Analyzing Japan’s Role in Korean Security within the Framework of
the Quasi-Alliance ModelJames F. DurandInternational Council on Korean Studies
Abstract
This paper assesses Japan’s role in Korean security using the quasialliance model. Developed by Professor Victor Cha, the quasi-alliancemodel to analyze the security relationship between Japan and theRepublic of Korea, “two states that remain unallied despite sharing acommon ally.” Cha defined the quasi-alliance model as “the triangular
relationship between two states that are not allied, but share a third party
as a common ally.” A key assumption is that the third state serves as the“great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities
for the two are limited.” While historical issues affected relations
between Tokyo and Seoul, American security policies were the primary
determinant of cooperation between Japan and Korea. American policychanges produced distinct “abandonment” or “entrapment” responses
within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances:
sharedperceptions yielded cooperation, while differing views produced friction.
This paper analyzes America’s East Asia policies during the Bush andObama administrations to assess Japanese and Korean reactions.
Analyzed through the quasi-alliance model, American policies produced
asymmetric responses in Japan and Korea, inhibiting security
cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Diverging views of China
exacerbated inherent friction between Korea and Japan. Thus, Japan willplay a limited role in Korean security.
Keywords: China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, United States,
Alliance Theory, Quasi-Alliance Model, Abandonment, Entrapment,
Victor D. Cha, Global War on Terror, Axis of Evil, AllianceTransformation, Future of the Alliance, Wartime OPCON Transfer,
Strategic Patience
Introduction
This paper examines relations between the United States, Japan, and122International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring 2016

the Republic of Korea (ROK) to assess how recent changes in the
security environment in East Asia and changes in American security
policies affect security cooperation between Japan and the ROK. Using
the quasi-alliance model developed by Georgetown University professor
Victor Cha, this paper assesses Japanese and Korean perceptions of the
security environment and American actions, and determines whether
these changes foster perceptions of “abandonment” or “entrapment”
within the framework of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances.
Japanese and Korean perceptions of changing American security policies
affect cooperation between the two states.
The Quasi-Alliance Model
In developing the quasi-alliance model, Cha built upon the work ofother alliance theorists to create a framework for analyzing relations
between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Central to this theory are theconcepts of abandonment and entrapment developed by Glenn Snyderthat “capture the expectations and anxieties of mutual support that
underpin interaction between allied and aligned states.” 1 External
security threats are the reasons that states enter into alliances and are thebasis for abandonment and entrapment concerns. Fears of abandonment
and entrapment also exist among states that have no formal security ties,
but satisfy the definition of aligned countries that possess “a set ofmutual expectations between two or more states that they will have eachother’s support in disputes or wars with particular other states.” 2 Thus,
Cha summarizes the conditions for abandonment and entrapment among
unallied states as 1) an external security threat, 2) a degree of commonly
perceived interest in defending against this threat, and 3) resultant
expectations of mutual support. 3
Cha developed the quasi-alliance model in order to explain the
security relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, “twostates that remain unallied despite sharing a common ally.” 4 During theCold War, the United States formed separate alliances with Japan and theRepublic of Korea through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and U.S.ROK Defense Alliance. The bi-polar structure of the Cold War andAmerica’s status as a superpower allowed Cha to further refine thedefinition of the quasi-alliance model as “the triangular relationshipbetween two states that are not allied, but share a third party as acommon ally. A key assumption is that the third state serves as the“great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities

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for the two are limited.” 5
Using this framework, Cha developed two hypotheses to explain
cooperative behavior or friction between states based upon abandonment
and entrapment concerns:
Hypothesis A: If relations between states X and Y reflect anasymmetrical structure of abandonment/entrapment concerns,
then there will be friction between X and Y.
Hypothesis B: If relations between states X and Y reflect asymmetrical structure of abandonment concerns, with respect
to each other or respect to a third party Z, then cooperative
relations should ensue. 6
In both hypotheses, the action of the third party is the most importantfactor, overriding changes in the security environment, domestic
attitudes, and the status of bilateral relations.
In this case, changes in American security policy overshadow thehistorical animosity that characterizes relations between the two Asianstates. Japan and Korea share a legacy of distrust that is heightened bymemories of Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula. Cha
acknowledges the “Korea-Japan Tangle,” notes that negative perceptions
affect relations at all levels, and concedes that “mutual enmity may
constitute a baseline of Japan-Korea interaction.” 7 However, because
historical animosity also existed during times of cooperation, it is “larger
strategic concerns that ultimately determine outcomes.” 8
Using the congruence and process tracing methods, 9 Cha analyzed
relations between Tokyo and Seoul following the normalization of
diplomatic relations in 1965 through the end of the Cold War. He
examined four major changes to American security policies during thisperiod: the Nixon Doctrine, Détente, the Fall of Vietnam and the Carter
Plan, and Reagan’s Peace through Strength initiative. These changes
produced distinct abandonment and entrapment responses within the
U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances, which affected security
cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul, as indicated below:

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Table 1: Quasi-alliance model for Japan-ROK Relations
Quasi-alliance model for Japan-ROK Relations 10
PeriodAB/ENT Structure
Animosity
Outcome1969-71
Symmetrical AB (H:B) Yes
Cooperation
1972-74
Asymmetrical AB/ENT Yes
Friction(H:A)
1975-79
Symmetrical AB (H:B) Yes
Cooperation
1980-88
Asymmetrical AB/ENT Yes
Friction (mixed)(H:A)
AB=Abandonment, ENT=Entrapment, H:A=Hypothesis A,
H:B=Hypothesis B
While other issues certainly influenced relations between Japan and
Korea, changes in American security policy in East Asia were the mostsignificant factor in affecting security cooperation between the twostates.
Because the previous analysis was conducted was within the context
of the Cold War-security environment, the first question this paper must
answer is whether the quasi-alliance model remains relevant in the postCold War era. In a brief analysis of security relations between Tokyoand Seoul in the 1990s, Cha noted that a “vastly different set ofcircumstances” has perhaps made the model “less useful in specificapplications.” 11 Indeed, the post-9/11 era portends even greater changes
than the security environment of the 1990s.
Methodology
This paper assesses prospects of security cooperation between Japanand Korea by analyzing three main areas. First, it examines the current
status of security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul to determine
whether the conditions exist for using the quasi-alliance model.
Significant agreements on security issues, either in bilateral or trilateralfora, would constitute a de facto alliance, thereby negating conditions forthe model’s applicability. Second, assuming that Tokyo and Seoul
remain aligned but not allied, this paper analyzes how the Japanese andKorean governments have reacted to American changes in security
policies in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. This analysis
preserves the framework of the quasi-alliance model, focusing on

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125whether Japanese and Korean responses to American actions reflected
abandonment or entrapment concerns. Third, it assesses the validity of
Cha’s assumption that America “serves as the great-power protector of
the two states, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited.”
The enormous changes in the security environment in East Asia may
provide Japan or Korea with security options independent of their
alliances with the United States.
In a related issue, Cha’s research showed that while changes in
American security policy were the dominant factor in influencing
cooperation between Japan and Korea, differing assessments of the
security environment heightened or dampened the effects of American
actions. Applying these assessments within the framework of the quasialliance model will yield broader conclusions on prospects for security
cooperation between Japan and Korea.
Trilateral and Bilateral Security Cooperation: Completing the
Triangle?
The first step is to determine whether the conditions for applying thequasi-alliance model still exist in the post-Cold War era; i.e., do Japanand Korea remain aligned but not allied? Despite changes within both the
U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances, they retain much of theirCold War mission, focus, and structure. Consequently, examining
trilateral (U.S.-Japan-Korea) and bilateral (Japan-Korea) initiatives will
determine whether increased security cooperation between Japan and
Korea alters the basic premise of the quasi-alliance model.
Since the end of the Cold War, academics and practitioners havepromoted trilateral security cooperation between the United States, Japanand Korea. The logic for this cooperation emphasizes the similarities
between Japan and Korea.
Both democracies are market-based
economies that require access to sea lanes to import natural resourcesand export manufactured goods. Japan and Korea share a common allyin the U.S. and a common threat in North Korea. Establishing a trilateralalliance would address common security concerns, and serve as a means
to build confidence and resolve differences. For example, a trilateral
security mechanism would ease concerns over disparities in force
structure; i.e., Japanese anxieties over Korea’s large army and Koreansuspicions of Japan’s sizable air and naval forces.
Prospects for trilateral security cooperation increased following theend of the Cold War. American, Japanese, and Korean defense officials

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began Track II negotiations in 1994 and the discussions became official
18 months later. 12 Scholars from all three countries explored areas forcooperation: Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), in
conjunction with the Center for Naval Analysis and Korea Institute for
Defense Analyses (KIDA), examined trilateral naval cooperation in
1997. The Washington-based Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis(IFPA) held a trilateral workshop on military responses to nuclear,chemical, and biological contingencies in 2000. 13 Reflecting the
optimism of the period, Ralph Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum
CSIS, developed the term “Virtual Alliance” to describe the close
relations between the three states. 14
However, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG)
demonstrated the challenges and limitations of trilateral security
cooperation. Established in 1999, the TCOG was a means for high-level
diplomats from America, Japan, and Korea to meet regularly and develop
common policies toward North Korea. The TCOG’s purpose was“consulting on the development, and later coordinating theimplementation, of the Perry Process,” a high-level review of America’s
policy toward North Korea. 15 In his report, former Secretary of Defense
William Perry predicted that “this tripartite cooperation will endure into
the future, and be applied to other problems in the region as well.” 16
In 2004, the IFPA, in collaboration with the Japan Forum on
International Relations and Yonsei University’s Graduate School ofInternational Studies, began research on trilateral cooperation on security
policy issues beyond North Korea. Based on the initial success of theTCOG, the researchers sought to determine whether the TCOG model
could be applied to other areas Dr. Perry envisioned, including
contingency planning, long-term planning, and institution building. 17
However, significant changes in America’s policy toward North
Korea, the abandonment of the Perry Process, and the advent of the Six
Party Talks made the TCOG less important by the time the researchersbegan their study. The level of the participants and frequency of
meetings declined; after 2003 the process was no longer referred to as theTCOG. 18 Summarizing the challenges of trilateral security cooperation,
the IFPA report noted:
For all of the factors bringing the three countries closer together
on security and related matters in the 1990s, however, there aremany persistent reasons why the growth of this kind ofInternational Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XX, No. 1

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cooperation has been slow, and why it might have bumped up
against a ceiling above which it simply cannot grow. [Emphasis
added]. These include Japanese constitutional restrictions on theuse of its military, South Korean historical sensitivities
regarding Japan’s armed forces from its colonial era, slightly
divergent threat perceptions, tight budgets on all sides that limit
opportunities to design special trilateral exercises, and varying
levels of tolerance for alarming China or Russia with stepped-up
security cooperation. 19
While all parties agreed that the TCOG process was beneficial, it was
unable to withstand many policy changes and unable to move beyond
North Korea issues. The IFPA concluded
the North Korean nuclear issue has commanded the allies’
collective attention in a way that no other single issue probably
can. For this reason, a similar frequent, open-ended, and highlevel dialogue on an issue like trilateral-crisis management or
security cooperation does not seem feasible.” Lastly, theproliferation of multi-lateral forums within Asia made trilateral
security cooperation less relevant. The advent of Six Party Talks
reduced the role of the TCOG to “preparing for, and comparing
notes after, a six-party gathering. 20
Republic of Korea (ROK)-Japan bilateral security initiatives also
must be considered to determine if the quasi-alliance model remains
valid. The first bilateral security meeting between defense officials from
Tokyo and Seoul occurred shortly after the initial trilateral discussions in
1994. 21 Military-to-military exchanges exist at many levels including
staff-talks, professional military education, and port visits. NIDS andKIDA hold frequent discussions on a variety of issues. Similar
exchanges occur between the Japan Defense Agency’s TechnicalResearch and Development Institute and Korea’s Agency for Defense
Development.
Although the frequency and scope of the exchanges increased, there
are clear limits to deeper security cooperation. There are no structures
for bilateral training, planning, or operations. Command and control islimited to a hotline to coordinate flight plans. 22 Government attempts to
expand mechanisms for further exchange and cooperation have been

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scuttled due to political reasons and exacerbated by nationalistic media inboth countries.
In April 2011, South Korea and Japan were prepared to sign a
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). South
Korea has similar intelligence sharing agreements with 24 othercountries, and a GSOMIA with Japan would have facilitated theexchange of classified information relating to North Korea. However,
Korean President Lee Myung-bak did not consult with the legislature,
leading to charges of “selling out to Tokyo” and the withdrawal of theagreement. 23 In 2014, Japan and Korea quietly entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding, enabling the two countries to share
information related to North Korean nuclear and missile programs
through the U.S. 24
A dispute between ROK and Japanese peacekeeping units in South
Sudan further highlighted the challenges to bilateral security cooperation.
In late December 2013, the commander of South Korea’s Hanbit unit
requested additional ammunition as anti-government forces seized atown near the unit’s headquarters. How the request was handled and towhom it was addressed remains a source of controversy. Japanese
accounts, which continue to be published on the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs homepage, state the Korean commander requested ammunition
from his Japanese counterpart. 25 The Koreans contend the request wasmade to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, which delivered
Japanese ammunition after Japan’s Cabinet approved the transfer of
10,000 rounds. The Korean press quoted unnamed government officials
alleging the Japanese actions not only endangered troops, but was part ofa larger strategy of “active pacifism.” Japanese media accounts reflected
exasperation with the “ungrateful” Koreans, noting public disclosure wasnecessary due to the Japan’s self-imposed weapons-export ban. 26
In summary, trilateral and bilateral initiatives have yielded greater
cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and Korea. However, the scope ofthe enhanced cooperation was largely based on concerns about North
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Despite a common
threat, efforts at further cooperation revealed constitutional and politicalbarriers. Concurrently, the increased use of multilateral fora to address
the North Korean problem and other regional security concerns madetrilateral and bilateral relationships less critical. Thus, despite significant

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changes since the end of the Cold War, Japan and Korea remain aligned,
not allied. The premise for applying the quasi-alliance model remains.
Changes to American Security Policy and Japanese and Korean
Responses
This section examines changes to each alliance in two periods: thepost-Cold War period (1991-2001) and the post-9/11 era (2001-present).
Although several events have influenced relations between the U.S. andits alliance partners since the end of the Cold War, the September 11th
terrorist attacks marked a defining point in American defense strategy,
ushering in new policies and giving urgency to existing initiatives. By
analyzing responses to America’s initiatives with a focus onabandonment and entrapment concerns, prospects for security
cooperation between Japan and Korea can be assessed.
Changes to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union is frequently used to markthe end of the Cold War, this event had a less pronounced effect on the
U.S.-Japan security alliance. Since its inception, political and structural
constraints have created vagaries related to threat perceptions, roles, andmissions. While Americans frequently sought increased cooperationfrom Tokyo in regional security issues, successive Japanese governments
desired a more limited role. The 1969 Nixon-Sato Communiqué, inwhich Japan acknowledged interests in stability on the Korean Peninsula
and in the Taiwan Strait, is perhaps the best example of America
succeeding in its objective of defining a broader regional role for Japan.
However, successive Japanese governments worked to reverse thispolicy. They achieved their objectives with the publication of the 1978
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, which limited Tokyo’s
responses to the defense of Japan. 27
Michael Green, Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, notes the shared outlook on regional security in thelate 1970s and early 1980s was the only period in which American global
security interests coincided with Japanese threat perceptions. More
importantly, the mutual concerns were supportable within the limitationsof Japan’s political and institutional restrictions:
By accident of geography, Japan’s enhanced ability tocooperate with U.S. forces in the defense of the home

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islands effectively “bottled up” the Soviets’ new ballistic
missile submarine fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk and new
Backfire bomber squadrons in the Maritime Provinces.
Without changing its exclusively defensive focus, theJapanese side became a player in regional military
strategy. 28
Despite this shared outlook, the American and Japanese militaries
continued to operate in parallel. There were no attempts to developed a
combined command structure or formalize contingency planning.
Differences in American and Japanese perceptions and expectationsof one another quickly emerged following the Cold War. During the1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. and other members of the international
community viewed the Japan’s $13 billion contribution as insufficientdue to Tokyo’s unwillingness to deploy its Self Defense Forces. 29 The
1994 North Korean nuclear crisis further highlighted obstacles tocooperation. In response, American and Japanese diplomats andlawmakers crafted successive initiatives to enhance cooperation inregional security issues including the National Defense Program Outline(1995), the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (1996), and the
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (1997, Guidelines).
Similar to the Nixon-Sato Communiqué, the Guidelines extended
Japan’s interests beyond the defense of Japan. Unlike the Communiqué,
the Guidelines did not mention specific areas or countries, but addressed“cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an
important influence on Japan’s peace and security.” 30 Because the
Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Straight were the likely sources ofconflict, analysis of Japanese concerns related to both areas may reveal
entrapment fears similar to those provoked by the Nixon-Sato
Communiqué.
The Guidelines were developed in response to the 1994 North
Korean nuclear crisis with a focus on Korean contingencies. 31 Emphasisof the North Korean threat significantly changed the security calculus in
Japan; strengthening the alliance to deter Pyongyang’s ambitions
overshadowed previous entrapment concerns.
Professor Akiko
Fukushima of the National Institute for Research Advancement
explained why Japanese citizens favored strengthening the alliance,
stating “events emanating from North Korea have made Japanesecitizens aware of the need for, and the cost of, Japanese peace, security,

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and safety. The North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and in 1994 led totheir acceptance of a stronger alliance with the United States.” 32
Pyongyang’s subsequent actions, particularly its 1998 Taep’o Dong
Launch and 2002 admission that North Korean agents had kidnapped 13
Japanese citizens, further increased public awareness of the security
threat. However, this public support should not be viewed as universal.
In particular, the Japanese people opposed unilateral American action
against North Korea. In this scenario, traditional entrapment concerns
emerge. 33
Because any conflict outside of Korean Peninsula is likely to
substantially increase Japanese fears of entrapment, American andJapanese officials have sought to narrowly define “situations in areas
surrounding Japan.”
In announcing the Guidelines, then-Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Defense Kurt Campbell stated, “First of all, this is
not a mechanism to contain China.” 34 However, the Taiwan Strait crisis
in March 1996 revived Japanese concerns that the Japan would become
involved in Sino-American disputes. Yoshio Omori, who served as
Director of the Cabinet Research Information Office from 1993-97,
stated:The most serious crisis during that time was not Aum [areligious terrorist incident], or [the hostages in] Peru, but the
China-Taiwan showdown. That was our gravest moment, atleast in the sense that it exposed us to a kind of catalyst for
confronting the question of what kinds of role Japan should playin the fabric of Asia and the world in the 21st Century as it
became entangled in Sino-American power politics. 35
Although the crisis was resolved peacefully, fears of entrapment
resurfaced when the Bush Administration sought to strengthen militaryties with Taiwan after coming into office. 36
In the months following the September 11th attacks, President
George W. Bush declared the Global War on Terror (GWOT), named
North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil,” and sought to transform its
global alliances. Perhaps recalling the 1991 Persian Gulf War—when
the Kuwaitis omitted Japan from the list of countries thanked forliberating the emirate —the government of Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi moved swiftly and publicly to support the U.S. Japan Maritime

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Self Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels escorted the USS Kitty Hawk as theAmerican battle group departed Japanese coastal waters on September
21, 2001. Following the passage of the Anti-Terror Special Measures
Law (ATMSF) in October, JMSDF warships deployed to the Indian
Ocean, providing fuel to multinational ships and inspecting suspicious
vessels. 37 JMSDF support continued as Diet extended the ATSML in
2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007 before replacing it with the Act on Special
Measures concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support
Activities. From December 2001 to November 2010, nearly 16,000
JMSDF sailors served in the Indian Ocean, providing fuel, water, andsupplies to nearly 1,200 allied vessels. 38
Japan further supported the GWOT by dispatching the Japanese Iraq
Reconstruction and Support Group to Samawah. David Foust of the Asia
Pacific Center for Security Studies notes that while the Japanese
government used UN Resolutions 1483 and 1511 as justification for the
deployment, the Ground Self Defense Force carried out their mission aspart of the American-led “coalition of the willing.” 39 The battalion-sizedunit provided humanitarian assistance and construction support insouthern Iraq from January 2004 to June 2006.
In contrast to its strong support for the GWOT, Japan reacted to
President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” declaration with silence. 40 The
differences between the two allies became apparent in the following
months. In August, Prime Minister Koizumi announced he would travel
to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-il, and was considering largescale economic aid to North Korea. At the time, U.S. government
officials were presenting Japan and other allies with evidence of North
Korea’s uranium enrichment program.
American and Japanesedifferences widened when Kim Jong-il admitted North Korean agents
had kidnapped Japanese citizens; the North Korean leader allowed fiveabductees to return to Japan with the prime minister. Japanese
government efforts concentrated on securing the release of all abductees.
Prime Minister Koizumi went back to North Korea the following May,
returning with an additional five Japanese citizens. 41
These differences notwithstanding, Washington and Tokyo beganefforts to transform the U.S.-Japan Alliance in December 2002.
Following nearly three years of discussions, the Security Consultative
Committee (SCC) approved the document U.S. Japan Alliance:
Transformation and Realignment for the Future. Although not anamendment to the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, the new

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document reflected significant changes in bilateral cooperation,
contingency planning, and force posture realignment. Matteo Dian,
Research Fellow at the University of Bologna, summarizes the rationale
behind alliance transformation:
It stressed that the alliance had to be considered functional forthe international security environment to improve and forcommon regional and global strategic objectives to beachieved. This opened up the possibility of wider cooperationthat transcended the limits of the East Asian theatre—
foreseeing possible globalization of the alliance. 42
The document also addressed force reductions associated with therelocation of Marine Corps units to Guam. The SCC approved theUnited States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation at theirnext meeting in May 2006, facilitating the relocation of 7,000 Marinesand dependents from Okinawa.
In contrast to the Bush administration, President Barack Obama’s
policies did not significantly alter the structure or function of its security
alliances in Northeast Asia. Announced in 2009, the Strategic Patience
policy extended an “open diplomatic hand to North Korea, contingent on
North Korea’s return to the six-party framework and the path ofdenuclearization.” 43 While stressing coordination in bilateral, trilateral,and multi-lateral fora, the Obama administration spent considerable timeand effort implementing the policies and changes begun during the Bushadministration.
Similarly, the 2011 “Pivot to Asia” represented a “continuation andexpansion of policies already undertaken by previous administrations.”44
For Japan, this meant perpetuating the policies that “emphasized
strengthening of relations with existing allies.” 45 Because the Obamaadministration’s policies toward Japan represented a continuation of
those of the Bush administration, abandonment and entrapment concerns
arising from Bush administration’s policies are likely to persist in the
Obama administration.
As with previous changes, Japanese officials were concerned thatalliance transformation efforts would obligate Japan to disputes in which
it had no concerns. Seeking to avoid entrapment, Japanese diplomats
insisted that provisions against collective self-defense remain, based
Japanese support on situational needs instead of a geographic area, and134International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring 2016

excluded Taiwan from possible contingencies. 46 These measures, as well
as a broad-based understanding of the alliance, have alleviated many
concerns about entrapment. In a 2009 poll by the Cabinet Research
Office, only 17 percent of respondents chose the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty as a cause for entrapment. 47
Fears of abandonment outweigh entrapment issues, particularly
among the Japanese officials responsible for developing policy andmanaging the alliance in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. These
concerns can be traced to the Persian Gulf War, as Kevin Cooney notes
in his history of Japan’s foreign policy:
The origins of this fear go back to the world community’s
reaction to Japan’s nonparticipation in the Gulf War. Japan
was at the pinnacle of its economic power, and yet its
contribution to the war effort, while significant in economic
terms, was deemed insignificant by Japan’s allies because there
was no human contribution. When the Gulf War was fought,
Japan was sitting on the sidelines . . . it does have a real fear ofabandonment. 48
This was both a personal and professional issue for a generation of
diplomats, military officers, and policymakers. An unnamed foreign
ministry official describes the traumatic and formative experience as “theVietnam for Japanese diplomats,” noting the ministry was divided bythose who experienced the Gulf War and those who did not. 49 Similarsentiments existed among Self Defense Force officers. Yoshitomi
Nozomu, who would retire as a major general and advise the Koizumi
Administration, recalls watching broadcasts of the Gulf War at a bilateral
military exercise in February 1991. His humiliation at having to answer
American soldiers’ questions about Japan’s failure to dispatch troops to
Kuwait was made worse by local broadcasts of Japanese soldiersbuilding ice sculptures for the Sapporo Ice Festival. 50
In summary, American policies in the post-Cold War and post-9/11
eras produced both abandonment and entrapment concerns in Japan.
Entrapment concerns vary with respect to the threat and thecircumstances in which Japan would be asked to fulfill its obligations. In
the case of North Korea, practical concerns for Japan’s security are themost important issue—the only scenario in which entrapment fears
become an issue is unilateral American action. In contrast, any scenario

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in which Japan becomes involved in a Sino-American dispute gives rise
to entrapment concerns. As noted, Japanese diplomats went to great
lengths to craft the alliance transformation document to avoid becoming
involved in any dispute over Taiwan.
Entrapment fears notwithstanding, abandonment was a greater
concern for Japan throughout the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods.
Japan’s response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait—the first crisis of the
post-Cold War era—profoundly shaped the attitudes of the security
practitioners and policymakers during this time. This experience led toJapan deploying the Self Defense Forces to support American-led
operations in the Indian Ocean and Iraq. However, it has not brought
about greater cooperation on Korean security issues.
Changes to the U.S.-ROK Security Alliance
The structure of the U.S.-ROK security alliance, particularly the roleof American forces, has and continues to change in the post-Cold War
and post-9/11 eras. In 1989, the U.S. Congress adopted the NunnWarner Amendment, mandating a three-phase withdrawal of American
military forces from Korea. By the end of 1991, the first phase of thewithdrawal was complete, reducing American troop strength in Korea
from 43,000 to 36,000. Symbolically, the last American battalion
defending the Demilitarized Zone was redeployed.
Shortly thereafter, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) was
reorganized.
The American-led Combined Field Army wasdisestablished and a Combined Ground Component Command wascreated under the command of a ROK Army general officer. Additional
combined functional components were established for naval, Marine,
civil affairs, and psychological operations. 51 Peacetime operational
control (OPCON) of Korean forces was transferred from the CFC
Commander to the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1994.
Scholars and government officials termed these changes a “redefinition”
of the alliance. 52 However, uncertainties over North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program, ballistic missile development, and regime stability
halted further reductions of American forces in the mid-1990s.
As noted, the Bush administration’s policies in East Asia can beassessed in terms of the War on Terror, Axis of Evil declaration, andalliance transformation. Korea’s response to the War on Terror was
swift and substantial. President Kim Dae-jung announced a “support
policy” for American operations on September 24, 2001 and the ROK

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National Assembly approved the deployment of medics and engineers to
Afghanistan on December 7 of that year. 53 Korea maintained over 200
soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan through 2007, followed bydeployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team from 2010 to 2014. In
response to a separate American request, the Korean government
dispatched the Zaytun unit to Iraq. Serving from 2004-2008, the 3,600man unit was the third largest foreign deployment to Iraq.
President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” declaration created significant
anxiety for President Kim, whose government adopted the “Sunshine
Policy” for dealing with North Korea. In his first summit with President
Bush following the declaration, President Kim sought to downplay
differences, stressing President Bush’s “staunch support for our sunshine
policy, as well as the U.S.'s unconditional proposal to dialogue with
North Korea.” 54 These policies, concerns, and disagreements continued
under Kim’s successor, Roh Moo-hyun.
The Future of the Alliance (FOTA) Policy Initiative was proposed atthe 34th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in December 2002.
American and Korean officials held 11 rounds of discussions between
April 2003 and July 2004, resulting in two major agreements involving
the relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison to the Pyongtaek area and therealignment and consolidation of the Second Infantry Division to basessouth of the Han River; 12,500 American troops would be withdrawn
from Korea in conjunction with the agreements. 55 The consolidation of
U.S. Forces Korea fulfilled the Bush administration’s policy objective of“strategic flexibility,” enabling American forces to be deployed in offpeninsula missions.
Neither the Obama administration’s Strategic Patience nor its Pivot
to Asia policies contained major changes to the structure or function of
the U.S.-ROK alliance. With the exception of a decision to delaytransferring wartime OPCON (which will be discussed in the following
section), Americans and Koreans have focused on implementing theFOTA, while contending with an increasingly belligerent North Korea.
Significant provocations include multiple attacks on South Korea,
nuclear weapons tests, and long-range ballistic missile launches.
As anticipated, the redeployment of American forces associated with
the FOTA Policy Initiative produced abandonment fears in Korea. Many
viewed the withdrawal as part of a continued process of disengagementthat began in the 1990s and accelerated in the post-9/11 era. Lee Sang
Hyun, Director of the Security Studies Program at The Sejong Institute,International Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XX, No. 1

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equated the reduction of forces specified by the Nunn-Warner
Amendment to the 1971 withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division andPresident Carter’s attempt to remove all ground forces from Korea. 56
Chosun Ilbo editorials during the FOTA discussions questioned decisions
to reduce troop strength—both American and Korean—stating, “KoreanU.S. cooperation has deteriorated” since the cuts of the early 1990s. 57
Despite assurances to the contrary, the agreement to maintain 25,000
troops in Korea and an $11 billion investment in new capabilities, many
Koreans feared America would abandon its commitment to thepeninsula.
Despite the abandonment concerns, the Bush administration’s
policies seem to have produced greater fears of entrapment. Kongdan(Katy) Oh of the Institute for Defense Analyses summarized Korean
entrapment during the War on Terror: “South Korea was dragged into a
war on terror it had not chosen to fight.” 58 Differences over North
Korean policy—the Axis of Evil versus the Sunshine Policy—led tofears that South Korea might be dragged into war should the UnitedStates strike North Korean nuclear facilities. 59 Koreans also feared
becoming entrapped in American conflicts, should these forces be
deployed from Korea. In his first official comments following the FOTA
Agreement, President Roh stated, “the USFK should not be involved in
disputes in Northeast Asia without Korea’s agreement.” 60 Katy Oh
affirmed these entrapment fears, noting that Koreans refer to the strategic
flexibility policy as a “’water ghost,’ which will drag anyone who
pursues it into deep water.” 61
Similar to Japan, the Obama administration’s policies in East Asia
did not affect the structure or function of the alliance in the same manneras those of the Bush administration. The Strategic Patience and Pivot toAsia policies appear to have produced neither distinct abandonment nor
entrapment concerns. Indeed, while scholars and practitioners routinely
examined Korean abandonment and entrapment concerns throughout the
post-Cold war era, there has been little published on this topic during the
Obama administration.
In summary, American policies produced both abandonment andentrapment concerns in the Korean government during the post-Cold
War and post-9/11 periods. Force reductions during the 1990s, alongwith those resulting from the FOTA agreement, aroused abandonment
concerns similar to previous troop withdrawals. However, the possibility
that American units in Korea could be deployed off-peninsula in support

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of regional or global contingencies led to fears of entrapment. The War
on Terror and Axis of Evil declaration led to similar entrapment
concerns.
Collectively, entrapment concerns are greater thanabandonment fears. Because the Obama administration’s policies appear
to have elicited neither distinct abandonment nor entrapment responses,
entrapment remains the principal concern of the Korean government.
Exit Opportunities
The final area that must be examined is Cha’s assumption
concerning America’s role as a “great-power protector,” in which Japanand South Korea have limited opportunities to exit their alliances with
the United States. The end of the Cold War has ushered in an era
characterized by vastly changed threat perceptions. Economic growth
and technological advances have afforded both nations with significant
military resources. Accordingly, both Japan and Korea have three
options with respect to their security alliances with the United States:
maintain the existing alliances, abandon the alliance and pursue a policyof neutrality, or seek an alliance with another power.
There are no indications the Japanese government has, or isconsidering, an alternative to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The trade
frictions that characterized relations in the 1980s and the frustrations thatexisted during the 1991 Gulf War and 1994 nuclear crisis do not exist.
This assessment is shared on both sides of the Pacific; the American andJapanese people broadly support the policies of both governments. The
Pew Research Center conducted comprehensive polling in conjunction
with the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and found that
more than eight in ten surveyed prefer to maintain or improve close ties,
with 68 percent of Americans trusting Japan and 75 percent of Japanesetrusting America. Additionally, an equal percentage of Americans (31percent) responded that the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis werethe most important events in relations between the two nations as those
who identified World War II. 62 Writing in the Wilson Quarterly,
Professor Ellis Krauss underscored today’s mutual support—“U.S.-Japan
relations have never looked more positive. President Obama’s “pivot” toAsia was matched by Japan’s own pivot to America.” 63
Conversely, because of changes to the U.S.-ROK alliance, differing
perceptions of the North Korean threat, rising nationalism and attendantanti-Americanism, and an increased sense of reconciliation or unification
with the north, Korean policy makers were often at odds with theirInternational Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XX, No. 1

139

American counterparts.
While successive administrations haveadvocated a continued American presence on the Korean Peninsula—toinclude the period following reunification—these same administrations
have sought enhanced roles for Koreans within the alliance as well as
broader contacts with other countries in the region. Transfer of wartime
OPCON highlights the desire for enhanced roles.
In his 2005 graduation address at the ROK Air Force Academy,
President Roh advocated an increased Korean role within the alliance,
stating, “[t]he Korean military will develop in 10 years into anindependent army which will take over wartime operational control[from the U.S.].” 64 The president’s announcement is part of a larger
initiative to pursue a more independent foreign policy and “play aleading role as a balancer, instead of an unappreciated agent as in thepast.” 65
Shortly after President Roh’s address, Defense Minister Yoon
Kwang-ung announced that Korea would enhance its military ties with
China and Russia as the first step in “balancing” role. Returning from avisit with his Chinese counterpart, he said, “[w]e plan to strengthen
military cooperation with China, upgrading Seoul-Beijing security
exchanges to a level similar to those between South Korea and Japan.” 66
At the time, observers believed the “balancer” policy is the first step of astrategic realignment in which Korea would abandon its ties with the
U.S. in order to be aligned with China. 67 Increased trade andinvestment—China surpassed the U.S. as Korea’s largest trading partnerin 2004—deep cultural ties, and dissatisfaction with American policies
appeared to support the rationale for a China-Korea alliance. 68
In 2015, two key events seemed to indicate Seoul’s further tilt
toward Beijing. In March, South Korea joined the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, China’s planned development bank. In its account of
the announcement, The Wall Street Journal noted that China accounted
for a quarter of Korea’s exports, compared to 12 percent sent to the
U.S. 69 In early September, President Park Geun-hye attended events in
Beijing to commemorate the end of World War II. President Park joined
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping inreviewing a military parade as part of “[t]he 70th Anniversary ofVictories in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese
Aggression and the World Against Fascism.” Although the Chinese
government invited world leaders to attend the events on a newly
established national holiday, Western leaders declined to attend.

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While media accounts cite both events as “evidence that South Korea
cannot resist the growing centripetal pull of Beijing’s orbit,” political andsocial scientists provided a more nuanced explanation. 70 Scott Snyder,
Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations, views Park’s visit as part of a long-term diplomatic strategy togain support from Beijing in Seoul’s dealings with Pyongyang. He noted
this strategic rationale has not changed since the two countries
established diplomatic relations in 1992, commenting that many
elements of President Rho Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik exist in Park’s
Trustpolitik. While South Korea has not achieved its desired level ofstrategic coordination with China on North Korea, President Park’s visit
provided another opportunity to pursue its diplomatic objectives. 71
Similarly, Yonsei University Professor Sohn Yul believes Korea’s
actions—both in terms of its bilateral relations with China and trilateralrelations with the U.S. and Japan—reflect the country’s “middle-power
diplomacy.” 72 Sohn observed that, “as the United States and China
compete for regional leadership, with Japan firmly aligned with theUnited States,” South Korea has “attempted to take a different approachby playing a mediating role and developing friendly relations with both
great powers.” 73
University of Southern California Professor David Kang offeredanother explanation of South Korea’s closer relations with China. Kang
asserted that Seoul’s foreign policy is based on two fundamental strandsof the country’s identity: South Korea’s intense desire for unification
and Korea’s long history of stable relations with China. Korean identity
is based on a unified Korean Peninsula, from which a unified language,
culture, and history evolved over 5,000 years. Kang notes that Korea has
had generally good relations with China throughout much of its history,
and highlights that the current warm relations extend beyond mutual
economic interests. Lastly, Kang asserts that South Korea’s long-term
objectives—unification with the north regardless of its nuclear
capability—are more aligned with China’s goal of peaceful change thanthe American objective of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear andballistic missile capabilities. 74
These factors notwithstanding, there are many factors that make a
Korea-China security alignment scenario unlikely, both presently andfollowing reunification. Regardless of current challenges, neither
Americans nor Koreans are willing to abandon the security alliance while
North Korea remains a threat to both countries. In either a rapid

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reconciliation or a North Korean collapse, the alliance will help preserve
Korean security, lest it have to “contend directly with the militaries ofChina, Russia, and Japan.” 75 Cha noted that, “despite the historicaltributary relationship, China has never provided the type of security
guarantee that the U.S. has provided Korea.” 76
While the Korean people view China as critical to the country’s
economic future, public opinion overwhelmingly supports maintaining
the security relationship with the U.S. In March 2014, the Asan Institutefor Policy Studies found that support for the alliance remained near its
all-time high, with 93.3 percent of South Koreans surveyed stating, “thealliance was a necessity.” In the same survey, 66.0 percent ofrespondents favored maintaining the alliance following reunification.
The results suggested “the Korean public has both broader perceptions of
threats in the region as well as an expanded view of the scope of thealliance.” 77 Thus, while Seoul will continue to seek greater autonomy
and authority within the alliance, it is unlikely that Korea will abandon
the U.S.-ROK security alliance to pursue neutrality or develop a similar
military pact with China.
Conclusions
In summary, the quasi-alliance model and its associated hypotheses
remain valid for analyzing the prospects for security cooperation
between Japan and the Republic of Korea in the post-Cold War and post9/11 eras.
Despite increased security cooperation, the TCOG
demonstrated the limits to trilateral cooperation. Political, legal andhistorical differences continue to inhibit bilateral cooperation. Cha’s
assumption that America “serves as the great-power protector of the twostates, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited” is also
valid, as neither Japan nor Korea is considering options outside of thecurrent system. Indeed, Japanese support for the alliance is at historiclevels. Although Koreans may express dissatisfaction with certain
aspects of the alliance, this criticism should be interpreted as seeking
change within the alliance, rather than a repudiation of the alliance itself.
Because the basic premises of the quasi-alliance model remain valid,
analyzing abandonment and entrapment perceptions arising fromchanges to American security policies can be used to assess prospects forsecurity cooperation between Japan and Korea.
Extending the quasi-alliance model to the post-Cold War and post
9/11 periods, Japan’s response to American policy changes has been a

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perception of “abandonment,” while Koreans fear “entrapment.” The
results, along with previous outcomes, are summarized below using
Cha’s methodology:
Table 2: Quasi-alliance model for Japan-ROK Relations
Quasi-alliance model for Japan-ROK Relations
PeriodAB/ENT Structure
Animosity Outcome
1969-71
Symmetrical AB
Yes
Cooperation
Nixon Doctrine (H:B)
1972-74
Asymmetrical
Yes
Friction
AB/ENT (H:A)
Détente1975-79
Symmetrical AB
Yes
Cooperation(H:B)
CarterDoctrine
1980-88
Asymmetrical
Yes
Friction(mixed)Peace Through AB/ENT (H:A)
Strength
1991-2000
Asymmetrical
Yes
Friction(mixed)Post-Cold War AB/ENT (H:A)
Period
2001-present
Asymmetrical
Yes
Friction(mixed)Post-9-11 Era AB/ENT (H:A)
AB=Abandonment, ENT=Entrapment, H:A=Hypothesis A,
H:B=Hypothesis B
American-initiated changes to the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security
alliances produced distinct abandonment and entrapment concerns in its
allies in Asia during the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. Japanese
entrapment concerns occur in scenarios involving unilateral American
action against North Korea, or the possibility of becoming involved in acrisis in the Taiwan Strait. However, abandonment concerns arising fromthe aftermath of the Persian Gulf War outweigh Japanese fears ofentrapment. These concerns were particularly acute among the policy
makers and practitioners who shaped Japan’s security policies over thelast quarter-century.
South Korea’s reaction to American initiatives is also mixed.
Drawdowns associated with the Nunn-Warner Amendment and FOTA
produced abandonment concerns similar to previous withdrawals ofInternational Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XX, No. 1

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American forces. Repositioning American forces with the capability to
deploy off the peninsula causes entrapment concerns, particularly if thoseforces were to be deployed within the region. Similarly, disagreements
on strategic objectives—gradual unification versus the elimination of
North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missiles—lead to fears of unilateral
American action.
Differing views on China’s role exacerbates
disagreements between the U.S. and Korea. Despite the hypotheticalnature of both scenarios—off-peninsula deployment and unilateral
action—entrapment fears outweigh abandonment concerns.
American actions since the end of the Cold War have produced
asymmetrical responses from its respective allies: Japanese perceptionsof abandonment and South Korean perceptions of entrapment. Prospects
for increased cooperation are limited, as evidenced by the disagreements
in South Sudan and failure to sign a GSOMIA. Friction will continue tocharacterize the relationship between Japan and Korea, and Japan willplay a limited role in Korean security.
Notes:
1 Chris Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 180-99 and Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in
Alliance Politics,” quoted in Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The USKorea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 37.
2 Snyder as quoted in Cha, p. 39.
3 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 40.
4 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 37.
5 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 47.
6 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 46.
7 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, pp. 19-23 and 231-2.
8 In addition to Japan and Korea, Cha cites Britain and France after the Napoleonic Warsand France and Germany after World War II as examples of cooperation where strategicinterests took precedence over historical animosity. Cha, p. 23 and pp. 231-2.
9 Cha defines the congruence method as a means to determine “whether there is temporalco-variation between the independent and dependent variables. . . the independent
variable is abandonment/entrapment structures. The dependent variable is cooperationand friction in Japanese-Korean foreign-policy behavior." Process tracing is used toassess “whether a necessary causal connection exists between the abandonmententrapment concerns and foreign-policy outcomes.” Cha, Alignment Despite
Antagonism, p. 58.
10 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 201.
11 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 207.
12 Remarks by Major General Noboru Yamaguchi, JGSDF, Defense and Military Attachéof the Japanese Embassy in Washington, “US-Korea-Japan Security Cooperation:
Opportunities, Challenges, and Tasks,” Modern Asia Series, Harvard University Asia
Center, February 18, 2000.

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13 James L. Schoff, Editor, “Building on the TCOG: Security Policy Reforms and a
Trilateral Crisis Response Planning Opportunity.” Second Interim Report, March 2005,
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 5.
14 Ralph Cossa, Editor, US-Korea-Japan Relations: Toward Building A Virtual Alliance,
Washington: CSIS Press, 1999.
15 James L. Schoff, Editor, “The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” Institutefor Foreign Policy Analysis, First Interim Report, November 2004, p. 5.
16 Perry Report, quoted in Schoff, First Interim Report, p. 2.
17 Schoff, First Interim Report, p. 2.
18 Schoff, First Interim Report, p. 1.
19 Schoff, “Building on the TCOG: Security Policy Reforms and a Trilateral Crisis
Response Planning Opportunity,” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Second Interim
Report, March 2005, p. 5.
20 Schoff，First Interim Report, p. 20.
21 Major General Noboru Yamaguchi, JGSDF, “Trilateral Security Cooperation:
Opportunities, Challenges, and Tasks,” US-Korea-Japan Relations: Toward Building A
Virtual Alliance, (Washington: CSIS Press, 1999), p. 9.
22 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1998, translated into English by the Japan
Times, p. 168, quoted by Major General Noboru Yamaguchi, JGSDF, “Trilateral Security
Cooperation: Opportunities, Challenges, and Tasks,” p. 5.
23 Seong Ho Sheen and Jina Kim, “What Went Wrong with the ROK-Japan Military
Pact?” Asia-Pacific Bulletin, No. 176, July 31, 2012 and Ashley A.C. Hess and John K.
Warden, “Japan and Korea: Opportunities for Cooperation,” The National Interest,
March 19, 2014.
24 Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence, “Ballistic Missile
Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition,” Congressional
Research Service, April 3, 2015.
25 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Webpage.
26 Max Fisher, “Japan and South Korea can’t even Cooperate over Peacekeeping in South
Sudan,” The Washington Post, December 26, 2013.
27 Michael Green, “The Challenges of Managing US-Japan Security Relations after theCold War,” New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations, Gerald Curtis, Editor, (Tokyo:
Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 244.
28 Green, p. 244.
29 Hitoshi Nakanishi, “The Gulf War and Japanese Diplomacy,” December 6, 2011.
Available on line at http://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00202/
30 The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. September 23, 1997. Available online at www.jda.go.jp
31 Former Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord recalled briefing Chinese officials in
November 1995, noting “We went out of our way to say that the Guidelines Review was
directed at Korean contingencies and not directed at China.” Former General Secretaryof the Liberal Democratic Party Koichi Kato reiterated this in 1997. Quoted in Yoichi
Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 428
and 399.
32 Akiko Fusushima, “Popular Perceptions of Japan’s New Security Role,” The Future of
the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship, Asian Perspectives Seminar, November 20, 2003,
pp. 14-15.

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33 Survey by Chuo Ron Monthly, July 2004, reported in
34 United States Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing. Defense Guidelines
Review. September 19, 1997.
35 Funabashi, pp. 400-1.
36 William E. Rapp, “Past its Prime? The Future of the US-Japan Alliance,” Parameters,p. 112.
37 Vijay Sakhuja, “Japanese Maritime Strategic Review,” Maritime Studies No. 147(March-April 2006). pp- 22-23.
38 Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Homepage. International Counterterrorism
Operations. Available online at
http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/english/about/operation/kokusaitero.html
39 David Fouse, “Japan’s Dispatch of the Self-Defense Force to Iraq: Lessons Learned,”Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, July 2007. Available online at
http://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Japans-Dispatch-of-the-GSDF-toIraq.Fouse_.doc.pdf
40 “Northeast Asia has Mixed Reactions to ‘Axis of Evil’ Remark,” Stratfor, February 1,
2002, Available online at https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/northeast-asia-has-mixedreactions-axis-evil-remark-0
41 Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s Relations with the U.S. and its North Korea Option,”
Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 2002. Available online at
http://www.fpri.org/article/2002/12/japans-relations-with-the-u-s-and-its-north-koreanoption/
42 Matteo Dian, The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance: The Eagle and theChrysanthemum, (Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2014), p. 123.
43 Charles L. Pritchard and John Tilleli, Jr., Chairs and Scott A. Snyder, Project Dirctor,“US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,2010), p. 9. Available online at http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/us-policy-toward-koreanpeninsula/p22205
44 Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F.
Martin, Ronald O’Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, “Pivot to the Pacific The Obama
Administration’s Rebalancing Toward Asia,” CRS Report for Congress, (Washington:
Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2012), p. 2.
45 Manyin, p. 2.
46 Dian, pp. 123-124.
47 Tomohito Shinoda, “Costs and Benefits of the U.S.-Japan Alliance from the Japanese
Perspective,” Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichioro Sato, Eds., The U.S.Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism, (New York: Palgrave-Macmillian,2011), p. 52.
48 Kevin Cooney, Japan’s Foreign Policy Since 1945, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007).
49 Jonathon Watts, “Japan Revisits the Gulf War,” The Diplomat, September 20, 2001,
Available online athttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/20/worlddispatch.afghanistan
50 Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Gulf War Began Japan’s Retreat from Pacifism,”
Reuters, December 19, 2015. Available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/japanmilitary-history-idUSL3N13W1M820151220
51 The Combined Naval Component Command and Combined Marine Forces Command
were established in 1994, and the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force was established in

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1998. The Combined Psychological Operations Task Force was established in 1999.
52 Seoung Ryoul Cho notes that the term “redefinition” has been used in many studies of
the US-ROK Security Alliance, but that there is no consensus on the direction of the“redefinition” process. Seoung Ryoul Cho, “The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US
Forces in South Korea,” Korea Journal for Defense Analysis, p. 79.
53 John Hemmings, “The ROK Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan,” Scott
Snyder, Editor, Global Korea: South Korea’s Contributions to International Security,(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), p. 45.
54 US Department of State, Transcript of Remarks by President Bush and President Kim
Dae-Jung in Press Availability, The Blue House, Seoul, Republic of Korea, February 20,
2002. Available online at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2002/8606.htm
55 US Department of State, Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative, Transcript of Press
Briefing by Richard P. Lawless, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asia-PacificAffairs, Mr. Ahn Kwang Chan, ROK Ministry of National Defense, Mr. Evans Revere,
Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State; Mr. Kim Sook, ROK
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, July 23, 2004. Available on-line at
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/34662.htm
56 Lee Sang Hyun, p. 72.
57 “With the Korean and American Armies Growing Smaller, How Can the People
Sleep?” Editorial, The Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 2004 and “Government Must Explain
Troop Reduction to the People,” Editorial, The Chosun Ilbo, January 11, 2005.
58 Kangdon (Katy) Oh, “U.S.-ROK: The Forgotten Alliance,” Brookings East Asia
Commentary, October 2008, Available online at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/10/south-korea-oh
59 Kim Dong Shin, “Meeting Challenges in Transforming the Alliance Prudently,” SeoulWashington Forum hosted by The Brookings Institute and the Sejong Institute, May 1-2,
2006, Available online at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Events/2006/5/01-northkorea/20060502_shin.pdf?la=en
60 Seong Jae Min, “Roh limits role of USFK in A sia,” JoongAng Daily Korea, available
on line at http://www.iht.com/getina/files/230887.html
61 Kongdan (Katy) Oh.
62 Bruce Stokes and Russ Oates, “Americans, Japanese: Mutual Respect 70 Years Afterthe End of World War II.” Pew Research Center, April 7, 2015. Available online at
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/04/07/americans-japanese-mutual-respect-70-yearsafter-the-end-of-wwii/
63 Ellis Krauss, “Japan, the United States, and a Changed Pacific,” The Wilson Quarterly,
Winter 2016. Available online at http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-post-obamaworld/japan-the-united-states-and-a-changed-pacific/
64 Seong Jae Min.
65 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea, “Government position on the Northeast
Asia situation reference and history textbooks,” March 24, 2005.
66 World Tribune, “Seoul sets closer military ties with China, Russia as U.S. ties fray,”
Available on-line at http://216.26.163.62/2005/ea_skorea_04_18.html
67 Richard Halloran, “China-Korea alliance appears to have edge,” The Honolulu
Advertiser, April 24, 2005, Available on-line at
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2005/April/24/op/op05p.html
68 Korea International Trade Association (KITA), available on-line at http://www.kita.org

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69 Kwanwoo Jun and Alastair Gale, “South Korea Says It Will Join China-Led
Investment Bank,” The Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2015.
70 Scott A. Snyder, “This is Why Ties Between South Korea and China Beijing are
Growing Stronger,” The National Interest, September 2, 2015. Available online at
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-ties-between-south-korea-china-aregrowing-stronger-13763 The quote was republished in an a subsequent article by theauthor entitled, “Why South Korea’s President Park Attended Xi’s Military Rally inBeijing,” Newsweek, September 4, 2015. Available online at
http://www.newsweek.com/why-south-koreas-president-park-attended-xis-military-rallybeijing-368735
71 Scott A. Snyder, “Why South Korea’s President Park Attended Xi’s Military Rally inBeijing.”
72 Yul Sohn, “Searching for a New Identity: South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy,”
Policy Brief, December 2015. Available online at
http://fride.org/descarga/PB212_South_Korea_middle_power_diplomacy.pdf.
73 Yul Sohn, “Relocating Trilateralism in a Broader Regional Architecture: A South
Korean Perspective,” Briefing Series, The National Bureau of Asian Research, March2016. Available online at http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=660
74 David C. Kang, “China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia,” (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 104-125 and David C. Kang, “The Balance ofPower and State Interests in International Relations: South Korea Between China and theU.S.” East Asia Institute Working Paper Series 5, January 27, 2007. Available online at
http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/200905211202773.pdf
75 Chung Min Lee, “Domestic Politics and the Changing Contours of the ROK-US
Alliance: The End of the Status Quo,” The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast
Asia, (Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), p. 205.
76 Cha, “Shaping Change and Cultivating Ideas in the US-ROK Alliance,” p. 121.
77 Kang Choi, Ji Yoon Kim, Karl Friedhoff, Chung Ku Kang and Eui Cheol Lee, South
Korean Attitudes on the Korea-US Alliance and Northeast Asia, (Seoul: The Asan
Institute for Policy Studies, 2014), p. 8.

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