Conference Papers
The Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue
International Order in the 21st Century
and the Security of Maritime Asia
July, 12, 2016
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA)
Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS)
Western Sydney University
Under the Auspices of
Headquarters of International Collaboration, Meiji University

Table of Contents
1. Program ................................................................................................................... 1
2．Biographies of the Panelists .................................................................................. 3
3．Presentation Papers ................................................................................................ 6
Session I: The Security of Maritime Asia from a Global Perspective
ITO Go, Academic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji University .................... 6
NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh, Vice Dean, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam) ...................... 7
SATO Koichi, Professor, College of Liberal Arts, J. F. Oberlin University.................................. 9
YOU Ji, Professor, University of Macau (China)......................................................................... 11
SHOJI Tomotaka, Head, America, Europe, and Russia Division, Regional Studies Dept.,
National Institute for Defence Studies ......................................................... 14
Hikmahanto JUWANA, Professor, University of Indonesia (Indonesia) ................................... 18

Session II: How to Maintain Maritime Asia Open, Free and PeacefulDavid WALTON, Senior Lecturer, Western Sydney University (Australia) ................................... 20
YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Department of Maritime Civilizations, Tokai University ........... 20
Pham Quang MINH, Rector, Univ. of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National
University-Hanoi (Vietnam) ....................................................................... 22
ASANO Ryo, Professor, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University ....................................................... 22
Virginia Bacay WATSON, Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (USA & The
Philippines) ................................................................................................. 22

4．Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations ........................... 24(1) The Global Forum of Japan ........................................................................................................... 24(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations ............................................................................... 25(3) Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) .................................................................................... 26(4) Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS) ............................................................. 26(5) Western Sydney University ............................................................................................................ 27

1. Program
日・アジア太平洋対話
Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue----------------------------------------------------------------------------------「21 世紀の国際秩序とアジアの海」
International Order in the 21st Century and the Security of Maritime Asia
2016 年 7 月 12 日／July 12, 2016
明治大学グローバルフロント「グローバルホール」／ "Global Hall", Global Front, Meiji University
共催／Co-sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム ／ The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
明治大学国際総合研究所・国際政策研究所 ／ Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA)／
Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS) /西シドニー大学／ Western Sydney University
後援／Under the Auspice of
明治大学国際連携本部／ Headquarters of International Collaboration, Meiji University

開会セッション ／ Opening Session

13:00-13:30
開会挨拶（5 分間）
Opening Remark (5 min.)伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人／日本国際フォーラム理事長
ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR

基調講演（20 分間）
Keynote Speech (20 min.)中谷
元 防衛大臣NAKATANI Gen, Minister of Defense

セッションⅠ／ Session I
13:30-14:50

グローバルな視座からみたアジアの領土海洋問題
The Security of Maritime Asia from a Global Perspective

議長
Chairperson

伊藤 剛 グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人／明治大学国際政策研究所長・教授
ITO Go, Academic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji University

報告 A （8 分間）
Lead Discussant A (8min.)

グエン・ティ・ラン・アン ベトナム外交学院南シナ海研究所副所長（ベトナム）NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh, Vice Dean, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam)

報告 B （8 分間）
Lead Discussant B (8min.)佐藤 考一 桜美林大学リベラルアーツ学群教授
SATO Koichi, Professor, College of Liberal Arts, J. F. Oberlin University

報告 C （8 分間）
Lead Discussant C (8min.)

由 冀 澳門大学教授（中国）YOU Ji, Professor, University of Macau (China)

報告 D （8 分間）
Lead Discussant D (8min.)

庄司 智孝 防衛省防衛研究所地域研究部米欧ロシア研究室長
SHOJI Tomotaka, Head, America, Europe, and Russia Division, Regional Studies Dept.,
National Institute for Defence Studies

報告 E （8 分間）
Lead Discussant E (8min.)ヒクマハント・ジュワナ インドネシア大学教授（インドネシア）
Hikmahanto JUWANA, Professor, University of Indonesia (Indonesia)

自由討議 （40 分）
Free Discussions (40 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

14:50-15:00

休憩／Break1

セッションⅡ／ Session Ⅱ
15:00-16:30

開かれた自由で平和なアジアの海を維持するために
How to Maintain Maritime Asia Open, Free and Peaceful

議長
Chairperson

デビッド・ウォルトン 西シドニー大学准教授（豪州）David WALTON, Senior Lecturer, Western Sydney University (Australia)

報告 A （8 分間）
Lead Discussant A (8min.)

山田 吉彦 東海大学海洋学部教授
YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Department of Maritime Civilizations, Tokai University

報告 B （8 分間）
Lead Discussant B (8min.)ファン・カン・ミン ハノイ国家大学人文社会科学院院長（ベトナム）
Pham Quang MINH, Rector, Univ. of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University-Hanoi (Vietnam)

報告 C （8 分間）
Lead Discussant C (8min.)浅野 亮 同志社大学法学部教授
ASANO Ryo, Professor, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University

報告 D （8 分間）
Lead Discussant D (8min.)ヴァージニア・ワトソン アジア太平洋安全保障センター教授（米国・フィリピン）Virginia Bacay WATSON, Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (USA & The
Philippines)

報告 E （8 分間）
Lead Discussant E (8min.)鈴木 健人 明治大学准教授
SUZUKI Taketo, Associate Professor, Meiji University

自由討議 （50 分）
Free Discussions (50 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

総括セッション／ Wrap-up Session
16:30-16:50
デビッド・ウォルトン
総括 （20 分間）
Wrap-up (20 min.)

西シドニー大学准教授（豪州）David WALTON, Senior Lecturer, Western Sydney University (Australia)
伊藤 剛 グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人／明治大学国際政策研究所長・教授
ITO Go, Academic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji University[NOTE］日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2

2．Biographies of the Panelists【Asia-Pacific Side】
NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh

Vice Dean, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam)

Received a B.A. in Law from Hanoi Law University in 1998, a B.A. in International Relations from the
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 1999, and a LLM. in International, European and Commercial Law
from the University of Sheffield in 2004. Obtained a Ph.D. in International Law from the University ofBristol in 2008. Currently, serves as the Vice Dean of the Faculty of International Law, where she hastaught since 2000. At the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, teaches courses of Public International Law,
International Law of the Sea and International Dispute Settlement. Also serves as Deputy Director
General of the Institute for South China Sea Studies of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.

YOU Ji

Professor, University of Macau (China)

You Ji (B.A.,Peking University and PhD from ANU) is professor of international relations and head of
Department of Government, University of Macau. He authored four books, including China’s MilitaryTransformation (2015); The Armed Forces of China (1998) and China’s Enterprise Reform (1997). His papers
appear in journals such as Problem of Communism, The International Journal of Korea Unification Studies; The
China Journal; The Pacific Review; Comparative Strategy; Japanese Studies; Contemporary Southeast Asia; The
Naval War College Review; Strategic Analysis; China Information; Journal of Contemporary China; Issues &Studies; Contemporary Security Policy. Among his latest papers are “China’s Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Asian
Policy, No. 22, July, 2016; “China’s National Security Council: Evolution, Rationality and Operations”,
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No. 96, 2016; “China’s civil-military strategy for the South China Sea
dispute control”, East Asian Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2015.

Hikmahanto JUWANA

Professor, University of Indonesia (Indonesia)

Hikmahanto Juwana is a Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law and International Relations Department
of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Indonesia, where he has lectured since 1988.
Hikmahanto earned his LL.B from the Faculty of Law Universitas Indonesia (1987), LL.M from Keio
University, Japan (1992) and Ph.D from University of Nottingham, UK (1997). He was appointed as Deanat the Faculty of Law Universitas Indonesia (2004-2008). He has assisted the Indonesia Government as
non-permanent advisors to various ministers, inclunding Attorney General Office, Minister of Defense,
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Minister of Trade, Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is also a
regular resource person for the House of People’s Representative (DPR) and the House of Regional
Representative (DPD).

David WALTON

Senior Lecturer, Western Sydney University (Australia)

Received Ph.D. from the University of Queensland. Conducted research in the field of diplomatic history,
foreign policy, and Australia-Japan post-war relations. Taught at Griffith University, University of
Tasmania, and Western Sydney University since 1995. Publications include New Approaches to Human
Security in the Asia Pacific: China, Japan and Australia co-edited with William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten(Ashgate, 2013) and Power Transition In Asia co-edited with Emilian Kavalski (Routledge, in print).
Served as a Japan Foundation Fellow, School of Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo 2014 andVisiting Professor at Meiji University in 2015.

3

Pham Quang MINH

Rector, Univ. of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University-Hanoi (Vietnam)

Pham Quang Minh is associate professor of history and politics at the University of Social Sciences andHumanities (USSH), Vietnam National University-Hanoi. After receiving his PhD in Southeast Asianstudies from Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany in 2002, he became deputy dean, and then dean ofInternational Studies Faculty. Since 2012 he was promoted to vice rector for research affairs andpost-graduated programs of USSH, VNU-Hanoi. Since 1 January 2016 Pham Quang Minh was promoted
to the position of Rector of USSH, VNU-Hanoi. He was visiting professor to Pomona College (California),
SciencePo (France), Waseda University (Japan), Chulalongkorn University (Thailand) and some others.
His main teaching and research interests, among the other things, are world politics, international
relations of Asia-Pacific, and Vietnam’s foreign policy. His most recent publications appeared in JournalInternational Relations of the Asia-Pacific (Oxford University Press), Journal of Vietnamese Studies (The
University of California Press), Asia Europe Journal, Asia-Pacific Review, H-Diplo, and East Asia Forum.

Virginia Bacay WATSON

Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies(USA & The Philippines)

Joined the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies as Assistant Professor in July, 2004.

Her areas ofinterest include science, technology and security in the Asia-Pacific region, water security, and Southeast
Asia geopolitics. Held appointments at the University of Denver and Colorado School of Mines, andserved as an exchange faculty for the University of Colorado in Beijing, China, as well as a consultant forvarious organizations. Taught cources of science and technology issues in Asia, renewable energy
technology, Southeast Asia, and international politics and security. Currently working on “Governance in
Asia: Issues in Emerging Technologies” and editing “Science, Technology and Security: Issues of Concern
Now and Ahead.”【Japanese Side】

ITO Kenichi

Chairman & President, GFJ / President, JFIR

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS
of Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as
Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS
(1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He has been
President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 and now
concurrently serves as Chairman of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus
and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.

NAKATANI Gen

Minister of Defense

Graduated from National Defense Academy of Japan in 1980. Retired from the Ground Self-Defense Forcein 1984. Served as Secretary to Mr. KATO Koichi, Member of the House of Representatives (Minister ofState for Defense) in 1985, to Mr. IMAI Isamu, Member of the House of Representatives (Minister of
Health and Welfare) in 1985, and to Mr. MIYAZAWA Kiichi, Member of the House of Representatives(Minister of Finance) in 1986. Parliamentary Secretary for Posts and Telecommunications in 1997, Senior
State Secretary for Home Affairs in 2000, and Minister of State for Defense in 2001. Elected to a Member ofthe House of Representatives for 9 times since 1990. Concurrently serves as Minister in charge of Security
Legislation.

4

ITO Go

Academic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji University

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies,
University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed thecurrent position in 2006. Also served as Visiting Professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica (Taiwan),
Bristol University(Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct
Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as AdjunctResearcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the
Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006. Concurrently serves as Superior Research Fellow, JFIR.

SATO Koichi

Professor, J.F.Oberlin University

Received his Ph.D. in International Studies from Waseda University. Served as Sales Engineer of Hitachi
Chemical Co. Ltd., Research Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Lecturer of
the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serves as Lecturer of Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) Staff College, Policy Adviser to Japan Coast Guard, Lecturer of National Institute for
Defense Studies (NIDS).

SHOJI Tomotaka

Head, America, Europe, and Russia Division,
Regional Studies Dept., National Institute for Defence Studies

Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1995. Received M.S. from Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore, in 2006, and Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo in 2006. His research focuses on Area Studies(Indochina, particularly Vietnam) and Security in Southeast Asia. Published some articles, such as“Japan’s Security Cooperation with ASEAN: Pursuit of a Status as a ‘Relevant Partner,’” NIDS Journal of
Defense and Security, No.16 (December, 2015) and “The South China Sea: A View from Japan,” NIDS
Journal of Defense and Security, No.15 (December, 2014), etc.

YAMADA Yoshihiko

Professor, Tokai University

Graduated from Gakushuin University. Received Ph.D. in Economics from Saitama University. Served as aTrader, Bond Market Section, Finance Securities Department, Toyo Trust and Banking Company, Limited(1989-1991), Director of Maritime Department, the Nippon Foundation (1991-2008), Associate Professor(2008) and Professor (2009-Present), Tokai University. Concurrently serves as Deputy Director, Institute of
Oceanic Research and Development, Tokai University.

ASANO Ryo

Professor, Doshisha University

Graduated from International Christian University in 1977 and received Diploma from the Chinese
University of Hong Kong in 1982. Served as a part-time lecturer (2005) and a Visiting Professor(2007-2008) at the University of Tokyo. His research interests include China’s security policy, foreign policy,
and IR theory. His recent publications include China's Maritime Power (Sodo-sha, 2014), China’s
Expanding Military Power (Koyo-Shobo, 2012), History of Modern China (Minerva-Shobo, 2011), China’s
Military Power (Sodo-Sha, 2009) and China's National Security (Minerva-Shono, 2007).

SUZUKI Taketo

Associate Professor, Meiji University

Graduated from Gakushuin University in 1982. Received his Ph.D. in Politics from Gakushuin University
in 2002. Served as an Assistant Professor of Faculty of International Studies (2002-2007) and AssistantProfessor (2005-2007) and Associate Professor (2007-2009) of Graduate School of International Studies,
Hiroshima City University. His research interests include international security, the Cold War history, andIR theory. Published The Idea of “Containment” and U.S. World Strategy: Thoughts and Actions ofGeorge F. Kennan, 1931-1952 (Keisuisha, 2002) and co-authored Changes and Continuity ofContemporary Asia (Sairyusha, 2008).

(In order of appearance)
53．Presentation Papers
Session I: The Security of Maritime Asia
from a Global Perspective
ITO GoAcademic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji
University
The South China Sea and the Conception of Maritime Security
1.

The Security in the Maritime Area
(1) Freedom of Navigation(2) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)(3) Territorial Ownership

2.

China says that Japan and the US are outsiders for the South China Sea.

3.

The above claim cannot be sustained from the perspectives of (1), since that area is the place where atremendous number of vessels pass every day for transport and other logistical purposes.
4.

China has obstructed the passage of various vessels in the past, and these events challenge theexisting foundations of maritime order globally.
5.

It is not enough in terms of the maritime security only to observe the freedom of navigation. We canfind issues of (2) and (3) by claimant countries. We will discuss these problems and possible solvency forthe security of maritime Asia.
6.

China could say:(a) Guam and Hawaii for the United States.
(b) French Polynesia for France(c) The Falkland Islands for Britain(d) Antilles for the Netherlands, the United States, France and Britain

Above islands are geographically located quite far from their home countries, while China claims only
the area of the South China Sea, which is in the neighborhood of China.

67.

However, this claim cannot be sustained since China’s claim on the nine-dotted line argues that thewhole maritime area should be owned and monitored by the Chinese. The UNCLOS does not argue theownership of maritime areas.
8.

Ownership of an island in the South China Sea (which is (3).) may lead to the claim on the EZZ

around the island (which is (2).), and may expand the argument of obstructing the freedom of navigation(which is (1).). This argument contends that maritime areas are like an extension of land.
9.

The existing maritime order will become in turmoil!!

NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh

Vice Dean, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam)
The Security of Maritime Asia from a Global Perspective:
Issues in the South China Sea
The South China Sea contains a rich diversified marine environment of a semi-enclosed sea.
It has great potential of hydrocarbon resources and one of the largest fishing grounds of the world. It
also possesses the second busiest sea-lane of communication. Unfortunately, these advantages of theSouth China Sea have been improperly exploited and managed due to a number of complicatedissues concerning the territorial and maritime disputes as well as the interpretation andimplementation of international law. These issues have produced negative impacts for regional andglobal maritime security.
The issues in the South China Sea contain at least three layers. The first and the deepest
layer is the territorial disputes over the Paracels, the Spratlys and Scaborough/Huangyan. The
Paracels groups are under contest of China and Vietnam. The illegal use of force was conducted herein 1974 and resulted in the current illegal occupation over the Paracels. The Scarborough/Huangyan
is disputed between the Philippines and China. In 2012, an incident at the Scarborough was broken
out concerning illegal fishing of endanger species and escalated into tension. The incident led toChina’s new control over the Scarborough and a case against China at the Arbitral Tribunal under
Annex VII of UNCLOS. The Spratlys is under dispute between 5 countries, 6 parties namely
Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. The illegal use of force again was
conducted here and resulted in the first illegal presence of China on 6 features of the Spratlys. Thesefeatures, together with the Paracels, are currently used for massive construction and militarization.
The uses of force in the South China Sea constitute the grave violation of basic principles ofinternational law.

7

The second layer of the issues in the South China Sea is concerning the maritime disputes.
The most prominent issue is the nine dashed line, covering up to 80% of the South China Sea. Albeit
only based on a map without fixed coordination and lack of legal basis, the nine dashed line is used to
enforce the maritime rights over fishing and hydrocarbon resources, deeply infringes with thosebelong to the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal stated recognized by UNCLOS. Nationallaws are also unilaterally applied to restrict the freedom of navigation and overflight of other statesover the maritime zones and airspace in the South China Sea. In addition, archipelagos regime isimproperly applied for the Paracels and Spraltys. Under UNCLOS, archipelagic regime is only
granted under strict conditions for archipelagic state. Fail to meet the requirement of archipelagicstates, archipelagic regime is still intentionally miss-applied for excessive maritime claim in theSouth China Sea. Last but not least is the unilateral activities of massive construction and rammingat sea that cause serious consequences for the marine environment and the safety of navigation.
The third layer of the issues in the South China Sea is the dispute settlement mechanism.
Bilateral negotiation is insisted as the preference and the only way to settle the difference issues in
the South China Sea. All other peaceful dispute settlement measures are either refused or evenconsidered as a hostile act. Yet, many issues in the South China Sea are of multilateral in nature, e.g.
territorial dispute over the Spratlys, maritime disputes concerning the nine-dashed line, respect
universal principle of freedom of navigation and overflight, etc. In addition, up to date, nomechanism has been set up for territorial and maritime dispute settlement in the South China Sea.
The only document between parties in the region for dispute management is the DOC is lack ofbinding force and fail to prevent the escalation of tension in the South China Sea.
Three layers of issues in the South China Sea are concerning interests of claimants andother states in different ways. Claimants to the South China Sea dispute are suffer from constanttensions, the use of force and militarization. Their legitimate rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ andcontinental shelf are seriously infringed. And their attempts to settle the dispute are at the deadlock
due to the lack of willingness and the lack of a common approach to apply peaceful disputesettlement. Meanwhile, for other states, some fundamental and universal principles, namely
none-use of force, peaceful dispute settlement and freedom of navigation and overflight have been
violated and triggered serious issues of the effectiveness of the current rule-based order. Marine
environment and a safe navigation route of communication, the common assets of the sea, are at risk.
Tension is on the rise and cooperation is on decline. All in all, currently, the South China Sea
situation negatively contributes to the regional and global maritime security.

8

SATO Koichi
Professor, College of Liberal Arts, J. F. Oberlin University
China’s Maritime Offensive: Xi Jinping’s People’s War
Much has been said about China’s maritime offensive in the South and East China Seas.
China’s maritime offensive can be categorized into three sections. First, the nuclear patrol of thestrategic submarines against the U.S.A (high intensity conflict). Secondly, the modern naval warfare
training with the trial aircraft carrier: Liaoning, and landing ship docks: LSDs (middle intensity
conflict). Thirdly, the low intensity conflict with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy crafts,
China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels, transportation ships, and fishing boats.
The PLA navy activities in the South China Sea includes the mine sweepers’ escortnavigation for the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in the Paracel sea area in May-July 2014, and somerougher activities such as the intentional collisions of the Chinese landing Ship Tanks against theVietnamese fishing boats in the Spratly sea area in July 2015. The CCG vessels rammed against theVietnamese and Philippine’s fishing boats in the sea areas of Paracel Islands and the ScarboroughShoal, too. Former State Oceanic Administration (SOA) patrol vessel also cut the Vietnamese oil
detection ship’s cable in May 2011.
The Chinese government decided to merge the SOA and Fishery Law Enforcement
Command (FLEC) vessels into the CCG in March 2013. The relations between the PLA navy and theChinese law enforcement agencies have been quite different from that of the western countries. A
PLA navy fleet conducted patrol and training missions in the South China Sea in March 2013. The
FLEC vessels join the PLA patrol surrounding Mischief Reef, and the PLA fleet commander visitedthe FLEC vessel 45001, and briefed by a captain on the vessel’s law enforcement efforts.
The engagement of the CCG vessels, transportation ships, and the fishing boats in the low
intensity conflict were also remarkable in the escort operation of the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in
May-July 2014. Thirty four Chinese fishing boats joined the oil rig escort, and all of their hulls werecladded with iron plates. The crew of the fishing boats that join the operation of the PLA navy andthe CCG in the low intensity conflict are called Haishang Minbing: maritime militias. The duties ofthe maritime militias are not only the fishing, but also the information collection, reconnaissance,
supply, and sabotage for the PLA navy and CCG. Their maritime demonstration with the PLA navy
and CCG may include an attempt to exert a territorial claim that may not be legitimate.
The U.S. Naval War College researchers believe the sabotage incident against USNS
Impeccable in March 2009, and the intentional collision of Fujianese trawler against the Japan Coast
Guard (JCG) patrol vessels in September 2010 were also caused by Chinese maritime militias
9

(James Kraska & Michael Monti, The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia,

International Law Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Vol. 91, 2015, 450-467). The Senkaku collision
incident might be led by the Chinese political group that won’t accept “Japan-China Joint Statement:

Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea” on 18 June 2008.
According to General Ryoichi Oriki, former head of the Joint Staff: Japan Self-Defense Force(JSDF), there are 2,300 maritime militias in Hainan Island in 2012. President Xi jinping stressed theimportance of the collection of maritime information and the support to the reclamation of the South
China Sea reefs to the fishermen of Tanmen village in Hainan Province in early 2013. It gave themotivation to the Chinese fishermen and citizens to organize maritime militia fleet and construct the
new fishing vessels.
The maritime militias belong to the grey zone between the military and civilian categories.
If so, what are the extreme cases, and what are the legal issues of their activities? The extreme cases
may be the armed fishing boats appeared in the sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands in April
1978, or, the North Korean spy ship which engaged in a shoot-out with the JCG patrol vessels in
December 2001. These cases show that the maritime militias are the crew of the combatant crafts
disguised as the fishing boats, and they may be heavily armed. It is impressive that the Vietnamese
marine police delegation rushed to Yokohama exhibition museum of North Korean spy ship when
they visited Japan in September 2015. It suggested the extreme case of the future maritime militia
craft.
The legal issue of the maritime militias is relevant to the difference between the formal
status of the PLA militias and the Chinese maritime militias. Captain Katsuya Yamamoto: Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) suggests that there is a definition of the PLA militias in
China’s military service law, and it defines them as part-time soldiers and they should wear uniforms
when they are in charge of military duties. It is quite different from the reality of Chinese maritime
militias wearing plain clothes. The militias’ status is also strictly defined in the international law.
When they are taken, they shall be distinct from the espionage agents and treated as prisoners ofwar (Soji Yamamoto, Kokusaiho [International Law], Yuhikaku, 1994, 746-748).
The U.S. Naval War College researchers suggested that the case of Paquete Habana, andthe international law defines the protection afforded to fishing vessels in time of war, and lamented
that China’s employment of maritime militia complicates the U.S. and allied naval operations during
peacetime, in the “grey zone” between peace and war, and in periods of armed conflict at sea (Kraska& Monti, op. cit.). They told that, “As Beijing further integrates the maritime militia into its naval
force structure, the line between civilian fishing ships and military vessels erodes.” Xi Jinping’s

People’s War suggests us the new difficulties. We, the Japanese need to strengthen and expand thepower of JCG!

10

YOU Ji

Professor, University of Macau (China)*SCS: South China Sea

11

*FoNOPs：Freedom of Navigation Operations

12

13

SHOJI Tomotaka

Head, America, Europe, and Russia Division, Regional Studies Dept.,
National Institute for Defence Studies
Maritime Cooperation between Japan and ASEAN: Three Approaches
The South China Sea (SCS) issue is undergoing a structural change. China, the strongest
claimant in the South China Sea, continuously shows a growing assertiveness by promoting reclamationand militarization activities in the features controlled by the country. On the other hand, the UnitedStates has been deeply involved in the SCS. As countermeasures against Chinese activities, the US has
conducted “freedom of navigation” operations. The issue is transforming from diplomatic disputes
between ASEAN and China to a military confrontation between the US and China.
Against this backdrop, Japan is promoting maritime cooperation with ASEAN. For effective
cooperation, a comprehensive and strategic approach is needed by combining military, political, andeconomic measures. In this regard, I will analyze three approaches mentioned below:－Political cooperation in ASEAN-centered multilateralism－Bilateral support to ASEAN claimants－Reinforcing US military presence
Supporting ASEAN-centered multilateral frameworks is relevant in terms of creating an
atmosphere of unanimity for protecting basic rules like freedom of navigation as well as appealing to
public opinion in the international community. Bilateral cooperation with ASEAN claimants includes the14strengthening of their coastal defense capabilities. Providing a strategic alternative to respective
countries of ASEAN leads to support the association’s unity and centrality. Reinforcing the US militarypresence in the South China Sea is related to the JSDMF’s enhancing cooperation with the navies ofVietnam and the Philippines, including a port call to strategically important locations like Cam Ranh Bay
and the Subic Naval Base.

15

16

17

Hikmahanto JUWANA

Professor, University of Indonesia (Indonesia)
The Security of Maritime Asia from Global Perspective:
Post PCA DecisionThis July 12, 2016 will mark a new landscape of Maritime Security in South China Sea ason this day the Permanent Court of Arbitration (the Court) between Phillipine versus China issues
its ruling. Even though there are numerous requests submitted by the Phillipine to the Court, there
are three categories of issues which may have effect to the Security of Maritime.
First is on the dispute of sovereignty of features, including islands, rocks and reefs, in theSouth China Sea. The Court will address the issue base on interpretation in an attempt to clarify
certain provisions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The second issue is on maritime zones, in particular with respect to China’s claim of Nine
Dash Line. The Phillipine has requested the Court to declare that China’s maritime claims in theSouth China Sea based on its so-called “nine-dash line” are contrary to UNCLOS and thus invalid.
Lastly is the issue of freedom of navigation.
Ever since the Phillipine lodged the case, China has outright reject the jurisdiction of the
Court. In numerous occasions China has stated that it will not recognized whatever the decisions of
the Court. Furthermore, as the Court is nearing on its decision, China has been assertive in
occupying effectively its presence in the South China Sea.
Chinese boats and fishermen are encouraged to fish within the Traditional Fishing Ground,a concept not known under the UNCLOS. The concept of Traditional Fishing Ground is derived fromthe claim of Nine Dash Line.
In addition the Chinese government has conducted military exercise from July 5 until July11, 2016. The exercise is to show the international community the power projection of China in South
China Sea as the Court will render its decision on July 12.
Against these backdrops, many countries, apart from the Phillipines, have also been
anxious to hear what the Court will have to say. These include countries that have sovereignty
dispute against China, that have maritime dispute and countries who have interest in the freedom ofnavigation in South China Sea.
Even though it is difficult to predict what will the ruling of the Court be, generally thedecision may have three scenarios of outcome. First the rulis will be in favour of China’s interest.
Second the ruling will not be in favour of China’s interest. Third the decision may be ambiguos andmulti-interpretable so countries reading the decision think that is in favour to them.
If the scenario of the decision is not in favour of China’s interest, the big question is what
will happen to the Security of Maritime Asia?
For sure China is unlikely to accept the decision of the Court. This is an accordance with
China’s policy from the beginning. China is expected to be more assertive in its presence in the South18

China Sea. China would want to show the international community that it has been effectively
occupying the South China Sea, be it on issue of sovereignty, maritime zones or freedom ofnavigation. Use of force may not be excluded by China in its assertion. In doing this China may need
its ally countries to go against countries that are jeopardizing China’s interest based on the ruling of
the PCA. ASEAN for example may not be united in issuing policy on the decision of the Court.
On the other hand, in an extreme scenario, countries who have interests against China will
become more confidence as the Court decisions become its legal basis. They will insist for China toobserve the award issued by the Court.
The question is in doing so will these countries enforce the award by placing economic
embargo against China? Or will they go further by using force?
This would be highly unlikely. If this scenario happens then the world will be in a totalchaos. In the current era of globalization and multipolar international environment it would be
difficult to imagine China using force to assert its interest in the South China Sea. The same goes tocountries that are against China. These countries need China, both economically and politically.
China is just too big to be subdued. At the same time China may not want to jeopardize itself
if it is all out against every countries having interest in South China Sea.
The question is now, what is the likelihood scenario?
The likelihood scenario would be relations between countries that have interests in South
China Sea will enter a new landscape. The new landscape will be based on the decision of the PCA.
China may not recognized the ruling, yet it may somehow accept the ruling by introducing
certain concepts in its claims. This kind of policy is invoked by China in the recent dispute ofmaritime zone against Indonesia.
In such dispute, Indonesia has firmly not recognized China’s Traditional Fishing Ground,but at the same time China is not recognizing Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. However, China
sees the importance of Indonesia in terms of its trade partner, market and in financing Indonesia’s
infrastructure projects.
Thus, China has now changed its previous policy by stating that it has dispute against
Indonesia over a so-called maritime rights and interests. A concept newly introduced andunprecedented. Hence, a new equilibrium may be formed, even though it is difficult to predict whatkind of equilibrium it would be.
The main thing in this near future is, peace will be preserved in the South China Sea and,
importantly, force will not be used. Disputes over Security of Maritime may not be readily settled,
but remain to afloat for sometime.

19

Session II: How to Maintain Maritime Asia Open,Free and PeacefulDavid WALTON

Senior Lecturer, Western Sydney University (Australia)
Australia and the South China Sea Maritime dispute
Australia’s formal position－Neutral position on territorial dispute－Support for international law conventions such as UNCLOS and respect for decision to behanded down on July 12－Support for Freedom of Navigation in disputed area (hugely important for Australian andinternational shipping routes)
Issues
1. There has been noticeably tougher stance evident in Australia since Malcolm Turnbull became
Prime Minister in September 2015.
2. Australia was worked with the United States, Japan and Southeast Asian countries as part of asecurity web－Australia has criticized Beijing’s massive land reclamation activities and installation ofpotential military bases.
－The Australian military routinely patrols in the South China Sea, under Operation Gateway.
The flights typically take place from Butterworth base in Malaysia, and are normally undertaken by
P3-Orion aircraft.
－Australian Air Marshal Davies said unlike the past, "nearly all" recent Operation Gateway
surveillance flights had been challenged. But he insisted they would continue because they are inline with international law.
3. The rise of China and claims and actions in the South China Sea represents a dilemma forAustralian foreign policy and relations with China and Japan as well as Australia’s overall regional
diplomacy.
－Australia promotes closer ties with China to enhance commercial and economic ties andsubsequent benefits to the Australian economy, yet paradoxically the South China Sea dispute has
led China to be viewed as a potential security threat to regional security.
－ Finding the appropriate range of policies towards China poses a range of interrelated
problems for Australia’s foreign relations with Japan. At the regional level, the difficulty is finding20

the balance between security and commercial interests. Both Australia and Japan have a burgeoning
trade relationship with China and have made efforts to further expand commercial links in China
through investment and trade opportunities. Yet as is well known, Canberra and Tokyo havesubstantially strengthened security links and have maintained a strong commitment to an enhanced
security alliance with the United States. Australia’s dual strategy of close ties with the United States
and Japan and proactive foreign policy towards China becomes problematic in light of ongoingstrategic competition in the South China Sea and the United States to pivot in Asia.
－The recent upgrading of bilateral relations between Australia and China highlights thechallenge of maintaining a hedging strategy towards China. Australia has made the decision todevelop a genuine strategic partnership with China within the next few years. The decision has led
to almost unprecedented and at times fiery public debates among academics and defence specialists.
In many respects, the debate is symbolic of the China question; can the current Australian hedging
strategy continue to work?

YAMADA Yoshihiko

Professor, Tokai University

The East Asian waters are facing multiple issues related to maritime security. Crimes on
the high seas and EEZ such as smuggling of goods or people, and IUU fishing show no sign ofdecline. Recently, refugees due to conflicts stemming from ethic and religious are also became a big
issue. These crimes often threaten the livelihood of coastal residents.
In the past, there were heinous incidents of piracy occurred in the South East Asian seas at
a high level. In order to cope with such situation, the Regional Conference on Combating Piracy andArmed Robbery against Ships was held in Tokyo in 2000. Various Asian countries worked together toestablish measures against piracy. After that, 2009, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was launched. Thisagreement has been promoted based on the information sharing on piracy, the building of cooperative
systems for handling piracy, and human resource training and development of patrol andinformation management capabilities. Currently, not only countries in Asia, but also relevant
maritime-developed countries such as U.K., Norway, Netherlands, and the United States participate
in the ReCAAP as the “user” of this area. There are now 20 member nations. In addition, although
not contracting parties, Indonesia and Malaysia cooperate as observers.
ReCAAP has played the role of reducing incidences of piracy in Asia and encouraging
cooperative actions among maritime security agencies in Asian countries. We believe that expanding
the concept of the ReCAAP and further reinforcement of information sharing and cooperative actions
to get rid of crimes on the high seas and EEZ are important to ensure the maritime security in Asianwaters.
21

Moreover, complicated issues over territory and territorial sea are now arising in Asia.
Actions such as exploitation of seabed resources and constructing artificial islands through theaggressive reclamation by unilateral decisions especially in the South China Sea createcross-national conflicts and have bad effects on the good relationship of Asian countries. In addition,such actions may violate international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. The changing present circumstance by force is never acceptable.
In order to avoid such conflicts, taking communication is the first step and the mostimportant thing; for example, the clear transmission and discussion of their own concepts ofmaritime management. The transnational information sharing and exchanges in this field such asutilization of shipping routes, actual condition of fish resources, status of maritime exploitation andenvironment are also essential in such international convention.

Pham Quang MINH

Rector, Univ. of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University-Hanoi (Vietnam)“A Law-Based Regional Order”: The South China Sea Dispute on Trial
This conference opens on July 12, 2016 is not a contingency because today the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in La Haye issues its decision on the lawsuit against China’s claim in the South
China Sea that the Philippines brought to PCA on 10 January 2013. Its results will influence not
only on the Sino-Philippines bilateral relations but also on the dispute in the South China Sea andsecurity of whole region. The main argument of the paper is that whatever the decision is, China’s
prestige will be seriously fractured, and more importantly its moral and legal status in the South
China Sea dispute will be more eroded. In order to do so, the paper first provides an overview of thislawsuit. Then the paper will analyse the international opinion relating to this lawsuit. By the end it
will predict some scenarios of this dispute in the time to come. The paper concludes that a law-baed
regional order is still a long way ahead for Southeast Asia, and to respect the decision of PCA is oneof fundamental act to build such kind of order.

ASANO Ryo

Professor, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University
Mechanism of South China Sea Dispute(1) Change of Power Balance in Global and Regional Order(2) Maritime Dispute: Symbol of the Sino-US Contest
22

(3) Simultaneous Pursuit of Balancing and Bandwagoning(4) Vision of Increasing and irreversible Asymmetry of Regional Balance(5) Foreign Policy: Rational or Ruled by Domestic Politics(6) Intertwined Dynamism of Economic Interdependence and Security(7) Three Types of Warfare in the South China Sea – Media (Public Opinion), Psychological, and
Legal(8) Pursuit of Short-Term and Limited Gains under Increasing Uncertainty(9) China’s Evolutionary Approach to the South China Sea Dispute?
(10) South China Sea Dispute under the Condition of “New Normal”

Virginia Bacay WATSON

Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies(USA & The Philippines)“How to Maintain Maritime Asia Open, Free and Peaceful”
PHILIPPINE STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS (Post-Hague)－“gray zones”－U.S.-Philippine alliance－ link between foreign and domestic interests－ Philippine-PRC relations－ Philippine role in Southeast Asia (+ASEAN)－Relations with other [non-ASEAN] Asian nations
Opportunities and Challenges－New leadership: Philippines (Duterte) and U.S.
－ASEAN Chairmanship (2017, short-term)－Significance of non-traditional security issues－Expanded regional security network－Internal (domestic) reforms and continuities－Implications of the Hague decision23

4．Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations(1) The Global Forum of Japan【Objectives】
In today’s world, people’s attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with theglobalization, but also the rise of new states including People’s Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both
inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in
Asia-Pacific region, it has become increasingly important for Japan to establish new channels of dialogue both in the first
and the second tracks with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as member countries of theOrganization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Romania, etc.). On the basis of such understanding,
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in thefield ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet
members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of neworders in global and regional arenas.
【History】
The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance.
Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals
and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there
must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participatingstates. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C.
Commission Vice President Etienne DAVINGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representativesof the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in
Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits
themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by
the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October
1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on
the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only toparticipants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, thegravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for
Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations),
and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on
February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a
hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanesecomponent was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be
self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membershiporganization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regionaland global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is
independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as
the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA
Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO Kenichi as Chairman& President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and
TOYODA Shoichiro; 16 Political Members including the four Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KAKIZAWA Mito, KOIKE
Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 86 Academic Members including the three Governors, ITO Go, SHIMADA Haruo
and MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.
【Activities】
Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges
with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring
countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India and Australia European
countries, Wider Black Sea Area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formationof international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries
in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number ofJapanese participants in the “Dialogue”, GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues"
and its overseas co-sponsors in past years given below.
Year
2016

2015

Month
July
March
December
September
July
March
February

Topic
Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue
The Japan-U.S. Dialogue
Japan-East Asia Dialogue
The Japan-China Dialogue
The Second Japan-GUAM Dialogue
Central Asia + Japan Symposium
The Japan-U.S. Dialogue
Japan-East Asia Dialogue

Co-sponsor
Meiji University, Western Sydney University
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the University of Tokyo
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University24

(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations【Objectives】
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit,
independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy
and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its
members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy.
Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, theviews expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the
responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign themalone.
【History】
The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo,
Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political,
and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international
affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR wasreincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister inrecognition of its achievements.
【Organization】
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2)associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the“Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of
supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge ofthe management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.
■Board of Trustees
ARIMA Tatsuo
HAKAMADA Shigeki
HATTORI Yasuo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
INOUE Akiyoshi
ISHIGAKI Yasuji
ITO Tsuyoshi
KOIKE Yuriko
KUROYANAGI Nobuo■Board of Directors
IMAI Takashi
ITO Kenichi
WATANABE Mayu
HANDA Haruhisa
KAMIYA Matake
MORIMOTO Satoshi
SHIMADA Haruo
TAKUBO Tadae

OHYA EikoSAKAMOTO Masahiro
SATO Ken
WATANABE Toshio
YAMAGUCHI Norio

ChairmanPresident
Executive Director
Director
Director
Director
Director
Director■Auditors
NAITOH Masahisa
WATANABE Kenichi【Activities】
The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum”“Research Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,”“Diplomatic Roundtable,” “Foreign Policy Luncheon,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars ofactivities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom”(http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public,
functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles
posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu”
in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners aretranslated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR
Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” isdelivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

25

(3) Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA)
The Organization for the Strategic Coordination of Research and Intellectual Properties(hereinafter referred as ‘the Organization.’) promotes internationalization of researches at Meiji
University in coordination with the Organization for International Collaboration established in 2009. In
order to become one of the world class universities, Meiji University needs a research base where
researches which have global implications are conducted. We established MIGA as such research baseunder the Organization.
MIGA’s researches have two axis based on which various researches will develop. One is to
identify Japan’s role for the world’s development and also to consider how to actualize it. In doing so, weneed to have a broad perspective to understand various changes, geopolitical, economical or
technological, in the world. The second axis is to identify various issues which are shared globally andconsider the ways to overcome them.
Through the abovementioned research studies, we aim to develop policy proposals, publicize
academic papers and establish global intellectual network through cooperation with foreign researchers.
In order for Japan to remain as a viable and respectable player intellectually and economically in theworld, MIGA intends to serve as a basis for facilitating global intellectual interaction.

(4) Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS)
Director: Go Ito (Professor, Meiji University)
Tel & Fax: 03-3296-2112
E-mail: meijimiips@meiji.ac.jp
1) The MIIPS was established in January 2013 within Meiji University as a research unit engaging ininternational studies.
2) In collaboration with the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA), the MIIPS held an international
conference entitled “What are Big Power Relations?: Toward Peace, Prosperity, and Stability in the
Asia-Pacific” with distinguished invitees such as Douglas Paal (Vice President of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace), Gerald Curtis (Professor, Columbia University), and SongYanghui (Academia Sinica, Taiwan).
3) During 2013-2015, with funding from the US-Japan Foundation, the MIIPS conducted a joint study
with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (Honolulu, Hawaii) on the role of the US and Japanfor maritime security in the East and the South China Seas.
4) In December 2014, the MIIPS invited Professor John Mearsheimer (Professor, University of Chicago)
for his first visit to Japan. During his visit, he conducted lectures on offensive realism at the Cabinet
Office, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Forces, various universities and thinktanks, including “TheAsia-Pacific in Power Transition: How Many Powers?” co-sponsored by the MIIPS and the Global
Forum.
5) In July 2015, the MIIPS conducted an international conference entitled “Enhancing Cooperation for
Peace and Stability in a Maritime Asia” with invitees from the United States, the Philippines,
Vietnam, and Taiwan.
6) The MIIPS is currently conducting such studies as US security commitment to Asia with China’s rise,
the role of the self-defense forces in natural disasters, and possible agenda on the US-Japan
cooperation for maritime peace and stability in the East and South China Seas.

26

(5) Western Sydney University
Western Sydney University (Chancellor: Prof. Peter Shergold AC) began operation on 1st
January 1989, under the terms of the Western Sydney University Act, 1988 which had been passed by the
New South Wales Parliament in December 1988. However, the predecessors of the University date backas far as 1891 with the establishment of the Hawkesbury Agricultural College. The Act created afederated network university, based on two existing Colleges of Advanced Education - Hawkesbury
Agricultural College and Nepean College of Advanced Education.
Following incorporation into the University, the foundation network members were known as
the 'Western Sydney University, Hawkesbury' and the ' Western Sydney University, Nepean.'
The Act was amended by the Western Sydney University (Amendment) Act, 1989 (Act No. 128,
1989) and the Macarthur Institute of Higher Education became the third University member on 1
November 1989. The new campus was known as the ' Western Sydney University, Macarthur.'
In 1995 a review of the structure of Western Sydney University was undertaken. The Report of
the Committee to Review the Structure of the Western Sydney University (the Rogers Report)
recommended restructuring the institution and a new federated University system emerged. The
University became a federated university system comprising four co-operative and interrelated
elements: Office of the Vice-Chancellor, Western Sydney University, Hawkesbury, Western Sydney
University, Macarthur and Western Sydney University, Nepean.
This federated system ensured the University was represented at a national and international
level as a single institution with common objectives and values, while giving each of its Members theautonomy needed to react quickly and flexibly to the demands and needs of its local communities. The
principal advantage of the federated network structure was the opportunity to build on the individual
strengths of each member university, and through the University as a whole to define and achieve
objectives that the individual members might have found unattainable. Each member was largely
autonomous and responsible for: the development and conduct of courses; the admission of students;
the initiation and supervision of research programs; staffing; the development of consultancy andentrepreneurial activities; and the development and maintenance of campus facilities and properties.
On 26 November 1997, the Western Sydney University Act, 1997 (Act No. 116, 1997) was passedby the State Parliament. This Act which replaced the original Act came into force on 1 January 1998.
Following consultation across Western Sydney University the Vice Chancellor put proposals
before the Western Sydney University Board of Trustees at the end of 1999 for a major restructure of the
University. The Board approved the principles of the restructure, and the consequent detailed work to beundertaken to develop the new structure. From the beginning of 2001 the Western Sydney University
operated as a single multi-campus university rather than as a federation.
The new structure of the university was outlined in the 2001 Calendar with revisions andchanges outlined in the 2002 Calendar. The single multi-campus Western Sydney University has six
campuses: Bankstown, Blacktown, Campbelltown, Hawkesbury, Parramatta, and Penrith.
“Western Sydney University has been named one of the world's top 400 universities, with therelease of the prestigious Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings for 2014-2015. The
University has moved into the 351-400 band for the first time, firmly placing it within the top two percent of universities worldwide.”[Contact]
Locked Bag 1797
Penrith NSW 2751
Tel: +61 2 9852 5222
27

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193[Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp[URL] http://www.gfj.jp/[This “Dialogue” is administered by the Secretariat of The Global Forum of Japan]