September 29, 2017
Mr. Christopher J. Kirkpatrick
Secretary
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street NW
Washington, DC 20581
Re:

Project KISS Recommendations

Dear Mr. Kirkpatrick:
Citadel LLC 1 (“Citadel”) appreciates the opportunity to provide input to the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (the “Commission”) as it considers ways to simplify and streamline
the regulatory framework through the Project KISS initiative. We support efforts to streamline
the regulatory framework while continuing to focus on the integrity, transparency, efficiency, andstability of our financial markets. Below, we provide specific recommendations that are designed
to further strengthen the preeminent global position of the U.S. capital markets by reducing
regulatory burdens on market participants and ensuring that these markets are fair, open,
competitive, and transparent. Our recommendations address (a) registration, (b) reporting, (c)clearing, (d) execution, and (e) other market structure topics.
I. Registration
A. Simplifying Regulatory Reporting for Fund Managers
Fund managers that are dually registered with the Commission and the Securities andExchange Commission (the “SEC”) must regularly prepare and submit Forms CPO-PQR and
CTA-PR to the Commission and Form PF to the SEC. The requirement to file these separate
reports is duplicative given that they were originally intended to serve very similar purposes.
Furthermore, numerous differences in how relevant information is required to be compiled andpresented increases the burden on fund managers with little apparent commensurate benefit. We
urge the Commission to work with the SEC to consolidate these reports into one form that can beused by both agencies. In addition, the agencies should streamline reporting by better leveraging
data that firms already calculate as part of their day-to-day operations and by ensuring that the
information requested is actually useful for oversight purposes. This will promote a more
standardized approach to regulatory reporting while reducing complexity and burdens for market
participants.

1

Citadel is a global financial firm built around world-class talent, sound risk management, and innovative marketleading technology. For more than a quarter of a century, Citadel’s hedge funds and capital markets platforms havedelivered meaningful and measurable results to top-tier investors and clients around the world. Citadel operates inall major asset classes and financial markets, with offices in the world’s leading financial centers, including
Chicago, New York, San Francisco, Boston, London, Hong Kong, and Shanghai.

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B. Appropriately Calibrating Capital Requirements for Swap Dealers
Swap dealer capital requirements are intended to promote market safety, stability, andintegrity. However, they should be appropriately calibrated to the risks posed by a particular firm’s
dealing activities and should be flexible enough to permit a diverse array of swap dealers to serve
the market. Improvements should be made to the Commission’s proposal to:
1. Ensure a level playing field. The Commission proposal permits swap dealers to choose
between a “bank-based” option and a “net liquid assets” option. However, there are higher
minimum capital thresholds under the “net liquid assets” option for firms that wish to use
an internal model. This creates an unlevel playing field for firms that cannot use the “bankbased” option.
2. Calibrate standardized market risk and credit risk charges for cleared swaps. We strongly
support calculating standardized market risk charges for cleared instruments by reference
to the initial margin requirements of the DCO, which are specifically designed to accurately
measure the risks associated with a cleared swap portfolio. The Commission should clarify
this will be the approach under both the “bank-based” option and the “net liquid assets”
option, and that both self-clearing members and non-self clearing members will be treatedequally under the rules.
3. Provide adequate time for implementation. All swap dealers should be given sufficient
time to develop internal models and for those models to be approved by regulators. A swap
dealer using an internal model will, in many cases, have a material competitive advantage
from a capital perspective over a swap dealer using the standardized schedule.
II. Reporting
A. Improving the Swap Data Reporting Framework
We commend the Division of Market Oversight for recently publishing and soliciting commenton its “Roadmap to Achieve High Quality Swaps Data.” We fully support Commission efforts toimprove the quality and accuracy of swaps data while streamlining reporting requirements formarket participants, and provided the following suggestions to the Division of Market Oversight:
1. Improve the Reporting of Package Transactions. In certain asset classes, a significant
percentage of overall trading activity is transacted as part of a package. It is therefore
critical that the Commission and market participants have accurate data regarding the typesof packages that are traded, and the amount of trading activity in each type.
2. Streamlining the Reporting of Cleared Swaps. The Commission should reconsider whether
it is necessary to report an intended-to-be-cleared “alpha” swap to a swap data repository(“SDR”). The current approach creates several duplicate records in an extremely shortwindow of time, given that the Commission’s straight-through-processing rules result inmany “alpha” swaps being successfully cleared (and therefore cancelled) almost
immediately following execution. Consideration should be given to whether the reporting2

of “alpha” swaps to SDRs can be eliminated without impacting compliance with theseparate real-time public reporting requirements.
In addition, DCOs are in the best position to maintain data on the post-clearing “beta” and“gamma” swaps. In our view, swap data reporting would be greatly simplified if DCOs
were responsible for maintaining SDR data for cleared swaps, rather than redundantly
reporting it to a third party SDR (and subsequently updating and reconciling records withsuch SDR).
3. Increasing the Utility of Publicly Disseminated Swap Data. The data fields that are
publicly reported can be further streamlined. Unnecessary fields should be removed whilecertain select fields that would improve market transparency, such as identifying therelevant DCO for a cleared swap, should be included.
B. Appropriately Calibrating Block Trade Thresholds for Swaps
Pursuant to Commission Regulation §43.6(f), the current block trade thresholds for swaps(which were established in 2013) should be updated once an SDR has collected at least one yearof reliable data for a particular asset class. Therefore, we believe that the Commission should, at
a minimum, update the block trade thresholds for the credit and interest rate asset classes.
Market research demonstrates that the introduction of real-time public reporting in the swaps
market has led to meaningful benefits for end investors, removing information asymmetries andfacilitating more accurate assessments of execution quality.2 By enabling investors to compare
the prices they receive from liquidity providers with concurrent trading activity across the market,
post-trade transparency enhances investor confidence and incentivizes price competition as
investors are able to demand more accountability from their liquidity providers. The removal ofpreviously existing information asymmetries also contributes to market resiliency by ensuring thatchanges in supply and demand are more efficiently reflected in current price levels.
It is therefore important that block trade thresholds are regularly updated using recent market
data, since these transactions are eligible for a 15 minute delay from real-time public reporting
requirements. Employing block trade thresholds that are based on market data from several years
ago risks that too many, or not enough, transactions are eligible for the delay from real-time public
reporting requirements.
C. Streamlining Recordkeeping Requirements for EFRPs
An Exchange for Related Position (“EFRP”) involves executing a privately negotiated offexchange future or option simultaneously with an equivalent quantity of the cash product, byproduct or related product, or OTC derivative corresponding to the underlying asset of the future2

See, e.g., Loon, Y. C., Zhong, Z. K., 2014. The impact of central clearing on counterparty risk, liquidity, andtrading: Evidence from the credit default swap market. Journal of Financial Economics 112 (1), 91-115; Loon, Y.
C., Zhong, Z. K., 2015. Does Dodd-Frank affect OTC transaction costs and liquidity? Evidence from real-time CDS
trade reports, Journal of Financial Economics.

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or option. EFRPs can be an effective way to transfer risk and hedge across products, and areoverseen by the DCM that lists the relevant future or option.
However, DCMs frequently apply the recordkeeping requirements associated with EFRPs in
an impractical and inflexible manner. For example, market participants executing an exchange forphysical are required to provide third party proof of payment evidencing settlement anddocumentation representing the transfer of ownership of the commodity.3 However, instead of
accepting a SEC Rule 10b-10 confirmation or other records evidencing settlement that are readily
accessible to a market participant, DCMs frequently request additional confirmation from a thirdparty clearinghouse. These additional recordkeeping requests are time-consuming andburdensome for market participants, and do not result in a more effective monitoring andsurveillance regime for EFRPs. We recommend that the Commission work with DCMs to apply
the recordkeeping requirements for EFRPs in a more practical manner.
III. Clearing
A. Continuing the Swap Market’s Transition to Central Clearing
The Commission’s implementation of mandatory clearing for certain interest rate and credit
default swaps has led to a gradual and orderly market transition to a safer and more transparent
regime. The scope of market participants subject to the clearing mandate was gradually phasedin over a nine-month period in 2013, and the list of covered instruments has also been gradually
expanded over time.4 This deliberate approach has enabled the market to transition to central
clearing with minimal disruption, thereby maximizing the associated benefits of systemic risk
mitigation, customer protection, and increased market transparency and competition. Central
clearing uniquely mitigates systemic risk by replacing the interconnected web of bilateralcounterparty credit exposures with a safer system where all market participants face a wellregulated clearinghouse. Customer protection is enhanced as the DCO safeguards customer
collateral and protects market participants from the default of their trading counterparties. Central
clearing is also the first step in other market innovations that can improve market transparency andefficiency, and increase competition. By eliminating bilateral counterparty credit risk and the needfor bilateral trading documentation, central clearing creates the conditions necessary for market
participants to access a wider range of trading counterparties, enhancing price discovery andliquidity.
Given the importance of the clearing mandate, and its positive impact on market liquidity,5 werecommend that the Commission continue to regularly assess whether additional instruments

3

See CME Market Regulation Advisory Notice RA1707-5, Question 18 ((July 7, 2017), at
http://www.cmegroup.com/notices/market-regulation/2017/07/RA1707-5.pdf.
4

See 81 Fed. Reg. 71202, available at:
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2016-23983a.pdf.
5
See Loon, Y. C., Zhong, Z. K. Does Dodd-Frank affect OTC transaction costs and liquidity? Evidence from realtime CDS trade reports. Journal of Financial Economics, 119 (3), 645–672 (2016) at page 4, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443654 (“the reduced counterparty risk and increased posttrade transparency associated with central clearing have beneficial effects on liquidity”).

4should be included. For example, certain additional CDS indices and FX non-deliverable forwards
are now being cleared in material volumes6 and may be appropriate for the clearing mandate.
In addition, we urge the Commission to refrain from modifying the scope of market
participants subject to the clearing mandate. The current clearing mandate has been successfully
implemented since late 2013, and substantively changing its coverage risks creating market
disruption. Any additional exemptions proposed for proportionality reasons have to be carefullybalanced against the potential impact on liquidity and risk in the cleared market. Overly broad
exemptions can bifurcate liquidity between cleared and uncleared iterations of an instrument,
reduce counterparty diversity within DCOs, and dis-incentivize DCOs, clearing members, andrelated service providers from investing in expanding their client clearing offerings.
B. Codifying Existing Straight-Through-Processing Standards for Cleared Swaps
The Commission’s straight-through-processing requirements are a critical part of theregulatory framework for central clearing, successfully reducing market risk, credit risk, andoperational risk by creating a robust execution-to-clearing workflow. These requirements include:(i)

pre-trade credit checks for cleared swaps executed on, or pursuant to the rules of, a SEF
to ensure that both parties are able to successfully clear the transaction,(ii)

the submission by a SEF to the DCO of a transaction as soon as technologicallypracticable but in any event no later than 10 minutes following execution,(iii)

DCOs accepting or rejecting submitted transactions within 10 seconds, and(iv)

in the rare event that a transaction is rejected by the DCO, permitting the parties tosubmit a new trade in the event the rejection was due to an operational or clerical error,
but otherwise declaring the trade void in order to prevent the reintroduction of bilateralcounterparty credit risk.7

Given the importance of these standards, we urge the Commission to ensure that they are fully
codified, as currently they are set forth in a combination of rules, guidance, and letters. Failure to
codify these standards risks significant disruption to the market, as altering the current status quo
could reintroduce bilateral counterparty credit risk and require market participants trading clearedswaps to negotiate complex and costly bilateral trading and credit support documentation. Anychange to existing operational workflows would also be extremely costly and disruptive from atechnological and operational perspective.

6

See “NDF Volumes – It’s All About Clearing”, Clarus Financial Technology (Dec. 21, 2016), available at:https://www.clarusft.com/ndf-volumes-its-all-about-clearing/. According to data from ICE, market participants havevoluntarily cleared hundreds of billions of dollars of transactions in the CDX EM and iTraxx Senior Financials
indices.
7

See “Staff Guidance on Swaps Straight-Through Processing” (Sept. 26, 2013), available at:
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/stpguidance.pdf; CFTC Letter No. 15-67 (Dec.
21, 2015), available at: http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/15-67.pdf; andCFTC Letter No. 17-27 (May 30, 2017), available at:
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/17-27.pdf.

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In addition, we recommend the Commission actively verify that the required timeframes arebeing complied with by market participants. It has now been over a year since the Commission
explicitly stated that cleared swaps executed on, or pursuant to the rules of, a SEF must be sent to
the DCO within 10 minutes of execution. 8 Compliance with this requirement is critical tominimizing market and operational risk when executing a cleared swap, as it allows the trading
counterparties to confirm as quickly as possible that the swap has successfully cleared. We also
note that the same 10 minute standard will be effective for cleared swaps executed by voice on EU
MTFs and OTFs starting in January 2018 (with an even tighter 10 second submission standard forelectronic trades),9 as the Commission’s straight-through-processing requirements have served asa model for Europe when implementing MiFID II.
Finally, the Commission should coordinate with the SEC to adopt similar straight-throughprocessing requirements for security-based swaps. Currently, the execution-to-clearing workflow
for single-name CDS is much slower and less robust than for index CDS, even though both typesof swaps are cleared at the same clearinghouse and through the same clearing members. Due tothe lack of SEC straight-through-processing requirements, it can still take more than a day for asingle-name CDS transaction to be successfully cleared.
C. Appropriately Calibrating Prudential Requirements for Cleared Swaps
A key component of the G20 reforms to the OTC derivatives markets is transitioning trading
activity in standardized swaps into central clearing. Therefore, it is important that prudential
requirements are not implemented in a manner that is inconsistent with or undermines thisregulatory objective. For example, we support revisions to the leverage ratio to recognize theexposure-reducing effect of client initial margin. We believe the current capital treatment of client
initial margin may unnecessarily raise the cost of client clearing offerings. We recommend that
the Commission coordinate with other policymakers and regulators to ensure that the overall
regulatory framework is appropriately calibrated and does not inadvertently dis-incentivize thetransition to central clearing.
D. Simplifying the Portfolio Margining Regime for Cleared Swaps and Cleared Securitybased Swaps
We urge the Commission to work with the SEC to simplify and streamline the portfolio
margining regime for index CDS and single-name CDS. The SEC currently requires each clearing
member to establish its own margin methodology that is different from the margin methodologyof the DCO. This undermines a core operational benefit of central clearing, which is that all market
participants can rely on the same, fully vetted and approved margin methodology maintained by
the DCO. In addition, it compromises investors’ transparency into margin calculations and createsa barrier to entry for new clearing members seeking to provide clearing services to investors. As

8

CFTC Letter No. 15-67 (Dec. 21, 2015), available at:
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/15-67.pdf.
9

See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/582, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0582&from=EN.

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a result, the current regime makes it more difficult and expensive to trade and clear index CDS
and single-name CDS together.
E. Improving Porting Processes for Cleared Swaps
We recommend that the Commission engage with DCOs to develop more robust andautomated porting processes. Currently, many of the operational workflows designed by DCOs
are manual and time consuming. Improving the ability for customers to efficiently port clearedswaps between clearing members has several benefits, including (i) reducing systemic risk byenabling customers to protect against a clearing member default, (ii) enhancing portfolio
management and facilitating compression, and (iii) increasing competition among clearing
members. Development and use of these processes on a regular basis will also enhance stability
in an actual clearing member default scenario, as customers will be able to more easily transfer
portfolios to solvent clearing members.
F. CCP Resilience, Recovery, and Resolution
We support the Commission’s continuing focus on CCP resilience, recovery, and resolution.
As trading activity in standardized OTC derivatives continues to transition to central clearing, it iscritical that there are robust standards around CCP governance, risk management, and default
management. The recommendations put forward by the Commission’s Market Risk Advisory
Committee provide an example of Commission leadership on these important topics. 10 We
recommend that the Commission continue to monitor progress with respect to the implementationof these recommendations.
IV. Execution
A. Enforcing Existing Impartial Access Standards on SEFs
The Commission has further clarified through rulemaking and guidance the statutory
requirement that SEFs must provide market participants with impartial access.11 This additional
clarification has been instrumental in eliminating discriminatory access barriers that historicallywere used to limit competition from new liquidity providers and to restrict the ability of investors
to access the best available prices. We note that EU regulators have issued similar guidelines foraccessing MTFs and OTFs under MiFID II.12
We urge the Commission to actively monitor to ensure that SEFs are complying with these
impartial access requirements. As part of this oversight, the Commission should assess whether
10

See CCP Risk Management Subcommittee Final Recommendations, available at:
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/mrac111716_ccpdrecommendations.pdf.

11

See “Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities”, 78 Fed. Reg. 33476 (June 4, 2013),
available at: http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-12242a.pdf; and “Staff
Guidance on Swap Execution Facilities Impartial Access” (Nov. 14, 2013), available at:
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/dmostaffguidance111413.pdf.
12

ESMA Q&A on MiFID II and MiFIR market structure topics (Sept. 12, 2017) at pages 30-32, available at:https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-872942901-38_qas_markets_structures_issues.pdf.

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the continued use of post-trade name give-up by SEFs that offer pre-trade anonymous trading
protocols is inconsistent with the impartial access requirements. While post-trade name give-up
makes sense for uncleared swaps since the two counterparties have an ongoing bilateralrelationship, there is no justification for its continued use for cleared swaps. Instead, the practiceserves only to dissuade buyside investors from joining SEFs that historically have been available
only to dealers. In order to join one of these SEFs, a buyside investor must be prepared to (i)disclose to every other member of the SEF that it has joined the platform (as this will be disclosed
once it enters into a trade), and (ii) tolerate the potential leakage of valuable trading information
to every other member of the SEF (since it cannot control who the other counterparty will be whenusing pre-trade anonymous trading protocols). As a result, buyside market participants are
discouraged from accessing these significant sources of liquidity on SEFs.13
Finally, the Commission should coordinate with the SEC to adopt similar impartial accessrequirements for security-based swaps. This will ensure that market participants are subject to thesame standards when trading economically-correlated swaps together, such as index CDS andsingle-name CDS. Otherwise, divergent platform access requirements may negatively impact
liquidity and price discovery in these correlated instruments.
B. Continuing the Transition of Package Transactions Onto SEFs
In certain asset classes, a significant percentage of overall trading activity is transacted as partof a package. For example, data has shown that over 50% of all USD interest rate swaps areentered into as a package.14 Pursuant to Commission rules, once a swap is determined to be subject
to the SEF trading obligation, all transactions in that swap must be executed on a SEF absent an
exemption. This is the case even if a market participant chooses to execute the swap as part of a
package with other instruments. However, the Commission sensibly adopted a phased approachfor transitioning packages onto SEFs through no-action relief.15 Under this phased approach, themost frequently traded types of packages successfully transitioned onto SEFs in 2014, including(i) interest rate curves, (ii) interest rate butterflies, (iii) interest rate and credit rolls, (iv) spreadover Treasuries, and (v) CCP basis swaps.
However, the Commission has left the scope of the no-action relief for other package types
unchanged since early 2015. This semi-permanent relief has reduced incentives for trading venues
and market participants to develop solutions for trading a broader range of packages on SEFs.
Transitioning as much trading activity onto regulated trading venues as possible in swaps that are
already subject to the SEF trading obligation:

13

See also MFA Position Paper: Why Eliminating Post-Trade Name Disclosure Will Improve the Swaps Market(March 31, 2015), available at: https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MFA-Position-Paperon-Post-Trade-Name-Disclosure-Final.pdf.
14

See “Spreadovers: US Treasury Spreads in the Swaps Data,” Clarus Financial Technology (March 23, 2105),
available at: https://www.clarusft.com/spreadovers-us-treasury-spreads-in-the-swaps-data/.

15

CFTC Letter No. 16-76 (Nov. 1, 2016), available at:
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/16-76.pdf.

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enhances market stability and integrity given the monitoring and surveillance capabilities
of SEFs;

reduces operational risk through the pre-trade credit check and straight-through-processing
requirements that are applicable to SEF trades; and

improves market liquidity and competition since SEFs are subject to impartial accessrequirements, thereby enabling market participants to have access to a greater number ofliquidity providers.

We therefore recommend the Commission consider gradually scaling-back the no-action relief
currently available to packages. For example, an intermediate step could be to require certain
additional package types to be traded on SEF, but to continue to provide no-action relief from theseparate required methods of execution requirement.
We also urge the Commission to engage with the CME to amend CME Rule 538 so as to allow
invoice spread packages containing an interest rate swap and an interest rate future to trade on
SEFs, bringing greater price transparency to market participants. Currently, CME Rule 538
prevents a swap that is traded on, or subject to the rules of, a DCM or SEF from serving as therelated position component of an Exchange for Risk or Exchange of Option for Option transaction.
There is no legal or operational justification for this limitation, and the conflict between CME Rule538 and the SEF trading obligation must be resolved in order to facilitate the transition of invoice
spread packages onto SEFs.
C. Enforcing DCM Prohibitions on Disruptive Trading Practices
We recommend that the Commission actively engage with DCMs to ensure that theirmonitoring and surveillance programs are effective in preventing disruptive trading practices in
the futures markets, such as wash trading and spoofing. Recent enforcement cases suggest that
this should remain an area of focus, as disruptive trading practices negatively impact market
efficiency and price discovery for all investors.
In addition, we believe that requiring the use of self-trade prevention tools on DCMs that canbe configured according to a specific market participant’s trading activity will assist in reducing
the incidence of disruptive trading practices. We also support increased transparency from DCMs
regarding the occurrence of self-trades on their systems.
V. Miscellaneous
Improving the Commission’s Commitments of Traders Reports
The Commission’s weekly Commitments of Traders Report provides valuable transparency tocommodity market participants. These reports detail total long and short open interest in majorcommodity contracts across the following categories of traders: (i) producer / merchant / processor/ user, (ii) swap dealers, (iii) managed money, (iv) other reportables, and (v) non-reportable
positions.
9Recently, however, this transparency has been impaired by a material increase in the numberof positions that are being reported under the “other reportables” and “non-reportable” categories.
This trend warrants inquiry to ensure that market participants are accurately reporting and to
determine why these two categories have increased in use. Depending on the conclusions reached,additional categories may be required in order to provide the intended level of transparency tomarket participants.
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We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the Commission’s Project KISS.
Please feel free to call the undersigned at (646) 403-8235 with any questions regarding thesecomments.
Respectfully,/s/ Stephen John Berger
Managing Director, Government & Regulatory Policy

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