Keeping Self-Interest under Control:
Effects of Procedural Fairness and Project Success Ratein a Cost-Reduction Context*
ERTAMBANG NAHARTYOINTIYAS UTAMI†

Faculty of Economics and Business,
UNIVERSITAS GADJAH MADA

Faculty of Economics and Business,
SATYA WACANA CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACTIn this study, we investigated the effects of procedural fairness (fair and no fair) andsuccess rate on self-interest behavior. We compared a fair procedure condition thatprovides detail information regarding colleagues’ cost structure and their willingness tosacrifice with an unfair condition without such information. Participants were assigned
into two success rate groups: low and high. We expected that individuals who
encountered a higher success rate condition were inclined toward a self-interest choice.
Ultimately, we hypothesized that procedural fairness and success rate have aninteraction effect on self-interest behavior. We conducted a controlled laboratory
experiment to investigate individual decision process in a standard costing setting. The
participants were 136 undergraduate business students enrolled in management
accounting classes at three large private universities that acted to be the managers in a
production department. They completed an experimental task on computer. The resultof our experiment indicated a mitigating effect of procedural fairness on theindividuals’ self-interest behavior once the individuals realized the pressure of cost
reduction process. The findings allow concluding that both self-interest and social
preferences are guiding motivational factors of individual behavior. The findings
indicated that people are willing to pursue organizational goals on the expense of theirpersonal benefits. The results also showed the process of encouraging employees toundertake projects that decrease their current benefit but potentially have futureorganizational payoff. However, we did not find the interaction effect between
procedural fairness and success rate.

JEL Classificatoin: M41

Key Words: Self-interest; Procedural Fairness; Success Rate*†

We thank the Faculty of Economics and Business Universitas Gadjah Mada for funding this project.
Corresponding Author. Address Satya Wacana Christian University, Jl. Diponegoro 52-60 Salatiga - Indonesia
50711. Telephone +6285226069200
E-mail intiyas@staff.uksw.edu

Received August 9, 2013; accepted April 9, 2014; available Online July 5, 2014 (Advance publication by J-STAGE)
DOI: 10.11640/tjar.4.2014.02
Copyright©2014 Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration - Kobe University.

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1. Introduction
Firms that deal with intense competition must become excellent in developing low-cost,high-quality products that have value in the eyes of customers. Cost, quality, and value have beeneffective competitive weapons and managed throughout competing firms in the past three
decades. Accordingly, the rapid progress of high technology and the increasingly competitive
international markets have led to changes in management accounting practices in developed
countries such as the United States and Japan (Atkinson et al. 2012; Monden and Monden 2007;
Nishimura 2003).
Unfortunately, the wave of change does not seem to affect Indonesia’s competitivenesspositively. In fact, higher production costs driven by domestic cost inflation, which include higher
labor costs, have weakened Indonesia’s capability to compete internationally. According to theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), Indonesia’s unit labor cost has been steadily increasing,thus eroding the Nation’s competitiveness (Thee 2006). Other studies report that in recent years,
China, India, and Vietnam have emerged as strong competitors of Indonesia, since thosecountries export similar low-skilled workers and labor-intensive products (Waheeduzzaman2011).
To gain competitive advantage, firms in Indonesia must ceaselessly research and develop low
cost, yet high quality products that meet market’s expectations. Firms have to give importance to
how to reduce costs continuously. The yardstick of cost management should shift from how tomeet standard costs to how to reduce costs continuously.
Cost reduction has been a fruitful area in management accounting research (Chenhall andSmith 2011; Lam 2011). Current studies have focused on factory cost measurement and control.
Companies control costs in all value-adding stages, including the production phase (Endenich etal. 2011). Extant literature suggests that the cost reduction process requires cooperation between
workers and managers (Nishimura 2003). To achieve continuous improvement in the production
phase, companies emphasize the importance of organizing work that stimulates all employees’
cooperation (Abrahamsson and Gerdin 2006). The working task of production employees has
expanded to active engagement in reducing costs. Production employees should continually seekout and eliminate sources of process imperfection (Wynder 2008).
Hence, the effectiveness of the cost reduction process depends heavily on human factors.
Wynder (2008) finds that efficient involvement of managers in cost-reduction efforts isachievable by employing activity-based costing information or by relying on the managers’
intuitive understanding of the production process. Research shows that transforming shop-floor
workers’ responsibility from a vertically oriented perspective to a more horizontal can enhance
employee cooperation for continuous improvement (Abrahamsson and Gerdin 2006). Lam(2011) finds that individuals are more likely to be involved in continuous improvement processes
when they are evaluated over the long period.
Nevertheless, previous studies have provided incomplete answers about how individuals behave
during the process of contributing within a production cost reduction context. Specifically, existingstudies in the context base on behavioral assumptions that are subject to potential egocentric biases.
Economic rationality is the main realm of behavioral decision research (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel
1998). A common assumption of classic economic models is that individuals would act
opportunistically for private gain at the expense of the collective (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
While this assumption is valid to explain behavioral tendency of people in certain conditions, it may

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only partially represent people behavior in various settings (Ghoshal 2005). This assumption isundermined by the actual decisions individuals make, which cannot be predicted by rational
economic models. There is strong empirical evidence showing that individuals are subject tobounded rational behavior (Bigus 2012). Individuals, in fact, make decisions that are inconsistent
with economic rationality (Rankin et al. 2008; Booker et al. 2007).
This study differs from prior research because it focuses on individuals’ self-interest
mitigation in a production cost reduction setting. This psychological focus aims at addressing anunanswered question of previous studies: whether individuals participating in a collective effort
are able to control their self-interest leanings when they are exposed to social and psychologicalpressures. Specifically, this experimental study proposes that individuals face a conflict of interest
when they see a possibility to realize personal gain from their participation in a standard costsetting process but their self-interest runs against the interests of the organization as a whole. We
expect that participation in a process to determine production standard costs affect the extent towhich individuals perceive this conflict of interest to constitute an ethical dilemma.
We address an important question related to a factor that can undermine individuals’ selfinterest: how does perceived procedural fairness affect individuals’ decisions? Previous studies
found that people involved in participative decision-making are concerned with how fair theprocedures are (Nahartyo 2013; Wan et al. 2012). Research indicates that managers often havestronger reactions toward the fairness of the procedures than toward distributive fairness (Luo2007; Konovsky 2000). While studies reporting reactions to fair procedures have shown solid
results, there is not conclusive evidence yet regarding whether procedural fairness affects
individuals’ decisions in setting standard costs. Specifically, the study examines the role ofprocedural fairness, particularly the "soft side" (i.e., group value) of procedural justice elements, in
explaining how individuals take into account fair conditions in making standard cost decisions.
The study also focuses on the effect of uncertainty or ambiguity on individuals’ resource
allocation decisions. Previous research shows that individuals’ perception of the risks involved (i.e.,level of uncertainty and/or ambiguity) influence their choice of options. This perception alters theirself-interest behavior. We hypothesize that the level of success rate is of importance in determining
standard cost decisions. Psychological theory, particularly expectancy theory, suggests that people
are willing to postpone short-term benefits when there is an acceptable likelihood of future payoff(Fudge and Schlacter 1999). Therefore, related to the first question above, we address the literature
gap formulating the second question: are the effects of procedural fairness different depending on
the success rate? Based on the framework, we expect that there is a negative relation between the
success rate and individuals’ willingness to delay short-term gain.
This study contributes to behavioral management accounting literature in two ways. First, it
considers the impact of social preferences as well as personal perception on resource allocation
decisions. The findings will allow concluding that both self-interest and social preferences are
guiding motivational factors of individual behavior. Such explanation, to answer why people mustpursue organizational goals at the expense of their personal benefit, are relevant to the broader
topics of self-control and organizational commitment, and has implications for settings such as
the workplace. Secondly, this research sheds light on the process of how to encourage employees
to undertake risky projects that decrease current financial benefit but potentially have futureorganizational advantages.
We tested our hypotheses by conducting a laboratory experiment in which 136
undergraduate business students, each one acting as a member of management of a production

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department. All subjects were to make decisions regarding product standard costs. We posit thatwhen subjects have the opportunity to participate in a standard costing process, they have
incentives to alter the decision to acquire a greater share of resources. We manipulated bothprocedural fairness and success rates between subjects at two levels. In the fair condition, subjects
received information regarding the willingness of their colleagues to reduce their share ofresources (wages) and to disclose their cost structure, whereas in the non-fair condition subjects
did not receive such information. In the low (high) risk project condition, subjects were informedthat the success rate estimate of the project is 80 percent (between 20-40 percent).

2. Background and Hypotheses
2.1 Setting
We set up a setting in which individuals work in a production department and ther duty is todetermine the standard cost of a particular product. The standard cost consists of three elements:
material, labor, and overhead cost. The individual realizes the benefit of keeping the labor cost at
the maximum amount and that reducing the material cost will lead to product quality
deterioration. The overhead cost was fixed and could not be altered. Further, each individual was
endowed with a certain amount of money to be allocated to material, labor, or overhead costs.
However, utility could be derived only from the labor cost. In this setting, each individual has todecide on the amount of money to allocate among the three product cost elements. The extent towhich the individual allocated money to labor costs represents self-interest decision.
This raises a question regarding the method or scheme organizations should employ tomotivate individual employees to allocate resources as a manner to provide a benefit as great as
possible for the organizations. In this study, we examined the efficacy of procedural fairness andsuccess rate to alter allocation decisions. We selected the variables described below for their
theoretical importance and their common use in practice and research (Nahartyo 2013; Loi et al.
2012; Lam 2011; Fudge and Schlacter 1999). For example, Nahartyo (2013) discusses twocomponents of procedural justice theory: self-interest theory and group value model. Loi et al.
(2012) provide an explanation of why fair procedures influence employees’ feeling of uncertainty.
Lam (2011) documents the effect of a longer evaluation window on the effectiveness of
encouraging employees to focus on long-term rather than short-term profitability. Fudge andSchlacter (1999) offers a model based on expectancy theory to eliminate unethical practices of
employees that may harm the long-term interests of the company.

2.2 Mitigating effect of procedural fairness
The question of what motivates individual behavior in social interactions is central for abetter understanding of participative decision-making. Whether individuals selfishly maximize
their own material welfare or whether they take the well-being of others into account is debatable.
Traditional rational choice theory suggests that individuals are both self-interested and inequality
averse (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Prior research suggests that managers, under certain
conditions, exhibit myopic behavior. That means that they choose actions that improve shortterm profitability at the expense of long-term profitability (Bhojraj and Libby 2005). On theother hand, opponents of the theory have developed arguments that explain that even in genuine
distributional problems, individuals still hold sufficiently strong social preferences (Sauermann
and Kaiser 2010; Davis et al. 1997).

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Procedural fairness represents the degree to which the processes used to make a decision are
fair (Konovsky 2000). In this study, we define procedural justice as the extent to which employees
judge the fairness of the standard costing process. Procedural fairness provides valuable
information to the sense-making processes through which individuals develop their attitudinaland behavioral reactions to valued outcomes they receive from organizations (Brockner 2002).
Self-interest theory of procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker 1975) asserts that procedures are
considered as fair if those affected by the outcome of the procedures have control over thedecision process. The theory suggests that in a fair situation, people may forego short-term
benefits from a relationship and focus on forthcoming advantageous outcomes in the future. On
the other side, if the procedure is perceived as unfair, people will believe that the future outcome
is negative and they will care mostly about short-term outcomes.
Lind and Tyler (1988) provide an explanation beyond self-interest theory. Their group value
model postulates that in addition to economic benefits, individuals value psychological rewards inan economic relationship. People are predisposed to belong to social groups and they are very
attentive to signs and symbols that communicate information about their position within groups.
The group value model suggests that people are concerned about their long-term social
relationships and do not view them as a one-time deal (Tyler 1994). This leads people to beconcerned with three factors: neutrality of the decision-making procedure, trust in the groups,
and evidence about social standing or status. If neutrality exists, then the decision-maker is freefrom bias. People perceive decision-makers as neutral if they create a level playing field for all.
Trust refers to the degree to which people believe that the decision-maker intends to act in a fairmanner. Standing is the position that individuals possess in a group as the result of how thegroup treats them. Being treated with respect and dignity implies that a person is a valued
member of the organization and furnishes a source of self-validation.
The current study measures the extent to which individuals make egocentric decisions andhow procedural fairness mitigates the individuals’ inclination to act selfishly. The presence ofhigh procedural fairness prevents individuals from developing feelings of animosity toward theorganization and makes them more likely to accept and support the organization and its decisions(Brockner, 2002). Specifically, high procedural justice stimulates trust in the organization.
Applied to the current study, this sense-making perspective simply sees that procedural fairness
will also attenuate the individuals’ myopic behavior tendency.
In addition, uncertainty management theory relates fairness with uncertainty in the sensethat individuals tend to rely heavily on fairness information when they are confronted withuncertainty (Loi et al. 2012). According to this theory, people tend to focus on environmental
signals to reduce uncertainties and procedural fairness information is one of the most importantcues. We thus anticipate that with higher levels of procedural fairness individuals are willing topostpone their short-term, individual benefit in exchange for an enhanced long-term relationshipwith the organization. Acting as a management team member in the standard costing process,individuals are expected to undergo an ethical dilemma when a cost reduction program is enacted.
The study expects a mitigating effect of procedural fairness on the individuals’ self-interest
behavior once the individuals realize that the standard costing process produces cost reduction
pressure. The following hypothesis is thus proposed.
H1: Subjects in fair procedure condition will allocate less money to labor cost.

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2.3 The effect of project success rate
The project success rate explains the project risk in gaining domain. Project risk is explainedwith uncertainty and ambiguity. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines uncertainty as a
doubt or lack of sureness about someone or something. Uncertainty may range from a fallingshort of certainty to an almost complete lack of conviction or knowledge especially about an
outcome or result. In the literature, uncertainty is subject-specific, that is, uncertainty resides inthe eye of the beholder (Geersbro and Ritter 2010). Different individuals may have varying
degrees of perceived uncertainty in a similar situation.
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ambiguity is something that does not have asingle clear meaning: something that is ambiguous. Ambiguity can represent a situation in whichsomething can be understood in more than one way and it is not clear which meaning is intended.
There is a controversy in understanding the concepts of uncertainty and ambiguity. Geersbro andRitter (2010) argue that ambiguity is not the same as uncertainty. They contend that the lack of
information causes uncertainty, while the quality of information is the source of ambiguity. On
the other hand, a number of academics have defined ambiguity very closely to the definition of
uncertainty. Bigus (2012) states that ambiguity implies uncertainty about the probability that a
future event will occur. This view of ambiguity focuses on the amount of information available,
which fits better with the definition of uncertainty. Ho et al. (2002) conceive ambiguity as adding
a second order probability distribution on top of the probabilistic uncertainty in making adecision under risk. Stated differently, in an ambiguous situation, people may reason in a way
analogous to how they face uncertainty. Our study adopts the latter argument and defines projectsuccess rate as the accumulation of uncertainty and ambiguity effects in carrying out a specificprocess, that is, a cost reduction project.
Chang et al. (2002) propose a framework for resource allocation projects. Chang et al. assertthat project-related factors (e.g., uncertainty), decision-makers’ characteristics (e.g., knowledge
and experience), and the managerial environment (e.g., information asymmetry) affect managers’
resource allocation decisions. The framework proposes that in making decisions regarding
resource allocation among different projects, future uncertainty affects the managers’ subjectivity.
The link between uncertainty and individuals’ subjectivity in making decisions is critical inassessing the characteristics and effectiveness of resource allocation.
Ho et al. (2002) state that the outcome and ambiguity of payoffs probability affects
managerial decisions involving allocation of resources. They found that when managers face
imprecise probabilities, their perceptions of the risks involved influence their choice of options.
Specifically, managers tend to choose the least ambiguous option. Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
showed that the prospect theory model could describe a value function over outcomes. The model
implies that people tend to be averse to risk when they might have something to gain and to berisk prone when they might have something to lose. In relation with ambiguity, the model
indicates that ambiguity may affect such probabilistic decision weights. This is also suggested byresearch findings that show how people generally avoid ambiguity in the gains domain and areambiguity prone in the loss domain (Cabantous 2007).
Ambiguity aversion may have an important implication: pessimism. Pessimism means that
individuals overestimate the probability of the worst outcome. With ambiguity aversion, people
tend to weigh less favorable outcomes more highly, and are, therefore, more pessimistic. For
instance, other things being equal, individuals usually prefer a 30 percent chance to a (imprecisely
defined) chance of 10-50 percent (Bigus 2012). In short, individuals prefer a certain probability

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to a probability range. This implies that ambiguity aversion can be considered rational. Based on
our arguments, we expect that individuals with a higher success rate (80 percent) will exhibit
more self-interest choice than those with a lower success rate (20-40 percent). Thus, thefollowing hypothesis is proposed.
H2: Subjects in a high success rate condition will allocate more money to laborcosts.

2.4 The interaction effect of procedural fairness and success rate
The procedural fairness theory suggests that people are attentive to long-term social
relationships and expect valuable outcomes from those relationships. When they perceive
procedural fairness, individuals may delay short-term advantages in exchange to a long-term gain.
Moreover, when individuals deal with an uncertain decision environment, they depend on
information about procedural fairness to reduce the uncertainty level in coming to a decision. In
organizational settings, the perception of being fairly treated leads to a variety of pro-social
consequences, such as higher commitment to organizations and institutions, more extrarole
citizenship behavior, greater likelihood of conflict prevention and resolution (Van den Bos and
Lind 2004). As discussed in the previous section, we expect that procedural fairness perception
will lead to individuals’ lower inclination to self-interest decisions.
Expectancy theory asserts that motivation is a function of individuals’ perceptions of theirenvironment (Fudge and Schlacter 1999). Of particularly important in this study are three factorsof the theory: effort-performance expectancy, performance-outcome expectancy, and valence.
The first factor relates to the individual’s perception that effort is positively correlated with thelevel of performance. The second corresponds to a person’s expectations that the rewards that will
be received are closely tied to the level of performance. Valence is associated with the degree towhich an individual values a particular reward. The more a person values the reward received forthe effort, the more motivated that person will be to receive the reward. Rewards for whichpeople generally have a high valence include salaries, bonuses, promotions, and recognition.
Hence, in the present study, we expect that high certainty or low ambiguity (i.e., low success rate)
will encourage individuals to pursue a project that decreases current benefit but potentially havepositive future payoffs.
Existing literature on motivation reveals that the pursuit of personally constructed goals
involves maintenance of a positive self-regard, whereas striving for socially constructed goals
involves identification with the role obligations at work (Chen et al. 2009). Personal goals may
not have high social value and are not necessarily subject to consistent expectations from others.
On the contrary, social goals are generally associated with expectations from others and have highsocial value. Hence, we infer that the consideration of social preferences considerably adds
explanatory power to rational predictions of behavior in standard costing decisions. Both selfinterest and social obligation motivate individual behavior in decision-making.
Taken together, the theories discussed above imply that individuals who perceive fair
procedural conditions and are exposed to a high likelihood of future advantage will be more likely
to behave in a less self-interest manner. Then, we propose the following hypothesis.
H3: Higher procedural fairness perception and lower success rate will lead to lessmoney allocated to labor cost.

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3. Method
Laboratory experiments provide an excellent method to investigate individual decision
process in standard costing. Due to real-world complexity, an empirical test with field data bears
the major problem that it is hardly possible to control for all possible causal influences.

3.1 Participants and design
The participants were 136 undergraduate business students at three large private universities
in Java, Indonesia. They were from Sanata Dharma University (33 students), Satya Wacana
Christian University (36 students), and STIE YKPN (67 students). We conducted theexperiment from June 20th to 26th, 2013. We asked for participation via email and print media.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects treatment conditions. We
obtained the four between-subjects treatment conditions by fully crossing two group procedural
fairness conditions with two group success rates. First, we assigned the participants to one of two
procedural fairness conditions (fair and unfair conditions). Second, we assigned the participants
to one of two group success rates (low and high success rates) in gaining domain. Finally,
participants in all four between-subjects conditions completed an experimental task and theentire experiment via computer. Figure 1 below shows the entire cells.

3.2 Procedure
The experimental procedure comprised six steps:
1. We set up the computer lab with predesigned software and when participants
arrived, we randomly assigned them to computer terminals.
2. The first few computer screens explained participants’ role and task. Eachparticipant acted as a manager in the production department of a medium size
furniture factory. Their task was to determine a standard cost in the department.
The software was designed to be attractive and informative enough to assist therole and task internalization. A number of questions were asked to ensure that theparticipants understood their role and task and its requirements.
3. We informed the participants that they would earn “dollars” during theexperimental task and that each dollar would be converted into raffle tickets at therate of one ticket per dollar. At the conclusion of the experiment, the participantsreceived their tickets. The tickets were drawn to select four winners. Each winnerreceived 500 thousand rupiahs.
4. The next computer screens described the experimental task. Participants completed
an experimental task that consisted of two stages. At the first stage, participants
had to determine a standard cost for a particular product. Weinformed theparticipants that they could allocate 2,400 dollars to three costcomponents:
materials, labor, and overhead. There were three choices of materialsand costs:
high quality material with the highest cost (900-1,000 dollars), moderate quality
material with a modest cost (700-899 dollars), and low quality material with thelowest cost (300-699 dollars). The maximum amount of labor cost was set at 1,000
dollars. Participants learned they would receive the entire labor costs that theydecided during the experiments as their payment. The overhead cost was set fixedat the amount of 500 dollars. Participants were not allowed to change the overhead

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cost. In this stage, participants had to make their first decision regarding how toallocate the $2,400 standard costs to labor costs and material costs.
5. At the second stage, we informed participants that due to market changes, thecompany should reduce its production cost to 2,000 dollars. The participants
should decide whether they would reduce the material cost, labor cost, or both. In
the fair procedure condition, we told the participants that their colleagues (othermanagers) were willing to reduce labor cost at minimum level and to maintain thequality of material at the maximum level. In the unfair procedure condition, wetold the participants that the other managers would reduce the production cost but
without the detail of the cost reduction. In the low-risk project condition, we
informed the participants that the probability of success of the cost reduction
project was 80 percent. In the high-risk project condition, we told the participantsthat the probability of success was between 20 to 40 percent. They received
manipulation checks throughout the treatment processes. During this second stage,
participants had to make their second decision regarding how to allocate the$2,000 standard cost to labor cost and material cost. They made the decision after
receiving information about fair/unfair procedure and high-risk/low-risk project
condition.
6. Next, the participants were to determine the money allocation to the cost elements.
Upon completing the task, participants answered an exit-questionnaire. Lastly, we
calculated participant’s payments (in form of raffle tickets to be drawn). We
announced the participants who won the prizes soon after all experimental sessions
finished.

3.3 Measures
We examined resource allocation for our dependent variable and fairness (fair and unfair
conditions) and success rate (high and low) for our independent variables. Low success rate was
20-40 percent and high success rate was 80 percent.

4. Results
The test indicated significant difference across the allocation resources between group andwithin group for any following variables: age, GPA, gender, and grade. A one-way ANOVA wasemployed to test homogeneity of the experiment cell and demographic characteristics (table 1).
We also tested the disturbance factor that might influence the labor cost allocation decision,that is, the level of understanding of cost accounting. We tested with seven questions about costaccounting and the score of each question was 20. The ANCOVA analysis with independent
variable fairness and success rate, and covariate score of understanding of cost accounting ispresented in table 2. The ANCOVA test indicated that the score of understanding of costaccounting was 0.730. It means that there was no influence level of understanding of costaccounting in decision of labor cost.

4.1 Hypotheses test: Mitigating effect of procedural fairness
Hypothesis 1 states that subjects in fair procedures condition will allocate less money to laborcosts. An independent t-test compared the participants’ decision with fair procedure and

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participants’ decision with unfair procedures. The results are reported in table 3.
The independent t-test indicated that labor costs that determined participants in the fairgroup were 598.51 and labor costs that were determined by participants in the unfair group were681.16. There was significant difference (p= 0.001), thus hypotheses 1 was supported. Subjects
that received information preference from other production managers that chose high material
quality would determine labor cost lower than subjects that received no information from otherproduction managers. That information indicates that fairness has a significant role on mitigating
manager self-interest. This result supported the traditional rational choice theory that individual
tends to prioritize self-interest and expect the highest incentive (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). An
individual will get the benefit for himself in the short time (Bhojraj and Libby 2005) and ignores
the organization’s long-term goals.
Fairness procedural treatment was information that another manager chose the best material
quality and this situation encouraged participants to develop attitudinal reaction and behavior on
the value of the organization (Brocker 2002). This result supported Konovsky’s (2000) argument
according to which procedural fairness indicates that the decision-making process is fair. The
result was also similar to a study by Thibaut and Walker (1975) that fair procedure was an
influenced outcome of the procedure that controlled the decision-making process and ignored theshort-term interest and focused on interest forward. When an unfair procedure is perceived,
individuals will believe that forward outcome is negative and will focus on the short-time
outcome.

4.2 The effect of project success rate
Hypothesis 2 predicts that subjects in a high success rate condition allocate more money tolabor costs. Table 4 presents the results of the independent t-test.
Table 3 presents the results of the independent t-test showing that the mean of labor costsfor high success rate was 669.12 and the mean of labor costs for low success rate was 611.76. The
difference between the two groups was statistically significant (p=0.028) and hypothesis 2 was
supported. This result coincides with the prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1981),
which states that individuals will tend to avoid risk if there is in gain domain and will take a risk
if there is in loss domain. This research used success rate (high and low) in gaining domain. Highrate shows that the rate of project success was 80 percent and low rate shows that it was 20-40
percent.
This study indicated that managerial decisions to allocate production costs to labor costs andmaterial costs with a fixed overhead cost were influenced by the outcomes and ambiguity of
incentives that were received. This result confirms the view of Ho, Keller, and Keltyka (2002).
Participants who acted as managers had the choice of taking high incentives but sacrificing highquality and ambiguity to make decisions. This result also supports Cabantus’ (2007) viewaccording to which individuals generally avoid ambiguity in the gaining domain and feelambiguity in the loss domain.

4.3 The interaction effect of procedural fairness and project success rate
Hypotheses 3 states that higher procedural fairness perception and lower successrate would lead to less money allocated to labor costs. Table 5 shows the interaction testwith a two-way ANOVA. The probability value of fairness was 0.001 and risk wasNahartyo and Utami: Keeping Self-Interest under Control

0.018, but the interaction was not statistically significant (p=0.192). The results indicatethat there was no interaction effect between procedural fairness and success rate.
This finding did not support the fairness procedural theory, when individual
decisions depend on the success rate, even though the partial test showed that fairness
and success rate influenced decision-making. Individual decision-making was more
attentive to long-term social relationships and the expectation to get outcome did not
influence the success rate.

5. Conclusion
This study provides empirical evidence that procedural fairness influenced
participant decision making, so in fairness condition participants focus on high material
quality compared with incentive that was determined from labor costs. This researchalso supports that in higher success rate, the decision making to allocate labor costs
tends to prioritize self-interest by allocating high labor costs. However, it does notsupport the interaction effect of procedural fairness and success rate. Future research
could provide additional effect on issues examine in this paper. First, we made a specificchoice for success rate (low and high) for the gaining domain (success rate); future
research could examine the sensitivity of our results with affective response like Moreno
et al. (2002). The affective response measures how individuals feel conflict when choose
labor costs that impact in their incentive or high material quality. Second, future
research can expand success rate in the gaining and loss domains. Third, future research
could examine two employee groups and use single decisions that impact in incentive
group and will confirm Fisher, Peffer and Sprinkle’s (2005) point. They argue that
employee shirking could increase within larger groups. This study used the economic
incentive to stimulate individuals’ self-interest. Nevertheless, the form of the economic
incentive may introduce a possible hypothetical bias that is usually doubted inquestionnaire survey, because the possibility of being a winner in our experiment (i.e.,
4/136=0.029) was too low.

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Nahartyo and Utami: Keeping Self-Interest under Control

41

APPENDIXFIGURE 1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Project success rate

Low
High

Cell 1
Cell 3

Procedural Fairness Conditions
Fair
UnfairCell 2Cell 4

Note: Cell1: Fair condition, low risk
Cell 2: Unfair condition, low risk
Cell 3: Fair condition, high risk
Cell 4: Unfair condition, high risk

TABLE 1. HOMOGENEITY TESTGender

Age

GPA

Grade

Sum ofSquares

Df

Mean
SquareF

Sig

Between Groups

2.398

9

0.266

1.227

0.284

Within Groups

27.366126

Total

29.765135

Between Groups

2.404

9

0.774

0.640

Within Groups

43.478126

Total

45.882135

Between Groups

3.145

9

0.766

0.648

Within Groups

57.495126

Total

60.640135

Between Groups

15.243

9

0.736

0.675

Within Groups

289.786

126

Total

305.029

135

0.217
0.267
0.345
0.349
0.456
1.694
2.300

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The Japanese Accounting Review, 4 (2014), 27-47

TABLE 2. RESULT OF ANCOVA
Independent Variable

Type III Sum
of Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Fairness

236,780.413

1236,780.413

11.3160.001

Success rate

115,219.762

1

115,219.762

5.507

0.020

2,502.539

12,502.539

0.120

0.730

Score ofunderstanding costaccounting

TABLE 3. HYPOTHESIS 1 TEST
Procedural
Fairness

Fair

N
67

Mean
598.51

SD
153.24

Unfair69

681.16141.71

Independent t-test
F=0.02p=0.965
t= -3.267
p=0.001

TABLE 4. TEST OF HYPOTHESES 2

Project success
rate

N

Mean

SD

High

68

669.12167.74Low

68

611.76131.05

Independent t-test
F=4.544p=0.035t= 2.222
p=0.028

TABLE 5. INTERACTION EFFECT TEST
EffectDF

Type III SS

Mean
SquareF-Value

P>F

Fairness

1

247,352.941

247,352.941

11.9650.001*

Risk

1

117,647.059

117,647.059

5.691

0.018**

Fairness *
Risk
Error

1

35,588.235

132

2,728,823.529
Note: *significance at 1%**significance at 5%

0.192

Nahartyo and Utami: Keeping Self-Interest under Control

Experimental Test Instruments
Available at simulasi.eksperimen.net
Profile of Participants
Name:
Gender:Age:
Grade:
University:
Department:
Level:
GPA:
Email:
Hand phone:
Profile of Cemara Indonesia Furniture Company- Picture (vision, mission, product, exhibition, organization structure,
Role and Task
Your role is a production manager of Cemara Indonesia Furniture Co.
Your task is allocating labor cost and material cost of job order costing.
Production cost consists of:
1. Material cost
2. Labor cost
3. Overhead cost
Prime cost = Material cost + Labor Cost
Conversion cost= Labor cost + Overhead Cost
Instruction
The value of labor cost determines your incentive.
Your incentives will convert with coupon ticket (1 dollar = 1 ticket) and get opportunity to win
prison total IDR 2 Million for 4 participants.
If you determine higher labor cost, your incentive is higher to.
Incentives
You will get incentive:
1. 20,000 IDR hand phone voucher
2. Opportunity to win prisons total IDR 2 Million.

43

44

The Japanese Accounting Review, 4 (2014), 27-47

Check Manipulation 1 & Test of Cost Accounting(if the first answer correct, score 20, if the first answer wrong then choose again and correct, score 10, if the first and second answer wrong then choose
again and correct, score 5). The total score influence the incentive and will convert to coupon and get opportunity to win total IDR 2 million).

1. Your position are …
a. Human resource manager
b. Production manager
c. Marketing manager
2. Your task in that position is…
a. Determine time of production
b. Determine cost production
c. Determine labor time
3. The component of cost production is…
a. Material cost + direct labor cost+ overhead costb. Indirect material+ material cost+ overhead costc. Direct labor cost+ material cost+ indirect labor cost
4. Prime cost consists of component…
a. Direct labor cost + indirect labor costb. Direct labor cost+ overhead costc. Direct labor cost + material cost
5. Conversion cost consists of component…
a. Direct labor cost + indirect labor costb. Direct labor cost+ overhead costc. Direct labor cost + material cost
6. Electricity cost is a component of…
a. Material costb. Administration costc. Overhead cost
7. If material cost is $50, direct labor cost $100 and overhead cost $25, determines prime
cost!
a. $150
b. $125c. $75
8. If material cost is $50, direct labor cost $100 and overhead cost $25, determines
production cost!
a. $150
b. $175
c. $125
9. If sales $500, cost of goods sold $200, determine gross profit!
a. $200
b. $300
c. $700
10. The component of cost of goods sold include cost element below, except…
a. Beginning inventoryb. Ending inventoryc. SalesNahartyo and Utami: Keeping Self-Interest under Control

45

Email from Head of Production Division (for all groups)
To: <participants>
Subject : Job Order No 2324.
Determine production cost for job order No 2324 (living), order from Mr. Michael (USA).
Mr. Michael is potential buyer Cemara Indonesia Furniture and that order will distributed as
hotel interior in USA.
You must determine production cost NOT MORE THAN $2,400.
Your incentive in DOLLAR based on labor cost that you choose.
Remember:Higher labor cost, higher your incentive.
ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTION COST
Determine production cost for job order No 2324, NOT MORE than $2,400.
Choose material cost and direct labor cost.
Overhead cost is fixed ($500)
Material Cost
100
200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Labor Cost
100
200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Incentives total…………….. (Computer will automatically input)
Check of manipulation 2
1. What is the value of job order No 2324 from Mr. Michael that you determined?
a. $2,500
b. $2,400
c. $2,000
2. You get incentive based on decision of…
a. Material costb. Labor costc. Overhead cost
3. What is the value of overhead cost (fixed) for job order No 2324?
a. $300
b. $200
c. $500

46

The Japanese Accounting Review, 4 (2014), 27-47

Email from Head of Production (Fair & Unfair)
Mr. Michael had offered the lower production cost from our competitor.
If we want to win the competition, please determine production cost Job order 2324 NOT
MORE than $2,000.
Additional information if fair
Another production manager decides to:
1. Choose highest material cost
2. Decrease labor cost
We estimate that success rate Mr. Michael order project is 20-40% (high risk).
We estimate that success rate Mr. Michael order project is 80% (low risk).
ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTION COST
Determine production cost for job order No 2324, NOT MORE than $2,000.
Choose material cost and direct labor cost.
Overhead cost is fixed ($500)
Remember:
Success rate of this project is 20-40%
Success rate of this project is 80%
Material Cost
100
200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Labor Cost
100

200

Manipulation Check 2
1. You must decide production cost not more than…
a. $2,000
b. $2,500
c. $3,000
2. What is the success rate of this project?
a. 20-40%
b. 60%
c. 80%
3. Information from head of production chooses to.
a. Highest material quality

Nahartyo and Utami: Keeping Self-Interest under Control

b. There is not information about option of another production manager
c. Marketing***47