[Policy Note Back Number]
No.1 Development with Alternative Strategic Options: A Japanese View on
the Poverty Reduction Drive and Beyond
Kenichi Ohno
May 2002
No.2 Diversifying PRSP: The Vietnamese Model for Growth-Oriented
Poverty Reduction
Izumi Ohno
October 2002
No.3 The East Asian Experience of Economic Development and Cooperation
Kenichi Ohno
December 2002
No.4 新しいアフリカ成長支援イニシャティブの提言「アフリカ成長支援の具体化」検討会

事務局

2008 年 8 月

No.5 Proposal for a New African Growth Support Initiative
Secretariat for the Multi-stakeholder Discussion Group on“African Growth Support Initiative”
August 2008

c GRIPS Development Forum
Contact:
GRIPS Development Forum
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
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Phone: +81-3-6439-6337 / Fax: +81-3-6439-6010
Email: forum@grips.ac.jp
URL: http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/(Japanese)
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/(English)
政策研究大学院大学（GRIPS） 開発フォーラム・プロジェクト〒106―8677 東京都港区六本木7―22―1
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Publication of this volume was supported by the Japan International Cooporation Agency (JICA).

Proposal for a New African Growth
Support Initiative

GRIPS Development Forum
Secretariat for the Multi-stakeholder Discussion Group on“African Growth Support Initiative”

August 2008

Preface
This proposal for a “New African Growth Support Initiative” was compiled by
the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) Development
Forum, based on intensive discussions by a multi-stakeholder group aimed at
concretizing Japan’s growth support to Africa in the context of the FourthTokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD IV), which
was held on May 28–30, 2008, in Yokohama, Japan. The participants of themulti-stakeholder group were professionals interested in enhancing Japan’s
growth support to Africa. They included government officials, staff of aid
implementing agencies and international organizations, researchers, and businesspersons. 1 The group met four times between April and June 2008, witheach member participating in a personal capacity. The proposal also benefited
from discussions at a GRIPS Development Forum workshop held in late July
2008, which gathered African perspectives on Japan’s contribution to African
development, with the participation of prominent African professionals andAfrican ambassadors in Tokyo. 2
In initiating the multi-stakeholder discussions, we referred to the following
recent policy initiatives aimed at reactivating Japan’s support to Africa.
• “Report of the Stocktaking Work on the Economic Development in Africa
and the Asian Growth Experience” by the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC),
May 2008• “Interim Report by the Advisory Council on International Cooperation”
submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 2008
• “ODA Manifesto—30 Proposals for Enhanced International Cooperation”
by the Group for Renovating Japanese Official Development Assistance(ODA), October 2007 (with the GRIPS Development Forum serving as secretariat)

1

For the activities and meeting minutes of the multi-stakeholder discussion group, please see theAfrican Growth Support Initiative websites as follows: http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/af-growth/index.htm (Japanese), http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/af-growth/index.htm (English).
2
GRIPS Development Forum workshop “How Can Japan Effectively Support Economic Growthin Africa–The African Perspective,” July 25, 2008.

1

In formulating this proposal, we have given due consideration to renewedinterest in the growth agenda on the part of the international aid community inrecent years. We have analyzed current international efforts to support African
development to determine how they can be enhanced by incorporating East
Asian perspectives and what kind of actions should be taken by Japan in thisendeavor, in collaboration with other development partners.
We hope that this proposal will be useful for policy makers, aid practitioners,
researchers, and professionals in the business and civil society sectors who areresponsible for implementing the Yokohama Declaration and the Yokohama
Action Plan adopted at the TICAD IV. We also hope that the proposal willserve as policy input to the new JICA–which will be established in October
2008 through the merger of the current JICA and the ODA loan operations of
JBIC–when it concretizes country-specific assistance packages related to“Boosting Economic Growth” (one of the priority pillars of the TICAD IV), in
selecting target countries and identifying entry points and specific activities forJapan’s engagement.
This proposal consists of the following contents:
1. Basic principles
2. Enhancement of growth support by incorporating East Asian perspectives
3. Target countries and selection criteria
4. Entry points for Japan’s engagement
5. Requests for the Japanese Government and the new JICAGRIPS Development Forum
Secretariat for the Multi-stakeholder Discussion Group on “African Growth
Support Initiative”
August 2008

2

Proposal for a New African Growth
Support Initiative
In May 2008, the Government of Japan co-hosted the Fourth Tokyo
International Conference for African Development (TICAD IV) with theWorld Bank, the United Nations, and the United Nations Development
Programme, around the theme “Towards a Vibrant Africa.” The TICAD IV
adopted the Yokohama Declaration and the Yokohama Action Plan, which callfor continued and intensified international efforts to support African development, outlining the actions to be taken in the next five years under the TICAD
process. As the main organizer of the TICAD IV, the Japanese Government
made a strong commitment to intensify its engagement in African development. In particular, to support growth acceleration (corresponding to one of the
TICAD IV priority pillars, “Boosting Economic Growth”), the Japanese
Government announced a series of initiatives including: (1) increasing Japan’s
Official Development Assistance (ODA) (providing ODA loans up to US$4
billion in the coming five years, and doubling grant aid and technical cooperation) and private investment in Africa; (2) increasing infrastructure ODA
through co-financing with the World Bank and the African Development Bankand the expansion of technical cooperation in related areas; and (3) utilizing
other official flows to encourage foreign investment to Africa (setting up theJapan Bank for International Cooperation [JBIC] Facility for African
Investment to offer equity investment, guarantees, and local currency financing, and promoting public-private partnerships). The Japanese Government
also indicated its willingness to strengthen policy dialogues with African governments by “support[ing] African countries to plan and implement industrial
development strategies and policies, drawing on Asian experiences as appropriate” (TICAD IV, 2008b, p. 4). In light of today’s economic dynamism andrising interest in East Asian development experiences among African countries, we consider these initiatives timely and highly relevant.
To follow up on the TICAD IV and effectively implement the Yokohama
Declaration and the Yokohama Action Plan, Japan should immediately formulate overall and country-specific assistance visions for African development.
Especially, there is a need to package individual initiatives for each country,

3with due consideration to the combination of various components (e.g., agriculture and rural development, private sector development, infrastructuredevelopment) to achieve sustainable growth and poverty reduction in Africancountries.
Our proposal for a “New African Growth Support Initiative” (hereinafterreferred to as a “new growth support initiative”) aims to reactivate Japan’s
support to Africa by sharpening the focus of the support, enhancing the current
international efforts by incorporating East Asian perspectives, and strengthening Japan’s engagement in partnerships with relevant actors.

1. Basic Principles
The three basic principles of Japan’s new growth support to Africa are:(1) Making a firm commitment to establishing long-term development partnerships with African countries, with sustained policy dialogue as a key ingredient;(2) Selecting a few target countries and producing “success stories” (the concept of “target countries” could be extended to specific regions/areas overlapping into neighboring countries), and restructuring and concentrating
human and financial resources in the selected countries; and(3) Mobilizing cooperation by other donor agencies, emerging donor countries(for example, under the framework of South-South cooperation), and theprivate sector (Japanese and non-Japanese firms) and putting Japan’s
growth support into the partnership context.
Let us discuss these points in greater detail. First, without a strong policy commitment, Japan’s ODA to Africa faces difficulty when it comes to putting
together assistance packages that combine sustained policy dialogue, financial
cooperation, and technical and intellectual support-with the exception of a limited number of annual ODA loan recipients with whom the Japanese government and aid agencies have more opportunities for comprehensively discussing
national development priorities over the longer term, including macroeconomic management, infrastructure development, and public service delivery. This4

is the fundamental difference between Japan’s aid to Africa and its experiencesin Asia, where Japan has fostered long-term partnerships and provided assistance packages based on shared visions with partner countries. Therefore, forJapan to engage itself in the new growth support initiative in Africa, it is critically important that Japan make a firm commitment to building long-term partnerships with recipient countries, learning from the lessons of its past aid to
Africa. The scope of Japan’s engagement could vary, ranging from overall
development policies, sector-specific policies, and master plans for regional
development to the prioritization of development projects and so on. This
scope should be decided according to country-specific circumstances, but sustained policy dialogue should be a key ingredient of all of Japan’s assistancepackages, including measures to promote public-private partnerships.
Second, it is necessary to focus the initial efforts on a few countries in order toproduce “success stories.” We expect that these “success stories” will motivate
other countries to follow Japan’s new growth support initiative. Although theJapanese Government announced an increase of its ODA to Africa at the
TICAD IV, the amount remains small relative to that of other donors.
Furthermore, the size of Japan’s country-based ODA task forces (primarily
composed of the staff of the Embassy of Japan and JICA offices) is small if
measured by the number of aid professionals. Therefore, it is crucial to select asmall number of target countries and concentrate or reallocate human andfinancial resources in these countries.
Third, in view of strong development partnerships and the limited presence ofJapan’s aid and business in Africa, Japan must make efforts to mobilize
resources of other donors and developing countries (for example, under theframework of South-South cooperation) and explore the possibility of attracting non-Japanese private firms as well. Rather than unilaterally launching the
new growth support initiative, Japan should actively participate in ongoingdevelopment partnerships and multi-donor initiatives at the country level, suchas growth diagnostics and infrastructure support by the World Bank, theUnited Kingdom (UK)’s Department for International Development (DFID),
and others (see section 2). Specifically, Japan should complement the Western
approach with the East Asian approach and take intellectual leadership in asmall number of African countries. Furthermore, Japan should mobilize East

5

Asian professionals who have been directly involved in formulating and implementing development policies in their own countries and provide opportunities
to share their accumulated experiences with African countries. In light of the
difficulty of establishing industrial agglomeration only by Japanese firms,
Japan should consider collaborating with non-Japanese firms (for example,
those of Europe, United States, and emerging countries). Various options
should be explored, including a possibility of taking phased approaches—
inviting non-Japanese firms first and preparing for the attraction of Japanesefirms in the medium and long term.

2. Enhancement of Growth Support by Incorporating
East Asian Perspectives
Following a decade of focus on poverty reduction, the growth agenda hasrecently returned to the center of global development debates. Typical examples of this new focus are intensified efforts to apply analytical tools such as
growth diagnostics (which identifies a few binding constraints to growth; seebelow), expand donor assistance to infrastructure development, and promote
public-private partnerships. The recent World Bank report, “Challenges ofAfrican Growth: Opportunities, Constraints and Strategic Directions” (Ndulu
et al., 2007), and “The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained and Inclusive
Development” (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008) also stand as
examples of the new focus on growth. Since the introduction of the first generation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) by the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1990s, Japan has insisted on theneed to pay greater attention to growth and infrastructure development, so thatdeveloping countries could attain self-reliance and overcome aid dependency.
Japan should seize the opportunity provided by the change in focus of global
development debates by taking concrete actions to realize its development
vision.

Infrastructure Development
Under the poverty reduction drive, donor assistance for infrastructure declined
sharply in the latter half of the 1990s; however, there has been a sign of change

6

in recent years. According to the World Bank, the share of infrastructure in
total sector-allocable ODA to low-income countries fell from 33 percent in
1990–94 to 22 percent in 2000–04, and the share of the social sector in total
sector-allocable ODA increased from 29 percent to 52 percent in the corresponding period. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the share of infrastructure ODA
decreased from 29 percent to 19 percent during this decade (International
Development Association [IDA], 2007). 3 Nevertheless, especially since the
Gleneagles G8 Summit was held in 2005, international efforts to expand infrastructure support in Africa have been intensified, as shown by the establishment of the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa and other initiatives. The
World Bank announced its intention to place a special emphasis on SubSaharan Africa and scale up regional projects, especially those located in SubSaharan Africa, as part of the IDA 15 Replenishment (which mobilizes
resources for World Bank operations in low-income countries during the period of July 2008 to June 2011). In 2007, the DFID formulated the “Growth andInfrastructure Policy Paper” and announced its strong interest in promoting
growth through infrastructure development, private sector development, andtrade. The United States (US)’s Millennium Challenge Corporation, since its
establishment in 2004, has also been engaged in infrastructure support.
In principle, we should welcome the recent renewed interest in infrastructuredevelopment on the part of the international aid community. However, weshould give due consideration to the possible debt burden on recipient countries, because large infrastructure projects often involve external borrowing. It
is necessary to ensure that infrastructure development contributes to growthpromotion and eventually strengthens the debt sustainability of those Africancountries. To this end, it is vitally important to identify and formulate highquality projects and then implement policy measures that enable the infrastructure to be utilized to reactivate regional economies. The World Bank, DFID,
and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) regard infrastructure support as an integral part of growth support packages and are making
efforts to combine related measures, such as industrial development, trade promotion, and investment climate improvement.

3

All the figures cited above are commitments and period averages.

7

Growth Diagnostics
The growth diagnostics framework is a systematic methodology for undertaking country diagnosis and identifying the most binding constraints to growth. It
is often referred to as the “HRV” approach after the Harvard economists whopioneered it, Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, and Andres Velasco. This
framework has been pilot-tested by aid agencies including the World Bank and
DFID in a number of countries and is increasingly being incorporated in theireconomic reports. The framework attempts to remove a limited number of key
constraints to growth (i.e., focused intervention) specific to each country byusing a decision tree methodology. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional
approach of directing the same Washington-Consensus-style reforms at all
countries, based on a long list of interventions. Nevertheless, for the following
reasons, room remains for improving the growth diagnostics framework: (1)The diagnosis is driven by economic analyses, with limited attention paid tothe political feasibility of proposed measures. The framework’s prime concern
is to identify “what should be done” to initiate growth (desirability question),rather than “what can be done” given the existing political and institutional
constraints (feasibility question). (2) The structure of problem setting is too
narrow, and the decision tree treats the low level of private investment as the
key problem. (3) It is neither realistic nor desirable to identify weaknesses ofdeveloping countries in terms of international standards and to try to remove
them. This implies that developing countries should be “average” on all scores(for example, Worldwide Governance Indicators and Doing BusinessIndicators, proposed by the World Bank) before formulating and implementing
their growth strategies. (4) While focusing on short-run constraints, the framework does not indicate the sequence of measures to be adopted over the longrun. Even if one constraint is removed, another is likely to emerge in the complex growth processes. For all these reasons, whether the growth diagnostics
framework will become a truly useful instrument for policy makers in developing countries remains to be seen. If the growth diagnostics framework is notcarefully designed, there might be a risk of its becoming an additional donordriven instrument.
Therefore, we consider it useful to complement the growth diagnostics framework by incorporating East Asian perspectives, such as a goal-oriented, prob-

8

lem-solving approach combined with a long-term policy dialogue for strategy
formulation.

The East Asian Approach—Continuous Policy Dialogue for
Joint Strategy Formulation, Goal Orientation, and Concrete
Thinking
Transferability of East Asian lessons to Sub-Saharan Africa is a popular topic
in development economics, but investigation into this matter needs to go deeper than is currently being undertaken to be truly useful for policy makers. We
believe that the “East Asian experiences” do not mean a standard “model”
applicable to all African countries. Rather, it is the process (or a methodology
in a broad sense) by which countries enhance their capabilities through trial
and error, by applying a goal-oriented approach and concrete thinking. It is
important to note that today’s successful East Asian countries did not necessarily have strong institutional capabilities at the outset.
Japan should enhance the current international efforts by incorporating the two
factors that characterize the East Asian approach. The first factor is concernedwith engagement in long-term, open-ended policy dialogue for strategy formulation. This involves sharing a development vision with top leaders and policy
makers in partner countries, jointly drafting development policies and strategies through trial and error processes, and developing them into concrete
action plans. Such a “think together” approach should help identify both desirable and feasible policy measures for each country. Since development is botha political process and an economic process, policy formulation is inseparablefrom political and institutional reforms. We believe that “what should be done”(desirability question) should not be equated with “what can be done” (feasibility question). The optimal solution from an economic rationale is not necessarily implementable in a developing country faced with various political andinstitutional constraints. Even if the growth diagnostics framework identifies
key binding constraints to growth for each country, the recommendations will
not be useful if they conflict with political reality.
The second factor in the East Asian approach is concerned with goal orientation and concrete thinking. The East Asian approach pays greater attention to9discovering positive aspects and identifying break-through opportunities for
growth promotion, rather than correcting general weaknesses, compared tointernational standards. In this approach, growth constraints are viewed as specific obstacles blocking efforts to build the country’s unique strengths. Japanand other East Asian countries have identified their own strengths and madeefforts to hone them by preparing concrete actions designed to make full use of
their growth (such as promoting specific industries and regions/areas, developing road and communication networks based on a time-bound plan). Typicalexamples include coastal area development in China (Special Economic
Zones), Eastern Seaboard Development Program in Thailand (port development combined with industrial zones), and highway and port development
linked with foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction in Northern Vietnam.
In applying the East Asian approach, conflicts may arise between the current
international drive toward “result-orientation” and open-ended, continuous
policy dialogue because the latter case is likely to require more time to produce
tangible results. Furthermore, some African countries may expect quick resultsfrom donor assistance. Given the need to consider both short- and long-term
results, an option for donor engagement might be to aim to produce concrete
results within the first three to four years of a longer timeframe (for example,
by sharing a development vision up to 2020 and formulating time-bound actionplans).

3. Target Countries and Selection Criteria
To implement the new growth support initiative and produce “success stories,”
we propose that the Japanese Government select target countries based on thefollowing criteria. As a precondition, the eligible countries must attain andkeep macroeconomic and political stability.
(1) Strong will for and solid understanding of implementation of growth strategies by the leaders in the political and administrative systems (including
the country’s leader);(2) Existence of central government administration capable of consistent policy design and implementation;

10

(3) Possibility of continuous financial support from Japan (preferably, budget
support and ODA loans);(4) Interest by the Japanese private sector in investment (including large-scale
investment projects);(5) Potential for economic development (including labor quality and geographical conditions such as coastal areas and islands); and(6) Accumulation of country knowledge and experience and the capacity ofJapan’s country-based, ODA task forces.

Partner countries

Japan• Leadership• Govt. administration forpolicy implementation• Economic potential• Possibility of financial
support• Business interest• Capacity of countrybased teamTargetcountries

Among the six selection criteria, (1) and (2) are prerequisites for building along-term relationship between a partner country and Japan. While (3), (4),and (5) are not prerequisites, their existence would facilitate the building of
long-term partnerships between the two countries. If policy dialogue is conducted in parallel to the ODA-supported projects and / or private investments(including resource-based large-scale projects), the two countries will be better
able to share a development vision and expected results. Criterion (6) is important. It is indispensable to assign human resources capable of conducting
dynamic aid diplomacy and undertaking policy implementation in a consistentmanner (staff of the Embassies of Japan, JICA offices, long-term experts, andso on). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily require a large staff equivalent
to that of the Embassies and JICA offices in Asian countries. We believe thatthe assignment of a few competent professionals in the target countries will
suffice to bring dramatic changes. Such resource reallocation and concentration should be possible if the Japanese side (especially the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and JICA) has a strong political will to do it.

11

These suggested criteria for narrowing down target countries for Japan’senhanced support relate to the pillar of “Boosting Economic Growth.”
However, it is also possible to select target countries in relation to the otherpillars of the TICAD IV, such as “Consolidation of Peace and Good
Governance”, “Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)”,
and addressing “Environmental Issues and Climate Change”. The target countries for the new growth support initiative do not have to be the largest recipients of Japan’s ODA; there is no need to explicitly link the size of Japanese
ODA with the selection of target countries.

4. Entry Points for Japan’s Engagement
In implementing the new growth support initiative, Japan should identify entry
points for its engagement, giving due consideration to country-specific circumstances. Specifically, we propose the following four entry points for Japan’senhanced growth support to Africa.
(1) If the country already has a valid development vision and strategy, provide
policy support for their further improvement (if necessary) and align aid
activities to realize them, for example, in the areas of human resource
development, technology transfer, quality and productivity improvement,
and infrastructure development.
(2) If not, the country should engage itself in continuous policy dialogue forjoint strategy formulation with partner countries (like a “mini” Ishikawa
Project 4) and align various aid activities around the new strategy. The
4This project was formally named “Study on the Economic Development Policy in the Transition
toward a Market-Oriented Economy in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” The project was officially agreed to by the two governments when former Communist Party General Secretary Du
Muoi visited Tokyo in April 1995. Shigeru Ishikawa, professor emeritus of Hitotsubashi
University, was appointed as the leader on the Japanese side. The “Ishikawa Project” was implemented jointly by the Vietnamese and Japanese teams over six years (1995–2001) as part of
JICA technical cooperation. The unique characteristics of the Ishikawa Project are that comprehensive and thorough analyses were conducted by a joint research team, involving Japanese academics and their Vietnamese counterparts, and that the research examined issues related to theformulation and implementation of Vietnam’s long-term development plans and made policy
proposals to address them.

12scope of the strategy can vary; some examples are overall development
policies, development of specific industries and geographical regions/areas,and prioritization of development projects.
(3) Build core infrastructure with ODA and align various aid activities aroundit, such as the formulation of master plans for regional and / or industrial
development, One-Stop Border Posts, local small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) development, human resource development, and “One Village
One Product (OVOP)” programs.
(4) If the country has attracted (or is likely to attract) large FDI projects by theJapanese private sector, mobilize ODA to create an enabling business environment through infrastructure development, regional and local SME
development, human resource development, corporate social responsibility(CSR), and so on. However, it is important to ensure that such ODA mobilization for FDI-led projects benefits the local economy and society, notonly particular firms.
Regarding the above (1) and (2), policy dialogue precedes specific ODA projects, while in (3) and (4), ODA projects or large FDI projects could come first.
These two approaches are not conflictive, and several activities and projects
could go together and complement each other. For example, regarding (3), if
Japan and partner countries could share the vision for regional development
and prioritization of various ODA projects through policy dialogue, it would
be more likely that the benefits of infrastructure development could be spreadto the wider segments of the population. Regarding (4), it is expected that theexistence of large FDI projects would facilitate the conduct of policy dialogue
with partner country governments.
Among the four entry points, (1), (2), and (3) are not entirely new for Japan.
Japan has already accumulated experiences and expertise in extending support
to these areas. For example, a standard menu of Japan’s technical cooperationin East Asia includes the development of a “shindanshi” (enterprise evaluator)
system for SMEs, support to quality and productivity improvement, and training for specific skill development. In Africa, JICA has recently provided technical cooperation to assist in the formulation of a master plan for quality andproductivity improvement in Tunisia, where activities aimed at improvementof the production processes were implemented. These activities included facto-13

ry diagnosis, guidance on quality and productivity improvement on the factory
floor of model companies, and training of counterparts. The Ethiopian government has shown strong interest in this JICA assistance, and discussions areunderway for possible industrial support from Japan. Regarding (2), Japan has
been intensively involved in policy dialogue and has assisted in the formulation of development strategies in several East Asian countries. Examples
include the “Ishikawa Project” in Vietnam (formally, “Study on the Economic
Development Policy in the Transition toward a Market-Oriented Economy”),
an “Economic Policy Support Program” in Indonesia, which provided policy
advice for economic recovery after the East Asian financial crisis (supported
by six Japanese scholars, including Prof. Takashi Shiraishi, who was at Kyoto
University at that time, and Prof. Shinji Asanuma of Hitotsubashi University),and “Macroeconomic Policy Support for Socio-Economic Development” in
Laos (led by Prof. Yonosuke Hara, who was at Tokyo University at that time).
All these projects were based on agreements between the top leaders of partnercountries and Japan. In Africa, JICA is conducting a “Triangle of Hope” project, mobilizing a Malaysian consultant to provide policy advice to improve theinvestment climate (an example of South-South cooperation). Based on thiswork, investment promotion initiatives are underway, targeting Indian and
Malaysian firms. Also, a master plan and a feasibility study for the establishment of Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ) are being conducted.
Regarding (3), there are many examples, including the Eastern Seaboard
Development Program in Thailand to create industrial zones around a port
infrastructure; the development of a Hanoi-Haiphong transport corridor combined with Haiphong Port improvement in Vietnam, which aims at FDI attraction; and the development of Sihanoukville Port and power and telecommunication networks combined with a special economic zone in Cambodia. In addition, as a non-Asian example, Japan’s ongoing initiative in El Salvador
deserves special attention (see below).
The above (4) is a new initiative, based on Japan’s commitment at the TICAD
IV to promote public-private partnerships. We expect its fuller development in
the future.

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Japan’s Initiative in El Salvador
Since 2001, the Japanese Government has been supporting the development of
La Union Port in El Salvador through an ODA loan and aligning various aid
activities with port development, aimed at promoting the development of El
Salvador’s less developed Eastern Region and strengthening the country’s economic competitiveness. This is a good example of the above (3): building core
infrastructure with ODA and aligning aid around it. We consider Japan’s initiative in El Salvador noteworthy in the following three aspects.
First, this initiative is based on the East Asian approach to perfecting the country’s strengths, rather than correcting its general weaknesses (the aim of thegrowth diagnostics framework). In El Salvador, by international standards,
infrastructure is not the major binding constraint to growth. But theGovernment of El Salvador embraces a vision for reactivating the Eastern
Region, raising the country’s productivity and competitiveness, and eventuallypromoting trade in Central America as a regional transport hub, through theupgrading of the La Union Port. For El Salvador, the La Union Port
Development Project is a key entry point to realize this national vision.
Second, in parallel to the infrastructure project, the Japanese Government
assisted in the formulation of a master plan for the development of the Eastern
Region and is providing technical and financial cooperation to realize priority
activities proposed by this master plan, such as human resource development,water resource management, agriculture and industrial development, SME promotion, formulation of trade and investment promotion strategy, and so on.
Furthermore, this master plan is expected to serve not only as JICA assistance,
but also as a coordinating framework for other donor assistance to the Eastern
Region. Third, the initiative has been implemented by a dynamic countrybased ODA task force, 5 building on close collaboration between the Embassyof Japan and the JICA office. The Japanese Ambassador was actively engaged
5

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially established ODA task forces in March 2003
in the majority of developing countries. This was a new attempt to set up an all-Japan coordinating body in the field that can foster internal Japanese coordination around a common vision andbuild synergies among agencies dealing with grants (Embassy of Japan), technical cooperation(JICA), loans (JBIC), and private sector development (Japan External Trade Organization, or
JETRO).

15

in policy dialogue with the President and economic ministers on a regularbasis, discussing the prioritization of Japanese assistance in light of the country’s development needs. The size of the ODA task force in El Salvador is notas large as that in Asia, but this experience suggests that if clear assistancevision exists, it is possible to build a dynamic country-based team necessary
for implementing the new growth support initiative.

5. Requests for the Japanese Government and the new
JICA
The new JICA, to be established in October 2008, will be the largest bilateral
aid agency responsible for technical cooperation, grant aid, and loan aid (ODA
loans). There is a high expectation that the new JICA will make important contributions to African development. It is our strong desire and request that theJapanese Government support this proposal for the “New African Growth
Support Initiative” and, in collaboration with the new JICA, select target countries based on our suggested selection criteria (described in section 3), and takenecessary actions including resource mobilization and allocation. We also
request that the new JICA, as a main actor to implement the new growth support initiative, assume full responsibility for implementing assistance packagesin the selected countries, with due consideration to the four entry points mentioned above (see section 4). Below, we list specific issues to be considered in
the implementation of the initiative.
First, it is important to build professional teams to provide intellectual aid byforging new alliances among the public, private, and academic circles. Basedon the lessons learned from past experiences, we suggest that serious efforts bemade to form a consortium of universities, consulting firms, and local research
institutes (in partner countries) to undertake policy dialogue and provide necessary intellectual support for formulation and implementation of development
policy.
Second, it is important to build a theoretical basis for growth support with East
Asian perspectives and to vigorously disseminate Japan’s messages to theinternational aid community and developing countries. On this point, we have16

a high expectation on the role of the research institute of the new JICA and its
collaboration with universities and other research institutes. We also believethat the message of Japan’s new growth support initiative should be disseminated to the Japanese taxpayers and electorate.
Third, it is necessary to devise innovative approaches and instruments, particularly in infrastructure development, to ensure the formulation of high-quality
projects. More specifically, there is a need to mobilize technical cooperation at
the early stage of project formulation, enhance the content of feasibility studies, and implement technical cooperation to support capacity development for
operation and maintenance systems and so on. It is also important to strengthen
collaboration with regional development organizations such as theDevelopment Bank for Southern Africa, which is recognized for its ability andexperience in project formulation, appraisal, and implementation.
Fourth, it is necessary to introduce instruments to support local private sector
development. These may include microfinance, equity investment, and guarantees. Implementing them should allow the benefits arising from ODA-supported infrastructure projects and privately-financed large-scale investment projects to contribute to local SME promotion and regional development. It is also
important to make efforts to link the micro-level information obtained fromlocal SME support and other assistance to the macro-level policy dialogues.

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