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Vol.7, 120-130, Mar. 2010

国際コンフリクト管理に関する統合的記述モデルを用いた研究～コソヴォ紛争を事例として～
A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITH AN
INTEGRATIVE EXPLANATORY MODEL:THE CASE STUDY OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT
サシャ

1

ジヴァノヴィッチ ・堀田

2

昌英 ・長山

大介

3

1

2

Ph.D. ＪＳＳ株式会社代表取締役 (E-mail: sasha@jssjapan.com)
Ph.D.東京大学大学院新領域創成科学研究科准教授 国際協力学専攻 (E-mail: horita@k.u-tokyo.ac.jp)
3
M.Eng. 東京大学大学院新領域創成科学研究科 国際協力学専攻 博士課程
(E-mail:mail@d-nagayama.com)

This paper explores the Kosovo Conflict through the use of the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model and theIntegrative Explanatory Model. The paper discusses the perceptions of two conflicting sides, the Kosovo Serbs andthe “West” represented by the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), investigating how from a perspective
different from the common branding of the Serbs as the perpetrators and the Albanians as the victims, the West can beperceived as contributing to an exacerbation of the situation by the “rational loop” which leads to an aggravation of
the human rights situation and the “cognitive loop” which leads to a support of independence under unsatisfactory
human rights situations. The Integrative Explanatory Model provides a holistic representation of the main factors of
the conflict, supplementing the mechanism unraveled by the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model.

キーワード：Kosovo, Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model, Integrative Explanatory Model, Geopolitics,
Conflict Resolution, United Nations Mission in Kosovo

1.

Introduction

achieved (as of 2007). Therefore, the main objective of thisresearch is to build a model explaining the evolution andoutcome of the Kosovo conflict and to provide a logicalexplanation in an integrative, holistic manner.

1.1. Background and Objective
Since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent bloody
civil wars, extensive research has been conducted in the area of
ethnic conflicts, humanitarian intervention (e.g. Moral Hazard
Theory) or the legality, morality and consequences of theNATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Yet, these researches havefailed to address the seemingly essential question with regard to
the Kosovo Conflict: What are the factors that hinder therealization of a democratic, multiethnic and tolerant society in
Kosovo?
Due to neglect of this central question, the following
problems are still unresolved in Kosovo:
1.
Problems of communication between UNMIK and
Belgrade, the Kosovo Serbs, respectively.
2.
Return of refugees.
3.
Destruction of cultural property of minorities.
It is of interest to discuss why the Kosovo conflictremains unsolved and why UNMIK’s objectives were not

2.

The Kosovo Conflict: A Historical Overview

2.1. Kosovo: Geography and History
Kosovo Province is situated in the heart of the Balkan
Peninsula surrounded by the neighboring territories of Serbia,
Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. The earliest known
inhabitants of Kosovo are believed to be the “Illyrians”, but by
the end of the 8th century the Slavs had colonized most of thearea of modern Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. In 1389, in the
Battle of Kosovo Polje, Kosovo became a part of the Ottoman
Empire and Albanians migrated into Kosovo. The Great
Migration of Serbs out of Kosovo in the 17th century and theresettlement by Albanians tilted the demography towards
Albanian majority. After the defeat of the Ottoman Turks in the120

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Vol.7, 120-130, Mar. 2010changes in the borders within Yugoslavia.
In March 1997 the civil government in Albania collapsed
into anarchy. Following several years of conflict in Kosovo, theKosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had become strong enough tochallenge Yugoslav forces and a whole-scaled war for
independence erupted in Kosovo during 1998. After several
warnings by the West to use military force, a conference washeld at Rambouillet to negotiate an end to the war. The
participating parties were (1) the Western allies and Russia, (2)Yugoslavia and (3) representatives of the Kosovo Albanians.
Two rounds of negotiations were held and at the end of thesecond round, the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the
proposed peace agreement but the talks broke up without asignature from the Serbian delegation, due mainly to a
NATO-presented “ultimatum” that was unacceptable for
Milosevic. On March 24th, 1999, NATO began an overallbombing campaign with an expectation that Yugoslavia would
capitulate to the West and sign the Rambouillet agreement.
Yugoslavia instead stepped up its war with the KLA, and thebombing continued for 78 days. On June 3rd, 1999, Yugoslavia
and NATO signed the Kumanovo Agreement which called for“substantial” autonomy for Kosovo and “substantial” NATO
presence in Kosovo, but that the territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia would be respected (i.e. Kosovo remains a part of
Yugoslavia).
The agreement was reached after NATO compromisedon three major issues as listed below:(1) NATO – not the UN – would lead the foreign occupation of
Yugoslavia(2) An annex to the Rambouillet agreement which would havegiven NATO troops free reign to occupy all of Yugoslavia
without accountability(3) Requirement for a referendum on Kosovo’s independence,slated to occur in three years’ time under the Rambouillet
ultimatum .
The central tasks of the UNMIK, installed subsequent to
the Kumanovo agreement, were (1) to ensure the rights ofrefugees to return home, (2) to ensure commitment of all
member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia, (3) to establish a functioning interim civil
administration, (4) to promote the establishment of substantial
autonomy and self-government, and (5) to facilitate a politicalprocess to determine Kosovo’s future status (Yannis, 2004). A
functioning civil administration was established, the KLA wastransformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps and the 10 seats
were reserved for the Serbs in the Assembly of Kosovo, but the
security situation for Serbs did not improve significantly.
Facing unbroken and continuous discrimination against

Russo-Ottoman War in 1878, the northern parts of Kosovo
were controlled by Bulgaria, but the rest remained under
Ottoman rule. In 1912, during the first Balkan War, Serbia,
Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria attacked Albania, which wasin alliance with the Turks. The Serbian Army defeated the
Albanians, the Serbian peasants reoccupied the land, and in
1912, Serbia was given sovereignty over Kosovo. Albania wasrecognized as a fully independent state in the Treaty of London
in 1913, but there existed much anti-Serbian sentiment. In 1913,
the second Balkan War broke out in which Bulgaria attacked
the Serbian and Greek armies in Macedonia, but were quickly
and decisively defeated. In 1914, after Austria-Hungary
annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Serbian student assassinated
the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, triggering
World War I which continued until November 11, 1918.
Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, declared war on
Serbia. Russia came into the war in support of Serbia, followed
by France and Britain. The peace treaties of 1919-1920
established a Yugoslav state which included the Slovenes,
Croats, Serbs, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro andMacedonia. In World War II, the Yugoslav government wascoerced into joining the Tripartite Pact, but an anti-axis coup
followed two days later and Germany began bombing
Yugoslavia on April 6th. In 1945, the British Government
withdrew support for Mihailovic and began supporting
Marshall Tito and the Communists. After the end of the war, a
new communist Yugoslavia composed of the republics ofSlovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro
and Macedonia was formed, but Kosovo was not recognized asa republic. It was defined as an “autonomous region” under
Federal, not Serbian jurisdiction. The 1974 constitution madeKosovo an “Autonomous Province” of the Republic of Serbia
and granted equal constitutional element of the Federation as
one of the eight federal units. Albanians in Kosovo began tocall for an “ethnically clean” Kosovo after Tito’s death in 1980,
and an increasing amount of Serb migration occurred out ofKosovo due to widespread intimidation and violence as
Kosovo Albanians called for status as a republic within
Yugoslavia (Dempsey, 1998).
2.2. Outbreak of the Kosovo Conflict
In September 1991, the parliament of Kosovo
overwhelmingly approved a resolution supporting the“Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo” and by thesummer of 1992, Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo essentiallycompletely separated from each other. The Albanian leadershipin Kosovo boycotted the 1992 Yugoslav elections, and violence
broke out after the Dayton Accord which denied any additional

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represents the whole conflict situation. Due to the significanceof the Balkan Peninsula in the context of the Eurasian Power
contest, it was speculated that the theoretical assumptions ofrealism should be overriding in the Kosovo Conflict. Further,
the research employed a new approach of data collection andanalysis known as Multilingual Comparative Data Analysis
which analyzes and compares different multilingual data inorder to assess possibly existing biases in the reporting of thesame event by different international media in different
languages.
In the second phase of the research, as abovementioned,a field study was performed in Serbia proper and Kosovo
Province as a part of the case study. From May 20, 2006 to
May 30, 2006, one of the authors (“the interviewer”
hereonafter), together with two other Japanese citizens,conducted a series of qualitative interviews using open-ended
questions. Interviewees were selected from different parties,
and classified into three groups: the first group was composedof people actively involved in the conflict and have executive
power, the second group of people who are involved in theconflict with indirect influence but no executive power, and thethird group which was composed of those individuals who
were affected by the conflict but had no means to influence its
outcome.
The authors also attempted to maintain a balance inselecting the interviewees (e.g. in interviewing high-ranking
officials, Dr. Todrovic, the second highest ranking Serbian
politicians for Kosovo and Mr. Berisha, the highest ranking
K-Albanian politician, were selected).
The exact number of key interviewees is 10, but not allof the profiles of interviewees could be presented in the paper
because of specific requests by interviewees not to disclose
information that may lead to their identification. The number ofinterviewees (including group interviews) was relatively small
due to the extreme sensitivity of the case. However, because theobjective of these interview exist not in their statisticallegitimacy but in their potential to excavate the wide array ofperceptions that exist without a priori categorization, theauthors have deemed the data obtained from field surveys to be
sufficient for the purpose of this research.
There is a methodological issue that information derived
from the interviews should be given different interpretive
consideration from that of the literature and other secondary
sources. In reflection of this point each piece of evidence has
been cross-examined to verify the internal consistency among
different data categories.
In the third and final phase of the research, theIntegrative Explanatory Model was applied. Integrative models

minorities, UNMIK chief Michal Steiner initiated in 2002 theso-called “Standards before Status” policy, a series of standardsof international expectations for Kosovo’s institutions andsociety, giving priority to realization of these standards before
discussions of Kosovo’s future status. In March 2007, although
the situation in Kosovo has not improved significantly, UN
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari proposed conditional
independence as the final status for Kosovo Province with US
support and Russian and Serbian opposition (Todorovic, 2006).
This paper is based on the research activities conducted
up until September 2007, and therefore, the events describedhereon after in this section are not included in the analysis. Yet,because the objective of the paper is to analyze the events
during and immediately after the Kosovo Conflict, theexclusion of the below events does not undermine thelegitimacy of the paper’s claims.
2.3. Declaration of Independence
On February 17, 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo
approved a declaration of independence and in the following
days, countries such as the United States, Turkey, Albania,
Austria, Germany, Taiwan, and others announced theirrecognition of the Republic of Kosovo while countries such as
Russia and Serbia have opposed. In the UN Security Council,
the United States, UK and France have recognized thedeclaration while the People's Republic of China has expressed
concern and Russia considers the declaration as illegal. The
neighboring states of Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania,
Croatia, Bulgaria and Hungary have also recognized thedeclaration.

3.

Research Methodology

The methodology employed in this research is designed
in a three-phase process. In the first phase, empirical data was
obtained from field surveys, official policy documents andsecondary literature. The official documents include the
Serbian documents including the Declaration on Kosovo andMetohija of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia,
the United Nations documents include the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1160, the Secretary Statement to
the General Assembly, and so forth. Secondary literature, video
material and internet data sources were also explored.
The conclusion of the first phase of the research was that
there existed no model or theory that can sufficiently explain
the current situation in Kosovo. Therefore, an attempt wasmade in this research to construct an integrative model, which122社会技術研究論文集

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Serbian oppression and terror, serving as the main moral
ground for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and still used as
the main premise in the argumentation employed byproponents of independence as the final status of Kosovo. This
perception created an atmosphere that allowed for reverse
discrimination against the Kosovo Serbians, which had actually
begun under the reign of Tito when a “strong Yugoslavia” wassought. This was considered as equivalent to a “weak Serbia”
because Tito dispersed Serbs into other republics of Yugoslavia,
a policy which decreased the power of Serbians in the Republicof Serbia. Any opposition against these policies was met withterror. In the years following the 1974 revision of the Yugoslav
constitution in which Kosovo was granted separate federal
representation, cases of discrimination and abuse against Serbs
have been reported. In 1989, Belgrade downgraded Kosovo’s
autonomy to its pre-1974 level, Milosevic was electedpresident of Serbia, and oppression of Kosovo Albanians began
under his regime.
As illustrated here, the entire picture of the Kosovo conflictcan be completed only if both of the two phases of the conflict are
thoroughly considered: the pre-1989 years in which Kosovo Serbs
were oppressed and assaulted, and the post-1989 years in which
the Kosovo Albanians were oppressed under the Milosevic
regime. Yet, the Western media almost univocally agrees on thepremise that the Kosovo Albanians fight for human rights andoppression in Kosovo, led by the political leader of the Albanians,
Rugova, in regard to the oppressive policies imposed by the
Serbian government under Milosevic. This perception does nottake into account the whole background which led to an imposingof Milosevic’s draconic measures towards Kosovo after hisnotorious words “nobody shall dare beat you (Kosovo Serbs)
again”. This event is generally characterized in Western media as
the beginning of an uprising of Serbian nationalism and theoutbreak of hostilities of the Kosovo Albanian plight in Kosovo,
4. Integrative Explanatory Model – Construction both personified by Milosevic.
The mass media, such as public relations companies andProcess and Analysis of Facts
news agencies, played an integral role in formulating Westernperception of the Kosovo conflict. Takagi (2005) reports, that Jim
As abovementioned, the Integrative Explanatory Model
Harff – the main character responsible at Ruder Finn for theemployed in this research categorized the factors for theBosnian Muslims’ propaganda, himself admitted that the main
outcome “West ‘supports’ K-Albanians” into four main
purpose of feeding the mass media with biased anti-Serbian
categories: (1) Cognitive and perceptional factors, (2)information was to get them on fact-finding missions on the
Geopolitical factors, (3) Personal Factors and (4)ground for their cause (i.e. finding and backing information which
Mission-related factors.
is advantageous to Ruder Finn’s clients, the Bosnian Muslims andFirstly, regarding cognitive and perceptional factors, this
Croats). From the viewpoint of characterization, the wars in thepaper argues that there are two important observations
former Yugoslavia evolved in a generally unfavorable way for the
regarding Western perception of the Kosovo conflict. First,
Serbs, under President Milosevic, who were branded as theduring the Kosovo conflict, the Kosovo Albanians haveaggressors. This branding of Serbs is said to have been initiated bygenerally been portrayed by Western media as victims ofare models that integrate different theories and concepts. The
first step in this model-building process was to illustrate theresults of the previous phases and establishing a causal
relationship between them. For this, an influence diagram wasdesigned for the Kosovo Conflict in which the factors leading
to the outcome “West ‘supports’ Kosovo Albanians”, foundfrom evidence in existing research and inconsistencies in the
representation of the current situation in Kosovo and past
events, are categorized into the following: geopolitical factors ,personal factors, UNMIK mission-related factors and cognitiveand perceptional factors. Having constructed an integrative
explanatory model to illustrate the entirety of the conflict, eachof the factors was explored in detail, and a Cognitive Conflict
Evolution Model was constructed. This model is related to
Cognitivie Dissonance Theory, which is one of the most classic
theories in the field of social psychology, Most of a person’s
cognitions are in a cognitive irrelevant relationship, but if two
cognitions are relevant to each other, they are either consonantor dissonant (Festinger 1957, Festinger and Carlsmith 1959,
Zanna and Copper 1974). According to the theory of cognitive
dissonance, people are usually motivated to reduce or avoid
psychological inconsistencies (Plous 1993). Therefore, people
are inclined to reuce dissonance in the following ways: (1)removing dissonant cognitions, (2) adding new consonantcognitions, (3) reducing the importance of dissonant cognitions,or (4) increasing the importance of consonant cognitions.
In section 5 of this paper, it is argued that perceptions by
the West may at times be synthesized and fortified by suchattempt to reduce dissonance or increase consonance in theirpolicies in reacting to the situation in Kosovo, therefore
creating a cognitive loop in which a perception shapes reality(i.e. policies), and reality in turn shapes the perception.

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Vol.7, 120-130, Mar. 2010a PR Company, who coined the term ethnic cleansing, closest inmeaning to the word “holocaust” but used for the Serbs’ actions.
This branding of the Serbs as agressors during the wars in
Croatia and Bosnia had allowed for a good/bad dualistic
simplification of the conflict. Herman (2003) lists four “wrong
characterizations” promulgated by the Western media: branding
Milosevic as the source of the Balkan conflict, concluding that
Milosevic’s 1989 nationalist speech as the beginning of Serbiannationalism and the cause of the following wars, NATOreasonableness and Serb intransigence at Rambouillet, and theclassification of Serb actions during the NATO bombing as “Serbgenocide”. The characterization of the events during the NATObombardment shows three perceptions: (1) the Serbs were killing
vast numbers; (2) this was a part of the process of “ethnic
cleansing” and genocide, and (3) the expulsion of K-Albanians
had been planned and was not due to NATO bombing.
Secondly, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors also played
an integral role in the development and the outcome of theKosovo conflict. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of theSoviet Union made the United States the sole superpower withunrestrained power to dictate the new world order. This fact isrelated to the Kosovo conflict in that the dissolution of Yugoslavia
must be understood not only as a civil war, but as a part of abigger geopolitical game.
Against the general perception of the majority of scholars,some recent analyses suggest that the beginning of the Yugoslav
tragedy was initiated by the U.S. out of geostrategic moves. The
Balkans were still of vital interest to the U.S. for two importantreasons: first, the Balkan Peninsula under U.S. control would push
the Russian influence sphere back and provide an enlargement
area of NATO because it connects U.S. ally Turkey with former
Warsaw Pact Eastern European states. Second, the Balkan
Peninsula was considered an important gateway for future oiltransports coming from the Caspian Region to Western Europe.
Thirdly, personal factors refer mainly to external factors that
may have existed before the events that led directly to the conflict,such as past relations between the United States and Serbs. Since
Milosevic’s rise to power in 1989, some authorities in the UnitedStates began to view his regin as xenophobic and characterized by
Serbian nationalism. For example, United States governmentalorganizations such as the CIA have expressed Milosevic’s
leadership as “leading various military campaigns to unite ethnic
Serbs in neighboring republics into a ‘Greater Serbia’”. These
perceptions regarding the Serbs may have developed into theUnited States wating to remove Milosevic from power and aconsequent alliance with the KLA.
UNMIK mission-related factors were extracted from theinterviews, in which some of the officials have stated that the124

mission itself may have been too costly to sustain for a longer
period of time, and that there was never a clear definition for
victory in the mission, which led to a lack of incentive for theWest to solve the fundamental social issues that remained in
Kosovo as well as their eagerness to bring about a concise,dualistic conclusion to the conflict rather than to investigate
deeply into both sides of the conflict.

5.

Model Formulation: Cognitive Conflict Evolution
Model and Integrative Explanatory Model

5.1. Field Study – Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model
From May 20, 2006 to May 30, 2006, the interviewer –together with two Japanese citizens – performed a field study in
Belgrade, Pristina, Kosovo Polje, Lipljan and Caglavica.
Interviews were conducted and important observations werestored by video and photographic devices. Special attention
was given to the different perceptions of the involved parties
and an investigation of their argumentation because it reveals
causal relationship which cannot be derived otherwise.
In the interview with the Vice President of theCoordination Centre for Kosovo, Dr. Milorad Todorovic, one
important discovery was that the communication between the
Serbian Government and UNMIK has deteriorated especiallysince the March 2004 rioting. This event can therefore beconsidered to be a key event in the conflict evolution. Dr.
Todorovic pointed out that Serbs in Kosovo, including himself,have lost faith in the UNMIK after the March riots. He himself
retreated from his post a Minister of Return in the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government in 2004.
In an interview with Mr. Berisha, the President of theAssembly of Kosovo and President of Kosovo’s largest
political party, LDK, information was obtained regarding theargumentation and perceptions of the Kosovo Albanianleadership. First, the President of the Assembly of Kosovo
stated that “Kosovo was already multiethnic” and that Kosovo
had already taken, or was taking all measures to protect humanrights and minorities. He further pointed out that “in all
documents that we have developed up to now, and we sent tonegotiation team for the negotiation process that is taking placein Vienna. In all these documents, the Albanian side has
guaranteed in that we will protect the human rights of allminorities in Kosovo. And the international community
received these documents.” Second, when asked about what
concrete measures his government was planning to take toimprove the human rights situation of the minorities in Kosovo,
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West’s position at the beginning of the UNMIK mission from
June 10, 1999 may be the cause of actions by the Kosovo
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, which led to the aggravation of
the conflict situation. This aggravation is then further enhancedby the reaction of the West, which does not perceive that its
own actions are in fact the cause of the outcome on which it
now reacts. In other words, the West had created aself-reinforcing cognitive loop, where cognitive consonanceoccurs in which “the West supports K-Albanians” because the“West criticizes the Serbs”, and in this case, such a loop canonly be avoided if it is perceived and causes of its increase are
eliminated. This, however, requires a strong commitment to theresolution of the conflict. The detailed explanation of the
Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model is as follows:
In Figure 1 below, the simplified process of interaction among
the three players in Kosovo since the installation of UNMIK in
Jun 1999 is illustrated. In this Cognitive Conflict Evolution
Model, the actions of the three players are dependent on theactions of the other players, but the whole process is kicked-off
by the West’s position from the beginning of the mission. The
model shows that there are two loops, which influence theevents in Kosovo.

“I don’t think that they are afraid, this is not true. They are notafraid to use Serbian language.” The expulsion of 200,000
Serbs and other non-Albanians out of Kosovo was also denied.
In an interview with a UNMIK official and Political
Affairs Office in the Immediate Office of the SRSG, it was
found that he had not yet visited conglomerations of Kosovo
Serbian villages near Kosovo Polje, a village in vicinity to
Pristina which was targeted during the March 2004 riots.
During the same interview the interviewee stated that the main
reason why Kosovo Serbians were fleeing Kosovo was
economical, and that the situation in the province in terms ofthe conflict is actually improving.
After evaluation of all obtained data, one crucial
relationship was revealed, that a cognitive vicious circle into
which the three involved parties – UNMIK, K-Serbs and
K-Albanians – have fallen and which inadvertently exacerbates
the conflict. The existence of this cognitive loop was
rediscovered during interviews, where great commonality ofthe positions of UNMIK and K-Albanians on the one hand.
The negation of the problematic security situation of K-Serbs
by UNMIK officials and K-Albanians was found, on the other
hand.
The Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model shows how theWest supports
Independence of(Albanian) Kosovo

K-Albanians
perceive support
as “green light”
for suppressionof K-Serbs

West supports
K-Albanians

K-Albanians
expel K-Serbs
and eradicate
historical
traces

K-Serbs
perceive
UNMIK asAnti-Serbianand siding
with
K-Albanians

Rational Causal Loop
Cognitive Consonance LoopA

B ... Event ‘A’ leads to Event‘B’: rational relationship, perceived by involved partiesC

D... Event‘C’ leads to Event‘D’: cognitive, not perceived relationship

Figure 1 Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model under UNMIK

125

K-Serbs
boycott
K-Albanians
governmentand create
parallelinstitutions

Westcriticises
Serbs

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Interviewees in Groups 3 remarked that there was always
oppression on the Serbs by Albanians.
The “reverse ethnic cleansing theory”, most often
promulgated as the state that the Kosovo Albanians in returning
back to Kosovo after the NATO bombardment and the retreatof Serb police and military forces from Kosovo, have taken
revenge on the Kosovo Serbs by expelling them, also proves tobe problematic on several points. First, while this theory can
explain the first wave of ethnically motivated attacks against
the K-Serbs shortly after their return to Kosovo, there isdifficulty in explaining why it has not stopped after anemotional period of revenge-taking has passed. Second, it isdifficult to argue why the systematic destruction of churches
and monasteries, a planned attack, could have occurred out ofan emotional motivation of revenge. Surprisingly, there is little
media coverage or academic research regarding this theory.
Although this paper does not go deep enough into this issue as
to be able to provide a clear explanation as to why such
perception is lacking, it is an area that requires muchinvestigation.
The next chain in the causal relationship in the model isthe Kosovo Serbs’ reaction on the violence performed on themand the non-action of UNMIK/KFOR. This is perceived by the
K-Serbs as Anti-Serbian and leads to a mistrust towards
UNMIK. Evidence for this relationship has been found in
5.2. Analysis of the Causality in Cognitive Conflict Evolution interviews with all three groups of Serbian interviewees (seeZivanovic, 2007 for a complete report).
Model
During the field study a great correlation between the
The analysis of the causal loop in the Cognitive Conflict
positions of the UN officials and K-Albanian representatives
Evolution Model starts with the first event “West ‘supports’
have been found. It was stated that K-Serbs perceive UNMIK
K-Albanians”. This leads to a perception of the K-Albanians
as anti-Serbian but it can be inferred from the available
that they can continue with the suppression of K-Serbs. This is
information on the ground that UNMIK/KFOR has noa very strong assumption that requires discussion. First,“mandate” to protect the K-Serbs and their property in Kosovo,
supportive evidence for “West ‘supports’ K-Albanians” mustwhich is a stated mission objective in UNSC 1244.
be shown, or in other words it must be proven that the
In interviews with UN officials, it was also found out thatperception of the K-Albanians is caused by the West’s action,
the reasons why minorities flee Kosovo are portrayed as “outand not by other possible factors.
of economic reasons”, but these statements do not represent the
An analysis of the factors leading to “West ‘supports’living conditions of the K-Serbs correctly. This research has
K-Albanians” has revealed that two fundamental causing
discovered that although most of the K-Serbs live in difficult
factors for the perception in the West about the Kosovo was the
economic conditions, they stressed their wish to stay in Kosovo.
premise based on historical understanding of the conflict.
According to Todorovic, most of the K-Serbs have stopped
While most existing theories are based on the premise thatcooperation with UNMIK after the March riots because they
K-Albanians have the moral and ethical right to independence
have lost hope and sense in cooperating with UNMIK, whichand self-government because of the crimes and suppression
is viewed as incapable for securing their safety.
they had experienced under Serb President Milosevic in the
The Cognitive Conflict Loop represents the natural
1990s, such theories overlook possible K-Albanian aspirations
behavior of the UN officials working in Kosovo: a means tofor an ethnically clean Kosovo in the previous decades.
reduce the cognitive dissonant rate, which arises from the
Evidence has been found in interviews with the expelled or
UNMIK’s cognition and the reality on the ground.
internally displaced Serbs in Kosovo during the field survey.

In order to be considered a valid causal relationship, thedifferent variables must be related. We can define a dependent
variable “perception” and independent variable “behavior” inthe model. The perception of a player is always dependent on
the behavior of another player. This relationship is necessary
causation, i.e. the variable “behavior” must be followed by thevariable “perception”, for there is no perception about anything
if there is any behavior of somebody that creates this perception.
Conversely, independent variables may or may not be
influenced by external factors. The behavior of K-Albanians
can be influenced by perceptions, but the driving force behind
the resulting behavior is stronger than the influence ofperceptions. This can be summed as the manifestation of aself-image that the individual holds in his subconscious mind
as opposed to the conscious nature of perceptions. This image
depends on deeper-rooted cognitive factors, such as history,
education, tradition and other inner values i.e. root causes forhuman behavior which have to be planted in the subconscious
mind, and this can only be done by choosing thoughts.
In addition, the West’s explicit criticism of the Serbs as
oppressors may emit a message that K-Albanians rightfully
perceive this as the West’s “green light” for suppression of
K-Serbs, creating a rational causal loop that allows for the
suppression of the criticized.

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Vol.7, 120-130, Mar. 2010

actions are identified, which lead to a certain situation underwhich UNMIK was installed. In the group Perceptions of theKosovo Conflict, seven important factors have been found.
Those seven factors all lead to one important perception:
Perception of the Serbs as aggressors, perpetrators. This
perception leads to the actions U.S. allies with KLA. The group
Personal Factors of Importance consists of two factors leading
to the event U.S. wants to get rid of Milosevic. This factor also
influences the decision of the U.S. to ally with the KLA, i.e. theevent U.S. allies with KLA. The third group of factors is
Importance of Balkans. This group consists of five factors
which contribute to Geostrategic Importance of the Balkan
Region. This importance has been identified to have favored
the NATO bombing. The logical chain is as follows: U.S. allies
with KLA leads to the failure of the peace talks at Rambouillet
and NATO bombing is the result. As a result of the NTO
bombing, the Serbs expel K-Albanians as an asymmetricmeans of warfare. The result of this Serb action is that the U.S.
favors an Albanian Kosovo and this becomes an important
influential factor for the evolution of the UNMIK mission.
In the second time period there are five groups of factors:
Mission related factors, factors about democratic standards,
UNMIK’s perception of the situation in Kosovo, Serb’s
perception of UNMIK and K-Albanians perception of UNMIK.
The Mission-related factors consist of 4 factors, which lead tothe outcome democratization efforts failed. This outcome leads
to the outcome UNMIK seeks Exit Strategy. The group offactors about democratic standards consists of three factors,
which all influence the third group of factors, UNMIK’s
perception that the Albanians are also aggressors andperpetrators. The fourth group of factors is about Serb’s
perception of UNMIK. It consists of two factors:
UNMIK/KFOR does not protect Serbs, and UNMIK indirectly
responsible for the expulsion of Serbs, which both lead to the
Serbs’ action Serbs create parallel institutions. The fifth groupof factors is K-Albanians’ Perception of UNMIK. It consists of
4 factors: UNMIK slows down way to independence,
K-Albanians frustrated with UNMIK, UNMIK/KFOR does notprotect Serbs, and K-Albanians perceive possibility for
oppression of K-Serbs which all lead to the March 2004 riots.
Besides these five factor groups, there are also 5 identified
actions: K-Albanians attack Serbs, UNMIK transforms KLA
into KPC, UNMIK –FRY document, Serbs create parallel
institutions, and the March 2004 riots.
The main causal chain in this time period is twofold.
First, the outcome U.S. favors Kosovo Albanians is a direct andfactor for the currently observed outcome West “supports”
Kosovo Albanians. Parallel to this direct influence of the U.S.

The existence of cognitive consonant/dissonant behavior
follows from the obtained information of the interviewees andthe statements of Western official. The obtained data gathered
during the field study suggests that all four cognitive
mechanisms which reduce cognitive dissonance are at work
under UNMIK, which can be considered as a proof for the
existence of the above illustrated cognitive consonant loop,
which inadvertently leads to an aggravation of the situation in
Kosovo.
The first possibility to reduce dissonance is to (1) remove
dissonant cognitions. Applied to the Kosovo case, this can bedone in two ways; (a) improve the real situation, i.e. thesecurity situation for minorities in Kosovo, or (b) change thecognition about the situation. The second possibility to reduce
dissonance is to (2) add new positive cognitions. Applied to theabove Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model, this pattern was
found in the fact that Kosovo Albanians’ rights were stressed
and it was pointed out that K-Albanians would not live any
more under Belgrade rule now that they have their own rule.
By emphasizing the positive sides of a situation, new positive
cognitions are added and the negatives reduced. The third
possibility to reduce dissonance is by (3) reducing theimportance of dissonant cognitions. This can be done throughstressing the positive outcomes and effects of the current
situation and believing that they are more important than thenegative sides. The fourth possibility is (4) to increase theimportance of consonant cognitions. This can be done throughstressing the positive outcomes and effects of the current
situations. In the field study this mechanism has been found in
the “praising of K-Albanians” improvements since theinstallation of the UNMIK.
5.3. Integrative Explanatory Model
The Integrative Explanatory Model, illustrated in Figure
2 on the previous page, integrates three different aspects; (1)time; (2) involved players and (3) their actions and perceptions.
In this case, the Integrative Explanatory Model consists of threemain time periods. The first time period covers the time before
the installation of the UNMIK mission. The second time period
covers actions and perceptions of the involved actors from the
beginning of the UNMIK mission, namely June 10, 1999 to
March 2004. The third time period covers the period after
March 2004.
In the first time period two main groups of factors havebeen identified, which lead to three important actions by
involved actors: perceptions of the Kosovo Conflict,
importance of the Balkans and personal factors of importance.
Originating from these three groups of factors, three main127

10th June 1999 – 2004

before UNMIK (–June 1999)
Importance of Balkans
Serbiatraditional allyof Russia

USA wants to prevent
Russian influence inBalkans

KFOR has noorder to protect
K-Serbs
U.S favours‘Albanian’ Kosovo

Oil Pipelines from
Caspian region

Democratic Standards not fulfilledby K-Albanians

Personal Factors of Importance
US/West’s ‘negative’
experience with Serbs
during Ex-YU wars

Expulsion of K-Serbs
by K-Albanians
U.S. wants to get
rid of Milosevic

U.S. allies
with KLA

128

K-Albanians
attack Serbs

Perceptions of Kosovo Conflict
Oppression towards
Perception of
K-Serbs not perceived
Serbs asduring Tito-Yugoslavia
aggressors,
perpetrators
Tito’s ‘Federalism’
praised in the West.

Media & PR
influenceWars in Croatia
and Bosnia

K-Albanians fightfor independence,create Kosovo
Liberation Army
(KLA)

Oppression of
K-Albanians during
Milosevic regime

UNMIK seeks ‘Exit
Strategy’

Serbs expel
K-Albanians in
NATO war

UNMIK’s perception
Perception of
K-Albs. ‘Moral
Right to SelfDetermination’

Destruction of Serbian
Churches, Houses

NATO
Bombing

Attacks on UNMIK /KFOR by K-Albanians‘Peace Talks’ atRambouillet ‘fail’

Democratisation
Efforts failed

Mission becomestoo costly

Geostrategic
Importance ofBalkan Region

NATO enlargement

Mission Related Factors

UNMIK has no
defined mission
strategy

U.S. Military Base‘Camp Bond Steel’s

March 2004 – 2007

UNMIK transforms
KLA into KPC

Perception of
Albanians as
aggressors andperpetrators

UNMIK-FRY
document

UNMIK’sfears
K-Albanianattacks

West ‘supports’
Kosovo Albanians

West ‘supports’
Independence ofKosovoSerbs stop to
cooperate with
UNMIK

Serbs’ Perception of UNMIKUNMIK / KFOR does
not protect Serbs
UNMIK indirectly
responsible for
expulsion of Serbs

Serbs create
parallelinstitutions

K-Albanians’ Perception of UNMIKMarch 2004
riots

UNMIK

UNMIK slows down
way to independence

K-Albanians. frustrated
with UNMIK

Serbia/KSerbs

UNMIK / KFOR does
not protect Serbs

K-Albanians perceive
possibility for oppressionof K-Serbs

K-Albanians

Figure 2: Integrative Explanatory社会技術研究論文集

conflict.
Several unperceived factors which had an impact on
the outbreak of the conflict have not sufficiently been
perceived by the international community, but were of
crucial importance for all following decisions inrelation to the conflict.
(3) The Cognitive Conflict Evolution model has led to theconclusion that the cognitive state of UNMIK, whichfavors Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, led to problemsof communication between UNMIK and Belgrade.
(4) Existing correlation between the positions of the
K-Albanians and UN officials in Kosovo has anegative effect on the evolution of the conflict in two
ways: it does not represent the real situation on the
ground, and it has been concluded that the position of
the West is perceived by the Kosovo Albanians as apossibility to exert more pressure on the existing
Serbs.
(5) Return of K-Serbs and other non-Albanians to
Kosovo is still not possible due to a catastrophic
security situation.
Contrary to existing research about the Kosovo conflict,the results of this research have provided a logical explanationof the seemingly illogical situation that the international
community represented by the UNMIK in Kosovo has
supported an independence of Kosovo under the circumstances
described in this paper. As of 2009, Kosovo has alreadydeclared independence, and states around the world, excluding
states such as Serbia, Russia and China, are beginning torecognize Kosovo as an independent, sovereign state. This
paper does not cover this recent event due to the timing at
which the field study was performed, and that the time periods
covered in this paper suffice in laying the foundation for
discourse regarding any subsequent events that might follow in
the future. It is not the objective of this paper to assess orprovide an opinion about the declaration of independence, butrather to define the spectrum of opinions that have existed bothon the side which supports the way the conflict has evolved andthose who oppose it.

favors Kosovo Albanians there is another causal chain: U.S.
favors Kosovo Albanians leads to KFOR has no order toprotect Serbs, and this fact influences the outcome
Democratization efforts failed. At that same time K-Albanians
attack Serbs has the effect that the Democratization Standards
are not fulfilled by the K-Albanians, which leads to UNMIK’s
perception that the K-Albanians are aggressors andperpetrators. As a result of this perception, UNMIK tried to
improve the situation by the action UNMIK-FRY document.
This was a common document between UNMIK and Serbia,
which led to an improvement of communication between
Serbia and UNMIK for a short period of time. At the same time
this action UNMIK-FRY document was perceived by
K-Albanians in such a way that it led to the March 2004 riots.
Finally, the action UNMIK transforms KLA into KPC directly
led to the March 2004 riots, which again led to the action Serbs
stop cooperating with the UNMIK. The riots also led to
UNMIK fears K-Albanian attacks. Summarizing, four events
directly point to the outcome West ‘supports’ Kosovo
Albanians: UNMIK seeks exit strategy, US favors Albanian
Kosovo, UNMIK fears K-Albanian attack, and March 2004
riots. This strong general support by the West for the Kosovo
Albanians leads to the West’s support for the independence ofKosovo.
Finally, as a main finding of the Integrative Explanatory
Model, a new theoretical framework is derived which can besummarized by the following two main propositions:
Proposition 1: If the intervener in “humanitarian intervention”
has different motivations than those presented to the public, theactions taken by the intervener are likely to lead to an
exacerbation of the conflict.
Proposition 2: The circumstances on the ground in Kosovo
create a cognitive loop, which inadvertently led to an
exacerbation of the conflict.

6.

Vol.7, 120-130, Mar. 2010(2)

Conclusion

This paper has explored the possibility of a holistic
explanation of the Kosovo conflict by the use of an Integrative
Explanatory Model. By embracing human cognitive theories,
such as Cognitive Dissonance Theories, the paper introduced a
new understanding of the events and circumstances which
eventually led to the current situation in Kosovo. The main
conclusions of this research are as follows:(1) Effective conflict management by the international
community is one of the most crucial issues in dealing
with inter-ethnic armed conflicts such as the Kosovo

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A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITH AN
INTEGRATIVE EXPLANATORY MODEL:THE CASE STUDY OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT
1

2

3

Sasha ZIVANOVIC , Masahide HORITA , and Daisuke NAGAYAMA
2

1
Ph.D.,CEO, JSS Inc. (E-mail: sasha@jssjapan.com)
Ph.D., Assoc. Prof., Department of International Studies, University of Tokyo (E-mail: horita@k.u-tokyo.ac.jp)
3
M.Eng. Department of International Studies, University of Tokyo (E-mail: mail@d-nagayama.com)

This paper explores the Kosovo Conflict through the use of the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model and theIntegrative Explanatory Model. The paper discusses the perceptions of two conflicting sides, the Kosovo Serbs andthe “West” represented by the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), investigating how from a perspective
different from the common branding of the Serbs as the perpetrators and the Albanians as the victims, the West can beperceived as contributing to an exacerbation of the situation by the “rational loop” which leads to an aggravation of
the human rights situation and the “cognitive loop” which leads to a support of independence under unsatisfactory
human rights situations. The Integrative Explanatory Model provides a holistic representation of the main factors of
the conflict, supplementing the mechanism unraveled by the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model.

Key Words: Kosovo, Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model, Integrative Explanatory Model, Geopolitics,
Conflict Resolution, United Nations Mission in Kosovo

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