October 24, 2019

12049

MexicoChief Analyst
xxxxx Analyst

Atsushi Masuda
Shinichi Endo

Long-term RatingA-

Outlook*

StableShort-term Rating-*Long-term Rating refers to Foreign Currency Long-term Issuer Rating in principle.

Overview
Mexico is a major regional economy with apopulation of about 120 million and a nominal GDP of
approximately USD 1.2 trillion, both of which are thesecond-largest in Latin America after Brazil. Its per capita
GDP totaled approximately USD 9,800 in 2018. Its landarea is about 1.96 million square kilometers, about fivetimes that of Japan.
In terms of ethnic composition, Mestizo, a mixed
blood of European (Spanish, etc.) and indigenous people,
accounted for about 60%, indigenous people for about
30%, and European (Spanish, etc.) approximately 9% of
the total population. The official language is Spanish and
90% of its population is Catholic. Such population
composition, language and religion reflect the influenceof the era of Spanish colony.

Social and political bases
Mexico started an independent war against Spain, theformer suzerain country, in 1810 and won independence
in 1821. It is currently a federal republic headed bypresident and based on constitutional democracy. The
president is elected by popular vote and the term of thepresident’s tenure is one term of six years, withreelection prohibited under the constitution. Its
legislature is a bicameral Congress composed of thechamber of senators and the chamber of representatives.
Partido Revolucionario Institucional or theInstitutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), founded in 1929,
had been in power for 70 years since the Mexican
Revolution. In 2000, Partido Accion Nacional or the
National Action Party (PAN) took over power for the firsttime and stayed at the helm until 2012. In December<1>

2012, PRI returned to power when its candidate Pena
Nieto was elected president. During his presidency, Pena
Nieto pursued structural reforms in a variety of fields,
including energy, finance, banking, communications,labor and education, and gained support from thedomestic business community and foreign investors. On
the other hand, he was unable to enforce effective
measures to stem the spread of corruption amid
disclosure of corruption scandals involving himself andhis wife. In addition, public security has deteriorated as
the murder rate hit a record high in 2018. The approvalrate of his government plunged due to its inability toeffectively tackle with these issues.
The latest presidential election was held in July 2018,
and Andrés Manuel López Obrador, widely known as
AMLO, from emerging left-wing political party MORENA(Movimiento Regeneración Nacional or the National
Regeneration Movement) was elected by garnering
53.2% of the votes cast. In the congressional election
held on the same day, a leftist coalition led by MORENA
won a majority in both houses. In contrast, José Antonio
Meade, who ran on the center right-wing PRI ticket, won
only 16.4% of the votes to rank third, with PRI's share ofseats in Congress falling sharply from about 50% to some
12%. AMLO officially launched his administration uponassuming the presidency in December that year.
The new administration has identified eradication ofcorruption as one of its top priorities. In Mexico,
productivity has remained sluggish for many years due
to rampant corruption and the existence of large-scale
informal labor, but successive governments had failed tofind effective solutions to those problems. Against thisbackdrop, Mexican people seemed to have pinned
hopes on the freshness of the new AMLO administration
backed by the emerging left-wing MORENA.

Issuer Report
On the other hand, the administration has beenrevising the main policies pursued by its predecessor.
Even before assuming office in October 2018, AMLO said
his administration would suspend the construction of a
new international airport in Mexico City. In December
2018, he suspended the oil bidding process for privatesector companies, which had been part of the previous
administration’s energy-sector reforms, and announcedplans aimed for self-sufficiency in petroleum products
through a renovation of existing refineries and theconstruction of a new refinery. These decisions madestock prices and exchange rates temporarily volatile, anindication that investors both at home and abroad hadturned wary about growing future uncertainty.
In his inaugural address in December 2018, however,
AMLO also expressed his willingness to pay certain
consideration to domestic and overseas investors, suchas maintaining fiscal discipline and respecting theindependence of the central bank. JCR will watch
whether his administration will be able to push ahead
with necessary reforms such as suppression ofcorruption over the medium to long term while giving
consideration to investors' concerns about the futureand reducing uncertainty about imminent governmental
policies.
On the diplomatic front, since the conclusion of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with theUnited States and Canada, Mexico has strengthened its
economic interdependence with the United States inparticular. On the other hand, the Trump Administration
inaugurated in January 2017 has made a spate ofhardline assertions against Mexico, including
renegotiation of NAFTA (concluded in September 2018),
the construction of walls along the Mexican-American
borders and the repatriation of illegal immigrants. The
bilateral relations have since remained politically tense.
In May 2019, US President Trump branded themeasures taken so far by the Mexican government onillegal immigrants as insufficient and announced a plan
to impose a 5% tariff on all goods imported from Mexico.
The tariff would be raised in stages to a maximum of
25% if Mexico's response was not improved, Mr. Trump
added. Following the conclusion of the negotiations
between the two countries, the United States eventually
announced an indefinite suspension of tariff imposition
on Mexico in June. It was also agreed that an interim
assessment of Mexico’s response would be carried out
45 days later and a final conclusion including the
invocation of a higher tariff would be drawn within 90
days by the US administration. According to media,<2>

Mexican side received a certain level of appreciation forthe progress that has been made from the US side in themeeting of ministers held after the 90 days passed. JCR
will closely monitor the future development of thebilateral talks between the US and Mexico for this issue.

Economic baseSince the conclusion of the NAFTA, Mexico has
established a solid export base for automobiles andhome appliances mainly bound for North America by
accepting a large amount of direct investments. The
share of industrial products in exports reached 88% in
2018. The country is also open to other countries, andthe ratios of goods exports and imports to GDP are thehighest among the top five countries in Latin America innominal GDP terms. Goods exports (on a balance of
payments basis) in 2018 accounted for 36.8% of GDP
and goods imports for 38.0% of GDP, both of which havebeen on a moderate upward trend. Approximately 90%of the goods exports are manufactured goods, withsome 80% of them bound for the United States. In
particular, the automobile industry has been growing
remarkably, and the automobile production reached4.067 million units in 2018 (INEGI), the sixth largest in
the world.
Blessed with abundant mineral resources such as oil,silver and lead, Mexico ranks 19th in the world (third in
Latin America) in terms of proved oil reserves at 7.7
billion barrels per day at the end of 2018 according to BP
statistics, and 12th in the world (second in Latin
America) in terms of oil production at 1.85 million
barrels per day in 2018 according to BP statistics and theMinistry of Finance of Mexico. The country’s oil
production peaked at 3.38 million barrels per day in
2004, and the declining trend has not been halted.
Behind this is the fact that the state-owned petroleum
company PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos), which solely
undertakes oil production, has not been able to makeinvestments necessary to recover production due to thefinancial deterioration stemming from its heavy burdenof payments to the government. While the real sector's
dependence on mineral resources is low at around 4%,
with crude oil accounting for only 6.8% of total exports,
the government continues to rely on oil-related
revenues for its finance. Since oil production affects
government finance via PEMEX, it needs to take effective
measures to restore its production.
The new AMLO administration announced a threeyear suspension of the oil bidding process, saying that

Issuer Report
the current private-sector participation in the oil sector
had no clear effect in recovering oil production. The
administration looks to reinforce PEMEX's production
capacity through a renovation of existing refineries andthe construction of a new refinery. To this end, it isrevising the previous administration's policy to utilize theprivate sector in favor of greater priority on reforms of
PEMEX itself. It should be carefully noted that the efforts
to boost PEMEX's production capacity made by the
successive governments in the past have not beensuccessful, and there remains much uncertainty about
whether domestically produced petroleum products canbeat US-produced products to ensure self-sufficiency.
Given this situation, JCR will monitor whether the newadministration's PEMEX modifications will lead up to
improving the petroleum sector’s performance.
One of the focal points about the Mexican economy
in recent years has been whether the central bank canstabilize the high inflation rate mainly brought by rising
import prices and a spike of international crude oil prices
amid the Mexican peso’s depreciation against the US
dollar caused by the US interest rate hikes.
The CPI (headline) inflation rate began rising sharply
since January 2017 due mainly to the peso’s
depreciation and the liberalization of energy prices,reaching 6.8% year-on-year in December that year. In
2018, the impact of liberalized energy prices wasremoved, but the inflation rate remained high due to theimpact of rising import prices and crude oil prices. It
averaged higher than 4% in 2018, exceeding the central
bank's inflation target (3 ± 1%).
The central bank resolutely raised its policy interest
rate by a cumulative 525 basis points between
December 2015 and December 2018, bringing it to
8.25%, the highest since 2008. Thanks to the bank’s swift
policy responses, the peso has generally stabilized since
the beginning of 2019 and the CPI inflation rate fell to
3.2% year-on-year in August 2019, coming closer to thecentral bank’s inflation target. Amid the growing
speculation of an interest rate cut by the US Federal
Reserve, the pressure on domestic and international
financial conditions is likely to weaken for the time being.
JCR holds that the central bank may shift its stance infavor of lower interest rates in the second half of 2019 at
the earliest to support growth amid an outlook of pricestabilization.
The Mexican economy grew 2.0% in real GDP terms in
2018, slowing for the third consecutive year on stagnant
domestic and foreign demand. Private consumption was
sluggish as higher prices persisted and private-sector<3>

capital investment was also bleak amid the uncertainty
over the country’s trade relations with the US and the
new administration's economic policies. External
demand made a negative contribution for the second
consecutive year amid the global economic slowdown.
In 2019, the contribution of government spending andpublic investment to growth is expected to decline dueto the new administration's curtailment of budget
expenditures. Corporate activities may also stay cautious
from the viewpoint of assessing the administration’s
economic policies. JCR expects that the growth rate will
be lower than 2% in 2019 and around 2% in 2020
although the central bank may have some room formonetary easing to support growth in the near futureagainst the backdrop of a halt to US interest rate hikes
and weakening inflation pressures.

Fiscal baseOil-related revenues including those from PEMEX
accounted for 19.1% of the total public-sector revenues
in 2018. Compared to the most recent peak 39.4% in
2012, the decline was largely due to a significant fall of
crude oil prices since 2014 and a continuing downtrendof domestic oil production. The expansion of the tax
base for non-oil tax revenues and the establishment of aframework to reduce the impact of fluctuations in oil
prices promoted by the former Peña Nieto
administration also contributed to the reduced
dependence on oil-related revenues. Yet the country’s
fiscal dependence on oil remains high. While the real
economy's reliance on the oil sector is not so high,Mexico's public finance remains structurally susceptible
to the impact of the entire oil sector, including PEMEX.
Under these circumstances, the Fiscal Responsibility
Act was amended in 2014 under the former Peña Nieto
administration, requiring the government to set anannual target for Public Sector Borrowing Requirement(PSBR), the broadest-based budget deficit. PSBR in 2018settled at 2.2% of GDP for a significant increase in the
deficit from 1.1% (including the transfer of the Bank of
Mexico’s operating surplus) in the previous year.
However, the government's target of 2.5% was achieved
and the cumulative PSBR fell from 45.8% to 44.9% in
2018, indicating that fiscal discipline has been largely
maintained.
Even before assuming the presidency, AMLO had
pledged that his administration would enhance
expenditures on social policies, infrastructuredevelopment and energy investments while securingIssuer Reportfinancial resources solely by reducing current
expenditures, such as salary cuts for the highest paid
civil servants, without resorting to tax increases. How
these would be reflected on budget proposals had been
seen as crucial in predicting the fiscal policy of the newadministration. The 2019 budget submitted by the newadministration in December 2018 shortly after thepresidential inauguration proved to be one that would
not impair fiscal discipline. That was clear from two
points that the budget was based on conservative
economic forecasts and that PSBR target was to be kept
retrained at 2.5% of GDP.
A breakdown of the budget shows that total revenues
have been projected to decline in GDP terms due mainly
to a prospective fall of non-tax revenues whereas on the
expenditure side, the growth of various expenses havebeen curbed such as proposed salary cuts for public
servants. The budget has incorporated AMLO's publicpledges to a discernible extent.
The 2020 budget submitted by the government in
September 2019 also shows its continued adherence tofiscal discipline as the PSBR is to remain at 2.6% of GDP
and the primary balance is to be secured a surplus of
0.7% of GDP.
The Mid-Term Economic Outlook (2020-25), madepublic along with the budget, projects an annual average
economic growth rate of 2.5% for 2020-2025, which canbe seen as quite realistic in light of IMF's outlook (anaverage growth rate of 2.5% for 2020-2024). It is actuallya conservative outlook that falls short of a 4% growthpledged by AMLO. The fiscal outlook predicts thatannual revenues will stay at around 21% of GDP
throughout 2025 and that while pension expenditures
will increase, current expenditures such as personnel
expenses and capital spending will be curbed to deliver
PSBR to restrain within the level of 2.5% of GDP. The
cumulative PSBR is planned to be reduced from 45.3% of
GDP at the end of 2019 to 44.7% of GDP at the end of2025. It deserves recognition that the newadministration's adherence to fiscal soundness has beenshown in terms of specific figures. However, theprojected PSBR reduction in the medium-term outlook isplanned to be achieved mainly through restrained
expenditures. Given that most of the administration's
priority policy measures require increased spending, it isunclear if it can restrain budget expenditures as planned.
This needs to be closely monitored going forward.
With regard to PEMEX, while its EBITDA has been insurplus, it has been obliged to pay about 80% of thesurplus to the government. Therefore, it has been in<4>chronic deficit, staying in excess liabilities since 2009.
This has left PEMEX unable to make necessary capital
investments to recover production, which has kept
falling since the 2004. Its EBIDTA in 2018 was 2.3% of
GDP and profit before tax was 1.3% of GDP, but it had a
net loss equivalent to 0.6% of GDP because its payments
to the government reached 1.9% of GDP. Its balance offinancial liabilities reached 8.8% of GDP at the end of
2018. In February 2019, the new administration
announced relief measures worth about 0.3% of GDP for
PEMEX. Restoring PEMEX production is essential tofundamentally improve its financial conditions and,
consequently, to reduce its burden on the government
finance. The new administration has temporarilysuspended the opening of mining areas to the private
sector which had been promoted by the previous
administration in a policy shift in favor of increasing
PEMEX's oil production capacity. JCR will closely monitor
whether it would be possible to recover PEMEX's oil
production without relying on the private sector.

External position
Mexico's current account deficit mainly stemmingfrom a trade deficit and interest payments on foreign
direct investment has stayed in the range of 1-2% of GDP
in recent years. The current account deficit in 2018 wasequivalent to 1.8% of GDP, little changed from 1.7% in
the previous year. Mexico is easier to draw foreign direct
investment due to its proximity to the United States
under NAFTA, with its net inflow remaining stable ataround 2% of GDP in recent years. Therefore, the current
account deficit has been stably financed by foreign direct
investment and the impact of volatile portfolio
investment on the overall external balance has been
kept mitigated. In fact, the net inflow of foreign direct
investment in 2018 was equivalent to 2.0% of GDP,
enough to cover the current account deficit in that year.
Portfolio investment in Mexico is characterized by alarge portion of nonresidents’ investments concentrating
on debt securities issued by the government and stateowned
corporations.
However,nonresidents’investments in those instruments declined significantlyin the third and fourth quarters of 2018. One of thefactors behind the fall was the growing concerns among
foreign investors over AMLO's election as president inJuly 2018 and forthcoming economic policies to be taken
by his administration.
The growth of Mexico’s external debt has been
restrained since 2015, and the debt totaled USD 446.1

Issuer Reportbillion in 2018, up 2.2% from the previous year. The debt
in GDP terms has been on a declining trend sincepeaking at 38.3% in 2016. In 2018, the rate stood at
36.4%, which is lower among the countries rated in the
A-range by JCR. Looking at its composition by period, theshare of short-term debt has remained lower at around
10% in recent years. The country's foreign currency
reserves have been staying flat at around USD 177 billion
since 2015. The total reserves including gold stood at
USD 176.4 billion at the end of 2018, or 2.8 times of theshort-term debt and 4.2 months of imports of goods andservices. In addition, Mexico had a SDR 53.5 billion(approximately USD 73.6 billion) Flexible Credit Line
(FCL) with the IMF as of the end of October 2018 and istherefore highly resistant to external shocks.
The NAFTA renegotiations initiated by the UnitedStates, Mexico and Canada in August 2017 wereconcluded in September 2018. The new agreement,
renamed USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement), was signed by the leaders of the three
countries at the end of November 2018. USMCA
included stricter rules of origin for automobiles.
Specifically, the US assertion to increase the ratio of
procurement from the United States was reflected to acertain extent in the agreement as follows: (1) raising instages the regional value content (RVC) of completed
vehicles from the current 62.5% to 75% in 2023; (2)introducing a so-called wage clause that a certain
percentage or more of the value-added must be put inregions with hourly pay of USD 16 or more; and (3)requiring that the steel and aluminum purchased bycompleted vehicle manufacturers should meet 70% of
local value content.
However, the most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff ratefor US-bound passenger cars and SUVs is low at 2.5%
even when the rules are not met. Some automakers thus
may find it more rational to pay the tariff than making
major changes in their production and partsprocurement systems.
The Side Letter attached to USMCA stipulated a limit
on Mexican automobile exports to the United States.
The meaning of this export quota is that Mexican
automobile exports to the US will be exempt from
Article 232 tariff when Washington invokes the higher
tariff under Article 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. The
cap on passenger car and SUV exports has been set at2.60 million units. Given that such exports in 2018
totaled approximately 1.70 million units and considering
the rate of growth in recent years, actual exports areunlikely to exceed the limit for at least several years to<5>come. Therefore, the export quota could be considered
to have a stronger significance as an insurance to avoid
Article 232 tariff than a quantity export control.
For these reasons, JCR holds that Mexican auto
exports to the United States and direct investments
related to auto production in Mexico are unlikely to besignificantly restrained by USMCA.

Financial system
The Mexican commercial banking sector ischaracterized by the strong presence of foreign banks
following the currency crisis in the 1990s andsubsequent financial restructuring. Foreign banks now
account for about 70% of the total assets held bycommercial banks.
Despite the Mexican peso’s depreciation from 2015
to 2017 and the substantial rate hikes by the central
bank, the Mexican banking sector has generally beenretaining its high profitability and soundness. The ROA of
the banking sector as a whole remained relatively highat 2.2% at the end of 2018. The capital adequacy ratio
has been rising since 2016, reaching 15.9% at the end of
2018. The NPL ratio has been declining continuously
since 2014. It stood at 2.1% at the end of 2018. The
loan-to-deposit ratio has been staying stable at around
90% in recent years.
The limited impact of the major rate hikes by thecentral bank on the banking sector is due to the fact that
financial deepening in the country is still in thedevelopment process and, therefore, the impact ofmonetary policy on the real economy is not so large. In
fact, domestic claims stood at 54.4% of GDP at the endof 2018, the lowest among the countries rated in the Arange by JCR. The intermediation function of the banking
system as a whole has not sufficiently deepened incomparison to the size of the economy and the domestic
financial sector alone can hardly supply enough funds tofinance growth. Riding on a stable loan-deposit ratio, thebanking sector kept its balance of external borrowings
low at 2.6% of GDP at the end of 2018 whereas thecorresponding ratio for non-financial corporations
stayed relatively high at 17.5%. This surely proves that
Mexican firms have good access to international
financial markets. However, it is important to promote
financial deepening in the medium- to long term inorder to enhance the stability of the financial systemagainst external shocks although the external debt-GDP
ratio itself is low among the A-rated countries.

Issuer Report

Overall assessment and rating outlook
The ratings are supported by the country’s solid
export-oriented industrial base, its adherence to fiscal
discipline, flexible and swift management of monetaryand exchange rate policy, and resilience to external
shocks. On the other hand, the ratings are constrainedby the necessity of modernization of Mexican oil
industries, and prevalent corruption and large-scale
informal labor which impedes economic efficiency.
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), from the leftist
party MORENA, was elected in the presidential electionin July 2018 and took office as president in Decemberthat year. His new administration advocates eradicationof corruption, which had worsened under the previous
administration, as its top priority. On the fiscal front, it
presented a 2019 budget which attached great
importance to maintaining fiscal discipline with an
expected surplus in the primary balance of 1.0% of GDP.
JCR holds that a further increase of the fiscal deficit andpublic debt may continue to be restrained under its
policy. On the other hand, NAFTA renegotiations wereconcluded in September 2018, and the new agreement(United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, USMCA) is
aimed to come into effect in 2020. While USMCA has
tightened rules of origin for automobiles, JCR sees little
likelihood of a substantial decline in Mexican auto
exports to the US and direct investments related toautomobiles in Mexico. Based on the above, JCR has
affirmed its ratings with Stable outlook. It has also
maintained its “A+” country ceiling.
If concerns arise about the government's
commitment to fiscal discipline when increased
expenditures in excess of its fiscal outlook are requiredfor its priority policy measures, the ratings will comeunder downward pressure. In addition, if the newadministration continues to implement policies that may
significantly dampen the medium- to long-term
investment predictability, such as the one seen in thesuspension of the new airport construction project, theinstability of the external balance may grow amid
heightened concerns among foreign investors over its
policy management. That will also bring downward
pressure on the ratings. Moreover, continued attention
needs to be paid to the impact that future US economic,
monetary and trade policies and its policy toward
Mexico may have on the country's external sector.

<6>Issuer Report

12049

Mexico● Major Economic Indicators

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Nominal GDP per capita

USD

11,014

9,691

8,826

9,392

9,808

Real GDP growth

％

2.8

3.3

2.9

2.1

2.0

CPI inflation (annual average)

％

4.0

2.7

2.8

6.0

4.9

Public sector primary balance to GDP

％

-1.1

-1.2

-0.1

1.4

0.6

Public sector fiscal balance to GDP

％

-3.1

-3.4

-2.5

-1.1

-2.1

Public sector borrowing requirement(PSBR) to GDP

％

-4.5

-4.0

-2.8

-1.1

-2.3

Public sector historical PSBR to GDP

％

42.6

46.5

48.7

45.8

44.9

Current account balance to GDP

％

-1.9

-2.6

-2.3

-1.7

-1.8

Trade balance to GDP

％

-0.2

-1.2

-1.2

-0.9

-1.1

Financial account balance to GDP

％

-4.4

-2.3

-3.3

-2.1

-3.0

Official reserve assets

bn USD

195.7

177.6

178.0

175.4

176.4

Official reserve assets to imports ofgoods and services

months

5.4

5.0

5.1

4.6

4.2

Official reserve assets to short-term
external debt

x

2.1

2.5

3.2

3.2

3.3

External debt to GDP

％

32.4

35.6

38.3

37.7

36.9

Foreign exchange rate (annual average) MXN/USD

13.3

15.9

18.7

18.9

19.2

Capital Adequacy Ratio(domestic deposit-taking institutions)

％

15.8

15.0

14.9

15.6

15.9

NPL Ratio(domestic deposit-taking institutions)

％

3.0

2.5

2.1

2.1

2.1

Domestic claims to GDP

％

49.1

52.5

54.7

54.8

54.4

* Figures for the most recent period could be indicators based on preliminary figures.
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), Central Bank, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), IMF and CEIC

● Ratings(millions of yen)

RatingOutlook*Japanese Yen Bonds 19th Series (2014)

A--

Japanese Yen Bonds 20th Series (2014)

A-

Japanese Yen Bonds 22th Series (2016)
Japanese Yen Bonds 23th Series (2016)

AmountRate (%)

Issue Date

Maturity Date

Release13,9001.44

2014.07.24

2024.07.24

2019.03.26-

12,3002.57

2014.07.24

2034.07.24

2019.03.26

A--

50,9000.70

2016.06.16

2021.06.16

2019.03.26

A--

16,3001.09

2016.06.16

2026.06.16

2019.03.26

Japanese Yen Bonds 24th Series (2016)

A--

21,9002.40

2016.06.16

2036.06.16

2019.03.26

Japanese Yen Bonds 25th Series (2018)

A--

57,2000.60

2018.04.20

2023.04.20

2019.03.26

Japanese Yen Bonds 26th Series (2018)

A--

24,1000.85

2018.04.20

2025.04.18

2019.03.26

Japanese Yen Bonds 27th Series (2018)

A--

38,7001.05

2018.04.20

2028.04.20

2019.03.26

Japanese Yen Bonds 28th Series (2018)

A--

15,0002.00

2018.04.20

2038.04.20

2019.03.26

Japanese Yen Bonds 29th Series (2019)

A--

65,5000.62

2019.07.05

2022.07.05

2019.06.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 30th Series (2019)A--

41,2000.83

2019.07.05

2024.07.05

2019.06.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 31th Series (2019)A--

27,3001.05

2019.07.05

2026.07.05

2019.06.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 32th Series (2019)A--

31,0001.30

2019.07.05

2029.07.05

2019.06.27

Foreign Currency Long-term Issuer Rating

A-

Stable----2019.03.26

Local Currency Long-term Issuer Rating

A+

Stable----2019.03.26<7>

Issuer Report● History of Long-term Issuer Rating
Date(Foreign Currency Long-term Issuer Rating or its equivalent)

RatingOutlook*

Issuer Name

1998.06.17

BB+-

Mexico2000.11.02

BBB-

Mexico2005.01.26

BBB

StableMexico2006.01.20

BBB+

StableMexico2008.01.28

A-

StableMexico*Outlook for Foreign Currency long-term issuer rating, or direction in case of Credit Monitor

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