Japan- Asia Pacific Dialogue

The Asia-Pacific in Global Power Transition:
How Many Great Powers?

Conference Papers

December, 12, 2014
At Meiji University
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Meiji University
University of Western Sydney
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)Table of Contents
1．Program .................................................................................................... 1
2．Biographies of the Panelists .................................................................... 2
3．Presentation Papers ................................................................................. 5

Opening Session: The World in Transition and Japan ............................... 5John MEARSHEIMER ............................................................................. 5
ITO Go....................................................................................................... 7

Session I: The Asia-Pacific in Transition and Japan............................................ 9David WALTON ........................................................................................ 9
YAMADA Yoshihiko ................................................................................ 10
LIN Cheng-yi .......................................................................................... 12
SATO Koichi ........................................................................................... 15

Session II: China in the Future and Japan .............................................. 20
MOMMA Rira ......................................................................................... 20
SHI Yongming ......................................................................................... 22
YUMINO Masahiro ................................................................................ 23
HOO Tiang Boon..................................................................................... 26
4．An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) .......................... 32
5．An Introduction to Meiji University ...................................................... 33
6．An Introduction to University of Western Sydney ................................ 34
7．An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)......................... 35

1．Program
日・アジア太平洋対話
Japan- Asia Pacific Dialogue

パワー・トランジションの中のアジア太平洋：何極の時代なのか
The Asia-Pacific in Global Power Transition: How Many Great Powers?
共催／Co-sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム ／ The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
明治大学 ／ Meiji University
西シドニー大学 ／ University of Western Sydney
公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム ／ The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)2014 年 12 月 12 日（金）／ Friday, 12th December, 2014
明治大学グローバルフロント１階「グローバルホール」／ "Global Hall," Global Front, Meiji University
開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks

13:30-13:40
開会挨拶 （5分間）
Opening Remarks (5 min.)伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人・日本国際フォーラム理事長
ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR

開幕セッション／Opening Session

13:40-14:10

世界の変動と日本
The World in Transition and Japan

報告A （15分間）
Presenter A (15 min.)

ジョン・ミアシャイマー シカゴ大学教授
John MEARSHEIMER, Professor, The University of Chicago

報告B （15分間）
Presenter B (15 min.)伊藤 剛 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員・明治大学教授
ITO Go, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Meiji University

セッションⅠ／Session I

14:10-15:45

アジア太平洋の変動と日本
The Asia-Pacific in Transition and Japan議長 （5分間）
Chairperson (5 min.)

石川 薫 グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人・日本国際フォーラム研究本部長
ISHIKAWA Kaoru, President, GFJ / Director of Research, JFIR

報告A （10分間）
Presenter A (10 min.)デビッド・ウォルトン 西シドニー大学准教授
David WALTON, Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney

報告B （10分間）
Presenter B (10 min.)

山田 吉彦 東海大学教授
YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Tokai University

報告C （10分間）
Presenter C (10 min.)

林 正義 台湾中央研究院欧美研究所研究員
LIN Cheng-yi, Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica

報告D （10分間）
Presenter D (10 min.)佐藤 考一 桜美林大学教授
SATO Koichi, Professor, J. F. Oberlin University

自由討議 （50分）
Free Discussions (50 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants
休憩 ／ Break

15：45-15:55
セッションⅡ／SessionⅡ

15：55-17:30

中国の将来と日本
China in the Future and Japan議長 （5分間）
Chairperson (5 min.)伊藤 剛 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員・明治大学教授
ITO Go, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Meiji University

報告A （10分間）
Presenter A (10 min.)

門間 理良 防衛研究所主任研究官
MOMMA Rira, Professor, The National Institute of Defense Studies

報告B （10分間）
Presenter B (10 min.)

時 永明 中国国際問題研究所副研究員
SHI Yongming, Associate Research Fellow, China Institute of International Studies

報告C（10分間）
Presenter C (10 min.)

弓野 正宏 早稲田大学現代中国研究所招聘研究員
YUMINO Masahiro, Research Fellow, Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies

報告D （10分間）
Presenter D (10 min.)フー・ティアン・ブーン 南洋理工大学准教授
HOO Tiang Boon, Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

自由討議 （50分）
Free Discussions (50 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants[NOTE ］日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

12．Biographies of the Panelists【Foreign Panelists】
John MEARSHEIMER,

Professor, The University of Chicago

Received Ph.D. in government from Cornell University in 1981. Served as an Assistant Professor (1982-1984),
Associate Professor (1984-1987), Professor (1987-1995), Harrison Chair, (1987-present), and Department
Chair (1989-1992) at the Political Science Department, the University of Chicago, and as a Visiting Scholar at
the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University (1992-1993). Concurrently Serves as a R. Wendell
Harrison Distinguished Service Professor and a Co-director of the Program on International Security Policy,
the University of Chicago. Published The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton, 2014) which has beentranslated into 8 languages: Chinese, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Romanian, and Serbian.
David WALTON

Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney

Received Ph.D. from the University of Queensland. Conducted researches in the field of diplomatic history,
foreign policy, and Australia-Japan post-war relations. Taught at Griffith University, University of Tasmania,
and University of Western Sydney since 1995. Co-edited New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia Pacific:
China, Japan and Australia with William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten (Ashgate, 2013) and published Australia,
Japan and the Region, 1952 to 1965: Early Initiatives in Regional Diplomacy (Nova, 2012). Concurrently serves asJapan Foundation Fellow, School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo.
LIN Cheng-yi

Research Fellow, the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan

Received Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia in 1987. Served as the Director of theInstitute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica (1998-2003), Director of Institute ofinternational Relations at National Chengchi University (2004-2005), and Executive Director of the Center
for Asia-Pacific Area studies at Academia Sinica (2009-2012). Co-edited Rise of China: Beijing’s Strategies and
Implications for the Asia-Pacific with Micahel Hsiao (Routledge, 2009) and The Future of United States, China,
and Taiwan Relations with Denny Roy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
SHI Yongming

Associate Research Fellow, China Institute of International StudiesTechnological University

Graduated from Fudan University, majoring in international politics. Conducted researches on
Asia-Pacific issues and international strategic issues for many years. Served as a Consul in Chinese
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan. Published “Constructing an International System that Corresponds to
a Harmonious World” in Building a Harmonious World: Theory and Practice edited by Guo Zhenyuan (World
Affairs Press, 2008), “The Impact of U.S. Financial Crisis on International Structure” in Peace andDevelopment, No. 4, 2009, and “Barrack Obama’s East Asia Policies and Regional Construction” in Peaceand Development No. 1, 2010.
HOO Tiang Boon

Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University

Received Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Served as a Visiting Fellow at the
China Foreign Affairs University, Visiting Scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and Visiting
Researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. Involved in diplomatic initiatives, such as theSingapore-US Strategic Dialogue, Korea-Singapore Forum, and the Network of ASEAN Defense andSecurity Institutions. Author of publications on China, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations.
Concurrently serves as the Coordinator of the M.Sc. Programme for Asian Studies at RSIS.
2

【Japanese Panelists】
ITO Kenichi

Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS
of Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as
Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS
(1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He has been
President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 and now
concurrently serves as Chairman of Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and Council on East Asian Community(CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.
ITO GoProfessor, Meiji University / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies,
University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed thecurrent position in 2006. Also served as Visiting professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica(Taiwan),
Bristol University(Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct
Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as AdjunctResearcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the
Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006.
ISHIKAWA Kaoru

President, GFJ / Director of Research, JFIR

Graduated from University of Tokyo and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. Studied at l’Ecole
Nationale d’Administration in France. Served as Research Associate of International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS), London and Minister-Counselor to France, G8 Summit foreign affairs Sous-Sherpa(1999-2001 and 2005-07), Ambassador in charge of Civil Society (2002), Director General of Global Affairs
Department (2002-05), Director General of Economic Affairs Bureau (2005-07), Ambassador to Egypt,
Ambassador to the Arab League and then Ambassador to Canada. Also having served as Part timelecturer at Waseda University and Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo. Concurrently serves as
Executive Vice-President of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).
YAMADA Yoshihiko

Professor, Tokai University

Graduated from Gakushuin University. Received Ph.D. in Economics from Saitama University. Served as aTrader, Bond Market Section, Finance Securities Department, Toyo Trust and Banking Company, Limited(1989-1991), Director of Maritime Department, the Nippon Foundation (1991-2008), Associate Professor(2008) and Professor (2009-Present), Tokai University. Concurrently serves as Deputy Director, Institute of
Oceanic Research and Development, Tokai University.
SATO Koichi

Professor, J.F.Oberlin University

Received his Ph.D. in International Studies from Waseda University. Served as Sales Engineer of Hitachi
Chemical Co. Ltd., Research Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Lecturer of
the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serves as Lecturer of Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) Staff College, Policy Adviser to Japan Coast Guard, Lecturer of National Institute for
Defense Studies (NIDS).
3

MOMMA Rira

Professor, The National Institute for Defense Studies

Received his M.A. in 1993 and completed the Ph.D. Program in History and Anthropology at the
University of Tsukuba in 1999. Served as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Kazankai Foundation in 1997,
Researcher at the Taipei Office of the Interchange Association, Japan (1997-2000), Researcher at the
Embassy of Japan in the People’s Republic of China (2000-2001), Senior Specialist for Textbooks at the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan (2001-2012).

Concurrently

serves as a Visiting Professor at Takushoku University (2008-present).
YUMINO Masahiro

Research Fellow, Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies

Received M.A. in Law（Diplomatic Studies) from Beijing University in 2003 and completed Ph.D. Programin Politics at Waseda University in 2008. Served as a Visiting Lecturer at the Waseda Institute ofContemporary Chinese Studies in 2008 and as a Researcher at the National Institutes for the Humanities
of Japan. Published some articles such as “The Enforcement of the ‘National Defense Education Law of
the People’s Republic of China’” in Waseda Journal of Political Science and Economics in 2007 and “People’s
Liberation Army as a Local Community-Based Army” in Waseda Asia Review No. 10, 2011 etc.
(In order of appearance)

43．Presentation Papers
Opening Session: The World in Transition and Japan

John MEARSHEIMER
Professor, The University of Chicago
The World in Transition and Japan
I. The Changing Balance of Power in Asia
The focus will be on the rise of China and what impact that development will have on the balance ofpower in Asia. In addition to talking about the changing balance of power between China and its
neighbors, considerable attention will be paid to the Sino-American balance and how America’s
commitments in Europe and the Persian Gulf affect its presence in Asia.
II. The Consequences for the Region
I will make case that if China continues growing economically at an impressive pace, it will build amore powerful military and try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western
Hemisphere. China will try to become a regional hegemon in Asia, because that is the best way for agreat power to maximize its security in a dangerous world.
In practice, that means China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbors.
In other words, Beijing will work to become much more powerful than India, Japan, and Russia.
Moreover, it will try to push the US military out of Asia, and in effect develop a Monroe Doctrine of its
own for Asia. China will also build a blue water navy so it can protect its sea-lanes and project
power into strategically important regions like the Persian Gulf.
Almost all of China’s neighbors, as well as the United States, will go to great lengths to contain China
and prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon. China’s rivals will form a balancing coalition tokeep China in check. The United States will play the central role in managing that alliance, although
Japan will be a key player in the coalition.
The result of all this will be an intense security competition between China and its neighbors that
could easily lead to war. There are certainly a number of possible flashpoints in the region: Korea,
the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
5

III. The Consequences for Japan
If China continues its rise, Japan will have to spend much more money on defense and the risk of a
Sino-Japanese war will increase markedly.
Furthermore, Japan will have to think long and hard about whether to acquire its own nuclear
weapons, in large part because those weapons of mass destruction are the ultimate deterrent.
Moreover, Japan is the only major power in the region that does not have its own nuclear arsenal.
The main reason for Japan not to acquire nuclear weapons is that the United States has extended its
nuclear umbrella over Japan.

However, it seems likely that Japan will have doubts about thereliability of extended deterrence, especially if the United States remains pinned down in losing wars
in the greater Middle East and also remains bogged down dealing with the Ukraine crisis, which
could go on for a long time.
IV. Conclusion
Japan should hope that China does not continue its striking rise. Otherwise Tokyo will face anincreasingly dangerous security environment in Asia.

6

ITO Go
Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Meiji University
The World in Transition and Japan
I. Changing “Rules of Games” in International Relations
・ China as the second largest economyChanges in the Balance of Power in Asia
・ The US seeks to maintain partnership with China, while at the same time being concerned about
China’s rapid rise.
・ China has been successful in not having its economy dominated by foreign capitals ever since1978.
・ G2 or G20: Both cases indicate a relative decline of US power.
・ While seeking to be involved into the “club of advanced countries,” the emerging economies
emphasize the small size of the GDP per capita, and try to avoid international responsibilities.
・ MultilateralismIrresponsible diplomacy?
II. International Order for International Stability・ International Stability stemming from the Balance of Power or Hegemony
・ Asia’s stability has long been kept under the US primacy, with which China is now dissatisfied.
・ Hainandao Incident in 2001: China started to have fear that the US could come close to theChinese continent.
・ China’s claim on “core interests” implies that international relations should be shifted from the US
primacy to the BOP between the US and China (=New Type of Great Powers)
・ China emphasizes the BOP with the US, while at the same time seeking to have primacy over
Asian countries.
・ China thinks unilaterally, explores issues bilaterally, and behave multilaterally
III. Incongruence between Security and Economy
・ Security has been provided bilaterally by the US, while Asia’s economy has come from China’s
rapid rise. China has been an indispensable partner.
・ China as an insider within the economic system, but an outsider in the area of security.
・ China looks eager to expand its territories: Senkaku (Diaoyudao)OkinawaMaritime Interests
in northern Hokkaido
・ As China develops economically, its security policy becomes threatened by neighboring countries.
IV. Future Configurations
・ Confrontations on military, economies, and international standards
・ China seeks the BOP with the US, while trying to have hegemony within Asia
・ Ameba-type enlargement: It continues to expand without the others’ deterrence.
・ Projection of domestic dissatisfaction to the international arena
・ For Japan: How to balance between the US “credibility” and Japan’s “self-help”
7

世界の変動と日本
Ⅰ

中国の台頭によって生じた「ルール・オブ・ゲーム」の変容

・ 世界第 2 位の経済大国としての中国米中間の経済的、政治的なパワーバランスの変容
・ アメリカは、一方で中国とのパートナーシップをとっていきたいという考え、他方で中国の急速な台頭に脅威を感じている・ 中国は 1980 年代には食品、軽工業、鉄鋼、90 年代には自動車、精密機械、そして現在の第 12 次 5カ年計画期（2011～15 年）は資源・環境、ライフサイエンス、IT、ナノ、材料工学と、常に選択的に自分の国にとって役立つ産業を海外から受け入れる・ オバマ政権以降、一方で G2 論、他方で G20 論。いずれにせよ、アメリカの力の減退を示す
・ 経済規模を拡大した新興国が「先進国クラブの中に入れてくれ」と「正当性」は強調する一方、国際社会における責任を負わないことで、取り決めの「実効性」が下がるというジレンマが存在
・ 「国際公共財」なきマルチラテラリズム無責任外交の交錯
Ⅱ

国際関係が「安定」するための秩序・ 覇権による安定か、勢力均衡による安定か・ アジア太平洋の国際秩序というのは長らくアメリカによる圧倒的な優位によって維持されてきたが、中国はその「覇権」による平和に不満
・ 2001 年海南島事件：「アメリカは中国の近くまでやってくるが、その逆はなし」という不満
・ 「核心的利益」論（中国としては譲れない利益）「アメリカによる覇権」から「米中勢力均衡」
へ＝「新型の大国間関係」
・ しかし、アジアでは「中国中心による覇権」こそが東アジア国際政治の安定と主張
・ 一国主義的に思考、二国間主義的に問題を追及、多国間主義的に振る舞う
Ⅲ．安保と経済のミスマッチ
・ 安全保障上の構造と経済システム上の構造とがミスマッチ
・ 前者はアメリカを中心として放射線状にのびる。後者は中国の経済成長と同時に、①中国、②その他のアジア諸国、③アメリカによる三角貿易が展開
・ 中国は経済的な相互依存関係では主要な地位を占めているが、安保システムではよそ者
・ 領土に対する拡大傾向：尖閣沖縄北海道と樺太の間に海洋権益
・ 東南アジアの「小国」の切り崩しアメリカの弟分への嫌がらせ最後の本丸アメリカ
・ 経済成長すればするほど、安保での脅威感が増す
Ⅳ

今後の展望

・ 軍事的対立＋経済摩擦の政治利用＋スタンダードの対立
・ 中国はアメリカとの勢力均衡を目指すが、アジアでは自らの覇権的秩序を求める
・ 抑止されなければアメーバ的拡大
・ 国内の不満を対外的に投射国際秩序への関心がなければ、悲惨な結末
・ 日本にとって：アメリカからの「信用性」と、「自助」のバランス

8

Session I: The Asia-Pacific in Transition and JapanDavid WALTON
Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney
Juggling Triads: Australian foreign policy towards Japan and China
Synopsis
Australia’s capacity to promote closer ties with China while remaining firmly ensconced in a security
alliance with the United States and close security ties with Japan is of critical importance. In a period oftense relations between China and Japan and strategic competition between the United States and China,
officials in Canberra require sophisticated diplomatic skills to maintain a balance between alliance andeconomic interests. Given the rise of China as an economic superpower over the past ten years, thecurrent focus on China by the Australian Government is not new, but the attention that China receives inAustralian Government circles and more broadly in Australia represents a significant shift from the
comfortable security arrangements Australia enjoyed with the United States (security) and Japan (Trade)for the previous forty years.
This presentation will consider three key questions in the context of the rise of China:
1. What does the rise of China and subsequent debates about power transition between the UnitedStates and China in the region mean in real terms for Australia- Japan political and security
relations?
2. What, if any, are the contentious policy issues between Tokyo and Canberra on the rise of China?
3. Australia’s capacity to successfully juggle two competing bilateral relations (Japan and China) isviewed in Canberra as vital to Australia’s long-term economic and political wellbeing. Is thisperception likely to change in the short to mid term during a period of close alignment between
Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe?
These questions are significant as they consider the historical shift from a cold war framework to the newless certain realities in the contemporary period. The decision by the Australian Government in 2012 toallow a substantial number of US marines to be based in Darwin demonstrates the continuation ofAustralia’s post-war foreign and security policy and suggests that existing security arrangements with
the United States are very much intact. As well, there have been remarkable security upgrades between
Japan and Australia since 2007. Nonetheless, the rise of China as an economic superpower represents asignificant challenge to current global and regional order. In this context, the issue of the rise of China
and its consequence is arguably the most weighty and pressing issue in the history of Australia-Japanbilateral consultation on regional issues.
9

YAMADA Yoshihiko
Professor, Tokai University
In 2012, problems of territory and territorial waters occurred suddenly between Japan and its
neighboring countries. Since 2010, China has been rapidly advancing into East China Sea. In particular,
in 2013, the patrol boats of the newly established China Coast Guard have been repeatedly trespassing
the territorial waters of Japan. The advance of China was not limited to East China Sea. Its advance into
South China Sea has been even more intense. In 2014, a situation developed, one in which a Chinese
patrol boat collided with a Vietnamese patrol boat.
Asian countries started to turn their attention to maritime security to maintain peace. The conclusion of
the arrangements for maritime security in the Asian waters has become an urgent issue. In Japan, it is therole of Japan Coast Guard to protect marine security.
Japanese citizens have started to pay attention to maritime situations. In particular, the development ofseabed resources has been attracting attention. In 2012, the presence of "rare earth" in the seabed near
Minamitorishima was reported. Moreover, the prospecting for the commercialization of methane
hydrate has begun. In addition, the development of seabed hydrothermal deposit started to beresearched with the goal of commercialization. Efforts in maritime development in the waters under thejurisdiction of Japan have started to progress. The indirect support of these developmental endeavors
has been added to the missions of Japan Coast Guard.
As symbolized by the defense of Senkaku Islands, the mission expected of Japan Coast Guard is crucial.
Moreover, it must have defense capabilities, in terms of both quantity and quality. However, there is alimit to its security activities. Hereafter, along with increasing the number of Coast Guard officers andthe number of patrol boats, it is necessary to implement the division of roles with the Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force. Needless to say, it is necessary to create a system for the cooperation of the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard. Moreover, it is necessary to have monitoring
activities from the air to increase mobility.
In addition to the above endeavors, with the advance in the development of the Northern Sea Route, themaritime security operations in the waters in the north will become more important. We believe that thetime has come to restructure the system of maritime security.
In its relations with its neighboring countries, it is crucial for Japan to establish a system to protect its
waters, one that is based on international law. Japan is expected to construct a maritime management
system with dignity.

10日本における海洋安全保障の重要性
2012 年、日本と近隣国の間で領土、領海の問題が勃発した。また、東シナ海の尖閣諸島周辺海域では海洋管理の問題が発生した。
2010 年以降、中国は、東シナ海の進出を急速に進めている。特に尖閣諸島周辺では、2013
年に新設された中国海警局の警備船が頻繁に日本領海への侵入を繰り返している。中国の海洋進出は、東シナ海のみならず、南シナ海においてはさらに激しい。2014 年、ベトナムの警備船に対し、中国の警備船が衝突する事態となった。
アジアの各国は、平和維持のために海洋安全保障に目を向けるようになった。
アジア海域において海洋安全保障にかかわる取り決めの締結が、早急の課題となっている。
日本において海の安全を守るのは海上保安庁の役割である。
日本の国民は、海洋の情勢に注目するようになった。特に海底資源開発が注目を集めている。2012 年南鳥島付近の海底にレアーアースが存在することが報告された。また、メタンハ
イドレートの商業化に向けた試掘が開始されている。さらに、海底熱水鉱床の開発も商業化に向けての研究が始まった。日本の管轄海域内での海洋開発がまさに動き出したのである。
この開発行為を側面的に支援するのが、海上保安庁の任務に加わった。
尖閣諸島の警備に象徴されるように、海上保安庁に求められている任務は、重大でありか
つ、量、質ともに高い能力を求められている。しかし、海上保安庁の警備活動にも限界がある。今後、海上保安官の人数、巡視船の数を増やすとともに、海上自衛隊との役割分担も進めなければならないだろう。当然に、海上自衛隊と海上保安庁が、連携する体制を作る必要がある。また、機動力を増すために空からの監視活動も必要である。
また、北極海航路の開発が進むと北の海域の海上保安業務もさらに重要な任務となる。海
洋安全保障体制を再構築する時期に来ていると考える。
隣国との関係に置いて、国際法に基づき海を守る体制をとることが重要である。威厳を持ち、海洋管理体制を構築することが求められているのである。

11

LIN Cheng-yi
Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica
The Japan Factor in the Security of the Taiwan Strait
In the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan-Republic of China (ROC) Peace Treaty of 1952, Japanrenounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan and Penghu (Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands andthe Paracel Islands. In the 1950-1960s, in addition to cooperating with the U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) and Taiwan Defense Command, Chiang Kai-shek secretly brought in Japanesemilitary consultants to Taiwan to help his mission in returning to Mainland China. Naosuke Tomita,
whose Chinese name was Pai Hung-liang, served in Taiwan as a military consultant to the ChiangKai-shek government before he died in 1969. Tomita and about 80 Japanese military advisors, known as
the Pai Group, assisted Chiang Kai-shek in training the ROC military and conducting war planning for
return-to-the-mainland missions.
Japan maintained its diplomatic ties with the ROC on Taiwan until September 1972. Although Japan andTaiwan had no defense security [agreements?], the U.S. transferred weapons such as 8-inch howitzers
from Okinawa to Taiwan and Kinmen (Quemoy) during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. In November 1969,
in a joint statement with President Nixon, Prime Minister Sato said that “the maintenance of peace andsecurity in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.” In Articles 4 and 6of the 1960 U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Taiwan’s status is unspecified but included implicitly in “themaintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” In the 1997 U.S.–Japan Defense
Cooperation Guidelines, Taiwan is again made implicit in “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan(SIASJ).” Not until the 2005 and 2011 U.S.–Japan Common Strategic Objectives do these two countries
officially welcome “the progress to date in improving cross-Strait relations, [and] encourage the peacefulresolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue.”
Since the expiration of the U.S.–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979, the strengthening of U.S.–Japansecurity ties and continuing U.S. military deployment in Okinawa have played a reassuring role in
Taiwan’s security. President Lee Teng-hui initiated a Taiwan–Japan–U.S. trilateral secret security dialogue(the Ming-teh Project) conducting 20 meetings with Japanese Councillor Motoo Shiina and U.S. politician
Richard Armitage from 1994 to 2000. The project helped with coordination between the three capitals in
dealing with the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crises. From the mid-1990s to 2008, cargo and ships
navigating between Taiwan and eastern China were instructed to use Ishigaki Island as an intermediarystop because of the prohibition on direct cross-Strait navigation. President Ma Ying-jeou has publicly
supported the strengthening of the U.S.–Japan security alliance through the settlement of the Futenma
marine base relocation between the Obama administration and the Japanese government. None of
Taiwan’s presidents have publicly argued for cross-Strait joint cooperation in safeguarding thesovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
12

When asked which country they saw as a threat, the Japanese, the Filipinos and the Vietnamese all named
China. A similar sense of enmity is also evident in Taiwanese opinion polls. Japan has topped all others as
the friendliest country for Taiwanese people in surveys conducted by the Taiwan Thinktank and theInterchange Association (Japan) from 2011 to 2013. In the cases of China and South Korea, only 8% of
Chinese liked Japan while 22% of South Koreans saw Japan in a favorable light.1 China has always
reacted strongly when Japan’s prime minister visits Yasukuni Shrine, while South Korea has focused on
the comfort women issue. In stark contrast to China and South Korea, Taiwan has a milder reaction tothese two issues.
According to the 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper, the PLAN has conducted long-distance training inwaters of the Western Pacific involving over 90 ships in nearly 20 batches since 2007. Some Chinese naval
ships have conducted their training in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Guam and Hawaii without
meeting U.S. objection. Increasing Chinese naval activities in waters northeast of Taiwan and in the
Miyako Strait have created additional pressure for the defense of Japan and Taiwan. Japan has deployedradar installations and 100–150 troops on Yonaguni Island, which is Japan’s westernmost island and isabout 100 kilometers from Taiwan. For Taiwan to avoid waging a two-front battle, one in the Taiwan Strait
and the other in the Pacific, leaders in Taipei have had little choice but to side with the U.S. and welcome
the strengthening of U.S.–Japan defense cooperation related to Taiwan’s national defense.
With the rise of China and its assertive policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Japanese
government’s security strategy under the Abe government has evolved dramatically since December 2012.
After long-awaited executive actions, Japan’s National Security Council was established in December
2013, and immediately after, Japan’s first ever National Security Strategy was adopted in which the Abegovernment has taken up the role of proactive contributor to peace. As such, Japan’s new national defense
program guidelines were finalized along with the mid-term defense program. In April 2014, the Abegovernment promulgated “the Three Principles on [the?] Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,”
which modified the principles set in 1967 for restricting weapons exports to foreign countries. Japan can
now transfer its defense equipment and technology to its allies and partners if such a transfer could
contribute to Japan’s security and international peace.
A more striking development is Japan’s Cabinet Decision on the development of security legislation toensure Japan’s survival and protect its people on July 1, 2014. Prime Minister Abe approved a proposal toreinterpret Japan’s constitution to end the ban on allowing its military forces to exercise the right ofcollective self-defense. The move widened the set of options available to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces inoverseas military activities, but it soon met opposition from both domestic and international sources.
China is always the staunchest opponent of Japan’s active security posture. The U.S., Australia, and1

Bruce Stokes, “Japan, China Neck and Neck in Asian Popularity Contest,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 17, 2014.

13

Singapore have publicly supported Japan’s formulation of a new security strategy. Most Southeast Asian
countries have been privately supportive but publicly cautious about their stances. Taiwan’s ruling party,
the KMT, and President Ma Ying-jeou are somewhat ambivalent. For example, Ma does not criticize
Japan’s new security posture as his counterpart in Beijing does, but he does say that he will watch closely
as the situation develops. Ma stated that his great concern is whether Japan’s decision will result in a
deterioration of its relations with China, particularly in light of the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes. Taiwan’s
opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, has publicly supported Japanese Prime Minister
Abe’s removal of the ban on collective self-defense rights arguing that it would benefit Taiwan’s long-term
security in waters surrounding Taiwan and Japan.
Japan’s ongoing security restructuring has implications for Taiwan, China, and the United States. The East
China Sea issue will be the test case. The U.S. State Department has called on all sides to exercise restraint
in this matter. However, the U.S. government has also made known that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands fallwithin the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Xi
Jinping’s new model of major power relations with the U.S. may be at odds if the dispute is not properly
managed, and likewise the situation may also complicate Barack Obama’s Asian rebalancing strategy.
To date, the ROC and Japan have concluded 36 major agreements since Tokyo severed diplomatic ties
with Taipei in 1972. Taiwan is Japan’s fifth-largest trading partner, while Japan is Taiwan’s second-largest
trading partner. Important bilateral agreements include the Private Investment Arrangement (September2011), Open Skies Arrangement (November 2011), Memorandum on the exchange of financial
information related to money laundering and terrorist financing (April 2012), fisheries agreement (April2013), search and rescue operations involving aviation accidents at sea (November 2013). Among them,
the fisheries agreement was signed after 17 years of fisheries talks between the two countries. Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe apparently wanted to use the fisheries agreement to prevent Taiwan and China fromforming a joint front against Japan in the disputed East China Sea waters. In addition, President Ma hasconstantly tried to assure the Japanese that Taiwan will not seek cooperation with the PRC in settling the
Diaoyu/Senkaku sovereignty dispute. In the eyes of U.S. Secretary John Kerry, the Taiwan–Japan fisheries
agreement has demonstrated that shelving the dispute while acting creatively could serve as a good
example for promoting regional stability amid escalating tensions in the East China Sea.2

2 “John Kerry Praises Taiwan, Japan for Pact on Sea Claims,” Taipei Times, August 15, 2014, p. 3.

14

SATO Koichi
Professor, J. F. Oberlin University【No parts can be reproduced, or cited without author’s written permission】

China’s Rise and the Political Dynamics of the Asia-Pacific Region
Dominance of the Maritime Power, New Containment, or Rise of Trading States?

Professor John Mearsheimer warned the people that the prospects for the war among the regional
powers in Europe were likely to increase if the Cold War ended, and the bipolar distribution of military
power became a mere name. Late Professor Samuel P. Huntington also warned the people that the crashof the civilizations led by the religious conflicts would emerge in the Post Cold War World when theideological confrontation between the East and West diminished. What kind of scenery we can observe,
if we apply these warnings to the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century?

Firstly, many people say that the rise of China in economic & military fields, and the relative Japanesedecline in economic field are remarkable. They consider the power-transition between Japan and China
is progressing. The United States, Japan’s ally, also reduces the defense budget every year. The U.S.
annual reduction amount is almost equivalent to the Japan’s annual defense budget, and the U.S.
intervention in the Asia-Pacific region is moderate in spite of State Secretary Hilary Clinton’s words:“Pivot toward Asia” in October 2011. It is safe to say that China’s presence in Asia-Pacific Region isremarkable. From now on, the correlations among China, the U.S., and Japan have the impacts upon theregional politics and economies. The Chinese government intends to become the maritime power, andthe military drills and activities of the Chinese navy, China Coast Guard (CCG), Chinese fishing boats inthe East and South China Sea are escalated.

Secondly, activities of the terrorists who assert some religious trends such like ISIS, never diminish after
the death of Osama bin Laden. Many developing states in the Asia-Pacific Region including China areplural societies which are composed of many religious groups. The Chinese government is worried
about the activities of the radicals and separatists in Xinjiang and Tibet, and their exchanges with foreign
activists. In short, both of the warnings of Professor Mearsheimer and Professor Huntington are partiallymaterializing in the Asia-Pacific Region.

From the Cold War days, there has been no monolithic multilateral alliance in Asia-Pacific Region such
like the NATO in Europe. There is only a hub and spokes security architecture which was composed of15

many U.S. – regional states bilateral treaties. If so, the war among the regional powers in Asia-pacificRegion which was predicted by Professor Mearsheimer is more likely to increase. It seems to be serious.
There is no domestic symptom of the crash of the civilizations in Japan. For the moment the Japanese
defense and security issues are the Chinese challenge at the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, andthe disturbance of the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

In Japan and the United States, some people have begun to study the use of the power projection
capability to deter the Chinese various maritime provocations; submerged navigation of Han-classnuclear submarine in the Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, dangerous access of the Chinese
navy helicopter to the Japan-Maritime Self-defense (JMSDF) Destroyer in April 2010, collision of theChinese fishing boat against the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol boats in September 2010, weaponry
radar-lock on JMSDF destroyer in January 2013, China’s set-up of the Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) in November 2013, and frequent illegal entrance of the CCG patrol boats into the Japanese
territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.

It is said that China’s estimated oil storage is only for 30 days, and the Chinese navy weaponry system is
not enough to suppress the JMSDF, so that we can do many things. There may be some temptation forJapan to open war against China. “It may be possible for Japan to co-operate with the U.S. and ASEAN
states, in closing of the choke points of Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) in the East and South
China Sea. Together, we can contain China! “

We should remind the fact that the rate of economic interdependence among the competing nations in
the 21st Century is much higher than these in the 19th and 20th Century, and many competing nations live
together. The economic statistics 2013 shows that China is Japan’s largest trade partner (amount 30.3
trillion yen), and Japan is China’s second largest trade partner. Currently, 135 thousands Japanese live in
China, and 649 thousands Chinese live in Japan. If Japan open war against China, we, the Japanese haveto abandon this trade amount and sacrifice many of these citizens’ lives.

The situation is not so different at the Chinese side. President Xi Jinping’s unhappy face at the meetingwith the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Summit
in November 2014 symbolized it. China could not get any concessions on the Senkaku Islands andYasukuni Shrine issues from Japan before the APEC Summit. China’s energy resource detection in thesea area surrounding the Paracel Islands for the months of May to July 2014, was also recognized as the
diplomatic failure, because of the Vietnamese tough resistance and the international criticism of Chinese
forcible detection with the CCG patrol boats and Chinese navy vessels.

16

The U.S. government voiced the concern on it, and China stopped the detection. It is a reality of theinterdependent Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century that no government can survive without thecommunication with the uncomfortable partners. China needs more efforts to avoid the frictions with
the United States and the neighboring countries including Japan and ASEAN nations. China should shelf
the slogan of the maritime power, and concentrate their attention on the mitigation of “the crash of thecivilizations” in the domestic fields.

The political leaders of Japan and the United States should stress the importance of the economic
interdependence with China and the prospects for the feasible regional development. Japan and theUnited States should guide China to be the Trading State equivalent to Japan, by the economic andtechnological incentives and power projection capability of Japan-U.S. alliance (Richard Rosecrance, The
Rise of the Trading State, Basic Books, 1986). Japan and the U.S. should use the soft and hard powers
skillfully. It is possible option for Japan to restart the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China.
We can show our goodwill toward China, and assist China’s effort to mitigate the serious environmental
issues such like air and marine pollutions.

Further, there are political distrusts among Japan, the U.S. and China in the economic regionalism. China
has pursued her sphere of influence in East Asia without the U.S. intervention. China has tried tocompose it through the plans of East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), and the East Asia Summit (EAS).
Professor Shi Yinhong asserts that China should demand the western part of the West Pacific Ocean. It
sounds quite anachronistic in current interdependent region. China would like to maintain the protective
system for China’s State Companies, too. These are at the background of the friction between Trans
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Japan and theUnited States should persuade China gradually in the process of the EAS for the integration of the TPP
and RCEP. Japan and the United States also need the compromise each other, on tariff rate on
agricultural products in Japan, and import restriction on Japanese automobiles in the United States, forthe progress of the TPP negotiation.

Japan names herself as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” in the field of defense and security. She should
name herself as a “Proactive Contributor to Trade” too, in addition to the actor of Abenomics in the fieldof economics. These economic policies demand the drastic reform of the distribution system of the goods
in Japan, and it is a painful reform. But it is important for the Japanese government, if Japan want to be awell-balanced contributor to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese nation should remindthat Japan is one of three pillars of the tripolar system in this region.

17【禁引用・転載】

中国の台頭とアジア太平洋の政治力学「海洋強国」の台頭か、新たな封じ込めか、諸貿易国家の興隆か？
冷戦が終わった時、21 世紀の世界について、ジョン・ミアシャイマ－教授は、二極システムが終われ
ば、（欧州の）大国間の関係は対立的なものに回帰すると警告した。また、故サミュエル・ハンチントン
教授はイデオロギー対立に代わって、宗教対立に導かれる「文明の衝突」が起こると警告した。これらの警告を、21 世紀のアジア太平洋に当てはめると、どのような情景が見えてくるか。

第一に、アジア太平洋地域の国家間関係を見ると、経済・軍事両面での中国の台頭と、日本経済の相対的な地盤沈下が注目されている。日中の間のパワー・トランジッションが進んでいると見られるわけである。また、日本の同盟国アメリカも、毎年日本の防衛予算額に相当するような大幅な国防予算の削減を行っており、2011 年 10 月のクリントン長官の論文の中の「アジアへの回帰」という言葉とは裏腹に、地域への介入は控えめである。アジア太平洋では、現在は中国が突出している。そして、おそらく、今後は、その中国と日米の 3 極の相互作用が、地域を動かすことになるだろう。中国は、「海洋強国」を志向しており、その海軍、海警、漁船による、東シナ海、南シナ海での活動は、エスカレートしている。

第二に、宗教的な主張を背景としている諸テロリストの活動は、ISIS のように、2011 年 5 月のオサマ・
ビン・ラディンの死後もなくなっていない。中国を含むアジア太平洋の発展途上国の多くは複数の宗教グループを抱える複合社会である。中国政府自体も新疆ウイグル自治区や、チベット自治区などでの国内の過激派や分離主義者の抑制と、彼らの、国外の勢力との交流に頭を痛めている。言ってみれば、ミアシャイマ－教授の警告と、故ハンチントン教授の警告は、アジア太平洋地域では、部分的ながら、同時に進行しつつあるようにも見えるのである。

冷戦期から、アジア太平洋地域には、欧州の北大西洋条約機構（NATO）のような堅固な多国間同盟はない。アメリカと地域諸国の二国間同盟をハブ＆スポーク型に展開した安全保障協力関係があるだけだ
ったから、ミアシャイマ－教授の予言した大国間の対立（日米と中、あるいは日中）の実現は、より深刻である。そして、日本国内には、少なくとも深刻な「文明の衝突」的現象はない。日本にとって、当面の安全保障問題は、東シナ海の尖閣諸島の領有をめぐる問題と、重要な南シナ海の航行の自由の確保である。

そのため、これまでの数多くの中国の、東シナ海での挑発行為：漢級原潜の日本領海での潜没航行、艦載ヘリコプターの異常接近、護衛艦への武器管制レーダー照射、防空識別圏の設定、尖閣諸島沖での海保巡視船への中国漁船の体当たり、ほぼ毎週起こっている中国海警船艇の領海侵犯、を止めさせるた
めに、力を行使する研究が、日本でもアメリカでも始まっている。中国は、石油備蓄が 30 日前後しかないというし、自衛隊に対して中国海軍が圧倒的に優勢ではない今なら、かなりのことができる。そして、
18

アメリカや、ASEAN 諸国と協力すれば、シーレーンのチョークポイントを押さえて中国を封じ込められる、という誘惑が日本側にはある。

だが、ここで考えなければならないことは、19 世紀から 20 世紀にかけての時代と違い、21 世紀の現
在は、対立する国同士でも経済的な相互依存の度合いが非常に高く、競合する国民同士が一緒に住んでいる場合も多い、ということである。2013 年の統計では、中国は、日本の最大の貿易相手国（総額 30.3兆円）であり、日本は、中国にとっても第二の貿易相手国である。また、中国に在住する日本人は 13.5
万人、日本に在住する中国人は 64.9 万人である。日本が戦争をするには、これらの経済及び人的関係を犠牲にする覚悟がいる。

中国側も状況はそう変わらない。11 月 10 日の APEC 首脳会議の際の個別会談で、不愉快そうに顔をゆがめながら、安倍総理を迎えた習近平国家主席の表情がそれを象徴している。中国は、会談前に尖閣問題でも靖国問題でも日本を譲歩させることができなかった。5 月から 7 月にかけてのパラセル諸島沖での天然ガスの資源探査でも、ベトナムの抵抗と国際社会の批判を受け、外交的には失敗した。アメリカ
が懸念を示し、中国は探査を止めた。不愉快な国でも、付き合わざるを得ないのが、21 世紀の相互依存下のアジア太平洋地域の現実である。中国は、日本や ASEAN 諸国を含む周辺諸国やアメリカとの関係の悪化を避けるには、もっと努力が必要だ。
「海洋強国」を目指すスローガンは、棚上げにせざるを得なくなるだろう。その上で、国内の「文明の衝突」の緩和に取り組むべきだ。

日米の政治指導者は、中国との経済的な相互依存と持続可能な地域の経済発展への展望を重視するべきである。経済・技術面での誘因と日米同盟の実力によって、中国を、日本と同じ「貿易国家」へ誘導することが求められる（貿易国家とは、1986 年に、リチャード・ローズクランス教授が著書のタイトルに使った言葉である）。ハードパワーと、ソフトパワーの併用が必要なのだ。日本は、中国に敵意がない
ことを示し、深刻な環境問題（大気・海洋汚染）の緩和を支援するために、対中 ODA の再開も検討せざるを得ないかもしれない。

貿易自由化をめぐっては、TPP と RCEP の区分の背後に、日米中の間の政治的不信感がある。中国は、
EAEC 構想以来、東アジアでアメリカの影響力の及ばない勢力圏を欲し、また国有企業を保護する規制の存続を望んでいる。時殷弘教授などは「西太平洋の西部を中国の戦略空間にする必要がある」と述べているが、これだけ相互依存が進んだ時代に、勢力圏を求める構想はアナクロニズムだ。中国を取り込
むには、東アジア首脳会議等の場で時間をかけて、TPP と RCEP を繋ぐ努力が必要だろう。また、TPPの前進には、日米間の農産物の関税撤廃と自動車の輸入制限の問題でも、お互いの妥協が必要である。
積極的平和主義を掲げる日本には、経済面ではアベノミクスにプラスして、積極的貿易主義も必要だ。
これらの政策は、日本国内の流通構造の改革無しには、実現できない、痛みを伴う改革である。日本がこの地域で、よりバランスの取れた貢献者として、アジア太平洋地域の安定に貢献したいのなら、これは重要である。日本国民は、我が国がアジア太平洋の三極の一つであるという自覚を持つべきである。
19

Session II: China in the Future and Japan

MOMMA Rira
Professor, The National Institute of Defense Studies
China in the future and Japan
Until around 2030


Xi Jinping has often pledged “Chinese dreams”, “great renewal of Chinese nation” and “Strong
army dreams“. China denies the current situation of international order and demands newinternational order which is favorable to the country. This is the basic posture of current Chinese
diplomacy.

The economy of China will keep growing for years. China will also increase national power andmilitary power steadily. However, the economic growth rate of China will stall after that. Moreover,
the Chinese Government will have to cope with the aging its population and the increase of thesocial security expenses.

While China would avoid a confrontation with the United States, the country hopes the influence of
US in Asia becomes weak.



Although there will be potentially strained relation, China and Russia will maintain strategic
partnership.

With its burgeoning state and military power, China has been taking inflammatory actions in the
Senkakus and the South China Sea without fear of friction with neighboring countries. Even though
the county knows a stable international relation is a prerequisite for China’s future economic growth,
China does not make a concession regarding the issues of sovereignty and territorial rights.



By China Coast Guard and fishing boats, China will continue to put pressure on the Senkaku
Islands. Japan must maintain its economic power in order to oppose the pressure.

China will adhere to the principle of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems” and the
proposal for growing cross-Straits relations. On the other hand, Taiwan Administration will keep
the status quo with China.

The change in the situation of Korean Peninsula can happen. It can affect the security systems inneighboring countries and change the attitude toward the social system in China.



PLA Navy will deploy two aircraft carriers. Even though they cannot compete with US Navy on thewestern Pacific Ocean, these Chinese carrier strike groups can threaten Vietnam, Philippine,
Malaysia and other neighboring countries on the South China Sea.



China will be confronted with the problem of environmental pollution and the frequency ofminority riot. The corruption of Senior Chinese Officials cannot be eliminated and protest actions
will occur frequently. Therefore, the public peace and order in China will be worse.



As the economic growth rate decreases and the public anxiety increases, the national distrust of theCommunist Party of China will increase and its social order will be more unstable.



The Communist Party of China will be more dependent on People’s Liberation Army, People’s
Armed Police and Militia in order to maintain the government and social order.
20

中国の将来と日本
2030 年頃まで


習近平はしばしば「中国の夢」、「中華民族の偉大な復興」、「強軍の夢」を強調する。中国はこれまでの国際秩序を否定し、中国に有利な新国際秩序を要求している。これが中国の現在の基本的外交姿勢である。



中国は今後数年間、経済成長を続ける。中国は国力を伸長させ、軍事力を着実に増大させる。しかし、その後は経済成長率が鈍化していく。また、老齢人口が増加して中国政府は社会保障費の増加に対処しなければならなくなる。



中国はアメリカとの決定的な対立を避けたい。しかし、アメリカのアジアへの影響力の低下を望んでいる。



中国とロシアとは戦略的パートナーシップ関係を維持しつつも、潜在的緊張関係も継続するだろう。



中国は国力増大と軍事力の向上を背景にして、尖閣諸島、南シナ海のいずれの海域においても周辺国との摩擦を恐れない行動をとるようになってきている。中国が経済発展を進めていくためには、安定した国際環境は必要であるものの、主権や領土の問題では譲歩しない姿勢を示している。



中国は海警と漁船による尖閣諸島に対する圧力を継続させるだろう。中国の圧力に対抗するために、
日本は現在の経済力を維持していく必要がある。



中国は台湾に対する「平和統一、一国二制度」の統一方針と、両岸関係を発展させることを堅持するだろう。一方、台湾側は現状維持を貫こうとするだろう。



朝鮮半島情勢に変化が現れて、周辺各国の安全保障体制に影響を与える事態が発生する可能性がある。中国にとっても社会体制の変革が意識されるきっかけとなるだろう。



中国海軍は新たに空母２隻を配備するが、アメリカに西太平洋で対抗できはしない。しかし、中国の空母攻撃群は南シナ海においてベトナムやフィリピン、マレーシアなどに対し脅威を与えるだろう。



中国国内では環境汚染が進行し、少数民族暴動も頻発する。中国高官の汚職は根絶できず、集団抗議行動が多発し、社会治安は悪化する.



経済成長率の鈍化や社会不安の増加に従って、中国共産党の統治の正統性に対する疑問が高まるとともに共産党政権に対する信任がさらに薄れていく。中国の社会はますます不安定になっていく。



共産党政権は政権維持と社会治安維持のために、人民解放軍や武装警察、民兵、警察に対する依頼度を高めていくだろう。

21

SHI Yongming
Associate Research Fellow, China Institute of International Studies
China, Japan, in the future
1. China in the future
China will not be a superpower, because the superpower means hegemony, but China’s policy isnever be a hegemony. After the second world war, only the former Soviet Union and the United States
are called superpower.
China will be a biggest economic body, but will not be a biggest military body. We will just keep aforce sufficient to self-defence.
China will be a very important power on keeping peace in the world, and will play that role inpolitical way not military
China will be a good neighbor of Asia countries and a common player in regional cooperation.
2.

Japan in the future
From Chinese side, we can’t understand. The questions are:Will Japan play a role as a superpower?
Why Japan want to use its military forces in the international politics?

3.

China and Japan relations in the future
Now, we are on the cross road,
Will Japan Government abide by the “ four-point consensus”?
The future: what kind of relations? Cooperation or confrontation or cooling relation?
Friendship, interests, strategy, and the regional structure, how to deal with these problems?

22

YUMINO Masahiro
Research Fellow, Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies
Dilemma Between Economic Temptation and Political Ideology：
How we face with post “China Rising” Era
We now have been facing with the dilemma to choose between Economic temptation and Political
ideology. The reason of this dilemma is of course China which still keep its authoritarian regime formore than 6decades and even after collapse of Cold War International Regime. As Chinese economic
growth now we face with situation that we accept status quo which China is growing its economic
influence to the world and became top economic and trade partners for many countries. But at the sametime, we have to ignore reality of political ideology that China is still keeping authoritarian country
regime. But Chinas stability and economic prosperity is getting more and more suspicious in these days.
So the more Chinese Economy and influence bigger, the more we need to have clear mind to keep
political identity, which is Liberty and freedom.
The End of “Chinese rising” Era
Quarter of century ago we were facing Political Regime Change in Communist countries such as
Soviet Union, East Europe. Many people had thought next country could be China. But regime change
hadn’t happened in China. Then From Jiang Zeming, Hu Jingtao to Xi Jingping, China has Succeeded“Economic Reform” policy and Accomplished Economic Prosperity. But those “China Rising” Era looks
come to end not as Chinese officials and specialists said. Officially China insists Win-Win economic
relations with world but reality is not so well as it said. Chinese domestic economy is facing big
problems like bubble economy looked brisk of crash and peoples uprising happening more than 10,000
for a year. P.M 2.5 hurts peoples health and shorten lifespan. Chinese economy had just turned corner of“China Rising” Era.
China as a Fragile Superpower: Not So Powerful and Stable as it seems.
As We all see China looked really powerful and big country, especially after APEC Summit last month in
Beijing. China had succeeded to show his power to the world more than he really is. It was just likereflection of Tributary system of China Dynasty. China now is acting strong not just in Diplomatic way
but also in Military way and which cause tension with its neighbors like Vietnam, Philippine and Japan.
Those tensions mainly came from Chinese aggressive behavior as Sea power. Those behavior looks camefrom strong nationalism which reflect the strong ambition to recover lost territory. In addition tonationalism, there looks strong profit oriented activity of powerful interest group like oil major, militaryindustrial complex and military. So CCP government is just like a prisoner of those interest group. The
more China show strong power in South China Sea or in East Sea, the more actor behind scene will be
disclosed.
China still living in Pre-modern Era
Dec 13th is the first national memorial day of Nanjing incident. CCP government decided to make this23

day for national Memorial Day and those suggestion has passed as law in this spring. Japan had invaded
China more than century ago but for China it is unforgettable incident not just in the history but forpeople in china today. But Japanese existence is more than in the history but for CCP, it is really
important for survival and national unification. China has never had united country and from those
aspect it is absurd to insist Post-modern and trans-nation, cosmopolitan identity for China. Westerncountry include Japan and China looks living same age but, actually living different era.
Universal Value - Still the matter for the world include China, and Japan
There are big argument Between Hard liner called left wing party and Soft liner called Right wing party
in China. Left supporter emphasize the importance of Maoizm and Chinese Characteristics. And Rightsupporter emphasize Universal values, so Left supporter strongly criticize Right supporter as traitor. But
still universal value is still extremely important not only for the world but for China. Chinese
anticorruption policy’s key is depend on this universal value, not top down policy order. So it is still andmaybe more, important to keep faith with universal value such as democracy and freedom. There are bigargument for “Value Diplomacy”, but still it is very important not only for Japanese diplomacy but also
for China to encourage political reform and to form a country under rule of law.

経済的誘惑と政治アイデンティティの間のジレンマ
私たちはポスト「中国崛起（Rising China）」時代にいかに向き合うか
私たちは今日、経済的な誘惑と政治的アイデンティティをどのように折り合いをつけるかというジレンマに直面している。こうしたジレンマに直面するのは中国共産党一党支配を堅持しながら経済成長を謳歌し、世界第二位の規模にまで成長した中国の存在があるためだ。中国は「建国」から 60 年以上経た
今でも共産党一党支配を堅持し、その体制は揺がないようにみえる。東西陣営が対立する冷戦体制が崩壊した当初、私たちは西側資本主義陣営が勝利し、世界は民主主義体制が世界の潮流になるか期待が高まった。ところが中国はその体制の堅持に成功し、GDP の成長率では年率 10％を超える成長を続け、「世界の工場」と言われるまでになった。冷戦の終結から四半世紀。中国は香港マカオの返還を達成し、台湾を残して国家統一を待つのみとなった。ところがここへきて高度成長には陰りが生じ、中国周辺の「ミニ・チャイナ」で反発が高まっている。政治体制改革が進まなかった中国に対して欧米型の民主主義を享受してきた香港や台湾が「No」を突き付けたのだ。中国は巨大な市場を有し、世界にその経済的恩恵を梃子に政治的影響力も行使しようとしている。中国は経済面で双方の関係は「ウィン・ウィン」を強調するが同時に、政治的な選択を強いる場面も少なくない。日中間では尖閣問題を始め、歴史認識、「靖国」参拝が、ベトナムやフィリピン、インドとは領海、領土問題、欧米とは香港や少数民族を巡る人権の問題で譲歩を迫る。中国との経済関係を優先して口をつぐめば経済貿易は発展するだろうが、政治的変化、進歩は停滞し、民主主義、言論表現の自由、という価値で妥協を強いられることになる。つまり根本的スタンスで私たちは中国がもたらす経済的な恩恵と政治的なアイデンティティをどう折り合いをつけるかジレンマに直面している。
「中国崛起（Ring China）」時代の終わり「中国崛起時代の終わり」という言い方は議論を呼ぶものかもしれない。中国の発展の現状及び将来、近未来に対する評価を表すためだ。中国は今年 GDP の成長率が 7.5％を切り、成長に陰りが見えるが、景気の問題は表層的でメインの課題ではない。それよりも過度に低く抑えられた賃金に依拠した「世界24

の工場」としての発展モデルや国有地の割譲（土地使用権の売買）による「打ち出の小槌」が「中国的発展モデル」に依拠する発展が頭打ちになったことが「中国崛起の時代」の終焉を象徴している。こうした状況を打開すべく中国は内需拡大よりも海外に打って出る事でインフラや金融面で外国と協力関係を深め、二か国間では援助外交を強化し、同時に地域毎のマルチな関係でも関係強化に乗り出し、ブリックスや SCO との多国間外交の場でも影響力を示し、アジア・インフラ投資銀行（AIIB）設立といった金融支援枠組み構築でも存在感を示している。しかし根本的には国内での持続可能な発展が行き詰まっており、パラダイム変換を成し遂げない限り持続的な発展は厳しい。これは PM2.5 や水、土壌汚染といった環境問題においても同様である。
「脆弱な超大国」（Fragile Super-power）としての中国
外見では強靭で強硬的で存在感を示す中国だがその実、あまりに多くの問題を国内に抱え、その国家統合さえもままならない。汚職、貧富の格差、少数民族問題、土地バブル崩壊、ゴーストタウン出現など現政権が抱える問題解決の課題は山積みであるにもかかわらず、治安維持、分裂阻止のための武力出動に勢力が削がれ、国防費と治安維持費、そして党のプロパガンダ、教育、ネット監視等の一党体制擁護のための費用が膨大で繁栄を国民皆で享受するどころではない。環境問題もより突出している。民衆の生活向上と内需の拡大が優先されるべきところ、国防や警察力強化に財政支出の重点がおかれ、民衆の不満が高まって年間の集団騒擾事件は 10 万件を超えると言われている。APEC や G20 などで国際的なプレゼンスをアピールし、「一帯一路（シルクロード経済ベルト、21 世紀海上シルクロード）」構築の対外戦略を打ち出すが、国内的にはそれどころではなく「脆弱さ」はより突出している。
「前近代時代（Pre‐Modern）を生きる中国」
12 月 13 日は南京大虐殺犠牲者を追悼する記念日に指定されてから初の国家追悼日だ。近代中国において日本は極めて重要な存在で現在の政権形成には日本が大きな影響を与えたことは否定できないが、本質的な性質の面からいえば、中国は「前近代社会」を生きている。通常、アヘン戦争や清朝、中華民国
を近代の境目と捉える傾向があろうが、ここでの「前近代」とは「国民国家」として統合されていないという意味である。中国は統一国家としての悲願を達成しえていないという意味で未だに「国民国家」
としての統合を成し遂げていないためだ。1997 年に香港返還で国家統合に一歩近づき馬英九政権は中共政権（PRC）への接近政策をとっていたが、馬政権が選挙で大敗北し、香港では学生デモが発生して、「国家統合」への危機感が再び高まりつつある。台湾に対する武力統一主張のような強硬論も見え隠れする。
こうした状況から、欧米で多々ポストモダン叫ばれ、「脱国家」や「トランスナショナル」が主張されるが、中国はまだその段階にまで至っていない。つまり欧米や日本と中国は同じ時代を生きているようで異なる時代を生きていることになる。
普遍的価値の重要性を強調し、追い求める必要がある
冷戦体制の残滓が完全に消滅せずに、異なる時代を同時に生きている日本と中国だが、それでも民主、自由といった普遍的価値を謳い守っていくことが極めて重要である。中国では現在、普遍的価値を受け入れるか否かで猛烈なイデオロギー論争を国内で繰り広げているがこれは国内の既得権益層からなる保守グループが猛烈な抵抗を繰り広げているからである。しかし、ネットが普及し、情報が瞬時に入手できる時代になって情報統制は困難になりつつあり、市民意識が高まっている。こうした中で多くの人々に受け入れられるような民主と自由、機会の平等という普遍価値がこれまで以上に重要であることを引き続き強調していく必要があろう。

25

HOO Tiang Boon
Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University*Please do not circulate, post or cite without author’s permission

Flexing Muscles Flexibly: China’s Regional Strategy
Conference Paper
Introduction
1.

‘There is one basic difference among us,’ China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi reportedly

pointed out to his Southeast Asian colleagues at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, ‘China is a
big country and you are smaller countries.’1 These words have been commonly evoked to highlight the
emerging brand of Chinese regional diplomacy that is being increasingly perceived by many observers
as ‘newly’ assertive or increasingly assertive.

Other often cited examples of such purported

assertiveness include, inter alia, the 2014 oil rig incident in disputed waters off Vietnam’s coast; the 2013
declaration of a Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea; the occupation of
the disputed Scarborough shoal since mid-2012; and the harrying of Vietnamese and Philippine boats by
Chinese paramilitary vessels. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, the prevalence of perceptions ofChinese assertiveness is like a ‘meme’ that has ‘gone viral.’22.

This paper attempts to make better sense of China’s regional policy and behaviour in recent

years—in particular, its perceived rising assertiveness in the region. Speaking to, and contributing to,nascent scholarship and debate on China’s ‘new’ assertiveness, the paper aims to address a number ofcritical questions: Is there a consistent or coherent strategy to China’s supposed regional assertiveness?
How should we interpret China’s regional behaviour? What are some of the factors or dynamics driving
this process?

1

Odd A. Westad, ‘Memo to China: Size Isn’t Everything,’ Bloomberg, 18 October 2012.

2

Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’ International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4(Spring 2013), pp. 7-48. According to survey data by Feng Huiyun and He Kai, even amongst the Chinese scholarly
community, some 63.1% of Chinese scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science andInternational Studies (CCPSIS) ‘somewhat agree (with reservations)’ that China’s foreign policy has been more assertive
since 2008-2009. See Huiyun Feng and Kai He, ’Examining China’s Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars,’
RSIS Working Paper, No. 281, 17 September 2014, pp. 1-17.

26

Nascent Scholarship and Debate
3.

There have only been a few works that specifically examine the issue of China’s assertiveness.3

In a recent issue of the International Security (IS) journal, Iain Johnston probes the veracity of the newly or
more assertive China narrative. Iain Johnston concludes that such a narrative is ultimately ‘problematic’and exaggerates the degree to which China’s actions have been newly assertive, though he does concedethat concerning China’s regional maritime claims, Beijing’s conduct does appear to be more assertive.44.

Bjorn Jerden pursues a similar ‘revisionist’ argument to Iain Johnston in the Chinese Journal ofInternational Politics, and argues that the assertive China narrative is basically flawed. Like Iain Johnston,Jerden notes several empirical examples that challenge the assertive China narrative. Jerden suggests
epistemological reasons—e.g. ‘information cascade, discursive determinism, realism’s prejudices’—forthe prevalence of such a narrative.55.

Furthering the debate is Chen Dingding and Pu Xiaoyu’s correspondence article in the IS

journal. Chen and Pu take issue with Iain Johnston’s ‘narrow’ understanding of assertiveness, andpropose that foreign policy assertiveness should be understood from a typology of (i) ‘offensive’assertiveness; (ii) ‘defensive’ assertiveness; and (iii) ‘constructive’ assertiveness.’ They conclude that
China’s diplomacy has been indeed more muscular in recent times, but that this phenomenon should be
more accurately interpreted as a form of defensive assertiveness.6
Flexible Assertiveness
6.

This paper builds on the nascent debate on the PRC’s assertiveness ‘syndrome.’7 But first, twoimportant qualifiers: for one, ‘assertiveness’ remains both a contested and taken-for-granted concept ininternational relations. There is little consensus within the literature on what constitutes assertiveness inforeign policy while at the same time, it is often assumed that one recognises assertive state behaviour
when one sees it.8 Second, the notion of assertiveness suffers from what is termed as the tyranny ofperceptions. As Miles’ Law put it, ‘where you stand depends on where you sit.’ Thus, perceptions ofassertiveness encompass a degree of inherent subjectivity that cannot be objectively eradicated.
7.

I agree with Iain Johnston that it is facile and misplaced to generalize China’s foreign policy, inparticular its regional policy, as being uniformly assertive. But Chen and Pu are also right to note that it is3

Here, I only highlight the more representative, recent works that explicitly address the Chinese assertiveness debate.

4

It should be noted that in Iain Johnston’s article, he only focuses on events in 2010. See footnote 2.

5

Bjorn Jerden, ‘The Assertive China Narrative: Why It is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It,’ The Chinese

Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 47-88.
6

Dingding Chen and Xiaoyu Pu, ‘Correspondence: Debating China’s Assertiveness,’ International Security, Vol. 38, No. 3(Winter 2013/14), pp. 176-183. See as well Feng and He, ’Examining China’s Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR
Scholars.’
7

Interview with Chinese scholar, Beijing, June 2014.

8

Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’

27

unhelpful to conceive the notion of assertiveness in monolithic terms and that more analytical nuance
would be useful.
8.

I suggest here that China’s Asia policy can be better understood from the lenses and idea of

flexible assertiveness. Flexible assertiveness refers to a two-pronged foreign policy strategy thatcombines two particular aspects: one, a tougher and more uncompromising approach towards what
China regards as its core interests. The other is a more flexible and more beneficent approach towards
those interests (so-called ‘non-core’ national interests) that are perceived as less crucial, and hence, morenegotiable.
Flexible assertiveness can be characterised by the Chinese axiom ‘硬的更硬, 软的更软’ (i.e.

9.

‘hardening the hard, softening the soft’). Thus, in many respects, China’s flexible assertiveness reflects a
carrot-and-stick strategic approach, but one involving heightened costs and benefits. Chinese
commentators have noted the apparent success of this approach in the handling of the Taiwan question(for example, the passing of the 2005 anti-cessation law versus the promises of enhanced economic
integration), so some have suggested that this model be applied on a regional wide basis, in particular, toChina’s maritime territorial issues.9
10.

It should be emphasized that this flexible assertiveness is not just a one-dimensional,

carrot-and-stick policy; here, it is centred on the concept of China’s core national interests. This begs thefollowing question: What are China’s core interests?
China’s Core Interests
11.

In brief, the concept of core interests (核心利益) refers to those national interests that China

would never ‘compromise or trade’ (绝不能退让或进行交易的重 大利益). Some analysts interpret thisas representing China’s ‘red lines,’ delineating those interests which China would be willing to resort toforce (not saying that it would necessarily do so).10
12.

The rhetoric of core interests first appeared in Chinese diplomatic language around the

2003-2004 period as an expression and response to China’s concerns over Taiwan’s growing
independence movement.11 By 2007, according to the Chinese government portal, this concept had been
‘incorporated’ into China’s ‘official documents and foreign affairs activities.’ 12 Around this time, in
addition to the Taiwan issue, the Tibet and Xinjiang questions also became linked to, or were included in,

9See, for example, ‘南海解局的关健：软的更软，硬的更硬’ (The Key to Solving the South China Sea Conundrum:

Softening the Soft, Hardening the Hard), Zhonghua Wang Luntan, 2 February 2012; Field interviews in Beijing, March 2014.
10‘China’s Declaration of Key Interests Misinterpreted,’ Beijing Review, 26 August 2013.

11

Caitlin Campbell, Ethan Meick, Kimberly Hsu and Craig Murray, ‘China’s “Core Interests” and the East China Sea,’

US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Research Backgrounder, 10 May 2013, pp. 1-7.
12

‘China’s Declaration of Key Interests Misinterpreted.’28the notion of China’s core interests. However, it was only at the China-US Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) in July 2009 that the concept was given more specific description for the first time.
State Councillor Dai Bingguo identified China’s core interests as the ‘safeguarding of its political andeconomic systems and national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and sustainable economic
and social development.’ These themes were further underlined and reiterated in Dai’s 2010 article, ‘坚持走和平发展’ (Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development) and the 2011 White Paper on ‘China’s Peaceful
Development.’ As Dai put it categorically, ‘no violation of these interests will be allowed.’13
13.

To be sure, Dai’s articulation of China’s core interests still remains relatively vague and broad.

Moreover, these interests appear to be defined in a way that suggests some degree of overlap. That said,
it is evident that three particular, mutually non-exclusive areas are of paramount importance to Beijing:(i) the continuity and perpetuation of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political leadership, i.e.
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’; (ii) ensuring China’s economic and social progress; and (iii)
ensuring the non-violation of China’s political independence and territorial whole.
14.

The current Xi government has continued with the engagement of the idea and language ofChina’s core interests. At a 28 January 2013 group study session of the CCP Politburo, Xi Jinping
emphasized that:‘We will stick to the road of peaceful development but will never give up ourlegitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should
presume that we will trade our core interests or that we will allow harm to be done to
our sovereignty, security or development interests.’14
15.

The promulgation and continuation of the concept of core interests in Chinese foreign policy

discourse are informed by at least two rationales. According to the Beijing Review, the concept is about‘preventing misjudgements and reducing the possibility of conflicts.’ The logic here is that an explicit
enunciation of China’s core interests is necessary in order to ‘avoid further erosion of those interests.’ The
second reason is connected to the growing public attention and sentiments paid to such interests, inparticular, Chinese territorial interests. It is suggested that rising public ‘consciousness’ of the PRC’s
territorial disputes puts pressure on the Chinese government to better protect those interests.15
16.

Not surprisingly, it is this aspect of the declared core interests, i.e. safeguard sovereignty andterritorial integrity ( 主 权 和 领 土 完 整 ), that has seen the most expression of China’s purported
assertiveness. While there has been a range of Chinese diplomatic actions labelled as ‘assertive,’ themajority of such perceived assertive activities relates overwhelmingly to questions of China’s territorial
integrity.

13

Ibid. See as well Campbell, Meick, Hsu and Murray, ‘China’s “Core Interests” and the East China Sea.’

14‘China’s Declaration of Key Interests Misinterpreted.’

15

Ibid.

29

17.

Given that Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang are areas already specified at one point or another as

falling within the locus of China’s core interests, the question that has concerned many analysts (andindeed, governments) is whether the territorial claims in the East and South China Seas are being
considered by China as part of its core interests. For the reason of consistency, it would appear that
Beijing would be inclined to do so.16 Yet, interestingly, there has been scant official evidence that Beijing
has explicitly linked these maritime territorial disputes to its core interests.
18.

According to the 8 November 2010 interview of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by The

Australian newspaper, Clinton reportedly affirmed that Dai Bingguo told her that Beijing ‘viewed theSouth China Sea as a core interest.’ However, this assertion was not subsequently verified by Clinton nor
were there official records confirming that Dai did indeed made such remarks.17 On 26 April 2013, in
response to a question on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spokesperson Hua Chunying was reported to have answered, ‘The Diaoyu Islands are about sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Of course, it’s China’s core interest.’ Yet, when the transcript of the press
conference was released on 28 April, the spokesperson was recorded as only saying that the dispute‘concerns’ the PRC’s core interests.18
19.

Therefore, based on prevailing evidence, it appears that either the issue (on whether the

maritime disputes are part of core national interests) remains a question of continuing debate within
Zhongnanhai or that the matter is being kept deliberately ambiguous by Beijing. What is clear, though, isthat Beijing has ‘neither publicly confirmed nor denied’ the elevation of this issue to that of China’s coreinterests.19 One Chinese scholar describes these maritime territorial interests as ‘tacit’ core interests.20
An Emerging Pattern
20.

There appears to be growing evidence that Beijing’s regional diplomacy has conformed to a

general pattern of flexible assertiveness in recent years, especially since the advent of Xi’s leadership. On
the one hand, China has pursued a discernibly tougher and more robust posture vis-à-vis its maritime
territorial claims in Asia. Most analysts (including Iain Johnston) agree that, as compared to earlier
antecedents, this aspect of Chinese diplomacy has been demonstrably more assertive.21 This should not
be surprising because after all, these maritime claims are unavoidably related to the core interest of
territorial integrity (even if this connection is not yet explicit).

16

Conversation with Chinese analyst in Singapore, November 2014.

17

Michael Swaine, ‘China’s Assertive Behaviour: Part One: On Core Interests,’ China Leadership Monitor, No. 34, 22

February 2011, pp. 1-25.
18‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on April 26, 2013,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairsof the People’s Republic of China, 28 April 2013.
19

Campbell, Meick, Hsu and Murray, ‘China’s “Core Interests” and the East China Sea.’

20

Field interview with Chinese scholar in Beijing, March 2014.

21

See, for example, Michael Yahuda, ‘China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,’ Journal of Contemporary China,

Vol. 22, No. 81, pp. 446-459.

30

21.

On the other hand, China has been exercising a more beneficent, more sophisticated and morenegotiable approach in its regional economic statecraft. From launching economic-centred initiatives likethe Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), promising
substantial infrastructure loans to regional countries, to the promotion of regional integration
frameworks such as the Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), we see a China that appears
more willing and committed to extend the benefits of its growth to its peripheries.
Conclusion
22.

It is sometimes said that China has been sending ‘mixed signals’ in the region in recent years.22

What I have tried to show in this paper is that, amidst these mixed signals, there is actually aconsiderable degree of coherency and pattern. By understanding China’s Asia strategy through thelenses of flexible assertiveness, we can see that Beijing has been fine-tuning its regional policy, making it
defter and more sophisticated, so as to respond to what it perceives as an increasingly complex andchallenging regional environment (especially in the wake of the US rebalance to Asia).
23.

My other aim has been to try to inject greater nuance in the understanding of the idea of China’s

assertiveness, speaking to the extant debate on this area. Many analyses either make a prori assumptionsof China’s assertiveness or make sweeping generalizations of China as an assertive power. That isunhelpful in my opinion. As this paper has tried to argue, China’s assertiveness is not a uniform
phenomenon. It is one welded to the notion of Chinese core interests, yet encompassing considerable
flexibility for those interests deemed outside of this rubric.

22

Nguyen Hung Son, ‘China Sending Mixed Signals to ASEAN,’ The Straits Times, 13 May 2014.

31

4．An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)【Objectives】
In today’s world, people’s attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with the globalization, but also the rise of newstates including People’s Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Under thesecircumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in Asia-Pacific region, it has become increasingly important for Japan to establish
new channels of dialogue both in the first and the second tracks with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as
member countries of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Balarus, etc.). On the basis of such
understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in thefield ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members andopinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional
arenas.
【History】
The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed
concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within thiscontext, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to betransmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade
Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVINGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY,
as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington
in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary
for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The
Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum
was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out toopen its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Overthe years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic
and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the Americancomponent ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter
act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws
accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line withthe principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage inand promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat ishoused in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on
International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro,
OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO kenichi as
Chairman and ISHIKAWA Kaoru as President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGIYuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 18 Political Members including the three Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI
Sadakazu; and 93 Academic Members including the one Governor, SHIMADA Haruo.
【Activities】
Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries forthe purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China,
Korea, ASEAN countries, India and Australia European countries, Wider Black Sea Area, for the purposes of deepening mutual
understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchangeorganizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial
number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue”, GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" andits overseas co-sponsors in past years given below.
Year

Month

Topic

Co-sponsor

December

The Japan- Asia Pacific Dialogue “The Asia-Pacific in Global Power
Transition: How Many Great Powers?

May

The Japan-China Dialogue “Prospect of Japan‐China Relationship in
the Changing World”
The Japan-U.S. Alliance in Changing International and Domestic
Environments
Toward Building Confidence Between Japan and China in ‘New
Domains’
Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy

Meiji University
University of Western Sydney
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences(CASS)
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

2014
March
January
October
March
2013

2012

February
January

Future Prospect of the Japan-GUAM Partnership for Democracy andEconomic Development
How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation
Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship

September Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International
Public GoodsMarch
The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's RoleMarch
The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global GovernanceFebruary

The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China
Relations32

The Japan Forum on International Relations
Washington College International Studies Program
Foundation of Research on Transformation of Malaysia
GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University
World Resources InstituteCollege of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
Fudan University
Nanyang Technological University
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies

5．An Introduction to Meiji University
Meiji University was founded in January 1881 as the Meiji Law School by a group of young lawyers
barely in their 30's: Tatsuo Kishimoto, Kozo Miyagi, and Misao Yashiro. It was an era characterized by
Japan's urgent need to develop as a modern independent nation. The three founded the Meiji Law
School in their fervent hope to "foster bright capable youths who would lead a modern civil society inJapan".
Although confronted with countless obstacles and hardships along the way, Meiji University was born asa site for learning and education. Continuing its growth without ever ceasing to ring the chimes of liberty,
Meiji University has expanded as one of the prominent private universities of Japan, celebrating its 130th
anniversary in 2011. With Rights, Liberty, Independence and Self-government as its guiding principles,
Meiji University is committed to fostering students who satisfy the requirements of "austerity andsturdiness", "creation of new intellect" and "needs of the times". Having sent out more than 520,000
graduates into the world to date, it has contributed vastly to the progress of society. The achievements of
the university's numerous alumni actively engaged in key roles in various walks of life are highly
reputed.
Meiji University ranks solidly among the best universities in Japan, currently consisting of 10 schools:
the School of Law, School of Commerce, School of Political Science and Economics, School of Business
Administration, School of Arts and Letters, School of Information and Communication, School of Global
Japanese Studies, School of Science and Technology, School of Agriculture, and the School ofInterdisciplinary Mathematical Sciences. The Graduate School is made up of 15 Schools: the Graduate
School of Law, Graduate School of Commerce, Graduate School of Political Science and Economics,
Graduate School of Business Administration, Graduate School of Arts and Letters, Graduate School ofInformation and Communication, Graduate School of Global Japanese Studies, Graduate School of
Science and Technology, Graduate School of Agriculture, Graduate School of Advanced mathematical
Sciences, and the Graduate School of Humanities. There are independent schools in various disciplines,
including the Law School, Graduate School of Governance Studies, Graduate School of Global Business,and the Graduate School of Professional Accountancy. The University also boasts the Meiji University
Meiji High School and Meiji University Meiji Junior High School.
In fiscal 2004, in order to respond to the "needs of the times", Meiji University Women's College and the
Evening Division ceased recruiting students.
In addition to the Surugadai Campus, Meiji University also comprises the Izumi Campus, Ikuta Campus,
and the Nakano Campus newly opened in April, 2013. Along with excellent teaching staff, all of thesecampuses are linked with other institutions and facilities for education and research and feature thelatest facilities, equipment and so on for extracurricular activities. Providing steady education andresearch opportunities, the Surugadai Campus in particular features the latest IT infrastructure and theLiberty Tower, with 23 stories above ground and three below. On top of this, the construction of “Global
Front”, a cutting edge center of excellence in the age of globalization has been completed in January, 2013.
Meiji University aims to make dramatic advances into the world as the top 21st-century urban university
in Japan.

33

6．An Introduction to University of Western Sydney
The University of Western Sydney (UWS) began operation on 1st January 1989, under the terms of the
University of Western Sydney Act, 1988 which had been passed by the New South Wales Parliament in
December 1988. However, the predecessors of the University date back as far as 1891 with theestablishment of the Hawkesbury Agricultural College.
The Act created a federated network university, based on two existing Colleges of Advanced Education Hawkesbury Agricultural College and Nepean College of Advanced Education.
Following incorporation into the University, the foundation network members were known as the'University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury' (UWS Hawkesbury) and the 'University of Western Sydney,
Nepean' (UWS Nepean).
The Act was amended by the University of Western Sydney (Amendment) Act, 1989 (Act No. 128, 1989)
and the Macarthur Institute of Higher Education became the third University member on 1 November
1989. The new campus was known as the 'University of Western Sydney, Macarthur' (UWS Macarthur).
In 1995 a review of the structure of UWS was undertaken. The Report of the Committee to Review theStructure of the University of Western Sydney (the Rogers Report) recommended restructuring theinstitution and a new federated University system emerged. The University of Western became afederated university system comprising four co-operative and interrelated elements: Office of theVice-Chancellor, UWS Hawkesbury, UWS Macarthur, UWS Nepean.
This federated system ensured the University was represented at a national and international level as asingle institution with common objectives and values, while giving each of its Members the autonomy
needed to react quickly and flexibly to the demands and needs of its local communities. The principal
advantage of the federated network structure was the opportunity to build on the individual strengths ofeach member university, and through the University as a whole to define and achieve objectives that theindividual members might have found unattainable. Each member was largely autonomous andresponsible for: the development and conduct of courses; the admission of students; the initiation andsupervision of research programs; staffing; the development of consultancy and entrepreneurial
activities; and the development and maintenance of campus facilities and properties.
On 26 November 1997, the University of Western Sydney Act, 1997 (Act No. 116, 1997) was passed by theState Parliament. This Act which replaced the original Act came into force on 1 January 1998.
Following consultation across UWS the Vice Chancellor put proposals before the UWS Board of Trustees
at the end of 1999 for a major restructure of the University. The Board approved the principles of therestructure, and the consequent detailed work to be undertaken to develop the new structure. From the
beginning of 2001 the University of Western Sydney operated as a single multi-campus university rather
than as a federation.
The new structure of the university was outlined in the 2001 Calendar with revisions and changes
outlined in the 2002 Calendar.
The single multi-campus University of Western Sydney has six campuses: Bankstown, Blacktown,
Campbelltown, Hawkesbury, Parramatta, and Penrith.
“The University of Western Sydney has been named one of the world's top 400 universities, with therelease of the prestigious Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings for 2014-2015. UWS
has moved into the 351-400 band for the first time, firmly placing it within the top two per cent of
universities worldwide.” The information can be found at
http://www.uws.edu.au/newscentre/news_centre/more_news_stories/uws_now_among_the_top_two_pe
r_cent_of_universities_worldwide
34

7．An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, andpublishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.
[History]
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 inTokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60
other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizingthat a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from thegovernment was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public
interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its
achievements.
[Purpose]
The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved
understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional
position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to
propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate
policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations
represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of therecommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.
[Organization]
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2)associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR,
the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors”
and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which isin charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

■Board of Trustees■Directors

HAKAMADA Shigeki
HATTORI Yasuo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
INOUE Akiyoshi
KOIKE Yuriko
KURODA Makoto
NOGAMI Yoshiji
OHYA EikoTANAKA Tatsuo
UTADA Katsuhiro

IMAI Takashi
ITO Kenichi
ISHIKAWA Kaoru
WATANABE Mayu
HANDA Haruhisa
TAKUBO Tadae

ChairmanPresident
Senior Executive Director
Executive Director
Director
Director■Auditors
ICHIKAWA Isao
TAKEUCHI Yukio[Activities]
In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, anotherimportant pillar of JFIR’s activities is the e-Forum “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers inFull Bloom” (http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The e-Forum, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to
the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs.
All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon
Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention forforeigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR
(http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mailmagazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers
worldwide.
35

MEMO

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193[Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp[URL] http://www.gfj.jp/