社会技術研究論文集

Vol.2, 78-88, Oct. 2004

国際コンフリクトマネジメントの支援手法論：
トゥンヒンブン水力発電プロジェクトの調査事例を通して
BUILDING AN ANALYTICAL TOOL FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: A CASE STUDY OF THEUN-HINBOUNHYDROPOWER PROJECT
Akio YONEZAWA1 and Masahide HORITA2
1M.Eng., Tohoku Regional Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Government of Japan.

（E-mail: yonezawa-a82ab@pa.thr.mlit.go.jp）
2Ph.D., Assoc. Professor, Dept. of Civil Engineering, University of Tokyo. (E-mail: horita@ken-mgt.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp)

Part-time Researcher, RISTEX Mission Program.
Development projects often cause conflicts. For supporting negotiation during conflict situations, this researchhas built a model that can provide a mediator with information about stakeholders’ perception of the situation andother stakeholders. Also, the model’s feasibility has been tested in a real conflict case.
In the case study, the model has successfully been used to clarify the overall situation of the conflict by argument
trees and a table of decision making. Subsequently, it has found a crucial misperception which made stakeholders
adhere to their decision by analyzing their preferences and strategies. It has been demonstrated that the model can
provide helpful information for a mediator to move negotiation forward.

Keywords： conflict management, development, hypergame analysis, argumentation.

efforts, this paper turns to potential contribution fromsemi-formal approach to management science. We argue thatsome of the methods traditionally used for structuring
ill-defected (or “wicked”) problems can be applied to conflict
management for mediators of development projects. The
objective of this study is twofold: to build a model of conflict
under possible misperception for mediators; and to implement
the model and test its feasibility based on a retrospective case ofan actual development project.

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background and objective
Conflict management has recently been the focus ofattention throughout the development community1). As withany domain of social activities development projects often
become the subject of conflict at every level, while at the sametime it could work as absorbent or even solution to alarger-scale interstate conflict2)3).
This is primarily because development projects often cause
large social impacts on all those concerned, positive andnegative. In simple terms, to decide who gets what and how
exposes or creates substantial conflict of interest among
different social groups. Sometimes it is about involuntary
resettlement caused by the infrastructure development, anotherabout how to share water resources flowing from one country
to another.
These conflicts arising from development projects needmanaging pragmatically, analytically, and methodologically.
Though there is a long history of conflict management indevelopment, which has produced much practiced guidelines
on stakeholder relations and alternative dispute resolution,
newer approaches are also arising. Among such on-going

1.2. Conflict over development projects
Though it is beyond the scope of the present paper topropose a comprehensive picture of what essentiallycharacterizes conflicts over development projects, it is useful tohighlight some illustrative features of interplays among
principal actors of this domain. In most cases of development
projects, prominent actors include governments, internationalorganizations, investors, project implementation contractors,
local representatives/residents, and non governmentalorganizations. The precise form of actor constitution varies
among the cases - they sometimes play multiple roles, or
certain roles may remain to be filled. Some actors are
inherently in conflict with each other. The dichotomy between

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achieving this objective.

developmentalists and environmentalists is a classic example ofsuch role conflicts. Those actors placed in an opposite end of
this scale will evaluate the same consequences that materialize
from a development project completely differently.
More often than not, these actors have an incentive toresolve the conflicts for political, managerial or organizational
reasons. The project owner would like the project to be
implemented swiftly without too much controversy. Local
residents might also seek for an agreement because they would
otherwise need to bear huge social cost as a result of theconfrontation with more powerful actors.
At the same time, there are many reasons why theseconflicts cannot be easily resolved. Even when all parties agree
that they would be better off with an agreement, lack of trust or
confidence can hider them from cooperating towards resolution.
Some rational choice theorists call this ‘trust dilemma4)’, which
has also empirical support in a number of development related
conflicts.
The basic position of this study is that such ‘views’ – i.e.,
how each actor views others – have a significant impact on theway conflict develops. Knowledge about other actors isimportant in understanding the structure of a conflict, such as
who they are and what they want. This may even be more
important in some cases than the materialistic aspect of the
project, such as what physical impact the project produces on
the environment, how much income it would generate, etc.
Since actors cannot always see what physical force theircounterparts actually have, their actions are formed through aperceived image of the others though existence of substantive
evidence also plays a crucial role in forming their perception.
It is not only each actor’s perception of others, but theirdifferences that matter. In conflict situations, there are gaps
among stakeholders’ perception which could prevent
agreement or concession. Providing information about how
stakeholders perceive the situation and what difference, if any,
there is among their perceptions are useful for promoting
negotiation and managing the conflict.
However, it is generally difficult for actors in conflict tofind their perceptual gaps by themselves because themisperception is the very product that each actor wants todeliver for the others. There is also a heuristic problem that
actors tend to believe their perceptions of others are correct.
Under these circumstances, potentially useful clues forresolution may be overlooked or buried under large amount of
dis-contextualized information. Perhaps as a first step t is useful
to organize such information that helps the actors make senseof what they are observing and check the consistency with theirviews of the conflict. Below we propose a methodology for2. MODELANALYSISBUILDING

FOR

CONFLICT

2.1. Overview of the model
Many development projects cause significant social andphysical impacts. This often coincides with a large number ofaffected people and inter-connected issues. The complexity ofthe problem then implies conflicting views of the conflict5),with seemingly relevant information pointing to different
interpretations. In such situations, one can very easily become
unassured about what version of the story they should believe
in. It is even more difficult to be focused about what particularissues they need to resolve with others. In building our model,
we have made explicit a pre-requisite that such muddled viewsof the conflict should be incorporated.
First, a model has been devised to clarify what issues arein conflict and how stakeholders view them. In order to identify
these issues comprehensively in the whole context of a project,‘argument trees’ are created. This is broadly an offspring ofargumentation theory originally developed by Toulmin6). Thisoriginal model by Toulmin divides and hierarchizes anargument into nodes and links, which correspond to a subset ofstakeholders’ statements and their relations, respectively.
Argument trees can dialectically show the rationale behind the
project justification by schematically showing what eachstakeholder claims. Information to be included in the tree could
come from any kind of data source. The collected informationis then stored in a database and extracted when users need it. To
highlight the relationship between each actor’s argument andtheir actual decision, the argument tree can be complemented
with a table of decision-making history.
Based on the information structured in the argument tree
and decision table, the model next provides a way to compare
differences in the views held by each actor. A schematic table isdesigned to visualize how, for example, Actor A’s view ofActor B’s thinking seems to differ from what actually is B’s
thinking. Finally, these misperceptions are incorporated into agame theoretic model of strategic actions. Through thisstrategic analysis, it becomes possible to reason whatconsequence these misperceptions would produce or haveproduced. An illustration of the model is described in Section 3.
2.2. Proposed scheme for implementation
A proposed cycle for implementation of the model isshown in Fig.1. In setting out the context for implementation,

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displayed in a table of decision making. Mediators canunderstand the flow of the project, even if they themselves had
not been involved in the project from the outset. Mediators can
extract one or more issues which need to be elaborated. As isdemonstrated in the case study below, one can see how eachissue is related to others and how they can be argued from eachside. This view of the conflict helps mediators decide the scopeof analysis.

we consider the possibility (not necessity) that a mediator ofconflicts uses the proposed methodology. A primary task of
mediators is to structure the problem from an independent view
point and to see if there is any room for negotiation for joint
benefit. In this sense, the model is designed to be used by amediator for demonstrating the rationality of mediator’s
proposed solution.

Negotiation(2) Phase 2: analyzing stakeholders’ decision
making in a specific issue
In the second phase, those issues selected in Phase 1 areanalyzed using tables of perception and preference, as well as agame theoretic model. Perception in this framework is broadly
defined how each actor views other actors’ reasoning andpreference. Preference is defined as a completely or
incompletely ordered set of possible outcomes of conflict. By
comparing each actor’s perception in a tableau format,
mediators can find gaps among each stakeholder’s perceptionof preference. Mediators can investigate which perceptual gapsof preferences need a careful examination.
The effects of these perceptual gaps are formally evaluatedusing hypergame analysis7)8). Hypergame analysis can reveal
what are the fundamental causes of the conflict and whatconsequence arises from a possible amendment to a certain
actor’s misperception9)10)11). Mediators may then utilize thisresult in deciding what message they should provide for eachactor to inform them of the structure of the conflict.

Implement the model
Deadlock
Mediation• The model provides
information for a mediator• A mediator uses information
effectively

Agreement/Concession
Cooperation
Fig. 1 Implementation cycle of the modelMore specifically, the model highlights those elements ofconflict including, i) interrelationship and dependency amongissues, ii) perception and possible misperception of eachstakeholder, and, most importantly, iii) the structure that makes
the conflict deadlocked.
2.3. Model Building
The procedure by which users or mediators collect andanalyze data is divided into two phases (Fig.2).

3. CASE STUDY

Information source

Database

Argument Tree

Phase 1

Table of Decision Making

Table of Perception and PreferenceThis section reports on a case study where the methodology
was applied to a retrospective analysis of a real development
project that displayed conflict of interest, We use this case toillustrate a possible implementation process assuming there
was a mediator in the case.

Phase 23.1. Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project
The project, a transbasin run-of-river plant of 210MW
diverts water from the Nam Theun River, a major tributary of
the Mekong River in central Lao PDR, to the Nam Hai River, atributary of the Nam Hinboun River which also flows to the
Mekong downstream of the Nam Theun12).
The main objective of Then-Hinboun hydropower project(THHP) is to support economic growth in Lao PDR byenhancing foreign exchange earnings through export of electric
power to Thailand. The Government of Lao PDR (GOL)
requested ADB assistance in early 1993 to act as the lead

Game Analysis

Fig. 2 Design of the model(1) Phase 1: structuring an overall process of a
project
The first phase of model building is to create an argumenttree that captures the whole project. By constructing anargument tree, the history of stakeholders’ decision making is80

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coordinating agency and provide financial and legal advice. A
company named Project Company A (PCA), incorporated
under the foreign investment law of the Lao PDR, was to be
the owner of the project.
During construction, ADB and GOL were alerted byNGOs to potentially significant impacts becoming apparent atseveral project sites, and particularly downstream in the Nam
Hai and Nam Hinboun rivers, which would receive thediverted waters. Subsequent review missions of ADB notedthat inadequate measures were being taken to address socialand environmental impacts.
Main stakeholders which can make a decision by their own
insistence in THHP are PCA, GOL, ADB, local people, andNGOs. Of these stakeholders, those who have frequently
communicated with each other are PCA, ADB, and one ofNGOs. Therefore, these three stakeholders, “PCA”, “ADB”,
and “NGO” are defined as the main actors in the following
analysis.

Vol.2, 78-88, Oct. 2004

1,3,There is no forum for local people
2,3,Public debates are needed
3,3,Villagers have little information
4,2, People have to be informed about the process
10,2, The NGO is questioning PCA credibility
24,2, PCA has neglected raised issues
6,3, Public input mechanism should be developed
8,3, ADB and PCA must provide information for the world
11,2, ADB welcomes public input
12,1, PCA disagrees with public input
13,1, PCA requested ADB to provide a shortlist of consultants for the
study of downstream
15,1, PCA is having

an open house for NGOs

16,1, PCA permits ADB's comments on the TOR for securing transparency
17,1, PCA thinks TORs need to be reviewed independently
20,3, Affected local people and NGOs should participate in the studies
23,2, PCA accepts TOR commented by ADB and suitable consultants
35,3, ADB can exert pressure on PCA more
27,2, ADB & NGO deserve to get information
34,3, ADB efforts persuade PCA to open TOR
38,3, The NGO still urges ADB to publicize TORs for suitable
candidates of the downstream release study
40,3, ADB indicated the process of mitigation will be confidential
41,3, The TOR should be available for public comments

3.2. Implementation of the model

45,2, PCA shares the TOR

with ADB and qualified consultants

provided by ADB(1) Database on the case study
A database was built based on data collected from allavailable information sources. Of those sources, lettersexchanged between the three stakeholders and interviews tothem provided core information for the analysis.

44,2, ADB does not provide short-lists of consultants
46,2, PCA is well staffed, so public input is not needed

47,2, PCA is well staffed, so public input is not needed
48,3, The NGO requests TORs copies and a list of consultants forthe study
49,3, TOR should be open, because PCA tries to escape from its
commitment about releases(2) Phase 1: Argument tree on the case study

50,1, PCA is serious concerning transparency

Through building an argument tree on this project, such
issues as compensation, minimum downstream releases, andinformation sharing were found prominent. An example of anargument tree, which concerns the issue of information sharing,is shown in Fig.3. The relationship between these tree issues isshown in Fig.4.
In the argument tree, summary of stakeholders’ statements
about the issue is shown. Each item is added under its parent
when the new item can be interpreted a response to the existingstatement. Unidirectional arrows (→) designate that the childstatement support or substantiate its parent statements.
Bidirectional arrows (↔) designate that the child statements
challenge or refute its parent. If a child statement falls intoneither of these two categories, a single line (―) is used torepresent the connection. In a box of a statement, the firstnumber corresponds to its ID and the second number
represents who made that statement. In this example, the IDs
and of the stakeholders are 1: (PCA), 2: (ADB) and 3: (NGO),
respectively.

52,2, ADB does not have the final say about whether public input
is allowed or not

14,1, PCA is not prepared to provide the directors' names
21,3, PCA should make board members public
29,2, PCA has refused ADB’s and the NGO’s requests for naming the PCA
Board Members
33,1, Members of the board cannot be made public without permission ofindividuals under Lao law
37,3, ADB should give the NGO a consultant's review and names
53,3, Establishment of monitoring system is only way to the current deadlock
54,2, There is no need for an independent panel

9,3, ADB has constraints working with GOL & PCA
18,2, ADB supports requests on transparency and puts pressure on PCA
19,2, PCA and GOL will provide information by ADB's pressure
22,2, ADB shares the NGO's views on transparency
25,2, ADB & GOL will lose their reputation
30,2, ADB thanks the NGO for raising peple's awareness on critical issues
31,2, ADB is increasing GOL's awareness of issues

Fig. 3 An argument tree about the issue of information sharing81Vol.2, 78-88, Oct. 2004

社会技術研究論文集

implementation procedure and criteria of evaluation.
Argument over compensation

Argument over minimum releases
1,3, T he poor EIA was rece ived to pu sh the proj ect for ward

1,3, LG co ndemn s peo ple's r es our ce s with ou t co mpen sation
2,3, $1m isn't en ou gh

2, 2, The poo r EIA was tur ne d down

(3) Phase 1: Table of decision making on the casestudy

3, 1, The d am has lim ite d impact

4, 1, EIA s ays c om pe nsation isn 't ne eded

4, 1, EI A was po or, but the pro je ct sho uld be pr oce eded

5, 1, $1m is for c an al

5,2, Rese ttlem ent is n eeded 'c os ero sion in th e headpond

6,3, ADB & THP C do n't ac knowledge negative im pacts

13,2, Not dam, no t r es ettleme nt

7,3, T her e are affec ted people, but no plan for co mpe ns atio n

15,3, T her e are m ain ly 4 e nvir on me ntal problems

8,3, T he budget isn't us ed pro per ly.

18, 1,T he re is n eithe r er os io n nor e vacuation

22,2, Co mpens at io n payme nts have been genero us22, 3, Upstr eam peo ple ne ed a n ew ne t and lost their gardens

23,2, Co mpens atio n is prior to the proj ec t impleme ntation

A table of decision making by each stakeholder has beencreated based on the argument tree (Table 1). The table shows
how stakeholders have changed their positions over the time.
For example, the NGO’s criticism of the project had an
impact on PCA and ADB’s stands. PCA and ADB had not
explicitly acknowledged negative impacts on the project area at
first, but they did so in response to the NGO’s criticism. This
caused the project a big move to dealing with environmental
and social problems. However, the NGO was still not satisfied
with the pace of progress PCA made. NGO then requested
PCA and ADB to provide terms of reference (TOR) about their
mitigation and compensation plan (MCP), and names of theconsultants and PCA board members. Although not all
decisions of stakeholders are listed, an important sequence of
events and decision makings such as this one can be foundfrom the table. It is also possible to see what move produced
what consequences.

9,1, T HPC has no obligatio n on com p
7,1, T he ne w EIA s ays fishe ry damage will occ ur wit hou t min im um flow

10,3, T HPC says no r es ettle ment is ne eded, but it's nee de d21,3, Do wns tream level is do wn, he adpond are r ais ed

11, 3, Some villagers must move

23,1, Nam Hai is mitigated by a c anal fro m he adpo nd

13, 2, It's re lo cation, not res ettlement.

8,3, Criticisms have little im pact
14, 1, N o finan cial co mpe ns at ion fo r fish er y shouldn't be don e

9,3, ADB does no thing

becaus e o f no base lin es

10,2, ADB pro mis es to r eview comp reh en sively

15,3, Dire ct fin an cial compens ation is needed

11,3, NGO is pleas ed
19, 2, Bankers h ave a differen t view, Lao 's suc ce ss fu l en try

16,1, T HPC agrees to direct compens ation
17,1, Compensatio n s ho uld be in commo dity

20, 3, I RN adm its L ao's s itu ation, but the harm is n't pe rmitted

18,2, Compe nsation for gar den s h as started

26, 3, Inves to rs are impo rtan t for ADB
32, 3, TH HP is in violatio n of ADB guideline

19,3, Com pe nsation for all losse s sh ould be pro vided
20,3,

TH PC

s ho uld

makepublicreport andco nsu ltan t for s ho win g a pr ope r sur ve y
6, 2, NORAD conc ede d th er e is vesting intere st on No rcons ult

24, 2, ADB c on ce des the pr oj ect affec ts on both25, 1, Who le bas in should be c os ider ed
27, 2,ADB e xpanded impac ted area
28, 1,T HPC re cogn iz ed whole bas in
29,3,D elayed pro cess of TH PC
30,1, THP C m onitors bank e cosyste m on 3 basins
31,3, TH PC wants to renege 5 cume cs com mitment , ‘c os th ey
don ’t expen d additional funds on compens ation
34,1, TH PC is under no obligatio n for chan ging m inimu m release
37,2, TH PC is s till committe d to c arry ou t 5cu mec
39, 3, ADB pe rs uades THP C to de dicate incom e41, 1, THP C un changed its policy an d un der take the s urvey
38,2, T HPC agr eed t o dedicates income t o en viro nm en tal caus es
40,3, Stu dies for m in imum r eleas e sh ould be ope n
35,1, ADB does n't be lie ve TH PC's quick o per atio n
36,1, MCP sc hedu le is not r ealis tic

20,3,PCA should make reports and consultants
public for showing a proper survey
40,3, Studies for minimum downstream releases should be open
Argument over information sharing
and monitoring mechanism
1, 3,T he re is no for um for loc al pe ople
2, 3,P ublic debates are n ee de d3, 3,Villagers h ave little in fo rmation
4,2, P eople have to be infor med abo ut the proce ss
10,2, T he NGO is qu es tioning PCA cr edibility
24,2, P CA h as n eglec ted raise d is sues
6, 3, Public input mechanism should be developed
8, 3, ADB an d P CA mus t pr ovide infor mation fo r th e wor ld
11,2, ADB welcom es pu blic inpu t
12, 1, T HP C disagree s with public input
13,1, P CA r equ es ted ADB to provide a sho rtlist of c on sultants for thes tudy o f do wnst ream
15, 1, P CA is h aving

an o pen ho use for NGOs

16, 1, P CA per mits ADB's c om men ts o n the T OR for s ec uring t ranspar en cy
17, 1, PCA thinks T ORs n eed to be revie wed in depe ndently
20, 3, Affecte d local pe op le and NGOs s ho uld participate in t he stu die s23, 2, P CA acce pts T OR co mme nted by ADB an d su itable cons ultants
35,3, ADB can e xer t pre ss ur e on PCA m ore
27, 2, ADB & NG O dese rve to get inform ation
34,3, ADB e ffo rts pers uade PCA to open T OR
38,3, T he NGO still urge s AD B to public iz e TO Rs for s uitable
can didates of the downstr eam release s tudy
40,3, ADB indicate d the p ro cess of mitigation will be co nfiden tial

Table 1 A table of decision making on the case study

41,3, T he T OR sh ould be available for public comm ents
45, 2, P CA s hare s the T OR

with ADB an d qualified c ons ultants

p rovided by ADB
44,2, AD B do es not pr ovide sh or t-lists o f cons ultan ts
46, 2, PCA is well staffed , s o public input is n ot ne ede dFig. 4 Dependency of the issues

PCA

ADB

Provided the poor first
EIA

The NGO
Insisted that there
negative impacts

Month,Yearare

Approved the project by
ADB Board

The information collected can be represented in the form ofinter-connected argument trees (see Fig.4). By investigating thestatements of those three issues illustrated in Fig.4, the relation
among the different issues can be pointed out. Focusing on
NGO’s point of view, each statement defined in the argumenttree over compensation and that over minimum release aremostly criticized over the information sharing (e.g. PCA shouldmake reports and consultants public for showing a proper
survey; studies for minimum downstream release should beopen, etc.). Therefore, it could be implied that these two issues
are strongly related to the issue about information sharing andmonitoring mechanism. For instance, NGO had criticized the
project specifically over direct compensation and minimum
downstream releases, by claiming the extent of adverse effects
on local people and the environment. Later, the NGO wasfound to criticize the project over the issue of procedures andcriteria on information provision. It is clear in the argument
trees that every environmental and social problems raised by
the NGO are linked to information sharing and establishmentof independent monitoring mechanism. A mediator, if there
was, could have seen that the NGO had doubts about PCA’s
implementation and thus demanded transparency inInsisted that there is no
negative impacts
Ignored criticisms andproceeded the projectFeb,1995
Approved the second EIA
Ignored criticisms andproceeded the project

1995
Apr,1996
Reported
environmental
impacts by a report basedon a fieldwork

Conceded expansion of
impacted area
Implemented
themitigationplans
oncautious process
Insisted that PCA cannot
compensate because of nobaseline
Insisted on no obligation
for minimum change andcompensation
Disagreed public input
and provision of board
members
Insisted on providing
compensation by rice
Permitted
ADB’scomments on the TOR
Refused provision ofboard members becauseof Lao law

1993
Nov,1994

Acknowledged expansionof impacted area

Apr,1998
Aug,1998
1999

Welcomed public input

Complained PCA’s delayed
process for mitigationSep,2000

Insisted on development ofpublic input mechanism

May,2001

Requested names of PCA
board members

Jul,2001
Jul,2001

Put pressure on GOL

Aug,2001

Followed the PCA aboutprovision of PCA board
members

Aug,2001
Insisted that compensation
should be financially for all
lossesContinued requesting public
input
Requested establishment of
independent
monitoringmechanism

Refusedtoprepareshort-lists of consultantsand establishment ofmonitoring mechanism

Oct,2001
Oct,2001
Oct,2001

Nov,2001

In Fig.4, it can be shown that every issue is ultimately linked tothe issue of transparency, which suggests the possibility that82

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already had adequate expertise in-house and, if PCA allowed
the public input, efficiency of the study would be sacrificed. On
the other hand, PCA did not want to refuse the request, because
PCA was concerned about the pressure from GOL and ADB.
PCA was partly owned by GOL and GOL was a publiccompany in Lao PDR. That is how ADB could impose an
influence on PCA via GOL. What actually happened is that
PCA ended up sharing the TOR only with ADB, which meansthat PCA need not directly take the NGO’s advice on the TOR.
PCA tried to secure transparency and make the NGO trust PCA
by involving ADB in the TOR process. PCA requested ADB
for cooperation, particularly by providing consultants for the
study and its audit. However, ADB did not agree with theprovision of consultants. The action ADB took is to transfer the
PCA’s answer to the NGO again. The NGO requested
allowance for public input again as they were not satisfied withthe answer from ADB and PCA. It did not seem that the actors
would compromise with each other. The situation was
deadlocked.

transparency is the most important issue in this project. Then, adetailed analysis of decision making on the transparency issue
was made as shown in Table 2. There are four issues overwhich each actor disagreed. Each stakeholder’s position or
claim about the issue is shown in the same row.
In the issues on transparency, there was a much disputed
topic as to whether public should provide input on TOR for theminimum downstream releases. The NGO had insisted on
public input on TORs for studies of MCP, but PCA had refused
this request. This is because TORs were strongly related to how
PCA implemented MCP, which also contained highly technicaldimensions. ADB was naturally concerned with
implementation of MCP because ADB was responsible forcompleting their projects without negative impacts on local
people and environment. Also, MCP was an essential device
for supporting local people’s lives, which was a concerned
topic for the NGO as they had alerted that the project would
affect local people and environment. That is why the issue on
public input on the TOR was a key topic for all the three actors.
In Phase 2, the issue of “public input on TOR for the studyof minimum downstream releases” was analyzed as a detailed
case analysis of issues.

transfer

PCA

requestADB

transfershare TOR onlywith ADBNGO

Table 2 Positions of stakeholders on transparency issues
Fig. 5 Diagram of the conflict situation
PCA

ADB

The NGO

Issue in Conflict

Requested to allow for
Share the TOR onlywith ADB

Agreed with the NGO

public input for TOR

Public input on TOR for

and transferred thefor a study of thestudy of minimum

request to PCA

minimum downstream

downstream releases

This story of the specific topic, focusing on the actors’
positions, was mainly established by studying letters
reciprocated among the actors and by interviewing
stakeholders. Also, information was available through web sites
and newspaper articles. It is worth noting that even if there wasalready sufficient amount of information for establishing thestructure, it is generally difficult to do so without amethodological representation of data. At this state, it has
become apparent how the actors saw each other, and what were
the possible causes of lack of trust, such as misunderstanding,and difference in value. This is made possible at Phase 2 of theanalysis.

releases
Replied that PCA is not

Agreed with the NGO

allowed to meet theand transferred therequest under Lao law

request to PCA

Requested names,
positions andProvision of names ofnationalities of PCA

PCA board members

board members
Requested two

Not made the reports
publicRequested both reports

consultants’ reports
about criteria of the wayof compensation

RefusedSharing of reports about
the way ofcompensation

Requested ADB to

Establishment of

establish independent

independent monitoring

monitoring mechanism

mechanism(4) Detailed analysis of the TOR issue
The relationship between the three actors regarding the
TOR issue can be represented as shown in Fig.5. The three
actors were in a deadlocked situation by sticking to their own
position. The NGO requested ADB to let PCA allow public
input on the TOR for the study of minimum downstream
releases. ADB thought the organization that had the capability
to allow public input on the TOR is not ADB but PCA. This
made ADB transfer the NGO’s request to PCA. PCA did notwant third parties’ input on the TOR, because they felt that they(5)

Phase 2: Analysis
preferencesofperceptions

andEach actor’s perception and preference was interpretively
analyzed and represented in tables of perception and preference(Table 3,4,5). All collected information of stakeholders’perceptions regarding the corresponding topic was enumerated
in the tables.
Definition of the item on the table is as follows: PX is Actor
X’s true preference (as perceived by the analyst); PYX is Actor

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社会技術研究論文集

Y’s preference perceived by X; PXYX is Actor X’s perception
about how actor Y perceives actor X, and so on.
Though an analysis up to the third level (i.e. PXYX) would
have been of academic interest, in this particular case, we foundno grounds that misperceptions at this level had an impact on
the outcome. Therefore, most of the boxes of perception at thethird level are blank. Some issues were selected for a detailed
analysis using hypergame theory at the first and second levelsof perception (PX and PYX).

Options of each actor are as follows:(6) Phase 2: Game analysis on the case study
Game trees were constructed based on the tables ofperception and preference (Table 3,4,5) and prepared for eachactor. Game trees represent possible strategic interactions basedon perceived preferences. This means that each actor owns aseparate and possibly different game tree as a representation of
their perceptions. Elements of differences can include options
and preferences of the actors and these can be updated as theactors obtain new information. In each game tree, anequilibrium can be calculated based on what option the ownerof the game tree decides to take. This yields to a combination of
option-taking by each actor – a state that actually materializes
under misperception. This is also called the ‘moment of truth.’
Not all misperceptions are necessarily important. What is ofsignificance is those misperceptions without which ‘themoment of truth’ would be different. The primary objective of
the analysis at this stage is to identify such misperceptions.
For example, a game tree on PCA’s view is shown in Fig.6.

ii) ADB’s options:- ‘refuse’: ADB rejects the request from the NGO and does nottransfer the requests to PCA;
- ‘transfer’: ADB transfers the NGO’s request to PCA without
providing any response and information for the NGO; and- ‘follow up’: ADB positively provides information about the
study for the NGO.

i) PCA’s options:- ‘invite NGO’s comments on TOR’: PCA allows input on the
TOR by the NGO;- ‘not invite’: PCA refuses the request about public input on the
TOR from the NGO.
- ‘share TOR only with ADB’: PCA allows to share the TOR
only with ADB for comments.

iii) The NGO’s options:- ‘request public input on TOR’: the NGO continues requesting
PCA and ADB to allow public input on the TOR; and- ‘not’: the NGO stops requesting public input on the TOR.
Table 3 A table of perception and preference of PCA
Topic: Public input on TOR for the study of minimum downstream
releases
Stakeholder: PCAPPi) A private company does not have to provide information andaccept public input on TORsii) We do not want to take time and money by providing
information for third partiesiii) PCA thinks TORs need to be reviewed independentlyiv) PCA disagrees with public inputv) PCA accepts ADB's and suitable consultants' comments on theTORvi) PCA is considering NGOs concernsvii)ADB should provide some information for NGOs requesting
information disclosure before transferring the requests to PCA,
because ADB has much information
PAP i) ADB would address the questions raised from NGOsii) ADB tries to meet requests from NGOs and villagers because
information sharing is international standard now and ADB
wants to avoid conflicts
PNP i) The NGO wants to stop dam construction, particularly Nam
Theun 2, because of their view of dams as destructionii) The NGO would like to intervene the TOR because the NGO
wants to improve the world for villagersiii) The NGO is storing and providing information for other NGOs
to use in a campaign against this and future projectsiv) The NGO has little practical expertise on this subjectv) The NGO's criticism will be dwindled by involving ADB in the
TOR, because transparency will be secured
PPAP i) ADB doesn't believe PCA operates as quickly as possible
PPNP i) The NGO thinks MCP is not in accordance with some
expectations or the original schedule

Game tree on PCA’s view
invite NGO’scomments
on TOR

pressure by
GOL and ADB

ADB
criticismby NGOsrefuse

not

NGO
r n

share TOR onlywith ADB

ADB
refusefollow up

ADB

follow up

refusetransfertransferNGO
requestpublicinput on
TOR
TOR

PCA
not

NGO

NGO

r

r

n

n

follow up

transferNGO

NGO NGO

NGO

NGO

r

r

r

r

n

n

r

n

n

n

i) ii) iv)

PP

vi)
v)
vii

PAP

ii)
i)

i) ii) iii)ii)iii)iv

PN P

i) iiv)) iii)vi)viiii)
v)
viii

Fig. 6 A game tree on PCA’s view84

社会技術研究論文集

means the left scenario is preferred to the right one. The options
which each actor actually took to produce the present situation
are shown by a thicker line. The equilibrium scenarios on eachgame tree are shown by double circles. Uncertain preferences
are shown by squares. Each roman number on the right side ofpreference sets indicates where the related description can befound is in tables of perception and preference.
In many conflict situations, misunderstanding of otheractors’ preferences plays a key role. While the preference sets
were determined through an analysis of textual data in various
formats, it is generally not possible to guarantee its
exhaustiveness and completeness. However, even within
incomplete set of interpreted preferences, significant
misperceptions can often be extracted. Practically, eachpreference is compared with its correspondents as shown in
Fig.7.

Table 4 A table of perception and preference of ADB
Topic: Public input on TOR for the study of minimum downstream releases
Stakeholder: ADB
PAi)

ADB welcomes public input because ADB can always argue with NGOs and avoid
being criticized by NGOsii) ADB & the NGO as stakeholders deserve to get informationiii) ADB believes the NGO should monitor as a suitable candidate of a reviewer forthe studyiv) We think GOL and PCA should take responsible for information providing and
MCPv) ADB want to maintain a good reputationvi) ADB thinks ADB can put pressure on PCA through GOL, because GOL has
responsibility for following ADB guidelines as dictated in the loan documentsvii) ADB thanks the NGO for raising people’s awareness on critical issuesviii) ADB thinks transparency is not secured, if we provide information, because we are
regarded as one of stakeholdersix) We do not have the final say about whether public input is allowed or not
PPAi)Vol.2, 78-88, Oct. 2004

PCA doesn't try to meet requests from ADB and NGOsii) PCA and GOL will provide information by ADB's pressureiii) PCA will act more quickly by ADB's pressure through GOLiv) GOL is positive for inviting third parties’ monitoring on MCPv) PCA are willing to address the issue by sharing the TOR with ADB and qualified
consultants provided by ADB

PAP

PPA

vi) PCA doesn't allow a lengthy open review and comment for TORs on MCP

PNPvii) PCA tries to secure transparency by involving ADB in the TOR
PNA

i)

PA

PP

The NGO is questioning PCA credibility

PNii) The NGO continues to correspond with ADB, because they want to affect ADB’s

PPN

future hydropower projects and they have more leverage with us than GOL and

PAN

PNA

PCA

comparediii) The NGO will criticize us for concealing information, if we don’t deal with theirrequestsiv) The NGO will be influenced not by our decision but by PCA’s decision
PAPA

Fig. 7 Comparison of preference

PANA

Table 5 A table of perception and preference of the NGOi) ii) iii)

PNP

i)

PNA

Stakeholder: the NGOi)ii) v)i)

Topic: Public input on TOR for the study of minimum downstream releases
PNi) ii) iii)ii) iii)

Affected local people should be considered first in the projectii)iii)iv)

ii) The NGO should be allowed for input on the TORv)

PNiii) The NGO believes the process of the downstream study must be open,vi)vii)transparent, and participatory

viii)iv) The TOR should be available for public commentsv) ADB should compensate people using leverage with GOLvi) The NGO believes establishment of an independent monitoring panel is the only

Fig. 8 NGO’s real preference and others’ view of NGO

way to break the current impassevii) Affected local people and NGOs should be directly involved in the TORviii) ADB should approach this issue more positively
PPNi)

As shown in Fig.8, we focused on the preferences of theNGO. PCA and ADB had almost the same perception as what
we believe was the real NGO’s preferences. However, it ispossible that logical contradiction occurs depending on someuncertain elements in PNP. The uncertain preference orders aredesignated as “□” instead of inequality. There was no available
evidence to determine these preference orders. Therefore, we
carried out a game analysis to investigate whether this missing
part of the model would have any significant implications.

PCA is still not positive to secure transparencyii) PCA tries to escape from its commitment about minimum downstream releases
PANi)

ADB tries to persuade PCA to open up the TOR for public inputii) ADB exerts pressure on PCA moreiii) ADB tries to request PCA for providing informationiv) ADB tries to proceed compensation and mitigation confidentiallyv) ADB has constraints working with GOL and PCA
PNPN
PNAN

Each branch of the game tree represents option-taking by
the corresponding actor; and bottom-end nodes (or ‘leaves’)
represent possible scenarios that result from the option-taking.
Each circle in each preference set designates the scenario in thecorresponding position. Ellipses mean a group of scenarios.
Signs of inequality represent preferences. For example, “○>○”In Fig.6, PCA’s view of each stakeholder’s preference isshown. The equilibrium’s calculation can be done by applying
backward reasoning in game analysis. According to Fig.6,
based on PCA’s point of view, options chosen by NGO are
firstly considered based on its preference (i.e. PNP). Then by85

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Vol.2, 78-88, Oct. 2004

that the misunderstanding could be a fundamental cause of thecurrent deadlocked situation. If PCA had perceived the correct
preference of NGO, PCA might have selected another option.

moving upward, Options to be chosen by ADB and PCA itself
have been consequently identified by considering PAP and Pp,
respectively. As a result of game analysis, four possible
equilibriums were found given the uncertainty over PNP.
However, two of these scenarios are known not to be the case.
In the actual story, PCA took the option to ‘share TOR onlywith ADB’, though in this analysis PCA could also take theoption ‘not to invite’.
A possible explanation is that PCA held a view of NPO’s
preference that led to the option-taking that actually happened.
Elaborating this possibility, we explored what preference orders
make PCA’s action the only rational choice. The game tree wasanalyzed in every combination of inequality for all the three
unknown preference (“□”). Those preferences which lead PCA
to the option ‘share TOR only with ADB’ are found to be thefollowing combinations: “< < <”, “< < >”, “< > <”, “> < <”, “>< >”, and “> > <”. Some of these six combinations are
unrealistic, however. For example, it is not logically possiblethat the NGO prefers continuing the request if ADB provides afollow-up for PCA, even though NGO prefers stopping therequest if ADB refuses the request. Impossible and infeasiblecombinations were then removed. As a result, it has been
deduced that PCA’s view of the NGO’s preferences would be“< < <”, “> < <”, or “> > <”. It appears that PCA thought the
NGO would not continue the request for public input, at least if
ADB positively provided a follow-up for PCA and provided
information for the NGO.
Provided with any of these three combinations of inequality,
the rational action taken by PCA is to share the TOR only with
ADB as it happened. It has been demonstrated by the gameanalysis that PCA’s misunderstanding of the NGO’s preference
can be a possible, even strong, explanation for the current
deadlock.
As a conventional hypergame analysis, it is useful toinvestigate what would have happened if PCA had perceived
the NGO’s preferences correctly. Such a case is shown in Fig.9.
PN was used as PCA’s view of the NGO’s preferences
instead of PNP. In this case, there are four possible equilibria. It
is not determinable which option PCA should take, ‘invite
NGO’s comments on TOR’ or ‘not invite’, by available
information. It depends on which PCA prefers, the NGO’s
renunciation of the request or avoidance of involving the NGO
in the TOR process. However, it can be inferred that PCA
would at least not select the option ‘share TOR only with
ADB’.

Game tree on PCA’s view
invite NGO’scomments
on TOR

pressure by
GOL and ADB

ADB
criticismby NGOsrefuse

not

NGO
r n

share TOR onlywith ADB

ADB
refusefollow up

ADB

follow up

refusetransfertransferNGO
requestpublicinput on
TOR
TOR

PCA
not

NGO

NGO

r

r

n

n

follow up

transferNGO

NGO NGO

NGO

NGO

r

r

r

r

n

n

r

n

n

n

i) ii) iv)

PP

vi)
v)
vii

PAP

ii)
i)
ii)iii)iv

PNv)
vi)vii

viii

Fig. 9 Game tree on PCA’s view in a case PCA perceives the NGO
correctly

4. CONCLUSION
Although much research has been done for conflict
resolution and prevention in academic and practical fields,
potentially relevant body of knowledge and useful lessons fromthe past experience remain to be fully integrated. Practitioners
have produced a number of pragmatic theories on ‘what to do’in the face of real-world problems. Researchers have tried toanalyze conflict by using descriptive and prescriptive theories
and models. Both often refer to the importance ofmisperception and misunderstanding issues, but dialogues
between the two sides is still much less than dialogues withinthemselves. This study is a preliminary attempt to incorporate
these two approaches. This has led to a conclusion that it isuseful to build an analytic model with adequate reasoning
capability without excessive data demand. The model has been
applied to the real context, and its possible use has beensuggested.
The model of the case study has clarified the structure of aconflict. What the proposed methodology has delivered can besummarized as follows:i) Analysis of relationship among different issues in theconflict for determining key issues.
The project used for the case study displayed a number ofinter-related issues, namely compensation, resettlement, theamount of minimum downstream releases and information

This means the PCA’s misunderstanding of the NGO’s
preferences may be the very reason why PCA persists on trying
to share the TOR with ADB. Now it has been demonstrated

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Vol.2, 78-88, Oct. 2004

are not the exception. The concept proposed here will hopefully
be used to act as a catalyst for multi-perspective, pluralistic
thinking for conflict management.

sharing. The model has found that every issue can be finallylinked to the issue of information sharing. Then, the issue wasdetermined as an issue for a more detailed analysis.
ii) Showing each stakeholder’s preferences
It is important in conflict management to understand what
each stakeholder demands and how each stakeholder views thesituation. In the case study, the main actors appeared to be stuck
in a fallback position. PCA did not want to invite the NGO’s
input on the TOR of minimum downstream releases. ADB did
not act proactively, because they thought they did not have a
final say on the issue. The NGO requested their involvement in
the TOR. Such stakeholders’ perception and preference ofothers were investigated systematically.
iii) Identification of a fundamental cause of the conflictThrough game analysis of the actors’ perceptions, themodel has found that a possibly fundamental cause of thecurrent deadlock is a gap between the NGO’s preference
perceived by PCA and ADB. A mediator can devise anappropriate countermeasure for breaking the deadlock
considering the gap.
It has been demonstrated through a trial implementationthat the model is useful for analyzing conflict situations andthat the model can suggest specific points that a mediatorshould consider in order to make the actors cooperate. Suchoutput will assist mediators in understanding conflict situations
and give them unnoticed perspectives for promoting
negotiation.
Though this methodology is certainly found on therationalist perspective, it can also be applied to those cases withpreferences of strategic manipulation. These preferences might
appear paradoxical but this methodology could ultimately
reveal inconsistency with what they seem to envisage.
Plausibility analysis of this kind is also among the objectives ofthis methodology
The main objective of the model is to contribute toclarifying the structure of a conflict by focusing on gaps amongactors’ perception and finding fundamental causes of theconflict. As long as there is a possibility that differences instakeholders’ preferences is what prevents conflict from being
resolved, there is potential benefit from utilizing the proposedmodel. It is also worth noting that the model could work insituations which actors have not yet fallen into confrontation.
Any conflict of interests among actors can be analyzed in thesame manners to produce a prescription for conflict prevention.
Again this study highlights a general point about social
conflict that actors can easily be ignorant of how differently
other people may be looking at the situation. Even thoseindividuals and organizations with experience and knowledge

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(1993). Manifesto For A Theory Of Drama And Irrational
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7) Bennet, P. (1997). Toward a theory of hypergames, Omega(5). pp. 749-751.
8) Bennet, P., Cropper, S. and Huxham, C. (1989). Modelinginteractive decisions: the hypergame focus, Rational
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9) Bennet, P. (1980). Using Hypergames to Model Difficult
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10) Bennett, P., Bryant, J. and Howard, N. (2001). Drama
Theory and Confrontation Analysis, Rational Analysis for a
Problematic World Revisited, pp. 225-248.
11) Poundstone, W. (1992). Prisoner’s Dilemma, Doubleday, adivision of Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This paper was mainly developed during the first author’sinternship at Asian Development Bank (ADB). The authors are
greatly indebted to thoughtful advices from ADB staff.
Assistance from Chakrit Suwannachote in completing thepaper is also profoundly acknowledged.

87社会技術研究論文集

Vol.2, 78-88, Oct. 2004

国際コンフリクトマネジメントの支援手法論：
トゥンヒンブン水力発電プロジェクトの調査事例を通してBuilding an Analytical Tool for Conflict Management in Development Projects:
A Case Study of Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project
米澤 明男 1

堀田 昌英 2

1

M.Eng. 国土交通省東北地方整備局(E-mail: yonezawa-a82ab@pa.thr.mlit.go.jp)
2
Ph.D. 東京大学大学院助教授
社会技術研究システム・ミッションプログラム 非常勤研究員（兼任）(E-mail: horita@ken-mgt.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp)

国際開発プロジェクトの実施にあたっては、利益集団間の利害衝突がしばしば深刻な問題となる。本研究では、そのような状況での交渉を支援するための手法を考案した。本手法の特徴は、それぞれの当事者が争点や相手の発言・行動に対してどのような認識を持っているのかという情報を、仲介者に提供することにある。考案した手法は過去の開発事例に適用された。事例分析では、議論ツリーと意思決定マトリックスを用いて争点の全体像を明らかにした。さらに、認識表とハイパーゲーム理論を用いて当事者の選好と戦略を分析することで、各プレーヤーの協力行動を阻む「認識の齟齬」を発見した。本事例研究により、構築された手法が実際の交渉支援に適用可能であることが示された。

キーワード：コンフリクトマネジメント、開発プロジェクト、ハイパーゲーム、議論ツリー

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