The Japan-U.S. Dialogue
U.S.-China “New Cold War”?:
Implications for Japan and the United States

Conference Papers

February 15, 2019
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Supported by
The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership

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Table of Contents
1. Program……………………………….…………………………………………..1
2. Biographies of the Panelists………….…………………………………….........2
3. Presentation Papers……………………………………...…………………….....5
Evans REVERE…………..………………………………………………...…….....6
James SCHOFF………….………..……………………………………...……….....9

4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations…...…...…..…...13(1) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)………..………………..………….....13(2) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)…………………………...……………………..…….....14(3) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)……………...…...….…...……….....15

1. Program
日米対話
米中「新冷戦」？：日米にとっての含意
2019年2月15日／February 15, 2019
アイビーホール、東京／IVY HALL, Tokyo
共催／Co-sponsored by
公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム ／ The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
米カーネギー国際平和財団／Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)
開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks
16:00-16:10
開会挨拶（5分間）

渡辺 繭 GFJ執行世話人／JFIR副理事長

Opening Remarks (5 min.)WATANABE Mayu, President, GFJ / Vice President, JFIR

セッションⅠ／Session I
16:10-17:15
議長
Chairperson「際限のない戦略的対立は必然なのか？」"Are We Destined for Unbounded Strategic Rivalry?"
神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／GFJ有識者世話人／JFIR理事・上席研究員
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan /Academic Governor, GFJ / Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

基調報告A （10分間）

川島

Keynote Speaker A (10 min.)KAWASHIMA Shin, Professor, the University of Tokyo

真 東京大学教授

基調報告B （10分間）

エヴァンス・リヴィア オルブライト・ストンブリッジ・グループ上級顧問

Keynote Speaker B (10 min.)Evans REVERE, Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group

コメントＡ （5分間）

飯田 将史 防衛研究所主任研究官

Commentator A (5 min.)IIDA Masafumi, Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies

コメントB （5分間）

マイケル・スウェイン カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員

Commentator B (5 min.)Michael SWAINE, Senior Fellow, CEIP

コメントC （5分間）

佐橋Commentator C (5 min.)

SAHASHI Ryo, Professor, Kanagawa University

コメントD （5分間）

マイケル・チェイス ランド研究所（ワシントン事務所）上級政治学者

亮 神奈川大学教授

Commentator D (5 min.)Michael CHASE, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Cooperation

自由討議 （25分）

出席者全員

Free Discussions (25 min.)All Participants

17:15-17:20

パネリスト座席移動

セッションⅡ／Session Ⅱ
17:20-18:25「経済戦争か地域協力か？」"Economic War or Regional Cooperation?"議長

細谷 雄一 慶応義塾大学教授

Chairperson

HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University

基調報告A （10分間）

ジェームズ・ショフ カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員

Keynote Speaker A (10 min.)James SCHOFF, Senior Fellow, CEIP

基調報告B （10分間）

伊藤 亜聖 東京大学准教授

Keynote Speaker B (10 min.)ITO Asei, Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo

コメントＡ （5分間）

ニコラス・セーチェーニ 米戦略国際問題研究所日本部副部長・上級研究員

Commentator A (5 min.)Nicholas SZECHENYI, Deputy Director, Japan Chair, CSIS

コメントB （5分間）

森

Commentator B (5 min.)

MORI Satoru, Professor, Hosei University

コメントC （5分間）
Commentator C (5 min.)
コメントD （5分間）

聡 法政大学教授

カーラ・フリーマン ジョンズ・ホプキンス大学ポール・H・ニッツェ高等国際関係大学院外交政策研究所エグ
ゼクティブ・ディレクター
Carla FREEMAN, Executive Director of the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute大庭 三枝 東京理科大学教授

Commentator D (5 min.)

OBA Mie, Professor, Tokyo University of Science

自由討議 （25分）

出席者全員

Free Discussions (25 min.)All Participants

総括セッション／Wrap-up Session
18:25-18:35
ジェームズ・ショフ
総括 （10分間）
Wrap-up (10 min.)James SCHOFF
神谷 万丈
KAMIYA Matake[NOTE] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き／English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided.

12. Biographies of the Panelists【U.S. Side】
Evans REVERE

Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group

Evans REVERE is a Senior Advisor at the Albright Stonebridge Group. He is also Nonresident Senior
Fellow at the Brookings Institute, where he focuses on the Korean Peninsula. During a distinguishedcareer as one of the U.S. Department of State’s top Asia hands, he served as Acting Assistant Secretaryand Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. His diplomatic
career included service at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and also in China, Taiwan, and Japan. Hiscommentaries on North Korea and on Asian affairs are highly sought after by leading media outlets in the
United States, Asia, and Europe. Mr. REVERE is a graduate of Princeton University, a U.S. Air Forceveteran, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is fluent in Chinese, Japanese, andKorean.

Michael SWAINE

Senior Fellow, CEIP

Michael SWAINE is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and one of themost prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. Formerly a Senior Policy Analyst at the
RAND Corporation, Swaine is a specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations,and East Asian international relations. He has authored and edited more than a dozen books andmonographs, as well as many journal articles and book chapters in these areas, directs several
security-related projects with Chinese partners, and advises the U.S. government on Asian security
issues. He received his doctorate in government from Harvard University.

Michael CHASE

Senior Political Scientist, RAND Cooperation

Michael S. Chase is a Senior Political Scientist at RAND, an adjunct professor in the China Studies andStrategic Studies Departments at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies(SAIS). A specialist in China and Asia-Pacific security issues, he was previously an associate professor at
the U.S. Naval War College (NWC), a research analyst at Defense Group Inc. and an associateinternational policy analyst at RAND. He is the author of the book “Taiwan's Security Policy” andnumerous chapters and articles on China and Asia-Pacific security issues, of which some have appearedin journals such as Asia Policy, Asian Security, China Brief, Survival, and the Journal of Strategic Studies.
CHASE holds a Ph.D. in international affairs and M.A. in China Studies from SAIS.

James SCHOFF

Senior Fellow, CEIP

James SCHOFF is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research
focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and regional engagement, Japanese security policy, and the private
sector’s role in Japanese policymaking. He previously served as Senior Adviser for East Asia Policy at the
U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as Director of Asia Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis (IFPA). Prior to IFPA, he was a Program Officer in charge of policy studies at the UnitedStates-Japan Foundation, following six years living in Japan and other parts of Asia working in the fields
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of business, education, and journalism. SCHOFF’s publications include “Uncommon Alliance for the

Common Good: The United States and Japan after the Cold War” (Carnegie, 2017) and “What Myanmar
Means for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” (Carnegie, 2014).

Nicholas SZECHENYI

Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Japan Chair, CSIS

Nicholas SZECHENYI is a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Japan Chair at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and U.S.
strategy in Asia. Prior to joining CSIS in 2005, he was a news producer for Fuji Television where hecovered domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy in Asia. He holds an M.A. in international economics andJapan studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a
B.A. in Asian studies from Connecticut College.

Carla FREEMAN

Executive Director of the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute,
Johns Hopkins University

Carla Freeman is an Associate Research Professor in China Studies at the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She conducts research on Chinese foreign and domestic
policy with a current focus on regional dynamics, including China and its periphery, nontraditional
security, and China's role in international organizations. Her career has included directing the programin civil society and community sustainability at The Johnson Foundation, and various academic positions
at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, University of Wisconsin-Parkside, Beloit College, and Alverno
College. FREEMAN received a PhD in International relations and Asian Studies from Johns Hopkins
SAIS, where she also completed a master's in international economics and China Studies. She is the
Editor-in-Chief of the academic journal “Asian Perspective,” published by Johns Hopkins University
Press.

【Japanese Side】
WATANABE Mayu

Vice President, JFIR / President, GFJ

Graduated from Chiba University. Received M.A. in Education from the Graduate School of the University ofTokyo in 1997. Joined the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) in 2000 and appointed Seniorresearch fellow in 2007, during which period she specialized in global human resource development andpublic diplomacy. Appointed Executive Director in 2011 and assumed Senior Executive Director in 2017. She
has served as Vice President since 2018. Concurrently serving as President of the Council on East Asian
Community (CEAC).

KAMIYA Matake

Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan /Academic Governor, GFJ / Director and Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIRKAMIYA Matake is concurrently adjunct research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs andMember of the Board of Directors of the Japan Association for International Security. He served asDistinguished Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, during 1994-1995, and andas editor-in-chief of Discuss Japan - Japan Foreign Policy Forum from 2013 to 2016. He has published3

extensively on international relations, Asia-Pacific security, U.S.-Japan security relations, and Japanese foreignand security policies including Japan’s non-nuclear policy. He is co-editor of Introduction to Security Studies,
5th edition, (Aki-shobo, 2018), the most widely read textbook on security studies in Japan (Chinese andKorean translations have been published). His English-language publications include "The U.S.-Japan
Alliance: Enhancer or Brake on Japan’s power?" (Japan’s World Power, Routledge, 2018), “Strong, but
Worrying: The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Trump Era” (The National Committee on American Foreign Policy,2017), “Realistic Proactivism: Japanese Attitudes Toward Global Zero” (Stimson Center, 2009), and articles in
The Washington Quarterly and Arms Control Today among others. He is a graduate of the University ofTokyo, and Columbia University (as a Fulbright grantee).

KAWASHIMA Shin

Professor, the University of Tokyo

He teaches the history of international relations in East Asia at Komaba Campus. He was educated at theTokyo University of Foreign Studies (B.A.1992) and the University of Tokyo (Oriental history, M.A., 1992 andPh.D, 2000). He taught at Hokkaido University’s Department of Politics, Faculty of Law during 1998-2006
before moving to the University of Tokyo in 2006. He served as a visiting scholar at the Academia Sinica in
Taipei (Institute of Modern History, 1995-96), the Beijing Center for Japanese Studies (vice director, 2000-2001),
National Chengchi University in Taipei (department of history, 2005) and Beijing University (department ofhistory, 2005), and Awarded Japan Scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2009). He
has studied Chinese diplomatic history based on Chinese diplomatic archives. His first book, the Formationof Chinese Modern Diplomacy (Nagoya University Press, 2004), was awarded the Suntory Academic Prize in
2004.

IIDA Masafumi

Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies

He holds a B.A. in Policy Management and M.A. in Media and Governance from Keio University, in addition
to an M.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University. He has held various positions within NIDS, andmost recently was assigned as Senior Staff to the Defense Policy Bureau within the Japanese Ministry of
Defense (MOD). Additionally, he has completed a term as a Visiting Scholar with the Center for East AsianStudies at Stanford University in 2010 and with the China Maritime Studies Institute at U.S. Naval War
College in 2014. Professor Iida has focused his research primarily on China’s foreign and security policies andin particular, the growing maritime implications of this relationship within East Asia.

SAHASHI Ryo

Professor, Kanagawa University

He received his B.A. from International Christian University and his Ph.D. with honor from the Graduate
Schools for Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo. He also studied at Department of Political Science,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His early academic career as faculty started with the Universityof Tokyo and Australian National University. He joined Kanagawa University in 2010. He teaches also atUniversity of Tokyo and Sophia University, and serves as Research Fellow, Japan Center for International
Exchange. He has been Visiting Associate Professor, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center,
Stanford University and Shigeru Yoshida Chair, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). He also
served adjunct Senior Research Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo Foundation-German Marshall
Fund of the United States Partnership Fellow, and Guest Researcher for First Special Committee Research
Office, House of Councilors.
4

HOSOYA Yuichi

Professor, Keio University

Received his M.I.S. from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D. from Keio University. He is also SeniorResearcher at Nakasone Peace Institute (NPI), The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and at theTokyo Foundation for Policy Research (TKFD). Served as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in
Paris (2009–10), Visiting Fellow at Princeton University (2008–2009). His research interests include thepostwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporaryinternational security. He was a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal
Basis for Security (2013-14), a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense
Capabilities (2013) and of the Advisory Board of the National Security Secretariat (2014-16).

ITO Asei

Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo

He obtained PhD in Economics from Graduate school of Economics, University of Keio, Japan. His researchcovers the Chinese industrial development, China’s outward FDI activities, and innovation in China and Asia.
He is the author of Industrial Clusters in Contemporary China: “The Workshop of the World” and A
Bottom-up Economic Development (the University of Nagoya Press, 2015, in Japanese) and China Unmanned
Aerial System Industry Report 2017: An emerging industry from an emerging economy (the Institute of Social
Science, University of Tokyo, in Japanese), and one of co-editors of China’s Outward Foreign Direct
Investment Data (University of Tokyo, 2014, in English) and Understanding Contemporary China: Lecture
Series at the University of Tokyo (University of Tokyo Press, 2014, in Japanese).

MORI Satoru

Professor, Hosei University

He also serves as a senior fellow of the Japanese government’s National Security Secretariat and is also asenior fellow at the Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace Institute. He is a graduate of Kyoto University and received his
LL.M. degrees from Kyoto University Graduate School of Law and the Columbia University Law School.
After serving as a career diplomat at the Japanese Foreign Ministry (1996-2001), he obtained his Ph.D. fromthe University of Tokyo and was a research fellow at the Center for Comparative Law and Politics, Universityof Tokyo (2006-08). He joined the Faculty of Law at Hosei University as a tenured associate professor in 2008
and assumed professorship in 2010. During his sabbatical leave, he was a Visiting Fellow at the Sigur Center
for Asian Studies, George Washington University (2013-15) and Visiting Researcher at the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University (2014-15). He is currently undertaking
research on themes such as U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. defense innovation and its implications
for U.S. allies, and technology and international relations.

OBA Mie

Professor, Tokyo University of Science

Graduated from International Christian University in 1991. Received M.A. in 1994 and Ph.D. in 2002 from the
University of Tokyo. Served as Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at
Nanyang Technological University in Singapore (2004), Academic Associate, Program on U.S.-Japan Relationsat Harvard University (2006-2007), and Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science (2007-2014) before
assuming current position in 2014．Her major is International Relations and the politics in Asia-Pacific. Her
current research interests include the development of regionalism in this region as well as theories of regional
integration and regionalism.
(In order of appearance in the “Program”)

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3. Presentation Papers
Evans REVERE
Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group
U.S.-China Relations: A New Paradigm and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
I.
•
•

•

•

•

II.

A New Center of Gravity in U.S.-China Relations
A break with the past
Previous basis for U.S.-China relations- Bipartisan support- Manage differences, engagement, expand the scope of bilateral cooperation,encourage Beijing to play a constructive role, “responsible stakeholder”
A new center of gravity- But a new consensus?
- Misgivings about strategy/goals
New paradigm building for some time
- Defections from the consensus
 Business community, security experts
 Across the spectrum
The Trump factor- “America First”- Nationalism- Zero-sum mentality- The diplomacy of resentment

The China Challenge• The Pence “indictment”• Perceived threats to the rules-based international ordero The military dimension
 South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan
 Military modernization, budget growth, new capabilities, new ambitions
o Economics and Trade “We’re number two!”• Ten years to number one
 Trade deficit, forced technology transfer, cyber espionage, trade barriers,
the return of state enterprises, disaffected U.S. investors• Impact on U.S. businesses, government• Is there a Chinese “private sector”?
6

o The Huawei problem• BRI
o Xi Jingping and the Party Revival of authoritarianism
 Crackdowns galore: human rights activists, labor and women’s groups,
lawyers, environmental activists, the Internet, basic freedoms• “McCarthyism with Chinese characteristics”• Uighurs• AI and authoritarianism
 Reassertion of central authority
 Leader-for-life Xi• Echoes of an earlier era A troubling question: Is a China led by the Chinese Communist Party
fundamentally incompatible with the rules-based liberal international
order?
III.
•

•
•

•
•

IV.

Pitfalls and Dangers
Demonization; creating an atmosphere of necessary confrontationo Worst-case analysis leads to worst case planning leads to…
o Military confrontation
 SCS, ECS, Taiwan
o Arms race Matching capabilities
 The INF problem
Forcing regional actors/allies to “choose sides”
Trade war and global/regional supply chainso What’s the goal?
 Can we really force systemic change in China’s economy?
 Is “decoupling” realistic in a modern, globalized economy?
 Does the U.S. seek to block China rise?
Creates atmosphere of uncertainty for investors in region
Leads to loss of cooperation on key regional and global issues: environment, terrorism,
Korea, etc.

Recommendations for the U.S.-Japan Alliance• For the U.S:o Remember: Our allies live in the neighborhoodo Consider implications of trade war for allied economies, particularly Japan, andregional supply chains Unintended consequenceso Remember: An attitude is not a strategy
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•

•

 Getting the first is easy; developing the second, not so mucho Develop a shared strategy with key allies, including Japano Unilateralism and “America First” rhetoric is undermining allies’ confidence in
U.S. leadership Beware the danger of encouraging hedging
o China’s unfair trade practices, opaque military and security ambitions, rapidly
growing military budgets, and attempts to intimidate neighbors are legitimate
concerns
 Dealing with them forthrightly should not rule out cooperation in otherarenas.
o Beware of zero-sum calculations
 Strike a balance between pressing our concerns and pursuing areas forcooperationo Concerns over human rights, authoritarianism, crackdown on activists and theInternet are also legitimate
 These should be part of regular dialogue with Beijing• But confrontation with China or creating impression U.S. is seeking
to prevent China’s rise is unlikely to help advance dialogue on theseissuesFor Japan:
o Be clear in consultations with Washington where Japan’s interests lie
o Urge Washington to develop a shared/integrated strategy towards China – astrategy that reflects Japan’s interests
For the United States and Japan:o Make clear our determination to respond to China’s territorial ambitions
o Reaffirm defense commitmentso Continue to develop forces/capabilities to defend interests
 We cannot ignore China’s rising capabilities
o Seek opportunities to work with China/PLA – CBM dialogues, SAR, and crisis
management exercises, etc.
o Develop a shared/integrated strategy towards the PRC
oMake clear to China that improvements in China-Japan relations will not come at
expense of U.S.-Japan ties

8

James SCHOFF
Senior Fellow, CEIP
“U.S.-China and a New Cold War: Economic Conflict or Regional Cooperation?”
Scoping the Issue:
U.S. policy makers have criticized China’s economic management and trade practices for wellover a decade, worried about the potential damage they were inflicting on the U.S. economy andworkforce. In 2006 Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) sponsored a billthat would have levied a 27.5 percent tariff on all Chinese imports unless the yuan was
substantially revalued, but later withdrew the legislation after China pledged to address U.S.
complaints. Among U.S. grievances were unfair subsidies to state owned enterprises (SOEs),
currency manipulation, restricted markets, and theft of intellectual property (IP).
Many analysts at that time downplayed the danger of a rising U.S. trade deficit with China,
noting the benefit to American consumers of cheaper Chinese imports that were arguably justreplacing imports from other Asian countries, which had shifted final assembly to China.
Moreover, China’s rising middle class was becoming an important market for U.S. goods andcommodities, and there was reason to expect that China’s economy would increasingly resemble
that of other industrialized countries as it matured. Japan’s economy also benefited greatly from
China’s growth.
But even as China’s economy grew to become among the world’s largest and most influential, its
unbalanced trade continued amid allegations of IP theft, mercantilism, and a drive to dominate
the most consequential technologies of the 21st century. China’s economic and technologicalpower has transferred mere trade complaints into a broader sense of strategic rivalry withsignificant national security risks and some commercial opportunities for the allies.

9US Trade Deficit in Goods (in $bns) from 1996 to 2018$450.0$400.0$350.0$300.0$250.0China$200.0Japan$150.0$100.0$50.0$-

Source: US Census Bureau https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html (2018 isestimated)
What’s at stake for the United States:•

Macro performance of China’s economy and the performance of some of China’s largest
companies can have a significant impact on U.S. national interests in both the short and longterm. At stake are U.S. economic health and growth, private firms’/farmers’ prosperity,
technology leadership, military and global competitiveness, and U.S. foreign policy influence.
This is true regardless of which direction China’s economy takes (i.e., there are bothpotentially positive and negative impacts from either growth or deterioration in China’s
economy).

•The worst development for U.S. would be strong Chinese economic growth andtechnological innovation at the expense of the United States and U.S. firms. This has thegreatest potential for U.S. experiencing mostly negative aspects of Chinese growth over thelong term.

•

It is this dynamic/fear that a growing number of Americans and U.S. policy makers believe
has been happening since China’s admission to the WTO (although data generally shows amixed picture, suggesting that some of China’s gains have been at the expense of certain U.S.
firms and workers, while the U.S. has also benefited in certain areas). 1•

A more open and rules-based form of Chinese capitalism could benefit both countries,
including boosting Chinese FDI in the United States, though some U.S. businesses and1

For negative impacts, see Salman Ahmed, et al, “U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives from Ohio,” John

Glenn College of Public Affairs at The Ohio State University and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/12/10/u.s.-foreign-policy-for-middle-class-perspectives-from-ohio-pub-77779. For
benefits, see “The China Footprint,” produced by Marco Polo and The Paulson Institute,
https://macropolo.org/china-footprint/ accessed January 24, 2019.

10

workers would still suffer from the competition. Competition in dual-use technologies andwriting rules of the road for new technologies (and rules on data usage/privacy) will continue
to be contentious.
Recent developments:
What accounts for souring US views of China?
•

There is imbalance in trade (some displaced from rest of Asia), SOE subsidies & other “unfair”
practices•

IP theft, espionage, military growth and expansion (a real and potentially threateningchange)•US economic inequality exacerbates the problem, creates political pressure (China an easy
scapegoat).

•

Tariff policy is aimed here…to force China to change (level playing field) or pushrealignment of supply chains to other parts of Asia and US (as punishment/incentive for
China to change)•

The Trump administration launched multi-pronged attack:1) Super 301 and Section 232 tariffs on the one hand, to protect industry and pressure Beijing
to agree to major changes to economic structure and behavior; and2) Efforts to protect technology edge via restrictions on inward FDI (CFIUS and FIRRMA),
export control (ECRA) and pending Commerce guidelines for special treatment of“emerging and foundational technologies,” and government/military procurement
restrictions (NDAA).

•

U.S. business community and members of Congress have not liked Trump’s tariff approach,but as the new House Ways & Means Chairman (Richard Neal, D-MA) said: “Ascontroversial as the China tariffs have been, this administration does currently have theattention of China’s economic policy makers…[creating] a unique opportunity…to secure
meaningful and significant changes from China in the way China competes,” arguing against“a quick and easy deal” that does not secure “a fundamental reset of the U.S.-China traderelationship.”Current and future risks:•

A sharp drop in near-term growth for China can adversely affect the U.S. economy andcertain firms in particular (e.g., ~20% of Apple revenue is from Greater China, and earnings
guidance on Jan 2 w/ drop of up to 10% of revenue in Q1 nearly all attributable to lower
iPhone sales in China, & shares drop ~7%).

11

o There is also a broader ripple effect, as we saw Apple’s decline hurt other firms like
Taiwan’s Foxconn, which eliminated 50,000 seasonal jobs as a result, causing broader pain.
The agriculture sector will suffer too, with long-term implications.
o Also longer-term inability to finance U.S. deficit spending. Only benefit might be fewer
resources to compete militarily, diplomatically, and in terms of technology innovation.
•

On the flip side, a Chinese economic revival at the expense of the United States (in terms ofhollowing out of key U.S. industries, reducing competitiveness, locking in Chinese technicaland economic standards globally) will harm the U.S. economy and erode its militaryadvantages.

Current and future opportunities:•

In China, the so-called “reform camp” thinks that the U.S.-China conflict is an opportunity tohelp overcome political obstacles and promote economic reform in China (i.e., utilize
gaiatsu). This could bolster development of good global governance standards and positively
influence other countries in Central, South, and Southeast Asia.

•

Balanced economic growth in China helps the U.S. and Japanese economies (certain firms
and business sectors particularly). It also allows China to contribute to external financing andinfrastructure investment (some is politically driven, but some also adheres to higher
standards and co-financing with Asian Development Bank is on the rise…can we promote
more?).

•

Introducing “green” economic growth policies in China could have a major positive impact
on the global environment and assist with mitigating climate change.

•

U.S.-Japan consultations on U.S. bilateral trade negotiations with China (as a subset of
US-Japan-EU discussions re: WTO reform and pressing for structural change and behavior
change re: China’s economy) can be useful. We need to work in concert with allies andpartners to prioritize negotiating points and share information for evaluating progress.

•

In this sense, strong-arm (punitive) U.S. negotiating tactics vis-à-vis Japan on trade arecounterproductive and should instead be a “win-win” bilateral dialogue that approximates a
TPP-like U.S.-Japan arrangement.

12

4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations(1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Objectives and History
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) originates from the Japan Chapter of the Quadrangular Forum (QF), which was establishedin 1982 in Washington to serve as an informal promoter of the exchange of policy-oriented views and opinions among Japan,
US, Europe, and Canada. As the Cold War ended and its aftermath faded away, QF ceased its activity in 1996. The Japan
Chapter of QF survived the vicissitudes and developed into the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) as an independent institution ofJapan for international intellectual exchanges. Since then, GFJ has been active as a hub for international exchanges with theglobal intellectual community at large.
Organization
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan.
Business Member, Political Member, and Academic Member support its activities as Governors and Members. The Secretariat
is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations. GFJ is currently headed by ITO Kenichi as Chairman, WATANABE
Mayu as President, and TAKAHATA Yohei as Vice President and Executive Secretary. The membership is composed of 10
Business Members including the 4 Governors, TOYODA Shoichiro, MOGI Yuzaburo, ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, and YAGUCHI
Toshikazu; 10 Political Members including the 4 Governors, KAKIZAWA Mito, SUEMATSU Yoshinori, SUZUKI Keisuke, and
FUNADA Hajime; and 56 Academic Members including the 3 Governors, ITO Go, KAMIYA Matake, and TAKAHARA Akio.
Activities(1) e-forum “Giron-Hyakushutsu (Hundred Views in Full Perspective)” operated on the website of GFJ(2) Monthly held meetings of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” and “Diplomatic Roundtable”(3) PR and Enlightenment through publication of “Bulletin,” the website, mail magazine, etc.
(4) “International Dialogues” convened 3 to 4 times a year on policy-oriented issues with counterparts invited from various
parts of the world. Recent International Dialogues are as follows:
Years and
ThemesMonthsCounterparts

2019

Jul.

The Japan - Indo-Pacific Dialogue “Free and Open Indo- PacificInitiative and Maritime Order”

Pathfinder Foundation (Sri Lanka)"Routledge Studies on Think Asia"

2018

Dec.

The Japan-Russia Dialogue “Possibility of Japan-Russia Cooperationin an Increasingly Complex Northeast Asianew”
The Dialogue with the World “ GEOECONOMICS and The 21stCentury World and Japan”
The Strategic Dialogue with Central Asia “Strategic Prospects ofRegional Cooperation and Security in Central Asia”
The Japan-U.S. Dialogue “China Risks and China Opportunities –Implications for the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ –”The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025

The Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of
Sciences (FEB RAS)The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR)The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR)
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace(CEIP) (U.S.)
The French Institute for International andStrategic Affairs (IRIS) (France)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

July

Mar.
Feb.
2017

Aug.
Jun.

Mar.
Feb.

“Central Asia + Japan” Dialogue “Prospects on the Current andFuture Japan-Central Asia Relations
Japan-ASEAN Dialogue “Changing Regional Order in the Asia Pacificand Japan-ASEAN Cooperation”

Japan-U.S. Dialogue “The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Trump
Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?"
Japan-China Dialogue “Prospect of Japan-China Cooperation in
Aging Society”

The S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS) (Singapore), Nanyang
Technological University / The University ofSocial Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam
National University (VNU-USSH) (Vietnam)
Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University (INSS) (U.S.)
Shanghai International Studies University /Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences / Fudan
University (China)

Contact
Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2193 FAX: +81-3-3505-4406 E-mail: gfj@gfj.jp URL: http://www.gfj.jp/j/13

(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisanorganization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no
institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose
alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on mattersof public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the
responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.
The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof.
ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that apolicy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently
needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by
the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, and (3)individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is incharge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive
body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.
■Board of Trustees■Board of Directors

ARIMA Tatsuo

ITO Kenichi

Chairman

HAKAMADA Shigeki

WATANABE Mayu

Vice President

HATTORI Yasuo

HANDA Haruhisa

Director

HIRONAKA Wakako

ITO GoDirector

HIRONO Ryokichi

ITO Masanori

Director

INOUE Akiyoshi

KAMIYA Matake

Director

ISHIGAKI Yasuji

KIKUCHI Yona

Director

KUROYANAGI Nobuo

MORIMOTO Satoshi

Director

OHYA Eiko

TAKUBO Tadae

Director

SAKAMOTO Masahiro

YANO Takuya

Director

SATO Ken■Auditors

WATANABE Toshio

NAITOH Masahisa

YAMAGUCHI Norio

WATANABE Kenichi

The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research Programs,”“International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Information Gathering,” and “PR and
Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred
Flowers in Full Bloom” (http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public,
functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forumare sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Foramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers inJapan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR
(http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” inEnglish. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.
Contact
Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2190

FAX: +81-3-3589-5120

E-mail: jfir@jfir.or.jp URL: http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/14

(3) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global network of policy research centers in Russia,
China, Europe, the Middle East, India, and the United States. Our mission, dating back more than a century, is toadvance peace through analysis and development of fresh policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration
with decisionmakers in government, business, and civil society. Working together, our centers bring theinestimable benefit of multiple national viewpoints to bilateral, regional, and global issues.

In 2006, Carnegie launched a revolutionary plan to build the first global think tank. Since then it has transformed ahundred-year-old American institution into one well-equipped for the challenges of a globalized world. Today,
Carnegie has research centers in Beijing, Beirut, Brussels, Moscow, New Delhi, and Washington. The network issupervised by an international board of trustees, and its research activities are overseen by a global management
group.

The scholars of each center are drawn from the region and write in the local languages, while collaborating closelywith colleagues across the world. The result provides capitals and global institutions with a deeper understandingof the circumstances shaping policy choices worldwide as well as a flow of new approaches to policy problems.

Contact
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036-2103
Phone: 202 483 7600 Fax: 202 483 1840

15

Memo

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193[Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp[This “Dialogue” is administered by the Secretariat of The Global Forum of Japan]