Dialogue with the Worldof
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

GEOECONOMICS

andThe 21st Century World and Japan

Conference Papers

July 31, 2018
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)Rules of Proceedings
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Table of Contents

1.

Program ............................................................................................................... 1

2.

Biographies of the Panelists .............................................................................. 2

3.

Presentation Papers ............................................................................................ 4
TERADA Takashi ........................................................................................................................................... 4
Antoine BONDAZ ......................................................................................................................................... 6
IIDA Keisuke.................................................................................................................................................. 7
Ryan Paul MANUEL ..................................................................................................................................... 9
SAKURAGAWA Masaya ............................................................................................................................. 10

4.

Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations ......................... 11(1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) ................................................................................... 11(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)...................................................... 12

1. Program12. Biographies of the Panelists
ITO GoAcademic Governor, GFJ / Director of Research, JFIR / Professor, Meiji University
Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies,
University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed thecurrent position as Professor since 2006 and Director of Research at JFIR since 2017. Also served as
Visiting Professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica (Taiwan), Bristol University(Britain), Australian
National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct Professor (International Security) at
Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors.
Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006.
WATANABE Mayu
President, GFJ / Vice President, JFIR
Graduated from Chiba University. Received M.A. in Education from the Graduate School of the
University of Tokyo in 1997. Joined JFIR in 2000 and appointed to Senior Research Fellow in 2007, during
which period she specialized in global human resource development and public diplomacy. Appointed
to Executive Director in 2011 and assumed the current position as President of GFJ since 2017 and as Vice
President of JFIR since 2018. Concurrently serving as Acting Vice-President of the Council on East Asian
Community (CEAC).
Robert D. BLACKWILL

Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy,
Council on Foreign Relations
His current work focuses on U.S. foreign policy writ large as well as on China, Russia, the Middle East,
South Asia, and geoeconomics. Most recently, he was a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation in Santa
Monica, California (2008-2010) after serving as president of BGR International (2004-2008). As deputy
assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor for strategic planning under President
George W. Bush, he was responsible for government-wide policy planning to help develop andcoordinate direction of U.S. foreign policy. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was theadministration’s coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. He went to the National
Security Council after serving as the U.S. ambassador to India (2001-2003). His latest book, War by Other
Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Harvard University Press, April 2016), coauthored with Jennifer M.
Harris, was named one of the best foreign policy books of 2016 by Foreign Affairs.
KAWAI Masahiro

Academic Member, GFJ / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR /Professor, the University of Tokyo
Obtained a B.A. in Economics from the University of Tokyo in 1971 and a Ph.D. in Economics from
Stanford University in 1978. Served as: Research Fellow of Brookings Institution; Associate Professor,
Department of Political Economy, The Johns Hopkins University; and Professor of Economics, Instituteof Social Science, University of Tokyo. During this period, also served as: Chief Economist, East Asia andPacific, World Bank (1998-2001); Deputy Vice Minister for International Affairs, Japan’s Ministry of
Finance (2001-03); and Dean, Asian Development Bank Institute (2007-14). Concurrently serves as
Representative Director, Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia and as Councilor, Bank ofJapan.

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TERADA Takashi
Academic Member, GFJ / Professor, Doshisha University
He received his Ph.D from Australian National University in 1999. Before taking up his current positionin April 2012, he was an assistant professor at National University of Singapore (1999-2006) and associate
and full professor at Waseda University (2006-2011). He also has served as a visiting fellow at Universityof Warwick, U.K. (2011-12), a public policy scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Washington D.C. (2012) and an operating adviser for the US-Japan Institute (USJI) (2011-present). His
areas of specialty include international political economy in Asia and the Pacific, theoretical andempirical studies of Asian regionalism and regional integration, and Japanese politics and foreign policy.
He is the recipient of the 2005 J.G. Crawford Award.
Antoine BONDAZ
Research Fellow, FRS / Senior lecturer, Sciences Po Paris
Obtained a Ph.D. summa cum laude in international relations from Sciences Po. Served as Visiting
scholar at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace and at Korea University, and as Research
fellow at Asia Centre (2011-2015) where he co-headed the Observatory on China for the Ministry of
Armed Forces. Currently a Research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris where heconducts research on China and Korea’s foreign and security policy, he is also a special adviser to the
Chairman of the delegation for relations with the Korean peninsula at the European Parliament. He has
testified before the French National Assembly and Senate, the European Parliament, NATO and at theUN.
IIDA Keisuke
Academic Member, GFJ / Professor, the University of Tokyo
Received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University. He has formerly taught at Princeton
University and Aoyama Gakuin University. He has been a fellow at Brookings Institution and a visiting
scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. His research interests include the politics of trade, thepolitical economy of financial crises, the politics of regional integration, and the interactions between
security and economics. He is a member on the Board of Directors at the Japan Association ofInternational Relations (JAIR). He is also a member of the Policy Council at JFIR. He is an editor of thejournal Leviathan and the editor-in-chief of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific.
Ryan Paul MANUEL
Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong
He is Director of Policy Research, Asia Global Institute and an associate professor at Hong Kong
University. He previously taught at Oxford University and The Australian National University. Prior toacademia, he was a Senior China Analyst with the Australian government (where he wrote for the Prime
Minister and the National Security Committee) and a management consultant with the Boston
Consulting Group. He holds a doctorate from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.
SAKURAGAWA Masaya
Professor, Keio University
Graduated from Waseda University in 1984 and Obtained M.A. (1988) and Ph.D. (2002) in economics
from Osaka University. Served as Associate Professor (1995-2002) and Professor (2002) at the Departmentof Economics, Nagoya University before assuming the current position since 2003. His field of specialty
is banking and finance, and macroeconomics. He authored “Capital Flight, North-South Lending, andStages of Economic Development,” International Economic Review 42, 2001, “Bank’s Capital Structure
under Non-Diversifiable Risk,” Economic Theory 20, 2002, “Absence of Safe Assets and Fiscal Crisis”,
Journal of The Japanese and International Economies 40, 2016, and edited, China and Japan in the Global
Economy, Routledge, 2018
(In order of appearance)33. Presentation Papers
Main Session: The Geoeconomic World and Japan’s Course of Action

Presentation A
China’s Interdependence Trap and Regional Integration
TERADA Takashi
Academic Member, GFJ / Professor, Doshisha University
China, the largest trading partner for more than 130 nations in the world, is in the position to use its
economic clout to realise its political and strategic interests. Economic interdependence, chiefly intensified
by China’s trade and aid growth in the region, can thus act as a means of achieving China’s national interest,
including its assertion in the South China Sea, as seen in China’s massive flow of aid to Laos and Cambodiathat has been instrumental in dividing ASEAN members on the South China Sea dispute. Therefore,
deepening interdependence does not lead to the political stability in East Asia. It has been growingly
difficult for any nation, which has increased their trade and, for some, aid, reliance on China, to passstrictures on China’s policy approach, and China has capitalized on the economic influence over somemembers for manipulating moves concerning the South China Sea in ASEAN-sponsored meetings. This canbe called China’s trap of interdependence.
I propose the institutional balancing approach should be effective for those nations to free themselves fromthe trap. A key mechanism in institutional-balancing, especially designed to exercise an influence on thetargeted states through economic agendas is trade diversion from the exclusive nature of Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs). Benefits brought to a party to an FTA, such as the elimination of tariffs, generally
victimise a third country not included in the agreement. Dubbed the “platinum standard,” the agreement
imposes greater tariff concessions and deregulations than afforded by the WTO—WTO-plus
provisions—and includes additional economic rules—WTO-extra provisions—, which affect state-owned
enterprises, intellectual property, government procurement, and environmental and labor standards, the
TPP emerged as a potential tool to encircle, or restrict China’s massive economic power in the region. The
exclusion of China from TPP served as a major condition as an exclusive institutional balancing tool. In
short, if TPP achieved the promised liberalization by reducing exemptions through high-standard rules intrade and investment, it could lead to deeper economic interdependence and interconnections among
like-minded states. That result would reduce those states’ trade dependence on China and theirvulnerability arising from trade and investment reliance on the Chinese market. This was a useful way tostay out of China’s attempts to exercise political influence on the basis of a substantial economic presence.

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A key argument was whether the regional trade pact can help to form cohesion within institution to impose
an effective pressure on China. The TPP has presented a dilemma to China: if China does not enter the TPP,
it would miss out on the benefits of the world-largest free trade areas as well as the opportunity to shape therules that would hold dominant impact to regional economic governance. On the other hand, it is also
problematic that China has not always wanted to follow the Western liberal rules. Having different
economic systems, it would be difficult for China to embrace the ideologically different principles of the
TPP, so-called ‘universal values’ such as freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rules of law,which impose some serious challenges to China’s state capitalism. China is thus stuck in the sense that it
faces two similarly undesirable options: “joining the TPP would be painful, but saying out might be worse”.
A source of China’s concern over the TPP and expectation towards the RCEP can be identified in asimulation study, which assesses that the TPP, if launched, would cause a substantial loss to Chinese
economy. Yet, the losses could be offset and even overcome if RCEP were realized since it would provide
China with preferential access to countries which join both the RCEP and the TPP such as Japan. Thissymbolises the TPP’s effectiveness as an institutional-balancing tool in reducing TPP member states’ relianceon Chinese market.
When the US President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP in January 2017, a key
driver for institutional balancing tactics disappeared for nations which intended to reduce their overrelianceon Chinese money and market. Owing to the TPP’s demise, RCEP has emerged as an alternative regional
integration framework possibly serving as a rule-setter in the Asia-Pacific region. RCEP can be viewed as acase of intra- or inclusive institutional balancing, which some nations such as Vietnam and Japan see as atool to constrain China’s power and influence in pursuit of rule-making within the same multilateral
institutions. Yet, RCEP’s function to restrain China’s aggressive behavior through having closer institutional
links with is small. China’s commitment to the RCEP is strongly oriented toward developing countries andfavors more exemptions in the form of tariff elimination duties, with few deregulation requirements andconsequently few reforms required of domestic economic systems. RCEP’s speed and level of liberalizationis going to be based on the standard that China, India and ASEAN’s developing countries generally prefer,the so-called a “lowest common denominator” dilemma in terms of liberalization. RCEP would beeventually established as a low-quality FTA, offering members less strict binding-rules and less ambitious
liberalisation package than the TPP, having a limited impact on the members’ trade and business relations
with China. This is a major reason why Japan took an initiative in realizing the TPP without the UnitedStates, or TPP-11, and more states, such as Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, now display their interestin participating the TPP-11.
[END]

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Presentation B
Promoting a strategy of coordinated multi-level multilateralism to advance ourcommon interests in the age of geopolitics
Antoine BONDAZ
Research Fellow, FRS / Senior lecturer, Sciences Po Paris
What is geo-economics? Most commonly, it is understood as the use of economic tools by states to advancegeopolitical objectives. Today like yesterday, all types of economic activity – trade, access to finance, andinvestment – are being used as weapons and tools of disruption in what we could call an enduring economic
warfare. Indeed, from French mercantilism in the XVIth century to the concept of “fukoku kyōhei” during
the Meiji Era, from President Trump’s protectionist stance to China’s Belt and Road initiatives (BRI),
economic might is not only an integral part of any power definition, it is being used to pursue strategic
objectives.
Yet, European countries are feeling even more insecure in the current system due to the combined fear of
economic decline and sense of losing their identity. As an ambivalent economic power, a worldwide
regulatory power that still lacks of internal cohesion to fully exploit its potential, the European Union isfacing two economic superpowers, the United States and China. The two countries share half of Fortune
global 500 top companies, and among today top 20 Internet leaders, all of them are either American (Apple,
Amazon, Microsoft, etc.) or Chinese companies (Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, etc.).
Europe’s lack of confidence is further fed by a return of protectionist policies on one side, and China’s
economic rise and uncertainties about its future path on the other side. From Chinese foreign direct
investments targeting high-tech companies to a national strategy of civil-military integration withtremendous consequences, from the use of the BRI to leverage its economic might into political influence toChina’s growing sharp power to weaken interstate and intrastate cohesion, issues of concern are numerous.
In that context, countries should manage interdependence and avoid depending too much on any single
other country to shield from most geo-economic attacks. To act alone, even if necessary such as working onan European Union common framework for investment screening, will be insufficient. Coordination withlike-minded countries, such as Japan, Australia, India, and indeed the United States, will be key.
The signature of a bilateral EU-Japan FTA, together accounting for about a quarter of the world’s grossdomestic product, was an important first step. Yet, we should further discuss a strategy of coordinatedmultilateralism at various levels: international organizations, states, companies and civil societies levels. The
aim would be to create some form of interests and values-based network to strengthen positive
interdependence in diverse fields such as the infrastructures of globalization, both physical (transportation)and virtual (cyberspace), energy security and unrestricted access to resources, etc. The objective is not toprevent any country’s rise or to refuse to face the changing balance of power, but to make sure it will not be
detrimental to our common interests and to better protect ourselves against economic warfare.
Such a strategy would enable Europeans but also Japanese to restore some optimism and self-confidence andto fully exploit our common potential while promoting a stronger liberal international order.
[END]

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Presentation C

Trade Policy in the Age of Geoeconomics
IIDA Keisuke
Academic Member, GFJ / Professor, The University of Tokyo
Introduction
World trade politics is at an uncertain and precarious stage today. The China-United States (US) trade war
seems to be real and is threatening to escalate. The US and European Union (EU) have agreed to a ceasefire,
but how long it will stick remains to be seen.
Analysis
Since January 2018, the protectionist tendency of the Trump Administration has been notable, and has upset
the trade policy community. President Trump’s policy on tariffs is confusing because it has two purposes:
protection and coercion.
President Trump’s tariffs such as those on solar panels and tariffs on steel and aluminum are protectionist.
Auto tariffs which are contemplated are also of this kind despite the pretense of national security.
However, his tariffs have another purpose which is coercive: This is the case particularly for China tariffs. He
believes that inflicting pain on the opponent when the latter is intransigent is quite effective. He thinks that
his opponent will cave in eventually. His China tariffs are intended as such.
However, the problem is that tariffs are tariffs, and even coercive tariffs can turn into protectionist tariffs.
President Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on the entirety of Chinese imports to the US. As long as it
is intended as a bluff it is harmless (except for the chilling effects on the market), but he may be forced to
implement this threat at some point.
Japan’s Response
So far Japan has been taking three approaches:1) To be a champion of free trade by pursuing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)-11 and the EU-Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA);
2) Not to criticize President Trump or to retaliate;3) To resist US pressure for a bilateral FTA.1
So far this three-pronged strategy has been working, but we need to be prepared for the worst case scenario:
simultaneous trade wars between US-EU and US-China. Despite President Trump’s skepticism toward theWorld Trade Organization (WTO), these will have to be resolved at the WTO.
The United States has been willing to discuss these issues at the multilateral forum. The US has alreadyfiled a complaint at the WTO against the EU, Canada, and China on their retaliatory tariffs. Earlier, the US
had filed a complaint against China on intellectual property rights.

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Sooner or later, Japan may have to think about joining a complaint by the EU and China against the US,
which will send a signal that Japan is not a sitting duck.
Also, Japan should actively participate in the discussion on WTO reform, which the US and EU have agreed
to.
The United States has been willing to discuss these issues at the multilateral forum. The US has alreadyfiled a complaint at the WTO against the EU, Canada, and China on their retaliatory tariffs. Earlier, the US
had filed a complaint against China on intellectual property rights.
Sooner or later, Japan may have to think about joining a complaint by the EU and China against the US,
which will send a signal that Japan is not a sitting duck.
Also, Japan should actively participate in the discussion on WTO reform, which the US and EU have agreed
to.
Conclusions
This is always a silver lining. On July 25, President Trump and Junker, President of the European
Commission, met and promised that they would not impose no new tariffs as long as they are negotiating,which means a ceasefire between the US and EU for now. How the US-China relationship evolves remains
to be seen.
--------------------------------1Japan has been the most reticent toward President Trump’s steel tariffs. Even though Japan was affected as much as the EU.

The EU, China, Canada and others have imposed retaliatory tariffs on imports from the US, but Japan has not. This policy has
been quite prudent, given the irascibility of President Trump. Also, Japan has been very reticent about the whole affair. Prime
Minister Trudeau of Canada made a faux pas by criticizing President Trump after Trump had left the G7 meeting at
Charlevoix, and President Trump responded by saying he would unsign the G7 communique.

[END]

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Presentation D
Geoeconomic Challenges in Asia from Australian Perspective
Ryan Paul MANUEL
Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong
Australian issues dealing with China— the failure of economics to overcome politics— the absence of a framework that allows multiple voices on China— the impact of a confused government, the foreign interference legislation and the Turnbull ‘stands up’debacle— geoeconomics has suffered; Australia is unsure how to progress its Indo-Pacific agenda given RCEPs
prominence and ascendance.

All of this has led to Australia’s engagement with Asia being largely its engagement with China.
— leadership is needed from other countries— there is unlikely to be much difference between Labor and Liberal policies— integrating defence and geoeconomics is a whole of government challenge and it’s not sure that
Australia is up to that challenge.
[END]

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Presentation E
Future of International Currencies,
the US dollar, Euro, Chinese Yuan, and Japanese Yen
SAKURAGAWA Masaya
Professor, Keio University
As the famous Triffin’s Dilemma predicts, the United States, whose GDP falls less than 20 percent in the
global share, is leaving the status to supply international liquidity to the growing world economy. The US
dollar's strong position has been eroded in Europe since the common currency Euro was established. But the
US dollar keeps its dominant position in growing Asia; China and Japan hold huge amounts of US
Treasuries as foreign reserves.
The experience of the global financial crisis revealed the limitation of the US dollar currency system. Now
US cannot supply safe liquidity to catch up with the growing demand of emerging countries. We expect thetransition from the US dollar dominance to multiple international currencies. However, the history does not
move along this expectation. The Euro could not obtain the position as the second most dominantinternational currency that was capable of challenging the role of the US dollar when the Eurozone fiscal
crisis hit the European economy. China revealed the weakness of its financial system with the collapse of the
Shanghai stock market bubble. China experienced the huge amount of capital flight and had to impose
capital controls to prevent it. This policy accelerated the domestic housing bubbles along with the everexpanding credit growth. The Chinese Yuan officially ranked up to the position of SDR, getting the IMF's
endorsement as an official reserve currency, but its risk of domestic financial crisis and the lack of thetransparency in the foreign exchange market are the obstacles to the Yuan becoming a credible reserve
currency.
As a resolution of the “global shortage of safe assets”, an alternative currency system is expected, instead of
the US dollar dominant system. What makes things complicated is that the two largest Asian countries,
Japan and China, hold huge net foreign assets, but have played a small role as a provider of internationalliquidity. This means that the currency of the country that holds negative net foreign assets is used as themost dominant international currency.
It will take some time for China to provide international public goods in the field of international finance.
The Japanese economy is stagnant, but Japan is in a pretty good position of supplying international safe
assets because the market for the government bonds is huge, and its size is next to the US bond market.
Japan’s constraints are first the huge fiscal deficit, and secondly the fact that more than 90 percent ofgovernment bonds are held domestically, but Japanese government bonds have the potential of being ananchor asset in Asia, solving the global shortage of safe assets, and stabilizing international finance. Asianfinancial cooperation will go well if China buys Japanese government bonds and Japan cooperates with BRI.
[END]

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4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations(1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Objectives and History
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) originates from the Japan Chapter of the Quadrangular Forum (QF), which wasestablished in 1982 in Washington to serve as an informal promoter of the exchange of policy-oriented views andopinions among Japan, US, Europe, and Canada. As the Cold War ended and its aftermath faded away, QF ceased its
activity in 1996. The Japan Chapter of QF survived the vicissitudes and developed into the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
as an independent institution of Japan for international intellectual exchanges. Since then, GFJ has been active as a hub
for international exchanges with the global intellectual community at large.
Organization
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in
Japan. Business Member, Political Member, and Academic Member support its activities as Governors and Members.
The Secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations. GFJ is currently headed by ITO Kenichi as
Chairman, WATANABE Mayu as President, and TAKAHATA Yohei as Vice President and Executive Secretary. The
membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the 4 Governors, TOYODA Shoichiro, MOGI Yuzaburo,
ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, and YAGUCHI Toshikazu; 10 Political Members including the 4 Governors, KAKIZAWA Mito,
SUEMATSU Yoshinori, SUZUKI Keisuke, and FUNADA Hajime; and 56 Academic Members including the 3 Governors,
ITO Go, KAMIYA Matake, and TAKAHARA Akio.
Activities(1) e-forum “Giron-Hyakushutsu (Hundred Views in Full Perspective)” operated on the website of GFJ(2) Monthly held meetings of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” and “Diplomatic Roundtable”(3) PR and Enlightenment through publication of “Bulletin,” the website, mail magazine, etc.
(4) “International Dialogues” convened 3 to 4 times a year on policy-oriented issues with counterparts invited fromvarious parts of the world. Recent International Dialogues are as follows:
Years and
ThemesCounterparts
Months2018
Jul.
Dialogue with the World “Geoeconomics and the 21st Centiry The Japan Forum on International
World and Japan”
Relations (JFIR)
Strategic Dialogue with Central Asia “Strategic Prospects of
The Japan Forum on International
Mar.
Regional Cooperation and Security in Central Asia”
Relations (JFIR)
Japan-U.S. Dialogue “China Risks and China Opportunities –Carnegie Endowment for International
Feb.
Implications for the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ –”Peace (CEIP) (U.S.)
The Dialogue with the World “Eurasia 2025”
The French Institute for International andStrategic Affairs (IRIS) (France)
2017
Aug.
“Central Asia + Japan” Dialogue “Prospects on the Current
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japanand Future Japan-Central Asia Relations
Jun.
Japan-ASEAN Dialogue “Changing Regional Order in the
The S. Rajaratnam School of International
Asia Pacific and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation”
Studies (RSIS) (Singapore), Nanyang
Technological University / The Universityof Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University(VNU-USSH) (Vietnam)
Mar.
Japan-U.S. Dialogue “The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Institute for National Strategic Studies,
Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?"
National Defense University (INSS) (U.S.)
Feb.
Japan-China Dialogue “Prospect of Japan-China Cooperation
Shanghai International Studies University
in Aging Society”/ Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences /Fudan University (China)
Nov.
The Dialogue with the World “The International Order in
The Institute of World Policy (IWP)
Europe and Asia-Pacific after the Ukraine Crisis and Japan's(Ukraine) / The Atlantic Council's Brent
Course of Action”
Scowcroft Center (BSC) (U.S.)
2016
Sep.
Japan-China-ROK Dialogue “Japan-China-ROK Relations in
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)
the Global Perspective”
Jul.
Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue “International Order in the 21st
Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) /Century and the Security of Maritime Asia”
Meiji Institute of International Policy
Studies (MIIPS) / Western Sydney
University (Australia)
Mar.
Japan-U.S. Dialogue “Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a
Institute for National Strategic
Turbulent Time of Transition: Sustaining an Open, Rules-based Studies(INSS) (U.S.)
Global Order”
Contact
Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2193 FAX: +81-3-3505-4406 E-mail: gfj@gfj.jp URL: http://www.gfj.jp/j/

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(2)

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, andnon-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations.
The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only toanalyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate
policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way
those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of thosemembers of the Forum who sign them alone.
The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro,
Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan,
recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from thegovernment was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest
foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, and(3) individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body,which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” isan executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.
■Board of Trustees■Board of Directors

ARIMA Tatsuo

ITO Kenichi

Chairman

HAKAMADA Shigeki

WATANABE Mayu

Vice President

HATTORI Yasuo

HANDA Haruhisa

Director

HIRONAKA Wakako

ITO GoDirector

HIRONO Ryokichi

ITO Masanori

Director

INOUE Akiyoshi

KAMIYA Matake

Director

ISHIGAKI Yasuji

KIKUCHI Yona

Director

KUROYANAGI Nobuo

MORIMOTO Satoshi

Director

OHYA Eiko

TAKUBO Tadae

Director

SAKAMOTO Masahiro

YANO Takuya

Director

SATO Ken■Auditors

WATANABE Toshio

NAITOH Masahisa

YAMAGUCHI Norio

WATANABE Kenichi

The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research Programs,”“International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Information Gathering,” and “PRand Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means“Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, isopen to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All
articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Foramu” inJapanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English
and posted on the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also
introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000
readers worldwide.
Contact
Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2190 FAX: +81-3-3589-5120 E-mail: jfir@jfir.or.jp URL: http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/

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NOTE

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193[Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/[This “Dialogue” is administered by the Secretariat of The Global Forum of Japan]

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