THE 4th JAPAN‐BLACK SEA AREA DIALOGUE“How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation”

Conference Papers

February 20‐21, 2013
At the International House of JapanTokyo, Japan
Co‐sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
Supported byWorldwide Support for Development (WSD)
The Tokyo Club
Under the Auspices of
The Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of JapanThe Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)Table of Contents
1．Program………………………………………………………………………………………………1
2．Biographies of the Panelists……………………………………………………………………3
3．Keynote Papers ………………………………………………………………………………9
Session I : The Black Sea Area in the Changing World………………………………………………….……….9
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo................................................................................................................................9
Mithat RENDE.....................................................................................................................................20

Session II: The Development Strategy of the Black Sea Area…………………………………………..............22
HATTORI Michitaka.............................................................................................................................22

Session III: The Role of Japan for the Future of the Black Sea Area………………………………….............24
KAWAZU Kunihiko............................................................................................................................24
Georgi VASSILEV.......................................................................................................................................28

4．An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)……………...…….…………30
5．An Introduction to Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)…31

1. program
第４回「日・黒海地域対話」
The Fourth JAPAN-BLACK SEA AREA DIALOGUE「日・黒海地域協力の発展に向けて」

How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation
on February 20-21, 2013
at International House of Japan / 国際文化会館
共催 / Co-Sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
黒海経済協力機構 / Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
助成 / Supported by
世界開発協力機構 / Worldwide Support for Development (WSD)
東京倶楽部 / The Tokyo Club
後援 / Under the Auspices of
日本国外務省 / The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
日本国際フォーラム／The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

Wednesday, 20 February, 2013
"Room Tsuru," Imperial Hotel / 帝国ホテル「鶴の間」
開幕レセプション *特別招待者のみ / Welcome Reception *Invitation Only
19:00-20:30

松山 政司 日本国外務副大臣主催開幕レセプション
Welcome Reception hosted by MATSUYAMA Masaji, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Thursday, 21 February, 2013
"Lecture Hall," International House of Japan / 国際文化会館「講堂」
開会挨拶 / Opening Remarks
9:30-10:00
開会挨拶 A （５分間）
Opening Remarks A (5min.)伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人
ITO Kenichi, President, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

開会挨拶 B （５分間）
Opening Remarks B (5min.)ヴィクトル・ツヴィルクン ＢＳＥＣ事務総長
Victor TVIRCUN, Secretary General, BSEC

開会挨拶 C （１５分間）
Opening Remarks C (15min.)

山田 淳 外務省欧州局審議官
YAMADA Jun, Deputy Director-General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

本会議Ⅰ / Session I「変容する世界における黒海地域」
The Black Sea Area in the Changing World

10：00-12:00

共同議長（５分間）
Co-Chairpersons (5min.)竹中 繁雄 前アジア生産性機構事務総長
TAKENAKA Shigeo, former Secretary General of Asian Productivity Organization
ミコラ・メレネブスキ ウクライナ外務省無任所大使（ウクライナ）
Mykola MELENEVSKYI, Ambassador at large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (Ukraine)

基調報告 A （１５分間）
Keynote Speaker A (15min.)六鹿 茂夫 静岡県立大学教授 / グローバル・フォーラム「日・黒海地域関係研究会」代表
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, University of Shizuoka / President, The Study Group on “Japan-Black Sea Area Relations,” GFJ

基調報告 B（１５分間）
Keynote Speaker B (15min.)

ミシャト・レンデ トルコ外務省多国間経済局長 （トルコ）
Mithat RENDE, Director General, Multilateral Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (Turkey)

コメントA（５分間）
Lead Discussant A (5min.)小池百合子 衆議院議員（自由民主党）/ グローバル・フォーラム国会議員世話人
KOIKE Yuriko, Member of the House of Representatives (LDP) / Diet Member Governor, GFJ

コメントB（５分間）
Lead Discussant B (5min.)

ユアン・ミルチャ・パシュク 欧州議会議員・同外交副委員長
Ioan Mircea PASCU, Member of the European Parliament (EP), Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of EP

コメントC（５分間）
Lead Discussant C (5min.)

宇山 智彦 北海道大学スラブ研究センター教授
UYAMA Tomohiko, Professor, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University

コメントD（５分間）
Lead Discussant D (5min.)レヴァズ・ベシッゼ 駐日グルジア大使 （グルジア）
Revaz BESHIDZE, Ambassador of Georgia to Japan (Georgia)

自由討議 （５５分間）
Free Discussions (45min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

議長総括（１０分間）
Summarization by
Co-Chairpersons （10min.）竹中 繁雄 前アジア生産性機構事務総長
TAKENAKA Shigeo, former Secretary General of Asian Productivity Organization
ミコラ・メレネブスキ ウクライナ外務省無任所大使（ウクライナ）
Mykola MELENEVSKYI, Ambassador at large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (Ukraine)

昼食 / Lunch
12:00-13:00

Lunch Break ／ 昼食休憩

1

本会議Ⅱ /Session II「黒海地域の開発戦略」
The Development Strategy of the Black Sea Area

13:00-15:05

共同議長（５分間）
Co-Chairpersons (5min.)基調報告 A （１５分間）
Keynote Speaker A (15min.)

廣野 良吉 成蹊大学名誉教授 /日本国際フォーラム客員上席研究員
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University/ Visiting Superior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations
エミン・ママドフ アゼルバイジャン外務省経済開発協力局局長 （アゼルバイジャン）
Emin MAMMADOV, Head of Division, Department of Economic Cooperation and Development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
セルゲイ・ゴンチャレンコ ロシア連邦外務省経済協力局次長 （ロシア）Sergei GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation(Russia)

基調報告 B（１５分間）
Keynote Speaker B (15min.)服部 倫卓 ロシアＮＩＳ経済研究所次長
HATTORI Michitaka, Deputy director, Institute for Russian & NIS Economic Studies

コメントA（５分間）
Lead Discussant A (5min.)アジム・パショリ アルバニア外務省地域協力局長 （アルバニア）
Agim PASHOLLI, Head of Regional Initiatives Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Albania)

コメントB（５分間）
Lead Discussant B (5min.)

蓮見 雄 立正大学教授
HASUMI Yu, Professor, Rissho University

コメントC（５分間）
Lead Discussant C (5min.)ニコラオス・ツァマドス 駐日ギリシャ大使 （ギリシャ）
Nikolaos TSAMADOS, Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)

コメントD（５分間）
Lead Discussant D (5min.)

袴田 茂樹 新潟県立大学教授/日本国際フォーラム評議員
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, University of Niigata Prefecture / Trustee, JFIR

コメントE（５分間）
Lead Discussant E (5min.)

ボヤナ・アダモビッチ・ドラゴビッチ 駐日セルビア大使（セルビア）
Bojana ADAMOVIC DRAGOVIC, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia (Serbia)

自由討議 （５５分間）
Free Discussions (45min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

議長総括（１０分間）
Summarization by
Co-Chairpersons （10min.）

15：05-15：15

廣野 良吉 成蹊大学名誉教授 /日本国際フォーラム客員上席研究員
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University/ Visiting Superior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations
エミン・ママドフ アゼルバイジャン外務省経済開発協力局局長 （アゼルバイジャン）
Emin MAMMADOV, Head of Division, Department of Economic Cooperation and Development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(Azerbaijan)

休憩/Break

本会議Ⅲ /Session III「黒海地域の将来と日本の役割」
The Role of Japan for the Future of the Black Sea Area

15：15-17：15

共同議長（５分間）
Co-Chairpersons (5min.)

平林 博 グローバル・フォーラム常任世話人
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, GFJ
ラドゥ・ペトル・シェルパン 駐日ルーマニア大使 （ルーマニア）
Radu Petru SERBAN, Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)

基調報告 A （１５分間）
Keynote Speaker A (15min.)

河津 邦彦 外務省欧州局中・東欧課長
KAWAZU Kunihiko, Deputy Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

基調報告 B（１５分間）
Keynote Speaker B (15min.)ゲオルギ・ヴァシレフ 駐日ブルガリア大使（ブルガリア）
Georgi VASSILEV, Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria to Japan (Bulgaria)

コメントA（５分間）
Lead Discussant A (5min.)

小寺 清 国際協力機構理事
KODERA Kiyoshi, Vice President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

コメントB（５分間）
Lead Discussant B (5min.)アレクセイ・ニステリアン モルドバ外務省地域協力局長（モルドバ）
Alexei NISTREAN, Director of Regional Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moldova)

コメントC（５分間）
Lead Discussant C (5min.)

金原 主幸 日本経済団体連合会国際経済本部本部長
KINBARA Kazuyuki, Director, International Affaris Bureau, Japan Business Federation (KEIDANREN)

コメントD（５分間）
Lead Discussant D (5min.)グラント・ポゴシャン 駐日アルメニア大使 （アルメニア）
Grant POGOSYAN, Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to Japan (Armenia)

自由討議 （５５分間）
Free Discussions (45min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

議長総括（１０分間）
Summarization by
Co-Chairpersons （10min.）

平林 博 グローバル・フォーラム常任世話人
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, GFJ

ラドゥ・ペトル・シェルパン 駐日ルーマニア大使 （ルーマニア）
Radu Petru SERBAN, Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)[NOTE］English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided／日本語・英語同時通訳付き

2

2. Biographies of the Panelists【Black Sea Area Panelists】
Secretary General, BSEC

Victor TVIRCUN

Received Ph.D. in History. Served as various posts including Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova in
the Republic of Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Arab Republic of Egypt (2001-2005), State of Kuwait, Stateof Qatar, Republic of Lebanon, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, Minister of Education andYouth of the Republic of Moldova (2005-2008), Director of the Institute of European Integration and
Political Science in Chisinau (2009-2010), Professor
Mykola MELENEVSKYIof the Pedagogical University (2010-2012).

Ambassador at large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (Ukraine)

He worked as an interpreter, and at the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine for one year. Joined the Ministryof Foreign Affairs in 1981, but returned to the Academy of Sciences three years later, where he enrolled
for post graduate studies in 1983. He worked at the Kyiv City Trade Union council for six years until
1992, after which he returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Served as Head of the Human Rights
Division in the ministry’s United Nations Department, Deputy Director of the United Nations Division
and Deputy Director General for the Central European Initiative.
Director General, Multilateral Economic Affairs,

Mithat RENDE

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (Turkey)
Graduated from Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara University. Completed the Post Graduate
Program of the Royal College of Defence Studies London on Security and International Relations in 2000.
Served as Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in London and Deputy Permanent Representative ofTurkey to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) from 1996-2000. Ambassador of Turkey to theState of Qatar before assuming the current post.
Member of the European Parliament (EP),

Ioan Mircea PASCU

Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of EP
Received Ph.D. in Political Science from the Institute of Political Sciences, Bucharest in 1980. Served as
various posts including Presidential Counselor (1990-92), Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Japan
Forum on International Relations (1992-1993), State Secretary in Defense Ministry (1993-96), Chairman of
the Defense Committee in The Chamber of Deputies (1996-2000), Minister of National Defense of
Romania (2000-2004), Member, Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs Ctee since 2007.
Ambassador of Georgia to Japan (Georgia)

Revaz BESHIDZE

Received Ph.D. in Geography from Tbilisi State University in 1990. Entered the Georgian Ministry ofForeign Affairs in 1996. Held various positions, including Head of Military Cooperation Division
Department for Politico-Military Affairs, Director of the Department for Politico-Military Affairs,3Director of the Department for Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Head of Mission ofGeorgia to NATO before assuming the current post in 2009.
Head of Division, Department of Economic Cooperation and Development

Emin MAMMADOVof the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Azerbaijan)
Received M.A. in Business Administration from Azerbaijan State University of Economics in 2007.
Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Served in various positions, including Attaché and Third
Secretary, Economic and trade section, Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to UN Office and other
International Organizations in Geneva (2001-2004), Second and First Secretary, Economic and tradeissues, Embassy of Azerbaijan to Switzerland(2006-2010).
Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation,

Sergei GONCHARENKO

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Russia)
Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served various positions. Also, served as Chairman of theCommittee of Senior Officials of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 2001 and in
2006, Chairman of the Working Group on Economic Cooperation at the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council in
2000-2001 and in 2006-2009, and Chairman of the Working Group on Economic Cooperation at theCouncil of the Baltic Sea States in 2001-2002.
Agim PASHOLLI

Head of Regional Initiatives Department,Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Albania)

Graduated from University of Tirana (1973). Served as Head of Division and Deputy Director,”M.Duri”
Company (1973-1989), Chief of Economic Relations Office at the Albanian Embassy, Hungary(1993-1996), National Coordinator of the BSEC (1996-2013) National Coordinator of CEi 1996-2013) andDirector of Multilateral Initiatives Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005-2012).
Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)

Nikolaos TSAMADOS

Received Ph.D. from the Freie Universität Berlin. Entered the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1982.
Held various positions, including Deputy and acting General Director for Development Cooperation,
Deputy Permanent Representative at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France, and Director of A5
Directorate for Russia and other C.I.S. countries, before assuming the current post in 2009.
Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia (Serbia)

Bojana ADAMOVIC DRAGOVICEntered the Foreign Affairs in 1979. Served as various positions, including First Counsellor, Department
for International Organizations (1990-1998), Counsellor, Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to
the United Nations in New York (1998-2001), Minister Counsellor, Department for International
Organizations,(2001-2004),

MinisterCounsellor,

EmbassyoftheRepublicof

SerbiaandMontenegro/Republic of Serbia, New Delhi, India, Deputy Head of Mission (2004-2008), Head of Asia,
Australia and Pacific Department (2009).

4

Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)

Radu Petru SERBAN

Graduated from the Academy of Economic Studies – Faculty of International Economic Relations,
Bucharest (1975), holds a Ph.D in Economy on “European Economic Integration” (2000) and a Diploma
on “Global Security Issues” from Georgetown University (2003). Joined the Ministry of Economy andCommerce in 1989. Served as various positions, including Economic Counselor in Sweden, Minister
Counselor for Economic Affairs at the Mission of Romania to the EU. In 2002, he joined the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Romania, being appointed Director General for Economic Diplomacy.His overseas
assignments from MoFA include Brussels as Deputy Chief of Mission and London as Minister
Plenipotentiary of the Romanian Embassies.The ambassador is also author of a number of articles andbooks on economy, trade and European integration.
Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria (Bulgaria)

Georgi VASSILEV

Graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He has completed a number ofcourses and academic specializations for diplomats and senior executives in the field of foreign, security
and defense policy. Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria in 1988. Served as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Bulgaria to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam(2006-2010). He has received an Honorary Sign of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Bulgaria, as well as numerous other Bulgarian and foreign distinctions.
Alexei NISTREAN

Director of Regional Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moldova)

Received PhD in Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies, Moldova. Received M.A. in
Diplomatic Studies from University of Westminster, UK. Served in various posts, including Director of
the Department of International Economic Organizations, Mofa (1996-1997), Director of the Department
of UN and Specialized Agencies, Mofa (2003-2006), Executive Manager, BSEC PERMIS, Istanbul, in
Turkey (2006-2012).
Grant POGOSYAN

Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to Japan (Armenia)

Received Ph.D. in Computer Science from USSR Academy of Sciences in 1982. Served as Professor at
International Christian University, Tokyo (1996-2012), Visiting Professor at University of Montreal,
Canada (1997-1998), Rutgers University, USA (1999-2000), Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS), France(2005-2006), Advisor (Japanese Affairs) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Armenia (2004-2010), andAdvisor to the Embassy of Republic of Armenia in Tokyo (2010-2012).
(In order of appearance)5

【Japanese Panelists】
President, Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

ITO Kenichi

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at
Harvard University (1961-1963). Served various positions, including Director of First Southeast Asian
Division until 1977. Served as Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). Concurrently servingas President of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), President of Council on East Asian
Community (CEAC), and Professor Emeritus at Aoyama Gakuin University. Received an Honorary
Doctorate from the University of Cambodia (2011).
YAMADA Jun

Deputy Director‐General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Received LLM from University of London in 1985. Entered theMinistry of Foreign Affairs in 1985. Served as various positions, including Deputy Director, Science &Nuclear Energy Division, Arms Control & Science Department (1993-1995), Senior Coordinator for G8
Summit, Economic Affairs Bureau (1998), Counsellor, Embassy of Japan in the United States (2002-2005)
and Ambassador and Deputy Chief, Mission of Japan to the European Union (2011-2012).
TAKENAKA Shigeo

former Secretary General of Asian Productivity Organization

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and enter Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1965. Served in various
posts including Ambassador to Bangladesh and Ambassador to Turkey until 2003. Served as
Secretary-General of the Asian Productivity Organization until 2009.
Professor, University of Shizuoka

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo/ President, The Study Group on “Japan-Black Sea Area Relations,” GFJ
Graduated from Sophia University in 1976. Received M.A. in International Relations from Sophia
University in 1978 and Ph.D. in Law from University of Bucharest in 1985. Served as Visiting Fellow at
the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Dean of the Facultyof International Relations and a Presidential Aid at University of Shizuoka. Concurrently serves as
President of the Study Group on Japan-Black Sea Area Relations of GFJ as well as Director of the Wider
Europe Research Center at University of Shizuoka.
KOIKE Yuriko

Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)/ Diet Member Governor, GFJ

Graduated from Cairo University. Severed as a TV Personality and Arabist (2003-06), Minister of theEnvironment (2006), Special Advisor to Prime Minister on National Security Affairs (2007), Japan’s firstfemale Defense Minister (2007-2008). Currently serves as a member of the House of Representative.
Author of books and magazine articles on Japanese politics, international affairs and career women’s
networking.

6

Professor, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University

UYAMA Tomohiko

Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1991. Received M.A. in Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts
and Sciences from the University of Tokyo in 1993. Served as Attaché, Embassy of Japan in the Republicof Kazakhstan (1994–1995), Visiting Scholar, Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciencesof the Republic of Kazakhstan (1995–1996) and Associate Professor of Central Asian Studies, Slavic
Research Center, Hokkaido University (1996–2006).
Professor Emeritus, Seikei University/

HIRONO Ryokichi

Visiting Superior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations
Graduated from the University of Chicago and completed research program in 1958. Served as AssistantProfessor, Associate Professor and Professor at Seikei University. Currently Professor Emeritus, Seikei
University, and concurrently serving as Director, Japan Committee for UNICEF, Senior Advisor, Japan
Evaluation Society (JES), Senior Program Advisor, United Nations University (UNU) and Visiting
Superior Research Fellow of JFIR.
HATTORI Michitaka

Deputy director, Institute for Russian & NIS Economic Studies

Graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Russian Faculty. Received M.A. from School ofInternational Politics, Economics and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University in 1989. Served as
Attaché, Japan Embassy in Republic of Belarus (1989-2001), Economist, Senior Economist and Vice
Director, Institute for Russia & NIS Economic Studies (1989-), Editor in Chief, Russia & NIS Business
Monthly (2004-).
Professor, Rissho University

HASUMI Yu

Received M.A. in Area Studies from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in 1988. Served as Economist at
Institute for Russian & NIS Economic Studies, Japan Association for Trade with Russia & NIS. Chief ofSecretariat at Institute of Eurasian Studies, Associate Researcher at Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU
Studies, Vice‐chief Editor at Monthly Journal ‘Russian‐Eurasian Economy and Society’, Director at theEuropean Union Studies Association‐Japan.
HAKAMADA Shigeki

Professor, University of Niigata / Prefecture Trustee, JFIR

Graduated from Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo majoring in Philosophy. Completed
postgraduate studies at Moscow State University and doctoral course at Graduate school of Universityof Tokyo. Entered Aoyama Gakuin University as Professor in 1982 and served as Dean of School ofInternational Politics, Economics and Business of the same university from 2002-04. Concurrently held
posts as Visiting Research Fellow of Princeton University, as Visiting Professor of University of Tokyo,
Moscow State University and University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Uzbekistan.

7

Vice President, GFJHIRABAYASHI Hiroshi

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1963. From 1991 to
2006, served successively as Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington, D.C., Director-General of Economic
Cooperation Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief Cabinet Councilor on External Affairs at
Prime Minister’s Cabinet, Ambassador to India and Ambassador to France. Actually, Vice-President of
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), Executive Vice-President of The Council on East
Asian Community (CEAC), President of the Japan-India Association.
KAWAZU KunihikoDeputy Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division,
European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990. Served as
various positions, including Principal Deputy Director, Status of U.S. Force Agreement Office, Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty Division, North American Affairs Bureau (2002-2004), First Secretary, the Permanent
Mission of Japan to the United Nations and Other International Organization of Geneva (2004-2007) andDirector, Cabinet Legislation Bureau (2007-2010).
KODERA Kiyoshi

Vice President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Served as Alternate Executive Director for Japan at the WorldBank (1991-1994), Country Director for Central Asia at the World Bank (1997-2001), Deputy
Vice-Minister of Finance for International Affairs, Ministry of Finance (2005), Executive Secretary of the
Joint World Bank-IMF Development Committee, and Deputy Corporate Secretary of the World Bank
(2006-2010).
KINBARA Kazuyuki

Director, International Affaris Bureau, Japan Business Federation (KEIDANREN)

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Received M.Litt. of International Relations from Faculty ofSocial Studies, the University of Oxford in 1983. Entered KEIDANREN in 1979. Served as various
positions, including Special Assistant to the Japanese Ambassador to the Mission of Japan to the EC(Brussels), Senior Research Fellow, 21st Public Policy Institute, Group Manager for European
Affairs/Trade Affairs, Deputy Director, International Economic Affairs Bureau.
(In order of appearance)83. Keynote Papers
Session I : The Black Sea Area in the Changing World

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo
Professor, University of Shizuoka / President, The Study Group on“Japan-Black Sea Area Relations,” GFJInternational Politics in Transition in the Black Sea Area
1.

Fluctuations in the international political structure of the Black Sea area

The international politics of the Black Sea area has always been in constant change.
Historically, the Black Sea was controlled by the Ottoman Empire from the end of fifteenth century,
was dominated by the Russian and Ottoman Empires in the 18th century, became aninternationalized sea with the involvement of Britain, France, and Austria-Hungary in 19th century,and eventually became the sea where NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization confronted eachother during the Cold War era. Immediately after the Revolutions of Eastern European in 1989 andthe demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, it became a sea in a vacuum of power, where none of thegreat powers dominated. However, soon after it again came under Russian and Turkish control, as
the two countries strengthened mutual cooperation beginning around 1997~1998 in order tomaintain the status quo in region. However, the Black Sea began to become internationalized again
as EU and NATO eastward enlargements approached around 2002~2003, resulting in intensified
confrontation between status-quo forces aiming to keep the Black Sea closed, and revisionist forces
aiming to open it to international society. As such, the power structure of international politics inthe Black Sea area became, in essence, a bi-polar one.
Significantly, this structure composed of status-quo and revisionist forces in the Black Sea
region can be discerned not only in the dimension of relations among the states, but also in
sub-national, trans-national and regional dimensions in the Black Sea region. Thus, sub-national
and trans-national actors such as political elites, ethnic organizations, religious organizations,
NGOs seeking democracy and human rights, commercial enterprises, non-state military groups,
terrorist organizations, organized crime syndicates, local entities, etc., in the Black Sea region havealso promoted activities supporting the status-quo or revisionism in the region. This bi-polarstructure is noticeable in the issues characteristic of the region, such as the frozen conflicts,
democratization, and energy security. i This bi-polar structure also seems to have influenced
regional cooperation within the BSEC.
However, the balance of power between status-quo and revisionist forces within the bi-polarstructure has not been fixed, but in the recent past it has been fluctuating back and forth every few
years. During 2003 and 2004, it was inclined favorably toward the Western powers as a result of
the EU/NATO enlargements towards the East in the spring of 2004, as well as the Rose and Orange
Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively. The GUAM organizationii

9caused a restrengthening of cooperation between the member states, and expanded it from
economic to political cooperation at the summits in Chisinau (2005), Kiev (2006), Baku (2007) and
Batumi (2008). However, the pendulum began to swing back in 2005, as Russian foreign policy
became more assertive, as suggested by the well-known speech of President Vladimir Putin in
Munich in February 2007.iii As a result, the confrontation between the two sides intensified,culminating in the Georgian-Russian war in 2008. After the war, however, the West and Russia
sought to “reset” relations, and reached a rapprochement. The GUAM restricted its cooperation toeconomic fields.
2.

The end of the “reset” policy

These “reset” relations, however, did not extend beyond the narrow common interests of theWest and Russia – the new START treaty, stability in Afghanistan, fights against terrorism, etc. －as the author anticipated in January 2010.iv After the NATO Lisbon summit in October 2010,
relations abruptly deteriorated over the Missile Defense issue. At the Lisbon Summit, President
Medvedev proposed the “sectoral approach”, in which Russia and NATO would create a joint
missile defense system, with each of the two powers assuming responsibility for shooting down
missiles traveling over specific geographical zones distributed between them.v In other words,
Russia would guarantee security against the missile attacks from the East and the South for thezone assigned to it.vi However, NATO did not accept this proposal, stating that the security of its
members should be guaranteed by NATO itself, not by non-member states such as Russia. Russia
then demanded that NATO provide a formal guarantee of refraining from missile attacks against
Russia in a legally binding document.vii When NATO rejected this demand, Russia asked for atechnical guarantee that NATO’s missile defenses would never overpower Russian nuclear
deterrence in the form of a limit on the number, speed, and placement of NATO’s deployed missile
defense. viii However, NATO began to deploy its missile defense facilities in Europe in 2011
without accepting Russia’s demands. The NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012 declared that
“NATO missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic
deterrence capabilities,” and it proposed a joint NATO-Russia Missile Data Fusion Centre and a
joint Planning Operations Centre to cooperate on missile defense.ix President Putin was absent
from the Chicago summit, and a NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement was not issued, in contrast
to the Lisbon NATO Summit in October 2010, which issued a NRC Joint Statement declaring “wehave embarked on a new stage of cooperation towards a true strategic partnership.”x
In addition, the confrontation also intensified over ‘sovereign democracy’ as theparliamentary and presidential elections approached in Russia in December 2011 and in March
2012, and in the US in November 2012. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted in December
2011 that the elections in Russia were neither fair nor free, and President Vladimir Putin criticized
her statement, asserting that it had instigated anti-government demonstrations in Russia.xi As such,the “reset” policy came to an end by late 2011, both between the US and Russia, and between the
EU and Russia. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton stated at the beginning of February
2012 that the Russian government should engage in dialogue with protesters and the opposition,and she also mentioned the differences between the EU and Russia that had emerged over Syria,
Iran, Georgia and Moldova.xii
The confrontation over democracy in Russia also appeared in EU-Russia relations, as thePartnership for Modernization between the EU and Russia aims not only for economic andtechnical modernization, but also for politico-social modernization, such as the development ofcivil society, rule of law, anti-corruption, etc. xiii EU High Representative Catherine Ashton
criticized a variety of laws adopted after the return of President Putin to the Kremlin, includinglaws limiting freedom of assembly, forcing the NGOs receiving foreign funds present themselves10as ‘foreign agents’, allowing internet filtering, xiv and defining certain acts as treason. xv The
confrontation between the West and Russia over democracy in Russia culminated in the adoptionof a law by the US Congress in mid-December 2012 prohibiting entrance to the US of the Russians
accused of involvement in the death in custody of anti-corruption lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, as
well as in laws adopted by the Duma banning Americans from adopting Russian children andoutlawing human rights organizations that receive any private or public support from the US or
employ any US citizens.xvi
The EU and Russia confronted each other in the field of economics as well. The EU has
demanded a “WTO Plus” trade regime in negotiations over a new agreement with Russia, while
Russia has recently started to assert that the EU should negotiate with a Customs Union composedof Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, but not with Russia alone.xvii They have also opposed eachother over the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the Customs Union, thetwo of which are clearly incompatible, as well as over the Third Energy Package, which provides
for increased liberalization of the gas market of the EU. The EU has insisted on de-monopolizationand liberalization of the energy market by separating production, transportation and consumption,
while Russia, namely Gazprom, has attempted to dominate it by monopolizing these three sectors.
The European Commission announced the initiation of an anti-trust investigation against
Gazprom in September 2012. xviii Furthermore, the EU and Russia have competed over gas
pipelines, primarily the Southern Gas Corridor and the South Stream. In particular, Russia has
opposed the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline, arguing that all the Caspian states must be in agreementwith it from a legal point of view, and Russia has also expressed its concern about environmental
damage caused by the pipeline around the Caspian Sea. On the other hand, the EU has questioned
Russia about whether all of the littoral countries had been in agreement over the construction of
the Nord Stream. Regarding the environmental issue, the EU has promised to keep its effect on theenvironment to the lowest level by the use of high technology. In addition, the EU has asserted
that energy imports from Russia will never decrease, as the EU’s demand for energy will continue
to steadily increase.xix
3.

The transformation of relations within the status-quo forces, Turkey and Russia

In the international environment discussed above, how have regional politics around theBlack Sea area developed? The most prominent structural transformation of regional politics isthat of relations within the status-quo forces – Russia and Turkey. Until recently, they had
strengthened their cooperation. They concluded a strategic Eurasian action plan in 2002, andopened the Blue Stream pipeline in 2003. Turkey opposed the introduction of NATO’s Active
Endeavor operation into the Black Sea, taking Russian national interests into consideration.
However, these cooperative relations between the two states to maintain the status quo in theBlack Sea area have recently become more confrontational. This change comes mainly from thefact that Turkey’s foreign policy has become more assertive and pro-American. It has expanded its
interests into Central Asia through the South Caucasus, proposing a plan to construct a railway
from Turkey across Georgia to North Ossetia,xx and it has become a dialogue partner of SCO(Shanghai Cooperation Organization) at the annual summit in Beijing on June 2012. It also has
strengthened relations with Chinaxxi and Kazakhstan.xxii At the same time, Turkey has switched tomore pro-American course since the confrontational foreign policy it had with the US when it
refused to allow the US to use military bases in the country during the Iraq War. This change of
attitude is reflected in Turkey’s officially agreeing to have in its territory an American radar system
in September 2011.xxiii Turkey has also aligned itself with the international community on the
Syrian issue. Such an assertive and pro-American foreign policy by Turkey may be explained by
the fact that the current ruling party, the Justice and Development Party, has succeeded both inputting the army under its control and in sustaining economic development.xxiv

11

As a result of these developments, Turkey cannot avoid a confrontation with Russia, whose
foreign policy had already become assertive under President Putin. Thus, the two states have beenin opposition over many issues, including Missile Defense, CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe),
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), Cyprus, South Caucasus, Mediterranean Sea gas deposits,
Syria, and Iran. In the military and security sphere, Turkey has insistently opposed the Russian
demand that the flank ceilings on Russian forces should be removed.xxv Russia has refrained fromrecognizing the PKK as a terrorist group, in contrast to the US, which has helped Turkey’s fightagainst the PKK by agreeing to the basing of US unmanned Predator drones at Incirlik air base inTurkey.xxvi Russia and Turkey also have differing views on Syria. Russia has supported the Assadregime, while Turkey has asserted that it should step down, an opinion in line with that of theinternational community and the Arab League. Turkey has forced a Syrian aircraft to land in
Ankara and inspected its cargo. According to Turkish authorities, found on board were
Russian-made parts for military radar and missiles, as well as over a dozen of Russian Federal
Security Services personnel.xxvii
The competition between the two states has also increased in the energy sphere recently, incontrast to the period when the two had cooperated in the construction of the Blue Stream pipelinein the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. This is because Turkey has an objective to become an energy hub,while Russia has consistently seen energy as the main source of its great power status, and has
attempted to monopolize the gas transportation route. Therefore, the interests of the two states
have clashed over the offshore gas deposits in the East Mediterranean Sea. Since the East
Mediterranean natural gas deposits were discovered by Texas-based Noble Energy during 2010
and 2011, the Republic of Cyprus (the so-called Greek Cypriots) and Israel have delineated theirrespective exclusive economic zones, and have coordinated the exploration and export of gas
together with Greece. But Turkey, which has never recognized the Republic of Cyprus as anindependent state, also explored the gas deposits in the region in September 2011 and April 2012,
under escort by Turkish warships and planes stationed in the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (so-called Northern Cyprus). Russia, on the other hand, has expressed its intention toparticipate in the trilateral projects among Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, and Israel. Therefore,
Turkey now finds itself confronted by the Republic of Cyprus, Israel, and Greece, as well as
Russia.xxviii
They have also been in opposition over gas prices. Turkey demanded that Gazprom reduce
gas prices in the fall of 2011, but the company refused to do so. Turkey then concluded anagreement with Azerbaijan on the transit and supply of Azerbaijan gas to Turkey on December
26th, 2011, which would become the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) in June 2012, and it
then continued its negotiations with Gazprom from the stronger position this agreement put it in.
As a result, Turkey succeeded in signing an agreement with Gazprom on December 29th, 2012,
under which Moscow would send its gas to Turkey at lower prices and with a mitigation of the“take or pay” clause. xxix However, Turkey was not fully satisfied with the agreement, because
while it did stipulate that the South Stream gas pipeline would go through Turkey’s Economic
Exclusion Zone in the Black Sea, it did not include a provision allowing Turkey to import BlackSea oil through the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, as Turkey desired.xxx
However, in order to compensate for the deal with Moscow, which permitted the constructionof the South Stream gas pipeline, Turkey embarked on urging the construction of theTrans-Caspian gas pipeline project with the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, with the objectiveof transporting gas from Turkmenistan to Europe through Turkey, connecting the Trans-Caspiangas pipeline and the Trans-Anatolia gas pipeline in the framework of the Southern Gas
Corridor.xxxi

12This transformation of Turkish foreign policy and its resulting changes in relations between
Turkey and Russia have also changed relations between Turkey and Romania. In the past, theviews of Romania and Turkey on the Black Sea area were polar opposite, with Turkey being astatus-quo force, and Romania a revisionist force. Thus, Turkey opposed the proposal by Romania
to extend NATO’s naval anti-terrorist operation Active Endeavour from the Mediterranean into theBlack Sea, and attempted to obtain a consensus opposing it among the littoral states by organizing
the BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Force) in April 2001. It succeeded in preventing theextension of the NATO operation by organizing Operation Black Sea Harmony in March 2004.
Turkey argued that the presence of NATO’s navies in the Black Sea would change the balance ofpower at the area, and would cause deterioration in relations with Russia.xxxii Furthermore, when
Romania organized the Black Sea Forum in June 2006 in Bucharest, Turkey was not pleased withthis initiative and sent a lower-ranking official to the conference, in contrast to other states such as
GUAM member states, which sent their presidents to the meeting. Still now, Turkey and Romania
have different views about a possible integration of BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony.
Turkey proposes to integrate the two in order to strengthen their function, while Romania opposes
this, as it is worried that strengthened regional Black Sea maritime forces might make the BlackSea more closed.xxxiii Nevertheless, the two states concluded a strategic partnership in December
2011, which led to the establishment of a firm alliance line among Warsaw, Bucharest, Ankara, andWashington in the area of the missile defense cooperation.
4.

NATO enlargement, the Eastern Partnership, and the Customs Union

In accordance with their relationship to NATO, the states around the wider Black Sea area canbe categorized as follows: the NATO member states are Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania,
Croatia, Albania (as of September 2009); the states with MAP (Membership Action Plan) status are
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro; and the states with the status of ‘Intensified Dialog’ with
NATO, which the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit specified as future members of NATO, are
Ukraine and Georgia. Both Ukraine and Georgia have developed their relations with NATOthrough the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Georgia Commission respectively. In
particular, Georgia has contributed to NATO’s security operations by sending over 1500 military
personnel to Afghanistanxxxiv, in contrast to Ukraine, which declared itself to be a non-blockstate.xxxv Georgia’s contribution is an important one for such a small country, especially consideringthat NATO was enforced to introduce ‘Smart Security’xxxvi.
As for the relationship between the states of the Black Sea area and the EU, the EU member
states are Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania, although the latter two states have been monitored
through the CVM (Cooperation and Verification Mechanism) since their accession to the EU on
January 1st, 2007. The EU candidate states are Croatia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republicof Macedonia, and Turkey. The states with the status of potential candidates are Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo under UN Security Resolution 1244. The EU has
promised to make Turkey and the West Balkan states members of the union if all of the conditions
imposed by the EU are met. In the case of the West Balkan states, this will occur through the
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), in the same way that the Central and Eastern
European states were promised through the Association Agreement.
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been targeted as membersof the Eastern Partnership, but the EU has never promised that they would become members of
the union. The Eastern Partnership was proposed at the initiative of Poland and Sweden in May
2008, as neither European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) launched in May 2004, nor ‘ENP Plus’
presented by Germany in July 2006 produced any fruitful results. The decision-making process to13

create the Eastern Partnership was accelerated by the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008, andthe partnership was launched in May 2009. Its objectives are to prepare the targeted members foraccession to the EU through increased political association and economic cooperation between
them and the EU.
Among the six Eastern Partnership states, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have alreadystarted negotiations on the Accession Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area (DCFTA), while Armenia and Azerbaijan are preparing to start negotiations on the DCFTA.
Negotiations over the agreement between the EU and Belarus are at a standstill, because essential
political conditions such as democratization have not been fulfilled in Belarus.
The EU and Ukraine started negotiations on a new agreement in March 2007, and they agreed
to start negotiations on the Association Agreement at the Paris Summit in September 2008.
Following that, Ukraine became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in May 2008,
and it entered negotiations on DCFTA in February 2008. The EU and Ukraine initialed the
Association Agreement document on 30 March 2012 and the DCFTA on 19th July 2012. xxxvii
However, the EU refrained from signing it, due to the politically-motivated convictions of former
government members in Ukraine during the same year. The EU Foreign Affairs Council decided in
December 2012 that the EU would sign the Association Agreement at the Vilnius summit inNovember 2013, if conditions could be implemented in the following three areas: to follow up theshortcomings of the parliamentary elections, to address the issue of selective justice and prevent
recurrences, and to make progress on reforms as defined in the joint Association Agenda, such as
in the judiciary, rule of law, human rights, anti-corruption, and citizens’ participation in publicdecision making.xxxviii
Moldova and Georgia started negotiations on the Association Agreement on 12 January 2010
and on 15 July 2010 respectively, and they launched negotiations on DCFTA in March 2012. The
current coalition government, the ‘Alliance for European Integration’, has actively promoted
negotiation on the Political Association and DCFTA with the EU, and it has produced quite
substantial results within a very short period. This is reflected in the words of European
Commissioner Stefan Fule: “I have a dream of a Republic of Moldova, prosperous, loyal to ourvalues, consolidated, modernized, and re-integrated into the European family. […] I am talking
here about the most powerful foreign policy instrument of the European Union and the expressionof its ultimate transformative power – the prospective for a country to accede.”xxxix The US andGermany have also shown increasing interest in Moldova under the current AIE government, asshown by the visits of US Vice-President Joe Biden in Chisinau in March 2011 and of German
Prime Minister Angela Merkel in Chisinau in August 2012.
Ukraine and Moldova have been approaching the EU through the Association Agreement,
DCFTA, and the Energy Community; however, tensions between them and Russia have intensified,
as Russia has attempted to prevent Ukraine and Moldova from concluding the Association
Agreement, including DCFTA with the EU. President Putin has started to reintegrate CIS member
states through the Customs Union, the Single Economic Space, and Eurasian Union since May
2012, when he became the President of Russia.xl President Putin urged Ukraine to become amember of the Customs Union together with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, in exchange for a
reduction in gas prices from Moscow. President Yanukovici proposed a substitute ‘3 + 1’ formulafor the Customs Union, which would enable Ukraine to participate in the union in a limited
number of areas without making any political commitments. xli However, President Putin
categorically refused this suggestion, stating that Ukraine had only two options: becoming a full
member of the Customs Union, or not becoming a member at all. He also told Moldovan Prime
Minister Vlad Filat in Moscow in September 2012 that Moldova should withdraw from the14

European Energy Community, including its Third Energy Package, if Moldova wants Russian gas
prices to be reduced. As for Georgia, although there is not currently some reliable information on
negotiations between Georgia and Russia, it is said that Russia might propose to Georgia a barterexchange, such as Georgia’s return to the CIS in exchange for a resumption of imports from
Georgia.xlii If this information is true, and if Georgia returned to the CIS, Georgia’s agreementswith DCFTA and the Customs Union would be incompatible.
5.

The South Caucasus at the crossroads

Despite the difficulties faced by the states discussed above, neither the South Caucasus states
nor the West Balkan states have faced such difficulties. Armenia and Azerbaijan have not started
negotiations on the DCFTA, and the Balkan states are not target members of the Eurasian Union,
so their current relations with the EU have not yet brought them into confrontation with the ideas
of President Putin on the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union. However, the South Caucasus
and the Balkans are a focal point in the international politics of the Black Sea. The South Caucasus
faces the Iran issue, conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, the birth ofa new government and the start of cohabitation regime in Georgia, construction plans for new
railway and highway infrastructure, the influence of Russia and Turkey, and the Trans-Caspianand Trans-Anatolian gas pipelines and Russian gas policy opposing them. The Balkans is the place
where Russia’s South Stream gas pipeline and the EU’s South Gas Corridor cross.
The characteristic structure of regional politics in the South Caucasus is composed of two
pillars. One is the relationship between Russia and Georgia, and the other is the oppositional
relationship between the Russia-Armenia alliance and the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia alliance.
Tense relations between Russia and Georgia have never improved since the war in August 2008.
Russia has refused to withdraw both its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and its army stationed in these two places. The Geneva talks among Russia, Georgia,
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and US under the co-chairs of the EU, the OSCE, and the UN haveproduced only modest results, such as the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism(IPRM).xliii Georgia continues to express its intention to accede to the NATO as well as the EU, incontrast to Ukraine and Moldova, which have declared their intention to become members of theEU, but not to accede to NATO. Relations between Georgia and NATO have been intensified
through the NATO-Georgian Commission and the Annual National Program. The new Georgian
defense minister declared a continuation of the country’s defense policy by strengthening
cooperation with America and NATO, stationing 1600 soldiers in Afghanistan, and creating aprofessional army. xliv
The basis of the second pillar of regional politics in the South Caucasus lies in the conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. To this basic relationship we
can add Russian support for the position of Armenia, and Turkish and Georgian support for
Azerbaijan. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey have cooperated, in general, through the BTC oilpipeline, the BTE gas pipeline, and GUAM.
In an exception to this general pattern, since 2010 Turkey has attempted to improve relations
with Armenia, and since around 2000 Azerbaijan has tried to improve relations with Russia inorder to obtain its support for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in its favor. However,neither attempt has produced fruitful results. The failure of negotiations over the Gabara Radar
Station between Russia and Azerbaijan in 2012 seems to have made the oppositional relations
between Russia-Armenia and Azerbaijan-Turkey-Georgia even more fixed. Last year Moscow and
Baku negotiated on the extension of the lease to Russia of the Gabara Radar Station, as it expiredin 2012. Russia demanded another 25 years, while Azerbaijan is said to have proposed a yearly15

lease renewable up to 40 times (at 300 million dollars annually), and to have tried to use the issue
as a bargaining tool in the negotiation process on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Azerbaijan could
not obtain a favorable settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh, while Russia failed to extend the lease on
the radar station.xlv
Despite these tensions, two factors might contribute to changing the balance of power in theSouth Caucasus. One is possible changes in Georgian foreign and security policy under the
newly-elected Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. His recent comments seem to suggest
a multilateral foreign policy, as when he stated that “Armenia provides a good example forGeorgia.” He may be moving towards improving relations with Armenia through a proposal on
the reopening of the Russia-Armenia railway through Georgia, including Abkhazia.xlvi He appears
to promote a multilateral diplomacy, as he seems to be aiming to improve relations with Russia as
well by progressing relations with Armenia, and, at the same time, to be aiming to continue close
relations with the EU, NATO, and the US. Turkey has also proposed a truck and bus route fromthat country through Georgia to the North Caucasus in Russia.xlvii Competition may increase
among the states in the region over the route of the newly proposed rail and highways, and thismay cause a change in geo-strategic relations among the states in the region.
Another factor which might change the balance of power in the region is the Iran issue. The
potential for an attack by Israel against Iran has caused a tense situation in the South Caucasus. A
political scientist in Tbilisi claimed that Russia had a plan to attack Georgia if Israel attacked Iran –a claim denied by Russian political scientists.xlviii A Russian military official disclosed informationthat Russia had started to prepare military operations before 2009 in case Iran were to be attacked
by Israel.xlix Owing to his information, Russia had achieved preparedness in its military bases in
Gyumri, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia against potential attacks from Turkey, Georgia andAzerbaijan. Furthermore, he said, “Perhaps, it will be necessary to break the Georgian transport
blockade and supply the transport corridors leading to Armenia by military means.” If this is true,
the suspension of the CFE treaty by Russia in December 2007 had real importance for promoting
its security policy in the South Caucasus. This might be the reason that Turkey opposed the liftingof flank ceilings on Russian forces.
6.

The South Stream gas pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor in the Balkans

The Balkans and the South Caucasus are also a focal point of regional politics in the Black Sea
area, because of the energy politics in the region. The EU’s South Gas Corridor and the RussianSouth Stream gas pipeline meet each other in the Balkans and South Caucasus.
The European Union has attempted to diversify its gas import routes in order to reduce its
dependence on Russia. Therefore, it initially made efforts to realize the Nabucco gas pipeline, theroute of which was planned to extend from Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Iran to Europe throughTurkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria. However, energy companies from Germanyand Hungary decided to withdraw from the Nabucco project in 2012l and, instead of Nabbuco, theagreement on the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) was concluded between Azerbaijan andTurkey in June 2012 as one component of the South Gas Corridor. Thus, it is thought that TANAP
will be connected either with Nabucco West, which extends to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, andAustria, or with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline projects (TAP), which extend to Greece, Albania, andItaly.li As such, the Southern Gas Corridor has been promoted as a connection between theTrans-Caspian pipeline, Trans-Anatolian pipeline, and Nabucco West or Trans-Adriatic pipeline.
At the same time, Russia also needed to diversify its gas transportation route in order toreduce its dependence on transit states to Europe such as Ukraine. Therefore, Russia has

16

developed the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline as well as Nord Steam 1lii, and has attempted to realize
South Stream since 2007. South Stream is an important project for Russia, as it is expected tocontribute to increasing the dependence of Ukraine on Russian energy supplies, to increasing
Russian influence in the Balkans, and to strengthening relations between Central Asia and Russia.
Furthermore, the pipeline project may prevent or impede access to Central Asian gas sources foralternative projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor pipelines.liii The route of South Stream has
finally been set as extending from Russia to Slovenia through Turkey’s Economic Exclusion Zone
in the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary.liv Bulgaria, Hungary, and Serbia have alreadyconsented to the project.lv
In this way, the Balkans and South Caucasus have become focal points in relation to the SouthStream gas pipeline and the South Gas Corridor. In this context, Bulgaria seems to be the mostimportant hub in the Balkans for both projects, while Azerbaijan and Turkey are key countries for
the South Gas Corridor, as they have been promoting TANAP. This may be the reason that Russia
made a significant concession to Bulgaria in agreeing to a ten-year contract for gas supplies with
Gazprom, which stipulates a 20% decrease in gas prices and a more favorable “take and pay”
clause.lvi This is in striking contrast to Russia’s dealings with Ukraine and Moldova, to which it
refused to reduce the price of its gas.
The recent relations of these two states recalls the situation surrounding the Treaty of San
Stefano in March 1878, in which Russia supported the independence of Great Bulgaria with the
expectation that Bulgaria would be an important strategic ally in the Balkans. Needless to say,
today Bulgaria is a member of the EU and NATO, and the current situation in Bulgaria iscompletely different from that in 1878. What should be emphasized here, however, is that theimportance of Bulgaria in the Balkans will almost certainly increase as an energy hub if the SouthStream and the Southern Gas Corridor are constructed. In addition, in connection with Russia, it
may be worth mentioning both that Russia and Serbia have concluded a strategic partnership, andthat the Russian government media outlet Vocea Rusiei encouraged the attempt by the Romanianruling party coalition to suspend Romanian President Traian Basescu in the summer of 2012.lvii
This appears to be because Basescu refused Romanian participation in South Stream in 2008lviii,
and promoted the Black Sea Forum and its Eastern Diplomacy, focusing on Moldova through the‘Washington-London-Bucharest’ axis.lix As such, it seems clear that Russia under President Putin
has been aiming to strengthen its traditional foreign policy towards the South such as the Balkans
and the South Caucasus, as well as the Eurasian Union.
As the preceding discussion has made clear, the states in the Balkans and in theSouth-Caucasus region are now situated at the crossroads of influences from the East and West, as
well as from the North and South. Taking into consideration the many unstable factors in theworld such as the world economic-financial recession, the transformation of the balance of power
among the great powers, increased competition for energy resources, terrorism, new wars, and soon, the future of the Black Sea area is uncertain. However, it is certain that the Black Sea area willcontinue to be a key focal point in world politics, even as the center of world politics moves to theAsia-Pacific region.
i

六鹿茂夫「広域黒海地域の国際政治」羽場久美子、溝端佐登史編『ロシア・拡大ＥＵ』ミネルヴァ書房、265-284 頁、2011 年 4 月。(Shigeo Mutsushika, ”International Politics at the Wider Black Sea Area”, in
K. Haba et al (eds.), The EU and Russia, Minerva, Japan, April 2011, pp.265-284.
ii GUAM is the organization created in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova.
iii President of Russia, Speech and the following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,
Munich, February 10, 2007.
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.
shtml.

17

Shigeo Mutsushika, “Transformation of Relations among the Big Powers over the Black Sea Region after
the Georgian War,” Report of the Third Japan-Black Sea Dialogue on “Prospect of Changing Black Sea Area
and Role of Japan,” The Global Forum of Japan, Tokyo, 2010, pp.19-28.
v Stephene Fidler and Gregory L.White, “Russia Rebuffed on Missile Offer,” The Wall Street Journal,
November 26, 2010.
vi Interview, Brussels, March 1, 2012.
vii Tom Z. Collina, “Missile Defense Cooperation: Seizing the Opportunity,” Arms Control Association, May
24, 2011. Interview, Brussels, March 1, 2012.
viii “RF, NATO need to understand where they can agree on missile defense – view,” Itar-Tass, November
14, 2011. Interview, Brussels, 1 March 2012.
ix Chicago Summit Declaration, 20 May 2012, Article 62.
x NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement at the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council held in Lisbon on
November 20, 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68871.htm
xi Matt Spetalnick and Susan Cornwell, “Analysis: US, Russia resetting ‘reset’ button in relations,” December
9, 2011.
xii Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Russia, European Parliament, Brussels,
February 1, 2012.
xiii Interview, Brussels in March 2012, and Moscow in September 2012.
xiv “Statement by Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the amendments to the Russian
NGO law,” A 319/12, Brussels, July 10, 2012; “The EU and Russia hold human rights consultation,” A 350/12,
Brussels, July 24, 2012; “The European Union – Russian Federation human rights consultation,” A 566/12,
Brussels, December 10, 2012; “Speech by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in the European
Parliament on the political use of justice in Russia,” Strasbourg, A 403/12, September 11, 2012.
xv “Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative on new law on treason in Russia”, A 473/12,
Brussels, October 25, 2012.
xvi Witold Rodkiewicz, “Human rights back on the agenda of Russia’s relations with the West,” OSW,
December 12, 2012. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Putin Activates Anti-American PR Campaign,” Eurasian Daily
Monitor, January 10, 2013.
xvii “Speech by EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecelia Malmstrom on behalf of High Representative
Catherine Ashton on the Swoboda Report,” December 12, 2012, p.2.
xviii “The European Commission opens antitrust proceedings against Gazprom,” OSW, September 5, 2012.
xix Interview, Brussels, March 2012.
xx Paul Goble, “Turkey Wants to Open a Transportation Corridor through Georgia to North Ossetia,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, November 16, 2012.
xxi Selcuk Colakoglu, “Turkey-China Relations: Seeking A Strategic Partnership – Analysis,” Eurasia Review,
April 17, 2012.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/17042012-turkey-china-relations-seeking-a-strategic-partnership-analysis.
xxii Richard Weitz, “Kazakhstan-Turkey Presidential Summit deepens Economic Ties,” Eurasian Daily
Monitor, October 19, 2012. Richard Weitz, “Kazakhstani-Turkish Security Cooperation Deepens Within the
CICA Framework,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, October 26, 2012xxiii Thom Shanker, “U.S. Hails Deal With Turkey on Missile Shield,” Washington Post, September 15, 2011.
xxiv Ahmet T. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, andCommunism,” Insight Turkey, Vol.14, No.2, 2012, pp.37-57.
xxv Interview, Brussels, March 2012.
xxvi Saban Kardas, “US-Turkey Security Cooperation Deepened,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 8, Issue 205,
November 8, 2011.
xxvii Szymon Ananicz and Witold Rodkiewicz, “Turkish-Russian Tension over the Syrian crisis,” Center for
Eastern Studies, October 17th, 2012.
xxviii Vladimir Socor, “Exploration Intensifying for East-Mediterranean Natural Gas,” Eurasian Daily Monitor,
Volume 9, Issue 87, May 8, 2012. V. Socor, “Russia Backs Greece-Cyprus-Israel Triangle against Turkey on
Offshore Gas,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, Volume 9, Issue 87, May 8, 2012.
xxix Wojciech Kononczuk, Slawomir Matuszak, and Ewa Paszyc, “Russian-Turkish agreement on the SouthStream pipeline – an instrument of pressure on Ukraine,” OSW January 4, 2012.
xxx Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank, “Russo-Turkish Divergence (Part 2): The Energy Dimension,”
November 14, 2012.
http://www.gloria-center.org/2012/11/russo-turkish-divergence-part-ii-the-energy-dimension-2/) Yigal
iv

18

Schleifer, “Turkey: In Pipeline Deal with Russia Did Ankara Get a Bargain It Can’t Afford?” Eurasia Insight,
January 11, 2012 http://www.eurasianet.org.)
xxxi Vladimir Socor, “Turkey Sees Opportunity in Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project,” Eurasian Daily
Monitor, September 11, 2012.
xxxii Interview, Ankara, March 2006.
xxxiii Interview, Bucharest, March 2012.
xxxiv With a total of over 1500 military personnel, Georgia is one of the largest contributors to ISAF among
NATO’s partner countries. The Georgian Parliament has approved plans to contribute additional troops to
ISAF in autumn 2012, which would make Georgia the largest non-NATO troop contributor.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm.
xxxv “Developing constructive partnership between Ukraine and NATO,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine. http://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/euroatlantic-cooperation/ukraine-nato.
xxxvi http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-57E9F56D-3E959138/natolive/topics_84268.htm?
xxxvii http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/ukraine.
xxxviii 3209th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, December 10, 2012.
xxxix Stefan Fule, European Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood, speaking at
the EU-Moldova Forum organized by Deutsche Gesellshaft fur Auswartige Politik / Berlin, Germany October22, 2012. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-753_en.htm.
xl Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation,
Stagnation or Rivalry?” Chatham House, August 2012.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_dragnev
awolczuk.pdf.
xli Tadeus Iwanski and Rafal Sadowski, “Ukraine: Between the European Union and the Customs Union,”
OSW, December 12, 2012.
xlii Giorgi Menabde, “Will Georgia Reenter the CIS?” Eurasian Daily Monitor, February 6, 2013.
xliii Interview in Brussels and Tbilisi in March 2012.
xliv Giorgi Menabde, “Georgian Defense Minister Unveils Plans to Create Entirely Professional Army,
Compatible with NATO Forces”
xlv Aybeniz Turan, “Aliev-Sagsyan Summitt in Sochi: No credible Prospects for Russian Medation,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, volume 9, issue 25, February 6, 2011. Anar Valiev, “Azerbaijan: Difficult Year Ahead,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, volume 10, issue 6, January 14, 2013.
xlvi Vasili Rukhadze, “The Shift in Geopolitical Balance of Power in South Caucasus in Underway,” Eurasian
Daily Monitor, February 7, 2013.
xlvii Paul Goble, “Turkey Wants to Open a Transportation Corridor through Georgia to North Ossetia,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 16, 2012.
xlviii Interviews in Tbilisi in March 2012 and in Moscow in September 2012.
xlix Sergey Konovalov, “Moscow optimimizes its military grouping in the South,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
December
15,
2011,
RussiaandIndianReport,http://indrus.in/articles/2011/12/15/moscow_optimizes_its_military_grouping_in_the_south_14016.html.
l Konrad Mazur, “RWE may withdraw from Nabucco,” OSW, January 25, 2012. Tomasz Daborowski,“Hungary is losing faith in Nabucco,” OSW, April 25, 2012.
li Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, “Southern Gas Corridor managed by Azerbaijan and Turkey,” OSW, July 18, 2012.
lii Ewa Paszyc, “Russia: Gazprom has activated Nord Stream’s second pipeline,” OSW, October 10, 2012.
liii Szymon Kardas and Ewa Paszyc, “At any price: Russia is embarking on the construction of South Stream,
OSW, December 7, 2012.
liv T. Daborowski, A. Sadecki, M. Szpala, “Progress in the preparation for building South Stream” OSW,
November 7, 2012.
lv T. Daborowski, A. Sadecki, M. Szpala, “Progress in the preparation for building South Stream” OSW,
November 7, 2012. Tomasz Daborowski, “Bulgaria: cheaper gas from Russia in exchange for the approval ofSouth Stream,” OSW, November21, 2012.
lvi The level of compulsory payment has been reduced from 90% of the contracted volume of gas to 80%.
Tomasz Daborowski, Ibid.
lviiVocea Rusiei,”Romania este condusa de la Budapesta,”30.07.2012, http://romanian.ruvr.ru/83365248.html.
Vocea Rusiei,”Ce a promis Basescu lui Orban,”31.07.2012, http://romanian.ruvr.ru/83492768.html.
Vocea Risiei, “Valentin Mindrasescu, Curtea constitutional din Romania: intre formalism si realitate,”
1.08.2012, http://romanian.ruvr.ru/83634918.html.

19

Vladimir Socor, “Romania Firmly Abord Nabucco Project, Hits at Leverage vis-à-vis South Stream,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 3, 2008.
lix 六鹿茂夫「ルーマニアの東方外交」羽場久美子、小森田秋夫、田中素香編『ヨーロッパの東方拡大』岩波出版、2006 年 6 月、233－250 頁。(Shigeo Mutsushika, “Romania’s Eastern Diplomacy,” Kumiko Ha
ba, Akio Komorida, Sokou Tanaka(eds.) Enlargement of Europe tothe East, Iwanamishoten, June 2006,
pp.233-25.)
lviii

Mithat RENDE
Director General, Multilateral Economic Affairs, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Turkey
I would like to start by expressing my most sincere thanks and appreciation to the Global
Forum of Japan for organizing the “Fourth Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogue” and through them toall the sponsors and supporters of this important initiative.
From the ancient Silk Road to modern oil pipelines and transportation corridors, the Black Sea
region has served as a bridge and crossroads of both modern and traditional routes of commerce
and migration, throughout the history. It encompasses an area of approximately 20 million square
kilometers with a population of over 330 million. The region, at the heart of Eurasia, enjoys vast
natural and human resources combined with deep cultural heritage. Using its potentials by way ofcloser cooperation would serve the purpose of making the Black Sea region a sea of peace, stability
and prosperity.
As we have marked the 20th Anniversary last year, we are pleased to see that the BSEC now
stands as the most institutionalized and inclusive economic cooperation organization of the region.
It has proven to be the main framework for multilateral cooperation and a significant platform forsustainable development. Moreover, the interest of the international community towards thisregion has grown significantly, and BSEC is viewed by the international community as a uniqueand credible partner. Hence, there are 17 observers and 16 Sectoral Dialogue Partners of the BSEC.
With the membership of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU, the Union has gained more
representation within BSEC. Number of EU members within BSEC has tripled this way. On theother hand, cooperation and interaction between BSEC and EU are still far from being satisfactory.
In order to further strengthen BSEC, it is important to engage in meaningful cooperation with the
EU. We believe that BSEC can benefit from the experiences of the EU as well as the opportunities
that it can offer. While BSEC offers the EU a well-established institutional framework, the EU
could assist BSEC in carrying out major projects in the wider Black Sea Area. However BSEC
should not be perceived as a subordinate of any other international organization. We would like
BSEC to be seen as the main partner of the EU in the wider Black Sea area.
As we all witness today, the global economy remains in a difficult phase. The risks remain
significant. Growth is slowing in both advanced and emerging economies and some regions arelikely to be in a recession. We are all aware that the global repercussions of the crisis in Europe
could be painful if things get worse. This increased uncertainty amplifies the need forstrengthened policy actions and greater ability to provide regional responses to global challenges.
With this in mind, BSEC’s new strategy appears especially timely. The updated “Economic
Agenda Towards an Enhanced Partnership” was endorsed at the Istanbul Summit, in June. In linewith the priority areas of action redefined at the new Economic Agenda, Turkey will continue tomake every effort for the effective implementation of the action plan of the Agenda. We believe

20

that this will help to advance our progress towards increasing intra-BSEC trade and investments,
sustainable development of the BSEC region, enhancing the role of civil society, as well as
institutional reform of BSEC by initiating new projects and ideas.
BSEC, a mature international organization, plays a unique role in disseminating the message
of peace and stability via concrete infrastructure projects on the ground. However, BSEC should
not be confined to economic cooperation only. Its potential goes much beyond that. In today’s
world, concepts such as democratization, pluralism, inclusiveness, intercultural dialogue are
gaining importance. The need to bring solutions to the problems on the basis of international law
and effective multilateralism has become more evident.
Cognizant of this fact, our approach to security is multi-dimensional and not limited to hard
security concerns alone. Climate change, for instance, is a global problem also evolving into asecurity issue in its own right, with serious implications in many fields. Epidemic diseases are nolonger tragedies that only threaten the less fortunate areas in the world. The current financial crisis
speaks for itself when we look at how badly it affected economies worldwide. Illegal migration,organized crime, energy security, democratization also stick out as crucial topics that are bound to
dominate the regional as well as global agenda.
Energy supply security has become one of the most important issues which dominate theinternational agenda. In this respect, the wider Black Sea region, where energy producer countries
co-exist with energy consumer and transit countries, presents us a unique case in terms of global
energy supply security. This unique position of the Black Sea brings with it important duties andresponsibilities to the countries of the region.
We should keep in mind that the BSEC region is the lynchpin between Europe and Asia. The
multiple transformations taking place here have a direct bearing on the membership of thisorganization. The evolution of the integration within the European Union, or the historicalawakening of the Arab world, for instance, are all going to have significant repercussions in theBlack Sea area, situated in the epicenter of Eurasia.
On its part, Turkey is making every effort to contribute to enhancing confidence andcooperation in this wide region. We are becoming increasingly active in our foreign policy, startingwith our neighbors and reaching out to far-away geographies and international organizations. In
all these endeavors, our driving goal is to help generate peace, stability and prosperity in regionaland global terms. We also try to help conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts in our region
through several mediation activities and regional cooperation initiatives. We aim to addresscertain pertinent issues through global initiatives such as the Alliance of Civilizations, theMediation for Peace or Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, both of which are co-sponsored byTurkey.
We would like to engage non state actors including your organization, the Global Forum ofJapan, in this endeavor. For that we do believe that Japan’s entrepreneurship skills, capacity andwillingness to work together will provide necessary leverage to achieve sustainable and inclusive
development in the region and beyond to the interest of all our people.
Therefore, I fully support the proposal of Ambassador Victor Tvircun, Secretary General of
BSEC to organize the Fifth “Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogue” in Istanbul, with the participation of
the business communities from the Black Sea region and Japan with a special focus on intermodaltransport projects.
Thank you for your attention.

21

Session II : The Development Strategy of the Black Sea Area

HATTORI Michitaka
Deputy Director,
Institute for Russian & NIS Economic Studies
A Viewpoint on the Black Sea as Economic SpaceIn this presentation I refer only to the countries geographically facing the Black Sea, i.e. Russia,
Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia, with a special emphasis on Russia and Ukraine.
First of all, I have to point out difficulty in featuring the Black Sea as economic space. Theremay be consensus regarding its geographical sphere. There are some notable topics likeconstruction of gas pipelines through the Black Sea. Statistical data concerning economic relations
among the countries of the region may be available. We even have a full-fledged regional
economic organization: Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). It is not,however, at least to me, self-evident what shall we focus on when we discuss the Black Sea
economic space.
Maybe one of the standard approaches is to analyze trade turnover. Therefore I made Table 1
and Figure 1 to survey merchandise trade relations among countries of the region. As we can see,
Russia is the biggest trader in the region, followed by Ukraine and Turkey. Russo-Ukrainian tradeturnover is the biggest in volume among all bilateral trade relations. Relatively small economies
like Ukraine, Bulgaria and Georgia tend to depend more heavily on intra-region trade, with an
exception of Romania. Russia enjoys huge trade surplus in intra-region trade supposedly owing to
its gas export, while many others record deficit.
I suspect, however, that the findings above are superficial. Russia is geographically too vast to
be regarded as a pure Black Sea nation. The same goes, to a lesser extent, to Ukraine and Turkey.
Most trade transactions between Russia and Ukraine have nothing to do with the Black Sea, likewhen Ukraine imports natural gas from Siberian field or when a Moscow company buys
machinery from a Kharkiv manufacturer. It may be better to limit the scope to relevant regions(regions of Southern Federal District in the case of Russia) than to take countries as a whole when
we discuss the Black Sea as economic space. This, true, makes statistical analysis extremely
difficult because of scarcity of materials.
We cannot overestimate significance of intra-Black-Sea economic relations to national
economies as a whole, especially to bigger ones like Russia or Turkey. But it is still of great
importance to particular regions facing the Black Sea. As is seen in Table 2, Black Sea countries
account for almost 30 % of trade turnover by economic entities of Russia’s Southern Federal
District. Euroregion “Donbas” is reported to be very successful in promoting economic relations
between Rostov Oblast of Russia and Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine after established in2010. Thus I would like to repeat that we had better put more emphasis on particular regions,rather than nation-states as a whole, in discussing the Black Sea as economic space.

22

Table 1 Merchantise Trade among countries of the Black Sea Region (2011)(million US dollars)
Trade w ith
TradeBlack Sea
with thecoutries
World (A)(B)

B/A

Trade partners
RussiaUkraine Romania Bulgaria

TurkeyGeorgia

Russia'trade turnover

Export516,481

61,48011.9%

30,520

1,828

3,477

25,409247

Import305,605

28,952

9.5%

20,122

1,727

690

6,374

39

Ukraine's
tradeturnover

Export

68,41025,93337.9%

19,820

951

755

3,749

658

Import82,60732,15338.9%

29,132

1,126

270

1,481

144

Romania's
trade turnover

Export62,742

8,957

14.3%

1,419

1,128

2,272

3,875

263

Import76,369

8,880

11.6%

2,915

1,096

2,199

2,650

20

Bulgaria's
trade turnover

Export28,330

6,609

23.3%

758

404

2,703

2,423

322

Import32,722

11,165

34.1%

5,770

1,314

2,260

1,547

275

Turkey's
trade turnover

Export134,907

13,316

9.9%

5,993

1,730

2,879

1,623

1,092

Import240,842

35,355

14.7%

23,953

4,812

3,801

2,475

314

Georgia's
trade turnover

Export

2,189

519

23.7%

37

141

20

94

228

Import

7,058

2,812

39.8%

390

706

188

256

1,272

Note: Each country's trade turnover is based on its own national statistics and often slightly differ from the figures shownin statistics of the trade parnters.

Figure 1 Network Image of Bilateral Trade Turnoveramong Countries of the Black Sea Region (2011)23

Table 2 Main Trade Partners ofSouthern Federal District of Russian Federation (2011)(1000 US Dollars)
Trade Partner
－
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
－

Total
UkraineTurkeyItaly
Netherlands
China
FranceGermany
Switzerland
Egypt
USA
Spain
GreeceIran
Malta
IsrealAzerbaijan
Syria
BrazilArgentina
CyprusSaudi Arabia
MoroccoJapan
Uzbekistan
South Korea
Turkmenistan
Tunisia
Bulgaria
Romania
PolandCountries of the BlackSea Region Total

Turnover%

ExportImport%%30,987,236 100.0%
4,690,918
15.1%
4,212,081
13.6%
3,541,426
11.4%
1,605,532
5.2%
1,554,261
5.0%
1,462,782
4.7%
859,3762.8%
815,9282.6%
814,1722.6%
804,384
2.6%
624,3272.0%
558,3591.8%
548,2311.8%
451,7171.5%
427,251
1.4%
390,965
1.3%
382,4431.2%
357,538
1.2%
355,4111.1%
331,175
1.1%
293,6200.9%
261,775
0.8%
228,7530.7%
212,386
0.7%
205,465
0.7%
202,355
0.7%
202,224
0.7%
184,3070.6%
178,139
0.6%
177,361
0.6%

19,059,937 100.0%
1,236,049
6.5%
2,708,787
14.2%
3,107,251
16.3%
1,465,060
7.7%
92,4850.5%
1,256,997
6.6%
146,357
0.8%
760,129
4.0%
609,183
3.2%
472,618
2.5%
442,7882.3%
479,252
2.5%
431,8122.3%
451,7142.4%
227,101
1.2%
240,460
1.3%
379,7222.0%
84,771
0.4%
297,399
1.6%
312,107
1.6%
288,0541.5%
251,611
1.3%
11,6600.1%
163,890
0.9%
4,696
0.0%
188,6361.0%
201,1101.1%
152,249
0.8%
122,604
0.6%
51,935
0.3%

11,927,299 100.0%
3,454,869
29.0%
1,503,294
12.6%
434,175
3.6%
140,473
1.2%
1,461,776
12.3%
205,785
1.7%
713,018
6.0%
55,7990.5%
204,9891.7%
331,766
2.8%
181,539
1.5%
79,1080.7%
116,4191.0%
30.0%
200,1501.7%
150,504
1.3%
2,721
0.0%
272,767
2.3%
58,012
0.5%
19,067
0.2%
5,566
0.0%
10,1640.1%
217,094
1.8%
48,4960.4%
200,769
1.7%
13,719
0.1%
1,114
0.0%
32,0580.3%
55,5340.5%
125,4261.1%

9,265,445

4,219,689

5,045,755

29.9%

22.1%

42.3%

Note: Southern Federal District of Russian Federation consists of Republic of Adygea, Astrakhan
Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, Republic of Kalmykia, Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast

Session Ⅲ : The Role of Japan for the Future of the Black Sea Area

KAWAZU KunihikoDeputy Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division,
European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
1. The Importance of Black Sea Region●As a Corridor Area Connecting Europe, Russia, Central Asia and Middle East
For Japan, which locating in the far east of Asia, honestly speaking, the Black Sea is not sofamiliar. “Sea” reminds ordinal Japanese people of the Pacific or the Sea of Japan, and it is not thesituation to imagine the Black Sea at the very first. It is rarely known that the Black Sea is very
international because six countries are littoral states, or very famous for delicious fishes. Becauseof the 22nd winter Olympic games in Sochi of Russia, many Japanese people realize that Sochi is24

locating at coast of the Black Sea and it is one of the most famous resort area in Russia, from theera of the Soviet Union.
However, it is no doubt that the Black Sea region is geographically very important at any
period of the time, which locates Western end of the Silk Road which connects Japan and Europe,
or in other words, very ends of Europe and it is exactly strategic point of East-West trading. At thesame time, from the North-South interchange point of view, for Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova,
Romania, and Ukraine, it is the only way to get out to the open sea. Ships of these five countries go
through Bosporus and Dardanelles then get the open sea.
When we pay attention to the Black Sea’s corridor function, the importance of the Black Sea
area will be much clearer. European countries import their energy resources from Russia, Middle
East, and Caucasus. And all the energy resources go through the Black Sea area. In the sense ofcommodity distribution and movement of people, it is also a very important corridor. Networkfrom the Central Asia and Caucasus to Europe comes into effect, when we can apply the Black Sea
area for a pathway. The numbers of tankers go through Bosporus increase every year.
●The Black Sea Countries: Countries that Have Potential Ability for Development
However, the importance of the Black Sea area does not rely on its corridor function. Eachcountry which locates at the Black Sea area has very high potential in the sense of future
development.
At the time when the BSEC was established, there was political transition, which was causedby the collapse of Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Black Sea
area was unstable, because each country needed their own domestic political systemre-established. Actually, because of that, many multilateral frameworks were established at the
moment, for the purpose of stability and development of this region.
Last year, BSEC celebrated 20th anniversary. During these two decades, there was a big change
for the region such as Bulgaria and Romania succeeded EU membership. Other countries also gettheir political stability, some countries experienced huge and rapid economical development.
During these two decades, Japan established close relation between each BSEC member statesin the bilateral framework. For an example, please see the table titled “Japanese Economic
Cooperation to the BSEC Member States.” It is understandable that Japanese economic
cooperation can be seen in broad area for the countries it is needed. In the bilateral framework it ispossible to cooperate in the field depends on the necessities which are different from country tocountry. As a result of this, we proud that we could make contribution for their economicaldevelopment. Of course our cooperation is not restricted in the field of economy. For the purposeof cross-fertilization of cultures, we achieve cultural event quite often.
Japan sets its diplomatic achievement as widening of its skirts, bringing broaden the scopeof Japanese companies’ activities into view, has constructed its relation.

25

Japanese Economic Cooperation to BSEC Member States
Romania (Excluded as Recipient from the DAC List)：●The Project for the Improvement of Farm Management by Developing ofAgricultural Cooperatives, 06●The Project for Strengthening the Air Quality Monitoring Capability of the
National Reference Laboratory, 06●The Project on the Reduction of Seismic Risk for Buildings and Structures, 09●The Project for the Improvement of Audio-Visual Equipment of National
Museum of Contemporary Art,07●The Project for the Improvement of Equipment for the Restoration of the
Cultural National Film Heritage of Romania,08●The Bucharest International Airport Rail Access Link Project, 09
Serbia：●The Project for Capacity Building of the Water Quality
Management in Sava River Basin, 06●Small and Medium Enterprises Support-Agency
Reinforcement Project, 06●Institutionalization of Mentoring in Small and Mediumsized Enterprise Support, 08●The Project for Capacity Development of Digital Basic
State Mapping in Serbia,09●Capacity Development Project on nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions, 10●The Project for the Improvement of Water Supply
System in Belgrade City, 06●The Project for the Improvement of Audio-Visual
Equipment of National Theatre in Belgrade, 07●The Project for Breast Cancer Screening and Prevention
Capacity Improvement, 10

Ukraine：●The Project for Ukraine-Japan Center, 06●The Project for the Improvement of Lighting Equipment of the Donetsk Academic State Opera andBallet Theatre named after A. B. Solovyanenko, 06●The Project for the Improvement of Lighting Equipment of Kharkiv State Academic Opera and Ballet
Theatre named after M. V. Lysenko, 08●The Project for the Improvement of Musical Instrument of the Kyiv Music Institute named after R. M.
Glier, 09●The Boryspil State International Airport Development Project, 11
Moldova：● Grant Assistance for Underprivileged
Farmers,06, 07, 10●The Project for Improvement of Equipment
for the National Training Center for Agricultural
Mechanization, 07●The Project for Introduction of Clean Energy
by Solar Electricity Generation System, 10

Azerbaijan：●Provincial Cities Water Supply and Sewerage
Project, 08●The Project for the Improvement of Mushviq
Substation in Baku, 06●The Project for Improvement of Emergency
Medical Equipment in Baku City,07●Grant Assistance for Underprivileged Farmers, 08,
10
Armenia：●Yerevan Combined Cycle Co-Generation Power Plant
Project, 08●The Project for Improvement of Fire Fighting
Equipment in Yerevan City, 08●The Project for the Improvement of MusicalInstrument of Yerevan Komitas State Conservatory, 08●Grand Assistance for Underprivileged Farmers, 09●The Project for the Improvement of Equipment for
Restoration of Collections of National Art Gallery of
Armenia, 09

Albania：●Greater Tirana Sewerage System Improvement Project, 08●The Project for the Improvement of the Medical
Equipment of the regional Level Emergency Centers, 09●Support for Establishing Agricultural Cooperatives, 09
Bulgaria (Excluded as Recipient from the DAC List)：●The Project for the Improvement of Musical Instruments of the SymphonyOrchestra of the Bulgarian National Radio, 06●The Project for the Construction of the Museum Center for Thracian Arts ofEast Rodopi Mountains, 07●The Project for the Improvement of the Equipment for the Restoration
Laboratories and Audio-Visual Equipment of the National Art Gallery, 09●The Project for the Improvement of Sound Equipment of “Konstantin
Kisimov” Musical and Drama Theatre-Veliko Tarnovo, 10●New Container Terminals Development Project at the Port of Varna andBourgas, 07

Georgia：●East-West Highway Improvement Project, 09●The Project for Introduction of Clean Energy by
Solar Electricity Generation System, 10

Turkey：●Flatfish Culture Project, 07●The Project for the Construction of Kaman-Kalehoyuk ArchaeologicalMuseum, 07●The Project of the Development Industrial Automation Technologies Department and theEstablishment of Teacher Training Center, 07●The Project for Energy Efficiency Improvement of Power
Plant, 06●Bosphorus Rail Tube Crossing Project (II), 10●School-based Disaster Education project, 10●The Project of Third Country Training Program “Capacity Building on remote Sensing and Geographical
Information Systems for Palestinians,” 06●Capacity Improvement Project on Seismic Observation, 09●Master Plan Study on Participatory Watershed Rehabilitation in Coruh River, 10●The project for Improvement of Livelihood for Small-Scale Farmers in Eastern Black Sea Region, 06

2. Japanese Interests●Interface between Japan and the Black Sea area
As I mentioned before, unfortunately, Japan does not maintain close relationships with theBlack Sea area as a whole, if not through bilateral framework. However, cooperation with regionalorganization is important for us for the different aspects.
Regional organization, which is established by the member states’ own initiative, sets its goal
to develop by their own effort, utilizing each country’s advantages. And actually, it is possible to
do so. As a Japanese economical cooperation, we set basic attitude for international cooperation assuch; support for their own effort for their development. Cooperation with regional organization
is suitable for our basic attitude for international cooperation. Japan considers that in the bilateralrelation, we can achieve support based on each country’s need, and with cooperation with regionalorganization, we can achieve support for their own effort for their development.
●BSEC Characteristics: Cooperation Framework Specialized for Economy
By the way, BSEC has special aspect that we can see very rarely in other regionalorganizations. That is, specifying its cooperation field as economy, it succeeded to deepen
cooperative relation between member states, which sometimes can be easily confrontational
politically. And because of this reason, BSEC framework itself should be highly appreciated andcooperation with BSEC looks very attractive for non-member states of BSEC.
3. Japanese Cooperation between the Black Sea Area
●The Status of Sectoral Dialogue Partnership
Because of the background and aim I have mentioned above, Japan decided to get Sectoral
Dialogue Partnership status of BSEC and was given in 2010. The status of Sectoral Dialogue
Partnership is very flexible status because we can have dialogues not to be restricted in specific26

fields. After getting this status, we attend the meetings, and observe the discussions including
working group meeting which are held in each BSEC member states and high level councils suchas Foreign Ministers’ meetings.
As a concrete project of Japan, we are preparing for sending specialist such as university
professor or scholar to BSEC. We, Japanese side and BSEC side are already confirmed that themutually useful area to dispatch a specialist is disaster management, so we will coordinate theschedule with Ukraine, which is the chair in first half of 2013. I will mention to the details later
about the background of this decision.
●Cooperation with Other Regional OrganizationsFirst of all, there are varieties of cooperation framework in the Black Sea area. Political andeconomical field, we can point out GUAM, Eastern Partnership Group (EU initiative), South East
European Cooperation Process (SEECP), Black Sea Synergy, and Black Sea Forum (Some of them
are not organization but consultative process). As a military cooperation, there are Black Sea For
and Black Sea Harmony. These regional cooperation frameworks are established centered on theBlack Sea. Member state changes in each framework, so it consists multi-layered relation.
Japan has cooperation with other Black Sea regional organization. Especially “GUAM-Japan”
framework is developing in step by step fashion. This framework was established in 2007,
according to Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s foreign policy called “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.”
The policy was aiming to support development of Eurasian countries including BSEC member
states. We had 5 times high level meeting and workshops in Tokyo once in a year since 2007.
Last November, we conducted “GUAM-Japan” transportation seminar in Tokyo. This was thefirst seminar which was conducted by GUAM side initiative. Japanese side arranged whole theschedule. It was named GUAM project, yet actually, we can say that the project was BSEC’s one.
Main goal of this seminar was to see and learn the systems of parking areas and service areas ofJapanese high ways, and the knowledge will be introduced to the Model High Way Initiative,
which is conducted by BSEC and International Road and Transport Union, IRU, as a project ofsome part of the Black Sea Ring High Way project. In the Model High Way Initiative, modern
highway will be constructed between Baku, Tbilisi, Batumi and Trabzon. Because of this GUAM
seminar, Japan contributed BSEC project at second hand.
●For the Future of deepening Cooperation between Japan and BSEC
In conclusion, it is worth to mention to my belief about the importance of communication inorder to achieve concrete cooperation which we can expect exact harvest. As a result of
conversations about what is BSEC need for development and prosperity of the region and what isJapanese specialty which can be introduced to abroad in a positive manner, we can find the mosteffective cooperation ways.
Last November, I visited Istanbul to meet Secretary General H.E. Dr. Tvircun, to discuss about
future cooperation between Japan and BSEC, especially what we, Japanese side can do for BSEC.
Secretary General was flying for official visit to abroad on that day, however, H.E. attached a highvalue to future cooperation with Japan, we could meet at a hotel close to the Ataturk Airport. Afterthe meeting, on the same month, Secretary General visited the Global Forum of Japan, Tokyo, forthe preparation of this Forth Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogue. Taking advantage of this occasion, he
had a consultation with Mr. Yamada, who made an opening remark this morning.
At the second meeting, Secretary General talked about expectation from Japan as a futurecooperation. In the BSEC, some countries are prone to earthquake, however modern anti-seismic
system is not implemented yet, so in this field BSEC want to get any cooperation from Japaneseside. On the other hand, Japan is a famous earthquake country, and not only developed high-level27

anti-seismic technology, but also developed anti-seismic city-building and disaster-prevention
education system for children, so has plenty accumulation of technology and knowledge.
Especially after the earthquake on 11th of March in 2011, Japanese people are again raised
awareness of disaster prevention. Disaster prevention field is BSEC sides’ needs and also it is aJapanese side’s area of specialty, so it is beneficial for both sides. Dispatch of specialist of disasterprevention which I mentioned before was examined under this background. From now on, in thefield of disaster management or disaster prevention, we will cooperate with BSEC.
This is the fourth Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogue, which is organized by BSEC and The Global
Forum of Japan. Not only between governmental level, but also it is worth to keep dialogues in all
kinds of levels, so this Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogue offers good opportunity. And now I am
informed that the Black Sea Association of Maritime Institutions is considering to make a “BlackSea Knowledge Highway Network.” This is a plan to make an internet network between
universities or educational institutions in the Black Sea area and make an internet educational
system. This will be an example of autonomous cooperation between educational institutions andwe hope development of multi-layered cooperation.

Georgi VASSILEV
Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria to Japan

Before sharing my views on the development of the Japan-Black Sea cooperation process, I
propose that we first look back to what has changed within the Organization of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation itself since the last forum in Tokyo and stress the importance of the 20-th
Anniversary of BSEC, which we marked on 26th June 2012 in Istanbul, for the cooperation
process within the Black Sea area. In fact, it was a challenging moment for the Organization. With
the Summit Declaration we have enhanced our regional cooperation with a new “Economic
Agenda towards Enhanced Partnership”, reflecting the common priority areas of cooperation
among our states.
I would also like to draw your attention to the purpose of the adoption of a new Economic
Agenda. It was meant to face the new challenges, both in global and local environment, taking into
account the changes, that has taken place in the last decade. To this end, we have set goals in 17
priority areas, among which we could mention transport infrastructure, combating organizedcrime, illegal trafficking of people, drugs and weapons and terrorism, as well as energy
cooperation and environmental and climate change.
With regard to the implementation of the above-mentioned Economic Agenda, we need an
Action plan, which among the other lines, would seek better interaction with the Observers andSectoral partnership countries and enhancement of the cooperation with these states.
As a representative of the Republic of Bulgaria, I am glad to notе that it was during the
Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship-In-Office when Japan was granted Sectoral Dialogue Partner status
in 2010. Japan’s representatives not only regularly attend meetings such as Council of Ministers ofForeign Affairs Meeting (CMFA) or the Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials Meeting(CSO), but also take active participation in organizing various workshops ever since. For instance,
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) co-organized and participated in the Joint

28

Workshops “How to Implement Energy Management Standards in BSEC Countries”, which took
place in Ankara and at the BSEC headquarters in Istanbul on 2-4 March 2011 and 6-9 March 2012.
We appreciate Japan’s continued interest and engagement in the Black Sea area. Japan’s
generous support to Bulgaria throughout the transition period through ODA loans, technicalcooperation and grant aid in the fields of infrastructure, including major projects such as themodernization of the port of Bourgas, the extension of the Sofia metro, environment, culture,
education, health care and social services was an important factor for the success of the reforms.
Now, in the post-ODA phase of our bilateral relations we are actively seeking other forms of
economical interaction, mainly attracting Japanese investments and technologies, boosting trade
and tourism.
The growing strategic importance of the Black Sea area as a key geopolitical corridor, linking
Europe with Central Asia and Middle East, and the changes that the region is going through intimes of financial crisis, should result in new approach in promoting the cooperation between
Japan and the Black Sea area. In this regard, on 14-16 November 2012, in Tokyo took placeconsultations of the BSEC Secretary General, Dr. Victor Tvircun, with the Japanese side on issues
related to prospects for future cooperation between BSEC and Japan. As you already know, during
these consultations was reached a common agreement that both sides will focus their futurecooperation efforts mainly in the fields of environment, energy and transport.
In addition, in October 2012 the Government of Japan has informed that it was planning tosend Japanese experts in the above-mentioned fields, that will hold various kind of seminars in the
BSEC Member States, thus demonstrating Japan’s strong will to enhance cooperation with the
BSEC and actively participate in the process of exchanging expertise and best practices, as far astransport, environment and energy are concerned. Moreover, such cooperation would be inharmony with the recently-renewed, through the Istanbul Declaration from 26th June 2012,
commitment of the BSEC Member States to strengthen the project-oriented dimension of theOrganization by giving priority to projects that would bring tangible benefits and greater impact
and at the same time stimulate internal reforms and the integration of the national economies in
the region.
Last but not least, I would also like to emphasize the importance of Japanese practices andknow-how in the field of disaster prevention. Being Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria toJapan, living and working in the Land of the Rising Sun, I have no hesitation in saying thatJapanese achievements and knowledge, related to the anti-seismic city-building could be valuable
experience for the countries from the BSEC region, especially since some of them are located inseismic zone, and yet don’t have on their disposal modern anti-seismic system. This is a crucial
topic and much more attention needs to be given to the question of how to improve and develop
disaster-prevention systems in BSEC Member States and as a leading economic power and acountry with a well known expertise in seismic protection, Japan could play a vital role in
improving the disaster management in the region.
In conclusion, I am personally convinced that Japan and the BSEC Member States would only
benefit from even more active Japanese economic involvement in the Black Sea area, as the BSEC
region continues to develop in terms of political and economic stability. In this regard it is mystrong belief that the Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogue, organized by The Global Forum of Japan,
represents a functional platform for sharing views, which would eventually lead to enhancing the
fruitful cooperation between both sides.

29

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)【 Objectives 】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, andglobalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especiallyneighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental levels, is one of the indispensableconditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote theexchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to the economy, trade,finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart
countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there
were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was
at risk. Within this context, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges ofprivate-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign
Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, andCanadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiativein founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the alterednature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global
Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in
Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global
consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only
to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravityof The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic andInternational Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the Americancomponent ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would
thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, andamended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global
Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any
other organization.
【 Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membershiporganization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global
implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any otherorganizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The
Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, and TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982,
GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman, ITO Kenichi as President and HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi as Vice
President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and
TOYODA Shoichiro; 19 Diet Members including the three Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu;
and 89 Opinion Leader Members including the two Governors, SHIMADA Haruo, and WATANABE Mayu. Friends andsupporters of The Global Forum of Japan are organized into the Supporters’ Club of the Global Forum of Japan.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the
Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the
Asia-Pacific region including the U.S., China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea
area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been
active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual
exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue,” GFJ in principle
holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its overseas co-sponsors in the last five years is given
below.
Year
2013

2012

Month
February
January

OctoberJuly
February
February
September
May
2010

2009

Co-sponsor

How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation
Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship

September Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International
Public Goodss
March
The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's RoleMarch
The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global GovernanceFebruary

2011

Topic

February
January
September
June
April

The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China
Relations
The Japan-China Relations at Crossroads
The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation on
Disaster Management
The Japan-U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power
East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional
Cooperation
East Asian Regional Architectures and Japan-India Relations
Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security:
the Case of Counter Piracy
Promoting Japan-China Cooperation on Environmental Issues ofthe 21st Century: In Pursuit of Recycling Society
Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan
Japan-ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis
Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World
US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration

30

Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University
World Resources InstituteCollege of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
Fudan University
Nanyang Technological University
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.)
International Studies Department, Vietnam National University(Vietnam)
The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (India)
National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University (China)
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
ASEAN-ISIS
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (U.S.)5. An Introduction to Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC)On 25 June 1992, the Heads of State and Government of eleven countries, Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed in
Istanbul the Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement, giving birth to the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC). With the accession of Serbia in April 2004, the organization’s
Member States increased to twelve.
In March 1994, the BSEC Headquarters—the Permanent International Secretariat of theOrganization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC PERMIS)—was established in Istanbul.
With the entry into the force of its Charter on 1 May 1999, BSEC acquired international legal
identity and was transformed into a full-fledged regional economic organization:
ORGANIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
Today, BSEC has become the most inclusive and comprehensive organization in the wider BlackSea area. BSEC, consisting of 12 Member States and having 17 Observers and 17 Sectoral Dialogue
Partners, is a solid institution with a Permanent International Secretariat and four Related Bodies,
namely, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), the BSEC
Business Council (BSEC BC), the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) and theInternational Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). BSEC Secretary General
The members of BSEC, since its inception, have endorsed multilateral economic cooperation anddevelopment in the region through joint efforts, dialogue and good neighborliness, to the benefitof the Member States and their peoples with the aim of promoting peace, stability and prosperityin the BSEC region. The Member States are determined to make use of the great potential of theOrganization as a platform of dialogue to play a more proactive, effective and constructive role inpromoting the common goal of a peaceful, stable and prosperous BSEC Region to the interest of all
stakeholders in the spirit of partnership and entrepreneurship.
Secretary General of BSEC : Ambassador Dr. Victor TVIRCUN
Observers : Republic of Austria, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Croatia, Czech Republic, Arab
Republic of Egypt, French Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, State of Israel, Republic of Italy,
Republic of Poland, Slovak Republic, Republic of Tunisia, United States of America, International
Black Sea Club, Energy Charter Secretariat, Black Sea Commission, Commission of the European
Union
Sectoral Dialogue Partners : Hungary, Islamic Republic of Iran, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Montenegro, Republic of Slovenia, United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland, Black Sea International Shipowners Association (BINSA), Black & Azov Seas
Ports Association (BASPA), Union of Road Transport Association in the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Region (BSEC-URTA), Black Sea Region Association of Shipbuilders andShiprepairers (BRASS), Black Sea Universities Network (BSUN), Conference of Peripheral
Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR), Danube Commission, International Network for SMEs
(INSME)[Contact Information]
Permanent International Secretariat
Sakıp Sabancı Caddesi, Müşir Fuad Paşa Yalısı, Eski Tersane 34467- Emirgan
Istanbul / Turkey Tel :+90 212 229 63 30-35 Fax:+90 212 229 63 36
31

Copy Inhibit

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/