THE JAPANJAPAN‐‐U.S.
U.S.‐‐CHINA DIALOGUEThe Asia‐Pacific Region in Transition and
the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations

Conference Papers
February 23‐24, 2012at the International House of JapanTokyo, Japan

Co‐sponsored by
The Global Forum of JapanThe Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China Association of Asia‐Pacific Studies
The Japan Forum on International Relations

Table of Contents
1．Program………………………………………………………………………………………………1
2．Biographies of the Panelists……………………………………………………………………2
3．Presentation Papers ……………………………………………………………………4
Session I : Growing Asia and the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations............................................. 4
OGAWA Eiji.....................................................................................................................4
Jae‐Ha PARK............................................................................................................................. 5
KIMURA Fukunari..................................................................................................................... 6
ZHONG Feiteng.............................................................................................................................6
MARUKAWA Tomoo.....................................................................................................................8
Session II : Peace and Stability in the Asia‐Pacific Region and the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations……9
MURATA Koji.............................................................................................................................9
Douglas PAAL............................................................................................................................. 10
TAKAHARA Akio.............................................................................................................................15
Narayanan GANESAN.............................................................................................................................16
SATO Koichi............................................................................................................................. 17

4．An Introduction to the Global Forum of Japan……….……………………………18
5. An Introduction to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace….…19
6. An Introduction to Chinese Academy of Social Science…………………………20
7．An Introduction to the Japan Forum on International Relations………...…21

2012年2月20日現在
As of Feb. 20, 2012

1. Program
日米中対話
The Japan‐U.S.‐China Dialogue「変容するアジア太平洋地域と日米中関係」
The Asia‐Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations
２０１２年２月２３−２４日／February 23‐24, 2012
国際文化会館「講堂」、東京、日本／ International House of Japan ”Lecture Hall”, Tokyo, Japan
共催／Co‐sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
カーネギー国際平和財団／the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
中国社会科学院中国アジア太平洋学会／China Association of Asia‐Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Science
日本国際フォーラム ／The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)2012 年 2 月 23 日 （木） / Thursday, 23 February, 2012
International House of Japan "SAKURA" / 国際文化会館「ＳＡＫＵＲＡ」
開幕夕食会 * 特別招待者のみ / Welcome Dinner *Invitation Only
18:00 ‐ 20:00

開幕夕食会
Welcome Dinner2012 年 2 月 24 日 （金） / Friday, 24 February, 2012
国際文化会館「講堂」 / International House of Japan ”Lecture Hall”
開幕挨拶／ Opening Remarks

10:00 ‐ 10:05

大河原良雄 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人
OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ

セッションⅠ／ Session I

10:05 ‐ 12:00

成長するアジアと日米中関係
Growing Asia and the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations

議長
Chairperson

高原 明生 東京大学教授
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo

報告A （12分間）
Presenter A (12 min.)小川 英治 一橋大学副学長
OGAWA Eiji, Vice President, Hitotsubashi University

報告B （12分間）
Presenter B (12 min.)ジェハ・パク アジア開発銀行研究所副所長
Jae‐Ha PARK, Deputy Dean, Asian Development Bank Institute

報告C （12分間）
Presenter C (12 min.)

木村 福成 慶應義塾大学教授
KIMURA Fukunari, Professor, Keio University

報告D （12分間）
Presenter D (12 min.)

鐘 飛騰 中国社会科学院アジア太平洋研究所外交安全研究室副主任
ZHONG Feiteng, Deputy Director, Research Department for Security and Foreign Relations, Institute of Asia‐
pacific Studies, CASS

報告E （12分間）
Presenter E (12 min.)

丸川 知雄 東京大学教授
MARUKAWA Tomoo, Professor, The University of Tokyo

自由討議（55分間）
Free Discussions (55 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

昼食 ／ Lunch

12:00 ‐ 13:05

昼食休憩／Lunch Break(会議場外で各自でお取り下さい）

セッションⅡ／ Session II

13：05 ‐ 15：00

アジア太平洋地域の平和と安定と日米中関係
Peace and Stability in the Asia‐Pacific Region and the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations

議長
Chairperson

木村 福成 慶應義塾大学教授
KIMURA Fukunari, Professor, Keio University

報告A （12分間）
Presenter A (12 min.)村田 晃嗣 同志社大学教授
MURATA Koji, Professor, Doshisha University

報告B （12分間）
Presenter B (12 min.)ダグラス・パール カーネギー国際平和財団研究部門担当上席副会長
Douglas PAAL, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

報告C （12分間）
Presenter C (12 min.)

高原 明生 東京大学教授
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo

報告D （12分間）
Presenter D (12 min.)

ナラヤナン・ガネサン 広島平和研究所教授
Narayanan GANESAN, Professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute

報告E （12分間）
Presenter E (12 min.)佐藤 考一 桜美林大学教授
SATO Koichi, Professor, J.F.Oberlin University

自由討議（55分間）
Free Discussions (55 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

2．Biographies of the Panelists【Foreign Panelists】
Jae‐Ha PARK
Deputy Dean, Asian Development Bank Institute
Graduated from Seoul National University and received his Ph.D. in Economics from Pennsylvania State
University. Served as Senior Advisor to the Minister of Finance and Economy of Korea, Director General of
the Task Force for Economic Restructuring in the Office of the President of Korea, Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Shinhan Bank, and Vice Chairman of Korea Money and Finance Association. Entered ADBI in
October 2011.

ZHONG Feiteng

Deputy Head, Department of Security and Diplomacy Studies, Institute ofAsia‐Pacific Studies, CASS
Received his Ph.D. of Philosophy in International Studies from Waseda University. Received his Ph.D. of Law
from Peking University. Served as Assistant Research Professor in Department of Security and Diplomacy
Studies, Institute of Asia‐Pacific Studies, CASS (2009), and Associate Research Professor in CASS (2011).

Douglas PAAL
Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Received his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University. Served as director of Asian
Affairs of the National Security Council staffs of Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush (1986‐1993),
Unofficial U.S. Representative to Taiwan as director of the American Institute in Taiwan (2002–2006) and Vice
chairman of JPMorgan Chase International (2006–2008). He held positions in the policy planning staff at theState Department, as a senior analyst for the CIA, and at U.S. Embassies in Singapore and Beijing.

Narayanan GANESAN
Professor, Hiroshima Peace InstituteReceived his Ph.D. of Political Science in Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois, U.S. Served as Visiting
Associate, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (1988‐89), Instructor, Comparative Politics,
Department of Political Science in Northern Illinois University (1989), Senior Lecturer, Department of Political
Science and Southeast Asian Studies Programme in National University of Singapore (1996‐2003) and
Associate Professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute in Hiroshima City University (2004‐06).

【Japanese Panelists】
OKAWARA Yoshio
Chairman, GFJ
Graduated from The University of Tokyo. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942. Served various
positions including Director‐General of the American Affairs Bureau, Deputy Vice Minister for
Administration, Japanese Ambassador to Australia and Japanese Ambassador to the United States(1980‐1985). Concurrently serving as Special Adviser of Institute for International Policy Studies andPresident of America‐Japan Society, Inc.

2

TAKAHARA Akio
Professor, The University of Tokyo
Received his DPhil from the University of Sussex in 1988. Served as visiting scholar at the Consulate‐Generalof Japan in Hong Kong (1989‐1991), the Japanese Embassy in Beijing (1996‐1998), and at the Fairbank Center
for East Asian Research of Harvard University (2005‐06). Concurrently serves as the Secretary‐General of the
New Japan‐China Friendship 21st Century Committee (Japanese side).

OGAWA Eiji
Professor, Hitotsubashi University
Received his Ph.D. in Commerce from Hitotsubashi University in 1999. Served as Visiting Scholar of the
Department of Economics of University of California at Berkeley and Visiting Scholar of Research
Department of the International Monetary Fund. Concurrently serves as Chairperson of Governing Board of
EU Studies Institute in Tokyo, Councillor at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies of Bank of Japan,
Faculty Fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.

KIMURA Fukunari
Professor, Keio University
Received his Ph.D. in economics from the Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin‐Madison in1991. He worked for the International Development Center of Japan as Researcher (1982‐1986), theDepartment of Economics, State University of New York at Albany as Assistant Professor (1991‐1994).
Concurrently serves as Chief Economist, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), andPresident, Japan Society of International Economics.

MARUKAWA Tomoo
Professor, The University of Tokyo
Received his B.A. in Economics from University of Tokyo in 1987. Served as Visiting Scholar at Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, Visiting Professor at the Institute d’Asie Orientale CNRS in France, Researcher at
the Institute of Developing Economies. Received the 19th Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize in 2003.

MURATA Koji
Professor, Doshisha University
Received B.A. from Doshisha University in 1987 and M.A. and Ph.D. is from Kobe University in 1995. Also
received M.Phil. from the George Washington University as a Fulbright student. Academic interests include
U.S. foreign policy and Japanʹs foreign policy. Currently, serves as the dean of the Faculty of Law andprofessor of political science, Doshisha University, Kyoto

SATO Koichi
Professor, J.F.Oberlin University
Received his Ph.D. in International Studies from Waseda University. Served as Sales Engineer of Hitachi
Chemical Co. Ltd., Research Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Lecturer of theTokyo University of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serves as Lecturer of Japan Maritime Self‐Defense Force(JMSDF) Staff College, Policy Adviser to Japan Coast Guard, Lecturer of National Institute for Defense
Studies (NIDS).

(In order of appearance)33. Presentation Papers
Session I: Growing Asia and the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations
OGAWA Eiji
Professor, Hitotsubashi University

Alliances Still Matter: Power Shift and the Asia‐Pacific Region Order
1. Because of its surpassing function as a means of exchange, the US dollar key currency system has
been sustainable even though it has been poorly functioning as a means of store of value. This situation
gives little governance over the currency policy of the US government. Currency competition under a multikey currency system should work in giving more effectively governances over the US currency policy.
However, given the current situation of the euro, it is not easy to achieve currency competition. It isnecessary that other governments persuade the US government to conduct sound currency policy andmacroeconomic policy and that the governments should have surveillances over them at any forums
including G7 and G20.
2. The current European fiscal crisis occurred in a process of the accumulation of fiscal deficits caused
by capital injection into damaged financial institutions in Europe and fiscal stimulus during the global
financial crisis. Because the major cause of the global financial crisis is subprime mortgage problem in theUS, surveillance over the macroeconomic policy of the US government is important. Because of a fear oftransmitting financial crisis from Europe to other countries, it is desirable for other countries to giveinternational cooperation to the EU in funding for European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) in order to prevent from developments in European fiscal crisis into any
financial crisis. Specifically, it is desirable to invest in bonds which the EFSF and the ESM issues for raisingmoney.
3. The global financial crisis had asymmetric effects on East Asian currencies although it did not
directly affect on East Asian economy. The uncoordinated currency policies among the East Asian countries
have brought about volatility and misalignments among the East Asian currencies, which have had adverse
effects on intra‐regional trade and intra‐regional investments in production networks and, in turn, mademis‐allocation of resources in this region. Thus, it is necessary for East Asian countries to conduct
surveillance over their macro‐economy including intra‐regional exchange rates and conduct coordinatedcurrency policies among them in order to reduce volatility and misalignments of the intra‐regional exchange
rates. The Chinese government has already announced a RMB reform including adoption of a managed
floating exchange rate system with reference to a currency basket. The neighboring countries in East Asia
should persuade the Chinese government to adopt the announced currency policy. Moreover, the euro‐zone
economy faced the US dollar liquidity deficit after the Lehman shock even though it used the euro as aregional key currency in the EU. In East Asia, weights of the US dollar in international trade and capitaltransactions are still relatively high. It is important to shift a regional key currency from the US dollar to East
Asian own currencies including a regional common currency unit. The regional common currency unit
should be a composite of East Asian currencies with convertibility in terms of current and capital accounts.
The RMB should be internationalized in terms of not only current account but also capital account.

4

Jae‐Ha PARK
Deputy Dean, Asian Development Bank Institute

Emerging Asia and Japan–U.S.–People’s Republic of China Relations
1. Growth and Challenges of Emerging Asian Economies
Recently, emerging Asian economies, particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India and
ASEAN, have continued their rapid economic growth. As a result, the Asian region has emerged as thegrowth center of the global economy. For example, these three economic giants together held nearly a 15%
share of the global GDP in 2010. If these countries continue to grow at a projected average growth rate of
6.9% during 2010–2030, their share of global GDP is expected to almost double, to 28% by 2030. By contrast,
the global GDP share of the U.S. is projected to decrease from 24.3% in 2010 to 19% in 2030 and that of Japan
from 8.6% in 2010 to 5% in 2030.
However, in the course of this radical transformation, emerging Asian economies will face
unprecedented challenges as they strive to reduce income and non‐income inequality, avoid the middle
income trap, accommodate a rising middle class, respond to rapid urbanization, develop the social sector,
raise the quality of life, enhance productivity, transform industry, build infrastructure, manage resources,
protect the environment and reduce climate change, develop economic and financial institutions, generateinnovations and new technologies, and forge new cooperative relations and partnerships in the region andworldwide.
2. Issues Arising from the Rise of Asian Economies
The rise of emerging Asian economies, and in particular the growth of the PRC economy, will have agreat impact on the rest of the world. In general, the impact will be positive as the rapid economic growth of
Asia is expected to contribute to the growth of the global economy. The emergence of large middle‐class
populations in the PRC and India will have a great impact on global demand.
Currency policy and external imbalances will remain contentious issues between emerging Asia andother developed countries. However, global imbalances are expected to unwind gradually as developed
economies increasingly raise their domestic savings to address fiscal deficits. Meanwhile the PRC is
expected to shift its growth path away from export and investment‐led growth. Emerging Asia’s rapidly
growing demand for commodities, particularly natural resources and food, will also be a significant issue
for the global economy.
3. Japan–U.S.–People’s Republic of China Relations
Developed countries such as Japan and the U.S. will need to find the best way of living with these
rapidly growing emerging Asian economies, including allowing them a much larger role in global
governance, together with responsibilities that they will need to abide by. In particular, developing Asian
countries need to have a greater voice in international forums and to play a major role in finding solutions tosuch issues as currency policy, external imbalances, financial regulations, investor protection, climate change,commodities prices, and the free trade system.

5

KIMURA Fukunari
Professor, Keio University
Opportunities for deeper economic partnership in East Asia
and Asia‐Pacific : trade and investment
Japanese participation in Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) will change the trajectory of economic
integration in East Asia and Asia‐Pacific in a benevolent direction. Japan should realize the value of
economic diplomacy and act strategically so that the U.S. and China can effectively utilize their dynamism
for regional prosperity.
1. The removal of agricultural protection, particularly border measures and price support, has been
undue homework for decades and should be cleared up in order for Japan to gain a large degree of freedom
and negotiating power in economic diplomacy.
2. China and Japan should support ASEAN initiatives for deeper and wider economic integration andnurture regional identity of “East Asia,” which presents a new development model and works on novel
challenges for deepening economic integration, narrowing development gaps, and sustainable development.
3. The U.S., China, and Japan should promote 21st century regionalism in which a new international
economic order supports a 21st‐century‐type international division of labor or “the 2nd unbundling.” TPP
and ASEAN++ FTA (or RCEP) can play complementary roles by effectively combining high‐level FTAs withwell‐structured development agenda.

6

ZHONG Feiteng
Deputy Head, Department of Security and Diplomacy Studies,
Institute of Asia‐Pacific Studies, CASS

Alliances Still Matter: Power Shift and the Asia‐Pacific Region Order
1. In recent years, China’s rise has received great concerns around the world due to its huge size andrapid growth. The Obama administration’s “Return to Asia” strategy has stimulated great debates in China.
Thus, the biggest challenge in the Asia‐Pacific region is the two kinds of political economy system. Is there aseparation of politics and economics in the region to other countries, or could it be sustainable?
2. The Asia‐Pacific region has experienced power shift. China’s rapid growth has contributed to anincrease in its share in world GDP from nearly 4.2 percent (PPP basis) in 1991 to about 13.6 percent in 2010.
China’ foreign trade value gradually increased from less than 140 billion US dollars in1991 to 3.3 trillion U.S.
dollars in November 2011, 24 times as much as 1991. Now, China is the largest exporter in the world.
3. Thus, does Japan depend on China in trade? To some extent, the answer is yes. However, weshould take a political economy view on this issue. Japan’s trade volume with the U.S. alliance system is stilllarger than with China. The conventional saying “politics cool, economic hot” misunderstands the alliancepolitics. And, in some important industries, such as automobile, Japan has very close relationship with U.S.
From the perspective of production chain, the U.S. automobile market was suddenly and seriously
influenced by the Great East Japan Earthquake. While the influence to China’s market lags one month or late.
That means the connection in automobile industry between Japan and China is not so close and deep.
4. .China is a broker in region trade. According to data released by China’s General Administration ofCustoms, the “Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc” and “Electrical, electronic equipment” are the twomost important commodities in China’s foreign trade. Korea, Japan, U.S., Philippines, and Thailand areimportant import origins for China; U.S., Japan, Korea, Australia and Thailand are important destination ofChinaʼs export. The UThus, we can say China join economic interdependence with U.S. alliance system.
5. In the latter of 2011, U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton announced that the 21st century is“America’s Pacific Century.” In November, 2011, Obama said at Honolulu, that “the TPP has the potential to
be a model not only for the Asia Pacific but for future trade agreements.” The trade background of “return toAsia” is Asia’s rise, Europe’s decline in U.S. trade. During the past decades, Asia’ share of U.S. increased 2%
and became the largest export destination, while Europe’s share decreased 3.7%. At the same time, theUnited States still has great competitiveness in service trade. The total export of China and Japan’s service
products only accounts 60% of U.S. export. Partly due to political relationship between Japan and U.S., U.S.
service products exports largely to Japan than to China.
6. Due to relative small GDP share and trade share in the world, TPP countries, including Australia,
New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, Chile and Peru, could not solve U.S. trade imbalance.
Japan’s economic relationship with U.S. alliance system was reinforced. Thus, TPP’s potential is not so great.
7. Although China grows quickly in trade, it still needs to integrate more deeply into global trade andupdate its division status. The strategic stability among the great powers could be expected due to economic
interdependence. However, competing for small and middle trade partnership in the region may produce
uncertainty in the near future due to their political reason. And in the long run, Japan might also confront
dilemma of politics and economics separation.
7

MARUKAWA Tomoo
Professor, The University of Tokyo
Some Proposals for the Japanese Industry in the Face of Deepening
U.S.‐China Business Relationship
1. Make use of the capabilities of rising Asian manufacturers
Trade disputes arise quite frequently between the United States and China, but this is a reflection of
the deepening of business relationship between them. In high‐tech industries, U.S. and China have created adivision of labor, with Taiwan assuming the intermediary role. In the case of semiconductors, for example,
American fabless makers, i.e., semiconductor vendors which specialize in designing, and Taiwanesefoundries, i.e., semiconductor companies which specialize in manufacturing, which have their factories in
China as well as in Taiwan, have created a powerful tag which overwhelms the competition against Japanese
integrated device manufacturers (i.e., vertically‐integrated semiconductor vendors). In electronic products,
American lead firms and Taiwanese and Chinese electronic manufacturing services (EMS) jointly create
innovative products that compete against Japanese products. Japanese manufacturers have been relatively
reluctant in using the supply base of Asian foundries and EMSs for fear of technology leakage and for theself‐confidence in their competence in manufacturing. Such hesitation has led to the decline of Japanesehigh‐tech manufacturers’ share in many parts of the world market, including Japan itself. Japanesemanufacturers must not hesitate in making use of the powerful supply base created by Taiwanese andChinese manufacturers.
2.

Make Japan a platform for the emerging Asian multinational corporations

Since around 2005, many Chinese firms had their stocks listed in American stock exchanges, such as
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. As of November 2011, 168 Chinese firms were listed in NASDAQ.
These Chinese firms typically have their headquarters in China, but in order to bypass Chinese regulations
they establish nominal headquarters in British Virgin Islands or in Cayman Islands, and after raising funds
by IPO they usually invest these funds back to China. Chinese firms which have been listed in NASDAQ
include promising firms in rising industries, such as Baidu, Sohu, and Netease in internet services, HomeInn and China Lodging Group in hotels, Spreadtrum, Vimicro, and UTStarcom in electronics. By contrast,
only three Chinese companies have been listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange with limited success. The listing ofpromising Chinese and other Asian enterprises in the Japanese stock markets can become a stimulus for
invigorating the markets. We must consider how to invite Asian enterprises to Japanese stock markets andstudy the impediments that hamper their listing.
3. Be prepared for the slowdown of Chinese economic growth
We estimate that the growth rate of China will slow down to 7‐8% in 2010s, mainly because of the endof the growth of its working age population and its decrease, which is expected to start from 2015. But still
China will be the most dynamically developing market in the world. We must not be obsessed too muchwith short‐term fluctuations of Chinese economy and turmoil in Sino‐Japanese diplomatic relations. China
will no doubt be the largest economy in the world within a decade or so. Corporate strategies and national
industrial policies must be designed on this assumption.

8

Session II: Peace and Stability in the Asia‐Pacific Region and
the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations

MURATA Koji
Professor, Doshisha University
Chinese Challenges to Global and Regional Security for Japan and the UnitedStates and Possibilities of the Triangle Cooperation
The rise of China both in military and economic terms poses serious security challenges to Japan andthe United Sates at global and regional levels. China now may be similar to Japan in the past. The rise ofChinese economy may be similar to Japan in the late 1970s and the 1980s. Chinese military expansion may
be similar to Japan in the 1930s. And, Chinese environmental and demographic situations might be similar
to Japan in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.
Japan, even at the economic zenith of the 1980s, however, never successfully exercised future
projection capabilities, the abilities of manipulating the images in future, as does Chine now. Also, China is
expanding power projection capabilities in East Asia. Increasing in anti‐access, and area denial capabilities,
Beijing may seek to make the South China Sea the second Persian Gulf.
On the other hand, the United Sates is going to return to Asia from the post‐9.11 Middle East.
Nonetheless, due to strict budgetary restrictions and the above‐mentioned Chinese military expansion,
Washington might decrease in power projection capabilities in the Asia‐Pacific area. At least, the UnitedStates must relocate its oversea military presence in the region in more effective ways.
To sum up, in short or middle terms, Japan is in between increasing Chinese future projection
capabilities and decreasing U.S. power projection capabilities. In long terms, however, China has a lot ofsocio‐economic problems, and the United States has enough socio‐economic potentials.
First, Tokyo must stabilize domestic politics in order to stabilize the alliance relationship with theUnited States. Second, Japan must promote multilateral security cooperation with neighboring countries
such as South Korea and Australia. Third, in order to develop inclusive, not exclusive, policies towards
China, Japan and the United States must expand human networks with China at various levels. Finally,
Japan and the United States should try to share the political, economic, and social experiences, both
successful and unsuccessful, with China.

9Douglas PAAL
Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace

The commanding narrative of 2011 was the ongoing process of how the United States and China
are shaping their relations for the decades ahead, diplomatically, strategically, and economically, amidst
major shifts in their relative wealth and power. The pivotal event of 2011 in this regard arrived early in theyear with the January 19‐21 state visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the United States. That chapter in
US‐China history, opened by Hu, was closed at the end of the year with President Barack Obama’s
participation in the East Asian Summit (EAS) in Bali, Indonesia, after hosting the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting in Honolulu, November 12‐13.
The risks for the entire Asian‐Pacific region in worsening US‐China ties became unusually clear in
2010, when incidents involving China in the South China Sea, near the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao), and on
the Korean peninsula, brutally reopened sensitive territorial and political disputes, and startled many ofChina’s neighbors out of a decade’s complacency.
Linking the incidents of 2010 with the summitry of 2011 was a little remarked journey to Beijing in
September 2010 by two senior White House officials, then Deputy National Security Advisor Thomas
Donilon and National Economic Council Chair Lawrence Summers. They were on a mission to induce China
to manage growing disputes and find a more constructive path to durable bilateral and regional relations.
Donilon and Summers presented a “road map” to better relations during their meetings in Beijing.
The road map started with suggested steps to address issues that were eroding political support in the US
for cooperation with China. They included appeals for concrete progress on straightforward businessmatters such as market access, indigenous innovation requirements, intellectual property protection,
undervalued currency, and government procurement.
But the roadmap crucially underscored the need to seek restraint of North Korea’s violent
provocations against South Korea, recommencement of dialogue between the two militaries, and a retreat
from China’s increasingly fiery rhetoric against the US and others emerging from official and unofficial
channels in China. The enticing milestone on the road map presented to China was the offer of a successful
state visit to the US in 2011, before President Hu is to complete his ten years in office in 2012. (This was incontrast with a generally unsatisfying state visit to the George W. Bush White House in 2006.)
Following the Donilon‐Summers visit, the outlines of an internal debate emerged in China overwhether or not to accept the American terms for the state visit as an emblem of a stabilized relationship.
The debate evidently concluded in favor of better relations in early December, when Beijing conveyed to theWhite House Hu’s acceptance of the invitation to a state visit. Almost simultaneously, China’s statecouncilor for foreign affairs, Dai Bingguo, posted an article on the Foreign Ministry’s website calling for
China to return “to the path of peaceful development.”
Dai Bingguo’s message of restraint was instantly recognized as an authoritative admonition to“cool it” to diplomats, military officers, and China’s growing pool of hot‐headed commentators. There areindications of other unpublished circulars instructing military officers and academics to stick to official
themes or seek prior authorization for their published views. In the end, Chinese commentary on a host ofsensitive issues cooled considerably (and has remained so) as preparations raced ahead for Hu’s January
state visit to the US. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made a hurried trip to China just before the Hu state
visit, reopening military‐to‐military contacts and removing an impediment to a successful visit.
10

Wisely, the Obama administration sought not just a one‐off state visit, whose influence might or
might not endure. US officials also sought Chinese agreement to a series of exchanges over a year or more,
including visits to each other by their vice presidents, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. When China agreed, thishad the virtue of prolonging the mutual restraint started in December 2010. It gave bureaucracies on bothsides goals to demonstrate constructive cooperation with each visit. And, in the case of Xi Jinping, it
offered a chance to give China’s most likely leader for the next ten years a personal stake in the relationshiphe might otherwise have ducked.
Vice President Biden made his visit to China (as well as to Mongolia and Japan) in late August. Xi
Jinping’s return visit has not yet been formally announced, but it is widely expected to be before the Chinese
New Year’s holiday in early 2012.
In the background of the year’s diplomatic activity there flowed a lively and continuing debate
about the rise of China and presumed permanent decline of the United States. Gloom persisted over theAmerican economy and the political gridlock in Washington, as China’s estimated gross domestic productsurpassed Japan’s in mid‐year, ranking China number two behind the US. China’s evident success bubbled
up in patriotic public sentiment, symbolized and motivated by the impressive 2008 Olympics, 2009 AsianGames, and 2010 Shanghai Expo, as well as by the first flight of a Chinese built stealth fighter and sea trial of
its first aircraft carrier in 2011.
China’s holding of roughly $1.3 trillion in US securities was a perennial topic, however
misinformed the debate often was about which country was the more vulnerable. While 2011 commenced
with seemingly monotonous commentary about inevitable US decline, toward the end of the year, the range
of opinion had broadened to include some reflections on the high environmental price China is paying andthe economic and social risks it is running with break neck economic growth and excess liquidity andaccompanying high levels of bad debt. These were mirrored by reports, including one from China’s Instituteof Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), that in a preponderant number of important categories the
US remains well ahead of China and will not soon be superseded.
It is possible some of these second thoughts were fathered by the wish to keep the US powerfully
engaged in the region. Since the eruption of various disputes in 2010, certainly Vietnam, the Philippines,
Japan and South Korea have made evident their desire to keep the Americans close as security partners andto counter balance growing Chinese power.
This marked a sharp turnaround from the previous decade, when China quite skillfully andsuccessfully deployed leaders, diplomats, and business opportunities to win approving audiences in theregion. By the end of 2011, it was manifest that China’s year of less volatile rhetoric and regional restraint
had not undone the damaging lessons taught by the 2010 frictions.
Natural disasters reinforced the sense of vulnerability in general for populations, especially inJapan and Thailand. Japan’s great northeastern earthquake on March 11 took 20,000 lives and brought
Japan’s nuclear‐dependent power grid to worrying lows with consequent effects on industry and exports.
Japan’s long and winding road from the previously efficient political system under the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) to a new multi‐party arrangement is still meeting impediments, including opposing, as theJapanese say, “twisted” (nejiri), majorities in the Upper and Lower houses of the Diet.
The US military threw itself into a massive rescue effort, known as Operation Tomodachi (Friend),
and demonstrated anew the practical value of the alliance (and of Japan’s own armed forces) to ordinary
Japanese. But the government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan, of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the fifth
prime minister in five years, proved disappointing, leading to his departure in September. His successor,
Yoshihiko Noda, sought to break through a number of festering issues, including how safely to re‐start a11number of nuclear power plants shut down in the wake of the March 3 earthquake and tsunami. He
compromised with the LDP and Komei parties on tax increases to finance the recovery efforts.
Japan’s industrial supply lines were damaged by the earthquake, and then were worsened bymassive and rare floods in Thailand, in October and November. Japan is Thailand’s largest foreign investor,and constructing new capacity there appeared to be specially promising after the earthquake, as analternative to new investment in China, where many companies and officials fear becoming overly
dependent.
The loss of life in Thailand was in the hundreds, but the heavy rains exposed recent lack ofinvestment in infrastructure in favor of various subsidies to less privileged voters. The government of
neophyte Prime Minister Yingluck Shinowatra was over‐stretched in attempting to meet the needs of thevast displaced population of the lower Chao Phraya River reaches. As in Japan, great resources will beneeded for the recovery, providing a proportionately small but an aggregate measurable stimulus to anemic
global economic growth.
Thailand’s western neighbor, Myanmar (Burma), surprised long time observers in 2011, when
newly inaugurated President Thein Sein introduced a number of policies suggesting departures from theprevious twenty years of political stasis. The authorities in capital Naypyidaw relaxed the house arrest
restrictions on Nobel Peace Prize laureate and long time opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Media
muzzles were loosened, and hundreds of political prisoners (out of some 3,000) were released.
At the end of the year, it was not yet clear how deep the willingness to pursue reform might prove
to be. Presumably, at least, the military commanders backing the government will be wary of letting the
new tolerance go too far, too fast. The measures taken so far may be merely to loosen foreign sanctions andgain the regime respectability, perhaps just enough to chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) events in 2013, when its turn arrives.
But, in October, Thein Sein surprised observers when he ordered a moratorium in the constructionof a hydroelectric dam at Myitsone in the upper Irrawaddy under construction by Chinese firms. The
president may have acknowledged the importance of civil society in opposing the costs of moving
populations and damaging the ecology. Yet there was no questioning that he defied Chinese interests despite
their strong international and economic support in recent years. Much of the power from the dam would
have fed Chinese appetites for electricity.
Early in his term, President Thein Sein made a trip to Beijing pledging cooperation, so his decisionin October to oppose the dam construction raised questions about whether Myanmar is seeking decisively toloosen the recent smothering dependency on China, as have Burmese leaders in previous centuries, ormaking only a tactical maneuver.
Australia and New Zealand, both prospering from expanding commodity trade with China,
nonetheless sought to reaffirm their alliance relationships with the US. Successive governments in Canberra
and Wellington defied skeptics at home to provide support for Washington’s wars in Iraq and more
obviously in Afghanistan. But in 2011, they chose to draw closer to Washington in ways intended to send amessage of caution to Beijing.
Wellington returned to the inner circle of the Australia‐New Zealand‐U.S. (ANZUS) Alliance,regaining access to intelligence denied since the 1980s, when the Lange government rejected port calls by US
Navy ships that might carry nuclear weapons. In contrast, Prime Minister John Key made a positive visit to
Washington this summer, and Wellington welcomed a contingent of US Marines to march in ANZUS 60th
anniversary celebrations.

12Canberra also celebrated the anniversary, with an Australia‐US Ministerial (AUSMIN) meeting ofdefense and foreign ministers in San Francisco in September. They put final touches on announcements to bemade during Obama’s twice‐delayed state visit to Australia in November. The decisions included a new
agreement for regular exercises by US forces in northwestern Australia and an aircraft dispersal
arrangement to permit US planes to access Australian airports. Obama also chose to deliver his mostsignificant speech on Asia policy to the Parliament in Canberra.
Following the killing of Osama bin Laden on May 1 in Pakistan, Washington’s relations with
Islamabad endured an increasingly severe series of strains that were already difficult after an American
diplomatic employee killed two Pakistanis in Lahore in January. Unable to relax their reliance on each otherbecause of their respective needs, such as continued aid for Pakistan and air and land access to Afghanistan
for the US, the two capitals are nonetheless full of skepticism and distrust about each other’s intentions.
Tensions between India and Pakistan failed to increase to a critical level, despite their deep
suspicions. But by the end of the year, Pakistan’s leaders seemed to have recognized that they needed to dialback their overt hostility toward Afghanistan, after Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed a new StrategicPartnership Agreement with his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in October.
Allegations of Pakistani intelligence support for terrorist attacks on Kabul appear to have led Karzai to show
a willingness to tilt toward India’s interests in Afghanistan if Pakistan continues to be facilitating Taliban
aggressiveness.
India continued to disappoint Americans hopeful of a new strategic relationship with the major
power in South Asia. Washington’s officials continued to articulate convergence in US and Indian policies inSoutheast and East Asia, in a tacit alliance against non‐democratic China, should China’s behavior warrant a
joint reaction. But when tested in practice, over India’s acquisition of a new type of fighter aircraft for its
air force, or commercial nuclear power (for which the Bush and Obama administrations adjusted theapplication of the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty to accommodate India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons),
India looked other than to the US for suppliers.
By the time Barack Obama reached Bali, Indonesia, in November to be the first American president
to attend the nascent East Asian Summit, Washington was articulating forcefully its argument that it had
brought the US “back” to Asia. In a drumbeat of speeches and briefings, the Obama team argued that the US
had misdirected lives and resources to secondary struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan and neglected America’s
interest in the main theater of 21st century history, the Asia‐Pacific region. They argued it is time to “pivot”
to Asia, a term that may sound more military than intended.
Bush veterans argued they had not neglected Asia, but the truth is that the US had its eye on
counter‐terrorism for ten years at the expense of many other interests, including the engagement of senior
officials in Asia, where China had vastly stepped up its involvement in the interim. Indeed, an argument canbe made that the US gaze had overlooked Asia after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when the Clinton
administration chose not be as helpful as China appeared to be to the afflicted economies. It is neatly ironicthat Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is now the cheerleader of the “back to Asia” argument.
With an election looming in 2012 in the US and in most capitals of consequence in the region,
including China’s election‐like party congress, it was unsurprising that the Obama administration departed
from its deft touch at the beginning of the year and grew heavy handed in organizing the president’s trip
through Asia. Needing to promote jobs at home, Obama overcame Democrat party reservations and finallyendorsed passage of the Korea‐US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) on the occasion of pro‐US Koreanpresident Lee Myung‐bak’s state visit in October.
As host of the APEC meeting in Honolulu in November, Obama chose to make a centerpiece of his
Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is intended to be a high‐standard free trade agreement among nine13

nations (US, Korea, Brunei, Peru, Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand) largely building
on existing bilateral free trade agreements. But by excluding China from prospective participants, theproposal fed suspicions that it is a new anti‐China league. The last minute decision by Japan’s new Prime
Minster Noda to seek to participate in the TPP, welcome on many counts, nonetheless fed the suspicions,additionally because Japan has so many internal hurdles to overcome to enter into an effective free trade
agreement.
The US, having shown a deft hand in cooling tensions in 2010. It succeeded in developing
productive ties with China and the region simultaneously in 2011, but was at risk of succumbing to a newround of tensions as 2012’s political year began. Disputes over the South China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear
weapons programs and unease over the correlation of power between the US and China remainedunresolved. They stirred emotions among the region’s populations, as their leaders failed to find paths
toward their resolution.

14

TAKAHARA Akio
Professor, The University of Tokyo
How Can We Promote Japan‐China Relations? : Some Proposals
1. “Strengthen the resilience, weaken the fragility”
There is a lot of uncertainty about the future of China: e.g. can it succeed in soft‐landing?
Japan is an eternal neighbour of China: cannot move, cannot run away
Create a virtuous circle: Japan‐China relations⇔Japan‐US relations⇔US‐China relations
Japan‐China relations (and US‐China relations) is both resilient and fragile
Both countries jointly should reinforce the resilience, and deal with the fragility
I.e. further develop economic, cultural and societal exchange; discuss strategic coexistence and ways tocontrol exclusive nationalism

2. Collaborate to realise human security
China is in the midst of modernisation, aspiring to become wealthier and mightier
Patriotic education inspires people to achieve the Great Revival of the Chinese Nation, but at the sametime reproduces the sense of humiliation and victim mentality
Increase in social contradictions and the rise in the aggressive language of the military reminds us ofJapan in the 1930s
China must develop stably to make a post‐modern society soon; Japan makes a good reference
Japan should collaborate with the affluent Chinese for human security in China and other parts of East
Asia.

3. Promote research and publish in Chinese
One element of fragility is distrust and overly negative image of the other side
Japan should establish a contemporary China study centre, and institutionalise a mechanism of trilateralresearch exchange between China and US
Send out information in Chinese about various views that exist in Japan

4. Increase the diplomatic power and soft power of Japan
Japan and China should compete in their public diplomacy
Inform not only foreign countries but also its own nationals of Japanese diplomacy
Japan must do better in PR
Japan should increase its soft power, for example by promoting science & technology and improving its
language education

15

Narayanan GANESAN
Professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE GREAT POWERS:
PREFERENCES AND POLICIES
1. General Observations
Most countries prefer a balance of power among great powers
Indonesia and Malaysia more committed to active and independent foreign policy
Singapore committed to overwhelming American power as small vulnerable state
Indonesia and Myanmar are skeptical about benign American interests
Muslim majority states think US worsens Middle East problems by supporting Israel
Most countries welcome economic investments and aid without conditionalities

2. United States
Traditionally worked with hub and spokes allies Thailand and the Philippines
Thailand has drifted after 1975 and had a strategic alignment with China till 1988
Philippines voted out the bases in 1991 but has increased cooperation since VFA in 1999
Singapore has the strongest policy of alignment now after 1990 MOU, Addendum and Implementation
Arrangements by hosting COMLOG WESTPAC, F16 aircraft on rotational deployment and berthing andresupplying for aircraft carriers
Relationship with Vietnam has increased significantly and now has decided to strategically engage
MyanmarHas extensive economic interests in region and is heavily invested

3. China
Traditional ally of Myanmar and has renewed relations with Vietnam though some outstanding issues
remain and close to Laos and Cambodia
Fears of Indonesia and Malaysia regarding threat perceptions have dissipatedSingapore’s bilateral relationship has significantly strengthened
Dense economic transactionalism with region and overseas Chinese immigrants
Philippines is the occasional thorn in the region on maritime issues
Clearly a rising power that aims to secure soft power and diplomatic support

4. Japan
Residual distrust in region from older generation
Strong economic linkages especially in construction, infrastructure, automotive, electronic and extractive
industries, continuation of Yoshida Doctrine
Strong engagement of states along Malacca Strait, especially Malaysia and Indonesia
Much goodwill accumulated in Indochina for infrastructural development and ODA
Attempting to rapidly reengage Myanmar to offset China’s influence

16

SATO Koichi
Professor, J.F.Oberlin University
Policy Recommendations on “The Japan‐U.S.‐China Dialogue:
The Asia‐Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan‐U.S.‐China Relations
Much has been said about the rapid increase in the number of Chinese maritime deployments,
including the activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy and the Chinese maritime security
agencies in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. These sea areas are believed to be rich in oil andfishery resources. The Chinese government claims the all South China Sea Islands including the Spratly
Islands and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. They have sovereignty disputes with the Southeast
Asian neighbors and Japan on these maritime features. The U.S. government also opposes the Chineseinterference with the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. If so, what can we do for the preventionof the maritime disputes, and promotion of the Japan‐U.S.‐China Cooperation?
1. Establish the Maritime Security Cooperation Committee (MSCC) among Japan, the U.S,

and China.
2. Promote the contribution to the Japan‐U.S. Alliance for strengthening of Security ofAsia‐Pacific Region.
3. Support the establishment of the Council for the Cooperative Projects in the South China

Sea (CCPSCS) and encourage the solution of South China Sea Conflict.
4. Reinforce the Japanese domestic maritime law regime and practice the maritime patrol andtraining against the violation of territorial waters by the foreign ships.
5. Dispatch the meteorologists, ecological and environmental researchers periodically to theremote islands including the Senkaku Islands, and restore the lighthouse keepers’ presencein these islands for the defense purpose. The nationalization of the remote islands may berealized, too.
6. Establish the East Asia Future Community Dialogue (EAFPD)
Establish the EAFPD, a forum for the East Asian friendship, and comprehensive cooperation of
security, economic and cultural fields, and future visions including the U.S., India, Australia, New Zealand.
The cooperation should cover the disaster‐relief, prevention and cure of infectious diseases, fish farming &marine preserve, anti‐marine pollution, prevention of climate change, regional finance & trade, education &support for the students from regional countries, academic exchanges, and alleviation of the cultural
frictions among the citizens in the region.

17

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)【 Objectives 】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, andglobalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especiallyneighboring countries in the Asia‐Pacific region at both governmental and non‐governmental levels, is one of the indispensableconditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote theexchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to the economy, trade,finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart
countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there
were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was
at risk. Within this context, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges ofprivate‐sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign
Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, andCanadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private‐sector in their respective countries, took the initiativein founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the alterednature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global
Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in
Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global
consensus on the many post‐Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only
to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravityof The Global Forumʹs activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic andInternational Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the Americancomponent ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would
thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, andamended its by‐laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forumʹs Japanese component was reorganized into The Global
Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self‐governing, self‐financing, and independent of any
other organization.
【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non‐profit, non‐partisan, and independent membershiporganization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy‐oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global
implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any otherorganizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The
Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, and TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982,
GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 10
Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 25 Diet Members including thefive Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, HATOYAMA Yukio, KOIKE Yuriko, SUEMATSU Yoshinori, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 84
Opinion Leader Members including the three Governors, HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, SHIMADA Haruo, and WATANABE Mayu.
Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of Japan are organized into the Supporters’ Club of the Global Forum of Japan.
Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 11 leading Japanese corporations(Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each, and the other 9 corporations contributing 1 or 2
shares each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan‐ASEAN Exchange Projects, Japan‐ASEAN
Integration Fund, The Tokyo Club, The Japan‐Korea Cultural Foundation, etc. KIKUCHI Yona serves as Acting Executive Secretary.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the
Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the
Asia‐Pacific region including the U.S., China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea
area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been
active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy‐oriented intellectual
exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue,” GFJ in principle
holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its overseas co‐sponsors in the last five years is given
below.
Year

Month

Topic

Co‐sponsor

March
March

The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japanʹs RoleThe Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global GovernanceFebruary

July

The Asia‐Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan‐U.S.‐China
Relations
The Japan‐China Relations at Crossroads
The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation on
Disaster Management
The Japan‐U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power
East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional
Cooperation
East Asian Regional Architectures and Japan‐India Relations
Promoting Japan‐U.S. Cooperation in Non‐Traditional Security:
the Case of Counter Piracy
Promoting Japan‐China Cooperation on Environmental Issues ofthe 21st Century: In Pursuit of Recycling Society
Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan
Japan‐ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis
Prospect of Japan‐China Relationship in the Changing World
US‐Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration
Prospect of Japan‐ASEAN Partnership after the Second Joint
Statement on East Asia Cooperation
Japan‐China Relations Entering A New Stage

June
January

Cooperation in Environment and Energy
An East Asian Community and the US

2012

OctoberJuly
2011

February
February
September
May

2010

2009

February
January
September
June
April
September

2008

18

ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
Fudan University
Nanyang Technological University
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China Association of Asia‐Pacific Studies
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.)
International Studies Department, Vietnam National University(Vietnam)
The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (India)
National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University (China)
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
ASEAN‐ISIS
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (U.S.)ASEAN‐ISIS
Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations (China)
The Council on East Asian Community, The East Asian Institute of
National University of Singapore (Singapore)
The Council on East Asia Community, The Pacific Forum CSIS (U.S.)5. An Introduction to The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization
dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international
engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan anddedicated to achieving practical results.
The last decades have seen rapid internationalization in all kinds of fields—from small
business to terrorism to religion, entertainment and social activism. Oddly, thinktanks—even those whose interests are international—remained largely national
enterprises, rooted in the views of one country. The Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace was the first to break the pattern.
In 1994, the Endowment launched the Carnegie Moscow Center, pioneering the ideathat in today's world a think tank whose mission is to contribute to global security,
stability, and prosperity requires a permanent international presence and amultinational outlook at the core of its operations.
Building on the strength of this success and following its century-long practice ofchanging as global circumstances change, the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace undertook a fundamental redefinition of its role and mission.
As it celebrates its Centennial, the Carnegie Endowment, led by Chairman Richard
Giordano and President Jessica T. Mathews, is pioneering the first global think tank,with flourishing offices now in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels.
These five locations include the centers of world governance and the places whose
political evolution and international policies will most determine the near-term
possibilities for international peace and economic advance.
【Contact Information】
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington, DC 20036-2103
Tel: 202 483 7600 Fax: 202 483 1840

19

6. An Introduction to China Association of Asia Pacific Studies
China Association of Asia Pacific Studies (President: Zhang Yunling) is a non-governmental andnon-profit academic organization, which was established by the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). It has dedicated to promote and coordinate
academic studies in the Asia-Pacific region, and to enhance mutual understandings andfriendship between China and Asia-Pacific countries.
The Association organizes experts of Asia-Pacific studies and undertakes research projects
commissioned by the Chinese Government. It also promotes academic exchanges domesticallyand internationally, and strengthen cooperation with many research institutes in the
Asia-Pacific Region and worldwide.
The Association sponsors and organizes the nationwide symposium and seminar every year. In
2011, the association held the symposium, titled as “Economic Development and Building
Bridgehead in Asia-Pacific Region”, co-sponsoring with Yunnan Provincial Federation of Social
Science Circles and the government of Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture. Each
Asia-pacific Research Institute in China and more than 100 scholars over 30 Universities
attended.
The Association has published a comprehensive journal of Asia-Pacific Studies biannually,emphasizes on researches in relation to on Asian-Pacific politics, economics, foreign relations,
literature, philosophy and linguistics.
【Contact Information】
3 Zhang Zizhong Rd. Beijing, 100007 China
Tel: 8610-64063922, Fax: 8610-64063041

20

7. An Introduction to the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishingresearch reports and policy recommendations, etc.
[History]
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987
in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Mr. ITO Kenichi, and 60 otherindependent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that apolicy‐oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government wasmost urgently needed in Japan. JFIR celebrated its 20th anniversary on March 12, 2007. And on April 1, 2011,
JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Ministerin recognition of its achievements.
[Purpose]
The Forum is a private, non‐profit, independent, and non‐partisan organization dedicated to
improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no
institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but topropose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy
recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in noway those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is thatof those members of the Forum who sign them alone.
[Organization]
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2)associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the“Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of
supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge ofthe management of day‐to‐day operations of JFIR.
[Activities]
In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, anotherimportant pillar of JFIR’s activities is the BBS “Hyakka‐Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom”(http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m‐bbs/). The BBS, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as
an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the BBS are
sent through the bimonthly e‐mail magazine “Meru‐maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000
readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on
the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introducedin the e‐mail magazine “JFIR E‐Letter” in English. “JFIR E‐Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000
readers worldwide.

21

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/