Japan in the International Community Is Japan a normal state in terms of its foreign policy?
To what extent is Japan now a normal state in terms of its foreign policy?

Maarten Gerkes
After World War II, Japan lost its independence to the Allied Powers which were
led by the United States. On 28 April 1952 the US-Japan Security Treaty went into
effect and Japan regained its independence. This treaty, however, allows the US tohave military bases in Japan, while on the other hand Article 9 of the revised
Japanese Constitution, forbids Japan to use forces for settling international disputes
and maintaining an army. Since 11 September 2001 this anti-militaristic norm ischallenged by the US and policy-making agents, with the result of the ‘hollowing out’of Article 9 (Hook et al. 2005, 163). Still, it is hard to think of another majorcountry that has pursued a more successful foreign policy-one that brought prosperity
and security for its own citizens with minimal costs. (Mochizuki, 2007). Therefore, it
is interesting to investigate the following question: To what extent is Japan now anormal state in terms of its foreign policy? As the term ‘normal’ can be interpreted
in many ways, I will define it as a state which makes full use of its state power,
including the military, and material capabilities, economical and political, to provide
public goods and uphold the multilateral global institutions.
First of all, I would like to consider the fact that Japan is not a permanent Security
Council member of the United Nations. Even though Japan contributes a considerable
amount of money each year,“…it gives the second largest scale of assessment

among member countries, after the United States.” (MOFA, 2001), Japan does notbelong to one of the veto-wielding permanent members. Japan claims 14.4 percent of
the global gross domestic product (GDP), while “…the United States pays 22 percentof the U.N. budget even though it represents 30.3 percent of global GDP.” (U.N.
Wire). This shows that while the global GDP of the US is more than twice as highcompared to Japan, it only contributes a very small amount extra, namely two percent.
In other words, “Japan is grossly over-assessed.” (Schaefer and Smith 2006). Even

though the other members pay considerably less, they are permanent members whichmakes Japan stand out. While Japan uses its economical and political material
capabilities, it seems to fail to provide its people with the right of veto power
concerning international peace and security, which makes it arguably less ‘normal’when looking at the other countries.

The anti-militaristic norm of Japan could function as an example for other countries,
but not only this norm makes Japan stand out. The way it uses its norm of
economism combined with the developmentalistic norm can also very well be used asan example. Economism prioritizes economic activity and imputes it with positivevalue, with on the other hand post-war developmentalism being supported by this very
economics-first policy, while still being able to pursue a non-military, mainly
economic, foreign policy. The Official Development Assistance (ODA) program as
early as the mid-1980s has become one of the most central policy tools for Japan’scontribution to the international community (Mochizuki, 25). In this respect Japan uses
its economy to the fullest regarding internationalism, also when you consider that
“Japan provided regular reserve funds to assist the UN when funding was in shortsupply.” and that Japan is “the second largest contributor to the peacekeeping budget”(Hooketal.

2005,378).

While most other countries in the UN and all the permanent members of the UNSC
are using its capabilities on demographic, economic and military level, Japan is, due
toarticle 9, not engaging

with its military.

The earlier

mentioned

domestic

economistic and developmentalist norms have been in constant tension with theseinternationally embedded political, economic and security dimensions.
This brings us to next reason why Japan cannot be considered a normal state; theway it uses its military. In 2004, Lind wrote an article concerning Japanese security
policy and its antimilitarist norm, while focusing on its military. While the article iswritten with a rather materialistic view she provides useful and detailed information
regarding Japan’s military force. After thorough investigation she concludes that “Japanis clearly one of the world’s leading defence spenders” and “…analyses of theJapanese military show that Japan is a world leader in air and naval power” (Lind2004, 96, 101). While these could be arguments that Japan is a normal state, since it
has at least potential military capabilities, it is the way it uses the military that makes
it rather unusual compared to most other countries. The 1990-1991 Gulf War is a2

good example. Because of Article 9, Japan did not send the SDF to the Gulf area.
Instead it made a financial contribution of US$ 13 billion and when the war ended,mine sweepers of the MSDF were dispatched (Inoguchi 2005, 22 Hook et al. 157). In
other words, Japan used its norm of economism to make up for the restraints that arecaused by Article 9, the norm of anti-militarism, although they got little recognitionby other countries that were involved for taking this stance.
More recently, a similar thing can be seen when looking at the deployment ofGSDF to Iraq. The main activities were purifying water, reconstruction projects andproviding humanitarian aid. In 2004, General Tsumagari Yoshimitsu admitted that theASDF used transporters to carry US armed military personnel (Hook et al. 166).
Transporting military personnel is beyond simple transport of supplies and can beconsidered military cooperation. Ofcourse, Japan is not actively participating, but thisincreasingly proactive role of the SDF along with the way it uses economical means
regarding war activities, can be thought of as an indirect participation.
What seems important though is the symbolic nature of the despatch to Iraq. It is
Japan’s “…most ambitious military operation since World War II…” (Hwang 2004)
and proves that Japan is taking a more international proactive role together with astrong bilateralism since its position, concerning Iraq, is “…more tightly aligned withthe United States.” (Inoguchi 2004, 4). Japan was certainly not involved in any
military actions, therefore not being a normal state since it did not use the deployedtroops to the fullest of their capabilities, but on the other hand it “modified its
behaviour” (Inoguchi 2004, 22) to conform to the internationalism norm and seems to
be heading towards a more normal statehood. Japan now acts as global civilian power,
committed to the causes of anti-terrorism and peace-building.
When we take a closer look at the relations with East Asia, we can see anotherreason of why Japan is not a normal state. Japan faces difficulties, due to for
example memories of WWII and the legacy of colonialism, as it has a particular needto reassure its neighbours, along with broadening its global security role (Mochizukiand Tsuchiyama 2007, 98). Visits of prime ministers and other officials to theYasukuni Shinto Shrine and for example history textbook controversies still provoke
East Asian countries. (Hook et al. 2005, 195) However, former DPJ prime minister
Yukio Hatoyama, decided not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. This implies that the normof Asianism is becoming more important. During the Cold War the anti-militarist
norm together with the legacy of colonialism, prevented Japanese policy-making agents3

from making direct contributions to the military security in East Asia. Mainly throughthe framework of the US-Japan alliance system contributions are being made to East
Asia. However, in order not to rely too much on the US, Japan adopted a more
active diplomacy in the form of ODA and economic cooperation. (Hook et al. 2005,251-252) While the above mentioned problems concerning legacies of colonialism canbe seen in a lot of countries, Japan deals with it in different way than other states
which makes full use of its state power. We can derive that Japan uses its
developmentalist norm and norm of economism in order not to be dependent on
military security means, which East Asian countries are wary of. Japan has themilitary capabilities to support the East Asian region but she is reluctant to use it asa means for improving relations. In exchange, the norm of developmentalism is usedin combination with the belief that economic progress is the ultimate guarantor ofpeace and security. Japan adopted a comprehensive security agenda towards the East
Asian region (2005, 268; Katzenstein 1998, 3), meaning that Japan is uniquelyequipped to deal with the regional, East Asian security agenda.
When we look at the East Asian region, there are implications that Japan is heading
to a more normal statehood. Though Inoguchi discusses the ambition of Japan
becoming a normal statehood with a different definition of normal, namely theWestphalian manner (a normal state has basic authority and can exercise autonomy in
the management of its economic and security affairs), he points out the leadershipJapan tends to take in the East Asian region regarding free trade. (Inoguchi 2004).
Indeed, Japan seems to be taking a more international, proactive role according to its
needs in making full use of material capabilities. An example is the Japanese
governments’ proposal of the AMF in 1997. “…drawing on their attachment todevelopmental and increasingly Asianist and internationalist norm”, Japan proposed theAMF as a solution to the crisis in the East Asian region (Hook et al. 2005, 240).
While it did not succeed, it clearly shows that Japan was after better financial andpolicy cooperation in the region along with improving economic relations. Japan is
also working on better security relations with East Asia. The JDA and MOFA started
in the late 1980s with exchange visits of defence ministers and for example training
ships. This progress has been further boosted with the SDF’s participation in UNPKOin Cambodia in 1993 and in East Timor in 2002-4 (2005, 230). Japan made the firstsymbolic contributions to the bilateral security relations with the region, ever since theend of the Pacific War.
4The alterating anti-militaristic norm might be another indicator of a possible normal
statehood. After the September 11 attacks, the Japanese government adopted on 29
October that year the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and revisions to the Self
Defence Forces Law in order to give the SDF more freedom in the range of possible
activities (Hughes 2002, 2). Noteworthy in this matter is the speed of the passage ofthis law, considering Japan’s bureaucratic nature. Though the International Peace
Cooperation Law took nine months, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law took
less than three weeks. Furthermore, when you take into consideration that Japan has“…one of the most powerful military forcesin the world with potent offensive anddefensive capabilities.” (Lind 2004, 120) in combination with the so-called ‘hollowing
out’ of Article 9 and an increased role for the SDF, arguments of Japan heading
towards normal statehood seem much more viable. (Hook et al. 2005, 163; Jain 2009)
From the 90s on, however, one could argue that Japan is, through the years,
becoming a more normal state. Good examples are the proposal of the AMF in 1997,
which would look after a better financial and policy cooperation in the East Asianregion and therefore improving economic relations in the region, the stunning increaseof defence spending in the 1990s and the increased role for the SDF which, in otherwords, relates to the ‘hollowing out’ of Article 9. Since the government underHatoyama, Japan also seems to value the norm of Asianism more, since he pledged
for example not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, which has a big symbolic value. Japanis taking a more international proactive role according to its needs in making full useof material capabilities. Therefore it is interesting to look at how this changes Japanas a state itself because from within Japan, as well as from outside, different notions
exist what Japan can and should do. Though I acknowledge that there are importantalterations of Japan heading towards normal statehood, at this moment, with the above
stated arguments taken in consideration, I conclude that Japan is not a normal state.

5Bibliography
BBCNews.
2005.
JapanPMvisits
Yasukuni
shrine.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4348280.stm (accessed November 27, 2009).

(October17)

Charter of the United Nations. Chapter V: The Security Council.
Hook, Glenn D., Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson. 2005. Japan’sInternational Relations: Politics, economics and security. London and New York: Routledge.
Hughes, Christopher W. 2002. Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady
Incrementalism or Radical Leap? CSGR Working Paper No. 104/02.
Hwang, Balbina Y. 2004. Japan’s Troop Dispatch to Iraq: The End of Checkbook Diplomacy.
TheHeritage
Foundation:
Leadership
forAmerica(February9)
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm419.cfm (accessed November 27,2009)Inoguchi, Takashi. 2005. Japan’s Ambition for Normal Statehood. In East Asia, Latin
America and the “New” Pax Americana, ed. Jorge Dominguez and Byungkook Kim, 1-31.
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
Jain, Purnendra. 2009. Japan’s bureaucrats face the firing line. Asia Times (August 25)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KH25Dh01.html (accessed November 29, 2009)
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1998. Cultural norms and national security: Police and military inpostwar Japan. New York: Cornell University Press.
Lind, Jennifer M. 2004. Pacifism or Passing the Buck?: Testing Theories of Japanese Security
Policy. International Security Vol.29, No 1: 92-121.
Metraux, Daniel A. 1995. Religious Terrorism in Japan: The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinrikyo.
Asian Survey Vol. 35, No. 12: 1140-1154.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. April 2001. Japan’s Share of Assessed Contribution tothe United Nations.
Mochizuki, Mike M., and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama. 2007. “The Domestic Foundations of Japan’sInternational Contribution.” And “Japan’s Changing International Role.” In Japan inInternational Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State. London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc.
Olsen, Kyle B. 1999. Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat? Emerging Infectious Disease
Vol. 5, No. 4.: 513-516.
Schaefer, Brett D., and Janice A. Smith. 2006. The U.S. Should Support Japan’s Call toRevise the UN Scale of Assessments. The Heritage Foundation: Leadership for America(March18)
http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm1017.cfm(accessed November 27, 2009).

6