Discussion Paper No.437
Impact of the Memory of Kurofune (Black Ships) on the
Course of Industrialization in Early Meiji JapanODANAKA, Naoki

November 2020TOHOKU ECONOMICS RESEARCH GROUPGRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND
MANAGEMENT TOHOKU UNIVERSITY
27-1 KAWAUCHI, AOBA-KU, SENDAI,
980-8576 JAPANImpact of the Memory of Kurofune (Black Ships) on the Course of Industrialization in Early Meiji
Japan

Naoki Odanaka (Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan)

SUMMERY
This paper analyzes the impact and influence of the memory of kurofune (black ships),
iron‐armored battleships of the United States Navy led by Commodore Matthew Perry(1794‐1858) that came to Japan in 1853, exerted over the course of industrialization in early Meiji
Japan, which is the period from the Meiji Restoration (1868) to the Sino‐Japanese war (1894‐5).
Using the comparative advantage theory formalized by David Ricardo (1772‐1823) as an analyticaltool, we consider the arguments of major contemporary Japanese policymakers as the object ofanalysis. We have three conclusions. First, the economic policy adopted by early Meiji
policymakers generally followed the comparative advantage theory. Second, their goal was not the
monoculturization of the comparative advantage goods, but the heavy industrialization necessary
for avoiding the colonization: export of comparative advantage goods was a means to collectmoney for it. Third, they regarded the development of transportation‐related industries asimportant because it would hasten the “movement” of men and goods, which would lead to theincreased wealth and which was symbolized by the kurofune in the collective memory.

*This paper is prepared for the preparatory meeting of the Workshop on “Memory andEconomy,” co‐organized by Stefan Berger and Thomas Fetzer, to be held on 11 December
2020 online.
**This paper is based on the research supported by JSPS KAKENHI (number of grant‐in‐aid
15K02925 and 19K01048).
***Not for citation.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the impact and influence of the memory of kurofune (black ships),
iron‐armored battleships of the United States Navy led by Commodore Matthew Perry(1794‐1858) that came to Japan in 1853, exerted over the course of industrialization in early Meiji
Japan, which is the period from the Meiji Restoration (1868) to the Sino‐Japanese war (1894‐5),
using the comparative advantage theory formalized by David Ricardo (1772‐1823) as an analytical
tool. I consider the arguments of major contemporary Japanese policymakers as the object ofanalysis.
In order to do that, I have the following questions: Did the early Meiji era Japanese
government adopt this policy when it began to import goods for heavy industry (metallurgy,
machinery, shipbuilding, weapon manufacturing, etc.) as reverse‐engineering models andmanufacturing technologies, and even brought in engineers and scientists (okakae gaikokujin:
hired foreigners), mainly from Europe, to teach at schools and factories? How did policymakers
understand this theory? Did they accept it unaltered from its origins in the UK, or did they modify
it to suit to their own country and situation? What characterized “their” comparative advantage
theory, as understood by those who created and enacted the economic policy, particularly
regarding industry and international trade after the kaikoku (opening the country to the world)
and the Meiji restoration?
To address these questions, this paper is presented as follows: First, I briefly overview theRicardian comparative advantage theory. Second, I provide a brief description of thecharacteristics of early Meiji Japanese economic structure to understand what sectors or goods
had a comparative advantage. Third, I present and analyze the representative arguments of early
Meiji policymakers about the economic policy that Japan needed to adopt then. Fourth, I explore
how these policymakers understood the comparative advantage theory and the Western
civilization that created it, as well as the importance of the memory of kurofune to thisunderstanding.
Thus, I start by briefly presenting the Ricardian comparative advantage theory.1 Although it
might seem strange to explain a famous international trade theory formalized by a famousclassical economist, I begin here because, according to an economist Paul Krugman, it is “a simple
concept,” but “experience shows that it is a surprisingly hard concept to understand (or accept).”2
The main implication of comparative advantage theory is simple: each country (or any kind of
economic unit) could maximize its wealth (or welfare or profit) by specializing in making goods

1

The Ricardian comparative advantage model is explained in most standard international

economics textbooks. See for example Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc J. Melitz,
International Economics (tenth edition, Harlow: Pearson, 2015), chap. 3.
2

Ibid., p.56.

2

that are more efficiently produced (comparative advantage) than others, and export them inexchange for the comparatively disadvantageous ones.
Here, we must address what “comparative advantage” means. Ricardian comparativeadvantage refers to the relative production efficiency of one good compared to others within acountry. Consider the “two countries (A, B) and two goods (m, n)” model, where m is moreproductive than n in A. In this case, m has a comparative advantage to n in A and A should
specialize in producing m.
The theory becomes more complicated when we introduce the trade between A and B. Heretoo the comparative advantage means no more than the higher productivity in each country. Let
us assume that the production cost (measured by person‐hours) of m is 5 in A and 3 in B, whereas
the production cost of n is 8 in A and 2 in B (see Fig.1). In this case, m has comparative advantage
in A and n has that in B. It may seem that B has a comparative advantage to A in the production ofboth goods for they are more efficiently produced there, and that trade seems impractical as mand n produced in A are more costly and thus higher‐priced. That is, however, not what Ricardo
intended.
good

m

n

A

5

8

B

3

2

country

Fig.1 Production costs (person‐hours)
The theory also states that even if one country produces both goods more efficiently thanthe other does, trade and increased wealth remain attainable for both countries. Assuming A has
80 person‐hours for producing m and n, and that A allocates 40 for producing m and 40 for n, A
produces 8 units of m and 5 of n. However, with the same person‐hours, A could specialize in the
production of m and produce 16 units. A could then export 6 units of m to B and import 9 units ofn from B, which rate is because the production of m needs 3 person‐hours per unit and that of n 2
person‐hours, and so the value and price of m is 1.5 times that of n. Thus, A would have 10 unitsof m and 9 of n using the same 80 person‐hours. This means that even a country with lower
productivity than other countries for all goods could still increase its wealth through international
trade.
In sum, comparative advantage theory claims that, in the world of free trade, each country
should specialize in manufacturing their most efficiently produced goods. By exporting them andimporting those with comparative disadvantage, the country could still increase its wealth.
2. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF EARLY MEIJI JAPANI now explore Japan’s economic structure in the early Meiji era to determine whether thecourse of early stage industrialization followed the comparative advantage theory. If the Japanese3government had economic rationality and followed the comparative advantage theory, it would
have adopted an industrial economic policy that encouraged production of comparativeadvantage goods and an international trade policy of exporting those goods and importing
comparative disadvantage ones.
Before the Meiji restoration, in the late Tokugawa period, industrial policy was conducted by
the han (local government). As a natural consequence of the Tokugawa government’s sakoku(national seclusion policy) for almost three centuries, each han encouraged producing goods to be
consumed within its territory; and it promoted producing specialty goods to be sold outside toincrease wealth in han territory. Konosuke Odaka characterized this policy “mercantilist.”3
Many hans tried to encourage the brewing and textile industries at the end of the Tokugawa
4era. When sakoku ended and Japan was forced to engage in international trade, the possible
export goods were mainly the products of these two industries, such as sake (Japanese rice wine),
vinegar, soy sauce, and cotton (yarn and fabric) and silk products (silkworm eggs, yarn, and fabric).
After kaikoku, Japan began primarily exporting silk products in exchange for cotton ones.5
Other countries were interested in silk products, because sake and soy sauce were not popularabroad and many countries could produce vinegar and cotton products domestically. The importof cotton products also reflected the high productivity of the industry in Western countries,
particularly the UK, which had already finished or were undergoing their own industrial
revolutions.
According to Daniel Bernhofen and John Brown, the international trade pattern of early Meiji
Japan followed the comparative advantage theory.6 As previously mentioned, the theory claims
that goods with higher production efficiency rates should be exported and those with lower rates
should be imported. Bernhofen and Brown measured the comparative production efficiency rates
of goods by using their price rising rate after kaikoku (proxy variable of internal‐external

3

Konosuke Odaka, “Josho [Introduction]” (in Japanese, in Yuzo Yamamoto and Konosuke Odaka,eds., Bakumatsu Meiji no Nihon Keizai [Japanese Economy in the late Tokugawa and Meiji eras],Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1988), p.12.
4

Takeshi Abe, “Kinsei Nihon ni okeru Men Orimono Seisandaka [Output of Cotton Fabric in

early‐Modern Japan]” (in Japanese, in Yamamoto and Odaka, eds., Bakumatsu Meiji, op. cit.),p.69.
5

See Abe, “Kinsei Nihon,” op. cit., p.69; Daniel Bernhofen and John Brown, “A Direct Test of the

Theory of Comparative Advantage” (Journal of Political Economy 112‐1, 2004), p.57.
6

Bernhofen and Brown, “A Direct Test,” op. cit., pp.62‐4. See also Tetsuji Okazaki, EisukeTaniyama and Masaki Nakabayashi, “Nihon ni okeru Kyodotai Kankei no Yakuwari [Role ofCommunity Relation in Japan]” (in Japanese, in Yasuyuki Sawada and Tetsushi Sonobe, eds., Shijo
to Keizai Hatten [Market and Economic Development], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2006),
pp.46‐51.

4

comparative price in the autarchy era) and found that goods with higher production efficiency
began to be exported and less production‐efficient ones were imported.7
Introduction of international trade brought an increase in wealth to Japan. The comparativeadvantage theory was, therefore, well‐suited to the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras. According
to Bernhofen and Brown, “at most the gain in real income was 8 to 9 percent of GDP.”8 Kaikoku
enhanced Japan’s economy by making it possible to sell comparative advantage goods to othercountries and to buy comparative disadvantage ones from them.
Policymakers in the early Meiji government were impressed by the impact of international
trade on their economy and on the welfare of the people. They were interested in encouraging
international trade, primarily exporting silk products, and importing cotton ones, above all else.9
The import of investment goods or heavy industry products occurred at a relatively low rate.
According to Bernhofen and Brown, weapons, ammunition, machinery, instruments, and othersaccounted for little more than 15 percent of imports in 1868‐1875, whereas cotton yarn and cloth
added up to more than 30 percent.10 This seems odd considering the post‐restoration era
corresponded with the age of globalizing imperialism, when industrialization and modernization
were regarded as crucial for every developing country to avoid colonization, for which theseproducts were essential.
In the mid‐1870s the situation began to change as two factions emerged among Japanesepolicymakers. They collided over economic policy, particularly industrial and international trade.11
The first faction, which we could call the Nationalist and was represented by Shigenobu Okuma(1838‐1922) and Takayoshi Kido (1833‐1877), adopted an export‐oriented policy that encouraged
the growth of existing sectors, starting with agriculture and textile (especially silk) production, andthe export of their products in exchange for trains, ships, or machinery.12 The second faction,
which could be called the Modernist and gathered around Toshimichi Okubo (1830‐1878), Tomomi
7

Bernhofen and Brown, “A Direct Test,” op. cit., p.63.

8

Daniel Bernhofen and John Brown, “An Empirical Assessment of the Comparative Advantage

Gains from Trade” (American Economic Review 95‐1, 2005), p.210.
9

See Osamu Saito, “Bakumatsu Ishin no Seiji Sanjutsu [Political Arithmetic in the late Tokugawa

and Meiji Restoration eras]” (in Japanese, in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai, ed., Meiji Ishin no Kakushin
to Renzoku [Change and Continuity in Meiji Restoration], Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992).
10Bernhofen and Brown, “A Direct Test,” op. cit., p.57.

11

See Hiromichi Ishizuka, Nihon Shihonshugi Seiritsu Shi Kenkyu [Studies on the History of theEstablishment of Japanese Capitalism] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1973), pp.3‐8,
108‐115, 292.
12

Masaaki Kobayashi stated that Japan could only export products of existing industries because

it did not have customs autonomy in early Meiji era. Masaaki Kobayashi, Nihon no Kogyoka to
Kangyo Haraisage [Japanese Industrialization and “Meiji Privatization”] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Toyo
Keizai Shinposha, 1977), p.72.

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Iwakura (1825‐1883), Hirobumi Ito (1841‐1909), and Masayoshi Matsukata (1835‐1924), adopted
the import substitution economic policy line, which sought to introduce heavy industry
manufacturing technology, to invite Western engineers and professors to Japan and hire them,and to import machinery for reverse‐engineering, in order to develop heavy industry in Japan.13
The confrontation over the economic policies resulted in the so‐called “governmental crisis of
the 14th year of Meiji (1882),” where the Modernist faction led by Ito expelled Okuma and hisallies, that is to say the Nationalist faction, from government. The newly nominated Minister ofFinance, Matsukata, began the radical austerity policy (Matsukata Zaisei) to collect and keep
money for the investment in domestic secondary and tertiary industries, starting with the heavy(particularly locomotive and steamship) and shipping industries.14
3. ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF EARLY MEIJI POLICYMAKERS
Next, I explore the theoretical background of the early Meiji policymakers’ economic policy,
particularly industrialization and international trade. To do so, I must first analyze the previously
mentioned policy discourses of the Nationalist and Modernist factions.
Economic policy in early Meiji Japan was characterized by the slogan “enrich the country andstrengthen the army (fukoku kyohei).”15 According to this view, Japan opened its doors to othercountries in the age of emergent imperialism, and policymakers of the new Meiji government had
to find a way to avoid colonization. Thinking that the key to fukoku kyohei was heavy industry that
produced machinery and weapons necessary for realizing the second purpose (kyohei), theyencouraged the exportation of silk products and certain consumption goods and the importationof machinery, weapons, and related technologies.
This international trade pattern seems to follow the comparative advantage theory, but
policymakers had a different goal for economic policy. Silk products were comparative advantage
goods, whereas machinery and weapons were comparatively disadvantageous in Japan at thattime. According to the theory, specialization in the production of comparative advantage
goods—silk products—should increase the wealth of the nation. Policymakers, however, wanted
to develop the then comparatively disadvantageous heavy industry, to realize not only fukoku but
also kyohei. They encouraged the exportation of silk products to earn the necessary funds to13

According to Hiroshi Nakanishi, policymakers just before and after the Meiji restoration weregenerally ignorant of and indifferent to heavy industry. Hiroshi Nakanishi, Nihon Kindaika no Kiso
Katei [Fundamental Process of Japanese Modernization] (in Japanese, 3 Vols., Tokyo: Tokyo
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982/1983/2003), Vol.1, pp.6, 265, 312.
14

See Mikio Harada, Nihon no Kindaika to Keizai Seisaku [Modernization and Economic Policy inJapan] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1972), p.273.
15

See for example Ishizuka, Nihon Shihonshyugi, op. cit., pp.5‐6; Kanji Ishii, Meiji Ishin Shi [Historyof Meiji Restoration] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Kodansha, 2018, original edition, 1989), p.325; Haruhito
Takeda, Nihon Keizai Shi [Japanese Economic History] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2019), p.131.

6

develop heavy industry and hastened the importation of heavy industry products to use them asmodels for setting up factories in Japan. Exportation of comparative advantage goods was not agoal but a means for them.
The political stance shared by Japanese policymakers can be found in two policy documents:
the Declaration Establishing the Ministry of Industry (Kobusho wo Mokeru no Mune) issued in
1870 and written by the leader of the Nationalist faction, Okuma, and the Proposition of
Establishing the National Exportation Company (Kaigai Chokubai no Kigyo wo Hiraku no Gi)
written in 1876 by the leader of the Modernist faction, Okubo.16 In the former, Okuma said thatthe “world of iron” was spreading in Western countries, where the development of sciences andtechnologies encouraged the production of iron goods, such as trains and ships, which were thefoundation of national wealth and power. In the latter document, Okubo presented the normal
course of development of a national economy: of agriculture, industry, and then commerce.
According to him, economic policy, particularly regarding industrial and international trade, must
agree with this course.
Although the Nationalist and Modernist factions clashed, which resulted in a political purgewith a huge historical impact,17 they shared a purpose and economic theoretical framework:
fukoku kyohei, and comparative advantage theory. Where they disagreed was on the concrete
political line to take. The Nationalists chose import substitution policies to achieve rapid heavy
industrialization, whereas the Modernists chose export‐oriented ones to earn money to invest in
heavy industrialization.18
4. “MOVEMENT” AS A KEY TO MODERNIZATION

16“Kobusho wo Mokuru no Mune,” wholly cited in Hirofumi Yamamoto, “Shoki Shokusan Seisaku

to sono Shusei [Industrial Policy in Early Stage and its Transformation]” (in Japanese, in Yoshio
Ando, ed., Nihon Keizai Seisaku Shi Ron [Studies on the History of Japanese Economic Policy], 2Vols., Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1973, Vol.1), pp.28‐9; “Kaigai Chokubai no Kigyo wo
Hiraku no Gi” (in Masanori Nakamura, Kanji Ishii and Yutaka Kasuga, eds., Keizai Koso [Economic
Ideas] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), pp.40‐4.
17Some of the purged individuals criticized and opposed the government in various ways. For

example, Okuma, the main target of the purge, established a new political party called Rikken
Kaishin To (Constitutional Reformist Party) shortly after the crisis and demanded thereinforcement of local self‐government and the extension of (male) voting right, criticizing thegovernment as despotic and clientelist. He and his party later assisted with the introduction ofparliamentary system in Japan in the 1890s.
18This important point is clearly noted in Minoru Sawai and Masayuki Tanimoto, Nihon Keizai Shi[Japanese Economic History] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2016), p.119.

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In this section, I tackle the remaining question: why did the early Meiji policymakers
emphasize the importance of trains and ships as heavy industry products and that of railway andshipping as tertiary industries?
The Ministry of Industry concentrated its effort and funds on the construction of railroads: inthe early Meiji era, almost half of its budget was used for it, especially for the construction of theTokyo‐Yokohama and Kyoto‐Kobe railroads.19 The government also established public factories tofunction as test sites for new technologies and as a model for private factories. In the 1880s, there
were twice the steamship construction factories than machine manufacturing ones in the public
sector.20
The government also supported the tertiary railroad and shipping industries financially,legally, and administratively: it constructed railroads with public money, lent public land forrailroads to private railway companies for free, sold public ships cheaply to private shipping
companies, granted them a subsidy, and enacted the Shipping and Ship Building Encouragement
Act (1896).21
Early Meiji policymakers regarded trains, ships, their manufacture, and railway and shipping
activities as important because they represented “movement” of men, goods, and information.
For them, “movement” was key to modernizing the nation. They tried to encourage “movement,”
for modernization was a precondition of fukoku kyohei, their main and ultimate objective.
“Movement” was important for policymakers for two reasons. First, it generated wealth.
Consider the case of the so‐called Iwakura mission. In 1871, three years after the Meiji restoration,
the new government sent a mission to the USA and Europe to negotiate the revision of treatiesthat the Tokugawa government had conducted and that were disadvantageous to Japan. The
mission, led by Iwakura as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, comprised
policymakers of the Meiji government, such as Kido, Okubo, and Ito. It lasted almost two years,
but could not succeed in revising the treaties. It was, however, important for the modernization of19

See Ishizuka, Nihon Shihonshyugi, op. cit., pp.108‐111.

20

Hirotake Koyama, Nihon Gunji Kogyo no Shiteki Bunseki [Historical Analysis of Japanese Military

Industry] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1972), pp.102‐8.
21

Mataji Umemura, “Matsukata Defure ka no Kangyo Seisaku [Industrial Policy under theso‐called Matsukata Defration]” (in Japanese, in Mataji Umemura and Takafusa Nakamura, eds.,
Matsukata Zaisei to Syokusan Kogyo Seisaku [Financial Policy by Matsukata as Minister of Financeand Industrial Policy] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1983), pp.239‐240;
Shunsaku Nishikawa and Takeshi Abe, “Gaisetsu [Overview]” (in Japanese, in Id, eds., Sangyoka no
Jidai [The Age of Industrialization], Vol. 1, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), pp.23‐6; Minoru Sawai,“Kikai Kogyo [Machine Industry]” (in Japanese, in Idem.), pp.215‐8; Takafusa Nakamura, “Macro
Keizai to Sengo Keiei [Macro Economy and post‐Sino‐Japanese‐war Economic Policy]” (in Japanese,in Shunsaku Nishikawa and Yuzo Yamamoto, eds., Sangyoka no Jidai, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Vol.
2), pp.24‐6.

8Japan because it allowed policymakers to experience modernized Western society. As theyrealized the overwhelming inequality of wealth and power that existed between Japan andWestern countries, they decided to use them as a goal, translated “modernization” into
“Westernization,” and tried to identify the key to modernization in Western civilization.
According to the official report by the Secretary of Mission Kunitake Kume (1839‐1931),22
members were greatly impressed by the importance of “movement,” both of people encouragedby their sociability, and that of goods realized by international trad. Western people were sociable
and enjoyed going out and meeting friends, talking with neighbors, and so on, whereas theJapanese preferred to stay at home. This sociability meant that people frequently gathered inpublic spaces, exchanged information, broadened their knowledge, and had more opportunities
to acquire wealth. Second, Western people regarded international trade as an essential economic
activity. Even farmers and artisans were interested in it, unlike in Japan. Eastern and Southerncountries provided raw materials to Western ones, which processed them and sold the products
back for high profits.
Another reason why early Meiji policymakers thought that “movement” was crucial for
fukoku kyohei was due to the memory of kurofune when they came to Japan. People describedkurofune as “flying birds,”23 and in the late Tokugawa era, they would have been even more
impressive compared to Japanese ships, which were generally small, wooden vessels. They were
the symbol of the power of civilization and modernization, for they made “movement” more rapid
and easier.24
The impact of this memory of kurofune on the importance of “movement” for modernization
was clearly expressed by Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835‐1901), a Meiji intellectual who wrote many
bestseller books that introduced Western civilization to a previously isolated Japanese audienceand became the most influential ideologue of modernization in the Meiji era.25 Fukuzawa realizedthat they were in the age of “movement” when international trade brought the “movement” ofgoods and the increase in wealth, and when humans could make progress by physically moving tointeract with other people.26
22

Kunitake Kume, Tokumei Zenken Taishi Beio Kairan Jikki [Real Record of Visit to America andEurope by the Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleniotentiary] (in Japanese, 5 Vols., Tokyo: Iwanami
Shoten, 1977‐82, originally published in 1878). See Vol.1, pp.82, 100, 360, Vol.2, 253‐4, Vol.3, 298.
23

Yuzo Kato, Kurofune Ihen [Black Ships Incident] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988),

p.2.
24

Idem., pp.51, 116.

25

For more on his life and thought in general, see for example Albert Craig, Civilization andEnlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Alain MacFarlane, Secrets of theModern World: Yukichi Fukuzawa (Milton Keynes, the UK: Nimble Books, 2011).
26

Id., “Boeki Rikkoku Ron [Building Country by International Trade]” (in Japanese, in Nakamura,

Ishii and Kasuga, eds., Keizai Koso, op. cit., originally published in 1884), pp.257‐9; Id., “Hi Naichi

9According to him, the Tokugawa government decided to open the country, aware of thepresence of and afraid of the power of kurofune, which was itself an innovation of thetransportation manufacturing industry. 27 The memory of kurofune asserted that Western
progress was above all else the result of the development of the transportation andtransportation manufacturing industries.28
In sum, the collective memory of kurofune convinced policy holders that “movement” of men,goods, or information was crucial to modernization and to fukoku kyohei, and thus contributed tothe encouragement of transportation‐related industries.
5. CONCLUSION
After examining the economic structure of late Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan, especiallyregarding industry and international trade, their comprehension of the comparative advantage
theory, and the impact of their memory of kurofune on their policies, we can see that bothfactions of early Meiji policymakers shared the belief that economic policy based on thecomparative advantage theory was an effective tool for their ultimate purpose, fukoku kyohei. The
theory claims that the production of comparative advantage goods by each country would resultin monoculturization, international trade and division of labor, and each nation’s increased wealth.
However, they realized that the adoption of economic policy wholly based on comparativeadvantage theory would lead Japan to the monoculture of silk goods and would contribute to
fukoku (enriching the country), but not kyohei (strengthening the army), for the latter needed
heavy industrialization, especially in the age of imperialism.
Heavy industrialization, however, was a difficult task. New technologies were necessary totransform the economic structure, but the Japanese heavy industry, especially the machineindustry, did not expand in the early Meiji era. This phenomenon hastened the importation ofZakkyo Ron ni tsuite [On the non‐mixed residence between the Japanese and Foreigners]” (inJapanese, in Idem., originally published in 1893), pp.375‐7.
27

Yukichi Fukuzawa, “Naichi Ryoko Nishi Sensei no Ron wo Bakusu [Criticism of Mr. Nishi’s

Argument on Inner Trip by Foreigners]” (in Japanese, in Id., Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu [Complete
Works], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Vol. 19, 1962, originally published in 1875), p.543; Id., Fukuo
Jiden [Autobiography] (in Japanese, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978, originally published in 1899),
pp.31, 64.
28

Id., “Datsua Ron [On Exiting from Asia]” (in Japanese, in Fukuzawa Yukichi Chosakushu[Selective Works], Tokyo: Keio Daigaku Shuppankai, Vol. 8, 2003, originally published in 1885),
pp.260‐2; Id., “Hi Naichi Zakkyo Ron ni tsuite,” op. cit., pp.370‐1.

10capital goods, which in turn hindered technological expansion.29 Japanese heavy industry was
about to enter this vicious cycle.
It was aided by the recovery of customs autonomy in 1899. The government could use thecustoms policy to modify relative prices and, thus, the comparative advantage of goods. Customs
on certain foods (sugar, flour), paper, woolen cloth, and machines rose gradually and functioned
as a major protective policy. 30 Their comparative advantage, including that of machines,
increased artificially.
After the Sino–Japanese War (1894‐1895), the Japanese government began an industrial
policy that encouraged iron, ship building, and shipping industries. This is said to be the result of
the war,31 but I suggest that it also resulted from the interest of policymakers in “movement,” as a
product of the memory of kurofune.

29

Takamasa Ichikawa, “Yunyu Daitai Kogyoka no Katei to sono Ninaite [Process and Carriers of theIndustrialization of Import Substitution Type]” (in Japanese, in Yamamoto and Odaka, eds.,
Bakumatsu Meiji, op. cit.), pp.235‐6.
30

Hideaki Miyajima, Sangyo Seisaku to Kigyo Touchi no Keizai Shi [Economic History of industrial

Policy and Company Governance] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2004), pp.28‐30.
31

Ibid., p.33.

11