GCOE Discussion Paper Series
Global COE Program

Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics
Discussion Paper No. 278

Gender imbalance at birth and parents’anxiety about old age in China

Yoshihiko Kadoya and Ting Yin

August 2012GCOE Secretariat
Graduate School of Economics

OSAKA UNIVERSITY

1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043, Japan

Gender imbalance at birth and parents’anxiety about old age in China*
Yoshihiko Kadoya†
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Ting Yin
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Abstract
Chinese parents prefer to have sons as they depend on their sons for support in old age,according to most of the literature. This paper uses the Preference Parameters Study,
which randomly interviewed individuals in six major cities in China in 2011, to present
empirical evidence about the possible cause of the problematic gender imbalance atbirth in China. From the dataset, this paper compares sons’ and daughters’ commitment
to parental care from a selection of respondents who were married, aged 20-70, had atleast one living parent, and had no missing answers to the interview questions. The
results indicate that Chinese sons (and their wives) are more likely, compared todaughters (and their husbands), to be primary caregivers for parents. Nonetheless,parents’ dependency on their children would not necessarily decrease with social
security, although children with highly educated spouses appear to present an exception.
The current study supports the initial claim found in literature; however, the solution to
the gender imbalance at birth in China may not be the development of a social security
system.

Key Words: gender imbalance, anxiety about old age, family caregiving, son preference,
China
JEL classification: P29, J16*

This research used micro data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University’s 21stCentury COE Program ‘Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments’ and its Global
COE project ‘Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics.’ We acknowledge the program/project’s
contributors: Yoshiro Tsutsui, Fumio Ohtake, and Shinsuke Ikeda. We thank Fumio Ohtake, Masaru
Sasaki, Charles Yuji Horioka, Midori Wakabayashi, Wataru Kureishi, and the other seminar
participants at Osaka University, Japan.
†Corresponding author: Yoshihiko Kadoya, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka
University, Mihogaoka 6-1, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan. Phone: +81-6-6879-8573. E-mail:kadoya@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp1Introduction
Does the anxiety about old age cause the gender imbalance in China?
Chinese parents prefer to have sons as they depend on their sons for support
in old age, mainly because of the absence of well-functioning social insurance
programs (Chan, Yip, Ng et al., 2002; Chen, Li, & Meng, 2012; and Wei &Zhang, 2011). There is, however, no empirical evidence that a) Chinese sonstake care of their parents more than daughters do, or b) the development ofsocial security would ease the gender imbalance at birth. This research firsttests the hypothesis that Chinese sons take care of their parents more thanChinese daughters do by investigating Chinese household survey data, andthen considers whether the development of social security would solve theproblematic gender imbalance in China.
Traditionally, Chinese parents have preferred boys and the population ofChina reflects a significant gender imbalance that favors males (Coale, 1991).
As reported in censuses, gender imbalance (male to female) at birth rosefrom 1.076 in 1982 to 1.223 in 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics of China,2010). Sex selective abortion that has become possible due to modern sciencehas accelerated such gender imbalance (Chen, Li, & Meng, 2012). Heskethand Xing (2006) pointed out that the abnormal gender ratio in the population
may cause social problems in the future, increasing levels of violence as
many young males fail to find partners.
Much of the literature considers parents’ anxieties about old age as a major
reason for Chinese parents preferring boys. Traditionally, the Chinese
believe that once daughters are married, they belong to their husbands andtheir husbands’ families; thus, daughters’ families-of-origin, especially theirparents, rely heavily on their sons and daughters-in-law for security in oldage (Chan, Yip, Ng et al., 2002; Chen, Li, & Meng, 2012; and Wei & Zhang,2011). Recently, due to the government’s one-child policy, most parents canhave only one child. If the only child is a girl, her parents have no one to carefor them in old age. Therefore, families place strong preference on maleoffspring.
There are some poorly supported, yet possible, rebuttals. First, one may
claim that the male preference in China is a part of its traditional culture,2

not stemming just from the need for long-term care, but such traditional
culture is not unique to China. Ancient Chinese, Egyptian, and Greek
civilizations, for example, shared some practices and manipulations thatthey claimed to be effective in influencing the gender of a child before its
birth (Chan, Yip, Ng et al., 2002). Such a male preference culture remains intoday’s world, to some extent due to the notion of “inheriting family history.”
In most countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, theUnited States, Japan, and Korea, children usually carry their fathers’ familynames, not their mothers’. Yet, such male preference tradition does not affect
the gender balance in most countries. Table 1 indicates the gender balance atbirth by selected countries. Although the notion of “inheriting family history”
is to some extent common in these countries, there is no other country thatloses the gender balance as much as China.
Table 1: Gender-balance at birth and total fertility rate in selected countries
Gender-balance (Male Total
to Female) at birth (2010)(2005-2010)
China

1.19

-

United Kingdom

1.05

2.00

Germany

1.06

1.39

France1.05

2.01

United States

1.05

1.93

Japan

1.06

1.39

Korea, Republic of

1.10

1.23

fertility

rate

Source: For Gender-balance, World Bank (2012). For total fertility rate,
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2012).
Second, one may think male preference results from China’s introduction of
its unique one-child policy, but the effect may be limited. Certainly, parents
in China tend to be more selective on the gender of their child because theyoften have no second chance. Nonetheless, many parents in other countries,
such as Germany, Japan, and Korea, cannot afford a second child either, due
to socio-economic circumstances. Evidently, the total fertility rate of thesecountries indicates much less than two, yet these countries do not lose their3gender balance at birth to the extent that China does.
A major difference between China and the others lies in the level ofdependency on the son in old age: Chinese social security is very weak. Table
2 indicates workers’ pension participation rates in selected countries. While
the pension coverage rate is only 20 percent in China, the overages in mostother countries are about 90 percent. Korea appears to be an exception, but
the coverage is still more than double that in China. In addition, Table 3
shows that China has not yet developed the long-term care policies that
other nations have already prepared. As the literature claims, therefore,
Chinese parents most likely prefer boys because of the absence of awell-functioning social security system.
Table 2: Worker’s Pension Program Participation Rates in Selected Countries
Worker’s
Participation
Rate
Remarks

China
20.7%

UK
92.3%

Germany
87.6%

France
87.9%

US
92.1%

Japan
95.2%

Korea
49.5%

Still
under
development

Compulsory
participationfor employees
andself-employedindividuals

Compulsory
participationfor employees
and
some
types
of
self-employedindividuals

Compulsory
participationfor employees
andself-employedindividuals

Compulsory
participationfor employees
andself-employedindividuals

Universal
coverage

Universal
coverage

Source: OECD (2007).
Table 3: Major Public Long-Term Care Programs Selected Countries
China
Major Public
Long-Term
Care
ProgramUnderdevelopment

UK
Social services/
Social Security
Benefits(Means-Tested)

Germany
SocialLong-Term
Care
Insurance(Universal)

France
APA(Universal)

US
Medicaid(Means-tested)Japan
Long-Term
Care
Insurance(Universal)

Korea
Long-Term
Care
Insurance(Universal)

Source: OECD (2005) and Colombo F., Llena-Nazal A., Mercier J., & Tjadens
F. (2011).
The solution drawn from literature is that the development of the social
security eases the gender-imbalance at birth in China. With well-functioning
the social security, Chinese parents would become less dependent on theirson. Many of them would not make “efforts” to choose to have a son.
Consequently, the gender imbalance would be eased.
However, the argument has a critical weakness. The logic, based on the
traditional assumption that Chinese sons take care of their parents more
4

than Chinese daughters do, has no empirical evidence to support it. Most
literature related to the gender imbalance issue builds arguments based on
the assumption that Chinese sons provide better long-term care for parents.
If the assumption were wrong, the cause of the gender imbalance in China
would be unrelated to parental anxiety about old age. The conclusion, andthe assumed solution, therefore, would address the wrong cause. In addition,even if the traditional assumption were correct in the past, there is no
guarantee it is still right today. Some literature disagrees with thetraditional assumption due to the recent transitions in the socio-economic
environment. Davis (1993) and Zhan & Montgomery (2003) claim a recentchange of the gender role in elder care. Cooney & Di (1999) report anincrease in the number of parents cared for by daughters in the Shanghai
area as opposed to daughters-in-law and sons. The basic assumption ingender imbalance issues in China now strongly requires nationalverification.
The primary purpose of this paper is to address the absence of empiricalevidence. Testing the assumption that Chinese sons take care of theirparents more than Chinese daughters do, this research proposes a basis forthe cause of the gender imbalance issue in China and a possible solution to
the issue.

Data
The data used in this research were from Osaka University’s “Preference Parameters
Study in China 2011.” The study conducted face-to-face interviews of individuals andhouseholds in six major cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu,
Wuhan, and Shenyang, from December 23, 2010 to January 21, 2011. The target
respondents were adults aged 20 to 70 years old. The sampling applied MultistageSampling and Allocation Methods. The study first set predicted numbers of responses
based on the target population in each district using the Statistical Yearbook. Then, thestudy randomly selected an area in each district. Finally, the study chose the interviewed
individuals from families using the Kish Grid method. From the data set, the current
research chose 454 observations who were married, had at least one living parent, andhad no missing answers.
Collected in major Chinese cities only, the data unfortunately do not represent the entire
5

nation of China. Representing the population of the six major cities, however, thedataset includes a significant part of the country. As mentioned earlier, Cooney & Di
(1999), who compared the number of parents cared for by sons and daughters,
used data from Shanghai only. The current research, therefore, also
contributes to a better understanding of the hypothesis that Chinese sonstake care of their parents more than Chinese daughters do.

Results
Simple Observation
The primary question asked for this research was the following: Who will be

the primary caregiver for your own father/mother when he/she needs
long-term care? The choices were 1) you (respondent), 2) your spouse, 3) yourbrother/sister or your spouse’s brother/sister, 4) the spouse of the parent
requiring care, 5) other family member, 6) nursing home or assisted living
home, 7) home-helper, or 8) other. The respondent was required to make only
one choice for each parent. Table 4 indicates the answers. The responses forfathers and mothers are uneven because some respondents had only one
living parent.
The answers to the question have four implications for parent-childrelationships in the context of long-term care in China. First, Chineseparents are heavily dependent on their children for their long-term care. The
answer choices from 1 to 3 indicate a child(ren), including a child(ren)’s
spouse(s), primarily providing care for the parent(s). The sub-total of thetotal category in Table 4 shows that 90 percent of parents are dependent on
their child(ren) for required care.

6

Table 4: Primary Care Giver for Parents According to the Respondent’s Gender
Respondent= Male (Son)

1
2
3

You
(=Respondent)Your spouse

7Your
brother/sister or
yourspouse’sbrother/sister
The spouse of theparent requiring
care
Other
familymemberNursinghome/assisted
living home
Home helper

8

Other

4

5
6

Total

Respondent= Female (Daughter)

Total

220
(62.86%)59(16.86%)41(11.71%)

Own
Father96(56.16%)13(7.6%)
42(24.56%)

Own
Mother98(56.98%)9(5.23%)
46(26.74%)

194(56.56%)22(6.41%)
88(25.66%)

Own
Father207(60.53%)38(11.11%)62(18.13%)

Own
Mother207(58.97%)43(12.25%)67(19.09%)414(59.74%)81(11.69%)129(18.61%)4(2.23%)

6(1.71%)

3(1.75%)

2(1.16%)

5(1.46%)

5(1.46%)

6(1.71%)

11(1.59%)

0(0%)
7(4.09%)

0(0%)
5(2.79%)

0(0%)
12(3.43%)

2(1.17%)
2(1.17%)

1(0.58%)
2(1.16%)

3(0.87%)
4(1.17%)

2(0.58%)
9(2.63%)

1(0.28%)
7(1.99%)

3(0.43%)
16(2.31%)

6(3.51%)
0(0%)
171(100%)

6(2.79%)
0(0%)
179(100%)

12(3.43%)
0(0%)
350(100%)

12(7.02%)
1(0.58%)
171(100%)

13(7.56%)
1(0.58%)
172(100%)

25(7.29%)
2(0.58%)
343(100%)

18(5.26%)
1(0.29%)
342(100%)

19(5.41%)
1(0.28%)
351(100%)

26(5.34%)
1(0.29%)
693(100%)

Own
Father111(64.91%)25(14.62%)20(11.70%)Own
Mother109(60.89%)34(18.99%)21(11.73%)2(1.17%)

Sub-total

Sub-total

Sub-total

Second, Chinese parents seem to be more dependent on their sons. Choice 1
for male respondents (sons) occupies more than 60 percent, whereas that offemale respondents (daughters) is about 56 percent. Including choice 2,
which is the respondent’s spouse, the dependency on sons increases to nearly
80 percent, whereas that on daughters is only about 63 percent. As predictedin the literature, Chinese parents rely on their sons and daughters-in-law forlong-term care.
Third, parents that have daughters may have difficulties finding caregivers
in the future. The female respondents in this research expect their siblingsor the siblings’ spouses to provide long-term care for their parents. In fact,
almost 25 percent of female respondents chose choice 3, which is more thandouble the 11.7 percent of male respondents who made this choice. However,choice 3 is possible only when female respondents have siblings. As
mentioned earlier, the Chinese government introduced the one-child policy in
1979. Targeting those aged 20-69 years old, this research included many
respondents born prior to 1979. It is clear, however, that younger generations
will not often have siblings and the parents that have daughters will suffer
more than those who have sons.
Fourth, it is unknown from the results if the development of social security
would ease the sons’ preference. As seen earlier, the parents that have7

daughters rely more on their other children, not necessarily on professionalcare, indicated by choices 6 and 7. As choice 3 may become unlikely due tothe one-child policy, many parents who do not have sons may have to rely on
professional care in the future, which usually requires a decent social
security income. However, the results produced no such evidence.
One must consider that the implications above may be biased. Table 4 simply
arranges the answers from the respondents, according to their gender. In
reality, the respondents’ attributes, such as age, income, educational
background, and sibling status, may also influence the answer. The researchneeds a further investigation, controlling for these factors.

Controlled Observations
This section uses 5 explained and 10 explaining variables as seen in Table 5.
Among them, the years of education of one’s own/spouse’s father and mother(5-8 in explaining variables) is a proxy variable for joining a pension program,which allows parents to be more independent from their children. As seen in
Table 2, workers’ pension participation rate in China is only 20.7 percent.
The observations assume that higher education provides a better chance ofparticipating in a pension program.

8

Table 5: Variables and Description
Variable

Description(Explained)(1) I_care_own (dummy)

Who will be the primary caregiver for your own parent(s) when
he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1 = respondent, 0 = others)(2) I_care_spouse (dummy)

Who will be the primary caregiver for your spouse’s parent(s)when he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1 = respondent, 0 =others)(3) Couple_care_own(dummy)Who will be the primary caregiver for your own parent(s) when
he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1= respondent or
respondent’s spouse, 0 = others)(4) Couple_care_spouse(dummy)Who will be the primary caregiver for your spouse’s parent(s)when he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1 = respondent or
respondent’s spouse, 0 = others)(5)
Professiornal_care_own(dummy)Who will be the primary caregiver for your own parent(s) when
he/she (they) needs long‐term care? (1= Nursing home/Assisted
living home/Home helper, 0 = others)(Explaining)
1. Male_dummy

1= male, 0 = female

2. AgeAge

3. Education

Years of Education

4. E_spouse

Spouse’s “Years of Education”

5. E_father

Father’s “Years of Education”

6. E_mother

Mother’s “Years of Education”

7. E_spouse_father

Spouse’s father’s “Years of Education”

8. E_spouse_mother

Spouse’s mother’s “Years of Education”

9. IncomeRespondent’s household income (yearly)

10. One_child_dummy

1 = no siblings, 0 = have sibling(s)Having five explained variables, this section has five estimation models:(1) Prob (I_care_own = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d (Education) + e(Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: other explanatory variables)
If the hypothesis were right, sons would be more involved in parental care.
9Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be positive. By contrast, if the
hypothesis were wrong, daughters would be more involved in parental care.
Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be negative.
(2) Prob (I_care_spouse = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d (Education)+ e (Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: other explanatory
variables)
This is the opposite of model (1). If the hypothesis were right, daughters
would be more involved in the care for their spouses’ parents. Thus, theimpact of Male_dummy would be negative. By contrast, if the hypothesis
were wrong, sons would be more involved in the care for their spouses’
parents. Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be positive.
(3) Prob (Couple_care_own = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d(Education) + e (Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: otherexplanatory variables)
If the hypothesis were right, sons and their wives would be more involved inparental care. Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be positive. By
contrast, if the hypothesis were wrong, daughters would be more involved inparental care. Thus, the impact of Male_dummy would be negative.
(4) Prob (Couple_care_spouse = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d(Education) + e (Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: otherexplanatory variables)
Again, this is the opposite of model (3).
(5) Prob (Professional_care_own = 1) = a + b (Male_dummy) + c (Age) + d(Education) + e (Income) + f (One_child_dummy) + g*X (X: otherexplanatory variables)
If the hypothesis were right, the parents with pension programs would rely
more on professional services. Since parents’ dependency on their children
causes the gender imbalance in China, the development of a social security
10system would decrease that dependency. As a result, Chinese genderimbalance at birth would be eased. Therefore, the impact of E_father andE_mother would be positive. Otherwise, the results would not support thelogic drawn from the literature.
Table 6 depicts the descriptive statistics for the variable used in this analysis.
Almost exactly half of the observations are male. Education ranges from aminimum of 3 years to the 16 years of a PhD candidature. As the average ageof the respondents making the observations is 47.6 years old, many of themwere born prior to 1979. As a result, only 13 percent of them are single
children (no siblings).
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics(Explained)(1) I_care_own (dummy)(2) I_care_spouse (dummy)(3) Couple_care_own(dummy)(4) Couple_care_spouse(dummy)(5) Professiornal_care_own(dummy)(Explaining)
1. Male_dummy
2. Age3. Education
4. E_spouse
5. E_father
6. E_mother
7. E_spouse_father
8. E_spouse_mother
9. Income10. One_child_dummy

Mean
0.515
0.205
0.586

Sd
0.500
0.404
0.493

Max
1
1
1

Min
0
0
0

Obs
454
454
454

0.564

0.496

1

0

454

0.062

0.241

1

0

454

0.509
47.21810.84610.652
7.337
6.828
7.073
6.670
5158.590
0.143

0.500
11.316
2.747
2.739
2.460
2.465
2.463
2.424
6012.691
0.351

1
70
16
16
16
16
16
16
90300
1

0
24
3
3
3
3
3
3
1400
0

454
454
454
454
454
454
454
454
454
454

Table 7 summarizes the estimation results. Model 1 and Model 3 show that
Male_dummy is positive and significant. Model 2 indicates that
Male_dummy is negative and significant. In Model 4, Male dummy is also
negative, but not significant. Overall, the results support the hypothesis.

11

Table 7: Estimation Results
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

I_care_own

I_care_spouse

Couple_care_own

Couple_care_spouse

Professional_care_own

0.286*(2.28)-0.240(-1.72)0.435***(3.37)-0.0724(-0.57)-0.140(-0.69)-0.0314***(-4.38)-0.0265**(-3.28)-0.0402***(-5.36)-0.0403***(-5.43)0.0153(1.32)

Education

0.0480(1.24)

0.0187(0.43)

0.0445(1.09)

0.0678(1.67)

0.0274(0.43)

E_spouse-0.00273(-0.07)-0.0254(-0.57)-0.0224(-0.54)-0.0501(-1.22)0.132*(2.08)

E_father-0.0770(-1.59)0.00148(0.03)-0.0390(-0.75)-0.0190(-0.37)0.0245(0.33)

E_mother

0.0625(1.24)

0.000179(0.00)

0.0564(1.05)

0.0360(0.68)-0.0568(-0.75)

E_spouse_father-0.0168(-0.33)-0.0326(-0.56)-0.0197(-0.37)-0.0455(-0.85)0.0430(0.53)

E_spouse_mother-0.00196

0.00408-0.0249

0.0245-0.0716(-0.04)(0.07)(-0.48)(0.47)(-0.87)0.0000135(1.01)-0.00000622(-0.47)0.0000298(1.49)

0.0000229(1.23)-0.00000220(-0.14)

one_child_dummy

0.107(0.55)

0.0417(0.20)

0.0696(0.34)

0.257(1.25)

0.251(0.92)

_cons

1.079
(1.78)
454

0.793(1.18)
454

1.732**(2.73)
454

1.826**(2.91)
454-3.647***(-3.70)454

Male_dummy

Age

IncomeNt statistics in parentheses*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Throughout Model 1 to 4, age is negative and significant. That is, the older
the child, the less he/she is involved in a parent’s care. As the average age ofthe respondents is over 47 years old, this is probably because older children
cannot physically afford to serve as primary caregivers for their parents.
Contrary to the hypothesis, Model 5 shows that both E_father and E_mother
do not substantially influence the reliance on the use of professional care.
This may mean that social security does not necessarily decrease parents’dependency on their children. Thus, the results do not support the12hypothesis that the development of social security eases the genderimbalance at birth.
In Model 5, E_spouse is uniquely positive and significant. The better
educated the child’s spouse, the more likely the parents are to use
professional care services. This may be because educated spouses tend towork outside the home, rather than staying at home and taking care ofparents-in-law.

Conclusions
This paper provides evidence about the possible cause of the problematic
gender imbalance at birth in China. Much literature on this issue has
proceeded to discussions based on the traditional assumption that Chinesesons are more involved in taking care of parents than Chinese daughters are,and thus, Chinese parents prefer sons. Yet, empirical evidence is lacking.
This study first verified the assumption by using the “Preference Parameters
Study in China 2011,” which conducted face-to-face interviews of randomly selectedindividuals in six major cities. More specifically, the study used target
population samples aged 20-70 years old, married, and with at least one
living parent. Second, discussions in the literature have led to the argumentthat decreasing child dependency by developing social security may ease thegender imbalance at birth. Thus, the study tested the validity of theargument, investigating the above-mentioned data.
As a result, this paper first presents empirical evidence that Chinese sons(and their wives) are more likely, compared to daughters (and theirhusbands), to be primary caregivers for parents. The paper also reports thefinding that parents’ dependency on their children would not necessarily
decrease with the development of social security, although that may be thecase when a child has a highly educated spouse.
Although this study has obvious limitations in that the data were collected in
six major cities only, the problematic nature of gender imbalance at birth andthe lack of available empirical evidence demand that researchers begin toconstruct a better understanding of the causes and possible solutions to thistroubling phenomenon. With that in mind, this paper contributes to that13

construction of knowledge and insight.

14

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