China’s National Strategy and Its Place in a Globalized World
June Teufel Dreyer
Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami

Abstract: Xi Jinping has committed China to a strategy of national rejuvenation under the
rubric of The China Dream. A well-coordinated meld of economic, military, andpsychological aspects, the dream aims at establishing a new world order under rules
established by the People’s Republic of China in ways reminiscent of the traditional
Chinese world order in which the emperor claimed to rule tianxia, all under heaven.
Domestic vulnerabilities and resistance from other nations may halt the dream short offulfillment.

The China Dream
In common with most other nations, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) describes its
strategy in abstract terms phrased in lofty moral principles, with its actual meaning
dependent on the content the leadership chooses to assign at any given time. In recent
years, this has been The China Dream. First publicly articulated by Xi Jinping inNovember 2012, just after being confirmed as leader of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) and its Central Military Commission, but even before being named head of thegovernment, the term was sufficiently vague that an anonymous Chinese cartoonist
showed Xi asleep in a bed surrounded by thousands of citizens puzzling over what hemight mean. Only later did Xi add that it meant the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation. This, too, raised questions. How the rejuvenation was to be accomplishedremained unclear: when one nation rises, does another fall behind? Does a nation rise bypushing other nations down and, if so, by what means. An earlier strategy, “peacefulrising,” had been discarded because the phrase aroused concerns in other states, and was
replaced with “peaceful development.” Finally, since the success of any strategy depends
on being able to reconcile means and ends, what are China’s capabilities to achieve theChina dream?
Neither peace nor war were mentioned in Xi’s statement, but two years before, a seniorcolonel in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had written a book also titled
The China Dream Great Power, subtitled Thinking and Strategic Posture in the PostAmerica Era that took a struck a decidedly militant tone. Its author, Liu Mingfu, argued
that China should be the most powerful country in the world, with the most powerful
military. As an implicit challenge to the United States, the country with the then-mostpowerful military, the book attracted much attention, not all of it favorable. In a
subsequent interview, Liu took a softer tone, explaining that the strongest military would
be used for defensive purposes only. This did not appreciably diminish apprehensions,since nations bent on war virtually always justify their actions in terms of the need for
defense. And it would be difficult to find a state that had the intention to invade China.
One must wonder about the identical wording of Liu’s title and Xi’s description of hisplan for China. He has neither endorsed the book nor repudiated it, though after Xi
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announced his China dream, Liu’s book enjoyed a renewed boost in sales. In his firstspeech to the politburo in 2013, Xi took an aggressive stance, speaking of “a long-term
struggle between the two social systems.”1 However, at his meeting with then-president
Barak Obama at Sunnylands in 2013, Xi explicitly equated the China Dream with theAmerican dream.2 In an unusual departure from the leader’s statement, Renmin Ribao,
the official newspaper of the CCP’s Central Committee, took a decidedly different view,
stating that the Chinese dream was “completely different’ from the American dream,
since the dream of the Chinese people was to create prosperity for the entire nation,
whereas Americans focus only on creating individual wealth.3 And that while Chinese
depend solely on their own strength, Americans exploit the resources of other nations.
Six years later, and also in an unusual departure from past practice, the CCP’s flagshipjournal on political theory, Qiushi (Seeking Truth) republished Xi’s speech. While
Qiushi frequently publishes the speeches of top leaders, it very rarely reprints older ones.
Even more eye catching was the inclusion of an additional paragraph that observers
interpreted as a clear message: comrades must understand the ability of capitalist
societies to self-correct, to learn from them, and “to prepare to cooperate and competewith capitalist countries that were armed with greater developed productivity.” People
would be comparing the achievements of Western states to China’s, Xi continued, andblame China for shortcomings.4 This seemed to indicate that, in contrast to frequent
references in the media to the decline of the Western system, and particularly that of theUnited States, Xi envisioned the struggle to establish the Chinese model, which hedescribed as socialist development, as the international norm would be a much longerterm process than originally envisioned.
A dream, and a wish for rejuvenation, are at best vague hints to the guiding principles ofa strategy, and in the absence of a document clearly marked as such, one must infer from
subsequent actions how the strategy is to be implemented. What became evident as theprocess of operationalizing the China Dream unfolded was a multi-faceted and wellcoordinated initiative encompassing economic, military, and psychological aspects.
The Economic Component of the China Dream
Xi’s statement on the China Dream was followed, also in 2013, by his announcement of
the One Belt One Road (OBOR), which was to be a principal vehicle for the achievement
1

Renmin Ribao, January 4, 2013.

2 Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China After Bilateral

Meeting, June 8, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/08/remarkspresident-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china3

Renmin Ribao, June 6, 2013.

4

William Zheng South China Morning Post, April 2 2017 “XJP Speech From 6 years Ago Resurfaces to‘Send Message on Trade War, Leadership’ ”
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3004209/xi-jinping-speech-six-years-ago-resurfacessend-message-trade2

of the China Dream. A globe-spanning initiative of breathtaking proportions, OBOR’s
premise was that lack of infrastructure had kept less developed countries fromdeveloping, and that, with China’s help, these infrastructure gaps could be remedied.
With connectivity established, prosperity for all would follow. What was needed wascooperation for mutual benefit, which would, in an oft-repeated catchword, result in a“win-win” situation. Later, reportedly responding to misgivings about the word “one,”
OBOR was renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As to how this connectivity was
to be achieved, the Chinese government would extend generous help in the form of loans
and technological assistance.
A new financial institution, the Asian Infrastructure Bank, AIIB, would provide theinstitutional structure for channeling these loans. The bank was originally proposed in2009 at the Bo’ao Forum, another of China’s challenges to the international financial
system, to make better use of China’s general foreign currency reserves during the world
financial crisis. While all recipients of the bank’s largesse were expected to contribute,
China’s contribution was by far the largest, and the AIIB was, appropriately,
headquartered in Beijing. Although the Chinese government has been critical ofestablished international financial aid institutions like the International Monetary Fund,the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, it was careful to stress that the AIIB
was to supplement these institutions rather than compete with them. Currently the AIIB
has, according to its website, 102 approved members, as well as a number of candidate
countries .5
Going beyond the initial scope of the less developed countries that were in need of loans
for infrastructure, the AIIB membership also included highly industrialized states such as
Germany and the United Kingdom. Many of these believed that, by joining as founding
members, they would be able to influence the AIIB’s development. The British
government also wished to obtain Chinese investment in newer state-of-the-art nuclear
power plants, and hoped that the City of London would became the base for the firstclearing house for the renminbi outside Asia.6
In time, what began as one belt---a creative recreation of the silk roads from China
through Central Asia to Europe---and one road---a maritime silk route allegedly based on
ancient sea routes, spread into different spheres that included a digital silk road, an
undersea silk road, and an Arctic sea road. The digital silk road was introduced at theSecond Belt and Road Forum, held in Beijing in 2019 and represents a broadening of theconnectivity goal. It includes strengthening internet infrastructure, deepening spacecooperation, developing common technology standards, and improving the efficiency ofpolicing operations.7
In 2016, the Chinese Academy of Sciences established two regional research centers aspart of a “Digital Earth Under the Information Silk Road” initiative to gather space-based
remote sensing data for several projects under the BRI, particularly in South and5https://aiib.org“U.S. Anger at Britain Joining China-Backed Investment Bank AIIB,” The Guardian, March 26, 2015.
7
Chan Jia Hao, “China’s Digital Silk Road: A Game Changer for Asian Economies,” The Diplomat, April
30, 2019.
6

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Southeast Asia. The BeiDou-2 navigation satellite system is also being vigorously
promoted as an alternative to the Global Positioning System (GPS) of the U.S.
government. By summer 2019, it was found more frequently than GPS satellites in 130
countries.8
The Undersea Silk Road entails the construction of submarine cable projects. These
collectively carry about 95 percent of intercontinental voice and data traffic, making themcritical for economic and security interchanges. China’s Huawei Marine is now tied withJapan’s NEC Corporation as the world’s third largest contractor for such projects, justbehind France’s Alcatel and America’s SubCom, which is the market leader. Huawei
Marine is involved in at least 98 projects. Its largest completed project, the West Africa
Cable System (WACS) runs across 14 countries and connects South Africa with GreatBritain. Another project will connect Brazil with Cameroon, and the Finnish government
has contracted with Huawei to construct the Arctic Connect cable. The cables currently in
use travel under the Red Sea, where they can be damaged by the heavy fishing in thearea. As a polar route, Arctic Connect will also be shorter in distance, making for fasterconnection speeds.9
These technologies have the potential to do much good. A Global Energy Interconnection
proposed in 2015 aims at supplying the world’s demand from clean power and is
described as “increasing[ing] mutual trust in politics and creating a new pattern ofenergy security featuring cooperation, mutual benefit, and win-win results.” The projectis particularly attractive to countries whose economic development is hindered by power
shortages, though China also invested in the Portuguese and Spanish power industries at atime when those countries were among the hardest-hit of the world financial crisis of
2007-2010.10 Chinese companies announced 35 new power transmission projects outside
China between March 2018 and December 2019, in addition to dozens of pre-existing
power generation projects. According to the Global Energy Interconnection Development
and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO), the entity established to supervise theenterprise, the total investment in power sources and grids could reach $27 trillion by
2050.11
Mobile payments facilitate international trade as well as the interchange of goods andservices among individuals and many will welcome their further development. In
Venezuela, the carnet de patria, or fatherland card, developed by another Chinese telecom“More Beidou than GPS in 130 of 195 Countries,” Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, August22, 2019. https://rntfnd.org/2019/08/22/more-beidou-than-gps-in-130-of-195-countries/
89Frank Jüris, “Handing Over Infrastructure for China’s Strategic Objectives,” Policy Brief Presented at
Conference “Beyond Huawei: Europe’s Adoption of PRC Technology and its Implications, Prague,
November 27, 2019. p. 7 https://sinopsis.cz/en/arctic-digital-silk-road/
Akane Okutsu, Cliff Venzon, and CK Tan, “China’s Belt and Road Power Grids Keep Security Critics
Awake,” Nikkei, March 3, 2020.
10

GEIDCO, “Research Report on the Belt and Road Energy Connection,” April 2019.
https://img1.nengapp.com/tech/ydyl/yjbg_en.html
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giant, ZTE, already links holders to the subsidized food, health, and other social benefit
programs that most citizens rely on to survive.12 For the future, China’s Ministry ofTransport and Communications is working with Huawei to launch 5G broadband services
by 2025. Systems that provide faster connectivity and, particularly in the case ofsubmarine cables, are less prone to damages that have periodically caused disruptions inservice, are welcomed by all.
Defense and the China DreamThe double-digit increases in the PRC’s defense budget that began in 1989---even as
other countries were reducing their expenditures due to the disintegration of the Soviet
Union---have been slightly reduced in recent years presumably consonant with declining
increases in the national GDP. Yet China’s defense budget is the world’s second largest13
and continues to grow at a pace larger than economic growth rates and well above
allocations for more needy domestic sectors such as education and health care. Although
American defense publications publicly refer to the PRC as a “near peer competitor,”other comments seem to indicate that it is considered a peer and, in some areas such as
hypersonic weapons, possibly ahead of the United States.
Beijing has used its newly acquired military power to enforce its claims in the East China
and South China seas. When an international tribunal ruled that the PRC’s claim to thearea under a self-drawn nine dash line had no basis in law, China announced that it
intended to ignore the verdict.14And has done so.
China has also become skilled in gray-area military tactics that avoid kinetic force suchas using maritime militias and fishing boats to enforce its claims to contested areas.15 At
times these become violent, as when in 2019, a Chinese trawler travelling at full speed hit
and sank a Filipino fishing boat that was anchored in the South China Sea, and then took
off, ignoring the boat’s crew.16 In the following year, a large Chinese ship chased andrammed a Vietnamese fishing boat near a contested area.17 China’s response in bothcases was that the boats had no right to be in the area. Analysts believe that, with
Angus Berwick, “How ZTE Helps Venezuela Create China-Style Social Control,” Reuters, November
14, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-zte/
1213International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020 (London: Routledge, 2020) p. 21.
Robert D. Williams, “Tribunal Issues Landmark Ruling in South China Sea Arbitration,”lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration, July 12, 2016.
14

15

U.S. Department of Defense, China Military Power Report 2019.
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf
16

Julie McCarthy, “Chinese Trawler Hits and Sinks Filipino Fishing Boat,” National Public Radio, June29, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/06/29/737268828/chinese-trawler-hits-and-sinks-filipino-fishing-boat.
17

No author, “Vietnam Airs Video of Chinese Ship Sinking Fishing Board in South China Sea,” South
China Morning Post, March 28, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1526701/vietnam-airsvideo-chinese-ship-sinking-fishing-boat-south-china-sea

5

claimant states putting more resources into bolstering their presence, more clashes areprobable. Vietnam, for example, has quietly fostered a state-supported fishing boat militia
with military-trained personnel. 18
Yet the power imbalance between China and any of the other South China Sea claimants
would seem to predetermine the outcome. Shortly after the incident with Vietnam, China
escalated its claim by establishing new administrative arrangements for the disputed
Spratly and Paracel islands and, in a separate action, announcing names for the islands
and reefs therein. According to Beijing’s Global Times, this further consolidates China’s
sovereignty to the area within the nine-dash line that the Permanent Court of Arbitration
had earlier ruled had no basis in international law.19
Ports have been acquired in strategic areas throughout the world. Much attention has been
paid to its acquisition of a base in Djibouti, China’s only actual overseas military base,but the Chinese navy’s ships have visited other strategically located ports where Chinesecompanies have important stakes like Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka,
and could presumably be accommodated there in time of armed confrontation.

Non-kinetic Aspects of the China Dream
First introduced in 2003 as guiding concepts for the political work of the People’s
Liberation Army and soon broadened beyond the military, the “three warfares” can beconsidered a campaign to win hearts and minds with Chinese characteristics.
• Psychological warfare seeks to undermine the target’s resistance throughoperations designed to demoralize, either by creating a mindset that resistanceis futile or instilling a feeling of guilt by suggesting that the target owes China
for alleged past misdeeds. Tactics include creating doubts and instigating or
encouraging anti-leadership sentiments. Phrases such as “China’s inevitablerise” and “the inexorable decline of the United States/West/Japan” haveentered public discourse and are often used by people who are unaware thatthey have adopted Beijing’s narrative. Beijing has also incentivized domestic
public opinion in rallies to support China’s alleged “indisputable sovereignty”
over territories “since ancient times” and intimidated opponents through showsof force. It has encouraged its students in foreign universities to protest against
policies that run counter to Chinese interests. In the case of the South China
and East China seas, the Chinese government points out that the U.S. has said
it has no position of the sovereignty of the disputed islands and asks, or has its
sympathizers in those countries ask, whether American leaders would risk a

Kristin Huang, “China and Vietnam ‘Likely to Clash Again” As they Build Maritime Militias,” South
China Morning Post, April 12, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3079436/chinaand-vietnam-likely-clash-again-they-build-maritime
18

19

No author, “China’s Sansha City Establishes Xisha, Nansha Districts in Major Administrative Movehttp://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-04/18/content_9795211.htm

6

confrontation over such areas, hinting that, if they take a more confrontational
stance, the United States would not back them.
•Media warfare uses all entities that inform and influence public opinion,
including films, television programs, books, the internet, and the global media
network to build support for Chinese policies and dissuade the governments of
its targets from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests, with state news
agency Xinhua and state television network CGTV particularly active in suchendeavors. They have bought space in major newspapers such as the
Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal in which Chinese journalists
regularly present the PRC’s views on policies. The film industry is anothermajor target, with Chinese businesses buying into film studios and or pointing
out to directors that the PRC’s censors will either ban a film from being shownin Chinese theaters or demand changes in the script. Since China has theworld’s largest film audience, studios typically hasten to comply. Paramount,for example, bowed to Chinese pressure by removing the Taiwan and Japanese
flags from star Tom Cruise’s jacket in the studio’s remake of Top Gun.20 It has
become impossible to have a film that portrays a Chinese character in a badlight shown in China.

•

Legal Warfare, “lawfare,” uses international law and the targets’ own domestic
laws to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. These extend tousing bogus law or selective use of provisions in international legal
conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or
producing allegedly definitive maps to bolster Chinese claims to territory or“justify” claims, most notably to the nine-dash line that encompasses about 80
percent of the South China Sea, and to large portions of the East China Sea.21

Soft Power, Sharp Power, and the China Dream
Beijing has sought to win hearts and minds abroad in support of Chinese policies. Most
observers feel that efforts to create international good will through present-day culture
have fallen short of success: officially sponsored Chinese-made films, with their often
heavy doses of propaganda, have not been box office successes, and cute cartoon
characters have been unable to compete successfully with Disney productions or Japanese
anime and manga. Marketing traditional Chinese culture or, more accurately, a
selectively chosen version of traditional Chinese culture, has had more success.
The premier vehicles for doing this have been the Confucius Institutes, located within
foreign countries’ universities, and Confucius Classrooms in elementary schools to teachAlex Lockie, “Looks Like the New Top Gun Bows to China’s Communist Party by Censoring
Maverick’s Jacket,” Business Insider, July 20, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/top-guns-maverickappears-changed-to-please-chinas-communist-party-2019-7
20

21

See Stefan Halper ed., China: The Three Warfares, study prepared for U.S. Department of Defense,
Office of the Director of Net Assessment, May 2013, passim.

7the Chinese language and present cultural programs. Teachers are sent from China, with
their salaries paid through the Hanban, a division of the Ministry of Education. The
agreement between the university or classroom and the Hanban specifies that nothing bedone that will embarrass the Chinese government. This has been construed to mean notinviting certain people such as exiled Tibetan leader the Dalai Lama and Uyghur politicalactivist Rebiya Kadeer, and not speaking out on human rights violations such as theincarceration and mistreatment of over a million Chinese Muslims and an uncounted
number of adherents of religious groups, thus running counter to liberal principles about
freedom of speech .
The Hanban also ordered that a faculty member of a university in Canada be fired
because she was a member of a religious organization that is proscribed in China,
although not in Canada. The university refused to do so, and its Confucius Instituteclosed. At the same time, a former member of the Canadian parliament resigned as adirector of the Pierre Eliot Trudeau Foundation after it was revealed that a million dollar
donation to the organization and the University of Montreal was made by senior officials
in Chinese organizations whose purpose was to project Beijing’s influence abroad.22
In another instance, this time in Portugal, Hanban director and vice-minister Xu Lin
insisted on tearing out pages from the conference program of the European Institute ofChinese Studies before it was distributed to attendees because the program listed afoundation headquartered in Taiwan as among the conference’s sponsors. The association
denounced the act as a “totally unacceptable act of academic bullying,” and it became aninternational incident. BBC then interviewed Hanban director Xu in Beijing, reportingthat she confirmed that her organization exports the values of the Chinese Communist
Party to foreign academic institutions. Ms. Xu later asked BBC to delete portions of theinterview; it refused. The Wall Street Journal commented that director Xu had justconfirmed critics’ charges that the Confucius Institutes pose a threat to academic
freedom.23
Although these and other incidents led to the closure of a number of Confucius Institutes
and classrooms, their numbers continue to increase. According to the Hanban’s website,
there are now 541 institutes and 1170 Confucius Classrooms in the world.24
United Front Work

22

Steven Chase, “Former MP Chuck Strahl Quits Trudeau Foundation in Wake of Donor Revelations,”
Globe and Mail, November 24, 2016. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ex-mp-chuck-strahlresigns-from-trudeau-foundation/article33014375/
23

No author, “Madam Xu’s Party Line: Beijing Confirms That Confucius Institutes Subvert Western
Academic Freedom,” Wall Street Journal, December 25, 2014.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/madam-xus-party-line-1419375797
24

http://www.hanban.org/confuciusinstitutes/node_10961.htm

8

Another important part of party and government efforts to win support for their policies is
United Front work. In the early days after the founding of the PRC, the party sought toportray itself as bringing together people from all social classes and walks of life tosupport the building of the communist state. Externally, the CCP’s United Front Work
Department (UFWD) coordinated visits by sympathetic non-communist leaders,
professional groups such as doctors and professors, in fields that they wanted to establish
rapport with, and cultural exchange programs. The UFWD also established contacts with
Chinese diaspora communities.
After Deng Xiaoping announced China was to be opened to the outside world, increasing
numbers of Chinese left the PRC, usually to study or conduct business. Many stayed,
becoming citizens of those countries while retaining varying degrees of ties to their nativeland. Chinese student and scholar associations (CSSAs) proliferated. In addition toproviding support for members in the difficult process of adjusting to new ways of life,
they could be mobilized to support the party’s policies. Non-Chinese, particularly those
who enjoyed positions of respect in their communities and or wealth were sought out as
well, earning the honorary title of “Friends of China.” Apart from relatively minor
incidents like protesting against films sympathetic to Tibet and the flying of the Taiwan
flag, the organizations had little salience.
This changed with Xi Jinping’s ascension to the leadership of party and government in2012 and 2013, respectively. Delegates to the 18th National Congress in 2012 werelectured on the importance of united front work; those attending the 19th Party Congress
five years later heard Xi declare that “united front work is an important magic weapon for
the victory of the party’s cause.”25 Having received clear instruction, the bureaucracy
hastened to comply. As in other aspects of China’s dealings with the outside world, thisincreased activism soon began to raise misgivings in the countries toward which united
front work was targeted.
The Chinese diaspora and sympathetic Westerners, sometimes from naivete andsometimes in exchange for financial or prestige reasons, have been enlisted in support of
the China dream. Sometimes soft power measures, operating through perfectly legal
procedures in the states involved, are employed. In others, soft power verges into sharp
power, which deliberately seeks to undermine liberal principles through pressure,bullying, illegal financial transactions, and subversion. These influence operations have
led to adverse reactions in several different countries including, but not limited to, thefollowing four.
Australia
In Australia, a joint investigation by journalists from two different organizations exposed
what their report called a campaign by the Chinese government and its proxies toinfiltrate the country’s political process. Its targets included universities, local student andcommunity groups, the Chinese language media, and some of the nation’s leading“Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Address to the 19th Congress of the Central Committee of the People’s
Republic of China,” Xinhua, November 3, 2017. www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/201711/03/c_136725942.htm
25

9

politicians. The head of the Australian Security Investigation Organization (ASIO)
warned, not explicitly naming but clearly referring to China, that “espionage and foreigninterference are occurring here on an unpresented scale, with the potential to cause
serious harm to this nation’s sovereignty, its security, and …the integrity of our politicalsystem.”In 2015, a team of counterespionage officers raided the Canberra home of a Chinese
woman whose husband was a former high-ranking Australian intelligence official, seizingclassified Australian intelligence documents. Her spouse had been Assistant Secretary atAustralia’s Office of Net Assessments, with duties that included providing secretintelligence briefings to the prime minister. The woman, described as a socialite withconnections to senior levels of government in China and Australia, was named as theintermediary in the transfer of $200,000 into the bank account of a United Nations
official after another wealthy Chinese-Australian had said he wanted he wanted theofficial to become his “sincere friend in [China’s] Guangdong Province.” This wasclearly illegal; the woman was charged, pleaded guilty to bribery charges, and served ajail term.
Prior to the raid, ASIO analysts had been tracking the links between political donors inAustralia and the Chinese Communist Party, with the ASIO director warning the heads ofmajor political parties that, although no laws had been broken, the donations might comewith conditions attached. According to Australian academic Clive Hamilton, major
publishing house Allen and Unwin delayed publication of his manuscript, Silent Invasion,“due to fears that it would be targeted by Beijing and its proxies in Australia" because hedetailed these and other Chinese activities to influence politics.
In the same time frame, it was revealed that Senator Sam Dastyari, a naturalized IranianAustralian, had allowed a company owned by Chinese billionaire, Huang Xiangmo, who
had close connections to the highest levels of the CCP, to pay a legal bill for his office.
Later, in a secret meeting with Huang, Dastyari warned him that his phone was likely
being tapped in connection with an investigation into his activities. Additionally, at a
Chinese media conference, Dastyari had endorsed China’s stance on the South China Sea,
contradicting both government policy and the policy of his own party. He resigned fromparliament.
A former senior intelligence analyst called for an urgent review of an arrangement underwhich a Confucius Institute was embedded inside the New South Wales Department of
Education, citing the words of a Chinese official that the institutes are an important partof China’s overseas propaganda establishment. Others objected to the placement of anAustralia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) inside the University of Technology Sydney,noting that ACRI was founded by donations from the afore-mentioned Huang Xiangmo.
Clive Hamilton testified at an Australian parliamentary hearing on national security
legislation that United Front Work Department efforts extended beyond persuading the
Chinese Australian community to back the PRC’s policies but also to intimidate andcoerce them into doing so. The Chinese foreign ministry’s response was that the PRC
10never interferes in the domestic affairs of other countries, and that such allegations arebaseless creations of the biased Australian media that are prompted by racism.
New ZealandIn New Zealand, the issue of Chinese interference in politics gained prominence as aresult of a detailed investigation by University of Christchurch academic Anne-Marie
Brady. As in Australia, the PRC has worked through the Chinese community, supporting
youth organizations and buying Chinese language print and broadcasting media. There
have been generous donations to candidates for office who support China’s positions, andlucrative board memberships and business opportunities for the politicians once theyleave office.
The most eye-catching among many revelations was the story of member of parliament
Yang Jian. Yang, born and educated in the PRC, had omitted to mention on his
application for New Zealand citizenship that he had had a fifteen-year career in China’s
military intelligence sector. The People’s Liberation Army would not have allowedanyone with his background to go overseas to further their studies, as Yang had, without
official permission, and would also have had to wait two years to do so, which Yang did
not. Having received New Zealand citizenship, Yang became active in politics, and waselected to parliament. As such, he received automatic security clearances, and lateraccompanied two successive prime ministers to meetings with visiting Chinese leaders,which gave him privileged access to New Zealand’s China policy briefing notes andpositions.26 Since New Zealand is a member, with Australia, Canada, Great Britain, andthe United States, of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing group, Yang would presumably
have been able to access those as well.
CanadaAs in other countries, Chinese state-owned corporations were able to buy major shares inimportant Canadian industries by working through Chinese who had become Canadiancitizens. A welcoming immigration policy---despite a study by the Canadian Economic
Council that said there was plenty of investment money available in Canada--immediately became perverted. A 1997 secret report that was leaked to the press stated
that, among other activities, the Chinese intelligence service was using its access to
Canadian industries through exchanges of specialists and students, and had set up shellcompanies to pursue acquisition of economic and technological intelligence. According
to the report, over 200 Canadian companies from banking to real estate and high-tech hadcome under Chinese influence or ownership since the early 1980s through mafia-likesecret societies, tycoons who owed the CCP favors, and state-owned corporations. The
secret societies also used the companies to pursue criminal activities that included
money-laundering and heroin trafficking.
Chinese language newspapers and radio stations were either bought or founded anew tospread the CCP’s message; journalists who resisted were fired. Canadian politicians often
Anne-Marie Brady, Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping,
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2018. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weaponschinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping
26

11

acceded to Beijing’s wishes to exclude journalists affiliated with a religious movementthat had been banned in China from Canadian media events. Canadian universities, likethose in many other countries, have become at least partially dependent on students from
China, and are aware that speaking out on sensitive issues might result in angry student
demonstrations or a Chinese government decision to withdraw the students entirely.
A Canadian journalist who conducted an extensive investigation into the issue concluded
that the CCP is “riding roughshod” over Canadian values and interfering in its internalaffairs to a degree that sometimes amount to a challenge to Canadian sovereignty. While
his country’s intelligence services have been aware of the dangers for many years, hestated, political officials too often do not seem concerned.27
Great Britain
While the revelations of Chinese machinations have been less numerous from the United
Kingdom than elsewhere, they follow a familiar pattern of holding forth trade deals in
return for support for Chinese policies and use of Chinese students in support of theseends. In a case involving what might be called “mapfare,” Chinese officials pressured theLondon School of Economics to change a globe to show Taiwan as part of the PRC.28
Politicians, including those at the highest levels of government, are also involved: soonafter resigning as prime minister, David Cameron announced that he would lead a billiondollar infrastructure initiative between the UK and China that is connected to the PRC’s
belt and road project. A respected U.S. international affairs journal described Cameron’s
project as “rather uncompromisingly aligned with an aggressive interpretation of Chineseinterests.”29 He has denied that his duties will involve any discussion of the classified
information he was party to as prime minister.
Japan
Unlike the previous four countries, and others such as Taiwan,30 United Front activities inJapan have had limited success. This does not mean that they have been absent, as
successive Japanese governments have tried to find a proper balance between, on the one
hand, a country it wanted to placate and trade with, and, on that other, guard against thatcountry’s proclaimed desire to export its ideological and social system to Japan. Afternationalism displaced communist ideology in the PRC and the country’s economic
growth took off, Beijing stepped up efforts to use the lure of lucrative contracts to gain
Jonathan Manthorpe, Claws of the Panda: Beijing’s Campaign of Influence in Canada. (Toronto:
Cormorant Books, 2019) passim.
27

No author, “A Cartographic Clash Between the LSE and its Chinese Students,” Economist, April 13,
2019. https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/04/13/a-cartographic-clash-between-the-lse-and-itschinese-students
28

29 Bruno Maçaes, “David Cameron Didn’t Just Sell Out to China,” Foreign Policy, December 20, 2017.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/20/david-cameron-didnt-just-sell-out-to-china/
for a detailed discussion of United Front activities in Taiwan, see June Teufel Dreyer, “The Big Squeeze:
Beijing’s Anaconda Strategy to Force Taiwan to Surrender,” Foreign Policy Research Institute e-note,
August 2018. https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/the-big-squeeze-beijings-anaconda-strategy-to-forcetaiwan-to-surrender/
30

12compliance with its policies. Another conduit for United Front activities are Chinese
students, who as of the end of 2019 comprised the largest group, 38 percent, ofinternational students in Japan. Chinese student associations in Okinawa have been
supportive of anti-base activities there, and there are concerns that the students could be
used for theft of technology or influence over university policies. Another possible
conduit is collusion between Japanese gangs, the yakuza, and their Chinese counterparts
who, like all other segments of Chinese society, are constitutionally bound to supply
information to the government.
But there are important differences that make it more difficult for United Front activities
to succeed in Japan. First, although the non-Japanese proportion of the population, has
increased in recent years, it has historically been very small. The path to citizenship is
steep, and complaints of discrimination against non-Japanese are frequent. Unlike
several of the above-mentioned countries, no Japanese newspapers are owned by Chinese
affiliated entities. That a Chinese who was born, educated, and previously employed by a
PRC military university could be naturalized, elected to parliament, and given high-levelsecurity clearances, as happened in New Zealand, is unthinkable. As is the possibility that
wealthy Chinese residents could underwrite the election campaigns of those who thenargue China’s case, contrary to the policy of their own government and party, as
happened in Australia, No former high-ranking Japanese intelligence officials or military
men have taken up residence in China, as has several times occurred Taiwan. Nor has aformer Japanese prime minister agreed to head a Chinese investment fund, as happened
in Britain. In short, the more closed nature of Japanese society has given it a degree ofprotection. A concern is that the forces of globalization, when combined with more
foreign workers being absorbed to meet labor shortages, may be eroding these protections
and increasing Japan’s vulnerability.31
Subnational Efforts
Where central governments are resistant, support from lower levels is courted as well. In
February 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo revealed that a Chinese
government-backed think tank had produced a report on each of America’s 50 governors,labeling them friendly, hardline, or ambiguous in their attitudes toward the PRC.32 Those
designated friendly or able to be won over would receive invitations to attend a
networking event that promised great “deal-making opportunities” with the Chinese
government. Very few would have been aware that the host, the Chinese People’s

31

for a fuller treatment of Chinese activities in Japan, see June Teufel Dreyer, “China’s Political Warfare
Against Japan,” Orbis, Spring 2020 pp, 249-270. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.007
32

Zhimin (D.C. Thinktank)“Meiguo Dui Hua Taidu Quanjing—Zhoujiang Pian” (Overview of American
Attitudes Toward China: Section on Governors” June 22, 2019,https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6779094-PRC-Think-Tank-Study-on-US-GovernorsAttitudes.html

13

Association for Friendship in Foreign Countries, was the public face of the United FrontWork Department.33
Responding to hostility from Washington on the coronavirus pandemic, the editor of
Beijing’s nationalistic Global Times advocated working with state governments instead,“while giving the federal government a cold shoulder.”34 Typically, this involves efforts
to get the state to praise the Chinese government’s handling of the virus. The president of
Wisconsin’s state senate received multiple emails from a woman claiming to be“responsible for China-Wisconsin relations” that asked him to “consider adopting a
resolution expressing solidarity with the Chinese people in fighting the coronavirus” even
including the draft of such a resolution. A check revealed that she was the wife of theChinese consul general in Chicago.35
Among Chinese reasons for the pique with the U.S. federal government was therevelation by its intelligence agencies that Chinese operatives spread disinformation
across social media platforms to create panic during that coronavirus pandemic. Among
their findings are that top Chinese officials issued directives to agencies to engage in a
global disinformation campaign around the virus. Some of these disinformation articles
have stressed disunity among European nations and praise for China’s generous“donations,” while failing to mention reports that the equipment was defective or shoddy,
and that in at least some cases had been paid for rather than donated. Another, citing abogus source in the Department of Homeland Security, said that the administration
planned to lock down the United States as soon as troops were in place to help prevent
looters and rioters.36
Combining co-option with intimidation, now known as “wolf warrior diplomacy,”37 these
efforts have been accompanied by a more assertive manner among Chinese military anddiplomatic sources that foreign officials first began to notice in 2010. Among otheroccurrences, the PRC’s then foreign minister and currently state councilor, Yang Jiechi,
Megan Fox, “Busted: Mike Pompeo Says He Has List of American Governors Named as ‘Friendly’ by
Communist China,” PJ Media, February 9, 2020. https://pjmedia.com/trending/busted-mike-pompeo-sayshe-has-list-of-american-governors-compromised-by-communist-china/
33

34 Hu Xijin, “Cooperate with US states on virus fight, not federal government” Global Times, April 19,

2020 https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1186035.shtml
35 Tobias Hoonhout, “Chinese Consulate Asked Wisconsin State Senate to Praise CCP for ‘Sharing Key

Information’ about Coronavirus, Emails Show” National Review April 14, 2020
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/chinese-consulate-asked-wisconsin-state-senate-to-praise-ccp-forsharing-key-information-about-coronavirus-emails-show/
36

Edward Wong, Matthew Rosenberg, and Julian E. Barnes, “Chinese Agents Spread Messages That
Sowed Virus Panic in U.S., Officials Say,” New York Times April 22, 2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-disinformation.html?smid=em-share“wolf warrior diplomats” are named after patriotic blockbuster films starring a muscular Chinese
commando killing American mercenaries in Africa and Southeast Asia with his bare hands.
37

14

replying to ASEAN delegates wanting to discuss their territorial disputes at a meeting in
Hanoi, said pointedly that China was a big country and others were small “and that’s justa fact.”38
A year later, the Chinese ambassador to New Delhi told an Indian reporter to “shut up”
when the journalist repeatedly questioned him about a map on the cover of a Chinese
firm’s brochure that showed Arunachal Pradesh and other contested areas as part ofChina or Pakistan.39
In Sweden, relations with PRC cooled after several incidents that indicated that Beijing
had little respect for Swedish law, even in Sweden. In 2018, a diplomatic row began after
Swedish police removed a group of Chinese tourists from a hotel when it was discoveredthat they had booked their rooms for different date and were refused permission to remainin the lobby until then. The group sent a dramatic videotape to Chinese social media
showing a man yelling in English “this is killing,” then falling over as his mother cried“help” while police officers looked on. A subsequent satirical sketch on Swedish
television further enraged Chinese public opinion, with Foreign Minister Geng Shuang
calling the program “a gross insult and vicious attack on China and the Chinese people.”40
In a more serious case, Gui Minhai, a naturalized Swedish citizen whose Hong Kongbookstore had sold books critical of the Chinese leadership, was abducted from a train
while on a visit to China. He later received a ten-year prison term for allegedly providing
intelligence to foreign sources. According to Chinese sources, Gui had renounced his
Swedish citizenship. The Swedish government is skeptical, and believes his confession
was forced.41 When Gui received the Swedish PEN award, the Chinese embassy warned
Sweden of “serious consequences,” to which Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven
replied that the country would “never give in to this type of threat…Never. We havefreedom of expression in Sweden and that’s how it is, period.”42 By early 2020 theSwedish foreign ministry had summoned Chinese ambassador Gui Congyu more than 40

John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes A Tougher Tone with China” Washington Post, July 30, 2010.
http://www/washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/...
38

Sameer Arshad, “Distorted Map: Chinese Ambassador Tells Indian Journalist to Shut Up,” Times ofIndia, November 3, 2011, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Distorted-map-Chinese-ambassadortells-Indian-journalist-to-shut-up/articleshow/10595147.cms
3940

No author, “Why Sweden and China Have Fallen Out So Badly,” BBC September 26, 2018https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45635646
41

Lily Guo, “Hong Kong Bookseller Gui Minhai Jailed For 10 Years in China,” The Guardian, February
25, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/25/gui-minhai-detained-hong-kong-booksellerjailed-for-10-years-in-china
42

No author, “China Threatens Sweden After Gui Minhai Wins Free Speech Award,” The Guardian,November 18, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/nov/18/china-threatens-sweden-after-guiminhai-wins-free-speech-award15

times for what the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders called his spiteful attacks on
Swedish media and journalists.43
The prime minister of the Czech Republic asked that the Chinese ambassador to Prague
be recalled after he wrote a letter suggesting that Czech companies operating in China
would suffer if the then-senate speaker of its parliament visited Taiwan.44 The mayor of
Prague, Zdenek Hrib, had already incurred Beijing’s anger when he refused to comply
with the Chinese ambassador’s request that he expel the representative of Taiwan to afunction to which he had been invited, blocking the queue of other ambassadors waitingon the reception line When his request was refused, the ambassador abruptly left thegathering. Before becoming mayor and while serving as member of the city assembly,
Hrib had also advocated removing the “one China” clause from the sister city agreement
between Prague and Beijing, prompting Beijing to cancel the agreement. The city council
then approved a sister city relationship between Taipei and Prague.45
When Nobel literature laureate Mario Vargas Llosa, in a newspaper article published inboth Spain and in Peru, said that the coronavirus pandemic would not have happened
were China a democracy rather than a dictatorship that stifled information, he was
accused of arbitrary defamation and stigmatization, with a Chinese foreign ministry
spokesman tweeting that “it might be the U.S. army who brought the epidemic toWuhan.” 46
And China demanded an official apology when Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of President Jair
Bolsonaro accused China of misleading the world about the scale of the virus outbreak,comparing its management of the crisis with the Soviet regime’s handling of theChernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. The Chinese embassy in Brasilia then accused the
younger Bolsonaro of having a “mental virus that is infecting the friendship between ourpeoples,” alluding to a trip he had made to the United States. 47 Beijing’s anger escalated
when Brazil’s education minister accused Chinese medical equipment makers of
43 Repotrar Utan Granser, “New report: China´s media world order – no stop for Chinese attacks on

Swedish journalists,” February 19, 2020 https://www.reportrarutangranser.se/new-report-chinas-mediaworld-order-no-stop-for-chinese-attacks-on-swedish-journalists/#
No author, “Czech Prime Minister Says China’s Ambassador Should Be Replaced, Reuters March 9
2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-czech/czech-prime-minister-says-chinas-ambassadorshould-be-replaced-idUSKBN20W1EH
44James Shotter, “Prague Mayor Fights to Put Distance Between Prague and Beijing,” Financial Times,
January 2, 2020 https://www.ft.com/content/3f89c6ae-1ce1-11ea-9186-7348c2f183af
45

No author, “China Hits Out as Nobel Laureate Mario Vargas Llosa Over ‘Prejudiced” Virus
Article“ Straits Times, March 17, 2020. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/americas/china-hits-out-atnobel-laureate-mario-vargas-llosa-over-prejudiced-virus-article
46

Sami Adghirni, “China Outraged as Bolsonaro’s Son Blames Virus on Beijing” Bloomberg, March 19,
2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-19/china-outraged-as-brazil-president-s-sonblames-virus-on-beijing
47

16

profiteering from the coronavirus pandemic and, in a twitter post that he later deleted,that the disease would help China “dominate the world.”48
When the Australian government pressed for an independent inquiry into the outbreak of
the coronavirus, China’s ambassador to Canberra told media that continuing to do so
could result in a boycott of the country’s goods, and a foreign ministry spokesman
rejected the request as a “political maneuver.” Chin has since suspended meat imports
from four Australian abattoirs,49 with the editor of Global Times adding that Australia “isa bit like chewing gum stuck on the sole of China’s shoes.”50 At the height of thecoronavirus pandemic, after the Netherlands government discovered that coronavirus
testing kits sent by China were faulty, China threatened to withhold medical aid to theNetherlands for changing the name of its representative office in Taiwan to include theword “Taipei,” under which Taiwan has for years participated in various internationalorganizations without objection from China. 51
China’s efforts to pressure Western countries to endorse the PRC’s version of its
allegedly rapid, efficient handling of the coronavirus outbreak were rebuffed by officials
in Berlin, with the Chinese embassy accusing the newspaper that reported the exchangeof “inaccurate and irresponsible reporting filled with arrogance and a feel-goodattitude.”52 An open letter from the Chinese embassy criticizing Europe’s best-selling
tabloid Bild resulted in a scathing and detailed response YouTube rejoinder. Inter alia, theeditor of the Berlin-based magazine asked how China could surveil its own people but
not its wet markets and accused the government of “imperialism with a smile.”53
British foreign secretary Dominic Raab, serving as acting prime minister while Prime
Minister Boris Johnson was hospitalized with the coronavirus, stated that there could be“no return to business as usual” due to Beijing’s lack of transparency over the origins of48

Eduardo Simoes, “Brazil-China Diplomatic Spat Escalates Over Coronavirus Supplies” U.S. News andWorld Report, April 6, 2020. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-04-06/brazil-chinadiplomatic-spat-escalates-over-coronavirus-supplies
Mike Foley and Eryk Bagshaw, “China Suspends Meat Imports from Four Australian Abattoirs,” Sydney
Morning Herald, May 12, 2020. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-suspends-australian-beefimports-from-four-abattoirs-20200512-p54s4k.html
49

Lily Kuo, “Australia Called ‘Gum Stuck to China’s Shoe’ by State Media in Coronavirus Investigation
Stoush,” The Guardian, April 28, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/28/australia-calledgum-stuck-to-chinas-shoe-by-state-media-in-coronavirus-investigation-stoush
50

51

Steven Erlanger, “Global Backlash Builds Against China Over Coronavirus,” New York Times, May 3,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/world/europe/backlash-china-coronavirus.html
52

Stuart Lau “Coronavirus: Germany ‘rejected China’s bid for positive spin’ on pandemic response” South
China Morning Post, April 27, 2020
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3081800/coronavirus-germany-rejected-chinas-bidpositive-spin-pandemic
53

https://www.facebook.com/663112015/posts/10156753447637016 /17the pandemic.54 While accusations that the Chinese party and government lacktransparency have been common for decades, it seems safe to say that its efforts tominimize the danger of the virus outbreak, deflect the responsibility elsewhere, and attack
those who disagree have magnified prior concerns into a major credibility gap.
These efforts at pushback are, however, rare. Many more times, China’s Rumpelstiltskinlike outbursts, or the fear thereof, can induce self-censorship: “if we do [X], it will make
China angry, so we’d better not do it”. One European analyst has pointed out that mostoften there is no “smoking gun,” since that is not necessary.
Another motivation for pre-emptive capitulation is resentment against another state orstates. A case in point is Greece. After its feckless financial management led Athens toseek help from the European Union, the EU imposed stringent budgetary conditions thatangered the Greek population. Greece welcomed investment by Chinese state-owned
China Ocean Shipping Company, COSCO. By 2016, COSCO had a majority stake in the
Piraeus Port Authority, consummated in the signing of a concession agreement that runs
until at least 2052. COSCO now controls the port’s container terminals, cruise ship piers,
and a ferry quay.55Athens helped to stop the EU from issuing a unified statement against
Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, later preventing the EU from condemning the
PRC’s human rights record and opposing closer scrutiny of Chinese investments in
Europe. Chided by the EU, the head of Greece’s foreign affairs and defense committee
contrasted China, which brought in money, with the EU, whose behavior he likened tothat of “medieval leeches.”56 Similar reasons may motivate the attitude of Philippine
president Rodrigo Duterte, who resents American criticism of his administration’s humanrights record.
Other nations are also aware that the Canadian government’s arrest of Huawei’s chief
financial officer was followed by the detention of Canadian citizens, that China
threatened to withhold rare earths exports to Japan unless its fishing boat captain was
released, and that sanctions were imposed on Norway after the Nobel Peace Prize wasawarded to dissident Liu Xiaobo.
The sum total of these endeavors is that China has created situations in which its
adversaries must react, but to which they are not able to react effectively. A report from
Eastern European analysts describes the situation in the 17 + 1 configuration of Eastern

George Parker, “Raab Fires Warning Shot at China Over Coronavirus,” Financial Times, April 16, 2020
https://www.ft.com/content/8c46252e-766f-4fe6-964f-fe7f67a03c0e
55
Joanna Kakissis, “Chinese Firms Now Hold Stakes Over a Dozen European Ports,” National PublicRadio, October 9, 2018. https://www.npr.org/2018/10/09/642587456/chinese-firms-now-hold-stakes-inover-a-dozen-european-ports
54

Jason Horowitz and Liz Alderman, “Chastised By the EU, a Resentful Greece Embraces China’s Cashand Interests,” New York Times, August 26, 2017https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/europe/greece-china-piraeus-alexis-tsipras.html
5618

European states plus China as a hub and spokes, with China at the center guiding policies
and the other 17 having little to no communication with each other.57

Results of the Dream: The Morning After
Connectivity can be a source of vulnerability as well as enhanced trade. No mere
facilitators of commercial competition, Chinese satellites are believed to be able to jam
signals and could do so in cyberattacks. And, while trans-national supply chains cancreate cost-cutting efficiencies in production, they can also hold production hostage when
there are disputes among the parties.
The case of Japan is illustrative. In 2010, after a Chinese fishing boat rammed two
Japanese coast guard ships in the waters near the Senkaku Islands and its captain wasarrested by the Japanese government, the Chinese government imposed sanctions on
trade with Japan and arrested several Japanese nationals on spying charge until thecaptain was returned. Beijing then announced that its vessels would begin patrolling thearea to protect the country’s legitimate interests in the area. Two years later, in responseto the Japanese government’s buying three of the disputed islands from their Japaneseowner, anti-Japanese riots broke out in several cities in China causing millions of dollars
to Japanese factories and other business interests in the PRC. China patrols around thedisputed islands became more frequent as well.
Another case in point is Vietnam, where Chinese investors had underwritten both
physical and digital infrastructure development. When, in 2017, the Vietnamese
government voiced its opposition to the PRC’s assertion of authority over contested areasin the South China Sea, the investors stopped cash flows into the projects. At the sametime, Vietnam’s airport systems, which had been developed by Chinese companies, were
disrupted by hackers.58
Ethiopians discovered from an investigation by French newspaper Le Monde that datafrom the African Union’s headquarters had been transferred nightly to Chinese servers
for five years. During a sweep for bugs after the discovery, microphones were also foundhidden in desks and walls. China denied the charges. Construction of the AU’s $200
million facility, located in Dar Es-Salam was supervised and fully funded by China.59
57

Ivana Karaskova et al Empty Shell No More: China’s Growing Footprint in Central and Eastern Europe,
Prague, Association for International Affairs, Prague, April 20, 2020, p.7 chinaobservers.eu › newpublication-empty-shell-no-more...
No author, “The Cybersecurity Implications of Chinese Undersea Cable Investment,” Henry M. Jackson
School of International Studies, University of Washington, February 6, 2017.
https://jsis.washington.edu/eacenter/2017/02/06/cybersecurity-implications-chinese-undersea-cableinvestment/
58“China Rejects Claim It Bugged Headquarters it Built for African Union,” The Guardian, March 29,
2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/30/china-african-union-headquarters-bugging-spying
59

19

When Sri Lanka could not repay Chinese loans that it had used to finance thedevelopment of Hambantota, it leased the facility to China Merchants Ports Holdings for
99 years. Hambantota’s strategic location, overlooking South Asia’s vital sea lanes,
makes it an important asset for the PRC both commercially and militarily. Indian
analysts, sensitive to the implications for their own country, fear that Hambantota will
become a facility for forward-arming, restocking, and refueling of high-end naval asserts,
with the government in Columbo having little ability to resist.60 These and otherexamples of a state having to forfeit assets after being unable to repay Chinese loans havegiven rise to fears that they are being lured into “debt traps,” a charge that Beijing
vehemently denies.
Venezuela’s carnet de la patria, in addition to providing access to government services,
also allows the government unfettered access to all other aspects of the card-carriers
lives, including their business activities and voting behavior.
In the Philippines, there has been an investigation into potential security risks due toChinese’s part ownership of that country’s power grid operator. Similar concerns are apt
to exist in other countries connected to the grid, including Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam.
Failure to comply with Beijing’s wishes could bring the economy to a halt.61
Implementation of the Arctic Connect project would give China the ability to monitor thepassage of other countries’ submarines in the area. In addition, missiles launched fromthere by Chinese submarines would travel the shortest distance to any major city in thenorthern hemisphere. The cables themselves, with or without additional sensing
equipment, can be used to create an underwater surveillance system.62
And, with much of the world’s attention riveted on dealing with the coronavirus, Beijing,has introduced a new administrative system to further consolidate de facto sovereignty
over the area within its self-proclaimed nine-dash line, also completing the naming of theislands and reefs therein.63

60

Abhijit Singh, “China’s Strategic Ambitions Seen in the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka,” Hindustan
Times, July 26, 2018. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/china-s-strategic-ambitions-seen-in-thehambantota-port-in-sri-lanka/story-PErf7dzG8lZINVGuF37gxK.html
61

Akane Okutsu, Cliff Venzon, and CK Tan, “China’s Belt and Road Power Grids Keep Security Critics
Awake,” Nikkei, March 3, 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/China-s-Belt-and-Roadpower-grids-keep-security-critics-awake
62 Frank Jüris, ”Handing over infrastructure for China’s strategic objectives: ‘Arctic Connect’ and theDigital Silk Road in the Arctic,” p. 4. Policy brief presented at the conference “Beyond Huawei: Europe’s
adoption of PRC technology and its implications”, organized by Sinopsis. March 3, 2020
https://sinopsis.cz/en/arctic-digital-silk-road/
Leng Shumei, “Names of Islands, Reefs in South China Sea Released,” Global Times, April 19, 2020.
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1186084.shtml
63

20

Also controversially, the PRC’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong announced that China was
not bound by a clause in the city’s Basic Law that bars the Beijing government frominterfering in local affairs---and that it would re-introduce national security legislation.64
It has warned that a resurgence of the violence that wracked the colony last year oversuch legislation will not be tolerated, and arrested 15 high-profile pro-democracy
advocates. The activists’ supporters describe the arrests as a golden opportunity to crack
down on dissent and make sure that those detained cannot run in the elections that arescheduled for September. Assuming they are freed, their future in Hong Kong, and thefreedoms that were promised to the former British colony, are in jeopardy if they stay.65
Even if they leave Hong Kong, they may not be safe. Taiwan allowed a Hong Kongbookstore owner who was arrested and tortured in China, presumably for selling literature
critical of the Chinese leadership, to reopen his shop in Taipei. Just before the store wasto open, the bookseller was doused with red paint by a communist sympathizer as he sat
in a coffeehouse.66
To what extent are all these activities connected—in other words, does China have agrand strategy or, as some have argued, are these simply a disconnected series of businessand military decisions that foreigners choose to see as a pattern? Whether disconnected
or not---and the argument for connectedness appears the more plausible of the two---theend result is the same. Party and government use China’s growing military strength toback up commercial enterprises, and civilian-military fusion is an important part of theChinese government’s game plan. What might be called China Incorporated strives for afusion of party, government, military, and trade. Telecommunications giant Huawei
Corporation’s protestations of autonomy notwithstanding, China does not havebusinesses that can operate free of state control. Should there have been any doubt, anational intelligence law passed in 2017 obliges Chinese nationals and organization tocooperate with intelligence services.67 Although some have advocated that affected states“accommodate” a rising power, it is clear that Beijing, judged by its own words anddeeds, does not wish to be accommodated but rather to displace. Nor is it certain that the
PRC will continue to rise.
What Is To Be Done?
Michael C. Davis, “Controversy Over Role of Beijing’s Offices in Hong Kong Shows Weight of ‘OneCountry’ Threatens Scaffolding of ‘Two Systems,’ “ South China Morning Post, April 24, 2020.
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3081090/controversy-over-role-beijings-offices-hongkong-shows-weight-one
64

Helen Davidson, “Hong Kong Using Covid-19 Crisis As ‘Golden Opportunity’ for Crackdown, Says
Arrested Leader,” The Guardian, April 20, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/20/hongkong-using-covid-19-crisis-as-golden-opportunity-for-crackdown-says-arrested-leader
65

66

No author “Hong Kong bookstore under attack in China reopens in Taiwan” Associated Press/Asahi
Shimbun, 25 April 2020 http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13327903
67

Murray Scot Tanner “China’s New Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offence,” Lawfare Blog, July 20,
2017. https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense21

We must recognize that, contrary to what some seem to believe, the continued advance ofa Chinese juggernaut whose values will ultimately prevail is not inevitable. Democracies
are not powerless to counter Chinese aggression, nor is capitulation the only alternative towar. The success of Xi’s great struggle to have the Chinese system prevail is not aforegone conclusion: China has vulnerabilities.
Chinese Vulnerabilities
Many of the BRI projects are not working out as promised. In Pakistan, a focal point for
shipment of goods through Central Asia, Seven years after the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) was established, there is little evidence that its vision of a seaport,
roads, railways, pipelines, dozens of factories and the largest airport in Pakistan isrealized. There have been frictions involving the management of the port of Gwadar, andBaluchi separatists have attacked workers on the CPEC. Several Chinese have been
killed.68
The passage through Central Asia has also experienced problems. Meant to facilitate thepassage of goods from China to Europe, it has come athwart rivalries among several
Central Asian states who sometimes balk at cooperating with each other, resentment
against the increased presence of Chinese in their countries, and concern that over a
million Turkic Muslims have been incarcerated and mistreated in neighboring Xinjiang.
In Kazakhstan, there have been demonstrations against Kazakh land being sold toChinese.69
In Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, a strident critic of his predecessor’s
approach to China, accused him of selling Malaysia’s sovereignty to China, particularlyon the BRI issue. He was able to renegotiate several of the projects, while adding a noteof caution that freedom of passage on both sea and land should be respected.70
With regard to Africa, decades of Chinese efforts to establish friendship have beenmarred by racist incidents related to pandemic controls: in south China, Africanbusinesses were closed, Africans were evicted from their homes, and restaurants refused
68

Sheridan Prasso, “One of China’s Most Ambitious Projects Becomes a Corridor to Nowhere,”
Bloomberg, March 7, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-03-02/a-china-belt-and-roadproject-becomes-a-corridor-to-nowhere
69

See, e.g., Reid Standish, “China’s Path Forward is Getting Bumpy,” The Atlantic, October 1, 2019.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/10/china-belt-road-initiative-problemskazakhstan/597853/; Marlene Laruelle, ed,. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Impact in Central
Asia, Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University Central Asia Program, 2018.
https://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OBOR_Book_.pdf
Kinling Lo, “Malaysia’s Mahathir Backs China’s Belt and Road, But Insists on Open Trade Routes,”South China Morning Post, April 26, 2019.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007874/malaysias-mahathir-backs-chinas-belt-androad-insists-open
70

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to serve them. Their videotaped stories became major news on African television
channels, just as quarantines kept millions in their homes with more time to watch. An
estimated dozen countries on the continent called in their ambassadors to complain, andAfrican ambassadors in Beijing signed a joint document of protest. 71

Difficulties with BRI are not the only vulnerability that may derail the China Dream.
Xi’s espousal of a cult of personality with himself at the center has displeased manyotherwise loyal party members who feel that self-aggrandizement is inimical tocommunist ideals. For the same reason, there is a good deal of resentment over Xi’sremoving term limits for the presidency. His essentially wrapping himself into the
dream, accompanied by successful purges of rivals with the aid of an anti-corruption
campaign may prove a liability if the dream does not survive waking hours. Corruptionthat reaches into the highest levels of party and government continues, and thegovernment’s belated efforts to curb the dangerous levels of pollution that are byproducts of its rapid industrialization have had marginal success. The financial system
was precarious even before the coronavirus pandemic. While there is broad agreementthat economic restructuring is necessary, it has proved impossible to do.72
Even more efficacious in promoting the China Dream than military power has beenmoney: aid, loans, trade and investment deals and to grant or withhold. Should this ability
to keep dispensing largesse decrease due to the decline in economic growth that began
before the trade war with the United States and the impact of the coronavirus, fewer
countries would be inclined to endorse Beijing’s policy positions or see it as a model for
their own development. Internal divisions may also become more pronounced. Central
planners, already concerned about high youth unemployment, are facing a historicallylarge college graduating class and are acutely aware of the restive penchant of that
demographic. To reduce the possibility of social instability, those who cannot find jobs
are being urged to enroll in graduate degrees or join the military, and the government will

71

Chun Han Wong, Joe Parkinson, and Nicholas Bariyo, “African Countries Complain of Racism inChinese City’s Pandemic Controls, Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2020.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/african-countries-complain-of-racism-in-chinese-citys-pandemic-controls11586808397 ; see also Kenya Report, April 20, 2020 https://kenyanreport.com/2020/04/15/videonigerians-burn-chinese-factory-in-retaliation-to-attacks-of-africans-inchina/?fbclid=IwAR0AdrfJDX5v_SEKLwbofA3U8mrQacx1OMjvbp3IjvSNs7TVGo1nHYSvbR072

Efforts have been made, though falling far short of the restructuring that economists agree is needed.
For example, in order to be more competitive and less reliant on state subsidies, CNPC, Sinopec and
CNOOC to form COGPC, China Oil and Gas Piping Network Corporation were merged in December
2019. This followed the merger of CNR and CSR , the two largest railcar manufacturers, in 2014 to create
CRRC and in 2015, two largest shipping groups reshuffled to create four mini-monopolies encompassing
container shipping, energy transport, maritime finance, and ports. This leaves little room for private sector
companies to survive much less thrive in competition with what Beijing calls national champion industries.
See, e.g., Tom Mitchell, “Why China’s State Oil Company Merger Looks Like an Unusual Step,”
Financial Times, April 7, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/48b0961b-8704-4ba0-9c82-8d5723629e55

23increase civil service hiring.73 The first may prove a temporary fix unless there are jobs
suitable for the additional degrees students have earned, and more soldiers and civil
servants will impose an additional burden on China’s already stressed budget.

Counterstrategies
The sum total of these efforts to bend international governance to its will indicate that
Chinese strategy has broken with Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “hide and bide,” as isconsonant with the nation’s arrival at a far more powerful position than it held when thethen-paramount leader laid down the hide and bide strategy.
While diagnosing the problem is easy, it is harder to decide how to respond, and harderstill to operationalize the remedies.
A number of counterstrategies have been suggested, none of which is without
controversy. Among those commonly heard are• discussions among interested parties who feel regionally or strategicallythreatened on a common policy toward China. To borrow the terminology of the17+1 group analysts, the spokes would communicate with each other, and not justbe communicated to by the hub• provide additional resources to organizations such as America’s Committee on
Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) to investigate the implicationsof Chinese investments in the relevant countries• expand restrictions on the export of dual-use technology to include hardware andsoftware that could facilitate political censorship, surveillance, and oppression in
China and elsehere• enlist the country’s high-tech talents to penetrate China’s Great Firewall of theinternet• expand outreach to the Chinese people so that they hear other countries’ side ofissues• require reciprocity: if Chinese papers are to be allowed space in U.S. newspapers,
U.S. papers should have equal, and equally uncensored, space in Chinese
newspapers• vigorously combat disinformation and cyber intrusions• require Beijing media to comply with foreign agent registration acts, known in the
United States as FARA
• increase penalties for non-compliance with these regulations

73

Stu Woo, Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2020, A New Shortage in China’s Coronavirus-Hit Economy:
Jobs for Biggest Graduating Class in Years
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-new-shortage-in-chinas-coronavirus-hit-economy-jobs-for-biggestgraduating-class-in-years-11585580297

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•
•
•

monitor more closely Chinese activities in one’s country to distinguish between
legitimate business and educational opportunities and those that aim at
influencing or subverting the target government’s policies
identify strategically significant supply lines and move them back to one’s own oranother friendly country so that they cannot be withheld in time of crisis, as China
has several times threatened to dodisestablish Confucius Institutes and classrooms embedded within educational
institutes

Some of these measures are being taken, although in nascent form and not without critics
in the countries involved. To date,• Sweden has closed all of its Confucius Institutes, many twin city agreements with
Chinese counterparts have been cancelled.74• Prompted by legislation from congress, a number of Confucius Institutes haveclosed in the U.S.
• Australia passed laws barring foreign donations to political campaigns and,separately, mandated that people or companies in Australia who are acting on
behalf of foreign principals in the political sphere must register and detail theiractivities on a public website. Failure to register is punishable by up to five years
in prison.75• Japan will subsidize moving supply chains and industries for a large number of
items from Nintendo switches to rare earths back to Japan or to friendly countries
so as to minimize China’s ability to wage economic blackmail; it will also provide
aid to companies exporting optical fiber submarine cables76 and has mandated thathenceforth all of its coast guard’s drones purchased be made in Japan or countries
outside China.77• the United States has lobbied against adoption of Huawei’s 5G on grounds that it
is a threat to national security, threatening to withhold sensitive intelligence datathat it previously shared, with mixed results, since Huawei’s system is cheaper
than its rivals. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Faroe Islands will not adopt
Huawei, while Britain will allow it limited access to help build the U.K.’s 5G

Rachel Wong, “Gothenburg Axes Twin City Agreement with Shanghai as Sweden Closes All Confucius
Institutes,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 24, 2020. https://hongkongfp.com/2020/04/24/gothenburg-axestwin-city-agreement-with-shanghai-as-sweden-closes-all-confucius-institutes/
74

Kelsey Munro, “Australia’s New Foreign Influence Laws: Who is Targeted” The Interpreter, Lowy
Institute, December 5, 2018. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-new-foreign-influencelaws-who-targeted
75

76

no author, Government Looks To Counter China’s Growing Submarine Presence,” Yomiuri, January 8,
2020.https://www.intellasia.net/govt-looks-to-counter-chinas-growing-submarine-cable-presence-756741
77Hiroyuki Akiyama, “Japan Set To Give Domestic Drone Industry a Lift: Security Concerns over Chinese

Devices Drives Efforts to Make Homegrowns Fly” Nikkei, February 2, 2020.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Japan-set-to-give-domestic-drone-industry-a-lift2

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•

•

network.78 Recent British pique over China’s handling of the coronavirus
pandemic has incentivized Conservative Party politicians who always opposed
allowing Huawei to build the system, and China’s part in constructing UK nuclear
reactors as well, which may result in a reversal of the decision. German legislators
have backed a position paper that recommends tougher rules while stopping shortof banning Huawei entirely.79
Japan and the United States are cooperating in a Blue Dot network infrastructure
plan to provide an alternative to the BRI.80
the United States has rejected China’s claim to be “a near-Arctic state and an
important stakeholder in Arctic affairs,” saying that there are only two categories,
Arctic states and non-Arctic states; it has pledged $2.1 million in economic aid to
Greenland in response to Chinese activities there, and is to open a consulate inNuuk.81
U.S. Senator Ted Cruz has introduced the SCRIPTS ("Stopping Censorship,
Restoring Integrity, Protecting Talkies) Act, which would cut off Defense
Department funding to film studios who censor films to accommodate Chinesepressure.82

Many of the other suggestions arouse civil liberties concerns in the countries where they
have been suggested. Critics argue that closer surveillance risks endangering the corevalues of liberal democracy---that in seeking to counter objectionable Chinese activities,
we are becoming like them in order to resist them by adopting the very techniques we
object to. Businesses who profit from manufacturing in China’s lower-wage and lesssafety-standard conscious environment may not want to repatriate their operations. It is
not easy for the states of a region to deal collectively with China, since they frequently
compete with each other for contracts with China. Too often, the spokes continue tocommunicate with the wheel rather than with one another, and Beijing is adept at playing
Rhyannon Bartlett-Imadegawa, “UK Bans Huawei, Cutting Gear from 5G Network by 2027” Nikkei,
July 14, 2020 https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Huawei-crackdown/UK-bans-Huawei-cutting-gear-from5G-network-by-2027#:～:text=The%20U.K.%20government%20announced%20it,slow%20the%20rollout%20of%205G
78

Andreas Rinke, “Merkel’s Conservatives Stop Short of Huawei 5G Ban in German,” Reuters, February
11, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-usa-huawei/merkels-conservatives-set-to-stop-shortof-huawei-5g-ban-in-germany-idUSKBN205146
79

John Reed, “U.S. Backs Infrastructure Scheme to Rival China’s Belt and Road,” Financial Times,
November 4, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/5c0a6226-fed1-11e9-b7bc-f3fa4e77dd47
80

Alex Fang, “US rejects China's 'near-Arctic state' claim in new cold war: Washington to open consulate
in Greenland and give economic aid,” Nikkei April 24, 2020 https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Internationalrelations/US-rejects-China-s-near-Arctic-state-claim-in-new-cold-war
81“Senator Cruz to Introduce Legislation Cutting Off Hollywood Studios Over Complicity in Chinese
Censorship,” Office of Senator Cruz, April 28, 2020.
https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=5083
82

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one spoke against the others. The Quad, a loose security arrangement among Australia,
India, Japan, and the United States, to counter Chinese expansionism has yet to become ameaningful configuration.
Like-minded democracies must also make efforts to improve their own competitiveness.
This will require concessions and compromises from citizens, unions, and political elites.
We must provide a better education for those who are willing to receive it and be willingto pay more for products manufactured by factories where safety standards are enforced
and whose workers receive health insurance and pension plans. These democracies mustalso work together to provide more attractive alternatives to those Chinese loans that havebeen accused of being debt traps.
If we wish to defend our democratic way of life against an authoritarian government who
seeks to impose an alternative world order, we must recognize that the failure of statescomes not from powerful external enemies alone but when those combine with deep
internal divisions. Nations who balk at cooperation would do well to remember BenjaminFranklin’s advice in 1776 to the contentious colonies in their fight for independence fromBritain: we must all hang together or assuredly we will hang separately.”27