The Japan- U.S. Dialogue

Alliance in a New Defense Guideline Era

Conference Papers

March, 11, 2015
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
The Japan Forum on International Relations

Table of Contents
1．Program ................................................................................................................................................. 1
2．Biographies of the Panelists ................................................................................................................. 2
3．Presentation Papers .............................................................................................................................. 5
Session I: The Best Case Scenario for the U.S.-Japan Alliance .......................................................... 5
NAKANISHI Hiroshi .......................................................................................................................... 5
Rust DEMING ..................................................................................................................................... 7
Session II: Pitfalls for the U.S.-Japan Alliance................................................................................... 11
HOSOYA Yuichi ................................................................................................................................. 11James SCHOFF ................................................................................................................................. 13
4．An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan................................................................................ 19
5．An Introduction to Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ......... 20
6．An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations ........................................... 21

1．Program
日米対話
The U.S.-Japan Dialogue「新ガイドライン時代の日米同盟」"Alliance in a New Defense Guideline Era"
2015年3月11日／11 March, 2015
アイビーホール「サフラン」、東京、日本／"Safran", Ivy Hall,Tokyo, Japan
共催／Co-sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
米国防大学国家戦略研究所／Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University（INSS)
公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム ／ The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)2015 年 3 月 11 日（水）／ Wednesday, 11th March, 2015
アイビーホール「サフラン」／ "Saffron", Ivy Hall
開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks
13:30-13:40
挨拶（5分間）Remarks (5 min.)伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人兼執行世話人／日本国際フォーラム理事長
ITO Kenichi, Chairman & President, GFJ / President, JFIR

セッションⅠ／ Session I

13:40-15:10「日米同盟のベスト・ケース・シナリオ」"The Best Case Scenario for the U.S.-Japan Alliance"

議長
Chairperson

神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／日本国際フォーラム上席研究員
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

報告A （10分間）
Paper Presenter A (10 min.)中西 寛 京都大学教授
NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University

報告B （10分間）
Paper Presenter B (10 min.)

ラスト・デミング 元国務省首席次官補代理
Rust DEMING, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

コメントA（5分間）
Commentator A (5 min.)加藤 洋一 朝日新聞編集委員
KATO Yoichi, National Security Correspondent, the Asahi Shimbun

コメントB（5分間）
Commentator B (5 min.)ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員
James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS

コメントC（5分間）
Commentator C (5 min.)

泉川 泰博 中央大学教授
IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro, Professor, Chuo University

コメントD（5分間）
Commentator D (5 min.)ニコラス・セーチェーニ 米戦略国際問題研究所日本部副部長・主任研究員
Nicholas SZECHENYI, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS

コメントE（5分間）
Commentator E (5 min.)宮岡 勲 慶應義塾大学教授
MIYAOKA Isao, Professor, Keio University

自由討議 （45分）
Free Discussions (45 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

Break / 休憩

15:10-15:20
セッションⅡ／ Session Ⅱ

15：20-16：45「日米同盟にとっての陥穽」"Pitfalls for the U.S.-Japan Alliance"

議長
Chairperson

ジェームズ・プリスタップ 国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員
James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS

報告A （10分間）
Paper Presenter A (10 min.)細谷 雄一 慶應義塾大学教授
HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University

報告B （10分間）
Paper Presenter B (10 min.)ジェームズ・ショフ カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員
James SCHOFF, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

コメントA（5分間）
Commentator A (5 min.)伊奈 久喜 日本経済新聞特別編集委員
INA Hisayoshi, Foreign Policy Columnist, the Nikkei

コメントB（5分間）
Commentator B (5 min.)ニコラス・セーチェーニ 米戦略国際問題研究所日本部副部長・主任研究員
Nicholas SZECHENYI, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS

コメントC（5分間）
Commentator C (5 min.)

神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／日本国際フォーラム上席研究員
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

コメントD（5分間）
Commentator D (5 min.)榊原 智 産経新聞論説委員
SAKAKIBARA Satoshi, Editorial Writer, the Sankei Shimbun

自由討議 （45分）
Free Discussions (45 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

総括セッション／ Wrap-up Session

16：45-17:00
総括 （15分間）
Wrap-up (15 min.)

神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／日本国際フォーラム上席研究員
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員
James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS

[NOTE ］日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

12．Biographies of the Panelists【U.S. Panelists】
Rust DEMING
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Received BA from Rollins College and MA in East Asian Studies from Stanford University. Has spentmuch of his career dealing with Japanese affairs, having served in Japan as charge d’affaires, and as
deputy chief of mission. Served as principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacificaffairs (June 1998 to August 2000), senior advisor to the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacificaffairs from December 1997. Also, served as director of the Office of Japanese Affairs in Washington from1991 to 1993. In 2011 he was recalled to the State Department for six months to serve once again as Japan
Director. Concurrently serves as an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.

James J. PRZYSTUP
Senior Research Fellow, INSS
Holds BA Summa Cum Laude from the University of Detroit and MA and Ph.D. from the University of
Chicago. Has worked on issues related to East Asia for close to thirty years on Capitol Hill, on the Houseof Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, as the Deputy Director of the Presidential
Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations, as Senior member for Asia-Pacific on the Policy Planning Staff of the
Department of State, and Director of Regional Security Strategy, Asia-Pacific, on the Policy Planning Staff
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.

Nicholas SZECHENYI
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS
Received MA in international economics and Japan studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. in Asian studies from Connecticut College. Prior tojoining CSIS in 2005, served as news producer for Fuji Television in Washington, D.C., where he covered
U.S. policy in Asia and domestic politics. In 2009, selected as an inaugural fellow of the Maureen andMike Mansfield Foundation’s “U.S.-Japan Network for the Future” program.

James SCHOFF
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
A specialist in East Asian security issues, U.S. alliance relations in the region, and WMD nonproliferation
focused on North Korea, Schoff previously served as senior adviser for East Asia policy at the U.S. Officeof the Secretary of Defense, and as director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis (IFPA) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. . Prior to joining IFPA, served as program officer in chargeof policy studies at the United States-Japan Foundation in New York.

2

【Japanese Panelists】
ITO Kenichi

Chairman & President, GFJ / President, JFIR

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS
of Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as
Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS
(1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He has been
President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 and now
concurrently serves as Chairman of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus
and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.

KAMIYA Matake
Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1985 and did graduate study at Columbia University as a
Fulbright grantee. Became Research Associate at the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1992, Lecturer
with tenure in 1993, Associate Professor in 1996, and became Professor in 2004. Meanwhile, served asDistinguished Research Fellow at Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994-95), and Visiting
Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (2004-2005). Concurrently serves as Superior
Research Fellow of The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), Editor-in-Chief of Discuss
Japan—Japan Foreign Policy Forum (http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/), and Member of the Board of
Directors of Japan Association for International Security.

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University
Received MA from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department
at the University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990 as Ph.D candidate. Served as Associate Professor in Kyoto
University. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, withparticular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreignand security policy. He has been on the panel of several Governmental advisory committees, such as theCouncil on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, which issued the final report in August
2010.

KATO Yoichi
National Security Correspondent, The Asahi Shimbun
Graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and joined the Asahi Shimbun. Received MA fromthe Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. From 2001 to 2002 he was a visiting
research fellow at both the Institute for National Strategic Studies of National Defense University(INSS/NDU) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Served as
deputy editor of both the political and foreign news departments from 2002 to 2004 in Tokyo and became
Bureau Chief of Asahi’s American General Bureau in Washington D.C. He taught a course on national
security strategy at Gakushuin University in Tokyo from 2011 to 2012. Currently based in Beijing, China
as visiting scholar at the School of International Studies, Peking University.

3

IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro

Professor, Chuo University

Graduated from Kyoto University in 1990. Entered Osaka Gas Co. in 1990 and retired from office in 1994.
Received his M.A. from School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University in
1996. Received his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in 2002. Served as Associate Professor at Miyazaki
International College from 2002 and then at Kobe College from 2005. Held the current position since 2014.
His research interests include international relations theory, alliance politics, and East Asian security.

MIYAOKA Isao

Professor, Keio University

Graduated from Keio University in 1990. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1990 andretired from office in 1995. Received M.A. Honours from the University of Canterbury in 1994 and D.Phil.
in politics from the University of Oxford in 1999. Served as Associate at Harvard University in 1999-2001
and then as Associate Professor at Osaka University of Foreign Studies from 2001 to 2007, at Osaka
University from 2007 to 2010, and at Keio University from 2010 to 2012. Held the current position since2012. His research interests include international relations theory and Japanese and American security
policy.

HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University
Received his MIS from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D from Keio University. He is also SeniorResearcher at Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and at the Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Served
as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009–10), Visiting fellow at Princeton
University (2008–2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic
history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security. He is a member of Prime Minister’s
Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, and a member of Prime Minister’s
Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities, in which capacity he helped to draft
Japan’s first National Security Strategy.

INA Hisayoshi
Foreign Policy Columnist, The Nikkei
Graduated from Waseda University and joined Nihon Keizai Shimbun (The Nikkei Newspapers) in 1976.
His journalistic career includes four years in the Nikkei’s Washington. DC. bureau as chief politicalcorrespondent and, subsequently, as a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. Has also been an editorial writer andvice-chair of the editorial board of Nikkei. He lectures at Aoyama Gakuin University, the University of the
Sacred Heart, and Doshisha University Graduate School.

SAKAKIBARA Satoshi
Editorial Writer, the Sankei Shimbun
Graduated from the University of Tokyo and joined the Sankei Shimbun in 1990. Served as the Chief ofthe Democratic Party of Japan Club and the Liberal Democratic Party Club at the Political Department.
Meanwhile, received M.A. in Security Studies from National Defense Academy of Japan in 2013.
Concurrently serves as a senior staff writer of the Political Department of the Sankei Shimbun, Visiting
Professor of Takushoku University, and a member of Defense Personnel Review Board, the Ministry of
Defense.
(In order of appearance)
43．Presentation Papers
Session I: The Best Case Scenario for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University
Toward ever closer alliance: achievement and challenges
1.

It is no small achievement that the arch enemy relationship 70 years ago transformed

itself to one of the most enduring alliance in history. The movement toward closer allianceaccelerated in the last 20 years since the Hashimoto-Clinton declaration on security (1996),
Japanese defense guidelines (1995, 2004, 2010, 2013), US-Japan guideline (1997), and theso-called Armitage-Nye reports (2000, 2007, 2012).
2.

The best situation for the Japan-US alliance can be measured by three criteria:1) bilateral closeness at various levels (uniform, government, political leaders, economy,
public opinion, etc.),
2) mutual recognition of the importance of the other as major power and the willingness
to take risks the alliance involves,
3) both countries share the basic strategy for the regional and global peace and stability,
3.

The

most

advanced

area

of

close

cooperationis

uniform-to-uniform

andgovernment-to-government level cooperation, about which the first Armitage-Nye Report
was most concerned. This is no wonder that the authors of the report stayed in or around theAmerican administration and the Japanese foreign policy elite in charge, not least the PM
Abe, have taken the report as their playbook.
The alliance cooperation at this level has widened greatly in recent years, such as
joint training, joint use of facilities and resources, non-combat support operations by the SDF,
humanitarian operations such as Operation Tomodachi. The institutional and legal settings
have also been changed, such as the establishment of the NSC, defense equipment export
rules, and exercise of collective defense right.
But there is still the gap to be filled even in the bilateral military/operational
cooperation. For example, the problem exists at both ends of the escalation spectrum: highend of the credibility of extended deterrence of the US toward Japan and low end of thecrisis response in the so-called grey zone scenarios such as Senkaku maritime border dispute.
5

Another is the extent Japan exercises collective defense right, the matter being discussed in
the Diet and through the bilateral defense guideline negotiation.
4.

Skepticism about Japan’s staying capacity as one of major powers in the world has

waned since the onset of the Abenomics, but the real test will be this year’s economic growthand inflation indices.
Japan’s move toward more active engagement in security affairs is likely to continue,
but given the constitutional and political controversies as well as Okinawa situation, the paceand extent of the change may disappoint the US.
The American commitment to “rebalancing to Asia” is credible, but with the issues
in Europe (Russia and Ukraine) or the Middle East (the Islamic State or Iran) burning, howmuch resource and attention the US can spare to Asia-Pacific is not without question.
For Japan’s economic recovery, the US is becoming more important as export rises
and imports energy, while trade with China stagnates and investment to China is reduced by
38% in 2014. Both governments see the TPP as important, but the future of the negotiationunclear.
5.

Perception on what constitutes the stability in Asia-Pacific is the largest source of

discrepancy between the two allies. In principle, two countries agree on “engage and hedge”
policy toward China, the gap in the threat perception and the response to Chinese driving
wedge strategy can cause mutual suspicion. Through dialogue with China and establishingcredibility of the alliance commitment, we need to enhance the legitimacy of the alliance inthe regional context.
Japan-Korea relationship is unlikely to be as cordial as it could be not only becauseof history issues but strategic alienation of Korea (continent) and Japan (maritime), so that
the US needs to continue sometimes frustrating job of mediating the two countries.
Japan will deepen its engagement in the oceanic and coastal areas both in the Pacificand the Indian Ocean. This will embed the US-Japan alliance into multilateral security
architecture. The extent and strength of this engagement varies with Japanese overallnational strength and interest towards the region.
Two countries need to work to strike the “right balance” between memory of war
and postwar achievement, for both the war result and the postwar transformation are
lynchpin of the current status quo. Too much war debate will hamper Japaneseinternationalist stance, while forgetfulness of war will weaken Japanese soft power.

6

Rust DEMING
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of StateThe Best Case Scenarios for the U.S.-Japan Allianceover the Next Decade
In order to maximize the benefits of the U.S.-Japan Alliance over the next ten years,
both governments will need to make alliance management one of their highest priorities andpursue broader policies that help strengthen the overall relationship.

At the same time, thealliance will be heavily affected by regional and global developments and by how the twocountries deal with these challenges. The inter-action of these internal and external factors
will shape the possibilities, limits and hazards to US-Japan alliance to 2025. This paper
describes, from one American’s perspective, the factors that would likely produce the “bestcase” scenario for the U.S.-Japan alliance over the next decade.

Japan
Critical developments in and actions by Japan to produce the “best case” scenario would
include:Abenomics succeeds. Japan joins TPP, implements structural reforms which lead toincreased investment and innovation and a more competitive Japanese economy,
growing in the 2-3% range annually. This allows Japan to address more effectively its
long term fiscal and demographic challenges and increase its regional and global role inmultiple dimensions.
Collective Self-Defense legislation is enacted in a manner that allows Japan greater
flexibility in supporting the U.S.in meeting shared challenges in East Asia. Thislegislation also allows Japan to participate more fully in UN PKO activities and otherstability operations with like-minded states and international organizations (e.g.
NATO).
Japan’s greater role in the Alliance is spelled out in the successful revision of the
U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation which defines more precisely respectiveroles and missions with respect to defense of Japan (Article V), regional peace andsecurity (Article VI), and “grey areas,” (situations that fall short of war but pose asecurity challenge to both).
The gap on base issues between Tokyo and Okinawa narrows, and Futenma is
successfully relocated.
Japan increases defense industry collaboration with the U.S. as a result of the changes inJapan’s arms export policies and the revised Guidelines.

7

Japan joins the U.S. and other concerned states in taking a lead role in combatting
emerging terrorism threats, including ISIS.
Constitutional revision proceeds at a measured pace that wins the broad support of
the Japanese people and acceptance from Japan’s neighbors.
Japan and the ROK reach at least a tacit understanding on managing history andterritorial issues and resume cooperation in other areas, including intelligencesharing and defense cooperation.
Japan and China tacitly agree to “re-shelf” the Senkaku issue, and they develop rulesof the road for patrolling the area. Both sides avoid actions and statements that
inflame the history issue.
Japan increases its political and economic influence in ASEAN, including helping
ASEAN states enhance their ability to patrol and control their maritime boundaries.
Japan and India enhance their bilateral and regional cooperation, including helping
to shape the regional environment.
Japan’s relations with Australia continue to develop, including in the security arena.
There is fundamental continuity in Japanese foreign policy and political stability,
and the activism demonstrated by Abe becomes the norm of Japanese internationaland domestic leadership.

The U.S.
With respect to the United States, the following developments and actions would be
conducive to a “best case” scenario for the Alliance:
The U.S. economy is resurgent, facilitated by TPP.
Washington moves away from political gridlock toward modest bipartisanship on key
budgetary and foreign policy issues and on the importance of the U.S. playing anactivist U.S. role in the world.
In 2016 the U.S. elects a president who understands the importance of the Americaninternational leadership role and the critical importance of Asia for America’s future.
Tea Party Republicans and “populist” Democrats do not dominate the Congress.
The U.S. leads in the Third Industrial Revolution (IT-driven biotech, nanotech,robotics, advanced materials and 3D printing), with Japanese companies as key
partners.
The U.S. defense budget stabilizes, and the U.S. continues to shift priority from
Middle East to Asia.
The U.S. maintains its strategic and regional military superiority and the capability
to ensure its continued unfettered access to the international commons.
U.S. allows natural gas and oil exports to FTA partners, including Japan. The shale
revolution continues.

8

The Region
The evolution of East Asia and the behavior of the key players will have a profound effect on
the U.S.-Japan alliance. Under a “best case” scenario:
China’s economy slows to 3-4% annual growth; the party focuses on internal andexternal stability. Beijing does not renounce its “historical claims” but becomes lessaggressive in pursuing these claims.
China’s defense budget levels off and becomes increasingly transparent;
Cross straits relations continue to improve, but Taiwan retains a credible defense
capability.
Beijing agrees to initiate dialogues with the U.S., Japan, and others on strategic
stability (BMD, cyber and space norms) maritime rules/ incidents at sea/operationalarms control).
The PRC agrees to a code of conduct with ASEAN with respect to the South China
Sea.
China shows renewed interest in the 2008 China-Japan joint development
agreement in the East China Sea.
North Korea moves gradually towards Chinese-type reforms. North-South relations
move forward, based on the 1991 North-South accord, and ROK investment in the
North increases. The North avoids further nuclear and long range missile tests.
China is supportive of DPRK reforms and North-South rapprochement. At the sametime, Beijing agrees to quiet discussions with Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo
designed to try to ensure a soft landing on the Korean peninsula, including thenuclear issue.
Japan, ROK and the U.S. evolve a coordinated approach toward the ASEAN states,
including ODA, with an emphasis on Myanmar and the Mekong Delta.

The World
The U.S.-Japan alliance will be affected not only by the actions of the two governments anddevelopments in East Asia but also by the course of global events. Russia and the Middle
East of course will be crucial. If these areas erupt, American attention and resources will once
again be diverted from fully pursuing its long-term interests in Asia, including its alliancewith Japan. For Tokyo, increased chaos on the Middle East could put at risk energy sources
and put pressure on Japan to participate in stability operations. In addition, if climatechange increasingly outpaces the international community’s efforts to slow carbon emissions
and take remedial actions, the consequences could overwhelm the world.

9

Under the “best case” scenario we are considering:Russia, either under Putin or a successor government, pulls back from its aggressive
approach to its “near abroad.”・It becomes a more reliable energy provider and a more cooperativeinternational player. In this context, Russia shows renewed interest in
concluding a peace treaty with Japan and becomes more flexible on the Northern
Territories.
In the Middle East, the “Arab Spring” moves into a period of national consolidation
and accommodation.
・The Sunni Arabs begin to take concerted action against ISIS and otherterrorists groups.
・Iran concludes a nuclear agreement, abides by it, and the Israelis refrain fromany unilateral actions.
With respect to global warming, the best case scenario will be:
・The international community, including the U.S., Japan, EU, China, India andother emerging economies, develop the leadership, political courage, and public
support to overcome special interests and inertia and make the hard decisions
needed to reduce carbon emissions and slow the rate of climate change while atthe same time taking the collective actions needed to deal with the those changes
that are inevitable.
・The pace of the development and deployment of “green energy” increases, andthird generation nuclear power makes a come-back as a necessary interim
source of energy.

Conclusion
The U.S.-Japan alliance is unlikely to have the benefit of these “best case scenarios,” but lessfavorable scenarios will only increase the importance of U.S.-Japan collaboration across theboard.

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Session II: Pitfalls for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

HOSOYA Yuichi
Keio University

1. Can the U.S. and Japan have a Common Strategy towards China?
Due largely to their different geopolitical settings, there will possibly be an increasing
gap in their threat perception on China between Japan and the U.S.
It seems to many Japanese security experts that the U.S. government under President
Obama has often relied too much on the cooperative aspect of the U.S.-China relations,while Japanese government has been aware of China’s increasingly aggressive attitudeparticularly on territorial issues both in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
National Security Advisor Susan Rice said, in her speech at Georgetown University on
November 20, 2013, that “we seek to operationalize a new model of major power
relations”.1

Rice seemed to be proud of “the high-level communication that has been ahallmark of this Administration to China”, while largely ignoring China’s expanding
territorial claims in East Asia which has caused deep anxiety among Asian countries.
While the Obama Administration seeks to find out a more cooperative approach to
China, Chinese government tries to “minimize US influence” in East Asia.2 The U.S. canenjoy its friendly relationship with China, so long as the U.S. will not prevent China’s
predominant position in East Asia.

2. Can the U.S. Reassure Japan in its Engagement in East Asia security?
The Obama administration is very much aware of the limit in its engagement in East Asia.
President Obama wrote, in the introduction to the National Security Strategy 2015, that“our resources and influence are not infinite”, and also that “a smart national security
strategy does not rely solely on military power”.
Although these statements can be true, the allies of the U.S. often show concerns over
American reluctance to deeply engage in East Asia, as China now becomes much more
1

Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice, “America’s Future in Asia”, at Georgetown

University, Washington, D.C., November 20, 2013.
2

Zhang Yu, “Xi defines new Asian security vision at CICA”, May 22, 2014, Global Times.

11

assertive in achieving its own goals in East Asia.
At the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia (CICA) held in Shanghai on May 21, 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping
said that “security problems in Asia should eventually solved by Asians themselves who
are able to achieve regional peace and stability through cooperation”, by denying
American role in it.
A large part of the Libertarians, the members of the Tea Party movement, andisolationists in the U.S. expect the retreat from American military engagement in East
Asia, and American policy will possibly be influenced by these pressure groups.

3. Will Historical Issues Damage the U.S.-Japan Alliance?
One of the most difficult issues between the two allies would be historical issues. The U.S.
governments have been expecting that Japan can solve the comfort women issue by
negotiating

with

the

ROK

government.

The

U.S.

government

showedits“disappointment” when Prime Minister Abe visited the Yasukuni shrine on December 26,
2013.
If the two governments can show a common position on the historical issues at the time
when PM Abe visits the U.S. in this coming April, the alliance can have a very strong
foundation. Otherwise, public opinion of the both sides will be less willing to recognize
the importance of the alliance.

12

James SCHOFF
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Potential Pitfalls for the U.S.-Japan Alliance
I am an optimistic person by nature (especially with regard to the U.S.-Japan
relationship), so I am put into a somewhat difficult position when asked to focus on thepotential pitfalls for the Alliance.

But it is worthwhile thinking about kinds ofsituations or developments can weaken bilateral cooperation, because it might help us
avoid problems in the future.
Before we can analyze the things that might undermine the alliance, we have to identify
the main purpose or function of our relationship. This will help us understand which
pitfalls are the most important, because not all pitfalls are equal. Here I would highlight
two main purposes for the alliance:
1. To protect our shared physical security interests through the Grand Bargain of Japanhosting U.S. bases in exchange for a U.S. commitment (and the means) to help
protect Japan’s sovereignty and independence. I will call this the security role.
2. To be partners in shaping and helping to build a global rules-based order that ispeaceful, stable, productive, open, respectful, and environmentally sustainable.
Some of the pitfalls you can imagine could impact just one of these purposes or both.
A major military accident or crime in Okinawa, for example, would likely affectnegatively the first, but perhaps not the second. On the positive side, proactive U.S.
support for Japan in the wake of the 3.11 tragedy had some impact on both purposes,
I think. I will call this the partnership role (it is also about long-term security, but it
is much more complex and comprehensive).
In our group project, when we thought about different alternative futures for the allianceand the region, we started by identifying a series of important drivers/factors and trends
that will have the biggest impact on the future. To the extent that Washington andTokyo can influence some of these factors, they can help determine their alliance destiny.

There a number of ways one could categorize these key factors, and one way weconsidered was to focus on domestic drivers (in Japan and in the United States),
alliance factors, and regional or global trends. Focusing on these main factors canhelp us think about possible pitfalls, and I will use this construct to explore some of
them.
13

Several domestic drivers overlap, although they have their own special character ineach country.

It starts first and foremost with economic performance andtechnology leadership. The partnership role in particular will suffer if one or bothcountries suffer extended economic stagnation and decay, as this will limit a
country’s capacity to contribute, and it could cause our people to lose respect for eachother. In an extreme case, the security role could also be affected. Japan must
continue to tackle its public debt problem, its demographic challenge, foster
continued innovation and expand entrepreneurship.

The U.S. must also balance its

budgets while reinvesting in its infrastructure (which suggests finding more
revenue) and mitigate the negative effects of income inequality.
Political stability and political functionality are also key factors, and to some extent it
is linked to the economic story (but not completely). Japan went through a difficult
period before and after Prime Minister Koizumi, but it has managed to restore
stability and is generally demonstrating an ability to govern effectively. I expect the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to keep the majority coalition together for a while,
but we have seen wide election swings in the past due to the large number of
unaffiliated voters, so there is an underlying weakness and some deep splits amongvoters regarding economic policy, nuclear power, and security policy. The situation
is worse in the United States, with strongly divided politics and a poisonous politicalatmosphere, fanned by partisan media.

A true pitfall for the alliance would be a U.S.

slide into deeper political dysfunction.
The above two factors have some influence on the third, which is each country’s
defense policy. I would have been a little more worried if Japan had not taken steps
to strengthen its defense capability and its ability to cooperate when necessary with
the United States and other countries. But I am comfortable with the direction the
Abe government is taking, as long as Japan is able to follow through in times of need.
On the U.S. side, I am confident that the U.S. military will remain strong and capable,
but our dysfunctional politics is taking a toll. Sequestration and lower defense
budgets are manageable if Congress would work more productively with theadministration to reduce some benefits and personnel costs, close unneeded bases,
and streamline the procurement process. But instead we waste $billions, whichputs pressure on readiness and long-term investment.
The overall direction of our countries’ foreign policies is another important factor,
particularly in Northeast Asia. If our policies diverge significantly with regard to
China, North Korea, Russia, and even South Korea, that could cause serious frictionin the alliance.

An overly accommodating U.S. policy towards China is just as

dangerous as one that is too antagonistic.

Japan’s relationship with South Korea is amajor concern in the United States, and overall the question of how Japan handles
14

legacies of the past with its neighbors (territorial disputes and historicalinterpretation) is becoming a hotly debated topic in Washington. To me, the issue of
apologies for wartime actions is not as important as the mixture of politics with adebate about the historical record. History is never clear cut, but it is an issue better
left to the historians to debate domestically and internationally.

The Japanese

government’s attempted pressure on a U.S. text book publisher a few months ago tochange wording related to the Comfort Women issue was disturbing to many
Americans. If a Japanese scholar had approached the U.S. professor, it would nothave been a big deal, I don’t think. I know that the road to repairing Japan-South
Korea relations is a two-way street, but we cannot give up trying to improve that
relationship, even when it seems that South Korea is not willing or able to travel thatsame road.
Some of these foreign and defense policy issues can be categorized as alliance factors,
such as how we order our threat perception and foreign policy priorities. Generally
speaking we manage these slight differences well, in the sense that Washington
places certain Middle East or Eastern European threats as a higher priority comparedto Tokyo, but Japan understands and supports these efforts. The China threat in the
East and South China Seas is taken seriously by the United States, but it ranks as ahigher priority for Japan. We do not need to have identical foreign policy priorities
or approaches for a healthy alliance, but we must constantly manage this gap andseek to understand the other’s perspective. There is some question whether or not
Americans are becoming disillusioned with global entanglements and are looking
increasingly inward after the Great Recession, but I think this is only incremental andit can be tempered when other like-minded nations show leadership andengagement of their own.

If Americans see other countries helping, taking risks

and committing resources (each in their own way), then they are much more
motivated to play a major role in addressing global threats and injustices. Japan’s
humanitarian and political contributions in the Middle East are important in thisregard.
Leadership relations are important for the alliance, as is maintaining alliancecredibility, so leaders must always remember that various decisions related topolitical, economic, or military commitments should be evaluated not only on their
merits but also with regard to the signals it sends (to our citizens and to othercountries) about alliance credibility. Managing U.S. base issues in Japan is anotherpotential pitfall, especially if there is a high-profile accident or crime involving U.S.
personnel. Resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station in Okinawa will requirepatience and consistent leadership attention, and we will enter again this year theseason of negotiating host nation support levels and terms, which is never easy. I
think the alliance can survive a slow and incremental reduction of U.S. forces and15

bases in Japan, provided Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are given the resources
and legal flexibility to play a wider regional role in support of its own defense andregional stability and security.

Ultimately I think this will make for a moresustainable and powerful alliance, but we cannot achieve this quickly and it
shouldn’t change the policy of relocating Futenma.
There is a wide range of potential regional and global pitfalls that lie beyond theallies’ direct control, although we might still be able to influence them positively, andwe can certainly control how our nations respond to different crises. A short list of
the most important factors could be:
The extent of intra-Asia security cooperation and regional governance /architecture building
Regional trade liberalization and economic integration
Chinese economic growth and political development (and rates of militaryspending)
North-South Korea relations
China-Taiwan relations
Management of South China Sea territory disputes
Extra-regional distractions and crises (in the Middle East, Europe, a majorenergy/environmental crisis or severe impact from climate change, etc.)
In many respects, one of the great values of the U.S.-Japan alliance is that it helps
provide our countries with a hedge against crisis and instability (be it economic,
military, or environmental).

Regional or global disruptions tend to draw Americans

and Japanese closer, as long as we understand the risks and causes in similar terms,
communicate well, and cooperate effectively.

A major concern of mine, for example,

is terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, which could do incalculable
damage to the global economy. But this would give Japan and the United Stateseven greater common cause.

Of all of these, the most dangerous factor is probably

potential conflict between North and South Korea or China and Taiwan, because thestakes will be extremely high and involve unpredictable dynamics including U.S.
forces and bases in Japan, Japanese domestic politics, the American appetite forintervention overseas, determination of blame or “who started it,” and the powerfulforce of the Chinese population (in one form or another).
In sum, most of these potential pitfalls mentioned above are avoidable through far-sighted
policy making, strong leadership (and good leadership relations), and a consistentreinvestment in our relationship. The good news is that we have the ability to shape ourown future in a positive direction, and we have plenty of talent and resources with which to16

work.

We also have other friends and allies around the world. The biggest pitfall in myopinion is if the United States and Japan simply lose touch and faith in each other. I think
our close economic relationship helps keep us in touch guards against this, but we should
continue to actively nurture the next generation of scholars, business people, political leaders,scientists, teachers, etc. that has experience in each other’s country and gets to know theother as friends. We can overcome any pitfall with true friendship.
Before closing, I’d like to offer some analysis of a recent Yomiuri-Gallup Poll from
December 2014. The poll was positive overall, but there was some information relevant
to issues raised above.

The first encouraging aspect of the survey is that highpercentages of both Americans and Japanese continue to think the relationship is good,
and a vast majority believes it will either stay that way or improve. Mutual trust remains
relatively high, and a majority in each country thinks that the U.S. military presence inJapan should be maintained at its current level. Interestingly, this is the first year since
the survey started over a decade ago that more than half the Japanese respondents felt
this way.
Significant majorities in both countries also believe that their bilateral security treaty
contributes to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, and they have felt this way
consistently throughout the survey history. All of this creates a solid foundation for thealliance in the future. Another encouraging sign for the alliance is the fact that when a
new security challenge in the world appears, such as the Islamic State terrorist group in
Syria and Iraq, the U.S. and Japanese public react in a similar way.
The survey also reveals indications of different thinking in the alliance, however, which
requires careful evaluation. In many cases divergent thinking in the two countries isnatural and to be expected, but it can also show early signs of conflicting priorities orperception gaps of a problem that the alliance must address together. In these cases,
active efforts to enhance mutual understanding and maybe even to narrow perception
gaps could be critical to the smooth functioning and long-term health of the alliance. The
most consistent challenge on this front appears to be each country’s view of China.
The allies share similar concerns about China in the areas of intellectual property theftand cyber-attacks, but Japan worries more about territorial disputes while Americans
elevate human rights concerns.
Perhaps more significant is how the allies identify which country will be more important
politically to them in the future, with Japanese increasingly choosing the United States inrecent years (59 percent in 2014) and Americans picking Japan less often (at a twelve-year
low of 34 percent in 2014). On the economic front, Americans are even less convinced ofJapan’s long-term importance (22 percent). This reflects real economic trends in theregion to an extent (and argues for certain reforms in Japan to strengthen its economy),17

but this also underappreciates some dynamic aspects of Japan’s economy and theimportance of Japanese investment in the United States. On the trade front, it isinteresting to note overall American optimism regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership(TPP) trade agreement being negotiated.
More subtle changes can be detected within some of the positive alliance responses
mentioned above. Notwithstanding mutual perceptions of good U.S.-Japan relations andtrust overall, for example, this year’s response showed a slight drop compared to 2013.
Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and continued strained relations with U.S.
ally South Korea could be a factor on the U.S. side, and there might be some Japanese
doubts about U.S. political stability and continual efforts by Washington to reach out toChina.
All of this suggests to me that while the United States and Japan continue to sharesimilar interests and concerns, their priorities could be shifting to a small degree as eachnation focuses on issues close to home. A key challenge in this regard is that one of thebiggest issues for Japan is China, which is something for which many Japanese believe
the U.S.-Japan alliance is particularly relevant. Many Americans, however, are not eager
to make U.S.-Japan relations “all about China,” although the survey does show general
American sympathy regarding Japan’s worry about creeping Chinese expansionism in
the region.
To maintain the current strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance there is no substitute forcontinued leadership interaction to clarify our views, as well as public discussions about
why this bilateral relationship is important and the positive benefits it offers to bothcountries.

18

4．An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan【Objectives】
In today’s world, people’s attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with the globalization, but also the rise of newstates including People’s Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Under thesecircumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in Asia-Pacific region, it has become increasingly important for Japan to establish
new channels of dialogue both in the first and the second tracks with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as
member countries of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Romania, etc.). On the basis of such
understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in thefield ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members andopinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional
arenas.
【History】
The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed
concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within thiscontext, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to betransmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade
Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVINGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY,
as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington
in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary
for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The
Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum
was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out toopen its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Overthe years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic
and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the Americancomponent ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter
act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws
accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line withthe principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage inand promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat ishoused in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on
International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro,
OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO kenichi as
Chairman & President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA
Shoichiro; 18 Political Members including the four Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KAKIZAWA Mito, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI
Sadakazu; and 86 Academic Members including the three Governors, ITO Go, SHIMADA Haruo and MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.
【Activities】
Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries forthe purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China,
Korea, ASEAN countries, India and Australia European countries, Wider Black Sea Area, for the purposes of deepening mutual
understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchangeorganizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial
number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue”, GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" andits overseas co-sponsors in past years given below.
Year

Month

Topic

Co-sponsor

2015

March
February

The Japan-U.S. Dialogue “Alliance in a New Defense Guideline Era”
Japan-East Asia Dialogue "What Should We Do toward Reliable
International Relations in Asia?"

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University
the Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies

December

The Japan- Asia Pacific Dialogue “The Asia-Pacific in Global Power
Transition: How Many Great Powers?

May

The Japan-China Dialogue “Prospect of Japan‐China Relationship in
the Changing World”
The Japan-U.S. Alliance in Changing International and Domestic
Environments
Toward Building Confidence Between Japan and China in ‘New
Domains’
Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy

Meiji University
University of Western Sydney
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences(CASS)
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

2014

March
January
October
March

2013

February
January

Future Prospect of the Japan-GUAM Partnership for Democracy andEconomic Development
How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation
Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship

19

The Japan Forum on International Relations
Washington College International Studies Program
Foundation of Research on Transformation of Malaysia
GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University
World Resources InstituteCollege of Public Administration, Zhejiang University

5．An Introduction to Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University
The mission of Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is to conduct strategic studies for the
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands tosupport the national strategic components of the academic programs at National Defense University(NDU) and to provide outreach to other US governmental agencies and to the broader national security
community.
INSS includes the following Centers: Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Center for Technology andNational Security Policy (CTNSP), Center for Complex Operations (CCO), the Center for Strategic
Conferencing (CSC), the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), the Center for Transatlantic Security
Studies (CTSS), and the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSMA).
The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their
mission by performing the following functions: research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy
support, and outreach.

[Contact]
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Lincoln Hall, Building 64
National Defense University
Ft. Lesley J. McNair
260 5th Avenue
Washington, DC 20319(202) 685-2335

20

6．An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations
The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, andpublishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.
[History]
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 inTokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60
other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizingthat a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from thegovernment was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public
interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its
achievements.
[Purpose]
The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved
understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional
position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to
propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate
policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations
represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of therecommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.
[Organization]
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2)associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR,
the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors”
and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which isin charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

■Board of Trustees

HAKAMADA Shigeki
HATTORI Yasuo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
INOUE Akiyoshi
KOIKE Yuriko
KURODA Makoto
NOGAMI Yoshiji
OHYA EikoTANAKA Tatsuo
UTADA Katsuhiro■Directors

IMAI Takashi
ITO Kenichi
ISHIKAWA Kaoru
WATANABE Mayu
HANDA Haruhisa
TAKUBO Tadae

ChairmanPresident
Senior Executive Director
Executive Director
Director
Director■Auditors

ICHIKAWA Isao
TAKEUCHI Yukio[Activities]
In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, anotherimportant pillar of JFIR’s activities is the e-Forum “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers inFull Bloom” (http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The e-Forum, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to
the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs.
All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon
Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention forforeigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR
(http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mailmagazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers
worldwide.
21

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193[Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp[URL] http://www.gfj.jp/