Development Forum Report

GRIPS

GRIPS

Development Forum Report

Records of Ethiopia-Japan Industrial Policy Dialogue Ⅱ

Records of Ethiopia-Japan Industrial Policy Dialogue
Policy Research in Third Countries

Vol.Ⅱ

GRIPS Development Forum

Edited by the GRIPS Development Forum©GRIPS Development Forum 2016
Contact:
GRIPS Development Forum
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 106-8677
Phone: 03-6439-6337
Fax: 03-6439-6010
E-mail: forum@grips.ac.jp
URL: http://grips.ac.jp/forum-e/

Records of Ethiopia-Japan Industrial Policy Dialogue
Vol. II
Policy Research in Third Countries

GRIPS Development ForumTable of Contents
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………… 5
English reports
1．Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency(August-September 2010) ……………………………………………… 17
2．Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers(November 2010) ………………………………………………………… 34
3．Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Move (March 2011) ………………… 52
4．India̶A Liberalizing Giant (September 2012) ……………………… 72
5．Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy(October 2012) …………………………………………………………… 95
6．Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap
(June 2013) ……………………………………………………………… 116
7．Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization(June 2014) ……………………………………………………………… 137
8．Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle (August 2014) ……………… 164
9．Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion (May 2015) ………… 189
10．Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity(May 2015) ……………………………………………………………… 205

日本語報告
11．ウガンダ――東アジアへの関心の萌芽（2009年2月） ……………… 226
12．EACおよびタンザニア――産業政策の模索（2010年10月）………… 233
13．ガーナ――ACETとの意見交換（2012年8月） ……………………… 238
14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面（2013年9月） ………………… 245
15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策（2014年6月）……………………………………………………………… 271
16．ルワンダ――アフリカの奇跡となりうるか（2014年8月） ………… 295

注、14．タイは、アジア太平洋研究所（ APIR ）研究プロジェクトの企画と予算による調査報告である。15．インドネシアは、7．Indonesiaを訳出したものである。16．ルワンダは、8．
Rwanda執筆前に日本語で書かれた簡略版である。

Introduction
The two volumes, of which this volume is one, contain internal records of EthiopiaJapan Industrial Policy Dialogue Phase 1 and Phase 2 conducted jointly by GRIPS
Development Forum and JICA, and other related reports. Documents have been edited
for external publication. The first volume provides records of policy dialogue andresearch in Ethiopia (in Japanese) while the second volume offers records of policy
research in third countries (English and Japanese). The Drafts of the Ethiopian mission
reports contained in Volume I were usually started on the plane returning from Ethiopia
to Japan, which were sent to JICA for comment in the following week, and used ininternal strategy meetings held frequently by connecting Tokyo, Addis Ababa, and otherlocations via a TV conference system. Meanwhile, the English records contained inVolume II were prepared to report the results of industrial policy research in countries
other than Ethiopia to the leaders and relevant ofﬁcials of the Ethiopian Government.
Volume II also contains Japanese reports. The report on Indonesia was translated into
Japanese for Japanese readers. The Japanese report on Rwanda is shorter than the
English full version. Additional Japanese reports on Uganda, EAC & Tanzania, Ghana,and Thailand were produced not so much for informing Ethiopians but for formulating
and adjusting industrial cooperation strategies on the Japanese side.
We publish these internal records because we want to share our main activities
with a broad range of stakeholders, because we need to fulfill the accountability andtransparency for this project supported by Japanese taxpayersʼ money, and because wehope to inform the concrete methods of our Industrial Policy Dialogue̶preparation,
implementation, responding to unexpected developments and Ethiopian requests, strategy
formation on the Japanese side, etc.̶to those who may be interested in this type ofcooperation. In so doing we had to delete parts which were confidential informationof companies or governments, but such parts were very limited in amount (edited
records for public viewing had been uploaded in the GRIPS Development Forum
homepage each time a new record was added). As for our policy letter exchange with
Prime Ministers and Economic Ministers, we would like to publish them on anotherappropriate occasion. Apart from these, there were additional documents, presentation5

slides, and records and memos for strategy formulation, but they were too numerous to
be included in published volumes. We believe that reading the two volumes we havecompiled should be enough for the reader to understand how our policy dialogue with
the Ethiopian Government started, how it evolved, and what it achieved in concrete
detail including our sense of wonder, urgency, and pride in conducting the policy
dialogue (however, Volume II contains policy research outside Ethiopia and does notdirectly inform how our policy dialogue progressed in Addis Ababa).
Except for very limited deletion for conﬁdentiality, our records published thistime are the same as those originally written (except for minor corrections andsome updating). The spellings of Ethiopian person and place names, which may
have oscillated from time to time, and other style and wording inconsistencies, areleft as they were originally written.

How it began
From around 2002, the GRIPS Development Forum was looking for an ideal
partner of industrial policy dialogue on the African continent. We visited Zambia,
Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique, etc., met Presidents and Economic Ministers
and Permanent Secretaries, conducted policy research, and implemented mini
policy dialogues. However, we were not very satisﬁed with the results. Then, in thesummer of 2008, we were invited by JICA to Addis Ababa to participate in the African
Taskforce Meeting, a series of high-level policy conferences hosted by Professor andNobel Laureate J. E. Stiglitz. JICA, a ﬁnancial sponsor of this project, wanted to senda Japanese team to the meeting to be held in Ethiopia to contribute Japanese ideas aswell as money. We were happy to oblige because we had known that the Ethiopian
Government was serious about industrial policy. What we did not know was thatPrime Minister Meles was to attend almost all sessions of this two-day event.
We explained industrial policies in East Asia. During the break, we approached
Prime Minister Meles to give him a copy of the book we recently edited1. During
1

GRIPS Development Forum ed., Diversity and Complementarity in Development Aid: East Asian
Lessons for African Growth, GRIPS Development Forum, 2008. This volume was later re-edited
for commercial publication under a different title: Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno eds. (2013),
Eastern and Western Ideas for African Growth: Diversity and Complementarity in Development Aid,
Routledge, 2013.

6

the conference he started to read it. Chapter 7 of the book discussed JICAʼskaizen assistance in Tunisia. In the following week, Prime Minister Meles invitedthe Japanese Ambassador to his ofﬁce and requested two-part cooperation fromJapan: policy dialogue with GRIPS and kaizen assistance by JICA. This was the
beginning of our industrial policy involvement in Ethiopia.
In reality, Industrial Policy Dialogue was implemented jointly by GRIPS and
JICA (not by the GRIPS Development Forum alone) and at three levels including
Prime Minister, Ministers and State Ministers, and other officials. We alsofrequently visited regions, enterprises, universities, international organizations,and other development partners in Ethiopia as well as gave lectures at ministries,
agencies, and universities on request basis. Policy dialogue sessions were conductedfour times a year during Phase 1 (2009-2011) and twice a year during Phase 2 (20122016). Even though frequency was reduced, we were equally or even more busy inPhase 2 because works in Japan, letter exchanges with top leaders, and visits to third
countries in Asia and Africa were increased. As a result the GRIPS Development
Forum was constantly engaged in Ethiopian policy research throughout the year.
Industrial Policy Dialogue and Kaizen Assistance in Ethiopia

Note: the black boxes indicate three-level dialogue sessions with Prime Minister, Ministers and State
Ministers, and operational level in Addis Ababa.

7

Several key points
The two volumes serve as our aide memoire, a report to stakeholders, and a
textbook for those interested in policy dialogue. At the same time, however, we fear
the contents are too long and tedious for normal readers. In the hope of arousing
interest in what are contained in these volumes, we would like to explain several key
points of our policy dialogue here at the outset. We would be happy if the reader has
the patience to at least go through the next several paragraphs. We would be evenhappier if the reader will be prompted to actually read some or all of our records.
First, our Industrial Policy Dialogue in Ethiopia was successful. Supported by
Ethiopiaʼs strong desire to learn from Japan and the rest of East Asia, we were able
to provide a wide range of information and cases to the Ethiopian Government,some̶actually, many̶of which were used to formulate or revise industrial policy.
Speciﬁcally, JICA-supported kaizen was put into practice from the beginning withresolve. Industrial policy organization and structure were learned and implemented.
The Light Manufacturing Vision was declared. Our advice on FDI attraction, highquality industrial zones, creation of champion products, the wage-labor productivity
nexus, re-branding of national image, and so on, was also reﬂected in many policy
actions. Our method was not to explain what Japan did in the past but to introduce
and analyze a large number of selected international cases that best ﬁt the policy
reality of Ethiopia. We dispatched research missions to and invited experts frommany countries in Asia and Africa. What we wanted to convey was not concrete andunique measures adopted by Meiji or Post-WW2 Japan but the Japanese mindset
and attitude toward economic development. The important thing was learning themethodology of how to identify and overcome economic challenges of each country
in the way typical of Japanese or Asian industrial ofﬁcials and experts.
Second, candidness was valued. We from East Asia were often puzzled by
the thinking and action of the Ethiopian Government. Nevertheless, from thevery beginning, the Ethiopian leaders pleaded us to be open and frank in policy
discussion, and we strictly followed their advice. We remained honest andsometimes even critical in our meetings with Ethiopian policy makers from top tobottom, but we never received any reproach or discomfort from them. Probably
they understood our sincere desire to be useful to Ethiopia, and they accepted our
frankness and discourtesy. We believe that most of our recommendations were8

on the mark, but on some occasions we had to admit that we were wrong and theEthiopians were right. For example, seeing what happened recently, we had toeat our words that state-run industrial parks in a latecomer country were unlikely
to function, or that few Japanese manufacturers would be interested in coming toEthiopia. On the other hand, we still continue to insist that SME policy should beconcentrated in one ministry (MOI) and that specialized and powerful agencies
should be established under it for FDI attraction and export promotion. Our advice
may be initially ignored or rebutted. But over time, the Ethiopian Government may
listen to our counsel and even implement some of our recommendations.
Third, Ethiopian policies and institutions change fast. The Ethiopian Government
is highly action-oriented, and we often feel that it moves too fast. Our repeated advice
such as “Slow and Steady Wins the Race” and “Quality over Speed” are counteredwith the refutation that Japan and Japanese businesses are too slow. Ethiopian ofﬁcials
started revising Investment Proclamation on the plane back from Malaysia where
JICA invited them for policy study. Industrial zone policy and institutions are created
and revised at bewildering speed. The Government is determined to build a highquality industrial zone within six months (despite the fact that many delays occur). An
SME policy is drafted and approved after researching three countries brieﬂy. We fearthat the different attitudes toward policy speed between our two countries will neverbe bridged. All the same, we are still happy to continue to work with the Ethiopians in
the full knowledge of our different mindsets.
Fourth, the topics for discussion were chosen carefully just before each session.
We did not select topics a few years in advance because Ethiopian situations
and policies shift rapidly and because it is important to link what we discusswith concrete policy actions instead of engaging in just academic research andpresentation. As already noted, the Ethiopian Government is quick to adopt
whatever ideas it thinks are useful. As a result, we also have to be cautious andvigilant to give only such advice that is relevant and worth giving, and listen
carefully and selectively to the problems raised by the Ethiopian side. Unlike aconstruction project that must follow pre-agreed detail design, the best strategy inpolicy dialogue shifts quickly as the dialogue partner or the situation changes. It
is similar to a chess match, a judo or kendo (Japanese sword) match, instructions
by a baseball manager, or even how you go out with your date until the two get
serious and marry. For these cases, it is hardly possible to declare in advance what9

concrete steps you will take. The key is being alert and having good insights as
to what action is required at every instant, moving quickly on such insights, andpreparing necessary human resource and budget in time.
Fifth, there must be clear linkage between policy discussion and JICAʼs industrial
support. Many donors and NPOs offer “intellectual assistance” to Ethiopia but
most of such programs are just talk and no action. A meeting arranged for thePrime Minister and a visiting eminent foreign scholar, provision of research funds,
bilateral joint research, supporting researchers through foreign study opportunities
and research guidance, and so on, can produce policy analysis and proposals but
their relevance and implementability are often in question. Only a few countries
study one problem deeply together with the Ethiopian Government, propose policy
actions, and implement some (if not all) of them actually on the ground. In ourcase, Industrial Policy Dialogue and kaizen have been ﬁrmly linked from the outset,
and JICA has followed up our discussions with many additional industrial projects
including frequent expert dispatches, a metal and engineering industry survey (incooperation with Germany), a large policy mission to Malaysia, champion products
creation, national re-branding, a cost-beneﬁt analysis of export subsidies, a survey
on labor productivity and wage, and a comparative survey of Ethiopian businessconditions with other African countries. This cooperation model which combinespolicy discussion with industrial projects is very effective in encouraging both Japanand developing country government to seriously engage in bilateral dialogue andimproving the chance of what was discussed being implemented.
Sixth, East Asiaʼs experiences are becoming increasingly germane to Ethiopia. When
our policy dialogue started, Ethiopia seemed a poor African country with little economic
interaction with Japan. Initially, we did not discuss interests of Japanese businesses orindustries. However, the situation changed around 2009 when manufacturing FDI began
to race into Ethiopia. With rapid increases in their domestic wages, Turkey, India, China,
and other emerging economies had to relocate labor-intensive garment and footwear
production to new frontiers. Taiwan, Korea, EU, US, Southeast Asia, and South Asia
soon followed. Construction of new factories in Ethiopia continues even today. Someforeign professors brag about this FDI inflow as their achievement, but the fact is
Ethiopiaʼs existing advantages such as cheap and good labor and social stability havebeen boosted by proactive FDI and industrial policies of the Government. Phase 2 ofIndustrial Policy Dialogue began to highlight FDI policy, industrial zones, productivity,10

industrial human resource, FDI-local firm linkage, attraction of Japanese FDI, andimproving business environment. The East Asian Flying Geese seem to have arrived in
Africa. Industrial policy issues in Ethiopia are no longer distinguishable from those indeveloping Asia. In fact, problems Ethiopia faces also remain unsolved in many Asian
countries. This means that industrial policy lessons from East Asia̶both successes andfailures̶are now more directly relevant to Ethiopian policy formulation.
Seventh, Japanese industrial cooperation in Africa will be effective only if internaland external policy networks are activated. This is because Japan is only a small
player in Africa. In our policy dialogue, we actively listened to and worked withother industrial policy stakeholders. Networks must be created at three levels: within
Ethiopia, within Japan, and with other development partners and investors interested
in Ethiopia. Weak coordination among industry, government, academics, and evenamong their internal units is commonplace in developing countries. Dialogs andactions initiated by foreign outsiders such as us often invigorate horizontal exchange
and cooperation (meanwhile, vertical communication is fairly strong in Ethiopia).
As for Japan, JICA must involve MoFA, METI, JETRO, JBIC and others in strategy
formation and work in the context of industry-government-university coalition. We
also actively exchanged information and conducted hearings with non-Japaneseagencies such as UNIDO, GIZ, DFID, USAID, KOICA, EU, and other foreign
missions and international organizations in Addis Ababa. Japanese aid ofﬁcials havea bad habit of trying to do projects by Japanese alone but such an approach will not
maximize the impact of limited resources or produce visible results in Africa.
Industrial Policy Dialogue is like a heated tennis match. At the beginning we had no
idea of whether or how policy dialogue would proceed in Ethiopia. We were constantly
amazed at unexpected developments and actions by the Ethiopian Government. We
only did our best to come up with most suitable advice and assistance given what
Ethiopia needed at every instant. Cumulative interactions such as this, without any
prescribed scenario, were how we conducted the total of 18 sessions of Industrial Policy
Dialogue and many policy research trips in third countries.
Plato in his Seventh Epistle says that philosophical truths cannot be expressedin written form but must be delivered from a teacher to a student like ﬂying sparks
through repeated discussions. Philosophy consists not only of recorded discussionsof the past but also of uncertainty, amazement, concord, and joy at every instant of a11serious dialogue. Truths emerge by sharing such a holistic experience. In this sense,
our records of Industrial Policy Dialogue are akin to a fossil that does not convey
unpredictability and excitement we always felt in our sessions. But for those withsharp eyes such unwritten feelings may well be sensed between the lines.
GRIPS Development Forum

12

Appendix Table 1. Topics Discussed at High Level Forums (Ministerial Level)
Presentations by Japan or Third Country< PHASE 1 > (1) JICA’s plan for policy dialogue
Session 1
June 2009
Session 2
Sep. 2009(2) ADLI and future directions forindustrial development”

Presentations by Ethiopia(1) Evaluation of current PASDEP
focusing on industrial
development and related sectors(1) Cross-cutting issues on industrial (1) Comments and feedback by thepolicy & East Asian policy menu
Policy Dialogue Steering
Committee on Japanese(2) Organizational arrangements forpresentationsindustrial policy formulation(3) SME policies in Japan

Session 3
Nov. 2009(1) Designing industrial master plans: (1) Concept for the industrial
international comparison
chapter of PASDEP II and theformulation plan(2) Industrial policy direction of
Ethiopia: suggestions for
PASDEP II

Session 4
Mar. 2010

Session 5
July 2010(1) Basic metals and engineering(1) Draft of industry sector forindustries: international
PASDEP II
comparison of policy framework & (2)Overview, contents of PASDEP II
Ethiopia’s casedraft of chemical subsector(1) Report of kaizen training in(1) Result of basic metal andengineering industries firm-level
Osaka
study – parts conducted by MPDC (2)Report of kaizen training in
and JICA
Chubu(3) Current status of kaizen projectand institutionalization of kaizen

Session 6
Oct. 2010

Session 7
Jan. 2011
Session 8
May 2011(1) Singapore’s experience withproductivity development:internalization, scaling-up, andinternational cooperation(1) The making of high priority
development strategies:
international comparison(1) Contents of industry sector in
GTP(2) Singapore’s productivity
movement and lessons learned(1) Organizational structure of MOI
and linkage with other ministries”(1) Ethiopia’s industrialization under (1) MSE development strategy of
GTP
Ethiopia(2) Achievements of Kaizen Project(2) Kaizen dissemination plan(3) Kaizen movement in Asia & Africa(3) Botswana’s productivity movement
and its Implication for Ethiopia(4) Taiwan: policy drive for innovation13

< PHASE 2 > (1) Export orientation: 3 policy
directions
Session 1
Jan. 2012(2) Export promotion: JICA’s
experience(1) Export promotion of Ethiopia(2) Assessing Ethiopian investment
and export policies(3) Export promotion center in Egypt(1) Results of champion productseminar(1) Performance of export promotion
in Ethiopia(2) Export promotion of Malaysia(3) Economic diplomacy in Thailand(2) Export promotion by foreign
missionSession 3(1) Proactive FDI policy(1) FDI inflow into Ethiopia

Jan. 2013(2) FDI policy experience of
Malaysia

Session 4(1) JICA’s PSD assistance inIndonesia

Session 2
Aug. 2012(3) JICA’s assistance in Zambia etc.
Jul. 2013
Session 5
Feb. 2014

Session 6
Aug. 2014(1) Malaysia’s strategic FDI policy(2) FDI-linked technology transfer(2) Revision of Investment
Proclamation(1) International comparison of
manufacturing performance(1) Sectoral institutes: roles &performance(2) Handholding programs(2) Kaizen in GTP II and long-term
vision(1) FDI-led industrialization in EastAsia(1) Proposal for key ideas in GTP II(2) Current status of Ethiopian FDI(2) FDI inflow into latecomer Asia
Session 7
Jan. 2015(1) Modality & key points of(1) Productivity & competitivenessJapanese-run industrial zones inchapter, industry chapter &Vietnam & Thailand
kaizen in GTP II(2) Industrial zones & foreign currency
issues in Myanmar & India

Session 8
Oct. 2015(1) Remaining industrial issues
ahead(2) Industrial zone experience inCambodia14(1) Discussion on GTP II draft(2) Ethiopian wage & laborproductivity survey

Appendix Table 2. Policy letters exchanged with high-level leaders(Those with substantive policy discussion only)
No.

Date

To/from

Pages

Main topics
Democratic Developmentalism (DD)
1 June 9, 2009
From PM Meles
16 & Agricultural Development Led
Industrialization (ADLI)
2 July 27, 2009
To PM Meles
9
Agriculture, import-substitution, ADLI
Agriculture, proto-industrialization, import
3 July 30, 2009
From PM Meles
6
substitution, ADLI
Master plan structure, energizing private
4 Nov. 16, 2009 To PM Meles
3
sector, proactive industrial policy
5 July 13, 2010
To PM Meles
9
Kaizen, metal industry, MSEs
To Minister of Industry
Formulation of GTP; report on high-level
6 Oct. 29, 20105
Mekonnendiscussion
Response to the question on how to cope
To Minister of Industry
7 Dec. 27, 20108with export firms that do not fulfill their
Mekonnentargets
Request for meeting in Yokohama (TICAD
8 Apr. 30, 2013
From PM Hailemariam-V) regarding GTP2 & kaizen, via Japanese
Embassy
Kaizen, GTP2, planning mechanism, think
9 May 27, 2013
To PM Hailemariam
8
tank (response to PM’s inquiry)
10 Aug. 11, 2013 To PM Hailemariam
10 Vision & industrial strategy in GTP2
To high-level
Comments on the draft report on Ethiopian
11 Aug. 11, 2013
7participants of IPD
Industrial Development
Response to Aug. 11 letter; light
12 Sep. 2, 2013
From PM Hailemariam5
manufacturing vision, Planning Commission,Competitiveness Council, etc.
Light manufacturing vision, FDI data
13 Dec. 24, 2013 To PM Hailemariam4
problem, export promotion
Data analysis & key issues of large inflow
14 Apr. 28, 2014
To PM Hailemariam
11 of manufacturing FDI from the viewpoint of
East Asia; kaizen, handholding
To high-level
Issues related to industry, productivity &15 Sep. 29, 2014
17
participants of IPD
competitiveness (input to GTP2)Concrete conditions & requests for
To PM Economic Advisor
16 Jan. 26, 20155inviting Japanese firms (based on bilateral
Dr. Arkebe
discussion)Comprehensive discussion on industrial
17 Mar. 27, 2015
To PM Hailemariam
18
issues in GTP2
Progress in Japanese Investment Area,
18 Nov. 13, 2015 To PM Hailemariam9
remarks on latest GTP2 draft, future ofIndustrial Policy Dialogue
Note: it has been customary to cc policy letters to high-level participants in Industrial Policy
Dialogue. Page numbers include tables, figures, and appendices. Apart from the correspondence inthe table, shorter letters were sent from GDF to PM Meles on July 6 and Dec. 2, 2009.

15

Appendix Table 3. Third Country Policy Missions
Participating officials & experts
No.

Date

Country

1 Nov. 2009 Burkina Faso

Total

Ethiopian Japanese

Other

1

0

1

0

Singapore

9

1

4

4

3 Oct. 2010 Tanzania

2

0

2

0

4 Nov. 2010 Korea

5

1

2

2

5 Jan. 2011 Burkina Faso

1

0

1

0

6 Feb. 2011 Botswana

1

1

0

0

7 Mar. 2011 Taiwan

5

1

2

2

8 Aug. 2012 Ghana

8

0

8

0

9 Sep. 2012 India

3

0

3

0

10 Oct. 2012 Mauritius

3

0

3

0

11 June 2013 Malaysia

16

11

5

0

12 June 2014 Indonesia

5

0

3

2

13 Aug. 2014 Rwanda

6

0

6

0

14 May 2015 Thailand

3

0

3

0

15 May 2015 Cambodia

3

0

3

0

2

Aug/Sep.
2010

Purpose(other than studying policy
formulation & organization)
Current status of national
productivity movement
National productivity movement,
FDI policy, SME policy, Nanyang
Politechnics
East African Communicty (Arusha),
MOI & industrial policy
Industrial policy, SME policy, ODA
strategy
Current status of national productivity
movement (follow-up of Nov. 2009
mission)Current status of national productivity
movement
Technology & RD, science parks &EPZs, SME policy
African Center for Economic
Transformation (ACET), industrial &finance policy
National Manuf. Policy, industrial
corridor, kaizen
EPZ & FDI policy, garment & sugar
sectors, export promotion, SMEs &HR, kaizen, policy coordination
FDI, export & industrial park policies
as a model for Ethiopia; National
Transformation Strategy
Development planning, policy
coordination, new industrial policy,
FDI policy, private efforts
Development planning, Rwanda
Development Board, industrial HR,
ICT, SEZ
FDI-local firm matching & linkage
policyCollective policy formulation, newindustrial dev. policy, FDI & SEZ
policy under CDC, Sihanoukville

Total participants
71
15
46
10
Note: as a general topic, most of the policy missions examined industrial policy formulation and implementation
including policy procedure and organization. Total number of participants includes double-counting of same
individuals. During the period of Ethiopia-Japan Industrial Policy Dialogue, industrial policies of Vietnam andMozambique were also studied intensively on other budgets.

16

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

1. Singapore－Productivity and Policy Competency(August 29 - September 3, 2010)

The GRIPS Development Forum, together with researchers and ofﬁcials from
Vietnam and Ethiopia, visited Singapore from Aug. 29 to Sep. 3, 2010 to study
Singapore's experiences in productivity improvement and skills upgrading as wellas organizational aspects of industrial policy formulation and implementation.
Findings of this mission will be provided to concerned officials in developing
countries including Ethiopia and Vietnam1. We also gathered information on
Singapore ' s international cooperation in the industrial sector of developing
countries. The mission had meetings with government ministries and agencies,
research institutes and universities, and Japanese organizations such as JCCI,JETRO, and JICA. It also visited a Japanese manufacturing company operated bySingaporeans.
The mission members consisted of Prof. Kenichi Ohno, Prof. Izumi Ohno, Ms.
Sayoko Uesu (GRIPS Development Forum); Prof. Daniel Kitaw (Addis Ababa
University); and Ms. Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy, and Ms. Truong Thi Nam Thang(Vietnam Development Forum). In addition, Mr. Le Mang Hung and Mr. Nguyen
Quang Vinh (Ministry of Planning and Investment, Vietnam), and Ms. KumikoKasai (JICA expert/SME policy advisor in Vietnam) joined the mission (seeattachments for mission schedule, places visited, and information collected). We
would like to express our deep appreciation to all organizations and individuals
who kindly received us and shared valuable information with us. The mainﬁndings of the mission are as follows.

1

This mission was commissioned by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) tocompile information on industrial policies in selected East Asian countries for the use of otherdeveloping countries. Visits to South Korea and Taiwan are also planned in the near future.

171. The current situation surrounding productivity
In recent months, productivity improvement has been resurrected as a highpriority national agenda in Singapore. As the Singaporean economy came out of the
global recession, the government sees an opportunity to restructure the economy
and maximize growth capability in the post-crisis era which is characterized byrising China and India. The government formed the high-level Economic Strategies
Committee (ESC) chaired by the Finance Minister in May 2009 with tripartite
participation of government, labor unions, and industry2. The ESC submitted a ﬁnal
report to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the end of January 2010, which wasofﬁcially launched on February 1, 2010. Envisioning “high-skilled people, innovative
economy, distinctive global city,” the ESC Report recommended a drastic shift fromfactor-driven to productivity-driven growth. It set an annual productivity growthtarget of 2-3% and an average GDP growth target of 3-5% in the next ten years, andpresented seven key strategies to achieve these goals. The main thrust of the ESC
Report was endorsed by the Prime Minister and reflected in the FY2010 budget(starting from April 1).
One of the seven key strategies is “growing through skills and innovation.” To
oversee and drive the national effort to boost productivity and skills upgrading,the government established the National Productivity and Continuing Education
Council (NPCEC) in April 2010 (see Section 3).
While the Singaporean economy grew by an average 5% per annum over the past
decade, productivity gains have declined in recent years3. According to the ESC
Report, the country's productivity levels in manufacturing and services are only 552

The ESC was formed as one of the many ad hoc mechanisms for shaping economic future andlong-term development visions of the country. Under the committee headed by the Finance
Minister and comprising of 25 members, eight subcommittees and several working groups
were formed. Each subcommittee was co-chaired by the representatives of the public and private sectors. For formulating key policies the Singaporean government does not produce ﬁveyear or any other regular plans.
3
In Singapore, productivity primarily means labor productivity or value-added per worker, reﬂecting the governmentʼs deep concern with sustaining high wages and high living standards
for its citizens. As such, it is affected by technology, capital accumulation, efficiency andwaste reduction, systemic innovation, and training adopted by companies. Concerns about
Singaporeʼs recent slowdown in productivity have been also pointed out in Singapore Competitiveness Report: 2009 (foreworded by Michael E. Porter) produced by the Asia CompetitivenessInstitute of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. This report also supports the governmentʼs ongoing effort to move towards an innovation-driven economy.

18

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

65% of those in the US and Japan. In the construction sector, the productivity levelis only one-third and one-half of Japan and the US, respectively. According to many
whom we interviewed, this apparent low productivity in a country renowned forwell-educated people and excellent policies was caused by the existence of lowskill foreign workers and the old generation of Singaporeans who received little
education in the past, both of which bring down average productivity. In terms ofsectors, low productivity is observed in construction, SMEs, and certain services
such as retails, restaurants, and tourism.
Over the past decade, Singapore has become increasingly dependent on foreign
workers, including both highly skilled professionals and low-skill workers, which
now account for about one-third (or 1 million) of the entire workforce. Low-skill
foreign workers compete with relatively less educated Singaporeans on the job
market. The ESC Report points out the need to manage (i.e., gradually reduce) the
country's dependence on low-skill foreign labor and support continuous educationand training of low-wage Singaporean workers. The Report also emphasizes theimportance of productivity growth to sustain high wages and high living standards
which Singaporeans have come to enjoy, and urges the government to encourage
enterprise innovation, investment in technology, and training to create better andmore high paying jobs.

2. History of Productivity Movement4
Singapore was the ﬁrst country where JICA provided comprehensive technicalcooperation called Productivity Development Project (PDP) to transfer Japan's
knowhow in productivity improvement. At the request of then Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew, JICA implemented PDP during 1983-1990. Subsequently, Singapore
became quite successful in internalization, scaling up, and institutionalization of
Productivity Movement. Its experiences should offer useful insight for developing
countries which plan to introduce similar projects.
Singapore ' s interest in productivity dates back to the early days of
independence, before the initiation of JICA cooperation. In 1967, the National
4This section is based mainly on the information provided by Mr. Low Hock Meng, Executive
Director of the Singaporean Productivity Association and the former counterpart of JICA-supported PDP.

19

Table 1. History of Productivity-related Organizations
PeriodOrganization

Remark1964

Productivity Unit, EDB

1965: Charter for Industrial

1967-1972

National Productivity Center (NPC)- an autonomously-run division under EDB

1971: Tripartite Interim

1972-1995

1973-present: Singapore
National Productivity Board (NPB)- a statutory body, initially afﬁliated with Ministry
Productivity Associationof Labor and later with Ministry of Trade and(SPA)
Industry (MTI)
1981-85: awareness stage
1986-88: action stage
Productivity Standard Board (PSB)
1989-90s: ownership stage- a statutory body, afﬁliated with MTI

1996-2001
2002-present

Progress, Productivity
Code of PracticeManagement Committee(to prepare NPB)

Standards, Productivity and Innovation Board(SPRING)- a statutory body, afﬁliated with MTI

Productivity Center was established under the Economic Development Board(EDB). In 1972, the Center was upgraded to a separate agency, the National
Productivity Board (NPB), and in 1996 was merged with the Singapore Instituteof Standards and Industrial Research to become the Productivity Standard
Board (PSB). In 2002, PSB's productivity-related functions were transferred to
the Standards, Productivity and Innovation Board (SPRING). Separately, theSingapore Productivity Association (SPA) was established in 1973 as an afﬁliatedbody of NPB with the purpose of promoting active involvement of organizations
and individuals in Productivity Movement and spreading the idea of productivity
and its techniques.
Productivity Movement in Singapore evolved in three stages: (i) awarenessstage (1981-85); (ii) action stage (1986-88); and (iii) ownership stage (198990s). The awareness stage aimed to create widespread awareness of productivity
among companies and workforce. The National Productivity Council (NPC)
was established in 1981, chaired by the State Minister of Labor and with theparticipation of about 20 members from government, employer groups, unions
and academia, which reviewed productivity efforts and outlined future strategy.
Massive productivity campaigns were launched at both national and company
levels. November was designated as “Productivity Month,” in which then Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew delivered annual speeches on productivity from 1981

20

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

for seven consecutive years. In the action stage, “awareness” was translated into
specific programs to improve productivity at the workplace, by introducing amanagement consultancy referral scheme, model company projects, training of
workforce through the Skills Development Fund (see Section 3), and so on. The
ownership stage assured sustainability of Productivity Movement by launching
many initiatives to encourage company-level productivity movement. The
Singapore Quality Award was introduced in 1994.
Throughout the three stages, NPB played a key role as the secretariat of NPC
by providing training and management consultancy, spreading quality control (QC)
circles, promoting the concept of productivity, and administering SDF. Key factors
for successful scaling-up of Productivity Movement included establishment ofinstitutional mechanisms (including NPC), strong support of key stakeholders(public sector, unions, and employers), and sharing productivity gains among
these stakeholders. JICA-supported PDP made important contributions to thismovement by sharing best practices, training NPB staff and company workers,
and developing manuals.
After PDP was completed in Singapore, NPB and JICA conducted joint training
programs in developing countries in Asia and Africa until around 2005. In parallel,
under the Singapore Cooperation Program (see Section 5), SPA also provided
cooperation to productivity improvement in Botswana from 1991 for about ten years
at the request of the President of Botswana to then Singaporean Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong. Based on the experience of PDP, SPA supported promotion of tripartite
cooperation among government, labor, and industry, staff training of the Botswana
National Productivity Center, and implementation of pilot projects. In its ﬁrst phase,cooperation produced mixed results as it caused brain drain of trained staff. In thesecond phase, however, cooperation successfully strengthened the Botswana National
Productivity Center which has come to be regarded as a center of excellence in SubSaharan Africa. For countries interested in introducing Productivity Movement in
Africa and elsewhere, a detailed study of SPA's cooperation in Botswana should bea useful guide for understanding how technical cooperation should be designed for
maximum impact and minimum brain drain.

21

3. Current industrial policy measures and organizations
The policy process in Singapore is characterized by: (i) tripartite cooperation
among government, labor unions, and industry, and (ii) a multi-sectoral and multifunctional approach involving all relevant government ministries and agencies
in good collaboration. Regarding industrial policy measures, the Singaporean
government takes both broad-based and targeted/sectoral approaches. The
government offers various incentives to encourage enterprises to adjust andrestructure by following (policy-adjusted) market price signals rather than throughquantitative quotas or direct subsidies to individuals. Recent initiatives related to
productivity, SMEs, and FDI attraction include the following.

3-1. Measures for productivity and continuing education and training
As explained before, the National Productivity and Continuing Education
Council (NPCEC) was established in April 2010 to lead the national effort totransform Singapore into a productivity-led economy. NPCEC is chaired by
Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean and its members come from government,
business community, and labor unions. Chairpersonship of DPM signiﬁes the highpriority accorded to the productivity issue. The Ministry of Trade and Industry(MTI) and the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) jointly act as the secretariat.
Under NPCEC two layers of organizations are created including (i) the Working
Committee for Productivity and Continuing Education (WCPCE) led by thePermanent Secretaries of MTI and MOM; and (ii) 12 sector working groups
and horizontal thematic working groups which are coordinated by responsible
government agencies (see Figure 1).
NPCEC has selected 12 priority sectors based on the criteria of the size ofcontribution to employment and GDP and high potential for productivity gain.
Each sector group formulates a productivity roadmap for the next ten years. Theseroadmaps are reviewed by WCPCE and submitted to NCPEC for ﬁnal approval. A
ministry or an agency is assigned to oversee each priority sector. For example, EDB is
responsible for electronics, precision engineering, transport engineering, logistics andstorage, while SPRING is responsible for general manufacturing, food and beverages,
and retails. In addition, horizontal working groups are created to work on crosscutting issues such as low-wage workers, research and benchmarking, and infocomm

22

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

Figure 1. Institutional Mechanism for Boosting Skills and Enterprise
Productivity through National Effort(ICT) and logistics. As usual, government, businesses, and unions participate in these
sectoral and thematic working groups.
The government has committed to a total of S$5.5 billion over the next ten
years to support productivity initiatives. This includes S$3 billion for the National
Productivity Fund (NPF) and the Productivity and Innovation Credit (PIC) and
S$2.5 billion for CET. PIC, a new tax beneﬁt scheme, is one of the broad-based
supports. Under PIC, any enterprise in any sector is eligible for a ﬁscal incentive
when they invest in productivity enhancement or innovation. Speciﬁcally, they areentitled to a deduction of 250 percent of eligible expenditures from their taxable
income with a cap of S$300,000 per activity. Meanwhile, NPF is a targeted support
which provides funding for productivity initiatives in specific industries orenterprises only. Under the priorities and guidelines established by NPCEC, sector
working groups propose productivity initiatives which are reviewed by WCPCE.
Regarding Continuing Education and Training (CET), the previous system has
been expanded to upgrade workforce skills and competitiveness at all levels, by23

Table 2. Major Initiatives on Productivity and Continuing Education andTraining (CET)
Policy area

Actions taken

Boosting skills and enterprise -Establishment of National Productivity and Continuing
productivity through national effort Education Council (NPCEC)
Investing in people-Enhancement of Continuing Education and Training
System-Introduction of Workfare Training Scheme-Enhancement of Workfare Income Supplement

Supporting enterprise investments -Introduction of Productivity and Innovation Credit
in innovation and productivity-Establishment of National Productivity Fund
-Raising foreign worker levies
Supporting business restructuring-Introduction of tax allowance to defray acquisition
costs for qualifying mergers and acquisitions-Introduction of stamp duty relief for acquisition ofunlisted shares

Enhancing land productivity-Introduction of Land Intensiﬁcation Allowance

Source: Sanchita Basu Das, Road to Recovery, ISEAS, 2010, Appendix IV, pp.190-200.

providing multiple skills-based progression paths to complement the academic
path, and by reaching out to more professionals, managers, executives andtechnicians. Furthermore, the government now encourages companies to retain
and train workers (especially low-wage workers and older workers) by introducing
the Workfare Training Scheme and enhancing the Workfare Income Supplement
Scheme. Companies can also receive ﬁnancial support for employee training fromtwo sources: the Skills Development Fund (SDF) and the Lifelong Endowment
Fund (LLEF)5. Until 2008, SDF targeted only low-wage workforce, but more
recently the SDF Levy was broadened to cover the entire workforce. While all
workers have access to the CET scheme in principle, subsidies from SDF and
LLEF are currently limited to Singaporean workers only.

5

SDF was established in 1978 as an employer-based funding that provides ﬁnancial incentives
for staff training. Through SDF, employers can enjoy course fee subsides of up to 90%, though
the amount of subsidies depends on each course. All employers must pay Skills Development
Levy for all workers up to the ﬁrst S$4,500 of gross monthly remuneration at a levy rate of
0.25%, or S$2 per worker, whichever is higher. The Central Provident Fund collects the levy
on behalf of WDA. The levy collected is channeled into SDF, which provides grants to companies that send their workers for training. LLEF was established in 2001 with an initial capitalof S$500 million and with the current total capital of S$2 billion. Interest earned from this endowment fund can be used to support various lifelong learning initiatives.

24

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

3-2. SME development
There are over 116 , 000 local SMEs in Singapore. SMEs account for 50 %of value-added, and 60 % of the total employment 6. Responsibility for SME
development rests with MTI ' s Enterprise Division (policy) and SPRING(implementation). SPRING is an SME development agency and a national
standards and accreditation body.
The Singaporean government takes both broad-based and targeted approaches
to SME promotion. Broad-based approaches are implemented on a scheme base incollaboration with business chambers and associations. There are ﬁve Enterprise
Development Centers located at business associations and chambers, where a teamof business advisors give face-to-face advice to SMEs on government assistanceschemes applicable to SMEs, ﬁnance, management, human resources, operations,etc. As part of this advisory service, the Financial Facilitator Program has
ﬁnancial facilitators (composed of ex-bankers, ﬁnancial consultants, and advisors)
who help SMEs to gain access to ﬁnancing. Targeted approaches are tailored toindividual enterprises (which are usually relatively large SMEs). SME managers
can contact designated SPRING ofﬁcers when necessary to seek advisory services
and resolve problems.
Singapore does not have the equivalent of Japan' s Shindan system (SMEManagement Consultants System), an institutionalized and state-backed system
for training, testing, registering, and renewing certified SME consultants(shindanshi) who advise on management and facilitate SME ﬁnance (shindanshi'sreports on SMEs ' business plans are regularly used by Japanese banks toevaluate loan applications). In Singapore, banks and management consultants
work independently, and it is the responsibility of banks' loan ofﬁcers to assessand decide on loan applications. There is however the Practising Management
Consultant (PMC) Certification Scheme, which gives formal endorsement on
the quality of management consultants (authorized by SPRING, WDA, andInternational Enterprise Singapore). This system is modeled after the UK ' s
Certified Management Consultant System. About 200 consultants have so far
6

In Singapore, an SME is defined as a company with: (i) less than S$15 million fixed asset
investment (for manufacturing), or (ii) less than 200 workers (for non-manufacturing andservices). The government plans to revise this deﬁnition next year to align with international
norms which use revenue-based deﬁnition.

25

been qualiﬁed by the Certiﬁcation Board. Although more information is needed,
a quick look at the training and examination modules of the PMC Certification
Scheme indicates that this scheme focuses primarily on project management,
ﬁnance, laws, and applications for government incentives, and less on production
management on the factory ﬂoor (which is covered by Japan's shindanshi).

3-3. FDI attraction
MTI's Industry Division (policy) and EDB (implementation) are responsible for
FDI attraction and industrial development. The two work closely to attract FDI,
foster “industry verticals” (suppliers of intermediate inputs), and enhance businessenvironment. Singapore generally ranks very high in the ease of doing business.
It has consistently held the top position among nearly 200 countries in the World
Bank's Doing Business Reports from 2007 to 2010.
EDB is a one-stop agency for FDI marketing as well as the hub of industrial
development, especially in transport engineering, electronics, precisionengineering, chemicals, biomedical sciences, logistics, healthcare services,education services, infocomm and media, professional services, and consumer
businesses. It also promotes new areas of growth such as clean energy,
environmental technologies, bio-technology, and digital media.
In attracting FDI, EDB also combines broad-based approaches with targeted
approaches. In addition to improving business environment generally, itoffers targeted, company-specific support and incentives based on individual
negotiations. This is called the “Queen Bee” approach where inviting the queenbee (an anchor ﬁrm) automatically brings a large number of other bees into thecountry (similar to the “Canon effect” in Northern Vietnam). A good example
in this regard is the attraction of world-class aerospace firms such as RollsRoyce, Pratt & Whitney, ST Aerospace, to the Seletar Aerospace Park which wastransformed from a secondary airport with an area of over 300ha, which promptedarrival of related maintenance and repair services.

26

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

4. Nanyang Polytechnic
Nanyang Polytechnic (NYP) is one of the five national polytechnics in
Singapore. It was established in 1992 and now has about 78,000 students. NYP
provides both Pre-Employment Training (PET, for students) and Continuing
Education and Training (CET, for current workers). Regarding PET, seven schoolsof NYP run 47 full-time courses for three-year diploma in engineering, information
technology, business management, interactive and digital media, design, chemicaland life sciences, and health sciences. CET at NYP offers formal diploma
courses, customized courses, and degree programs with overseas universities. The
government provides full funding for administration and operations of NYP (minus
tuition fees collected). Meanwhile, NYP is free to use its revenue from services
provided to industry for any activities or investments.
NYP has a strong link with industry. This includes: (i) preparing suitablytrained graduates to meet the manpower needs of industry; (ii) practice- andapplication-oriented training; (iii) “industry attachment” (internship) for students;and (iv) collaboration with industry and development agencies such as SPRING,
Infocomm Development Authority, etc. NYP carries out many industrial projects
on a commercial basis in R&D, product design and development, and innovative
solutions for industry, as well as teaming up with EDB to support start-up
technopreneurs. Such collaboration is “win-win” for both industry and NYP,
because industry can benefit from reduced cost and risk for R&D and start-up
investment and because NYP can have ample opportunities for staff capability
development and student training in frontline technology in addition to earningmoney. Industry is represented in NYP's Board and Advisory Committees andparticipates in course development and review. NYP's reputation is ﬁrm and longstanding among Singaporean manufacturers. It cannot accept all cooperation
applications from industry because it receives too many.
NYP is also active in international cooperation. NYP International provides
consultancy services including a World Bank Project in TVET reform (China) andcooperation with the Suzhou Industrial Park Institute of Vocational Technology(China). It also conducts training programs for management staff and specialistsof TVET institutions around the world.
In Singapore, manpower policy is formulated through close collaboration between

27

concerned official bodies and educational institutions. The National Manpower
Council (NMC), a ministerial council headed by the Minister of Manpower, identiﬁes
the country's human resource needs in the medium to long run and maps out strategies
to meet these needs. Various government ministries and agencies, including MTI,
the Ministry of Education (MOE), and EDB, participate in NMC. Based on demand
projection and skills mapping, NMC sets numerical targets for speciﬁc skills requiredby the country and decides on the number and type of students to be graduated fromuniversities and polytechnics over the next four to ﬁve years. MOE provides funding
to educational institutions for establishing new courses if that is judged necessary.
EDB may also provide additional funds to relevant industries (e.g., aerospace) for
upgrading its workforce.

5. Singapore's international cooperation in the industrial
sector
In 1992, the government established the Singapore Technical Cooperation
Program (SCP) to share the country's development experience and public sector
expertise with developing countries. SCP is administered by the TechnicalCooperation Directorate (TCD) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), whichis responsible for planning and executing various training courses, seminars,
workshops, and study visits in collaboration with domestic agencies and foreign
partners. In FY2009, about 300 such activities were organized, and the number of
SCP participants reached a record 6,729.
SCP is implemented in various channels including: (i) bilateral training programs,(ii) joint training programs or third-country training programs, (iii) Initiatives
for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Centers; and (iv) small island developing statestechnical cooperation programs. Bilateral training programs are offered directly
by Singapore to developing countries on a government-to-government basis, inthe areas where Singapore has strength. Examples of FY2010 training courses
include private sector growth and FDI attraction (executing agency: Civil Service
College) and technical and vocational education and training (TVET) programs forprincipals and instructors (executing agency: ITE Education Services). Since 1997,
JICA has managed the Japan-Singapore Partnership Program for the 21st Century(JSPP21) with TCD/MFA. This included the joint training program on productivity

28

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

management in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries
which was implemented during 1997-2004.
Apart from SCP, the Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (SCE) provides feebased technical cooperation which does not fall within SPC's responsibility. SCE
was formed by MTI and MFA in 2006 to respond to growing foreign requests to
tap on Singapore's development experiences. It mobilizes expertise accumulated
in the country's public agencies and retired civil servants and politicians on a
project basis. SCE does not receive financial support from the government andcharges fees for technical cooperation on a cost-recovery (non-proﬁt) basis.
The Singaporean government sees complementarity between ODA-based SCP
and fee-based SCE, and uses them strategically. On a government-to-government
basis, SCP is used as an entry point to share Singapore's development experienceswith developing countries in general, which can lead to more specific countrytailored cooperation projects conducted by SCE. Meanwhile, SCE can work withboth government and non-government clients in developing countries.
A good example is the ongoing cooperation with Rwanda. President Kagame
has a strong desire to learn from Singapore, a small and resource-poor country
which, despite these handicaps, achieved impressive economic growth by building
human capability. Cooperation started with SPC-managed bilateral training
programs, which subsequently developed into various projects supported by SCE(e.g., workforce development and public sector capacity building, and social
security fund reform). Currently, SCE implements cooperation projects in China
as well as other countries in Asia, Middle East, and Africa.

6. Other visits
The mission visited the Center for Strategic Futures in the Strategic Policy
Office, under the Prime Minister's Office. Detached from daily administrative
works, this center conducts long-term scenario planning from national and global
perspectives and analyses chances and risks that may affect Singapore's future.
Their exercises are inputs to setting broad policy directions and determining
Singapore's future positioning. Similar divisions also exist in different ministries
to conduct scenario planning exercises in respective areas. These “future divisions”
work closely with research institutes, universities, and other stakeholders to collect29

information and facilitate vision-sharing. Singapore does not produce regularnational development plans (there was only one Five-Year Development Planin the 1960s). Instead, it does long-term vision formation and strategic planning
through ad hoc and task-based committees and councils (such as the Economic
Strategies Committee and the National Productivity and Continuing Education
Council mentioned above) and scenario planning by “future divisions.” Being asmall and open economy, the government considers it vital to retain flexibility
and ability to quickly respond to changing global environment. Flexible strategicplanning is possible thanks to high institutional capacity of civil servants whoare clean, purposeful, and able to translate policies into actions. The small size ofSingapore and its unique politics may also facilitate information sharing among all
stakeholders without political capture and serious conﬂicts of interest.
We exchanged views with the management team and faculty members of the
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.
At their invitation, Kenichi Ohno gave a public seminar on “Industrial Policy inAfrica: What and How East Asia Can Teach.” The mission also visited the Instituteof Southeast Asian Studies and exchanged views with its researchers.
The mission also visited Yokogawa Electric Asia Pte. Ltd, a Japanese company
producing made-to-order equipment for factory automation such as distribution
control systems, transmitters, measurement instruments, and power supply
units. The mission met with the management team as well as toured the factory.
Yokogawa started its Singapore operation in 1974. Since the late 1990s, Yokogawa
Singapore has been run by Singaporeans only. The company introduced QC
circles in the early 1980s, and there are currently 14 active QC circles with theparticipation of about 90% of the workforce. We were impressed with the strong
commitment of both management and workers to quality, cost reduction, andcontinuous improvement. Yokogawa Singapore won the 2010 Manufacturing
Excellency Award (EDB Award), and became the ﬁrst among Japanese companies
operating in Singapore to receive this honor.

30

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

Mission Schedule (29 Aug.- 3 Sep. 2010)
Mission Schedule (29 Aug.- 3 Sep. 2010)

Attachment 1
Attachment 1

1. Mission Members

1. Mission
Kenicni
OhnoMembers Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan
Professor, National
National Graduate
Graduate Institute
Institute forfor Policy
Policy Studies
Studies (GRIPS),(GRIPS), Tokyo,
Tokyo, Japan
Japan
Kenicni
Ohno
Professor,
Izumi
Ohno

Izumi Ohno
SayokoUesu
SayokoUesu
Daniel Kitaw

Daniel Kitaw
Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy
Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy
Truong Thi Nam Thang
Truong Thi Nam Thang
Le Manh HungLe Manh Hung
Nguyen Quang Vinh
Nguyen Quang Vinh
Kumiko Kasai
Kumiko Kasai

2. Mission Schedule
2. Mission
DATE Schedule
TIME
PM
DATE
1 Aug
29 Sun TIME
PM
1 Aug 29 Sun
AM
PM
PM
AM
2 Aug 30 Mon PM
2 Aug 30 Mon PM
PM
AM
PM
AM
3 Aug 31 Tue PM
AM
3 Aug 31 Tue PM
PM
PM
AM

4 Sep 1 Wed
4 Sep 1 Wed

5 Sep 2 Thu
5 Sep 2 Thu
6
6
7
7

Sep
Sep
Sep
Sep

3
3
4
4

Fri
Fri
Sat
Sat

AM
AM
PM
AM
PM
AM
PM
AM
AM
AM
PM

PM
AM
PM
AM
AM
PM
AM

Professor,Associate,
National Graduate
forInstitute
Policy Studies(GRIPS),Japan
Research
National Institute
Graduatefor Policy
StudiesTokyo,(GRIPS),Tokyo, Japan
Research
Graduate Institutefor Policy
Studies(GRIPS),Tokyo,
Japan
Associate Associate,
Professor, National
Dept. of MechanicalEngineering,
Addis
Ababa
University,
Ethiopia

Associate Professor,of Mechanical
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia
Researcher,
Vietnam Dept.
Development
ForumEngineering,(VDF) / GRIPS-NEU
JointUniversity,
Research Project,
Researcher,
Vietnam Development Forum (VDF) / GRIPS-NEU Joint Research Project,
VietnamHanoi,
Researcher,
VietnamDevelopment
Forum
(VDF)
/
GRIPS-NEU
Joint
Research
Project,
Hanoi, Vietnam
Researcher,
Vietnam Development Forum (VDF) / GRIPS-NEU Joint Research Project,
VietnamHanoi,
Director,
The Assistance Center for SME - North Vietnam (TAC Hanoi), Enterprise
VietnamHanoi,
Director, The AssistanceCenterfor SME- North Vietnam(TAC Hanoi),
Agency (EDA),
Ministryof Planningand Investment(MPI),Enterprise
VietnamDevelopment
SeniorOfficial,Agency
SME Development
Division,Enterprise
Develop ment
Agency(EDA),(EDA), Ministryof Planningand Investment(MPI),
VietnamDevelopment
Senior Official,
SME andDevelopment
Enterprise Develop ment Agency (EDA),
of Planning
InvestmentDivision,(MPI), Vietnam
Ministry
SME
PolicyImplenentation
Advisor/JICA
Expert,SME
Development
Division,Enterprise
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), Vietnam
SME
Policy Implenentation
Advisor/ JICA
Expert, and
SMEInvestment
Development
Division,Enterprise
Agency (EDA),
Ministryof Planning(MPI),
VietnamDevelopment
Development Agency (EDA), Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), Vietnam

ACTIVITY
Arrival
ACTIVITY
Short
Arrivalintroductory meeting
Instituteof Southeast
Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Short introductory
meeting
Lunch meetingwith mgt.
teamand professors
Instituteof Southeast
Asian
Studies(ISEAS) at Lee Kuan Yew School (LKYS) / NUS
Prof.
Wengwith
Tat, mgt.
LKYS
LunchHuimeetingteam and professors at Lee Kuan Yew School (LKYS) / NUS
JICA
Representative
Office at LKYS
Prof. Hui
Weng Tat, LKYS
PublicRepresentative
lecture at LKYS
JICA
Office at LKYS
Planning
andManpower
Public lecture at LKYS Policy Div., Ministry of Manpower (MOM)
Industry Division,
Ministryof Trade
Industry of(MTI)
Planning
and Policy
Div.,& Ministry
Manpower (MOM)
Manpower
Japanese
Chamberof Commerce
Industry(MTI)(JCCI)
Industry Division,
Ministryof Tradeand& Industry
Industry Skills& Planning
Office, Workforce
Development
Agency (WDA)
Japanese
Chamberof Commerceand Industry(JCCI)
DinnerProf.
Khuong Minh
VuWorkforce(LKYS) Development Agency (WDA)
Industrywith
Skills& Planning
Office,HumanCapital,Planning,
Strategic
Planning,
Energy&Chemical/ Japan Desk,
Dinner with Prof. Khuong Minh Vu (LKYS)
Human
Capital,Planning,
Strategic
Board(EDB)Planning, Energy & Chemical / Japan Desk,
Economic
Development
Technical
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Board (EDB)
Economic Cooperation
DevelopmentDirectorate,
Nanyang
TechnicalPolytechnic
Cooperation(NYP)
Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Prof. PangPolytechnic
Eng Fong, (NYP)
Singapore Management University (SMU)
NanyangEnterprise
Research& EnterpriseDiv., MinistryProf. Pang Development,
Eng Fong, Singapore
Management
University(SMU)of Trade and Industry (MTI)
Centerfor
Strategic
Futures,Public &ServiceDiv., Div.,
PrimeMinistry
Minister's
Office and(PMO)
Enterprise Development, ResearchEnterpriseof Trade
Industry (MTI)JETROSingapore
Center for
StrategicRepresentative
Futures, PublicOfficeService Div., Prime Minister's Office (PMO)
Combined
SessionRepresentativewith ProductivityOffice
Programme Office, SPRING and Singapore
JETRO
Singapore
Combined Session
with Productivity
Programme Office, SPRING and Singapore
Productivity
Association
(SPA)
Plant
Visit toAssociation
Yokogawa Electric
Productivity(SPA) Asia Pte Ltd
Plant
Visit to Yokogawa Electric Asia Pte Ltd
Departure
Departure

Note:
Among
Note: eight members, Kenichi Ohno, Izumi Ohno, Sayoko Uesu (GRIPS Development Forum) andNguyenThi XuanThuy andTruongOhno,
Thi NamThang(VietnamDevelopment
Forum)
are the members
theAmong eight
members,
KenichiIzumi
Ohno,
SayokoUesu (GRIPS
Development
Forum)ofand
JICA-commissioned
study
Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy
andmission.
Truong Thi Nam Thang (Vietnam Development Forum) are the members of the
JICA-commissioned study mission.

31

Attachment 2

Organizations/Persons Visited
The Government of Singapore
Organization
Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Ministry of Manpower (MOM)
Economic Development Board (EDB)

Workforce Development Agency (WDA)
Public Service Division,
Prime Minister's Office (PMO)Standards, Productivity, and Innovation
Board (SPRING)
Singapore Productivity Association (SPA)

Universities / Research Institutes

Organization
Lee Kuan Yew School (LKYS),
National University of Singapore (NUS)

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies(ISEAS)
Nanyang Polytechnic (NYP)
Singapore Management University (SMU)

Japanese Organizations in Singapore

Organization
Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA)
Japanese Chamber of Commerce andIndustry, Singapore (JCCI)JETRO Singapore Representative Office

Japanese Company in Singapore

Organization
Yokogawa Electric Asia Pte Ltd

32

Name
Gaurav Keerthi
Tan Hual Tze
Cheong Wei Yang
Benjamin KW Koh
Koh Tim Fook
Denise Cheng
Mindy Low
Jane Lim Hui ChenJo Law Jiu Rong
Kimberly Quek
Matthew Lee
Vincent Kwek
Andre Heng
Anil Das
Chai Yee Yuen Lionel
Hee Gin Siang Kelvin
Aaron Maniam
Bernard Toh
Woon Kin Chung
Desmond Choo
Loo Ya Lee
Low Hock Meng
Chew Poh Hong

Position
Senior Assistant Director, Industry Division
Senior Assistant Director, Resource Division
Deputy Director, Industry Division
Deputy Director, Research & Enterprise Division
Director, Technical Cooperation Directorate
Assistant Director, Technical Cooperation Directorate
Technical Cooperation Officer, Technical Cooperation Directorate
Deputy Director, Manpower Planning & Policy Division
Assistant Manager, Manpower Planning & Policy Division
Director, Human Capital Division
Head, Planning
Assistant Head, Planning
Senior Officer, Energy & Chemical/Japan Desk
Senior Director, Industry Skills & Planning Office
Assistant Director, Industry Skills & Planning OfficeSenior Manager, Industry Skills & Planning Office
Head, Center for Strategic Futures / Deputy Director, Strategic Policy Office
Economist
Executive Director
Manager, Productivity Programme Office
Manager, Productivity Programme Office
Executive Director
Senior Manager, Marketing & Public Relations

Name
Stavros N. Yiannouka
Eduardo Araral
Charles Adams
Darryl S. L. Jarvis
Hui Weng Tat
Khuong Minh Vu
Wong Kang Jet
Toby Carroll
Omkar Shrestha
Sanchita Basu Das
Aekapol Chongvilaivan
Edward HoJohn Tan
Cher Thon Jiang
Pang Eng Fong

Position
Executive Vice-Dean
Assistant Dean (Academic Affairs) & Assistant Professor
Visiting Professor
Associate Professor
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor
Director of Strategic PlanningResearch Fellow
Visiting Senior Research Fellow
Research Fellow, Researcher for Economic Affairs, ASEAN Studies Centre
Fellow, Regional Economic Studies
Deputy Principal/Development
Deputy Principal/Technology
Director/Office for International Students
Professor

Name
Takaaki Oiwa
Michiyo Morohashi
Junichi Azuma
Masamitsu Okada
Wendy Hwee
Shigeki Maeda
Eiji Hisatomi
Masamichi Yamaguchi

Position
JICA Senior Fellow/JICA Representative in Singapore
Project Coordinator
Secretary General
Management Consultant for Japanese Enterprises
CoordinatorManaging Director
Deputy Managing Director
Senior EPA Advisor

Name
Lai Ah Keow
Chua Seng Kian
Clement Yeo
Yvonne Tong

Position
President
General Manager, Head, Manufacturing Center
General Manager, Production Control Centre
Assistant Manager, Managing Director OfficeSource

Road to Recovery -Singapore's Journey through the Global Crisis , 2010

National University of Singapore

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

33

OthersPioneers Once More -The Singapore Public Services 1959-2009 , 2010

"Learning by Exporting and High-tech Capital Deepening in Singapore Manufacturing Industries, 1974-2006"
Japanese Chambers of Commerce and Salary Survey Report 2010 (Japanese)
Industry
Personal data on Mr.Okada
Construction Productivity and Capability Fund (CPCF)
Construction Engineering Capability Development (CED) Programme

Economic Strategies Committee

Workforce Development Agency"FDI, Finaincial Constraints, and Productivity䠖 Firm Level Study in Vietnam"

Sigapore Competitiveness Report 2009

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,

Heard Work: Stories of How EDB Steered the Singapore Economy from 1961 into the 21st Century, 2002

Title

Singapore Cooperation Programme Training Calendar 2010-2011
DVD: Singapore, a Global Citizen
PPT: Nanyang Polytechnic
NYP network, 2010, Issue 44 & 45
DVD: Prospectu䡏 2010-2011
Annual Report 09/10
Revolutionising Electronics
Nanotechnology in Singpore
Singapore - The Biopolis of Asia
Precision Engineering
PPT: Singapore Story

PPT: Singapore's Labour Market and Manpower Strategies
Annual Report 2009
Government Assistance Programmes for SMEs
Spring News August 2010
PPT: The Singaporee Productivity Movement
Productivity @ Work
Achieve more with less through SME-PRO
DVD: Annual Report 2008
Success, A Career Kit for PMETs
The Key to Building Capabilities, an Employer's Handbook
Workforce Skills Qualifications System
Report of the Economic Strategies Committee: High Skilled People, Innovative Economy, Distinctive Global City,
February 2010.
Newsletter of the Lee Kuan Yew School, Issue 07 2010

SPRING / Singapore Productivity
Associaion

Ministry of Manpower

Economic Development Board

Nanyang Polytechnic

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

List of Information Collected

Chua Mui Hoong /Straits Times Press

Christian Ketels, Ashish Lall,
Neo Boon Siong / Asia
Institute
Sanchita Basu Das / ISEAS
Shandre M. Thangavelu,
Christopher Findlay, Aekapol
Chongvilaivan
Aekapol Chongvilaivan

Lead Author: Chan Chin
Bock / EDB Singapore

Authors / Publishers

Attachment 3

1. Singapore̶Productivity and Policy Competency

2. Korea－Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers(November 22-26, 2010)

An international team visited Seoul during November 22-26, 2010 to study
South Korea's experiences in industrial development and draw lessons for otherdeveloping countries including Ethiopia and Vietnam1. The mission members were
Prof. Kenichi Ohno, Prof. Izumi Ohno (GRIPS Development Forum); Mr. Berihu
Assefa Gebrehiwot (GRIPS and Ethiopia Development Research Institute); Ms.
Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy (Vietnam Development Forum); and Ms. Truong Thi Chi
Binh (Ministry of Industry and Trade, Vietnam).
Specifically, the mission studied: (i) Koreaʼs economic and industrial policy
making processes in the past and at present; (ii) industrial policy tools andapproaches, especially for promoting small and medium enterprises (SMEs);and (iii) Korea's ODA policy with a focus on its recent initiative for compiling
Korean development experiences and sharing knowledge with developing
countries. We had meetings with the government ministries and agencies aswell as research institutes and universities (see attachments 1-3 for the mission
details, organizations/persons visited, and information collected). We would liketo express our deep appreciation to all organizations and individuals who kindly
received us and shared valuable information with us. Below are main ﬁndings ofthe mission.

1. The policy making process in South Korea
1-1. Five-Year Economic Development Plans (from the 1960s to theearly 90s)
Starting from the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962, the1This mission has been commissioned by JICA to compile information on industrial policies inselected East Asian countries for the policy learning of other developing countries. We visited
Singapore in August/September 2010 and plan to visit Taiwan in early 2011.

34

2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers

Korean government formulated seven Five-Year Economic Development Plans
between the 1960s and 90s (until 1996, just before the Asian Financial Crisis or theso-called “IMF” Crisis of 1997-98). These Plans made critical contributions to therealization of rapid growth through building a national consensus on the necessityof economic development effort and setting its major directions.
The Economic Planning Board (EPB)2, created in 1961, was a super-ministryequipped with strategic functions such as development planning, national budget
management, and management of aid, foreign capital (borrowing), and technology.
Headed by Deputy Prime Minister who chaired the Economic Ministers' Council
and directly reported to the President, EPB had authority above other ministries
and agencies. Policy research institutes, especially the Korea Development
Institute (KDI) established in 1971, supported EPB's development planning.
Within EPB, the Bureau of Planning was charged with drafting policies incollaboration with KDI, which provided assessment of international environmentand domestic capabilities, resource availability, growth and other macroeconomic
scenarios. Sectoral plans were prepared by relevant ministries and included in theFive-Year Economic Development Plan. Preparation of each Five-Year Economic
Development Plan took two to three years.
Notable features of Korea ' s development planning were sharp strategic
focus based on the selectivity and concentration principle, as well as adaptive
implementation accompanied by annual action planning and performancemonitoring. Being a resource-poor country, Korea in the 1960s and 70s focusedon three priorities: (i) export promotion to ameliorate chronic trade deﬁcits; (ii)industrialization by mobilizing human resources; and (iii) wise use of foreign
capital and technology. Five-Year Economic Development Plans set targets
for economic growth and mobilized national resources and capabilities towardachieving them. In implementation, action plans were formulated and thenconstantly adjusted in response to shifting domestic and foreign environments.
Korea thus had a mechanism for ﬂexible and adaptive implementation of the Planrather than rigidly following pre-deﬁned targets and policy tools.
2

In 1994, EPB and the Ministry of Finance were merged into the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which was later separated into the Ministry of Planning and Budget and the Ministry of
Finance in 1999. In 2008, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance was formed by combining both
functions.

35

In addition to annual action plans, there were two important monitoring devices:
the Monthly Council for Export Promotion and the Monthly Council for Monitoring
Economic Trend, both of which were chaired by President Park Chung-hee andattended by key government officials, business leaders, and representatives offinancial institutions. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry provided secretariat
functions for the former council which carried out measures to eliminate impediments
to export growth in speciﬁc sectors while EPB provided similar functions for the lattercouncil which analyzed and monitored macroeconomic performance indicators suchas growth, export, and investments.
The role of the Korean government in development planning changed over time.
In the 1970s, which was the period of Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive,the government intervened directly in the market for the execution of the Planalthough the degree of official involvement varied among industries3. From the
1980s onward, as private businesses grew and economic liberalization proceeded,
the government began to play a less direct role. Korea's development planning
ended with the seventh Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1996.

1-2. Presidential Committees (at present)
In present Korea, Presidential Committees serve as a key instrument for economic
policy making. Under the presidential system, every President establishes a small
number of Presidential Committees (up to 4 or 5) to concretize, implement, andmonitor the priority agenda during his ﬁve-year term. Each Presidential Committee
is headed by a person who has expertise in the chosen subject and enjoys strong
confidence of the President as well as secretarial support by staff seconded fromvarious ministries.
President Lee Myung-bak, who assumed ofﬁce in February 2008, established four
Presidential Committees: (i) Future and Vision; (ii) Green Growth; (iii) National
Competitiveness; and (iv) Nation Branding. These committees operate only during
his presidential term. The most important among them is the Presidential Council
3

The promotional law targeted six strategic industries including industrial machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, automobiles, steel, and petrochemicals. Among these, the government took
full responsibility for initial investment in the steel industry. Meanwhile, the private sector
took the initiative to develop other industries such as electronics, automobiles, and shipbuilding, with the government playing a facilitating role by, for example, assisting with ﬁnance andtechnology acquisition.

36

2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers

for Future and Vision (PCFV), established in May 2008, which is an advisory bodyto the President for establishing national strategies and setting policy priorities (i.e.,national strategies and unity, diplomatic and security issues, environment, energy
and science, industry and economy, and “soft power” leadership). It is chaired by
Prof. Seung Jun-kwak, Dean of Korea University, and has 26 members drawn fromacademia, NGOs, legal experts, and business leaders. Vice Ministers also attend
the Council. The Council meets on a need basis without any ﬁxed schedule. PCFVis supported by the Executive Ofﬁce of the Council, a secretariat of about 30 staff
comprised of seconded ofﬁcials from various government ministries and agencies.
The secretariat is charged with drafting of policy documents, inter-ministerial
coordination, and related administrative works.
The Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) was established in
February 2009 at the recommendation of the Presidential Council for Future andVision. PCGG is co-chaired by the Prime Minister and Dr. Kim Hyung-kook, aneminent scholar representing the non-government sector4. By November 2009,
the Committee met six times which were presided by the President except in one
occasion. PCGG adopted the National Strategy for Green Growth as the highestlevel government plan on Green Growth, and set policy objectives for 2050 and
performance indicators for 2020 in 10 key policy agenda points. It also adopted theFive-Year Green Growth Plan by reviving the past practice of ﬁve-year planning
cycles. This is because Green Growth5 (environmental agenda) is an area where
government must play a proactive role even though the present Korean economy
is driven by the private sector. A large number of government ministries andagencies and public research institutions participated in developing the Green
Growth strategy and its five-year implementation plan. All central and local
government institutions are required to develop their own Green Growth Action
Plans which must be approved by PCGG.
4

The operation of PCGG is similar to that of PCFV. PCGG consists of 47 members including
ministers and representatives from private stakeholders. It is supported by a secretariat of 60
staff comprised of seconded ofﬁcials from over 14 government agencies and public and private
institutions (see Presidential Committee on Green Growth, Green Growth Korea’s Choice: Progress Report 2008-09, p.10).
5The objective of the national vision on “Green Growth” is to tackle the issue of climate change,
environmental degradation and the depletion of energy resources. Unlike past approaches,
however, green growth puts more emphasis on sustainable growth while reducing greenhousegas emissions (Green Growth Korea’s Choice: Progress Report 2008-09).

37

Presidential Committees (Lee Myung-bak Administration)

One of the ten key policy agenda of the national strategy for Green Growth
is ODA-related, namely, “ becoming a role-model of green growth for theinternational community.” To this end, performance indicators are set to increase
the proportion of Green ODA from 11% in 2009 to 20% by 2013 and to 30% by
2020. The Korean government has also proposed to the OECD/DAC to introduce
new ODA classification to measure and encourage donor support to the sectors
related to “Green ODA.”
Apart from regular Presidential Committees lasting for the five-year term, theKorean government set up the Presidential Committee for the G20 Summit inNovember 2009, a special committee for preparing the Seoul G20 Summit which
took place in November 11-12, 2010. It was chaired by Dr. Sakong Il, who servedin the Ofﬁce of the President as Special Economic Advisor to the President fromMarch 2008 to February 2009 and then led the G20 Korea Coordinating Committee
in the Ofﬁce of the President, formed earlier in 2009 and the precursor to the current

38

2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers

committee6. This Presidential Committee was temporary but its activities wereintense and received much attention. A separate building was reserved for thisPresidential Committee, a large number of ofﬁcials were mobilized as its secretariat,
and various consultation meetings and working groups were organized involving
academia, NGOs, donor agencies.

2. Small and medium enterprise policy (also see attachment 4)
The mission asked many SME experts and ofﬁcials about the effectiveness of
SME policy in Korea. Their opinions were divided, with some seeing positive
developments while at least one expert bluntly put it as a “failure.” The majority
seem to agree that the results have been mixed, policy consistency was not
maintained, and the performance of Korean SMEs was not as good as theircounterparts in Japan or Taiwan. However, there are some bright spots suchas the emergence of creative IT companies after the “IMF Crisis” and recent
exports of Korean parts and components to Japan assisted by the Korea TradeInvestment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). Korea also provides intellectual aid to
UAE, Kazakhstan, and other countries in setting up SME policy and institutions,industrial promotion agencies, and so on.
At end 2007, manufacturing SMEs (employment size from 5 to 299) were 118,506
in number and occupied 99.5% (establishments), 76.9% (employment), 48.7%(production), and 50.6% (value added), respectively, in the total manufacturingsector of Korea.
Korean SME policy has gone through various stages. Its goals have also
been varied, combining job and income generation for the poor, protecting andstrengthening suppliers of parts and components to large corporations, andcreation of innovative and independent venture businesses, even to this date. It is
our impression that Korean programs to support SMEs are more numerous andmore complex than Japanese.
In the 1960s the basic policy framework was created which included the Korea
Federation of Small and Medium Business (1962), KOTRA (1962), the Kookmin
Bank ( 1963 ), the Basic Law on SMEs ( 1966 ), the SME Policy Deliberation
6

Dr. Sakong held a number of key positions in the government, including Minister of Finance (1987-88), Senior
Secretary to the President for Economic Affairs (1983-87), and Senior Counselor to the Minister of EPB (1982).

39

Committee (1967), the SME Department of the Ministry of Commerce, and manyothers. Many of these tools were modeled after Japanese policies and institutions.
In the 1970s and 80s the main policy objective was protecting weak SME
suppliers from the exploitation of big chaebols and boosting their competitivenessand productivity. The 1970s was the period of state-led HCI drive, and it wasthought that Korea needed SME producers of competitive parts and components
to import-substitute industrial inputs. Policies to “ systematize ” SMEs (havestable business contracts with big buyers) and ensure fairness in their relations
were introduced. Financial supports were enhanced with credit guarantee (1976),
technology credit fund (1989), and so on. Highly interventionist measures werealso used to narrow the gap between strong chaebols and weak SMEs. Mandatory
loan ratios to SMEs (30-40%, later 35-55%) were imposed on commercial banks
and regional banks, and 23 industrial sectors were first prioritized (1979), thenexclusively reserved (1982), for SMEs in which no big companies could enter.
After the IMF Crisis of 1997-98, policy weight shifted toward creation ofautonomous venture businesses with creativity. As a result, a cluster of IT venturesappeared in Seoul's Kangnam area and SMEs began to engage in export andoutward FDI. In the 1990s annual outward FDI averaged only a few thousandin number (registration basis) and $1-5 billion in disbursed investment but theseincreased to over ten thousand and $23 billion by 2008, of which SMEs accounted
for $5.9 billion (before declining in 2009 due to the global financial crisis).
Outward FDI includes both suppliers moving outside Korea and independent
businesses unrelated to big corporations.
Currently, SME policy is designed at the Small and Medium Business
Administration (SMBA, located in Daejeon City) and implemented mainly by
the Small and Medium Business Corporation (SBC). SMBA covers all SMEs,
small businesses, and micro enterprises. There are different promotion policies
and measures for manufacturing SMEs and others. SBC targets manufacturing
SMEs only. SBC was established in 1979 and has 23 regional ofﬁces, four training
institutes, and the Korea Business Development Centers. SBC 's supports are
divided into ﬁnancial programs and non-ﬁnancial programs. The former includes
venture business start-up, loan for commercializing R&D results, new growthindustry promotion, industrial structural adjustment, management stabilization,
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) issuance, and assistance for small merchants and40

2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers

industrialists. The latter includes consulting, training, marketing assistance, global
cooperation, and information services. SBC and KOTRA cooperate to assist SMEs
to export or invest abroad in their respective ﬁelds (SBC supporting them inside
Korea and KOTRA outside).
Notably, in Korea, financial and non-financial support are integrated in one
agency (SBC). This policy configuration is different from Japan or Malaysia,
where SMEs of all sectors, not just manufacturing, are supported while various
promotion measures are implemented by different agencies and organizations.
More than one SME experts remarked that one cause of inconsistency andineffectiveness of Korea's SME policy was politicization. Politicians and interest
groups use SME support programs to rally support and win votes in elections,leading to multiplication and overlapping of similar measures with no strict
selection criteria or economic reasoning. Korean SMEs may have good potential
but policy has not been able to realize it fully. In this sense, Korean SME policy
may have some resemblance to Japan's agricultural policy.
Standard productivity tools (5S, six sigma, etc.) are used in supporting SMEs in
Korea. However, terms such as “kaizen” and “shindan” are not known even among
the SME experts and officials whom we met. While many Japanese ideas were
imported into Korea, these Japanese terms were not used as drivers of productivity
movement.

3. ODA policy making and institutional framework
Korean ODA, through both bilateral and multilateral channels, is currently
about US$0.8 billion (2008 data, net disbursement basis), or 0.09% of Gross
National Income (GNI). Although this is still small in absolute volume, there is a
growing sense of global responsibility among the Koreans. In an effort to increase
its global contribution as an emerging donor, the government plans to triple ODA
by 2015 and raise the ODA/GNI ratio to 0.25%. President Lee Myung-bak himself
declared that Korea through international cooperation would become a guiding
light for developing countries in the 21st century. A symbolic example in thisregard is an intensive advance effort to mainstream the development agenda in thelatest G20 Summit in Korea.
Similar to (past) Japan, Korea has a dual structure of ODA policy formulation

41

and implementation. Two key ministries charged with ODA are: (i) the Ministryof Strategy and Finance (MOSF), which overseas concessional loans administeredby the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF, located in the ExportImport Bank of Korea) and contributions to international ﬁnancial institutions suchas the World Bank, ADB, AfDB, EBRD; and (ii) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MOFAT), which has authority over grant aid and technical cooperation
implemented by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and othergovernment ministries and agencies as well as contributions to the UN and othermultilateral agencies. EDCF and KOICA are the main implementing agencies ofbilateral aid7.
Korean ODA: Past and Future(Unit: million USD, net disbursement basis)
Korea's ODA: 2004-2008
Classiﬁcation
2004
Total ODA
423.3
Bilateral Aid
330.8
Grants
212.1
Loans
118.7
Multilateral Aid
92.6
ODA/GNI (%)
0.06

ODA Scale-up Plan
2005
752.3
463.3
318.0
145.3
289.0
0.10

2006
455.3
376.1
259.0
117.1
79.2
0.05

2007
699.1
493.5
361.3
132.2
205.6
0.07

2008
803.8
540.7
370.2
170.6
263.1
0.09

2012

2015

0.15

0.25

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Korea's Development Cooperation.”

Korea is widely known for its economic “ miracle ” and its successfultransformation from an aid recipient to an emerging donor in a relatively shortperiod. In November 2009, Korea joined the OECD Development AssistanceCommittee (DAC). On November 11-12, 2010, it organized the G20 Summit inSeoul and will host the OECD's Fourth High-Level Forum for Aid Effectivenessin Busan a year later. The Lee Myung-bak administration regards ODA as a
key instrument to raise Korea's soft power and brand-image, and took a strong
initiative to incorporate the development agenda in the G20 Summit which led
to the “Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth” and the “Multi-Year7

In 1965, Korea began to provide ODA in the spirit of South-South cooperation by inviting
trainees from other developing countries. In 1982, it initiated the International Development
Exchange Program (IDEP). In 1987, EDCF was established under MOSF to implement concessional loan programs, and in 1991, KOICA was created under the supervision of MOFAT
by consolidating diverse technical cooperation and grant aid programs.

42

2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers

Action Plan on Development”.
Domestically, the Korean government has also started to enhance its
institutional framework for providing ODA. This includes the introduction of
the International Development Cooperation Basic Law (enacted in January 2010,
effective from June 2010) which stipulates the fundamental ideals, objectives,and principles of Korea's ODA. Prior to this, the Committee on International
Development Cooperation (CIDC) was established in 2006 to improve policy
coordination8. CIDC is the highest-level ODA policy council chaired by the Prime
Minister with the participation of about 25 members (6-7 private-sector members,
plus ministers of concerned ministries). It meets about twice a year and deliberates
key ODA policy directions such as priority countries and sectors and the ratios ofloans and grants. In 2010, 26 countries have been designated as strategic partner(recipient) countries for Korea's ODA (the list of countries is not published).
Below CIDC, there are a Working Committee and a number of sub-committees
consisting of MOSF and MOFAT officials, academia, NGOs, etc. These
committees and subcommittees are charged with formulation of country assistancestrategies, ODA evaluation, and other operational matters requiring holistic
approach (see the ﬁgure below). Moreover, every ﬁve years, MOSF and MOFAT
are expected to draft the “Basic Plan” for ODA and submit it to CIDC via the
Working Committee. To improve efﬁciency and transparency of ODA, CIDC has
been given the mandate for ex-post evaluation of ODA policy and projects, andmust submit an ODA evaluation report to the National Assembly by June 30 everyyear.

4. The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP)The Korean miracle in economic and political development has drawn
admiration and strong interest from developing countries. Recognizing its global
responsibility and comparative advantage of having a relatively recent memoryof development9, the Korean government is working hard to become a bridge
8

For the details of CIDC, see “Koreaʼs Development Cooperation Experience” by Dr. Ahn
Eungho, Country Research Ofﬁce, Korea EXIM-Bank. This paper was presented at the Jeju
Peace Institute-Friedrich Nauman Foundation for Liberty Joint Workshop, held on Oct. 18-20,
2010.
9Many of our interviewees stressed that, unlike Japanese or Westerners, Korean ofﬁcials and43

between traditional and emerging donors as well as donor and partner countries.
As a new and still small ODA provider, Korea has clearly highlighted andinstitutionalized its intellectual aid as the “Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP).”
Korea's ODA Policy-Making Structure

KSP activities are carried out through two channels: (i) MOSF and KDI; and (ii)
MOFAT and KOICA. Regarding the former, KDI receives the program fund fromMOSF and then hires Korean and local consultants for their work and supports
their visits to and from partner countries. The latter is conducted by KOICA
as part of bilateral ODA. Both emphasize the knowledge sharing of Korean
development experiences tailored to each developing country.
KSP by MOSF/KDI started in 2004 and contains two main activities: (i)systematization of Korean development experiences; and (ii) policy consultation
with developing partner countries. KSP initially tended to focus on “knowledgetransfer” of what Korea did in the past, but more recently, its emphasis has shiftedto “knowledge sharing” which means demand-driven and tailor-made consultation
experts have gone through initial poverty and subsequent rapid growth so they can understandwhat poverty is and share their lessons with other countries from their own experiences.

44

2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers

and joint problem-solving with individual partner countries. Currently, these arecarried out by the Center for International Development (CID) of KDI10.
Regarding the systematization of Korean development experiences, overthe next three years, MOSF plans to create about 100 modules (case studies)of specific policy measures and tools (e.g., Export Promotion Fund, Export
Promotion Committee). Each module will have about 40-50 pages in English
and contain background, options, decision making process, policy content,
assessment, conclusion, etc. In 2010, compilation of 25 modules is underway with
KDI assuming overall responsibility for supervision, coordination, and quality
assurance. Some of these modules are produced by KDI itself (primarily in theareas of economic development planning, macroeconomic management, export
promotion, and development financing) while other modules are assigned toother research institutes and consultants (increasingly through a bidding process).
Discussion will be general and examples will be drawn not just from Korea but
also from other countries, since Korean policies cannot be copied directly to othercountries with different contexts (however, this intention by KDI does not seem tobe completely shared by all concerned ofﬁcials and experts yet).
Policy consultation began in 1982 when Korea offered seminars and tours
for developing countries (under IDEP). These activities were consolidated andinstitutionalized as KSP in 2004. Policy consultations are normally conducted in a
one-year project cycle consisting of demand identiﬁcation, policy research, policy
consultation, and monitoring and evaluation11. In the ﬁrst stage, MOSF conducts
demand survey through Korean embassies in about 20 partner countries. Based on
its results, Korea short-lists countries with high demand for intellectual support,
political will, etc. and visits are organized to hear details from these countries. If adecision is made to initiate policy consultation, a joint team is organized (usuallyconsisting of 4-5 experts from the Korean side and relevant ofﬁcials from the other10

During 2004-09, KSP was carried out by various units within KDI̶with the Center of Economic Cooperation (CEC) of the KDI School of Public Policy and Management providing
education and training, and the Office of Development Cooperation (ODECO) conducting
policy research and consultation. In 2010, CID was established to integrate these activities (aswell as North Korea Research Division).
11
Examples of policy consultations include Vietnam (support to Socio-Economic Development
Strategy 2011-2020); Uzbekistan (development of Free Economic Zones); Indonesia (development of policy solutions for four high-priority areas); Cambodia (microﬁnance and public-private partnership development); and Kazakhstan (industrial-innovative development plan).

45

side). The Korean team visits the partner country a few times and conducts policy
research and consultation, and the counterparts are invited to Korea for workshops
and visiting relevant institutions, factories, industrial zones, etc. In this process,(retired) senior ofﬁcials who have hands-on experiences in Korean development
are mobilized to head policy dialogues. After monitoring and evaluation, theproject may continue into the second or even the third year with additional topics
selected by the partner country.
The other channel for KSP is provided by MOSF/KOICA which started
more recently. An example is policy consultation for industrial development of
Algeria implemented by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade(KIET) during 2007-09. This KOICA/KIET support was initiated at the request of
Algerian President to former Korean President Roh Moo-hyun on the occasionof his visit to Algeria. 13 KIET experts were mobilized to conduct analyses on
six industries (petrochemical, iron and steel, IT, automotive, textile and apparel,and pharmaceutical) and six policy issues (export promotion, FDI attraction,technology, regional development, human resource, and SMEs). The project
included eight (or more) visits and ﬁve workshops. Main counterparts were seniorand middle-managers of the Ministry of Industry and Investment Promotion of theAlgerian government.
To link KSP more effectively with KOICA's technical cooperation on the
ground, the KOICA Research Ofﬁce in 2010 proposed the “Korean Development
Cooperation Model (KDCM)”12 which selected 10 primary sub-sectors and 13
general sub-sectors as priority areas for KOICA's KSP. Prioritization was based on
supply-side factors (Korea's experience, technical competency, complementarity
with other donors, etc.) and demand-side factors (needs of partner countries,
applicability, alignment with MDGs, etc.) Among sub-sectors, TVET,
e-government, economic development strategy, integrated rural development,
and supply of stable electricity scored high as Korea's priority areas. Beginningin 2011, KOICA plans to integrate KDCM into its operations gradually in the 26
strategic partner countries using country assistance strategies and sector strategies
as key vehicles. To this end, KOICA hopes to strengthen the program-based
approach and conduct a wide spectrum of consultations with various stakeholders
12“The Korean Development Cooperation Model,” by Woojin Jung (Research Ofﬁce), publishedby KOICA, 2010.

46

2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers(governments, NGOs, research institutes, etc.)
In our meetings, several experts noted that the two channels of KSP (MOSF/
KDI and MOTFA/KOICA) are implemented separately without coordination.
Since KSP hires Korean and local consultants under the MOSF-supported program
fund, the traditional division of labor between grant aid/technical cooperation(MOFAT) and loan aid (MOSF) is becoming less clear in KSP, as the turf of
MOFAT/KOICA is increasingly shared by MOSF/KDI.
Despite this problem, KSP is clearly a focal point for Korean development
cooperation and expanded vigorously for projecting the Korean voice to therest of the world. Together with Green Growth initiative mentioned above,
knowledge sharing is regarded as Korea's strategic attempt to lead global agenda
and design global rules. While Japan has also conducted intellectual cooperation
with many developing countries in various forms and in large quantity̶policy
dialogues, drafting sectoral or regional development plans, joint research, industry
surveys, seminars and lectures, study tours and training in Japan, etc.̶Japaneseeffort in this area is less documented and institutionalized, less linked to global
development architecture, and therefore less well known to the rest of the world.

5. OtherDuring this mission, we did not have time to visit SMBA (located in DaejeonCity) which is responsible for overall SME policy and support. Nor did we havesufﬁcient time to visit Saemaul Undong Center (HQ located in Seoul) and Saemaul
Undong Central Training Institute (located in Sungnam City). Many experts
emphasized the contribution of Saemaul Movement (or New Village Movement),
launched in 1970, to the modernization of Korea's rural economy̶not only
through community-based infrastructure and rural-livelihood improvement
projects, but also through mindset and attitudinal changes of the people. “Can-Do
spirit,” a collective confidence-building effort, was encouraged, and three main
values̶diligence, self-help, and cooperation̶were promoted across the country.
Although Saemaul Movement took place primarily in the rural context, suchnational movement may parallel Singapore's Productivity Movement in the urban
context. These aspects deserve further investigation.

47

Attachment 1

1. Mission Members

Mission Details (21- 27 Nov. 2010)
Mission Details (21- 27 Nov. 2010)

Attachment 1

Kenicni
OhnoMembers
1. Mission

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Kenicni
Ohno
Izumi Ohno

Professor,
Professor, National
National Graduate
Graduate Institute
Institute forfor Policy
Policy Studies
Studies (GRIPS),(GRIPS), Tokyo,
Tokyo, Japan
Japan

Researcher,
National
Graduate
Institute
PolicyStudies(GRIPS),Tokyo,
Japan andProfessor, National
Graduate
InstituteforforPolicyStudies(GRIPS),Tokyo,
Japan
Izumi Ohno
Berihu Assefa Gebrehiwot
Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Researcher, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan andBerihu Assefa Gebrehiwot Researcher, Vietnam Development Forum (VDF) / GRIPS-NEU Joint Research Project,
Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy
Hanoi, Vietnam
Researcher, Vietnam Development Forum (VDF) / GRIPS-NEU Joint Research Project,
Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy
Director,
Supporting Industry Enterprise Development Center, Institute for Industry Strategy
Hanoi,
VietnamTruong Thi Chi BINH
and Policy, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Hanoi Vietnam
Director, Supporting Industry Enterprise Development Center, Institute for Industry Strategy
Truong Thi Chi BINH
and Policy, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Hanoi Vietnam

2. Mission Schedule
DATE

TIME
2. Mission Schedule
DATE
1 Nov
21 Sun1 Nov 21 Sun
2 Nov 22 Mon
2 Nov 22 Mon
3 Nov 23 Tue
3 Nov 23 Tue
4 Nov 24 Wed
4 Nov 24 Wed
5 Nov 25 Thu
5 Nov 25 Thu
6 Nov 26 Fri
26 SatFri
6 Nov 27
7
7 Nov 27 Sat

AM
TIME
PM
AM
AM
PM
PM
AM
PM
PM
AM
PM
PM
AM
AM
PM
PM
AM
PM
PM
AM
PM
PM
AM
PM
PM
AM
PM
PM
AM
PM
PM
PM

ACTIVITY
ACTIVITY
ArrivalKorea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)
ArrivalKorea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)
Dr. Thomas Kalinowski, Assistant Professor, Ewha Womans University
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Korea Development Institute (KDI)
Dr. Thomas Kalinowski, Assistant Professor, Ewha Womans University
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET)
Korea Development Institute (KDI)
Korea Institute for Development Strategy (KDS)
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET)
Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE)
Korea Institute for Development Strategy (KDS)
Prof. Eun Mee Kim, Ewha Womans University
Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE)
Korea Small Business Institute (KOSBI)
Prof. Eun Mee Kim, Ewha Womans University
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET)
Korea Small Business Institute (KOSBI)
Small Business Corporation (SBC)
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET)
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)
Small Business Corporation (SBC)
Prof. Kang Sun Jin, Korea University
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)
Departure
Prof. Kang Sun Jin, Korea University
Departure

Note:
Among five mission members, Kenichi Ohno, Izumi Ohno (GRIPS Development Forum), Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy (Vietnam Development Forum)
Note:and Truong Thi Chi Binh are the members of the JICA-commissioned study mission.
Among five mission members, Kenichi Ohno, Izumi Ohno (GRIPS Development Forum), Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy (Vietnam Development Forum)
and Truong Thi Chi Binh are the members of the JICA-commissioned study mission.

48

2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers

Attachment 2

Organizations/Persons Visited
The Government /Governmental Organization of Korea
Organization
Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE)

NameAhn, Chang-yong
Son, Hoyoung
Kim, Beom Soo

Korea International Cooperation Agency Kim In(KOICA)

Position
Senior Deputy Director, Industrial Economic Policy Div., Office of Industrial
Economic Policy
Director, Planning & Management Team, Planning Office of Free
Economic Zone
Deputy Director, Policy Planning Team, Planning Office of Free Economic
Zone
Managing Director, Research Office

W oojin Jung

Policy Analyst, Policy Research Office

Moon, Sangwon

Manager, Policy Planning Team, Regional Strategy Department

Kang Kongnae

Policy Research Office

Small & Medium Business Corporation

Kim, Yi-Won

Senior Manager, Global Cooperation Dept.

(SBC)

Junghee Baek

Manager, Global Cooperation Dept.

Chung, Ha Rim

Global Cooperation Dept.

Mi-Ho Jon

Director, Business Development Team

Seung-Woo Lee

Manager, Business Development Team

Korea Trade-Investment Promotion
Agency (KOTRA)

Research Institutes / Universities
Organization
Korea Development Institute (KDI)

Korea Institute for International
Economic Policy (KIEP)
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics& Trade (KIET)

Name
Kim, Joo Hoon

Position
Vice President

Kwang Eon Sul

Managing Director, Center for International Development

Wonhyuk Lim

Director of Policy Research, Center for International Development

Kim, Ji Hwan

Specialist, Policy Consultation Division, Center for International
Development

Bokyeong Park

Director, Dept. of International Macroeconomics and Finance

Yul Kwon

Head of Development Cooperation Team, Center for International
Development Cooperation

Kim, Dohoon

Senior Research Fellow

Joo, Dong-Joo

Research Fellow, Industrial Cooperation and Globalization Division

Yang, Hyun Bong

Research Fellow, Small and Venture Business Research Division

Research Institute for Small & Medium
Soon Yeong Hong
Industries (KOSBI)
Korea Institute for Development Strategy
Seung-Hun Chun
(KDS)
Yeon Seung Chung

Senior Research Fellow
President
Visiting Research Fellow

Korea University

Sung Jin Kang

Professor, Department of Economics

Ewha Womans University

Eun Mee Kim

Professor, Graduate School of International Studies

Thomas Kalinowski

Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Studies

49

Attachment 3

List of Information Collected
SourceMinistry of Knowledge
Economy
(MKE)

Title

Authors / Publishers

Ministry of Knowledge Economy
Where Business Blossoms, Korean Free Economic Zones

Korea International
Journal of International Development Cooperation, 2010 No.3
Cooperation Agency (KOICA)

Small & Medium Busineses
Corporation (SBA)

PPT: Korean Development Cooperation Model (KDCM)
Supporting your Success (English and Japanese)

SBA

Korea Trade-Investment
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency
Promotion Agency (KOTRA)
Korea Development Institute Toward the Consolidation of the G20, From Crisis Committee to Global Steering(KDI)
Committee
Postcrisis Growth and Development, A Development Agenda for the G-20
Economic Growth in Low Income Countries: How the G20 Can Help to Raise andSustain it (Working Paper 2010-01)

Korea Institute for Industrial
Economics & Trade (KIET)

KOICA
Woojin Jung/ KOICA
Research
Office

KOTRA
Editors: Colin I .Bradford andWonhyuk Lim/ KDI, The
Brookings Institution
Editors: Shahrokh Fardoust,Yongbeom Kim, Claudia
Sepulveda/ The World Bank
L Alan Winters, Wonhyuk
Lim, Lucia Hanmer, andSidney Augustin/ KDI

Center for International Development

CID/KDI

Knowledge Sharing Program

KSP/KDI

Proceedings for The Fourth Workshop for the Industrial Development Plan ofAlgeria, October 20-22, 2007, In Algiers, Algeria

KOICA䞉KIET

Report on ODA (Korean)

EDCF, EXIM, KIET

Korea Small BusinessInstitute (KOSBI)

Paper submitted to APO Study (selected pages)

Soon-Yong Hong/KOSBI

Korea Institute forInternatinoal Economic
Policy (KIEP)PPT: Changing Landscape of the ASEAN and Korea ASEAN Cooperation

Yul Kwon/ KIEP

Reinterpretation of Korea's Economic Development and Lessons for Developing
Countries (Policy Analysis 07-13) (Korean)

Bokyeong Park/KIEP

Nordic Aid Untying Policy: Implications on Korea's Aid Strategy (Korean)

Yul Kwon, Jisun Jeong/KIEP

Overall Strategy for Korean ODA Reform (Policy Analysis 06-03) (Korean)

Yul Kwon, Han Sung Kim,
Bokyeong Park, Jooseong
Hwang, Sooyeon Hong/KIEP

Prof. Kang Sun Jing, Korea
University

Korea's Systematic Approach of ODA Policy toward Africa (Policy Analysis 08-19)(Korean)

Green Growth Korea's Choice, Progress Report 2008-2009Prof. Eun Mee Kim,

Graduate School of International Studies

Ewha Womans University

Cross-National Comparative Analysis of the Effectiveness of Development
Assistance

50

Yong Ho Park/KIEP

Presidential Council for Future & Vision (Organization)
Presidential Committee on
Green Growth2. Korea̶Knowledge Sharing with Latecomers

Attachment 4

Korean SMEs
Table 1. Definitions of SMEs, Small Businesses and Micro Enterprises
Small
SMEs
business
SectorNo. ofNo. ofCapital/employeemployees
Sales
es
Less thanCapital worth Less than
Manufacturing300$8M or less
50
Less thanCapital worth Less than
Mining, construction and transportation
300$3M or less
50
Large general retail stores, hotel,
Less than
Sales worth
Less thanhospital…
300$30M or less10
Seed and seedling production, fishing,Less than
Sales worth
Less thanServices business support services, etc.
200
$20M or less
10
Wholesale and productLess than
Sales worth
Less thanintermediation, machinery equipment
100$10M or less10
rent for industrial use, etc.
Less than
Sales worth
Less than
Others50$5M or less
10

Micro
enterprises
No. ofemployees
Less than
10Less than
10Less than 5Less than 5Less than 5Less than 5

Source: Small and Medium Business Administration.

Graph 1. Shares of SMEs in Establishments and Employment
%
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
No. of firms

Year

No. of employees

Source: Small and Medium Business Administration.

Table 2. Korean SMEs’ Overseas Investment by Region
2006
2007

㻌
㻌㻌
RegionDistribution
As i aTotal

Number of
Cases

Amount(mil USD)

Number of
Cases

9,148

3,383

85 .0 %

73 .7 %

2008

Amount(mil USD)

Number of
Cases

Amount(mil USD)

11,192

5,882

10,408

5,707

81.3%

6 7 . 1%7 7 . 9%65 .7 %

Middle East

0.6%

1.3%

1.3%

1.1%

1.5%

1.3%

North America

8.7%

14.1%

9.5%

12.0%

11.7%

10.3%

Latin America

1.0%

3.9%

1.7%

6.4%

1.8%

12.1%

Europe

3.1%

5.6%

3.9%

9.8%

4.8%

6.6%

Others

1.5%

1.4%

2.2%

3.7%

2.4%

3.9%

Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea

51

3. Taiwan－A Silicon Island on the Move
(March 21-25, 2011)

A policy research team visited Taipei, Hsinchu and Kaohsiung in the Republicof China during March 21-25, 2011 to study Taiwan's industrial policy and its
formation mechanism1. The mission consisted of Prof. Kenichi Ohno, Ms. Sayoko
Uesu (GRIPS Development Forum); Mr. Berihu Assefa Gebrehiwot (GRIPS and
Ethiopia Development Research Institute); Ms. Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy and Ms.
Pham Thi Huyen (Vietnam Development Forum). Ms. Uesu participated in Taipei
meetings only.
The issues we investigated in Taiwan were (i) past and current industrial
policy and its formulation; (ii) technology and R&D policy; (iii) industrial park
creation and operation; and (iv) small and medium enterprises (SMEs). We visited
government ministries and agencies, policy and technology research institutes,
industrial parks and their management organizations, and one private firm
operating in an export processing zone (EPZ). The mission schedule, interviewees
and information gathered are listed in the attachments. We would like to thank all
the people we met in Taiwan for their kindness and hospitality.
Main ﬁndings of the mission are reported below.

1. Past policies and new direction
In 2010 , Taiwan ' s per capita GDP was $ 19 , 046 and its real income was
equivalent to Japan's level.2 Taiwan has successfully transformed itself from an
1This mission was commissioned by the Japan International Cooperation Agency to compile information on industrial policies in selected East Asian advanced countries for the policy learning of developing countries including Ethiopia and Vietnam. For this purpose we previously
also visited Singapore in August/September 2010 and South Korea in November 2010.
2
Japanʼs per capita income in 2010 was $42,325 but Japanese prices are much higher than Taiwanʼs. As a result, living standards in the two economies are similar. Using Angus Maddison,
The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD Development Centre (2003) and updating with
IMF data, Japanʼs price-adjusted per capita income in 2010 was estimated at $21,900 while
Taiwanʼs was $22,227.

52

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Moveagro-based economy exporting rice and bananas to a highly industrialized silicon
island with large global shares in mask ROM (93.8%), IC foundry (66.4%), blank
optical disk (63%), IC package (44.4%), electronic glass fabric (39%), IC design(27%), DRAM (21.8%), etc. Moreover, if overseas production (including Mainland
China) by Taiwanese ﬁrms is also included, Taiwan is by far the top exporter ofsuch ICT hardware as motherboard (95.5%), notebook PC (95%), server (88.9%),
WLAN CPE (81%), cable modem (78.6%), portable navigation device (76.9%),
LCD monitor (71.8%), and so on.3
Taiwan's industrial policy thrust and its key industry shifted over time asfollows.
1950s – import substitution – food industry
1960s – export expansion – textile industry
1970s – infrastructure enhancement – petro-chemical industry
1980s – economic liberalization – IT industry
1990s – industrial upgrading – IC industry
2000s – global deployment – LCD industry
Up to the mid-1980s, this remarkable transformation was driven by a powerfulbureaucracy (Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs(IDB/MoEA)̶see below) and a handful of key elite figures that constituted
a developmental state model described as “Governing the Market” by Robert
Wade. At that time, principal policy instruments included SME finance, market
entry regulation (to protect SMEs), trade promotion agency, credit facilities andinsurance, and technical assistance by government-created research institutions.
SMEs in Taiwan were dynamic and responded strongly to these policy initiatives.
In those “ old days, ” SMEs were Taiwan ' s main exporters while a few large
corporations such as Formosa Plastic (private) and China Steel (state-owned)
supplied to the domestic market.
After the mid-1980s, a number of structural shifts occurred. First, the private
sector became more powerful relative to the government. Second, large domesticﬁrms emerged while the relative share of SMEs in output, export and employment
all declined. Third, liberalization, economic interaction with Mainland China
3

These global market shares for 2009 are provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan.

53

and WTO entry (2002) exerted global competitive pressure. Currently Taiwan's
largest firms include TSMC (semi-conductor), UMC (semi-conductor), AUO(LCD), Foxconn (EMS), Acer (PC), Asus (PC), Yulon Motor (automotive), San
Yang Motors (SYM, motorcycle) and Kwang Yang Motor (Kymco, motorcycle).
Previous giants are also moving into new fields including Formosa Plastic(artiﬁcial ﬁber) and China Steel (high quality steel for auto, E&E and machinery).
With the growth of vibrant domestic firms, Taiwan's industrialization is nolonger mainly dependent on FDI or expatriates. Even today, Taiwanese SMEs
remain more autonomous (not under keiretsu or chaebols) and have higher
start-up ratios (turnover of 7.1% per year) than Japanese or Korean. However,as globalization deepens and size becomes increasingly important, large firms
are becoming dominant and the role of SMEs in industrialization is shrinking.
Nevertheless, even large ﬁrms feel that they are too small compared with Koreanchaebols and want to grow more with brand-name products. Contracted hardware
manufacturing for foreign brand-name electronic products̶original equipment
manufacturing (OEM), original design manufacturing (ODM) and electronics
manufacturing service (EMS)̶has already reached a plateau and Taiwan needs a
new business model to grow into the future.
Given these trends, industrial policy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs(MoEA) is also changing. In Taiwan, the industrial policy statute is the mostimportant legal document for industrialization. The first such law, the Statutefor Encouragement of Investment (1960-1990) and its revision, the Statute forUpgrading Industries (1991-2010), guided past policies. The most recent one, theStatute for Industrial Innovation, approved by the National Assembly in May 2010,sets future directions for Taiwan's industries4. Three features of the new statute are
noteworthy. First, it expands policy scope from the previous manufacturing focus
to include agro and biotech industries, industrial services and high-value services(which requires involvement of ministries other than MoEA). Second, it replaces
the previous system of multiple incentives for various specified activities by asimpler, more uniform system of 17% corporate income tax (previously 25%)5 and
4The statute gives only guidelines. For implementation, detailed laws must be prepared for all
relevant sectors. Concerned ministries are currently working on them.
5
Corporate income tax rates of neighboring countries are as follows: Japan (30%), Korea (22%),
Singapore (17%), Hong Kong (16.7%), and China (25%).

54

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Moveeliminates all tax incentives except for R&D6. Third, it aims to shift Taiwan from
hardware manufacturing to an economy of “soft power” with national brands andregional logistic and transport hubs. Like many other high-income economies,
Taiwan wants to become an innovation-driven economy as it graduates fromfactor- and efﬁciency-driven ones of the past.
Taiwan's current industrial policy, as explained by MoEA, has two pillars:
creation of soft power and improving cross-strait relations. The soft power drive
has three sub-components: (i) supply of industrial professionals; (ii) promoting
emerging industries; 7 and (iii) upgrading conventional industries including
ICT, garment and footwear. Even without tax incentives, MoEA can promote
targeted sectors and activities through technology projects commissioned by the
Department of Industrial Technology (DOIT) and other agencies, as explained
below.
Regarding cross-strait relations, restrictions on China-bound investment were
relaxed in August 2008 with higher permissible ratios or value ceilings for corporate
and individual investors. Meetings, seminars and industrial collaboration withMainland China were also activated. Taiwan's market is also opening, gradually andbased on observation of actual performance, to Chinese investors since June 2009. The
recent cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), effectivefrom January 2011, is expected to have further impacts on cross-strait relations. ECFA
is modeled after the ASEAN-China FTA which features “early harvest” trade items ingoods and services.
With the exception of Mainland China, Taiwan does not care about thenationality of investors whether they are domestic, foreign or joint venture.
Taiwan accepts FDI in any sector except in national defense. Taiwan provides auniversal low corporate income tax and transparent incentives for R&D only and,6

Previous tax incentives amounted to about NT$70 billion per year, of which tax holidays,
mainly beneﬁting large ﬁrms, were about NT$20 billion, automation tax credits were about
NT$30 billion (both of which are now abolished), and IT tax credits were about NT$20 billion(now halved). As a result of the new industrial statute, only NT$10 billion remains. As of end
March 2011, US$1 is worth about NT$29.
7
Six “major emerging industries” are biotechnology, precision agriculture, green energy, medical and healthcare, tourism and cultural innovation industries. Four “emerging intelligent
industries” are invention and patent commercialization, cloud computing, electric intelligent
cars and intelligent green construction industries. Besides these, 10 service industries are also
targeted which are however outside the mandate of MoEA.

55

unlike Singapore, does not engage in customized negotiation to attract individual
foreign investors.

2. Policy making process
As noted above, the most important policy making body for Taiwan ' s
industrialization is the Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs (IDB/MoEA). Although its inﬂuence has waned over the decades, it stillyields substantial power in guiding the private sector. IDB currently has 240
permanent staff mainly from engineering backgrounds (recruitment of economists
into IDB is only a recent phenomenon). Temporary staff are also hired to copewith its heavy work load. Unlike Japanese METI, many processes in policy
drafting and stakeholder consultations are outsourced to government-created semiofﬁcial policy “think tanks,” especially the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research(TIER) and the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), as
discussed below. “Committees” are used for consensus building among ministries
and experts, and “seminars” are extensively organized for interacting with theprivate sector. In Taiwan, think tanks, committees and seminars are not just meansof information exchange and dissemination but integral parts of action-oriented
policy making. They will not be assessed highly or receive much funding unlessthey directly contribute to the policy process.
IDB has seven divisions which include three “industry-oriented” (i.e., sectoral)
divisions (metal and mechanical, IT, and consumer goods & chemicals) and four
“industrial support” (i.e., functional) divisions (industrial policy, knowledge services,sustainable development, and industrial parks). Besides these, task forces and ofﬁces
for sectoral promotion are also placed under IDB. Restructuring of MoEA is expected
for the implementation of the new industrial statute which has a wider sectoral scopethan the previous one.
Another important body under MoEA is the Department of Industrial
Technology (DOIT). Its main task is to identify, screen and finance projects
that will directly enhance technology of the private sector. In 2010, the national
budget for science and technology was allocated among the National Science
Council (43.0%), MoEA (30.8%) and Academia Sinica (11.0%). DOIT received
US$618.1 million, which was the lion's share of this fund allocated to MoEA.

56

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Move

Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Economic Affairs

DOIT uses this to finance projects conducted by research institutes, privateorganizations or universities that support national industrial policy. Funding is
allocated competitively, based on proposals submitted by applicant organizations(DOIT sometimes works closely with them to improve proposals) and outcome isreviewed strictly by DOIT advisory groups for alignment with national policy andkey performance indicators such as number of patents and awards, levels of R&D
relative to GDP or corporate revenue, and so on. DOIT's technology projects havebeen a very important policy tool for Taiwan's innovation drive8.
The process of industrial policy making, in the case of the Statute for Industrial
Innovation of 2010, was as follows.
In anticipation of expiration of the previous industrial law (Statute for Upgrading
Industries, 1991-2010), a taskforce was created by IDB/MoEA three years in advance8

DOIT is the main department for technology project funding although IDB and SMEA, also
under MoEA, have budgets for industrial purposes. MoEA has bureaus, departments and administrations under it as shown in Figure 1. It seems that bureaus are larger than departments, andadministrations are tasked with implementing functions.

57

Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the Industrial Development Bureau,
MoEA

to draft a new law. MoEA Minister Dr. Yen-Shiang Shih, an MIT graduate, ledbrainstorming sessions which were organized by CIER, a think tank in support of
MoEA policy. According to one IDB ofﬁcial, “Dr. Shih dominated this law and vision.”
The proposed ideas were then conveyed to the private sector through a large number ofpublic hearing meetings with six business associations (steel, IT, etc). These meetings
were mainly used for the Ministry to “persuade them” for easy passage of legislature
rather than receiving substantive comments from the private sector. Sometimes private
ﬁrms had divided opinions.
In addition, “one or two inter-ministerial meetings” were also held with Dr.
Shih presiding and ministers of other related ministries attending. Interventions
by other ministries were few and no objections were raised against MoEA's ideas.
While MoEA has historically dominated industrial promotion, other ministries
in charge of services, agriculture, health care, education, culture, etc., which are
now included as targeted sectors, are only “regulators” unfamiliar with positive
promotion measures (issuing certificates for R&D, for example) and remained58

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Movepassive on the listening side. After these consultations, the Industrial Policy
Division of IDB/MoEA drafted the law with support of law ﬁrms for wording.
However, the draft law prepared by IDB was substantially revised in thelegislative process. Taiwan's National Assembly is strong and attracts lobbying
by interest groups. The law drafted by technocrats originally proposed loweringof the corporate income tax from 25% to 20% and kept four incentives for R&D,
branding, human resource training and attracting headquarters of MNCs to
Taiwan. The National Assembly, backed by industrial and SME lobby, slashedthe corporate income tax rate further to 17% (though the Ministry of Financewas concerned about revenue loss) and eliminated all incentive measures except
for R&D. According to one industrial expert, this was too aggressive an act bylegislature but results must be accepted as a compromise in democracy. Finally,an “island tour” was conducted in the North, Middle and South of Taiwan todisseminate the new law.
The policy making procedure as described above was established around the late1980s when the previous industrial statute was formulated. Before that, a few elite
leaders and technocrats created policies while research institutes produced internalstudies only.
In sum, consensus building over the contents of the new law was strongly
guided by MoEA, especially Minister Shih, with CIER serving as secretariat.
However, consultation with other ministries and the private sector was somewhat
unilateral in the case of the 2010 Statute. Another unique aspect of Taiwan isstrong legislative intervention which upsets the picture painted by technocrats.
Regarding this policy making process, we heard many non-government voices.
According to one expert, private ﬁrms often complain that government does too much
R&D which competes with and crowds out private R&D. However, another expert
argued that government must be more proactive in pushing innovation in the 21st
century. One expert said that private ﬁrms (especially SMEs) are still willing to listen
to government because government-backed R&D and technology transfer are usefulto them. Another scholar stated that “embedded autonomy” (government with closeinteraction with businesses without being hijacked by vested interests) was possible in
Taiwan because of such historical factors as social mobility, fair competition withoutclass discrimination, and leadership paranoia over external threats previously from
Communism and now from integration pressure. A number of experts expressed mild59

doubts about the prospects of the current innovation drive (biotech is slow to emerge,
for example).

3. Policy and technology research institutes
In Taiwan, there are 19 government-related research institutes created by MoEA
which play vital roles in designing and implementing national industrial andtechnology policy. Some of them received seed money at establishment but they
now operate as NPOs competing for funds for industrial projects commissioned
by both government and private ﬁrms. These research institutes can be classiﬁed
into policy think tanks (TIER and CIER, for example) and technology support
institutes (ITRI, III (triple eye), and sectoral institutes for metal, auto, bicycle,
precision machinery, etc.) The mission visited four of them.
Among policy research institutes, the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research(TIER) and the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER) are two
think tanks created by and supporting the policy making of MoEA.
TIER, founded in 1976 , maintains a databank of Taiwanese industries,
conducts domestic and global economic forecasts, and acts as secretariat to theIndustrial Development Advisory Council as well as several cross-strait economic
cooperation projects, among other things. It also conducted the impact study of
ECFA (increased trade with Mainland China). TIER has seven research divisions,several service providing centers, Tokyo Office, and other departments andcommittees. Its revenue comes from undertaking government projects (about 70%)
and private sector projects (about 30%). The Industrial Development Advisory
Council, to which TIER serves as secretariat, is a platform for interaction among
government, businesses and academics established in 1984 following the Japanesemodel of MITI's Industrial Structure Council. MoEA uses the Council to fathom
the impact of its policies and hear the requests and problems of the business
community. The Council holds 15 meetings per year, two of which are organized
by IDB/MoEA and others by other bureaus of MoEA.
CIER, established in 1982 with the official endowment of NT$1 billion, islocated on the premises of the National Taiwan University. Like TIER, it conducts
commissioned projects for the President, the Executive Yuan (Taiwan's executive
branch), and government ministries and agencies. It has three research divisions60

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Movethat conduct applied research respectively on Mainland China, international issues
and domestic issues. CIER also produces economic forecasting and operates
the WTO Center as well as other ad hoc centers. CIER was the secretariat to theformulation of the 2010 industrial statute, ECFA and WTO entry. For ECFA, forexample, CIER conducted 2-3 years of research and produced a report on ECFA's
costs and benefits which was circulated to the public and academia for criticalreview. The report was then discussed among concerned ministries and agencies,
businesses (through “seminars”), and ﬁnally with legislators before it was sent to
the National Assembly. CIER feels that about 70-80% of what it proposes in its
report makes to the ﬁnal stage.
Among 11 technology support institutes, the mission visited the Industrial
Technology Research Institute and ITRI College in Hsinchu and MIRDC in
Kaohsiung.
The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), founded in 1973 , isTaiwan ' s largest R&D organization in support of technology transfer andcommercialization. Its supervising agency is MoEA. ITRI has 5,800 employees
in its huge complex, of which 80% are engaged in R&D and 1,200 hold doctorate
degrees. There are three ways to disseminate R&D: (i) technology licensing;(ii) spinning off a research team to form a start-up company9; and (iii) forming a
joint venture to become a new section in an existing company (“spin-in”). ITRI
also offers open labs where domestic and foreign companies can send staff to do
joint research with ITRI researchers using ITRI facilities. Half of ITRI's revenue
comes from industrial service fees and the other half from state-funded research
projects on a competitive bidding basis. ITRI is commissioned to plan, train andformulate policies mainly for MoEA but also for other ministries. Its location in
Hsinchu, in proximity to science parks and two technology universities, allows
active cooperation with private ﬁrms and academia although ITRI also works withpartners all over Taiwan. Many graduates from the two universities join ITRI for
several years to learn industrial application and accumulate practical experiences,then start migrating back and forth between industry and ITRI. Thus, ITRI is thelargest focal point for industry-government-academia cooperation to carry out
9

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), the two world largest IC foundries, are ITRIʼs most famous spin-offs. ITRI has
produced 65 ventures and 19,589 ITRI alumni.

61

MoEA's technology development programs.
ITRI College, a new addition to ITRI, is a training provider for ITRI employees
at all levels as well as for industry. It offers courses lasting from one day to threemonths on ﬁve innovation competencies and six technological domains10. It alsooffers customized training programs for enterprises. It issues certiﬁcates but nodegrees because its courses are for the actual use by industry to create value andnot for academic merits. Of particular interest are its need-based programs forgovernment officials and researchers from developing countries in such topics
as national innovation system, human resource development system, SME
promotion, science park development and intellectual property management. In
2010 ITRI College received four ofﬁcial delegations from Vietnam and Philippines(about 25 persons each) as well as India and Poland (2 persons each). However,Taiwan is not conducting knowledge sharing as a national project, and the size of
its intellectual assistance to the developing world remains small compared withJapan or Korea. Political concern vis-à-vis Mainland China is another reason for
Taiwan to remain low-key in its assistance activities.
The Metal Industries Research and Development Center (MIRDC),
established in 1963, is one of the sectoral technology institutes under MoEA.
It is headquartered in Kaohsiung with eight branches and centers acrossTaiwan. It supports metal and related technologies, including automation, with
612 employees ( 51 with doctorate and 325 with master degrees) with main
specialization in mechanical (38%), material and chemical (11%) and electrical,
opto-electronic and info-tech (8%) areas. Its annual staff turnover is 10% andthe average working period is 10 years (at ITRI, they are 20 % and 6 years
respectively). MIRDC also hires staff on a contract base. It has five focusedindustries of metal material and fabricated metal products, mold and die and microparts, automotive, opto-electronics and energy equipment, and medical devices
and care. Its revenue of NT$2 billion per year comes from industrial services (25%directly from private sector, 35% commissioned by government) and government's
technology projects (40%). A team is formed for each project which may last for
10

The five innovation competencies are creative thinking, industrial analysis, R&D management, business development, and intellectual property management. The six technology domains are information and communication, materials and chemical engineering, electronics
and optoelectronic, biomedical technology and device research, mechanical and system research, and energy and environment management.

62

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Move

Figure 3. Organizational Structure of the Industrial Technology ResearchInstitute

4-5 years for big projects and 3-6 months for small ones. For a large DOIT-funded

project, for example, about two years are spent for sounding local industry needs
and working out a proposal jointly with DOIT. If approved, implementation andmonitoring will usually take 3 to 4 years. As with other institutes, MIRDC must
bid competitively for projects and their performance is reviewed for number ofpatents and companies helped, new investments and technology applications
generated, and so on.

4. Hsinchu Science ParkIn Taiwan, there are three types of centrally managed industrial estates with different
overseeing authorities: 13 science parks under the National Science Council, 8 export
processing zones under the EPZ Administration of MoEA, and 61 industrial parks under
IDB/MoEA.11 Besides centrally managed industrial estates, Taiwan also has 18 industrial
11

Industrial parks under IDB/MoEA (last category) focus on light industry, basic consumer
goods, petrochemical, etc. with regional specialization and local regulatory differences. Un-63

parks developed by local governments and 93 industrial parks developed by the private
sector.
The National Science Council, through its Science Park Administration,
supervises Taiwan's 13 science-based parks. Among them, Hsinchu Science Park
(HSP), established in December 1980, was the first and most successful, and has
become the central location for Taiwan's ICT industry with high international
reputation. It now receives about 1,000 visiting missions annually from all over theworld to learn how such a high-tech park can be created and managed. In its 30year history, the number of tenant companies, their revenues, and park employment
grew signiﬁcantly, which as of 2010 stood at 449 companies, US$40.9 billion and
139,416 employees (including 4,134 foreigners of which 1,074 are highly skilled),
respectively. The average R&D/sales ratio at HSP was 6.0% in 1989-2008 against
the national manufacturing average of 1.1%. Land in HSP is state-owned andleased out on a 20-year contract at subsidized rates to domestic and foreign firms
with no intervention in companies' activities. 400 standard factories with the sizeof 700-1,000 m2 are also available for rent (a firm may rent more than one unit).
The monthly rent is NT$50/m2 for land and NT$100/m2 for rental factory. One-stop
service, good infrastructure and comfortable living conditions are guaranteed.
By company revenue, HSP's largest industry is IC (67.5%) followed by optoelectronics (20.7%), computer (6.4%), telecom (2.7%) and precision machinery( 1 . 8 %). Its renowned tenants include TSMC, UMC, Acer, Foxconn, AUO,
Logitech, Du Pont, Hoya, Shin Etsu and DNP. HSP is host to 44 foreign ﬁrms, ofwhich 10 are Japanese and 17 are American. 95 companies were set up by overseas
Chinese.
Although HSP's land (653 ha) has no plan for future expansion, there is a relatively
high turnover of tenant companies whose number is continuously increasing. Insteadof enlarging HSP, satellite parks are created to accommodate more firms. At HSP,
about 30 companies move in every year. As for the number of the companies moving
out, it depends on the ﬂuctuations in economy and differs every year. Average landsize per factory is becoming smaller over the years, which is the intention of the
Science Park Administration. Applying companies are given exams regarding theirlike science parks or EPZs, these industrial parks can sell land to investors. On the other hand,
they may not provide one-stop investor service. There is a plan to merge the administration of
EPZs and MoEA-managed industrial zones.

643. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Move

R&D activities, capital, environmental concern, etc. There are about 60 companies
waiting to enter HSP at present. Companies which fail to spend at least 2.28%(twice the national average) of sales revenue on R&D, or those which miss monthly
payments twice, are asked to leave HSP.
The Science Park Administration is a central agency which has invested about
NT$86 billion since the establishment of the park. Besides state investment, HSP's
income came from management fee and rental and operational revenues. HSP
started to make proﬁt ten years ago and now enjoys stable revenue. Because HSP
is the leading science park, it ﬁnancially assists other science parks in Taichung,
Tainan, etc. and monitors their operations.

5. Export processing zones
Taiwan established its ﬁrst export processing zone (EPZ) at Kaohsiung Port in
December 1966, combining the functions of free trade zone and industrial zone12.
Its industrial focus changed over time along with overall structural transformationof Taiwan. Its tenants were engaged initially in low-end OEM such as garment
which gradually moved up to mid-end and high-end OEM in technology- andcapital-intensive products by the mid 1990s. Subsequently, R&D and high-value
ICT industries were added. The current focus industries include IC testing andpackaging (Nantze EPZ), LCD modules (Kaohsiung EPZ), and opto-electronics(Taichung EPZ). Gauged by total corporate revenue in 2009 (US$8.66 billion), thedominant sector in EPZs was electronic parts and components (64.2%) followedby non-metallic mineral products (8.8%) and computer, electronic and opticalproducts (8.6%). Compared with science parks which require high R&D/sales
ratios for entry and stay, EPZs are for more downstream manufacturing.
The EPZ Administration of MoEA, located in Kaohsiung, oversees eight EPZs
in Central and Southern Taiwan. The total area of these zones is 532 ha, which
includes Kaohsiung EPZ (72.4 ha) and Nantze EPZ (97.8 ha). Corporate revenues,
investments and trade at EPZs have increased signiﬁcantly over the decades. In
2010, total tenant companies were 456 in number producing NT$380 billion inrevenue and US$19.2 billion in export (US$10.12 billion) and import (US$9.09
12

The brochure of EPZ Administration says Kaohsiung EPZ was the ﬁrst such park in the world
but some MoEA ofﬁcials in Taipei said it was not (Ireland created the ﬁrst).

65

billion). As factors of success, EPZ Administration cited right timing, excellent
location, perfect legal system, single contact window, excellent investment
environment, skilled workers, and others.
About five years ago, EPZ Administration began to bridge and mediate
industry-university linkage. The program consists of human exchange such as
student internship and visiting professors as well as research cooperation fortechnology transfer and commercialization. EPZ Administration offers matching
services, one-stop window and database for universities. Based on company needs,a student team led by a professor is to conduct joint R&D (as is actively done in
Nanyang Polytechnic in Singapore). While such industry-university linkage wasstrong from the outset at HSP, this is a relatively recent policy drive at EPZs.
The mission visited the EPZ Administration office in Nantze EPZ and paida factory visit to Taiwan Brother Industries, Ltd. located in that EPZ which
manufactured high-end personal-use sewing machines with artistic embroidery
capability.

6. SME policy
Promotion of small and medium enterprises is the responsibility of SME
Administration under MoEA. In 2010, the number of SMEs in Taiwan was 1.24
million, or 97.77% of all enterprises. The SME sector accounts for 76.7% of
total employment, 29.8% of total sales, and 17.9% of total export. The numberof start-up companies is 88,531 annually, amounting to 7.1% of total SMEs.
For manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying, SMEs are defined as
establishments with less than NT$80 million (US$2.5 million) in paid-in capital orless than 200 persons. For service and commerce, they are establishments with lessthan NT$100 million (US$3.2 million) in paid-in capital or less than 100 persons.
Micro businesses are defined as establishments with less than 5 persons for all
sectors.
SME support is provided in three layers. The “award strategy” is adopted for top
SMEs (1-3% of total) by which national, rising star and R&D awards are given. The“guidance strategy” is used for the middle layer (27-34%) where 11 guidance systems

66

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Moveare available13. For the remainder of “foundation” SMEs (65-70%), the “grouping
strategy” comprising of mutual cooperation, industry cluster, local cultural industry
and financing programs is offered. SME Administration works closely with IDB,
DOIT, Bureau of Foreign Trade and Department of Commerce, all under MoEA, toprovide integrated support.
SME Administration has ﬁve divisions corresponding to ﬁve task areas, which
are Policy Planning, Management Consulting, Business start-up and Incubation,
Information Technology, and Financing. Taiwan's SME service network consistsof SME Administration headquarters with a one-stop service center in Taipei,
two regional offices in Center and South, and 24 local service centers. SME
Administration also cooperates with the National Association of SMEs and its 20
branches, the China Youth Career Development Association and its 21 branches,and 23 industrial associations and 24 chambers of commerce at central andmunicipal levels. SMEs located in industrial estates can receive services fromzone administrations.
Financial support for SMEs is provided by the SME Development Fund andthe National Development Fund. These funds are on-lent by commercial banks to
SMEs and start-up companies. 15% of funding from the SME Development Fundgoes through SME investment companies. Additionally, the SME Credit Guarantee
Fund guarantees 80-90% of commercial bank loans to SMEs (which seems avery generous guarantee). The Incubation Fund Account and various official
rewards given to excellent SMEs are additional facilitators of SME ﬁnance. These
government measures are expected to pump-prime SME ﬁnance by private funds,
capital markets and venture capital.
For management and technical support, SMEs are provided with classes,
enterprise consultancy (which is connected to bank loans), technology andlinkage. SME consultation service is given by private firms and individual
consultants through open bidding for government procurement. Unlike Malaysia(or Thailand in the past), no government officials are SME consultants. SMEs
receive consultation free of charge. However, if new investment or training
13

The guidance systems are managed by appropriate bureaus and departments of MoEA andconsist of industrial safety, R&D, pollution prevention, production technology, marketing,management, ﬁnance, quality upgrading, information management, business start-up and incubation, and mutual assistance and collaboration.

67

becomes necessary, that must be ﬁnanced by SMEs themselves. Among Taiwaneseindustrial experts, Japanese terms such as kaizen and shindan are not well known
although standard productivity tools such as 5S and QCC are widely recognized
and used.
One promotion measure of interest is the Taiwan One Town One Product (OTOP)
program, adopted from Japan's One Village One Product movement, which aims
to develop local specialty industries with township or city as units. Starting from1989, SME Administration has supported local SMEs with management, design,
packaging, technology, space arrangement, and so on; participation in exhibitions
and training courses; and creation of publications, websites and Taiwan OTOP
shops. A total of 96 featured towns have successfully generated their distinctive
local products.

68

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Move

Attachment 1

Mission Schedule (20- 26 Mar. 2011)
1. Mission Members

Kenicni Ohno
Sayoko Uesu*

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Berihu Assefa Gebrehiwot
Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy
Pham Thi Huyen*Participated from 20 to 23 March only.

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan
Researcher, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan andEthiopian Development Research Institute, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Researcher, Vietnam Development Forum (VDF) / GRIPS-NEU Joint Research Project,
Hanoi, Vietnam
Researcher, Vietnam Development Forum (VDF) / GRIPS-NEU Joint Research Project,
Hanoi, Vietnam

2. Mission Schedule
DATE
1

20 Sun2

21 Mon22 Tue

3

4

5

6
7

Mar

23 Wed24 Thu25 Fri26 SatTIME

Location

ACTIVITYAM
PM

TaipeiArrivalAM

TaipeiIndustrial Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs (IDB/MOEA)

PM

TaipeiTaiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER)

AM

TaipeiProf. Tain-Jy Chen, College of Social Sciences, National Taiwan University

PM

TaipeiDr. Wan-Wen Chu, Research Fellow, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences,
Academia Sinica

AM

Taipei

Department of Industrial Technology, Ministry of Economic Affairs, (DOIT/MOEA)

AM

TaipeiSmall and Medium Enterprise Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs (SMEA/MOEA)

PM

Taipei

Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER)

AM

Hsinchu

Hsinchu Science Park Administration, National Science Council

PM

HsinchuIndustrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) and ITRI College

AM

Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs (EPZA/MOEA)

AM

Kaohsiung Taiwan Brother Industries Ltd.

PM

Kaohsiung Metal Industries Research and Development Centre (MIRDC)

AM

Kaohsiung Departure

Note: Among the five mission members, Kenichi Ohno and Sayoko Uesu (GRIPS Development Forum); and Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy
and Pham Thi Huyen (Vietnam Development Forum) are the members of the JICA-commissioned study team.

69

Attachment 2

Organizations/Persons VisitedGovernment and its Organizations
Organization

Industrial Development Bureau,
Ministry of Economic Affairs

Name

Position

Hui-Ying Chen

Deputy Director, Industrial Policy Division

Robert M.S. Jahn
Han Wen Kuan
Kuan-Yu Huang
Department of Industrial Technology,
Hao-Chu Lin
Edie Chin An Wang㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻱㼏㼛㼚㼛㼙㼕㼏㻌㻭㼒㼒㼍㼕㼞㼟Chen-Tsair Cheng
Small and Medium Enterprise Administration,
Pu-Yun Long
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Chia-Hsien Yang
Susan S. Chen
Hsinchu Science Park Administration, National Science
Tuan, Ssu-Heng
CouncilGrace Chen
Export Processing Zone Administration,
Ministry of Economic Affairs

Research Institutes / Universities
Organization

Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER)
National Taiwan University

Metal Industries Research and Development Centre

Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)
ITRI College
Academ ia Sinica
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER)

Company

Organization

Taiwan Brother Industries Ltd.

70

Senior Specialist
Chief of P.R. Office
Office of Public Relations
Section Chief, Department of Industrial Technology
Business Manager, International Business Center, ITRI
Deputy Director General
Commercial Secretary, Business Startup and Incubation Division
Section Chief, Business Startup and Incubation Division
Deputy Director, Investment Services Division
Section Chief, Investment Services Division
Investment Services Division

Name
Sung Min-Te
Gary Chen
Liu Yau-Jr
Tain-Jy Chen
Paul Chung
Judy C.Lo
Louis Hung-Lu Yen
Charles Chen
Ethel Cheng
Shing-Yuan Tsai
Ho, Kwun-Yao
Feng-Kwei W ang
W an-W en Chu
Jiann-Chyuan Wang
Hui-Lin Wu
Tsung-Che Wei
Hsien-Yang Su

Position
Director, Secretariat of Industrial Development Advisory Council
Public Relations Officer, International Affairs Specialist
Project Principal and Associate Research Fellow, Research Division II
Professor, Departm ent of Econom ics
Vice President
Project Manager, IP & Innovalue Section, Planning & Promotion Dept.
Project Manager, IP & Innovalue Section, Planning & Promotion Dept.
Project Manger, Industrial Research Section, Planning & Promotion Dept.
IP & Innovalue Section, Planning & Promotion Dept.
Vice President and Executive Director
Deputy Representative of Tokyo Office
Executive Director
Research Fellow, Research Center for Hum anities and Social Sciences
Research Fellow and Vice President
Research Fellow, Division of Taiwan Economy
Assistant Research Fellow, Division of Taiwan Economy
Research Fellow, International Division/Director, Japan Center

Name
Morinaga Tadashi
Da Shi Kong

Position
Representative Director & General Manager
Manager, VM Promotion Department

3. Taiwan̶A Silicon Island on the Move

Attachment 3

List of Information Collected
SourceTitle

Industrial Development Bureau,
Ministry of Economic Affairs(IDB/MOEA)

Industrial Development in Taiwan R.O.C. 2010

Taiwan Institute of Economic
Research (TIER)

Leaflet/Pam phlet: Taiwan Institute of Econom ic Research
PPT:Taiwanese Econom ic Developm ent

Department of Industrial
Technology, Ministry of Economic
Affairs (DOIT/MOEA)

Leaflet/Pamphlet: 2010/2011 Department of Industrial Technology

PPT: Industrial Development in Taiwan, R.O.C, 2011

PPT: Industrial Technology Innovation (Date: 2011.3.23)

Small and Medium Enterprise Development in Taiwan, ROC
PPT: SME Development and Policy Measures in Taiwan, March 2011
Taiwan One Town One Product, Taiwan Local Cultural Industries Map
DVD: Building Industries from Creative Ideas
Small and Medium Enterprise
Administration, Ministry of Economic Incubation Centers 2010
Affairs (SMEA/MOEA)White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Taiwan, 2010
Annual Report 2009
Taiwan No.1, Highlights of Taiwan's Featured Industries, 2010 International Small
Business Congress䚷Special Edition
Unbiased, Independent and Transcendent, National Policy Think-Tank
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic
Figures: The system of technology development in Taiwan/ The division of labor for
Research (CIER)
technology development in Taiwan

Authors / Publishers
IDB/MOEA
TIER
Ming-Te Sun, TIER
DOIT/MOEA

SMEA/MOEA

National Association of Small& Medium Enterprises
CIER
Dr. Wang, CIER

Discovering the Beauty of the Hsinchu Science Park, A Compilation for the 30th
Anniversary of the Hsinchu Science Park
Hsinchu Science Park

Industrial Technology ResearchInstitute (ITRI)
ITRI College

Innovation for a better tommorrow
Investment Guide
Map of Hsinchu Science Park
PPT: Welcome to the Hsinchu Science Park
PPT: ITRI/Industrial Developm ent /Governm ent Policy
Annual Report 2009
Innovative Technologies for a Better Future
Program Overview
Historical Gallery Guide
Transforming for the Global Economy, An Investment Guide to Export Processing
Zones in Taiwan

Export Processing Zone
EPZ Statistics at a glance
Administration, Ministry of Economic
Affairs (EPZA/MOEA)
PPT: Export Processing Zone: An Overview

Metal Industries Research andDevelopment Centre (MIRDC)

Science Park Administration

Shing-Yuan Tsai, ITRI
ITRI
ITRI College
EPZA/MOEA
Victoria Kuan-Yu Huang,
EPZA/ MOEA

"Taiwan's Export-Processing Zones: Shifting Roles through the Decades", Taiwan
Business Topics (December 2010)

Steven Crook

Pamphlet: Metal Industries Research and Development Centre
CV of Dr. Paul C.K.Chung
PPT: A Brief Introduction of MIRDC, March 25, 2010

MIRDC

71

4. India－A Liberalizing Giant(September 23-29, 2012)

Researchers of the GRIPS Development Forum visited India (Delhi and its
vicinity, Gurgaon and Manesar in the State of Haryana) during September 23-29,
2012 to study India's experiences in economic and industrial policy making and to
draw lessons for other developing countries including Ethiopia and Vietnam1. The
mission members were Prof. Kenichi Ohno, Prof. Izumi Ohno, and Ms. Mieko
Iizuka (research assistant).
The mission studied (i) methodology of Indiaʻs economic and industrial policy
making, including the policy contents and processes of the latest Five-year Plan,
the National Manufacturing Policy, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, kaizen(productivity and quality improvement), investment attraction, and the rolesof export promotion organizations and industry-specific organizations; and (ii)institutional aspects of policy making at present and in the past including how
coordination works among various ministries, agencies, and other stakeholders;
the roles of state governments and the private sector; and how implementation andmonitoring and evaluation mechanisms are set up.
We had meetings with government ministries and agencies, the resident ofﬁce
of the State of Gujarat in New Delhi, business associations, industry-specificorganizations, and research institutes and universities (see attachments for mission
schedule, places visited, and information collected). We would like to express our
deep appreciation to all organizations and individuals who kindly received us andshared valuable information with us. This report summarizes main ﬁndings of themission.

1

The purpose of this mission, which was commissioned by JICA, was to compile information
on industrial policies in selected Asian countries for the policy learning of other developing
countries. In the phase 1 of Japan-Ethiopia industrial policy dialogue 2009-2011, we visited
Singapore (August and September 2010), South Korea (November 2010), and Taiwan (February2011). Our India mission was part of phase 2 of Japan-Ethiopia industrial policy dialogue 20112013.

72

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giant

1. The state of the economy: liberalization and the role ofmanufacturing
After independence in 1947, India embraced heavy industrialization and stateowned enterprise development under socialistic planning. Serious effort in economic
liberalization was started in 1991 by the Narasimha Rao government (1991-1996)
where Dr. Manmohan Singh, the current Prime Minister, served as Finance Minister.
Economic growth and FDI inﬂow were stimulated by this policy shift. Ever since,
despite changes in ruling parties, India has stayed on the course of gradual andsteady liberalization. In 1991, seven sectors were designated as public-sector only
areas, 18 sectors were licensing areas, and over 800 sectors were reserved only forsmall-scale enterprises. Today, only two areas are public-sector only areas (atomic
energy and railroad), only ﬁve areas are licensing areas (defense industry, industrial
explosives, cigarettes and tobacco, hazardous chemicals, and portable alcohol), andonly 20 items are reserved for small-scale enterprises. Many of these permissions
are devolved from federal to state levels.
According to a non-government researcher, remaining focal points in industrial
policy are (i) licensing policy, (ii) FDI policy, (iii) monopoly restrictions and tradepractices (MRTP), (iv) plan documents, and (v) annual budgets that determine actual
resource allocation. According to other researchers, the only remaining signiﬁcanteconomic controls are mainly in FDI policy, where Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh just recently launched a new drive to liberalize even that area (multi-brandretail FDI). Another current move is introduction of “e-Biz” to simplify businesspermissions. Despite these policy efforts, however, India's business environment
generally and in reality still remains difﬁcult and fraught with delays, ambiguity andbureaucracy according to foreign ﬁrms.
The Indian economy registered high growth in the early 2000s, to the tune of
9% per annum, but growth has fallen recently to the 6% level2. This slowdown
was partly due to the tightening of macroeconomic policy to ﬁght inﬂation andpartly due to the impact of a series of global crises. As interest rates rise and both2

The reader should be aware that Indiaʼs economic data captures only registered (formal) units
with 10 or more employees whose shares of production and employment are two-thirds andone-fifth, respectively, in the national economy. Annual changes in the small-scale sector,
mainly family businesses, where wages and productivity are low, are difﬁcult to estimate although surveys are conducted for such enterprises every ﬁve years.

73domestic and global markets shrink, Indian manufacturers are currently facing
difficulties. Fiscal and current-account deficits are other serious problems for
India at the moment.
From a longer perspective, high growth generated by economic liberalization in
the past two decades was remarkable, but growth came mainly from service sector
expansion in which ICT and finance were prominent drivers. Services rose andagriculture fell in the share of GDP, but manufacturing's share remained stagnant at
about 15-16%. A concern rose among political leaders that lopsided growth in certain
service sectors did not produce enough jobs for all, and that strong manufacturing
was needed to sustain shared growth in a huge economy such as India. The
incumbent United Progress Alliance (UPA) government led by Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, which came to power in 2004, immediately appointed Dr. V.
Kurishnamurti as the head of the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council（ NMCC ）to coordinate related ministries and produce a manufacturing policy forthe first time in India. Businesses and academics also participated in this policy
formulation. The National Manufacturing Policy (NMP) was ﬁnalized in 2011 andimplementation details are currently worked out. The key thrusts of NMP will be
carried into the industry chapter of the 12th Five-year Plan. Details of the procedureand content of NMP will be discussed below.
The overarching “macro” objective of Indian economic policy is job creation,
followed by value creation, infrastructure, ameliorating regional inequalities,
further liberalization, and so on. The new manufacturing drive is required mainly
to create more jobs on a broad basis, not just for few elites and professionals.
India's sectoral preferences are not very strong; priority sectors in manufacturing
are speciﬁed but they are not given special incentives or treatments unlike in someother countries.
As explained below, India's policy making features broad consultation with all
stakeholders, especially business associations and academia. In addition, underfederalism, close consultation with state governments is a must. Policy visions are
generated both top-down and bottom-up, as extensive consultation covers various
aspects and interests and informs them for policy makers, while the Prime Ministerannounces prioritization based on such information. It is amazing to see such acomplex and “democratic” policy formulation to work so reasonably well in India
without breaking down or causing significant delay and confusion. At the same74

4. India̶A Liberalizing Gianttime, implementation and ultimate performance are less spectacular and also varyacross states. Proactive states such as Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh are
attracting domestic and foreign investment while conservative states are left behind.
According to a representative of one of these proactive states, good economic
performance requires a mixture of “enabling environment” (general liberalization) at
the federal level and wise and strong leadership at the state level. Some researchers
mentioned good governance and cultural differences as additional determinants ofdivergent economic performance across states.

2. The policy making process
Reflecting the large size and diversity of the country, India's policy planningis systematic and comprehensive. It is said that a democratic process must takeall important aspects into account if policy is to win legitimacy. Jurisdictions offederal and state governments are stipulated in the Constitution in which mattersrelated to manufacturing fall into the category of “concurrent” or joint responsibilityof both federal and local governments. Additionally, in the last ten years or so,
the policy making process has become increasingly participatory and interactive
among government, industry, and academia. Not only the Planning Commission
but also all ministries, in producing any policies, now actively seek and incorporate
the voices of industry, through business organizations such as the Confederationof Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce andIndustry (FICCI), and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India(AssoCham), as well as academicians in universities and think tanks. Policy making
without deep interaction among key stakeholders is unthinkable in India today. The
mission was informed by a number of researchers that government ministers often
hijacked, “owned,” and printed their names on studies independently prepared byexternal experts when ministers discovered that the content was agreeable. Tripartite
policy consultation among government, industry, and academia has become
pervasive, substantial, and highly institutionalized in India.

75

2-1. The Planning Commission and the 12th Five-year Plan
India is well known for its elaborate policy machinery led and coordinatedby the Planning Commission that produces development plans3. The Planning
Commission was established in 1950 and the first Five-year Plan was launched
in 1951 under the chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru. While five-year planning
was interrupted several times in the 1960s, 70s and the early 90s due to India's
political and economic crises, it has been normalized since the Eighth Plan
1992-97. The Planning Commission consists of Prime Minister as ex-officio
Chairman, one Deputy Chairman appointed by Prime Minister with the rank ofa full Cabinet Minister, and full-time members who are experts of such ﬁelds as
economics, industry, science, and general administration4. Cabinet Ministers withcertain important portfolios act as part-time members of the Commission. Mr.
Montek Singh Ahluwalia is presently Deputy Chairman of the Commission. The
Commission works through its various Divisions (the website shows 30 Divisions,
including Industries Division). Full-time members of the Commission provide
advice and guidance to the subject Divisions for formulating Five-year Plans,
Annual Plans, State Plans, Monitoring Plan Programs, and Projects and Schemes.
The 12th Five-year Plan (2012-17) was recently approved by the Cabinet.
This Plan seeks to achieve average economic growth of 8.2% per annum. The
overarching vision of the 12th Five-year Plan is “Faster, Sustainable, and More
Inclusive Growth5.” The Plan has been drafted through extensive stakeholder
consultation, taking about one-and-half years since April 2011 when preparation
works started. The Plan document will be placed for final approval by the
National Development Council (NDC) which has all Chief Ministers and Cabinet
Ministers as members and is headed by the Prime Minister, and must eventually
be approved by the Parliament. It will then be reﬂected in the annual budget, with
the new ﬁscal year starting April 2013.
3

In January 1, 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi replaced the Planning Commission with the
National Institution for Transforming India (NITI), which is expected to be less interventionist
and more open to diverse developmental needs [Editor].
4
The tenure of full-time members and Deputy Chairman is not ﬁxed. The total number of members can also change according to the wish of the government.
5
See Approach Paper to the 12th Five-year Plan. Before the Plan is drafted, the Planning Commission prepares an Approach Paper which lays out major targets, key challenges in meeting them,and a broad approach that must be followed to achieve the stated objectives. The Approach Paper
is approved by the Cabinet and the NDC.

76

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giant

The nature of Five-year Plans and the role of the Planning Commission have
evolved over time. The ﬁrst eight plans put strong emphasis on the public sector
with massive investment in basic and heavy industries. Since the launch of theNinth Plan in 1997, Five-year Plans have become more indicative. The function of
the Planning Commission has changed accordingly from central planning to policy
coordination through multi-stakeholder consultations. There are a large numberof ministries and agencies in India whose policy scopes are limited to narrowsectoral issues. To rectify this situation, the Planning Commission is increasingly
becoming a focal point for producing a holistic approach in formulating policies
and bringing “macro” and cross-cutting perspectives in the critical areas of humanand economic development. Many officials and experts note that the Fiveyear Plan still remains an important policy document which sets priorities andpolicy direction of the country every ﬁve years and inﬂuences the allocation ofdevelopment budget (excepting for defense, subsidies, and maintenance). Basedon the Five-year Plan, the Ministry of Finance formulates annual budgets. It isalso charged with the recurrent budget. The Planning Commission conducts midterm appraisal of Five-year Plans. Because of the country's size and diversity,
ﬁve-year planning continues to enjoy legitimacy as an instrument for ascertaining
the current situation of socio-economic development and agreeing on future
direction through the process of multi-stakeholder consultation.
At the same time, we heard from a number of officials and experts that
implementation is a problem not only for the Five-year Plan but also for otherkey policies under it. Once the Five-year Plan is approved, individual ministries
assume responsibility for implementation, by “notifying” (officially announcing)policy measures and securing budgets. Furthermore, under the federal system, state
governments are also charged with executing a large part of policy measures. Whileclose collaboration between federal and state levels is necessary, in reality it is
difﬁcult to always ensure this.

2-2. K ey features of the 12th Five-year Plan as related to the
Manufacturing Plan
The Industries Division of the Planning Commission assumes prime
responsibility for creating policy inputs to the industry chapter of the Five-year
Plan. In the process of drafting the 12th Five-year Plan, 25 working groups (WGs)77were created, with 15 WGs for sector-speciﬁc industries (e.g., steel, automobile,and textile) and 10 WGs dealing with cross-cutting issues (e.g., businessenvironment, environment sustainability, and export competitiveness). Sectoral
WGs are normally chaired by respective ministries in charge. These WGs submit
reports to the Planning Commission. Although these reports are not treated asofﬁcial documents of the Planning Commission, the Commission takes due noteof their recommendations as policy inputs to the Five-year Plan.
According to an Advisor at the Industries Division of the Planning Commission,
with regards to the formulation process there have been two notable changes in
the industry chapter of the 12th Five-year Plan: (i) more attention given to crosscutting issues which are beyond the interests of speciﬁc industries; and (ii) more
intensive consultation with various stakeholders including ministries and agencies
concerned, the private sector (through business associations and industry-speciﬁcorganizations), think tanks, and universities.
Regarding (i), for the ﬁrst time in India's planning history, the Manufacturing
Plan was created as a new and comprehensive document on industry for informing
and serving as a pillar of industry chapter of the 12th Five-year Plan. The Steering
Committee was established and managed by the Industries Division to provide theoverall guidance and strategic direction to the development of this Plan. In thisprocess, recommendations of various reports produced by WGs were incorporated.
The Manufacturing Plan also gave due consideration to the NMP produced by the
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion in 2011 (see section 3).
Regarding (ii), both government officials and experts and researchers in
the private sector whom we met confirmed a very intensive nature of multistakeholder consultation 6. Many experts and organizations stated that they
took active part in the policy-making process through diverse channels ofcommunication and appreciated the government's effort in this.

6

Our interviewees included the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Apparel Export Promotion Council (AEPC), the Society of Indian Automobile Manufactures (SIAM), Jawaharlal
Nehru University, the Institute of Economic Growth (IEG), the Research and Information
System for Developing Countries (RIS), and the Indian Council for Research on International
Economic Relations (ICRIER).

78

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giant

3. National Manufacturing Policy (NMP) and related documents
In 2011, the Indian government formulated the National Manufacturing Policy(NMP). This was the ﬁrst policy document for the manufacturing sector in India.
The NMP sets two main targets that must be attained by 2022: (i) increasing theshare of manufacturing in GDP to at least 25% (currently around 16%); and (ii)creating 100 million additional jobs (which is almost doubling the current manpowerof 120 million).
There were several reasons for such a manufacturing drive. First, there is a growing
concern about the low and stagnant share of the manufacturing sector in India's GDP
compared to East Asian countries such as China (35%), Thailand (34%), and Malaysia(31%)7. The contribution of manufacturing in India is considered far below its potential.
Second, India is a country with the largest young population in the world. This creates
opportunities and challenges. India must have 220 million jobs by 2025 in order to reap
the demographic dividend. Although India has achieved remarkable growth over the
past decade, the main driver of growth was a few service sectors such as ICT, hostelry
and finance, which however does not generate broad employment opportunities forall. There is mounting pressure to create gainful employment for the entire workforce,
especially for the youth, and robust growth of manufacturing is integral to the inclusive
Development of Manufacturing Policy and Plan

7

Quoted from the National Manufacturing Policy of 2011 with original data based on the WorldBankʼs World Development Report.

79

growth agenda of the government. This point was emphasized by many in our meetings
with ofﬁcials and experts. Such obsession with job creation is unique in India. In many
East Asian countries, policy focus tends to cover global and regional competition(especially with China), productivity and innovation, integration into global value
chains, industrial skill development, and other competitiveness-enhancing issues in
addition to the sheer number of jobs created.
Like Five-year Plans, the NMP is formulated through extensive stakeholder
consultation in which the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP)
of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry assumed prime responsibility for
coordinating the drafting work.8 The initial draft of the NMP was placed on
the DIPP's website in March 2010 for stakeholder comments. In response, theNational Manufacturing Competitiveness Council (NMCC) proposed a draft
national manufacturing policy, incorporating the views of member organizations
such as CII, FICCI, management and technical institutes, and various ministries.
Industry-specific organizations sent their comments through their supervising
ministries. The Planning Commission also commented on the draft NMP, andmore recently prepared the National Manufacturing Plan, as part of drafting workof the 12th Five-year Plan as noted above. After the clearance of its final draftby the Cabinet, the NMP was notified by DIPP in November 2011. After that,it entered the implementation stage, with the latest Five-year Plan (through the
Manufacturing Plan) supporting this policy direction.
It is important to note that, as a background of this work, the National Strategy for
Manufacturing, published by the NMCC previously in 2006, played a critical role. This
Strategy gave an impetus to the manufacturing drive and contributed to raising politicalawareness of “manufacturing imperative” in India. It triggered subsequent actions by thegovernment, such as the Prime Minister's Group Report on Manufacturing (2008)9, NMP(2011), and the Manufacturing Plan (2012). The NMCC was created in October 2004 as
an apex advisory body to the government based on public-private partnership. It acts as a
8

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry has two departments, the Department of Commerce
and the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. Previously they belonged to different
ministries.
9
In 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh constituted a group led by NMCC Chairman Dr.
Krishnamurthy to look into the reasons behind the sluggish growth of the manufacturing sector. The group produced the Prime Ministerʼs Group Report on Manufacturing, which recommended measures to ensure its sustained high growth.

80

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giantpolicy forum for framing government policies to enhance competitiveness in the Indian
manufacturing sector. Its Chairman, Dr. V. Krishnamurthy, is a guru in manufacturing
who previously served as the first chairman and CEO of Maruti Suzuki as well as amember of the Planning Commission and enjoys high trust of the Prime Minister. The
NMCC is composed of 25 members representing industrial sectors, management andtechnical institutions, economists, industry organizations, and various offices of the
Indian government.
Content-wise, the most notable features of the NMP are (i) establishmentof National Investment and Manufacturing Zones (NIMZs) which intend
to offer comfortable business environment for both exporters and domestic
market targeting enterprises in place of failed SEZs; and (ii) rationalization andsimpliﬁcation of business regulations (e-BIZ project). These measures collectively
aim to ease the problems of administrative red tapes and business regulations.
The NIMZs are one type of industrial zones where procedural clearances are
simpliﬁed̶for example, in the areas of environment, labor, land acquisition̶andone-stop services are provided to enterprises but without any specific financial
incentives. To this end, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs, for this purpose often
called industrial estate management authorities in other countries) are to becreated, assuming the role of developer of industrial zones. On the other hand,the e-BIZ project is applied to those firms operating outside NIMZs. It aims todrastically improve business environment by providing efﬁcient and convenientelectronic services to investors in the areas of information on forms andprocedures, licenses, permits, registrations, approvals, clearances, permissions,
reporting, ﬁling, payments, and compliance. Additionally, the NMP also discusses
simple and expeditious mechanisms for closure of units, incentives for SMEs,
industrial training and skill upgrading measures, and green technologies.
Here again, many government officials and non-government experts statedthat the drafting process of the NMP had been consultative with very active
participation of stakeholders including concerned ministries, apex businessassociations (CII, FICCI, AssoCham, etc.), industry-specific organizations,and academia. They appreciated the participatory process and opportunities
provided for them to comment on the draft. The process of policy formulationin India is built on the value of democratic society with various constituencies,
with enormous effort and energy being expended to ensure the inclusive and81Process of Five-Year Plan Formulation in the Industries Sector

participatory nature of the process.
Despite the impressive policy formulation process, India continues to face
problems in the implementation stage. This is another point stressed by many
officials and experts we met. India needs to strike a balance between formal
correctness of policy making procedure which can be supported by democratic
aspiration of all stakeholders on the one hand and ensuring effectiveness of
implementation (budgeting, staffing, monitoring, etc.) as well as obtaining
ultimate objectives such as growth, productivity and competitiveness on the other.
India seems to be very strong on the former but weak on the latter. Three things
may be mentioned in relation to this problem.
First, though India is admittedly a huge and complex society, extreme
subdivision of organizational structure makes the policy process unnecessarily
cumbersome. For example, there are 12 ministries directly involved in
manufacturing such as the Ministries of Textile, Steel, Heavy Industry, Micro andSMEs, and so on; and 48 ministries are either directly or indirectly related to the
manufacturing sector. In most East Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea,82

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giant

Malaysia, and Thailand, only one ministry directly handles all manufacturingissues. In export promotion, the textile sector alone has 10-12 agencies separately
promoting exports of apparel, cotton, wool, synthetic fiber, handloom, powerloom, silk, etc. whereas East Asian countries usually have only one export
promotion agency for all sectors (JETRO in Japan, KOTRA in Korea, MATRADE
in Malaysia, etc.)
Second, while state governments assume prime responsibility for implementing
policy measures specified in the NMP, their commitment to policy reforms
varies signiﬁcantly. In manufacturing, state governments issue licenses, provide
infrastructure, facilitate land acquisition, oversee environmental clearance, andso on. In these matters state autonomy is ensured and the federal government
cannot simply instruct state governments. Consequently, large performancevariation exists among states in, for instance, attracting investment and developing
industries.
Third, although the NMP outlines policy direction and broad measures, there isno concrete action plan which speciﬁes sub-actions, expected outcome, deadlines,
monitoring criteria and procedure, organizations with principal responsibility,
and organizations with supplementary responsibility. Such action plan matrices
are used to ensure policy implementation in a number of countries, but no suchmechanism has so far been mobilized in India.
National Investment and Manufacturing Zones (NIMZs), featured in the NMP
in which the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (see section 5) is supposed to be
the spearheading showcase, may also face similar problems in the forthcoming
implementation stage. It is unclear whether and how fast the NIMZ concept canbe put into practice. First, the establishment of an NIMZ requires approval byboth federal and state governments. According to the NMP, the application forestablishment of an NIMZ must be forwarded by the state to DIPP upon which
DIPP will constitute a Board of Approval for considering all such applications
and approving such proposals as are found feasible. Each NIMZ will be notiﬁed
separately by DIPP. How quickly and smoothly this process will go is to be seen.
Second, it is questionable whether a state-run SPV is capable of functioning as
an effective one-stop shop for NIMZs. Providing customer-oriented services toprospective investors and promptly solving daily operational problems faced bytenant ﬁrms in NIMZs is a challenge that requires deep understanding of global83

trends, enormous expertise, and dedicated effort. East Asian experiences showthat only a limited number of industrial estates can supply such services, and it
is particularly a tough call for state-run bodies. In fact, industrial zones in East
Asia, upon ofﬁcial approval, are usually built and managed by domestic or foreign
private developers rather than operated directly by the public sector. Given thatIndian authorities have not had any experience in offering efficient businesssupport functions in industrial estates, how effectively proposed SPVs can operateneeds to be seen.

4. Kaizen
The concept and practice of kaizen, and its associated tools such as 5S, mudaelimination, suggestion box, QCC, TQM, quality awards, etc., are widespreadamong ofﬁcials and organizations in the manufacturing sector of India. Though
our mission had no time to study the extent of sectoral or geographical reach, it isclear that kaizen is a ﬁrmly established practice in the Indian automotive sector
and is also recognized in some other sectors such as textile10. India is one of the
few countries that use the Japanese term “kaizen” to denote this practice11.
Kaizen was introduced to India with the establishment of the first factory of
Maruti Suzuki (joint venture of Suzuki for automobile manufacturing) in Gurgaon
in the State of Haryana in 1984. Indian managers and engineers at Maruti Suzuki
were trained and local component suppliers were selected and improved as
required by Japanese quality standards. For this, the Maruti Center for Excellence(MACE) run by Maruti Suzuki, as well as the Association for Overseas Technical
Scholarship (AOTS)12 training in Japan (Nagoya), played key roles. Japanesecomponent suppliers, such as Daiichi, and Japanese organizations, such as theJapan Productivity Center, also assisted Indian companies. Introduced practices
changed names from Toyota Production System (TPS) to Suzuki Production
10

Previously we visited an Indian textile ﬁrm spinning synthetic ﬁber in Kitwe, Zambia, which
practiced kaizen throughout its factory.
11
The term kaizen is also well known in Thailand and Ethiopia among industrial circles. In
Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and Malaysia, substance of kaizen is broadly introduced without
calling it kaizen.
12
In April 2012, AOTS and the Japan Overseas Development Corporation (JODC) were merged
into the Overseas Human Resources and Industry Development Association (HIDA).

84

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giant

System (SPS) then to Maruti Production System (MPS) but the contents remained
essentially the same. Honda also teaches kaizen. Other automotive producers inIndia include Hyundai, Toyota, GM, Volkswagen, Tata, and Mahindra & Mahindra(the last two are local and mainly produce commercial vehicles).
After nearly three decades of introduction, kaizen is widespread among car
assemblers and component suppliers. It is practiced smoothly without Japanese
assistance. All 380 ﬁrst-tier suppliers of Maruti Suzuki must practice kaizen whichis introduced by vendor training programs and monitored regularly. Local suppliers
teach kaizen to employees and new recruits through in-house training as well as
MACE and other external programs. One salient feature of Indian kaizen is active
interaction and migration of kaizen leaders both vertically and horizontally (between
Maruti Suzuki and suppliers as well as among suppliers). It is common thatexperienced kaizen experts at Maruti Suzuki teach vendors through short-term visits
or long-term assignments. Kaizen leaders of each company know each other wellthrough various programs, award ceremonies, and mutual assistance. This promotes
information sharing, standardization, and training of new employees. While exact
data are difficult to obtain, it is suspected that highly experienced Indian kaizen
leaders are thousands in number, if not more. While excellent persons and practices
are frequently recognized by prizes and awards, India does not have any official
licensing or certiﬁcation of kaizen leaders.
Another interesting feature of India is that kaizen has so far been private sector
activity without any support from government. In this sense, its development iscloser to Japan than Singapore or Ethiopia where the state is (was) the initiatorof national productivity movement. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
and the Automotive Component Manufacturers Association (ACMA), as businessassociations, are active promoters of kaizen. CII is particularly important inspreading the practice to non-automotive sectors. Its headquarters has a librarythat carries manuals and textbooks on kaizen. In this regard, JICA's Visionary
Leaders for Manufacturing (VLFM) program, led by Professor Shoji Shiba, forinculcating the spirit of Japanese manufacturing to senior and middle managers, isan important component (human capital). Another important industrial cooperationof JICA is the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (physical infrastructure), as
discussed below.
The mission visited one factory, Horizon Industrial Products, Pvt. Ltd., a85Blue Peter Group company, in Manesar Industrial Zone in the State of Haryana.
Blue Peter was a metal utensil manufacturer which turned to the production of
Maruti Suzuki components with the help of Maruti Suzuki in 1985 and Honda
components in 1996. Its products are welded and stamped automotive metal parts(45 parts for 6 car models) as well as jacks for all Maruti Suzuki cars. The factoryhas 120 staff (all Indians, of whom 60 are managers and engineers) with a very
low turnover (1% quit rate per year). It has six experienced kaizen leaders who
migrate actively across companies, three of whom were trained by AOTS. General
Manager Mr. V.K. Saxena is a veteran of kaizen since 1984 who was dispatchedfrom Maruti Suzuki to Horizon in 2010. The factory practices the same quality andproductivity activities as in any excellent Japanese company, including morning
meetings, weekly staff meetings, wall posters, kaizen and other boards, safetycontrol, suggestion box, red box (rejected parts are analyzed), in-house training
and awards, seven QC circles, clean toilets, family events and sports, etc. It
received the Corporates of the Future Award from CII and 5S Silver Award fromthe Suppliers Convention. For Maruti Suzuki (largest customer occupying 60%
of orders), the Dispatch Instruction System is used where part orders are received
on the previous day by email and delivered the next day by trucks, by 11am to the
Gurgaon Factory and by 2pm to the Manesar Factory of Maruti Suzuki.

5. D elhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor and investment
promotion by the State of Gujarat
The Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) is a flagship project of thegovernments of Japan and India, agreed by the two top leaders13. DMIC isconceptualized to eventually become India's largest industrial belt by linking
the industrial zones and harbors of the six states between Delhi and Mumbai(Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Maharashtra)
in order to promote export and investment by foreign enterprises, particularly
those from Japan. Under the DMIC initiative, plans are also being developed
13

See the Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership, signed by two Prime Ministers Mr.
Noda and Dr. Singh in December 28, 2011, entitled “Vision for the Enhancement of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership upon Entering the Year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations.” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kinkyu_
img/20111229_01.pdf

86

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giantto create industrial zones and logistics hubs with well-developed infrastructure
extending up to 150 kilometers on both sides of the Western Dedicated Freight
Corridor (DFC) which aims to provide fast-freight railway connection between
Delhi and Mumbai.14 The Japanese government is actively exploring ways tosupport the implementation of the NMP for which the DMIC project is regarded
as the principal instrument. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
has already signed ODA loan agreements (450 billion yen on STEP terms15) on
the DFC project. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) is also
supporting the DMIC Initiative by contributing to the Project Development Fund
(US$75 million) and equity participation in the DMIC Development Corporation(DMICDC)16. The majority of infrastructure projects in DMIC are envisaged to be
implemented through public-private partnerships.
Out of the six states covered in DMIC, the State of Gujarat is the front runnerin investment promotion and business environment. Furthermore, about 37% of
the planned DMIC route will pass through Gujarat and more than 60% of total
investment is likely to come to Gujarat (according to the information provided
by the Resident Commissioner of Gujarat in Delhi). Thanks to its proactive andbusiness-friendly policies for investment promotion, Gujarat has achieved tangible
results in enhancing the social and economic welfare of its people and has becomea highly industrialized state. Gujarat accounts for 7.5% of India's GDP (2011-12),
17% of national industrial output (2011-12), 26% of total investments (implemented
projects up to 2011), and 25% of India's exports (2010-11). With a long coastal line,
the state is strategically located and its ports handle 37% of India's total port cargo(2011-12). Unlike other states, Gujarat is a power-surplus state that can supply
electricity without interruption in every town and village in the state.
Gujarat's achievements can be attributed to three factors: (i) good leadershipof the current Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, who assumed office in 2001; (ii)cultural traits of the Gujarat people who are industrious and business-oriented; and14

Quoted from JICA homepage: http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2010/100726.html
The scheme of Special Terms for Economic Partnership (STEP) is designed to promote ODA
with a distinct Japanese proﬁle through transfer of Japanʼs advanced technology and knowhow to developing countries.
16
JBIC will invest about 260 million rupees ($4.67 million) or 26% stake and send an executive
as a board member of the DMICDC. JICA will also send an expert to DMICDC to provide
technical advice.
15

87

(iii) enabling business environment provided by the federal government througheconomic liberalization since 1991. In particular, Chief Minister Modi has won highreputation for his pro-business policy and moral authority. From around 2002-03,
various reform initiatives were taken under his leadership, which led to increasing
FDI to Gujarat. A good example is “Vibrant Gujarat Global Investors Summit,” asummit organized every two years by the Gujarat state government inviting businessleaders and prospective investors from all over the world. The ﬁrst summit was heldin 2003, and the sixth one is planned for January 2013. Gujarat is ranked top among
Indian states in terms of total investment attraction including both domestic and
FDI, and is poised to become a new hub for automotive production in India. Tataand Ford have already car plants in Gujarat17 and Maruti Suzuki plans to build its
third factory in Gujarat with expected start of operation by 2015.
Gujarat formulated its state industrial policy in 2009 embracing a vision of“Gujarat aspires to become a beacon of comprehensive social and economic
development”. The industrial policy of Gujarat discusses extensively the needto leverage DMIC and its surrounding area to integrate industrial, social, andinfrastructure development. To this end, special emphasis is placed on clusters,
large industrial zones (which can become NIMZs, subject to the approval of
DIPP), special economic zones (SEZs), and special investment regions (SIRs).
The state industrial policy is also mindful of the urgency of job creation and skill
development in light of growing young population who will enter the labor market
in the near future.
Regarding large industrial zones, the Gujarat Industrial Development
Corporation (GIDC), an SPV funded by the state through paid-up capital,
constructs basic infrastructure such as roads, power, water, sewerage, waste
treatment, etc. and develops industrial zones including land acquisition18. The
Industrial Extension Bureau (iNDEXTb) of Gujarat promotes investment inindustrial and infrastructure projects, acting as a single contact point. As partof the DMIC initiative, establishment of an industrial park dedicated solely to
17

Tata Motors originally planned to invest in the State of West Bengal, but decided to eventually
come to Gujarat due to the difﬁcult business environment in the former, especially in land acquisition.
18
In India, land acquisition for industrial purpose is a very difﬁcult matter due to complex registration of land inherited through history which does not easily reveal all owners. As a result,investors must spend signiﬁcant time in investigation and negotiation with farmers.

88

4. India̶A Liberalizing GiantJapanese enterprises is planned at Detroji (Sanand area)19. Currently, details arebeing worked out to launch the offer in December 2012.
A unique feature of this industrial zone is deep involvement of the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO) in providing full advisory and consultative
services to Japanese firms interested in investing there. Furthermore, JETRO
even directly negotiates with state authorities (including GIDC and iNDEXTb)
on behalf of individual Japanese enterprises on matters that require immediate
attention and action. In East Asia, such concrete problem-solving is usuallyhandled by private industrial estate developers, foreign or local, while JETRO'srole is to provide general information and facilitate FDI in its initial stages. Indiais the only country where JETRO provides full investor services both before
and after investment in place of private developers. Detroji is the second case ofJapanese industrial zones fully supported by JETRO, following the Nimurana
Industrial Zone located in the State of Rajasthan20. JETRO intends to scale up theexpertise accumulated through the experience of the Nimurana Industrial Zone toother states, particularly Gujarat.
In India, manufacturing is the “concurrent” sector in which federal and state
governments have shared responsibility for policy implementation. While the federal
government sets minimum standards for the regulatory framework (e.g., environment,labor codes), state governments can set their own guidelines (which are stricter thanfederal standards), issue business licenses and permits, facilitate land acquisition,and supply infrastructure. Now that the ﬁrst generation of economic reforms (generalliberalization) has advanced at the federal level, state-level efforts for the second
generation of reforms (which should include creation of jobs and value added) mattera lot for investors' choice of location for establishing new factories. States that offer
superior initiatives and business environment are likely to garner the lion's share in
new industrial investment.

19

Along DMIC, there are ﬁve planned NIMZs including a Japanese industrial zone in Gujarat(Detroji) mentioned in the text. They are the ﬁrst NIMZs notiﬁed by DIPP. It should be noted, however, that the concept of DMIC was shaped before the NMP invented the concept of
NIMZs.
20
The Rajasthan Industrial Investment Corporation is responsible for the development and management of the Nimurana industrial zone. About 80% of the Nimurana Industrial Zone has
already been rented out to approximately 40 companies.

896. Concluding observation
Successful execution of development policies requires fulﬁllment of the following
steps.
(i) Policy formulation̶ vision creation, consensus building, stakeholder
consultation, surveys and analyses, and documentation(ii) Implementation̶budgeting, staffing, legal base, organizational setup,
assignment of authority and responsibility, and monitoring and evaluation(iii) Economic performance̶growth, structural transformation, job and income
creation, productivity, innovation, and competitiveness.
Needless to say, (iii) is the ultimate goal while (i) and (ii) are the means toattain it. It must be stressed that perfection in (i) alone, or even (i) and (ii) jointly,
does not automatically guarantee (iii). Each step requires separate expertise andconditions, and their linkage is a complex one. If (ii) is lacking despite good effortin (i), implementation must be additionally learned. If (iii) is missing despite
progress in (i) and (ii), government should go back to (i) and re-work the direction
and concrete content of the policy from scratch. Studying India's policy method
sharply reminds us of linkage issues among these policy steps.
India is very strong in (i) but weaker in (ii) and (iii). The new manufacturing
policy in particular and development policies in general are the products of highly
complex consultation and interaction of all key players̶national leaders, federal
and state governments, business associations, and academia. The participatory
process is exemplary and admirable, and may even serve as a model for otherdeveloping countries. Virtually all officials and experts whom we interviewed
emphasized that the huge size, diversity, and democratic tradition of India
supported and legitimized this elaborate policy process.
Special features of India certainly dictate its policy methods. Due process andconsultative effort must be respected. At the same time, however, it should also be
pointed out that size, diversity and democracy do not justify all complexities andduplications. What can be simpliﬁed without loss of efﬁciency or legitimacy should
be simpliﬁed. There seems to be excessive subdivision of policy organizations andtoo many overlaps of responsibilities within the Indian government that can bestreamlined. For competent and proud technocrats, there is even a risk that policy
formulation becomes the end in itself without producing ﬁnal economic results. The

90

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giant

way must be sought to strengthen (ii) and (iii) while maintaining the achievementsin (i)21.
The first-generation reforms launched in 1991 were “easy” ones of gradualliberalization and opening up. The process has almost run its course and produced
initial results in economic growth. However, this is not enough to compete
globally and reach high income in the 21st century. The next step should beestablishment of policies and institutions to encourage and even compel domestic
citizens and enterprises to create value and compete effectively with a strong
foundation in productivity and innovation. Topics frequently discussed by Indianauthorities during our mission ̶ further liberalization and deregulation, job
creation, infrastructure, industrial zones, etc.̶are traditional ones that constituteonly a subset of industrial policy menus in East Asian high performing countries.
From now on, India is likely to need more proactive industrial policy that not only
cursorily mentions but can also actually implement a large number of capability
enhancing measures such as TVET, skills matching, SME management andﬁnance, FDI-local linkage, benchmarking, technology transfer, commercializationof R&D, coalition among government, businesses, and academia to produce newindustries and products, and so on.

21

During our stay in Delhi a local newspaper printed an article by one of the members of the
Planning Commission (Arun Maira, “The Reforms That Matter,” The Times of India, September 29, 2012). His argument was that institutional reforms of government and policy making
institutions were key to the successful implementation of the 12th Five-year Plan, in which
coordination within the Indian system and administrative reforms were most urgent. Admittedly, coordination and effective administration are important for policy execution, but they
are not enough. For India, acquiring technical expertise in industrial corridor design, strategic
FDI attraction, one-stop investor services, etc. on the ground is equally important for successful policy implementation.

91

Attachment 1

Mission Schedule (23- 30 Sept. 2012)
1. Mission Members
Kenicni Ohno Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan
Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Mieko Iizuka

Research Assistant, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

2. Mission Schedule
DATE

TIME
ACTIVITYAM
PM Arrival
AM Prof. Amitabh Kundu, Jawaharlal Nehru University
2 Sep 24 Mon AM Prof. B.N. Goldar, Jawaharlal Nehru University
PM Office of the Resident Commissioner, Government of Gujarat
AM Confedaration of Indian Industry (CII)
PM Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)
3 Sep 25 Tue PM Mr. Kazuki Minato, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan (@IEG)
PM Prof. Arup Mitra, Institute of Economic Growth (IEG)
PM Business dinner with JICA India office @ Oberoi Hotel
AM Horizon Industrial Products PVT. LTD.
4 Sep 26 Wed
PM Apparel Export Promotion Coucil (AEPC)AM Dr. Ram Upendra Das, Research and Information System for Developing Coutries (RIS)AM Planning Commission
5 Sep 27 Thu
PM Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM)PM Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce and Industry
AM JETRO New Delhi
AM JICA India Office
6 Sep 28 Fri
PM National Manufacturing Competitivenes Council (NMCC)PM Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance
7 Sep 29 Sat PM Departure (Kenichi Ohno & Izumi Ohno)
8 Sep 30 Sun AM Departure (Mieko Iizuka)
1 Sep 23 Sun

92

4. India̶A Liberalizing Giant

Organizations/Persons Visited
The Government / Governmental Organization of India

Organization
Planning Commission
Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion,
Ministry of Commerce and Industry
National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council (NMCC),
Ministry of Commerce & Industry

Attachment 2

Na m eRenu S. Parmer

Position
Adviser (Industry & VSE)

Daniel E. Richards

Director

Office of the Resident Commissioner, Government of Gujarat
Idustrial Extension Bureau, A Govt. of Gujarat Organization

Gaurav DaveR.Dharini
M.C.Singhi
Gopal Singh Negi
Bharat Lal
Amresh Chandha

Apparel Export Promotion Council (AEPC)

Chandrima Chatterjee

Joint Secretary
Deputy Chief
Senior Adviser
Adviser
Resident Commissioner
Jr. Resident Officer
Director, Economic & Consultancy/ComplianceDepartment of Economic Affairs, Ministry of FinanceResearch Institutes/ University
Organization

Na m ePosition
Amitabh Kundu
Professor
Purushottam M. Kulkarni Professor
Jawaharlal Nehru University
Deepak Kumar Mishra
Associate Professor
Bishwanath Goldar
Visiting Professor
Rajat Kathuria
Director & Chief Executive
Arpita Mukherjee
Professor
Indian Council for Research on international Economic Relations Chetan Ghate
Researve Bank of India Chair(ICRIER)
Sanjana Joshi
Senior Consultant
Francis Xavier Rathinam Senior Fellow
Pooja Sharma
Senior Fellow
Arup Mitra
Professor of Economics
Institute of Economic Growth (IEG)
Senior Fellow
Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) Ram Upendra Das

Private Sector

Organization
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM)
Horizon Industrial Products PVT. LTD.

Governmental Organization of Japan
Organization

JETRO New Delhi
JICA India OfficeInstitute of Developing Economies

Na m ePosition
Sarita Nagpal
Deputy Director General
Ritika Changia
Assistant Manager
V.K.Saxena
General Manager (Quality)
Sugata Roy Chowdhury Factory Manager

Na m eTomofumi Nishizawa
Kenichiro Toyofuku
Shinya Ejima
Sei Kondo
Kazuyoshi Ohnuma
Yui Nakamura
Kazuki Minato

Position
Director (Research)
Chief Representative
Representative
Representative
Programme Specialist
Res earc her

93

94

Centre for the Study of Regional Development (CSRD), A Profile
Vibrant Gujarat, Global Trade Show 2013
CD (including "Summit Brochure, Destination Gujarat, Sector Profile,
Presentaions & Films, Doing Business in Gujarat"
50 Golden Facts about Gujarat
Destination Gujarat
Welcome to Vibrant Gujarat -The Global Business HubCentres of Excellence
Wider Perspectives, Clearer Stragies, Smarter Initiatives
Retail in India, 2009
FDI in Retail Sector INDIA , 2005
Japan Project Newsletter 2011-12
about ICRIERICRIER䠖䚷Medium Term Strategy (2009-10 to 2019-20)
Leaflet

Title

List of Information Collected

ICRIER

Mathew Joseph & Nirupama Soundararajan
Arpita Mukherjee &Nitisha Patel / ICRIER

CII

Idustrial Extension Bureau, A Govt. ofGujarat Organization

Authors/Publisher

CSRD, SSS, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers
Ministry of Heavy Industries & Public
Automotive Mission Plan 2006-2016 -A Mission for Development of Indian Automotive Industry(SIAM)Enterprises
List of Items reserved for Exclusive Manufacture by Micro and Small Enterprise Sector
Definition of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in India (ANNEXURE-XII)
Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Statement on Industrial Policy (July 24, 1991)
DIPP, Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Departmet of Industrial Policy & Promotion Brief on Package for Special Category States of J&K, H.P. and Uttarakhand(DIPP)
Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) Project
National Manufacturing Policy Press Note No.2 (2011 Series)
Annual Report 2011-12
Measures for Ensuring Sustained Growth of the Indian Manufacturing Sector (Report of the Prime
National Manufacturing Competitivenes
NMCC
Minister's Group), September 2008
Council (NMCC)
PPT: Welcome to the Mission Members of GRIPS, JapanThe latest economic situation of India (Sept. 2012)
JETRO Business Support Center (New Delhi)
Economic situation and business environment of India (Sept. 2012)
JETRO, New Delhi Office
Comparative cost study for investment (Apr. 2012)
JETRO New Delhi(originally written in Japanese)
List of Japanese companies operating in India (Oct. 2011)
Trend of Japanese companies starting business operation in India, by industry (Apr.2012䡚䠅
Trend of local & foreign companies in India, by industry (Apr. 2012䡚䠅
Summary of the 6th survey on wage (Jun. 2012)
JCCII (originally written in Japanese)
News Letter from JICA-India Office, Issue 18 & 19
JICA India Office
List of Projcets in India 2012
JICA India Office
Operations & Activities in India
JICA (originally written in Japanese)
Visionary Leaders for Manufacturing (VLFM)
CII
Indian National Award on Professor Shoji Shiba

Indian Council for Research on
International
Economic Relations (ICRIER)

Confedaration of Indian Industry (CII)

Office of the Resident Commissioner,
Government of Gujarat

Jawaharlal Nehru University

Source 
Attachment 3

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

5. Mauritius－A Business-Friendly Island Economy(October 1- 4, 2012)

The policy research team of the GRIPS Development Forum (GDF), consisting ofProf. Kenichi Ohno, Prof. Izumi Ohno and Ms. Sayoko Uesu, visited Mauritius from
1 to 4 October, 2012. The mission objective was to collect information on (i) industrial
policies, tools and policy formulation mechanisms of Mauritius in the past and present,and (ii) its current economic policy direction. We have conducted similar missions
in a number of other Asian and African countries in search of best and diverse policy
practices. Information from these countries, including Mauritius, will be used in ourpolicy dialogue with other developing countries as well as for informing the Japanese
authorities involved in development cooperation, including those preparing for theFifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V) scheduledin June 2013. We would like to express our sincere appreciation to all organizations
and individuals who kindly received us and shared valuable information and insights
with us1.

1. History
Mauritius is a small island located in the Indian Ocean with a population of 1.3
million. The island was uninhabited until the Dutch came to colonize the island,
unsuccessfully, in the 17th century. After being abandoned by the Dutch in 1710,
the French took possession of the island in 1715 and ruled for the next hundredyears bringing Malgash and other African people from the continent. As a resultof France-Britain battles, Mauritius was colonized by Britain in 1810 and a large
number of Indians were brought to the island as labor at sugar and tea plantations.
With a constant influx of Chinese workers beginning in the early 20th century,1

Our deepest gratitude goes to Mr. Seewraj Nundlall, Director of Goods Producing Sector of theBoard of Investment, who kindly coordinated all meetings with the public sector. The mission
members would also like to thank Dr. Jean-Claude Maswana of the JICA Research Institute forhis intellectual and pragmatic help in conducting the ﬁeld research.

95

Mauritius became a multi-ethnic society where the majority was Hindu followedby Créole, Muslim, and Chinese. Ethnic and cultural diversity has become afundamental feature and asset of Mauritius to this date, where every citizen speaks
both English and French as well as their native language. Mauritius became
independent in 1968 and has enjoyed relative political stability since then.
At the time of independence, the economy was dominated by sugar plantation
which exported raw sugar to Europe. In the 1980s, Mauritius initiated economic
development with steady progress in structural transformation. With its per capita
GNI reaching US$8,240 in 2011 (World Bank), by now the country is regarded
as one of the most successful economies in Africa and extensively studied asmodel cases. Mauritius is also ranked high in terms of investment climate,competitiveness, climate and governance. For consecutive years, the country has
been ranked top in Africa in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Report2.
The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index ranked Mauritius at
54 out of 133 countries in 2011-12, behind only South Africa in the Africa Region.
The country scored the highest in the 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance.
However, success was neither naturally arising nor easily foreseeable at theoutset when the economist and Nobel Prize winner James Meade, around the timeof independence, gave a pessimistic view on the future of the island nation due tothe lack of natural resources and remoteness to any industrial areas, which wereseen as major obstacles for industrialization3. However, monoculture and isolation
did not prevent Mauritius from achieving an economic miracle. In retrospect,
the Mauritian government has been reasonably wise and strategic, making
right choices at every difficult point in the nation's short history. Proactive andforesighted policies included establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZs)
and development of the textile sector in the 1970s, as well as a more recent and2

Mauritius was ranked 19th out of the 185 countries in the 2013 Doing Business Report, improving ﬁve ranks from the previous year. The countryʼs ranking of Ease of Doing Business isalways the focus of attention of the government and private sector. For example, when Mauritius lost three ranks in the 2012 Report, both the government and private sector took this issue
seriously (even though it has remained top rank in Africa). The JEC memorandum on 2013
budget suggests that Mauritius improve its “Ease of Doing Business" environment and aim at
the top 15 countries in the next three years.
3
James Meade, a British recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics, prophesied in the early
1960s that Mauritiusʼs development prospects were poor̶that the country was a strong candidate for failure, with its heavy economic dependence on one crop (sugar), vulnerability toterms of trade shocks, rapid population growth, and potential for ethnic tensions.

96

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

successful restructuring of the sugar sector, as explained below. Mauritius has
diversiﬁed its industrial base and moved up to high-end products and services, as
described by the Joint Economic Council (JEC) in Figure 1 below, a movementthat still continues today.
By the 1990s the national economy had three pillars of sugar, textile andtourism. The textile industry was particularly remarkable, as it created more jobs,
boosted export, and contributed signiﬁcantly to the industrialization of the island.
Whenever possible, the mission asked public and private sector leaders of
Mauritius for the reason of success. Common answers included the smallness ofthe country where all key players in businesses and government personally knoweach other and work together intensively; and historical existence of entrepreneurs
and strong business culture which can interact with and lead government
effectively. With a capable public sector and a dynamic private sector, balance
between state and market has also been well managed historically without goingto either extremes.

2. New policy direction
However, success up to recent past was mainly due to ample supply of unskilledlabor and trade privileges such as sugar quotas and price guarantees in the European
market as well as the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) and the US African Growth andOpportunity Act (AGOA) for Mauritian garments. In recent years, harsh competition
from China and other Asian countries emerged. Moreover, as the country gradually
lost generous trade preferences in sugar and textile mentioned above, especiallywith the dismantlement of MFA at the end of 2004, many investors relocated theirfactories to other countries and the manufacturing sector of Mauritius began toshrink. This compelled the government to shift its policy focus from privileged
market access to a more open economy in pursuit of global competitiveness basedon human resource and technology.
The government has often sourced developmental ideas from East Asian
economies such as Taiwan and Singapore. In particular, the experiences ofSingapore, an island nation with spectacular performance, have been closely
studied influencing the economic and administrative management of Mauritius
as a reference point and benchmarks. In 2005, when the administration of Navin

97

Figure 1. Economic Trajectory of Mauritius

Source: Joint Economic Council (2012).

Ramgoolam came to power, the new government initiated a series of bold
economic reforms, which were also inspired by Singapore's experiences.
One of the boldest measures was extreme simpliﬁcation of tax rates. All taxes,
including corporate tax, VAT and personal income tax, are now uniformly set at15%. No special treatment or exemption is offered unlike the previous incentive
system built on generous tax holidays.
The government currently promotes both traditional sectors and new growth areas.
Traditional sectors̶sugar and textile in particular̶are supported for consolidationand more value creation. Mauritius still wants to develop manufacturing as it has
greater spillover effects than other sectors4. At the same time, ICT, medical devices
and services, precision engineering, pharmaceuticals, seafood, “land-based oceanic”(deep sea water development), and so on, are added as newly targeted sectors. The
government is preparing skills upgrading programs to meet human resource needsof these industries.
4

According to a certain study, an output increase of 1 rupee in manufacturing generates additional 51 cents in other sectors whereas a similar increase in the service sector creates only 27
cents additionally.

98

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

Another policy initiative is opening up to more aggressively absorb financial
and human resources from abroad to stimulate the economy. While Mauritius has
always tried to attract professional expatriates such as accountants and lawyers,
the government has extended the policy even to unskilled labor despite somesocial concerns. In fact, because of the shortage of non-professional labor in
the country, the manufacturing sector now has to recruit unskilled workers from
China, Bangladesh, Madagascar, and so on.
Deepening regional integration and becoming an international bridge is anotherimportant pillar. Being a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
Mauritius now sees countries in Eastern and Southern Africa as promisingmarkets. The government is also trying to take full advantage of its geographicallocation to become a bridge between growing Asia and Africa for business andﬁnance. In this connection, the government is negotiating a new Air Access Policy
to increase flights to these regions. Certainly, Mauritius is well connected toEurope by air; but there are no direct ﬂights to targeted African countries except
South Africa.
Two recent instances of successful policy adjustments in key industrial sectorsof textile and sugar also deserve special mention.
First, in order to cope with the announced disappearance in January 2005 of
the MFA, from which Mauritian garment producers had benefited greatly, thegovernment established a High-Powered Committee led by the Ministry ofIndustry. The committee reviewed the sector and decided to put much greater
emphasis on productivity and competitiveness instead of guaranteed access tolarge markets. Textile Emergency Support Team (TEST)5 was set up in July 2003
as a joint private-public initiative to assist any enterprise which showed serious
intention to become more competitive. TEST conducted work in two stages:(i) diagnosis of individual enterprises, followed by (ii) financial assistance torestructure them with the help of external consultants. Free diagnoses were carriedout by the National Productivity and Competitiveness Council (NPCC, see below).
5

Gilles Joomun, “The Textile and Clothing Industry in Mauritius,“ pp.206-207, in Herbert Jauch
and Rudolf Traub-Merz (eds.) The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2006, see http://library.fes.de/pdf-ﬁles/iez/03796/14mauritius.pdf.

99

Out of 260 eligible textile and garment firms, only 43 took advantage of freediagnosis, and none of them actually availed itself of subsidized restructuring. A
balanced mix of private effort and partial ofﬁcial support succeeded in downsizing
the sector. Weak producers exited while remaining enterprises are continuing to
improve productivity and becoming lean6.
Second, when the sugar industry was seriously hit by the removal of price andquota privileges of the EU market and forced transition to global competition in
2007, the Mauritian government negotiated with the EU for the provision of funding
for an upgrading program, in which the sugar industry was assisted in consolidation
and upgrading. New activities such as establishment of refineries, developmentof specialized sugar, creation of the bio mass industry, and distillery of rum were
initiated. Job loss due to the closure of many sugar mills for consolidation into
four large mills was compensated by a general retirement scheme. The fact that theMauritian sugar industry could be transformed in this way within only ﬁve years
was considered a miracle.
In the current policy debate, another wave of policy adjustments, which
may be larger than the case of textile or sugar, is discussed. Since around 2005
Mauritius began decisively to shift from the trade privilege regime to the open
competition regime. However, before solid results were obtained, global situations
became severely unstable with the Lehman shock and the Euro crisis. Challenges
from emerging economies such as China and India are also constraining thecompetitiveness of Mauritius. One group, for example the Ministry of Financeand Economic Development, advocates further external opening and freer markets
for actively inviting foreign enterprises and talents to invigorate the economy.
Another idea, which seems more widely shared among various public and privatebodies, wants government to do a little more, especially in sectoral targetingand incentives, to push the private sector because this group feels that leaving
economic development to market alone does not always attain the nation's full
6

The mission visited the main factory of Esquel (Mauritius) Ltd., a member of Esquel Groupof Companies headquartered in Hong Kong. It employs 3,000 people with additional 2,000in three other factories on the island. All materials come from China and this factory manufactures high-end cotton shirts (retail prices of $60-80) for the US market. It was the mostadvanced garment factory that the mission had known in terms of processes, skills and quality
control. Although workersʼ wages are high and rising ($300-650 per month), they are easily
offset by continuous productivity increase. Orders are rising despite global economic crises
and the company has to expand capacity every year.

1005. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

potential. There are also people in the middle who support new policy initiatives
but are hesitant to endorse selective promotion. This is a fundamental question inindustrial policy and it is interesting to see how the debate goes in the context ofMauritius.

3. Key support institutions and their evolution
Since the late 1960 s, institutions have been created to promote economic
development, initially to support the sugar industry and EPZs for the textile industry
and subsequently to promote other industries. Figure 2 shows their evolution overthe last four decades.

EPZs and export promotion

The history of Mauritius Miracle is closely associated with the development ofExport Processing Zones (EPZs) initiated in the late 1960s. With limited impact ofthe previous import substitution program, the government under the leadership ofFigure 2. Evolution of Major Institutions since the 1970s

101Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and Minister Duval explored alternatives
including the establishment of EPZs, although foreign (European) experts advised
the Prime Minister that EPZs would not work in Mauritius because of remotenessand resource constraints.
The driving force behind the introduction of EPZs was Professor Edouard Lim
Fat, a Sino-Mauritian professor and engineer, now respected as the “Father ofMauritius EPZ.” Intrigued by the success of EPZs abroad, he traveled to Hong
Kong, Puerto Rico, Singapore, and Taiwan to study their experiences. Having beenassured of its applicability in Mauritius, he submitted a report to the government
for its adoption and convinced the Prime Minister to opt for this approach. Prof.
Lim Fat ' s background, originating in East Asia, also helped to bring initialinvestors from Hong Kong and other Asian countries. Hong Kong manufacturers
were ﬁrst to come to Mauritian EPZs as they feared that the expected return of
the British colony to China in 1997 would destroy their business environment andlooked for another production base. Together with Prof. Lim Fat, Ministers ofIndustry, Foreign Affairs, etc. traveled extensively to promote Mauritian EPZs,
which showed firm commitment of the government to this policy and had aconsiderable impact on attracting foreign investors7.
The state worked hard to forge a difficult political consensus toward
establishment of EPZs. In December 1970 , the Mauritian parliament passed
the Export Processing Zones Act and the government created the necessary
framework for EPZs. Because strengthening the capacity of the Ministry ofCommerce and Industry was imperative, the government called for various
technical cooperation programs of international partners to increase its staff sizeand expertise, and created the Industrial Coordination Unit that covered project
evaluation and monitoring, investment promotion, export marketing, projectfunding, and provision of insurance to protect exporters against defaults byimporters. While foreign consulting firms were initially mobilized, they were
replaced as soon as Mauritian authorities gained expertise. This unit, initiallycreated for simplifying investment procedure in EPZs, later expanded to become
the Mauritius Development and Investment Authority (MEDIA) in 1983 andfurther renamed to the Mauritius Industrial Development Agency (MIDA) in 1993.
7

Sir Edouard Lim Fat, From Vision to Miracle: Memoirs of Sir Edouard Lim Fat and the Story of
the Mauritius Export Processing Zone (EPZ), Printed by T-Printers Co. Ltd., Mauritius, 2010.

102

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

MEDIA and subsequent MIDA had the following objectives:8
Promotion of goods and service export
Development and operation of industrial sites and estates
Plan, implement and review action programs for developing export-oriented
manufacturingAdvice to the Minister on all matters relating to export promotion
More speciﬁcally, it provided market information to entrepreneurs, organized
and assisted participation in trade fairs, promoted SME development, conductedmarket surveys, and developed industrial estates. Though MEDIA/MIDA was notmeant to be serving only the textile and garment sector, it was in reality one of
the main support agencies for this sector which became the dominant industrial
engine of EPZs.
Another important institution was the Export Processing Zones Development
Agency (EPZDA) set up in 1992 to ensure smooth transition from a laborabundant to a skills-intensive economy. This agency focused its assistance on the
textile and garment sector with its main objectives as follows9:
Diversiﬁcation of product range
Maintenance of growth of core textile products
Moving up the market to attain higher value added exports
Fostering textile clusters
Promotion of technology transfer and acting as a technology watch
Provision of support services in the ﬁeld of regional cooperation
R einforcing knowledge transfer through research and information
dissemination
Skills development
Promotion of ICT application in industry
E nhancement of enterprise efficiency through Business Process Re
engineering
One of the main achievements of EPZDA was the establishment of the Clothing
Technology Center where training was delivered to employees of the garment
8

Gilles Joomun, “The Textile and Clothing Industry in Mauritius,” p.205, in Herbert Jauch andRudolf Traub-Merz (eds.), The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2006. See http://library.fes.de/pdf-ﬁles/iez/03796/14mauritius.
pdf.
9
Ibid., pp.205-206.

103

sector to enhance their capacity to use new technologies in their factories.
In 2001, MIDA and EPZDA were merged into a one-stop service, Enterprise
Mauritius (EM), which provides assistance to the private sector that produces
exportable goods which are “Made in Mauritius.” It assists manufacturing ﬁrms
with such services as export promotion, export facilitation, export development,
and policy advocacy on international trade. Although EM is specialized in export
promotion, it must cooperate closely with other agencies to achieve results. For
exporting SMEs, the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority(SMEDA, discussed below) must first strengthen their design and production
capabilities. Once their products become exportable, EM can take over and assist
SMEs. For exporting FDI, the Board of Investment (BOI, also discussed below)
must initially attract appropriate foreign investors. Once they establish production
base in Mauritius, EM steps in to help and advise them in marketing their products
abroad. While the division of labor among EM, SMEDA and BOI is theoretically
clear, according to some observers, coordination among these implementing
agencies is in reality not perfect.

FDI attraction
With the promulgation of a new investment law in 2001, the Board of Investment(BOI) was established to facilitate and promote investment in Mauritius. BOI is thenational Investment Promotion Agency under the aegis of the Ministry of Financeand Economic Development. Similar to the Economic Development Board in
Singapore, it serves as a one-stop shop to both domestic and foreign investors. BOI
oversees both the production sector (manufacturing) and the service sector, andalso coordinates multi-sectoral investment projects such as the Jin-Fei Economic
Zone, a Chinese investment program to create an integrated city combining
industrial, commercial and residential areas. Activities of BOI include counseling on
investment opportunities in Mauritius, provision of sector-speciﬁc and tailor-madeinformation for potential investors, organization of customized meetings and visits,
and identification of joint-venture partners. The Board has about 90 staff, which
includes about 60 professionals and 30 support staff. It had three overseas bureaus in
Mumbai, Paris and London but they are now closed.
The majority of FDI come from the UK, India, France and South Africa,
accounting for more than 75% of the total FDI ﬂows in Mauritius in 2010. Real104

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

estate, ﬁnancial services, healthcare, hotels and restaurants are the major sectors
attracting FDI to Mauritius. With the Euro crisis continuing, Mauritius is moving
towards new markets in Asia and Africa. The country is increasingly positioned
itself to be a major business platform in the Indian Ocean, serving as a bridge
between Asia and Africa.
Being a small island country vulnerable to external shocks, Mauritius has been always
mindful of sending a strong pro-investment signal to both local and foreign investors.
As explained before, Mauritius has one of the world's most generous tax regimes,
where personal and corporate tax and VAT are harmonized at 15% and where dividends
are tax-free. There is no exchange control, and export-oriented firms enjoy duty-free
privilege for their inputs and equipment. Mauritius has also singed non-double taxationagreements with 39 countries so far (of which 13 are African countries) and is signatory
to a number of Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements, namely with 36
countries (BOI website).
For these reasons, BOI was awarded the Investment Promotion Agency of theYear Award for the second consecutive year at the Africa Investor Investment
Business Leader Awards, held in Tokyo in early October (during the IMF/WorldBank Annual Meetings), outperforming the Rwanda Investment Promotion Agency,
the Kenya Investment Authority, the Department of Trade and Industry of South
Africa, the Investment Promotion Centre of Mozambique, the Ghana Investment
Promotion Centre, and so on.

SME development
Starting one's own business as an independent and innovative SME is emphasizedin Mauritius for absorbing highly-educated talents. At high schools and universities,
students are encouraged to “be your own boss” instead of looking for a job at an
established ﬁrm.
In Mauritius SMEs are defined as enterprises with an annual turnover notexceeding 50 million rupees (about US$1.5 million). The country has about
100,000 registered SMEs in manufacturing and service sectors 10. The creationof EPZs had a positive effect on the development of local SMEs as most of the
textile factories provided materials and subcontracted CMT (cut-make-trim) works
10

About 40-50 % of trade establishments are not registered and excluded from the statistics.

105

to local ﬁrms. It thus created a vertical linkage in the textile industry, and as local
SMEs gradually gained expertise in production and quality control, they became
more independent from large ﬁrms and began producing clothing for the domestic
market (including the tourist market).
The government has always supported SMEs since the import-substitution
period of the 1960s. In 1976 the Small Scale Industry Unit was established within
the Ministry of Industry. It became the Small Industry Development Organization(SIDO) in 1983 with further reorganization as the Small and Medium Industry
Development Organization in 1993. After more reorganization in the 2000s, theSmall and Medium Enterprises Development Authority (SMEDA) was set up in
2009. SMEDA works under the auspice of the Ministry of Business, Enterprises
and Cooperatives, which was separated from the Ministry of Industry in 2008. It
has about 100 staff (of which 20 are professionals), allocated in the headquarters
and four outstations (three in Mauritius and one in Rodriguez Island). SMEDA
provides a range of assistance to SMEs covering business counseling, businessfacilitation, training, and marketing support. The mission visited the SMEDA
headquarter complex which comprised of classroom, library, training center,exhibition hall as well as administrative office. The exhibition hall of the
SMEDA head office (at Coromandel) serves as an important platform forshowcasing locally made products and allows foreign and local visitors including
representatives of hotels to purchase value-added gift items.
In addition, recent initiatives include the support to creative craft incubators,
as well as the establishment of the SME Resource and Technology Center. The
former provides assistance to creative crafts incubators in seven areas (ceramics
and pottery, pyrography, silk painting, coconut craft, wood craft/sculpture,ceramics, and painting on wood ship models), in the form of workspace,specialized training and mentoring services by Master Craftsmen. The SME
Resource and Technology Center, launched in April 2012, aims to provide support
to SMEs in search of information on recently developed technological innovations
that add value to their business activities. Such support includes personal coachingand online technical training on new technologies by local and foreign trainers
through proper information channels.
The budget for export marketing is normally allocated to Enterprise Mauritius(EM, see above). But for 2012 , because of the difficulties that SMEs are106

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

facing, SMEDA is additionally allowed to directly assist SMEs to participate
in international trade fairs. SMEs are also supported by the Mauritius Business
Growth Scheme, launched in 2011 with the World Bank assistance, which provides
ﬁnancial resources for consultancy.

Skills development
Mauritius stresses skills development and has created mechanisms for thispurpose, which are similar to the ones in Singapore. All firms must contribute
1.5 % of their employees' salary bills to the levy fund for training managed by
the National Human Resource Development Council, an agency established in
2004 under the Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development. Firms
are reimbursed when they send employees for training at the rate of 60-75% oftraining cost depending on the sector.
The Mauritius Institute of Technology and Development (MITD), establishedin 2009 as a successor of the Industrial Vocational Training Board (IVTB), offers
a wide range of skill development programs totaling 65 full-time courses at its 22
training centers. MITD has a governing board supported by strong partnershipwith the private sector. The feedback mechanism with industries allows MITD todevelop appropriate courses in response to business needs. In the future MITD
plans to become a regional hub for trainings as there is a large unﬁlled demand forskill training in Africa, and Mauritius is a short distance away from the continent.
Universities are also a part of the skill development mechanism. Mauritius
has two universities: the University of Mauritius, established in 1968, and the
University of Technology Mauritius, established in 2001. The latter and thenewer, which the mission visited, started with some 600 students initially and has
now expanded to boast 5,500 students with 90 programs. It has four Schools ofBusiness Management and Finance (to be soon split into Business and FinanceLaw), Innovative Technology and Engineering, Sustainable Development andTourism, and Health Sciences. Many programs are developed in collaboration
with the private sector as well as in support of government policy, with the
ICT sector as the most active collaborator with the university showing strong
performance. The university is preparing a new course in aeronautical engineering
starting in 2013 in response to the new government policy. Like MITD, it plans to
attract foreign students to become the knowledge hub in the region. The target set

107

by the government is 100,000 foreign students by 2020.

4. Policy making process and public-private dialogue
Mauritius ceased to make medium-term development plans in 2005 , andsince then the overall development direction is stipulated in the annual Budget
Speech, prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development after
consultation with line ministries and relevant private organizations.
Sectoral policies are drafted by line ministries. In the case of industrial policy11,
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce leads the process in consultation withprivate exporters, the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI, see
below), and other business associations. Once approved, the policy is implemented
by several public organizations, while the Ministry in charge assumes themonitoring function.
Since about four years ago, all government programs have been monitored
through program-based budgeting (PBB) with concrete targets allocated toindividual departments and agencies with evaluation and future budgets dependingon performance. Under PBB, all public authorities must make three-year rolling
plans which are submitted to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
for review. While this mechanism compels each ofﬁce to seriously pursue given
targets at hand, overall consistency of various policy components, across different
sectors for producing ultimate economic performance, is usually harder to obtain.
Inter-ministerial coordination at the policy level is ensured by cabinet meetings
held every Friday, which are chaired by the Prime Minister and attended byministers. Additionally, for important topics, ad hoc mechanisms are used. Recently,
the Prime Minister created the High-Powered Committee to examine bottlenecks ofthe economy, which was chaired by the Cabinet Secretary (the highest civil servant).
It invites the heads of EM, BOI, and other public authorities to discuss criticalissues such as the progress of the Jin-Fei Economic Zone. However, high-levelmechanisms such as these may not be sufﬁcient to attend to the details of concrete
11

Mauritius has published the Industrial and SME Strategic Plan (2010-2013), drafted by the
Ministry of Industry which was later split into the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (focusing on large establishments) and the Ministry of Business (focusing on SMEs). The mission
was unable to meet the Ministry of Industry. The Strategic Plan is a well-organized documentwith detailed action plans. Its challenges seem lie mainly in implementation and monitoring.

108

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

issues arising in individual sectors. More than one source admitted that coordination
among implementing agencies, as well as overall implementation records of
economic policies, had room for improvement.
One of the prominent features of policy making in Mauritius is very strong
and highly productive state-business relationship. It is in fact one of the mostproductive public-private dialogue we have seen in any country. The mission
conﬁrmed that small wise-men groups, with members coming from both public
and private sectors, has played a central role in policy making of Mauritius,enabling the country to engage in substantive policy discussions and makeappropriate choices at difﬁcult moments. Mauritius seems to be full of key persons
who are often long-time friends or alumni of the same university, who can ﬂexiblyinteract, migrate across government, business and academia, and collectively
draft policies. For instance, from around 2000 to 2005, when the country needed
to revise economic policies as trade privileges for Mauritius were being removed,
Mr. Sithanen, a prominent economist who later became the Minister of Finance,
drafted a proposal for opening up the nation and steered the government towards
that strategy.
In such intensive public-private dialogue, the role played by major businessorganizations such as the Joint Economic Council (JEC) and the Mauritius
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI) are particularly important, as they
are the ones that develop proposals that eventually become policies.
MCCI, established in 1850, is the oldest chamber of commerce in the Southern
Hemisphere. It has about 400 member firms, which covers 90% of the country's
larger establishments. While it provides usual business facilitation services tomember ﬁrms, its recent focus is advocacy at the policy level. For instance, MCCI
sits in all international trade negotiations together with the Ministry of Industry andother public authorities, a practice which is uncommon for traditional chambers ofcommerce and industry.
JEC, established in 1970 (two years after independence), is a summit organization
for coordinating different views of the private sector and advising the government
on policy matters. The Council has six sectoral associations and three multi-sectoral
organizations under it and its chairman is elected from among leading business109

leaders12. JEC is an influential private sector actor, integrating all sectors of theeconomy. Regular meetings are held between the government and JEC, on broad
economic policies, usually twice a year. These meetings are chaired by the Prime
Minister and are attended by senior Ministers as well. Furthermore, JEC has animportant say in the annual budget process, and its suggestions for better industrial
policies are frequently taken up by government budgets (Rojid et. al 2010, te Velde
2010).
JEC was initially less active in the policy ﬁeld, but it gradually became moreproactive as trust had built up between it and government. It is now quite active,
for example, in jointly preparing the Business Facilitation Program in 2006 with
BOI, and jointly proposing the economic reform in 2006 with the Ministry of
Finance. At the sector level, representatives of relevant ministries and privateorganizations from JEC meet twice a week to discuss policy issues and makedecisions. Mr. Raj Makoond, the incumbent Director of JEC, stressed that linkage
between policy and practice was crucial in effective implementation; theoretical
inputs from academics are not very useful. In fact, unlike India, Mauritius does nothave any think tanks that draft policies or conducts studies for the government. All
policies are generated through the interaction between government and businesses.
The below summarizes various interaction channels between the public andprivate sectors in Mauritius.

5. Kaizen in Mauritius
According to Imai (2009), Mauritius is one of the first African countries that
adopted kaizen practice. The National Productivity and Competitiveness Council(NPCC), an NPO established in 1999 (operational in 2000), is charged with thetask of advancing the productivity movement in Mauritius. The establishment of
NPCC followed the “Declaration of Productivity” by SADC in 1999, whereby theheads of states, including the Republic of Mauritius, committed themselves to
12

The six sectoral associations include: Mauritius Producer Association (MSP), Mauritius
Bankers Association (MBA), Mauritius Exports Association (MEXA), Association Hoteliers
Restaurateu de Lile de Maurice (AHRIM), Insurer Council Mauritius (ICM), and Association
Mauritian Manufacturer (AMM). The three multi-sectoral organizations are: Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture (MCA), Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI), and Mauritius Employers Federation (MEF).

110

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

meet socio-economic challenges in their respective countries through improved
productivity. At the same time, it should be noted that even before this initiative,
Mauritius had given serious consideration to the issue of quality and productivity.
The history of quality and productivity movement dates back to the 1980s, when
the textile sector struggled to attain quality standards set by foreign clients.
EPZDA mentioned above, which was handling the quality issue at that time,
introduced kaizen to the country by inviting quality experts dispatched by UNIDO
to train local ﬁrms and people.
At present NPCC is a relatively small organization with 14 staff (of which 9 areprofessionals). Its supervising ministries changed frequently from the Ministry ofPlanning and Economic Development to the Ministry of Training, then the Ministryof Education, and the Ministry of Business. Since this year (2012) it is under the
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. The most (80%) of its financial
resource comes from government budget with the rest financed by training andconsultancy fees.
Since its establishment, more than 80 ﬁrms have been trained in productivity andquality tools such as 5S, cell production, kanban, TQM, and TPM. The Council has
beneﬁted from Japanese cooperation from 2006 to 2010 with experts from the Japan
Productivity Center regularly visiting selected ﬁrms for quality improvement. An
observational study mission to Japan was also organized for Kaizen Championsof three of the ﬁve model companies in 2008, to give the opportunity to the modelcompanies to study Japanese SME development model and experience practicalimplementation of Japanese management and productivity techniques in theworkplace. In parallel, the Asian Productivity Organization trained NPCC staff from2006 to 2010 in productivity and quality techniques to strengthen their technical andanalytical competencies.
Figure 3. Interaction Channels between the Public and Private Sectors
Formal•Government/JEC meetings (chaired by
the Prime Minister)•Tripartite wage negotiations•Proposals for the National Budget•Representation in a number of committees

Informal•Regular meetings between Private Sector
organizations and relevant Ministries on
sectoral issues•Joint promotional activities•Ad hoc Committees

Source: S. Rojid, B. Seetanah & R. Shalini (2010), “Are State Business Relations important to Economic
Growth? Evidence from Mauritius”, IPPG Discussion paper 36.

111

Under the vision “Better Living for the Nation,” NPCC has launched a series ofcampaigns to raise awareness. For instance, “Make Mauritius Muda Free” was anation-wide campaign from 2003 to 2006 which included the younger generation
to learn a productivity culture. The NPCC is presently organizing another national
campaign on productivity with an overall aim of demystifying the concept of
productivity. Many related programs were conducted for students, communities
and women organizations, some of which are still in place. The Council also hassome projects in the pipeline for which it plans to work closely with the Ministryof Industry and SMEDA. However, recent funding cuts from the government andthe absence of its Director at the moment are causing delay and downsizing inthese activities.
At one time kaizen generated great interest in Mauritius. Kaizen appears to be
one of the effective tools to chart the nation towards productivity and innovation.
In order to re-ignite productivity fever, however, NPCC needs stronger support
from political leaders as well as increased budget and stafﬁng.

6. Concluding remark
Mauritius is widely viewed as a developmental success story. However, its
experiences reveal that the success is not brought by luck. Rather, it is the resultof conscious efforts by key leaders of the government and business sectors, overthe past four decades, to manage the development process with strong ownershipand forward-looking mindset. As a small island economy, Mauritius faces inherent
vulnerabilities. Sharing a sense of crises and the country's future vision, the public
and private sectors have established joint policy formulation mechanisms, bothformally and informally. In particular, small wise-men groups from the public andprivate sectors have played a central role in policy making of Mauritius, enabling
the country to engage in substantive policy discussions and make appropriate
choices at difficult moments. As such, they have developed quite an advanced
level of public-private alliance. Although Mauritius experiences cannot be directly
copied to other countries, we should bear in mind that “an economic miracle” does
not just happen, but that it has been made to happen by the efforts by foresighted
leaders in both public and private sectors.

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5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

Attachment 1

Mission Schedule (29 Sept.- 4 Oct. 2012)
1. Mission Members
Kenicni Ohno Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan
Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Sayoko Uesu

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

2. Mission Schedule

DATE
TIME
ACTIVITY
1 Sep 29 Sat PM Arrival (Sayoko Uesu)
2 Sep 30 Sun AM Arrival (Kenichi Ohno & Izumi Ohno)
AM Board of Investment
3 Oct 1 Mon
PM SEZ visit
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
AM
Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI)
4 Oct 2 Tue
Joint Economic Council (JEC)PM Mauritius Export Association (MEXA)Enterprise Mauritius
Small & Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA)AM
National Productivity and Competitiveness Council (NPCC)
5 Oct 3 Wed
Mauritius Institute for Training and Development (MITD)
PM
University of Technology Mauritius
AM Esquel Group
6 Oct 4 Thu
PM Departure113

Organizations/Persons Visited

Attachment 2

The Government / Governmental Organization of Mauritius
Organization

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

Board of Investment
Small & Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA)
Enterprise Mauritius

University / Institute

Organization
University of Technology Mauritius
Mauritius Institute for Training and Development (MITD)

Private Sector

Organization

Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI)
Joint Economic Council (JEC)
National Productivity and Competitiveness Council (NPCC)
Mauritius Export Association (MEXA)
Esquel Group

114

Name
Position
Vishnu D. BassantDirector
F. Dilmahamood
AnalystK. Rughoomkh
AnalystP.Kutwoaroo
AnalystP.Hurry
Consultant
Seewraj Nundlall
Director, Goods Producing Sector
Shakeel Jaulim
Investment Advisor
Indranee Seebun
Managing Director
Maurice Chi Kam Chun
Assistant Manager
Mohammad Ehsan Saumtally Assistant Manager
S.BhanjiDirector
Dev Chamroo
Chief Executive Officer
Nitish Gobin
Manager, Market Research

Name
Dharamand Fokeer
Pradeep Joosery

Position
Director General
Officer in Charge

Name
Mahmood Cheeroo

Position
Secretary-General
Manager, Economic Analysis andIndustry Division
Director
Productivity Executive
Productivity Consultant
Productivity Specialist
Director
Director
Technical Engineering Dept. Manager

Renganaden Padayachy
Raj Makoond
Dominique Louise
Dev Appalswamy
Hemlata Ramsohok
Daniel Wong
Hemraj Ramnial
Jeebun L.K.

5. Mauritius̶A Business-Friendly Island Economy

Attachment 3

S ourc e

Board of I nves tm ent (BOI)
Mauritius Export Association(MEXA)

List of Information Collected
Title

Pamphl et on M auritius
MEXA Directory of Export
Annual Report 2010
The Exporter, Issue No.13 Dec. 2011

Ministry of Ind ustry, Commerce andConsumer Protection and Ministry
Mauritius Business Excellen ce Award 2012of Business, Enterprise andCooperatives
Mauritius Bu siness Growth Scheme(MBGS) Unit, Ministry of Business, Leafle t etc .
Enterprise and Coopera tives
Competitiveness Foresight -What Orientations fo r Maur itius(A Disucussion Paper, January 2005)
Nationa l Productivity and
NPCC News Letter, Vol.9 No.3-4Competitiveness Council (NPCC)
Annual Report 2007/2008, 2008/2009, 2009/2010
Leafle t
SM EDASME Direc tory 2011

Ent erpris e Ma uritius
Esquel Group

Maurit ius, Your Sourc ing D est inat ion
Pamphl et

Aut hors/P ublis he r

BOI

MEXA
Ministry of Industry,
Commerce andConsumer Protection
MBGS Unit

NPCC
Ministry of Bu siness,
Enterp rise andCoope ratives
Enterp rise Maurit ius
Esqu el Group

115

6. Malaysia－Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap
(June 24-28, 2013)

Researchers of the GRIPS Development Forum, together with the Ethiopian
delegation led by H. E. Mr. Sisay Gemechu, State Minister of Industry,
visited Malaysia from June 24 to 28 , 2013 to study Malaysia ' s experiences
in industrialization including export and investment promotion, and to draw
implications for Ethiopia1. This study tour was arranged by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) in response to the request made by H.E. Mr.
Mekonnen Manyazewal, then Minister of Industry, who indicated strong interestin learning from Malaysia, inspired by the presentations made by the officialsof the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE) and the
Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA) at the 2nd (August 2012)
and the 3rd (January 2013) High-Level Forums for the Phase II Ethiopia-Japan
Industrial Policy Dialogue.
The Ethiopian delegation consisted of eleven ofﬁcials of various ministries andagencies, including the Ministry of Industry (MOI), Ethiopia Investment Agency(EIA), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), Ethiopia
Revenue and Customs Revenue Authority (ERCA), Leather Industry Development
Institute (LIDI) and Textile Industry Development Institute (TIDI). The Japanese
members consisted of Mr. Keiji Ishigame (JICA headquarters)2, Prof. Kenichi
Ohno, Prof. Izumi Ohno, and Ms. Miho Murashima (GRIPS Development
Forum). The GRIPS mission participated in some of the study tour program
as well as conducted separate meetings with government agencies, businessassociation, research institutes and Japanese organizations (see attachment for1

The study tour for the Ethiopian delegation was arranged for the period of June 24-July 5,
2013, except for H. E. Mr. Sisay who stayed in Malaysia for the ﬁrst week only. As part of theEthiopia-Japan industrial policy dialogue the GRIPS Development Forum was commissioned
by JICA to compile information in selected East Asian countries for the use of other developing countries including Ethiopia.
2
Mr. Ishigame is Deputy Director, Private Sector Development Division, Private Sector Development Group, Industrial Development and Public Policy Department, JICA. He joined themission from June 24 to 26, 2013.

116

6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap

mission schedules)..
We would like to express our deep appreciation to MIDA which organized the study
tour program and the JICA Malaysia ofﬁce, particularly Ms. Mayumi Suehiro and Ms.
Umme Aiman Siddiqi who coordinated the program in close cooperation with MIDA.
We are also grateful to all other organizations and individuals who kindly sharedvaluable information with us. The following summarizes highlights and main ﬁndingsof the mission.

1. History of Malaysia's industrial development
Malaysia is a country in Southeast Asia with a population of about 28.6 million(as of 2011) consisting of the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians. Since its
independence from Britain in 1957, Malaysia has successfully transformed its
economic structure from a resource-based to a manufacturing-based one. Throughthe 40 years of industrialization effort, Malaysia's GDP per head increased from
US$376 in 1970 to US$9,976 in 2012, and manufacturing's contribution to GDP rosefrom 11% in 1970 to 25% in 2012 (EPU data). By now, Malaysia has emerged as
one of the world's largest exporters of consumer and industrial electronic products,
with the share of manufactured exports rising from 11.9% in 1970 to 67% in 2012
(Department of Statistics data).
The industrial policy of Malaysia has gone through several stages (Figure 1). In
the early years of independence, the main objective was diversiﬁcation of economic
structure to escape from heavy dependence on a few traditional primary commodities
such as rubber, tin, timber, and palm oil. In the 1970s, policy focus shifted from importsubstitution to export orientation based on attraction of manufacturing FDI which
engaged in assembly and processing for export. To expedite this policy, a seriesof laws such as the Investment Incentive Act (1968) and the Free Trade Zone Act(1971) were introduced. The May 1969 ethnic riot was a big shock to Malaysia, andconsequently, the government formalized the Bumiputra (indigenous residents) policyby putting in place racial afﬁrmative actions for public positions, business ownershipand management, and worker employment in favor of ethnic Malays. In the 1980s,
under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir, heavy industrialization was initiatedwhile export oriented policy was continued for electronics. Look East Policy (learningfrom Japan and South Korea) was also launched at that time.

117

Figure 1. Malaysia: Evolution of Industrial Policy

The first Industrial Master Plan (IMP1) 1986-1995 included outward-looking
industrialization which targeted exports, modernization of supporting industries andstrengthening of industrial linkages. A number of liberalization measures, such asallowance of 100% foreign ownership to enterprises which meet some conditions,were undertaken. In 1991, Prime Minister Mahathir announced Vision 2020, anaspiration to become a fully-developed country by 2020. Ever since, Vision 2020
has become the supreme national goal of Malaysia for all policies and actions. The
Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) 1996-2005 was guided by two overruling
ideas of “cluster-based industrial development” and “manufacturing plus plus”. The
Third Industrial Master Plan (IMP3) 2006-2020 seeks holistic development. Services,
especially high-value services and industry-supporting services, have been added tothe policy menu along with traditional manufacturing.

118

6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap

2. Recent initiatives and economic policy-making process
The year 2010 marked another turning point for Malaysia. In response to
the World Bank's warning that Malaysia faced a middle income trap (WorldBank 2009)3, Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, who assumed power in April
2009, announced the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010, which aimed attransforming Malaysia from a middle-income economy to a high income economy
by year 2020. With the launch of NEM, overcoming the middle-income trap
has become the most important economic goal of the Malaysian government.
Although Bumiputra policy will not be dismantled any time soon, emphasis isshifting from administrative ethnic quotas to market-guided equal opportunities
among all ethnicities.
NEM concretizes the economic goals of Vision 2020 and the National
Transformation Policy, declaring that (i) Malaysia wants to attain high-income
status with per capita income of US$ 15 , 000 by 2020 ; (ii) growth should be
inclusive and strike a balance between the special position of Bumiputra andlegitimate interests of other groups; and (iii) economic and environmental
sustainability must be assured.
To achieve these goals, the National Transformation Policy sets a slogan,“1Malaysia̶People First, Performance Now” and establishes transformation
programs including the Economic Transformation Program (ETP) and theGovernment Transformation Program (GTP). These are supported by the 10th
(2011-2015) and the 11th (2016-2020) Malaysia Plan. ETP is one of the pillars of
the National Transformation Policy. It comprises NEM with its eight Strategic
Reform Initiatives (SRIs) and 12 National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs).
NKEAs include 11 sectors and one region as engines of future growth, which
are considered high value-added, knowledge intensive and high technology
sectors4. GTP is another pillar of the National Transformation Policy, aiming at
fundamentally transforming the Government into an efﬁcient and citizen-centeredinstitution with seven National Key Result Areas (NKRAs) and Ministerial Key
3
4

World Bank, Malaysia Economic Monitor: Repositioning for Growth, November 2009.
The following 11 sectors and one geographic area have been designated as NKEAs: oil, gas andenergy; palm oil; ﬁnancial services; tourism; business services; electronics and electrical; wholesale
and retail; education; healthcare; communications content and infrastructure; agriculture; and theGreater Kuala Lumpur/Klang Valley area.

119Result Areas (MKRAs). Lately, four more transformation programs have been
added to the National Transformation Policy, i.e., “Social”, “Community (Rural &Urban)”, “Political”, and “Digital.” The structure of the National Transformation
Policy is shown below.
NEM was formulated by the National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC),
which was established by the Prime Minister and operated from May 2009 to May
2011. NEAC was chaired by Tan Sri Amirsham A. Aziz, former Minister of thePrime Minister's Department in charge of EPU and the Department of Statistics, andincluded ten members representing the private sector, academia, and development
experts including a World Bank senior ofﬁcial. NEAC published a two-part reportoutlining strategic directions as well as necessary policy measures that aimed atpromoting Malaysia's growth in an inclusive and sustainable manner. The reportprovided the basis for pillars of the National Transformation Policy. The newly
created Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) under the Prime
Minister's Department was designated as the agency for monitoring and facilitating
the implementation of the National Transformation Policy.
The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) is a principal government agency responsible
for preparation of development plans for the country. Since its establishment in
1961, EPU's functions have remained basically the same although it has taken on
additional roles in consonance with the changing emphasis of the government's
development policy.
The 10th Malaysia Plan (2011-2015, 10MP) is a 5-year plan formulated andimplemented by EPU under the Prime Minister's Department. In the present
context, 10 MP is regarded as the government ' s action plan to implement
the National Transformation Policy. It has adopted an “ Integrated National
Development Planning” approach which differs from the previous plans in several
aspects5. Based on the perceived weaknesses of 9MP, the new planning approach
introduces more ﬂexibility in resource management for key priority areas. It aims
to ensure that outcomes are systematically linked within and between all levels ofplanning from central design, subsector policy formulation and implementation.
Integrated outcomes would be achieved by the cascading of Key Result Areas
5

The remainder of this paragraph is based on “A New Approach to the 10th Malaysia Plan” by
Y. BHG. Datoʼ Noriyah Binti Ahmad, Director General, EPU of the Prime Ministerʼs Department, October 27, 2009.

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6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap

Figure 2. Malaysia: National Transformation Policy

Source: the Economic Planning Unit. The number of pillars in the National Transformation Policy
has increased from the original two (ETP and GTP) and even varies with ministries and agencies
interviewed. According to the explanation of EPU in late June 2013, it has six pillars as shown in thisdiagram.

(KRAs) from the national and sectoral levels to the implementation level. For
each KRA, one or more national outcomes are identiﬁed, and for each national
outcome a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are established. During theplanning process of 10MP, national priorities and targets have been identified
systematically, in accordance with the National Transformation Policy based on
NEM, and linked with resource allocation.
More speciﬁcally, there were three major changes in the development planningapproach. First, Outcome-based Budgeting (OBB) has been introduced to 10MPby linking budget allocation to program outcomes defined in the planning
framework. This should provide flexibility to review programs and projects forachieving expected outcomes. Under OBB, a core ministry is appointed for eachprogram. Second, instead of “Inter-Agency Planning Groups (IAPGs)”, “Mission
Cluster Groups (MCGs)” have been formed around priority policy areas, as away of facilitating inter-agency and stakeholder coordination beyond the existing
ministerial/agency boundaries. Also, wider stakeholder consultations have been
introduced through MCGs. In this way, the MCGs (issue-based inter-ministerialgroups with think-tank functions) and the National Development Planning
Committee play important role in planning and implementation of 10MP (Figure1213). Third, beginning with 10MP, a two-year rolling plan with an annual review has

been introduced replacing ﬁve-year planning with a mid-term review in the past.
This aims to provide greater ﬂexibility in adjusting spending and responding tochanges in the global environment.

3. Institutions and strategies for supporting industrial
development
In Malaysia, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is theministry charged with planning, legislating and implementing international tradeand industrial policies toward achieving Vision 2020. MITI has comprehensive
policy coverage including (i) industrial development, international tradeand investment; (ii) foreign and domestic investment; (iii) export promotion(manufactured products and services) with enhanced bilateral, multilateral andFigure 3. Malaysia: New Development Planning Framework under 10MP

Source: the Economic Planning Unit.

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6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap

regional trade relations and cooperation; and (iv) national productivity andcompetitiveness in the manufacturing sector. These policies are implemented
by seven executing agencies called the “ MITI family ” which include the
Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA), Malaysia External
Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE), Small and Medium Enterprise
Corporation Malaysia (SME Corp), Malaysia Productivity Corporation (MPC),
Malaysia Automotive Institute (MAI), Malaysian Industrial Development Finance(MIDF), and Halal Industry Development Corporation (HDC).
The GRIPS team had opportunities to visit MITI as well as MIDA, MATRADE,
and SME Corp among the MITI family. In addition, the GRIPS team visited
Bank Negara Malaysia, which is the central bank, and SIRIM Berhad, the stateowned national corporation for standardization, quality and industrial research anddevelopment. Main features of these organizations are given below.

3-1. Malaysian Investment Development Authority
The Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA), established in 1967,
is the principal investment promotion agency under MITI and the first point ofcontact for investors. While MIDA initially focused on attracting manufacturing
FDI, its mandate has expanded in 2004 to include investment promotion in theservices sector6. With rising wages and the government's orientation towardinnovation and high skills, MIDA wants traditional labor-intensive industries suchas garment to leave the country and become global. Instead, Malaysia wishes topromote high value-added, high technology, knowledge-intensive and innovationbased industries and services. In 2011, MIDA was renamed from the Malaysian
Industrial Development Authority to the Malaysian Investment Development
Authority (with the same abbreviation but with a new logo).
The main functions of MIDA are investment promotion, evaluation and approvalof licenses and incentives, planning for industrial development, and follow-up andmonitoring of the implementation of investment projects. Regarding investment
promotion, MIDA adopts a strategic approach in which general attraction andtargeted attraction are combined. In addition to regular trade and investment
missions, meetings, seminars and international exhibitions, it dispatches specific6

Excluding ﬁnancial services and utilities, which belong to Bank Negara Malaysia and Malaysia Communication and Multimedia Commission, respectively.

123

project missions offering customized incentives packages to targeted foreigncompanies. MIDA has 24 overseas ofﬁces which actively promote and attract FDI in
the manufacturing and service sectors.
MIDA issues manufacturing licenses, evaluates and grants various incentives
such as tax incentives (i.e., pioneer status, investment tax allowance, reinvestment
allowance, and import duty and sales tax exemption), expatriate posts, and importduty exemption on raw materials, components, and machinery and equipment.
MIDA has no minimum capital requirement for license approval, welcoming all
sizes and sectors of investors except those on the negative list. At the same time,
MIDA leverages incentives to promote priority sectors. In accordance with NKEAs,
it currently prioritizes high-tech and high value-added manufacturing and services
rather than traditional manufacturing. MIDA gives incentives to domestic andforeign companies without discrimination (except for customized deals to attract
targeted individual FDI companies mentioned above).
MIDA's investment incentives are given by the combination of the publishedeligibility list and case-by-case organizational judgment. The National
Committee on Investment (NCI), established in May 2010 and chaired by the
MIDA Chairman, is the central committee for deciding projects and incentives
on a weekly basis. This is an inter-ministerial committee for quick decision,
where officials from relevant ministries and agencies with decision-making
authorities attend. Also, MIDA has a “One-Stop Center” to assist investors. Senior
representatives from key agencies are stationed at MIDA's headquarters to advise
investors on government policies and procedures, and those agencies basedoutside MIDA also assign contact persons in charge7.
At the implementation stage, MIDA supports investors in obtaining allnecessary approvals until their projects become operational. To this end, MIDA
also has one-stop agencies at the state level. Thanks to such follow-up andserious project screening mentioned above, Malaysia enjoys a relatively high FDI
implementation ratio (75.7% of approved projects). Furthermore, MIDA continues
7

Six organizations are stationed in MIDA including Immigration Department, Royal Malaysian
Customs, Department of Environment, Tenaga Nasional Berhad (Electricity), Telekom Malaysia Berhad (Telecom), and Labor Department. Organizations based outside MIDA are Department of Occupational Safety and Health, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, Ministry of
Tourism, Ministry of Human Resource, Ministry of Higher Education, Multimedia Development Corp. (MDeC), and Construction Industry Development.

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6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap

to help existing companies in production expansion, product diversiﬁcation andother reinvestments.
Recently, MIDA increasingly focuses on domestic investment in addition to
FDI as the Malaysian government promotes domestic investment and nurture
Malaysian companies to become global players. Under ETP, domestic investment
is targeted to account for 73% of total investment by 2020. This is a higher target
than what was envisaged in IMP3 (60%). MIDA initiated various policy measures,
including the Domestic Investment Strategic Fund, to spur domestic investment. It
also provides hand-holding services to domestic investors at 12 state ofﬁces.

3-2. MATRADE
MATRADE, established in 1993 , is a national export promotion agency
under MITI responsible for Malaysia's external trade with particular emphasison the export of manufactured and semi-manufactured products and services.
MATRADE assists Malaysian companies to establish their presence and raise
their proﬁles in foreign markets through various promotional activities, such as
participation in trade missions, specialized marketing missions and international
trade fairs. MATRADE also organizes business matching programs for Malaysiancompanies and foreign importers. Like MIDA, MATRADE has a broad overseas
network of 35 trade ofﬁces and eight marketing ofﬁces in 40 countries, of which
21 ofﬁces are in Asia.
MATRADE provides services in “exporter development”, “export promotion”,“trade and market information” and “trade advisory support” to assist Malaysiancompanies with knowledge and skills. Among them, “exporter development”
service offers a hand-holding program to assist Malaysian companies, particularly
SMEs, to develop necessary skills and knowledge to penetrate and expand
export markets, and meet international standards in technology, product design,
packaging, and health and safety standards. Companies with export potential are
selected to join the program under which assistance will be provided for export
promotional activities, training, market and product consultation, etc. for three
years.
The Malaysian Export Exhibition Center (MEEC) is a permanent display center
located inside MATRADE showcasing Malaysian products and services. Businessmeetings can be arranged for foreign buyers to meet Malaysian companies

125displaying their products and services at MEEC.
In Malaysia, no numerical export targets are set by the government. Although
the government actively promotes exports of the Malaysian products, it takes theview that ﬁnal results are up to the private sector.

3-3. SME Corporation Malaysia
SME Corporation Malaysia (SME Corp) was established in 2009 as an agency
under MITI, by upgrading the Small and Medium Industries Development
Corporation (SMIDEC)8. Its key functions are to coordinate policies and programsfor SMEs across all sectors, provide business advisory and information, and develop
competitive SMEs through capacity building programs. Additionally, SME Corp acts
as the Secretariat for the National SME Development Council (NSDC), establishedin 2004, which is the highest policy-making body for SME development across all
economic sectors. NSDC is chaired by the Prime Minister and members compriseministers and heads of 15 ministries as well as three agencies (BNM, EPU, andDepartment of Statistics) involved in SME development. According to SME Corp,
since 2004 (when NSDC was created), the average annual growth of the SME sector
has constantly been higher than that of the overall economy.
In Malaysia, SMEs account for 97.3% of total business establishments (662,939),
and micro-enterprises (with less than five workers) occupy 75%. The majorityof them are in the services sector, with manufacturing SMEs accounting for lessthan 6%. SMEs play an important role in the Malaysian economy contributing to
32.5% of GDP, 57% of employment, and 19% of exports (SME Census 2011). The
SME Master Plan 2012-2020 envisages that the SME contribution to GDP would
increase to 41% by 2020 through development of innovation-led and productivitydriven enterprises. The SME Master Plan aims to create globally competitive
SMEs that enhance wealth creation and contribute to social well-being of thecountry. For this purpose it proposes 32 initiatives, of which six are designatedas “High Impact Programs9.” In 2012, Prime Minister Najib launched “the SME
8Compared to its predecessor, the Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation(SMIDEC), established in 1996, which focused on the manufacturing sector, SME Corp has abroader mandate covering all SMEs. Until 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia served as the secretariat of the National SME Development Council.
9Six "High Impact Programs" are (i) integration of business registration and licensing (toenhance ease of doing business), (ii) technology commercialization platform (to encourage126

6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap

Week,” making the fourth week of June to highlight the importance of SMEs
every year.
SME Corp coordinates and organizes various programs improving SME accessto infrastructure, finance, advisory services and information, technology, andhuman capital10. Below are some of such activities.
One Referral Center (ORC) is a focal meeting point for SMEs to get business
advice and information. In addition to the central location in Kuala Lumpur,
ORCs are located in 11 states. Available services include Business Advisory
Services, ORC Link, Info. Center, Resource Center, Pocket Talks, SME ProductGallery, and Virtual ORC.
SME Expert Advisory Panel (SEAP) is a 3-phase program that provides onsite assistance and transfers technology and technical know-how to SMEs by 64
industry experts in the areas of operation and financial management, productivity
improvement, lean production system, marketing, compliance to standards andcertification, and packaging and labeling.
SME Competitiveness Rating for Enhancement (SCORE) is a diagnostic toolto rate performance and capabilities of SMEs. Based on the rating, SME Corp
can provide appropriate support to individual SMEs in training, consultationand finance to enhance their competitiveness. For micro-enterprises, the more
simplified M-CORE is used as a diagnostic tool.
For human capital development, short-term courses are available at 47 training
centers appointed by SME Corp. Also, SME University (modeled after Japan's
SME Universities) provides 3-month structured learning opportunity for CEOs andmanagers of SMEs in both theory and practice.
Promoting branding through certificating and issuing the National Mark of
Malaysian Brand for ensuring the quality of products or services.
1-InnoCERT is a program that recognizes and certifies innovative companies
including SMEs and encourages entrepreneurs to venture into high technology andinnovation), (iii) SME investment program (to provide early stage financing), (iv) going
export program (to expedite internationalization of SMEs), (v) catalyst program (to promote
more homegrown champions), and (vi) inclusive innovation (to empower the 40% of lowestincome earners).
10
In 2013, 155 SME programs are planned across ministries and agencies, which will be
implemented not only by the government funding (139 programs), but also by private sector
funding (16 programs).

127

innovation-driven industries (modeled after Korea's InnoBiz). Companies will be
guided by coaching and business advice. Certified companies are given fast-track
access to incentives including financing facility, tax deduction, and government
procurement.

SME Corp runs SME Info Portal, which is a one-stop information hub. It
provides information an all aspects of SME development including financing,
advisory services, training programs, business and networking opportunities aswell as other SME development programs and initiatives by both government andthe private sector.
There are several notable features of SME policy in Malaysia. First, its primaryobjective is not poverty reduction but enhancement of innovation, emergenceof homegrown champions, and SME internationalization. Second, the approachof SME Corp is to cultivate independent SMEs which can compete in global
markets rather than to develop supporting industries (component suppliers) bycreating production linkages between local and FDI firms. According to SME
Corp, the Industrial Linkage Program, introduced by SMIDEC in 1997 to speed
up industrial deepening in Malaysia, is no longer implemented. Third, SME Corp
maintains contact with companies which have graduated from its support programs,
encouraging them to be mentors for other SMEs.

3-4. Bank Negara Malaysia
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), established in 1959, is the central bank of
Malaysia. Besides conducting monetary policy and ensuring financial systemstability, it additionally assumes a developmental role through a comprehensive
mechanism for SME financing. These include establishing institutionalarrangements, strengthening ﬁnancial service providers, developing a microﬁnanceinstitutional framework, hosting special funds and financing schemes, andimproving outreach and awareness. The Development Finance and Enterprise
Department of BNM is responsible for these tasks.
There are various types of ﬁnancing for SMEs including loans by commercial
banks, loans by development ﬁnancial institutions (DFIs), loans by government
agencies, and equity, grants and guarantees, which are available at different stagesof business development (start-up, early stage and growth expansion, as well as at
the time of distress). While the commercial banking system is the main provider

128

6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trapof SME ﬁnancing accounting for nearly 90%, the other sources of SME ﬁnancing
are channeled by the DFIs and the various special funds established by thegovernment.
DFIs are specialized financial institutions established and funded by thegovernment that aim at accelerating the growth of strategic sectors identified
by the government. There are six DFIs under the purview of BNM11: EXIM
Bank, Agro Bank, Development Bank, National Saving Bank, Rakyat Bank and
SME Bank. Among them, the SME Bank is a one-stop financing and businessdevelopment center for SMEs. It was established in 2005 as an institution 100%
owned by the government through the Ministry of Finance. The SME Bank offersa variety of SME support products including ﬁnance, training, consultation, andrental factories.
The history of Malaysia's microﬁnance goes back to the late 1980s when thefirst microfinance institution, AIM (NGO-based), was created on the Grameen
Bank model of Bangladesh. Subsequently, TEKUN was created in the late 1990s
under the Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry Malaysia. Morerecently, particularly since 2006, government-sponsored microfinance schemes
began to play a large role in microfinance infrastructure. In 2006, the National
SME Development Council approved a comprehensive microﬁnance institutionalframework proposed by BNM. Currently, the framework to develop a sustainablemicroﬁnance industry consists of seven commercial banks, three DFIs (National
Saving Bank, Bank Rakyat, and Agro Bank), and credit cooperatives. Participationof commercial banks is important since the banking system has large funding anda network of branches that are critical to ensure the wide outreach of microﬁnance.
Major efforts are being undertaken to design right products to meet the needs ofmicro enterprises and create widespread awareness on the availability and beneﬁts
of microﬁnance. Emphasis has been placed on easy, fast and convenient accessto microﬁnance for the beneﬁts of microenterprises.12 At the same time, the BNM
ofﬁcials noted that the level of gross non-performing loans (NPL) of microﬁnanceis higher than that of SMEs, exceeding 5%. The challenge is how to lower NPLs
11

Separately, MITI supervises the Malaysia Industrial Development Finance（MIDF）, which
promotes the manufacturing industry through the provision of medium-and long-term loans.
12
Key features of these microﬁnance products are: small size of ﬁnancing; minimum documentation, simple procedures and no collateral; fast approval and disbursement of ﬁnancing (about
six days); wide accessibility through branches and other channels of ﬁnancial institutions).

129

while promoting access to microﬁnance across the country.

3-5. SIRIM Berhad
SIRIM Berhad is Malaysia 's primary research and standards development
organization. It is a corporate organization owned wholly by the government
under the Ministry of Finance. It assists Malaysian companies in certifying theirproducts and services and adhering to international and national standards ofquality and innovation. It also collaborates with universities as well as conducts
its own research to ensure that intellectual property and knowledge developed
locally is transferred to Malaysian companies. SIRIM was established in 1975 as
the Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia under the Ministry of
Science, Technology and the Environment, through the merger of the Standards
Institute of Malaysia (SIM) and the National Institute for Scientiﬁc and Industrial
Research (NISIR). In 1996, SIRIM was corporatized to become SIRIM Berhad.
SIRIM received international cooperation from various donors including JICA,
GTZ (now GIZ), DANIDA, and currently receives support from EU. At present, iteven provides technical assistance to developing countries through the MalaysianTechnology Cooperation Program.
As a government-owned corporation, SIRIM operates on a non-profit basis.
Additionally, it has four subsidiaries which are run on a commercial basis13. While
SIRIM's operational expense (accounting for about 40% of its total expense) iscovered by the government, its developmental budget must be ﬁnanced by own
revenues, such as fees from technology licenses, dividends from four subsidiaries,
and facility fees.
SIRIM's core services include (i) technology development and innovation, (ii)technical service; and (iii) conformity assessment. Regarding (i), SIRIM will focus
on three flagship areas starting from 2013, i.e., energy and environment, medical
technology, and plant and machinery. These areas are consistent with the National
Key Results Areas (NKRAs) guided by the National Science and Research Council.
SIRIM wants to become a total solution provider in these three key areas, involving
products and services in research, development of pilot plants and prototypes,
technology transfer, conformity assessment, and testing and inspection. Regarding
13

SIRIM QAS International, SIRIM Training, SIRIM National Precision Tooling, and SIRIM Standards Technology.

130

6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap(ii), SIRIM provides special training courses for local SMEs to develop their capacity
by helping them take their visions from inception to realization and to ensure that
their businesses conform to international standards and practices. SIRIM collaborates
with SME Corp under 1-InnCERT program noted above by auditing, verifying andmonitoring applicants for the SME Innovation Award.

4. D iscussion with Mr. Jegathesan, former Deputy Director
General of MIDAThe GRIPS team, together with the Ethiopian delegation, had an opportunity
to discuss with Dato J. Jegathesan, former Deputy Director General of MIDA,
on the key aspects of Malaysia's industrial development based on his ﬁrst-handexperiences in MIDA. More recently, Mr. Jegathesan was engaged in Zambia
as a senior investment advisor in a JICA-sponsored technical cooperation
project, “Strategic Action Initiatives for Economic Development: Trade andInvestment Promotion in Zambia.” As one of the ﬁrst-generation MIDA ofﬁcials,
Mr. Jegathesan explained factors behind Malaysia's economic transformation,
by referring to the concepts of the Triangle of Hope (TOH) and the Quadrant
Strategy, as follows.
TOH is a concept designed to open the eyes of the leadership of developing
countries to the three forces that must work together for economic development.
These three forces are (i) political will and integrity; (ii) civil service efﬁciency
and integrity; and (iii) private sector dynamism and integrity. In Malaysia, all three
forces shared the same vision and strategies and together implemented various
development plans. Once the TOH concept is understood, the Quadrant Strategy
becomes the vehicle to move from concepts and principles to creating jobs andwealth. The term “quadrant” is used because four steps must be taken. The ﬁrst
step in this process is to create an attractive environment for general and speciﬁc
sectors. Second, identify projects and industries that have competitive advantages.
Third, promote the national image to attract investment. Finally, implement
approved projects as speedily as possible to create jobs and wealth within the
country.
Mr. Jegathesan pointed out the importance of cooperation of all stakeholders
including all government institutions, the private sector and political leaders131

for economic development, and stressed the following points to the Ethiopian
delegation:
Target ten companies which have potential instead of general FDI marketing.
Responsibility of investment promotion agencies does not end until jobs are
created in the country through FDI attraction. Organizing investment seminars
is not enough. Follow-up actions with potential investors are criticallyimportant.
Free Trade Zones (FTZs) should be established with due consideration to urban
development. To this end, it is important to give attention not only to traditional
FTZs but also to Multi-facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) and the scheme ofLicensed Manufacturing Warehouses.
For a One Stop Service Center to function effectively, it is not just enough tophysically locate their staffs in the same office. It is also important to assign
at least two contact persons at each of the responsible agencies outside theinvestment promotion agency.
One-stop decision-making on investment incentives is also important as theexample of the MIDA's National Committee on Investment shows.
Regarding overseas trade and investment promotion, all embassies must work
to move business activities forward. Embassy ofﬁcials charged with trade andinvestment promotion should report activity progress to responsible ministries
and agencies at home, such as MITI, MIDA and MATRADE, not just to theAmbassador.

5. Issues to be considered for the Ethiopian Government
Based on the findings and discussions with the Ethiopian delegation in
Malaysia, the GRIPS team would like to raise the following points for further
consideration by the Ethiopian government.

5-1. A holistic approach to industrial development
It is notable that the Malaysian government takes a holistic approach to industrial
development with MITI acting as a super-ministry charged with all aspects ofindustrialization. MITI's policy functions cover trade, investment, productivity, SMEs,
and industrial development. At the implementation level, MIDA and SME Corp are132

6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap

responsible for not only the manufacturing but also the service sectors. In addition,
MIDA and MATRADE provide services to all companies regardless of their size.
Such institutional arrangements facilitate comprehensive and cross-sectoral support toindustrial development.
By contrast, Ethiopian ' s present institutional arrangements for industrial
development are fragmented across the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Trade,and the Ministry of Urban Development and Construction. As the government plans
to strengthen the institutions and methodology for development planning under theleadership of H. E. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, it is worth re-considering
the modality and institutional arrangements for industrial policy formulation andimplementation14.

5-2. Overseas functions for trade and investment promotion
The Malaysian government has numerous overseas offices to promote thecountry's trade and investment. Separately from embassies, MITI has eight ofﬁces,
MIDA has 24 ofﬁces, and MATRADE has over 40 ofﬁces abroad. Currently, theEthiopian government is conducting Economic and Business Diplomacy led by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by making the embassies responsible for thecountry's trade and investment promotion.
While the number of overseas business promotion offices must be carefully
decided with due consideration to budget constraint and cost-effectiveness, theEthiopian government may wish to consider various institutional options suchas: (i) continuing with the current arrangement and training the officials of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for business promotion skills; (ii) sending the ofﬁcialsof the Ministries of Industry and Trade (and/or EIA) to embassies abroad to assume
business promotion functions; and (iii) creating overseas ofﬁces of EIA (which canbe located initially within embassies).
Additionally, over the medium- and long-run, Ethiopia may wish to consider
strengthening export promotion functions like MATRADE. One possibility may beto equip EIA with such functions, as in the cases of Japan (JETRO) and South Korea(KOTRA).
14

In early July 2013, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, H. E. Mr. Hailemariam Desalegn announced
the establishment of the Planning Commission charged with development planning, and appointed H. E. Mr. Makonnen, former Minister of Industry, as the Commissioner.

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5-3. One stop services
In Malaysia, the concept of “One Stop Service Center” is well established andpracticed by MIDA and SME Corp. What matters is not just physical location, but
the mindset of those ofﬁcials of the responsible ministries and agencies toward
providing necessary services for customer companies for the common goal of thecountry's investment promotion and industrial development.
5-4. Strategic FDI attraction
Malaysia's experiences and current practices offer a number of useful hints on
how to strengthen the newly restructured EIA of Ethiopia15.
Open and targeted approach to FDI attraction: MIDA issues investment licenses
automatically to all projects (except for very few sensitive areas such as defense).
There is no distinction between local and FDI investments. There is no ownership
limit or minimum capital for licensing, either. At the same time, MIDA gives
incentives only to projects in targeted sectors, and only after screening forvalue creation and contribution to Malaysia. To receive any incentive, activities
or products must not only be included in the published eligibility list but also
be approved by MIDA's weekly committee. In this way, investment licensing(which is automatic) and investment incentives (which are selective) are clearly
distinguished. By contrast, Ethiopia ' s current Investment Law establishes
minimum capital requirement for FDI, which may discourage technology-oriented
and innovative foreign SMEs from investing in Ethiopia. Also, Ethiopia's positive
list approach to investment licensing may give restrictive impression to potential
investors.
C areful investment analysis and follow-up: MIDA carefully scrutinizes
investment projects and conducts strong follow-up of approved projects to raise
the implementation ratio. Prior to approving licenses and granting incentives,various internal and external committees review the proposed projects andmake final judgment at the weekly National Committee on Investment. Once
projects are approved, state-level ofﬁces play an important role in ensuring theirimplementation. MIDA compiles, updates and analyzes the database of approved
15

The Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA) under the Ministry of Industry was upgraded in 2014
to the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) under the Ethiopian Investment Board chairedby the Prime Minister in order to strengthen FDI policy implementation [Editor].

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6. Malaysia̶Struggling with an Upper Middle Income Trap

investment projects in coordination other ministries and agencies. Since 2004,
MIDA has been coordinating and compiling the investment data for all economic
sectors (not just manufacturing). The implementation survey is conducted semiannually to monitor the progress of all investment projects. Such careful analysis
and follow-up appear to have contributed to a high implementation ratio (75.7%)
of approved investment projects, which is much higher than in Ethiopia (around35%). Furthermore, MIDA continues to have dialogue with all companies whether
they are old or new, or domestic or FDI, as long as they continue to operate in
Malaysia̶because new issues and problems arise all the time.

5-5. Promotion of domestic industries
In recent years, MIDA actively promotes domestic investment. This is also
supported jointly by MATRADE and SME Corp through their support programs
for local SMEs. Malaysia's current approach to domestic industry promotion
is to foster the growth of independent homegrown SMEs by encouraging theirinternationalization and penetration into global markets (primary) and creating
linkages between large local anchor firms such as Petronas (secondary). The
Malaysian government appears no longer interested in the Industrial Linkage
Program, introduced in 1997 by expanding the former Vender Development
Program, that enhanced linkages between large foreign automotive and electronic
assemblers with local component suppliers. This policy is still strongly promoted in
Thailand but already abandoned in Malaysia.
Given that there are alternative models of enterprise capacity building, somebased on the creation of independent and globally competitive local SMEs andothers based on FDI-linked technology transfer, Ethiopia should study various
country cases carefully before deciding on a technology strategy most suitable in the
Ethiopian context.

135

Attachment 1

Mission Schedule (23- 29 June. 2013)
1. Mission Members
Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Kenicni Ohno
Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Miho Murashima

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

2. Mission Schedule
DATE

1 Jun 23
2 Jun 24
3 Jun 25
4 Jun 26
5 Jun 27

6 Jun 28
7 Jun

29

136

TIME
AC TIVITYAM
PM Arrival
AM
Mon
Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA)PM
AM Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
Tue
PM Malaysia External Trade Development Cooperation
AM Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department
Wed
PM Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA)AM SME Corporation Malaysia
Thu PM The Federation of Malaysia (FMM)
PM Malaysian Institute of Economic Research
AM Bank Negara Malaysia
AM Mr. Joji Ikeshita, Managing Director, JETRO Kuala Lumpur
Fri
PM Mr. Hiroshi Matsuura, Minister Deputy Chief of the Mission, Embassy of JapanPM SIRIM Berhad
PM Departure
Sat AM ArrivalSun7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

7. Indonesia－Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization(June 16-20, 2014)

A policy research team visited Jakarta during June 16 - 20 , 2014 to study
Indonesia's experiences in industrial development and draw lessons for otherdeveloping countries including Ethiopia and Vietnam1. The mission consistedof five members: Kenichi Ohno, Izumi Ohno, Akemi Nagashima (GRIPS
Development Forum, Tokyo); Le Ha Thanh (National Economics University andVietnam Development Forum, Hanoi); and Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy (Institute forIndustrial Policy and Strategy, Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade, Hanoi).
The mission examined (i) methodological and organizational aspects of industrial
policy making in comparison with other governments in Asia and Africa; and (ii)the content of Indonesia's industrial policy.
We met government ministries and agencies, business organizations, researchand training institutes, private ﬁrms, and Japanese aid and business organizations.
Mission schedule is given in the attachment. We would like to express our deep
appreciation to all people and organizations who kindly received us and sharedvaluable information with us. This report summarizes the mission's ﬁndings.

1. Overview: current policy focus and issues
During the decade of 2004-2013, Indonesia recorded an annual average growth of
5.8% with only minor fluctuations despite the Lehman Shock, the Euro Crisis, andother external disturbances2. By 2012 its per capita income reached $3,500, placing
1

The purpose of JICA-commissioned missions, including this one, was to collect information on industrial policy
formulation in selected countries for the policy learning of other developing countries. During Phase I of Japan-Ethiopia industrial policy dialogue 2009-2011, the GDF team visited Singapore (August- September 2010),
Korea (November 2010) and Taiwan (February 2011). During Phase II, India (September 2012), Mauritius (October2012) and Malaysia (June 2013) were visited in addition to Indonesia. Vietnam, Thailand, Mozambique, Zambia,
Tanzania, Ghana and Uganda were also visited on other budgets. Views expressed in this report are those of the
GDF team and do not necessarily represent the views of JICA.

2

It is generally perceived in Indonesia that growth of at least 6% is needed for avoiding social problems, especiallyfor creating 3 million new jobs each year for entering young workers.

137the nation in the lower middle income category and generating a growing middle
class with a strong appetite for consumer goods and services. With a population of
250 million, Indonesia has emerged as one of the largest markets in the world. Rapid
motorization backed by vigorous demand for private cars is underway in the last
several years, attracting car assemblers and component makers from abroad as well as
causing serious trafﬁc congestion in Jakarta. The nation aspires to become one of theworld's developed countries by 2025.
Despite surging domestic income and demand, all is not going well. Indonesia
is popular among foreign investors mainly because of its abundant natural
resources and large and growing domestic demand, not because of its technology
mastery or competitive workers. Unlike Malaysia (electronics exporter), Thailand(automobile exporter) or Vietnam (smart phone exporter), Indonesia is not viewed
as a manufacturing base for conquering global markets. The manufacturing share in
GDP declined from 27.7% in 2000 to 24.8% in 2010, and the share of manufactured
products in total export fell sharply from 57.1% in 2000 to 37.5% in 2010 (WorldBank data). From the long-term perspective, Indonesia lags behind other East
Asian miracle economies. In 1960, Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia had similar per
capita incomes. By now, Korea has reached high income, Malaysia is in the upper
middle income range, but Indonesia remains in the lower middle income range.
The Indonesian economy grew, but its speed was less than others. At the same time,
disparities in personal and regional income are widening with the Gini coefﬁcientrising greatly from 0.32 in 1990 and 0.33 in 2002 to 0.41 in 2012.
If a middle income trap is deﬁned as a situation where growth is driven by FDI,
ODA, natural resources, big projects, and other “given” advantages and not byinternal value creation, Indonesia has been trapped for a long time. Despite this,fear of a middle income trap or the way to overcome it is not debated as loudly
and ofﬁcially as in such countries as Malaysia, China or Vietnam where copingwith a middle income trap is a top national agenda3.
Historically, Indonesia ' s economic policy has vacillated between stateinterventionism and liberal reforms. The cycle is often synchronous with ﬂuctuating
commodity prices. The current policy mood is that of economic nationalism. The
3

During our mission, the slides of the Investment Coordination Board (BKPM) mentioned the middle income trap,
but no other ministries and agencies discussed it. The situation of the middle income trap problem being raised
only sporadically and only by some ministries is akin to the situation in Thailand.

138

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralizationlack of strong domestic industries, as explained above, is regretted. Skepticism overfurther international integration is emerging because it is felt that the Indonesia-Japan
Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA, 2008) and the ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement (ACFTA, 2010) failed to bring expected benefits to Indonesia (perhaps
expectations were too high). Dissatisfaction with current FDI-driven industrialization
is mounting. Laws and regulations are becoming more restrictive to foreign investors.
The pride of a large nation is on the rise. This mood is reﬂected in the presidential
candidate debate between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto which was televised
during our stay. Both candidates are nationalists, and the difference (which may besubstantial) is mainly in their degrees and approaches.
Part̶possibly a large part̶of the reason why Indonesian industries are not as
dynamic as hoped is weak policy capability. Our mission had discussions with key
economic ministries and agencies, private firms, summit business organizations,Japanese aid and business organizations, and a think tank. When compared with
East Asia's other industrializing economies, Indonesia's industrial policy has somebright spots such as well-established processes for stakeholder consultation andinter-ministerial coordination for some policy making, existence of certain proactive
government leaders with strong business background, and competency of some(not all) government ministries, agencies and individual officials. Nevertheless, inoperational and implementation aspects, Indonesia's policy capability is found to be
weak and more primitive than most other middle income countries in the region such
as Malaysia and Thailand, and far inferior to “Tigers” such as Singapore, Taiwan and
Korea. Examples of policy issues are given below.
Both local and foreign businesses complain bitterly that policy isunpredictable, ambiguous, arbitrary and uncoordinated, and that too many
Ministerial Regulations are issued without stakeholder consultation or any
period for preparation4.
 The Horticulture Law (2010), the Mining Law (2012), and the Trade Law (2014)
have been revised to pursue national interest. The new Horticulture Law raises hurdles
4

Indonesian policy documents are classiﬁed into Laws, Government Regulations, Presidential Regulations, andMinisterial Regulations in descending order of difﬁculty of issuing. Laws must be passed by the Parliament whichusually takes a long time. In contrast, a large number of Ministerial Regulations are issued but they are often criticized for the lack of stakeholder consultation or inter-ministerial coordination.

139

for foreign investors. The new Mining Law requires processing minerals domesticallyinstead of exporting them in raw form (including aluminum and nickel). The new
Trade Law is drafted so vaguely that it allows wide interpretation and confounds
investors.
 In 2013 Jakarta's minimum wage rose as much as 43.9% due to aggressive andviolent labor unions. With unskilled labor wage at $234 per month and rising(JETRO survey, December 2013), Indonesia is quickly losing competitiveness inlabor-intensive processes, which is too early for a labor-surplus country. Politicalwage demands must be replaced by a predictable wage mechanism based onlabor productivity performance (section 6).
 Investment incentives exist only on paper. Only large FDI is eligible and lessthan ten ﬁrms have been granted tax holiday so far (only two since 2012)5. Tax cutsmust be negotiated individually with relevant line ministries which use their limited
budget to pay taxes for exempted ﬁrms. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) rejects mostincentive proposals for fear of revenue loss. The recognition that manufacturing
SMEs and supporting industries add a competitive edge to the nation does not seemto exist.
 Industrial activities are concentrated in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area putting
severe strain on transport infrastructure. Although plans have existed for a longtime, construction of a new port, airport expansion and needed additional accesshighways have not been started and construction of a metro network is justbeginning (section 4). In contrast, Bangkok, New Delhi, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City have built such infrastructure gradually and in steps to partly alleviate (if noteliminate) congestion.
 SME policy is fragmented across ministries and also between central andlocal authorities. There is no nationally uniﬁed deﬁnition of SMEs. Integrated
and effective SME promotion as seen in Japan, Taiwan and Malaysia does not
yet exist in Indonesia (section 7).
Decentralization has deepened since the beginning of the 2000s. This has
5

To enjoy tax holiday, an investor must belong to one of the ﬁve sectors (metal, petrochemical, machinery, recyclable energy, and telecom) and invest at least IDR1 trillion (about $83 million). To receive tax allowances,many conditions, such as employing over 500 workers within ﬁve years, providing at least IDR10 billion (about$83,000) for socio-economic infrastructure, and input localization of 70% after the fourth year, are required. A
BKPM leader told Japanese businesses, who requested more substantive investment incentives, that a large population was Indonesiaʼs investment incentive.

1407. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

contributed to political stability and democracy in this large and diverse country.
But it also has downsides including the lost central grip on national issues
such as TVET and SME promotion, shortage of local capacity, and varied
performance depending on the willingness and capability of local governments.
 Fiscal balance is deteriorating. One-fourth of budget expenditure goes to fueland electricity subsidies. An ambitious social security system is about to belaunched in 2015, but funding has not been identiﬁed.
To strengthen industrial capacity, Indonesia is turning to more control andnationalism rather than enhancing such standard measures as labor training andmatching with industrial needs, technical and ﬁnancial assistance to enterprises,
logistic superiority, linkage between FDI and local suppliers, and establishment of
national standards, certiﬁcation and testing systems. By the East Asian standard,industrial policy in Indonesia has not reached the knowledge frontier of the 21st
century.

2. National development planning
Long- and medium-term development planning as well as annual development
planning at both national and regional levels are regulated by the Law on
the National Development Planning System (Law No.25, 2004). Nation-level
documents consist of the National Long-term Development Plan (RPJPN, for 20
years), the National Medium-term Development Plan (RPJMN, for five years),
and annual development plans. Because presidential and planning cycles aresynchronized, every ﬁve years an incoming government prepares RPJMN to set
new priorities within the framework of the longer-term RPJPN. RPJMN must
be enacted by a Presidential Regulation no later than three months after theinauguration of the President which takes place in October. Table 1 summarizes
Indonesia's development plans at national and regional levels.
The National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) and Regional
Development Planning Agencies (BAPPEDA) are responsible for development
planning. During the Suharto years (1968-98), BAPPENAS was a powerful superagency with combined authority over development planning, development budget,and foreign aid mobilization. At times, the BAPPENAS chairman doubled as the
Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. However, sweeping decentralization in141

2001 (Regional Autonomy Laws No.22 and No.25) and the transfer of development

budget to the Ministry of Finance in 2003 (Law No. 17 ), which made MOF
responsible for the formulation and execution of both development and recurrent
budget, significantly reduced the role of BAPPENAS. Subsequently, the Law on
the National Development Planning System (Law No.25, 2004), mentioned above,clariﬁed the development planning system in the democratic and decentralized era
as well as the revised functions of BAPPENAS and BAPPEDA. According to thislaw, BAPPENAS is responsible for coordinating and drafting National RPJPN,
National RPJMN and annual development plans while BAPPEDA is responsible for
equivalent functions at the regional level.
Table 1. Types of National Development Plans
㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚 㼍㼘㻾㼑 㼓㼕㼛㼚 㼍㼘㻼㼑 㼞㼕㼛㼐

㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻸㼛㼚㼓㻙㼠㼑㼞㼙㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㻔㻾㻼㻶㻼㻺㻕㻦㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻸㼛㼚㼓㻙㼠㼑㼞㼙㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㻔㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻾㻼㻶㻼㻕㻦㻌 㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻞㻜㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟

㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻸㼍㼣㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻹㼑㼐㼕㼡㼙㻙㼠㼑㼞㼙㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻔㻾㻼㻶㻹㻺㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻼㼞㼑㼟㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼕㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻹㼑㼐㼕㼡㼙㻙㼠㼑㼞㼙㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻔㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻾㻼㻶㻹㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼕㼟㼟㼡㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻡㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟

㼞㼑㼟㼜㼑㼏㼠㼕㼢㼑㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻴㼑㼍㼐㼟㻿㼠㼞㼍㼠㼑㼓㼕㼏㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼕㼑㼟㻛㻭㼓㼑㼚㼏㼕㼑㼟㻔㻾㼑㼚㼟㼠㼞㼍㻙㻷㻸㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼞㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼕㼟㼟㼡㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼔㼑㼍㼐㼟㻌㼛㼒㻿㼠㼞㼍㼠㼑㼓㼕㼏㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻳㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼃㼛㼞㼗㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻔㻾㼑㼚㼟㼠㼞㼍㻙㻿㻷㻼㻰㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼞㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㼔㼑㼍㼐㼟㻌㼛㼒㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼕㼑㼟㻛㻭㼓㼑㼚㼏㼕㼑㼟㼞㼑㼟㼜㼑㼏㼠㼕㼢㼑㻌㼃㼛㼞㼗㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㻔㻾㻷㻼㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻼㼞㼑㼟㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼕㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㻔㻾㻷㻼㻰㻕㻦㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㼞㼑㼘㼑㼢㼍㼚㼠㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻛㻭㼓㼑㼚㼏㼥㻌㻔㻾㼑㼚㼖㼍㻙㻷㻸㻕㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻳㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼃㼛㼞㼗㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㻾㼑㼚㼖㼍㻙㻿㻷㻼㻰㻕㻌㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻴㼑㼍㼐㻡㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟

㻝㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞
㻝㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞

㻿㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㻦㻌㻸㼍㼣㻌㼛㼚㻌㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㻌㻔㻸㼍㼣㻌㻺㼛㻚㻞㻡㻘㻌㻞㻜㻜㻠㻕The current RPJPN 2005-2025 (Law No.17, 2007) and RPJMN 2010-2014(Presidential Regulation No. 7 , 2009 ) were prepared by the government of
President Yudhoyono. The vision of the 20-year RPJPN is to “establish a country
that is developed and self-reliant, just and democratic, and peaceful and united.”
The mission of the 5-year RPJMN 2010-2014 is to realize “prosperous, democratic,
and just Indonesia in the globalized world. ” The targets of RPJMN include
accelerating economic growth to 7% and reducing open unemployment to 5-6%
and the poverty rate to 8-10% by 2014. It specifies eleven national priorities6.
6

The priorities are (i) reforming the bureaucracy and administration; (ii) education; (iii) health; (iv) reducing poverty;(v) food security; (vi) infrastructure; (vii) investment in the business sector; (viii) energy; (ix) environment and natural disaster; (x) left-behind, frontline, most outer, and post-conﬂict regions; and (xi) culture, creativity, and technological innovation. The current RPJMN also discusses regional development directions and policies.

1427. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

While the intention of trying to attain inclusive and sustainable growth is clear
in RPJMN 2010-2014, it does not specify the driver of growth or concrete steps
and measures for enhancing economic competitiveness and industrialization.
The current RPJMN only generally discusses the need to promote SMEs andcooperatives, maintain macroeconomic stability, pay more attention to science andtechnology, productivity, creativity and innovation, and so on.
Presently, BAPPENAS is drafting RPJMN 2015-2019, which will be the third
medium-term plan under RPJPN 2005-2025. Preparation of RPJMN takes about two
years including informal preparatory processes. To draft the industry chapter of thenext RPJMN, the Directorate of Industry, Science Technology, Tourism and Creative
Economics of BAPPENAS started background studies and data analysis in 2012
involving academia and experts. The basic idea for new industrial chapter was to add
value before exporting, especially for agriculture and mining, which was proposed
simultaneously by BAPPENAS and the Ministry of Industry (MOI)7. During 2013,
BAPPENAS and MOI continued to share and adjust each other's views by organizing
seminars and inviting each other. BAPPENAS has an ample budget for hosting suchseminars and meetings.
In February 2014, BAPPENAS officially presented the concept paper for theindustrial chapter of the next RPJMN to MOI. After incorporating about 90%
of received comments, the revised concept paper was presented in April 2014 to
the leaders and directorates of MOI as well as business representatives such as
the Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (KADIN), the Employer's
Association of Indonesia (APINDO), and sectoral associations. BAPPENAS will
officially announce its perspective for the next RPJMN, of which the industry
chapter is a part, at end June 2014 to receive public reaction. On October 15,
2014 when a new President will assume office, the draft RPJMN 2015-2019 will
be presented to the President's team for comments and inputs. The plan must be
finalized by January 15, 2015, after which BAPPENAS will begin work on theannual development plan and budget. Each ministry will also be required to draft its
strategic plan for the next ﬁve years.
Chapters of RPJMN 2015 - 2019 will consist of priorities, past review,
macroeconomic scenarios and targets, nine key sectors (agriculture (5), mining
7

In 2012, MOI Minister Hidayat issued a pamphlet entitled “Acceleration of Industrialization in Indonesia” to makethis point.

143

(2), industry (1) and services (1)), and cross-sectoral issues. It is expected to be
Indonesia's ﬁrst development plan that highlights industry as a prime mover ofthe economy. Consistent with the New Law on Industrial Policy (section 5), theindustry chapter will recognize the need to deepen industrial structure, develop
supporting industries, and increase value added to natural resources before
exporting.

3. The Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs and MP3EI
Indonesia has a unique mechanism for inter-ministerial policy coordination.
Above line ministries, there are three coordinating ministries headed by senior
ministers dealing with (i) political, legal and security issues; (ii) economic affairs;and (iii) people's welfare. Among them, the Coordinating Ministry for Economic
Affairs (EKON) 8 is charged with matters related to policy implementation
among 17 economic ministries (Indonesia has 34 ministries in all). The role ofthe coordinating ministries is similar to that of high-level committees or councils
headed by Deputy Prime Ministers in other countries, but Indonesia does policy
coordination by a permanent mechanism, i.e., ministries that stand above line
ministries and have regular staff.
The Master Plan for Economic Development for Acceleration and Expansion ofIndonesia's Economic Development 2011-2025 (MP3EI), an ad hoc development plan,
was prepared during the second term of President Yudhoyono and announced by a
Presidential Regulation in May 2011. According to EKON, its former Minister Hatta
Rajasa, who felt the need for an additional plan that listed concrete priority projects,
played a central role in producing its initial concept. Preparation for MP3EI began inAugust 2010 at EKON which subsequently conducted stakeholder consultations andfinalization in collaboration with BAPPENAS, related ministries, and the business
community9.
Embracing the vision of “ self-sufficient, advanced, just, and prosperous
8

The Coordination Ministry for Economic Affairs, with the current Indonesian acronym of EKON, was establishedin 1966 and went through many name changes. Until 2000, it was routinely called EKUIN whose functions included ﬁnance. At times, the EKUIN Minister assumed the chairmanship of BAPPENAS (as in the case of Dr.
Widjojo Nitisastro during 1973-83).

9

Meanwhile, MP3EI itself states that it originated from the directive order of President Yudhoyono given to theLimited Cabinet Retreat in December 2010 which stressed the need for economic transformation.

144

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

Indonesia, ” MP 3 EI aims at high, balanced, fair and sustainable economic
growth. It sets a growth target of 7 - 9 % per annum to achieve Indonesia ' stransformation into one of the top ten advanced economies in the world by 2025,with expected per capita income of $14,250-15,500. MP3EI includes eight main
programs consisting of 22 main economic activities. It has three strategies: (i)developing potentials of six economic corridors (Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, Maluku-Papua and Bali-Nusa Tenggara); (ii) strengthening domestic
and international connectivity; and (iii) promoting human resource capacity andscience and technology. MP3EI also provides guidelines for the development of
infrastructure needs and recommendations for revision of regulations.
As a plan document, MP3EI has two notable characters. First, it is an effort toharmonize RPJMN and the National Spatial Plan (Spatial Planning Law No.24, 1992).
Second, its many large projects, amounting to IDR4,000 trillion, are to be ﬁnancedby all stakeholders including central and local governments, state-owned enterprises,
and the private sector in sharp contrast to RPJMN which covers publicly-financed
projects only. While MP3EI states that it does not replace any of the existing nationalor regional development plans, questions are occasionally raised about the consistency
between the two.
Implementation of MP3EI is the task of the Committee on Economic Development
Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia 2011-2025 (KP3EI), established in May 2011
for this purpose and headed by the President. The duties of KP3EI are coordinationof planning and implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and removing obstacles
in implementing MP3EI. To handle daily matters, KP3EI has two operational units:(i) Team KP3EI that contains nine task teams̶for six economic corridors and threecross-cutting issues of regulatory reforms, connectivity, and human resources andscience and technology; and (ii) Secretariat KP3EI headed by a Deputy Ministerof EKON charged with infrastructure and regional development coordination andsupported by six divisions of EKON.
MP3EI is subject to periodic review. The government completed the ﬁrst reviewof MP3EI in May 2014. The main revision was expansion of the scope of projects
from large-scale infrastructure projects in the original MP3EI to projects in all
sectors including environmental ones.

1454. Metropolitan Priority Area
The Metropolitan Priority Area (MPA) initiative, an ambitious infrastructure
plan for Jakarta and its surrounding areas, is a key component of the Java
Economic Corridor which is one of the six economic corridors in MP3EI. The
Japanese government has been supporting its formulation and implementation.
The objective of MPA is to make JABODETABEK, a combined acronym
for Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi, more attractive for industrial
investment by accelerating infrastructure development and creating a businessclimate that can compete effectively within ASEAN. Due to the economic boom
and motorization in the last several years, the area is suffering from severe trafﬁccongestion, and the low quality and lack of infrastructure has emerged as amajor barrier to economic activities. To improve both the hard and soft aspectsof business environment, the governments of Indonesia and Japan signed amemorandum of cooperation in December 2010 and conducted the MPA Master
Plan Study under the Steering Committee and Technical Committee composed of
the two governments and relevant organizations.
The Master Plan Study (i) presented a vision of JABODETABEK in the year
2020 and forecasted economic and social conditions surrounding Indonesia
in 2030; (ii) formulated an overall plan for infrastructure development in the
JABODETABEK Area by the year 2020 specifying 45 priority projects; and (iii)selected 18 fast track projects (two more were added later) to be undertaken by
the end of 2013 from the priority project list. The Master Plan Study estimated thetotal required amount by 2020 to be 3.4 trillion yen (about $34 billion, including
the fast track projects), which was to be financed by both private and publicmeans. Roughly 1 trillion yen (about $10 billion) was expected to be forthcoming
externally, including Japanese ODA. Among 20 fast track projects, five wereselected as ﬂagship projects with highest priority10.
The JABODETABEK MPA Strategic Plan was also drafted jointly by the10

The ﬂagship projects are (i) Cilamaya New Port Development, (ii) Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit; (iii) terminal
expansion at Sukarno-Hatta International Airport; (iv) sewage system development; and (v) the New Academic
Research Center. See The Master Plan for Establishing Metropolitan Priority Area for Investment and Industry
in JABODETABEK Area, Final Report by the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs and JICA, November
2012. This information is based on JICA Press Release dated October 9, 2012:
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2012/121009.html

146

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

Figure 1. Relationship among Development Planning, Spatial Planning,and MP3EI

two governments. From March 2011 to October 2012, three Steering Committee
meetings, co-chaired by the EKON Minister on the Indonesian side and theMinister of Economy, Trade and Industry or the Minister of Foreign Affairs on
the Japanese side, were held. Six Technical Committee meetings, co-chaired by
the Deputy Minster for Infrastructure and Regional Development Cooperationof EKON and the Minister of the Japanese Embassy to Indonesia, were alsoorganized. One wing of the Technical Committee monitors the progress of
infrastructure projects while the other is a bilateral forum for improving
investment climate (called the MPA High Level Consultation for Investment
Promotion). The Jakarta Japan Club (JJC), having the function of a chamber ofcommerce and industry for Japanese ﬁrms operating in the Greater Jakarta area,
provides substantive comments and requests to the latter wing of the TechnicalCommittee. Major issues raised at present are related to labor, taxation andcustoms as well as general unpredictability of laws and regulations.
MPA has become JICA ' s main economic cooperation in Indonesia. JICA

147

Figure 2. Implementation Coordination Mechanism for MP3EI

supports some of the fast track projects such as the North-South Line of
the Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit System, the Java-Sumatra Inter-connection
Transmission Line, and improvement of the Pluit Wastewater Facilities for ﬂood
control. Assistance to project formulation is also underway for a new port as wellas road, railway and wastewater treatment improvements. Some of the projects
may be carried out through public-private partnership. However, implementationof MPA is behind the schedule, which is not entirely surprising for such a large
and complex set of projects requiring a high capability for political, technicaland administrative coordination. Land acquisition for infrastructure projects is
also slow. Greater efforts are needed by EKON and the ministries concerned toaccelerate implementation.

148

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

5. The New Industrial Policy
In January 2014, the new Law on Industrial Policy replaced the old law of 1984
to take into account the national, regional and global changes that took place inthe past three decades. It also updated the National Industrial Policy (Presidential
Regulation No.28, 2008). Formulation of the new Law is led by MOI Minister
Mohamad S. Hidayat who comes from a private sector background (previously he
was the chairman of KADIN).
Main changes between the 2008 National Industrial Policy and the 2014
Industrial Policy Law include: (i) expanded scope of priority sectors; (ii)prioritizing the use of natural resources for domestic industries over raw-form
exports; (iii) more emphasis on human resource and capacity development
including the introduction of national work competency standards andcertification; and (iv) a more active role of the government in developing
industrial estates and related infrastructure, particularly in outer islands11.
Meanwhile, the nationalistic tone of the new Law worries some businesses.
For example, it allows foreign workers to work only for a limited period andrequires them to meet knowledge and skill requirements set by the national work
competency standards. It obliges investors in turnkey projects to perform technology
transfer with little regard to whether this is commercially and technically viable.
The law paves the way for the government to set quotas or even a ban on the exportof minerals and commodities to reserve their use for domestic activities. The law
permits price control and the state control of strategic industries on the grounds ofsafety and other national interests. Also, preferential treatment is given to domestic
companies for government tenders.
The new Law on Industrial Policy mandates drafting of the National Industrial
Development Master Plan (RIPIN) that articulates the vision, mission, strategy
and priority programs for industrial development in the next two decades (20152035). MOI is currently working on it. The draft Master Plan will be submitted to
the MOI Minister in July 2014, after which related ministries and organizations
11

About 90% of Indonesiaʼs industrial estates are developed and operated by the private sector. The government has
so far played a very limited role in supplying industrial land. Since 2009, all manufacturing FDI has been obliged
to locate in an industrial estate (there are some conditional exceptions). According to the MOI Secretary General,the purpose of this requirement is two-fold: provision of supporting services (one-stop window, power supply,etc.) for enhancing competitiveness, and environmental protection.

149

will be consulted for comment. MOI plans to ﬁnalize it by October 2014 when a
new government will be inaugurated. The draft Master Plan is expected to have thefollowing policy architecture: Six core industries̶food; pharmaceutical and cosmetics; textile and footwear;
transportation equipment; electronics and ICT; and energy.
 Three supporting industries ̶ capital goods; component industry; andmachinery accessory and support materials.
 Three upstream industries: agro-based; mining; and gas and coal.
 Six basic requirements ̶ natural resources, human resource; technology,
innovation and creativity; infrastructure; policy and regulation; and ﬁnance.
According to MOI, one of the difﬁculties in designing industrial policy is very
limited room for ﬁscal incentives for industrial promotion. The Finance Law ishighly restrictive, and tax allowance and tax holidays are very difﬁcult to obtain.
This is primarily because MOF places the highest priority on maintaining ﬁscal
disciplines and, as a result, is extremely cautious about any proposal for new
incentives.
While all cross-ministerial policies must in principle be coordinated by
EKON, the drafting of the Industrial Master Plan is proceeding at the initiativeof MOI. The Secretary General of MOI is responsible for overall supervision andcoordination. The Task Team for drafting has been organized by MOI chairedby the Director General of Industrial Regional Development. It comprises of 25
members from MOI, universities, research centers, consultancy, and businesses.
During the last one year, the Task Team worked intensively, meeting at least
every other week. A seminar with KADIN was also organized. BAPPENAS
was also informally but closely involved, as explained above. As with national
development planning, the Industrial Master Plan is being prepared with extensive
institutionalized discussions among government, businesses, and experts̶but
without a strong involvement of EKON.
In sum, Indonesia has three sets of documents deﬁning industrial policy̶RPJPN
and RPJMN (routine plan documents drafted by BAPPENAS), MP3EI of which MPA
is an important part (with attention to spatial planning and investment climate, led by
EKON), and the Industrial Law and the Industrial Master Plan (specifying various
industrial policy components, formulated by MOI). In theory, these policies should bemutually consistent and reinforcing. However, there is also a risk of too many cooks150

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

spoiling the broth.
When more than one organization participate in the same policy, successrequires a shared direction and an effective coordination mechanism. The fact that
all ministries support a nationalistic industrial vision is good̶at least from theviewpoint of avoiding fights over policy purpose. Indonesia also has EKON, adesignated coordinator of line ministry policies, which should be able to provide theneeded high-level coordination.
However, the mission detected a strong sense of autonomy and rivalry amongcertain economic ministries and even among directorates of the same ministry.
Even when a policy direction is broadly agreed, competition for securing priority
and budget can be fierce. Information seems to flow freely among friendly
ministries via well-established consultation mechanisms but not between
contending or remote ones. EKON, with its own plans and strategies, is an active
player as well as a coordinator in this industrial policy competition. MOF tries toshoot down any policy proposal requiring new funding, which is understandable
given its mandate. While inter-bureaucratic contention and a non-generous MOF
are hardly unique to Indonesia, their degrees are such that they often signiﬁcantly
delay or even hold up policy implementation. Advanced decentralization, whateverits many merits may be, also makes central economic policy making a challenge.
By contrast, in countries equipped with a policy supervising mechanism chaired
personally by a powerful president or prime minister, industrial policy is actually
executed even with some delay.

6. FDI policy
Foreign investment in Indonesia is governed by the Investment Law (Law
No.25, 2007), the Investment List (Presidential Regulation No. 111, 2007; No.
36, 2010; and No.39, 2014) and many other laws covering specific sectors or
products. Investment authorities are distributed among the Indonesian Investment
Coordinating Board (BKPM), sectoral ministries, and local governments. BKPM
is the central investment agency as well as a one-stop shop for investors covering
all sectors except oil, gas, and ﬁnancial sectors. Investment applications can besubmitted to its Jakarta head office or regional offices. Under decentralization,
local governments are responsible for monitoring and supporting investment151

projects within their jurisdictions except for certain projects which remain undercentral authority.
Daily operation of BKPM, as the initial contact point for foreign investors,
is efficient and responsive in comparison with other parts of the Indonesian
government. Despite this, Indonesia's investment incentives and administration aresaddled with many shortcomings as already discussed. FDI liberalization began toaccelerate in the aftermath of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98, a process which
continues to date. However, investment climate has not yet reached the level ofpredictability and business friendliness of other industrial economies in the region
such as Malaysia and Thailand.
Although far from being an investors' paradise, Indonesia is absorbing an increasing
amount of FDI year after year. FDI realization rose from $10.8 billion in 2009 to $28.6
billion in 2013 accounting for 68% of total investment in the latter year. Manufacturing
FDI, especially in the automotive sector, is most dynamic. The share of secondary
sectors in total FDI realization increased sharply from 35% in 2009 to 55% in 2013. To
reﬂect this sector shift, Japan became the top investor in 2013 replacing Singapore which
was the largest source country in the past (BKPM data excluding oil, gas, and ﬁnancial
sectors). Similarly, from the viewpoint of Japanese firms, Indonesia's ranking as adesirable investment destination in the future (next three years) jumped from No.8 in
2007-2009 to the top position in 2012.
Indonesia's attractiveness mainly comes from large and growing domestic
demand and rich natural resources rather than knowledge, skills or technology.
Most foreign manufacturers target consumers and users in Indonesia rather thanbuild a global supply base. This is FDI-led industrialization driven by quantity
rather than competitiveness. This was the major reason for policy makers to adopt
a series of inward-looking industrial measures. However, export competitivenesscannot be forged unless favorable business environment and effective policy
support are in place. Indonesia has a long way to go before such environment andmeasures are realized.
One of the shortcomings is meager incentives. Standard privileges such as tax
allowance, tax holiday, and import duty exemption are available only under strict
conditions which are difﬁcult to meet for most foreign ﬁrms. One of the highest
hurdles is the minimum size of investment such as IDR0.5-1.0 trillion and/or 100-152

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

300 employees depending on incentive types. Other conditions include sectors12,bank deposit requirement, R&D requirement, and contribution to infrastructure.
New regulations are frequently issued and conditions are often unclear, with theresult that eligible ﬁrms must negotiate with ministries in charge. This shuts out
most FDI ﬁrms except the largest. There are also no incentives for manufacturingSMEs, supporting industries, technology transfer, or worker and engineer
training. Nevertheless, additional tax deduction to labor-intensive industries andﬁrms exporting at least 30% of output were enacted in 2013 and tax incentive forreinvestment was introduced in 2014. This may be because MOF Minister Basri,
who previously chaired BKPM, is more understanding to the joint requests of
MOI and BKPM.
An interesting case is the low-cost green car (LCGC) policy whose details wereannounced in July 2013 (MOI Ministerial Regulation No.33). It exempts luxury tax on
cars produced in Indonesia which satisfy certain conditions regarding engine capacity,
fuel efﬁciency, and selling price. Localization of 80-85% is also required but not stated in
the ofﬁcial document13.
In April 2014, a new negative list for foreign investors (Presidential Regulation
No.39) replaced the previous one in 2010, easing conditions for some sectors but
tightening for others. 100% foreign ownership is now permitted for manufacturing(there are exceptions), but for wholesale distribution and warehousing maximum
foreign ownership was reduced from 100% to 30%. Restrictions not stated in thenegative list are also reported.
Wage pressure and labor disputes are another serious problem that may damage
Indonesia's international competitiveness. In our interviews, business leaders andindustrial ofﬁcials were generally frustrated with aggressive wage demands unrelated
to productivity performance. It is interesting that the Ministry of Manpower andTransmigration, BKPM, APINDO and KADIN are proposing a predictable wage
mechanism in which government, employers and unions should agree on wage levels
12

For instance, tax holiday is available to ﬁve sectors only (basic metal, oil reﬁnery and petrochemical, machinery, renewable energy, and communication devices), which however are different from BKPMʼs seven priority
sectors (export-oriented, capital goods and raw materials, consumer goods, downstream industries, sectors withrising domestic consumption, infrastructure, and tourism and creative industries).

13

LCGC policy, in which ﬁve Japanese car makers participate, is one of the reasons for FDI acceleration in automotive assembly and component production in recent years. However, luxury tax reduction for made-in-Indonesia
cars is very likely to violate WTO rules. In certain instances, Indonesia seems to impose incentive requirements
in a non-documented way.

153

for three to ﬁve years into the future based on productivity measurement with inﬂation
adjustment14.
Regarding the operational modality of BKPM, the two-step investment licensing
procedure (initial approval followed by the principle license) was abolished in2013 and the two steps were uniﬁed. BKPM initially thought that investors needed
time to think before implementing the project, and allowed six months between
the two steps. But it was learned that most investors, such as from Japan, Korea
and Singapore, did not need such time as they had already decided to invest by thetime they approached BKPM. For greater convenience, BKPM has introduced an
online tracking system which allows an investor to check the position and statusof his or her application. Additionally, online application for the principle license
will be operative in 2014.
BKPM's Investment Promotion consists of promotion development, sectoral
promotion, regional promotion, and exhibition and promotion. These are supported
by other functions of BKPM. After getting a principle license, BKPM assists
investors with obtaining a business license, owner change, capacity increase of
more than 30%, and import duty exemption on equipment and materials (during thefactory preparation period only). Investment implementation is monitored for some
but not all projects. For this purpose, BKPM relies mainly on reports from local
governments. One peculiar aspect of BKPM's data reporting is that the number ofapproved projects is no longer made public, with only “investment realization” (total
value and sectoral and source country distribution) announced. The mission could
not understand the reason for this practice15.

7. Promotion of SMEs and industrial human resource
Indonesia does not have a unified definition of SMEs as definitions differ
across ministries, agencies, and financial institutions (Table 2). The Ministry14

The idea of tripartite cooperation for productivity-wage nexus is comparable to Singaporeʼs Charter for Industrial
Progress in 1965. A similar advice was also given by the GRIPS Development Forum in a letter addressed toEthiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam in April 2014.

15

Most countries regularly (often monthly) report the number and value of investment approvals as well as implemented value. With this information it is easy to compute the average investment size and conﬁrm, for example,
the recent trend that the number of FDI projects by Japanese manufacturing SMEs is rising, which is observablein Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. It is suspected that the same is true in Indonesia.

154

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralizationof Cooperative and SMEs, which provides cross-sectoral support in policy
formulation, financing, training and marketing, uses the asset-based definition
given in Law No.28 of 2008. The National Agency for Statistics (BPS), which
conducts SME surveys, classifies enterprises according to the number of
employees. MOI also adopts the BPS definition. Sector-wise SME support ismanaged by each responsible line ministry including MOI.
Table 2: Definition of SMEs in Indonesia㻰㼑㼒㼕㼚㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼎㼥㻌㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻭㼓㼑㼚㼏㼥㻌㼒㼛㼞㻌㻿㼠㼍㼠㼕㼟㼠㼕㼏㼟㻔㻮㻼㻿㻕㻰㼑㼒㼕㼚㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼎㼥㻌㻸㼍㼣㻌㼛㼚㻌㻹㼕㼏㼞㼛㻘㻌㻿㼙㼍㼘㼘㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻹㼑㼐㼕㼡㼙㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㼟㻌㻔㻸㼍㼣㻌㻺㼛㻚㻌㻞㻜㻘㻌㻞㻜㻜㻤㻕㻘㼟㼍㼠㼕㼟㼒㼥㼕㼚㼓㻌㼍㼠㻌㼘㼑㼍㼟㼠㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼣㼛㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻱㼙㼜㼘㼛㼥㼑㼑㼟㻺㼑㼠㻌㻭㼟㼟㼑㼠㼟㻌㻔㻵㻰㻾㻕㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻿㼍㼘㼑㼟㻌㻔㻵㻰㻾㻕㻹㼕㼏㼞㼛㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㻮㼑㼘㼛㼣㻌㻡

㻡㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼛㼞㻌㼎㼑㼘㼛㼣㻟㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼛㼞㻌㼎㼑㼘㼛㼣㻿㼙㼍㼘㼘㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㻡㻙㻝㻥㻹㼑㼐㼕㼡㼙㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㻞㻜㻙㻥㻥㻸㼍㼞㼓㼑㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㻝㻜㻜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼍㼎㼛㼢㼑㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻡㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛 㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻟㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛㻡㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻞㻘㻡㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻡㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛 㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻞㻘㻡㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼡㼜㻝㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㼠㼛㻌㻡㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻡㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻿㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㻦㻌㻮㼍㼟㼑㼐㻌㼛㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼞㼑㼘㼑㼢㼍㼚㼠㻌㼘㼍㼣㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼞㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻵㼚㼐㼛㼚㼑㼟㼕㼍㻚㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㻭㼏㼏㼛㼞㼐㼕㼚㼓㻌㼠㼛㻌㻸㼍㼣㻌㻺㼛㻚㻞㻜㻘㻌㻞㻜㻜㻤㻘㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼢㼍㼘㼡㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼚㼑㼠㻌㼍㼟㼟㼑㼠㼟㻌㼐㼛㻌㼚㼛㼠㻌㼕㼚㼏㼘㼡㼐㼑㻌㼘㼍㼚㼐㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼡㼕㼘㼐㼕㼚㼓㻚

While many definitions make comparison difficult, as of 2014 there are 57.9
million SMEs nationwide (MoC&SME data), of which 4.3 million belong toindustry (called SMIs, MOI data). Most, but not all, SMEs are organized as“cooperatives” which offer various services to its members. The total number ofcooperatives was 203,701 in 2013 (MoC&SME data). Separately, “clusters” arelocal concentration of SMEs that produce similar products. Cooperatives andclusters may overlap but they are not necessarily the same. After decentralization,
cooperatives and clusters have been managed by local authorities. This makes
it difﬁcult for central ministries to uniformly implement SME policy across thenation or work effectively with local governments. Moreover, scattered authority
and the lack of strong coordination even at the central level additionally weaken
SME promotion.
Historically, the Indonesian government often stressed the importance of SMEs
and has tried many types of support measures since the late 1960s including
marketing, finance, supporting industries, Foster Father Scheme, SME clusters,
technical service extension units, Business Development Services, technology155transfer, and innovation. But positive impacts on the quality and dynamism of
SMEs remain elusive. Compared with neighboring countries such as Thailand andVietnam, Indonesian SMIs are less likely to be formally registered or linked with
global players and markets.
Like India, an important purpose of Indonesia's FDI policy has been protectionof local SMEs. Certain sectors are closed to foreign firms and others requirepartnership with locals. However, such restrictions may backfire as they
discourage incoming FDI and encourage SMEs to stay small and weak to receive
privileges.
At present, functions of the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs are (i) policy
making; (ii) training in cooperation with local governments; (iii) ﬁnancial support
through loan guarantee (KUR), grants for cooperatives and start-up ﬁrms, and arevolving fund for subsidized loans (in cooperation with MOF); (iv) marketing,which includes the SME Tower exhibiting provincial products; and (v) incubation.
The SMI Directorate of MOI has four Priority Programs: (i) One Village One
Product (OVOP) learned mainly from Taiwan and Thailand; (ii) SMI clusters; (iii)
creative industries; and (iv) “entrepreneurship.” The last is a scholarship program forselected young students to acquire technical skills in chosen ﬁelds at one of the 17
technical institutions for three years, then dispatching them to SME Centers acrossthe nation to assist businesses for at least two years. About 1,000 students havebeen recruited in this way during the last two years. Meanwhile, the Directorate's
Supporting Programs include (i) replacement of old equipment with 35% of costborne by the central government and 45% by the local government; and (ii) SMI
facilitation (IPR and packaging clinics, halal products, etc.) The Directorate hasbudget to help local governments with capacity building programs as well as
financial transfers. Separately, MOI operates eight Training Centers for training
local government ofﬁcials, seven technical colleges, 11 technical high schools, 11
technical institutes, and 11 industrial standards centers. However, limited budget andoutdated equipment are common problems.
Shindanshi is a system of ofﬁcially recognized SME consultants initiated in postWW2 Japan. From 2005 to 2008 JICA assisted Indonesia to train 450 (mostly) local
government officials as shindanshi and also created a national certification system.
The Industrial Education and Training Center under MOI manages this project.
However, activities have stagnated recently. The reasons include rotation, promotion

156

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

and retirement of trained local officials, difficulty for MOI to mobilize shindanshi
under decentralization, and inadequate local capacity. There is, however, a desire to
revive shindanshi within MOI.

8. Private sector efforts
Apart from government ministries and agencies, the private sector contributes
significantly to Indonesia ' s industrial competitiveness and improvement ofbusiness climate. Such efforts should be scaled up, ideally with the government's
policy support. Some organizations interviewed by the mission are discussed
below.

The Indonesia Mold & Dies Industry Association (IMDIA)IMDIA is an association of companies and institutions engaged in manufacturing,purchasing, marketing and/or maintenance of mold and dies, including those
afﬁliated with Japanese FDI. It was established in February 2006 with the supportof the Japanese private sector and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI). The idea of IMDIA originated from the Competitiveness/SMEs Working
Group of the Strategic Investment Action Plan (SIAP)16, a high-level public-private
sector joint forum of Japan and Indonesia, which saw an urgent need to strengthen
local supporting industries so Japanese ﬁrms could meet localization ratios requiredby the Indonesian government. Under the Japan Indonesia Economic Partnership
Agreement (JIEPA), which was signed in August 2007 and became effective in July
2008, this bilateral public-private partnership was transformed into a mechanism for
implementing JIEPA. IMDIA is unique because it is an Indonesian association under
the KADIN umbrella, but its management and activities are strongly supported by
the Japanese private sector and government.
IMDIA acts as a coordinator of programs related to local industry capacity
development, particularly strengthening Indonesia's supporting industries. As of July
2014, IMDIA had 408 members. IMDIA's programs include: (i) METI-supported
skill training of the local die and mold industry with the dispatch of 13 experts for
16

The SIAP was announced at the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in June 2005 by Prime Minister Koizumi and
President Yudhoyono as an initiative for promoting FDI from Japan to Indonesia. Its four working groups were
Tax/Customs, Labor, Infrastructure, and Competitiveness/SMEs.

157

group training during 2008-2012; (ii) dispatching experts to individual companies withthe support of the Japan Foundation from 2008 to present; and (iii) skill evaluation
activities, including training of skill evaluators, with the support of the Japan
Vocational Ability Development Association. In FY2014, IMDIA plans to organize 52
workshops in such areas as mold design and management, die ﬁnishing, equipment
maintenance, and mechanical inspection17.
IMDIA is managed by Mr. Makoto Takahashi (Chairman) and Mr. Itsuo
Tanigawa (Secretary General), two dedicated Japanese industrial experts who havetheir own businesses and work for IMDIA on a voluntary basis. IMDIA provides
training for member companies free of charge (lecturers receive no fees). Since
IMDIA does not have its own facilities, lecture rooms and training equipment arerented at various collaborating companies for which IMDIA pays fees and runningcosts. Japanese passion and support at IMDIA is laudable, but such monozukuri
initiative should be eventually assumed and scaled up by local managers andexperts so IMDIA will become a truly Indonesian-owned industry association.

Polytechnic Manufacturing Astra (Polman Astra)
Polman Astra is one of the leading private vocational training institutionsin Indonesia. It was founded in 1995 by Astra International 18, the largest
conglomerate in Indonesia, in order to ﬁll gaps of the existing education to meetthe needs of industry. Vocational training was initiated by P.T. Astra Honda Motor,
one of the afﬁliated companies, because of the difﬁculty to recruit workers withskills required by the industry. Polman Astra's vision is to be the best polytechnicin Indonesia.
Polman Astra provides three-year vocational training to produce D 3 level(Diploma 3 , below university) graduates in the field of automotive andnatural resources with QCDI (quality, cost, delivery and innovation) mindset
and discipline. Its programs consist of (i) mechanical engineering and tools
17

For details, see http://www.imdia.or.id/english/proﬁle/index.html

18

Astra International is a holding company in seven ﬁelds: automotive, ﬁnancial service, heavy equipment, manufacturing engineering, agribusiness, information and technology, and infrastructure. There are nearly 200 Astra
Group companies including joint ventures with foreign partners̶Toyota, Daihatsu, Isuzu, UD Trucks, Honda,
BMW, Peugeot, Lexus, etc. Astra was established as a trading company by Mr. William Soeryadjaya (Chinese-Indonesian businessman) in 1957. Its successful joint venture with Toyota in 1969 had a domino effect of prompting
many other Japanese companies to work with Astra.

158

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

manufacturing; (ii) manufacturing process and production engineering process;(iii) mechatronics; (iv) plantation crops process engineering; (v) informatics
management; (vi) automotive engineering; and (vii) heavy equipment engineering.
Emphasis is given to practical training (65%) over theory (35%). All curriculums
are accredited by Astra Group industries, and students are given opportunities forinternship at Astra Group companies during the last 6-9 months of the three-yeartraining period. Uniqueness and strength of Polman Astra lies in its close linkage
with the Astra Group which boasts a variety of leading manufacturing companies.
This makes the institution guaranteed to be practical and useful.
About 220 students are taken annually. As of June 2014, there were 658 students
enrolled with the cumulative number of students since establishment at 2,289. The
Astra Group provides subsidies of about $1 million per annum, which enables Polman
Astra to offer full scholarship to 35% of the students (tuition and living costs) andcover part of the training fees for other students. There are 55 full-time lecturers and108 visiting lecturers. After graduation, about 60-70% of the students are placed in
Astra group companies. Because of its renowned curriculums and promising job
opportunities, entry selection is highly competitive. For the annual in-take of 220, there
were 3,955 applicants in 2012, 3,474 in 2013, and around 5,000 in 2014. The majority ofstudents (about 60%) come from Java.
In addition to the vocational training program, Polman Astra also operates: (i) training
for Astra staff; (ii) a center for vocational and educational development; (iii) a center
for SME development; (iv) a center for commercial and product development; and (v)commercial production. Income from these activities is used to support the vocational
training program.

Business organizations
KADIN, the Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, is an umbrellaorganization of Indonesian business chambers and associations focusing on
trade, industry and services. It was established by Law No.1 of 1987 as the only
nationwide business organization to speak on behalf of private businesses. It has
33 regional chambers and 440 district branches. International chambers, suchas the Jakarta Japan Club (JJC) and AmCham, are also members of KADIN.
Being financed by membership fees, KADIN maintains independence from thegovernment. The government consults with KADIN on the drafting process of all

159

related laws and regulations. Recently, for example, KADIN commented on thedraft Laws on Minerals and Industry
Within KADIN, there are bilateral committees to enhance trade and investment
with partner countries. The Indonesia-Japan Economic Committee chaired by
Mr. Sony B. Harsono is the main counterpart of JJC for exchanging views on
Indonesia's business climate. At MPA High Level Consultations for Investment
Promotion, JJC works closely with KADIN to address issues raised by Japanesecompanies in doing business, such as taxation, labor disputes, customs clearance,and predictability of laws. KADIN has been an important actor for IndonesiaJapan bilateral public-private dialogue.
APINDO, the Employers ' Association of Indonesia, is an independent
organization with the vision of creating a good business climate to realize real
national development19. Its mission is to enhance competitiveness of Indonesiancompanies, realize harmonious industrial relations, represent the Indonesianbusiness community in various national and international institutions particularlyin employment organizations, and protect, empower and advocate all businesses,
especially its members. APINDO has approximately 10,000 members in all partsof Indonesia which ranges from private enterprises to state-owned enterprises,
local companies, joint ventures, and cooperatives. It is the sole body representing
employers in all tripartite councils on industrial relations and manpower affairs.
APINDO is active in policy advocacy. It expressed serious concern overexcessive increases in Provincial Minimum Wages in 2013, and stressed theneed to depoliticize wage determination and promote social dialogue between
employers and employees. APINDO also provides services to members at thenational, provincial and district levels, such as consultation on industrial relations
and manpower development, legal assistance, representation at labor courts, andtraining programs on manpower affairs.

19

The predecessor of APINDO was formed in 1952 by a group of Indonesian employers under the name of PUSPI(Employerʼs Council on Socio-Economic Affairs). It was recognized in 1975 by a decree of the Minister of Manpower, and mandated by KADIN to represent employers on industrial relations and manpower affairs. It was thenrenamed to APINDO in 1985.

160

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

9. A note on the Indonesia-Japan economic relation
Economic ties between Indonesia and Japan have been long and strong, and Japan'scontribution to the Indonesian economy has been immense. In March 2014, a JETRO
survey counted at least 1,517 Japanese ﬁrms operating in Indonesia, which are mostly
located in industrial zones east of Jakarta and whose number is rapidly on the rise.
The manufacturing sector, especially automotive, is dominated by Japanese ﬁrms withover 90% of cars on Indonesian roads carrying Japanese brands. Since 2013, Indonesia
has been the most popular FDI destination among Japanese ﬁrms. On the ODA front,
Indonesia is currently the largest recipient of Japanese ODA. At end 2012, cumulative
ODA loans, grants and JICA's technical cooperation to Indonesia amounted to 4.64
trillion yen ($46 billion), 276 billion yen ($2.7 billion), and 328 billion yen ($3.2
billion), respectively.
Despite such deep interaction for more than a half century, the quality of industrial
policy and business environment in Indonesia remains weak as discussed in thisreport. Given the high expectation Japan has for Indonesia, and given the large
volumes of FDI, ODA and trade in the past, this is a regrettable situation for Japan aswell as for Indonesia. True, progress has been made in income and industrialization.
But in comparison with rival economies in ASEAN̶not to speak of the East Asiantigers̶Indonesia's economic achievements have been modest and based more on
quantity than quality.
Indonesia's new leader should take decisive actions to overcome the middle
income trap as the top national agenda. However, in pursuing this objective,
economic nationalism must be combined with well-informed market-oriented
policy making, which seems to be lacking in today's Indonesia. On the Japaneseside, change is also needed to upgrade the bilateral economic relationship. For a
middle-income and key economic partner like Indonesia, Japan should formulate
an “All Japan” industrial cooperation strategy (not just ODA-based assistancestrategy) accompanied by regular public-private bilateral policy dialogue. The new
approach should be more selective and strategic than at present and produce synergy
between Japanese FDI and ODA in support of Indonesia's industrial development.
Speciﬁcally, the following are suggested.
First, a long-term goal of Japanese industrial cooperation in Indonesia must be
set in a way consistent with Indonesia's national development plans. This goal161

should be unique to Indonesia, substantive, and ﬁxed for at least a few decades.
Second, concrete medium-term targets, whose progress can be monitored easily
and continuously, should be agreed. Third, to realize these targets, a rolling
action plan specifying who will do what by when (which includes actions by bothIndonesia and Japan), together with performance criteria, should be constructed.
Fourth, a bilateral high-level permanent mechanism (Industrial Policy Dialogue)
should be created to advise and supervise policy design as well as monitor the
implementation of the action plan.
The MPA initiative with its Steering Committee and two Technical Committees
is a good start. But what is proposed here is broader in scope and more solid as
an institution than the current MPA-related meetings. It should be an annual orsemi-annual permanent bilateral forum that should cover not just infrastructure
projects and investment climate but also capacity building of local enterprises
and industrial human resource, FDI-SME linkage, supporting industry promotion,
logistic benchmarking, and standards, certiﬁcation and testing, which collectively
constitute the core of a nation's industrial capability. By implementing them withJapanese assistance, Indonesia will have a true industrial policy and policy-aided
value creation. At present, policy initiatives in these areas are very fragile.
Finally, Indonesia's challenge̶receiving massive aid and investment fromJapan but policy capability and ownership remaining weak̶is also visible inVietnam, except that the latter's economic interaction with Japan is only two
decades old instead of a half century. As an equally vital industrial partner ofJapan, Vietnam-Japan economic relation must also be revitalized along a similar
line.

162

7. Indonesia̶Industrial Policy under Nationalism and Decentralization

Attachment 1

Mission Schedule (15- 21 June 2014)
1. Mission Members
Kenicni Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Akemi Nagashima

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, JapanLe Ha Thanh

Lecturer & Researcher, National Economics University & Vietnam Development Forum (VDF), Hanoi, Vietnam

Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy

Director, Institute for Industrial Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Hanoi, Vietnam

2. Mission Schedule
DATE
TIME
1

15

2

16

3

4

5

17

Jun

PM

Arrival

Mon

AM
AM
PM

JICA Indonesia Office
JETRO Jakarta Office
The Jakarta Japan Club (JJC)

Tue

18 Wed19

AC TIVITY

Sun

Thu

6

20

Fri

7

21

Sat

PM

Deputy Minister (VII), Research & Development for Cooperative & SME Resources,
Ministry of Cooperative and SME

AM
AMSecretariat General, Ministry of Industry
Directorate General of International Industrial Cooperation (KII), Ministry of Industry

PM

Assistant Deputy, Spatial Planning and Development for Underdeveloped Regions,
Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (CMEA)

PM

Deputy Minister (VII), International Economic and Financial Cooperation,
Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (CMEA)

PM
AM

Indonesian Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KADIN)
Directorate General of Small and Medium Enterprises, Ministry of Industry

AM
PM

Directorate General of Leading and High Technology Based Industry, Ministry of Industry
The Employers' Association of Indonesia (APINDO)

PM

Directorate of Industry, Science Technology, Tourism and Creative Economics,
National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS)

AM
AM

Agency for Industrial Policy, Business Climate and Quality Assessment (BPKIMI), Ministry of Industry
Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)AM

Ministry of Industry(JICA Project on Small and Medium Industry Development Based on Improved Service Delivery)PM

Directorate of Sectors Investment Promotion, The Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)

PM

Ministry of Trade(JICA Project on Service Improvement of NAFED: National Agency for Export Development)

AM
AM

Matsushita Gobel Foundation
Indonesia Mold & Die Industry Association (IMDIA)

PM
PM
PM

Astra Manufacturing Polytechnic (POLMAN ASTRA)
Departure (Kenichi Ohno, Izumi Ohno & Akemi Nagashima)
Departure (Le Ha Thanh & Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy)163

8. Rwanda－An Emerging African Miracle(August 5-8, 2014)

A GRIPS Development Forum (GDF) team consisting of Kenichi Ohno, Izumi
Ohno, and Akemi Nagashima visited Kigali during August 5-8, 2014 to study thefeatures of Rwanda's remarkable growth in recent years from the perspective ofinternational comparison of policy methods, and draw lessons for other developing
countries including Ethiopia1. The GDF team conducted many meetings jointly with
JICA's parallel mission consisting of Ms. Miho Oikawa, Mr. Masaaki Hamada (JICA
Industrial Development and Public Policy Department), and Ms. Yuko Ikeda (JICA
Ethiopia Ofﬁce).
We visited government ministries and agencies, a private sector organization, a
policy think tank, an industrial estate, and donors with industrial support programs
including Japan, Germany, the African Development Bank and the World Bank.
Mission schedule, organizations visited and information collected are shown inattachments 1-3. We would like to express our deep appreciation to all people who
kindly received us and shared valuable information with us. Our special thanks go
to the JICA staff at the Africa Department and the Rwanda Ofﬁce in particular, who
assisted us greatly in executing this mission. We also thank Rwandan Ambassador
to Japan Dr. Charles Murigande, as well as Japanese Ambassador to Rwanda Mr.
Kazuya Ogawa and his embassy staff.

1. Overview
Rwanda has a unique and remarkable history of economic development. Afterthe tragic genocide in 1994, the Rwandan economy remained weak with per capita
1

The purpose of our JICA-commissioned missions, including this one, is to collect information on industrial policy
formulation in selected countries for the policy learning of other developing countries. During Phase I of Japan-Ethiopia industrial policy dialogue 2009-2011, the GDF team visited Singapore (August- September 2010), Korea(November 2010) and Taiwan (February 2011). During Phase II, India (September 2012), Mauritius (October 2012),
Malaysia (June 2013), and Indonesia (June 2014) were visited in addition to Rwanda. Separately, Ethiopia, Vietnam,
Thailand, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana and Uganda were also visited on other budgets.

1648. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

GDP hovering in the range of $200 to $300 during the period from 1998 to 2002.
Subsequently, with the initiation of proactive development policy in the early
2000s, the economy began to rebound strongly and sustained high growth with per
capita GDP rising at an average rate of 10.7% between 2002 and 2013 (World Bankdata). In 2013 per capita GDP stood at $620, about twice the level prior to the
genocide. President Paul Kagame, who assumed ofﬁce in 2000, has transformed
Rwanda into a developmental state and guided the nation toward economic
growth. The country aims to attain middle income status by 2020 (“Vision 2020”).
During this recent ascent achievements were made in both policy method
and economic performance with the result that certain aspects of the Rwandan
economy already resemble those of advanced economies while other aspects stillretain weaknesses expected of a typical latecomer country. This unevenness is one
the most striking features of the Rwandan economy today.
Rwanda's advanced aspects, which are rarely seen in other countries at similar
income levels, include the following: President Paul Kagame is seriously and strongly committed to development
and gives clear policy directions, to which the country responds.
 High-ranking technocrats are competent and have excellent presentation
skills.
 Policy is made through systematic stakeholder consultation, the government has
strong policy ownership, and policy documents are well-written. National Dialogue
is annually held with the participation of the President, and public private dialogue isalso active.
 There is little corruption, citizens enjoy personal security, and streets areclean.
 Performance contracts, based on the tradition of Imihigo, are pervasive.
Promised policies are monitored and assessed at every level of government.
 Significant poverty reduction has been achieved with population below thepoverty line falling from 77% in 1995 to 45% in 2011.
 In the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business survey in 2014, Rwanda ranks
No.2 in Africa after Mauritius, or No.32 globally.
 High value services such as ICT, telecom and finance are emerging, withservices occupying 45% of GDP in 2013.
 Overall national self-sufficiency in agro products has been attained165

overcoming the heavy food aid dependency of the past.
 National branding effort has created the image of a rising nation replacing thedark image of the past.
These features collectively make Rwanda an African Miracle in the eyes ofglobal analysts and investors. A large number of returning Diaspora̶the patriotic
Rwandans equipped with global knowledge and professionalism coming homefrom America, Europe and neighboring African countries̶provide the humancapital necessary for high-value industries and supporting policies. On the other
hand, three deficiencies of Rwanda identified by this mission, which are also
commonly seen in many other low-income countries, are (i) a weak (Rwandans
prefer to say “young”) private sector in sharp contrast to the advanced public
sector; (ii) high aid dependency in the absence of competitive foreign exchangeearning industries 2; and (iii) inadequate execution of policies despite theirelaborate formulation, which reduces impact.

2. Causes of high growth
In the opinion of the GDF mission, which was echoed by some development
partners of Rwanda, recent high growth can be explained mainly by three factors.
First, fast growth is not uncommon in economies that start from a very low level.
Because the Rwandan economy was devastated after the 1994 tragedy, it had muchroom to rebound when political stability and policy conﬁdence were restored. Postcrisis recovery is a natural phenomenon and can continue for 10-15 years or moreas witnessed in post-WW2 Japan, China and Vietnam in the 1990s, or Myanmar andEthiopia today.
Second, continuous injection of purchasing power into the national economy
through public money and ODA has sustained growth. Government spending
is about 20% of GDP with foreign aid supporting 40% of fiscal revenue. This isdemand-driven growth rather than productivity-driven one backed by strongly
emerging industries and structural diversification and transformation. True,
agriculture and services are doing reasonably well, but their dynamism alone cannot
explain the 8% growth recorded in the recent few years. The government is clearly
2

The Rwandan economy is relatively closed with the export volume equivalent to 15% of GDP. Coffee, tea andminerals accounted for 59% of total export in 2013 (World Bank data).

166

8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

aware of this situation and determined to transform the current consumption boom
into a “private sector-driven” (supply-driven) growth.
Third, policy improvements and initial economic achievements mentioned
above have generated business confidence and good reputation which sustained
high international attention and robust inﬂows of foreign aid and investment. The
government should be credited for the successful national branding and image recreation.
From the perspective of East Asian experience, however, demand-driven
booms and projection of a good image are not sufﬁcient to produce and sustain
high-quality growth. For this purpose, private sector dynamism, supported byappropriate policy actions, must be ignited. The Rwandan government values
logical consistency, well-defined participatory frameworks and the pursuitof global best practices. However, it seems relatively weak in gemba -based
pragmatism and unbroken attention to down-to-earth details which are thehallmark of East Asian development including Japanese3. To achieve high andsustained growth to middle income and beyond, procedural correctness must be
supplemented by gemba pragmatism (see sections 8 and 9).
While strong policy ownership and national pride mark the development
processes of both Rwanda and Ethiopia, the two countries are quite different
in their policy approaches. Rwandans often commission top-class international
advisors and consultants to produce well-structured global standard documents andmechanisms but they are relatively weak in helping small farmers and producers on
the ground. Ethiopians, on the other hand, often struggle to draft relatively clumsy
policy documents by themselves but have established implementing agencies suchas textile, leather and kaizen institutes for boosting priority sectors, agricultural andhealth extension services and a farmer training center in every village, a national
network of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and engineering
universities, state-run and World Bank-assisted industrial zones, and so on, throughtrial-and-error and with national budget (topped up by aid). Ethiopia can learn
national marketing and branding from Rwanda, while Rwanda can learn gemba3

Gemba is a Japanese term signifying a physical location where production actually takes place such as a factory ﬂoor ora farm. Improvement of gemba through relentless attention to details is the heart of kaizen (Japanese-style continuous,
bottom-up and low-cost productivity improvement) spearheaded by Toyota and practiced by virtually all competitive
manufacturers in Japan. Gemba-orientation is also visible in other high-performing Asian economies.

167

oriented hands-on policy making from Ethiopia4.

3. EDPRS2 and key policy components
Rwanda has so far drafted three five-year plans toward Vision 2020, which is an
overarching national aspiration to catapult the country into middle income. They are the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP: 2002-2006), the First Economic Development
and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS: 2007-2012), and the Second Economic
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2: 2013-2018). PRSP aimed tomove the country from dependency on humanitarian aid to economic recovery, whileEDPRS turned economic recovery into sustained growth. The main objective of current
EDPRS2 is to accelerate progress toward middle income status and better quality of life.
Based on the greater-than-expected achievements of the recent past, Vision 2020 itself
was revised in 2012. The original vision created in 2000 targeted a per capita income of$900 by 2020 but it was moved upward to $1,240 by 2020. The required annual growth was
set at an ambitious 11.5%. EDPRS2 has the following thematic areas, targets and priorities.
Drafting of EDPRS2 took one year, starting a year before the end of EDPRS. It
began with the self-assessment of performance in the past five years by sectors anddistricts5 which was supplemented by the Household Living Standard Survey 2010/11
and the Demographic Survey 2010. Five principles of innovation, emerging priorities,
inclusiveness and engagement, district-led development, and sustainability were set.
In industry, priority sectors were categorized into three groups: existing, emerging andfuture6. Comprehensive hearings of stakeholders were organized through the EDPRS2
website (where over 10,000 SNS opinions were received), road shows with artists andcelebrities, and community-based work days. Also, strategic retreats with development
partners were organized twice. After that, the document was ﬁnalized by the Ministryof Finance and Economic Planning within a few months. The drafting team at the4

Kaizen was adopted in Ethiopia as a nationwide productivity movement with Japanese assistance starting from 2009.
The second phase of JICA cooperation ends in November 2014 with the third phase expected to follow. Rwanda, whichlacks such basic gemba-oriented activities, is a prime candidate for kaizen especially in light of the fact that the Rwandans are highly disciplined and responsive to national calls for excellence.

5

Rwanda is composed of ﬁve provinces which are subdivided into a total of 30 districts. Below districts are sectors, thencells and villages as the lowest administrative level.

6

Existing sectors are tea, coffee, mining, horticulture, construction materials, tourism, and food processing and beverages.
Emerging sectors are logistics, ICT-related services, private equity funds, remote back-ofﬁce operations (for ﬁnance),
and electronics assembly. Future sectors include green economy and new green investments.

168

8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

The Second Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2)

Thematic
Targetarea
Economic
Average GDP
transformation growth of 11.5%

Priorities

Domestic & international connectivity,
export, investment in priority sectors,
urbanization, green economy
RuralLess than 30%
Land use & human settlements, agriculturaldevelopment poverty
productivity, graduation from extreme
poverty, rural economic opportunity
Skills & attitudes, technology & innovation,
Productivity 200,000 off-farmjobs p.a.; increased entrepreneurship, ﬁnancial access, business& youthemployment output per worker development, labor market interventions
Accountable More than 80%
Citizen participation, demand forgovernance service delivery;accountability, improved service delivery
increased citizen(macroeconomic stability, demographic
participation
issues, food security & malnutrition, etc.)
CrossCapacity building, environment & climate change, gender &cuttingfamily, regional integration, HIV/AIDS & non-communicableissuesdiseases, disaster management, disability & social inclusion
Source: Economic Development & Poverty Reduction Strategy II (2013-2018), abridged version, May

2013.

Ministry consisted of approximately 25 Ministry officials and a few external
consultants and technicians. Within the team, a focal person was assigned foreach thematic area such as economic transformation, rural development, etc. who
actively interacted and coordinated with relevant ministries and agencies.
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning explained the formulation of
growth numbers of EDPRS2 to the mission as follows. Given Vision 2020, theWorld Bank's lower middle income threshold in 2020 was forecasted at $1,240
per capita, from which the necessary annual growth of 11.5% was derived. Intersectoral consistency was checked by the IMF-type Excel-based “ Financial
Programming” without sophisticated econometric modeling.
Recent growth was analyzed as follows. The vibrant service sector led thegrowth. Service growth was broad-based and included telecom (thanks toliberalization), financial services, micro-finance, tourism, trade, transport, realestate and construction. Food production is large but declining due to falling
import of inputs and loss of competitiveness. The Rwandan franc is strong andregional integration is progressing within the East African Community, whichmeans Rwandan crops are not competitive against imports. Land consolidation

169

and village crop specialization for scale merit are to counter this problem. Rwanda
has a nationally integrated market thanks to the construction of feeder roads
funded by donors. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning does not haveproductivity data of Rwandan industries.
The main challenge of EDPRS2 is how to generate the required growth of 11.5%.
The government-driven economy must be transformed into a private sector-driven
one. Industries need strengthening, skills must be upgraded, and funds must be
mobilized by increasing export receipt and domestic revenue. This concern is widelyand acutely shared by all quarters of the Rwandan government. As mentioned above,outstanding growth since 1994 was driven mainly by aggressive spending for recovery
and development through public investment and international aid. Meanwhile, theshare of private investment remained small7. Growth fell significantly to 4.6 % in2013 due to the partial suspension of donors' aid for general budget support which
was triggered by a certain suspicion against the Rwandan government. This incident
clearly showed the quantitative impact of ODA in the current growth mechanism. In
our interviews, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the World Bank and
the African Development Bank all agreed that private sector dynamism was key if
Rwanda was to sustain high growth and reduce aid dependency. With a relatively highpopulation growth rate and urbanization, it is estimated that 200,000 new off-farm jobs
need to be created every year.
During the years of the First EDPRS, Rwanda established new institutions andstrengthened old ones for the purpose of accelerating economic development.
Most importantly, in September 2008, the Rwanda Development Board (RDB)
was created as a principal agency for implementing private sector development
by merging existing organizations (see next section).8 It has a broad mandate
including cross-cutting functions such as investment, export, human capital,
7

Rwandaʼs public investment accounted for 16.2% of GDP while private investment amounted only to 8.2% of
GDP in 2013. The corresponding numbers in neighboring countries are as follows: Kenya (5.3% vs. 14.3%, in2009), Uganda (5.9% vs. 18.5%, in 2013), Ethiopia (14.3% vs. 18.7%, in 2012), and Tanzania (8.0% vs. 29.5%, in2013). Rwandaʼs investment is highly skewed toward public investment by the standard of East Africa (data provided by the World Bank Rwanda Ofﬁce).

8

RDB was created by merging eight government agencies: the Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency(RIEPA); the Rwanda Ofﬁce of Tourism and National Parks (ORTPN); the Privatization Secretariat; the Rwanda
Commercial Registration Services Agency; the Rwanda Information and Technology Authority (RITA); the Center for Support to Small and Medium Enterprises (CAPMER); the Human Resource and Institutional Capacity
Development Agency (HIDA); and the Rwanda Environmental Management Authority (REMA).

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8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

institutional capacity and privatization, as well as specific sectors such as ICT,
trade and manufacturing, services, agriculture, and tourism and conservation.
RDB is directly under the President and its CEO is a member of the cabinet
meeting. These features were copied from Singapore's Economic Development
Board (EDB).
Other industrial policy initiatives which were recently introduced include thefollowing.
 TVET policy was formulated and the Workforce Development Authority(WDA) was established under the Ministry of Education (2009). A State Ministerof Education in charge of TVET was appointed (2013).
 Special Economic Zone Policy (Government, May 2010 ) defined land
allocation, incentives, infrastructure development, regulatory framework. RDB
was made the supervising authority.
 Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy (Ministry of Tradeand Industry, June 2010 ) proposed support for entrepreneurship, Business
Development Services, regulatory framework, and policy institution (Ministryof Trade and Industry designs policy, RDB implements and coordinates).
 Industrial Policy (Ministry of Trade and Industry, April 2011) specified short-,
medium- and long-term policy directions for existing and new industries, giving
concrete contents to the preceding Rwanda Industrial Master Plan 2009-2020 ofDecember 2009.
 National Export Strategy (Ministry of Trade and Industry, April 2011 )classiﬁed sectors into traditional (tourism, coffee, tea, minerals), non-traditional(BPO, floriculture, horticulture) and potential (interior design, fashion,
biotechnology, etc.) and proposed promotion plans.
 Private Sector Development Strategy 2013-2018 (Government, January 2013)
showed integrated policy direction for the Ministry of Trade and Industry, RDB,
WDA, the Private Sector Federation (PSF)9 and other related public and privateorganizations to follow.
 ICT development has been guided by a series of policy documents
9

PSF is a professional organization that promotes and represents the Rwandan business community. It has eightsectoral chambers such as ICT, tourism, industry, etc. and two cross-cutting chambers for women and young entrepreneurs. Each chamber has sector-speciﬁc associations under which individual companies belong. Registeredmembers as of August 2014 counted about 80,000. PSFʼs main mandate is advocacy with additional activities incapacity building, ﬁnance, marketing, B-to-B meetings, information, and tours.

171

(Government). The First National Information Communication Infrastructure(NICI 1 ) 2005 - 2010 created a legal framework, NICI 2 2005 - 2010 laid ICT
infrastructure, and NICI3 2010-2015 aims at an expanded use of ICT. SMART
Rwanda 2015-2020, the next policy under preparation, will propose realization ofa knowledge-based economy with an extensive use of ICT.
 The National Employment Program (Government, January 2014) is a fiveyear action plan in line with EDPRS2 to produce 200,000 off-farm jobs annually.
Featuring skills development, private sector development, and strengtheningof labor market functions, it presents measures to be undertaken jointly by the
Ministry of Education, WDA, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, RDB, theMinistry of Public Service and Labor, PSF, and local organizations.
Overall, these policies are mutually consistent and collectively share thedirection for national economic development. The basic idea behind these policies
is overcoming the constraints of a landlocked country as well as earning/saving
foreign exchange by (i) promotion of light-weight and high-value sectors such as
ICT, tourism and ﬁnancial services through active FDI attraction; (ii) productionand export of high-value agro products; and (iii) supporting import-substituting
manufacturing of household goods and construction materials. In sum, it can besaid that agricultural productivity and value-creation must go hand-in-hand withstable and gainful job creation by the development of manufacturing and services.
Regional integration is an important component of this policy direction.
Rwanda is a strong promoter of the East African Community together with
Kenya and Uganda. An oil pipeline to Kenya, electricity import from Ethiopia,
and a railroad link to Uganda are planned to reduce high energy and transport
costs. Rwanda hopes to become an air link hub for Africa with an expansion of
RwandAir and planned construction of a new airport. Many government ofﬁcials
talk about turning land-locked disadvantage into land-linked advantage andRwanda becoming a regional, African and even global hub. While the feasibilityof this grand plan must be examined, it is evident that Rwanda has a strategic andambitious plan for economic development.
Some of the policy measures and institutions which play crucial roles in
Rwanda' s economic development are discussed more fully in the following
sections.

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8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

4. Rwanda Development Board
The Singapore model was benchmarked to create the Rwanda Development
Board (RDB). After the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (rulingparty) dispatched many missions to Singapore to study various aspects of its
development policies including investor support. RDB was conceived as a
modiﬁed version of Singapore's Economic Development Board offering one-stop
service, investment incentives, and logistic, trade and other support by businessminded authorities. Dr. Rama Sithanen, Former Vice-Prime Minister and Ministerof Finance and Economic Development of Mauritius, was invited to assume the
Chairman of RDB.
RDB was officially established in 2008 and started operation in 2009. It is
an implementation agency with an objective of empowering the private sector.
Its key goals are promotion of local and foreign investment, export, and job
creation. To carry out this task, it has three departments in charge of (i) investment
promotion and implementation with ﬁve priority sectors (tourism & conservation,
ICT, trade & manufacturing, services, and agriculture); (ii) human capital andinstitutional development which provides an enabling environment for private
sector development; and (iii) assets and business management. In Rwanda, strategic
projects which are not taken up immediately by private investors are operated asstate-owned businesses which are later privatized. For example, previously state-run
tea factories are now all in private hands, and ﬁber optics laid by the government
are operated by the private sector. Apart from these departments, the Strategic
Investment Unit under the CEO Ofﬁce of RDB has the power to negotiate special
incentive deals with preferred investors. RDB's one-stop shop for investors provides
smooth investment registration which contributes to Rwanda's increasingly higher
marks in the World Bank's Doing Business ranking.
RDB's functions and organizations continue to evolve10. In October 2013, theCEO of RDB was elevated to be a cabinet member to facilitate inter-ministerial andagency coordination on the matters related to private sector development. Recently,
10

The JICAʼs internal study on RDB dated in February 2012 gave a mixed assessment of the agency. Its establishment backed by strong political will, projection of a positive image of Rwanda, and efﬁcient one-stop service werehighly evaluated while overlapping division of labor with existing ministries and agencies and weak investment
follow-up were cited as negative factors. Some of these problems have already been ﬁxed as explained in the current report.

173

with the cabinet reshufﬂe of July 2014, Mr. Francis Gatare replaced Ms. Valentine
Rugwabiza as the CEO of RDB. Also, new structure was imposed where a few
divisions moved out of RDB. Part of human capital building went to the Ministryof Public Service and Labor as well as the National Capacity Building Secretariat,
the ICT Department now focuses on FDI and export while other ICT functions left,
and tourism functions were enhanced (with convention services likely to moveout). These changes did not affect RDB's core mandate. As of August 2014, RDB
staff numbered 293 who were housed in the RDB Headquarters and Telecom House(ICT Department only) in Kigali. RDB also employs about 300 national park staff
who will however be privatized in the future. Although RDB does not have its own
overseas ofﬁces, RDB staff are dispatched as commercial attaches in the embassies
of Canada (Montreal), China (Shenzhen), and India (Mumbai)
For monitoring investment projects, one key account manager is assigned toeach FDI project who follows up and trouble-shoots until the project is properlyin operation. This “implementation” team consists of about 30 RDB staff. Another“after-care” team of about 10 staff continues to monitor all projects in operation
with less frequency. There are no micro or small investors to follow up because
Rwanda sets a minimum size of investment for registration11.
RDB feels that the private sector of Rwanda is not as vibrant as hoped for but
there are signs of new growth in telecom, water, services, etc. Rwanda's export isdominated by a few crops which should be replaced by more valued and processedexports. To strengthen the private sector RDB engages in various measures andservices.
For enterprise support, the Trade and Manufacturing Department of RDB conducts
the Manufacturing Growth Program which was started in 2013. RDB hires consultants(Rwandans and Kenyans from Ernst & Young) for diagnostics and formulation of
growth action plans of individual companies suffering from low operation. RDB
pays up to certain hours of their consultancy services beyond which each company
must pay for additional service. If the problem is caused by external factors beyond
the power of company management, RDB takes the issue to the policy level forsolution. In the first year of this program (2013), 20 companies were coached in this11

Investment certiﬁcates are issued to projects of at least $100,000 for local investment and at least $250,000 for
FDI only. In 2013 total registered investment (local and FDI) amounted to 262 in number and $1.4 billion in capital, or worth 19% of GDP.

174

8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

way. Separately, there is a plan to develop local experts (Small Business Development
Advisors) in 2014 with 10-day training (by hiring local consultants) after which a
certiﬁcate is issued. Existing “Proximity Business Advisors” are primary candidates
for this program. 800 such local experts are targeted in 2014, who will be dispatched to
all districts when the training is completed12.
For export promotion, the Export Development Program was initiated also in
2013. Trade Links, an Irish ﬁrm, teaches on standards, packaging, contracts, andexport plans with the funding of Trademark East Africa, an international NGO for
facilitating trade and regional integration in East Africa funded by Western donors.
15 companies were selected for this program among the 40 ﬁrms that previously
tried to export through trade fairs. Services are rendered free of charge to thecompanies except expenses for reaching out to regional buyers and distributors.
Through this program there are already some export contracts signed mainly
for agro products such as cassava and maize milling, baby food, construction
materials (granite), and Inyange (mineral water). RDB is also training local
advisors for export development which includes four government ofﬁcials and 14
private experts.
Other support programs by RDB include TVET-industry linkage (with WDA
under the Ministry of Education, see below), Sector Skill Councils (see below),
and the proposed Supplier Development Program that will link FDI firms withlocal suppliers. In preparation for this program, a survey is being conducted on thecurrent input procurement of large ﬁrms to identify items that may be produced
and procured locally.

5. Industrial human resource
For value creation, industrialization and economic diversiﬁcation, human capital iscrucial. Rwanda also needs industrial skills to remain competitive in the East African
Community (EAC), reverse the trade imbalance, and increase employment. Since all
cannot be realized at once, creation of import substitution industries and value-added
12

The mission expressed amazement at the proposed speed of this expert training plan. In Ethiopia, about 400 local
kaizen experts were produced after two phases of JICAʼs cooperation spanning ﬁve years, whose skills must be further strengthened in the third phase. In Singapore, during the 1980s JICAʼs productivity development project spenteight years coaching local enterprises and experts before the country was ready to teach others.

175exports must be strategized. This means that industrial human resource development
must be selective and closely linked to future labor demand as well as the direction ofnational industrialization drive.
The Ministry of Education recognizes that skills at all levels and in all sectors
are seriously lacking. To remedy this problem, access to primary and secondary
education must be complemented by strong higher-level education. Moreover,to produce demand-driven education, TVET by both public and private hands ishighlighted. The government plans to increase the number of TVET institutions andtheir enrollment by three to four times within the next three to four years. Within
ﬁve years the Ministry of Education wants to see more TVET students than normaltrack students. In this connection, JICA supports Tumba College of Technology
including its linkage with industry. Vulnerable and handicapped people will also be
supported more strongly in the future.
Sector Skills Councils were recently launched as the principal mechanism forstrengthening the TVET-industry linkage based on public-private engagement.
The objectives include provision of infrastructure for skills formation, trainingof trainers, and transformation of curriculums from knowledge cramming tocompetency creation. Councils are in the initial formation stage and their concrete
modalities will be decided in the near future. The Ministry admitted that Rwanda's
private sector was still “young” and it was difﬁcult to expect all sectors to embrace
this approach immediately and grow at the same pace. For this reason, this policy
must be applied selectively to most prospective sectors. Councils have alreadybeen set up for several priority sectors13 with RDB acting as a collective chair withactive PSF participation. The Ministry hopes that the hospitality and construction
sectors will spearhead this approach.
This policy is expected to produce better curriculums and teaching materials that
respond to changing industrial needs. It will also promote pre-graduation “industrial
attachment” and post-graduation “internship” of students (this terminology comesfrom Singapore). It is critical that these measures will lead to actual employment intargeted sectors. While skills development is the responsibility of the Ministry of
Education, other ministries will cooperate to increase absorption of TVET graduates
13

As of August 2014, Sector Skills Councils already existed for mining, construction, agriculture, energy, manufacturing, ﬁnancial service, ICT and hospitality. However, not all were operational and the frequency of meetings
remained up to each Council. These sectors largely overlap with the sectors prioritized by RDB.

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8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

in industries. The Ministry of Trade and Industry will help startup companies withbusiness development and entrepreneurship support. The Ministry of Public Service
and Labor will provide regular labor demand forecasts including labor demand
from FDI and public works in the pipeline. Government projects such as road
construction, power transmission and others will also be used for job creation andskills development and matching14.
Sector Skills Councils are an ambitious undertaking. This mechanism isapparently imported from Singapore's Council for Professional and Technical
Education, which implements a detailed matching between TVET curriculums,
courses and budgets and the number of students in each ﬁeld on the one hand, andforecasted industrial skill needs and national industrial plans four to five years
ahead on the other. Singapore can engage in such an elaborate labor matching
because of its very high policy capability, long experience and compact size. A
strong private sector, tripartite coalition among government, management andlabor, highly advanced TVET programs, active participation of enterprises inmanaging TVET and revising curriculums, and skills training centers locatedinside industrial estates are already in place, which collectively form a solid
basis for effective implementation of such matching. But most other countries,
including Japan, find it impossible to imitate this feat. For a latecomer country
with a weak private sector and without necessary policy tools in place, a sectoral
skills matching mechanism is a great challenge.

6. ICT
Rwanda prioritizes ICT. Given the country's geography where bulky products
are difficult to export or import, the focus on ICT was a natural one althoughsomewhat surprising for a low-income country recovering from war and genocide.
In the last one-and-half decades, Rwanda has built ICT infrastructure; connected
all districts with central government; promoted ICT use in government, education,industry and services; introduced the One Laptop per Child Program; operated four
ICT buses for rural communities; adopted 4G technology through Korea Telecom;
invited Carnegie Mellon University to offer master programs in ICT and computer
14

According to the State Minister of Education in charge of TVET, this approach was copied from Ethiopiaʼs lowcost housing project which facilitated skills development for youths and provision of contracts to SMEs.

177

engineering, etc. So far the results are highly visible and national commitment to
ICT development is evident.
Telecom House in central Kigali serves as the Home of ICT in Rwanda where
many ideas and companies emanate. A JICA expert is assisting the formulationand implementation of the national ICT strategy along with the establishmentof k-Lab, which is an incubation center for ICT entrepreneurs. The mission was
greatly impressed with the dynamism of young leaders we met from the Ministryof Youth and ICT, the ICT Department of RDB, the ICT Chamber of PSF, andk-Lab.
The history of ICT promotion policy dates back to 1998 when President
Kagame proclaimed the vision that ICT should be the catalyst for Rwandandevelopment. The First National ICT Strategy and Plan 2000-2005 (a.k.a. National
Information Communication Infrastructure Phase I or NICI1) provided regulatory
and enabling environment for ICT development and liberalized the telecom sector.
Subsequently, NICI2 2005-2010 laid out national backbone infrastructure including
the internet center and e-Government, while NICI 3 2010 - 2015 is promoting
development of ICT services. SMART Rwanda 2015-2020, the next ICT masterplan under preparation, will aim at the creation of a knowledge-based economy by
expanding ICT use to produce more and better services in both public and private
sector.
As of 2013, ICT sector proﬁle includes mobile subscribers reaching 65% andinternet subscribers of 20% (both numbers are expected to jump significantlywith the scheduled launch of 4 G in September 2014 ). The One Laptop perChild Program had reached 203,000 kids and 95.3% of hospitals were connected
electronically. SMART Rwanda intends to accelerate the use of ICT even moreby overcoming the existing challenges in ICT literacy, content, and internet
penetration.
Despite these achievements, the long-term vision of ICT as a future industry of
Rwanda remains unclear. SMART Rwanda proposes broad and active use of ICT
in e-Government, agriculture, education, healthcare, environment, infrastructure,urban development, job creation, etc. but it seems rather terse in charting adevelopment strategy of the ICT industry itself especially regarding the level andscope of technology and human resource to be targeted and support measuresand marketing strategies required for this purpose. Production of ICT services is178

8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

a different matter from its use, just as making a car requires different skills fromdriving one. If Rwanda wants to be an excellent user of ICT infrastructure tocatalyze and strengthen its domestic industries and services (indirect creation ofcompetitiveness), that is one good option. Another option is to export ICT services,
expertise, engineers and even systems to earn foreign exchange (direct creation ofcompetitiveness). ICT as a competitive industry needs a proper goal, supporting
measures, and a phased strategy on how much should be relied on incoming FDI
and how much to be done by Rwandans. To us it seems more natural to pursue both
paths̶use and export ICT̶and the master plan should accordingly spell out thelong- and medium-term strategies for each in detail. But we were not convincedthat this was the way Rwanda was heading and we are still unsure even after the
mission.

7. Special Economic Zones
The feasibility of industrial estates with superior procedural and infrastructureservices was studied in 2006 to overcome Rwanda's geographic disadvantage.
The initial idea was Free Trade Zones exempted from tax and tariff obligations
provided that tenant companies exported 80% or more of their products. Exports
to neighboring countries were targeted. However, Rwanda's accession to the EAC
in 2007 meant that it had to conform to the requirements of the EAC Customs
Union, which invalidated the strategy of exporting to EAC neighbors with special
conditions. Thus, the idea of Free Trade Zones was replaced by Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) which combined the functions of free port, export processing zone,
bonded warehouses, and investor services.
At present the first SEZ is being constructed, policy and legal frameworks areprepared, and the SEZ authority has been established under RDB. In the future,
Rwanda plans to develop more SEZs in other sectors including business process
outsourcing, tourism and ﬁnancial services, and the SEZ authority will be upgraded as
an independent agency.
Kigali SEZ, the ﬁrst SEZ in Rwanda, is situated on a hilltop near the airport in
the Eastern part of Kigali. It takes about 20 minutes by car from the city center.
Phase 1 consists of 100 ha of land divided into 85 plots, which are already sold out.
Infrastructure has been completed except delayed selection of a private internet

179

provider. Tenant companies can be in any sector, even users of dye and paint,
as long as they pass environment impact assessment (“Everything but Guns”).
Centralized waste water treatment is installed and a carrier of solid waste to the
dumping area has been designated. The funding is provided by public private
partnership which includes the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (30%),
state-run corporations, and private firms and banks. The SEZ is managed by aspecial purpose vehicle, which means a private company assigned for the task.
Plots are sold to companies and the proceeds will be used to develop more SEZs.
Sectoral composition of Phase 1 companies includes construction materials, agro
processing, motorcycle assembly, mattresses, bio-degradable plastic, and traders anddistributors. In terms of nationality, two Chinese factories are already operational andothers are from Denmark, Lebanon, India, Tanzania, Uganda, etc. Among the 100 haof Phase 1 development, 16 ha (8 ha x 2 locations) is reserved for the relocation of 14
existing factories from the city center. Standardized sheds are already completed forrelocation15.
Phase 2 of Kigali SEZ will have 175 ha of land divided into over 100 plots. It is
under construction with 70-80% of infrastructure completed and 60% of the plots
already “booked” (a deposit of $10,000 has been made).
There is a wave of Chinese producers relocating to Africa and some of themtarget Rwanda. Ms. Helen Hai, a Chinese FDI promoter who managed Huajian
Shoe Factory in Ethiopia, is helping to establish a baby clothes factory here forWalmart purchase through AGOA. Chinese investors seem to be in a hurry. Eight
more industrial estates are planned and “plug-and-play” factories (ready-madesheds) are mulled mainly to accommodate Chinese investors who are eager tocome in.
There is no minimum wage regulation in Rwanda. The Ministry of Trade andIndustry feels that Rwandan wage is competitive enough to attract factories
relocating from Asia16. Wage advantage is particularly secure if SEZs and factories
15

Relocating companies are selected from good performers and receive ofﬁcial support for relocation. Their sectors include coffee, steel, tobacco, paint, biscuits, and plastic water tanks. Some relocators decided not to comebecause prepared sheds (600m2, 1,200m2 and 2,400m2) were too small for their operation. Two such unoccupied
sheds were sold to new investors (Chinese textile and Danish packaging). In the ﬁrst phase of relocation, sheds
were built by a Chinese contractor supervised by a Kenyan company. In the second phase of relocation (whichis still in Phase 1 of Kigali SEZ), sheds will accommodate size and style requirements of companies and will bebuilt jointly by local and Chinese contractors.

16

An industrial ofﬁcial in charge did not know the average wage of factory workers in Kigali, but he cited the wage

180

8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

are located in rural areas. The Ministry is even considering to lower the wage byoffering food, accommodation and social security to workers
At present 90% of cargo is transported by land through the North (throughUganda and Kenya) and Central (through Tanzania) corridors, especially theformer. Future railway connection to Uganda (and Kenya) should further assist
industrial shipment.

8. General issues in policy making
Three cross-cutting issues concerning industrial policy formulation andexecution were identiﬁed by the mission.
First, current achievements should be combined with gemba-based pragmatism.
Rwanda's economic growth, as well as public and private efforts behind it, during thelast two decades were truly remarkable. Nevertheless, the current growth mechanism
may not be sufﬁcient to produce private sector-led development or graduation fromaid dependency. There is no need to abandon the existing policy contents, frameworks
and institutions, but they should be enhanced by the adoption of gemba-orientation sothat policy can respond more effectively to varied needs of individual entrepreneurs
and deliver necessary supporting measures on the ground. Transparent and systematic
procedures and frameworks, on the upper level of policy making, are importantelements imported mainly from the West. They can produce great results if national
leaders and policy makers are also equipped with the ground-level knowledge of whatworks and what does not in the context of speciﬁc factories, farms and schools. Suchknowledge, which turns theories and plans into real actions that work, can be acquired
only through continuous interest, experience and interaction with a large numberof private actors who produce, trade, invest, compete, and innovate. Development
officials in East Asian governments are usually very comfortable with dailyinteractions of this kind. While Rwandan ofﬁcials interviewed by the mission werehighly competent and strongly committed to national development, additional lessons
could be learned from the mindset, attitude and methods of development ofﬁcials andexperts in East Asia including Japan.
of RWF4,000 per day for a professional mason and RWF2,000 per day for a support worker, which roughly translates to $150 and $75 per month respectively. The standard wage for factory workers may be difﬁcult to obtain in
Rwanda because such workers are just emerging.

181

Second, there is an issue of proper balance between internalizing and outsourcing
policy works. The Private Sector Development Strategy of the Ministry of Trade andIndustry was commissioned to Deloitte consultants. RDB has handholding programsfor diagnosing and advising potential enterprises. For Exporters Development
Program, an Irish consulting ﬁrm is dispatched to RDB Headquarters by TradeMark
East Africa, a non-profit company. For Manufacturing Growth Program, a mixed
team of Kenyans and Rwandans from Ernst & Young is providing diagnostic andadvisory services using standard management and marketing menus. In principle,
we have no grudge against mobilizing external teams for policy purposes at theoutset. However, it is also imperative to “import substitute” industrial expertise sothat domestic ofﬁcials (at ﬁrst) and domestic private service providers (ultimately)
can provide such services in sufficient quality and quantity without dependingon aid, NGOs or foreign consultants in the medium to long run. This was theoverarching objective of Japan's industrialization strategy in the mid 19th century.
More recently, JICA's industrial projects usually have such an “internalizing”
component from the beginning, with the understanding that domestic experts willtake over the works initiated by Japanese experts17. Without such substitution, aproject is deemed a failure. Our mission did not have enough time to determine
whether the use of outsourced experts in Rwanda was for coaching companies onlyor for multiplying Rwandan experts who could replace foreigners.
Third, there is a question of stability versus flexibility in policy frameworks.
Rwanda's SME policy is changing rapidly, introducing new mechanisms before
previous ones take root. Moreover, it is not entirely clear how responsibilities for
SME development are divided among the Ministry of Trade and Industry, RDB,
and PSF. The state-run, free-of-charge Business Development Service (BDS)
established in 2006 was replaced by fee-based BDS Centers in 30 districts throughPSF-RDB collaboration in 2010. In 2011, BDS Centers were placed directly under
RDB which commissioned service provision to private consultants. More recently,
RDB created the Business Development Fund (BDF)18, a new mechanism to assist
17

For example, the main purpose of JICAʼs cooperation with Singaporeʼs productivity development in 1983-90
was training domestic ofﬁcials and private experts rather than just counting the number of companies advised,and similarly for Phase 2 of JICAʼs kaizen project in Ethiopia in 2011-14. In Thailand, from 1999 to 2004, JICA
trained 450 Thai experts for shindan (public purpose SME consultancy) after which Thai NPOs and universities
took over to continue the shindan teaching.

18

BDF is an afﬁliate of the Development Bank of Rwanda set up with government support in 2012 to facilitate1828. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

SMEs into which existing services will be merged. There must be good reasons
behind these adjustments. It is not unusual to revise institutions in any country andthat may even be necessary when situations change or if the country is in an earlystage of development. But speed of institutional change in Rwanda is extraordinary.
All developing countries tend to say they are in a hurry, but even in that case, it ishighly desirable and rewarding to spend a few solid years in properly designing policy
targets, actions, schedule and institutional frameworks most suitable for the local
context, with all foreseeable possibilities discussed, rather than jumping onto policy
and trying to amend it as (obvious) problems arise. East Asian economies such asSingapore, Taiwan and Malaysia normally take about three years to formulate a newpolicy and about one year to revise an existing one. Due consideration of all views andcontingencies takes that much time. Rwanda may wish to lean more toward policy
stability and predictability. Ofﬁcials should spend more time and energy on ensuring
the effectiveness of training and support on the ground even with less-than-perfect
institutions than revising policies frequently.

9. How Japan can contribute
There appears to be much room for Japanese contribution in introducing gembabased pragmatism to Rwanda's policy making (the first item in the previous
section). Japan is good at ﬁlling the gap between policy formulation in the highlevel and its implementation at factories, shops, schools, hospitals, and crop ﬁelds.
Ambitious policy targets and reasonable policy frameworks are already in placein Rwanda. But details must be filled in. The perspective of Japanese experts
who stay at gemba, work closely with engineers, operators, workers, farmers,
etc., and propose and improvise measures to overcome the problems at hand cancomplement the existing policy mechanism. This perspective should provide a
feedback between gemba and policy making, regularly inform implementation
issues to policy authorities, adjust policy to gemba reality, and reduce theprobability of excellent plans and strategies remaining only on paper or being
implemented with little impact.
Even with a limited policy area and on a small scale initially, Japanese experts
SMEsʼ access to ﬁnance.

183

should consciously offer such policy information and services in their assigned
ﬁelds, and simultaneously teach national ofﬁcials and experts how to do the same.
The Japanese government (including JICA) should monitor the progress of Japaneseexperts, regularly discuss strategies with them, and create a communication channel
with relevant government leaders and ofﬁcials when necessary. Quality, not quantity,
should be the goal of Japanese industrial cooperation in Rwanda in particular and in
Africa in general.
Japan's current Country Assistance Strategy for Rwanda (approved in April2012) supports sustainable growth with four pillars: economic infrastructure,
agricultural development (value addition and commercialization), social services(safe water supply), and growth-supporting human resource development (scienceand technology TVET). Within this framework, JICA is implementing or has
implemented projects in One-Stop Border Post, One Village One Product, ICT
strategy formulation and implementation, and TVET and TVET-industry linkage,
among others. Given the emphasis on private sector development, off-farm job
creation and urbanization in EDPRS2, new industrial cooperation may be initiatedby Japan. Ideally, the new project should be designed in such a way that it has closeinteraction with JICA's existing ICT and TVET cooperation.
The ﬁrst possible step may be a review of Rwanda's SME policy in the past and atpresent and exploration of its future directions. Since JICA is considering the dispatchof an SME expert, the TOR can include this review work as its main component.
As discussed above, SME policy in Rwanda is in a formation stage with frequent
trial-and-error, and lacks many components normally seen in other countries. The
Deloitte-drafted Private Sector Development Strategy is strong on creation of enabling
environment and public private dialogue forums but concrete action plans for skills
and enterprise capacity building may be wanting. Institutions change fast and mandate
is not allocated clearly or predictably among ministries, agencies and the private
sector. Under such institutional ﬂuidity, the Japanese expert should advise on the longterm and overall picture of SME policy from the East Asian perspective rather thanbeing assigned to work on a narrow sub-issue.
Impact of past and current SME policies should be reviewed, which includes thecurrent Private Sector Development Strategy, RDB's Exporters Development Programand Manufacturing Growth Program assisted by outsourced experts. The detailed
curriculums and content of existing business coaching programs should be evaluated1848. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

against international standards as well as Rwanda's speciﬁc industrial needs. SMEs
and business organizations in different sectors and districts should be interviewed
for their awareness and assessment of each policy component. Policies desired by
the private sector and proposed and executed by government should be listed andcompared. The quality and number of business consultants in government, districts
and the private sector should be surveyed and the possibility of “import substitution”
of experts should be explored. In conducting this basic policy research, the perspectiveof international comparison is extremely valuable. Concrete cases of policy successes
and failures from various countries should be cited for reviewing and designing
Rwanda's SME policy measures19.
Based on such research, past achievements and remaining issues should be
identified, and alternative future directions should be proposed with concrete
timetables and numbers. This should be a joint interactive process between the
Rwandan authorities and Japanese ofﬁcials and experts, not a commissioned report
drafted by a foreign expert and commented on later by the government. Such aninteractive project should provide a small but good start for strengthening Rwanda's
SME policy as well as conveying Japanese mindset and method of industrial policy
making to the relevant Rwandan policy makers.

19

While Japan and Taiwan have highly advanced SME policies, they are hard to replicate in most developing countries. Singapore also has well-developed SME assistance which is unique and different from the East Asian norm.
Southeast Asian developing countries, especially Malaysia, may offer a more feasible model of SME development to latecomer countries. Nevertheless, one model is usually insufﬁcient to guide SME policy of any country.
Various policy components should be gathered from different countries, with proper combination and necessary
adjustment, to form a policy package most suitable for Rwanda.

185

Attachment 1

Mission Schedule (for GRIPS team)
Mission Members
Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Kenichi Ohno
Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Akemi Nagashima

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Miho Oikawa

Special Advisor, PSD Group, Industrial Development and Public Policy Dept., JICA

Yuko Ikeda

Project Formulation Advisor, JICA Ethiopia Office

Masaaki Hamada

JICA Consultant

Mission Schedule
Time
Date

1

5

2

6

Sun

Mon

Aug

3

7

Tue

4

8

Wed

5

9

Thu

186

ActivityAM

ArrivalPM

JICA Rwanda OfficePM

Embassy of Japan in Rwanda

PM

Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM)AM

African Development Bank (AfDB), Rwanda OfficeAM

Industry Development Unit, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM)PM

Institute of Policy Analysis and Research Rwanda (IPAR)

PM

Directorate of Policy Evaluation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)AM

Department of Trade and Manufacturing, Rwanda Development Board (RDB)

AM

GIZ, Rwanda OfficePM

Private Sector Federation (PSF)

PM

State Minister in charge of TVET, Workforce Development Authority (WDA)

PM

World Bank, Rwanda officePM

Official dinner reception at Japanese Ambassador Residence (GRIPS team)AM

Directorate of Macroeconomics, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)PM

Joint Meeting with Ministry of Youth & ICT (MYICT), RDB/ICT, PSF/ICT Chamber, and kLabPM

Departure to Addis abada, Ethiopia

8. Rwanda̶An Emerging African Miracle

Attachment 2

Organizations/Persons Visited
The Government / Governmental Organization of Rwanda
Organization

Name
Richard Mushabe

Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)

The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM)

Rwanda Development Board (RDB)

Position
Acting Director of Policy Evaluation and ResearchAlexis Ruzibukira

Director of General Industry and SMEs

Amina Rwakunda Umulisa

Director of Macroeconomics

Obald Hakizimana

Senior Economist

Charles Kalinda

Public Investment Specialist

Thomas Mazuru Semahoro

Policy Analysis and Research Expert

Emmanuel Hategeka

Permanent Secretary

Jean Pierre Dukuzimana

Professional in charge of manufacturing development, Industry
Development Unit

Eusebe Muhikira

Head of Trade and Manufacturing

Muhizi Rugamba

Division Manager of Strategy CompetitivenessMartin Carlos Mwizerwa

Division Manager of National ICT Planning & Coordination

Ministry of Education, Workforce Development Authority(WDA)

Albert Nsengiyumva

Minister of State in Charge of Technical and Vocational
Education and Training

Ministry of Youth & ICT, together with Private Sector
Federation ICT Chamber (MYICT)

Lambert Ntagwabira

Senior Technologist, ICT Skills Development

Private Organization
Organization

Name

Position

Director of Member Service, Capacity Building and
Entrepreneurship Promotion

Pri vate Sector Federation (PSF)

Donatien Mungwarareba

The Institute of Policy Analysis and Research(IPAR䇲Rwanda)

Malunda Dickson

Senior Researcher

kLab

Jovani Ntabgoba

General Di rector

Patrick Kabagema

President

Alex Ntale

Director

ICT Chamber, PSF

International Organizations
Organization
World Bank, Rwanda Office

Name
Yoichi ro Ishi hara

Position
Seni or Economi st

Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbei(GIZ), Rwanda Office

Ulrike Maenner

Country Director

Africa Development Bank (AfDB), Rwanda Office

Edward B. Sennoga

Country Economist

Governmental Organization of Japan
Organization

Name
Kazuya Ogawa

Embassy of Japan in Rwanda

JICA Rwanda Office

Position
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Tatsuya Oniki

Coordinator of Economic Cooperation

Mayumi Fujita

Researcher

Takahiro Moriya

Chief Representative

Ryutaro Murotani

Acting Senior Representative

Satomi Kamei

Program Advisor (Education and Vocational Training)

Fumiaki Ishizuka

Program Manager (Water and Sanitation)

187

Attachment 3

List of Information Collected
SourceTitle

Authors/Publisher

Power Point Document: Republic of Rwanda, A Model of Reform-Driven, Market-Based, Sustainable
Development

Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning (MINECOFIN)

Brochure: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II 2013-2018(EDPRS2 -Sharpe our development) (May, 2013)
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2013-2018 (EDPR2)MINECOFIN

Rwanda VISION 2020 (July, 2000)
Rwanda VISION 2020 (Revised 2012)
Brochure: BDF -Your Business Development PartnerThe Ministry of Trade and Industry(MINICOM)

Rwanda Industrial Master Plan 2009-2020 (December 2009)
National Industrial Policy (April, 2011)

Business Development
Fund (BDF)
MINICOM

Rwanda Development Board(RDB)

Brochure: Rwanda Special Economic Zones

RDB

Ministry of Youth & ICT(MYICT)

National ICT Strategy and Plan NICI-2015

Ministry of Youth & ICT(MYICT)

kLab

kLab Guide kit -Rwanda's 1st Techpreneur Innovation Open Space

MYICT, PSF, Rwanda ICT
Chamber, RDB and JICA

Private Sector Federation(PSF)

Brochure: enterprise -Private Sector Federation Magazine- (July, 2014)

PSF

Rwanda Case Study on Economic Transformation -Report for the African Centre for Economic
Transformation (ACET)- (2012)

IRAR (Dickson Malunda
and Serge Musana)

Against The Odds: Achieving MDGs in Rwanda

IPAR

The Institute of Policy Analysis
and Research (IPAR-Rwanda)

Rwanda Economic Update; Seizing Opportunities for Growth ~with a Special Focus on Harnessing the
Demographic Dividend~(December, 2013)
World Bank

J ICA

188

International Development Association International Finance Corporation Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency, Country Partnership Strategy for Republic of Rwanda for the Period FY2014-2018(May 1, 2014)

World Bank

Quantitative Analysis of Crisis: Crisis Identification and Causality

Yoichiro Ishihara

Institutional Framework and Implementation Flow of SME Support in Rwanda

JICA

9. Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion

9. Thailand－FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion(May 24-26, 2015)

A policy research team consisting of Kenichi Ohno, Izumi Ohno, and Akemi
Nagashima visited Bangkok during May 24 - 26 , 2015 to study Thailand ' sexperience in fostering FDI-local firm industrial linkage, and draw lessons forother developing countries including Ethiopia1. Special attention was paid topublic and private efforts for promoting such linkage and matching between Thaiand Japanese firms. Japan is the dominant (roughly 60%) source country of FDI
into Thailand. Moreover, there is an increasing interest in enhancing business tiesof various types̶input sourcing, OEM, joint venture partners, etc.̶between Thai
SMEs and Japanese SMEs, the latter of which are rapidly increasing investment inThailand in recent years.
We visited relevant Thai official and private organizations and met Thai
policy makers and practitioners as well as Japanese advisors assigned at Japan
Desks. We would like to express our deep appreciation to all people andorganizations who kindly received us and shared valuable information with us.
This report summarizes the mission's ﬁndings. The mission schedule, interviewed
organizations and persons, and information collected are given in attachments 1-3.

1. Key features of Thailand's FDI-local linkage development
Since the mid-1980s, Thailand has introduced a number of programs to promote“supporting industries” (part and component suppliers for large assembling firms
operating in Thailand, especially in automotive and electronics sectors). FDI-local
1

The purpose of JICA-commissioned missions, including this one, was to collect information on industrial policy
formulation in selected countries for the policy learning of other developing countries. During Phase I of Japan-Ethiopia industrial policy dialogue 2009-2011, the GDF team visited Singapore (August- September 2010),
Korea (November 2010) and Taiwan (February 2011). During Phase II, India (September 2012), Mauritius (October2012), Malaysia (June 2013), Indonesia (June 2014), Rwanda (August 2014), and Cambodia (May 2015) werevisited in addition to Thailand. Views expressed in this report are those of the GDF team and do not necessarily
represent the views of JICA.

189

industrial linkage development is one of the key programs. Japanese manufacturing
FDI increased suddenly in Southeast Asia in the late 1980s following a sharp yen
appreciation, but component producers were undeveloped in the region. This
prompted some governments in Southeast Asia to develop supporting industries
from scratch, often with Japanese private and public assistance. Malaysia introduced
the Vender Development Program (1988) and the Industrial Linkage Program (1995),
but it subsequently abandoned this policy and began to focus on value-creating
high-tech Malaysian SMEs without linkage with FDI. By contrast, Thailand
has steadfastly maintained the policy of attracting manufacturing FDI firms andstrengthening Thai ﬁrms to work effectively with them even to this date. The recent
rise of FDI by Japanese SMEs into Thailand has activated both the Thai government
and private sector to strengthen business matching and linking services to produce
a “win-win” situation for the two countries. The appetite of Thai companies fortechnology transfer from Japanese FDI remains strong.
Figure 1 illustrates the Investment Promotion Network for Thai-Japanese SMEs
with special attention to industrial linkage development and supporting industry
promotion. The Board of Investment (BOI, an investment agency under the Prime
Minister's Ofﬁce)2 and the Ministry of Industry (MOI) are the key ofﬁcial actors
for FDI-led industrialization and industrial capacity building. They ﬂexibly andinformally coordinate activities of related agencies and units afﬁliated with BOI
or MOI, as well as private sector bodies such as the Alliance for Supporting
Industries Association (A.S.I.A.) which comprises of twelve Thai industrial
associations (see section 3 ). The network is neither dominated by a single
organization nor governed by explicit rules. Each member organization performs
its works separately, and refers customers to other organizations whenever they
can ﬁll required functions better than itself. Personal relationship among ofﬁcials
and experts at various organizations matters greatly in ensuring the quality ofcollective services. Such mutual referral is called taraimawashi in Japanese,
often with a negative connotation of bureaucratic irresponsibility. But whentaraimawashi is conducted speedily and properly, customers are well served even
without a focal point or formal procedure. Loose working style such as this is2

BOI was originally under the Prime Ministerʼs Ofﬁce, but it was placed under MOI during the time of former
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (August 2011-May 2014). Under the current government of Prayuth Chanocha, BOI was moved back to the Prime Ministerʼs Ofﬁce.

190

9. Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion

typical of the Thai government not special to the Investment Promotion Network
alone.
BOI issues investment licenses and approves incentives based on the publishedlist of priority activities and products which is combined with internal deliberation.
As an investment promotion agency, BOI is the first contact point for foreign
investors. On January 1, 2015, BOI introduced new investment incentives guided
by the Seven-Year Investment Strategy 2015-2021, which promotes investments
enhancing national competitiveness through R&D, innovation, value creation in
the agricultural, industrial and service sectors, or promoting environment-friendly
activities. This was a major shift in Thai FDI policy from the previous zone-based
regime (different amounts of incentives were granted depending on location:
Bangkok, near Bangkok, or remote areas) to the combination of the activitybased (knowledge-based, value-added, high-technology) and the merit-based(competitiveness enhancement, decentralization, industrial area development, etc.)
regime. BOI also has the BOI Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD,
Figure 1 : Investment Promotion Network for Thai-Japanese SMEs

191

see section 2) which provides business matching and linkage services between
FDI and Thai ﬁrms.
The Department of Industrial Promotion (DIP) of MOI is responsible forindustrial policy design, as well as policy implementation directly or indirectly
through various ofﬁcial and non-ofﬁcial bodies such as the Bureau of Supporting
Industry Development (BSID) under DIP (section 3), several sector-specificinstitutions, industry associations and their apex organization A.S.I.A., and theIndustrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT). In addition, there are academic
institutions and NPOs that provide management and technical education andtraining, business consulting, among which the Technology Promotion Association(TPA, section 5) is most prominent.
The remaining sections will explain key member organizations of theInvestment Promotion Network for Thai-Japan SMEs, illustrated in Figure 1,
as well as selected private sector organizations that contribute to FDI-Thai ﬁrm
matching and linkage.

2. BOI Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD)
To meet the demand of FDI companies for procuring domestic inputs or ﬁnding
suitable Thai partners for joint venture (JV) or Original Equipment Manufacturing(OEM) arrangement, BOI established the BOI Unit for Industrial Linkage
Development (BUILD) in 1992. BUILD provides one-stop sourcing services for
FDI companies by identifying the needs of FDI manufacturers and matching themwith local suppliers. Through industrial linkage development, BUILD contributes
to the transfer of production technology and the growth of supporting industries inThailand.
Main activities of BUILD include sourcing service, SUBCON Thailand,
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Supporting Industry Database(ASID), and internationalization (Vender Meet Customers (VMC) Roadshow
Program).
Sourcing service―BUILD provides free service to help both Thai and foreign
buyers source parts and components in Thailand. When an inquiry is received
from a buyer, BUILD identifies potential suppliers that meet the buyer's
requirements. Normally, BUILD announces the specification and volume

192

9. Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion

requirements of foreign buyers in the website and solicits expression of interest
from Thai suppliers. One-on-one meetings can also be arranged for a buyer todiscuss individually with each potential supplier. There are various channels
through which BUILD receives inquiries from buyers. In some cases, buyers
directly contact BUILD via email or phone. In other cases, the One Start One
Stop Investment Center (OSOS) or the overseas ofﬁces of BOI transfer inquiries
by foreign buyers to BUILD. Japanese local governments often contact BOI's
Tokyo or Osaka Ofﬁces instead of contacting BUILD in Bangkok directly.
SUBCON
Thailand― this event, started in 2007 , is the largest industrial
subcontracting exhibition for industrial parts and business matchmaking in
the ASEAN region. It is organized jointly by BOI, the Thai Subcontracting
Promoting Association, and UBM Asia (Thailand) in May every year. It is also
held to coincide with Intermach, the largest machinery exhibition in Southeast
Asia. SUBCON Thailand 2015 took place on May 13-16, 2015, in Bangkok.
ASEAN Supporting Industry Database (ASID)̶this is an information service of
ASEAN that lists manufacturers of parts and components in the ten member
countries on the internet for global access. BUILD is responsible for maintaining
this database in Thailand by consolidating and updating information. For eachentry, the database includes company proﬁle, investment proﬁle, and information
on employment, customers, products, capacity, processes, raw materials, andmachinery and equipment. The BUILD team asks registered companies to update
their information annually. The team told us that convincing registered companies
on the merit of database inclusion was the key to secure their cooperation forregular updating.
Internationalization (VMC Roadshow)―the VMC Roadshow Program allows
Thai parts manufacturers to participate in overseas exhibitions and trade fairs
with the aim of widening their vision and knowledge. Participating local
firms are expected to gain entrepreneurial experience leading to businessdevelopment and competitiveness improvement. It is hoped that exposure to
linkage opportunities may enable Thai companies to become part of a global
supply chain.
BUILD is run by one director and ten staff members, with each staff assuming
responsibility for sourcing service for different buyers. According to the BUILD
Director, business matching is not an easy task with partner search being more difﬁcult

193

than finding local inputs. It sometimes takes more than one year to look for suitablepartners. BUILD arranges various types of business partnership for FDI customers (joint
venture, OEM, patent use, production contract, etc.). BUILD does not have data on thenumber of buyer inquiries or the number of successful search3. However, the BUILD
team often receives positive feedbacks from companies. One of the staff felt that about
half of the FDI ﬁrms that made inquiries would subsequently send a thank-you email
and report the progress to BUILD.

3. Bureau of Supporting Industry (BSID) under DIP/MOIThe Bureau of Supporting Industry (BSID) under the Department of Industrial
Promotion of the Ministry of Industry assumes the main responsibility forpromoting supporting industries (Thai SMEs rather than foreign suppliers in
Thailand). The history of BSID goes back to 1988, when the Metal-working andMachinery Industries Development Institute (MIDI) was established within DIP as
an agency to implement promotion measures for metal-related supporting industries
with JICA technical cooperation. At that time, there was a strong need to strengthen
Thai ﬁrms as reliable partners of Japanese FDI production, in the wake of a massive
relocation of Japanese manufacturers to Thailand following a sharp yen appreciationof 1985. In 1996, MIDI was upgraded to BSID with a higher organizational status
and a broader scope of work (including plastic, packaging, and linkage). It focusedon the three aspects of people, technology, and linkage. This is a good example ofscaling up and institutionalizing JICA technical cooperation by the ownership of
the Thai government. During the 1990s, more industrial institutes were establishedby DIP/MOI including the Thai-German Institute (TGI, 1992), the Thailand
Automotive Institute (TAI, 1998); the Electrical and Electronics Institute (EEI, 1998),
the Iron and Steel Institute (ISI, 2000), and so on. These were initially establishedwith government budget or foreign aid, but are currently required to operate as
autonomous, non-proﬁt, and ﬁnancially self-supportive organizations.
BSID has taken a step-by-step approach to strengthening the capacity of Thai
3

When we asked about the number of inquiries from FDI companies and the number of successful business matching per year, the BUILD team was unable to give clear answers. The unit seemed too busy with day-to-day operations to produce such statistics, and the general working environment of the Thai government does not require
such reporting unlike some other governments.

1949. Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion

supporting industries. Initially, when the private sector was weak and the numberof supporting industry firms was limited, BSID directly provided technical andmanagerial support to individual companies. When the number of companies
grew to approximately 1,000, BSID established and managed thematic forums of
supporting industries (design, metal, machinery, foundry, etc.), serving as their coachand secretariat. Gradually, these forums have gained experience and developed into
truly privately-run industrial associations. Currently, there are twelve such industrial
associations fostered by BSID (see footnote 4). Increasingly, those associations are
beginning to provide technical support and human resource development to member
companies without BSID's help.
In 2008, the Alliance for Supporting Industries Association (A.S.I.A.) wasestablished, again with the support of BSID/DIP, to promote networking among
existing supporting industry associations4. There are more than 15,000 companies
involved in A.S.I.A. A.S.I.A. plans and conducts activities related to all industry
associations for producing synergetic effects. Compared to the Federation of Thai
Industries (FTI) established in 1987, A.S.I.A. is a young apex organization focusing
on domestic supporting industries, and its capacity needs to be further strengthened.
Nevertheless, this is a good way to promote cooperation among different supporting
industry firms toward a common goal of becoming competitive regionally andglobally, now that Thai supporting industries have grown to a certain level and are
aspiring to achieve higher management and technology capability.
Currently, BSID, industrial institutes, A.S.I.A., and A.S.I.A.-affiliated industrial
associations collectively work to strengthen supporting industries. BSID is a policymaking organization responsible for overall policy for supporting industry promotion.
It initiates and directly implements innovative pilot projects, which should eventually
be handled by the private sector (A.S.I.A. and its industrial associations). BSID isalso responsible for emerging industries such as the medical and health care industry
and the elderly care industry, for which industrial associations are yet to be formed.
Industrial institutes play a key role in drafting and implementing industrial masterplans in respective sectors, acting as the hub for businesses, government (BSID),
4The A.S.I.A. has a network of the following twelve associations: Thai Machinery Association, Thai Composites
Association, Thai Foundry Association, Thai Embedded Systems Association, Thai Plastic Industries Association,
Thai Logistics and Production Society, Thai Tool and Die Industry Association, Thai Air Conditioning Traders
Association, the Association of Thai Software Industry, Thai Subcontracting Promotion Association, Hazardous
Substance Logistics Association, and the Association of Thai Small and Medium Entrepreneurs.

195experts, and other organizations. A.S.I.A. and its industrial associations are the initialpoint of contact for member companies for information, training and other capacity
development activities, business matching, and so on. It is important to note that
BSID, industrial institutes, and industrial associations work very closely in Thailand.
Most (80%) of these associations are housed in the same complex in Klong Toey,
Bangkok, where BSID, the Thailand Automotive Institute and the Iron and SteelInstitute are also located. Physical proximity allows these organizations to visit anddiscuss with each other easily and frequently5.
As the above history shows, the degree of government's direct involvement inenterprise support was strong at first, but has decreased over time as the private
sector developed its capacity. Now, BSID's role in enterprise support is indirect,
primarily working through A.S.I.A. and its industrial associations. Likewise,
shindan (SME management consultant system) service was initially provided by
the government, but now it is implemented by individual ﬁrms that have come tounderstand its beneﬁts. Currently, the main role of BSID in shindan is normative,
setting the criteria for enterprise diagnosis and establishing a mechanism in whichshindan reports can be used effectively to address concrete problems. A few years
ago, Thai companies became obliged to present shindan reports when applying
for BSID technical support or financial support from the SME Bank. BSID also
manages a database for supporting industries in Thai language. It is exploring thepossibility of linking it with J-GoodTech, a database of Japanese high-quality SMEs
recently created by the SME Support, Japan (SMRJ).

4. Japan Desks at BOI and MOI
Because of close economic relationship between Thailand and Japan, both BOI and
MOI have established “Japan Desks” as consultation windows dedicated to Japanese
investors.
At BOI, Japan Desk is headed and staffed by Thai ofﬁcials. In addition, overthe last twenty years, Shoko Chukin Bank6 has continuously dispatched its staff to
5

In Thailand, there is no secondment practice from government to the private sector. In order to reach out to various
industrial institutes and associations, BSID staff may spend one day of every working week at a particular instituteor association while they are at BSID on other days. This eliminates the need for formal personnel arrangement.

6

The Shoko Chukin Bank is the only public ﬁnancial institution in Japan, jointly invested by government and theprivate sector (partial privatization started in 2008). It provides ﬁnancial access to SMEs and SME cooperatives to196

9. Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion

BOI's Japan Desk as a bilateral investment advisor. This advisor gives necessary
advice on application procedures, company registration, investment promotion
policy, and incentives to Japanese investors. Approximately 20-30 cases arehandled per month.
At present, the Thai-Japan investment advisor sits in BOI's One Start One Stop
Investment Center (OSOS) in central Bangkok, established in 2009, rather thanat BOI's headquarters. The aim of OSOS is to bring investment-related agencies
under one roof, make the process of starting business easier, and centrally provide
information on business operations. Staff from BOI and the Ministries of Finance,
Commerce, Industry, and Labor are stationed at OSOS, and staff of some otherministries and agencies are available by appointment. According to the Thai-Japan
investment advisor, the majority of Japanese investors use business consultants
on a fee basis to obtain investment and business licenses instead of free service at
OSOS. As a result, OSOS functions primarily for a small number of companies
that choose to do all application procedures by themselves without using businessconsultants. It should additionally be noted that, in contrast to relatively efﬁcient
BOI procedure for issuing investment licenses and incentives, application
procedure for obtaining tax and import duty exemption is highly complex andonly in Thai language, and companies must ﬁle application for each consignmentof imported goods.
At MOI, Japan Desk was established in 2009 within the Business Opportunity
Center (BOC) of the Bureau of Strategies Management (BSM) of DIP, and a rotating
Japanese expert has been dispatched with JICA funding since then. While BOC
disseminates information on Thai industry and business opportunities generally
to all, Japan Desk here is dedicated to providing initial contacts and facilitating
networking between MOI (that is, DIP) and Japanese local governments (prefecturesand municipalities) which are interested in business expansion of Japanese local
SMEs in Thailand. Fukuoka Prefecture was the spearheading case. With a strong
initiative of the prefectural authority, various programs have been organizedincluding mutual visits of SMEs in Thailand and those in Fukuoka Prefecture,
networking and business matching events, lectures, and so on. The Fukuoka model
stimulated other Japanese local governments that have similar interest in facilitating
facilitate their business activities.

197

bilateral business partnership. With rising interest among Japanese SMEs to invest
abroad in recent years, eleven local governments have signed MOUs with DIP (Aichi
Pref., Akita Pref., Fukui Pref., Fukuoka Pref., Saitama Pref., Shimane Pref., Tottori
Pref., Toyama Pref., Yamanashi Pref., Kawasaki City, and Minamiboso City).
DIP also has partnership arrangements with the SME Support, Japan (SMRJ), theTokyo Metropolitan Industrial Technology Research Institute (TIRI), and the Tokyo
Metropolitan Small and Medium Enterprise Support Center.

5. Technology Promotion Association (TPA)The Technology Promotion Association (TPA) is a private Thai NPO establishedin Bangkok in 1973 by former Thai students who studied science and technology
in Japan. For 42 years, it has provided management and technical education andtraining, language courses, and book publication with a strong focus on Japanesemanufacturing. Based on its accumulated experience and expertise, TPA establishedthe Thai-Nichi Institute of Technology (TNI) in 2007, a private university forteaching Japanese style manufacturing in theory and practice, with strong emphasison the latter. TNI was financed by TPA's accumulated profits and a bank loan.
Japanese businesses in Thailand have assisted TPA and TNI from the sideline
by dispatching experts, accepting student internship, providing equipment andscholarship, and so on. The Japan-Thailand Economic Cooperation Society (JTECS)
was an organization established in Tokyo to coordinate and provide private andpublic assistance to TPA from the beginning. However, management and ﬁnancial
resources of TPA and TNI have been local with strong Thai ownership.
TPA has been offering three core programs: (i) culture and language (with anemphasis on Japanese but also other languages); (ii) shindan consultancy forcompanies; and (iii) calibration (setting or correcting of measurement on precisionrequiring equipment). In addition, TPA recently adopted an innovative approach(i-TPA) in which project-based pilot activities can be started on a trial basis toenlarge its functions̶which can be formalized if successful and ended if not. Thisis an effort to positively respond to the changing needs of both Thai and Japanesebusinesses. In 2014, TPA was reorganized by adding pilot project units to theexisting functional units conducting regular programs.

198

9. Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion

The Thailand-Japan Business Alliance Center (abbreviated as J-SMEs)7, is a notable
example of such pilot projects. J-SMEs was established in August 2013 to conductbusiness matching between Thai companies and Japanese SMEs, building on TPA's
strong Japanese network. Its activities include: (i) arranging business trips and businessmatching for Japanese investors interested in Thailand or other Southeast Asian
countries as well as for Thai investors interested in Japan; (ii) organizing workshops
for both Thai and Japanese SMEs; and (iii) business coordination functions such as
business advice, market research service, local business trip arrangement, and market
development support. TPA has assigned three permanent ofﬁcers to run J-SMEs, which
is located on the third floor of the Old TPA Building, and collaborates with Tokyo
Higashi Shinkin Bank which has dispatched two staffs to J-SMEs, from January 2014,
to promote business matching and exchange between Japanese SMEs (clients of Tokyo
Higashi Shinkin Bank) and Thai companies.
The first two years of J-SMEs have shown that business matching is timeconsuming and does not produce quick results. The J-SMEs staff have faced amismatch between Japanese SMEs which have specialized high technology (“OnlyOne” technology) and Thai SMEs which prefer producing a large quantity at low
cost. To be compatible, Japanese SMEs must make great effort to localize theirtechnology and produce at lower cost, while Thai SMEs need to upgrade theirtechnology and capability. From this experience, TPA now realizes the importantrole of business matching coordinators who understand technology and can advise
both Thai and Japanese SMEs in technological aspects, not just in management andmarketing. To produce such coordinators, TPA has turned to the Model of the Greater
Tokyo Initiative (TAMA for short)8. TAMA was established in 1998 and became an
association in 2001, to vitalize industries in the Greater TAMA area (encompassing
parts of Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Saitama) through innovative collaboration amongindustries, universities, local governments, and financial institutions. TAMA has
7

For details of J-SMEs, visit http://www.tpa.or.th/industry/index.php.

8

TAMA is named after the Tama Region, which is the Western part of Tokyo comprising the core geographic area
for this initiative, as well as for abbreviation of the Technology Advanced Metropolitan Area. As of March 2014,
TAMA had 595 members including 300 ﬁrms (94% of which are SMEs), 64 economic associations and NPOs,
38 universities, and 22 local governments (TAMA Annual Report FY2013). Building on this broad and diverse
membership, about 150 TAMA coordinators work to create various types of business collaboration involving
local SMEs, in such areas as R&D, marketing, and overseas business expansion, human resource development,
information sharing, and networking with other regions. The number of business collaboration cases arranged by
TAMA exceeds 500.

199

contributed to the cluster formation of SMEs, R&D and technology, and creation of“Global Niche Top” companies in the Greater TAMA area. TPA is seeking twinningarrangement with TAMA, by inviting experts for training high-skilled project
coordinators, curriculum development, and advising SMEs for writing good businessproposals.

6. Implications
Thai experience in FDI-local industrial linkage development offers useful
lessons for today's developing and emerging economies in three ways.
First, two main components of industrial linkage development are (i) creating
linkage between FDI and domestic companies through various types of businessmatching programs; and (ii) capacity building of domestic SMEs. Both components
are necessary for effective linkage development. In Thailand, the former component
is handled mainly by BUILD of BOI, which is the first contact point for foreign
investors, and the latter is assumed by BSID of MOI, industry institutes, andindustrial associations belonging to A.S.I.A. These organizations form a loosely
coordinated investment promotion network for Thai and Japanese SMEs. In
addition, there are private organizations, such as TPA, which provide various
programs for business matching and industrial capacity building.
Second, in Thailand, many organizations, both public and private, support businessmatching between Thai and FDI firms including sourcing service, matching events,and overseas visits (Vender-Meet-Customer Roadshow). However, it has become
increasingly clear that superﬁcial matching is not enough to produce results, and that indepth preparation is necessary to identify the real needs of both local and FDI companies
including technology aspects. In the most innovative case, TPA plans to train highlyskilled project coordinators with technical knowledge to conduct more effective businessmatching, in collaboration with a Japanese industrial NPO. It is important to monitor the
results of this initiative.
Third, the Thai government has played a vital role in fostering the private
sector, by helping first the establishment and then the enhancement ofindustrial associations. In particular, BSID has taken a step-by-step approach tostrengthening the Thai supporting industries. When the private sector was weak,
BSID directly provided technical and managerial support to individual companies.

2009. Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion

It then created and served as secretariat for thematic forums of supporting
industries, which later developed into relatively capable privately-run industrial
associations. More recently, BSID supported the establishment of an apex
networking organization, A.S.I.A., to facilitate information sharing and various
capacity development activities across industrial associations.
What Thailand practices is a relatively advanced form of FDI-local ﬁrm industrial
linkage development and supporting industry promotion in comparison with otherdeveloping countries. This is the result of cumulative efforts over the last three decades
made by both public and private players. Although it is not easy to replicate the fullset of what Thailand does in most other countries, we believe that the examples givenin this report are highly useful for countries aspiring to strengthen manufacturing
capability under FDI-led industrialization. They point to a general direction to go aswell as pitfalls to avoid.

201

Mission Schedule
Mission Members
Kenichi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Akemi Nagashima

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Mission Schedule
Date

Time

Activ ity

PM Flight from Haneda to Bangkok
24

Sun

PM Dinner with Ambassador Shiro SADOSHIMA, Embassy of Japan in Thailand
AM
25 MonMinistry of Industry, Department of Industrial Promotion (DIP),
Bureau of Strategies Management (BSM), Business Opportunity Center (BOC)

AM Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD), BOI

MAY

PM Technology Promotion Association (TPA)
AM
26

Tue

Ministry of Industry, Department of Industrial Promotion (DIP),
Bureau of Supporting Industry (BSID)

AM Thailand Board Of Investment (BOI)PM Flight from Bangkok to Phnom Penh202

9. Thailand̶FDI-Local Firm Linkage Promotion

Organizations/Persons Visited
Organization

Name

Position

Ministry of Industry, Department ofIndustrial Promotion (DIP),Bureau of
Kiyoshi MURAKAMI
Strategies Management (BSM), Business
Opportunity Center (BOC)

Advisor for BOC Japan Desk

Ministry of Industry, Department ofIndustrial Promotion (DIP), Bureau of
Supporting Industry (BSID)

Panuwat Triyangkulsri

Director

Sonklin Ploymee

Director

Keeratinun Srimuang

Investment Promotion Officer

Tomoyoshi HARADA

Thai-Japan Investment Advisor

Unit for Industrial Linkage Development(BUILD), BOI
Thailand Board Of Investment (BOI)

Damrong ThawesaengskulthaiTechnology Promotion Association (TPA)

Virach Sornlertlamvanich
Napaporn Ngamthanacom

Executive Director and Director
GeneralAdvisory Executive Director
GeneralOversea Project Director

203

List of Information Collected
Sou rceThailand Board Of Investment (BOI)

T itleA Guide to the Board of Investment 2014

BOI

Presentation Documents: Thai-Japanese SMEs
Investment Cooperation, 23 May 2013

BOI

Brochure: BUILD

BUILD, BOI

Brochure: BUILD -One Step Sourcing Service-

BUILD, BOI

Ministry of Industry, DIP, Bureau of
Thai Magazine article: OTAGAI -Thai & Japan for
Strategies Management (BSM),
the future- (Japanese Translate by JICA)
Business Opportunity Center (BOC)

Others204

Au th ors/Pu blish er

MBA Magazine

The Eleventh National Economic and Social
Development Plan 2010-2016

NESDB

Presentation Documents: Investment in Thailand,
11 March 2015

Mr. Daisuke MATSUSHIMA,
JICA expert at NESDBBrochure: Ticon Group FORWARD, September
2014, March 2015

TICON

10. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

10. Cambodia－Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity(May 27-29, 2015)

A GRIPS Development Forum (GDF) team consisting of Kenichi Ohno, Izumi
Ohno, and Akemi Nagashima visited Phnom Penh during May 27-29, 2015 to study
the features and issues of Cambodia's industrial policy. This was one of the regularresearch missions conducted by GDF to compare industrial policies across countries
and draw lessons for developing or emerging economies including Ethiopia1. Before
and during the mission we were supported by Mr. Hiroshi Suzuki (CEO & Chief
Economist) and Ms. Chea Dalin (secretary) of the Business Research Institute of
Cambodia (BRIC) as well as Mr. Masayuki Ishida, Chief Advisor of the JICA SME
Promotion Policy Formulation Project, to which we are very grateful. We would
also like to express our appreciation to all people who kindly received us and sharedvaluable information with us. The mission schedule and collected documents are
given in the appendix section.

1. Overview
Cambodia began economic development from the status of a post-conflictfragile state. After the mass killing by Khmer Rouge and subsequent intervention
by Vietnam, peace was ﬁnally restored under UN supervision, and King Sihanouk
returned to Cambodia in 1993. Initially, sheer survival was the name of the game forthe new government. At that time, “we were trying to swim, keep our heads above
water, and got whatever we could get” in the words of a Cambodian high ofﬁcial.
Policy capability and organization were weak, the goal of poverty reduction was
imposed from outside, and two international organizations sided with different
1

The purpose of our JICA-commissioned missions, including this one, is to collect information on industrial policy formulation in selected countries for the policy learning of other developing countries. During Phase I of Japan-Ethiopia
industrial policy dialogue 2009-2011, GDF visited Singapore (August-September 2010), Korea (November 2010), andTaiwan (February 2011). During Phase II, India (September 2012), Mauritius (October 2012), Malaysia (June 2013),
Indonesia (June 2014), Rwanda (August 2014), and Thailand (May 2015) were visited in addition to Cambodia. Views
expressed in this report belong to the GDF team and are not necessarily the views of JICA.

205

ministries to create inconsistent policies.
From a little over ten years ago, however, the Cambodian government began togradually regain policy initiative and ownership. The Supreme National Economic
Council (SNEC), a forum consisting of top policy makers, started to concretize
Prime Minister Hun Sen's vision in the Rectangular Strategy of 2004, which laidout broad directions for the nation and was revised twice subsequently. The Rice
Policy of 2010 was the ﬁrst sectoral master plan calling for concrete policy action toexport surplus rice by processing and adding value. FDI policy (the 1994 FDI law
was revised in 2003 and 2005) and SEZ law (2005), as well as the development planof Sihanoukville, were drafted. The latest addition is the Industrial Development
Policy (IDP) 2015-2025, approved in March 2015, which is the key document
guiding Cambodia's future industrialization (we will discuss it in detail below). To
implement IDP, the Productivity Committee and the Labor Advisory Board havealso been created, and more mechanisms may follow.
When GDF visited Phnom Penh previously, in 2004, the government was weak
and passive, with development policies dominated by the agenda of powerful
donors. Today, we can clearly see the emergence and dynamism of policy ownershipand national pride, with relatively young leaders and officials taking charge.
Policy evolution is in progress, and Cambodia today is a very different nation from
Cambodia in the past.
Cambodia has just attained or is about to attain the lower middle income status
with per capita income of $950 in 2013 (World Bank data)2. The population is about
15 million, with more than half under the age of 24. The poverty ratio declined
rapidly from 50% in 2004 to 16% in 2013. The Gini coefﬁcient also fell to a mere 0.26
suggesting that, if true, Cambodia is one of the most equitable countries in the world(this data probably needs checking). Financial deepening is also underway withbank deposits and lending reaching 80% and 65% of GDP, respectively. International
reserves are at a reasonably comfortable level of 4.5 months of import. According to
the assessment of the World Bank and IMF, Cambodia's foreign debt service burden
is low.
2

According to the World Bankʼs latest income classiﬁcation based on GNI per capita as of July 2013, Cambodiaʼs
income was $950 per head, slightly below the threshold of $1,045 for lower middle income countries. Other sources report somewhat higher income for Cambodia. It is highly likely that Cambodia has already joined the group of
lower middle income countries by 2015.

206

10. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

Progress is visible and expectation is rising. However, like many other latecomer
countries that show high growth at ﬁrst, Cambodia is still in the recovery phase fromthe suppressed past in which economic opening and liberalization alone can attainhigh initial growth. Up to now, the quality of industrial policy did not matter verymuch because ODA, FDI, and autonomous private-sector resurgence were sufﬁcientto push the country forward. However, real achievements in productivity andcompetitiveness are still limited. From now on, the quality of industrial policy, andprivate sector response to such policy, will matter greatly if Cambodia wants to avoid
a future middle income trap and climb further to upper middle income and above. In
IDP mentioned above, broad directions are set more or less correctly, but concrete
details must be properly installed and executed.
We are surprised and happy to see many changes in Cambodia during the last
decade. Some governments are static and their policies hardly improve. But in
Cambodia, rapidly changing landscape, not only in physical infrastructure but alsoin policy mindset and aspiration, gives us hope. However, Cambodia's starting
point was low. The country has made visible progress but still has a long way to
go before it is fully industrialized. Much work is required for both government
and the private sector.

2. Leading policy organizations
The impact of Khmer Rouge massacre is still felt in Cambodia. Experienced
leaders and experts in their 50s and 60s are in serious shortage. Young dynamic
leaders are emerging, but they lack practical knowledge for executing policies
effectively or competing in the global market.
Presently, Cambodian policy formulation is characterized by (i) a developmental
leadership of Prime Minister Hun Sen; (ii) a relatively small number of highranking technocrats supporting the Prime Minister; and (iii) policy competitionand collaboration among such technocrat groups as well as economic ministries.
Personal rapport and cooperation among such technocrats seem to be ensuring
policy coherence more effectively than formal inter-ministerial coordination
mechanisms. Cambodia does not have a super planning agency that stands
above all ministries such as the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of Malaysia,
BAPPENAS of Indonesia, or the Economic Planning Board of Korea in the2071960s-70s. Cambodian policy making is an interactive and relatively flexible

process among multiple leaders and ministries. Such policy making is perhaps
suited to Cambodia at this particular development stage.
More specifically, the Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC), theMinistry of Economy and Finance (MEF), and the Council for the Development of
Cambodia (CDC) are the three lead organizations at different levels that cooperate
to produce and execute development policies. According to a number of ofﬁcials
we interviewed, this centralized mechanism is necessary for speed and coherence in
key policy formulation because line ministries are too weak to draft and implement
policies. Some noted the lack of policy capacity at the Ministry of Industry andHandicraft (MIH) or the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF),
and at present the Ministry of Planning (MOP) is mainly responsible for statistics.
This raises an interesting question of balance between central policy management
versus the need for strengthening line ministries3.
SNEC, established in 2000, is the Prime Minister's policy think tank (or the“Brain Bank” as some high official calls it) which functions as an action-oriented
inter-ministerial discussion and coordination forum attended by high officials, withparticularly strong representations by MEF and CDC. Its task is to produce realpolicies rather than just talk or formally approve. SNEC-drafted policies go to theCouncil of Ministers and relevant ministries. SNEC consists of about 10 minister-rank
members, and is supported by a secretariat staffed with about 30 current (non-seconded)ofﬁcials of various ministries and agencies including MEF, MOP, MOC, CDC, andNBC (central bank). SNEC, which was previously chaired by a MEF Vice Minister,
is now chaired by the MEF Minister. This may be good for elevating the authority of
SNEC, but there is a risk that SNEC meetings may become less frequent because the
MEF Minister is usually too busy.
MEF is the key ministry for economic policy formulation in Cambodia. It
oversees ﬁscal revenue and expenditure as well as macroeconomic balance andviability, but it also has a leading role in development and industrialization. In
most countries, macro balance and industrialization are handled by separate
3

Ethiopia is moving toward central management of such key policies as FDI and industrial parks. The Rwanda
Development Board is similar to Cambodiaʼs CDC as it covers wide policy issues including FDI, industrial parks,
SMEs, IT industry, etc. overwhelming line ministries. In our opinion, policy centralization is acceptable and eveninevitable in a latecomer country in the short run, but we also advise strengthening productive-sector line ministries so they can take over key economic functions in the future.

20810. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

ministries or mechanisms because they are not only very broad but also often
in conflict over a budget constraint. It is possible to embody both functions in
one ministry, such as MEF, but this will tend to create a very powerful ministrythat requires high policy competency in its ofﬁcials. To fulﬁll its role, during thelast few years, MEF has been training young economists in their 20s and 30s by
sending them abroad for study and hiring them for hands-on policy training at the
Ministry. In our meeting at MEF, we spotted six young ofﬁcials sitting beside theSecretary of State, one of whom explained to us the main thrusts of IDP.
CDC was established in 1994, initially to manage external resource inflows into
Cambodia. By now, it has become a strong inter-ministerial implementation agency.
CDC consists of the Cambodia Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB, for
ODA management), the Cambodia Investment Board (CIB, for FDI administration), andthe more recently (in 2005) added Cambodian Special Economic Zone Board (CSEZB,
for SEZ management). While it is an implementing agency, CDC is expected tofunction, and actually partly functions, also as a policy proposing agency like Malaysia's
MIDA or Rwanda's RDB4. MIH is a member of CDC but does not lead its operation.
For foreign investors, CDC, which grants licenses and incentives, is the ﬁrst point ofcontact as well as the place to raise and solve issues. IDP proposes to further enhance
CDC for industrial development.
In terms of personalities, there are policy leaders in these and other economic
mechanisms, ministries, and agencies who have the trust and support of the Prime
Minister5. They collectively form the Prime Minister's advisory group and lead thenation along a development path. Their precise relations and responsibilities, how they
actually compete or collaborate in policy making, and correspondence between these
personalities and key bodies such as SNEC, MEF and CDC, could not be fathomed byour three-day mission.
In addition, Cambodia has a large number of committees and sub-committees
4Powerful one-window agencies such as these are often modeled after Singapore’s Economic Development Board(EDB). Apparently the objective is to concentrate limited human capacities in one agency for speed and efﬁciency
rather than spreading them over many agencies. Before adopting, however, the applicability of the Singaporeanmodel, that works well in a small city state with very high capability in all ministries and agencies, to an average
latecomer country with limited policy experience should be examined carefully.

5

They include Hang Chuon Naron (Minister of Education), Aun Porn Moniroth (Minister of Economy and Finance), Vongsey Vissoth (Secretary of State, MEF), Keat Chhon (Deputy Prime Minister), Sok Chenda Sphea(Secretary General, CDC), Cham Prasidh (Minister of Industry and Handicraft), Sun Chanthol (Minister of Commerce), and others.

209

at the government as well as ministerial levels. They include the Economic andFinancial Policy Committee, and the Committee for Private Sector Development
Affairs (its subcommittees include SMEs, Investment Climate and Participationof Private Sector in the Infrastructure Development, and Corporate Governance).
New committees are added as necessary, such as the Advisory Council for
Development of Cambodian Industry (related to IDP). There is also theGovernment-Private Sector Forum which meets biannually, chaired by the Prime
Minister and attended by all cabinet members, and ten working groups (e.g.,
agriculture and agro-industry, tourism, manufacturing/SME/services, banking
and financial services). With limited time, the mission was unable to grasp theoverall structure of these sub-committees, task forces, and working groups. Theirfunctions and effectiveness must be studied separately.
In sum, Cambodia has policy-minded leaders and technocrats working jointly
for policy initiatives and execution. Such a process seems healthy and appropriate
as long as policy competition among different groups remains constructive andnon-revengeful, and if it simultaneously achieves policy continuity and dynamism.
How this Cambodian model compares with the “Flexible Structure of Politics
in Meiji Japan” is another interesting topic that must be pursued on anotheroccasion6.
Another critical issue is how to institutionalize good practices and mechanisms
established by the current relational policy formulation, and pass them onto
the next generation of policy makers with modifications and improvements asnecessary.

3. Industrial Development Policy 2015-2025
Cambodia's key policy documents for national development consist of the
Rectangular Strategy (RS) for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency(RS I of 2004, RS II of 2008, and current RS III of 2013), the National Strategic
Development Plan as the RS's ﬁve-year working plan (since 2006; the current one
6

Junji Banno and Kenichi Ohno, in Meiji Restoration 1858-1881, Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2010, argued that Meiji
Japan pursued multiple national goals successfully by allowing a large number of policy leaders to form and reform coalitions ﬂexibly to both compete and cooperate, rather than by a top-down order of a charismatic leader
who stayed in power for long. For English excerpts see:www.dlprog.org/publications/the-ﬂexible-structure-of-politics-in-meiji-japan.php

21010. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

covering 2014-2018), and annual budgets7. For effective implementation, thesepolicy documents need to be complemented by concrete guidelines for selected
key sectors, and this need has so far been ﬁlled only partially and incompletely.
The Rice Policy, FDI and SEZ policies, and the development plan of Sihanoukvilleare the ones that already exist, but their concreteness and implementability vary.
This year the government added Industrial Development Policy (IDP) to the list,
which means that Cambodia is now becoming ready to design and execute thisvery important policy component.
Completion of IDP also means that Cambodia has shifted from the previous
development regime where poverty reduction was the main objective to a regime
where value creation and industrialization take the central stage. Even in that case,there is an ongoing debate as to whether government should provide only general
support and frameworks to all sectors and firms without sectoral preferenceor it should work selectively and proactively with the private sector to create
certain champion products. The answer to this question appears undecided at thismoment in Cambodia. If industrial policy intends to go beyond just liberalization,
integration, and provision of good business conditions, the Cambodian
government must engage in serious policy learning̶including industrial humanresource, SME promotion, productivity movement, FDI marketing, strategic
export promotion, and regional and corridor development̶because the current
policy capability of Cambodia is still low. East Asia abounds in good policy
practices from which much can be learned.
Moreover, free market orientation of the past may have to be adjusted.
Cambodia ' s policy stance has been relatively liberal, featuring open FDI
policy which accepts foreign investors even in commercial, financial, telecom,
professional, and other services. Although this liberalism beneﬁted the nation by
providing reasonably good financial, communication, and other services which
can support industrialization, we also believe that it is possible to add selectivity
and targeting in industrial policy without abandoning the liberal businessenvironment which Cambodia has created.
7

Before the RS, there were two overlapping strategic documents in Cambodia reﬂecting donor rivalry̶the Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP II: 2001-05) formulated by MOP with the support of ADB, and the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS: 2003-05) formulated by MEF with the support of the World Bank. The
formulation of RS of 2004 and NSDP of 2006, by merging SEDP and NPRS, should be understood as a process inwhich the Cambodian government regained policy ownership.

211

SNEC began to prepare IDP in 2012 with JICA support. The ﬁnal document wasapproved by the Council of Ministers on March 6, 2015. CDC will be responsible
for managing and coordinating IDP implementation. The content of IDP, as
explained to our mission by MEF ofﬁcials, can be summarized as follows.
IDP's overall objectives include diversification of the industrial base, value
addition, competitiveness, and meaningful participation in global and regional
value chains. Currently, Cambodia's export base is narrow (mainly garment),
SMEs are weak and unregistered, skills and technology are low, infrastructureservices (including power) are inadequate or costly, and labor relations are tense.
Cambodia aims to shift from labor-intensive to skill-based industries by 2025.
Various components of IDP, which exhibit some repetition and overlaps, aresummarized in the table.
A MEF high ofﬁcial further explained to us that the four pillars of IDP were (i)FDI attraction; (ii) SMEs with FDI linkage; (iii) logistics and connectivity; and (iv)
legal and policy frameworks; and IDP's geographic focuses were (i) Phnom Penh; (ii)Sihanoukville; (iii) the area bordering Thailand; and (iv) the area bordering Vietnam.
To this end, IDP specifies four key practical measures to be achieved before theend of 2018 as a milestone̶reducing electricity cost and ensuring stable power
supply; preparing and implementing a master plan for transportation and logistics
systems; labor market management and skill training; and developing Sihanoukville
Province into a model multi-purposed SEZ. In our opinion, these pillars and focuses
are quite appropriate to Cambodia at this development stage̶although we alsofeel there could be more concrete industrial targets unique to Cambodia8, as well aseven greater stress on industrial human resource and productivity enhancement (inaddition to SME support)9.
8

In our preliminary opinion, a vision to become Asia’s high-quality labor-intensive manufacturing leader by 2025 will
not be entirely amiss for Cambodia. To attain it, numerical targets and deadlines should be set, for example, by benchmarking Vietnam for labor productivity and discipline; Thai BOI and Malaysia’s MIDA for strategic FDI attraction;
Thai BUILD and other Thai mechanisms for linkage policy; Malaysia and Taiwan for comprehensive SME promotion;and selected neighboring countries for logistic cost and time comparison. Productivity statistics and targets should becreated by working with APO and other interested donors. Productivity movement, perhaps including kaizen, may beintroduced. High wage costs in emerging economies, AEC, China-plus-One, Thailand-plus-One, Southern Corridor
links, and other dynamic trends in FDI migration should be captured with concrete targets.

9

For low and lower-middle income countries that can receive a large amount of manufacturing FDI, we recommend a standard policy package for FDI-linked technology transfer consisting of (i) strategic attraction of FDI; (ii)local enterprise capacity building; (iii) FDI-domestic ﬁrm linkage policy; (iv) efﬁcient logistics; and (v) industrial
human resource. Cambodia’s IDP covers much of these grounds while industrial orientations of Vietnam and Indonesia are quite different from this model.

21210. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

Cambodia's Industrial Development Policy 2015-2025
VisionFrom labor-intensive to skill-based industries by 2025; linking with
global and regional value chain with clusters; competitiveness andproductivity, marching toward modern technology and knowledgebased industry.
(1) GDP share: industry 30%, manufacturing 20%
Targets (for2025)(2) Export diversiﬁcation: non-garment 15%, agro-processing 12%(3) SME registration and proper accounting
Strategy(1) Mobilize both large FDI and domestic investment with quality(2) Upgrade SMEs
(3) Improve regulatory environment(4) Coordinate supporting policies
Priority sectors (1) New, high-value, creative industries(2) SMEs in pharmaceuticals, construction materials, packaging,furniture, industrial equipment, etc.
(3) Agro-processing(4) Supporting industries (backward or forward linkage)(5) ICT, energy, heavy industries, cultural/traditional handicraft,green technology
Approaches- The private sector leads, government coordinates- Structural transformation- Providing support, incentives, markets linked with performance- Greenness and inclusiveness
Policy measures - FDI attraction with improved investment climate and SEZs
and action plans - Upgrade SMEs with registration, accounting, and agro-processing- Regulatory environment including trade facilitation, standards,
taxes, industrial relation, etc.
- Supporting policies incl. skills, STI, infrastructure, financial
system, etc.
Source: Presentation slides of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, May 28, 2015, summarized by GDF.

The Cambodian government admits that IDP is a broad policy framework only, anddetailed action plans (implementation strategies) must be created for implementation.
We entirely agree with this assessment. The next important task is to create concreteplans on who will do what by when, how results should be monitored and evaluated,and how projects should be ﬁnanced. New organizations and budget must be arranged,
and Cambodian officials and experts must be trained, if necessary, for execution.
Because it is impossible to pursue all targets, strategies, and approaches at once,
implementation must be prioritized and sequenced. The matrices of policy measuresand action plans attached to IDP still seem crude and general, and may have to berevised and expanded significantly to enhance implementability and gain sufficient
stakeholder support. Domestic and foreign businesses, industrial experts, and relevant
ministries must be deeply involved in this process. For all these purposes, policy

213

learning on international best and worst (to avoid common pitfalls) policy practices isimperative for the Cambodian government.
Recently, the Productivity Committee and the Labor Advisory Board were createdto address skill, productivity, and labor market issues raised by IDP. Furthermore,
to facilitate the implementation of IDP, the Advisory Council for the Developmentof Cambodian Industry will be established. It is also envisaged that, under CDC,
the CIB function will be expanded to include coordination and monitoring of IDP
implementation, and the CRDB function will be re-oriented to support industrial
development cooperation. The Government-Private Sector Forum will be enhanced
further. It is to be seen how these institutional details will be shaped and actuallyfunction.
According to IDP, Cambodia will graduate from labor-intensive industries
into skill-based ones by 2025. We are under the impression that this time line isa bit too short given the experiences of neighboring countries and given the factthat Cambodia is still in the early stage of labor-intensive processing. A MEF
ofﬁcial explained to us that national aspiration must be set high. This is true, buthigh skills can be pursued in parallel with improvements in more basic skills of
Cambodian workers such as literacy, mindset, and work discipline. We believethat Cambodia's advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing should be maintained
for more than a decade by steadily improving labor productivity, worker quality,
product delivery, primary education, etc. Cambodia should take full advantage oflabor-intensive processes before they are abandoned.

4. FDI attraction and SEZs
Economic liberalization has proceeded in Cambodia since the 1990 s. By
now, the country has a relatively open business climate for investment, foreignexchange, banking, telecom, internet services, etc. Unlike some countries thatmobilize SOEs for developing certain sectors, the Cambodian economy isdriven predominantly by foreign and domestic private firms. There are six (ormore) domestic industrial groups in agro-business, telecom, finance, securities,
insurance, property development, cigarettes, trade and distribution, tourism
and entertainment, etc. Foreign-advised economic liberalization also led to theadoption of market-based provision of infrastructure services such as power. The

214

10. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

results are not totally satisfactory, however, producing high electricity tariffs andproliferation of small-scale foreign power companies.
CIB and CSEZB under CDC are the implementation agencies for FDI and SEZ
policies, respectively, and also serve as the main official one-stop service agencies
for investors. The Qualified Investment Project (QIP) status, granted to mostmanufacturing projects and some high-value and/or large-scale service projects, is themain incentive scheme of Cambodia offering exemptions of corporate income tax (upto nine years), import duties, and value-added tax. The type and level of investment
incentives in Cambodia are, by and large, standard and moderate in comparison withother countries. For Japanese investors equipped with necessary conditions, obtaining
QIP status is not a big problem, and one-stop services at SEZs or business consultants
can assist them if necessary. For small investors, establishing offices, shops, andrestaurants is easy with little procedural hassles, unlike some countries that set
minimum capital requirements for foreign investors.
Cambodia has 34 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) of which 12 are operational. They
are located in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and areas bordering Thailand (Poipet, KohKong) and Vietnam (Bavet). The largest concentration of Japanese manufacturing FDI
is in Phnom Penh SEZ (PPSEZ) managed jointly by Cambodian (78%) and Japanese(22%) capital. It has one-stop service in Japanese language, water supply, waste water
treatment, a power generator, a dry port, and a Japanese restaurant. In principle, CSEZB
provides one-stop service at each SEZ staffed with the ofﬁcials of relevant ministries
and agencies (such as CDC, customs bureau, MOC, MOL). Not all SEZs have full
support such as PPSEZ, however. Other than such services provided by zone operators,
SEZs do not offer any additional legal privileges or incentives beyond QIP, which meansthat ﬁrms with QIP status can enjoy the same incentives wherever they are located. In
addition, there is the SEZ Trouble Shooting Committee housed in CDC to promptly
settle issues occurring in SEZs.
Japanese ﬁrms in PPSEZ (40 ﬁrms as of May 2015) are mostly engaged in laborintensive processes in electronics, machinery, garment, leather, etc. They include
Minebea (small motors and liquid-crystal display backlight panels), Sumitomo
Wiring Systems (automotive wire harnesses), Ajinomoto (food processing), andDenso (automotive parts). According to the CEO of PPSEZ, presence of even one

215

large Japanese ﬁrm stimulates Japanese SMEs to come to Cambodia in droves10.
The JETRO Ofﬁce was established in Cambodia only recently, in 2010. Earlier,
JICA experts and private consultants provided necessary information for Japanese
investors. JICA also supported the capacity development of CDC and establishedJapan Desk at CDC where a Japanese expert was assigned. The Japanese embassy,
JETRO, the Japanese Business Association for Cambodia, and JICA-supported
Japan Desk have collaborated closely to provide good conditions for Japanesefirms. Furthermore, there are a large number of Japanese business consultants,
labor-exporting agencies to Japan, and Japanese restaurants in Cambodia. The three
Japanese megabanks (Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui, and Mizuho) also
have representative offices in Cambodia. Aeon Mall, a large Japanese shopping
center, opened in Phnom Penh in 2014.
Japan is not the largest investor in Cambodia, however. China is by far thelargest with cumulative registered FDI in the past two decades of over $11 billion(mostly real estate and energy), followed by Korea (mostly real estate), Malaysia,
and the UK. Japan is No.11 with only 1,150 projects worth $713 million (up to 2014
including cancelled projects), but it is the dominant investor in SEZs as well as
in manufacturing. Japanese QIP ﬁrms are about 100 in number, and their entry is
accelerating from around 2010.
Japan is the only investing country that has formal and regular investment
climate discussions with the Cambodian government. Demands and requests
of Japanese FDI firms are collected by the Japanese Business Association of
Cambodia (JBAC), and bilateral discussions are held twice yearly to solve
raised issues at the Japan-Cambodia Public-Private Sector Meeting co-chairedby the Secretary General of CDC and the Japanese Ambassador. Some of therecent issues include (i) the high cost and unreliable supply of power; (ii) rising
wages and low quality of labor (see below); (iii) non-applicability of investment
incentives to project expansion; and (iv) non-transparent and complicatedadministrative procedure including taxes and customs clearance.

10

This phenomenon is called the Queen Bee effect in Singapore, and the Canon effect in Vietnam.

216

10. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

5. The wage and productivity problem
Cambodia has a young and mostly rural population with 75% of the people
under the age of 35 , a condition generally suitable for light manufacturing.
However, Japanese firms report labor-related problems regarding availability,
quality, and cost.
Factory workers must often be recruited in rural areas because they are nolonger easy to ﬁnd in urban areas. Some ﬁrms in PPSEZ build or rent dormitories
for migrant workers, and other (mostly non-Japanese) ﬁrms locate in rural areas
for the ease of worker recruitment. Labor-intensive processes normally use young
female labor, but job hopping is rampant among such workers in pursuit of slightly
more favorable salaries or working conditions. Footloose workers are observed inmany developing countries and not unique to Cambodia.
One unfortunate feature of Cambodia is the low quality of labor. The majorityof young factory workers are primary school graduates or dropouts, or people
who never went to school. As a result, many are illiterate, unpunctual, and lackteamwork, discipline, and cooperative spirit. A Japanese firm in PPSEZ confided
that it was surprised to discover the lack of basic attitude and mindset in Cambodian
workers, which was far worse than in India, Brazil, or other locations in the world.
Some factories need to train workers with very basics (reading, attitude, etc.) before
they are given operational training. In contrast, in Vietnam, virtually all factory
workers are high school graduates who are literate and skillful. Chinese workers areeven more productive than Vietnamese workers. Cambodia has a long way to catchup in labor quality.
Another headache is rapidly rising wages in the absence of corresponding
improvement in labor productivity. During the last two decades, labor productivity
in Cambodia grew 3-5% per year on average according to Asian Productivity
Organization (APO) data11. Meanwhile, the monthly minimum wage for textile
workers was revised upward from $40 (1997) to $61 (Oct. 2010), $80 (May 2013),$100 (Feb. 2014), and $128 (Jan. 2015). Adjustments in the last few years wereparticularly large, with an annual average increase of 19% from Oct. 2010 to Jan.
2015. Recent wage decision was made amid labor disputes and pressure from labor
11

Average annual labor productivity growth of Cambodia, as reported in APO Productivity Databook 2014 (p.61),
was 4.3% (1990-95), 3.4% (1995-2000), 3.6% (2000-05), and 5.0% (2005-12).

217

unions. Wage increase has outstripped labor productivity by a wide margin. At$128 per month, the minimum wage in Cambodia is now higher than the minimum
wage in the rural areas of Vietnam12. If such wage pressure continues, Cambodia's
labor advantage will soon be lost.
The Cambodian government as well as foreign investors are alarmed. Effort
to de-politicize wage setting is beginning. Previously, the government decided
the minimum wage after inter-ministerial consultation led by the Labor Minister
but without reference to hard facts and analysis. The Productivity Committee
was established in January 2015 to collect data and propose a solution. It is
hoped that the minimum wage will from now on will be based on productivity,
competitiveness, and other economic factors rather than just workers' demand forbetter life13.
We heard from more than one Japanese firm that Prime Minister Hun Sen'sApril 2015 pledge that the minimum wage would be $160 by 2018 (which implies
an average annual increase of 8% in the next three years), if actually kept, would
be highly welcome. This will impart predictability to business management.
Given the situation above, Cambodia needs to overcome many problems tomaintain the current labor advantage. First, reliable statistics on wages and laborproductivity must be produced and analyzed. Second, a rational wage-setting
process that balances productivity and workers' aspiration must be agreed andpracticed. Third, labor productivity must be continuously improved, for which(i) benchmarking rival countries and setting numerical targets, (ii) introductionof kaizen and national productivity movement, and (iii) a social contract among
government, management, and labor to jointly make effort to improve laborproductivity, should be considered. Fourth, primary education and technicaltraining must be upgraded nationwide to equip workers with basic attitude,
discipline, and literacy. High skills, technology, and knowledge cannot be taught
unless workers have the right aptitude.

12

As of Jan. 2015, Vietnam has four minimum wages from urban to rural: $150, $140, $125, and $104. However, it
should be noted that social security contribution per worker is at present much higher in Vietnam than in Cambodia.

13

A wage setting mechanism that reﬂects productivity performance is also requested by entrepreneurs in Indonesia,
a country that similarly suffers from rapid increases in minimum wage. See GDF, Report on the Indonesian Mission, July 2014 [Chapter 7 in this volume].

218

10. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

6. SME promotion
Following the RS I, the SME Development Framework was formulated in 2005
by the SME Sub-committee with ADB support, but it was just a broad direction
without implementable action plan. More recently, in March 2015, a new document(Cambodia's SME Promotion: SME's Initiative for Cambodia Brand of Quality:
Policy Framework) was drafted by MIH with JICA support, to be deliberated
by the SME Sub-committee. While this document provides a comprehensive
policy menu referential schemes, clear prioritization and sequencing of actions
must be speciﬁed in order to make it implementable. SME promotion is one of
the core issues in IDP, but identifying policy details remains a future task. At
present Cambodia has no SME law. Donor-supported projects have not yet been
institutionalized in the Cambodian government. Up to now, we must say that there
have been few effective policy measures to develop Cambodian SMEs14. SME
promotion in Cambodia is in a very early stage. Much work and cooperation will
be needed to implement policies effectively.
As the first step, the definition of SMEs must be given in a way consistent with
Cambodia's development objectives as well as international practices. Without an agreed
deﬁnition, data collection, analysis, and policy formulation are hardly possible. An SME
law or a master plan that guides SME policy must be crafted. Good practices in othercountries should be studied, combined, and modiﬁed to ﬁt Cambodia's reality. The SME
Sub-committee must be revitalized to do these works. Foreign technical cooperation
may be sought if necessary.
Globally, standard measures for SME promotion are well-known and include: (i)legal and policy frameworks; (ii) human resource development including managers,
engineers, and workers: (iii) enterprise capacity building in corporate strategy
formulation, technology, marketing, export, accounting, labor management, IT, etc.;(iv) ﬁnancial access; (v) building networks, forward and backward linkage, clustering,business associations, etc.; and (vi) startup support, innovation, and R&D. Within eachcategory there are many sub-measures and further items. The whole universe of SME
support as practiced by such countries as Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia is
14

Some measures proposed in the 2015 document, such as the lease law, credit guarantee for rice millers, and thecollateral systems, have been introduced. But these still remain modest and random in view of the overall policy
structure required for SME promotion.

219

vast and complex. A latecomer country such as Cambodia needs to be selective andmodest in initiating SME promotion.
At present the main issues in Cambodia's SME policy are registration and accounting.
Only 30,000 are formally registered among 514,000 SMEs in Cambodia (MOP data for2014), which makes it difﬁcult for government to reach out and analyze SMEs worthyof support. The proposed one-stop registration center at MIH may accelerate SME
registration. But this is only a small beginning for SME promotion. After registration
and accounting issues are solved, there are many more things to be done to proactively
support SMEs as listed above.
Generally speaking, SME policy has two purposes: (i) job and income generation
for poverty reduction, and (ii) supporting selected SMEs for value creation andcompetitiveness. Both are necessary for Cambodia, but high ofﬁcials we met made it
clear that the main objective of SME policy in Cambodia was the latter, namely thecreation of competitive SMEs with FDI linkage. We believe this is an appropriate choiceat this moment.

7. Development of Sihanoukville
Apart from indirect sea access through Thailand and Vietnam, Sihanoukville,
situated in the southern coast, is a critically important logistic gateway to Cambodia.
The government plans to develop Sihanoukville as a multi-purpose SEZ and a regionaltransport hub hosting manufacturing, transport, services, tourism, and residential areas.
High officials we met explained to us the current status of this vision. A deep-watercontainer port has been built with Japanese cooperation and is operational. The port has
gantry and mobile cranes, stackers, storage and warehouses, etc. with the total cargohandling of 3 million tons in 2013. Bulk freight port must be added and container port
capacity has to be expanded in the future.
Using Japanese yen (ODA) loans, Sihanoukville Port SEZ (SPSEZ) was also
constructed adjacent to the container port and opened in 2012, with the total
area of 70ha and the factory area of 45ha (48 plots). As of now only three tenantﬁrms came to SPSEZ. Slow sale is blamed mainly on high cost, while some alsomention the lack of proper customer services, plot design, and over-speciﬁcation.
Separately, Sihanoukville SEZ (SSEZ) was built with Chinese cooperation at
12km from the port with a planned area of 1,113ha, and became operational in22010. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

2012.

Regardless of the current performance of SPSEZ, the critical importance ofSihanoukville, located along the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Southern
Coastal Corridor, for the development of Cambodia remains unquestionable.
Sihanoukville is still under construction. Development must encompass not justthe city and port of Sihanoukville but entire Preah Sihanoukville Province or evenbeyond. A comprehensive regional development master plan and urban planningmust be drawn up or revised, highways and other road links to Phnom Penh andother key locations must be built, soft components such as trouble-free customs
clearance and fast cargo handling systems must be installed, and marketing for FDI
and tourism must be beefed up.
With proper design and execution, Sihanoukville has a chance of becoming a large
industrial and urban area similar to the Eastern Seaboard Development of Thailand, oreven better because it has non-industrial functions as well. For this purpose, a powerfulhigh-level ad hoc coordination mechanism chaired and supervised by the Prime
Minister, like the Eastern Seaboard Development Committee of Thailand in the 1980s,
may prove effective.

8. Concluding remarks
Cambodia has come a long way. Starting from the position of a post-conflictfragile state dominated by donors, it recently began to regain policy autonomy
and establish policy ownership. Broad directions set in IDP, as explained to thismission, are reasonable and well-focused, unlike long and unimplementablewish lists found in some countries. The mindset and collective decision making
among top technocrats seem to be working for growth acceleration. We applaud
the progress Cambodia has made in the last decade in the area of industrial policy
formulation.
However, there is a long and winding road ahead. Broad directions must be
concretized in strategies and action plans, proper staff and organizations must be
prepared, ﬁnancial resources must be found, and progress must be monitored andadjusted. Implementation is a challenge for all aspiring governments. We hope
Cambodia will successfully solve many coming issues in the implementation
process. Policy learning must be enhanced and systematized. Even after221implementation, the question of how much ultimate impact the policy has had
must be asked.
This is a critical moment in Cambodian history, in which policy capacity
acquired in the next stage will largely determine whether the nation willcontinue to march to high income in the future or become stuck in a middle
income trap. Japan as an important economic partner of Cambodia, especiallyin manufacturing, should further align its economic cooperation and investment
with IDP's priorities. In addition to discussing investment issues with CDC, Japan
should start regular policy discussion with top leaders of Cambodia, set clear
cooperation targets which are monitorable, invite appropriate Japanese ﬁrms andprovide concrete cooperation projects to realize some of the IDP's objectives, andreview their progress and make adjustments as necessary.
Japan's cooperation in the past has emphasized infrastructure, private-sector
development, agriculture, governance, and social areas such as water, health,education, and land mines. It should now add kaizen and productivity, upgradingindustrial human resource, soft and hard logistic efficiency along the Southern
Corridor, comprehensive regional development encompassing Sihanoukville andthe Southern Coastal Corridor, and other concrete industrial support measures inline with IDP.

222

10. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

Mission Schedule
Mission Members
Kenichi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Akemi Nagashima

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Mission Schedule
Date

Time

26 TuePM Flight from Bangkok to Phnom Penh

Activ ity

AM Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC)
27 WedPM Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC)
AM Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)
28 ThuAM JETRO Phnom Penh
PM Ministry of Industry and Handicraft

MAY
AM O&M (Cambodia) Co.,Ltd
AM Sumi (Cambodia) Wiring Systems Co., Ltd.
29 FriPM Phnom Penh SEZ Co.,Ltd
PM Young Entrepreneurs Association of Cambodia (YEAC)PM Flight to Haneda (Transit at Bangkok)

30 SatAM Arriving at Haneda airport

223

Organizations/Persons Visited
Organization

Ministry of Economy and Finance(MEF)

Supreme National Economic Council(SNEC)

Name

Position

H.E. Vongsey Vissoth

Secretary of State for MEF and Vice Chairman of SNEC

Ung Luyna

Deputy Director, General Dept. /Budget for MEF and amember of SNECEng Touch

Personal Assistant to Secretary of State

Lay Sopheak

Personal Assistant to Secretary of State

Sieng Chamnan

Deputy Director, General Dept. /Economic and Public
Finance Policy

Heng Socheat

Officer, General Dept. /Economic and Public Finance Policy

Khut Vanne

Officer, General Dept. /Economic and Public Finance Policy

Choum Rottanak

Officer, General Dept. /Economic and Public Finance Policy

H.E. Kalyan Mey

Senior Advisor for SNEC and Chairman for Royal Universityof Phnom Penh

H.E. Sok Chenda Sophea Minister attached to the PM/Secretary General
Council for the Development of
Cambodia (CDC)

Lim Visal

Deputy Director, Dept. Public Relations and Promotion ofPrivate Investment

Unvoanra Nut

Assistant to Minister attached to the PM/Secretary General

Yuji IMAMURA

Advisor for CIB and CSEZB Japan Office

H.E. Heng Sokkung

Secretary of StateSon Seng Huot
Ministry of Industry and Handicraft(MIH)

Peou Vorleaks
Yea Bunna
Soem Nara
Masayuki ISHIDA

Young Entrepreneurs Association of
Cambodia (YEAC)

Oknha Sok Piseth
EK Sopheara

Under Secretary of State
Director General, General Department of SME andHandicraft
Deputy Director General, General Department of SME andHandicraft
Director General and Board Chairman of General
Department/Industry Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority(PPWSA)
JICA SME Project Leader
President for YEAC and CEO& Co-founder of G-Gear
Co.,Ltd
Managing Partner, BDtruS Research & Business
Consultancy

Phnom Penh SEZ Co.,Ltd

Hiroshi UEMATSU

CEO

O&M (Cambodia) Co.,Ltd

Junichiro TOMIZUKA

President

Takahisa WAKISAKA

President

Kenichi ONOGI

General Manager, General Affairs Department

Masashi KONO

Chief Representative

Sumi (Cambodia) Wiring Systems Co.,Ltd.
JETRO Phnom Penh224

10. Cambodia̶Building Policy Autonomy and Capacity

List of Information Collected
SourceMinistry of Economy
and Finance (MEF)

Council for theDevelopment of
Cambodia (CDC)

T i tl e
Presentation Documents: Cambodia Industry Development Policy 20152025, 6 March 2015
Presentation Documents: Three Key Points for Investment in Cambodia,
June 2011 (Japanese)
Presentation Documents: Investment environment in Cambodia, March
2015 (Japanese)

Authors/Publisher
Approved by Council of
Ministers
Mr. Yuji Tanzaki, JICA expert
at CDC Japan desk
Mr. Taro TANZAKI, JICA expert
at CDC Japan desk

Guidebook for Camb od ia investment, 2013

CDC (Translate by JICA)

Brochure: Sihanoukville Port SEZ (Japanese)

Sihanoukville Port SEZ and
JICA

Brochure: Investing in The Heart of Dynamic Southeast Asia

CDC

Ministry of Industry andIndustrial Development Policy 2014-2024 (First Draft as of 11 March 2014) MIH
Handicraft (MIH)
Phnom Penh SEZ
Co.,Ltd
JETRO Phnom Penh

”Welcome to PPSEZ -Communicated to the future PPSEZ" (Japanese)

PPSEZ

Magazin e: Cambodia Business Partners (Japanese)

CLD Marketing Partn ers

Presentation Documents: Cambodia Actual situation such as Economy,
Trade, Investment, and Japanese FDI (Japanese)

Cambodia's SME Promotion -SME Initiative for Cambodia Brand of
Quality- Policy Framework, March 2015
Presentation Documents: SME Promotion Policy Development Challenges for the SME base Policy-, 7 April 2015
Rectang ular Strateg y Phase III, 7 September 2013

SNEC

Guidelines for formulating National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)
2014-2018, April 2013

Ministry of Planning

Small and Medium Enterprise Development Framework, 29 July 2005

JICA project on SME
Promotion

JETRO Phnom Penh
MIH (English Translate by
JICA SME Project)
SME Secretariat on behalf of
SME Sub-committee
MIH and JICA SME Promotion
Policy Formulation Project
Mr. Masayuki ISHIDA, JICA
SME Project Leader

Cambodia's Industrial Development Policy 2015-2025, March 2015

National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2014-2018, 17 July 2014

Ministry of PlanningSoutheast Asia Regional Programme, November 2014OECD

Active with Southeast Asia, May 2014OECD

ASEAN SME Policy Index 2014 -Towards Competitive and Innovative
ASEAN SMEs-

OECD

Presentation Documents: Investment Seminar in Tokyo, Japan "METI,
Embassy of Cambodia to Japan, JETRO Phnom Penh, JDI, NIKKOKINZOKU, and HITACHI", November 2014 (Japanese)

Japan Development Institute

Presentation Documents: Investment Seminar in Nagoya and Hamamatsu,
METI Chubu
Japan "CDC, JETRO Phnom Penh, Toyotsu, Deloitte, and JBIC",
February 2015 (Japanese)

OthersIn vestment environment in Cambodia, Ap ril 2014

JBIC

Presentation Documents: Growing Cambodia, April 2015 (Japanese)

JICA

Presentation Documen ts: CJCC (Jap anese)

JICA

Presentation Documents: Sihanoukville Port SEZ (Japanese)

JICA Phnom Penh

Presentation Documents: Making Industrial Development Strategy for
Cambodia, 26 April 2012
Presentation Documents: Industrial Policy for Cambodia -Policy Planners’
Guides-, September 2012
Presentation Documents: Industrial Policy Designs for Cambodia, June
2012

Mr. Shinji ASANUMA,
Hitotsubashi University/JICA
Mr. Shinji ASANUMA,
Hitotsubashi University/JICA
Mr. Shinji ASANUMA,
Hitotsubashi University/JICA

225

11．ウガンダ――東アジアへの関心の萌芽＜日程＞2009年 ２ 月23日〜26日

GRIPS 開発フォーラムの大野健一、細野昭雄、大野泉は2009年2月23〜26日にカンパラを訪問し、財政計画経済開発省および国家計画局の関係者と面談し、策定中の国家開発計画の方向性を聴取するとともに、当方から東アジアの開発経験を紹介
し意見交換を行った。本訪問は、財政計画経済開発省のキザ経済政策局長の要請に応じて、当フォーラムの活動として企画したものである。加えて、日本の ODA 関
係者や英 DFID から対ウガンダ援助動向について、フェニックス・ロジスティック
ス社の柏田社長から繊維産業育成に対する政府の取組みについて伺う機会をえた（日程は別添を参照）。今回出張において、在ウガンダ日本大使館の加藤大使と橋本専門調査員には面談や有識者との夕食会企画等で多大なご協力を頂いた。心からお礼申し上げたい。
以下、今回出張で行った意見交換やヒアリングの概要を記す。ただし、限られた期間で収集した情報にもとづく、我々の暫定的な理解である点を申し添える。

１ ．貧困撲滅行動計画（ PEAP ）から国家開発計画（ NDP ）へ
ウガ ン ダ 政 府 は、 第三次貧困撲滅行動計画（ Poverty Eradication Action Plan:

PEAP、2004/05〜07/08年 ） を 継 承 す る5ヵ 年 の 計 画 文 書 と し て、 国 家 開 発 計 画（ National Development Plan：NDP、2009/10〜2014/15年）を策定中である1。NDP 策
定作業は国家計画局（ National Planning Authority: NPA ）が中心になって進めているが、財政計画経済開発省（ Ministry of Finance Planning Economic Development:

MOFPED ）も資源動員や予算配分の観点から関わっている。NPA は2003年に設立された独立機関で、長期ビジョンとしての Vision 2035 の策定（現在ドラフト段階）、
長期開発計画（10年）、そして開発計画（5年）の策定を担っている。NPA は新会計
1

第一次 PEAP はウガンダ政府のみで作成した政策文書で、続く第二次 PEAP は世銀により最初の PRSPとして認定をうけ、ウガンダは拡大 HIPC イニシャティブの最初の適用国となった。第二次から第三次
PEAP への展開に伴い、策定プロセスにおいて多様なステークホルダーとの協議や評価モニタリングの拡充が図られた（PEAP の変遷・評価については “Independent Evaluation of Ugandaʼs Poverty Eradication
Action Plan (PEAP): Final Synthesis Report,” Oxford Policy Management, July 2008 を参照）。

226

11．ウガンダ――東アジアへの関心の萌芽

年度が始まる2009年7月までに NDP 策定をめざしているが、MOFPED によれば最近の同省大臣の交代等もあり、同省や議会が最終版を承認するには2009年末まで時間を要する可能性があるとのことだった。NDP のドラフトは現時点で（少なくともドナーには）未公開である2。なお、NPA によれば、2011年に NDP の中間レビューを実施し、同年に予定されている大統領選挙の結果をふまえて必要な調整を行う予定とのことである。
旧 PEAP と現在策定中の NDP の主な相違は、①対象期間が3年から5年に長くなったこと、②第三次 PEAP で打ち出した成長志向をより明確にし、2006年の大統領選
挙でムセベニ大統領が掲げた政策綱領「 Prosperity for All 」（成長・雇用・繁栄）の具体化を意図していること、③策定主体が NPA に変わり、PEAP 策定・モニタリン
グを主導してきた MOFEPD は資源動員や予算配分の観点からの関与になったことである3。第三次 PEAP は、貧困削減、特に教育・保健を中心とする社会開発を重視した第一次・第二次 PEAP に比べて成長志向が強いが、NDP は、第三次 PEAP の柱のひとつである「生産・競争力・所得の向上」をさらに重視する方向で策定が進んでいる（以下の表を参照）4。加えて、MOFPED のキザ局長や援助関係者の情報によれば、NPD 策定プロセスは第二・第三次 PEAP と比べてドナーとの協議は限定的で、ウガンダ政府主導で進んでいるようである。
第三次PEAPとNDPの構成比較（重点分野の対応関係）
第三次PEAP（貧困撲滅行動計画）

NDP（国家開発計画、策定中）①

経済運営管理②

生産・競争力・所得の向上① 生産セクターでの雇用創出とその質の向上② 社会・経済・投資インフラの改善③ 国際競争力のある産業の育成④ 経済活動を支える天然資源の最適な活用と環境保全③④

治安・紛争解決・災害管理
グッド・ガバナンス⑤ 人間の安全保障およびグッド・ガ
バナンスの向上

⑤

人間開発

⑥

生活水準の改善（出所）我が国の対ウガンダ支援戦略（案）（在ウガンダODAタスクフォース、2008年10月）を参
考に作成。

2

NPA は現在テーマ別の分析ペーパーを作成中で、これらを参考に NDP を取纏めるとのこと。

3

NPA は 2003 年に設置されたが、特にここ 8 ヶ月間で人員強化を図っている。

4

ムセベニ大統領は 2011 年の大統領選出馬に意欲を示しており、NDP が志向する成長はきわめて政治的関心が強いアジェンダであるとのこと（DFID からのヒアリング情報）。

227

これらの変化の背景にはムセベニ大統領の意向が強く働いているようである。初等教育や保健医療サービスの普及といった社会開発面で一定の進展をみた現在、ムセベニ大統領は国民の約8割を占める農民の生活向上のために、農業近代化・商業化やインフラ整備を重視している。これをうけて、NPA は NDP 策定にあたり、成長を牽引するセクター（ Primary Growth Drivers ）を特定するためのマクロ分析枠組の作成や、必要となるセクター別投資水準の推計（特に農業を含む生産セクター）等の作業を行っている。

２ ．東アジアの開発経験についてのプレゼンと意見交換
以上の文脈のもとで、東アジアの開発経験に強い関心をもつ MOFPED のキザ
局長のイニシャティブにより、我々は、① NPA と MOFPED のテクニカルレベル（ NDP 副局長を筆頭とした NDP スタッフ、MOFPED の経済政策局スタッフ等、約15名）、および② MOFPED 新大臣（我々が訪問中に着任）、各国務大臣、次官・局長クラスを含む MOFPED 幹部を対象（約15名）とする2つの場で、プレゼンと意見交換を行う機会を頂いた。②については加藤大使も同席された。両会議において我々は、能力開発や工業化アクションプランの策定手法についての東アジアの経験（大野健一）、およびアジアと中南米の経済危機克服の経験や JICA・JBIC「アフリカ開発とアジアの成長経験」検討会報告書の骨子（細野昭雄）を限られた時間の中で簡潔に説明し、ウガンダ政府関係者と率直な意見交換を行った5。
印象的だったのが、テクニカルレベルの会合の冒頭で、NPA のルウェンディレ
副局長と MOFPED のキザ局長より、①欧米とは異なるアプローチで開発に取組んできたアジアの経験を通じてウガンダに足りない点を学び、NDP 策定プロセスに反映させていきたい、②日本は近年アフリカの成長支援に積極的に取組んでおり、
アフリカ数カ国で具体的な支援を始めたと聞いているが、ウガンダも日本の成長支援の対象として考慮頂きたい、という発言があったことである。この背景として、我々が面談した DFID エコノミストは、2006年の大統領三選をめぐる論議を契機としてムセベニ大統領はガバナンス問題に干渉する欧州ドナーと距離を置き始めていること、また一般論として中国やインドのめざましい成長や同国への経済進出をふまえて、アジアの開発経験への関心が高まっている点を指摘していた。実際に、

5

Izumi Ohno & Kenichi Ohno, “Dynamic Capacity Development in East Asian Industrialization,” Kenichi Ohno
“Industrial Action Plans: East Asian Experience in Modality, Content and Organization,” and Akio Hosono“Coping with Crises: Lessons from Asia and Latin America”（昨年 12 月に当方チームがエチオピアで行った発表）の要旨を説明。

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11．ウガンダ――東アジアへの関心の萌芽

我々が面談した NPA 関係者の中にはタイ、マレーシア、シンガポール等を訪問した人々もいた。
2つの会議に共通するウガンダ側の最大関心事は、開発計画の実施をどう担保するかという点だった。MOFPED のサイダ・ブンバ新大臣からは、ウガンダには強いリーダーや有能なテクニカルスタッフがおり、ビジョンや政策文書が存在するにも関わらず、実施が弱いのはなぜかとの問題提起があった。同様の質問はテクニカ
ルレベル会合でも出された。他にも評価・モニタリング体制（例えば、評価指標の範囲、業績の悪い組織・人材の処遇の仕方）、東アジア型のトップダウンアプロー
チの是非、産業政策策定・実施における政府介入の最適水準、優先順位の絞り込み方、（明治時代の工場労働者は勤勉でなかったとの当方説明に対し）怠惰な文化の克服可能性など、様々な質問が出された。また、東アジアと中南米が経済危機を克服してきた経験をふまえて、世界金融危機の悪影響を回避するためにウガンダがなすべきことについても意見を求められた。
これらに対し当方は、我々のウガンダに関する知識はまだ少ないので断定は避け
たいが、おそらく政策の実施が弱い原因として、同時に多くの課題に広く対応しようとするからではないかと述べ、優先課題の選択と集中の必要性を提起した。東アジアで成功した国々は優先課題を絞り込み、そのために具体的目標を設定して実施に必要な体制をつくり評価モニタリングを行った。そして、この方向づけにおいて政治指導者が決定的に重要な役割を果たした。また、政府介入の度合いについて、
世銀の Country Economic Memorandum（2007）6は政府の個別産業や企業レベルの介入に慎重であるべきと述べているが、我々はむしろ逆に、官民連携や経済特区への企業誘致を推進するうえでその国に関心を持ち投資を考えている特定企業の意見をきき、彼らの要望に応えていく必要性は非常に大きく、一般支援か個別支援かといった抽象的議論は、官民協力が具体的かつ有効に開始されれば現実の問題として消滅するのではないかと指摘した。これらの質疑応答を通じた暫定的印象として、
ウガンダ政府関係者の東アジアへの関心は（ MOFPED のキザ局長を除いては）一
般的レベルにとどまっており、東アジア諸国がどのように優先課題を絞り込んで具体的な目標設定や実施体制を構築したか、産業政策の策定・実施をどのように行ったか、等についての知識は限られているように思われた。
関連して、フェニックス・ロジスティクス社の柏田社長が同国の産業振興の最大の課題として政府の対応の遅さを指摘していた点も印象深い。柏田社長は私財を投じて現地パートナーと共同出資で2000年に現在の会社を立ち上げてオーガニック
6

Uganda Moving Beyond Recovery: Investment and Behavior Change for Growth (CEM Summary &Recommendations), World Bank, PREM Unit, Africa Region, Sept. 2007.

229

コットン製品の生産を始めたが、その際に日本やウガンダでのビジネス経験にもとづいてムセベニ大統領に繊維産業振興策の必要性を具申した7。大統領は直ぐに関係省庁に繊維産業振興策の策定を指示したが（8年前）、その実現に長い時間を要しており、今ようやく MOFPED で最終ドラフトを検討中とのことである。これについては、柏田社長がある会合で出会ったエチオピアの繊維産業関係者に詳細な指導を行い、それを学んだエチオピアで先に繊維政策が立ち上がり、現在その隣国政策を参考にウガンダが繊維産業振興策を策定したとの話も伺った。

３ ．日本の対ウガンダ援助
日本の対ウガンダ ODA は、1997年に大使館設置、JICA は2000年の JOCV 調整員
事務所の設置を経て2006年に本格的な事務所体制が敷かれるなど、比較的歴史が新しい。支援規模は、2007年度のブジャガリ送電網整備への円借款供与（アフリカ開発銀行との協調融資）までは、年間20〜30億円程度と米国や欧州ドナー、国際機関（世界銀行、アフリカ開発銀行、EU 等）に比べて決して大きくなかった。またウ
ガンダでは、欧州ドナーや世界銀行を中心に、一般財政支援やセクターワイドアプ
ローチを軸とした援助協調が活発に展開している。こうした援助環境の中で、日本は他ドナーの支援が手薄で、かつ人を介した支援や日本の技術力活用といった日本の比較優位が活かせる分野を中心に支援を行っている。具体的には、①人的資源開発（理数科教育、職業訓練強化）、②基礎生活支援（医療インフラ整備、水へのア
クセス改善）、③農業開発（農民の所得向上、ネリカ米、地場産業振興）、④経済基
礎インフラ（道路、電力インフラ整備）を主な支援分野とし、併せて北部復興支援
や公共財政管理といった横断的課題にも取組んでいる。
これらはウガンダ政府が策定中の NDP で掲げるテーマのうち、「成長の加速化」「農村社会の近代化」「生活レベルの改善」への貢献であるとともに、日本が昨年5月に開催した TICAD IV で打ち出した重点課題にも合致している。特に経済インフ
ラ整備はウガンダ政府の優先課題であり、日本にとってもウガンダは円借款供与対象国であり（当面はアフリカ開発銀行や世界銀行との協調融資が中心）、かつ昨年10月の新 JICA 設立をうけて円借款と技術協力、無償資金協力を組合せた一体的運営が円滑に行える体制ができたことから、ウガンダ側は日本に強い期待を寄せている。TICAD IV で打ち出した技術協力・無償資金協力の倍増、円借款供与の拡充（57柏田社長の工場は、オーガニックコットンの買い付けから最終製品の生産まで一貫して行っており、ウガンダ唯一の日系製造企業でもある。同社については、日本の政策投資金融公庫 JBIC ウェブサイトも参照
されたい（http://www.jbic.go.jp/ja/investment/smes/case/006/index.html）。

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11．ウガンダ――東アジアへの関心の萌芽

年間で最大40億ドル）という方針をうけて日本の対ウガンダ ODA も増額が見込まれることから、今まさに両国間は発展的な協力関係をめざす転換点にきていると思われる。
その意味で、現在 ODA タスクフォースが中心になって策定中の対ウガンダ援助計画（新規）は非常に重要な取組みである。また、日本の ODA 関係者は MOFPEDを含む政府関係者や現地有識者とのネットワーク構築に尽力しており、例えば、大使主宰による現地有識者との月例会合は、新援助計画へのインプットを得るための場にもなっているとのことである。

４ ．所感、今後の当方活動への示唆
今回ウガンダ出張を通じて、日本が実践してきた成長支援や東アジア的発想による開発に対する関心がアフリカ諸国で広がってきていることを感じた。ただしウガ
ンダ政府関係者や有識者の東アジアに対する関心は、首相自らが強い関心と具体的な問題意識をもち日本に産業支援を要請しているエチオピアや、マレーシア専門家の協力（投資環境改善）を通じて大統領や政府首脳が東アジア型アプローチに理解を示し始めたザンビアと比べて一般的レベルにとどまっている。こうした国ごとの関心・理解度に差はあるが、こうした動きを契機として、今後、日本がアフリカ諸国間での知的交流を進めていく意義はあると思われる。
我々は最終日に MOFPED のキザ局長と再度面談したが、その際に当方チームに対して、今回行ったような東アジアの経験に基づいた知的交流（ knowledge

sharing ）を継続してほしいとの要望が出された。将来的には、本格的な知的支援が二国間 ODA の枠組のもとで展開していくことを期待したいが、我々としては、
当方の今までの取組みや今後、JICA・GRIPS 協力で他国（エチオピアなど）の産業支援に取組んでいく過程で作成していく文献や発表資料を共有していくことは可能と考える。
最後に、今後日本が経済インフラ支援を拡充していく際に、内陸国で多くの隣国をもつウガンダの地理条件を考えると、（国別援助計画を補完するうえで）地域的視点にたった案件形成に取組んでいくことも重要と思われる。既に JICA 地域支
援事務所で地域レベルの知識・技術の交流が進んでいるが、広域支援を推進するには外務本省や JICA 本部の強い関与が必要になろう。東アジアのメコン川流域では、日本とアジア開発銀行がリードドナーとなり、東西回廊・水資源開発等の広域
インフラ支援を展開している。また中米地域では米州開発銀行のイニシャティブで231

広域インフラ整備（プエブラ・パナマ計画8）が進んでおり、日本も広域無償資金協
力・技術協力、および円借款を通じた支援を行っている。日本の対アフリカ ODA
はトップドナーでない等、東アジアとは異なる援助環境にあることから、アフリカ
で広域インフラ支援に取組む際には、東アジアに限らず、中米を含む日本の他地域での支援経験・教訓を参考にすることも有用と思われる。

日程・面談先2月22日（日） 羽田発、移動。
2月23日（月） カンパラ着。
在ウガンダ日本大使館 橋本専門調査員との面談。
2月24日（火） 国家計画局（ NPA ）と財務計画経済開発省（ MOFPED ）とのテクニカルレベル会合（ Abel Rwendire NPA副局長、Lawrence
Kiiza MOFPED経済政策局長を含め、約15名）。
MOFPED Syda Bbumba大臣を含むMOFPED幹部（約15名）との会合（加藤大使も同席）。
2月25日（水） DFID Gwyneth Lee (Senior Economic Adviser)との面談。
JICAウガンダ事務所・関所長との面談（橋本専門調査員も同席）。
フェニックス・ロジスティックス社訪問、柏田社長と面談、工場視察。
加 藤 大 使 主 催 に よ る 夕 食 会（ Ezra Suruma 大 統 領 顧 問（ 前MOFPED大臣）、Livingstone S. Luboobiマケレレ大学副学長、世銀Paul Wade（ Senior Country Economist ）、滋賀参事官。
2月26日（木） 在ウガンダ日本大使館 加藤大使と橋本専門調査員との面談。
MOFPED Kiiza局長長との面談。
カンパラ発、移動。

8

メキシコの提案で開始された、メソアメリカの物理的統合をはじめとする総合的な協力システムで、早い時期から米州開発銀行や中米経済統合銀行等が支援に取組み、日本も協力を行ってきている（日本・中米「対話と協力」の枠組み（「東京宣言」、2005 年等）を活用）。

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12．EAC およびタンザニア――産業政策の模索

12．EAC およびタンザニア――産業政策の模索＜日程＞2010年10月 ９ 日〜14日

GRIPS の大野泉 ･ 大野健一は、エチオピアに引き続き2010年10月9〜14日にタンザニアを訪問し、東アフリカ共同体（ EAC、アルーシャ）およびタンザニア産業
貿易マーケティング省（ MITM、ダルエスサラーム）において、それぞれの組織が策定中の産業開発戦略につき情報収集と協議を行った。この実現には JICA タンザ
ニア事務所（勝田幸久所長、長谷川次長、丸尾所員）、水野専門家1、および EAC・

MITM で産業を担当する GRIPS 卒業生3名（ Ndira, Mhede, Fred ）等の協力を得た。
加えて、在タンザニア日本大使館の中川大使と関書記官、徳織専門家（ EAC ）、小関専門家、黒田専門家にも情報提供を含め大変お世話になった。心から感謝の意を表したい。

１ ．東アフリカ共同体（ EAC ）EAC 事務局では、① Juma Mwapachu 事務局長との協議、② GRIPS 卒業生で産業
プリンシパルエコノミストの George Ndira 氏との協議、③ EAC インフラ局の徳織JICA 専門家からの情報提供、④大野健一による東アジア的産業政策のアフリカへの示唆に関するセミナー等を行った。

EAC は2001年1月に正式発足し、現加盟国はケニア、タンザニア、ウガンダ、ブルンジ、ルワンダの5カ国である。EU 型地域統合を急速に進めており、関税同盟（2005年）、完全域内関税撤廃の開始（2010年1月）、共通市場の開始（2010年7月）がすでに実施され、さらに2012年の通貨統合、近い将来の政治統合を目標として掲げている。現在ケニアのコンサルタント会社による EAC 産業戦略のドラフトが作られている2。ただし産業政策の実施主体は原則として各国政府であるから、地域共同体としての EAC が産業政策に果たすべき役割は明確であるとはいえない。国際回
1

水野 JICA 専門家（産業政策アドバイザー）には MITM の公式訪問に先立ち、大使館・JICA・民間関係者
を交えた私的勉強会も企画いただいた。

2

East African Community Industrialisation Policy (Draft Final Report), East African Community Industrialisation
Strategy 2010-2030 (Draft Final Report), September 2010.

233

廊（道路 ･ 港湾）の建設や運搬車両 ･ ワンストップボーダーポストに関する枠組 ･実施といった国境を越える経済活動については EAC の役割は明瞭であるが、それ以外の政策、たとえば中小企業やバリューチェーンといった分野ではそうではない。貿易投資を通じた経済統合が先行した東アジアとは異なり、EAC における現行統合度は低く、域内貿易比率も12％にとどまっている（ケニア経由ウガンダ行き
物資といった再輸出も含む）。現在策定中の産業戦略も、各国分析に終始し EAC が担うべき施策が書かれていないのでさらなる検討が必要とのこと。

Mwapachu 事務局長からは、統合の政治的背景が説明された。EAC 内ではケニア製造業が圧倒的に強く、ケニアから他国への投資も始まっている。一方、タンザ
ニアは社会主義的残滓や保護志向があり、急速な統合には慎重である。また加盟国にはケニアの一人勝ちに対する危惧がある。こうした事情から、ケニアのキバキ大統領の意向により、統合が全ての加盟国に恩恵をもたらし経済格差を拡大しないよ
うなメカニズムを内在することが EAC に要請された。EAC の産業戦略つくりはその一環であるから、その目的は各国の産業政策を統一することではなく、たとえば国ごとにふさわしい産業配置を行い、お互いに原材料・中間財などを供給しあうことが求められているとのことであった。
当方からは、東アジアでは国境インターフェイス以外の産業政策の域内統一といった要求はなく、タイとマレーシアもお互いの中小企業政策をあまり知らないこと、経済も政策もまだまだ弱い EAC としては、政策統一の範囲拡大は慎重にした方がよいことを述べた。たとえば、現在進みつつある国際回廊を核として、必要な法律 ･ 制度の調整や他産業案件の国際回廊への動員などを行うことは大いに望ましい。一方で、製造業をケニアから分散するために加盟国間で産業の分散配置を行うといった発想はかなり社会主義的であり、グローバル市場における国家 ･ 企業間競争とぶつかる可能性を指摘した。またケニアがかつての日本と同様、FDI を通じて周辺国の雁行形態的発展の一番鳥になりつつあるという話も聞いたが、この比喩の現実性についても疑問を呈しておいた。
なお、EAC 事務局の産業担当の Ndira 氏からは、EAC の産業戦略が重視するス
キル・技術向上に関連して、カイゼンを導入した生産性向上支援（ EAC を通じた広域支援の可能性など）について関心が示された。

２ ．タンザニアの産業政策
これまで比較的高い成長を達成してきたものの、タンザニアはエチオピアとは異なり、貧困率が減少しないという矛盾を抱えている。農業の生産量が伸びないまま、

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12．EAC およびタンザニア――産業政策の模索

成長率の上昇は農業価格の高騰とそれ以外の分野（鉱業 ･ エネルギー、観光、運輸、製造業など）の拡大に支えられており、これが零細農民が貧困から抜け出せない一因となっているようである（水野専門家）。また長年同国は援助協調・財政支援の優等生であったが、最近は貧困削減 ･ 社会部門の停滞やドナーの課した諸条件の未達成をめぐって、財政支援ドナーとの関係が悪化している（小関専門家、黒田専門家）。大統領府の Planning Commission では、従来のドナー関係や貧困削減一辺倒から脱却して産業の成長に力点を置いた政策志向があるとのことである。また、産業貿易マーケティング省（ MITM ）では回廊、エネルギー、中小企業といった分野
での具体的な行動計画（ Integrated Industrial Development Strategy: IIDS ）が策定されつつある3。
このような背景をふまえ、ダルエスサラームでは MITM で Mapunjo 次官や関係諸局長、水野専門家、GRIPS 卒業生とのセミナー ･ 意見交換、大使館・JICA とのフォーマル ･ インフォーマルを含む意見交換を行った。大野健一による東アジア型
産業政策やエチオピア政策対話のプレゼンも関心を集めた。MITM 次官や工業局長
は、カイゼンと政策対話を柱とする日本の支援への強い関心を示した。当方は、ドナー協調が発達したタンザニアでは他ドナーを無視して日本が単独で産業支援をすることはエチオピアよりむずかしいこと、日本の対タ援助計画はインフラと農業に傾注しており現在のところ産業は含まれていないことの2点を述べた。また産業政策対話の成功のためには、最高指導者の強いコミットメントと工業省における最低限の政策実施能力が不可欠なことを強調した。次官は、それらの問題は突破しうるとの見解を示した。
中川大使と関書記官との会合では、以上の MITM の意向を伝えたうえで、日本がタンザニアの産業支援を強化するにはどのようなチャネルがあるかを議論した。
また JICA 事務所においても勝田所長、長谷川次長、丸尾所員、小関専門家、黒田専門家を交えて同様の意見交換を行った。実施中の案件（農業 ･ インフラ、カイゼ
ン4など）を拡大して産業的要素を追加するという道は比較的可能性はあろう。だがもし本格的な取組みをするならば、日本側、タンザニア側、ドナー関係それぞれの体制枠組を強化かつ調整して、タンザニア政府のオーナーシップのもとで産

3

MITM が策定したタンザニアの現行の産業開発戦略としては、Sustainable Industrial Development Policy(SIDP) 1996-2020 年がある。ただし、SIDP は策定から年月を経ており、またアクションの詳細が欠けているので、より最近の状況をふまえた実行可能なアクションプランとして現在、IIDS の策定が進んでいる（2010 年 7 月版、最終ドラフト）。
4

JICA は保健分野で個別専門家の協力を通じて、拠点病院にカイゼン（特に 5S）の導入を進めている。また、
別途、GRIPS の園部教授は世銀の資金で、MITM 工業局の協力を得て零細小企業を対象とした経営研修を実施する予定である。

235

業開発戦略が打ち出され、その実施のために日本が重要な役割を担うという形に持っていくことが不可欠であろう。そのためには、JICA が水野専門家（や工業局の GRIPS 卒業生）を通じて MITM の関係者・部局と準備協議するとともに、大使館では Planning Commission の Mpango 事務局長への接触を始めることが有意義であろう5。いずれにせよ、政治的意志と実施体制がタンザニア側でしっかりと確立されなければ、中途半端な状況で日本が産業支援強化にシフトすることは、成果達成の観点からもドナーポリティックスの観点からも望ましくない。逆にいえば、こうした準備が整うことが、我が国の政策関与強化のための必要条件である。現在のところ、タンザニアにおけるこれらの条件は、エチオピアに比べてはるかに整っていない。
この点に関し、Mapunjo 次官は翌週公表予定の新5ヵ年開発計画（ MKUKUTA

II 2010/11-2014/15年）において、製造業が今までの開発計画より明示的に位置づけられており、産業開発への政治的コミットメントはある、今後はドナー支援がMKUKUTA II のプライオリティに対応することが重要になるので、MKUKUTA II
策定をドナーから産業支援を動員する契機にしたいとの発言があった6。

JICA はタンザニアやガーナでガバナンス支援の一貫としてシンガポール政府と連携して公務員研修プロジェクトを実施した経験がある。ガーナにおいては、日本・シンガポールパートナーシッププログラム（ JSPP21）のもとで事前に JICA とシンガポール外務省が協議したうえで、Civil Service College がシンガポールへの招聘・研修を実施し（費用は両国で折半）、加えて JICA プロジェクトの経費でシンガポール専門家をガーナに派遣してセミナーを2度行った実績があるとのことだった（黒田専門家）。

5

以前に、Planning Commission の Mpango 事務局長のチームから中川大使にコンタクトがあったとのこと。
GRIPS チームは 2008 年 8 月のタンザニア訪問時に、Mpango 氏（当時は大統領の私的アドバイザー）と面談している。

6

Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP)
II. MITM 関係者によれば、来週にも最終化・公表されるとのことである。本年 6 月時点のドラフトでは、製造業は成長クラスターの中に含まれているが、エチオピアと比較しても分析・記述はあまり具体的でない。
知識・スキルの向上は優先施策のひとつに挙げられている。

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12．EAC およびタンザニア――産業政策の模索

日程・面談先10月8日（土） アジスアベバからダルエスサラーム経由でアルーシャ着。
10月9日（日） 資料整理。
10月10日（月） EAC事務局の産業担当Ndira氏と、EAC産業開発政策・戦略についての意見交換、Julius氏（財政・運営担当の事務局次長）表敬、
徳織JICA専門家（インフラ・計画局）との意見交換。午後にAU各部署の参加のもと、大野健一のセミナー（東アジア型の産業政策とアフリカへの示唆）、Amb. Juma Mwapachu事務局長表敬（生産・社会セクター事務局次長、貿易、インフラ、生産・社会セクター局の各局長、および徳織専門家が同席）。
10月11日（火）午前にMITM所管の技術開発機関であるTanzania Engineering andManufacturing Design Organization (TENDO) お よ び Center for

Agricultural Mechanization and Rural Technology (CAMARTEC)を視察。
午後にダルエスサラームに移動。JICA水野専門家宅にて非公式勉強会（水野専門家よりタンザニア経済事情のブリーフ、続いて大野健一による東アジア型の産業政策にいての発表）。
10月12日（水）産業貿易マーケティング省にて東アジア型の産業政策やエチオピ
アでの産業政策対話についての紹介・意見交換（ Mapunjo次官、Sikazwe工業局長を含め、各部局から約20名参加。水野専門家から冒頭、タンザニアの産業開発戦略について概要説明あり）。在タ
ンザニア日本大使館中川大使および関書記官との昼食および面談、JICAタンザニア事務所勝田所長、長谷川次長、丸尾所員、小関専
門家、黒田専門家との意見交換。JICA事務所関係者との夕食。
10月13日（木） GRIPS卒業生との懇親。
午後にダルエスサラーム発、ドバイ経由で帰国（翌日着）。
なお、本出張はGRIPS開発フォーラムの調査として実施した。

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13．ガーナ――ACET との意見交換＜日程＞2012年 ８ 月 ６ 日〜 ７ 日＜参加者＞ GRIPS開発フォーラム：大野健一、大野泉、上江洲佐代子

JICA 本部：産業開発・公共政策部 本間徹国際協力専門員、同部産業・貿易課

石亀敬治主任調査役、同課

渡辺佑子インハウスコンサルタ

ント（デベックス日本支社所属）／アフリカ部アフリカ第二課 渡辺
元治課長、伊藤早紀職員
エチオピアに続き、8月4日〜7日、GRIPS 開発フォーラムと JICA エチオピア政策対話チームはガーナを訪問した。ガーナでの面談には、当地出張中の JICA アフ
リカ部からもご参加いただいた。ガーナ出張の主な目的は、在アクラの研究機関

ACET（ African Center for Economic Transformation ）とのセミナー開催（8月7日）
であり、日本側からエチオピアの政策対話の経験を共有することで、アフリカ諸国の経済構造の変革（ transformation ）につき実務的な分析・助言を目指している

ACET との今後の連携の可能性について意見交換を行うことにあった。
同時に、在ガーナ日本国大使館、JICA ガーナ事務所からはガーナの政治・経済
状況と産業開発の進捗状況や課題につきヒアリングを行った他、貿易産業省の Nii

Ansah-Adjaye チーフ・ダイレクター（事務次官に相当）、財務経済計画省債務管理局の Dabone Atta 氏（ GRIPS 卒業生）や上司の Cynthia A. Arthur（対外債務ユニット長）他とも面談し、ガーナの産業政策や対外支援の動向につきヒアリングを行った。なお、ガーナにおけるセミナー開催および現地調査の実施にあたっては、

JICA ガーナ事務所からの多大なる支援を頂いたことに、深く感謝したい。

１ ．ACETにおけるセミナーおよび意見交換（ ８ 月 ７ 日午前 ９ 時〜14時、
於ACET ）ACET は、2007年に K. Y. Amoako 氏（ガーナ人で世界銀行幹部、国連アフリカ経1
済委員会事務局長等を歴任）により設立された研究機関で、アフリカ諸国の持続的1

Amoako 氏は、2012 年 7 月に急逝した Mills 前大統領の経済顧問も務めた。世界銀行をへて 1995 〜 2005
2005 年に英国ブレア首相（当時）年の期間に国連アフリカ経済委員会（UNECA）の事務局長を務めたほか、

238

13．ガーナ――ACET との意見交換

な経済成長と構造転換を促すための政策および制度改革の促進を目的とした分析作
業およびアドボカシーを行っている。GRIPS チームは昨年 Amoako 氏の来日時に意見交換を行った際、外部者ではなくアフリカ人による産業振興策の策定と、アジ
ア諸国の経験の共有という点で共通の問題意識をもっていることを確認し、日本にとってアフリカ各国との知的交流のゲートウェイとなりうる可能性が強く感じられた。同時に JICA アフリカ部においても昨年 ACET 主催セミナーに参加するなど情報収集を行っていたことから、今般の合同セミナー・意見交換の場が設けられた。
なお、今般、代表の Amoako 氏が不在であったため、次席のチーフエコノミスト

Yaw Ansu 氏を中心に、ACET の研究者12〜3名との意見交換を行った。
（1） ACETの活動概要

ACET の基本的立場は、「アフリカに必要なのは経済成長のみならず経済構造の多様化であり、それを促すためには民間の活力と併せて政府の能動的な役割が重要」というものである。活動の柱は以下の3点である。
①

政策研究（国別研究、産業研究（繊維、農産品加工、観光、製造業2）、テー
マ別研究、農業研究、アフリカ経済の構造転換の進展度の指標化）、およびこれらを元に隔年毎に出版する Africa Transformation Report の作成。

②

政府への政策提言（輸出振興、技術革新、人材育成、農産品加工、天然資源
管理）
。

③

実 施 に 向 け た ア ド バ イ ス（ 政 府 ハ イ レ ベ ル と の 対 話（ transformation

dialogue ）、セミナー等の開催、民間セクターとの対話等）の実施。
現在の調査対象地域はサブサハラアフリカ15か国で、今後、北アフリカを含めて25か国とする予定。スタッフは10か国より30名（うち研究者は10数名）ほどが在籍し、対象国の拡大に伴い研究者の増員を予定しているとのこと。

ACET は対象国の政府上層部と密な関係をもち、対話を行っている。日本の政策対話と類似している点は、国別に実施する対話（ transformation dialogue ）であり、総花的な政策枠組みではなく個別具体的な戦略（ go beyond the general policy

framework, targeted sectoral strategies ）をめざしていることである。ACET には提言内容を具体的なプロジェクトとして実施するマンデートはなく、相手国政府におがグレンイーグルズ G8 サミットのために主宰したアフリカ委員会にも委員として参画している。
2

製造業については、アフリカでの製造業の立ち遅れの理由と今後の発展の見込みについて日本の助言を仰ぎたい分野との言及があり、特に日本企業の投資（組立工場の誘致）によるシンガポール、マレーシア、
タイ等のような発展は今でも妥当なモデルであるかどうか、もし妥当なモデルであるならばアフリカ諸国の取りうるオプションとは何か、につき検討したいとの説明があった。加えて、日本企業のアフリカ諸国への進出促進についても支援を仰ぎたいとのことであった。

239

ける実施を促進する catalyst としての役割を担っている。政策提言・対話の具体例
として、採掘資源部門ディレクターの Sheila Kharma 女史（ボツワナ出身）より、
モザンビーク、ザンビア、リベリア、シエラレオネ等における天然資源管理プログ
ラムにつき紹介があった。

Africa Transformation Report（2013年第1四半期に出版予定）は、Transformation（経済構造の転換、すなわち工業化）に焦点を当てた報告書であり、中長期的な視点に立って成長を考える点が特徴である。本報告書は、国別の経済構造に関する指標や、他国の経験とも比較しながら、経済構造の多様化に関する議論を広く喚起し、アフリカの政策担当者に影響を与えるような内容をめざしている。報告書の提言はどうしても一般的な内容になるため、国別のアドバイザリー業務でフォローアップを行うこととしている。
経済転換をキーワードにするかどうかは別にして、これらの議論の実質的内容は
わが国の開発理念とほぼ重なるものであることが再確認された。
（2） 日本側のプレゼンと質疑応答
日本側からは、産業政策対話（ GRIPS 大野健一）、日本と韓国との政策対話アプ
ローチの比較（ GRIPS 大野泉）
、JICA によるカイゼン支援（ JICA 本間徹国際協力専門員）につきプレゼンテーションを行い、ACET 側と活発な議論を行った。先方の質問はおおよそ的確なもので、こうした議論がアフリカのシンクタンクとできるのは驚きである。議論のポイントは以下の通り。

GRIPS 側のプレゼンに対し、ACET からは、産業政策に対する考えや活動について下記の通りコメントがあった。産業政策については、ガバナンス・民主化等といった一般的な制度能力の強化よりも特定の産業を振興するための施策や能力強化に焦点を当てることが妥当と考えており、理論ではなく国別の経験に基づくことを重視している。政策対話は先方政府からの要請に基づいて実施し、資金は先方政府と折半である。モデルがあるわけではなく（ no single model ）、政治など当該国固有の課題や、相手国にとっての取っ掛かり（ hook ）を念頭におきながら対話をつなげることを意図している。
大野健一のプレゼンに対し、ACET の参加者から、エチオピアのメレス首相の強力なリーダーシップなど、エチオピアは特別な事例である一方、ルワンダにも同様の開発主義的な要素がみられるとの指摘があったうえで、政策対話と先方政府のリーダーシップとの関係について質問があった。例えば、首相の個人的能力に頼る
エチオピア開発の脆弱性、長期独裁ではなく民主化のもとで政権交代が通常となった現在のアフリカで開発主義は可能か、民主主義が定着したガーナへの示唆等であ240

13．ガーナ――ACET との意見交換

る（大野健一より、政策対話では有能なリーダーと協働すべきで、その際に民主化等ではなく、より実務的なテーマに焦点を当てることが現実的と説明）。プレゼン
では日本・韓国・台湾に比べて現在の後発国はよりシステマティックな政策学習が必要とのことだが、その意味は何か、といった質問もあった。また、アフリカの開発計画が形式的・冗長に過ぎるとのプレゼンに対し、政情不安定な国が多いアフリカにおいては、多様な民族・社会を束ねるビジョンが必要であることも指摘したい、
今般、大統領が急逝したガーナがその典型である、といった発言もあった。
エチオピアにおけるチャンピオン商品発掘の事例等に対し、ACET は、潜在性あるセクター / 商品の特定にあたり、輸出データ分析に加え、民間セクターとの対話を重視しながら、政策分析と市場分析を行っているとの説明があった。
大野泉のプレゼンに対し、エチオピアの政策対話に対する世銀 /IMF や伝統的ドナーの反応は如何か、韓国の政策対話と日本との関係はどうか等の質問があった（大野泉より、国際機関や伝統的ドナーは産業政策の詳細に立ち入らないので日本の支援とは重複しておらず、また節目で民間セクター開発を支援しているドナーに進捗説明をしている。韓国との関係については、韓国の知的支援は既に体系的な仕組みがあるため、それを踏まえて相互補完的になるようにすればよいこと、また日本の政策対話に韓国の有識者を招聘する可能性もある旨回答）。
この他にも、産業政策の理論に関する新たな潮流をどう政策対話に反映させているか（大野健一より、理論の進化と政策対話とは別次元で進んでおり、理論上の結論を待っている余裕は政策対話にはない旨回答）、かつて韓国が巨額資本を投下して造船業を振興・育成したような大胆な新産業創設についてどのようにアドバイス
したらよいか（大野健一より、韓国が成功したのは政府の能力と韓国人のメンタリ
ティによるところが大きく、また財閥があり、巨額の投資が可能になった背景がある。政府が大胆な政策を打ち出せない場合、外部のアドバイザーが後押しすることもあるが、その際はマクロ経済運営等のリスクにも留意しながら、大胆な施策と伝統的なものの双方を検討する必要がある）、等の質疑応答があった。
本間国際協力専門員がプレゼンしたアフリカにおけるカイゼンの導入・実施についても、多くの研究者より、カイゼンは文化の異なるアフリカにおいても定着可能かどうか、カイゼンを持続可能にする条件は何か（賞罰を含む）、民間企業だけではなく行政機関にも適用可能か、またサブセクター毎にパフォーマンスの違いはあるか、エチオピアのパイロットプロジェクトの成果はどう評価するのか、失敗例はあるか、等の質疑が出され、研究者らがカイゼンに高い関心を抱いている様子が窺えた。
最後に、ACET の Yaw Ansu 氏より、アフリカで日本のビジネスや援助のプレゼ

241

ンスが高まることを希望したうえで、ACET と JICA、あるいは GRIPS との今後の連携策（アフリカ数ヶ国における共同研究、例えばザンビアの資源管理と工業化戦
略、モザンビークでのリンケージ（巨大プロジェクトと現地企業の連携・技術移転）などについての共同セミナーなど）に関するアイデアがその場で暫定的に提起されたが、実施の可能性、具体的な国・テーマあるいは JICA の担当部局（アフリカ部、
産業開発・公共政策部、JICA 研究所）についてはこれから検討することとなった。
先述のとおり、アフリカで日本の知的プレゼンスを高め開発協力を宣伝するにはACET は効果的なパートナーであり、双方にとってウィンウィンになり予算や人的な負担が小さくなるよう配慮した上で、何らかの具体的協力を開始することがきわめて望ましいであろう。

２ ．ガーナの産業政策等の動向
ガ ー ナ は2010年 に 策 定 さ れ た 開 発 上 位 計 画 で あ る Ghana Shared Growth andDevelopment Agenda (GSGDA、2010〜2013年、 国 家 開 発 計 画 委 員 会（ National
Development Planning Committee/NDPC ）が主管）のもと、貿易産業省が産業政策や民間セクター開発計画（ Private Sector Development Strategy 2: PSDS2、2010〜
2014年）を主管している。ただし、民間セクター開発計画はドナー資金を得るための文書との位置づけで、実質はドナー支援のもとで外部コンサルタントが作成している模様。
貿易産業省の Nii チーフ・ダイレクターからは、経済構造の多様化と高付加価値化に重点を置いた次期5ヵ年計画（注：産業政策のことと思料）を実施に移すために組織改編を行ったこと、貿易政策（2010年まで）においては国際貿易（輸出振興・競争力強化等、WTO 交渉に関わる能力強化）、国内流通の整備等（小売り等の地元企業の能力強化）を重視し、2010年12月に策定した PSDS2では、民間セクター開発のための環境整備を主眼とし、実施は Industrial Sector Support Programme（ ISSP ）を通して行っているとの説明があった。ISSP は原材料生産や鉱物加工に携わる地
場産業の強化、人材育成・技能開発、技術革新、横断的テーマの4つの柱からなり、
特に人材育成・技能開発については、石油・ガスの採掘が進む中で、資源関連産業
を高付加価値化するために必要な実務的訓練（ TVET 等）が急務であるとの考えを示している3。
3

在ガーナ日本国大使館の本田書記官からは、石油・ガス部門の人材育成という政府の計画は非現実的であり（雇用創出効果は極めて限定的）、むしろ石油派生製品等の振興をめざせばよいのではないかとの指摘があった。また、石油をめぐる政府の考えについて、望月参事官からは、ガーナはナイジェリアの失敗（汚職、242

13．ガーナ――ACET との意見交換

政府の優先業種は農業・農産品加工であり、現地調達可能な原材料による加工業の育成をめざしている。工業部門については、低迷している綿花への支援を行うほか、自動車部品工場等の誘致も図っている。また、官民連携（ PPP ）による電子部
品組み立て工場（現地市場向け）も開始しており、10年をかけて能力を育成する予定である4。加えて、港湾（中国、米国 MCC 等の支援）、EPZ（中国）、鉄道、空港等のインフラ整備も、天然資源に関心を持つブラジル・中国等からの支援を受けている。中国からは現在30億 US ドル（ローン）のコミットメントが示されており、今後5年間で100億 US ドルの支援パッケージについても協議中である5。また、スイス、独、英 DFID、EU 等は民間セクター開発（ PSDS2）の実施を支援するプール・ファンドに拠出しており、この資金もインフラ開発に充当しているとのこと。

Nii チーフ・ダイレクターは本年 JICA の本邦研修を受けており、その際に東アジ
ア諸国の開発経験について学び、特に中小企業振興に関心を抱き、現在、中小企業支援に関する中央レベルの公的機関のあり方についても検討しているとの話であった。

経済構造転換の失敗）を繰り返してはいけないと認識しており、石油収入管理もノルウェーをモデルとした石油ファンドを設置するなど、ナイジェリアよりも立ち上がりの意識が高い。しかし輸入品への依存に慣れていることもあり、このままの方向性では、製造業育成には向かわないであろうとの話であった。
4

製造業への関心が低い理由として、望月参事官からは、南ア、中近東、中国からの輸入品が多数を占める中で、ガーナが競争力をもつ産品はないこと、また外資を誘致して開発したいものが政府にはないこと、そして外資もより大きな市場を有する近隣国ナイジェリアを選びがちであること、等の指摘があった。

5

在ガーナ日本大使館によると、中国の 30 億ドルと追加の 100 億ドルは、あくまでも公約にすぎず、まずは
10 億ドルが拠出されたのみで 30 億ドルが全額拠出されるかどうかも分からない（与党 MDC が本年 12 月の大統領選挙を睨んだキャンペーンの一環として中国による巨額支援を引き合いに出しているとの見方もある）。財務経済計画省の対外資金担当者に確認したところ、これまでのところ中国からディスバースされたのは 10 億ドルのうちの 7．5 億ドルであり、残りは依然として協議中との話であった。なお、30 億ドル
はガーナにとっては前代未聞の巨額の借入額である。

243

日程・面談先（ GRIPSチームのみ）
8月4日（土） アジスアベバからアクラへ移動。
8月5日（日） 資料整理。
8月6日（月） JICAガーナ事務所と打合せ（稲村事務所長、木藤次長、西畑所員、
野口企画調査員）。貿易産業省にてニイ・アンサ・アジェエ次官との意見交換（コフィ・アッド主任商業オフィサーが同席）。在ガーナ日本大使館の望月参事官、本田一等書記官と意見交換。財務経済計画省債務管理局との面談（ GRIPS卒業生のデボネ・アッタ氏、及び対外債務課長のシンシア・アーサー氏ほか）。
8月7日（火） アフリカ経済変換センターにてJICA・ACETセミナー。報告はチーフエコノミストのヨー・ヤンス氏（ ACETの方針と研究概要）、大野健一（エチオピアとの産業政策対話）、大野泉（日韓の政策対話の比較）、本間国際協力専門員（ JICAによるカイゼンの取組み）、および意見交換。
アクラ発、フランクフルト経由で帰国（8月9日朝に帰国）。

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14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面＜日程＞2013年 ９ 月 １ 日〜 ７ 日1
＜参加者＞政策研究大学院大学（ GRIPS)：大野泉（ RL ）、大野健一、村嶋美穂
近畿経済産業局（ METI関西）：青井登志子課長（国際事業課長）
大阪府商工労働部：領家誠（商工振興室参事）
森純一（産業人材育成専門家、2013年1月までJICAハノイ工業大学産学連携専門家）＜目的＞
・日系中小企業の誘致に関するタイ政府の政策・インセンティブ、およびビジネス
環境（工業団地や関連サービス、産業育成の状況等）について情報収集を行う。
・タイにおける日本の支援機関、及び現地の経済団体、教育・研究機関等の取組に関する情報収集、および実務レベルのネットワーク構築を行う。
・経済統合が進むアジアにおいて、製造業拠点としてのタイの戦略的位置づけと可能性について、タイ・日本双方の関係者から意見聴取する。

１ ．タイの最近の経済状況と政府の産業政策
タ イ は イ ン ド シ ナ 半 島 の 中 央 に 位 置 し、 人 口 約6,785万 人（2012年5月 時 点、

National Statistical Ofﬁce ）、面積51万3115㎢（日本の約1.4倍）の国土を持つ国である。
一人当たり GNI は5,210 ドル（2012年、世界銀行）で「中所得国」に位置づけられる。
東南アジアで唯一植民地化の経験がなく、1932年6月の立憲革命による臨時憲法公
布以来、国王を元首とする安定した立憲君主制を敷いてきた。また、政権交替を経ても行政体制が比較的安定しているため、他の東南アジア諸国と比べて法制度の運用等における不透明性・不確実性の問題が少ないといわれている。
産業開発政策に関しては、タイ政府は1972年に高関税による輸入代替政策から外資導入による技術振興・輸出志向型政策へと転換を図った。その背景としては、タ
イは資源に乏しく、また独自の製造技術もなかったため、外資を通じた製造業の振興・育成に活路を求めたこと、またタイの国内市場が外資を引き寄せるのに十分な
1

この訪問は、アジア太平洋研究所（APIR、大阪）において大野泉が主幹をつとめる研究プロジェクト「中小企業の東南アジア進出に関する実践的研究」の一環として実施したものである［編者］。

245

大きさがあったことがある。以来タイ政府は、良好な投資環境を維持して外資を積極的に導入し、輸出産業へ労働力を集中させた。また、外資と自国の大資本（財閥等）との合弁企業を設立させ、合弁事業を通じて技術移転を促した。こうしたタイの政策および経済的背景により、1970年の産業構造（農林水産業が約27％、製造業が約25％、サービス業が約47％）から、製造業が突出する2011年の産業構造（農林水産業が8.6％、製造業が46.6％、サービス業が44.5％）へと大きく変化を遂げた（図表1-1）。タイへの直接投資額は1997 年の通貨危機、2009年リーマンショック以降の世界経済危機等で一時的に何度か低迷したものの、2011年度は91.32億ドルでASEAN 中第5位の規模となっている（ JETRO 資料2より）。
図表1-1 産業別実質GDP比の推移

出所：JBIC「タイの投資環境2012年10月」（元データは NESDB)。

最近の経済状況をみると、タイの工業地帯を襲った2011年の洪水後、2012年には災害後の特需的な消費や投資の増加により GDP 成長率は6.5％となった。自動車製
造台数も、洪水による待機需要や復興需要、政府による内需刺激策（税還付、最低賃金引き上げ）等により、過去最高の245万台（世界第9位）を達成した。しかし、2013年に入ると、税還付の終了等で民間消費が慎重になって減速、総資本形成は政府部門の設備投資は好調であったが建設部門が大幅に減速、輸出も農林水産物の不調や海外経済の弱い回復、バーツ高による製造業輸出の低調などが重なり、GDP
成長率は前年より低い4％台（ NESDB、タイ中央銀行、タイ財務省）と予測されている。工業生産指数も、世界不況による輸出不振により減少傾向、とりわけ自動2

JETRO「ASEAN ６カ国の対内直接投資の動向」2012 年。

246

14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

車製造台数は輸出減少や税還付制度の終了により減少している。一方、雇用情勢については、タイ経済がこれまで比較的堅調に推移していたことから、失業率が1％を切る状態が継続しており、自動車産業をはじめとする各分野で深刻な人手不足となっている。
政策面をみると、2011年7月3日に下院総選挙にてタイ貢献党（プアタイ党）が与党となり、タクシン元首相の実妹であるインラック氏が首相となった。公約もタクシン元首相の意思を受け継ぎ、地方や低所得者層に対して手厚い政策などの大衆受けする政策が多くなっている。企業活動や経済状況への影響の大きい政策としては、以下の「最低賃金の大幅引き上げ」、「農家への所得補填」、「インフラ整備推進のための2兆バーツプロジェクト」が挙げられる。
「最低賃金の大幅引き上げ」に関しては、2012年4月1日、同政権はバンコクを含む7都県で215バーツから300バーツに引き上げたあと、2013年1月には最低賃金を全
国一律300バーツに引き上げた。この大幅な引き上げにより、給与負担増加による中小企業の収益悪化が懸念されている。
「農家への所得補填」は、農家に対し米を担保にした貸付および1トン15,000バーツ等での買い取りをする制度である。
「イン
フラ整備推進のための2兆バーツプロジェクト」については、2013年3月19日に、通常予算とは別枠で2兆バーツ（約6.8兆円）のインフラ整備に必要な内貨あるいは外貨での借り入れを7年間（2020年末まで）行う権限を政府に与える法律が、閣議承認後、国会に提出された。同政権は、これによりタイのモーダルシフト、連結性向
上、モビリティ向上を図る考えである。
国家経済社会開発委員会（ NESDB ）が策定し、2011 年10 月に閣議承認された「第11次5カ年計画（2012-2016年）」3は、外資主導の自動車、電子電気、石油化学を中心とした経済から、知識集約産業、グリーン産業、再生エネルギー、医療、運輸などを中心とした経済への移行を目標としている。さらに、2011年8月に就任したインラック首相は、2012年12月に国家戦略（ Country Strategy ）を発表し、「新成長モデル（ New Growth Model ）」を打ち出した4。同モデルは、①成長と競争（持続可能な成長を可能とする競争力のための能力強化）、②包括的成長（社会的格差の是正と経済・社会・政治的機会の提供）、③ Green Growth（人々の生活の質の向上、環境にフレンドリーな成長）、④内部的改革（法制度や行政機関の改革等）を4つの柱とし、持続可能な成長をめざすとしている。重点セクターとしては、既に基盤のあ3

タイでは、1957 年の世界銀行の提言に基づき、1961 年に「第 1 次国家経済社会開発計画」が策定された。
以降継続的に国家経済社会開発庁 (NESDB) が発表する 5 カ年（第 1 次は 6 カ年）の経済社会開発計画を、
同国の経済・社会全般に関する基本的な考え方や発展の方向性を示す国家の中期的開発計画としている。

4

DIP ビジネス開発サービス課の Aditad Vasionta 氏との面談による。

247

る6業種（ゴム、食品、石油・プラスチック、バイオディーゼル・エタノール、自動車、電子電気機器）に加えて、将来ポテンシャルがある5業種（クリーンエネル
ギー、健康商品、バイオ関連製品、飛行機、クリエイティブ関連）、および農業、サービスを挙げている（図表1-2）。
図表1-2

国家戦略（ Country Strategy ）と新成長モデル（ New Growth Model ）こうした政策の背景には、2015年の ASEAN 経済共同体（ AEC ）の実現を控え、人件費が上昇する中で競争力を確保し「中所得の罠」を回避する必要があり、そのためにすでに基盤がある自動車や電子電気を中心とした産業集積をより強固にするとともに、労働集約的な生産工程はカンボジア、ラオス、ミャンマーといった周辺国に出して、タイ自身は高付加価値産業を担当するという方針転換を図る政府の意
向がある。加えて、輸送インフラの強化には、ASEAN 地域のロジスティックハブ
の役割を果たしていきたいという期待が込められている。バンコクを中心に地方へと広がる鉄道網と国境都市の開発には、ラオス、カンボジア、ミャンマーとの経済関係強化が想定されている。さらに、インドやバングラデシュなどの南アジア市場
へのアクセスを改善するため、ミャンマーのダウェー港の開発にも、ミャンマー政府と協力して取り組む予定である5。

5

大泉啓一郎「タイ政府、大型インフラ開発計画発表」、アジア・マンスリー 2013 年 5 月号、日本総研。

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14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

２ ．日本企業のタイへの投資動向
1985年のプラザ合意による急激な円高により、日系企業にとってタイは生産拠点として非常に魅力的となった。以来、日本からタイへの投資は増加基調にあり、日本のバブル崩壊、アジア通貨危機、リーマンショックを発端とした世界金融危機の影響の際には一時的な落ち込みはあったものの、2012年時点で日本はタイへの最大の投資国となっている。同時に、日本からの直接投資の流入により、金属製品、自動車、電子電気などの分野で裾野産業が育っていった。
2008年10月のタイ商務省データベースによると、タイに進出している日系企業は
約7,000社となっている。その内訳は、製造業が48.4％（1,879社）、うち金属製造・加工が9.7％（376社）、輸送用機械が8.5％（330社）、電気機器が6.0％（234社）となっている。続いて、卸売が23.4％（907社）、サービス業が12.2％（475社）、建設業が3.5％（137社）と続き、日系企業の活動領域は広範囲にわたっていることがわかる。日本
商工会議所の会員社数も、中国上海に次いで多い。フローベースでみると、2012
年の日本からタイへの直接投資は件数、金額ともに前年比で大幅に拡大しており、過去最大を記録した（図表2-1）。業種別内訳（認可ベースの金額）は、金属製品、機械および輸送用機器が全体の49％、電子電気機器が25％、化学・プラスチック・
紙が13％と、製造業分野が8 割以上を占めている6。なお2013年は、認可件数ではプラスを維持しているものの、金額ベースでは減少に転じている。
図表2-1．日本からタイへの直接投資

出所：日本アセアンセンター。

6

JETRO「タイ概況」、ジェトロバンコク事務所、2013 年 8 月（元データはタイ投資委員会）。

249

バンコク日本商工会議所（ JCC ）による2013年上期の日系企業景気動向調査7によると、日系企業の2013年下期の業況感は、洪水の影響から急速に回復した2012年
上期に比べ改善幅を縮小した。2013年は、改善幅を更に縮小していくものの、引き続きプラスとなる見通しである。設備投資の増加を見込む企業は全体の41％、横ばいが24％、輸出の増加を見込む企業は全体の42％。横ばいが36％となっている。
歴史を振り返れば、1980年代後半の日系大手メーカーの大量タイ進出に伴い、下請け企業の進出が活発化すると共に、タイにおける裾野産業の育成が非常に重要な課題となった。タイ政府は職業訓練を通じた裾野産業の人材育成を開始し、1988
年には工業省に裾野産業振興局（ BSID ）を設置して裾野振興にあたってきた。また、産業開発人材育成やインフラ等のビジネス環境整備については、国際協力機構（ JICA ）、国際協力銀行（ JBIC ）、海外産業人材育成協会（ HIDA、前身は海外技術者研修協会（ AOTS ）と海外貿易開発協会（ JODC ））等の日本の支援機関による貢献も大きい（後述）。2011年11月に発生した大洪水により、バンコク周辺の日系の電気・自動車関連の輸出向け工場が浸水で稼動不能になるなどの被害を受けた。
しかし、日本側の支援とタイ側の努力により迅速な復旧がなされるとともに、日タ
イ間にはすでに積極的な生産協力体制が構築されており、洪水を機に日系企業がタ
イから工場を引き上げるという動きはほとんど見られなかった。
日 本 と タ イ の 経 済 関 係 は、2007年11月1日 に 発 効 し た 日・ タ イ 経 済 連 携 協 定（ JTEPA ）により、さらに結びつきが強くなっている。同協定は、物・サービスの貿易の自由化および円滑化、人の移動、相互承認の円滑化、知的財産の保護、政府調達分野における協力の拡大等について2国間で締約したものであり、両国共に9割以上（金額ベース）の物品の関税が撤廃される予定である。

３ ．タイ政府や関係機関の取組み
本調査では、タイ政府および関係機関の投資振興や中小企業振興への取組みを確認するため、工業省産業振興局（ Department of Industrial Promotion, Ministry ofIndustry：DIP/MOI ）のビジネス開発サービス課（ Bureau of Business Development
Service: BDS）および裾野産業振興課（Bureau of Supporting Industries Development：
BSID ）、MOI が 管 轄 す る 中 小 企 業 振 興 庁（ Ofﬁce of Small and Medium Enterprise
Promotion： OSMEP）、タイ投資委員会（Board of Investment： BOI）、タイ自動車イ
7

JCC 会員企業を対象に年 2 回、景況や財務状況（売上、損益、設備投資）、時々の関心事項などについて実施。
1984 年以来 29 年続いている調査で、タイで事業を展開する日系企業の動向を包括的に把握することのできる唯一の調査である。

250

14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

ンスティチュート（Thailand Automotive Institute：TAI）8、タイ工業団地公社（Industrial

Estate Authority of Thailand： IEAT）、および首相府直属の科学技術イノベーション・
オフィス（ National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Ofﬁce： STI ）にヒアリングを行った。工業省組織図は図表3-1の通りである。
図表3-1. タイ工業省組織図

出所、工業省ホームページ（2013年9月）。

工業省は国家の工業振興と工業規則に関する政策を担当しており、その DIP は産業振興政策を担当する部署である。同省は、「第11次5カ年計画」および「国家戦略」の下で、タイ工業振興のためのマスタープランを策定している。同マスタープ
ランでは、10〜20年後の創造的（クリエイティブ）産業とバランスのとれた持続可
8Thailand Automotive Institute にはタイ自動車産業振興協会、タイ自動車産業機構、タイ自動車研究所など
多くの訳がある。ここではタイ自動車インスティチュートとしておく。

251

能な社会をめざし、5年後に知識ベースの産業、5〜10年後に革新的（イノベーティ
ブ）な産業から持続可能な産業、そして10年後から20年後には創造的産業へと段階を追って成長していく方針が示されている。また、OSMEP が作成した中小企業振興策によれば、①新規起業者の支援、②企業の成長支援（コンサルタントファンド、
産業集積、トータルエナジーマネージメント、地域産業開発等）、③ SHINDAN 制
度活用を通じて、2016年までに25,000社の起業、中小企業30,000社の支援をターゲットとしている。なお、DIP 局の BDS 課と面談した際に、最近、日本の中小企業の海外展開関連のミッションが増えており、半年間で5〜6件の地方自治体や中小企業の訪問をうけたとのことであった。

DIP 局の裾野産業振興課（ Bureau of Supporting Industries Development： BSID)
は、工業省においてタイの裾野産業育成を担う課である。1988年に前身の Metal-

Working and Machinery Industries Development Institute (MIDI) が設立され、1996年に現在の課名になった。タイには、独立行政法人として、Iron and Steel Institute ofThailand, Thailand Automotive Institute, Plastics Institute of Thailand, Electrical andElectronics Institute, Thai-German Institute の5つの協会があり、これらの協会が、裾野政策実施の役割を担っている。また、機械振興会などの約15の中小企業の工業会がある。
中小企業診断士制度については、BSID のパヌワット課長によれば（前職で中小企業診断士の育成を担当）、タイではかつての日本のように、工業とサービスに分けた形で診断士を育成しており、工業省は診断結果を見て、どの企業にどのような支援を行うかを検討する。診断士育成コースは、泰日工業大学 (TNI) 等で設置されているが、受講時間や内容を簡略化している場合もあり、レベルはまちまちである。
診断士はタイに現在2,000〜3,000名いると推定されるが、実働は500〜600名程度とのこと。資格・登録制度はないが、工業省事業に参加した診断士についてはデータ
ベースに記録している。データベースの内容については診断士が自己申請したもの
を、工業省職員がチェックしてから登録する。また、顧客が診断士のパフォーマン
スを評価できるようにしている。将来的には、他省庁にもデータベースを公開した
いと考えている。今後は、製造現場における自動化の指導を行える診断士を育成す
ること、それぞれの診断士が得意の分野に特化することが重要と考えている。さらに、医療機器などの他の産業にも診断を展開したいとのことだった。
パヌワット課長からは、日系企業の直接投資が増えているが、今以上に多くの日系中小企業がタイに進出してくると、タイの地場企業との軋轢が起こる可能性があるため、共存共栄できる道を探さなければいけない、との発言があった。今後タイに進出する日系企業は、タイ国内だけでなく ASEAN を市場として考えるべきであ252

14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面る。日系企業は親企業の支援があり、日本国内の融資条件はタイに比べて金利がかなり低いうえ、日本人同士であれば取引の話もしやすい。加えて投資委員会の特典も受けられるとなれば、タイの地元企業が不公平と思う可能性はある。人材については、リーダー格の人材が足りない。また、繊維・陶器などの衰退産業から有望産業への人材の移動をいかに促進できるかが、製造現場の自動化の促進と合わせて課題であるとのことであった。
タイ投資委員会（ BOI ）は、投資奨励を担当する政府機関である。首相を議長とし、工業省、財務省等の関係大臣、官僚、民間代表者、学識者が委員もしくは顧問に任命され、工業省管理下の BOI オフィスが事務局機能を持っている。同委員会
は、投資奨励法および投資奨励策（2000年8年施行）に基づき、タイの経済発展・技術力向上に寄与する投資に対し様々な面からインセンティブを与えている。具体的な枠組みとしては、①産業の地域分散、地方産業の振興、地域間の所得格差是正を目的とした「奨励ゾーン制度」、②特定の企業や産業集積の促進を目的とした「奨励業種制度」、③特定政策を達成することを目的とした「投資奨励措置」の3つの優遇措置がある。
ただしこの制度はまもなく変更される予定である。すなわち、インラック首相が打ち出した「国家戦略」における高付加価値産業シフトという方針に基づき、その具体化のために2013年1月に「投資奨励5カ年戦略（案）」が発表された。内容はまだ調整中であるものの、政府が重視する特定業種や特定の産業集積地域に対して恩典を厚くすることになっている。具体的には、「奨励ゾーン制度」による特典が廃止される一方、対象業種の投資には、売り上げに対する研究開発（ R ＆ D ）費用の割合や金額に応じて1〜3年の法人税免税措置や、ISO 14000など BOI が認めた基準
認証を受けた上で、奨励対象の工業団地や工業区内へ立地した場合にそれぞれ1年の法人税免税措置が追加される。この投資戦略自体は、労働集約型産業や発展の遅れた遠方地域への投資優遇措置の廃止を含んでいるため、内外企業から懸念が示された。これをうけて、BOI は内外の経済団体や業界団体と引き続き協議し、2013年
中に内容を確定し、2015年1月から施行する方向でスケジュールを変更することとした（調整の結果、遠方地域への投資奨励は残る可能性があるとのこと）。また、
既に承認されているプロジェクトは期限まで税優遇を受けられるが、拡張（セカンドフェーズ）等は新方針の下で審査されることになるので、拡張事業の土地所有ができなくなる可能性があり、この点については日系企業からも懸念が示されている。BOI は、これらを含め、今後対応策を検討し、年内に新しい投資奨励制度を固める予定。

BOI は2000年より、中小企業振興の観点から、投資優遇制度を受けられる最低253

投資金額を外国企業100万バーツ、タイ企業500,000バーツに減らした。とくに日系中小企業の投資については、日系中小企業誘致のためのプロモーションを昨年実施したほか、「日タイ中小企業のための投資促進ネットワーク」を設置し、BOI をハブとして、BOI の裾野産業リンケージ構築ユニット（ BUILD ）、工業省 DIP 局のBSID やジャパンデスク、IEAT、裾野産業協会連合会等と協調して、日タイ両国の中小企業に資する活動をコーディネートしていく予定である。また東京、大阪の事務所を通じて、新投資制度や今後重視するセクターに関して、積極的に日本企業に投資を呼びかけていく方針とのことであった。
中小企業振興庁（ OSMEP ）は、工業省が監督する中小企業振興のための組織であり、タイの中小企業政策を省庁横断的に調整することが期待されている。しかし、

OSMEP からのヒアリングによると、同庁への予算配分は全体額の5％程度と非常に少なく、各省庁に予算配分する権限も与えられていないこと、またマスタープラ
ン、アクションプランについても、同庁が作成してはいるものの、各業界団体および省庁の意向が強く反映される上、承認する権限はないことから、十分に期待される機能を果たせていないとのことである。中小企業振興策については、GDP に占める中小企業比率の増加（37% から40％へ）という政府目標の下で、第3次マスター
プラン（2012-2016）を策定した。同計画では、①中小企業ビジネスのためのツー
ル開発、②タイ中小企業の競争力強化および地域の潜在力に沿った中小企業の成長促進、③国際社会におけるタイ中小企業のリンケージ強化、といった段階的な中小企業振興を方針としている。さらに中小企業振興の新成長戦略として、①中小企業の持続可能性強化（効率性・生産性、製品の付加価値増、資金アクセス等）、②
草の根レベルの収入と経済的能力向上（起業支援、中小企業能力向上、一村一品のアップグレード等）、③経済的リンケージ促進（新しいマーケティング・チャンネ
ル、知識向上、FTA/AEC の機会活用等）を図っていく予定とのことである。
タイ自動車インスティチュート（ TAI ）はタイの自動車産業振興を担う機関であり、会員数は大企業を含め約700社である。2012年に策定された第三次自動車マス
タープランでは、「量から質への転換」のコンセプトの下で、3つの課題――①国際競争力（ R&D ）の向上、②環境保護・安全性の向上、③2015年の ASEAN 経済統合（自由貿易）――を設定し、3つのターゲット――①国際的な自動車生産拠点となる、②ビジネス環境の向上（人材、試験・研究機関等）、③中所得の罠からの脱却（部品生産の付加価値の50％向上、製造業 GDP の10％達成、1兆円以上輸出する等）――を掲げている。そのための戦略としては、①研究・技術開発、②人材開発、③起業家強化、④インフラストラクチャー、⑤政府政策が挙げられている。また、第二次自動車マスタープラン時に実施されたエコカー計画は、日系企業（三菱、ス254

14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

ズキ等）のスモールカー導入により成功したため、今次マスタープランではより高度な基準でのエコカー2計画が掲げられている。第三次マスタープランは既に周知されているが、予算確保のために必要な工業大臣の正式な承認はこれからである。
また、第三次マスタープランを実施していく上での課題は、長期の取組みが必要であるにも関わらず政府からの継続支援が得られるか不明であること、テクニカルセ
ンターがないため維持管理能力が低いことである。試験センターは第二次マスター
プランで実現しているが、拡張したいので政府に予算要求している。日本の支援で試験や R&D の人材を育成しているが、一回の研修期間が短かすぎ、またプロジェ
クトの実施期間も2016年まででは足りないと考えている。
タイ工業団地公社（ IEAT ）は MOI 管轄の公社であり、全国の工業団地の開発と運営を通じた工業振興を目的としている9。現在、IEAT が独自に所有する工業団
地と民間企業との合弁工業団地を合わせて48の工業団地（15の省に所在、テナン
ト企業数4,097件、従業員数530,680名）を運営している。2012年時点で IEAT が運営する工業団地のテナント企業の60％が外資で、うち49％が日本、ヨーロッパ9％、USA6％である。分野別では、多い順に自動車、鉄、サポーティング・インダスト
リー、電子となっている。IEAT が運営する工業団地は General Industrial Zone
（ GIZ)と IEAT Free Zone の二種類がある。GIZ では、内部でサービス業・貿易業を実施することが許される、土地所有、海外の技術者・専門家の招聘が可能になるといった特権が得られる。IEAT Free Zone では、さらに税・関税関係の特権や優遇がある。
なお、外資・内資の区別や国籍による差別はない。IEAT が運営する工業団地の入居企業は、上記特権の他に IEAT Total Solution Center（ TSC) を通じて土地、建設、
ライセンス、就労ビザ、関税免除等の手続きに係るワンストップサービスがあるのに加え、Focal Point Service（立ち上げ時の手続き支援）、オンラインでの承認手続
きや Training service（他企業へ派遣する研修が中心）、ライセンシングサービス、
ウェブサイト（製品広告のため）等のサービスを低料金で受けることができる。
現在、IEAT はタイの中小企業のための支援を検討中である。構想としては、工業省がコーディネーターとなり、中小企業の競争力向上を目的として、ファイナン
ス面（ SME バンク等によるローンや出資）、ロジスティック面、人材面などあらゆる角度から関係省庁が協力し、パッケージで進めていくことを考えている。中小企
業向けの工業団地は、アマタナコンのオオタテクノパーク（一区画400㎡弱）があ
9

タイには 62 の工業団地があり（2011 年時点）、うち 48 が IEAT 所有または民間企業との共同開発、14 が民間企業による所有。なお、IEAT の認可を受けた工業団地を Industrial Estate、BOI の認可を受けた工業団地を Industrial Zone、工業省工場局のサポートで開発した工業団地を Industrial Community、民間企業が国のサポートを受けずに開発した工業団地を Industrial Park と呼んで区別している（METI「タイにおけるエコタウン整備に係る検討調査事業」、2010 より）。

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る。それ以外では、チョンブリのピントンに一区画が1,200㎡程度の工業団地がある。BOI が遠隔地への投資インセンティブをなくす予定であるが、IEAT は、政府が今後重視するクラスターベース（航空、プラスチック、廃棄物、中小企業、エンターテイメント、サービス）とエリアベース（経済回廊、既に産業集積がある地
域）の二本柱で工業団地を開発していくので、とくに影響は受けないと考えている。
国際展開については、IEAT のアジア地域でのビジネス戦略を明確化し、アセアン
統合（ AEC ）を活用してタイ企業が隣国へ投資するのを支援する。そのため IEAT-International Co. Ltd. を持ち株会社として立ち上げ、中国（雲南）とミャンマー（ダウェー）の2ヵ所にロジスティックベースとなる工業団地を開発することが予定されており、現在閣議承認を待っているところである。これは、労働集約的な企業を周辺国に出すという政府方針に沿ったものである。
科学技術イノベーション・オフィス（ STI ）は、首相府直属の科学技術分野政策担当機関であり、政策執行機関である科学技術省と同列の組織である。タイの現状として、官民共に研究者が少なく R&D が弱いため、「第11次5カ年計画（2012-2016年）」および「 New Growth Model 」の下で、より高付加価値産業へのシフトを促すための知識・技術力の高度化を図っている。STI は今後10年の方針・計画として、「 The National Science Technology and Innovation Policy and Plan 2012–2021」を策定した（2012年4月閣議承認）。同計画のフレームワークは、①人口構成と社会の変化、②エネルギーと環境、③グリーンイノベーション、④ ASEAN 地域という4つの柱の下で、持続可能な経済と質の高い社会をめざすものである。そこでは、「知識ベースの社会」、「イノベーションを通じた STI の活用・商業化」、「低カーボン社会を通じた持続可能な開発」、「グリーンイノベーションに通じる新しい科学技術」、「明確で意味のある分野別ターゲット」、「地域イノベーションと生活の質の強化促進」を重視している。具体的な取り組みとしては、大学研究機関の助成、研究者の育成に加え、技術の商業化のための基金設置や企業の R&D 支出に対する税優遇を行っている。さらに、タイ各地に BOI の優遇措置と同等の特典が得られるサイエンスパー
クの設置も検討している。
以上のヒアリングを通じて、ASEAN 経済統合を控えて産業競争力強化が喫緊の課題となっており、タイ政府内では高付加価値化への産業構造転換の必要性についての共通認識があることが判明した。他方、そのための具体的な政策については、政府全体として省庁横断的に合意された内容と優先順位があるかは不明であり、各省庁・機関ごとに対応策を考えている印象が強い。また、農家所得補填や地方中小企業の経営を圧迫する最低賃金の引き上げなど、自国製造業の競争力強化とは矛盾する施策が同時に打ち出されており、政府が「中所得の罠」への危機感をどの程度

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14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

もって取組んでいるのかについて、少なくとも面談からは明確に伝わってこなかった。これは、「中所得の罠」に陥ることを強く懸念し、ナジブ首相が2010年に発表した「新経済モデル（ New Economic Model ）」のもとに、各省・機関が政府内で合意された具体的指標の達成のために取組んでいる、マレーシア政府とは異なる状
況である。
また、日系企業と関係が深い自動車インスティチュートや、タイ商工会議所やCP グループ等の民間企業を代表する機関からもヒアリングを行ったが、日系中小企業のさらなる進出に関し、歓迎ではなくむしろタイ中小企業との競争激化を懸念する声が聴かれた。これは、中央・地方政府をあげて日系中小企業の誘致に取り組
み、裾野産業の発展を幅広く奨励する方針をとっているベトナムとは大きく異なっている10。タイ政府が掲げる高付加価値産業へのシフトの下で、今後はより高度な技術を持つ日系企業が現地企業との合弁で進出する形態が、タイ側からは期待されている。しかし、既に進出した日系企業からのヒアリングによれば、現地企業との合弁は大きな困難が伴うとするケースもある（後述）。

４ ．人材育成機関
タイに進出する日系企業の人材確保の観点から、我々は日本と関係が深い大学3校（チュラロンコン大学サシン経営大学院、モンクット王工科大学ラカバン校、泰日工業大学）に対し、卒業生の日系企業への就職状況、就職支援等につきヒアリングを行った。また、泰日工業大学の母体であり、日本留学帰国者の有志が約40年前に設立したタイ国法人泰日経済技術振興協会（ Technology Promotion Association（ Thailand-Japan ）：TPA ）も訪問した。
チュラロンコン大学サシン経営大学院は、チュラロンコン大学の独立採算型大学
院大学（ビジネススクール）であり、米国ノースウエスタン大学ケロッグ経営大学
院および米国ペンシルベニア大学ウォートン・スクールとの学術協定によって設立された。教員の半数以上はケロッグとウォートンから派遣されており、アジアの中でも非常に高い水準のビジネス教育がなされている。欧米的なマネージャーの育成機関であることから、卒業生は非日系のグローバル企業に就職することが多く、日系企業への就職はこれまでない。ただし、同校内に設置されているサシン日本セン
10

ベトナム政府は 2011 年に首相決定と政令を発表し、機械製造、電子・コンピューター、自動車部品組立、繊維・縫製、皮革・履物、ハイテク開発事業の各産業に供給する原材料・部品・半製品をベトナムで生産する裾野産業に対して、市場開拓、土地等のインフラ提供、技術移転・人材育成、情報提供、財政支援・関税優遇等を付与する方針を発表した。ベトナムの裾野産業の定義は繊維・縫製、皮革・履物を含む広いもので
ある。

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11
ター（ SJC ）は、日系企業とタイ企業のビジネスマッチングを含めた企業向けコンサルティングサービスを提供している。業務の中心は日系の大企業向けであるが、同校の執行役員である藤岡教授が阪南大学の関教授や JICA の「お互いプロジェク
ト」（後述）と協力し、日系中小企業向けの経営アドバイスも行っている。
モンクット王工科大学ラカバン校（ KMTL ）は、タイにおける工科系人材の育成機関として重要な役割を担っている。前身である「ノンタブリ電気通信訓練センター」設立時（1960年）より、日本政府の無償資金協力および技術協力による支援や東海大学の支援を多く受け、1964年に3年制大学、1971年には5年生大学へと発展した。ODA による支援が終了した現在でも東海大学との繋がりは拡大しており、各学部でそれぞれ交流がある。卒業生の就職先についてはしっかりと把握していな
いとのことであるが、日系企業に就職している学生もある程度はいる。企業との交流はインターンシップが中心であり、就職支援と結びついていないとのこと。また、産官学連携もあまりないのが現状である。今後、同校が東海大学を通じた日本との関係を財産として、東海大学以外の日本関係機関とのネットワークを広げ、日系企業との連携を強化していくことを期待したい。
泰日経済技術振興協会（ TPA ）は、1970 年代のタイ日経済摩擦による対日感情の悪化を憂いたタイの元日本留学生・研修生が中心となり、1973 年1 月24 日に設立された。タイの経済発展のため、日本からタイへの最新技術と知識の移転・普及、および人材育成を行うことを目的とする公益法人である。設立に先だち、日本側のカウンターパート機関として JTECS（社団法人日・タイ経済協力協会、経済産業省
所管）がつくられた。また2007年には、TPA の長年の念願だった泰日工業大学（後述）が発足し、日本型ものづくりに直結する実践的な技術と知識をもつ人材の育成が始まった。
タイ企業においても設備のオートメーション化が進み、管理体制の基盤強化が重要になってきているため、TPA の企業向け研修もそれを踏まえて、高度な技術よりは基礎的な能力向上に重点を置いている。また、診断士コースでは、生産性やカイゼン等を教えている。TPA で授業を受け実際に活躍している診断士は十数名いる
11

サシン日本センターの前身は、2008 年度に発足したチュラロンコン大学サシン経営大学院付属のコンサル
ティング部門（Sasin Management Consulting) の日本ユニットである。その後、日系企業へのコンサルティ
ング業務のみならず、経営幹部育成講座、各種セミナー、政府機関からの調査依頼、大学の国際化（アジア化）支援、社会事業活動などの要請を受け、活動範囲を広げ支援内容を拡充するために多くの企業から支援があり、2011 年 4 月にサシン日本センターへと組織改編した。SJC の機能は以下の 3 つである。①日本の先進的な大学研究者との共同研究を進める、②サシンエグゼクティブ教育センターならびに日本能率協会（JMA）と連携しながら、日系大手企業の幹部候補を対象に包括的な経営管理教育を提供する、③サ
シンマネジメントコンサルティング（SMC）ならびに日本能率協会コンサルティング（JMAC）と連携しながら、日系企業の経営課題（マーケティング、人事管理など）を解決する。

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14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

が、企業側の要望もあり、その業務は診断ではなくコンサルティング業務が中心になっている。日本が支援した診断士コース（受講時間1,000時間）の卒業生は450名程度いたが、協力終了後、300時間程度の短いコースになり、さらに国家資格としてタイに制度化されなかったこともあり、多様なレベルの診断士が生まれてしまった。4年前に、BSID のパヌワット課長が、前職で中小企業診断士の育成を担当していた際に認定試験を作ったので、現在はこの試験を受けて通った人のみ診断士を名乗れるようになっている12。日系企業が多数進出することがタイ企業の脅威になっているという見方もあるが、TPA としては、タイ企業と日系企業の協力を促進し、競争ではなくたとえば合弁を組むなどして一緒に成長していけるようにしたいと考えている。しかし、情報不足のままの合弁ではリスクも伴うので、診断士を使って企業の評価やランキングをしていく可能性を検討中とのこと。
検定試験については、日本の中小企業診断士のみならず、APEC 小規模事業者カ
ウンセラーや研修を受けていないサービスプロバイダー（後述）など全てを対象とした一般的知識を問う内容になっており、サービスプロバイダーとしての基準を一律化する方向との見解もある（ JICA「地方レベルの統合中小企業支援普及プロジェ
クト」コンサルタントより聴取）。

TPA では、こうした主事業に加え、最近は日系中小企業向け支援にも取り組み始めている。400社にのぼるタイの日系企業が TPA 会員であること、ものづくり技術に習熟していることなどの強みを生かし、2013年8月からタイ日投資促進プロジェ
クト（ Thailand-Japan Investment Promotion Project：J-SMEs ）をたちあげ、タイ進
出を希望する日本の中小企業に対し、①国内外の視察ツアーのアレンジ、②タイ・日本双方の中小企業への研修・セミナーの提供、③技術や経営に関するコンサル
ティングサービス、④通訳・翻訳業務といったサービスを提供する予定である。対象分野は主に電子、自動車、食品としている。バンコク中心に位置するスクンビッ
ト地区の TPA の別オフィスに、日系中小企業向けのためのビジネスマッチングセ
ンターを設立し、サービスを提供している。TPA に蓄積しているタイ中小企業のデータを活用する計画もあるとのこと。
泰日工業大学（ TNI ）は、両国の友好とタイ産業界の人材育成を目的として、上記の泰日経済技術振興協会（ TPA ）を母体として2007年に創立された日本型ものづくり大学である。創立に際してはバンコク日本人商工会議所が全面的な協力を行っ

12

検定試験については、日本の中小企業診断士のみならず、APEC 小規模事業者カウンセラーや特に研修を受けていないサービスプロバイダー（後述）など全てを対象とした一般的知識を問う内容になっており、
サービスプロバイダーとしての基準を一律化する方向との見解もある（JICA「地方レベルの統合中小企業支援普及プロジェクト」コンサルタントより聴取）。

259

ており、開学から4年間、会員企業およびタイ企業からの募金活動で奨学金を提供している。新大学であるが、年々生徒が増え、現在は年1,000名以上の入学生がいる。
希望者の96％は卒業後まもなく就職し、その約50％が日系企業に就職している。卒業生は日本語が話せるため、日本企業からの引き合いも多いことに加え、現在の労働市場は売り手市場であるため、全ての学生がすぐに就職が決まる状態とのこと。
しかし学生は大企業を好む傾向があるので、売り手市場である現在、日系中小企業
にとって同校卒業生の確保は難しい状況である。企業との交流はインターンシップが中心であり、研究等での接点は少ない。

５ ．日本の支援機関の取組み・協力
日タイ間の経済的繋がりが非常に強くなっている背景としては、日本の多方面における長年の支援に依るところが大きい。1960年代の支援当初は基礎的な人材育成
やインフラ支援が中心であったが、同国の成長に伴い、現在は「戦略的パートナー
シップに基づく双方の利益増進及び地域発展への貢献の推進」を基本方針とする援助に発展している13。日本の各支援機関の取組み・協力内容は以下の通り。

JICA（旧海外技術協力事業団、旧海外経済協力基金、旧国際協力銀行）による
タイへの産業開発支援は、1954年に開始された技術協力、1968年に開始された円借款、そして1970年に開始された無償資金協力の3つのスキームを用いて、制度、技術（人材）、インフラ面から多岐にわたって行われてきた。タイの経済発展に伴い1993 年に無償資金協力が原則終了したが、日本はタイにとって最大の援助供与国（累計）となっている。近年の JICA によるタイ国向け産業開発関連支援を大別すると、①中小企業・裾野産業育成（人材育成）、②政策支援、③インフラ強化に分類できる。
（1） 中小企業・裾野産業育成（人材育成）支援

JICA による中小企業・裾野産業育成（人材育成）支援は、家具産業振興や天然
ゴムの品質改善といった一次産業の振興及び品質向上のための協力に始まり、その後職業訓練センターの設立・運営に関わる協力が行われた。1997年のアジア通貨危
機後は、主にタイに進出する日系企業の裾野産業育成を目的として、タイ自動車インスティチュート (TAI) に対する専門家、ボランティア、JODC（現 HIDA ）専門家（後述）派遣を通じた技術協力が行われてきた。2006年から2011年にかけては、
13

外務省「対タイ王国 国別援助方針」、2012 年 12 月。

260

14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面「タイ自動車裾野産業人材育成プロジェクト（技術協力）」が実施され、TAI の組織・活動の構築や日系企業に供給する現地サプライヤ企業の生産技術向上、さらには日系企業のタイにおける生産力強化に貢献した。
高度技術者育成に関しては、上述の通り、JICA は現在タイを代表する工科大学であるモンクット王工科大学ラカバン校（ KMTL ）に1961年から専門家を派遣し、技術者の指導・養成を行ってきた。日本が指導してきた同校の通信、電子、コンピューター学科などの電気系学科の研究活動は国内トップレベルにあり、近年はラオスなど近隣諸国の第三国研修の拠点となっている。また JICA は、工学系
高等教育を通じた ASEAN の人材育成のため、同校やチュラロンコン大学を含む

ASEAN10ヵ国の工学系トップ大学19校を対象とし、（1）教員の資格向上、（2）大学院プログラムの改善、（3）大学間ネットワーク強化を目的とした「アセアン工学
系高等教育ネットワーク（ AUN/SEED-Net ）」プロジェクトを2003年より実施している。ネットワークの基盤強化と対象範囲の拡大を目的とした第2フェーズ（2008〜2013年）を経て、現在第3フェーズ（2013年〜）が計画されている。第3フェーズ
では、これまでの協力成果を活用しながら、当該地域に進出する日系8企業を含む
産業界とメンバー大学との連携を促進する計画である。
さらに、地方における中小企業クラスターの強化や地域産業の活性化という観点から、1999年以降、JICA は中小企業診断士の制度構築のための専門家派遣や技術協力プロジェクトを実施してきた。中小企業診断士の育成事業は、現在「地方レベルの統合中小企業支援普及プロジェクト」（2013〜2016年）に引き継がれ、地方の中小企業と中小企業支援ネットワークをマッチングさせる仕組みが計画されている。具体的には、中小企業支援ネットワークの構築、サービスプロバイダー（企業経営、市場アクセス、競争力強化を支援するコンサルタント）の育成、中小企業支援ネットワークの広報支援、地方レベルの統合中小企業支援普及事業の推進をする予定である。
（2） 政策支援
政策支援分野では、JICA は1988年からタイの工業の基礎強化のための一連の開発調査「タイ国工業分野振興開発計画」を実施してきた。この開発調査の成果は、現在のタイへの産業開発政策支援の基礎となっている。近年、JICA はタイ政府に対し、「タイ中小企業事業促進強化アドバイザー」（2010〜2013年）、「域内競争力
強化アドバイザー」（2011〜2013年）、「 ASEAN 地域連結性アドバイザー」（2011〜
2013年）の3名の専門家を派遣している。
「タイ中小企業事業促進強化アドバイザー」は、工業省 DIP 局に中小企業の生産

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性と競争力の向上を目的として新たに設置されたビジネスオポチュニティセンター
に対し、職員や関係者の能力強化や日タイ官民の関連機関関係強化に関する助言を行っている。「域内競争力強化アドバイザー」は、タイの国家経済社会開発計画策
定の中核を担う国家経済社会開発委員会（ NESDB ）において、同長官に対し、①
主要産業の高付加価値化および輸出拡大、②日メコン経済産業協力イニシアティブ
における協力促進、③域内競争力強化、④メコン地域のインフラ整備、に関する助言を行っている。「 ASEAN 地域連結性アドバイザー」は、同じく NESDB 長官に対し、①域内インフラ連結性および物流開発のためのハード・ソフト両面での地域開発戦略策定、②地域開発戦略、③地域開発や域内連結性の人材育成、④ハード・ソ
フト両面でのパッケージ型インフラ支援等につき助言を行っている。
2011年には、「域内競争力強化アドバイザー」の提案により、日本とタイ相互の産業クラスター連携を通じた集団的・戦略的なタイへの直接投資を目的として、「お互い（ Otagai ）」プロジェクトが提案され、タイ政府で正式に閣議報告された。
「お互い（ Otagai ）」プロジェクトとは、災害等の不足の事態に備えた日タイの企業ネットワーク構築に加え、同ネットワークが①日系中小製造業企業のタイ進出を含む海外直接投資の促進、②日系インフラ関連企業の技術やノウハウのタイへの導入、③日系製造業企業や日系インフラ関連企業の戦略的投資・進出を通じた、新たなタイブランドの創出のためのプラットフォームの構築を目的としている。初年度は、集団的 FDI 促進のために、①人材育成（日本側はコーディネーター、タイ側はコー
ディネーターと高度産業人材）、②日系中小企業のタイ投資を後押しする自治体のキーパーソンの組織化、③タイローカル企業の徹底調査とデータベース化が行われた。またインフラ企業の進出促進のために、④タイコバン基準14に沿ったインフラ
製品のパッケージ化と認証機関の設置、⑤日系企業による「インフラ・マネージメ
ント・サービス」の実現と上記パッケージの一体化といった取り組みを実施した。
第2年次にあたる2013年には、①情報プラットフォームの構築、②自治体のキーパー
ソンのネットワーク化、③クラスター連携に係るベストプラクティスのケーススタ
ディ、④「軒先企業」の実態と類型、⑤コーディネーターおよび高度人材の確保と育成、⑥工業団地の高度化に資するインフラ・サービス等を調査ないし実施する予定である。
その他、JICA は工業団地開発に関するマスタープラン策定支援として、「レム
14

タイへの製造業投資の持続および加速のためには、受け皿となる工業団地が環境、防災、産業高度化の観点から持続性・発展性をもつことが望まれており、これらについての基準を設定し、各工業団地を評価するもの。具体的には、グリーン・エコ、安心・安全、産業高度化（熟練工育成・品質管理）の 3 分野の実践的かつ受入れ可能な基準で評価する。

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14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

チャバン工業基地開発計画調査（開発調査）（1988）」、「バンサパン工業団地開発計
画調査（開発調査）（1995-96）」等を実施している。
（3） インフラ強化

JICA（旧経済協力基金、旧国際協力銀行）は1968年から円借款を通じて、発電、送電、電話網、港湾、橋梁、鉄道、道路、灌漑、空港といった経済活動の基礎となるインフラ支援を行っている。タイ経済の発展に伴い、近年は首都圏の大規模道路
網（バンコク大量輸送網整備事業）や給水（第8次バンコク上水道整備事業）、地方の橋梁（ノンタブリ1道路チャオプラヤ川橋梁建設事業）といった、拡大するインフラ需要に対応する支援がなされている。
日本貿易振興機構（ JETRO ）も、タイ向けに産業人材育成支援を行っている。

JETRO は、経済産業省からの委託を受け、アジアを中心とする開発途上国の貿易
投資関連制度構築のための貿易投資円滑化事業（ JEXSA ）のスキームでタイに専門家を派遣し、現地企業の技術指導を行っている。また、2013年度より「中小企業
現地海外展開支援のプラットフォーム」として、現地の公的機関および民間のネッ
トワークづくりに貢献する予定である。中小企業相談のアドバイザーも配置している（週1回）。加えて、次項の HIDA と共に、日タイ EPA の枠組みで実施されている「タイ自動車人材育成機関プロジェクト」において、自動車分野の専門家を日本から派遣している。
一般財団法人海外産業人材育成協会（ HIDA ）によるタイ向け人材育成支援の歴史も非常に長い。HIDA は2つの事業が柱となっている。そのうち海外技術者研修
協会（ AOTS ）事業15は、ODA と民間資金を活用して現地企業の技術者・管理者研修を行うものだが、1959年度からタイ向け支援を開始しており、2011年度までの累計で43,562名（うち受入研修20592名、海外研修22,970名）が研修を受けている。近年は自動車、電気機器（電気・電子、IT)、産業機械、建設といった分野が多い。いっぽう HIDA の海外貿易開発協会（ JODC ）事業は、ODA と民間資金の組み合わせ
により開発途上国の企業、商工会議所、業界団体に専門家を派遣して技術指導を行うものである。タイ向けには1979年から支援を実施しており、2011年までに1,645人の専門家を派遣している。タイにおける HIDA の主要な事業としては、「技術研修」、「管理研修」、「貿易投資促進支援事業」、「国際エネルギー使用合理化対策事業」、「産業財産権人材育成協力事業」、「インフラビジネス等展開支援技術協力事業」、「国際15

海外の産業技術研修者の受け入れ・研修等を行う組織として 1959 年に設立された。2012 年に海外貿易開発協会（JODC）と合併し、海外産業人材育成協会（HIDA）となった。

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経営支援事業」、「専門家派遣事業」、「タイ自動車人材育成機関プロジェクト」16、「産業人材裾野拡大支援事業」等がある。また、2011年の大洪水の際は、被災した日系企業を対象とした緊急支援策の一環として「タイ人従業員の日本への受入研修」、「日本からタイへの専門家派遣」、「日本からタイへの専門家派遣」を実施し、高い評価を得ている。加えて、長年培ってきた HIDA 研修生の同窓会ネットワークを活用したビジネスネットワーキングやコンサルタント事業も開始した。また1970年代には、AOTS タイ同窓会を母体として上述のタイ日経済技術振興協会（ TPA ）がバ
ンコクに設立され、日本の協力を得つつも自己資金でタイ技術者の育成を継続的に実施することで、日本とタイの友好増進に大きく寄与した。

６ ．日系進出企業からのヒアリング
今回の調査では、現在のタイのビジネス環境を中心にヒアリングを行った。
アマタコーポレーション PCL 社（ AMATA ）は、タイ最大の工業団地開発・運営会社であり、IEAT との合弁形態でチョンブリ県にアマタナコン工業団地、ラヨーン県にアマタシティー工業団地を運営している。両工業団地ともに東部臨海工業地帯に立地し、陸・海・空の交通網の接続もよい。日系企業が入居企業の60％以上（タイや他国がマジョリティの日系企業も含めるとさらに多い）を占めているが、近年入居希望企業がますます増加しており、現在第9期まで拡張を実施済みである。
人材確保のための取組みとしては、質の高い教育インフラ（カセサート大学付
属小中高など）を誘致して地元の若者を教育している。また高専とも連携して、東北農村部の学生に学費支援という意味合いで1年間有給インターンを実施している。
さらに、企業の R&D 活動を支援するため、STI と協力してサイエンスシティーを開発している。定着率を高める工夫としては、タイ人の生活は家族中心で回っているため、家庭の事情による欠勤を減らすために皆勤手当てを渡したりしているとのこと。
同工業団地内にある「オオタ・テクノ・パーク（ OTP ）」はアマタ社と東京の大田区産業振興協会が協力し、アマタ社が全額出資する形で2006年6月に開設した、中小企業向け賃貸集合工場である。OTP では、タイに製造拠点をもちたい大田区の中小企業（現在は日系入居企業の出身地は問わない）のニーズに応えるため、工162006 〜 2011 年に JICA が実施した「自動車裾野産業人材育成プロジェクト」の後続案件。日タイ経済連
携協定に基づく協力事業の一環として、経済産業省、JETRO、HIDA が自動車分野の専門家を日本から派遣している。2012 年度は 8 名の専門家をタイの業界団体や民間企業へ派遣し、自動車分野の研究・開発、
自動車産業関連金型の設計製作等に関する技術指導を行っている。

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場立ち上げ、操業、操業後まで大田区とアマタ社の無料支援サービス（アマタ社については一部有料）を受けることができる。工場床面積は1ユニット320㎡で、その他に事務棟と呼ばれる共用ファシリティを利用することができる。日系企業のみ入居可能。費用は1ユニット当たり年間30万円程度（賃貸料が64,000バーツ / 月、共益費が33,600バーツ / 月）で、賃貸期間は3年となっている。今年第3期の工場棟に4社が新たに入居し、現在計12社が入居している（空きなし）。
株式会社南武は、1955年に発足した油圧シリンダ専門メーカーである。同社は、以前からタイに製品を輸出していたが、納期とコストの削減のために2002年2月にタイに進出した。当初大阪の企業である花野商事の軒先を OTP と同程度の賃料で借りて4年間操業したが、手狭になった際にちょうど OTP から声がかかったため、2006年6月に OTP に入所した（3ユニット占有で900㎡）、その後仕事量の増加により、2011年、アマタナコン工業団地内に2,500㎡の新工場（従業員65名）を建設した。同社の成長は OTP の成功事例といえる。
オオタ・テクノ・パークのメリットとしては、賃料はやや高いが、家賃、情報共
有、税務、労務等で困った際に日本語によるサポートがある。タイでは労使交渉に失敗すると従業員が一気に辞めてしまうので、労務管理はとくに重要である。南武によれば、外資に対するタイ政府の方針はおおむねよいとのこと。唯一問題を感じたのは最低賃金を全国一律で300バーツに引き上げたことで、これにより、人件費の増加、さらには地方の学生が（地元でも月300バーツ稼げるので）出稼ぎに来な
くなるといった問題が生じている。一方、これ以外で問題を感じたことはないとのこと。BOI 優遇政策の変更で同社が対象から外れるかもしれないが、気にしていても仕方がないと感じている。また、タイは中国と異なり模倣リスクが少ないため、従業員を信頼して技術を隠すことなく教えられるメリットがある。今後の方針としては、タイから ASEAN およびインドへと事業を拡大してく予定。人材の確保が困難になっているのは確かだが、日本での研修を全員に行うことによって長期雇用に活かしているとのことだった。

Valuable Industrial Technology（ V.I.T. ）社は、株式会社フクイ（愛知県）が経営し、テクノ高木株式会社（岐阜県）と共同でタイに立ち上げた、無人搬送車の製作
および搬送機・製缶品・専用機の会社である。この本業と並行して、日系中小企
業のタイ進出のために「出資企業」（現在19社）の支援を行っている。具体的には、
各社それぞれニーズに応じて、V.I.T. 社が人材確保、商社機能、受注窓口、機材設置のための場所貸し等からなるカスタマイズされたサポートを提供している。タイに進出する日系企業にとっては、同業の日系企業との競争はあるが、実際にはむしろ互いに困難に対して情報を共有し助け合っている状況とのこと。近年は、タイ企

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業も最新機器を投入して質のよい製品が作れるようになってきているが、日系企業
は納期と品質管理、アフターケアの面で勝っている。同社は、今後タイで持続的に営業していくため、ローカルサプライヤ（現在40社）との関係も重要視しているが、ローカル企業は日系企業を脅威だと思っている。解決策として合弁という方法もあるが、タイ企業は契約条件の認識で齟齬が出るなどの問題があるため、あまり勧められない。最低賃金300バーツ化は、日系企業の賃金はそれより上なので直接の影響はないが、最低賃金が上がると「 ３ K 」の仕事に誰もつかなくなるという可能性がある。タイ人は冷房が効いたオフィスでのホワイトカラー業務に憧れており、職人は少なくなってきている。今後の展望としては、工場拡張のためアマタナコンに土地を買う予定であり、現在値段の交渉中である。また別途、アパートや食堂を併設したミニ工業団地（レンタル工場）を作る計画もある。
これらの一連のヒアリングにおいて、タイでのビジネスの課題として共通に指摘されたのは「人材不足」、「競争の激化」、「最低賃金300バーツ化」である。現在
タイの失業率は1％を切っており、全業種で人材不足が深刻となっている。マネージャー、エンジニア、ワーカーの全ての人材が不足している。ワーカーについては周辺国からの労働移民で補充しているが、エンジニアについては恒常的に不足している。また、タイの学生は大企業や有名企業を好む傾向があるため、日本の中小企業が進出しても労働力の確保できない可能性が高い。
また、タイにはさまざまな分野・技術水準の日系企業が進出しているのに加え、ローカル企業も最新機器を投入して品質をあげていることから、普通の技術を持つ
日系中小企業が進出しても、既存企業との競争は避けられない状態である。しかし、日系企業は納期厳守、品質管理、アフターケアにおいてタイ企業より優位に立つた
め、こうした面を活かすか、またはタイ側が求める現地にはない高い技術を持って進出するならば、進出余地はあるものと考える。一方、タイ企業との合弁は日本からの技術移転やタイ企業が持つネットワークの活用において有意義と考えるが、タイと日本は企業文化が異なるので、先方との契約や約束には十分注意が必要である。インラック政権が実施した最低賃金300バーツ化政策についても、懸念を示す
企業は多かった。同政策はワーカーに支払う給与を増加させるのみならず、上級職
賃金への波及や地方からの出稼ぎの減少など、間接的に企業を圧迫する可能性がある。
タイでは労働力不足と賃金上昇により労働集約型生産に適さなくなったことに加え、カンボジア、ラオス、ミャンマー（ CLM ）が外国投資の受け皿として浮上してきたことから、「タイプラスワン」という考えが盛んに提唱されている。日本総266

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研の大泉氏17によると、「タイプラスワン」は、タイから CLM に工程の一部を移転することで、タイを中心とするサプライチェーンを拡大・強化するという新しいビ
ジネスモデルであり、チャイナリスクを回避するために他国にも生産拠点をつくるという「チャイナプラスワン」とは意味が違うという。「タイプラスワン」はタイに生産拠点を維持したまま労働集約型工程だけを CLM に移転するのであり、これが生産拠点としてのタイの魅力、ひいてはタイで操業する日系企業の競争力の強化に繋がることが期待される。タイ政府は研究開発の促進、高等教育の充実などでこの動きを積極的に後押ししている。またアジア開発銀行や日本政府も、タイの生産拠点と CLM 各国を結ぶ経済回廊や周辺国のインフラ整備を通じて、「タイプラスワン」の実現に向けた支援を行っている。ただし、「タイプラスワン」を成功させるには、タイ自身が周辺国にはない優れた技術、技能、システムを備える必要があり、これが、タイが産業空洞化ではなく産業高度化を実現できるか否かを決めることになろう。これは、中所得の罠を突破するのに必要な条件と同じである。

７ ．タイとベトナムとの比較から得られる示唆
我々の一連の調査はベトナムとタイを比較してきたが18、それを通じて明らかとなった両国の最大の違いは、自動車分野、電子・電気分野の産業集積の充実度合であった。特に、ローカル裾野産業の発展の違いは大きい。タイでは早い段階から日系企業が進出していた結果、あらゆる分野・レベルの日系企業が存在し、それに伴いローカル企業も日系企業と競争するほどに育っている。一方、ベトナムでは裾野産業が育っておらず、競争は官民にとっての課題として顕在化していない。
これに鑑みると、タイには充実したインフラに加え、すでに日系企業ネットワー
クや日本人向けのサービスがあり進出のしやすさはあるが、進出後は販路をめぐって厳しい競争にさらされることになる。もちろん業種・製品にもよるが、一般的にいってベトナムの方が日系中小企業が進出し活躍できる余地が大きいといえる（現地調達比率と人件費については図表7-1、7-2を参照）。ただし、現地企業のリソースを活用したい企業にとっては、タイには日系中小企業にはないマーケティング能力やネットワークをもち、価値創造で協力できる現地企業の厚みがあるが、ベトナムにはそうした企業は多くない。もちろん現地企業がみな信頼できるわけではないの
17

大泉啓一郎、「現実味を持ち始めた『タイプラスワン』：新興国・途上国市場を狙う新しいビジネスモデル」、
日本総研、アジア圏フロンティアシリーズ No.2、Research Focus、2013 年。

18

アジア太平洋研究所（APIR）の「中小企業の東南アジア進出に関する実践的研究」プロジェクトは、日系製造業中小企業の海外展開を、ベトナムを主、タイを従として研究した。両国は、日系製造業中小企業のアンケートで常に第 1 位と第 2 位を占める投資先人気国である［編者］。

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で、パートナー選びはどこの国でも慎重に行わねばならないことはいうまでもない。
ゆえに、日系中小企業が海外進出を検討する際には、自社の製品、技術水準、マー
ケティング能力などを十分勘案の上で進出先を決定すべきである。タイには人材確保の困難さや賃金上昇の問題があり、タイ政府の高付加価値産業育成の下で、時がたてばこれらの状況が解消するという見通しはない。むしろ同国の政策に積極的な貢献ができる企業こそがタイに進出すべきだし、そうでなければ歓迎はされない。
他方で、ベトナムでは高度人材が不足しているものの、人材確保や賃金面での問題
はタイに比べ小さいといえる。
人材育成機関の長年にわたる努力も、タイが抜きん出ている。タイ人の中には親日派や日本型ものづくりを熟知する人材の蓄積が官民にあり、これが日系企業の仕事のしやすさにも繋がっていると考えられる。今後は、いかにこれらの人材をタイ政府が企図する産業高度化に戦略的に活用し、タイと日本で Win-Win となる形で両国の製造業を進めていくかが重要となる。すでに TPA、泰日工業大学、HIDA 同
窓会などではそうした取組みが始まっている。またベトナムにおいても、タイほどではないが、日本の官民による産業人材支援の蓄積があるので、これら人材の活用
方法について検討すべきである。

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14．タイ――日系中小企業誘致の新局面

図表7-1．現地調達率

出所、JETRO、「在アジア・オセアニア日系企業活動実態調査（2012年度調査）」。

図表7-2．人件費

出所、同上。

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政策的にも、タイでは現地企業が育っており日系企業と競争関係にあるため、あるいはそう信じられているため、タイ政府は無条件であらゆる日系中小企業の進出を歓迎しているわけではなく、高付加価値技術を持つ企業に重点を置いている。これは、裾野産業振興のために日系中小企業の進出を全面的に歓迎しているベトナムとは異なる。他方、タイでもベトナムでも産業開発課題に対しては政府の関係省
庁・組織ごとに対応しているのが現状であり、包括的な産業開発政策が構築された
うえで、政策の詳細や優先度が関係省庁で共有されてはいない点は共通していると感じた。
以上を踏まえると、個々の日系中小企業の決断は当然ながら各社の経営判断に委ねることになるが、政策論としては、日本としてはタイ側の事情にも配慮して中小企業の海外進出支援に取組むべきということになる。今後、日本とタイの良好経済関係を維持するためには、双方に Win-Win となる事業をめざすべきであり、日本はタイとの「ものづくりパートナーシップ」構築のための産業協力ビジョンを示し、タイ側と共有すべきではないか。具体的には、タイに進出すべき日系企業の基準作
成、ローカル企業が育っている業種・工程およびそうではないミッシングリンクの確認、タイ側が日系企業の協力を望んでいる業種における技術指導などである。
1970年代には、タイやインドネシアで日系企業の進出急増に対する反日運動が勃発したことを考えると、支援の方向性を長期的視点に立って再確認することが重要と考える。
将来タイが ASEAN 地域における生産拠点かつロジスティックハブとして発展していくことを考えると、現在 JICA が実施している「お互い」プロジェクトのめざ
す方向や問題意識は重要と考える。すなわち、タイ企業の技術審査・ミッシングリ
ンクの特定、軒先ビジネス、人材コーディネーター、工業団地のインフラ整備ガイ
ドライン（タイコバン、近隣諸国の工業団地も視野にいれる）などである。こうした取組みも念頭において、日系企業の海外展開が従来の大企業だけでなく中小企業も主役となった新時代に突入したことを認識し、日本とタイとの「ものづくりパー
トナーシップ」を政策ビジョンとして打ち出すべきと考える。

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15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策［本章は、7．Indonesiaを訳出したものである］＜日程＞2014年 ６ 月16〜20日
政策研究大学院大学（ GRIPS ）の研究チームは2014年6月16〜20日にジャカルタを訪問し、インドネシアの産業政策の経験、およびその経験が他途上国（エチオピ
ア、ベトナムを含む）に対してもつ含意について調査した1。チームのメンバーは、
大野健一、大野泉、長嶌朱美（以上 GRIPS 開発フォーラム：東京）、レ・ハ・タイ
ン（国民経済大学およびベトナム開発フォーラム：ハノイ）、グェン・ティ・スア
ン・トゥイ（ベトナム工商省工業政策戦略研究所：ハノイ）の5名。調査の眼目は、
アジア・アフリカの他国政府と比較した際のインドネシアの産業政策の方法論・組織の特徴、および産業政策の内容の把握であった。
ミッションは、政府官庁、企業団体、調査・訓練機関、民間企業、日本の援助・経済組織と面会を行った。ミッションスケジュールは付録に掲げる。これらの会合において貴重な情報を提供いただいた方々に深く御礼申し上げたい。以下は、ミッション報告である。

１ ．はじめに――政策の現況と課題
2004〜2013年の十年間に、インドネシアは5.8％の年平均成長率を記録した。その間、リーマンショック、ユーロ危機他の外的ショックがあったにもかかわらず、成長率のぶれはわずかだった2。 2012年に一人当たり所得は3,500ドルに達した。これ
は低位中所得国の水準であり、消費財やサービスに対する国民の需要は旺盛であ1

本ミッションは、途上国政府の政策学習を目的として、選ばれたいくつかの国の産業政策形成につき情報収集する JICA 委託調査の一環である。日本エチオピア産業政策対話第 1 フェーズ 2009 〜 2011 において、
GRIPS 開発フォーラムは、シンガポール（2010 年 8 〜 9 月）、韓国（2010 年 11 月）および台湾（2011 年 2 月）を訪問した。第 2 フェーズでは、インド（2012 年 9 月）
、モーリシャス（2012 年 10 月）、マレーシア（2013年 6 月）および今回のインドネシアを訪問している。さらに他案件の予算で、ベトナム、インドネシア、モザンビーク、ザンビア、タンザニア、ガーナ、ウガンダ等の政策調査を実施済みである。なお、本報告は、あくまでもミッションを実施した GRIPS 開発フォーラムの見解を記したもので、JICA の公式見解ではない。

2

一般にインドネシアでは、社会問題、とりわけ毎年労働市場に参入してくる若者 300 万人分の雇用創出のためには、最低 6％の成長が必要であるとされている。

271

る。また2億5千万の人口を擁するインドネシアは、世界でも有数の巨大市場となっている。この5〜6年、強いマイカー購買意欲に支えられて急速なモータリゼーショ
ンが進行しており、これは外国からの自動車組み立て・部品メーカーをひきつけると同時に、ジャカルタの激しい交通渋滞の原因となっている。2025年までに世界の先進国の仲間入りをするというのが、インドネシアの目標である。
所得と需要は増加しているが、すべてが順調というわけではない。外国投資家にとってインドネシアの主たる魅力は豊富な天然資源および急拡大する内需であり、技術の高さや競争力をもつ労働者ではない。マレーシアは電子を、タイは自動車を、ベ
トナムはスマホを輸出しているが、インドネシアをグローバル市場への供給拠点と見る投資家は少ない。実際、インドネシアの GDP に占める製造業のシェアは2000年の27.7％から2010年の24.8％へと低下しており、総輸出に占める製造業の割合も2000年の57.1％から2010年の37.5％へと激減している（世銀データ）。 長期的にみても、東アジアの高度成長経済と比べてインドネシアの工業化はかなり遅い。1960年の韓国、マレーシア、インドネシアの1人当たり所得はほぼ同じだった。ところが現在、韓国は高所得国、マレーシアは上位中所得国、それに対してインドネシアは低位中所得国にとどまる。インドネシア経済は成長したが、その速度は他国よりも遅かったのである。
同時に、個人間および地域間の所得格差は拡大している。不平等度を示すジニ係数は、1990年の0.32、2002年の0.33から2012年の0.41へと急激に高まっている。
中所得のわなを、国内価値創造が希薄なまま外資、援助、天然資源、ビッグプロ
ジェクトなどの「与えられた」アドバンテージに頼る成長と定義するならば、インドネシアはそのわなに久しく陥っている。ただし中所得のわなに対する懸念は、インドネシアではそれほどきかれないし、政府が公式に検討している様子もない3。これとは対照的に、マレーシア、中国、ベトナムなどでは、中所得のわなの克服が国家のトップアジェンダとして位置づけられている。
歴史を振り返れば、インドネシアの経済政策は国家介入と自由化改革の間を揺れ動いてきた。この揺れは、一次産品価格の変化とかなり連動している。現在の政策
ムードは、経済ナショナリズムの再興である。すなわち、上で説明したような自国産業の弱さを懸念し、国際統合のさらなる進行に対して疑念を抱き始めている。この背景には、日インドネシア経済連携協定（ IJEPA、2008）や ASEAN 中国自由貿
易協定（ ACFTA、2010）が、自国に期待通りの利益をもたらしていないという認識がある（そもそも期待が高すぎたのかもしれない）。現行の外資主導型工業化に
3

われわれが訪問した機関では、投資調整庁（BKPM）のスライドに中所得のわなへの言及があったが、他官庁ではきかなかった。中所得のわな問題が散発的にしか語られず、省庁でも関心を持つところが限られているという状況は、タイに似ている。

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15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

対する不満がくすぶっており、外国投資家をしばる法律や規則が数多く出されている。大国としてのプライドも高い。この雰囲気は、ミッション滞在中にテレビ放映されたジョコ・ウィドド氏とプラボウォ・スビアント氏の大統領選ディベートからも顕著であった。両候補はいずれもナショナリストであり、その違いはその程度やアプローチにしかないといえる（ただしそれは実質的には大きな差かもしれない）。
インドネシア産業の活力が期待以下にとどまっている理由の1つ――おそらくかなり大きな理由――は、政府の政策能力の弱さにある。われわれが東アジアの他工業国との比較を念頭に置きながら、インドネシアの主要経済省庁、民間企業、主要
経済団体、日本の援助機関や経済組織、シンクタンクなどから聴取を行った結果、インドネシアの産業政策にはいくつかの長所があることが判明した。それは、政策形成において関係者とのコンサルテーションや省庁間調整がいくつかの重要なケー
スでよく制度化されていることであり、政府の指導層にある人々に能動的で民間経験が豊富な人物が散見されることであり、（すべてではないが）一部に能力の高い省庁や官僚が存在することである。しかしながら、政策の運営・実施の面においては、インドネシアの政策能力は決して高いとはいえない。シンガポール、台湾、韓国などの先進経済と比較にならないのは当然だが、マレーシアやタイといった

ASEAN の中所得国と比べても、インドネシアの政策はかなり拙劣である。たとえば、以下のような事例がある。
内外の投資家は、インドネシアの政策が予測不可能、曖昧、恣意的であり、省庁間調整もなされていないこと、しかも多くの省令が関係者との事前相談
も準備期間もなく打ち出されることに大きな懸念を抱いている4。
園芸法（2010）、鉱業法（2012）、貿易法（2014）などが国益を追求するために最近改定された。新園芸法は、外国投資家にとっての制約を引き上げた。
新鉱業法は、アルミ・ニッケルを含む鉱物資源を鉱石ではなく国内で加工してから輸出することを義務づけた。新貿易法は、内容が曖昧で解釈がむずか
しく、投資家を困惑させている。
2013年にジャカルタ地域の最低賃金は43.9％も引き上げられたが、これは攻撃的で暴力も辞さない労働組合の圧力によるものだった。非熟練労働の賃金が234ドル / 月（ JETRO 調査、2013年12月時点）であり、しかも上昇が止まらないのでは、労働集約的工程におけるインドネシアの競争力は急速に失わ

4インドネシアの政策文書は、法律（Law）、政府規則（Government Regulation）、大統領規則（Presidential
Regulation）、省規則（Ministerial Regulations）があり、この順番で策定のハードルが下がる。法律は議会を通さねばならないので時間がかかる。対照的に、省規則は数多く発せられるが、関係者間協議や省庁間調整が不十分であるとの批判が強い。

273

れてしまう。これは、労働余剰経済にとって早すぎる事態である。政治圧力ではなく、労働生産性のパフォーマンスに依拠し、将来にわたって予測可能な賃金決定メカニズムが求められている（第6節）。
投資インセンティブは紙の上にしか存在しない。その対象は大規模投資に限られており、これまで法人税減免を認められたのは10社以下という（2012年
以降は2社）5。税優遇は各ラインミニストリの予算を使って行われるため、それを受けるためには、企業は限られた予算しかない担当省と個別交渉せねばならないという。歳入確保に腐心する財務省は、インセンティブ創設の提案を拒否するのが常である。ここには、製造業中小企業や裾野産業が国家に競争力をもたらすといった思考は見出しえない。
産業活動はジャカルタ首都圏に集中しており、輸送インフラがそれに追いついていない。インフラ建設計画は昔から存在するが、新港、空港拡張、高速道路の追加等はまだ着手されておらず、MRT はようやく一部の建設が開始されたばかりである（第4節）。これに比べ、バンコク、ニューデリー、ハノ
イ、ホーチミン市などでは輸送インフラが徐々に建設されており、混雑を解消するところまではいかないが、緩和努力は部分的に成功している。
中小企業政策は省庁間および中央と地方の間で統合されていない。中小企業の定義も省庁間で統一されていない。インドネシアには、日本、台湾、マレー
シアで見られるような、統合されたすぐれた中小企業政策はいまだ存在しない（第7節）。
2000年代初めに深化した分権化の動きは、この巨大で多様な国家の政治安定と民主主義に貢献したが、マイナスの側面もある。それはたとえば、教育訓
練や中小企業振興といった国全体の課題に対し中央政府が管理能力を喪失したこと、地方政府の能力不足、地方の意欲・能力の差異から来る政策の地域間格差などである。
財政収支が悪化している。歳出の約4分の1はガソリンと電力料金の補助金に回っている。2015年に大胆な社会保障制度が導入される予定だが、その財源が確保できていない。
産業能力を高めるためにインドネシアが採用しつつあるのは、国家管理の強化とナショナリズムの高揚である。これは、標準的施策――職業訓練、労働者技能と企5税の減免を受けるためには、指定された 5 業種（基礎金属、石油化学、機械、再生可能エネルギー、通信機器）のいずれかに属し、1 兆ルピア（約 8300 万ドル）以上の投資を行う必要がある。税控除を受けるためには、
5 年以内に 500 人以上雇用、100 億ルピア（約 83,000 ドル）以上の社会経済インフラへの支出、4 年以内に70％の現地調達など、多くの条件が課される。ある BKPM トップは、意味のあるインセンティブをもっと提供すべきだという日本企業に対し、わが国の投資インセンティブは人口規模の大きさだと語ったという。

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15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

業ニーズのマッチング、企業に対する経営・技術支援、ロジスティックスの効率化、外資企業と現地サプライヤの結合、製品基準・認定・検査システムの導入など――とはまったく別の方向である。東アジアの政策基準からみる限り、インドネシアは21世紀の知識フロンティアに達していない。

２ ．国家開発計画
中央および地方の中長期開発計画および年次開発計画の法的根拠は、国家開発
計画システム法（ Law No.25, 2004）である。国レベルの文書としては、20年間の国家長期開発計画（ RPJPN ）、5年間の国家中期開発計画（ RPJMN ）、および年次開発計画がある。大統領の任期と計画サイクルは同じなので、5年ごとに新政府はRPJMN を作成して、長期の RPJPN の枠組み内で新たなプライオリティを設定することになる。RPJMN は新大統領就任（10月）の3カ月以内に大統領規則によって発効させねばならない。表1に、インドネシアの中央および地方の開発計画を示す。
表1．国家開発計画の一覧表
㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚 㼍㼘㻾㼑 㼓㼕㼛㼚 㼍㼘㻼㼑 㼞㼕㼛㼐

㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻸㼛㼚㼓㻙㼠㼑㼞㼙㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㻔㻾㻼㻶㻼㻺㻕㻦㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻸㼛㼚㼓㻙㼠㼑㼞㼙㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㻔㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻾㻼㻶㻼㻕㻦㻌 㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻞㻜㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟

㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻸㼍㼣㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻹㼑㼐㼕㼡㼙㻙㼠㼑㼞㼙㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻔㻾㻼㻶㻹㻺㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻼㼞㼑㼟㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼕㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻹㼑㼐㼕㼡㼙㻙㼠㼑㼞㼙㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻔㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻾㻼㻶㻹㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼕㼟㼟㼡㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻡㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟

㼞㼑㼟㼜㼑㼏㼠㼕㼢㼑㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻴㼑㼍㼐㼟㻿㼠㼞㼍㼠㼑㼓㼕㼏㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼕㼑㼟㻛㻭㼓㼑㼚㼏㼕㼑㼟㻔㻾㼑㼚㼟㼠㼞㼍㻙㻷㻸㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼞㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼕㼟㼟㼡㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼔㼑㼍㼐㼟㻌㼛㼒㻿㼠㼞㼍㼠㼑㼓㼕㼏㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻳㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼃㼛㼞㼗㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻔㻾㼑㼚㼟㼠㼞㼍㻙㻿㻷㻼㻰㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼞㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㼔㼑㼍㼐㼟㻌㼛㼒㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼕㼑㼟㻛㻭㼓㼑㼚㼏㼕㼑㼟㼞㼑㼟㼜㼑㼏㼠㼕㼢㼑㻌㼃㼛㼞㼗㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㻔㻾㻷㻼㻕㻦㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻼㼞㼑㼟㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼕㼍㼘㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㻔㻾㻷㻼㻰㻕㻦㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㼞㼑㼘㼑㼢㼍㼚㼠㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻛㻭㼓㼑㼚㼏㼥㻌㻔㻾㼑㼚㼖㼍㻙㻷㻸㻕㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻳㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼃㼛㼞㼗㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㻾㼑㼚㼖㼍㻙㻿㻷㻼㻰㻕㻌㻌㼑㼚㼍㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻾㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼓㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻴㼑㼍㼐㻡㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟

㻝㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞
㻝㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞

㻿㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㻦㻌㻸㼍㼣㻌㼛㼚㻌㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻰㼑㼢㼑㼘㼛㼜㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㻿㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㻌㻔㻸㼍㼣㻌㻺㼛㻚㻞㻡㻘㻌㻞㻜㻜㻠㻕㻌

開発計画を担当するのは国家開発計画庁（ BAPPENAS ）および各州政府傘
下 の 地 方 開 発 計 画 庁（ BAPPEDA ） で あ る。 ス ハ ル ト 時 代（1968〜98年 ） は、

BAPPENAS は開発計画、開発予算、外国援助受け入れのすべてを所掌する強力なスーパー官庁であった。当時、BAPPENAS の長官が経済担当調整大臣を兼ねる場合もあった。だが2001年の大胆な分権化政策（ Regional Autonomy Laws No.22

and No.25）、および2003年に開発予算が BAPPENAS から財務省に移管されたことにより（ Law No.17、これにより開発予算・経常予算の作成・執行権限は財務省に集中した）、BAPPENAS の権限は大幅に縮小された。その後、上記の国家開275

発計画システム法（ Law No.25, 2004）が、民主主義かつ分権化時代の開発計画
システムおよび BAPPENAS と BAPPEDA の新たな所轄範囲を定義した。同法によれば、BAPPENAS は国レベルの RPJPN および RPJMN の調整と作成を担当し、BAPPEDA は地方レベルで同様の機能を果たすことになった。
現行の RPJPN 2005-2025（ Law No.17, 2007）および RPJMN 2010-2014（ Presidential

Regulation No.7, 2009）は、ユドヨノ政権下で作成されたものである。RPJPN（20年間）のビジョンは、「発展、自立、正義、平和および統一を実現した国を建設する」
であり、RPJMN 2010-2014（5年間）のミッションは、「グローバル化した世界の中で、繁栄、民主主義、正義のインドネシア」を実現するというものである。RPJMN の
目標は、2014年までに経済成長を7％に加速し、顕在的失業を5〜6％に減らし、貧困率を8〜10％に低下させるなどである。そこには11の国家プライオリティが示されている6。RPJMN 2010-2014にはインクルーシヴで持続可能な成長をめざすことが明確にうたわれているが、いっぽうで、成長の源泉あるいは競争力や工業化を強化するための具体的ステップや施策は記されていない。現行5カ年計画には、中小企
業や協同組合の支援、マクロ経済安定の維持、科学技術・生産性・創造力・イノベー
ションの重要性などが一般的に述べられているだけである。
現在、BAPPENAS は現行長期開発計画（ RPJPN 2005-2025）の中の第3次中期計画となる RPJMN 2015-2019を作成中である。RPJPN の作成期間は、インフォーマルな準備も含めて約2年である。次期 RPJMN の工業章を執筆するために、BAPPENASの担当部署である産業・科学技術・観光・創造的経済総局は、2012年より研究者や専門家を集めて基礎調査やデータ分析を開始した。新工業章の基本的考え方は、「農
産品と鉱産物を中心に、付加価値をつけて輸出する」というものであり、これは

BAPPENAS と工業省から同時に提案された7。2013年には、BAPPENAS と工業省はセミナーでお互いを招きあって相互見解の提示と調整を続けた。BAPPENAS にはそうしたセミナーや会合を行う予算が潤沢にあるとのことである。
こうした作業ののち、2014年2月に BAPPENAS は次期 RPJMN の工業章のコンセ
プトペーパーを正式に工業省に提出した。その後、工業省から出されたコメントの9割を採用したうえで、改定コンセプトペーパーは BAPPENAS から工業省のトップおよび各総局に再提示され、またそれはインドネシア商工会議所（ KADIN ）、インドネシア経営者団体（ APINDO ）、業種別協会などの産業界にも公開された。
611 の国家プライオリティは、①官僚・行政改革、②教育、③保健医療、④貧困削減、⑤食糧安全保障、⑥
インフラ、⑦産業セクターの投資、⑧エネルギー、⑨環境と自然災害、⑩低開発、辺境、遠方、ポストコ
ンフリクトの地域、⑪文化、創造性、技術イノベーション、である。現行 RPJMN はこれに加えて、地方開発の方向性と政策も議論している。

7

2012 年にヒダヤット工業大臣は、「インドネシア工業化の加速」と題するパンフレットを公表した。

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15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

BAPPENAS は、さらに一般のコメントを受け付けるために、2014年6月に次期RPJMN の概要を正式に発表することになっている。2014年10月15日の新大統領就
任日には、RPJMN 2015-2019 のドラフトが大統領チームに提示され、コメントや修正を受けることになる。5カ年計画は2015年1月15日までに最終合意される。そのあと BAPPENAS は年次開発計画および年次予算の作業にとりかかることになる。
同時に各省庁にも、所轄分野の次期5年間の戦略計画の執筆が義務づけられている。

RPJMN 2015-2019の章構成は、プライオリティ、過去のレビュー、マクロ経済シ
ナリオ・目標、9つの基幹セクター（農業5部門、鉱業2部門、工業1部門、サービス1部門）、および横断的課題からなる予定である。新計画は、経済の最大原動力として工業を位置づける、インドネシアで初の5カ年計画となる模様である。新工業政策法（第5節）と同様、その工業章は、産業構造を深化させ、裾野産業を発展させ、天然資源に付加価値をつけて輸出する必要性を強調することになろう。

３ ．経済担当調整大臣府とMP3EI
インドネシアの省庁間調整メカニズムはユニークである。通常のラインミニスト
リの上に、①政治・法令・安全保障、②経済問題、③国民厚生の調整を行う ３ つの調整省が置かれており、シニア閣僚がそれぞれの長をつとめる。このうち経済担当
8
調整大臣府（ EKON ）は、経済に関わる17省（インドネシア政府は全部で34省からなる）を束ねる役割を担っている。インドネシアの調整各省は、他国における副首相を議長とするハイレベル委員会ないし国家協議会などに相当するが、インドネシ
アでは調整作業をイシューごとではなく、他省庁の上に常設され常任スタッフを持
つ組織が行っているわけである。
「インドネシアの経済開発を加速し拡張するための経済開発マスタープラン20112025」（略称 MP3EI ）は、第2次ユドヨノ政権によって作成され、2011年5月に大統領規則で公表された臨時開発計画である。経済担当調整大臣府によると、優先プロ
ジェクトを具体的に指定した追加計画の必要性を感じた同府のハッタ・ラジャサ前大臣が、そのコンセプトの発起人であるという。MP3EI の作成は2010年8月より経済担当調整大臣府で開始され、その後 BAPPENAS、関係各省、経済界とも協力しながら、意見聴取や文書の修正作業が行われた9。
8

現在 EKON の略称で呼ばれている経済担当調整大臣府は、1966 年に設立された後、数多くの名称変更
をへてきた。2000 年までは EKUIN と略称されており、ファイナンスの機能も有していた。また当時は、
BAPPENAS 長官が経済担当調整大臣を兼任することもあった。

9

ただし MP3EI の文書自体には、最初のアイデアは、2010 年 12 月の限定閣僚リトリートにおいて、ユドヨ
ノ大統領が発した経済変革の必要性を強調する指令であると書かれている。

277

MP3EI は、「自立的、進歩的、正義でかつ繁栄するインドネシア」のビジョンのもと、高く、バランスがとれ、公正で、持続可能な経済成長をめざしている。イ
ンドネシアを2025年までに世界の最も進歩した10経済の1つとするため、それに対応する1人当たり所得を14,250〜15,500ドルとして、年成長率の目標を7〜9％に設定している。MP3EI は8つの主要プログラムからなり、それは22の主要経済活動に分かれる。MP3EI の戦略として、①ジャワ、スマトラ、カリマンタン、スラウェシ、
マルク・パプア、バリ・ヌサテンガラからなる6経済回廊のポテンシャルの開発、②国内および国際的コネクティビティの強化、③人材と科学技術の強化、の3つの柱がある。さらに MP3EI は、インフラニーズの開発のためのガイドラインや規則改定のための勧告を含む。
計画文書としての MP3EI には2つの特徴がある。第1に、それは5ヵ年計画 RPJMNと国家空間開発（空間開発法 No.24、1992）を調和させる試みである。第2に、そこで計画されている計4,000兆ルピアにのぼる多数の大型プロジェクトの資金は、中央政
府、地方政府、国有企業、民間等のすべてのアクターからファイナンスされるという点である。RPJMN の場合は、国家予算によるプロジェクトしか原則含まれていない。

MP3EI には、本計画は既存の国家ないし地方の計画文書を代替するものではないと書かれているが、通常の計画と同計画の整合性を疑問視する意見も散見される。

Development Planning

Spatial Planning

National Long-term
Development Plan
(RPJPN 2005-2025)

National Spatial Plan
(RTRWN)

National Medium-term
Development Plan
(RPJMN 2010-2014)

National Annual
Development Plan䠋
State Budget Draft(RKP䠋RAPBN)

Master Plan for
Economic
Development for
Acceleration andExpansion ofIndonesia䇻s Economic
Development
2011-2015 (MP3EI)JABODETABEKPUNJUR
Region Spatial Plan
(Presidential Regulation
No.54/ 2008)

Province Spatial Plan
(RTRWP)
JABODETABEKMPA Strategic Plan

Source: MPA Study Team, based on
MP3EI document, JICA

㻌

図 １ ．開発計画、空間計画およびMP3EIの相互関係

MP3EI の実施を担当するのは、「インドネシアの経済開発を加速し拡張する委員会2011-2025」（略称 KP3EI ）である。同委員会は、この目的のために、2011年5月に278

15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

大統領を議長として創設された組織である。KP3EI は MP3EI の企画、実施、モニタリング評価を調整し、実施における問題を解決する任務を負う。KP3EI は日常業
務のために、①9つのタスクチームからなる「チーム KP3EI 」（6つの経済回廊、および規制改革、コネクティビティ、人的資源・科学技術の3つの横断的課題）、および②経済担当調整副大臣を長とし、同府の6つの課のサポートを得ながらインフラ
開発と地方開発の調整を行う「 KP3EI 事務局」の2つのユニットを擁している。

Chairman

Chairman: President
Vice Chairman: Vice President

Executive Chairman

KP3EI
Secretariat

Executive Chairman: Minister EKON
Vice Executive Chairman I: Minister BAPPENAS
Vice Executive Chairman II: Chairman, National Economic Council
Committee Members: Related Ministers/ Head of Agencies(EKON team, headed by
Deputy Minister
Infrastructure andRegional Development)Inter-Sectoral WG

Each WG chaired
by Related Ministers/
Head of Agencies(see table below.
WG members include
private sector)

Economic Corridor WG
Inter-Sectoral WG (chairman)

Economic Corridor WG (chairman)

Regulation

Secretary EKON

SumatraConnectivity

Vice Minister BAPPENASJava

Minister Public Works

HR & Sci. Tech

Vice Minister Education & Culture

Kalimantan

Minister Agriculture

Source: Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (EKON)

Minister Forestry

Sulawesi

Minister Marine Affairs & Fisheries

Bali-NT

Minister Culture & Tourism

Papua & Maluku

Minister Transportation

㻌Note: Alternate chairmen are assigned for Economic Corridor WG as follows: Sumatra (Minister Energy
and Mineral Resources (Sumatra); Minister Industry (Java), Minister Public Housing (Kalimantan),
Minister Cooperatives and SMEs (Kalimantan); Minister Trade (Bali-NT), Minister Development of
Disadvantaged Regions (Papua & Maluku).

図2．MP3EIの実施調整メカニズム

MP3EI は定期的にレビューされる。最初のレビューは2014年5月に完了した。そこでの主な改定点は、プロジェクトの範囲を大型インフラ・プロジェクトから環境など全セクターにまたがるプロジェクトへと拡大したことにあるという。

279

４ ．MPA計画
首都圏優先地域（ Metropolitan Priority Area、略して MPA ）は、ジャカルタとその周辺地域のインフラを大規模に整備するためのイニシャティブであり、MP3EIの6経済回廊の １ つであるジャワ経済回廊の中の基幹案件でもある。日本政府はその案件形成および実施を支援してきた。

MPA の目的は、JABODETABEK（ジャカルタ、ボゴール、デポック、タンゲラン、ベカシの5つの地名の頭を連ねた呼称）を、インフラ整備の加速および ASEAN 内で競争力をもつビジネス環境の創造を通じて、工業投資にとってより魅力的な地域とすることにある。近年の好景気とモータリゼーションの進行は、ジャカルタ首都圏に激しい交通渋滞をもたらした。インフラの質の低さおよび不足は、いまや経済活動の大きな障害となっている。ビジネス環境をハード・ソフト両面で改善するた
めに、2010年12月にインドネシア・日本両政府は協力協定に調印し、両国の政府および関連機関からなる指導委員会および技術委員会を設置し、そのもとで MPA マ
スタープラン調査を実施した。
マスタープラン調査では、①2020年の JABODETABEK のビジョンおよび2030年のインドネシアの経済社会条件の予測、②2020年までの JABODETABEK 地域のイ
ンフラ開発総合計画を策定し、45の優先プロジェクトを指定、③優先プロジェクトのリストから、2013年末までに着手されるべき18のファストトラック・プロジェク
トを選定（のちに2つ追加）、などが行われた。同調査は2020年までに必要な資金を3.4兆円（約340億ドル、ファストトラック・プロジェクトを含む）と見積もり、これを官民のさまざまな方式でファイナンスされるものとした。うち約1兆円（約100億ドル）は日本の ODA を含む外国資金によってカバーされることになっている。
20のファストトラック・プロジェクトの中から、さらに5つが最大の優先度をもつ
フラッグシップ・プロジェクトに指定された10。

JABODETABEK/MPA 戦略計画も、両国の政府によって策定されたものである。
2011年3月〜2012年10月に、指導委員会はインドネシア側からは経済担当調整大臣、
日本側は経産大臣ないし外務大臣を共同議長として、3回開催された。また技術委
員会は、インフラ・地域開発担当の経済担当調整副大臣および在インドネシア日本
10

フラッグシップ・プロジェクトは、①チラマヤ新港開発、②ジャカルタ MRT、③スカルノハッタ国際空
港のターミナル拡張、④下水システム開発、⑤新学術研究センター、からなる。詳細は、経済担当調整
大臣府と JICA 共同の Master Plan for Establishing Metropolitan Priority Area for Investment and Industry in
JABODETABEK Area のファイナル・レポート（2012 年 11 月）を参照。以上の情報は、2012 年 10 月 9
日付 JICA プレスリリースに依拠する。
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2012/121009.html

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15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

大使館公使を共同議長として、6回開催された。技術委員会の一翼はインフラ・プ
ロジェクトの進捗状態をモニターし、「投資促進のための MPA ハイレベル協議」と称される別の一翼は、投資環境を改善するための二国間フォーラムとして機能している。ジャカルタジャパンクラブ（ JJC ）は、日系企業にとって商工会機能をもつ団体であり、後者の投資環境を扱う技術委員会に対しさまざまな意見や要請を出している。JJC が最近提起した政策領域には、労働、税、関税に関わる問題、さらには法律・規則の一般的予測不可能性に関わるものなどがあった。

MPA は JICA の対インドネシア経済協力の主要案件である。JICA はいくつかのファストトラック・プロジェクト、具体的にはジャカルタ MRT 南北線、ジャワ・スマト
ラ相互連結送電線、プルイット下水施設の改善（洪水対策）を支援している。さらには、新港建設、道路、鉄道、下水処理改善に関する案件形成支援も行っている。
いくつかの案件は、PPP 手法が採用される予定である。ただし、MPA の実施は計画より遅れている。MPA が政治的、技術的、行政的コーディネーションを必要とする
巨大かつ複雑なプロジェクト群であることを考えれば、これは意外ではないかもしれない。インフラ・プロジェクトの土地収用も遅れている。以上からすると、実施
加速にむけた経済担当調整大臣府や関係省庁の努力は、より強化される必要がある。

５ ．新産業政策
2014年1月に、新たな産業政策法が成立した。これは、1984年の旧産業政策法にかわって、同法以降の30年間に発生した国内、地域および世界の変化を反映した法律である。同法はまた、国家産業政策（大統領規則 No.28、2008）を更新することとなった。新産業政策法の作成を指導したのは、民間経験が長く、前 KADIN 会長もつとめたモハマド・S・ヒダヤット工業大臣であった。
2008年の国家産業政策と2014年の産業政策法の主たる相違は、①優先セクターの範囲の拡大、②天然資源をそのまま輸出せず国内産業のために優先的に使用する、③人材と能力開発の強調（国家労働能力基準および認証の導入を含む）、④工業団
地および関連インフラの建設における政府の役割の拡大（とくに遠隔島嶼におい11て）、などである。

ただし、新法のナショナリスティックな性格は産業界に懸念を与えている。たと11

インドネシアでは、約 9 割の工業団地が民間によって開発かつ運営されている。これまで政府は工業用地の提供にはほとんど関与してこなかった。2009 年より、すべての製造業外国企業は工業団地に入居することが義務づけられている（ただし条件つきで例外あり）。工業省次官によれば、この規則の目的は、ワンストップ・ウィンドウ、電力などのサービスの提供の確保および環境保護のためとのことであった。

281

えば、外国人の勤務期間が制限され、しかも国家労働能力基準で定められた知識と技能をクリアせねばならないとされる。ターンキー・プロジェクトを行う投資家に技術移転を要求しているが、それが商業的あるいは技術的に可能なのかという検討はなされていない。あるいは、国内産業に優先使用させるために、鉱産物輸出に対して政府がクォータや禁止を設定する権限を有するとある。新法はまた、安全性などの国家利益のために、価格規制や戦略的産業の国家管理を可能にしている。さらに、国内企業には政府入札における優遇が与えられている。
新産業政策法は、それに付随して、将来20年（2015〜2035年）にわたる産業開発のためのビジョン、ミッション、戦略、優先プログラムを明確化する「国家産業開発マスタープラン」（ RIPIN ）の執筆を義務づけている。工業省が現在その作業中である。予定では、2014年7月に省内でマスタープランのドラフトが工業大臣に提出され、その後関連省庁・組織のコメントを受けることとなっている。工業省は、マスタープランを新政府が発足する2014年10月までに完成したい意向である。
マスタープランのドラフトは以下の政策構成をもつ予定である。
6つの基幹産業――食品、医薬品・化粧品、衣料・履物、輸送機械、電子・ICT、エネルギー
3つの裾野産業――資本財、部品産業、機械部品・部材
3つの上流産業――農業関連、鉱業、ガス・石炭
6つの基本要求――天然資源、人材、技術・イノベーション・創造性、インフラ、政策・規則、金融
工業省によれば、産業政策を策定するうえでの困難の １ つは、産業振興のために使える税インセンティブがほとんどないことである。財政法はきわめて限定的で、税の控除や減免はほとんど適用されない。その主な理由は、財務省が財政規律の維持を最優先し、新インセンティブの提案に極めて慎重なことにある。
複数省にまたがる政策は経済担当調整大臣府が調整するというのが原則だが、産業マスタープランの作成については工業省のイニシャティブで行われている。工業省の次官（ Secretary General ）が全体の指揮と調整を行い、執筆を担当するタスク
チームは工業地域開発総局長（ Director General of Industrial Regional Development ）をトップとして、工業省、大学、研究所、コンサルタント、民間からの計25名のメンバーから構成される。過去1年間、タスクチームはほぼ毎週会合を開いて精力的に活動した。KADIN とのセミナーも行われた。前述の通り、BAPPENAS ともイン
フォーマルな形で密接に作業した。国家開発計画の場合と同様、産業マスタープランの文書も、産官学を動員する制度化された集中的議論を通じて――経済担当調整
大臣府があまり関わることなく――作成されているといえよう。

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15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

以上をまとめれば、インドネシアには産業政策にかかわる3種の文書が存在する。
すなわち、BAPPENAS が作成する定期計画文書としての RPJPN と RPJMN、経済担当調整大臣府が主導し空間計画と投資環境を主題とする MP3EI（ MPA はその重要な部分をなす）、工業省が執筆し産業政策の詳細部分を規定する産業政策法と産業マスタープランである。理屈としては、これらの政策文書は互いに整合的かつ補完的ということになる。ただし、シェフが多すぎるとスープがだめになるという懸念も否定できない。
同一政策を複数組織が主導するとき、大きな方向性が共有されていること、および調整メカニズムがしっかりしていることが成功の要件である。インドネシアでは、多くの省庁がいわゆるナショナリスティックな産業ビジョンの推進で一致していることは、少なくとも政策目的をめぐる対立を回避するという点ではよいことである。インドネシアにはラインミニストリ間の調整を専門とする経済担当調整大臣
府もあるので、必要なハイレベルの調整もできるはずである。
しかしながら、われわれのミッションは、多くの経済省庁に強い自立心と競合関係があるのを感じた。この雰囲気は、同一省の総局間にさえ存在するようである。
たとえ政策の大まかな方向性が合意されていても、優先順序や予算獲得をめぐって熾烈な省庁間競争は起こりうる。友好的な省庁の間では多くの情報が共有され、日常的にコンサルテーションを行うしくみが存在するが、そうではない省庁間では状況は異なるようである。経済担当調整大臣府は、産業政策をめぐる政府内競争の中で、調整役でもあり、計画や戦略を企画するプレーヤーでもある。財政省は、新支出を伴う政策提言をみな撃ち落そうとするが、同省のマンデートからしてそれは理解できないでもない。省庁間の不和や予算を渋る財政当局はなにもインドネシアに限ったことではないが、その程度がかなり激しく、政策実施の大幅な遅れや中断の大きな原因となっていることも事実である。また分権化の極度の進展も、それ自体に多くの利点があることは確かだが、少なくとも中央政府が経済政策を実施する際には足かせになっている。これとは対照的に、強い大統領ないし首相が責任をもって主宰する政策執行メカニズムを有する国では、ある程度の遅れは発生しても、産業政策はかなり着実に実行されるものである。

６ ．外資政策
インドネシアの外国投資に関する法令は、投資法 No.25（2007年）、投資リスト（大統領規則 No.111（2007年）、No.36（2010年）、No.39（2014年））、および個別業種・製品にかかわる多くの法令からなる。投資政策に関わる権限は、インドネシア投資調283

整庁（BKPM）、各業種担当のラインミニストリ、および地方政府に分かれている。

BKPM は、石油・ガス、金融を除くすべてのセクターを所轄する中央投資機関かつ投資家にとってのワンストップショップである。投資申請はジャカルタに所在する

BKPM、ないし州政府傘下の地方投資調整庁（BKPMD）で受けつけている。分権化のもとでは、地方政府は管轄地域の投資案件をモニターしサポートする役割を担っている。ただし、一部の特定プロジェクトは中央でモニターおよびサポートする。
外国投資家を最初に迎える役所である BKPM の日々のオペレーションはかなり効率的かつ顧客志向であり、インドネシア政府の他省庁よりはるかによい。だが、インドネシアの投資に関わるインセンティブや行政は、すでに述べたように多くの課題を抱えている。外資政策の自由化は1997〜98年のアジア通貨危機以降加速し、現在に至っている。それにもかかわらず、インドネシアの投資環境は、マレーシア
やタイなどの東南アジアの工業化経済に比べて、予測可能性やビジネスフレンド
リーの程度においてまだまだ劣っているといわざるを得ない。
投資家にとって天国ではないインドネシアだが、最近は外資流入額が年々拡大している。外国投資の実現額は、2009年の108億ドルから2013年には286億ドルへと急増しており、外資は2013年の全投資の68％を占めるに至っている。製造業外資の流入、とりわけ自動車関連の流入がとりわけ活発である。外国投資総実現額のうち第二次産業が占める割合は、2009年の35％から2013年の55％と上昇している。この業
種構成の変化を反映して、2013年に日本はこれまで最大投資国だったシンガポール
を抜いて対インドネシア最大投資国となった（石油、ガス、金融を除く BKPM デー
タ）。同様に、日系企業のサーベイでも、将来（3年程度）の有望な投資候補国のランキングで、インドネシアは2007〜2009年の第8位から2012年にはトップに躍り出た。
インドネシアの主たる魅力は、巨大で成長性の高い内需および豊富な天然資源であって、国民のもつ知識、技能、技術ではない。大部分の外資製造業はインドネシアの消費者ないし国内操業企業を販路としており、グローバル供給基地としてインドネ
シアを選ぶ外資は少ない。これは、質よりも量に依存する外資主導型工業化といえるであろう。まさにこの問題の認識が、いま政策担当者をして内向きの産業施策へとシフトさせている主な理由といってよい。しかし、良好なビジネス環境と効果的な政策
支援がなければ、輸出競争力を創造することはむずかしい。政策の現状を見るかぎり、
インドネシアがそうした環境と支援をつくりだすことは容易なことではない。
インドネシアの課題の1つは貧弱なインセンティブである。他国では普通にみられる税の控除や減免、あるいは輸入関税の免除は、多くの外国企業にとってほとん
ど不可能なほど厳格な条件のもとでしか提供されない。その条件とは、たとえば（優遇のタイプによって異なるが）0.5〜1兆ルピアの最低投資額ないし100〜300人の284

15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

最低雇用をクリアすることである。このほか、対象業種の限定12、銀行預け入れ金の要求、研究開発要求、インフラへの貢献義務などがある。しかも、新たな規則が次々と出され、その内容も不明瞭な場合が多いため、インセンティブを受けようとする企業は所轄省庁と個別に交渉する必要があるという。これでは、大企業以外の外資はインセンティブをはじめから断念せざるをえない。また、ものづくり中小企
業、裾野産業、技術移転、ワーカーや技術者の訓練に対するインセンティブなども用意されていない。ただし、2013年には労働集約型業種および製品の30％以上を輸出する企業に対する追加的税控除が認められ、2014年には再投資に対する優遇税制が導入されている。これは、前 BKPM 長官だったバスリ現財務大臣が、工業省とBKPM の共同要請に対して理解を示しているからかもしれない。
低コストグリーン車（ LCGC ）は特筆に価する政策である。その施行詳細は2013
年7月の工業省規則 No.33で発表された。これは、インドネシアで生産され、エンジン容量、燃費、販売価格に関する一定の条件を満たした自動車について奢侈税を免除するというものである。80〜85％の現調率も要求されるが、これは公式文書には記載されていない13。
2014年4月には、外資に対する新たなネガティブリストが発表され（大統領規則

No.39）、2010年のリストが改定された。そこではいくつかの業種では条件が緩められたが、他の業種ではより厳しくなったものもある。製造業には（例外はあるが）100％外資が認められたいっぽう、流通業と倉庫業は外資の最大保有比率は100％から30％へと下げられた。さらに、ネガティブリストに記載のない禁止事項があることも報告されている。
賃金高騰と労働争議も、インドネシアの国際競争力を大幅に減じかねない深刻な問題である。われわれが面会した産業界のリーダーや産業官僚らは、生産性パ
フォーマンスと切り離された攻撃的な賃金要求に対して一様に不満をもらしていた。この点で、労働移民省、BKPM、APINDO および KADIN が共同提案している、
予測可能な賃金メカニズムのための三者協力案は注目すべきである。それは、政府、経営者、労働組合が生産性の伸びを基礎とし、インフレも加味して将来3〜5年にわたる賃金水準に合意すべきというものである14。
12

たとえば、税減免の対象は 5 業種（基礎金属、石油化学、機械、再生可能エネルギー、通信機器）だが、これらは BKPM が指定する 7 つの優先セクター（輸出志向、資本財と原材料、消費財、下流産業、内需が拡大しているセクター、インフラ、観光とクリエイティブ産業）とは異なっている。

13

低コストグリーン車政策には日系自動車メーカー 5 社が参加しており、近年の自動車組立・部品関連の外資流入加速の 1 つの原因となっている。だが、現地調達にリンクした奢侈税減免は WTO ルールに違反する可能性がきわめて高い。インドネシアでは、場合によっては、インセンティブ提供の条件を正式文書に記載しない形で通達するようである。

14

生産性と賃金をリンクさせる三者協力は、シンガポールの産業進歩憲章（1965 年）と類似する。同様の政285

BKPM の通常業務については、以下の点が特記される。以前の2段階の投資ライ
センス手続き（はじめに初期承認、その後に主ライセンス）は、2013年に廃止され2つのステップは統合された。当初 BKPM は、投資家はプロジェクトを実行する前に検討時間が必要であろうと考え、2つのステップの間に6ヶ月を置いたが、実際にはほとんどの投資家、とくに日韓シンガポールなどの投資家は、BKPM に来た時
点ですでに投資を決めているので、そのような猶予期間は不要であることがわかったという。さらなる便宜のために、BKPM は投資家が自分のライセンス申請がいまどの段階・状態にあるのかをウェブで見られるオンライン・トラッキングを導入した。さらに2014年内には、主ライセンスのオンライン申請も可能になるという。

BKPM の投資促進活動は、促進手法の開発、業種別促進、地域別促進、展示会
促進に分けられる。これらの4機能は、BKPM の部署構成に対応している。主ライ
センスを取得済みの投資家に対しては、BKPM はビジネス・ライセンスの取得、所有者の変更、30％以上の拡張投資、設備・原材料の輸入関税免除（ただし工場建
設時のみ）などの手続きを支援する。投資の実施状況は、すべてではなく一部の案件についてモニターされる。実際にモニターするのは地方政府であって、BKPM
はその報告を受けるという形になっている。BKPM のデータについては、承認案件の件数が現在は公表されなくなり、「投資実現額」（総額および業種別、投資国別の金額）が発表されるだけである。こうしなければならない理由は、われわれには理解できなかった15。

7．中小企業と産業人材の振興
インドネシアの中小企業の定義は省庁間でまちまちで、統一されていない（表2）。
政策形成、金融、訓練、販路開拓などの業種横断的な中小企業支援を実施する協同組合中小企業省は、2008年の法律 No.28に依拠する資産額による定義を採用している。他方で、中小企業サーベイを行う国家統計庁（ BPS ）は、従業員数により企業規模を分類している。工業省は BPS の定義に従う。業種別の中小企業支援は、工業省を含む各ラインミニストリの担当である。

策勧告は、GRIPS 開発フォーラムがエチオピアのハイレマリアム首相にあてた書簡でもなされている（2014
年 4 月）。
15

多くの国では、投資案件承認の件数と金額、および実行額が定期的に報告されている（月ごとなど）。この情報があれば、流入する投資の平均規模を計算するのは容易であり、たとえば近年において日系製造業
中小企業の投資件数が増加しているといった事実を確認することができる。この傾向は、マレーシア、タイ、ベトナムで顕著であり、おそらくインドネシアでも同様と推察される。

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表 ２⾲䠎䠊䜲䞁䝗䝛䝅䜰䛻䛚䛡䜛୰ᑠ௻ᴗ䛾ᐃ⩏㻌．インドネシアにおける中小企業の定義
㻰㼑㼒㼕㼚㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼎㼥㻌㻺㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻭㼓㼑㼚㼏㼥㻌㼒㼛㼞㻌㻿㼠㼍㼠㼕㼟㼠㼕㼏㼟㻔㻮㻼㻿㻕㻰㼑㼒㼕㼚㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼎㼥㻌㻸㼍㼣㻌㼛㼚㻌㻹㼕㼏㼞㼛㻘㻌㻿㼙㼍㼘㼘㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻹㼑㼐㼕㼡㼙㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㼟㻌㻔㻸㼍㼣㻌㻺㼛㻚㻌㻞㻜㻘㻌㻞㻜㻜㻤㻕㻘㼟㼍㼠㼕㼟㼒㼥㼕㼚㼓㻌㼍㼠㻌㼘㼑㼍㼟㼠㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼣㼛㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻱㼙㼜㼘㼛㼥㼑㼑㼟㻺㼑㼠㻌㻭㼟㼟㼑㼠㼟㻌㻔㻵㻰㻾㻕㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻿㼍㼘㼑㼟㻌㻔㻵㻰㻾㻕㻹㼕㼏㼞㼛㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㻮㼑㼘㼛㼣㻌㻡

㻡㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼛㼞㻌㼎㼑㼘㼛㼣㻟㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼛㼞㻌㼎㼑㼘㼛㼣㻿㼙㼍㼘㼘㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㻡㻙㻝㻥㻹㼑㼐㼕㼡㼙㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㻞㻜㻙㻥㻥㻸㼍㼞㼓㼑㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㻝㻜㻜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼍㼎㼛㼢㼑㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻡㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛 㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻟㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛㻡㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻞㻘㻡㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻡㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛 㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻞㻘㻡㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻌㼡㼜㻝㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㼠㼛㻌㻡㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻡㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼙㼕㼘㼘㼕㼛㼚㻿㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㻦㻌㻮㼍㼟㼑㼐㻌㼛㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼞㼑㼘㼑㼢㼍㼚㼠㻌㼘㼍㼣㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼞㼑㼓㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻵㼚㼐㼛㼚㼑㼟㼕㼍㻚㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㻭㼏㼏㼛㼞㼐㼕㼚㼓㻌㼠㼛㻌㻸㼍㼣㻌㻺㼛㻚㻞㻜㻘㻌㻞㻜㻜㻤㻘㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼢㼍㼘㼡㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼚㼑㼠㻌㼍㼟㼟㼑㼠㼟㻌㼐㼛㻌㼚㼛㼠㻌㼕㼚㼏㼘㼡㼐㼑㻌㼘㼍㼚㼐㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼡㼕㼘㼐㼕㼚㼓㻚㻌

複数の定義により比較はやや困難だが、2014年時点で全国に中小企業は5,790万存在し（協同組合中小企業省データ）、うち工業（インダストリ）に属するのは430万であった（工業省データ、これらを Small and Medium Industries、略して SMI と称する）。中小企業の全部ではないが大部分は「協同組合」に属し、後者は会員に対してさまざまなサービスを提供する。2013年の協同組合総数は203,701であった（協同組合中小企業省データ）。これとは別にクラスターがある。これは類似製品を生産する中小企業の地域的な集合である。協同組合とクラスターはオーバーラップす
ることもあるが、必ずしも同じではない。分権化後のインドネシアでは、協同組合とクラスターはいずれも地方政府の管轄となった。これは、中央諸省が全国的に中小企業政策を展開することをむずかしくし、また地方政府との効果的な協力関係を築くことも一般に困難となった。さらに中央においてさえ、権限の分散や調整機能の欠如が見られ、中小企業振興をますますむずかしくしている。
歴史を振り返れば、インドネシア政府は中小企業の重要性をしばしば強調し、
1960年代後半から現在に至るまで実にさまざまな支援策を導入してきた。たとえば、販路開拓、金融、裾野産業、フォスター・ファーザー制度、中小企業クラスター、
技術サービス支援ユニット、ビジネス開発サービス（ BDS ）、技術移転、イノベーションなどである。だが、中小企業の品質や活動が大いに高まったという結果は得られていない。近隣のタイやベトナムなどと比べても、インドネシアの SMI はインフォーマルなまま正式登録されていない傾向が強く、グローバル企業や世界市場とのリンクも希薄である。
インドと同様、インドネシアの外資政策の重要な目的の1つは、地場の中小企業を競争から守ることにある。ある業種には外資参入が禁止されており、他の業種は287

参入には現地企業との合弁が要求される。ただし、この種の制限は諸刃の剣であり、むしろ外国投資の流入を減少させ、他方で中小企業には、優遇を維持するためにあえて規模拡大をしないといった負の効果をもつ可能性がある。
現在の協同組合中小企業省の役割は、①政策形成、②トレーニング（地方政府と協力）、③融資保証（ KUR ）、および協同組合や新規企業への補助金を通じる金融支援、④販路開拓（各州の産物を展示する SME タワーなど）、⑤インキュベーショ
ン、からなる。
いっぽう、工業省工業中小企業総局の優先プログラムは、①主として台湾とタイから学んだという「一村一品」、② SMI クラスター、③クリエイティブ・インダストリ、④起業家プログラム、の4つである。この最後のプラグラムは、若者を選別し、奨学金を与えて17ある工業専門学校の1つで特定業種の技能を3年間学ばせて、卒業後は全国にある中小企業センターのいずれかに派遣し、少なくとも2年間、実際に企業支援をさせるというものである。このプログラムには、過去2年間で約1,000人の青年が採用されたという。これとは別に、同総局の支援プログラムには、①旧設備の更新支援（中央政府が35％、地方政府が45％のコスト補助を行う）、② SMI ファシリテーション（知的財産権やパッケージングを指導するクリニック、ハラル製品に関するものなど）がある。同総局には、能力開発プログラムないしは財政移転を通じて地方政府を支援する予算もある。このほか工業省は、地方官僚を訓練するための8つのセンター、7つの工業短大、11の高専、11の技術研究所、および11の工業標準センターをもっている。
ただし、限られた予算と旧式設備はこれらに共通の問題である。
診断士とは、戦後日本で創設された政府公認の中小企業コンサルタントを意味する。2005年から2008年にかけて、JICA は450人のインドネシア地方官僚（一部は工業
省工業開発機関職員を含む中央官僚）を診断士として訓練し、同時に国家資格制度を立ち上げた。このプログラムのインドネシア側のカウンタパートは、工業省傘下の工業教育訓練センターである。だが、最近この活動は停滞している。この背景には、訓練済みの診断士たちの異動、昇進、退職など、分権化のもとで工業省が地方官僚でもある診断士たちを動員する権限をもたないこと、さらには地方政府の能力不足などがある。ただし、工業省内では診断士を再び活用しようという動きもあると聞く。

８ ．民間セクターの努力
政府官庁とは別に、民間部門もインドネシアの産業競争力およびビジネス環境の改善に大きな貢献をしている。理想的には、そうした努力は政府政策による側面支援によりスケールアップされるべきであろう。ミッションが訪問したいくつかの組

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織の活動を報告する。
インドネシア金型工業会（ IMDIA ）は金型の製造、購入、販売ないしメンテナ
ンスに関わる企業および組織からなる協会であり、日系企業に関連する企業や組織もメンバーとなっている。日本の民間および経済産業省の支援を得て、2006年2月に設立された。IMDIA 創設のアイデアは、日系企業がインドネシア政府の要求する現地調達率を達成するために現地裾野産業を強化する必要性を背景に、二国間ハイレベル官民共同フォーラムである日本インドネシア戦略的投資行動計画（ SIAP ）16の競争力・中小企業作業部会から出された。2007年8月に締結され2008年7月に発効した日インドネシア経済連携協定（ JIEPA ）のもとで、二国間官民協力である IMDIA は、同協定を実施するメカニズムとして位置づけられた。IMDIA は、

KADIN 傘下にあるインドネシアの協会でありながら、日本の官民によって強力に支えられている点がユニークである。

IMDIA は、インドネシアの地場産業の能力開発、とりわけ裾野産業強化に関わる諸プログラムのコーディネータとして機能する。2014年7月現在のメンバー企業・団体は408を数える。IMDIA が担当するプログラムは、①経済産業省が支援する現
地金型工業向けの技能研修（2008〜2012年の間に13名の専門家が派遣されグループ研修を実施）、②国際交流基金が支援する個別企業への専門家派遣（2008年から現在に至る）、③中央職業能力開発協会が支援する技能検定関連活動（技能検定者の育成を含む）、などからなる。2014年度には、IMDIA は金型設計・管理、金型仕上
げ、機械設備保全・点検などの分野で52のワークショップを実施する予定である17。

IMDIA は、高橋誠会長および谷川逸夫事務局長という製造業に造詣の深い二人の日本人の献身的奉仕によって運営されている。お二人はそれぞれ本業をもつが、ボランティアベースで IMDIA を支えている。IMDIA の研修は会員企業には無料で提供される（講師は謝金なし）。IMDIA は自前の施設をもたないので、研修はさま
ざまな協力企業の講義室や訓練設備で、IMDIA が使用料と実費を払うことによって行われる。IMDIA に対する日本側の情熱と貢献は賞賛されるべきものである。
だが最終的には、こうしたものづくり支援活動はインドネシア人の運営者および専門家に引き継がれるべきであろう。そのときはじめて、IMDIA は真のインドネシ
アによる工業会になるのである。
ポルマン・アストラ――アストラ工科短大（ Astra Manufacturing Polytechnic、
16

SIAP は、2005 年 6 月の日本インドネシア首脳会談で小泉首相とユドヨノ大統領によって公表された、日本からインドネシアへの投資を促進するためのイニシャティブである。その作業部会は、税・関税、労働、
インフラ、競争力・中小企業、からなる。

17

詳細は、http://www.imdia.or.id/english/proﬁle/index.html を参照せよ。

289

略して Polman Astra ）――は、インドネシアの民間職業訓練機関をリードする工科短大である。既存の教育制度と産業ニーズのギャップを埋めるために、インドネシ
ア最大の財閥アストラ・インターナショナルによって1995年に創立された18。同財閥傘下にあるアストラ・ホンダモーター社が、必要な技能を備えたワーカーを雇用するのがむずかしかったために、職業訓練を行ったのがその最初である。
ポルマン・アストラは D3（3年で卒業する短大）レベルの職業訓練を、自動車および天然資源を中心に提供している。そこでは、QCDI（品質、コスト、納期、イ
ノベーション）のためのマインドセットと規律が重視される。学科は、①機械工学・ツール製造、②製造工程・生産工学工程、③メカトロニクス、④プランテーション
作物プロセス工学、⑤情報管理、⑥自動車工学、⑦重機工学、からなる。理論よりも実習が強調され、その比率は35対65である。すべてのカリキュラムはアストラ・
グループによって認証をうけており、学生は3年過程の最後の6〜9ヶ月にアストラ・
グループの企業でインターンを行うことができる。ポルマン・アストラの強みは、さまざまな分野の製造業トップ企業を擁するアストラ・グループとの密接な協力関係にあるといえよう。そのことが、同校の教育訓練が実践的で役に立つものである
ことを保証している。
毎年の入学生は約220名である。2014年6月時点の在校生は658名、創立以来の学生数は2,289名である。アストラ・グループはポルマン・アストラに対して年100万ドルの資金を提供し、これは35％の学生への全額奨学金（授業料と生活費）および残りの学生への部分的奨学金にあてられている。専任講師は55名、非常勤講師は108名である。卒業生の6〜7割はアストラ・グループ企業に就職するという。すぐれたカリキュラムと魅力ある就職先のために、入試倍率は非常に高い。220名の合格枠に対して、2012年は3,955名、2013年は3,474名の応募者があり、2014年は約5,000
名に達する模様である。約6割の学生はジャワ島出身である。
以上の職業訓練のほか、ポルマン・アストラは、①アストラ・グループのスタッ
フ訓練、②職業訓練開発センター、③中小企業開発センター、④商業製品開発セン
ター、⑤商業生産、といった活動も行っている。
経済団体のインドネシア商工会議所（ KADIN ）は、商業、工業、サービスに関わるインドネシアの商工会や業種別協会をたばねる上部組織である。1987年の法律
18

アストラ・インターナショナルは、7 分野にわたる企業群を統括する持ち株会社である。すなわち、自動車、
金融サービス、重機、製造業エンジニアリング、アグリビジネス、IT、インフラである。アストラ・グルー
プに属する企業は 200 近くあり、その中にはトヨタ、ダイハツ、いすゞ、UD トラックス、ホンダ、BMW、
プジョー、レクサスなどの外資との合弁企業も含まれる。アストラ社は、1957 年に中華系インドネシア人ビ
ジネスマンであるウィリアム・スリヤジャヤ氏が創立した商社である。1969 年に同社がトヨタとの合弁事業を成功させたことがドミノ効果となって、他の日系企業との協力が次々と開始されたという。

290

15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策

No.1により設立され、唯一の全国的な経済団体として民間企業を代表する立場にある。33の州レベル商工会と440の県・市レベル支部をもつ。ジャカルタジャパンクラブ（ JJC ）や米国商工会議所といった外国の商工会も KADIN 会員である。運営費は会員組織からの会費ですべてまかなわれているため、政府からは独立している。政府はすべての関連法令・規則を起草するにあたって、KADIN に意見を求めることになっている。最近 KADIN がコメントした法律には、鉱業法や工業法などがある。

KADIN には、主要国との貿易投資を促進するための二国間委員会が設置されている。その1つである、ソニー・B・ハルソノ氏が議長をつとめるインドネシア日本経済委員会では、ジャカルタジャパンクラブを主たるパートナーとして、インドネシ
アのビジネス環境に関する意見交換が行われている。投資促進のための MPA ハイレ
ベル協議では、ジャカルタジャパンクラブと KADIN が密接に連携しながら、税制、労働、関税、法令の予測可能性といった日系企業が関心をもつ課題を提起している。

KADIN は、インドネシア・日本の二国間官民対話における重要なアクターである。
インドネシア経営者協会（APINDO）は、インドネシアの真の開発のための良好なビジネス環境の創造をビジョンとする独立組織である19。そのミッションは、インドネ
シア企業の競争力の強化、良好な労使関係の実現、およびさまざまな全国ないし国際レベル、とりわけ雇用関連組織において、インドネシアの産業界を代表し、すべてのビジネスとりわけ会員企業のための保護、エンパワーメント、およびアドボカシーを行うことである。APINDO の会員は1万を数え、インドネシア各地の民間企業、国有
企業、地方企業、合弁企業、共同組合を含む。APINDO は労使関係や労働問題を扱う
政労使の3者協議のすべてにおいて、経営側を代表する唯一の組織である。

APINDO は、活発な政策アドボカシーを行っている。2013年の州別最低賃金の大幅な引き上げに対しては深刻な懸念を表明し、賃金決定を非政治化し、労使間の社会対話を促すことの重要性を訴えた。また APINDO は、全国、州、県・市の各レベルで、会員企業のために労使関係・人材開発のアドバイス、法務支援、労働裁判
所での代理業務、労働関連の訓練プログラムなどのサービスを提供している。

９ ．日インドネシア経済関係に関するコメント
インドネシアと日本の経済関係の歴史は長く、また深い。インドネシア経済に対する日本の貢献には実に大きいものがある。2014年3月付の JETRO 調査によると、
19

APINDO の前身は、1952 年に設立された社会経済問題経営者会議（PUSPI）である。1957 年の労働大臣令により同会議は正式に認知され、KADIN は労使関係および労働問題に関する経営側代表機関として、同会議を指定した。1985 年には名称が APINDO と改められた。

291

インドネシアで操業する日系企業は少なくとも1,517社を数える。その多くはジャカルタ東方の工業団地に入居し、その数は近年急増している。自動車を筆頭とする製造業は日本勢が圧倒的に優勢であり、インドネシアで走っている自動車の9割以上が日本ブランドという。2013年以降、インドネシアは日系企業の投資先候補国の中でトップの人気を占めるに至った。また開発援助では、現在インドネシアは日
本の ODA の最大受け取り国である。2012年末時点での日本の対インドネシア累積

ODA 額は、円借款が4.64兆円（460億ドル）、贈与が2,760億円（27億円）、JICA の技術協力が3,280億円（32億ドル）となっている。
この半世紀以上に及ぶ親密な経済交流にもかかわらず、インドネシアの産業政策やビジネス環境のクォリティは、本報告で詳述したとおり、まだまだ満足できる状況ではない。インドネシアに対する日本の大きな期待、およびこれまでの投資、援助、貿易の規模にかんがみれば、これは双方にとって残念な事態である。所得や工業化の面では、たしかに進捗があった。だが ASEAN 内の競合国と比較すると、インドネシアの到達点は依然低く、経済成長は質よりも量に多分に依存するものであった。もちろん、東アジアの四虎経済（シンガポール、香港、台湾、韓国）とは比べものにならない。
インドネシアの新指導者は、中所得のわなの克服を最上位の国家アジェンダに据えて、断固たる行動を開始すべきであろう。ただしこの目的を達成するためには経済ナショナリズムの称揚だけではだめで、しっかりとした情報に基づく市場志向型の政策形成が同時に不可欠だが、今日のインドネシアにはそれが欠如している。また日本側も、二国間経済関係をより高い次元にシフトするためにアプローチの変更が必要であると思われる。中所得の重要パートナーであるインドネシアのような国に対しては、わが国は単に国別援助方針だけでなく、オールジャパンの産業協力戦
略およびそれを指導するための定期的な二国間官民政策対話が必要となってくる。
ここで提唱するのは、現在までの戦略や対話よりもっと選択的かつ戦略的なもの、かつわが国の民の投資と官の ODA がインドネシアの産業発展のためにシナジー効
果をもって貢献することができるようなアプローチである。
具体的には、以下を提言したい。
第1に、インドネシアにおける日本の産業協力の「長期ビジョン」を定め、それをインドネシア自身の国家開発計画等と整合的なものとする。このビジョンはどこの国でもあてはまるような漠たるものではなく、インドネシアにとってユニークかつ実行して意味のあるもので、20〜30年は変えないことが重要である。第2に、その進捗が容易かつ継続的にモニターできる、具体的な「中期目標」に合意する。第3に、これらの目標を達成するために、誰がいつまでに何をするのかおよびその成功基準

292

15．インドネシア――ナショナリズムと地方分権のもとでの産業政策を明記したローリングの「行動計画」を策定する。そこにはインドネシア側と日本側のアクションを併記する。第4に、二国間のハイレベル常設メカニズム（
「産業政
策対話」
）を立ち上げ、政策形成に対する指示や行動計画実施のモニタリングを行う。

MPA のもとで開催されている指導委員会や2つの技術委員会は、その入り口といえるかもしれない。だがここでの提案は、MPA 関連で議論されているものよりは分野が広く、制度としても権限が強いものである。ハイレベル会合は年に1〜2度開催すべきであり、そこではインフラ案件と投資環境だけでなく、現地企業および産業人材の能力強化、外資と現地企業のリンケージ、裾野産業育成、ロジスティックのベンチマーキング、標準・認証・検査といった、一国の産業能力のコア部分を構成するさまざまな課題を扱うべきである。以上を日本の協力を得て実行に移すならば、インドネシアは真の産業政策を学ぶことができるであろうし、それにより、政策に支援された民間価値創造を実現することができる。現在のところ、こうした政策はほとんどないに等しい。
最後に、インドネシアと同様の課題、すなわち、わが国から多くの援助と投資を受けいれているにもかかわらず政策の能力とやる気が乏しいという課題は、ベトナ
ムにおいても見られることを付記しておきたい。ただしベトナムの場合は、日本との経済交流が半世紀ではなくまだ20年程度にしかすぎないという点がやや異なっている。インドネシアと同様、日本にとって重要な産業パートナーであるベトナムにも、上記で提案したような新たなアプローチが必要である。

293

Attachment 1

Mission Schedule (15- 21 June 2014)
1. Mission Members
Kenicni Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Akemi Nagashima

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, JapanLe Ha Thanh

Lecturer & Researcher, National Economics University & Vietnam Development Forum (VDF), Hanoi, Vietnam

Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy

Director, Institute for Industrial Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Hanoi, Vietnam

2. Mission Schedule
TIME
DATE
1

15

Sun

2

16

Mon

3

4

5

17

Jun

Tue

18 Wed

19

Thu

6

20

Fri

7

21

Sat

294

ACTIVITYPM
AM

ArrivalJICA Indonesia OfficeAM
PM

JETRO Jakarta Office
The Jakarta Japan Club (JJC)

PM

Deputy Minister (VII), Research & Development for Cooperative & SME Resources,
Ministry of Cooperative and SME

AMSecretariat General, Ministry of Industry

AM

Directorate General of International Industrial Cooperation (KII), Ministry of Industry

PM

Assistant Deputy, Spatial Planning and Development for Underdeveloped Regions,
Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (CMEA)

PM

Deputy Minister (VII), International Economic and Financial Cooperation,
Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (CMEA)

PM
AM
AM

Indonesian Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KADIN)
Directorate General of Small and Medium Enterprises, Ministry of Industry
Directorate General of Leading and High Technology Based Industry, Ministry of IndustryPM

The Employers' Association of Indonesia (APINDO)

PM

Directorate of Industry, Science Technology, Tourism and Creative Economics,
National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS)

AM
AM

Agency for Industrial Policy, Business Climate and Quality Assessment (BPKIMI), Ministry of Industry
Department of Economics, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)AM

Ministry of Industry(JICA Project on Small and Medium Industry Development Based on Improved Service Delivery)PM

Directorate of Sectors Investment Promotion, The Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)

PM

Ministry of Trade(JICA Project on Service Improvement of NAFED: National Agency for Export Development)

AM

Matsushita Gobel Foundation

AM
PM
PM

Indonesia Mold & Die Industry Association (IMDIA)
Astra Manufacturing Polytechnic (POLMAN ASTRA)
Departure (Kenichi Ohno, Izumi Ohno & Akemi Nagashima)PM

Departure (Le Ha Thanh & Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy)㻌16．ルワンダ――アフリカの奇跡となりうるか

16．ルワンダ――アフリカの奇跡となりうるか［本章は、8．Rwanda 起草前に準備された簡略版である］＜日程＞2014年 ８ 月 ５ 日〜 ８ 日＜参加者＞GRIPS開発フォーラム：大野健一、大野泉、長嶌朱美JICA本部：産業開発・公共政策部民間セクターグループ 及川美穂
同課特別嘱託、濱田正章インハウスコンサルタント
在エチオピア JICA 事務所：池田佑子企画調査員
エチオピア産業政策対話に先立ち、8月5日〜8日に、GRIPS 開発フォーラムとJICA チーム（本部から及川特別嘱託、濱田インハウスコンサルタント、およびエ
チオピア事務所から池田企画調査員）とともに、キガリを中心にルワンダを訪問した。主な目的は、①ルワンダの近年のめざましい経済発展の特徴について、政策策
定・実施方法の国際比較という観点から調査し、エチオピアをはじめとする他の途
上国の参考にすること、および②我々が JICA と共同で取り組んでいるエチオピア
産業政策対話の経験から得られた示唆を関心あるルワンダ関係者と共有し、意見交換を行うことであった。
短期間の訪問、また内閣改造（7月24日）の直後の日程であったにもかかわらず、JICA アフリカ部や JICA ルワンダ事務所、そして在京ムリガンデ大使のご尽力のおかげで、同国政府・関係機関、経済団体、政策シンクタンク、主要ドナー（ JICA
事務所に加え、世界銀行、アフリカ開発銀行、ドイツ国際協力公社）との有意義な面談がかない、キガリ近郊の経済特区や k-Lab（ ICT 起業家イノベーションセン
ター）を視察する機会もいただいた（日程は別添参照）。また、小川和也大使をはじめとする在ルワンダ日本大使館からも同国の政治経済事情のブリーフや公邸での夕食会を含め、大変お世話になった。深く感謝の意を表したい。
以下、今回訪問の主なポイントを記す。ルワンダ政府関係者に対するフィード
バックやエチオピア政府関係者への共有を念頭においた、より詳しい英文出張報告
は別途、作成する予定である。

295

１ ．ルワンダの経済発展の特徴
ルワンダは、ユニークでめざましい経済発展を遂げている。1994年に起こった悲
惨なジェノサイドと内戦により、ルワンダ経済はマイナス41.9％の成長という壊滅的状況に陥った。しかし、内戦終結後の1995〜97年は年率25.5％、11.6％、14.9％、その後1998年〜2012年の15年間は年率平均8％の経済成長を持続して、驚異的な復興を遂げた（ GDP 実質成長率 MINECOFIN・IMF データ）。一人当たり GDP は2013
年に620ドル（世銀データ）に到達し、内戦前の2倍の水準になった1。ポール・カガ
メ大統領（当時は副大統領兼国防相）は2000年にビジムング大統領の辞任をうけて現職に就任2、開発主義国家を標榜してルワンダの復興・発展を率いている。
長期国家ビジョンの「 Rwanda Vision 2020」（2000年策定、2012年改定）は、2020年までの中所得国入りをめざしている。本ビジョンは2000年版では一人当たりのGDP の達成目標を900ドルに定めていたが、順調な経済復興・成長をふまえ、2012
年 版 で は1,240ド ル に 上 方 修 正 さ れ た。 貧 困 率 は58.9％（2000/01年 ） か ら56.7％（2005/06年）、そして44.9％（2010/11年）に減少した。こうした奇跡的な復興・成長を人的に支えているのが欧米や近隣アフリカ諸国などから帰国したディアスポラである。彼らのプロフェッショナリズム、世界のベスト・プラクティスに関する知識やネットワークの貢献もあり、ルワンダの開発政策策定の方法や経済運営は目を見張るほど先進的である。その一方で、国全体をみわたすと、約8割が農村人口（2013年）、約8割の国民が無電化地域に住むなど、典型的な後発国の様相をしている。先進性と後発性の極端な差――これこそが今日のルワンダ経済をユニークたらしめ、他の途上国と際立たせている。

２ ．ルワンダの先進性と後発性
ルワンダが海外投資家や国際的アナリストから見て、躍進する「アフリカの奇跡」と評される所以として、次のような先進性がある。これは、同程度の発展段階にある途上国には見られない。
カガメ大統領は真剣かつ強く開発にコミットしており、国家ビジョンや政策運営において明確な指示を与えている。
1

ただし、人口増加率が年率 2.9％（国連、2010 〜 2015 年平均）と高いこともあり、一人当たり GDP が内
戦前の水準を超えたのは 2007 年になってからである。

2

カガメ大統領は 2003 年 8 月に、1994 年以来はじめて実施された大統領選挙で圧倒的な支持を得て当選し、2010 年の大統領選挙でも再選された。

296

16．ルワンダ――アフリカの奇跡となりうるか

政府幹部は有能で、プレゼンテーションスキルに卓越している。
政策は体系的なステークホルダー協議を通じて策定され , 政府は強い政策
オーナーシップをもち、政策文書は体裁を含め、精緻に書かれている。毎年、カガメ大統領出席のもと、官・民・市民社会が集い、議論・提言をする「国民対話」を開催。また、「官民対話」も定期的に実施されている。
汚職はきわめて少なく、市民は安全を享受し、市街は清潔である。
伝統的な慣習に基づく、業績契約（イミヒゴ：Imihigo ）が毎年とりかわされ、
政策・施策の遂行がモニタリングされる。大統領や閣僚、知事・郡長ほか、在外大使らも業績契約を結ばねばならない。
世界銀行・国際金融公社（ IFC ）のビジネス環境評価（ Doing Business ）において、ルワンダはサブサハラ・アフリカでモーリシャスに次ぎ、2番目にビジネス環境が良好な国と評価されている（2014年のビジネス環境評価では、
世界189ヵ国中32位のランキング）。

ICT、通信、金融などの高付加価値サービスが勃興している。
内戦時は食糧援助を受けていたが、食糧自給率が向上した結果、近隣諸国への農産品（キャッサバ、メイズ、小麦等）の輸出が可能となった。伝統的な商品作物（コーヒー、紅茶等）の輸出も回復した。
国家ブランド創出に努め、「悲劇の国」から奇跡的復興・成長を遂げる「未来志向の国」へとイメージ刷新に成功しつつある。
しかし一方で、多くの途上国に共通する脆弱性・後発性もみられる。短期間の訪問
で実際の政策実施現場に行く機会はなかったが、われわれが一連の面談でうけた印象を3点あげたい。第1に、非常に高度な能力を備えた公的セクターとは対照的に、民間セクターの活力が弱い（ルワンダ人によれば、「若い」）こと。第2に、競争力をもつ
外貨獲得産業がなく、援助依存度が高いこと（国家予算の約4割を外国援助に依存）。
第3に、政策策定の方法はきわめて精緻であるが、実施面は不十分で、いまだ政策イ
ンパクトを生み出すに至っていないことである。特に最後の点については、ルワンダ
政府は論理的な整合性、確立された参加型枠組、グローバル・ベスト・プラクティスの追求を重視し3、政策文書の策定方法や表現においては日本を上回るほどである。しかし、現場主義にもとづくプラグマティズム、地に足のついた詳細へのこだわりといった点では、比較的弱いように見受けられた。後者はまさに日本が得意な分野であ3

ルワンダ政府はドナー支援も得て、国家能力強化ファンドを設置し、シンガポール、モーリシャス、チリ、ドバイ等から第一線の専門家を招聘してベストプラクティスを学んでいる。また 2008 年より、元英国首相の Tony Blair 氏が立ち上げた Africa Governance Initiative から助言をうけている（大統領府、首相府、
MINECOFIN、RDB、公的セクター能力開発基金等）。

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り、また東アジア諸国で国造りに携わる行政官や専門家にも共通する特性である。中所得国、そしてそれ以上の発展段階へと高度で持続的な成長を遂げるためには、手続き面の精緻さと現場主義によるプラグマティズムの両者を兼ねそなえる必要がある。
この点で、日本が具体的な協力を通じて、政策と実施のギャップを埋めることに貢献できる余地は多いにあろう。ルワンダ政府の野心的なビジョンや政策枠組みの中で、現場におりて実態調査・分析を行い、その結果を政府幹部にフィードバック
して具体的な施策づくりを支援するとともに、実施段階で実務レベルの行政官に寄り添って How To を教えていくことは有用と思われる。こうした協力こそ日本人専
門家や JICA の強みであり、枠組的志向が強い他ドナーを補完して、日本が中身において比較優位を発揮できる余地は十分ある（第4節）。

３ ．主な経済政策文書と戦略的方向
ルワンダは2000年に策定した長期国家ビジョンの実施計画として、5年ごとに貧困削減戦略（ PRSP：2002-2006）、第1次経済開発貧困削減戦略（ EDPRS1：2007-2012）、
そして現行の第 ２ 次経済開発貧困削減戦略（ EDPRS2：2013-2018）を策定している。

PRSP は人道援助からの復興、続く EDPRS は復興から持続的成長へ転換をめざした。
そして、めざましい成果を基盤として、EDPRS2は成長をさらに加速させて（年率
平均11.5％を目標）、2020年までの中所得国入りを確実にすることを掲げている。

EDPRS2は、①経済成長の加速による中所得国化、②貧困削減、③農外雇用と都市化、④対外依存度の減少、⑤民間セクター主導の成長を5つの目標とし、その達成のために優先分野として、①経済転換、②農村開発、③生産性と若年層の雇用、④説明
責任あるガバナンス、をあげている。ここで特記すべきは、次なる発展段階として、
民間セクター主導の経済成長を重視している点である。1994年以降、ルワンダ経済は驚異的な成長を遂げたが、その原動力は初期においては復興特需、また直近の15年は（援助資金を含む）公共投資であり、民間投資による貢献は小さかった（公共投資がGDP に占める比率は16.2％であるのに対し、民間投資は8.2％に過ぎない、2013年デー
4タ）。ルワンダの GDP 成長率は2013年に4.6％と減速したが、これは主にドナーが2012

年に一般財政支援を一部凍結した影響による（ルワンダ政府がコンゴ民主共和国東部の反政府軍を支援しているとの疑惑への対抗措置）。今後、ルワンダが対外援助依存
度を下げつつ、成長を持続させるためには民間セクター主導の成長実現が不可欠であ
4

公共投資と民間投資の比率は、ケニア（5.3％と 14.3％、2009 年）、ウガンダ（ 5.9％と 18.5％、2013 年）、、タンザニア（ 8.0％と 29.5％、2013 年）であり、東アフリカ諸国
エチオピア（14.3％と 18.7％、2012 年）と比べても、ルワンダは公共投資に偏重している（世銀ルワンダ事務所、石原氏の提供資料）。

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16．ルワンダ――アフリカの奇跡となりうるかる（MINECOFIN、世銀、アフリカ開発銀行との面談より）。人口増加率が比較的高く、
都市化が進むことを考えると、若年層を含め、年20万人の農業以外（off-farm）の雇用創出が必要と推計されており、政府の危機意識をさらに高めている。
ルワンダは、復興から持続的成長へ転換をめざした EDPRS を策定した頃から、経済開発にむけた組織体制の拡充や各種政策の策定を本格化させた模様だ。まず2008年に、貿易・投資促進機能を含む民間セクター開発を一括して担うルワンダ開発庁（ Rwanda Development Board: RDB ）が新設された5。RDB は横断的機能としては投資促進・輸出振興、人的資源開発・組織開発、民営化、分野別には ICT、貿易・製造業、サービス、農業、観光・環境保に焦点をあてて、民間セクターの競争力強化や雇用創出に積極的に取り組んでいる。RDB は大統領直属で、長官は閣僚級で閣議にも参加する（このモデルは、シンガポールの経済開発庁に倣ったといわれる）。また、TVET 政策を2009年に策定し、2009年には教育省傘下に労働力開発局（ Workforce Development Authority: WDA ）を設置し、2013年からは教育省にTVET 担当国務大臣を配置している。
さらに、以下のように産業開発に関する個別政策が矢継ぎ早に策定された。
経済特区政策（2010年5月）：政府――経済特区の範囲、インセンティブ、インフラ開発、規制枠組と監督組織（ RDB ）等について示す。
中小企業開発政策（2010年6月）：産業貿易省（ MINICOM ）――中小企業開発に関し、起業家支援、ビジネス開発サービス、ファイナンス、規制枠組、制度組織（ MINICOM が政策、RDB が実施・調整を担当）について提案。
産業政策（2011年4月）：産業貿易省（ MINICOM ）――産業をすでに比較優位をもつ産業、新たな可能性がある産業等に分類して、短・中・長期と段階的に支援の方向を示す。産業政策に先立ち、ルワンダ産業マスタープラン
2009-2020年が策定された（2009年12月）。
国家輸出戦略（2011年4月）：産業貿易省（ MINICOM ）――輸出構造の多様化をめざし、伝統的産品・サービス（観光、コーヒー、紅茶、鉱物等）、非
伝統的産品・サービス（ Business Processing Operations、花卉・園芸等）、
潜在的に大きな成長可能性がある業種（インテリア、ファッション、バイオ
テクノロジー等）に分類して、とるべき輸出振興策を提案。
第3期 ICT 戦略・計画2011-2015年：政府――第1期（法制度整備に注力）、第2期（ ICT インフラ整備に注力）を基盤に、第3期は ICT 活用を重視する。現在、「 SMART Rwanda 」マスタープラン2015-2020を策定中で、知識集約的な経済
5

投資輸出振興庁（RIEPA）、中小企業育成庁（CAPMER）、観光庁（ORTPN）、情報技術庁（RITA）、人的、および環境管理庁（REMA）の一部を統合して、2008 年に RDB が創設された。
資源開発庁（HIDA）

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へ移行していく方針。
民間セクター開発戦略2013-2018年（2013年1月）：政府――EDPRS2に対応して政府が策定。MINICOM、RDB、WDA、PSF 等、関係する官民が共同で取り組む民間セクター開発の行動計画を示す。
国家雇用プログラム（2014年1月）：政府――EDPRS2に対応して、年20万人の農外雇用を創出するために政府が策定した5ヵ年の行動計画。技能開発、民間セクター開発、労働市場の機能強化を柱とし、教育省・WDA、MINICOM、RDB、公共サービス労働省、PSF、地方機関等が共同で取り組む施策を示す。
これらの政策は整合的で、政府ワイドで経済開発の方向性が共有されている。基本にあるのは、内陸国の制約を克服するために、①軽量で高付加価値のサービス産業として ICT、観光、金融サービス等を振興し、そのために外資導入に積極的に取り組むこと、②農業国として農産品の高付加価値化を通じた輸出振興を図り、外貨を獲得すること、③生活用品や建築資材等については輸入代替による国内製造業を振興し、外貨を節約することである。そして、農業生産性の向上に努める一方で、製造業・サービス業の振興により安定的・生産的な雇用を生み出す。ケニアやウガ
ンダとともに東アフリカ地域統合を積極的に推進し、航空ハブ化（新空港整備、ル
ワンダ航空の拡充等）、電力の安定確保・低価格化（エチオピアが建設中のグラン
ド・ルネサンスダムに期待）に取り組むことも、これらの方向性と密接に関係している。我々が面談した政府関係者は幾度となく、「 Land-locked 」という制約条件を「 Land-linked 」という好条件へ変えていくと述べていたが、まさに東アフリカのみ
ならずサブサハラ・アフリカ、ひいては世界のハブになるという構想である。その実現可能性については十分な吟味が必要だが、戦略性と整合性ある、野心的な発展をめざしていることは疑いない。

４ ．実施面の課題、および日本の協力への示唆
ルワンダが今後、援助依存から脱却し、真に民間セクター主導の発展を遂げるた
めには、今までの努力で築いた精緻な政策体系・組織制度に現場主義の要素を取り入れ、地場の中小企業や生産者に着実に届く施策づくりとその実施が重要になる。
面談した政府幹部は皆、きわめて優秀で国造りに高い意欲をもっているが、現場感覚においては、日本や東アジアの行政官や専門家から学ぶ点は多いと感じた。以下、いくつかの例をあげる。
第1に、RDB は輸出振興（ Exporters Development Program ）や輸入代替産業の育成（ Manufacturing Growth Program ）のために、意欲ある企業に対して現状診断

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16．ルワンダ――アフリカの奇跡となりうるかにもとづく助言と集中支援を行うハンドホールディング・プログラムを有するが、いずれも実施は外部コンサルタントに委託している。前者については、TradeMark

East Africa6という非営利組織から派遣されたアイルランドのコンサルタントがRDB 内にオフィスをもち輸出振興支援を行っている。これには、40社から15社に絞り込んで企業の輸出戦略・マーケティングを指導し、さらにルワンダの官民の専門家を育成する（ RDB2名、MINICOM1名を含む計18名）活動が含まれる。後者の輸入代替産業育成については、Ernst & Young 社（ケニア人、ルワンダ人の混成チーム）に依頼して、企業診断やその後の指導を行っている。今まで20社で企業診断が行われ、経営改善等のためのアクションプランが作られた。いずれも企業支援の標
準的なメニューと思われるが、支援内容や指導方法の詳細を確認する必要がある。
また、コンサルタントに外注するだけでなく、中央・地方政府の企業支援を担当する人材育成や、資格認定制度等を通じた民間専門家の育成などについて中長期的な視点から考えているかどうか、その方法などについては具体的な話は聞けなかったので、今後確認する必要があろう。
第2に、中小企業政策については、スクラップ・アンド・ビルドが激しく、様々な施策が定着する前に新施策が導入されている。実施組織も RDB、産業貿易省（ MINICOM ）、民間セクター連合（PSF ）の間でめまぐるしく変化している7。現在、

RDB および MINICOM を中心に中小企業振興プログラムの再編がはじまっており、金融重視のビジネス開発ファンド（ BDF ）の枠組のもとに中小企業への相談と指導を位置づけ、今年は外部（ローカル）コンサルタントにより、10日間の研修で中小企業アドバイザー（Small Business Development Advisors ）を800人育成する予定とのことである。主な研修対象者は、既存の制度で中小企業の窓口業務を務めた経験者（ Proximity Business Advisors: PROBA ）が中心になる模様である。だが、そのような短期研修で中小企業のニーズに応えるサービスを提供できる人材が育つのか、東ア
ジアの感覚からいえば疑問の余地はある（日本には中小企業診断士の制度が確立し
6

TradeMark East Africa（TMEA）は非営利企業で、東アフリカ諸国の貿易促進や地域経済統合に向けた各種支援を行っている（ベルギー、デンマーク、オランダ、スウェーデン、フィンランド、英国、米国、カナダが支援）。ルワンダについては、RDB の輸出振興プログラムのほかにも、MINICOM、ワンストップ・
ボーダー・ポストをはじめとして様々な支援をしている。詳細は、http://www.trademarkea.com/category/projects/projects-rwanda/
7

中小企業への相談・指導については、2006 年に PSF によって全国 30 の District でビジネス開発サービス（Business Development Services: BDS）が導入されたが（無料）、その後、2010 年初に PSF が BDS の運営
をコンサルタントに委託するようになった（有料）。しかし、有料化された BDS は効果的に機能しなくなり、2011 年には、RDB がビジネス開発センター（Business Development Center: BDC）を設立し、中小企業支援を行うようになった（無料）。BDC の直接運営には多額の費用がかかったため、RDB は 2012 年末に運営を民間企業に委託し、サービスを有料化した。そして今般、BDC 運営をさらに見直し、RDB は金融支援を中心とするビジネス開発ファンド（Business Development Fund: BDF、2012 年にルワンダ開発銀行から独立した組織）に運営を委託し、BDC を BDF の支店として位置づけ、その中で相談・指導業務も行うことになった。

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ており、タイやマレーシア等も日本に及ばなくても中小企業専門のアドバイザー育成に時間をかけて取り組んでいる）。たとえば、JICA がエチオピアで実施している
カイゼン支援（現行フェーズ）では、政府が設立したカイゼン・インスティチュートの職員や中小零細企業庁、地方の TVET 指導員を研修し（座学と企業実習をあわせて3〜6ヵ月のプログラム）、3年かけて約400名のカイゼンの指導に関わる人材を育成した。しかも、彼らには将来、国内のカイゼン普及・指導を担う役割が期待されている。これは、ルワンダの現在の企業支援より、はるかに地道なアプローチである。
第3に、TVET に関しては分野別技能協議会（Sector Skills Council）が設立されており、12分野について8、RDB が議長となって PSF 等の参加のもと、市場が求める技能
ニーズとのギャップ解消、生産性向上や技能向上のための施策等について官民ステー
クホルダーで協議する仕組みを構築中である。これはシンガポールの専門技術教育協
議会（Council for Professional and Technical Education）という、市場の技能ニーズと技術教育の需給予測をし、人材教育戦略を策定する仕組みに倣った可能性があるが、そうであれば、かなり高レベルの取組みである。TVET 運営・カリキュラム作成への企業の参加や、工業団地内における技能研修センターの設置といった、実際の教育訓
練現場を通じて民間ニーズを反映させていくことも併せて重要と思われる。
第4に、ルワンダは ICT 立国を標榜して、ICT インフラの整備、ICT を活用したサービス普及を推進し、小学校児童を対象とした One Laptop per Child Program の導入、第四世代移動通信システム（ ４ G ）の導入、そしてアフリカ初のカーネギーメロン
大学の誘致（情報技術、電気・コンピューターエンジニアリングの修士課程）等に精力的に取り組んでいる。我々は、青年 ICT 省、RDB の ICT 担当、PSF の ICT 商工
会議所、k-Lab（ ICT 起業家のインキュベーションセンター）の代表との合同会合を行ったが、皆、活力あふれる若者達だった。その一方で、ICT 立国としてルワンダがめざす具体像についてはかなり曖昧である。
「 SMART Rwanda 」マスタープラン
は ICT の開発への貢献として様々なセクターへの活用（電子政府（ e-Government ）、農業、教育、医療、環境、インフラ、都市開発、Business Process Outsourcing（ BPO ）を含む雇用創出等）を構想しているが、ICT 産業そのものの振興や人材育成（たとえば、ソフトウェア開発、プログラミング専門家の育成等）の方針については、具体的な話は聞けなかった。ICT インフラを活用できる人材（ ICT のユーザー）の育成と、ICT を輸出産業として振興し競争力を強化していく人材（ ICT の生産者）の育成とでは、産業振興や教育訓練の目標や政策が異なってこよう。
1994年から今日に至る20年間に、ルワンダが成し遂げた成果や官民をあげた努力
8

建設、農業、エネルギー、製造業、金融サービス、ICT、観光等、RDB が重視している分野が中心になっている。
最初の Skills Council は鉱業セクターで設置された。

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は、実に称賛に値する。しかし今後、EPRDS2のもとで、民間セクター主導により、対外援助依存を減らして自立的な成長をめざすのであれば、すでに定着している欧米的な枠組志向による精緻な政策体系に、東アジア型の現場主義の実践をバランス
よく組み合わせ、いまだ脆弱な民間セクターを底上げしていく取組みも必要ではないだろうか。ルワンダの各種政策や組織制度を現場レベルで着実に機能させていく
うえで、日本が貢献できる余地は十分にあると感じた。
日本は対ルワンダ国別援助方針（2012年4月策定）のもとで、経済基盤整備、農業開発（高付加価値化やビジネス化）、社会サービスの向上（安全な水の供給）、成長を支える人材育成（科学技術教育訓練）を重点分野として、ルワンダの持続的成長の促進を支援している。この枠組みの中で、JICA は一村一品運動のための能力強化、ICT 分野の戦略策定および実施支援、TVET 支援等に取り組んできている（実施済・実施中を含む）。EDPRS2（2013年策定）がルワンダの次の発展段階として、
民間セクター開発、農外雇用や都市化を重視していることをふまえ、今後、日本が従来の農業開発支援だけでなく、また実施中の ICT 分野や TVET 支援と有機的に関連づけて、産業開発支援も重点分野として強化していく意義はあろう。
その際、JICA が予定している中小企業振興の専門家派遣を、将来の産業開発支援の方向を検討するエントリーポイントとして位置づけるのも一案と思われる。ル
ワンダの中小企業政策は、実施面でいまだ試行錯誤を続けていることは上述のとおりである。今般の専門家派遣を通じて、過去に実施された様々な中小企業支援策の成果と課題、中小企業支援の担い手となる人材の蓄積度（官・民、および地方）、新施策で想定されている支援メニューやアプローチの詳細等を現場レベルにおりて精査し、日本や東アジアの他国の経験に照らして不足の点があれば具体的に指摘し、再編中の中小企業振興プログラムにインプットしていくことが有用である。

RDB が外部コンサルタントに委託している輸出振興や輸入代替産業の育成プログ
ラムの支援内容や指導方法、ローカル人材育成計画の有無についても、調査に含めるべきである。こうした協力は、ルワンダの課題である政策と実施のギャップを埋めるという点で、日本らしいユニークな貢献になろう。

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日程・面談先
8月5日（火） JICA本部チーム（及川美穂特別嘱託、濱田正章インハウスコン
サルタント）と共にキガリ着。その後、JICAエチオピア事務所（池田祐子企画調査員）と合流。
JICAルワンダ事務所にて守屋貴裕所長、室谷龍太郎所員、亀井里美企画調査員と打ち合わせ。
在ルワンダ日本国大使館にて小川和也大使と意見交換（藤田真由
美専門調査員、鬼木達矢経済協力調整員同席）。
産業貿易省（ MINICOM ）にてエムマニュエル・ハテゲタ事務次官との面談。
8月6日（水） アフリカ開発銀行（ AfDB ）ルワンダ事務所にてエコノミストのエドワード・センノガ氏と面談。
産業貿易省（ MINICOM ）貿易・投資局にてアレックス・ルジブ
キラ局長と面談。
政策分析研究所（ IPAR、シンクタンク）にてシニアリサーチャーのディクソン・マルンダシニア氏と面談。
財務・経済計画省（ MINECOFIN ）の政策評価・リサーチ局にてリチャード・ムシャベ局長と面談。
8月7日（木） ルワンダ開発庁（ RDB ）の貿易・製造業局にてユセべ・ムヒキ
ラ局長および戦略・競争力部のルガムバ・ムヒジ部長と面談。
ドイツ国際協力公社（ GIZ ）ルワンダ事務所にてウルリケ・マエ
ンナー代表との面談。
民間セクター連合（ PSF ）にて会員向けサービス、キャパシティビルディング・企業プロモーション局のドネシエン・ムングワラ
レバ局長との面談。
教育省雇用開発局（ WDA ）にてアルバード・センジユンバァ
TVET担当大臣と面談。
世界銀行ルワンダ事務所にてシニアエコノミストの石原陽一郎氏と面談。
在ルワンダ小川大使の招待を受け、公邸会食にGRIPSチーム出席（小川大使夫人および鬼木経済協力調整員同席）。
8月8日（金） 財務・経済計画省（ MINECOFIN ）のマクロ経済政策局にてアミナ・ウムリサ・ルワクンダ局長およびオバルド・ハキジマナ専門家と面談。
k-Lab（若手起業家が集う施設）にて、青年ICT省（ MYICT ）のランバート・タングワビラ シニアエンジニア、RDBのICT部署のマーティン・カルロス・ムウィゼルワ部長、PSFのICT商工会
議所のパトリック・カバジマ会長およびアレックス・テール所長、
k-Labのジョバアニ・タブゴバ運営執行管理者等のICT関連者を集めた合同面談。
JICAルワンダ事務所との意見交換夕食会（守屋所長、亀井企画
調査員、石塚史暁所員同席。当方JICAミッションおよびGRIPS
チーム全員）。
8月9日（土） キガリからアジスアベバへ移動。

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Development Forum Report

GRIPS

GRIPS

Development Forum Report

Records of Ethiopia-Japan Industrial Policy Dialogue Ⅱ

Records of Ethiopia-Japan Industrial Policy Dialogue
Policy Research in Third Countries

Vol.Ⅱ

GRIPS Development Forum

Edited by the GRIPS Development Forum