September 9, 2020

12049

MexicoChief Analyst
xxxxx Analyst

Atsushi Masuda
Shinichi Endo

Long-term RatingA-

Outlook*

Negative

Short-term Rating-*Long-term Rating refers to Foreign Currency Long-term Issuer Rating in principle.

Overview
Mexico is a major regional economy with apopulation of about 126 million (2019) and a nominal
GDP of approximately USD 1.26 trillion (2019), both ofwhich are the second-largest in Latin America after Brazil.
Its per capita GDP stands at approximately USD 10,000(2019). Its land area is about 1.96 million square
kilometers, about five times that of Japan.
In terms of ethnic composition, Mestizo, a mixed
blood of European (Spanish, etc.) and indigenous people,
accounted for about 60%, indigenous people for about
30%, and European (Spanish, etc.) for approximately 9%of the total population. The official language is Spanishand 90% of its population are Catholic. Such population
composition, language and religion reflect the influenceof the era of Spanish colony.

Social and political bases
Mexico is currently a federal republic headed bypresident and based on constitutional democracy. The
president is elected by popular vote and his or her
tenure is one term of six years, with reelection
prohibited under the constitution. Its legislature is abicameral Congress composed of the chamber ofsenators and the chamber of representatives.
Partido Revolucionario Institucional or theInstitutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), founded in 1929,
had been in power for 70 years since the Mexican
Revolution. In 2000, Partido Accion Nacional or the
National Action Party (PAN) took over power for the firsttime and stayed at the helm until 2012. In December
2012, PRI returned to power when its candidate Pena
Nieto was elected president. During his presidency, Pena

<1>

Nieto pursued structural reforms in a variety of fields
including energy development. However, the approvalrate of his government plunged despite his strong
initiatives to promote economic structural reforms, due
to his inability to enforce effective measures to stem the
spread of corruption, as well as the deterioration of
public security.
Under these circumstances, the newly emerging leftwing political party MORENA (Movimiento Regeneración
Nacional or the National Regeneration Movement)
gained support from the voters who had been
disillusioned with established political parties.
MORENA's leader Andrés Manuel López Obrador, widely
known as AMLO, won the presidential election in 2018,
and in the congressional election, a leftist coalition led
by MORENA won a majority in both houses. Since its
inauguration in December 2018, the AMLO
administration has been promoting eradication ofcorruption and enhancement of social welfare as its toppriority issues.
JCR is of the view that the AMLO administration has
attained some progress in tackling its top priorities. As toeradication of corruption, in addition to cutting thesalary of the president and civil servants, it decided tosuspend the construction of new Mexico City airport,
which had been promoted under the previous
administration, on the grounds that there had beencertain corruption. The administration prosecuted theformer administration's stakeholders for alleged
corruption related to the airport construction project. In
addition, it has strengthened the legal framework tofight corruption.
In its social welfare policy, it implemented a
substantial increase of the minimum wage for two
consecutive years (16% in 2019 and 20% in 2020), asIssuer Reportwell as setting various types of cash transfer programsfor vulnerable population. Against the backdrop of theseachievements, the approval rate of the administration
had remained at a high level exceeding 50%.
Nevertheless, the poor public security, which was an
issue under the previous administration, has evendeteriorated since the beginning of 2020. Moreover,there has been growing public dissatisfaction with thegovernment's policy response to the COVID-19
pandemic since the turn of the year. The latest approval
rating for the administration stood at 59% as of July
2020 according to the poll published by Oraculus,
however it has been gradually declining since thebeginning of 2020.
With regard to economic and financial policies, the
AMLO administration has been adjusting the mainpriorities advocated by the previous administration.
Dubious about the effect of the previous
administration's active use of the private sector on
employment and the economy, in our view the newadministration has pronounced a policy to let the public
sector take the lead in creating jobs and boosting the
economy. The suspension of the airport construction
project and the major hike of the minimum wage are inline with this policy. The new administration has alsodecided to postpone the opening of oil fields to privatecompanies (“round”) and joint development with privatecompanies (“farm-out”) until the private companies canshow good results in terms of investment andproduction, both of which were strongly pushed by theprevious administration. The AMLO administration is
now pushing ahead with a plan to aim for self-sufficiencyof petroleum products through the renovation ofexisting refineries and construction of new refinery
under the initiative of the state-owned petroleum
corporation (PEMEX). However, JCR holds that thesemeasures might be somewhat too hasty. In our view,
they have led to the growing uncertainty over thegovernment's economic policy, particularly in the private
industrial sector which had been actively committed tothe development of oil fields. For this reason, corporate
investment has been staying stagnant since the latter
half of 2018.
Faced with the situation, the government announced
its private sector-led infrastructure development plan inNovember 2019. This will constitute a part of the
National Infrastructure Development Plan (PNI 20202024), which is scheduled to be announced by thegovernment. It calls for the private sector to promote
infrastructure construction by mobilizing funds totaling<2>

approximately MXN 860 billion (about 3.5% of GDP) tofinance 147 projects. The government will support theprivate sector from institutional aspects. However, 72 of
the 147 projects are concentrated in 2020. It is
increasingly uncertain whether the plan will proceed asscheduled. Moreover, the announcement of an
infrastructure investment plan for the energy sector,
initially scheduled for February 2020, has been delayed
due in part to the COVID-19 pandemic.
On the diplomatic front, the Trump administration of
the United States inaugurated in 2017 has made strong
assertions against Mexico, including the renegotiation of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
construction of barriers on the U.S.-Mexico border andrepatriation of illegal immigrants. In response, the AMLO
administration has taken a stance of prioritizing theconclusion of a new trade agreement in place of NAFTA.
Consequently, the United States, Mexico and Canada
ratified the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement(USMCA) by March 2020, and the new pact went into
effect on July 1 that year. This has reduced the opacity
inherent in Mexico's trade relations with the U.S. aspreferential access for Mexican products to the UnitedStates and Canada is maintained. As to the issue ofillegal immigration from Mexico to the U.S., Washington
has made some positive remarks about the measurestaken by the AMLO administration, and talks are still
continuing between the two governments.

Economic baseSince the conclusion of NAFTA, Mexico has
established a solid export base for automobiles andhome appliances mainly bound for North America by
accepting a large amount of direct investments. The
share of industrial products in exports reached 89% in
2019. Approximately 80% of its goods exports are boundfor the U.S. In particular, the automobile industry has
been growing remarkably. It turned out approximately 4
million vehicles in 2019, the sixth largest in the world.
Mexico has become increasingly dependent on external
trade, with the latest ratio of goods exports and imports
to GDP reaching close to 80%. This has made it more
susceptible to the impact of the economic situation
outside Mexico, particularly the U.S. economy.
Mexico is blessed with abundant mineral resources,
such as petroleum, silver and lead. However, the shareof mineral resources in the real economy is low, withmining accounting for about 4% of nominal GDP and
crude oil accounting for about 6% of exports. On theIssuer Reportfiscal side, however, oil-related revenues accounted for
18% of the total revenues in 2019. Although the ratio
has been declining in recent years, it is still high, leaving
the national budget highly dependent on revenues fromresources.
Mexico ranks 20th in the world (third in Latin
America) in terms of proven oil reserves at 5.96 billion
barrels per day at the end of 2019, and 12th in the world(second in Latin America) in terms of oil production at
1.92 million barrels per day in 2019. Oil production
peaked at 3.38 million barrels per day in 2004 and hadsince continued to decline. But the decline has been
coming to a halt since 2019. This is attributable to thehalt of decline in PEMEX’s production and, to a lesser
extent, to the start of production in oil fields which wereopened to private companies under the previous
administration.
As a measure to restore the sagging oil production,
the AMLO administration has changed the policy ofutilizing the private sector promoted by the previous
administration and is shifting to reforms focused on
PEMEX. However, the previous administration was not
successful in reinforcing PEMEX's production capacity.
There remains much uncertainty over whether Mexico
can become self-sufficient in oil products in the face ofcompetitive U.S. products. Currently, the global oil
demand has steeply fallen due to the COVID-19
pandemic, and Mexico is seen to take a considerable
amount of time to attain a clear recovery of its oil
production.
The Mexican economy contracted 0.3% in real GDP
terms in 2019 as compared to the previous year, the firstnegative growth since 2009 when it shrank 5.3%. In
addition to bleak consumer spending, private-sector
investment was sluggish amid the growing uncertainty
over the Mexico-U.S. trade issue and the AMLO
administration's economic policy. As stated above, thegovernment announced its private sector-led
infrastructure development plan in November 2019.
However, whether the plan will proceed as scheduled
remains highly opaque due to the impact of thepandemic.
At the end of March 2020, the AMLO administration
issued a sanitary state of emergency in response to the
spread of COVID-19, imposing restrictions on economic
activity across the country and urging people to refrainfrom going out. These restrictions have been graduallyeased since May, but both the number of infections andthe number of deaths have been rapidly increasing. As ofthe end of July, the number of confirmed cases reached<3>

about 400,000, with the cumulative number of deaths
exceeding 40,000, the third-highest after the U.S. andBrazil. This situation was compounded by the fall ofexports resulting from the stagnation of global economic
activity and a heavy damage the oil industry sufferedfrom the collapse of oil prices. As a result, the Mexican
economy suffered an 18.9% year-on-year negative
growth in the second quarter of 2020, contracting forfive quarters running for the worst-ever result on record,
as other countries have also experienced their worstever economic contraction. In this situation, the central
bank has cut its interest rates by a cumulative 250 basis
points since March. In addition, the AMLO
administration and the central bank worked out
economic measures including a comprehensive liquidity
provision equivalent to 3.3% of GDP for the domestic
financial market. The package put priority to support for
low-income households and SMEs, and the infusion ofliquidity to the banking system implemented by theauthorities has led to certain increase in lending to nonfinancial private sector in March and April. In our view,
however, there has also been persistent voices from thebusiness community for large-scale funding support andother financial assistance for the entire corporate sector.
JCR holds that current financial support to thecorporates might not be necessarily sufficient to fully
recover entire business activities. Considering thecurrent rebound of the pandemic and its impact on thedomestic economy, JCR holds that the slowdown of theeconomy will become severer and its contraction can be
deeper than the 5.3% it suffered at the time of the
global financial crisis in 2009.

Fiscal baseOn the fiscal front, while the budget deficit has been
reduced and the government debt has been curbed
since the previous administration's fiscal reconstruction
initiatives, the country's financial administration has still
remained susceptible to the performance of the oil
sector as a whole including PEMEX. Oil-related revenues,
including those from PEMEX, account for 18% of thetotal public-sector revenues in 2019, although the ratio
was lower than the latest peak-time level of 39%
registered in 2012. Given its oil hedging strategy, though,Mexico’s oil-related government revenues arecompletely hedged against the risk of falling oil prices.
Under these circumstances, the Fiscal Responsibility
Act was amended in 2014 under the previous
administration, requiring the government to set anIssuer Reportannual target for Public Sector Borrowing Requirement(PSBR), the broadest-based budget deficit. In 2019, PSBR
was kept at 2.3% of GDP, almost flat from 2.2% in theprevious year (including the transfer of the operating
surplus from the central bank) and clearing thegovernment-set 2.5% target. That was attained by wayof restrained expenditures and revenue compensation
through the use of the Budgetary Revenue Stabilization
Fund (FEIP). The primary balance ended with a surplus
equivalent to 1.1% of GDP. The cumulative PSBR came to44.8% of GDP, a modest decrease from 44.9% in theprevious year, which indicated that the AMLO
administration kept fiscal discipline in 2019.
In its draft budget for 2020 submitted in September
2019, the government had envisaged a primary surplus
equivalent to 0.7% of GDP and PSBR equivalent to 2.6%
of GDP to be attained mainly through continued
spending restraints. In April 2020, however, it madepublic a preliminary macroeconomic outlook as the basis
for its 2020 budget following the economic downturncaused by COVID-19 and the sharp fall of oil prices. In
this outlook, the government lowered the growthestimate from 2.0% to minus 2.9% in anticipation of
reduced tax revenues, the peso’s depreciation andcontraction of economic activity. It then downgraded its
PSBR estimates for 2020 and 2021 to 4.4% and 4.0% ofGDP, respectively, predicting that cumulative PSBR willrise to 52%. The government has been working to holdback any further increase of cumulative PSBR throughutilization of FEIP and sale of public assets. The tax
revenue of the government for the period between
January and July of 2020 has dropped only 0.8% in realterms y-o-y. In case of a decrease in revenues in 2020 or
2021, the government is expected to have access to theresources in the FEIP. Moreover, in 2021 the federal
government is also expected to receive the central
bank's "Remanente de Operación", due to an expected
depreciation of the peso as compared to
2019.Considering the gravity of the COVID-19 pandemic
and its impact on the economy, however, JCR holds that
fiscal deterioration may severely worsen and that theannual PSBR might exceed 6%, with the cumulative PSBR
topping 60%.
With regard to PEMEX, while its EBITDA has been insurplus, it has been obliged to pay about 80% of thesurplus to the government. Therefore, it has been inchronic deficit, staying in excess liabilities since 2009.
The current government has acknowledged this problem,and has implemented several measures to mitigate thefinancial burden of PEMEX including the reduction of the<4>

tax rate and profit sharing duty rate. However, it is still
the fact that this problem has the capital investments of
PEMEX has not returned to be fully sufficient to recoverits production. It incurred a final loss equivalent to 1.4%
of GDP in 2019, with its accumulated financial liabilities
reaching 8.2% of GDP at the end of the year. The
situation forced the AMLO administration in 2019 tolaunch a series of support measures totaling 1% of GDP
for PEMEX. In 2020, its financial situation is being further
stressed due to reduced oil demand caused by the
pandemic in addition to the plunge of oil prices. In ourview, the government's fiscal position may come under
greater pressure with the need of additional financial
support for PEMEX increasing, although both PEMEX andthe government has implemented various measures
including cutting expenditure and the reduction of theburden of the tax and profit sharing duty as mentioned
above.

External position
Mexico's current account deficit has stayed in therange of 1-2% of GDP in recent year due mainly to a
trade deficit and interest payments on foreign direct
investment despite a steady inflow of remittances by
migrant workers. In 2019, however, the trade balanceturned positive due to reduced imports and the current
account deficit narrowed to 0.3% of GDP. A net inflow of
FDI into Mexico has been in the range of 2-3% of GDP in
recent years as the country has been easier to attract
investment because of its proximity to the U.S. market
under NAFTA. As a result, its structure for financing thecurrent account deficit has stayed stable and the impact
of volatile portfolio investment on the external balancehas been alleviated. Net FDI inflows in 2019 totaled 1.9%
of GDP, enough to cover the current account deficit.
In 2020, Mexico’s exports are expected to stagnate
due to the sluggish economic activities both at home
and abroad caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. While anincrease of the current account deficit is expected to be
restrained to some extent by reduced imports, JCR holds
that the FDI inflow may slow down due in part to thegrowing uncertainty over the current administration's
economic policy. JCR will closely watch future
developments.
Mexico's external debt has been under control since2015. The gross external debt stood at USD 441.3 billion(36.0% of GDP) at the end of March 2020, down 3.2%
from a year earlier, which is relatively low among thecountries rated in the A range by JCR. Its short-term debt

Issuer Reportaccounted for USD 53.5 billion (4.4% of GDP). The
foreign exchange reserves had stayed little changed ataround USD 177 billion since 2015, but they have since
been on the increase, reaching USD 192.6 billion at theend of July2020. The reserves were 3.5 times as much as
the short-term external debt and were enough to cover
five months of imports. In addition, Mexico has a SDR
44.6 billion (approximately USD 61 billion) Flexible Credit
Line (FCL) with the IMF and is therefore highly resistant
to external shocks.
The renegotiation of NAFTA, which began among theU.S., Mexico and Canada in August 2017, was concluded
in September 2018 and the new agreement was named
USMCA. It was ratified by the three countries by the endof March 2020 and came into force on July 1 that year.
Under USMCA, the regulations on the origin of
automobiles have been tightened. Specifically, it called
for: (1) a phased increase of the regional value content(RVC) of completed vehicles from the current 62.5% to
75% in 2023; (2) introducing a wage clause that requires
40-45% of the parts and materials of automobiles to be
produced in regions with an hourly wage higher than
USD 16; and (3) obliging the steel and aluminumpurchased by completed vehicle manufacturers to meet
a 70% RVC. Washington's assertion for a higher
procurement ratio for U.S. products has been reflected
to a certain extent on the agreement.
However, a transition period lasting till the end of2020 has been put in place for the new requirements
during which their application can be deferred. In
addition, the most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff rate
imposed on U.S.-bound passenger cars and SUVs will be
low at 2.5% even when the rules are not met. Some
automakers may find it less costly and more rational to
pay the tariff instead of making major adjustments totheir production and procurement systems.
A side letter attached to USMCA stipulates a limit on
Mexican auto exports to the U.S. It provides that evenwhen the U.S. raises its tariff rate based on Article 232 of
its Trade Expansion Act, Mexican auto exports can be
exempted from the higher tariff as long as they fall shortof the quantitative quota. The cap on passenger car and
SUV exports has been set at 2.6 million units.
Considering that such exports in 2019 totaled
approximately 2.1 million units and given their rate of
growth in recent years, the cap may be reached as early
as in 2023. All in all, USMCA is unlikely to act
immediately as a constraint on Mexican auto exports to
the U.S. and auto-related direct investment in Mexico,
but future developments still warrant some attention.

<5>

Financial system
Mexico's banking sector mainly consists ofcommercial
banks
and
government-affiliateddevelopment banks, with the former accounting fornearly 90% of the sector's total assets. As part of thereforms on the financial system after the currency crisis
in 1994, the restriction on foreign investment in Mexicanbanks was abolished in 1999. This prompted foreignbanks to acquire major Mexican banks. Their combined
assets now account for about 70% of the total assets ofthe banking sector, and four of the top five banks inasset terms are owned by foreign capital. This highpresence of foreign banks is one of the characteristics of
Mexico’s banking sector. As foreign banks have taken acautious stance toward credit provision, the sector's
total lending stays at mid-50% of GDP, the lowest among
the countries rated in the A range by JCR. Its financial
intermediation is not deep enough for the country's
economic scale and the supply of growth funds by thesector alone is not necessarily sufficient. The current
government has acknowledged the issue and has
implemented various measures to promote financial
deepening.
Mexican banks have generally retained their highprofitability and financial soundness even amid the cyclic
hike of interest rates by the central bank from 2015
through 2019. Their average ROA stood high at 2.2% in
2019. Their capital adequacy ratio and Tier 1 ratio also
stood high at 16.2% and 14.7%, respectively, at the endof March 2020. According to the central bank, the capital
adequacy ratio after deducting the expected CVaR with aconfidence level of 99.9% is estimated at about 10%, still
higher than the 8% regulatory lower bound. Moreover,stress tests conducted by the central bank have provedthat the ratio will exceed the lower limit even in themost pessimistic scenario.
The banking sector's NPL ratio was kept reined at
2.2% at the end of March 2020. The liquidity coverage
ratio (LCR) has recently declined slightly, but it still stays
at a high level of just less than 200% and the net stable
funding ratio (NFSR) stands at around 130%, well above
the regulatory lower limit of 100%. The loan-to-deposit
ratio has been stable at around 90%. The sector'sinterest-bearing debt remains low at about 17% of GDP
and approximately 80% is denominated in peso.
Loans made by commercial banks had grown fasterthan 10% year-on-year in the mid-2010s, but the growthrate has been declining in keeping with the economic
slowdown after 2018. It fell to 4.9% at the end of 2019.

Issuer Report
The country's business activities have shrunk in 2020
due to the pandemic, and in April, the government andthe central bank announced a financial support package
equivalent to 3.3% of GDP. However, JCR holds that thesize of the assistance is not necessarily sufficient.
The household debt has been kept low at about 16%
of GDP. Its foreign exchange risk is limited as it is mostly
peso-denominated. The debt owed by non-financial
businesses is also low at about 25% of GDP, although
70% of their debt is denominated in foreign currencies.
Many of these businesses benefit from a natural hedge,
receiving a large proportion of revenues in dollars, ormake use of financial hedging instruments, and theforeign exchange risk has been somewhat mitigated.
Following the slump of economic activity resulting
from pandemic, the National Banking and Securities
Commission (CNBV), which oversees the Mexicanbanking sector, granted a partial or total deferral ofprincipal and/or interest payments for up to 6 months
on consumer, housing and commercial loans, which haveallowed to restructure 6.5 million credits (14.7% of totalloan portfolio). In addition, CNVB and the National
Insurance Security Commission (CNSF) have been jointly
urging banks to restrict dividend payments and sharebuybacks. CNBV has also allowed banks to reduce theircapital buffer based on the capital adequacy
requirements by up to 50% as a temporary measure toramp up their liquidity position.

Overall assessment and rating outlook
The ratings are supported by the country’s solid
export-oriented industrial base, flexible and agile
monetary and exchange rate policies, and resilience toexternal shocks. On the other hand, they are constrainedby the country’s oil industry that needs modernizationand the existence of large-scale informal labor which
impedes economic efficiency.
The new left-wing AMLO administration has beenpromoting eradication of corruption and enhancementof social welfare as its top priorities, drawing a highapproval rating from the public. It also kept fiscal
discipline in 2019 by holding down PSBR below its
planned target. On the other hand, the Mexican
economy suffered a negative growth in 2019 due mainly
to sluggish private investment. The government
announced its private sector-led infrastructuredevelopment plan in November 2019, but JCR holds that
there remains uncertainty as to whether it can be
implemented as initially planned. Under these<6>

circumstances, the economy may further contract in2020 due to the halt of economic activity caused by
COVID-19 and the plunge of crude oil prices. The
government is prepared to support the economy
through additional fiscal measures and JCR holds that its
fiscal position may severely worsen due to reduced tax
revenues as well as expanding expenditure following
economic slowdown. Moreover, uncertainty over thegovernment’s economic policy has been mounting as
evidenced by its growing feud with the business
community over its funding support for the corporate
sector. Based on the above, JCR has changed the rating
outlook to Negative while keeping the ratings
themselves unchanged. It will closely monitor the
impact that the COVID-19 pandemic and the plunge ofoil prices may have on the economy and the fiscal
position along with future progress on the government's
additional economic package in order to have theoutcome reflected on its ratings.
The strategy of the government is to reallocate nonpriority spending strategically across the country andthrough time to maintain a balance between stimulating
the economy and maintaining stable public finances.
Due to high uncertainty of the evolution of thepandemic, the government is administering the room of
maneuver and continuously assessing the situation toprovide extra funding if needed. The government may
come under growing pressure to spend more for an
additional economic support if its initial anti-coronavirus
package does not work effectively. Furthermore, if thegovernment does not swiftly provide effective support
measures to stem a deterioration of corporate funding
caused by the persistent COVID-19 pandemic, the slumpof business activities may become even more serious.
When JCR is convinced that such course of events has
become surer, it will promptly downgrade its ratings. On
the other hand, when it judges that the government's
initial package and its corporate funding support
measures do function effectively and that a swift
implementation of the private sector-led infrastructuredevelopment plan will stimulate private investment andgreatly alleviate the economic downturn, the possibilityof downgrading will decline. However, JCR thinks suchpossibility is remote.
On a separate note, JCR has retained A+ for thecountry ceiling for Mexico in line with the affirmation of
its ratings.

Issuer Report

12049

Mexico● Major Economic Indicators

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Nominal GDP per capita

USD

9,701

8,831

9,397

9,811

9,997

Real GDP growth

％

3.3

2.6

2.1

2.2

-0.3

CPI inflation (annual average)

％

2.7

2.8

6.0

4.9

3.6

Public sector primary balance to GDP

％

-1.2

-0.1

1.4

0.6

1.1

Public sector fiscal balance to GDP

％

-3.4

-2.5

-1.1

-2.1

-1.6

Public sector borrowing requirement(PSBR) to GDP

％

-4.0

-2.8

-1.1

-2.2

-2.3

Public sector historical PSBR to GDP

％

46.5

48.7

45.8

44.9

44.8

Current account balance to GDP

％

-2.6

-2.3

-1.8

-2.1

-0.3

Trade balance to GDP

％

-1.2

-1.2

-0.9

-1.1

0.4

Financial account balance to GDP

％

-1.8

-3.0

-2.5

-2.8

-1.4

Official reserve assets

bn USD

177.6

178.0

175.4

176.4

183.0

Official reserve assets to imports ofgoods and services

months

5.0

5.1

4.6

4.2

4.4

Official reserve assets to short-term
external debt

x

2.4

3.2

3.1

2.7

2.8

External debt to GDP

％

35.6

38.3

37.7

36.5

36.8

Foreign exchange rate (annual average) MXN/USD

15.9

18.7

18.9

19.2

19.2

Capital Adequacy Ratio(domestic deposit-taking institutions)

％

15.0

14.9

15.6

15.9

16.0

NPL Ratio(domestic deposit-taking institutions)

％

2.5

2.1

2.1

2.1

2.1

Domestic claims to GDP

％

52.5

54.7

54.8

54.4

58.8

* Figures for the most recent period could be indicators based on preliminary figures.
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), Central Bank, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), IMF and CEIC

● Ratings
Rating Outlook*

Amount(millions)-

Currency Rate (%) Issue Date Maturity Date

Local Currency Long-term Issuer Rating

A+

Negative-2020.04.27

Foreign Currency Long-term Issuer Rating

A-

Negative---

Japanese Yen Bonds 22th Series (2016)

A--

50,900

JPY

0.70

-

-

2020.04.27

2016.06.16

2021.06.16

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 29th Series (2019)

A--

65,500JPY

0.62

2019.07.05

2022.07.05

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 25th Series (2018)

A--

57,200JPY

0.60

2018.04.20

2023.04.20

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 30th Series (2019)A--

41,200JPY

0.83

2019.07.05

2024.07.05

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 19th Series (2014)

A--

Japanese Yen Bonds 26th Series (2018)

A--

13,900JPY

1.44

2014.07.24

2024.07.24

2020.04.27

24,100JPY

0.85

2018.04.20

2025.04.18

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 23th Series (2016)

A--

16,300JPY

1.09

2016.06.16

2026.06.16

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 31th Series (2019)A--

27,300JPY

1.05

2019.07.05

2026.07.03

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 27th Series (2018)

A--

38,700JPY

1.05

2018.04.20

2028.04.20

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 32th Series (2019)A--

31,000JPY

1.30

2019.07.05

2029.07.05

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 20th Series (2014)

A--

12,300JPY

2.57

2014.07.24

2034.07.24

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 24th Series (2016)

A--

21,900JPY

2.40

2016.06.16

2036.06.16

2020.04.27

Japanese Yen Bonds 28th Series (2018)

A--

15,000JPY

2.00

2018.04.20

2038.04.20

2020.04.27

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-

-

-

ReleaseIssuer Report● History of Long-term Issuer Rating
Date(Foreign Currency Long-term Issuer Rating or its equivalent)

RatingOutlook*

Issuer Name

1998.06.17

BB+-

Mexico2000.11.02

BBB-

Mexico2005.01.26

BBB

StableMexico2006.01.20

BBB+

StableMexico2008.01.28

A-

StableMexico2020.04.27

A-

Negative

Mexico*Outlook for Foreign Currency long-term issuer rating, or direction in case of Credit Monitor

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