Japan aktuell 3/2008

7

Im Fokus

Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy in Transition: An
Interpretation of TICAD IV
Japans Entwicklungshilfepolitik im Wandel:
Eine Interpretation der TICAD IV
Matsuo Watanabe
Abstract
As the host of two important international conferences, the Fourth Tokyo International Conferenceon African Development (TICAD IV) and the G8 summit, Japan has had an unrepeatable diplomatic
opportunity this year. The outcome of TICAD IV suggests that Japan’s aid policy for Africa
is changing from being conformist with international norms to being autonomous and resultorientated, looking to the interests of client countries and Japan more explicitly. As Africa is
becoming increasingly important politically and economically, the Japanese government appears
determined to mobilise its main diplomatic tool, official development assistance, to create closer
ties with the continent. The shift can be interpreted in the context of the changing environment
in diplomacy. The series of diplomatic setbacks and the declining role of the US as the anchor of
the international political economy no longer allow for the sole dependency on US hegemony forsecuring Japan’s interests; Japan needs to manoeuvre to pursue its interests on its own within the
global order.
Keywords: Africa, Japan, ODA, development, foreign policy

1 Introduction
This article is intended to examine Japan’s recent aid policy with particularreference to the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development(TICAD IV) held on 28-30 May 2008. 1 The year 2008 is a unique opportunity
for Japan to demonstrate its diplomatic presence and foreign policies as it ishosting two important international conferences, namely TICAD IV and the

1 The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the Japan
International Cooperation Agency.

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Matsuo Watanabe

G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (in July). The Japanese government scheduled
TICAD IV as a preliminary to the G8 Summit; the outcome of TICAD IV was
directly conveyed to the G8 Summit (TICAD IV 2008).
TICAD has taken place every five years since 1993, co-hosted by Japan, theUnited Nations (UN), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and the World Bank. 2 This year’s TICAD IV experienced the largest numberof attendants in TICAD’s history: 51 African countries (including 41 heads ofstate and the African Union), 34 donors and Asian countries, 74 internationaland regional organisations as well as representatives of the private sector. This
was largely due to TICAD IV’s direct linkage with the G8 Summit, in which
African development was one of the main themes. Furthermore, in the face ofrising commodity prices, rapidly growing African economies have been drawing
increasing international attention themselves, not only as aid recipients but as
one of the few remaining business frontiers in the world. 3
The list of agendas at TICAD IV included economic growth, human security
and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), consolidation of peace, governance and environmental issues, including climate change. 4 While the agendas
inevitably reflected current global issues, the Japanese government managed to
add some of its own priority foreign policy issues as well. By looking at TICAD
IV, Japan’s latest strategies (and its departure from the past) regarding African
development and aid policies for the region can be observed.
One of the distinctions of TICAD IV was that economic growth was placedat the top of the agenda, which departs from mere poverty reduction centred
on distributive support to social sectors (e.g. health). This is a small sign, but
could represent something of a jump for the country from a “faithful follower”

2

In the early 1990s when “aid fatigue” set in after the Cold War, Japan launched TICAD I
to re-focus international attention on African development. A central feature of TICAD is the
co-operation between Asia and Africa (MOFA 2008a). Information on TICAD IV and the G8
Hokkaido Toyako Summit is available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/index.
html and http://www.g8summit.go.jp/eng/index.html respectively.
3 Africa has seen remarkable economic growth. The continent’s real GDP has grown steadily
since 2000; the annual growth rate of even non-resource countries has exceeded 5 per cent.
Reflecting these phenomena, China and India have also hosted conferences to which African
leaders were invited: the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (China-Africa Beijing Summit),
November 2006 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/xglj/default.htm) and the India-Africa Forum
Summit, April 2008 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/xglj/default.htm).
4 See the UN’s website for details about the MDGs: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.

Japan’s ODA and TICAD IV

9of international norms to a “moderate advocator”. Consequently, two questions
arise: What does TICAD IV explain about Japan’s official development assistance(ODA) policy shifts, and what are the factors behind the shifts? This article seeks
to answer these questions by focusing on TICAD IV in particular. Moreover, an
examination of ODA would provide some insights for analysing Japan’s foreign
policy. As the use of military force is restricted by the constitution, and hence
ODA is virtually the sole diplomatic tool for the country, ODA policy should besensitive to any foreign policy changes.
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the outcomeof TICAD IV and examines the features which distinguish TICAD IV fromthe conventional international norms and/or Japan’s past practices. Section 3
discusses the changes in Japan’s aid policy by looking into diplomatic aspects:
the objectives of TICAD IV, the trajectory of Japan’s development assistance andthe international politics behind the policy change. Section 4 concludes thisarticle with a summary of the findings. 5

2 What Can Be Learnt from TICAD IV?
2.1 Synopsis
TICAD IV adopted the Yokohama Declaration: Towards a Vibrant Africa, in which
five areas are specified as priorities: i) boosting economic growth, ii) achieving
the MDGs, iii) the consolidation of peace and good governance, iv) addressing
environmental issues and climate change and v) a broadened partnership (TICAD
IV 2008). 6 These areas apparently reflect the current global concern as well as theprimary concept throughout TICAD from 1993 onwards, namely, “ownership”
and “partnership”, which encourages Africa’s self-help efforts and support of theinternational community.
In the course of TICAD IV, the Japanese government made a number ofpledges:• to double the ODA for Africa to 1.8 billion USD by 2012, including the Yenloan (mainly for infrastructure) equivalent to 4 billion USD, and doubling

5 This article does not address the other issues discussed in TICAD IV and the G8 Summit,
namely climate change, food, commodity prices or the monitoring of the TICAD process.
6 The original text can be found at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad4/doc/declaration.pdf.

10Matsuo Watanabe

grant and technical assistance,• to set up a 2.5 billion USD fund to help Japanese firms invest in Africa withthe aim of doubling Japanese investment to Africa to a total figure of 3.4
billion USD by 2012,• to allocate the substantial part of its 1 billion USD Emergency Food Assistance
Package to Africa and to provide extra relief for those who face starvation,• to offer 5.6 billion USD to the Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis andMalaria, 7• and to co-finance large-scale projects with the World Bank to facilitate Africa’s
regional economic integration. 8
The agendas and pledges seemingly follow conventional issues of international
development, such as MDGs, communicable disease and the increase in ODA
disbursement. Nevertheless, four distinctive features are found (which departsomewhat from conventional poverty reduction and Japan’s past aid practices):i) an emphasis on economic growth, ii) a closer public-private coalition, iii) a
broader role on the part of the government and iv) a call for country-specificindustrial strategies.

2.2 An Emphasis on Growth
The Yokohama Declaration states that “it is essential to accelerate broad-based economic growth and diversification” for Africa’s sustainable development (TICAD
IV 2008). Japan traditionally believes that sustainable economic growth is crucial
for the poor to be able to extricate themselves from poverty, as illustrated by
East Asia’s experience, in which the expansion of the private sector contributed
to an improvement in the poor’s income through increased employment (MOFA2005). 9 To get out of poverty and stay out of it, the absolute income level of the7

See http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/.
In addition, Japan will train 100,000 local medical personnel over five years and help to double
Africa’s rice production over ten years through training and infrastructure building, and will
construct 1,000 primary and secondary schools for about 400,000 children as well as expanding
teacher training in maths and science.
9 It is often mentioned that the per capita GDP of East Asian countries was lower than Africa’sin the 1940-50s, while the present level is three times that of Africa. The per capita GDP of East
Asia grew at a rate of 5.5 per cent per annum between 1981 and 2003. The size of the population
living in absolute poverty (i.e. people who live on less than 1 USD a day) decreased by 400
million. These developments have been achieved through economic growth financed largely by
8Japan’s ODA and TICAD IV

11

poorer people must rise. For this to happen, economic growth led by productivity
improvement has to be sustained.
In the African context, despite the recent good performance, the economic
growth is far from adequate on a per capita basis (Secretariat of the Stocktaking
Work, JICA 2008). The real per capita GDP, an indicator of the income level,in low-income African countries has remained less than 300 USD over the past
decade, a third of the continent’s average. For the income level of African
economies to reach that of present-day Malaysia, say, within the next 20 years,
the economies would have to grow at least eleven per cent annually. 10
Based on this conception, the Yokohama Declaration acknowledges thatindustrial development is essential to achieve economic growth through trade,investment and infrastructure development. 11 In this regard, the important roleof the private sector (both domestic and foreign) in promoting and financing sustainable economic growth is explicitly noted – in contrast to the 2005 Gleneagles
Summit, which focused more on corruption, democracy and human rights. 12
The focus on (investment-led) growth is legitimate for Africa’s sustainable
development, and investment is exactly what the African side deserves rather thanaid (Kristof 2007). During the G8 Summit in Japan, African leaders expressed
appreciation of Japan’s focus on infrastructure and investment promotion (Daily
Yomiuri 2008a). My own interviews with MOFA officials after TICAD IV also
confirm that the most frequent requests from African leaders during the 47

foreign private capitals and ODA (MOFA 2005). MOFA (ibid.) calculates from OECD statistics(Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients) that the total ODA inflow to East
Asia and Africa between 1980 and 2003 amounted to 1,079 trillion USD and 2,089 trillion USD
respectively. That is, Asian economies achieved such growth with half the volume of ODA for
Africa.
10 Recent discourse on African development has increasingly focused on the importance of thegrowth; see, for instance, Hausmann et al. (2006) and Commission on Growth and Development(2008).
11 The importance of agriculture is also recognised in the Yokohama Declaration as a “major
driving force for economic growth” rather than as a means of mere rural employment absorption,
following the recent literature, including World Bank studies (2007). The stress of TICAD IV
was on productivity growth of the sector through water infrastructure, for example, as well as on
facilitating rural entrepreneurship and local (support) industries.
12 See http://www.g8.gov.uk/ for the 2005 Gleneagles G8 Summit. African development
has been one of the major agendas of G8 summits. African leaders were first invited to
the 2000 G8 Okinawa Summit in Japan, which led to the G8 Africa Action Plan in 2002
(www.g8.gc.ca/kan_docs/afraction-e.asp).

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Matsuo Watanabe

dialogues with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda were for investment promotion
rather than aid. Why is this the case?
In the short/medium term, foreign direct investment (FDI) creates employment
which contributes to immediate poverty reduction, and local residents’ welfare
can be increased by investing companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). 13
The macro-economic balance can be improved if investments are in exportorientated sectors. In the longer term, various investment-induced effects are
expected, e.g. an increase in the productivity of the national economy as awhole through technology transfer and diffusion, and the development of local
supporting industries, which all lead to further economic development. In
addition, the beneficiaries of Japan’s ODA include all domestic and foreign
investors, as ODA-financed infrastructure, for example, is public goods.

2.3 Public-private Coalition in ODA
The second distinctiveness is public-private partnership (PPP) in the development
process – i) one only between the Japanese government and companies, and ii)
one that involves all stakeholders, i.e. public and private actors in both Japanand recipient countries. The term “PPP” is not a new one in the field of ODA,
typically being observed in large-scale infrastructure projects since the mid-1990s.
The public sector constructs roads financed by ODA and then transfers theownership to private firms who then operate them. 14 What is new in the PPP
strategy presented at TICAD IV is that more emphasis is put on effectivenessand quick results. ODA-financed infrastructure projects are to be more directly
connected to private FDI projects than the past ODA projects in Asia.
Japan’s past ODA in the form of infrastructure to Asia acted as a catalyst for
private FDI (Watanabe 2003). What is important to note here is that there was no
explicit association (e.g. pre-consultation) between the Japanese government andinvestors. Such a catalyst functioned relatively well in Asia: Japanese investors

13 A joint study (Bertelsmann Stiftung / Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit(GTZ) 2007) provides a good introduction to CSR and its application in the context of public
policy with case studies in Africa.
14 The GTZ has also been involved in PPP since the 1990s (http://www.gtz.de/ppp/english/).
German PPP is more like a “joint venture”, while the scope of the Japanese style has been limited
and more parallel, with the public and private sector staying out of each others’ operations. Partof the reason was to avoid criticism from the domestic (i.e. Japanese) media that public money
should not be used to benefit particular companies.

Japan’s ODA and TICAD IV

13

were familiar with the region, hence they could assess investment risks accurately
and react flexibly to ODA projects even without a close association with thegovernment. When it comes to Africa, however, Japanese investors have muchless information about the continent, and uncertainty has discouraged them frombecoming involved.
Business risks can be reduced in several ways, including Africa’s own effort tostabilise the macro-economy and improve governance, among other things. In
addition, extra incentives by the Japanese government, such as ODA-financed
infrastructure specifically designed with FDI projects in mind (e.g. constructing
roads connecting factories to ports) and investment insurance should reduce thedirect and indirect costs of operating in Africa.
Besides the partnerships on the Japanese side, TICAD IV advocates another
PPP between whole stakeholders, i.e. governments of Africa and Japan andrespective private sectors which do business in the real world. To promote
investment-led growth in Africa, the public sector bears more responsibility
for creating a business-friendly environment than the counterpart of advanced
economies. In Africa, the private sector is small and fragile, production factors
are inadequately distributed and economic structures are rigid. The measures
to create a business-friendly environment may include building an institutional
capacity in financial markets, improving the infrastructure, providing financial
and technical assistance and risk-sharing guarantees for entrepreneurs, andsupporting investment funds (MOFA 2008b).
The problem is whether African governments actually have enough capacity todesign and implement appropriate policies on their own (which requires profoundcomprehension of the socio-economic conditions as well as their advantages
and shortcomings vis-à-vis regional and global counterparts). According to a
G8 summit document on development and Africa (MOFA 2008b), it is essential
for donors and international organisations as well as private sectors (businessand academic) to work together with African governments. Watanabe/Hanatani(2008) argue that the international community should support African countries
in designing and implementing country-specific growth strategies and policy
measures by setting up a bilateral policy dialogue mechanism and a public-private
council consisting of public and private representatives and academics from theAfrican side and that of the donors. 15

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Matsuo Watanabe

The Japanese ODA practice has been shifting from “request-based” (i.e. ODA
projects were adopted upon recipient countries’ requests) to “co-formulation”
by the government of Japan and its counterpart(s). 16 This shift may reflect thelessons from past setbacks: investment projects (public or private) tended tobe “stand-alone” and the effects were confined to specific regions or sectors,
not necessarily leading to country-wide development. For the benefits of ODA
to be maximised, the recipient country’s institutional capacity to design andmanage projects needs to be improved through closer public-private consultation
practices (see section 2.4).

2.4 Lessons from Asia’s Experience: The Role of the Government
And an Industrial Strategy
One of the ways that the fifteen-year TICAD process differs from other international forums on African development is that the lessons from Asia’s development
experience are incorporated in it. TICAD IV particularly underlines i) respectfor diversity, ii) the government’s role and iii) country-specific industrialisation
strategy.
• Respect for diversity: Watanabe/Hanatani (2008) and the Secretariat of theStocktaking Work, JICA (2008) argue that Asia’s development is commonly
characterised as export-orientated industrialisation. In practice, however, thedevelopment paths have been diverse in the region: individual economies
pursued different development strategies according to their different endowments and circumstances. 17 This attention to diversity has increasing support
in the international development discourse. Weiss (2008), who examines thepost-Washington Consensus paradigm for development assistance with a view
to its validity and effectiveness, contends that aid strategies will have to re-

15 Japan has a successful record in this area, including a technical assistance project in Zambia
which officially commenced in 2006. The Japan International Cooperation Agency deployeda Malaysian advisor to Zambia to improve the investment environment in the country. The
initial results include i) the establishment of investment promotion policies, ii) the developmentof investment-related legislation and investor relations, and iii) the modification of government
systems in this context. See Jegathesan/Ono (2008).
16 The move towards co-formulation was first advocated in 1997 in the ODA White Paper(MOFA 1997). In addition, a more drastic policy change that occurred was reflected in theForeign Ministry’s announcement on 18 April 2008 to allow companies to propose ODA projects
to recipient countries.

Japan’s ODA and TICAD IV

15spect specific conditions and be adaptable to local contents to reduce poverty
effectively. African countries whose geographical conditions and endowments
are as diverse as Asia would have adopted different economic policies andgrowth strategies with different prioritised measures and sequences reflecting
their diverse conditions. In practice, however, their policies and strategies
have ended up converging on export-orientated industrialisation throughforeign investments. In addition, African countries have been virtually forced
to meet standardised “best practices” set by the international development
regime since the 1980s (e.g. the structural adjustment programme, good
governance and the Poverty Reduction Strategy). The set of policy measures recommended by international development organisations has always
been identical, and yet such identical recommendations failed to bring about
continent-wide economic success.
• The role of the government – more policy space: By the same token, thescope of governments in pursuing economic policies has been limited, whilemost of the private sector remains fragile. For example, African governments today face stricter discipline regarding international trade, investment
and intellectual property rights under the World Trade Organization regime
than their Asian counterparts did in the 1980s. The recent “policy space”
discourse in the global economy and development (e.g. Stiglitz 1998; Hoekman 2005; Chang 2006) argues that the rules and norms of international
economic regimes, e.g. liberalisation of trade and finance, market reform,
improvement of governance, have narrowed down the policy options thatgovernments can take regarding trade, macro-economic management andindustrial development. This limitation thereby constrained economic growth
opportunities for developing countries. In a symposium during TICAD IV,
Joseph Stiglitz stressed the important role of Asian governments in pursuing

17 For example, Japan, Korea and Taiwan financed development projects domestically, while
the economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) mainly depended on FDI.
There are both resource-rich countries (e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia) and non-resource ones
like Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. The governments of Korea, Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines have had active records of intervening in the economy, while thoseof Taiwan (after the 1980s) and Thailand have made modest interventions. Although the “flying
geese” model – the transformation from labour-intensive to capital-/technology-intensive industries – was prevalent in general, the leading sectors have also varied among countries, e.g. heavy
industry, electric appliances, the agricultural industry or textiles (Watanabe/Hanatani 2008).

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Matsuo Watanabe

economic policies, striking the appropriate balance between government andmarket, based on country by country conditions. Other participants, including Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete and Ethiopian Prime Minister
Meres Zenawi, echoed that African governments ought to have broader policy
options, for example, in addressing market failure and investing in humanresource development and infrastructure to meet public obligation.
• The call for a country-specific industrial strategy: The Yokohama Declaration
acknowledges the urgent need to accelerate Africa’s industrial development.
Watanabe/Hanatani (2008) propose that African governments establish andimplement country-specific industrial development strategies which look to
identify and support prospective growth industries with a focus on the latentpotential of individual economies. African countries have made decade-longefforts to reform their economies and governance. Such efforts, however, havenot necessarily borne fruit in terms of promoting new industries or achieving
economic development. The insufficiency of reforms, the civil wars and their
negative effects on neighbouring countries account for some of the setbacks.
Nevertheless, the current low levels of infrastructure and other capital stocks,
the disparity between productivity and wages, the costs associated with public
administration and the lack of efficient financial systems have all contributed
to reducing business profitability in Africa and thus placed limits on economic
growth. With more policy space, governments should design their own
development strategies by taking advantage of the current buoyant economy.
Of course, it is naive to expect that all of the African governments havethe full capacity to do so from day one. Rather, an initial target for many
governments may be to increase their institutional capacity to pursue suchstrategies through flexible and continuous efforts to design, try out, review,scrap and re-build appropriate policies in accordance with their individual
capacity levels. As such, the international community has a role to play insupporting their efforts. 18 These ideas in support of broader government roles
appear to be meeting with increasing support (Rodrik 2008; Commission
on Growth and Development 2008) as well as scepticism (e.g. Lawrence2007). 19 What is important is that the ideas do not express the leftist sentimentof Big Government, but are intended for particular objectives, i.e. private
sector development in Africa. Specific policy initiatives are indispensable forfragile private sector in Africa to attain far-reaching development; otherwise
economic success is likely to be confined to resource-related sectors that haveJapan’s ODA and TICAD IV

17

fewer ripple effects on an economy.

3 The Transition of Japanese Aid Policy
Japan is turning its resources to Africa, whose political and economic relations
with the Asian nation were relatively limited until recently. The regional distribution of ODA has also seen a drastic shift to Africa. 20 As mentioned above, Japan
has advocated economic growth, closer PPP, a broader role on the government’s
part and industrial policy as its assistance strategies for Africa. These propositions
depart from conventional international norms of development and indicate asomewhat different trait judging from Japan’s past practices. Why is this thecase? This section explores Japan’s aid policy changes and their backgrounds.

3.1 What Are the Objectives of TICAD IV?
Most analyses agree that the main short/medium-term goals of TICAD are gaining
African support for Japan’s bid for permanent membership of the UN Security
Council and securing a sustainable supply of natural resources from Africa (Terada
2008; Kamiya/Hongo 2008). These goals can be classified as a manifestation ofJapan’s political and economic interests.
The former has been one of the most desirable diplomatic goals in Japan’sview. However, the last bid it made in 2005 – jointly undertaken with Brazil,
Germany and India – was unsuccessful because the four countries failed to secure
enough support, especially from Africa, which accounts for 25 per cent of the
UN’s 192 members. TICAD IV was a good opportunity for Japan to gain support
for the important diplomatic mission.

18 There are numbers of strategy-making projects in this context. South Africa has employeda Harvard University team to design economic policies (including industrial development). See
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/growth/.
19 For example, industrial policy – typically represented by governmental intervention throughimport restrictions, subsidies, regulation, loans and tax to promote certain industries – has been
the subject of scepticism from mainstream economists who felt it inefficient and costly (Yusuf
2001). Baer et al. (1999) even ascribe industrial policy to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The
prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund have been equally blamed for confounding thecrisis-affected economies, however.
20 According to MOFA (2007), Japan’s ODA for Africa amounted to 34.2 per cent of the overall
figure in 2006, increasing from 10.1 per cent in 2000, whereas the Asian share declined from54.8 per cent to 26.8 in the same period. This reflected the commitment made at the 2005 G8
Gleneagles Summit to double its ODA to Africa within three years.

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Matsuo Watanabe

There was an immediate result during TICAD IV (and the G8 Summit),
however: a number of African heads of state confirmed their countries’ explicit
support for Japan. However, some countries reserved their answer, while others
gave conditional support for “mutual support to Africa”. This implies that theJapanese government is urged to produce quicker and tangible results which the
African side looks to – i.e. not merely one-time aid disbursement, but sustainableeconomic growth – to gain political support from Africa. For this to happen,
Japan has endeavoured to hammer out the four aid strategies that it deems
effective. 21
On the economic front, the view that Japan just wants recourse is short-sighted;
rather, longer-term perspectives for the Japanese economy should be considered.
Prime Minister Fukuda contended that Africa’s rich natural resources were nota factor when TICAD was inaugurated 15 years ago and that the meeting waspurely aimed at assisting the continent and building a long-term relationship(Kamiya/Hongo 2008). 22 This comment deserves careful interpretation. Japan’s
intension to establish closer ties with Africa is explained by the awareness that
Africa is becoming a powerful engine driving the growth of the world rather thanmerely remaining a resource supplier – the Prime Minister referred to a “centuryof African growth” at the opening of TICAD IV (Fukuda 2008; Daily Yomiuri
2008b). This awareness may be encouraged by the recent economic performancein Africa as well as the potential offered by the African market (see Hammond etal. 2007, for example), let alone its rich resources.
The reason why PPP is emphasised can be explained in this context. Japanesecompanies’ businesses in Africa have been lagging far behind their European
and Chinese counterparts. A comment made by the state-backed Japan External

21

The changing environment of foreign aid also urges donors to be more result-orientated andeffective thanks to the MDGs and the 2005 Paris Declaration, in which 56 items of code of
conduct are provided for donors and recipients to make aid more effective. For details of theParis Declaration, see http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html.
22 There was also a sceptical view that TICAD was intended for geographical rivalry against
China. In fact, the author observed that a number of African states were intent on coaxing more
aid pledges by stimulating the sentiment of rivalry at various meetings held prior to TICAD IV.
Japanese officials always flatly denied such rivalry because assistance for Africa was not a zero-sum
game. In addition, the “temperate” Japanese attitude could be partly accounted for by China’s
shift in diplomacy towards Japan in recent years, moving to a more conciliatory approach takenby the Hu Jintao administration than that of its predecessor, Jiang Zemin.

Japan’s ODA and TICAD IV

19

Trade Organization that “it is vital for Japan to make efforts with an ‘all-Japan
approach’”, calling for closer public-private ties with Africa, illustrates a sense ofurgency regarding Japan’s participation in Africa (Terada 2008). As such, PPP,
including an investment fund and insurance, is employed as a support measure
for Japanese investors in Africa, applying lessons from their record of successfulintervention in Asia.

3.2 The Historical Background of Japan’s ODA
Why has Japan ventured to set out a distinct aid policy? A brief review of thehistory of the country’s foreign assistance activities will help us to understandthe problem.
Table 1 The Transition of International Development Regimes
1960s
Development
regime/initiatives
Approaches

Focus

1970s

1980s

1990s

UN Decade of Basic Human
Development Needs

Structuraladjustment

ImportRedistribution
substitution in- of growth,dustrialisation, community
trickle down development

Human
development,sustainability
GovernancereformMarketmechanism,
exportorientatedindustry
Macro
Institution,balance,human rights,
liberalisation, democracy
privatisation
Conditionality Aid fatigue

Infrastructure Education,
health, water

Characteristics Filling
financial gaps
Events inEast-West
international confrontation
politics andeconomySource: The author.

Oil crisis, New World debt
International problem,
EconomicReaganOrder
Thatcheradministrations

End of 1990s
afterwards
Poverty
reduction,
MDGs
Socialdevelopment,
inclusiveness

Peace-building,post-conflictrehabilitationAid
effectiveness
Post-Cold War, 9/11, fightglobalisation against
terrorism

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Matsuo Watanabe

Japan’s aid policies have always been made within the framework of US hegemony
and as a member of the West. Most of Japan’s aid agendas have followed theinternationally prevalent regime, which was established by the UN, the WorldBank or the OECD. 23
Tadokoro (2006) argues that Japan’s foreign assistance, which started in the
1950s as a complement of war reparations to Asian countries, was implemented
under the framework of the Japan-US Security Treaty. Under US hegemony inSoutheast Asia, Japanese aid for the region was intended to prevent the penetration of communism and maintain security by stabilising people’s livelihoods(remember, a military contribution was politically difficult for Japan). Japan’s
foreign aid was conducted in consideration of the US government’s expectation
particularly during the Vietnam War period (1959-1975) when the US Congress
resolutely cut the foreign assistance budget.
President Johnson explicitly demanded that Japan purchase US Treasury
bonds, contribute 100 million USD to the Asian Development Bank and giveODA to what was then South Vietnam when Okinawa Island was returned toJapanese sovereignty in 1972 after US occupation. This was also followed by
the Carter administration, which called on Japan to disburse aid to the conflictaffected countries, namely Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey, for the solidarity of theWest (Nakanishi 2006). The Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Blue Book (MOFA1980) states that the aid was intended to ensure continued security in a broad
sense. The series of Japanese Yen loans has also been politically used to stabilise
the Japan-China relationship, e.g. to support Deng Xiaoping’s Reform andOpen-Door Policy and hence to strengthen China’s orientation to the West.
Nakanishi concludes that the history of Japanese aid can be regarded as partof an effort to be treated as one of the world’s major nations, allowing it to escapethe status it had at the end of WW II as a vanquished country. This illustrates
the characteristic of Japan’s aid policy (as a “faithful follower” of international
regimes, often criticised as being passive rather than proactive).

23 The international development agendas have directly/indirectly reflected the views of theAmerican and British governments, who mobilised international organisations to make their policies as global consensuses. For example, the structural adjustment programme was developed
during the period of the two transatlantic conservative administrations of Reagan and Thatcher(Table 1).

Japan’s ODA and TICAD IV

21

3.3 From Subordination to Autonomy? The Reaction to the
Changing International Political Economy
Japan’s attempt to seek a leading role in international development discourse began in the mid-1990s and was represented by the OECD Development AssistanceCommittee formulating a new development strategy in 1995. 24 In the post-Cold
War period when other major donors were experiencing aid fatigue, the Japanese
government took the lead in producing this strategy. Subsequently, in 1998,
Japan proposed the concept of Human Security and made a contribution to atrust fund established in the UN. 25 These initiatives were prepared after carefully
observing international development trends; in other words, the Japanese effort
was centred on producing what major donors could accept.
Meanwhile, the ODA budget retrenchment in 1998 forced Japan’s ODA
to change. The decade-long depression and huge budget deficit turned public
opinion on ODA sour. While the international community found resurging
interest in assisting developing countries by establishing MDGs in 2000 andmajor donors pledged a substantial increase in ODA at the 2002 International
Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Japan’s ODA budget
continued to shrink, falling to a level of 729.3 billion JPY in 2007, a 38 per centreduction compared with 1997 (MOFA 2007). The 2003 revision of the ODA
Charter hence needed to incorporate national interest to be pursued throughODA and urged a transition from volume to quality (House of Councillors 2004).
TICAD IV’s emphasis on quick and effective results can be also explained in thiscontext.
Another more fundamental factor which helped to bring about the aid policychange were the diplomatic realities. As mentioned above, Japan’s diplomacy
has essentially been subject to the US, and Japan bore the costs (including ODA)
in order to maintain US hegemony. This system actually functioned quite well:financial and diplomatic costs have been modest, and the country was not exposedto the ferocious reality of international politics until the mid-1990s.

24 Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution & Development Co-operation, propounding
a reduction in extreme poverty by half by 2015, is considered as a harbinger of MDGs. The
strategy outline can be found on the Foreign Ministry’s website, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ref4.html and the original text can be viewed at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/35/2508761.pdf.
25 See http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/.

22

Matsuo Watanabe

However, such peacefulness now appears to be dispersing. The series of
diplomatic stalls in recent years (e.g. the North Korea problem, the bid for
the UN Security Council and the dispute with China over control of offshore
gas fields) as well as the long-standing dispute with Russia over the Northern
Territories posed the question of whether the intended diplomatic results could
be guaranteed by Japan by simply taking a conformist stance. 26 In addition,
US setbacks in Iraq, the Middle East peace process and the sub-prime loan
problem since 2007 indicate that US supremacy is declining and a process ofmulti-polarisation is currently under way (regardless of the US’s own intention). 27
Under these circumstances, Japan appears to be determined to face the problems
rather than pretend not to see them and to pursue a more result-orientateddiplomacy. The change in diplomatic stance is reflected in its main policy tool,i.e. ODA.

4 Conclusion
The outcome of TICAD IV suggests that Japan’s aid policy is in a state oftransition and is an effort to strengthen the country’s ties with African countries
in order to gain Africa’s political support in the international arena as well as
to create business opportunities. The explicit emphasis on economic growth inAfrica and the accompanying strategies to achieve growth represent a departurefrom conventional international norms and Japan’s past ODA practices.
This growth orientation is not a spontaneous idea just for TICAD IV. The
Japanese government has been pointing out the contribution of economic growth
to poverty eradication in international development policy discussions eversince the end of the 1990s, although the international development discourse

26 The North Korea problem (namely nuclear weapons, missiles and the abduction of Japanesenationals), one of the most pressing diplomatic issues, has seen no substantial progress, and theparticipants of the Six Party Talks on the problem appear to have conflicting priorities. Prime
Minister Koizumi chose to despatch the Self-Defence Force to Iraq in 2003 in support of theBush administration’s position, stressing the importance of the Japan-US alliance (Koizumi 2003).
Japan vainly “expected” the US to exercise the power to solve the North Korea problem, especially the abduction. In addition, although the US has consistently supported Japan’s permanent
membership of the UN Security Council, no explicit sign has been observed that the US has taken
any specific action to bring this about.
27 See Haass (2008) regarding the US decline and multi-polarisation (which Haass calls “nonpolarity”).

Japan’s ODA and TICAD IV

23

on poverty reduction centred more on distribution than growth. By taking
advantage as the host of TICAD IV and the G8 Summit this year, the Japanese
government determined to incarnate the idea to effectively achieve its objectives
and mobilise its main diplomatic resource (i.e. ODA) to encourage Japanese FDI
to Africa by applying its successful experience in Asia.
This policy shift is interpreted as a compelling reaction to the multipolar
global political economy rather than a manifestation of any ambitious “lust forconquest”. Japan’s national interest has long been secured under US hegemony
since 1945. However, by facing the series of diplomatic setbacks and the decliningrole of the US as the anchor of international political economy, it appears thatJapan needs to manoeuvre to pursue its interests on its own in the global order.
Although this article has just focused on one aspect of Japan’s foreign policy,
namely its ODA strategy with respect to Africa, the argument presented here
might point at a broader trend in Tokyo’s foreign affairs. There is at least an
emerging sign that Japan’s main diplomatic tool is being used in a different way
to reflect the interests of diversifying stakeholders in the international political
economy.

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