COVER STORY • 3

Trade Rules & the WTO– Present & Future

By Michitaka Nakatomi

Introduction
In addition to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade
agreements (FTAs), the security perspective of the global trade
framework has rapidly gained importance since the late 2010s as athird pillar. It is essential to maintain a balance between free tradeand security perspectives, and it is necessary to take measures toprevent the abuse of the “security exception” (GATT Article 21) in the
WTO.
On the issue of who has the authority to make decisions on
security exceptions, there is a sharp conflict of views between the
United States, which says that only the parties concerned can makesuch decisions, and the WTO panel, which says the WTO disputesettlement framework has the right to decide matters concerning
security exceptions. Given the US position, the proposal to treat
security exceptions as a non-violation requires serious
consideration. In addition, strengthening the WTO’s monitoring
functions with regard to security cases is an important issue.
The WTO’s dispute settlement system has become dysfunctional
due to issues relating to its Appellate Body. The 13th WTO
Ministerial Conference (MC13) stated that it aims to reach aresolution by the end of 2024, but in restoring the dispute settlement
functions, the introduction of not only a two-trial system but also a
one-trial system deserves consideration, given the rapid increase of
appeals into the void regarding security exceptions and other issues.
Restoring the WTO’s rule-making functions is required along withthe restoration of its dispute settlement functions. The latter cannever be restored without the restoration of rule-making functions.
With regard to plurilateral agreements, I would like to commend theincorporation into the WTO of the outcome of negotiations on
domestic regulations of services at MC13. On the other hand, failure
to incorporate the investment facilitation and e-commerce rules into
the WTO so far is regrettable. In the future, it will be necessary to
strategically analyze the requirements for establishing plurilateralagreements, and to develop and utilize them as a WTO rule-making
method.1

I Transition of Trade Regimes & Emerging
Economic Security Concept

AuthorMichitaka Nakatomi

trade regimes embodied in the GATT and WTO, but since thebeginning of the 21st century FTAs have gained importance as acomplementary pillar to the GATT and WTO. Since the latter half ofthe 2010s, the rapid narrowing of the economic and technological
gap between the US and China has led to the perpetuation of
US-China confrontation and the introduction of various measuresfrom a security perspective, which has come to be regarded as thethird pillar of trade policy. This trend has been accelerated by the
Russia-Ukraine conflict of 2022 and the introduction ofcountermeasures by various countries. While it is indisputable thatthe security perspective is extremely important as it is a viewpointthat forms the basis of a country’s existence, it is also important toharmonize it with the trade policy that has been the foundation of the
global economy, and of Japan’s prosperity and development. We
must not forget to protect and nurture free trade and the global
values chains (GVCs) embodied in the WTO which have supported
the Japanese economy and the world economy.2

1. Transformation of trade policy based on the pillars of free
trade and GVCs(i) Stagnation – from GATT-centrism to WTO + FTA twowheel principle (2000~)

After the Uruguay Round negotiations were essentially completed
in 1993 and the WTO was established in 1995, rule-making in the
WTO proceeded smoothly with firm support from member countries
until the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and theTelecommunication and Financial Services Agreement were realized
in 1997. But in the 21st century, rule-making slowed down, partly
due to the difficulty of the consensus-based WTO decision-making
process. The year 2001 saw the accession of China to the WTO andthe start of the Doha Round amid the multi-polarization of the world
economy, but the Doha Round drifted along and was never settled.
On the other hand, from around 2000, FTAs came to be positioned
as the wheels of international economic order.
During this period, the WTO’s dispute settlement system
functioned smoothly, but against a background of sluggish WTO
rulemaking, the US in particular began to show strong dissatisfaction
with the functioning of the Appellate Body in the 2010s, and in 2019
the Appellate Body ceased functioning as it was unable to secure thenecessary members.

Japan’s trade policy has developed on the basis of multilateral
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https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

(ii) Development of the concept of national security ininternational trade due to the constant confrontation
between the US and China

As China’s economy grew rapidly following its accession to the
WTO, the conflict over US-China economic hegemony became more
serious in the 2010s. In particular, when Donald Trump became
President of the US in 2017, he introduced comprehensive restrictive
measures against China in trade, investment, and technology,
including higher tariffs against China. Even under the administrationof his successor Joe Biden, the hardline US stance toward China
continued, and in the 2020s the idea of developing a trade policy
based on security has been gaining further ground. The measures
being implemented are becoming increasingly sharp and include
some that cannot be easily justified under WTO rules.
These measures are not necessarily limited to China. For example,
the US has introduced measures to increase tariffs on steel andaluminum under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, based on
the security exception in GATT Article 21.
(iii) Russia-Ukraine conflict and countermeasures (from2022)

With the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 and theimposition of extensive sanctions against Russia by the US,
European nations, Japan, and other like-minded countries, the statusof security exception clauses such as GATT Article 21 is coming
under close scrutiny.
In other words, the scope of application of Article 21 has
expanded greatly, and a situation is emerging in which the rules ofcontingency are eroding and replacing the rules of peacetime.
The active use of the Article 21 exception by the US is particularly
conspicuous. It is necessary first to accurately grasp the current
situation in which the security exception, which was an “exception”
in the first place and not considered for active use, is rapidly
expanding its meaning and being used more and more frequently.3

2. The need for “balance” between free trade and security:
basic directions in the WTO
There is a tension between free trade and security regulations.
While GATT Article 21 allows for exceptions as necessary forsecurity reasons, it does not mean that any security measure is
acceptable. As trade measures for security reasons are expanding, as
analyzed below, it is necessary to find a balance by comprehensively
discussing the status of security from each aspect of the WTO’s
legislative, judicial, and monitoring and surveillance functions.4

II Security Exceptions & the WTO
To look at the relationship between the security exception and theWTO, it is necessary to analyze the relationship from the aspects ofrule-making, monitoring, and dispute settlement.
Let us look at the replacement of peacetime rules by contingency
rules and the measures that should be taken to prevent the abuse of
the security exception under GATT Article 21.

1. Putting a stop to contingency rules by improving andexpanding peacetime rules
The cause of the abuse of the security exception is the inability of
WTO rules to discipline economic reality. GATT Article 21 is a trumpcard, so to speak, that need not be used if the WTO’s peacetime rules
are functioning. The use of Section 232 of the US Trade Enlargement
Act and the citation of the security exception is due to the fact that
the WTO’s peacetime rules have not been properly developed
through negotiations. These rules have not developed mainly
because of the WTO’s consensus principle and developing country
status (China is also treated as a developing country), but also
because member countries have not always been enthusiastic about
rule-making. For example, the US has not been active in revising theAgreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights(TRIPS Agreement) and the anti-dumping and subsidy rules since
the establishment of the WTO.5
The chaos in the dispute settlement function of the WTO due tothe lack of a functional Appellate Body was also, in a sense,
predictable: it is impossible to discipline economic issues in the 21st
century with the Magna Carta,6 and the WTO’s dispute settlement
mechanism has been overburdened. To restore this function, it isessential to develop rule-making in light of economic and traderealities, and even if the dispute settlement function is provisionallyrestored without this, it would not last long. In particular, as is clear
from the debate over the Appellate Body, it will be essential to revise
the rules on anti-dumping and subsidies etc. in order to avoid
placing an excessive burden on judicial proceedings. As countries
introduce aggressive domestic industry subsidy measures, such as
the Inflation-Reduction Act (IRA), the development of rules for trade
remedy measures is an essential task.
Looking at the outcomes of MC13, a certain amount of progresshas been made on the basis of plurilateral agreements in the Joint
Statement Initiative (JSI), such as domestic regulations of services.
But commitment to core trade rule-making, such as subsidy rules, isstill insufficient. Japan, in cooperation with the US, the European
Union, and other like-minded countries, should play an active role inrule-making in these areas.

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27

2. Utilizing the monitoring function of the WTO
Along with the legislative and judicial functions of the WTO,
monitoring the implementation of WTO rules is one of its importantfunctions. In particular, in areas such as security exceptions, where
the details of the rules are not clear, it will be important for the
relevant committees to discuss the actual situation, background, andnecessity of the measures and to monitor them to ensure that
excessive or protectionist measures do not prevail.
Each WTO committee plays an important role in monitoring theactual implementation of rules. In particular, the role played by theTechnical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee7 and Sanitaryand Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Committee often attracts
attention, but other committees and bodies, such as the Trade
Facilitation Committee, also function effectively. Member countries
should consult with each other to determine which committee orbody would be most efficient.
For TBT, the legal basis for the procedures is set forth in the TBTAgreement 13.1, but the procedures are quite well established, basedon the history of implementation from the Standard Code in the
GATT era. The basis is the submission of questions on SpecificTrade Concerns (STCs) by member countries and their responses,
which are shared with the committee at the same time. Informal
consultations are held among the countries concerned on the STCs
reported, and if no resolution is reached, the matter is placed on theagenda of the TBT Committee for discussion. The concerns
expressed range from further clarification of measures, unnecessary
barriers to trade, transparency, legitimacy of measures, international
standards, discriminatory treatment, and timeframes for
implementation. The basis for the declaration of STCs is thefulfillment of notification obligations under the Agreement, and it iscritical that countries fulfill their notification obligations.
Looking at the track record, according to Kateryna Holzer, between
1995 and 2017, there have been 548 STCs raised by countries in the
TBT Committee. The STC consultations are expected to have thefollowing effects: clarification of technical standards, improvement oftechnical standards, sharing of experiences and best practices,
resolution of issues that also pertain to other agreements, andresolution of inexpensive trade friction.
According to Holzer, there have been many cases in which formal
WTO dispute procedures have been avoided as a result of the STC
process,8 and only 15 of the above STC cases have been brought
before the formal WTO dispute procedures. The establishedprocedures for handling STC cases in the TBT Committee and otherbodies can be used as a reference and be utilized in the handling of
security cases. In particular, for security exceptions where the detailsof the rules are not clear, the exchange of views in the relevant
committees would contribute greatly to understanding and resolving
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the issues. In addition, it is considered politically difficult in manycases to actually withdraw security-related measures once they havebeen taken due to their nature, and it would be necessary to discuss
compensatory measures (e.g., suspension of concessions orcompensatory payments) in order to achieve a balance between
countries taking the measures and countries affected by themeasures.9
The idea of a committee (National Security Committee) toconcentrate on such security-related measures (e.g., Lester)10 is anextremely interesting and worthwhile proposal. The establishment ofsuch a committee, based on transparency, would contribute to theclarification of security exceptions, the understanding of facts andthe reconciliation of interests of the parties regarding security-related
measures, the establishment of best practices, and rebalancing
among the parties. Regarding the non-trade objectives (NTOs),
including security measures, it is recommended that, in addition tothese committee discussions, the WTO utilize the framework ofplurilateral agreements and clubs inside and outside the WTO, basedon transparency and the active exchange of views.11

3. Dispute resolution functions and security
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Panel has accumulated a certain
number of cases on the security exception, such as DS512, the 2019
Russian traffic in transit case. In particular, on the issue of the rightto decide on the security exception under GATT Article 21 (whether
the dispute settlement body has the right to decide), there has been a
sharp conflict between a series of panel decisions that the WTO has
the right to decide and the US position that only the parties have theright to decide, with the US expressing dissatisfaction with the panel
decisions in the Article 232 case, the Hong Kong origin case, andothers. The US has expressed dissatisfaction with the panel’sdecision in the cases of Article 232 , the Hong Kong case of origin,etc., and has filed an appeal into the void to the Appellate Body,
which has ceased functioning, to block the panel’s decision.
The US has stated that the issue of the security exception is an
essential requirement for the restoration of the WTO’s disputesettlement function,12 and it is considered essential for the
restoration of this function to take the US position into account withregard to the security exception.
On the other hand, prevention of abuse and black-boxing of the
security exception is an essential issue. W. Maruyama and A. Wolff(2023),13 while taking into account the position of the US governmentthat the right to decide on security exceptions rests with the parties,
propose a non-violation remedy for the other party. Appeals into thevoid, including national security cases, are detrimental to the WTO’s
dispute settlement procedures, and measures to prevent suchappeals need to be considered.

4. FTAs and security exceptions
Although security exception clauses in FTAs generally follow GATT
Article 21 in their provisions, many recent FTAs, especially those
involving the US, including the FTAAP (TPP11), have provisions that
could possibly be interpreted to mean that only the parties have theright to determine security exceptions. The development of FTAs will
also need to be closely monitored, as security exceptions may be
determined in the dispute settlement procedures of FTAs in the
future.

III Early Restoration of the Dispute Settlement
Function
The WTO’s Appellate Body has been non-functional since 2019.
Although the panel is functioning, the losing party can file an appeal
to the Appellate Body that simply goes into the void. As a result, the
WTO’s dispute settlement procedures have lost their automatic
adoption function, returning to the pre-WTO situation where parties
can refuse to adopt the outcome of the panel.
Appeals into the void on security exception cases (e.g., Article 232
cases) are likely to occur frequently in the future due to the politicalnature of security issues. A resolution of the Appellate Body issue isurgently needed to restore the dispute settlement function. Although
MC13 also stated the goal of restoring the dispute resolutionfunction by 2024, there has been no progress on a concrete path
towards it. There is some support for a Multi-Party Interim Appeal(MPIA) arbitration, but the likelihood of US participation in it is slim.
While we look forward to further progress in discussions toward
restoring the dispute settlement function in full, in light of thestalemate it is suggested that not only a two-trial system, but also a
one-trial system be considered as an option.14
First, we would need to share an understanding that a frameworkthat allows parties to block the panel’s conclusions (the pre-WTO
framework) is not one we should pursue. In addition, it is necessary
to consider the current situation where coordination for restorationof the Appellate Body has been stalled for a long time, as well as the
position of the US on the Appellate Body.
In view of avoiding a stalemate with respect to the Appellate Body,
the US position, and the prevention of appeals into the void (in aone-trial system, of course, there are no appeals into the void), it isnecessary to keep in mind the option of a one-trial system in addition
to restoring the full functions of the Appellate Body (a two-trial
system).
The one-trial system is considered to be beneficial as a framework
for avoiding conflicts of views regarding the Appellate Body and forpreventing appeals into the void.
Further continued confusion in the dispute settlement function is acrisis for the WTO and the trade framework.15

IV Restoration & Strengthening of Rule-Making
Functions & Plurilateral Agreements
The rule-making function of the WTO is based on the principle ofconsensus: not only Annex 1 (agreements involving all members)
but also Annex 4 (e.g., government procurement agreements which
obligates only participating members) require consensus among
WTO members in order to be established.
After the realization of the ITA, Financial Services, andTelecommunication Services Agreement in 1997, rule-making in the
WTO stagnated. A series of rounds (Tokyo, Uruguay, Doha) wereorganized to support consensus building, but the Uruguay Round,which ended in 1993, was the last to produce results. The Doha
Round could not be concluded. Due to the increase and diversity ofmember countries and the participation of developing countries(Doha is defined as a “development round”), the current situation issuch that a package deal for the round cannot be concluded.
Under the circumstances where negotiations have to be conductedon each individual case basis, the only multilateral outcomes are theAgreement on Trade Facilitation (agreed in 2013, to enter into force
in 2017) and the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (agreed in2022).16 In order to reach agreement on each individual case basis, it
is practical to use a plurilateral framework based on the cooperationof like-minded countries (e.g., ITA expansion negotiations, tradefacilitation).
On the other hand, standardized methods for incorporating theoutcomes of plurilateral agreements into WTO agreements have notbeen established. For market access for goods, a standardized
method (e.g., ITA and its expansion negotiations) has beendeveloped using the formation of a critical mass and MFN extensionof benefits from the agreement to non-members.17
As for rulemaking, there is no such established method, and weare still groping for a method to achieve consensus building (orframework formation to prevent veto triggering). For example, themethods taken in trade facilitation include (1) general consideration
for developing countries, (2) consideration of implementation period(especially for developing countries), (3) phased implementation,and (4) provision of technical assistance. In addition, a cautious
approach has been taken in introducing mandatory provisions.
As for the outcome of the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI), which
has been negotiated among multiple countries, a detailed analysis of
the outcome of the MC13 is necessary, but I will attempt a generalevaluation at this point in time.

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E-Commerce
In the area of e-commerce, Japan, Australia and Singapore took
the lead in the negotiations, but postponed the resolution of difficult
issues such as the three TPP principles regarding data free flow,
non-localization of servers and forced transfer of source codes, etc.
Instead, the negotiating parties reached agreement on 13 basic
principles for e-commerce.18 The agreement concentrated on items
where there is little need for developing countries to express theirconcerns from a policy perspective. While it may not be a high-levelagreement, it is significant that useful basic principles for
e-commerce and data flow have been established. We hope thatefforts to formulate more difficult rules, including the three TPP
principles, will be made in the future.
However, although at MC13 there did not seem to be explicit
argument on the incorporation of the agreement into the WTO19, it isexpected that discussions on this issue will be held as soon as
possible, referring to the success of domestic regulations of services
agreement. In terms of content, I would like to see discussions
develop on difficult items such as cross-border movement of data,server installation, and prohibition of mandatory source code
disclosure requests as items for future discussion.

Domestic Regulations of Services
Negotiations on domestic regulations of services were concluded
early on, and their legal status was clarified as a reference documentin the WTO in MC13. In a sense, this is an agreement equivalent to
the TBT in the services sector and a landmark agreement. As withtrade facilitation, this was made possible by (1) generalconsideration of developing countries, (2) consideration of
implementation period (for developing countries), and (3) provisionof technical assistance. In addition, the domestic regulation ofservices was a built-in agenda of the Services Agreement, and India’semphasis on trade in services is seen as having influenced its
success.

Investment Facilitation
Negotiations on investment facilitation rules have been led bySouth Korea and Chile, focusing on the perspective of promoting
investment facilitation in developing countries. However, at MC13,
India and other countries strongly opposed to incorporating theresult as an Annex 4 Agreement in the WTO, and its incorporation
into the WTO Agreement was not realized.
These developments in the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI),
especially in the domestic regulation of services, will be of greatsignificance for the future formation of a plurilateral agreement andits incorporation into WTO legal frameworks. I look forward to
30 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

strategic development of a rule-making approach based on
plurilateral agreements within the framework of the WTO.
It is extremely regrettable that MC13 did not achieve incorporationof investment facilitation and e-commerce into WTO rules, but it isexpected that strategic efforts for WTO incorporation will continue.
On the other hand, as for the framework aiming to create various
important trade rules, such as trade and investment rules, and tradeand environmental rules, it must be said that the hurdles tomultilateralization remain high, as seen in the above difficulties informing plurilateral agreement.20
The use of plurilateral agreements has been recommended for along time, but current outcome of domestic regulation of services isgroundbreaking as it opens up new possibilities for the future. The
concept of an open plurilateral agreement (based on the participationof countries that meet the conditions of the agreement) should also
be further considered and utilized in the future.21

V Transformation & Utilization of FTAs & Regional
Frameworks
Japan has concluded FTAs with major countries and regions,
including the RCEP, FTAAP, and the EU-Japan FTA. With an FTA
coverage rate of 80%, the development and utilization of FTAs is anasset for Japan’s trade policy. FTAs are valuable as a pillar
supporting the WTO, and it is necessary to continue aiming toconclude new FTAs (such as the JCK FTA), as well as to expand
members and deepen the quality of FTAs.
From a qualitative aspect, there are great expectations for the roleof FTAs, given the current situation where rule-making in the WTO isvery difficult under the consensus principle. It is also important to
respond to the emergence of diverse FTAs and RTAs (DEPA, IPEF)
and participate in such initiatives with a positive and flexible attitude.
Regarding the addition of member countries, the accession of the
US and India to the FTAAP will be a particularly important issue.
Interconnection of broad FTAs (FTAAP and EU-Japan FTA) should
also be considered. Although not an FTA, revitalization of APEC,
which has had a major impact on liberalization in the Asia-Pacificregion, its strategic utilization (e.g., liberalization), and utilization of
ERIA will also be important issues.

VI Comprehensive Use & Dissemination of Trade
Tools
In summing up, I hope that Japan will continue to strategicallyutilize and disseminate a trade framework, especially the WTO, tocontribute to the maintenance and expansion of free trade and GVCs
in the future. Although I have not addressed these issues here due tospace limitations, comprehensive efforts to deepen trade policy,
including regulatory harmonization, responding to international
standards and other soft rule-making, and modernization of trade
tools, are necessary and beneficial, and comprehensive examination
and utilization of these tools should be pursued.22

References
1 Michitaka Nakatomi (2022), “On the Promotion of Digital Tradeand East Asia’s Response: the Necessity of a Multi-pillar
Approach Focusing on the WTO and FTA”, Research Institute of
Economy, Trade and Industry (in Japanese).
2 For details on the relationship between the security exception
and the WTO, see Michitaka Nakatomi (2024), “Security
Exception and WTO Reform”, Research Institute of Economy,
Trade and Industry and Michitaka Nakatomi (2024), “Security
exceptions and trade norms in WTO reforms”, East Asia Forum(May 23, 2024).
3 The White House (2023). Remarks by National Security Advisor
Jake Sullivan on reviewing American economic leadership at the
Brookings Institution, April 27, 2023.
4 On the necessity of balance between national security and free
trade, see Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2023)“White Paper on International Economy & Trade 2023”; andKeidanren (Sept. 13, 2022) “Toward the Reconstruction of theFree and Open International Economic Order.”5 Too fixated on the unclear outcomes of the Uruguay Roundnegotiations, there has been a reluctance to respond to changes
in the situation since then.
6 Richard Baldwin and Michitaka Nakatomi (2015), “A world
without the WTO: what’s at stake?” CEPR Policy Insight No. 84(July 2015), Centre for Economic Policy Research.
7 As for the function of the TBT Committee, K. Holzer (2018),“Addressing tensions and avoiding disputes: Specific tradeconcerns in the TBT Committee”, WTO Staff Working Paper, No.
ERSD-2018-11.
8 The EU REACH case is a typical example.
9 J. Bacchus (2022), “The Blackhole of National Security – Striking
the Right Balance for the National Security Exception inInternational Trade”, CATO Policy Analysis, No. 936.
10 S. Lester & I. Manak (2020), “A Proposal for a Committee on
National Security at the WTO”, Duke Journal of Comparative &International Law, Vol. 30.
11 B. Hoekman, P. Mavroidis and D. Nelson (2023), “Non-Economic
Objectives, Globalization and Multilateral Trade Cooperation”,
CEPR.
B. Hoekman, P. Mavroidis and D. Nelson (2022), “Geopolitical

Competition, Globalization and WTO Reform”, RSC Working
Paper 2022/67, European University Institute.
12 USTR (2023), “US objectives for a reformed dispute settlement
system”, JOB/DSB/4, WTO, July 5, 2023.
13 W. Maruyama & A. Wolff (2023), “Saving the WTO from thenational security exception”, Working Paper 23-2, Peterson
Institute for International Economics.
14 Michitaka Nakatomi (2024), “The Security Exception and WTO
Reform”, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. On
the framework under a single-trial system, see B. Hoekman and
P. Mavroidis (2020), “To AB or Not to AB? Dispute Settlement in
WTO Reform”, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2020/34.
15 Michitaka Nakatomi (2024), “Security Exception and WTO
Reform,” Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
16 MC13 did not make the expected progress in the areas ofagriculture and fisheries subsidies.
17 Michitaka Nakatomi (2012), “Exploring Future Applications of
Plurilateral Trade Rules: Lessons from the ITA and the ACTA”,
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
18 WTO Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce: Statement by
Ministers of Australia, Japan and Singapore, https://www.meti.
go.jp/press/2022/01/20230120002/20230120002-3.pdf
19 Discussion focused on the treatment of the moratorium on
imposing tariffs on electronic commerce. The moratorium was
extended until the next WTO Ministerial Conference.
20 The use of FTAs, MRAs, etc. should be considered.
21 B. Hoekman, P. Mavroidis and D. Nelson (2023), “Non-economic
Objectives, Globalization and Multilateral Trade Cooperation”,
CEPR; B. Hoekman & C. Sabel (2019), “Open Plurilateral
Agreements, International Regulatory Cooperation and the
WTO”, Global Policy (2019).
22 Michitaka Nakatomi (2022), “On the Promotion of Digital Tradeand East Asia’s Response: the Necessity of a Multi-pillar
Approach Focusing on WTO and FTA”, Research Institute of
Economy, Trade and Industry (in Japanese).
Article translated from the original Japanese by Naoyuki Haraoka
Michitaka Nakatomi is senior research fellow of the Japan Economic
Foundation (JEF), and also special advisor to JETRO and consulting fellow of
the RIETI. He focuses on such areas as international trade, investment,
services, digital trade and global value chains. He was principal trade negotiatorof METI (2011-12) and president of JETRO (2008-11). He joined MITI in 1977
from Tokyo University and worked on trade issues covering multilateral,bilateral, plurilateral and regional arenas. He served as Japanese negotiator for
the Information Technologies Agreement (ITA), five FTAs (Mexico, Philippines,
Brunei, Indonesia, Switzerland) and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement(ACTA). See the following for his recent writings: http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/
nakatomi-michitaka/index_en.html

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