COVER STORY • 2

The Future of the United
Nations

By Takahiro Shinyo

Introduction
If the United Nations Security Council continues to be ineffective inthe “multipolar and chaotic era” of post-Ukraine war, the balance ofpower and nuclear deterrence will have to deter war among the
major powers. The United States is adrift between its own priorities
and multilateralism, while China is promoting a Chinese-style global
governance strategy. This zero-sum game continues, with China
filling the void when the US exits UN agencies.
Security Council reform has not progressed in over 30 years andhas yet to generate negotiating momentum. Expansion of permanentseats is no longer the best option, and strategies need to be revised.
In order to move reform forward, we must move toward Plan B,
which includes the creation of a semi-permanent (or long-term) seaton the Council (four- to eight-year terms, with immediate reelections
possible; the number of seats to be expanded is six to eight), rather
than focusing on expanding the permanent membership, which isunlikely to get a two-thirds majority of member countries.
The process of Security Council reform should be two-stage. The
first phase will achieve reform through the creation of a semipermanent or longer-term member of the Council, and the second
phase, reform regarding permanent members, will last until 2045
(the 100th anniversary of the UN). What kind of agreement on
reform will be reached at the UN Future Summit in September 2024
and what kind of common understanding on global governance,
including the Security Council, will be reached at the G20 Summit in
Brazil in November will also be important.
With its national power in decline, Japan needs to abandon theillusion of a great power and strengthen its ties with the Global Southand others as a representative of the global middle powers. Japanesediplomacy is also in need of change. Security Council reform is thetouchstone for this.
There is no universal organization that can replace the UN. It is themission of Japan and other like-minded nations to continue to seekreform and improvement of the UN and to make it an organizationthat will exist for more than 100 years.

The UN in a Multipolar & Confused Era
The year 2024 marks the 79th anniversary of the end of WorldWar II and the 35th anniversary of the demise of the Cold War. The
world now faces many geopolitical crises, such as wars of
20 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

Author Takahiro Shinyo

aggression by a major power and the resurgence of regional
conflicts, in addition to natural threats to humanity and the earth,such as infectious diseases, disasters, and global warming.1 The
dysfunction of the Security Council, exposed by the wars in Ukraine
and Gaza, has been chronic since the Cold War era, but it
fundamentally calls into question the raison d’être of the UN. The
post-Ukraine war world, in which the Security Council does not
function at the critical moments and no country takes leadership toresolve the conflict, is a “multipolar and chaotic era” in terms ofinternational order.2 In such a world, wars among major powers
must ultimately be deterred by classical order maintenancemechanisms based on geopolitics and the balance of power.
Fortunately or unfortunately, nuclear weapons, the leviathan
created by World War II, and the veto of the permanent members of
the UN Security Council have actually contributed to the deterrenceof war among the major powers. Even so, the UN, as an international
public good, should not only be utilized as a “bastion of peace” todeter the next world war, but should also be a center for the
resolution of international disputes through a multilateralist
approach.
If authoritarian leaders like Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping lead theundemocratic world, including the “axis of evil” of Russia, Iran, andNorth Korea, and if Donald Trump returns to the presidency in theNovember 2024 US presidential election and revives home-firstprinciples, multilateralism and the liberal world order could quickly
retreat. The world needs solidarity and cooperation as never before.
With an eye on the post-Ukraine war world order, I would like toconsider the nature and future of the UN and the possibility ofreforming the Security Council as we approach the 80th anniversaryof its founding.

Ineffectiveness of the UN
The UN is reaching its limits in overcoming human crises. Whatcan be said about the crisis facing the UN and the international
community exposed by the pandemic and current wars is that, first,
the role of sovereign states remains crucial in the management of
infectious diseases and security crises that affect human life, andthat national governments are at the center of the response. Second,the US-China and US-Russia conflicts are reflected in internationalorganizations, with the World Health Organization (WHO) losing
credibility due to the pandemic and the World Trade Organization
https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

(WTO) continuing to be paralyzed in its dispute settlement function.
The legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness of internationalorganizations that are supposed to be neutral are at stake. Third, theUN Security Council, which plays a central role in collective security,
has failed to take effective action in Ukraine and Gaza due to US andRussian abuse of their veto, which shows that UN reform is a matterof urgency.
Already on April 15, 2020, the Washington Post severely criticized
the US for its lack of leadership, Europe’s hands are full with its own
affairs, and China is acting selfishly. The same article further
commented that the UN Security Council is not merely failing tofunction, it no longer meets its purpose, and the G7 and G20 are
meeting but not taking immediate action.3 A Dubai-based healthexpert commented, “The UN Security Council has been ineffective
since the end of World War II.” In short, the UN has just about
prevented the outbreak of a third world war for 79 years, but it has
exposed its incompetence since 2020, when it was hit by a once-ina-century pandemic and an unexpected war of aggression by apermanent member. The ineffectiveness of the Security Council is
now clear for all to see.

Global Governance the Chinese Way
China’s rise is remarkable, and it now competes with the US on all
fronts. Until recently, four of the 15 UN specialized agencies were
headed by Chinese – the Food and Agriculture Organization of theUnited Nations (FAO), the International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and theUnited Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The
UN Headquarters Secretariat includes the UN Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), which is in charge of economic
and social affairs. Its head under-secretary-general is also a Chinese
national. DESA is a key department that oversees the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), environment, social development, andhuman rights issues, and has tremendous influence.
Although there was an unwritten rule that permanent members of
the Security Council should refrain as much as possible fromrunning for the heads of specialized agencies, China has behaved
without regard for this. These organizations set global standards andinternational rules, and are directly related to economic security.
China is actively sending its own personnel to the top positions ofthese bodies and is trying to expand its influence in UN
organizations. On Oct. 13, 2020, the UN General Assembly heldelections to change 15 of the 47 members of the Human Rights
Council and elected China, Russia, and Cuba. The international
human rights organization Human Rights Watch criticized China for
its “massive human rights violations” and Russia for its “complicity
in numerous war crimes in the Syrian civil war”, and identified thethree countries as “unfit” to serve on the Human Rights Council. The
UN Human Rights Council and the Third Committee of the UN
General Assembly have been powerless to denounce human rights

violations against people in Hong Kong, the Uighur Autonomous
Region, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Thus, it is assumed that China has a long-term plan to prevent
Western values from taking precedence by obtaining the posts ofheads of the UN Secretariat and specialized agencies as part of its
process to become a superpower. In his book, US-China expert
Michael Pillsbury describes the danger of China further weakening
the UN and the WTO as one of the scenarios that the “Chinese World
Order in 2049” aims to achieve.4 It is believed that China is pursuinga strategy of using the UN to achieve Chinese-style global
governance in line with this very scenario.

Drifting America
On the one hand, the US retreated from the UN and multilateralism
under former President Trump’s “America First” policy. It withdrew
from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO), the Human Rights Council, the UN Population Fund
(UNFPA), and from the WHO. It also withdrew from the Paris
Agreement on global warming. The zero-sum game continued, with
China filling the void when the US left these organizations, and as aresult China’s influence increased. Since President Joe Biden took
office, the US has returned to multilateralism again, rejoining the
WHO and the Paris Agreement, but the US and China continue tocompete and confront each other. At the US-China meeting at the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in November
2023, both sides expressed recognition that the US and China arepartners in competition, not confrontation, but tensions still persist
over Ukraine and Taiwan. Successive US Democratic Party
administrations have initially been idealistic, attempting to realize
US-style values diplomacy in the multilateral arena. However, whenthat idealism hits a wall, they fall back on realism and inaction, andthe results are intractable. As the US pursues realpolitik (diplomacythat protects national interests), idealism has no choice but toretreat. Nevertheless, as long as the US continues to pursue a courseof international cooperation, the very survival of the UN and its
international organizations will not be fundamentally undermined.
However, if Trump returns to the presidency in the November
2024 presidential election, the US emphasis on national interests andunilateralism may well be restored, the Security Council will continue
to be dysfunctional, the UN and multilateralism will be greatly
reduced, and the world will be forced to shift to a model of ordermaintenance based on geopolitics and balance of power dominationby the major powers.

Can the UN Be Reformed?
The UN is the center of multilateralism that creates international
cooperation. Cooperation on global issues such as conflicts,
terrorism, global warming, infectious diseases, development, andpoverty must continue to be promoted mainly through the UN andJapan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

21

international organizations. When the national interests of eachcountry are sublimated into the international public interest throughmultilateral negotiations, they become matters of common concern
and cooperation is encouraged. This is the essence of multilateraldiplomacy.
The UN and the Bretton Woods system are the crystallization ofhuman wisdom, created at the great human cost of the two world
wars. It is unrealistic and futile to rebuild the UN on the grounds that
the Security Council is dysfunctional. I do not believe that such a
drastic measure can be taken in peacetime. The UN should be
improved and inherited, and this is the responsibility of all UN
member states. For defeated countries such as Japan and Germany,
which were not involved in the creation of the UN but enjoyed its
benefits to the fullest under the UN-Bretton Woods system, thereform and succession of the UN can now be said to be their
mission. It is in Japan’s national interest to resolve international
disputes and global issues within various multilateral frameworks,
such as the UN, G7, and G20, and this will enhance the significanceof Japan’s existence, as it is becoming less of a great power.
Strengthening multilateralism as well as coordinating bilateralrelations, which is important for Japanese diplomacy, and fostering a
spirit of international cooperation with democracies and countries of
the Global South are the central tasks of Japanese diplomacy in the
chaotic post-Ukraine war era, which is becoming a century of war.
To this end, it is necessary to reform the UN and internationalorganizations that have become outdated, and Security Council
reform is symbolic of this. It has been more than 30 years since
Japan proposed Security Council reform in 1992. Although
discussions have taken place in informal plenary sessions of theGeneral Assembly, negotiations have been in name only, and thesubstance of reform has not moved one step forward. Security
Council reform must be realized for the future of the UN, whose
primary mission is conflict resolution and peacekeeping. However, inlight of the objective situation of drastic changes in international
affairs and Japan’s declining national strength, it is necessary toreconsider whether aiming to expand the number of permanent seatson the UN Security Council as if it were a golden rule is the best
option for Japan and the UN.

Why Isn’t Security Council Reform Making
Progress?
Security Council reform gained momentum in 2005 when theso-called G4 (Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil) launched a
diplomatic offensive by submitting a draft resolution to the General
Assembly. However, their proposal, as well as the African Union (AU)and the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) proposals, were all withdrawn
from the table.5 Subsequently, with the relative decline in the national
power of Japan and Germany, the momentum for Security Council
reform has slowed down, and diplomatic offensives have not been
undertaken.
22 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

In 1992, as director of the UN Policy Division of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs, I was in charge of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa’s
Security Council reform proposal, and from 2006 to 2008, as deputy
permanent representative of the Japanese mission to the UN, I was
involved in the follow-up of the G4 proposal. I would like to discussspecifically why reform has not progressed after more than 30 years
and what reform is feasible.
Although all countries are in favor of Security Council reform ingeneral, the complex interplay of national interests and stakes is aclassic example of opposition on each side of the issue. Why havenegotiations for reform not progressed? Simply put, it is because thepositions of the interested countries (G4, AU, UFC, P5 (Permanent5), etc.) are widely divergent and no common language (e.g.,“common but differentiated responsibilities” in the case of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change) and common
denominator have been found to guide negotiations. The US, Russia,
China, and the UFC countries have been reluctant to enter into a deal
based on specific wording. In other words, the momentum toward“win-win” (all win) or “lose-lose” (all lose), which is a necessary
condition for successful multilateral negotiations, has not been
generated as a result of the “negotiations” to date.
Regardless of how the war in Ukraine ends up, the choice must be
made: whether to resign oneself to a deadlock over reform by still
holding out hope for both permanent and non-permanentenlargement, which is unlikely to win a two-thirds majority in termsof negotiating dynamics, or to be pragmatic and take the next bestthing, which is better than the status quo (Table).

What Is Realistic Security Council Reform?
What will happen if Security Council reform does not proceed?
Japan has been a candidate for non-permanent membership of the
Security Council at intervals of three to six years, and has been
elected 12 times, the most of any member country. The next
opportunity for Japan to be a candidate for non-permanent
membership of the Security Council is in 2032 eight years from now,and it will be increasingly difficult to become even a non-permanent
member; thus it will not be possible to continue to wait patiently fora chance to expand the permanent membership of the Council. A
drastic policy shift is needed to break through the stagnation ofreform, using the deep disappointment in the Security Council
expressed by member countries over the war in Ukraine as leverage.
The basic perceptions at that time are as follows.
1) As a lesson from the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, it is believedthat the majority of countries recognize that the permanent
membership of the Council should not be expanded and that the vetoshould be limited.
2) The US supports the expansion of both the permanent and nonpermanent members of the Council, including Japan and Germany,
Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, but has not moved to
do so on its own. It’s nothing more than lip service (the US position

TABLE

Comparison of the basic positions of each group
Present

G4

AfricaUFC

Permanent Members

5
US, UK, France, China,
Russia+6
Asia 2, Africa 2, Latin America 1, West Europe and others 1+0
Status quo

Non-Permanent Members

10
Asia 2, Africa 3,
Latin America 2,West Europe and others 2,
East Europe 1+4/5
Asia 1, Africa 1-2,Latin America 1,
East Europe 1+5
Asia 1, Africa 2,
Latin America 1,
East Europe 1

Under +11
Includes newly created longterm and re-electable nonpermanent members.

Veto

Permanent members 5

New permanent members
should have the same
responsibilities and duties
as current permanent
members, but veto will not
be exercised until after the
15-year review.

The veto should be
abolished, but if it is toremain, the new permanent
members should be given it.

All permanent members
refrain from exercising it.

Diffusion

15

25/26

26

Under 26

Note 1: The G4 expressed support for Africa’s position in a joint press statement at the September 2021 G4 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.
Note 2: Countries comprising each group; G4 – Japan, Germany, India, Brazil; Africa – 54 African countries; UFC – 12 countries, South Korea, Pakistan, Türkiye, Italy, Spain, Malta, San
Marino, Canada, Mexico, Costa Rica, Columbia, Argentina

Source: Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

may further retreat if Trump becomes president).
3) Since the G4 proposal favors certain countries, it is unlikely to
win majority support by two-thirds of the member countries. We
should aim to create a “semi-permanent member” or “long-term
member” of the Council, which is considered to have less
opposition.
4) Promptly implement feasible reforms to prepare for the nextcrisis in the international community ⇒ (shift to the Security
Council’s two-step reform theory described below)
5) Prevention of abuse of the veto must be achieved in any form.

expansion of permanent membership of the Council. With thisoption, it is recommended for Japan to pursue the creation of anelected semi-permanent (or long-term) Council seat (term of officewould be four to eight years, with consecutive re-election possible),and the expanded number of countries would be six to eight or more.
If they can continue to be elected after their term of office is over, it
would be tantamount to a de facto permanent member of theCouncil.

Under the circumstances of wars involving permanent members of
the UN Security Council in Ukraine and Gaza, it is unlikely that Russia
and China, let alone the US, the United Kingdom, and France, would
agree to the proposed expansion of the permanent members of theCouncil, much less agree to the permanent status of Japan andGermany. There seems to be no prospect of such a charter
amendment proposal winning a two-thirds majority of the UN
member states (even if the General Assembly resolution were to be
adopted, China and Russia would ultimately veto it at the stage ofratification of the charter amendment proposal). While leaving the G4
as an option that cannot be taken immediately, Japan will have toprepare a negotiating strategy to move to Plan B in order to soft landon another option for Security Council enlargement (including thecreation of a semi-permanent or long-term member) that the P5 andthe majority of the Global South cannot oppose.
Specifically, it would have to be an intermediate response thatstops short of the G4 and UFC proposals. This intermediate option(Option B in the 1995 Kofi Annan Report) may provide room fornegotiation with the UFC and P5, which are opposed to the

In the first phase, we will achieve immediate reform through thecreation of a semi-permanent or long-term member of the Security
Council, giving new life to the Council. The aim should be foragreement on a two-stage reform theory, in which reform regarding
permanent membership of the Council will be an issue for 2045 (the100th anniversary of the UN) and not an immediate issue.
Specific negotiating tactics for the first phase include informal
discussions with the UFC to develop a reform plan. At the same time,
we will communicate well with the US, UK, and France, and request
their cooperation. We also need to persuade India and Brazil, which
are likely to oppose the reform within the G4, and to break up theAU, which is sticking to the expansion of the permanent membershipof the Council and its veto under the Ezulwini Consensus. Then, as asecond-stage goal, it is necessary to work on reform of thepermanent members of the Council (expansion, reduction, phasing
out, etc.), and to obtain the member countries’ agreement onreaching a concrete conclusion by 2045.

Security Council Reform in Two Stages

Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

23

What about Veto?
With regard to the veto, it will be necessary to exercise some
restraint in the first stage of reform. It would be good if the P5 as awhole could agree to the voluntary non-use of the veto, which the UK
and France announced with the end of the Cold War, but if thiscannot be achieved it will be necessary to seek some restraint
through a UN General Assembly resolution or other means. What the
UN General Assembly should aim to achieve is the following
improvement of the working methods of the Security Council andrestraint on the use of the veto, which would not require a Charter
amendment in consideration of the opposition of the P5.
① Consensus that the veto will not be exercised in cases of genocide
or war crimes (General Assembly resolution or P5 arrangement).
② Regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes, ensuring thefulfillment of the obligation of the Security Council members, who
are parties to the conflict, to abstain from voting (Article 27.3 of
the Charter). This is the formula agreed to at Yalta through Josef
Stalin’s concession. Japan should take the initiative by teaming
up with like-minded Middle Power countries and the Global
South. It would also be beneficial to seek an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice on the issue ofinterpretation regarding “parties to the conflict”.
However, the restrained use of the veto must be done carefully so
as not to overstimulate the US, China, and Russia. Even this is not aneasy reform, but after witnessing the abuse of the veto in the wars in
Ukraine and Gaza, now is the time.
In the event that the UN Security Council is unable to function due
to the veto or other reasons, there is a system whereby issues ofinternational peace and security can be referred to the General
Assembly. This is made possible by General Assembly Resolution
377 of 1950, known as the “Uniting for Peace Resolution”. Based on
this, the Emergency Special Session, which is convened by amajority of the General Assembly or by at least nine Security Council
members, may be utilized to make recommendations, including
military measures, by a two-thirds majority vote. It is necessary to
work on strengthening the functions of the General Assembly so that
this complementary function already possessed by the UN General
Assembly can be flexibly utilized as a full-fledged mechanism when
the Security Council is unable to function due to the confrontation
between the US, China, and Russia.

The UN Future Summit & the G20
There are two developments during 2024 that are worth noting in
relation to UN reform. The first is the “Future Summit” proposed bySecretary-General Antonio Guterres in his 2021 Report of theSecretary-General (Our Common Agenda), which will be held at the
UN General Assembly on Sept. 22 and 23, 2024. The outcome will bea document entitled “Pact for the Future”. The president of theGeneral Assembly has appointed the permanent representatives of
24 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

Germany and Namibia to co-facilitate the work among member
states on the preamble and the outcome document, which willconsist of five chapters on sustainable development, international
peace and security, and global governance reform. In this global
governance reform, though proposals are to be made on reforms of
the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social
Council as well as international financial institutions, the zero-based
draft of the Agreement released on Jan. 29, 2024 does not include
any proposals for reform of the Security Council, and theco-facilitators will present their recommendations in June 2024.7 It isdifficult to predict what this will look like, but this part of theagreement is the biggest challenge and is expected to be a toughnegotiation.
The second is the G20 Summit, which Brazil chairs in 2024. Brazil
has identified (1) combating hunger, poverty, and social inequality,(2) sustainable development in the economy, society, andenvironment, and (3) global governance reform, as its priorities, withparticular emphasis on (3) reform of the paralyzed Security Council
and international financial institutions. Based on the UN Future
Summit, the G20 Summit will be held in Brazil in November, and it isbelieved that Brazil is trying to take the lead in global governancereform, including the Security Council, as a leader of the Global
South. The G20 will be presided over in 2023 (India), 2024 (Brazil),and 2025 (South Africa) by the leaders of the Global South, BRICS,
and IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), and it is expected that
Security Council reform and international financial institution reform
will be led by the Global South for the time being. Japan needs toseriously consider how to make the most of these developments in
the Global South in its diplomacy.

Conclusion: Paradigm Shift in Japanese Diplomacy
Due to population decline and sluggish economic growth, Japan
has fallen to the fourth-largest economy, surpassed by Germany in2023; it is projected to be overtaken by India in 2025 and to fall to
middle power status in the 2030s. Japan has always been ambivalent
about whether it is a great power or not. If we hesitate to call Japan a
middle power in the current situation, we can call it a “global middle
power”. In light of the limited status of Japan's national power, it isnecessary to shed the illusion of great power and conduct down-toearth diplomacy.
As a representative global middle power, Japan should actively
cooperate with other middle powers and countries of the Global
South to contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes and themaintenance of international order, and to promote dialogue andcooperation among countries with diverse cultures and values. The
same applies to Security Council reform. Japan must break awayfrom the big-power aspirations represented by the G4 proposal andmake a drastic change in direction to a global middle power
diplomacy that generates change from below through cooperation
with smaller countries and the Global South. In this sense, Japanalso needs diplomatic reforms.
Japan’s voice in the world will be diminished compared to thepast. To compensate for this, Japan must continue its alliance with
the US, while at the same time engaging in entente with China andneighboring countries, and actively utilizing the UN and internationalorganizations as part of multilateral diplomacy. Regarding UN
diplomacy, it is essential to formulate a long-term foreign policy inview of the 100th anniversary of the UN (2045), and the development
and utilization of intellectual, material, financial, and human
diplomatic assets should be discussed in this context. What Japan
does not have is this kind of long-term national interest calculation.
From now on, too, Japan’s national interest must not be a closed
national interest. We must pursue national interests that are open,
fair, and accountable. In pursuit of open national interests, Japan will
exercise wisdom and leadership in solving global problems. Since
Japan’s economic power is limited, we must cultivate and utilize ourhuman assets from now on. Specifically, the current plan to increase
the number of Japanese personnel working in UN organizations to
1,000 by 2025 should be doubled at once to 2,000 by 2035. This
would be a commitment to the survival of the UN and internationalorganizations, and at the same time, it would mean that Japan would
make better use of the UN. If more Japanese with less political bias
become heads of UN agencies, the UN will regain its original role asa coordinating body among member states, with impartiality as its
principle, rather than being biased toward the West or dominated by
China, which will be beneficial to the future of internationalorganizations. We must make a paradigm shift in this way.
The responsibility of the member states supporting the UN,
especially the democratic countries including Japan that advocate
freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, is grave, and now is thetime for the UN agencies embodying the UN Charter to devote theirpersonnel to fulfill their original mission. There is no universalorganization that can replace the UN. We recognize that Japan andother like-minded nations have a major role to play in seeking its
improvement and continuing to urge change, and in making the UN
an organization that will endure for 100 years or longer.

translation, China 2049, “100-Year Strategy for Global
Hegemony”, Nikkei BP, 2015), Chapter 9.
5 For more on the diplomatic battles over the 2005 Security
Council reforms, see “Academia and Politics: New Openings andAdvancement,” by Shinichi Kitaoka, serialized in the February
and March 2024 issues of Chuo Koron (in Japanese).
6 May 23, 2023 Yomiuri Shimbun online article (in Japanese).
7 Summit of the Future: zero draft, Jan. 26, 2024, para 116 [5.1].

Bibliography
For Security Council reform, see the reform proposal by Yasushi
Akashi, former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Sukehiro Hasegawa, former Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Timor-Leste, and the author (“Toward Realistic Reformof the UN Security Council”, July 25, 2022, https://www.gpaj.org/
ja/2022/10/01/20028), as well as a report on UN reform and otherissues by the Commission on Global Governance established under
the Japanese Parliamentary Committee of the World Federation(http://www.gpaj.org/ja/2020/04/09/18707, May 2020).
For more information on Security Council reform, see thefollowing:“Considering UN Security Council Reform” by Toshitaka Takeuchi
and Takahiro Shinyo, eds. Toshindo, 2021 (Chapters 2 & 11) (inJapanese).
Takahiro Shinyo, “How to Respond to President Zelensky’s
Request: the Direction of UN Security Council Reform”, Chuokoron,
July 2022. (in Japanese).
“What feasible Security Council reforms have emerged from thewar in Ukraine?” by Takahiro Shinyo, Kasumigasekikai Kaiho, Sept.
23, 2023 (in Japanese).
“The Future of International Organizations: Reflections on the
Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations” by Takahiro
Shinyo, SRID Journal, January 2021, 20th issue (in Japanese).
Article translated from the original Japanese by Naoyuki Haraoka

References
1 In the 2024 edition of the annual Eurasia Group’s “Ten Major
Global Risks” report, the world continues to be a “G-Zero world”
without a leader, and three wars dominate the global situation.
The first is the war in Ukraine, the second is the war over Gaza,
and the third is the conflict within the US (polarization within theUS). The report warns that the nature of such a G-Zero world willcontinue to produce unresolvable conflicts.
2 UN Secretary General Guterres’ speech to the UN General
Assembly on Feb. 7, 2024.
3 “Global institutions are flailing in the face of the pandemic”,
washingtonpost.com. April 15, 2020.
4 Michel Pillsbury, “The Hundred-Year Marathon” (JapaneseProf. Takahiro Shinyo is a Japanese scholar of international politics andformer diplomat. After serving as a professor at Osaka University, directorgeneral of the Multilateral Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, ambassador at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations
and ambassador to Germany, he became a professor and vice president ofKwansei Gakuin University in 2012.

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