2005・3
Variability of Buyer-Supplier Relationships:
Empirical Evidence from Japanese
Keiretsu Systems
Junya Sakaguchi
Yutaka Kato
Nobumasa Shimizu
Takaharu KawaiVARIABILITY OF BUYER-SUPPLIERRELATIONSHIPS:EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESEKEIRETSU SYSTEMS
Junya Sakaguchi
Associate Professor
Kanto-Gakuen University, Japan
Address: 200 Fujiaku-cho, Ota city, Gunma 373-8515, Japan
Tel: +81-276-32-7800
E-mail: jsakaguc@kantogakuen-u.ac.jp

Yutaka Kato
Professor
Kobe University, Japan
Address: 2-1 Rokkodai, Nada, Kobe city, Hyogo 657-8501, Japan
Tel: +81-78-803-6922
E-mail: ykato@kobe-u.ac.jp

Nobumasa Shimizu
Professor
Momoyama-Gakuin University, Japan

Takaharu Kawai
Associate Professor
Momoyama-Gakuin University, Japan
Address: 1-1 Manabino, Izumi city, Osaka 594-1198, Japan
Tel.: +81-725-54-3131
Fax: +81-725-54-3202
E-mail: tkawai@andrew.ac.jp

VARIABILITY OF BUYER-SUPPLIERRELATIONSHIPS:EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESEKEIRETSU SYSTEMS

Abstracts:
Japanese buyer-supplier relationships, or Keiretsu systems, are recognized as being amajor factor contributing to the competitive advantage of Japanese companies.
Academics have been interested in these close relationships and some Westerncompanies have introduced these systems. Against the reputation, Japanesebuyer-supplier relationships are facing various difficulties. In particular, recent
economic stagnation has added an element of seriousness to the business environmentof Japanese companies.
In this paper, recent changes in buyer-supplier relationships among Japanesecompanies are examined using a questionnaire survey. Questionnaires were mailed to
353 manufacturing companies with stocks listed in Section One of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. The results indicate that some Japanese companies are no longer willing tosustain long-term relationships. Additionally, it was indicated that receiving benefits
from inter-organizational information-sharing activities affects buyers’ incentives tosustain long-term relationships with their suppliers.

Key Words:
Buyer-Supplier Relationships, Keiretsu systems, Supply Chain Management, JapaneseCompanies, Questionnaire Survey

1

VARIABILITY OF BUYER-SUPPLIERRELATIONSHIPS:EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESEKEIRETSU SYSTEMS

1. INTRODUCTION
Japanese buyer-supplier relationships, or Keiretsu systems, are considered to be amajor factor contributing to the prosperity of Japanese companies (Roos et al., 1990;
Clark=Fujimoto, 1991). Keiretsu systems are designed to establish close relationships
between buyers and suppliers. In these systems, buyers collaborate with suppliers at the
R&D and production stages, collect supplier information, and manage supplier
relationships. Through these practices, Japanese companies, like Toyota and Nissan,
have achieved outcomes such as significant cost reduction and/or outstanding quality
improvement. As a success of Japanese companies and the practices of Japanesebuyer-supplier relationships have become widespread, some Western companies haveattempted to introduce close buyer-supplier relationships (Womack=Jones, 1996).
Close buyer-supplier relationships and/or Keiretsu systems have been discussed in thefield of management accounting in recent times. In management accounting literature,
the application of management control concepts to interfirm relationships (Otley, 1994;
van der Meer-Kooistra=Vosselman, 2000) and inter-organizational cost management
practices (Cooper=Yoshikawa, 1994) are regarded as an important issue.
In order to examine the application of management control concepts to interfirm
relationships, the features of close buyer-supplier relationships and/or Keiretsu systems
have been considered. Gietzmann (1996) described that the relationships between
Japanese buyers and their first-tier European suppliers show some features of the close2

relationships. European suppliers make long-term contracts with their buyers, provide
cost data to their buyers, and visit to the production facilities (Gietzmann, 1996). These
activities enable European suppliers to be flexible according to the buyers’ demand, andto bring out relational specific investment (Gietzmann, 1996). In these settings,
contracts are not complete and price is not enough to monitor. Thus, in order to monitor
the qualities of their suppliers wider, close relationships with their suppliers should bemaintained. Additionally, the inter-organizational context and the management control
patterns of interfirm relationships are correlative (Cooper=Slagmulder, 2004;
Langfield-Smith=Smith,

2003;

van

der

Meer-Kooistra=Vosselman,

2000).

Inter-organizational context according to the level of design dependence, predominant
specification responsibility, and predominant design responsibility affect the expertnessof cost management techniques (Cooper=Slagmulder, 2004) and contingency factor
such as characteristics of the transaction, the transaction environment and thetransaction parties fix the management control patterns of interfirm relationships (vander Meer-Kooistra=Vosselman, 2000).
On the other hand, inter-organizational cost management practices have been
observed. In recent times, some companies are reducing the cost that is affected by theentire supply chain as well as the manufacturing cost of intra-organization(Shank=Govindarajan, 1993; Carr=Ittner, 1992; Dekker, 2003). In order to identify theinter-organizational cost, considering purchasing price alone is insufficient. The concept
of total cost of ownership indicates that non-price factors related to purchasing items,
such as quality, delivery, and other selection criteria, are essential to achieve cost
reduction for long-term (Carr=Ittner, 1992). Moreover, analyzing entire supply chain(e.g. benchmark analysis, a strategic what-if analysis, and cost monitoring) is useful to3

optimally manage supplier activities and reduce logistics cost (Dekker, 2003). For
reducing inter-organizational cost, Japanese automobile supply chain developed
inter-organizational cost management techniques, such as target costing systems,
quality-price-functionality

trade-off,andminimum

cost

investigation(Cooper=Yoshikawa, 1994), and Nissan and its U.K. suppliers implemented
collaborative cost reduction activities at the R&D stage (Carr=Ng, 1995). Arrangement
for the cost reduction activities, buyers and suppliers should share each other’s
information (Cooper=Slagmulder, 1999). U.K. manufacturing companies tried toachieve sharing of information, including cost information, through open bookaccounting (Seal et al, 1999) and Sainsbury facilitated to share cost information with its
suppliers (Dekker, 2003). The type of information shared between buyers and suppliers
might differ as to the conditions of their relationships (Tomkins, 2001).
Although the concept of close buyer-supplier relationships have become widespreadand examined, some Japanese buyers quest for new suppliers in recent years (Kato,
2000; Nobeoka, 1998). In other words, a certain portion of the suppliers has beenswitched. Implementations of global sourcing and electronic purchasing (Kokuryo,1995) in Japanese companies accelerate this tendency. This trend indicates that several
features of Japanese buyer-supplier relationships and/or Keiretsu systems may converseto the features of arm’s-length buyer-supplier relationships. However, little is known
about the extent to which Japanese companies change their buyer-supplier
relationships1.
1 Although Helper=Sako (1995) already pointed out the changes in Japanese buyer- supplier

relationships as well as those in U.S. buyer-supplier ones, they mainly examined the type ofcontracts. For instance, they stated that Japanese firms tried to change their buyer-supplier
relationships from a partnership mode to an arm’s-length mode; however, they did not explain themanner in which Japanese companies changed their mode and to what extent they abandoned theirtraditional management practices.
4

In this paper, the modifications in the Keiretsu systems are examined mainly among
Japanese companies, using questionnaire survey data. Section 2 presents the history andsome characteristics of Keiretsu systems through a comprehensive literature survey.
Section 3 presents sample questions from the questionnaire survey that we conductedduring 2002. Section 4 discusses survey results. Section 5 concludes with directions for
future research in inter-organizational management accounting.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW: KEIRETSU SYSTEM

Academics have examined the features of Japanese buyer-supplier relationships
and/or Keiretsu systems. From literature survey, Nishiguchi (1994) and Fujimoto (1997)
denoted that the features of buyer-supplier relationships in Japanese companies take its
origin from early 20th century and have been appeared gradually. Throughformal/informal interviews, Asanuma (1985a, 1985b, 1989) explained that Japanesesuppliers have competed with other suppliers to get contracts of more complicatedcomponents because of the high rents. This mechanism has confirmed Japanese close
buyer-supplier relationships. Based on the survey data, the differences between
Japanese and U.S. supply chain practices (Cusumano=Takeishi, 1991; Helper, 1991),
Japanese and U.K. supply chain management practices (Sako, 1992) were investigated.
They indicated that high level of co operations, information sharing and trust are thefeatures of Japanese buyer-supplier relationships and concluded that these relationships
are closer than U.S. or U.K. relationships.
In this section, we discuss the history, information sharing and long-term contracts5which are the part of Japanese buyer-supplier relationships’ characteristics2, and recentchange in Japanese buyer-supplier relationships based on relevant literature.

Configuration of Keiretsu system

Close buyer-supplier relationships emerged during the early 20th century in Japan(Nishiguchi, 1994). Excessive demand for parts of goods after World War I urged
Japanese companies to utilize suppliers following the temporary increase in productions(Nishiguchi, 1994). Thereafter, suppliers were frequently utilized due to the increased
demands for munitions, technical innovations in machine tools, and the prevalence ofthe transportation systems and communication networks (Nishiguchi, 1994). However,since suppliers were neither organized nor managed by buyers during this period, these
relationships were indeed unstable (Nishiguchi, 1994).
After World War II, Japanese suppliers were rapidly organized by buyers andincreased in number (Nishiguchi, 1994). The highly organized supplier groups werecalled Keiretsu systems. The reasons for the buyers having organized their suppliers
were that the production capacities of Japanese companies were reduced due to thedamage to infrastructure that occurred during the war (Wada, 1984). Additionally, thebuyers could not meet the huge demand for various goods at the beginning of the 1950s
themselves, and the wages of buyers’ employees had been increasing beyond those of

2 Academics pointed out many other characteristics of Japanese buyer-supplier relationships fromplural viewpoint. For example, they indicated risk sharing between buyers and suppliers(Asanuma=Kikutani, 1992), multi-sourcing (Cooper=Slagmulder, 1999; Kato, 1993a), relational
specific skill (Asanuma, 1989) and etc. For further discussion, see Asanuma (1985a, 1985b, 1989),
Asanuma=Kikutani (1992), Cooper=Slagmulder (1999), Cusumano=Takeishi (1991),
Dyer=Ouchi(1993), Helper (1991), Helper=Sako (1995), Kato (1993a, 1993b), Nishiguchi (1994)
and Sako (1992, 1996).
6the suppliers (Nishiguchi, 1994). By organizing the suppliers, buyers had transferredsome portion of their production machinery to suppliers and offered training programsin production technologies (Wada, 1984). At the same time, supplier associations(Kyoryoku- Kai) were developed for the purpose of facilitating interactions between
buyers and suppliers as well as among suppliers (Sako, 1996). For instance, Toyota
sophisticated its supplier association in the automobile industry (Sako, 1996), andMatsushita increased the number of associate suppliers to five times those in the electricindustry during the 1950s (Nishiguchi, 1994).
Organizing the suppliers enabled Japanese companies to generate close relationships
between buyers and suppliers and to manage suppliers within the Keiretsu systems(Wada, 1984). Since 1953, Toyota has executed supplier assessments (Keiretsu shindan),which check seven categories (i.e., business, operations management, personnel
management, sales and procurement, finance, accounting, and new productdevelopment) (Wada, 1984). Supplier assessments have enabled buyers to address
suppliers’ problems and offer technical advice to suppliers. Through supplierassessments and investigation of suppliers’ production management systems to provide
technical advice, the buyers had come to share various types of information with
suppliers (Sako, 1996). Such close relationships and interactions had encouraged
information sharing and prolonged contracts between buyers and suppliers, as describedlater.

Information sharing and long-term contracts

Information sharing is one of the major features of Japanese buyer-supplier7

relationships (Cusumano=Takeishi, 1991; Dyer=Ouchi, 1993; Helper, 1991; Sako, 1992,
1996). Japanese companies interact and share information with their suppliers on
several occasions during the R&D and production stages (Cooper=Slagmulder, 1999;
Kato, 1993a). In the Keiretsu systems, buyers assist their suppliers by providing capital
investment and technical advice and consulting (Sako, 1992, 1996). For instance, they
send their engineers to their suppliers, send their employees to their suppliers’ meetings,
and so on (Cooper=Slagmulder, 1999). These activities might contribute to thecontinuous growth of suppliers who belong to Keiretsu systems. On the other hand,buyers demand that suppliers contribute to their competitive advantages (Sako, 1992,
1996). For instance, they request suppliers’ engineers to be stationed at their plants,
participate in their meetings, suggest ideas to improve their production techniques, andso on (Cooper=Slagmulder, 1999). Additionally, they compel their suppliers to disclose
various kinds of information (Kato, 1993b). Japanese companies collate financial
information, including process cost and product cost, and non-financial information,
including quality and delivery information, from their suppliers (Cusumano=Takeishi,
1991; Kato, 1993b). Ultimately, these interactions, namely information-sharing
activities might contribute to reducing production cost and improving the quality of thebuyers’ products because buyers lie on the downstream of the supply chain (Aoki, 1988).
That is to say, the components delivered by suppliers embedded in the buyers’ product,
therefore the price and the quality of the components affect directly to the price orreliance of the buyers’ products.
This characteristic has resulted in barriers that prevent buyers from entering into acontract with suppliers outside the Keiretsu system (Kato, 1993a). In these close
relationships, although intensive interactions and information sharing might contribute8

to the financial performance of both buyers and suppliers, they might need a great dealof patience since they are mutually rewarding, such as sending engineers and employees,
and the effects of their cooperation take a lot of time to achieve. Therefore the buyers’
motivation to contracts with new suppliers or one-shot transactions might be low. As aresult, the tendency to enter into long-term contracts is observed in Japanesebuyer-supplier relationships and/or Keiretsu systems (Kato, 1993a). On the other hand,
suppliers might have incentives to contract with buyers for long-term since suppliers
merely provide components to the market. As suppliers’ components only realize theirfunction in the buyers’ products, they would depend heavily on their buyers (Asanuma,
1985a; Kato, 1993a). In the Keiretsu systems, the amount of trade would increase as thebuyers’ trust increases. Therefore suppliers want to win the trust of buyers throughinformation exchange and mutual technical suggestions during the period of the contract(Kato, 1993a). Additionally, the suppliers’ sales will be strongly related to their buyers’
margins since their components embedded in the buyers’ products (Kato, 1993a). In
these situations, suppliers’ loyalties to their buyers are fierce and buyers can manage
their suppliers smoothly (Kato, 1993a).

Conversion of the Japanese buyer-supplier system

Although several features are described in the description of Keiretsu systems in the
80s or early 90s, Japanese buyer-supplier relationships have gradually changed (Kato,
2000; Nobeoka, 1998). One-shot contracts and price based transactions which are thefeatures of arm’s-length relationships have appeared to Japanese buyer-supplier
relationships in this decade (Kato, 2000). The reasons for the transitions are increase in9the number of non-Japanese suppliers and severe economic stagnation.
Firstly, non-Japanese suppliers have recently improved their R&D and production
capabilities. For example, U.S. super-suppliers provide high-functionality components
and Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese suppliers provide high-quality and low-cost parts
to Japanese buyers. The technical developments achieved by non-Japanese suppliers
suggest that Japanese buyers should not persist in continuing contracts with Japanesesuppliers who belong to Keiretsu systems. In other word, Japanese companies can selectsuppliers only by price criteria if the components meet their requirements. The
innovation of information technology stimulates the global sourcing. This innovationand the price based transaction that are appeared by global sourcing also offer
opportunities for Japanese buyers to enter into contracts with new suppliers. Thistransition of buyer-supplier relationships may reduce buyers’ direct material costs to acertain extent.
Additionally, since the latter part of the 1990s, Japanese companies have faced severerecession. The average stock price in Section One of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
declined by approximately 58% during the 1990s (Statistics Bureau Japan, 2004). The
average stock price was about 24 000 yen in 1990, approximately 20 000 yen in 1995,
and 14 000 yen in January 2000 (Statistics Bureau Japan, 2004). This economic
condition adds an element of seriousness to the business environment of Japanesecompanies. Particularly, recent Japanese companies have difficulties in maintaining
Keiretsu systems, such as sending buyers’ engineers and/or employees to their suppliers,
for financial reasons. Sending buyers’ engineers and/or employees usually add to thebuyers’ own labor cost, and this supply chain practice tends to impose a heavy burden
on the buyers, in the current recession.

10

Despite some discussions on changing buyer-supplier relationships in Japanesecompanies, there is little evidence about the manner in and the extent to which Japanesecompanies change their close buyer-supplier relationships and/or Keiretsu systems. We
have no knowledge about how high is the rate of Japanese companies that trying tochange their close buyer-supplier relationships. Additionally, we have little evidence
about the kind of information Japanese companies collect for cooperating with suppliers
these days. In order to present a sound discussion, it is necessary to recognize actual
Japanese buyer-supplier systems that are currently prevalent. We also examine theextent to which the buyers’ performance affects the characteristics of Japanesebuyer-supplier systems.
In this paper, we discuss two research questions pertaining to the conversion ofKeiretsu systems. These research questions are based on the characteristics of theKeiretsu systems presented previously.

RQ1: Do the characteristics of Keiretsu systems (i.e., information sharing, activities
that facilitate information-sharing, and long-term contracts) still exist inJapan?
RQ2: Do the performances of buyer and supplier activities affect the buyers’
expectation of long-term contracts?

3. SAMPLES
We use questionnaire survey data to examine the current status of information sharing
and long-term contracts in Keiretsu systems. For designing questions and scales, wereferred Cooper=Slagmulder (1999), Cusumano=Takeishi (1991), Helper (1991), Kato

11

(1993a) and Sako (1992). Questionnaires were mailed to 353 Japanese manufacturers by
The Management Accounting Research Group at Kobe University during 2002. The 353
companies are listed in Section One of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and also belong to themachinery, electrical/electronics, transportation equipment, or precision equipment
industries. These industries were selected because they had explicitly sustained Keiretsu
systems. Questionnaires were sent to the Procurement Division Manager of eachcompany. Finally, a total of 107 companies replied to the questionnaire, representing a
response rate of 30.3%3.
4. RESULTS
In this section, we present recent descriptive statistics about the information sharing
and the long-term contracts of Japanese buyer-supplier relationships reviewed in
Section 2 and discuss whether Japanese buyer-supplier relationships still have thesecharacteristics.

Information sharing and buyers’ willingness to contract for long-term-----Insert Figure 1 about here-----As mentioned above, previous research suggests that information sharing is one of
the major features of Japanese buyer-supplier relationships (Cusumano=Takeishi, 1991;
Dyer=Ouchi, 1993; Helper, 1991; Sako, 1992, 1996). Figure 1 shows the extent towhich buyers want to share information about each other. 12% of the buyers do not
3 Survey responses from Machinery are 39 (36.4%), electrical/electronics are 35 (32.7%),transportation equipment are 28 (26.2%), or precision equipment industries are 5 (4.7%).
12

want information sharing, 66% of the buyers want to definite information sharing and
22% of the buyers are willing to share information actively4. In brief, a small proportionof companies is willing to share more information. This result is contrary to that
documented in literature. Many Japanese buyers think their information is importantresources for their competitive advantage and reluctant to disclose their information totheir suppliers.

-----Insert Table 1 about here-----

Next, we examine the type of information that Japanese buyers gather. Table 1 reports
the information gathered about suppliers, including (a) Asset, Liability and Capital, (b)Revenue and Expense, (c) Cash Flow, (d) Cost, (e) Capacity Utilized, (f) Quality
Control, and (g) Inventory Level in Japanese manufacturing companies. The scores in
the Table 1 vary widely. (a) Asset, Liability and Capital, and (f) Quality Control showshigh average score and (d) Cost and (g) Inventory Level indicates the low score5. The
evidences of Cusumano=Takeishi (1991) provides similar results. The importance of
information for selecting suppliers and the feasibility of gathering information might beanother reason for this result. (a) Asset, Liability and Capital information and (f) Quality
Control information are requisite for entering into contracts with suppliers because
buyers must guarantee their quality and provide their products to the market surely. On

4 The results of the transportation industry which are typically recognized to have close relationships

are following: 7% of the buyers do not want information sharing, 75% want to definite information
sharing and 18% are willing to share information actively. This has a parallel trend to whole data.
5
The results of Transportation industry are (a) Asset, Liability and Capital (3.79), (b) Revenue andExpense (4.11), (c) Cash Flow (3.68), (d) Cost (3.14), (e) Capacity Utilized (4.07), (f) Quality
Control (4.32), and (g) Inventory Level (2.96). The transportation industry also has relatively lowscore for (d) Cost and (g) Inventory Level.
13the other hand, (d) Cost and (g) Inventory Level information are private information for
suppliers and have nothing to do with their contract. As to feasibility of gathering
information, (a) Asset, Liability and Capital is the information disclosed by financial
statement and (f) Quality Control information typifies the defective rate disclosed to thebuyers by the suppliers, ISO9000 certification, and quality-related information compiled
by buyers. On the other hand, buyers find it difficult to gather (d) Cost and (g) Inventory
Level information from their suppliers because these types of information are
confidential for suppliers and important to them for price negotiation and sustaining acompetitive advantage (Cooper=Slugmulder, 1999; Dekker, 2003; Seal et al., 1999).
Porter (1985) argues that bargaining power is one of the critical factors in determining
the ability to compete. Thus, buyers cannot obtain such kind of information until the
suppliers consider them to be trustworthy (Seal et al., 1999). That is, gathering
important, innovative information depends on the stability of the buyers’ relationshipwith their suppliers. The results presented in Table 1 imply that only a small proportionof Japanese companies can get important information about their suppliers. In otherwords, although Japanese manufacturing companies easily obtain information that does
not require a stable relationship, it is difficult for them to obtain information that needs ahigh level of stability.

-----Insert Table 2 about here-----

Additionally, we investigate the typical information-sharing activities executed by
Japanese companies. Table 2-A presents descriptive statistics of the buyers’ activities
that encourage information sharing at the R&D stage. It is observed that all types of14

activities show low scores, particularly, for sending engineers to suppliers and attending
suppliers’ R&D meetings6. Table 2-B shows the descriptive statistics of the suppliers’
activities that facilitate information sharing at the R&D stage and also indicates low
average scores for sending engineers to their buyers and attending buyers’ R&D
meetings7. The reason of the low scores in information-sharing activities is thatcompanies should execute these activities without their correspondents’ pay and sending
their capable employees to their correspondents results in the absence of theiremployees during their stay at correspondents’ company. For example, Kato (1993a)suggests that sending the suppliers’ engineers to buyers weakened the suppliers’ newproduct development capabilities. Thus, these two activities increase the cost involved
by a great deal (Sako, 1996) for both buyers and suppliers. Particularly, stationing theirengineers at their correspondents’ factory at the R&D stage results in time constraints inachieving technical improvements, and costs Japanese companies a great deal. This may
result in low average scores for sending engineers to buyers or suppliers. Situations inwhich there is a likelihood of sending employees will occur only if both buyers andsuppliers perceive their trading partner as being completely beneficial and trustworthy.

-----Insert Figure 2 about here-----As described in section 2, Japanese buyer-supplier relationships prolonged because
the effects of information-sharing activities take a lot of time to achieve. Figure 2
illustrates how Japanese companies expect a long-term contract, 25% of the buyers
6

The results of transportation industries are following: (a) To Attend Suppliers’ Meeting (2.82) (b)To Send Engineers (2.25) (c) To Instruct Cost Saving Procedure (3.57).
7
The results of transportation industries are following: (a) To Attend Buyers’ Meeting (3.50) (b) To
Send Engineers (2.75) (c) To Instruct Cost Saving Procedure (3.93).
15

intend to search new suppliers, 62% of the buyers waver in continuing long-term
relationships and 13% of the buyers are willing to sustain long-term relationships8. This
result also shows that the number of companies that genuinely want to sustain long-term
relationships is low. In other words, some companies give up continuing long-term
relationships with suppliers and enter into one-shot contracts.
Based on our evidence, we have observed a tendency for the buyer-supplier
relationships in Japan to switch to the arm’s-length type in recent times. Japanesebuyer-supplier relationships have formerly been characterized as highly
information-shared and highly committed, i.e., voice relationships (Helper, 1991).
Helper (1991) advocates that the transition from exit relationships to voice relationships
is inevitable for competing in the global market. To build voice relationships, the buyer
and supplier at first make a formal as well as informal commitment to long-term
relationships (Helper, 1991). Once the buyer and supplier are highly committed, they
begin exchanging information to solve problems and work together to improve theirproducts (Helper, 1991). Nevertheless, our results show that there exists a certain
number of buyers who share little information about suppliers and/or are not willing toform long-term relationships. In addition, Japanese buyers do not attach much
importance to gathering information about their suppliers and not to being able tocollect their suppliers’ cost information, which requires their suppliers’ loyalty.
Helper=Sako (1995) also noted that transition from voice relationships to exit
relationships will occur. In this way, some Japanese companies might shift to exit
relationships because the commitment involved in long-term relationships is decreasing.

8 The results of Transportation industry are following: 25% of the buyers intend to search new

suppliers, 57% of the buyers waver in continuing long-term relationships and 18% of the buyers arewilling to sustain long-term relationships. This also has a similar tendency to whole data.
16

One potential explanation for this transition is that information sharing and activities
that facilitate information exchange are developed only if they have the merit of
improving the involved party’s profit growth, quality, and/or flexibility, etc. That is,there is little incentive to sustain long-term buyer-supplier relationships where theparty’s effort to share information does not have any bearing on their performance.
From this point, we infer that the commitment to sustain long-term relationships
tends to be affected by the performance of their information exchanging activities. In
the following section, we examine this issue in detail.

Performance of information-sharing activities and long-term relationships
To test the relationships between the performance of activities that encourage
information sharing and buyers’ expectations when maintaining long-term relationships,
we divide long-term expectations into three groups and compare the correlation between
the effort level required for the activities that facilitate information sharing and thedegree of performance that comes from buyer-supplier relationships.

-----Insert Figure 3 about here-----

Figure 3 illustrates the conceptual framework of the buyer-supplier relationships andthe economic consequences of their information-sharing activities. Samples are divided
into three groups based on their response to the question about long-term relationships
discussed above (i.e., Figure 2). We define these groups as stable relationships,
opportunistic relationships, and volatile relationships. Stable relationships represent
companies that prefer long-term relationships with suppliers (n = 14). Opportunistic

17

relationships represent companies that waver in their long-term relationships with
suppliers (n = 64). Volatile relationships represents the companies that prefer one-shotcontracts (n = 27). In our research setting, if the most number of activities that showcorrelations with buyers’ performance are observed in the stable relations among thesethree groups, we assume that buyers’ performance affects their motivation to sustain
long-term relationships with their suppliers. Otherwise, we can presume that buyers
might not perceive the association between their efforts to facilitate information sharing
and their performances and/or might reconsider long-term relationships with their
suppliers for other reasons. As discussed above, we surmise that Japanese buyers expect
long-term relationships with their suppliers in the case where they are remunerated forthe effort they put into information-sharing activities. In other word, we predict that,among the three groups, the stable relations group shows the maximum activities thathave a significant correlation with buyers’ performance.

-----Insert Table 3 about here-----

Table 3 presents the correlation between the level of the buyers’ information-sharing
activities and the buyers’ performance. With regard to stable relationships, several
activities are significantly correlated with the buyers’ performance (i.e., 10 relations).
The buyers’ attendance at the suppliers’ meeting relates to revenue (r = 0.611, p = 0.020),
cost (r = 0.585, p = 0.028), quality (r = 0.659, p = 0.010), and flexibility (r = 0.634, p =0.015; two-tail). Sending buyers’ engineers to their suppliers correlates with revenue(r=0.540, p=0.046), cost (r = 0.600, p = 0.023), and flexibility (r = 0.651, p = 0.012;
two-tail). Buyers’ proposing ideas to their suppliers is related to revenue (r = 0.696, p =18

0.006), cost (r = 0.611, p = 0.020), and flexibility (r = 0.653, p = 0.011; two-tail). With
regard to opportunistic relationships, a few activities are significantly correlated withthe buyers’ performance (i.e., 3 relations). The buyers’ attendance at the suppliers’
meeting relates to quality (r=0.283, p=0.024), and flexibility (r=0.286, p=0.022;
two-tail). Sending buyers’ engineers to their suppliers correlates with flexibility(r=0.282, p=0.024; two-tail). In volatile relationships, no relations between buyers’
information-sharing efforts and their performances are significantly correlated. These
results suggest that in keeping with our presumption there exist buyers who prefer stable
relations with their suppliers enjoy privileges due to information-sharing activities. This
result also shows that several activities of suppliers are related to cost and flexibility.
These activities not only reduce production and R&D costs directly but also easeproduction coordination with suppliers. In brief, buyers with stable relationships use
information-sharing activities effectively.

-----Insert Table 4 about here-----

Table 4 reports the association between the level of the suppliers’ information-sharing
activities and the performance on buyers. In stable relationships, the suppliers’
attendance at buyers’ meetings relates to the buyers’ revenue (r = 0.549, p = 0.042),
sending the suppliers’ engineers to the buyers is correlated with cost (r = 0.560, p =0.037) and flexibility (r = 0.634, p = 0.015), and suppliers’ proposing ideas to theirbuyers relates to cost (r=0.647, p=0.012) and quality (r=0.613, p=0.020; two-tail).In
opportunistic relationships, the suppliers’ attendance at buyers’ meetings is associatedwith revenue (r = 0.318, p = 0.011), cost (r = 0.365, p = 0.003), quality (r = 0.368, p =19

0.003), and flexibility (r = 0.453, p = 0.000; two-tail). Sending suppliers’ engineers tobuyers correlates significantly with revenue (r = 0.275, p = 0.028), cost (r = 0.265, p =0.034), and flexibility (r = 0.339, p = 0.006; two-tail). Suppliers’ proposing ideas totheir buyers relates to revenue (r=0.289, p=0.021), quality (r=0.299, p=0.016), andflexibility (r=0.277, p=0.027; two-tail).Merely sending the suppliers’ engineers tobuyers relates to flexibility in volatile relationships (r=0.522, p=0.005, two-tail). The
results presented in Table 4 show that, among the three types of relationships, buyers
who expect opportunistic relations have received the most benefit from their suppliers’
information-sharing activity; additionally, stable relations have some merit for them.
Buyers can also reduce costs and enhance flexibility through information-sharing
activities that are executed by suppliers. In this case, the suppliers’ value engineering,value analysis, and/or setup time reductions contribute to increasing their buyers’
production efficiency.
Judging from mutual information activities, information activity relates the most to
the buyers’ activity in stable relationships. That is, these activities favor stable
relationships over opportunistic and volatile relations. Based on this, receiving benefit
from information-sharing activities might give buyers the incentive to sustain long-term
relationships and affirm their commitment to cooperation. On the other side, volatile
relationships group seldom show relationships between information-sharing activities
and their performance. For this, the fact that only a few benefits are received frominformation-sharing activities may contribute to a low level of incentive andcommitment to long-term relationships. The level of benefit and commitment to sustain
long-term for the opportunistic relationships group might position between the level forstable relationships group and for volatile relationships group.

20

5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUESClose Japanese buyer-supplier relationships or Keiretsu systems have been receiving
increasing attention in the field of management accounting. Particularly, many
researchers argue the manner in which Western arm’s-length buyer-supplier
relationships can be transformed into Japanese type close buyer-supplier relationships.
In this issue, the buyers’ information gathering about suppliers, information-sharing
activities, and long-term relationships are characterized as keys to achieve thistransformation (Carr=Ng, 1995; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Seal et al., 1999).
However, our research provides empirical evidence that buyer-supplier relationships
in Japan are also currently changing. Our descriptive statistics show that some Japanesecompanies do not expect long-term relationships with suppliers, cost and inventory
information that relates to the stability of their relationships is not extensively corrected,
and costly activities like sending buyers’ engineers to their suppliers and/or inviting
suppliers’ engineers are not common. This suggests that some Japanese companies havereconsidered or abandoned their close relationships with suppliers and have adopted theone-shot transactions. This change in buyer-supplier relationships in Japan implies thatclose buyer-supplier relationships are being transformed into arm’s-length relationships.
This paper also shows that the extent of buyers’ willingness to sustain long-term
contracts with suppliers relies on the strengthen of relationships between
information-sharing activities and buyers’ performance. That is, survey results link
efforts toward information-sharing activities with the buyers’ performance in the case ofcompanies that prefer long-term relationships with suppliers; however, the information
activities conducted by companies that prefer one-shot contracts are not clearly related
to buyers’ performance. This empirical evidence implies that the conversion of21

buyer-supplier relationships in Japan occurs due to the merit derived from theircooperative activities with the suppliers. Some Japanese firms advantageously manage
their activities with suppliers and perceive the benefits from close buyer-supplier
relationships and/or Keiretsu systems. These companies will continue to sustain close
relationships with suppliers. However, other Japanese companies might not perceive thebenefits from close buyer-supplier relationships and/or Keiretsu systems following thelong depression. These companies tend to abandon Keiretsu systems. If buyers do notrecognize the effect of information-sharing activities, they no longer have muchincentive to sustain long-term relationships and will gradually transform theirrelationships with suppliers from close ones to arm’s-length ones. Although a large
amount of literature suggests that long-term relationships is one of the characteristics of
the Japanese business style, buyer-supplier relationships may depend on the extent ofrecognition of the benefits from close relationships since keeping close relationships
costs a large amount. Therefore, in cases when there is little merit derived fromcooperating with suppliers, it is economically rational for Japanese buyers to abandon
close relationships with suppliers.
In conclusion, four future research issues appear in inter-organizational management
accounting:First, the type of information and information-sharing activity should be examined
carefully. This paper examines seven types of information. However, the role ofinformation to sustain long-term relationships is an open question and may vary acrossdifferent types of information. Tomkins (2001) summarized information that is
exchanged by buyers and suppliers into two types (i.e., information for enhancing trustand information for managing buyer-supplier relationships). Although he explained that22

information needs will change with to the stability of buyer-supplier relationships, noempirical evidence is available to support this claim. A precise investigation of thesetypes of information is required. With regard to information-sharing activities, previous
researches have focused mainly on the meeting of buyers and suppliers (Carr=Ng, 1995;
Seal et al., 1999). However, meetings are not the only way to share information forbuyers and there is a possibility to get information through other patterns of interactions
between buyers and suppliers. Although additional information-sharing activities suchas sending employees to buyers or suppliers and proposing ideas to buyers or suppliers
have been examined in this paper, other kinds of information-sharing activities have to
be explored.
Second, the management of information-sharing activities in inter-organizationalsettings is an important topic. Our empirical evidence indicates that the stability ofrelationships is affected by the performance of information-sharing activities. In order tomanage the performance of these activities, researchers must examine the factors thatstrengthen of relationships between information-sharing activities and buyers’
performance. For example, the effect of the properties of components, production
strategy, and corporate culture should be investigated.
Third, long-term relationships are not Japan-specific practices but may depend on therecognition of the benefits from collaborations with suppliers. Although this research
focuses on Japanese firms, long-term relationships will be observed in other countries.
For instance, recent cases of cooperative activities by Japanese buyers and European
suppliers (Carr=Ng, 1995) and the contracts between European buyers and Japanesesuppliers are interesting.
Finally, the economical efficiency of the governance structure is an issue opens to23

debate. The literature on buyer-supplier relationships often compares Japanese firms
with European or American firms to emphasize the characteristics of Japanesebuyer-supplier relationships (Cusumano=Takeishi, 1991; Dyer=Ouchi, 1993; Helper,
1991; Sako, 1992). Additionally, previous literature often suggests that close
buyer-supplier relationships are better than arm’s-length buyer-supplier relationships(Dyer=Ouchi, 1993). These trends are also observed in the field of management
accounting (Cooper, 1996; Cooper=Slagmulder, 1999). However, Gietzmann=Larsen(1998) indicate that close buyer-supplier relationships are not always economicallyefficient. Our results also provide evidence for the conversion of Japanesebuyer-supplier relationships and the rationality of this conversion. The economical
efficiency of the governance structure depends on its inter-organizational settings. In
other words, comparing Japanese companies with European ones or considering theKeiretsu systems as the best practice is not sufficient for discussing this issue; hence a
deep understanding of the buyers’ intentions of constructing buyer-supplier relationships
is critical. Future research must carefully investigate the condition of the buyer-supplier
relationships and the buyers’ view of their relationships with suppliers. It is also
necessary to examine the effect of the selection and the conversion of the governancestructure of buyer-supplier relationships.
Previous management accounting studies have tended to overestimate the effect of
the close buyer-supplier relationships. Additionally, the incentive to sustain close
buyer-supplier relationships has not been considered adequately. The main positive
contribution of this research has been to provide empirical evidence indicating that thebenefit from buyer-supplier relationships affects the governance structure of them. The
governance structure of buyer-supplier relationships is not fixed but change dynamically.

24

Some Japanese companies have abandoned close buyer-supplier relationships and haveattempted to adopt arm’s-length relationships because of the depression. The transit of
the governance structure of buyer-supplier relationships requires to transform
inter-organizational management control systems. Therefore, the buyers’ benefit frombuyer-supplier relationships is one of the keys to understanding inter-organizational
management control.
[2005.2.7 693]

25

REFERENCES
Aoki, M. (1988), Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy,
New York, Cambridge University Press.
Asanuma, B. (1985a), The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive
Industry, Japanese Economic Studies, Summer, pp.32-53.
Asanuma, B. (1985b), The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese
Automotive Industry, Japanese Economic Studies, Summer, pp.54-78.
Asanuma, B. (1989), Manufacture-Supplier Relationships in Japan and the Concept ofRelation-Specific Skill, Journal of the Japanese and International Economics, Vol.3,
No.1, pp.1-30.
Asanuma, B. and T. Kikutani (1992), Risk Absorption in Japanese Subcontracting: A
Microeconometric Study of the Automobile Industry, Journal of the Japanese andInternational Economies, Vol.6, pp.1-29.
Carr, L. P. and C. D. Ittner (1992), Measuring the Cost of Ownership, Journal of Cost
Management, Vol.6, No.3, pp.42-51.
Carr, C. and J. Ng (1995), Total Cost Control: Nissan and It’s U.K. SupplierPartnerships, Management Accounting Research, Vol.6, No.4, pp.347-365.
Clark, K.B. and T. Fujimoto (1991), Product Development Performance: Strategy,
Organization and Management in the World Auto Industry, Harvard Business School
Press.
Cooper, R. (1996), Costing Techniques to Support Corporate Strategy: Evidence fromJapan, Management Accounting Research, Vol.7, No.2, pp.219-246.
Cooper, R. and R. Slagmulder (1999), Supply Chain Development for the Lean
Enterprise: Interorganizational Cost Management, Portland, Productivity.

26

Cooper, R. and R. Slagmulder (2004), Interorganizational Cost Management andRelational Context, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol.29, No.1, pp. 1-26.
Cooper, R. and T. Yoshikawa (1994), Inter-Organizational Cost Management Systems:
The Case of the Tokyo-Yokohama-Kamakura Supplier Chain. International Journalof Production Economics, Vol.37, pp.51-62.
Cusumano, M. A. and A. Takeishi (1991), Suppliers Relations and Management: A
Survey of Japanese, Japanese-Transplant and U.S. Auto Plants, Strategic
Management Journal, vol.12, pp.563-588.
Dekker, H. C. (2003), Value Chain Analysis in Interfirm Relationships: A Field Study,
Management Accounting Research, Vol.14, No.1, pp.1-23.
Dyer, J. H. and W. G. Ouchi (1993), Japanese-Style Partnerships: Giving Companies a
Competitive Edge, Sloan Management Review, Fall, pp.51-63.
Fujimoto, T. (1997), Seisansisutemu no Sinkaron (The Evolutionary Theory of
Production System), Tokyo, Yuhikaku (in Japanese).
Gietzmann, M.B. (1996), Incomplete Contracts and the Make or Buy Discussion:
Governance Design and Attainable Flexibility, Accounting, Organizations andSociety, Vol.21, No.6, pp.611-626.
Gietzmann, M. B. and J. G. Larsen (1998), Motivating Subcontractors to Perform
Development and Design Tasks, Management Accounting Research, Vol.9, No.3,
pp.285-309.
Helper, S. (1991), How Much Has Really Changed between U.S. Automakers and Their
Suppliers?, Sloan Management Review, Summer, pp.15-28.
Helper, S. and M. Sako (1995), Supplier Relations in Japan and the United States: Are
They Convergence?, Sloan Management Review, Spring, pp.77-85.

27

Kato, Y. (1993a), Genkakikaku: Senryakuteki Kosutomanejiment (Target Costing:
Strategic Cost Management), Tokyo, Nihonkeizaisinbunsya (in Japanese).
Kato, Y. (1993b), Target Costing Support Systems: Lessons from Leading JapaneseCompanies, Management Accounting Research, Vol.4, No.1, pp.33-47.
Kato, Y. (2000), Sapuraicheinmanejiment: Soshikikankankei no Siten (Supply Chain
Management: A Viewpoint of Inter-Organizational management), Business Insight,
Autumn, pp.30-39 (in Japanese).
Kokuryo, J. (1995), O-punnettowa-ku Keiei: Kigyousennryaku no Shintyouryuu (OpenNetwork Strategy: The New Stream of Corporate Strategy), Tokyo, Nihonkeizaisya(in Japanese).
Langfield-Smith, K. and D. Smith (2003), Management Control Systems and Trust in
Outsourcing Relationships, Management Accounting Research, Vol.14, No.3,
pp.281-307.
Mouritsen, J., A. Hansen and C. Ø. Hansen (2001), Inter-Organizational Controls andOrganizational Competences: Episodes around Target Cost Management/Functional
Analysis and Open Book Accounting, Management Accounting Research, Vol.12,
No.2, pp.221-244.
Nishiguchi, T. (1994), Strategic Industrial Sourcing: The Japanese Advantage, Oxford
University Press.
Nobeoka, K. (1998), Buhinsapuraiya no Kokyakunettowa-ku Senryaku: Kokyakuhanni
no Keizaisei (Customer Network Strategy of Parts Supplier: The Economical
Efficiency of the Customer Scope), (in Fujimoto, T., H. Ito and Nishiguchi, T eds.
(1998), Sapuraiya Sisutemu: Atarasii Kigyoukankankei wo Tukuru (Supplier Systems:
Organizing the New Interfirm Relationships) (in Japanese).

28

Otley, D. (1994), Management Control in Contemporary Organizations: Towards a
Wider Framework, Management Accounting Research, Vol.5, No.3/4, pp.289-299.
Porter, M. E. (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior
Performance, New York, The Free Press.
Roos, D., J.P. Womack and D. Jones (1990), The Machine that Changed the World,
Boston, MacMillian.
Sako, M. (1992), Prices, Quality and Trust: Inter-Firm Relations in Britain and Japan,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Sako, M. (1996), Suppliers’ Associations in the Japanese Automobile Industry:
Collective Action for Technology Diffusion, Cambridge Journal of Economics,
Vol,20, No.6, pp.651-671.
Seal, W., J. Cullen, A. Dunlop, T. Berry and M. Ahmed (1999), Enacting an European
Supply Chain: A Case Study on the Role of Management Accounting, Management
Accounting Research, Vol.10, No.3, pp.303-322.
Shank, J.K. and V. Govindarajan (1993), Strategic Cost Management, New York, The
Free Press.
Statistics Bureau Japan (2004), Nihon Toukei Geppou (Monthly Statistics of Japan), No.
518.
Tomkins, C. (2001), Interdependencies, Trust and Information in Relationships,
Alliances and Networks, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol.26, No.2,
pp.161-191.
van der Meer-Kooistra, J. and E. G. J. Vosselman (2000), Management Control ofInterfirm Transactional Relationships: The Case of Industrial Renovation and
Maintenance, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol.25, No.1, pp.51-77.

29

Wada, K. (1984), ‘Jun Suityokutougousosiki ’ no Keisei: Toyota no Jirei, Academia, No.
83 (in Japanese).
Womack, J. P. and D. Jones (1996), Lean Thinking: Banish and Create Wealth in Your
Corporation, New York, Simon & Schuster.

30

Table 1
Types of Suppliers’ information that are gathered by buyers

n

Mean

Standard Deviation(a) Asset, Liability and Capital

107

3.61

0.988

(b) Revenue and Expense

107

3.68

0.917

(c) Cash Flow

107

3.36

1.032

(d) Cost

107

2.87

0.891

(e) Capacity Used

107

3.95

0.719

(f) Quality Control

107

4.21

0.615

(g) Inventory Level

107

3.01

0.852

31

Table 2
Information-sharing Activities

Table 2-A: Buyers’ activities that encourage information sharingn

MeanStandard Deviation(a) To Attend Suppliers’ Meetings

106

2.59

1.185

(b) To Send Engineers

106

2.09

1.038

(c) To Instruct Cost Saving Procedures

106

3.48

0.928

Table 2-B: Suppliers’ activities that facilitate information sharingn

MeanStandard Deviation(a) Attending Buyers’ Meetings

106

3.20

1.199

(b) Sending Engineers

106

2.34

1.120

(c) Providing Cost Saving Ideas

106

3.53

0.819

32

Table 3
Pearson’s correlation of buyers support and buyers’ performance(R&D Stage)
Stable Relationships (n = 14)
Attending Meeting

Sending Engineers

Proposing Ideas

Revenue

0.611*

0.540*

0.696**

Cost

0.585*

0.600*

0.611*

Quality

0.659*

0.479

0.385

Flexibility

0.634*

0.651*

0.653*

Opportunistic Relationships (n = 64)
Attending Meetings

Sending Engineers

Proposing Ideas

Revenue

0.189

0.062

0.216

Cost

0.219

0.196

0.138

Quality

0.283*

0.163

0.173

Flexibility

0.286*

0.282*

0.155

Volatile Relationship (n = 28)
Attending Meetings

Sending Engineers

Proposing Ideas

Revenue-0.012-0.044-0.102

Cost

0.153

-0.127-0.017

Quality

0.245

0.240

-0.095Flexibility

0.275

0.291

-0.015* = Statistically significant at 5% level** = Statistically significant at 1% level33

Table 4
Pearson’s correlation of suppliers’ support and buyers’ performance(R&D Stage)
Stable Relationships (n = 14)
Attending Meetings

Sending Engineers

Proposing Ideas

Revenue

0.549*

0.531

0.517

Cost

0.439

0.560*

0.647*

Quality

0.466

0.470

0.613*

Flexibility

0.497

0.634*

0.526

Opportunistic Relationships (n = 64)
Attending Meetings

Sending Engineers

Proposing Ideas

Revenue

0.318*

0.275*

0.289*

Cost

0.365**

0.265*

0.190

Quality

0.368**

0.223

0.299*

Flexibility

0.453**

0.339**

0.277*

Volatile Relationships (n = 28)
Attending Meetings

Sending Engineers

Proposing Ideas

Revenue

0.244

0.319

-0.094

Cost

0.120

0.237

0.017

Quality

0.129

0.367

0.032

Flexibility

0.345

0.522**

0.150* = Statistically significant at 5% level** = Statistically significant at 1% level34

Figure 19
Proportion of responses to a question on innovative information sharing

Innovative information sharing

12%
22%

Scaled 1
Scaled 2
Scaled 3

66%

Statement: We develop innovative ways to ensure competitive advantage (e.g., productdevelopment, production, quality management logistics, etc.). We must share
this innovative information with suppliers.

9 The following are the responses for the statement provided by researchers

Scaled 1: No. Our innovative information is one of our most important resources.
Therefore, we must use innovative information to facilitate our competitive
advantage and sustain our bargaining power (n = 13).
Scaled 2: Mostly. However, we must select information to be shared with suppliers to sustain
our bargaining power (n = 71).
Scaled 3: Absolutely. We must share our innovative information with suppliers to facilitate thecompetitive advantage of the entire supply chain (n = 23).
35

Figure 210
Proportion of replies to a question on long-term contracts

Long-term contracts

13%
25%

Scaled 1
Scaled 2
Scaled 362%

Statement: We have had long-term relationships with suppliers. Thus, we will continue
long-term relationships with current suppliers in the future.

10

The following are the comments of the statement provided by researchers

Scaled 1: No. We may enter into contracts with suppliers who are beneficial to us without
considering their past contract profile (n = 27).
Scaled 2: Mostly. However, it tends to be difficult to sustain long-term relationships with current
suppliers (n = 66).
Scaled 3: Absolutely. We will basically sustain win-win long-term relationships withcurrent suppliers (n = 14).

36

Figure 3
Conceptual framework of the relationship between the effect of information-sharing
activities and the types of relationships

Stable Relationships
Buyers’Efforts
Buyers’Performance
Suppliers’
Performance
Several activities relate to performance
Opportunistic Relationships
Buyers’Efforts
Buyers’Performance
Suppliers’
Performance
More activities relate to performance than volatile relationships; however, thiscorrelation is less than that in stable relationships
Volatile Relationships
Buyers’Efforts
Buyers’Performance
Suppliers’
Performance
Few activities relate to performance37