Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition
1985, Vol. II. No. I, 59-69

Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0278-7393/85/$00.75

Nature of Priming Effects on Categorization
E. T o r y Higgins, J o h n A. Bargh, a n d W e n d y L o m b a r d i
New York University
Alternative models for explaining priming effects on categorization are described,
and their predictions concerning the relative advantage of frequent versus recent
priming as a function of interstimulus delay are contrasted. Subjects were asked
to categorize an ambiguous stimulus description that could be characterized ineither a positive or a negative manner. Prior to its presentation, subjects wereunobtrusively exposed to both positive and negative primes related to thedescription. For half of the subjects, the positive primes appeared more frequently,
but the negative prime appeared most recently; for the remaining subjects, thenegative primes appeared more frequently, but the positive prime appeared mostrecently. Between the final prime and stimulus presentation, there was a delay ofeither 15 s or 120 s, Subjects tended to categorize the stimulus description interms of the recently primed construct after the brief interstimulus delay, butthey tended to categorize the description in terms of the frequently primed
construct after the long interstimulus delay. These results are consistent with aproposed synapse model of priming effects. Other possible models that makedifferent assumptions about the level of activation, the decay function, and theirability to account for the findings are discussed.

Priming effects on the subsequent identification of stimuli have been examined extensively in recent years. In the cognitive literature, most research on priming effects has
involved presenting subjects with a word orgroup of words (the prime), followed quickly
by a target letter string that subjects must
name or classify (e.g., as a word vs. a nonword). These studies found that naming orclassifying the target is facilitated when theprime is semantically related to or associatedwith the target (e.g., Forbach, Stanners, &Hochhaus, 1974; Meyer, Schvaneveldt, &Ruddy, 1975; Neely, 1977; Warren, 1977). In
the social cognitive literature, most researchon priming effects has involved presenting
subjects with a word or group of words aspart of one study, followed a few minutes
later by a separate, unrelated study in which
subjects read a behavioral description of atarget person and formed an impression of
him or her. These studies found that subjects
tend to characterize the target person information in terms of the construct that had
been previously primed (e.g., Bargh & PietroRequests for reprints should be sent to E. Tory Higgins,
Department of Psychology,New York University,6 Washington Place, Seventh Floor, New York, New York 10003.
59

monaco, 1982; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones,
1977; Rholes & Pryor, 1982; Srull & Wyer,
1979). In addition to these effects of recent
priming on subsequent stimulus identification,
there is also evidence that frequent priming
increases the impact of priming on subsequent
processing (e.g., Hayes-Roth, 1977; Reder,
1983; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). Thus, it
has been well established that both recent
and frequent priming influence the identification of subsequent stimuli. But what mechanism underlies such priming effects? Whatis the relation between recent and frequentpriming, and how do their relative effects
change over time? The purpose of this study
was to address these questions.
With respect to the effects of priming on
categorization, it is known that the primingof an applicable construct increases the likelihood that it will be used to process a
subsequent stimulus, that the likelihood ofutilization increases as the frequency of priming increases, and that the likelihood of utilization decreases as the temporal delay between priming and stimulus presentation increases (Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & Srull,1981). At present, two types of models (or,more appropriately, metaphors) have been
proposed in the literature to explain such

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E.T. HIGGINS, J. BARGH, AND W. LOMBARDI

Table 1
Possible Assumptions of Excitation Transmission
Models of Priming Effects for Level of Activation
and Decay Function Parameters
Possible assumption
Parameter
Level of activation

Alternative
1

Alternative
2

BinaryContinuous(Imstthreshold)

Decay function
Between constructs U n i f o r mNonuniform
Within constructs
Constant Nonconstant
Source of variability Levelof
Length ofactivation
activation(e.g., frequency)

priming effects: mechanistic models, where
the explanation is in terms of the arrangement
and the working of component parts, andexcitation transmission models, where theexplanation is in terms of the heightening
and the dissipation o f excitation or energy
levels.
The clearest example of a mechanistic
model that has been specifically used to interpret priming effects on categorization is
Wyer and Srull's (1980) "storage bin" model.
They proposed that the constructs in eachbin are stored in layers in the order in which
they were previously activated. When stimulus
information is interpreted, the relevant bin issearched from the top down so that constructs
at the top are more likely to be retrieved andutilized. Thus, when several constructs arepotentially applicable for stimulus processing
the most recently activated construct is most
likely to be used. A construct will remain at
the top of the bin for a substantial period aslong as other constructs in the bin are
not activated during the interval. Typicallythough, other constructs in the bin are more
likely to be activated as the delay between
priming and stimulus presentation increases.
Thus, as the delay period increases, theprimed construct is less likely to remain on
top and so is less likely to be utilized insubsequent processing. When a construct isfrequently activated, however, it is more likely
to have been recently used, and thus it ismore likely to remain on top to be utilized

subsequently. In this model, therefore, theeffect of frequent activation is reinterpreted
in terms of its relation to recent activation.
A very similar conceptualization of priming
effects also has been proposed by Forbach etal. (1974).
Priming effects on categorization also havebeen interpreted in terms of various formsof excitation transmission (see Higgins &King, 1981; Marcel & Forrin, 1974; Reder,
1983; Warren, 1972; Wyer & Carlston, 1979).
These models have generally included thefollowing basic postulates: (a) The primingof a construct increases its excitation level;(b) a construct's excitation level must reacha certain, minimal threshold for that construct
to be used in stimulus processing; (c) the
more frequently a construct is primed, themore likely it is that this minimal threshold
will be maintained; and (d) the excitationlevel of a construct decreases over time, andt h u s the longer the period since the final
priming, the less likely it is that the minimal
threshold will be maintained. There is no
excitation transmission model, however, thatis as specific as Wyer and Srull's (1980)
storage bin model with respect to the parameters that underlie recency, frequency, andtemporal delay effects of priming on categorization. To be more specific, an excitationtransmission model must make some assumptions with respect to two parameters:level of activation and decay function. As
shown in Table 1, there are a number ofpossible assumptions that could be made.
For level of activation, there are two basic
alternatives. One could assume either that
activation level is binary (i.e., all or none) orthat activation level is continuous, such that
constructs can build up different levels ofactivation above the minimal threshold ofactivation (e.g., Wyer & Carlston, 1979).
There are a greater number of possible
assumptions that one could make with respect
to decay function. First, with respect to a
between-constructs comparison, one could
assume either that the decay function is thesame for all activated constructs (i.e., a uniform decay function) or that the decay function varies for different activated constructs
as a function of their level or length ofactivation (i.e., nonuniform decay functions).
Second, with respect to a within-constructs

NATURE OF PRIMING EFFECTS

comparison, decay functions could involve
either a constant amount (a linear function)
or a constant rate (a nonlinear function) of
decay per unit time (i,e., constant decay) or
they could involve varying amounts or rates
of decay per unit time as a function of level
or length of activation (i.e., nonconstant decay). A uniform and constant decay function
for primed constructs has been suggested by
Marcel and Forrin (1974). A nonuniform
and nonconstant decay function that varies
as a function of level of activation is consistent
with Wyer and Carlston's (1979) suggestionthat residual excitation decreases more rapidly
initially than later on, as long as one assumes
higher decay rates for higher levels of activation. Another possibility, and our preferredalternative, is a nonuniform decay functionthat varies as a function of how often or how
long a construct has been primed, where therate of decay decreases as the length of priming increases.
There are various possible excitation transmission models that could be constructed by
combining different assumptions with respect
to the level of activation and the decay function. Let us consider two possibilities thatreflect two common energy transmission systems: the battery model and the synapse
model. In the battery model, the level ofactivation is assumed to be continuous, andthe decay function is assumed to vary as afunction of level of activation (i.e., nonuniform and nonconstant). This model would
be consistent with Wyer and Carlston's (1979)
general discussion of the parameters of priming effects. In this model, a construct is likea standard automotive battery that is charged
by priming: The more the battery is primed,
the higher is its level of activation or charge,
and the higher the level of activation or
charge, the higher the likelihood of subsequentutilization. Because the level of activation
decreases over time, the likelihood of using
the construct decreases as the amount of time
between final priming and stimulus presentation increases. Frequency effects in thismodel are explained by assuming that themore frequently a construct is primed, thehigher is its level of activation or charge.
The synapse model proposes that a construct functions like the synapses of vertebrates (see Kandel, 1976). Thus, the level of61

activation is assumed to be binary (i.e., all ornone), and the decay function is assumed tovary as a function of the length of priming(i.e., nonuniform). In this model, stimulationof a construct through priming increases its
action potential to a fixed, maximum levelof elevation, which then slowly dissipates overtime. Thus, as the delay between construct
stimulation and stimulus presentation increases, the likelihood of utilizing the construct for subsequent stimulus processing decreases. In addition, the synapse model holds
that, just as for synapses (e.g., Lloyd, 1949),
the more frequently or longer a construct has
been stimulated, the slower its action potential
dissipates. (The decay function would be nonconstant as well.) Therefore, it follows thatthe more frequently a construct is primed,
the more likely its action potential will remain
sufficiently high to give it an advantage insubsequent processing.
The major difference among these models
concerns the effect of frequent priming on
subsequent stimulus processing as the delay
between final priming and stimulus presentation increases. This difference among themodels can be highlighted by considering
what each would predict if people were asked
to judge stimulus person information that
could be categorized either positively or negatively (e.g., an ambiguous, independent/aloof
behavioral description) and prior to this had
one of the applicableconstructs frequently
primed (e.g., independent) and the other construct primed only once but most recently(e.g., aloof). According to the storage binmodel, the recent construct would predominate over the frequent construct, as long as
it was the last applicable construct to be
activated, regardless of the delay between
final priming and stimulus presentation.
According to the battery model, whicheverconstruct has the higher level of activation
immediately after final priming would predominate, regardless of the delay between
final priming and stimulus presentation. This
would typically be the frequent constructbecause its greater priming would give it ahigher level of activation, unless the period
between its last priming and the priming of
the recent construct was so long that its
activation level fell below the level attainedby a single priming of the recent construct.

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E. T. HIGGINS, J. BARGH, AND W. LOMBARDI

In a n y case, w h i c h e v e r c o n s t r u c t p r e d o m i n a t e d a f t e r a b r i e f delay w o u l d also p r e d o m i n a t e after a l o n g delay, g i v e n t h e a s s u m p t i o nof the battery model that the rate of decay
varies as a f u n c t i o n o f level o f a c t i v a t i o n .
T h a t is, w h e n t h e c o n s t r u c t w i t h t h e h i g h e r
a c t i v a t i o n level at T i m e 1 (e.g., at t h e e n d o f
t h e b r i e f delay) e v e n t u a l l y d e c a y s to t h e levelt h a t t h e c o m p e t i n g c o n s t r u c t was at T i m e 1,t h e n it will follow t h e s a m e d e c a y f u n c t i o n
as d i d t h e c o m p e t i n g c o n s t r u c t since T i m e 1,b u t t h e c o m p e t i n g c o n s t r u c t will always be
f u r t h e r a l o n g this d e c a y f u n c t i o n . T h u s , alt h o u g h t h e a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n activ a t i o n levels o f these c o n s t r u c t s m a y d e c r e a s e
o v e r t i m e , t h e i r r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s will n o tchange.
Only the synapse model predicts a possible
reversal o f w h i c h c o n s t r u c t p r e d o m i n a t e s asa f u n c t i o n o f the delay b e t w e e n final p r i m i n g
and stimulus presentation. Given that thefrequent and recent constructs have the samem a x i m a l level o f a c t i o n p o t e n t i a l w h e n t h e yb e g i n to d i s s i p a t e a n d t h a t t h e f r e q u e n t c o n struct b e g i n s to dissipate s o o n e r t h a n t h erecent construct, the recent construct shouldp r e d o m i n a t e i m m e d i a t e l y after final p r i m i n g .
H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e t h e f r e q u e n t c o n s t r u c t is
h y p o t h e s i z e d to h a v e a slower r a t e o f dissipation than the recent construct, the frequentc o n s t r u c t s h o u l d p r e d o m i n a t e w h e n t h e r e isa l o n g d e l a y b e t w e e n final p r i m i n g a n d s t i m u l u s p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e p r e s e n t s t u d y wasd e s i g n e d to test t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e p r e d i c t i o n s .
MethodDesignSubjects were randomly assigned to 1 of 12 experimental conditions formed by completely crossing thethree factors of interest. Three different ambiguous stimulus descriptions were employed in order to examine thegeneralizability of effects across different trait dimensions.
The stimulus descriptions exemplified the following trait
dimensions: independent/aloof, adventurous/reckless, andpersistent/stubborn. These pairs were constructed so thatthe members of each pair differed in social desirability
hut referred to highly similar behavior. A second factor
was whether the positively valenced or the negatively
valenced member of each pair would appear more frequently during the priming task. In the positive frequency/
negative recency condition, the desirable trait from eachpair appeared more frequently, and the undesirable trait
appeared most recently during priming. In the negative
frequency/positive recency condition, the undesirable trait
appeared more frequently, and the desirable trait appeared

most recently. The third factor was the amount of delay
a subject encountered between the final priming andpresentation of the stimulus description: either 15 s or
120 s. During this delay, the subject engaged in a mediatingtask designed to clear working memory. Thus, the experiment employed a 3 × 2 × 2 (Type of Stimulus Description × Type of Priming × Postpriming Delay) betweensubjects factorial design.

Subjects
Sixty-three male and female undergraduates enrolled
in the introductory psychology course at New York
University participated in the experiment in return forcourse credit. All subjects were run individually and were
fluent in English. Five subjects were randomly assigned
to each of the 12 experimental conditions. During debriefing, 3 subjects indicated at least some awareness ofa relation between the priming task and the stimulusdescription labeling task, and so these subjects were
replaced in the design.

Apparatus and Materials
The experimental room was equipped with two chairs
and a table on which a Zenith model ZVMI21 cathoderay tube (CRT) screen and response box were placed.
The subject was seated in front of the CRT display, andthe response box was placed within easy reach. The
experimenter sat behind and out of sight of the subject.
The CRT display was under program control of an Apple
II microcomputer located in a separate control room.
The response box, which was directly connected to thecomputer as an input device, contained a button that,when pressed at appropriate times by the subject, caused
the computer program controlling the experiment toproceed with the next phase of the experiment. With the
exception of the experimental consent form, which explained the three tasks to the subject prior to the startof the experiment, all instructions were presented on the
CRT display.

Procedure
Before the subject was shown into the experimental
room, his or her experimental condition was randomly
determined and was entered into the computer by theexperimenter. The computer program used this code topresent the appropriate stimulus materials (describedlater) to the subject. After being seated in front of the
CRT screen in the experimental room, subjects wereasked to sign a consent form that fully described theprocedures of the study in which they were about toparticipate. Through the consent form, subjects were
informed that the experiment concerned the relation
between language skills and the ways in which people
mentally manipulate symbols, such as numbers. To foster
subjects' continued belief in the stated rationale for theexperiment, the experimenter carried a clipboard andwrote down subjects' verbal responses during the courseof the experimental sessions.
The subject pressed the response button to begin theexperiment. Each subject was informed that he or she
would perform a series of tasks three times. Unbeknownst

NATURE OF PRIMING EFFECTS
to the subject, the first two series were practice trials
intended to familiarize the subject with the task procedures. Only the third and final task series contained thecritical priming manipulation and person-description labeling task. There was no relation at all between thepriming and labeling tasks during the first two practicesequences, which further disguised the relation between
the two tasks in the experimental series that followed.
The experimenter ensured that all tasks were being
performed properly prior to the start of the third, criticalseries of tasks.
Priming task. The first task consisted of 20 trials inwhich groups of four words were presented on the screen.
The subject was instructed to use three of the words tomake a grammatically correct and meaningful sentence.
The groups of words were selected so as to make thispossible on every trial. Each set of words remained on
the screen for 3 s, after which the screen went blank fora pause of 1 s. During this time, the subject formed asentence and stated it out loud. (Pretesting had determined
this to be sufficient time to perform this task, and no
subject experiened any difficulty with this time constraint.)
In the two practice task series, all words presented
were carefully chosen to be neutral in their implications
for personality: No trait adjectives or other words wereused that could be used to describe someone's personality.
Examples of these practice, four-word groups are "write
the mail letter" and "heavy it green is?' In the experimental
task series, the frequent trait word or one of threesynonyms appeared as one of the four words in the 3rd,
7th, 12th, and 15th trials. The recent trait word waspresented in the 20th and final trial. Examples of these
critical four-word groups are "you unconventional arequiet;' and "children older bold become?' The trait wordalways appeared as one of the first three words (readingfrom left to right) in the four-word group. This was sothat subjects would not fail to read a priming adjective
due to constructing a sentence from the first three words.
The synonyms used for each trait word were as follows:
Adventurous: bold, courageous, brave
Reckless: careless, foolhardy, rash
Persistent: determined, persevering, steadfast
Stubborn: unreasonable, obstinate, headstrong
Independent: free, unconventional, individualistic
Aloof: unneighborly, distant, unsociable

Interference task. After the final word group had
been presented, the display immediately presented the
instructions for the interference task, the second task inthe series. The subject was instructed to count backwards
as fast as he or she could, beginning with a given number
and by a certain unit. The beginning number and theunit size were given in the instructions each time. The
subject counted backwards from 368 by 3s in the firstseries, from 467 by 6s in the second series, and from853 by 7s in the final series. Different and relatively large
starting numbers and counting units were utilized inorder to eliminate as much as possible any prior experience with counting backward or any practice effects
carrying over from an earlier task series. This helped
ensure that the interference task would completely clear
memory each time. This procedure has been shown
repeatedly to accomplish this objective in past studies(e.g., Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959; Reitman,

631974). The subject continued to count backward until
the screen display instructed him or her to stop. In the
short-delay condition, the interval was 15 s after the
instructions to begin counting had been presented; in thelong-delay condition, the interval was 120 s.
We chose these two delay lengths based on the following
reasoning. Each of the alternative models would predictthat the greatest advantage for the recently primed construct would occur with the shortest possible delay before
stimulus presentation. With our procedure, the shortest
possible delay was 15 s, as subjects had to read thenumber from which to count backward, had to read thecounting unit, and then had to engage in the task for atleast a modicum of time so that our cover story regarding
various symbol-manipulation tasks would be taken seriously. Determination of the long delay length was more
problematic. There is evidence that priming can lastquite a long time with multiple priming of the same
construct, apparently as long as 24 hr for 35 or moreprimes (Srull & Wyer, 1980). But when different constructs
are being primed simultaneously and only a few times
each, a situation that more closely resembles the present
procedure, there is no evidence of priming effects lasting
much longer than l0 min (cf. Forbach et al., 1974). We
expected that this "effect window" would be attenuatedfurther under the present procedure due to (a) theinterference task (as it is meant to inhibit rehearsal), (b)the fact that alternative constructs for the same stimulus
were primed (possibly speeding decay through mutual
inhibition), and (c) the relatively low amount of priming(a maximum of 4 primes, compared with Srull & Wyer,
1980, who required 24 primes to obtain strong priming
effects with a l-hr delay). Therefore, a long delay of 2
min was implemented in order to provide a period thatwas both long enough for frequency effects to occur andwas within the boundary conditions of priming effects
given our procedure. It should also be noted that thecounting-backward task becomes less effective in maintaining subjects' attention after about 3 min, so that our
2-min delay made sense for practical considerations as
well.
Labeling task. In the third task of each series, whichbegan immediately after the conclusion of the second
task, the subject was given a brief, ambiguous description
to read. In the first two task series, the description wasof an animal, and the subject was instructed to write
down the name of the type of animal, as quickly as sheor he could. In the third series, an ambiguous descriptionof a person was presented that had been demonstrated
previously to elicit with approximately equal frequency
both members o f the adjective pair involved (Higgins etal., 1977). The subject was told to write down the one
word that best described the person. The descriptions
presented to the subject in each adjective-pair condition
were as follows:
Adventurous/Reckless: He has risked injury, and evendeath, a number of times. Now he is in search of new
excitement. He is thinking, perhaps, he will do someskydiving or maybe cross the Atlantic in a sailboat.
Persistent/Stubborn: Once he makes up his mind to
do something, it is as good as done no matter how longit might take or how difficult the going might be. Only
rarely does he change his mind even when it might wellhave been better if he had.

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E.T. HIGGINS, J. BARGH, AND W. LOMBARDI

Table 2
Mean Categorization of the Stimulus Information
Postpriming delay
Type of priming

Brief

Long

Positive frequency/negative
recency
Negative frequency/positive
recency

3.1

3.4

4.8

2.9

Note. The higher the score, the closer a categorization wasin meaning to the positive alternative construct.
Independent/Aloof: Other than business engagements,
his contacts with people are rather limited. He feels hedoesn't really need to rely on anyone.
In all three versions of this task, the subject immediatelypressed the response button after writing down the oneword label.
At the conclusion of the third series of tasks, allsubjects were informed that it would be helpful to theexperimenter to know if they felt that their performanceon any of the tasks had been influenced by any of theother tasks. As an example of what was meant, theexperimenter suggested that the sentence-forming task or
the counting-backward task might have influenced theirperformance on the labeling task that followed. Only 3
subjects responded to this line of questioning by reportingthat the words in the sentence-forming task were related
to the description presented in the third task, but eventhese subjects did not guess the hypothesis being tested
in the study. These subjects were replaced in the design,and their responses were not included in any of theanalyses. The remaining subjects did not report noticing
the trait words in the sentence-forming task and did not
feel that any of the words in that task had influenced
the label they used in the third task. As a check on theirmemory for the priming words, all subjects were next
asked to write down all of the sentences they had formedin the sentence-formation task. The experimental procedures and purpose then were explained fully to eachsubject, and he or she was thanked for participating inthe study.
Results and Discussion
As discussed earlier, alternative models o fpriming effects make different predictions
concerning the relative advantage o f recent
versus frequent priming on subsequent categorization o f stimulus information as a function o f the delay between final p r i m i n g andstimulus presentation. The storage bin model
predicts an advantage o f the recent construct
after both delay periods. The battery model
predicts that whichever construct has theadvantage after a brief delay will also havethe advantage after a long delay. The synapse
model predicts that the recent construct will

have the advantage after a brief delay, but thefrequent construct will have the advantage
after a long delay. To test these alternative
predictions, subjects' categorizations o f thestimulus information were first scored by two
independent coders (blind to experimental
condition) with respect to their similarity inmeaning to either the positive or the negative
alternative construct that could be used tocharacterize the stimulus information. The
categorizations were scored on a 6-point scaleranging from s a m e as negative alternative
construct (1) to s a m e as positive alternative
construct (6). The agreement between thecoders was very high, r = .94, and so thecoders' scores for each categorization wereaveraged together to yield the final scores. A
Type o f Priming (positive frequency/negative
recency; negative frequency/positive recency) X Postpriming Delay (brief; long) X
Type o f Stimulus Description (adventurous/
reckless; persistent/stubborn; independent/
aloof) between-subjects analysis o f variance(ANOVA) then was performed on these scores.
As shown in Table 2, subjects' categorizationso f the stimulus information reflected the recent construct more than the frequent construct after the brief delay but reflected thefrequent construct m o r e than the recent construct after the long delay, F(1, 48) = 4.84,
p < .05.
A n additional analysis then was carriedout to c o m p a r e the n u m b e r o f subjects ineach delay condition who clearly used therecent construct to categorize the stimulus
information with those who clearly used thefrequent construct. First, categorizations receiving a score between 1 and 2.5 were classifted as clear reflections o f the negative prime;
categorizations receiving a score between 4.5
and 6 were classified as clear reflections o f
the positive prime, and categorizations receiving a score greater than 2.5 but less than
4.5 were classified as ambiguous. We thendetermined, for each delay period separately,
how m a n y subjects clearly categorized thestimulus information in terms o f the positiveor negative frequent construct, how m a n y
subjects clearly categorized the stimulus information in terms o f the positive or negative
recent construct, and. how m a n y subjects
categorized the stimulus information in an
ambiguous manner. As shown in Table 3,

NATURE OF PRIMING EFFECTS

65

after the brief delay, most subjects used the Table 3
recent construct to categorize the stimulus Number of Subjects Using the Recent, Frequent,
information, whereas after the long delay, or an Ambiguous Construct to Categorize theStimulus Information as a Function ofmost subjects used the frequent construct toPostpriming Delay
categorize the stimulus information, x2(N =60) = 6.79, p < .05, two-tailed.
Postpriming delay
Type of
These results are consistent with the precategorization
Brief
Long
diction of the synapse model of priming
effects and do not support the predictions of Recent construct
21 (70%)11 (37%)either the storage bin model or the battery Ambiguous construct
1 (3%)
3 (10%)
model. It should also be noted that the same Frequent construct
8 (27%)
16 (53%)
pattern of recency-frequency reversal as afunction of delay was found for each of the Note. Numbers in parentheses represent percentages of
total subjects in each delaycondition.
three different stimulus descriptions. Thus,
the Type of Priming X Postpriming Delay
interaction was independent of type of stim- much smaller sample size, F(I, 24) = 7.78,
ulus description (F < 1). The probability of p = .0 I, but it was even more dramatic thanobtaining this exact pattern (i.e., recency for the total sample (brief delay: positive
greater than frequency after a brief delay and frequent/negative recent, M = 2.8; negative
frequency greater than recency after a long frequent/positive recent, M = 4.5; long delay:
delay) for all three stimulus descriptions is positive frequent/negative recent, M = 3.9;
only .016 (i.e., p = [1/2 X V213).
negative frequent/positive recent, M = 1.6).
• Moreover, the correlation between use of theprimed construct (as measured by the coders'
Memory o f the Primes and its Relation
6-point scale ratings) and memory for the
to Categorization
primes was nonsignificant for both the freIf subjects' categorizations o f the stimulus quent primes (r = . 13, 17> .25) and the recent
information were influenced by the primes prime (r = .16, p > .25). Finally, it is not atthey remembered seeing in the priming task, all clear how a memory for primes interprethen there should be a relation between their tation could predict both the advantage ofcategorizations and their memory of the the recent prime after a brief delay but notprimes. To test this possibility, an additional the advantage of the frequent primes after a
Type of Priming X Postpriming Delay X long delay, given that reliably more frequentType of Stimulus Description X Memory for primes were remembered than recent primes
Frequent Primes (0 vs. 1 or more correctly after both the brief delay (frequent, M = .43;
recalled) X Memory for Recent Prime (0 vs. recent, M = .20) and the long delay (frequent,
1 correctly recalled) ANOVA was performed M = .47; recent, M = .23; overall t[59] =on the categorization data. The Type of Prim- 2.59, p = .01, two-tailed) and that memory
ing X Postpriming Delay interaction was in- for the primes was generally poor (overall,dependent of memory for frequent primes only 13% were remembered). It should be( F < 1), and the interaction with memory for noted that although the mean numbers ofrecent prime was not significant (p > .10). frequent and recent primes remembered in
The reversal in categorization as a function the long-delay condition were greater than inof delay and type of priming depicted in the short-delay condition, these differences
Table 2 was, if anything, even stronger among were small and unreliable (both ps > .50).
those subjects who did not remember the
recent prime, so that memory for the recent
General Discussion and Conclusions
prime was clearly not responsible for the
The results of this study indicate that wheninteraction. In fact, an ANOVA of the categorization data for only those 28 subjects who alternative constructs for characterizing an
did not remember any primes (frequent or ambiguous stimulus are both made accessible
recent) found that not only was the recency- by being either frequently or most recently
frequency reversal still reliable despite the primed, people will categorize the stimulus

66

E. T. HICK]INS, J. BARGH, AND W. LOMBARDI

in terms of the most recently primed construct
if the stimulus appears almost immediately
after final priming, but they will categorize
the stimulus in terms of the frequently primed
construct if there is sufficient delay between
final priming and stimulus presentation. Thisfinding of a recency-frequency reversal overtime is consistent with the synapse model ofpriming effects. This model proposes that
there is a fixed, maximum level of action
potential or accessibility that a constructreaches after being primed, that the level ofaction potential slowly dissipates over time,
and that the rate of dissipation is slower the
more frequently the construct has beenprimed (i.e., binary level of activation andnonuniform decay function that varies withlength of activation). Thus, when there is adelay between the final priming of the frequent construct and the priming of the recent
construct, the frequent construct will necessarily be at a lower level of action potential
than the recent construct immediately after
the recent construct is primed. But after asufficient delay, the frequent construct will
be at a higher level of action potential than
the recent construct, given its slower rate ofdissipation. The results do not support either
the storage bin model (where frequency effects
are interpreted in terms of recency effects) or
the battery model (where the decay function
varies with level of activation) of priming
effects because both models predict thatwhichever construct has the advantage aftera brief delay will also have the advantage
after a long delay.
Although the results of the present study
are consistent with the synapse model andare not consistent with the battery model,
these are not the only two possible kinds of
excitation transmission models. In fact, it isevident in Table 1 that alternative, possiblemodels could be constructed from other combinations of assumptions with respect to levelof activation and decay function. Could anyof these alternative possible models accountfor our findings? First, one could combine abinary level of activation and a uniform
decay function. This model (whether a constant or a nonconstant decay function isassumed) would predict that the recent construct would predominate over the frequent
construct at both delay periods because they

begin at the same level of activation, but thefrequent construct starts to decay sooner.
This kind of model, then, could not accountfor our findings. Thus, if one assumes thatlevel of activation is binary, then one mustalso assume a nonuniform decay functionthat varies with the length of activation (asin the synapse model) in order to accountfor the results. Second, one could combine acontinuous level of activation and a uniform,
constant decay function (see Marcel & Forrin,1974). This model (whether a constant rate
or a constant amount of decay is assumed)
would predict that whichever construct predominates at the brief delay would also predominate at the long delay, because theirrelative positions could not change if they
decay at the same rate or the same amount
per unit time (although the difference between
them may decrease over time). Thus, thismodel also cannot account for our findings.
There are two additional possible models
that can account for our results. The firstwould involve combining a continuous levelof activation and a nonuniform decay functionthat varies with length of activation. Thismodel would be a synapse model without theconstraint of assuming a binary level of activation and might be called a cell or cell
assembly model (see Hebb, 1949). The present
study was not designed to distinguish between
these two alternatives, but the synapse modelat this point has the advantage of simplicity.
The remaining alternative model differs moreradically from the synapse model. This model
combines a continuous level of activation anda uniform, nonconstant decay function, andlike the battery model, would also be consistent with Wyer and Cadston's (1979) general
discussion of the parameters of priming effects. If the frequent construct began at ahigher level of activation, the decay function
did not vary systematically with level ofactivation, and the rate of decay decreased
over time, then the recent construct could
predominate at the brief delay, and the frequent construct could predominate at thelong delay.
The design of the present study does not
permit a test between the synapse model andthese two competing alternatives. The common difference between the alternatives andthe synapse model is their assumption of a

NATURE OF PRIMING EFFECTS

continuous level of activation, as opposed tothe binary level of activation assumed by thesynapse model. Assumptions concerning levelof activation were not critically examined in
the present study but will be in future studies.
One possibility would be to vary both thefrequency of the frequent construct (e.g., 2,
4, or 6 primes) and the delay between the
final priming of the frequent construct andthe priming of the recent construct (5 s, 30
s, l min, 2 rain), with stimulus presentation
occurring soon after the recent prime. With
respect to the predominance of the frequent
construct, the synapse model would predict
little advantage of increased frequency at the
shortest delay period (given the assumptionof a binary level of activation) but would
predict an increasing advantage of frequency
with increasing interprime delay (at least
until the decay functions reached asymptote).
In contrast, the alternative models would
predict a clear advantage of increased frequency at the shortest delay period (given theassumption of a continuous level of activation), and for the uniform, nonconstant alnative model at least, the advantage of increased frequency would remain constant or
would decrease over time.
In addition to these alternative, excitationtransmission models, there is another type ofmodel that needs to be considered as a possible explanation of our results. There isevidence in the memory literature that recent
items in a list are recalled better than earlier
items after little or no delay, whereas earlier
items are recalled better than recent items
after a long delay (see Glanzer, 1972). Thereis also evidence that massed repetitions aresuperior to spaced repetitions after short retention intervals, whereas spaced repetitions
are superior to massed repetitions after longretention intervals (see Bjork, 1970). In thepresent study, the priming of the frequent
construct involved earlier and spaced repetitions relative to the priming of the recent
construct. This suggests that our results possibly could be interpreted in terms of memory
for the priming events and that the effect of
the frequent priming might have been due
simply to its primacy. Such an explanation
would be qualitatively different from those
we have considered thus far. The storage bin
and excitation transmission models all involve67

assumptions about how priming influences
some feature of the primed construct that isstored in conceptual or semantic memory(i.e., the arrangement of its component parts
or its excitation level). In contrast, this memory for primes model involves assumptions
about the acquisition, retention, and retrievalof traces of the priming events themselves in
episodic memory (see Tulving, 1972; Wickelgren, 1973).
The results of the present study, however,
do not support this alternative type of model.
The critical assumption underlying this explanation is that the more primes of a construct that are recalled, the more likely it isthat the construct will be used to categorize
the stimulus. And, following this assumption,
one would expect that the stimulus would
tend to be categorized in terms of whicheverconstruct had more of its primes recalled.
But more primes were recalled for the frequent construct than for the recent construct
after both the long delay and the brief delay.
Based on that finding, the memory for primes
model should predict that the frequent construct would predominate (i.e., would be used
to categorize the stimulus) after both delay
periods. More generally, there was no evidence
in our study for any relation between memory
for primes and categorization of the stimulus.
Thus, just as recency and frequency effects
in impression formation are independent ofmemory for the specific traits contained in
the original stimulus list (see Anderson &Hubert, 1963; Dreben, Fiske, & Hastie, 1979),
the effects of recent and frequent priming on
categorization appear to be independent ofmemory for the priming events themselves.
Indeed, as described earlier, the size of therecency-frequency reversal over time was increased considerably when the data of subjects
who recalled one or more primes were excluded from the analysis. This suggests thatrecall of the primes in episodic memory, if
anything, interfered with the effects of priming
the competing constructs in conceptual
memory.
The recall results also indicated that memory for the primes was quite poor. Higgins etal. (1977) also found that verbal priming
significantly affected subjects' subsequent categorizations of stimulus descriptions eventhough their recall of the priming words

68

E . T . HIGGINS, J. BARGH, AND W. LOMBARDI

themselves was relatively low. Bargh and Pie- stimulus presentation, which is longer thantromonaco (1982), in fact, obtained priming our long-delay condition, where the predomeffects on categorization even though their inance of the frequent construct over the
subjects were never aware of the presence of recent construct was found. Given the highthe priming words, much less had any mem- priming frequency used in SruU and Wyer's
ory of them. This phenomenon can be un- (1979) study (6, 12, 24, and 48 primes), it isderstood in terms of Tulving's (1972) distinc- quite possible that the effect of differenttion between semantic memory, where general priming frequencies on reducing the rate ofconstruct information is stored, and episodic decay (as would be predicted by the synapse
memory, where particular experiences of spe- model) might have been maximal at thiscific events are stored. Priming can increase delay period. After an hour delay, however,
the accessibility of constructs stored in con- the decay function of each priming frequency
ceptual memory, thus increasing the likeli- would likely approach asymptote, whichhood of their utilization in subsequent stim- would reduce the frequency effect. Thus,
ulus processing, without the actual experience given the actual delay periods involved in theof exposure to the prime (i.e., the priming Srull and Wyer (1979) study, the synapse
event itself) being retained in episodic mem- model can account for the decreasing effectory. In fact, it is this property of priming of frequency with increasing delay.
that makes it an especially useful technique
To conclude, the results of the present
for investigating the impact of construct ac- study demonstrate that even though subjects
cessibility on stimulus processing, because it had two competing constructs primed priormakes it possible to manipulate the accessi- to presentation of the same stimulus inforbility of different constructs without the risk mation, different subjects categorized theof producing experimental demand effects. stimulus information differently, depending(see Higgins & Chaires, 1980, for other ar- on which construct was frequently versus
guments against a demand effect interpreta- recently primed and depending on how soontion of priming effects.)
after final priming the stimulus information
Our discussion thus far has focused on appeared. Thus, momentary, and even accihow the results from the present study can dental, contextual factors can have a considbe accounted for by various models. Of erable influence on how people categorize
course, the alternative models proposed must stimulus information.
account for the results of previous studies as
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