Discussion Paper No. 970

WHY DO CHILDREN TAKE CARE
OF THEIR ELDERLY PARENTS?
ARE THE JAPANESE ANY DIFFERENT?

Charles Yuji Horioka
Emin Gahramanov
Aziz Hayat
Xueli Tang

May 2016

The Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan

Why Do Children Take Care of Their Elderly Parents? Are the Japanese Any Different?§
Charles Yuji Horiokaa,*

Emin Gahramanovb

Aziz Hayatc

Xueli Tangda

Asian Growth Research Institute, Kitakyushu, Japan; Institute of Social and Economic
Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
MA, USAb

American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emiratesc

Deakin University, Melbourne, AustraliadDeakin University, Melbourne, Australia
May 7, 2016

Abstract
In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of why individuals provide care and attention totheir elderly parents using a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous saving
and a “contest success function” and test this model using micro data from a Japanese household
survey, the Osaka University Preference Parameter Study. To summarize our main findings, wefind that the Japanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide
care and attention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong
support for the selfish bequest motive or the exchange motive (much stronger than in the UnitedStates), but we find that their caregiving behavior is also heavily influenced by the strength oftheir altruism toward their parents and social norms.
JEL Classification Codes: D12, D64, D91, E21, J14
Key Words: Altruism; attention; bequest motive; care; caregiving; contest success function; coresidence; elderly care; exchange motive; family care; informal care; intergenerational transfers;
Japan; parental care; parent-child relations; selfishness; social norms; strategic bequest motive§

This research uses micro data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University’s 21st Century
COE Program ‘Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments’ and its Global COE
project ‘Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics.’ We acknowledge the program/project’s
contributors Yoshiro Tsutsui, Fumio Ohtake, and Shinsuke Ikeda. The authors are indebted to Yoko Niimi
and Ching-jen Sun for their helpful discussions and suggestions. This work was supported by JSPS (Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science) KAKENHI Grant Number 15H01950, an Asian Growth ResearchInstitute project grant, and a grant from the MEXT Joint Usage/Research Center for Behavioral Economics,
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. Any remaining errors are the authors’.
*

Corresponding author: Asian Growth Research Institute, 11-4, Ohtemachi, Kokurakita-ku, Kitakyushu,
Fukuoka, Japan. Tel.: 81-93-583-6202. E-mail: horioka@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

1. Introduction
Why do people take care of their elderly parents? Is it because they have their eye on their parents’assets and want to maximize their share of their parents’ bequest (the strategic bequest motive or
the exchange motive)? Is it out of love (the altruism model)? Is it because they are adhering to
the social norms of the society in which they live?
In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of why individuals provide care and attention totheir elderly parents and test this model using micro data from a Japanese household survey, theOsaka University Preference Parameter Study. To summarize our main findings, we find that theJapanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide care andattention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong support
for the selfish bequest motive or the exchange motive (much stronger than in the United States),
but we find that their caregiving behavior is also heavily influenced by the strength of theiraltruism toward their parents and social norms.
Recent theoretical contributions to the economics of inter-family interactions highlight theimportance of sibling rivalry in providing care/attention to parents with the objective ofstrategically influencing the latter’s inheritance decision, given that parents are also strategic
manipulators who, at the same time, display altruistic feelings towards their children (see Chang
and Weisman, 2005; Chang, 2009; Chang, 2012; and Chang and Luo 2015). In line with thisstrand of the literature, we develop a two-period overlapping generations model as a two-stage
Nash game that integrates parental altruism and sibling rivalry for family resources withendogenous bequest formation, strategic manipulation of children’s behavior, and endogenous
saving. The two-period structure of our model conveniently endogenizes the saving rate, which
is important because it adds realism to the model given strong life-cycle saving motives in Japan.
Further, as was noted in the one-period setting of Chang (2009), financial constraints may prevent
parents from making transfers, especially with a greater number of children. Yet if everyone isallowed to save when young, the saved amount may alleviate financial constraints during old age
when transfers to children are made. In addition, wealth accumulation during younger ages may
also influence the need for children to receive bequests to begin with and thus their desire toprovide care/attention in return. We thus attempt to model the complex interplay of these factors
in a Nash game with sibling rivalry and parent-child exchanges.
Turning to the empirical analysis conducted in this paper, it makes an original contribution in atleast 4 respects. First, it is one of the first studies to make use of data for Japan where informal(family) care of the elderly is much more prevalent than in the United States and other Western1societies. Second, it uses multiple measures of care and attention (co-residence, living nearby,
help with housework, and financial assistance from children to parents) whereas most previous
studies for Japan focus primarily on parent-child co-residence. Third, it uses a direct measure ofbequest expectations whereas most previous studies use parental wealth (particularly
bequeathable wealth) as a proxy for expected or potential bequests because of a lack of direct data
on bequest expectations. Fourth, it is one of the first studies to take explicit account of the strengthof children’s altruism toward their parents, social norms, and religiosity.
This is an exceedingly important research topic because it sheds light on one of the key issues in
economics (whether households are motivated by selfish or altruistic considerations in their intrafamily interactions) and because the roles to be played by informal (family) care of the elderly
and public long-term care insurance programs are being hotly debated in many, if not most,developed economies as their life expectancies increase relentlessly and their populations age
rapidly.
Moreover, whether intergenerational transfers and exchanges are altruistically or selfishly
motivated has very important policy implications. If transfers and exchanges are motivated bypure altruism, households will offset the impact of government-initiated actions involving
compulsory redistributions across generations via transfers in the opposite direction (Barro, 1974,
and Becker, 1974).i For example, if government subsidies for elderly care are introduced, parents
will increase their bequests to their children because they wish to compensate their children forthe higher taxes they have to pay in order to finance these subsidies.

By contrast, if

intergenerational transfers and exchanges are selfishly motivated, public income redistribution
policies will not be neutral (Cox, 1987, and Juarez, 2009). For example, government subsidies
for elderly care will lead to a decline in care provided by children to their parents, which in turnwill lead to a decline in bequests from parents to children and a redistribution of income fromyounger to older cohorts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present the theoretical model;
in section 3, we survey previous empirical studies; in section 4, we present the estimation model;
in section 5, we describe the data source and sample selection criteria; in section 6, we present
descriptive statistics; in section 7, we present the estimation results; and in section 8, wesummarize our results and discuss the policy implications thereof.

22. An Altruistic-Strategic Bequest Model with Endogenous Saving
In this section, we explain our theoretical model of the determinants of care/attention to elderly
parents by their children. Most theoretical studies (e.g., Abel and Warshawsky, 1988, and Becker,1991) focus exclusively on either altruistic or exchange motives for bequests, but a growing
number of studies attempt to analyze the two motives in tandem (see Masson and Pestieau, 1996,
and Laferrere and Wolff, 2006, for useful surveys of this literature). Further, since empiricalstudies of bequest motives and their effects often report results that are contradictory (see, forexample, Juarez, 2009), we too integrate the two motives in a unified framework and empiricallytest its theoretical predictions.
Consistent with the general spirit of the seminal study by Bernheim, et al. (1985), our model posits
that the parent’s own utility is influenced by the actions of her children (in particular, it is anincreasing function of the total amount of care/attention she receives from her children) and thatthe parent leaves a bequest partly to intentionally and strategically manipulate her children’s
behavior (i.e., to induce her children to provide care and attention). Following Chang (2009), we
focus in our model on intergenerational exchanges of bequests from parents to children with care
and attention from children to parents in the presence of sibling rivalry. Yet, along with sibling
rivalry for bequests, we also incorporate parents’ purely altruistic feelings towards their children
as well as their desire to save for their own retirement. The assumption that saving is chosen
endogenously is well-justified in the case of Japan where public pensions were late in being
introduced and life-cycle saving motives have historically been particularly strong (see, forexample, Horioka and Watanabe, 1997). We also assume that parents leave a bequest to theirchildren partly out of altruism and partly as a way of inducing their children to provide care andattention.
We study parent-child interactions within a two-period overlapping generations setting, presented
as a two-stage non-cooperative Nash game. We assume that a lifetime consists of two periods: aworking period and a retirement period. Young parents have

2 identical children (bornexogenously), who in turn enter the workforce at the start of their parents’ second period of life.
As in Cremer, et al. (1992), we ignore the individual’s utility while a dependent child.
The individuals’ time endowment is normalized to unity. Young adults inelastically devote a
fixed fraction
fractionof their total time endowment to work, and they also supply care/attentionof their total time endowment in a given time period, , to their parents. (Hereafter,

the first subscript of a given variable is either 1 (corresponding to a “young (working) adult”) or
2 (corresponding to an “old (retired) parent”), while the second subscript indicates the respective
3

time period. Superscript denotes individual (child) , where

1, … , .) In the first period oflife, people work, earn wages, save, and provide care to their parents. In the second period of life,
people retire and decide how much wealth to set aside for bequests to their grown up children,
while expecting some care from them in return.
Similar to Chang (2009) and Chang and Luo (2015), we introduce a “contest success function”(CSF) that determines the share of the total bequest going to a particular child . The transfer
share of child , denoted by, is defined as follows:≡

1, … , , and

where

(1)

∑

.

We consider a two-stage game played as follows. In the first stage, the old parent chooses theamount of her bequest, and in the second stage, her grown-up children simultaneously and noncooperatively choose how much attention to provide to the parent and also how much to save for
their own retirement. We assume that the parent credibly commits to sticking to her bequest
amount and bequest share decisions. Further, the parent does not distribute her bequest until her
children realize their attention and saving rate decisions.
Thus, we proceed by solving for the children’s optimal level of attention and saving rate for any
given bequest amount and then let the old parent plug these attention and saving functions into
her utility function to determine the optimal bequest amount to leave. By specifying functional
forms, our objective is to derive explicit analytic solutions for the model’s choice variables so we
can clearly see how they vary with respect to various parameters of interest. To strike a balance
between realism and tractability and to facilitate closed-form interior solutions, we assume that
leisure and total attention from all children enter everyone’s utility function linearly and that utility
from first and second period consumption is logarithmic. We further set the time-discount factor
in the utility function to unity.
Thus, letbe the overall lifetime utility of an adult individual , defined as follows:

≡ ln

1
1

ln

1

(2)

4

where parameter 0

1 denotes the weight the parent places on the total welfare of herchildren. The first two terms on the right-hand-side of (2) represent the utilities from first-period
consumption and leisure, respectively.

and stand for the wage rate per unit of time and thedenotes the fraction of income saved.

interest rate, respectively, whileis the total

amount of bequest left by individual to her children during her second period when old.

isthe total amount of bequest left by individual ’s parent. In the second period of life, leisureamounts to unity by assumption, but we can safely ignore it. Note that (2) implies that theindividual does not enjoy the time/attention he provides to his parent, an assumption that is often
made in this strand of the literature. Existing studies assume that such services do not have closemarket substitutes and that they may involve, among other things, behavioral control that mayhinder the child’s independence (e.g., Cox, 1987). In addition, one may conjecture that, in reality,
time spent with parents is correlated with time spent away from one’s own children and spouseand that the net effect is disutility to the child. However, we should note that the fact that thechild derives disutility from attention to his parents does not necessarily imply that the child is“inhumanly” selfish. Oftentimes, taking care of ageing parents involves finding out about theirdeclining health and well-being, and such stressful thoughts may lower the child’s well-being.
Recalling (1), first-order conditions for the maximization of (2) are as follows:
1
1

∑

0

1

∑

∑

1

0

(3)

(4)

1

∑

Next, note that under the assumption of identical siblings, a symmetric Nash equilibrium would
imply

,

, and thus ∑1, while, for any

1, … , . We thus make these substitutions into (3) and (4), which allows us to obtain the following
expressions:
1
2
2

(5)

1
1 1

1

5

(6)

By taking the logarithm of both sides of (6) and differentiating the resulting expression withrespect to, it is possible to show, under the assumption of positive interest, wage income, andold-age consumption, that, ceteris paribus, the level of care and attention provided to parents
responds positively to the parents’ bequest amount.
A retired parent decides at time how much to bequeath to each of her children. Note that theparent also realizes that each of her children will simultaneously choose

,

, and

thus takes this into account in her maximization program. Clearly, the parent also assumes that∑1

. This implies that the bequest share in the parent’s, whileoptimization program is simply 1/ . Therefore, the retired parent’s optimization problem is asfollows:
max ln 1
where

(7)

is the total amount of bequest left to the retired parent’s children, while the saving rate

(which was decided by the retired parent one period earlier when she was young) isand thus

is taken as given during the parent’s old-age optimization exercise. Note from (2) that we assume
that the retired parent does not tire of her child’s attention but that she is aware of the fact that her
child’s utility is negatively affected by attention.

is clearly defined in the manner of (2) as

follows:
≡ ln

1

/
1

ln 1

(8)

The retired parent takes as given the attention level her grandchildren will provide to her children
and also the well-being of her grandchildren. That is, decisions that are made at current time
matter. To solve for the steady-state equilibrium, we proceed according to the following steps:
Step 1. Substitute expression (8) into (7), whereandare determined by (5) and (6),respectively.
Step 2. Differentiate the resulting objective function from the previous step with respect
to

.

6

Step 3. In the final derivative expression from Step 2, use the right-hand side of thefollowing expression:
1
2
in place of1(see expression (5)).

Step 4. Noting that the steady-state first order condition from Step 3 would depend on
, and

,

as well as on other model parameters, replace all of these bequest amounts withthe common notation∗.

Step 5. Set the final expression from the previous step to zero and solve for
Having found

∗

∗

.

, we can determine the equilibrium level of the choice variable of interest ( ∗ )∗from (6), where

:

2

∗

1
1

1
1

(9)

The following comparative statics results can be straightforwardly established:
∗

2
1

1
∗

2

0

0

(10)
(11)

Expression (10) arises because greater altruism leads to a greater bequest amount, thus increasing
the reward for providing care and attention to parents. Expression (11) shows that children’s time
contribution towards their parents increases with the number of siblings. Intuitively, an increased
number of contestants intensifies the Nash equilibrium competition level.

3. Survey of Previous Empirical Studies
There have been many empirical studies of the determinants of care of, and attention to, elderly
parents by their children. We will not provide an exhaustive survey of this literature because anumber of excellent surveys already exist (for example, Arrondel and Masson, 2006; Laferrere
and Wolff, 2006; and Horioka, 2014), but there has been a large number of studies that attempt totest for the presence of the strategic bequest (exchange) motive by seeing whether or not thebequeathable wealth or bequest intentions of elderly parents have a significant impact on the care7

and attention they receive from their children. One study of this genre is Menchik, et al. (1988),
which obtains a positive correlation between parents’ intention to bequeath and the frequency of
their children’s telephone calls and visits, a result that appears to support the strategic bequest(exchange) motive. However, this study fails to distinguish between single-child families andmultiple-child families, as done by later studies. The seminal paper of this genre is Bernheim, etal. (1985), which finds using U.S. data from the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (LRHS)
that the amount of attention provided by children to their elderly parents (as measured by thefrequency of phone calls and visits) is an increasing function of parents’ bequeathable wealth (butnot of their non-bequeathable wealth) in multiple-child families but not in single-child families,
even after controlling for parental characteristics. All of these results appear to support thestrategic bequest (exchange) motive because only bequeathable wealth should influence thebehavior of children and because parents’ threat of disinheritance is truly credible only if they
have multiple children. However, Perozek (1998) replicates Bernheim, et al.’s (1985) test using
a richer data set (the 1987 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH)) and finds thatbequeathable wealth no longer has a significant impact on attention from one’s children when
additional child and family characteristics are taken into account and/or a more comprehensive
measure of attention is used.
Similarly, Sloan, et al. (1997) examine the impact of various variables relating to the strategic
bequest (exchange) motive on care of disabled elderly parents by their children and found little
evidence of a strategic bequest motive. For example, they found that parental wealth has anegative and insignificant impact on informal care rather than the positive and significant impact
predicted by the strategic bequest motive.
Moreover, Altonji, et al. (2000) analyze inter vivos time and money transfers from parents tochildren as well as those from children to parents using data from the 1988 wave of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and find little evidence that parental income or wealthincreases time transfers from children or that time transfers from children to parents are exchanged
for money transfers from parents to children or conversely. Similarly, Ioannides and Kan (2000)
analyze two-directional inter vivos transfers of time and money between parents and children andfind that they are motivated by mutual altruism rather than by selfish exchange motives (but see
Cox, 1987; Cox and Rank, 1992; and Altonji, et al., 1997).
Thus, the evidence from the United States suggests that altruistic motivations are more important
than selfish or strategic motivations.

According to Laferrere and Wolff’s (2006) morecomprehensive review of this literature, about two-thirds of the studies using U.S. data find8

support for the altruism model or reject the selfish exchange model, whereas the results for
European countries are more mixed. ii
Turning to studies that use Japanese data, Ohtake and Horioka (1994) analyze the determinantsof financial support from children to parents and parent-child co-residence using data from the1986 Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions, conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labourand Welfare of the Japanese Government.

They find that parents’ financial net worth (acomponent of bequeathable wealth) has a positive and significant impact on the amount offinancial support from children to parents (given that the child provides financial support to his
or her parents) and that housing wealth (also a component of bequeathable wealth) has a positiveand significant impact on the probability of parent-child co-residence but that non-bequeathable
wealth does not have a significant impact on either (see also Ohtake, 1991).
Similarly, Komamura (1994) finds, using data from the Survey of Retirement Assets, conducted
in 1990 by the former Management and Coordination Agency of the Japanese Government, that
housing wealth has a positive and significant impact on the probability of parent-child coresidence, while Johar, et al. (2015) find, using data from a Nihon University survey, that parental
wealth (both housing assets and financial assets) increases the probability of parent-child coresidence (see also Horioka, et al., 2000).
Furthermore, Yamada (2006) analyzes the determinants of parent-child co-residence, parent-childdistance, and the frequency of parent-child contact using data from the Survey on Life Planningin the Age of Long Life, conducted in 1992 by the Japan Institute of Life Insurance, and finds that
inheritance expectations have a significant impact on all three dependent variables, at least in thecase of the husband’s parents, and that inheritance experience has a significant impact on thesecond and third dependent variables in the case of all parents as well as in the case of thehusband’s parents.
Finally, Kohara and Ohtake (2011) find, using data from a Japanese Government survey, thatchildren provide more time transfers (care) to parents with more wealth (proxied by parents’
educational attainment).iii
Thus, studies that examine the impact of parental bequests or wealth on the amount of care,attention, and/or financial assistance parents receive from their children using Japanese data findstrong support for the selfish bequest (exchange) motive, unlike in the case of the United States.
Moreover, attitudinal data on bequest plans provide further corroboration of the differences
between U.S. and Japanese intra-family behavior. For example, Horioka, et al. (2000), Horioka
9(2002), and Horioka (2014) find that the proportion of respondents planning to leave a larger shareof their bequest to children who provide more care is much higher in Japan than in the UnitedStates (29.2% in Japan vs. 3.1% in the United States in the case of Horioka, et al. (2000) andHorioka (2002) and 20.5% in Japan vs. 2.5% in the United States in the case of Horioka (2014)).
These results also suggest that the strategic bequest (exchange) motive is much more applicablein Japan than it is in the United States (see also Horioka, 2008, 2009).
Turning next to studies that look at the impact on social norms on care behavior, Wakabayashi
and Horioka (2009) analyze the determinants of parent-child co-residence behavior in Japan andfind that parents are more likely to live with their eldest child if their eldest child is a son and are
more likely to live with their eldest son even if he is not the eldest child. Similarly, Johar, et al.
(2015) find that being the eldest son increases the probability of parent-child co-residence in Japan.
All of these findings suggest that social norms (especially the social norm that it is the duty of theeldest son to live with and take care of his parents) influence care and co-residence behavior inJapan.
Turning finally to the impact of religiosity, Gans, et al. (2009) find that religious children are more
likely to provide care to their aged parents, which confirms the importance of religiosity.

4. Estimation ModelIn this section, we describe the estimation model we use to analyze what determines whether or
not individuals provide care and attention to their parents. Our estimation model is derived fromthe theoretical model we presented in section 2, which showed that parents’ altruism towards theirchildren, combined with their desire to receive care and attention from their children, will induce
parents to leave bequests to their children and that this, in turn, will induce their children to provide
care and attention to their elderly parents. We will test our theoretical model by examining
whether or not parents’ bequest plans have a significant impact on their children’s caregiving
behavior.
Moreover, our theoretical model also predicts that the number of siblings will have a positive
impact on the provision of care and attention to one’s parents because an increased number ofcontestants intensifies the Nash equilibrium competition level of care and attention. The survey
we use collects information on the number of siblings, and thus, we can also test this implicationof our theoretical model.
10The survey we use collects information on several types of care and attention provided byrespondents to their parents so we use the following 3 dependent variables:
CORESIDE = 1 if the respondent lives with his/her parents and 0 otherwise
NEARBY = 1 if the respondent lives near his/her parents and 0 otherwise
HOUSEWORK = 1 if the respondent assists his/her parents with housework and 0 otherwise
The survey we used also collects information on whether the respondent provides nursing care or
financial assistance to his/her elderly parents, but we do not present the results for these dependent
variables because of space limitations, because the results for nursing care were very similar to
the results for housework, and because the results for financial assistance were not verysatisfactory, with the coefficients of the key explanatory variables (BEQEXP and NSIB) and mostof the other explanatory variables never being statistically significant.
The key explanatory variables are as follows:
BEQEXP = 1 if the respondent expects to receive a bequest or inter vivos transfer from his/herparents and 0 otherwise
According to the strategic bequest (exchange) motive that is one element of our theoretical model,
if an individual is selfish, he/she will be more likely to provide care and attention to his/her parents,
ceteris paribus, if he/she expects to receive a bequest or inter vivos transfer from them. Thus, theexpected sign of the coefficient of BEQEXP is positive.
NSIB = the number of siblings the respondent has (included only in the samples with one or moresiblings)
An individual who has more siblings would be expected to provide more care to his/her parents,
according to our theoretical model, because he/she has more rivals to compete with for his/herparents’ bequest. Thus, it appears at first glance that the sign of the coefficient of NSIB should
be positive. On the other hand, it is possible that the sign of the coefficient of NSIB is negativeif there is a fixed amount of care and attention that is required because the amount of care andattention that each child needs to provide will decline as the number of siblings increases.
In addition, we include a number of control variables, the first of which pertains to the strength of
respondents’ altruism toward their parents.

11

CHILDALTRUISM = the proportion of his/her family income that the respondent would be
willing to donate to his/her parents until things get better (possibly for a few years) if his/herparents were both alive and living separately from him/her and the per capita family income of
his/her parents was less than one-third of his/her own (in ratio form)
The survey used a one-third threshold to ensure that a significant proportion of respondents would
indicate a positive proportion. Since we would expect a more altruistic respondent to provide
more care and attention to his/her parents, ceteris paribus, the expected sign of the coefficient of
CHILDALTRUISM is positive.
The next three control variables pertain to social norms. The social norm is Japan and many other
Asian countries is for sons (especially the eldest son) to live with, and take care of, their elderly
parents, and thus, it is of great interest to see the extent to which social norms rather than economic
rationality can explain caregiving behavior in Japan.
ELDESTSON = 1 if the respondent is the eldest son and 0 otherwise (included only for the fullsample and the male sample with one or more siblings)
Since the social norm in Japan is for the eldest son to live with, and take care of, his/her parents,
ceteris paribus, the expected sign of the coefficient of ELDESTSON is positive.
NOBROTHERS = 1 if the respondent has no brothers and 0 otherwise (included only for thefemale sample with one or more siblings)
Since the social norm in Japan is for sons (especially the eldest son) to live with, and take care of,their parents, daughters should be more likely to live with and take care of their parents, ceterisparibus, if they have no brothers. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient of NOBROTHERS
is positive.
MALE = 1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise (included only for the full sample)
Since the social norm in Japan is for sons to live with and take care of their parents, ceteris paribus,
the expected sign of MALE is positive.
We also include a control variable pertaining to religiosity as at least one previous study (Gans,
et al., 2009) found it to be important.
RELIGIOSITY = the respondent’s degree of religiosity, where 1 denotes the lowest degree of
religiosity and 5 denotes the highest degree of religiosity
12

Since an individuals who is more deeply religious will presumably be more likely to provide care
and attention to his/her parents, ceteris paribus, the expected sign of the coefficient of
RELIGIOSITY is positive.
Turning to the other control variables we included,
BOTHALIVE = 1 if both of the respondent’s parents are alive and 0 otherwise
Since there is less need for children to take care of their parents, ceteris paribus, if both parents
are still alive and one parent can take care of the other, the expected sign of the coefficient of
BOTHALIVE is negative.
AGEPARENT = the age of the respondent’s parent if only one parent is alive and the age of the
respondent’s older parent if both parents are alive
Since health inevitably deteriorates with age, older parents will be more likely to require care andhence the expected sign of the coefficient of AGEPARENT is positive.
REQCARE = 1 if one or both of the respondent’s parents is alive and requires physical care orhelp with housework and 0 otherwise
Since an individual should be more likely to provide care and attention to his/her parents, ceterisparibus, if his/her parents require physical care or help with housework, the expected sign of
REQCARE is positive.
BOTHREQCARE = 1 if both of the respondent’s parents are alive and both require physical careor help with housework and 0 otherwise
Since there is more need for children to provide care and attention, ceteris paribus, if both parents
require care, one might think at first glance that the sign of the coefficient of BOTHREQCARE
should be positive. However, if both parents require care, it may be more likely for the parents to
be institutionalized, which means that the sign of the coefficient of BOTHREQCARE might benegative.
WORK = 1 if the respondent is working and 0 otherwise
Since an individual is less likely to be able to take care of his/her parents, ceteris paribus, if he/she
is working, the expected sign of the coefficient of WORK is negative.

13

COLLEGE = 1 if the respondent graduated from a junior college or a 4-year university or engaged
in graduate study and 0 otherwise
Since an individual who has a higher educational attainment will presumably have a higher market
wage, meaning that the earnings he/she foregoes by providing care and attention to his/her parents
is greater, he/she should be less likely to provide care and attention to his/her parents, ceterisparibus. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient of COLLEGE is negative.
MARRIED = 1 if the respondent is currently married and 0 otherwise
The sign of MARRIED is ambiguous a priori. On one hand, a married (male) individual might
be better able to provide care and attention to his parents because his spouse can provide assistancewith caregiving. On the other hand, a married individual may be less able to provide care andattention to his/her parents because he/she is too busy taking care of his/her spouse and children.
Since our dependent variables are all binary variables, we use a probit model in our estimations
and present marginal effects, which are average partial effects, in our estimation results. We use
robust White standard errors for the marginal effects to adjust for low-level residual
heteroscedasticity (White, 1982) as hinted by the normalized randomized quantile residual plots(see Dunn and Smyth, 1996) (not shown in the paper due to space limitations).

5. Data Source and Sample Selection Criteria
The data source used in this paper is the “Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University(Kurashi no Konomi to Manzokudo ni tsuite no Chousa),” a panel survey of households that was
conducted concurrently in 4 countries (China, India, Japan, and the United States) by the 21stCentury Center of Excellent Program “Behavioral Macrodynamics based on Surveys andExperiments” (2003-2008) and the Global Center of Excellence Program “Human Behavior andSocioeconomic Dynamics” (2008-2013) of Osaka University. The Japanese survey surveyed anationwide random sample of individuals of both sexes aged 20 to 69 every year from 2003 until
2013. We use data from the 2011 wave of the Japanese survey (except that data on the
CHILDALTRUISM variable are taken from the 2010 wave of the same survey because it was notincluded in the 2011 wave) because this wave collected the most extensive information on
respondents’ care of, and attention to, their elderly parents. The sample size varies from year toyear but was 4934 in 2011.

14

This survey collects extensive information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent,
his/her spouse, his/her parents, his/her children, and the household as a whole, on care andattention provided by children to their parents (as measured by co-residence, living nearby,
providing help with housework, etc.), on intergenerational transfers (bequests as well as intervivos transfers), on various preference parameters such as those relating to altruism, risk aversion,
time preference, and externalities, etc., so it is ideally suited to the objective of this paper.
The sample selection criteria we used are as follows:(1) We dropped all observations for which there were missing values for at least one of thevariables used in the estimations.
(2) Since it is possible for children to provide care or attention to their parents only if at least one
parent is alive, we dropped all observations for which neither parent is alive.
(3) Since children are unlikely to provide care to their parents if their parents are young andhealthy, we dropped all observations for which both parents are less than 60 years of age.
(4) Since our theoretical model applies only to those with at least one sibling (since those with nosiblings do not need to compete against their siblings for their parents’ wealth), we dropped
all observations for respondents who have no siblings (i.e., who are only children). However,
we also did the estimations for the sample of respondents with no siblings (respondents who
are only children) for comparison purposes although we had to drop explanatory variables
with insignificant coefficients in this case due to the small sample size.
Since the care decision is likely to be very different for sons and daughters in Japan where thesocial norm is for sons (especially the eldest son) to live with, and take care of, their parents, we
did the estimations not only for the full sample but also for the male sample and the female sample.

6. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the variables to be used in our econometric analysis for the sample with
one or more siblings are shown in Table 1, and as can be seen from this table, 24.0% of
respondents live with their elderly parents, 43.6% live near their elderly parents, 25.9% help theirelderly parents with housework, and (though not shown in Table 1) 18.9% provide financial
assistance to their elderly parents. Thus, it can be seen that a substantial proportion of Japaneseprovide some form of care or attention to their elderly parents.

15

Table 2 shows the impact of bequest expectations on parental care and attention, and as can beseen from this table, respondents are far more likely to provide care and attention to their parents
if they expect to receive bequests (or inter vivos transfers) from them, with the difference being
especially large in the case of co-residence and help with housework. For example, in the case ofboth sexes, only 17.75% of respondents live with their elderly parents if they do not expect toreceive bequests from them whereas a full 30.60% live with their elderly parents if they do expect
to receive bequests from them. Similarly, only 20.47% of respondents help their elderly parents
with housework if they do not expect to receive bequests from them whereas a full 31.61% help
their parents with housework if they do expect to receive bequests from them. This strongly
suggests that the strategic bequest (exchange) motive applies in the case of Japan and that children
provide care and attention to their parents in order to increase their share of their parents’ bequest.

7. Estimation Results
We present the estimation results in this section. Tables 3-5 present the results for those with one
or more siblings whereas Tables 6-8 present the results for those with no siblings (only children).
In both cases, the first table shows the results for the full sample (both sexes), the second tableshows the results for the male sample, and the third table shows the results for the female sample.
The estimation results are highly satisfactory, in general, as the model’s goodness of fit measures
show that the percent correctly predicted by the model (with the classification threshold forprediction set to 0.5) ranges from 60.70 to 82.90% in Tables 3-5 and from 65.45 to 80.43% in
Tables 6-8, respectively, for various regressions. Similarly, the McFadden’s and maximum
likelihood pseudo R-squareds range from 0.12 to 0.19 and from 0.14 to 0.16, respectively, inTables 3-5 and from 0.12 to 0.26 and from 0.15 to 0.30, respectively, in Tables 6-8 in the case of
the CORESIDE equation, which is very respectable in regressions based on cross-section micro
data. Moreover, visual inspection of the randomized quantile residuals (not shown in the paper
due to space limitations) show no pattern and their normal Q-Q plots (also not shown in the paper)show no deviation from normality. We also calculated vector inflation factors (VIFs) for all
variables used in the regressions (also not shown in the paper) to test for the presence ofmulticollinearity and found that they were less than 2 and usually close to 1 except in the case of
MALE and ELDESTSON and that it was less than 3 even in this case, indicating the absence ofmulticollinearity.

16

7.1. Estimation Results for Those with One or More Siblings
We first look at the estimation results for the sample of respondents with one or more siblings,
which are shown in Tables 3-5. As can be seen from these results, the coefficient of BEQEXP ispositive and significant in all 3 equations (except that it is insignificant in the case of the NEARBY
equation for females), indicating that those expecting to receive bequests from their elderly
parents are more likely to live with or near them and to help them with housework. These results
are fully consistent with the results shown in Table 2 (discussed in the previous section) andstrongly suggest that the strategic bequest (exchange) motive applies in the case of Japan and thatchildren provide care and attention to their parents in order to extract a larger bequest from them.
The coefficient of NSIB is not significant in any of the 3 equations in the sample with one or moresiblings even though our theoretical model predicts a positive impact. However, this result iseasily explicable if the two effects discussed in section 5 offset one another completely.
Looking next at the impact of children’s altruism toward their parents, the coefficient of
CHILDALTRUISM is always positive and significant in the case of the CORESIDE equation,never significant in the case of the NEARBY equation, and positive and significant in 2 out of 3
cases in the case of the HOUSEWORK equation. Thus, altruistic respondents are more likely tolive with their elderly parents and to help them with housework but are not necessarily more likely
to live near them. This suggests that individuals provide care and attention to their elderly parents
partly because they harbor feelings of altruism towards them.
Turning to the impact of variables relating to social norms, the coefficient of ELDESTSON is
positive and significant in the CORESIDE and HOUSEWORK equations and insignificant in the
NEARBY equation for the full and male samples, indicating that respondents who are eldest sonsare more likely to live with their elderly parents and to help their elderly parents with housework,
which is consistent with Japanese social norms, as discussed in section 5, but neither more nor
less likely to live near their elderly parents.
Similarly, the coefficient of NOBROTHERS is positive and significant in the CORESIDEequation and insignificant in the NEARBY and HOUSEWORK equations for the female sample,
indicating that female respondents who have no brothers are more likely to live with their elderly
parents, which is consistent with Japanese social norms, as discussed in section 5, but neither
more nor less likely to live near their elderly parents or to help them with housework.

17

The coefficient of MALE is insignificant in the CORESIDE and NEARBY equations and negativeand significant in the HOUSEWORK equation for the full sample, indicating that male
respondents are less likely to help their elderly parents with housework. This is contrary to our apriori expectation discussed in section 5 but can be explained by the fact that females are typicallymore adept at housework than males.
Turning to the impact of religiosity, the coefficient of RELIGIOSITY is insignificant in the
CORESIDE and HOUSEWORK equations and negative and significant in the NEARBY equation,
indicating that respondents who are more religious are less likely to live near their elderly parents.
The latter result is contrary to our a priori expectation discussed in section 5 for reasons that are
not clear. One possibility is that the parents of religious individuals also tend to be religious andthat religious parents are less likely to threaten their children with disinheritance as a way of
inducing them to provide care and attention and/or that they are more likely to strive for selfsufficiency so that they do not impose a burden on their children.
Turning to the impact of the other control variables, the coefficient of BOTHALIVE is negativeand significant in the CORESIDE equation, positive and significant in the NEARBY equation,and insignificant in the HOUSEWORK equation, indicating that respondents are less likely to livewith their elderly parents but more likely to live near their elderly parents (and neither more nor
less likely to help their elderly parents with housework) if both of their elderly parents are alive.
These results are consistent with the explanation we gave in section 5.
The coefficient of AGEPARENT is negative and significant in all 3 equations for the full andfemale samples, indicating that respondents are less likely to live with their elderly parents, live
near their elderly parents, and help their elderly parents with housework the older their parents
are but is negative and significant only in the CORESIDE equation for the male sample. This
result is contrary to our a priori expectation given in section 5, but it could arise because wealready control for whether or not the respondent’s parents require care, meaning that thecoefficient of AGEPARENT is picking up the impact of parental age excluding its impact via thelikelihood of requiring care.
The coefficient of REQCARE is positive and significant, as expected, in the CORESIDE equationin 2 out of 3 cases but insignificant in the NEARBY and HOUSEWORK equations, indicatingthat respondents are more likely to live with their elderly parents, as expected, but neither more
nor less likely to live near them or to help them with housework if their elderly parents require
care.
18

The coefficient of BOTHREQCARE is not significant in any of the 3 equations, presumably
because the two effects discussed in section 5 offset one another completely.
The coefficient of WORK is not significant in any of the 3 equations, indicating that respondents
who are working are not any more or less likely to live with their elderly parents, live near theirelderly parents, or help their elderly parents with housework.
The coefficient of COLLEGE is negative and significant in all cases in the CORESIDE equation,negative and significant in 2 out of 3 cases in the NEARBY equation, and insignificant in all casesin the HOUSEWORK equation, indicating that respondents who are college graduates are lesslikely to live with or near their parents. This result is consistent with our a priori expectation
discussed in section 5 since the cost of providing care to parents in the form of foregone earnings
is greater in the case of better educated individuals.
The coefficient of MARRIED is always negative and significant in the CORESIDE and
HOUSEWORK equations and positive and significant in 2 out of 3 cases in the NEARBY
equation, indicating that married respondents are less likely to live with their elderly parents andto help their elderly parents with housework but more likely to live near their elderly parents.
Since the impact of marriage is ambiguous, as discussed in section 5, it is not surprising that we
obtain mixed results.

7.2. Estimation Results for Those with No Siblings
We now turn to the estimation results for the sample of respondents with no siblings (onlychildren), which are shown in Tables 6-8. As can be seen from these results, the coefficient of
BEQEXP is not significant in any of the 3 equations, unlike in the case of the sample ofrespondents with one or more siblings, except that it is positive and significant in the NEARBY
equation for the female sample. This is not surprising because our theoretical model does not
apply to those with no siblings, who have no need to compete with their siblings for a greater
share of their parents’ assets. To put it another way, if they are selfish, only children will not feelthe need to provide care and attention to their parents even if they expect to receive bequests fromthem because they know that they will be able to receive all of their parents’ assets whether or notthey provide care and attention to them. The fact that the coefficient of BEQEXP is dramaticallydifferent in the sample with one or more siblings and the sample with no siblings is strong
evidence in favor of our theoretical model.
19

Looking next at the impact of children’s altruism toward their parents, the coefficient of
CHILDALTRUISM is positive and significant in 1 out of 3 cases in the CORESIDE equation andin all cases in the NEARBY equation but insignificant in all cases in the HOUSEWORK equation,
indicating that altruistic respondents are more likely to live near their elderly parents and perhaps
to live with their elderly parents but not to help their elderly parents with housework.

These

results contrast with the results for the sample of respondents with one or more siblings, whichshowed that the coefficient of CHILDALTRUISM is positive and significant in the CORESIDEand HOUSEWORK equations but not in the NEARBY equation. However, the 2 sets of results
are mutually consistent in the sense that they show that individuals with a strong sense of altruism
toward their parents are more likely to provide care and attention of one kind or another to theirelderly parents.
We could not include the variables relating to social norms in the regression equation in the caseof the sample of respondents with no siblings because they require the presence of 1 or moresiblings.
Turning to the impact of religiosity, the coefficient of RELIGIOSITY was not significant in the
CORESIDE and HOUSEWORK equations and was significant with the wrong sign (negative) in
the NEARBY equation in the case of the sample of respondents with one or more siblings, but it
is now positive and significant in 2 out of 3 cases in the CORESIDE and NEARBY equations andinsignificant in all cases in the HOUSEWORK equation, indicating that religious respondents are
more likely to live with or near their elderly parents, as expected.
Turning to the impact of the other control variables and focusing on the ones that have significant
coefficients, the coefficient of BOTHALIVE is negative and significant in the CORESIDEequation and positive and significant in the NEARBY equation (except for the female sample), as
in the case of the sample of respondents with one or more siblings.
The coefficient of WORK was never significant in the sample of respondents with one or moresiblings, but it is now positive and significant in the NEARBY and HOUSEWORK equations(except for the male sample), contrary to expectation, and always insignificant in the CORESIDEequation for reasons that are not clear.
Finally, the coefficient of MARRIED is negative and significant in 2 out of 3 cases in the
CORESIDE equation, positive and significant in all cases in the NEARBY equation, and negativeand significant in 2 out of 3 cases in the HOUSEWORK equation, and thus the results are broadly
consistent with the results for the sample of respondents with one or more siblings.
20

7.3. Estimation Results for Our Analysis of Respondents’ Co-residence Behavior with Their
Children
Whereas we have thus far examined the determinants of whether or not respondents live with (ornear) their elderly parents and/or provide care and attention to them, we also conducted an analysisof the determinants of whether or not elderly respondents live with their children and found thatelderly respondents planning to leave bequests are significantly more likely to live with theirchildren than elderly respondents not planning to leave bequests (these results are not shown due
to space limitations but are available from the authors upon request). These results constitutefurther corroboration of our finding that care behavior in Japan is motivated by strategic
considerations and that the strategic bequest (exchange) motive applies in the case of Japan.

8. Conclusions
In this paper, we test a two-period strategic-interactions overlapping generations model withendogenous saving and a “contest success function” of why individuals provide care and attention
to their elderly parents using a using micro data from a Japanese household survey, the Osaka
University Preference Parameter Study. To summarize our main findings, we found that theJapanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide care andattention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong support
for the selfish bequest (exchange) motive, but we found that their caregiving behavior is alsoheavily influenced by the strength of their altruism towards their parents and social norms. Ourfindings are broadly consistent with previous studies for Japan, which find that the strategic
bequest (exchange) motive applies in Japan (much more so than in the United States) and showthat the finding of previous studies holds up even if we consider a broader range of care/attention
variables, use direct data on bequest expectations, and control for other variables such as thestrength of children’s altruism toward their parents, social norms, and religiosity.
Turning to the implications of our findings, our finding that individuals are more likely to provide
care and attention to their parents if they expect to receive bequests from them suggests that they
are selfishly motivated in their interactions with their parents although this does not preclude thepossibility that parents are (at least partly) altruistically motivated in their interactions with theirchildren (as assumed in our theoretical model). Another implication of our findings is that parents
who are willing and able to leave large bequests to their children can induce their children toprovide care and attention, but conversely, that parents who are either unwilling or unable to leave21

large bequests to their children will not be able to induce their children to provide care andattention. This, in turn, implies that poor parents will require public assistance with care during
old age because they will not have enough assets to hire third parties to provide care or to induce
their own children to provide care. Japanese social norms will alleviate these problems to someextent because they will induce individuals to provide care and attention to their parents even if
they do not expect to receive large bequests from their parents, but the need for public long-termcare insurance will increase over time to the extent that social norms weaken over time.
Most societies have various obstacles that interfere with leaving bequests, making exchanges
within families, providing informal (family) care of the elderly, and preserving social norms. One
example of such an obstacle is Japan’s public long-term care insurance system, which, unlike
Germany’s system, covers care provided by professional care workers but not care provided byfamily members (i.e., there is no provision for cash benefits for within-family care). The
government should remove all such obstacles to intergenerational exchanges that facilitate elderly
care since this will help societies to deal with the problems of population aging and elderly care
and alleviate the strain on public resources that otherwise might be used as a substitute for private
care.

22

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25

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Sample with 1 or More Siblings
Variable name
Mean
Std. dev.
Minimum
Maximum
No. of obs.
CARE1
0.24000.4270
0
1
1639
CARE2
0.43600.4960
0
1
1639
CARE3
0.25900.4380011639
BEQEXP
0.484
0.500
0
1
1639
NSIB
1.698
0.883
1
7
1639
CHILDALTRUISM
0.0846
0.069200.25
1639
ELDESTSON
0.328
0.469
0
1
1639
NOBROTHERS
0.353
0.478
0
1
883
MALE
0.461
0.499
0
1
1639
RELIGIOSITY
1.593
0.975
1
5
1639
BOTHALIVE
0.47500.5000
0
1
1639
AGEPARENT
76.23
8.74
60
99
1639
REQCARE
0.21
0.41
0
1
1639
BOTHREQCARE
0.06830.2524
0
1
1639
WORK
0.81700.3868011639
COLLEGE
0.49100.50000
1
1639
MARRIED0.84620.360801
1639
Notes: Refer to the main text for variable definitions. The NOBROTHERS variable was used only in the female
sample.
Data source: The Osaka University Preference Parameter Study for Japan, 2011 wave except that the data on
CHILDALTRUISM were taken from the 2010 wave.

26

Table 2: Impact of Bequest Expectations on Parental Care/Attention
Type of care/attention
Respondents not
Respondents
Full sample
Sample size
expecting bequests
expecting bequests
Both sexes
Co-reside
17.75
30.60
23.98
1639
Live nearby
40.71
46.60
43.56
1639
Help with housework
20.47
31.61
25.87
1639
Males
Co-reside
26.40
35.94
31.88
756
Live nearby
36.34
44.47
41.01
756
Help with housework
19.25
29.03
24.87
756
Females
Co-reside
12.43
24.17
17.21
883
Live nearby
43.40
49.17
45.75
883
Help with housework
21.22
34.72
26.73
883
Notes: The figures show the proportion of respondents providing each type of care/attention to their parents(in percent). The figures are for the sample with 1 or more siblings.
Data source: The Osaka University Preference Parameter Study for Japan, 2011 wave.

27

Table 3: Determinants of Care and Attention (Both Sexes, 1 or More Siblings)
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable
CORESIDE
NEARBY
HOUSEWORKBEQEXP
0.0968 ***0.0675 ***0.1041 ***(4.7131)(2.6638)(4.6386)
NSIB-0.0024-0.0025
0.0086(-0.2064)(-0.1683)(0.6678)
CHILDALTRUISM
0.5976 ***-0.28650.4589 ***(4.5085)(-1.6017)(3.0726)
ELDESTSON
0.1460 ***-0.0528
0.0980 **(4.0844)(-1.3066)(2.5715)MALE
0.0175-0.0065-0.1033 ***(0.5634)(-0.1710)(-3.1420)
RELIGIOSITY
0.0045-0.0335 ***0.0037(0.4654)(-2.6655)(0.3391)
BOTHALIVE-0.0898 ***0.1386 ***0.0374(-4.3532)(5.0786)(1.5970)
AGEPARENT-0.0054 ***-0.0035 **-0.0031 **(-4.0514)(-2.1027)(-2.1477)
REQCARE
0.0700 **-0.00220.0532(2.1821)(-0.0574)(1.4720)BOTHREQCARE-0.0599-0.0278-0.0126(-1.5757)(-0.4823)(-0.2584)
WORK
0.00250.0113-0.0036(0.0947)(0.3345)(-0.1217)
COLLEGE-0.0796 ***-0.0498 **-0.0332(-3.9900)(-2.0004)(-1.5073)
MARRIED-0.3034 ***0.0557 *-0.2160 ***(-9.0574)(1.7134)(-6.4761)
Number of observations
1639
1639
1639
Goodness of fit measures of the fitted probit
model
Percent correctly predicted
78.22%
60.70%
75.05%
Log likelihood value of the model-757.03-1082.00-878.02
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared
0.16
0.04
0.06
Maximum likelihood pseudo R-squared
0.16
0.05
0.07
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. The upper figures denote marginal effects, which are calculated
from average partial effects; the lower figures in parentheses denote z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significancelevels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The classification threshold for prediction is set to 0.5.
Data source: The Osaka University Preference Parameter Study for Japan, 2011 wave.

28

Table 4: Determinants of Care and Attention (Males, 1 or More Siblings)
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable
CORESIDE
NEARBY
HOUSEWORKBEQEXP
0.0819 **0.0986 ***0.0838 ***(2.4719)(2.6397)(2.5867)
NSIB
0.00680.02650.0249(0.3284)(1.1703)(1.3530)
CHILDALTRUISM
0.5791 ***-0.21620.2022(2.8524)(-0.9076)(1.0296)
ELDESTSON
0.1728 ***-0.0497
0.1062 ***(5.1615)(-1.1783)(3.2582)
RELIGIOSITY
0.0138-0.0386 **0.0087(0.8138)(-1.9845)(0.5159)
BOTHALIVE-0.0978 ***0.1058 ***0.0286(-2.7597)(2.6122)(0.7995)
AGEPARENT-0.0041 *-0.0032-0.0011(-1.8289)(-1.2927)(-0.5117)
REQCARE
0.04960.00140.0491(0.9996)(0.0243)(0.9841)
BOTHREQCARE-0.0503-0.0223-0.0174(-0.7006)(-0.2548)(-0.2420)
WORK-0.0351-0.1116-0.0079(-0.5256)(-1.3642)(-0.1135)
COLLEGE-0.1261 ***-0.0183-0.0407(-3.7901)(-0.4905)(-1.2277)
MARRIED-0.2877 ***0.0431-0.2700 ***(-5.3421)(0.8745)(-5.0065)
Number of observations
756
756
756
Goodness of fit measures of the fitted probit
model
Percent correctly predicted
71.69%
61.24%
74.07%
Log likelihood value of the model-416.23-497.36-393.10
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared
0.12
0.03
0.07
Maximum likelihood pseudo R-squared
0.14
0.04
0.08
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. The upper figures denote marginal effects, which are calculated
from average partial effects; the lower figures in parentheses denote z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significancelevels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The classification threshold for prediction is set to 0.5.
Data source: The Osaka University Preference Parameter Study for Japan, 2011 wave.

29

Table 5: Determinants of Care and Attention (Females, 1 or More Siblings)
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable
CORESIDE
NEARBY
HOUSEWORKBEQEXP
0.0957 ***0.04590.1168 ***(3.9270)(1.3266)(3.7659)
NSIB-0.0036-0.0298-0.0051(-0.2522)(-1.4897)(-0.2590)
CHILDALTRUISM
0.6009 ***-0.4092
0.7259 ***(3.5284)(-1.4831)(3.2288)
NOBROTHERS
0.0599 **0.00470.0136(2.3372)(0.1312)(0.4300)
RELIGIOSITY-0.0005-0.0291 *0.0020(-0.0455)(-1.7731)(0.1380)
BOTHALIVE-0.0777 ***0.1681 ***0.0495(-3.2792)(4.5590)(1.6001)
AGEPARENT-0.0065 ***-0.0045 **-0.0045 **(-4.0321)(-1.9912)(-2.2652)
REQCARE
0.0804 *-0.0079
0.0474(1.9095)(-0.1538)(0.9201)
BOTHREQCARE-0.0614-0.0260-0.0035(-1.5516)(-0.3418)(-0.0535)
WORK
0.00610.03690.0034(0.2306)(0.9968)(0.1022)
COLLEGE-0.0461 *-0.0793 **-0.0291(-1.9129)(-2.3636)(-0.9838)
MARRIED-0.3113 ***0.0802 *-0.1747 ***(-7.2623)(1.8518)(-4.1144)
Number of observations
883
883
883
Goodness of fit measures of the fitted probit
model
Percent correctly predicted
82.90%
61.27%
75.20%
Log likelihood value of the model-330.15-578.05-479.09
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared
0.19
0.05
0.07
Maximum likelihood pseudo R-squared
0.16
0.07
0.07
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. The upper figures denote marginal effects, which are calculated
from average partial effects; the lower figures in parentheses denote z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significancelevels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The classification threshold for prediction is set to 0.5.
Data source: The Osaka University Preference Parameter Study for Japan, 2011 wave.

30

Table 6: Determinants of Care and Attention (Both Sexes, No Siblings)
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable
CORESIDE
NEARBY
HOUSEWORKBEQEXP
0.01500.02040.0567(0.1729)(0.2043)(0.5926)
CHILDALTRUISM
0.82132.1800 ***0.9211(1.2916)(3.2046)(1.2356)MALE-0.0006-0.0866-0.1229(-0.0061)(-0.9237)(-1.2504)
RELIGIOSITY
0.0645 *0.0763 *0.0075(1.8337)(1.9215)(0.1629)
BOTHALIVE-0.1984 **0.2275 **0.1686(-2.0661)(2.3281)(1.5864)AGEPARENT
0.00470.00290.0055(0.7181)(0.4140)(0.7833)
REQCARE-0.0711-0.12170.0024(-0.7440)(-0.9623)(0.0191)
BOTHREQCARE
0.3978 **0.21990.0639(2.1764)(1.3179)(0.2694)
WORK
0.15580.2537 **0.2727 ***(1.6134)(2.2099)(2.8877)
COLLEGE-0.0237-0.1212-0.1275(-0.2763)(-1.3494)(-1.4825)
MARRIED-0.4593 ***0.2292 **-0.2572 *(-3.9391)(2.2977)(-1.9112)
Number of observations
101
101
101
Goodness of fit measures of the fitted probit
model
Percent correctly predicted
68.32%
72.28%
68.32%
Log likelihood value of the model-53.83-56.46-58.12
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared
0.20
0.18
0.14
Maximum likelihood pseudo R-squared
0.24
0.22
0.17
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. The upper figures denote marginal effects, which are calculated
from average partial effects; the lower figures in parentheses denote z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significancelevels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The classification threshold for prediction is set to 0.5.
Data source: The Osaka University Preference Parameter Study for Japan, 2011 wave.

31

Table 7: Determinants of Care and Attention (Males, No Siblings)
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable
CORESIDE
NEARBY
HOUSEWORKBEQEXP
0.1309-0.15990.0905(0.9706)(-1.4369)(0.6568)
CHILDALTRUISM
0.69461.4808 **0.8456(0.7351)(2.4018)(0.7372)
RELIGIOSITY
0.03400.1284 **0.0135(0.7609)(2.5457)(0.2449)
BOTHALIVE-0.2743 **0.3373 ***0.2702 *(-2.1013)(2.8878)(1.9212)
WORK-0.0758-0.0026
0.0266(-0.3481)(-0.0118)(0.1589)
MARRIED-0.2661
0.4632 ***-0.0177(-0.8720)(7.3696)(-0.0823)
Number of observations
46
46
46
Goodness of fit measures of the fitted probit
model
Percent correctly predicted
73.91%
80.43%
73.91%
Log likelihood value of the model-26.09-21.41-26.49McFadden’s pseudo R-squared
0.12
0.32
0.09
Maximum likelihood pseudo R-squared
0.15
0.35
0.11
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. The upper figures denote marginal effects, which are calculated
from average partial effects; the lower figures in parentheses denote z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significancelevels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The classification threshold for prediction is set to 0.5.
Data source: The Osaka University Preference Parameter Study for Japan, 2011 wave.

32

Table 8: Determinants of Care and Attention (Females, No Siblings)
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable
CORESIDE
NEARBY
HOUSEWORKBEQEXP-0.10270.2561 **0.0510(-0.7796)(2.1255)(0.3911)
CHILDALTRUISM
2.0044 **1.9199 *0.8202(2.2827)(1.9507)(0.9033)
RELIGIOSITY
0.1067 **0.0265-0.0057(2.1325)(0.3778)(-0.0768)
BOTHALIVE-0.1080
0.0651-0.0470(-0.8801)(0.5100)(-0.4018)
WORK
0.1317
0.3354 ***0.3401 **(0.8862)(2.8863)(2.3997)
MARRIED-0.4508 ***0.2191 *-0.2994 **(-3.6695)(1.8403)(-2.0157)
Number of observations
55
55
55
Goodness of fit measures of the fitted probit
model
Percent correctly predicted
74.55%
65.45%
69.09%
Log likelihood value of the model-27.65-31.61-30.98
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared
0.26
0.15
0.18
Maximum likelihood pseudo R-squared
0.30
0.19
0.22
Notes: The regressions are estimated using probit. The upper figures denote marginal effects, which are calculated
from average partial effects; the lower figures in parentheses denote z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significancelevels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The classification threshold for prediction is set to 0.5.
Data source: The Osaka University Preference Parameter Study for Japan, 2011 wave.

33

Endnotesi

The implications of this result are far-reaching and can be extended to obtain neutrality withrespect to public redistributions, distortionary taxes, and market prices (Bernheim and Bagwell,1988).
ii

Angelini (2009) replicates Bernheim, et al.’s (1985) study for eleven European countries using

data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and finds thatparental wealth (total wealth and real wealth but not financial wealth) has a positive andsignificant impact on the frequency of contact, which is consistent with the strategic bequest(exchange) motive.
iii

Niimi (2015) finds empirical support for the strategic bequest (exchange) motive using anentirely different approach. She finds that having to provide care to their parents lowers the
subjective well-being of unmarried children in Japan but that the negative impact of parental careon their subjective well-being is significantly reduced if they receive inter vivos transfers fromtheir parents.

34