Will the Indo-Pacific become “free and open”?
Brahma Chellaney
Professor of strategic studies at Center for Policy Research, India

The Indo-Pacific region, uniting the Indian and Pacific oceans, is the world’s economic
and geopolitical hub. It is home to the world’s most populous nations, largest economies,
and largest militaries. While the Pacific is the world’s largest ocean, the Indian Ocean is
also big, extending from Australia to the Middle East and southern Africa. Two-thirds ofthe world trade moves through the Indo-Pacific. This vast region includes more than halfof Earth’s surface and two-thirds of the population. Just Asia is projected to have 40
percent of the world’s middle class by next year.１
More significantly, the Indo-Pacific is emerging as the center of global power and wealth.
Building a stable balance of power that keeps the peace is at the heart of the security
challenges in this sprawling region.
Geopolitical rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, however, is already sharpening. For example,
several boundary, sovereignty and jurisdiction disputes threaten freedom of navigation.
China is challenging the existing balance of power, with its territorial and maritime
revisionism injecting greater instability and tensions. Indeed, China is seeking tocheckmate, if not supplant, the United States, as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has championed the concept of a “free andopen Indo-Pacific.” Under this strategy, freedoms of navigation and overflight would besafeguarded, commerce and culture flows would stay unhindered, existing borders would
not be disturbed, and nations would respect international rules and norms and also respect
their neighbors as equals. Simply put, the concept’s “free” part includes keeping regional
states free from external coercion. Any sustained coercion, after all, can undermine
strategic autonomy.
The Trump administration, through its “free and open” Indo-Pacific strategy, has clearlysignaled that the United States has no intention of ceding influence or control over theregion to China. In fact, in his speech at the 2018 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) CEO meeting, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence mocked Chinese President Xi
Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a “constricting belt” and a “one-way road”
that compromises sovereignty and drowns partner-states in “a sea of debt.”２ “Preserve

１

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Carter: Demographics, Economics Boost Asia’s Global
Profile,” April 3, 2015, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/583492/carterdemographics-economics-boost-asias-global-profile/.
２

The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 2018 APEC CEO Summit,”
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, November 16, 2018. Full transcript:
1

your independence,” he counseled. “The truth is governments that deny rights to theirown people too often violate the rights of their neighbors. Authoritarianism andaggression have no place in the Indo-Pacific,” Pence added.

The Region
According to the U.S. government, the Indo-Pacific region extends from “the west coastof India to the western shores of the United States.”３ The phrase “Indo-Pacific,” as then
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson alluded to, is intended to emphasize that the U.S.
and India are “bookends” in that extended region. However, not all the regional states
accept this definition of the region. India, for example, sees the region as stretching fromthe western coast of North America to South Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the criticalsea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the Strait of Hormuz. Japan too sees the
Indo-Pacific as extending India’s west coast.
The fact is that the U.S. definition of the Indo-Pacific has much to do with thegeographical zones of its naval commands. The definition of the Indo-Pacific mesheswith the geographical range of the U.S. Navy’s Indo-Pacific Command. That range
extends up to India’s sea frontier with Pakistan. The area beyond that point comes under
the U.S. States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), which includes the Fifth
Fleet and whose area of responsibility extends to the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, theRed Sea and the Gulf of Oman. However, because of India’s location close to the Middle
East, U.S. navy fleets under three different U.S. commands — the Indo-PacificCommand, Central Command, and Africa Command — interact with the Indian Navy.
It was in May 2018 that then U.S. Defense Secretary James N. Mattis announced therenaming of the U.S. Pacific Command as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command describing
the expanded theater as stretching “from Bollywood to Hollywood.” The renaming wasa recognition of the increasing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans andAmerica’s commitment to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific strategy. The move implicitly
recognized India’s increasing strategic significance for the United States. Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi, for his part, unreservedly echoed the American objective toachieve a “shared vision of an open, stable, secure and prosperous” Indo-Pacific, which
he described as “a natural region.” India occupies a critical position in the Indo-Pacific. It
has a coastline of 7,500 kilometers, with more than 1,380 islands and more than two
million square kilometers of Exclusive Economic Zone.
The plain fact is that the Indo-Pacific has emerged as the new global center of trade andenergy flows, in keeping with the shift in world power from the trans-Atlantic region tohttps://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2018apec-ceo-summit-port-moresby-papua-new-guinea/?utm_source=twitter.
３

The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America(Washington, DC: December 2017), https://goo.gl/CWQf1t.
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the East. In fact, the Indo-Pacific is likely to determine international geopolitics, maritime
order, and balance of power. Yet, it is also true that in no part of the world is the security
situation so dynamic and in such flux as in the Indo-Pacific — the hub of global
geopolitical competition.
The challenges in the Indo-Pacific extend from traditional security threats tonontraditional and emerging challenges. The challenges are linked to its vast size and its
vulnerability to natural disasters and global warming. Indeed, the region is regularly
battered by natural disasters and accounts for more than three-quarters of the world’s
natural disasters.
The Indo-Pacific is actually on the frontlines of climate change. It has countries whosevery future is imperiled by global warming. These states include the archipelago of
Maldives (the world’s flattest country) and Bangladesh, whose land area is less than half
the size of Germany but with a population more than double. Because it is made up
largely of low-lying floodplains and deltas, Bangladesh risks losing 17 percent of its landand 30 percent of its food production by 2050 due to saltwater incursion resulting fromthe rising ocean level, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. If, in
the future, a state like the Maldives was submerged due to the global-warming-induced
rise of ocean levels, what would be the legal status of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
including the mineral wealth in it? This is an open question.
More fundamentally, the increasing use of the phrase “Indo-Pacific,” instead of the“Asia-Pacific” term that had long been common, reflects the concerns in most capitals in
the region about the security of the maritime domain. “Asia-Pacific” and “Indo-Pacific”
may cover the same large region. But unlike “Asia-Pacific,” the term “Indo-Pacific”
connotes a maritime dimension. After all, the term Indo-Pacific represents the fusion of
two oceans — the Pacific and the Indian.
The regional security competition is occurring largely in the maritime context, which
explains the increasing use of the term “Indo-Pacific,” rather than “Asia-Pacific.”
Underscoring the growing importance of the maritime domain, Asia’s oceans and seas
have become an arena of competition for resources and influence. It now seems likelythat future crises in the Indo-Pacific will be triggered at sea or at least settled at sea.
To be sure, the terminology change rankles Beijing, which insists on using the term
“Asia-Pacific” because it sees that concept as underscoring China’s centrality. Indeed,
China views the term “Indo-Pacific” as helping to raise the profile of its foe, India. New
Delhi, of course, loves the name “Indo-Pacific.” As Prime Minister Narendra Modi saidin an op-ed published in 27 ASEAN newspapers on January 26, 2018 (the day leaders of
all 10 ASEAN states were honored as chief guests at India’s Republic Day parade),“Indians have always looked east to see the nurturing sunrise and the light of3

opportunities. Now, as before, the East, or the Indo-Pacific region, will be indispensable
to India’s future and our common destiny.”４
As a concept, “Indo-Pacific” offers the geopolitical framework to foster growing strategiccooperation and collaboration among the United States, India, Japan, Australia and otherkey regional players. For example, by employing the Indo-Pacific as their geopoliticalframework, democratic powers can develop the appropriate maritime capabilities andpartnerships to help advance regional stability and power equilibrium. However, suchcollaboration and partnerships must extend to non-democracies like Vietnam, a country
that has demonstrated a resolve to stand up to China.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
The new challenges and opportunities in the region are underscored by the U.S.-led “freeand open Indo-Pacific” strategy; China’s increasing forays into the South Pacific and theIndian Ocean region, which extends up to the Middle East and eastern and southern
Africa; India’s “Look East” policy, which has now become the “Act East” policy; andJapan’s western-facing approach. With China establishing its first overseas military baseat Djibouti and increasingly dispatching submarines to the Indian Ocean, where it has
pursued a string of port-related projects, including a dual-purpose port in Gwadar,
Pakistan, the shift to the term “Indo-Pacific” became inevitable for analytical correctness
and policy application.
In fact, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is concentrated largely in the Indo-Pacificregion. Grand on ambition but short on transparency, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
marquee project, the BRI, seeks to refashion the regional economic and political order byluring nations desperate for infrastructure investments into China’s strategic orbit. The
BRI was essentially designed as an imperial project aiming to make real the mythicalMiddle Kingdom.
The BRI, rolled out in 2013, attracted many countries with China’s offer to finance andbuild major infrastructure projects, including ports, highways, energy plants andrailroads. Nations neglected by multilateral lending institutions flocked to the BRI. Xi,
seeking to put the international imprimatur on his initiative, hosted the first BRI summit
in Beijing in 2007 that was attended by a number of world leaders but prominently
boycotted by India.
But after smooth sailing in the first phase, the BRI has been encountering strong
headwinds, as partner-countries worry about China ensnaring them in sovereigntyeroding ‘debt traps.’ China has extended huge loans to financially weak states, only tostrengthen its leverage through debt entrapment. Indeed, Beijing has converted big credits
not just into political influence but also a military presence, as its first overseas naval
Nadrendra Modi, “Shared Values, Common Destiny,” The Straits Times, January 28,
2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/shared-values-common-destiny.
４4base at Djibouti illustrates. Trapped in a debt crisis after borrowing billions of dollars,
Djibouti was left with no choice but to lease land for the base to China for $20 million in
annual rent.
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang by hisside in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, criticized China’s use of infrastructure projects
to spread its influence. By warning China against “a new version of colonialism,”
Mahathir highlighted international concerns over Beijing’s use of geo-economic tools toachieve geopolitical objectives. A number of countries have now been trying torenegotiate their deals with Beijing. Some have decided to scrap or scale back BRI
projects. Even China’s close ally, Pakistan, has downsized its main BRI railroad project
by $2 billion.
The BRI not only seeks to export China’s model of top-down, debt-driven development
through government-to-government deals clinched without competitive bidding, but isalso creating new markets for China’s state-owned manufacturers and infrastructuredevelopers at a time when they are facing sharp slowdown and overcapacity at home.
But, increasingly, the BRI is being seen internationally as an attempt to remake global
commerce on China’s terms and project Chinese power far and wide.
Vulnerable countries are awakening to the risks of accepting loans that are too good to betrue and then slipping into debt entrapment. From Myanmar to Kenya, China’s big-ticket
BRI projects are facing criticism for their potential to saddle countries with debt that theycannot pay off, which would leave them with no option but to transfer their strategic
assets to Beijing. This is exactly what happened to the small island-nation of Sri Lanka.
In December 2017, China acquired the strategic Indian Ocean port of Hambantota on a 99
year lease in exchange for shaving $1.1 billion off of Sri Lanka’s debt.
By financially shackling smaller states through projects it funds and builds, China is
crimping their decision-making autonomy in a way that encourages these states to staywithin its strategic orbit. China is even replicating some of the practices that were usedagainst it during the European-colonial period; for example, the concept of a 99 year
lease emerged when Britain leased the New Territories from China for that period in
1898, causing Hong Kong’s landmass to expand by 90 percent.
In the Maldives, China has managed to acquire several islets in that heavily indebted
Indian Ocean archipelago. While the terms of the various lease agreements have not been
disclosed, the acquisitions have come cheap; for example, China paid just $4 million for
Feydhoo Finolhu, an island that previously served as a police training center. Mohamed
Nasheed, the nation’s first democratically elected president who was ousted at gunpointin 2012, said that, “Without firing a single shot, China has grabbed more land in theMaldives than what [Britain’s] East India Company did at the height of the 19th century.”
Despite these criticisms, the BRI is still bagging new contracts in some other countries.
U.S. punitive policies against countries as varied as Russia, Iran and Zimbabwe are5

aiding China’s geo-economic objectives. Internal political developments in some nations
have also advanced Chinese interests.
One example is the Himalayan nation of Nepal, which became the world’s sixthcommunist-ruled country in February 2018. China helped unite warring communist
factions in Nepal and funded their election campaign. Now Beijing is reaping the
rewards. The new communist government in Nepal has reinstated a deal with China for a$2.5 billion dam project that was scrapped by the previous government. China won thecontract without an open bidding process, and further, critics in Nepal say, China has
massively inflated the project cost, which will leave Nepal struggling to repay the
Chinese loan.
Laos, another communist-ruled nation, is also seeking more BRI financing andinvestment. In continental Southeast Asia, while Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam are
now wary of getting too close to China, Laos and Cambodia see the BRI as critical toboosting their economic growth. Ensnared in a sovereignty-eroding Chinese debt trap,
Cambodia, of course, has had little choice but to continue making major concessions to
China.
The reality, however, is that after the initiative’s heady first phase, the pace of newcontracts under the BRI has slowed, as concerns spread about China’s debt-trap
diplomacy and as heavily indebted nations recoil from accepting more Chinese financing
in the form of market-rate loans. This trend is likely to intensify in the next few years.
With the BRI funding largely going to economically weak and politically fragile
countries, China’s business logic could face greater scrutiny even at home, especially as
the security costs of some projects mount. Take Pakistan, the largest recipient of BRI
financing. The Pakistani military has created a special 15,000 strong force to protect
Chinese projects. In addition, thousands of police have been deployed in some provinces
to protect Chinese workers. Yet sporadic attacks on Chinese in Pakistan have underscoredthe rising security costs. The BRI has also contributed to Pakistan’s deepening financial
crisis, with the country forced to seek an international bailout package.
Within China, the BRI has started to face criticism from intellectuals who question thewisdom of plowing hundreds of billions of dollars into overseas projects when thegovernment is still grappling with poverty and underdevelopment in a number ofprovinces. Critics are also concerned that Xi’s aggressive, in-your-face quest for Chinese
dominance is inviting an international backlash. The BRI — the world’s biggest building
program, which Xi has hailed as “the project of the century” — exemplifies how China isflaunting its global ambitions.
The larger pushback against China’s neocolonial practices is likely to intensify in the
coming years, putting greater pressure on the BRI. The initiative, however, will continue
to benefit from a U.S.-led sanctions approach that seeks to punish countries in the nameof human rights or nuclear nonproliferation. Thanks to this approach, the BRI is still6

bagging major lucrative contracts in countries as diverse as Iran, Sudan and Cambodia, inspite of the looming risks to each country’s financial future.
“Free and open Indo-Pacific”
The term “Indo-Pacific” has become shorthand for a rules-based, liberal order. By
contrast, the concept of “Asia-Pacific” is seen as placing China too firmly at the center,with that country’s muscular rise raising the troubling specter of an illiberal, hegemonicorder with Chinese characteristics.
The concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” was originally authored by Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, who has been pushing since 2007 that the “Indo-Pacific” term beused in preference to “Asia-Pacific.” Abe, clearly, was instrumental in shaping the Trumpadministration’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy. Abe first used the “free and open
Indo-Pacific” phrase in August 2016 in Nairobi, Kenya, while laying out Japan’s own
strategy for the region. Abe’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” speech in Nairobi
was delivered at the Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD),
which was launched by Japan in 1993 to help promote Africa’s development, peace andsecurity through multilateral cooperation and bilateral partnerships.５ In that keynote
speech, Abe outlined his vision for the largest stretch of the globe — from the Pacific to
the Indian oceans — that he hoped would be united by trade and a common politicalworldview. Partly a riposte to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Abe’s “Free andOpen Indo-Pacific” vision was based on the principles of free trade and freedom ofnavigation, the rule of law and the market economy. These are the very principles thathave come to define America’s own “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy.
Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy grew out of his 2012 proposal to create a “democratic
security diamond” in Asia. Speaking of “the confluence of the Indian and Pacific
Oceans,” Abe wrote in an op-ed in 2012 that “it is imperative that the democraticnations” in the region work together. He suggested “a strategy whereby Australia, India,
Japan and the U.S. state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commonsfrom the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific.”６
About a year after Abe made his Indo-Pacific proposal in Nairobi, the idea was echoed by
the then U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in his first major speech after assuming
office. Tillerson, speaking at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International
Studies in October 2017, said: “The Indo-Pacific, including the entire Indian Ocean, theWestern Pacific and the nations that surround them, will be the most consequential part ofYuichi Hosoya, “FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-PacificStrategy,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2019), pp. 18.28.
５Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27,
2012, https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-indiaby-shinzo-abe?barrier=accesspaylog.
６7

the globe in the 21st century. Home to more than 3 billion people, this region is the focal
point of the world’s energy and trade routes. Forty percent of the world’s oil supply
crisscrosses the Indian Ocean every day, through critical points of transit like the Straitsof Malacca and Hormuz. And with emerging economies in Africa, and the fastest
growing economy and middle class in India, whole economies are changing to accountfor this global shift in market share. Asia’s share of global GDP is expected to surpass 50
percent by the middle of this century. We need to collaborate with India to ensure that the
Indo-Pacific is increasingly a place of peace, stability and growing prosperity so that it
does not become a region of disorder, conflict, and predatory economics. The world’s
center of gravity is shifting to the heart of the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. and India, with ourshared goals of peace, security, freedom of navigation, and a free and open architecture,must serve as the Eastern and Western beacons of the Indo-Pacific, as the port andstarboard lights between which the region can reach its greatest and best potential.”７
But it was President Trump who formally unveiled his administration’s new “free andopen Indo-Pacific” strategy. He did that, interestingly, in the Vietnamese beach resort of
Da Nang while delivering his speech at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum in November 2017.８ As Trump put it, Vietnam is “in the very heart of the IndoPacific.” He said that his vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific is “a place wheresovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, canall prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in peace.” Then days later, speaking in
the Philippines, Trump called for a “truly free and open Indo-Pacific region.”９This was followed by the U.S. National Security Strategy report also detailing the “freeand open Indo-Pacific” vision. According to the report, “A geopolitical competition
between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacificregion. The region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of
the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of theworld. The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, ““Defining Our Relationship with India for the
Next Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, DC, October 18, 2017, full transcript at:https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/event/171018_An_Address_by_U.S._Secretary_of_State_Rex_Tillerson.pdf?O0n
MCCRjXZiUa5V2cF8_NDiZ14LYRX3m.
７

U.S. President Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit,”
November 10, 2017, Da Nang, Vietnam (Washington, DC: The White House),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceosummit-da-nang-vietnam/.
８

The White House, “FACT SHEET: President Donald J. Trump’s Trip to thePhilippines,” November 14, 2017, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trumps-trip-philippines/.
９8

of our republic.”１０ While stating that “Chinese dominance risks diminishing thesovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific,” the report held out a warning: “We areunder no obligation to offer the benefits of our free and prosperous community torepressive regimes and human rights abusers.”
What do the words “free” and “open” mean in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy? U.S.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has explained: “When we say ‘free’ Indo-Pacific, itmeans we all want all nations, every nation, to be able to protect their sovereignty fromcoercion by other countries. At the national level, ‘free’ means good governance and theassurance that citizens can enjoy their fundamental rights and liberties. When we say‘open’ in the Indo-Pacific, it means we want all nations to enjoy open access to seas andairways. We want the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes. This is key
for international peace and for each country’s attainment of its own national aims.
Economically, ‘open’ means fair and reciprocal trade, open investment environments,
transparent agreements between nations, and improved connectivity to drive regional ties
— because these are the paths for sustainable growth in the region.”１１ According toPompeo, the Indo-Pacific is “one of the greatest engines of future global — of the future
global economy, and it already is today. And the American people and the whole world
have a stake in the Indo-Pacific’s peace and prosperity. It’s why the Indo-Pacific must be
free and open.”１２
The geopolitical flux in the Indo-Pacific is being highlighted by several developments.
The escalating U.S.-China trade war, despite a Phase One deal, is setting in motion a
gradual “decoupling” of the world’s top two economies. Relations between America’s
closest allies in East Asia, South Korea and Japan, are deteriorating. South Korea’s
weaponization of history is increasingly roiling its relations with Japan. Instead ofseeking to hold Japan accountable for its colonial-era excesses, South Korea, throughover-use, appears to be blunting its history card. Add to the picture the surging tensions
over two Indo-Pacific hotspots: Taiwan, with the growing animosity between Beijing andTaipei increasing the risks of a shooting war; and the erstwhile kingdom of Jammu andKashmir, whose control is split among India, Pakistan and China.
Meanwhile, China still pursues aggression in the South China Sea, as exemplified by its
aggressive move in the waters off Indonesia’s northern Natuna Islands (which Beijingclaims are its “traditional fishing grounds”), as well as by the Chinese coercion against
Vietnamese hydrocarbon exploration within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. Hong
１０

The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America(Washington, DC: December 2017), available at: https://goo.gl/CWQf1t.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, “Remarks: Secretary Pompeo,” Department ofState, July 2018,https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm.
１１

１２

Ibid.
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Kong’s pro-democracy movement, however, poses an increasingly difficult challenge for
Beijing. The Xi Jinping government cannot afford to back down because of the risk that it
would encourage citizens in mainland China to demand rights.
If Hong Kong’s mass movement loses to Chinese authoritarianism, the implications will
not be limited to that city. Indeed, it could embolden Beijing’s designs against Taiwan aswell as China’s territorial revisionism against Vietnam, Japan, India and others. AnotherTiananmen Square triggered by China’s unleashing of brute force, this time in Hong
Kong, would have far greater international geopolitical fallout than the 1989 massacrethat occurred in Beijing. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Washington did notsustain sanctions against Beijing in the naïve hope that a more prosperous China would
liberalize economically and politically.
To be sure, the larger challenges in the Indo-Pacific center on establishing a pluralistic
and stable regional order, ensuring respect for existing borders, and safeguarding
freedoms of navigation and overflight.
In this light, the “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy is seen as a much-needed successor
to the Barack Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, which failed to take concrete
shape.１３ The broadening of the U.S. policy focus to a wider region encompassing theIndian Ocean was a response to the expanding ambitions of China, which, after building
and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea, started focusing on the Indian
Ocean and the western Pacific. Despite Obama policy underscoring Asia’s new centrality
to American economy and security, his administration’s “pivot” to Asia never acquired
concrete strategic content, remaining largely a rhetorical repackaging of policies begun
over the previous decade.
In recent years, the U.S. has made the most of the regional concerns over China’s
increasingly muscular approach by strengthening its military ties with existing Asian
allies and forging security relationships with new friends. The heady glow of America’s
return to the Asian center-stage, however, has obscured the key challenges it faces toretain its primacy in the region in the face of China’s relentless push to expand its sphereof influence.
Under Obama, the U.S. increasingly ceded ground to China, a trend that admittedly began
as the Bush administration became preoccupied with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This spurred doubts about Washington’s ability to provide strategic heft to its “pivot”
policy by sustaining a higher level of commitment in the Indo-Pacific, where it still
maintains 320,000 troops. In fact, the Obama administration, after appearing to raise
Asian expectations about a more-robust U.S. response to China’s growing assertiveness,started to tamp down the military aspects of its “pivot” and instead lay emphasis on
greater U.S. economic engagement with Asian countries.
Michael Cole, “The True 'Pivot to Asia' Is Here,” The National Interest, October. 23,
2018.
１３

10

The renewed emphasis on the economic aspects came as a relief to some regional states
apprehensive about being caught in a situation where they might be forced to choose
between the U.S. and China. But for the countries bearing the brunt of China’s recidivist
policies on territorial or maritime disputes, this emphasis raised new doubts about the
U.S. commitment. The economic reorientation actually signaled a correction in a “pivot”
policy that began overemphasizing the military component, putting Washington on an
uncomfortable path of seeking to take on Beijing. It was Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton who first signaled a more hawkish U.S. stance on China by talking tough at the2010 ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi but who later moderated that line byplaying the role of a business promoter in visits to Asian countries.
The refocus on trade and economic issues also prompted the Obama administration tolaunch the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative, which aimed to create a new free
trade group in the Indo-Pacific that excluded China. Trump, however, pulled the UnitedStates out of the TPP as soon as he took office. The Obama administration also beganemphasizing the importance of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN summit usually overlaps with the EAS
summit. In contrast to the Obama administration, the Trump administration hasprioritized bilateral trade deals, with friends and foes, and placed strategic issues on the
backburner. This explained why the Trump administration downgraded U.S. participationin the 2019 East Asia Summit and the ASEAN-U.S. summit in Bangkok.
Under Obama, the U.S. firmly believed that it was not in America’s interest to take sides
in bilateral disputes between China and its neighbors — unless, of course, U.S. interests
were directly at stake, as in the South China Sea over freedom of navigation. For
example, the Obama administration, like the Bush administration, charted a course oftacit neutrality on the recrudescence of Sino-Indian territorial disputes, including
Beijing’s sudden resurrection of a claim to the large Himalayan Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh. Similarly, Obama publicly urged both Beijing and Tokyo to peacefully resolve
their dispute over the Japanese-controlled Senkaku islands. The longstanding U.S. policy
has been to ensure that the Sino-Japanese standoff does not escalate to a level where
Washington may be forced — against its own interests — to take Japan’s side.
Consequently, the U.S. has been publicly reiterating to this day that it does not take sides
in the dispute over the control of the islands. However, under Trump, the U.S. has
explicitly stated that the Senkakus are covered by its security treaty with Japan.
The Obama administration’s reluctance to call out China’s incremental aggression in theSouth China Sea emboldened Beijing to step up its actions, including launching a
massive land-reclamation program there. It was that reluctance that allowed China to
begin calling the shots in the South China Sea by gradually creating facts on the groundand at sea and challenging the regional order.
A wake-up call for Asian states that rely on the U.S. as their security guarantor was
Obama’s silence on the 2012 Chinese capture of the Scarborough Shoal, located within
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. The takeover occurred despite a U.S.-brokered
11

deal under which both Beijing and Manila agreed to withdraw their vessels from the area.
Obama’s inaction on the capture, coupled with his administration’s apparent indifference
to the U.S. commitment to the Philippines under their Mutual Defense Treaty,
emboldened China to step up its aggression.
A second wake-up call for Asian allies came when China established an air defense
identification zone (ADIZ) in 2013, setting an ominous new precedent by usurping
international airspace over the East China Sea. Washington, far from postponing Vice
President Joe Biden’s trip to Beijing to express disapproval of the Chinese action, advised
U.S. commercial airlines to respect the ADIZ — an action that ran counter to Japan’s
advice to its carriers to ignore China’s demand that they file their flight plans through thezone in advance.
It was after China was able to unilaterally declare an ADIZ in the East China Sea
without incurring any international costs that Beijing launched its land-reclamation
program in the South China Sea. By the time an international arbitral tribunal set up by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled in 2016 that China’s
territorial claims in the South China Sea lacked legitimacy under international law, a
new status quo had already been created at sea. １４This allowed China to trash the rulingas “null and void” and “a farce.”
China’s first land-reclamation site was Johnson South Reef in the Spratly archipelago.
The Spratlys lie to the south of the Vietnam-claimed Paracel Islands, which China seizedin 1974 by cashing in on the departure of U.S. forces from South Vietnam. The Johnson
South Reef was the scene of a 1988 Chinese attack that killed 64 Vietnamese sailors andsunk two of their ships.
Beijing pressed Asia’s largest dredger, the 127-meter-long Tianjing, into service at
Johnson South Reef. After arriving at the reef on December 17, 2013, the Tianjing —boasting its own propulsion system and a capacity to extract sediment at a rate of 4,530
cubic meters per hour — created 11 hectares of new land, including a harbor, in less thanfour months, as a Chinese warship stood guard.１５ This provided a preview of the speed
and scale with which China went on to create more manmade islands and then turn theminto forward operating bases.
But it is important to note that China, far from starting the artificial enlargement of reefs
and atolls suddenly or on a large scale, first probed possible U.S. reaction throughArbitral Tribunal, “In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration,” PCA Case No.
2013-19, Final Award, http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PHCN%20-%2020160712%20-%20Award.pdf.
１４

１５Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus and Jake Doughlas,
Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, May 2017).
12

symbolic moves over several months. The absence of a tangible American pushback
encouraged Beijing to ratchet up land-reclamation operations. For example, as part of its
probing, Beijing first sent its dredger Tianjing to Cuarteron Reef. But, despite a threeweek presence there in September 2013, the Tianjing initiated no land reclamation at that
reef. Commercially available satellite images later showed the Tianjing at another reef,
Fiery Cross, but again doing little.
Land reclamation at Johnson South Reef thus became the defining act. It paved the way
for China’s conversion of some other Spratly reefs, including Cuarteron Reef, Fiery
Cross, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, into artificial islands through large-scale dredging.
To be sure, before initiating probing exercises in the South China Sea, China first tested
the U.S. response in mid-2012 by seizing the Scarborough Shoal. The Scarboroughcapture showed to Beijing that Washington’s bark was worse than its bite.
China’s terraforming activities in the South China Sea, followed by militarization,
occurred on Obama’s watch. In a calibrated, step-by-step approach, with an eye on the
U.S. reaction, China ramped up its island building gradually, with the final two years of
the Obama presidency marked by frenzied Chinese construction.
In fact, Obama’s last defense secretary, Ash Carter, in a 2018 Harvard University essay,
highlighted Obama’s soft approach toward China. Carter wrote that Obama, “misled” byhis own analysis, “viewed recommendations from me and others to more aggressively
challenge China’s excessive maritime claims and other counterproductive behaviors as
suspect.”１６ For a while, according to Carter, Obama even bought Beijing’s idea of a G-2
style condominium.
Against this background, when the Trump administration unveiled its “free and open
Indo-Pacific” strategy, it was seen as an attempt by the United States to recoup its losses
in the region. Significantly, the “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy coincided with astill-evolving paradigm shift in America’s China policy. After all, the new challenges in
the Indo-Pacific are largely linked to China’s muscular rise and its territorial andmaritime revisionism. China has become the main catalyst of the changing Indo-Pacificpower dynamics. From the South Pacific to the Indian Ocean, China is seeking to change
the status quo. It has been positioning itself in strategic ports along key shipping lanes inwhat has come to be known as a “string of pearls” strategy.
Trump, given his unilateralist approach, may have done little to build concrete
geostrategic collaboration with other important players in the Indo-Pacific. But his lasting
legacy will be the fundamental change in America’s China policy — a shift that enjoys
bipartisan support in the United States. This shift will outlast the Trump presidency. As
the investor and philanthropist George Soros put it in his September 2019 op-ed, “TheAsh Carter, “Reflections on American Grand Strategy in Asia,” Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, October 2018,https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/reflections-american-grand-strategy-asia#5.
１６

13

greatest—and perhaps only—foreign policy accomplishment of the Trump administration
has been the development of a coherent and genuinely bipartisan policy toward Xi
Jinping’s China.”１７
As the House of Representatives’ vote along party lines to impeach Trump underscored,
Washington is more polarized and divided than ever before. So, it is highly significant
that, in this toxic environment, a bipartisan consensus has emerged that the decades-old
U.S. policy of “constructive engagement” with China has failed and must give way toactive and concrete counteraction.
Future of the U.S.-led “free and open” Indo-Pacific strategy
Today, it has become imperative to build a pluralistic, rules-based Indo-Pacific order, freeof coercion and open to unhindered freedoms of navigation and overflight. This is what
the U.S.-led “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy aims to do. With the global center ofgravity shifting to the Indo-Pacific, the region holds the key to the future of American
power.
The new U.S. policy approach relies on a core group of democracies called “theQuad,” which, besides America, includes India, Japan and Australia. The elevation of the
Quad dialogue to the foreign ministers’ level in September 2019 represented amilestone.１８While there is no intent to turn it into a military grouping, the Quad as amaritime initiative for strategic cooperation and coordination has become a reality at atime when the Indo-Pacific is witnessing sharpening maritime competition.
Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, however, still lacks strategic content. The Trumpadministration has defined the objectives, especially building a rules-based anddemocratic-led regional order, but is still searching for the effective means to achieve theends. The same issue plagues the Quad, which, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hascontended, aims to ensure that “China retains only its proper place in the world.”１９Despite such talk, the Trump administration has placed strategic issues on the backburner
while prioritizing bilateral trade deals, with friends and foes. There is a real risk that
Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy, like Obama’s “pivot” to Asia, could fail to gain traction.
George Soros, “Will Trump Sell Out the U.S. on Huawei?,” Wall Street Journal,
September 9, 2019.
１７

Jason Scott and Isabel Reynolds, “Indo-Pacific Ministers Elevate Security Talks That
Irk China,” Bloomberg, September 26, 2019.
１８

U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Trump Administration Diplomacy: The
Untold Story,” Speech at the Heritage Foundation President’s Club Meeting, Washington,
DC, October 22, 2019, transcript published by the Department of State,https://www.state.gov/trump-administration-diplomacy-the-untold-story/.
１９14Without a clear strategy behind it, a “free and open Indo-Pacific” will remain just an
attractive catchphrase. The U.S.-led approach, for example, has not tamed China’s
territorial and maritime revisionism. China has changed South China Sea’s geopolitical
map without firing a single shot and incurring any international costs. The term Trump
used to describe Obama’s approach to the South China Sea, “impotent,” has come toreflect his own failure to halt Chinese expansionism there. The stepped-up US freedomof-navigation operations, or FONOPs, in the South China Sea neither deter China nor
reassure US allies in the region.２０
In fact, the single biggest challenge to the “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy relates
specifically to the South China Sea. The South China Sea is a highly strategic corridor
that connects the Indian and Pacific oceans. But, in the absence of a strategy on how todeal with the changing status quo there, the South China Sea constitutes a missing link in
America’s larger Indo-Pacific strategy.
To be sure, the South China Sea poses a difficult challenge. How can the U.S., atthis stage, undo what China has done in the South China Sea? Yet the need for
Washington to evolve a clear strategy on the South China Sea is underlined by the factthat this corridor is central to a truly “free and open” Indo-Pacific. How can the IndoPacific be free and open if its most-important sea corridor is neither free nor open?
With its new perch in the South China Sea, China is better positioned to not only sustain
air and sea patrols in the region, but also to advance its strategy of power projection
across the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. The biggest casualty of China’s new
foothold has been the region’s marine ecosystem, especially coral reefs, which teem withlife and supply larvae for Asia’s all-important fisheries. The international arbitral
tribunal, which in 2016 rejected China’s claim to sovereignty over much of the South
China Sea, found that island building had caused “devastating and long-lasting damage tothe marine environment.” China has acknowledged the widespread destruction of coral
reefs and the poaching of sea turtles in the South China Sea. The environmental andgeopolitical toll of China’s territorial grab is set to rise.
Against this background, while seeking to capitalize on Beijing’s muscular andpredatory practices to advance its own interests and influence, the U.S. essentially hews
to a cautious policy on China. With the U.S. imposing no sanctions, China has escaped
scot-free over its South China Sea aggression. Or take China’s gulag policy in Xinjiang,
where more than a million Muslims have been detained in the largest mass incarcerationof people on religious grounds in the post-Nazi period. Despite a bipartisan U.S.
commission recommending sanctions in August 2018, the Trump administration dragged
its feet for over a year before slapping export restrictions on some Chinese entities andEleanor Freund, “Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide,”
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, June 2017,https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practicalguide.
２０

15

visa curbs on a few Chinese officials linked to the internment camps — actions that
Beijing has scoffed at.２１These weak sanctions cannot compel Beijing to change course.
U.S. caution is also apparent in implementing two new domestic laws — the Taiwan
Travel Act and the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act ２２ — whose enactment in 2018
signaled a tougher bipartisan line toward China. The same holds true of the Hong Kong
Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 and the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019
(which seeks to deter Beijing’s poaching of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies).２３ In fact, as the
U.S. Congress was in the process of approving the 2019 Hong Kong and Taiwan bills,
Chinese President Xi Jinping warned that anyone attempting to “split China” would end
up with “crushed bodies and shattered bones.”２４
The Trump administration aims to primarily employ economic levers to rein in China,
including through a gradual decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies in key
sectors. China has relied on large trade surpluses and foreign-exchange reserves to fundits expanding global footprint, with surging exports fueling domestic growth. But the
U.S. pushback threatens to undercut China’s ability to mobilize vast state funds in pursuitof its ambitions — an advantage the U.S. cannot match because it must rely on drawing
private funds. Thanks to American tariffs, the fall in Chinese exports to the U.S. hasaccelerated, thereby accentuating China’s economic slowdown.２５
However, the Trump administration must also employ strategic levers, or else it will
struggle to expand or reinforce America’s Indo-Pacific partnerships. Indeed, its present
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Chairs Lead Bipartisan Letter
Urging Administration to Sanction Chinese Officials Complicit in Xinjiang Abuses,”
August 29, 2018, https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/chairs-leadbipartisan-letter-urging-administration-to-sanction-chinese,
２１

２２

H.R.535 - Taiwan Travel Act, 15th Congress (2017-2018),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535/text; and H.R.1872 Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018, 115th Congress (2017-2018),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1872.
２３

H.R.3289 - Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, 116th Congress(2019-2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3289; andH.R.2002 - Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019, 116th Congress (2019-2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2002.
CNBC, “China’s Xi warns attempts to divide China will end in ‘shattered bones’,”October 14, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/chinas-xi-warns-attempts-to-dividechina-will-end-in-shattered-bones.html.
２４Wall Street Journal, “China’s U.S. Exports Tumble as Tariffs Bite,” October 14,
2019.
２５

16

approach, coupled with its unpredictability, is encouraging U.S. allies to hedge their bets.
This gives Chinese President Xi Jinping strategic space to pursue a neo-imperialist
agenda.
Japan, seeking to mend strained ties with China, has quietly dropped the term “strategy”
from its policy vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”２６ In fact, the U.S. itself now
refers to a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as a vision, not a strategy.２７ Australia, whose
economic prosperity is linked to China, with which it has forged a “comprehensive
strategic partnership,” does not wish (like South Korea or Singapore) to be in a situation
where it has to choose between Washington and Beijing.２８
The Australian hedging was apparent from the July 2018 joint statement that emerged
from the Australia-US ministerial (AUSMIN) consultations. The statement said the twosides “made clear their commitment to work together — and with partners — to shape an
Indo-Pacific that is open, inclusive, prosperous, and rules-based.”２９ The reference to an“open, inclusive, prosperous, and rules-based” region — not “free and open” — wassignificant. However, the U.S., after skipping the phrase “free and open Indo-Pacific” inthe joint statement with Australia, quickly returned to that expression, with Secretary ofState Mike Pompeo explaining in a July 30, 2018, speech in Washington what a “free”
and “open” Indo-Pacific actually means for U.S. policy.３０
The fourth Quad member, India, hosted Xi at Mamallapuram in October 2019 as part ofPrime Minister Narendra Modi’s effort to “reset” ties with Beijing. However, India has
unequivocally embraced the phrase “free and open” for the Indo-Pacific. For example,
Modi, in his keynote address at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, said that India “stands fora free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress andJapan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), “Free and open Indo-Pacific,” undated,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000430632.pdf.
２６See, for example, Department of State, “A Free and open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a
Shared Vision,” November 4, 2019, https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.
２７Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), “China Country Brief,”
undated, https://dfat.gov.au/geo/china/Pages/china-country-brief.aspx.
２８“Joint Statement: Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations 2018,” available at:https://au.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-australia-u-s-ministerial-consultations-2018/.
２９

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, “Remarks: Secretary Pompeo,” Department ofState, July 2018,https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm.
３０17

prosperity.”３１ India has also been including the “free and open” phrase with respect tothe Indo-Pacific in joint statements with willing strategic partners. For instance, India,
which forms the world’s second-largest peninsula, and Indonesia, the world's largest
archipelagic state, identified in 2018 a shared vision for “a free, open, transparent, rulesbased, peaceful, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.”３２ As the U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Alex Wong, put it in
2018: “India as a nation has invested in a free and open order … India for sure has thecapability and potential to play a more weighty role.”

Looking ahead
The imperative in the Indo-Pacific today is to build a new strategic equilibrium pivoted
on a stable balance of power. A constellation of likeminded states linked by interlocking
strategic cooperation has become critical to help build such equilibrium.
The Australia-India-Japan-U.S. “Quad” has attracted a lot of attention. It has been labeled
a maritime “quad” of democracies. But has the Quad lived up to its promise? The
institutionalization of the Quad has yet to take off. It has yet to acquire strategic content.
The Quad can acquire strategic content once its goals, and the means to achieve them, areclarified.
A Quad in a military sense, of course, is not in the making. In fact, its four members havenot attempted to turn it into a military initiative. But the Quad as a maritime initiative forstrategic cooperation and coordination is already a reality. In a regional crisis or conflict,the Quad members are expected to coordinate their approaches. The Quad members needto build broader collaboration with other important players in the Indo-Pacific and alsowith strategically located smaller countries. Such collaboration and coordination cancontribute toward creating a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
The U.S., for its part, must provide strategic heft to its Indo-Pacific policy if it is to yield
meaningful results. It also needs a clearer strategy on how to stem the China-drivenchanging status quo in the South China Sea. Vietnam, for example, seems skeptical of the
U.S. readiness to halt Chinese expansionism. If the U.S. giant ExxonMobil exits
Vietnam’s largest gas project at a time when China is seeking to exclude extra-regional
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri
La Dialogue (June 1, 2018),” text released by India’s Ministry of External Affairs,
https://www.mea.gov.in/SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogu
e+June+01+2018.
３１

India’s Ministry of External Affairs, “Shared Vision of India-Indonesia Maritime
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” May 30, 2018, available at: https://mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/29933/Shared_Vision_of_IndiaIndonesia_Maritime_Cooperation_in_
the_IndoPacific.
３２18

energy firms from the South China Sea, American credibility will suffer. Without U.S.
leadership and resolve, a credible counter to Chinese expansionism will never be
convincing.
Threats to navigation and maritime freedoms in the Indo-Pacific can be countered only
through adherence to international rules by all parties, along with monitoring andenforcement of the rules. This is a tall order, given the fact that great powers comply withinternational law only so long as it does not conflict with their perceived interest. And
when it does conflict, international law is treated as if it applies only to weaker states.
Progress on establishing an inclusive, pluralistic, rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific is
linked to addressing the regional imperative for strategic equilibrium and regional
stability. Playing by international rules and not seeking to redraw borders in blood are
central to peace and security.

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