The Democracy of Objects

New Metaphysics
Series Editors: Graham Harman and Bruno Latour
The world is due for a resurgence of original speculative metaphysics. The New Metaphysics series aims to provide a safe house for such thinking amidst the demoralizing caution
and prudence of professional academic philosophy. We do not aim to bridge the analyticcontinental divide, since we are equally impatient with nail-filing analytic critique and thecontinental reverence for dusty textual monuments. We favor instead the spirit of the intellectual gambler, and wish to discover and promote authors who meet this description. Likean emergent recording company, what we seek are traces of a new metaphysical ‘sound’
from any nation of the world. The editors are open to translations of neglected metaphysicalclassics, and will consider secondary works of especial force and daring. But our main interest is to stimulate the birth of disturbing masterpieces of twenty-first century philosophy.

Levi R. Bryant
The Democracy of Objects

OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS
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First edition published by Open Humanities Press 2011
Freely available online at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.9750134.0001.001
Copyright © 2011 Levi R. Bryant.
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Contents
Acknowledgementsix

Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

13

Grounds For a Realist Ontology 34
The Paradox of Substance
Virtual Proper Being

87

The Interior of Objects

135

67

Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure
The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

Notes

293

Bibliography

305

245

193

For my daughter Elizabeth,
so that you might always
remain curious andremember that it is not
all about us.

Acknowledgements

Can I claim authorship of the book that follows? In the typical andfrustrating manner of a philosopher—if such I am—I can only answer
that this depends on what authorship is. Certainly, I spent months typing
words and editing various drafts of The Democracy of Objects. Yet if there
is some truth to the ontology that I here develop, then every object isalso a crowd of objects. Moreover, the circumstances under which thisbook came to be written, coupled with the way in which this book was
written, render this point especially true. This book was already on its
way to coming into being before I even conceived of it as a result of myencounter with the literary and media theorist Melanie Doherty. I met
Doherty around eight years ago under unusual circumstances when I wasat the height of my Lacanian period, singing endless odes to the signifier
and fully enmeshed within the linguistic and rhetorical turn. A deep
and productive friendship ensued that continues to this day. Doherty
continuously challenged my focus on the signifier and the semiotic,
conceding that these things play a role, but also drawing my attention to
the role the non-semiotic and material plays in the formation of social
relations. Like the reincarnation of Alice that she is, she sent me down the
rabbit hole of thinkers such as Latour, Ong, Kittler, Haraway, McLuhan,Marx, and a host of others, while also underscoring the singularity ofmathematics, science, neurology, and biology. While I remain a resolute
Lacanian—how couldn’t I, having suffered through all the seminars,
having gone through analysis, and having practiced for a time myself?—Ix   Levi R. Bryant

gradually found that I could no longer maintain my Lacanianism in theform I had initially articulated it, and had to set forth to develop a newontology (for me), capable of taking into account the points that Doherty
was making. I had to find a way to silence her endless protestations of“but! but! but!”, but have since found that she is an equal opportunity
critical thinker who finds opportunities to ask “but!” in response to
my newly developed ontology. Badiou speaks of events and the truthprocedures that follow from them, while Deleuze speaks of encounters
and the invention they invoke. Doherty has been an event, encounter,truth-procedure, and source of endless invention in my thought. She
deserves as much credit for the authorship of this book as I do. I ardently
hope she begins to write soon so that I might have the opportunity toprotest “but!” in relation to her thought.
Then there was my encounter with Graham Harman nearly three years
ago. I first approached Harman to be a third editor for The Speculative
Turn as a consequence of the diligent help he provided in pulling thecollection together and putting Nick Srnicek and me in contact withvarious presses. At the time I knew very little about Harman’s ontology,
having read scant little of his work (he did earn his Ph.D., after all, froma rival school!), and finding him generally rather suspect; no doubt as aresult of projective identification. Over the next couple of weeks, a very
friendly yet intense email discussion erupted between the two of us, withme arguing from a Deleuzian relational-monist perspective and Harmanarguing from the standpoint of his object-oriented philosophy, defending
both the existence of substances and their autonomy from relations. I
came out of the tail end of that debate transformed, finding that I needed
to rework the entirety of my thought within a framework that made room
for substances independent of relations. Every page of the book that
follows is inspired by Harman’s work, such that it is impossible to cite all
the ways in which he has influenced my thinking.
A number of the concepts and lines of argument developed in the The
Democracy of Objects were initially developed on my blog Larval Subjects
and I owe a deep debt of gratitude to those who amused themselvesby participating in those discussions. Adrian Ivakhiv, whose own

Acknowledgements

xi

ontological instincts and ecological sympathies are so close to my own,
yet simultaneously so alien, constantly challenged me from a processrelational perspective, driving me to better hone my arguments andconcepts. The same is true of Christopher Vitale’s engagement, which
forced me to better articulate my claims. Ian Bogost’s unit-operational
ontology has been a deep influence in my thought as well. Joseph C.
Goodson has often understood object-oriented ontology better thanmyself and has constantly given me insights into this burgeoning
ontology that I hadn’t yet seen. Adam Kotsko, Craig McFarlane, andAnthony Paul Smith have all provided helpful, if sometimes painful,criticism that has motivated my thought to evolve. Paul Bains, for over a
decade, has drawn my attention to traditions and thinkers in the historyof philosophy, introducing me, in particular, to autopoietic theory
and Peircian semiotics. Alex Reid and Nathan Gale have provided mewith endless inspiration from the domain of rhetoric and composition
studies. Moreover, Michael, from Archive Fire, has kept me honestfrom the domain of ethnography. Steven Shaviro has been a constantsource of illumination for me and has challenged my own thought in his
debates over relations and events with Graham Harman. I aspire to be
as magnanimous as he some day. Jeremy Trombley has provided similar
inspiration from the direction of ethnography. Similarly, the loquacious
Pete Wolfendale has forced me to refine arguments and concepts within aframework that is alien to me, hopefully rendering my claims sharper thanthey would have otherwise been. Finally, I would be remiss were I not tomention the profound inspiration I’ve drawn from the devilish novelist
Frances Madeson and the sublime poet Jacob Russell. Perhaps some day
I’ll rise to the levels of their art, but for the moment I plod along in theworld of the concept. Would this book be what it is—however short it may
fall of rising to the contributions of time and thought they’ve put into
discussion—had I not encountered these voices? Given the fact that thisobject was composed in this milieu, it is difficult for me to see how they
are not also authors, with me functioning as a sort of stenographer.
Jon Cogburn, Timothy Morton, and Michael Flower provided invaluable
editorial and philosophical critiques of earlier versions of this book.
Not only did Michael Flower engage in the monotonous task ofxii   Levi R. Bryant

editing this text, but he also created the majority of the diagrams. Jon
Cogburn, a friend from nearly two decades ago but whom I’ve only
recently had the privilege of getting to know again, provided cogent
critique and editorial comments from a philosophical orientation very
foreign to my own background. I am tremendously fortunate to havehis friendship and eagerly look forward to developments in his own
thought in the years to come. I have only had the pleasure of knowing
Timothy Morton’s friendship this year, but despite the short time of our
encounter, he generously provided extremely helpful editorial advice
and has been a deep influence on the concepts developed in the text that
follows. Carlton Clark and Timothy Richardson both endured long anddisjointed conversations with me revolving around the main claims ofthis book, providing excellent suggestions to improve my arguments andconversations. April Jacobs also provided helpful editorial advice.
Andrew Cutrofello, who supervised my dissertation which later became
Difference and Givenness, taught me how to read philosophy creatively so as
to produce new philosophy out of the material of the history of philosophy.
He also instilled me with a spirit of rigor and careful argumentation. His
influence and the lessons he imparted to me continue throughout thepages of this book. Finally, I would like to thank my partner Angela andmy daughter, both of whom were patient with me as I wrote this book,and supportive of the project.
Books are born out of a crowd of voices, taking on a unity where
the traces of these voices often disappear. I am both humbled andtremendously grateful for all those voices that assisted me in thecomposition of this text.

Introduction
Towards a Finally Subjectless Object...[T]he effect of the empirical method in metaphysics isseriously and persistently to treat finite minds as one among
many forms of finite existence, having no privilege above
them except such as it derives from its greater perfection
and development. Should inquiry prove that the cognitive
relation is unique, improbable as such a result might seem,
it would have to be accepted faithfully and harmonisedwith the remainder of the scheme. But prima facie there
is no warrant for the assumption, still less for the dogma
that, because all experience implies a mind, that whichis experienced owes its being and its qualities to mind.
Minds are but the most gifted members known to us ina democracy of things. In respect of being or reality all
existences are on an equal footing. They vary in eminence;
as in a democracy, where talent has an open career, the mostgifted rise to influence and authority.
— Samuel Alexander 1

Ordinarily, upon hearing the word “object”, the first thing we think is“subject”. Our second thought, perhaps, is that objects are fixed, stable andunchanging, and therefore to be contrasted with events and processes. The

14Levi R. Bryant

object, we are told, is that which is opposed to a subject, and the questionof the relation between the subject and the object is a question of how
the subject is to relate to or represent the object. As such, the question of
the object becomes a question of whether or not we adequately represent
the object. Do we, the question runs, touch the object in its reality in our
representations, or, rather, do our representations always “distort” theobject such that there is no warrant in the claim that our representations
actually represent a reality that is out there. It would thus seem that the
moment we pose the question of objects we are no longer occupied with thequestion of objects, but rather with the question of the relationship between
the subject and the object. And, of course, all sorts of insurmountableproblems here emerge because we are after all—or allegedly—subjects, and,as subjects, cannot get outside of our own minds to determine whether our
representations map on to any sort of external reality.
The basic schema both of anti-realisms and of what I will call
epistemological realisms (for reasons that will become apparent in a
moment) is that of a division between the world of nature and the worldof the subject and culture. The debate then becomes one over the status ofrepresentation.

subject/culturexnature/object

representation

Within the schema of representation, object is treated as a pole opposed
to subject. The entire debate between realism and anti-realism arises as aresult of how these two circles overlap. While the overlap between these twodomains seems to establish or guarantee their relation, this overlap also
contains something of an antinomy or fundamental ambiguity. Because
the representation lies in the intersection between the two domains, there's
a deep ambiguity as to whether or not representation actually hooks onto the world as it really is. Epistemological realists seek a correspondenceor adequation between subject and object, representations and states-of-

Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

15

affairs. They wish to distinguish between true representations and mere
imaginings, arguing that true representations mirror the world as is,reflecting a world as it is regardless of whether any represents it. In short,epistemological realists argue that true representations represent a worldthat is in no way dependent on being represented by the subject or culture
to exist as it does. Often epistemological realisms are closely connectedwith a project of Enlightenment critique, seeking to abolish superstitionand obscurantism by discovering the true nature of the world and giving
us the resources for distinguishing what is epistemologically justified andwhat is not.
Anti-realisms, by contrast, note that our relationship to the world still
falls within the domain belonging to the subject, mind, and culture:subject/culturexnature/object

representation

Here the darkened space within the right-hand circle indicates thatthe domain of nature and the object has been foreclosed, that it's been
blocked out, and that we are to restrict inquiry to what is given in thesubject and culture circle. While the anti-realist generally does not denythat a world independent of subject, mind, and culture exists—i.e., he's
not a Berkeleyian subjective idealist or a Hegelian absolute idealist—theanti-realist nonetheless argues that because representation falls entirely
within the domain of the subject and culture we are unable to determine
whether representations are merely our constructions, such that they do
not reflect reality as it is at all, or whether these representations are true
representations of reality as it is and would be regardless of whether itwere represented. However, while the anti-realist argument generally bases
itself on the indeterminability of whether representation is construction
or a true representation of reality, it often slips into the thesis that
representation is a construction and that reality is very likely entirely
different from how we represent it. For the anti-realist, truth thus becomes16

Levi R. Bryant

inter-subjective agreement, consensus, or shared representation, rather
than a correspondence between representation and reality. Indeed, the very
concept of reality is transformed into reality for-us or the manner in which
we experience and represent the world. Like epistemological realisms,
anti-realisms are often closely connected to a project of critique. In thisregard, they might seek to demonstrate the limits of what we can know,or alternatively they might attempt to show how “pictures” of the world
are socially constructed such that they vary according to history, culture,
language, or economic class. In this way, the anti-realist is able to debunk
universalist pretensions behind many “world-pictures” that function toguarantee privilege.
As a consequence of the two world schema, the question of theobject, of what substances are, is subtly transformed into the questionof how and whether we know objects. The question of objects becomes
the question of a particular relation between humans and objects. This,in turn, becomes a question of whether or not our representations map
onto reality. Such a question, revolving around epistemology, has been theobsession of philosophy since at least Descartes. Where prior philosophy
engaged in vigorous debates as to the true nature of substance, with oraround Descartes the primary question of philosophy became that of how
subjects relate to or represent objects. Nor were the stakes of these debates
about knowledge small. At issue was not the arid question of when andhow we know, but rather the legitimacy of knowledge as a foundation for
power. If questions of knowledge became so heated during the Renaissanceand Enlightenment period in Western philosophy, then this is because
Europe was simultaneously witnessing the birth of capitalism, the erosionof traditional authority in the form of monarchies and the Church, theReformation, the rise of democracy, and the rise of the new sciences.
Questions of knowledge were political questions, simultaneously targetingarguments from authority that served as a support or foundation for themonarchies and the Church—the two of which were deeply intertwined–and laying the groundwork for participatory democracy through ademonstration that all humans have the capacity to know (Descartes andperhaps Locke) or that knowledge is not possible at all, but consists ofmerely sentiment, custom, or opinion (Hume).

Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

17

In any event, the two options that opened Modernity—Descartes andHume—led to much the same consequences at the level of the political:
that individual humans are entitled to define their own form of life andparticipate in the formation of the State because either a) all humans arecapable of knowing and therefore are not in need of special authorities
or revelation to govern them, or b) that because absolute knowledge isunobtainable for humans, any authority claiming to ground his or her
authority on the basis of knowledge is an illegitimate huckster bent on
controlling and manipulating the populace. In short, behind this debate
was the issue of egalitarianism or the right of all persons to participate
in governance. In one form or another this debate and these two options
continue down to our own time and are every bit as heated and political
as when the shift to epistemology first arose. On the one hand we havethe pro-science crowd that vigorously argues that science gives us thetrue representation of reality. It is not difficult to detect, lurking in the
background, a protracted battle against the role that superstition andreligion play in the political sphere. Society, at all costs, must be protectedfrom the superstitious and religious irrationalities that threaten to plunge usback into the Dark Ages. Here The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins comesto mind.2 On the other hand, there are the social constructivists and antirealists vigorously arguing that our conceptions of society, the human, race,
gender, and even reality are constructed. Their worry seems to be that any
positive claim to knowledge risks becoming an exclusionary and oppressive
force of domination, and they arrive at this conclusion not without goodreason or historical precedent.
As always, the battles that swirl around epistemology are ultimately
questions of ethics and politics. As Bacon noted, knowledge is power. And
knowledge is not simply power in the sense that it allows us to control ormaster the world around us, but rather knowledge is also power in the sensethat it determines who is authorized to speak, who is authorized to govern,
and is the power to determine what place persons and other entities should,
by right, occupy within the social order. No, questions of knowledge are
not innocent questions. Rather, they are questions intimately related to life,
governance, and freedom. A person's epistemology very much reflects their

18

Levi R. Bryant

idea of what the social order ought to be, even if this is not immediately
apparent in the arid speculations of epistemology.
Yet in all of the heated debates surrounding epistemology that have castnearly every discipline in turmoil, we nonetheless seem to miss the pointthat the question of the object is not an epistemological question, not aquestion of how we know the object, but a question of what objects are.
The being of objects is an issue distinct from the question of our knowledgeof objects. Here, of course, it seems obvious that in order to discuss the
being of objects we must first know objects. And if this is the case, it follows
as a matter of course that epistemology or questions of knowledge must
precede ontology. However, I hope to show in what follows that questionsof ontology are both irreducible to questions of epistemology and thatquestions of ontology must precede questions of epistemology or questionsof our access to objects. What an object is cannot be reduced to our accessto objects. And as we will see in what follows, that access is highly limited.
Nonetheless, while our access to objects is highly limited, we can still say agreat deal about the being of objects.
However, despite the limitations of access, we must avoid, at all costs,
the thesis that objects are what our access to objects gives us. As Graham
Harman has argued, objects are not the given. Not at all. As such, thisbook defends a robust realism. Yet, and this is crucial to everything that
follows, the realism defended here is not an epistemological realism, but an
ontological realism. Epistemological realism argues that our representations
and language are accurate mirrors of the world as it actually is, regardless ofwhether or not we exist. It seeks to distinguish between true representations
and phantasms. Ontological realism, by contrast, is not a thesis about ourknowledge of objects, but about the being of objects themselves, whether or
not we exist to represent them. It is the thesis that the world is composedof objects, that these objects are varied and include entities as diverse as
mind, language, cultural and social entities, and objects independent of
humans such as galaxies, stones, quarks, tardigrades and so on. Above all,ontological realisms refuse to treat objects as constructions of humans.
While it is true, I will argue, that all objects translate one another, theobjects that are translated are irreducible to their translations. As we willsee, ontological realism thoroughly refutes epistemological realism orIntroduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

19

what ordinarily goes by the pejorative title of “naïve realism”. Initially it
might sound as if the distinction between ontological and epistemologicalrealism is a difference that makes no difference but, as I hope to show, this
distinction has far ranging consequences for how we pose a number ofquestions and theorize a variety of phenomena.
One of the problematic consequences that follows from the hegemonythat epistemology currently enjoys in philosophy is that it condemns
philosophy to a thoroughly anthropocentric reference. Because theontological question of substance is elided into the epistemological questionof our knowledge of substance, all discussions of substance necessarily
contain a human reference. The subtext or fine print surrounding our
discussions of substance always contain reference to an implicit “forus”. This is true even of the anti-humanist structuralists and poststructuralists who purport to dispense with the subject in favor of various
impersonal and anonymous social forces like language and structure thatexceed the intentions of individuals. Here we still remain in the orbit ofan anthropocentric universe insofar as society and culture are humanphenomena, and all of being is subordinated to these forces. Being isthereby reduced to what being is for us.
By contrast, this book strives to think a subjectless object, or an object
that is for-itself rather than an object that is an opposing pole before or in
front of a subject. Put differently, this essay attempts to think an object
for-itself that isn't an object for the gaze of a subject, representation, or acultural discourse. This, in short, is what the democracy of objects means.
The democracy of objects is not a political thesis to the effect that all objects
ought to be treated equally or that all objects ought to participate in humanaffairs. The democracy of objects is the ontological thesis that all objects, as
Ian Bogost has so nicely put it, equally exist while they do not exist equally.
The claim that all objects equally exist is the claim that no object can betreated as constructed by another object. The claim that objects do not exist
equally is the claim that objects contribute to collectives or assemblages to agreater and lesser degree. In short, no object such as the subject or cultureis the ground of all others. As such, The Democracy of Objects attempts tothink the being of objects unshackled from the gaze of humans in their
being for-themselves.

20

Levi R. Bryant

Such a democracy, however, does not entail the exclusion of the human.
Rather, what we get is a redrawing of distinctions and a decentering of thehuman. The point is not that we should think objects rather than humans.
Such a formulation is based on the premise that humans constitute somespecial category that is other than objects, that objects are a pole opposed tohumans, and therefore the formulation is based on the premise that objects
are correlates or poles opposing or standing-before humans. No, within theframework of onticology—my name for the ontology that follows—there
is only one type of being: objects. As a consequence, humans are notexcluded, but are rather objects among the various types of objects that exist
or populate the world, each with their own specific powers and capacities.
It is here that we encounter the redrawing of distinctions proposed by
object-oriented philosophy and onticology. In his Laws of Form, George
Spencer-Brown argued that in order to indicate anything we must firstdraw a distinction. Distinction, as it were, precedes indication. To indicate
something is to interact with, represent, or point at something in the world(indication takes a variety of forms). Thus, for example, when I say the sun
is shining, I have indicated a state-of-affairs, yet this indication is based on aprior distinction between, perhaps, darkness and light, gray days and sunnydays, and so on. According to Spencer-Brown, every distinction contains amarked and an unmarked space.

markedunmarked

The right-angle is what Spencer-Brown refers to as the mark of
distinction. The marked space opens what can be indicated, whereas theunmarked space is everything else that is excluded. Thus, for example, I
can draw a circle on a piece of paper (distinction), and can now indicate
what is in that circle. Two key points follow from Spencer-Brown's calculusof distinctions. First, the unmarked space of a distinction is invisible to theperson employing the distinction. While it is true that, in many instances,the boundary of a distinction can be crossed and the unmarked spacecan be indicated, in the use of a distinction the unmarked space of theIntroduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

21

distinction becomes a blind-spot for the system deploying the distinction.
That which exists in the unmarked space of the distinction might as well
not exist for the system using the distinction.
However, the unmarked space of the distinction is not the only blindspot generated by the distinction. In addition to the unmarked space of a
distinction, the distinction itself is a blind-spot. In the use of a distinction,
the distinction itself becomes invisible insofar as one passes “through” thedistinction to make indications. The situation here is analogous to watchinga bright red cardinal on a tree through one's window. Here the window
becomes invisible and all our attention is drawn to the cardinal. One caneither use their distinctions or observe their distinctions, but never use
their distinctions and observe their distinctions. By virtue of the withdrawalof distinctions from view in the course of using them, distinctions thus
create a reality effect where properties of the indicated seem to belong
to the indicated itself rather than being effects of the distinction. As aconsequence, we do not realize that other distinctions are possible. The
result is thus that we end up surreptitiously unifying the world under aparticular set of distinctions, failing to recognize that very different sorts ofindications are possible.
Within the marked space of its distinctions, much contemporary
philosophy and theory places the subject or culture. As a consequence,
objects fall into the unmarked space and come to be treated as what is otherthan the subject.

content:
signs/signifiers/representations

subject/culture

Here one need only think of Fichte for a formalization of this logic.
Within any distinction there can also be sub-distinctions that render theirown indications possible. In the case of the culturalist schema, the subject/culture distinction contains a sub-distinction marking content. The catchis that in treating the object as what is opposed to the subject or what isother than the subject, this frame of thought treats the object in terms of22

Levi R. Bryant

the subject. The object is here not an object, not an autonomous substancethat exists in its own right, but rather a representation. As a consequenceof this, all other entities in the world are treated only as vehicles for humancontents, meanings, signs, or projections. By analogy, we can compare theculturalist structure of distinction with cinema. Here the object would be
the smooth cinema screen, the projector would be the subject or culture,and the images would be contents or representations. Within this schema,
the screen is treated as contributing little or nothing and all inquiry is
focused on representations or contents. To be sure, the screen exists, but it
is merely a vehicle for human and cultural representations.
Onticology and object-oriented philosophy, by contrast, propose toplace objects in the marked space of distinction.

subject/culture/nonhumans

object

It will be noted that when objects are placed in the marked space ofdistinction, the sub-distinction does not contract what can be indicated,but rather expands what can be indicated. Here subjects and culture are notexcluded, but rather are treated as particular types of objects. Additionally, it
now becomes possible to indicate nonhuman objects without treating themas vehicles for human contents. As a consequence, this operation is not a
simple inversion of the culturalist schema. It is not a call to pay attention
to objects rather than subjects or to treat subjects as what are opposed toobjects, rather than treating objects as being opposed to subjects. Rather,just as objects were reduced to representations when the subject or culture
occupied the marked space of distinction, just as objects were effectivelytransformed into the subject and content, the placement of objects in themarked space of distinction within the framework of ontology transforms
the subject into one object among many others, undermining its privileged,
central, or foundational place within philosophy and ontology. Subjects are
objects among objects, rather than constant points of reference related toall other objects. As a consequence, we get the beginnings of what anti-Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

23

humanism and post-humanism ought to be, insofar as these theoreticalorientations are no longer the thesis that the world is constructed throughanonymous and impersonal social forces as opposed to an individual
subject. Rather, we get a variety of nonhuman actors unleashed in the worldas autonomous actors in their own right, irreducible to representations andfreed from any constant reference to the human where they are reduced toour representations.
Thus, rather than thinking being in terms of two incommensurable
worlds, nature and culture, we instead get various collectives of objects.
As Latour has compellingly argued, within the Modernist schema thatdrives both epistemological realism and epistemological anti-realism,
the world is bifurcated into two distinct domains: culture and nature.3
The domain of the subject and culture is treated as the world of freedom,
meaning, signs, representations, language, power, and so on. The domainof nature is treated as being composed of matter governed by mechanistic
causality. Implicit within forms of theory and philosophy that work with thisbifurcated model is the axiom that the two worlds are to be kept entirely
separate, such that there is to be no inmixing of their distinct properties.
Thus, for example, a good deal of cultural theory only refers to objects
as vehicles for signs or representations, ignoring any non-semiotic or
non-representational differences nonhuman objects might contribute tocollectives. Society is only to have social properties, and never any sorts ofqualities that pertain to the nonhuman world.
It is my view that the culturalist and modernist form of distinction isdisastrous for social and political analysis and sound epistemology. Insofar
as the form of distinction implicit in the culturalist mode of distinction
indicates content and relegates nonhuman objects to the unmarked spaceof the distinction, all sorts of factors become invisible that are pertinent
to why collectives involving humans take the form they do. Signifiers,
meanings, signs, discourses, norms, and narratives are made to do all theheavy lifting to explain why social organization takes the form it does. While
there can be no doubt that all of these agencies play a significant role in
the formation of collectives involving humans, this mode of distinction
leads us to ignore the role of the nonhuman and asignifying in the formof technologies, weather patterns, resources, diseases, animals, natural

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Levi R. Bryant

disasters, the presence or absence of roads, the availability of water,
animals, microbes, the presence or absence of electricity and high speed
internet connections, modes of transportation, and so on. All of thesethings and many more besides play a crucial role in bringing humans
together in particular ways and do so through contributing differences thatwhile coming to be imbricated with signifying agencies, nonetheless areasignifying. An activist political theory that places all its apples in the basket
of content is doomed to frustration insofar as it will continuously wonder
why its critiques of ideology fail to produce their desired or intended socialchange. Moreover, in an age where we are faced with the looming threat ofmonumental climate change, it is irresponsible to draw our distinctions insuch a way as to exclude nonhuman actors.
On the epistemological front, the subject/object distinction has the
curious effect of leading the epistemologist to focus on propositions
and representations alone, largely ignoring the role that practices andnonhuman actors play in knowledge-production. As a consequence, thecentral question becomes that of how and whether propositions correspondto reality. In the meantime, we ignore the laboratory setting, engagementwith matters and instruments, and so on. It is as if experiment and theentities that populate the laboratory are treated as mere means to the endof knowledge such that they can be safely ignored as contributing nothing
to propositional content, thereby playing no crucial role in the productionof knowledge. Yet by ignoring the site, practices, and procedures by whichknowledge is produced, the question of how propositions represent reality
becomes thoroughly obscure because we are left without the means ofdiscerning the birth of propositions and the common place where the worldof the human and nonhuman meets.
In shifting from a dual ontology based on the nature/culture split tocollectives, onticology and object-oriented philosophy place all entities on
equal ontological footing. Rather than two distinct ontological domains, thedomain of the subject and the domain of the object, we instead get a single
plane of being populated by a variety of different types of objects including
humans and societies:

Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

25

collectives
humansnonhumans

The concept of collectives does not approach being in terms of two
separate domains, but rather as a single plane in which, to use Karen
Barad's apt term, objects are entangled with one another.4 In this regard,society and nature do not form two separate and entirely distinct domainsthat must never cross. Rather, collectives involving humans are always
entangled with all sorts of nonhumans without which such collectives could
not exist. To be sure, such collectives are populated by signs, signifiers,
meanings, norms and a host of other sundry entities, but they are also
populated by all sorts of asignifying entities such as animals, crops, weather
events, geographies, rivers, microbes, technologies, and so on. Onticology
and object-oriented ontology draw our attention to these entanglements byplacing the human and nonhuman on equal footing.
However, it would be a mistake to suppose that collectives necessarily
involve humans. There are collectives that involve humans and othercollectives of objects that have nothing to do with humans:collectives
nonhumans

In short, not everything is related to the human, nor, as I will argue inwhat follows, is everything related to everything else. While we might beparticularly interested in collectives involving humans because we happen
to be human, from the standpoint of ontology we must avoid treating allcollectives as involving the human.
From the foregoing it can be gathered that the ontology I am proposing
is rather peculiar. Rather than treating objects as entities opposed to a
subject, I treat all entities, including subjects, as objects. Moreover, in26Levi R. Bryant

order to overcome the dual world hypothesis of Modernity, I argue that itis necessary to staunchly defend the autonomy of objects or substances,refusing any reduction of objects to their relations, whether these relations
be relations to humans or other objects. In my view, the root of theModernist schema arises from relationism. If we are to escape the aporiathat beset the Modernist schema this, above all, requires us to overcome
relationism or the thesis that objects are constituted by their relations.
Accordingly, following the ground-breaking work of Graham Harman's
object-oriented philosophy, I argue that objects are withdrawn from all
relation. The consequences of this strange thesis are, I believe, profound.
On the one hand, in arguing that objects are withdrawn from their relations,
we are able to preserve the autonomy and irreducibility of substance,
thereby sidestepping the endless, and at this point rather stale, debate
between the epistemological realists and anti-realists. On the other hand,where the anti-realists have obsessively focused on a single gap between
humans and objects, endlessly revolving around the manner in which
objects are inaccessible to representation, object-oriented philosophy allows
us to pluralize this gap, treating it not as a unique or privileged peculiarityof humans, but as true of all relations between objects whether they involve
humans or not. In short, the difference between humans and other objects
is not a difference in kind, but a difference in degree. Put differently, allobjects translate one another. Translation is not unique to how the mind
relates to the world. And as a consequence of this, no object has directaccess to any other object.
Onticology and object-oriented philosophy thus find themselves in a
strange position with respect to speculative realism. Speculative realism isa loosely affiliated philosophical movement that arose out of a Goldsmith's
College conference organized by Alberto Toscano in 2007. While theparticipants at this event—Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham
Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux—share vastly different philosophicalpositions, they are all united in defending a variant of realism and in
rejecting anti-realism or what they call “correlationism”. With the otherspeculative realists, onticology and object-oriented philosophy defend
a realist ontology that refuses to treat objects as constructions or mere
correlates of mind, subject, culture, or language. However, with the anti-Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

27

realists, onticology and object-oriented philosophy argue that objects
have no direct access to one another and that each object translates
other objects with which it enters into non-relational relations. Objectoriented philosophy and onticology thus reject the epistemologicalrealism of other realist philosophies, taking leave of the project of policing
representations and demystifying critique. The difference is that where theanti-realists focus on a single gap between humans and objects, objectoriented philosophy and onticology treat this gap as a ubiquitous featureof all beings. One of the great strengths of object-oriented philosophy
and onticology is thus, I believe, that it can integrate a number of thefindings of anti-realist philosophy, and continental social and politicaltheory, without falling into the deadlocks that currently plague anti-realiststrains of thought.
For those not familiar with the basic claims of object-oriented
philosophy and onticology, a list of object-oriented heroes might prove
helpful for gaining orientation within onticology. Among the heroes of
onticology are Graham Harman, Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers, Timothy
Morton, Ian Bogost, Niklas Luhmann, Jane Bennett, Manuel DeLanda,
Marshall McLuhan, Friedrich Kittler, Karen Barad, John Protevi, Walter
Ong, Deleuze and Guattari, developmental systems theorists such as
Richard Lewontin and Susan Oyama, Alfred North Whitehead, Donna
Haraway, Roy Bhaskar, Katherine Hayles, and a host of others. Some ofthese thinkers appear more than others in the pages that follow, and others
appear scarcely or not at all, but all have deeply influenced my thought.
The thread that runs throughout the work of these thinkers is a profounddecentering of the human and the subject that nonetheless makes room forthe human, representation, and content, and an accompanying attentivenessto all sorts of nonhuman objects or actors coupled with a refusal to reducethese agencies to vehicles of content and signs. In developing my argument,
I have proceeded as a bricoleur, freely drawing from a variety of disciplines
and thinkers whose works are not necessarily consistent with one another.
Of the bricoleur, Lévi-Strauss writes that,[t]he 'bricoleur' is adept at performing a large numberof diverse tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not
subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials

28

Levi R. Bryant

and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the
project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rulesof his game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand',that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always
finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears
no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular
project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there
have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it withthe remains of previous constructions or destructions. The
set of the 'bricoleur's' means cannot therefore be defined interms of a project (which would presuppose, besides, that,as in the case of the engineer, there were, at least in theory,
as many sets of tools and materials or 'instrumental sets' as
there are different kinds of projects). It is to be defined only
by its potential use or, putting this another way and in thelanguage of the 'bricoleur' himself, because the elements arecollected and retained on the principle that 'they may always
come in handy'. Such elements are specialized up to a point,
sufficiently for the 'bricoleur' not to need the equipment andknowledge of all trades and professions, but not enough foreach of them to have one definite and determinate use. They
each represent a set of actual and possible relations; they
are 'operators' but they can be used for any operations of
the same type.5
For readers startled by some of the thinkers and lines of thought I forge
together in the pages that follow, it is worthwhile to recall that this is thework of a bricoleur and that it very much reflects the idiosyncrasies of myown intellectual background and development. For example, Lacan makes
a number of appearances in the pages that follow and this reflects my timein a previous incarnation as a practicing psychoanalyst. As I argue in what
follows, every object is a crowd and this is above all true of books. Where
the materials out of which a book is constructed might themselves beheterogeneous, what is important is not whether these other materials arein themselves consistent with one another, but rather whether the productformed from these parts manages to attain some degree of consistency inIntroduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

29

the formation of a new object. Readers, for example, might be surprised to
discover Harman's object-oriented ontology, the constructivism of Niklas
Luhmann's autopoietic social theory, Deleuze and Guattari's ontology ofthe virtual, and the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan rubbing elbows
with one another. Standing alone, these various theories are opposed ona number of fronts. However, the work of a bricoleur consists in forging
together heterogeneous materials so as to produce something capable ofstanding on its own. I hope that I've done so, but I make no claim that thisis the only way that object-oriented ontology can be formulated, nor am I
particularly interested in policing others with a theory of reality.
It is unlikely that object-oriented ontologists are going to persuade
epistemological realists or anti-realists that they have found a way of
surmounting the epistemological problems that arise out of the two-worldmodel of being any time soon. Quoting Max Planck, Marshall and Eric
McLuhan write, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents
die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it”.6 This appears
to be how it is in philosophy as well. New innovations in philosophy do
not so much refute their opponents as simply cease being preoccupied bycertain questions and problems. In many respects, object-oriented ontology,
following the advice of Richard Rorty, simply tries to step out of the debate
altogether. Object-oriented ontologists have grown weary of a debate thathas gone on for over two centuries, believe that the possible variations ofthese positions have exhausted themselves, and want to move on to talking
about other things. If this is not good enough for the epistemology police,
we are more than happy to confess our guilt and embrace our alleged lackof rigor and continue in harboring our illusions that we can speak of areality independent of humans. However, such a move of simply moving
on is not unheard of in philosophy. No one has yet refuted the solipsist, nor
the Berkeleyian subjective idealist, yet neither solipsism nor the extremesof Berkeleyian idealism have ever been central and ongoing debates inphilosophy. Philosophers largely just ignore these positions or use themas cautionary examples to be avoided. Why not the same in the endlessdebates over access?

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Levi R. Bryant

Nonetheless, in the pages that follow I do try to formulate argumentsthat epistemically ground the ontological realism that I defend. The firstchapter outlines the grounds for ontological realism, drawing heavily on
the transcendental realism developed by Roy Bhaskar. The basic thrust of
this argument is transcendental in character and argues that the world must
be structured in a particular way for experimental activity to be intelligible
and possible. Bhaskar's articulation of these transcendental, ontologicalconditions also provides me with the means of outlining the basic structureof objects, the relation between substance and qualities, the independenceof objects from their relations, and the withdrawn structure of objects. HereI also uncover the root assumption that leads to the endless debates of antirealism and epistemological realism.
Having outlined the basic structure of objects, the second chapter
explores Aristotle's concept of substance, carefully distinguishing itfrom that which is simple or indivisible, and outlining the relationshipbetween substance and qualities. Here a problem emerges. On the one
hand, substance is necessarily distinct from its qualities in that qualities
can change, yet substance persists. On the other hand, the subtraction of
all qualities from a substance seems to lead us to a bare substratum or
a completely featureless substance that would therefore be identical toall other substances or objects. Additionally, while substance is the very
being of an object, its individuality or singularity, substances only ever
manifest themselves through their qualities. With respect to this thirdproblem, I argue that the very being of substance consists in simultaneously
withdrawing and in self-othering. The structure of substance is such that itothers itself in its qualities. However, if such an account of substance is tobe successful, it is necessary to provide an account of withdrawn substancethat is structured without being qualitative. How are we to think such a
non-qualitative structure?
Having encountered the problem of non-qualitative structure, the thirdchapter turns to Deleuze's ontology and the distinction between the virtualand the actual. There I critique Deleuze's tendency to treat the virtual as
something other than the individual, arguing that the individual precedes
the virtual such that virtuality is always the virtuality of a substance. I referto this as “virtual proper being” and treat it as the powers or capacities ofIntroduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

31

an entity. Deleuze's concept of the virtual provides us with the means of
thinking substance as structured without being qualitative. I refer to thequalities produced out of virtual structure as “local manifestations” andtreat them as events, actions, or activities on the part of objects.
If objects are withdrawn from one another, then how do they relate?
This is the problem of what Harman refers to as “vicarious causation”.
How do objects relate to one another when they are necessarily
independent of all their relations? Chapter four picks up with this question
and turns to the autopoietic theory of Niklas Luhmann to provide an
account of interactions between withdrawn objects. There I argue that
all objects are operationally closed such that they constitute their own
relation and openness to their environment. Relations between objects areaccounted for by the manner in which objects transform perturbations
from other objects into information or events that select system-states.
These information-events or events that select system-states are, in
their turn, among the agencies that preside over the production of local
manifestations in objects.
Chapter five turns to questions of constraint, relations between parts
and wholes, and time and entropy. If objects are withdrawn from one
another, how is it that they can constrain one another? Drawing on the
resources of developmental systems theory in biology, I attempt to provide
an account of how an object can simultaneously construct its environmentand be constrained by its environment, leading local manifestations totake particular forms. The section on mereology develops an account ofrelations between larger-scale objects and smaller-scale objects, defending
the autonomy of larger-scale objects from the smaller-scale objects out of
which they are built and the autonomy of the smaller-scale objects thatcompose the larger-scale object. Here I argue that a number of problems
that have haunted contemporary social and political theory arise from a
failure to be properly attentive to these strange mereological relations. The
chapter closes with a discussion of temporalized structure, the relation of
objects to time and space, and how objects stave off entropy or destruction
across time.
Finally, chapter six outlines the four theses of flat ontology advocatedby onticology. The first of these theses is that all objects are withdrawn,

32

Levi R. Bryant

such that there are no objects characterized by full presence or actuality.
Withdrawal is not an accidental feature of objects arising from our lack of
direct access to them, but is a constitutive feature of all objects regardlessof whether they relate to other objects. To develop this thesis I draw on
Lacan's graphs of sexuation, treating them not as accounts of sex, but rather
as two very different ontological discourses: ontologies of immanence andwithdrawal and ontologies of presence and transcendence. The second
thesis of flat ontology is that the world does not exist. Here I argue that
there is no “super-object”, Whole, or totality that would gather all objects
together in a harmonious unity. The third thesis is that humans occupy no
privileged place within being and that between the human/object relation
and any other object/object relation there is only a difference in degree,
not kind. Finally, the fourth thesis is that objects of all sorts and at all
scales are on equal ontological footing, such that subjects, groups, fictions,
technologies, institutions, etc., are every bit as real as quarks, planets, trees,
and tardigrades. The fourth thesis of flat ontology invites us to think interms of collectives and entanglements between a variety of different typesof actors, at a variety of different temporal and spatial scales, rather thanfocusing exclusively on the gap between humans and objects.
In the pages that follow I have, above all, pursued three aims. First, I
have sought to provide an ontological framework capable of providing a
synthesis of two very different research programs. Within cultural studies
there is a sharp divide between those forms of inquiry that focus on
signification and those forms of inquiry that focus on the material in theform of technologies, media, and material conditions. Likewise, the broader
and dominant tendency of the humanities has been to focus on content,
excluding the material. I have sought an ontological framework capable ofintegrating these diverse tendencies. However, second, such an integration
requires an avoidance of reductivism. To the same degree that natural
entities ought not be reduced to cultural constructions, social, semiotic,
and cultural entities ought not be reduced to natural entities. This requires
us to shift from thinking in terms of reduction or grounding one entity inanother, to thinking in terms of entanglements. Entanglements allow us tomaintain the irreducibility, heterogeneity, and autonomy of various typesof entities while investigating how they influence one another. Finally,

Introduction: Towards a Finally Subjectless Object

third, I have above all sought to write a book that is both accessible to awide audience and that can be put to work by others in a wide variety of
disciplines and practices, generating new questions and projects. I hope I
have been somewhat successful in accomplishing these aims.

33

Chapter 1
Grounds For a Realist Ontology
Things-in-themselves? But they're fine, thank you verymuch. And how are you? You complain about things thathave not been honored by your vision? You feel that thesethings are lacking the illumination of your consciousness?
But if you missed the galloping freedom of the zebras in thesavannah this morning, then so much the worse for you; thezebras will not be sorry that you were not there, and in any
case you would have tamed, killed, photographed, or studied
them. Things in themselves lack nothing, just as Africa did
not lack whites before their arrival.
— Bruno Latour 7

1.1. The Death of Ontology and the Rise of Correlationism
Our historical moment is characterized by a general distrust, evendisdain, for the category of objects, ontology, and above all any variantof realism. Moreover, it is characterized by a primacy of epistemology
over ontology. While it is indeed true that Heidegger, in Being and Time,attempted to resurrect ontology, this only took place through a profoundtransformation of the very meaning of ontology.8 Ontology would nolonger be the investigation of being qua being in all its variety and diversity
regardless of whether humans exist, but rather would instead become anChapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

35interrogation of Dasein's or human being's access to being. Ontology would
become an investigation of being-for-Dasein, rather than an investigationof being as such. In conjunction with this transformation of ontology froman investigation of being as such into an investigation of being-for-humans,
we have also everywhere witnessed a push to dissolve objects or primary
substances in the acid of experience, intentionality, power, language,
normativity, signs, events, relations, or processes. To defend the existenceof objects is, within the framework of this line of thought, the height ofnaïveté for objects are held to be nothing more than surface-effects ofsomething more fundamental such as the signifier, signs, power or activitiesof the mind. With Hume, for example, it is argued that objects are reallynothing more than bundles of impressions or sensations linked together
by associations and habits in the mind. Here there is no deeper fact ofobjects existing beyond these impressions and habits. Likewise, Lacan willtell us that “the universe is the flower of rhetoric”9, treating the beings that
populate the world as an effect of the signifier.
We can thus discern a shift in how ontology is understood andaccompanying this shift the deployment of a universal acid that has cometo dissolve the being of objects. The new ontology argues that we canonly ever speak of being as it is for us. Depending on the philosophy inquestion, this “us” can be minds, lived bodies, language, signs, power, social
structures, and so on. There are dozens of variations. The key point here isthat it is argued that being can only be thought in terms of what Graham
Harman has called our access to being.10 As such, ontology becomes not
an interrogation of being as such, but rather an interrogation of our accessto being. The answer to the question, “what is being?” now, everywhere
and always, carries a footnote, colophon, or bit of fine print such that thequestion must be read as “what is being for us?”
And if the question of ontology now becomes the question, “what isbeing for us?” it follows that there can be no question of what being might
be as such, for we have resolved to treat being only in terms of our accessto being such that what being might be apart from our access to being now
becomes an entirely meaningless question. This for two reasons: First, were
we capable of knowing being apart from our access to being, it is argued, itwould follow that we therefore have access to this being, thereby converting

36

Levi R. Bryant

this being alleged to be beyond its givenness to us back into being-for-us.
Second, to know something, the argument runs, we must have access tothat thing. Yet being beyond our access to it is precisely a form of being
to which we have no access. Therefore it follows that claims about such abeing are, strictly speaking, meaningless. I hope to show later why there isgood reason to doubt the soundness of both of these arguments, but for the
moment it is enough simply to tarry with them to understand their logic,
for these arguments constitute the basic schema of nearly every reigningphilosophical position today.
If, then, these arguments are granted, it follows that there can be noquestion of what being might be like apart from our access to being. For
the condition under which it would be possible to speak of being apartfrom our access to being would require access to that being, yet we do nothave such access. Consequently, it follows that philosophy must abandon
the question of whether being as it is given to us is like being as it is initself because we are unable to “get out of ourselves” to compare being as
it manifests itself to us with being as it is in-itself apart from us. The best
we can hope for, the most we can know, is being as it manifests itself tous, and philosophy shifts from being a discourse concerned with the beingof beings, with what substance, as Meillassoux has put it, constitutes true
substance (objects, God, nature, particles, processes, and so on?)11, to beinga discourse about the mechanisms through which beings are manifested
to us (mind, language, normativity, signs, power, for example). Ontology
becomes transcendental anthropology and the world becomes a mirror inwhich we don't recognize our own reflection.
Philosophy, of whatever stripe, thus comes to be characterized by what
Meillassoux has aptly named correlationism. As Meillassoux puts it, “[b]y'correlation' we mean the idea according to which we only ever have accessto the correlation between thinking and being, and never either term
considered apart from the other”.12 While I have reason to disagree with
Meillassoux's proposal for escaping the correlationist circle (and with his
ontology), I believe that his concept of correlationism nicely summarizes
the episteme, in the Foucauldian sense, that governs contemporary
philosophy. When, in The Order of Things13 and The Archeology of Knowledge14, Foucault introduces the concept of epistemes, he intends epistemes not as

Chapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

37

determinate positions in some discipline that might be opposed to anotherposition, but rather as a set of statements functioning as the historical apriori of a particular discursive space. An episteme would be precisely thatset of statements that allow opposed theories of, for example, language, tobe opposed. It is the common framework these opposed positions sharethat allows them to enter into antagonistic relations with one another.
The claim that correlationism constitutes the episteme of contemporary
philosophy is thus not a claim about any specific philosophical position, butrather about the common framework regulating philosophical discourse in
our contemporary moment. This episteme is shared by thinkers as diverse
and opposed, for example, as the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, theMerleau-Ponty of The Phenomenology of Perception, and the Derrida of Of
Grammatology. Despite the vast differences and disagreements among these
positions, their thought and disagreements nonetheless unfold within thehorizon of the unspoken premise of a necessary correlation between being
and thought. The object of these disputes is not whether correlationism istrue, but rather how the primordial or most fundamental correlation is to
be articulated.
With correlationism we thus discover the root of contemporary
theory's suspicion of both objects and realism. Realism must necessarily
be anathema to all variants of correlationism by virtue of the fact that it
claims knowledge of beings independent of the correlation between thinking
and being. All realisms are committed to the thesis that it is possible toknow something of beings independent of their being-for-thought, yet
this is precisely what is precluded by the correlationist gesture. Here it
is important to be precise. Correlationism is not the thesis of subjective
idealisms whereby esse est percipi or where to be is to be perceived.
Subjective and absolute idealism are only two variations of correlationism.
The correlationist need not be committed to the thesis that there is nobeing apart from thought. Indeed, most correlationists are committed tothe thesis that there is something other than thought. Kant, for example,
held that in addition to phenomena (beings for-us) things-in-themselves
exist. The correlationist merely argues that we have no access to thesebeings that are apart from thought and can therefore only speak of being as
it is for-us. And here we find the categorical dividing line between realisms

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Levi R. Bryant

and anti-realisms or correlationisms: for the anti-realist or correlationist,claims about beings are never claims about beings-in-themselves orbeings apart from us, but are always and only claims about beings as they
manifest themselves to us. For the realist, by contrast, claims about objects
really are claims about objects and not objects as they are for-us or only in
relation to us.
As a consequence, it becomes clear that, for the correlationist, objects
take on the status of fictions. Because objects can no longer be equated withthings-in-themselves, because objects are only ever objects for-us and neverthings as they are independent of us, objects become phenomena or are
reduced to actual or possible manifestations to us. Philosophy now shifts
from being a debate about the nature of things-in-themselves or substance,
to a debate about the mechanisms by which phenomena are produced or
structured. Is it mind that structures phenomena? Language? Power?
Intentionality? Embodied experience? Such are but a handful of the options
that have been entertained by contemporary theory.
At the heart of correlationism it is thus clear that there is a profoundanthropocentrism, for where it is held that being can never be thought in its
existence apart from thought, it becomes clear that any claims about being
ultimately harbor the implicit colophon that claims about being are claims
about being for humans. Moreover, despite declarations of anti-humanismon the part of both Heidegger and the structuralists and post-structuralists,
it is clear that these anti-humanisms bring us no closer to realism. For, to
put it crudely, what the anti-humanisms object to is not the correlationist
thesis of a necessary relation between being and thought such that thetwo can never be thought apart from one another, but rather the mannerin which humanisms situate the primordial correlation in the minds ofindividual knowers. Thus, for example, structuralist and post-structuralistanti-humanisms emphasize the autonomy and independence of language
and social relations. Here the argument runs that it is not sovereign subjects
that are calling the shots, but rather language and/or social relations. What
the structuralist and post-structuralist anti-humanists wish to examineis the manner in which language and social relations are determinativeof the actions of individuals and how, if Althusser is to be followed, theindividual itself is an effect of these more primordial agencies. It nowChapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

39

follows that these impersonal and anonymous agencies are the condition
for manifestation, not individual human minds. World, the story goes, is
not a construction of the mind of human individuals or transcendental
subjectivity, but of impersonal and anonymous social structures.
However, while anti-humanisms rescue philosophy from its focus on
individual minds, allowing us to discern the sway of far more impersonal
and anonymous patterns and structures at work in the heart of thought andsocial relations, it by no means follows that anti-humanism has escaped
anthropocentrism. For social relations, economic relations, and language
are nonetheless human phenomena, even where the human is discursively
constructed, and it therefore follows that we remain within the orbit ofanthropocentrism; for just as we began humanistically with the premisethat we cannot know what being might be independent of our thinking of
being, we now conclude that our claims about being are claims about being
in relation to or correlation with language, power, or social relations. The
question of what the world might be like apart from humans is, for both thehumanists and the anti-humanists, entirely foreclosed.

1.2. Breaking the Correlationist Circle
With correlationism, the question of ontology is no longer, “what is beingqua being?” but rather, “what is being qua Dasein?” or, “what is being qua
language?” or, “what is being qua power?” or, “what is being qua history?”
or, “what is being qua the lived body?” and many other avatars besides.
While disputes among these various formulations of the correlation
are heated, we are nonetheless faced with a series of anthropomorphic
determinations such that being is always to be thought in relation tosome aspect of the human. Protagoras, in one form or another, rules theday. What we thus get is not a democracy of objects or actants where all
objects are on equal ontological footing and the philosopher can be just as
interested in questions of how, to evoke Harman's favorite example, cotton
relates to fire as she is in questions of how humans relate to mangoes, butinstead a monarchy of the human in relation to all other beings where someinstance of the human is treated as that which overdetermines all otherbeings and where the primary order of the day is always to determine how40Levi R. Bryant

individual minds relate to other objects or how the social and cultural
relates to being. If, as Žižek contends, metaphysics, in the pejorative senseof ontotheology, consists in elevating a part to the ground of the whole,then the anthropocentrism of correlationism is metaphysical through andthrough despite its protestations to the contrary or its characterizations ofitself as a critique of metaphysics.15 Correlationism is ontotheology with thehuman in the place of God.
Our question is two-fold: on the one hand, what are the philosophicalpremises that led correlationism to become such a persuasive position incontemporary philosophy? On the other hand, is there a way to twist freefrom the correlationist deadlock so as to convincingly defend a genuinely
post-humanist, realist ontology? A post-humanist, realist ontology is not ananti-human ontology, but is rather, as we will later see, an ontology where
humans are no longer monarchs of being but are instead among beings,
entangled in beings, and implicated in other beings. In this section, I willaddress the second of these questions through a foray into the early thoughtof the philosopher of science Roy Bhaskar. This discussion will also set thestage for my later discussion of the ontology of objects. Ironically, it turns
out that the way out of correlationism is to be found through transcendental
argumentation. But here I am getting ahead of myself.
Before outlining Bhaskar's defense of ontological realism, it is firstnecessary to express a note of caution. In his early work, and especially
A Realist Theory of Science on which I will lean heavily here, Bhaskar is
primarily interested in the ontology of science. Within the context of thepresent book, this poses special dangers as readers might arrive at the
mistaken impression that I am arguing that the objects of the naturalsciences are exhaustive of being as such. In short, one might conclude
that I advocate the thesis that being and the objects of the natural world
are synonymous. As I develop Bhaskar's argument for a realist theory ofscience, my aim is not to defend naturalism as the one true ontology, butrather to unfold the argument by which he arrives at a realist ontology. And
here I am only interested in the ontological dimension of his argument. As
Bhaskar writes,
Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way ofgrappling with this central paradox of science: that men inChapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

41

their social activity produce knowledge which is a social
product much like any other, which is no more independentof its production and the men who produce it than motorcars, armchairs or books, which has its own craftsmen,
technicians, publicists, standards and skills and which is noless subject to change than any other commodity. This is one
side of 'knowledge'. The other is that knowledge is 'of' things
which are not produced by men at all: the specific gravity of
mercury, the process of electrolysis, the mechanism of lightpropagation. None of these 'objects of knowledge' depend on
human activity. If men ceased to exist sound would continue
to travel and heavy bodies fall to the earth in exactly the sameway, though ex hypothesi there would be no one to know it.16
Bhaskar refers to these two dimensions of knowledge as the transitive
and the intransitive respectively. The transitive refers to the dimension of
the social in the production of knowledge, such as inherited discourses,
scientific training, institutions, and so on. By contrast, the intransitiverefers to the domain of being that would exist regardless of whether or not
humans know of them. We can thus say that Bhaskar, in his philosophy ofscience, wishes to reconcile something like the insights of Kuhn's Structureof Scientific Revolutions17 or Foucault's Order of Things (the transitive orsocial dimension of knowledge production), with a realist ontology ofscience (the intransitive dimension). In the present context, my focus ison Bhaskar's arguments on behalf of realist ontology and therefore theintransitive, though readers should not conclude from this that the social
dimension through which knowledge is produced is ignored.
As subsequent chapters of this book will hopefully demonstrate, thedomain of real being advocated by onticology is far broader than thedomain of beings belonging to the natural world. Put differently, natural
beings constitute a subset of the category of real beings. In addition tonatural beings, onticology also counts technologies, symbolic entities,
fictional entities, groups, nations, works of art, possible beings, artificial
entities, and many other entities besides as belonging to the domain of real
being. Bhaskar's arguments for the reality of natural entities thus functions

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Levi R. Bryant

as a launching point for ontology, but is by no means exhaustive of thedomain of real beings.
Consequently, second, the ontology defended in these pages will expand
significantly on the ontology Bhaskar proposes in A Realist Theory of Science,going, I believe, well beyond what he proposes in his own ontology. Thus,
while I am deeply indebted to the ontology Bhaskar proposes in A Realist
Theory of Science, it should not be assumed that the ontology presupposedby onticology is identical to the ontology proposed by Bhaskar's
transcendental realism. In what follows, there will be many points of overlap
between these ontologies, and many points of divergence as well. My aim
in this book is not to provide a commentary on Bhaskar's ontology, nor toremain true to his ontology, but rather to develop a post-humanist, realist
theory of being capable of breaking with correlationism, that is nonethelesscapable of integrating the most important and significant findings of thecorrelationists.
Bhaskar's defense of ontological realism begins with a very simple
transcendental question: “...what must the world be like for science to bepossible?”18 In asking what the world must be like for science to be possible,
Bhaskar is asking a transcendental question and deploying a transcendental
mode of argumentation. The question here is not, “how do we have accessto the world?” or, “how do we know the world?” but rather what must be
presupposed about the nature of the world in order for our scientific practices
to be possible. As Deleuze reminds us, the transcendental is not to be
confused with the transcendent.19 The transcendent refers to that which isabove or beyond something else. For example, God, if it exists, is perhaps
transcendent to the world. The transcendental, by contrast, refers to thatwhich is a condition for some other practice, form of cognition, or activity.
Thus, for example, perhaps speech requires language as its transcendental
condition. If this is the case, then it would be because the condition underwhich it is possible for two people to communicate requires the existenceof a shared code in the form of language. The conditions under which it
is possible for me to speak to you would here lie in both of us sharing thesame language, whether language be something minimal like gestures orsomething very complex like chains of signifiers capable of self-reflexively
commenting on themselves. By contrast, the referent of speech would,Chapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

43

perhaps, be transcendent to both language and speech. If the referent ofspeech is transcendent to speech, then this is because 1) we can speak
about fictional entities that have no physical referent or, 2) we can speak ofentities in their absence, and 3) we can speak of speech itself, transforming
speech into an object. Too often questions of the transcendental have been
confused with questions of the transcendent. The point, however, is thattranscendental questions are questions about what renders a particular
practice or activity possible. Transcendental questions are questions of whata particular practice requires to take place and refer to what is immanent tothese practices.
Additionally it should be noted that transcendental questions are
not foundationalist in character. Transcendental questions do not seek anabsolutely secure and unassailable foundation for knowledge or practice,but merely ask, “given such and such a practice, what must be the casein order for this practice to be possible?” As such, transcendental inquirysidesteps the epistemological project inaugurated by Descartes and socompellingly critiqued by Hume, by disavowing the project of seeking for
an absolute foundation for knowledge.
Yet already, with Bhaskar's question, we sense that the air or atmosphereis very different. Bhaskar does not ask what the mind must be like forscience to be possible, but rather what the world must be like for science
to be possible. In framing the question of science in this way, Bhaskar
shifts the transcendental question from the domain of epistemology to thedomain of ontology. The world itself must be a particular way for science tobe possible, not the mind. And if Bhaskar's deployment of transcendental
argument is ironic as a defense of realism, it is for precisely this reason.
For beginning with Kant, who first explicitly invented the transcendental
model of argument, all subsequent models of transcendental argument
have either traced the conditions of certain forms of practice back to mind
or some variant of the social. Yet with Bhaskar we here have a thoroughinversion of this mode of argumentation. The question is no longer, “whatmust the mind be like for X to be possible?” nor, “what must the social
be like for X to be possible?” but rather, “what must the world be like for
X to be possible?” And in this way Bhaskar already shifts transcendental
philosophy out of its constraint to some form of transcendental idealism or44Levi R. Bryant

anti-realism, and shifts it to the framework of transcendental realism. For inasking what the world must be like for science to be possible, we begin withthe premise of a world apart from and independent of human beings.
Thus, elsewhere, in a gloss on the nature of transcendental
argumentation, Bhaskar will write,
If philosophy is to be possible (and I want to contend
that it is in practice indispensable) then it must follow
the Kantian road. But in doing so it must both avoid any
commitment to the content of specific theories and recognize
the conditional nature of all its results. Moreover, it must
reject two presuppositions which were central to Kant's own
philosophical project, viz. that in any inquiry of the form
'what must be the case for ϕ to be possible?' the conclusion,X, would be a fact about us and that ϕ must invariably standfor some universal operation of mind. That is to say, it must
reject the idealist and individualist cast into which Kant
pressed his own inquiries.20
To this I would add that we must avoid the conclusion that any answer
to the question, “what must be the case for ϕ to be possible?” must refer
to society, language, or power. In effect, Bhaskar thus proposes a desuturation of transcendental modes of argumentation from mind and thesocial. To suture is to tie, and in this respect all correlationism is a suture.
The mark of any and every correlationism is a suture of being to the humanin some form or another. Thus, a de-suturing would amount to an untying
and systematic separation of the domains of being and thought, thereby
undermining the reign of Protagoras in the modern era. Yet, nonetheless, as
promising as this strategy of de-suturation sounds, we require compelling
reasons to follow Bhaskar in this de-suturation of being and thought, or inthis move directly from mind to world.
Bhaskar argues that the condition under which science is possible is theexistence of what he calls “intransitive objects” which are real structuresthat exist independently of our minds and that are often “out of phase” withactual patterns of events.21 As Bhaskar articulates it,Chapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

45...the intransitive objects of knowledge are in generalinvariant to our knowledge of them: they are the real thingsand structures, mechanisms and processes, events andpossibilities of the world; and for the most part they are quite
independent of us. They are not unknowable, because as amatter of fact quite a bit is known about them... But neither
are they in any way dependent upon our knowledge, let alone
perception, of them.22
The claim that intransitive objects are invariant to our knowledge of themis not equivalent to the claim that intransitive objects are invariant. Rather,
the point is that these objects would do what they do regardless of whether
anyone knew about them or perceived them. The claim that intransitive
objects can be “out of phase” with actual patterns of events is the claimthat these intransitive objects can act or be dormant, thereby not producing
certain events that they would produce in other settings or contexts.
So far we know what Bhaskar claims are the transcendental conditionsof scientific practice, but we do not know why Bhaskar claims these are
the transcendental conditions of science. Indeed, as it stands, it sounds
as if he is dogmatically affirming the existence of mind-independent
objects without providing any grounds as to why these objects must be
presupposed by scientific practice. Here everything turns on Bhaskar's
thesis that intransitive objects can be “out of phase” with actual patterns ofevents and the nature of experiment in scientific practice. “The intelligibilityof experimental activity presupposes not just the intransitivity but thestructured character of the objects investigated under experimental
conditions”.23 But why is this so? According to Bhaskar,...an experiment is necessary precisely to the extent that thepattern of events forthcoming under experimental conditions
would not be forthcoming without it. Thus in an experiment
we are a causal agent of the sequence of events, but not of
the causal law which the sequence of events, because it has
been produced under experimental conditions, enables us
to identify.24

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To understand Bhaskar's point, it is necessary to compare his thesis
here to that advocated by sense-data empiricism. “A causal law is analysedin empiricist ontology as a constant conjunction of events perceived (orperceptions)”.25 Borne out of foundationalist aspirations, the empiricist
attempts to eradicate all unfounded ontological presuppositions byresolving to tarry with what is given in sensations alone. For example, forthe empiricist there is no deeper fact independent of the sensations. I
now regard a clementine with relish. This clementine just is, for the sensedata empiricist, the sheen of orange and roundness I see before me, thefragrant citrus scent that fills my nostrils, the refreshing coolness I feel as
I now touch it, and so on. What we call a clementine, for the empiricist,is a bundle of sensations that my mind has unified together through theoperations of association. If, according to the empiricist, there is moreto the clementine than these sensations afford me, if it has independent
existence in its own right, then I can know nothing about it for I only
ever have access to the object through these sensations. Therefore theempiricist, practicing a sort of critical vigilance, decides to cut the real
independent object out of the discussion altogether as an unjustified
metaphysical residue, restricting philosophical discussion to what is given insensation alone.
When the empiricist arrives at discussions of causality, she thus has norecourse but to discuss claims about causality as claims about constantconjunctions of events or impressions. For the empiricist, a causal claim is
no more nor less than a constant conjunction of sensations in experience.
Above all, causal claims are not claims about powers that reside in objects,
precisely because we have no access to these hidden powers. As Humeputs it, “[t]he bread which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body ofsuch sensible qualities, was, at that time, endowed with such secret powers:
But does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time,
and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret
powers?”26 What we are given is not the powers of the object—in thiscase bread—but rather a constant connection of sensations: the visualappearance of the bread followed by the sensations of our painful hunger
being satiated. The causal relation is nothing but the mental association ofthese sensations in the order of time.

Chapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

47

We are now in a position to better appreciate Bhaskar's point. Were
the empiricist thesis correct, there would be no point to the activityof experiment, for causal knowledge would be nothing but constantconjunctions of events presented in sensations. For the empiricist
experiment must be unintelligible precisely because the idea of hidden
or disguised powers of objects is banished by the empiricist reductionthat resolves to treat being only in terms of what is present or given insensations. Accordingly, elsewhere, in a moment of humor, Bhaskar
will write that...the Humean account depends upon a misidentificationof causal laws with their empirical grounds. Notice thatas human activity is in general necessary for constantconjunctions, if one identifies causal laws with them then one
is logically committed to the absurdity that human beings, intheir experimental activity, cause and even change the lawsof nature!27
This absurdity would follow from the claim that causal relations arenothing more than constant conjunctions of events or sensation, forbidding
any hidden powers in objects, thereby leaving the only site for the
emergence of new sensations in the experimenter.

1.3. The Onto-Transcendental Grounds of Experimental Activity
Bhaskar thus concludes that the transcendental conditions under which
experimental activity is intelligible are ontological in character. In orderfor experimental activity to be intelligible, it is the world, not our minds,that must be a certain way. And the world must be this way regardless ofwhether any science takes place or whether any sentient beings exist to
engage in something approximating science. Above all it is necessary that 1)
objects be intransitive to our knowledge, perception, or discourse about
objects, and that 2) it be possible for objects to be out of phase with actual
events. I will address the second of these points first.
If we must draw an ontological distinction between objects and the events
they generate to understand the intelligibility of scientific practice, then this48

Levi R. Bryant

is precisely because objects do not ordinarily or regularly produce constantconjunctions of events. Constant conjunctions of events are the exception
rather than the rule, and it is for this reason that we engage in experimental
practice. In this connection, Bhaskar draws a distinction between open andclosed systems. Closed systems are systems where constant conjunctions ofevents obtain. Open systems are, by contrast, systems where the powers ofobjects are either not acting or are rather disguised or hidden by virtue ofthe intervention of other causes. Open systems are the norm rather thanthe exception. And within open systems or entanglements of objects, thepowers of discrete objects are often veiled or inactive. It is here that we
encounter the rationale behind experimental activity. As Bhaskar puts it,
Now once it is granted that mechanisms and structures may
be said to be real, we can provide an interpretation of the
independence of causal laws from patterns of events, anda fortiori of the rationale of experimental activity. For thereal basis of this independence lies in the independence ofthe generative mechanisms of nature from the events theygenerate. Such mechanisms endure even when not acting;and act in their normal way even when the consequents of the
law-like statements they ground are, owing to the operation ofintervening mechanisms or countervailing causes, unrealized.
It is the role of the experimental scientist to exclude suchinterventions, which are usual; and to trigger the mechanism
so that it is active. The activity of the mechanism may thenbe studied without interference [...]. It is only under closed
conditions that there will be a one-to-one relationshipbetween the causal law and the sequence of events.28
We thus have an ontological distinction between objects or generative
mechanisms on the one hand, and events, on the other. If experimental
activity is necessary, then this is because generative mechanisms can bedormant, inactive, or veiled by the agency of other objects or generative
mechanisms. Nonetheless, it is generative mechanisms or objects that are
responsible for the production of events. As Bhaskar will remark further on,“[t]he world consists of things, not events. Most things are complex objects,

Chapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

49

in virtue of which they possess an ensemble of tendencies, liabilities andpowers. It is by reference to the exercise of their tendencies, liabilities andpowers that the phenomena of the world are explained”.29
Because things, objects, or generative mechanisms can be out ofphase with events, experimental activity is required to produce closed
systems so that the relation between generative mechanisms and eventsmight be discovered. To illustrate this point, Bhaskar provides a diagram
distinguishing between the domains of the real, the actual, and theempirical:30
Domain of Real

Domain of Actual

Mechanisms

X

EventsX

X

Experiences

X

X

Domain of EmpiricalX

The domain of the empirical reduces events to experiences and excludes
mechanisms altogether. As we saw in the case of Hume's empiricism, only
sensations are given. In the domain of the actual, some events may be
experiencable, yet there can be many events that we are yet to experienceand even other events that are beyond the possibility of any experience.
Moreover, events or actualities can be out of phase with mechanisms,
objects, or things. Finally, the domain of mechanisms or the real is inclusiveof both mechanisms, events, and experiences without the requirement thatthese categories overlap or always occur together. Thus there can be thepresence of mechanisms without the presence of events or experiences, andthere can be the presence of events without anyone about to experience
them or anyone even capable of experiencing them. Zebras run across thesavannah just fine without the aid of our gaze.
Bhaskar drives his point home rather dramatically by claiming
the condition under which experimental practice is intelligible lies in
the possibility of “a world without men”.31 Initially this thesis sounds
paradoxical in that it is humans and perhaps other sentient beings that
conduct experiments. However, Bhaskar's point lies elsewhere. He is not
making the absurd claim that experiment requires no humans or sentient
beings to conduct experiments—it does—but rather that because constantconjunctions of events ordinarily require humans or some other sentient

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Levi R. Bryant

being to produce them, because constant conjunctions of events are not
the rule but the exception, and because generative mechanisms or objects
are ordinarily out of phase with events or actualities, the intelligibility of
our experimental activity is premised on the possibility of a world without
humans where objects reside in the world unrealized and unwitnessed,
and without producing certain actualities such as those we find in theexperimental setting.
Consequently, Bhaskar's thesis is radically opposed to something like
Lacan's claim that the universe is the flower of rhetoric. Such a thesis ismisguided on two grounds: first, this thesis conflates propositions about
the world with the world itself. Yet the world requires no propositions
about the world to be the world. Second, and more importantly, this thesis
renders experimental activity completely incoherent because science does
not begin with true propositions, but seeks to create closed systems (where
possible) so as to trigger generative mechanisms and thereby produce or
uncover constant conjunctions of events. Were the world the totality of true
propositions or constructed by language, this activity would be most peculiar
indeed as there would be no unknown generative mechanisms to uncover inthe experimental setting. In other words, the intelligibility of experimental
practice is premised on the ontological supposition of generative mechanisms
or objects independent of that activity.
And it is for this reason also that the condition for the intelligibilityof experimental activity is the existence of objects that are intransitive or
independent of mind and perception. For if objects were dependent on
mind, perception, or culture, then there would be nothing to discover inthe closed systems produced in the experimental setting. Consequently, notonly are intransitive objects the premise of experimental activity, but thegenerative mechanisms discovered in experimental activity are also treatedas operative in open systems once they are discovered, despite the fact thatthey operate in open systems in a fashion where the events they are capableof producing go unrealized because the mechanism is either dormant or
countervailed by other generative mechanisms.
Bhaskar thus argues that claims about generative mechanisms aretransfactual. Experimental activity does not show that constant conjunctionsof events must always be operative in open systems, but rather that

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51

where these generative mechanisms exist without producing actualities
or events, they are nonetheless operative in these open systems. Bhaskarthus argues that generative mechanisms must be understood as tendencies
or powers. “[T]endencies are potentialities which may be exercised oras it were 'in play' without being realized or manifest in any particularoutcome”.32 Needless to say, a tendency or power is a real feature ofobjects themselves, a feature of the being of objects, and not the being ofobjects for-us. Moreover, the distinction between generative mechanisms
or objects with their tendencies or powers and events or actualities isan ontological distinction, not a distinction pertaining to our knowledge.
Events are real beings or occurrences produced by generative mechanisms,
and generative mechanisms are real entities with the power to produce
these events. Thus the transcendental conditions Bhaskar uncovers for theintelligibility of experimental practice are thoroughly ontological and realist
in character. They are features of the world itself and not the mind thatregards the world.
Already we can sense just how far we are from Kant and Hume, bothof whom have influenced contemporary theory so deeply, albeit in an often
subterranean fashion. Where both Kant and Hume call for an investigationof mind when raising questions of knowledge, Bhaskar calls for aphilosophical investigation of the world. For Bhaskar, it is ontology that isfirst philosophy, not epistemology. More importantly, where both Kant andHume treat claims about causality as claims about constant conjunctionsof events, Bhaskar vigorously rejects the thesis that claims about causality
are claims about constant conjunctions of events on the grounds that
constant conjunctions of events are the exception rather than the rule,and instead argues that claims about causality are claims about generative
mechanisms that may or may not produce certain events depending on
their entanglements with other objects.
Additionally, it will be noted that the ontology proposed by Bhaskar
is immune to the charge of being a naïve realism. The charge of naïve
realism is a favorite lazy rejoinder of anti-realist and correlationist styles ofargument whenever encountering a defense of realism. Now, naïve realismis the thesis that the world is exactly as we perceive or experience it. It is,in short, the thesis that the qualities we perceive in an object truly belong

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Levi R. Bryant

to the object itself regardless of whether anyone perceives that object.
However, it is clear that nothing could be further from Bhaskar's position.
In distinguishing between generative mechanisms or objects and eventsor actualities, in noting the manner in which objects behave differently inopen and closed systems, Bhaskar underlines the manner in which objects
are withdrawn from any qualities they might happen to manifest. Putotherwise, a key feature of Bhaskar's argument is that objects or generative
mechanisms cannot be equated with or reduced to their qualities. I shallhave much more to say about this later when I deal with exo-relations or
relations between generative mechanisms or objects, but for the moment it
is sufficient to note that the ontology proposed by Bhaskar is anathema to
any variant of naïve realism.

1.4. Objections and Replies
No doubt a number of objections will have arisen in the mind of thereader sympathetic to the correlationist line of argument. In particular,
three lines of argument can be anticipated: First, that the realist ontology
and transcendental line of argument proposed by Bhaskar purports toknow objects a priori before knowing them; second, that it is impossible toimagine a world without men because we still imagine ourselves as being
present to this world in our absence to this world; and third, in a closely
related vein, that it is impossible to think anything without, as it were,
including ourselves in the picture of what is to be thought. I will addresseach of these objections in their turn.
The first of these arguments is the easiest to dispatch. What thisargument purports is that realist ontology claims to know before weknow. Through this line of attack it hopes to establish the primacy of
epistemology over ontology, or that epistemology is, in fact, first philosophy.
For, the argument runs, how can ontology make claims about the being of
being without first knowing these beings? As Bhaskar formulates this lineof argument, “ontology is dependent upon epistemology since what we
can know to exist is merely a part of what we can know”.33 I suspect that
this line of argument, more than any other, motivates the subordinationof ontology to epistemology and the treatment of ontology as “onto-Chapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

53

epistemology”. This seems to follow as obvious: to speak of being, wemust know being and therefore an inquiry into knowledge or epistemology
must precede any discussion of being. Heidegger, for example, argues that
before we can even formulate the question of the meaning of being (it’snoteworthy that he formulates this question as a question of meaning rather
than a question of what being is) we must first investigate Dasein's onticontological pre-comprehension of being.34 Nothing could be more obvious.
However, as Bhaskar argues,
this defense trades upon a tacit conflation of philosophicaland scientific ontologies. For if 'what we can know to exist'
refers to a possible content of a scientific theory then that it ismerely a part of what we can know is an uninteresting truism.
But a philosophical ontology is developed by reflection upon
what must be the case for science to be possible; and this isindependent of any actual scientific knowledge. Moreover, it
is not true, even from the point of view of the immanent logic
of a science, that what we can know to exist is just a part ofwhat we can know. For a law may exist and be known to exist
without our knowing the law. Much scientific research has
in fact the same logical character as detection. In a piece ofcriminal detection, the detective knows that a crime has beencommitted and some facts about it but he does not know, orat least cannot yet prove, the identity of the criminal.35
Ontology does not tell us what objects exist, but that objects exist,
that they are generative mechanisms, that they cannot be identified with
events, actualities, or qualities, and that they behave differently in open
and closed systems. These are ontological premises necessary to render our
experimental activity intelligible. It is the job of actual inquiry to discoverwhat objects exist. However, if inquiry is to be intelligible then it must
begin with the premise that there are objects that act independently ofthis inquiry.
A second line of argument holds that it is impossible to intelligibly thinka world without men because, in the very act of thinking such a world,
we are picturing ourselves as present to this world. The thesis here is that

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every picturing of the world includes ourselves in that picture. However,as Quentin Meillassoux has convincingly argued, such a line of argument
leads to the conclusion that the thought of our own death is unintelligibleor that we are necessarily immortal. For if it is true that we cannot think theworld without thinking our presence to the world, then it follows that eventhe thought of our own death requires the presence of our thinking, thereby
undermining the possibility of dying. As Meillassoux formulates this line ofargument, “I can only think of myself as existing, and as existing the way I
exist; thus, I cannot but exist, and always exist as I exist now”.36
Such is the argument of absolute idealists that 1) denies the existence ofan in-itself apart from thought, and 2) argues that the correlation between
being and thought is absolute or reality itself, i.e. that there is nothing apartfrom correlation (Berkeley and Hegel, though in very different ways). In
response to this line of argument, Meillassoux cites the agnostic—thecorrelationist that concedes the possible existence of the in-itself apart fromthought while maintaining the index of all thought to phenomena or beingfor-us—pointing out that,
In order to counter the latter [the strong or absolutecorrelationist], the agnostic has no choice: she must maintainthat my capacity-to-be-wholly-other in death (whether
dazzled by God, or annhilated) is just as thinkable as mypersisting in my self-identity. The 'reason' for this is that I
think myself as devoid of any reason for being and remaining
as I am, and it is the thinkability of this unreason—of thisfacticity—which implies that the other three theses—those of
the two realists and the idealist—are all equally possible. For
even if I cannot think of myself, for example, as annihilated,neither can I think of any cause that would rule out thiseventuality.37
While I do not follow Meillassoux in his inference from the contingencyof our being to the contingency of being as such (I await a clearer
formulation of this argument), I do believe his argument here hits the mark.
If it is conceded that our annihilation is, in principle, thinkable, then we arealso conceding that a world without humans is thinkable. For to think ourChapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

55

annihilation just is to think a world where we are absent. Yet if this is thecase, then the correlationist argument that it is impossible to think a formof being apart from thought is severely challenged.
Here it must be emphasized that Meillassoux's argument does not reston establishing that we are annihilated with death or that we know thatdeath entails the extinction of our being. As unlikely as it is given what
we have come to know about the relationship between mind and brain, it
could be that we persist after death. All that is required for Meillassoux's
argument is that our extinction or annihilation be thinkable as a possibility.
And if it is thinkable as a possibility—a point that seems amply supported
by people's anxieties about death—then it also follows that it is possible tothink a world without humans.
A final, and closely related line of argument, revolves around thereflexivity of thought. Here the idea is that it is impossible to think anything
without simultaneously thinking that I am thinking it. Like the second
objection, this objection revolves around the thesis that the thinker isalways included in the picture of what she thinks. Thus, for example, as
I think about making myself a cup of coffee, it is held that I must also beaware of thinking that I am thinking about making myself a cup of coffee.
All thought, therefore, must include the thought of the thought in theactivity of the thinking. As such, all thought must necessarily be reflexive ormust simultaneously be aware of the object that it thinks and the fact that
it is thinking this thought. And if this is the case, then it follows that thethinker must be included in the thought of any being other than thought,
and that therefore it is impossible to escape the correlation between
thought and being.
As Meillassoux amusingly puts it in his Goldsmith's talk, thought turns
out to be like a bit of dual adhesive tape one attempts to remove from one’s
finger.38 This talk was the occasion of a conference organized by Alberto
Toscano, where Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman,
and Meillassoux each gave talks. It was here that the term “speculative
realism” was used for the first time. In his talk, Meillassoux illustrated thecorrelationist argument through analogy to a dual adhesive bit of tape stuck
to a person’s finger. Each time she attempts to remove the tape it ends
up sticking to another finger, such that the tape is inescapable. Likewise,

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if thought indeed has this character of reflexivity as a characteristic thatalways accompanies thought, then it follows that correlation or thought isinescapable. Such is the import of Descartes' famous analysis of the wax inthe second meditation. As Descartes writes,
What, I ask, am I who seem to perceive this wax so distinctly?
Do I not know myself not only much more truly andwith greater certainty, but also much more distinctly andevidently? For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that
I see it, certainly from this same fact that I see the wax it
follows much more evidently that I myself exist. For it could
happen that what I see is not truly wax. It could happen that
I have no eyes with which to see anything. But it is utterly
impossible that, while I see or think I see […], I who think am
not something. Likewise, if I judge that the wax exists fromthe fact that I touch it, the same outcome will again obtain,
namely that I exist.39
Descartes' innocent little thesis here has been the source of muchmischief in subsequent philosophy and is one of the root premises ofcorrelationist thought. Whether we are speaking of Kant's transcendental
unity of apperception which is treated as something that must accompany
all thought40, or Hegel's dialectical gymnastics where it is shown that thethinker is always included in the thought41, the root of these claims traces
back to Descartes' thesis that all thought is necessarily reflexive. It is
this, for example, that will ultimately allow Hegel to assert the identity of
substance and subject in The Phenomenology of Spirit.
However, is this seemingly obvious thesis truly so obvious? Meillassoux
believes that this is a powerful argument that must be addressed. I’m notso sure. Is it self-evident that any thought must include the thinker or thatthe thinker is thinking the thought? While I certainly concede the thesisthat in many instances we are capable of self-reflexively thinking the thoughtthat we are thinking a thought, I am much more circumspect about theclaim that all thought is necessarily reflexive. Were this the case, then it
would seem that thought is impossible, for we would fall into an infinite
regress. Thus, as I sit here thinking that I would like to make myself a cup

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57

of coffee, I would, if the reflexivity thesis were true, have to think that I
am thinking that I would like to make myself a cup of coffee. But since it
is asserted that all thought is reflexive, I would additionally have to thinkthat I am thinking that I am thinking that I would like to make a cup ofcoffee, and so on to infinity. Yet if this were what truly takes place in theactivity of thought, thought would be paralyzed. As Bhaskar puts it, “[i]t is
possible for A to think ε and be aware of thinking ε without thinking about
thinking ε; and unless this were so no-one could ever intelligently think”.42
What we need here is something like Sartre's “pre-reflexive cogito” which
thinks something without simultaneously thinking itself.43 Yet if such a cogito
is possible, and indeed it appears necessary, then we have a thinking that
doesn't simultaneously posit itself but which is completely absorbed in what
we are thinking.

1.5. Origins of Correlationism:
Actualism and the Epistemic Fallacy
In 1.2 I raised the question of what philosophical premises rendercorrelationism such an appealing and persuasive hypothesis. We are
now in a position to answer this question. In A Realist Theory of Science,
Bhaskar identifies “actualism” as the root premise that ultimately leads tocorrelationism. As articulated by Bhaskar,'actualism' [...] refer[s] to the doctrine of the actuality of
causal laws; that is, to the idea that laws are relations between
events or states of affairs (which are thought to constitute theobjects of actual or possible experiences). Behind this idea ofcourse lies the notion that only the actual (identified as thedeterminate object of the empirical) is real.44
Here it should be noted that actualism does not treat the actual as
events that take place in the world regardless of whether or not anyone isabout to witness them, but rather identifies the actual with what is given
in sensations or impressions. Moreover, this hypothesis is not restricted
to empiricists such as Hume, but is also carried over by Kant and his
descendents. Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between classical58

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empiricists, such as Hume, and empiricist ontology. Classical empiricists
hold that knowledge arises from sensation alone. Empiricist ontology holds
that only the actual, construed as what is given in atomistic sensations, isreal; or, at any rate, is all that we can speak of.
Kant does not question Hume's thesis that our knowledge is restricted
to what is given in impressions or sensations, but rather embraces it
wholesale. And because Kant carries over the actualist thesis of empiricist
ontology, he is committed to the thesis that causal claims are claims about
constant conjunctions of events given in sensation rather than about powers
residing in objects or generative mechanisms that may go unactualized.
Kant's innovation, therefore, does not reside in rejecting Hume's doctrineof impressions, but in recognizing that psychological operations of themind such as the principles of association are insufficient to account for
the necessity we attribute to causal relations. Sensation, Kant contends,
requires supplementation by the mind, for relations are not themselves
directly given in impressions. Consequently, Kant will argue that ourjudgments of necessity arise not from sensations or associations, but rather
from the application of a priori categories of the understanding such as
cause and effect to the manifold of sensations.
Yet Kant and his heirs are only led to the conclusion that sensation
requires supplementation by categories of mind (or culture, language,
norms, or power) as a result of presupposing the actualist hypothesisof empiricist ontology. For where knowledge is restricted to the actual,and the actual is equated with sensation or impressions, relations among
objects become thoroughly mysterious as these relations are not directly
given in the actual. As Harman has persuasively argued, what we get is asecularized form of occasionalism.45 The occasionalist argues that all events
are radically independent of one another. For the occasionalist there is no
direct link between objects. In traditional occasionalisms, God is called
upon to link objects to one another. Thus, when the paper burns it is not
the flame that causes the paper to burn, but rather the intervention of God
that brings the paper and the flame into relation with one another.
If, with Hume and Kant, we get a secularized form of occasionalism,
then this is because the thesis that events, in the form of sense impressions,are absolutely independent of one another and without relation. As such,

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59

mind, rather than God, brings about the relation between events. For Kant,
this linkage takes place through the a priori categories of the understanding
and the a priori forms of intuition in the form of space, while for Humethis linkage is effected through the operations of association. The problem
is that it is unclear how mind acquires this mysterious power to link thatwhich is without linkage and why mind alone should have this privileged
capacity. There is no more reason to think that mind should have thispower than events themselves. However, this problem only emerges where
the real is equated with the actual and the actual is treated as composedof atomistic sensations. Where claims about cause and effect relations are
no longer treated as claims about constant conjunctions of events given inexperience, but about generative mechanisms that may or may not produce
certain events, the problem disappears. Causal claims are not claims about
our experience of objects, but about objects themselves. And wherever weencounter arguments to the effect that sensations require supplementation
by some other agency such as principles of association, categories of theunderstanding, language, signs, norms, and so on, we can be sure that
actualism is lurking in the shadows and that the ontological conditions forthe intelligibility of experimentation have been ignored.
Yet how comes it that we fall into this sort of actualism? Bhaskar
contends that actualism originates in what he calls the “epistemic fallacy”.
As Bhaskar articulates it,
This consists in the view that statements about being canbe reduced to or analyzed in terms of statements aboutknowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always betransposed into epistemological terms. The idea that being
can always be analysed in terms of our knowledge of being,that it is sufficient for philosophy to 'treat only of the
network, and not what the network describes', results in thesystematic dissolution of the idea of a world (which I shallhere metaphorically characterize as an ontological realm)
independent of but investigated by science.46

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Earlier Bhaskar remarks that, “[t]hese presumptions can [...] only be
explained in terms of the need felt by philosophers for certain foundationsof knowledge”.47
Here it is necessary to clarify what the epistemic fallacy is and is notabout. A critique of the epistemic fallacy and how it operates in philosophy
does not amount to the claim that epistemology or questions of the nature ofinquiry and knowledge are a fallacy. What the epistemic fallacy identifies isthe fallacy of reducing ontological questions to epistemological questions,or conflating questions of how we know with questions of what beings are.
In short, the epistemic fallacy occurs wherever being is reduced to ouraccess to being. Thus, for example, wherever beings are reduced to ourimpressions or sensations of being, wherever being is reduced to our talkabout being, wherever being is reduced to discourses about being, wherever
being is reduced to signs through which being is manifest, the epistemic
fallacy has been committed.
We have seen why this is so, for our experimental practice is only
intelligible based on a series of ontological premises and these ontologicalpremises cannot be reduced to our access to being. They are ontologicalin the robust sense. These ontological premises refer not to what ispresent or actual to us. Indeed, they refer, as we will see, to beings that areradically withdrawn from any presence or actuality. And as such, they are
genuinely ontological premises, not epistemological premises pertaining towhat is given.
In recognizing that the epistemic fallacy emerges from foundationalist
aspirations on the part of philosophers, Bhaskar hits the mark. It is thedesire for a secure and certain foundation for knowledge that leads
philosophy to adopt the actualist stance and fall into the epistemic fallacy.
These decisions, in turn, ultimately lead to correlationism. In raising
the question, “how do we know?” and seeking an argument that would
thoroughly defeat the skeptic or sophist, the philosopher concludes that
only what is present or given can defend against the incursions of the skeptic.
But what is present or given turns out either to be mind or sensations.
Therefore the philosopher finds himself in the position of restricting all
being to what is given as actual in sensations. From here a whole cascade ofChapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

61

problematic consequences follow that increasingly lead to the dissolution of
the world as a genuine ontological category.
However, once these foundationalist aspirations are abandoned, thenature of the problem changes significantly and we no longer find ourselvestied to the actualist premise that generates all of these issues. And indeed,
these aspirations should be abandoned, for foundationalism is premisedon the possibility of absolute presence, absolute proximity, the absence of
all absence, and we have now discovered that it is being itself that is split
between generative mechanisms or objects and the actual. Difference,deferral, absence, and so on are not idiosyncracies of our being preventing
us from ever reaching being, but are, rather, ontological characteristics ofbeing as such. Moreover, this split at the heart of all beings is not simply
characteristic of those objects that we would seek to know, but are alsocharacteristics of the peculiar object that we are. We ourselves are split.
If, then, this split is a general ontological feature of the world, then the
dream of presence required for any form of foundationalism is a priori
impossible. We are then left with two paths: to persist in the correlationist
thesis that would reduce ontological questions to epistemological questions
and which is itself implicitly premised on the ontotheological assumptionof actualism, or to investigate the split in being in a post-humanist, realist
fashion that is genuinely ontological. It is the second of these two paths that
I here attempt.

1.6. On the Alleged Primacy of Perception
In response to the preceding line of argument, one might argue thatnonetheless we must identify objects in order to know the being of objects,
and that the identification of an object requires some reference to aperceptual convention. To be an object is to possess a boundary or to be
distinguished from other things, and in order to distinguish one object
from another we must refer to perception. This, then, would be the firststep in the argument, asserting the primacy of epistemology over ontology.
The next step would then consist in pointing out that different creatures
perceive or divide up the world in different ways. Thus, for example, while
I very clearly see a tree, it is unlikely that the amoeba encounters this62

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tree as a tree. Likewise, flowing water encounters no difference between
a frog jumping into its currents, a rock obstructing its path, or a gust ofwind impacting it. The point, then, is not only that we must refer back toepistemology or perceptual conventions to distinguish objects, but that
also, while there is something other than perception (Berkeleyian subjective
idealism is mistaken), there is no reason to suggest that being-in-itself iscomposed of objects or that this something is anything like our perceptionof the world.
This line of argument underlines just why it is so important todistinguish between arguments advanced on ontological grounds andarguments advanced on epistemological grounds. Why is this distinction so
important? The reigning assumption in philosophy since the 17th century
is that questions of epistemology must precede questions of ontology.
The idea here is that we must first know an object before we can begin
talking about the being of objects. This hearkens back to common readingsof Meno's paradox in Plato. In the Meno, Socrates asks, “how can we
inquire into the nature of virtue without first knowing virtue?” And if thisconstitutes a paradox, then this is precisely because if we already know
virtue, then we have no reason to inquire into the nature of virtue.
The question of perception is not a question about the being of objects,
but a question about our access to the being of objects. The point of thequestion is two-fold: first, the claim is that in order to talk about the beingof objects we must first have access to objects. Second, the claim is thatperhaps our access to objects has nothing to do with what reality itself is
like. This is the point of the amoeba and the tree. The amoeba doesn't
encounter the tree as a tree, and thus we should be skeptical of the ideathat entities like trees are independent or real entities at all. The thesis isthus that the being of an object arises not from the object's own independent
structure, but rather from the distinctions the being perceiving it makes.
This is the correlationist gesture par excellence. To be sure, the correlationist
may concede that there is something other than the amoeba, but he wishes
to argue that there's no reason to suppose that this something is anything
like how the amoeba experiences it because the nature of the being that theamoeba perceives is a function of the amoeba's distinctions, not of the beingof this other-being itself.

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63

Let us now return to the difference between arguments that are
ontologically driven and arguments that are epistemologically driven. The
first point to note with respect to the correlationist's argument is that it
seems to ignore the fact that this argument already concedes the existence ofat least one object. What object is that? Certainly not the existence of thetree. Rather, the correlationist concedes the existence of the amoeba. In
order for the amoeba to grasp anything as anything at all, it must exist as
an entity, substance, or object. In short, the correlationist's argument can
only get off the ground through the presupposition of at least one entity.
And this is a central reason that arguments about how observers constituteobjects are unconvincing: these arguments always forget that the observeris an object.
Let us return to the example of the water encountering a rock, frog, orgust of wind. Here the argument was made that these entities aren't distinct
for the water but produce all the same qualitative effects. In chapter four
we will see why this is the case, but for the moment, rather than speaking
about the water, let's instead speak of the relation between a frog and theamoeba. When we discuss the relation between the amoeba and the frog,
we encounter exactly the same problem as the relation between the waterand stones, frogs, and wind: the frog does not distinguish amoebas. The
amoeba does not encounter the frog as a frog, nor does the frog encounterthe amoeba as an amoeba. From the standpoint of the frog's experience,
the amoeba is indistinguishable from air or water. The frog is every bit asindifferent to the existence of the amoeba as an amoeba, as the water isindifferent to the existence of a rock or frog or the wind as a rock, frog, orwind. There is no real difference here. It might as well not exist. However,here's the rub: does the fact of the amoeba's non-existence within the frog’s
Umwelt have anything to do with the amoeba's existence? To claim that it
does is to be led to the peculiar conclusion that it is the entity's distinctions
that make other entities what they are.
Here, then, we arrive at the difference between epistemologically-driven
arguments and ontologically-driven arguments. Epistemologically-driven
arguments will always pitch questions of what beings are in terms of ouraccess to these entities. Rather than asking what beings must be by right,
we instead ask what conventions we use to distinguish entities. However, as64Levi R. Bryant

can be clearly seen, this changes the issue or question. Rather than treating
the question as a question of what beings are, the correlationist insteadtransforms the question into a question of how we know what things are.
And because the correlationist has transformed the question from the issueof what must belong to entities by right in order to be entities, regardlessof whether anyone else knows these entities, to the question of how weknow entities, the correlationist finds himself confronted with the questionof givenness or access. Having transposed a properly ontological question
into an epistemological question, and having thereby arrived at the problemof givenness (the reference to perception) or access, the correlationist now
notices that different entities or observers perceive the world differently, i.e.,that the world is given in different ways to different observers. The amoeba
doesn't encounter the tree as a tree. A person who is colorblind cannot see
the color purple, and so on.
Based on this line of argumentation, we can now see why Bhaskarrefers to the epistemic fallacy as a fallacy. The epistemic fallacy does notlie in raising questions of epistemology. That would be absurd. Of course
we should raise epistemic questions. The epistemic fallacy consists in thethesis that properly ontological questions can be fully transposed into
epistemological questions. Because the correlationist has transformed
questions of what beings are into questions of our access to beings, andbecause questions of access necessarily trace back to questions of givenness,givenness now comes to legislate what exists and what does not exist.
The correlationist is therefore compelled to argue that the tree does notexist or that frogs and rocks don't exist. If this move is problematic, thenthis is because it always finds itself trapped in a self-referential paradox:
to wit, it concedes the existence of at least one entity, and then uses themanner in which that entity observes the rest of the world through its own
distinctions to erase the existence of other entities. Every argument of thissort, driven by how we cognize or perceive the world, will run afoul of thissort of problem.
The point here is that questions of ontology cannot, in any manner,
shape, or form, be reduced to questions of epistemology. Put otherwise,
claims about the being of beings cannot be transposed into claims about
our access to beings. Wherever claims about the being of beings areChapter 1: Grounds For a Realist Ontology

65transposed into questions about our access to beings, we end up withgivenness legislating what exists and what doesn't exist based on what isgiven or accessible, and we thereby find ourselves trapped in a self-defeating
self-referential paradox where we simultaneously concede the existence ofobjects while denying their existence.
As a consequence, claims about the being of entities are arrived at in an
entirely different manner than the epistemological question of access. We
do not begin with our access to beings, but instead ask what the world mustbe like for certain practices to be possible. The object-oriented ontologist
is not claiming that we have access to beings, that they are given, or thatour perception is identical to the way the world is, but that the existenceof substance is a necessary premise for a whole slew of our practices to be
intelligible. In other words, the onticological thesis is that the world must
be a particular way for certain practices and activities like perception,
experimentation, discourse, and so on, to be possible and that the world
would be this way regardless of whether we perceived, experimented, or
discoursed about it.
Perhaps the best way to defeat the correlationist is to shift the termsof the debate. It is almost always the case that the correlationist proceeds
through a discussion of how humans perceive and discourse about theworld. Rather than beginning with humans, however, why not instead
begin with the amoeba? Does the correlationist really wish to claim thatthe amoeba constitutes his being? This conclusion follows directly fromthe correlationist argument about how the amoeba encounters the tree.
If he doesn't wish to arrive at this conclusion, then why? There are only
two possible conclusions here, both of which lead to the collapse of thecorrelationist's argument. The first possible conclusion would be that it is
not possible for the amoeba to constitute the correlationist's being because
humans are somehow special in the order of being by virtue of being theonly beings capable of constituting other beings from the primordial fluxof “other-being”. The second possible argument is that the amoeba doesn't
constitute the correlationist's being through perceiving the correlationist
because the correlationist is a substance or independent being in his own
right and how something perceives another being has nothing to do withthat being's status as a substance.

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Now, one might expect the realist to reject the first possibility on the
grounds that it is anthropocentric. However, while this is true, this is not
my argument. If we follow the correlationist in the first counter-argument(which really is the disavowed, yet fully embraced, implicit premise of all
correlationisms), we have to note that the correlationist has conceded theexistence of at least one object, namely, the correlationist himself. From
here it is but a short step to asking why humans or the correlationist shouldhave this privileged status within the order of being. Moreover, it's quite
remarkable that any being should be able to perform this feat like Atlas
holding the world on his shoulders, carving up a structureless world, apre-individual flux, into discrete packets or units. If we grant the second
argument, then, of course, we've conceded the existence of withdrawn
substances that have their own being regardless of how other substances
perceive them. Those who advise us to observe the observer somehow seemto miss the point that the very act of observing the observer or observing
how other observers observe presupposes the existence of an observer thatis doing the observing of other observers. Far from undermining the thesisthat substances or objects exist, in other words, this move presupposes theexistence of at least one substance or object. And as a consequence, thismove is incapable of consistently maintaining the thesis that the world is a
product of how observers perceive other objects.

Chapter 2
The Paradox of Substance
When the materiality of the glove, the rat, the pollen, thebottle cap, and the stick start to shimmer and spark, it wasin part because of the contingent tableau that they formed
with each other, with the street, with the weather thatmorning, with me. For had the sun not glinted on the black
glove, I might not have seen the rat; had the rat not been
there, I might not have noted the bottle cap, and so on.
But they were all there just as they were, and so I caught a
glimpse of an energetic vitality inside each of these things,
things that I generally conceived as inert. In this assemblage,
objects appeared as things, that is, as vivid entities notentirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) subjects
set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics.
— Jane Bennett 48

2.1. Introduction
From Roy Bhaskar's early work we have learned that, if experimental
practice is to be intelligible, the world must be a particular way. First,
objects must be capable of behaving differently in open and closed systems.
For this reason, the being or substance of generative mechanisms cannot
be identified with its actualized qualities, but must be located elsewhere.

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It is only in closed systems, Bhaskar contends, that constant conjunctionsof events in cause and effect relations obtain. In open systems, by contrast,
objects can remain dormant, producing no events at all, or the interventionof countervailing causes can either a) hide events produced by objects, orb) produce events different from those that the generative mechanism orobject would produce in a closed system by virtue of how entanglementsof objects are woven together. Consequently, second, objects or generative
mechanisms must be distinguished from events or actualities. Objects orgenerative mechanisms are defined not by their qualities or events, butrather by their powers or capacities. An object cannot be without its powers
or capacities, but it can be without its qualities or events. Finally, third, if
it is possible to form closed systems where constant conjunctions of events
can obtain, then it also follows that objects or generative mechanisms must
be independent of their relations.
While I readily concede that objects can enter into relations—howelse would open systems be possible?—it does not follow from this that
objects are their relations. In short, if it is to be possible to form closed
systems in which constant conjunctions of events occasionally obtain as
they sometimes do in experimental settings, then it follows that relations
cannot ontologically be internal to their terms or the objects that they
relate. In other words, objects are not constituted by their relations to therest of the world. While relations to other objects often play a key rolein the precipitation of events or qualities in objects, we must here recall
that objects are not identical to their qualities but are rather the groundof qualities. Accordingly we must distinguish between objects and theirrelations, or rather the structure of objects and the relations into which
objects enter. I call the former “endo-relations” (or, following Graham
Harman, “domestic relations”), and the latter “exo-relations” (or, asHarman calls them, “foreign relations” 49 ). Endo-relations constitutethe internal structure of objects independent of all other objects, while
exo-relations are relations that objects enter into with other objects. Wereobjects constituted by their exo-relations or relations to other objects, thebeing would be frozen and nothing would be capable of movement orchange. It is only where relations are external to objects that such change
can be thought.

Chapter 2: The Paradox of Substance69

Insofar as what Bhaskar calls generative mechanisms are the ground of
events or qualities, they deserve the archaic, Aristotelian name of substance.
Because substances have the power to produce events, I shall refer tothem as difference engines, for the production of an event is the productionof differences in the world. Because difference engines or substances are
not identical to the events or qualities they produce, while nonethelesssubstances, however briefly, endure, the substantial dimension of objects
deserves the title of virtual proper being. And because events or qualities
occur only under particular conditions and in a variety of ways, I will referto events produced by difference engines as local manifestations. Local
manifestations are manifestations because they are actualizations that occur
in the world.
To this list of the properties of substances we can add a fourth: local
manifestations are not to be confused with manifestations to or for a subject,
but are rather events that take place in the world regardless of whether or
not any subjects or sentient beings exist to witness them. Consequently,
local manifestation is not equivalent to the empirical or what is experienced
by a subject. Experience is a subset of local manifestation, but the set
comprised of local manifestations is infinitely larger than the set consistingof experience. In this respect, the category of local manifestation sharessome affinity to Badiou's conception of appearance as appearing without asubject to which appearance appears or is given.50
If, by contrast, local manifestations or events are local, then this isbecause the qualities or events of objects are variable depending on internal
dynamisms in the object or difference engine and the exo-relations into
which the object enters. Consequently, we must not say that an object has
its qualities or that qualities inhere in an object, nor above all that objects
are their qualities, but rather in a locution that cannot but appear grotesqueand bizarre, we must say that qualities are something an object does. The
concept of local manifestation is here designed to capture the context
dependency—whether that context be internal or external—of the events anobject produces in its manifestations.
Finally, insofar as substances are not identical to events or their
qualities—nor, moreover, their exo-relations to other objects—I refer todifference engines as split-objects. The characterization of difference engines

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as split-objects refers not to a physical split such as the idea that objects
can always be broken in half or divided, but rather to the split between thevirtual proper being of objects or their powers and their local manifestationsor qualities. Here the point to be borne in mind is that objects are always inexcess of any of their local manifestations, harboring hidden volcanic powers
irreducible to any of their manifestations in the world. In this respect, theconcept of split-object captures my version of what Graham Harman has
referred to as the “withdrawal” of objects. As Harman puts it, “[t]here
are objects [...] withdrawn absolutely from all relation, but there is also aubiquitous ether of qualities through which these objects interact”.51
Harman defends the withdrawal of objects in a much more radical
sense than I do here; however, there are strong points of overlap between
our positions. Within the framework of onticology, the claim that objects
are withdrawn from other objects is the claim that 1) substances are
independent of or are not constituted by their relations to other objects,
and 2) that objects are not identical to any qualities they happen to locallymanifest. The substantiality of objects is never to be equated with thequalities they produce. Thus, as Harman goes on to remark,If there are objects, then they must exist in some sort ofvacuum-like state, since no relation fully deploys them.
The recent philosophical tendency is to celebrate holistic
interrelations endlessly, and to decry the notion of anythingthat could exist in isolation from all else. Yet this is precisely
what an object does. An object may drift into events andunleash its forces there, but no such event is capable ofputting the object fully into play. Its neighboring objects will
always react to some of its features while remaining blindto the rest. The objects in an event are somehow always
elsewhere, in a site divorced from all relations.52
Onticology finds much to admire in this passage. Like Harman's
object-oriented philosophy, onticology argues that objects or substances
are withdrawn from or independent of their relations to other substances.
Like Harman's object-oriented philosophy, onticology rejects the thesisof holistic interrelations where objects or substances are understood toChapter 2: The Paradox of Substance71

be constituted by their relations to other substances. Finally, like Harman's
object-oriented philosophy, onticology holds that no relation ever deploys
all of the forces contained within an object. The point where onticology
and Harman's object-oriented ontology diverge is on the issue of whether
the independence of objects or substances entails that objects never touchor encounter one another, or that objects, by virtue of their withdrawal,
must be vacuums. Were this the case, it seems that it would be impossible
for any object to ever unleash the forces of another object. Given that
objects often do unleash forces in other objects, it thus appears that objects
must somehow be capable of perturbing one another, while the virtual
proper being of an object forever remains in excess of this encounter and is
nonetheless closed.
In this chapter, my aim is to articulate the structure of substance andthe relationship between virtual proper being and local manifestation in
the production of qualities. However, before proceeding to this task it isfirst necessary to articulate some features of the concept of substance andrespond to what Kenneth Burke has called “the paradox of substance”. If
Burke’s discussion of the paradox of substance in The Grammar of Motives
is here relevant, then this is because what Burke treats as a paradox, andtherefore critique of substance, unwittingly provides us with a fundamental
clue as to the ontological structure of substance and why it is necessarily
characterized by withdrawal.

2.2. Aristotle, Substance, and Qualities
It is often said that Aristotle has an analogical conception of being, holdingthat being is said in many senses. However, as is so often the case in thehistory of philosophy, the issue is more complicated than this; for while
Aristotle does indeed argue that, for example, we use the term “being”
differently when referring to secondary substances (qualities) and primary
substances (individual things or objects), Aristotle also argues that the
primary meaning of being is that of individual things. As Aristotle puts it inbook Z of the Metaphysics,
There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be[...], for in one sense it means what a thing is or a 'this', and72

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in another sense it means that a thing is of a certain quality
or quantity or has some such predicate asserted of it. While'being' has all these senses, obviously that which is primarilyis the 'what', which indicates the substance of a thing [...].
And all other things are said to be because they are, someof them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense,
others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others somedetermination of it. And so one might raise the question
whether 'to walk' and 'to be healthy' and 'to sit' signify in eachcase something that is, and similarly in any other case of thissort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable ofbeing separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it isthat which walks or is seated or is healthy that is an existentthing. Now these are seen to be more real because there issomething definite which underlies them; and this is thesubstance or individual, which is implied in such a predicate;for 'good' or 'sitting' are not used without this. Clearlythen it is in virtue of this category that each of the others
is. Therefore that which is primarily and is simply (not issomething) must be substance.53
To be, for Aristotle, is to be a substance or a thing. All other senses ofbeing, Aristotle argues, ultimately refer back to substance for ultimately
all these other forms of being reside in substances or are made possible
by substances. It is this Aristotelian orientation to the being of being as
substance or individual thing that onticology, and object-oriented ontology
more broadly construed, defends. The question, then, is what precisely is a
substance? It is this question that this book seeks to answer.
Elsewhere, in the Categories, Aristotle gives us an important clue as tothe nature of substance. There Aristotle writes that, “[a] substance—that
which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is thatwhich is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the individual man
or the individual horse”.54 In short, a substance is that which is not predicatedof anything else, and which therefore enjoys independent or autonomous
existence. Color, for example, is always predicated of a substance. Put
differently, color must always reside in something else. The color red isChapter 2: The Paradox of Substance73

never a substance in its own right, but is always in a ball or a strawberry or
lipstick. Qualities reside in substances, they are predicated of substances,whereas substances are not predicated of anything.
Thus Aristotle will remark that, “of the primary substances one is no
more a substance than another: the individual man is no more a substancethan the individual ox”.55 In short, there is an equality of objects, ademocracy of objects, in the precise sense that all substances are equally
substances. This does not entail that substances are equal to one another,that there are no differences among substances, and that there are notsubstances more or less powerful than other substances, but rather thatall substances are equally substances. When I discuss the concept offlat ontology we will see that this thesis of “equal being” has profoundconsequences for critical theory and how we practice critical theory. In
particular, it entails that we cannot treat one kind of being as the ground of
all other beings.
Likewise, when I discuss mereology later, we will see that the thesisthat 1) a substance is not itself predicated of anything else, and the thesis 2)that no substance is more or less a substance than any other gives rise to ahost of delicate and fascinating problems pertaining to relations between
parts and wholes. If objects or substances are not predicated of anythingelse, then it follows that substances cannot be treated as identical with
their parts. Were objects identical to their parts, then this would entail that
objects are predicates of their parts. This, in turn, would undermine theautonomy or independence of objects. Consequently, while substances
certainly cannot exist without their parts, substantiality must be somethingother than the parts of which an object is composed. Here we encounterone of the ways in which the realism advocated by onticology is anathema
to every form of classical materialism. The sorts of classical materialism
defended by thinkers such as Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius holdthat objects ultimately are their parts in the form of atoms and that theseatoms, in their turn, are the only true substances. Onticology, by contrast,
argues that scale and whether or not something is an aggregate is irrelevant
to whether or not something is a substance. As Harman nicely articulates
it, “[n]o privilege is granted to objects over and against mere aggregates, as
though atoms were real and baseball leagues only derivative, or individual

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soldiers real and armies only derivative”.56 “Instead”, Harman goes on
to remark, “we have a universe made up of objects wrapped in objects
wrapped in objects wrapped in objects” such that, “[e]very object is both asubstance and a complex of relations”.57
Mereologically this entails that we must develop an ontology capableof maintaining the autonomy or independence of substances from one
another such that parts are understood as themselves being substances
independent of the whole to which they belong—i.e., they are not merely
predicates of the wholes to which they belong—and wholes are treatedas independent of their parts. A key feature of each and every object—infact, a defining feature—is its autonomy. Regardless of whether an object
is simple or compound—and onticology strongly suspects that all objects
are compound—each object is nonetheless autonomous. As we will see,these seemingly arid ontological issues of the relation between parts andwholes are of surprising importance for a host of issues in social andpolitical theory. Here it is also important to note that “size doesn't matter”.
Insofar as no substance is neither more nor less a substance than anothersubstance, it follows, as Harman points out, that atoms are no more nor lesssubstances than molecules, aardvarks or baseball teams.
Insofar as substances are not predicated of anything else, it follows
that substances are not in anything else in the sense that qualities arein substances. As Aristotle puts it, “[i]t is a characteristic common to
every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither
said of a subject nor in a subject”.58 Substances are not something in an
individual thing, but are rather what individual things are. Consequently,
all substances have the characteristic of sets whereby sets do not include
themselves as a member of themselves. Thus, while all substances are“multiplicities” insofar as they contain parts that are themselves objects—
though in a very different way, we shall see, than Badiou proposes in
Being and Event—the substantiality of a substance is not itself a part of thesubstance. Substantiality, rather, is the substance.
Insofar as substances cannot be identified with their parts or the objects
which compose them, it follows that substances are always numerically one.
As Aristotle puts it, “[s]ubstance, it seems, does not admit of a more or aless”.59 A substance is always a substance. As a consequence, a substanceChapter 2: The Paradox of Substance75

is neither more nor less than itself, nor is a substance ever any more thanone. In the first instance, a substance is neither more nor less than itself inthe sense that when a person gains weight or loses an arm they are still thissubstance. In the second instance, if a substance is always one then this isbecause, while a substance might be compounded of many parts or otherobjects, qua substance the substance is still one substance. Once again, it
is clear that this determination of substance raises a number of delicate
mereological issues revolving around problems of the one and the many.
Finally, it is a peculiar characteristic of substances that they are nondialectical. As Aristotle remarks, “[a]nother characteristic of substances isthat there is nothing contrary to them”.60 Beginning with Hegel, dialectic
takes on two meanings that are distinct but often conflated with one
another. First, and especially in a Marxist context, dialectic can be taken
to refer to thinking that is specifically relational in character. Marx, forexample, shows how commodities can only exist in certain social formations
characterized by wage labor and capitalism. Later, in our discussion ofregimes of attraction and exo-relations we will see how some notion of
dialectic in this relational sense can be retained with respect to local
manifestations. Second, dialectic can be taken to mean a thinking ofrelation in terms of contraries and contradictions that are sublated inever greater wholes or totalities. While onticology readily recognizes theexistence of antagonisms, it sees no reason to see antagonisms as theequivalent to contraries or contradictions.
Substances are not defined by contraries or opposites, but simply arewhat they are. This, of course, is not to suggest that substances do notcome into being or that they cannot pass out of being, only that they do
not admit of opposed or contrary terms. An individual cane toad does nothave an opposite. Rather, if there is contrariety, it exists only in the domainof qualities. Later, when discussing local manifestation and virtual proper
being we will see that there is reason to doubt that contrariety is a genuine
ontological category. Insofar as substances are not constituted by theirrelations, insofar as relations are not internal to their terms, it follows that
substances cannot be dialectical in either the relational sense or the senseof contrariety. Contrariety, if it exists, exists at the level of qualities, notsubstances. It is only through an erasure of substances, through a reduction

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of substances to their qualities, through the gesture of actualism as discussed
in the last chapter, that it can be supposed that substance is dialectical.
This leads Aristotle to formulate another definition of substance thathas wide-ranging ontological consequences. We have already seen that
substance is that which is not predicated of anything else. In addition tothis, Aristotle remarks that “[i]t seems most distinctive of substance thatwhat is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries”.61
Aristotle goes on to illustrate this point with an example: “[A]n individual
man—one and the same—becomes pale at one time and dark at another,and hot and cold, and bad and good”.62 In short, a substance is that whichis capable of actualizing a variety of different qualities while remaining
one and the same substance. Later in the Categories Aristotle will remarkthat qualities are “that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified
somehow”.63 Here we find confirmation of the onticological thesis that
substances are not identical to their qualities for, insofar as substances areable to take on different qualities while remaining the same substance, itfollows that objects must be distinct from their qualities.
However, here we must take care. For, in claiming that substances
are distinct from their qualities, we do not mean to imply that they are
numerically distinct from one another, as if the qualities were one entity
and the substance another entity. Speaking of the difference between real
distinctions, numerical distinctions, and formal distinctions, Deleuze writes,
We can conceive that names or propositions do not havethe same sense even while they designate exactly thesame thing (as in the case of the celebrated examples:morning star- evening star, Israel - Jacob, plan - blanc). The
distinction between these senses is indeed a real distinction[distinctio realis], but there is nothing numerical—muchless ontological—about it: it is a formal, qualitative or
semiological distinction.64
While I do not wish to follow Deleuze in his thesis that the difference
between numerical distinction and formal distinction is merely a semiologicaldistinction that refers to nothing ontological, Deleuze nonetheless draws
attention to a difference between two very important forms that realChapter 2: The Paradox of Substance77

distinctions take. On the one hand, two things are numerically distinct when
they exist independently of one another. As we have seen, all substances are
numerically distinct insofar as they are independent of one another. On theother hand, two things are formally distinct if they really are distinct fromone another, but they cannot exist independently of one another.
In the case of the relation between substances and their qualities,
there is a real distinction insofar as substances are never identical to their
qualities. However, the distinction between substances and their qualities is
not a numerical distinction but a formal distinction. Here, however, I hasten
to add that the formal distinction between substances and their qualities
is not symmetrical but rather asymmetrical. As we saw in the last chapter,
substances can exist unactualized or without producing any events. As aconsequence, substances are not dependent on their qualities, but can exist
without any qualities at all (in a form yet to be specified). The contrary,
however, is not true. Where substances can exist without their qualities orwithout producing any events, qualities can never exist without substancesin which to exist. Finally, to this we must add that the distinction between
substance and quality is not a distinction between what is real and what is
not real. Both substances and qualities are entirely real. The point is merelythat substances can never be reduced to any of their local manifestations or
actualized qualities.

2.3. The Paradox of Substance
As we saw in the last chapter, the ontological category of substance is
indispensable to rendering our account of experimental practice intelligible.
The practice of experiment is premised on the existence of generative
mechanisms, difference engines, or substances that act in open systems,
that they can be out of phase with the events they are capable of producing,
and that they are separable from their relations to other substances.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the concept of substance has fallen into
disrepute within philosophy, often being equated with a metaphysical ghostor fiction with no warrant whatsoever.

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One of the roots of the disdain with which the concept of substanceis today received can be found in Locke's An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding. There Locke writes that,
if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion of pure
Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it atall, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support ofsuch Qualities, which are capable of producing simple Ideas
in us; which Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any
one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or
Weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid
extended parts: And if he were demanded, what is it, that that
Solidity and Extension inhere in, he would not be in a muchbetter case, than the Indian before mentioned; who, sayingthat the World was supported by a great Elephant, was asked,
what the Elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great
Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave support
to the broad-back'd Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not
what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where we use words
without having clear and distinct Ideas, we talk like Children...
The Idea then we have, to which we give the general nameSubstance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown
support of those Qualities, we find existing, which we imagine
cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support
them, we call that Support Substantia; which, according to thetrue import of the Word, is in plain English, standing under, or
upholding.65
Locke's criticism of the concept of substance spins on the manner inwhich substance and qualities are split. Within the Aristotelian framework,
substance is the ground of qualities, yet we never encounter substanceas such, but rather only ever encounter the qualities of substance. From
this observation, two problems emerge for Locke: first, what warrant isthere for supposing the existence of substance at all? If substance is neverencountered at all, if all we ever encounter are qualities, how is substanceany different from a reference to Zeus to explain lightning? Second, if

Chapter 2: The Paradox of Substance79

substance differs fundamentally from its qualities, what could it possibly
be? If substance is stripped of all its qualities aren't we left with a baresubstratum, leading to the bizarre and absurd conclusion that all substances
are ultimately identical?
Elsewhere, in The Grammar of Motives, Kenneth Burke, in a discussionof Locke, will call this “the paradox of substance”. There Burke writes
that, “the word ‘substance,’ used to designate what a thing is, derives froma word designating something that a thing is not. That is, though used todesignate something within the thing, intrinsic to it, the word etymologicallyrefers to something outside the thing, extrinsic to it”.66 Burke's point is that
substance is supposed to be that which is intrinsic to an object, that whichmakes an object what it is, but that oddly substance ends up being external
to the object. If substance, according to Burke, turns out to be external
to the object, then this is because we only ever encounter the qualities ofthe object, and never the substance of the object. If, then, the object isequated with its qualities, then substance turns out to be strangely otherthan the object.
Locke's critique of substance precipitates something of a crisis thatreverberates all the way down to contemporary philosophy today. As
Meillassoux remarks, in prior philosophy “one of the questions that divided
rival philosophers most decisively was, 'Who grasps the true nature of
substance? He who thinks the Idea, the individual, the atom, God? Which
God?'” 67 However, with Locke's critique of substance, this entire debate
is thrown into crisis as there no longer seems to be any epistemic warrant
for the ontological concept of substance. However, while the ontologicalconcept of substance seems to be banished to the world of occult andunwarranted suppositions with no place in philosophy, individual things
nonetheless persist in the world of our experience. Having banished theontological concept of substance—viz., substances as they exist in their own
right, independent of any cognition—philosophy thus finds itself confronted
with the question of how to account for individual things without recourse
to mind-independent substances inaccessible to experience. Hume, forexample, will argue that substance is not a feature of the world—or, at least,
any world that we can know—but rather arises from the operations of mind.
Having experienced the combination of many similar sensations occurring80

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together in the past, the mind comes to associate these impressions or
sensations with one another. In this respect, the object itself, for Hume,is not a substance, but rather the sense that one encounters a substancewhen encountering an object is instead an effect of how the mind associates
impressions and ideas together in a unity. In this way, Hume responds to
Locke's challenge by making no reference to “occult entities” independentof what is given in sensation.
We encounter a similar move from world to mind in Kant's Critique ofPure Reason. As Kant observes,in experience, to be sure, perceptions come together only
contingently, so that no necessity of their connection is or
can become evident in the perceptions themselves, sinceapprehension is only a juxtaposition of the manifold of
empirical intuition, but no representation of the necessity of
the combined existence of the appearances that it juxtaposesin space and time is to be encountered in it. But since
experience is a cognition of objects through perception,consequently the relation in the existence of the manifold is
to be represented in it not as it is juxtaposed in time but as it
is objectively in time, yet since time itself cannot be perceived,
the determination of the existence of objects in time can only
come about through their combination in time in general,
hence only through a priori connecting concepts. Now sincethese always carry necessity along with them, experience isthus possible only through a representation of the necessaryconnection of the perceptions.68
For Kant, the realm of empirical intuition (sensation) is a sort ofconfused chaos and therefore cannot, contra Hume, provide us with anyordered or structured experience. “[O]ur entire sensibility is nothing but
the confused representation of things, which contains solely that whichpertains to them in themselves but only under a heap of marks and partial
representations that we can never consciously separate from one another”.69
Or, as Kant will write when discussing the first analogy, “[o]ur apprehensionof the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always

Chapter 2: The Paradox of Substance81

changing. We can therefore never determine from this alone whether thismanifold, as objects of experience, is simultaneous or successive”.70
It will be noted that Kant fully carries over the premise of Locke's
critique of substance, leaving this critique itself unquestioned. Beginningwith the premise that we have no access to substances but only qualities
as they are experienced, and with the thesis that the “manifold of intuition”
or empirical sensation is unformatted, Kant has no other recourse thanto claim that the substantiality of substances is not an ontological featureof objects themselves, but rather issues from our mind. To be sure, Kant
endorses the thesis that things-in-themselves exist, but maintains that wehave no access to these objects and therefore no means of determining
whether, like the objects of our experience, things-in-themselves areautonomous, individual unities, or whether the things-in-themselves are,in reality, really a thing-in-itself, a primordial unity or One, that is thensubsequently formatted or “cut up” by our minds. Since the substantialityof substance must issue from somewhere, and since we cannot appeal tobeing itself to ground substance, Kant contends that substance is instead
an a priori category of mind that is imposed on the chaotic manifold of
intuition giving it structure or formatting it.
What we have here is what Harman has referred to as the “overmining”
of substances. Where undermining dissolves objects in a something that is
purported to be more fundamental such as atoms, water (Thales), the One,the pre-individual, and so on, overmining dissolves objects in somethingthat is treated as being more immediate. Of overmining, Harman writes,“it is said that [objects] are too deep. On this view the object is a uselesshypothesis, a ‘je ne sais quoi’ in the bad sense”.71 In the case of Hume,substances are overmined in favor of impressions or sensations that arethen bundled together by associations of the mind, while in the case ofKant, substances are overmined in favor of the manifold of intuition(sensations), along with the pure a priori forms of space and time and thea priori categories of the mind. In both instances, objects or substances
are treated as effects of something more immediate or accessible (empiricalexperience and mind).
It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of Locke's critique of
substance and Hume’s and Kant's proposed solution to the paradox of

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substance on the subsequent history of philosophy and theory. For while
direct reference to Locke, Hume, and Kant in subsequent philosophy andtheory will often be absent, we nonetheless encounter Locke's critique of
substance as an implicit presupposition, and Hume’s and Kant's style ofsolving this problem throughout contemporary philosophy and theory.
Wherever, for example, we are told that it is language that structures reality,
we are encountering a variant of Kant's response to Locke. While, to be
sure, the content of the critique and the proposed solution differs, the formof the critique remains the same. Here the premises that 1) the ontologicalcategory of substance should be banished because we have no direct accessto substance, and 2) that the manifold of intuition is a chaotic rhapsody of
sensation have been fully embraced and Kant's mind and a priori categories
have been replaced by society and language.
Ironically, however, Kant's reasoning is based on an amphiboly, thoughof an ontological rather than a transcendental sort. In the Critique of Pure
Reason Kant tells us that a transcendental amphiboly is, “a confusion of
the pure object of the understanding with [an empirical] appearance”.72
For Kant, there is both a rationalist and an empiricist way of falling into
amphibolous reasoning. Drawing on Leibniz and Locke as examples, Kant
argues that “Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totallysensitivized the concepts of the understanding, i.e., interpreted them as
nothing but empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection”.73 Kant's charge
is that Leibniz is guilty of amphibolous reasoning by virtue of finding,
directly in sensation, what only issues from the a priori concepts of theunderstanding. Leibniz treats sensations as if they were identical to what
is found only in concepts. For example, sensations are always particularand require the presence of a thing, whereas concepts allow me to think aplurality of things with a shared characteristic in their absence. By contrast,
Locke, according to Kant, falls prey to amphibolous reasoning by virtue ofarguing that categories that can only be found a priori in the understanding,concepts that can only be generated by mind, can be abstracted fromsensation or the domain of the empirical. In both cases, Kant contends,
Locke and Leibniz conflate the transcendental structure of mind and theempirical dimension of sensation.

Chapter 2: The Paradox of Substance83

If Kant (and Locke) are guilty of amphibolous reasoning, this arises notfrom conflating the transcendental (as understood by Kant as a structure of
the mind) and the empirical, but rather from conflating the ontological andthe empirical. For on the one hand, Locke infers that because substances
are not given in experience but rather only empirical qualities are given, we
are warranted in banishing substance from our ontology. Likewise, Kant
infers that because substance is not given in the manifold of sensation, wemust reject the claim that substance pertains to things-in-themselves, butmust instead see substance as a category issuing from mind. An ontologicalamphiboly thus consists in confusing two distinct domains of inquiry: theontological and the epistemological. The ontological is here subordinated tothe epistemological, and the epistemological is then used to determine what
is and is not. The problem is that what we can and cannot know cannot
be used to legitimately legislate what is and is not. The being of a thing is
independent of our ability to know a thing.
However, the problem with the Humean and Kantian solution is much
more serious than a mere conflation of two distinct sets of questions or
domains of inquiry. Let us take the example of Kant to illustrate this point.
Kant's thesis is that the manifold of intuition, being a sort of rhapsodic
chaos, cannot deliver the determinations necessary for experience. Rather,
this delirious manifold must be structured by a priori categories of mind.
And for this reason, these a priori categories of mind cannot be drawn orabstracted from experience, but must instead spring from the mind alone.
Whether these categories represent reality as it is independent of our mind
is, according to Kant, forever beyond our knowledge because we cannot
sneak up on ourselves from behind to see how we see reality and determine
whether our experience corresponds to reality. Consequently, whenever weexperience an individual thing or speak of an individual thing, this thing is
the result of how our mind has formatted the chaotic manifold of intuition
through the application of the a priori categories of unity, reality, substance,and existence. And here we must note that these four categories issue frommind not world.
Initially it would seem that Kant provides a clever solution to thequestion of why our experience is formatted in the way that it is, thereby
evading Locke's critique of substance as a sort of occult concept by

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showing how these concepts issue a priori from the mind (to which we dohave access). However, a moment’s reflection reveals that Kant's solution
is far more problematic than it first appears. Speaking in the context ofHeidegger's early 1919 discussions of being where being is distinguishedbetween “being as a whole” and “something at all”, Harman observes
that “no explanation is offered of why certain specific qualities should be
assigned to one 'something at all' rather than another”.74 This same criticism
applies equally to Kant's proposed solution to Locke's critique of substance.
Kant has no way of explaining how or why a priori categories such asunity, substance, and existence get applied to one manifold of sensations
rather than another. Why, for example, are the categories of substance andunity not applied to an aggregate consisting of my daughter, my parents'
dog Rula, and the United Nations? Insofar as the categories are purely
a priori, they themselves have no content. What is it then that leads an apriori category to be applied to one thing rather than another? The sameproblem emerges with those variations of the Kantian solution that would
have language rather than pure a priori concepts of the understanding do
this work. In both cases we are left without the means of explaining how
the “something at all” is ever specified as a concrete entity. As Deleuze puts
it in the context of his discussion of Bergson's critique of dialectic and thecategory of possibility, these categories are “like baggy clothes, [that] aremuch too big”.75
The point here is not that we have incorrigible knowledge of substances
and access to them in our experience, nor that the way we parse the worldis the way the world is actually formatted. Rather, the point is that 1)questions of substance are ontological questions absolutely distinct fromhow we know substances, and 2) that questions of substance cannot be
dissolved in questions of access or knowledge. As we saw in the last chapter,
ontology cannot be erased by epistemology, nor can ontological questions
be transformed into epistemological questions revolving around our accessto beings. Wherever one attempts to erase ontological questions in this way,
we end up with a variant of Harman's “something at all” problem.
Locke, Kant, Hume and much of the subsequent philosophical traditionends up where they do precisely because they fall into what Bhaskar calls
the “epistemic fallacy” and actualism, confusing questions of our accessChapter 2: The Paradox of Substance85

to beings with questions of what beings are. Beginning with the actualist
thesis borne out of a desire for secure foundations (i.e., a desire secondary
to the demands of ontology), they restrict discourse to what is given inexperience. They then find that they are unable to account for the furnitureof the universe precisely because substance is that which withdraws fromany givenness, experience, or, indeed, actuality. As such, substance is
not something that can anywhere be found in experience—no one hasever seen or experienced, I contend, a single substance—but is rather anirreducible ontological premise necessary if our commerce with the worldand experimental activity is to be intelligible. The existence of substanceis not something that can be arrived at through an experience or a direct
observation, but can only be arrived at as a premise through transcendental
argumentation. When we adopt the actualist gesture of restricting
knowledge to what is directly given in experience, this way of reaching
substance is irrevocably foreclosed.
Returning then to what Burke called “the paradox of substance”, weshould not so much argue that Burke is mistaken in his characterization ofsubstance, as that Burke articulates the very essence of substance. In short,
we should embrace Burke's characterization of substance as split between
qualities and substantiality. It is only when we begin from the standpointof epistemology, from the standpoint of what is given in experience, that
substance appears paradoxical. And if this is the case, then it is because
beginning with epistemology leads us to simultaneously claim that theobject we experience is its qualities and that it is something radically otherthan its qualities. However, if we begin from the other end with ontology
and note that substance is such that 1) it can actualize different qualities
at different times (Aristotle), and that 2) it can fail to actualize qualities(Bhaskar), we can now argue that the very essence or structure of substancelies in self-othering and withdrawal. Insofar as objects or substances alienate
themselves, as it were, in qualities, they are self-othering. They generate
differences in the world. However, insofar as objects are never identical totheir qualities, insofar as they always harbor a volcanic reserve in excess of
their qualities, they perpetually withdraw from their qualities such that they
never directly manifest themselves in the world. As Harman remarks, it's

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as if all objects are vacuums populating the universe. It is precisely for thisreason that the being of substance is essentially split.
And here it should be noted that onticology and object-oriented
philosophy are both metaphysics or ontologies that thoroughly escape what
Derrida refers to as ontotheology and the metaphysics of presence. Far
from being a signifier that denotes presence or the fullness of being, the very
essence of substance is to withdraw from presence and to be in excess of all
actuality. However, this overturning of the metaphysics of presence occurs
not through a demonstration of the manner in which being always harbors
deferral and difference for us such that presence is forever unobtainable, butrather by showing that being as such, being in itself, withdraws in this way.
Let us look more closely at this split between virtual proper being and local
manifestation through a concrete example.

Chapter 3
Virtual Proper Being
What would a truly democratic encounter between truly
equal beings look like, what would it be—can we evenimagine it?
— Timothy Morton76

3.1. The Mug Blues
Although we have addressed Locke's criticism of substance as an occult
entity not warranted by the givens of experience, the problem of thebare substratum remains. If substance is not its qualities, does this notentail that substance as such is without qualities and is therefore a baresubstratum? And if substance is a bare substratum, does this not entail thatall substances are identical? If this is the case, then this spells the ruin of
the concept of substance for substance is supposed to account, in part, for
the individuality of substance. Yet where substance is bare, all individuality
is erased. If this difficulty is to be avoided, we require some way of talking
about the structure or formatting of substances or split-objects without thisstructure consisting of qualities. Towards this end, it would prove helpful toinvestigate the being of a particular substance.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that my blue coffee mug sitting
here on the table is a substance. When I distinguish between the virtual
proper being of an object and the actual local manifestation of an object, I

88Levi R. Bryant

am attempting to distinguish between the object qua formatted structure
and as an enduring unity, and the object qua qualities or properties. The
virtual proper being of an object is its self-othering substantiality, its
being as substance, or its being as a (more or less) enduring unity. Hereit is important to bear in mind that the time of endurance is irrelevant
to whether or not a substance is a substance. A substance can exist forthe briefest moment before being destroyed, or for billions of years. It
will be recalled that, according to Aristotle, no substance is any moreor less a substance than any other. This holds no less for the difference
between a rock and a human than it does for an object that is long-lived or
instantaneous.
The virtual proper being of an object is what makes an object properly
an object. It is that which constitutes an object as a difference engine
or generative mechanism. However, no one nor any other thing everencounters an object qua its virtual proper being, for the substance of an
object is perpetually withdrawn or in excess of any of its manifestations.
Rather, the virtual proper being of an object can only ever be inferred fromits local manifestations in the world. By contrast, the local manifestationof an object is the manner in which a substance or virtual proper being is
actualized in the world under determinate conditions. Here it is important
to emphasize that manifestation refers not to phenomena or appearances
for a subject, though clearly this can take place as well. When I refer tomanifestation, I am not referring to givenness to a subject, but rather toactualization within a world. Objects require no subject to manifest
themselves in the world. The universe could be a universe in which no
sentient beings of any sort exist and manifestation would continue to takeplace. We are therefore fortunately relieved of playing Atlas. Consequently,
appearances and phenomena, what is given, are a subset of manifestation,
not the reverse. Manifestation is an ontological predicate, not an
epistemological predicate.
It is my contention that traditional ontology was correct to distinguishbetween the substance and qualities of objects, but mistaken in how it
thought about the nature of substance. It is correct to hold that objects
cannot be reduced to their qualities because qualities change and shift
while the object remains this substance. Traditional philosophy goes astray,

Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being89

however, in concluding that because substances cannot be reduced to their
qualities, then substance must be the object stripped of all qualities or, as
Locke puts it, a bare substratum. Where substance is conceived in this way,its concept becomes entirely incoherent.
My thesis is that the substantiality of objects is not a bare substratum,
but rather an absolutely individual system or organization of powers.
Powers are the capacities of an object or what it can do. The powers of an
object are never something that is directly manifested in the world. And if
this is so, then this is because the qualities of an object are only ever local
manifestations of the object’s power. That is, the domain of power possessedby an object is always greater than any local manifestation or actualizationof an object. For this reason, following Manuel DeLanda, I distinguishbetween the phase space of an object and the powers of an object. A phasespace is a set of points that can be occupied in a series of variations. For
example, as a pendulum swings back and forth, it passes through a seriesof points between two maxima and a minima. Each of these points is apoint in phase space. Moreover, none of these points are ever occupied
all at once. Likewise, we can think qualities or properties as points anobject manifests or actualizes as points in a phase space. The power of thependulum is its ability to move through this phase space, to produce theseactualizations, while each point the pendulum moves through is a local
manifestation of this power of the pendulum.
Two points follow from this thesis about the relationship between
substance or virtual proper being and qualities or local manifestations.
First, we should not speak of qualities as something an object possesses, has,or is, but rather as acts, verbs, or something that an object does. Second,knowing an object does not consist in enumerating a list of essential
qualities or properties belonging to an object, but rather consists in knowing
the powers or capacities of an object. As we will see in the next chapter,
this entails that no object is ever fully known insofar as every object
necessarily has an infinite phase space while simultaneously having a finite
structure of powers.
Here I return to the blue mug with which I began this section. Within
the ontological framework I am proposing, it would be inaccurate tosuggest that the mug is blue or that the mug possesses the quality of blue.

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Rather, if we had an ontologically accurate language, we would instead
say that “the mug blues” or that “the mug is bluing” or that “the mug
does blue”. The blueness of the mug is not a quality that the mug has but
is something that the mug does. It is an activity on the part of the mug.
Nor would it be accurate to claim, at the level of the mug's virtual proper
being, that “the mug has blue power”. The mug does not have blue power,
but rather coloring power. If this is the case, then it is because the mug
always has the power to produce a broader range of colors than the shade it
produces at any given time.
The decision to think qualities of an object as acts or doings rather thanas possessions, along with onticology's rejection of the thesis that the mug
has blue power rather than coloring power, is motivated by two interrelated
concerns. First, qualities are acts on the part of objects precisely because
qualities vary. If it is inaccurate to suggest that the mug is blue, then this isbecause the mug is a variety of different colors as a function of the exorelations with light the mug enters into. As I look at the mug under thewarm light of my desktop lamp, it is now a very dark, deep, flat blue. Now
I open the shade to my office window, allowing sunlight to stream in. The
mug becomes a brilliant, bright, shiny blue. Sharing a romantic momentwith my coffee mug by candlelight, the colors are deep and rich as they
were under my office light, but now the blue flickers and dances in responseto the shifting intensity of the candle flame. And finally, I blow out thecandle and the mug becomes black.
Here there are a couple of points worth making. First, in pointing to
the manner in which the qualities of the mug change, I am not making theclaim that these qualities are unreal or that the mug is truly one shade ofblue and that these other shades are distortions or deviations from the mug’strue color. Rather, these qualities of the mug are entirely real and the mug
is all these colors. Indeed, we can say that in principle the mug is potentiallyan infinite number of colors because there is no limit to the exo-relations
into which the mug can enter. Consequently, we cannot say that we would
finally get the true being of the mug by adding up all the qualities that it
actualizes. The being of the mug is not the sum of its qualities, but rather
qualities are unique events that a substance produces.

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91

Second, what is true of the color of the coffee mug is also true of all its
qualities or properties. For example, the spatial shape of the mug, whilecertainly far more enduring than the color of the mug, is no less variable,
in principle, than the color of the mug. The mug tends to have a relatively
stable spatial or extensional structure because it exists within a stableregime of attraction or set of exo-relations. Change the temperature or
gravity of the mug’s exo-relations and the extension or spatial shape of the
mug will also change.
Here, then, we encounter one of the central ways of distinguishing
between the virtual proper being of an object and its local manifestations.
Where local manifestation is geometrical, virtual proper being is topological.
As described by Steven Connor,
Topology may be defined as the study of the spatial propertiesof an object that remain invariant under homeomorphic
deformations, which is to say, broadly, actions of stretching,squeezing, or folding. [It is] not concerned with exact
measurement, which is the domain of geometry [...] but
rather with spatial relations, such as continuity, neighborhood,insideness and outsideness, disjunction and connection [...].
Because topology is concerned with what remains invariant asa result of transformation, it may be thought of as geometry
plus time, geometry given body by motion.77
Where geometry treats fixed metric properties and shapes, topology,
by contrast, treats of structures capable of undergoing variation throughoperations of stretching, squeezing, or folding while retaining its structure.
Here the distinction between topology and geometry should not be
understood mathematically in terms of two different ways of approaching
space, but rather philosophically as two distinct aspects of substance. The
topological domain refers to the domain of how the virtual powers of a
substance are organized, whereas the geometrical refers to how substances
are actualized in locally fixed qualities. There is no less a topology andgeometry of colors in substances than there is topology and geometry of
spatial qualities in objects. As a consequence we can say—and I'll havemuch more to say about this in section 3.5—that the virtual proper being

92

Levi R. Bryantof objects is characterized by a topological plasticity that is nonethelessabsolutely individual and concrete.
The coloring power of the mug is not a Euclidean property of the mug,a geometric property of the mug—which is to say, a fixed property—but
is rather a topology or series of variations that are a function of the exorelations the mug enters into with other objects (different photons of light).
For this reason, we must say that the mug blues, that it “does” blue, rather
than that the mug is blue. The bluing of the mug is the local manifestationof the mug. Likewise, if we don't say that the mug has blue power, butrather has coloring power, then this is because the mug has the topologicalpower to produce a whole range of colors ranging from black to brilliant
blue. This range is the power of the mug, while every point or variation
within this range is the phase space of the mug. Finally, the actualizationof a point within this topology or phase space is a local manifestation of
the mug. Aristotle's formal cause must be rescued from its fixed-structure
Euclideanism and placed soundly within the field of topology or structuresthat contain the potential for a series of variations volcanically lockedwithin substances. And this is why I refer to objects as “difference engines”
or “generative mechanisms”, for objects are these powers of producing
differences in the world at the level of qualities or local manifestations.
Why, then, are we inclined to say that the mug is blue rather than thatthe mug blues and has coloring power? I think there are three reasons for
this, one cognitive, another sociological, and a third having to do withlogoi, local ontological situations, or regimes of attraction in which objects
manifest themselves. Cognitively our thought and perception is geared
towards action and therefore what interests us. As Bergson so nicely puts it,[m]y body [...] acts like an image which reflects others, andwhich, in doing so, analyzes them along lines corresponding
to the different actions which it can exercise upon them. And
consequently, each of the qualities perceived in the same
object by my different senses symbolizes a particular directionof my activity, a particular need.78
In relating to other objects, there's a way in which our body reduces
objects, simplifies them, as a target of its own aims, needs, and desires. As

Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being93

a consequence, variations in objects are ignored and the object is reduced
to a geometric identity most congenial to its desired action. As we will seein the next chapter, this is not a peculiarity of human or animal nature, butrather is true of all inter-object relations, whether animate or inanimate,whether human or animal, whether living or non-living. The reduction or
simplification of one object by another object is a general ontological featureof how objects relate to one another. In short, this sort of simplification is
not an epistemological peculiarity of human beings.
Sociologically, philosophers, as writers and scholars, do a lot of sitting.
This is also true of those times when we pause to reflect and wonder what
objects are. Everything is still. Rather than acting on objects, we look at
objects. Where acting on objects tends to produce qualitative differencesin the objects, gazing at objects tends to reveal fixed properties (especially
if we and the object are sitting still). As such, when we cast about for
objects to contemplate, our tendency is to encounter objects in relatively
fixed circumstances. The philosopher picks up the first item that is aboutor nearby, such as my blue mug. But as a result of these relatively fixedcircumstances characterizing reflection, we encounter qualities not intheir changes or transitions, but rather as abiding qualities possessed byan object. We then build this lack of engagement with objects and theconsequent non-variation into the very foundations of our ontology
without realizing it. In this connection, Gilbert Simondon suggests thata prejudice for fully constituted local manifestations or the geometricreflects the social hierarchy of Greek philosophy.79 Likewise, in works
like Pascalian Meditations, Pierre Bourdieu shows how what he calls “thescholastic disposition” leads us to systematically distort questions about
the nature of practice.80 The claims of Simondon and Bourdieu hold
not only for ancient Greece and sociological questions of practice, butalso for our contemporary historical moment and questions of ontology.
Intellectual work today, no less than in ancient Greece, is dependent on acertain distribution of labor that renders academic life possible by relievinga particular segment of society largely independent of manual labor. This,in turn, leads objects to be encountered in a particular way insofar as theacademic, by and large, does not encounter the volcanic potentials hidden
within objects by virtue of not directly acting on objects. As a consequence,

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this leads to a systematic distortion of ontological questions and what
constitutes an object.
Finally, third, the objects that populate our world tend to exist in fairly
stable sets of exo-relations or regimes of attraction. For example, gravity,pressure, and temperature are fairly stable on our planet—at least in theenvironments where we most commonly act. This entails that there is very
often very little variation in the qualities of the objects that make up thefurniture of our daily experience. This, no doubt, is one reason that theconfusion of objects with their qualities is such a persistent tendency ofthought. If Aristotle was able to think the formal cause of objects in largely
fixed Euclidean or geometric terms rather than in dynamic topologicalterms, then this is because there is often a sort of détente of exo-relations
among objects leading to fairly stable qualities or local manifestations
among objects. If I am led, for example, to think my body as possessing arather fixed form, then this is because the atmospheric pressure produced by
the Earth's gases pressing down upon me is fairly constant. If, by contrast, a
mad scientist were to place me in a room that slowly decreased atmosphericpressure, the form or shape of my body would change in subtle ways up
to the point where I would finally decompress and become a plurality ofobjects. Likewise, the form of my body changes in subtle ways with changes
in temperature, becoming now more compact when it is very cold andsomewhat swollen when it is very hot. Even the spatial form of my body isan act on the part of my body, something that my body does, not something
my body has or is. This is why I refer to logoi, local ontological situations,or regimes of attraction rather than logos. These logoi or local ontologicalsituations are relatively stable exo-relations among objects that tend to
generate, as a consequence, enduring and stable qualities in objects.

3.2. Deleuze's Schizophrenia: Between Monism and Pluralism
No one has explored this anterior side of substance—in the transcendental,
not the temporal, sense—more profoundly than Gilles Deleuze. In
Difference and Repetition, Deleuze names this dimension of substance thatis formatted or structured without possessing qualities the virtual. Herethe virtual is not to be confused with virtual reality. The latter is generallyChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being95

treated as a simulacrum of reality, as a sort of false or computer generated
reality. By contrast, the virtual is entirely real without, for all that, being
actual. The term “virtuality” comes from the Latin virtus, which has
connotations of potency and efficacy. As such, the virtual, as virtus, refers
to powers and capacities belonging to an entity. And in order for an entity
to have powers or capacities, it must actually exist. In this connection,
while the virtual refers to potentiality, it would be a mistake to conflate thispotentiality with the concept of a potential object. A potential object is anobject that does not exist but which could come to exist. By contrast, thevirtual is strictly a part of a real and existing object. The virtual consistsof the volcanic powers coiled within an object. It is that substantiality,that structure and those singularities that endure as the object undergoes
qualitative transformations at the level of local manifestations.
However, in evoking Deleuze's concept of the virtual, we must proceedwith caution for two deeply opposed tendencies animate Deleuze's
discussions of the virtual. On the one hand, Deleuze often speaks of thevirtual in terms of an ontological monism that suggests he is committed
to the thesis that there is only one substance that is then broken up into
discrete entities through a process of actualization. Monism tends to comein one of two variants. One variant of monism has it that only a single
substance exists and that everything that exists is a property or qualityof that one substance. Spinoza's monism, for example, argues that only asingle substance exists and that all entities (modes) are expressions of thisone substance. Another variant of monism has it that there is only a single
type of being, but that being is populated by numerically distinct entitiesof this type. Lucretius, for example, could be construed as a monist of thissort, as he holds that only atoms and their combinations exist, not two
distinct ontological types such as Plato's world of the forms and the fallen
world of entities or appearances.
Deleuze often appears to advocate this former sort of monism, while
object-oriented ontology and onticology might appear to be committed to
the latter type. Throughout Deleuze's work, we find the theme of a single
substance that somehow comes to be formatted into discrete entities.
By contrast, object-oriented ontology advocates the thesis that being is96Levi R. Bryant

composed only of discrete entities or substances. DeLanda articulates thisvariant of Deleuze nicely when he remarks that,
Deleuze distinguishes the progressive unfolding of amultiplicity through broken symmetries (differentiation), fromthe progressive specification of the continuous space formedby multiplicities as it gives rise to our world of discontinuous
spatial structures (differenciation). Unlike a transcendent
heaven which exists as a separate dimension from reality,
Deleuze asks us to imagine a continuum of multiplicities
which differentiates itself into our familiar three-dimensional
space as well as its spatially structured contents.81
I will discuss Deleuze's concept of multiplicity momentarily, but forthe moment it is important to note that “multiplicity” is among Deleuze's
terms for the virtual. The suggestion here is that the virtual seems to consistof a single continuum, such that there is only one virtual, one substance,that is then partitioned into apparently distinct entities. And indeed, as
Deleuze remarks, “all [multiplicities] coexist, but they do so at points, on
the edges”.82 Moreover, Deleuze's constant references to the virtual as
the pre-individual suggests this reading as well, for it implies a transition
from an undifferentiated state to a differenciated individual. If the virtual ispre-individual, then it cannot be composed of discrete individual unities
or substances. Here the individual would be an effect of the virtual, notprimary being itself.
On the other hand, Deleuze speaks of the virtual as a part of the real
object. Here Deleuze seems to move in the direction of the second sense of
the monism, where monism entails that being is composed of a pluralism of
distinct entities, all of the same type. As Deleuze remarks, “the virtual must
be defined as strictly a part of the real object—as though the object had one
part of itself plunged as though into an objective dimension”.83 Deleuzegoes on to ask,
How, then, can we speak simultaneously of both complete
determination and only a part of the object? The
determination must be a complete determination of theobject, yet form only a part of it. Following suggestions made

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by Descartes in his Replies to Arnauld, we must carefully
distinguish the object in so far as it is complete and the object
in so far as it is whole. What is complete is only the [virtual]part of the object, which participates with other parts ofobjects in the [Multiplicity] (other relations, other singularpoints), but never constitutes an integral whole as such. What
the complete determination lacks is the whole set of relations
belonging to actual existence. An object may be ens, or rather(non)-ens omni modo determinatum, without being entirely
determined or actually existing.84
In treating the virtual as a part of the object and as completely
determined (structured), Deleuze seems to suggest that the virtual—far
from constituting a pre-individual continuum that is then parceled up
into discrete entities—is, in fact, purely discrete and individual. Under
this reading, multiplicities or endo-relational structures would be discrete,
existing individuals. Here there would be no transition from the preindividual virtual to the individual actual, but rather the relation between
endo-structure and actuality would be a transition between unexercised
power and actualized quality within an individual.
It is not my aim here to provide a commentary on Deleuze's ontology
nor to remain true to his thought, but rather to determine how it ispossible for substance to be formatted without this formatting consistingof substance's qualities. My contention is that the transcendental condition(in the transcendental realist sense) under which it is possible for an object
to be out of phase with its qualities lies in a formatted structure that is notitself qualitative. It is only in this way that the bare substratum problem canbe avoided and Aristotle's insight that substances are capable of carrying
contrary qualities can be vindicated. However, paraphrasing Karen Baradin her discussion of Niels Bohr, “I propose an ontology that I believe to beconsistent with [a number of Deleuze's] views, although I make no claimthat this is what he necessarily had in mind”.85 Consequently, Deleuze's
thought is only relevant here insofar as it advances our understanding of the
split-nature of substance. In chapter 1, I take it that I have demonstrated
the ontological necessity for the existence of discrete or individual
substances. Contra Deleuze's Spinozist monism and his continuum

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hypothesis with respect to the virtual, this necessity follows above all fromthe requirement that objects be separable from their relations to otherobjects if experimental activity is to be intelligible. In order for experiment
to be possible, it is necessary that it be possible to form closed systems inwhich objects can express their powers. If objects or generative mechanisms
were merely expressions of a continuum that is itself one, then it is difficult
to see how this condition could ever be met. Yet given that it seems that
this condition is regularly met, it seems that Deleuze's monism must clearlybe mistaken.
Approaching Deleuze's thought more directly, two difficulties seem tobesiege his monist continuum hypothesis. First, if the virtual is a single
substance that is then partitioned into discrete entities, it is difficult tounderstand why the virtual ever departs from itself to become “alienated”
in individuals at all. Deleuze's tendency is to speak of the actual, of theindividuated, as that which contributes no differences of its own but whichis merely a sort of sterile secretion of the virtual. As Deleuze puts it,[d]ifference is explicated, but in systems in which it tends
to be cancelled; this means only that difference is essentially
implicated, that its being is implication. For difference, to be
explicated is to be cancelled or to dispel the inequality whichconstitutes it. The formula according to which 'to explicate is
to identify' is a tautology. We cannot conclude from this thatdifference is cancelled out, or at least that it is cancelled initself. It is cancelled in so far as it is drawn outside itself, inextensity and in the quality which fills that extensity. However,difference creates both this extensity and this quality.86
The terms “implication” and “explication” should be read etymologically
here, rather than literally. “Explication” denotes not the activity of
explanation, but rather “to unfold”. Here, then, the emphasis should beplaced on the term “plication”, which indicates that which is folded.
Consequently, the term “implication” should be read not in the sense of
a possible logical inference from a given fact, but rather as denoting thatwhich is enfolded or hidden in something else. From this we can derive thefollowing table:

Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being
Implication

Explication

VirtualPotent, yet unactualized difference/
Cause of beings/Pre-Individual

Canceled Difference/Formation of
Quality/Sterile Being

ActualCondition/Cause of the Actual

Product/Individual being withoutcausal efficacy/Completion or
end of Process99

Following Simondon, Deleuze arrives at this conception of being andthe relationship between the virtual and the actual on the grounds that“[i]t is notable that extensity does not account for the individuations which
occur within it”.87 When Deleuze refers to an extensity, he is referring to anentity with qualities situated in time and space. Returning to the example
of my blue coffee mug, simply by examining my coffee mug here and now, I
cannot determine how it came to have the shape it has, the color that it has,
why it is sitting here on my desk, etc.
Deleuze's suggestion is thus that because extensity does not accountfor the individuations that occur within it (the qualities and structure thatmake it this individual), we must refer to another dimension, the implicit,
the virtual, to account for these individuations. Furthermore, since theextensive consists of individual or individuated entities, Deleuze concludes
that this supplementary dimension must be pre-individual. As Deleuzeremarks, “[t]he individuating is not the simple individual”.88 However, inmaking this move, Deleuze renders the motivating grounds of individuation
thoroughly mysterious. If the virtual is, as Deleuze suggests, a continuum
and a whole populated by potent yet unactualized differences, and if theactual is merely a secretion or excresence of the virtual, what is it that leads
the virtual to ever ex-plicate itself, to unfold itself, or to leave itself andfall into the sterile, actual individual? Difference comes from the domainof the virtual, not the actual, for the actual is precisely that domain where
difference is canceled. Here, then, we encounter a problem similar to the
one that haunted Plato's theory of the forms, where we are left to wonder
why the world of imperfect creatures ever comes into being and why theworld of the perfect forms doesn't simply reside in tranquil and unmoving
eternal existence.
These observations lead to a second problem. As Hallward notes in
his controversial study, Out of This World, Deleuze's ontology essentially100

Levi R. Bryant

conceives being in terms of creativity and creating. This, according toHallward, leads Deleuze to distinguish between the creating and thecreature, the individuating and the individual, with the creature and theindividual being granted a derivative status to that of the creating andindividuating. As Hallward puts it,
Almost every aspect of Deleuze's philosophy is caught up withthe consequences of this initial correlation of being, creativity
and thought. Roughly speaking, it implies: (a) that allexistent things or processes exist in just one way, as so many
distinct acts of creation or so many individual creatings; (b)that these creatings are themselves aspects of a limitless andconsequently singular creative power, a power that is mostadequately expressed in the medium of pure thought; (c) thatevery creating gives rise to a derivative creature or createdthing, whose own power or creativity is limited by its materialorganisation, its situation, its actual capacities and relations
with other creatures, and so on; (d) that the main task
facing any such creature is to loosen and then dissolve theselimitations in order to become a more adequate or immaterial
vehicle for that virtual creating which alone individuates it.89
Hallward's third point here is particularly salient. In treating difference,the virtual, the implicit, as that which is responsible for individuation, andthe explicate, the actual, the individual as the product of individuation,
Deleuze inevitably grants the creature or the individual a derivative place
within being. The individual becomes a product of being, an effect of virtual
difference, but certainly cannot be treated as a motor of difference in theworld. Like the trail of slime left behind in the wake of a snail or slug, theindividual is merely the remainder or excresence of a differential process of
individuation that has already moved on.
What we thus get in Deleuze's thought is a sort of vertical ontology ofthe depths. Rather than entities or substances interacting with each otherlaterally or horizontally, we instead get an ontology where difference arises
vertically from the depths of the virtual. As a consequence, the individualChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being101

takes on a secondary status as a mere effect of the genuine processes that all
occur at the level of the virtual.
In a philosophically rich review of Hallward's book, John Protevi
contends that Hallward illicitly flattens the complexity of Deleuze's
ontology. As Protevi remarks,
The relations among actual, virtual and intensive form themost important issue in explicating Deleuze's ontology. I
would argue that we should consider the intensive as anindependent ontological register, one that mediates the virtualand actual, which are its limits. Even if one doesn't accept thisand insists on a dualism of the virtual and actual, one would
have to say that the intensive belongs with the actual.90
Protevi goes on to argue that,
Spatio-temporal dynamisms, that is, morphogenetic processes
exhibiting intensive properties, are processes of individuation,of emergence from pre-individual fields. The paradigm
cases for Deleuze are embryos and weather systems. In the
biological register, the “field” of individuation (the gradientsof which are laden with pre-individual singularities) isthe egg, while the process of individuation is embryonicmorphogenesis; in the meteorological register, the field ofindividuation is the pre-condition (the bands of different
temperature and pressure in air and water) to the formationof wind currents or storms, which are the spatio-temporal
dynamisms. [...]. Any resident of Louisiana will be able tolocate hurricanes for you in terms of their spatio-temporalco-ordinates. To be fair, we do have to distinguish between
the location of a hurricane as embedded in a geographic
co-ordinate system—its extensive properties—and thethresholds proper to its intensive properties. It's only at
certain singular points in the differential relations among air
and water temperature and wind currents that thunderstorms,
tropical depressions, tropical storms, and hurricanes form.
Nonetheless, the point is that the weather system itself is the102

Levi R. Bryant

intensive process by which those singularities are actualized,
and that this intensive process operates here, in this world.91
Quite right. What Protevi doesn't seem to notice, however, is that
this treatment of the relationship between the virtual, the actual, andthe intensive requires a significant revision of Deleuze's ontology. In his
reading of Deleuze's ontology, we note that Protevi perpetually refers todiscrete and actual substances or individuals that interact with one anotherand perturb each other in a variety of ways. Far from a monistic virtual
continuum that is then cut up into discrete entities, Protevi's parsing ofDeleuze's ontology requires the existence of discrete substances or entities
that interact with one another and evoke virtual powers within one anotherthrough these interactions. And here, in passing, we should recall Deleuze's
constant polemics against the concept of causality. As Deleuze remarks,
It is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes placein time not between one actual term, however small,and another actual term, but between the virtual and its
actualisation—in other words, it goes from the structure toits incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the casesof solution, from the differential elements and their ideal
connections to actual terms and diverse real relations whichconstitute at each moment the actuality of time.92
If Deleuze is so quick to reject the notion of causality, then this isbecause causality works laterally or horizontally, from object to object,
whereas the virtual works vertically from the implicate to the explicate.
It is precisely this thesis that must be rejected under Protevi's account.
If Deleuze's account of time in the relation between the virtual and theactual is here embraced, it is difficult to see how the actual terms evokedin Protevi's characterization of Deleuze's thought can have the sort ofcausal efficacy Protevi attributes to them. Rather, under Deleuze's model ofvirtual time, any causal relation between actual terms can only be apparent
or a sort of transcendental illusion. My point here is not that Protevi is
mistaken in his account of the relation between the virtual, the actual, andthe intensive, but rather that Deleuze's account of virtual time, of the timeof actualization, must be abandoned if something like Protevi's account is

Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being103

to remain coherent. It must be possible for actual terms to causally interact
with one another and for the actual to affect the virtual.
But if this is the case, then we can no longer say that the virtual is
the pre-individual and the actual is the individual. The virtual is not
something that produces the individual, but rather must strictly be adimension of the individual. It is precisely the individual that precedes thevirtual—transcendentally, not temporally—not the virtual that precedes
the individual. If it is to be possible for substances or individuals to perturb
each other, then being cannot consist of a whole or a continuum, but must
instead come in discrete packets or substances. Moreover, it follows thatthe actual dimension of the entity cannot mark the erasure or cancellationof difference, but must instead itself be an instigator of difference in otherentities and one of the mechanisms by which the volcanic, yet unactualized,
powers of the virtual are released and set forth in the world. And here I
note that when outstanding commentators on Deleuze such as Protevi
and DeLanda set out to analyze the world, it is precisely in these terms
that they speak. Far from treating the actual and substances as derivative,
they instead display a profound attentiveness to the differences that
individual substances make. Here the ontology of theoretical practice belies
the ontology espoused when striving to describe what they're doing intheir practice.
In an interview Deleuze once remarked that,
Philosophers introduce new concepts, they explain them,but they don't tell us, not completely anyway, the problems
to which those concepts are a response. Hume, for example,
set out a novel concept of belief, but he doesn't tell us how
and why the problem of knowledge presents itself in sucha way that knowledge is seen as a particular kind of belief.
The history of philosophy, rather than repeating what aphilosopher says, has to say what he must have taken for
granted, what he didn't say but is nonetheless present in what
he did say.93
It is in this way, I believe, that we should approach Deleuze's
deployment of the concept of the virtual. In short, what is the problem to104 Levi R. Bryant

which Deleuze's concept of the virtual responds? However dimly Deleuze
might have discerned the problem himself, the problem to which theconcept of the virtual seems to respond is that of the split in objects
between withdrawn being and qualities, coupled with the problem of thebare substratum. It appears that Deleuze clearly recognized that the beingof substance cannot be identified with its qualities and actualized structure.
Because substance changes, because it is capable of carrying contrary
qualities, substance, in its proper being, must differ from its qualities.
However, if substance is to differ from its qualities, then it requires aform of structure that is formatted without being qualitative. Without thisother dimension of substances, we fall into the bare substratum problem
discussed in the last chapter, where substances are completely blank,completely indifferent, and therefore, absurdly, all identical to one another.
It is precisely this domain of being that the virtual names, for the virtualis structure and potency without quality. However, having dimly glimpsed
this problem, Deleuze immediately falls into a set of errors that lead his
account of the virtual into incoherence. Oddly, these problems seem toarise from conceding far too much to actualism. Having recognized that thedomain of the actual or qualities and extensities is incapable of accounting
for the individuality of the individual or the substantiality of substance,
Deleuze nonetheless treats the actual as the sole domain of the individualor primary substance. As a consequence, he's led to characterize thedomain of the virtual as the pre-individual, when he should instead treat thedomain of the virtual as the domain of the individual, the substantial, orthat which persists through change. The consequences of this decision are
profound. By treating the domain of the virtual as the pre-individual andthe domain of the actual as an effect of the virtual, Deleuze is left without
an account of why the virtual actualizes itself at all (despite his impressive
efforts to the contrary), and is led to treat the actual as a mere product,
an excresence, that itself has no efficacy within being. What is required, bycontrast, is an account of the virtual that treats it as a dimension of primary
substances or discrete individuals, where substance precedes the virtual(transcendentally, not temporally) not the reverse, and where actual entities
are capable of interacting with one another. It is to this account of thevirtual that I now turn.

Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being

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3.3. Virtual Proper Being
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze remarks that “[t]he virtual is opposed
not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it isvirtual. Exactly what Proust said of states of resonance must be said of thevirtual: 'Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract'“.94 Within
the framework of onticology, the claim that the virtual is real is the claimthat the virtual is always the virtuality of a substance or individual being.
Put differently, the claim that the virtual is real is not the claim that thevirtual is a potential being, but rather the claim that the virtual is always
the virtuality or potentiality of a being or substance. Here the genitive
is of the utmost importance. The virtual always belongs to a substance,
not the reverse. Moreover, the virtual is always the potential harbored or
carried by a discrete or individual being. In this regard, we must distinguishbetween the two halves of any object, substance, or difference engine. On
the one hand, there is the actual side of an object consisting of qualities andextensities, while on the other hand, there is the virtual side of substances,consisting of potentialities or powers. In claiming that the virtual is “ideal”,
Deleuze is not claiming that the virtual is mental or cognitive—thoughminds too have their virtual dimension—but rather that the virtual isrelational. These relations, however, are not relations between entities, butconstitute the endo-structure of an object, its internal topology. Finally,
we can claim that it is entirely possible—if not common—for actuallyexisting entities to remain in a state of virtuality such that they are fully realand existent in the world, fully concrete, without producing any qualities
or extensities. Only on this condition can we make sense of Bhaskar's
claim that it is possible for generative mechanisms, difference engines, or
substances to be real while remaining dormant such that they are out ofphase with their qualities or events.
How, then, are we to understand this dimension of substance that isformatted without possessing qualities? Two features in particular render
Deleuze's concept of the virtual particularly well suited for theorizing thiswithdrawn dimension of substance. On the one hand, Deleuze is careful
to emphasize that the virtual shares no resemblance to the actual. “Everyobject is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one

106 Levi R. Bryant

another”.95 If the actual is treated as embodying qualities and geometricalstructure in the sense specified in section 3.1, then this captures themanner in which the virtual dimension of a substance differs from anything
qualitative, thus providing us with substance that is structured or formatted
without being qualitative. To illustrate this lack of resemblance between
the virtual and actual halves of split objects, Deleuze gives the illuminating
example of genes. “[G]enes as a system of differential relations”, of which
virtual multiplicities are composed, “are incarnated at once in a species andthe organic parts of which it is composed”.96 Genes, as a contributor to theoverall form that an actualized organism embodies form a set of differential
relations and singularities that share no resemblance to that actualizedorganism. Genes are among the conditions for the form the organism will
take, but in no way resemble that organism.
On the other hand, the concept of virtuality allows us to theorize themanner in which substances are always individual substances without
requiring reference to other substances or beings. According to Deleuze,
the virtual is composed of “multiplicities”. I will have more to say about
multiplicities momentarily, but for the moment it bears noting that
according to Deleuze, “'[m]ultiplicity', which replaces the one no less thanthe multiple, is the true substantive, substance itself”.97 Deleuze draws theconcept of multiplicity from the differential geometry of Friedrich Gauss
and Bernhard Riemann. As explained by Manuel DeLanda,
In the early nineteenth century, when Gauss began to tap into
these differential resources, a curved two-dimensional surface
was studied using the old Cartesian method: the surface
was embedded in a three-dimensional space complete with
its own fixed set of axes; then, using those axes, coordinates
would be assigned to every point of the surface; finally thegeometric link between points determining the form of thesurface would be expressed as algebraic relations between
the numbers. But Gauss realized that the calculus, focusing
as it does on infinitesimal points on the surface itself (thatis, operating entirely with local information), allowed thestudy of the surface without any reference to a global embedding
space. Basically, Gauss developed a method to implant theChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being

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coordinate axes on the surface itself (that is, a method of'coordinatizing' the surface) and, once points had been sotranslated into numbers, to use differential (not algebraic)equations to characterize their relations.98
The concept of multiplicity is of great significance not for only
mathematics, but ontology as well. For through enabling us to think theinternal structure of a space without reference to a global embedding space, theconcept of multiplicity also enables us to think the being of an individual
substance independent of its relations to other substances or its exo-relations.
It is for this reason that I refer to the virtual proper being of substance asconsisting of endo-relations, an endo-structure, or an endo-composition.
The point is not that all substances are spatial—when we discuss flat
ontology we will see that this is not the case—but rather that multiplicity
allows us to think individual substance in a purely immanent fashion
detached from any sort of global embedding space or set of exo-relations.
While substances can and do enter into relations with other substances,
their being qua substance is not constituted by these exo-relations. Exorelations often play a crucial role in the qualities a substance comes toembody at the level of local manifestations, but the being of substance in its
substantiality is something other than these exo-relations. As an additional
consequence of this concept of multiplicity, the Kantian conception of
space and time as containers must here be abandoned as well in favor of amodel of space and time arising from substances.
In defining multiplicities Deleuze remarks that “the utmost importancemust be attached to the substantive form: multiplicity must not designate a
combination of the many and the one, but rather an organisation belonging
to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in orderto form a system”.99 A moment later, Deleuze goes on to explain thatmultiplicities must “thus be defined as a structure”.100 If multiplicities must
be defined as a structure or a system, then this is because the elements thatcompose them,must in effect be determined, but reciprocally, by reciprocal
relations which allow no independence whatsoever to subsist.
Such relations are precisely non-localisable ideal connections,

108 Levi R. Bryant

whether they characterise the multiplicity globally or proceedby the juxtaposition of neighboring regions. In all cases
the multiplicity is intrinsically defined, without externalreference or recourse to a uniform space in which it would besubmerged.101
In his drive to formulate a differential ontology or account of being
resting on nothing but difference without reference to identity, Deleuze’s
concept of multiplicity is pulled in two opposing directions. On the one
hand, associating unity with identity, Deleuze wishes to deny any unity
to multiplicities. On the other hand, in his discussions of multiplicities
Deleuze seems ineluctably drawn to treating them as unities. With respect tothis second tendency, we need only observe the manner in which Deleuzerefers to multiplicities as structures where all the elements are reciprocallydetermined, such that they embody an organization. If multiplicities are
structured or organized, if they are intrinsically “defined”, then it seems
difficult to maintain that they lack unity.
Rather, it appears that the very being of multiplicities consists in theirunity. It is only on these grounds that we can refer to them as substances.
In thinking multiplicities, Deleuze seems to be groping for the classicalcategories of totality or community. A totality is a system in which all of
the parts depend on one another such that they are, as Deleuze puts it,reciprocally determined. My body, for example, is a totality. By contrast,
a community is not so much a social entity, as a system in which all theparts simultaneously cause and affect one another. Thus, for example,
every organic body is simultaneously a totality and a community insofar
as its parts are both dependent on one another and constantly interact
with one another. Likewise, the relation between the Earth and the moonis a community insofar as the moon's gravitation affects the Earth and theEarth's gravitation affects the moon. It is precisely this sort of structure that
Deleuze seems to have in mind when he evokes the concept of multiplicity.
However, while systems of this sort are certainly differentiated internally,
they are nonetheless unities or substances.
In defining the being of the virtual or multiplicities, Deleuze argues that“[t]he reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations
along with the singular points which correspond to them. The reality ofChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being109

the virtual is structure”.102 If Deleuze treats the virtual or multiplicities as
pre-individual and the actual as individual, then this is because he fails toadequately distinguish between the topological and the geometrical within
substance. Concluding that the individuality of the individual resides in
its qualities, parts, or in geometric extensity, Deleuze is forced to deny
individuality to multiplicities. But as I argued in section 3.2, this thesis isuntenable for a variety of reasons. Rather, while multiplicities are without
qualities, they are nonetheless the structure or “form” that functions as theground of a substance's qualitative variations.
Here, then, we might think of Harman's discussion of Xavier Zubiri in
Tool-Being. There Harman begins by noting that “[t]he reality of a thingcannot be identified with its presence”.103 Here presence can be equatedwith the actuality of a substance or thing, with the properties or qualities
that it embodies. In contrasting the substance of a thing with its qualities
or properties, Harman's Zubiri accords closely with Bhaskar's thesis that
substances can be out of phase with their events or properties. Harman goeson to remark that “[t]he reality of a thing cannot be regarded as a substanceendowed with properties. Instead, the thing is always a system, a system thatunifies all of its numerous 'notes.'” 104 In treating the substantiality of a thing
as a system of notes, Harman's Zubiri displays an exceptional proximity to
Deleuze's conception of virtual multiplicities as composed of differential
relations and singularities. Harman goes on to remark that,
A reality is defined as that which acts on other things byvirtue of its notes. This term “note” is meant as a replacement
for the word “property”, which Zubiri regards as biased
towards reality viewed conceptively, that is, from the external
standpoint of a relation rather than from the thing in andof itself. To speak of a property, he says, is to speak of theidiosyncrasies that distinguish one thing from another; in thisway, the property is an extraneous feature grafted onto someunderlying substrate, and always viewed from the outsiderather than from within. As opposed to properties, the notesof a thing make up even the most intimate parts of that thing:“matter, its structure, its chemical composition, its psychic

110 Levi R. Bryant'faculties', etc”. Instead of qualities belonging to a substance,
Zubiri's notes are the reality of the thing itself.105
Like Zubiri's notes, Deleuze's singularities are the most intimate realityof a thing, defining and structuring its being. However, unlike Zubiri's
notes, Deleuze's singularities do not replace the concept of properties or
qualities, but rather are evoked as the ground of properties or qualities.
Singularities are those potencies that generate qualities or properties as
acts on the part of the object. And if Deleuze is compelled to develop
the concept of singularity to account for the being of objects, then thisis precisely because the properties of objects or substances are variable
and changing, yet a substance still—within certain limits—remains that
substance. What is thus required is a ground that is plastic, that can vary,
while retaining its identity. It is precisely this requirement that the conceptof multiplicity satisfies.
Unfortunately, Deleuze tells us very little as to just what thesesingularities are. We know that we need them, that substances must possess
singularities, but insofar as these singularities are not themselves qualities,
we don't know what they are. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze defines
singularities as “the point of departure for a series which extends over all
the ordinary points of the system, as far as the region of another singularity
which gives rise to another series which may either converge or diverge
from the first”.106 Unfortunately, this definition isn't very helpful. What
are the ordinary points? What are the singular points? What are the seriesin question? Perhaps some light is shed on this issue if we return to theconcept of topology.
It will be recalled that topology is a sort of dynamic geometry thatstudies the invariant features of an object that remain the same underhomeomorphic deformations through operations of bending, stretching,folding and so on. Thus, for example, within the framework of Euclidean
geometry, a triangle and a quadrilateral are completely distinct, whereas
in topology quadrilaterals and triangles are equivalent to one another. If
this is the case, then it is because triangles, through operations of folding,stretching, and bending can be transformed into quadrilaterals and viceversa. To transform a triangle into a quadrilateral, simply take one of its
vertices and fold it over. In this regard, singularities occupy a paradoxicalChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being

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place within topology. Clearly singularities must simultaneously define
the series of ordinary points and mark the threshold at which new forms
emerge. On the one hand, the singularities of a topological space cannot
be, for example, the vertices of the triangle. Were this the case, then thetriangle and the quadrilateral would not be structurally equivalent. Rather,
the vertices of the triangle and the quadrilateral must define ordinary points
within a topological space of singularities. And here it bears noting thatthe singularities of a topological space themselves never appear or manifest
themselves. What manifests itself are the ordinary points, the Euclidean
geometry, of each individual figure. The singularities serving as the groundof these figures can only be inferred. They are never directly given but areperpetually withdrawn. There is no shape that embodies the singularitiesof the topological space, nor does the corresponding geometrical spaceever resemble the topological space. On the other hand, singularities define
thresholds between different topological spaces. For example, if I take astrip of paper and fasten its two ends or twist it and then fasten its two
ends, I am now in two new topological spaces with their own variety ofpossible mutations.
Now, in evoking topology in the context of onticology's ontologicalconcerns, it is important to exercise caution. First, topology is concerned
specifically and exclusively with spatial relations, whereas ontology isconcerned with entities and qualities of all kinds. Second, topology isconcerned with homeomorphisms or structural identities across a variety of
distinct entities, whereas here I am trying to account for the substantialityof individual entities. Consequently, parallels between topology andmultiplicities diverge in important respects. The lesson to be drawn fromtopology is that there are variations that are nonetheless structure- orsystem-preserving. As Deleuze puts it, “[e]very phenomenon refers to an
inequality by which it is conditioned. Every diversity and every change
refers to a difference which is its sufficient reason”.107 Phenomena here
should be understood in the sense of “local manifestation”, whereas
inequality or difference should be understood in terms of the singularities
or notes belonging to a multiplicity as the condition or ground for the
production of qualities.

112 Levi R. Bryant

In Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, Manuel DeLanda proposesto treat Deleuze's singularities as attractors. With a few qualifications
and conceptual modifications, this is the interpretation of Deleuze's
singularities that I would like to defend. However, before proceeding todiscuss attractors, it is first necessary to distinguish the position I am
developing here from DeLanda's position. In Intensive Science and Virtual
Philosophy, DeLanda argues that Deleuze's concept of multiplicities isdesigned to replace the old philosophical concepts of essences, and thatthings, substances, or objects are to be explained in terms of how they
are produced, rather than in terms of their essence. As DeLanda puts it,“[i]n a Deleuzian ontology [...] a species (or any other natural kind) is notdefined by its essential traits but rather by the morphogenetic process that gave
rise to it”.108
Clearly onticology, and object-oriented philosophy more broadly
construed, rejects this thesis. In section 3.2, we already saw that DeLanda
endorses the Deleuzian thesis that the virtual is composed of a monistic
continuum of singularities that is then cut up into discrete entities withqualities. There I argued that this position is incoherent and that the virtual
must instead be strictly conceived as a part of discrete entities such thateach object has its own virtual dimension. Likewise, the thesis that an entity
is defined by the morphogentic process by which it came to be conflates two
distinct issues. While many entities must certainly come to be, it does notfollow from this that the being of entities can be defined by the process bywhich they came to be. Were this the case, then we would reduce entities
to their history. However, as every parent knows, while they were certainly
the efficient cause of their child coming to be, the child has a being
independent of this morphogenetic process by which it came to be. The
being of a being cannot be reduced to its efficient cause, but also has its
formal or structural cause.
Moreover, DeLanda seems to be at odds with his own thesis, for later,in the same text, he proposes a flat ontology that would be “one madeexclusively of unique, singular individuals, differing in spatio-temporalscale but not in ontological status”.109 In formulating his ontology as aflat ontology, DeLanda's thesis seems to work against his prior claim thatthe being of beings is to be conceived in terms of their morphogenetic

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processes. For here it seems that DeLanda takes the Aristotlean route oftreating individual substances as what are primary. As Aristotle puts it,“anything which is produced is produced by something [...], and fromsomething”.110 In other words, individual substances are produced byand through other individual substances. As a consequence, individual
substances necessarily precede processes of production and are thecondition of production. The point, then, is not that we shouldn't examine
processes of production. We should. Rather, the point is that substanceontologically precedes production.
In Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, DeLanda remarks that“[s]ingularities [...] influence the behaviour [of objects] by acting as
attractors for [their] trajectories”.111 Here it is crucial to note that theconcept of attractors is not a teleological concept. Attractors are not goals
towards which a substance tends, but are rather the potentialities towards
which a substance tends under a variety of different conditions in theactualization of its qualities. As DeLanda goes on to say, “singularities are[...] the inherent or intrinsic [...] tendencies of a system, the states which thesystem will spontaneously tend to adopt [...] as long as it is not constrainedby other forces”.112 In this respect, DeLanda's attractors are extremely close
to Bhaskar's generative mechanisms developed in A Realist Theory of Science.
However, in contrast to DeLanda—though I believe his analysis alreadysuggests this distinction—I want to argue that attractors are not states ofan object or substance, but rather are what in substances preside overthe genesis of actualized states or local manifestations. In this respect,
the attractors of a substance constitute what Harman, following Zubiri,
refers to as the notes or the most intimate reality of the object. They are
the generative mechanisms within an object that preside over the eventsor qualities of which the object is capable. However, while serving as thecondition of these events or qualities, these attractors are not themselves
qualitative or events. As DeLanda puts it, “attractors are never actualized,
since no point of a trajectory [of an object] ever reaches the attractor
itself ”.113 As such, the attractors or singularities inhabiting the endostructure of an object are radically withdrawn. They are that which serves
as the condition for the actual dimension of an object, for the local
manifestations of an object, but are never themselves found on the actual

114 Levi R. Bryant

side of an object. For this reason, DeLanda contends that we must “make[...] a sharp ontological distinction between the trajectories as they appear in
the phase portrait of a system, on the one hand, and the vector field, on theother”.114 The phase portrait or phase space of an object is the variety ofstates an object occupies at the level of its actualized qualities or properties,
while the vector field consists of the attractors that preside over the genesisof these qualities. Thus, for example, the phase space of the coffee mug
would be, among other things, the variety of different colors it actualizes,
whereas the attractor would be that singularity that functions as the genetic
conditions for all of these different colors. It is the attractor that persists
throughout these variations or transformations.
The claim that objects are split-objects is the claim that they are split
between their virtual proper being and their local manifestations. The
virtual proper being of an object is its endo-structure, the manner in which
it embodies differential relations and attractors or singularities defining avector field or field of potentials within a substance. The local manifestationof a substance is the actualization of a point within the phase space of thisvector field in the form of actualized qualities. If it is crucial to distinguishbetween virtual proper being and local manifestation, then this is because
the qualities of an object can undergo variations while still remaining theobject that it is. It is a vague recognition of this capacity within substancesthat leads Aristotle to distinguish between substance and its qualities.
However, if we are to avoid falling into Locke's bare substratum problem
while maintaining the distinction between substance and its qualities, itis necessary to articulate the way in which substance can be structured
without possessing qualities. It is precisely this problem that the concept ofvirtual proper being resolves. Yet, above all, the distinction between virtual
proper being and local manifestation teaches us that objects are plastic. As
a function of the exo-relations objects enter into with other objects, theattractors defining the virtual space of a substance can be activated in avariety of different ways, actualizing objects in a variety of different ways
at the level of local manifestations. It is for this reason that the confusionof objects with their actualization in local manifestations always spells
theoretical disaster, for in doing so we foreclose the volcanic potentials
harbored in the depths of objects.

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3.4. The Problem With Rabbits and Hats
In Prince of Networks, Harman, following Latour, levels a trenchant critiqueagainst the concepts of potentiality and virtuality that are at the core of myconcept of split-objects. By responding to this critique, I hope to render
the concept of virtual proper being a bit more concrete and bring out someof its important consequences. In Irreductions, Latour remarks that “[t]heorigin of potency lies in this confusion: it is no longer possible to distinguishan actor from the allies which make it strong”.115 As Latour goes on to remark,“[t]alk of possibilities is the illusion of actors that move while forgetting thecost of transport”.116 Perhaps one way of articulating this critique would be
to say that you can't pull a rabbit out of a hat without first putting it in thehat. The problem with the concept of potentiality under this model is thatit treats the rabbit as if it were already in the hat, without accounting for thework it takes to put the rabbit in the hat.
This seems to be precisely the sense in which Harman takes Latour's
critique. As Harman argues, “[t]o speak of something existing in potentia
implies that it is already there but simply covered or suppressed. This
is what Latour denies. For him, a thing is only here once it is here, notsooner”.117 Illustrating this point, Harman remarks that “[f]or Latour aperson does not stand up by drawing on an inner reservoir of potency,
but through a series of mediations—nervous excitations acting on
muscles, which then shift the body's weight onto a hard, unyielding floor.
Numerous allies are brought into play even in the simplest movements ofour bodies”.118 What Latour wishes to capture are all the translations an
actant or object must go through in order to engage in even the simplest of
motions such as standing up. In this regard, the problem with the conceptof potentiality is that it treats these powers as already residing in the beingof the substance, thereby leading us to ignore these myriad translations
necessary for an action to take place. We say, for example, that the prince
has power even when he doesn't exercise it, thereby ignoring all the workthat goes into keeping soldiers in line, maintaining a legal system, forming
stable alliances with other nobles, dealing with peasant uprisings, and so on.
Or, similarly, we say that the acorn contains an oak tree within it, such that
it is already there only waiting to come out.

116 Levi R. Bryant

In response to Harman-Latour's critique of potentiality, there are acouple of points worth making. First, while Harman and Latour's points
about translation and work are well taken, this critique seems to miss thepoint that substances must be susceptible to these translations. Returning
to Harman's remarks about standing up, I readily grant that nerves must
be excited so that muscles must be activated so that feet can press against
a hard floor, and so on. However, in order for nerves to be excited, nerves
must be capable of being excited. When Harman and Latour argue that
only the actual exists, are they arguing that the excited nerves are an entirely
new entity, or are they claiming that this entity merely changes its states? Ifthey are making the claim that the excited nerves are an entirely new entity,then they seem committed to the rather odd thesis that entities are popping
into existence ex nihilo. As a consequence of his principle of irreduction
and commitment to Whitehead's ontology, it seems that this is precisely thethesis that Latour advocates. Within the Whiteheadian framework, every
actual occasion (entity) is an instantaneous entity that is fully complete inits being. As Steven Shaviro puts it,each occasion, taken in itself, is a quantum: a discrete,indivisible unit of becoming. But this also means thatoccasions are strictly limited in scope. Once an occasion
happens, it is already over, already dead. Once it has reached
its final “satisfaction”, it no longer has any vital power. “Anactual occasion [...] never changes”, Whitehead says; “it only
becomes and perishes.119
What we get with Whitehead is a sort of radical actualism where everychange implies an entirely new entity. Yet if this is the case, it is difficult tosee how we can get from one entity to another entity. Rather, it seems that
entities must possess the capacity, the potentiality, to undergo change.
In this regard, another way of understanding the concept of virtual
singularities or attractors is in terms of Spinoza's concept of affect. As
Spinoza writes in the Ethics, “By [affect] I understand the affections of
the body by which the body's power of activity is increased or diminished,assisted or checked”.120 What makes Spinoza's concept of affect sointeresting is that it doesn't restrict affect to what is felt, but links theChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being

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concept of affect to the capacities of an object. And here, if I refer to thecapacities of an object, then this is because for Spinoza all entities, whether
human, animal, or inanimate possess what Spinoza calls affects. And these
affects consist of both an entity's “receptivity” to other entities and thevarious capacities an entity has to act. Unless we are to fall into an atomism
where there is an insurmountable gulf between entities, it seems that wemust attribute to objects affects in Spinoza's sense. Those nerves must havethe capacity of being excited or stimulated.
In discussion with me surrounding these issues, Harman remarks that,“[c]ontra what Bryant implies [...] however, I don’t think that the acorn
already has oak-qualities. I think it has acorn-qualities”.121 However,this is precisely what I don't claim. To suggest that the acorn has oakqualities would be to conflate qualities with substance. But as I argued in
section 3.3, the virtual proper being of an object cannot be equated withanything qualitative. Virtual proper being is radically other than qualities.
Moreover, it cannot be said that the acorn already contains the oak tree.
What the acorn contains are acorn powers or attractors, and while thesepowers or attractors are entirely determinate, their actualization is a purely
creative process producing new qualities and eventually a new object.
In this respect, Harman and I are very close, for like Harman I advocate
the thesis that the acorn does not contain oak-tree qualities, but is fully
determinate at its virtual level as an acorn. The virtual dimension of objects
is concrete without being actual. In this regard, Harman and Latour seem toconflate the virtual with the possible.
It is precisely this conflation of the potential with the possible that
Deleuze seeks to avoid with his account of the virtual. As Deleuze cautions,
The only danger in all this is that the virtual could be
confused with the possible. The possible is opposed to thereal; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a'realisation'. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real;
it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes isthat of actualization.122
Deleuze criticizes the concept of the possible for reasons similar to
those Latour levels against the potential. In short, he criticizes the concept

118 Levi R. Bryantof the possible for treating the rabbit as if it were already in the hat. As
Deleuze argues,
Every time we pose the question in terms of the possible
and real, we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute
eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind
our backs and as subject to a law of all or nothing. Whatdifference can there be between the existent and the nonexistent if the non-existent is already possible, alreadyincluded in the concept and having all the characteristics thatthe concept confers upon it as a possibility. Existence is thesame as the possible but outside the concept.123
Between the possible oak tree and the actual oak tree there is absolutely
no difference beyond the brute fact of existence. If, then, we conflate
the potentiality of the acorn with the possibility of the oak-tree, we aremaking the claim that the acorn already contains the oak tree, but in a
potential state.
Alternatively, “[t]he actualization of the virtual, on the contrary, always
takes place by difference, divergence or differenciation [...]. Actual terms
never resemble the singularities they incarnate”.124 In contrast to a processof realization or a movement from the possible to the real, the processof actualization is a creative process within substances that requires work.
Moreover, the local manifestation produced in the process of actualization
is something new and shares no resemblance to the singularities which it
actualizes. To illustrate this point, let's return to the vexed example of theacorn. The virtuality of the acorn is not the oak tree, but rather is the notesof its being. The singularities that characterize its concrete existence arefolded deep within that existence and withdrawn from the world. When theacorn enters into exo-relations with other entities, these singularities will be
activated in a variety of ways depending on the exo-relations it entertains
with other entities. If the soil is too damp and the temperature doesn't get
warm enough, the acorn rots. If the temperature is right and there is arequisite amount of water in the soil, the acorn begins to germinate. But
now, as the acorn germinates, it encounters other entities in the field of its
exo-relations. There are, for example, all sorts of other plants growing inChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being119

the region of the acorn with which the acorn's own roots must compete.
As a consequence of this, the seedling becomes weak and anemic or strong
and thriving. The region in which the acorn grows is perhaps particularly
windy, with sheets of wind buffeting the plain where the seedling grows
from a predominantly westerly direction. When we come across the oak tree
decades later, we notice that it is bent and knotted in an easterly direction
like a carefully pruned bonsai tree. It is as if the oak tree has become
petrified wind.
The point here is that the singularities or attractors belonging to theacorn do not contain the oak tree in advance. Rather, the acorn negotiates a
milieu of exo-relations to other entities in producing its local manifestationsor qualities. The attractors that preside over this process are radically
non-qualitative. Here I find myself inclined to embrace Latour's thesis that“[w]hatever resists trials is real”.125 The problem with Latour's formulationis that it is purely negative and relational. In situating the endo-structure ofan entity in terms of resistance, Latour emphasizes what occurs when an
entity enters into exo-relations with other entities. This confuses epistemic
criteria through which we or other entities recognize another entity as real,with what constitutes the reality of the entity regardless of whether anyone
or anything knows it. In this regard, he thinks the being of an entity fromthe perspective of other entities encountering that entity. The wind, itself
composed of many entities, encounters the seedling and must move around
it. The seedling resists the wind. It is by virtue of its singularities, its endostructure, that the seedling is able to resist the wind, but these singularities
aren't the resistance. Rather, the singularities would be there in the seedlingregardless of whether or not anything interacted with them.
From these observations, a number of distinctions follow. On the
one hand, we must distinguish between symmetrical and asymmetricalqualities or local manifestations. Symmetrical qualities are qualities that canrepeatedly snap in and out of existence. For example, the various shadesof color the coffee mug manifests are symmetrical qualities in that, barringa transformation of the endo-structure of the coffee mug, these qualities
can come in and out of existence. Turn off the lights and the mug becomes
black. Turn on the light and the mug returns to that particular shadeof blue. Asymmetrical qualities, by contrast, are irreversible qualitative

120

Levi R. Bryanttransformations that take place within an object. These are qualitativetransformations that can be produced by either the object itself, or throughexo-relations to other objects. Thus, for example, the bent figure of thetree is an asymmetrical quality produced by the tree's exo-relations to thewind and perhaps other plants in its vicinity it competes with for sunlight.
The key point not to be missed with asymmetrical qualities is that they are
irreversible. Asymmetrical transformations cut off other possibilities within
the vector field of a substance's attractors.
On the other hand, we must distinguish between exo-qualities andendo-qualities. Exo-qualities are qualities that can only exist in andthrough a set of exo-relations to other objects. Color, for example, seems
to be a quality of this sort. Color is an event that only takes place througha network of exo-relations between the molecular endo-composition of
the object, particular wavelengths of light, and a particular neurologicalstructure in an organism. Take any of these elements away and color puffs
out of existence. As such, color, as an exo-quality, is a genuine creation ofthese three agencies being woven together. It is not the cup that is colored,
but rather the entanglement of these agencies that produces color as an
event. The cup merely has the power to contribute to the production ofthis exo-quality. Endo-qualities, by contrast, are qualities that really are in
the object. However, endo-qualities, as local manifestations of a substance,
come about in two ways. First, endo-qualities are local manifestations thatcan come about through the internal dynamisms of an object independentof any other objects. Here the object need not be perturbed by anotherobject for the endo-quality to be produced. Second, endo-qualities cancome about through exo-relations to other objects, where these exorelations irreversibly transform the local manifestation of the object. Allasymmetrical qualities are of this sort. These events also harbor the powerof transforming the endo-structure of objects, leading to the genesis of new
singularities, powers, attractors, or vector fields in the virtual proper beingof an object.
The great error to be avoided lies in conceiving the virtual or potential
in teleological terms, or in believing that the entity could be captured or
fully grasped by summing up all possible points of view on the object.
The relation between virtual proper being and local manifestation is not aChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being

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teleological relation or a relation between an agency and a goal. Throughout
the last three chapters, I have attempted to argue that objects can be fully
concrete without locally manifesting themselves or actualizing themselvesin qualities. Another way of putting this is to say that local manifestation is
not the fulfillment of objects. Local manifestation is something that objects
can do, but an object that does not locally manifest itself is not lacking insome way, nor is it somehow incomplete. Nor is it the case that we would
encounter the complete being of a substance if only we could see it fromeverywhere at once. Where the local manifestations of a substance areconcerned, these manifestations are, in principle, infinite. There is no limit
to the number of local manifestations that an object can actualize, precisely
because there is no limit to the exo-relations an object can enter into andthe exo-relations it can consequently produce. Yet even if God exists and iscapable of perceiving an infinity of local manifestations, the being of objects
is nonetheless radically withdrawn even from God for the subterranean
dimension of substance, its virtual proper being, is in excess of any of its
local manifestations. The virtual proper being of objects consists not of
qualities, but of powers and these powers are never exhausted by local
manifestations. In this regard, there is never a complete mapping of any
phase space, but rather only ever a limited mapping of a phase spacedependent on the exo-relations into which the object has been placed.
Here I see no reason to follow Bhaskar in privileging closed systems
over open systems. Bhaskar's thesis seems to be that the events we witness
when a substance is placed in the closed system of an experimental setting
constitute the true being of an object. Here, I believe, Bhaskar betrays
his fundamental insight: that substances can be out of phase with thequalities or events of which they are capable, and that there is therefore afundamental difference between substance and qualities. All that takes placein the closed system of an experimental environment is the situating of an
object within a particular set of exo-relations such that particular eventstake place. Nothing about this suggests that the substance thus situated isexhausted by this setting or that we have been brought before the true beingof the object. That being is always withdrawn and in excess of any of its
manifestations. As every cook knows, when placed in other exo-relations
other local manifestations take place.

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As I reflect on Harman's vigorous critique of potentiality, it seems to me
that the real motivating desire behind this critique is the desire to preserve
the concreteness of objects. As Harman writes,
The recourse to potentiality is a dodge that leaves actuality
undetermined and finally uninteresting; it reduces what iscurrently actual to the transient costume of an emergent
process across time, and makes the real work happen outside
actuality itself. The same holds true if we replace 'thepotential' with 'the virtual', not withstanding their differences.
In both cases, concrete actors themselves are deemed
insufficient for the labour of the world and are indentured tohidden overlords: whether they be potential, virtual, veiled,topological, fluxional, or any adjective that tries to escapefrom what is actually here right now.126
However, if what Harman says here is true, I fail to see how it is possible
for an object to change while remaining the same substance. Rather, thisthesis seems to lead us to the punctualistic atomism of Whitehead's actual
occasions, where each change constitutes an absolutely new entity. Here,perhaps, we should distinguish between the concrete, the actual, and thevirtual. Harman appears to treat the concrete and the actual as synonyms
of one another. Yet if we treat the concrete and the actual as synonyms of
one another, then we're forced to go the route of Whitehead and treat everychange in an actual entity as an absolutely new entity. With each strokeof the keyboard, with each movement of my finger, with each beat of myheart, I am, under this model, not the same entity now writing this essay,
but rather am an absolutely new and distinct entity. This seems like a highontological price to pay for preserving the concrete and seems to lead to thethesis that entities are created ex nihilo precisely because no entity contains
potentials by which a new entity could be produced.
It is far better, in light of these concerns, to distinguish between theconcrete, the actual, and the virtual. Within this framework, all entities are
absolutely concrete, but have virtual and actual dimensions. The virtual
is not the possible, nor is it an entity or substance that doesn't yet exist.
Rather the virtual is a fully concrete, real, and existing dimension of objects.

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Nor does it indenture objects to hidden overlords, rendering actuality
irrelevant. This would only hold if the true being of objects were theirvirtual dimension, but as we have seen, the virtual is but a dimension of
objects and actuality plays a key role in objects; not the least of which liesin unleashing potentials within objects when they enter into exo-relations.
Here, in many respects, I sense that my position and Harman's are muchcloser than might initially be suggested. In Guerilla Metaphysics, Harman
remarks that “[a]n object may drift into events and unleash its forces
there, but no such event is capable of putting the object fully into play”.127
Without the dimension of potentiality or virtuality, it's difficult to see how it
would be possible for objects to unleash their forces in this way. In his mostrecent work, Harman distinguishes between real objects and real qualities,
and sensuous objects and sensuous qualities. Real objects and qualities refer
to objects and qualities withdrawn from all relation to other objects, while
sensuous objects and qualities refer to how one object encounters anotherobject. Between Harman’s real objects and sensuous objects, I sense morethan a passing resemblance between my virtual proper being and local
manifestations.

3.5. Žižek's Objecting Objects
Characterizing objects as split-objects onticology naturally invites
comparison with Žižek's conception of objects as developed in his ontology.
In concluding this chapter, I will discuss both where onticology is inagreement with Žižek and where it diverges from his thought. In The
Parallax View, Žižek remarks that,
Many times I am asked the obvious yet pertinent question
about the title of my longest book (the present one excepted):“So who or what is tickling the ticklish subject?” The answer,of course, is: the object—however, which object? This, in anutshell (or, rather, like a nut within the shell), is the topic of
this book. The difference between subject and object can also
be expressed as the difference between the two corresponding
verbs, to subject (submit) oneself to object (protest, oppose,create an obstacle). The subject's elementary, founding,124

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gesture is to subject itself—voluntarily, of course: as both
Wagner and Nietzsche, those two great opponents, were wellaware, the highest act of freedom is the display of amor fati,
the act of freely assuming what is necessary anyway. If, then,the subject's activity is, at its most fundamental, the activityof submitting oneself to the inevitable, the fundamental modeof the object's passivity, of its passive presence, is that whichmoves, annoys, disturbs, traumatizes us (subjects): at its mostradical the object is that which objects, that which disturbs thesmooth running of things. Thus the paradox is that the roles
are reversed (in terms of the standard notion of the active
subject working on the passive object: the subject is definedby a fundamental passivity, and it is the object from whichmovement comes—which does the tickling. But, again, what
object is this? The answer is the parallax object.128
The parallax object of which Žižek here speaks is “the apparent
displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a background),caused by a change in observational position that provides a new lineof sight”.129
The concept of the parallax summarizes a long line of development inŽižek's thought revolving around the non-identity of the One with itself. AsŽižek remarks elsewhere, “[t]he Hegelian Twosome, rather designates a split
which cleaves the One from within, not into two parts: the ultimate split
is not between two halves, but between Something and Nothing, between
the One and the void of its Place”.130 As a consequence, “the Real is the'almost nothing' which sustains the gap that separates a thing from itself”.131
With respect to the ontology of objects, Žižek's concept of the parallax
functions to surmount the Kantian opposition between the thing-in-itself
and phenomena or between reality and appearance.
It will be recalled that one of Kant's central claims is that we only ever
have access to phenomena (appearances) and never things-as-they-are-inthemselves (reality). As a consequence, in the best case scenario, we areunable to determine whether reality or things-in-themselves are anything
like they appear to us, while in the worst case scenario it is possible thatreality or things-in-themselves are entirely different from how they appear

Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being125

to us. The Hegelian gesture for overcoming this duality advocated byŽižek lies not in showing how we can overcome appearances, but rather
in arguing that this split between phenomena or appearances and thingsin-themselves arises from within appearance itself.132 In other words, thesplit between reality and appearance is a sort of illusion of perspective. AsŽižek remarks,[A]ppearance implies that there is something behind it
which appears through it; it conceals a truth and by the same
gesture gives a foreboding thereof; it simultaneously hides andreveals the essence behind the curtain. But what is hidden
behind the phenomenal appearance? Precisely the fact that
there is nothing to hide. What is concealed is that the very actof concealing conceals nothing.133
In short, the parallax that Žižek effects with respect to the relation
between appearance and reality is not to show us how we can get beyond
appearances to reach or touch reality, but lies rather in showing how thisapparent gap between appearance and reality lies, in fact, on the side ofappearance itself. Not only is appearance internally split, but this split is itself
an appearance, a sort of optical illusion. If, then, this constitutes a parallactic
shift, then this is because where, in the first figure of subjectivity, we
experience ourselves as trapped within appearances, unable to touch reality,
we now see this as an illusion qua illusion. Put differently, we come to seethat appearances themselves are structured in such a way as to produce
this very illusion. It is for this reason that we can say, in Žižek's sense, that
objects are split. And as a consequence, reality is not something beyond or
behind appearances, but is rather appearance itself.
But why do objects or phenomena produce this sort of illusion whereby
phenomena appear to be manifestations of an inaccessible reality? Žižek's
answer is that this effect arises from the split in the object embodied in therelation between the object and the void of its place. As Žižek remarks, theidentity of an entity with itself equals the coincidence of thisentity with the empty place of its “inscription”. We comeacross identity when predicates fail. Identity is the surplus
which cannot be captured by predicates—more precisely (and126

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this precision is crucial if we want to avoid a misconception of
Hegel), identity-with-itself is nothing but this impossibility ofpredicates, nothing but this confrontation of an entity with thevoid at the point where we expect a predicate, a determinationof its positive content (“law is…”.). Identity-with-itself is thus
another name for absolute (self-referential) negativity, for thenegative relationship towards all predicates that define one's—
what?—identity.134
Because entity, according to Žižek, is this non-identical identity divided
between the object and the empty place of its inscription, it creates a“reality effect” in the object such that the object simultaneously appears to
be an appearance through predicates and the expression of an unreachable
reality in excess of this appearance. As Žižek argues elsewhere,[objet] a, qua semblance deceives in a Lacanian way: notbecause it is a deceitful substitute of the Real, but precisely
because it invokes the impression of some substantial Realbehind it; it deceives by posing as a shadow of the underlying
Real. And the same goes for Kant: what Kant fails to notice isthat das Ding is a mirage invoked by the transcendental object.
Limitation precedes transcendence: all that “actually exists” isthe field of phenomena and its limitation, whereas das Ding is
nothing but a phantasm which, subsequently, fills out the voidof the transcendental object.135
And, as Žižek will go on to remark a moment later,
What we experience as “reality” discloses itself against thebackground of the lack, of the absence of it, of the Thing,of the mythical object whose encounter would bring about
the full satisfaction of the drive. This lack of the Thing
constitutive of “reality” is therefore, in its fundamental
dimension, not epistemological, but rather pertains to theparadoxical logic of desire—the paradox being that this Thingis retroactively produced by the very process of symbolization,i.e, that it emerges from the very gesture of its loss. In other(Hegel's) words, there is nothing—no positive substantial

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entity—behind the phenomenal curtain, only the gaze whose
phantasmagorias assume different shapes of the Thing.136
The key point not to be missed is precisely that the “reality effect” is a
result of inscription in the symbolic. Everywhere Žižek is careful to remarkthat the fundamental opposition is not between a signifier and an opposing
signifier such as the opposition between wet and dry, but rather that thefundamental opposition, the founding opposition, is between a signifier
and its place of inscription.137 However, insofar as a signifier simultaneously
embodies itself and the emptiness of its place of inscription, it is always
non-identical to itself in its identity, thereby suggesting an excessive being
beyond itself. Yet this excessive being or reality is something that can neverbe reached precisely because it is a radically void or empty place. In otherwords, this being, this transcendence, is an “optical illusion”.
The fundamental point is that it is not a domain distinct from thesymbolic, but rather is a peculiar twist in the symbolic. As Žižek explains,
the bar which separates [the symbolic and the real] is strictlyinternal to the Symbolic, since it prevents the Symbolic from“becoming itself”. The problem for the signifier is not
its impossibility to touch the real but its impossibility to“attain itself”—what the signifier lacks is not the extralinguistic object but the Signifier itself, a non-barred, nonhindered One.138
In short, the real is not something other than the symbolic, but rather
is a sort of effect of the symbolic resulting from the difference that haunts
every signifier by virtue of the split between the signifier and its place of
inscription. Because the signifier always embodies this difference between
itself and its place of inscription, the signifier always and everywhere
necessarily fails to attain identity with itself. However, this very failure
to attain identity with itself is precisely the very essence of its identity. As
Hegel playfully remarks in the Science of Logic, if A were identical with itself,
why would I need to repeat it? The repetition of an identity in a tautology
like “A = A” actually marks the difference or non-identity of A with itself.
Along these lines, Žižek will compare the shift from viewing the real as aprediscursive reality that is then “chopped” up by mind to viewing the real

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as an effect of the symbolic, to the shift from special to general relativity in
Einstein's theory of gravity.
And is not the shift from purification to subtraction also theshift from Kant to Hegel? From tension between phenomena
and Thing to an inconsistency/gap between phenomena
themselves? The standard notion of reality is that of a
hard kernel that resists the conceptual grasp—what Hegel
does is simply to take this notion of reality more literally:
nonconceptual reality is something that emerges when
notional self- development gets caught in an inconsistency
and becomes nontransparent to itself. In short, the limit
is transposed from exterior to interior: there is Reality
because and insofar as the Notion is inconsistent, doesn't
coincide with itself. The multiple perspectival inconsistencies
between phenomena are not an effect of the impact of
the transcendent Thing—on the contrary, this Thing is
nothing but the ontologization of the inconsistency between
phenomena. The logic of this reversal is ultimately thesame as the passage from the special to the general theoryof relativity in Einstein. While the special theory alreadyintroduces the notion of curved space, it conceives of thiscurvature as the effect of matter: it is the presence of matterthat curves space—that is to say, only empty space would
be noncurved. With the passage to the general theory, thecausality is reversed: far from causing the curvature of space,matter is its effect. In the same way, the Lacanian Real—theThing—is not so much the inert presence that “curves” thesymbolic space (introducing gaps and inconsistencies in it),but, rather, the effect of these gaps and inconsistencies.139
And to complete Žižek's sentence, we can say that the gaps andinconsistencies in the symbolic produce these effects of the real. The shift
from the “special theory of the Lacanian Real” to the “general theory of
the Lacanian real” is thus a shift from viewing the real as a prediscursive
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perturbs the symbolic, to a theory of the real as an effect of the symbolicor deadlocks of formalization within the symbolic such that any reference
to a prediscursive real is mythological or a sort of optical illusion. As aconsequence, any defense of pre-discursive reality becomes the height ofdogmatic thought.
Returning, then, to the quotation with which I began this section, why is
it that the real or the split object in Žižek's sense “tickles” the subject? If thereal tickles or perturbs the subject, then this is because it creates the illusionof the Thing that the subject simultaneously lacks access to and that blocks
its access to this Thing. This Thing is the illusion of something that would
satiate and satisfy the subject’s unsatisfied desire.
The Real is thus the disavowed X on account of which
our vision of reality is anamorphically distorted; it issimultaneously the Thing to which direct access is notpossible and the obstacle which prevents this direct access,the Thing which eludes our grasp and the distorting screen
which makes us miss the thing.140
However, this Thing from which we are blocked is precisely an effect of
the internally split nature of the object between the object and its place of
inscription. If the object appears suggestive of a Thing, of a complete object
beyond appearances that would satisfy our desire once and for all, then thisis precisely because, at the level of appearances, predicates fail to capture
the object. However, if predicates fail to capture the identity of the object,then this is precisely because the object is internally fissured by the void of
its place of inscription in the signifier, suggesting a fullness through its very
absence that can never be filled.
As a consequence, this split within the object becomes the site of social
antagonism. “The 'Real'” is “the traumatic core of some social antagonism
which distorts” our view of actual social organization. And, as Žižek goeson to remark, “the parallax Real is [...] that which accounts for the very
multiplicity of appearances of the same underlying Real—it is not the hardcore which persists as the Same, but the hard bone of contention which
pulverizes the sameness into the multitude of appearances”.141 EarlierŽižek remarks that the Real, the parallax gap, is “that unfathomable X

130Levi R. Bryant

which forever eludes the symbolic grasp, and thus causes the multiplicity
of symbolic perspectives”.142 Insofar as the symbolic is haunted by anirreducible and ineradicable kernel of the Real, it becomes the site ofsocial struggle as different groups strive to fill in the void that perturbs
the symbolic.
In the preceding pages I have not done nearly enough justice to thecomplexity of Žižek's ontology and his account of the relationship between
the subject and the object, but have only sought to outline the most relevant
features of his account of being. In the next chapter we will see how agood deal of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Žižek's critique of ideology canbe retained within the ontological framework proposed by onticology.
However, it is clear that ontologically onticology and Žižek must diverge
markedly from one another. The first point worth noting is that for Žižek
the object is a pole in a relation between subject and object. In other words,
there is one type of being, the subject, and another type of being, theobject. The object is always an object for a subject and the subject is always
a subject for an object. As such, Žižek’s ontology is a variant of absolutecorrelationism or the position that there is no being apart from the subject.
Within the framework of onticology, by contrast, there is no special
category referred to as “the subject” that is necessarily and irrevocably
attached to an object. Rather, the central thesis of onticology is that being
is composed entirely of objects or primary substances. To be sure, objects
differ from one another and have different powers or capacities. Moreover,there are objects which we refer to as persons. However, the category ofobjects composed of persons possesses no special or privileged place withinbeing, nor are all beings necessarily related to persons in some form or
another. As Latour remarks, the zebras gallop across the steppes just fine
without the benefit of our gaze. Humans are among beings and are beings
among being, they aren't at the center of being, nor are they the necessary
condition for being. Were Žižek's claims true, there could be no being apartfrom the human insofar as language, no matter how alien and alienating,
only exists for humans and perhaps some other animals.
By way of a second point, while both onticology and Žižek argue that
objects are split, the two do so for radically different reasons. For Žižek,objects are split between their appearance and the void of their place ofChapter 3: Virtual Proper Being

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inscription in the symbolic. As a consequence of this divide between placeholder and place, objects can never be identical to themselves. Insofar as
objects are split between their appearance and the void of their place of
inscription, objects are effects of the symbolic or the signifier. Here Žižek
directly follows Lacan, for as Lacan remarks in Encore, “[t]he universe isa flower of rhetoric”.143 The claim that the universe is a flower of rhetoricis the claim that the universe is an effect or product of rhetoric. The
universe, for Lacan, is that which blooms out of language and speech. And
indeed, earlier we find Lacan remarking that, “[t]here isn't the slightest
prediscursive reality, for the very fine reason that what constitutes acollectivity—what I called men, women, and children—means nothingqua prediscursive reality. Men, women, and children are but signifiers”.144
Presumably Lacan would claim the same thing of flowers, zebras,
subatomic particles, burritos, stars and all other entities.
The thesis that objects are an effect of the signifier, the symbolic, or
language is a variant of what I call the “hegemonic fallacy”. Put crudely,in political theory a hegemonic relation is a social, ideological, cultural, or
economic dominance exerted over all other members of the social field.
For example, Christianity and, in particular, evangelical Christianity, hasa hegemonic influence on United States politics in comparison to otherreligious beliefs or the absence of religious belief altogether. Onticology
shifts the concept of hegemony from the domain of political theory to thedomain of ontology and might be fruitfully compared to the concept of
ontotheology. Within the framework of onticology, the hegemonic fallacy
occurs whenever one type of entity is treated as the ground or explanans of
all other entities.
In treating language or the signifier as the ground of being or theuniverse as an effect of the signifier, this is precisely what takes placein Žižek and Lacan. Beings are hegemonized under the signifier or
language, just as they are hegemonized under mind in Kant. Lurking in
the background of Žižek's argument is, I suspect, a variant of the epistemic
fallacy and actualism as discussed in the first chapter. Just as Locke rejected
the coherence of the concept of substance on the grounds that we are notgiven any access to substance in consciousness, the grounds for rejecting
anything like prediscursive reality would lie in the fact that we can only

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speak about prediscursive reality through signifiers or language and that,no matter how hard we strive to escape language, we only produce moresignifiers. Here language is the actuality that is given and we are invited tothink of all being in terms of the epistemological or how beings are given to
us through language.
However, as we saw in the first chapter, this argument only follows if it
is possible to transform properly ontological questions into epistemologicalquestions. The reasoning through which we arrive at the existence of objects
is found not in our access to objects through language or consciousness,but rather through a reflection on what the world must be like for ourpractices to be intelligible. And indeed, it is difficult to see how language
could ever have the power to divide or parcel in the way suggested by the
linguistic idealists were it not for the fact that the world is itself structured
and differentiated. Absent a world that is structured and differentiated, thesurface of the world, as a sort of formless flux, would be too slippery, toosmooth, for the signifier to structure at all.
The point here is not that we should ignore the signifier, language,
and signs, but that the signifier cannot function as the ground of being.
Here the “hegemon” of the hegemonic fallacy needs to be taken seriously.
A hegemon is a monarch that stands above, overdetermining everythingelse in a collective of objects. A hegomonic relation is a vertical relationfrom top to bottom, where the entity serving as the hegemon functions
as a monarch governing all that falls underneath the hegemon. In ŽižekLacan's schema, this is precisely how language functions. The hegemon of
the hegemonic fallacy thus functions like an active form giving structure
or formatting a passive, structureless matter. Rather than thinking in termsof hegemonic conditioning, onticology recommends that we instead thinkin terms of entanglements of objects. Without sharing all the conclusions ofher agental realism (especially her relationist ontology), while nonethelessbeing deeply sympathetic to her project, I borrow the term “entanglement”
from the work of Karen Barad.145 Barad encourages us to think in termsof entanglements of different agencies and the diffraction patterns theseentanglements produce. As described by Barad,diffraction has to do with the way waves combine when they
overlap and the apparent bending and spreading of waves that

Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being133

occur when waves encounter an obstruction. Diffraction canoccur with any kind of wave: for example, water waves, soundwaves, and light waves all exhibit diffraction under the rightconditions.146
The concept of diffraction patterns proposed by Barad embodies amuch “flatter” conception of being than the sort of vertical conception of
being we encounter in hegemonic ontologies. Where a hegemonic ontology
treats one agency as making all the difference, an ontology premised on
entanglements is attentive to how a variety of different objects or agencies
interact in the production of phenomena. Just as new patterns emerge whenwaves intersect one another or encounter an obstacle with no one agency
entirely responsible for the pattern, networks of objects interacting with one
another produce unique patterns that cannot be reduced to any one of
the agencies involved. Thus, Barad remarks, “diffractions are attuned todifferences—differences that our knowledge-making practices make and theeffects they have on the world”.147 And here the crucial point is that “theseentangled practices are productive, and who and what are excluded throughthese entangled practices matter: different intra-actions produce different
phenomena”.148 Within an entanglement and a diffraction pattern there canbe no hegemon, which isn't to say that some objects might not contribute
more differences within a particular constellation than other objects. It isprecisely this tangled contribution of differences that an obsessive focus on
the signifier blinds us to. And once again, the point here isn't that signifiers
and signs don't contribute differences, but that we need to be attentive tothe role played by other, non-signifying differences within a collective.
With reference to Barad, we thus arrive at the profound difference
between Žižek's conception of split objects and the conception of splitobjects proposed by onticology. For Žižek, the object is internally split
between its appearance and the void of its place of inscription within thesymbolic order, whereas for onticology objects are split between their
manifestation and their virtual proper being. Here local manifestion is not
manifestation to a subject or humans, but rather actualization in the world.
Moreover, local manifestation would take place regardless of whether
or not any humans existed to receive it and whether or not the symbolic
existed. And, in this respect, the multiplicity of perspectives Žižek discusses

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are not the product of the split between appearance and the void of theplace of inscription in the symbolic, but rather are a product of different
intra-actions among objects. As we saw in our discussion of virtual proper
being, the virtual dimension of objects is such that it can actualize itself
in different ways as a function of the various exo-relations into which an
object enters with other objects. There is nothing special or privileged
here about the human-object relation. What is true of the human-object
relation is true of any object-object exo-relation, regardless of whether or
not humans are involved or exist. And insofar as this is true of object-object
relations regardless of whether or not humans exist, it follows that thesignifier cannot play a constitutive role in the constitution of objects. The
key point here is that local manifestations are, in part, a product of how
objects act on one another when they enter into exo-relations. Salt brings
about different local manifestations in water than, for example, wood.
However, while local manifestation is a phenomenon that takes place
regardless of whether or not humans exist, the concept of exo-relationand local manifestation does encourage us to be particularly attentive
to questions of how humans act on objects through their instruments
and under specific conditions in the production of local manifestations.
In short, so long as we remain within the framework of representation,
asking how we mirror or reflect objects, we have posed the questions ofepistemology poorly. The logic of representation, based as it is on visual
metaphors of reflecting and mirroring, raises only the question of whether
there is a similitude between the representation and the represented. As
such, it necessarily misses the field of exo-relations and inter-actions among
objects in the production of local manifestations. What onticology instead
recommends is a particular attentiveness to fields of action among objects
that enter into exo-relations with one another, examining how these interactions produce a variety of local manifestations in a diffraction pattern.

Chapter 4
The Interior of Objects
What those who use hermeneutics, exegesis, or semiotics
say of texts can be said of all [objects]. For a long time it
has been agreed that the relationship between one text andanother is always a matter of interpretation. Why not accept
that this is also true between so-called texts and so-calledobjects, and even between so-called objects themselves?
— Bruno Latour 149...[E]very prehension consists of three factors: (a) the'subject' which is prehending, namely, the actual entity inwhich that prehension is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum'
which is prehended; (c) the 'subjective form' which is howthat subject prehends the datum.
— Alfred North Whitehead 150

4.1. The Closure of Objects
In chapter 2, I argued that, far from being a paradox, the very essenceof objects consists in simultaneously withdrawing and self-othering. If
objects simultaneously withdraw and are self-othering, then this is because,on the one hand, substances never directly manifest themselves in the

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world while, on the other hand, they perpetually alienate themselves inqualities and states as a consequence of their own internal dynamics andthe exo-relations they enter into with other objects. In the last chapter, I
analyzed the self-othering of objects in terms of the relationship between
the perpetually and necessarily withdrawn virtual proper being of objects
and the local manifestations of objects that take place through the internal
dynamics of substance and the exo-relations they enter into with otherobjects. The claim that substances withdraw from one another suggests that
it is impossible for objects to directly encounter one another. If this is thecase, then this raises the question of how objects relate to one another or
how we are to think the interior of objects with respect to other objects.
In this chapter, I will discuss the manner in which one entity, to use
Whithead's vocabulary, “prehends” another entity, producing what Graham
Harman has called “sensuous objects” on the interior of a real entity. Here“prehension” refers to the manner in which one entity grasps or relates toanother entity. Whitehead carefully distinguishes between the subject that
prehends (what I call a substance or object), what is prehended (anothersubstance or object), and how that other substance is prehended. In thischapter, I focus on the first and third dimension of prehension in terms of
autopoietic systems theory. In underlining the “how” of how one substanceprehends another entity, Whitehead implicitly captures the sense in which
entities or substances withdraw from one another insofar as no entity
encounters another entity in terms of how that entity itself is, but rather
every entity reworks “data” issuing from other entities in terms of theprehending substance's own unique organization. However, the position I
develop here diverges markedly from Whitehead's own ontology in rejecting
the thesis that in “the analysis of an actual entity [...] into its most concreteelements” the entity is disclosed in its most concrete elements “to be aconcrescence of prehensions”.151 While substances do indeed prehend
other entities, substances must exist, it is argued, for these prehensions totake place. In other words, I seek to maintain a much stronger distinction
between the subject/substance doing the prehending and the how ofprehensions than the one Whitehead seems to suggest in his thesis that
substances are a concrescence of prehensions. Part of this distinction was
already developed in the last chapter with respect to the endo-structure ofChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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objects or their being as multiplicities. While prehensions can, as we willsee, lead to the modification of the endo-structure of objects, the point
throughout my analysis of inter-object relations is that objects must havea structure for the “how” of prehensions to take place at all and that thisendo-structure constitutes the substantiality of objects.
It is to this issue that I now turn by drawing on the resources of
autopoietic systems theory as developed by Maturana, Varela, and especially
Niklas Luhmann. At the outset, it is important to note that my thesis is
not that all objects are autopoietic machines. In their early founding essay,“Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living”, Maturana and Varela
distinguish between autopoietic machines and allopoietic machines.152 LaterI will explain the distinction between these two types of objects in greater
detail, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that when Maturana
and Varela refer to autopoietic machines, they are referring to living
objects, while when they refer to allopoietic machines they are referring
to non-living objects. Luhmann expands the domain of the autopoietic
beyond living organisms to include social systems within the purview
of autopoiesis, but for the moment this rough and ready distinction is
sufficient for our purposes. With a few qualifications, I accept Maturana
and Varela's distinction between autopoietic and allopoietic machines.
However, if the work of Luhmann is so vital to this project, then this isbecause he ontologizes autopoietic systems, treating them as real entities,
whereas Maturana and Varela advocate a radical constructivism that treats
autopoietic systems as constructed by an observer. As Luhmann writes
at the beginning of the first chapter of the sublime Social Systems, “[t]hefollowing considerations assume that there are systems. Thus they do not
begin with epistemological doubt”.153 For Luhmann, systems are reallyexisting objects in the world. I believe that I have shown in the first chapter
why, following Roy Bhaskar, this supposition is warranted.
Additionally, it might come as a surprise to enlist a thinker like Niklas
Luhmann in defense of object-oriented ontology. In essays like “Identity—
What or How?” Luhmann levels a substantial critique against the very ideaof ontology. There Luhmann remarks that “ontology is understood to be acertain form of observing and describing, to wit, that form that consists ofthe distinction between being and nonbeing”.154 A moment later, Luhmann

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goes on to remark that “[a]mong the consequences of an ontologicaldissection of the world, one that differentiates being and nonbeing is thisone: that the identity of what is [des Seienden] must be presupposed”.155
I will discuss Luhmann's concept of distinction in more detail in thenext section. Here what is to be noted is the manner in which Luhmanndeconstructs ontology. Luhmann's point is that a particular distinction
precedes the identity of an entity, such that the identity of an entity is aneffect of the distinction that allows for observation, not a substantial realitythat precedes observation. To understand Luhmann's point we must referback to Spencer-Brown's calculus of forms. Spencer-Brown opens Laws
of Forms with the thesis that indication is only possible on the basis of aprior distinction. As Spencer-Brown writes, “[w]e take as given the ideaof distinction and the idea of indication, and that we cannot make anindication without drawing a distinction”.156 An indication might be, forexample, a reference to anything in the world. Spencer-Brown's point isthat any indication requires a distinction if the indication is to be made. A
distinction cleaves a space in two, defining an outside and an inside. For
example, we can imagine a piece of paper populated by a plurality of x's. We
draw a circle on this paper (the distinction), and can now indicate x's within
the circle and x's outside of the circle. Every distinction thus contains amarked and an unmarked space. The marked space is what falls within the
distinction (in this instance, what is inside the circle), while the unmarked
space is everything else. This unity of marked and unmarked space
generated by a distinction is what Spencer-Brown calls a “form”. There's
a very real sense in which distinction is “transcendental” with respect toindication. Form is the condition under which indication is possible. As
a consequence, the indicated does not precede the distinction, but is thecondition under which the indicated comes into being for the system drawing
the distinction. The point, of course, is that while distinctions or forms obey
rigorous laws once made, the founding distinction itself is contingent inthat other distinctions could have always been made.
By analyzing ontology in terms of how its indications are possible
through a prior distinction, Luhman, in effect, deconstructs the grounding
premise upon which ontology, as he understands it, is based. By tracing
ontology back to the being/non-being distinction upon which it becomesChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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possible to observe beings as identical, Luhmann effectively shows how this
distinction is contingent such that identity is no longer the ground of being
but an effect of a distinction that enables observation. The point, then,is that insofar as distinctions are contingent, they can be drawn otherwise,
producing other objects as effects. As a consequence, objects become notautonomous substances that exist in their own right, but rather what Heinz
von Foester called “Eigenvalues”.157 As von Foester articulates the concept,
Eigenvalues have been found to be ontologically discrete,
stable, separable, and composable, while ontogeneticallyto arise as equilibria that determine themselves throughcircular processes. Ontogenetically, Eigenvalues and objects,
and likewise ontogenetically, stable behaviour and the
manifestation of the subject's “grasp” of an object cannot
be distinguished. In both cases, the objects appear to reside
exclusively in the subject's own experience of his sensorimotor coordinations.158
In other words, the object is not something that exists substantially in
its own right, but is rather something that is constructed by the cognizing
system through the production of stable equilibria in perception thatcan be returned to again and again. Elsewhere, Gotthard Bechmann andNico Stehr sum up this line of thought when they remark that Luhman“describes the old European style of thought as concerned with theidentification of the unity underlying diversity [...] Ontology refers to aworld existing objectively in separation from subjects aware of it, capable ofunambiguous linguistic representation”.159 It is precisely this model of beingthat Luhmann challenges.
What we have here is a variant of the epistemic fallacy and actualism as
discussed in the first chapter. In treating objects as Eigenvalues, Luhmannconflates substances with what substances are for a particular observing
system. However, he cannot coherently get by without the category of
substance. Although Luhmann everywhere focuses on epistemologicalissues, he requires the existence of systems in order to launch these
epistemological inquiries. These systems are characterized by unity,
autonomy, and endurance, which are precisely the marks of substance.

140 Levi R. Bryant

As a consequence, it is necessary to distinguish between substances assuch and what other substances are for a substance. Here onticology andobject-oriented philosophy encounters an unexpected ally in the antirealism of autopoietic theory and Luhmann's autopoietic systems theory inparticular. Insofar as Luhmann's systems are characterized by autonomy,
they avoid the holism of relationism and therefore present us with apicture of the universe that is parceled or composed of units. As I argued,
following Graham Harman, in the last chapter, objects are characterizedby withdrawal such that they never directly encounter one another. In theiraccount of how systems always encounter other systems in terms of theirown organization, Luhmann and autopoietic theory provide onticology
and object-oriented philosophy with powerful conceptual tools for fleshingout the concept of withdrawal. The sort of ontological realism Bechmann
and Stehr rightly denounce only pertains to those accounts of substancepremised on presence. Yet where substances perpetually withdraw fromother substances and from themselves such that they are characterized byclosure, we encounter an ontology adequate to the critique of ontotheology
and the metaphysics of presence.
What interests me in autopoietic systems theory is not so much its
account of life or society, as its account of operational closure. As Maturana
and Varela elsewhere define it, “their identity [the identity of autopoietic
machines] is specified by a network of dynamic processes whose effects
do not leave that network”.160 The concept of operational closure as it
applies to autopoietic machines embodies two key claims: First, the claim
is that the operations of an autopoietic system refer only to themselves
and are products of the system itself. For example, if, as Luhmann hasargued, social systems are composed entirely of communications, if
communications are the elements that compose social systems, thencommunications refer only to other communications and never anythingoutside of themselves. Here communication is not something thattakes place between systems but is strictly something that takes place
in a system. Another way of putting this would be to say that a systemcannot communicate with its environment and an environment cannot
communicate with a system.

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Second, the claim is that autopoietic systems are closed in on
themselves, that they do not relate directly to an environment, that they do
not receive information from an environment. As a consequence, it follows
that information is not something that pre-exists an autopoietic machine,
waiting out there in the world to be found. To be sure, objects outside an
autopoietic machine can perturb or irritate an autopoietic machine, but thisperturbation or irritation does not, in and of itself, constitute information
for the system being perturbed. Rather, any information value theperturbation takes on is constituted strictly by the distinctions belonging
to the organization of the autopoietic machine itself. As I argue in what
follows, this closure of machines or objects in terms of perturbations is
not unique to autopoietic machines, but to both autopoietic machines andallopoietic machines. Both autopoietic and allopoietic machines possess
only selective relations to the world around them, such that both selfreferentially constitute that to which they're open. Thus, while allopoietic
machines do not reproduce themselves through their own operations as
is the case with autopoietic machines, allopoietic machines nonethelessconstitute the way in which they are open to other entities in the world.
In “Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living”, Maturana and Varela
argue that “[a]n autopoietic machineis a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network ofprocesses of production (transformation and destruction)of components that produces the components which (i)through their interactions and transformations continuously
regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations)that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as aconcrete unity in the space in which they (the components)
exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as
a network.161
The unity of a system is what I call the system's “endo-consistency”,
its virtual proper being, or a multiplicity. As unities, systems, whether
allopoietic or autopoietic, are substances. Autopoietic machines, systems,
or substances are unique in that not only are they unities, not only are
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their own elements. As Luhmann puts it elsewhere, “[i]n contrast to whatordinary language and conceptual tradition suggest, the unity of an element[...] is not ontically pre-given. Instead, the element is constituted as a unity
only by the system that enlists it as an element to use it in relations”.162
Perhaps no one has gone further in formalizing, radicalizing, anddeveloping the implications of autpoietic systems theory than Luhmann in
his autopoietic sociological theory. Although I will here discuss elementsof Luhmann's sociological theory, it should be borne in mind that mymain aim is to outline the general features of autopoietic and allopoietic
systems, rather than to focus on Luhmann's conception of society as
an autopoietic system. Before proceeding, it is important to note that
there are significant differences between how Maturana and Varela think
autopoietic systems, and how Luhmann thinks them. For Maturana andVarela, autopoietic machines are homeostatic in character. “Autopoietic
machines are homeostatic machines”.163 That is, they are systems that
attempt to maintain a particular equilibrium across time. By contrast,
Luhmann's autopoietic machines, at least in the case of meaning systems,
are inherently characterized by unrest. “[W]e begin, without attempting
reductive 'explanation,' from the fundamental situation of basal instability(with a resulting 'temporalized' complexity) and assert that all meaningsystems, be they psychic or social, are characterized by such instability”.164
In a communication system, for example, the system aims not simply atmaintaining equilibrium or homeostasis, but rather it is always necessary
to find something new to say if the system is to continue to exist. Consider,for example, a conversation. Were the participants in the conversation
to simply keep repeating themselves, the conversation would cease. It's
necessary to find something new to say for the conversation, as a system, tocontinue its existence. Indeed, Luhmann will remark that both absence andremaining unchanged can therefore function as impetuses for change. As
Luhmann remarks,
On the one hand, given the capacity to process information,
things that are not present can also have an effect; mistakes,
null values, and disappointments acquire causality insofar
as they can be grasped via the schema of difference. On theother, not just events but facts, structures, and continuities

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stimulate causalities insofar as they can be experienced as
differences. Remaining unchanged can thus become a causeof change.165
The key problem for any autopoietic system is how to get from oneelement to another in the order of time. Every autopoietic system ischallenged by entropy and must find ways of staving off a collapse into
entropy or disorganized complexity. The elements of autopoietic machines
within the Luhmannian framework are events. As events, they disappear
as soon as they occur. As a consequence, every autopoietic machine faces
the problem of how it can reproduce itself or generate new elementsfrom moment to moment. Confronted with an absence of change, thatabsence of change itself becomes the instigator of new events or elementsin the ongoing autopoiesis of the system. Only through the production ofsubsequent elements or events is the autopoietic machine able to persist orcontinue existing. It is for this reason that meaning systems, at least, mustnecessarily be basally unstable. Here it should be noted that the substanceof autopoietic systems resides not in the materiality of its parts—theseparts can be and are replaced while the substance continues to exist—butrather by virtue of their structure or organization which I have referred to as
multiplicities or the “endo-structure” of substances.
In arguing that the elements that compose autopoietic systems are notontically pre-given, it is argued that these elements are not themselves
substances, but rather only exist for the endo-consistency of the substanceor multiplicity that constitutes them. The point is not that nothing exists
apart from a system—everything must be built out of other things as
Aristotle observed—but rather that what constitutes an element for asystem does not pre-exist the system that constitutes or constructs it.
Luhmann observes that we “must distinguish between the environment ofa system and systems in the environment of this system”.166 If the distinction
between the environment of a system and systems in the environmentof a system is crucial, then this is because the former refers to how one
substance encounters other substances in the world through its own
closure and organization, while the latter refers to actually existing systems
or substances that would exist regardless of whether or not the system
encountering them existed. These actually existing systems, whether

144 Levi R. Bryant

autopoietic or allopoietic themselves, can and do serve as material throughwhich systems constitute their elements.
In his sociological systems theory, Luhmann develops the closure ofsystems to dramatic effect. For autopoietic systems theory
the point of departure for all systems-theoretical analysis
must be the difference between system and environment. Systems
are oriented by their environment not just occasionally andadaptively, but structurally, and they cannot exist without anenvironment. They constitute and maintain themselves bycreating and maintaining a difference from their environment,
and they use their boundaries to regulate this difference.
Without difference from an environment, there would noteven be self-reference, because difference is the functional
premise of self-referential operations.167
Insofar as onticology maintains that substances are fully autonomous,it parts ways with Luhmann in the thesis that substances or systems
cannot exist independently of an environment. Nonetheless, onticology
also recognizes that many systems would produce less than ideal local
manifestations were they separated from an environment of exorelations with other entities of a particular sort. A cat, for instance, isunable to exercise all sorts of powers of acting in the absence of oxygen.
The important point here is that the distinction between system andenvironment is self-referential. Although this distinction refers to two
domains (system and environment), the distinction itself originates fromone of these domains: the system. The distinction between system andenvironment is a distinction drawn by each system. This is not only one ofthe origins of the operational closure of systems, but is also a condition for
the autonomy of systems as individual and independent substances.
In the case of autopoietic machines, the distinction between system andenvironment emerges “because for each system the environment is more
complex than the system itself”.168 As a consequence, “[t]here is [...] nopoint-for-point correspondence between system and environment”.169 Were
there a point-for-point correspondence between system and environment,
there would be no distinction between systems and their environments.

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Moreover, this would require systems to respond or react to every eventthat takes place in their environment, thereby overburdening the system.
Consequently, one way of thinking about autopoietic systems or substances
is as strategies of selection or continuance within an environment thatthey are unable to completely anticipate and which they are certainly
unable to dominate or master by virtue of the greater complexity that eachenvironment possesses when compared to the complexity of systems.
A similar point holds with respect to the elements that systems produce
or constitute. In the case of elements composing the endo-consistency of amultiplicity or system, these elements only exist in relation to one another.
“Just as there are no systems without environments or environments
without systems, there are no elements without relational connections
or relations without elements”.170 Here we must carefully distinguishbetween substances and elements. Elements are always elements for a
substance. They only exist as elements within the endo-structure or endocomposition of a system and do not, as we have seen, have any independent
ontological existence of their own. Substances, by contrast, always enjoy
an autonomous ontological existence in their own right, and therefore only
exist in relations that are external to them. That is, substances are capable ofbreaking with their relations and entering into new relations, or of existing
completely without relations at all. With an increase in the complexityof a system or the number of elements it must maintain to exist, special
problems emerge. As Luhmann observes, “when the number of elementsthat must be held together in a system or for a system as its environment
increases, one very quickly encounters a threshold where it is no longer
possible to relate every element with every other element”.171
Three interesting consequences follow from this endo-complexity ofsystems. First, insofar as it is not possible to feasibly connect every elementof the system to every other element, it follows that systems must maintainselective relations among their elements, such that, they “[omit] otherequally conceivable relations [among elements]”.172 These selective relations
among elements are thus strategies for contending with an environmentthat is always more complex than the system itself. Luhmann emphasizes
the contingency of these relations and the manner in which they involverisk. However, second, because not every element relates to every other146 Levi R. Bryant

element in a complex system, but rather relations are contingent strategies
for contending with the environment, it follows that “very different kindsof systems can be formed out of a substratum of very similar units”.173 In
other words, when speaking about the virtual proper being of an object
or a multiplicity, it is not so much the substance's elements that constitutetheir substantiality, but rather how their elements are organized or related. It
is for this reason that I speak of “endo-relations” in relation to the endoconsistency of the virtual proper being of an object. Finally, third, because
systems constitute their own elements it follows that “systems of a higher(emergent) order can possess less complexity than systems of a lower orderbecause they determine the unity and number of elements that composethem”,174 along with the relations among these elements.
One paradoxical feature of the system/environment distinction at
the heart of any system, whether autopoietic or allopoietic, is that this
distinction is not a distinction between two entities in their own right, but
is rather a distinction that arises from one side of the distinction. In short,
it is the system itself that “draws” the distinction between system andenvironment. As Luhmann remarks, “[t]he environment receives its unity
through the system and only in relation to the system”.175 An environmentis thus an environment only for the interior of an object or substance. Twoconsequences follow from this: First, the environment is not a container ofsubstances or systems that precedes the existence of substances or systems.
There is no environment “as such” existing out there in the world. Putotherwise, there is no pre-established or pre-given environment to which asystem must “adapt”. Rather, we have as many environments as there aresubstances in the universe, without it being possible to claim that all ofthese systems are contained in a single environment. As Timothy Morton
puts it in a very different context, “[t]here is no environment as such. It's
all 'distinct organic beings.'” 176 The environment is not a container lying
there present at hand, awaiting the system to adapt to it. Rather, there are
as many environments as there are systems, and the environment is nothing
more than other systems that in turn “draw” their own system/environment
distinctions. As we will see in chapter six, this leads to the conclusionthat the world does not exist. Second, the distinction between system andenvironment is, as a consequence, paradoxical and self-referential. Insofar as

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the distinction between system and environment is a distinction “made” by
the system, this distinction is also self-referential or a distinction belonging
to the system itself. As we will see in a moment, this has significant
consequences for how systems or substances relate to other entities.
To illustrate these points, take the example of the humble tardigrade.
The tardigrade is a microscopic multicellular organism with eight legs,
two eyes, and antennae and which looks somewhat like an alien pig. The
tardigrade is particularly interesting because it is capable of surviving
extreme variations of heat and cold without dying. Thus, for example, it
can be subjected to extremely high temperatures such as those that occur
when a meteor enters the Earth's atmosphere. When this occurs, all thewater in the tardigrade’s body steams away and it withdraws its legs into its
trunk, becoming a hard pellet that appears to be dead. However, if water isintroduced back into the tardigrade's environment, the tardigrade plumps
back up and is walking around again within a few hours as if nothing
happened. Returning to some themes of the first chapter, it is highly
unlikely that substances like cats or humans belong to the environment of
the tardigrade. As a microscopic organism, it perhaps crawls in and outof the different fissures in the skin and bodies of larger scale organisms,
completely unaware that such organisms even exist. Nor, we can say, dothese larger scale organisms function as that to which the tardigrade must
adapt. The point is not that these larger scale organisms don't exist or thattardigrades get to decide what exists and what does not exist. To claim
this, one would be confusing the environment of a system with systems or
substances in a system's environment. Rather, the point is that substances
maintain only selective relationships to their environment.
The self-referentiality of the system/environment distinction is one of
the meanings of operational closure, and is common to both allopoietic
substances and autopoietic substances alike. It is a common feature of all
substances that they are one and all closed to the world, relating to systems
in their environment only through their own distinctions or organization.
As a consequence of this closure, systems or substances only relate tothemselves. Put differently, while substances can enter into exo-relations withother substances, they only do so on their own terms and with respect to theirown organization.

148 Levi R. Bryant

Luhmann draws startling conclusions from this thesis in his analysis ofsociety. If societies are autopoietic systems or substances, and if autopoietic
substances both constitute their own elements and are operationally closed,
then it follows that humans are not a part of society. Luhmann's conceptionof society is thus radically at odds with that found in the humanist tradition.
As Luhmann writes,
The point of difference is that for the humanistic tradition
human beings stand within the social order and not outside
it. The human being counts as a permanent part of thesocial order, as an element of society itself. Human beings
were called “individuals” because they were the ultimate,indivisible elements of society.177
Here it is important to note that, far from denying the existence ofhumans, Luhmann is defending their existence. Were we to claim thathumans are products or effects of society as Althusser, for example, doesin his essay on the ideological state apparatus and elsewhere, we would be
conflating the existence of humans with that of elements in the system ofsociety. However, just as societies are operationally closed systems, so too
are humans. “If one views human beings as part of the environment ofsociety (instead of as part of society itself), this changes the premises of all
traditional questions, including those of classical humanism”.178
Humans belong not to society, but rather the environment of society.
Paradoxically, then, humans are outside of society. For Luhmann, society,by contrast, consists of communications and nothing but communications.
And insofar as humans belong to the environment of society, they do
not participate in society. As Luhmann puts it elsewhere, “one could
say that the environment of the social system cannot communicate withsociety”.179 Likewise, systems or substances cannot communicate with
their environments. If this is the case, then it is because systems only relate
to themselves and “[i]nformation is [...] a purely system-internal quality.
There is no transference of information from the environment into thesystem”.180 Put a bit differently, systems or substances communicate onlywith themselves. If, then, society is not composed of persons or humans,
what is it composed of? As Luhman remarks, “[i]n the end, it is always

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people, individuals, subjects who act or communicate. I would like to assert
in the face of this that only communication can communicate and thatwhat we understand as “action” can be generated only in such a networkof communication”.181 The elements that compose society consist ofnothing but communications and the production of new communications
in responses to communications. It is not persons that communicate, butrather communications that communicate.
To be clear, Luhmann is not advancing the absurd thesis that societies
can exist without humans. Social systems are autonomous from humans,
they are distinct substances in their own right, but they require theperturbations or irritations of humans in order to come into existence. As
Luhmann puts it in Social Systems,
Psychic and social systems have evolved together. At any
time the one kind of system is the necessary environmentof the other. The necessity is grounded in the evolution thatmakes these kinds of systems possible. Persons cannot emerge
and continue to exist without social systems, nor can social
systems without persons.182
How, then, are we to understand this jaw droppingly counter-intuitive
thesis that humans do not belong to society and that they are incapable ofcommunication insofar as only communications communicate? Elsewhere
Hans-Georg Moeller explains this point well:
The Old European philosophical tradition and IndoEuropean grammatical habits have contributed to theestablishment of the “conventional assumption” that humanbeings can communicate—but it is an empirical fact thatthe “essential” elements of what is understood to constitutethe human being cannot. Neither brains nor minds cancommunicate. We cannot say what our brainwaves are“oscillating”, and we can't even say what we think. Whatis said in communication is never equal to what is thought
and felt in the mind. It is impossible for me to adequately
represent on this page what is going through my mind—
intellectually, emotionally, “perceptionally”—while I am

150 Levi R. Bryant

writing this sentence. And the same is true for every sentence
I say or write—there is no one-to-one correspondence
between communication and mind. I suppose the same istrue in regard to your reading of what I write. What you think
and feel while reading this sentence will be, in each single
case, entirely different from what is communicated in thissentence. Communication systems and mental systems areoperationally separate.183
Minds are operationally closed with respect to brains. Minds relate tothemselves through thought alone, whereas brains relate to one anotherthrough electro-chemical reactions alone. Neither of these systems
knows anything of the other. Likewise, the communications of society areoperationally closed with respect to minds such that communications can
respond only to communications. In each of these cases we have systems
and their environments.
To illustrate Luhmann's thesis, I turn to the simple example of a humble
dialogue. For the last few years I have been fortunate to have the friendshipof my colleague Carlton Clark, a rhetorician at the institution where I teach.
Within a Luhmannian framework, this dialogue is not a communication
between two systems (Clark and myself), but rather is a system in its
own right. In this respect, Clark and I belong not to the system of this
dialogue, but to the environment of this dialogue. We are outside the systemconstituted by this dialogue insofar as neither of us have access to thethoughts or neural system of the other. What communicates in this dialogue
is thus neither Clark, nor myself, but rather communications. Moreover, this
dialogue continually makes self-references (references to events that arewithin the dialogue and communications that have been made in the pastof the dialogue) and other-references (references to the environment of the
dialogue). In other words, the dialogue is organized around what is internal
to the dialogue itself, to the system that has emerged over time, and to what
is outside the dialogue or in the environment of the dialogue constituted by
the dialogue itself. An event that has taken place at the college, for example,
is treated as belonging to the environment of the dialogue, as outside thedialogue, while it can also become a topic within the dialogue that is related
to according to the meaning-schema that the dialogue has developed over

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time. Over the course of this lengthy dialogue, the dialogue as a system has
evolved its own distinctions, themes, topics, and ways of handling these
themes and topics. Some of these topics and themes include rhetoric,teaching, philosophy, family, college politics, politics, and so on. The
distinctions inhabiting the dialogue are the implicit ways in which these
themes and topics are handled or the meaning schema that regulate thedialogue. Events in the environment of the dialogue can perturb or irritate
the dialogue, providing stimuli for new communicative events. For example,
a new book can be published that becomes a stimulus for the productionof new communications within the system. However, the publication ofthis new book does not enter the dialogue qua book, but is integrated into
the dialogue according to the distinctions and organization of the dialogue
itself. In this respect, the dialogue is an entity itself that constitutes its own
elements (the communication events that take place within it) and thatis something Clark and I are bound up in without being parts or elements
within the dialogue. Just as Meno is not himself an element in Plato's
dialogue Meno, Clark and Bryant are not elements in this dialogue.
From our discussion of the operational closure of autopoietic objects, wehave thus learned four important features of the nature of objects. First andforemost, objects relate only to themselves and never to their environment.
Here it is as if the universe were populated by solipsists, Aristotle's First
Cause, Unmoved Mover, Leibnizian monads, or, as Harman has put
it, vacuums. Second, every substance or system is organized around a
distinction between system and environment that the system itself draws.
As a consequence, this distinction between substance and environment
is self-referential. Third, autopoietic substances, in contrast to allopoietic
substances, constitute their own elements or perpetually reproduce
themselves through themselves or their own activities. In the case of
autopoietic substances, the elements composing the autopoietic substanceconstitute one another and are constituted by one another. Finally,
substances are such that we can have substances nested within substances,while these substances nested within substances nonetheless belong to theenvironment of the substance within which they are nested. This is the case,for example, with societies. Humans are nested within societies but do notbelong to the social system but rather the environment of the social system.

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In many respects, humans are the matter upon which social systems draw
to construct themselves insofar as they constantly perturb social systems,
without the humans being the ones doing the constructing. Instead, it iscommunication that constructs communications. To see this point, thinkof the way in which our intentions get entangled in communications.
We make, for example, a claim that contradicts some claim we made in
the past and the subsequent communication that follows points out thiscontradiction, regulating, as it were, our subsequent communications.
We find an analogous case of substances nested within substances withrespect to the relationship between cells and the body. Each cell is its own
closed autopoietic system, yet the body employs cells in the constructionof itself through its own autopoietic processes. Here we encounter, once
again, the strange mereology of onticology and object-oriented philosophy
where objects can be nested in other objects while nonetheless remaining
independent or autonomous of those objects within which they are nested.
This mereology destroys organic conceptions of both society and theuniverse, where all substances are thought of as parts of an organic whole.
One important consequence that follows from the operational closure of
substances is that this closure renders unilateral control of one substance byanother substance impossible. As Luhmann puts it,
An important structural consequence that inevitably
results from the construction of self-referential systems
deserves particular mention. This is abandoning the idea of
unilateral control. There may be hierarchies, asymmetries, ordifferences in influence, but no part of the system can control
others without itself being subject to control. Under suchcircumstances it is possible [...] that any control must be
exercised in anticipation of counter-control.184
In this context, Luhmann is speaking of subsystems of a system andhow they relate to one another. Because each subsystem of a system is itself
founded on an operationally closed, self-referential system/environment
distinction, one subsystem of the social system cannot control anothersubsystem of the social system. For example, the political subsystemcannot control the economic subsystem because each subsystem relatesChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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to its own environment in its own unique way as a function of its peculiarorganization. The economic subsystem of the social system, for example,
encounters perturbations from the political subsystem of the social systemin terms of economics. What holds for subsystems within a larger systemholds equally and even more so for relations between different systems or
substances. Each substance interacts with other substances in terms of its
own peculiar organization. As a consequence, there can be no unilateraltransfer of actions from one system to another system, such that the content
or nature of the initiating system or substance's action is maintained as
identical. As we will see in the next chapter, this requires us to rethink
relations of constraint between substances in what Timothy Morton has
called “meshes” or networks of substances.

4.2. Interactions Between Objects
If, then, objects or substances are operationally closed, if they only relate
to themselves, how do objects interact? While substances are closed to
one another, they can nonetheless perturb or irritate one another. Andin perturbing or irritating one another, information is produced by thesystem that is perturbed or irritated. However, here we must proceedwith caution, for information is not something that exists out there in theenvironment waiting to be received or detected. Moreover, information
is not something that is exchanged between systems. Often we think of
information as something that is transmitted from a sender to a receiver.
The question here becomes that of how it is possible for the receiver todecode the information received as identical to the information transmitted.
However, insofar as substances are closed in the sense discussed in the lastsection, it follows that there can be no question of information as exchange.
Rather, information is purely system-specific, exists only within a particularsystem or substance, and exists only for that system or substance. In short,there is no pre-existent information. Instead, information is constructedby systems. As Luhmann remarks, “above all what is usually called'information' are purely internal achievements. There is no information thatmoves from without to within a system”.185 Elsewhere, Luhmann remarksthat “[i]nformation is an internal change of state, a self-produced aspect154 Levi R. Bryantof communicative events and not something that exists in the environmentof the system”.186 Consequently, information is a transformation of
perturbations of an object into information within a system.
This point can be illustrated with respect to my relationship withmy cats. When my cat rubs against me or jumps on my lap these events
constitute perturbations for me. However, as a system I translate these
perturbations into information, registering them as signs of affection. In
response, I pet my cat to show my affection. By contrast, my cats might
merely be seeking warmth or marking me with their scent so as to establish
territory. The point here is that no identity of shared information need bepresent for this interaction to take place and maintain itself. My cat andI are perhaps occupied with each other for entirely different reasons,completely unaware that we have different reasons, yet an interaction andcommunication still takes place.
However, two points must be made here: first, substances are notcapable of being perturbed in any old way. My eyes, for example, are notcapable of being perturbed by infrared light. Dogs and cats, as I understandit, have a very limited range of color vision. Neutrinos pass straight throughmost things on the planet Earth. Rocks, as far as I know, are unable to see
color at all. Electric eels sense the world through various electric signals,
whereas cats very likely have no sense of what it would be like to experience
the world in such terms. Consequently, all substances, whether allopoietic
or autopoietic, are only selectively open to the world. Second, and in aclosely related vein, not all perturbations are transformed into information.
In the next section we will see that allopoietic machines and autopoietic
machines relate to information events in very different ways. In the caseof autopoietic machines, however, it is always possible for perturbations
to which a system is open to nonetheless produce no event of informationsuch that the perturbation is coded merely as background noise. As I am
writing this, for example, my three-year-old daughter is dancing about theroom, yet I scarcely notice her at the moment.
Information is thus not something that exists in the world independentof the systems that “experience” it, but is rather constituted by the systems
that “experience” it. Nonetheless, this constitution does not issue entirely
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were, a genuine event that befalls a substance or happens to a substance.
The perturbations that function as the ground for the production of
information can issue from either the environment or transformationsin the system itself, but they are always events that must take place for
information production to occur. Following Gregory Bateson, Luhmanntreats information as a difference that makes a difference.187 If information
is a difference that makes a difference then this is because it selects systemstates. As Luhmann writes, “[b]y information we mean an event that selects
system states. This is possible only for structures that delimit and presort
possibilities. Information presupposes structure, yet is not itself a structure,
but rather an event that actualizes the use of structures”.188 Informationis thus not so much a property of substances themselves, but is rather
something that occurs within substances. In “Pathologies of Epistemology”,
Bateson articulates this point nicely. As Bateson writes,
1. The system shall operate with and upon differences.
2. The system shall consist of closed loops or networksof pathways along which differences and transforms ofdifferences shall be transmitted (What is transmitted on aneuron is not an impulse, it is news of a difference.)
3. Many events within the system shall be energized by
the respondent part rather than by impact from thetriggering part.
4. The system shall show self-correctiveness in the directionof runaway. Self- correctiveness implies trial and error. 189
Elsewhere, Bateson remarks that differences are “brought about by
the sort of 'thing' that gets onto the map from the territory”.190 Here we
can think of map and territory as system and environment, where theterritory is always more complex than the map. Bateson's point seems
to be that difference is not an identical unit that is transmitted from one
thing to another—for example, from one neuron to another—but rather
is a perturbation or irritation that is then transformed into information by
the receiving entity. As such, information is constituted by the systems
receiving the differences. Situated within the context of the thing-schema156 Levi R. Bryant

developed in chapter three, information, as that event that selects system
states, actualizes virtual potentials belonging to the virtual proper being ofan object, which are then deployed to produce local manifestations.
Later Luhmann will remark that “information is nothing more thanan event that brings about a connection between differences”.191 Although
Luhmann does not develop his thesis in this way, we can characterize
the linkage of difference that events of information generate in terms of
three dimensions. First, information differentially links an object to itself
in a relation between the withdrawn virtual proper being of the object
and its local manifestations. Here we encounter the process by which
local manifestations take place within an object; or rather, the processof self-othering and withdrawal characteristic of every object whether
that object be autopoietic or allopoietic. Through the selection of asystem state, information affects a self-othering in the object whereby thevirtual dimension of the object simultaneously withdraws and a quality is
produced. These information events can take place both internally or asa result of external interactions of the object with other objects. Second,
events of information link difference to difference through the linkageof perturbations to information. Perturbations are never identical toinformation precisely because information is object-specific, whereas thesame perturbation can affect a variety of different objects while producing
very different information for each object perturbed. Finally, third,
events of information link difference to difference through a linkage ofdifferent withdrawn objects to one another. No object directly encountersanother object precisely because all objects are operationally closed. As
a consequence, no object is capable of representing another object or offunctioning as a pure carrier of the perturbations issued from anotherobject. This is because objects always transform or translate perturbations.
Nonetheless, information links the different to the different in a substancespecific manner wherever substances relate to one another.
Because information is not a property of a substance, but rather an
event that befalls or happens to a substance and which selects a system
state, “[i]nformation [...] always involves some element of surprise”.192
For this reason, information plays a key role in the evolution anddevelopment of autopoietic systems, contributing to the formation of newChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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forms of organization within existing autopoietic substances. Insofar as
information selects object-states it always carries an element of surprise. As
Luhmann puts it,a piece of information that is repeated is no longer
information. It retains its meaning in repetition but loses
its value as information. One reads in the paper that thedeutsche mark has risen in value. If one reads this a second
time in another paper, this activity no longer has value as
information (it no longer changes the state of one's own
system), although structurally it presents the same selection.
The information is not lost, although it disappears as an
event. It has changed the state of the system and has thereby
left behind a structural effect; the system then reacts to andwith these changed structures.193
Here whether or not a bit of information functions as information
depends on the preceding object-state of the substance in question. If,
after hearing that the value of the dollar has fallen, I shift to another news
channel and hear the same thing once again, this bit of information has lostits status as information because it no longer selects a new cognitive state
within my mental system. However, if I hear this bit of information a weekor month later it can once again become information by virtue of how it
contrasts with my preceding mental state. The value of the dollar has fallen
again. And if this information selects a system state, this might be in theform—were I an investor—of not selling stocks at this particular time byvirtue of the fact that I won't get a good return on my sale.
In order for information to take place as an event within a system itis thus necessary for distinctions to be operative within the system. As
we will recall from the last section, indication can only occur based on aprior distinction that cleaves a space into a marked and unmarked space
the unity of which Spencer-Brown refers to as a “form”. Information isa sort of indication that an environment “forces”, as it were, on a system.
For example, when I awoke early this morning I saw that it was raining.
Certainly I didn't conjure this weather state into existence through my own
whim. However, for this weather state to function as information, there158 Levi R. Bryant

had to be a prior distinction at work in my cognitive system. Perhaps this
distinction consists of something like the distinction between precipitation(marked state) and non-precipitation (non-marked state). It will be notedthat this distinction doesn't tell me in advance what states exist in myenvironment. It doesn't tell me in advance whether the precipitation will bea torrential downpour, snow, sleet, a drizzle or whether the day is sunny orovercast. Nonetheless, for cognitive and communication substances, it is thedistinction that allows for any of these states, and many others besides, totake on significance. Here the environment selects how this distinction will
be actualized or filled with content, yet the prior distinction predelineates
what environmental states can serve this function for the system.
There are a variety of ways in which such events select system-states.
Not only do such events actualize the operative distinction in a particularway (“it's a heavy downpour!”), but they also play a role in subsequent
operations of the system. For example, upon seeing that it is raining, I now
conclude that I don't need to water my garden for the next couple of days,
that I need to bring an umbrella if I go out, and that I need to dress in aparticular way to keep warm and dry. In short, the information leads tosubsequent events within the system.
Here it is important to note that the subsequent events that take place
within the system are not of a determinate nature but could unfold in avariety of different ways. This is especially true of systems organized aroundmeaning such as psychic systems and social communications systems. As
Luhmann argues,
the momentary Given that fills experience at any timealways and irrevocably refers beyond itself to somethingelse. Experience experiences itself as variable—and unlike
transcendental phenomenology we assume organic bases
for this. It does not find itself closed and self-contained, notrestricted to itself, but is always referring to something that is
at that moment not its actual content. This referring-beyonditself, this immanent transcendence of experience, is not amatter of choice; rather, it is the condition on the basis ofwhich all freedom to choose must first be constituted.194

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Here, in his discussion of “experience”, we encounter Luhmann's basic
concept of meaning. Meaning is the unity of a difference between actuality
and potentiality. Each actualized meaning simultaneously refers beyond
itself to other meanings that could have been actualized. For example,
while I conclude that since I am going out I must carry an umbrella,this actualization still refers beyond itself to the possibility of staying in.
The phenomenon of meaning is such that while it actualizes a meaning,
the negated or excluded alternatives remain, even though under the signof negation. This is one reason every meaning has an air of contingency
about it. Every meaning is haunted by the other potential meanings it has
excluded. And this, incidentally, is why ultimate foundations are impossible
within philosophy. Insofar as meaning is the unity of a difference between
actuality and potentiality, every ground that purports to function as the
final ground nonetheless refers beyond itself to other excluded potentials
that could have functioned as grounds.
This account of meaning provides us with the means of distinguishing
between information and meaning. As Luhmann writes,
Meaning functions as the premise for experience processing
in a way that makes possible a choice from among different
possible states or contents of consciousness, and in thisit does not totally eliminate what has not been chosen,
but preserves it in the form of the world and so keeps it
accessible. The function of meaning then does not lie in
information, i.e., not in the elimination of a system-relative
state of uncertainty about the world, and it cannot, therefore,
be measured with the techniques of information theory. If it
is repeated, a message or piece of news loses its information
value, but not its meaning. Meaning is not a selective event,but a selective relationship between system and world.195
Information is an event that reduces uncertainty within a system byselecting a state based on a prior distinction (“what will the weather belike today?” “it's raining!”). Meaning, by contrast, maintains the unityof a difference between an actualized given and other potentialities or
possibilities.

160 Levi R. Bryant

Because information is premised on a prior distinction that allows
events in the environment to take on information value, it follows thatsystems, in their relation to other objects, always contain blind spots. What
we get here is a sort of object-specific transcendental illusion produced as aresult of its closure. As Luhmann remarks in Ecological Communication, “onecould say that a system can see only what it can see. It cannot see what it
cannot. Moreover, it cannot see that it cannot see this. For the system thisis something concealed 'behind' the horizon that, for it, has no 'behind'”.196
If systems can only see what they can see, cannot see what they cannot see,and cannot see that they cannot see this, then this is because any relation
to the world is premised on system-specific distinctions that arise from thesystem itself. As a consequence of this, Luhmann elsewhere remarks that,“[t]he conclusion to be drawn from this is that the connection with thereality of the external world is established by the blind spot of the cognitive
operation. Reality is what one does not perceive when one perceives it”.197
If reality is what one does not perceive when one perceives it, then thisis because (1) objects do not relate directly to other objects, but rather
relate to other objects only through their own distinctions, and (2) because
objects do not themselves register the distinctions that allow them to relate
to other objects in this way. Objects are thus withdrawn in a dual sense.
On the one hand, objects are withdrawn from other objects in that they
never directly encounter these other objects, but rather transform these
perturbations into information according to their own organization. On theother hand, objects are withdrawn even from themselves as the distinction
through which operations are possible, the endo-structure of objects,
withdraw into the background, as it were, in the course of operations. WhenI note that it is raining, the distinction between precipitation and nonprecipitation is not there before me for my cognitive system, but is rather
used or employed by my cognitive system.
The transcendental illusion thus generated by the manner in which
objects relate to one another is one in which the states “experienced” by asystem are treated as other objects themselves, rather than system-specificentities generated by the organization of the object itself. In other words,
the object treats the world it “experiences” as reality simpliciter, rather thanas system-states produced by its own organization. Here it is importantChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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to note that the foregoing analysis does not require us to follow Luhmannor Spencer-Brown in the thesis that such system-states are produced bybinary distinctions. All that is required is that these states be produced as aconsequence of an object's endo-structure or virtual proper being. It could
be that binary distinctions are only operative in “more advanced” objects
such as cognitive systems and communication systems, with other systems
simply having an endo-structure composed of networks of relations defining
a particular organization that can only be perturbed in various ways along
the lines described by Bateson in terms of a transmission (or better yet,production) of differences. It could be that “more advanced” systems are
non-linear networks of this sort as well. What is important is not whether
or not information is produced through binary distinctions, but rather that
information is a product of the organization of the system in question, not atransfer of information as self-identical from one object to another.
Between Luhmann's account of how systems relate to the world andGraham Harman's object-oriented ontology, we find remarkable pointsof overlap. Like Harman's objects, Luhmann's systems are autonomous
individuals that are closed and independent of other systems. In his mostrecent work, Harman has argued that all objects are quadruple in theirstructure.198 Without going into all the details of his account of objects,
Harman distinguishes between real objects and real qualities, and sensuous
objects and sensuous qualities. Here we must proceed with caution, forHarman's sensuous objects 1) do not refer solely to objects that are merely
fictional, and 2) are not restricted to humans and animals alone. Rather,
all objects, whether animate or inanimate, relate to other objects not as
real objects, but as sensuous objects. Evoking a sort of quasi-Lacanianism,
we can say that “a sensuous object is an object for another object”.
Sensuous objects are not the real object itself, but are, rather, what objects
are for other objects. In this respect, sensuous objects are very similar to
Luhmann's information events and system-states.
Unlike real objects, Harman's sensuous objects exist only on the interiorof a real object. These sensuous objects can arise both from the interior of
the real object that encounters them or from other real objects. In Princeof Networks, Harman gives the examples of “Monster X” and a friend’s catthat he is taking care of.199 Monster X is a monster that Harman generates

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Levi R. Bryant

through his imagination and whose qualities he refuses to share with us(he assures us that this is the most fearsome and frightening monster
ever imagined). Now, unlike a real object, Monster X only exists in theinterior of Harman's imagination, is not withdrawn, and ceases to exist
when he falls asleep at night or ceases thinking about it. Monster X iscapable of acting on Harman through a sort of auto-affection of Harman
by Harman, but it is not an object out there in the world that is capableof being perturbed by other objects. The case is similar with the catHarman was taking care of when writing about Monster X. The cat is, ofcourse, a real entity out there in the world that is an “autonomous force
unleashed in Harman's apartment” regardless of whether he is aware of its
activities. However, for Harman, the cat is also a sensuous object that exists
on the interior of Harman. Like Monster X, the cat qua sensuous object
ceases to exist when Harman ceases to think about it or when he goes tosleep. However, unlike Monster X, the cat qua real object continues tobe an autonomous force unleashed in the world even when he ceases tothink about it.
In this context, the important point to take away from Harman's
quadruple objects is that objects only ever relate to other objects throughsensuous objects. No object ever encounters another object as a real object.
If we translate Harman's thesis into Luhmannian terms, we can say thatsystems or real objects only ever encounter other objects as informationand system-states. Harman's fearsome Monster X would be an example
of a system-state. Monster X is not an event produced within a system
as a consequence of a perturbation from the environment, but rather is ameaning-event that Harman produced on his own. By contrast, Harman's
friend's cat is a combination of information and meanings. When the cat
perturbs him in a particular way, the cat functions as information, selecting
a particular system-state within Harman. Various thoughts Harman might
have about the cat would be meaning-events produced by Harman. Yet
in both cases, what we have are purely internal system states that differ
from whatever other objects might happen to be in the environment. As
a consequence, we only ever encounter other objects as sensuous objects
rather than real objects, such that we are both withdrawn from these real
objects and they are withdrawn from us.

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4.3. Autopoietic and Allopoietic Objects
Returning to the themes of the last chapter, we can now situate thefunctioning of systems with respect to how they produce and respond to
information in terms of virtual proper being and local manifestation. As I
observed in 4.1, Maturana and Varela distinguish between autopoietic andallopoietic machines. Autopoietic machines are machines or objects that
produce their own elements and “strive” to maintain their organization
across time. Our bodies, for example, heal when they are cut. The key
feature of autopoietic machines is that they produce themselves. Not only do
autopoietic machines constitute their own elements, but they paradoxicallyconstitute their own elements through interactions among their elements.
By contrast, allopoietic machines are machines produced by something else.
Generally the domain of allopoietic machines refers to inanimate objects.
Here it's worth noting that the distinction between autopoietic objects
and allopoietic objects is not a hard and fast or absolute distinction, but isprobably a distinction that involves a variety of gradations or intermediaries.
Despite the differences between allopoietic machines and autopoietic
machines, I want to argue that both undergo actualizations throughinformation and both involve system/environment distinctions that
constitute their relations to other objects. Here a major difference between
autopoietic machines and allopoietic machines would be that allopoietic
machines can only undergo actualization through information, whereas
autopoietic machines can both be actualized in a particular way throughinformation and can actualize themselves in particular ways throughongoing operations internal to their being. Here it might appear strange
to speak of information in relation to allopoietic or inanimate objects.
However, we must recall that information is neither meaning, nor isinformation a message exchanged between objects. Rather, as we have seen,
information is a difference that makes the difference or an event that selectsa system state. In this regard, there is no reason to restrict information
to autopoietic objects, for such events take place within allopoietic
objects as well.
Before proceeding to discuss the differences between how these
two types of objects relate to information, it is important to make some164 Levi R. Bryant

points regarding the system/environment distinction as it is deployed in
autopoietic theory. Maturana, Varela, and Luhmann tend to speak of the
distinction between system and environment as a distinction that systems
draw such that this distinction allows systems to observe their environment.
In my view, these are conventions that should be abandoned, or rather, thatshould be evoked in highly system-specific contexts. Rather than claimingthat systems draw distinctions between themselves and their environment—
implying that there's a homunculus that does the drawing—we should
instead say that systems are their distinction or form. Here it will berecalled that “form”, as Spencer-Brown understands it, is the unity of themarked and unmarked space produced by a distinction. The distinction thatgenerates the marked and unmarked space is, of course, self-referential in
the sense that it belongs to one side of the distinction: the system. Insofar
as objects are autonomous and independent, they are necessarily selfreferential in that their separation from the environment is produced by
the object itself. It is the distinction between system and environment thatboth constitutes the closure of objects and their particular form of openness
to other objects. In the case of more “advanced” systems like cognitive
systems, social systems, and perhaps some computers, we get the ability
to actively draw distinctions and follow through their consequences orwhat subsequent operations they generate, but in many other instances it'sunlikely that systems have any real freedom in how the distinction between
system and environment is constituted.
Likewise, rather than claiming that systems observe their environment
through their distinctions, we should instead claim that objects interact withother systems through their distinctions. The emphasis on observation, in
my view, is one of the greatest drawbacks of various strains of autopoietic
theory. Observation implies a distinction between self-reference orreference to internal states of the system and other-reference or references
to the environment. The distinction between self-reference and otherreference, in its turn, requires a doubling of the distinction between
system and environment within the system itself. That is, systems that
distinguish between self-reference and other-reference are systems where
the distinction between system and environment re-enters the systemthat draws this distinction so that the distinction between system andChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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environment can itself be observed. In other words, self-reference andother-reference requires a self-referential operation whereby the systemobserves how it observes and thereby distinguishes between what arises
from within the system itself and what comes from without. Rather
than simply undergoing a perturbation, I now treat this perturbation
as something that issues from the environment and register that thisperturbation comes from the environment. This doubling of the system/
environment distinction is a necessary condition for observation.
In their discussions of autopoietic theory, Maturana and Varela often
evoke cells as a prime example of autopoietic systems. However, thisexample, above all, indicates just why we should not talk about the selfreferential distinction upon which any system or object is founded in termsof observation. Although cells cannot exist without a boundary between
system and environment that is constituted self-referentially by the cell
itself, it is misleading to suggest that there's any meaningful sense in whichcells observe their environment or make other-references to the world
independent of them. To be sure, cells interact with their environment
and are, like any other system, perturbed by their environment, but there's
no meaningful sense in which they refer to their environment. To suggest
otherwise is to imply that entities like cells operate according to meaning.
Rather than speaking in terms of observation and other-reference, both ofwhich are far too epistemological and cognitive in their connotations, weshould instead speak in terms of how systems are selectively open to theirenvironment and how they interact with their environment. Other-reference
and observation, rather, seems to be something that only emerges withmore complicated systems such as tardigrades, frogs, and perhaps certain
computer systems.
The term “information” is fortunate in that it contains within itself acertain productive polysemy that allows it to resonate in a variety of ways.
In addition to treating information as an event that selects system states,
we can also read the term “information” avant la lettre to play on the more
literal connotations of the term. When we break information into its units,
we can say that information refers to what is in formation. Here informationrefers to the genesis of local manifestations as ongoing processes rather
than as fixed identities. The identity of objects is not fixed, but is rather a166 Levi R. Bryant

dynamic and ongoing identity that is in formation. While there is indeed
an identity to the object, in the sense that it has a virtual endo-structurethat persists across time, this identity is always manifesting itself in avariety of ways. Similarly, we can also read information as “in-form-ation”.
Here information does not refer to the ongoing genesis and openness ofobjects—that which is “in formation”—but rather refers to the manner inwhich objects take on new form or come to embody new form with theiractualizations in local manifestations. Returning to the distinction I drew
between the topology of objects and the geometry of objects in the lastchapter, information as in-form-ation here refers to the transition that takes
place within an object from the domain of virtual proper being and thepotentialities populating virtual proper being to the geometric actualizationof a form or quality in an object. In other words, in-form-ation refers to the
local manifestation of an object embodied in a specific quality.
In both allopoietic and autopoitic systems, information is an eventthat makes a difference by selecting a system-state. However, information
functions in very different, yet related, ways in the case of allopoietic andautopoietic systems. In both cases, information is non-linear and systemspecific, existing only for the system in question and as a function of theorganization or endo-structure of the object. In saying that information is
non-linear, my point is that it is an effect of the endo-structure of the object as
it relates to its environment and how this endo-structure resonates within
the field of differential relations that define that structure. Information is
not in the environment, but is a product of the system perturbed by its
environment. In the case of allopoietic systems, information functions toactualize a degree in the phase-space of the virtual proper being of thesubstance, leading to the actualization of a particular quality in a local
manifestation.
Here the point I wish to make is so basic as to appear trivial. However,this point has important consequences for how we analyze allopoietic
objects in the world. When an allopoietic object is perturbed in a particularway, it produces an actuality proper to the endo-structure of its being. One
and the same perturbation can produce very different local manifestations
in different allopoietic objects. Thus, for example, water behaves differently
than rocks when hit by another object or heated up. When water is heatedChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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up, it locally manifests itself in the quality of boiling. When a rock is heatedup, heat is distributed throughout the rock. When water is hit by anotherobject, it produces waves. When a rock is hit by another object, it begins toroll and perhaps vibrates.
These are obvious and familiar points about the objects that populate
our world. We all recognize, even if only implicitly, that different objects
or different types of substances respond differently to one and the same
perturbation. However, while this is an obvious point, it is nonetheless apoint that needs to be accounted for. It is precisely this which the conceptsof virtual proper being, local manifestation, and information attempt toaccount for. When an allopoietic object is perturbed in a particular way,
information is produced as a consequence of how the object in question isorganized. This information, in turn, selects a system-state which actualizes
a potentiality in the virtual proper being of the object in the form of aparticular quality or local manifestation.
Now, there are two important points worth making here. First, as in
the case of autopoietic objects, allopoietic objects are only selectively open
to their environments. Many events can occur in the environment of an
object without all of these events being capable of perturbing the object
and thereby being transformed into information. While rocks, for example,
are certainly open to sound waves, they are not, as far as I know, open to
signifiers. Uluru or Ayers Rock, for example, is in-different to its title as
Uluru or any special legal status it is given. It does not get offended whena stranger that has never heard of it fails to refer to it by its proper name,it doesn't answer to its proper name, nor does it likely worry itself overany sacred or legal preferences it might gain through being Uluru. Herereference to Uluru's in-difference to its name should be taken quite literally
as signifying that Uluru's name cannot select system-states within Uluru.
Uluru is entirely closed with respect to its name.
Lest one conclude that this sort of closure to its name is merely afeature of the difference between culture and nature, I offer an exampleof (non)relations between completely natural beings as well. Neutrinos
are extremely small elementary particles that travel close to the speed oflight. Because neutrinos are electrically neutral, they pass through most
matter completely undisturbed and without disturbing that matter. This

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causes, of course, massive problems in the detection of neutrinos as most
detection devices we might use to detect them cannot be perturbed bythem due to the electric neutrality of the neutrino. Here the neutrino isa perfect example of a strongly closed entity that cannot be perturbed byother entities and that cannot perturb many other entities. Between theindifference of Urulu to its proper name and the indifference of neutrinos
to most other entities, there's a difference in degree rather than kind. While
it is important to recognize that most inanimate objects cannot answer totheir name (computers are quickly calling this generalization into question),
there is no reason to treat culture as a special domain or distinct realm
unlike material interactions. In both cases, the issue is one of how entities
are selectively open to their environment.
The second consequence that follows from treating allopoietic objects
in terms of self-referential system/environment distinctions that are only
selectively open to their environment is that allopoietic objects cannot
be treated as bundles of qualities. Qualities are results of how allopoietic
objects are actualized by their perturbations. They are things that objects
can do, but they do not define the proper being of objects which consists ofpowers. As I tried to show in my discussion of Bhaskar in the first chapter,
objects can be “out of phase” with the events they're capable of producing.
When situated in terms of qualities, this means that objects can exist, they
can be there in the world, either in a dormant state where they produce noqualities of a particular sort, or in a state where, due to the interventionof other generative mechanisms or objects they produce exo-qualities that
inhibit the production of particular qualities of which the object is capable.
The key point not to be missed is that the qualities of an object arevariable. Every object, allopoietic or autopoietic, is capable of a variety ofdifferent local manifestations. And we can say that perhaps every object
is capable of producing an infinite number of different properties. Thisis among the reasons that we cannot treat objects as bundles of qualities.
Qualities are products of how allopoietic objects are perturbed, how those
perturbations are transformed into information, and how that information
selects system-states producing local manifestations.
The question that emerges here is that of why, if objects cannot
be equated with their qualities, we have such a persistent tendency toChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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reduce objects to their qualities. I think there are two basic reasons forthis. The first has to do with the type of objects we are. Like all objects,
we are operationally closed and relate to the world only through thedistinctions that regulate our openness to the world. These distinctions,like all distinctions, have a marked and an unmarked space, such thatthe unmarked space becomes invisible or disappears. In the case of ourperceptual world, one operative distinction seems to be the distinction
between identity and change. Here identity functions as the marked state,while change functions as the unmarked state. If this schema plays suchan important role in our experience of the world, then this is because, as
Bergson observed long ago, our perception is geared towards action andour ability to act on other objects. Since action requires a more or lessstable platform to take place, change and difference is thrown over into theunmarked side of the distinction governing our perception and cognition.
When I go to grab my beloved coffee mug, I register it not as a series ofvariations or different local manifestations, but as a blue coffee mug. I register
my mug in this way even when the lights are out and the mug is no longer
blue. Here the blueness of the mug functions as a marker for returning to
the mug. “Oh, there's my mug!”
However, while the manner in which we translate objects plays a rolein our tendency to treat objects as bundles of qualities, there are objectcentered reasons for this tendency as well. While objects are, in principle,
independent of their relations, objects are only ever encountered in andamong relations to other objects. Terrestrial existence is such that these
relations are more or less stable and enduring. The consequence of thisis that allopoietic objects tend to be perturbed by other objects in theirenvironment in more or less constant ways. Insofar as objects are perturbed
in more or less constant ways by other objects in their environment,
they tend to have fairly stable and ongoing local manifestations. As aconsequence, the volcanic powers objects have folded within them remain
largely hidden from view.
I refer to networks of exo-relations like this as “regimes of attraction”.
Regimes of attraction are networks of fairly stable exo-relations among
objects that tend to produce stable and repetitive local manifestations
among the objects within the regime of attraction. Within a regime of

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attraction, causal relations can be bi-directional or symmetrical or unidirectional or asymmetrical. Bi-directional causation is a circular relationin which two or more entities reciprocally perturb one another in responseto each other. Like fireflies signaling to one another, one lightning bug
lights up and another lights up in response, leading the first to lightup again. Similarly, one object perturbs another, producing an act inthe second object that in turn perturbs the first object that started thesequence. As a consequence of these sorts of relations, we get constantlocal manifestations. The moon’s gravity affects the earth and the earth's
gravity affects the moon. Likewise, we can have uni-lateral or asymmetrical
relations of perturbation that bring about a largely constant statein an object.
Fire is a particularly good example for illustrating the idea of regimes
of attraction. In its terrestrial manifestation, fire behaves in relatively
predictable ways. It leaps up towards the sky and is characterized bypointed tongues of flame that dance and oscillate. As a consequence, weare led to think of this sort of behavior (these qualities) as constituting theessence of fire. However, in outer space, fire behaves more like water, rollingover things in waves, expanding everywhere like liquid on the surface of atable. In its terrestrial manifestation, fire behaves this way because of thegravity of the earth. Here fire exists within a particular regime of attractionthat leads to very specific local manifestations. When situated in different
regimes of attraction, fire behaves in a very different way.
The concept of regimes of attraction is of central importance toonticology and has profound implications for how we think about
epistemology or inquiry. The concept of regimes of attraction entails that
it is not enough for inquiry to merely gaze at objects to “know” them, butrather that we must vary the environments of objects or their exo-relations
to discover the powers hidden within objects. Knowledge of an object does
not reside in a list of qualities possessed by objects, but rather in a diagramof the powers hidden within objects. However, in order to form a diagramof an object we have to vary the exo-relations of an object to determinethat of which it is capable. And here, of course, the point is that knowledge
is gained not by representing, but, as Aristotle suggested in a different
context in the Nicomachean Ethics, by doing. In the case of Aristotle, thisChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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doing consists of repeated actions so as to produce habits or dispositionsof action. In the case of other forms of knowledge, by contrast, this doing
consists in acting upon objects to see what they do under these conditions.
As should be obvious, the concept of regimes of attraction is crucial
to our understanding of both allopoietic and autopoietic objects. In “A
Developmental Psychobiological Systems View”, biologist Gilbert Gottlieb
recounts his early doctoral research on the sensitive period for imprinting
in ducklings.200 Imprinting refers to any time-sensitive phase of learningthat occurs very quickly and appears to be independent of behavior. As one
might suspect, lurking in the background here is the issue of innateness orwhether certain phases of imprinting are innate or learned. While Gottlieb
did indeed discover a critical period of imprinting before and after which
imprinting could not occur, he also discovered that the developmental
age for imprinting could be moved around through a manipulation of the
duckling's early environment. As Gottlieb puts it, “[t]he sensitive period for
imprinting was not exclusively a function of maturation but depended also
on the nature and extent of the bird's prenatal and postnatal experiences
prior to entering into the imprinting situation”.201 Here maturation, ofcourse, refers to factors of innateness. The crucial experiences that played
a role in the timing of the onset of imprinting (or, presumably, lackthereof) had to do with whether or not the duckling was reared with visualand social experiences with other ducklings, or whether it was raised incomplete darkness and in complete social isolation.
What we encounter here is the importance of regimes of attraction as
they function in the development of allopoietic objects. The point here isthat, if we don't attend to the regime of attraction in which the autopoietic
system develops, we fall prey to a tendency to treat local manifestations asstrictly resulting from innate factors in the system, rather than seeing themas results of an interaction between both system-specific properties of thesystem and perturbations from the environment that are translated into
information which then selects system-states. Here the conclusion seems
to be that development does not have any one particular attractor in the
teleological sense. Rather, through entering into different exo-relations withother objects in the world, an allopoietic object can develop in a variety
of different ways. This entails that a key component of inquiry consists

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in 1) mapping the exo-relations in which particular local manifestations
take place, and 2) varying the exo-relations into which an object enters todetermine the variations of which it is capable.
Nonetheless, there are significant differences between how autopoietic
and allopoietic systems respond to information events. With allopoietic
systems, the selection of a system-state is a terminal process. When the wateris frozen in response to a change in temperature, it is frozen. There areno additional operations that take place within the system until it is once
again perturbed in a new way. By contrast, in autopoietic systems, there
are continuous operations that take place within the object even after theselection of a system-state through information. Taking an example froma social system, a news report that the value of the dollar has risen selectsa system-state within the economic system. This information event, in its
turn, kicks off a variety of subsequent operations within the social system.
For example, people begin selling their stocks to maximize their profit.
The point here is that, even in the absence of new information events, these
subsequent operations continue apace. These system-states and operations
are, of course, local manifestations of the autopoietic system in question.
Another, perhaps counter-intuitive, difference between autopoietic
systems and allopoietic systems is that there's a way in which the local
manifestations of allopoietic systems are more elastic than the local
manifestations of autopoietic systems. As I noted in a previous chapter, it isnecessary to distinguish between symmetrical and asymmetrical qualities.
In the current context, the important nuance of this distinction is thatsymmetrical qualities are reversible qualities, while asymmetrical qualities
are irreversible qualities. While there are certainly asymmetrical qualities thatcharacterize a number of local manifestations for allopoietic objects (paper
yellowed with age comes to mind), many qualities of allopoietic objects are
symmetrical in character. I turn out the lights and my beloved coffee mug
becomes black. I turn the lights on and the mug becomes a shade of blue
once again.
In the case of autopoietic objects, by contrast, asymmetrical qualities
seem to be the rule rather than the exception. Developmental processes,
for example, appear to be largely irreversible, changing the structure of
an autopoietic object's local manifestation irrevocably. In communication

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systems, a statement that is repeated is no longer the same statement, but
has now taken on ever so slight new resonances. In the structural couplingof psychic systems and communications systems, I cannot read the same
book twice because the very act of having read the book through once tothe end already changes how the beginning of the book reads the second
time when I begin it anew. As Bergson recognized at the beginning of thelast century, the presence of memory as a dimension of all living, psychic,and social experience transforms each event, no matter how apparently
repetitious in the brute sense, into a novelty.
However, where allopoietic systems often appear to have a greater
degree of elasticity with respect to qualities, autopoietic systems seem tohave a greater degree of elasticity with respect to distinctions or what wemight refer to as “channels”. It will be recalled that distinctions play a keyrole in how closed systems are open to their environment or other objects
in their environment. One of the crucial features of autopoietic systems isthat they have the ability to develop new distinctions, thereby enhancing
their capacity to be irritated or perturbed by other objects. This occurs in avariety of ways that are subject to very different degrees of freedom. Thus,
for example, it is likely that many plants can only transform the distinctions
through which it is possible for them to be irritated by their environment
through evolutionary processes of random variation and natural selection.
Throughout the animal world, we seem to get increasing degrees of
freedom in forming new distinctions through developmental processes thattake place through learning rather than innate structure. The same holds
true of social systems. And finally, it appears that computers are slowly
developing the ability to revise their own distinctions, broadening theirability to be irritated by their environment.
What is important here in these reflections on the difference between
autopoietic and allopoietic objects is that both types of objects areorganized around a system/environment distinction, both objects areoperationally closed, both types of objects are only selectively related
to their environment, and both objects transform perturbations into
information that selects system-states presiding over local manifestations.
In the case of both allopoietic and autopoietic systems, local manifestations

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are a product of actualizations of virtual proper being rather than fixed
properties in substances.

4.4. Translation
In light of the foregoing, we can now make sense of Latour's thesis, cited in
the epigraph to this chapter, that objects “interpret” one another. Insofar as
all objects are operationally closed, no object can transfer a force to anotherobject without that force being transformed in some way or another.
This generates a specific set of questions when analyzing relations among
entities in the world. On the one hand, in any discussion of relations among
entities, we must first determine whether the receiving entity even haschannels capable of receiving perturbations from the acting entity. Because
substances only maintain selective relations to their environment, they are
not open to all perturbations that exist in their environment. As we saw
in the last section, for example, rocks, as far as we know, are indifferent toour speech. This sort of selectivity is true not only of relations of objects
between different sorts, but also of relations between objects of the same
sort. Many, I'm sure, have experienced and been baffled by conversations
with others from very different theoretical backgrounds and orientations.
In such discussions, points and claims you take for granted as obvious seemnot even to be registered or noticed by the interlocutor when made. Here
we have different forms of selective openness among humans in discourse.
On the other hand, in those cases where an entity is open to
perturbations of a particular sort, we must nonetheless be attentive to themanner in which the entity that receives that perturbation transforms it
according to its own organization. In other words, we cannot begin withthe premise that the effect is already contained in the cause, but must
instead be attentive to how the cause is transformed into something new
and unexpected. In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan
contrasts laws and causality in a way that resonates nicely with this point.202
As Lacan remarks,
Cause is to be distinguished from that which is determinate
in a chain, in other words the law. By way of example, thinkof what is pictured in the law of action and reaction. ThereChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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is here, one might say, a single principle. One does not go
without the other.203
Lacan goes on to remark that,
Whenever we speak of cause, on the other hand, there isalways something anti- conceptual, something indefinite. The
phases of the moon are the cause of the tides—we know thisfrom experience, we know that the word cause is correctly
used here. Or again, miasmas are the cause of fever—that
doesn't mean anything either, there is a hole, and somethingthat oscillates in the interval. In short, there is cause only insomething that doesn't work.204
Lacan concludes “there remains essentially in the function of thecause a certain gap”.205 In characterizing causality in terms of a gap andsomething that “doesn't work”, Lacan emphasizes the manner in which theeffect of a cause always contains an element of surprise or something that
can't simply be deduced from the cause. Here there's a way in which theeffect is always in excess of the cause. And the claim that the effect contains
something in excess of the cause is the claim that the entity being affectedtranslates the cause producing something new.
Lacan's concept of causality is deeply related to his understanding ofobjet a, the object-cause of desire, and the unconscious. Without going
into all the details of Lacan's understanding of the unconscious, objet a,and desire, we can here make a few brief remarks as to how this is to beunderstood. The first point to note is that objet a is not the object desired,
but the object that causes desire. In other words, the object desired canbe quite different from the object-cause of desire or the objet a. The objet
a is rather that gap that generates desire. Desire is the effect of objet a, andobjet a is the cause of desire. Put otherwise, we can say that it is that point
where the symbolic fails and that it is the explanation of the effects of thisfailure. To illustrate this point, take the example of someone who desires
an expensive luxury car. The car is the object of desire, but not the objectcause of desire. Rather, the object-cause of the desire for the car is perhaps
the gaze of others who will envy the car or attribute status to the ownerof the car.

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This relation can be illustrated in terms of Lacan's discourse of themaster, first introduced in Seminar XVII: // aEach of Lacan's four discourses has four positions and defines astructure.206 In the upper left position we have an agent, addressing an otherin the upper right position, producing a product in the lower right position,with an unconscious truth in the lower left position.
One way of reading Lacan's discourse of the master is in terms of how
signifiers relate to one another. We have a master-signifier, S1, relating toanother signifier, S2, producing a remainder, a. The point is that in all speechor utterances something escapes. When we utter something, we feel as if wenever quite articulate what we wish to say. Indeed, we aren't even entirely
sure what we wish to say in our own speech. On the other hand, when wehear another person's utterances, we're never quite sure why they say what
they say. This is the gap that lies at the heart of all discourse. One wayof thinking about Lacan's discourses is as diagrams of little machines ininterpersonal relations. In the diagram above, it is paradoxically the product,
the failure, objet a, that keeps the discourse going. Because I never quite feelthat I've articulated what I wish to say and because I'm never quite sure
if I've understood what the other has said, new utterances are produced
that strive to capture this allusive remainder that perpetually recedes inthe discourse.
Within a psychoanalytic context, the gap by which objet a functions
as the object-cause of desire can be fruitfully thought in terms of the role
played by the unmarked side of a distinction as it functions in psychic
systems. Put a bit differently, while the unmarked side of a distinction is
not indicated by a system employing a particular distinction, this unmarked
side nonetheless has effects on how the psychic system functions. In his
discussion of the cause, Lacan remarks that “what the unconscious does isshow us the gap through which neurosis recreates a harmony with a real”.207
Here the unconscious is the network of unconscious signifiers, while theChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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gap is the real. The psychoanalytic formation (the symptom) is the harmony
recreated with the real.
To illustrate this point, I refer to an example from early in my own
analysis years ago. During this time, I was just beginning to teach. Thiswas back in the days when chalk was still used. Much to my dismay, I
found that I was breaking multiple pieces of chalk during every classsession. Indeed, this symptom was so pronounced and noticeable, thatit became a running joke with my students. They even got together andleft a chalk guard in my mailbox with a petition written in calligraphy
imploring me to stop killing the citizens of “Chalkville” and a picture of apiece of chalk dressed in armor. Now, I found all of this quite upsetting as
I felt it was undermining my authority in the classroom and revealing my
incompetence. One day, in a session, I was rambling on about this little
symptom. “I don't know what my problem is. I can't seem to modulate mypressure on the chalk. I try not to, but I always end up pressing too hard.
Why can't I use less pressure?” And so on. As my ramble went on, myanalyst, in a flat voice, intoned in a statement that was ambiguous as towhether it was a question or a statement, “pressure at the board?” “Yes”, I
responded, completely missing the polysemy of his remark, “pressure at theboard! I just can't keep myself from using too much pressure!” After thissession, I didn't think about the discussion of the chalk at all. Two weeks
later, however, I noticed that I hadn't broken any chalk for two weeks.
Somehow the desire embodied in my symptom had been articulated andtherefore, from the standpoint of my unconscious, I no longer had to breakchalk to articulate that desire.
Now where is the objet a, desire, and the unconscious in this example?
Where is the gap through which the unconscious recreates a harmony withthe real? Here the objet a is very likely the gaze of my students. That gazeposes a question: what am I for them? This gaze, however, was not the objectof my desire, but the cause of my desire. It was that which set the desirein motion. In his various glosses on desire, Lacan said that “desire is thedesire of the Other”. This is a polysemous aphorism that has a number ofdifferent connotations. It can mean that desire desires the Other. Likewise,
it can mean that our desire is not, as it were, truly our own, but rather isthe Other's desire. That is, it can mean that we desire as the Other desires,

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as in the case of an adult who lives her life pursuing the career her parents
wanted. Finally, it can mean that we desire to be desired by the Other.
In this instance, my chalk breaking symptom did not seem to desire the
Other (my student's here standing in the place of the Other), but rather
seemed to be an articulation of their desire (or, rather, my fantasy of what
they desired). Faced with the opacity or enigma of my students' desire,
my unconscious sought to transform this traumatic and enigmatic desire
into a specific demand or judgment: “You are not competent, you do notbelong here!” In other words, through the breaking of the chalk I was
perhaps unconsciously trying to satisfy my fantasy of what I took to be theirdemand. The breaking of the chalk at the board was both an articulationof how I was feeling (“pressured at the board”) and a potential solution
to the pressure I was experiencing: “if I'm incompetent then I won't haveto teach!” The unconscious recreated a harmony with the real by giving
content to the enigmatic gaze of my students through the symptom of
breaking the chalk.
The gap functions in a very specific way in Lacan's conception of themechanisms of the unconscious, but we can say that Lacan also makes
a broader and more profound point about the gap and the relationshipbetween cause and effect that holds for all inter-object relations. Here wecan coin the aphorism, “there is no transportation without translation”,
or, alternatively, “there is no transportation without transformation”.
Here we must take care not to take Lacan's notion of the gaze too literally,
but the point in this connection would be that the effects of the gaze as aperturbation cannot be anticipated in advance. Rather the effect that thegaze produces is an aleatory product of the organization or virtual proper
being of the system that is perturbed by the gaze. Each substance translates
perturbations in its own particular way.
Here, then, we can make sense of what Latour means when he claims
that objects interpret one another. To interpret is to translate, and totranslate is to produce something new. As Latour remarks, “[t]o interpret
something is to say it in other words. In other words, it is to translate”.208
The translated is never identical to the original, but rather produces
something different from the original. For example, if this book is some day
translated into, say, German, it will very likely take on resonances that itChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

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doesn't have in English. My discussions of “existence” might be translated
into Dasein. Yet the German term Dasein has connotations that English
doesn't have, such as “there-being” or “here-being”. In being translated
into another language a text becomes something different. Likewise,
when a perturbation is received by another entity, it becomes something
different. As Latour says earlier in Irreductions, “[n]othing is, by itself, thesame as or different from anything else. That is, there are no equivalents,
only translations”.209 The point here is that no perturbation ever retains its
identity or self-sameness when transported from one entity to another, butrather becomes something different as a consequence of being translated
into information and then producing a particular local manifestation in thereceiving object.
Along these lines, Latour elsewhere draws a distinction between
mediators and intermediaries in Reassembling the Social. As Latour
articulates this distinction,
An intermediary [...] is what transports meaning or force
without transformation: defining its inputs is enough todefine its outputs [...]. Mediators, on the other hand, cannot
be counted as just one; they might count for one, for nothing,for several, or for infinity. Their input is never a goodpredictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into
account every time. Mediators transform, translate, distort,
and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed
to carry.210
All objects are mediators with respect to one another, transforming
or translating what they receive and thereby producing something new
as a result. By contrast, intermediaries merely carry a force or meaning
without transforming it in any way. In this connection, we can say that theconcept of intermediaries treats objects as mere vehicles of the differences
contributed by another entity. In one of his most recent works, Latour
drives this point home, remarking that,what should appear extraordinarily bizarre is [...] theinvention of inanimate entities which should do nothing
more than carry one step further the cause that makes them180 Levi R. Bryant

act to generate the n+1 consequence which in turn arenothing but the causes of the n+2 consequences. This conceit
has the strange result of composing the world with longconcatenations of causes and effects where (this is what is
so odd) nothing is supposed to happen, except probably at the
beginning—but since there is no God in those staunchly
secular versions there is not even a beginning [...]. The
disappearance of agency in the so called “materialist worldview” is a stunning invention especially since it is contradicted
every step of the way by the odd resistance of reality: every
consequence adds slightly to the cause. Thus, it has tohave some sort of agency. There is a supplement. A gap
between the two.211
Our treatment of objects in terms of autopoietic and allopoietic
machines has explained just why this is the case. Insofar as all entities
draw a system/environment distinction and transform perturbations into
information as a function of their own internal organization, they always
contribute something new to the perturbations they receive.
The concept of translation, coupled with the distinction between
mediators and intermediaries has profound implications for both theory
and practice. In the docile bodies chapter of Discipline and Punish, we
encounter a prime example of theories and practices organized around theconceptualization of substances in terms of mere intermediaries.212 There
Foucault analyzes a disciplinary structure of power that aims to form thesoldier down to the tiniest detail.
By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become
something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt
body, the machine required can be constructed; a postureis gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly
through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable,
ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism ofhabit; in short, one has 'got rid of the peasant' and given him'the air of a soldier'.213

Chapter 4: The Interior of Objects

181

This conception of the formation of the soldier is premised on an
implausible idea of causation where causes are transported from one object
to another without remainder. Here the soldier is a pliable clay that can beformed however we like. Here information is conceived as something thatis transported as self-identical, producing a univocal effect in the body ofthe soldier-to-be. What is entirely missed in such a model is the manner inwhich the entity receiving the perturbation transforms it according to its
own organization.
In a very different context, biologist Richard Lewontin contrasts thedifference between how applied biologists approach research into plants
and animals and how developmental biologists in the laboratory approach
plants and animals.214 For the developmental biologist in the laboratory,
a lot of research revolves around the manipulation of genes to see how
they affect the phenotype. This encourages a conception of organisms inwhich genes are thought of as already containing the information whereby
the phenotype is produced. In other words, genes are thought as a map
or blueprint of the organism. By contrast, applied biologists investigating
potentially new crops, test these crops for several years by growing variantsof the crop in different environments or in different regions. As Lewontin
notes, the crop that is eventually chosen for sale is not necessarily thecrop that produces the largest yield but the one that produces the mostconsistent yield when grown in a variety of different regions.215
In Lewontin's example, we find a perfect instance of the difference
between approaching the world in terms of intermediaries and approaching
the world in terms of mediators. In treating information as alreadycontained in the genes, the developmental biologist treats the organism as amere intermediary. The blueprint is already contained within the genes andit is enough to merely manipulate the genes in a particular way to produce
a particular phenotype. The point here is not that such manipulations don't
produce particular phenotypes but that 1) these particular perturbations
are a particular environment, and 2) in many instances environmental
perturbations can produce similar transformations of phenotypes. As aconsequence, we should see genes not as something that already contain
information, but rather as one causal factor among others, where information
is not already there, but rather where it is produced as a result of operations

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Levi R. Bryant

in the system/environment relation. In this connection, Susan Oyama calls
for parity in investigating objects. As Oyama puts it, developmental systems
theory (DST),
makes extensive use of parity of reasoning. Descriptions
and explanations of development are often asymmetric: thelogic that is used (when there is a logic at all) to characterizecertain factors as informing, coding, controlling, and so forth,
could be, but typically is not, applied to other factors that playdemonstrably comparable roles. In contrast, DST includes as
full-fledged interactants many factors that are generally left inthe background.216
In contrast to the developmental biologist described by Lewontin, theapplied biologist's investigative practice implicitly indicates parity reasoning
in its approach to new crops. In growing crops in different environments
and regions, the applied biologist works on the premise that genes are notblueprints already containing information, but rather are one causal factor
among others that can generate very different effects at the level of thephenotype when grown under different environmental conditions.
For the applied biologist, the entity (the seeds) are full-blown mediators.
Between cause and effect there is here a gap, such that the effect is
unknown. That is, we don't know what phenotypes will be produced underthese circumstances. By contrast, the gap between cause and effect tends todisappear in the research practices of Lewontin's developmental biologist.
Lewontin's developmental biologist, of course, begins with the premisethat we don't know what phenotype will be produced if we manipulate
this gene. The point, however, is that through the focus on genes alone,
the developmental biologist tends to create the implicit conclusion thatthe information is already contained in the genes. In other words, thedevelopmental biologist creates the impression that the effect is alreadythere, requiring only a perturbation to take place. Lewontin's appliedbiologist, by contrast, works from the implicit premise that the phenotype
is something that is constructed and that it is constructed in a way that
can't be determined from the genes alone. One and the same genotype canproduce very different results when cultivated in different environments.

Chapter 4: The Interior of Objects

183

As such, the seed is, for the applied biologist, a mediator. In short, there
is no one-to-one mapping between genotype and phenotype. In thisregard, we need to think the role that information plays in an object not
as something that exists already in the entity, but as a cascade of events
where information is simultaneously constructed and where information
selects system-states. Needless to say, these selections have an impact on
subsequent stages of development, playing a role in the determination ofwhat subsequent information constructions are possible and excluding
other possibilities.
Implicit assumptions about the transmissibility of information are rife invarious forms of cultural studies as well. Whenever we speak of discourses,
narratives, signifiers, social forces, and media as structuring reality anddominating people behind their backs, we speak as if persons were mereintermediaries or as if information can be exchanged without remainder.
In other words, we ignore the manner in which systems are closed andhow there is always a gap between cause and effect. Yet social systems,
which are always themselves objects or substances, have a tough go of itas the objects of which these objects are composed never quite cooperate.
All communication, as Lacan said, is miscommunication. And if this is thecase, then it is because all systems produce their own information according
to their own organization. As a consequence, every object or system is beset
by its own system internal entropy as a consequence of the other objects or
systems of which it is composed. Because objects are not intermediaries but
rather mediators, the elements that a system constitutes never quite behavein the way the system anticipates.
The point here is that society cannot, as Latour said, be treated as an
explanation but is precisely what has to be explained.217 What is remarkable
is that any stable social relations ever emerge at all. In A Sociological Theoryof Communication, Loet Leydesdorff raises a similar question with respect
to the self-organization of scientific discourse. How is it, we might ask, thatsomething like a Kuhnian paradigm comes into existence? Leydesdorff
proposes that first we have a field of heterogeneous communication acts, ora field that might be characterized by a high degree of entropy. Now, one of
the remarkable and important features about human communication is that
it is self-reflexive. That is, we can communicate about our communications

184 Levi R. Bryant

or talk about our talk. At the second stage, reflexive discourse begins to set
in. As Leydesdorff puts it,
if reflexive analysts begin to communicate among themselves
not only in terms of how they analyze data, but also at thereflexive level, e.g., about standards of analysis, the standards
may become de-personalized; they begin to circulate in thecommunication system of this community, and thus begin
to form a supra-individual dimension of quality control forthe actors.218
With the reflexive moment of communication, distinctions andselections begin to emerge, determining a marked state or that which is
selected and an unmarked state or that which is excluded. Over time,
this talk about talk spreads through the community and becomes a sortof assumed background of those involved in communication, such that
communications that deviate from these newly formed norms, themes, anddistinctions are simply coded out as noise. In other words, a social systemorganizes itself and now develops its own capacity for selection at thesecond-order level through the manner in which talk about talk has become
sedimented in those participating in the discourse.
In this way, the system thereby attains closure, both being produced byits own elements and producing its own elements. The system only comes
into being from the action of those participating in the communication, but
their communications begin to play a constraining role and produce newelements in the form of both new communications within the framework of
the distinctions and selections produced by the system, and to produce newcommunicators capable of participating within that system. The productionof these new elements, of course, takes place through the training of
those participating in scientific discourse. The important point to keep inmind, however, is that even while such a self-organizing system comes toconstitute its own elements, these elements aren't just elements. Rather,
they are substances in their own right as well. As a consequence, such
systems always struggle against a system-specific entropy. Communications
are perpetually emerging that either diverge from the system that has
emerged, or that challenge that system. In other words, the elements of theChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

185system are never simple intermediaries. Communications within the systemperpetually generate surprising results as they pass through the mediatorsin the form of the persons participating in the discourse.
The concept of translation encourages us to engage in inquiry in adifferent way. Working from the premise that entities are mediators, it
discourages any mode of theorizing that implicitly or explicitly treats objects
as mere intermediaries such that effects are already contained withincauses. As Latour suggests, all entities are treated as having greater or
lesser degrees of agency by virtue of having a system-specific organizationthat prevents the relation between cause and effect from being treated as asimple exchange of information that inevitably produces a particular result.
Likewise, in approaching entities as mediators, we are encouraged to attend
to the manner in which entities produce surprising local manifestations
when perturbed in particular ways and to vary the contexts in which entities
are perturbed to discover what volcanic powers they have hidden withinthemselves. That is, we begin to investigate the manner in which substances
creatively translate the world around them. In this respect, we move fromthe marked to the unmarked space of much contemporary thought. Rather
than treating deviations from our predications as mere noise to be ignored,
we instead treat these deviations as giving us insight into the way in which
entities translate their world.

4.5. Autopoietic Asphyxiation: The Case of the Lacanian Clinic
To illustrate these points about the nature of translation and the closure ofobjects, I now turn briefly to some schematic remarks about the ontologicalfoundations of the Lacanian clinic. My aim here is twofold. On the one
hand, my aim is to schematically outline why Lacanian analysts conduct
themselves as they do with respect to the treatment of their analysands.
On the other hand, I wish to head off the criticism that object-oriented
ontology ignores humans or the subject. As discussed in the introduction,
the thesis of onticology and object-oriented philosophy is not that weshould ignore subjects and focus instead on objects, but rather that being
is composed entirely of objects or substances. In this respect, subjects are
not other than objects, but rather are a particular type of object that relates186 Levi R. Bryant

to the world in a specific way. Far from excluding subjects, onticology iscompletely able to integrate various theories of the subject. What onticology
and object-oriented philosophy object to is thus not the category of thesubject, but rather the modernist conception of the subject in which theobject is always coupled to the subject or culture in some form or another.
Onticology, by contrast, seeks to think a subjectless object or an object thatis not merely a correlate of a subject.
The account of autopoietic systems and operational closure
developed in the foregoing turns out to be quite consonant with Lacanian
psychoanalysis. In many respects, this comes as no surprise for, as abrief glance at the index to Seminar II indicates, Lacan was well awareof cybernetics which is, in turn, deeply related to autopoietic theory.219
One of the features that marks Lacan's account of the subject is that it isthoroughly “intersubjective”. The subject is both constituted in the field of
the Other and is a perpetual relation with the Other. This is reflected bothin Lacan's theory of the various subject-structures (neurosis, psychosis, andperversion) and how analysis is conducted.
Speaking strictly in the context of neurosis, it is ordinarily a symptomthat brings a person to analysis. Setting aside the intricacies andtransformations Lacan's theory of the symptom undergoes over the courseof his teaching, it is important to note that Lacan's conception of thepsychoanalytic symptom is not that of an underlying pathology arisingfrom organic causes—for example, a chemical imbalance—but rather ofthe expression of a repressed desire and a relation to the Other. In thisrespect, the symptom is a form of speech, an address to the Other, thatspeaks without speaking. For example, my breaking of the chalk was saying
something to my students. In this regard, Lacan remarks “that symptoms
can be entirely resolved in an analysis of language, because a symptom isitself structured like a language: a symptom is language from which speech
must be delivered”.220 The symptom, in short, is a way of speaking or
addressing the Other while simultaneously not speaking.
Yet the symptom is also an expression of desire. However, here we mustrecall that for Lacan “desire is the desire of the Other”. As we saw in thelast section, this can entail that desire desires the Other, that desire desires
to be desired by the Other, and that desire desires as the Other desires. In

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each instance, desire marks an intersubjective relation to the Other or a wayof relating to the Other. In the case of neurosis, the desire that underlies
the symptom is a repressed desire that the analysand, for whatever reason,cannot acknowledge or embrace. In this connection, it is crucial to notethat the aim of analysis is not to treat the symptom, but to transform theanalysand's relationship to both their own desire and the Other. While
psychoanalytic treatment can, indeed, dissolve many symptoms—I ceased,for example, breaking chalk after that session—those symptoms that are
dissolved come to be replaced by other symptoms. This is because, in thecase of neurosis, the subject very much is its desire. What Lacan aims forrather is an avowal of desire and a separation from the Other.
In many respects, the symptom can be seen as a way of responding to
the enigma of the Other's desire. In Seminar X, Lacan asks us to imagine
standing before a female praying mantis without knowing whether or not
we are wearing the mask of a male or female praying mantis.221 As is wellknown, the female praying mantis devours the male praying mantis aftermating with him. This perfectly embodies the dilemma of desire. Insofar
as we don’t know which mask we are wearing, we don’t know what we arefor the female praying mantis. The symptom can thus be thought as a wayof surmounting or filling out this enigma by forming a hypothesis of what
the Other desires. Desire, it could be said, embodies our non-knowledge
with respect to the Other's desire. Embodied in all intersubjective relations
is the sense that despite the fact that we are being addressed by the Other,
we nonetheless do not know why the Other is addressing us. Put differently,
we do not know the desire that animates the Other's relation to us. In
this regard, the desire of the Other closely mirrors the phenomenon ofoperational closure with respect to systems. The Other perturbs us in avariety of ways, but we are unable to determine what intentions lie behind
the Other's interaction with us.
It is this non-knowledge with respect to the desire of the Other thatgenerates the fantasy and the symptom. Within the Lacanian framework,
the fantasy is not so much a wish for something we lack, but is rather
an answer to the enigma of the Other's desire. Fantasy, we could say, is ahypothesis as to what the Other desires. Through fantasy, the anxiety the
subject encounters in the face of the enigma of the Other's desire is thereby

188 Levi R. Bryant

minimized. Even where the fantasy is rather grim (“the Other wants tobeat and exploit me!”), the answer to the enigma of the Other's desire is
nonetheless preferable to the anxiety-provoking non-knowledge of thatdesire. With the answer provided by the unconscious fantasy, the analysand
can now set about either thwarting or satisfying what they unconsciously
believe to be the Other's demand, while also providing themselves with aschema for understanding what the Other wants from her.
Within a Luhmannian framework, we can already see that fantasy serves
a function deeply analogous to the role of distinction in the continuing
operations of a system. Here it will be recalled that distinction is a necessary
condition for indication. If a system is to be capable of indicating anything
within its environment, then it must first draw a distinction. However,distinction embodies two blind spots. On the one hand, every distinction
contains a blind spot in the form of its unmarked state or what falls outsideof the distinction. On the other hand, the distinction itself embodies ablind spot insofar as in the use of the distinction to make indications,the distinction itself becomes invisible, disguising the manner in which
it renders indication possible. Just as Lewis Carroll said that you can eat
your food or talk to your food but not eat your food and talk to your food,distinction is such that you can use your distinctions to make indications orobserve your distinctions, but you can't observe your distinctions and use
your distinctions. As a consequence, the use or operation of distinctions inmaking indications or observations produces a “reality effect” where what
is observed or indicated appears to be a direct property of the indicateditself, rather than an effect of the distinction that renders the indication
possible. So it is with fantasy as well. The fantasy is that which recedesin the background while structuring relations to the Other. As such,
fantasy creates an effect whereby the manner in which fantasy transforms
perturbations from the Other into information appears to directly result
from the Other or to be a property of the Other itself. As Žižek puts it,“[t]he role of fantasy [is to] mediate between the formal symbolic structure
and the positivity of objects we encounter in reality—that is to say, it
provides a 'schema' according to which certain positive objects in reality
can function as objects of desire, filling in the empty places opened up by
the formal symbolic structure”.222 However, it is not simply the holes in theChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

189

symbolic structure that are at stake here, but the opacity of the Other in our
relations to the Other that fantasy fills. In this regard, it can be seen that
fantasy is a direct response to the withdrawal of objects or others, to theirconstitutive opacity borne out of the operational closure of other persons
and the social field as a whole.
The operational closure of subjects and the role played by the fantasy
pose special challenges in the analytic setting. If fantasy structures theanalysand's interpersonal relations in such a way as to pre-interpret
perturbations from others in a particular way, how can the analyst
intervene in the psychic economy of the analysand without merely
reinforcing the analysand's fantasy and confirming their unconscious
conception of the Other? Already we see that this question is a question of
how it is possible to relate to operationally closed objects that cannot be
dominated or controlled. Expressed a bit differently, the point here revolves
around the status of information as it functions in psychic systems. One
psychotherapeutic approach might have it that information is somethingthat can be exchanged between therapist and patient such that it retains
its identity or the meaning of the message. This seems to have been thepremise of Freud's early treatments where he would didactically explain
the dreams of his patients and their symptoms as, for example, in the caseof Dora. However, as Freud quickly learned, not only did such didactic
explanations have little impact on the symptom or in transforming therelationship of the subject to the Other, but in certain instances, suchas in the case of Dora, it actually led patients to flee the analytic setting.
Somehow a practice had to be devised that allowed the analysands to arriveat these discoveries for themselves, and the reason for this revolves around
how information functions in closed systems.
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues thatthe end of analysis consists in traversing the fantasy and separating fromthe desire of the Other. In light of the foregoing, we are now in a position
to understand what Lacan is getting at with these proposals. Traversing the
fantasy consists in a shift in perspective from relating to the Other in termsof first-order observation through the fantasy to second-order observationof the fantasy. The analysand shifts from making indications based on the
distinctions drawn by the fantasy, to observing how he or she observes; that190 Levi R. Bryant

is, observing the fantasy itself. Accompanying this shift is a realization of
the contingency of the manner in which the fantasy has drawn distinctions
or how the analysand might be mistaken about the Other's desire. In otherwords, the analysand is confronted with the enigma of the Other's desire
and thereby freed from the unconscious belief that the Other is making
a specific demand of the subject. Accompanying this shift is a separationfrom the desire of the Other. Where first-order observation based on fantasy
creates the impression that it is the Other itself that is making a specificdemand, the shift towards second-order observation reveals the manner inwhich the subject's fantasy formatted perturbations from the Other in sucha way as to transform them into a specific demand. Like Harry Angel in
Alan Parker's Angel Heart, the analysand discovers that what he took to be
the Other's demand was his desire all along.223 At this point, the analysand
is in a position to avow his desire, which, in turn, is often accompanied by aquite significant shift in how the subject relates to his or her symptom.
Yet how is this shift accomplished within the psychoanalytic setting?
This shift is brought about by the manner in which the analyst conducts
herself. As has often been remarked, the analyst is an enigmatic andimpassive figure who seldom responds to the analysand. Lacan goes so
far as to compare the position of the analyst with playing dead. As Lacan
remarks, “the analyst concretely intervenes in the dialectic of analysis byplaying dead—by 'cadaverizing' his position, as the Chinese say—either by
his silence where he is the Other with a capital O, or by canceling out his
own resistance where he is the other with a lowercase o”.224 This activity ofplaying dead serves the important function of confronting the analysandwith the enigma of the Other's desire. Where the analysand expects theanalyst to say something, thereby giving him a framework by which totransform this enigma of the Other's desire into a specific demand thatthe analysand can then satisfy or thwart, the analyst instead presents theanalysand with a blank screen, thereby bringing the analysand before an
inscrutable desire or a question: What does the Other want? In the earlysessions of my own analysis, for example, I recall asking my analyst how
he was doing at the beginning of my sessions or would inquire about some
aspect of an article that he had recently published. My analyst would
respond with utter silence that would then be punctuated with a drawn outChapter 4: The Interior of Objects

191“so?” inviting me to begin free associating. In this way, the analyst gave me
no foothold to transform his desire into a demand. Whatever I began talking
about issued from me and me alone rather than taking place as a response
to a demand. This impassivity of the analyst's position thus graduallybrings the analysand before the manner in which he or she projects certain
demands on to the Other. Insofar as the analyst makes no specific demands
beyond the demand to free associate, the analysand increasingly becomesaware of the manner in which the Other makes a specific demand of him
issues from himself rather than the Other. In this way, he gradually traverses
the fantasy, coming to see how he throws the net of fantasy over the Other
as a way of transforming the enigma of desire into demand.
However, it would be a mistake to suppose that the analyst merelysits there quietly. The analyst does ask questions and make remarks. Yet
the remarks that the analyst makes are generally of an enigmatic andpolysemous nature, amenable to a variety of different interpretations.
Lacanian interpretation does not tell an analysand what such and suchmeans, but is rather an enigmatic and polysemous speech-act on the partof the analyst wherein the analysand or the patient creates the meaning.
In this respect, one way of understanding Lacanian interpretation is assystematic misinterpretation. A properly psychoanalytic interpretation does
not register that the analyst has understood—this would reinforce thebelief that information is transmitted between closed systems—but rather
works on the statements of the analysand in a surprising way that creates
new meaning. Returning to the example from the last section, when myanalyst intoned “pressure at the board”, this statement systematicallymisinterpreted my discourse and upset my anticipations by taking thediscourse I was articulating around physiology and physics (placing too
much pressure on the chalk) and formulated a polysemous statement thatsimultaneously articulated these points about physics and physiology while
also transforming the meaning in such a way as to indicate my pressure andanxiety at the board.
This particular form or practice of interpretation serves two importantfunctions within the clinical setting. On the one hand, insofar as theinterpretation is never quite what the analysand expects and insofar as
it always slightly misinterprets what the analysand is saying, it becomes

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Levi R. Bryant

an event capable of producing information or resonance within theanalysand. That is, it functions as an event capable of selecting new
system-states. Where an interpretation that merely indicates the analyst
has understood produces no new information (information repeated is nolonger information), the minimal surprise embodied in a psychoanalyticinterpretation carries the possibility of generating new meaning andredrawing distinctions that structure the analysand's experience of theworld. As such, it becomes possible to shift the symptom into new basinsof attraction that might be far less painful for the subject. On the other
hand, insofar as the interpretation seems to misunderstand the analysand,it systematically undermines the analysand's deeply held belief that hehas access to the Other, thereby assisting in the process of separationfrom the Other.
This brief gloss on Lacanian practice hardly does justice to the depth
and complexity of Lacanian theory. I have, for example, said nothing
about the objet a, jouissance, the various subject-structures, the imaginary,
symbolic, and the real, and so on. However, my point is that if Lacan isright, then the quandaries the neurotic subject finds himself in follow
directly from the ontological withdrawal of objects and their operational
closure as systems. The quandaries of the neurotic subject are quandaries
that emerge when psychic systems are coupled to other operationally closed
systems such as the social system into which they are born and relations toother people. The subject wonders what their place is in the social system,
what they are for the social system, and what they are for other people.
Yet because systems are operationally closed, because psychic systems areboth outside other psychic systems and exist only in the environment of thesocial system, there is no univocal answer to these questions. The symptom
and the fantasy are ways in which this dilemma is navigated. This is true
even where the symptom has an organic foundation in, for example, theneurology of the analysand, for the psychic system must still give these
perturbations coming from within its own internal environment a meaning.
Lacanian theory and practice gives us insight into just what is entailed by
the withdrawal of objects, how this withdrawal is organized, and the reality
effect produced as a function of the way in which objects construct theiropenness to their environment.

Chapter 5
Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure
The final step in the integration of developmental biology
into evolution is to incorporate the organism as itself a causeof its own development, as a mediating mechanism by which
external and internal factors influence its future.
— R. Lewontin225

Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full ofplants, and as a pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant,
each limb of an animal, each drop of its humors, is still
another such garden or pond.
— G.W. Leibniz226

5.1. Constraints
In Critical Environments, Cary Wolfe, a strong defender of Luhmann's
systems theory, develops an important critique of autopoietic theory. As
Wolfe writes,
We might say [...] that Luhmann's “blind spot”, his
unobservable constitutive distinction, is his unspoken
distinction between “differentiation” and what historicist,194 Levi R. Bryant

materialist critique has theorized as “contradiction”, ablind spot that manifests itself in Luhmann's inability or
unwillingness to adequately theorize the discrepancy between
the formal equivalence of observers in his epistemology andtheir real lack of equivalence on the material, social plane.
It seems that the category of contradiction—insofar as it
names precisely this difference—proves much more difficult
to dispose of than Luhmann's systems theory imagines. Or
rather—to put a somewhat finer point on it—it is disposed ofby systems theory, but only “abstractly”, as Marxist theorists
like to say, only in thought, but not in historical, material
practice.227
In point of fact, this shortcoming of autopoietic theory arises not simply
with respect to social relations, but rather besets all discussions of exorelations with respect to objects. In its focus on the operational closure ofobjects, the self-regulation and self-production of objects, and the mannerin which objects constitute their own information, autopoietic theory tends
towards a utopianism that ignores material constraints on the activity ofobjects when objects enter into exo-relations with other objects. In its
emphasis on the closure of objects, autopoietic theory often tends towards apicture of objects in which they are completely self-determining and therefore
entirely sovereign. Each object is treated as an observer that observes
the world through its own distinctions, and all observers are treated asabsolutely equal. For example, we encounter Luhmann saying that objects
cannot be dominated. What is missed here, however, are inequalities among
objects that emerge as a result of how they are related to other objects
in networks.
In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx observes that,“[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please;
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but undercircumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past”.228 What
Marx says here is true not only of human actors, but also of all nonhumanactors. In many of its formulations, autopoietic theory threatens to invert
this thesis. That is, autopoietic theory tends towards a characterization of
the world in which entities not only make their own history, but make theirChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure195

own history in conditions of their own making. What we get here is a sort ofradical idealism, where every entity, by virtue of its operational closure,fully constructs its own world. As Paul Bains articulates it in The Primacyof Semiosis,
There are nothing but interpretations. Maturana contends
that reality as a universe of independent entities is a fiction of
the descriptive domain and that the notion of reality should
be applied to this domain of descriptions in which we, thedescribing system, interact with our descriptions as if withindependent entities.229
As a consequence, Bains continues, “we can begin to see that
Maturana and Varela oscillate between realist claims about the natureof the individuality of autopoietic systems independent of an observer
and idealist and phenomenological claims wherein thought is not able tohave a real relation with something other than itself”.230 Do Maturana
and Varela contend merely that we cannot have a direct relation withother objects, or are they making the more radical claim that each object
constructs all other objects? The two claims are very different. The firstclaim is broadly consistent with the claims of object-oriented philosophy
and onticology, insofar as both hold that all objects withdraw from one
another, encountering each other only on conditions of closure. The second
claim seems to lead to incoherence in that it is not clear how there cansimultaneously be no independent reality and be entities that construct
other entities. In other words, minimally autopoietic theory requires theindependent reality and existence of entities doing the construction.
However, the more significant problem with autopoietic systems
theory is that in its focus on the internal functioning of the entity, it tends
towards a conception of entities that carry out their functions in a purely
frictionless space, where each entity is a complete sovereign encounteringno constraints from the world around it. It is one thing, following
Aristotle, to defend the autonomy and independence of substance. It isquite another to argue that this autonomy and independence of substanceentails that when substances enter into exo-relations with other objects they
nonetheless remain completely unconstrained. The absurdity of the thesis

196 Levi R. Bryant

that there are no independent objects can be discerned by simply reversing
Maturana and Varela's claims about observation. Are Maturana and Varela
prepared to claim that they are constructed by the observations of anotherautopoietic system such as the tardigrade? If not, why? And if they do grant
independent existence to themselves, why do they not follow Bhaskar in
granting a similar autonomous existence to other objects? What we need isan account of exo-relations capable of doing justice to both the closure andwithdrawal of objects as well as the constraints that other objects exercise
on withdrawn objects.
In this connection, we can ask ourselves how it is possible for objects
to be constrained despite their autonomy, independence, and selfdetermination. In many respects, it is the distinction between virtual proper
being and local manifestation, coupled with the concept of regimes of
attraction that allows us to theorize these constraints. For while, in theirvirtual proper being, objects withdraw from any of their actualizations inlocal manifestations, while every object always contains a reserve excess
over and above its local manifestations, nonetheless local manifestations
are often highly constrained by the exo-relations an object enters into withother objects in a regime of attraction.
The key point not to be missed is that while objects are only selectively
open to their environments, this doesn't entail that objects are free to do
whatever they might like with their environments. In the case of autopoietic
systems, for example, the distinctions which organize a system's relation
to its environment are more or less anticipations, selecting events that are
relevant to the ongoing autopoiesis of the system. However, as anticipations,these distinctions can be disappointed and those disappointments play a rolein the subsequent development of the system. What we need is a modelof exo-relations that allows us to thematize these complex exo-relations
between system and environment. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuzeremarks that,
A living being is not only defined genetically, by the
dynamisms which determine its internal milieu, but also
ecologically, by the external movements which preside overits distribution within an extensity. A kinetics of populationadjoins, without resembling, the kinetics of the egg; aChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure197

geographic process of isolation may be no less formativeof species than internal genetic variations, and sometimes
precede the latter. Everything is even more complicatedwhen we consider that the internal space is itself made up
of multiple spaces which must be locally integrated andconnected, and that this connection, which may be achievedin many ways, pushes the object or living being to its own
limits, all in contact with the exterior; and that this relation
with the exterior, and with other things and living beings,
implies in turn connections and global integrations which
differ in kind from the preceding.231
Deleuze here presents us with a model of objects in which thedevelopment of objects unfolds in a relation between three environments.
In the case of the organism, there is the internal environment defined by
the genes of the organism. In addition to the internal environment of theorganism, there is the external environment of the organism defined byrelations to other organisms and entities out there in the world. Finally,
there is what we might call the “horizontal” environment of the organism,
consisting of the internal parts of the organism and the pressures they place
on one another requiring integration. When we think this threefold relation
between environments, we must not forget the dimension of time andinteractivity among these different domains. Development, which continues
throughout the entire life of the organism, unfolds interactively and in thedimension of time, such that events in one of these environments impact
events in other environments, actualizing them in aleatory ways.
Missing in Deleuze's mapping of developmental relations, however,is a role for the agent itself in its own construction. Formulated in termsof Kenneth Burke's pentad, Deleuze's map of development is all scene
with no agent. Rather, the agent (object) ends up becoming an effectof the dynamics taking place in the scene (the interactions among theenvironments). Deleuze's mapping of exo-relations thus points us in theright direction for thinking constraints or relations of dependency in local
manifestations, but suffers from treating the agent or object as a mereeffect of these relations rather than granting the agent a causal role inthese developmental processes. In my view, developmental systems theory

198 Levi R. Bryant(DST) provides the resources for navigating the radical constructivism of
autopoietic theory where each object is a sovereign constructing all otherobjects, and the extreme “environmentalism” of Deleuze's mapping of
ecological relations where the object is merely an effect of relations between
internal, horizontal, and external environments.
Although the focus of DST has revolved around debates indevelopmental biology, it nonetheless provides us with a general modelof how objects behave in regimes of attraction or within fields of exorelations to other objects. DST research has focused primarily on
nature/nurture debates within biology and the social sciences, strongly
contesting models of genetics that treat genes as blueprints pre-delineating
the eventual form that the phenotype (what I would call the “local
manifestation”) of an organism will take. In her early groundbreaking work,
The Ontogeny of Information, for example, Susan Oyama shows that whilemainstream biology gives lip service to the interactionist hypothesis thatthe development of the phenotype results from the interaction between
genes and environment, nonetheless biologists tend to discuss genes as
already containing information that presides over the development of thephenotype as a sort of map. In contrast to this, DST theorists argue that,
information “in the genes” or “in the environment” is notbiologically relevant until it participates in the phenotypicprocesses. It becomes meaningful in the organism only as it isconstituted as “information” by its developmental system. The
result is not more information but significant information.232
Along the lines I argued in the last chapter, information is not
something that exists out there in the world, but is rather something thatis constituted and constructed. There is no pre-existent information in theenvironment, nor can it be said, in the context of genes, that genes alreadycontain information. Rather, events that take place in the developmentof the organism, cell development, and protein production themselves
have an effect on how genes are actualized and the activation of particulargenes also impacts how other genes are actualized or set in motion. As aconsequence, while genes are indeed a causal factor, they cannot be said toconstitute a map or blueprint of the organism.

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199

In the introduction to Cycles of Contingency—a collection of articles bydevelopmental systems biologists and theorists—Oyama, Griffiths, andGray outline six basic themes of DST research:
1. Joint determination by multiple causes—every
trait is produced by the interaction of many
developmental resources.
2. The gene/environment dichotomy is only one of many
ways to divide up interactants.
3. Context sensitivity and contingency—the significance of
any one cause is contingent upon the state of the rest of
the system.
4. Extended inheritance—an organism inherits a wide rangeof resources that interact to construct that organisms
life cycle.
5. Development as construction—neither traits nor
representations of traits are transmitted to offspring.
Instead, traits are made—reconstructed—in development.
6. Distributed control—no one type of interactant controls
development.
7. Evolution as construction—evolution is not a matterof organisms or populations being molded by theirenvironments, but of organism-environment systems
changing over time.233
Here it is important to note that developmental systems theorists use
the term “system” in a different way than I have been using it up to thispoint. For the DST's, the organism-environment relation constitutes adevelopmental system. By contrast, within the framework of autopoietic
theory, systems are one side of a distinction between system andenvironment.
Despite these differences, however, there are strong points of resonancebetween the autopoietic conception of systems and that advocated bydynamic systems theorists. Like autopoietic theorists, DST emphasizes the200

Levi R. Bryant

manner in which organisms construct their environment. The constructionof the environment does not simply consist in the construction of things
such as ant nests and bird nests, but also involves the way in whichorganisms are selectively open to their environments. As biologist Richard
Lewontin observes,
Organisms determine what is relevant. While stones arepart of a thrush's environment, tree bark is a part of awoodpecker's, and the undersides of leaves part of a warbler's.
It is the life activities of these birds that determine whichparts of the world, physically accessible to all of them, areactually parts of their environments.234
In short, environments cannot be treated as something that is simply
given or there such that the organism subsequently fills a niche that
already existed in the environment. Rather, organisms take an active rolein constructing their environment, both through determining relevancies
in the environment and through actively changing their environment
through activities like building nests. In terms of autopoietic theory, systems(organisms/objects) determine that to which they are open or what isrelevant in the world about them. In other words, there is no such thing as
an “environment as such”. Rather, we can only discover what constitutes
the environment of an organism through a second-order observation of how
the organism relates to the world around them.
A central axiom of traditional evolutionary biology is that “the organism
proposes and the environment disposes”. Here the theory runs that randomvariations within the population of a species are proposed as various
solutions to the problem of the environment. Individual organisms areproposed as various solutions to the problem posed by the environment.
The premise of such a thesis is that the environment is something there,
present-at-hand, that the organism must adapt to. This thesis, however,
becomes significantly complicated when we recognize that organisms
construct their own environments. Here the organism can no longer betreated as a passive object, such that genes and the environment are thesubjects forming this object, but rather the organism itself becomes a“subject” that plays a role both in how its genes are actualized and howChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 201

its environment is constructed. This does not entail that the organism is asovereign acting without constraint in a purely smooth space it can define atwill, but it does entail a far more active role on the part of the organism inthese processes.
Lewontin goes so far in this line of thought as to argue that species
actually co-construct one another. As Lewontin remarks,
It might be objected that the notion of organisms constructing
their environments leads to absurd results. After all, hares do
not sit around constructing lynxes! But in the most importantsense they do. First, the biological properties of lynxes arepresumably in part a consequence of selection for catching
prey of a certain size and speed, i.e., hares. Second, lynxes are
not part of the environment of moose while they are of hares,
because of biological differences between moose and hares.235
Part of the reason lynxes are as they are has to do with how theproperties of hares and other similar creatures have constructed them.
In other words, those lynxes that were more adept at catching the speedy
hare were more likely to reproduce. Likewise, we can say that hares areconstructed by lynxes and other similar organisms.
One of the central themes in DST is the concept of extended
inheritance. Where traditional evolutionary biology tends to treat genes
as the only thing inherited by organisms, thereby leading to the neoDarwinist thesis that genes are the true units of natural selection, DST
emphasizes, how, in addition to genes, all sorts of environmental factors
are selected as well. Ant larvae, for example, inherit the nest and traces ofpheromones built and left by other ants. These inheritances play a role inthe development of the organism’s phenotype, determining, for example,
what type of ant the larvae will become (worker ant, soldier ant, and soon). Needless to say, these are non-genetic inheritances. Likewise, humans
inherit culture, infrastructure, practices, and so on.
Observations such as these lead DST to defend parity in explanations
and to remodel the concept of natural selection. Parity reasoning is a formof reasoning in which the theorist refuses to grant one sort of agency—
for example, genes –control of development. Rather, parity reasoning

202

Levi R. Bryantemphasizes distributed causality, where a variety of different causal factors
contribute to the development of the phenotype. The thesis here is notthat all causal factors contribute equally to the local manifestation of thephenotype or organism, but that the interaction or interplay of a variety
of different causal factors play a role in the local manifestation of theentity. This has real consequences for how research is conducted in bothbiology and the social sciences. In biology, for example, we might conduct
experiments where we keep the environment constant to see what effects
this has on the phenotype, but also conduct experiments where we vary
the environment while keeping the genes constant to see what effects theseshifts have on the phenotype.
Returning to some themes from the introduction, we saw how a gooddeal of contemporary theory focuses on the subject's and culture's relation
to the world. Within this framework, the framework of representation, thesubject falls in the marked space of the grounding distinction of thought.
Beneath the subject or culture, we find a sub-distinction referring tocontent that leads us to focus on signs, signifiers, and representations. While
clearly signs, signifiers, and representations play an important role in how
human relations come to be organized, we can see how parity reasoning
would lead us to expand the focus of our analyses in the social sciences
and in social and political thought. Jared Diamond, for example, raises thequestion of why Western Culture has enjoyed such a dominant position
throughout world history.236 Why, for example, did the West conquer theAmericas, rather than the Americas conquer the West? If we begin from thestandpoint of the subject and culture, thereby indicating signs, signifiers,
and representations as our sub-distinction, we are led to explain thesecultural differences based on something unique to Western systems ofrepresentation or narratives that allowed the West to conquer other groups.
For example, we follow Heidegger in asserting something unique andsingular about the “Greek event”, or perhaps we follow the theology of
Radical Orthodoxy promoted by figures such as John Milbank, locating afundamental historical break for humanity in the “Christian event”.
Through careful analysis, however, Jared Diamond emphasizes theenvironmental differences between different cultures and the advantages
and disadvantages these created for various people. Thus, for example,

Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure203

Diamond contends that there were few animals fit for domestication in
the Americas. This had a profound impact on how Eurasian and American
populations developed. Because Eurasian populations had far moredomesticated animals, there was also a much higher degree of cross-species
germ development in Eurasian history. This meant that Eurasians not only
developed greater immunity to disease, but also had far more diseases
in the environment. One reason European conquest of the Americas
was so unilateral was precisely because there were a variety of diseases
moving from Europe to the Americas without the reverse movementfrom the Americas to Europe. As a consequence, tens of thousands ofNative Americans died, rendering the European conquest far easier inthe long run. Again, the point here is not that semiotic differences makeno difference, nor that disease alone (Diamond explores a variety ofgeographical factors) completely explain such brutal events. The pointis that when we draw distinctions in particular ways, certain phenomena
and causal factors become completely invisible. Diamond practices an
exemplary form of parity reasoning in exploring these geographical factors.
Continental social and political thought and theory needs to do a muchbetter job in exploring the role played by non-semiotic actants such as
natural resources, the presence or absence of power lines, road distributions
and connections, whether or not cable internet connections are available,
and so on, in their exploration of why certain social formations take theform they do.
Insofar as it is not simply genes that are inherited, but environments aswell, it follows that natural selection must operate not only at the level ofthe organism or genes, but at the level of environments too. Here we mustrecall that many organisms quite literally construct their environments,
building nests and so on. Those constructed environments that confer anadvantage in the reproduction of the organism will tend to be selected
and passed on through generations. Here it's worth recalling that Darwin
nowhere specifies what the mechanism of inheritance is, only that inorder for natural selection to take place there must be inheritance. Thereis thus no reason to suppose that genes alone are the sole mechanism ofinheritance. Constructed environments such as ant nests and culture arealso forms of inheritance. In their article, “Darwinism and Developmental

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Levi R. Bryant

Systems”, Griffiths and Gray give a striking example of such environmental
inheritance (and a number of other examples as well). As Griffiths andGray observe,
Certain aphid species reliably pass on their endosymbiotic
Buchnera bacteria from the maternal symbiont mass toeither eggs or developing embryo. The bacteria enable theiraphid hosts to utilize what would otherwise be nutritionally
unsuitable host plants. Aphids that have been treated with
antibiotics to eliminate the bacteria are stunted in growth,
reproductively sterile, and die prematurely.237
The point here is that the Buchnera bacteria is not a part of the aphid's
genome, but nonetheless plays a significant role in the development of
the phenotype. Far from the genes already containing information in
the form of a blueprint of what the organism will turn out to be, genes
are one developmental causal factor among a variety of others. The
phenotype is plastic in the sense that it can take on a variety of different
forms. Here it goes without saying that the plasticity of the phenotype isn't
entirely without constraint. The organism-environment system indeed
constrains the development of the phenotype in a variety of ways, defining
a topological space of possible variations. What's important here is thatthe information presiding over the genesis of the phenotype is something
constructed in the process of development from a variety of factors, and,moreover, the qualities that the organism comes to embody are not locatedalready in the organism in a virtual or implicit form, but are rather new
creations in the process of development.
In light of the foregoing, we are now in a position to theorize theemergence of constraints within an onticological and object-oriented
philosophical framework. The whole problem arises from the mannerin which objects are operationally closed and the manner in which they
constitute their own environment through their distinctions, definingthat to which they are open and that to which they are not open. This, inturn, leads to Luhmann's thesis that objects can neither be dominated nor
controlled. However, while objects indeed constitute their own openness totheir environment, it does not follow from this that objects control or createChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 205

their own environment. Here we will recall that the environment is always
more complex than the object or system that unifies the environment
through a determination of what is and is not relevant to it. Moreover, while
openness to the environment arises from the manner in which the object
or system is organized, this openness does not determine which events takeplace in the environment. Were this the case, then each substance would becontrolling or “dominating” the other substances or systems that exist in
its environment. Just as other substances in a substance's environment can
only perturb the substance without determining what information events
will be produced on the basis of these perturbations, the most the substancecan do is attempt to perturb other substances without being able to control
what sort of information-events are produced in the other substances. And
these attempted perturbations can always, of course, fail. My three-year-old
daughter, for example, might yell at her toy box when she bumps into it, yet
the toy box continues on its merry way quite literally unperturbed.
Everything turns on recognizing that, while objects construct theiropenness to their environment, they do not construct the events that takeplace in their environment. When Luhmann observes that objects cannot
be controlled or dominated, his point is not that objects are completely
free sovereigns capable of creating whatever reality they might like, butrather that any event that perturbs them will be “interpreted” in terms of
the system’s own organization. As a consequence, objects cannot be steered
from the outside. However, the events that do or do not take place in theenvironment of an object and to which the object is open nonetheless playa tremendously significant role in the local manifestations of which theobject is capable. We see a significant example of this in the case of Griffith
and Gray's aphids, where the presence or absence of the Buchnera bacteria
makes a significant difference in the formation of the aphid's phenotype.
Those other objects and events in the environment of the object define a
regime of attraction with respect to the object, creating regularities in thelocal manifestation of the object and producing constraints on what local
manifestations are possible.
Regimes of attraction should thus be thought as interactive networks
or, as Timothy Morton has put it, meshes that play an affording andconstraining role with respect to the local manifestations of objects.

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Depending on the sorts of objects or systems being discussed, regimes
of attraction can include physical, biological, semiotic, social, andtechnological components. Within these networks, hierarchies or subnetworks can emerge that constrain the local manifestations available toother nodes or entities within the network. Thus, for example, government
officials and high ranking business leaders such as CEO's have access toboth contacts and business information that gives them an advantage inthe capture of wealth and power. This appropriation of wealth and power
leads, in its turn, to an absence of resources for those without this access.
As a consequence, local manifestations at less “connected” levels of thesocial sphere are severely limited in terms of what is possible for them inmuch the same way that aphids without access to the Buchnera bacteria
develop in a particular way. While the particular texture of a regime of
attraction does not determine what an object will become or be because suchactualizations depend on the organization of the object in question, they
can play a significant role in limiting what local manifestations are possible
for an object.
Similarly, in another context, Marx discusses the manner in which therepetitive activity of factory work has the effect of de-skilling the worker anddampening his or her cognitive abilities.238 Without going into too muchdetail, the factory form arises, in part, as a consequence of the developmentof wage-labor and the necessity it engendered for diminishing the cost of
production so as to maximize the production of surplus-value. The paradoxof the factory form is that through de-skilling labor as a result of highly
specialized and rote, repetitive activity, the laborer becomes increasingly
dependent on the wage-labor system that divests him of control of his
own life and circumstance, reinforcing the very system that limits his own
freedom. The knowledge and skills are lost that would allow him to do othertasks. As a result, he becomes trapped in the factory system in part throughhis own actions. Technology here plays a central role in both this de-skilling
and the diminution of cognitive ability as a result of endless repetitive
activities that require little thought or skill. As such, wage-labor, the factory,
and technologies function as a regime of attraction that deeply influence
local manifestations at both the societal level (the texture that society takeson) and at the individual level of the worker. Different activities, regimes

Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 207

of attraction, and modes of production might lead to very different local
manifestations at the cognitive and affective level.
Within this context, one of the central roles of social and political theory
ought to be the cartography of regimes of attraction. This cartography
consists in mapping those networks of objects that play a significant role in
the production of local manifestations at the level of individuals, groups,
and the texture of societies at large. Through such cartographies, it becomes
possible to strategically locate those places where bifurcation points within
the social system are available, allowing for the possibility of new local
manifestations at the level of individuals and society. In this regard, Marx
was an exemplary cartographer. In Capital, at least, Marx did not use“society” and “class” as explanatory variables, but instead mapped theregimes of attraction within particular historical settings precisely to explain
why society takes the form it does and how class structures come to exist as
they do. However, in his cartography of the social sphere, Marx sought tomap not only existing social relations, but also virtual social tendencies aswell. That is, Marx sought to locate those tensions and lines of flight within
existing social structures to determine where change might be taking place
and where new forms of social organization might be emerging. Through aknowledge of regimes of attraction, the attractors that organize them, andthe bifurcation points to which they are susceptible, it becomes possible tostrategize practices that might intensify and accelerate these processes. The
presence of a bifurcation point is no guarantee that a system will shift into
a new basin of attraction. Consequently, cartography, a cartography of thevirtual, becomes an indispensable dimension of practice, providing us withresources for determining how to activate these bifurcation points.
Above all, we must avoid the conclusion that regimes of attraction
determine the local manifestations of objects or entities. While regimes
of attraction play a significant role in the form that local manifestations
take, objects are not merely effects of regimes of attraction. When objects
enter into exo-relations with other objects, these other objects certainly
perturb the object in a variety of ways, influencing its local manifestations,but objects, and above all, autopoietic objects, are also causes and actors
in the world. A cat that finds that the heat of the fire in the fireplace is a
bit too hot does not merely sit there and roast, but rather gets up, paces

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back and forth a bit, and finds a place to sit more amenable to its desired
temperature. In this way, the cat takes an active role in modulating the
production of its local manifestations in relation to the milieu in which it
finds itself. Likewise, beavers construct imposing dams, creating optimal
environments for themselves to live in. While the regimes of attraction
we find ourselves enmeshed in might constrain us in a number of ways,
through our movement and action we have the ability to act on theseregimes of attraction, construct our environments, and therefore modify
the circumstances in which we find ourselves. We are not simply acted uponby regimes of attraction, but act on them as well. Given the unpredictable
nature of other actors, however, the question revolves around which form ofaction might be most conducive to enhancing our existence.

5.2. Parts and Wholes:
The Strange Mereology of Object-Oriented Ontology
Within Continental philosophy and theory, a lot of mischief has beencaused as a result of failing to carefully think through issues of mereology
or the relationship between parts and wholes. This has especially been thecase for bodies of social and political thought deeply influenced by the
structuralist turn arising out of Lévi-Strauss and a variety of other Frenchthinkers. In its focus on social structure as a totalizing relational system
without an outside, structuralism created a crisis in French social andpolitical thought, raising questions as to how any sort of agency or socialchange is possible. For if structure consists in differential or oppositional
relations between elements and elements cannot be said to exist
independent of their relations, then the question emerges of how any action
whatsoever is possible that doesn't merely reproduce the social structure.
Matters were further complicated in the tendency of structuralism to treat
the subject as an effect of impersonal and collective structures that function
according to their own pulse and rhythm. In this connection, who canforget Althusser's pronouncements concerning the subject in “Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses”? There Althusser remarks that,the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but
at the same time and immediately I add that the category of theChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 209

subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has
the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals
as subjects. In the interaction of this double constitution
exists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being nothing
but its functioning in the material forms of existence of thatfunctioning.239
Althusser's pronouncements about the subject immediately generated acrisis in French social and political theory, generating, in subsequent years,
a series of responses from both his students and those deeply influenced byhis thought and conception of the social.
In many respects, the problem is quite simple. If the subject is bothconstitutive of ideology and constituted by ideology, and if ideology is
the means by which the social system “reproduces the conditions of
production”,240 then it would appear that social and political thought isunable to account for how it is possible for social change to take place. This
problem emerges from the relational conception of the social developed
within the various structuralist frameworks. Insofar as the relations
constituting structure are themselves internal relations in which all elements
are constituted by their relations, it follows that there can be no external
point of purchase from which structure could be transformed. As anelement of structure, this would hold for the subject as well. Like anythingelse within the social system, the subject would necessarily be differentiallyconstituted by the relations making up social structure.
With these grim pronouncements, a desperate search began tofind a free or void point within structure, a point not overdeterminedby the differential relations constituting social structure, such that thetranscendental condition under which change is possible could bearticulated. Surprisingly, the theoretical resources for such an account werealready suggested in the early work of Lévi-Strauss. In his early Introduction
to the Work of Marcel Mauss, Lévi-Strauss's theorization of the concept ofmana suggested the existence of a paradoxical feature of structure that issimultaneously internal to structure and undetermined by structure. As
Lévi-Strauss observes,

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always and everywhere, those types of notions [mana],
somewhat like algebraic symbols, occur to represent anindeterminate value of signification, in itself devoid of
meaning and thus susceptible of receiving any meaning at all;their sole function is to fill a gap between the signifier andthe signified, or, more exactly, to signal the fact that in such a
circumstance, on such an occasion, or in such a one of their
manifestations, a relationship of non-equivalence becomes
established between signifier and signified, to the detriment of
the prior complementary relationship.241
Further on, Lévi-Strauss goes on to remark that,
I believe that notions of the mana type, however diverse they
may be, and viewed in terms of their most general function[...] represent nothing more or less than that floating signifier
which is the disability of all finite thought (but also the suretyof all art, all poetry, every mythic and aesthetic invention),even though scientific knowledge is capable, if not of
staunching it, at least of controlling it partially.242
To this list we can add politics. What this floating signifier suggested
was the possibility of a void point within structure, a point of complete
indetermination, marking a space where both the social might betransformed and where the subject might exist as something more than apatient or object of social forces.
And indeed, if we look at the trajectory of subsequent French social andpolitical theory, we see a variant of precisely this option being embraced.
The later work of Althusser comes increasingly to focus on Lucretius anda discourse of the swerve and the void.243 Rancière comes to emphasize
the role of the “part of no part” as that void point within the social order(which he calls “the police”) from which the social order comes to betransformed.244 Badiou emphasizes the manner in which every structured
situation is haunted at its edge by a void where entirely novel andundecidable events can occur that a subject can then decide, inaugurating
truth-procedures that gradually change the organization of the structured
situation.245 And Žižek emphasized the unrepresentable real at the heart ofChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure211

the symbolic from whence a subject becomes possible that marks the failureof the symbolic and such that an absolute act that completely abolishes
the subject and re-creates it is open. All of these themes, developed in somany different ways, appear to be variations of the floating signifier thatsimultaneously marks the limit of the social and its infinite transformability.
Closely connected with this recognition of the void or floating
signifier that haunts every social structure was a growing awareness of thecontingency of structure. In a certain respect, the contingency of structure
had been a persistent theme of structuralist thought. Where Kant had
proposed one universal transcendental structure of the world issuing fromthe transcendental subject, structural anthropology and linguistics had
revealed a variety of different structures organized in very different ways.
However, increasingly structure came to be thought as veiling an infinite
multiplicity bubbling beneath structure without order or unity. No one
has developed this line of thought with more rigor and in greater detailthan Alain Badiou in his magnificent Being and Event. There, developing
an ontology based on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, Badiou advances
something of a dialectical ontology partitioned between what he calls
inconsistent multiplicities and consistent multiplicities. Inconsistentmultiplicities can be thought as a sort of chaos insofar as they are puremultiples without any structure or individuated entities. These multiplicities
constitute being as such or being itself. Consistent multiplicities, bycontrast, are structured and unified situations. Consistent multiplicities areformed from inconsistent multiplicities through an operation Badiou refers
to as the “count-as-one” and, by virtue of being founded in inconsistentmultiplicities, are always haunted by a chaos that bubbles just beneaththe surface. As such, any consistent multiplicity is only a contingent
organization of a situation.
It is not difficult to detect, lurking behind Badiou's ontology, the desire
to rigorously ground revolutionary social theory. One of the main ways inwhich ideology functions is through the naturalization of the social world.
In other words, ideology presents the structure and organization of thesocial world as the inevitable and natural order of things, such that otherarrangements are impossible. One major form of ideological critique has
thus historically taken the form of demonstrating the manner in which

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Levi R. Bryantsocial formations are contingent or capable of being otherwise throughmaneuvers of historicization and so on. Badiou's thought provides anontological grounding for this capacity to be otherwise. In many respects,
such a conclusion is already internal to set theory. Recall that, within theframework of set theory, sets are defined strictly through their extension
or the elements that belong to the set. Here we can distinguish between
a set and a type based on whether or not membership in the collection isdefined extensionally (by the parts that belong to it) or intensionally (bysome shared feature among the elements). The collection of all dogs, forexample, is a collection that is defined intensionally insofar as membershipin it is a function of all elements belonging to the collection sharing acommon characteristic or set of characteristics. In contrast to types, setsare collections defined purely in terms of their members, such that there isno necessity of these elements sharing a common characteristic. Nor mustthe elements of the set be ordered in any particular way. Insofar as setsare defined extensionally, the set {x, y, z} is equivalent to the set {y, z, x}.
In short, the elements of sets are non-relational or are not defined by the
relations among their elements. The point here is that if social structuresare sets, there is no one way in which they can be organized and a variety ofother forms of social organization are possible.
Initially these issues pertaining to set theory might seem remote fromissues of ideology and the naturalization of the social field. However, if
it is true that being is “set theoretical” and that, at its most fundamental
level, being consists of inconsistent multiplicities rather than consistentmultiplicities, then it also follows that any social structure is contingent in
the precise sense that relations among elements can be otherwise. From
the foregoing, this can be seen in two ways. On the one hand, because setsare defined extensionally and without any ordering relations among theelements, it follows that there is no necessary relation among the elements.
Here relations are external to their terms. Likewise, a similar point canbe made through the power set axiom in set theory. The power set axiom
allows us to take all possible subsets of a set, forming a new set out of thiscollection. Thus, for example, given a set {x, y, z}, its power set would be{{x}, {y}, {z}, {x, y}, {x, z}, {y, z}, {x, y, z}}. The power set can then be
applied recursively yet again to generate an even larger set and so on. The

Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure

213“cash value” of the power set axiom at the level of ideology critique is thatit reveals the manner in which social groupings are contingent and capableof being otherwise by being grouped in different ways. In effect, Badiou
provides an ontological “foundation” for demonstrating the contingency ofsocial relations, thereby underlining the manner in which they are always
capable of being structured otherwise.
Through this maneuver, Badiou strikes a strong blow against theinternalism of structuralism. Structuralism had argued that all relations
are strictly internal to their elements, such that elements cannot be said
to have any existence independent of their relations. Through an ontology
of inconsistent multiplicities coupled with an account of the externalityof relations, Badiou is able to show that while elements do indeed enter
into temporary relations with one another, these relations are always andeverywhere necessarily contingent and capable of being otherwise. As such,
Badiou significantly broadens the possibility of our ability to think change
within the social sphere, while also allowing us to maintain the best insightsof structuralism through his account of consistent multiplicities.
Badiou's meditations on the relationship between sets and subsets
is thoroughly mereological in character. In making claims about theextensional composition of sets (parts), Badiou underlines the manner inwhich the parts of a set are simultaneously objects in their own right while
also being parts of larger objects, to wit, the sets from which they are drawn.
What is interesting here is that the parts are not defined by their relations
to other elements in the set, but are objects of their own that can be
detached from their membership in the set. Here object-oriented ontology
and onticology find an unexpected ally with Badiou and a surprising pointof resonance. As we have already seen, Graham Harman argues that all
objects are such that there are objects wrapped in objects wrapped in
objects, such that we can simultaneously treat objects as relations among
objects and discrete units in their own right. Badiou argues—and, I might
add, argues well –that all sets are infinite in the sense that they are infinitely
decomposable. This is the dimension of inconsistent multiplicity haunting
every consistent multiplicity.
What we encounter here is what I call the “strange mereology” ofonticology and object-oriented philosophy. Mereology is that branch of

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mathematics, ontology, and logic that studies the relationship between parts
and wholes. The study of mereology is highly complex and formalized,
however onticology and object-oriented philosophy are concerned witha particular mereological relation; namely, that relation between objects
where one object is simultaneously a part of another object and an
independent object in its own right. To understand why this mereology issuch a strange mereology, we must recall that all objects are independentor autonomous from one another. Objects can enter into exo-relations with
one another, but they are not constituted by their relations. Put differently,
their being does not consist of their relations. Consequently, the strangenessof this mereology lies in the fact that the subsets of a set, the smaller objects
composing larger objects, are simultaneously necessary conditions for thatlarger object while being independent of that object. Likewise, the larger
object composed of these smaller objects is itself independent of thesesmaller objects.
Despite profound points of overlap between Badiou's mereology andthe mereology advocated by onticology and object-oriented philosophy,
there are nonetheless important points of divergence between the two
ontological frameworks. While both Badiou and onticology and objectoriented philosophy endorse an extensionalism of relations between objects,
onticology and object-oriented philosophy endorse an intensionalismof relations within individual objects. In short, objects are not merely
aggregates of other objects, but have an irreducible internal structureof their own. However, it's important to note that the intensionalism
advocated by onticology and object-oriented philosophy is not an
intensionalism revolving around a predicate shared by a plurality of objects,
but is rather an intensionalism pertaining to the relations composing theinternal relations of an object. To avoid confusion, I thus follow Graham
Harman's convention of distinguishing between “domestic relations” and“foreign relations”. Domestic relations are relations that structure theinternal being of an object and correspond to what I have called “endorelations” in chapter 3. Foreign relations, by contrast, are relations an
object enters into with another object and which I have referred to as“exo-relations”. Foreign relations are external to objects in the sense that
objects are not constituted by exo-relations and can be detached from theseChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 215

relations. Of course, such detachment can also bring about less than happy
local manifestations. If I am launched into outer space by a giant catapult
without any sort of life-support suit, I will undergo a local manifestationthat freezes me solid and kills me. Domestic relations, by contrast, arethose relations that constitute the internal being of an object, its internal
structure, and therefore the essence of an object.
Where Badiou sees sets or objects as possessing only foreign relations
among the elements composing the set—e.g., {x, y, z} is equivalent to{y, x, z}—onticology and object-oriented philosophy insist that objects
contain domestic relations such that their elements cannot be related
in any old way. I will have more to say about this in the next section,
but for the moment it is sufficient to note that Badiou's account of therelationship between inconsistent and consistent multiplicities generates
special problems for his ontology. I have already discussed some of these
problems in the first chapter when addressing those ontologies that argue
that being is composed of chaos or a one-All that is then subsequently
carved up into units. A similar problem emerges with respect to Badiou's
ontology concerning the question of just how the transition frominconsistent multiplicities without unity or one to consistent multiplicities
that are unified such that “one-ification” takes place. To explain thistransition from inconsistent multiplicity to consistent multiplicity, Badiou
refers to operations of the “count-as-one”. These operations somehow
effect both a selection and a unification of elements within the field ofinconsistent multiplicity, producing consistent multiplicities. Two questions
emerge here: first, what is the agency that carries out this operation, andsecond, exactly how does this agency accomplish this feat of both making
selections from the field of inconsistent multiplicity and producing unified
collections? Despite the advancements of Logics of Worlds, it is my view thatthe answers to these two questions are significantly underdetermined in
Badiou's ontology.
By contrast, object-oriented ontology begins with the premise that theworld is composed of distinct entities or units, each of which has its own
internal structure or set of endo-relations. The twist is that larger scale
objects can emerge from smaller scale objects and larger scale objects arecomposed of smaller objects. Similarly, larger scale objects can break apart

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into a plurality of other independent objects under certain circumstances.
Thus, while onticology maintains that there are ordering relations, domestic
relations, or endo-relations among elements within an object, it also argues
that larger scale objects contain autonomous smaller scale objects. In thisconnection, what constitutes the substantiality of a substance is not theparts that compose it, but rather the organization, domestic relations, orendo-relations presiding over the organization of these parts.
A variety of examples can be marshaled in defense of this thesis.
Organic bodies, for example, continuously lose cells and generate new cells.
Although a body cannot exist without its cells, it is clear that bodies cannot
be reduced to their cells either. What constitutes the substantiality of a body
is not its cells, but its organization or its endo-relations. This point might bereadily granted, yet someone might object that while bodies and cells are
distinct, it is a mistake to suggest that cells are independent objects in theirown right insofar as cells only exist within bodies. However, this is not true.
On the one hand, we can think of the various forms of cancer as relations
between a body and its cells in which cells have begun to act autonomously.
Likewise, organ transplants are dependent on the possibility of cells being
separated from bodies. Recently, scientists in Surrey, England have createda monstrous hybrid of organic life and machine, splicing a certain numberof rat brain neurons into a computer chip that sends radio messages to arobot that can sense the world and that develops pattern and cognitive skills
over time.246
Various forms of social relations have this structure as well. The
citizens of the United States, for example, are born, die, and sometimes
renounce their citizenship, yet the United States continues to exist.
While it is certainly true that the United States would not exist at allwithout any citizens, it cannot be equated with its citizens. Additionallythese citizens must be linked in some way. In Imagined Communities, forexample, Benedict Anderson shows how print culture, among other things,
contributed to the formation of national communities.247 My only caveat
here would be that these entities aren’t imagined, but are, once built, realentities in their own right. Moreover, the United States cannot be equatedwith a particular geography either. The United States was the UnitedStates when it was just thirteen small colonies. Similarly, were some sort ofChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 217

national catastrophe to occur, the United States would remain the UnitedStates even if located solely on an island like Hawaii, or, more radically,
even if citizens scattered all over the world maintained its existence throughthe internet. Moreover, the citizens of the United States are not just elementsof the United States, but are autonomous entities in their own right. They
can plot against the United States, seek to bring about the demise of theUnited States, renounce their citizenship, and engage in many activities not
related to how they are counted as citizens of the United States.
From a certain perspective it can thus be said that all objects area crowd. Every object is populated by other objects that it enlists inmaintaining its own existence. As a consequence, we must avoid reducing
objects to the manner in which they are enlisted by other objects precisely
because the objects enlisted are always themselves autonomous objects.
Another way of putting this would be to say that there is no harmony or
identity of parts and wholes. Parts aren't parts for a whole and the wholeisn't a whole for parts. Rather, what we have are relations of dependency
where nonetheless parts and wholes are distinct and autonomous fromone another. In this respect, we must reject the thesis of holism. Latour
remarks that when one object enlists another “the two join together andbecome one for a third [object]”.248 While I do not go as far as Latour inclaiming that every relation between objects generates a third object, theimportant point is that the object that emerges out of other objects does
not erase the objects out of which it is composed, but rather generates athird autonomous object related to these other autonomous objects. For
example, if we treat romantic relationships and friendships as objects wemust ask how many objects are before us. For the sake of simplicity, we
can say that the romantic relationship is composed not of two objects, butof three objects. Here you have the two people involved in the relationship,
as well as the amorous relationship itself. The amorous relationship isan object independent of the two persons in the amorous relationship.
While initially this sounds very strange, we should here recall how couples
talk about their relationships. They talk about being in a relationship,
about how the relationship is going well or is in a state of crisis. Likewise,friends of couples often treat couples as units, behaving as if one person
cannot be invited to dinner without inviting the other. Similarly, from a

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legal standpoint, a person is married regardless of whether or not she hasrenounced the marriage or has decided to step out on her spouse. In all ofthese cases, the relationship is an autonomous object that has an existenceover and above the persons that it enlists in its own continuing existence.
The relationship between multiples and sub-multiples or larger scale
objects and smaller scale objects is one in which sub-multiples provide
constant perturbations to multiples and where multiples perturb submultiples. Each object is an operationally closed object that relates to thesub-multiples of which it is composed or the multiples that it composes
only in terms of its own internal organization. Sub-multiples and multiples
are only “interested” in one another in terms of the perturbations they
provide for one another with respect to their own respective autopoietic
processes. The United States, for example, only relates to American citizens
qua citizens, being exclusively concerned with things such as taxes, votes,
positions on a variety of issues determining strategies for Congress andadministrations, whether or not their action is legal or illegal, and so on.
Most of the things that occupy the personal life of individual citizens arecompletely invisible to an object such as the United States and are treatedas mere noise. The United States, for example, is completely oblivious towhat I cooked for dinner last night or the fact that I am now sitting on
the floor before my computer. Put in terms of Spencer-Brown's theoryof distinctions, things like what I had for dinner last night belong to
the unmarked state of the distinctions deployed by the United States indefining its channels of openness to its environment. These are events thatcannot perturb or “irritate” the United States in its processes of producing
information.
These relations between multiples or larger scale objects and submultiples are thus relations of what Maturana and Varela refer to as“structural coupling”. As they describe this relation, “[w]e speak ofstructural coupling whenever there is a history of recurrent interactions
leading to the structural congruence between two (or more) systems”.249
In short, structural coupling is a relation in which two or more objects
constantly perturb or irritate one another, thereby making contributions to
the local manifestations of each other and the evolutionary developmentof one another. The key point here is that while these systems or objects

Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 219

perturb or irritate one another, each system relates to these perturbations
according to its own organization or closure such that we can't treat
relations between objects as simple input/output relations.
Because objects are operationally closed and are composed of otherobjects, it follows that tensions or conflicts can emerge between multiples
or larger scale objects and sub-multiples or smaller scale objects. As
Latour writes, “[n]one of the actants mobilized to secure an alliance stops
acting on its own behalf [...]. They each carry on fomenting their own
plots, forming their own groups, and serving other masters, wills, andfunctions”.250 Here it could be said that each object contends with its own
system-internal entropy arising from the surprising and dissident role that
other objects play within it. In enlisting other objects to produce them,larger scale objects must contend with the tendencies of other objects
to move in other directions and act on behalf of other aims. Each object
therefore threatens to fall apart from within, to have the endo-relations
presiding over its own organization destroyed, and therefore must develop
negative feedback mechanisms to maintain its own structural order.
For example, if a class is an object, the professor, an element or submultiple of the class, might conduct him- or herself in a way different fromhis or her prescribed role as professor, teaching nothing at all, talking about
unrelated things, relating to students in inappropriate ways, and so on. In
these circumstances, some or all of these students or perhaps administrators
might relate back to the professor in such a way as to steer him or her backto his role as a professor. Indeed, today one major administrative trend inacademia is to formulate ways of gauging the performance of professors
by selecting samples of student work as well as student evaluations. At ahigher system-specific level, these are ways in which the administrative
level increases its capacities to be “irritated” or “perturbed” by classes thatare difficult to directly observe on a day to day basis. Based on these waysof constructing openness to an inaccessible environment, administrations
devise techniques to steer faculty or introduce negative feedback into
the classroom that strive to normalize or codify academic standards andtechniques. Meanwhile, many faculty who are called upon to constructeducational rubrics for these purposes try to structure them in such a way
as to minimize the intervention of administration into their classroom

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and while appeasing the desire of administrations to have a spread sheetthat shows their institution is successfully instructing students. In otherwords, we get relations of counter-feedback where faculty attempt to steer
administrations in such a way as to keep them out of their business. In
this instance, we can see the operational closure of two distinct systems,
the classroom and administration, that do not so much communicate
with one another but rather produce very different information based on
perturbations with respect to one another.
Returning to the themes with which I began this section, we can seethat the issues of social change are far more complex than is suggested byboth structuralist thought and the heirs of structural thought. On the one
hand, I believe that Althusser and his heirs tend to over-estimate the rolethat ideology plays in reproducing the conditions of production. While it iscertainly true that “subjects” can internalize ideologies and therefore act to“reproduce the conditions of production”, the role that negative feedback
plays in larger scale objects such as social systems, coupled with problems
arising from operational closure, play at least as great a role if not a greaterrole in explaining why certain social systems tend to reproduce themselvesin such a way that they are resistant to change. Moreover, we cannot
blithely reduce subjects to effects of social structure. While social structures,
like any other system or object, indeed constitute their own elements, it
is also important to recall that they do so from other systems or objects
outside the system itself. That is, they draw on systems in their environment
as the “matter” out of which they produce their elements. However,these systems are themselves operationally closed, governed by their own
distinctions and organization, and thus can never be reduced to mereelements within a higher order system. The result, as social and politicaltheory inflected by Lacanian psychoanalysis has constantly reminded us, isthat subjectification is never complete or entirely successful. Nonetheless,within the framework of activist politics, groups, which are themselves
objects within larger scale objects such as societies, find themselves beset by
negative feedback issuing from these larger scale objects that tend to standin the way of producing the sort of change for which these groups aim.
Returning to the theme of ideology as only one element among others
explaining why social systems take the form they have, we must not forgetChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure

221

that individuals or psychic systems exist in regimes of attraction that might
severely limit or impede their capacity for action. For example, a subject
might very well know that he is getting a raw deal, that the political andsocial system within which he is enmeshed functions in such a way as todisproportionately benefit the wealthy and powerful, diminishing his wages,
quality of life, benefits, and so on. However, such a subject must also eat,
especially if he has a family, and must therefore have a job. In order tohave a job, such a subject must have a place to live so as to eat, rest and bepresentable, must have transportation, very likely requires a phone, etc.,
etc., etc. As a consequence, such a subject finds himself trapped withina regime of attraction and a form of employment that, while unsavory,is required for his existence. Taking action against such a system mightvery well amount to cutting off the very branch the person is sitting on tosustain his own existence. In this connection, I suspect that people are far
more aware of the manner in which the cards are stacked against them by
the broader social system and far less “duped” by ideology than one might
initially suspect.
Similar observations can be made with respect to how people are
dragging their feet with respect to responding to the growing environmental
crisis. Here we are trapped between an awful knowledge that theenvironment is changing in ways that might very well affect humanexistence in a radical way and a social structure that is organized in such a
way that nearly everything required for mere existence carries a significant
carbon footprint. We need some form of transportation to get to work and,absent affordable electric cars or some equivalent, are therefore trapped
within a system dependent on fossil fuels. We do not produce our own foodand, due to the de-skilling of labor that has arisen as a consequence of thefunctional differentiation of society, are largely unable to do so on a scale
necessary to sustain a family. Thus, we are dependent on food transported
by vehicles that run on fossil fuels and that is produced in a way that harms
our environment. Likewise, electricity, largely produced by fossil fuels, is
now a necessity of life. Meanwhile, the broader social system is structured
in such a way that it is very difficult to persuade politicians to change
regulatory standards for industries like trucking to invest in alternative
energies and so on because such changes would be detrimental to large

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businesses that both create jobs (which translate into votes) and whichline the pockets of politicians through the campaign contributions theyrequire to get re-elected. Closely related to this, we might note that many
politicians enter the private sector as lobbyists and consultants after theirterms of office, getting paid handsomely for the access they have to otherpoliticians and agencies. Faced with the option of low-paying activist workthat improves the world and high-paying consultant and lobbying workthat largely benefits big corporations, they tend towards the latter and most
likely are thinking about such a future while they’re in office.
Finally, questions of political change are constantly beset by issues
revolving around resonance between systems. Resonance refers to thecapacity of one system to be perturbed or irritated by another system. As
we saw in the last chapter, because systems or objects are operationallyclosed such that they only maintain selective relations to their environment,
they can only see what they can see and cannot see what they cannot
see. Most importantly, they cannot see that they cannot see this. Niklas
Luhmann has argued that modern society is functionally differentiated(legal system, media system, economic system, and so on), such that it
contains a variety of different subsystems each organized around its own
system/environment distinction within the social system. In addition tothese function systems, society is also inhabited by various groups that
become objects or systems in their own right, organized around their own
system/environment distinctions.
As a consequence of this, one of the major issues facing any collective
seeking to produce change within a social system is that of how to produce
resonance within the various subsystems in the social system. This issue
can be seen with particularly clarity in terms of how the 1999 World Trade
Organization (WTO) protests were reported by the media system in the
United States. While there was indeed a great deal of reporting on these
protests, one curious feature of this reporting in televisual media wasthat there was very little discussion of just what was being protested andwhy it was being protested in cable and network news. Rather, viewers
were presented with images of massive throngs of people and acts ofvandalism protesting the WTO, while being told little in the way of just
why these activists were protesting the WTO. The positions and complaints

Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure223

of the protestors were almost entirely absent from media coverage. As
a consequence, the manner in which the message resonated within the
media system ended up working, in many respects, counter to the aimsof the protestors. Within the media system, the protestors were coded or
portrayed as anarchistic hooligans with no respect for private property andas “dirty hippies” filled with the enthusiasm of youth and its accompanying
immaturity. There was next to no analysis of the protestor's arguments
against how the WTO places countries in massive debt, forcing them toprivatize various industries and local resources, bringing about massive
environmental exploitation and the oppression of indigenous peoples,
thereby causing a severe decline in wages and quality of life. Nor was
there any discussion of how similar dynamics are occurring in “first tier”
countries, causing significant inequalities of wealth and diminishing theability of average citizens to represent their interests within the politicalsystem. In many respects, we can thus say that the manner in which the
WTO protests perturbed or irritated the media system and the way inwhich those perturbations were transformed into information ended up
working contrary to and against the very aims of the protestors. Within thepsychic systems inhabiting the broader social system and coupled to themedia system, it is likely that the protestors resonated as an anarchic threat
against which the social system needs to be defended.
Similar points about system resonance or the lack thereof can be madewith respect to the notorious response of the United States government toHurricane Katrina. Everything about the government’s delayed responseto the events that were unfolding in Louisiana and New Orleans suggeststhat there was a lack of resonance between the political system and what
was unfolding on the ground. Given the detail and pervasiveness of thereporting of these events in television and print media, this is difficult tobelieve yet, without such a thesis, it is difficult to account for how the Bushadministration could have acted in a way so contrary to its own politicalinterests. Here we should recall that the environment of a system or an
object is always more complex than the system itself. As a consequence,
there is much in a system's environment that a system cannot observe orregister. The events following Hurricane Katrina suggest a form of systemclosure at the level of government and administration that was structured

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in such a way that these entities lacked the capacity for resonance withthese features of the environment occurring in both New Orleans andLouisiana and the media system. This lack of resonance with the media
system is particularly difficult to explain. However, if we recall that withinconservative circles the media has been branded as biased by liberal
ideology and that the Bush administration had taken many steps to manage
the media and control their access to government, it becomes plausible toconclude that the then current administration and Congress had ceased
observing the media and instead created an “echo chamber” that severely
diminished their openness to the environment.
In the Critique of Cynical Reason, Peter Sloterdijk argues that cynicism
has become the new form of dominant ideology.251 Cynicism differs fromtraditional ideology in that where traditional ideology is a false belief
about the world and social relations, cynicism has a true knowledge ofsocial relations, power, exploitation and so on, yet continues to participate
in these oppressive forms of social structure as before. As Žižek puts it,“[t]he cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the ideologicalmask and the social reality, but he nonetheless still insists upon the mask.
The formula, as proposed by Sloterdijk, would then be: 'they know very
well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it”.252 From this, Žižek
concludes that ideology resides not at the level of what subjects know, but ofwhat subjects do. In other words, if we are to locate ideology, we ought notlook at the level of their beliefs, but at the level of their actions.
In his treatment of society at the level of ideology, Žižek returns social
analysis back to the domain of content, meaning, or signification. Recalling
figure 4 from the introduction, we can see that Žižek's engagement of thesocial structure is organized around the culturalist or humanist schema:

content:
signs/signifiers/representations

subject/culture

Within the field of this distinction, the subject or culture falls in themarked space of distinction and we get a sub-distinction where all otherChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure

225

entities in the world are comprehended or related to as vehicles for signs,
signifiers, meanings, discourses, narratives, or representations. To analyze
a cultural practice or artifact according to this structure of distinction isthus to focus on its meaning-content in some form or another. Nonhumanobjects and entities qua nonhuman objects and entities thereby fall into theunmarked space of the distinction.
Putting a finer note on this point, we can say that the culturalist or
humanist approach to the world of objects treats any differences objects
might contribute as signifying or representational differences. By way of
analogy, we can say that the culturalist schema of distinction thinks about
nonhuman objects in much the same way that we might think about
the relation between a movie screen, a projector, and the images thatappear on that screen. Objects are reduced to the status of screens andculture or subjects are treated as projectors. The only thing that becomesrelevant to the analysis of social formations is thus the images that appear
on the screen and how they are cultural or subjective projections. As aconsequence, non-signifying differences contributed by nonhuman objects
or actors are largely excluded from the domain of social analysis. Indeed,within the culturalist framework, objects aren't actors at all but are merely
screens for the projection of human meanings and representations.
Within the framework of onticology and object-oriented philosophy, bycontrast, we get an entirely different structure of distinction:subject/culture/nonhumans

objectHere objects fall into the marked space, such that being is composed ofonly one sort of thing: objects or substances. While objects or substances,
no doubt, differ from one another, being is nonetheless composed
entirely of substances. As a consequence of this shift, we now encounter a
subdistinction where subjects, culture, and nonhumans are placed on equal
footing. In short, nonhuman actors are no longer treated as an opposingpole necessarily related to culture or human subjects, but rather are treated226

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as autonomous actors in their own right. Thus, while we can and do indeed
have relations between humans and nonhuman objects, these relations
are no more privileged than relations between nonhuman objects andnonhuman objects. Moreover, insofar as nonhuman objects are themselves
actors or agents, they can no longer be treated as passive screens for humanand cultural projections.
In light of the foregoing, I hope it is now evident as to just why thisredrawing of distinctions is of such crucial importance. Because theculturalist model of distinction places nonhuman actors or objects in theunmarked space of its distinction, regimes of attraction become largely
invisible. Likewise, because the culturalist model focuses on content
within the marked space of its sub-distinction, questions of resonancebetween systems or objects become largely invisible. The point is notthat we ought not to analyze ideology or content, but that the mannerin which we have organized our distinctions renders all sorts of otherobjects crucial to why society is organized as it is invisible or outside
the space of discourse. As a consequence, we deny ourselves all sorts ofstrategic possibilities for engaging with the social world around us. In thisregard, it is not enough merely to debunk the “ideological mystifications”
from which we suffer. It is additionally necessary to raise questions anddevise strategies for enhancing the resonance of other systems or objects
within the social sphere so that change might be produced. Similarly, in
his recent “Compositionist Manifesto”, Latour proposes the practice ofcomposition as an alternative to critique. Where critique aims at debunking,composition aims at building. Where critique focuses on content and modesof representation, composition focuses on regimes of attraction. If regimes
of attraction tend to lock people into particular social systems or modesof life, the question of composition would be that of how we might build
new collectives that expand the field of possibility and change within thesocial sphere. Here we cannot focus on discourse alone, but must also
focus on the role that nonhuman actors such as resources and technologies
play in human collectives. For example, activists might set about trying
to create alternative forms of economy that make it possible for people tosupport families, live, get to work, and so on without being dependent on
ecologically destructive forms of transportation, food production, and foodChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure

227

distribution. Through the creation of collectives that evade some of theconstraints that structure hegemonic regimes of attraction, people mightfind much more freedom to contest other aspects of the dominant order.
The point here is that the failure for change to occur despite compelling
critiques of the dominant social order cannot simply be attributed toideological mystifications. Social and political thought needs to expand
its domain of inquiry, diminish its obsessive focus on content, andincrease attention to regimes of attraction and problems of resonancebetween objects. The social space is far more free and informed than the
structuralists and neo-structuralists, in their focus on content, acknowledge
and it is more likely that the lack of change arises not from subjects being
ideologically duped alone but from the manner in which we are entangled
in life. It is not by mistake that often profound social change only occurs
when the infrastructure of social systems encounter profound collapse, forin these circumstances psychic systems no longer have anything left to lose
and live in the midst of a situation where the regime of attraction in which
they once existed has ceased to be operative. Observations such as theseteach critical theorists something important, yet the message of these events
seems to be received with deaf ears. It is not an accident, for example, that
the Russian Revolution took place in the middle of massive economic crisisand World War I. What examples such as these teach us are that content
alone is not enough and that political theorists need to enhance theircapacity of resonance with respect to nonhuman actors and regimes of
attraction.

5.3. Temporalized Structure and Entropy
As we discovered in the last section, every object is threatened from within
and without by entropy such that it faces the question of how to perpetuate
its existence across time. Entropy refers to the degree of disorder within asystem. Suppose you have a tightly closed glass box and somehow introduce
a gas into it. During the initial phases following the introduction of thegas into the system, the gas will be characterized by a high degree of order
or a low degree of entropy. This is so because the particles of gas will be
localized in one or the other region of the box. However, as time passes, the228Levi R. Bryant

degree of disorder and entropy within the system will increase as the gas
becomes evenly distributed throughout the box. In this respect, entropy isa measure of probability. If the earlier phases of the gas distribution indicate
a lower degree of entropy than the later stages, then this is because in theearlier phases there is a lower degree of probability that the gas will be
localized in any one place in the box. As time passes, the probability offinding gas particles located evenly throughout the box increases and we
subsequently conclude that the degree of entropy has increased.
In many respects, the real miracle is not that change takes place, butrather that change is not more frequent. This is especially mysterious in
the case of higher-order or higher-scale systems or objects such as social
systems. How is it that they maintain their endo-consistency or organization
across time, such that they don't disintegrate into a high degree of entropy?
Put differently, why do such objects not dissolve as objects? In what follows,
I focus on Luhmann's analysis of the relationship between structure,complexity, entropy, and time as it pertains to biological, psychic, andsocial objects. I leave the analysis of structure and entropy as it functions
in nonliving objects to others, noting that when suitably modified byan object-oriented framework, the work of DeLanda and Massumi isparticularly promising in this connection.
There are a number of reasons that Luhmann's conception of structure
is particularly promising. First, the tendency of structuralism was to fall
into a sort of structural imperialism arising from a failure to note themanner in which systems distinguish themselves from their environmentor are withdrawn. Structure became a sort of net thrown over the entire
world without remainder or outside. To be sure, structuralists recognizedthat something other than structure exists, yet were unable to articulate
what this might be because of the manner in which we are always-alreadysituated within structure such that everything we might encounter isoverdetermined by structure. This schema posed very difficult questions
for structuralist thought with respect to the question of how changetakes place. The structuralists recognized that structures are organizedsynchronically and evolve diachronically, yet were left without the means ofaccounting for just how this diachronic evolution takes place because theirdoctrine of internal relations, coupled with their formalism, prevented themChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure229

from appealing to any outside as a mechanism of change. As a consequence,the development or evolution of structure became thoroughly mysterious.
I take it that I have already shown how, in the first chapter, we canspeak of objects independent of us despite the fact that all objects arewithdrawn. One major advancement introduced by Luhmann's conceptof structure is to mark both the boundary of structure and the conditions
under which structures can change or evolve. Closely connected to this isa pluralization of structure with respect to different systems, allowing us
to conceptualize a variety of different structures embedded and entangledwith one another, yet also operationally closed to one another, such thateach one “comprehends” the entirety of the world in terms of its own
organization. In this respect, Luhmann is able to account simultaneously
for the particularity or finitude of objects and their curious universality. As
Luhmann writes in The Reality of the Mass Media,[a]mong the most important consequences of [...]
differentiation is the complementary relationship between
universalism and specification. On the basis of its own
differentiation, the system can assume itself, its own function,
its own practice as a point of reference for the specificationof its own operations. It does and can only do whatever has
connective capability internally, according to the structureand historical situation of the system. It is precisely this,however, which also creates the conditions for being able todeal with everything which can be made into a theme for its
own communication.253
In other words, each object or system is universal in the sense that it isable to comprehend the rest of the world in terms of its own distinctions.
Nonetheless, each system is particular precisely because it relates to
its environment or the rest of the world in terms of its own specificdistinctions.
The rise of structuralist thought marked a growing awareness of thisparadoxical simultaneity of universality and specificity. Replacing theuniversal Kantian transcendental subject, the structuralists recognized thecontingency and plurality of different structures and how they relate to the230

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environment through their own distinctions. Implicitly they thus recognized
the manner in which objects are withdrawn from other objects. At themethodological level, they implicitly practiced second-order observation,observing how observers observe, by observing the manner in which othersocial systems or objects relate to the world. Yet this line of inquiry, as
promising as it was, was itself under-theorized. On the one hand, having
made the monumental discovery that there are other objects at a larger
scale than human beings or subjects such as social systems, they madethe move of treating lower scale objects such as humans as mere effectsof structure so as to protect their important discovery and prevent all
subjectivist or humanist attempts to ground these larger scale objects in the
cognitive and affective capacities of psychic systems. Rather than adopting
an ontological mereology of objects at a variety of scales and durations thatare all operationally closed and that relate to each other only selectively,
they instead attempted to banish these other lower-scale objects altogether.
Yet, in making such a move, they swept the ground out from beneaththemselves as they could no longer account for how their own discussion of
structure was anything other than yet another formation being produced bystructure itself.
On the other hand, having recognized system-specific universality inthe plurality of structures they had uncovered in the domain of culture
and language, they nonetheless tended to fail in properly theorizing theconditions under which they could make these claims. In other words, intheir structuralist imperialism of treating structure as a net thrown overthe entire world, they undermined the possibility of accounting for how
second-order observation of other structures might be possible. In part,
this problem emerged as a result of failing to properly mark or identify thelimits of structure. A similar problem has more recently emerged in theradical constructivism of Maturana's autopoietic theory.
Among his major contributions to our understanding of structure lies
Luhmann's treatment of structure in terms of the distinction between
system and environment and the temporal problem of how structures
reproduce themselves across time. It will be recalled that the environmentis always more complex than any structure or environment. There is nevera point-for-point correspondence between system and environment.

Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 231

Were there such a correspondence, system would cease to exist. As aconsequence, objects only maintain selective relations to their environment,
and this entails that the relations a system maintains to its environment
always involve contingency and risk with respect to the ongoing autopoiesis
or existence of the object. As Graham Harman puts it, every object
caricatures other objects when relating to them. Moreover, objects have aninternal complexity such that every element is not related to every otherelement, but rather elements are only related in specific ways. Not only do
the ongoing operations or events that take place within an object risk falling
into entropy, but each object is threatened by disintegration from events in
its internal and external environment. Structure names the mechanism ororganization through which a system or object both makes use of entropy tocontinue its existence and resists falling into entropy. As Luhmann writes,[d]rawing on general systems theory and structuralism, we
obtain an initial characteristic of the concept of structure byreferring to problems of complexity. Structure transforms
unstructured complexity into structured complexity—but
how? Unstructured complexity is entropic complexity, which
can at time disintegrate into incoherence. The formation of
structure uses this disintegration and constructs order out of
it. Out of the disintegration of elements (i.e, the necessary
cessation of every action), it draws the energy and information
to reproduce elements that therefore always appear within
existing structural categories yet still always appear as new. In
other words, the concept of structure defines more precisely
how elements relate across temporal distance.254
The advantage of treating structure in terms of the system/environment
distinction is that it allows us to think the manner in which structure isopen to the world, thereby providing structure with events from the outsidethat play a role in how structure evolves or develops. Likewise, by treating
structure in terms of entropy and complexity, we can see how structure isrelated to questions of how an object reproduces itself across time.
It is sometimes contended that structure consists of relations between
elements. Luhmann rejects this thesis on the grounds that it is too broad

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and indeterminate. While it is indeed the case that within any structureelements are related to one another, these relations are of a specific kind.
On the one hand, while it is the case that one and the same structure
can be embodied in a variety of elements, it doesn't follow from this thata structure can be embodied in any element. This feature of multiple
realizability is crucial to understanding structure and objects, for it is almost
always the case that the elements that realize a structure are destroyed or
pass away, while the structure remains and persists. For example, citizens
are born and die in the United States, and offices are occupied by a variety
of different politicians. It is thus not the parts that make an entity an entity
precisely because these parts can change. However, it would be a mistake toconclude from this that structures can exist without their elements. Objects
can be destroyed through their parts insofar as a point is reached where
the endo-structure of an object can no longer embody or sustain itself. It isprecisely because the elements that realize structure pass away that systems
or objects face the question of how to perpetuate themselves across time.
In the case of autopoietic objects, the object faces the question of how to
produce new events or elements to maintain itself across time.
In short, each system or object must reproduce itself across time. In theabsence of a reproduction of elements and therefore of relations, the object
dissolves or falls apart. In this respect, we can see just how dynamic objects
are. Objects are not brute clods that simply sit there unchanging until
provoked, but perpetually reproduce themselves in the order of time. This
structure of reproduction can be represented in terms of Bergson's diagramof attention and memory as presented in Matter and Memory.255
D
C
B
A
O
B’
C’
D’

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Bergson uses this diagram to outline the role of memory in the processof perception, yet it works equally well for thinking the reproduction of
objects across time. In Bergson's schema, each moment of perception isoverlaid by a memory image trailing off into the remote past. Bergson
describes this as a “circuit” of perception and memory, where the twocome to be ever more deeply intertwined. In the case of perception, theresult is that each perception becomes increasingly overlaid by memory.
Bergson's circuit of perception and memory is particularly illustrative of the
dynamics of autopoietic objects in the order of time. ABCD refers to thesubsequent reproduction of the object in the course of unfolding in time orin moving towards the future. By contrast, A'B'C'D' refers to the memory
produced by the autopoietic object that can, in its turn, be reactualized in
the present in a variety of ways. The object uses each prior phase, as well as
stimulations from its environment, to reproduce itself across time. Similarly,
in autopoietic objects, memory can be used to actualize new states in thepresent. As a consequence, objects are temporally elongated, tracing a paththroughout time through their acts.
Why, then, if objects must reproduce themselves from moment tomoment, do I not follow Whitehead in arguing that being, at its most basic
level, is composed of “actual occasions” and that objects are but “societiesof actual occasions”? Whitehead's actual occasions are instantaneous events
that cease to exist the very moment that they come into existence. They
are the true atoms of being, with the important caveat that these atoms
are not enduring entities, like Lucretius's atoms, but events that flicker inand out of existence like the flickering of fireflies. As a consequence, froma Whiteheadian perspective, objects are a sort of illusion in the sense thatthey are not the true units of beings, but are rather multiple-compositions
or societies of actual occasions that are continually coming into existence
and passing out of existence. In this respect, Bergson's circuit of the object,coupled with Luhmann's thesis that objects must perpetually reproduce
themselves in the order of time, would seem to be a mirror image ofWhitehead's metaphysical thesis.
However, to treat actual occasions or instantaneous time-slices as theatoms or true units of being is to confuse the being of objects with theirparts. An object is not its parts, elements, or the events that take place

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within it—though all of these are indeed indispensable—but is rather
an organization or structure that persists across time. This brings us to
Luhmann's second reason as to why structure cannot be identified withrelations among elements simpliciter. As Luhmann remarks,
relations acquire structural value only because the relations
realized at any given time present a selection from a pluralityof combinatory possibilities and thus introduce both theadvantages and the risks of a selective reduction. And only thisselection can be held constant across change in elements, thatis, can be reproduced with new elements.256
From this Luhmann concludes that “structure, whatever else it may
be, consists in how permissible relations are constrained within the system”.257
What Whitehead's account of objects as societies of actual occasions misses
is that this organization, this constraint on permissible relations among
elements, is not itself of the order of an actual occasion but is rather thatwhich persists or endures across the existence of actual occasions. To be
sure, these structures exist only in and through actual occasions, but thisdoes not change the fact that these structures are irreducible to actual
occasions for, without structure, there could be no regulation of how eventsare constrained and produced in the ongoing existence of the object.
A system in which all elements related to one another would be a systemcharacterized by absolute entropy and would thus be no system at all
because it would be unable to distinguish itself from its environment. There
are thus three problems that beset each system and to which structure
responds. First, there is the question of how events are to be constrained
and selected within a system. For example, were all possible memories,
thoughts, and imaginings to suddenly flood the mind, the mind would
immediately collapse into absolute entropy, falling into an autistic jumble
preventing any action or attention. Within a psychic system, there must be
selectivity as to what events take place within the psychic system and how
these events are linked to one another.
Second, and similarly, there must be selectivity or constraint withrespect to the events that a system is open to from the world or its
environment. Take the example of an object like a conversation at a cafe.

Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 235

If such a conversation is to be possible, its relationship to its environment
must be highly constrained, remaining open only to certain events within
the coffee shop. Of course, this openness to the environment can shift withchanging events within the system such that the system becomes open to
events that it was previously closed to, but the point is that at any point intime the system only maintains selective relations to its environment. Within
the cafe, all sorts of conversations are taking place, people are bustlingabout, waiters and waitresses are serving various customers, cappuccino
machines are hissing their songs, music is playing, people are walking
back and forth on the sidewalk, and cars are honking and screechingoutside. Were the conversation as a system or object to share a one-to-one
correspondence to all these events in the environment, the conversation
would be impossible and would again fall into a maximum state of entropy.
As a consequence, the conversation can only be selectively open to eventsin its environment, constituting itself as an object or system through asystem/environment distinction that both constitutes the conversation
as an object distinct from its environment and that institutes selective
relations to the environment, allowing certain events occurring within
the environment to perturb the system constituted by the conversation.
Two young women heatedly discussing Sartre's Being and Nothingness andwhether he stole his ideas from Simone de Beauvoir pause suddenly when
an impending blizzard is announced over the radio. This event functions
like a switch. Suddenly the conversation changes direction and the women
begin discussing whether they should leave to beat the weather, only toturn back to Sartre's discussions of facticity and how they constrain choice.
This event perturbs the conversation in a particular way, leading it to drift
in another direction, yet what is more remarkable is all the other eventsin the environment that fall into the unmarked space of the distinctions
regulating the conversation's relationship to its environment, becoming
all but invisible. Only certain events from the environment are capable ofinfluencing the local manifestations the conversation takes.
Finally, each system faces the question of how to produce subsequent
events so as to continue its existence across time. Luhmann remarks that“one must radically relate the concept of event [...] to what is momentaryand immediately passes away”.258 Because events are momentary and236

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fleeting, and because structure can only exist so long as it is embodiedin elements, each system or object faces the question of how to passfrom one event to another so as to perpetuate its existence. As Luhmannobserves, “we will constrain the concept of structure in another way: notas a special type of stability but by its function of enabling the autopoietic
reproduction of the system from one event to the next”.259 In the space of aconversation, it is necessary to find something else to say if the conversation
is to continue. The production of events can take place either throughthe internal domain of the system itself, as in those instances where oneutterance in a conversation leads to another utterance or one secretion ofa cell initiates processes in another cell in a body, or through perturbations
coming from the environment.
Because objects face the question of how to get from one moment to thenext, they are condemned to change and their identity is a dynamic identitythat perpetually reproduces itself across time. As Luhmann argues,
the event, if one may say so, suffers the consequences of thefact that no object can change its relationship to the course oftime. To endure, objects must change in time. Events prefer topass away. On the other hand, every event brings about a totalchange in past, present, and future—simply because it gives
up the quality of being present to the next event and becomes
past for it (i.e., for its future). This minimal displacement
can change the perspective of relevance that structures andbounds the horizon of past and future. In this sense, every
event brings about a total modification of time.260
In the case of autopoietic objects such as organisms, tornadoes, social
systems, psychic systems, and conversations, events taking place in thepresent modify the substance’s relationship to the past as well as the future.
This is especially the case with respect to the role played by events thatissue from the environment. Upon reading a book once, rereading the bookproduces a different impression of the book as a result of both how the firstreading reconfigured my prior thoughts about the world and other texts andas a result of how the opening pages of the book now resonate differentlyChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure237

as a result of my anticipation of what is coming. As a consequence, objects
develop and evolve.
Information plays a particularly important role in the development andevolution of structures. Because structures operate within the frameworkof system/environment distinctions, they are selectively open to theirenvironment and can therefore evolve and develop as a result of that
openness to their environment. Objects constrain the sort of events towhich they're open from their environment through their distinctions ororganization. In the case of autopoietic objects, this entails that structures
are anticipatory of what the future will bring. When events issue from theenvironment, information-events are produced selecting system-states
within the system. This leads to the production of further events within thesystem, unfolding within a particular order and structured in a particularway. This can have the effect of reinforcing and intensifying certain
developmental vectors within the object.
However, because structures are anticipatory, they can also undergo
disappointment when events anticipated from the environment failto materialize. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that thedisappointment of an anticipation entails the absence of information. As
we have seen, in more “advanced” objects, the absence of an event canitself function as information. In Sartre's famous example in Being andNothingness, he walks into a cafe and discovers that his friend Pierre is
not there.261 Far from being an absence of information, the non-event of
Pierre's appearance creates an event, information, that selects subsequentsystem-states. Depending on the magnitude of the disappointment, suchinformation events can have the effect of propelling systems capable ofself-reflexivity to revise their distinctions, modifying their system structureand developing new forms of openness to the world while foreclosing otherforms of openness. Similarly, in the case of autopoietic objects or systems
not capable of self-reflexivity, such disappointments can play a key rolein natural selection, leading to the death of certain substances reliant on
particular forms of perturbation to continue their existence and paving
the way for other organisms to more effectively reproduce themselves.
This can occur when massive environmental changes take place. Indeed,certain organisms unwittingly produce their own demise as in the case of

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pre-historic microorganisms that required carbon dioxide to continue theirautopoiesis or self-reproduction and that produced oxygen as a bi-productof this process. One result of this process was that they eventually saturated
their environment with oxygen, contributing to the construction of new
niches in which other organisms could emerge and undermining the niche
upon which they relied for their continued existence.
From the foregoing, we can thus see why selection, constraint,
distinction, and organization involve risk at the level of structure. Structure
is contingent in the sense that both the manner in which elements are
related and the openness to events within the environment could always
be otherwise. Insofar as structure is a strategy for staving off entropy so as
to reproduce system-organization across time, the contingency of selection
and constraint carries with it the risk of dissolution in those instanceswhere the selections opening the object to the environment anticipate
perturbations or irritations that fail to reliably appear. In these instances,
we encounter less than fortunate local manifestations or death. Here death
can take one of two forms. On the one hand, death can take the form of a
substance continuing to exist but becoming incapable of producing certain
local manifestations such as movement, affect, and cognition. On the other
hand, death can take the form of absolute death, where entropy completely
sets in and the substance is utterly destroyed such that it is no longer able
to enlist other objects in maintaining its own organization and the otherobjects of which the entity was once composed now go their separate ways
autonomously, enjoying their existence elsewhere. The first death generally
leads to the second eventually.
The risk of selectivity and constraint can be seen with particular clarity
with respect to the issue of climate change. At present, the world's various
social systems and subsystems lack sufficient capacities for resonance toregister the importance of changes taking place in the climate. To be sure,much of the world's various social systems are aware that climate change istaking place and that this will potentially have a massive impact on whether
or not these social systems are able to sustain themselves. However, despite
this knowledge, we don't see social systems making the sorts of changes
necessary to avoid this destruction. Why is this? A good deal of the problem
has to do with the nature of resonance between various subsystems withinChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 239

the social system and between the various social systems and psychic
systems. We can only learn of climate change through the scientific systemand the media system because the changes produced by climate change
are so diffuse and spread out that they can only be observed through very
specific techniques. At the level of the other social systems and psychic
systems, this generates doubt in the science system as the environmentsof these other social systems and psychic systems do not register any
significant differences. Like two shades of red that are extremely close to
one another, we see the climate as largely unchanged. The media system,
in its turn, creates constant noise around the issue, endlessly parading
experts before the viewing audience that claim that there is a lot of disputesurrounding whether or not anthropogenic climate change is taking place
and who suggest it is based on junk science. Insofar as the media system isselectively open to its environment in terms of controversy so as to maximize
its possibility of new reporting on a daily basis, it generates the impressionin psychic systems that there is broad disagreement regarding theseissues when, in fact, it is a minority of scientists, often funded by energy
companies, who hold such views.
The more significant problem emerges with respect to resonancebetween the science system, the political system, and the economic system.
The code according to which the economic system functions is the profit/
no-profit code. In other words, the economic system encounters its
environment in terms of whether or not it is capable of producing profit.
As a consequence, the economic system is largely blind to the sciencesystem unless the findings of the science system create the opportunity
for producing profit. Initially, it seems as if progress is being made inthis regard as many businesses are adopting a “green orientation” thatadvertises an ecologically friendly orientation. However, the lion's shareof our ecological problems issues not from whether we're using energy
efficient light bulbs, but from farming practices (it's a dirty secret thatlivestock methane contributes more to climate change than the use offossil fuels), industry, shipping, and the sort of energy we use. The sorts ofchanges required in these areas immediately fall into the “no-profit” side of
the codes deployed by the economic system.

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The political system, in its turn, finds itself entangled with the regimes
of attraction governing the lives of psychic systems as well as the economic
system. The code according to which the political system functions is thatof power/no-power. In concrete terms, this code revolves around questions
and issues of re-election. Many of the changes required to mitigate theeffects of climate change would prove to be a significant hardship on lives ofcitizens, as it would require major changes in the regimes of attraction uponwhich they rely for their existence. This is especially the case in countries
with developing economies where many are just trying to find a way to feed
their families from day to day. While many might be abstractly supportiveof taking action to mitigate the coming climate crisis, when concrete
proposals are made, many of the suggested changes are deeply unpopular
because these things would significantly impact how people live theirlives (imagine how Americans would respond to being told to cut downon their meat consumption!) and might lead to the loss of jobs. This, inturn, translates into whether or not politicians get votes and get re-elected.
As a consequence, it is likely that a Faustian bargain is made where thepolitician who is ecologically aware tells himself that at least he is making
incremental change.
Nonetheless, it seems that a lot could be done by more heavily
regulating the shipping industry, encouraging the trucking industry, forexample, to switch over to alternative fuels, giving large tax breaks tofamilies and individuals that drive hybrid cars, use solar panels, increase
their energy efficiency, making the use of school buses and trains a patriotic
action for high school students, and providing government subsidies todeveloping countries that provide and develop environmentally friendly
industries for their citizens, and so on. However, here the political system
encounters another entanglement with industry and business that makes
such actions less than appealing from a political perspective. Thesechanges all imply major economic hardship for a variety of businesses andindustries that make massive amounts of money from their practices. In
the United States at least, the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission opened the gates for corporations
to use unlimited funds for political purposes. This entails that every U.S.
politician must now think twice before proposing policy changes as they

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now face massive advertising campaigns—always conducted behind “front
groups” implying that they're the work of average Americans and grass root
activists—targeting the possibility of the politician's re-election.
The point of this rather pessimistic analysis of resonance withinsocial systems with respect to issues of climate change is to underline themanner in which the constraints and selections governing openness tothe environment always involve risk. Within our current social system, thedistinctions governing resonance between the various social subsystems,
psychic systems, and the broader environment have generated a quagmirethat renders responsiveness to climate change very difficult. The forms ofresonance that do exist, in their turn, create the very real possibility thatthese social systems will themselves collapse as a result of changes in theirenvironments that abolish sources of perturbation upon which they depend.
As climate change and population growth intensifies, it is very likely that
there will be famines as a result of changes in the climate that destroy
farming and water resources. This will generate a variety of social crises thatwill reverberate throughout all the different social subsystems.
The question of how certain forms of system resonance can bediminished and how other forms of resonance can be enhanced thereby
becomes a key question for activists concerned with issues of climatechange. In his book, Collapse, Jared Diamond notes that one reason Dutch
citizens, politicians, and businesses seem to be more eco-friendly is not
because they are more enlightened, but because much of their landmass isbelow sea-level, rendering climate change in the form of rising sea levels
a potential threat to the majority of the population.262 Likewise, Diamondnotes how foreign logging companies depleted the rain forests of the Malay
Penninsula, Borneo, the Solomon Islands, Sumatra, and the Philippines by
logging these lands as quickly as possible once they were leased to them by
the local countries and then declaring bankruptcy rather than replanting as
it was more beneficial financially to do so. The citizens of these areas werethen left to endure the ecological consequences of these practices, losing
their own sources of food and industry.263 One lesson of these contrasting
examples seems to be that resonance is enhanced when a system or object
has a direct stake in the long-term preservation of elements of the local

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environment or climate. Yet how such a suture to local climate is to be
produced in various industries is a very difficult question.
Returning to some themes from the last section pertaining to mereology,
we can also discern that a number of objects have some very peculiar
properties with respect to space and time. It is fairly common to argue
that objects are individuated by occupying a particular position in space
and at a particular time. This, for example, was Locke's position. However,
if it is true that it is the organization or structure, not the parts, that
determine whether or not something is an object, it follows that objects
can be discontinuous across time and can be vastly spread out acrossspace. A conversation, for example, can cease and be resumed at a later
point. Here the conversation falls out of existence for a time, it ceases tomanifest itself locally, and comes back into existence at a later point intime. A variety of objects have this strange sort of temporal structure. An
Alcoholics Anonymous group, for example, might only meet once or twicea week, thereby flickering in and out of existence. A number of groups andinstitutions only meet intermittently.
Not only do we encounter this strange temporality where objects can flitin and out of existence while remaining the same object, but there are also avariety of different temporal scales characteristic of different objects that are
oddly simultaneous with one another yet working at very different temporallevels. It takes the sun, for example, 225 million years to make one rotation
around the Milky Way. The Milky Way is one object, characterized by its
own temporal duration, whereas the solar system is yet another object.
Here we encounter one temporal duration embedded in another temporal
duration, with very different cycles unfolding in each object. Similarly,
societies, climates, and ecosystems each have their own heterogeneous
durations, moving at different rates and characterized by their own uniqueorganizations. In this regard, there's a very real sense in which durationis always system-specific such that each object is characterized by its own
duration and relates to other durations in terms of its own. Different
social groups, for example, exist in their own “plane of history”, as canbe observed with the old university professor who hasn't kept up with hisreading and continues to fight philosophical wars that are decades past, or
the Amish who live in a very different temporal frame both with respect toChapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure243

the structuration of their daily life and their relation to the broader social
system in which they're embedded. The temporal rhythms of an organism
are different from those of a population of organisms, and these, in theirturn, are different from the temporal rhythms of an entire ecosystem.
Between all these different temporalities are different forms of resonance, as
well as different possibilities of conflict.
Similar features characterize the mereology of objects in space. Blog
discussions involve participants located all over the world, integratinginternet servers, various blogs, and participants so as to produce anevolving and developing object of its own. Increasingly a number of people
work from home, yet various businesses still exist as entities in their own
right. More recently, there's been a trend towards university courses being
offered online, allowing students to enroll in courses at a specific university
or college from all over the country and world. Indeed, a friend of minemakes his living teaching online courses “in” the United States from
Israel. Currently, there are massive radio telescope arrays that span entire
continents, drawing on many smaller radio telescopes to plumb the depthsof outer space and using thousands of home computers volunteered byaverage citizens to increase their ability to compute the huge amounts ofdata they receive. And, were this not astonishing enough, the observationsof these entities are not observations of entities existing in the present, but
in the remote past!
At the level of object-oriented and onticological mereology, we cannot
work from the premise that location in time and space is sufficient to
individuate an object, nor that objects exist only at a particular scale such as
the mid-range objects that tend to populate the world of our daily existence.
Rather, entities exist at a range of different scales, from the unimaginably
small to the unimaginably large, each characterized by their own durationand spatiality. Here a tremendous amount of work remains to be done inthinking these spatial and temporal structures. In my view, onticology andobject-oriented philosophy have opened a vast and rich domain for thinking
these strange structures of space and time. What is important, however,is the recognition that the substantiality of objects lies not in their parts,
but in their structure or organization, and that objects are not brute clodsthat merely sit there, contemplating their self-perfection like Aristotle's

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Unmoved Mover, but that they are dynamic and evolving as a consequenceof their own internal dynamics and interfaces with their environment.

Chapter 6
The Four Theses of Flat Ontology
The rock was one of those tremendously solid brown,
or rather black, rocks which emerge from the sand likesomething primitive. Rough with crinkled limpet shells andsparsely strewn with locks of dry seaweed, a small boy has
to stretch his legs far apart, and indeed to feel rather heroic,
before he gets to the top. But there, on the very top, is ahollow full of water, with a sandy bottom; with a blob of jelly
stuck to the side, and some mussels. A fish darts across. The
fringe of yellow-brown seaweed flutters, and out pushes anopal-shelled crab— “Oh, a huge crab”, Jacob murmured—— Virginia Woolf 264

6.1. Two Ontological Discourses:
Lacan's Graphs of Sexuation and Two Waysof Thinking Being
Onticology proposes what might be called, drawing on DeLanda's term
yet broadening it, a flat ontology. Flat ontology is a complex philosophicalconcept that bundles together a variety of ontological theses under asingle term. First, due to the split characteristic of all objects, flat ontology
rejects any ontology of transcendence or presence that privileges one
sort of entity as the origin of all others and as fully present to itself. In

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this regard, onticology proposes an ontology resonant with Derrida's
critique of metaphysics insofar as, in its treatment of beings as withdrawn,
it undermines any pretensions to presence within being. If this thesis ispersuasive, then metaphysics can no longer function as a synonym for“metaphysics of presence”, nor substance as a synonym for “presence”,
but rather an ontology has been formulated that overcomes the primacy
of presence. In this section, I articulate this logic in terms of Lacan's
graphs of sexuation. Here I believe that those graphs have little to tell us
about masculine or feminine sexuality—for reasons I will outline in what
follows—but a great deal to tell us about ontologies of immanence or flat
ontologies and ontologies of transcendence. Second, flat ontology signifies
that the world or the universe does not exist. I will develop the argument
for this strange claim in what follows, but for the moment it is importantto recognize the definite article in this claim. The claim that the world
doesn't exist is the claim that there is no super-object that gathers all otherobjects together in a single, harmonious unity. Third, following Harman,
flat ontology refuses to privilege the subject-object, human-world relation
as either a) a form of metaphysical relation different in kind from otherrelations between objects, and that b) refuses to treat the subject-object
relation as implicitly included in every form of object-object relation. To
be sure, flat ontology readily recognizes that humans have unique powers
and capacities and that how humans relate to the world is a topic morethan worthy of investigation, yet nothing about this establishes that humans
must be included in every inter-object relation or that how humans relate
to objects differs in kind from how other entities relate to objects. Finally,
fourth, flat ontology argues that all entities are on equal ontological footing
and that no entity, whether artificial or natural, symbolic or physical,
possesses greater ontological dignity than other objects. While indeed some
objects might influence the collectives to which they belong to a greater
extent than others, it doesn't follow from this that these objects are more
real than others. Existence, being, is a binary such that something either
is or is not.
Apart from the fact that I believe these propositions to be ontologicallytrue, the broader strategic import of the concept of flat ontology is todiminish the obsessive focus on the human, subjective and the cultural

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within social, political, cultural theory and philosophy. In particular,
my ambition is to diminish an almost exclusive focus on propositions,representations, norms, signs, narratives, discourses, and so on, so as tocultivate a greater appreciation for nonhuman actors such as animate andinanimate natural entities, technologies, and such. To be clear, in seeking
to diminish a focus on these sorts of actors, my aim is not to exclude these
sorts of actors. Rather, I seek both to synthesize divergent trends withincontemporary Continental social, political, cultural, and philosophicalthought and broaden the field of inquiry available to these discourses anddebates. Within the framework of contemporary Continental thought, it
would not be too far off the mark to say that there are two highly different
cultures. Within the one culture, we have a focus on lived experience, text,
discourse, signifiers, signs, representation, and meaning. This is a formof inquiry dominated by figures such as the various phenomenologists,
Derrida, Lacan, Žižek, and Foucault, for example. Here there is very
little in the way of a discussion of the role played by nonhuman actors incollectives involving human beings. Rather, nonhuman entities are treatedas screens upon which humans project their intentions, meanings, signs,
and discourses, rather than as genuine actors in their own right. They
are instead passive matter awaiting formatting by humans. This is notentirely fair to the theorists of this culture, as Foucault devotes a great
deal of attention to institutions, architecture, and practices, while Derrida
recognizes the importance of simple agencies like writing in the most literal
sense and digital encoding, yet nonetheless, these are dominant tendencies
within this culture or orientation of theory.
By contrast, the other culture ranges widely over nonhuman actors
or objects and pays careful attention to the differences contributed by
nonhuman agencies such as technologies, animals, environments, and soon. Here we might think of monumental intellects such as Donna Haraway
and Katherine Hayles, the work of McLuhan, Kittler, Ong, and Stiegler,
the later work of Deleuze and Guattari, the thought of Latour and Stengers,
engagements with technology such as that found in Ian Bogost's work,
pathbreaking work such as that found in Protevi, DeLanda, and Massumi,
ecologists like Timothy Morton, Marx's meditations on how the moneyform, technologies, and factories change our very identities, critical animal

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theorists such as Cary Wolfe, and a host of other thinkers. Within thisculture, we find two important trends. On the one hand, there is a tendency
to decentralize the human by describing the impact of the nonhuman in
the form of technology and other inhuman agencies on collectives involving
humans and how these agencies cannot be reduced to human intentions,signs, meanings, norms, signifiers, discourses, and so on.
On the other hand, there is, in this culture, a speculative tendency,
deserving of the title of “Spinozism”, that ranges freely over the“experience” of nonhuman entities, plumbing the worlds of otherentities without being obliged to relate everything back to the human.
Graham Harman's universe is a universe populated by circuses andclowns, vampires, unnamed monsters, fire and cotton, and a host of otherfrightening and delightful carnivalesque entities that erupt across his pages
like so many apparitions that simultaneously withdraw and capture us with
their inherent fascination and allure. Jane Bennett's universe is inhabited by
the vital forces of abandoned bottle caps, dead rats, trash heaps undergoing
various forms of bio-chemical decomposition, and a host of other objects.
Ian Bogost is currently writing his Alien Phenomenology, which promises
to bring us into the subterranean experience of all sorts of other entities
such as computer software we scarcely notice in our day to day existence.
Donna Haraway's universe is pervaded with wolves, microbes, lab reports
and articles, various types of primates, plants, and all sorts of laboratory
equipment. Karen Barad's universe is populated by all sorts of particles,
instruments and waves.
What I aim for with the concept of flat ontology is a synthesis ofthese two cultures. I desire an ontology capable of doing justice to thesestrange nonhuman actors, capable of respecting these strange strangers
on their own terms, and an ontology capable of doing justice to thephenomenological and the semiotic. Moreover, I believe that such a
project is absolutely vital to the future of contemporary thought. The firstof these two cultures is regnant in the contemporary world of theory. The
aim of diminishing the primacy of the human is not nihilistic nor designed
to exclude the human, but is premised on the thesis that, so long as thefirst culture maintains center stage, we are thoroughly unable to properly
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them. In this connection, flat ontology makes two key claims. First, humans
are not at the center of being, but are among beings. Second, objects are nota pole opposing a subject, but exist in their own right, regardless of whether
any other object or human relates to them. Humans, far from constituting
a category called “subject” that is opposed to “object”, are themselves one
type of object among many.
The difference between philosophies of transcendence and philosophiesof immanence such as those advocated by the flat ontology of onticology
can be thematized in terms of Lacan's graphs of sexuation. Here my aim
is to argue that onticology and its conception of objects aligns itself withthe feminine side of Lacan's graph of sexuation. Before proceeding tooutline this congruence and the difference between ontological discourses
organized around withdrawal and ontological discourses organized aroundpresence (the masculine side of Lacan's graphs of sexuation), it is firstnecessary to make some qualifications. Within the history of philosophy,
there has been a long history of associating women with nature, being, andpassivity coupled with an objectification of women that denies them agency
as subjects in their own right. Onticology certainly does not wish to alignitself with these unfortunate tendencies, yet doesn't it risk doing precisely
this in arguing that the true discourse of being falls on the side of thefeminine side of Lacan's graphs of sexuation? Moreover, doesn't it fall into
an even worse plight in treating being as composed of objects?
There are a few points worth making in response to this entirely justified
concern. First, and above all, it is necessary to recognize that it is difficult
to see what, if anything, Lacan's graphs of sexuation have to do with sex orgender. As Bruce Fink articulates this point,[i]t should be recalled that sexuation is not biological sex:
What Lacan calls masculine structure and feminine structure
have to do not with one's biological organs but rather withthe kind of jouissance one is able to obtain. There is not,to the best of my knowledge, any easy overlap between
sexuation and “sexual identity”, or between sexuation andwhat is sometimes referred to as “sexual orientation”. [...].
When I refer to men in the ensuing discussion, I mean thosepeople who, regardless of biological sex, fall under certain

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formulas—what Lacan calls “the formulas of sexuation” –[...] and when I refer to women I mean those people who,
regardless of their biological sex, fall under the [feminineside] of the formulas.265
Having spent more time than I care to admit with the Lacaniansecondary literature and the seminars in which he develops his account ofsexuation, I believe that Bruce Fink is essentially correct in this judgment.
While Lacan does indeed articulate two different structures of thedeadlocks that beset desire and jouissance, it is not at all clear why these
two structures should be called “masculine” and “feminine”. In my view,
Lacan fails to establish any direct link between these structures and sex andgender. For example, any subject, whether biologically male or female—assuming, questionably, that we can even speak univocally of subjects being
biologically male or female—can occupy either side of Lacan's graphs ofsexuation. Put differently, biologically “male” subjects can enjoy or fail toenjoy as feminine subjects and biologically “female” subjects can enjoy or
fail to enjoy as masculine subjects.
The strongest argument in favor of associating the graphs ofsexuation with the masculine and the feminine arises from the fact thatthe masculine side of the graph of sexuation can be read as a highly
abstract and formalized version of the structure of Freud's patriarchal
Oedipus Complex and myth of the Primal Father in Totem and Taboo. If
the Oedipus Complex and the myth of the Primal Father are understood
to be intrinsically patriarchal and phallocentric structures, then there issome reason to associate the masculine side of the graph of sexuation
with forms of jouissance and desire related to masculinity. However, here
again we encounter the question of why the feminine side of the graph ofsexuation should be associated with women. We could just as easily refer tothe two sides of the graphs of sexuation as outlining logics of immanence(the feminine) and logics of transcendence (the masculine), or logics of the“not-all” (the feminine) and logics of exception (the masculine).
A second point to be made is that in arguing that the objects ofonticology and object-oriented philosophy fall on the feminine side of thegraphs of sexuation, it is imperative to recall that, within the framework of
onticology, objects are neither passive nor a pole opposed to the subject.

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Within the framework of object-oriented ontology, there are not two
domains of being, one belonging to the domain of the subject, the otherbelonging to the domain of the object, but rather just one type of being:
objects. On the one hand, we can thus say that subjects are not a pole
opposed to objects, but are themselves a type of object. They are objects
among other objects. To be sure, what we refer to as subjects have special
powers and capacities, but they are nonetheless a sort of object in theworld. On the other hand, far from being passive clods awaiting formattingfrom humans and getting worked over by humans, objects, as theorized
by onticology, are themselves, following Latour, actors or actants that arethemselves agents. In this regard, treating objects as falling on the feminineside of the graphs of sexuation in no way suggests that women are passive
objects. To the contrary, the feminine side of the graph of sexuation turns
out to be the side of agency.
With these caveats in mind, I now turn to Lacan's graphs of sexuation. I
will first discuss the graphs of sexuation within the framework of Lacanian
theory and then reformulate them in ontological terms. Lacan's graphsof sexuation attempt to symbolize or display certain deadlocks that occur
whenever we attempt to totalize the symbolic order or the world. Lacanargues that whenever we attempt to totalize the world, certain deadlocks
emerge preventing such totalities from being successfully accomplished.
Because of the absence and metonymy introduced into the world of thesubject by language, Lacan contends that each potential object of jouissance
contains a remainder of absence or lack that prevents it from conferring
complete enjoyment. Complete enjoyment would require the totalizationor completion of the symbolic, yet such totalizations always fail. Moreover,there is not merely one way in which we attempt to totalize the world andfor this totalization to fail, but rather two ways. These two ways of failingare what Lacan refers to as the “masculine” and the “feminine”. These
two forms of failure, in their turn, generate two very different structuresof desire and jouissance. Put differently, depending on how the subject is
structured as either a “masculine” or a “feminine” subject, different formsof jouissance will be available to the subject. The term “jouissance” is highly
polysemous within Lacanian theory, however within the framework of thegraphs of sexuation we can treat jouissance as the sort of enjoyment open

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to a subject. Put more precisely, the two graphs explain why our jouissancecomes up short or lacking as a result of our being enmeshed within thesymbolic order. As Bruce Fink remarks, “[w]e find the pleasures available
to us in life inadequate, and it is owing to that inadequacy that we expoundsystems of knowledge—perhaps, first and foremost, to explain why ourpleasure is inadequate and then to propose how to change things so that it
will not be”.266
Within the Lacanian framework, this deficit of jouissance is notaccidental but rather structural. In other words, our deficit of jouissancearises not from an accidental lack such that if we could only find theappropriate object we would experience complete enjoyment, but rather isa structural feature of how we are enmeshed in language or the symbolicorder. These structural impossibilities of complete jouissance, in their turn,generate fantasies to account for both why jouissance is lacking and how
this lack might be surmounted. For example, racists are often particularly
attentive to the imagined jouissance of other groups, believing these groups
to both possess a greater jouissance than themselves, and believing that theother group has perhaps stolen their jouissance from them. The racist might
endlessly talk about how the other group is lazy, how they get free rides
from the government, how they are promiscuous, how they lack moral
values, and so on. Based on such fantasies, the racist might imagine all sorts
of ways to take action against these other groups so as to get back theirstolen jouissance. It's not difficult to discern such mechanisms at work in
misogyny and homophobia as well. The tragedy of this sort of jouissance is
two-fold. On the one hand, these dark fantasies lead to the persecution ofother people and groups based on an imagined jouissance that one believes
these other groups have stolen. The pursuit of jouissance purported to belost and stolen thus riddles the social field with conflict. On the other
hand, the belief that total jouissance exists, that it is possible to attaincomplete jouissance, makes it all the more difficult to enjoy the jouissancethat is available because it always falls short of imagined jouissance. As
a consequence, the subject suffers from fantasies of total jouissance thattransform life into cold ashes. Filled with envy at the jouissance one believes
to be enjoyed by other groups, and crushed by bitterness at the absence ofjouissance in one’s own life, the subject becomes unable to enjoy anything.

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To illustrate the structural deadlocks that arise when we attempt
to totalize the symbolic order, Lacan resorts to the resources ofsymbolic logic:267

Φx

A
E



A
E

Φx

x
x

x
x

Φx
Φx

 (A)
a

Φ



The upper portions of the graph filled with equations refers to thestructural deadlocks that inhabit the symbolic. The left side is the masculine
side, whereas the right side is the feminine side. These refer to logics
of exception and the “not-all” respectively. The symbols that appear in
the lower portion of the graph refer to the sorts of jouissance available tosubjects depending on whether they fall under the left or right-hand sideof the graph. Within symbolic logic, “∃” is what is known as an “existential
quantifier”. Existential quantifiers refer to partial collections such as“some”, “many”, “one” and so on. Thus, for example, the proposition“some cats are black” would be written in symbolic logic as follows: ∃xCx
& Bx. Translated back into ordinary language, this would read, “there
exists at least one entity such that this entity is a cat and this entity isblack”. The upper case letters are thus predicates qualifying a subject orentity, while the lower case letters are variables or arguments. Similarly, insymbolic logic, the symbol “∀” is what is known as a “universal quantifier”.
Universal quantifiers refer to expressions such as “all” and “every”. Thus,
the proposition “all humans are mortal” would be translated into symbolic
logic as follows: ∀xHx → Mx. Translated into ordinary language, this would
read, “for all entities, if x is human then x is mortal”. The arrow thus reads
as a conditional or an “if/then” statement. Finally it will be noted thatover some of the expressions in the upper portions of Lacan's graph a bar
appears. This bar denotes negation. Within what follows, I will use thefollowing symbol to denote negation: “~”.
In all four of the propositions populating the upper portion of Lacan's
graph of sexuation we notice the symbol “Φ” appearing as a predicate

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qualifying “x”. Within the framework of the upper portion of the graphs,
this symbol refers to the phallic function. Like many of Lacan's mathemes,Φ is highly polysemous depending on the context in which it appears.
Within the present context, Φ does not refer to the phallus—at leastin the upper portion of the graph—much less to the male organ of thepenis. Rather, Φ refers to castration, our submission to language, or our
submission to the Law. In other words, Φ refers to the manner in which wemust pursue jouissance through language and therefore encounter a priori
restrictions or limitations to jouissance.
We are now in a position to read the propositions in the upper portionof Lacan's graphs of sexuation. The top and bottom propositions are to beread together or in relation to one another as embodying a sort of deadlock
or contradiction. Thus, on the left or masculine side, the top proposition
reads ∃x~Φx, while the bottom proposition reads ∀xΦx. Translated into
ordinary language, the first proposition reads, “there exists an entity suchthat this entity is not subject to the phallic function”, while the second
proposition reads, “for all entities, x is submitted to the phallic function”.
When read together, the deadlock or contradiction embodied in these two
propositions is that of a fantasy held by the subject in which complete
enjoyment is possible, coupled with an existence where all jouissance comesup short by virtue of being subordinated to the phallic function.
One of the great advantages of Lacan's abstraction in these formulations
is that it allows us to discern a common structure in a number of diverse
domains. Not only does Lacan's handful of symbols allow us to discern
the basic structure of the Oedipus Complex and the myth of the Primal
Father in Totem and Taboo, but we can also see it as articulating the basic
relationship between a monarch and his subjects, God and his creatures,
the Cartesian subject and other objects, a celebrity and his fans, and soon. In each of these cases, we have the fantasy of a subject that either has
complete knowledge, complete power, or complete enjoyment coupledwith a plurality of subjects or entities that are lacking in knowledge,
power, or enjoyment. In the case of the Primal Father, for example, wehave an entity that has no limitations on his jouissance. Not only does hepossess all the women of the tribe, he is also able to enjoy incest with hismother and daughters. Similarly, in the case of the Oedipus, the subject

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encounters a limit to his enjoyment in the incest prohibition. Likewise, in
The Concept of the Political, Schmitt's monarch enjoys a strange status of
exception, simultaneously being above and outside the law and therefore
enjoying absolute power, while also being the origin of the law (castration/
limitation).268 What we thus get here is a logic of universality defined by
exception. In order for the universal to establish itself in the form of thelaw, there must be a shadowy and phantasmatic exception that allows theboundary of the law to establish or ground itself. The sovereign need not
truly have absolute power, nor must the Primal Father really have existed.
All that is necessary is the unconscious belief in such exceptions to thefailure of jouissance. If it proves impossible to totalize the symbolic orderunder this model, then this is because such totalization always requires
an impossible exception outside that order, whereas the signifier is always
differentially constituted without positive terms.
On the feminine side of the graph of sexuation, we get not a logic ofexception, but a logic of the “not-all”. The top proposition of the feminineside of the graph of sexuation reads, ~∃x~Φx, while the lower proposition
reads, ~∀xΦx. Translated into ordinary language, the first proposition
reads, “there does not exist an entity that is not submitted to the phallic
function”. By contrast, the second proposition reads, “not all of x is
submitted to the phallic function”. In other words, on the feminine side,something escapes from the law of language, castration, or the phallic
function. It will be noted that whereas the masculine side constitutes auniversal (the universality of the law) through an exception, we find no
exception on the feminine side, nor do we find any universality. Insteadof universality, what we find is the “not-all” or the “not-whole”. Twoconsequences follow from this: first, insofar as there is no constitutive
exception within the structure of feminine sexuality, this structure can be
described in terms of immanence. Where the structure of masculine sexuality
presupposes a transcendent term outside the world or law in some way or
another, within the field of feminine structure we find only a flat plane withno transcendent outside or exception.
Second, the absence of a constitutive exception leads to Lacan's muchmaligned and misunderstood claim that the woman does not exist.269 Herewe must attend to the role of the definite article in Lacan's formulation.

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Lacan's thesis is that, in order for a class to constitute itself as existing oruniversal, there must be an exception that defines the rule. If, according
to Lacan, we can say what a male is, then this is because all men sharethe common characteristic of being castrated or subordinated by the Law
defined by the phallic function. This law is guaranteed by the constitutive
exception that allows the law to be determined. There is no analogous
instance on the feminine side of the graph of sexuation, therefore it is
impossible to constitute a universal class of women. The upshot of this is
not that women do not exist, but rather that woman, the woman, does notconstitute a closed and defined class. Put in more positive terms, womenbelong to the set of the singular, the individual, the different. They form an
open set without any shared or overarching predicate defining a universal
identity, thereby undermining any pretension to essence or identity.
In response to the failures of totalization found on both sides of thegraph of sexuation, forms of jouissance appear as attempts to supplement
and surmount this failure. On the masculine side we witness , the symbol
for the barred subject, pointing at a, the matheme for objet a. It will be
noted that the form of jouissance that appears on the masculine side of thegraph of sexuation also has the structure of Lacan's formula for fantasy, ($<> a), read “barred subject punch objet a”. In chapter four, we already saw
that objet a is the remainder produced as a result of the subject's entrance
into language. As a consequence, objet a is not an empirical or existing
object, but a sort of remainder, excess, or irreducible fractional quantity
marking that which cannot be integrated into the symbolic. Lacan refers
to the objet a not as the object of desire, but as the object-cause of desire.
Objet a forever propels the masculine subject forward, seeking a lost object
he never had to begin with. Nonetheless, within the framework of fantasy,
while objet a is not the object of desire but the cause of desire, various
objects come to function as surrogates or stand-ins for objet a. Within thedomain of unconscious fantasy, these surrogates are thought as that which,if destroyed or gained, would complete the subject, allowing the subject tosurmount the lack that characterizes his being. In this respect, all fantasies
are dual, organized like a Möbius strip, containing both a hypothesis as towhat must be gained in order to surmount lack and a hypothesis as to whatcaused the loss of that object which would complete him. For example, theChapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

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anti-Semite might believe that Jews are responsible for his economic woes
and that money would provide the satisfaction that he seeks. This belief inthe possibility of total jouissance arises from the upper proposition of the
masculine side of the graph of sexuation, ∃x~Φx, and the unconscious
belief that either an uncastrated subject exists or is possible.
Lacan often refers to phallic jouissance or the sort of jouissance foundin objet a as deferred jouissance. As Bruce Fink puts it, “Lacan associates
phallic jouissance with organ pleasure, the pleasure of the genitalia [...];
the idea here is that one must endlessly defer or altogether give up organ
pleasure to obtain another kind of pleasure”.270 Part of the reason for thisdeferral is that, were the subject to actually reunite with the semblanceof objet a, he would discover that the semblance of objet a is not “it”.
Thus, for example, Lacan argues that obsessionals, which are associatedwith masculine sexuation, have a desire for an impossible desire.271
Through a fantasy structure organized around an impossible desire, themasculine subject can thereby sustain his desire and protect against thedisappointment of jouissance coming up short.
In many respects, masculine jouissance can be described as solipsistic
and masturbatory. In Encore, Lacan notoriously claims that there is nosexual relationship.272 In the case of the masculine sexuated subject,
whether biologically male or female and whether one's partner is male orfemale, we can see how this is the case. The masculine sexuated subject
relates not to his partner qua subject, but rather to objet a. Returning toour discussion of the Lacanian clinic in chapter 4, the masculine sexuatedsubject attempts to reduce or abolish the subject as Other, as autopoieticallyclosed, relating only to the Other's demand and objet a. I refer to this wayof relating to the Other and the world as “Malkovichism”. In Spike Jonze's
Being John Malkovich, we are told the strange tale of a passage in an officebuilding that allows you to enter John Malkovich's mind and experience
what it is like to be John Malkovich for fifteen minutes. At a certain pointin the film, John Malkovich becomes wise to what is going on and himself
goes through the passage. When Malkovich goes through the tunnel andexperiences his own experience, he has the harrowing experience of seeing
everyone else, male and female, with his own head, speaking not ordinary
language, but endlessly repeating his name: “Malkovich! Malkovich!

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Malkovich!” In short, Malkovich is forcibly confronted with his own
narcissism and phallic economy of jouissance. What we encounter here iscorrelationism in its purest form. Within the correlationist frame of thought,
the world is reduced to a passive screen that merely reflects our intentions,meanings, signs, narratives, and discourses. Within the masculine economy
of jouissance, one relates not to the partner but to Žižek's ticklish object
which functions like a strange attractor bringing the subject into existence.
In this connection, Lacan makes the joke that masculine jouissance is“hommosexual”. Here Lacan is punning on the French “homme” or “male”,
and “homosexuality”. His point is not that all men are homosexuals, butrather that masculinely sexuated subjects desire the same or identity andtherefore strive to banish the alterity encountered in desire. Lacan's point is
not that men only desire other men, but rather that masculine desire desires
the same in the form of objet a or the fetish object.
On the feminine side of the graph of sexuation we encounter a very
different form of jouissance. On the one hand, we see not one arrow, as in
the case of masculine sexuation, but rather two arrows. On the other hand,
we see not the barred subject, , but rather the barred “”.  refers to
non-existent woman that cannot be totalized under a single category or
identity. In the lower portion of the feminine side of the graph of sexuation,
we see an arrow pointing at Φ. Here we encounter the polysemy of Lacan'smathemes. In this context, Φ does not seem to represent the phallic
function or castration, but rather power, potency, or a master. Lacan's
somewhat sexist thesis here seems to be that the feminine sexuated subject,
whether biological male or female, can find jouissance by identifying with apartner that embodies Φ. Such a subject might be someone that possesses
political power, knowledge, celebrity, prestige, physical strength, skill,and so on. The idea would thus be that the feminine sexuated subject,
who can find no signifier within the symbolic to define or fix her identity,
identifies with Φ so as to confer an identity upon herself. Whereas marks the inability for language to complete or totalize itself and therefore
an inability to produce a fixed or stable identity within the symbolic, Φcreates the illusion of a fixed or stable identity. In this regard we can see theimpossibility of the sexual relation in terms of feminine sexuation, insofar as

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the femine sexuated subject relates to his partner not as a subject but as asemblance of Φ.
This reading of  as it relates to Φ seems to recommend itself as aconsequence of Lacan's discourse of the hysteric, which Lacan associateswith the feminine. In the discourse of the hysteric, we have the barredsubject addressing itself to the master or master-signifier, demanding to be
told what it is:a // 
In the discourse of the hysteric, the subject addresses the Other ormaster from the standpoint of his split. This split results from the inabilityof the symbolic or language to provide the subject with a signifier thatwould fix or name his identity within the symbolic. In short, the hystericalsubject calls on the other to tell him what he is. This inability of language
to provide a signifier that would found the subject arises from the essenceof language itself. As Lacan remarks in The Logic of Fantasy, “it is of thenature of each and every signifier that it cannot signify itself”.273 Insofar
as the signifier cannot signify itself, it always requires another signifier toproduce effects of signification. In this respect, signifiers have the structureof sets that do not include themselves, and Lacan does not hesitate to draw
a parallel with Russell's paradox pertaining to the impossibility of a set of
all sets that do not include themselves. The net result of this is that there
cannot be a “universe of discourse” or totality of language because it will
always be beset by paradox from within.274 The consequence of this is that
there can be no stable signifier that could ground the subject's identity,
for each signifier will necessarily refer to another signifier without any
possibility of completeness. It is this structure of language that accounts
for the divided structure of the subject. Moreover, in the position of truthin the discourse of the hysteric, we encounter objet a as that remainderthat is always lost within language. It is this remainder that literally drives
the subject forward, forever looking for that signifier that would ground
identity, and further alienating himself through his speech. The productof this discourse, we note, is knowledge, S2, produced as a result of the260

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hysteric's demand. Indeed, Lacan claims that the discourse of the hystericis the only discourse that produces knowledge.275 In this connection, we
can treat Φ and the master or S1 to which the hysteric addresses himself asequivalent.
At this point, there are a couple of points worth noting. Attentive
readers will have noted that I have been referring to the hysterical subject inmasculine terms. First, while Lacan associates hysteria with the feminine,
any neurotic subject that undergoes analysis must enter into the discourseof the hysteric or begin asking the question “what am I for the Other?”
Second, and more fundamentally, however, both Lacan and Freud argue
that the subject is, at root, a hysterical subject. As Žižek puts it, “the statusof the subject as such is hysterical. The subject is constituted through his
own division, splitting, as to the object in him; this object, this traumatic
kernel, is the dimension that we have already named as that of 'death drive',of a traumatic imbalance, a rooting out”.276 If the subject is hysterical at its
core, then this is because both masculine and feminine neurotic subjects
undergo the same alienation in language and therefore encounter the same
paradoxical structure of language with respect to its inability to totalize orcomplete itself. In this vein, Žižek goes on to remark that,hysteria and obsessional neurosis are not two species ofneurosis as a neutral-universal genus; their relation isa dialectical one—it was Freud himself who noted thatobsessional neurosis is a kind of “dialectic of hysteria”:
hysteria as a fundamental determination of a neurotic
position contains two species, obsessional neurosis and itself as
its own species.277
At root, at the most fundamental level, the subject is hysterical in its
structure such that obsessional neurosis is a subspecies of hysteria.
The importance of this observation is not to be underestimated. If it
is true that subjectivity is at root hysterical, if it is true that obsession isa subspecies of hysteria, and if it is true that hysteria is associated withfeminine sexuation and obsessional neurosis is associated with masculine
sexuation, we find that we are able to invert a fundamental characterizationof woman throughout Western history. Generally we hear that woman isChapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

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characterized by masquerade, deception, semblance, inconsistency, and soon. However, in light of the foregoing, it would appear that in point of fact
it is masculinity that is a charade, a semblance, a masquerade. And indeed,this is clearly visible in Lacan's discourse of the master.

 // aLacan associates the discourse of the master with obsessional neurosis
and therefore with masculine sexuation. In the position of truth in thelower left-hand corner of this discourse, we witness the barred subject, $,which is nothing other than the hysterical subject. As a consequence, themaster-signifier that appears in the position of the agent in the upper lefthand corner must be a charade, a semblance, or a masquerade. What theforegoing entitles us to claim is thus that the feminine side of the graph ofsexuation is the structure of truth, whereas the masculine side of the graphof sexuation is the side of semblance. Moreover, we can now say that the
totalization that masculine sexuation attempts to effect through the logic ofexception is a semblance that strives to erase and cover over the constitutive
split of being.
The second arrow on the feminine side of the graph of sexuation
points not to Φ, but rather to S(). S() refers to what Lacan calls “Other
jouissance”, which is a form of jouissance outside the symbolic that Lacan
associates with the experience of mystics.278 Because not-all of woman issubject to the phallic function, the feminine sexuated subject, whether maleor female, is capable of a jouissance outside the symbolic. Echoing Lacan's
thesis that masculine sexuated subjects are “hommosexual”, we could saythat in light of Other jouissance, S(), feminine sexuated subjects are thetrue “hetero-sexuals”. Here the “hetero” of hetero-sexual should not beread as claiming that women only desire men, but rather that feminine
sexuality is structured in such a way that it is capable of desiring alterity or
the Other qua Other, regardless of whether the other subject is biologicallymale or female.
Having made this detour through Lacan's graphs of sexuation interms of desire and jouissance, I now turn to the question of how these262

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structures relate to flat ontology. We have already seen that Lacan's graphsof sexuation have no clear or unambiguous link to biological sex or gender.
Biologically male subjects can occupy the feminine side, just as biologicallyfeminine subjects can occupy the masculine side. Moreover, we have seen
that, as structures, these graphs are able to represent a wide variety ofdiverse formations. Likewise we have seen that the graphs represent failuresof totalization. Finally, we have seen that the masculine side of the graphof sexuation refers to semblance, whereas the feminine side of the graph ofsexuation refers to truth.
Without excluding the reading of Lacan's graphs in terms of sexuation,
desire, and jouissance, I propose to read these graphs in terms of ontologicaldiscourse and, in particular, in terms of withdrawal. This reading is notdesigned to have any argumentative or demonstrative force, but rather isdesigned to outline how the discourse of onticology and object-oriented
ontology differ from other ontological discourses. Moreover, this treatmentof onticology in terms of the graphs of sexuation will, I hope, allow us tosee more clearly what is entailed by a flat ontology. Under this reading,the phallic function or Φ is no longer treated as the phallic function or
castration, but rather as the ontological function of withdrawal. In theforegoing, we have already seen how objects are constitutively withdrawn
from other objects. This withdrawal takes two forms: on the one hand,
objects are withdrawn in the sense that they are always in excess of anyof their local manifestations. Objects always have a virtual domain that isnever exhausted by any of their local manifestations. On the other hand,
objects are withdrawn in the sense that they are never directly perturbed
or “irritated” by other objects, but rather always translate perturbations
into information according to their own endo-structure, organization, or
distinctions. Φ refers to this constitutive withdrawal of objects.
In this respect, the two sides of Lacan's graphs of sexuation refer tothe manner in which different ontological discourses handle or treat thisdimension of withdrawal within objects. Rather than referring to thesestructures as “masculine” and “feminine”, I now refer to the two sidesof Lacan's graphs as ontologies of presence and ontologies of withdrawal
respectively. Likewise, ontologies of presence can be referred to as
ontologies of transcendence, whereas ontologies of withdrawal can beChapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

263

referred to as ontologies of immanence. Ontologies of transcendence refer
to ontologies where some being or term stands apart from the world,
thereby immunized from withdrawal. Such ontologies are organized aroundthe logic of exception outlined in the foregoing. By contrast, ontologies ofimmanence refuse any such term, treating all of being as composed of asingle flat plane in which all beings are subject to withdrawal. Both forms
that ontology takes relate to withdrawal but do so in very different ways.
On the side of ontologies of transcendence, we encounter the following
propositions: ∃x~Φx and ∀xΦx. The first proposition now reads, “there
exists an entity such that that entity is not withdrawn”. The second
proposition now reads, “for all entities, these entities are withdrawn”. As
abstract as this formulation is, it allows us, I believe, to capture the core
hypothesis of philosophies of presence or ontotheology. On the one hand,
whether we're speaking of the God of ontotheology or the traditional
subject of philosophy embodied in Descartes' thought, we encounter aterm that is not itself withdrawn, but which is fully present to itself. This istrue even of Hume's mind or Kant's structure of experience, where theircritiques of metaphysics are premised on some form of consciousness orexperience that is present to itself, but where there is no direct access toother objects. Hume, for example, is able to advance his critique of causality
and the notion that objects are inhabited by “hidden powers” while arguingthat cause and effect relations are associations drawn by mind on the
grounds that mind is present to itself, whereas causal relations and powers
are withdrawn from mind. Likewise, Kant is able to argue that substance,
for example, is a category imposed by mind on the manifold of intuition
producing phenomena, while also arguing that things-in-themselves are
unknowable on the grounds that mind is present to itself, while objects arewithdrawn. A good deal of philosophy influenced by the linguistic turn has
this structure as well. Language here is treated as what is present, whereas
objects are withdrawn. Finally, in theology, within this framework God istreated as a fully self-present term, while all of God's creatures are treatedas finite, imperfect, and incomplete.
What we find in all variants of the ontologies of presence andtranscendence is thus a term that is treated as present or immune to thefunction of withdrawal. As a consequence of this structure, withdrawal

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comes to appear as accidental rather than as an essential feature of all
objects. Withdrawal is treated as something to be overcome, rather thanas a structural feature of being. Here we encounter the function of objet
a in ontologies of presence. Objet a is that remainder or leftover within
representation that eludes complete presence. However, the premise hereis that this remainder is not a constitutive feature of the being itself, butrather is an accidental feature of the relativity of our representations. Put
a bit differently, objects are seen as withdrawn for-us and fully present inthemselves. In this regard, withdrawal is a sort of “optical effect” produced
as a result of how our representations hook on to the world, rather than as astructural feature of objects themselves. This is true even of skeptical variantsof ontologies of presence such as Hume's where the thesis is not that
entities are in-themselves withdrawn, but rather where the thesis is that wehave no direct access to entities by virtue of how we represent entities.
This discussion of ontologies of transcendence provides me with theopportunity to distinguish between epistemological realism and ontologicalrealism, the latter of which is advocated by onticology and object-oriented
philosophy. Any confusion of the ontological realism advocated byonticology and object-oriented philosophy and epistemological realism isdoomed to be disastrous, as these two forms of realism belong to entirely
different registers. Epistemological realism is a variant of the ontologies
of presence that strives to bring objects or the world to presence in an
adequate representation. The concern of epistemological realism is torepresent the world and objects as they are and to sort between true
representations, illusions, and superstitions. As such, epistemologicalrealism treats the withdrawal of objects as an accident that can, in
principle, be overcome by the proper form of inquiry. It is for this reason
that epistemological realisms remain within the domain of ontologies ofpresence or ontotheology.
The ontological realism advocated by onticology and objectoriented philosophy, by contrast, is what Graham Harman has calleda weird realism.279 The realism advocated by object-oriented ontology
and onticology is not an epistemological thesis, but an ontological thesis.
This realism is not a thesis about how we know things, but rather about
how things are. On the one hand, onticology refuses to reduce entities

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to constructions by other entities. To be sure, every entity translates theother entities to which it relates, yet these translations must be rigorously
distinguished from the entities that are translated. In this regard, every
entity is an irreducible entity in its own right. On the other hand, onticology
and object-oriented philosophy are the thesis that entities are constitutively
withdrawn from one another. In other words, withdrawal is not an
accidental feature of how mind represents entities, but is rather a structuralfeature of what beings or entities are as such. In this regard, onticology
and object-oriented philosophy are able to retain many of the insights
of anti-realism, while situating them in ontological terms. Here, followingŽižek, onticology and object-oriented philosophy can proclaim that we arehealed by the spear that smote us.280 Withdrawal, far from being an accidentof how mind, representation, or language hooks on to being, is instead a
constitutive feature of all beings.
Turning to the ontologies of immanence, we now encounter twovery different propositions: ~∃x~Φx and ~∀xΦx. If these propositions
characterize an ontology of immanence, then this is because there is nolonger a transcendental term that is exempted from withdrawal. Rather, as
the first proposition reads, there does not exist an entity that is not subject
to withdrawal. If, for example, God exists, God is necessarily withdrawn
with respect to itself and God's creatures are withdrawn from God. In
short, even God has no privileged or omniscient access to its creatures, noreven to himself. Likewise, subjects are both withdrawn from themselves
and other beings are withdrawn from subjects. Withdrawal is thus not an
accidental feature of beings, but is rather a constitutive feature of beings.
Moreover, withdrawal is not simply a relation between one entity andanother, but is the core of each entity itself. In this regard, every entity, up
to and including God if God exists, is like a Lacanian divided or barredsubject, , such that, regardless of whether or not it is related to anotherentity, each entity is withdrawn with respect to itself. Put differently,
no entity is fully self-present to itself, but rather every entity necessarily
contains blind spots or is opaque to itself. Withdrawal here is the very
structure of entities, not an accidental relation of how one entity relates toanother entity. In short, such ontologies are ontologies of immanence inthat no entity escapes withdrawal either for-itself or in-itself.

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However, while there is no entity that is not subject to withdrawal, theside of the graph pertaining to ontologies of immanence also indicatesthat not all of entities are withdrawn. This thesis is expressed by the lower
proposition on the feminine side of the graph of sexuation. Here somethingof the entity manifests or presents itself in the world through actualization
or local manifestation. In short, withdrawal is never so thorough, never socomplete, that local manifestation in one form or another is impossible.
Returning to the themes of chapter two, we thus encounter the basic
structure of objects in the relation between the top and bottom propositions
on the feminine side of Lacan's graph of sexuation. There we saw that thebasic structure of objects is to simultaneously be withdrawn and selfothering. No object directly relates to another object and every object is inexcess of any of its actualizations, yet objects undergo self-othering throughtheir local manifestations. Something of the object presents itself to theworld. However, here we must be careful to note that this presentation or
local manifestation is not a presentation to the gaze of a subject, but rather
is an event that takes place in the world regardless of whether any entity ispresent to register this local manifestation.
The difference between ontologies of transcendence and ontologies
of immanence is thus evident. In the case of ontologies of transcendence,
withdrawal is an accidental feature of objects. Here, while objects might
indeed be withdrawn from us, objects are entirely present to themselves.
Moreover, subject, mind, and language are invariably treated as present or
immune to withdrawal within these ontologies. In the case of ontologies ofimmanence, by contrast, withdrawal is not an accident, but a constitutive
feature of all objects. Withdrawal constitutes the very structure or beingof their being. Here objects are not only withdrawn from themselves suchthat every object is akin to a Lacanian divided subject, , but objects arealways withdrawn from one another. In this regard, local manifestation
is not a presentation of an object that presents “part” of the withdrawn
object such that, were there enough local manifestations, the object would
be completely presented and withdrawal would be overcome. Rather, local
manifestation is always the production or creation of a new quality that
actualizes powers of the virtual proper being of the object without rendering
virtual proper being itself present. Virtual proper being is necessarily abyssal

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267such that it never comes to presence. In this respect, the agency of virtual
proper being can only ever be inferred through the variety of qualities anobject produces in its local manifestation. It can never itself be directly
encountered for, as we saw in chapter 3, virtual proper being is structured
without being qualitative.
Within discourses organized around ontologies of immanence, themathemes populating the lower portion of the feminine side of Lacan's
graphs of sexuation now take on a new valence. S() continues to signify
Other jouissance, yet Other jouissance is no longer an ineffable jouissanceoutside the symbolic, but rather is an attentiveness to what Timothy
Morton has called “the strange stranger”. Describing the strange stranger,
Morton writes,[t]he strange stranger [...] is something or someone whose
existence we cannot anticipate. Even when strange strangers
showed up, even if they lived with us for a thousand years,
we might never know them fully—and we would never knowwhether we had exhausted our getting-to-know process.281
Indeed, the strange strangers can never be exhausted precisely because
withdrawal is a constitutive feature of being. However, it would be a
mistake to suppose that the strange strangers are objects other than us. To
think the strange strangers in these terms would be to think them in termsof a binary based on identity. On the one hand, there would be the familiar,
the heimlich, while on the other hand there would be the strange stranger,
the unfamiliar, the unheimlich. The strange stranger would constitute itself
as the strange stranger by virtue of its lack of proximity to the heimlich or
the familiar. It would be that which is different from. And in being different
from, it would be a difference based on identity or the same.
The concept of the strange stranger, however, is a concept withouta binary. Rather the multiple-composition of being consists of strange
strangers all the way down. And in this regard, we ourselves are strange
strangers not only to other entities, but above all to ourselves insofar as
withdrawal is not merely a relation of one entity to another, but also a
relation of entities to themselves. Ontological discourses premised on
immanence thus relate both to themselves and other objects qua strange

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strangers. Such discourses welcome the other as a strange stranger andacknowledge the strange stranger within themselves or their constitutive
being as self-othering. In this regard, discourses of immanence are notunlike the ethics Lacan ascribes to the analyst. As Lacan remarks,[t]he analyst's desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire toobtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when,confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the
first time, in a position to subject himself to it. There only
may the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it isoutside the limits of the law, where alone it may live.282
Ontologies of immanence strive to relate to themselves and others
as strange strangers, in and through their differences. They welcomethat difference, remaining open to the possibility of surprise, refusing to
reduce strange strangers to fixed identities. In this regard, they practicethe difference between local manifestation and virtual proper being. In
other words, philosophies of immanence recognize the locality of local
manifestation and the openness and excess of virtual proper being, refusing
any reduction of the being of beings to their local manifestations. It is thisexcess that accounts for the strangeness of the strange stranger. Strange
strangers always harbor an excess within them that refuses any reduction to
local manifestation.
The difference between how ontologies of transcendence and how
ontologies of immanence relate to objects can be illustrated in terms of
Lacan's discourse of the master.

 // aOne way of thinking about Lacan's discourses are as little machines thatpropel a certain discourse forward. Here the product of each discourse (thelower right-hand corner of the discourse) has a paradoxical status in that
it is simultaneously something produced by the discourse and somethingthat contributes to the continuation of the discourse. In the discourse of themaster, associated with discourses of transcendence, the discourse attempts

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to identify and define objects, yet there is always a remainder, objet a, thatevades identification. Like a Markov chain, this remainder, in its turn,generates a next round of discourse attempting to capture and integrate theremainder. In short, the discourse of the master treats the remainder not
as a constitutive feature of all objects, as the mark of their being as strange
strangers, but rather as an accident to be surmounted and overcome. In
other words, ontologies of transcendence are governed by a telos, even if
impossible, of attaining full presence.
In the case of the graphs of sexuation, we have already seen how
masculine sexuation is a structure of semblance whereas feminine sexuation
is a structure of truth. Masculine sexuation is a reaction to the fundamental
split of being that attempts to surmount this split and cover it over throughthe enaction of an exception. This carries over into the difference between
ontologies of presence and transcendence and ontologies of immanence
and withdrawal. However, the seeds of this erasure of withdrawal canalready be detected within ontological discourses organized aroundwithdrawal. Within ontological discourses organized around immanence, Φmarks that tendency within ontologies of immanence to erase withdrawal.
Φ marks the yearning or desire for full plenitude or actuality that erases
the strange stranger. As such, Φ is the seed within immanence upon which
the semblance of an exception is constructed. However, as we will recall
from the discourse of the master, any exception, S1, veils $, the barredsubject, in the position of truth. In other words, S1, whether in the form ofa master-signifier, a transcendental subject, God, consciousness or mind isa semblance or masquerade that cloaks and disguises its own withdrawal,
parading itself as fully present or actual.
Lacan's graphs of sexuation allow us to make our first pass at what
constitutes a flat ontology. In the first approximation, flat ontology consistsin the thesis that there are no transcendent terms, no exceptions, nopositions “out-of-field”, with respect to withdrawal. Here being is flat in
the precise sense that all beings are characterized by withdrawal and selfothering. In this regard, all beings that populate the multiple-compositionof being are strange strangers. The consequence of this is a democracy of
strange strangers. Where there is no hegemon that stands above and outside
withdrawal as a full actuality, there is only a flat plane composed of strange

270 Levi R. Bryant

strangers. As Morton puts it, “[d]emocracy implies coexistence; coexistence
implies encounters between strange strangers”.283

6.2. The World Does Not Exist
Crucial to the flat ontology proposed by onticology is the thesis that theworld does not exist. Alternatively, we could say that the whole does notexist. Here I am deeply indebted to Alain Badiou's Logics of Worlds andTimothy Morton's dark ecology proposed in Ecology Without Nature. In
Logics of Worlds, Badiou demonstrates that every concept of the Wholeis beset by inconsistency.284 In Ecology Without Nature, Morton argues
that we must abandon the concept of nature as a unified whole or milieu
within which beings reside and with respect to which humans and culture
constitute an outside such that nature is always “over there”.285 To mythinking, Morton's conception of being without nature shares a great dealof affinity to Latour's concept of “collectives”. In Pandora's Hope, Latour
writes that,[u]nlike society, which is an artifact imposed by the modernist
settlement, [the concept of collectives] refers to associationsof humans and nonhumans. While a division between natureand society renders invisible the political process by which thecosmos is collected in one livable whole, the word “collective”
makes this process central.286
Setting aside Latour's reference to politics, the concept of “society”
is, according to Latour, based on a distribution or enclosure of beings
where nature and society are treated as two already collected wholes thatare somehow supposed to relate to one another while remaining entirely
distinct. Society is treated as the domain of all that pertains to the humanin the form of freedom, agency, meaning, signs, and so on, while nature istreated as the domain of brute causality and mechanism without agency.
As a distinction, the concept of society thus encourages us to focus oncontent and agency, ignoring the role that nonhuman actors or objects playin collectives involving human beings. Within the distinction pertaining
to nature, nature is treated as already gathered and unified and we areChapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

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encouraged to focus on causality and mechanism alone. By contrast,
in proposing that we replace the concept of society with the concept ofcollectives, Latour encourages us to attend to how associations between
humans and nonhumans are formed.
In arguing that nature does not exist, Morton challenges the notionthat there is an outside to nature or that nature is something other, outside
the domain of society. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, [t]here is no suchthing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one
within the other and couples the machines together”.287 Neither nature norbeing is an outside that we must stretch to reach or that is encounteredwhen taking a stroll on Black Forest woodland paths, but rather being an
immanent field without outside or other. And here, when Deleuze andGuattari refer to machines, I see no reason not to treat these machines asobjects. In short, a collective is an entanglement of human and nonhumanactors or objects. However, here it is important to be cautious, for while
there are indeed collectives of human and nonhuman objects or actors, wemust not conclude that collectives as such are composed of human andnonhuman actors. Collectives can just as easily be collectives of tardigrades
and other objects, collectives of planets and asteroids, and so on without
any human involvement whatsoever. In short, what's important about theconcept of collectives is that they mark, like the concept of regimes of
attraction, entanglements of objects in a network or mesh. If Morton is so
eager to abandon the concept of nature within ecological thought, thenthis is not, I take it, because he wishes to reduce all of being to culture,but because in order to properly think ecologically we must overcome thenotion that nature is a closed whole or totality “over there” or outside ofhuman relations.
If it is so vital for flat ontology to establish that the world does notexist, then this is because the world must not be treated as a milieu in
which beings or objects are contained as parts to a whole. In short, if flat
ontology is to truly be flat, then it is necessary to establish that the worldis not a container within which beings are found. Alternatively, it must be
shown that the world is not a super-object composed of all other objects
as sub-multiples that form a harmonious whole consisting of beings ascomplementary and inter-locking parts. As such, following Badiou, there272

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is not world, but rather worlds. The universe, which is really only a mannerof speaking, is a pluriverse or multiplicity of universes. Here, then, it isimportant to observe the role of the definite article in the thesis that “theworld does not exist”. Generally when we speak of “the world” we mean
this as shorthand for the totality of all that exists. The thesis that the world
does not exist is the thesis that no such totality exists nor is it possible forsuch a totality to be formed. Rather being consists entirely of objects andcollectives.
There are two ways of arguing that the world doesn't exist, the firstof which has already been hinted at in chapter five in the context of
mereology. Within the domain of formal reasoning, Z-F set theory shows
the inconsistency of any attempt to form a totality or whole. Set theory
provides a variety of resources for contesting the consistency of any totality
or whole, however, here I'll focus on the power set axiom. As we've alreadyseen, the power set axiom allows one to take the set of all subsets of an
initial set. Thus, if we have a set composed of elements {a, b, c}, the power
set of this set would be {{a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}}. At thelevel of formal reasoning, if the power set axiom spells the ruin of any whole
or totality, then this is because it reveals the existence of a bubbling excess
within any whole or collection.
This is a variation of Cantor's Paradox. Cantor's paradox demonstrates
that there can be no greatest cardinal number precisely because the power
set of any cardinal number will necessarily be larger than the cardinal
number itself. In a stunning inversion of the ancient thesis that the wholeis greater than the sum of its parts, the power set axiom reveals, to thecontrary, that the parts are always greater than the whole. As I argued in thelast chapter, from a certain perspective each object is a crowd, containing
within itself a plurality of other autonomous objects that very likely “know”
nothing of the object of which they are parts. Any whole that does manage
to establish itself is, as Deleuze has put it, a “One or Whole so special thatit results from the parts without altering the fragmentation or disparity of
those parts, and, like the dragons of Balbec or Vinteuil's phrase, is itself
valid as a part alongside others, adjacent to others”.288 What the power
set reveals is the bubbling pluralism of “the” world beneath any unity orChapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

273

totality. Any totality or whole, in its turn, is itself an object or One alongside
all sorts of other ones.
At the formal level, the real force of the power set axiom lies in themanner in which it reveals the possibility of a multiplicity of relations
and objects within any collective. It will be recalled that any exo-relation
between objects is potentially itself also an object. If we ask the strange
question, “when is an object?” we can answer this question with the
hypothesis that an object is when exo-relations among other objects
manage to attain operational closure such that their aggregate or multiplecomposition becomes capable of encountering perturbations as informationin terms of their own endo-consistency. On the one hand, the power
set axiom reveals the possibility of a plurality of other objects within any
collective. On the other hand, the power set axiom discloses the possibilityof alternative exo-relations among objects, not present in the whole fromwhich the subsets are drawn. Finally, the power set axiom reveals thepossibility of withdrawing objects from their relations to collectives sothat they might function as autonomous actors, either entering into othercollectives, subsystems, or going it alone within the order of being.
If, from the standpoint of formal reasoning, the Whole is not, the One isnot, or the world does not exist, then this is precisely because these subsets,
these other possible objects and relations populating the power set of theWhole or alleged One are neither counted nor countable within the Wholeor One. In short, every Whole or One contains an excess within it that is notitself treated as a part of the Whole or One. Put differently, such subsets areincluded in the set from which they are drawn, without belonging to it. Yet
it is precisely this absence of belonging or membership that spells the ruinof the Whole, One, or World.
However, while the formal reasoning of set theory provides us theresources for thinking the nonexistence of the world, it does not establish
the nonexistence of the world. Confronted with the formal demonstrationof excess bubbling within any Whole or totality, one can easily respond bypointing out that, as provocative as these formal demonstrations are, theconcept of World pertains not to what is possible, but to what actually exists.
In this regard, the demonstration that any collection could contain otherobjects and relations does not establish that the World does contain other274 Levi R. Bryant

objects and relations not counted within that totality. Since the conceptof World pertains to those relations and objects that do actually exist, theformal demonstration of the inexistence of the World has no purchase on
the thesis that the World exists.
If it is to be established that the World does not exist, then what isrequired is not a demonstration of the possibility of the ruin of any Whole,
but rather the demonstration that in fact the World does not exist. The
resources for this second argument have already been developed in mydiscussion of operational closure in chapter four. There we saw that every
object is operationally closed such that it constitutes its own system/
environment distinction. The paradox of this distinction is that, while it isa distinction between system and environment, the distinction itself falls
on one side of what it distinguishes: the system. In short, the environment/
system distinction refers not to two present-at-hand entities, systems
and environments, but is rather constituted by systems themselves. Thisdistinction, in its turn, constitutes the entity's openness to its environment,
and that openness is always of a selective nature. However, here we must
be careful to distinguish between the environment of a system and systems
in the environment of a system. While an object does indeed constitute its
environment in the sense of constituting those sorts of perturbations towhich it is open, objects do not constitute other objects or systems in theirenvironment. At best, working on the premise that an object is open tosome other systems in its environment, an object translates perturbations it
receives from these other objects.
Two points follow from these observations. First, insofar as environment
is constituted by the object “drawing” the distinction between system andenvironment, it cannot be said that environments are a present-at-handmilieu in which objects exist. As we saw in chapter five in connection
with our discussion of developmental systems theory, objects constructtheir environment even as they are often buffeted by perturbations fromsystems in their environment. Second, and in a closely related vein, because
objects are only selectively open to their environments, it follows that
objects are not open to all systems in their environment. The tardigrade
does not belong to the environment of a tree, nor does the tree belong to
the environment of a tardigrade. Likewise, my three-year-old daughter,

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qua social subject, does not belong to the environment of her toy box.
No matter how much my daughter yells at the lid of her toy box when it
accidentally falls down upon her head—and she does, indeed, yell andcurse, in her own way, the toy box—the toy box does not respond or bow to
her will. While she might address her toy box as “little brother” for reasonsthat thoroughly baffle me, the toy box is indifferent to her designations
and scoldings. One might object that certainly the acoustic resonances ofher scolding voice perturb the toy box and such an objection would not be
mistaken. However, the manner in which the vibrations of this tiny voiceaffect the polished oak wood of the toy chest do not entail that that oaken
toy box transforms these perturbations into information qua voice. Sadly,
for my daughter, that toy box is as dense as wood.
With Leibniz, perhaps, we can say that there are as many worlds as there
are objects. What we cannot say, however, is that the World forms any sortof organic unity or whole in which all objects interrelate with one anotheras a compossible system. There is no world-system precisely because there
is no World. On the one hand, contrary to Whitehead, it simply isn't the casethat every entity relates to every other entity. Many entities fall completely
outside local collectives such that they are both entirely oblivious to thesecollectives and such that these collectives are entirely oblivious to them. Put
differently, there are a number of instances in which there is absolutely noresonance between entities. Quite literally, they belong to entirely different
universes. As in the case of neutrinos that are unable to relate to mostother particles due to their neutral charge, scientists have to painstakingly
create apparatuses capable of bringing these entities into relation with theentities of our world. On the other hand, even in those instances whereentities do relate, each entity relates to other entities on its own terms as afunction of the distinctions it draws and its own peculiar organization. As
a consequence, there is no whole or totality that can be formed out of theentities that populate the world.
The thesis that the World forms an organic totality where no suchtotality exists surreptitiously treats the collective as already formed, as
already being there, without attending to any of the work and translations
required for collectives to come into being. It treats collectives asaccomplished, while ignoring the arduous work required for any collective

to form itself. As such, it ignores the antagonisms that populate being aswell as the lack of resonance between all sorts of objects. While the ideaof the World as an organic and harmonious unity might prove comforting
and reassuring, providing us with the sense that we belong to a Whole inwhich each entity has its proper place, such a conception of being does a
profound injustice to the entities that populate the multiple-compositionof being and ends up recapitulating the discourse of the master and thelogic of ontologies of transcendence. Put differently, concepts of World as
an organic Whole or totality foreclose the strange stranger. Each entity, thestory runs, has its proper place within the organic totality and is definedby its relation to all others. What is thereby abolished is the non-relation ofeach and every relation and the recognition of that which is entirely nonrelational with respect to any particular collective or entity.
If conceptualizations of the World premised on the organic unity of theWhole recapitulate the logic of the discourse of the master and ontologies
of transcendence, then this is because such discourses inevitably must haverecourse to some entity that perturbs the “natural” order, preventing itfrom existing harmoniously as ontologies of the World dictate. It is always
Man, technology, the foreigner and so on that perturbs the “natural”
order. In other words, within the conception of Nature as an organic whole
or totality, there is always recourse to some uncanny agency generating
disharmony that upsets the harmonic natural order. Such conceptions ofbeing necessarily have recourse to objet a as a disruptive agency that upsetsthe “natural” order. Moreover, this disruptive agency, this trickster, to use
Lévi-Strauss's memorable term, is treated as an accident that could returnthe natural order to harmony were it eradicated. As such, discourses about
the existence of the World and the intrinsic harmony of nature end up
repeating the friend/enemy logic analyzed so attentively by Schmitt.
Yet it is not simply that the idea of the World as an organic andharmonic Whole producing objet a as a remainder that is problematic.
Rather, in declaring that the World exists, that the world forms an organic
Whole, all objects are subordinated to the World as parts of the Whole. As
such, their only value and being arises from what they contribute to theWorld or the Whole as elements in this massive machine that swallows them
all up in a total system in which they're integrated. The consequence here isChapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

277that the being of the part is completely effaced, such that the part becomes
merely a functional element providing perturbations that the Whole candraw on in producing information in its own ongoing autopoiesis. Objects
themselves therefore have no autonomy apart from the Whole and simply
are what they are as elements of the Whole. Gaia, it turns out, is either afascist or a totalitarian.
The point here is not that collectives can't be pushed into chaotic basinsof attraction that spell their destruction, or, at least, bifurcation, down theroad, but rather that these strange strangers are not, to put it in Aristotelian/
Scholastic terms, accidents. Put more precisely, these strange strangers are
not outside of worlds, but rather are themselves elements of worlds. The
Luddite thesis that Man, technology, and media are unnatural imposters
that unbalance the natural order of the World is premised on the existenceof a World that never existed to begin with. They treat as ontological what
is, in reality, a covert normative judgment. And again, here the point is notthat normative judgments shouldn't be made, but that these judgments
are made from the standpoint of a particular system or object and do notthemselves determine what is or is not. But more fundamentally, fromthe standpoint of worlds, the harmonic has never existed. It has neverbeen the case that it is merely Man, Technology, or Media that perturbs
Nature. The odds are that at this very moment, somewhere in the universeor the multiverse, there is a massive black hole devouring a solar systemwith a rich and complex ecosystem supporting sentient and intelligent
life. The Black Plague swept across Europe and Asia for decades andcenturies, wiping out massive populations of humans and other creatures.
Precambrian organisms caused the extinction of many of their species
by saturating their environment with oxygen, diluting the carbon dioxidethey needed to thrive. The dinosaurs very likely became extinct as a resultof an asteroid. It is worlds themselves that are out of kilter and lacking inharmony. While we should make the case for certain forms of equilibrium,balance, or harmony, we should refuse to ontologize such claims, treatingthem as reflective of a “Goddess Earth”, and be upfront in the declarationthat these are normative judgments made from the standpoint of aparticular object or system. From the standpoint of the bubonic plague,

278 Levi R. Bryant

sickness is merely a convenient way of replicating itself. In other words, it is
not sickness at all.
The thesis that the world does not exist is crucial to flat ontology so
as to avoid surreptitiously treating as collected that which is not collected.
What the inexistence of the world teaches is that worlds are a work, thatmeshes must be produced, and that they cannot be said to exist in advance.
There is, as Graham Harman has so aptly, beautifully, and poetically put
it in Guerrilla Metaphysics, a “carpentry” of being. That is to say, collectives
must be built by the objects that deign to enter into structural couplings
with one another. In this regard, the inexistence of the world draws ourattention to what Latour has called the “sociology of associations” asopposed to the “sociology of the social”.289 It seems that if he could, Latour
would prefer to abandon the term “sociology” altogether given the mannerin which it is thoroughly contaminated by what he calls “the modernist
constitution”, where nature and society are treated as two entirely distinct
domains. Yet if, contends Latour, the term “sociology” should be retained
then it ought to be retained not as a theory of that peculiar domain ofwhat is unique to the human, but rather as that domain that pertains to
associations, relations, or what Harman calls “the carpentry of being”.
Where the sociology of the social appeals to society, social forces, power,
meaning, language, and a host of other nefarious human-related entities to
explain why people behave as they do, the sociology of associations instead
draws attention to how relations are forged in the creation of assemblages.
The profound difference embodied in Latour's sociology of associations
is not only that it draws attention to relations between humans andnonhumans and how these relations are forged and what impact they have,but that we can imagine a sociology of associations that does not involve
humans at all. This would not simply be a matter of analyzing bee, ant,
and gorilla societies after the fashion of Jane Goodall, but would involvethe investigation of collectives involving no sentient beings whatsoever.
For example, the sociologist of associations might investigate the impact
various storms and winds have on strata and how they manage to maintainsuch remarkable chaotic consistency. In this regard, the molecular biologist
and the chemist are sociologists of association, for they investigate how
particular collectives are forged among particular actors. It just happens

Chapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

279that these collectives are composed not of humans or animals, but of atomsof oxygen, hydrogen, and heavy metals. What is, above all, important toremember for the purposes of flat ontology is not simply that the World
does not exist, but rather that collectives must be forged. Moreover, it
must be remembered that not all entities relate to all other entities andthat like the floating city of George Lucas's Empire Strikes Back, there
are collectives that are unassociated with other collectives and that know
nothing of other collectives. While the thesis that the World does not exist
or that being does not form an organic harmonious totality might appear
to be a grim hypothesis, denying us our oneness and unity with everythingelse, this thesis also embodies the freedom and hope of collectives; for it
entails that we can set about the arduous work of building new collectives
and welcoming unheard of strange strangers, building what are as of yet
unheard of collectives. In other words, the theory that the Whole and Worlddo not exist both promises to free us from a tyrannical collective gone madand offers the possibility of building other collectives. Rather than critique,which is, in its own way and from its own point of view indispensable, thethesis that the world does not exist offers us the activity of composition.

6.3. Being is Flat
The foregoing chapters and sections lead to the conclusion that being is
flat. The flatness of being is embodied in two fundamental claims. First,
in light of our exploration of the interior of objects in chapter four, it
becomes clear that ontologically the bland human-world gap or relationshippossesses no metaphysical priority. As Harman puts it, “object-oriented
philosophy holds that the relation of humans to pollen, oxygen, eagles, orwindmills is no different in kind from the interaction of these objects witheach other”.290 Second, onticology and object-oriented philosophy establish
what might be called a heteroverse or pluriverse, where entities at all levelsof scale, whether natural or cultural, physical or artificial, material orsemiotic are on equal ontological footing. As Ian Bogost puts it, “all beings
equally exist, yet they do not exist equally”.291 Onticology and object-oriented
philosophy therefore democratizes being, asserting not one primary gap
between subjects and objects, humans and world, mind and reality, but

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rather an infinity of gaps or vacuums between objects regardless of whether
humans are involved. Likewise, onticology and object-oriented philosophy
democratize being by defending a plurality of types of objects, ranging fromthe semiotic to the natural. Rather than treating one type of object such as
quantum particles as the really real upon which all else is grounded andto which all else ultimately reduces, flat ontology advocates a pluralism oftypes of objects at all levels of scale that are irreducible to one another. In
other words, objects of different types and at different levels of scale arewhat Aristotle referred to as genuine primary substances.
As Harman has compellingly argued, philosophy, for the last two
hundred or so years, has been obsessed with a single gap between thehuman and the world, treating this gap as metaphysically privileged or
special, unlike all other relations with objects. Within the framework of
onticology and object-oriented philosophy, however, the human-object gap
possesses no privileged status, but is one among many gaps populating aheteroverse. As Harman remarks,[w]hen the things withdraw from presence into their dark
subterranean reality, they distance themselves not only fromhuman beings, but from each other as well. If the humanperception of a house or tree is forever haunted by some
hidden surplus in the things that never become present, thesame is true of the sheer causal interaction between rocks orraindrops.292
From this Harman concludes that, “contrary to the dominantassumption of philosophy since Kant, the true chasm in ontology lies not
between humans and world, but between objects and relations”.293 Far fromthe gap between humans and objects constituting a unique form of relation,
withdrawal is a perfectly ubiquitous relation within being characteristicof all relations between objects. All objects are strange strangers withrespect to one another regardless of whether or not humans are involved inthese relations. Moreover, all objects are strange strangers with respect tothemselves.
Within the framework of onticology, the ubiquity of withdrawal
characteristic of all objects is theorized in terms of the operational closureChapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology281

of objects analyzed in chapter four and the split within objects between
virtual proper being and local manifestation analyzed in chapter three. With
respect to the operational closure of objects, the relation between objects
whether human, social, biological, or inanimate is a non-relation between
objects in which objects never directly touch or encounter one another. Like
Leibniz's windowless monads, each object is a discrete substance or unitof its own, withdrawn from all other objects without any direct relation orcontact. Objects never directly encounter one another, but rather only relate
to one another as translations or information. And information is neversomething transmitted or exchanged by objects, but rather is constituted byeach object as a function of its own internal organization and distinctions.
With respect to the split nature of objects embodied in the split
between virtual proper being and local manifestation, a similar ubiquity ofwithdrawal is encountered. The virtual proper being of objects is abyssal
and subterranean, such that it itself never comes to presence. Virtual proper
being is structured without being qualitative and refers to that domain of
powers and attractors presiding over the actualization of qualities or local
manifestations. Insofar as virtual proper being is thoroughly withdrawn andnever itself becomes present, it can only be inferred through the actual.
It is only through tracking local manifestations and their variations that
we get any sense of the dark volcanic powers harbored within objects. In
other words, through second-order observation or the observation of how
an object relates to the world in its non-relation, we form a hypothetical
diagram of objects or a map of their attractors or powers. However, insofar
as all local manifestations create something new in the form of qualities,
this diagram can only ever be partial, hypothetical, and incomplete
for, as Spinoza so nicely put it, we don't ever completely know what
objects can do.
Nor is the withdrawal of objects ever merely a withdrawal of objects
with respect to one another. Withdrawal is a form of non-relation so
thorough that objects aren't simply withdrawn from one another, but arewithdrawn even from themselves. As we have seen, all objects are akin to
Lacanian divided subjects, $. On the one hand, no object ever actualizes
the subterranean volcanic core with which its virtual proper being ishaunted. This virtual domain is like a reserve or excess that never comes

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to presence. It is not simply that objects are, in themselves, fully actualand only withdrawn for other objects relating to them, but rather that
objects are withdrawn in themselves. On the other hand, the distinctions
or organization by which objects produce information for themselves
are themselves withdrawn or invisible to the object that deploys them.
As we have seen, every distinction necessarily contains two blind spots.
Distinctions are blind to the unmarked space produced as a result of
the distinction. As Luhmann puts it, objects can only see what they can
see and cannot see what they cannot see. Moreover, they do not see thatthey do not see this. Yet in addition to this, objects are blind to their own
operative distinctions. Distinctions can only be observed or used, butnever observed and used. In making indications or interacting with otherobjects, the distinctions that render these indications possible become
thoroughly invisible.
Insofar as withdrawal is ubiquitous, there is no reason to treat thehuman-object relation as metaphysically privileged. The human-object
relation is not a special relation, not a unique relation, but a subset of a far
more pervasive ontological truth that pertains to objects of all types. The
point here is not that we should exclude inquiry into human/object relations
or social/object relations, but rather that these analyses are analyses forregional ontology, for a particular domain of being, not privileged groundsof ontology as such. The issue here is thus very subtle. It is not a questionof excluding the human and the social, but of decentering them from theplace of ontological privilege they currently enjoy within contemporary
philosophy and theory. Nor does this entail that all objects relate to otherobjects in exactly the same way. There are as many forms of translation as
there are types of objects. Indeed, there are as many forms of translation as
there are objects. Moreover, new forms of translation come into being all
the time with the emergence of new objects and with the development ofobjects as analyzed in chapters four and five.
What onticology and, I believe, object-oriented philosophy propose
is therefore a subtle shift in the distinctions governing the marked spaceof what philosophy and theory indicates. Far from seeking to exclude or
eradicate phenomenology and bodies of cultural theory in the name of, forexample, a naturalism or a scientistic materialism, object-oriented ontology

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aims to expand what can be indicated within the domain of philosophy andtheory. Onticology and object-oriented philosophy thus find themselves in
the position of receiving opposite and opposed objections from all sides.
From the culturalists, we receive criticisms declaring that we are rejecting
the human, the subject, meaning, signs, and the social. From the naturalists,
we are accused of wooly-headed thinking that treats social entities, semiotic
entities, texts, films, fictions and so on as real and autonomous entities
within being.
In both cases, however, the rejoinder of object-oriented ontology is thesame. What is objected to with respect to the culturalists is not the thesisthat humans and social entities translate other entities in their own way,
nor the thesis that humans and social entities are not genuine entities, butrather the Malkovichism that arises from privileging the human/world orsocial/world gap. As we saw in 6.1, Malkovichism consists in treating allother objects as blank screens upon which humans project their meanings,
intentions, signs, and signifiers. Malkovich, like Narcissus, sees only
himself in other objects, denying objects their own autonomy and dignity.
The trick of cultural analysis thus lies in demonstrating that what we taketo be the object is rather our own alienated image. What object-oriented
ontology opposes is not the thesis that humans and society translate otherobjects, nor the thesis that humans and societies only encounter objects in“distorted” form in their own interior, but rather the culturalist tendency
to reduce objects to alienated human reflections. To be sure we can, andshould, investigate the manner in which humans and societies translate
objects. Put in more technical terms, we should engage in reflexive secondorder observations of our own distinctions and how they organize ourexperience of the world. Yet having made this concession, we must also
redraw our distinctions in such a way as to make room for nonhumanobjects as autonomous actors in their own right, such that these objects
are not treated as merely passive screens for human projections and suchthat they are treated as perturbing the world in their own way. In otherwords, the point is to expand the domain of what can be investigated,
not to limit it. However, this requires placing objects in the marked spaceof our distinctions and treating humans and societies as entities among
other entities.

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From the naturalists, by contrast, object-oriented ontologists areaccused of treating a variety of psychic and cultural entities as real entities,
ignoring the truth that the only real reality is the material and physicalworld. Put crudely, the naturalist accuses object-oriented ontology oftreating as real what is merely an illusion or derivative. To the ears of
the naturalist, object-oriented ontology thus looks like a form of archculturalism insofar as it treats entities like nations, groups, chairs, films,
and so on as genuinely real entities. To make matters worse, the naturalist
is appalled by the object-oriented thesis that these entities are irreducible
to the physical, material, or natural domain. This ends up getting translated
into the thesis that object-oriented ontology rejects neurology, biology,
chemistry, physics and a host of other “hard sciences”.
However, once again, the point is the same. The aim is not to exclude
or reject the entities explored by the “hard sciences”, but to refuse ahierarchical conception of being where these entities are treated as the“really real” beings and all the others are treated as derivative illusions ormere effects. Here, again, the aim is not to limit inquiry, but to expand
the domain of what can be investigated. With the naturalists, objectoriented ontology agrees that the culturalists or social constructivists haveillicitly reduced nonhuman beings to cultural constructs. With the social
constructivists or culturalists, however, object-oriented ontology refuses totreat social and cultural entities as mere effects of the material and physical.
Rather, object-oriented ontology argues that these entities are genuinely
real entities in their own right. What object-oriented ontology thus objects
to is the reductivism of many naturalist approaches.
However here we must proceed with care. Object-oriented ontology
can readily agree that Supreme Court justices are impossible without
brains, even if often it appears that they don't use their brains. The pointis that brains are one thing and Supreme Court justices are another thing.
Being a Supreme Court justice is irreducible to being a brain. Here we
encounter considerations of both mereology and operational closure. Ina rather bizarre formulation, we can ask ourselves whether Antonin Scalia
is a Supreme Court justice. Initially the answer would appear to be an
obvious yes, unless, somehow, Scalia is an imposter. However, within theframework of onticology, matters are not so simple. Supreme Court justices

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are elements within a particular object, namely, the United States. Like allother objects, this object is operationally closed, relating only to itself. As
such, Scalia, the individual psychic system, belongs not to that object that
contains Justice Scalia as an element, but rather to the environment of that
object. Put differently, Scalia the individual psychic system belongs to theenvironment of Justice Scalia the element within a particular larger scale
object. Moreover, insofar as the individual psychic system Scalia is itself
an operationally closed object, it follows that Scalia's brain belongs to theenvironment of Scalia the individual psychic system. Insofar as Scalia's brain,such as it is, belongs to the environment of the individual psychic system
Scalia, and insofar as Scalia belongs to the environment of that object that
contains Justice Scalia as a member, it follows that Scalia's brain can only
perturb Scalia the individual psychic system, and that Scalia the psychic
system can only perturb the social-system or object that contains JusticeScalia as an element. In other words, each of these objects is withdrawn
from the other such that each operates in terms of its own operational
closure translating perturbations from one another into information.
In this regard, Scalia's brain has little to tell us about Justice Scalia.
Put differently, Justice Scalia is irreducible to the individual psychic
system Scalia, and the individual psychic system Scalia is irreducible to
Scalia's brain. Instead, what we get is something akin to a high voltage
Jacob's Ladder where sparks leap from non-communicating object to noncommunicating object with each of these objects being irreducible to one
another. At this point, I imagine the naturalist protesting that I'm proposing
a thoroughly obscurantist universe populated by all sorts of occult
substances like so many ghosts. Am I not here suggesting that Scalia is an
immaterial soul and, were it not problematic enough to posit immaterial
souls for individuals, have I not now multiplied the sorts of souls that exist
through the postulation of even stranger objects like groups, societies, roles,
and so on? Is not Ockham spinning in his grave in response to my lack ofontological parsimony?
However, I have already developed the resources for responding to thiscriticism in section 5.3 where I addressed the ontology of structure. Whileemergent entities are indeed irreducible to smaller scale entities, this does
not entail that they violate any laws of physics or material reality. As we saw

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in 5.3, the defining feature of structure lies in the manner in which relations
among elements making up the endo-structure of an entity or system areconstrained. Nothing about these constraints violates the laws of physics
or the findings of neurology, however the laws of physics and the findingsof neurology cannot themselves account for why relations among elements
are constrained or structured in this particular way. It is this nature ofconstraints or structures that accounts for the irreducibility of larger-scale
objects. In a fine discussion of causality and emergence, Protevi writes,[t]he concept of emergence entails reciprocal or circularcausality. Upward causality is the emergence of systematic
focused capacities (the parts of a system function in sucha way as to provide for capacities of the system that theindividual parts do not possess), and downward causality
is the constraint on the behavior of component parts thatenables systematic-capacities (the whole exerts an influenceon the parts that now have a reduced field of action).294
With emergence, higher scale objects take on a life of their own thatcan only be accounted for in terms of their own organization. Such objects
begin to constitute their own elements through their own elements. Hereupward causality refers to the manner in which elements of the object
produce the object, whereas downward causality refers to the manner inwhich the object constrains and structures its elements. What we get here isa system-specific causality, unique to each object, that while dependent onlower-scale objects is not accounted for by these objects.
With these observations, we now encounter the heteroverse
characteristic of the flat ontology advocated by onticology and objectoriented ontology. Rather than one type of object, such as subatomic
particles, that constitutes the really real, we instead get a heteroverse ofdifferent types of autonomous and irreducible objects ranging from quarks
to tardigrades to ecosystems, groups, institutions, societies, humans,
burritos and so on. An awl is no less real than a cane toad by virtue of being
fabricated by humans, nor is an institution or group any less real than an
awl by virtue of being immaterial. It might be argued that an awl is only an
awl so long as it exists within the framework of society. Perhaps this is true,Chapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology

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but how is this any different from the other regimes of attraction we explore
in 5.1 where we saw that the particular form a local manifestation takes isin part dependent on structural couplings and regimes of attraction? Whena sadistic scientist places a cane toad within a glass box without oxygen,that cane toad very quickly loses the capacity to locally manifest qualities
pertaining to life. When the awl is detached from society, it is no longer able
to locally manifest powers of punching holes in wood or leather. In these
instances, what has been abolished is not the entity itself, but rather theability of the entity to locally manifest itself in a particular way. Of course,
in the case of the frog, entropy begins to set in rather quickly. Then again, it
appears that this particular limitation on local manifestations arising fromthe absence of particular structural couplings is not necessarily irreversible
in that it appears there are many instances where frogs can be broughtback to life.
With this heteroverse of varied objects, we begin to see just how muchthe concept of society and the concept of collectives discussed in 6.2 differ
from one another. The distinctions organizing the concept of society draw
attention to subjectivity, signs, meanings, narratives, texts, discourses,
power, social forces and so on. By contrast, the concept of collectives draws
our attention to a variety of very different actors, human and nonhuman,
perturbing and translating each other in particular ways within networks orassemblages. No doubt, it is something like this that Guattari was after in
Chaosmosis. As Guattari writes,[s]hould we keep the semiotic productions of the mass
media, informatics, telematics and robotics separate frompsychological subjectivity? I don't think so. Just as social
machines can be grouped under the general title of Collective
Equipment, technological machines of information andcommunication operate at the heart of human subjectivity,
not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its
sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms. Recognition ofthese machinic dimensions of subjectivation leads us to insist,in our attempt at redefinition, on the heterogeneity of thecomponents leading to the production of subjectivity. Thus
one finds in it: 1. Signifying semiological components which

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appear in the family, education, the environment, religion, art,sport [...]. 2. Elements constructed by the media industry,the cinema, etc., 3. A-signifying semiological dimensions
that trigger informational sign machines, and that function
in parallel or independent of the fact that they produce andconvey significations and denotations, and thus escape fromstrictly linguistic axiomatics.295
Guattari appears to envision the analysis of collectives where a variety
of different actors or objects ranging from subjects to signs to technologies
and groups and institutions interact with one another in a highly complex
fashion. To Guattari's list, of course, we could add the presence or absenceof roads, power lines, internet connections, weather patterns, cane toads,
ocean-going ships and canoes, H1N1 viruses and a host of other objects.
Guattari's ontology is flat in the precise sense that all of these entities are
full-blown actors rather than mere screens for human signs and intentions.
And, of course, collectives need not involve signs or humans at all, but canbe purely inhuman as in the case of the atmosphere of Saturn.
At this point, it is not unusual to hear humanist correlationists cry foul,accusing object-oriented ontologists of technological and environmental
determinism. In my view, this is an unfair criticism. Somehow pointing outthat it is impossible to fry eggs without a frying pan or some similar cooking
surface becomes equivalent to the thesis that frying pans determine people
to fry eggs. Somehow pointing out how the inland remoteness of China's
abundant coal reserves played a role in China not kicking off the industrial
revolution is transformed into the claim that this remoteness determined
the form that Chinese culture took. In this regard, any qualification ofhuman freedom, any evocation of actors other than meaning, narratives,
signifiers, and discourses is responded to with incredulity at the suggestionthat humans are merely among other beings rather than at the center ofbeings such that nonhuman beings are merely their screen, passive things
upon which they impose form through their intentions and techniques, andwhere the world is merely our own alienated reflection. Such is the heightof Malkovichism.
Faced with decades of content-based cultural criticism that implicitly,at least, adheres to Marx's formula that the aim of philosophy is not toChapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology289

represent the world, but rather to change it, it is peculiar that such theory
doesn't seem to recognize that such cultural critiques seem to be fairly
unsuccessful in producing their desired change. Here one would thinkthat social and political theorists would become aware that this absenceof change suggests that perhaps meanings, signifiers, signs, narratives, anddiscourses are not the entire story. One would think that in addition to thesesemiotic actors that play a role in collectives of humans and nonhumans,
greater attention would be directed at the role of nonhuman actors inhuman collectives and the role they play in constraining the possibilities ofexistence. Such an attentiveness to these nonhuman actors would provide
us with the resources for thinking strategies of composition that might pushcollectives into new basins of attraction. Whether or not a village has a well,a city has roads that provide access to other cities, and whether people havealternative forms of occupation and transportation can play a dramatic rolein the form collectives take. However, in much of contemporary cultural
theory, these sorts of actors are almost entirely invisible because the marked
space of theory revolves around the semiotic, placing nonhuman actors in
the unmarked space of thought and social engagement.
However, setting aside these criticisms, the more basic ontologicalpoint is that there can be no question of technological or environmental
determinism precisely because objects cannot be determined by otherobjects. Insofar as all objects are withdrawn from one another, insofar
as objects only relate to their environment selectively and through theirown distinctions or organization, there can be no question of objects
determining one another. This holds for humans as well. The most one
object can do to another is perturb it, and even this is not always the case as
objects are only selectively related to their environment such that there aremany things towards which they are completely blind. In this regard, themanner in which one object responds to another always embodies a highdegree of creativity.
In many respects, all of onticology culminates in the four theses offlat ontology. It is flat ontology that constitutes the democracy of objects.
However, this democracy of objects does not amount to the thesis that all
objects contribute equally to all other objects or to all collectives. Clearlytardigrades contribute little or nothing to collectives involving human

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beings. Here, then, I return to Ian Bogost's thesis that all objects equallyexist, but not all objects exist equally. Entities perturb other objects more
and less. Entities play greater and smaller roles in various collectives. Someentities, no doubt, do not perturb other objects at all, and as we saw in thecase of Roy Bhasker in the first chapter, other objects are dormant. Flat
ontology is not the thesis that all objects contribute equally, but that all
objects equally exist. In its ontological egalitarianism, what flat ontology
thus refuses is the erasure of any object as the mere construction ofanother object.

Notes
Introduction
1.

Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity vol. I (London: Adamant Media
Corporation, 2007) p. 7.

2.

Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Houghton and Mifflin,2008).

3.

Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

4.

Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

5.

Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1966) pp. 17 - 18.

6.

Marshall and Eric McLuhan, Laws of Media: The New Science (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1988) p. 42.

7.

Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988) p. 193.

Chapter 1
8.

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1962).

9.

Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book XX, Encore: On Feminine
Sexuality, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998) p. 56.

10.

Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects(Chicago: Open Court, 2002).

11.

Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency(New York: Continuum, 2008) p. 6.

12.

Ibid., p. 5.

13.

Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences(New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

14.

Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language,trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).

15.

Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 1989) pp. 87
- 89.

16.

Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (New York: Routledge, 1998) p. 21.

17.

Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970).

18.

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 23.

19.

Cf. Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life...” trans. Nick Millet, Theory, Culture& Society – Explorations in Critical Social Science 14.2 (1995).

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Levi R. Bryant

20.

Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of theContemporary Human Sciences (New York: Routledge, 1998) p. 5.

21.

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 13.

22.

Ibid., p. 22.

23.

Ibid., p. 33.

24.

Ibid.

25.

Ibid.

26.

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999) p. 114.

27.

Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 9.

28.

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 46.

29.

Ibid., p. 51.

30.

Ibid., p. 13.

31.

Ibid., p. 34.

32.

Ibid., p. 50.

33.

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 39.

34.

Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 34.

35.

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 39.

36.

Meillassoux, After Finitude, p. 55.

37.

Ibid., p. 56.

38.

Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux,“Speculative Realism,” Collapse vol. III (Falmouth: Athenaeum Press, 2007).

39.

René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans.
Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998) p. 69.

40.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

41.

GW.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977). Under Robert Pippin’s reading, Kant’s transcendental
unity of apperception and the manner in which it is necessarily included in all
representations is the key to Hegel’s absolute idealism. Cf. Robert B. Pippin,
Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).

42.

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 48.

43.

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert
Kirkpatrick (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990) pp. 40 - 42.

44.

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 64.

45.

Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne:
Re.Press, 2009) pp. 112 - 116.

46.

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 36.

Notes47.

295

Ibid., p. 16.

Chapter 2
48.

Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2010) p. 5.

49.

Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester, UK: Zer0 Books,
forthcoming).

50.

Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (New York: Continuum,2009) p. 119.

51.

Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry ofThings (Chicago: Open Court, 2005) p. 76.

52.

Ibid., p. 81.

53.

Aristotle, Metaphysics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle (Two Volumes) ed.
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 1028a10 - 30.

54.

Aristotle, Categories, Complete Works, p. 2a10 - 15.

55.

Ibid., p. 2b25.

56.

Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, p. 76.

57.

Ibid., p. 85.

58.

Aristotle, Categories, p. 3a10.

59.

Ibid., p. 3b35.

60.

Ibid., p. 3b25.

61.

Ibid., p. 4a10.

62.

Ibid.

63.

Ibid., 8b25.

64.

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994) p. 35.

65.

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979) pp. 295 – 296.

66.

Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1969) p. 23.

67.

Meillassoux, After Finitude, p. 6.

68.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. A176/B219.

69.

Ibid., p. A43/B60.

70.

Ibid., p. A182/B225.

71.

Harman, The Quadruple Object, chapter 1.

72.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. A270/B326.

73.

Ibid., A271/B327.

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Levi R. Bryant

74.

Harman, The Quadruple Object.

75.

Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York: Zone Books, 1991) p. 44.

Chapter 3
76.

Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2010) p. 7.

77.

Steven Connor, “Topologies: Michel Serres and the Shapes of Thought,”
Anglistik 15 (2004): 106. Quoted in Cary Wolfe, “Bring the Noise: The Parasite
and the Multiple Genealogies of Posthumanism”, in Michel Serres, The Parasite,
p. xvii.

78.

Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul (New York:
Zone Books, 1991) pp. 48 - 49.

79.

Gilbert Simondon, L'Individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information(Millon: PUF, 2005) p. 51.

80.

Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2000).

81.

Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science & Virtual Philosophy (New York: Continuum,2002) p. 23.

82.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 186 - 187. Modified.

83.

Ibid., pp. 208 - 209.

84.

Ibid., p. 209.

85.

Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 69.

86.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 228.

87.

Ibid., p. 229.

88.

Ibid., p. 38.

89.

Peter Hallward, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (NewYork: Verso, 2006) p. 2.

90.

John Protevi, “Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation,”
Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews, August 3, 2007.

91.

Ibid.

92.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 183.

93.

Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995) p. 136.

94.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 208.

95.

Ibid., p. 209.

96.

Ibid., p. 210.

97.

Ibid., p. 182.

98.

DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, pp. 11 - 12.

Notes99.

297Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 182.

100. Ibid., p. 183.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., p. 209.
103. Harman, Tool-Being, p. 244.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., pp. 246 - 247.
106. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 278.
107. Ibid., p. 222.
108. DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, p. 10.
109. Ibid., p. 47.
110. Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 1033a25.
111. DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, p. 15.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid., p. 31 - 32.
114. Ibid., p. 32.
115. Bruno Latour, “Irreductions,” The Pasteurization of France trans. Alan Sheridan
and John Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988) p. 174.
116. Ibid.
117. Harman, Prince of Networks, p. 128.
118. Ibid.
119. Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009) p. 19.
120. Benedict de Spinoza, Spinoza: Complete Works, trans. Samuel Shirley(Indianpolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002) p. 278.
121. Harman, “Levi Responds,” Object-Oriented Philosophy. May 24, 2010. Available at
http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/?s=Levi+Responds.
122. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 211.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., p. 212.
125. Latour, “Irreductions,” p. 158.
126. Harman, Prince of Networks, p. 129.
127. Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, p. 81.
128. Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006) p. 17.
129. Ibid.
130. Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor(New York: Verso, 2002) p. xxvii.

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Levi R. Bryant

131. Ibid., p. xxvii.
132. For an excellent discussion of how Žižek overcomes this deadlock by drawing on
Hegel, cf. Adrian Johnston, Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theoryof Subjectivity (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008).
133. Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 1989) p. 193.
134. Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, p. 36 - 37.
135. Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying With the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) p. 36 - 37.
136. Ibid., p. 37.
137. Cf. Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, pp. 72 - 80.
138. Ibid., p. 112.
139. Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003) p. 66.
140. Žižek, The Parallax View, 26.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., p. 18.
143. Lacan, Encore, p. 56.
144. Ibid., p. 33.
145. cf. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway.
146. Ibid., p. 74.
147. Ibid., p. 72.
148. Ibid., p. 58.

Chapter 4149. Latour, “Irreductions,” p. 166.
150. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978)
p. 23.
151. Ibid.
152. Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, “Autopoiesis: The Organizationof the Living”, in Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (Boston:
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980) pp. 78 - 82.
153. Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. John Bednarz, Jr. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1989) p. 12.
154. Luhman, “Identity—What or How?”, in Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the
Descriptions of Modernity, ed. William Rasch (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2002) p. 115.
155. Ibid., p. 118.
156. G. Spencer-Brown, Laws of Form (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1979) p. 1.

Notes299

157. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 29.
158. Heinz von Foester, Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics andCognition (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2003) p. 266.
159. Gotthard Bechmann and Nico Stehr, “The Legacy of Niklas Luhmann,” Society
39 (2002) p. 70.
160. Maturana and Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human
Understanding, trans. Robert Paolucci (Boston: Shambhala, 1992).p. 89.
161. Maturana and Varela, “Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living”, pp. 78 - 79.
162. Luhman, Social Systems, pp. 21 - 22.
163. Maturana and Varela, “Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living”, p. 78.
164. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 65.
165. Ibid., pp. 40 - 41.
166. Ibid., p. 17.
167. Ibid., pp. 16 - 17.
168. Ibid., 25.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., 20.
171. Ibid., p. 24.
172. Ibid., p. 21.
173. Ibid., p. 25.
174. Ibid., p. 22.
175. Ibid., p. 17.
176. Morton, The Ecological Thought, p. 60.
177. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 210.
178. Ibid., p. 212.
179. Luhmann, Ecological Communication, trans. John Bednarz, Jr. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 29.
180. Ibid., p. 18.
181. Luhmann, “What is Communication?”, Theories of Distinction, ed. William Rasch(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) p. 156.
182. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 59.
183. Hans-George Moeller, Luhmann Explained: From Souls to Systems (Chicago: OpenCourt, 2006) p. 11.
184. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 36.
185. Luhmann, “The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and the Reality that
Remains Unknown”, in Theories of Distinction, p. 135.
186. Luhmann, “The Autopoisis of Social Systems”, in Essays on Self-Reference (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1990) p. 10.

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187. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 40.
188. Ibid., p. 67.
189. Gregory Bateson, “Pathologies of Epistemology”, in Steps to an Ecology of Mind
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) p. 490.
190. Bateson, “Form, Substance, and Difference”, in Steps to an Ecology of Mind, p.
458.
191. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 75.
192. Luhmann, “Meaning as Sociology's Basic Concept”, Essays on Self-Reference, p.
31.
193. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 67.
194. Luhmann, “Meaning as Sociology's Basic Concept,” p. 25.
195. Ibid., p. 27.
196. Luhmann, Ecological Communication, p. 22 - 23.
197. Niklas Luhmann, “The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and the Reality
That Remains Unknown”, in Theories of Distinction, p. 145.
198. Cf. Harman, Prince of Networks, pp. 188 - 211.
199. Ibid., pp. 189 - 190.
200. Gilbert Gottlieb, “A Developmental Psychobiological System's View: Early
Formulation and Current Status”, in Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems
and Evolution, eds. Oyama, Susan, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001) pp. 41 - 42.
201. Ibid.
202. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998) pp. 21 - 23.
203. Ibid., p. 22.
204. Ibid.
205. Ibid., p. 21.
206. For a detailed discussion of Lacan's discourse theory, cf. Levi R. Bryant, “Žižek's
New Universe of Discourse: Politics and the Discourse of the Capitalist,”
International Journal of Žižek Studies 2.4 (2008).
207. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 22.
208. Latour, “Irreductions,” p. 181.
209. Ibid., p. 162.
210. Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 39.
211. Latour, “An Attempt at Writing a 'Compositionist Manifesto'” Available athttp://
www.bruno-latour.fr/articles/article/120-COMPO-MANIFESTO.pdf.
212. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan
Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995) pp. 135 - 169.

Notes301

213. Ibid., p. 135.
214. Richard Lewontin, “Gene, Organism and Environment: A New Introduction”, inCycles of Contingency, pp. 55 - 56.
215. Ibid., p. 55.
216. Susan Oyama, “Terms in Tension: What Do You Do When All the Good Words
are Taken?”, in Cycles of Contingency, pp. 182 - 183.
217. Latour, Reassembling the Social, p. 8.
218. Loet Leydesdorff, A Sociological Theory of Communication: The Self-Organizationof the Knowledge-Based Society (Universal Publishers, 2003) pp. 5 - 6.
219. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in theTechnique of Psychoanalysis, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: W.W. Norton &Co., 1988).
220. Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York:W.W. Norton & Co., 2006) p. 223.
221. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Seminar X: Anxiety (1962 - 1963), trans.
Cormac Gallagher (Unpublished) lesson of 14 November 1962.
222. Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (New York: Verso, 1997) p. 7.
223. Cf. Žižek, Tarrying With the Negative, pp. 9 - 12.
224. Jacques Lacan, Écrits, p. 357.

Chapter 5225. Richard Lewontin, “Gene, Organism and Environment”, in Cycles of Contingency,
p. 62.
226. G.W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology (1714),” in
Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, p. 78.
227. Cary Wolfe, Critical Environments: Postmodern Theory and the Pragmatics of the“Outside” (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) p. 77.
228. Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1978) p.
595.
229. Paul Bains, The Primacy of Semiosis: An Ontology of Relations (Toronto: Universityof Toronto Press, 2006) p. 90.
230. Ibid.
231. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 216 - 217.
232. Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution, p. 16.
233. Oyama et. al., Cycles of Contingency, p. 2.
234. Richard C. Lewontin, “Gene, Organism, and Environment”, in Cycles ofContingency, p. 64.
235. Ibid., p. 64.

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Levi R. Bryant

236. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York:W.W. Norton & Co., 2005).
237. Paul E. Griffiths and Russell D. Gray, “Darwinism and Developmental
Systems,” in Cycles of Contingency, p. 198.
238. Karl Marx, Capital vol. I, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books, 1990)
pp. 340 – 416.
239. Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (NewYork: Monthly Review Press, 2001) p. 116.
240. Ibid., p. 85.
241. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, trans. Felicity
Baker (New York: Routledge,1987) pp. 55 – 56.
242. Ibid., p. 63.
243. Louis Althussser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978 – 1987, eds.
Oliver Corpet François Matheron, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso,2006).
244. Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
245. Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum,2005).
246. For the rat-brained robot of Surrey, England cf. http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=1QPiF4-iu6g.
247. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 2006).
248. Latour, “Irreductions,” p. 159.
249. R. Maturana and Varela, The Tree of Knowledge, p. 75.
250. Latour, “Irreductions,” p. 197.
251. Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
252. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 29.
253. Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media, trans. Kathleen Cross (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2000) p. 23.
254. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 282.
255. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 105.
256. Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 283.
257. Ibid.
258. Ibid., p. 287.
259. Ibid., p. 286.
260. Ibid., p. 287.
261. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology,trans. Hazel E.Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1984) pp. 40 - 42.

Notes303

262. Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York:
Penguin Books, 2005) p. 431.
263. Ibid., p. 430.

Chapter 6
264. Virginia Woolf, Jacob’s Room (New York: Hartcourt Brace & Company, 1992) p.
9.
265. Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2004) p. 158.
266. Ibid., p. 155.
267. Lacan, Encore, p. 78.
268. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996).
269. Lacan, Encore, p. 72.
270. Fink, Lacan to the Letter, p. 161.
271. Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory andTechnique (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) p. 51.
272. Lacan, Encore, p. 12.
273. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Logic of Fantasy (1966 1967):Seminar XIV, trans. Cormac Gallagher (Unpublished) lesson of 16
November 1966.
274. Ibid.
275. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis:
Seminar XVII, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007)
p. 23.
276. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 181.
277. Ibid., p. 191.
278. Lacan, Encore, p. 74 - 76.
279. Brassier et al., “Speculative Realism,” p. 367.
280. Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative, chapter 5.
281. Morton, The Ecological Thought, p. 42.
282. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 276.
283. Morton, The Ecological Thought, p. 81.
284. Badiou, Logics of Worlds, pp. 109 - 112.
285. Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics, pp. 181- 197.
286. Bruno Latour, Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) p. 304.

304 Levi R. Bryant
287. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press, 1983) p. 2.
288. Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs: The Complete Text, trans. Richard Howard(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) pp. 164 - 165.
289. Latour, Reassembling the Social, pp. 8 - 9.
290. Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, p. 1.
291. Ian Bogost, “Materialisms: The Stuff of Things is Many”, at Ian Bogost—Video
Game Theory, Criticism, Design, February 21, 2010, http://www.bogost.com/
blog/materialisms.shtml.
292. Harman, Tool-Being, p. 2.
293. Ibid.
294. John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2009) p. 9.
295. Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, trans. Paul Bains andJulian Pefanis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) p. 4.

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