NEA InternationalPeer Reviews forRadioactive Waste
Management
Background and Process

Rebecca Tadesse
Head of Division, Radioactive Waste
Management & Decommissioning, NEA© 2023 OECD/NEA

NUMO Webinar, 8 June 2023

NEA member countries

The NEA's current membership consists of 34 countries in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacificregion. Together they account for approximately 82% of the world's installed nuclear capacity.
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NEA Standing Technical Committees

RWMC: Developing strategic policies,

best practices in addressing safety, societaland economics issues in managing
radioactive wastes in all phases.

Environmental
factors© 2023 OECD/NEA

Societalfactors

Regulatory /legal aspects

CDLM: Developing strategic policies, bestpractices in nuclear decommissioning andmanagement of legacy facilities

Operational
Safetywww.oecd-nea.org

Economicfactors

Knowledge
management
3Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC)
The RWMC is an international committee supporting members in thedevelopment of safe and economically efficient management of all typesof radioactive waste (including spent fuel).
RWMC has:• Representatives from regulatory authorities, policy-making bodies, RWM
implementers, research institutes and other key stakeholders.
• 125 members, from 30+ countries and the European Commission (EC).
• Observers: IAEA
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4General aspects of an NEA coordinated peer review

International Peer Reviews are organised inaccordance with the published 2005 NEA
guidelines on international peer reviews forradioactive waste management.

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5General aspects of an NEA coordinated peer review• An NEA coordinated peer review can be described as the systematic
examination and assessment of a national waste management programme ora specific aspect of it, with the ultimate goal to help the requesting country toadopt best practices, comply with established principles and, in some cases,
improve policy.
• The examination is conducted on a non-adversarial basis. It relies on mutual
trust among the NEA Secretariat and the country/organisation requesting thereview, as well on shared international confidence in the process.
• This trust has been built over many years through the co-operation work
taking place under the aegis of the RWMC and through the refinement of thepeer review procedure over many earlier peer reviews.

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6General aspects of an NEA coordinated peer review(continued)• NEA coordinated peer reviews are not meant to formally approve ordisapprove a national programme. Rather they are meant to help the national
programme improve and to facilitate the self-assessment of the reviewee
and/or the assessment by the national reviewers.
• Care is also taken to not interfere unduly with national decision-making
processes, e.g. for licensing a facility.

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Co-operational aspects of NEA Peer Reviews• With these elements in place, and through the possible reciprocity of theevaluation process, peer review tends to create a system of mutual
accountability among NEA member organisations.
• Peer review as a working method is closely associated with the OECD, where
it is facilitated by the homogeneous membership and the high degree ofshared trust amongst the member countries and in the Secretariat.
• In the OECD, peer review is seen as an instrument for both co-operation andchange. In particular, while there is value in the review report, the view isalso that much benefit is received by the member country from the processof undergoing a peer review itself.
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Identification of the International Review Team (IRT)• An International Review Team (IRT) with broad international experience wasassembled independently by the OECD/NEA. It consisted of seven external
experts from the RWMC, a hired technical writer, and two NEA staff, covering
the following areas of competence:• Expert knowledge in siting and design of deep geological repositories incrystalline and sedimentary rock formations;• Expert knowledge for conducting safety assessment of geological repositories
for HLW and TRU waste.

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NEA Peer Reviews in the 1990’s
YearCountryName

1992

SwedenSKI’s Project 90

1993

Netherlands Research programme for Onshore Geological Disposal ofRadioactive Waste in the Netherlands (OPLA-1a)

1995

SwedenSKI’s SITE-94 Project

1995

CanadaAECL - Environment Impact Statement of the Disposal of Canada’s
Nuclear Fuel Waste.

1996

USA

Performance Assessment for Compliance Certification of the US
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

1999

UKNIREX Methodology for Scenario and Conceptual ModelDevelopment – An International Peer Review

1999

Japan

JNC H-12 Project to establish the technical basis of HLW disposalin Japan

1999-2000

Sweden

SKB’s Safety Report 97: Post-closure Safety of a Deep Repository
for Nuclear Spent Fuel in Sweden© 2023 OECD/NEA

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NEA Peer Reviews in the 2000’s
Year

CountryName

2000

USA

Yucca Mountain Project’s Total System Performance Assessment for theSite Recommendation (TSPA-SR)

2002

Belgium

SAFIR 2: Belgian R&D Programme on the Deep Disposal of High-leveland Long-lived Radioactive Waste

2003

FranceThe French R&D Programme on Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive
Waste - “Dossier 2001 Argile”

2004

Switzerland

Safety of Disposal of Spent Fuel, HLW and Long-lived ILWin Switzerland. Post-closure radiological safety assessment for disposal
in the Opalinus Clay of the Zürcher Weinland (ProjectEntsorgungsnachweis)

2006

FranceSafety of Geological Disposal of High-level and Long-lived
Radioactive Waste in France - “Dossier 2005 Argile”© 2023 OECD/NEA

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NEA Peer Reviews in the 2000’s (continued)
YearCountryName

2011

SwedenThe Post-closure Radiological Safety Case for a Spent FuelRepository in Sweden

2012

Belgium

The Long-term Radiological Safety of a Surface Disposal Facilityfor Low-level Waste in Belgium

2016

Japan

Geological Aspects of the Siting Process for a HLW deep
underground Repository© 2023 OECD/NEA

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IRT Impartiality• To assure high standards of integrity and to avoid conflict of interest, theselected review team experts was not have been involved with the Japaneseradioactive waste management programme, including the Japanese
government or any of its subsidiaries / affiliated bodies, in the last five years.
• Statements of impartiality were attached in the review report.
• The IRT agreed to the ToR via written agreement.
• Mr Gérald Ouzounian served as the report’s technical writer.

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The International Review Team
Reviewer

Organization

ReviewerOrganization

Mr. Philippe
LALIEUX

Safety Case Strategy (IMPLEMENTER)
Ondraf / Niras, Belgium

Ms. Mihaela ION

Safety Assessment(IMPLEMENTER)
NWMO, Canada

Mr. Allan HEDIN

Post Closure Safety Assessment (IMPLEMENTER)
SKB, Sweden

Mr. Jussi
HEINONENSTUK, Finland (REGULATOR) &IRT ChairMr. Jean-Michel
HOORELBEKE

Safety Case Strategy (IMPLEMENTER)
Andra, France

Mr. Jeheong
BANG

KINS, Korea (TSO)

Mr. Jens MIBUS

BFE/BUND, Germany (REGULATOR)

Ms. Morgan
PACKERNEA Secretariat

Ms. Rebecca
TADESSENEA Secretariat

Mr. Gerald
OuzounianTechnical Writer© 2023 OECD/NEA

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Members of the IRT and NEA Secretariat

Jussi Heinonen

Philippe Lalieux© 2023 OECD/NEA

Je-Heon Bang

Allan Hedin

Jens Mibus

Rebecca Tadesse
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Jean-Michel
Hoorelbeke

Mihaela Ion

Morgan Packer

Gérald Ouzounian15

ToRs: Objectives of the NUMO Pre-siting, SDM-based Safety
Case Report• The objective of this peer review was to provide an independent review of theEnglish version of the “NUMO Pre-siting, SDM-based Safety Case Report”.
• The review will assess the maturity and readiness of this generic safety case,developed at a pre-siting stage, to confirm the technical feasibility of deep
geological disposal in Japan and to develop a framing structure applicable tosite-selection;• The review will check that the report reflects the latest international technicalknowledge and R&D achievements, built around the concept of a safety case,as established by OECD/NEA and IAEA;© 2023 OECD/NEA

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ToRs: Objectives
The review should determine sufficiency and credibility of the following 7
components of the report:• The safety strategy at this pre-selection stage and the approach chosen to
prepare to initiate site-specific work;• The assessment of geological environments considered to be representativeof those that would result from the siting programme and the proposed
methodology for site characterisation at the beginning of the siting process,focusing on knowledge integration within SDMs;• The repository design approach, tailoring layout to potential host rocks, andthe assessment of the practicality of repository construction, operation andclosure.
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ToRs: Objectives• The operational and post-closure safety assessments for repositories tailored to thehost rocks described;• The implementation of management tools to facilitate integration of the siting, designand safety assessment teams and provide the iterative feedback required to assuretechnical quality;• The fundamental feasibility of geological disposal in Japan within geologicalenvironments similar to the type of environments assessed;• The critical synthesis of the safety case strengths and weaknesses as the basis fordeveloping an R&D plan for the improvement of the credibility of the safetyassessment and practicality of implementation of the geological disposal programme.

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Thank you foryour attention

Please contact Rebecca.Tadesse@oecdnea.org and Morgan.Packer@oecdnea.org if you have any questions orcomments.

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Title page photo: Dry storage facilities (Creative Commons, NRCgov)