FEMA’s Oversight of
the Integrated Public
Alert & Warning System(IPAWS)

November 19, 2018
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DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

FEMA’s Oversight of the Integrated Public
Alert & Warning System (IPAWS)

November 19, 2018

Why WeDid This
Inspection
Following the January 13,
2018, false missile alert in
Hawaii, Congress requested
we examine the Federal
Emergency Management
Agency’s (FEMA) role in theincident. As part of thisreview, we sought todetermine whether FEMA
exercises appropriate
oversight of the Integrated
Public Alert and Warning
System (IPAWS) used tosend alerts to the public.

What We
Recommend
We are making two
recommendations toimprove the FEMA IPAWS
Program Management
Office’s oversight of IPAWS.

For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at(202) 981-6000, or email us at
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

www.oig.dhs.gov

What We Found
After examining FEMA’s roles and responsibilities in the
public alert and warning process, we concluded that
FEMA has limited responsibility for the sending andcanceling of state and local alerts. Although FEMA
maintains IPAWS as a messaging platform, state and local
alerting authorities must obtain commercially-available
emergency alert software to generate a message which
passes through IPAWS for authentication and delivery.
However, we found that FEMA does not require that thissoftware perform functions critical to the alerting process,such as the ability to preview or cancel an alert. Instead,
FEMA only recommends that software vendors include
these capabilities as “best practices.” FEMA also does not
require that software vendors provide training to alerting
authorities on how to use their chosen software. As aresult, alerting authorities have experienced difficulties invarious aspects of the alerting process.

FEMA Response
FEMA concurred with the recommendations and is
implementing corrective actions to enhance theeffectiveness of the IPAWS Program Management Office(PMO). The IPAWS PMO will incorporate requirements forinclusion of critical functions and provisions for training
into the memorandums of agreement with state, local,
tribal, and territorial alerting authorities. We consider
both recommendations resolved and open.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

1RYHPEHUMEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable William B. Long
Administrator
Federal Emergency Management Agency

FROM:

John V. Kelly
Senior Official Performing the Dutiesof the Inspector General

SUBJECT:

FEMA’s Oversight of the Integrated Public Alert &Warning System (IPAWS)

For your action is our final report, FEMA’s Oversight of the Integrated Public
Alert & Warning System (IPAWS). We incorporated the final comments provided
by your office.
The report contains two recommendations aimed at improving the overall
effectiveness of IPAWS. Your office concurred with both recommendations.
Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, weconsider both recommendations open and resolved. Once your office has fully
implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to
us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The
memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of the agreedupon corrective actions. Please send your response or closure request to
OIGInspectionsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.
Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will
provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight andappropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will
post the report on our website for public disseminations.
Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Jennifer Costello,
Deputy Inspector General, at (202) 981-6000.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

BackgroundIn the event of a disaster, state and local authorities need a way to alert andwarn the people potentially in harm’s way. Executive Order 13407 establishedpolicy for the United States to have a “system to alert and warn the American
people in situations of war, terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other hazards
to public safety and well-being.”1 In response, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) developed the Integrated Public Alert and Warning
System (IPAWS). Originally designed so the President of the United States could
alert and warn the American people within 10 minutes of a national
emergency, FEMA further expanded IPAWS so other Federal, state, local, tribal,
and territorial authorities could send alerts and warnings to the people within
their specific jurisdictions.2 The IPAWS Modernization Act of 2015
(Modernization Act) further defined FEMA’s role as the Federal agency
responsible for the public alert system. Specifically, the Act directed FEMA to,among other things, establish common alerting and warning protocols,
standards, terminology, and operating procedures; and conduct training, tests,
and exercises for the system.3
IPAWS aggregates alert and warning messages from Federal, state, local, tribal,
and territorial authorities – known as alerting authorities – and delivers themto the American public through various communication methods, such as radio
and television broadcasts, cellular phone messages, and Internet applications.
As of February 2018, 1,030 alerting authorities, including city and county
governments, sheriff’s offices, emergency management offices, and police
departments, could send alerts to the public. Alerts are sent for various
reasons, including law enforcement situations; evacuation or shelter-in-place
circumstances; extreme weather conditions; child abductions; or natural
disasters, like earthquakes or wildfires.4 From April 2012 through January 17,
2018, authorities sent over 36,000 alerts5 to cell phones and radio andtelevisions stations. Ninety-six percent of the messages were weather alerts, 2
1 Executive Order No. 13407, 71 Fed. Reg. 36975 – Public Alert and Warning System (June 26,2006) directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enable securedelivery of coordinated messages to the American people through as many communication
pathways as possible.
2 IPAWS is also capable of sending national-level alerts from the President in the event of anational emergency. This function has only been used in a test scenario, including on October 3,
2018, but not in a real emergency.
3 The Executive Order also establishes the role of other federal agencies in the public alert
system: the Federal Communications Commission oversees the emergency capabilities ofcommunication systems; the Department of Commerce provides expertise regarding standards,
technology, dissemination systems, and weather; and the Department of Defense ensures its
functions are properly coordinated with the alert system.
4 For example, in the aftermath of the 2013 Boston marathon bombings, law enforcement
issued an alert through IPAWS to city residents to "take shelter." During the August 2016
wildfires in San Luis Obispo, California emergency official sent alerts advising people toevacuate specific areas.
5 Alerting authorities also sent 9,564 test messages to radio and television stations.
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percent were child abduction alerts, and the remaining 2 percent were forvarious other reasons, such as evacuation orders and hazardous materials
warnings. Appendix B provides more information on the alerting authorities
and the alert types.
On January 13, 2018, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA),
mistakenly issued an alert through IPAWS to individuals in Hawaii warningthem of an inbound ballistic missile. The alert displayed on cell phones andwas broadcast live on television and radio, resulting in widespread panic
throughout Hawaii for 38 minutes, until HI-EMA sent out a notice that thealert was a false alarm. Senator Hirono of Hawaii requested the OIG examine
FEMA’s role in the transmission of the false missile alert. As part of our review,
we interviewed FEMA and HI-EMA officials, and examined communications
between the two agencies during the false missile alert. Additionally, we
reviewed FEMA documents and reports, as well as public laws, rules andregulations.

Results of Inspection
After examining FEMA’s current roles and responsibilities in the public alert
and warning process, we concluded that FEMA has limited responsibility forthe sending and canceling of state and local alerts. Following the Hawaii false
missile alert, three U.S. Senators proposed legislation to define the federal
government’s role during false missile alerts, as well as to direct FEMA torecommend best practices in the alerting process.
During our review, we also identified two areas of concern regarding FEMA’s
overall oversight of IPAWS. Although FEMA maintains IPAWS as a messaging
platform, state and local alerting authorities must obtain commerciallyavailable emergency alert software to generate a message which passes through
IPAWS for authentication and delivery. However, we found that FEMA does not
require that this software perform functions critical to the alerting process,such as the ability to preview or cancel an alert. Instead, FEMA only
recommends that software vendors include these capabilities as “bestpractices.” FEMA also does not require that software vendors provide training
to alerting authorities on how to use their chosen software. As a result, alerting
authorities have experienced difficulties in various aspects of the alerting
process.
FEMA Is Not Responsible for Sending or Canceling State and Local Alerts
In the aftermath of the Hawaii false missile alert, HI-EMA officials successfully
canceled the alert, which prevented further dissemination, but were uncertain
how to issue a false alarm. HI-EMA then contacted FEMA twice for assistanceeven though it was authorized to issue the false alarm without FEMA’s
approval. Ultimately, FEMA provided guidance to HI-EMA to correctly issue thewww.oig.dhs.gov

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false alarm. FEMA provides overall support to the 1,030 alerting authorities on
how to access and use IPAWS, and ensures IPAWS is operational at all times sothat alerting authorities can rely on it to disseminate messages. FEMA officials
stressed that state and local authorities are best able to determine alertingneeds for a specific area.
HI-EMA Officials Successfully Prevented Further Dissemination of the Missile
Alert but Were Uncertain How to Issue a False Alarm Message
Although HI-EMA officials knew the missile alert issued at 8:07am on January
13, 2018, was a mistake, they did not immediately issue a false alarm message.
Instead, they canceled the alert at 8:12am, stopping further transmission tocell phones and on radio and television broadcasts, and then contacted FEMAfor guidance. Based on FEMA’s guidance, HI-EMA issued the false alarm
message at 8:45am. The following timeline details the Hawaii false missile alert
on January 13, 2018, including HI-EMA’s interactions with FEMA:Time
8:05am

8:07am8:12amEvent
A night-shift supervisor decides to test incoming day-shift workers at HI-EMA
with a spontaneous ballistic missile alert drill. The supervisor plays a recording
over the phone that properly includes the drill language, “EXERCISE.
EXERCISE. EXERCISE” at the beginning and end of the message, but also
mistakenly includes the language “THIS IS NOT A DRILL.” The day-shift workers
receive the recorded message on speakerphone. While other HI-EMA employees
participating in the test understand that it is a drill, the employee at the alert
origination terminal claims to believe it is not a drill.
The HI-EMA employee at the alert origination terminal generates an alertdelivered through IPAWS to television and radio broadcasts and to cell phones.
The cell phone message reads: “BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO
HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL.”

The radio and television message states, “The US Pacific Command has detecteda missile threat to Hawaii. A missile may impact on land or sea within minutes.
This is not a drill. If you are indoors, stay indoors. If you are outdoors, seek
immediate shelter in a building. Remain indoors well away from windows. If you
are driving, pull safely to the side of the road and seek shelter in a building or
lay on the floor. We will announce when the threat has ended. This is not a drill.
Take immediate action measures.”
HI-EMA cancels the alert, which ceases transmission of the alert over radio andtelevision, and prevents additional cell phones (e.g., if a cell phone was notturned on at 8:07am or someone was out of cell coverage) from receiving thewww.oig.dhs.gov

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8:26am
8:30am8:45amwarning. At this time, HI-EMA does not send out another alert clarifying thatthe original message was a false alarm.
HI-EMA attempts to contact FEMA but no one responds, and HI-EMA leaves
message.
HI-EMA makes second attempt to contact FEMA and reaches someone, whoprovides guidance on the correct procedures for issuing an all-clear, or false
alarm, message.
HI-EMA generates an alert delivered through IPAWS to television and radio
broadcasts and to cell phones. The cell phone message reads: “There is no
missile threat or danger to the State of Hawaii. Repeat. False Alarm.”

The radio and television message states, “False Alert. There is no missile threat
to Hawaii,” while the television crawler message reads, “False Alert. There is no
missile threat or danger to the State of Hawaii. Repeat. There is no missile
threat or danger to the State of Hawaii. False Alert.”

As noted in the timeline above, FEMA provided guidance to the HI-EMA officials
on how to correctly issue the false alarm.
FEMA Provides and Ensures Overall IPAWS Access but Is Not Responsible for
Individual Alerts
While FEMA provides overall support to the 1,030 alerting authorities on how
to access and use IPAWS, it does not play a major role in the actual sending orcanceling of alerts. The IPAWS Program Management Office (PMO) may provide
guidance and assistance but cannot review each alert to verify its accuracy.
Alerting authorities, such as HI-EMA, are responsible for individual alerts andhave the authority to send false alarm messages without FEMA’s approval.
Proposed legislation in Congress may shift some of this responsibility to theFederal Government for missile alerts.
The Executive Order and later the Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 114-143(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 311 et seq.), direct FEMA to “consult, coordinate, andcooperate with…Federal, State, territorial, tribal and local governmental
authorities.” Pub. L. No. 114-143 § 526(b)(7). To implement this directive,
FEMA requires alerting authorities to sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with FEMA and obtain commercially-available emergency alert software from alist of FEMA’s pre-approved vendors.6 If the alerting authority needs to send a
6

FEMA requires that alerting authorities complete four steps in order to send alerts: 1) apply
for a Memorandum of Agreement with FEMA; 2) select alert origination software that iscompatible with IPAWS; 3) apply for public alerting permissions defining the types of alerts
they intend to issue, as well as the geographic area of the alerts; and 4) complete web-basedwww.oig.dhs.gov
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warning or alert message, it uses the software to generate a message thatcomplies with particular technological standards. The message then passes
through IPAWS, which authenticates and delivers it through various publicalerting systems.
FEMA’s role in this process consists mainly of providing and maintaining the
IPAWS messaging platform so that alerting authorities can rely on it todisseminate messages. The IPAWS PMO, consisting of 24 full-time Federal
employees, oversees these aspects of IPAWS. However, FEMA officials we spoke
to explained that alerting authorities, and not the PMO, are in control ofsending and canceling alerts and warnings to their respective communities.
They explained that while IPAWS logs every alert that comes through thesystem, PMO staff have no way of telling if any of these alerts is a mistake. For
example, if an alerting authority meant to issue an alert for a flash flood
warning but mistakenly issued one for a severe thunderstorm warning instead,
only the alerting authority would know it was a false alert. The FEMA officials
stated that PMO staff have no visibility into local emergencies and cannot verify
alerting authorities’ intent for each message transmitted through IPAWS.
One FEMA official explained that the alerting structure is based on the conceptthat the majority of emergencies “start local;” therefore, local officials are best
able to provide timely, relevant, and accurate warnings. Because the PMO does
not require alerting authorities to notify FEMA of alert mistakes, FEMA
typically becomes aware of mistakes when the alerting authority contacts the
PMO to request assistance with correcting them. FEMA does not officially track
mistakes or alerting authority requests for assistance but, based on
information FEMA provided to us, these situations are infrequent.
Regarding the Hawaii false missile alert specifically, three separate
investigations or after-action reviews took place and reached similar
conclusions. The Federal Communications Commission conducted aninvestigation, based on its oversight role of the emergency capabilities ofcommunication systems, and determined that human error and inadequate
management safeguards mainly contributed to the false missile alert. Hawaii
charged a retired Brigadier General with conducting an investigation, whichsimilarly concluded those factors at HI-EMA were the direct cause, and that
FEMA played no role in the false alert. None of the state’s findings were within
FEMA’s purview. Finally, FEMA conducted its own after-action review whichstated, “HI-EMA possessed the authority to cancel or issue any follow-up
information without intervention or approval from FEMA.”7 In fact, FEMA
requested via e-mail that a HI-EMA Deputy Chief amend previously
disseminated language regarding the events of that day from:
training on how to access and use IPAWS. Information available at www.fema.gov/how-signipaws (last visited September 13, 2018).
7 Hawaii False Missile Alert After Action Report, FEMA, March 30, 2018; obtained from FEMAon July 20, 2018.
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“After getting authorization from FEMA IPAWS, HI-EMA issued a“Civil Emergency Message” remotely by myself after building atemplate message.”

to:“The FEMA IPAWS Team assisted me with guidance on sending a“Civil Emergency Message” (CEM) indicating “No Missile Threat orDanger to Hawaii”. The State of Hawaii Emergency Management
Agency already is authorized to send CEM’s but requested advice
prior to sending the alert.”

While the false alarm message was at the full discretion of HI-EMA, officials
decided to delay sending the message until after HI-EMA employees contacted
FEMA. We interviewed HI-EMA personnel who indicated that while they
understood they did not need FEMA’s permission to send the false alarm
message, they felt it prudent to seek advice and guidance on the appropriate
message type because of the severity of the original alert. HI-EMA officials
stated that, had they not been able to reach FEMA IPAWS representatives via
phone, they would have eventually sent the false alarm message without
further guidance. Moreover, the HI-EMA officials pointed out that IPAWS
worked flawlessly during the false missile alert, in that it did exactly what thesystem is designed to do: disseminate an alert to a large number of people, in a
specific geographic area, in a quick manner. Ultimately, the officials praised the
IPAWS PMO for providing guidance during the false alert and for thecooperation and outreach they have received since the incident.
In the wake of the false alert, five Senators introduced the Authenticating Local
Emergencies and Real Threats (ALERT) Act in February 2018, which calls for theFederal Government to be solely responsible for alerting the public of a missile
threat. S. 2385, 115th Cong. § 7 (2018). The proposed legislation also aims tomodify the Modernization Act by requiring FEMA to recommend best practices
for procedures for state, tribal, and local government officials to authenticate
civil emergencies and initiate, modify, and cancel alerts. Id. at § 3.
FEMA Does Not Require Vendors to Include Critical Functions or to
Provide Training in Emergency Alerting Software
Although FEMA had no role in sending or canceling the Hawaii false missile
alert, during our review we identified two areas of concern regarding FEMA’s
oversight of IPAWS. First, FEMA does not require that software used by alerting
authorities perform functions critical to the alerting process, such as the ability
to preview or cancel an alert. Second, FEMA does not require that software
vendors provide training to alerting authorities on how to use their chosen
software. Until FEMA addresses these issues, the potential exists that alerting
authorities will continue to experience problems during the alerting process.
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Alerting authorities must choose and purchase commercially-available
emergency alert software from a FEMA-approved vendor before they are able tosend emergency alerts through IPAWS. As of July 2018, FEMA maintained alist of 23 vendors with emergency alert software approved to send IPAWScompliant messages. Before approving a vendor, FEMA only requires thevendors to demonstrate the software’s ability to author and send a properly
formatted message through IPAWS. However, based on feedback from alerting
authorities, FEMA determined that alerting authorities were unable to performseveral “critical functions.” Therefore, in a letter to vendors in February 2015,
FEMA recommended that they ensure their software include these functions,such as the ability to preview or cancel an alert, the ability to alert the userwhen the software license had expired, and more intuitive user interfaces.8
According to FEMA officials, some vendors subsequently updated theirsoftware, but others did not. In response, in 2018, FEMA again sent a letter tovendors strongly encouraging them to ensure their software provided essential
capabilities, which included ones in addition to those FEMA identified in 2015,
such as the ability to send an alert to multiple channels and for users to see
alert histories and logs.9
While the Hawaii false missile alert did not result from any of the concerns
identified by FEMA, other examples demonstrate the need to include thesecapabilities in emergency alert software:x The city of Monterey Park, CA, intended to send a test message, but
inadvertently sent a live message. The emergency alert software did notinclude the ability to cancel the message.
x The state of Georgia intended to send an alert about a winter storm
warning, but the message the public received was worded in a confusing
manner and referenced a civil emergency, not a winter storm warning.
The emergency alert software did not include the ability to cancel themessage.
x A representative from the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
noted that the alerting software they purchased does not allow users topreview the actual message before sending.
FEMA has indicated that the critical functions it identified were not formal
specifications, but a best practice tool. Until FEMA requires vendors to include
these functions, alerting authorities may face continued challenges in various
aspects of the alerting process.

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8 2015 FEMA Letter to Emergency Alerting Software Vendors, with the subject “WirelessEmergency Alerts, Origination Software Critical Functions” detailed minimum capabilities
alerting software should possess.
9 2018 FEMA Letter to Emergency Alerting Software Vendors, with the subject “Public Alert andWarning System (IPAWS) Alert Origination Software Critical Functions”
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FEMA officials were also concerned that, due to a lack of training from thesoftware vendors, alerting authorities experienced issues when sending orcanceling alerts. The Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 114-143 §526(b)(4)(B)
directs FEMA to ensure that it conducts training for the public alert andwarning system. FEMA fulfills that requirement by providing several online
training opportunities specific to IPAWS, but it does not mandate vendors
provide training to alerting authorities in their chosen emergency alert
software. Similar to above, the lack of training was not a concern during the
Hawaii false missile alert, as we confirmed that HI-EMA staff received adequate
training from the vendor related to their chosen software. However, otherexamples highlight the need to ensure alerting authorities receive training
regarding their specific software:

In June 2017, Florida authorities attempted to send a child abduction
alert (Amber Alert) to 54 separate locations (i.e., counties) but they were
unaware the emergency alert software only allowed dissemination to a
maximum of 31 locations at a time. Therefore, 23 locations that could
have assisted in responding to the Amber Alert were not notified.
During Hurricane Harvey in August 2017, two Texas counties relied on
FEMA for assistance after they experienced problems sending alerts tothe public. FEMA determined the errors resulted from a lack of training
on the vendor software.

Nonexistent or inadequate system training for alerting authorities increases thepotential for false or delayed alerts or cancellations, and other errors. Because
each alerting authority can use one of multiple vendors to access the IPAWS
interface, it is essential that they receive specific training and direction on their
particular software.

Recommendations
To strengthen its oversight role, we recommend that the FEMA IPAWS PMO:
Recommendation 1: Require software vendors to include critical functions intheir proprietary emergency alerting software that FEMA previously identified
and communicated in 2015 and 2018.
Recommendation 2: Require software vendors to provide training on system
functionality and capabilities to alerting authorities.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis
FEMA concurred with both report recommendations. Appendix A contains a
copy of FEMA’s management comments in their entirety. We also received one
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technical comment from FEMA, and we incorporated that comment in thereport where appropriate. We consider both recommendations to be resolved
and open. A summary of FEMA’s response and our analysis follows.
FEMA Response to Recommendation 1: FEMA concurred with therecommendation. The FEMA IPAWS PMO agreed to incorporate the functional
requirements of the 2015 and 2018 vendor letters into an updated version of
the MOA with FEMA that state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) alerting
authorities must enter into in order to leverage IPAWS services to send alerts
and warnings to the public. The estimated completion date is October 31,
2019.
OIG Analysis: FEMA’s proposed action is responsive to this recommendation.
This recommendation is resolved and will remain open until we review
documentation showing that FEMA incorporated the functional requirements ofthe 2015 and 2018 vendor letters into the MOA with SLTT alerting authorities.
FEMA Response to Recommendation 2: FEMA concurred with therecommendation. The FEMA IPAWS PMO agreed to incorporate a requirement
for vendor-provided training into an updated version of the MOA with FEMA
that SLTT alerting authorities must enter into in order to leverage IPAWS
services to send alerts and warnings to the public. The estimated completion
date is October 31, 2019.
OIG Analysis: FEMA’s proposed action is responsive to this recommendation.
This recommendation is resolved and will remain open until we review
documentation showing that FEMA incorporated the requirement for vendorprovided training into the MOA with SLTT alerting authorities.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG)
was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107ï296) byamendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978.
The objective of this review was to examine FEMA’s role in the January 13,
2018 Hawaii false ballistic missile alert and to review whether FEMA exercises
appropriate oversight of the use of the IPAWS.
To achieve our objective, we reviewed public laws, FEMA’s IPAWS Program
directives, policies and procedures, as well as investigations and after-action
reports conducted as a result of the January 13, 2018, missile alert. We alsointerviewed officials from HI-EMA and FEMA’s IPAWS PMO.

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We conducted this review between April and July 2018 under the authority of
the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality
Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency.
The Office of Inspections and Evaluations major contributors to this report are
Erika Lang, Chief Inspector; Amy Burns, Lead Inspector; Jennifer Berry, Senior
Inspector; Samuel Tunstall, Inspector; and Michael Brooks, Independent
Referencer.

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Appendix A
FEMA’s Comments to the Draft Reportwww.oig.dhs.gov

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Appendix B
Alerting Authorities and Types of Alerts
As of February 2018, over 1,030 alerting authorities had access to IPAWS.
Table 1 describes the various types and number of alerting authorities.
Table 1: Type and Number of Alerting Authorities, as of February 2018
Type of Alerting Authority
Number of Alerting Authorities
Local
950
State
72
Territory
3
Tribal3
Federal*
2
TOTAL
1,030
Source: OIG analysis of FEMA data
* Two Federal agencies are considered alerting authorities for local
emergencies: the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children forchild abduction alerts and the National Weather Service for weather alerts.

From April 2012 through January 17, 2018, these alerting authorities sent
over 34,000 alerts to cell phones. Ninety-six percent of these messages were
weather alerts, 2 percent were child abduction alerts, and the remaining 2
percent were for other various reasons. Table 2 describes the type and numberof alerts sent to cell phones.
Table 2: Emergency Alerts sent to Cell Phones
Type of Event
Event Description
WeatherFlash flood warning
Weather
Tornado warningChild abduction
Child abduction emergency
Weather
Hurricane warning
Weather
Blizzard
Other
Local area emergency
Weather
Dust storm warning
Other
Civil emergency message
Other
Law enforcement warning
Weather
Severe thunderstorm warning
Weather
Winter storm warning
Other
Fire warning
Other
Evacuation Immediate
WeatherFlood warning
Other
Civil danger warning
Other
Shelter in place warning
Other
Hazardous materials warning
Weather
Tsunami warning
TOTAL
Source: OIG analysis of FEMA data
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Number of Alerts
21,127
11,221
697
369
302
296
258
198
73
70
61
60
45
23
19
14
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During the same time period, alerting authorities sent over 10,000 alerts toradio or television stations. The vast majority (92 percent) were tests of thealerting system.
Table 3: Emergency Alerts sent to Radio and Television Stations
Test emergency alerts sent to radio or television
stations
Non-test emergency alerts sent to radio or
television stations
Total emergency alerts sent to radio or
television stations
Source: OIG analysis of FEMA data

9,564
858
10,422www.oig.dhs.gov

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Appendix C
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
FEMA Audit Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
Senator Mazie Hirono
External
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency

www.oig.dhs.gov

16

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Additional Information and Copies
To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at:www.oig.dhs.gov.
For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General
Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov.
Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig.

OIG Hotline
To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and clickon the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at:
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305