科学技術イノベーション政策の科学（STIG） 2014 年度国際シンポジウム

Science, Technology, and Innovation Governance (STIG) International Symposium 2014

よりよいガバナンスによる科学技術イノベーションの有効活用
Making the Most of Science and Innovation through Better Governance

実施報告書

日
会
主

時
場
催

2014 年 11 月 28 日（金）13:00 - 17:45
東京大学本郷キャンパス

福武ラーニングシアター

東京大学科学技術イノベーション政策の科学（STIG）教育・研究ユニット

目

次

開会挨拶

城山英明（研究代表者・東京大学公共政策大学院）

1

Dr. Kenneth Oye（マサチューセッツ工科大学）

*

基調講演1

「バイオテクノロジーにおける先行的順応型リスクマネジメント：
医薬品と合成生物学への適用」"Proactive and Adaptive Risk Management in Biotechnology:
Applications to Pharmaceuticals and Synthetic Biology"

・応答発表：佐藤 智晶（東京大学公共政策大学院）
・応答発表：柴山 創太郎（東京大学工学系研究科）

基調講演2

Dr. Michael Rogers（前E C 委員長科学技術顧問）「欧州におけるリスクガバナンスの最新動向：

35
8

予防原則からスマートレギュレーションへ」"Recent trends in Risk Governance in Europe: From Precaution to Smarter Regulations"・応答発表：平川 秀幸（大阪大学コミュニケーションデザイン・センター）

・質疑応答

基調講演3

Dr. David Laws（アムステルダム大学）「ホットな順応的管理：事実とステークホルダーの間で」"Hot Adaptation: Working between facts and stakeholders"

15
19
21

・応答発表：松浦正浩（東京大学公共政策大学院）

30

・質疑応答

37

・応答発表：鎗目 雅（東京大学公共政策大学院）
基調講演4

Dr. Jason J Blackstock（ユニヴァーシティカレッジロンドン）「公的意思決定過程において科学・技術・工学の知見を理解し強化する方法」

33

41"Understanding and Strengthening Science, Technology, and Engineering
Knowledge within Public Decision-Making Processes"

・応答発表：城山英明（東京大学公共政策大学院）
・質疑応答

総合討論

51
55
57

資料編

63

総合司会：松浦 正浩（東京大学公共政策大学院）* 基調講演1 につきましては、原稿の確認が取れ次第再掲します。

Opening Remarks / 開会挨拶

城山 英明 ( 研究代表者・東京大学公共政策大学院 )Hideaki Shiroyama(Research representative, Professor,
The Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo)

松浦正浩：

約束のお時間になりましたので、始めさせていたただきます。本日は、STIG 国際シンポジウムにお越しいただき、皆様ありがとうございます。2014 年度の東京大学科学技術イノベーショ

ン政策の科学国際シンポジウムを始めさせていただきたいと思います。私は本日の司会を担当いたします、東京大学公共政策大学院の松浦でございます。早速ですが、本プログラムの代表、本学公共政策大学院院長の城山英明から開会のご挨拶を申し上げたいと思います。
城山：

ご紹介いただきました、公共政策大学院の院長をしております城山と申します。主催者を代表しまして、一言ご挨拶させていただきます。今、松浦さんからもご紹介がありましたけれども、東京大学における STIG 科学技術イノベーション政策の科学教育プログラムの 3 年目の国際シンポジ

ウムとして、本日このようなかたちで開催させていただきました。海外から来られた先生方、また、お忙しいところお集まりいただきました皆様方にまずは感謝申し上げたいと思います。

プログラムとしては 3 年目でありますが、教育プログラムは昨年 2013 年度にスタートし、本年2014 年度が 2 年目です。3 年前には、まさにこのプログラムの立ち上げ時の国際シンポジウムにおいて、海外においてどのような科学技術と政策に関するプログラムを行っているかということで、本日もお越しいただいている Oye 先生等にもお話をいただきました。また昨年は、東京大学の STIG

だけではなく、国内 5 つの人材育成プログラム拠点大学と合同で、エビデンス・ベースド・ポリシー・

メイキングに焦点を当てて、国際シンポジウムを開催させていただきました。

それに対して、今年はむしろ科学技術のダウンストリームといいますか、実際の利用段階での話、どのように、より良いかたちで科学技術イノベーションを活用していくかに焦点を当てて、今日半日、会議をさせていただきたいと思っております。若干タイトな日程にはなっておりますけれども、最初に Oye 先生から、主に薬事規制とシンセティック・バイオロジー（合成生物学）の話を問題提起をしていただきます。それに対して、日本側でどのような研究を行っているか、あるいは、実際に再生医療等に関してどのような法制度ができているかを素材として提供させていただきたいと思っています。

2 つ目のセッションでは、規制のあり方や、そこにどのようにパブリックエンゲージメントの成果を使っていくのかというあたりを、Michael Rogers 先生からお話しいただきます。まず Rogers 先
生からヨーロッパの経験をお話いただき、次に大阪大学の平川先生から日本の事例のお話をいただきたいと考えております。

3 つ目は、主に都市レベルの実際のイノベーションプロセスについて、ヨーロッパの例を David
Laws 先生からお話いただきます。それに対して我々の方でやっていることを松浦先生、鎗目先生からお話をさせていただくということになります。

最後、4 つ目のセッションでは、ある意味では 2 年前のシンポジウムの補完的な展開になりますけ1

れども、最近イギリスでこの分野に関して極めて精力的に活動されているユニバーシティ・カレッジ・
ロンドンの試みについて、Blackstock 先生からお話をいただき、今後、どういうことができるかといったことも話し合っていきたいと思っております。

このように今年度は、少し科学技術政策の現場の話に則して議論させていただきたいと考えております。このプログラムは今年でまる 3 年を迎えようとしておりますが、今後の方向性についていろ

いろな示唆をいただければと思いますし、皆様方の実際のご経験等もぜひお話をいただき、様々なかたちで双方向で議論できればと思っておりますのでよろしくお願いします。半日と短い機会ではありますけれども、積極的にご参加いただき、有意義なものにさせていただければと思いますので、よろしくお願いいたします。

2

Response Presentation / 応答発表佐藤 智晶 ( 東京大学公共政策大学院)

Chiaki Sato(The Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo)

佐藤智晶：

東京大学公共政策大学院特任講師の佐藤智晶と申します。本日はこのような貴重な機会をいただき、本当にどうもありがとうございました。

私の報告は日本における現状です。先ほど Oye 先生がおっしゃっていた通り、私のキーメッセー

ジも同じで、reforms cannot be ended なんですね。サマリーにありますように、最近のエボラ出血熱に対応する薬をどうやってマーケットに持ちこむかという話ですとか、認知症対策の予防薬や治療薬が今盛んに作られようとして努力されていますけれども、それに対応する規制がまだ整備されていないという状況があります。それに対して、様々な試みがなされています。そこに挙げておりますのが、ノンランダマイズド・クリニカル・トライアルですとか、オフレーベルで薬を作るですとか、より効率的にデータを集めて、患者さんに早くお薬を届けるという試みが考えられていますけれども、まだ解があるわけではありません。本日は、日本における再生医療ないし再生医療製品等という話と、いわゆる日本版 NIH の話をしようと思っています。

再生医療については、ポイントは 2 つあります。1 つは、医療技術の規制と医療関連製品の 2 本立ての規制にしたことです。製品を対象とする従来の薬事法規制の中に入れ込んだものと、もう 1
つは手技そのものに若干規制を加えるというかたちの、2 本立ての規制が行われたという点に特徴があります。アメリカと比べますと、アメリカの FDA は手技の規制をする規定を持ちませんので、訴訟が起きたりもしています。その点、日本でもどこまでが規制対象の手技なのかという点については、
同じく問題が生じる可能性があります。

2 つ 目 は、 先 ほ ど Oye 先 生 も お っ し ゃ っ て い ま し た け れ ど も、Conditional pre-market
approval、いわゆる「条件・期限付き承認」というものが認められたということです。人間の人体組織を使って再生医療関連製品を作ったりした場合、再生医療関連製品はどうしても個人差が出やすい。そのため医薬品と同様な規制を加えるわけにもいかないでしょうということで、この「条件・期限付き承認」が導入されたという経緯があります。

私がここで申し上げたいのは、実は再生医療製品等で扱われているこの Conditional pre-market

approval というものが、果たして再生医療のためだけの議論で終わるのかどうかというと分からな

いということです。個別化医療の分野で議論されている話というのは、実は同じような内容です。

Oye 先生の基調講演にもありましたけれども、医薬品、とりわけ、がん治療薬の部分でも同じような議論があります。ですので、日本でも再生医療をトライアルとして、医薬品ですとか医療機器にも議論がつながってくるのではないかと思っております。

次に 2 つ目、「ジャパン NIH」と言うと政府に怒られてしまうかもしれませんが、特徴として一番大事なのは、これまで各所ばらばらにやっていたバイオサイエンス、ヘルスケアへのリサーチファン

ディングというものを、一度統合してみましょうということです。まだまだアメリカの NIH に匹敵するような規模のリサーチファンドはないですけれども、それでも統合したというところに意味があるのではないかと思います。

ただ、法的な課題としていくつか挙げることができると思われるのは、第 1 に、リサーチファン

ドのプライオリティを決めるときに、科学者がこの分野が伸びるはずだと考えてファンドをつける方
3

法と、一定の国民の負託を受けた政治家がこの分野は大事だから研究費をつけようと考える、その対立が当然あります。それをどうやって調整するかという点に、当然注目をしなければならないだろうと思います。現在のところは、政治家が会議の構成メンバーになっている健康・
医療戦略本部というものがあり、そこが中心的に行うことになっています。そのなかで、科学者の役割をどこに見出せばいいんだろうかということが問題になるのかなと。アメリカでも、

オバマ大統領と NIH のプライオリティセットのところで若干揉めた経緯がありますけれども、日本でもこれからどうなっていくのかが面白いかと思います。

2 つ目ですけれども、NIH は「リサーチファンディングエージェンシー」だとよく言われます。単にファンドをつけるというだけではなくて、規制分野ですとか、リインバースメント（保険収載）についても、早い段階で議論を深めることが考えられないのかなと思っている次第です。アメリカでも、

Medical Device Post-market Surveillance の部分で、そのような仕組みというものが進められているところでございますが、日本でも考えられる必要があるのではないかというふうに思っています。
最後は、ここに Needed new Public-Private Partnership と書いたのは、医薬品の分野で特に起きている問題です。医薬品のシーズというものがどんどん枯渇してなくなってきているんですね。そのなくなりつつあるシーズに関して、アメリカの NIH では、製薬企業がいったんこれは駄目かもしれないと思って研究を中止したものを再利用する仕組みを作ろうとしています。NIH と企業がタイアップした上で、研究者の皆さんにもう一度研究してもらおうと。それでもし成果がでた場合には、製薬会社も一定の利益を得ることができるという仕組みが考えられたばかりのところです。これが成功するか分かりませんけれども、医薬品の種がなくなりつつあるというのは全世界共通の課題ですので、日本でもやはり議論する価値があるのではないかと思っています。

そういう意味では、NIH が考えなければならない問題というのは、単純にファンドがないですとかっていうことではなくて、規制や保険収載の部分との議論を進めていくことであったりとか、新しいパブリック・プライベート・パートナーシップの仕方を考えていく必要があるのかなということです。

まとめとなりますが、先ほど冒頭にも申し上げましたけれども、reforms cannot be ended。基

本的には Oye 先生がおっしゃっていることと同じことを、私も実は考えておりました。再生医療の規制は、これが最終形態ではないと思っています。より改善していく必要があって、とりわけ stateof the art に照らして変える必要がありますし、新しい科学的な知見、また、ソサイエタル・バリュー
が変われば当然変えていく必要があるでしょう。2 つ目ですけれども、ジャパン NIH、日本医療研究開発機構も、おそらく早急に、日本の NIH はどのぐらいいいものなんだろうか、悪いものだろうかという議論が出ると思いますが、その判断には少し時間が必要だろうと思っています。その点を踏まえて、私としては日本の現状の報告と法的課題というかたちで報告を終わらせていただきます。どうもありがとうございました。
松浦：

ありがとうございました。続きまして、次は柴山先生からお話しいただきます。
4Response Presentation / 応答発表

柴山 創太郎 ( 東京大学工学系研究科)

Sotaro Shibayama(The Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo)

柴山創太郎：

こんにちは。ご紹介にあずかりました、工学系研究科の柴山と申します。本日の第 1

セッションは、バイオ医薬分野におけるリスクマネジメントということで、冒頭から Oye 先生から多岐にわたるお話をいただいてきたところでございます。私からは、かなり焦点を絞って、こちらにありますタイトルの “Weakening Scientiﬁc Integrity”、日本語で申しますと、「弱体化するサイエン

ティフィック・インテグリティー」とでも言いましょうか、私どもが日本のバイオ医薬分野で行った
ケーススタディのお話をしたいと思います。

まず、背景を少しだけ整理させていただきますと、いわゆるアカデミア、サイエンスのガバナンスというのは非常に分散的であるということが言えると思います。と言いますのも、サイエンスの発展というのは、科学論文の出版によって礎を作られています。
その審査は基本的にはピアレビューによって行われます。ボランティアベースで個人の科学者が論文を審査して、論文を審査しているということです。例えば特許の審査においての特許庁のような、中央集権的な仕組みは存在していないということです。

この仕組みにおいて 1 つキーになるのが、サイエンティストは正直ベースで行動してもらわないと困るということです。ピアレビューをする際に、科学者が嘘をついているかもしれないと思ってその論文の真偽を精査していくということは非常にコストがかかりますので、基本的には科学者は正直だと思わざるを得ない。ということで、これはある種のパーミッシブ・アプローチだと言えるのかなと思います。

しかしながら実際には、あまりオネストではないパブリケーションというようなことも、まま見られます。「ファブリケーション」、ねつ造とか盗用とか、そういったことはよく起こるわけです。こういったことが、科学を取り巻く様々なステークホルダーに悪影響を与えているということは明らかです。

最近の統計を少しお見せします。これはリトラクション、論文の撤回の推移です。ここ 40 年ぐら

いの間にリトラクションの数は約 10 倍に増えています。また別の統計では、100 人中 2 人ぐらいは不正行為を行ったことがあるというようなことが言われているわけです。日本のデータに関して見ても、これは最近のミスコンダクトの報道件数ですけれども、上昇の傾向があるということが言われています。

こういった背景を踏まえますと、なぜ科学者が正直な行動をしなくなってしまうのかということを把握しておくことは、サイエンスのガバナンスを高めていくという意味では非常に重要であるということが言えるわけです。多くの先行研究には、2 つぐらい問題があります。1 つは、ミスコンダクトを測定することが非常に難しいということ。「あなたは不正行為をしましたか」と質問しても、誰も「はい」とは答えないわけですね。そのあたりの難しさがある。もう 1 つの難しさが、ミスコンダク
トが増えているとは言っても、実際の件数はそれほど多くないということで、なかなか意味のある分
析をすることは難しいという状況がございます。

この研究で何をするのかと言いますと、あまり過激でないタイプのミスコンダクト、我々はこれを “questionable research practices” というふうに呼んでいますけれども、このマイルドなタイ
5

プの不正直な行動に注目して、ある程度の統計的な分析を試みました。“questionable research

practices” には、いろいろエレメントがあります。有名なものでは、俗に「サラミ法」、サラミ・ス

ライシング、論文を細切れにして数を稼ぐ行為があります。あるいは、オーサーシップの乱用もあります。我々がここで注目、利用しようと思ったコンセプトは、“Dishonesty Conformity” というふうに呼んでいるものです。論文を投稿すると、レフェリーがいろいろとコメントを言ってくる。中には到底受け入れられないような内容を言ってくるレフェリーもいます。そんな時にあなたはどうしま
すか？という質問です。中には、論文をアクセプトされたいので、仕方なく従ってしまおうというよ
うなことが起きるわけです。これを、“Dishonesty Conformity” と呼びます。

10 年 ほ ど 前 に、 同 じ コ ン セ プ ト を 研 究 し た 人 た ち が い ま し た。 彼 ら は こ れ ら の 行 為 を、“Academic Prostitution” だと呼びましたが、言葉が過激なので、我々は別の呼び方で、“Dishonesty
Conformity” と呼んでいるということです。
我々は、日本のバイオ分野での教授、准教授レベルで、360 人からデータを得ました。どうやってこれを計るのかですが、サーベイのなかで、最近のピアレビューの結果について教えてくださいと質問をしました。「major revision を要求されたケースで、あなたが科学的に間違っていると思うよ

うなことを言われたことはありますか」と。Yes ならば、その時に何をしましたかということを聞きました。
「出版を諦めた」とか、「他の雑誌に提出した」とか、「反論して再投稿した」とか、最終的に「やむを得ず従った」と、こういう回答があるわけです。

実際にデータを見てみますと、6 割ぐらいが、「やむを得ず従った」、残り 2 割ぐらいが「反論した」となりました。さらに 15％ぐらいは、別の雑誌に提出した、2％は出版自体諦めたと。その結果がどうなったかがこちらです。上のほうがこの赤いグループ、従った人たちですね。この人たちは、その雑誌にめでたくアクセプトされたと。一方で、反論した人たちは半分ぐらいしかアクセプトされな
いということで、不正直ベースで行動すると、結構、アクセプトというメリットがあるんだなあということになってしまうわけでございます。

次に、この不正直な行動は、どういう人たちに見られる行動かということを、リグレッション、回帰分析で見ていきます。いくつか簡単に結果をサマリーしますと、コンペティション、競合が 1 つの理由になります。これはまあそうかなと予想できます。准教授のほうが教授よりも不正直な行動をとりやすいと。これも、昇進等々の競合があることが影響するのかなということですね。ローパフォー
マンス、生産性が低い人たちのほうが不正直になりやすいということです。これもある種納得できる
かなと思います。ちょっと解釈がよく分からないんですけれども、ベーシックとアプライドのフィールドを比べると、ベーシックフィールドのほうがディスオネストなケースが多いんですね。我々がこの研究をするときに、インパクトファクターが高いジャーナル、有名な雑誌のほうが不正直な行為が多いのかなと予想していたんですけれども、結果は逆でした。

これを解釈してみますと、誰も読まないような雑誌というのがやはりありまして。そういったとこ

ろだったら不正な行為をしてしまってもいいんじゃないか、という心理があるのかなと、とりあえず、そういった解釈をしております。

最後に、海外経験、海外研究経験の有無です。海外経験のない人のほうが不正直行動が多いという結果が得られました。日本人の研究者に関して言うと、海外経験というのは大体アメリカの経験ということなんですけれども。我々はこれも、研究を始める前の想定としては、アメリカのほうがやはり競合が激しいですから、不正直な行動が増えるのかなと思っていましたが、結果は逆でした。解釈としては、例えばアメリカのほうがインテグリティに関する教育、トレーニングがきちんとされている
6

とか、そういった背景があるのかもしれません。

時間が限られておりますので、あと 1 つ、2 つで終わりにしたいと思います。こちらのスライドは、サーベイのなかで追加的に聞いた質問 2 つです。これはアティチュードに関する質問です。左のほう、自分の過去の研究と矛盾する結果が出たときに、それを出版するべきだと思うか、思わないかという質問に対して、ほとんどの人が「賛成」だと。きちんとそれを出版しますよ、正直に行動します、と答えています。

もう 1 つ別の質問です。論文を書くときに、都合の悪いデータは省いていいかどうか。それは違うんじゃないかという回答者が半分ぐらい。こういう質問をすると、みんな自分は正直だと回答する
んですけれども、そうは言っても、そこそこの分散はあります。これと、先ほどお見せしたレフェリーに正直に反論するかというところですね。この 2 つは、想定通り相関しているということでございます。

最後に、我々の研究はまだ始まったばかりでして、これからいろいろと追加的なデータをとって、実際にどういったことが不正直の決定要因になっているのかというところを分析していきたいと思っております。どうもご静聴ありがとうございました。

7

Keynote Speech 2 / 基調講演2

マイケル ロジャース (前E C 委員長科学技術顧問)

Michael Rogers (Former Adviser in Science and Ethics, Bureau of European Policy
Advisers, The European Commission)"Recent trends in Risk Governance in Europe:
From Precaution to Smarter Regulations"「欧州におけるリスクガバナンスの最新動向：
予防原則からスマートレギュレーションへ」

Good Afternoon: I want to start by looking back at the evolution of
public policy concerning risk governance over the last 20 years or so. Firstly, it should beappreciated that in the early days there were only two groups involved – the experts whocarried out the risk assessment and the regulators who took this expert information and used
it to create risk regulations. Of course there are many more players and factors that comeinto play in modern risk governance and my story concerns this evolution.
Michael Rogers:

A good example of such early risk governance concerns a cholera outbreak in London in1854 (a bit before my time). A local doctor (John Snow) undertook a simple epidemiologicalstudy and identified the source of the outbreak. He then conducted the simple risk
management action of removing the pump handle! This comparatively simple earlyrisk governance system was replaced by the modern complex system of detailed risk
regulations in the aftermath of WWII and then in recent years by post-modern prospective
risk regulations. However, before considering this I should complete the story about risk
assessment.
Risk assessment is encapsulated in this slide. It is the scientific determination of therelationship between the exposure to a given hazard (let's say a particular chemical)
and the realisation of a particular harm (let's say a specified cancer). The relationship is
probabilistic. There is a certain exposure which leads to a certain probability of harm. The
risk management action that follows from the risk assessment is to decide on how much
harm is acceptable and then decide on the exposure control point. Of course the exercise isbedevilled by uncertainty and the risk managers have to build in safety factors.
Turning to prospective or precautionary risk management, this in essence involves early
action to mitigate a risk scenario before the evidence is well established. The risk managers,
faced with uncertain science regarding a potentially serious risk, take an early (ex-ante)
precautionary risk management decision. This is followed by a research programme aimed
at reducing the uncertainty and then the risk management action is either confirmed,
increased in severity, or reduced.

8

This slide shows the many components of risk governance or, if you like, the "risk labyrinth".
The aspects which concern the expert community are assessment and management.
However, the aspects which concern the public are perception and trust. Then for
manufacturers there is risk issue management, by which I mean the sort of thing that
happened to the Perrier Company in 1990.
In February 1990, Perrier became aware that some of their bottles of fizzy water were
contaminated with small amounts of benzene. The levels were way below dangerous levels
but the company decided to withdraw the product from sale on a worldwide basis until theyfound out where the benzene was coming from. In risk assessment terms there wasn't a
problem but their risk issue management action helped maintain consumers' trust and when
the company put their product back on the shelves there were no problems.
There is an interesting meeting taking place in Brussels next February with the appealing
title "Scientiﬁc Evidence Never Comes Alone!" This risk labyrinth slide illustrates this point
very clearly.
The next slide is a map of all risks with Hazards along the x-axis and Harms on the y-axis.
The Hazard-Harm pairs are plotted within contours indicating the degree of certainty
in the relationship. It is not a graph in the conventional sense. It is a "mapping". In thecentre we have an island of certainty i.e. all the hazard-harm relationships that have been
demonstrated at the 95% certainty level. You will see that I have put a cross in this zone,
which could, for example, represent Itai-Itai disease in which cadmium contamination ofrice caused kidney damage in Japan in the 60's and 70's. The cause of Itai-Itai disease was
not accepted initially by the mining companies but it was eventually conﬁrmed with a highdegree of certainty.
In the next zone we ﬁnd the risks with a degree of certainty between 50% and 95%. These
two zones correspond, if you like, to the test for guilt in a criminal trial (beyond reasonable
doubt) and the test for guilt in a civil trial (on the balance of probabilities). I have placed a Y
in this second zone, which could represent, for example, cadmium exposure at low levels
which has been demonstrated to have the potential to reduce male fertility.
Which brings us to the question of precaution in risk regulation: The ﬁrst question concerns
the meaning attached to precautionary risk regulation. The starting point for me is the "RioDefinition" which states that if one has evidence of uncertain harm then regulators havepermission to act before the uncertainty is reduced. The stronger deﬁnition, which is muchfavoured by some "green" organisations, is that if there is evidence of uncertain harm thenregulators are obliged to mitigate the uncertain harm.

9The third broad definition is to reverse the responsibility for the risk assessment from theregulator to the risk producer. In effect the regulator says to the manufacturer "We don't
have the expertise in this area but you, the manufacturer, should be fully aware of the risks
associated with your products and should perform the necessary risk assessment for the
regulator". This is the current EU approach to chemicals regulation.
The European Commission issued a Communication on what was meant by the
Precautionary Principle which provided 5 criteria for its application. The first criterion is astraightforward proportionality criterion. The action the regulator takes should be proportional
to the degree of harm to be avoided. The second and third criteria are straightforward
market considerations. The action should non-discriminatory and consistent with what has
been done before. The fourth is that the action should be based on a cost-beneﬁt analysis.
The ﬁnal criterion is for me the most important but the least applied. It is critical to the postmodern approach and states that the action taken should be subject to review in the light of
new scientiﬁc data which the regulator should obtain.
The Precautionary Principle (PP) was formally introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
Some 8 years later the Commission's Communication described what the Principle meant
in practice. This Communication led to what I call the "War of Questions"! It seems that
the United States does not like the Precautionary Principle. They don't mind precaution inrisk regulations. In fact many US regulations are precautionary in nature. However, they
seem to dislike the idea of a "Principle" that might be judged in a court of law. So there was
my so-called "War of Questions" between the US challenging the PP and the EU which
wanted to apply it in various regulations. Clearly the PP encourages prospective rather thanretrospective thinking about risk governance and the next slide introduces one of the best
examples of its use.
This example concerns Bovine Somatotropin (BST). BST is a milk yield enhancing injectionused with cows in the US and elsewhere. However, there was an enormous opposition
to this technology in the EU, not least because it is a hormone and was confused withendocrine disruptors in the public mind. (There was a newspaper story in Italy at about thattime suggesting that young boys were developing breasts because of endocrine disruptors in
the environment.) So there was a lot of political pressure to ban this technology because of
uncertain risks but also because we had an overproduction of milk at the time (the so-called
milk lake) partly due to subsidies. So in 1990 the European Council took regulatory action.
The Council banned the agricultural use of BST for 10 years. The regulatory action also
launched a research programme on the harms that might arise from the use of BST in milk
production. This research found that there was no human harm from the use of BST in milk
production. In fact BST is naturally present in milk which we use for example every day in10

our coffee. However, the research uncovered a serious animal welfare issue. The cows
producing enhanced milk yields from BST injections had an increased incidence of infectionsof their teats which had to be treated with antibiotics and the enlarged udders meant that thecows had increased walking difﬁculties. These research results ensured that the temporary
ban became a permanent ban which has never been challenged: In my view because the
PP had been applied correctly. However, also in my view, this is a very rare example of thecorrect comprehensive application of the PP.
Coming back to the Transatlantic "War of Questions" an American academic and I were
tasked to carry out a co-funded Transatlantic "dialogue programme" to compare and contrast
the regulatory application of precaution in the US and the EU. We held about seven formal
dialogue meetings and this was supplemented by a large research effort by Duke University
in North Carolina. We came up with this sort of table shown on the slide (but keep in mind
the question marks). These are not deﬁnitive but for example the EU is more precautionary
about the use of hormones in beef production which is banned in the EU: Whereas, it isused extensively in the US. (Some people would even argue that this technology produces
tastier and tenderer beef!). The EU has maintained its ban in spite of losing the case before
the WTO.
Looking at other examples on this slide, we see that the US was very precautionary aboutmad cow disease while the EU has been very precautionary about the use of phthalates
as softeners in plastics (e.g. in baby feeders) - with little scientific basis according to
the industry. The US was very precautionary about the use of CFCs in aerosols etc.,
partly because they had an available alternative chemical, which they were ready to use
immediately to replace chlorinated ﬂuorocarbons. The US is a bit more precautionary thanthe EU about nuclear power and so on. The interesting case at the bottom of the slide is theuse of diesel as a fuel. The EU has promoted the use of diesel because it's a very useful
way of reducing the emission of climate change gases. The US has done the opposite withdiesel cars because in fact they want to combat the production of micro-particles, which cancause health problems.
Clearly there are divergences but if you examine a much larger sample, and Duke University
examined around 3,000 examples of risk regulation in the US and the EU, we find that
there is broad parity between the US and the EU. This is of more than academic interest.
There is a strong feeling in Europe that if we sign up to the transatlantic trade agreement(TTIP), which is currently being negotiated, there will be a reduction in the "high grade" EUregulatory standards in favour of the aggressive marketing of the US. Our research has
demonstrated that we regulate risks at about the same level of precaution and thus that it ishighly unlikely that there will be any great change if TTIP goes through.

11This year I've been spending a lot of time studying the complex question of how to build
trust in risk regulation. Certainly looking at this slide the question of fairness is critical. If you
consider trust in the regulation of nuclear power, post-Fukushima, it is clear to say that there
is an enormous difference in perceived fairness between those who bear the risk, those
who live close to nuclear reactors, and those who benefit from the generated electricity
but live much further away. Turning to the question of competence, one could question thecompetence of the International Council on Radiological Protection and their insistence on alinear no-threshold model for radiation risk against currently accepted threshold models. This
bedevils regulators' attempts to set more realistic regulations.
The third criterion for building trust is efficiency, which relates to the question "Are publicresources devoted to risk management cost effective?" Part of the answer to this question
concerns the quality of advice concerning the underlying science. This slide features theEU's current Chief Scientiﬁc Adviser, Professor Anne Glover. I know her quite well. She wasappointed in 2011, comes from a good biotechnology background and is very competentin what she does. Professor Glover has given the advice that there is no evidence that
GM technologies are any riskier than conventional foods and as a result several green
organisations have called for her dismissal. Unfortunately there has been no support
from the incoming Commission President Juncker, and it looks as though she has lost her
job. She will probably leave in January and at the moment the Commission hasn't taken
the decision to replace her. I think it's a great tragedy and will have a negative impact on"efﬁciency" in risk regulation.
The next slide concerns Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) which became an important
regulatory tool in 2002, two years after the PP Communication. RIA is now required for all
Commission legislative proposals above a certain size. It involves a balanced appraisal of
all impacts and includes a wide-ranging consultation. The current EU chemicals regulation
became EU law in 2006. It was necessary because the previous legislation was not ﬁt for
purpose since it divided the regulation of existing chemicals from that of new chemicals. New
chemicals had very strong regulation. Existing chemicals, which could be equally hazardous,
were not really evaluated at all.
There were major policy options to consider such as regulating at EU level or at Member
State level. (The EU decided on a central approach.) There were major industrial aspects
as the chemical industry is one of the EU's biggest industrial sectors. There were economic
impacts – testing and registration costs were estimated to be around $2 billion. The
environmentalists were keen because the health beneﬁts were estimated to be of the orderof $50 billion (but these were never fully evaluated). There was an enormous stakeholder
consultation resulting in more than 6,000 contributions.

12This slide highlights the main changes introduced following the RIA. There was asimplification of the information provision requirements from the industry. Polymers weretaken out of the REACH process because they represented very low risks. A reinforced
authorisation system was introduced for very problematic chemicals (those which are e.g.
carcinogenic or mutagenic) but which could sometimes be "authorised" on socioeconomic
grounds. However, the new rules insist that there has to be a process for ﬁnding alternatives
in case of authorisation. The final version of REACH includes streamlined administration,
greater legal certainty for producers relating to conﬁdential information, etc. The beneﬁts of
RIA are clear.
This slide summarises broadly the overall benefits of regulatory impact assessment. It
investigates costs, benefits and risks. It improves competitiveness. It's a transparent
public tool with an enormous public consultation and is evidence based leading to smarter
regulations. It helps to build public trust.
Moving from "precautionary" to "smarter" regulations, one should ask what might bewrong with precaution as it is applied. First of all, the ﬁfth criterion that it should respond toresearch has very, very rarely been followed through. I did an analysis of all the cases which
mentioned precaution in the European Court of Justice case law, and only in one case, did
they consider responding to uncertain science and then the court ruled that it wasn't their
job to order scientiﬁc research. So this criterion is in fact not followed at all. The problem isthat without an effective review of regulations based on precaution, the result is to paralyse
progress in certain fields. Two big fields where precaution has found strong application
are genetically modified crops and nuclear radiation exposure. (Although I would say incontradiction to Professor Oye, we actually have 11 authorised crops in Europe, or it mightbe 12 by now, but admittedly only one of them is being cultivated.)
By introducing the Precautionary Principle, or a precautionary approach, you encourage
societal pressure, which may be counter to established expert evidence. I am not saying thatsocietal pressure is wrong but emphasising that science is not concerned with faith, but withevidence. Any of us who has been at a party and been caught up in conversation with someanti- or pro-, this or that, will know that the public often base their opinions very much on
what they consider to be faith or values to which regulators also have to respond.
The implementation of an approach based on the precautionary principle should start with ascientiﬁc evaluation, as complete as possible, and where possible, identifying at each stage
the degree of scientiﬁc uncertainty. This is in the preamble of the communication and again
it's very rarely followed.
The next stage in this regulatory evolution is the introduction of the Smart Regulations
13

initiative shown on this slide. Smart regulations have four objectives, Retrospective Action,
Prospective Action, Current Action and Continuous Action, trying to improve the way in which
regulations are transposed into law. You ﬁnish up with this sort of continuous cyclical curve
shown on the current slide. The cycle is completed by ex-post evaluation, which constitutes
a brilliant new factor. In essence the regulator is required to look back and see whether
regulations met the need for which they were written. RIA is carried out for all significant
regulations nowadays. The Commission is also concerned about the way that regulations are
implemented. (In the past a lot of regulations were left to the member states to implement inways which suited them and often they were not implemented very effectively.) Last but notleast, we need to improve the way in which regulations are transposed into words and thatthese words should be fully understandable and clearly appreciated by all stakeholders.
The Commission has now introduced the REFIT Programme. This is the Regulatory Fitness
and Performance Programme, which concerns the systematic retrospective analysis of
the entire stock of EU legislation. One particular examination looked at water regulations,which resulted in a reduction in the number of water regulations in the EU from 18 to 9,
saving some € 30 million in the process. This involves a simple examination of whether the
regulations met the need for which they were written and deciding to get rid of those which
didn't. From this year onwards, the European Commission will schedule in its annual work
programme, a set of regulations which have to be re-evaluated to check their ﬁtness to meetthe original requirements.
I would suggest that one of the reasons why the EU system has been very successful
in this post-modern phase is because the European Commission has the sole right ofinitiative in introducing new regulations. It still has the sole right in spite of the evolutionof the European Parliament's and the European Council's powers. Since the Commission
is able to do this without being lobbied, it means that they can actually play the game of
public policy, introducing new ideas and seeing how they work. I would label this as a sort of
Darwinian approach to public policy evolution. It's the institutionalisation of policy change. I
think it's been extremely rapid. In just 14 years, we moved from the communication on the
Precautionary Principle, which launchedprecautionary risk regulation, through toRegulatory Impact Assessment, throughto Smarter Regulations, and finally to the
REFIT Programme, which is looking backon regulations, which were put in place
and which we may no longer deem to benecessary.
Thank you very much.
14

Response Presentation / 応答発表

平川 秀幸 (大阪大学コミュニケーションデザイン・センター)
Hideyuki Hirakawa(Osaka University, Center for the Study of Communication-Design)

平川秀幸：

ただいまご紹介にあずかりました、大阪大学の平川です。本日はこちらのシンポジウムにお招きいただきまして、まことにありがとうございます。私からは、タイトルにございます、パブリックエンゲージメントについてお話しいたします。これは、今ロジャースさんのお話にあったリス
クガバナンス、あるいは、もう少し広くイノベーションまで含めた科学技術ガバナンス、イノベーショ

ンガバナンスを考えるなかで、トラスト、信頼の問題、あるいは様々な知的なインプットを様々な社会のステークホルダーから意思決定のなかにインプットしていく。そのために必要なこととして、パブリックエンゲージメントという考え方が重視されてきています。これが日本でどのように発展してきたのか、また、どのような問題を抱えているのかということをお話したいと思います。

私は大阪大学で、コミュニケーションデザイン・センターというところに所属しております。そこ

では、公共圏における科学技術政策、Science and Technology in Public Sphere（STiPS）というプログラムを進めています。これは、東京大学の STIG のシスタープログラムになっておりまして、

文部科学省の「政策のための科学」教育研究拠点の 1 つです。STiPS では、このパブリックエンゲー

ジメントというのを 1 つ大きな教育研究の柱にしており、そういった観点からお話をしていきたいと考えています。

本日のお話のアウトラインとしてはこちらになります（図示）。日本でのパブリックエンゲージメ

ント、それが具体的にどのようなものをこれからお話しいたします。その発展と、重要視されるようになってきた社会的背景をまずお話しします。続いて、そうした活動が具体的にどういうふうに展開してきて、また、どういうふうに今現在なっているのかということをお話しします。最後に、特に福島の原発の事故、東日本大震災の後のいわゆる 3.11 後の 3 年半ぐらいの状態と、今後の課題をお話したいと思います。

これらの本題に入る前にまず、パブリックエンゲージメントというのはどういうものかをモデル的に示したものをお見せしたいと思います。タイポロジーということで示したんですけれども、科学技術のガバナンス、先ほどロジャースさんがお話になったリスクのガバナンスという点ですと、この図の中では主にこちらのほうの領域になります。パブリックエンゲージメントが重視される、あるいは行われるコンテクストというのは、大きく分けて 2 つあります。1 つは政策決定。リスクの問題であ
るとか、あるいは科学技術政策、そうしたことに関する政策決定、ポリシーのコンテクストです。もう 1 つ、より科学技術の研究開発の現場につながっている大学で、あるいは社会で。大学の外に出れば企業との連携がありますし、具体的な市場、マーケットでのインタラクションということも入ってきます。そういうリサーチアンドデベロップメント、あるいはイノベーションのコンテクストというのがもう 1 つです。

さらにパブリックエンゲージメントそれ自体も、大きく分けてこれらとのつながりが、こうした政

治、政策、あるいはイノベーション、研究開発そのものの意思決定に近いものと遠いものがあります。
遠いものでは、主にパブリックエンゲージメントというのは、基本的に対話とかインタラクティブなコミュニケーションを重視しています。そのインタラクションとして特に、図の下のほうではいわゆる専門家と非専門家のダイアローグ、対話ということを重視しています。具体例としまして、「サイ15

エンスカフェ」と呼ばれるものが、ここのところ日本でも盛んに行われてきています。

それに対して、より政策の意思決定に近いものというのは、単に専門家、非専門家という関係ではなく、実は下のコンテクストで一見非専門家と見えるなかには、例えば企業のマネージャーがいたり、別の分野の専門家がいたりというケースがあります。あるいは、医療関係の問題であれば、患者団体の人、あるいは患者当事者。それゆえに様々なステーク、アイデアを持っていたり、あるいは様々な関心事、あるいは期待、イクスペクテーションを持ったりする。そういったハイブリッドなパブリッ
クの間で行われ、単に対話ではなく、むしろなんらかの結論、いろいろなアイデアを出していくことをアウトプット、アウトカムを重視しています。デリバレーションというふうにここでは置き換えていますけれども、そうしたことが重視されるようなタイプのものがあります。

このようなかたちで大きく分かれているのに対し、さらに、こうしたパブリックエンゲージメントと呼ばれるインタラクティブなもの以外にも、広くは科学や技術、そして社会との関係に関しては、
特にコミュニケーション、科学技術コミュニケーションというところでは、昔からアウトリーチ、研究の内容を社会に向けて還元する、発表するといったアウトリーチがあります。英語では “Public

Awareness of Science”、科学についての様々な関心を高める。あと、“Public Understanding of
Science”、科学についての理解を広める、深める。日本語では、「科学技術理解増進活動」というのがあります。それから、“Public Acceptance”。新しい科学技術について、社会がどう受容するか、その受容を促すようなコミュニケーションです。

そうしたものもありますけれども、これらは伝統的には、インタラクティブというよりは専門家や行政、企業から一般の社会に対して、どちらかといえばワンウェイで、一方向的に情報を伝える、啓蒙するというスタイルのコミュニケーションだったのに対し、パブリックエンゲージメントでは、より対話的、ダイアローグ、あるいはデリバレーション、インタラクティブなプロセスを重視します。
これを念頭に置いた上で、その先にいきます。ちなみに、より意思決定に近い側のものとして、実践例としては、参加型テクノロジーアセスメントと言われるようなものが、アメリカ、ヨーロッパ、また日本でも様々行われています。

さて、ちょっと急ぎながらになりますけれども、こうした活動が日本でも実は行われているその歴史的背景をざっと見ておきたいと思います。大きく分けて 2 つの背景があります。1 つは、特に日本

では今から 20 年以上前、1980 年代終わりから 90 年代初頭にかけて問題になった、いわゆる「理科離れ」、科学技術離れというのが大きな背景としてあります。理科系の学部や大学院を出てもメーカーや製造業に行かずに、金融、証券などの別業界行く。ちょうど僕らの世代が、まさにそういう世代でした。そうしたことから「理科離れ」ということが問題になり、これが 90 年代の科学技術政策のアジェンダの 1 つになっていきます。そのなかから、「科学技術コミュニケーション」とか、「科
学技術理解増進」というのが必要だという話になっていきます。

もう 1 つ、特に 90 年代なかば以降、科学技術に関連する危機的事件が数多くありました。例えば、

特に 95 年というのは 1 つ象徴的な年でした。1 月の阪神淡路大震災で、高速道路を含めたくさん建築物が倒壊しました。3 月 20 日には、理工系の大学院生やポスドククラスの人たちが実際に犯行に及んだ、地下鉄サリン事件もありました。さらに年末には、高速増殖炉もんじゅの事故もありました。
その他、薬害エイズ事件とか様々な事件が 95 年から 96 年にかけてあったんです。その後も原子力に関しては、東海村の再処理工場での火災事故とか、99 年には JCO 臨界事故で 2 名作業員が死ぬという事故もありました。さらに、これに続いて 2000 年代にも、今度は食品分野で BSE が国内で発生し、さらにアメリカで発生した BSE の問題で、輸入再開問題が大きくクローズアップされました。
16

現在に近いところでは、東日本大震災と福島原発の事故がありました。こちらはこうしたことを背景に作成した年表ですので、参考として見ておいていただければと思います。

こうした背景で、政策、ポリシーの発展、さらにそのパブリックエンゲージメントに関する実践や研究というのが発展してきます。それを、次に見ていきたいと思います。

ま ず 90 年 代。90 年 代 は 基 本 的 に は、 英 語 で は “Public Understanding” あ る い は “Public

Acceptance”、こうした活動が主に行われてきました。特に 95 年の様々な事故などが起きた後、信頼回復のためにもっと科学について知識を広めるというような戦略をとったりしました。それと同時に、特に 90 年代終わりになると、科学技術と社会に関しての様々な研究が、政府の様々な助成金によって行われるようになってきました。そして 2000 年代になると、これらを踏まえて、新しい政策、

コンセプトというのも出てきます。例えば、日本では 5 年ごとに科学技術基本計画が策定されます。

2001 年からの第 2 期科学技術基本計画のコンセプトの 1 つには、社会における科学技術。社会のための科学技術というコンセプトが出てまいりました。

さらに、2004 年の「科学技術白書」。こちら、皆さんの資料に入れておりませんけれども、文部

科学省の科学技術白書では、科学技術ガバナンスの必要性が示されました。国民の各層、各主体から能動的に発せられる意思を、政策形成等の議論のなかに受け入れるようなことが必要だと、そういう意味でのパブリックエンゲージメントが必要だということが、
ここでは唱えられていたりもしました。

2000 年 代 に は も う 1 つ 重 要 な も の と し て、RISTEX（Research Institute for Science andTechnology for Society）という、新しい研究助成組織ができました。これによって、実はかなり多くの、特に科学技術と社会の間をつなぐような研究が行われるようになりました。その中で、パブリックエンゲージメントに関する社会的な実験、研究というのも行われてきました。私自身もそうでしたし、東大の STIG 代表の城山さんたちも、この RISTEX のファンドでいろいろな研究をさせてもらってきています。大体 180 ぐらい、様々なステークホルダーインボルブメントとか、学際的な研究とか、それらを重視したプロジェクトが進められてきました。

それから 2000 年代、さらに科学コミュニケーションということが重要だということで、例えば、東大や北大、早稲田大学で、科学コミュニケーションに関するトレーニングのプログラムがスタート
したり、「サイエンスカフェ」の取組みが広がったりということがありました。もう 1 つ重要なこと

として、先ほど最初にお示ししました図式のなかで、よりデリバレーション、アウトカムを重視したものとしては、参加型テクノロジーアセスメントの実践が様々行われました。こちらのリストは

RISTEX 研究プログラムのプロジェクトでデータベースを作ったものから引っ張ってきました。90年代終わり頃から 30 以上の様々な大小のプロジェクトがあります。その中には実際に国の政策や、

また、地方自治体の政策かに関連したものも多くありました。これに関連して、科学技術基本計画のコンセプトも様々に進化してきたというのがこの図です。

さらに、3.11 以降も様々なことがありました。特に福島原発の事故の後で、やはり科学に対する信頼がすごく落ちた。それを受けて様々な試みがなされています。細かい部分は飛ばしますけれども、様々な試み、リスクコミュニケーションであるとか、もう少し広くガバナンスに関連するようなテーマのコミュニケーションの重要性ということが言われていたりします。2 年ほど前からは、最初にお示ししました図式の中での、政策ではなく研究開発やイノベーションのコンテクストの中で、
パブリッ
クエンゲージメント的な対話的な活動を活用していこうという動きも、文部科学省のプログラムで始まったりもしています。

ここまでお話してきました流れ、特に 2000 年代に関する流れを振り返ってみると、いろいろな可
17

能性や達成もあるんですけれども、様々な限界もありました。まず達成としては、例えば、先ほどの一覧表を見せましたけれども、参加型テクノロジーアセスメントの実践、社会実験というのがたくさん行われました。また、サイエンスカフェのような、コミュニケーションの場も広がったということが挙げられます。しかしながら、そうした試みの大部分は、少数の例外を除くと基本的には政策からは離れています。政策の意思決定からは切れた、社会実験に留まっています。また、そうしたことを行うための制度化というものも進んではいません。そういう意味では、非政治的な、あるいは非政治化されたかたちでのサイエンスコミュニケーション、あるいはパブリックエンゲージメントというかたちになっている。大部分は昔ながらの PUS/PA、パブリックアクセプタンスに留まっているというふうに言えます。

さらに、この図の左右の関係で言うと、全体としてはこちらのほうに留まっていて、ここはまだまだ萌芽的なものしか始まっていないということです。そういう意味で、今後必要なこと、課題と思われることを最後に挙げておきました。どうやってこの政策と研究開発、大学の現場では例えば工学部と公共政策の間で、より研究の中身に関連するようなコラボレーション、インタラクションがどう実現できるのか。そのためにはインセンティブもいろいろと考えなくてはならないでしょうし、その制度化も様々なかたちで必要でしょう。そのための方法論やツールを揃える、整備することも必要になってくると思います。

今日は発表しませんでしたけれど、EU でも、例えば Responsible Research and Innovation、「責
任ある研究、イノベーション」というコンセプトで、新しい多国間研究開発・イノベーション促進プ
ログラム Horizon 2020 という大きなフレームワークのもとで協力が進みつつあります。こうしたものとの協力関係を作りながら、日本でも並行して展開するのが必要ではないかということを最後に挙げさせていただきました。時間が若干伸びましたけれども、以上で終わりにいたします。ご静聴あり
がとうございました。

18

Q&A / 質疑応答
松浦：

先ほどと同じように、Rogers 先生と平川先生のご発表に関して、何かご質問等があればお受けします。

参加者： Rogers 先生、平川先生、ご発表ありがとうございました。私、お二方に共通した質問を1 つしたいと思います。それはリスク管理というものに関するコアエレメント。あるいはキービジョンと言ってもいいと思いますが。それは研究機関、それから民間企業、それから市民の団体でもそうなんですけど、いずれにも共通して 4 つの要素があるだろうと。

1 つはやはり誠実さ、オネスティ。2 つ目には、やはりこれは説明責任というものです。それを遵守するアカウンタビリティがあると。3 つ目としてはやはり公開性、オープンネスというものがあるだろうと。あと、4 つ目として、このコラボレーションというんですか。先ほど平川先生おっしゃいましたけど、専門家、非専門家をつなぐダイアローグ、コミュニケーションというんですかね。この

オネスティとアカウンタビリティとオープンネスとコラボレーション、あるいはコミュニケーション。
この 4 つがリスク管理のキービジョンになると思うんですがいかがでしょうか。まずは Rogers 先
生からお答え聞きたいと思いますが。

Thank you very much: Thatʼs a key question in fact. When I lived inJapan, some 40 years ago, Japan was a highly efficient country, which was managing
things extremely well, largely based on a very intimate relationship between industry andgovernment and the public accepted this situation, broadly because it was effective andworked. Following a number of accidents and disasters, not only in Japan, but also in
Europe, that sort of public trust has been enormously eroded. Now we have the problem thatexperts coming from industry and giving advice to risk regulators are broadly distrusted.

Michael Rogers：

We have the appalling situation of a real expert in the European Food Safety Authority
actually being maligned because she was leaving to join the international organisation
concerned with risks in the food industry. There isnʼt an easy way around this and what I
think is essential is first of all that we have to accept that the experts in this field broadly
come from industry. Secondly, we have to persuade in some way by using the sort ofdialogue processes, which were described so ably by the last speaker, a much better
dialogue between experts and the public. We should also encourage experts, who usuallyﬁnd it much easier to speak to other experts, to engage with the public. It will take a longish
time but itʼs the only way in my view that we can get around this problem.
平川：

私のほうからも簡単にですけれども回答いたします。まさにご指摘いただいた 4 つの、オ

ネスティ、アカウンタビリティ、オープンネス、コラボレーションというのは非常に重要です。しかもこれはそれぞれ独立したものではなくて、相互に支え合っているものだと思うんですね。例えば、
19特にこのなかで重要なのは、コラボレーションという視点で、実際に世の中で大事だと考えられている問題、様々な期待、エクスペクテーションであったり、懸念であったり。それと実際に地域社会のレベル、あるいは国や世界のレベルで問題となっている問題に、実際にその問題に直面してる当事者の人たちとその問題解決を一緒に考えると。そもそも何が問題なのか、どういう解決が望ましいのか。
そういうことをやっていくなかで、信頼っていうのも再び回復されてくると思うんです。そういう意
味で、このコラボレーション、それにそのオープンネス、アカウンタビリティ、オネスティ、それぞれが非常に関連してくるのかなというふうに考えました。

それから、今 Rogers さんがおっしゃった点にも関連するんですけれども、もう 1 つ重要なのは、社会との関係をよくしていくのと並んで、やはりサイエンスアドバイスのあり方をちゃんとやっていく。オープンネスということも関係しますけれども、やはり透明性であるとか、説明責任ということ。
これを踏まえながら、かつ有効に、エフェクティブにちゃんとアドバイスが使われる。政治と政策とサイエンスの関係というものをちゃんと再構築していく必要があるのかなと。実際に今ヨーロッパ、
イギリスあるいは OECD などでも議論されていますけれども、それも重要なポイントかなと思いました。どうもありがとうございます。

Thank you: I just want to add one thing about transparency. There isenormous pressure from the public to have much greater transparency in the medical ﬁeld.
For example, the European Medicines Agency is predicated on making more and more
information available. However, total transparency can have unforeseen side effects. If, forexample, during an early stage clinical trial some people die of cancer, but the deaths are
essentially random and have nothing to do with the medicine which is under trial, making theresults easily available could have unforeseen results. A member of the public seeing thedeaths from cancer is likely to decide that that medicine is not for him or her and perhaps
forgo a potentially useful pharmaceutical. So transparency is an important issue, but it has
to be approached with caution and can have unintended consequences. Total transparency
can produce big problems.

Michael Rogers：

松浦： 少々時間が押してしまいましたが、ここでいったん休憩にしたいと思います。Rogers 先生、

平川先生、どうもありがとうございました。15 分間休憩の後、3 時 15 分くらいに後半を始めさせていただければと思います。

20

Keynote Speech 3 / 基調講演3

デイビッド ローズ ( アムステルダム大学)
David Laws (University of Amsterdam)"Hot Adaptation: Working between facts and stakeholders"「ホットな順応的管理：事実とステークホルダーの間で」松浦：

そろそろ後半を始めたいと思います。シンポジウム後半は、アムステルダム大学の Laws

先生から、
「ホットアダプテーション」というタイトルでご発表いただきたいと思います。
David Laws：

Konichiwa. First, I want to thank Shiroyama-sensei and others for theopportunity to come and talk with you. I am going to shift a little bit from the prior discussions
as was indicated and talk in a way about two differences. One, I think you could see what I
am going to say that instead of talking about science or science and technology in society,
you could think about – in my talk about society in science and technology and in that casealso where people from society have something to say about the conditions under which
this debate or discussion occurs and about how to interpret the results of it. That they are
unwilling to give that over and that becomes very important, the setup of these interactions
in what unfolds in the stories that I tell.
The other thing I am going to talk about is the domain of the local and thatʼs characterized bythis that there is – and the local is going to introduce a new set of actors in addition to what
was a policy wonks, engineering, geeks and nerds, science nerds. There are going to belocal people in these stories and you are going to see them and hear them talk about theirexperience and I think you will see that they are quite articulate about it. But the important
things to feature are that there is going to be someone who is going to take an action. Weʼre talking about where this gets put into place, the implementation part that action highlights
peopleʼs stakes. It highlights consequences. It triggers doubts about whatʼs going on, howis this going to affect me, my business, my family, the place where my family has lived for along time. It also sets a local context for action. Weʼre not talking about general principles
but how general principles unfold in peopleʼs backyards where they have knowledge about
those backyards that may be important to the way things that unfold, and it initiates then, you
could say, an exchange, an exchange of views, an exchange of experiences, sometimes, anexchange of insults.
What it also triggers is the process of framing, where facts, experience and values mix
as people try to make sense of whatʼs going on, whatʼs likely to happen as they look attheir experiences. We could think of this as an exploration of our relationships with each21

other as a community and also an exploration of our relationships with nature , with theenvironment in which we live whether thatʼs a – gene drivers being put into ﬁsh and thenﬁshermen watching what happens or something else, like that. In this fasion then a potential
for our community actually develops. The question is around questions that are likely to bevery controversial to the people who are involved in that. The community has one way or
another, a destructive potential, it can escalate, it can deepen the polarization around theissues but also I think I hope to be able to show you that there is a constructive potential
also inherent in that and to maybe bring out some insights about what shapes the role that
this community has in its development.
A quick map of what I am going to be talking about. I am going to be drawing two
distinctions and looking at a series of cases that are going to move and I will show you justthe way. On the one hand, I am going to talk about cases where knowledge is relatively
closed where science is right, and where we can turn to it for that knowledge. And in othercases where science is open, where questions are uncertain, where causal changes might
not be understood and in fact where action, if you think about putting gene drivers into theenvironment, are going to shape our understanding of what actually occurs. So the action
is going to inform, the action is an experiment or a continuation of prior experiment andof course these cases have a funny way of moving from this area to this area as action
highlights new features.
I am also going to be talking about a distinction between where the engagement, where thekind of reasoning is cool where we try to limit the role of emotions to move away from it, todepoliticize, to deescalate the situation and cases where reason is hot, engagement is hot
because peopleʼs lives are affected in very immediate and tangible ways and the way inwhich they interact with the situation is shaped by that. I am actually going to be arguingthat that can be a virtue, right, the process of reasoning isnʼt one of just marginalizing theinﬂuence of emotion, but people reasoning under those kinds of conditions that motivatedcognition can reason very well even lay people about technical subjects.
My cases then are going to move. I am going to start with a case thatʼs up here, though thelocal people think it should probably be down here. I am going to then move and I am goingto use that case to illustrate why we go from cool to hot, why local action is likely to be hot
and what that means, then I am going to talk about a case where the science is relatively
closed, though surprising but the issues in the way they are engaged are hot. Then I am
going to talk about a third case that moves over here towards what I call hot adaptationand that you will hear the resonance of this with whatʼs often referred to as post normal
science. There is an important box up here that are policy dialogues that try to set aside
alongside these kinds of things, other forms of engagement between the variety of actors or
stakeholders who are engaged. So our map is we are going from up here, down here and22over to here and if you keep that in mind as I move through the cases it might help.
So I am going to start now with a very Dutch case. This is a case in which technology,
science, nature and society are mixed up together over a period of more than 100 years,
so itʼs a historical case and also a contemporary case. Itʼs a polder here and actuallytechnically itʼs a droogmakerij in Netherlands which is a dry making but where land wasreclaimed from water and then interestingly enough what you see here as dry land aroundit was pit and so it was dug out. So, on the surface the situation is completely changed, sowhatʼs land here was once water and whatʼs water here now was once land. So the situation
has completely reversed itself and you see the interpenetration of nature and technology
and society as people live in this area. Now, this balance or at least the stable situation is
disrupted by a new policy plan that comes, and this is a policy to create new nature to bringwetlands into play to try to create environments for wildlife and to return some of the farmed
land to natural habitats.
You can think of this area and this is a diagram made by local citizens you will see in aminute as a big sponge. Itʼs land ﬁlled with water and if you know that water is heavy and if
you push down on a sponge the water is going move somewhere, itʼs going to move aroundand the dispute that you will hear about in a minute develops over whatʼs going to actually
happen to that water, once you put the weight of this new nature on this very sensitive
landscape. Okay, so there is a policy of local concerns developing about what this is goingto mean but they developed in part because of the consequences they have for local
businesses, for peopleʼs homes but also because people disagreed about the facts. It wasnʼ
t that they just didnʼt like what was going to happen to them, they had a different view about
what was going to happen in their backyards and they rebelled.
So the policy starts out then or the controversy starts out with this kind of hot cognition,
the predecessor to what I am calling hot adaptation. The interesting thing is science
turned out to be, or at least part of science on their side, so this person up here is a very
prominent expert on just these kinds of issues about water management who happen to be
taking a group from the UN, I think, on a tour to show them how the Dutch handled water
management. Local people saw him began talking with them and he agreed with them thatthey had a point that their analysis of the situation brought out issues that the policy experts
had not considered. The scientists who were informing it and he joined their protest. Now
their protest then spilled over into – here this is a museum for, letʼs say, policy follies where
they pointed out the ways in the actual landscape, the policies werenʼt working as intended.
They also had competence, they had technology themselves and here you see themactually starting to alter some of the things that the policy put in place. They actually started
to change what was going on the ground.

23Now, this hot cognition then didnʼt just lead to technical disagreements, it certainly did aboutthat but it also spilled over into a kind of political theater so because of the resistance on thepart of the government to this, there was a kind of escalation that occurred and you see here
the republic of Horstermeerpolder, this area is called Horstermeerpolder, they succeededfrom the Netherlands.
Here you see the flag Horstermeerpolder. Here you see them setting up blockades atthe borders of the republic – the new republic stopping traffic and checking people ʼ sidentiﬁcation as they drove through the streets of Horstermeerpolder. Here is the anthem. I
wonʼt play it for you, itʼs in Dutch but itʼs a sort of folk anthem, lightning and thunder rains lotsof protest, the inhabitants of the polder are angry, but do their best to reverse the water tide,
no wetlands, but then what should the Meadow Lakes thatʼs what they call area B, away withthe doom and gloom.
Here you see a series of photos of some of the protests that they then staged and that
attracted a lot of attention. Tractor is going through the street, "stop the green lies." Thegreen lie was that the creation of nature will be beneficial, they disagreed with it. They
organized a parade and here all policymakersʼ dream; the policy is being burned by thepresident of the newly formed republic. So itʼs very effective evocative political theaterthat also was effective in disrupting the expression of the new polder. So rather thanengagement here what we get is a kind of escalation that disrupted the implementation but
didnʼt do anything further with it, right.
Though it did lead to a new story emerging with so many fellows suffering to have to live
in a gutter, listen to the residents, here you hear the voices of people speaking about
implementation or else weʼd rather be dead, we are the people with experience, stop thegreen lies otherwise you may repent, okay.
Now, having shown a little bit about how this heat develops particularly as local action isundertaken where local views may come into interaction or at least to be contested by orcontest views of experts and how this – particularly when peopleʼs lives were affected in
immediate way, a kind of heat develops. I now want to turn to two cases that really show
the difference between what I call the closed and open views which I think Bruno Latour
captured with his idea of Janus-faced science, the science that knows and science that does
not or not yet know.
And look at two cases that bring this into play. The ﬁrst is as promised an urban case, so
this is about a conflict between two technologies, one is light rail transit that was being
introduced in a major urban center in Canada up here – this kind of train up here andthe second is MRIs because the light rail would go near a hospital and the people at the24hospital were saying that the train needed to be put underground because they were worried
about the effects of the electricity on the performance of the magnetic resonance imaging
machinery in the hospital and their ability to fulfill their tasks. People from the city were
saying absolutely not, the risk isnʼt there, thatʼs absurdly expensive, there is no way we cango through with it and they are caught in a ﬁght. And here now both sides had their expertsthat were saying why they were both right and people as you can well imagine can ﬁght for along time on those kinds of grounds.
Finally, they wore themselves out, they realized and here is the view, the words here now
quotes from the person who was responsible for managing then the interaction between the
antagonists in this story about what was going on. They realized that they were stuck thatthey could talk forever until they were blue in the face and neither one was going to convince
the other that they were right so it was a matter then of saying, “How are we going to getaround this, what do we need to know in order to get around this?”
Then we have a shift. We have a shift towards often called joint fact-ﬁnding, that they jointly
identified a series of questions. They jointly identified and here whatʼs important that thescience is relatively closed someone who they had confidence they both could agree to,could answer those questions and this consulted and became not a servant of one side oranother, not one groupʼs expert or the other groupʼs expert but it was working for the groupas a whole, and this was the real shift in the process.
What it prompted was a very surprising result. The consultant came back and said, “Guesswhat, youʼre both wrong. You can leave it above ground, you can put a below ground is notgoing to make any difference, what you need to do is shield MRIs with lead because there isgoing to be an effect but putting it underground wonʼt help with that.”
What he did for the actors involved though is it led to a legitimate or a justiﬁable basis foraction. They could both go back to the groups that they represented and said, “We got
advice together, we asked the good questions, the new proposals informed so the city
people could go back to their political bosses and say this is what we have to do. Thereis a basis for it and the healthcare people could go back to the governing board of thehospital and also say “This is what needs to be done and itʼs going to be effective, we haveconﬁdence in addressing the concerns.”
Now, I want to shift to a slightly different problem, where these questions about the technical,
about the scientiﬁc aspects, are more open. This has to do with radioactive waste disposal.
Low-level radioactive waste disposal, still where some of these things come up and here
then we start to have a picture of reframing. This is a quote again by the person who wasrunning this process and after the discussion had been going for a while he says, “I am25

listening to whatʼs going on around the table for the past few days of our discussions and I
am saying if we just went ahead with the discussion as it was planned it would be absurd, itwould be an insult and it wouldnʼt take account of whatʼs going on.”So the only thing to do then is to revise the agenda, to expand it, to address the concernsthat have come up and to see if there is a way to deal with it. And many of those questions
you can imagine were technical questions. But taking them up then became difﬁcult, one of
the questions was about their health effects of low-level ionizing radiation, everyone had astrong view, those views disagreed. And so they thought well, letʼs get an expert from theoutside, but then they wanted independent expert. But in a ﬁeld like this anyone who has
been involved for a long enough to really have the kind of expertise you want has some point– they have dedicated their professional lives to it, so they are invested in it in some way. T
hey are not from mars, they are not from outside of the situation so it became very hard to
identify someone.
When they did identify someone this is the charge they gave him that the goal is not to get
someone to say what the truth is. What we want to do as a group, what we feel itʼs our
responsibility to do and giving advice and this was a group of citizens who were giving advice
about what to do with low-level radioactive waste, to try to understand what the debate is,what people think on one side, what people think on another and this was the question thatthey asked the expert to deal with. And I donʼt want to defame him at all but it wasnʼt going
to be a simple presentation but it wouldnʼt be experienced as a partisan presentation.
He began then, and you see the contrast here, with “I regard it as a privilege to be here to tell
you what I think that consensus opinion about the effects of radiation is, not only in the US
but internationally.” So instead of arraying the debate I am going to tell you what I think thetruth is. It was a hard question for him to take up for some reason and then the conversation
eventually emerged and addressed the question but only, because the people pushed backthe question is what are some of the other views that you might have not touched on thatwould lead people to different conclusions perhaps. And we want to understand thoseviews because weʼre going to have to make recommendations about what is responsible,whatʼs fair, just, and in the interest of all. Then we want to understand the disagreements
not just be told what the consensus opinion is, particularly in a ﬁeld where if you looked at
the history of regulation, you could see that it was changing that it wasnʼt stable overtime.
They saw themselves as acting in this kind of temporal context where things were likely tochange. And so given that the response was to try to understand the level of agreement anddisagreement and the nature of those disagreements in making decisions.
So now itʼs going to get a little bit wordy but Iʼll go slow and Iʼll try to say. So then we getwhat I would say is a kind of effort to take responsibility that citizens actually who were26

involved in this is someone who was a carpenter worked on the historic preservation of
行詰めhouses but became a very eloquent participant in this discussion saying something about
how he views it and because they were initially asked to just give recommendations on
disposal site criteria, and they refused to that. Notice here what they are doing is taking
account not just for the recommendations but the conditions on which they are doing this,the agenda that they are pursuing the kind of expertise that they are doing, the interactionthat they have with the experts and here the kind of advice that they are willing or unwillingto give. So the reason I am uncomfortable is because itʼs exactly what they being theauthority of the agency want to hear. And he gives a different view, a contrasting view andthis became the view upon which this group created its own constitution for acting, for trying
to make sense of this situation and providing advice that they thought be reliable and in
the interest of the people of the state that they were representing. This body ought to keep
itself aloof enough, independent enough, and become educated enough so that it can tell
the authority what the authority may not want to hear, if we deem it in the best interest of thesafety of the people of the state. If that means ignoring the federally mandated time limits,so be it. We are going to be bound by our relationship, the democratic relationship to thepeople that weʼre representing here as citizens, so be it. Thatʼs not what the authority wants
to hear because they are mandated to work onto those timeframes and constraints.
And then the punch line, “I think we should be free to say, and this is tradition of New
England's folk wisdom. Thatʼs full of beans and you better do something about it.” That
they werenʼt willing to take on the assumptions that we built into the process. But they
saw themselves as exercising their capacity as citizens and actually highlighting thoseassumptions, testing the appropriateness of it and revising both in terms of the actual
content but also in terms of the organization that this process took.
So youʼll hear in that, I think, echoes of a post normal approach where the need for public
involvement is not only because of a general pressure on science where the public isconcerned but where problems donʼt have neat solutions. At the time they were engaging
in this radioactive waste disposal that did not have neat solutions, where the phenomena
are ambiguous and where, if you looked around at the cases, you found that most of themhad developed in ways that were unanticipated by the very people who were involved andwhere the techniques were all open to methodological criticism. And the debate then theysaw, this is the citizen speaking but it was very well captured by Funtowicz and Ravetz
discussion, enhanced by the exclusion of all but academic or ofﬁcial experts, they saw it as
their responsibility to wade into this debate and to bring into play their knowledge of local
conditions, which can determine which data is strong and relevant or at least be part of thatdebate which cannot be the exclusive. They were unwilling to let be the property of experts
and where a keen awareness of how these general principles are realized in their backyard,
they saw as being a very important feature.
27

Okay, those are the three cases, I have included this in the notes, I am not going to go into
it here, but this is a much more general case, here you can see Hilary Putnam talking about
the general organization of and about – if you want to know whatʼs right and good you haveto organize yourself in accordance with even around technical subjects with democratic
standards.
Now I want to move on to an epilogue and this isnʼt the case really about technology but
itʼs very interesting. Itʼs again a process where there is a conflict. In this case it was
between people who catch ﬁsh and people who were advocates for protecting birds. The
conflict develops because you can see catching fish in this case involves driving thesebig vehicles onto the beach and the birds not only very small but there is no trees on thebeach so they live and reproduce in the sand and because they were endangered, thesevehicles were direct threat and this triggered a severe – a policy exist in the United States,
the Endangered Species Act, where it gave people the right to limit beach access to protectthese birds. But the person who was in charge of the park realized as well that these people
were their neighbors and that if she was going to be in charge of a park and have a harsh
implementation of the law that she would be ﬁghting with her neighbors. They demonstrated
their political ability by blocking access for trafﬁc to this whole area where recreation is thecenter part of the economy and so they basically pulled the plug on the local economy andthus got some action.
Now, many things are interesting about this case but I want to highlight two. The first issomething thatʼs been part of the last two stories as well, which is that the group worked byconsensus. There was no voting and the commitment to consensus had two implications
that I think are very important to consider. First now we are talking about the details oforganizational design, right, not the broad process but this is turning in this case but in theseother cases as well on that. The ﬁrst is it creates a commitment to listen because if I justdisagree with you and you disagree with me and neither of us is really listening to another,
weʼre engaging in what sometimes called a dialogue of the death. Then weʼre not going to
get anywhere. So the only way weʼre going to get anywhere is by acknowledging that theother may have a point and that we need to at least engage enough to see that. The other isthat it engages a kind of pragmatic, a practical commitment to try to craft together some kindof step, some kind of plan that would meet both of our concerns, recognizing they both may
be legitimate. At least we may not be able to tell still, that we will be ﬁnding out by acting.
So thatʼs one that the details of the process matter and here this consensus rule really was
important for transforming the discussion from a destructive one where at the beginningthese people could not be in the same room with each other, the behavior was beyond
uncivil, it was one step short of physical violence, to a situation where at the end.
This is the second point I want to make. The fishermen but also the advocates and the28people on the other side were experts fromthe national government, from the state
government, from large nongovernmentalorganizations, so it was a very diverse
group. 23 organization representativearound the table. They built into theconclusions, their own recommendations,that were taken forward is the new policythat if they realize that they were making abet, they were making a guess about how
the ﬁsh and the birds were going to behave in the future. And that might not be the case.
They couldnʼt control them and so they did two things. They built in – they gave with triggers
emergency powers to the administrator of the local part, the district in this case, to implement
action if the data suggested that things werenʼt working out as they had planned. But thatwas contingent upon then that administrator also reconvening this group to revisit the new
evidence and then to revise the plan in light of it. And the interesting thing as how they
moved from this very deep controversy, really hating each other, and of course never talking
with each other that goes along with that to a situation in which they really moved toward
something that I think starts to approximate what we think about as adaptive management.
And in that way, I think we get some insights and this is the ﬁnal slide, about what this box
looks like, and what the kind of design features or the features of a process that would
work in this kind of situation and I think many of the ones who are talking about are down
here. The ﬁrst is that the opportunities for engagement be democratic. By democratic inthese cases I mean that the people who set the rules for the organization of the process
where the people who are involved, it wasnʼt imposed upon them from the outside but they
actually created the rules. This wasnʼt just local residents, it was local residents, it was
experts from the government, it was experts from NGOs, it was a variety of people but they
actually created the rules that they were going to have to live under and that they felt were
responsive to the challenge that they face. Thatʼs what I mean by democratic opportunity.
Second that it created an opportunity to share sources of insight, experience, knowledge but
also doubts. Doubt in these cases I think is a rare commodity and one we actually shouldprice much more than we do. People are concerned about whatʼs going on, about whatmight happen and these sources of doubt often are crowded out of these debates because
we can only express conviction. This democratic opportunity that they created allowed usa space to actually to discuss, to engage the doubts people had and ﬁnally what they did isthey started to reason, design, revise and eventually act together. Thank you very much.

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Response Presentation / 応答発表

松浦 正浩 ( 東京大学公共政策大学院)

Masahiro Matsuura (The Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo)

松浦： David 先生、ありがとうございました。次が、私と鎗目先生のほうからのプレゼンとなります。

私からは、今のお話しにも出てきた Joint Fact-Finding というものを日本でも使ってみようという

プロジェクトを 3 年間やってきましたので、それから得た知見のようなものをお話できればと思います。この話はいろいろなところでしているので、すでに聞いていたことがある方もいらっしゃるかもしれないですけれども、新しい話もいくつか盛り込んであります。

先ほど平川先生のプレゼンテーションのなかで、RISTEX という組織の話が出てきたと思います

が、そこのファンディングを受けまして、先週 2014 年 11 月 20 日まで 3 年間のプロジェクトを行って、私が研究代表を務めておりました。このプロジェクトは、先ほど言ったように Joint Fact-Findingという考え方を、日本の実際の政策形成に適用してみたらどうなるかを検討してみたという事例です。
「共同事実確認」と日本語で訳していますが、Joint Fact-Finding の考え方を、私はこういうふうに（図示）いつも考えています。つまりこういうステークホルダーたち、あるいは国民が何かで対立したときに、それぞれ異なる専門家が、それぞれに入れ知恵をするというのがこちらの図です。そうしたときに何が起こるかというと、advocacy science、「弁護科学」と呼んでいるんですが。結局、
このステークホルダーはこの先生が正しい、もう一方のステークホルダーは別の先生が正しい、ということをこの場で議論する。またこのスペクテーターというか第三者みたいな人は、この人はこの人のことを信じて、また別の人はこっちの人のことを信じている。結局どちらを信じればいいのか、どちらの科学者を信じるのかということですね。つまり、科学が宗教みたいなものになってしまう、どの神様を信じるかみたいな話になってしまうという問題があるということです。
それを解消するのが、Joint Fact-Finding だと私は考えています。つまり、ステークホルダーが議論するときに、その後ろに専門家がそれぞれつくのではなく、ステークホルダーの議論の場に、専門家のプールというものを別に設けて、その間で一元的なやり取りを繰り返すというのが、Joint Fact-Finding の考え方だということで、これを日本でやってみようという取り組みを進めてきたということです。

実際にアクションリサーチということで、私自身やってきたプロジェクトがこちらの報告です。日

本の方は皆さんご存じでしょうが、対馬という日本の西端の方にある小さな島で、木質バイオマスを使って再生可能エネルギーを入れようという事例や、あるいは 3.11 の福島以後、食品中の放射性物

質をどのぐらいまで許容するかという新たな基準値の設定課程を検証したり、人を集めて議論をした
りですとか。あるいは、これは岡山の日生の例ですが、小さな湾のようなところを、海洋空間計画ということで地域の人々がこれからどのように管理していくかということで、地元の中学生を集めた
ワークショップをやって、彼らが必要とするエビデンスとは何かを整理したりというようなこともやりました。

私と David と、その上の先生にドナルド・ショーンという人がいて、その人の書いた本で、“Reﬂective Practitioner”（『反省的実践家』）という本があります。その考え方は何かというと、実際にやってみて、やってみたことから知見を引き出して、その知見を機能的に整理していきましょうといったものの考え方です。つまり、何か仮説があってそれを検証するために実験をやるのではなくて、とりあえずやってみてそこから知見を引き出していくというのが、プラテクショナー、あるいは

30

プロフェッショナルの実際の思考回路なんだと。それをベースにして、今の経験を踏まえて、私たちが考える Joint Fact-Finding のあるべき姿ということで、5 つの条件を考えました。1 つ目がエビデンス。サイエンティフィック・エビデンスみたいなものは、議論の当事者、あるいはステークホルダーが取得するということですね。従来であれば、先ほど平川先生のプレゼンテーションのなかで、欠如モデルみたいな話がありましたけれども、専門家が人々にエビデンスを与えるといったフレームワー
クでものごとをとらえがちなんですが、そうではなく、エビデンスはステークホルダーが取りに行くものだと。そのフレームの転換が必要でしょうというのが 1 つ目です。

2 つ目が、エビデンスについての共通理解の形成ということです。これもいろいろなステークホル
ダーがいて、異なるエビデンスを持って争っているのであれば、まずそこの共通の理解、common
understanding を作らなければならないということです。
3 つ目が、多様なディシプリンからエビデンスを収集するということです。ある社会問題が存在したときに、社会問題とそのまま綺麗にマッチする学会とか学協会のようなものというのは実際には存在しません。いろいろな学協会、ディシプリンからの知見を、ある社会問題のために統合しなければならないというのが 3 つ目です。

4 つ目、エビデンスの不確実性について意識しましょうということです。先ほどの David のプレ

ゼンのなかで、ナレッジがオープンだという状況があるっていうお話がありましたけど、まさにそういうことです。ラトゥールのヤヌスの話がありましたけれども、つまり、'science in the making'のような状況の科学っていうものもあるんだよ。だからこそ、Uncertainty があったり、あるいはア

クセスできない、そもそも知識が全く存在しない、void の状態だといったような状況があり得るということもちゃんと認識しておきましょうということです。

最後に、議論の当事者が誰なのかについて意識する。1 番目の裏返しのようなものですが、科学者がエビデンスを誰かよく分からない人に渡すのではなくて、議論の当事者というステークホルダーがいて、その人がエビデンスを取りに行くんだということを意識しましょうということです。このようなプロジェクトの話を、幸いにも国会の原子力問題調査委員会に呼ばれて、意見陳述というか、専門
家証言をさせていただいたり、全国紙で新聞記事を載せてもらったりして、少しずつこうやって広めようとしてきたということです。

これを踏まえての反省がいくつかありますが、キーになるポイントをお話しします。1 番ポイントになるといいますか、面白いかなと思われるのが 4 つ目のポイントです。Joint Fact-Finding をやるということは、専門家を、David の言葉の中で “servant” という言葉が出てきたと思うんですが、専門家をステークホルダーの servant にするといったようなパラダイムというか考え方があったわけです。つまり、専門家が「これが情報です」と言って渡すのではなくて、専門家たちはあくまでス

テークホルダーに「どういう情報が必要ですか」と、メイドというか執事というか、「ご主人様、どういう情報が必要ですか」ということを科学者に言わせるというのが、ある意味共同事実確認のポイントであったわけです。実際にそれをやってみると、ステークホルダーとか議論の当事者の人たちっていうのは、意外と視野が狭かったりするんですね。先ほどの LRT と magnetic ﬁelds の論争の話の中でも、結局問題のフレーミング自体、ステークホルダーが間違ったフレーミングを持っていたと。
その時に、もしメイドのような科学者だと、答えられないわけですね。議論の当事者たちに対して、「いや、それは間違っているよ」と言えるような、対等の立場にいないといけないわけです。

ですので、私自身は共同事実確認を、科学者をメイドか執事のような立場に置くというつもりでずっとやってきたんですが、実はそれではうまくいかないということがわかってきました。また逆に、例
31

えば科学者自身が、「これはあなたのフレーミングが間違っていますよ」とか、「あなたの視点はちょっと狭いですよ。未来はもっとこんなふうに変わる必要がありますよ」みたいな話を伝えていくような役割も果たさなければいけないんじゃないかなということが、このプロジェクトをやってみて分かったということです。

他にもいくつか知見はあるんですけれども、こういったプロジェクトで 3 つの社会実験を行ってきて、今後どのようなかたちで日本で、様々な社会課題に広めていくかというのを、今後はこのSTIG 等のプログラムを通じてでも考えていきたいなというふうに思っているところです。どうもありがとうございました。次は、鎗目先生の方からお願いします。

32

Response Presentation / 応答発表

鎗目 雅 ( 東京大学公共政策大学院)

Masaru Yarime (The Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo)

Today, I actually invited some students and also working with mycolleagues, so I think I should try to speak in English although I can speak Japanese muchbetter than my English. Thank you very much for this opportunity. Currently I am working
for the STIG program at the University of Tokyo and also this may adjoin the UCL new
Department of Science, Technology and Engineering and Public Policy. And today we havethe head of the department Dr. Jason Blackstock. He is going to talk about that program in
more detail. But somehow I think this is a good opportunity to try to strengthen and expand
the cooperation between similar programs in different places. I think we could try to utilize
these kinds of opportunities fruitfully.

Masaru Yarime：

Somehow my talk is a bit different from the previous speakers in a sense that my work onthese is more on innovation studies and economics and policy studies of technologicalchange and innovation. I think the challenge is how to integrate these different kindsof, in a way, epistemic background together to address the complex issues in science,technology, and innovation. As you might know, some of the recent trends in science,technology and innovation policy, the first one is this innovation, how to encourage
innovation because of the stagnation of growth since the oil crisis and then coming to theuniversity industry collaboration triggered by the federal act in the US since 1980s andthen the similar legislation policy introduced in Japan since 90s and also in other OECD
countries. Particularly the emphasis is given to intellectual property rights and legal issues,and corresponding to that there are many changes in the legislation, regulations about
university and also the status of university which now has become independent entity fromthe government. Basically how to encourage university-industry collaboration has become
critical issues and still is a very important issue.
Then the second trends I identiﬁed is this societal term in a way, so these grand challenges,
societal challenges, I think in Europe and also in the US this grand challenges is used andprobably if you are a native speaker in English, the grand means something important,great, some kind of connotations. But in the case of Japan, we normally use these societal
challenges, social challenges. As far as I understand, they are somehow trying to saysomething similar and then the background is that this increasing importance of societal
issues which are not necessarily dealt with properly by private actors, so environmental
issues, energy security, public health and poverty. Then these agenda has been addressedin many governments and also international organizations like OECD and other.

33

Just this is one example addressed by US National Academy of Engineering. They identiﬁed
14 grand challenges including environment, energy, health, server security and these kindsof issues. Also the UCL probably Jason will talk more about this one but the university as awhole tries to identify some key areas as grand challenges and then knowledge expertise,ﬁndings accumulated within the university should be integrated together to address some of
the key societal challenges or grand challenges.
At different levels this agenda of how to deal with grand challenges and having impact
has become very important and particularly in the context of UK, this research excellent
framework which has been introduced recently explicitly mentioned that the reach andsignificance of impacts on the economy and society and culture. It has become very
important criteria for evaluating university, so that this has been one of the backgrounds
why the whole agenda of impacts utilizing science, technology and engineering into making
impacts in society has become very important challenge. And this sustainability which
includes all these kind of issues and then in this case also grand challenges include someof the more traditional, conventional components forecast observation but at the same time
how to encourage innovation has become the key issue. Then in this case we need tointegrate social science and natural, technological areas.
Perhaps this is just very simple solution but probably what we are trying to address issomething going beyond the traditional dichotomy of basic research versus appliedresearch. What we are trying to address is something called Use-Inspired Basic Researchor Application Oriented Basic Research or Solution Oriented Basic Research. This is also
applicable to sustainability science which I have been working.
And then coming to more into university, this is just one graph which shows that the relative
importance of government laboratories have been somehow decreasing in the sensethat universityʼs role has been increasing, so this also invites some question about whatshould be the function, role of government laboratories in the background of this increasing
potential of university research. So this is also the huge issue for many countries including
this country and also the US where the military research has been so dominant in the past
but then how to redeﬁne this national laboratory is a big challenge.
Then just coming to the evolution of university missions and then what we see in recent
years is this kind of emergence of entrepreneurial university which primarily focuses on
economic commercial applications. That has been introduced in Japan by changing
regulations, registrations about science, technology, basic plan, and also the university
operation. But then there are some criticisms and concerns because of this primary or
exclusive focus on commercial applications creates some problems. Probably what we
could mention here is the two types of dilemmas as individual scientist and also systemic34

level at the innovation system.
Individual scientist means potential tradeoff between basic research and commercial
industrial application which is somehow summarized as patents or papers. Then we could
do a kind of sociological analysis of this, how the individual scientist can allocate theirtime and energy between the two. In the more systemic level or societal level, we needto consider kind of institutions which are appropriate or relevant for what could be calledrepublic of science which is I think the Shibayama-san mentioned that more classicalargument about the transparency, universality of these kinds of norms and concerning toscience and at the same time we have this importance of enterprise of technology which ismore commercial entity property oriented kind of activities.
Then coming to the third challenge, the third transformations means how to somehow
address both at the same time research, education and societal contribution. Then thatwhat we need kind of preliminary study started about 2 years ago or so trying to assemble
some of the cases of how university stakeholder platform formed and operated to address
innovation for sustainability. Some of the questions, this is still ongoing and we havenʼt yet found very signiﬁcant answer yet but what kind of activities are important, what kindof incentives are important and what kind of outputs, impacts are made through this kindof activities for addressing societal concerns through these stakeholder platforms. So
somehow we try to identify some of the key properties although this is very simplistic andsomehow kind of exercising typology in these different kinds of activity. This is just for
example, depending on the nature of universities, the nature of activities previously different
and then some key examples which is undergoing in the case of University of Tokyo andthen some of the functions we identiﬁed, the vision creation and also target identiﬁcation andthen scenario making and also at the same time data collection and individual technologicaldevelopment which are more conventional approaches and then impact assessment andlegitimation in society. These kinds of activities somehow could be addressed by using thisinnovation platform and then some of the issues which I mention at the end of my talk.
Again that still there be tradeoffs between basic research and these grand challenges orsocietal challenges, particularly very pure scientiﬁc investigations and obviously that when
you try to emphasize societal challenges the resources with somehow shifted from thisconventional areas to these areas but then what are the impacts, implications of thesesocietal turn in science, technology and innovation policy. Also integration in practice meansthat I think somehow today many speakers raised this risk assessment, risk management,
and kind of joint fact finding. I think this is very, very important but somehow innovation
also comes from rather a small scale incremental type of activities, so how these kind ofactivities can be linked to risk assessment, management type of argument, which are I
think appropriate for rather big issues, GMO, nuclear, but at the same time innovations are35

happening at a daily level and incremental manner. Also methodologically speaking, today
we have discussion about STS, framing, value issues, normative issues, and also sociology
of science, I think Professor Shibayama examined behavior of scientist and also somehow
close to my background which is industrial organization, innovation studies which is more
about corporate strategy in the social structure, so market, the mechanisms and how thesekind of different streams of intellectual traditions can be integrated methodologically.
Again the challenge is how the papers, patents and policy advice could be integrated ideallyand how to deal with this the institutionally different spheres of public, science enterprises
technology and community of practice.
So these are just questions I donʼt have answers but hopefully by increasing, deepening
our collaboration internationally including University of Tokyo and then UCL which will be
addressed by Jason in the next session, so I hope that this will be a very good opportunity tostart these kinds of discussions. Thank you very much.

36

Q&A / 質疑応答
松浦：

ありがとうございました。まだ 5 分くらい質疑応答の時間あると思いますが、どなたかご

質問ありますでしょうか。Rogers さん、先にお願いします。

Thank you. A very fascinating presentation by David and Iʼd like to ask aquestion about building consensus. It seems to me that in many policy areas you are facedwith enormous inertia to change from the status quo and the only organization I know thathas been successful in consistently seeking and obtaining consensus is Codex Alimentarius
but it seems to me that many of the areas that you mentioned obtaining consensus requires
remarkably effective chairman and I donʼt meet so many people who are able to do that.
Michael Rogers：

David Laws： Two things that I hope to respond. One is that just to be clear that domainof consensus which is the question, what do we do here and it is not broadly what do we
do and I think that matters because thatʼs a little more practical domain. There is a kind of
scope for negotiation really in working that out, but the other thing that – I guess the implication
will be – so how do you get there. That is a feature of kind of practice that in which the key
features of the people who lead that. They work for the parties so they are not hired by –they may be paid by the government but they donʼt work for the government. They workfor the group of actors as a whole and at their behest. The rules, as I said, are that theycome forward with that so the people, by getting access to that, they also start to become
responsible to each other and for the outcomes. So usually itʼs the parties that produce
the consensus with the help of the person leading. But that person leading is really trying
to help them develop something thatʼs informed because they donʼt want advice thatʼs justsomething that they can agree upon but will really stand up, and stand up to a broad social
scrutiny.
That scrutiny is brought into play because if you have to go back to your group and I have togo back to my group, we have to do that along the way; otherwise we reach an agreement
and then we go back and they say, “Well, we are not going along with that.” So I think itʼspartly the organizational setup and then the chairman or the – it is not really chairman in thatcase but someone facilitating, mediating, doing something more like that is really working to
try to help that group build up through a sequence what that is and then the methods for thatare what we can discuss those they become a little bit of discussion technique. Does that
address? But it has to be given speciﬁc meaning. What this shows is now what consensus
means in general but what this group said consensus was going to mean in addressing the
problem that they faced. They wrote that and then had to live by the commitments they
made which included provisions for revising this, who could revise the rules, how can you
37

parties enter, all those kinds of things. Those were the rules they made and so you get
down to the details of the institutional design.
This is a question for Masa. The panel took up stakeholder consensual
risk governance and by implication effects on innovation. So all of Davidʼs examples werelocal, right?
Michael Rogers：

David Laws： Yeah.

Right, all of them were local and the question here is that if you takelessons from Davidʼs discussion and then turn to national issues where there are concernsof a risk and how you address the risk will affect innovation. What lessons do you take form
Davidʼs presentation on local to the management of risk, seeking if not consensus, at least
a little more understanding at the national levels? And itʼs a question to both Masaru and
Masa.
Michael Rogers：

Maybe I should respond in English because that will be easier. You
are asking how we can extract lesson or interpolate lessons from the local practice to thenational level. Right. Well, many of the cases I have been dealing with is more or lessin a local small islands or community, fishermen community but if you – one of the majordifferences is at the local level we can easily identify stakeholders or key leaders that wehave to deﬁne. And thatʼs going to be in the negotiation mode. They try to strike a deal sothat they can live together as a community, right. But at the national level, community is so
dispersed and sometimes itʼs hard to identify who the stakeholders are. In some cases, likethe debate about gun control, we often use the case of this gun control in the US, so somepeople believe that people are allowed to have guns and some people say, “No, we shouldnʼ
t have a gun.” Itʼs not much matter of negotiation, itʼs more about what the society should
be like and itʼs not much a matter of negotiation but itʼs more about matter of deliberation
and what the citizen ought to be, rather than "you being this, I being this, letʼs make a
trade." So at the national scale of the level may be negotiation framework doesnʼt work andmaybe more of the deliberative framework, maybe not just bringing in representative but
rather picking up randomly sampled population of the individuals. So maybe I think that thedifference in representation which actually David has written a chapter about representationin The Consensus Building Handbook, maybe that one.
Masahiro Matsuura：Thank you very much for very, very important question and to be honest
I donʼt have answer at this moment but probably at the level of very small-scale regional
initiatives by university then it might be possible to try to bring all the stakeholders involved
and then try to put them together at the same physical place or opportunities and then tohave kind of discussion or negotiation but if you go up the scale at higher, the city level,
Masaru Yarime：38

national level, international level obviously that itʼs impossible to bring all the stakeholders
onboard and then having a direct discussion with them so somehow you need to havesome kind of representatives and obviously there should be some political implication of
who should be in, who should be out and how to pick up the right stakeholders. But inmy presentation actually I didnʼt talk anything about the latter half of my prepared slide
and which is about phosphorus management and in this case itʼs based on material for
analysis which is national at the same time global. Then by using this kind of some common
understanding of how materials ﬂow through different stakeholders and then to try to identify
who are the main important stakeholders, own the material ﬂow analysis so that you could
pick up some of the major ones and then to try to bring in at the national level.
In the case of phosphorus, we created a national platform by inviting some of the major
players from different sectors, the agriculture, fertilizer industry, governments, and also theNGOs and also trying to bring link to the international global level platform which is emerging
by linking Japanese, European, American platforms. In this case, I used this platform
which is not so clearly deﬁned in my talk but somehow some kind of arena where the major
stakeholders can bring in, at least to know each other to share some of the knowledge, andin this case some of the basic data information about material ﬂows and some impacts. Thiskind of information could be a basis for creating a platform and then bringing in some othermajor representatives come together. Although it takes time to have the honest and also
frank discussion among them but I think this is just one of the examples of analyzing theplatform and also implementing the platform, in a sense that a lot of universities such as also
now doing, combining together this analysis as a researcher and also practitioner by joining
in this kind of initiatives at the same time. So this is kind of one example which the university
could be engaged in this societal challenges.
松浦：

最後に David のコメントで、このセッションは締めたいと思います。

David Laws： Just two sentences, because itʼs an important question. One is I think, one

design consideration could take as it was that if adaptation involves reframing and thesecases involved that then what features of the case lead to that and there I would say it was
the diversity. The actors, they didnʼt share perspectives, they didnʼt share the assumptions
and a set of institutional rules that require them to confront those differences and that led
them sometime to come to surprising results not one win, the other lose, but itʼs something
new emerging. The second issue that your question raises is also then what might theinstitutional design question of how local and superlocal or higher level might be related insome kind of more articulated design that doesnʼt assign a problem to one level but actually
where problems move across levels and that could be a key feature.
松浦：

他に挙手いただいた方もあるんですけれども、時間が結構押してしまいましたので、続きの39

ディスカッションは、最後のパネルディスカッションのところでもう少しできればと思いますし、そこの最後で皆さんから質問を受けられるようにしたいと思います。最後のセッションとして、教育関
係のセッションで、最初は Blackstock 先生から UCL のお話をしていただければと思います。

40

Keynote Speech 4 / 基調講演4

ジェイソン・ブラックストック（ ユニヴァーシティ
カレッジロンドン ）Jason J. Blackstock (Department for Science, Technology, Engineering andPublic Policy, University College London)"Understanding and Strengthening Science, Technology, andEngineering Knowledge within Public Decision-Making Processes"「公的意思決定過程において科学・技術・工学の知見を理解し強化する方法」
Jason Blackstock：

Konichiwa. First, let me begin by saying arigato gozaimasu to Yarime-

san for the invitation and to Matsuura-san and Shibayama-san and of course Shiroyamasensei for the invitation and the opportunity. Over the past couple of days, I have had thepleasure and the opportunity to get to understand a bit more about the STIG program and asProfessor Shiroyama had mentioned the STIG program is now 2-3 years old which makes it
almost twice as old as the program that I will be talking about at University College London,
the Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy.
Much of what I will talk about today, I have actually been editing my talk quite a bit over thelast couple of days as I learned more about the program, the STIG program and also due
to other meetings that Masaru was kind enough to organize about the context within Japanto try and draw out the most important aspect. What I am going to talking about is thecentral mission that our departments at UCL is attempting to accomplish and some of themechanisms that we are trying to build in order address many of the things that have been
discussed today. The innovations going on at the University of Tokyo in this space are very
related to the sorts of programs that we are building.
Our core mission in the department is summarized here and I will just read it out briefly,
to support and improve how science, technology and engineering knowledge is mobilized
in support of public decision making around the world. I will talk in a couple of moments
speciﬁcally about what we mean by knowledge mobilization and why we believe thatʼs an
important aspect. But there are three pillars to the work that we are building, education
program, research program and a policy institute that I will talk a little bit more about andbecause the design of the policy institute goes very much to the heart of how we begin tobuild bridges from the academic community and the research that we do in this environment
and all of our science, technology and engineering knowledge and the public decision
making environment, the policy environments. Now, these are all just to draw a bit moreof a connection to the STIG program now so that we can talk later about the international
collaborations that are possible. The STIG program, I just drew these ﬁgures from the STIG
website but at the core of STIG is this concept of the education, research programs being
interconnected, they are very much the same as ours, but over the past couple of years at41

the University of Tokyo there is also a program which I came to know over the past couple ofdays PARI, the Policy Alternatives Research Institute that has very strong connections withthe policy community in trying to link between academic knowledge. And thatʼs very closely
related to the policy institute that we are trying to build within our program.
Now, before I start talking in detail about these programs I want to talk a little bit about our
motivation and how we are thinking about the interface between STE and public policy andwhy we think about it the way we do. We have been talking today both about innovation
systems and the importance of science, technology, and engineering in innovation in the
R&D drive, but also about the public sector and public policy implications of a lot of scienceand engineering and both of those are very much at the heart of how we think about thisinterface, what we are trying to build at the department. So, to begin with for the rationale
well we have talked quite a bit about innovation and the opportunities of innovation to deal
with science and technology problems. We cannot forget that when the governments arepaying for so much of the R&D, they are doing so because they expect there will be a beneﬁt
to society in terms of economic growth and prosperity.
Now, this is just a simple slide to illustrate that that since 2008 in the ﬁnancial crisis, after the
ﬁnancial crisis when governments were slashing budgets across the board one thing they
did not slash but rather increased investment in across most of the OECD countries wasinvestment in research and development with the expectation that this would help reverse
the trend within the economy that had come about due to the economic crisis. You can seethat from 2008 to 2011 the grid in blue, there is increases almost across the board for all
countries in the investment with the rationale that the more investment in R&D, the more
economic growth will be returned at the end. Now, in the title of our department we do nothave the name, the word, innovation that is something that is within the STIG program but itʼs not explicitly something that we put front in the center but that doesnʼt mean itʼs not there.
One of the important rationales that we have is a belief that underpinning a successful
innovation ecosystem needs to be the reliable mobilization of STE knowledge into bothlegislation and regulation environment to enable the environment in which innovation cantake place. The examples earlier on by Professor Oye illustrated quite well the value for– an adaptive governance approach of having good mechanisms that bring in technicalknowledge from the examples that he raised, biotechnology and pharma, the importance of
having good relationships with government so there can be learning mechanisms. Without
strong relationships between the STE knowledge foundation and the regulatory environment,
there cannot the sort of enabling ecosystem that can support the adaptive governanceand adaptive planning that Professor Oye was outlining. So our belief is what we are notfocused particularly on for example policy for R&D budgets, we are very much focused on
enabling environments in what is necessary in terms of those knowledge system to support42

the innovation ecosystem.
Now, of course there are all of the other challenges, many of which we have talked
about from infrastructure, to energy technologies to communication technologies where
governments are heavily reliant on their ability to get knowledge from the Science,
Technology and Engineering, the STE communities in order to understand future trends.
Thanks to Yarime-san, we had a meeting today with the Science, Technology and Innovation
Council Member at the cabinet ofﬁce, Professor Harayama and we spoke about the value
and importance of futureʼs foresight and horizon scanning around these sorts of technology,
across the whole array of technological arenas, because of the importance of these changes
that the changes in technologies for governance process is going forward. Now, this isequally true when we start talking about the international context. I am just going to draw
a few examples that relates to work that Yarime-san and myself do in the sustainable
development or sustainability arena.
In just 2015, this coming year, there are three crucially important frameworks, internationalframeworks being negotiated or re-negotiated ranging from the setting of the sustainable
development goals, building off the Millennium Development Goals, the Hyogo Framework
for action on resilience and planning for disasters and particularly natural disasters andpreparation and of course the UN convention on climate change.
Now, all of these represent the sort of brand societal challenges that Masaru had mentioned
and the second motivation and rationale for how we are structuring our programs is basedon the fact that STE knowledge mobilization enables our societies to tackle this grandchallenge. Many of the conversations earlier on that we had from David and from Michael
and from Ken, all dealt with issues of credibility, legitimacy and salience. Now, I donʼt havetime in the talk to go into that framework in great detail but itʼs a framework that colleagues
at Harvard such as Bill Clark have developed to think about how we engage citizen
perspectives, the importance of having conversations that encourage the legitimacy of theknowledge, as well as the salience of the knowledge to make sure that it is both engaged
with the concerns of society, but also relevant to the issues upfront. This is very much at theheart of the sorts of programs that we are attempting to build.
Now, the other piece of background information which is quite important is if this is ourframework the one thing that I should say I well, these are principles that are guiding the way
in which we are shaping our programs, they are also hypotheses. When Vannevar Bush in
the 1940s gave his speech and wrote the paper, “Science, The Endless Frontier,” he statedthat investment in scientiﬁc and technological and engineering research will create wonderfulvalue for society, but if you read that in detail, I do this with my students every year, you ask
them how does he say itʼs going to happen and he actually he doesnʼt say how itʼs going43

to happen, he just says it will, trust us, we will invest and it will happen. And of course,
we have a belief that strong investment in the infrastructure, the social infrastructure, theinstitutional infrastructure and skills training enables the mobilization of scientiﬁc knowledge
within decision making, public decision making, will support both our ability to tackle grandchallenges and innovation ecosystems. Now the question is how? What are mechanisms?
What are the sorts of operational processes that we can use to effectively mobilize
knowledge? We heard some great examples earlier on about specific mechanisms. We
had some presentation in particular by Hirakawa-san, talking about different mechanisms for
public engagement for example, but all of these mechanisms or attempting to address how
we build, how we most effectively use our science, technology and engineering knowledge
within society. And the hypothesis underpinning these is that if we build these mechanisms
more effectively we will produce better innovation and we will tackle the grand challenges.
So part of the research program, these principles, these motivations also deﬁne the core of
our research programs within the department which I will come to in a little bit.
Now, alongside the creation of our department, or actually predating or motivating thecreation in our department is the fact that there has been quite an evolution in the landscapein the institutional frameworks for the interface of science and public policy over the past two
decades. Particularly in recent years, we have seen the development, particularly at thenational level but also more recently at the international level of science advisors. We earlier
heard about Anne Glover, the creation of Anne Gloverʼs post a couple of years ago in Europe
is the European Chief Science Advisor, and the unfortunate disillusion of that post now thatthe new president of the EU Commission has changed and has changed their mind.
Now, in Auckland, New Zealand, in August of this year, Sir Peter Gluckman, the Chief
Science Advisor convened a major conference called “Science Advice to Governments.”
Now, this pooled together 62 different countries, Chief Scientiﬁc Advisors or people playing
similar sorts of roles from around the world, both developing and developed countries todiscuss their practices, their mechanisms for doing it. That is actually the ﬁrst time that that
network of Chief Scientiﬁc Advisors has come together at that scale. At present, the OECDis running a study looking at how these networks work and actually professor Dr. Arimotosan and Dr. Sato-san at GRIPS are part of that important study, mapping out the institutions
that different countries have and the frameworks that they have. And more recently Ban
Ki-moon assembled for the ﬁrst time last year the Science Advisory Panel to the Secretary
General of United Nation.
Now, the reason I go through these examples is even in the United Kingdom where thescience advisory system is often thought of as being advanced, we can often forget that
this science advisory system up until the middle of the 1990s consisted primarily of one
government chief science advisor and a relatively small ofﬁce of support. It was only after
44

cases of BSE and foot-and-mouth and the government changed – realizing that evidence
informed policy making is a very important foundation for improving the way they dealt witha whole range of issues that they began the reafﬁrmation inside the UK of the structure thatthey use. Today, almost every government department in the UK has its own departmental
chief science advisor. That means there is now a network of science advisors across theentirety of government but these science advisors are relatively new in their post, most of
the time these are individuals with strong scientiﬁc backgrounds who are put into the post
but without necessarily any experience in government or public policy. And there have beenquite a few examples of individuals coming into that post and within 1 or 2 weeks saying
something publicly that the minister had to take into the back ofﬁce and say donʼt do thatagain. Partly because we do not have a large number of scientists and engineers withsigniﬁcant experience in the public policy environment, particularly not at the senior levels
these days. The reason I go through and illustrate this is to say this is a rapidly evolving
context. We donʼt have a lot of knowledge or understanding of what the best frameworks forthese are.
Now, let me just give another couple examples before moving on. The second examples
that Iʼll give are ones that where these are focused very much on advisors, there areother systems that are focused more on knowledge synthesis or evidence synthesis toprovide a broad array of evidence to help support decision makers. Itʼs not an advisor thatstands beside or behind the Prime Minister and gives advice but is rather a broad array of
institutions designed to summarize the evidence and the knowledge and put it forward. The
IPCC is one everyone will know about and I wonʼt talk much about it but we often forget
now that the IPCC is only 20 years old and at 20 years there is only now one other attempt
to replicate that IPBES which is focused on the ecosystem services and biodiversity, and inthat evolution from IPCC to the creation of this new entity, IPBES, they have started to think
about new mechanisms for stakeholder engagement for ensuring there is engagement of local
communities and the co-production of knowledge. So new mechanisms are being introduced
now in part because the IPCC is a fairly rigid process, while it was created 20 years ago
there has not been a very signiﬁcant evolution of the structure of how it works whereas there
are a lot of questions about how we could do this better? Are there opportunities to design it
better? There is, more recently in the UK, Iʼll just use a national example, something called“What Works Centers” and this comes out of the concept of making evidence useful. These
are a set of centers that have been set up across healthcare, education policy and a rangeof other social policies, policing and crime, for example, with the objective of being able tosynthesize the information and provide advice to practitioners and to policy makers about
what the evidence says is the most effective course of action.
Now, these are experiments, we donʼt have a good framework that says if you set this up
like the IPCC it will deﬁnitely work because as we know the IPCC has been very effective45

at summarizing the knowledge around climate change but we havenʼt solved the problem.
There are big gaps between the ability to summarize knowledge and the ability to mobilize it
into the public decisions to support better public decision making.
The last thing Iʼll just say on this to set the context is the fact that weʼve already talked alittle bit about city and local government, or city in local context and this should actually say
city, local or state in the context of the US because I just will go back to Kenʼs example for a
moment when he was talking about the – or responding to the conversation about Ebola andhe was talking about the fact that actually there has been a travesty of some cities or states
setting policies about how to deal with healthcare workers coming back into the UnitedStates from Africa which has been a disincentive for them to go out. One question would
be that right now those city and local governments are relying on national organizations likethe CDC to provide them advice, but there is one CDC and the CDC is understandably quite
focused on trying to deal with the Ebola situation itself. They donʼt have time to pick up thephone for every city ofﬁcial who wants to call and talk about the Ebola situation. There is notthat level of trust that is built necessarily when you look at a science advisory system andyou have a trusted science advisor standing beside the decision maker. So one big questionthat we are looking at within our department is what would these sorts of institutions look likeat the city and local level from mobilizing advice.
Now, this is the context that has evolved over the last 10, 15, 20 years in many cases, andit leads to some of the fundamental questions that we are trying to deal with in STIG, andparticularly when thinking about building capacity for effective decision making we think
about it, breaking it down into three separates things, much of which we have actually had
the conversation about already. First is the institutional structures. On the previous slide
I was showing two different models of one science advice, one evidence synthesis andactually there are a range of other models. And I did not do justice to any of the public
engagement activities or the other type of adaptive governance activities, there are a whole
range of potential frameworks out there, but they are poorly brought together, synthesizedand examined comparatively to ﬁnd out which institutional frameworks and which practices
would work better in which context. There is both the institutional level of how do you
structure science advisory systems or evidence synthesis systems but also what are thepractices that make them more effective or not. During the break Michael had mentioned toDavid that in some of these context that David was talking about, it sounds like you need astrong chairman in order to be able to make the sort of negotiations between different parties
work, you need some sort of a broker in order to be able to facilitate that and thatʼs an open
question, I donʼt – we donʼt – but there is a question of whether or not we can build up an
understanding of these practices to know when they will be more effective and why because
policy context around the world would like to have it. But of course in order to run theinstitutions or design the institutions and implement the practices we also need huge amount46

of skills. Going back to the chief scientiﬁc advisor example, we donʼt have skills training forscience advisors who are plugged out of a laboratory and suddenly put in a government
department which operates just a little bit differently. When you start doing experiments
on bureaucrats they are not necessarily very happy with you, understandably so. And ofcourse as we focus on trying to understand institution practices and skills, this is for both thescience, tech and engineering and public policy communities. These are two very distinct
communities with their own drivers, with their own backgrounds and we need to look at thisfrom both sides.
STEaPP and actually STIG and PARI in the context of University of Tokyo are experimentson the academic side but equally there are experiments like the chief scientific advisor
networks going on the policy side and we need to be aware of it and understand how they
map together, both of them together.
Now, in the interest of time, I am going to go through just very quickly some of the things that
we have been doing within STEaPP to begin to address this, to begin to map this out.
The aims are illustrated by our mission to educate current and future generations ofboth scientists and engineers and policy makers at how to interface , to improve ourunderstanding of the landscape of this interaction through research that is coproducedwith policy communities. We havenʼt talked a lot about this today but this idea of having
a strong interaction between policy communities and research communities at the earlystages of research design is very important. This connects very well again with the sort ofadaptive planning approach that Professor Oye was outlining, this idea that you need early
engagement between policy communities and scientiﬁc communities so that you can identify
where there are opportunities to address some of the issues upfront and early on.
And finally in the policy institute, our goal is to develop and test models on how well thisworks. We donʼt want to just study the practices and the skills, we want to set up a living
laboratory that interfaces between the policy communities and academia, much like PARI sothat we can run the experiments and understand better how these models work in different
environment. One key issue that Masaru had identiﬁed though is there are challenges withthe cultures and incentives that exist within both public policy decision making and within
academia. As an academic I have to publish papers, if I donʼt publish papers I am notgoing to be relevant and I am not going to be relevant to my community, but those papers
are judged by my peers of scientists, they are not judged by policymakers, whereas from a
policy context the ability to address the issues day-in, day-out that are coming so fast andfurious is the key driving force and the tensions that exist there manifest throughout all ofthese aims in these goals and all of the programs that we are trying to build. This could
itself be a symposium that we could talk through and they well be worth doing that to try
47and understand how the cultures and incentives misalign at times and what we can do withbuilding the institutions between them.
Within our education programs, this is an array of our education programs and Iʼll skip
through these relatively quickly and not talk about them in any detail, but we have a corefocus on experiential learning and the focus on experiential learning is based on the ideathat you canʼt learn to do this interface from reading a textbook or from having a lecture.
You can only learn about this interface, you can only learn about policy communities by
having the experience, you can only learn about trying to engage and mobilize science,technology and engineering knowledge by actually engaging at that interface. So things likeour Masters of Public Administration program which is brand new this year, it is an MPA inscience, engineering and public policy. The students have as part of it one-third of their timeat UCL is actually spent working with a real world policy client, this is the World Bank or the
department of energy and climate change so that the students have the experience trying
to broker between academic knowledge that they are able to get from within the classroom
and from within their advisors and the policy environment itself. Part of that is to build up theexperience of the next generation who will therefore have the ability to move back and forthand run some of the engagement processes or the dialogues that are necessary so that they
develop the skill sets, but part of it is also because students can become are often moreable to willing to break down some of the incentive barriers or some of the cultural barriers
between the two environments in order to effectively mobilize knowledge. The students
themselves can be very valuable vehicles of change and we do this across not only the MPA
program, the graduate program and this is just the details of the graduate program I am
happy to talk about that in more detail. We are also launching a doctoral program in orderto do very similar things. We have a Ph.D. program which is for sort of future academics,
we are also launching a Doctorate of Public Administration which is for people who arepracticing in policy environments to come and spend half of their time, not all of their time
but half of their time within the academic context to be able to get a doctorate of practiceeffectively at mobilizing this sort of knowledge of this interface.
And weʼre also doing it at the undergraduate level. We run a program which is entitled “howto change the world” that was my deanʼs idea to call it something that ambitious, but in thisprogram we have over 500 students for a two-week intense program where a whole range ofreal world organizations present challenge problems to the undergraduates and they work insmall designed teams of ﬁve or six people for a two-week period to come up with innovativeideas to address those challenges. And from the ﬁrst year alone when we ran this, we had
a range of these organizations saying can I do this again next year and would you mind
sending some of those student groups to us to present the ideas, because the students evenat this undergraduate level can be very effective mobilizers of the knowledge into a policy
context where they are facing challenge.
48

Iʼll skip through the research because essentially the research builds very much off of
this framework of institutions practices and skills across both communities and just brieﬂy
say that the goal that are range of research groups emerging such as science advice tofind broadly risk and innovation leadership, etcetera. And of course Masaru had alreadymentioned the fact that at UCL we do have these topical grand challenges, human wellbeing, global health and within the department we are attempting to ensure that we havea metric structure where when we begin to look at these practices and these institutionalframeworks and skills we look at them across a range of different topical arena not just
local, national and international but also across sustainability, urbanization, development,
humanitarian response so that we begin to develop a map, a comparative map of where –in which context do these practices become more effective. Kenʼs questions earlier about
how do you take engagement practices at the local level and scale them to the national levelare exactly the sorts of questions that we want to ask for a whole range of processes andequally that sort of the inverse question of how do you take a national level CSA process andscale it down to a local level. But of course the answer may be different if you are talking
about sustainability versus development, whether you are talking about a developed country
context or developing country. So having that comparative framework is quite important.
And the ﬁnal thing in terms of STEaPP to talk about is the policy institute. I am not goingto talk in detail about what weʼre doing here but when I explain this, when I was originallydeveloping the framework for the department, I went to my dean and he is a dean ofengineering, he is a computer scientist by background and an engineer and he was saying,“Well, what is this thing? I understand education, I understand research but tell me whata policy institute is and tell me how are you going to staff it?” And I responded to him bysaying, “Well, in engineering you have big laboratories, right, youʼve got big workshops andlaboratories and you staff them with technicians, you staff them with technicians because
oftentimes if you take a professor in there, the professor doesnʼt have time to maintain theequipment and you need that technical expertise to be able to help with mobilizing that
infrastructure in order to deliver the value” and he said, “Ah, yes I understand that” and I
said, “Well, take another example. When we look at the interface between university andbusiness and private sector we build things like business development and technology
transfer ofﬁces that have become very effective in the last 30 years at building relationships
between private sector and university.” He says, “Yes, I understand that as well.” And thequestion that I posed to him is “Where is the equivalent on the public sector side?” Andat the heart of the policy institute became this idea that we need a team of policy ofﬁcers,
non-academics who arenʼt motivated by or managed or driven having to publish papers all
the time and people who have significant experience both in policy and in the academic
environment in order to act as the knowledge brokers, in order to act as the interface, the go
between , just like chief scientiﬁc advisors in the government have become a bit of an envoy
49

out to the science community to help bringknowledge in, this sort of role and again
this is similar in my understanding to what
PARI has emerged into, it becomes aninterface of the university reaching out withits knowledge to the policy environments to
support them.
Now, there are lots of questions about
wh a t s h o u ld o u r p r o g r a m s l o o k l i k e
across, executive and professional education, policy consultancy, etcetera but theseare questions that we want to address in an international context. So the final point that
I will make connecting to what Yarime-san had said is I believe there is a need for aninternational academic network, there is already the beginning of emergence of things
like the international CSA network, chief science advisor network and other international
conversations like the IPCC but if we can begin to build networks between places like STIG
and PARI and STEaPP and others in other parts of the world, we can begin doing more of
a comparative mapping of understanding the institutions practices and skills that are more
effective in different environment. We also can look at how we are trying to education boththe scientists and engineers of the future and also current generation and the same on thepolicy side and compare best practices and look at the opportunities to compare curriculum
and compare examples and compare case studies, symposiums like this or wonderful
opportunity and I am hoping we can do more in collaboration.
And finally there is the sharing of best practices between these sorts of policy institutes,
things like PARI, things like the STEaPP policy institute and hopefully 15, 20 years from now
the interface between academia, between universities and their policy environments are aswell developed as the business development and technology transfer has become over thelast 30 years. There will always be more we can do and learn but the more we can share
the best practices, the better. And ﬁnally we set up the department last year on August 1st,
2013 and there were three of us at that time, we have now grown to be – this is not evenall of us anymore because itʼs out of date by 2 months now, but the team has grown quite
quickly and I have the distinct honor of working with such tremendously brilliant people andtheir support has been invaluable. So with that I will say thank you very much for being
here. Thank you.
松浦：

ありがとうございました。では、最後に代表の城山先生のほうから、東京大学で行っている

教育プログラムのお話をさせていただきます。

50

Response Presentation / 応答発表

城山 英明 ( 東京大学公共政策大学院)

Hideaki Shiroyama(The Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo)

城山：

それでは、最後に私の方からお話しさせていただきます。今、Blackstock さんに UCL のプログラムの内容と、それからそのベースとなる考え方のようなことをお話いただきましたが、今度は我々の STIG の教育プログラムの概略と、成り立ちの経緯や考え方の特徴のようなことをお話させていただき、先ほどお話いただいたように、交流可能等かということを考える材料にできればなあというふうに思っています。

最初は、プログラムの中身の説明をかなり書いていたんですが、少しお話をうかがっていると、中身の細かいことというよりは、むしろ考え方ですとかどういった経緯でいろんなことをやり出したのかっていうことを、少しお話したほうがいいかなあと思いましたので、お配りしたものとは少しスライドを足して変えています。

もともと、UCL のプログラムは、まさに去年始まって、すでに先ほどお話したように、すごく大きな話になっているということです。一方我々のプログラムは、
かなりインクリメンタルなというか、
徐々にこういうことをやってきたというところがあります。もともとのきっかけは、2004 年に東大で GraSPP、公共政策大学院を、経済学部と法学部でジョイントベンチャーのような形で始めたわけです。これはある意味では経済と法律という限定した分野ですけれども、学際的に、かつ実務の人を巻き込んで来ようと。実際に実務家の方に教員になってもらったり、実務の人を巻き込むプロジェ
クトをいろいろ始めたというのがそもそもの経緯です。

ある意味では、2004 年にそのようなかたちで始まったんですけれども、その後いろいろなプロジェ

クトをやり始めます。例えば、民間企業の寄付金による、エネルギーと地球環境についてのプロジェ

クト、SEPP（Sustainability of Energy/ Environment and Public Policy）というプロジェクトがあります。その後、I2TA という、日本でテクノロジーアセスメントのようなものがどういうかたちであり得るのか、どういう手法が使えるのか、あるいはどういうかたちで制度化が可能なのかというようなプログラムも行いました。

これは 2008 年ですけれども、海洋アライアンスというプログラムを始めました。これは、むしろ工学系、農学系、理学系の先生方と公共政策大学院で、法律の人と政治系の人が組んで、部局横断型
教育プログラムを作るということを始めました。

2010 年には、これは小規模なんですけれども、JAXA、日本の宇宙航空研究機構の協力を得て、「宇宙開発と公共政策」という授業を始めました。その後、例えばヘルステクノロジーアセスメントに関するプロジェクトなども行っています。要は、もともと法学と経済の話で、学際的かつ実務を巻き込むということをやっていたのが、理科系の話を巻き込むような話をインクルメンタルにやっていったという経緯なんです。ある意味ではその延長上で、STIG プログラムの発足としては 2012 年、そして今年で 3 年目になりますが、科学技術とイノベーション政策に関わる包括的な研究教育プログラ

ムを行っているというのが、大きな流れであります。

そのなかで、先ほどちょっと触れていただきましたけれども、東大に PARI、政策ビジョン研究セ

ンター（UTokyo Policy Alternatives Research Institute）があります。日本語と英語の名称がずいぶん違うんですが、これはこのセンター設立時の東大総長が、日本語の名前を気に入っていたの51

でこうなりました。それで英語名は、自分たちの目指すことにしようといって、Policy Alternatives

Research Institute とした。つまり、1 つのビジョンを押しつけるというのではなく、政策の選択肢を議論して、それを社会に問うていきましょうという志として、こういうものを全学機構として2013 年にパーマネントベースで作りました。

私自身は今、公共政策大学院の院長をやっていますが、その前 3 年ぐらいはディレクターをやっていて。ディレクターという立場もありますが、私個人としては、
ここに科学技術ガバナンスのグルー

プとか、複合リスク・ガバナンスの研究を行っています。これらは中身はそれぞれかなり重なってくるところがあります。こういった、教育の部局でやっていた話と、大学の中で教育というよりは、むしろ社会発信でやってきたことを並行して行ってきたというのが経緯かなというふうに思います。

（図示）字がたくさんあってなかなか分かりづらいと思うんですが、我々の STIG のプログラムもその 1 つです。我々のプログラムはここにありますね。実は、このプログラムは複数の拠点大学が連携して実施しているプログラムであります。GRIPS（政策研究大学院大学）が中心拠点で、それ以外に経済、経営的な側面の拠点校としては一橋大学。あるいは、九州大学はアジア地域のリージョ
ナル・イノベーションを主にやっています。あと、メディカルを中心に、メディカルと ELSI、倫理や法的な問題、あるいはコミュニケーション、ここはまさに平川先生がからんでいるところですが、大阪大学と京都大学と、これら 5 つぐらいのグループでやっているわけです。

もともとのアイデアはというと、先ほど Blackstock さんのお話のなかで、リーマンショックの後、R&D のインベストメントが各国で増えているというお話がありました。ある意味ではこれも同じよ
うなところがあって、増えていったときにそれをどうやって正当化するのかと。ある種のジャスティ
フィケーションをしないとなかなかそれを維持できないという、政策当局的な意識というのが背景としてあったというところがあります。

より短期的には、当時日本は民主党政権だったわけですが、ある種の行政改革といいますか、事業仕分けの中で、科学技術政策というのはお金がかかって成果がないだろう、あるいはなんでこんなに予算を使わなきゃいけないんだっていうことが取りざたされました。
例えば、スーパーコンピューターのプロジェクトが話題になったり。それで、ちゃんと R&D 投資をするエビデンスがほしいというのが、直接的な動機となって始まったところがあるだろうと思います。そういう意味では、きちんと評価ができるようなデータを作るということが 1 つですが、それだけでなく、単にエビデンスを作れ

ばいいというだけではなくて、エビデンスを作るということと、政策形成のプロセスをどういうふうに運営していくのか。異なるコミュニティのインタラクションをどうするのかということも大事なので。データのエビデンスの話とプロセスの話を両方見るということが、プロジェクト全体としては謳われたわけです。ただ、短期的にはエビデンスをちゃんと作れと。そうしないと、仕事してないじゃ
ないかと、そういう批判は常に受けることになります。先ほど松浦先生が紹介された RISTEX のプ

ロジェクトも、このリサーチファンディングです。それからデータは政府系のいろいろな研究所が中心になっていますが、基礎的研究や人材育成が、先ほど申し上げた 5 つの拠点によってなされてきたというのが、このプログラムの大枠であります。

そういうなかで、STIG の基本理念ですけれども、分野横断的、インターディシプリンな教育プロ

グラムです。ポイントはプロセスとエビデンスを両方見るということで、そこは先ほどのお話をうかがっていると、すごく近いなという印象を受けました。エビデンスを作るというのは、1 つの焦点だったんです。例えば経済評価とか、あるいは実際にどういう成果ができたのかというのを、ビブリオメ

トリクスできちんと分析するというような。そういうエビデンスを作るというのが、1 つの焦点であっ52

たのは確かです。ただ、たまたまこの場合には、公共政策と工学系が一緒になってやったということもあって、エビデンスだけではなく、プロセスの問題をきちんと見ましょうというのが、1 つの特色になっています。ですから STIG には、Governance というキーワードをプログラムタイトルに入れています。あるいは、エビデンスがプロセスでどう使われるかという、
このインタラクションをちゃんと見ようということになっています。

これは全体の構造ですけれども、公共政策と工学系研究科が中心になって、他に例えば経済学、法学、政治学、医学部、それから情報学環ですね。駒場にある総合文化研究科にも入っていただいていますし、先ほどの政策ビジョン研究センター、PARI などとも連携しています。学位を出すわけではないですけれども、全学でいわゆる修了証、サーティフィケイトを出すプログラムとして実施しています。

細かいことはここでは触れませんが、カリキュラム的にもプロセスの話とエビデンスをきちんと作

るのと、両方習得するような仕組みになっています。先ほどのエキスペリエンシャルともつながると思うんですが、共通のコアになる科目というのはケーススタディで、異なる分野をバックグラウンドにもつ学生が一緒になって、かつ、実務の現場の人にも来てもらって、ある種のグループワークをやるという授業を必修科目にしています。

もう 1 つの特徴は、工学系の学科、医学系の学科等を巻き込んでいるので、フィールドスペシフィッ

クリサーチ、分野別研究科目と書いていますが、例えばパブリックヘルス、あるいは情報関係や海洋関係、宇宙など、そういう各分野については、むしろ理科系のいろいろな人たちを巻き込んで展開していることです。必ずしも社会科学系でそこまで個別に専門化している人はいないので、理科系を巻き込むことでこういう授業展開が可能になっているのが、1 つの特徴かなと思います。

現在は、比較的いろいろな学生を対象にオープンに、とりあえず履修登録をしてくださいというかたちで進めています。初年度は 92 人の学生に登録してもらって、今年は 77 人が登録し、トータルの登録者が 153 人います。授業出ている学生にどんどん登録するよう勧めたので、若干インフレ気

味のところはあるんですが、そのなかで、特に興味のある人には継続的に関わってもらうというようなかたちにしています。

通常は修了に必要な単位取得に 2 年かかることを想定しているんですが、1 年目の 2013 年度に 6名が修了しました。この 6 人は卒業後就職をして、文部科学省や鉄道会社、シンクタンクと、それなりに関係のあるような進路に進んでいます。今後、できれば毎年 15 人ぐらいを目標に、
サーティフィ
ケイトをとる学生を育てていきたいなと思っています。

実務の現場とのつながりという意味で言うと、「ポリシープラットフォームセミナー」と題して、毎回省庁の現場の人や海外の研究者に来ていただき、実務とのネットワーク、あるいは海外とのネッ
トワークをいろいろなかたちで作っていく取組みも行っています。過去 2 年ぐらいの間に 29 回実施

しましたから、毎月 1 度以上はやっているということになろうかと思います。

もう 1 つは、先ほどお話したように 5 つの拠点大学で実施していますので、毎年夏には全国の拠点から学生と教員が集まって、リトリート合宿をしています。最初の年は筑波で、この夏には兵庫県の淡路島で、来年度は我々東京大学が企画することになっていますが、名古屋での開催を予定しています。いろいろな大学、異なるバックグラウンドの人が来るということのメリットと、それから、実際の現場に行くという目的もあります。名古屋では三菱重工やトヨタのご協力も得て、そういった現場を見学したり、素材にして議論するようなことをやりたいなと思っています。

それから、国際的なネットワークです。これはいろいろな形態があり得ると思うので、まさにこ53こはいろいろ考えたいわけですが。現在進めているもので、去年から始めて今年も計画しているのは、Rathenau Instituut とい うオ ラ

ンダのテクノロジーアセスメントの機関と、ドイツのカールスルーエ工科大学の研究機関と一緒になって、根拠に基づく政策フェロー(Fellowship for Evidence-based Policy) があります。つまり、政策の実務をやっている人たちが、まさにエビデンスをどう扱うかや、ポリティクスとエビデンスの相互作用など、具体的なケースをベースに議論するという場です。昨年の第一回は東京大学で開催し 30 人ぐらいが参加

しましたが、今回は先ほどロジャースさんにも触れていただきましたが、2 月にベルギーのブリュッセルで開催を予定しています。

以上が STIG の成り立ち、あるいは実施している内容の経緯になります。さらに付け加えさせていただくと、STIG というのは修士、博士、いずれでも履修できるプログラムですが、もう 1 つ今動

いているのは、博士レベルでの分野横断的教育プログラムで、実務に関わるようなことを習得するというプロジェクトを、これも去年から始めています。考え方としては、先ほどの鎗目さんのプレゼンにかなり近いんですけれども、大学という場で、テクノロジー、サイエンスの話とポリシーインスティ
テューションの話をちゃんと組み合わせて、ソリューションをプロポーズするようなトレーニングをしたほうがいいだろうと。特に社会科学系もありますが技術系、あるいは科学技術系の人のトレーニングとして、こういうことを埋め込んだ学位プログラムをちゃんと作りたいというのが背景にあります。いろいろな専門分野を基礎にしつつ、さらに水平展開力といいますか、
ある程度俯瞰的にそういったものを見たりとか、あるいは全体をインティグレートする。あるいは、実際にプラクティカルにアクションにつなげるということも含めてプログラムを組もうとしています。これは学位プログラムですが、最後には学位をそれぞれ出すんですが、プロセスとしては毎年学生 25 人ぐらいを募集、部局横断で運営しますので、いろいろな工夫をしています。例えば、実際にプロジェクトを企画するというのをやっていて。なるべく現場に入っていくプロジェクトを企画して、2 カ月ぐらいは海外に行って研究するようなことを、博士論文を書く場合に求めるということをやったり。またセカンダリーア
ドバイザーをつけるなどの工夫を積極的に取り入れてやっています。

分野としては医療、エネルギー、航空宇宙。さらにレジリエンスやリスク、こういった分野を専攻している学生を集めています。これは、STIG とほぼ重なるようですが若干ずれていて。より幅広いということもありますが、こういったいろいろな部局をベースにやっているということです。そうい
う意味でいうと、修了証のプロジェクトとしてやってきたんだけれども、先ほどもちょっとお話のあった博士レベルの人材育成をしています。ただ、現時点で博士課程は絶対的に理系学生が多いので、このプログラムも公共政策が幹事部局をやってはいますが、学生の 7 ～ 8 割は理系で、2 割ぐらい社

会科学系の学生が混ざっているという感じです。ちょっと長くなりましたが、以上で私からのご報告とさせていただきます。ありがとうございました。

54

Q&A / 質疑応答
松浦：

あと、1 問くらい質問とかコメントがあれば受け付けますけど。

参加者：

ありがとうございます。どちらかというと IPCC に興味があった単なる一般市民で、こんな時間を使うのは申し訳ないんですが、1 つだけ質問させてください。私が今日うかがった範囲で理解した範囲では、Joint Fact-Finding というのは、利害関係者間で共通認識した議論の前提のようなものであって、どちらかというと裁判所の事実認定とかそういうものに近いのかなあという、私なりの理解としてはそんなふうに理解いたしました。

質問ですが、科学エビデンスが十分でない場合に、どうやって Joint Fact-Finding を、議論の前提を見つけ出したらいいのかというのが 1 つ目の質問です。2 つ目の質問は、科学エビデンスが十分でない場合に見つけ出した Joint Fact-Finding が、これは科学的なエビデンスとは違った、議論の前提としての Joint Fact-Finding なんだということが区別して利害関係者に提示されるのかどうか心配になっています。区別されないと、なんとなく一般市民としてはそれが混同されてすり替えられてしまったりすると、なんだか騙されたような気がして、科学の信頼を失ってしまうのではないかという不安を抱いております。

具体的な例としまして、先月起こった御嶽山の水蒸気爆発があると思うんです。科学的には、マグマ噴火は予測できるけれども水蒸気爆発は予測できないというのが、現在の科学技術のレベルです。
分かっていることは、水蒸気爆発の前には火山性微動が起きるけども、火山性微動が起きたからといって、必ず水蒸気爆発が起こるとは限らないと。こういったなかで、全国の火山の温泉保養地の観
光地の警戒レベルを決めなくてはならないとします。そうすると、微動が起きたからといって警戒レベルを上げると、全国の観光地の温泉街が干上がってしまう。そんな問題が起きた場合、どうやって

Joint Fact-Finding を決めて、なおかつこれは議論の前提であって、本当は科学エビデンスとしては
前回 1 回ぐらいしか水蒸気爆発したことないんで、ほとんどエビデンスがないですよと、そういうことを正直に言ってもらえるかどうか、そのへんをお伺いしたいんですが。
松浦：

はい。分かりました。この前のセッションの話についてのご質問ですね。

Thank you. Iʼll try to address maybe Dr. Matsuura. I think there are two
important things, one was an important piece that Dr. Matsuura identiﬁed in his presentation
and I think it captured the kind of state-of-the-art which is that this is a process of interaction
between stakeholders of various kinds including people from the world of science.
Previously they were viewed as servants but that for reasons here outlined quite well I thinkthat doesnʼt work either but then the idea is that – and remember this developed out ofsituations where there was some need to act, something had to be done, right, and that thethinking is that that is best informed by an understanding of what is known and also what
is not known. And that people act in light of that and being willing to share that uncertainty,
doubt in that kind of diverse group is the idea so itʼs not that it only can be applied whenDavid Laws：

55

knowledge is certain but exploring that in a kind of diverse setting with diverse actors who
might challenge one anotherʼs assumptions and who share and need to act is what deﬁnes
joint fact-ﬁnding. Itʼs not to hide uncertainties, nor is it to overburden us, but to understandthem in relationship to some situation that creates a need to act.
松浦：

私のほうから付け加えるとすると、Andrew Stirling という人が Risk Matirx というのを書いていて。結局それが何を言わんとしているかというと、従来のように科学者に基本的に任せると、問題が、何が起きるかを狭く定義してしまって、しかも確率がある程度特定されているという条件でリスク分析をして評価しましょうという方向に動いてしまいます。そうすると、水蒸気爆発とか火

山性微動みたいな分からない部分の話がどんどん捨象され捨てられていく、見えないことになってしまう。Joint Fact-Finding は、できる限りそこまで含めて整理しようと。分からないことはここです、分かっているのはここですと。科学者だけに依頼すると分かっていることだけ出てきて、分からないことは情報として出てこないので、そこを明らかにしようと。それが今回、David なり私なり、

Oye 先生の話もそこに近い部分あったと思うんですが、やらんとしていることかなと思います。

56

Wrap-up discussion / 総合討論松浦：

最後はパネルディスカッションをやりたいと思いますので、発表された先生方、前にお願いします。まだ時間には余裕がありますので、最後にもう 1 回質問を受けるかたちにしたいと思います。

パネルディスカッションといいますか、総括討論ということになりますけれども、基本的に今やってきた質疑応答の流れみたいなかたちでやっていきたいと思います。まずは、順番に皆さんから今回の1 日を受けてのコメント、あるいは誰かに対する質問というのがあれば発言いただきたいと思います。
In other areas who had ﬁghts. There was a huge ﬁghts over particulate matter, PM2.5 andwhether and how a Harvard study should serve as a basis for setting a tough standard. And
industry didnʼt like it. The Harvard guys said weʼre truthful. People were... the nasty ﬁght.
In this instance they turned to a third party organization that both sides of the controversy
agreed to fund, the Health Effects Institute which did an evaluation, which was ultimately
accepted. The last example. This is actually one that I mentioned in my presentation,
where there are very intense fights over the effects of synthetic biology on environment.
The parties to the conﬂict, NGOs, civil society, the leaders of the movement actually kind of
opposing, the ﬁrms that were doing the work, the academics that were doing the work, andthe environmental scientists and EPA did not agree on what the policy should be. But theyagreed on what they needed to know more about and they again sought public funding with
open access to the results. So, you look at these three examples and what I ﬁnd that they
have in common. This really resonates with many of the comments referred today is thatthe open acknowledgement of uncertainty, the open acknowledgement of what is not known
is often a critical ﬁrst step towards constructive engagement with issues, but it requires adegree of honesty which is hard to come by in public policy but is not without hope.
松浦：

今のポイントに関して、Uncertainty を認めるという話に関して、どなたか発言されたい方

いらっしゃいますか。

Uncertainty is a very loaded word. I come from a physics backgroundoriginally and I got very deeply involved with the evolution of the European Unions ʼ
precautionary approach which is based on uncertainty. Yet there is always uncertainty, so
there has to be some sort of balance here and it seems to me that many of the essential
problems we face are caused by a misunderstanding of what uncertainty means. For
example, most of my friends and colleagues in the nuclear business will tell you there isno uncertainty in disposal of radioactive waste. Itʼs a simple technology which has beenaround for about 20 years which we could deal with tomorrow if there wasnʼt an enormous
misunderstanding they would say about uncertainty. So I think the real problem comes
down to how do we move forward from this impasse between public understanding, publicMichael Rogers：57trust and this predication of regulations based on some sort of uncertainty. Itʼs easy to say
but itʼs not getting us very far.
Michael Rogers ： One rejoinder, I completely accept what you say. It is absolutely a major

problem and how we move forward is really not so obvious but the other problem that there
has been an enormous misunderstanding between hazard and harm. For example, in
European Union jurisdiction, and pressure from the Denmark, to actually label nickel-based
compounds as being essentially harmful whereas in fact most nickel-based compounds
are products which cannot ever reach the human consumer and so they are trying to baseregulations and public understanding on the basis of uncertainty in hazard rather thanuncertainty in the risk seems to be another real complication in this ﬁeld.
松浦：

デイビッドさんお願いします。

I think itʼs also worth noting in what Dr. Oye said about how understanding
accumulates in these areas. If you take for instance the understanding of letʼ s sayenvironmental health diseases, much of those – I wonʼt say most because thatʼs always acontroversial claim but many important cases developed out of case orientations that wereoriginally outliers and were marginalized. It was only when those cases became identiﬁed
and then they led to a broader exploration of what the issues were, what the system was,that we got an understanding of kind of etiology of these environmental diseases. So
it wasnʼt a top-down understanding. It emerged from case specifics and often were theprocedures in place marginalized the very symptoms that later became the core of the newunderstanding.
David Laws：

松浦：

ジェイソンさん。

Jason Blackstock：

Arigato. Just building off of Ken and Michaelʼs points, I think one of

the things that has struck me with the diversity of cases that we looked at today but also
thinking more broadly, of a range of them is there is – and Ken you already sort of alluded
to this that even the solution of focusing on
the uncertainty in the science will work insome cases but not others. In other words,
there is no one-size-fits-all mechanism
or framework to deploy and I think one of
the things that I, you know, from my focus
on climate change for example. Climatechange is an area where itʼs not a debate
about the uncertainty though I imagine
Ken will have a reason but I mean to some58

extent in that one it is very much, you know, just like GMOs. There are other value systems
that are engaged. There are other issues that are engaged in that context. One of thestories that I always used to illustrate that is in the early part of the 1990s, or even late ʻ80s
and early ʻ90s, when climate was becoming an issue, the problem of climate change waspresented hand-in-hand with a solution and the solution was a global carbon tax and thatwas based on previous experiment with sulfur dioxide and other systems that have beenused. But in that phrase global carbon tax are two words that the Republicans hate, global
and tax. They have come to my head at that time: carbon was neutral but my hypothesis
is, had the solution presented at that time been local carbon entrepreneurship actually the
Republicans may well have found that a perfectly acceptable framework. And so it was not
the science of climate change or the issues of the uncertainty about science that the politicalsituation revolved around. It became an attack on the science based on the fact that the
proposed solution was in fact an anathema or a threat to the political values. This is whereitʼs a situation where the types of mechanism. So we have seen recently things like theproposal of Roger Pielke, Jr., the model of The Honest Broker. If those of you who have notread his book, he suggests four stereotypes of different ways of that scientists can behave,and the honest broker is the scientist who presents only the facts and steps back and is notengaged, of course that has not worked very well in climate at all. In fact it seems to be a
straw man that fails routinely, precisely for many of the reasons that David and Michael and
Ken have raised in their presentations that just presenting the facts and stepping back does
not address whose facts, what issues are taken into account from the local perspective.
And so overall in my mind this push is very much in the direction of can we create not justresearch that looks at these individual mechanisms but actually starts to do the comparisonsacross these cases and look for those more general, databases of here is mechanisms andhere is cases they have been effective and how so we can begin to do that comparison and I
would hypothesize that that might be a very interesting international collaborative project forthe sort of network we may be able to begin building.
Very brieﬂy, but I would just highlight that. Resolving the controversy at thepolicy level is not resolving the controversy that you get agreement that there is climatechange. We need to do something and then you start to act. So you plan then to raise theissue in the Netherlands, the big inland sea wall to deal with the projected climate change
and all of a sudden local controversy breaks out. The uncertainty comes right back into play
because why do you need to this here, why do you need to do so much, why does it need tobe so big, why do you need to do it now and that just gets recreated. So itʼs not the end ofpolicy controversies, not the end of controversies.

David Laws：

松浦： 今までゲストの皆さんにうかがいましたけれども、どなたか。城山先生から順番にいきましょう。

Hideaki Shiroyama：

The point between evidence and reframing issue which was59repeatedly referred seems to be very interesting. So the issue of the evidence is not
行詰めjust evidence itself. How to frame the evidence, whose evidence he mentioned or, youknow, from the fourth perspective. So the issue of uncertainly also relating to that perhaps,
you know, uncertainty is not just about evidence itself, the uncertainty about from whose
perspective, you know. There can be many potential from which perspectives and evidence
can be build, so the interaction between the issue of evidence and reframing issue seems
to be very interesting. In the overall discussion today, ﬁrst session rather focusing on theevidence and how the regulation will be reviewed in the face of the new evidence. That kindof framing is basically made, but in the latter part, especially the Davidʼs part and you moreemphasized the framing issue rather than the evidence issue itself. So those seems to be alittle bit different, but actually those two sessions can be interacted to each other that can be
the potential area for the research I think, thatʼs the impression I had.
This is extremely important point. Itʼs what I written in my note so if I got
to raise an issue. But ﬁrst of all reframing or framing is characterized policy controversies
in that way as being precisely those situations in which turning to the facts usually tends
to escalate rather than resolve the dispute right. So the idea that you are going to bringin evidence and resolve a framing controversy is unlikely. But also if you think about andwhether you are talking in the policy level or much more local level, a kind of practiceperspective. People who work in these settings I think what you see is that if we are talking
about adaptation and reframing, we are talking about learning, right. But learning then – thenwe have to conﬁrm what learning is, whatʼs involved in it, and it gets much more complicatedI think because you could say is that learning involves changes in behavior, right. But thenyou have to look at what the behavior – the behavioral expression of knowledge it involves
and then thatʼs people having stakes on one part but thatʼs maybe the easy part. The otherpart is habits or professional practice, the context of institutional processes, organizationalroutines and remaking that so learning then becomes not a new insight, an epiphany that
leads me to something but really a remaking and a remaking in a social context. So itʼs amuch more complex process and then how evidence and uncertainty enter into that I think issomething that bears the kind of research that weʼve been talking about where there is very
close tie between research and policy, but also between those two and the practice world inwhich this gets done. And policy and practice then can usefully be disentangled from one
another to precisely raise those kind of issues.
David Laws：

松浦：

ありがとうございます。話題を変えてもいいかな。じゃあ、鎗目先生。

Well, just trying to change a little bit about the issue we are discussing.
The international cooperation mentioned by Jason, and this year I visited China for fourtimes and just a few weeks ago I was invited to attend trilateral Science, Technology andInnovation Policy Seminar which was organized by Chinese Academy of Science and also
Masaru Yarime：

60

NISTEP in Japan and also KISTEP STEPI in Korea. We made out the presentations andsomehow the Japanese presentation in a way referred to the social dimension in public
engagement and stakeholders roles and also the risk assessment and also engagement of
the psychology [ph] for the studies and then to some extent Korea has also similar tendency
to refer to the social dimension but then in the case of China, at least as far as I had
impression that they are interested in benchmarking the US and then how to catch up with
US, publication, patents, innovation and that was the main concern and when we talk aboutpublic engagement with these, the people in China, well itʼs not that easy to have a kind ofcommon understanding or common interpretation or somewhere the common ground and I
was also invited to give a seminar at the Sichuan Administration Institute which is operated
by the communist party, so all these students are local ofﬁcials of the communist party indifferent cities within the Sichuan province.
I talked privately with some of the people and then they say that their function is to just try
to interpret and translate what the central government says and then they just try to follow
what they say and implementation at the local level. So, in this case the public engagement
at this moment at least is not kind of priority. So in this kind of situation I guess in the caseof Jason, you have many students from different countries, in Middle-East and Netherlands
how we could discuss this public engagement and the consensus building, joint fact ﬁnding
in these kinds of environment? This is a huge question and I donʼt have any answer to thatbut I think when we talk about the issues like climate change what China will do will have ahuge impact and what increasingly China developed technologies and then we are using it,in this case the developers or scientists, engineers and not necessarily sitting next to you, inthis kind of case how we could have kind of dialogue and discussion then, just want to pose
this question to someone.
松浦：

そろそろ時間も迫ってきましたが、平川先生にまだご発言いただいていなかったので、エンゲージメントのお話しですとか、デモクラティック・ガバナンスみたいな話も今ありましたので、
ちょっとまとめみたいな感じになってしまいますがよろしくお願いします。

I would like to raise question about or make a point about thenecessity to classify and make a typology of the problem based on which we need to classify
or systematize the response to the risk governance or some other governance issues.
For example, the International Risk Governance Council has made some typology of thisproblem from the simple, complex and uncertain and ambiguous. Based on this kind of
typology of the problem, we can make a typology or systematize the response to the crisisof risk issues. So, for example, today I talked about public engagement and necessity andimportance of public engagement but public engagement is not necessarily best way or
better ways to solve the problems.

Hideyuki Hirakawa：61

Public engagement itself can raise the problem so we should ﬁnd a way to ﬁnd when the
public engagement is necessary or available and a good solution to the problems andwho can do it, who should do it and where and how and on what issues in which kind offraming? So we have to systematize the response in terms of the public engagement basedon the classiﬁcation of the problems. That is further our challenge in relation to the public
engagement activities, developments.
松浦：ありがとうございました。ちょっと時間も押してきてしまったので、私の方でいくつか、今出てきたキーワードだけでまとめさせていただきます。

1 つは、controversy ということで、対立があるような状況というのがあったということです。そのなかで、David のようなコンセンサスモデルもあれば、パブリックエンゲージメントのようなものもあって、最後に平川先生おっしゃっていただいたように、そういうのが必ずやらなくてはいけな
いかというとそうでもなくて、適切なガバナンスというもののを考えなくてはいけないよねという結論は、皆さんのコンセンサスとしてあるのかなというふうに思います。

2 つ 目 と し て、 先 ほ ど の 質 問 の な か に も あ っ た ん で す が、 分 か ら な い こ と、 不 確 実 性、Uncertainty があることを認めるということ自体が一つ、このガバナンスのなかでやらなくてはいけない大きなことであると。意外とそこをみんな認めたがらないけれども、それを認めるというのが 1
つ大きなステップになるというお話があったと思います。

また、Blackstock さんからあった話だと思うんですけれども、結局、科学という話をするときと、

ポリティカル、政治との関わりというものがやはりあると。ある場合には政治が優先してしまうし、ある場合には科学を優先して、そこをどうやってうまくバランスをとるか、つなぐかという話が出てくるということ。あと、もう 1 つ、科学とは何かというバウンダリーワークをどうやってやるかという話も、今出てきたかなというふうに思います。

あと 1 つ、コンプリートなプロポーザルとして、多くのケースが出てきたんだから、それを整理するっていうだけでも、まず必要だよねっていうお話をいただいたかと思います。それが最終的に使い分け、場の使い分けという平川先生の結論にもつながる部分かなというふうに思います。

質問を受け付けるというふうに申し上げたんですけれども、時間がなくなってしまい申し訳ありません。まだ皆さんここに少し残っていると思いますので、終了後に個別に問いかけていただくようにしていただければと思います。今日は長い間、どうもありがとうございました。まずは、先生方に拍手をよろしくお願いします。今後もこのように開かれた議論の場を、毎年できる限り設けていきたいと思いますので、皆様お付き合いいただければと思います。本日は、どうもありがとうございました。

62

Appendices / 資料編

Keynote Speech 1: Kenneth Oye

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Response Presentation: Chiaki Sato

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Response Presentation: Sotaro Shibayama

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Keynote Speech 2: Michael Rogers

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Response Presentation: Hideyuki Hirakawa

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Keynote Speech 3: David Laws

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Response Presentation: Masahiro Matsuura

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Response Presentation: Masaru Yarime

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Keynote Speech 4: Jason J. Blackstock

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Response Presentation: Hideaki Shiroyama

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東京大学科学技術イノベーション政策の科学（STIG）教育・研究ユニット〒113-0033
東京都文京区本郷 7-3-1 医学部 1 号館 S209
Tel： 03-5841-0955 Fax：03-5841-0956
URL：http://stig.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/
Mail: STIG@pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp