The Dialogue with the WorldThe Rise of Emerging Countries
and the Future of Global GovernanceConference Papers
May 1‐2, 2012at the International House of JapanTokyo, Japan

Co‐sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan
Fudan University
Nanyang Technological University
The Japan Forum on International Relations

Table of Contents
1．Program………………………………………………………………………………………………1
2．Biographies of the Panelists……………………………………………………………………2
3．Presentation Papers ……………………………………………………………………4
Session I : Global Governance in the ʺEra of Smart Powerʺ............................................. 4
NAKANISHI Hiroshi.....................................................................................................................4John KIRTON.............................................................................................................................6
MIYAOKA Isao..................................................................................................................... 7
Thomas HALE............................................................................................................................. 8
ISHIKAWA Taku..................................................................................................................... 9
Session II : Global Governance from the Point of View of The Rise of Emerging Countries…………10
KAWASHIMA Shin.....................................................................................................................10PAN Zhongqi..................................................................................................................... 11
OBA Mie..................................................................................................................... 13
TAN See Seng..................................................................................................................... 14
HOSOYA Yuichi.............................................................................................................................16

4．An Introduction to the Global Forum of Japan……….……………………………17
5．An Introduction to Fudan University……………………..………………………………18
6．An Introduction to Nanyang Technological University……………………………19
7．An Introduction to the Japan Forum on International Relations……….……20

1.Program
世界との対話The Dialogue with the World「新興国の台頭とグローバル・ガバナンスの将来」
ʺThe Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governanceʺ
２０１２年３月２日（金）／Friday, March 2, 2012
於 国際文化会館「講堂」、東京、日本／at Lecture Hall, International House of Japan,Tokyo, Japan

共催／Co‐sponsored by グローバル・フォーラム ／ The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
復旦大学 ／Fudan University
南洋理工大学 ／Nanyang Technological University
日本国際フォーラム ／ Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)2012 年 3 月 1 日 （木） /Thursday, 1 March, 2012
International House of Japan "SAKURA"/ 国際文化会館「ＳＡＫＵＲＡ」
開幕夕食会 * 特別招待者のみ ／ Welcome Dinner *Invitation Only
18:00‐20:00

平林 博 日本国際フォーラム副理事長主催開幕夕食会
Welcome Dinner hosted by HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, JFIR2012 年 3 月 2 日 （金） /Friday, 2 March, 2012
国際文化会館「講堂」 ／ International House of Japan "Lecture Hall"
開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks
13:30‐13:35
開会挨拶（5分間）
Opening Remarks(5min.)

平林 博 日本国際フォーラム副理事長
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, JFIR

セッションⅠ ／ Session I

スマート・パワー時代におけるグローバル・ガバナンス
Global Governance in the ʺEra of Smart Powerʺ

13:35‐15:15
議長 （5分間）
Chairperson (5 min.)

神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

報告A （10分間）
Presenter A (10 min.)中西寛 京都大学教授
NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University

報告B （10分間）
Presenter B (10 min.)

ジョン・カートン トロント大学教授
John KIRTON, Professor, University of Tronto, Canada

報告C（10分間）
Presenter C (10 min.)宮岡勲 慶應義塾大学准教授
MIYAOKA Isao, Associate Professor, Keio University

報告D （10分間）
Presenter D (10 min.)
報告E （10分間）
Presenter E (10 min.)トーマス・ヘイル ロンドン・スクール・オブ・エコノミクス客員研究員
Thomas HALE, Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics, U.K.
石川卓 防衛大学校准教授
ISHIKAWA Taku, Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

自由討議（45分）
Free Discussions (45 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants
休憩 ／ Break

15：15‐15:25
セッションⅡ／ Session Ⅱ

新興国からみたグローバル・ガバナンス
Global Governance from the Point of View of The Rise of Emerging Countries

15:25‐17：05
議長 （5分間）
Chairperson (5 min.)平林
博 日本国際フォーラム副理事長
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, JFIR

報告A （10分間）
Presenter A (10 min.)川島
真 東京大学准教授
KAWASHIMA Shin, Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo

報告B （10分間）
Presenter B (10 min.)PAN Zhongqi, Professor, Fudan University, China

報告C（10分間）
Presenter C (10 min.)

大庭 三枝 東京理科大学准教授
OBA Mie, Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science

報告D （10分間）
Presenter D (10 min.)

タン・シーセン 南洋理工大学准教授
TAN See Seng, Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

報告E （10分間）
Presenter E (10 min.)細谷 雄一 慶應義塾大学教授
HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University

自由討議（45分）
Free Discussions (45 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants潘

忠岐 復旦大学教授

閉幕挨拶／Closing Remarks

17：05‐17:10
閉幕挨拶（5分間）
Remarks(5min.)

大河原良雄 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人
OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ[NOTE］日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English‐Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2．Biographies of the Panelists【Foreign Panelists】
John KIRTON
Professor, University of Toronto, Canada (Canada)
Received his PhD in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
at Johns Hopkins University. Concurrently serving as director of the G8 Research Group and co‐director of
the G20 Research Group, the Global Health Diplomacy Program and the BRICS Research Group at Trinity
College at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.

Thomas HALE
Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics (U.K.)
He is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. His research focuses on thegovernance of transnational problems such as climate change and commercial dispute resolution. He hasstudied and worked in Argentina, China, and Europe, and currently lives in London.

PAN Zhongqi
Professor, Fudan University (China)
Received his Ph.D. of international relations in 1999 from Fudan University. Served as First Secretary at
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Communities of China’s Foreign Ministry(2008‐09).

TAN See Seng
Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore)
Received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Arizona State University. Served as Research Fellow at
Singapore Institute of International Affairs (1996‐1997), and Visiting Research Associate of International
Institute for Strategic Studies (2008). Concurrently serving as the Deputy Head of Studies at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

【Japanese Panelists】
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi
Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1963. From 1991 to 2006, served
successively as Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington, D.C., Director‐General of Economic Cooperation Bureau at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief Cabinet Councilor on External Affairs at Prime Minister’s Cabinet,
Ambassador to India and Ambassador to France. Concurrently, Executive Vice‐President of The Council on East
Asian Community (CEAC), President of the Japan‐India Association, Visiting Professor of the Graduate School of
Asia‐Pacific Studies of Waseda University, Opinion Leader Governor, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), and soforth.

KAMIYA Matake
Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1985 and did graduate study at Columbia University as a Fulbright
grantee. Became Research Associate at the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1992, Lecturer with tenure in
1993, Associate Professor in 1996, and became Professor in 2004. Meanwhile, served as Distinguished Research
Fellow at Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994‐95), and Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Instituteof International Affairs (2004‐2005). Concurrently serves as Councilor of The Japan Forum on International
Relations (JFIR) and Member of the Board of Directors of Japan Association for International Security.

2

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University
Received MA from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at the
University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990 as Ph.D candidate. Served as Associate Professor in Koto University. His
major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, with partiular interest on
Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign and security policy. He has
been on the panel of several Governmental advisory committees, such as the Council on Security and Defense
Capabilities in the New Era, which issued the final report in August 2010.

MIYAOKA Isao
Associate Professor, Keio University
Graduated from Keio University in 1990. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1990 and retired fromoffice in 1995. Received his MA in Political Science from the University of Canterbury in 1994. Received his D.Phil.
from the University of Oxford in 1999. Served as Associate at Harvard University in 1999‐2001, Visiting Fellow at
the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, The George Washington University in 2006. Served as Associate Professor at
Osaka University of Foreign Studies from 2001 and then at Osaka University from 2007. Held the current position
since 2010.

ISHIKAWA Taku
Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
Received his M.A. from the George Washington University in 1994 and Ph. D from Hitotsubashi University in
1998. Served as a research fellow of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (1996‐98), AssistantProfessor and then Associate Professor of Toyo Eiwa University (1998‐09).

KAWASHIMA Shin
Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo
Received M.A. from the University of Tokyo in 1994 and Ph.D. in 2007.Served as Associate Professor of
Faculty of Law at Hokkaido University (1998 ‐ 2006), and Visiting Associate Professor of International
Research Center for Japanese Studies(2002‐2005). Held the current position since 2006. Concurrently serving
as Senior Researcher of the Institute for International Policy Studies.

OBA Mie
Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science
Received M.A. in 1994 and Ph.D in 2002 from the University of Tokyo. Served as Visiting Research Fellow,
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore,
Academic Associate of Program on US‐Japan Relations at Harvard University (2006‐2007)．Her major isInternational Relations and the politics in Asia‐Pacific. Her current research interests include the developmentof regionalism in this region as well as theories of regional integration and regionalism.

HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University
Received his Ph.D from Keio University. Served as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences‐Po in Paris(2009–10), Visiting fellow at Princeton University (2008–2009). His research interests include the postwar
international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security.

OKAWARA Yoshio
Chairman, GFJ
Graduated from The University of Tokyo. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942. Served various
positions including Director‐General of the American Affairs Bureau, Deputy Vice Minister for
Administration, Japanese Ambassador to Australia and Japanese Ambassador to the United States(1980‐1985). Concurrently serving as Special Adviser of Institute for International Policy Studies andPresident of America‐Japan Society, Inc.

3

(In order of appearance)3. Presentation Papers
Session I: Global Governance in the ʺEra of Smart Powerʺ
NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University

The notion of global governance (GG), broadly defined as efforts to solve problems
identified as common internationally by both state and non‐state actors, has posed theoretical andpractical questions. Governance, or the normative search for order, presupposes that specific notion ofnorm is shared by the parties. But who decides what notion of norm and how? And The issue of actors
have also been questioned. It is generally agreed that international institutions and non‐state actors
play roles in global governance along with states. But it has not been resolved that states have special
roles, privileges and powers in global governance or they are just similar actors as international
institutions and non‐state actors. The idea of global governance has been around and generally hailed
by the parties who utter those words with these ambiguities never clarified.
Historically, in the last twenty years, the GG has been shifted from the tendency
emphasizing international institutions such as the UN and the NGOs to the one which puts more
importance to the state relations. Case in point is the global warming issue, one of the typical GG
agenda. The issue was initially addressed in the UN and the UN‐sponsored conference at Rio deJaneiro in 1992. The concern on climate change resulted in the establishment of the IPCC, ratificationof the Treaty on Climate Change by vast majority of countries in the world, and signing the Kyoto
Protocol. Then the matter moved to the implementation by states in 2000s. The US and Australia
bowed out from the Kyoto protocol, and the debate became more and more between the developed
countries and the developing countries. Of course this is just one case, but as the market oriented,
enlightenment‐type globalization lost its persuasiveness, the GG came to be played out in the sphereof international politics.
The notion of “smart power” advocated by Joseph Nye seems one reaction to this trend.
Global Governance is no doubt multi‐faceted, and non‐state actors are legitimate players. But the basic
framework of the GG must be played out by state players. It does not mean the GG reflects balance ofpower in the typical realist mold. The state needs to play different power resources, and within theconfinement of common interest among the states to avoid general breakdown of global
interdependence. So far the developed countries seem to hold edge against the emerging powers interms of military power, economic institutions, and universal norm. They hold power to intervene any
part of the world if they desires and given legitimate authorization. They secure major voices in the
IMF and the World Bank, and large companies. They hold the only universal value system ofliberalism which fits in the globalization era.
However, the emerging powers are showing more power in this game. They accumulate
military forces in strides so that they have more denial capability against the outside intervention.
Their high rate of economic growth in global market attracts more power and gradually increases
their voices. The universal norm of liberalism to some extent justifies their norm of independence ofsovereignty, economic justice, or multiplicity of culture.

4

Japan is in a unique position in this GG scheme. Japan is now losing a “great power” status
by default it arguably had in 1970s to 2000s (even then Japan was called military pigmy). But Japan
has relatively larger resources to be put in the middle powers, and uniqueness of Japan’s resources cancount against the Great Powers. Much depends on Japan coming up with a “smart” strategy inmobilizing it available resources and invest them wisely.
Japan’s natural conditions require Japanese SDFs to be more prepared to the denial
capability in and around territory as well as agile operations against the hard natural disasters. These
characters make Japanese SDFs as good resources in contributing GG such as peace‐building orinternational disaster response.
Japan’s poor endowment with natural resources tends to direct Japanese life style andeconomy towards higher technology and energy conservation, which can be used as source ofinternational influence. At the same time, the gift of diverse natural conditions can enhance moreinnovation in Japanese agriculture, fishery or forestry, which is hindered by various institutional
barriers. With proper institutional arrangements, these industries can be sources of international
cooperation and investment. Japan’s aging society gives opportunity for new medical and nursing
industry, as well as more unmanned robotics.
Japan’s culture is known to be receptive to almost any type of cultures and civilizations.
This cultural flexibility is source of soft power. The current Japanese cultural icons such as cartoons,cuisine, or novels etc., reflects this character. The problem of Japanese soft power is, though it’sreceived well by many parts of the world, the fact that it tends to lack clear message to the world associal values. Admitting the difficulty of the task, Japanese culture needs to be more outward‐looking
and try to explain what it is to other cultures and civilizations.

5John KIRTON
Professor, University of Tronto, Canada
The demand for global governance is great and growing, as old state‐to‐state and newnon‐state threats compound and combine to spread swiftly, widely and intrusively in an intenselyinterconnected, complex, uncertain world.
Given these “problems without passports,” the Bretton Woods–United Nations galaxy
remains an incomplete, siloed, uncoordinated system with no dedicated multilateral organizations forthe environment, energy, crime and terrorism, and nothing to foster co‐ordination at the top.
Despite the adoption of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle in 2005 and its successful
application over Libya in 2011, the UN remains confined by a legal charter that prohibits international
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, that ignores the natural environment, thatdeclares the world’s third‐ranked power to be an enemy, alien‐aggressor state, and that excludes itfrom a permanent veto on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which now consists
exclusively of states with nuclear weapons state.
Global governance, defined as the provision of public goods and the protection of people
against problems that spread widely to cause death and destruction, now requires international
institutions that are comprehensive and integrated (to address linked problems such as natural andnuclear disasters or climate change and health), flexible enough to act swiftly and authoritatively, andinnovative enough to produce solutions to solve or even prevent problems in the right way.
The G8 major market democracies, centred in an annual summit, has served as such an
institutions since its start in 1975. Created to intrusively protect and promote globally the values of“open democracy, individual liberty and social advance,” its all‐democratic members, doubling inmember since 1975, embraced Japan, Germany and Italy as equal founding members and addressedenergy, the environment, terrorism and crime as well as economics and security.
At Tokyo in 1979, the then G7 leaders stopped serious Middle East oil shocks for good andcreated the world’s first, its most ambitious and its most effective regime to control climate change. In
1999, under German leadership, with a deadlocked UNSC, the G8 — now with Russia — authorized
the military action delivered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that protected
innocent civilians in Kosovo and had Yugoslav dictator Slobodan Milosevic tried for war crimes in theHague. The G7/8 also led the peaceful transformation from the Soviet Union bloc, empire andideology to a democratic Russia and the global spread of democratic ideals, most recently in North
Africa.
The G20 systemically significant states, created in 1999 in response to the
Asian‐turned‐global financial crisis, then succeeded where the G8 failed, in embracing as full
founding members all emerging and established powers needed to prevent global financial crises orcontain them if they emerged. Elevated to the summit level in 2008 in response to theAmerican‐turned‐global crisis erupting then, it successfully stopped the greatest recession since theGreat Depression of the 1930s, contained the subsequent euro‐crisis and finally reformed theInternational Monetary Fund to give the rapidly rising, largely Asian powers — and Japan — thevoice and vote they deserved.
Japan has done much to support the G20, as an institution with more Asian than European
powers, and far more non‐nuclear and democratic members than nuclear and non‐democratic ones.
As Japan is one of the few members that was a provider rather than a consumer of financial security inboth 1997–2001 and 2008–12, Japan should broaden the G20 agenda to embrace more political‐security
issues and deepen the G20’s democratic value as a new leadership in China arrives.

6

MIYAOKA Isao
Associate Professor, Keio University

The Concept and Theories of Global Governance
1. Theories of Governance in the Cold War Period
2. Analytical Theories of Governance in the Post‐Cold War PeriodJames N. Rosenau, “Governance in the Twenty‐first Century,” 1995, p. 13.
global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from thefamily to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control
has transnational repercussions.

3. Normative Theories of Governance in the Post‐Cold War PeriodCommission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, 1995, p. 4
Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be
accommodated and co‐ operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes
empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions
either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.

Table 1: Theories of Governance in World Affairs
Analytical
1970s
Traditional
Hegemonic Stability Theory
1980s(Realism)International Society(English School)
Semi‐
Complex Interdependence
traditional(Liberalism)
1990s
Semi‐
Regime Theory
2000s
traditional(institutional interplay)
Non‐
Post‐International Theory
traditional

Normative

Historical Materialism(Marxism)
Regime Theory(institutional design)
Global Civil Society
World Government
Critical Theories

Theories of Global Governance

4. Critical Review of Global Governance Theories

Non‐traditional aspects: 1) Multiactor perspective, multi‐level2) New issues, and 3) Plurality of mechanisms and methods
These aspects are too complex to theorize world politics.
Traditional approaches are more suitable for examining the rise of emerging powers in thecontext of governance in world affairs.
Three principles of major power concert (Rosecrance 1992)
 involvement of all powers; ideological agreement; and renunciation of war

7

Thomas HALE
Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics, U.K.

“The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance”
1. Argument
Multilateral governance is increasingly gridlocked, and increasing multipolarity is asignificant cause. But new kinds of international institutions offer a partial solution topressing transnational problems.

2. The success of the postwar ordera. The globalization of “embedded liberalism”
b. A liberal, institutionalized order allowed the world to achieve unprecedented
interdependencec. Endogenous interdependence: self‐reinforcing process between interdependence
and institutionalizations.
i. Firms to organize multinationallyii. Shift in division of laboriii. Application of technology to supply chain management and outsourcing

3. Gridlocka. The very success of the postwar order, by allowing interdependence to deepen tosuch a high degree, has now created conditions that threaten it going forward
b. Pathways to gridlock (second‐order cooperation problems)
i. Institutional inertia
ii. Deeper, harder problemsiii. Institutional complexity
iv. Increasing multipolarity: arguably the most important
1. Increased transaction costs
2. More centralization entails less legitimacy
3. More diverse domestic conditions / interests need to beaccommodated

4. The partial transnational solution
a. Global governance has evolved
i. Transgovernmental networks
ii. Private regulationiii. multi‐stakeholder initiatives
iv. Dispute settlement functions
v. Innovative financing
b. New Forms of global governance offer a possible way to move ahead, but also face
limitations
i. increase flexibility
ii. lower transaction costs of multilateral foraiii. allow different coalitions to be built and broader capacities to be deployedc. Examples
i. Economic governanceii. Climate governance

5. The Role of Japan
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ISHIKAWA Taku
Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of JapanThe Rise of Emerging Powers and “Nuclear Order”
Some Implications for the Japan‐US Alliance
1.

William Walker’s Concept of “Nuclear Order”
Composed of two linked systems:a. The “managed system of deterrence” with the ABM Treaty as a pillar
b. The “managed system of abstinence” with the NPT as a pillar

2.

The Decline of the Order after the Cold War
a. Actual cases of proliferationb. US counterproliferation and “coercive nonproliferation” policy▶

3.

Power Transition and the Nuclear Order
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Obama’s effort to revive the order, and its increasing limitations
China’s nuclear modernization in search of “assured retaliation”
Russia’s emerging “hard balancing”
Legitimation of nuclear India, and its complications
Continuation of “nuclear renaissance”▶
▶

4.

Reconfirmed the link between the two systems and the importance of NPT Article VI

Need to reconsider the US formula of “nuclear reduction + conventional buildup”
Need to stabilize the deterrence system including some emerging powers, while keeping
nuclear disarmament momentum

Prospects and Recommendations
If the current power transition continues:
a. Japan should prepare for US acceptance of China’s “assured retaliation”▶ May be essential for a peaceful transition to a Concert of Power systemb. Japan should contribute to US effort to enhance “regional deterrence” in Northeast Asia,
while trying not to provoke a regional arms racec. Some restrictions on missile defense may become inevitable

9Session II: Global Governance from the Point of View of
The Rise of Emerging Countries
KAWASHIMA Shin
Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo
Four Key Points on Observations ofChinese Behaviors on Global/Regional Governance
About Chinese Perceptions and Diplomacy toward Global Governance, we have argued sometypical topics; (1) challenger and/or participants? ; (2) Engagement and/or containment, etc.. Thoroughsuch arguments, now that scholars share complexness of this issue and variety of Chinese attitude on
this field.

1．Global Governance for China
Under the financial and economic globalization, China has kept rapid development. China isbasically ‘beneficiary’ of so‐called globalization, and also participants of global governance with someextents. China has been cautious about global governance which had made by Western countries,
however this does not mean that China plays negative role on global governance completely. China
gradually accepted global rules and norms, as China joined WTO in 2001, and distinguished whether
it was acceptable or not deliberately, according as her own national interest. Some norms and rules, as
NPT regime, are acceptable for China, because they protect or increase Chinese national interests,
others are critical and harmful for Chinese development and sovereignty, and the other fields aremostly so irrelevant to Chinese national interests that China makes it good instrument to negotiate onother issues.

2. Mosaic Fields
For China, global governance is not recognized as a systematic and consistent norm. China
doesn’t have any stout thought and principle about global governance, so that China can cope witheach concrete issue, case by case. Sets of issues on governance in global society look like a kind ofmosaic field for China.
Probably, other newly emerging powers share such a stance toward global governance. And
the each country has different mosaics which don’t overlap each other. So, Newly emerging powers
cannot cooperate at all cases.

3. Mutual Communications
Advanced powers, if they expect Chinese and other newly emerging powers’ cooperation withforming governance, have to pay attentions to several points; (1) persuading China’s advantage tocooperate with governance and bringing out Chinese intention to commit making it; (2) observing
China and other countries carefully in detail, in order to prevent them from cooperating each otheragainst advanced countries; (3) keeping open‐mindness to China and other countries, andcompromising/adjusting the contents of regulations with flexibility.

4. Regional Governance ‐ Chinese Order? –On understanding Chinese attitude global governance, it’s efficient to distinguish the case of
global governance from regional governance. China sometimes adopts more assertive policy towards
surrounding regions, with which China has some specific issues relating sovereignty and other crucial
issues. However, at present, China has not been successful in creating new order which is shared bysurrounding countries.
10

PAN Zhongqi
Professor, Fudan University, China
Chinaʹs Perceptions of Global GovernanceThe concept of global governance (GG) gained prominence with the end of bipolarity, theemergence of globalization and the increasing economic interdependence. Various global challenges
necessitated a search for appropriate format and approach to GG, which becomes a new importantconcept that diverging perceptions of it cast shadows on relations between developed and developing
counties in general, and relations between existent great powers and emerging countries including
China in particular.
China’s conception and its approach towards GG differs significantly from that of the EU, forexample, be it on a normative, institutional or policy level, because of different historical starting
points and different conceptions of China’s place in the international system. A comparative
perspective, with the EU as an example, may help us to have a better understanding of Chinaʹsposition.
GG – understood both as strengthening existing multilateral institutions and as managing
global challenges – resonates with the EU more than with China. When comparing European andChinese approaches to GG, it becomes apparent that these approaches differ considerably. Amongothers, climate change, financial crisis, and nuclear proliferation, are three major issues most suitablefor GG.
Both China and the EU argue that those issues could not be solved by any single player, acollective action is a necessity other than a choice. Both China and the EU should and have made great
efforts in improving global environmental, economic, and security situation. Both emphasize thesignificant role of international institutions in GG, be they the UN, IMF, WB, G20, as well as regional
ones. A globally concerted effort is in need and should be encouraged.
But China and the EU do not find much common language on GG in general. For example,
their frictions on climate change were made more than remarkable in the 2009 Copenhagenconference.
Generally speaking, China aims to build a harmonious world, harmonization, while the EUtries to spread its values and norms, normalization. While Europe is an insider of the internationalsociety, China sees itself as an outsider. Europe has been the maker of many important international
norms, but China has been the taker of various Western political concepts.
China wants to shoulder international responsibilities, to promote its benign and constructive
image to the rest of the world, while the EU wishes to strengthen its identity, build its global actorness,presents itself as a leader in GG.

The EU frequently cites “effective multilateralism” as the right mechanism to build global
order and governance. China, to a less extent, also advocates multilateralism and emphasizes thecentral position of the UN in it. But China, by contrast, quite insists on the principle of sovereignty
and non‐interference. China is very careful and hesitant in participating in GG in order to avoid the
difficult questions regarding state sovereignty. The genuine acceptance of the need to trade national
11

sovereignty for a better grip on transnational issues that lies at the foundation of the European Unionis clearly not shared by China. The EU and China will in all likelihood not be able to completely avoid
conflicts based on different interpretations of sovereignty and particularly the right to interfere indomestic issues of a sovereign state.
China and the EU are two very different types of players in international politics today.
China is writing its story of peaceful rise and building itself as a consolidated sovereign state. The EU
on the other hand is seeking for further regional integration and building itself as a unitary
post‐sovereign polity. While China sticks to modern norms and values, the EU is moving towards apost‐modern normative actor. A sovereignty‐retaining China is definitely at variance with asovereignty‐pooling EU in their understandings of such concept as GG. For China, sovereignty andindependence take precedence over normative principles and constraints of GG in international
relations, while for the EU, national sovereignty is a futile notion, impeding regional integration and
GG. Despite China’s acceptance of many other international norms that have been championed by
Europe, such as human rights and democracy, China generally rejects any single and absolute mode
being alleged universally applicable. When China talks about those concepts, it is not simply
repeating the European ideas, but has made them Chinanized.
Since China is not as committed to multilateralism and a rule‐based international system as
the EU and China is preoccupied with internal instability, so its emphasis on sovereignty can be
expected to continue to trump considerations over collective international approaches to common
challenges. The conceptual gap poses a challenge to the formulation of joint approaches to GG
between China and the EU. These differences have led to concrete and divergent political positions.
The EU’s emphasis on dealing with failed states, or international intervention and the emerging
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) more generally, is at variance with China’s obsession withequality, sovereignty, and the principle of non‐intervention. Different perspectives thus block ameeting of minds.

12

OBA Mie
Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science

The Change of global governance system and Southeast Asia
The global financial crisis (2007‐2009) revealed that a shift in the global balance of powerthat had already begun years before. Emerging countries were able to extend their politicalleverage in the aftermath of the crisis, because the developed economies of the United States,
Europe, and Japan were in severe decline while evaluations of the potential for developing
economies rose substantially. Among these emerging countries, the rise of China and India in theinternational sphere and their enhanced political leverage was particularly remarkable. Someanalysts point out that the power shift would reshape the structure of the global governance. The
upgrade of the G20 from ministerial to summit level after the global financial crisis showed that
global governance system without emerging powers would not function in order to resolve
economic and financial issues.
The role of Southeast Asian countries is limited compared with those of China and India.
However, it should be considered that Southeast Asian countries are involved in the development
and change of global governance system with three ways. The first way is to promote regional
cooperation and integration in the ASEAN. The ASEAN, a regional institution embracing
Southeast Asia, can be regarded as a part of the global governance system, because it
demonstrates the stance to promote global norms and values such as human rights, democracy,
and role of law in this region. Besides, the ASEAN is attempt to deepen regional integration withvarious measures, which basically are consist with the principles of the WTO, in order to realize
regional prosperity in the development of the economic globalization. It should be consideredthat the development of regional cooperation in ASEAN in these manners might split themembers of the ASEAN into two camps: the supporters for the “new ASEAN” and those for the“old ASEAN”.
The second way is to enhance the special channels between the ASEAN and major external
powers like China, Japan, India, and the United States, all of which are global players that affectthe structure and activities of the global governance. Southeast Asian countries constructed“ASEAN+X” relationships with the FTA and the TAC. Besides, they attempt to keep the positionof the ASEAN to be the institutional “core” of broader regional frameworks like the ARF, theASEAN+3 and the EAS, all of which embracing those external powers.
The third way is to directly participate in the framework of global governance system.
Indonesia is the only member of the G20 among Southeast Asian countries and then can voice its
opinions as well as the opinions of Southeast Asian countries in this framework. However, it isvague whether Indonesia has a new vision for a new structure of global governance and what it
specifically tries to do in the global sphere.

13

TAN See Seng
Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University
Global Governance: The View from Emerging Countries
As a P5 member armed with veto rights, China regards the UN (UNSC included) as themost important institution for global security governance. China’s growing contribution to UN
peacekeeping missions (7,500 peacekeepers since 1990) is the biggest among P5 members, but
considerably less than Bangladesh’s or Pakistan’s contributions. But China’s contribution to thegeneral UN and UNPKO budget (at 2.67%) is lowest among the P5.1 Beijing’s veto of UNSC
resolution backing the Arab League’s plan for ending the violence in Syria (the Chinese have since
indicated support for the plan) suggests China practises strategic rather than normative
multilateralism in order to avoid legitimating a Libya‐type “humanitarian intervention” and theimplications that holds for international responses to its own crackdowns in Tibet and Xinjiang.2
As relatively small and/or weak states, ASEAN countries are generally supportive ofglobal institutions and multilateral arrangements as platforms whereby they can, individually aswell as corporately as the ASEAN collective, press for a bigger say on issues important to theirnational and regional interests. In that respect, the UN remains a highly important global security
provider for the ASEAN region, not least through peacekeeping (e.g. UNTAC in Cambodia,
UNTAET in East Timor). At least since An Agenda for Peace (1992), the UN has sought to enhancecollaboration with regional organizations, ASEAN included, in international security management.
The cooperative effort between the UN and ASEAN in encouraging the Burmese military junta toreceive foreign humanitarian assistance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 is a good example.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the WTO have become considerably more
important to ASEAN countries in their increasing turn to these institutions to adjudicate and settle
territorial and trade disputes among themselves. Persistent mutual distrust among ASEAN states
prevents them from relying on ASEAN’s own dispute mechanisms (e.g. High Council). However,
ASEAN’s institutional articles permit members’ reliance on third‐party arbitration andadjudication.
China increasingly regards the G20 as the most important institution for global economic
cum financial governance. Two reasons for this: (1) China believes the G20 will eventually
supplant and sideline the G7/G8. (2) China views the G20 as an expression of greater and fairer
representation and devolution of decision‐making power to emerging countries. This is on
contrast to other major global economic/financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and
WTO, which are still dominated by Western powers. Those institutions still suffer from “input”
legitimacy and a persistent exclusivity.3 China will continue to press for greater representation

1

Ian Taylor, “The Future of Chinaʹs Overseas Peacekeeping Operations,” China Brief (Jamestown
Foundation), Vol. 8, Issue 6 (March 14, 2008),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4792
2 In the same way, the U.S. refused to join the International Criminal Court (ICC), which could have
had repercussions on its war effort in Iraq and potential prosecution of U.S. soldiers for alleged war
crimes, etc.
3 Pradumna Rana, “Cannes Summit: Make G20 Plus Transparent,” RSIS Commentaries 152/2011 (1914and transparency at these institutions but will likely focus on the G20 as the arrangement throughwhich China can play a more significant role in global economic governance.

How much of a role China is prepared to take on in the G20, and more generally as aleader among emerging countries/economies to play public‐goods provider and help stabilize theglobal economic cum financial system, remains to be seen. For example, the present euro‐zone
troubles underscore the pressing need for emerging countries, the BRICs in particular, to assist
Europe via bond purchasing and direct investment. The BRICs are fully aware ensuring euro‐zonestability is in their national interests. Yet Europe’s incrementalism (doing enough to stave offcollapse but not to restore investor confidence and change market sentiments) and readiness toengage in a trade conflict with China sends mixed signals. At the same time, Chinese dithering
despite having given verbal assurances to assist Europe doesn’t help either.
There is some evidence to suggest China is keen to use the BRICs arrangement to press
for more power sharing with the Western powers.

While important for big emerging countries, the G20 remains a concern for ASEAN
members, except Indonesia, the only Southeast Asian country in the G20. From their perspective,
the G20 remains a “high council” of big established and emerging powers, from which the
majority of nations are still excluded. Greater transparency is required; the G20 members (19 statesand EU) were selected in 1999 without objective criteria (other than the assumption that theycollectively produce/manage 80% of world’s wealth), 4 while Europe is overrepresented. Its
imbalanced representation mirrors the composition of IMF and World Bank boards. While the G20
Seoul summit drew needed attention to development issues and the Asian region, ASEAN statesworry whether Asia will be further marginalized as a consequence of the G20+5 model, whichguarantees 2 invitations to African regional organizations based on the G20’s discretionary
practice of inviting regional organizations and loose groupings.5 Granted, should the G20 halt its
past practice of inviting ASEAN to attend its summits,6 ASEAN’s concerns could be conceivably
be addressed by Indonesia and possibly by Singapore, assuming the hosts of future G20 summits
will continue to invite the Global Governance Group (3G) of which Singapore is a leading
advocate. But those are big “ifs”!

October 2011), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1522011.pdf
4 Moises Naim, “Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action,” Foreign Policy(July/August 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/minilateralism?page=full
5 UK invited ASEAN and New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Canada added African Union,
ROK roped in the Global Governance Group (3G), France brought in the Gulf Cooperation Council.
6 The matter of whether to invite the ASEAN chair or the ASEAN secretary‐general needs to beaddressed.
15

HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University
The West, China and Japan in the “Pacific Century”:
Defending Liberal International Order
Summary
We are now seeing the rise of China, and the increasing importance of Asian economies.
Responding to these challenges and opportunities, the US President Barack Obama said in 2009 that
he was the “First Pacific President,” while his Secretary of State Hilary Clinton wrote in 2011 that weare entering into “America’s Pacific Century.” It is necessary for Japan to reexamine its own role in this“Pacific Century.”First, we need to understand that the basic foundation of international order is now being
challenged by the emerging countries, particularly China. China’s Gross National Product is now thesecond biggest after the US, and the rapid expansion of Chinese maritime activities in the South andEast China Seas threaten surrounding countries including Japan. The foundation of the current
international order based upon liberal values such as democracy, freedom of navigation, and the ruleof law has been constructed and defended by the Western Powers. After the Second World War, Japan
has been also an important defender of these values, as codified by the Constitution of Japan and the
US‐Japan security treaty. An important question is whether the Western countries and Japan canmaintain and reinforce these values and institutions in the era of the rise of emerging countries.
The US‐Japan alliance as well as the G7/8 Summit meeting is an important device for Japan to
do this. However, Prime Minister Hatoyama seriously damaged the alliance after he had won thegeneral election in August 2009. Japan’s diplomacy in the “Pacific Century” has to deal with the task ofrebuilding and reinforcing the current international order for the purpose of adapting to the challengeof the rise of emerging countries.

Related Articles
Yuichi Hosoya, “The Atlantic Community and the Restoration of the Global Balance ofPower: The Western Alliance, Japan, and the Cold War, 1947‐1951”, in Marco Mariano (ed.), Defining
the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid‐Twentieth Century (New York:
Routledge, 2010).
Yuichi Hosoya, “The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Grand Strategy: The “Arc of Freedom andProsperity” and the Future Asian Order”, Asia‐Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No.1, May 2011.
Yuichi Hosoya, “Japan’s National Identity in Postwar Diplomacy The Three Basic Principles”,
in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

16

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan【 Objectives 】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, andglobalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especiallyneighboring countries in the Asia‐Pacific region at both governmental and non‐governmental levels, is one of the indispensableconditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote theexchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to the economy, trade,finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart
countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there
were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was
at risk. Within this context, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges ofprivate‐sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign
Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, andCanadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private‐sector in their respective countries, took the initiativein founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the alterednature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global
Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in
Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global
consensus on the many post‐Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only
to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravityof The Global Forumʹs activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic andInternational Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the Americancomponent ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would
thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, andamended its by‐laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forumʹs Japanese component was reorganized into The Global
Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self‐governing, self‐financing, and independent of any
other organization.
【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non‐profit, non‐partisan, and independent membershiporganization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy‐oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global
implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any otherorganizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The
Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, and TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982,
GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 10
Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 25 Diet Members including thefive Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, HATOYAMA Yukio, KOIKE Yuriko, SUEMATSU Yoshinori, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 84
Opinion Leader Members including the three Governors, HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, SHIMADA Haruo, and WATANABE Mayu.
Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of Japan are organized into the Supporters’ Club of the Global Forum of Japan.
Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 11 leading Japanese corporations(Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each, and the other 9 corporations contributing 1 or 2
shares each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan‐ASEAN Exchange Projects, Japan‐ASEAN
Integration Fund, The Tokyo Club, The Japan‐Korea Cultural Foundation, etc. KIKUCHI Yona serves as Acting Executive Secretary.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the
Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the
Asia‐Pacific region including the U.S., China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea
area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been
active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy‐oriented intellectual
exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue,” GFJ in principle
holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its overseas co‐sponsors in the last five years is given
below.
Year

Month

Topic

Co‐sponsor

March
March

The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japanʹs RoleThe Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global GovernanceFebruary

July

The Asia‐Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan‐U.S.‐China
Relations
The Japan‐China Relations at Crossroads
The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation on
Disaster Management
The Japan‐U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power
East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional
Cooperation
East Asian Regional Architectures and Japan‐India Relations
Promoting Japan‐U.S. Cooperation in Non‐Traditional Security:
the Case of Counter Piracy
Promoting Japan‐China Cooperation on Environmental Issues ofthe 21st Century: In Pursuit of Recycling Society
Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan
Japan‐ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis
Prospect of Japan‐China Relationship in the Changing World
US‐Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration
Prospect of Japan‐ASEAN Partnership after the Second Joint
Statement on East Asia Cooperation
Japan‐China Relations Entering A New Stage

June
January

Cooperation in Environment and Energy
An East Asian Community and the US

2012

OctoberJuly
2011

February
February
September
May

2010

2009

February
January
September
June
April
September

2008

17

ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
Fudan University
Nanyang Technological University
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China Association of Asia‐Pacific Studies
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.)
International Studies Department, Vietnam National University(Vietnam)
The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (India)
National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University (China)
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
ASEAN‐ISIS
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (U.S.)ASEAN‐ISIS
Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations (China)
The Council on East Asian Community, The East Asian Institute of
National University of Singapore (Singapore)
The Council on East Asia Community, The Pacific Forum CSIS (U.S.)5. An Introduction to Fudan University
The Department of Political Science at Fudan University was founded in 1923. Then, in 1964, the Department ofInternational Politics was established to take its place. Most recently, the School of International Relations and Public Affairs(SIRPA) was founded in the year 2000. Having established a wide range of exchanges and cooperative relations with many
distinguished schools and institutions, SIRPA enjoys academic fame domestically and abroad.

SIRPA is staffed with a distinguished faculty, whose unrelenting efforts to improve research and teaching haveresulted in several accomplishments. SIRPA has two National Priority programs, one State Education Ministry DesignatedResearch program, two postdoctoral programs, six doctoral degree programs and seven master's degree programs. Everyone
at SIRPA works together to advocate the pursuit of excellence.

SIRPA is committed to educating its students in order to become the leaders of tomorrow. SIRPA makes great
efforts to teach our youth to become responsible citizens with diverse abilities, to acquire wide and profound knowledge, tofoster communication skills, and nurture a sense of cooperation with others. Students are required to develop the ability tothink broadly when analyzing issues, to be professional administrators. SIRPA helps to instill the pioneering, innovating andproblem-solving spirit in all of our students.

Meeting the increasing demands of globalization, the spread of market economies, and the rise of the informationage, SIRPA educates professionals of all classes to contribute to the glorious revival of our nation.

The School of International Relations and Public Affairs has four departments: the Department of International
Politics, the Department of Political Science, the Department of Public Administration, and the Department of Diplomacy.

【The location of the office】
220 Handan Road, Shanghai 200433, China
Tel 86‐21‐65117628, 86‐21‐65642258
Fax 86‐21‐65117298
Homepage: http://www.sirpa.fudan.edu.cn/
http://www.sirpa.fudan.edu.cn/english/18

6. An Introduction to Nanyang Technological University
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is an autonomous professional school cum think tank ofinternational affairs located at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore. Ranked 47 in the list of Top 50
think tanks worldwide (non-US) by the University of Pennsylvania’s 2011 Global Go to Think Tanks report, the
RSIS is one of Asia’s leading academic and research institutions. RSIS began life as the Institute of Defence andStrategic Studies (IDSS) on 30 July 1996. On 1 January 2007, ten years after its establishment, IDSS was formallyinaugurated to become the RSIS, named after the first foreign minister of Singapore, S. Rajaratnam.
Today, RSIS boasts not only the IDSS but five other distinct centers, all doing cutting-edge research andcapacity-building in their respective functional specializations. Through its 6 Master degree tracks, a small but vibrant PhD
program as well as a wide array of executive courses, RSIS offers its students a rigorous professional graduate education ininternational affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis. Its diverse team of internationally-renowned faculty members
and researchers conduct both academic and policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies,
diplomacy and international relations. RSIS also has a vibrant outreach orientation, collaborating with like-minded schools
and think tanks of international affairs from Asia and beyond to form a global network of excellence.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Blk S4, Level B4,
Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798
Tel: (65) 6790 6982
Fax: (65) 6793 2991
Email: wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg

19

7. An Introduction to the Japan Forum on International Relations
The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, andpublishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.
[History]
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987
in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Mr. ITO Kenichi, and 60 otherindependent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that apolicy‐oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government wasmost urgently needed in Japan. JFIR celebrated its 20th anniversary on March 12, 2007. And on April 1, 2011,
JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Ministerin recognition of its achievements.
[Purpose]
The Forum is a private, non‐profit, independent, and non‐partisan organization dedicated to
improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no
institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but topropose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy
recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in noway those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is thatof those members of the Forum who sign them alone.
[Organization]
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2)associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the“Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of
supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge ofthe management of day‐to‐day operations of JFIR.
[Activities]
In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, anotherimportant pillar of JFIR’s activities is the BBS “Hyakka‐Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom”(http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m‐bbs/). The BBS, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as
an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the BBS are
sent through the bimonthly e‐mail magazine “Meru‐maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000
readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on
the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introducedin the e‐mail magazine “JFIR E‐Letter” in English. “JFIR E‐Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000
readers worldwide.

20

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/