knowledge retention
Knowledge retention strategies vary greatly from one recipient to the other, withsome managing to retain and expand the knowledge acquired through capacity
building, while others almost go back to square one after several years. This section
presents numerous good and bad cases of knowledge retention and draws useful
lessons.

Focus 1: SSTL capacity building, comparison of Thailand (Thai-Paht) andSouth Korea (Satrec)
In the 1990s, two Asian universities received similar capacity building services fromUK company Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL), both ending up producing a
microsatellite, which was also their country’s first satellite:§§

In 1992, engineers from the Korea Advanced Institute of Science andTechnology (KAIST), foremost engineering and science university of the
Republic of Korea (ROK), were sent to SSTL to develop ROK’s first satellite,
KITSAT-1.
In 1998, student and engineers from Thailand’s Mahanakorn University ofTechnology (MUT) followed the same process and developed themicrosatellite Thai-Paht.

However, although they followed the same programme, both universities embarked
on a very different path, with KAIST ending up creating a competitor of SSTL, Satrec
Initiative (see Chapter 3, section 1, focus 4), while the knowledge generated in the
MUT mostly vanished. How can this be explained?
As extensively explained in an excellent paper written by the founder of Satrec
Initiative, the capacity building programme conducted by SSTL with KAIST
engineers and students was planned as the starting point of a progressive and longterm strategy aiming for the forming of indigenous satellite development capabilities
in Korea.17 The knowledge acquired during the development of KITSAT-1 – andduring the studies of Korean students in other countries – was used and extended
for the domestic manufacturing, a few years later, of KITSAT-2 and KITSAT-3.
KAIST engineers then decided to consolidate the knowledge into a privately owned
start-up company, therefore coupling the need to retain and expand the knowledge
with the commercial survival of the newly established company. It has proved to be

17

Park et al., ‘Journey of a Korean Small Satellite Company: From Space Technology
Recipient to Donor’.

42extremely successful, Satrec Initiative now being a major space technology
development and utilisation capacity building provider.
The MUT on the contrary had no such strategy in place when receiving support
from SSTL. According to an interviewee involved in the project at the time,
motivated neither by the desire to expand knowledge nor to the goal of setting up
commercial activities, the development and launch of Thai-Paht was primarily
aiming at the domestic and international promotion of the MUT, in a situation quite
similar to the case of Colombia’s Sergio Arboleda University presented later in thischapter.
Lessons that can be drawn from this comparison are:§§§

The need to include capacity building programmes within a long-term
strategic vision, in order to make sure to build on the existing momentum.
Tying the development of domestic capabilities with commercial imperatives,that is by conditioning a company’s survival to the necessary retention andfurther expansion of the knowledge, has proved to be an effective motivation.
The very limited and short-lived promotional benefits of launching a countries
first satellite, if not part of a sustainable programme.

Focus 2: Airbus capacity building, comparison of Thailand (THEOS-1) andTaiwan (FORMOSAT-2)
Although this example concerns capacity building provided by a large corporationand neither by a university nor a university spin-off, focus of the study, it helps
understand the importance of knowledge retention strategies.
In the 2000s, two countries purchased the same satellite from Airbus (still called
EADS at the time) and received similar associated capacity building services:§§

The Taiwanese National Space Organization (NSPO) purchased the large
remote sensing satellite FORMOSAT-2, launched in 2004. NSPO is part of the
National Applied Research Laboratories (NARLabs) under the administrative
supervision of the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Thailand’s Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency(GISTDA) acquired THEOS-1 – almost identical to FORMOSAT-2, launched in2008. GISTDA is under the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Higher
Education, Science, Research, and Innovation, but also has in its Executive
Board representatives from the Royal Thai Survey Department (Thai Armed
Forces) and the Bureau of the Budget (Ministry of Finance).

Similar to the cases of Focus 1, while capacity building services were similar, theirlong-term outcomes are radically different:

43

§

§

After the deployment in space of FORMOSAT-2, NSPO progressively built up
its capabilities, including with the development of an indigenous large satellite,
FORMOSAT-5.
Conversely, GISTDA did not develop any domestic satellite since then.
According to a GISTDA interviewee, part of the problem is that, out of 20
engineers and 20 students having been trained in France, only four are left intechnical positions in GISTDA, with almost no retention of knowledge. In fact,
when GISTDA engineers need help on THEOS-1, they usually contact their
Taiwanese counterparts, who managed to keep and expand their knowledge.

How can these stark differences be explained? Having been unable to interview
former NSPO trainees, we relied on literature review, which suggested that, like thecase of Satrec Initiative, the primary reason of NSPO’s success was the inclusionof FORMOSAT-2’s capacity building programme within a long-term satellite
development roadmap, having culminated with the domestic development of
FORMOSAT-5.18
The case of Thailand however is precisely examined thereafter. For THEOS-1, 20
engineers were sent to EADS-Astrium facilities in Toulouse and 20 scholarshipstudents were sent to French universities as part of the “THEOS training program”.
However, not having received any strict guidance, students registered formathematics, aeronautics or civil engineering programmes, with only a single one
focusing on space engineering. In addition to that, after the completion of the
training programmes, GISTDA did not establish any knowledge retention
mechanism, neither in terms of personnel management (as said above only four
trainees retained technical roles until now) nor in terms of centralised knowledge
repository or internal knowledge dissemination initiatives.
In addition to GISTDA’s internal institutional failures, an interviewee also blamed therisk-averse nature of the Thai government, favouring short-term project successrather than long-term capacity building. Not allowing a project to appear as a failure,
Thai government agencies tend to prefer turn-key solutions, at the expense oflearning. In addition, in Thailand, all governmental projects have to be concluded
within a single fiscal year. In fact, multi-year budgets are extremely complex tojustify and obtain as they require the personal approval of the prime minister(Indonesia has a similar system requiring the supervising minister’s approval).
Lessons that can be drawn from the comparison of the Taiwanese and Thai cases
are:
§
§

Again, the importance of long-term capacity development roadmaps.
The need for concrete institutional knowledge retention strategies, including
appropriate personnel management mechanisms, to ensure that former
trainees contribute to further spreading the knowledge that they acquired.

18‘The Push to Develop Aerospace Technology’, Executive Yuan (2.16.886.101.20003, 10
February 2020), https://english.ey.gov.tw/News3/9E5540D592A5FECD/46f4d4cc-ccea4d22-874e-ecb93e5cf1b8.

44

§The damages of excessive risk-aversion. The maximisation of the mission’s
probability of success should not be done at the expense of capacity building.

Focus 3: MicroDragon
The MicroDragon project having been extensively described in Chapter 2, thissection focusses on drawing lessons from the Vietnam National Space Centre’s(VNSC) knowledge retention approach.
The MicroDragon satellite was developed as one stage of a long-term satellite
development roadmap, expected to culminate with the manufacturing, inpartnership with Japanese company NEC, of the advanced radar satellites
LOTUSat. One strength of the VNSC’s approach is to contractually force trainees
to keep working at the centre at least until the completion of the roadmap (launchof LOTUSat in 2023) while also ensuring that they will have some real work to doafterwards. In particular, the future development of the LOTUSat satellites will
involve numerous VNSC staffs, many of them having already acquired a strong
knowledge – and advanced degrees – through the MicroDragon project: 48 forsatellite development, 16 for operations, 34 for data processing. In total, around
100 staffs will participate in short-term stays in Japan.
In parallel with satellite development, data processing will start being taught in 2021
at Vietnamese universities by experts of the Remote Sensing Technology Centre ofJapan (RESTEC), using data from the NEC’s Asnaro-2 satellite, on which LOTUSat
are based.
In addition, to further spread the knowledge acquired during the MicroDragon
project, VNSC has educational contracts with three universities: the Vietnam
National University, the Vietnam France University (also known as University of
Science and Technology of Hanoi) and the Vietnam International University.
Overall, lessons that can be drawn from the case of MicroDragon are the following:§§

Appropriate personnel management mechanisms need to combine
contractually forcing trainees to stay in their agencies after the completion of
capacity building programmes while parallelly ensuring that they have areason to stay, that is a space-related job in their home country ororganisation.
In order to spread the knowledge domestically, the receiving agency canpartner with local universities to have their engineers teach students, as wellas welcome students as interns in the agency. In turns, it helps the agency
develop a pool of competent prospective employees.

45

Focus 4: LAPAN’s LAPAN-TUBSAT project19
LAPAN-TUBSAT is a CubeSat developed at the Technical University of Berlin (TU
Berlin or TUB), by a team of engineers from the Indonesian space agency LAPAN,
as part of a capacity building programme.
Willing to initiate a capacity building programme for some of its promising
employees, LAPAN initially approached UK company SSTL after hearing about thecase of Malaysia’s TiungSAT microsatellite, launched in 2000. Based on LAPAN’s
initial requirements, SSTL provided a project budget estimation of around USD 10
million, which was ten times what LAPAN had expected and was willing to accept.
After receiving a similar answer from the German Aerospace Centre (DLR), the latterrecommended LAPAN to contact Professor Renner of TU Berlin, which had initiatedin 1985 a university small satellite programme called TUBSAT, having alreadyproduced five satellites at the time (2002-2003).20 TU Berlin proposed to LAPAN an
all-inclusive proposal (stay, learning and satellite development) within the expectedbudget (USD 1 million). LAPAN therefore selected four young engineers following avery strict process (out of 60 applicants), to stay in TU Berlin for the duration of the
project. In addition, a fifth trainee position was set up, with LAPAN engineers
rotating every three months. The project was initiated in 2003 and the satellite
launched in 2007.
Now, around 15 years after the project’s completion, LAPAN has around 150 trained
staffs devoted to satellite manufacturing with a 100 kg class clean room andvibration test facilities. The four initial trainees are all still in LAPAN, two having
remained in the satellite manufacturing department while the two others have
moved to other technical departments (remote sensing and rocket development).
According to one of the four main trainees interviewed for this study, the model ofthe LAPAN-TUBSAT project was followed by other countries (e.g. Singapore andChina tried to work with TU Berlin), but without the same successful results. He
explained it by the fact that 1) they did not select the best profiles and did notpromote them quickly enough after the completion of the programme, and that 2)
the key to capacity building is to build a strong relationship with the source ofknowledge which has to open up. LAPAN trainees explained being still in very close
contact with Professor Renner.
Commenting on 1), the interviewee explained that after coming back to Indonesia,
the four trainees were given generous budgets and staff to go on with their researchand keep the momentum. A new satellite programme was approved in 2008, themoney came in 2009, and the satellite, fully developed in Indonesia but including
foreign components, was ready in 2012 and launched in 2015 for free by India in
19

Unless otherwise referenced, the information in this section was obtained during aninterview with a former LAPAN-TUBSAT capacity building programme trainee.
20‘TUBSAT’, TU Berlin, Institute for Air and Space, 4 May 2016,
https://www.raumfahrttechnik.tuberlin.de/menue/forschung/abgeschlossene_projekte/tubsat/v_menue4/tubsat/.

46

exchange for using Indonesian islands for tests. LAPAN engineers were able to do
it even without clean room and proper testing facilities (“almost clean room”). Now
LAPAN teams are able to develop their own simple components.
Finally, in order to spread the knowledge that it acquired through capacity building
programmes, LAPAN initiated a partnership with the Bandung Institute ofTechnology (BIT), the only aerospace engineering university in Indonesia. BIT
students are usually hired in LAPAN but with limited space engineering knowledge.
LAPAN therefore decided to contribute to their education by teaching and by
welcoming them in LAPAN for their thesis or papers.
Knowledge retention lessons that can be drawn from the case of LAPAN-TUBSAT
are the following:§§§§

Trainees should be chosen following a strict selection process.
Former trainees should be quickly promoted and given good working
conditions in terms of budget, staff and equipment.
Keeping a good relationship with the training provider allows to maintainknowledge transfer even after the end of the programme.
Transfer knowledge to local students (BIT).

Focus 5: PHL-Microsat
There is no need to reaffirm the great contribution of the PHL-Microsat programme
to the development of space capacity in the Philippines, in particular with the very
appropriate combination of large, advanced satellites (DIWATA-1/2) with the leaner
educational approach of the BIRDS programme (Maya satellites).
Apart from this intelligent combined approach allowing to develop capacity while
conducting advanced missions, the most interesting feature of the PHL-Microsat
programme is the effort made by its leader, Professor Marciano, to retain the staffs
having been trained in Japan. Being unable to contractually force former trainees
to stay at the University of Philippines because they had been hired under a fix-term
project grant, he had to find a way to make them want to stay. He therefore
established the well-named STAMINA4Space programme, modelled after
Kyutech’s BIRDS, in order to maintain the country’s space development momentum
by keeping his engineers busy and training more and more domestic students. In
addition to this programme, he supported other trainees to become lecturers innational universities in order to transfer their precious knowledge to the next
generation.
STAMINA4Space being a fix-term programme, it is viewed as a smooth transition
towards the progressive build-up of the newly established Philippines Space
Agency (PhilSA). While PhilSA was created as the outcome of a separate policy
process led by Dr Rogel Mari Sese, the National SPACE Development Programme(NSDP), it is undeniable that the successful capacity building initiatives organised
under the umbrella of PHL-Microsat have contributed to the agency’s approval by47

the Congress and the nomination of Professor Marciano as inaugural director
general. PhilSA is currently in the process of recruiting numerous employees, manyof whom were pillars of the former PHL-Microsat programme.
The final point, strongly emphasised by Japanese professors leading capacity
building programmes, is the great importance to have a local champion aroundwhich capacity building efforts can be based. In the case of the Philippines, thepresence of Professor Marciano has been key in developing and cementing
relations with Japanese universities as well as for the domestic development ofresearch programmes – and PhilSA to some extent.
Overall, lessons that can be drawn from the case of PHL-Microsat are the following:••

Mechanisms to keep trainees after the completion of the capacity building
programmes is indispensable to retain the knowledge. A combination of
governmental (PhilSA) and academic job opportunities (STAMINA4Space or
lecturers at the University of the Philippines) has proved extremely efficient inboth retaining knowledge and spreading it to the next generations.
The presence of a strong local champion is a facilitator of international
relations and domestic institutionalisation of space development efforts. In
addition, having a local champion with an academic tenure allows long-term
continuity, independently from political changes.

Lessons from other projects studied in this report
In addition to the examples presented above, we reviewed additional case studies
highlighting a few useful lessons.
Colombia’s Libertad-121
The Libertad-1 project, which ended with the development and launch ofColombia’s first university CubeSat, was initiated to promote the newly establisheddepartment of engineering of the Sergio Arboleda University. According to a former
team member, the university headquarters having seen Libertad-1 more as publicity
stunt rather than as the first step of a long-term space development strategy, lostinterest in space activities soon after its launch, leading to the failure of researchers’
and students’ efforts to develop a second satellite, Libertad-2. Apart fromreinforcing the aforementioned lesson that when developing a CubeSat, one
should already have planned and secured resources for a second or third one,this example shows the limitations of the common practice of ‘advertisement’satellite projects, like in the case of Thai-Paht.

21

All the information presented in this section was obtained during an interview of Dr Jesus
D. Gonzales-Llorente, former researcher at Sergio Arboleda University and member of theteam having developed Libertad-1.

48

Costa Rica’s Irazú22
Initiated by a team of volunteers of the Central American Association of Aeronautics
and Space (ACAE, Asociación Centroamericana de Aeronáutica y del Espacio) in
2009, the Irazú 1U CubeSat project took a step further in 2013, when ACAE signed
an agreement with the Institute of Technology of Costa Rica (TEC, Tecnológico de
Costa Rica). While ACAE was in charge of strategic partnerships and funding, TEC
became the technical and scientific co-lead. In TEC, the technical dimension of the
project took off in January 2015 with a 4-year timeline. Approached by Professor
Cho in 2014, TEC signed an agreement with Kyutech in 2016 for launch, testing,technical support and capacity building. According to Irazú’s project manager
Marco Gómez Jenkins, Kyutech was chosen based on its ability to provide a “fullpackage”, thanks to its extensive infrastructure and technical expertise, at anextremely competitive cost of USD 55,000. While the full development happenedin Costa Rica with Kyutech support, tests have been conducted in Kyutech by
two Costa Rica students (one master’s and one PhD).
In order to retain capacity in Costa Rica and spread it further, a Space Systems Lab
was created in TEC in mid 2017 (the first in Central America) so students can learn
by operating Irazú. In addition, the institutionalisation of space activities in TEC
allowed to have an official structure working with the country’s Ministry of Science,
Technology and Telecommunications for the establishment of a national space
agency.
Central America’s Morazán23
Building on the pioneering experience of the Irazú project, ACAE initiated in 2018
the Morazán CubeSat project. According to an ACAE representative whom weinterviewed, while Irazú successfully completed its mission to create an enabling
ecosystem and awareness on the need of space technology development andutilisation for the Central American region, Morazán aims to focus on sharing
knowledge with “Central American brothers” as well as partners around theworld. ACAE therefore secured partnerships with the University of Costa Rica(different from TEC), the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH,
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras) and the University of San Carlos in
Guatemala, among others, as well as support from the Central American Integration
System, a regional economic and political cooperation organisation (roughly
equivalent of the ASEAN or the European Union).
Like Irazú, the Morazán project has concluded a partnership with Kyutech fortesting and capacity building. At the time of publication of this report, one student

22

All the information presented in this section was obtained from former members of the
TEC team having developed Irazú, in particular by the project manager Marco Gómez
Jenkins.
23
All the information presented in this section was obtained from members of the Morazán
project, met during the 2019 International Astronautical Congress in Washington, DC.

49

is supported by UNAH to study in Kyutech (currently remotely due the COVID-19
pandemic) and will be in charge of Morazán’s environmental testing when the
CubeSat will be sent to Kyutech (date yet to be decided). Morazán will then be
deployed in space by JAXA for free, pursuant to Morazán’s selection in the
KiboCUBE programme.

3. General lessons on knowledge retention
Knowledge retention in recipient countries should matter to Japanese universities
because even when capacity building programmes are fully paid for by therecipient, they consume Japanese resources: tax money funding the professors’
tenures, the facilities and initial technology development costs; time of professors,researchers and students that can have been devoted to a better use; supported
provided by government agencies for diplomacy, frequency registration, etc. The
loss of the recipient’s acquired knowledge is therefore an unacceptable waste oftax money and precious time. It is thus critical that Japanese universities checkbefore starting the programme that appropriate measures are taken by the recipient
to retain and develop the knowledge.
This section summarises the four most important ‘good practices’ to look for whenevaluating a recipient’s knowledge retention strategy. Conversely, we encourage
donors to help recipients devise an appropriate approach based on these key
lessons.

Good practice 1. Long-term space development roadmap
A common feature of all successful examples of knowledge retention, long after
capacity building programmes were concluded, is the inclusion of each project,even minor, in a long-term space development roadmap. As bluntly explained byan interview: “when doing your first satellite, you should have secured the number
two and the number three”. With a pre-decided roadmap, every single knowledge
development and acquisition activity is conducted for the achievement of short, mid
or long-term goals.
On the contrary, an example of ‘worst practice’ is the unfortunately too common
use of space development for promotion. Numerous universities have tried tobolster their domestic and international visibility with a CubeSat – often the firstnational satellite. However, a quick review of such practices clearly shows their very
short-lived promotional effect and their nonexistence capacity building benefits,
most space development programmes dying out after a few months of satellite
operations.

50

Good practice 2. Ensuring job opportunities in the domestic space sector
The principal benefit of capacity building programmes is not technology transfer orthe acquisition of a tangible piece of knowledge per se, it is the development of askilled local workforce. The key question that needs to be answered by the initiatorsof a capacity building programme, on the recipient side, is: why do we need thistrained workforce and what can the trainees do after the completion of the training?
When this question remains unanswered, then the knowledge is doomed to bequickly lost: trainees will find space-related jobs abroad or progressively lose theirknowledge while working in another research or business sector. Even if the
trainees are contractually forced to remain in the institution having paid for thecapacity building programme, not working on a real project will lead to theprogressive weakening of their abilities.
To ensure that the knowledge is retained, receiving organisations should have plansto keep the former trainees busy with satellite development projects, teaching at
local universities, etc. To this end, the cases of the VNSC and of the University of
the Philippines-Diliman provide excellent examples of good practices. This lesson
is obviously closely interrelated to the first one. As explained by Professor Marcianois the speech that he delivered after his nomination as inaugural director general of
PhilSA, his primary motivation is “to give a reason to Filipino space engineers living
abroad to come back home”.

Good practice 3. Existence of a stable local champion
Recipient countries having a clearly identified local champion often provesuccessful in developing and maintaining a long-term space development vision.
The best example is, once more, Professor Marciano, which has steadily led spacetechnology development efforts in the Philippines for almost a decade. Other cases
were mentioned during interviews, in South Korea (Professor Cho of KAIST) andSingapore.
In most cases, the local champion is a tenured university professor. It is in fact
primarily thanks to the stability and long-term visibility provided by academic
tenures, allowing its holder not to be affected too much by political changes.

Good practice 4. Partnerships between government agencies and local
universities
The final good practice emphasised in this section is, in the case of government
agencies having benefited from capacity building services, to further spread theknowledge through partnerships with local universities.
In the previous cases, the VNSC, the Philippine DOST and LAPAN have all
encouraged their former trainees to teach space technology-related lectures in51

national universities, which provides a series of benefits: spread the knowledge,
keep engineers busy if there is no current satellite project and finally ensure that
their future employees, selected among taught students, will already possess acertain technical level.

52

CHAPTER 6. IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON
CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMESThe COVID-19 pandemic, by limiting long-distance travel for more than a year
already, has strongly impacted international research and development
collaborations, including space technology development and utilisation capacity
building programmes. Due to the ongoing nature of the pandemic, itsconsequences are yet to be fully identified. This short chapter therefore provides
preliminary considerations on the impact of COVID-19 on capacity building
programmes through a few examples.

1. Academic and private providers: a very different situation
As extensively addressed in the next chapter, the respective strengths andweaknesses of academic and private providers of capacity building derive fromcommercial imperatives. While for university laboratories, capacity building
programmes are occasional activities, commercial private providers depend onthem for their survival.
By preventing international travel, the COVID-19 pandemic put a sudden stop to
the core of any capacity building programme: hands-on training (in the recipient or
donor organisations) and the installation of equipment in the recipient country.
Concretely, this situation imposed the temporary suspension of existing
programmes until travel can be resumed. Although some adaptation to thepandemic is feasible such as the organisation of online trainings or joint remotesatellite operations, space technology development capacity building cannot bedone online.
While inconvenient for universities, this situation did not disrupt their core activities(e.g. teaching, internal satellite projects), as budgets remained fairly stablethroughout the pandemic, covering the majority of staffs, facility and equipment
costs. Private providers however had to delay planned services and are struggling
to recover costs for services already provided, as shown by the example of
RWASAT-1 presented thereafter.
In addition, beyond disrupting the programmes themselves, the COVID-19
pandemic has strongly hampered the providers’ outreach activities. Spacetechnology development and utilisation capacity building being an expensive
venture, often difficult to justify by universities or governmental agencies indeveloping countries, it needs to be based on a certain level of confidence between
the donor and the recipient, confidence that can be built only after long, face-toface discussions. In the case of Japan, it explains why most of the programmes
were built upon existing solid relations between foreign officials and prominent

53

Japanese university professors. The example of the Kyushu Institute of Technology,
presented thereafter, illustrates this point perfectly.

2. A few examples
This section provides three examples of capacity building programmes having been
disrupted at various degrees by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.1. Kyutech’s BIRDS: importance of international travel to findparticipants
When asked what impact the COVID-19 pandemic had on Kyutech’s BIRDS
programme, Professor George Maeda, in charge of international relations andoutreach, emphasised the role of physical international travel for the recruitment of
BIRDS partner organisations and graduate students, “unavoidable to some extent”.
In particular, he explained the importance of international conferences to meetprospective partners. It includes some of the largest space-related events such as
the annual International Astronautical Congress, gathering for a week space experts
and enthusiasts from almost all countries around the world, and other events
focussing on international development. In particular, during the last Tokyo
International Conference on African Development in 2019 (TICAD7), Professors
Maeda and Cho were able to meet high-ranking officials from Uganda andZimbabwe, both countries having since then joined BIRDS-5. Then, after initial
contacts during conferences, it is often necessary to visit the prospective partnercountry in order to convince different domestic stakeholders of the benefits to join
the BIRDS programme.
The worldwide cancellation of international conferences and the suspension of nonessential air travel has put a sudden stop to Kyutech’s usual outreach initiatives,
critical for the international promotion of the BIRDS programme and the discovery
of future partners. The link among past and current participants was however
maintained by switching the annual international BIRDS workshop online in 2020,
until the improvement of the global health situation.

2.2. RWASAT-1: difficulties to fulfil contractual milestones
The example of the RWASAT-1 project is fairly common in any business area. The
agreement between the three contracting parties, the Rwandan government, Space
Edge Lab. Inc. and The University of Tokyo included specific tasks to completed
and an associated payment calendar.
Payments being conditioned to the completion of a group of tasks, what happens
when the provider completes only two thirds of them? This was the deadlock facing
RWASAT-1 project members after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The

54

Rwandan side, being subjected to strict government rules was legitimately unable
to honour – even partially – the payment deadline, while the provider, Space Edge
Lab., was legitimately unable to provide additional services requiring the physicalpresence of Japanese experts in Rwanda. Only after the pandemic subsides cansolutions be found to complete the project.

2.3. The University of Tokyo’s support to the Institute of Technology ofCambodia
The final example of this chapter concerns a University of Tokyo student-initiatedcapacity building programme with the Institute of Technology of Cambodia (ITC).24
In 2019, students of the Global Leader Program for Social Design and Management(GSDM) obtained funding to visit Cambodia and deliver the first-ever spaceengineering, law and policy course in the history of the country.
After the great success of this first training, which included numerous engaging
hands-on group activities, it was decided to continue with an additional visit in 2020
in order to progressively accompany the ITC towards the development of
Cambodia’s first satellite. However, the advent in the meantime of the COVID-19
pandemic forced the University of Tokyo team to entirely rethink its educational
approach, reducing hands-on activities to focus on online teaching.
Now, the project has been expanded thanks to the support of two laboratories of
the university’s department of aeronautics and astronautics. However, the COVID19 pandemic limits its scope to satellite design, with the impossibility to work on an
actual system for the foreseeable future.

24

All details on the initiation of the project are available in Maximilien Berthet et al.,‘Student-Led Policy and Technical Capacity Building Program: The Road to Cambodia’sFirst CubeSat’, in Proceedings of the 71st International Astronautical Congress, The
Cyberspace Edition (IAC 2020) (71st International Astronautical Congress, The Cyberspace
Edition (IAC 2020), Online, 2020).

55

CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION OF JAPANESECAPACITY BUILDING AND POLICYRECOMMENDATIONS
The final chapter of this report provides a precise analysis of Japanese universityled capacity building programmes and derives concrete policy recommendations
from it. It is organised as follows:
§

§
§

§

Section 1 lists the strengths of such programmes and differentiate thoserelated to the academic nature of the provider and those specific toJapanese universities.
Section 2 outlines the benefits for Japanese universities to engage in theprovision of capacity building services.
Section 3 identifies the weaknesses of Japanese university-led capacity
building programmes and classifies them into structural, governmentrelated and programmatic weaknesses. It then derives specific needs fromeach of the weaknesses.
Finally, section 4 presents a series of recommendations aiming to address
the needs identified in the previous section.

1. Strengths of Japanese university-led capacity building
programmes
The strengths of Japanese university-led capacity building programmes can bedivided into two types: those related to the fact the provider is a university and thoseto the fact that the provider is a Japanese university. Figure 7-1 illustrate thisclassification.

Figure 7-1. Classification of Japanese university-led capacity building programmes’
strengths

56

1.1. Strengths of university-led capacity building
The academic nature of the service provider is responsible for a series of strengths,
detailed below.
1.1.1. Affordability compared to private providers
Owing to their non-profit nature and to the fact that most of their basic costs arecovered by their government (professors’ tenures, facilities, etc.), universities havethe ability to cut the price of their services down to the minimum, in particular by
not including past technology development costs and core personnel costs.
In fact, when looking for a capacity building provider for its CubeSat project – later
to be known as LAPAN-TUBSAT, LAPAN initially turned to Surrey Satellite
Technology Ltd. (SSTL), which proposed a ten-million-dollar project based on
LAPAN’s requirements. This was ten times what LAPAN has planned and budgeted.
LAPAN officials then turned to the German Aerospace Centre (DLR) which
explained that, for a million-dollar budget, they would be able to provide only one
advanced component, like a star sensor. However, they encouraged LAPAN tocontact a professor at the Technical University of Berlin (TU Berlin), who agreed toprovide capacity building services within the budget.
An interviewee from LAPAN summarised efficiently the fact that pure commercial
providers tend to propose capacity building packages that are “too expensive, toobig, too early” for emerging and budget-constrained agencies.
1.1.2. Benevolent image and flexibility in negotiations
Most recipients of capacity building programmes have justified their willingness towork with universities because of their benevolent image and flexibility innegotiations.
The universities’ benevolent image was often equated to their absence ofcommercial motivation, owing to the fact that the fundamental objective ofuniversities is the advancement of space technology development and education.
On the other hand, recipients may doubt that the projects, budgets and timelines
proposed by commercial providers are in their best interests.
Flexibility in negotiations relates to the fact that collaborations with universities are
generally led by specific laboratories. It means that discussions involve a small
number of counterparts and that the collaboration’s approval process is usuallyshort and straightforward. It was pointed out by Japanese professors interviewed
for this study that recipient organisations wanted to work solely with universities,
with limited involvement of the Japanese central government, that they perceived
as complex, heavily bureaucratic and time-consuming.

57

1.1.3. Flexibility in project timeline and contents
Compared to pure commercial providers, universities, especially large ones, havethe ability to provide comprehensive capacity building services going beyond
science and engineering. One of the major takeaways of this report is theimportance of project management, strategy, law and policy in the long-termsustainability of a space programme.
Although commercial providers could theoretically organise such comprehensive
package, they could barely rival with the ability of major universities to leverage theirnumerous schools and departments. For instance, numerous components of The
University of Tokyo independently possess world-class space knowledge withwhich no commercial provider can rival: the Graduate School of Engineering forsatellite development and utilisation (Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics)
and management (Department of Technology Management and Innovation), theGraduate School of Science for sensor development and data analysis, and the
Graduate School of Public Policy for space law, policy and economics. Sameconsiderations can be made for most of the major Japanese universities mentioned
in this report.
In addition, owing to their commercial imperatives, private providers of capacity
building services have limited tolerance for extended deadlines and stretched
timelines. Universities, thanks to their stable budgets and the usually minor
importance of external capacity building funding, can provide more temporal
flexibility.
1.1.4. Ability to provide degrees
Finally, one major benefit of university providers compared to any other non-profit
provider is their ability to sanction trainings with an actual degree (master’s or PhD),
element that has been strongly emphasised by numerous interviewees fromrecipient institutions.

1.2. Strengths of Japanese university-led capacity building
Owing to their intrinsic characteristics and their close proximity to the Japanese
government, Japanese universities benefits from additional strengths with regards
to the provision of space technology development and utilisation capacity building
services.
1.2.1. JAXA-provided launch opportunities
As explained in Chapter 2, section 4.2, JAXA has been providing discounted rates
for small satellite deployment from the Kibo module of the ISS to selected
universities, as part of its Strategic Partnership Program.

58

These opportunities provided by JAXA were described by numerous Japanese
professors interviewed in this study as one of the key enablers of their capacity
building programmes. In particular, the high affordability of the BIRDS programme
relies on the assurance of low deployment costs.
However, as further discussed in 3.2, the Strategic Partnership Programme expires
at the end of FY2020 in March 2021, generating strong uncertainties for Japanese
universities.
1.2.2. Alignment with Japanese government diplomatic goals
Capacity building projects aligning with specific diplomatic targets of the Japanese
central government can benefit from different forms of support, in particularfinancial. Although official development assistance (ODA) tends to focus on
traditional areas of development (e.g. infrastructure, agriculture, sanitation), theJapan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been one of the first and very
few bilateral lenders supporting space technology development projects – spacedata utilisation projects are however more common.
The MicroDragon project has been fully supported by a JICA loan to the Vietnam
National Space Centre as part of an ambitious bilateral cooperation framework
aiming at the development of advanced satellite design and manufacturing
capabilities in Vietnam. To a smaller extent, JICA has also been supporting otherprojects such as RWASAT-1 (in particular concerning the drafting of a national
space policy to ensure the sustainability of the Rwandan space programme).
Apart from the specific case of Italy’s capacity building programme with Kenya, notstrictly speaking supported by ODA, we did not identify another example of bilateralor multilateral donor supporting space development programmes.
1.2.3. Easy decision-making of independent laboratories
An important finding on Japanese university-led capacity building programmes isthe very high level of independence of university laboratories with respect to their
university’ headquarters, a fortiori at the largest national universities.
In fact, all international cooperation programmes studied here were initiated basedon the sole decision of university professors. This is an important difference withthe practices of most universities worldwide in which headquarters tend to exert ahigher level of control over department-level or laboratory-level activities.
However, as discussed below in sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, the independence ofJapanese university laboratories is a double-edged sword: while it simplifies
negotiations and decision-making, it also creates a risky dependency on few
individuals.

59

2. Benefits for universities to engage in the provision of capacity
building services
Although the main beneficiary of capacity building services is the recipient, thedonor can also benefit from engaging in such activities.

2.1. Previously mentioned motivations of Japanese universities
Although their primary motivation is the dissemination of knowledge, Japanese
universities engaging in the provision of capacity building services can be motivatedby specific gains such as the access to additional satellite project opportunities, theobtention of external funding complementing the resources provided by theJapanese government, etc. For a detailed overview of the motivations of Japanese
universities to engage in capacity building, see Chapter 2, section 2.

2.2. Contribution to university branding and strategy
The positive impact of engaging in capacity building service provision on the overall
university branding domestically and internationally was never part of the initial
motivation of Japanese universities but has proved to be a major ‘collateral’ benefit.
The case of Kyutech is, in this regard, very revealing. Compared to Japan’s large
national – formerly imperial – universities such as The University of Tokyo or Kyoto
University, Kyutech was less visible on the international stage. However, since thebeginning of its BIRDS programme, Kyutech is now considered to be one the world
leading universities for small satellite design, development, integration, testing andoperations. Kyutech’s prominent achievements were recognised by numerous
prestigious international awards, such as:
§

§

§

§

Kyutech was ranked first global small satellite operator in the category“Academic and Non-Profit” of Bryce Space and Technology’s Smallsats by
the Numbers 2020.25 With 18 small satellites, Kyutech operates more small
satellites than major space agencies like JAXA, ISRO, the DLR or ESA.
Professor Cho received the International Astronautical Federation’s (IAF)
Frank J. Malina Medal, most prestigious space education award in the world,
for his outstanding contribution.
Numerous Kyutech students have been recognised as IAF Emerging Space
Leaders for their pioneering contributions to advancing space technology
development and utilisation knowledge in their respective countries.
Finally, and most importantly, Kyutech received huge international press
coverage in all the countries that it has supported in the development of theirfirst satellite.

25‘Smallsats by the Numbers 2020’ (Alexandria, Virginia: Bryce Space and Technology,2020), https://brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/Bryce_Smallsats_2020.pdf.

60

The great success of the BIRDS programme has in turn influence the overall
strategy of Kyutech, with space engineering now identified as one of the main fields
of expertise of the university as a whole.

3. Weaknesses of Japanese university-led capacity building
programmes and areas for improvement
Based on the overview of the current situation of Japanese capacity building
programmes presented in previous chapters, we identified three main categories of
weaknesses, defined thereafter: structural, government-related and programmatic.

3.1. Structural weaknesses of Japanese universities
Structural weaknesses refer to the environment surrounding capacity building
programmes as well as their management and structural characteristics. For
weaknesses related to the contents of the programmes, see 3.3.
3.1.1. Limitations induced by laboratory or university size
Being able to provide ambitious space technology development and utilisation
capacity building programmes requires a large infrastructure, extensive humanresources and a legacy of technology development. In addition, apart fromtechnical and educational aspects, administrative tasks can be overwhelming (e.g.
contract drafting, accounting, public relations, etc.).
As demonstrated in the four Japanese projects/programmes studied in this report,
only large laboratories, housed in large and well-funded universities, have the ability
to do capacity building programmes. In fact, even large laboratories sometimes
need to team up and share the burden for the most ambitious projects, which canlead to managerial conflict, like in the case of the MicroDragon project. Smaller
laboratories and smaller universities are doomed to be excluded from such venturesor enclosed into a supporting role if invited to join a consortium led by a larger
laboratory.
Japan can boast a large number of small to mid-size universities having developed
a deep expertise in a specific field. A small institute of technology working on
specific communication components or a laboratory having developed an
innovative camera could prove to be extremely valuable additions to a consortiumof large universities. However, in the current situation, there is no platform or
mechanism to highlight the comparative advantages of each prospective capacity
building donor and combining different prospective donors into an efficientconsortium. Everything is still done based on the personal connections of prominent
professors.

61

Finally, in addition to fostering the participation of small and mid-size universities inspace technology development and utilisation capacity building programmes, itwould be valuable to integrate relevant commercial providers in the consortia.
Need 1: national coordination mechanism to identify and combine the mostappropriate capacity building providers, according to the needs for therecipient3.1.2. Lack of satellite testing infrastructure in universities
Japan currently suffers from a lack of small satellite testing infrastructure, which
limits the development of small satellite projects across the countries. While
Kyutech possesses comprehensive and advanced facilities, they are not sufficient
to cover the demand of domestic organisations and international partners. Apartfrom Kyutech, there exist smaller facilities in the laboratory of Professor Torii on
Waseda University’s Kikuicho campus26 and at the Industrial Technology Centre of
Fukui Prefecture.
The lack of infrastructure can mostly be explained by two reasons:
1. The cost of the equipment itself and the difficulty to make a profitable, or atleast sustainable use of the facilities. The development of facilities should
therefore be made with the goal of pooling the resources of different
universities or private companies.
2. The cost of the floor space. Testing facilities require extensive facilities, whichis extremely complicated in some parts of the countries. In fact, during ourfield visit to Kyutech, Professor Cho explained to us that one important reason
why he developed testing facilities in Kyutech and not in Tokyo was that therent in Kyutech’s Tobata Campus in Kita-Kyushu is around ten times cheaper
than at The University of Tokyo’s Hongo Campus is central Tokyo.
The Northern half of Japan, far from Kyutech, would strongly benefit from theestablishment of joint testing facilities in the Tohoku region. Currently, the small
number of satellite testing facilities is a bottleneck for the emergence of more small
satellite development programmes in Japan. As said by Professor George Maeda
of Kyutech, the creation of additional testing facilities across Japan could help theestablishment of “numerous BIRDS-like programmes”.
Need 2: more small satellites testing centres across Japan
3.1.3. Reliance on professors’ personal connections
While personal connections are important for the initiation of university consortia
for space technology development and utilisation capacity building programmes
26

More information can be found here:
https://www.waseda.jp/top/assets/uploads/2016/08/285efa0e6d58b82f8e9b4e0d748dbd9
b.pdf

62

(e.g. Tohoku and Hokkaido Universities for PHL-Microsat and the five-university
consortium for MicroDragon), they are even more critical for the initiation ofpartnerships with Japanese universities, from the perspective of recipient countries:
Professor Nakasuka’s experience with the VNSC during the PicoDragon project led
to the realisation of the MicroDragon project, Professor Takahashi’s personalencounter with DOST Secretary Montejo was the starting point of PHL-Microsat,
etc.
In fact, with the exception of the BIRDS programme, the capacity building
programmes studied in this report have all relied on the personal connections ofJapanese professors, who initiated projects independently within their own
laboratories. The BIRDS programme’s situation is more nuanced as Kyutech is
openly promoting it and encouraging motivated countries to submit an application.
Therefore, past participants include organisations contacted by the Kyutech teamwhile others have directly reached out to Kyutech (e.g. Bhutan during BIRDS-2).
Therefore, the main question is: how can a country without specific connections
with prominent Japanese space engineering professors benefit from capacity
building support? In the current situation, there is no systematic framework toconnect interested countries with university laboratories willing to provide capacity
building services.
Need 3: national point of contact to connect prospective recipients withprospective donors
3.1.4. Concerns on continuity and stability
As demonstrated in the previous section, the initiation of capacity building
programmes is highly reliant on university professors’ personal choices anddecisions. In addition to the problems that it poses on domestic coordination andfor foreign organisations without pre-existing personal relations with Japanese
professors, this dependency on a few individuals endangers the continuity andlong-term sustainability of Japanese university-led capacity building programmes.
What if the professor leaves or is incapacitated? Most programmes would simply
end, and the expertise acquired by a laboratory with regards to capacity building
with developing countries would be lost.
Need 4: national repository of capacity building know-how
Need 5: extract programmes from their dependency on each professor

3.2. Government-related weaknesses
We identified weaknesses of Japanese university-led capacity building
programmes directly related to the shortcomings of the central government.

63

3.2.1. Inadequate strategic vision of the central government
All the Japanese experts interviewed for this study regretted the inadequate
strategic vision of the central government – in particular of the Cabinet Office’s
National Space Policy Secretariat – with regards to space technology development
and utilisation cooperation with developing countries.
In fact, numerous professors consider that their capacity building activities could
contribute greatly to the achievement of Japanese foreign policy goals by initiating
pragmatic working relations with foreign countries bearing some interest for theJapanese government. However, what are the Japanese foreign policy goals withregards to space cooperation with developing or emerging nations? Whichcountries are diplomatic priorities? When trying to get an answer to these very basic
questions, professors are faced with a void.
Based on the experience of some interviewees and of this report’s authors, theJapanese Cabinet Office, instead of being proactive, tends to try to benefit from thefait accompli of projects initiated independently by universities. With even aminimum of strategic vision, the Cabinet Office could maximise the benefits for thecountry of this strong diplomatic tool that are Japanese university-led capacity
building programmes.
However, it is critical to specify that strategic orientations developed by thegovernment would serve as recommendations not as instructions, owing to the factthat Japanese universities are autonomous.
In addition, while support from the central government (e.g. strategic, diplomatic,
financial) is much welcomed by Japanese universities, some professors pointed outthat it should remain only support. According to their experience, a strong
involvement of the central government could repel foreign partners, unwilling to deal
with heavy Japanese bureaucratic processes.
Need 6: the government should develop a national strategy on spacecooperation with developing countries, to inspire partnerships
Need 7: the government should not have a too strong direct involvement in
partnerships as it could frighten foreign partners
3.2.2. Expiration of JAXA’s Strategic Partnership programme with selected
universities after FY2020
As part of this study, we expressed our concerns to JAXA regarding the expirationof the Strategic Partnership programme at the end of FY2020, and the huge impact
it may have on university CubeSat programmes and therefore on the ability ofJapanese universities to provide affordable space technology development andutilisation capacity building programmes to developing countries.

64

JAXA’s answers to our concerns, obtained with the help of the MEXT
administrators, are summarised in this paragraph. From FY2021, deployments fromthe J-SSOD will be mostly operated by commercial operators SpaceBD and Mitsui
Bussan Aerospace, therefore realising the “promotion of economic activities on the
low earth track including the ISS” described in the Basic Space Plan formulated inJune 2020. However, recognising the contribution of the Strategic Partnershipprogramme, JAXA is currently considering how to balance the plans for LEO
commercialisation with the support to the development of skilled human resources
in Japanese universities.
According to different interviewees, JAXA is considering continuing to offer
discounted rates for project involving a foreign developing country. While it canseem attractive in the context of capacity building service provision, we think that
this approach could prove highly detrimental to Japanese academic small satellite
builders and operators. Under the Strategic Partnership programme, JAXA
supports selected universities’ satellite deployment, enabling them to support
foreign countries. It therefore supports both the development of purely domestic
academic capabilities in Japan as well as projects with foreign partners. However,the new approach supposedly envisioned by JAXA would sacrifice all purely
domestic projects on the altar of international development. JAXA is a Japanese
government agency with the mandate to expand space capabilities in the country.
JAXA is not JICA and should basically work in the interest of Japanesestakeholders, a fortiori national universities, and not prioritise the needs of foreigncountries at the expense of the vibrant academic small satellite community.
Concretely, such approach could create highly unfavourable situations. In the caseof BIRDS, for example, foreign teams would benefit from affordable deployment
costs while Japanese teams would have to pay the full commercial rate.
However, even if its upholding would be a great news, JAXA’s Strategic Partnershipprogramme suffers from one important limitation: is it only granted to very few large
universities (e.g. The University of Tokyo and Tohoku University) which according
to JAXA’s criteria, “have a track-record of releasing microsatellites”.27 It therefore
bars other smaller universities to benefit from affordable satellite deployment
contracts, unless they partner with the selected large universities.
This practice contradicts the spirit of small satellite development, which aims toprovide affordable space education to everyone, regardless of the size, budget or
historical prestige of the institution one belongs to. It seems also surprising for a
public agency to grant preferential partnerships to selected national universities.
Need 8: ensure affordable satellite deployment opportunities for all Japanese
universities

27

In Japanese: 「超小型衛星放出の実績を有する大学」

65

3.3. Programmatic weaknesses
Programmatic weaknesses relate the contents of the capacity building programmes
analysed in this study.
3.3.1. Excessive focus on engineering and scienceAs explained in section 1.1.3, universities have a strong comparative advantage inthe provision of capacity building services thanks to the multifaceted expertise thatthey have in their various schools and departments.
However, in the current situation, social sciences are generally excluded, or at least
underrepresented, in capacity building programmes, even though they have a keyrole to play in the long-term sustainability of the recipients’ space activities. Thereare examples of space law and policy education in some of the programmes studied
in this report (e.g. Dr Verspieren taught RWASAT-1’s interns and Dr Werner Baloghteaches space law to students in Kyutech’s Space Engineering International
Course), but they remain marginal, partially due to the lack of internal coordination
within large universities.
Need 9: enhance intra-university coordination leveraging all relevant
departments of the university, to include social sciences in capacity building
programmes
In the case of small universities not possessing the wide range of expertise existingin major national universities, then coordination needs not be internal but with otheruniversities or private partners, hence further justifying Need 1.
3.3.2. Limitedorganisations

concerns

about

knowledge

retentioninrecipient

As demonstrated in Chapter 5 with numerous examples, although capacity building
programmes are almost always successful in transferring knowledge to recipientorganisations, there is very little concern from the donor’s side regarding the abilityof the said recipients to retain and develop this knowledge. Numerous reasons wereidentified such as the absence of long-term technology development and utilisation
strategic vision when starting the capacity building project, of appropriate
personnel and knowledge management strategies, etc.
But why would it matter for Japanese academic providers? It matters because evencapacity building programmes fully paid for by the recipient consume Japanese
resources: tax money funding the professors’ tenures, the facilities and initialtechnology development costs; time of professors, researchers and students that
can have been devoted to a better use; support from government agencies for
diplomacy, frequency registration, etc. The loss of the recipient’s acquired
knowledge is therefore an unacceptable waste of tax money and precious time. It
is thus critical that the definition of a strategy for the long-term retention and further

66

development of the knowledge transferred is carried out before starting, or is
included as an action item in the capacity building programme.
Need 10: ensure that the knowledge transferred will be retained before
initiating a programme
For good practices on ensuring knowledge retention in recipient countries, see
Chapter 5, section 3.
3.3.3. Limited involvement of the private sector
This final section does not concern a weakness per se but rather an area for
improvement. Although most non-Japanese academic donors studied in this report
made the choice to offload their capacity building activities to a spin-off company,
Japanese programmes are all led by university laboratories. The only exception
being the logistical and administrative support provided to capacity building
projects of The University of Tokyo’s Intelligent Space Systems Laboratory by its
spin-off Space Edge Lab Inc. (now ArkEdge Space Inc.).28 Based on the lessons offoreign providers, university laboratories can only conduct programmes limited inscale. Establishing a pure commercial service provider is a way to break theselimits.
Beyond the use of university spin-offs to scale up activities, another issue concerns
the involvement of private providers in university-led capacity building programmes.
Most of the programmes develop satellites and components in-house with limited
reliance on commercial providers. The right balance between what can and should
be done by the laboratory and what can and should be done by a commercial
contractor is an issue that each laboratory involving in capacity building shouldcarefully consider. In turn, more interactions with private entities will support thedevelopment and strengthening of an ecosystem enabling the emergence of more
small satellite programmes in Japan.
Need 11: facilitate responsibility sharing with private contractors

4. Recommendations
This report’s final recommendations are mirroring the areas for improvement
identified in the previous section, and incorporate the conclusions of chapters 4 and5, focussing on improving, respectively, the diplomatic and educational
effectiveness of Japanese university-led space technology development andutilisation capacity building programmes. Four main recommendations areprovided below.

28

Dr Verspieren, co-author of this report, is an executive at Space Edge Lab. Inc. andsubsequently at ArkEdge Space Inc.

67

4.1. Establishing a national coordination mechanism for capacity building
providers
Our first and main recommendation, addressing most of the needs identified in
section 3, is the establishment of a national coordination mechanism for capacity
building providers, as illustrated by figure 7-2. Although this framework wasdeveloped with space technology development and utilisation capacity building in
mind, all the elements presented here can be applied to other fields of technologicalcapacity building.

Figure 7-2. Simplified chart of the role of the national coordinator for capacity
building

4.1.1. Benefits of the national coordination mechanism
The establishment of a national coordination mechanism would provide a series ofbenefits, addressing most of the needs identified in section 3, as shown below.
Benefit 1: coordination of all national actors
The primary benefit of the establishment of a national coordination mechanism is
to facilitate the creation of consortia including potential capacity building providers
otherwise excluded unless they had a direct connection with one of the leading
actors of the field (e.g. The University of Tokyo, Kyutech). This includes smaller
universities (need 1) and private companies (needs 1 and 11). In addition toconnecting different types of actors, such a framework would also facilitate
connections between mission experts and bus/hardware experts, like in the very
successful collaboration between Hokkaido and Tohoku Universities.
However, coordination should not be done at the expense of competition. As
highlighted by Professor Takahashi of Hokkaido University during the final review

68workshop, some capacity building projects can unlock important external funding
for the provider, as was the case of Hokkaido and Tohoku Universities with the
PHL-Microsat programme. Therefore, rather than merely building consortia, thecoordination mechanism should organise a fair and open competition among
different potential providers.
Benefit 2: single point of contact for prospective recipients
Apart from coordinating domestic players, the national mechanism would serve asa single point of contact for prospective recipients, whose opportunities to benefit
from a capacity building programme is often contingent on existing personalconnections with a Japanese university professor (need 3). In addition to facilitating
the contacts between recipients and donors, the mechanism would possessenough expertise to evaluate the requests of prospective recipients before
proposing them to prospective donors. It includes, for instance, making sure thatthe recipient has developed appropriate measures for knowledge retention and forthe long-term sustainability of its nascent programme (need 10).
Benefit 3: centralised repository of knowledge
Due to the fragmented nature of Japanese university-led capacity building efforts,
each new provider has to restart from scratch, without benefitting from theknowledge acquired by its peers. This report is the first attempt to collect andcompile information, lessons and good practices from past programmes. A national
coordination mechanism would serve as both a repository of capacity buildingknow-how (need 4) as well as an information platform collecting data on the spacedevelopment situation of developing countries (need 6), potentially supporting
governmental strategy-making on collaboration with emerging space nations.
4.1.2. Legal status: government or independent non-profit?
After justifying the benefits of establishing a national coordination mechanism forcapacity building arose the question of its legal status: should it a government or
an independent non-profit organisation.
Based on our analysis as well as the unanimous feedback of experts consulted
during the interview campaigns and the final review workshop, we recommend theestablishment of the mechanism as an independent non-profit organisation.
The direct involvement and supervision of the government would not provide any
particular benefit to both capacity building providers and recipients, but only to thegovernment itself, which would be able to impulse partnerships with specificcountries rather than others. However, an immediate downside of the involvementof the central government would be the reluctance of prospective recipients to deal
with the Japanese bureaucracy, hence offsetting part of the apparent benevolenceof academic providers of capacity building services (need 7).

69

On the other hand, an independent non-profit mechanism, that could be based on
the successful example of the University Space Engineering Consortium (UNISEC),
would provide a series of benefits. Thanks to its independence from the central
government as well as its non-profit nature, the coordination mechanism would beperceived as benevolent from the perspective of recipients, without hidden political,
diplomatic or commercial agenda. In addition, it would be seen as an independentsource of unbiased knowledge about Japanese capacity building activities with
developing countries. Finally, the central government itself could benefit fromhaving a third-party platform for discussion among various ministries and agencies,
apart from the sometime fastidious official interagency coordination processes (e.g.
at the Cabinet Office) (need 6).

4.2. Internal schemes to foster capacity building programmes in Japanese
universities
This report’s second recommendation is to develop internal schemes to foster
capacity building programmes and support innovation, within Japanese universities
engaging in capacity building services.
Increased internal coordination in Japanese universities would provide a series ofbenefits for the provision of space technology development and utilisation capacity
building services:
§

§

§

§

Reinforced support of university headquarters to laboratories engaged incapacity building, in particular for internationalisation and communication(e.g. translation, press releases, organisation of outreach events).
Inclusion of space capacity building in the strategy of the university as awhole, therefore removing the dependency of capacity building programmes
on one single laboratory or professor (need 5).
The ability to provide full capacity building packages including engineering,science, project management, law and policy, by leveraging the expertisepresent in the various schools and departments of the university (need 9).
The university headquarters could support the establishment of spin-off
companies from laboratories doing capacity building, following the exampleof Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (need 11).

Reinforcing university headquarters’ involvement may prove to be a very difficult
objective in the case of large universities, in which dozens, if not hundreds, of worldclass laboratories are shining in their respective fields. Professor Yoshida of Tohoku
University and Professor Nakasuka of The University of Tokyo have explained that
their respective headquarters have shown very limited interest in their activities andvery little subsequent support (for instance to recruit one more assistant professor).
They doubt that university headquarters would make a step towards them without
clear signals sent by the central government and in particular the MEXT on thestrategic importance of space technology development and utilisation capacity
building for the country’s diplomacy.

70

4.3. Establishing geographic poles for satellite assembly and testing in
Japan
The shortage of satellite testing facilities has been identified in this report and by
the experts consulted for this study as one of the major factors limiting the
emergence of more university small satellite projects in Japan and therefore of
associated capacity building programmes.
We therefore advise the government to fund the establishment of additional small
satellite testing infrastructure (need 2), in particular in the northern half of thecountry, far from the equipment available in Kyutech and in selected centres in
Kansai (Fukui Prefecture) and Kanto (Waseda University). This could be done incollaboration with a local university (e.g. Tohoku University).
Due to the heavy initial establishment costs, governmental support would beindispensable. The maintenance costs of the facilities would be covered by theexisting demand for satellite testing, and sustained by the future demand generated
by the small satellite projects that additional pieces of testing infrastructure will
enable.
As said by Professor Maeda of Kyutech, more testing facilities would allow thepositive emergence of BIRDS-like programmes across Japan.

4.4. Regulatory and/or promotional tools available to the MEXT
Apart from the three previous areas of recommendations that would require acoordinated effort of government, commercial and academic stakeholders, specificmeasures can be independently taken by the MEXT in order to promote andfacilitate university-led space technology development and utilisation capacity
building programmes with developing countries.
4.4.1. Funding targeted to international capacity building
When asked what forms of governmental support would be the most beneficial totheir capacity building activities, most Japanese university professors answered:“scholarships, more scholarships and again, scholarships!”.
We therefore recommend the MEXT to create, in addition to its existing generalist
scholarship programs (e.g. embassy or university MEXT research scholarship),official development assistance (ODA) grants dedicated to space education.
Such activities would perfectly embody the dual nature of the ministry. Having been
established in 2001 by the merger of the former Ministry of Education and the former
Science and Technology Agency, the MEXT retains two identities, which in thiscase, would cover, respectively university/education policy, and science andtechnology development and diplomacy. As demonstrated throughout this report,

71

space technology development and utilisation capacity building with foreigncountries is at the interface of these two missions of the MEXT.
4.4.2. Maintaining affordable
opportunities after FY2020

J-SSOD

small

satellite

deployment

The final recommendation of this report concerns the future of affordable J-SSOD
small satellite deployment opportunities, one of the major comparative advantagesof Japanese university-led space technology development and utilisation capacity
building programmes. We identified four possible scenarii and advise the MEXT to
discuss their applicability with JAXA.
Scenario 1: maintaining JAXA’s Strategic Partnership after FY2020, without change
The first scenario is simply to maintain JAXA’s Strategic Partnership with selected
universities beyond FY2020, without modification. While it would be satisfying as
the current existing partners are the universities deploying the most CubeSats inJapan, in particular as part of capacity building programmes for the benefit ofdeveloping countries, the choice of only three large universities constitutes as,
explained in section 3.2.2, an inappropriate breach of the principle of equity of
government support to all universities.
Scenario 2: maintaining JAXA’s Strategic Partnership after FY2020 and expanding
the membership
The second scenario addresses the breach of equity inherent to the existing
Strategic Partnership by allowing any university to join it, and therefore benefit fromaffordable deployment opportunities.
Scenario 3: direct contract with JAXA for affordable deployment
The third scenario generates the same results as the second one but removes anunnecessary step. Under the current situation, to benefit from affordable J-SSOD
deployment, selected universities need first to conclude a strategic partnershipagreement with JAXA before signing a deployment contract (including a discountedrate) for each satellite launch. We recommend removing the first step, in otherwords the Strategic Partnership agreement itself, to allow all universities to directly
sign an affordable deployment contract when necessary.
Scenario 4: subsidising contracts made with commercial providers
The fourth and final scenario concerns a point raised by JAXA interviewees when
proposing scenarii 1 to 3: giving preferential treatment to specific universities would
violate the commercialisation agreement conclude by JAXA with SpaceBD and
Mitsui Bussan Aerospace. Apart from the fact that the argument contradicts JAXA’s
apparent plans to provide preferential rates to foreign partners, a simple way tocircumvent it would be to provide discounted rates through commercial providers.

72

In fact, according to some information that we collected, most of the deployment
cost charged by SpaceBD and Mitsui Bussan Aerospace is the cost that JAXA
charges to them for using the J-SSOD. It would therefore be extremely simple for
JAXA to charge commercial deployment services providers less when they workwith Japanese universities.

73

Table 7-1. Impact of the recommendations on the needs derived from the weaknesses of Japanese university-led capacity building programmes
Need
1

Need
2

Need
3

Need
4

Need
5

4.1. National coordination mechanism for capacity building providers

Need
6

Need
7

Need
8

Need
9

Need
10

Need
11

N/A

Scenario 1: Government-led national coordination mechanism

○

○

○

○

○

×

○

○

Scenario 2: Independent non-profit national coordination mechanism

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

4.2. Internal schemes to foster capacity building programmes in Japanese universities○○

4.3. Establishing geographic poles for satellite assembly and testing in Japan
4.4. Regulatory and/or promotional tools available to the MEXT

N/A

4.4.1. Funding targeted to international capacity building

Beneficial for capacity building programmes beyond specific needs

4.4.2. Maintaining affordable J-SSOD small satellite deployment opportunities after FY2020

N/A

Scenario 1: maintaining JAXA’s Strategic Partnership after FY2020, without change×

Scenario 2: maintaining JAXA’s Strategic Partnership after FY2020 and expanding themembership○

Scenario 3: direct contract with JAXA for affordable deployment○

Scenario 4: subsidising contracts made with commercial providers○

Positive impact: ○Negative impact: ×74○

APPENDIX. DETAILS OF THE FINAL REVIEWWORKSHOP
Date

5 January 2021

Time

13:30 – 15:30

Place

Online (Zoom)

Participants

Project members(titles omitted)

§
§
§
§

Hideaki Shiroyama, The University of Tokyo
Shinichi Nakasuka, The University of Tokyo
Quentin Verspieren, The University of Tokyo
Yuichiro Nagai, Nihon University

MEXT administrators§

Emiko Ishida, Yokohama City Board of Education

Guest experts
§
§
§
§
§
§
AgendaMengu Cho, Kyushu Institute of Technology
George Maeda, Kyushu Institute of Technology
Kazuya Yoshida, Tohoku University
Toshinori Kuwahara, Tohoku University
Yukihiro Takahashi, Hokkaido University
Rei Kawashima, UNISEC

13:30 – 13:40(Shiroyama)

Opening remarks and presentation of the project

13:40 – 14:25(Verspieren)

Presentation of the work and conclusions of the study

14:25 – 15:20

Free discussion among participants

15:20 – 15:30

Wrap-up and closing remarks (Shiroyama)

75

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Beihang

University.
‘International
Education’.
Accessed1
https://ev.buaa.edu.cn/Admissions/International_Education.htm.

March

2021.

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. ‘KiboCUBE: UN / Japan Cooperation
Programme on CubeSat Deployment from the International Space Station (ISS)Japanese Experiment Module (Kibo) “KiboCUBE”’. Accessed 19 February 2021.
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