JAPAN’S SUPPORT FOR
DEMOCRACY-RELATED ISSUES—Mapping Survey—

Copyright © 2019 Japan Center for International Exchange
All rights reserved.
Written by Atsuko Geiger.
Copyediting by Kimberly Gould Ashizawa.
Design and typesetting by Kiyoko Shiromasa.
Japan Center for International Exchange
Meisan Tameike Bldg. 7F, 1-1-12 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052, Japan
www.jcie.or.jp
Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE/USA)
475 Riverside Drive, Suite 731, New York, New York 10115, USA
www.jcie.org

CONTENTS
Preface5

1. Overview

7

2. A Brief History of Japan’s Support for Democracy-Related Issues

8

3. General Trends and Views For and Against Japan’s Support
for Democracy-Related Issues

9

4. Recent Developments
4.1 Politics

13

4.2 Government

14

4.3 Civil Society

15

5. Democracy-Related Areas Where Japan Is Currently Active16

6. Next Steps for Expanding Support for Democracy-Related Issues

20

5

PrefaceThis report is based on a mapping study conducted as part of a pilot project that the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) launched in Spring 2018 to explore the potential for Japanto prioritize support for democratic governance in its foreign policy and overseas development
assistance. The project was subsequently developed into a full-fledged, multiyear program designed to engage a wide range of experts and policymakers in the discussion of how Japan and its
partners can strengthen democratic governance in Asia and around the world.
Initially, the report was envisioned as an internal survey of the field of democratic assistancethat would provide background information for planning purposes. However, we later decided
to publish it in the hope that it can serve as a useful reference for those wishing to gain a clearer
sense of Japan’s contributions to strengthening democratic governance around the world and thecontext in which Japanese policymakers operate.
In compiling this report, we relied on interviews with leading scholars and practitioners aswell as a review of a number of studies published in Japanese and English. In particular, thewriting of Maiko Ichihara, co-director of this project’s study team, and Koichi Sugiura, a study
team member during the pilot phase, proved to be invaluable resources. These provided in-depth
data and a comprehensive perspective on Japan’s historic involvement in the field of democracy
assistance.
Other study team members, especially Ambassador Yukio Takasu, who heads the group,
Takako Hikotani, and Kaori Shoji provided insightful advice and information during the
research and writing, for which we are grateful. The report was also informed by the discussions
at two JCIE events that were organized in June 2018 as part of the pilot project—a Tokyo seminarthat convened nearly 30 scholars and other thought leaders and a roundtable with 8 Diet members that featured noted political scientist Francis Fukuyama and the president of the National
Endowment for Democracy, Carl Gershman.
The report was authored by Atsuko Geiger with support from a team at JCIE’s New Yorkand Tokyo offices, and it was edited by Kim Gould Ashizawa with design and layout by Kiyoko
Shiromasa. All errors are the responsibility of JCIE. We are very grateful for those who haveparticipated in our program and their willingness to share their expertise and knowledge
so generously.

7

1. Overview
Japan’s position on support for issues related to democracy has been mixed and often ambiguous.
Nevertheless, the country’s policy in this field has evolved since the 1990s, and Japan has gradually
increased its rhetorical commitment to democracy-related issues as well as the actual amountof aid it provides. Support for democracy was incorporated into Japan’s Official Development
Assistance (ODA) Charter, and more recently, both the 2013 National Security Strategy and the 2015
Development Cooperation Charter have listed support for democratization as a priority issue.
Politicians have placed importance on democracy in Japan’s foreign policy, as most prominently
represented in discussions of the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in the mid-2000s.1
In practical terms, the share of ODA allocated toprojects related to democracy has incrementally
increased over the years. However, the amountof ODA spending in the field is still limited,
especially in comparison to that of other OECDdonors, and the types of projects carried out with
ODA are also limited and tend to be heavily concentrated in assistance for legal infrastructure
and technical support. Japan has also maintained
a relatively low profile in terms of its efforts to
support transitions to democracy—much lower
than those of the Western liberal democracies
of Europe and the United States in particular.
Japan’s approach to democracy support has been
described as hesitant, and its preference for consent and persuasion over more active measures
is particularly notable.2
This report examines the characteristics ofJapan’s efforts in recent history to advance democratic institutions and norms. It illustrates thebroader trends and main areas of focus of Japanese ODA in the field. General trends to datedemonstrate that Japanese efforts clearly concentrate on areas such as administrative management and judicial support, but Japan is also
engaged in a wide range of issues and projects
that can be categorized as democracy support.
Thus, the report attempts to identify various
initiatives and actors involved while also highlighting some unique cases. It also analyzes
sources of conflicting views—views for andagainst democracy support—while examining
issues that have affected recent discussions on
democracy support in Japanese politics, government, and civil society.
The report starts with a brief review of thehistory of Japan’s involvement in democracy
support. It then seeks to analyze the general characteristics of Japan’s support, based on an analysis of ODA data from the past decade, before
proceeding to discuss ideas and reasons that
explain Japan’s approach. The report next looks
at recent developments in discussions related todemocracy support in Japanese politics, government, and civil society, while explaining roles
that have been played by different actors. This isfollowed by a section that lists areas of democ­racy support in which Japan has been engaged
in recent years. While the list is not comprehensive, it is designed to illustrate the breadthof Japanese involvement in the field. The paper
then ends with a discussion of how Japan might
be able to expand its efforts related to support
for democratic governance, which is accompanied by a list of democracy-related areas where
Japan is not currently active but could potentially explore.

8

2. A Brief History of Japan’s Support for
Democracy-Related Issues3
Japan emerged as one of the world’s major foreign aid donors in the late 1980s. By 1989, Japan
became the largest donor in the world in termsof the amount of ODA provided, and underPrime Minister Noboru Takeshita, Japan began
discussing ODA as a part of its commitment tointernational peace.4 With heightened international interest in democracy support after theCold War, and as the country faced the need to
set clearer goals for its foreign aid, Japan adopted
the ODA Charter in 1992, which explicitly refers
to democracy as a consideration in foreign aid
decision making.5 In 2003, the ODA Charter was
revised and the new wording further emphasized
human rights and democracy. Issues surrounding democracy support gained greater attention
in Japan’s foreign policy in the mid-2000s, when
Foreign Minister Aso, who was part of the first
Abe cabinet, began discussing the creation of an“Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in Asia basedon values such as human rights, the rule of law,freedom, and democracy.6

The second Abe administration, which took
office in 2012, adopted a National Security
Strategy in 2013 that positioned freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as Japan’snational interest within the context of national
security. The Development Cooperation Charter
adopted in 2015 also lists support for democratization as a priority issue.
Generally speaking, Japan’s support for thisfield has been gradually increasing, but political developments have coincided with, or may
have triggered, jumps in the amount of ODA
allocated to that goal. Figure 1 shows ODA allocations to “government and civil society,” thecategory most relevant to democracy support in
the OECD data on foreign aid since 2002. (Allocations under this category were zero prior to
2002.) The amount went up in 2003, for example,
when the ODA Charter was revised. It increased
again in 2006 and 2007, around the time of thefirst Abe administration and when the Arc of
Freedom and Prosperity was being introduced.
There was also a slight increase in 2013, whichcoincided with the adoption of the National
Security Strategy.7

Figure 1. Japan’s support for government and civil society (US$ millions)

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System; modified from figure in Ichihara (2018), 41.

9

3. General Trends and Views For
and Against Japan’s Support for
Democracy-Related Issues
While the Japanese government’s aid for initiatives related to democracy increased over
the years, Japan’s commitment in terms of the
proportion of overall ODA directed toward thatgoal remains limited, especially in comparison
to the United States and European liberal
democracies.
Table 1 shows the percentage of ODA allocated for government and civil society support.
Between 2007 and 2016—the most recent 10
years for which data is available—Japan’s support
for government and civil society as a share of its
total ODA was 2.1 percent, placing Japan at

26th out of 29 countries. This is substantiallylower than countries like Australia, the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavian
countries, all of which allocated more than 10
percent to this category.
Looking at the substance of the aid allocatedto government and civil society support (tables
2 and 3), the bulk of the funds went to the categories of “public sector policy and administrative management” and “judicial support.” Insome years, the share of funds going to election
support increased, but these were one-time
contributions and not a change in the overall
trend. In contrast, almost no funds were allocated to categories such as civil society development over the years.

Table 1. Percentage of aid for government and civil society in total ODA, 2007–2016

Australia
SwedenUnited States
United Kingdom
CanadaGermany
Korea
Italy
Japan
France

2007
25.1%
16.6%
11.7%
15.3%
16.3%
7.5%
16.2%
4.7%
2.3%
1.0%

2008
21.4%
15.8%
11.5%
17.7%
13.1%
8.0%
10.4%
5.5%
1.5%
1.5%

2009
20.9%
17.6%
15.4%
10.4%
12.7%
11.4%
9.7%
4.0%
0.8%
1.3%

2010
20.3%
18.6%
12.7%
10.1%
9.7%
10.8%
5.2%
4.6%
1.0%
0.9%

2011
18.7%
18.7%
13.1%
10.0%
9.5%
9.3%
5.0%
2.4%
3.3%
1.8%

2012
19.7%
20.0%
15.3%
10.7%
7.8%
10.9%
7.4%
2.8%
2.1%
1.3%

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System; modified from table in Ichihara (2018), 44.

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System; modified from table in Ichihara (2017) p. 44.

2013
17.7%
19.9%
11.1%
9.4%
6.5%
10.2%
8.2%
3.8%
2.1%
1.7%

2014
16.9%
18.7%
13.2%
9.4%
7.3%
9.0%
5.8%
5.3%
2.4%
1.4%

2015
17.3%
12.9%
9.7%
9.5%
6.6%
6.7%
5.8%
6.4%
2.6%
1.6%

2016
19.6%
18.7%
10.4%
8.1%
7.3%
6.9%
5.7%
2.1%
2.5%
5.1%

Average
19.5%
17.7%
12.4%
10.7%
9.4%
8.7%
7.1%
4.1%
2.1%
1.7%

10

Table 2. Allocation of Japan’s support for government and civil society by subcategory, 2007–2016 (percentage)

Public sector policy andadministrative management
Public finance management
Decentralisation and support tosubnational government
Anti-corruption organisations
and institutions
Domestic revenue mobilisation
Legal and judicial development
Democratic participation andcivil society
Elections
Legislatures and political parties
Media and free flow of
information
Human rights
Women's equality organisations
and institutions
Ending violence against womenand girls

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Average

95.7%

95.0%

74.9%

51.3%

38.2%

73.2%

40.6%

40.6%

34.4%

34.4%

52.9%

-

-

0.9%

0.5%

0.4%

0.2%

0.3%

0.2%

0.8%

1.5%

0.5%

-

-

0.1%

10.0%

3.5%

7.8%

8.5%

3.2%

3.7%

3.4%

4.3%

-

-

-

0.4%

0.1%

0.2%

3.7%

0.2%

0.2%

0.1%

0.6%

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.9%

1.4%

0.3%

0.2%

3.1%

10.2%

10.8%

53.7%

12.3%

40.1%

50.6%

49.2%

44.4%

33.3%

0.4%

0.5%

-

0.4%

0.4%

0.6%

1.0%

1.4%

1.2%

2.2%

0.9%

2.9%

0.6%

13.8%

25.8%

2.3%

5.0%

5.2%

0.8%

3.7%

0.3%

4.3%

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.7%

0.7%

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.1%

0.1%

-

0.2%

0.1%

0.6%

0.2%

0.3%

0.8%

0.1%

0.3%

0.1%

0.1%

-

0.5%

1.2%

0.2%

0.4%

2.7%

4.9%

10.7%

2.4%

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1.5%

0.2%

Souce: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

Table 3. Allocation of Japan’s support for government and civil society by subcategory, 2007–2016 (US$ millions)
Allocation of Japan's Support for Government and Civil Society by Sub-category, 2007–2016 (USD million)

Public sector policy andadministrative management
Public finance management
Decentralisation and support tosubnational government
Anti-corruption organisations
and institutions
Domestic revenue mobilisation
Legal and judicial development
Democratic participation andcivil society
Elections
Legislatures and political parties
Media and free flow of
information
Human rights
Women's equality organisations
and institutions
Ending violence against womenand girls
Total Government and Civil
Society

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

255.3

207.0

73.1

80.6

200.6

217.9

167.4

122.9

109.2

115.7

1549.8

-

-

0.9

0.7

2.3

0.7

1.1

0.5

2.5

5.1

13.8

-

-

0.1

15.8

18.6

23.1

35.0

9.8

11.9

11.4

125.6

-

-

-

0.7

0.7

0.5

15.3

0.6

0.8

0.3

18.8

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2.9

4.8

7.7

0.5

6.7

10.0

17.0

282.2

36.6

165.2

153.3

156.2

149.2

976.8

1.1

1.2

..

0.6

1.9

1.7

4.2

4.4

3.8

7.5

26.3

7.8

1.3

13.5

40.6

12.0

14.8

21.3

2.4

11.9

0.9

126.5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.0

1.9

1.4

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3.3

0.2

0.2

-

0.4

0.8

1.7

1.0

0.8

2.6

0.4

8.2

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.8

6.2

0.7

1.5

8.2

15.7

35.9

69.3

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

4.9

4.9

266.9

217.9

97.6

157.3

525.2

297.8

412.1

302.7

317.3

336.1

2930.8Souce: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

11

Table 4. Amount and share of Japan’s support for government and civil society by recipient, 2007–2016

Amount of support (US$ millions)
Afghanistan
Indonesia
Cambodia
Viet Nam
Lao PDR
Kenya
JordanNepal
West Bank & Gaza Strip
Ghana
Philippines
Tanzania
Democratic Republic of the Congo
MyanmarMongolia
Asia, regional
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Sierra Leone
UgandaSouth Sudan
SenegalSudan
Madagascar
Africa, regional
China (People's Republic of)Timor-Leste
Developing countries, unspecified
Other developing countries
Total

2007
41.3
13.7
11.9
22.7
10.6
25.5
0.2
9.9
11.1
12.3
0.3
6.1
1.6
0.4
6.9
0.9
10.6
3.6
1.7
2.8
0.1
..
4.4
3.3
6.2
0.1
2.1
0.9
4.1
55.6
266.9

2008
40.3
12.5
15.2
4.6
1.5
1.8
14.5
0.9
0.3
15.0
6.2
1.4
10.4
0.3
8.2
0.5
0.1
7.3
1.0
0.1
0.6
..
7.7
1.2
8.7
0.6
3.2
0.2
4.3
53.6
217.9

2009
0.6
9.5
3.0
4.1
1.6
1.1
0.0
1.1
11.8
0.7
0.5
1.0
2.3
0.1
0.2
0.9
0.3
0.3
1.3
0.0
1.3
..
0.0
11.1
0.0
0.1
2.6
0.5
7.2
41.4
97.6

2010
37.2
12.5
6.0
3.4
2.4
0.8
0.9
1.1
2.3
0.2
4.9
2.1
1.6
0.3
0.3
0.7
2.0
3.8
0.1
1.5
0.8
..
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.2
2.0
0.4
39.7
68.6
157.3

2011
256.4
119.6
19.3
2.6
4.8
0.7
9.3
1.7
2.4
0.3
4.5
2.2
2.8
0.3
0.6
0.9
3.0
3.2
0.4
2.7
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.7
1.3
0.3
41.5
84.2
525.2

2012
159.4
13.2
9.7
5.3
6.4
3.7
0.6
1.8
0.6
0.1
2.6
4.5
0.4
3.4
0.7
1.8
2.8
1.5
2.3
6.6
14.9
8.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
1.4
1.2
0.4
7.6
43.9
297.8

2013
297.9
7.7
2.9
3.8
5.6
0.5
0.6
3.6
0.6
0.0
2.3
2.3
0.1
3.4
0.5
2.2
1.0
1.9
1.2
2.5
0.2
1.9
0.0
0.2
1.0
4.8
1.1
4.3
20.8
57.8
412.1

2014
205.9
12.6
6.0
4.6
4.3
0.3
2.5
1.1
0.3
0.0
2.8
1.7
0.0
4.6
0.7
1.1
1.2
0.1
3.7
0.9
0.1
2.4
2.2
0.3
0.0
1.2
0.7
1.2
6.0
40.0
302.7

2015
191.3
14.7
3.8
4.1
3.4
0.1
4.5
3.9
0.9
0.0
3.2
2.3
1.7
4.5
3.1
1.6
1.0
0.1
4.2
0.1
0.1
5.1
1.4
0.0
..
4.7
0.8
1.0
7.9
55.3
317.3

2016
194.3
10.7
4.2
6.0
2.2
1.7
2.4
7.9
0.2
0.1
0.4
3.4
4.8
8.1
3.5
11.7
0.3
0.2
3.8
1.6
0.2
1.2
1.5
0.0
0.0
2.3
0.9
6.8
7.8
55.4
336.1

Total
1424.6
226.9
81.9
61.3
42.8
36.2
35.6
33.1
30.5
28.8
27.9
27.0
25.7
25.6
24.8
22.4
22.3
21.9
19.8
19.1
18.8
18.8
17.5
17.4
16.2
16.1
16.0
16.0
147.0
556.0
2930.8Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

Table 4 shows Japan’s support for the governmentand civil society sector by recipient. During thisperiod, there was a large contribution to Afghanistan, which amounted to half of Japan’s total
support for the sector.8 In 2012, Japan committed
to providing up to US$3 billion for the reconstruction of the country over a five-year period,
and the amount here reflects that commitment.
Aside from Afghanistan, the table showsthat countries in Southeast Asia that are in
the transitional or democratic consolidation
phases—namely Cambodia, Indonesia, andVietnam—were top recipients of Japan’s support.
Considering the importance of the region to
Japan, this is not surprising. The bulk of support

to these countries went to public policy andadministrative management assistance, followedby judicial development, which is consistent
with the general trend of Japan’s democracyrelated support.
Japan’s tendency to focus on less politicallysensitive areas stems from its historical background.9 Because of Japan’s past aggression
and colonization in Asia, it has been extremely
cautious to avoid actions that could be viewed
as interference in the domestic political affairsof other countries, especially in Asia, and Japan
has come to adhere to the principle of noninterference in its aid policy. Japanese ODA has
focused on economic development as a primary

Share ofsupport
48.6%
7.7%
2.8%
2.1%
1.5%
1.2%
1.2%
1.1%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.9%
0.9%
0.9%
0.8%
0.8%
0.8%
0.7%
0.7%
0.7%
0.6%
0.6%
0.6%
0.6%
0.6%
0.6%
0.5%
0.5%
5.0%
19.0%
100.0%

12target from the beginning, and the culture, practice, and expertise of Japan’s foreign assistancedeveloped around that objective. Thus, in any
areas that may be related to democracy support,
Japan’s activities tend to focus on technical assistance, the provision of equipment, and administrative management, which are less political andhence less controversial in the view of Japanese
aid agencies.10 Furthermore, Japan’s approach to
ODA has been to operate on the basis of requests
from the recipient country’s government. This isintended to ensure the recipient government’s
initiative and ownership over assistance projects, and the Japanese government considers thisan important strength of Japan’s ODA, differentiating it from its Western counterparts who
sometimes adopt more forceful, interventionist
approaches, particularly in areas such as democracy support.11
However, the government-to-government
approach necessarily favors the recipient government’s current position rather than encouraging diversity and competitiveness in thepolitical landscape of the country, and it limits
Japan’s support to only countries where recipient governments are willing to accept such aid.
As a result, it limits the effectiveness of the aid,
particularly on issues related to democratic
governance.12
On the other hand, favorable views of democracy support derive from both normative andsecurity concerns in Japan. As an advanced,

stable, liberal democracy in Asia, Japan views
democracy as a guiding principle and thefoundation of its domestic political system, andmany Japanese consider it an important endeavor
to advance democracy as a universal value in theworld. In this sense, the country also recognizes
expectations from other democratic nations
that it play a role in championing democracyinternationally, and from time to time the Japanese government has felt pressure—from both
domestic and international sources—to do somore expressly and vocally. Such pressures havehelped to shape ODA policy and Japanese political rhetoric to champion democracy and the ruleof law over the years, although it may be argued
that its scope is still limited.13
In addition, security concerns have playeda major role in motivating Japan to promote
democracy in the region. Undeniably, China has
been a big factor in this, and the concept of an
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity represents an
example where democracy support was linked
to security concerns. In light of China’s rise to
become a major power and its increasing influence in the region, Japan hopes to strengthen
its ties with allies. Emphasizing its presence as aliberal democracy and differentiating itself from
China are part of that effort. As Japan searches
for strategies to counterbalance China, issues of
democracy support can gain greater salience inJapan’s foreign policy.14

13

4. Recent Developments
4.1 Politics15
There is a heightened interest and concern
among Japanese politicians about the courseof the country’s foreign policy. As noted above,
China’s rise and its growing influence in Asiaand the world is a major source of concern. The
return of autocratic governments in some Asian
countries that were thought to be on their way to
democracy also presents a worrisome prospectfrom Japan’s view. These issues have multiple
aspects, affecting not just security, geopolitics,
economics, and trade, but also in a broader
sense, the future of democracy and of the liberalinternational order from which Japan has greatly
benefited in the postwar era. Japanese politicians
have been discussing and contemplating strategies and policies toward other nations—andparticularly toward such Southeast Asian countries as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka—inrecent months and years.
For example, the July 2018 Cambodian elections became a contentious and problematic
topic in Japan, as the Japanese government went
ahead and supported the election although it
was largely seen as unfair and undemocratic,
controlled by the government of President Hun
Sen. Some Diet members, including Yukihisa
Fujita and Kentaro Gemma, vocally questioned
the Japanese government’s decision to provide
election support to Cambodia. Civil society
groups also reacted, calling on the government
to reverse its decision. Experts in this movement
included academics, NGO leaders, as well as anumber of former Japanese UN officials, such as
Yasushi Akashi.16
The government defended its position, saying
it was worthwhile to provide support so that theelection could be as fair as possible. The fundamental debate, however, is how Japan should
deal with governments in other Asian countries
that are autocratic or in transition when it isfeared that severing ties with those countries
might mean losing out to China. It is obvious

from various politicians’ comments that there isno consensus on what is the best approach, andno one seems to have articulated a clear path forward that appeals broadly to mainstream policy
thinkers in Japan.
Generally speaking, few Japanese politicians
have been exceptionally vocal about democracy support, and those who are interested inrelated topics seem to focus on specific casessuch as women’s empowerment and refugeerights. However, more general discussions on
issues particularly related to democracy support took place in a research committee oninternational economic and foreign policy(Kokusai Keizai/Gaiko ni Kansuru Chosakai)in the House of Councillors in May 2017, where
the role of the parliament in foreign policy was
one of the main topics. Experts on democracy
support, including a representative from theFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Japan Office, wereinvited to testify, and some committee members,
including Sayaka Sasaki, have demonstrated aparticular interest in the importance of working with NGOs and foundations in relation to
supporting democracy abroad, pointing to therole of the National Endowment for Democracyin the United States as one example.17
In addition, a number of parliamentarians
who are interested in the role of NGOs in foreignassistance have also shown interest in issues of
democracy support, including Keisuke Suzuki,
an up-and-coming politician from the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). Some senior LDP politicians, such as Taro Kono and Fumio Kishida,
have also shown interest in issues related to democratic governance support, and they may play a
key role if the topic is to be advanced in Japan’s
foreign policy.
On the broader issue of political rhetoric,
while “democracy” as a concept is commonly
accepted as a vital part of Japanese politics andforeign policy, in foreign policy speeches, politicians often use terms such as “universal values”
or “shared values” when discussing democracy.
Using such phrases sometimes implies keeping
nondemocratic countries in check, especially14

China. Reference to the rule of law is more popular to suggest something similar to liberalism.
One notable trend in Japan is that there is agreat awareness and acceptance of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the political,
business, and social sectors, as well as among
the general public. Thus, the language in theSDGs, including Goal 16, which is closely related
to democratic governance, could be widely
accepted in Japan at many levels.

4.2 Government
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is
responsible for handling Japan’s foreign policy
and foreign assistance, and it plays a major rolein decision making concerning Japan’s efforts
related to democracy support abroad. The Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), positioned under MOFA, is the implementing bodyof Japanese ODA. With approximately 2,000
staff, JICA is responsible for administering development projects, bilateral loans, and grants aspart of Japan’s foreign assistance. JICA’s staff areconsidered experts in foreign aid, and in somecases have greater expertise than staff at MOFA,
whose positions tend to rotate every few years.
Thus, while MOFA oversees JICA, the ministry
often depends on the implementing agency forexpertise in developing aid policies and strategies for each recipient country.
JICA has substantial experience in the field of
economic cooperation in particular, and it has
internalized Japan’s foreign aid culture and practices, such as the principle of noninterference
and the government-to-government approach.
Thus, it has not been a major driving force toadvance new fields such as democracy supportin Japan’s foreign policy, and there is strong hesitation within the agency to engage in issues that
could be seen as political or controversial.
However, in reality, many of JICA’s projects
are related to support for democratic governance, especially those that are carried out underthe banner of “good governance.” These include
judicial and election support, women’s empow-

erment, and peacebuilding efforts, although thesupport tends to be limited to technical assistance and the provision of equipment and isoften biased toward the recipient government’s
position.
In addition to MOFA and JICA, the Ministryof Justice (MOJ) has also been involved in thisfield through their judicial support projects that
send experts and host programs for judicial personnel training, often in cooperation with nonprofit entities such as the International Civil andCommercial Law Centre Foundation (ICCLC)
and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations(JFBA). The National Police Agency also has
been engaged in projects related to support forlaw enforcement, such as police officer training,some of which can be related to support for
democratic governance.18
The Japanese government also works with
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), theUN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and other UN
agencies in implementing democracy-related
projects. Japan was also a major contributor for
the UN Democracy Fund.19 However, here again,
Japan prefers a less interventionist approach andremains a less visible player on this front. At theregional level, the UN Asia and Far East Institutefor the Prevention of Crime and the Treatmentof Offenders has a close working relationshipwith the MOJ.20
In recent years, at JICA and in Japan’s foreign aid community in general, there has been
greater awareness and a certain level of urgency
to reconsider Japan’s foreign aid strategy andusage of ODA. China’s foreign aid resembles thatof Japan, as both emphasize noninterference andnoninterventionist principles. Thus, Japan needs
to find a way to differentiate itself to be able tomaintain its relevance in the international aid
community given that it is no longer able to compete with China in terms of the scale of its foreign
aid budget. JICA’s current leadership is said to berelatively sympathetic to views that Japan should
prioritize issues such as the advancement of universal values,21 and while democracy support is achallenging subject that has no clear formula on

15

how it should be done, space for discussion may
be opening up.

4.3 Civil Society
Japan’s nonprofit sector still remains relatively
underdeveloped and resource-poor compared tothose of North America and Europe, and its activities tend to be limited in general. In addition,
there are very few nongovernmental organizations in Japan that vocally identify their missions
as promoting democracy in other countries.22
Many organizations are hesitant to do so because
they are afraid to be labeled as political activists,
which could curb their opportunities for fundraising and networking in Japan. It could also
limit their access to countries where they wish
to work if they are seen as unwanted politicalgroups by host governments. A few exceptions
include Genron NPO, which is known for conducting studies and holding seminars to promote
democracy in Asia, and Inter Band, an NGO that
undertakes election support and other projects
related to democracy promotion.
In reality, however, a number of Japanesecharitable foundations, nongovernmental organizations, and universities engage in activities
that are related to the advancement of democracy in Asia and elsewhere. For example, many
humanitarian organizations are involved in projects that have elements of promoting democracy,such as community building, education, and theempowerment of women and other minority
groups.23 In the field of judicial support in particular, as mentioned earlier, nongovernmental entities such as the ICCLC, the JFBA, andNagoya University have also been active andhave implemented a number of programs, somewith the cooperation of JICA and some that aredone independently.24
In fact, the beginning of Japan’s judicial support in Asia illustrates the important role playedby the nongovernmental sector. A Nagoya
University professor, Akio Morishima, is considered a pioneer in the field as he helped tolaunch Japan’s judicial support projects in the

mid-1990s.25 The Ministry of Justice in Vietnam
initially requested that the Japanese government
support the drafting of Vietnam’s civil code, butwhen that went nowhere, they asked Professor
Morishima for help. The professor subsequently
worked with MOFA and the MOJ, both ofwhich were unsure how to respond. In the end,
Professor Morishima was sent to Vietnam withfunding from the Japan Foundation, a quasigovernmental foundation at that time. He followed
up later by flying to Vietnam with funding fromthe university as well as his own personal funds,
and in 1994, when the Japanese government’s
mission officially received a request from theVietnamese government to support the country in drafting its civil code as an ODA project,
MOFA and the MOJ looked to Professor Morishima to coordinate and launch the project inVietnam.26 Judicial support has become one of
the main features of Japan’s foreign assistance,
but would not have been possible without theefforts and support of nongovernmental leaders
such as Professor Morishima.
Over the last two decades, networks among
the MOJ, courts, the bar association, scholars,
and lawyers have been established, contributing
to the collective expertise in this area. Meanwhile, Nagoya University continues to be activein the field and has founded Japanese law education centers in countries such as Vietnam andMongolia.
Experts on democracy assistance suggest thatJapan needs to strengthen the involvement of its
NGO sector,27 while the sector itself also needs tostep up its efforts in the field. This would involve
building a better environment for NGO activities in the field, including raising awarenessamong the public of the importance of Japan’s
engagement in supporting democracies abroadand strengthening the funding base. Many also
believe that NGOs can play an important rolein establishing multiple channels of cooperation
with aid recipient countries and their societies, which will make Japan’s efforts to support
democratic governance more substantive andeffective.

16

5. Democracy-Related Areas Where
Japan Is Currently Active
The following is a select list of areas in which
Japan has been active in recent years that are relevant for the advancement of democratic institutions and norms. While the list is not comprehensive, it gives some concrete examples of thetypes of projects being conducted, and it also
includes some projects that are less frequently
noted when discussing Japan’s support for thefield in order to give a sense of the broader rangeof activities that may be overlooked in ODA
data. The aim here is to expand the discussion on
Japan’s democracy support beyond the generaltrends and to look at the wider range of relevant
issues that Japan’s work entails, although in somecases the number of projects or amount of aid
may still be limited at this point.

Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, and the Vietnam Federation of
Bar Associations by examining, preparing, andapplying legal normative documents.29
Cambodia’s civil codes: Japan was actively
involved in the drafting of Cambodia’s Codeof Civil Procedure and Civil Code, which wereadopted in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Following the completion of a ﬁve-year project totrain core personnel at the Ministry of Justice,
the Royal Academy for Judicial Professions, theBar Association, and Royal University of Law
and Economics on these codes in March 2017,
another five-year project was launched to
improve the application of the Civil Code andthe Code of Civil Procedure. The ICCLC was thesecretariat and managed these projects.30

a. Judicial Support
Among Japan’s various initiatives related to support for democratic institutions and norms, oneof its main focuses has been support for the ruleof law and judicial systems in developing countries, and it has developed substantial expertisein the field since the 1990s. Some of the main
activities undertaken in the area of judicial support include the following:28

Rule of Law Centres in Myanmar: In 2016, theJapanese government provided US$1 million in
funding support to the Rule of Law Centres
in Myanmar, established by UNDP in Yangon
and Mandalay, as well as in Myitkyina (Kachin
State) and Taunggyi (Shan State). The centers aredesigned to help legal professionals, community
leaders, and civil society organizations accessknowledge, nurture skills, and raise awareness of
the law.31

1. Supporting the drafting of civil, criminal, 		and commercial codes
2. Organizing seminars and training for
judicial personnel
3. Dispatching Japanese experts (long and 		short term)
4. Hosting study visits to Japan

Helping establish bar associations: In 2009, the
JFBA provided funding and support to help Vietnam establish its first bar association. The JFBA
had been working in partnership with JICA for anumber of years to dispatch legal experts to Vietnam and support the country’s efforts to develop
its expertise.32

Examples:Vietnam’s judicial system reform: Since 2015,
JICA has been carrying out the Technical
Assistance Project for Legal and Judicial System Reform for 2020. In cooperation with the
ICCLC, the project provides advice and guidance for capacity building of the country’s Ministry of Justice, the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce, theb. Support for Administrative Functions
Japan has implemented and supported programs
designed to strengthen the administrative functions of recipient countries’ governments bothat the national and local levels. They include
providing financial support, training personnel, hosting trainees, and conducting exchange
programs. In addition to JICA, other Japanese

17

governmental entities involved in this effort haveincluded the Council of Local Authorities forInternational Relations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC).

Examples:Strengthening government technical expertise: In 2006, the Japanese government pledged¥10 billion to establish the Economic ResearchInstitute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), an
ASEAN-based think tank that conducts research
related to regional integration and undertakes
initiatives that aim to expand policy research
capacity in the region’s least-developed countries.
These often have a special focus on expanding
the technical expertise of government officials in
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam, and Myanmar.33
Improving capacity to handle claims against an
administration: The Government Inspectorateof Vietnam needed to improve its capacity tohandle an increasing number of claims broughtby citizens against the government. In 2013, the
MIC signed an agreement with the Government
Inspectorate of Vietnam to cooperate in thisarea, and it has implemented a three-year training program funded by JICA.34

c. Election Support
Japan has supported elections in countries in
Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle
East. Efforts in this area have included
1. Providing financial support, materials,
and equipment
2. Training election officers
3. Dispatching observers
4. Providing security

Examples:Automation of the voter identification process
in Kyrgyzstan: JICA provided a grant to UNDP
of up to ¥740 million to support fair and transparent elections from 2015 to 2017. The projectprovided equipment to verify voter identity andconducted a training-the-trainers program on

the correct usage of the system for approximately
300 people around the country.35

d. Support for Legislatures
Japan has supported the legislative functions ofdeveloping countries by hosting various seminars
and dispatching experts to assist with the drafting ofcivil and commercial codes. In addition, a numberof nongovernmental organizations have politicalexchange programs for parliamentary members.
Examples:ODA to strengthen legislative capacity in the
Pacific Islands: In March 2018, the Japanese
government pledged US$5.2 million through
UNDP for an initiative to expand the capacity of
the legislatures in Samoa, the Marshall Islands,
and Micronesia, and to scale up ongoing support for the parliaments of the Solomon Islands,
Vanuatu, and Fiji. This is designed to strengthen
the work of their committees related to legislation and oversight (especially with regard to
key development issues), build the capacities oflegislators and the professionalism of staff, andimprove the budget process and financial oversight capacity of the legislatures. It builds on
previous Japanese support for the region, such as
the Fiji Parliament Support Program.36
Support for the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary
Assembly (AIPA): In 2016, the Japanese government pledged new support for AIPA throughERIA. This funding is intended to support
research and capacity-building initiatives for
AIPA, whose activities also include parliamentary exchanges with Japanese legislators.37

e. Support for Law Enforcement
Japan considers assistance for police systems
to be part of its democracy-related initiatives,and it has provided support—directly or indirectly through international organizations—tostrengthen the law enforcement agencies of aid
recipient countries.

18

Examples:Strengthening the Afghan National Police
through judo: JICA has been providing financial assistance and expertise for a program tohelp train Afghan police officers through judo.
Since 2011, thousands of Afghan cadets haveundergone training in Turkey, aided by six JICA
judo experts who were previously members of
the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department.
The training includes not only practical judo
but also lectures on professional ethics and discipline. JICA also has supported UN projects
to increase the number of police officers and toprovide education and training for police forces.
The National Policy Agency also hosted Afghan
police officers visiting Japan.38
f. Media Support
Japan has provided equipment, technical assistance, and expert training in order to support
media infrastructure. Japan has also assisted
in drafting media-related laws. Private entities,
such as NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation),
have cooperated in some cases.
Examples:Media support in South Sudan: In January
2013, JICA launched the Project for Institutional
Capacity Development of South Sudan TV andRadio (SSTVR) to reform the state-run broadcaster into a public system that is independentof the government. The project provided equipment and capacity-development training forjournalists, program producers, and equipment
engineers.39
Building the media sector for democratization in Nepal: Between 2010 and 2013, JICA
supported Nepal’s Ministry of Information andCommunications in drafting a revised media
policy, legislation, regulations, and guidelines. It
also supported Radio Nepal’s reform to becomea public service broadcaster through capacitydevelopment programs for its staff.40

Launching a satellite broadcast system in
Afghanistan: Between 2002 and 2004, JICA
provided the necessary equipment and facilities
in order to launch a national broadcast systemusing satellites. An NHK affiliate that provided
technical expertise as a contractor for the project
estimated that the broadcasts reached 4 million
people.41

g. Peacebuilding
The Japanese government and nongovernmental
institutions have a strong record of supporting
conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives
around the world. In particular, the Japanese
government has increased its efforts in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration(DDR) of ex-combatants, and Afghanistan has
been one of the major recipients of this support.
Examples:Japanese Initiative for the future of Syrian Refugees (JISR) by JICA and UNHCR: Launchedin 2016, JISR provides academic opportunities
for young Syrian refugees to study at graduate
programs in Japanese universities for two to
three years. This is the first JICA project where
refugees are accepted in Japan as students. The
program is carried out in cooperation with
UNHCR and is designed to contribute to Syria’s
future reconstruction.42
Nippon Foundation Myanmar Support Program: Japan’s largest private foundation, theNippon Foundation, has a long history of working in Myanmar. Since 2016, it has channeled
millions of dollars to initiatives in areas that havebeen home to minority populations previously atconflict with the central government in order tobuild confidence in the peace process. The projects have ranged from humanitarian assistanceto infrastructure development, and each activity
is pursued on the basis of consensus formed
between the central government and the ethnic
armed organizations in the area.43

19

Training peacebuilders: The Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, a nonprofit organization, offers anumber of short courses in Hiroshima and Tokyo
to train approximately 40 beginner and mid-career
peacebuilding practitioners annually from developing countries as well as from Japan on practicalskills to use on the ground. This is carried out on acontract basis with funding from MOFA.44

i. Women’s Empowerment
Various projects have been implemented withJapan’s support that are designed to empower
women and promote gender equality in countries that are in transition to democracy. They
include education for women, various seminars,
and training programs to strengthen women’sroles in the public sector.

Supporting local ethnic reconciliation: The
Japan International Volunteer Center, anothernonprofit organization, has worked in Kirkuk
and other Kurdish areas of Iraq since 2009 to foster reconciliation among ethnic groups. It partners with local NGOs to teach conflict resolution
techniques to local and refugee children throughtheater and the arts, as well as to foster tolerance
among them. As part of these programs, social
workers and other experts also provide services
for children who are suffering psychologicallyfrom the conflict.45

Examples:Training of female police officers: JICA, in
cooperation with UNDP, has been supporting the training of female police officers in
Afghanistan since 2014 in order to strengthen
their role in the country’s police force as well as incombatting violence against women and girls.48

h. Education
Educational programs—especially those targeting minority and other socially and economically disadvantaged populations—contribute tobuilding the environment necessary for nurturing democracy.
Examples:Education for ethnic harmony in Bosnia andHerzegovina: From 2008 to 2014, JICA implemented an IT education project targeting highschools to integrate ethnic differences in education and build educators’ networks that include
different ethnic groups.46
Education for female students in Pakistan:Japan supported a project in 2013 to promoteintermediate education for female students inHyderabad and adjacent provinces in southern
Pakistan. Coordinating with the United States,
Japan’s aid supplemented a US-led effort to discourage the radicalization of Islamic politics.47

Training for female government officials: Aspart of the “Development Strategy for Gender
Equality and Women’s Empowerment,” which
was announced in May 2016, the governmentof Japan undertook a three-year effort to train
about 5,000 female government administrative
officials and to improve the learning environment for about 50,000 girls by the end of 2018.49
Supporting women entrepreneurs: In July 2017,
on the occasion of the G20 Summit in Hamburg,
Germany, Japan pledged US$50 million to support the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative. This initiative, which is housed at the World
Bank, supports women-led businesses andworks with governments to improve the laws
and regulations stifling women entrepreneurs indeveloping countries.50

j. Anticorruption Training
Japan has contributed to the Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice Fund. Japan also collaborates closely with the Tokyo-based UN Asia andFar East Institute for the Prevention of Crimeand the Treatment of Offenders, which handles
various anticorruption programs, including
seminars and training.

20

Examples:Training law enforcement agencies in Northern Africa: In 2015, the Japanese government
and the UN Institute for Training and Research(UNITAR) launched an anticorruption training
program for law enforcement agencies in the
Sahel region. This involves workshops and othertraining for 16 mid- and senior-level officials
from government agencies and other institutions in the region. The UNITAR Hiroshima
Office, in particular, had significant experience
designing and delivering anticorruption andtransparency training in postconflict countries
such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus was wellequipped to work with the Japanese governmenton this initiative.5:

6. Next Steps for Expanding Support for
Democracy-Related Issues52
There are a number of ways in which Japan
can expand its support for issues related todemocracy. First, in connection with ODA,
most experts on Japanese foreign aid consider
that overhauling the entire system is neither
realistic nor necessary at this point to prioritize
support for democratic governance. Similarly,
suddenly taking an outright hostile position
toward undemocratic regimes in recipient
countries where Japan has established somegood relationships as a donor may not always
be a wise option. Rather, introducing elementsof democracy support in existing projects is amore feasible course of action and a good way
to strengthen Japan’s commitment to and theeffectiveness of its foreign aid in the field. For
example, one democratic governance expert
suggested that incorporating civic education at
the local, grassroots level in current JICA programs (e.g., youth education, agricultural assistance, etc.) would be a good step forward andOther Areas Related to Democracy
The following are examples of areas where Japan appears to be less active currently but where experts suggest it
should consider expanding its efforts:
a. Additional work related to the rule of law• Expanding access to justice• Commercial codes to encourage
		entrepreneurshipd. Expanding media support• Assisting aspiring journalists• Expanding support to cover independent,
		 nongovernmental media

b. Additional support for administration and 		
legislature• Improving transparency• Strengthening checks and balancese. Support for scholars and dissidents innondemocratic states• Collaboration with organizations such as
Scholars at Risk

c. Support for political participation and politicalparties• Civic education at the local level

f. Development of the nonprofit sector• Providing direct support for local civil society
organizations• Assisting in the drafting of NPO laws
• Supporting think tanks/policy institutes in Asia

21

could have an important effect in developing
democratic governance in a recipient country in
the long run. Looking at the higher educationlevel, those involved in judicial support suggestthat working with universities and students has
contributed to nurturing the next generation oflegal personnel and they recommend that suchprojects be expanded further. Media experts
also point out the important role of the free
media and the presence of aspiring journalists
in currently nondemocratic countries, and theysuggest assisting those journalists and independent media as a potential project that could
greatly contribute to democratic governance.
Second, part of the reason that Japan has
not been very active in some areas linked todemocracy support may be that Japanese ODA is
typically provided only at the request ofrecipient governments. Thus, some scholars
and experts suggest that revising or modifying the government-to-government approach
could open up a path to use ODA more effectively.
There is also the need to diversify channels, andexperts have suggested that further strengthening the involvement of civil society is necessary
and would prove beneficial. Also, experts suggest that another potential way to make Japan’s

foreign assistance more effective would be tochange the priorities of Japan’s ODA—which
is currently disproportionately focused on theprovision of money, infrastructure, and goods—
to focus more on people and ideas.
Third, in order to support changes in ODA
policy and strengthen the involvement of civilsociety, there is a need to build a sympathetic
audience in Japan among politicians, government officials, and the public. In particular,
with lingering sensitivities around Japan’s historyof aggression in Asia and its tendency to avoid
any political engagement for fear of being seen as
controversial, there is a need to cautiously selectthe terminology to be used to describe support
for democratic governance in order to ensure it
can gain traction and support in Japan’s foreign
aid debate. At the same time, education andawareness-raising for Japan’s domestic audienceat all levels will be one important aspect of thiseffort. There is also a need for more discussion
and debate so that the Japanese people canbetter understand what support for democratic
governance means to the country and to articulate how such ideas can be translated into
concrete projects.

22

Endnotes
1.

Some of the more comprehensive studies on Japan’s democracy assistance in recent years in English are:
Maiko Ichihara, Japan’s International Democracy Assistance As Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (NewYork: Routledge, 2018); Maiko Ichihara, Japanese Democracy Assistance: Weak Involvement of Civil Society
Actors (PhD dissertation, May 2012). For papers and reports in English and Japanese, see also Chapter 7 inKoichi Sugiura, Minshuka shien: 21 seiki no kokusai kankei to demokurashii no kousa [Democracy support:
crossover between international relations in the 21st century and democracy] (Kyoto: Horitsubunkasha,2010); Koichi Sugiura, “Nihon no ‘minshuka gaiko’: 1990 nendai iko no nihon no minshukashien katsudo”[Japan’s ‘democratization diplomacy’: its democratization support activities since the l990s], in Contemporary
Society 9 (2006): 23–41, 12, http://repo.kyoto-wu.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/11173/383/1/0130_009_002.pdf;
Yoichiro Sato, “Japan,” Freedom House website for the Supporting Democracy Abroad project (June 2012–May
2014), https://freedomhouse.org/report/democracysupport/japan#.XFnKeM9KiDU; Yasunobu Sato, “Japan’s
Approach to Global Democracy Support: Focused on Law and Judicial Reform Assistance,” in U.S.-Japan
Approaches to Democracy Promotion, eds. Michael R. Auslin and Daniel E. Bob (Washington DC: Sasakawa
Peace Foundation USA, 2017), 37–44. Examples of studies by Japanese governmental agencies include JICA
Research Institute, Minshuteki na kunizukuri no shien ni mukete: gabanansu kyoka wo chushin ni [Towardsupport for democratic state-making: centered around strengthening governance], March 2002.
2. For example, see Sato, “Japan,” and Sugiura, Minshuka shien. Terms “democracy support” and “democracy
assistance” are used interchangeably in this paper while there may be some differences.
3. Analysis of ODA data in this and the following sections generally follow the framework presented by
Ichihara. See Ichihara, Japan’s International Democracy Assistance, especially pages 40–58. The categoryof “Government and Civil Society” in the OECD data on foreign aid includes the following 11 sectors: (1)public sector policy and administrative management; (2) public finance management; (3) decentralizationand support to subnational government; (4) anti-corruption organizations and institutions; (5) legal andjudicial development; (6) democratic participation and civil society; (7) elections; (8) legislatures and politicalparties; (9) media and free flow of information; (9) human rights; (10) women’s equality organizations andinstitutions; and (11) ending violence against women and girls.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Kokusai bunka koryu no ayumi: Takeshita soridaijin Rondon supiichi (1989-nen
5-gatsu 4-nichi)” [History of international cultural exchange: London speech by Prime Minister Takeshita(May 4, 1989)], https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/culture/koryu/others/kokusai_3a.html.
5. See, for example, Sugiura, “Nihon no minshuka gaiko.”
6. Ichihara, “Japan’s Strategic Approach to Democracy Support,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peacearticle, March 7, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/07/japan-s-strategic-approach-to-democracysupport-pub-54816; Ichihara, Japan’s International Democracy Assistance, 33–40; Sugiura, “Nihon no minshuka
gaiko,” 28; Sugiura, Minshuka shien, 190.
7. The jump in 2011 was largely due to contributions to Afghanistan, which received US$256 million of
government and civil society support that year, while Indonesia also received a large portion (approximately
US$120 million in ODA loans) that year.
8. This figure includes all aid. JICA reported that the agency had spent only 3.3 percent of its budget for South
Asia on projects in Afghanistan in 2014. See JICA, JICA Annual Report 2015, 39; Richard Kraemer, “U.S.Japan Democracy Assistance in Afghanistan,” in U.S.-Japan Approaches to Democracy Promotion, 81–92.
But there were contributions of larger amounts from MOFA to projects conducted by UNDP and otherinternational organizations. While Japan generally avoided becoming engaged in politically charged tasks, its
involvement in the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) process and intervention in thereform of the Afghan Ministry of Defense have been described as “noteworthy.” Ibid., 85. See also Caroline A.
Hartzell,“Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace
Special Report 270 (2011): 1–14.
9. Sugiura, “Nihon no minshuka gaiko”; Yasunobu Sato, “Japan’s Approach to Global Democracy Support.”
10. Based on interviews with JICA officials. Also, see Japan’s International Democracy Assistance and Japanese
democracy assistance (chapter 3) by Ichihara for detailed analysis of Japan’s ODA.
11. Ownership is a key term repeatedly used by JICA to describe Japan’s ODA. For example, see JICA,
JICA 2017: Annual Report.

23

12. Issues relating to Japan’s government-to-government approach were raised in the thought leaders seminar
hosted by JCIE in June 2018.
13. Koichi Sugiura, Minshuka shien, 185–89.
14. For example, see Ichihara, “Japan’s Strategic Approach”; and Yoichiro Sato, “Japan.”
15. Analysis in this section is largely based on discussions from the Diet roundtable and thought leaders seminar
hosted by JCIE in June 2018, as well as research on records of parliamentary meetings available at http://kokkai.
ndl.go.jp/.
16. Mr. Akashi headed a group of experts who collectively submitted a proposal to reverse the course of Japan’s
election assistance to Cambodia in July 2018. See the Global Peacebuilding Association website, http://www.
gpaj.org/ja/2018/08/06/16833.
17. Other committee members who have expressed interest in the issue of support for democracy and the role ofprivate foundations such as Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the NED include Yukihisa Fujita, Eiji Kidoguchi, andHideya Sugio. Based on records available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/.
18. ICCLC, “Legal System Development Support Projects,” http://www.icclc.or.jp/english/project/;UNDP,“Yangon Rule of Law Centre Launches with Open House,” http://www.mm.undp.org/content/myanmar/en/
home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/01/23/yangon-rule-of-law-centre-launches-with-open-house.html;
Japan Federation of Bar Associations, “Kokusai kyoryoku katsudo” [International cooperation activities],
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/kokusai/shushokushien/date/2013_bengoshihakusho.pdf.
19. Koichi Sugiura, “Kokuren no minshuka shientaisei to sono kadai: Kokuren Minhsushugi Kikin (UNDEF)
no katsudo wo chushin ni” [The United Nations’ democratization assistance system and its problems: focusing on
the activity of the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF)], Wayo Women’s University Bulletin (humanities) 49(March 2009): 127–42, https://wayo.repo.nii.ac.jp index.php?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_
view_main_item_snippet&index_id=118&pn=1&count=20&order=17&lang=japanese&page_id=35&block_
id=44.
20. See examples of Japan’s aid programs in the next section of this report, “Democracy-Related Areas Where
Japan is Currently Active.”
21. Interviews with JICA officials.
22. Ichihara, Japanese Democracy Assistance; Sugiura, “Nihon no minshuka gaiko.” Also, the author’s interviews
with JICA officials and a human rights NGO leader.
23. Interview with a human rights NGO leader.
24. Takeo Kosugi, “Ajia no hoseibi shien no genjo to kadai” [Current state and challenges of judicial support inJapan], Gurobaru Keiei (September 2016), 20–23.
25. Ichihara, Japan’s International Democracy Assistance, 92.
26. International Cooperation Department Research and Training Institute of Ministry of Justice, ICD News 71(June 2017): 116–22.
27. For example, Ichihara, Japanese Democracy Assistance; JICA Research Institute, Minshuteki na kunizukuri no
shien ni mukete, especially pages 95–97; also, MOFA symposium “Challenges and Prospect of Japan’s Human
Rights and Democratic Diplomacy” (February 2008), https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/jinken/minshu/
sy_080201_gai.html.
28. In 2015, the Japanese government commissioned Mitsubishi Research Institute to evaluate the country’s
judicial support. Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc., Heisei 26 nendo gaimusho ODA hyoka: Houseido seibi
shien no hyoka, daisansha hyoka hokokusho [FY2014 Ministry of Foreign Affairs ODA assessment: evaluationof judicial system support, third-party evaluation report], February 2015.
29. ICCLC, “Legal System Development Support Projects,” http://www.icclc.or.jp/english/project/.
30. Ibid.
31. UNDP, “Yangon Rule of Law Centre Launches with Open House,” http://www.mm.undp.org/content/myanmar/
en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/01/23/yangon-rule-of-law-centre-launches-with-open-house.html.
32. Japan Federation of Bar Associations, “Kokusai kyoryoku katsudo” [International cooperation activities],
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/kokusai/shushokushien/date/2013_bengoshihakusho.pdf.
33. ERIA, ERIA Annual Report 2017, http://www.eria.org/uploads/media/publications-annualreport/0_ERIA_
Annual_Report_2017.pdf.
34. MIC, “Nikokukan kyoryoku, nikokukan koryu” [Bilateral cooperation, bilateral exchange], http://www.soumu.
go.jp/main_sosiki/hyouka/soudan_n/kokusaikyouryoku.html.

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35. UNDP Japan, “Dai-3-kai Kirugisu-hatsu ‘heiwa to kaihatsu’ no genba repooto” [3rd onsite ‘peaceand development’ report from Kyrgyzstan], http://www.jp.undp.org/content/tokyo/ja/home/presscenter/articles/2017/12/13/nihei.html.
36. AIDF Asia Summit, “Japan Signs $5.2 Million Agreement With UNDP To Support Six Pacific Nations,” http://
asia.aidforum.org/news/japan-signs-5.2-million-agreement-with-undp-to-support-six-pacific-nations.
37. AIPA, AIPA News (June 1), http://www.aipasecretariat.org/webassets/pdf/06.pdf; ERIA, “ERIA and AIPA Sign
MOU to Support ASEAN Parliamentary Members,” http://www.eria.org/news-and-views/eria-and-aipa-signmou-to-support-asean-parliamentary-members/.
38. Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, “Toruko Kyowakoku de no katsudo wo oete” [Conclusion of activities
in Turkey], http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/smph/about_mpd/shokai/kokusai/oda.html; JICA, “Afugan
fukko he no chosen: kokumin kara shinrai sareru keisatsu no saiken no tame ni” [Tackling recovery in
Afghanistan: Rebuilding police that have the public trust], https://www.jica.go.jp/press/2009/20100204_01.
html.
39. JICA, “Governance,” https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/governance/study.html.
40. JICA, “Project for Promoting Peace Building and Democratization through the Capacity Development of theMedia Sector in Nepal,” https://www.jica.go.jp/oda/project/1000337/index.html.
41. Naoki Shimizu, “Heiwa kochiku no tame no media shien” [Media support for peace-building], Rifarensu 674(March 2007), http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/diet/publication/refer/200703_674/067409.pdf.
42. JICA, “Japanese Initiative for the future of Syrian Refugees (JISR),” https://www.jica.go.jp/syria/english/office/others/jisr.html.
43. Nippon Foundation, “Myanmar Support Program,” https://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/en/what/projects/
myanmar/.
44. Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, “About the Program,” https://eng.peacebuilderscenter.jp/program/.
45. Japan International Volunteer Center, “Promoting Peace Building through ‘Peace Yard’ Activities,” https://www.ngo-jvc.net/en/blogs/2018/04/14/promoting-peace-building-through-peace-yard-activities/.
46. “Minshuka ga susumu Myanmaa de tenkai sareru Nihon ODA no ima” [The current state of the evolving
Japanese ODA in Myanmar, where democracy is progressing], BizCompass, March 28, 2014, https://www.
bizcompass.jp/original/bu-growth-009-1.html.
47. JICA, “Japan to Expand Girls’ Education Opportunities in Southern Rural Sindh,” https://www.jica.go.jp/
pakistan/english/office/topics/press140211.html; “JICA Works to Provide Educational Opportunities for
Women and Girls in Pakistan, the Home Country of Malala Yousafzai,” https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/
field/2013/20131022_01.html.
48. JICA, “Afuganisutan no josei keikan toshite boryoku ni do mukiau ka—Toruko de jendaa waakushoppu wo
kaisai [How to handle violence as a female police officer in Afghanistan? Gender workshop held in Turkey],
https://www.jica.go.jp/topics/news/2014/20150227_01.html; UNDP, “Afuganisutan wo yori anzen na kuni ni:
250-nin no josei keisatsukan ga Toruko de no kunren wo oe kikoku” [Making Afghanistan a safer country:
250 female police officers return home after completing training in Turkey], http://www.jp.undp.org/content/
tokyo/ja/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2017/02/12/afghan.html.
49. MOFA, Diplomatic Blue Book 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page22e_000817.html.
50. MOFA, “Launch of the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/hr_ha/
page3e_000693.html.
51. UNITAR, “UNITAR, with Support from the Government of Japan, Is Launching the Law Enforcement AntiCorruption Training Programme for the Sahel Region,” http://www.unitar.org/unitar-support-governmentjapan-launching-law-enforcement-anti-corruption-training-programme-sahel-region.
52. Concluding analysis presented in this section was largely drawn from discussions in JCIE’s Diet roundtable andthought leaders seminar in June 2018, which were then supplemented by individual interviews with some ofthe participants of those events.