FOCUS

Focus
Asia-PacificNewsletter of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (HURIGHTS OSAKA)

June 2022 Vol. 108

Contents
Child Soldiers in the Armed Conflict in Yemen
This article discusses the causes andmechanism in recruiting child soldiers in
Yemen. It also cites measures that can help
stop this phenomenon.
- Mwatana for Human Rights
Page 2
Enforcing the Law Against Child Marriage
This article discusses the problem of childmarriage in some communities in Mindanao
and the prospect of implementing a lawthat bans it.
- Rufa Cagoco-Guiam
Page 6
Black Hole of Child Abduction
This article explains why abduction by parentsof their own children in Japan occurs, theproblems faced by left-behind parents and theeffect of cutting off of relations between thechildren and the left behind parents. The article
also discusses some solutions to this issue.
- Find My Parent
Page 8“Ushiku” – Documenting Human Rights
Violations in Japan
This article explains the idea behind adocumentary titled “Ushiku” about nonJapanese who are indefinitely detained in
one of Japan’s detention centers. It features
the main message of the documentary
which is to reveal to the public the situationof the detainees that does not conform tointernational human rights standards.
- Jefferson R. Plantilla
Page 11

Editorial
Tolerated Abuse
Abuse of children happens with support from family and society.
Parents and other elders in society tolerate the suffering ofchildren by allowing them to fight in armed conflicts, marrying
them very young, and erasing their ties with their other parents.
Poverty as well as social pressure compel some Yemeni families
to allow their children to be recruited as child soldiers. Somefamilies in Mindanao follow traditions that allow old men to
marry young girls. Some parents (mothers or fathers) in Japan
deliberately hide their children from their other parents.
In these cases, parents largely fail to see the abuse being sufferedby their children. They fail to see the long-term adverse impactof their decisions on the children they profess to love.
The challenge lies in making parents and other elders in society
see this abuse from the perspective of their children. The
challenge also lies in finding ways of protecting their children
while satisfying economic needs or respecting socio-cultural
traditions.

Human Rights Education in Asia-Pacific,
Volume 11
This is an introduction to the contents of the
11th volume of Human Rights Education in
Asia-Pacific.
Page 131

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JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108

Child Soldiers in the Armed Conflict in Yemen*
Mwatana for Human RightsYemen witnesses an internal
armed conflict that involves
hundreds, and maybe
thousands, of child soldiers.
Persistent reports andinformation from the humanrights sector indicate that the
number of recruited soldiers is
continuously rising in Yemen,
primarily because this poor andwar-torn country presents a
fertile ground for the expansionof this phenomenon. They also
report the diversified childsoldier recruitment methods
and mechanisms, and the
deepening negative societal
effects of this recruitment.
Mwatana for Human Rights
conducted a study on childrecruitment and the use of childsoldiers in the armed conflict inYemen in September 2019. The
study is the first of its kinddevoted to the phenomenon ofchild recruitment, examining its
causes, mechanisms, direct
effects and possible future
directions.
The study covered nineteeng o v e r n o r a t e s i n Ye m e n
including Sanaa city: Sanaa,
Amran, Sa’adah, Dhamar,
Hajjah, Al-Mahweet, Raimah,
Al-Jawf, Hodeidah, Taiz, Aden,I b b , L a h j , A bya n , M a r i b ,Shabwah, Al-Baidha andHadramout. The sample cases
were selected from thesegovernorates taking into
account the characteristics ofchild recruitment, its
dimensions and the selectedcases included all the parties
involved in child recruitment,
namely: Ansar Allah (the Houthi
armed group), the Yemeni armya f fi l i a t e dwiththeinternationally recognized
government, forces loyal to theinternationally-recognized
government, forces affiliatedwith the United Arab Emirates(UAE)-backed Southern
Transitional Council, the Joint
Forces led by Tariq Saleh (thenephew of the former Yemeni
president Ali Abdullah Saleh),
Yemeni army brigades affiliatedwith the Saudi/UAE-led
coalition stationed in thesouthern Saudi borders, andAnsar Al-Sharia.
Causes of Child Recruitment
Economic conditions are amajor cause of childrecruitment in the armed
conflict in Yemen. Poverty often
compels some Yemeni families
to allow their children toparticipate in the conflict tosupport their minimum,
necessary survival needs, or inorder to increase the family’sutterly limited income. There
are also some cases wherechildren themselves join thearmy because of the hardship ofliving under poverty and theinability of their families toprovide for their personalneeds. Economic reasonsaccount for 40.7 percent of thecauses for child recruitment
based on the study sample.

2

Social reasons (which accountfor 37.8 percent) play animportant role in driving childr e c r u i t m e n t . Ye m e n i s
considered a low-educatedcountry with widespread
illiteracy. Influence and socialpressure, based on widespreadsocial norms that normalize andfurther child recruitment, also
drive many children to join
military units of the different
parties to the conflict. For
example, there exist social
norms which advocate thatchildren be viewed as capableo f t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y,
including carrying arms andfi g h t i n g . P o l i t i c a l a n dideological reasons, on theother hand, accounted for 14.1
percent of the interviewees’
cited causes of childrecruitment. These included
ideological allegiance to therecruiting party, as well as
political and ideologicalaffiliation to and/or support fora particular political issue. The
desire to carry and use weapons
and to imitate adults who
participate in the war was foundto be the least significant cause,
only cited by 7.4 percent of thesample.
Although these reasons vary interms of importance, they allplay an influential role.
It would be difficult to ascribe
the phenomenon of childrecruitment to one single cause—in many cases, multiplecauses, or push factors, were at

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play. For example, not all poorfamilies allow or encourage
their children to fight. In otherwords, if the poverty factor is
not combined with anotherfactor, such as social pressure
from relatives and friends, it
may not necessarily lead tochild recruitment. The cooccurrence of both economic
and social push factors was seen
in a large percentage of children
recruited who cited economic
reasons.
Likewise, causes for childrecruitment vary by different
warring parties. Economic
reasons, for instance, played aless important role in recruiting
children into Ansar Allah(Houthi) forces than social
reasons and the reverse for thenational army affiliated with theinternationally recognized
government, the forces loyal to
the government, the UAEbacked forces of the Southern
Transitional Council, the forces
affiliated with the Saudi/UAEled coalition and the forces of
Tariq Saleh. One potential
explanation for this is that
economic expectations—interms of pay and other material
benefits—from both the childand his family when recruited
by Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces
are relatively less than those forother forces. For this reason, theAnsar Allah (Houthi) groupdepends on its social influence
as well as ideological andpolitical factors more than otherrecruiting parties, with the
exception of Ansar Al-Sharia,
whose child recruits are mainly
i n fl u e n c e d by i d e o l o g i c a lfactors.

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
Patterns and Mechanisms ofChild Recruitment
Compulsory child recruitment( i . e . , r e c r u i t i n g by f o rc e )accounted for 55.8 percent of
the sample and can be regarded
as the prevailing pattern of childrecruitment. This includes
r e c r u i t i n g ch i l d r e n wh i l et h r e a t e n i n g t h e f a m i l y,
abducting children andrecruiting them without theirfamily’s consent. Voluntary
recruitment (i.e., with family
authorization) accounted for44.2 percent of the sample
cases, a relatively highpercentage compared tocompulsory recruitment.
“ Vo l u n t a r y ” r e c r u i t m e n t ,however, includes instanceswhere families felt compelled toallow their children to be
recruited due to deteriorating
economic conditions, social
i n fl u e n c e o r i d e o l o g i c a lmobilization. Children are notoften recruited individually. 80
percent of the sample of thepresent study involved
collective/group recruitment. In
other words, recruitment was
carried out through collective
mobilization in small and large
groups, suggesting how
important social influenceamong children is in thisphenomenon.
The parties to the conflictassigned people from different
social groups to recruit children
and to make it more attractive tothem, such as mobilizing
supervisors, children’s relatives
and friends and, to lesser
degree, parents and brothers.
Different parties followed
different mechanisms to recruitchildren. Ansar Allah (Houthi
armed group) promoted the ideaof ‘Jihad’ to influence children,3

wh e r e a s t h e a r my o f t h einternationally recognized
government and other forces
often recruited children byoffering financial benefits.
C o n fl i c t a n d R e c r u i t m e n t
Dynamics
Child recruitment has taken an
upward trend in the conflict,i.e., recruitment increases as theconflict continues. Children
play an important role infighting and providing security
for the warring parties. A large
percentage of children havebeen killed (31.6 percent) fromthe overall sample of those
recruited, demonstrating a highlevel of reliance upon children
for fighting and security tasks.
This in turn indicates at least
part of the reason why parties tothe conflict continue recruiting
child soldiers – their
participation is viewed asconsiderably important to allparties.
There is an ongoing debate on
the phenomenon of childrecruitment in Yemeni society.
There are some conflicting
trends related to thisphenomenon during thecontinuing conflict. Despite thefact that child recruitment has atendency to rise, 11.6 percent offamilies which agreed to havetheir children recruited changed
their position and had theirchildren returned back to thefamily. These families took theirch i l d r e n b a ck f o r s e vera lreasons, including fear for theirchildren’s lives (especially as
fi g h t i n g e s c a l a t e d ) a n d
improvement in householdincome. 17.19 percent of therecruited children left their units
for different reasons which had
nothing to do with pressures

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experienced by their families.
Pe o p l e ’s p o s t u r e t o w a r d s
recruitment (such as after being
exposed to bad recruiting
practices) can change based onchanges in social statuses andthe dynamics of the conflict.
M o r e ove r, e c o n o m i cintervention for families whosechildren have been recruited
also appears able to reduce themagnitude of the phenomenon
and impact its course in apositive way.
Violations against RecruitedChildren and Family’s Reactions
Child recruitment is considereda violation of national andinternational law. It also exposes
children to dangers and abuses,
including death, injury, rapeand sexual violence. Recruitedc h i l d r e n h av e a l s o b e e nsubjected to harsh conditions,
had severe bodily injuries andbeen maltreated. The study
shows that 68.4 percent ofchildren recruited in the sample
suffered from different dangers
and abuses by parties to theconflict, including being killedduring confrontations with theother party, abduction, rape andsexual violence.
The reactions of children’s
families towards the dangers towhich their children were
exposed (specifically their
deaths) were generally muted
due to constraints which neither
offer opportunities for them toexpress their stance openly nor
allow them to take legal actionin the case of violations due tolack of effective legal
mechanism in the midst of theconflict. The majority of families
held recruiting parties
responsible for dangers orabuses to which their children

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
were exposed, while 30 percentof the families blamed the party
that directly caused the sufferingof the recruited child (forexample, the opposing party if
the child was killed during
fighting).
Direct Effects of Child
Recruitment
There are many negative effects
of recruiting child soldiers.
Three major negative effects thatcame out of the study arehighlighted. School dropout is
one of the main negative effectsof this phenomenon. 90.5
percent of the recruited children
were school boys prior to
recruitment. These children
dropped out of school believingthat recruitment would provide
them future economic
opportunities (such as getting apermanent job in the military)which could not be attained bycontinuing their education.
Moreover, child recruitment
results in changes in thought
and behavior which impact
children’s manner of thinking
about the future on the one
hand and dealing with family
and society, on the other, forexample, acquiring ideas fromthe recruiting party andattempting to take on new roles
inconsistent with their age.
Another major negative effect ofchild recruitment is theincreased number of people
carrying weapons in society.
69.5 percent of the recruitedchildren did not carry weapons
prior to recruitment. However,they now carry weapons,
including in areas where arms
proliferation was not common.

4Child Soldiers Recruitment –A Future Outlook
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t u dy ’s
fi n d i n g s , t h e m a j o r i t y o f
recruited children are eager toleave their units in cases ofimproved living conditions of
their family. On the contrary,
only 18.9 percent of therecruited children expressedinterest in continuing with theirunits. 15.1 percent of therecruited children answered “I
do not know” when asked
whether they would leave theirunits.
Given that the majority ofrecruited children wanted toleave their units if living
conditions of their family
improved, the economic factor
appears as an essential factor in
determining the evolution of thephenomenon.
Thus,
improvement in the economic
sphere is likely to limit the
expansion of the childrecruitment phenomenon.
H ow e ve r,
economic
improvement of the whole
population would not occur inthe context of a continuing
armed conflict. In other words,
the positive impact of improved
economic circumstances
depends on ending the conflict.
If the conflict does not stop,
children are likely to continue
being recruited, perhaps atincreased rates, due todeteriorating living conditions.
In assessing the likelihood of the
expansion of child recruitment
through scoping interviews with
non-recruited children living inan active recruiting
environment, it was found that
non-recruited children who
expressed interest to be
recruited accounted for 57.7

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
percent of those interviewed,
whereas those who did not
express interest were 42.3
percent, some of whom
opposed the idea of childrecruitment more broadly. The
majority of non-recruitedchildren appeared strongly
inclined to be recruited and join
the fighting. They believed that
recruitment was a way to getmoney and gain weapons,
which was a dream to realize
for some of them.
M o r e o v e r, e x p o s u r e t orecruitment efforts is high, withthe result that families’ controlof their children, especiallythose who are inclined to be
recruited, has weakened. The
study shows that exposure to
recruitment among nonrecruited children accounted for53.8 percent of the sample.
Likewise, 73.1 percent of the
respondent parents revealed thatthey have concerns that theirchildren might engage inrecruitment of other children in
the future without theirknowledge.
Key Recommendations
Below are some key
recommendations on how toaddress the child soldier issue:
1. Strengthen the resilience torecruitment for the child andthe family- Undertake a program ofgiving immediate assistanceto families whose children
have left fighting forces toh e l p t h e i r ( c h i l d r e n ’s )reintegration into society,including by accommodatingthem in schools and paying
special attention to girls who
have been recruited and at

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
risk of suffering from social
stigma;2. Adopt special measures forending child recruitment in
the course of ending theconflict- Ensure the collective releaseof children recruited by allparties to the conflict as astep towards paving the way
to reach a politicalsettlement, rather than
postponing this step bytreating it as a result of an
intended settlement;
3. Strengthen the legal andinstitutional framework- Operationalize the action
plan signed by thegovernment and the United
Nations regarding the releaseof recruited child soldiers,
stopping re-recruitment,
seriously following up its
implementation and creating
mechanisms for thesupervisory role of the United
Nations;
4. Strengthen the local andinternational partnership forchildren- Raise the level of cooperation
between child rights nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) and civil society
institutions working in Yemen,
to strengthen monitoring anddocumentation of thephenomenon of childrecruitment and to assist in
conducting in-depth studiesof the phenomenon at thelevel of the most enlisted
governorates.
*This is a slightly edited versionof the Executive Summary of theJuly 2020 report of Mwatana for5

Human Rights entitled Colored
Coffins - Recruitment and Useof Child Soldiers in the Armed
Conflict in Yemen, April 2013 December 2018. Full report ofthe study available at https://mwatana.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/09/ColoredCoffins.pdf.
Mwatana for Human Rights(Mwatana) is a human rights
organization that documents
human rights violations in
Yemen.
For more information, pleasecontact: Mwatana for Human
Rights (Mwatana), Dairi St.
0000 Sanaa, Yemen, ph +967 1
210
755;
e-mail:info@mwatana.org;
www.mwatana.org/en.

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JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108

Enforcing the Law Against Child Marriage
Rufa Cagoco-GuiamAl aw c r i m i n a l i z i n g t h epractice of child, early, andforced marriage took effect in
the Philippines in February
2022. This law implements thestate policy of abolishing “alltraditional and cultural practices
and structures that perpetuate
discrimination, abuse, andexploitation of children such as
the practice of child marriage.”the BTA, the group of membersof parliament claimed that the“…Bangsamoro community
does not support this law,“ asstated by Minister Romeo Semaof the region’s Ministry of Laborand Employment.2

The law entitled “An Act
Prohibiting the Practice of Child
Marriage and Imposing
Penalties Thereof” (Republic Act
No. 11596) was signed on 10
December 2021. It imposes stiff
penalties on those who officiate
or even cause early or childmarriage, like parents and older
relatives of both girls and boys.

Enforcing the Law

The law was praised by some
sectors in society but opposedby a group of Muslim leaders
who were members of theparliament in the Bangsamoro
Transition Authority (BTA) in the
Muslim region in Mindanao. The
opposition to the law was basedon the view that child marriage
was part of Bangsamoro“tradition” or “culture” and that“it is hard to change.”1
The Bangsamoro Transition
Authority (BTA), the interim
governing body of theBangsamoro Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao(BARMM), issued a resolution
appealing to President Rodrigo
Duterte to stop the
implementation of the law. In
supporting their resolution at

The enforcement of the law
however has not beensuspended.

Save the Children–South Central
M i n d a n a o O f fi c e ( S C M O )commissioned a research to get
evidence-based information for
designing interventions
addressing the concerns andissues related to the practice ofearly or child marriage among
i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s . Th e
research adopted a humanrights perspective thatrecognizes an individual’s rightto marry and to found a family
as based on the requirement of
the “free and full consent of theintending parties.” 3 In thissense, the “free and full”
consent of the parties who are
below 18 years of age can be
dubious as th e y a r e s t i l lconsidered immature, andusually under the influence ofthe decisions made by theirparents or older relatives.
The research found out thatmany of the T’boli and Blaan
women who contracted earlymarriage (at ages ten, twelve,
fifteen and sixteen) were notable to finish their basic
education (primary and6secondary levels). When theywent back to school after being
married, they were ridiculed andbullied by their classmates. They
also had to deal with various
socio-psychological factors thatare part and parcel of married
life, like having to deal withinterfering in-laws, earning aliving for their family, andnurturing children, when they
themselves were still children.
One case stood out as among
the most worrisome situation achild bride can get herself into.
One team documented the caseof a young woman at sixteen,
who already had three children—her parents arranged for her tomarry the local village chief after
she reached puberty. In hercase, this happened when she
was twelve, so after her first
menstruation, she was sent off tothe household of the village
chieftain, who at that time
already had twelve wives. As
part of her tragic story, her twoelder siblings had become childbrides of the chieftain earlier.
This was because her parents
had to follow the “tradition” ofearly marriage of theirindigenous community. The
reckoning of the relationships ofthe children of each of thesethree siblings by the same
husband can be a hugechallenge for any sociologist tohandle, making the drawing of
the children’s family tree verymuch a confusing exercise: thechildren of the three siblings arealso siblings themselves(because they were fathered by acommon husband) but they are

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also first-degree cousins since
they are children of threesiblings.
Another study by the Save theChildren (STC) came up withseveral insights based on theprevalence of early marriage
among both the T’boli of South
Cotabato and the Blaan ofSarangani province. Some of theinterviewed traditional leadersin that study stressed that it ishard to beat “tradition,” yet theyalso realized that many in theirrespective communities became
out-of-school youth after they
got married. One of its research
team’s recommendations wasfor STC to conduct a series ofconsultations among theindigenous peoples’
communities within their areaof work, in both South Cotabato
and Sarangani, to convince thetraditional leaderships among
the T’boli and Blaan to consider
regulating the practice of earlymarriage in their communities.
This was carried out, andtoward the end of the series ofconsultations, traditional leaders
themselves agreed on acovenant to ensure that young
people, especially girls, would
not be pushed to marry earlyjust to keep the tradition.
In Marawi City, after the fivemonth siege in 2017, a
substantial number of child andforced marriages among girls
was reported in evacuation sites.
Thirty-one percent of the people
in these sites responded to asurvey conducted by Plan
International that child andforced marriage, especiallyamong young girls, isconsidered the most common
form of sexual violence. While
early or child marriage is“acceptable” among Meranaws
as it is part of their “tradition,”

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
there is also a growing numberof women among them who are
advocating the end of thisp ra c t i c e . Th e s u r ve y a l s orevealed that child marriage has
become a coping mechanism formany families in the temporary
or transitory shelter areas due to“economic instability, fear of
violence, and a felt need tomaintain ‘family honor.’” Thelatter is the consequence of theshame brought about by an actof sexual violence against young
girls in the evacuation sites. It isalways the violated girls whobear the brunt of being shamed
and pilloried by society. Whenshe gets pregnant, she will beforced to marry the older person
who sexually abused her to“preserve family honor.”
The Panginam (Hope) project inMolundo, a town situated twenty
kilometers south of Marawi City,is strongly advocating that girls
and boys are given opportunities
to study and to enjoy theirchildhood. In 2019, the United
N a t i o n s Po p u l a t i o n F u n d ,together with the United Nations
Development Programme andthe International Labour
Organization provided bothmaterial and capacity-building
support to a group of young
women who wanted to see thepractice of child and forced
marriage eliminated in theircommunities. Sam Guro, a youth
development officer in Molundo,
initiated this program, together
with three friends. Sam herself
revealed that her parents were
married when they werechildren, but are now realizingthat education can be a weapon
to fight against poverty, and bothyoung women and men should
be given adequate opportunities
to get quality education, learn
skills for livelihood, instead of
stopping school just because

7

they are already married in order
to work to support their families.
Children need to enjoy being
children, being able to play andengage in rough and tumble
kinds of games while in theirprimary and secondary schoolstudies. Sam is proud that she
and her friends are giving young
girls and boys hope for the
future, one that is no longer
practicing child marriage.
The results of these research
projects support the feasibility ofenforcing in Mindanao the lawthat prohibits child marriage.
Like all other aspects of culture,
tradition is learned; therefore, it
can also be unlearned.
Moreover, several traditions
among Magindanawan havea l r e a dy b e e n d e c r e e d by
Muslim Councils of Elders as“un-Islamic”—for example, thebelief in fortune-telling, sorcery,traditional forms of healing
invoking spirits like the pag ipat,
celebrating birthdays, among
others. These are strongly
discouraged among Muslims.
But practicing these cultural
traditions does not infringe on
anybody’s human rights, unlike
the practice of child marriage.
Rufa Cagoco‐Guiam, after
retiring as a Full Professor at theSociology Department, Collegeof Social Sciences andHumanities, Mindanao State
University - General Santos Cityin 2016, continues to research,
write and give presentations on
peace issues in Mindanao, as
well as participate in special
government projects on
addressing problems affecting
Muslims in Mindanao.

(Continued on page 15)

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JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108

Black Hole of Child Abduction
Find My ParentAside from being known asdeveloped and tech-savvy
country, Japan is also known ast h e “ b l a ck h o l e o f ch i l dabduction.” The country earned
this image years before Hague
Convention took effect in Japan
in 20141 and continues to bebrought up by local andinternational media today. Japanis accused of turning a blindeye to parental abduction for
decades and effectively
encouraging it through its solecustody and authority law.
Sole Parental Responsibility
Japan is unusual amongdeveloped nations in notrecognizing the concept of joint
child custody or shared parental
responsibility.
When a couple divorces inJapan – regardless of nationality– only one parent can retain
sole parental authority andcustody unless parents agree on
their own to have joint custody.
As a result, the non-custodial
parent is at the mercy of thecustodial parent; the latter can
prevent the former from seeing,interacting or even speaking
with their children.2 In addition,
once separated, the noncustodial parent has no right tomake any decision on thec h i l d r e n ’s s c h o o l i n g o r
healthcare issues.
Japanese courts give custody to
one parent by applying what is
known as the “continuity
principle” — which translates to“if the child is settled in one
household, he/she should not
be disturbed.”
As observed by a law professor3
Japanese family court judges
thus have tremendous
discretion when it comes tomaking decisions aboutchildren and may do so by,for example, completely
reversing a foreign custody,
refusing to award any
visitation to a non-custodial
parent, awarding visitation for
only a few hours once a year,
or ordering the custodial
parent to send a few
photographs of the childevery year in lieu ofvisitation.

Another government survey in
2021 showed that more than 50
percent of single parent
households struggle financially.6
Japan also has one of thehighest child suicide rates in theworld, with most children citing
family problems as a reason.7
Recorded child abuse has also
hit record highs.8
By having joint custody andauthority similar to othercountries in the world, children
in Japan of separated/divorced
parents would be less prone toany form of abuse or suffering
due to poverty. A second parent
and extended family would be
able to follow-up on theirchildren’s care and well-being.

There are also reports of abuseby lawyers and judges by
ensuring that the abductedchildren would not be able tosee their left behind parents.
T h e y a l l e g e d l y b e n e fi t
financially from this scheme.4

Criminal LiabilityChild Alienation

However, a parent who tries tofind his/her abducted children
risks being arrested forattempted kidnapping based on
Article 224 of the Penal Code.
This can happen even though
the left behind parent still
possesses full parental authority
and has no restrictions on
seeing his/her children. The
threats are real. A 2005
decision of the Supreme Court
illustrates the application of
Article 224 to a left behindfather:10

Single parent custody can havesignificant effect on the socioeconomic and psychologicalwell-being of children. In a
survey of children of divorced
parents, 40 percent ofrespondents “felt their lives
became more difficult after theirparents parted.” This is one of
the results of the “first largescale survey of children in Japan
regarding divorce” undertakenby the Ministry of Justice in
2021.58

Article 224 of the Japanese
Penal Code provides that
abduction of a minor is acriminal offense.9 This criminal
provision applies to any parent
who abducts his/her child.

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Where the father took away
by physical force his twoyear-old child who was in thecustody of the mother living
separately from him, if there
werenospecialcircumstances in which it was
actually necessary for thefather to commit such an act
and the act was violent andcoercive, the father's act ofkidnapping the child cannot
be justified even though hehas parental authority.

Australian Scott McIntyre spent
forty-five days in detention cellin Japan in 2019 trying to checkon the well-being of his children
his wife had kidnapped a few
months before.11
In the case of Vincent Fichot, hefiled four complaints for childabuse and child abduction with
the Japanese police during thelast four years. None of hiscomplaints were given due
course. Instead, the police
threatened to arrest him on
kidnapping charges in case hetried to see his children. The
irony is that, to this day, he isstill married to his estranged
Japanese wife and has fullparental authority over theirchildren.
Not Limited to Non-Japanese
Parents
Parental abduction occurs inevery social class, ethnicity, andgender in Japan. Though theinternational media often
focuses attention on theabduction of children of nonJapanese fathers, the reality12 isthat most abducted children
have two Japanese parents, anda growing number of abductors
are Japanese fathers.
Wi t h n e a r l y a q u a r t e r o finternational marriages in Japan

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
involving a Filipino wife andJapanese husband,13 it is likelythat a significant number ofJapanese-Filipino children are abeing abducted in Japan as well.
Change Underway?
I n N o v e m b e r 2 0 2 1 , fi v eJapanese news channels
reported the issue of childabduction for the first time afterFrance issued an Interpol arrest
warrant for Vincent Fichot's
Japanese wife on kidnapping
and abuse charges. Although
the children were kidnapped onJapanese soil, Fichot was able toobtain the Interpol arrest
warrant because his children
possess dual nationality (French
and Japanese). This highlighted
the weakness in the operation ofJapanese law. To date, theJapanese authorities have failed
to act on this arrest warrant
despite continuous pressure andfollow-up from Fichot.
Months after the news cameout, the Head of the National
Police Agency of Japan made asurprising announcement. He
instructed his departments tofacilitate the registration ofcomplaints of abduction ofminors (unilateral removal of achild from one parent). The
instruction included the
conduct of awareness-raising
activities for police officers incharge of complaints, and thesetting up of a dedicated phone
number to respond to any reportof abduction of children. For the
first-time, dozens of left behindparents in Japan went to thepolice to complain on theabduction of their children by
their spouses.
Will the police and the Ministryof Justice act on these childabduction complaints and file9

criminal charges in court inaccordance with the law? This is
still to be seen. But members of
the Japanese parliament
including Masahiko Shibayama
are closely monitoring thesituation in Japan and theimplementation of existing laws,
including Article 224 of theJ a p a n e s e Pe n a l C o d e o nabduction of minors.
SolutionsThough the current system andcultural norms can be large
barriers towards preventing andresolving parental abduction in
Japan, Find My Parent (FMP) is
confident that change can beachieved through consistent,c o o r d i n a t e d a n d s t ra t e g i cactions. Supporters of the child’s
right to both parents advocate
for change at the local andinternational levels. They holdregular demonstrations to raise
public awareness and pressure
the government for action.
Many politicians in Japan are
also advocating for an end toparental abduction.
Embassies of different countries
in Tokyo (in coordination with
their Ministries of Foreign
Affairs) can put pressure on
Japan to prevent as well as
resolve parental abduction ofchildren. Honorable Rahm
Emanuel, the new U.S.
Ambassador to Japan, expressed
his plan to raise the issue of
implementation of the Hague
Convention with the Japanese
government during theconfirmation hearing at the U.S.
Senate of his nomination asambassador to Japan and in his
response (5 April 2022) to theletter of Find My Parent (FMP)
regarding child abduction in
Japan. 14 Consistent pressuremust be put on the U.S.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
Embassy as well as otherembassies in Japan to ensurethat the abducted children are
not forgotten.
Te c h n o l o g y c a n p l a y a nimportant role in supporting
families during the divorce
process by providing them withthe right tools for a positive,
child-centered co-parenting
relationship. FMP is currently
developing a mobile
application created anddesigned for Japanese families
for this purpose. The mobile
application is expected to belaunched in the second half of2022. Also, left behind parents
who want to raise their voices
to the decision-makers can doso by visiting the FMP website https://findmyparent.org/.
For children who have alreadybeen abducted, restoring theirlink with the left-behind parent
as soon as possible is key. The
bond between a parent andchild is necessary to thechildren’s development andsuccess. Since the current
mechanisms for child-parent
reunification are largely failingchildren around the world, FMP
has developed a mobile
application that empowers
children and parents to reuniteu s i n g t h e l a t e s t a r t i fi c i a l
intelligence (AI) technology.
Learn more on YouTube15 about
this app, which can be
downloaded from the FMP
website(https://findmyparent.org/app/).

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
between a child and his/herparent and between a child andextended family cannot just be
put back together like a puzzle.
It is a complex relationship that
may take years to mend andsometimes it never does. That is
why efforts must be focused on
the prevention of parental
abduction and the promotion ofco-parenting. Supporters cancontribute by spreadingawareness through social media
and word of mouth. Most will
be surprised to see how many
affected people respond once
they start talking about theissue. FMP’s podcast You’re
Double17 is a great place to starthearing real stories and expert
advice on the issue.
Lastly, it is important that thosemost affected by parental
abduction – innocent,vulnerable children who areoften scarred for life - are notforgotten. We should take timeout of our day to check-in on
the children in our lives,
especially those who havedivorced parents. Governments,s c h o o l s a n d n o n - p r o fi torganizations need to play theirpart in making sure thesechildren get the support theyneed, by providing a safe spacefor children to express theirconcerns and by providing
access to quality, child-centeredmental health services.

FMP is using the same powerful
technology to help reunite
families16 separated during thecurrent war in Ukraine.

Find My Parent is a U.S.
registered, international nonprofit organization that iscommitted to empowering andadvocating on behalf of
abducted children around theworld.

Reuniting families after parental
abduction is not enough,t h o u g h . Th e r e l a t i o n s h i p

For further information aboutchild abduction in Japan or
supporting efforts that advocate

10

for the children of Japan, pleasev i s i t fi n d m y p a r e n t . o r g o r
download the Find My Parent
mobile app in the Google PlayStore or Apple Store to start
searching for your missing loved
ones.
Endnotes
1
2

3

4

5

See Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
w w w. m o f a . g o . j p / f p / h r _ h a /page22e_000249.html.
Story of Japanese mother Emi
presented in Find My Parent
You’re Double podcast https://
findmyparent.org/japanesegovernment-politicians-judgesand-lawyers-dont-care-aboutch i l d r e n - e m i - l e f t - b e h i n d parent-from-japan/.
Colin P.A. Jones, Divorce andChild Custody Issues in theJapanese Legal System, Official
Magazine, U.S. Embassy Japan,
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
amview.japan.usembassy.gov/
en/divorce-law-in-japan/.
See Nozomi Makino, The
Darkness of the Real Child
Kidnapping Business: Humanrights lawyers' crazy tricks,
https://hanada-plus.jp/articles/
3 2 3 , a n d Yo s h i k o I k e d a ,Darkness of child abduction
business continued - Here are
the “Villains” who killed theHague Convention, https://
hanada-plus.jp/articles/328.
See also Current Situation ofChild Abduction in Japan,
written statement submitted by
the International Career
Support Association, a nongovernmental organization to
the United Nations, UNGA, A/
HRC/39/NGO/86, 31 August
2018, available at https://
findmyparent.org/knowledgebase/19752/.
“1,000 people in their 20s and30s” participated in this survey
via the Ministry of Justicewebsite. ”Over 40% polled inJapan say parents' divorce,(Continued on page 15)

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108“Ushiku” – Documenting Human Rights Violations inJapan
Jefferson R. PlantillaT

he website of the
documentary film “Ushiku”
describes what it is all about:1
Ushiku takes viewers deep
into the psychological andphysical environment
inhabited by foreign detainees
in one of the largest
immigration centres in Japan.
On the eve of Japan’s recent –and highly contentious –immigration reform efforts, themedia blackout the
government has imposed on
its immigration centres is
bypassed, bringing viewers
into immediate contact withthe detainees, many of whom
are refugees seeking asylum.
Detainees are held indefinitely
and subject to violentd e p o r t a t i o n a t t e m p t s by
Japanese authorities against abackground of the ensuing
COVID-19 pandemic andwith the spectacle of theTokyo Olympics looming on
the immediate horizon.

The interview of detainees wasvideo-recorded in secret(without permission from thedetention center officials) ino rd er to r eport what t hedetainees say as human rights
violations in the center.
T h e fi l m p r e s e n t s t h etestimonies of nine people on
their condition inside the
Immigration Center in Ushiku
City, Ibaraki Prefecture. The
detainees have pending

applications to stay in Japan. In
most cases, the detainees aredeported from detention. Whenthey refuse deportation, they are"re-detained." Some have beendetained for several years.
The detainees, interviewed
several times over several
months, express their worsening
physical and mental conditions.
Some appeared on wheelchairs
due to illness or weakness due
to hunger strike. Theinterviewed detainees seem tosuffer from depression and othermental health problems. The
film includes an official videofrom the detention center
showing physical abuse in theway a detainee was restrained.
The film raises serious questions
on why such human rights
violations have remained inJapan’s detention centers until
the present. This issue has long
been the subject of appeals by
Japanese organizations
supporting those in theimmigration detention centers.2
Some of the detainees wereg ive n t e m p o ra r y f r e e d o m(known as "Provisional
Release") but were not given
legal permission to work to
support their needs. One of theinterviewed detainees
contemplated suicide for beingalone and without money, whilestaying out of the detention
center.

11

Motivation in Making the Film
The Director, Thomas Ash,made an official statement
about the documentary:3
My motivation was not tomake a film, but rather as awitness to human rights
violations, I felt morallycompelled to document
evidence in the form offi l m i n g t h e d e t a i n e e s ’testimonies; to document theirtruth.

He noted the need to address
the violation of human rights ofdetainees in Japan’s immigration
centers illustrated by the4death of Wishma Sandamali
Rathnayake in March 2021,
who had been detained for 7
months at an immigration
centre in Nagoya, and thedeaths of 16 others over the
past 15 years, [that]
demonstrate[…] why so many
supporters are concerned
about the health andwellbeing of people suffering
in indefinite detention [in]Japan.

The issue of indefinite detention
and the abusive treatment of thedetainees are the main focusesof “Ushiku.”
The Director and Film Festivals
Thomas Ash was a former
English language teacher under
the Japan Exchange andFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
Teaching Programme (JET) in
Tochigi prefecture from 2000 to
2003.5 He subsequently madefilms mostly about social issues
in Japan. As described by aninternational film festival, Ashis6a director, editor, producer
and writer based in Japan.
His documentaries on healthand medicine in the country
have covered topics such as
children living in areas of
Fukushima impacted by the
nuclear meltdown, end-oflife care, and male sex
workers.
“Ushiku” earned awards in film
festivals in several countries
including Nippon Docs Award(Audience Award) at the 2021
Nippon Connection Film
Festival (Germany), First Prize in
Asian Competition at the 2021
DMZ Docs FF (Korea) and
Camera Japan Award (AudienceAward) at the 2021 Camera
Japan Festival (Holland).7 It was
shown in the online Yamagata
International Documentary Film
Fe s t iva l 2 0 2 1 , 8 S i n g a p o r eInternational Film Festival(SGIFF) in 2021, Japan Square –Filmfestival 2022 (Belgium),9among others.10“Ushiku” started to be shown intheaters in different parts ofJapan from February 2022 andis slated to be shown in thirtyfive cities, but that number isstill increasing.
Documenting Human Rights
Violations
The value of “Ushiku” as a
documentation of human rights
violations in Japan is notaffected by the lack ofpermission from the detention
center to video-record theinterviews. The interviewed

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
detainees agreed to reveal to thegeneral public in Japan andother countries the problems
they face in the detention
center. On the supposed lack ofconsent of one of theinterviewed detainees, thedetained person made an online
statement about his fullagreement to the inclusion of
his interview in the film.11 The
interviewed detainees took therisk of speaking out about theirsituation despite the fear of
possible abuse later on insidethe detention center.
The film shows the problem of
inadequate scrutiny of theimmigration detention system inJapan. It challenges the Japanese
government to prove that its
detention system protects thehuman rights of the nonJapanese detainees, and to holdits officers properly accountablefor violations whenever theyoccur.12“Ushiku” is not about theapplication of the detainees for
permission to stay in Japan or to
obtain refugee status, or theJapanese refugee acceptancesystem. It simply aims to raise
public awareness on thesituation of detainees and theneed for the detention centers toprotect their human rights.
Ash expresses his hope about
the documentary film:13“My hope is that people who
see the film will want to know
more about the issues and will
investigate it further. I’ve
gotten involved by making thefilm, but everyone has adifferent role to play. I hope itwill lead to a range of actions.
Even just talking to someone
else is something. If more
people learn about the issues,
it could lead to a solution.

12

What I fear the most is
indifference.”

Jefferson R. Plantilla is a
R e s e a rch e r a t H U R I G H T SOSAKA. The author thanks
Thomas Ash for providing
additional information in thisarticle.
For further information, pleasecontact Jefferson R. Plantilla at
jeff@hurights.or.jp.
Endnotes
1 牛久
Ushiku,www.ushikufilm.com/.
2 See Japan Federation of Bar
Associations, Statement on the
Death of the Detainee in the
Nagoya Regional Immigration
Services
Bureau,w w w. n i ch i b e n r e n . o r. j p / e n /document/statements/
210330.html.
3 Director's Statement,w w w. u s h i k u fi l m . c o m / e n /statement/.
4 Director's Statement, ibid.
5 “Ushiku Film Screening andQ & A ,” Je t Wi t , h t t p s : / /jetwit.com/wordpress/
2 0 2 1 / 1 0 / 0 5 / u s h i k u - fi l m screening-and-qa/?
utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=ushikufilm-screening-and-qa.
6 Singapore International Film
Festival (SGIFF), 4 December
2021, https://sgiff.com/films/
ushiku/.
7 Ushiku press kit provided byThomas Ash via e-mail dated 28
April 2022.
8 Perspectives Japan section of the
Ya m a g a t a I n t e r n a t i o n a lDocumentary Festival, October
9, 2021, YIDFF Online, https://
online.yidff.jp/film/ushiku/.
9 Jochen Meeus, Japan Square2022 trailer, Japan Square, 24
M a rch 2 0 2 2 , w w w. j a p a n square.be/filmfestival/author/
tamala/.

(Continued on page 15)

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108

Human Rights Education in Asia-Pacific, Volume 11*

H

URIGHTS OSAKA finishedits 11th volume of Human
Rights Education in Asia-Pacific(2021) with articles from ninecountries and three international/
regional institutions (Hedayahbased in United Arab Emirates,
Search for Common Ground Sri
Lanka office, and Asia Justiceand Rights and the ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission
on Human Rights both based inIndonesia).

ethnic groups in minimizing
prejudice and discriminationthat constituted the root causeof the armed conflict. Personalencounters take the form ofhome and community visits.
Home visits lead to better
appreciation and acceptance ofdifferences in culture andthinking of ethnic groups, and amore nuanced understanding of
the suffering endured during theperiod of armed conflict.

Programs
The articles cover educational
programs for migrant workers in
S in ga p ore , Indones ia, thePhilippines and Hong Kong;
non-governmental organization
workers in the Philippines;
youth from rural communities in
Pa k i s t a n a n d S r i L a n k a ;community leaders from Timor
Leste, Indonesia and thePhilippines; school teachers inJapan; education andgovernment officials in Australia
and other countries.
The peace-related articles focus
on how to manage trauma fromarmed conflict, and how to
avoid violent conflict or preventthe rise of violent extremism.
Learnings
Several articles provide
significant lessons learned in theimplementation of educational
programs related to humanrights. The article on
memorialization in Sri Lanka
discusses the importance of
personal encounter amongpeople belonging to different

Community visits, on the other
hand, “helped the participants
to debunk cultural stereotypes,
see the plight of Hindu minority,
understand the feudal systemand experience interaction withpeople of different ethnic andcultural backgrounds.” Stories
and views expressed bymembers of the communities
provide essential understandingof issues that beset people inrural areas.
Educational efforts at preventing
extreme violence require13

measures such as “mitigating
feelings of isolation or exclusion
by establishing positive
connections between students’
own worlds and the worlds ofo t h e r s ,” a n d p r o v i d i n g“alternatives to violence andviolent extremism by cultivatinga t t i t u d e s a n d va l u e s t h a t
encourage students toparticipate as active citizens intheir communities.” Educational
efforts for those who sufferedfrom conflict and violence, on
the other hand, provide the“opportunity to learn about how
non-formal educationinfluences healing for victims of
trauma and how to help thoseindividuals become empoweredto assert their rights fortransitional justice andaccountability for human rights
violations.” Hedayah points topractical measures of changing
thinking and behavior in thisregard.
In training people on how toproperly react to situations ofabuse or violation of humanrights, that is, raising a voice tostop the acts of abuse or
violation or to change practiceand system, the VEOHRC pilot
project suggests the need for a“more iterative implementationof the program [that would
enable] participants to further
practice […] skills andtroubleshoot some of thesechallenges in a supportive
environment.”
The same project also stresses
the need to tailor training
program or module to thes p e c i fi c s i t u a t i o n s o f t h eFOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
participants to make them moree f f e c t i v e . S i m i l a r l y, t h eexperience of the Asia Justiceand Rights (AJAR) in training
field workers shows the need tocreate “training modules forindividuals working with AJAR
to better understand how towork with survivors of trauma,including key skills andprinciples for working withthem effectively.” The Educationfor Shared Societies (E4SS)
headed by Hedayah echoes thesame rule regarding its
educational recommendations:“A guiding principle in theimplementation of theserecommendations is that theyshould not be considered
universal, but rather guidelinesthat should be tailored to fit
local needs and contexts.”
Knowledge and skills have to beappropriate to the context of theparticipants to ensure theirapplication after the training.
Raising awareness of the generalpublic is a big challenge.
Human rights messages have tocompete against a multitude ofmessages in mainstream anddigital media. However, specifichuman rights issues that relate
to daily life of people or to an
important player in the national
economy may attract
considerable attention. The
issues regarding domestic help
who work in private homes andthe migrant workers who are a
key resource in construction,
service and manufacturingindustries in Singapore attract
public attention throughappropriate educational
activities. This public attention isuseful in pressuring thegovernment to change policy. As
experienced by Transit Workers
Count Too (TWC2), “[P]ublic
engagement to broaden popular

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
awareness of migrant workers
and their rights and encourage
support has played a role inbringing about such changes as
have occurred, and we thinkthat it has been laying a goodfoundation for further advances
in years to come.” The changes
refer to government policies
regarding “better securing
workers’ pay, days off fordomestic workers, andimproving accommodation,transport and safety standards.”
In the case of the Association for
To y o n a k a M u l t i c u l t u r a l
Symbiosis (ATOMS), engaging
the public has at least two major
objectives: a) to make theJapanese public in the city
understand the situation of the
non-Japanese residents; and b)
to gain public support for theprotection and realization of
their (non-Japanese residents’)rights. In line with theseobjectives, ATOMS sees thenecessity of focusing on specificissues of non-Japanese residents
and offers services beyond“mere provision of
information… [but]… are meant
to empower [them] … inengaging the Japanese residents
towards “Creating a fair andsustainable, multicultural
symbiotic society.”
Practical Suggestions on
Educational Programs
Several articles provide concrete
recommendations on how toeffectively implement
educational programs.
The evaluation of the Sri Lanka
project of Search for Common
Ground recommends that“[O]verall, skills building should
be more practical, more handson, and draw more from real life

14

examples so that the youth cansee their applicability to theirown lived circumstances better.”
It also recommends that “[M]oreneeds to be done afterworkshops end, to promote
networking and developing
structures of mutual support
between participating youth.”
Regarding the use of the“ C h a m p i o n s m o d e l ,” t h ee va l u a t i o n o f C o m m u n i t yMemorialization Project in Sri
Lanka recommends “[S]upport[for] the champions to build
their knowledge and conflict
resolution skills by engaging
with small-scale conflicts intheir own communities, before
engaging with large-scale
conflict at the national level.”
VEORHC recommends moretraining to be provided to“Champions on how to beeffective facilitators.” And“ongoing opportunity to debrief/
get support from theCommission staff” could makethe Champions model “an evenmore effective approach to[project] implementation.”* This article is based on the
Introduction in volume 11 of
Human Rights Education in
Asia-Pacific (2021) prepared byJefferson R. Plantilla.
Volume 11 of Human Rights
Education in Asia-Pacific (2021)
is available at the website of
HURIGHTSOSAKA:
www.hurights.or.jp/archives/
asia-pacific/.

FOCUS ASIA-PACIFIC
Enforcing the Law Against Child
Marriage(Continued from page 7)
For further information, pleasecontact: Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, email: rcguiam@gmail.com.

Black Hole of Child Abduction(Continued from page 10)

6

7

8

separation made life harder,”Mainichi Japan, 12 March
2 0 2 1 , h t t p s : / / m a i n i ch i . j p /english/articles/20210312/p2a/00m/0na/004000c.
“50% of single-parent
households in Japan struggle
financially: study,”
KYODO
NEWS, 24 December 2021,
https://english.kyodonews.net/
n e w s / 2 0 2 1 / 1 2 /d8b8b4ab2cc1-50-of-singleparent-households-in-japanstruggle-financially-study.html.
See “Suicide Data and Trends
in Japan,” Tokyo Mental Health,www.tokyomentalhealth.com/
suicide-data-and-trends-injapan/. Also, “Main reasons forcommitting suicide among
students in Japan in 2020,”
statista,www.statista.com/
statistics/1068645/japanreason-committing-suicideamong-students/.
“Child-abuse cases topped
200,000 in Japan in fiscal year
to March 2021,” Japan Times,
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/“Ushiku” – Documenting
Human Rights Violations in Japan(Continued from page 12)
10 See Ushiku Film website for thefilm festivals where the film wasawarded and/or shown:www.ushikufilm.com/en/watch/and also in DocumentingIan

JUNE 2022 VOLUME 108
Endnotes
1 See Jeoffrey Maitem, “Muslim
leaders ask Duterte to defer law
criminalizing child marriage,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10
January2022,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/153
8228/muslim-leaders-ask-dutert

e-to-defer-law-criminalizing-child-marriage.
2 Maitem, ibid.
3 See Article 16, Sections 1 and 2of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and Article 16.2of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

2021/08/27/national/childabuse-cases-japan/.
9 Chapter XXXIII. Crimes ofKidnapping and Buying or
Selling of Human Beings
Article 224. (Kidnapping of
Minors)A person who kidnaps a minor
by force or enticement shall bepunished by imprisonment withwork for not less than 3 months
but not more than 7 years.
PENAL CODE (Act No. 45 of
1 9 0 7 ) , w w w. c a s . g o . j p / j p /seisaku/hourei/data/PC.pdf.
10 2004 (A) 2199, Keishu Vol. 59,
No. 10, 2005.12.06, Judgmentsof the Supreme Court,w w w. c o u r t s . g o . j p / a p p /hanrei_en/detail?id=793.
11 “Australian journalist freed inJapan after arrest for trying tosee his children,” BBC, 15
January 2020, www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-51129580.
12 See Washington Post article,
www.washingtonpost.com/
w o r l d / a s i a _ p a c i fi c / j a p a n ch i l d r e n - c u s t o dy - d ivo r c e /2 0 2 0 / 1 0 / 1 8 /f7421d62-077f-11eb-8719-0df
159d14794_story.html.
13 See International Marriage inJapan: Trends in Nationality of

Spouses, nippon.com, 13 April
2018, www.nippon.com/en/
features/h00174/.
14 D e m a n d t h a t t h e U S
Ambassador to Japan
proactively encourage Japan torespect the Hague Convention,h t t p s : / / fi n d m y p a r e n t . o r g /ambassador-emanuel-stand-upf o r- a m e r i c a n - ch i l d r e n abducted-in-japan/ andresponse to letter of Vincent
Fichot and Deanielle Dawra ofFind
My
Pa r e n t s ,w w w. f a c e b o o k . c o m /findmyparent.org/photos/pcb.
512483287190111/512483193
856787.
15 Who is FMP and how does it
reunite families with AIt e c h n o l o g y ? ,www.youtube.com/
supported_browsers?
next_url=https%3A%2F% 2 F w w w. y o u t u b e . c o m% 2 F w a t c h % 3 F v%3D4QKVqVhqVIs.
16 E m p o w e r i n g U k r a i n i a n s
through real-time family tracing
and reunification, https://reunite-ukraine.com/.
17 Yo u ’r e D o u b l e , h t t p s : / /findmyparent.org/category/youre-double/.

w e b s i t e :www.documentingian.com/.
11 See ディレクターズ・ステート
メント (Director's Statement) inJapaneselanguage,w w w . u s h i k u fi l m . c o m /statement/.
12 See Japan Federation of Bar
Associations, op. cit.
13 Matsumoto Takuya, “Ushiku”
Director Thomas Ash Discusses

His Covert Reporting on
Immigration Detainees,
nippon.com, 15 April 2022,
www.nippon.com/en/japantopics/c030165/ushiku-directorthomas-ash-discusses-hiscovert-reporting-onimmigration-detainees.html?
fbclid=IwAR3cO3u4NuBlIAICEODDDaDyUL0J7rd1JoOO_ZV5
B3rmOaFWRowxw9XIEio.

15

HURIGHTS OSAKA Calendar

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Read the full volume 11 of Human Rights Education in Asia-Pacific at www.hurights.or.jp/archives/asiapacific/.

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HURIGHTS OSAKA, inspired by the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, formally opened in December 1994. It has the following aims: 1) to engender popular understanding in Osaka of the international human rights standards; 2) to support international exchange
between Osaka and countries in Asia-Pacific through collection and dissemination of information andmaterials on human rights; and 3) to promote human rights in Asia-Pacific in cooperation with nationaland regional institutions and civil society organizations as well as the United Nations. In order to achievethese goals, HURIGHTS OSAKA has activities such as Information Handling, Research and Study, Education and Training, Publications, and Consultancy Services.
FOCUS Asia-Pacific is designed to highlight significant issues and activities relating to human rights in
the Asia-Pacific. Relevant information and articles can be sent to HURIGHTS OSAKA for inclusion in thenext editions of the newsletter.
Sender: HURIGHTS OSAKA(Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center)
8F, CE Nishihonmachi Bldg., 1-7-7 Nishihonmachi, Nishi-ku, Osaka 550-0005
Japan
Phone: (816) 6543-7002
Fax: (816) 6543-7004
E-mail: webmail@hurights.or.jp Website: www.hurights.or.jp

HURIGHTS OSAKA