THE JAPANJAPAN‐‐U.S. DIALOGUEThe Japan‐ U.S. Alliance inChanging International and Domestic Environments

Conference Papers
March 5, 2014
Tokyo, Japan

Supported by
The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)

Co‐sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)Table of Contents
1．Program………………………………………………………………………………………………1
2．Biographies of the Panelists……………………………………………………………………2
3．Presentation Papers………………………………………………………………………………...5
Session I: U.S. Factors and Japan Factors………………………………………………………..5
HOSOYA Yuichi................................................................................................................................5
Robert MANNING.........................................................................................................................................6
INA Hisayoshi........................................................................................................................................12
Nicholas SZECHENYI………....................................................................................................................12
KAMIYA Matake.......................................................................................................................................14
James SCHOFF..............................................................................................................................................15

Session II: Security Environment in the Asia Pacific............. ............. ............. ............. ............. ......18
NAKANISHI Hiroshi...................................................................................................................................18
Rust DEMING...................................................................................................................................19
KATO Yoichi.................................................................................................................................................23
James J. PRZYSTUP......................................................................................................................................25
IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro...............................................................................................................................27
MIYAOKA Isao....................................................................................................................................28

4．An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan…………………………………….30
5．An Introduction to the Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University…………………………………………………………….…31
6．An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations…………...32

2014年2月14日現在／As of 14 February, 2014

プログラム／Program

日米対話
The Japan-U.S. Dialogue「変容する国際・国内情勢の下での日米同盟」"The Japan-U.S. Alliance in Changing International and Domestic Environments"
2014年3月5-6日／5-6 March, 2014
国際文化会館「講堂」、東京、日本／"Lecture Hall," International House of Japan,Tokyo, Japan
共催／Co-sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
米国防大学国家戦略研究所／Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University （INSS)
公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム／The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)2014 年 3 月 5 日（水）／ Wednesday, 5th March, 2014

国際文化会館「講堂」／ International House of Japan "Lecture Hall"
開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks
13:30-13:40
挨拶（10分間）
Remarks(10min.)

石川 薫 グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人／日本国際フォーラム専務理事
ISHIKAWA Kaoru, President, GFJ / Senior Executive Director, JFIR

セッションⅠ／Session I
13:40-15:30「米国要因と日本要因」"U.S. Factors and Japan Factors"

議長
Chairperson

ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員
James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS

報告A （10分間）
Paper Presenter A (10 min.)細谷 雄一 慶應義塾大学教授
HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University

報告B （10分間）
Paper Presenter B (10 min.)ロバート・マニング アトランティック・カウンシル上級研究員
Robert MANNING, Senior Fellow, the Atlantic Council

報告C（10分間）
Paper Presenter C (10 min.)伊奈 久喜 日本経済新聞特別編集委員
INA Hisayoshi, Foreign Policy Columnist, The Nikkei

報告D （10分間）
Paper Presenter D (10 min.)ニコラス・セーチェーニ 米戦略国際問題研究所日本部副部長・主任研究員
Nicholas SZECHENYI, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS

報告E（10分間）
Paper Presenter E (10 min.)

神谷 万丈
日本国際フォーラム上席研究員／防衛大学校教授
KAMIYA Matake, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

報告F （10分間）
Paper Presenter F (10 min.)ジェームズ・ショフ カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員
James SCHOFF, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

自由討議（50分）
Free Discussions (50 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

Break / 休憩

15:30-15:50
セッションⅡ／Session Ⅱ
15：50-17：40「アジア太平洋の安全保障環境」"Security Environment in the Asia Pacific"

議長
Chairperson

神谷 万丈
日本国際フォーラム上席研究員／防衛大学校教授
KAMIYA Matake, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

報告A （10分間）
Paper Presenter A (10 min.)中西 寛 京都大学教授
NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University

報告B （10分間）
Paper Presenter B (10 min.)

ラスト・デミング 元国務省首席次官補代理
Rust DEMING, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

報告C（10分間）
Paper Presenter C (10 min.)加藤 洋一 朝日新聞編集委員
KATO Yoichi, National Security Correspondent, Asahi Shimbun

報告D （10分間）
Paper Presenter D (10 min.)ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員
James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS

報告E（10分間）
Paper Presenter E (10 min.)

泉川 泰博 中央大学准教授
IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro, Associate Professor, Chuo University

報告F （10分間）
Paper Presenter F (10 min.)宮岡 勲 慶應義塾大学教授
MIYAOKA Isao, Professor, Keio University

自由討議（50分）
Free Discussions (50 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

総括セッション／Wrap-up Session
17:40-18:00
総括 （20分間）
Wrap-up (20 min.)ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員
James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS
神谷 万丈
日本国際フォーラム上席研究員／防衛大学校教授
KAMIYA Matake, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan[NOTE］English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided／日本語・英語同時通訳付き

12．Biographies of the Panelists【U.S. Panelists】
James J. PRZYSTUP
Senior Research Fellow, INSS
Holds BA Summa Cum Laude from the University of Detroit and MA and Ph.D. from the University of
Chicago. Has worked on issues related to East Asia for close to thirty years on Capitol Hill, on the House ofRepresentatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, as the Deputy Director of the Presidential
Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations, as Senior member for Asia-Pacific on the Policy Planning Staff of the
Department of State, and Director of Regional Security Strategy, Asia-Pacific, on the Policy Planning Staff in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Robert MANNING
Senior Fellow, the Atlantic Council
Formerly served as Senior Strategist, DNI National Counterproliferation Center, 2010-12 and Director,
Long-Range Energy and Regional/Global Affairs, U.S. National Intelligence Council, Strategic Futures Group,
2008-2010. From 2005-2008 is served as a member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, Department of Stateand from 2001-2005 he was Senior Counselor, Energy, Technology and Science Policy, Department of State.
Prior to joining Department of State in 2001, served as Director of Asian Studies and a Senior Fellow at theCouncil on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Nicholas SZECHENYI
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS
Received MA in international economics and Japan studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. in Asian studies from Connecticut College. Prior to joining
CSIS in 2005, served as news producer for Fuji Television in Washington, D.C., where he covered U.S. policyin Asia and domestic politics. In 2009, selected as an inaugural fellow of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield
Foundation’s “U.S.-Japan Network for the Future” program.

James SCHOFF
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
A specialist in East Asian security issues, U.S. alliance relations in the region, and WMD nonproliferation
focused on North Korea, Schoff previously served as senior adviser for East Asia policy at the U.S. Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and as director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis(IFPA) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. . Prior to joining IFPA, served as program officer in charge of policy
studies at the United States-Japan Foundation in New York.

Rust DEMING
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Received BA from Rollins College and MA in East Asian Studies from Stanford University. Has spent much of
his career dealing with Japanese affairs, having served in Japan as charge d’affaires, and as deputy chief ofmission. Served as principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs (June 1998 toAugust 2000), senior advisor to the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs from December 1997.
Also, served as director of the Office of Japanese Affairs in Washington from 1991 to 1993. In 2011 he wasrecalled to the State Department for six months to serve once again as Japan Director. Concurrently serves as
an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of theJohns Hopkins University.

2【Japanese Panelists】
ISHIKAWA Kaoru
President, GFJ
Graduated from the University of Tokyo and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. Studied at l’Ecole
Nationale d’Administration in France. Served as Research Associate of International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS), London and Minister-Counselor to France, G8 Summit foreign affairs Sous-Sherpa (1999-2001
and 2005-07), Director General of Global Affairs Department (2002-05), Director General of Economic Affairs
Bureau (2005-07), Private Secretary to Minister for Foreign Affairs Tsutomu Hata (1993-94), Liaison ofiicer toFormer Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (1999-2006), Ambassador to Egypt and then to Canada. Also
served as Part time lecturer at Waseda University, Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo and Akita
International University. He concurrently serves as Senior Executive Director of JFIR and Executive
Vice-President of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University
Received his MIS from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D from Keio University. He is also SeniorResearcher at Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and at the Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Served as
Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009–10), Visiting fellow at Princeton University(2008–2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic history,
Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security. He is a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory
Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, and a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on
National Security and Defense Capabilities, in which capacity he helped to draft Japan’s first National
Security Strategy.

INA Hisayoshi
Foreign Policy Columnist, The Nikkei
Graduated from Waseda University and joined Nihon Keizai Shimbun (The Nikkei Newspapers) in 1976. Hisjournalistic career includes four years in the Nikkei’s Washington. DC. bureau as chief political correspondent
and, subsequently, as a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. Has also been an editorial writer and vice-chair of theeditorial board of Nikkei. He lectures at Aoyama Gakuin University, the University of the Sacred Heart, andDoshisha University Graduate School.

KAMIYA Matake
Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1985 and did graduate study at Columbia University as a
Fulbright grantee. Became Research Associate at the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1992, Lecturer
with tenure in 1993, Associate Professor in 1996, and became Professor in 2004. Meanwhile, served asDistinguished Research Fellow at Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994-95), and Visiting Research
Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (2004-2005). Concurrently serves as Superior Research
Fellow of The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), Editor-in-Chief of Discuss Japan—Japan Foreign
Policy Forum (http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/), and Member of the Board of Directors of Japan
Association for International Security.

3

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University
Received MA from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at
the University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990 as Ph.D candidate. Served as Associate Professor in Kyoto
University. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, withparticular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign andsecurity policy. He has been on the panel of several Governmental advisory committees, such as the Council
on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, which issued the final report in August 2010.

KATO Yoichi
National Security Correspondent, Asahi Shimbun
Graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and joined the Asahi Shimbun. Received MA from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. From 2001 to 2002 he was a visiting research
fellow at both the Institute for National Strategic Studies of National Defense University (INSS/NDU) and theCenter for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Served as deputy editor of both thepolitical and foreign news departments from 2002 to 2004 in Tokyo and became Bureau Chief of Asahi’s
American General Bureau in Washington D.C. He taught a course on national security strategy at Gakushuin
University in Tokyo from 2011 to 2012.

IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro
Associate Professor, Chuo University
Graduated from Kyoto University in 1990. Entered Osaka Gas Co. in 1990 and retired from office in 1994.
Received his M.A. from School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University in
1996. Received his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in 2002. Served as Associate Professor at Miyazaki
International College from 2002 and then at Kobe College from 2005. Held the current position since 2009. His
research interests include international relations theory, alliance politics, and East Asian security.

MIYAOKA Isao
Professor, Keio University
Graduated from Keio University in 1990. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1990 and retired
from office in 1995. Received MA from the University of Canterbury in 1994 and D.Phil. in politics from the
University of Oxford in 1999. Served as Associate at Harvard University in 1999-2001 and then as Associate
Professor at Osaka University of Foreign Studies from 2001 to 2007, at Osaka University from 2007 to 2010,
and at Keio University from 2010 to 2012. Held the current position since 2012. His research interests include
international relations theory and Japanese and American security policy.

(In order of appearance)

43. Presentation Papers
Session I: U.S. Factors and Japan Factors

HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University

Japan’s National Security Strategy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance
On December 17, 2013, Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) was adopted by the
Cabinet. The NSS sets the basic orientation of Japan’s diplomatic and defense policies related tonational security issues. Japanese government has never before adopted such a comprehensive national
strategy. As Japan’s inter-departmental rivalries have been an impediment to have a comprehensive andcoherent national policy, this national security strategy paper together with the establishment of Japan’s
National Security Council (NSC) is widely welcomed by both Japanese media and security experts.
There are four important goals in Japan’s NSS. The most important goals of Japan’s NSS is“proactive contribution to peace based upon international cooperation”. What this means is thatJapanese government decides to take an internationalist approach in its security strategy. It is written in
the NSS that “it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with theprinciple of international cooperation”. This is because “Japan cannot secure its own peace and security
by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace andstability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities”. Japan clearly denies such
ways as isolationism, unilateralism and militarism.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who initiated the NSS clearly declared at Advisory Panel on
National Security and Defense Capabilities on December 11, 2013, that “the NSS and then new NDPG
are the cornerstones of these policies, and I am convinced that these instruments we have beenreviewing together will become historical documents that will shape the national security of Japan”.
The concept of “proactive contribution to peace based upon international cooperation” derives
from Preamble of the Constitution of Japan. The Constitution said that “we believe that no nation is
responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal”. It also said that “we desire
to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace”. It should
be noted that the basic idea of the NSS is a natural evolution of internationalist philosophy stipulated in
the Constitution, while the NSS is at the same time a result of the rapid change in international security
environment of the last decade. In this sense, the publication of the NSS is both necessary and timely.
Therefore, J. Berkshire Miller wrote that “the United States should be happy about these changes.”
The second important goal of the NSS is to remain Japan as “a first-tier nation”. In the NSS, it
is written that “Japan has contributed to peace, stability and prosperity in the region and the world.”“In a world where globalization continues”, the NSS argues, “Japan should play an even more5

proactive role as a major global player in the international community.” Regarding with this, Dan
Twining wrote that “American leaders should more forthrightly support their Japanese ally’s attempt torestore its geopolitical and economic competitiveness”.
The third important goal of the NSS is to defend liberal international order and its values. The
NSS argues that “the maintenance and protection of international order based on rule and universal
values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, arelikewise in Japan’s national interests”. This stance resonates with the tradition of American national
security strategy. Sharing this tradition, the Japan-U.S. alliance can be the center of Japanese national
security strategy.
Based upon its alliance with the U.S., Japanese government aims to enhance its security
cooperation with the other likeminded powers such as Australia, India and the Republic of Korea.
Prime Minister Abe wrote in 27 December, 2012, in his article “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”,
that “I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond
to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific”.
The fourth important goal is to defend “open and stable sea” by regarding Japan as “amaritime state”. It is written in the NSS that “surrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with animmense exclusive economic zone and an extensive coastline, Japan as a maritime stage has achieved
economic growth through maritime trade and development of maritime resources, and has pursued“Open and Stable Seas””.
It is scheduled that by the end of 2014 Japanese and U.S. governments will revise the defense
guidelines which was adopted in 17 years before. Both governments are fully aware that the stronger
Japan-U.S. alliance will undoubtedly contribute to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region,
when China is growing its economy and military might rapidly. At the same time, the bothgovernments can enhance the rule-based international order in this region. If one can long to have apeace and stable order based upon values such as democracy, freedom, the rule of law and humanrights, the years 2013 and 2014 would be a good starting point to consolidate such an order. For the
purpose of this, Japan’s government needs to change its traditional Constitutional interpretation of thecollective self-defense right and Japan’s role in the United Nations’ collective security. Prime Minister’s
advisory panel on the legal basis for security is expected to publish its report in April this year. By
doing it, Japan can fully implement its “proactive contribution to peace”.

Robert MANNING
Senior Fellow, the Atlantic Council

The U.S. “Rebalance” to Asia and the US-Japan Alliance to 2025
The US ”rebalance” toward Asia faces an array of challenges and persistent questions about its
durability. It is buffeted by at home by US budget constraints and political dysfunction, inconsistentand uncertain foreign policy behavior, and a war weary American public on the one hand, andinternationally by an assertive China with capabilities challenging the US naval access in the Pacific, an

6

unpredictable North Korea, and a region rife with tensions over territorial and historical disputes.
The recent US response to China’s assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas, rejecting
the legitimacy Beijing’s imposition of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) overlapping Japaneseand South Korean disputed territories, and also rejecting the legal basis of the “nine-dash line” in theSouth China Sea reinforced the Obama administration’s posture in the Indo-Pacific region.

Is it a shift?

To understand and assess the “pivot” to Asia it needs to be considered in its political andhistoric context. It should also be viewed as part of a larger effort to define a US role in the world in a
post-9/11 era. Despite Hillary Clinton’s triumphal “we’re back” rhetoric in 2010-11, what initially was
dubbed the “pivot to Asia,” was more a marketing device and dramatic shift in emphasis than it was amarked departure on actual policy. In many respects, the “rebalance” is a continuation and expansionof on-going policies.

Since WWII, the US has been the principal provider of public goods to East Asia and a criticalpart of the region’s remarkable economic success over the past half century. The U.S. security presence
and bilateral network of alliances, anchored in the US-Japan alliance, the US-ROK alliance, andalliances with Australia, the Philippines and Thailand are enduring, dynamic realities. Moreover, theUS has steadily built up security partnerships with key ASEAN states, particularly Singapore, Malaysia,
Vietnam and Indonesia. Of late, US leadership and early recognition of and support for the politicaland economic reforms in a transitioning Burma helped catalyze that nation’s economic and politicaltransformation.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the Asia-Pacific security environment has become
increasingly problematic. There has been a bifurcation of economic and security dynamics in the
Indo-Pacific region, each pulling in opposite directions, which I have called “the Two Asias.” 1 In 2012,
Asian defense spending surpassed that of Europe for the first time in the modern era, reaching 287
billion. 2 China, whose defense spending is roughly $166 billion, accounts for the vast majority of
Asian military investments.
Beijing’s re-emergence and growing assertiveness is a major driver of tension andapprehension in the region. Underlying Chinese assertiveness is its strategy of moving from a
principally continental power, to a major maritime actor in an effort to counter, if not diminish, US
naval access to the first island chain, stretching from the Kuril islands to Okinawa to the Philippines,
Malaysia and the straits of Malacca (see map below). This appears part of a PLA doctrinal shift from“coastal defense” to “Offshore Defense,”1

See Evan Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning, “A Tale of Two Asias,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/30/a_tale_of_two_asias#sthash.kIghmskz.dpbs
2

See Myra McDonald, “Asia’s Defense Spending Overtakes Europe’s, Reuters, March 14, 2013

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-security-military-iiss-idUSBRE92D0EL20130314

7

Source:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm
to permit the PLA Navy to operate in maritime areas out to 1800 kilometers beyond the Chinese
mainland to “defend the nation’s sovereignty.” 3

Origins of the Rebalance

Indeed, the US “rebalance” unveiled in November 2011 was in part animated by an upsurge ofChinese assertiveness in 2009-10. It was an effort to reassure US allies (particularly Japan and several
ASEAN states) after a 2010 incident near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands where Chinese
fishing boats confronted the Japanese coast guard, and a similar spat between China and thePhilippines over Scarborough Reef in the disputed Spratly islands raised concerns about US reliability
and commitment to regional security.
President Obama formally proclaimed the policy shift in a speech to the Australian Parliament
shortly thereafter. With no ambiguity, Obama decreed, “I have, therefore, made a deliberate andstrategic decision—as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping
this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies andfriends…we are here to stay.” 4That key speech, codifying the rebalance was followed by the release of a new Department of
Defense Strategic Guidance document in January 2012. DOD stressed that US economic and security
interests “are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific andEast Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia.” Thus, “we will of necessity,” DOD explained,“rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” This shift would entail the US Navy deploying 60% of its
assets to the region, including four new Littoral Combat ships to be rotationally ported in Singapore,

See GlobalSecurity.org: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm

34“Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” The White House, November 17, 2011.

8and an increase in visits and exchanges in the region. 5
While the military foundation of this policy has garnered the most attention, that is only one
component of it. The diplomatic element was also evident. The US joined the East Asian Summit (EAS)
which President Obama attended in 2011 and 2012, along with senior US officials spending aquantifiable more amount of time in the region, a deepening of engagement with ASEAN, and areinforcement of US alliances with Japan and the ROK. Equally important importance, theadministration brought new momentum to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) a regional trade
agreement, now in the final stages of negotiation.
The most comprehensive and concise exposition of the rebalance was given by then National
Security Advisor Tom Donilon in a speech earlier this year to the Asia Society. Donilon outlined fivepillars which he said “harnesses all elements of US power – military, political, trade and investment,
development, and our values”:• Strengthening alliances;• Deepening partnerships with emerging powers;• Building a stable, productive and constructive relationship with China;• Empowering regional institutions, and:• Helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity. 6
While the “rebalance” is clearly a multidimensional phenomenon, and has been admirably andvigorously promoted and underscores the US role in Asia in bright neon lights, the policy is one thatlargely represents continuity. Half of US aircraft carriers, and a similar proportion of the US Navy’s
ships and submarines were positioned in the region prior to the policy shift. Thus in military terms it isa welcome, if modest expansion. Similarly, deepening partnership with ASEAN as an institution andwith its members bilateral is a cumulative process. Serving in the Department of State from 2001-2008, I
can attest that this process was well underway. And the TPP began its negotiating efforts well before
Obama took office.

Renewing the Pivot

Most recently, when President Obama cancelled his planned visit to Asia in October during theGovernment shutdown, doubts in Asia over the durability of the US “pivot” to Asia reached acrescendo. But a cascade of recent events, highlighted by B-52s defying a Chinese air defense
identification zone have demonstrated US resolve and a sense of assurance about the US rebalance.
It began with the remarkable US response to the horrendous disaster that typhoon Haiyan
caused in the Philippines: more than 50 ships and planes, 9500 troops and $37 million in humanitarianassistance. If there was any doubt about who answers Asia’s 911 calls (not China, not ASEAN, not theARF), they were swiftly erased. Moreover the US effort contrasted with what was seen as a puny andmean-spirited Chinese initial response of $100,000.

Renewing the Pivot

The B-52 flyover was part of a US-Japan military exercise in the East China Sea that served as ahuge rebuff to an ill-conceived Chinese action. There is nothing unusual about Air Identification Zones(ADIZs) per se – the US and some 20 others nations have created ADIZs, which can require foreign
aircraft entering the airspace to identify itself. But China unveiled its ADIZ on Nov.23rd with noconsultation or warning in areas overlapping Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese airspace, triggering an

5st

US Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 Century Defense,” Washington,
DC, January 20126

Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific 2013,” speech to the Asia Society, New York, March 11, 2013.

9on-going international game of chicken. Not coincidentally, China’s ADIZ overlaps Japanese airspaceover the Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu by China), tiny uninhabited rocks administered by Japan but
claimed by China. It also overlaps a South Korean underwater reef, the Socotra rocks (also claimed by
China), which falls with Seoul’s ADIZ and on which it has built a research platform.
China’s ADIZ action was swiftly denounced in a statement by Secretary of Defense Hagel andSecretary of State Kerry, saying ,”We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the
status quo in the region. This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding andmiscalculations.” Kerry added that the US “does not apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft notintending to enter US national airspace. Hagel emphasized that the US would not change how it
conducts military operations in the region. The B-52 flyover underscored both statements.

Renewing the Pivot

In the aftermath of the impressive US response to the Philippines disaster, National Security
Advisor Susan Rice gave a major Asia speech on Nov.20th at Georgetown University designed to restore
confidence in the administration’s Asia Pivot. Rice emphasized, “rebalancing toward the Asia Pacificremains a cornerstone of the Obama administration foreign policy. No matter how many hotspots
emerge elsewhere.”
Rice stressed the importance of alliances, outlining US efforts to bolster those with Japan andSouth Korea, as evidenced during the October “2+2 Security Consultative meetings between the US
Secretaries of State and Defense and their respective Japanese and Korean counterparts.. Rice stressedthat “our foremost economic goal in the region is concluding negotiations for the Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP) and achieving Congressional approval.” And in one of the few explicit references tothe adhesive nature of TPP, Rice added that the US welcomes, “any nation that is willing to live up thehigh standards of this (TPP) agreement, and that includes China (my italics).

The China Challenge

While Rice amply depicted the complexity and ambiguity of US policy toward China, the one
new direction she pointed to undoubtedly gave pause to US allies in Asia. She explained that Obamaseeks to “operationalize a new model of major power relations.”(NMMPR) To be fair, Rice’s descriptionof it sounds a lot like current policy: “managing inevitable competition while forging deeper
cooperation on issues where our interests converge…”
But Beijing appears to have in mind something rather different, and this is the long-term
challenge to the Pivot. Chinese President Xi Jinping put NMMPR forward in 2012, and both leaders
endorsed it in aspirational terms at the October Sunnylands Summit. But beyond a considerable
economic interdependence and global issues such as climate change, it is a vacuous concept, depicted
by Chinese analysts in the fuzziest generalities: win-win, mutual understanding and respect, strategic
trust, etc.

The punchline in Chinese depictions of NMMPR is “respect for each other’s ‘core interests.” To
China this appears to mean stop selling arms to Taiwan, don’t meet with the Dali Lama, stop aerial
surveillance near our borders, don’t interfere with bilateral Chinese territorial disputes, and perhaps an
implicit acceptance of a Chinese sphere of influence in the region. In many conversations with Chinese
intellectuals and officials, when I ask, “if we had this new relationship, what would China dodifferently, I have gotten only silence in reply.
If the vague NMMPR is more than a rhetorical device by which Beijing seeks to maneuver the
US into accommodating its regional and global ambitions, it has to involve Beijing respecting arules-based order – the opposite of its recent actions. Over time, the success or failure of the rebalance10will rest on three key things:•
the state of US-China relations and;•the effectiveness of the US-Japan alliance and the ability to construct a network of US alliancesand partnerships that can evolve into an operationalized counter-balancing force withcounter-A2AD capabilities .
• A dynamic Japan acting as a more normal nation, and not undermining its strategic goals by
seeking to revise history, but building strategic trilateral cooperation between the US, Japan andthe ROK.
In the decade ahead, the US-China relationship will likely be pulled toward one predominantdirection or the other. This reality is implicit in Xi Jinping’s statement at the October Sunnylands,
California Summit that, “China and the United States must find a new path, one that is different fromthe inevitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past.”

Framework for Strategic Stability

The foundation for a long term US-China relationship that is decidedly more cooperative thancompetitive requires a decided PRC choice to pursue a foreign policy largely adhering tointernational norms and constructively working to shape and update them and also in fashioning aframework for strategic stability. It is worth noting that it took nearly two decades, and twonear-nuclear catastrophes (the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises) before the US and USSR reached theconclusion that neither could win a nuclear war and began a process to manage competition. While
China is not necessarily an adversary, its capabilities require reaching understandings that reinforce
strategic stability.
As a nuclear weapons power, one with growing ballistic missile capabilities and advanced
anti-space weapons, and a fledgling blue water navy, China’s capabilities – regardless of its
intentions—pose challenges to the U.S. and the region.
Though US-Russian relations are problematic, there is a strategic framework, transparency andpredictability in regard to each other’s strategic forces. For more than a decade, the US has sought
to engage Beijing in a strategic dialogue to address these issues.
There is no framework with Beijing on any strategic issues, creating fears of crisis instability.
China has viewed transparency as a weapon of the strong against the weak, and prefers uncertainty
to crisis management as to its strategic advantage.

Over the coming decade, the fate of U.S. Asia policy will likely depend on the resilience of the
US and Japanese economies as the foundations of sustained US military capabilities and Japan’s ability
to implement a robust collective defense posture.
To the extent the US is able to deepen its presence in the economic component of the policy,
that will enhance perceptions and reality in the region of the US as a Pacific power. The real prospect ofexports of natural gas to the region, enhancing the energy security of allies and partners would add a
new dimension to US economic engagement in the region. Finally, the character of US-China relations
and Japan’s relations with both China and the ROK will be a key driver of the success of the rebalance.

11

INA Hisayoshi
Foreign Policy Columnist, The Nikkei

The alliance in less warm atmosphere –Abe Crisis vs Obama Crisis
・April,2014 President Obama’s visit: ”No failure in summits” Press may point out indifference
between the leaders.
・May to June,2014 New interpretation about collective defense right・Autumn, 2014 Negotiation about new defense guidelines
・Calendar journalism or diplomacy about 2015:70th anniversary of the end of WW2, 50th anniversaryof Japan-ROK treaty,55th anniversary of the revision of US-Japan Security Treaty
・Structural reason of the indifference of US-Japan relations: Japanese lawmakers, bureaucrats and evenjournalists tend to have a soft spot for the Republican Party.
・Background：(1) geographical “Japan is another Alaska, ”as a very frontline state to the Cold war.
(2) historical. Woodrow Wilson rejected Japan's proposal for racial equality at the Versailles meeting in
1919. Franklin Roosevelt forced Japanese-Americans into internment camps during World War II.
Harry Truman authorized the use of atomic bombs against Japan. Dwight Eisenhower agreed torevise the Japan-U.S. security treaty, Richard Nixon authorized the return of Okinawa to Japan andRonald Reagan apologized to Japanese-Americans who were forcibly relocated during the war.
(3) psychological. Affinity between The L D P and the Republican Party. In foreign policy community
there is no “Armitage” in Democrats. Amrmitage and Green know “naniwabushi” but Campbell
does not.
Counterargument from the US side・”Nixon shock”, trade friction in Reagan era etc.
No counterargument to geographic and psychological reason so far

Nicholas SZECHENYI
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSISFor over six decades the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the cornerstone of security and stability in
the Asia Pacific and should continue to play an important role in shaping the regional order. Fivemonths ago the U.S. and Japanese governments convened a Security Consultative Committee or “2+2”meeting here in Tokyo to outline a strategic vision for the alliance based on shared values and interestsand detail the parameters for defense cooperation going forward. A review of the bilateral guidelines
for defense cooperation is taking place in parallel with dialogues on a range of security issues including
space, cyber, and extended deterrence. Initiatives in a host of other areas including humanitarianassistance and disaster relief, trade liberalization, and development assistance also speak to the breadth12and depth of the bilateral agenda. President Obama’s expected visit to Japan later this spring therefore
presents an opportunity to showcase the dynamism in the relationship and further develop a strategic
framework for the future that will, as stated in the recent 2+2 statement, “effectively promote peace,security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia Pacific region.”
The alliance has evolved in response to changes in the international security environment andpolitical developments in both countries and continues to flourish because of a mutual willingness toadapt to changing circumstances. Today’s event will address a broad range of issues currently
animating the U.S.-Japan relationship and factors that could help determine how the relationship will
advance in the coming years. Here are three themes for consideration:

EnergyJapan is devising a post-3/11 growth strategy that will depend fundamentally on a stablesupply of energy but has yet to reach consensus on an energy mix to support a path towards
sustainable growth. The shutdown of Japan’s nuclear power plants has increased dependency on fossil
fuels for power generation in the near term as the government attempts to finalize a new basic energy
plan as prelude to a detailed strategy for energy security. Meanwhile, the shale gas revolution in the
United States has sparked an energy policy debate over the best means to use this abundant resource
including the implications of increased gas exports to countries such as Japan. The United States andJapan have established a bilateral dialogue on energy cooperation including clean energy, civil nuclear
cooperation, nonproliferation, and climate change, but there is room to place energy cooperation in a
broader strategic context and develop an alliance framework for energy security that would support
Japan’s long-term energy needs.

The Politics of Trade

Japan’s entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations and the initiation of bilateral tradetalks in parallel have served to reinforce the economic pillar of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan’s
sensitivities toward liberalizing trade in agricultural products and ongoing disagreements over market
access issues for US automobiles have animated the bilateral discussions, and the failure of the 12 TPP
countries to reach an agreement by the end of last year, as well as the weakening prospects forcongressional approval of Trade Promotion Authority for the president, raise questions about the
timeline for implementing the signature economic component of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia Pacific.
The politics of trade in Tokyo and Washington continue to complicate economic relations but politicalleaders in both countries should not lose sight of the economic and strategic significance of Japan’s
participation in TPP and joint leadership in establishing rules and norms for trans-Pacific economic
integration.

Interoperability

Despite budgetary pressures the United States and Japan have embarked on an ambitious planfor security cooperation in the years ahead. Efforts at joint training and increased interoperability
between the Japan Self Defense Forces and the U.S. military can counter downward pressure on
defense spending in both countries, as well as initiatives to network with other partners in the region.
In addition, the relaxation of Japan’s three arms export principles to allow the joint development andproduction of defense equipment raises the potential for Japan to increase defense industrial
collaboration with the United States and other countries as a means of enhancing capabilities andefficiency. Fiscal constraints will place a premium on doing more with less as the two governments
work to align their respective defense strategies.

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KAMIYA Matake
Superior Research Fellow, JFIR /Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
Obama Administration's Incoherent Foreign Policy
As Factor That Could Damage the U.S.-Japan Alliance
1. 'Shaking' of U.S. policy on East Asia

Concern of being "entangled" into a "Japan's conflict" with China over the Senkaku Islands has
risen in the United States.
 There seems to be an increasing attempts in the United States to "dilute" the security aspect ("toput a brake on China's assertiveness" aspect) of the "rebalance" to Asia.
- The Obama administration initially hoped that the U.S. could induce China to become amore responsible supporter of the existing international order. -Disappointed to see a seriesof Chinese actions from the end of 2009 to 2010, however, the administration decided to put
more emphasis on the hedge side of the "engagement and hedging" policy toward China(without giving up engagement).
- However, without witnessing any improvement in Chinese behavior (on the contrary it
worsened from the Japanese view point), the Obama administration appears to be shiftingback to an engagement-centric policy toward China. This could invite Japanese distrust
toward the United States.
- In her first "Asia speech" at Georgetown University on November 20, 2013, National
Security Advisor Susan E. Rice said that the United States would "seek to operationalize a
new model of major power relations" with China:
 Is the U.S. policy on Japan also "shaking"?
- The Obama administration expressed "disappointment" over Prime Minister Abe's visit to
Yasukuni Shurine, but Abe seems to have been disappointed at Obama's not-very-warm
attitude toward him.



2. Influence of the Obama Administration's "vacillation" on the Syrian crisis







Negative "messages" that Obama administration's zig-zag on the Syrian crisis sent to thecountries in the Asia-Pacific region.
President Obama’s reputation as an international leader was severely damaged as a result of
this series of events, and the United States, as world leader, lost significant credibility: such aview is spreading thoroughout the international community.
-At one point, President Obama labeled the use of chemical weapons as a red line,
threatening Assad by indicating his stance that he is prepared to use military force if
chemical weapons were used.
-His administration however did not do anything against Assad, who crossed a red line andused a weapon of mass destruction (according to the administration's assertion).
-If comments by the president were in fact this callous and lightweight, how can the world
trust the promises and commitments made by the United States in the future? This is thekind of skepticism that has been emerging.
President Obama’s reputation as an international leader was severely damaged as a result of
this series of events, and the United States, as world leader, lost significant credibility: such aview is spreading throughout the international community.
Japan, whose security policy is based on the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented
defense (senshu-boei) and on the reliance on its alliance with the United States, is most seriously

14





worried about the possibility that President Obama’s vacillation on Syria has damaged thecredibility of the United States.
President Obama’s comment in a speech at the White House on September 10 that “America is
not the world’s policeman,” further heightened concerns and suspicions among the Japanese.
"As several people wrote to me, 'We should not be the world’s policeman.' I agree . . . The
United States is not the world’s policeman. Terrible things happen across the globe, and it isbeyond our means to right every wrong."- The Economist published an article entitled “Global cop, like it or not” in its August 31. The
president of the United States, however, said that his country is no longer burdened withthis role.
Would the United States, which is not the world’s policeman, keep the promises andcommitments it has made to its allies, including Japan? For now, while feeling an increasing
sense of insecurity, the Japanese people have not lost trust in the United States. That said, theJapanese people will likely keep a closer watch on President Obama’s statements and actions
from here on forward.

James SCHOFF
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
U.S. View of Japan’s Evolving Security Role under PM Abe and Beyond•

Overall, the US government is pleased that Abe was elected and it supports the direction he istaking on the economy and on security issues.
 Not that Washington disliked the DPJ. In fact, contrary to what Abe and the LDP sometimes say,the Obama administration felt that it had a very good partner in the DPJ (especially when Kan
and Noda were in charge). The US was proud of the fact that the alliance was earning“bipartisan support” in Japan, and Washington saw this as a long-term asset for the alliance.
 Still, the Abe administration is more proactive and decisive vis-à-vis the economy and defense
issues, and it is more politically stable...which is positive from US perspective.
 The US (and the Obama administration) is rooting for Japan and Abe to succeed. Even though
there are some competitive aspects to our relationship in areas like negotiating the Trans PacificPartnership (TPP) and some concern that PM Abe might push historical revisionism too much,overall the US understands that our values and interests align closely, and a stronger Japan isgood for the United States.

•

On the security front, we all know that Japan could play a more significant security role in Asia andthe world, but it faces many limitations (some self-imposed and some external):
 7th largest defense budget in the world
 Budget and personnel increase in FY2013
 One of the world’s most modern Navy and Air Force•

But in Yen terms, Japan’s defense budget in 2013 merely back to where it was in 2000, and the recent
personnel increase is less than 300. China’s defense budget has more than doubled during that15

timeframe (now about 3x the size of Japan’s defense budget and supports a military 9x the size ofJapan’s).
 Also, Japan’s current policy is for real defense spending decline (given inflation target); And, Japan doesn’t get as much as most others for its defense budget…high personnel andprocurement costs. For example, spending roughly $500m in 2013 for four F-35s. That’s about
10% of the procurement budget and 1/5 of the aircraft acquisition budget.
•Japan does have high-level capabilities (mid-air refueling, JDAMs, 5th gen fighters, AWACs,
Hyuga-class (helo) destroyers and Atago-class Aegis (BMD) destroyers), but laws restrict when andhow these capabilities can be used.

•

Japan has a lot of CH-47s, but no way of getting them overseas other than by ship (it’s newtransport aircraft was designed to carry Patriot batteries but not CH-47 helicopters).

•

Japan is great security cooperation partner with the US (not only for defense of Japan, but also incounter-proliferation, counter-piracy, and special missions like the Indian Ocean refuelingexperience, etc.). Still, Japan generally requires special exceptions and restrictive rules ofengagement for anything beyond defense-of-Japan. There has been some added flexibility in recent
years, but only on the margin, and the region would benefit from more.

•

Holding Japan back has been a combination of history, politics, and strategic choice (i.e.,
Constitution, voter sentiment, and preferred focus on econ/trade).
 Leadership in Japan now wants to make different strategic choices in response to theworsening security environment.
 There is some voter shift (though not as much as the US newspapers believe), but legal
foundation hard to change (and budget limitation is a big obstacle). 7•

Abe and LDP trying to change this via legal and policy means: State Secrets Law
 Establish NSC and National Security Strategy
 Updated NDPG and MTDP
 Expand Right of Collective Self-Defense New Defense Guidelines with US Long-term goal of revising Constitution, establish National Defense Force, and enact
Fundamental Law on National Security•

At the operational level, the focus is on enhancing the following capabilities:
 Strengthening intelligence gathering and information security (drones, info protection law,satellites, cyber) Strengthening island defense (including amphibious landing and Osprey procurement) Improved defense against nuclear/missile attack (BMD and possible retaliatory strike) Expanding weapons export and defense industry development opportunities

7

Debt service is almost ¼ of the general account budget (23% of expenditures, compared to 6% in US). Bonddependency ratio 46% (compared to 34% in US).

16

•This is all very ambitious, and though I expect Japan will make progress in some of these areas, it ispolitically difficult to change Japan’s security role so fundamentally. In the end, Japan will likely
make the most progress in the areas of national defense (outer island, cyber, and missile), and its
ability to project force as part of broader multilateral security cooperation activities will remain
limited (from both a legal and capabilities perspectives).

•

The key issue for Japan (and what I notice most about the new National Defense Program
Guidelines) is thinking beyond deterrence as the only role for the military and understanding that it
might actually become necessary to use force for self-defense (either around the Senkaku Islands orvis-à-vis North Korea). Moreover, it needs to be able to project force in a flexible manner to adapt todifferent possible situations and to give Japan’s leaders different options for controlling escalation.
This is a whole new era for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, and it is the backdrop for the bilateral
initiative to revise Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation.

•

Washington supports Japan’s efforts to improve its self-defense capability (especially in the East
China Sea), because this takes some of the pressure off the United States in the so-called gray zone
conflict scenarios. Japan is able to take the lead in these situations and make its own politicaldecisions, with the US providing logistical (and diplomatic) support.

•

But Washington also hopes that Japan will expand its interpretation to exercise collective
self-defense, which could apply to UN-approved international security cooperation activities and toa situation involving North Korea. This would allow for more integrated alliance defense
cooperation, particularly in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (including
space and cyber domains), logistical support, and maritime force protection. 8 The purpose of this
stepped-up security cooperation would be two-fold: To complement the US rebalance to Asia as a response to a more demanding regional security
environment (e.g., Asia is the only region of the world where defense spending increased lastyear compared to the year before); and To combine with other allies and partners w/ democratic governance (e.g., Australia, South
Korea, and some SE Asian countries) to build habits of regional security cooperation and aregional security architecture that can eventually involve China and help dampen security
competition in East Asia.

•

North Korea is a particular concern for the United States, because it is unpredictable and could
involve an all-out conflict. Also, the North’s nuclear and missile capability means that it is able tostrike Japan (or US bases in Japan) without warning, which is a good reason why Japan would bejustified to allow collective self-defense to apply to a North Korea scenario if the Diet approves.
Supporting the neutralization of North Korea’s military during a large-scale crisis is important forJapan’s self-defense, and it could involve cooperation with other countries besides the US, likeSouth Korea and Australia.

•

A concern in Washington is the possible agenda PM Abe and his circle have for historicalrevisionism. One PM visit to Yasukuni Shrine can be managed, but the larger problem would be asustained high-level campaign to rationalize or even dismiss some uncomfortable aspects of Japan’s
history in the first half of the 20th Century. This would make it harder for the US and Japan tostrengthen their alliance and could do disservice to Japan’s democracy.

8

For more on how the United States and Japan could use the Defense Guideline revision process to develop a more
integrated “front office/back office” alliance posture, see James L. Schoff, “How to Upgrade U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, January 16, 2014 available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/16/how-to-upgrade-u.s.-japan-defense-cooperation/gykq

17

Session II: Security Environment in the Asia Pacific

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University

Japan-ROK relations
There is no doubt that Japan-ROK relations get very low at this stage, arguably the worst
situation since the conclusion of the Basic Relations Treaty of 1965. Even though there are conspicuous
issues of contention between the two countries on history and territory such as Takeshima/Dokdo,
comfort women, compulsory wartime labor, textbook issues, it would be a mistake to single out any
specific factors or individuals to bring about this situation. The root cause of the current state of affairs
is irresponsible anti- Japanese and anti-Korean sentiment in both societies. “Irresponsible” means twothings. First, there is no considered restraint in claims and criticisms against the other. They are voiced
to denounce the other, rather than resolving differences. Second, both sides well know that thisseparation with the other does not jeopardize their own interest. Both countries have strong stake withothers: For Japan, the alliance with the US, competition and conflict with China, and rebuilding
relationship with Russia. For ROK, the alliance with the US, cooperation with China on economy and
DPRK affairs, and North-South relationship are important. But for Japan and ROK, it gets more andmore difficult to define precisely what is at stake to have good relationship with each other, which has
led to this “irresponsible” mutual disrespect. It is safe domestically and internationally for the public inboth countries to say “I hate the Japanese/Koreans.”
Apparently, the public’s perception towards the other is bad. The Genron NPO and East Asia
Institute survey in May 2013 is particularly informative.i 37.3% of Japanese has unfavorable view on
Korea (as relative to 31.1% favorable) and 76.6% of Koreans has unfavorable view towards Japan (12.2%
favorable). The recent survey by Nikkei newspaper shows that 57% of Japanese oppose to hold thesummit meeting with ROK and China if Japan needs to make concessions.ii But it is doubtful thatthese sentiments are deep-seated in both societies. Except for small number of activists who advocate
anti-Japanese/ anti-Korean sentiment, the majority of public takes sides on specific issues such as
comfort women, forced labor compensation, Takeshima/Tokdo, or Yasukuni visit, but they are neverhigh on the list of important affairs. So there is reasonable chance that if there is a bold move for bothgovernments to improve relationship coupled with compromise on some prominent issues such as
comfort women issue or forced labor issue, the public mood changes significantly.
But it has to be noted that the quasi-alliance of US-Japan-ROK, which appeared possible inlate 1990s and during much of the Lee Myung-pak’s era, has lost much of foundations internationallyand domestically. Getting back to those periods appear nostalgic. The chief reason is divergent interestof Japan and ROK in terms of East Asian international relations. As China rises in maritime policy andconflict between Japan and China escalates in East China Sea zone, Japan attaches more importance tothe alliance with the US. At the same time, the abduction issue by DPRK virtually suffocated Japanesepolity options toward North Korea and thereby diminished Japanese influence towards the peninsula.
ROK sees more and more as balancing among the surrounding powers: the US, China, Japan, and18

Russia important, and balancing alliance with the US and closeness with PRC seems most important tocontrol DPRK as well as economic and security interest. Japan fears risk of abandonment with the US,
while ROK
So what shall be done? Of course, the effort to hold the summitry and find reasonable
compromise on outstanding issues such as comfort women issue and forced laborers issue need to be
pursued. Still, some of the prominent issues are very difficult to find compromise. Takeshima/Dokdo
issue is case in point. There is no chance for Japan to stop claiming the island and the trend is moredomestic coverage on the issue such as longer textbook description or the memorial event such as the“Day of Takeshima (Feb. 22)” currently sponsored by Shimane prefecture. Korean government has
openly laid claims against these domestic public relations
It is important to redefine the roles and stakes of the Japan-ROK relationship within theframework of the trilateral relationship with the US and even larger framework of East Asia. In whatarea and in what ay the Japan-ROK cooperation as well as tripartite US-Japan-ROK is effective? The
episode of Japan’s SDF temporarily provided ammunitions to the ROK troops in the Southern Sudan
peace keeping operations suggest there is potential need and willingness for the cooperation. Japan and
ROK also needs to find areas of deeper cooperation for mutual interest. Possible agenda may include
cooperation in energy, global peace-building efforts, exchanges of policy ideas on rapidly-aging society,low fertility, and women’s role in society.
At the same time, the US needs to share its interests and policies on each bilateral relationshipto the third country. The US has to make clear to the ROK why the US-Japan alliance is important andsupports Japan’s increased security roles, while the US needs to explain its stake at the alliance with the
ROK, particularly after the return of the wartime operational command in 2015, and its stance on the
protracted nuclear power agreement expected to be revised in 2016.

Rust DEMING
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Challenges for the U.S.-Japan Alliance over the next Decade
The Evolving Strategic Setting

Over the next decade, there is likely to be a continuing shift of economic influence away fromthe U.S., EU, and Japan to China, India, the ROK and the other BRICS. Moreover, the technology gap
between the three traditional leaders and the rising economies with continue to narrow. This shift ofeconomic influence will see a corresponding change in political power and strategic weight. Pax
Americana will continue to fade, as will the effectiveness of the UN in addressing regional andsub-national disputes.
In this setting, rising powers, particularly China and India, will increasingly challengeinternational norms, including in the global commons, and demand a greater say in international andregional political institutions. There is likely to be continuing chaos in the Middle East, Africa,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Balkans, and Caucuses which will increase regional tensions and tensions
between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. and EU on the other. These disputes will also distract the19

U.S. from its “pivot” to East Asia.
In East Asia, China is likely to increase its assertive behavior in bordering maritime areas. Its
anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capability will become more formidable, and the PRC will become moreaggressive in responding to U.S. and Japanese naval activity within the first island chain, including
around the Senkaku Islands. North Korea‘s nuclear and missile programs are likely to advance andgive the DPRK a rudimentary strategic nuclear capability that can reach population centers in thecontinental U.S. The ROK will continue its economic and technological growth. As its self-confidence
grows, the ROK may become more assertive about its territorial and history agenda. It will continue totry to balance its relations with China and the U.S., but as Seoul takes over the leadership of Combined
Command, the U.S.-ROK alliance may weaken.
The U.S. will remain the preeminent military power in East Asia and the world and the only
one with global reach. At the same time, budgetary pressure will reduce the size of American armed
forces, particularly the Army, and slow down Navy and Air Force modernization programs. Because oftechnological changes and the growing capabilities of regional powers, the U.S. Navy and Air Forcewill adopt more “stand-off” strategies for applying military force, and there are likely to be major
adjustments in U.S. forward deployment.

Implications for the U.S.-Japan AllianceIn this shifting strategic environment, the U.S-Japan will face fundamental challenges that will
require dedicated leadership in both countries to manage. These challenges include:

1. Loss of Mutual Confidence
The U.S. Japan alliance represents an implicit grand bargain, based on American ability andwillingness to guarantee Japan’s strategic security (the nuclear umbrella) and provide regional stability,
in return for Japan’s agreement to host American forces, align its strategic interests to those of theUnited States, steadily take on greater defense responsibilities within the framework of the alliance, anduse its economic power and political influence to advance common objectives, as defined largely by the
U.S. With the tectonic shifts in global and regional power now underway, the long-term viability ofthis “grand bargain” is now in question.
From the Japanese perspective, there is growing concern about the reliability of the U.S. as a strategic
guarantor. Despite the U.S. rhetorical commitment to East Asia, as symbolized by the “pivot,”
Japanese strategic thinkers have a number of concerns:
1) Increased U.S. strategic vulnerability in the form of Chinese nuclear forces and North
Korean efforts to develop a first strike capability that raise fears of “decoupling” U.S. strategicinterests from those of Japan. This is coupled by the nagging fear of “atamagoshi gaikoo”
rooted in the Nixon shocks and Chris Hill’s uncoordinated negotiations with Pyongyang but
recently reinforced by the perceived inconsistency of Obama Administration toward China.
2) The increased vulnerability of U.S. maritime forces in East Asia to “asymmetric” A2AD
capabilities, including Chinese precision guided munitions and submarines, something that isalready causing the U.S. to consider a more of “standoff” doctrine that would bring into
question the viability of a forward deployed strategy, including American bases in Japan. Thisagain threatens to decouple Japan from the U.S.
3) Increasing doubts about the strength, vision, and commitment to internationalism ofAmerican political leadership of both parties, symbolized by Washington gridlock, looming
cuts in the defense budget, and the Syria debacle.

20

From the U.S. side, American leaders broadly welcome the leadership displayed by Prime Minister
Abe, particularly his renewed commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance, the restructuring andrevitalization of Japan’s national security policy, and his efforts to reinvigorate the Japanese economy.
At the same time there is a degree of distrust among American elites about certain aspects of the Prime
Minister’s agenda:
1) Abe’s perceived “historical revisionism”, particularly the comfort women issue. Abe’s earlystatements about revisiting both the Murayama Statement and Konno Statements, his December
26 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and his evasive response in Diet interpellations on the definition of“aggression” all caught the attention of American elites, particularly because of the intense
Chinese and Korean reaction. American reaction to the Abe government’s subsequent actions on
defense policy is influenced by these lingering suspicions about his views of history.
2) Japan’s long term strategic agenda. The majority of American defense strategists appear tounderstand and support Japan’s efforts to reinterpret the constitution to allow collective
self-defense and to reorient its defense structure forces to defense of the southwestern islands
and maritime control. At the same time, the flurry of initiatives in the last year, including thelegislation to create a National Security Council and establish an official secrets act, thereconstitution of the “Yanai Commission” on collective self-defense, the revision of the NDPG
to include consideration of acquiring missile “strike capability”, and the modest increase inJapan’s defense budget have been interpreted by some in the U.S. as signaling a major
departure from Japan’s post-war defense policy. The National Security Strategy put forward in
December did a great deal to put these evolutionary defense policy changes into the broader
context of Japan’s foreign policy, but it is important that Japan continue its efforts to explain its
policies to East Asian and American leaders and publics.

2. Differing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities
Alliances are generally based on common threat perceptions. The Cold War and the threat ofSoviet direct or indirect aggression was the original glue of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Since the 1990s, theNorth Korean nuclear and missile threat and growing Chinese maritime military capabilities andterritorial challenges have been the major unifying factors. However, there appear to be potential gaps
between the U.S. and Japan with respect to both China and North Korea.
China: While we share similar long-term strategic concerns and objectives, the U.S. and Japanrisk being out of sync at any given time with respect to right balance between engagement andhedging. This is particularly true because the issues that cause tension in our respective
relations with China are not always the same. Japan-China relations are heavily influenced byperiodic history and territorial clashes, while U.S.-China ties resonate more to human rights
disputes and politically charged finance and trade disagreements. The Senkaku Islands issue isparticularly allergic in this regard. While the Obama administration has been forthright about
reaffirming that the islands fall under Art. V of the MST, there is little desire in the U.S. to get
into a confrontation with the PRC over these islands. There is also wariness of provocations byeither side that could entangle the U.S. Managing potential divergences on China policy will amajor challenge for the alliance.
North Korea: There is no policy gap at the moment because neither Japan nor the U.S. is
engaged with North Korea, but should substantial negotiations resume, differences are likely toreemerge. There is continued U.S. frustration with Japan’s preoccupation with the abducteeissue, while Japan is concerned that if and when there are end game negotiations with
Pyongyang, the U.S. may well be willing to settle for something short of a fully denuclearized

21

DPRK. Such an eventuality could fundamentally undermine Japanese confidence in thecredibility of the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security. Korean reunification, when and if it
occurs, will also challenge the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly if a unified Korea isnuclear-armed and moves to remove the American military base structure.
Russia: Differing perceptions of Russia may also prove a challenge for U.S. –Japan alliancemanagement. There are signs that both Tokyo and Moscow see it in their strategic and economic
advantage to make a serious effort to reach agreement on the issues that have stood in the wayof a peace treaty. This would be a welcome development, ending one of the few remaining
issues from WWII. However, a Japan-Russia rapprochement, coming at a time of increasing
tension between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. and EU on the other, over Syria, Ukraine,and Iran, could risk putting Japan out of sync with the West on relations with Moscow.

3. Okinawa
Prime Minister Abe has renewed Japan’s commitment to resolving the Futenma issue andtaken a major step in that direction by creating the conditions that allowed Governor Nakaima toapprove the land fill permit. However, there remain serious obstacles to implementing the agreement.
If the FRF fails, the Marines are virtually certain to stay at Futenma, risking growing local pressure
against the U.S. base presence. The disconnect between alliance solidarity at the top and the growing
fragility of Okinawan support for American bases remains an Achilles heel of the alliance.

Conclusion

The above indicates a difficult environment for the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly if it is put
on “automatic pilot,” without strong leadership on either side to address the full range of challenges.
However, there are steps that Japan and the United States can take to mitigate the risks and enhance theopportunities for better outcomes: These include:

1. Getting our respective economies in order, including opening of our markets, to give us the
economic strength necessary for active international engagement.
2. Using political leadership to strengthen elite and public support for active, constructive
engagement abroad, including defense spending, ODA, and support for international institutions.
3. Ensuring that the political leadership in both Japan and the United States devote the time andattention necessary to build the alliance and strengthen mutual confidence. Both governments
should focus on future challenges and opportunities and avoid statements or actions that cause
historical differences to reenter the political arena.
4. Devoting the time and resources necessary to enhance elite and grass roots interchanges between
Japanese and Americans to build a wide and deep network for the future. The JET program is an
essential element in this regard, as are these kinds of exchanges.

22

KATO Yoichi
National Security Correspondent, Asahi Shimbun“Possible perception gap between Japan and the United States”
1. Introduction

Looking at the current status of the Japan-U.S. alliance relationship, there are a number ofperception gaps. Some of them are due to the difference of national interests and some are because of
the difference in the geostrategic standings of each country. Among those the most serious are the one
on strategic threat perception and the other on tactical situational awareness.

2. Perception Gap 1; Strategic Threat Perception

When analyzing the major threats that each county faces, Japan mainly focuses on the growing
military capabilities along with increasingly aggressive behavior of China, while the United States pays
more attention to the growing nuclear/missile threat from North Korea.
This gap was most clearly demonstrated when North Korea conducted the third nuclear test in
February 2013. The test was preceded by “satellite launch” into orbit, which revealed theirintercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. The United States concluded that these capabilities
combined pose “existential threat” (former Assistant Secretary of States Kurt Campbell) to the UnitedStates. And the United States government took swift and serious counter actions, including an
additional deployment of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and advanced radar in Japan.
Japan, of course, took such demonstration of advanced capabilities by North Korea very
serious just as the United States did, but did not regard these additional capabilities pose an “existential
threat” to Japan, because they are mainly targeted at the continental United States and also because
Japan is already within the range of shorter range Nodong missiles, which are more numerous and also
nuclear-capable.
The reality is that Japan has been in a more dire potential danger than the United States issince long before.

3. Perception Gap 2: Tactical Situational Awareness

From the U.S. point of view “Anti-access/ Area denial (A2/AD)” is the key concept tocharacterize the nature of security challenges that China poses to the United States. The Defense
Strategic Guidance of 2012 articulated this point as follows;“States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our
power projection capabilities. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability
to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.”
And Air-Sea battle is one of the operational concepts which have been developed to countersuch A2/AD challenges from potential adversaries.
Japan, however, did not employ either “A2/AD challenge” or “Air-Sea battle” as part of its
defense strategy until very recently. It is mainly because of the situational awareness that Japan is23

geographically located in “access denied area” to begin with and the perception that “A2/AD” is aconcept that is relevant and useful for foreign military forces coming into this area from outside. In
short “it is for the United States, but not for us” has been the typical mentality in Japan especiallyamong Self-Defense Forces leadership. But, of course, such a mentality with limited strategic scope
does not serve the strategic objectives of Japan. Japan’s defense strategy is structured on the premisethat Japan will have substantial reinforcement from the United States in time of foreign aggression. And
such reinforcement is only possible when the United States and Japan together neutralize the A2/AD
barriers imposed by the adversary.
It was no surprise, therefore, the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which
was rolled out in December 2013, has the following paragraph.
“China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities toprevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign
militaries to its surrounding areas. “This was the first time that Japan has ever officially acknowledged “A2/AD” challenge as thepotential threat to Japan itself, even though the term “A2/AD” was not used and the expression was
rather indirect.

4. Analysis

These two perception gaps mentioned above are both being narrowed under the recent
circumstances. The United States seems to pay more serious attention to the aggressive nature of
China’s recent actions in the region including the unilateral establishment of its own Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea and the near-collision maneuver of PLA Navy ship
against the U.S. frigate in the South China Sea.
And Japan has already started to implement the new defense strategy, which includes“A2/AD” challenge as its integral element.

These are good signs in terms of advancing the strategic/tactical interoperability anddeepening the defense cooperation between Japan and the United States. But that does not mean theseperception gaps have totally disappeared. They are rooted in fundamental difference in geostrategicinterests and perspectives of two countries. Continuous consultation and coordination are needed, if
further enhancement of the alliance relationship is the shared goal.

24

James J. PRZYSTUP
Senior Research Fellow, INSS

Strategic Game Changers in a New Era of “Smart Power”
The Fate of the U.S. and Japanese Economies

Sustained, long-term recovery and revitalization is critical to rebuilding public confidence inboth countries. The re-birth of public confidence is, in turn, critical to support for international
engagement. We will be challenged to demonstrate the political strength of our shared democraticvalues and our commitment to open, market economies. In this context, TPP is a critical to expanding
market access, enhancing international prosperity, and building a rules-based international economicorder. It is also critical to the success of the third arrow of Abenomics – the structural reform of Japan’s
economy.
In both the United States and Japan economic revitalization will require, an old but true
bromide, real and enduring political leadership. If we fail to get our economies right, little else will
matter -- we will not be able resource and sustain our shared commitment to regional and global
security and to a rules-based international order, in which disputes are settled, not by intimidation orforce, but peacefully through diplomacy. Ultimately, international stability and security are based on
demonstrated and enduring economic strength.
In the United States, economic revitalization is critical to the ability of future administrations
to sustain the military components of the Rebalance to Asia.

China in Transition

The Third Plenum of the CCP has called for a transformation of China’s economy, from theexisting export-oriented model to an economy driven by domestic consumption. This will entail
restructuring of the existing close CCP ties to China’s state-run industries. Some Chinese economists
have warned that the success of economic transformation will also require political liberalization.
Questions: Can the CCP pull this off without losing its political monopoly. How will this process affectChina’s internal stability? Will the CCP play to Chinese nationalism to sustain its hold on power?

The Alliance and China – Risk Management

Over the years since Deng Xiaoping opened China to the market, the United States and Japan
have pursued remarkably similar China policies – to encourage China to become, in Bob Zoellick’s
words, a Responsible Stakeholder. This has been and should continue to be the mainline of ourrespective strategies. In this context, it is critical that we make clear our opposition to unilateral Chinese
actions that attempt to alter the status quo through the use of force or intimidation and we continue tostand for our values of openness, transparency and rules-based order.
At the same time, we have to recognize that China may not move in the direction we desire
and, accordingly looks for ways to manage that risk. Thus, the United States and Japan must strengthen
our bilateral alliance-based cooperation and continue to expand it outward to engage new partners,
who share our values and commitment to peaceful change. Implementing the October 3, 2013 2 Plus 2statement is critical as is coordination in developing the review of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines.
Our objective should be to strengthen the deterrence picture in the Asia-Pacific region and to expand
U.S.-Japan cooperation across the region and beyond.

25

Strengthening ASEAN and enhancing the national resiliency of its individual members should
be high on our alliance priority list. This will require both security and economic support, with private
sector driving trade and investment. A strong ASEAN will serve as an independent strategic
counterweight to China. Prime Minister Abe’s emphasis on the region should be complemented bysimilar U.S. attention.

The Korean Peninsula

There are many facets to the Peninsula: the future of North Korea – will it still be here in 2030;
will it be denuclearized; or will unification take place, and under what circumstances; peaceful or as aresult of internal collapse; the role of China in the unification process and after in a unified Korea; thenature of the US-ROK alliance in a unified Korea. The answers to the above questions will significantly
shape the strategic landscape, not only of Northeast Asia but the broader Asia-Pacific region. Clearlywith respect to North Korea, the United States, as evidenced by the recent visit to Beijing of Secretary ofState John Kerry, is asking once again China to use its leverage and move Pyongyang back to the pathof denuclearization.
Also to be considered from an alliance perspective is the evolution of ROK-Japan relations.
Trends in both Seoul and Tokyo are not encouraging, and the visit by Prime Minister Abe to the
Yasukuni shrine on December 26 has only complicated an already difficult relationship. Chinese areeasily exploiting the current rift, gaining influence at Japan’s expense – and at the expense of broader
trilateral alliance cooperation.
Historically, Beijing has supported the DPRK as a buffer state and, recently, in response to the
Rebalance, many Chinese analysts have come to view North Korea as strategic asset. But, as
underscored by the Xi-Park Summit, China today appears to broadening its aperture on the Peninsulawith the long-term objective of inclining a united Peninsula toward China, turning the entire Peninsula
into a strategic buffer zone. This would alter the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia and the broader
Asia-Pacific, and this would not be in the interest of either the United States or Japan.
Clearly the ROK has to be sensitive to China, its leading trading partner and a country with asignificant say in how reunification plays out. The long-term strategic question is whether in a unified
Peninsula, historic Korean security concerns with respect to China would resurface and right thegeostrategic gyroscope.

Taiwan

Questions similar to those with respect to the Korean Peninsula also apply to Taiwan.
President Xi’s recent remarks – reunification is not a matter that can be put off indefinitely – seem
aimed at turning up the heat on Taiwan. But recent high-level engagement, the meeting of Wang Yu-Chi
of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and Zhang Zhijun of China’s Mainland Affair Office, may present
an opening for higher-level (Xi-Ma?) political dialogue -- which could be reversed depending on the
results of the 2016 presidential election.

RussiaThe role of Russia, and the strategic direction of Japan-Russia relations, is one of the great
unknowns, but one that could have a significant impact of the evolution of the Asia-Pacific region. The
key question is whether the Northern Territories question can be finessed politically – is there room forformer Prime Minister Mori’s construct of a joint development zone that would leave the territorial
question for future resolution? What are the prospects for such a deal here in Japan?

26

IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro
Associate Professor, Chuo University

The Future of China and U.S.-Japan Relations
Will China continue to increase its rise and replace the United States and become more
formidable competitor for the United Sates? Or, will its rise come to a sudden halt soon due to its
mounting problems, such as the unprecedented level of bad loans, demographic problems, theso-called middle-income trap, etc.? To these questions, people are inclined to be drawn to extreme
answers. Some predict the emergence of a China-centered hierarchical order in East Asia as a result ofChina’s continuing power growth, while others anticipate the meltdown or breakup of China due to its
domestic societal and economic problems. The fact of the matter, however, is that there is no way to
predict the future of China accurately, and our policy must be premised upon the assumption that thereality will fall somewhere in the middle of the two extremes. This leads us to believe that China, atleast in the short-term, will continued to grow economically although probably at a slower rate and to
consider the impact that such a China will have over East Asia.
The impact of China’s rise on East Asia has been heavily debated, so there is no need to repeat
what has been discussed. However, there are two things that I would like to point out. First, China’s
policy seems to be increasingly determined by internal rather than external factors. This point has been
already noted by an increasing numbers of China experts, but some of the recent decisions made by the
Chinese governments, such as its decision to unilaterally impose the ADIZ, indicate that when hawks
within the Chinese governments push their policy initiatives by resorting to nationalism and/or therhetoric of state sovereignty, moderates face significant difficulties resisting them even when they caneasily anticipate that such initiatives may defeat China’s larger strategic interests. This does not meanthat whatever Japan and the United States do toward China will not make a difference. Instead, an
important implication may be that external powers are required to take into account how theirpolicies/responses may have repercussions over China’s domestic politics, and to pursue the policy thatwould not strengthen the hawks within the Chinese government.
Second, while China’s increasing influence over South Korea (or the Korean Peninsula) andsome ASEAN countries have been frequently discussed, attention to its increasing influence toward
Taiwan should attract more attention. Many area experts, it seems to me, are rather optimistic aboutmaintaining the de facto independence of Taiwan, and they are probably right. (They point out
Taiwan’s public opinions, which are overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining the status quo, as a maincause of continuing the status quo.) Nonetheless, China’s influence over Taiwan seems to be increasing
steadily due to both strategic and economic reasons, and this trend, if continues, may pose intricate andpotentially significant problems for U.S.-Japan relations. Despite the fact, the Obama administration
had been paying insufficient attention to Taiwan at least until recently. Japan has been accustomed formore than hundred years to the situation in which Taiwan is separated from the mainland China, and it
is difficult to predict how Japan may react if some dramatic development occurs in the Taiwan Strait.
The U.S. and Japanese governments, therefore, must discuss more earnestly the implications of thecross-strait relations so that they may be able to coordinate their Taiwan policies.

27

MIYAOKA Isao
Professor, Keio University

Korean Unification and the Japan-US Alliance
Four possible security options for A Unified Korea
1.
2.
3.
4.

Maintenance of the alliance with the United States
Alignment with China
Neutralization of the entire Korean Peninsula
Nuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula

1. Maintenance of the alliance with the United States(1) Likely processes: collapse and absorption by ROK, unification through conflict,integration and peaceful unification(2) Other likely causes: the status quo, US influence, US as a “benign” hegemon
 Public opinion in ROK (Asan Institute): ROK-US alliance after unification
 necessary: 75% (2011), 84% (2012), 83% (2013)
 unnecessary: 25% (2011), 16% (2012), 17% (2013)(3) Implications for regional security
 A continued US force presence will promote stability.
 A collapse-unification crisis could help renew and prolong US primacy in the region.
 US Forces Korea (USFK) maintained at current or reduced levels
 Peaceful unification may lead to weaken domestic support for US presence in ROK, US,
and/or Japan.
 China may feel targeted by the ROK-US alliance.
 Deployment of USFK may be limited to below the 38th parallel Unless there is a perceived ground threat from China, USFK would need to be reduced
and made more expeditionary.
 The ROK-US alliance could be expected to function similarly to the Japan-US alliance.
(4) Implications for the Japan-US alliance The Japan-US alliance would be maintained or strengthened.
 The possible creation of US Northeast Asia Command Trilateral cooperation among Japan, US, and ROK?

2. Alignment with China(1) Likely processes: integration and peaceful unification,
destabilization in North Korea and Chinese intervention (federation)(2) Other likely causes: a shared border, greater economic exchange, and a closer political
relationship, anti-Americanism
 Withdrawal of USFK South Korea is a valuable US asset, but it is not a vital interest.
 historical animosity toward Japan
 Public opinion in ROK (Asan Institute): biggest threat to a unified Korea
 China: 63% (2011), 61% (2012), 47% (2013)
 Japan: 21% (2011), 26% (2012), 38% (2013)28

(3) Implications for regional security
 Trends toward Chinese regional primacy would be accelerated.
 Japan would feel isolated in Northeast Asia.
 security dilemma in the region(4) Implications for the Japan-US alliance Disappearance of the one alliance would make the other more important.
 The Japan-US alliance would be enhanced if US Forces Japan (USFJ) is maintained.
 If ROK decides to remove US bases, there is likely to be increased domestic pressure in
Japan to do the same.

3. Neutralization of the entire Korean Peninsula(1) Likely processes: integration and peaceful unification,
destabilization in North Korea and Chinese intervention (federation)(2) Other likely causes Public opinion in ROK (Asan Institute): preferred method of reunification
 South absorbs North: 57% (2010), 57% (2011), 42% (2012) Federation:
42% (2010), 42% (2011), 52% (2012)(3) Implications for regional security
 Increased competition over Korea among the major powers
 A deterioration in regional stability
 Better outcome than the status quo from a Chinese perspective(4) Implications for the Japan-US alliance Disappearance of the one alliance would make the other more important.
 The Japan-US alliance would be enhanced if USFJ is maintained.

4. Nuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula(1) Likely processes: integration and peaceful unification(2) Other likely causes: nationalism (desire for autonomy)(3) Implications for regional security
 A crisis of the ROK-US alliance Japan would go nuclear.
 A serious deterioration in regional stability(4) Implications for the Japan-US alliance Disappearance of the one alliance would make the other more important.
 The Japan-US alliance would be enhanced if USFJ is maintained.
 The Japan-US alliance would be weakened if Japan also goes nuclear.
 It would be necessary for the US to strengthen its assurance of the nuclear umbrella.

iii

http://www.genron-npo.net/english/opinionpoll_js_1.pdf
Nikkei newspaper, Feb. 24, 201429

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)【Objectives】
In today’s world, people’s attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with the globalization, but also the rise of newstates including People’s Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Under thesecircumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in Asia-Pacific region, it has become increasingly important for Japan to establish
new channels of dialogue both in the first and the second tracks with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as
member countries of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Balarus, etc.). On the basis of such
understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in thefield ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members andopinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional
arenas.
【History】
The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed
concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within thiscontext, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to betransmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade
Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as
representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in
September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for
The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The
Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum
was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out toopen its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Overthe years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic
and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the Americancomponent ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter
act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws
accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line withthe principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage inand promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat ishoused in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on
International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro,
OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO kenichi as
Chairman and ISHIKAWA Kaoru as President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGIYuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 18 Political Members including the three Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI
Sadakazu; and 93 Academic Members including the two Governors, HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, and SHIMADA Haruo.
【Activities】
Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries forthe purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including the U.S., China,
Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual
understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchangeorganizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial
number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue,” GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” andits overseas co-sponsors in the last three years is given below.
Year

Month
March

2014

January
October
March

2013

2012

February
January

Co-sponsor

The Japan-U.S. Alliance in Changing International and Domestic
Environments
Toward Building Confidence Between Japan and China in ‘New
Domains’
Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy
Future Prospect of the Japan-GUAM Partnership for Democracy andEconomic Development
How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation
Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship

September Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International
Public GoodsMarch
The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's RoleMarch
The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global GovernanceFebruary
October
July

2011

Topic

February
February

The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China
Relations
The Japan-China Relations at Crossroads
The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation on
Disaster Management
The Japan-U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power
East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional
Cooperation

30

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
The Japan Forum on International Relations
Washington College International Studies Program
Foundation of Research on Transformation of Malaysia
GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University
World Resources InstituteCollege of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
Fudan University
Nanyang Technological University
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.)
International Studies Department, Vietnam National University(Vietnam)5. An Introduction to the Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University

The mission of Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is to conduct strategic studies for the
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands
to support the national strategic components of the academic programs at National Defense
University (NDU) and to provide outreach to other US governmental agencies and to the broader
national security community.
INSS includes the following Centers: Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Center for Technology
and National Security Policy (CTNSP), Center for Complex Operations (CCO), the Center for
Strategic Conferencing (CSC), the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), the Center forTransatlantic Security Studies (CTSS), and the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs(CSMA).
The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their
mission by performing the following functions: research and analysis, publication, conferences,
policy support, and outreach.

[Contact]
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Lincoln Hall, Building 64
National Defense University
Ft. Lesley J. McNair
260 5th Avenue
Washington, DC 20319(202) 685-2335

31

６. An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishingresearch reports and policy recommendations, etc.
[History]
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on theprivate initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens
from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in
the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1,
2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Ministerin recognition of its achievements.
[Purpose]
The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved
understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on
issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on mattersof foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public
policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution andthe responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign themalone.
[Organization]
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate,(3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is thehighest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of
JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day
operations of JFIR.
Board of Trustees
HAKAMADA Shigeki
HATTORI Yasuo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
KOIKE Yuriko
INOUE Akiyoshi
KURODA Makoto
NOGAMI Yoshiji
OHYA EikoTANAKA Tatsuo
UTADA Katsuhiro

Directors
ChairmanPresident
Vice President
Senior Executive Director
Executive Director
Director
Director

IMAI Takashi
ITO Kenichi
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi
ISHIKAWA Kaoru
WATANABE Mayu
HANDA Haruhisa
TAKUBO Tadae

Auditors
ICHIKAWA Isao
TAKEUCHI Yukio[Activities]
In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, another importantpillar of JFIR’s activities is the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom”(http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The e-forum, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as aninteractive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-forum are sent
through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers inJapan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English
website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mailmagazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

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The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/