The Japan- U.S. Dialogue
Evolving U.S.-Japan Alliancein a Turbulent Time of Transition:
Sustaining the Open, Rules-Based Global Order

Conference Papers

March, 2, 2016
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)

Table of Contents
1. Program ..................................................................................................................... 1

2．Biographies of the Panelists .................................................................................. 3
3．Presentation Papers ................................................................................................ 5
Session I: Mission of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of
New Guidelines and Japan’s New Security Legislation.......... 5
HOSOYA Yuichi ........................................................................................................................... 5
Robert MANNING ...................................................................................................................... 7
Session II: Where Should the Two Allies Start?......................................................................... 11
NAKANISHI Hiroshi ................................................................................................................ 11James SCHOFF ........................................................................................................................... 13

4．Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations ........................ 15(1) The Global Forum of Japan .................................................................................................... 15(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations ....................................................................... 16(3) Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ............................ 17

1. Program
日米対話
The Japan-U.S. Dialogue---------------------------------------------------------------------------------「激動の世界と進化する日米同盟：開かれたルール基盤の国際秩序存続のために」
Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Turbulent Time of Transition:
Sustaining the Open, Rules-Based Global Order2016 年 3 月 2 日／March 2, 2016
東京・国際文化会館「講堂」／"Lecture Hall," International House of Japan, Tokyo, Japan
共催／Co-sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム ／ The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
米国防大学国家戦略研究所／Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University（INSS)

開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks

13:00-13:10
挨拶（5 分間）

伊藤憲一

グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人／日本国際フォーラム理事長

Opening Remark (5 min.)

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR

セッションⅠ／ Session I
新ガイドラインと新安保法制の下での日米同盟の使命

13:10-15:00

Mission of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of New Guidelines and Japan's
New Security Legislation

Chairperson

神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／日本国際フォーラム上席研究員
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research
Fellow, JFIR

報告 A （10 分間）

細谷

Paper Presenter A(10min.)HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University

報告 B （10 分間）

ロバート・マニング

Paper Presenter B (10min.)Robert MANNING, Senior Fellow, the Atlantic Council

コメント A （7 分間）

高原

Commentator A (7 min.)

TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, the University of Tokyo / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

コメント B （7 分間）

ジェームズ・ショフ

Commentator B (7 min.)James SCHOFF, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

コメント C （7 分間）

加藤

Commentator C (7 min.)

KATO Yoichi, Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

自由討議 （60 分）

出席者全員Free Discussions (60 min.)All Participants

議長

雄一

明生

洋一

慶應義塾大学教授

アトランティック・カウンシル上級研究員

東京大学教授／日本国際フォーラム上席研究員

カーネギー国際平和財団上席研究員

日本再建イニシアティブ研究主幹

15:00-15:10

休憩／Break1

セッションⅡ／ Session Ⅱ

15:10-16:50

何から始めるべきか
Where Should the Two Allies Start?

議長

ラスト・デミング

Chairperson

Rust DEMING, former U. S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

報告 A （10 分間）

中西

Paper Presenter A (10 min.)

NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ

報告 B （10 分間）

ジェームズ・ショフ

Paper Presenter B (10 min.)James SCHOFF, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

コメント A （7 分間）
Commentator A (7 min.)

神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／日本国際フォーラム上席研究員
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research
Fellow, JFIR

コメント B （7 分間）

ラスト・デミング

Commentator B (7 min.)Rust DEMING, former U. S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

コメント C （7 分間）
Commentator C (7 min.)

渡部 恒雄 東京財団政策研究ディレクター・上席研究員
WATANABE Tsuneo, Director for Policy Research and Senior Fellow, The Tokyo
Foundation

自由討議 （60 分）

出席者全員Free Discussions (60 min.)All Participants

寛

元国務省首席次官補代理

京都大学教授／グローバル・フォーラム有識者メンバー

カーネギー国際平和財団上席研究員

元国務省首席次官補代理

総括セッション／ Wrap-up Session

16:50-17:00
ラスト・デミング

元国務省首席次官補代理

総括 （10 分間）

Rust DEMING, former U. S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Wrap-up (10 min.)

神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／日本国際フォーラム上席研究員
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research
Fellow, JFIR[NOTE］日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2

2．Biographies of the Panelists【U.S. Panelists】

Robert MANNING
Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Atlantic Council
Formerly served as Senior Strategist, DNI National Counterproliferation Center, 2010-12 and Director,
Long-Range Energy and Regional/Global Affairs, U.S. National Intelligence Council, Strategic Futures
Group, 2008-2010. From 2005-2008 is served as a member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State and from 2001-2005 he was Senior Counselor, Energy, Technology and Science Policy,
Department of State. Prior to joining Department of State in 2001, served as Director of Asian Studies and a
Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
James SCHOFF
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
A specialist in East Asian security issues, U.S. alliance relations in the region, and WMD nonproliferation
focused on North Korea, Schoff previously served as senior adviser for East Asia policy at the U.S. Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and as director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis(IFPA) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Prior to joining IFPA, served as program officer in charge of policy
studies at the United States-Japan Foundation in New York.
Rust DEMING
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Received B.A. from Rollins College and M.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University. Has spentmuch of his career dealing with Japanese affairs, having served in Japan as charge d’affaires, and as deputy
chief of mission. Served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs(June 1998 to August 2000), Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs from
December 1997, Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs in Washington from 1991 to 1993. In 2011, recalled
to the State Department for six months to serve once again as Japan Director. Also served as American
Ambassador to Tunisia from 2000 to 2003. Currently serves as an adjunct professor of Japan studies at thePaul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.

【Japanese Panelists】

ITO Kenichi
Chairman & President, GFJ / President, JFIR
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS of
Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as Directorof First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS
(1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He has been
President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 and now
concurrently serves as Chairman of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus
and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.
KAMIYA Matake

Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1985 and did graduate study at Columbia University as a
Fulbright grantee. Became Research Associate at the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1992, Lecturer
with tenure in 1993, Associate Professor in 1996, and became Professor in 2004. Meanwhile, served asDistinguished Research Fellow at Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994-95). Concurrently serves
as Adjunct Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of Internatinal Affairs, Editor-in-Chief of Discuss Japan:
Japan Foreign Policy Forum (http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/), and Member of the Board of Directors ofJapan Association for International Security.
3

HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University
Received his M.I.S. from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D. from Keio University. He is also SeniorResearcher at Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and at the Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Served
as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009–10), Visiting fellow at Princeton
University (2008–2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic
history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security. He is a member of Prime Minister’s
Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, and a member of Prime Minister’s
Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities, in which capacity he helped to draft Japan’s
first National Security Strategy.
TAKAHARA Akio
Professor, the University of Tokyo / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
Received his DPhil from the University of Sussex in 1988. Served as a visiting scholar at theConsulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong (1989‐1991), the Japanese Embassy in Beijing (1996‐1998),
Fairbank Center for East Asian Research of Harvard University (2005‐06), Peking University (2014-15), andthe Mercator Institute for China Studies (2016). Holds the current position since 2005. Concurrently serves as
an adjunct fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and as senior fellow of the Tokyo
Foundation.
KATO Yoichi
Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation
Graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and joined the Asahi Shimbun. Served as Deputy
Editor of both the Political and Foreign News Departments from 2002 to 2004, Bureau Chief of Asahi’s
American General Bureau in Washington, D.C. from 2005 to 2009, and National Security Correspondent.
Meanwhile, received M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, served as avisiting research fellow at both the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) of National Defense
University (NDU), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, and at the
School of International Studies of Peking University, and taught a course on national security strategy at
Gakushuin University in Tokyo from 2011 to 2012. Holds the current position since January, 2016.
NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ
Received M.A. from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at
the University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990 as Ph.D. candidate. Served as Associate Professor in Kyoto
University. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, withparticular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreignand security policy. He was on the panel of several Governmental advisory committees, including theCouncil on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era and the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of
the Legal Basis for Security.
WATANABE Tsuneo
Director of Foreign & Security Policy Research and Senior Fellow, the Tokyo Foundation
Received D.D.S. from Tohoku University in 1988 and M.A. in political science from the New School
University in New York. Joined Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. in
1995 and has served as a Visiting Research Scholar, Research Associate, Fellow, Senior Fellow, and currently
an Adjunct Fellow. After serving as a Senior Fellow at the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute in Tokyo
since April, 2005, joined the Tokyo Foundation in October, 2008. Published On China’s Military Rise(co-authored, Tamkang University Press, 2015) and US-China Trading Places in 2025 [in Japanese] (PHP
Research Institute, 2011), etc.
(In order of appearance)

43．Presentation Papers
Session I: Mission of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of New
Guidelines and Japan’s New Security LegislationHOSOYA Yuichi

Professor, Keio University
Japan's New Security Legislation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance:
Internationalizing Japan's Security Policy
The Ideological Divide in Japanese Security Debate in 2015
-During the debates on the security bills in the summer of 2015, leading newspapers, political parties andpublic opinion in Japan were divided into two opposing groups. While the left-wing liberals claimed
that the bills are unconstitutional, the right-wing conservatives focused on the importance of enhancing
the U.S.-Japan alliance at the time when China has been rapidly building up its military power.

-The debate on the security legislation had become largely politicized and those who criticized the bills
intended to damage the popularity of the Abe's Cabinet which has remained in power for more than
three years. At the same time, the majority of Japanese constitutional law professors still think that the
Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional, and hence should be abolished.

SEALDs (Students

Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy-s), a pacifist activist group which initiated anti-security bills
demonstration, advocates "pacifist foreign and security policy based on dialogue and cooperation".

-However, the instability and the crises in East Asia has transformed the perception of Japanese people.
According to the result of the public opinion poll of Kyodo News in February 20 and 21, 47% of the
respondents support the security bills while 38.1% oppose them. The scale of the criticism has been
toned down, as it seems that the security bills will probably reduce, rather than increase, the likelihoodof a military conflict in East Asia.
5

"Further Contribution to the Peace and Stability"-One of the reasons why the security bills were so criticized is that ordinary people do not understand
why the Abe Cabinet was so eager to pass the security bills. The basic idea of Abe's security strategy is
written down in Japan's National Security Strategy.

It says that "surrounded by an increasingly severe

security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become
indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international
cooperation". Japan is now ready to provide "further contribution to the peace and stability". For thispurpose, it is essential to revise the security legislation to adopt to new strategic environment.

Two Pillars of Security Legislation: PKO and Support Activities-Two pillars of the security legislation are international peace cooperation activities and support
activities including logistics support. There are several new security activities that the SDF will be able
to do due to the passing of the security bills at the National Diet; such as internationally coordinatedpeace and security operation outside of the UN PKO framework.

-The constitutional reinterpretation to enable the exercise of the collective self-defense has been the most
focused issue during the debate. The protesters singularly criticized that the security bills would destroy
Japan's postwar peaceful path. By abolishing them, they argue that we can avoid every war.

-The basic philosophy of this security legislation, on the other hand, is to internationalize Japan's security
activities. There still exist many hurdles to clear to exercise the collective self-defense under the new
security bills. Japan has the severest conditions to exercise the right of the collective self-defense.

New Trajectory for the Alliance?
-With this new security legislation, the U.S.-Japan alliance will have a stronger Japan's support, and will
be enhanced with closer cooperation.

-However, we should not overestimate the extent of the security legislation.

6

Robert MANNING
Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,
Atlantic Council
Global Trends, Regional Challenges and the US-Japan AllianceLooking ahead to 2030, the world is at an inflection point. The US-Japan alliance will evolve inthe larger context of a world in the midst of historic transition from the post-post Cold War world to an
uncertain and future order.
The alliance will be buffeted global trends and regional challenges that will complicate efforts
to sustain an open-ruled based global and regional order. Some of the global megatrends shaping thesecurity environment:
A global diffusion of wealth and power from West to East and North to South, unprecedented
in the modern era. Global economic growth will be driven by emerging economies, G-7 economic
share of the global GDP will continue to decline relatively. Yet the international system createdafter WW2 has not adapted to new economic and strategic realities;
Individual empowerment: both super-empowered individuals like Bill Gates to jihadist using
the ICT revolution to globalize their sick message and recruit. Complicates governance;
Demographics offers one of the few reliable predictors of the future. The greying of Asia is one
trend – the ROK will follow Japan, China will become the first nation to grow old before it grows
rich. The Greater Middle East has a youth bulge, but is squandering its demographic dividend ina generation of internal conflicts. India has a huge opportunity to turn its youth bulge into a
dynamic labor force to catch up to China;
Urbanization: The world’s population is now 50% urban, by 2030, it will be more than 60% urban.
Cities are becoming more important global actors. China economic reform plans to increase its
urban population to over 60% adding the equivalent of Japan’s population to cities. The global
middle class is projected to increase by more than 600 million by 2030;
Globalization’s dynamic and perceptions of it have changed. Globalization is not identified asWesternization, and is increasingly regionalized with growing concentrations of trade andinvestment in North America, European Union, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. However, viewof globalization are changing and it is increasingly viewed as a source of inequality – both within
and between nations;Technology Revolution: Built on a digital IT platform, a host of emerging technologies – robotics,
artificial intelligence, 3D printing, new materials, big data/algorithms – are converging in a 3rd
revolution with transformational, disruptive socio-economic impact on areas from the future ofjobs to the future of warfare;7

Fragmentation: In part a local response to globalization, there is a trend toward nationalism andethno-nationalism, regionally, toward sphere of influence geopolitical competition:
o
o
o

o

The future of the European idea is in question—Brexit, the rise of nationalist parties
across Europe from France to Hungary, Poland; Scotland, Catalonia secessionism;
Russia, Putin is trying to elevate ‘Russian exceptionalism’ to a governing ideology;
In Asia, we see competing nationalisms, the re-emergence of China heightening territorial
disputes in the East and South China Seas. Also a tension between Trans-Pacific and
Pan-Asian institutions;
The Middle East is riven with ethno/religious nationalism threatening the Arab statesystem, intense Sunni-Shia proxy wars in strategic competition between Saudi Arabia
and Iran, and engulfing the region in likely generation-long conflict.

Global Challenges
Economic:
Slow growth in OECD nations, China and other BRICS. China’s actual growth may be closer to
3% than 7%, judging by electricity use and rail traffic. Beijing is having a difficult time
implementing market reforms, suffers massive capital outflows ($900 billion in 2015) and may be
stuck in the middle income trap for several years, In Asia Thailand and Malaysia may also be inthat category; as is Brazil.
Concern that the technology revolution may threaten jobs is a factor. Unlike previous epochs of
disruptive technological change, economists are debating whether this time is different, with thedigital economy, robotics and big data replacing whole categories of jobs;
The global trade and financinal system is at risk. The elements of this open, rules-based order
include the following: market access; free movement of goods, capital, and services; open investment
regimes; nondiscrimination; rule of law; protection of intellectual property rights; floating exchange
rates; regulatory convergence; private sector development; effective dispute resolution mechanisms; andrules of fair competition;
This broad consensus is increasingly being called into question in the United States, by some ofits closest allies in the Asia-Pacific region, and by a rising China taking a more assertive posturein regional and global affairs;
The failure of the Doha Round marks the end of global trade rounds. Instead sector specificglobal agreements and mega-regional accords (e.g. TPP, TTIP, RCEP) appear more likely trends
in the trade area;
Finance and monetary change is also underway. With the IMF addition of the RMB to the SDR
basket, we are entering a world of multiple reserve currencies. Though the US dollar is likely toremain dominant to 2030, the dollar, Euro and RMB along with the UK Pound will be competing
reserve currencies;
China’s creation of the AIIB appears less disruptive than feared, and is likely to become anothercomponent of the Bretton Woods system over time. But it is emblematic of Chinese efforts to
expand its global and regional role as a major power. (The chart below outlines
Chinese-supported alternative institutions being pursued by Beijing as a hedging strategy in theeconomic, political, and security spheres);8

Global Commons: all domains – air, maritime, cyber and space are increasingly contested:
In the maritime realm, China is seeking to reinterpret the Law of the Sea Treaty to facilitate its
anti-access strategy to complicate and reduce US predominance in the Asia-Pacific. This isplaying out in East and South Chines Seas territorial disputes as well;
Cyber: The future of the internet, a domain that is principally in the private sector risks
Balkanization. Russia and China are pursing the notion of “Internet sovereignty” to control
digital information flows;
Outer space, its peaceful use is also contested, with Russia and China building anti-satellite
capabilities, and seeking to promote self-serving UN norms;
In the cases of maritime and especially in regard to cyber and space, the US and Japan along with
the EU and like-minded countries will need to work to sustain the norms critical to an open
rules-based system In the relatively new domains of cyber and space, rules remain to be written
and the US and Japan will need to lead a coalition of like-minded nations shape acceptablenorms;
Security
Geopolitical competition has returned with a vengeance. Russia’s seizure of Crimea andcontinued efforts in eastern Ukraine to fragment that former Soviet Republic has broken the
security framework in Europe since 1991 and put reintroduced security concerns andcompetition to Europe;
China’s assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas, its growing military capabilities andstance against US alliances and security partnerships in the region has called into question thestability of current security arrangements in East Asia;
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear and ICBM capabilities, enabled by its economic support from
China is heightening tensions in Northeast Asia. How the Korean Peninsula and eventual
unification is managed is likely to shape the future geopolitical contours of Northeast Asia.

China-supported or initiated alternative institutions
Financial and Monetary Policy
BRICS New Development

Development bank with a focus on infrastructure,

World Bank, regional

Bank (NDB)

founded in July 2014 with headquarters in Shanghai; development banks
Indian presidency for the first five years.

Asian Infrastructure

ADB members were invited to join in; fifty-seven

Investment Bank (AIIB)

founding countries (as of May 2015).

BRICS Contingency Reserve Reserve pool (100 billion USD) for crisis liquidity

ADB
IMF

Arrangement (CRA)(signed in July 2014).

Mechanisms forTwenty-eight agreements on direct exchange of RMB Established currencyinternationalizing the RMB

with other currencies; treaties on clearing banks innine countries; seven country-specific Renminbi
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII)
quotas; twenty-eight swap agreements with central
banks.

9market mechanisms

Shanghai as global financial State Council decision (2012) to turn Shanghai into a

Established centers forcenter with

global financial center; approval of Shanghai

financial, commodities,

RMB-denominated futures

Free-Trade Zone (August 2013). RMB-denominatedand futures markets

markets

futures markets for crude oil, natural gas,petrochemicals (August 2014); gold trading platform(fall 2014); six other international commodities
futures markets are in the planning stage.

China International

CIPS for international RMB transactions (April 2012); Established payment

Payment System (CIPS)

SinoRussian negotiations on alternatives to SWIFT

systems (CHIPS, etc.)(fall 2014).
Transregional Infrastructure Projects
One Road, One Belt

Large-scale infrastructural and geostrategic projects

New Silk Road (United(announced by President Xi Jinping in November

States, 2011), Eurasian2013) that aim at opening up new land and maritime

Economic Union (Russia)

trading corridors across Eurasia.
Security
Conference on Interaction

A security forum originally initiated by Kazakhstan

and ConfidenceBuilding(1999); China serves as chair 2014-16.

ARF

Measures in Asia (CICA)
Shanghai Cooperation

An international organization (established in 2001)

Organization (SCO)

by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

CSTO, ARF

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with a security focus. In
2014, India, Iran, and Pakistan applied formembership.
Diplomatic Forums
Boao Forum for Asia (BFA)

An annual forum founded in 2001 for

WEF/Davos

decision-makers from politics, business, andacademia with a regional focus on Asia.
Pan-Asian Trade, Finance, Monetary Policy
Regional Comprehensive

A free trade agreement planned to be concluded by

TPP, TTIP

Economic Partnershipthe end of 2015 and to encompass three billion

IMF(RCEP)

people and 40 percent of world trade.

Chiang Mai Initiative

Reserve pool (increase to 240 billion USD in effectMultilateralization (CMIM); since July
ASEAN Plus Three; Asian2014) for crisis liquidity (“Multilateralization” started

Macroeconomic Researchin March 2010; AMRO established in April 2011,

Office (AMRO)

status as international organization since October2014).
China supported alternative Institutions

10

Session II: Where Should the Two Allies Start?
NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University
Agenda for Operationalizing the US-Japan Alliance2015 saw the two landmark developments of the US-Japan alliance in the form of the new
Defense Cooperation Guideline and the Security Law in Japan. They capped the transformation of thealliance into the post-Cold War world started around 1995.
Though the changes took too long, they are still relevant not in the least because the threats andchallenges emerged in 1990s are still live and kicking, and getting much more complicated: North Korea,
Chinese military rise, terrorism, and so on. Having achieved legal and policy framework update, the twocountries can lose no time implanting operational planning and preparation against various types ofconcrete situations.
Starting point must be the refurbishment of the bilateral alliance coordination. How to
implement the Alliance Coordinating Mechanism (ACM) is not easy. US Forces in Japan (USFJ) operates
as part of the Pacific Command (PACOM), so the USFJ-SDF coordination won’t be self-sufficient.
Difference of priorities between two countries, which is natural, and the elements of crisis management
make it difficult to decide who within the government is involved.
Given the recent cycle of escalating brinkmanship by North Korea, reaction against North
Korean situation is most pressing. This involves wider missile defense capability including coordinating
US-Japan SM-3 and Patriot on the one hand and US-Korea THAAD system. Since the China-centered
six-party talk is virtually dead, the revitalization of the trilateral security coordination is highly needed,which means the US required in mediating Japan and South Korea.
Another high priority issue is to respond to the ever-increasing encroachment of the Freedom of
Navigation by China in the South China Sea area. This requires a very subtle operation to balance
rejecting Chinese establishing fait-accompli and avoiding provocation leading to outright militaryconfrontation. Whether Japanese SDFs should join the Freedom of Navigation Operations is the matter11

to be examined carefully. Japan’s participation to the operation may have dual effect of sending themessage of its willingness to take responsibility of maritime freedom and provoking Chinese militaryresponse. The matter needs to be consulted closely between Japan and the US and possibly with theASEAN members, Australia, and India.
Third issue is the stealthy area of cyber-security filed, which seems moving out of non-statechallenges to state-sponsored challenges. Controlling the free flow of global information balancing
security needs and private information is the core of the free world, the US-Japan alliance forming thelynchpin in the Asia-Pacific. Japanese NSC and the Special Secrets Law in 2013 allow much wider room
for cooperation in this field.
Fourth area of immediate concern is global peace-building and wider security area including
anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and emerging infectious diseases. Japan still lacks depth of resources(facilities, equipment, and training), but finding best way to maximize the limited resources will havelong-term impact.
Fifth area is the information exchange of future arms procurement with multilateralimplications. Given the trend of ammunition price-tags skyrocketing, the US and Japan needs tocoordinate optimal arms equipment procurement. For example, deploying more land-to-surface andland-to-air missiles in and around Southwest Japan area may have added deterrent effect to theAmerican Air-Sea Battle strategy. Or Japan and the US can jointly develop form weapon procurement
network among the friendly powers like South Korea, the ASEAN countries, Australia and India.
Lastly, coordination between diplomatic-strategic thinking with economic-social thinking is one
area the Western countries tend to disregard. While the US and China having the annual S&ED meeting,Japan and the US lacks similar type of framework. Partly this is because free world has so many regularcontacts, but given the fact that the looming fear and anger on the economic future has the decisive
influence on the future of politics in major countries including Japan and the US, coordinating grandstrategy covering both diplomatic-military and economic-social spheres are both desirable and effective.

12

James SCHOFF
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Next Steps for Closer Alliance Integration in 2016 and Beyond
Last year when I spoke about the potential challenges for the Alliance in the future, I talked about
those challenges in the context of two main/broad purposes or functions for the U.S-Japan Alliance.
1. To protect our shared physical security interests through the Grand Bargain of Japan hosting U.S.
bases in exchange for a U.S. commitment (and the means) to help protect Japan’s sovereignty andindependence. I call this the security role.
2. To be partners in shaping and helping to build a global rules-based order that is peaceful, stable,
productive, open, respectful, and environmentally sustainable. I call this the partnership role.
The new U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines should have a profound impact on both ofthese roles over the long term, and the process of implementing these guidelines has already begun(albeit incrementally). They should enable more integrated alliance activity for certain missions
such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile defense (MD), asset protection(such as naval ships at sea), logistic support, and interdiction of illegal and dangerous shipments on
the high seas, among others.
Starting with the Security Role: More integrated alliance activity increases the need for efficient andaccountable decision making for both political and operational issues, and the new Alliance
Coordination Mechanism (ACM) should help in this regard.
The ACM approach borrows heavily from our experience with Operation Tomodachi and the U.S.
support for Japan’s response to crisis in 2011, with a structure that utilizes the existing 2+2
framework, but with added coordination w/ NSC officials & key political figures (for politicalaccountability). The ACM will be small and hard to notice during peacetime, but it can expand andreach up the chain of command during a crisis (and could also involve bilateral operations centersand component coordination centers in the field, as in 2011).
But we are not creating the ACM for its own sake or to simply “strengthen the alliance.” The whole
purpose is to enable a wider range of alliance activity that brings together our combined skills andresources to address the security challenges we face.
Similarly, the Alliance also has opportunities to leverage closer defense cooperation to strengthen its
partnership role.

Part of this stems directly from the work related to the security role, in the form of13

joint planning and exercises with other partner nations (like South Korea and Australia) to bolster
our ability to manage threats from North Korea (direct or indirect, such as in the form of nuclear
proliferation). But a lot of it will be collaborative activity focused specifically on partnership
missions in areas of disaster relief, maritime security, search and rescue (in the near term) andpossibly also defense equipment and technology cooperation over the longer term.
Specific partnership missions allow for the United States and Japan to engage a much wider
range of countries (including ASEAN, India, Canada, NATO members, Mongolia, and the United
Nations) and can produce a variety of direct and indirect benefits. Joint exercises in Thailand
for Cobra Gold is one example, as is Khan Quest in Mongolia or the RimPac exercises off Hawaii.
These exercises (and accompanying efforts to standardize certain procedures relevant tomultilateral coalition actions) improve our ability to respond jointly to natural disasters or somekind of refugee crisis, to support UN peacekeeping operations, prevent illegal trade and support
maritime security.
In addition to bilateral and multilateral exercises, the United States, Japan, and Australia inparticular have been making concerted efforts to support capacity building among many
Southeast Asian nations to improve their ability to protect their own maritime security interests.
Japan has provided surveillance ships to the Philippines and Vietnam, among other activities,
and the United States is launching a two-year $250 million maritime capacity building initiativein the region. Effectively coordinating this activity has been the subject of discussion at
U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral meetings, but the three still have a long way to go to make thiscoordination truly efficient.
Part of the challenge stems from the fact that “partnership role” cooperation often involves manydifferent parts of the government (and sometimes non-governmental organizations) of not only
the allies but also the host country.
The U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral coordination structure is fairly well developed (with the
diplomat-led Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), with associated issue-oriented sub-committees,
and the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) that focuses on defense policy issues,
primarily), but it is not designed to work collaboratively on specific issues. This is the nextchallenge for trilateral security cooperation, which is to leverage the investments we’ve made in
developing working-level relationships in various disciplines and apply them to specificmissions or challenges in a whole-of-government manner.

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4．Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations(1) The Global Forum of Japan【Objectives】
In today’s world, people’s attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with the globalization, butalso the rise of new states including People’s Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both inside and outside
the former Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in Asia-Pacific region, it
has become increasingly important for Japan to establish new channels of dialogue both in the first and the second tracks
with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as member countries of the Organization of theBlack Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Romania, etc.). On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forumof Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging frompolitics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members andopinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global
and regional arenas.
【History】
The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there wereexpressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity
was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfetteredexchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly,
Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice
President Etienne DAVINGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of theprivate-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in
September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had
made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the Americanand Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In linewith its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many
post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participantsfrom the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The
Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic andInternational Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after theAmerican component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7,
1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all
countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component
was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing,self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in
Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global
implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of
any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanesecomponent of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo,
TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO Kenichi as Chairman &President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and
TOYODA Shoichiro; 18 Political Members including the four Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KAKIZAWA Mito, KOIKE
Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 87 Academic Members including the three Governors, ITO Go, SHIMADA Haruo
and MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.
【Activities】
Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the
Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in
the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India and Australia European countries, Wider
Black Sea Area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international
order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing
policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number of Japaneseparticipants in the “Dialogue”, GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo.

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(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations【Objectives】
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent,
and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy andinternational relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its
members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy.
Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, theviews expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the
responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign themalone.
【History】
The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr.
HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, andmedia circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international
affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR wasreincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister inrecognition of its achievements.
【Organization】
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate
corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board ofTrustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of
supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge ofthe management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.
■Board of Trustees
ARIMA Tatsuo
HAKAMADA Shigeki
HATTORI Yasuo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
INOUE Akiyoshi
ISHIGAKI Yasuji
ITO Tsuyoshi
KOIKE Yuriko
KUROYANAGI Nobuo■Board of Directors
IMAI Takashi
ITO Kenichi
WATANABE Mayu
HANDA Haruhisa
KAMIYA Matake
KIYOHARA Takehiko
MORIMOTO Satoshi
TAKUBO Tadae

OHYA EikoSAKAMOTO Masahiro
SATO Ken
WATANABE Toshio
YAMAGUCHI Norio

ChairmanPresident
Executive Director
Director
Director
Director
Director
Director■Auditors
NAITOH Masahisa
SHIMADA Haruo【Activities】
The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research
Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Diplomatic
Roundtable,” “Foreign Policy Luncheon,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one
important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom”(http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public,
functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles
posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu”
in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners aretranslated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR
Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” isdelivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

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(3) Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
The mission of Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of
Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands to support the national
strategic components of the academic programs at National Defense University (NDU) and to provide
outreach to other US governmental agencies and to the broader national security community.
INSS includes the following Centers: Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Center for Technology and National
Security Policy (CTNSP), Center for Complex Operations (CCO), the Center for Strategic Conferencing (CSC),
the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS), and theCenter for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSMA).
The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission
by performing the following functions: research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy support, andoutreach.

[Contact]
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Lincoln Hall, Building 64
National Defense University
Ft. Lesley J. McNair
260 5th Avenue
Washington, DC 20319(202) 685-2335

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The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193[Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp[URL] http://www.gfj.jp/