Japan-U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific:
Outlook and Challenges Ahead
Report of the 5th Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum
October 2, 2013 䞉 Tokyo, Japan

Japan-U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific:
Outlook and Challenges Ahead
Report of the 5th Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum
October 2, 2013 ・ Tokyo, Japan

発行者： 公益財団法人 笹川平和財団〒107-8523 東京都港区赤坂 1-2-2 日本財団ビル 4 階
TEL: 03-6229-5400（代表）│FAX: 03-6229-5470
Email: japan-us@spf.or.jp （日米交流事業）
URL: http://www.spf.org/ │Japan-U.S. Exchange Program URL: http://www.spf.org/jpus
発行： 2013 年 12 月

Available from:Japan-U.S. Exchange Program
The Sasakwa Peace Foundation
The Nippon Foundation Bldg., 4th Fl.1-2-2, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan© 2013 The Sasakawa Peace Foundation. All rights reserved.

The Sasakawa Peace Foundation was established in September 1986 as a private nonprofit organization withan endowment from the Nippon Foundation and the Japanese motorboat racing industry. To achieve our goalsof fostering international understanding, exchange, and cooperation, we encourage surveys and research,develop human resources, invite and dispatch personnel, organize international conference and other forums
for discussion in cooperation with grantee organizations in the world.
The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
Location: The Nippon Foundation Bldg., 4th Fl.1-2-2, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
TEL: +81-3-6229-5400 │FAX : +81-3-6229-5470
E-mail : spfpr@spf.or.jp │Japan-U.S. Exchange Program E-mail: japan-us@spf.or.jp
URL: http://www.spf.org/ │Japan-U.S. Exchange Program URL: http://www.spf.org/jpus
公益財団法人 笹川平和財団は、日本財団およびモーターボート競走業界からの拠出金により、1986
年 9 月に設立された民間財団です。国際理解・国際交流および国際協力の推進を目的として、アメリカ、アジア太平洋地域を中心に、世界各国の団体と協力しながら、調査・研究、人材育成、人物
招へいと派遣、国際会議開催などの事業の実施および助成を行っています。
公益財団法人 笹川平和財団〒107-8523 東京都港区赤坂 1-2-2 日本財団ビル 4 階
TEL: 03-6229-5400（代表）│FAX: 03-6229-5470
E-mail: spfpr@spf.or.jp │日米交流事業 Email: japan-us@spf.or.jp
URL: http://www.spf.org/ │日米交流事業 URL: http://www.spf.org/jpus/

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in
Washington, D.C., is the living, national memorial to President Wilson. The Center establishes and maintains aneutral forum for free, open, and informed dialogue. It is a non-partisan institution, supported by public andprivate funds and engaged in the study of national and world affairs.
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20004-3027, U.S.A.
TEL: +1- 202-691-4000│URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/
ウッドロー・ウィルソン国際学術センターは、米国議会の要請によって、ウッドロー・ウィルソン
元米国大統領を記念し、1968 年に設立されました。ワシントン DC を拠点とし、自由、オープンかつ非公式な対話を行うために、無党派のフォーラムを形成してきました。また、中立的機関として、
公的また私的な資金助成を得ながら、米国の国内問題および国際問題についての研究に携わっています。

CONTENTSPROGRAM ......................................................................................................................................... 1-2
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 3-4
KEYNOTE SESSION ...................................................................................................................... 5-10
PANEL DISCUSSION I ................................................................................................................. 11-21
PANEL DISCUSSION II ................................................................................................................ 22-30
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 31-32
SPEAKER BIOS ............................................................................................................................. 33-36

< PROGRAM >OPENING REMARKS:

YUJI TAKAGI
President, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation

KEYNOTE SESSION: “U.S. Rebalance toward Asia and U.S.-Japan Relations”
Keynote Speaker:

Kurt M. Campbell
Chair and CEO, The Asia Group/former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State (EastAsia and Pacific)

Moderator:

Kamiya MATAKE
Professor of International Relations, National Defense Academy of JapanPANEL DISCUSSION I: “Sources of Uncertainties in the Asia-Pacific Region and Opportunities forJapan and U.S. Leadership”
Moderator:

Chikako UEKI
Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University

Panelists:

Ely RATNER
Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a
New American Security (CNAS)
Hiroshi NAKANISHI
Professor for International Politics at Kyoto University
David GORDONHead of Research and Director, Global Macro Analysis, Eurasia Group
Yorizumi WATANABE
Professor of International Political Economy, Keio University

PANEL DISCUSSION II: “Domestic Challenges Ahead for Japan and the United States and their
Impact on Japan and U.S. Leadership”
Moderator:

Robert M. HATHAWAY
Director of the Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Panelists:

Vance SERCHUKExecutive Director, KKR Global Institute and Principal, KKR / Former seniorforeign policy and national security adviser to Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT)
Tatsuhiko YOSHIZAKI
Chief economist and executive vice president, Sojitz Research Institute
Bruce STOKES
Director, Global Economic Attitudes, Pew Research Center
Jun IIO
Director of Policy Professionals Program and Professor of Political Science,
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)

CLOSING REMARKS:

Robert M. HATHAWAY
1

<プログラム>
開会挨拶：

髙木 雄次

氏

（笹川平和財団理事長）

基調講演:「米国のアジア・リバランス政策と日米関係」
基調講演者

カート・キャンベル 氏
The Asia Group 会長兼 CEO／前米国務次官補（東アジア・太平洋）

モデレーター

神谷 万丈 氏防衛大学校総合安全保障研究科・国際関係学科教授

パネル・ディスカッションＩ: 「アジア太平洋地域の不確実要素と日米のリーダーシップによる対応策」
モデレーター

植木 千可子 氏
早稲田大学大学院アジア太平洋研究科教授

パネリスト

イーライ・ラットナー 氏
新アメリカ安全保障センター（CNAS）アジア太平洋安全保障プログラム副部長兼フェロー中西 寛 氏
京都大学法学部教授
デビッド・ゴードン 氏
ユーラシアグループ研究部長／グローバルマクロ分析部門ディレクター
渡邊 頼純 氏慶 應 義 塾 大 学 総合政策学部教授

パネル・ディスカッションⅡ：「日米両国内の政治経済と日米リーダーシップの実現可能性」

モデレーター

ロバート・Ｍ．ハサウェイ 氏
ウッドロー・ウィルソン国際学術センターアジアプログラム部長

パネリスト

ヴァンス・サーチャック 氏
KKR グローバル研究所常務理事兼 KKR 社プリンシパル／ジョーセフ・リー
バーマン元上院議員元外交政策担当上級アドバイザー
吉崎 達彦 氏
双日総合研究所副所長、チーフエコノミスト
ブルース・ストークス 氏
ピュー・リサーチ・センター国際経済世論調査部門ディレクター
飯尾 潤 氏政策研究大学院大学

閉会挨拶：

教授

ロバート・Ｍ．ハサウェイ 氏
2

Japan-U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific: Outlook and Challenges Ahead
Report of the 5th Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum (October 2, 2013)
By Kazuyo Kato1

Introduction
The Asia-Pacific region represents half of the world’s population and serves as an engine of global
economic growth. The region includes three of the countries with the world’s highest population
including China, India, and Indonesia, and accounted for 40 percent of global GDP growth in 2012.
The United States recognized the importance of increasing its focus on the Asia-Pacific region when
President Barack Obama announced his strategic plan in 2011 to rebalance U.S. engagements,
activities, and resources toward this region.
While Japan, the United States, and the rest of the world have a major stake in ensuring peace,stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, the region confronts an extremely uncertain and dynamic
security environment. The United States and Japan continue to face not only nuclear and missile
threats from North Korea and uncertainties stemming from China’s military and economic rise, butalso the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, piracy and othermaritime security issues, as well as emerging issues of space and cybersecurity. Moreover, theregion’s growing population and economic activities have generated serious issues of securing andmanaging competition over energy and other vital resources. Meanwhile, there is increasing tradeconnectivity in the region, raising hopes for the acceleration of multilateral liberalization efforts.
On October 2, 2013, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, convened the 5th Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum on the topic“Japan-U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific: Outlook and Challenges Ahead.” This annual forum waslaunched in 2009 to strengthen cooperation between Japan and the United States on issues ofregional and global importance by facilitating policy dialogues between Japanese and American
experts. Previous forums addressed other topics of mutual concern, namely: bilateral cooperation on
nuclear non-proliferation (2009); economic partnership following the global financial crisis (2010);
Japan-U.S. cooperation after the Great East Japan Earthquake (2011); and the future of energy (2012).
The theme of the 5th forum was chosen to underscore the need for Japan and the United States tostrengthen their partnership as well as leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. The day-long conference
brought together a dozen experts from Japan and the United States to discuss appropriate responses
and policies for Japan and the United States to address regional and domestic challenges and seize
leadership opportunities in the region.
1

Kazuyo Kato is a Program Officer of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo, Japan.
3

The forum opened with a keynote speech by former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asianand Pacific Affairs, Kurt M. Campbell, to discuss the way forward for the U.S. rebalance toward Asia
and U.S.-Japan relations. Two panel discussions followed, each featuring two American and two
Japanese experts. In the first panel entitled “Sources of Uncertainties in the Asia-Pacific Region andOpportunities for Japan and U.S. Leadership,” panelists examined key features of the current
regional security and economic environment, and addressed how Japan and the United States could
individually and collectively deal with the risks and dangers that exist. In the second panel entitled“Domestic Challenges Ahead for Japan and the United States and Their Impact on Japan and U.S.
Leadership,” panelists discussed whether and how Japanese and American political leaders could
sustain domestic support for active diplomacy and regional leadership.

4

Keynote Session:
U.S. Rebalance toward Asia and U.S.-Japan Relations
Kurt M. Campbell, who is widely credited as being a key architect of the so-called U.S. pivot or
rebalance toward Asia during the first Obama administration, offered a keynote address on U.S. Asia
policy and U.S.-Japan relations.
Campbell began his speech with a discussion of what would have been a “path-breaking” trip by
President Obama to Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia, to attend the meetings of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on October 7-8 and the East Asia Summit (EAS) on
October 9-10. The visit would have underscored Obama’s personal commitment to “taking the
Asia-Pacific region into the 21st century.” In particular, the visit to Malaysia would have been thefirst by a sitting U.S. president since President Lyndon B. Johnson visited in 1966.
Lamenting the 16-day government shutdown that began on October 1—and subsequently required
Obama to cancel his Southeast Asia trip three days later—Campbell argued that U.S. domestic
politics is changing dramatically in ways that might affect the future role of the United States as a
global player. In recent U.S. domestic politics, he observed a “strong and uncertain undertone” thatcalled into question the idea of U.S. retaliation for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian
government. While it is unclear whether this undertone indicates a long-term trend or an intense
domestic opposition to Obama, Campbell suspected that there will not be such a determined U.S.
approach to foreign policy and national security commitments in the future as there was in the past. It
is uncertain whether this declining enthusiasm for active U.S. foreign engagements pertains only to
the “messy” circumstances of the conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia, or will spread into U.S.
engagement in the Asia-Pacific region; regardless, Campbell urged not only for U.S. engagement in
the region, but also for engagement in the other direction, i.e. he counted on U.S. allies and partners
in the region to speak to the Americans “with clarity and conviction” about the continued need for astrong U.S. role in the world.
After those introductory remarks, Campbell explained the context around the so-called U.S. pivot or
rebalance to Asia. Campbell stressed that the Obama administration’s motivation behind the pivot
was the recognition that Asia will be the center of global politics in the 21st century by every
measure—rising middle classes, economic performance, national security challenges, impact ofclimate change, etc.—and the belief that the United States has to play a role in this region. Whereas
the Middle East and South Asia are regions where the United States “spends capital,” theAsia-Pacific is a region where the United States can expect to “build a remarkable amount of capital,”according to Campbell. The United States must therefore shift its focus away from the greatchallenges in the Middle East and South Asia and more toward the Asia-Pacific.
5Campbell attested he has never seen a period in his 25-years of experience working on the
Asia-Pacific region where Asian countries have been more welcoming about the United States
playing a strong role in the area than they are today. He attributed their enthusiasm about thisenhanced U.S. role to the rise of China: “Clearly, it is the United States that, along with the rise ofregional architecture, plays the most important role in providing a strategic context for China’s rise.”
According to this view, the U.S. rebalance to Asia is a “strategic statement” about U.S. engagementin the region.
However, Campbell cautioned that this shift must take place gradually, responsibly, and subtly; andthus expressed his preference for the word “rebalance,” which suggests an “ever-changing processthat constantly requires fine-tuning,” as opposed to the word “pivot,” which suggests a dramatic shift.
He maintained that many Asian countries do not want the United States to “cut and run” from theMiddle East, as many of them have invested in the Middle East together with the United States,
including Japan, who has made one of the most generous and significant contributions to building astrong civil society in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Campbell identified two major challenges of implementing the U.S. rebalance to Asia. The firstchallenge is to obtain the time and attention of senior U.S. officials on Asia-related issues. Campbell
described the United States as seeking to accomplish an unprecedented challenge with its rebalance
to Asia, as the attention of the senior-most officials in the United States are currently being pulled by
two very strong corresponding pressures: on the one hand, there is the undeniable pressure to pay
attention to the continuing and urgent demands of the Middle East; on the other hand, there is thestrong pressure from domestic groups calling for more attention on domestic issues after decades ofmajor U.S. military engagement in the Middle East. The second challenge relates to the strategy for
implementing the U.S. rebalance to Asia: building the human capital associated with rebalancing
efforts. There is a great need to nurture a new generation of so-called “Asianists” who focus on Asia
as a region and think about strategic options associated with U.S. engagement.
Campbell then described the different schools of thought in the United States about U.S. strategy inAsia. One school is led by a bipartisan group of people who believe and act under the concept that,“if you get China policy right – that China is like a pinwheel—that the rest of Asia will fall into
place.” Another school of thought is led by those who believe that the best way to manage thecomplex issues of the day, whether it is instability on the Korean Peninsula or tensions across the
Taiwan Strait, is to have effective alliance structures. This school believes that strong alliances withJapan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines enable the United States to better engage anddeploy across the region. Noting that there are other variants of these two schools of thoughts,

6

Campbell argued that these two groups were the ones that have generally cooperated on Asia overgenerations.
Compared to the strategic approaches of these previous schools of thought, however, Campbell
contended that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put forward a much more comprehensive
strategy with the U.S. rebalance to Asia, a strategy that is “much more engaging and dynamic.” In
this light, Campbell highlighted what he considers are the enduring features of the strategy behind
the rebalance.
The first feature is in regards to alliances. There is recognition that alliances are consistent with otherengagements—multilateral or single-country—and requires a strong commitment to maintain and“garden” these relationships. Among these, Campbell believed that “there is no relationship in Asia
that is harder and more challenging to garden than the U.S.-Japan relationship,” while also addingthat there is no relationship that is more rewarding to work on.
The second feature is the recognition for a strong and enduring relationship with China that does not“pull punches,” is clear about areas of disagreement, and is consistent about wanting a good
relationship in the future. There is an understanding that the region wants the United States andChina “to get along somewhere in the middle” between a U.S.-China condominium and outrightconfrontation. According to Campbell, the region expects the United States and China to have a deep
strategic engagement across every vector, i.e. economic, political, and security, and take steps toprevent accidents as well as focus on common economic endeavors. Campbell explained that the U.S.
government under the first Obama administration has thus made conscious efforts to “engage China
in a 21st-century conversation,” or conversations about the need to find common norms and values
about cybersecurity, economy, freedom of navigation, peaceful settlement of disputes, andencouraging the Chinese to see that they have their interests at stake in these areas. Conversely, theUnited States should avoid “19th century conversations,” which are conversations centered on theidea of spheres of influence and areas where larger countries have more roles over smaller countries.
The third critical feature of the rebalance is an “active, outward, and optimistic” regional tradeagenda. Campbell expressed his support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Korea-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement as foundational commitments that are essential to a strong U.S. role in theregion. In particular, Campbell saw a potential for the TPP to be a “groundbreaking” achievement
despite the difficulties he foresees in completing the negotiations. Going forward, Campbell
maintained that a true and effective rebalance would require an economic and commercial rebalanceat the core, and considered the flow of investments between Asian countries and the United States tobe essential.

7

The fourth feature is U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia. Campbell insisted that Southeast Asia isa region on par with the economic performance of Europe, but where the United States has
under-invested and under-committed for decades. In particular, he noted that the United States has
failed to sufficiently recognize the importance of Indonesia. Pointing out that Secretary Clinton was
the first Secretary of State to visit all the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), Campbell also frequently underscored the importance of committing to a more robust
ASEAN and stronger relationships with ASEAN countries.
The fifth feature of the rebalance is the recognition of the need to establish strong regional
institutions in the years ahead. These institutions and consultative processes will be required for theUnited States to build the foundations for a 21st century Asia-Pacific community, including tradenorms and proper mechanisms to deal with difficult maritime disputes. Moreover, Campbell asserted
that the United States is no longer ambivalent about wanting a seat at the table of regional forums, as
indicated by the U.S. decision to join the EAS and its subtle linkage of the ASEAN Regional Forumto the EAS.
The sixth feature is inclusiveness. Campbell insisted that the United States needs to include othercountries and regions to have an effective Asia policy. He explained that the rebalance was nevermeant to exclude Europe as it might have been interpreted in its initial outreach, and commented on
the importance of the United States building stronger and deeper relations with Europe regarding
Asia. Campbell urged the United States and Europe to have more discussions about Asia, particularly
on trade issues such as intellectual property rights issues, referring to U.S. engagement with Europe
for subtle lifting of sanctions on Burma/Myanmar. He also put a spotlight on India, describing the
U.S.-India relationship as one that will “define the 21st century.” He argued that India and the UnitedStates have many common strategic interests such as building a constructive relationship with China,
engaging more in Southeast Asia, or being pioneers in connecting the East and West. In emphasizing
the need for the United States to continue its efforts to articulate and support India’s so-called “LookEast” policy, Campbell recognized Japan as having done the best job at building a strong relationshipwith India.
The final feature of the rebalance, which Campbell recognized would be extremely important but
also very challenging, is the rebalancing of the U.S. military forces in Asia. In addition to putting arotational group of Marines in Darwin, the capital city of Australia’s Northern Territory, he saw a lot
more opportunities for the United States to strengthen cooperation with Asian countries, including
China, on multilateral pursuits such as anti-piracy and disaster relief efforts.
Campbell concluded that all of the seven features discussed help build a comprehensive framework
for U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific, and underline the importance of the United States working
8more closely with Japan in establishing this framework. Campbell then went on to discuss views on
the future of Japan and U.S.-Japan relations.
According to Campbell, the hardest element of the U.S.-Japan relationship going forward would be
to build its people-to-people dimension. He explained that the relationship has always been takencare of by an extraordinarily small group of extremely dedicated Japanese and American
policymakers and diplomats. For the U.S.-Japan relationship to be successful into the 21st century,
Campbell argued that the two countries must build a broader and stronger group of people to work on
this bilateral relationship. In this regard, Campbell expressed concern regarding the declining numberof Japanese students at universities in the United States, and called for U.S. and Japanese institutions
to pay more attention to this issue and work towards increasing the number of Japanese youths wholearn and study in the United States and vice versa. In addition, regarding U.S. relationship withJapanese political leaders, Campbell underscored the importance of the United States and otherdemocratic governments to respect the people who manage to win elections, including the Abeadministration and the members of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administrations.
Campbell also shared his views on the way forward for Japan’s economic policy. While he supported
Prime Minister Abe’s economic policies, or otherwise known as Abenomics, and congratulatedTokyo for winning the 2020 Olympics bid, he agreed that the so-called third arrow of Abenomics,
associated with structural reforms, would be the key step in reinvigorating the Japanese economy.
Noting that positive sentiments between the people of the United States and Japan are very high,Campbell cautioned Japan to not return to a situation of using macroeconomic policy to spurlong-term exports to the United States.
Looking ahead, Campbell suggested Japan and the United States to take more time to think and workthrough strategic issues in the region such as North Korean provocations, maritime security issues,and shared perspectives on the implications of China’s rise and how better to coordinate. Though headmitted that the prospects are low for it to happen, he also endorsed the United States and Japan
holding a trilateral strategic dialogue including China, arguing that no grouping would send a morepositive signal and could create more harmony. Campbell also hoped to see Japan and the UnitedStates cooperate in their engagement in Southeast Asia, as he observed when he was in governmentthat the allies often competed with each other and searched for advantages in various commercial andpolitical pursuits across this region. Finally, Campbell advised the two countries to expand their areasof cooperation to not only regional issues such as the Korean Peninsula or issues associated with themaintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also to larger pursuits outside of the region.
In closing, Campbell stated that the key to the U.S. rebalance to Asia is not its labeling―whether it is“rebalance” or “pivot” to Asia—but the subsequent explanation about it. He emphasized that the9rebalance is not to contain a country, but “a determination to underscore a stronger Americancommitment to Asia going forward,” where he believes the destiny of the United States and Japan
lies.

10

Panel Discussion I:
Sources of Uncertainties in the Asia-Pacific Region and Opportunities for Japanand U.S. Leadership
In the first panel, panelists assessed the dynamics and elements of uncertainty in the regional security
and economic environment, and offered their thoughts on the opportunities and risks presented toJapan and the United States to ensure regional peace, stability, and prosperity.
Dynamics and Elements of Uncertainty in the Security and Economic Environment
The security environment of the Asia-Pacific region is dynamic and uncertain. Panelists identified
several trends and sources of uncertainty in the region whose outcomes and impact are still unclear;
they could indicate either potential opportunities for more cooperation and therefore greater stability,
or potential risks for more competition resulting in greater insecurity in the region. China was cited
as a major element of uncertainty in both the regional security and economic environment. In all of
the issues that were addressed, the ultimate question was how Japan and the United States could
engage and involve China in the region to ensure stable development and prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific.
China’s rise and greater intra-Asia connectivity
Expansion of security ties
Partly as a result of regional concerns over China’s fast-growing maritime and missile capabilities
and uncertainty of its strategic intentions, panelists observed greater intra-Asia connectivity in thepast decade on the security front. Individual states are not only increasing their military spending andmodernization efforts and strengthening their bilateral security ties with the United States, but also
deepening security ties with each other in the form of high-level defense visits and military
diplomacy, bilateral security arrangements, arms sales, military exercises and training, and joint
operations. According to this view, the regional security environment is gradually shifting away fromthe Cold War hub-and-spoke system of U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Thailand, and the Philippines toward a more networked security environment where Asian countries
are increasingly interconnected with one another.
A more networked security environment could imply more robust multilateral institutions and greater
multinational cooperation leading to enhanced deterrence against aggression and provocation. Morespecifically, one may see stronger deterrence against China’s assertiveness and diminished intensityof U.S.-China competition as a result. Conversely, one may see more security competition resulting
in heightened risks of conflict or a small crisis escalating into a larger one. While panelists did not
expect major conflicts to occur in the short-term, they cautioned that regional security competition is
becoming more complex in this uncertain security environment and creating additional risks. In
11recent years, countries are not only preparing for major power wars and deterrence by acquiring anddeveloping high-end capabilities such as advanced fighters, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons andmissile defense capabilities, but also competing in the lower-level domain of law enforcement andcoast guards. Including Japan, who is facing this type of low-level competition with China aroundthe disputed islands of the East China Sea, referred to by Japan as the Senkaku islands and Diaoyu in
China, countries in the region are recognizing the importance of investing in maritime domainawareness and civilian maritime capabilities in order to deal with daily provocations by Chinese
coast guard vessels in the maritime domain, which aims to advance China’s interests while avoidinga response from the U.S. military. On top of these high-end and low-end competitions, weaker
countries are now increasingly looking to obtain asymmetric means to deter stronger adversaries.
Recently, not only the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which adopted the anti-access/area-denial
strategy to challenge the U.S. military, but also countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines aredeveloping indirect military means to impose high costs on China without waging an all-out war
against the PLA.
While it is not yet evident how these dynamics will play out, participants agreed that the risk of crisis
escalation has become greater now that more countries have more capable militaries, thereby
increasing the number of potential players and complication in a crisis. Participants also recognizedthat countries in the Asia-Pacific region are still in the process of figuring out what an effective
deterrence and coercion mechanism would look like in the law enforcement and coast guard domain,and how existing alliances and new technologies would fit in to this mechanism.
Enhanced trade connectivity
On the economic front, panelists perceived greater momentum for regional economic integration in
the absence of a strong international trade agreement. They pointed to the failure of the Doha
Development Agenda and its liberalization procedures under the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and argued that the international community has not been able to reach global, multilateralagreements on trade issues such as investment, competition, government procurement, state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), or labor and environmental standards. The lack of Trade Promotion Authority for
the U.S. government negotiators, as well as the absence of explicit support given to the new WTO
Director-General by the developed countries, were also raised as reasons to doubt the potential
emergence of a strong international trade system supported by multilaterally agreed trade rules.
Panelists also saw a greater need to establish Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in the Asia-Pacific region, as data showed greater trade
discrimination and protectionism among East Asian countries than among European countries.
Nevertheless, panelists contended that a “business-driven regional integration” has already takenplace in the region, and that this type of integration would bring about the “multilateralization” of12various liberalization efforts within the Asia-Pacific region as well as between the Asia-Pacific andother regions, and in effect reinforce the multilateral efforts of the WTO.
Panelists explained this global multilateralization process as follows: A region-wide expansion of
supply chain and production networks, which occurred as companies in the parts industry took their
manufacturing sites abroad to produce locally, has propelled business-driven regional integration.
This integration then motivated countries to form bilateral FTAs/EPAs to lock-in and consolidate thebenefits of this de-facto integration through a legal framework, including Japan who has concluded
13 EPAs. By establishing rules and dispute settlement mechanisms, countries expected theFTAs/EPAs to enable countries to manage trade frictions in a business-like manner, and prevent any
protectionism that may arise in the future from reversing this integration. This impetus to form
bilateral FTAs/EPAs has subsequently facilitated the development of a number of wider, regional
FTAs/EPAs: five different versions of ASEAN plus 1; ASEAN plus 3; and ASEAN plus 6, which
Japan proposed in 2006 and is now called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP). The growth of regional FTAs/EPAs has then led to a discussion on the TPP, which panelists
believed has a great potential to become an inter-regional FTA that connects Asia and the Americas,
especially now that Japan has joined in the negotiations.
In this regard, panelists concluded that there is no single institutional answer to the question ofregional economic integration in the Asia-Pacific, and did not see any problems in having a numberof institutions with overlapping memberships in this region. They maintained that the different
regional trade groupings could be mutually reinforcing; for example, lessons and achievements of
TPP negotiations could feed back into negotiations in RCEP or RCEP’s missing piece: a trilateral
EPA among Japan, China and South Korea.
According to panelists, Japan is a key player in facilitating this regional and global
multilateralization process. As a potential member of both the RCEP and TPP, Japan could play avital role in combining the liberalization and rules-making efforts of different trade groupings within
this region, and pave the way for the establishment of the Free-Trade Area of Asia-Pacific by 2020.
Panelists raised specific merits for Japan to pursue both the RCEP and TPP. For instance, if South
Korea joins the TPP, Japan could bypass the difficulties of negotiating a bilateral EPA with South
Korea, which has been stalled since November 2004, and still negotiate a free trade deal. There isalso an opportunity for Japan vis-à-vis the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar andVietnam) to encourage more trade and capacity-building in the trade area, and help them catch up
with the development of other ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Panelists explained that Japan could then further multilateralize these regional efforts into a global
one, i.e. converge the liberalization efforts of the three mega-FTAs: the TPP; the Transatlantic Trade13

and Investment Partnership agreement; and the Japan-EU bilateral EPA. These FTAs would cover
two-thirds of the world economy and will therefore reinforce the liberalization efforts of the WTO.
With regards to challenges in pursuing multilateral trade agreements, panelists admitted it is unlikelythat the U.S. Congress would give Trade Promotion Authority to Obama and enable him to negotiate
the final elements of the TPP. They also mentioned the caveat that BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa) are not yet included, but agreed that doors should be open to them andremained optimistic that these countries would be inclined to join.
Energy-driven integration and cooperation
In addition to growing security ties and trade connectivity, participants raised energy as anothersource of greater integration in the Asia-Pacific. Panelists addressed the potential impact of therevolution in unconventional energy, i.e. shale gas and tight oil. According to the panelists, thisrevolution would result in a dramatic increase in North American energy production and exports
compared to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC), and drive down oil prices.
Consequently, this downward pressure on oil prices will free East Asian countries from traditionallyoil-linked natural gas prices and allow them to seek competitively priced energy from the UnitedStates. Panelists concluded that there is an opportunity for the United States to engage in greater
diplomatic efforts with East Asian countries to create a regional energy market that is much more
beneficial to the region.
Consequences of the new leadership in Japan and China
Another element of uncertainty in the regional security environment is the consequences of thesimultaneous leadership changes in Japan and China in 2012.
Panelists first considered the implications of the new leadership for Japanese and Chinese economies.
They agreed that there is a strong commitment by both the Xi administration of China and the Abeadministration of Japan to address economic issues at home, and in extraordinary ways. With regards
to China, panelists observed that the new leaders are less risk averse on economic reform and more
willing to launch a tough anti-corruption campaign, though they maintained their efforts to enhance
the authority of the Chinese Communist Party. Panelists contended that the leadership’s intense focus
on internal change has caused a shift away from its over-assertiveness in the region; China’s
assertiveness became very prominent in 2010, and drove the U.S. rebalance to Asia as well as Japan’s
efforts to strengthen security ties with other countries in the region.2 Panelists also stated that the Xi
2For example, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010, Chinese Foreign Minister warned Southeast Asian statesagainst coordinating with outside powers in managing territorial disputes with Beijing. Vis-à-vis Japan, Beijing
demanded an apology and compensation after Japan detained the captain of a Chinese fishing boat which had collided
with a Japanese coast guard vessel, causing Japan to release him. Vis-à-vis the United States and South Korea, China
twice spoke against their joint naval exercises in international waters near China. *Source: Thomas J. Christensen,“The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 201114

Jinping government is much more interested in engaging the United States than the previous Hu
Jintao regime, and expected more opportunities to improve U.S.-China relations. However, panelists
argued that there is now a greater risk that the leadership’s possible failure to carry through difficult
economic reforms would result in major domestic instability and greater inclination by the leadership
to use anti-Japanese rhetoric. They also did not deny the possibility of similar developments
occurring in Japan should Abenomics fail.
Panelists then discussed the direction of Japan’s security policy under the Abe administration and its
impact on the country’s future security role and leadership ability in the region. The panel debated at
length the potential for Japan to emerge as a regional security provider given the rapid developmentof Japan’s security policies under the Abe administration including the establishment of a Japanese
National Security Council and a National Security Strategy, along with a bill to protect state secrets;
review of the legal basis for security including a potential change in the interpretation of theConstitution to allow for the exercise of the rights to collective self-defense; and the subsequent
revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and review of the Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation Guidelines. In this regard, panelists agreed that there are some positive outcomes ofJapan’s experiences under the DPJ administrations. They contended that, in the three years of DPJ
rule, after witnessing the turmoil caused by the Hatoyama administration over the Futenma issue andthe enormous support of the U.S. military in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake andTsunami on March 11, 2011, the current opposition party members gained greater understanding of
the importance of having a strong U.S.-Japan alliance.
Panelists also addressed the claims of the critics of the Abe administration in Beijing and Seoul who
argue that Abe’s proactive stance to reinvigorate Japan’s security policy signals Japan’s move toward
the right and is thus destabilizing to the region. In response to such claims, panelists drew attention to
the fact that these plans, such as reinforcing the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) posture in areas
including Japan’s southwestern islands, reviewing the Three Principles on Arms Exports, andstrengthening Japan-South Korea defense cooperation, began to move forward under the previous
DPJ administration, admitting, however, that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) uses stronger
rhetoric. One panelist contended that it is inaccurate to describe the Abe administration’s security
policy agendas as indication that the Japanese society or the current administration is turning to theright or becoming more hawkish and nationalist, as these plans have been in discussion since the endof the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, Japan needed to adjust its security policy in order toadapt and respond to the changes in the international system, revolution in military technologies, andthe deterioration of the security environment surrounding Japan with respect to the Korean Peninsula
and China’s rise. For example, the issue of the exercise of the rights to collective self-defense
emerged out of the necessity for the Japanese and U.S. forces to conduct more joint operations, such
issue. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67477/thomas-j-christensen/the-advantages-of-an-assertive-china
15

as the joint operation of the ballistic missile defense system they built together and joint maritime
surveillance operations. Likewise, the NDPG is being revised to enhance SDF mobility, such as theintegration of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Forces and consideration of the purchase of Ospreysfrom the United States.
Even if the Abe administration’s security policy agendas do not signal Japan turning to the right,
panelists agreed that Japan’s ability to exercise a greater regional security role hinges on whether thegovernment could pursue these policies in an appropriate diplomatic and political context. In the caseof Japan, one participant stressed the importance of the Japanese government factoring in thepolitical context in which it mulls issues such as changing SDF’s exclusively defense-oriented
posture and allowing it to possess preemptive strike capability. According to this view, discussions
on such changes, when combined with inappropriate behavior and rhetoric or with false perceptionsof intentions, could potentially be destabilizing. Indeed, participants agreed on the importance of thepolitical and diplomatic context for all countries in the region, including China and the United States,in pursuing military modernization or increasing military spending without causing alarm.
Panelists differed in their assessment of Japan’s ability and willingness to create a political context
that is conducive to its plans to enhance SDF capabilities. One panelist expressed doubt, stating thatLDP politicians’ unapologetic rhetoric and comments on history have exacerbated regional concernsthat Japan is turning to the right. According to this view, critics of the Abe administration in Beijing
and Seoul are relatively accepting of SDF modernization in and of itself, but they voice concern
when it is presented in the context of such rhetoric and comments. Another panelist advised Japan to“strategize the diplomacy of its own peaceful rise,” so that other countries are more comfortable
about the country’s initiatives. Although panelists admitted that China’s characterization of Japan’s
initiatives as hawkish or nationalist is a “gross overstatement,” they also warned that China’s
explanation is gaining traction in the region, particularly in South Korea. The panel thus encouraged
Japan to put their SDF modernization efforts in the context of the normalcy of militarymodernization and highlight SDF capabilities that are in discussion as non-extreme, average andbasic capabilities. Panelists explained that the challenge is not in public relations, but in coming up
with a strategy for engaging allies and fundamentally counter anti-Japanese rhetoric.
Others put less responsibility on Japan for the current political context, arguing that it is only sincethe 1970s that historical and territorial issues have gotten greater political weight in Japan’s
relationship with China and South Korea. One panelist contended that, although nationalism has
traditionally been deeply rooted in East Asia, it did not surface for a period of time after World War II
during which countries in the region experienced rapid economic growth and greater equality in the
distribution of income. From around the 1970s, however, these countries could no longer rely on
economic performance alone to satisfy their people, and became prone to employ nationalist rhetoric.
16

This reliance on nationalism then became a structural problem. According to this explanation, themain problem in East Asia is not Japan’s inability to set an appropriate political context, but such
structural forces causing the extreme worsening of Chinese and Korean sentiments toward theJapanese, and vice versa. One panelist added that the notion of the potential re-rise of Japan, with thesuccess of Abenomics and a more capable and active SDF, is a particularly challenging one for China
to accept because there had been a consensus until the re-emergence of Abe that Japan isundoubtedly a waning power. However, this participant suggested that the concerns in Beijing about
Japan could be minimized in the context of improved U.S.-China relations.
In the view of one panelist, the major security issue in the region for the foreseeable future is thedanger of a crisis caused by a small-scale arms attack or conflict escalating into a larger conflict due
to these nationalist sentiments. Nationalism may prevent peacetime communication channels fromfunctioning effectively in times of a crisis. According to this panelist, it is unlikely that countries in
East Asia would be able to nurture public opinions that support restraint and compromise with others,or that a neutral third party would be able to mediate between conflicting parties—at least in the near
future. Japan and the United States should thus expect to deal with an unstable political situation for
the foreseeable future.
While it would be ideal to leave history issues up to historians, one panelist pointed out that it was
not useful to have a joint project to review history, as history issues are politicized in China andSouth Korea. The difficulty is evident in the failure of the Japan-China joint history textbook projectthat began under the Koizumi administration. With regards to South Korea, however, one panelist
emphasized the need for Japan to recognize that its history with South Korea is different from thatwith China: the former is about colonization, whereas latter is about wars and conflicts between two
sovereign nations. This panelist asserted that Japan must reflect on its colonization of South Korea asa factor affecting South Korea’s inclination to tilt toward China vis-à-vis Japan. Regarding thehistory issue with China, panelists agreed that a more pragmatic way to deal with it is possible.
Panelists also accepted that there is no easy solution to the issues of history, and that Japan must be
prepared to deal with these issues for the long-term. The future prospect for Japan to lead the regionis therefore very bleak, as countries in the region will not be able to break away from such structural
impediments, i.e. built-in historical animosities and nationalism that divide them. They stressed,
however, that Japan should not give up. In particular, they hoped that Japan would continue to workon improving its relations with South Korea, a U.S. ally, no matter how difficult it is and regardlessof which side Japan believes is at fault for the current poor state of relations.
The role of the United States
Panelists identified the role of the United States as another element of uncertainty in the regional
security environment. One panelist believed that the suspicions people in this region currently have17

about the relevance of the rebalance in the second term of the Obama administration are valid—the
U.S. rebalance may go into a “diplomatic hibernation.” Indeed, the main architects of the rebalance
have all left the government and been replaced by officials who are either much less interested or notnearly as influential. Moreover, in his speech at the United Nations on September 24, 2013, Obama
indicated that his foreign policy focus for the rest of his presidency will be the Middle East.3
However, panelists agreed that the main notion of the rebalance remained very much in place: theidea that the Asia-Pacific region is a crucial place for the United States to be because of its economic
and commercial interests and the unique role that it can play to ensure security for all the otherparties. At the same time, panelists lamented the stalemate in the U.S. political system and thecongressional dysfunction—epitomized by the U.S. government shutdown that began the day before
this forum and lasted for 16 days thereafter—as demonstrating the weakness of Obama despite being
in the fifth year of his presidency, and affecting the credibility of his administration to carry throughthe rebalance. Panelists also pointed to the decrease in U.S. defense spending, which saw the largest
decline in 2012 since 1991, as another reason to doubt U.S. ability and intention to continue its
rebalance to Asia.
Implications and Recommendations for Japan and the United States
In describing the current regional security environment as more interconnected, panelists asserted
that Japan and the United States should prepare for lower-level competition and small-scale crises in
the absence of major military-to-military conflicts. In particular, panelists stressed the importance ofcrisis management in Japan’s relationship with China. Japan and China should find a way for theirdefense authorities and law enforcement organizations to communicate routinely on a daily basis at
the bilateral level in order to avoid miscommunication and miscalculation. In this regard, panelists
expressed great concern regarding the lack of communication between the political leaders of Japanand China and between Japan and South Korea in recent years. While the political stakes for theseleaders are too large for observers to be optimistic, panelists hoped that summit meetings would takeplace soon between these countries. Panelists also raised other ideas for Japan to increase and expand
its communication channels between China. One suggested facilitating exchanges among theyounger politicians and bureaucrats of these countries as well as bringing European countries andSoutheast Asian nations to participate in regional dialogues.
Panelists also encouraged Japan and the United States to leverage this networked security
environment to augment regional multilateral institutions—particularly ASEAN and
ASEAN-centered meetings and institutions—and the role of international law. They also urged Japanand the United States to re-examine and hold deep strategic dialogues about the role of the
President Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” (speechdelivered at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY, September 24, 2013).
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/US_en_0.pdf
18
3

U.S.-Japan alliance in this evolving security environment. In their view, the two countries should
focus not only on bilateral issues, but also discuss what constitutes a regional strategy in terms of thealliance and the ways in which Japan and the United States connect with other partners andinstitutions. Panelists also found the need to close the gap between Washington and U.S. allies in
Asia when they engage in a dialogue about the U.S. rebalance to Asia or about building a regional
order based on rules and institutions. One panelist observed that Washington tends to discuss lofty,
big-picture goals, whereas the Asian allies are more inclined to address very local, tactical, andspecific issues related to their immediate security environment．
Specifically regarding Japan, panelists discussed how the country could create a more amenablediplomatic and political context that is conducive to stable SDF modernization. In order to alleviateregional concerns about a more active and capable SDF, panelists hoped that Japan would makeefforts to “socialize” the idea that a more active and capable SDF would contribute directly toregional security in order to gain regional support for SDF modernization efforts. Panelists also
advised Japan to pursue a multifaceted regional strategy by balancing its security initiatives with
regional engagements on economic, social and development issues, and think broader than in astrictly military sense. According to panelists, a multifaceted regional strategy would involve the TPP,
engaging proactively in regional multilateral institutions, strengthening the role of international law,building the capacity of other partners in the region, and drawing connectivity between East Asia andSoutheast Asia. Specifically regarding trade, one panelist referred to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull under the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration who believed that two nations engaged inpeaceful trade never go into war and free trade promotes international peace and prosperity.
Panelists advised Japan to strengthen its ties not just with the United States, but also with key
regional powers such as Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore. Ties could be strengthened bybuilding and sharing interoperable military platforms, engaging in multilateral training, anddesigning agreements on information-sharing and intelligence about common threats and challenges.
Panelists contended that working with capable partners in the region would reduce redundancy inregional security activities and increase synchronization of purpose and resources in security
cooperation. They cautioned, however, that Japan’s focus on strengthening its relationship with
Southeast Asian countries, who tend to be less concerned about the possible re-emergence of Japanas a security provider in the Asia-Pacific, should not come at the expense of Japan’s more difficult
relationship with China and South Korea in Northeast Asia; Japan’s relationship with these countries
in Northeast Asia has a profound effect on U.S. strategy and interests. To bring together Japan, theUnited States, and China, panelists argued that other countries in the region could play a vital role, as
it could be difficult for initiatives led by Tokyo or Washington to gain traction. However, panelists
added that there has always been reluctance among these countries to play proactive roles to avoid
getting involved in U.S.-China security competition, and advised Japan and the United States to19engage in strong and smart diplomacy to generate a sense of responsibility and desire from thesecountries to play this role to help create a peaceful and stable regional environment.
In considering the future regional security architecture, panelists also advised the United States andJapan to think at a region-wide level and in an inclusive sense, and argued against so-calledmini-lateral security arrangements, i.e. thinking in terms of a specific set of countries or a coalition
such as the “concert of democracies.” Moreover, panelists encouraged Japan and the United States toseek opportunities to cooperate, rather than compete, in helping to build the capacity of otherpartners in the region; in reference to Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s first port call to
Myanmar on September 30, panelists questioned whether Japan and the United States are
maximizing opportunities to work together in their capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia.
Panelists agreed that the main opportunity for Japan and the United States to take leadership in theregion is in the area of trade negotiations, and in particular engaging China in the multilateralliberalization process. Panelists acknowledged that some regional economies consider the TPP as analternative to a China-centered regional integration as well as for strategic hedging purposes against
China. One panelist explained that China is no longer at the center of the regional supply chain
integration, as regional economies believe that China’s growth model has begun to expire and they
began to de-couple themselves from the Chinese economy. Moreover, in addition to China’s future
economic prospects, there are questions about China’s ability and willingness to play by the rulesthat other countries, including Japan and the United States, have encouraged through the WTO.
Despite China’s efforts to lead and address issues such as judicial cooperation and anti-terrorist
cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was established in 2001 and includes
Russia and other countries in Central Asia, one panelist doubted the extent to which China and othermember states understand the meanings of concepts such as the “rule-of-law” and “anti-terrorism” asunderstood by the Western democracies.
However, panelists insisted that the TPP should not be a policy to contain China, and emphasized theimportance of actively engaging China in the TPP. They discussed the need for Japan and the UnitedStates to combine their knowledge and experience to establish trade rules, such as competitivenesspolicies or government procurement policies for dealing with abuse of power by SOEs. Panelists alsosuggested that there is room to engage China through energy cooperation, as China is starting todevelop a “non-zero sum” view of its relationship with the United States on energy. According totheir assessments, as a result of the North American energy revolution, China has begun to lookeastward, shifting its strategy away from a focus on its investment in Central Asian countries andtowards enhancing its cooperation with the United States on energy issues. Panelists contended,however, that even under the most successful scenario of China utilizing U.S.-based technology for
its own shale gas revolution, China will be increasingly dependent on Middle East oil in the near20

future. Panelists speculated that this growing reliance on Middle East oil might encourage China todevelop a more collective and collaborative view of security in East Asia as a way to support
continued U.S. security presence in the Middle East. However, they were uncertain if U.S.-China
energy relations would improve to this extent.
Regarding the possibility of U.S.-Japan-China cooperation, panelists considered it premature to
expect trilateral cooperation on emerging security issues such as climate change, cyber security andunmanned systems or drones. They pointed out that Japan and Southeast Asian countries areexperiencing difficulties cooperating with China even on traditional maritime security issues, inwhich there are decades of international law and practice to build upon. One panelist explained that,in order to preserve its nationalist credentials as it seeks rapprochement with the United States, theChinese leadership will seek to maintain a degree of tension with Japan. In the long-run, however,panelists expected China to try to reap the benefits of cooperating with Japan, noting the strong
interest among Chinese businesses in working with Japan as well as the growing demand of Chinese
provincial governments for Japanese investments in the face of reductions in fiscal revenue from thecentral government.

21

Panel Discussion II:
Domestic challenges ahead for Japan and the United States and their Impact on
Japan and U.S. Leadership
The second panel examined domestic challenges ahead for Japan and the United States as factors
influencing their foreign and security policies.
Domestic Challenges in the United States and their Impact on Foreign and Security Policy
According to U.S. public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, a non-profit,
opinion-polling firm in the United States funded by the Pew Charitable Trust, the political leadershipin the United States is relatively weak under Obama. The president’s public approval ratings
averaged 44 percent, which panelists underscored as being less than 50 percent and quite low for apresident in his fifth year. The president’s performance on foreign policy issues received a lower
approval rate of 33 percent, and his approval rating went down significantly for each specific issue
he has worked on since 2009. The approval rate of the Republicans in Congress is even lower thanthe president’s, though the approval rate of the Democrats in Congress is not much higher. Panelists
argued that the gerrymandered political system in the United States has resulted in an increasingly
less contestable Congress; the number of “safe seats” has grown in every election since 1992, on
both the left and the right.
U.S. response to Syria
To illustrate the politics of U.S. foreign and security policy, panelists analyzed the U.S. response to
the Syrian conflict, specifically regarding Obama’s decision to request the Congress for authorization
to use military force and the strong opposition of the Congress. According to panelists, the U.S.
response surprised Washington observers, and the president’s handling of Syria received only a 29
percent approval rate from the American public.
Panelists identified a couple of factors that led to the president’s decision to seek approval from theCongress: a division within the Obama administration and a certain ambivalence from the president
about the degree of U.S. national interest at stake in Syria; the president’s sense that it was the rightthing to do in terms of the U.S. Constitution; and a belief that the president could indeed obtain
authorization from the Congress. Panelists also analyzed the reasons for the strong opposition in theCongress. First, the idea of another military intervention was unacceptable to many Democrats who
were fatigued over wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and frustrated that the Obama administration’s
national security policies have not changed much from the Bush administration policies. Second,
panelists attributed the opposition among the Republicans to the historical tendency where the power
balance within a party tends to shift in favor of the internationalists when their party is in power but
in favor of the skeptics of a strong U.S. role in the world when their party is in opposition. According22

to this assessment, the very fact that the Republican Party is in opposition shifted the internal balanceof power in favor of the anti-intervention groups over the pro-intervention groups. In addition, theyargued that Obama failed to obtain the support of the Republicans who otherwise would havesupported military intervention because they perceived his proposal to be halfway in nature, fallingsomewhere in between those who thought it went too far and those who thought it did not go far
enough.
While panelists agreed that there is growing resistance among the American public as well as policy
and political elites toward military intervention in the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan wars as wellas the global financial crisis and the U.S. recession, they did not believe that the Syrian case indicatesa groundbreaking shift in the paradigm of the U.S. role in the world or a turn towards greater
isolationism or greater difficulty for the United States to exercise the use of military force in general.
While recent opinion polls did find that the American public is more focused on domestic issues thanthey are on foreign policy issues, panelists argued that this inward focus does not prove greater
isolationism. They cautioned that the Syrian example should not be over-generalized or used to draw
conclusions about how U.S. foreign and security policy is affected by domestic politics, as politics
differ for different cases. In this regard, panelists argued that there is a very strong bipartisanconsensus about the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. interests and that the United Statesshould remain engaged in this region.
Instead, panelists explained the Syrian case as falling under a broader trend in the U.S. history as a
global power. The United States tends to oscillate between decades of active engagement with theworld and decades of retrenchment; the 1930s, 60s, 80s, and the 2000s are arguably periods of active
U.S. foreign policy whereas the 1990s and the 2010s are periods of U.S. retrenchment. At the sametime, panelists argued that this oscillation should not be exaggerated, as there have always been
elements of constraint during decades of expansion and elements of engagements during decades of
forward-leaning engagement.
Panelists highlighted American attitudes toward trade, which they thought would come as a surpriseto the people in Asia. Trade issues are not one of the biggest issues for the United States; only 60
percent of Americans state that trade is good for the country, which is the lowest among advanced
economies, while less than 30 percent of Americans believe that trade lowers wages but not prices.
Polls did find that 60 percent of the Americans would like to increase trade with Japan, which
panelists interpreted as a positive development given the anti-Japanese sentiments in the 1980s when
Japan was considered a trade enemy. Finally, polls showed that Americans, in addition to the Chinese,are the least concerned about climate change as a major threat. They argued that the lack of concern
among the people of the two major emitters of carbon dioxide poses a major challenge ahead forthese countries to take leadership in addressing climate issues.
23

A divided political environment
Panelists characterized the current U.S. political environment as highly divided and polarized along
party lines. One panelist described the situation as, “Republicans have become more Republican, and
Democrats have become more Democrats,” resulting in less conservative Democrats and less liberal
Republicans. They argued that a strong political division exists not just in the Congress or between
the Congress and the White House, but among the American public as well.
Despite the American public’s desire for the government to operate in a bipartisan way, panelists
found that the people are as equally divided along party lines as their government when it comes tospecific issues. Panelists pointed to the partisan division on issues of values as one of thefundamental problems in U.S. politics today: in polls conducted since 1987, panelists found that theattitudes of the Republicans versus the Democrats are becoming increasingly different on issues suchas the social safety net, environment, labor unions, and equal opportunity.
Partisan division also exists in American attitudes towards the economy, according to panelists.
Whereas Republicans are more pessimistic and convinced that the U.S. economy will not improve,
Democrats are not pessimistic and are divided in their view on the future prospects of the U.S.
economy. Panelists admitted that the greater optimism among the Democrats could be due to having
a Democratic president. However, they emphasized the lack of bipartisan agreement on the current
state of the U.S. economy as well as its future trajectory. Polls also indicated a strong partisan divide
on what people considered were the biggest economic problems facing the United States today:
whereas Republicans worried more about the debt and did not recognize inequality as an issue at all,
Democrats overwhelmingly considered inequality as one of the biggest issues.
Foreign policy is not immune to partisan divergence among the American public, either. In the caseof Iran, for example, panelists found greater support from Republicans than from Democrats to use
military force against Iran, though the American public overall is willing to use military force if
needed. In another example, Republicans were more likely to see North Korea as a major threat,
whereas Democrats were more likely to see climate change as a major threat. With regards to China
in particular, Republicans were more concerned about economic issues than Democrats, although 75
percent of the Democrats were worried about specific issues such as the U.S. debt that China holds.
Panelists argued that, despite its stronger rhetoric for free trade, the Republican Party’s core
constituents are more protectionist than Democrats and want to be tougher on China. Panelists also
observed divergence of views between the public and the elites: while the public was moreconcerned about trade relations with China, elites were more concerned about cybersecurity issues
with China. At the same time, elites were no longer concerned about security issues such as Taiwan
and no longer concerned about the sovereignty issues in the East and South China Seas. Panelists
24also found that the public was more supportive of the U.S. government getting tougher with China,
whereas elites were more supportive of building a stronger relationship.
Domestic Challenges in Japan and their Impact on Foreign and Security Policy
In contrast to the United States, panelists agreed that the current political leadership in Japan isrelatively strong and stable. This is compared to Japan’s political leadership in the past six years
between the end of the Koizumi administration and the beginning of the current administration―
during which Japan had six prime ministers—and particularly under the three DPJ administrations.
In this regard, panelists explained that the frequent change of prime ministers in the past six years isdue to the fact that Japan has too many elections and the political parties changed their leaders every
time there was a new election, in hopes that putting a new face to their party would increase thechances of winning.
Reasons for the Abe administration’s high approval rating
Panelists offered a couple of caveats regarding the Abe government’s current approval rating, which
has remained consistently high at around 60 percent and is significantly higher than the previous
three DPJ administrations. First, panelists contended that the poor performance of the previous DPJ
administrations lowered the expectation of the Japanese people so much that it was difficult for the
LDP administration to do worse. The second caveat is that the LDP support base is limited despite its
high approval rating. Panelists noted that the LDP enjoyed a very small margin of victory in the 2013
upper house elections in most cases. In their view, LDP won because the opposing forces weredivided; there will be different results in future elections should opposition parties be able to unite.
The third caveat is that approval rating is an unreliable indicator of how well the administration is
performing in terms of effective policies. Panelists insisted that approval ratings only measure thepopularity of an administration at a particular moment in time, and can fluctuate over time forreasons that are uncertain. Panelists attributed this fluctuation as a reflection of a changing Japanesesocietal structure and the way people connect with society and politics since the end of thehigh-growth era when LDP enjoyed organized votes. On one hand, people are less organized throughtheir employers, schools, or community organizations. On the other hand, individuals are able toconnect more broadly with the rest of the world through new media in addition to traditional media.
It is thus difficult to deduce any conclusions about the society as a whole in this changing
environment.
For these reasons, panelists concluded that LDP’s victory in the past two elections does not indicate areturn to LDP’s one-party rule. In fact, panelists considered that the end of LDP’s one-party rule in2009 brought about a new era in which a change in the administration should always be assumed as apossibility.

25However, despite all the caveats, panelists gave credit to Abe and his administration for employing abetter strategy than before to pursue his goals and re-emerge as a stronger prime minister.
First, panelists asserted that Abe has been able to exercise stronger political leadership than theprevious DPJ administrations which had promised in their manifesto to strengthen politicalleadership but subsequently failed to do so. Panelists observed that the LDP is much more unified
under the leadership of Abe than past LDP administrations. They speculated that the experience oflosing to the DPJ and being in opposition gave the LDP an opportunity to break away from its oldpolicies as well as avoid conventional intra-party power struggles, and have a fresh start as a rulingparty again. One panelist commented how difficult it would have been in the old LDP days for thePrime Minister to interfere with the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of Japan or to reduce
corporate tax rates.
Second, panelists commended Abe for taking proper steps in executing the three pillars or so-called“arrows” of his economic policies, i.e. Abenomics. They agreed that his steps to focus initially onmonetary easing and fiscal stimulus were appropriate. They lauded his decision to move forwardwith growth-oriented structural reforms, including tax reforms, only after the monetary and fiscal
stimulus efforts were proven successful. They regarded that this order of steps enabled Abe toendorse the three-party agreement among the DPJ, LDP and New Komeito on a consumption tax
hike. Skeptics could have opposed the hike as a step in conflict with Abe’s reflation policy, which
implies stimulating the economy by increasing the money supply or reducing taxes. However, bypresenting his reflation policy and pro-growth efforts in one package under the mantra of Abenomics
and in the order that he did, panelists argued that Abe was able to convince these skeptics to consider
the increase in consumption tax as inevitable.
Third, panelists argued that Abe has changed and become more flexible in his policy priorities.
According to panelists, in his first term, Abe lost his initial momentum by trying to pursue too many
policies at once. Panelists observed that Abe is more cautious this time to focus on the economy, andis testing the water for the popularity of his other initiatives before implementing them. For example,
the Abe administration put its energy into TPP negotiations after it confirmed the effects of hismonetary and fiscal policies, and held back on discussing the issue of amending the Constitution andcollective self-defense rights after witnessing that the public was not ready to discuss these issues.
Despite Abe’s declaration to focus on the economy, panelist agreed that his true desire is to put apriority on strengthening Japan’s national security policy. One panelist endorsed the views expressedin Western media that China’s rise has caused Japan to finally become serious about strengthening its
defense and security. According to this panelist, the Abe administration has adopted the Meiji period
slogan of “Fukoku Kyohei,” (“Enrich the country, strengthen Japan”), which recognizes the need to26

rebuild the economy as a prerequisite for stronger defense. According to this view, Abenomics is infact a security policy like the policy of Fukoku Kyohei of the Heisei period.
Survivability and longevity of the Abe administration
After discussing the factors behind the Abe administration’s high approval rating, the big question
was: how long will it last?
Panelists agreed that the Abe administration, having won both houses, would enjoy three “golden”
years without elections until July 2015, when Japan has upper house elections or possibly a snap
election of both houses. After that, panelists expected the LDP to aim to win two elections in a row inorder to remain as the ruling party at the time of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Regarding the prospect
for Abe’s term as LDP president, panelists explained that he could serve as long as 5 years and 9months if he wins the next LDP presidential election in September 2015 and in effect serve more
years than former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.
However, for the LDP to win the 2015 upper house elections, panelists agreed that it would be vitalfor them to deliver results under Abenomics and build enough political capital. One panelist
described the daunting task the Abe administration has in its “golden” three years: it must increase
the consumption tax to 8 percent in April 2014, thereby raising revenue and improving the fiscal
situation, all the while ensuring not to slow down growth and preparing for another tax hike to 10
percent in October 2015. It must achieve the inflation target of 2 percent without causing interest
rates to increase significantly, and it must conclude TPP negotiations and subsequently establish andpass an agreement in the Diet.
Moreover, panelists stressed that monetary easing and fiscal stimulus package only have short-term
impact, and argued that the Abe administration must implement an effective economic growthstrategy, which includes structural reform, for Japan to increase productivity and experiencelong-term growth. Panelists were uncertain of the administration’s ability to implement an effective
economic growth strategy, noting that it has not set out any specific measures regarding the third
arrow of Abenomics. In this regard, panelists identified four major issues that need to be addressed.
The first is the problem of low birth-rates and aging population, which is changing the social
economic structure as a result. Panelists urged the Abe administration to take interest in reviewing
Japan’s social security system to address these changes. The second problem is the maturing of theeconomy, which has led to the demise of the politico-economic system of the high-growth era andgenerated new policy issues for employment and growth. Panelists claimed that the Abeadministration is showing signs of nostalgia for the high-growth era, and cautioned that it must notraise people’s hopes for a growth similar to that era, as Japan’s current situation is entirely different.
They also added that Abe has raised the people’s expectations too high and too quickly, thus27

increasing pressure for him to succeed. The third issue is the fiscal deficit, which adds further
difficulty to addressing the first and second problems. Finally, there is the issue of Japan’s
relationship with its neighbors. Panelists discussed the importance of Japan reestablishing its
relationship with other countries in the region to enable further cooperation and growth.
One of the greatest difficulties or obstacles for the LDP administration to focus on the economy,
according to the panelists, is Abe’s revisionist views on history and his “conservative” agendas,
including the issue of Constitutional revision and the exercise of the rights to collective self-defense.
Panelists agreed that the Abe administration is best advised to address economic issues before
pursuing these agendas if the current leadership were to survive past 2015. They contended thatpeople who expect the Abe administration to revise the Constitution in its three golden years,
including the Japanese hawks who dream of it and those on the left who worry about it, are not being
realistic given the economic difficulties presented. In their view, Abe will end up in a situation of“more haste, less speed” if he rushes to pursue his conservative agendas.
Nevertheless, panelists agreed that Abe will pursue his security and foreign policy agendas if his
administration achieves results in Abenomics and wins the upper house elections in July 2015, as hewill then have nothing to fear. Some panelists even claimed that Abe hopes to “change thepost-World War II international order,” and that he might release a statement on history issues similar
to the Murayama Statement for the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War on August
15, 2015.
While some panelists suggested that the prime minister’s conservative agendas should be postponed
until 2015 to focus on economic issues, other panelists cautioned that these agendas are controversial
and are not necessarily popular among the Japanese people at any rate. These panelists argued that
Abenomics is the basis for the people’s support of the Abe administration, and not Abe’s security or
foreign policies. One panelist stated that Japanese people are rather centrist if the Abe administration
can be characterized as being on the right, pointing to survey results showing less popular support for
constitutional amendment when a more detailed explanation is provided. Some panelists expressed
concern that Abe and his core supporters do not appear to take the deterioration of Japan’s relations
with South Korea and China too seriously, and worried that Abe’s conservative agendas will raise
tensions in East Asia.
Panelists differed on their assessment of what would happen should Abenomics fail. Some panelists
argued that Abe’s aspiration as prime minister is to enhance Japan’s national security policy, andtherefore he will begin to pursue his security and foreign policy agendas before he fully implements
Abenomics, even if his conservative agendas might reduce his approval rating. Others believed that
there would be pressure from within the LDP for Abe to resign if that were the case, and28

stated—rather ironically—that Japan will be able to find other candidates for prime minister as it hasdone six times in the past six years.
Implications and Recommendations for Japan and the United States
Based on their assessments of the domestic political and economic situation of Japan and the UnitedStates, panelists concluded that the political leadership is currently stronger in Japan than in the
United States, while the economic fundamentals are stronger in the United States than in Japan.
Panelists agreed that Abe’s political imperatives are clearly to implement effective economic growthstrategy and structural reforms, and to improve the economy in the next three years, howeverdifficult that may be. If the economic initiatives succeed, however, panelists expected theadministration to shift its focus far more heavily on foreign and security policy, regardless of whether
there is popular support of its policies. Panelists also acknowledged the importance of Japan
improving its relations with both China and South Korea to create a regional environment amenable
to economic growth. However, given the current difficulties in both of these relationships, panelists
stated that maintaining a solid U.S.-Japan alliance would be the key to Japan’s security andprosperity. On this point, one panelist stated that Japan must make conscious efforts to maintain thealliance and not take it for granted, as there is a growing need for the United States to share theburden of defense and security with its allies. Panelists cautioned that Japanese political leaders
should ensure that domestic frustrations are not taken out on the alliance and explain to the public theimportance of the alliance for Japan’s security.
With regard to the prospect of the Abe administration overcoming the opposition of the agricultural
sector and joining the TPP, panelists noted that Japan has spent three years discussing the pros andcons of the TPP since its announcement in the fall of 2010 to join TPP negotiations. Therefore, it will
be easier for Japan to ratify the TPP agreement itself. Panelists contended that the Japanese
government is now at the stage of negotiating with the agricultural sector on the conditions underwhich Japan signs the final TPP agreement, such as compensation measures to make up for any
losses that the TPP might bring to the sector. While panelists admitted that Japan’s fiscal situation
will not guarantee ultimate success of the TPP, they did not expect much difficulty in gathering
support from the agricultural sector over the course of the next 10 to 20 years, pointing out that theagricultural population is already aging and declining.
Regarding the U.S. domestic political situation and its implications, panelists provided short-termand long-term perspectives. In the short-term, panelist admitted that the United States faces serious
domestic challenges in implementing its rebalance to Asia. Panelists offered the view that the major
challenge to the rebalance is not the possibility of U.S. isolationism or distraction to the Middle East
region, but the inability of the U.S. government to get its domestic situation in order. They29

highlighted issues such as sequestration and the government shutdown as consuming the attention ofsenior political leaders and undermining U.S. credibility as demonstrated by Obama’s cancellation ofhis participation to the APEC summit in Bali and the East Asia summit in Brunei. Moreover,panelists expressed concern that the political dysfunction will challenge U.S. capacity to sustain
military capabilities that are necessary to maintain peace and stability in the region. Panelists also
observed polarization not only within the U.S. Congress or between the Congress and the WhiteHouse, but also among the American people on a wide range of issues. While they agreed thatpartisanship will always be a problem and is part of a democracy and an “American experience,”some panelists expressed concern over the fact that more women, younger Americans,
African-Americans and Hispanic Americans are voting for the Democrats, indicating that thedemographic future of the Republican Party is imperiled. According to their view, the U.S. politicalsystem functions best when there are two vibrant political parties. They contended that bringing theAmerican people back together will be a very difficult challenge, and will affect the rest of the world
in a significant way.
In the long-term, however, panelists agreed that the United States will continue to be better
positioned than any other country in the world for the next several decades in terms of economic anddemographic fundamentals and strong innovation, particularly considering the North Americanenergy revolution. They did admit, however, that the United States has had fundamental economic
issues such as wage stagnation and rising income inequality since the 1970s. Even so, panelists
maintained that history demonstrates the United States will remain resilient despite all the
shortcomings. Panelists also introduced the average results of surveys conducted worldwide thatpointed to the overall strength of the United States in terms of its soft power. In particular, theyounger generation remains very supportive of the United States worldwide, compared to theyounger generation’s view of China. There is also strong worldwide support for Obama, except in the
Middle East and China, despite his weaknesses domestically.

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Conclusion
The forum identified key features and elements of uncertainty in the current security and economic
environment in the Asia-Pacific region that indicate either greater cooperation and stability or greater
competition and insecurity. One of the key characteristics of the current regional environment isgreater regional integration in terms of expanding security ties, enhanced regional trade connectivity,
and a potential development of a regional energy market spurred by the North American energy
revolution. The first panel concluded that Japan and the United States confront major opportunities tofacilitate the regional integration process that is underway, particularly by promoting regional andglobal trade liberalization efforts. At the same time, panelists perceived regional security competition
as extremely complex and presenting major risks and challenges of crisis management for Japan andthe United States—there are more countries with more capable militaries, including weaker countries
with asymmetric capabilities, and greater lower-level competition in the domain of law enforcement
and coast guards.
The new political leadership in China and Japan is another major element that is influencing regional
dynamics. While both countries are focusing on achieving economic growth, they saw risks of social
unrest and rising nationalism should their economic initiatives fail. Regarding the Abe administration,
panelists contended that one of the major challenges for the new leadership is to conduct effective
diplomacy and create a political context that is amenable to its new security initiatives and SDF
modernization efforts. Panelists urged Japan to strengthen its ties with not just the United States, butalso other countries in the region. This certainly includes Japan’s relations with South Korea andChina, despite the difficulties that history brings to these relationships. Maintaining communication
channels between China would be extremely important given the greater risks of miscalculation andescalation in the current regional security environment.
The future role of the United States is another element of uncertainty that raises questions about theregion’s future. As functioning democracies, both Japan and the United States have domestic
challenges to overcome and address. While panelists agreed that the fundamentals of the UnitedStates are strong, they admitted that there is strong partisan division among both the American public
and policy elites. In this regard, the future of the U.S. rebalance to Asia and its role in the world will
hinge on its ability to bring the American people back together. With regards to Japan, panelists
agreed that the political leadership under Abe is relatively strong compared to the leadership of theprevious six years. However, given Japan’s aging and declining population, they agreed that the Abeadministration’s imperatives must be to implement an effective economic growth strategy and not his“conservative” policies such as Constitutional amendment.
As a result of an extensive discussion on the challenges and uncertainties that Japan and the United
31

States face in the region and at home, participants voiced renewed appreciation for the importance,
utility, and appropriateness of continuing to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance going forward. Whilequestions were raised as to whether the United States could continue to demonstrate leadership in theworld, and doubts were expressed over the potential success of Japan’s Abenomics and the Abeadministration’s ability to continue to exercise strong political leadership, panelists remained
confident and optimistic that Japan and the United States were the most thriving democracies in theworld, and that this bilateral relationship will play a central role in establishing regional norms, order,
and a platform for further economic prosperity.

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< SPEAKER BIOS >KEYNOTE SPEAKER:
KURT M. CAMPBELL is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Asia Group, LLC, a
strategic advisory and investment group specializing in the Asia Pacific region. He is also
Co-Chairman of the Board of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and writes a regularcolumn and book reviews for the Financial Times of London. From 2009 to 2013, Dr. Campbell
served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he is widely
credited as being a key architect of the “pivot to Asia.” He was awarded the Secretary of State’s
Distinguished Service Award in 2013. Previously, he was the CEO and Co-Founder of CNAS andconcurrently served as the Director of the Aspen Strategy Group and Chairman of the Editorial Boardof the Washington Quarterly. Prior to that, he was Senior Vice President, Director of the International
Security Program, and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
He was also Associate Professor of public policy and international relations at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government. Dr. Campbell is on the Board of Directors for Standard Chartered Bank of
London and MetLife Insurance in New York, and on the board of a number of organizations
including the Advisory Board of the UC San Diego School of International Relations and PacificStudies, the Association of Marshall Scholars, among others. He is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and the TrilateralCommission. He has author or co-author eight books on foreign policy and national security. He iscurrently writing a book about his experiences in the Obama Administration working on Asia,
tentatively entitled The Pivot; America’s Rediscovery of the Asia-Pacific Century. Dr. Campbell
received his B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, a Certificate in music and politicalphilosophy from the University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia, and his Doctorate in International
Relations from Brasenose College at Oxford University where he was a Distinguished Marshall
Scholar.
MODERATORS:MATAKE KAMIYA is Professor of International Relations at the National Defense Academy ofJapan. He is also Editor-in-Chief of Discuss Japan - Japan Foreign Policy Forum(www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/) and visiting superior research fellow at the Japan Forum on
International Relations. Previously, he was Distinguished Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic
Studies in New Zealand and Adjunct Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
He is Co-Editor of Introduction to Security Studies, 4th edition (Tokyo: Aki-shobo, 2009), the mostwidely read textbook on security studies in Japan (Chinese translation available), and author of over
250 articles, book chapters and other works in the areas of international relations and international

33

security. Born in 1961 in Kyoto, he is a graduate of the University of Tokyo, School of Liberal Arts,
and Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences as a Fulbright grantee.
CHIKAKO UEKI is Professor of the Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies at Waseda University.
Dr. Ueki holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). She received hermaster’s and bachelor’s degrees from Sophia University, Tokyo. Her field of specialization isinternational relations, security studies, and political science. Her research themes are international
relations and security of Asia-Pacific, rising powers and international system, and threat perception.
She has numerous publications including “Strategy, Military Power and Security," in Access
Anzenhoshoron (2005) and "China — In Search of New Thinking” in East Asia Strategic Review(2004). Her dissertation at MIT received the 2006 Lucian Pye Award for best dissertation in Political
Science.
ROBERT M. HATHAWAY has been Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. since 1999. Prior to joining the Wilson Center,he served for twelve years on the professional staff of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives, specializing on U.S. policy toward Asia. Dr. Hathaway has also been amember of the History Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, and has taught at George Washington
University and at Barnard, Middlebury, and Wilson Colleges. His most recent book is the co-edited
New Security Challenges in Asia (Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press,2013). He holds a Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from the University of North Carolina.
PANELISTS:DAVID GORDON is the Head of Research and Director of global macro analysis at the Eurasia
Group. Prior to his appointment, he held numerous senior posts with the U.S. government related tonational security. He served as the Director of policy planning under then-Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice, playing a leading role in developing policy ideas ranging from Afghanistan andPakistan to U.S. engagement in East Asia. He was also at the National Intelligence Council as well as
the CIA, and was a Senior Staff Member on the foreign affairs committee of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives, among other positions. Dr. Gordon received his B.A. from Bowdoin College, andcompleted both his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science and economics at the University of Michigan.
JUN IIO is a Professor of Government at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Study (GRIPS).
Dr. Iio is a well-known political scientist and political commentator, with a special expertise on
contemporary Japanese politics and administration, and has served on several governmental advisorygroups. Dr. Iio has been in his corrent position since 2000. From 2009 to 2011, he was Vice Presidentof GRIPS. Dr. Iio is a recipient of the prestigious Yomiuri-Yoshino Sakuzo Award and Suntory
34

Academic Awards. He graduated from the faculty of law of the University of Tokyo and holds Ph.D.
and M.A. degrees in political science from the University of Tokyo. Dr. Iio served as Chairman of
the Study Group of the Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan
Earthquake, which was commissioned by the Government of Japan. Dr. Iio has published various
books and articles on Japanese politics in Japanese language.
HIROSHI NAKANISHI has served as Professor for International Politics at Kyoto University since
2002, after serving as associate professor from 1991. His major interests are historical developmentof theories on international order and system, international history of the 20th century, with particularinterest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign andsecurity policy. He has numerous publications including Kokusaiseiji-toha Nanika(Chuokoronshinsha, 2003, Yomiuri-Yoshino Sakuzo prize winner), a chapter on Yoshida Shigeru in
Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific, Williamson Murray and Tomoyuki
Ishizu eds. (Praeger, 2010), a chapter on 1970s in The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan, Makoto
Iokibe ed., Routledge, 2011) (translated and annotated by Robert D. Eldridge), among others. He
received his Master’s from Kyoto University in political science and studied in the doctorate courseof the History Department at the University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990.
ELY RATNER is Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New
American Security (CNAS) based in Washington, D.C.. He recently served in the State Department
as the lead political officer covering China’s external relations in Asia. Prior to joining the State
Department, Dr. Ratner was an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. Hiscommentary and research have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Washington
Quarterly, The National Interest, Democracy, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies
Quarterly and Chinese Journal of International Politics. He previously worked as a Professional
Staff Member on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Dr. Ratner received his Ph.D. in
Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley.
VANCE SERCHUK is the Executive Director of the KKR Global Institute and a Principal at KKR,
a leading global investment firm. Prior to joining KKR, Mr. Serchuk lived in Japan as a Council on
Foreign Relations-Hitachi International Affairs Fellow, where he was also a monthly columnist for
the Washington Post. He previously served for six years as the Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to
Senator Joseph Lieberman and as a Professional Staff Member on the Senate Homeland Security andGovernmental Affairs Committee. In addition to the Washington Post, his writings have appeared in
the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and other publications. He received a
B.A. from Princeton University, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, and was a Fulbright scholar in
Russia. Mr. Serchuk also served in the U.S. Navy Reserve as an Intelligence Officer.

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BRUCE STOKES is Director of Global Economic Attitudes in the Pew Research Center’s Global
Attitudes Project, where he assesses public and expert views about economic conditions, values andpolicies. He formerly served as International Economics Correspondent for National Journal, SeniorTransatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations. He has appeared on numerous television and radio programs including CNN, BBC, NPR,
NBC, CBS and ABC and is a frequent speaker at major conferences around the world. Mr. Stokes isa graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Johns Hopkins University’s
School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
YORIZUMI WATANABE has been Professor of International Political Economy at Keio
University since 2005. Previously, he served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Director-General of
the Economic Affairs Bureau, Chief Negotiator for the Japan-Mexico EPA and the Working Party on
Russia’s Accession to the WTO, and Special Assistant to the Minister. He has engaged in all the
major bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations involving Japan in the past two decades, as policy
advisor to relevant Ministers and in Japan's diplomatic missions in Brussels and Geneva. Professor
Watanabe obtained his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees, and was a Ph.D. candidate in International
Relations, at Sophia University, Tokyo. He also studied at the College of Europe in Bruges under
Belgian Government Scholarship. He has authored numerous publications on GATT/ WTO and othertrade agreements such as Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), including a best-sellingbook on TPP.
TATSUHIKO YOSHIZAKI is Chief Economist, and Executive Vice President of Sojitz ResearchInstitute Ltd. Mr. Yoshizaki joined Nissho Iwai Corporation in 1984 after graduating Hitotsubashi
University. He was a Visiting Scholar of the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. and a SeniorResearch Fellow of the Keizai Doyukai, one of the most influential business organizations in Japan.
He has been in the current position since 2004, and worked for Sojitz Group, Japan’s large trading
company. He is also well known as a commentator of Japan’s TV program “Sunday Project” and“Morning Satellite,” and author of a number of books on U.S. politics and Japan’s economy.

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