1The Psychology of Intertemporal Preferences
To appear in the “Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making”

Oleg Urminsky
University of Chicago
Gal Zauberman
University of Pennsylvania

May 17, 2014

Author Note
Oleg Urminsky is an Associate Professor of Marketing at the Booth School of Business,
University of Chicago, email Oleg.Urminsky@chicagobooth.edu. Gal Zauberman is a
Professor of Marketing and Psychology at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
email gal@wharton.upenn.edu. Authors are listed alphabetically. Correspondence could be
addressed to either author. We thank the editors, Gideon Keren and George Wu, as well as
Daniel Bartels, Alixandra Barasch, Rob St. Louis, Daniel Read and an anonymous reviewer
for their helpful feedback and suggestions.

2Intertemporal decisions involve relative preferences and tradeoffs for costs and benefits
that occur over time. These decisions are ubiquitous and have been extensively studied
across multiple academic disciplines, including economics, psychology, business, and public
policy. Common examples of such decisions include whether to consume today (i.e.,borrow more and/or save less) but have less in your retirement fund; to purchase acheaper refrigerator or air-conditioning unit, but forgo the ongoing energy savings; to hire
an experienced employee who can start immediately instead of the brilliant but
inexperienced recent graduate who needs more extensive training; or to eat that fatty
chocolate cream dessert rather than the blueberry sorbet, increasing your current
enjoyment while increasing the risk for your long-term health.
Research on this question has occupied the pages of many journals and produced multiple
highly influential and widely cited papers (Fisher 1935; Ainslie 1975; Thaler 1981; Laibson
1997; Kirby et al 1999; Frederick et al 2002). The seminal paper on time discounting by
Ainslie (1975), which drew a link between findings from the animal behavior literature anda detailed theory of shifting time preferences, self-control and precommitment, spurred alarge and evolving research literature.
There have also been numerous chapters surveying the field. Loewenstein (1992) provides
a detailed account of the development of thinking about intertemporal choice within
economics. Frederick , Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) present a detailed review anddiscussion of the development of the literature on time discounting in both psychology andeconomics. Baron (2007) offers a general review of decisions involving time, while Read
(2004) and Killeen (2009) review alternative mathematical forms of discount functions.
Recently, there have been reviews focusing on the neurological underpinning ofintertemporal decisions (e.g., Kable, 2013).
The focus in this chapter is on the psychological foundation of intertemporal decisions andthe consequences for people’s decisions and behaviors. Much of the early research on the
behavioral aspects of intertemporal preferences has compared observed behavior acrossdifferent contexts to the normative standard--the discounted utility model, which assumes
that the discounting rate of utility is constant over time. This research has demonstrated
numerous violations of this normative model. While there is a great deal of heterogeneity
in individuals’ discounting, the literature has uncovered several robust empiricalgeneralizations. These findings were instrumental in shaping our understanding of thepsychology underlying intertemporal tradeoffs, but an explicit development of these
psychological theories was generally not the center of the investigations.
More recently, however, research has shifted from identification of “anomalies” touncovering the psychological determinants of intertemporal preferences. These theories

3

originally started with more emotional, visceral accounts and then developed to include
more cognitive elements focusing on mental representations of outcomes and time.
Much of the broader interest in intertemporal choice has been spurred by the possibility
that an understanding of how people make intertemporal tradeoffs might inform a wide
range of behaviors, including seemingly non-normative behaviors such as undersaving for
retirement, underinvesting in one’s own education, overconsuming unhealthy foods,
underexercising and abusing alcohol or drugs. However, while initial work discussed
intertemporal choices (and particularly hyperbolic discounting) as an analogy for thesebehaviors, more recent work has explored the degree to which such behaviors are directly
linked to intertemporal choice.
Rather than simply update the numerous excellent past reviews with a focus on the
discounting phenomena, the emphasis in this chapter is on recent developments inuncovering the psychology underlying intertemporal preferences, understanding
differences in discount rates across people and contexts, and using discounting tounderstand a broad range of intertemporal decisions and behaviors. The current chapter
will therefore mainly focus on recent empirical findings with an emphasis on thepsychological mechanisms underlying these findings. In particular, we examine the basic
effects in the context of the different psychological mechanisms proposed in the literature.
We conclude by pointing to open questions and the need to better map the match between
the multiple psychological drivers and the types of intertemporal decisions they
predominantly govern.

1. Discounting Behavior
Much of our initial understanding of intertemporal choice came from research comparing
actual behavior across different contexts to the established normative standard -- thediscounted utility model (Samuelson, 1937; described in the next section). Much was
written about the development of the discounted utility model, and many have pointed outthat it was never intended to serve as a descriptive model of behavior (Frederick et al2002). Still, due to the clarity of its normative properties, it has been used as a metricagainst which actual behavior can be compared. Two underlying features of the model aremost relevant for behavioral research: the source of utility should be irrelevant (since it is
the utility that is being discounted), and that the rate of discounting should be constantover time. A great deal of evidence has been amassed showing that these assumptions arecommonly violated. Because of the extensive literature on the issue, including
comprehensive review papers cited above, we will be brief and highlight only relatively
new findings.

4

Measuring and modeling intertemporal preferences
Measuring intertemporal preferences. The very basic effect of interest is the valuation of agiven outcome at different points in time. To that end, two broad categories of measuresare employed: matching-based and choice-based. The matching-based measures (e.g.,
Thaler 1981) provide participants an amount at a given point in time (e.g, $15 today) andask for the monetary equivalent at another point in time (e.g., $X in 3 months). This basic
task has been modified in different studies using different scenarios, and different framing(e.g., expedite a future receipt rather than delay a current receipt; Malkoc and Zauberman2006). One main advantage of this approach is that it is flexible and requires only a single
response to calculate a discount rate over a given time period.
The other commonly used measurement approach uses a series of binary choices to elicit
discount rates; for example, $15 today or $16 in 3 months; $15 today or $18 in 3 months,
etc. The researcher then identifies the point where a respondent switches from receiving
an amount today to receiving a specified amount in the future, based on which they thencalculate the discount rate. This binary choice measure has been implemented in a wide
range of ways, from a simple paper-and-pencil series of static choices (e.g., Kirby andMarkovic, 1996) to a more adaptive and iterative selection of the amounts and the times,
allowing for more efficient and reliable measurement (e.g., Toubia, Johnson, Evgeniou, andDelquie, 2012). While this method usually involves incrementing the amounts, the timedelay could be incremented instead.
When comparing the two most common measures, the matching task has the advantage ofrequiring only a single response to arrive at a discount rate. However, since it requires the
respondent to generate an equivalence number, which could be more cognitively
demanding, extreme responses may complicate the analysis. The binary choice task has theadvantage of presenting a simple two alternative question which are easier for
respondents to understand (Hardisty et al 2013) but requires a series of these questions toarrive at a discount rate. Fischer et al. (1999) argued that different measures can trigger
different ‘task goals,’ such as goal to equate options versus differentiate between options.
Specifically, while making separate choices leads to differentiating goal, making a series of
iterative choices that identify an indifference point triggers a goal to equate options, moresimilar to matching.
The study of intertemporal choice using recent developments in neuroimaging data has
been growing (for reviews see Barnes et al., 2007; Kable, 2013). While this new

5methodology has already provided some interesting insights, we will mention relevant
findings in the context of specific topics, but will not provide an in-depth discussion.
Modeling intertemporal preferences. The different theoretical models of discounting havebeen formalized using various mathematical models. We briefly describe the models mostcommonly used. Consider an outcome, such as receiving a sum of money x at some point in
the future, D units of time from now. At the time of receipt, the outcome will be valued withsome utility VD =U(x). The current valuation (V0) of the outcome, given that it is delayed by Dunits of time, is computed by multiplying the delayed outcome by a discount factor f, which isoften assumed to have values between 0 and 1:
V0 = f(D)VD
In most empirical work, a simplifying assumption of (local) linear utility is made, setting VD= x,
resulting in a model of the monetary discount rate (Noor 2009), rather than a utility-based
discount rate.
In the standard economic model (Samuelson, 1937), the degree of discounting depends on an
exponential discount factor fE, defined by the delay D and discount rate r:fE(D) = exp (-ra*D) or fE(D) = 1 / (1 + rb)D
The instantaneous discount rate is defined as –f ’(D)/f(D), and as a result, the exponential
discount rate is simply rE = ra = ln(1 + rb), and is constant regardless of delay in the
exponential model. Note, however, that the values of the discount rates are specific to the unitof time in which D is measured (e.g, days, weeks, years).
Alternatively, in the hyperbolic model (Mazur 1987), which allows for discount rates tocontinuously decline over time, discounting is defined by a hyperbolic discount factor:
fH(D) = 1 / (1 + k*D)
While k is sometimes referred to as the hyperbolic discount rate, it is important to note thatthe instantaneous discount rate is actually rH = - k / (1 + k*D), which varies with the delay. In
fact, the hyperbolic discount parameter k reflects not just the degree of change in the discountrate over time (e.g., the deviation from exponential discount) but also the average discountrate. For this reason, the widespread practice of correlating other variables to the kparameter (as discussed in subsequent sections) yields results that can be difficult tointerpret. In particular, a high correlation should not be interpreted as evidence that highvalues of the other variable relates to “more hyperbolic” or “more time inconsistent”
preferences.
The generalized hyperbola model (Harvey 1989) adds another parameter, which helps
deal with this issue:fGH(D) = (1+D) –In this model,  is interpreted as the deviation from exponential. The instantaneous discountrate is rGH = /(1 + *D),, and the model approaches the exponential model, exp(-D), in thelimit as  approaches 0 (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992).

6

Another widely used formulation, most popular in economics, is the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model (Laibson 1997) that distinguishes consistency of discounting from level of
discounting by assuming a higher discount factor () in the first period, but a constantdiscount factor () for subsequent periods:fQH(D) D
In this model,  can be interpreted as a measure of present bias, while  can be interpreted asdetermining the long-run discount factor, with an instantaneous discount rate after the first
period of rQH =  ln(), which does not vary with time.
Some more recent models (Benhabib et al 2007, Bleichrodt et al 2009, Ebert andPrelec 2007, Killeen 2009, Scholten and Read 2006, Scholten and Read 2010) provide
alternative or extended specifications, generally to account for non-hyperbolic violations oftime consistency. These models have been used to accommodate additional behavioral
anomalies, including some of those described in this chapter.
Model-free estimates of discount rates. An alternative non-parametric approach is to estimate
an aggregate degree of discounting without the use of a specific discounting function. Some
researchers have simply computed estimated discount factors based on the amount of
delayed outcome VD judged to be equivalent to the immediate outcome V0 as fEST = V0/VD (e.g.,
Bartels and Urminsky 2011). Importantly, when multiple estimated discount factors for a
respondent are averaged, the result should be interpreted as an approximate overall discountfactor that may depend on the range of delays used.
Another common approach, instead of averaging, is to use the estimated discount factor foreach delay to calculate the “Area Under the Curve” (AUC; Myerson, Green andWarusawitharana 2001). The estimated discount factor (e.g., V0/VD) is plotted as a function ofdelay D, and the area under the curve is estimated, usually by discretizing the area into
approximate trapezoids. On average, the lower the discount factors and the more rapid thedecline in discount factors with longer delay, the lower the AUC measure will be. Therefore,
AUC can be thought of as a non-parametric alternative to the hyperbolic k parameter,
incorporating both overall discount rate and time inconsistency or present bias.
Reliability and consistency of estimated discount rates. Given the widespread use of elicited
discount rates as a dependent variable or as a correlate in studies of intertemporal choices
and behaviors, the reliability of the instruments used is an important consideration. Low
reliability can frustrate attempts to study the effects of time discounting, leading tospurious null findings and low correlations. Furthermore, the reliability of a measurepresents an upper bound for estimates of correlations between that measure and otherconstructs (e.g., Vul et al 2009), potentially casting doubt on high correlation findings,
particularly for small samples.

7

Test-retest reliability has been assessed in multiple studies, over time periods ranging fromone week to a year, generally with very positive results. A meta-analysis of 17 studies
across 14 papers reveals a weighted average test-retest reliability of .78 (Urminsky 2014).
Comparing across studies reveals a strong effect of time interval, with longer intervals
between test and retest yielding lower reliabilities.
Methodological differences across elicitation instruments may also reduce the consistencyof estimates. Common methodological differences in the literature include hypothetical vs.
real outcomes, the order of multiple choice items, the reward magnitudes and time lengths,
and even the nature of the outcome (monetary vs. other items). Similar discount rates havebeen found when elicited via hypothetical questions compared to identical paid (orprobabilistically paid) choices (Frederick et al 2002; Johnson and Bickel 2002), and a highcorrelation between hypothetical and real choices has been documented (r=.83, Johnson andBickel 2002), albeit with a small sample. Correlations between different elicitation methods(e.g., titrated vs. randomized stimuli, computerized vs. on paper) using similar monetary
gains have generally been high, but sometimes led to different estimates of discount rates,
due to systematic differences in average scores (see Urminsky 2014). In particular, while
average discount rates differ based on the magnitude of gains used, as discussed below,
discount rates elicited using different magnitudes are strongly correlated (meta-analysis
average r=.77 based on eight studies, Urminsky 2014).
Order effects seem more problematic. When eliciting a series of choices, discount rates arehigher when the magnitude of the immediate option (sooner-smaller) is titrated indescending (vs. ascending order), and rates from different orders are only moderately
correlated (descending vs. ascending, r=.44, Robles et al 2009; descending vs. random,
r=.38, and ascending vs. random, r=.59, Robles and Vargas 2007).
The correlations between instruments based on fundamentally different choices can bevery low. Researchers have found very low correlations between discount rates using
hypothetical monetary choices and in-lab behavioral impulsivity,1 such as discount rates ofthirsty participants based on tradeoffs between drink rewards and short experienced
delays (Jimura et al 2011, Lane et al 2003, Smits et al 2013). Likewise, averaging acrossfive studies, there is very little correlation between discount rates from monetary gains andlosses (meta-analysis average r=.13, Urminsky 2014).

1 Sometimes labeled as “delay of reward” or “experiential discounting” paradigms.

8High discount rates
The literature on intertemporal choices has been characterized by a willingness to foregomuch larger future rewards in order to receive smaller rewards sooner, which can becharacterized as high discount rates (or, equivalently, low discount factors). Numerous
studies have attempted to estimate discount rates, using field and experimental studies, realand hypothetical outcomes, and a range of elicitation methods. Frederick et al. (2002)
characterize the findings as a “predominance of high discount rates – discount rates well
above market interest rates,” although they note that many potential confounds may inflate
estimates of the discount rate. While it is difficult to specify an objective normative rate, thereasonableness of a discount rate can be thought of as shaped by economic considerations,such as how much interest could be earned in the intervening time (Fisher 1930), liquidity
constraints (Meyer 1976; Fuchs 1982), inflation (Frederick et al 2002), uncertainty (Dasgupta
and Maskin 2005), among other factors. A large literature (reviewed in Frederick et al 2002),
using lab studies with either hypothetical outcomes or small-stakes real outcomes, has
attempted to control for these other factors and has found generally high discount rates.
One limitation of discount rates elicited in the lab is that they tend to be based on either
hypothetical choices or real choice with low stakes, due to cost limitations. However,discounting is of interest primarily for the insight that can be generated into people’s realconsequential behavior, which could be different. Some field studies have attempted toestimate discount rates from consequential high-stakes decisions. In an early attempt toquantify the discount rates implied by choices in the field, Hausman (1979) estimated aprivate annualized discount rate of 25%, based on the differential costs savings fromdifferent air conditioners. Laibson (1997) has found evidence that actual savings behavior isgenerally more impatient than what would be predicted by economic factors alone. Warnerand Pleeter (2001) document military employees’ preferences for a large lump-sum payment
over a higher-yield long-term annuity, and estimate an average inflation-adjusted discountrate of between 16 and 23 percent. Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) estimated discountrates from high-stakes real monetary choices with rural villagers in Vietnam, and find bothsubstantial present bias and extremely high average annualized discount rates (>1600%)
when looking at delays ranging from three days to three months. Kirby et al (2002) also finds
median annualized discount rates (> 4000%), over shorter time intervals for real choices with
Bolivian villagers.

9

Heterogeneity in discount rates.
A large literature has studied the ways in which discount rates vary across individuals. Some
researchers have proposed that discount rates should differ by demographic factors. Fisher(1930) predicted that people should have lower discount rates if they have higher current or
future expected income. Bjorklund & Kipp (1996) proposed, based on an evolutionary
argument, that women may be better able to delay gratification than men, potentiallyresulting in lower discount rates. Building on prior research suggesting that delay ofgratification is a learnable skill that increases as children age (Mischel et al 1989), Green, Fry
and Myerson (1994) proposed that discount rates would decline with age.
Differences in discount rates based on demographics have been documented in many studies,but results often conflict from one study to another, largely due to small sample sizes and low
statistical power. However, several factors seem to consistently replicate across large-sample
studies. In a particularly large scale study (N=42,863), Reimers et al (2009) find that choicesof a single hypothetical sooner-smaller option (vs. later-larger) are weakly but significantly
higher for younger (r=.05), less educated (r=.13) and lower-income (r=.09) respondents.
Warner and Pleeter (2001) analyze severance payment decisions of 11,000 military officers
and 55,000 enlisted personnel, and similarly find significantly more choices of a soonersmaller lump-sum payment among those who are younger, less educated, African-American,
or have more dependents. Lastly, using a panel data set of consumption in over 1,500
households, Lawrence (1991) finds evidence of higher discount rates for lower income, lower
education and non-white families. In these studies, the reported effects remained significant
when controlling for the other factors measured, which addresses potential confounds, suchas intercorrelations between age, income, and education.
Shamosh and Gray (2007) conducted a meta-analysis on the correlation between intelligencetest scores and discounting. They find a significant negative relationship (r = -.25), such thatthose with lower intelligence (IQ) scores have higher discount rates. Similarly, Frederick(2005) finds higher impatience among people with lower “cognitive reflection,” that is, those
who are more likely to choose mistaken but seemingly correct responses to test questions.
Consistent findings have been documented in multiple studies for highest level of educationachieved (de Wit et al 2007, Warner and Pleeter 2001 , Reemers et al, 2009). Furthermore,
there is some research suggesting that higher delay of gratification predicts future scores on
standardized achievement tests (Mischel et al 1989), and that lower discount rates predict
grades (Duckworth and Seligman 2005; Kirby et al 2005, Lee et al 2012; Silva and Gross
2004) and standardized test scores (Benjamin et al 2013).
Most papers that correlate discount rates with either demographics or behaviors (discussed
in section 3) either use a single intertemporal choice as a proxy for discounting or, in most lab

10studies, estimate a single discount parameter (e.g., the hyperbolic k parameter, or “area under
the curve”). It is important to note that choices of the sooner-smaller option, or larger valuesof the hyperbolic discount parameter, are influenced both by how hyperbolic (e.g. presentbiased) the discounting is and the average (or long-term) discount rate. To the degree that
present bias and long-term discount rates are conceptually and psychologically distinct,
quantifying discounting with a single parameter (e.g., as opposed to using a two-parametermodel, such as Laibson’s - model) confounds the two and makes accurate interpretation of
the results difficult. Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) provide an important exception,
which illustrates the potential problem. They find that older people and those with moreincome and education have lower average discount rates, but they find no effect of thesefactors on present bias. In contrast, in a repeated-measures study of changes in discount rates
over time, Green et al (1999) find that as people age, their discount rates decline and they also
become less present-biased.
Another important concern is that the link between demographics and discounting (as well as
between behaviors and discounting, Section 3) has been substantiated primarily throughcorrelational evidence. This makes it particularly problematic to draw causal conclusions. As
an illustration, consider the relationship between higher education and lower discount rates.
In a developmental account of the relationship, education is the cause and training in
gratification deferral would, directly and indirectly, presumably lower discount rates. In an
investment account, however, time preferences are the cause, such that people with lower
discount rates are less willing to bear the near-term direct costs and opportunity costs ofgetting more education. Alternatively, other factors (such as socio-economic status inchildhood or cultural norms) may shape both the level of educational attainment and discountrates, even without the existence of a direct causal relationship between education anddiscounting.
The recent interest in the psychological determinants of time preference, discussed in Section
2, has motivated research on interventions that shift intertemporal choices. This approachhas the potential to resolve some of the causal ambiguity. For example, several papers havenoted differences in discount rates across countries, cultures and ethnicities (Castillo et al
2011, Poulos and Whittington 2000). Chen, Ng and Rao (2005) and Benjamin, Choi andStrickland (2010) investigate the causal basis of one such difference by manipulating thesalience of national or cultural identity in order to isolate the effect of culture-specific norms
on discount rates.

11

Context dependent discounting.
The rate at which people discount the future depends strongly on the context in which they
are elicited. For example, discounting is higher for short delays than longer delays, higher
for smaller amounts than larger amounts, higher for gains than for losses, higher whendelaying a current amount than when expediting a future amount, and is often different fordifferent resources (higher for time than money). Because these features of discounting
behavior have been widely reviewed, we will only briefly mention them with a focus on
recent new findings.
Temporal inconsistency. The behavioral regularity that has probably received more attention
than any other is temporal inconsistency, also often referred to as ‘hyperbolic discounting’,‘declining impatience,’ or ‘present bias.’ This refers to the basic phenomenon where
discounting over a given time delay changes with the time horizon over which it is measured.
More specifically, revealed discount rates decline with the length of the duration (e.g.,
Benzion, Rappoport, and Yagil, 1989; Chapman; 1996; Thaler, 1981). Thaler (1981) foundmedian responses over a set of values to be 345% over one month delay, 120% over one-year
delay, and only 19% over ten year delay.
Beyond showing the sensitivity of unit discounting to time horizons, the key implication of
hyperbolic discounting is time inconsistent preferences which yield a preference reversal as
the time to both outcomes diminishes (Ainslie 1975). For example, a person would prefer $10
today over $12 in a week but prefer $12 in a year and one week over $10 in a year. Note,however, that the set of findings about declining discount rates, for which we have a great dealof evidence, often comes from matching tasks over different time horizons (Thaler, 1981).
Direct evidence for intertemporal preference reversal, for which we have far less evidence,
generally comes from studies in which people make prospective choices (Green, Fristoe, andMeyerson, 1994; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995). Recently, there has been accumulating
evidence that the process of actually waiting for the outcome may affect preferences, suchthat actual preference reversals may be unlikely (Harrison et al 2005; Luhmann 2013; Readet al 2012) or may even occur in the opposite direction, with increasing patience (Dai and
Fishbach 2013; Sayman and Öncüler 2009).
Still, taking the accumulated evidence on this question, the data supports the conclusion thatintertemporal preferences are sensitive to the time horizons being considered, with greater
weight on departure from the immediate present than any other period. The underlying
psychology is less understood. As discussed later, the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting
provided a foundational finding for the development of psychological theories, ranging from
affective to cognitive processes.

12

Magnitude and sign effects. Thaler (1981) noted that the magnitude of the outcomes being
considered also affects the level of discounting. This gave rise to the idea that we cannot thinkof the decision process as a simple consideration (and discounting) of present utility
regardless of its source. In particular, the paper established that small amounts are
discounted more steeply than large amounts. For example, over a one year delay, $15 yielded
a median annual discount rate of 139%, $250 yielded 34%, and $3000 yielded 29%. In
addition, Thaler (1981) reported that gains are discounted more than the monetaryequivalent loss.
Temporal framing effects. There are two aspects of temporal framing effects that have been
documented. One pertains to the direction: whether the situation involves delaying a current
outcome or expediting a future one. Loewenstein (1988) demonstrated that for a given time
horizon, delaying a present outcome results in steeper discounting than when expediting afuture outcome to the present. This effect was further established for losses as well as gains(Benzion, Rappoport, and Yagil, 1989; Shelly, 1993), and for the degree of hyperbolic
discounting rather than just overall discount rates (Malkoc and Zauberman, 2006).
The other facet concerns the manner by which the time horizon is being expressed, whether
making the length of delay explicit or just providing the date, often referred to as the datedelay effect (LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005). The two forms yield different elicited discountrates, indicating that the framing of the temporal context plays an important role in thedecision process. This effect demonstrates higher discounting when a given future time
horizon is framed as a delay (e.g., one month) versus a date marking the identical duration(June 27), as well as greater hyperbolic discounting. This shows that merely altering the way
in which a time horizon is represented changes the valuation of outcomes over that duration.

Resource specific discount rates.
While the elicitation of discount rates has primarily focused on monetary tradeoffs, manydecisions that researchers have tried to explain in terms of discounting involve nonmonetary tradeoffs, such as time, health, or environmental impact. If people maketradeoffs purely based on utility and timing, consistent with the normative discounting
model, then the source of utility should not matter and discounting in one domain should
explain behavior across other domains. However, people may either have different relative
valuations of sooner vs. later outcomes in different domains or may just have different
heuristics for making intertemporal choices in different contexts. In either case, people
would have effectively different discount rates for different items or benefits (Winer 1987).

13This possibility has been incorporated into economic models of intertemporal choice as
related to poverty (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010) and taxation (Futagami and Hori
2010). In particular, the “affective discounting” hypothesis (Vallacher 1993, Loewenstein1996) suggests that people will have higher discount rates (or exhibit more present bias)
when making tradeoffs involving more affectively rich outcomes. Zauberman and Lynch(2005) demonstrated that when considering discounting of time and money, two
fundamental economic resources, people consistently showed both greater discounting andmore hyperbolic discounting for time than for money, and show that this difference is due
to greater relative growth in the perceived availability of time then money. Still, to date, theevidence for cross-resource discounting stability is mixed.
The largest literature comparing discount rates across domains has been between
discounting money and health outcomes, such as trading off between a partial reduction insymptoms soon vs. a more complete reduction that begins later (Chapman, Nelson and Hier1999). These studies have generally replicated present bias consistent with hyperbolic
discounting (e.g., higher discount rates for a shorter delay, Bleichrodt and Johannesson
2001; Cairns and van der Pol 1997; Chapman and Elstein 1995), as well as other findings,
such as magnitude effects and higher discounting for gains than losses (Chapman 1996).
A central question is whether discount rates are higher for money or health. The results
are somewhat inconsistent, with most studies finding higher discount rates for health thanmoney, but some studies finding the opposite (see Urminsky 2014 for a review). In
particular, in order to rule out magnitude effect confounds, Chapman (1996) calibrates
equal-utility health and monetary outcomes and finds a higher discount rate for health thanmoney.
Other researchers have used the same methodology to compare how smaller-sooner vs.
later-larger tradeoffs are made for amounts of money and for amounts of other consumableproducts. Across twenty papers, higher discount rates are consistently found for money
than for drugs, cigarettes, alcohol and food, and somewhat weaker differences have also
been reported for non-consumable products such as books, DVDs and music, laptops andTVs (see Urminsky 2014 for a review). However, these studies do not control fordifferences in the utility or value of the products.
Despite the intuitive appeal of the idea that differences in discount rates underlie
differences in decision-making for hedonic vs. non-hedonic outcomes, the large literatureon hedonic consumption (see Alba and Williams 2013 for a review) has not shown a link
between individual differences in elicited discounting and hedonic consumption. There areseveral difficulties with comparing item-specific discount rates, which present
impediments to linking these two areas. First, the stimuli must be equalized so that14

differences in discounting cannot be due to differences in magnitude (Chapman 1996).
Second, when discount rates are elicited by trading off smaller or larger amounts of thesame item, item-specific differences in discount rates are confounded with item-specificdifferences in the shape of the utility function, such as diminishing marginal utility(Andersen et al 2008; Gafni and Torrance 1984).
However, it seems unlikely that this confound completely explains the existing findings. In
a large-scale field study in Uganda, Ubfal (2013) finds significantly higher discount rates forstaple foods (meat, sugar, plantains) than for money and some consumer products (lotion
and perfume) and lower rates for other products (clothes, shoes, school supplies, meals
outside, soda, airtime, saloon, entertainment and snacks), controlling for overall (but not
good-specific) diminishing marginal utility.
Given that much of the literature documents differences in average discount rates, it may
be that a person’s discount rate in one domain is largely unrelated to their discount rate inanother domain. However, some researchers have suggested that discounting for moneyor goods both draw on the same mental processes (McClure et al 1997). In the healthdomain, a meta-analysis of eight papers (Urminsky 2014) reveals a moderate but robust
weighted-average correlation of r=.23 between discount rates elicited from health versus
monetary outcomes. Similarly, a review by Odum (2011) found generally strong
intercorrelations between discounting of money, alcohol, cigarettes and food, ranging from.18 to .90. Similarly, moderate correlations (averaging approximately r=.35) have beenfound between discounting of money, alcohol, cigarettes, food and entertainment products(meta-analysis of four papers, Urminsky 2014). These results, particularly given the highshort-term test-retest reliabilities typically observed, suggest that discounting, while astable trait, can be moderated by state factors, including the type of good being discounted.

2. Psychological Determinants
This section reviews several psychological mechanisms that have been shown to driveintertemporal preferences. These mechanisms range from the “hot” (emotion based) to“cold” (cognitive based), and focus on the outcomes relevant to the choice, the self in thecontext of the choice, and the perception of the time horizon relevant to the choice. It is
important to note that intertemporal preferences are inherently multiply determined, andno one psychological mechanism can explain all situations. Yet, thinking about thepsychological underpinning of this behavior will lead to a better understanding and theability to better predict these choices and, therefore, the ability to design behavioral
interventions that will shift preferences. Moreover, these various mechanism, whether hot
or cold, all tend to result in a heightened motivation for the immediate outcome compared15

to the distant one. We first discuss determinants related to affect, motivation and tradeoff
conflict and then discuss cognitive determinants, including processing, memory and timeperception.

Affective determinantsFreud is famous for using a horse and a rider as an analogy to describe the id as providing
power and the ego controlling it. This dual system analogy has been used by George Ainslie
and others (e.g., “planner” and “doer”, Thaler and Shefrin 1981) to describe the mechanism
underlying impulsivity in intertemporal decisions, both high overall discount rates andhyperbolic discounting (e.g., Soman et al. 2005). In a decision that involves intertemporal
tradeoffs, the basic drive (the horse) is for the immediate reward, whereas self-control
comes from an overriding deliberate process (the rider) that takes future consequences
into consideration. It is this tension between the desire for the immediate andunderstanding that long term consequences need to be taken into account thatcharacterizes the process of intertemporal choice.
In one of the most often cited arguments for an affect-based process, Loewenstein (1996)
argued that visceral factors have a significant influence on intertemporal decisions, inparticular because people have a hard time anticipating these factors. Visceral factors are
emotions (e.g., anger) and drive states (e.g., hunger, thirst) that motivate people toconsume. As such, stimuli that are linked to these factors and can thereby satisfy the stateof deprivation (such as food, drugs, sex, etc) are then most likely to display impulsive
preferences that are difficult to anticipate when not in this ‘hot state’. This idea isconsistent with the horse and rider analogy above, and has provided an intuitively
appealing rationale for two-system models of interetemporal preferences, such as the betadelta model (Laibson 1997).
In support of the role of affective influence, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) present evidence
that the preference for an affect rich chocolate cake compared to the relatively affect poor
fruit salad increases when cognitive resources are low (e.g., using a cognitive load
manipulation). These results are often cited to make the point that the reference for the
option with the immediate benefit (taste) but long term costs (health) is determined by anaffective mechanism, that is controlled (to various extents) by cognitive resources. McClureet al. (2004) use evidence from a brain imaging study to propose the existence of two
distinct brain regions, one that correspond to the response to immediate rewards and theother to delayed rewards, although the evidence for two separate neural systems has beenchallenged (e.g., Glimcher, Kable, and Louie, 2007). Regardless of the exact neurological16

underpinning, emotions play a clear role in the heighted motivation toward immediate
rewards, and represent an important mechanism in intertemporal choice.

Mental representation and concreteness of outcomes
One important determinant for the weight given to present versus future outcomes is thedifferent way in which they are mentally represented: more concrete evaluations of thenear future and abstract evaluations of future outcomes. The most relevant theoreticalframework for this process is Construal Level Theory (see chapter XX), and temporalconstrual in particular (e.g., Liberman and Trope, 1998). The basic notion underlying thismechanism is that people naturally tend to construe immediate or near future outcomesconcretely, while naturally construing the more distant events in more abstract terms. The
implications of changes in mental representations over time, and the changes in the degreeof concreteness have been shown to mediate several established effects (Fujita, et al., 2006;
Liberman and Trope, 1998, Malkoc , Ulu and Zauberman, 2005; Malkoc and Zauberman,
2006).
Linking level of representation and impatience, abstract mental construal has been shownto lead to more self-control (Fujita, et al., 2006) and less present-bias or hyperbolic
discounting (Malkoc and Zauberman, 2006; Malkoc Zauberman, and Bettman, 2010).
Examining the role of the representation of outcomes in the temporal framing effect,
Malkoc and Zauberman (2006,) demonstrated that the greater concreteness of the near
future compared to the distant future outcome is one factor that leads to higher
discounting in delay versus expedite decisions. Delay decisions start with more concrete
immediate outcome, while expedite decisions start with the more abstract distant future
outcome. This effect of the initial mental representation then affects the level of
discounting. The lingering effects of the initial mental representation were also
demonstrated by triggering initial abstract mindsets that had an effect on subsequentintertemporal preferences (Malkoc et al, 2010). Asking participants to elaborate on theoutcomes before making their decision attenuated the delay-expedite effect (Malkoc andZauberman, 2006). Further supporting the effect of mental representation, Zhao, Hoeffler,
and Zauberman (2007) showed that mentally simulating the future outcome changes theweight of different attributes, moderating the standard temporal construal effects. Thissuggests that mental representation is a cognitive mechanism that drives overall levels of
discounting, as well as related intertemporal effects, such as present-bias and delayexpedite framing effects.

17

Goal-based determinants
The basic psychological idea in time discounting is that outcomes closer in time are morevalued in the present. This parallels the notion of a goal gradient, in which nearer outcomesare more motivating, which had been widely studied and documented in the animal
behavior literature (Hull 1932), and proposed to explain differences in motivation overtime in human behavior as well (Gjesme 1974). One interpretation is that more temporally
distant rewards are less motivating specifically because delayed rewards are discounted(and potentially also riskier). In this view, goal-gradient behavior (exerting more effort forsooner rewards) is another source of evidence for time discounting.
While much of the recent research on goals does not account for the potential time
discounting confound, some papers have documented goal-gradient differences in behavior
by manipulating perceived proximity to the goal, holding actual timing constant (Kivetz,
Urminsky and Zheng 2006; Nunes and Dreze 2006). Urminsky, Goswami and Lewis (2014)independently manipulate goal timing (i.e. when a lottery is drawn, an airline voucher isreceived or an assignment is due) from outcome timing (when the winnings are received,
the airline voucher is redeemed or the assignment grade is posted). They find separate
disassociated larger goal gradient and smaller time discounting effects and report
estimated discount rates which are substantially lower when separately accounting forgoal gradient effects. These findings suggest that goal gradient effects may contribute toelicited time discounting.
Connectedness of current and future self
One view of how valuation of future benefits vary across people and change over time has
to do with the way that people think about themselves changing over time (Parfit 1984).
Recent empirical research suggests that the motivation to sacrifice consumption on behalf
of future selves often depends on the degree of psychological “connectedness” people havewith their future self, where connectedness is defined by the degree of overlap in beliefs,
values, goals, and other defining features of personal identity (Bartels and Rips 2010). In
this view, the more people feel that their future selves are different in the defining aspectsof personal identity, the less they value the outcomes that befall the future self.
Although an initial exploration by Frederick (2002) did not find a correlation between
measured connectedness and discount rates, recent research has provided evidence that
discount rates are lower when people are experimentally made to feel more connected totheir future selves (Bartels and Urminsky 2011) and that rates correlate with neuralactivation approximations of connectedness (Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, and Knutson
2009; Mitchell et al 2011). In addition, variation over time in the degree of connectedness

18

to one’s present self can help explain hyperbolic discounting (Bartels and Rips 2010).
During intervals when connectedness to the present self declines more rapidly, future
outcomes are discounted more steeply, compared to time intervals when there is lesschange in connectedness.
Less is known about what causes differences in connectedness to the future self. Joshi andFast (2013) find that when people recall a prior experience of social power, they discount less,and the relationship is mediated by measured connectedness to the future self. Some
research has also looked at differences in how people think about their future self as apotential influence on connectedness. Hershfield et al (2011) find that visualizing one’s future
self increases connectedness and savings behaviors. However, Urminsky and Bartels (2014)
find a more complex pattern, where viewing a similar-looking aged future self reduces
discount rates (compared to a dissimilar-looking aged future self), but only when people areprompted to consider the gradual change between present and future self.

Opportunity cost considerations and resource slack theory
When discount rates inferred from decisions (either explicitly stated choices in the lab or
real-world behaviors) are interpreted as representing time preferences, an underappreciated assumption is generally being made that both immediate and delayedconsequences are equally salient and receive equal consideration over the specified time
horizon. Most laboratory or survey-based research on time discounting measuresintertemporal preferences using explicit tradeoffs between smaller-sooner and larger-later
rewards. However, in practice, this assumption may not hold, because of a limited planninghorizon, or limits in the degree to which people either spontaneously consider opportunity
costs (Frederick et al., 2009; Spiller 2010), have biased perceptions of these opportunity costs
over time (Zauberman and Lynch, 2005), or fail to plan for future financial decisions (Lynch,
Netemeyer, Spiller, and Zammit, 2010). Thus, a person who consistently over-consumes in
the present and under-saves for the future is seen as having a high discount rate, reflecting adeliberate preference for the present over the future. However, this pattern of behavior could
also arise for a person who makes far-sighted choices when facing explicit intertemporal
tradeoffs, but who fails to consider the opportunity costs of current spending and to plan for
future financial needs.
Across individuals, a greater propensity to consider the long-term implications of current
choices correlates with more engagement in a range of behaviors that yield primarily future
benefits, and that have been linked to low discount rates (Lynch, Netemeyer, Spiller andZammit 2010, coupon use and credit score; Nenkov, Inman and Hulland 2008, intended
retirement savings; Strathman et al 1994, health behaviors; Shell and Husman 2001, academic

19achievement). Furthermore, experimental manipulations that explicitly direct attention to the
future consequences (Hershfield et al. 2011; Magen et al. 2008, Malkoc and Zauberman, 2006;
Zhao et al. 2007), such as reminding people about the low level of future resources if current
consumption is chosen, or asking them to elaborate on costs and benefits at different points intime has been shown to increase preferences for larger-later rewards.
To date, there has been relatively little overlap between the literature investigating theconsideration of future consequences and that investigating the valuation of futureconsequences. In fact, most research on intertemporal preferences does not discuss thedistinction and has not provided a generally accepted theoretical integration of the two.
One possibility is that, for all practical purposes, the consideration of future consequences andvaluing those consequences are highly related or even equivalent. Thinking more about
future consequences may induce people to place a higher value on future outcomes (Logue
1988). Conversely, discount rates have also been proposed as underlying inattention to
future outcomes (Ainslie 1992), as people with lower discount rates may be more likely toinvestigate the future consequences of a present action (Hershfield, Cohen and Thompson,
2012; Strathman et al., 1994). Consistent with this view, some recent research has provided
evidence that the salience of outcomes can moderate elicited discount rates. Specifically,emphasizing the null outcomes (i.e., reframing the sooner-smaller outcome as “something
now and nothing later” and the later-larger outcomes as “nothing now but more later”)
increases choices of later-larger outcomes (Magen and Gross 2008), due to a difference in theattention paid to the delayed outcome (Radu et al 2011).
An alternative possibility is that the consideration of future outcomes and true discount rates
may be completely distinct, and both factors may independently influence intertemporaldecisions. One common interpretation of seemingly high discount rates is that people haveconsidered future outcomes but undervalued or underweighted them (e.g., see the discussionof Hausman’s (1979) findings for choices between more and less energy efficient appliancesin Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). Adams and Nettle (2009) examine the antecedents ofsmoking, by separately correlating measured discount rates and the propensity to consider
future consequences.
A third possibility is that when people make choices with intertemporal consequences, thecombination of both consideration of future consequences and concern for future outcomes(e.g., a low discount rate) are needed for far-sighted options to be chosen. Bartels, Urminsky
and Frederick (2013) provide evidence for this account in the context of consumer spending
decisions, by manipulating the salience of opportunity costs and discount rates (viaconnectedness). They find that spending is reduced primarily when people are bothconsidering opportunity costs and have low discount rates, but not when only one or the20other condition holds. This possibility is reflected in some quantitative models of dynamic
decision making (e.g., Winer 1997).
Slack Theory (Lynch, Spiller, and Zauberman, 2014; Zauberman and Lynch, 2005) provides
another approach that centers on the level of available resources and explains intertemporal
preference using the concept of slack. Slack is defined “as the perceived surplus of a given
resource available to complete a focal task without causing failure to achieve goals associatedwith competing uses of the same resource” (Zauberman and Lynch, 2005, p. 23). This theory
states that discounting, both the overall rate, as well as the extent of hyperbolic discounting
and differences between resources, such as time and money, can be explained by different
patterns of how much slack is perceived over time. That is, when people perceive much moreslack in the future than the present, they will tend to devalue the resource over time; forexample, a person’s tendency to take the sooner-smaller ($50 today) over the later-larger
reward ($75 in 3 months) will increase the more they think that they will have more money
available in the future compared to now. Consequently, because people generally believe that
their growth in slack in the future is greater for time than for money, they also then tend to
discount time more than money. It also predicts situations in which people do not display
discounting at all, and even cases where they will appear to show negative discounting,preferring to complete a task or take on an expense now rather than later.
Slack theory therefore provides another mechanism by which the perception of future
resources can motivate people to discount the future (e.g., consuming an immediate over a
distant reward), by highlighting which goal they will need to give up if they take on anotherimmediate task or expense. The main idea in this theory is that when an individual perceives
that in order to take on another task they have to give up a current active goal (for example,
saving for retirement will result in not replacing your current car), people will be more likely
to prefer delaying that new task.

Tradeoffs and constructed time preferences
The time discounting literature generally treats intertemporal choices as its own domain of
study, distinct from other decision processes. In particular, intertemporal choices are often
treated as revealing a stable discount rate, corresponding to a true time preference,
although this is often a problematic assumption (Cubitt and Read 2007) that falls short ofmuch of the accumulated empirical evidence. An alternative view is that decision-makers
reason through the tradeoff between sooner-smaller and later-larger options in much thesame way they reason through other attribute tradeoffs, by systematically comparing
attribute values (Arieli, Ben-Ami, and Rubinstein 2011). A large literature on tradeoffs inchoice has concluded that, in general, choices are often constructed (Payne, Bettman and21Schkade 1999), reflecting some stable preferences but resulting in decisions that can bemalleable (Simonson 2008). Intertemporal choices can be approached in the same way, as
another form of choice that may also be subject to unique or common heuristics and biases,
resulting in patterns of choice that are incompatible with both exponential and hyperbolic
discounting.
A person choosing between a sooner-smaller or later-larger outcome may experience thisas a potentially difficult conflict between the desire for immediacy and the desire formagnitude. Urminsky and Kivetz (2011) document a resulting “mere token” effect, inwhich adding a small immediate amount to both the sooner-smaller and later-larger
options increases the choice proportion of the later-larger option, particularly when choice
conflict is high. These findings are incompatible with simple models of exponential or
hyperbolic discounting.
Tradeoff reasoning also differs from the application of a stable discounting rule in that theway specific comparisons are perceived and processed may influence the choice. In
particular, people’s intertemporal choices are inconsistent between whether a given delay
is one interval or multiple periods (Read 2001, Roelofsma and Read 2000), potentially due
to similarity relations (Rubinstein 2003). Scholten and Read (2006) develop an “interval
discounting” model to account for some of these findings, in which discounting is definedby the difference in delays, rather than the absolute values of the delays. More recently,
Scholten and Read (2010) extended this approach to a full tradeoff model, in which people
make intertemporal choices by comparing the differential reward to the differential delay
when waiting. Scholten, Read and Bartels (2014) use this model to predict and document
context effects in multi-option intertemporal choices, while Scholten, Read and Sanborn(2014) implement the model in a general Bayesian framework.
These findings suggest that people making intertemporal tradeoffs may lack a stable frameof reference. Consistent with this view, intertemporal choices are affected by reference
points, such that discount rates are higher for otherwise equivalent choices framed aswhether or not to expedite rather than whether or not to delay rewards (Loewenstein
1988, Weber et al 2007). Even more problematic for assuming the generalizability offindings in time discounting, Read, Frederick and Scholten (2012) replicate standard
findings for tradeoffs between amounts but find lower discount rates, a reduced magnitude
effect and non-hyperbolic discounting when the same choice options are instead presented
using equivalent interest rates.
Anchoring effects have also been documented, such that a series of intertemporal choices
are affected by which choice in a sequence is presented initially (Robles and Vargas 2007,
Robles et al 2009). More generally, both present bias (preference for no delay) and22

discounting (delay aversion) are stronger when a single option is valued (e.g. by generating
willingness-to-pay for sooner or later outcomes), compared to when multiple suchvaluations of outcome timing differences are considered simultaneously (Hsee et al 2013).
These findings point to the important potential for specific discounting findings to be“constructed” and moderated by the specific context in which they are observed.

Memory queries and intertemporal decisions
Consideration of reasons and events stored in memory could be important factors that
could affect the generation of intertemporal preferences. Two theories that center on such
effects are query theory (Weber et al., 2007) and decision by sampling. (Stewart, Chater,and Brown, 2006). Query theory (Weber et al., 2007) posits that decisions are constructedin a given context and their evaluations are determined by a set of queries, or questions. In
the context of intertemporal decisions, people ask themselves what are the benefits ofconsuming now versus later. Weber et al. (2007) show that the queries’ content can
explain the delay versus expedite framing effect, because the relevant reference differs ineach of these decision frames (immediate consumption when delaying a current option;
future consumption when expediting a future option). They further show that reversing theorder in which reasons were listed attenuates the effect.
Another mechanism based on judging information generated from memory is decision by
sampling (Stewart, Chater, and Brown, 2006). Under this account, people judge time delays
via ordinal comparisons to the distribution of time delays sampled from memory (as opposed
to using a stable underlying psychometric scale). Because short delays are more frequent
than long delays, differences between short delays are given more weight than equivalentdifferences in long delays (which can be modeled with a power function). This distribution
and random sampling from memory account can explain some of the key temporal anomalies
in the literature, such as hyperbolic discounting, the magnitude effect and gain-loss
asymmetry.

Superficial or impaired processing
A basic general account for seemingly non-normative behavior, including high or timeinconsistent discount rates, is that the findings are due to insufficient mental processing.
When people think superficially (for example because they are not taking enough time,
because they are confused by the mathematics of the tradeoffs or because they are distracted
when making choices) their choices may be more prone to bias and error. This may be
because superficial thinking is more associative and heuristics-based than driven by

23

calculation and optimization (Sloman 1996) or because superficial thinking is more driven byaffective cues, such as impulsivity and impatience (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991). Frederick’s(2005) finding of a correlation between cognitive reflection (which he interprets as moredeliberative thinking) and lower discount rates is consistent with this view.
The most direct test of this hypothesis was conducted by Hinson, Jameson and Whitney(2003), who found that taxing participants’ working memory (either via a second concurrent
task or by making the discounting task more complex) resulted in higher elicited discountrates. They concluded that temporarily reduced cognitive capacity yielded impulsivity indecisions. However, subsequent research suggests that this finding is attributable to moreerror and lower reliability in responses under working memory load (Franco-Watkins,
Pashler and Rickard, 2006). Consequently, superficial thinking favors moderate estimateddiscount rates, and the opposite finding can also be shown, with cognitive load leading to
reduced discount rates, depending on the stimuli used (Franco-Watkins, Rickard and Pashler
2010).
This debate highlights the value of attending to inconsistent or seemingly nonsensicalresponses in discounting tasks, and in particular, of testing whether inconsistent responses
correlate with experimental manipulations or presumed drivers or outcomes. While mostresearch on discounting has not leveraged inconsistent responses in this way, an exception is
Bettinger and Slonim (2007), who find that inconsistent responses relate to mathematicalachievement among school children, but that degree of discounting and mathematicalachievement do not correlate.
Another potential test of this account is provided by research on how intoxication affects
decisions. De Wit and Mitchell (2010) review research on the effects of drug consumption
and drug withdrawal on discounting for human and animal subjects. The more extensive
animal literature documents higher discount rates under intoxication for most substancestested. Fewer studies have been done with humans, and these studies find little effect on time
preferences for immediate vs. delayed rewards. The only study that finds an effect of alcoholincreasing discounting uses very short delays (0-60s, Reynolds et al 2006), similar to theanimal-behavior studies. Somewhat related, one study has found that lower glucose levels
lead to higher elicited discount rates (Wang and Dvorak 2010).
Finally, as mentioned earlier, it is important to note that there is little evidence for systematicdifferences between discount rates elicited via hypothetical questions versus paid (orprobabilistically paid) choices (Frederick et al 2002; Johnson and Bickel 2002), which might
be assumed to receive deeper consideration. Likewise, the basic discounting findings havebeen replicated with real high stakes choices (Warner and Pleeter 2001; Tanaka, Camerer and24

Nguyen 2010), which is inconsistent with an easily corrected bias that only arises whenpeople fail to deliberate.

Time Perception
A particular cognitive determinant is the perception of the relevant future anticipated time
horizon. Unlike the mostly value-based mechanism mentioned above, this cognitive
process is not centered directly on the weight given to the outcomes at different points intime, but rather to the perception of the time horizon itself. Indeed, several researchers
have recently suggested the importance of the perception of delays (versus the actual
delay) in temporal discounting (e.g., Ebert and Prelec, 2007; Killeen, 2009; Zauberman,
Kim, Malkoc, and Bettman, 2009).
The role of time in intertemporal decisions is reflected in the weight given to the time delay
versus the value being delayed (e.g., Ebert and Prelec, 2007; Scholten and Read, 2010).
However, in addition to the decision weight of the time delay attribute, the way in whichtime is actually being perceived can affect decisions (e.g., Kim and Zauberman, 2009, 2013;
Kim, Zauberman and Bettman, 2012; Takahashi, 2005; Zauberman et al., 2009). In the first
empirical demonstration of this effect, Zauberman et al. (2009), measured people’s
perception of future time durations and discovered that it follows a standard non-linear
psychophysical function rather than an objective linear mapping to calendar time.
Specifically, one year is perceived to be less than four times as long as 3 months. They
further showed that this non-linear time perception can account for much of hyperbolic
discounting phenomena, including sub-additivity effects (Read, 2001). Moreover, thoseindividuals who perceived a given future duration as longer, discounted outcomes overthat duration more steeply than did those who perceived it as shorter (Kim andZauberman, 2009; Wittmann, 2009).
Furthermore, several papers have demonstrated that factors which change the perceived
length of a given duration, will also change the level of discounting over that duration.
Zauberman et al., (2009) found that asking people to judge expected durations of various
tasks (e.g., learning a new language, painting a house, etc.; versus judging the calories infood), makes people more sensitive to time (and more linear in their perceptions) and thus
reducing the extent of hyperbolic discounting. Kim et al. (2012) leveraged the effect of
spatial distance on temporal distance, where a given duration is judged to be longer when
it is associated with greater spatial distance versus less distance. For example, when amonth is embedded in spatial locations (e.g., today in Philadelphia and next month in TelAviv vs. today in Philadelphia and next month in Chicago) it is perceived to be temporally
longer when associated with the greater geographical distance. They then showed that the25resulting longer time judgments are associated with more discounting. That is, when timedelay was perceived to be longer due to the longer spatial distance, participants required
more money to delay receiving a reward.
Following a similar logic, Kim and Zauberman (2013) showed that changes in timeperception when people are exposed to sexual cues also yield changes in discounting.
Specifically, individuals perceive the same future time duration to be longer when they are
exposed to sexual cues, and then also showed greater impatience for immediate monetary
rewards because delayed rewards seem further away and therefore less attractive. In sum,these recent findings establish that the way that people perceive future time itself is an
important factor in their revealed intertemporal preferences (for recent brain imaging
findings see Cooper, Kable, Kim, and Zauberman, 2013).

3. Applications of discounting to decision making
Understanding how people make intertemporal tradeoffs, and quantifying their discountrates, is primarily of interest because of the potential to explain a wide range of seemingly“short-sighted” real-world behaviors. Ainslie (1975) first presented discounting,particularly hyperbolic discounting, as a compelling model to account for such behaviors.
However, investigations of the empirical link between discounting and “prudent” decisionmaking has relied primarily on correlational evidence, and the evidence has beensomewhat mixed. In part, this may be because discount rates should only predict choicesthat are treated as intertemporal tradeoffs at the time of decision (Bartels, Urminsky andFrederick 2013), which may not be the case in some decisions that researchers havelabeled intertemporal tradeoffs (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). In addition, people may use
other context-specific cues to make decisions, instead of or in addition to their discountrates.
One limitation to keep in mind in interpreting specifically the correlational resultssummarized below is the potential role of discounting as a surrogate variable in predicting
outcomes, particularly given the relationships described earlier between discounting andeducation and income. Studies vary widely in how they address this issue. Many papers
merely report correlations, without conclusively addressing the potential for confounds.
Papers in economics are more likely to measure and control for demographic factors andpapers studying clinical populations (e.g., recovering drug addicts) are more likely torecruit demographically matched control populations.

26

Savings
Perhaps the clearest prediction of discounting theories is for savings and spending behaviors,
where anomalous behavior consistent with hyperbolic discounting or high discount rates has
been observed in the field. Laibson (1997) argues that hyperbolic discounting is consistent
with both self-reported under-saving and with government interventions such as penalties forearly withdrawal from retirement accounts. Angeletos et al (2001) argue that people with
non-exponential discounting (e.g., hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic) will have more of theirlong-term assets in illiquid form, while also borrowing more and more often on credit cards.
Similarly, Bernheim et al (2001) argue that consumption patterns over time cannot be
explained by stable time preferences and other normative factors. They find a lack ofcorrelation between wealth and consumption growth patterns, as well as a correlation
between consumption decline at retirement and low financial resources (wealth andretirement benefits). They argue that these results indicate time preferences that areinconsistent with far-sighted rational optimization. Hurst (2004) identifies a subset of
consumers whose consumption closely tracks predictable changes in their income. He findsthat these consumers, who demonstrate a lack of voluntary savings in order to smoothconsumption, had low pre-retirement wealth. These papers document patterns of financial
behavior that are difficult to reconcile with far-sighted exponential discounting. Bernheim
and Rangel (2007) provide a review of savings behaviors incompatible with normative
assumptions and survey models of saving using behavioral assumptions, including quasihyperbolic discounting.
Ainslie (1975) outlined strategies that hyperbolic decision makers could use to prevent
future preference reversal (e.g. preferring to save in the future but choosing to spend when
the times comes). These strategies largely assume that people know they are hyperbolicand prone to reversals (e.g. sophisticated rather than naïve, in O’Donoghue and Rabin’s
1999 model). Perhaps the most cited example of behavioral economic interventions is the‘Save More Tomorrow’ savings plan (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). The plan leverages
people’s present bias and optimistic slack perceptions and asks employees to pre-commit
to increase the percentage of their salary saved for retirement when they get raises in the
future. The pre-commitment to boost savings can be reversed at a later point in time, but
once it is set, people tend to follow through. In one example, Thaler and Benartzi reportthat Save More Tomorrow led employees to increase their annual savings rate forretirement from 3.5% to 13.6% over the course of 40 months.
While certainly not the norm, research documenting people’s adoption of other suchstrategies (Wertenbroch, 1998), including different pre-commitment devices for saving,suggests that some people hold a partly sophisticated belief about future inconsistency.

27

Houser et al (2010) document the use of costly pre-commitment devices in a lab setting.
Beshears et al (2011) find that people put money in a savings account with penalties for early
withdrawal even when a no-penalty alternative is available, as long as the interest rates
match. Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2005) find more take-up of a pre-commitment savings planamong women with more hyperbolic time preferences (e.g., more present-bias or preference
reversals), leading to increased savings. Schwartz et al (2014) found that over a third ofparticipants in a wellness program were willing to pre-commit to an increase in healthy foodpurchases, risking their discount if they failed to do so, thus yielding a significant increase inhealthy food purchases.
Other research has more directly linked differences in elicited discounting tasks with some ofthese predicted differences in savings behaviors, sometimes attempting to distinguishbetween factors that relate to generally high discount rates vs. present-bias (higher discountrates specifically for tradeoffs involving the present). Meier and Sprenger (2009) found that
individuals with lower discount rates had both higher financial literacy and were more likely
to accept an offer of a free credit counseling session, controlling for other demographic
factors. People with more present-bias have less credit card debt, but credit card debt does
not vary with individual discount rate (Meier and Sprenger 2010; Harrison, Lau, and Williams
2002). Lower discounting has also been linked to people being more likely to pay their bills infull (Chabris et al 2008) as well as homeowners being less likely to owe more on their homes
than the market value (Johnson, Atlas and Payne 2011). However, discounting has not beenfound to correlate with the proportion of income saved (Chabris et al 2008) or voluntary
retirement account contributions (Chapman et al 2001).
One corrective action to under-saving for people near retirement age is continuing to work,
which represents a tradeoff between present leisure consumption and future total
retirement savings. Bidewell, Griffin and Hesketh (2006) find that people with lower
discount rates make hypothetical choices to delay retirement later. Appelt et al (2011) findthat present bias (but not long-term discount rate) predicts early-retirement preferences at
eligibility, but not before.
Some research has begun to look at how factors implicated in discounting might impact
savings decisions. Ersner-Hershfield et al. (2009) also present evidence that people whoreport having accrued greater total assets—more money invested in a home, in securities, inother material goods, and in the bank—tended to rate themselves as more similar to who theywould be in 10 years than people who had fewer assets. Bryan and Hershfield (2011) findthat an appeal focusing on the person’s responsibility to their own future self increasedsavings among those high in connectedness to the future self.

28

Overall, the tendency to focus on the present and under-weigh the future naturally leads todifficulty to save, especially for the long term. Many of the ways to counter this tendency arebased on making the future more salient or alternatively, using our discounting to facilitate
future commitment to increase savings. The main idea is to either try to counter discounting
or when possible leverage it by getting people to pre commit.

Employment decisions
Employment decisions often involve trading off efforts and revenues over time and giverise to multiple intertemporal tradeoffs. The investment in education, discussed above, canalso be seen as a tradeoff between short-term concerns (the effort to do well, the increasein current revenue from ending schooling and beginning work) and potential long-term
career benefits of longer schooling.
As people enter the workforce, the job search process can be seen as an intertemporal
tradeoff. Hesketh et al (1998) find hyperbolic discounting in hypothetical choices between
a less enjoyable immediate job and a more enjoyable job available later. Schoenfelder and
Hantula (2003) find both present-bias and magnitude effects in people’s tradeoffs between
jobs with different profiles of wages and enjoyment over time. In addition, they find that
discount rates over wages correlate only weakly with discount rates for favorability of job
duties (r=.19).
There is also supporting evidence for these findings in workers’ actual behavior. Lee andOhtake (2012) look at the decision to take a temporary work position, which they argue
provides short-term financial rewards potentially at the cost of longer-term careeradvancement. They find that people who have taken temp work have higher elicited
discount rates and more inconsistent time preferences. Saunders and Fogarty (2001), in athree year longitudinal study with a small sample of employees, found reversals ofpreference, from an initial preference for a future higher-paid senior manager position toan ultimate choice of a lower-paid manager role available immediately.
Other researchers have found additional evidence, by linking panel data on employment
history and behaviors to proxies for impatience. Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) find thatpeople with higher impatience (as measured by multiple proxy variables, such as smoking)have lower search intensity and therefore remain unemployed for longer. They argue thatthe pattern of results they observe are consistent with hyperbolic but not with exponential
discounting. Using cigarette smoking as a proxy, Munasinghe and Sicherman (2000) findthat more impatient workers have lower initial wages and slower wage growth. Drago(2006) finds that workers with lower proxied short-run impatience are more likely to29

invest in their current jobs and less likely to engage in on-the-job search. Likewise, Van
Huizen (2010) finds that workers with lower proxied short-run impatience are more likely
to invest in their current job, but contrary to Drago (2006), that they are also more likely tosearch for a new job. However, these findings have not been tested with elicited discountrates, and smoking may proxy for other relevant factors besides discounting.
Employment decisions can have a major effect on long-term financial resources, and are a
primary contributor to savings outcomes. As such, discounting may be central to how thesedecisions are made. The causal link between discounting and employment behaviors are
difficult to assess, however. In particular, unobserved differences in present resources andbeliefs about future resources may affect both discounting and employment behaviors.
More research on this important question is needed.

Educational achievement
As noted earlier, there is an intriguing correlational relationship between level of educational
attainment (e.g., years of schooling) and measures of impatience, including both discountrates and delay of gratification (Mischel et al., 1989). While causality is difficult to determine
in this context, and most studies do not control for income and other demographic factors,
perseverance in education can be seen as arising from either intrinsic motivation or from anintertemporal tradeoff between current effort and the potential future financial rewards ofhigher educational achievement. Consistent with the latter view, some research hassuggested that low discount rates may be related to behaviors that facilitate educational
attainment.
Lee et al (2012) find that the relationship between discount rates and grades is partiallymediated by a self-reported “school attitude”, which includes measures of motivation andeffort investment. Silva and Gross (2004) find a parallel correlation between grades and time
discounting as well as between grades and effort discounting (willingness to do more extra
credit work even when rewards decrease), although the relationship between time
discounting and effort investment is not tested.
Discounting may also be related to students’ focus and non-disruptive behavior. Castillo et al(2011) find that high discounting predicts disciplinary referrals in middle school, evencontrolling for demographics, suggesting another causal path via which discount rates might
influence educational achievement. Teens with a learning disability (ADHD) have also beenfound to have higher discount rates (Barkley et al 2001). However, Wilson and Daly (2006)
find no difference in discounting between juvenile offenders and a control group of highschool students.

30

Finally, Duckworth and Seligman (2005) show that a composite measure of self-discipline(which includes discount rate) predicts not only educational outcomes (grades, test scoresand high school placement) but also other relevant behaviors, such as students with lower
discount rates having fewer absences, spending less time watching television, starting their
homework earlier and spending more time doing homework. Consistent with these results,
Reed and Martens (2011) find that elementary school students with lower discount rates
were more likely to remain on-task when completing work in the classroom. However,focused interventions are needed to determine the direction of the causal link between
discount rates and education-related motivation and outcomes.

Consumer behavior and self-control
Research on consumption and purchase decisions has documented findings that areconsistent with time discounting, in particular with treating choices between “virtues” and“vices” (or, alternatively, since most lack a clear moral component, utilitarian vs. hedonic
options) as choices between larger-later vs. sooner-small rewards (Bazerman et al 1998,
Hoch and Loewenstein 1991, Thaler and Shefrin 1981). However, there exists remarkably
little research documenting a direct link between differences in either discount rate orpresent-bias and consumption or purchase decisions.
Some consumer behaviors may be explained by present-biased time preferences (Lynchand Zauberman 2006). These include failure to file for mail-in-rebates (Soman 1998) andto return undesired purchases (Wood 2001), as well as differential willingness to expedite
vs. delay consumption (Malkoc and Zauberman 2006). Preference reversals, such aspreferring healthy foods or high-brow movies in advance but then switching to unhealthy
foods or lowbrow movies at the time of consumption (Milkman, Rogers and Bazerman
2009; Read and van Leeuwen 1998; Read, Loewenstein and Kalyanaraman 1999), areconsistent with either hyperbolic discounting or errors in affective forecasting(Loewenstein 1996). Likewise, the tendency to overpay in advance for flat-fee gym
contracts (vs. per visit, Della Vigna and Mallmendier 2006), to favor non-leisure magazines
when subscribing (vs. at the newsstand, Oster and Scott-Morton 2005) and to choose
healthier groceries when ordering farther in advance (Milkman, Rogers and Bazerman2010) can be interpreted as driven by unanticipated intertemporal preference reversals,potentially due to hyperbolic discounting. In contrast, Chevalier and Goolsbee (2005) do
not find support for high discount rates, based on textbook purchase and resale decisions.
Some of the above results, however, can also be interpreted as a temporal inconsistency
due to different items potentially having different discount rates. A key implication of item-

31

specific discount rates is that people should be willing to forego money to get more steeply
discounted goods sooner. The notion of affect-driven time discounting (Loewenstein 1996;
Metcalfe & Mischel 1999; Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez 1989; Vallacher 1993) suggeststhat goods higher in affective (i.e. hedonic) dimensions will be discounted more steeply
over time than goods higher in cognitive (i.e. utilitarian) dimensions. Urminsky and Kivetz(2013) compare intertemporal tradeoffs between expensive-sooner and cheaper-later
options (e.g. due to shipping costs, expected price declines) for different kinds of consumer
goods. While they find results consistent with affective discounting in scheduling decisions(e.g., which of two goods to receive first) they find less willingness to spend to expedite
purchases for more affective goods, contrary to the prediction of affective discounting.
They argue that choices between hedonic items and money induce guilt, countering
hedonic discounting, more so than for choices between practical items and money.
Other consumer behaviors can be explained as an attempt to compensate for or circumvent
time-inconsistent preferences. Wertenbroch (1998) showed that people will pay a
premium for smaller packages of vice (but not virtue) foods, presumably to prevent areversal of preference and future over-consumption. Similarly, Gine, Karlan and Zinman(2008) show that people are willing to enroll in costly pre-commitment contracts toprevent future behaviors (e.g., smoking) and such a program can be effective.
However, the potential for guilt to over-ride intertemporal preferences suggests that someconsumers may in fact face the opposite self-control problem, deferring hedonic
consumption more than they would like. Consistent with this view, people do pre-commit
to hedonic consumption (Kivetz and Simonson 2002) and focusing consumers on the longterm regrets of hedonic under-consumption increases their consumption (Keinan andKivetz 2008).
Though the above mentioned papers seem to document patterns of behavior associatedwith intertemporal preferences, they are not directly linked to differences in elicited
discount rates. To a large degree, research on discounting and research on self-control have
evolved in parallel, with the two areas mutually influencing each other, but with very little
direct integration. In part, this may be because the behaviors studied, such as self-control,
may be jointly determined by the interaction of discount rates with other factors.
Consistent with this view, Bartels, Urminsky and Frederick (2013) find that restrained
spending (foregoing purchases or choosing a less expensive option) is motivated by lower
discount rates and lower connectedness to the future self, but only when tradeoffs andopportunity costs are salient to consumers.
There has been increasing interest in incorporating and testing discounting using dynamic
choice models applied to observed consumer choices. One major difficulty (summarized in32Dube, Hitsch and Jindal 2013) is that consumers’ utility function, discount function, andbeliefs about the future are not separately identifiable from panel data. This makes itchallenging (and at time impossible) to identify specific intertemporal effects in real world
observed data. One common approach is to fix certain parameters by assumption, in order
to be able to estimate others. For example, the discount factor may be set to a normativelysuggested level (e.g.,  = .995) and consumers are then assumed to be fully forward-looking, inthat they accurately take into account all future outcomes (Erdem and Keane 1996). A better
understanding of planning horizons, differential discounting of different kinds of benefits andthe relative discounting of payments and goods received will be important for progress in thisarea.

Energy conservation
Energy conservation involves two kinds of intertemporal choices, as future energy savings
can be achieved by either foregoing current benefits of energy consumption or by paying
more now for efficient equipment. One of the first and most influential demonstrations ofhigh revealed discount rates (Hausman 1979) was in this context, estimating a private
discount rate of 25% based on the upfront cost and energy savings from actual air
conditioner purchases. Other papers have found similar discount rates for appliances(Gately 1980), heating systems (Dubin and McFadden 1984) and for auto purchases(Dreyfus and Viscusi 1995). However, the implied discount rates can also be affected byother factors, including high inflation, anticipated duration of use, risk from changes inenergy prices in the future and beliefs about those prices, as well as differences in actual or
perceived product benefits that are confounded with energy efficiency. Consequently, theactual discount rates may be lower and more reasonable (see Allcott and Greenstone 2012
for a review and discussion).
High (and potentially hyperbolic) discounting is consistent with requiring a rapid recoup ofinvestment in more efficient technology, and an informal 2-year cutoff for payback in
capital budgeting has been proposed as a major barrier to commercial adoption of energy
efficient equipment (Bressand et al, 2007). If this is in fact a bias, there may be a profitable
opportunity to lease rather than sell such equipment, a shift in business model that has
arguably been successful in solar energy provision to both commercial and residential
consumers in the U.S. (Himmelman 2012).

33

Health behaviors
Managing one’s health often involves a trade-off, between either present rewards (e.g.
consuming unhealthy foods, smoking) or present costs (immunizations) and longer-term
health benefits. While it is important to note that long-term health benefits are often more
uncertain than the present consequences (i.e. a smoker generally faces only a higher risk oflung cancer), health behaviors can be thought of as an intertemporal choice between
present resources and investment in future human capital (Becker 1964; Grossman 1972).
The relationships between discounting and addictive behaviors have been the mostthoroughly researched. MacKillop et al (2011) provide a meta-analysis of 46 studies, andfind an overall significant relationship between addictive behaviors and higher discountrates (d=.15). This relationship is significant separately for alcohol, tobacco, stimulants,
opiates and clinical pathological gambling. Yi, Mitchell and Bickel (2010) review thisliterature and note that the evidence for a predictive relationship between priordiscounting and severity of relapse, while preliminary, is stronger than the link between
prior discounting and drug use initiation.
Multiple papers have found that financial proxies indicative of higher discount rates
correlate with a measure of obesity, Body Mass Index (BMI): Smith, Bogin and Bishai(2005), reported savings; Ikeda et al (2009), debtors; Komlos, Smith and Bogin (2003)
average savings rates across countries and debt-to-income ratio over time in the US.
Furthermore, multiple papers have now documented a small but robust correlation
between higher elicited discount rates and BMI. In particular, the Reimers et al (2009)
large-scale survey finds a correlation of r=.05. A meta-analysis of nine other studies(Urminsky 2014) likewise finds positive correlations in all but one and an estimatedaverage r=.07. However, Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) argue that changes in discountrate over time do not account for increases in obesity.
The literature has not been able to conclusively identify the means by which BMI anddiscount rates are related. Adams and Nettle (2009) find a marginally significant
correlation between moderate exercise and lower discount rates, while Chabris et al(2008) find mixed results for exercise across three studies and Melanko and Larkin (2013)
find no relationship. Cabris et al (2008) also find no relationship between discount rates
and self-reported over-eating or eating healthy foods, while Melanko and Larkin (2013)
find a positive relationship between discount rates using experienced delays and selfreported nutrition behaviors.
The evidence for a relationship between discounting and long-term preventative healthbehaviors and health outcomes is mixed as well. A review of six papers looking at the34relationship between discounting and health promotion behaviors finds mixed results forexercise, consuming healthy foods, prescription compliance and a range of preventative
health behaviors (Urminsky 2014), suggesting a potential but weak relationship. The
strongest evidence is for the correlation between getting a flu shot and low discount rates
for monetary losses (Chapman and Coups 1999; Chapman et al 2001). Of course, actual
health behaviors are affected by many other factors, and there may be a stronger
relationship between discounting and behavioral intentions. Consistent with thispossibility, Urminsky et al (2013) find a relationship between higher connectedness to the
future self and willingness to undergo painful or uncomfortable medical procedures thatpromise long-term health benefits.
The link between discounting and health behaviors has arguably been more thoroughly
studied than any other behavior. The most reliable relationships (although modest in
magnitude) have been the links between discounting and both addictive behaviors and
BMI. This research, as well as studies using pre-commitment, suggests that interventions
targeting discounting may be effective, albeit limited, as one component in treating these
problems, which is an interesting opportunity for future research.

Public policy
The literature on intertemporal choice has several major implications for public policy.
Most directly, cost-benefit analysis of potential policies that differ in the timing of theircosts and benefits requires specification of a social discount rate (or social time
preference), as well as making assumptions about the discount function (Sugden andWilliams 1978). The standard approach is to assume exponential discounting with a finite
time horizon and a market-estimated rate. However, there have been some arguments forwhy social time preference should be modeled using hyperbolic or declining (Henderson
and Bateman 1995; Weitzman 1998) discount rates.
More generally, making the assumption that people have exponential discounting withnear-market rates may lead to ineffective policies, because it may not reflects people’s
actual behavior. For example, Shapiro (2005) documents high start-of-month foodconsumption among food stamp recipients, consistent with present bias or high daily
discount rates, which suggests that moving from monthly to bi-monthly payments might bebeneficial. In a broader context, even small upfront costs (of time, money orinconvenience) may have a seemingly disproportionate impact, reducing adoption ofotherwise beneficial policy interventions (Bertrand et al 2006; Zauberman, 2003). For
example, Bhargava and Manoli (2013) find that, relative to other interventions, merely
simplifying program information so that it is quicker and easier for people to fill out is the35most effective in increasing take-up of the Earned Income Tax Credit. Conversely, policy
makers may find it surprisingly costly to incentivize homeowners to spend money onenergy conversion home upgrades. In contrast, programs that provide immediate benefits
and potentially deferred costs (e.g. “Cash for Clunkers”, Busse et al 2013) may be more
readily adopted. Lastly, providing steeply discounted “cash-out” opportunities, such as
lump-sum severance or foregoing some benefits in order to receive Social Security earlier
may be surprisingly cost-effective. However, some people’s choices when given suchopportunities may reflect their impatience and discounting tendencies (Appelt et al., 2013)
more than their actual future needs, resulting in negative long-term consequences.
A better understanding of people’s time preferences may provide policy makers additional
insight into the source of problems they are concerned with. Research described in thisreview points to the potential role of discounting in under-saving, over-spending, noncompliance with health care regimens, substance abuse, poor nutrition, and underinvestment in education and career outcomes.
To the degree that discounting contributes to these problems, understanding either how tochange people’s discount rates or how to structure choices so as to subvert the impact oftime preferences will be a necessary component of solving them. As mentioned earlier,Thaler and Benartzi (2004) have demonstrated the impact of one such approach in their“Save More Tomorrow” program, by having people commit in advance to future increases
in their automatic savings rate.
4. Conclusions
Understanding how people form their intertemporal preferences, and quantifying theirdiscount rates, is primarily of interest across multiple theoretical and applied areas
because of the potential to explain a wide range of real-world behaviors. This chapter
presented a review of the main current findings on intertemporal choice. However, given
the focus of past reviews, we only provided a descriptive account of discounting behavior
as a way to set up the main discussion of the psychological mechanisms that have beenshown to drive intertemporal preferences. We have also reviewed the studies thatinvestigate links between key real world decision domains and intertemporal choice.
The mechanisms we covered in this chapter range from emotion based to various cognitive
based accounts, and focus on the outcomes relevant to the choice, the future self in thecontext of the choice, the perception of resources and opportunity costs, and the perceptionof the time horizon relevant to the choice. Examining the vast research, both conceptualand applied, in psychology, decision research, economics, business, and policy, our view isthat intertemporal preferences are inherently multiply determined, and no one specific

36

mechanism can explain all situations. What is common across all these mechanisms,
however, is that they work on the relative attractiveness of achieving a present goalcompare to a later more distant one. It is then the salience and importance of their goals,
and the possibility to failing attaining them, that determines the attractiveness of thepresent verses the future outcome, and thus the extent of time discounting.
Our review highlights several important understudied areas and much-needed directions
for future research.
1. Reconciling multiple determinants. We have a better understanding now that time preferences
are determined by multiple psychological factors. Less is understood about how these factors
interact in jointly shaping both elicited time preferences and behavioral outcomes.
2. Separating elicitation factors from time preference. Many studies have identified contextual
factors that affect elicited time preferences. However, for the most part, we don’t know whichof these factors are central to actual time related preferences and which factors represent
biases that distort the link between actual preferences and elicited measures. We also don’tknow enough yet about the stability of time preferences over longer periods of time, which isimportant to understand the predictive usefulness of elicited time preferences.
3. Moving beyond single-parameter time discounting. Research on modeling time preferences,which has developed sophisticated multi-parameter models, has not been well-linked toresearch on the relationship between discounting and other behaviors. As a result, muchremains to be done to understand how multi-dimensional time preferences are, how reliableeach parameter is, and which behaviors are systematically related to which aspects of time
preference. Early work has provided evidence that  and  in quasi-hyperbolic discounting may
differentially correlate to specific behaviors, but much remains to be done in understanding
what these aspects capture and what behaviors each predicts.
4. Incorporation of time preference into general decision models. Time discounting has largely
developed in isolation from other decision models, using simple elicitation tasks. Much remains
to be done to incorporate time discounting into models of multi-alternative multi-attributechoice. Doing so can both help us understand a broader range of decisions and also refine ourunderstanding of time discounting in complex decision settings.
5. Causal interventions. The empirical links between discounting and time-related behaviors havelargely been established using correlational methods. At the same time, some researchers havebegun to develop interventions that manipulate time preferences. This provides an opportunity
to test whether time-preference interventions will causally impact the correlated behaviors thathave been identified. The opportunity is both to potentially establish causality, which is largely
lacking in this area, and to develop effective interventions that are useful for policy.

37

We hope that this review highlights both the wealth of data we now have on intertemporalchoice as well as the key unresolved questions and opportunities for future research.
While a single unified theory of intertemporal is probably unattainable, we do believe that
better understanding the relationship between the various affective and cognitive
mechanism can provide useful insight. We further believe that thinking about how thepsychological underpinnings of intertemporal choice relate to people’s time-relevant
decisions and behaviors will lead to better understanding of and to better ability to predictthese choices and will enable the design of interventions that will change behavior.

38

References.
Adams, Jean and Daniel Nettle (2009), “Time perspective, personality and smoking, body mass, andphysical activity: An empirical study,” British Journal of Health Psychology, 14(1), 83-105
Ainslie, George (1975), “Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse Control,”Psychology Bulletin, 82 (April), 463–96.
Ainslie, G. (1992). Picoeconomics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Alba, J. and Williams, E.F. (2012), “Pleasure principles: A review of research on hedonic consumption,”
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 23, 2-18.
Allcott, H., Greenstone, M. (2012). Is there an energy efficiency Gap? (Working Paper).
Andersen, S., G. W. Harrison, M. I. Lau, and E. E. Rutstrom (2008). Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences.
Econometrica 76 (3), 583–618.
Angeletos, George-Marios, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman and Stephen Weinberg(2001) “The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical
Evaluation,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), pp. 47-68
Appelt, Kirstin, Eric Johnson, Melissa Knoll and Jonathan Westfall (2013) “Choice Architecture for Time
Preferences: Representation vs. Process Interventions for Retirement Decisions,” Working paper
Arieli, A., Ben-Ami, Y., & Rubinstein, A. (2011). Tracking decision makers under uncertainty. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3, 68–76.
Ashraf, N., Karlan, D.S., Yin, W. (2005). Tying Odysseus To The Mast: Evidence From A Commitment
Savings Product In The Philippines. Yale University Economic Growth Center, Paper No. 917.
Barkley, R., G. Edwards, M. Laneri, K. Fletcher and L. Metevia (2001) “Executive functioning, temporaldiscounting, and sense of time in adolescents with ADHD and ODD”, Journal of Abnormal Child
Psychology, 29(6), 541-556
Baron, Jon (2007) “Decisions About the Future,” Thinking and Deciding, 4th Ed, Cambridge University
Press
Bartels, Daniel M. and Lance J. Rips (2010), "Psychological Connectedness and Intertemporal Choice,"
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139, 49-69.
Bartels, Daniel and Oleg Urminsky (2011) “On Intertemporal Selfishness: The Perceived Instability of
Identity Underlies Impatient Consumption,” Journal of Consumer Research, 38 (1), 182-198
Bartels, Daniel, Oleg Urminsky and Shane Frederick (2013) “To Know and To Care: How Awarenessand Valuation of the Future Jointly Shape Consumer Savings and Spending,” University of
Chicago Working Paper
Bazerman, M. H., A. E. Tenbrunsel, K. A. Wade-Benzoni (1998) “Negotiating with yourself and losing:
Making decisions with competing internal preferences,” Academy of Management Review 23(2),225–241.
Banerjee, A.V., & Mullainathan, S. (2010). The Shape of Temptation: Implications for the Economic
Lives of the Poor.(Working Paper).
Becker, G., 1964. Human Capital, a Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to
Education. Columbia University Press, NY.

39

Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., & Schotter, A. (2010). Present-bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and fixed
costs. Games and Economic Behavior, 69(2), 205-223.
Benjamin, Daniel, James Choi and Joshua Strickland (2010) “Social Identity and Preferences,” American
Economic Review, 100(4), 1913-1928
Benjamin, D. J., Brown, S. A., & Shapiro, J. M. (2013). Who is ‘behavioral’? Cognitive ability andanomalous preferences. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(6), 1231-1255.
Benzion, U., Rapoport, A., & Yagil, J. (1989). Discount rates inferred from decisions: An experimental study.
Management science, 35(3), 270-284.
Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B., & Sakong, J. (2011). Self control and liquidity: How todesign a commitment contract.
Bertrand, Marianne, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir. 2006. “Behavioral economics and marketingin aid of decision making among the poor,” Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 25(1): 8-23.
Bernheim, B. D., Skinner, J., & Weinberg, S. (2001). What accounts for the variation in retirement wealthamong US households? American Economic Review, 832-857.
Bernheim, B. D., & Rangel, A. (2007). Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with
Non-standard Decision Makers. In In: Diamond, P., Vartiainen, H.(Eds.), Economic Institutions
and Behavioral Economics. Princeton.
Bettinger, Eric and Robert Slonim (2007), “Patience among children,” Journal of Public Economics, 91(1-2), 343-363
Bhargava, S., & Manoli, D. (2013). “Why are Benefits Left on the Table? Assessing the Role ofInformation, Complexity, and Stigma on Take-up with an IRS Field Experiment” Working Paper.
Bidewell, J., Griffin, B., & Hesketh, B. (2004). Timing of retirement: Including a delay discounting
perspective in retirement models. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 68, 368-387.
Bjorklund, D. F., & Kipp, K. (1996). Parental investment theory and gender differences in the evolutionof inhibition mechanisms. Psychological Bulletin,120(2), 163.
Bleichrodt, H., Rohde, K. I., & Wakker, P. P. (2009). Non-hyperbolic time inconsistency. Games andEconomic Behavior, 66(1), 27-38.
Bleichrodt, H., & Johannesson, M. (2001). Time Preference for Health: A Test of Stationarity versus
Decreasing Timing Aversion. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 45, 265-282.
Borghans, L., & Golsteyn, B. H. (2006). Time discounting and the body mass index: Evidence from theNetherlands. Economics & Human Biology, 4(1), 39-61.
Bressand,F., Farrell, D., Haas, P., Morin, F., Nyquist, S., Remes, J., Rosenfeld, J., Rogers, M. (2007).
Wasted Energy: How the US Can Reach Its Energy Productivity Potential. McKinsey Global
Institute.
Bryan, C.J., Hershfield, H.E. (2011). You Owe It to Yourself: Boosting Retirement Saving With a
Responsibility-Based Appeal. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(3):429-432.
Busse, M.R., Knittel, C.R., Silva-Risso,J., & Zettelmeyer, Fl. (2012). Did “Cash for Clunkers” Deliver?
The Consumer Effects of the Car Allowance Rebate System. (Working Paper).
Cairns, J.A., & Van Der Pol, M. (1997). Constant and Decreasing Timing Aversion For Saving Lives.
Social Science & Medicine, 45(11), 1653-1659.

40

Castillo, Marco, Paul Ferraro, Jeffrey Jordan and Ragan Petrie (2011) “The today and tomorrow of kids:
Time preferences and educational outcomes of children,” Journal of Public Economics, 95 (1112), 1377-1385
Chabris, C.F., Laibson, D., Morris, C.L., Schuldt, J.P., Taubinsky, D. (2008). Individual laboratorymeasured discount rates predict field behavior. Journal of Risk Uncertainty, 37, 237-269.
Chapman, Gretchen B . (1996)," Temporal Discounting and Utility for Health and Money, "Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22 (3), 771-91.
Chapman, G.B., Brewer, N.T., Coups, E.J., Brownlee, S., Leventhal, H., & Leventhal E.A. (2001). Valuefor the Future and Preventive Health Behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied,
7(3), 235-250.
Chapman, G.B., & Coups, E.J. (1999). Time Preferences and Preventive Health Behavior: Acceptance of
the Influenza Vaccine. Medical Decision Making, 19, 307-314.
Chapman, G.B. & Elstein, A.S. (1995). Valuing the Future: Temporal Discounting of Health and Money.
Medical Decision Making, 15, 373-386.
Chapman, G.B., Nelson, R., & Hier, D.B. (1999). Familiarity and Time Preferences: Decision Making
About Treatments for Migraine Headaches and Crohn’s Disease. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Applied, 5(1), 17-34.
Chen, H., Ng, S., & Rao, A.R. (2005). Cultural Differences in Consumer Impatience. Journal ofMarketing Research, 42(3), 291-301.
Chevalier, J.A., Goolsbee, A. (2005) Are Durable Goods Consumer Forward Looking? (Working Paper)
Cooper, Nicole, Joseph Kable, B Kyu Kim, and Gal Zauberman (2013). Brain Activity in Valuation
Regions while Thinking about the Future Predicts Individual Discount Rates. The Journal of
Neuroscience. 33 (32). 13150-13156..
Cubitt, Robin and Daniel Read (2007) “Can intertemporal choice experiments elicit time preferences for
consumption?” Experimental Economics 10, 369-389
Dai, X., & Fishbach, A. (2013). When waiting to choose increases patience. Organizational Behavior andHuman Decision Processes.
Dasgupta, P, & Masken, E. (2005). Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting. The American Economic
Review, 95(4), 1290-1299.
De Wit H, Flory JD, Acheson A, McCloskey M, Manuck SB (2007) “IQ and non-planning impulsivity
are independently associated with delay-discounting in middle-aged adults,” Personality andIndividual Differences 2007;42:111–121.
De Wit, Harriet and Suzanne Mitchell (2010). “Drug effects on delay discounting,” In G. J. Madden, &W. K. Bickel (Eds.), Impulsivity: The behavioral and neurological science of discounting (pp.
213–241). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Della Vigna, S., & Malmendier, U. (2006). “Paying Not to Go to the Gym,” The American Economic
Review, 96(3), 694-719.
Della Vigna, S., & Paserman, M.D. (2005). Job Search and Impatience. Journal of Labor Economics,
23(3), 527-588.
Drago, Francesco (2006) : Career consequences of hyperbolic time preferences, IZA Discussion Papers,
No. 2113

41

Dreyfus, M.K., Viscusi, W.K. (1995). Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valuations of Automobile
Safety and Fuel Efficiency. Journal of Law and Economics, 38(1), 79-105.
Dube, Jean-Pierre H., Gunter Hitsch, and Pranav Jindal (2013), “Measuring subjective consumer beliefs
and heterogeneous discount factors for durable goods adoption,” Working paper, University of
Chicago Booth School of Business.
Dubin, J.A., McFadden, D.L. (1984). An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric Appliance
Holdings and Consumption. Econometrica, 52(2), 345-362.
Duckworth, A.L., & Seligman, M.E.P. (2005). Self-Discipline Outdoes IQ in Predicting Academic
Performance of Adolescents. Psychological Science, 16(12), 939-944.
Ebert, J. E., & Prelec, D. (2007). The fragility of time: Time-insensitivity and valuation of the near andfar future. Management Science, 53(9), 1423-1438.
Erdem, T., & Keane, M.P. (1996). Decision-making Under Uncertainty: Capturing Dynamic Brand
Choice Processes in Turbulent Consumer Goods markets. Marketing Science, 15 (1), 1-20.
Ersner-Hershfield, H., Garton, M. T., Ballard, K., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., & Knutson, B. (2009). Don’t stop
thinking about tomorrow: Individual differences in future self-continuity account for saving.
Judgment and Decision Making, 4(4), 280.
Ersner-Hershfield, H., Wimmer, G. E., & Knutson, B. (2009). Saving for the future self: Neural measures of
future self-continuity predict temporal discounting. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience,
4(1), 85-92.
Fischer, Gregory W., Ziv Carmon, Dan Ariely, and Gal Zauberman (1999). Goal-Based Construction ofPreferences: Task Goals and the Prominence Effect. Management Science. 45 (8). 1057-1075.
Fisher, Irving. 1930. The Theory of Interest. NY: Macmillan.
Franco-Watkins, A., Pashler, H., Rickard, T.(2006). “Does working memory load lead to greater
impulsivity? Commentary on Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney’s (2003)”. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 32(2), 443–447.
Franco-Watkins, A., Rickard, T., Pashler, H. (2010) “Taxing executive processes does not necessarily
increase impulsive decision making,” Experimental Psychology 2010; Vol. 57(3):193–201
Frederick, S. (2002), "Time Preference and Personal Identity," in Time and Decision: Economic andPsychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice, George Loewenstein, Daniel Read, and Roy
Baumeister, eds. NY: Russell Sage
Frederick, S. (2005). “Reflection and Decision Making,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4),25-42.
Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O'Donoghue (2002), "Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, 40 (2), 351-401.
Frederick, Shane, Nathan Novemsky, Jing Wang, Ravi Dhar, and Stephen Nowlis (2009), “Opportunity
Cost Neglect,” Journal of Consumer Research, 36, 553-61.
Fuchs, Victor (1982), “Time Preferences and Health: An Exploratory Study,” In V. Fuchs (Ed.) Economic
Aspects of Health. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 93–120.
Fujita, K., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Levin-Sagi, M. (2006). Construal levels and self control. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 351–367.

42

Futagami, K., & Hori, T. (2010). A Non-Unitary Discount Rate Model. GCOE Discussion Paper No. 163.
Gafni A and Torrance GW (1984) Risk attitude and time preference in health. Management Science, 30,
440–451.
Gately, D. (1980) “Individual discount rates and the purchase and utilitzaiton of energy-using durables:
Comment,” Bell Journal of Economics 11, 373-374
Glimcher Paul W., Joseph Kable, Kenway Louie Source (2007) “Neuroeconomic Studies of Impulsivity:
Now or Just as Soon as Possible? “ The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2 (May,2007), pp. 142-147.
Gjesme, T. (1974). Goal distance in time and its effects on the relations between achievement motives
and performance. Journal of Research in Personality, 8(2), 161-171.
Green, L., Fristoe, N., & Myerson, J. (1994). Temporal discounting and preference reversals in choice
between delayed outcomes. Psychonomic Bulletin, 1(3), 383-389.
Green, L., Fry, A.F., & Myerson, J. (1994). “Discounting of Delayed Rewards: A Life-Span
Comparison,” Psychological Science, 5(1), 33-36.
Green, L., Myerson, J., & Ostaszewski, P. (1999). “Discounting of delayed rewards across the life span:age differences in individual discounting functions,” Behavioural Processes, 46, 89-96.
Grossman, M., 1972. On the concept of health capital and the demand for heath. J. Polit. Econ. 80 (2),
223–255.
Hardisty, D. J., Thompson, K. F., Krantz, D. H., & Weber, E. U. (2013). How to measure time
preferences: An experimental comparison of three methods. Judgment & Decision Making, 8(3).
Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. E. (2005). Dynamic consistency in Denmark: A longitudinal
field experiment. University of Central Florida Working Paper.
Harrison, Glenn W., Morten I. Lau, and Melonie B. Williams. 2002. “Estimating Individual DiscountRates in Denmark: A Field Experiment.” American Economic Review, 92(5): 1606–17.
Harvey, C. M. (1989). Prescriptive models of psychological effects on risk attitudes. Annals of
Operations Research, 19(1), 141-170.
Hausman, J. A. (1979) “Individual discount rates and the purchase and utilitzaiton of energy-using
durables: Comment,” Bell Journal of Economics 10, 33-54
Henderson, N., & Bateman, I. (1995). Empirical and Public Choice Evidence for Hyperbolic Social
Discount Rates and the Implications for Intergenerational Discounting. Environmental andResource Economics, 5, 413-423.
Hershfield, H. E., Cohen, T. R., & Thompson, L. (2012). Short horizons and tempting situations: Lack ofcontinuity to our future selves leads to unethical decision making and behavior. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 117(2), 298-310.
Hershfield, Hal E., Daniel G. Goldstein, William F. Sharpe, Jesse Fox, Leo Yeykelis, Laura L. Carstensen,
and Jeremy N. Bailenson (2011), "Increasing saving behavior through age-progressed renderings ofthe future self," Journal of Marketing Research 48, no. SPL: S23-S37.
Hesketh, B., Watson-Brown, C., and Whiteley, S. (1998). Time-related Discounting of Value andDecision-Making about Job Options. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 52, 89-105.
Himmelman, Jeff (2012) “Here Comes The Sell,” New York Times Magazine; Aug 12, 2012; pg. 25-29

43

Hinson, J.M., Jameson, T.L., & Whitney, P. (2003). Impulsive Decision Making and Working Memory.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 29(2), 298-306.
Hoch, Steve and George Loewenstein (1991), “Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer SelfControl,” Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (March), 492–507.
Houser, Daniel, Daniel Schunk, Joachim Winter and Erte Xiao (2010) “Temptation and Commitment in
the Laboratory,” University of Zurich working paperHsee, Christopher, Jiao Zhang, LIangyan Wang and Shirley Zhang (2013) “Magnitude, Time and Risk
Differ Similarly between Joint and Single Evaluations,” Journal of Consumer Research, 40, 172184
Hull, C. L. (1932). The goal-gradient hypothesis and maze learning. Psychological Review, 39(1), 25.
Hurst, Erik (2004) “Grasshoppers, Ants and Pre-Retirement Wealth: A Test of Permanent Income
Consumers” University of Michigan Working Paper 2004-088
Ikeda, S., Myong-II, K., Ohtake, F. (2009). Fat Debtors: Time Discounting, Its Anomalies, And Body
Mass Index. The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Paper No. 732.
Jimura, K., Myerson, J., Hilgard, J., Keighley, J., Braver, T. S., & Green, L. (2011). Domain
independence and stability in young and older adults’ discounting of delayed rewards.
Behavioural processes, 87(3), 253-259.
Johnson, M. W., & Bickel, W. K. (2002). Within-subject comparison of real and hypothetical money
rewards in delay discounting. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 77(2), 129-146.
Johnson, Eric J., Stephen A. Atlas, and John W. Payne (2011), “Time Preferences, Mortgage Choice, andStrategic Default,” working paper, Columbia Business School.
Joshi, Priyanka and Nathanael Fast (2013) “Power and Reduced Temporal Discounting,” Psychological
Science, 24(4), 432-438
Kable, Joseph W. (2013) Valuation, intertemporal choice and self-control. Neuroeconomics, 2nd Edition,
Paul Glimcher and Ernst Fehr, Eds. 173-192. Academic Press.
Keinan, Anat and Ran Kivetz (2008). Remedying Hyperopia: The Effects of Self-Control Regret on
Consumer Behavior. Journal of Marketing Research: Vol. 45, No. 6, pp. 676-689.
Killeen, P.R. (2009). An Additive-Utility Model of Delay Discounting. Psychological Review, 116(3),602-619.
Kim, B. K., & Zauberman, G. (2009). Perception of anticipatory time in temporal discounting. Journal of
Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics,2(2), 91.
Kim, B. K., & Zauberman, G. (2013). Can Victoria's Secret change the future? A subjective timeperception account of sexual-cue effects on impatience. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 142(2), 328.
Kim, B. K., Zauberman, G., & Bettman, J. R. (2012). Space, time, and intertemporal preferences. Journalof Consumer Research, 39(4), 867-880.
Kirby, K. N. & Marakovic, N. N. (1996). Delay-discounting probabilistic rewards: Rates decrease as
amounts increase. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3(1), 100-104.

44

Kirby, K.N., Godoy, R., Reyes-Garcia, V., Byron, E., Apaza, L., Leonard, W., Perez, E., Vadez, V., &Wilkie, D. (2002). Correlates of delay-discount rates. Evidence from Tsimane’ Amerindians of
the Bolivian rain forest. Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, 291-316.
Kirby, K. N., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1995). Preference reversals due to myopic discounting of delayed reward.
Psychological Science, 6(2), 83-89.
Kirby, K.N., Petry, N.M., & Bickel, W.K. (1999). Heroin Addicts have Higher Discount Rates for
Delayed Rewards Than Non-Drug-Using Controls. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 128(1),78-87.
Kirby KN, Winston GC, Santiesteban M (2005) “Impatience and grades: delay-discount rates correlate
negatively with college GPA,” Learning and Individual Differences 2005; 15:213–222.
Kivetz, Ran and Itamar Simonson (2002), “Self-Control for the Righteous: Toward a Theory ofPrecommitment to Indulge,” Journal of Consumer Research, 29 (September), 199–217
Kivetz, R., Urminsky, O., & Zheng, Y. (2006). The goal-gradient hypothesis resurrected: Purchaseacceleration, illusionary goal progress, and customer retention. Journal of Marketing Research,
43(1), 39-58.
Komlos, J., Smith, P.K., & Bogin, B. (2003). Obesity and the Rate of Time Preference: Is there aConnection, Munich Discussion Paper No. 2003-16.
Laibson, D. (1997) Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May
1997, 444-477.
Lane, S. D., Cherek, D. R., Pietras, C. J., & Tcheremissine, O. V. (2003). Measurement of delay
discounting using trial-by-trial consequences. Behavioural Processes, 64(3), 287-303.
Lawrance, E.C. (1991). Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from Panel Data. Journal of
Political Economy, 99(1), 54-77.
LeBoeuf, Robyn A. (2006), “Discount Rates for Time Versus Dates: The Sensitivity Of Discounting toTime-Interval Description,” Journal of Marketing Research, 43 (February), 59–72.
Lee, N.C., Krabbendam, L., Dekker, S., Boschloo, A., de Groot, R.H.M., & Jones, J. (2012). Academic
Motivation mediates the influence of temporal discounting on academic achievement duringadolescence. Trends in Neuroscience and Education, 1, 43-48.
Lee, SunYoun and Fumio Ohtake (2012) “Procrastinators and hyperbolic discounters: Probability oftransition from temporary to full-time employment,” Osaka University Discussion Paper No. 841
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (1998). The role of feasibility and desirability considerations in near anddistant future decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 75(1), 5.
Loewenstein, G. (1992) “The Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in the Economics ofIntertemporal Choice,” in Choice Over Time, George Loewenstein and Jon Elster, eds; Russell
Sage Foundation, New York, NY
Loewenstein, G. (1988). Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice. Carnegie Mellon University Research
Showcase, Paper 92.
Loewenstein, George F. (1996), “Out of Control: Visceral Inﬂuences on Behavior,” Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65 (3), 272–92.

45

Loewenstein, George, and Drazen Prelec, (1992) "Anomalies in intertemporal choice: Evidence and aninterpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, no. 2: 573-597.
Logue, A.W. (1988). Research on self-control: An integrating framework. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,11, 665-709.
Luhmann, C. C. (2013). Discounting of delayed rewards is not hyperbolic. Journal of experimental
psychology: learning, memory, and cognition, 39(4), 1274.
Lynch, John G. Jr. and Gal Zauberman (2006), “When Do You Want It? Time, Decisions, and Public
Policy,” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Spring, 2006), pp. 67-78
Lynch J.R., J.G., Netemeyer, R.G., Spiller, S.A., and Zammit, A. (2010). A Generalizable Scale ofPropensity to Plan: The Long and the Short of Planning for Time and for Money. Journal ofConsumer Research, 37, 108-128.
Lynch, John G., Jr., Stephen Spiller, and Gal Zauberman (2014). Resource Slack: A Theory of Supply
and Demand. Working Paper.
MacKillop, James, Michael T. Amlung, Lauren R. Few, Lara A. Ray, Lawrence H. Sweet and Marcus R.
Munafò (2011) “Delayed reward discounting and addictive behavior: a meta-analysis,”
Psychopharmacology (2011) 216:305–321
Magen, Eran, Carol Dweck and James Gross (2008) “The Hidden-Zero Effect,” Psychological Science,
19 (7), 648-649
Malkoc, S.A., & Zauberman, G. (2006). Deferring Versus Expediting Consumption: The Effect of
Outcome Concreteness on Sensitivity to Time Horizon. Journal of Marketing Research, 43, 618627.
Malkoc, S. A., Zauberman, G., & Bettman, J. R. (2010). Unstuck from the concrete: Carryover effects ofabstract mindsets in intertemporal preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 113(2), 112-126
Malkoc, S. A., Zauberman, G., & Ulu, C. (2005). Consuming now or later? The interactive effect oftiming and attribute alignability. Psychological Science,16(5), 411-417.
Mazur JE (1987), “An adjusting procedure for studying delayed re-inforcement,” In: Commons ML,
Mazur JE, Nevin JA, Rachlin H (eds) Quantitative analysis of behavior: vol 5. The effect of delay
and intervening events on reinforcement value. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J., pp 55–73
McClure, Samuel M., David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D. Cohen (2004) “Separate
Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards,” Science 15 October 2004:
306 (5695), 503-507.
Meier, Stephan and Charles Sprenger (2009) “Discounting Financial Literacy: Time Preferences andParticipation in Financial Education Programs,” Working paper
Meier, Stephan, and Charles Sprenger. 2010. "Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1): 193-210.
Melanko, S., & Larkin, K. T. (2013). Preference for immediate reinforcement over delayed
reinforcement: relation between delay discounting and health behavior. Journal of behavioral
medicine, 36(1), 34-43.
Meyer, Richard F. (1976), "Preferences Over Time," in Decisions with Multiple Objectives. Ralph
Keeney and Howard Raiffa, eds. NY: Wiley, p. 473-89.

46

Metcalfe, Janet and Walter Mischel (1999), “A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of Gratiﬁcation:
Dynamics of Willpower,” Psychological Review, 106 (1), 3–19.
Milkman, K.L., Rogers, T., & Bazerman, M.H. (2009). Highbrow Films Gather Dust: Time InconsistentPreferences and Online DVD Rentals. Management Science, 55(6), 1047-1059.
Milkman, K. L., Rogers, T., & Bazerman, M. H. (2010). I’ll have the ice cream soon and the vegetables
later: A study of online grocery purchases and order lead time. Marketing Letters, 21(1), 17-35.
Mischel W, Shoda Y, Rodriguez ML (1989) “Delay of gratification in children,” Science 1989; 244:933–
938.
Mitchell, J. P., Schirmer, J., Ames, D. L., & Gilbert, D. T. (2011). Medial prefrontal cortex predicts
intertemporal choice. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 23(4), 857-866.
Munasinghe, L., & Sicherman, N. (2000). Why Do Dancer's Smoke? Smoking, Time Preference, andWage Dynamics. Eastern Economic Journal, 32(4), 595-616.
Myerson, J., Green, L., Warusawitharana, M. (2001). Area Under The Curve As A Measure Of
Discounting. Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 76, 235-243.
Nenkov, Gergana Y., J. Jeffrey Inman, and John Hulland (2008), “Considering the Future: The
Conceptualization and Measurement of Elaboration on Potential Outcomes,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 35(1), 126
Noor, J. (2009). Hyperbolic discounting and the standard model: Eliciting discount functions. Journal of
Economic Theory, 144(5), 2077-2083
Nunes, J. C., & Drèze, X. (2006). The endowed progress effect: How artificial advancement increases
effort. Journal of Consumer Research, 32(4), 504-512.
O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review, 103-124.
Odum, A.L. (2011). Delay discounting: Trait Variable? Behavioural Processes, 87, 1-9.
Oster, S.M., Fiona, M., & Morton, S. (2005). Behavioral Biases Meet the Market: The Case of Magazine
Subscription Prices. Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 5(1), 1-30.
Parfit, Derek (1984), Reasons and Persons, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Payne, J.W., Bettman, J.R., Schkade, D.A. (1999). Measuring Constructed Preferences: Towards a
Building Code. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1-3), 243-270.
Poulos, C., & Whittington, D. (2000). Time Preferences for Life-Saving Programs: Evidence from Six
Less Developed Countries. Environmental Science and Technology, 34, 1445-1455.
Radu, P.T., Yi, R., Bickel, W.K., Gross, J.J., McClure, S.M. (2011). A Mechanism For Reducing Delay
Discounting By Altering Temporal Attention. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior,
96, 363-385.
Read, D. (2001). Is time-discounting hyperbolic or subadditive?. Journal of risk and uncertainty, 23(1),5-32.
Read, Daniel (2004), "Intertemporal Choice," in The Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision
Making, Derek J. Koehler and Nigel Harvey, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 424-43.
Read, D., Frederick, S., & Airoldi, M. (2012). Four days later in Cincinnati: Longitudinal tests ofhyperbolic discounting. Acta psychologica, 140(2), 177-185.

47

Read, D., Frederick, S., Orsel, B., and Rahman, J. 2005. Four Score and Seven Years From Now: The"Date/Delay Effect" in Temporal Discounting. Management Science. Vol. 51, No. 9, pp. 13261335.
Read, Daniel, Shane Frederick and Marc Scholten (2012) “DRIFT: An Analysis of Outcome Framing inIntertemporal Choice,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition,
Vol 39(2), Mar 2013, 573-588.
Read, D., Loewenstein, G., & Kalyanaraman, S. (1999). Mixing Virtue and Vice: Combining theImmediacy Effect and the Diversification Heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12,257-273.
Read, Daniel and Barbara van Leeuwen (1998), "Predicting Hunger: The Effects of Appetite and Delayon Choice," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76 (2), 189-205.
Reed, D. D., & Martens, B. K. (2011). Temporal discounting predicts student responsiveness to exchange
delays in a classroom token system. Journal of applied behavior analysis, 44(1), 1-18.
Reimers, S., Maylor, E.A., Stewart, N., & Chater, N. (2009). Associations between a one-shot delay
discounting measure and age, income, education and real-world impulsive behavior. Personality
and Individual Differences, 47, 973-978.
Reynolds, B., Richards, J. B., & de Wit, H. (2006). Acute alcohol effects on laboratory measures of
impulsive behavior in humans. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 83, 194-202.
Rick, Scott and George Loewenstein (2008), “Intangibility in intertemporal choice,” PhilosophicalTransactions of the Royal Society B, 363, 3813-3824.
Robles, E., & Vargas, P. A. (2007). Functional parameters of delay discounting assessment tasks: Order ofpresentation. Behavioural processes, 75(2), 237-241.
Robles, E., Vargas, P. A., & Bejarano, R. (2009). Within-subject differences in degree of delay discounting asa function of order of presentation of hypothetical cash rewards. Behavioural Processes, 81(2), 260263.
Roelofsma, P. H., & Read, D. (2000). Intransitive intertemporal choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 13(2), 161-177.
Rubenstein, A. (2003). “Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting. International
Economic Review, 44(4), 1207-1216.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1937), “A Note on Measurement of Utility,” Review of Economic Studies, 40(2),155-61.
Saunders, R. & Fogarty, G. (2001). Time discounting in career preference. Journal of Vocational
Behavior, 58, 118-126
Sayman, S., & Öncüler, A. (2009). An investigation of time inconsistency. Management Science, 55(3),470-482.
Schoenfelder, T.E., and Hantula, D.A. (2003). A job with a future? Delay discounting, magnitude effects,
and domain independence of utility for career decisions. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 62, 4355.
Scholten, M., & Read, D. (2006). Discounting by intervals: A generalized model of intertemporal choice.
Management Science, 52, 1426–1438.

48

Scholten, Marc and Daniel Read (2010). "The psychology of intertemporal tradeoffs" Psychological
Review, 117(3), Jul 2010, 925-944.
Scholten, M., Read, D., Bartels, D.M. (2014) Tradeoffs and Choice-Set Effects in Intertemporal Choice.
(Working Paper)
Scholten, M., Read, D., & Sanborn, A. (2014). Weighing outcomes by time or against time? Evaluation
rules in intertemporal choice. Cognitive science.
Schwartz, J., Mochon, D., Wyper, L., Maroba, J., Patel, D., & Ariely, D. (2014). Healthier by
Precommitment. Psychological science, forthcoming.
Shapiro, Jesse (2005) “Is there a daily discount rate? Evidence from the food stamp nutrition cycle,”
Journal of Public Economics, Volume 89, Issues 2–3, February 2005, Pages 303–325
Shamosh, Noah and Jeremy Gray (2008) “Delay Discounting and Intelligence: A meta-analysis,”Intelligence, 36(4), 289-305
Shell, Jennifer and Duane F. Husman (2001), “The Multivariate Dimensionality of Personal Control andFuture Time Perspective in Achievement and Studying,” Contemporary Educational Psychology,
26(4), pp. 481–506.
Shelley, M. K. (1993). Outcome signs, question frames and discount rates. Management Science, 39(7), 806815.
Shiv, Baba and Alexander Fedorikhin (1999), “Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect andCognition in Consumer Decision Making,” Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (December), 278–92
Silva FJ, Gross TF (2004) “The rich get richer: students’ discounting of hypothetical delayed rewards andreal effortful extra credit,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 2004; 11:1124–1128.
Simonson, I. (2008). Will I like a “medium” pillow? Another look at constructed and inherent
preferences. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 18(3), 155-169.
Sloman, Steven (1996) “The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning,” Psychological Bulletin 119(1), 3-22
Smith, P.K., Bogin, B., Bishai, D. (2005). Are time preference and body mass index associated? Evidence
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young. Economics and Human Biology, 3, 259-270.
Smits, R. R., Stein, J. S., Johnson, P. S., Odum, A. L., & Madden, G. J. (2013). Test–retest reliability andconstruct validity of the Experiential Discounting Task. Experimental and clinicalpsychopharmacology, 21(2), 155.
Soman, Dilip (1998), "The Illusion of Delayed Incentives: Evaluating Future Effort-Money
Transactions," Journal of Marketing Research, 35 (November), 427-38.
Spiller, S. A. (2011). Opportunity cost consideration. Journal of Consumer Research, 38(4), 595-610.
Stewart, Neil, Nick Chater, Gordon D.A. Brown (2006). “Decision by sampling“ Cognitive Psychology.
53 (1), Pages 1–26.
Strathman, Alan, Faith Gleicher, David S. Boninger, and C. Scott Edwards (1994), “The Consideration of
Future Consequences: Weighing Immediate and Distant Outcomes of Behavior,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66(4),742-52
Sugden, R., & Williams, A. (1978). The principles of practical cost-benefit analysis. OUP Catalogue.

49

Takahashi, T. (2005). Loss of self-control in intertemporal choice may be attributable to logarithmic timeperception. Medical Hypotheses, 65(4), 691-693.
Tanaka, T., Camerer, C.F., & Nguyen, Q. (2010). Risk and Time Preferences: Linking Experimental andHousehold Survey Data from Vietnam. American Economic Review, 100(1), 557-571.
Thaler, Richard H. (1981), "Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency," Economic Letters, 8(3), 201-207.
Thaler, R.H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). Save More Tomorrow (TM): Using Behavioral Economics toIncrease Employee Saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112 (1), 164-88.
Thaler, R. H., H. Shefrin. 1981. An economic theory of self control. Journal of Political Economics 89(1)392–406.
Toubia, O., Johnson, E., Evgeniou, T., & Delquié, P. (2013). Dynamic experiments for estimating
preferences: An adaptive method of eliciting time and risk parameters. Management Science,59(3), 613-640.
Ubfal, D. (2012). How General Are Time Preferences? Eliciting Good-Specific Discount Rates. IZA
Discussion Paper No. 6774.
Urminsky, Oleg (2014) “A meta-analytic review of time discounting measurement,” University of
Chicago Working paper
Urminsky, Oleg and Daniel Bartels (2014) “Looking Into Future’s Mirror: How Representations of theAged Self Impact Impatience,” University of Chicago Working Paper
Urminsky, Oleg, Daniel Bartels and Kerry Milch (2014) “Understanding the ‘Self’ in Self-Control: The
Effects of Connectedness to Future Self on Far-Sightedness,” University of Chicago Working
Paper
Urminsky, Oleg, Indranil Goswami and Tim Lewis (2014) “Impatient to Achieve or Impatient to Receive:
How the Goal Gradient Effect Underlies Time Discounting,” University of Chicago Working
Paper
Urminsky, Oleg and Ran Kivetz (2011). “Scope Insensitivity and the ‘Mere Token’ Effect.” Journal ofMarketing Research: 48 (2), pp. 282-295.
Urminsky, Oleg and Ran Kivetz (2014) “Reconciling Myopia and Hyperopia: Explaining Differential
Impatience toward Hedonic and Utilitarian Consumption,” University of Chicago Working Paper
Vallacher, R. R. (1993). Mental calibration: Forging a working relationship between mind and action. In
D. M. Wegner & J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.), Handbook of mental control (pp. 443-472).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Van Huizen, T. (2010). On-the-Job Search, Work Effort and Hyperbolic Discounting. (Working Paper)
Vul E., Harris C., Winkielman P. & Pashler H. (2009) Puzzlingly high correlations in fMRI studies of
emotion, personality, and social cognition, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(3), 274-290
Wang, X.T., & Dvorak, R.D. (2010). Sweet Future: Fluctuating Blood Glucose Levels Affect Future
Discounting. Psychological Science, 21(2), 183-188.
Warner, J.T., & Pleeter, S. (2001). The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military Downsizing
Programs. American Economic Review, March 2001, 33-53

50

Weber, E. U., E.J. Johnson, K.F. Milch, H. Chang, J.C. Brodscholl and D.G. Goldstein (2007)“Asymmetric Discounting in Intertemporal Choice : A Query-Theory Account,” Psychological
Science 18, 516- 523
Weitzman, M.L. (1998). Why the Far-Distant Future Should Be Discounted at Its Lowest Possible Rate.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36, 201-208.
Wertenbroch, Klaus (1998), "Consumption Self-Control by Rationing Purchase Quantities of Virtue andVice," Marketing Science, 17 (4), 317-37.
Wilson, M., & Daly, M. (2006). Are Juvenile Offenders Extreme Future Discounters? Psychological
Science, 17(11), 989-994.
Winer, R. S. (1997). Discounting and its impact on durables buying decisions. Marketing Letters, 8(1),109-118.
Wittmann, M. (2009). The inner experience of time. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
London, Series B: Biological Sciences, 364, 1955–1967.
Wood, Stacy L. (2001), "Remote Purchase Environments: The Influence of Return Policy Leniency on
Two-Stage Decision Processes," Journal of Marketing Research, 38 (May), 157-69.
Yi, R., Mitchell, S. H., & Bickel, W. K. (2010). “Delay discounting and substance abuse-dependence,” In
G. J. Madden, & W. K. Bickel (Eds.), Impulsivity: The behavioral and neurological science of
discounting (pp. 191–211). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Zauberman, G. (2003). The intertemporal dynamics of consumer lock‐in. Journal of consumer research,
30(3), 405-419.
Zauberman, Gal and John G. Lynch (2005), “Resource Slack and Propensity to Discount Delayed
Investments of Time versus Money.” Journal of Experiment Psychology: General 134, 23-37.
Zauberman, Gal, B. Kyu Kim, Selin Malkoc, and James R. Bettman (2009). “Time Discounting andDiscounting Time.” Journal of Marketing Research 46, 543-56.
Zhao, M., Hoeffler, S., & Zauberman, G. (2007). Mental simulation and preference consistency overtime: The role of process-versus outcome-focused thoughts. Journal of Marketing Research, 379388.