平成 29
9 年度日欧欧フォーラ
ラム（欧州州）2017 年 5 月 18 日（木）
（於：ベル
ルリン）

開
開会の辞
DG
GAP テンペ
ペル博士

開会の辞 JEF
F 日下会長セッショ
ョン１ 登壇壇者

ョン１ スピーーカー 深尾尾教授
セッショ

セッション１ モデレ
レーター JEF 原岡専務理
理事

会場
場の様子

ディスカッションの様子

ーヒーブレイ
イクの風景
コー

セッショ
ョン２ 登壇
壇者

セッショ
ョン２ スピーーカー 加藤藤教授

セッション２ スピーカーー 福永氏

セセッション３
３ 登壇者

カッションの様子
ディスカセッション３ スピ
ピーカー 志賀賀氏

ディスカッションの様
様子

閉会の
の辞

┠

ḟ

1. 㛤 ദ ㊃ ᪨͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 1
2. 㛤 ദ ᴫ せ͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 2
3. ヲ ⣽ ᪥ ⛬͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 4
4. ฟ

ᖍ

5. ␎

⪅͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 7Ṕ͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 10

6. ㆟ ஦ せ ᪨᪥ᮏㄒ͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 17ⱥ ㄒ͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 31
7. Ⓨ ⾲ ㈨ ᩱ͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 44
8. ᡂᯝ͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 72

9. ཧ ⪃ ㈨ ᩱ͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 76
10. ඹ ദ ᅋ య͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 78
11. ஦

ົ

ᒁ͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐͐ 79

1. 㛤ദ㊃᪨ᅜ㝿⤒῭஺ὶ㈈ᅋࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡜ㅖእᅜ࡜ࡢ⤒῭஺ὶࢆಁ㐍ࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊྛᖺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⤒῭ၥ㢟➼ࢆྲྀࡾୖࡆࠊḢᕞࠊ⡿ᅜࠊ࢔ࢪ࢔኱ὒᕞࡢ᭷㆑⪅㛫࡛ࡇࢀࡽࡢၥ㢟ゎỴ➼࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㆟ㄽࢆ㔜ࡡ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
᪥Ḣࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࣛࡣࠊᨻ⏺ࠊᐁ⏺ࠊᏛ⏺ࠊ⏘ᴗ⏺࡞࡝ࡢᨻ⟇ᥦゝ࡟ᙳ㡪ຊࢆࡶࡘ᪥ᮏࠊ
Ḣᕞࢆ୰ᚰ࡜ࡍࡿ᭷㆑⪅ࡀ୍ᇽ࡟఍ࡋࠊඹ᭷ࡍࡿㄢ㢟࡞࡝࡟ࡘࡁᚷ៸ࡢ࡞࠸ពぢ஺᥮ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢᨻ⟇❧᱌࡟㈨ࡍࡿ࡜ඹ࡟᪥Ḣ༠ຊࡢ୍ᒙࡢᙉ໬ࢆᅗࡾࠊࡑࡢᡂᯝࢆᗈࡃ
ᬑཬࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ┠ⓗ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
≉࡟㏆ᖺࡣࠊ᪥ᮏཬࡧḢᕞ࡜࠸ࡗࡓᑐ㇟ᆅᇦࡑࢀࡒࢀࡀᣢ⥆ⓗⓎᒎࢆ㐙ࡆࠊࡦ࠸࡚ࡣୡ⏺⤒῭ࡢᣢ⥆ⓗⓎᒎ࡟㈉⊩ࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺ほⅬ࡛ࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀࡀᢪ࠼࡚࠸ࡿㄢ㢟ࠊᡂ㛗ᢚไせᅉࢆྲྀࡾୖࡆࠊࡑࢀࡽࡢゎỴ⟇ࡢⓎぢ࡜ᐇ⾜࡟ྥࡅ࡚ᨻ἞࣭⤒῭࡞࡝」ྜⓗ࡞どⅬ࡛ࡢពぢ࣭᝟ሗ஺᥮ࠊ┦஫ࡢᏛࡧࢆᚿྥࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
௒ḟࠊᙜ㈈ᅋࡣ 2017 ᖺ 5 ᭶ 18 ᪥㸦ᮌ㸧࣋ࣝࣜࣥ࡟᪊࠸࡚ࠊࢻ࢖ࢶእ஺ホ㆟఍㸦Die
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.: DGAP㸧࡜ࡢඹദ࡛ࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࣛࢆ
㛤ദࡋࡓࠋ࣓࢖ࣥࢸ࣮࣐ࠕⲨᾏࡢᾏ㊰ࢆᶍ⣴㸸ୡ⏺⤒῭ཬࡧᡂ㛗࡜㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶㸭Charting
Choppy Seas: The World Economy and the Future of Growth and Tradeࠖࡢୗࠊ⌧ᅾࠊ᪥Ḣࡀඹ㏻ࡢၥ㢟ࢆᢪ࠼࡚࠸ࡿ௨ୗ 3 ࡘࡢ㆟㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ゎỴ⟇ࠊᑐᛂ⟇ࡀ㆟ㄽࡉࢀࡓࠋࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸯

పᡂ㛗ࡢ⨜࠿ࡽ⬺ฟࡍࡿ࡟ࡣ
Escaping the Low Growth Trap

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸰

࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࠊಖㆤ୺⩏ࠊࡑࡋ࡚⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶
Populism, Protectionism, and the Future of Free Tradeࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸱

ࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿ➇தຊࡢ⥔ᣢ
Staying Competitive Through Digitalization࡞࠾ࠊࢻ࢖ࢶእ஺ホ㆟఍࡜ࡢඹദࡣࠊ2012 ᖺ࠿ࡽ⥆࠸࡚ 3 ᅇ┠ࡢඹദ࡜࡞ࡿࠋ

−1−2. 㛤ദᴫせ1. 㛤ദ᪥᫬㸸2017 ᖺ 5 ᭶ 18 ᪥㸦ᮌ㸧10㸸15㹼18㸸00
2. 㛤ദሙᡤ㸸ࢻ࢖ࢶ࣭࣋ࣝࣜࣥ㸦ࢻ࢖ࢶእ஺ホ㆟఍ෆ㸧Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. (DGAP)
Rauchstraße 17-18, 10787 Berlin, Germany
3. ୺ദ⪅㸸㸺᪥ᮏ㸼୍⯡㈈ᅋἲேᅜ㝿⤒῭஺ὶ㈈ᅋ
Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)㸺ࢻ࢖ࢶ㸼 ࢻ࢖ࢶእ஺ホ㆟఍
⊂ Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. (DGAP)
ⱥ German Council on Foreign Relations
4. ࢸ࣮࣐㸸
Charting Choppy Seas: The World Economy and the Future of Growth and Trade
Ⲩᾏࡢᾏ㊰ࢆᶍ⣴㸸ୡ⏺⤒῭ཬࡧᡂ㛗࡜㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶
Session 1

Escaping the Low Growth Trapపᡂ㛗ࡢ⨜࠿ࡽ⬺ฟࡍࡿ࡟ࡣ

Session 2

Populism, Protectionism, and the Future of Free Trade࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒࣭ಖㆤ୺⩏ࠊࡑࡋ࡚⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶

Session 3

Staying Competitive Through Digitalizationࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿ➇தຊࡢ⥔ᣢ

5. Ⓩቭ⪅㸸᪥Ḣࡼࡾィ 15 ྡ㸺᪥ᮏഃ㸼ィ 6 ྡ㸦ᩗ⛠␎㸭Ⓩቭ㡰㸧᪥ୗ ୍ṇ୍⯡㈈ᅋἲேᅜ㝿⤒῭஺ὶ㈈ᅋ ఍㛗ཎᒸ ┤ᖾ୍⯡㈈ᅋἲேᅜ㝿⤒῭஺ὶ㈈ᅋ ᑓົ⌮஦῝ᑿ ගὒ៞ᛂ⩏ሿ኱Ꮫྡ㄃ᩍᤵ㸭Ṋⶶ㔝኱Ꮫ⤒῭Ꮫ㒊ᩍᤵຍ⸨ ๰ኴබ┈㈈ᅋἲேᮾி㈈ᅋ ᖖົ⌮஦㸭ᅜ㝿኱Ꮫᩍᤵ⚟Ọ ဴ㑻᪥ᮏᶵᲔ㍺ฟ⤌ྜ ࣈࣛࢵࢭࣝ஦ົᡤ㛗

ᚿ㈡ ಇஅ᪥⏘⮬ື㌴ᰴᘧ఍♫ ྲྀ⥾ᙺ๪఍㛗−2−㸺Ḣᕞഃ㸼ィ 9 ྡ
Dr. Sylke Tempel

㸦Ⓩቭ㡰㸧
Member of the Executive Board, German Council
on Foreign Relations, DGAP

Alexander Schönfelder

Head of the Division 400 Basic Economic Issues,
International Economic and Financial Policy,
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Klaus Günter Deutsch Head of Research, Industrial and Economic Policy,
Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Dr. Claudia Schmucker

Head of Globalization and World Economy
Program, DGAP

Dr. Ilja Nothnagel

Head of Division Foreign Trade Policy and Law,
Association of German Chambers of Commerceand Industry (DIHK)

Dr. Henning Hoff

Executive Editor Berlin Policy Journal, DGAP

Mr. Michael Bültmann

Managing Director, HERE Deutschland GmbH

Dr. Andreas Rinke

Chief Political Correspondent, Reuters Berlin

Dr. Christian Mölling

Deputy Director of the Research Institute, DGAP

6. ᙧᘧ㸸ࣛ࢘ࣥࢻࢸ࣮ࣈ࣭ࣝࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩࣙࣥ
7. ౑⏝ゝㄒ㸸ⱥㄒ−3−

3. ヲ⣽᪥⛬

Thursday, 18 May 2017
9:30-10:15 am

Conference registration

10:15-10:30 am

OFFICIAL WELCOME
Dr. Sylke Tempel, Member of the Executive Board, German
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Kazumasa Kusaka, Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic
Foundation (JEF)

SESSION 1:
10:30-12:00 am

ESCAPING THE LOW GROWTH TRAP
x What are the lessons to be learned from low growth periods inJapan and Europe?
x What means are available to avoid getting stuck in second gear?
x What reform plans did the Japanese G7 presidency launch in2016?
x What can the German G20 Presidency do to tackle these
problems?

Speakers

Prof. Mitsuhiro Fukao, Professor Emeritus, Keio University
Alexander Schönfelder, Head of the Division 400 Basic Economic
Issues, International Economic and Financial Policy, Federal
Foreign Office
Dr. Klaus Günter Deutsch, Head of Research and Economic
Policy, Federation of German Industries (BDI)

Moderator:

Naoyuki Haraoka, Executive Managing Director, Japan Economic
Foundation (JEF)

12:00-1:00 pm

Lunch

−4−

SESSION 2:
1:00-2:30 pm

POPULISM, PROTECTIONISM, AND THE FUTURE OF
FREE TRADE
x In developed countries there is a growing distrust of
globalization and the benefits of free trade. The "Brexit"
decision is one example.
x What are the consequences for free trade? Is the world heading
to a new era of protectionism?
x What can be done to reconcile populism and regional
integration?
x What are the prospects for TTIP in Europe and RCEP and TPP
in the Asia Pacific Region?

Speakers:

Dr. Sota Kato, Executive Director, Tokyo Foundation; Professor,
International University of Japan
Tetsuro Fukunaga, Executive Director, Brussels Office, Japan
Machinery Center for Trade and Investment (JMC)
Dr. Claudia Schmucker, Head of Globalization and World
Economy Program, DGAP
Dr. Ilja Nothnagel, Head of Division Foreign Trade Policy and Law,
Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry(DIHK)

Moderator:

2:30-3:00 pm

Dr. Henning Hoff, Executive Editor Berlin Policy Journal, DGAP

Coffee break−5−

SESSION 3:
3:00-4:30 pm

STAYING COMPETITIVE THROUGH DIGITALIZATIONx What are the opportunities and challenges of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution for G20 countries such as Germany andJapan?
x Are Europe and Japan adequately prepared to reap growth
opportunities through innovation and efficiency gains?
x What can we learn from leading digital economies like the USA?

Speakers

Toshiyuki Shiga, Vice Chairman, Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.
Michael Bültmann, Managing Director, HERE Deutschland GmbH
Dr. Andreas Rinke, Chief Political Correspondent, Reuters Berlin

Moderator:

Dr. Christian Mölling, Deputy Director of the Research Institute,
DGAP

4:30-4:50 pm

CLOSING CEREMONY
Dr. Sylke Tempel
Kazumasa Kusaka

5:00-6:00 pm

Reception−6−4. ฟᖍ⪅Ⓩቭ⪅ྵࡴィ 72 ྡ㸦Ặྡ࢔ࣝࣇ࢓࣋ࢵࢺ㡰㸧Harrison Addo

University of Applied Sciences HTW Berlin

Tuna Akarasu

BerlinDietrich Alexander

Senior Consultant, WMP EuroCom AG

Dr. Nagih Al-Obaidi

Journalist

Lukas Althoff

Economics & Technology Management

Olga Arany

BerlinBianca Becca

Free University Berlin

Dr. Friederike Bosse

Secretary General, Japanese-German Center Berlin

Michael Bültmann

Managing Director, HERE Deutschland GmbH

Stefan Dauwe

Managing Director, DGAP Consulting GmbH

Dr. Klaus Günter Deutsch

Head of Research and Economic Policy, Federation of German
Industries (BDI)Frank Fronzeck

Director, SecureSystem GmbH

Prof. Mitsuhiro Fukao

Professor Emeritus, Keio University

Tetsuro Fukunaga

Executive Director, Brussels Office, Japan Machinery Center
for Trade and Investment (JMC)

Thomas Giotitsas

Press and Communications Office, Greek Embassy

Dr. Eduard Gloeckner

Journalist

Dr. Wolfgang Glomb

BerlinHeiko Günther

Director, Pharmunion LLC

Naoyuki Haraoka

Executive Managing Director, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

Arne Harrendorf

Research Assistant, Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems Europe
GmbH

Takayuki Hirabayashi

Deputy Director-General, Japan External Trade Organization
Berlin Office (JETRO)

Dr. Henning Hoff

Executive Editor Berlin Policy Journal, DGAP

Inge Joachimski

BerlinTim Jones

I. Secretary, Economic, Trade & Development, Economic
Team, British Embassy

Dr. Sota Kato

Executive Director, Tokyo Foundation; Professor,
International University of Japan−7−

Dr. Elguja Khokrishvili

Minister-Counsellor (Economic Policy), Embassy of Georgia

Yuka Kida

Officer, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan

Dr. Tilo KlinnerDirector, Trade, Finance and Technology Policies, Federal
Foreign Office

Sebastian Klotz

Research Fellow, Consultant, World Trade Institute (WTI) andInternational Trade Center (ITC)

Kyung Sok Koh

Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Korea

Orloff Kurth

BerlinKazumasa Kusaka

Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

Hans-Dieter Lochmann

CEO, Leadership Institute GmbH

Yulia Loeva

Head of Event Management, DGAP

Dr. Felix P. Lutz

BerlinAsas Mahrad

Researcher, Consultant Urban Planning

Corinna Martin

University of Applied Sciences HTW Berlin

Hitoshi Masuda

Director General, Japan External Organization (JETRO)

Dr. Christian Mölling

Deputy Director of the Research Institute, DGAP

Abdul Mueed

University of Applied Sciences HTW Berlin

Lucinio Munoz

Counsellor, Economic and Trade, Embassy of Spain

Pilar Munoz

Counsellor (Trade), Embassy of Spain

Gabriela Navia

University of Applied Sciences HTW Berlin

Dr. Ilja Nothnagel

Head of Division Foreign Trade Policy and Law, Association ofGerman Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK)

Tonny Nowshin

University of Applied Sciences HTW Berlin

Dr. Arend Oetker

President, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Dr. Jennifer Pernau

Executive Assistant to the CEO Dr. Arend Oetker Holding
GmbH & Co. KG

Jennifer Pierotti

Senior Researcher, Representative Office in Paris, Japan Bankfor International Cooperation (JBIC)

Elizabeth Pond

Publicist

Ivo Reginka

Lawyer, Partner, REG Business Law Firm Reginka

Dr. Andreas Rinke

Chief Political Correspondent, Reuters Berlin

Wolfgang RothConsultant

Michael Schach

RWTH Aachen

Wilfried Schmidt

Vice Chairman, Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited

Dr. Claudia Schmucker

Head of Globalization and World Economy Program, DGAP

Rolf Schnelle

Berlin European Studies Program, FU Berlin−8−Alexander Schönfelder

Head of the Division 400 Basic Economic Issues, International
Economic and Financial Policy, Federal Foreign Office

Toshiyuki Shiga

Vice Chairman, Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.

Dongmin Shin

II. Secretary, Embassy of Korea

Dr. Silke Stahl-Rolf

Head of Team, Innovation Policy - Innovation Strategies,
Internationalisation, VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH

Dr. Volker Stanzel

Former German Ambassador to China and Japan

Kilian Strauss

Manager / Risk Advisory, Deloitte GmbH

Rachel Tausendfreund

Senior Editor, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Dr. Sylke Tempel

Member of the Executive Board, German Council on Foreign
Relations (DGAP)

Niels Thürigen

Consultant, Economic & Finance, Economic Team, British
Embassy

Dr. Serhat Ünaldi

Senior Manager, Asia-Pacific-Committee of German Business,
Federation of German Industries (BDI)

Urs Unkauf

Humboldt Universität, Berlin

Tamas Váczi

Executive Assistant, Economist, The Central Bank of Hungary- Representative Office Hamburg

Dr. Thomas Voland

Lawyer, Freshfields

Lilian WeicheFree University Berlin

Muhammad Asif Zaman

University of Applied Sciences HTW Berlin

Dr. Michael Zickerick

Berlin−9−

5. ␎Ṕ
Michael BÜLTMANNManaging Director, HERE Deutschland GmbHMichael Bültmann was appointed managing director of HERE DeutschlandGmbH in November 2014, having served as managing director of Nokia
GmbH the previous six years. He joined Nokia in 2001 and held senior
controlling, legal, and governmental relations positions throughout thecompany in Germany and France. In addition, he has taught international business law at Lüneburg
University, and served as a board member of BITKOM, an association representing more than 2,400
digital companies in Germany.

Dr. Klaus Günter DEUTSCH
Head of Research, Industrial and Economic Policy, Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Dr. Klaus Günter Deutsch has been the head of the industrial and economic
policy research department at the Federation of German Industries(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, or BDI) since 2014. Prior to joining BDI,
he was senior economist with Deutsche Bank Research, the economics thinktank of Deutsche Bank. He joined DB Research in July 1996 where he worked as economist in theunit on Economic and Banking Policy, and European integration in the headquarters in Frankfurt.
After a one-year exchange stint with the Federal Chancellery in 1999/2000 at the desk for banking
and external economic relations, he founded and has directed the office of Deutsche Bank Researchin Berlin. Dr. Deutsch received his education in political science and economics from the Free
University of Berlin and spent a year as a Fulbright exchange student at George Washington
University, Washington, DC, in 1988/89. He completed his doctorate in political science at FU Berlinin 1995.

− 10 −

Prof. Mitsuhiro FUKAO
Professor Emeritus, Keio University
Professor Faculty of Economics, Musashino University
Mitsuhiro Fukao has been a Professor of Economics in the Faculty of Economics ofMusashino University since April 2017. He had been teaching at the Faculty of Business
and Commerce of Keio University in Japan for twenty years until March 2017. His
primary fields of expertise are financial regulations, international finance, monetary economics and policy. Fukao
has abundant publications in Japanese and in English on international finance, exchange rate policy, corporate
governance, and recently on financial system and its crisis. Prior to joining Keio University, Fukao was the Headof the Strategic Research Division of Research and Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan. Between 1991
and 1993, Fukao was a senior economist at the OECD in Paris and a G-10 secretary. In 1989 and 1990, he was asenior economist at the International Department of the Bank of Japan and a member of the Danielsson
subgroup of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. From 1983 to 1985, Fukao served as a senioreconomist at the Economic Planning Agency of Japan, and participated in drafting the official White Paper onJapanese Economy. Born in Japan, Fukao received his bachelor's degree in Engineering from Kyoto University in
1974. He was awarded a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Michigan in 1981. He is married to Masayo
Fukao, and has two children.

Tetsuro FUKUNAGA
Executive Director, Brussels Office, Japan Machinery Center for Trade and Investment (JMC)
Tetsuro Fukunaga currently holds the position of Executive Director of the Brussels
office of the Japan Machinery Center for Trade and Investment (JMC), where he
represents almost 250 Japanese machine manufacturers and trading companies. Prior tojoining JMC in 2013, he was the Director for Trade Policy at Large and for the Southwest
Asia Office at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2012, and the Counsellor in the National
Policy Unit of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Japanese Government in 2010. Mr. Fukunaga has a diverse
background in trade and energy – in addition to industrial policy – which he gained over his more than 20 yearsof work experience with the Japanese government.

− 11 −Naoyuki HARAOKA
Executive Managing Director, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)
Naoyuki Haraoka was born in Tokyo in 1955. After graduating from the University ofTokyo in 1978 (Bachelor of Economics), he joined the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI). Having been posted in the industrial policy section and theinternational trade policy section for several years, he was enrolled in a two year MPA(Master of Public Administration) programme at Woodraw Wilson School of Princeton University in the US on
a Japanese government sponsorship. After having acquired MPA at Princeton, he rejoined MITI in 1984 as an
economist. Since then he had been posted as Deputy Director and Director of a number of MITI divisions
including Research Division of International Trade Policy Bureau. He was also posted in Paris twice, firstly,
Principal Economist of Trade Bureau of OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development)from 1988 to 1992 and secondly Counselor to the Japanese Delegation of OECD from 1996 to 1999. Aftercoming back to MITI from his second stay in Paris, at the occasion of the government structural reform in 2001
when MITI was remodeled as METI (Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry) he joined the efforts to found
METI research institute, Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry as its Director of Administration.
He became Chief Executive Director of JETRO San Francisco in 2003 and stayed in San Francisco until 2006.
He was Director-General of METI Training Institute from 2006 until July, 2007 when he left METI permanently
and joined JEF as Executive Managing Director.

Dr. Henning HOFF
Executive Editor Berlin Policy Journal, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Dr. Henning Hoff is executive editor of Berlin Policy Journal and editor-at-large ofInternationale Politik, both published by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
He joined DGAP in 2011, after nearly a decade as foreign correspondent in London, where
he worked for German and international media, including DIE ZEIT/ZEIT online,Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, International Herald Tribune, and TIME. He is also co-founder and director of theWELTKIOSK publishing company (London/Berlin) which specializes in international journalism. An international
historian by training, he holds a PhD in Contemporary History from Cologne University, Germany (2001).

− 12 −

Dr. Sota KATO
Executive Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Tokyo Foundation
Professor, International University of Japan
After earning a law degree (LLM) from the University of Tokyo in 1991, Dr.
Sota Kato joined the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry(MITI). His positions at MITI have included assistant director for the Aircraftand Defense Industries Division, deputy director for the International Economic Division, and seniorresearch fellow for the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). After turning toacademia, he has served as a Professor at the International University of Japan since 2006. He has
held several positions at policy think tanks, including executive director of research and senior fellow
at the Tokyo Foundation, senior fellow at the Canon Institute of Global Strategy, and senior fellow
at the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute. His research interest includes comparative political
economy, political methodology, and Japanese political economy. He received the Nikkei Prize for
Economics Books in 2001, the Jiro Osaragi Rondan Prize (Asahi Shimbun) in 2002, and the Best
Paper Award at the Society of Advancement of Socio-Economics in 2012. He received his MBAwith honors from Harvard Business School and his PhD in political science from the University ofMichigan.

Kazumasa KUSAKA
Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)
Kazumasa Kusaka has been Chairman and CEO of the Japan Economic
Foundation (JEF) since April 1, 2013, and is also a Professor at the University ofTokyo Graduate School of Public Policy. He previously served for 36 years inJapan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), rising to become viceminister for international affairs in the reorganized Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in
2004. During his long career in public service, Kusaka was seconded to the International Energy Agency(IEA)/OECD and was Japan’s senior official for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). He playeda central role in Asia’s economic integration, promoting FTAs in the region as well as serving as a senior
official negotiating the Doha development agenda of the WTO. He was head of Japan’s Energy Agency
and held director-general positions in technology and environmental policy, in addition to trade andinvestment-related areas within METI. He was also instrumental in finalizing the Kyoto Protocol, anddeveloping Japan’s energy and environment policies. Among many other posts Kusaka has held are Special
Adviser to the Prime Minister on Global Warming, senior vice president of Mitsubishi Electric, executive
adviser to Dentsu Inc., and president of the Japan Cooperation Center for the Middle East.

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Dr. Christian MÖLLING
Deputy Director of the Research Institute, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Dr. Christian Mölling has been deputy director of DGAP’s research institute in
Berlin since February 2017. Before joining DGAP, he held research and leadership
positions with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), theInternational Security Research Division at the German Institute for Internationaland Security Affairs (SWP), the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, and the Hamburg Institute for
Peace Research and Security Policy. He has been a visiting fellow at the European Union Institute for Security
Studies, Paris, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, and the Fondation pour la recherche
stratégique, Paris. He studied politics, economics, and history at the Universities of Duisburg and Warwick
and holds a doctoral degree from Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich.

Dr. Ilja NOTHNAGEL
Head of Division Foreign Trade Policy and Law, Association of German Chambers ofCommerce and Industry (DIHK)
Dr. Ilja Nothnagel has been the managing director for international economic policy at
the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Deutscher Industrieund Handelskammertag, or DIHK) since February 2016. Before that, he worked at DIHK
as adviser to the president (2014-2016), the director for foreign trade, principle issues and promotion (20112014), and the director for corporate succession and corporate consolidation (2008-2011). Before joining DIHK,
he was a consultant focusing on location development and economics with the Stade Elbe-Weser Region’s
Chamber of Commerce. Dr. Nothnagel studied economics at Humboldt University in Berlin, earning his
doctorate in 2010.

Dr. Andreas RINKE
Chief Political Correspondent, Reuters Berlin
Dr. Andreas Rinke is Reuters’ chief political correspondent in Berlin. One ofGermany’s foremost “Hauptstadt-journalists” and a close observer of German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, he covers not only German politics and international
affairs, but also developments related to Industrie 4.0 and the digitizing ofGermany’s economy. His publications include Elf Drohende Kriege (“Eleven Looming Wars,” 2ndedition 2015, with Christian Schwägerl) and a highly-acclaimed Merkel lexicon (2016).

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Dr. Claudia SCHMUCKER
Head of Globalization and World Economy Program, German Council on Foreign
Relations (DGAP)
Dr. Claudia Schmucker has been head of DGAP's Globalization and World
Economy Program since 2002. She has published extensively on European andTransatlantic Trade Policy, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Doha
Round as well as on the role of informal global forums such as the G7 and the G20. She studied atRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität in Bonn, at Elmira College in New York State, and at Yale
University. She holds an MA in North American studies and a PhD in economics from the Free
University of Berlin.

Alexander SCHÖNFELDERHead of the Division 400 Basic Economic Issues, International Economic and Financial Policy, Federal Foreign Office
Alexander Schönfelder was born in Marburg in 1963. From 1989 to 1993, he worked with the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization; after that, he worked for the Federal Foreign Office,with postings in Washington, Bangkok, Tokyo, Baghdad, and Algiers. In 2014 he became the head of
the Foreign Ministry's Division for International Economic and Financial Policy and Trade Policy.

Toshiyuki SHIGA
Member of the Board of Directors, Vice Chairman, Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.
Chairman and CEO, Member of the Board of Innovation Network Corporation
Toshiyuki Shiga is a member of the Board of Directors, Vice Chairman of
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. Before assuming his current position in November
2013, Shiga acted as Chief Operating Officer from 2005, and as Senior Vice
President in charge of the general overseas market (GOM) Sales & Marketing division from 2000 to
2005. Since joining NML in 1976, Shiga has held a number of positions in Sales operations in Asia
and Corporate Planning. From 1991 to 1997, he has served as a General Manger of Jakarta office,
Asia, and Oceania. He has also served as Chairman and CEO, Member of the Board of Innovation
Network Corporation of Japan since June 2015. Shiga holds a degree from the faculty of economics
at Osaka Prefecture University.

− 15 −

Dr. Sylke TEMPELMember of the Executive Board, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Dr. Sylke Tempel is a member of the Executive Board of the German Council
on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Editor-in-Chief of Internationale Politik, aforeign policy magazine published by DGAP, lecturer at the Stanford Study
Center Berlin, and visiting professor at Stanford University. She studied
political science, Jewish studies, and history at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich andreceived her PhD from the University of the German Federal Armed Forces, Munich. Between 1993
and 2003 she was correspondent for major German language newspapers and magazines in Israel.
Among her publications are: Israel. Reise durch ein altes, neues Land (“Israel, Journey through an Old
New Land”), (2008) and Freya von Moltke. A Biography (2011).

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6. ㆟஦せ᪨㸦᪥ᮏㄒ㸧௨ୗࡢ᪥ᮏㄒࢧ࣐࣮ࣜࡣࠊඹദᅋయࢻ࢖ࢶእ஺ホ㆟఍㸦DGAP㸧࡛సᡂࡋࡓⱥᩥࢧ࣐ࣜ
࣮ࢆᙜ㈈ᅋ࡛௬ヂࡋࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ

ࢧ࣐࣮ࣜ㸦௬ヂ㸧᪥Ḣࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࣛ 2017
JEF-DGAP ᅜ㝿ࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘

Ⲩᾏࡢᾏ㊰ࢆᶍ⣴㸸ୡ⏺⤒῭ཬࡧᡂ㛗࡜㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶
2017 ᖺ 5 ᭶ 18 ᪥㸦ᮌ㸧࣋ࣝࣜࣥḼ㏄ࡢ࠶࠸ࡉࡘཬࡧ㛤఍ࡢ㎡➨ 3 ᅇ JEF-DGAP ᅜ㝿ࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘ࡣࠊDGAP ࡢࢩࣝࢡ࣭ࢸࣥ࣌ࣝ༤ኈࡢḼ㏄࠶࠸ࡉࡘཬࡧᅜ㝿⤒῭஺ὶ㈈ᅋ఍㛗 ᪥ୗ୍ṇẶࡢ⤂௓࡛㛤ᖥࡋࡓࠋ᪥ୗ ୍ṇ JEF ఍㛗᪥ୗ୍ṇẶࡣࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࡜᪥ᮏ཮᪉࡛㉳ࡁ࡚࠸ࡿ᰿ᮏⓗኚ໬ࢆᙉㄪࡋࡓࠋ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ
࡛ࡣ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࡢἼࡀࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࣭ࣉࣟࢪ࢙ࢡࢺࡢ೺඲ᛶ࡜⤒㊰࡟㛵ࡍࡿከࡃࡢ๓ᥦࢆ୍㋾ࡋ࡚ࡋࡲࡗࡓࠋࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘㛤ദ 10 ᪥๓࡟⾜ࢃࢀࡓࣇࣛࣥࢫ኱⤫㡿㑅ᣲࡣᏙ❧୺⩏ࡢᅜẸᡓ⥺ࡢᩋ໭࡟⤊ࢃࡗࡓ୍᪉࡛ࠊⱥᅜࡣ᫖ᖺ EU 㞳⬺ࢆᅜẸᢞ⚊࡛Ỵᐃࠊ⡿ᅜࡣᅜ㝿ἲࡸ㈠᫆つ⠊ࡢぢ┤ࡋࢆ⣙᮰ࡋࡓ኱⤫㡿ࢆ㑅ฟࡋࡓࠋࡇࡢ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒࡬ࡢ᚟
ᖐࡣࠊࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬ࡀఏ⤫ⓗ࡞ປാᕷሙࢆそࡋࡓ኱ࡁ࡞せᅉ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺㔜せ࡞ドᣐࡀ࠶ࡿ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣜࢬ࣒ࡀᘬࡁ㉳ࡋࡓ⤒῭ΰ஘࡬ࡢ 1 ࡘࡢ⟅࠼ࡔ࡜ㄝ᫂ࡉࢀ
࡚࠸ࡿࠋ୍᪉ࠊ᪥ᮏࡣேཱྀࡢᑡᏊ㧗㱋໬࡜࠸࠺㔜኱࡞ㄢ㢟࡜ྲྀࡾ⤌ࢇ࡛࠸ࡿࠋ᪥ᮏࡢேཱྀࡣᖺ㛫⣙ 1㸣ࡢ๭ྜ࡛ῶᑡࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊᑠつᶍᆅᇦࡢከࡃࡀࠊ⏕⏘ᛶ࡜㟂せࡀపୗࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺⎔ቃࡢ୰࡛⤒῭ⓗ࡟⏕ࡁṧࡿࡓࡵᚲṚ࡟ດຊࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡇࡢࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘ࡢ୺࡞ࢸ࣮࣐ࡣࠊᡂ㛗ࠊ㠉᪂ࠊ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࡢ 3 Ⅼ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ≉࡟ࠊࡇ− 17 −

ࡢ࠺ࡕࡢ 3 ࡘࡵࡢཎᅉ࡜࡞ࡗࡓഴྥ࡟ᑐฎࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ᭱ึࡢ 2 ࡘࢆ࡝࠺฼⏝ࡍࡿ࠿ࡀ㆟ㄽࡢ࣏࢖ࣥࢺ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࡜᪥ᮏ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࡢ኱ࡁ࡞ㄢ㢟ࡣࠊձᅜ㝿⤒῭⎔ቃ࡛㉳ࡇࡗ࡚࠸ࡿኚ໬ࡢ≛≅࡟࡞ࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊࡴࡋࢁࡇࢀࢆ฼⏝ࡋࠊղ⡿ᅜ࡜୰ᅜࡢ཮᪉
࠿ࡽࡢಖㆤ୺⩏ᨻ⟇࡟ᑐᢠࡋᅜ㝿㈠᫆⛛ᗎࢆᏲࡾࠊࡑࡋ࡚ճ฼┈ࡀᐩ⿱ᒙ࡟㞟୰ࡏࡎ☜ᐇ࡟ᆒ➼࡟㓄ศࡉࢀࡿࡼ࠺ࠊ࢖ࣥࢲࢫࢺ࣮ࣜ4.0 ࡬ࡢ㐺ᛂຊࢆⓎᒎࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
᪥ୗẶࡣ㔜せ࡞ࢫࢸࢵࣉࡢ 1 ࡘ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊEU࣭᪥ᮏ㛫ࡢ㈠᫆㛵ಀࢆ୍ᒙ῝ࡵࡿࡇ࡜ࡢ㔜せᛶࢆᙉㄪࡋࡓࠋ
᪥ୗẶࡣࠊJEF ࡸ DGAP ࡞࡝ࡢ⤌⧊ࡀࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀࡢᅜẸ࡟᝟ሗࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿୖ࡛ᯝࡓࡍ
࡭ࡁᙺ๭ࢆᙉㄪࡋ࡚Ⓨゝࢆ⤊࠼ࡓࠋྠẶࡣࠊࢢࣞࢩ࣒ࣕࡢἲ๎ࠕᝏ㈌ࡣⰋ㈌ࢆ㥑㏲ࡍࡿࠖࢆᘬ⏝ࡋࠊㄗࡗࡓ᝟ሗࡀࣈࣞࢢࢪࢵࢺ࣭࣮࢟ࣕࣥ࣌ࣥࢆỴᐃ࡙ࡅࡓ࡜ᣦ᦬ࡋࠊ୍⯡ᕷẸ࡟ࡼࡾⰋ㉁ࡢ᝟ሗࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿດຊࡢ୍⎔࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊཧຍ⪅࡟ࡇࡢࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘ࡸࡑࡢ௚ࡢ
࢖࣋ࣥࢺ࡟㈉⊩ࡍࡿࡼ࠺ಁࡋࡓࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 1㸸పᡂ㛗ࡢ⨜࠿ࡽ⬺ฟࡍࡿ࡟ࡣ
㸦ࣔࢹ࣮ࣞࢱ࣮㸧ཎᒸ┤ᖾ JEF ᑓົ⌮஦ཎᒸẶࡣࠊࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 1 ࡢෑ㢌࡛ࠊ௒᪥ࡢᡂ㛗ၥ㢟ࡢ῝้ࡉࢆᣦ᦬ࡋࡓࠋᅜ㝿㏻㈌ᇶ㔠ࡣ 2017 ᖺୡ⏺⤒῭ࡢᡂ㛗⋡ࢆ 3.5㸣࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ2016 ᖺࡢ 3.1㸣࠿ࡽᨵၿࡍࡿ࡜ண ࡋࡓࡀࠊ኱ከᩘࡣⓎᒎ㏵ୖᅜ࡛ࡢᡂ㛗࡛࠶ࡿࠋඛ㐍ᅜ࡛ࡣ 2㸣ᡂ㛗࡜ࡢぢ㎸ࡳࡔࡀࠊࡑࢀ࡛
ࡶ᭱ࡶᮇᚅ࡛ࡁࡿࡢࡀࠊ㔠⼥༴ᶵ࠿ࡽ࣮ࣘࣟᅪࡼࡾഹ࠿࡛࠶ࡿࡀ࠺ࡲࡃᅇ᚟ࡋࡓ⡿ᅜࡀࡶࡓࡽࡍᜠᜨ࡜᥎ᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ࣮ࣘࣟᅪ࡛ࡣᡂ㛗⋡ࡣࢃࡎ࠿ 1.7㸣ࠊ᪥ᮏࡣ 1.2㸣ࡢࡳ࡜ࡢண ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ2018 ᖺ࡟ࡣࡇࢀࡽࡢᩘᏐࡣࡑࢀࡒࢀࠊ1.6㸣ࠊ0.6㸣࡟⦰ᑠࡍࡿ࡜ண
ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡋ࠿ࡋࠊEU ࡜᪥ᮏ࡛ࡣ┤㠃ࡍࡿㄢ㢟ࡀ␗࡞ࡿࠋ⌧᫬Ⅼ࡛ࡣࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃࡣᨻ἞ࡸ㈠᫆
㠃࡛ࡢᑗ᮶ⓗ࡞⤫ྜ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣศ⿣࡟↔Ⅼࢆᙜ࡚࡚࠸ࡿࠋࣈࣞࢢࢪࢵࢺࡢవἼࡀṧࡿ୰ࠊEU ࡢ୺せ࡞௵ົࡣࠊᚲせ࡞ᵓ㐀ᨵ㠉ࡢ᥎㐍ຊࢆ⥔ᣢࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ௚ࡢຍ┕ᅜࡀⱥᅜ࡟ᘬ
ࡁࡎࡽࢀ࡞࠸ࡼ࠺࡟Ᏺࡾࢆᅛࡵࡿࡇ࡜ࡔࠋ୍᪉᪥ᮏࡣࠊேཱྀᵓ㐀ࡢኚ໬࡜㛗ᮇ࡟ࢃࡓࡾ
᱁㜚ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᫖ᖺ㸦2016 ᖺ㸧ࡢᅜໃㄪᰝ࡛ࡣ᪥ᮏࡢேཱྀࡣ 2010 ᖺࡢ 1 ൨ 2,800 ୓
ே࠿ࡽ 2015 ᖺࡢ 1 ൨ 2,700 ୓ே࡟⦰ᑠࡋࡓࠋࡇࡢῶᑡࡣࠊ⤒῭ᡂ㛗࡟┦ᛂࡢไ㝈ࢆࡶࡓࡽࡍࠋྠ᫬࡟ࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢᆅᇦࡢᅜࠎࡣ୙Ᏻᐃ࡞⎔ቃ࡛㈠᫆ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ⡿ᅜࡢࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒ
ࡣᵝࠎ࡞ᅜ㝿㈠᫆༠ᐃ࡟ᩛពࢆ♧ࡋࠊ௚ᅜ࡜ࡢ෌஺΅࡟㛵ᚰࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ୰ᅜࡣࠊᅜ
㝿㈠᫆ࡢ᧦ㆤ⪅࡛࠶ࡿ࡜୺ᙇࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊ⮬ᅜࡢ⏘ᴗࢆ➇த࠿ࡽᏲࡿ㞀ቨࢆ⠏࠸࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

− 18 −

࢔ࣞࢡࢧࣥࢲ࣮࣭ࢩ࢙࣮ࣥࣇ࢙ࣝࢲ࣮Ặࢩ࢙࣮ࣥࣇ࢙ࣝࢲ࣮Ặࡣࠊ♫఍ࡢᏳᐃ࡟࠾࠸࡚ᡂ㛗ࡀ㔜せ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᙉㄪࡋ࡞ࡀࡽヰࢆጞࡵࡓࠋ⏕⏘ᛶࡀ╔ᐇ࡟ྥୖࡍࡿ࡜ࠊ㈤㔠ࡀୖ᪼ࡋࠊḟ࡟ࡣ⏕άỈ‽ࡀ⥅⥆ⓗ࡟ୖ᪼ࡍࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ㏆ᖺࠊඛ㐍ᅜࡢᡂ㛗࡟ࡣ⏕⏘ᛶࡢྥୖࡀకࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋOECD㸦⤒῭༠ຊ㛤Ⓨᶵᵓ㸧࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊᐇ㝿ࡢ࢔࢘ࢺࣉࢵࢺ࡜ࡑࢀ࡟ᚲせ࡜ࡉࢀࡓ࢖ࣥࣉࢵࢺࢆẚ㍑ࡍࡿᡭẁ࡛࠶ࡿከせ⣲⏕⏘ᛶࡣࠊG7 ㅖᅜ࡛ࡣ೵⁫ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ࢖ࢱࣜ࢔࡛ࡣᚋ㏥ࡉ࠼ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ྠ᫬࡟ࠊᶵᲔタഛ࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࡀῶᑡࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡽ஧ࡘࡢ」ྜຠᯝࡣࠊປാຊ฼⏝⋡ࡢୖ᪼ࢆࡶࡓࡽࡋࠊඛ㐍ᅜ࡛ぢࡽࢀࡓ㈋ᙅ࡞ᡂ㛗⋡࡛ࡉ࠼ࠊࡋࡤࡋࡤປാ⏕⏘ᛶࡢྥୖ࡛
ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊປാ᫬㛫ࡢቑຍࡀཎᅉ࡛࠶ࡾࠊࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞≧ἣ࡟࠶ࡿປാ⪅ࡣࠊ㈤㔠ࡸ⏕άࡢ㉁ࡢᨵၿࢆ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣࡲࡗࡓࡃ⤒㦂ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࡶࡼࡃ࠶ࡿࠋ
ㄡࡶࡀ௙஦࡟ᑵ࠸࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࡟ࠊㄡࡶ᪼⤥ࡋ࡞࠸࡜࠸࠺ࡇࡢ㞠⏝ࡢࣃࣛࢻࢵࢡࢫࡀࠊ࣏ࣆ
ࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࡢ㔊ᡂࢆຓࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᢏ⾡㐍Ṍࡀࠊ㈠᫆௨ୖ࡟㞠⏝႙ኻࡢཎᅉ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜
ࡣ࠸࠼ࠊࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣜࢮ࣮ࢩࣙࣥࡢᜠᜨࡀ୙ᖹ➼࡟ศ㓄ࡉࢀ࡚ࡁࡓ࡜࠸࠺࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺࡢ
⪃࠼ࡣṇࡋ࠸ࠋ
ໟᣓⓗ࡞ᡂ㛗ࢆಁ㐍ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࡣࠊ࠿࡞ࡾࡢẁ㝵ࢆ㋃ࡴᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ⏕⏘⬟ຊ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ
➇த࡜ᢞ㈨ࡣᨻ⟇࡛ࣞ࣋ࣝዡບࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ࣐ࢡࣟ⤒῭ᨻ⟇࡜ᨻᗓ࡟ࡼ
ࡿ⫋ᴗカ⦎࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࡢ୧᪉ࢆ㏻ࡋ࡚㐩ᡂࡋ࠺ࡿࠋࢩ࢙࣮ࣥࣇ࢙ࣝࢲ࣮Ặࡣ㉁ࡢ㧗࠸ఏ⤫ⓗ࡞ᩍ⫱࡜ࠕࢫ࢟ࣝ࢔ࢵࣉࠖࡢ୧᪉ࠊ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣ᫬௦㐜ࢀ࡟࡞ࡗࡓ⏘ᴗ࡛ാࡃᚑᴗဨࢆ᪂
ࡋ࠸ศ㔝࡛ാࡅࡿࡼ࠺෌カ⦎ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᙉㄪࡋࡓࠋࡲࡓ᪂⯆௻ᴗࢭࢡࢱ࣮ࡢᨭ᥼ࡶ⾜ࢃࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
᭱ᚋ࡟ࠊ㈠᫆ࡣ㐣ཤ 1 ᖺࠊ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢ⌮⏤࡛೵⁫ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ1 ࡘࡵࡢ⌮⏤ࡣࠊከࡃࡢ௻
ᴗࡀ᭱⤊ᕷሙ࡟ࡼࡾ㏆ࡃ࡞ࡿࡼ࠺ࠊ⏕⏘⬟ຊࢆ⛣㌿ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࠋ2 ࡘࡵࡣࠊࡲࡍࡲࡍ
ከࡃࡢᅜࡀ㈠᫆ࣈࣟࢵࢡࢆ⤌⧊ࡍࡿࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡾࠊࣈࣟࢵࢡ㛫ࡢ㈠᫆༠ᐃࡣࠊྛᅜ㛫ࡢ㈠᫆༠ᐃࡼࡾ㐩ᡂࡀᅔ㞴࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࠋ3 ࡘࡵࡢ⌮⏤ࡣࠊ㐣ཤ 10 ᖺ㛫ࡢᅜ㝿㈠᫆ࡢᡂ㛗ࡢከࡃࡣࠊᐇ㝿ࠊ༢࡟୰ᅜࡢ⤒῭ᡂ㛗ࡢ㔜せᛶࡀ཯ᫎࡉࢀࡓࡔࡅ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࠊ୰ᅜࡢᡂ㛗ࡀ㕌໬ࡍࢀࡤࠊඹ࡟ᅜ㝿㈠᫆ࡢ࣮࣌ࢫࡶ㕌໬ࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋ

῝ᑿගὒᩍᤵ
᪥ᮏࡢྡ┠ GDP ࡣᶓࡤ࠸࡛᥎⛣ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊᐇ㉁ GDP ࡣᡂ㛗ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣ 1997
ᖺ࠿ࡽ 2013 ᖺࡲ࡛ࡢ᪥ᮏࡢࢹࣇࣞࢆ཯ᫎࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡇࡢഴྥࡣ᪥ᮏ㖟⾜ࡀ኱つᶍ࡟࣐ࢿ࣮ࢧࣉࣛ࢖㸦㏻㈌౪⤥㔞㸧ࢆᣑ኱ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛⤊ࢃࡗࡓࠋ㐣ཤ 20 ᖺ㛫ࠊ᪥ᮏ⤒῭ࡣ 1990ᖺ௦ᚋ༙ࡢ㔠⼥༴ᶵ࡜ 2008㸫09 ᖺࡢୡ⏺㔠⼥༴ᶵ࡛ᡴᧁࢆ⿕ࡾࠊ࡯ࡰ⥅⥆ⓗ࡟ࢹࣇࣞ࡟ⱞࡋࢇ࡛࠸ࡓࠋ⌧ᅾࠊ㣗⣊࡜࢚ࢿࣝࢠ࣮ࢆ㝖እࡋࡓᾘ㈝㈈ࡍ࡭࡚ࢆྵࡴࠕࢥ࢔࣭ࢥ࢔ࠖ

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ᾘ㈝⪅≀౯ᣦᩘ㸦CPI㸧㸦ࡇࡢᣦᩘࡣኚືࡋࡸࡍ࠸ࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ࡞≀౯ࡢືࡁࢆ⪃៖ࡋ࡞ࡃ࡚ࡼ࠸㸧ᇶ‽࡛ࡣࠊ᪥ᮏࡢ࢖ࣥࣇࣞ⋡ࡣ 0㹼1%ࡢ㛫࡛᥎⛣ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ⤒῭ࡣ₯ᅾⓗGDP ࡢỈ‽࡛㐠⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᪥ᮏࡢࢹࣇࣞࡣ⤊⤖ࡋࠊປാᕷሙࡣ㠀ᖖ࡟㐕㏕ࡋࡓ≧ἣ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ᪥ᮏࡢேཱྀῶᑡ࡛ࠊᡂ㛗࡟ࡣ㝈⏺ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ᪥ᮏࡀ⡿ᅜ࡟༉ᩛࡍࡿᖺ⋡ 1.5㸣ࡢ⏕⏘ᛶୖ᪼⋡ࢆ㐩ᡂࡋࡓ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊ
ᖺ 1㸣ࡢேཱྀῶᑡࡣࠊ
GDP ᡂ㛗⋡ࢆ 1 ᖺ࠶ࡓࡾ 0.5㸣㜼ᐖࡍࡿࠋேཱྀῶᑡࡣ╔ᐇ࡟ປാ౪⤥ࡀῶᑡࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆព࿡ࡍࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊᅜෆ㟂せࡀᜏᖖⓗ࡟ῶᑡࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ୰ࠊ௻ᴗࡣᅜෆ⏕⏘⬟ຊ࡟ᢞ㈨ࡍࡿ࢖ࣥࢭࣥࢸ࢕ࣈࡀ࡯࡜ࢇ
࡝࡞ࡃࠊປാ⏕⏘ᛶࡢྥୖࢆࡶࡗ࡚ࡋ࡚ࡶປാ⪅ᩘࡢῶᑡࡣ⿵࠺ࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ࠋᐇ㝿ࠊ
1990 ᖺ࡟ࣆ࣮ࢡࢆ㏄࠼ࡓ᪥ᮏࡢ₯ᅾⓗ࡞ປാᢞධ㔞ࡣࠊࡑࢀ௨᮶ῶᑡࡋ⥆ࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡇࢀࡽࡢ㞀ᐖ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊ᪥ᮏࡢ௻ᴗ฼┈ࡣዲㄪ࡛ࠊ฼┈ᑐ GDP ẚ⋡ࡣ 1980 ᖺ௦ᚋ༙ࡢ᪥ᮏࡢࣂࣈࣝ᭱┒ᮇࡢࡑࢀ࡜ẚ࡭࡚ 1.4 ಸ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᪥⤒ 225 ✀ᖹᆒᰴ౯ࡣࠊᵓᡂ௻ᴗࡢከࡃࡀࡶࡣࡸᛴ㏿࡞ᡂ㛗ࡣ࡞࠸኱௻ᴗࡸྂཧࡢ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࡶ࠶ࡾࠊ
ẚ㍑ⓗప࠸Ỉ‽ࡔࡀࠊᮾிドๆྲྀᘬᡤࡢ᫬౯⥲㢠ࡣ࠿࡞ࡾ㧗࠸ࠋࡇࡢ⤒῭ⓗ೺඲ᛶࢆᣢ⥆ⓗ࡞ᡂ㛗࡟ኚ࠼ࡿ࡟ࡣࠊ᪥ᮏࡣປാຊ౪⤥ࡢῶᑡ࡟ࢸࢥධࢀࢆࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ῝ᑿᩍᤵࡣ⛣Ẹ㞀ቨࢆపࡃࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛㐩ᡂ࡛ࡁࡿྍ⬟ᛶࢆ♧၀ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋປാຊࡢ㟂せࡀ㧗࠸࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊ᪥ᮏࡣᖺ㛫⣙ 70,000 ேࡢ⛣Ẹࡋ࠿ཷࡅධࢀ
࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋᐇ㝿ࠊᏳಸ᫴୕㤳┦ࡣࣅࢨࡸ⁫ᅾチྍ࡬ࡢ࢔ࢡࢭࢫࢆ⦆࿴ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ௨๓ᥦ
᱌ࡋࡓࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢᨻ⟇ᥦ᱌ࡀ෌Ⓩሙࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡣ࠶ࡿࠋ

ࢡࣛ࢘ࢫ࣭ࢠࣗࣥࢱ࣮࣭ࢻ࢖ࢳࣗ༤ኈ
ࢻ࢖ࢳࣗ༤ኈࡢヰࡣୡ⏺⤒῭ࡢᨵၿ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᴫほࡍࡿࡇ࡜࠿ࡽጞࡲࡗࡓࠋ୰ᅜࡣ 2017ᖺࡢᡂ㛗ண

ࢆ 6.5㸣࡟ᘬࡁୗࡆ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊୡ⏺ⓗᐇ㉁ᡂ㛗⋡ࢆ 3.5㸣࡞࠸ࡋ 3.6㸣࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࡜᪥ᮏࡢᬒẼᚠ⎔ࡢᨵၿࡣࠊࡑࡢࢠࣕࢵࣉࢆ࠸ࡃࡽ࠿ᇙࡵࡿࡶࡢ࡛ࠊ
ࡇࢀࡣᴫࡋ࡚㔠⼥༴ᶵ࡟ຠᯝⓗ࡟ᑐᛂࡋ࡚ࡁࡓࡑࢀࡒࢀࡢ୰ኸ㖟⾜ࡢാࡁ࡟ࡼࡿࡶࡢ
࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊࡇࢀࡣࡍ࡭࡚ࡀ㡰ㄪ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺ព࿡࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ⡿ᅜࡢぢ㏻ࡋ࡛ࡣࠊ⌧ᅾ 2017ᖺ࡟ 2.5㸣ࡢᡂ㛗ࢆぢ㎸ࢇ࡛࠸ࡿࡀࠊࡑࢀࡣࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒࡀ㈈ᨻᨻ⟇࡜⛯ไᨵ㠉ࢆᡂຌ⿬࡟㐍ࡵࡿ࡜࠸࠺๓ᥦ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚࠾ࡾࠊ๓ᥦࡣ㐣ᗘ࡟ᴦほⓗ࡛࠶ࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡶ࠶ࡿࠋᨻ
ᶒ⮬యࡣ⌧ᅾ」ᩘࡢ࣓ࣥࣂ࣮ࡀࣟࢩ࢔࡜ࡢ㛵ಀࢆࡵࡄࡿࢫ࢟ࣕࣥࢲࣝࡢ ୰࡟࠶ࡾࠊඹ
࿴ඪࡀከᩘࢆ༨ࡵࡿ㆟఍ࡣࠊඪࡢ❧ἲୖࡢ᭱ඃඛㄢ㢟࡛࠶ࡿࠊ⌧Ꮡࡍࡿಖ೺་⒪ἲࢆࠕᗫṆࡋ⨨ࡁ᥮࠼ࡿࠖ࡜࠸࠺⣙᮰ࢆᯝࡓࡍ࡭ࡃⱞᚰࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ௒ኟ࡟ࡣࠊඹ࿴ඪࡣᨻᗓࡢ஦
ᴗ࡟㈨㔠ࢆ౪⤥ࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ᪂ண⟬ࢆᡂ❧ࡉࡏ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ㐣ཤ࡟ㄽதࢆ
ᣍ࠸ࡓࣉࣟࢭࢫࠊᕪࡋ㏕ࡿമົୖ㝈࡟ࡶᑐฎࡋ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࠋ᭦࡟ᨻᶒࡀఱࡽ࠿ࡢ

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ᵓ㐀ᨵ㠉ࢆᡂຌ⿬࡟ࡸࡾ⤊࠼ࡓ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛࡟ᥦ᱌ࡉࢀࡓࢫࢸࢵࣉࡣᚲࡎࡋࡶࠊ⤒῭Ꮫ⪅ࡀ᥎ዡࡍࡿࠊࡶࡋࡃࡣዲࡴࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡣ㝈ࡽ࡞࠸ࠋ୰ᅜࡣࠊࡇࡢ㛫⊂⮬ࡢࣞࢺࣜࢵࢡ࡜▩┪ࡍࡿᑐ⟇ࢆ᪋ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ୰ᅜࡣ⮬⏤㈠᫆࡬ࡢᨭ
᥼ࢆ⾲᫂ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ⩦㏆ᖹ୺ᖍࡣࠊ1 ᭶ࢲ࣎ࢫ࡛㛤࠿ࢀࡓୡ⏺⤒῭ࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࣛࡢሙ࡛ࠕಖ
ㆤ୺⩏ࢆ㏣ồࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣᬯ࠸㒊ᒇ࡟⮬ศ⮬㌟ࢆ㛢ࡌ㎸ࡵࡿࡼ࠺࡞ࡶࡢࠖ࡜㏙࡭ࠊ୰ᅜࡣ
⡿ᅜࡀᯝࡓࡋ࡚ࡁࡓఏ⤫ⓗ࡞⮬⏤ᕷሙࡢ᧦ㆤ⪅࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢᙺ๭࡟㋃ࡳ㎸ࡴࡇ࡜ࢆ♧၀ࡋࡓࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊᐇ㝿ࡢᨻ⟇ࡣ㏫ࡢ᪉ྥ࡟ྥ࠸࡚࠸ࡿࠋᨻᗓࡣ㍺ධྍ⬟࡞〇ရࡢ⏕⏘ࢆᅜ᭷௻ᴗࡀ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜ࢆᨭ᥼ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊእᅜ௻ᴗࡀ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢ㒊㛛ࠊ≉࡟ࢧ࣮ࣅࢫ㒊㛛࡟㐍ฟࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᴟࡵ࡚ᅔ㞴࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
≧ἣࡣ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣⱝᖸⰋዲ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࣇࣛࣥࢫࡣ㔜せ〇ရᕷሙࡢᨵ㠉࡟ྲྀࡾ⤌ࡳࠊ࢖ࢱࣜ࢔ࡣྖἲไᗘ࡜ປാᕷሙࡢᨵ㠉ࢆᐇ᪋ࠊⱥᅜࡣ⏘ᴗ࡜ R&D㸦◊✲㛤Ⓨ㸧ࢭࢡࢱ࣮࡟ࡉࡽ࡞ࡿᢞ㈨ࢆࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ᳨ウࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋEU ࡛ࣞ࣋ࣝࡣࠊ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢ࢚ࢿࣝ
ࢠ࣮ࢭࢡࢱ࣮ᨵ㠉ࡀㄽ㆟ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊ㔠⼥ᕷሙࡸࢧ࣮ࣅࢫࢭࢡࢱ࣮࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㓄៖ࡣ୙༑ศ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ࡋ࠿ࡋࠊࢻ࢖ࢶࡣࠊከࡃࡢᅜࡀክ᝿ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡋ࠿࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ၥ㢟࡟ᑐᓖࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㈨㔠ࡢ㐣๫⵳✚࡛࠶ࡿࠋࢻ࢖ࢶࡣࠊ⤒ᖖ཰ᨭࡣᕧ㢠ࡢ㯮Ꮠ࡛࠶ࡿࡢ࡟ࠊ࢖ࣥࣇࣛᩚഛ࡜ᨵၿࠊ
࡜ࡾࢃࡅ IT ࢭࢡࢱ࣮࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࡀᴟ➃࡟ᑡ࡞࠸ࠋᐇ㝿ࠊࢻ࢖ࢶࡢ௻ᴗࡣࠊIT ࢖ࣥࣇࣛࡢ
୙㊊࡛ࠊ࡛ࡁࡿࡣࡎࡢ⏕⏘ᛶྥୖ࡟㝈⏺ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࢻ࢖ࢶࡣࠊ㐣ཤᩘᖺ㛫࡟ᮾ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ
ࡢ⛣Ẹࡸ㞴Ẹࡀὶධࡋࡓࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ⏕⏘ᛶࡢపୗࢆචࢀࡓ࡟㐣ࡂ࡞࠸ࠋᑗ᮶ⓗ࡟ࡣ࣋ࣝࣜࣥࡣࠊࣦ࢛ࣝࣇ࢞ࣥࢢ࣭ࢩࣙ࢖ࣈࣞ㸦Wolfgang Schäuble㸧㈈ົ┦ࡢᥦၐࡋࡓࠊ࠸ࢃࡺࡿࠕࣈࣛࢵࢡ࣭ࢮࣟ㸦㈈ᨻ㯮Ꮠ໬㸧ࠖᨻ⟇࡛࠶ࡿࣂࣛࣥࢫࡢྲྀࢀࡓண
⟬࠿ࡽࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ⏘ᴗࡢᑗ᮶࡬ࡢᢞ㈨࡟↔Ⅼࢆ⛣ࡍࡇ࡜ࡀ୙ྍḞ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࢻ࢖ࢳࣗ༤ኈࡣࠊ
GDP ࡢ 3.5㸣ࡣ R&D ࡟ὀຊࡋࠊ௚᪉࡛࢖ࣥࣇࣛᩚഛ࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࢆቑࡸࡋࠊ⛯㔠ࡣ㏆௦ⓗ〇㐀࡟࢖ࣥࢭࣥࢸ࢕ࣈࢆ୚࠼ࡿࡓࡵ࡟⦅ᡂࡋ࡞࠾ࡍࡇ࡜ࢆ᥎ዡࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋྠ᫬࡟ࠊ㞴Ẹࠊ⛣Ẹࠊప㈤㔠ປാ⪅ࢆ⼥ྜࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ປാᕷሙᨻ⟇ࢆㄪᩚࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 1㸫㉁␲ᛂ⟅ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 1 ࡛ࡢࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㉁ၥࡣࠊձG7 ࡜ G20 ࡀᐇ㝿࡟㐩ᡂࡋࡓ࠸࡜⪃࠼࡚࠸ࡓࡇ࡜ࡣఱ࠿ࠊղ᪥ᮏ࡜ࢻ࢖ࢶࡢ᪂⯆௻ᴗࡸ୰ᑠ௻ᴗ࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࢆಁ㐍ࡍࡿ᪉ἲࠊࡑ
ࡋ࡚ճ⌧ᅾࡢ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࡜᪥ᮏࡢ㈇മ≧ἣ࠿ࡽ⪃࠼࡚࡝ࡇ࠿ࡽࡉࡽ࡞ࡿᢞ㈨ࢆ࿧ࡧ㎸ࡴࡢ࠿ࠊ࡟㞟୰ࡋࡓࠋ
᭱ึࡢ㉁ၥ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡣࠊࣃࢿࣜࢫࢺࡢ㛫࡛ࡣࠊG7 ࡜ G20 ࡢ୺࡞┠ᶆࡢ 1 ࡘࡣ⡿ᅜࠊࡑࡋ࡚ⱝᖸ㔜せᗘࡣୗࡀࡿࡶࡢࡢ୰ᅜࡀୡ⏺㈠᫆ࡢ⛛ᗎࢆ஘ࡍࡢࢆ㜵ࡄ࡜࠸࠺༢⣧࡞ࡇ− 21 −

࡜࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ពぢࡀ୍⮴ࡋࡓࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢ⤌⧊ࡣࠊ㏆࠸ᑗ᮶ఱ࠿㔝ᚰⓗ࡞᪂ࡓ࡞ࣉࣟࢪ࢙ࢡ
ࢺ࡟╔ᡭࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡣప࠸ࡀࠊ⡿ᅜࡀᅜ㝿㈠᫆༠ᐃ࠿ࡽ᧔㏥ࡋࡓࡾࠊ㔜኱࡞㈠᫆㞀ቨࢆ⠏࠸ࡓࡾࡍࡿሙྜࡢ⿕ᐖࡢ㍍ῶ࡟↔Ⅼࢆᙜ࡚ࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠊ࡜࠸࠺Ⅼ࡟ࣃࢿࣜࢫࢺࡣྠពࡋ
ࡓࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊࢺࣝࢥ࡜࢖ࣥࢻࢆ⤫ྜ࡟ຍ࠼ࡿാࡁ࠿ࡅࡣྍ⬟ࡔࢁ࠺࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋ
᪂⯆௻ᴗࡸᑠつᶍ௻ᴗ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ≉ᐃࡢᨻ⟇࡟ᐇ㝿࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡞ຠᯝࡀ࠶ࡿࡢ࠿ࢆ㏙࡭ࡿࡢࡣ㞴ࡋ࠸ࠋ࢖ࣥࣇࣛᩚഛࡣ᪂௻ᴗࡢ๰タࢆಁࡍ୍Ṍ࡜࡞ࡿࡀࠊࡼࡾ୍ᒙᠱᛕࡉࢀࡿ
ࡢࡣࠊᡂຌࡋࡓ᪂⯆௻ᴗࡣࡋࡤࡋࡤࠊࡉࡽ࡟つᶍࡢ኱ࡁ࠸⡿ᅜࡸ୰ᅜࡢ௻ᴗ࡟㈙཰ࡉࢀ
ࡿ࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜ࡔࠋࡇࡢ㉁ၥ࡟ᛂ࠼ࡿ࡟ࡣࠊ⡿ᅜࡸ୰ᅜࡢ௻ᴗ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ
ࠕ᪥ᮏ௻ᴗࠖ
ࠕࢻ࢖ࢶ௻ᴗ࡛ࠖ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡣࠊ࡝࠺࠸࠺ࡇ࡜࠿࡜࠸࠺ࠊࡼࡾಠ▔ⓗ࡞㆟ㄽࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡘࡲ
ࡾࠊ⏕⏘ࡢࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ໬࡜࠸࠺≧ἣୗ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᡤ᭷ࡀࠊࡑࡢ஦ᴗᣐⅬ࡜ྠ⛬ᗘࡢ⤒῭ᙳ㡪ຊࢆᣢࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿࡝࠺࠿࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜ࡔࠋ
᭱ᚋ࡟ࠊ୍㒊ࡢ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃㅖᅜࡣ㈇മ࡟ⱞࡋࢇ࡛࠸ࡿࡀࠊࢻ࢖ࢶࡣࡑ࠺࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ࣋ࣝ
ࣜࣥࡣࠊᑗ᮶࡟ᑐࡍࡿᢞ㈨ࢆ⾜࠺వ⿱ࢆ༑ศᣢࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡶࡋࠕࣈࣛࢵࢡ࣭ࢮࣟࠖᨻ⟇ࢆẼ࡟ࡋ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ᭦࡟వ⿱࡛࠶ࡿࠋ୍᪉ࠊ᪥ᮏࡣ῝้࡞㈇മࡢၥ㢟ࢆᢪ࠼࡚࠸ࡿࠋ2016
ᖺ࡟ GDP ࡢ 250㸣࡟㐩ࡋࡓከ㢠ࡢ㈇മࢆᘬࡁཷࡅࡿࡓࡵ࡟ప㔠฼ࢆ᥇⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊ
ᴫࡋ࡚ᙉ࠸⤒῭࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎ⛯ࡢᘬࡁୖࡆ࡟᢬ᢠࡋ࡚ࡁࡓࠋ⛯ࡢᘬࡁୖࡆࡣ࠾ࡑࡽࡃ
ᐜㄆࡉࢀࠊ࢖ࣥࣇࣞࡣᅜࡢ㈇മ㈇ᢸࢆ㍍ῶࡍࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 2㸸࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࠊಖㆤ୺⩏ࠊࡑࡋ࡚⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶
㸦ࣔࢹ࣮ࣞࢱ࣮㸧࣊ࢽࣥࢢ࣭࣍ࣇ༤ኈ
࣍ࣇ༤ኈࡣࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ࡜᪥ᮏࡢ཮᪉࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࠊ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࠊಖㆤ୺⩏࡜⮬⏤㈠᫆࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢ㛵ಀࡀ㔜せ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᙉㄪࡋࠊࡇࡢࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥࢆ㛤ጞࡋࡓࠋ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡣࠊⱥᅜ࡛ࡢ
ࣈࣞࢢࢪࢵࢺᢞ⚊࠿ࡽ⡿ᅜ࡛ࡢࢻࢼࣝࢻ࣭ࢺࣛࣥࣉ኱⤫㡿ࡢ㑅ฟࡲ࡛ࠊ㐣ཤ 1 ᖺ㛫࡟ᩘከࡃࡢᡴᧁࢆཷࡅࡓࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ㑅ᣲᡓ୰ࢺࣛࣥࣉẶࡣ୰ᅜࠊ᪥ᮏࠊࢻ࢖ࢶࢆྠิ࡟ጾᄐ
ࡋࡓࡀࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉẶࡢ㈠᫆ᨻ⟇ࡣ࡝࠺࠸࠺ࡶࡢ࠿ࠊ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣ᪥ᮏࡸ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃࡀࡑࢀ࡟
࡝࠺ᑐᛂ࡛ࡁࡿ࠿ࡣࠊᮍࡔ࡟୙࡛᫂࠶ࡿࠋ

ࢡࣛ࢘ࢹ࢕࢔࣭ࢩ࣐ࣗࢵ࣮࢝༤ኈ
ࢩ࣐ࣗࢵ࣮࢝༤ኈࡣࠊᖜᗈ࠸ほⅬ࠿ࡽᅜ㝿㈠᫆ࡢ⾜᪉ࢆ♧ࡋࡓࠋ㈠᫆ࡀ╔ᐇ࡟ቑຍࡋ࡚
ࡁ 2 ୡ௦㸦Generation㸧ࡢᮇ㛫ࡢᚋࠊ₻ὶࡣኚࢃࡾጞࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡍ࡞ࢃࡕୡ⏺⤒῭ࡢᡂ㛗ࡀῶ㏿ࡋࠊ୙ᖹ➼ࡀቑ኱ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࡛ࡣ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᜠᜨࡀ␲ၥどࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ୍᪉ࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒࡣ⡿ᅜࡢ㈠᫆ᨻ⟇ࢆそࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ – TPP㸦⎔ኴᖹὒࣃ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮
ࢩࢵࣉ㸧࠿ࡽࡢ᧔㏥࡜ࠊ⡿ᅜࡀᑗ᮶ WTO㸦ୡ⏺㈠᫆ᶵ㛵㸧ࡢ⣮தゎỴ࣓࢝ࢽࢬ࣒ࢆᚲ

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ࡎࡋࡶᏲࡽ࡞࠸࡜࠸࠺ኌ᫂ࡣࠊಖㆤ୺⩏ࡢ᫬௦ࡀ௒ᚋࡸࡗ࡚᮶ࡿ࡜ࡢᠱᛕࢆច㉳ࡋࡓࠋ
3 ᭶࡟㛤࠿ࢀࡓࣂ࣮ࢹࣥࣂ࣮ࢹ࡛ࣥࡢ G20 ఍ྜࡣຬẼ࡙ࡅࡽࢀࡿࡶࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠿ࡗࡓࠋ
ࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒࡣࠊᨻᶒ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚᭱ึࡢᅜ㝿ࢧ࣑ࢵࢺࡢ 1 ࡘ࡜࡞ࡿࡇࡢ఍㆟ࢆ฼⏝ࡋ࡚ࠊ
ྛᅜࡢ㈈ົ㛶൉࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊ㈠᫆ࡢ⮬⏤࡜㛤ᨺࢆ⥔ᣢࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺ఏ⤫ⓗ࡞බ⣙㸦ཬࡧẼೃኚື࡜㜚࠺ࡓࡵࡢ㈨㔠ᥦ౪ࡢດຊ㸧ࢆ཯ᨾ࡟ࡍࡿࡼ࠺ᅽຊࢆ࠿ࡅࡓࠋࡑࡢᚋࡢ఍㆟࡛ࡣࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒࡢ௦⾲ࡣࠊ㐺ษ࡜ุ᩿ࡋࡓሙྜࠊ⡿ᅜࡣಖㆤ୺⩏ⓗᥐ⨨ࢆ᥇⏝ࡍࡿᶒ฼ࢆ
᭷ࡍࡿ࡜㏙࡭ࡓࠋ
ࡇ࠺࠸ࡗࡓኚ໬ࡣࠊᵝࠎ࡞Ⅼ࡛ᅜ㝿㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶ࢆኚ࠼ࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃࡢ㈠᫆ᨻ⟇ࡢ↔Ⅼࡣᮾ᪉࡟ࢩࣇࢺࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ⡿ᅜࡣࡶࡣࡸಙ㢗࡛ࡁࡿࣃ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮࡛ࡣ࡞࠸
࡜࡞ࢀࡤࠊEU ࡣ୍ᒙ୰ᅜ࡜᪥ᮏ࡜ࡢ㈠᫆༠ᐃࢆᅛࡵࡿດຊࢆࡍࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ୰ᅜࡣ㞴ࡋ࠸࡜࡞ࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ – ᚲṚ࡟ࣞࢺࣜࢵࢡࢆ୪࡭࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊ୰ᅜᨻᗓࡣ㏫࡟㈠᫆࡟㔜኱࡞㞀ቨࢆ⥔ᣢࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᪥ᮏ࡜ࡢ㛵ಀࡣࡎࡗ࡜⡆༢ࡔ࡜ࢃ࠿ࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ࣓ࣝࢣࣝ㤳┦࡜Ᏻಸ㤳┦ࡣࠊ᫖ᖺࠊ᪥࣭EU 㛵ಀࡢ㔜せᛶ࡜㔝ᚰⓗ࡞᪂㈠᫆༠ᐃ࡬ࡢ㛵ᚰࢆᙉㄪࡋࡓࠋ
EU ࡣࡲࡓࠊᅜ㝿㈠᫆ࡢᯟ⤌ࡳࢆᙉ໬ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟௚ࡢࣃ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮ࢆ᥈ࡍྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ –ࢩ࣐ࣗࢵ࣮࢝༤ኈࡣࡍ࡛࡟ྲྀࡾ⤌ࡲࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ࣓࢟ࢩࢥ࡜࣓ࣝࢥࢫ࣮ࣝ㸦༡⡿༡㒊ඹྠᕷሙ㸧࡜ࡢ஺΅ࡢ㔜せᛶࢆ㏙࡭࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

ຍ⸨๰ኴᩍᤵ
ຍ⸨ᩍᤵࡣࠊ⤒῭Ꮫ⪅ࡣಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿព⩏ࢆ⌮ゎࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ࡛ࡁࡎࠊᨻ἞Ꮫ⪅ࡣ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿព⩏ࢆ⌮ゎ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸࡜ᣦ᦬ࡋࠊ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࡢ᰿※࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢ
᳨ウࢆ㛤ጞࡋࡓࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆࡟ࡣࠊ⤒῭ⓗ฼┈ࡣ࠶ࡿࡀᨻ἞ⓗࣁ࢖ࣜࢫࢡࡀక࠺
ࡓࡵࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࢆᡓ␎ⓗ࡟ไ㝈ࡋࡓ࠸ㄏᝨࡀᖖ࡟ᨻ἞ᐙ࡟ࡘࡁࡲ࡜࠺ࠋ㈠᫆㞀ቨࡀసࡽࢀࡿࡢࡣ࡯ࡰᙜ↛ࡢ⌧㇟࡛࠶ࡾࠊ⤒῭࡜ᨻ἞ࡢ㛫ࡢ㌵㎚࡜࡞ࡿࠋᩍᤵࡣࠊ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺࡢືࡁࡀᚲࡎࡋࡶಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ᨻ⟇࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿࢃࡅ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊᐇ
㝿ಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ᨻ⟇ࡀᚲࡎࡋࡶ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺ㐠ື࠿ࡽጞࡲࡗࡓࢃࡅ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸࡜ࡢ୺ᙇ
ࢆᒎ㛤ࡋࡓࠋಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ࡣࠊࡉ࠿ࡢࡰࢀࡤከࡃࡣ≉࡟ᙉຊ࡞฼┈㞟ᅋࡢᨻ἞ⓗ㐠ືࡢᙧࢆ࡜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ࢣ࣮ࢫ࡛ࡣࠊ࡜ࡾࢃࡅ㈠᫆ᨻ⟇ࡀᢳ㇟ⓗ࡛ᨻ἞ⓗ࡟┠❧ࡓ࡞࠸ሙྜࠊᑠつᶍ࡛⤫ไࡢ࡜ࢀࡓ㞟ᅋࡀࠊࡼࡾ኱つᶍ࡞཯㠃ࢥ࣑ࢵࢺࡢᗘྜ࠸ࡀᑡ࡞࠸
ᕷẸࢆᅽಽࡋࡓࠋࡇ࠺࠸ࡗࡓ㐠ືࡣࠊ୍ࡘࡢࢶ࣮ࣝ࡜ࡋ࡚࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࢆ฼⏝ࡋࠊ≉ᐃࡢ┠ᶆࢆ㐩ᡂࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟㈠᫆࡟ᑐࡍࡿ୍⯡኱⾗ࡢᩛព࡟௜ࡅධࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡣ࠶ࡿࡀࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡸಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏࡜࠸࠺ᖜᗈ࠸ཎ⌮࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡼࡾࡣࡴࡋࢁࠊ≉ᐃࡢศ㔝ෆࡢ≉ᐃࡢ㒊ศⓗ࡞㞟ྜయࡢ᮲௳࡟᭱⤊ⓗ࡞㛵ᚰࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ⌧ᐇ࡟ࡣࡇࡢ✀ࡢಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ࡣ࣏ࣆࣗࣜ
ࢫࢺࡢ୺ᙇ࡟㈇ࡅࡿࡇ࡜ࡶ࠶ࡿࠋᏳಸ㤳┦ࡣࠊ᫇࠿ࡽࡢ⮬Ẹඪᇶ┙ࡢ㑅ᣲ༊ࡀ TPP ࡟཯ᑐࡋࡓ࡜ࡁࠊ኱ከᩘࡢ᪥ᮏᅜẸ࡟ࡼࡿ TPP ཧຍ࡬ࡢᨭᣢ࡜ඹ࡟ࠊ⮬㌟࡟ᑐࡍࡿୡㄽ
ࡢ㧗࠸ᨭᣢ⋡ࢆ฼⏝ࡋ࡚ཷ┈ᅋయ࡟ࡼࡿ཯ᑐពぢࢆᢚ࠼㎸ࡴࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡓࠋ

− 23 −

࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺࡢືࡁࡀಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ⓗ࡞ᨻ⟇ࢆࡶࡓࡽࡍ᰿ᣐࡣ 4 ࡘ࠶ࡿࠋࡍ࡞ࢃࡕࠊձ㈠᫆࠿ࡽᚓࡽࢀࡿ฼┈ࡀᑡᩘ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㐣ᗘ࡟㓄ศࡉࢀࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿሙྜࠊղ᭷ᶒ⪅ࡀ༑ศ࡟᝟ሗࢆ୚࠼ࡽࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ሙྜࠊճ᭷ᶒ⪅ࡀ㠀ྜ⌮ⓗ࡞ሙྜࠊմ⤒῭Ꮫ⪅ࡀ㈠᫆ࡢ
฼┈࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ㄗࡗ࡚࠸ࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿሙྜ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
1 ࡘࡵࡢ᰿ᣐ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ⡿ᅜࡼࡾ࠺ࡲࡃ⾜ࢃࢀ࡚ࡁࡓ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃࡢᑐᛂࡢ౛ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ㛤࠿ࢀࡓ⤒῭ࡣࠊሀᅛ࡞♫఍⚟♴ᅜᐙ࡜୍ᑐ࡛࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࠋࡍ࡞ࢃࡕࠊᖹᆒⓗ࡞ᢞ⚊⪅ࡀࡼࡾ㇏࠿࡟࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࡼ࠺ࠊ㈠᫆࡟ࡼࡿ฼┈ࢆẚ㍑ⓗᆒ➼࡟㓄ศ࡛ࡁࡿࡼ࠺ಖドࡍࡿᅜᐙ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞෌ศ㓄ࡢ௙⤌ࡳࡀ࡞࠸࡜ࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᜠᜨࡣ๻ⓗ࡟୙ᆒ➼࡟࡞ࡾᚓࡿࡢ࡛ࠊ⤒῭୙ᖹ➼࡜࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺࡢᛣࡾࢆᣍࡃࠋ
2 ࡘࡵ࡜ 3 ࡘࡵࡢ᰿ᣐࡣ㛵㐃ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋඛ㐍Ẹ୺୺⩏ᅜᐙ࡛ࡣࠊ᭷ᶒ⪅ࡣ୍⯡࡟㠀ᖖ࡟㝈ࡽࢀࡓ᝟ሗࡋ࠿ᣢࡗ࡚࠾ࡽࡎࠊࠕྜ⌮ⓗ࡟↓▱࡛ࠖ࠶ࡿࠋᨻ⟇ࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࡸᨻᗓࡢᵓᡂ
ࢆᕥྑࡍࡿ⚊ᕪ࡟ཬࡰࡍಶࠎࡢᢞ⚊ࡢᙳ㡪ຊࢆ♧ࡉࢀ࡚ࡶࠊ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝ࡢேࡣࢃࡊࢃࡊ᝟
ሗࢆᚓࡼ࠺࡜ࡣࡋ࡞࠸ࠋࡇࢀࡣࣈࣞࢢࢪࢵࢺࡢᢞ⚊ࡢᚋ࡛≉࡟᫂ⓑ࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋ⤖ᯝࡀⓎ⾲ࡉࢀࡓ┤ᚋࡢ Google ᳨⣴ࡢࢺࢵࣉ࡟ࠊ
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ࠕEU ࢆ㞳⬺ࡍࡿ࡜ࡣఱࢆ
ព࿡ࡍࡿࡢ࠿㸽ࠖࠕ⚾ࡓࡕࡢ EU 㞳⬺Ỵᐃ࡛ࠊఱࡀ㉳ࡇࡿ࡜ᛮ࠺࠿㸽ࠖࡀ࠶ࡀࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࠋ
ࡇࢀࡣࡘࡲࡾࠊ᭷ᶒ⪅ࡣࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆࡜ಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࡀࡼࡾ⤒῭ⓗ⚟♴࡟᭷┈࡛࠶ࡿ࠿ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࡀࡋࡤࡋࡤ࠶ࡾࠊಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ⓗࣞࢺࣜࢵࢡࢆ᥇
⏝ࡍࡿᨻ἞ᐙ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚↓㜵ഛ࡟࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆព࿡ࡍࡿࠋࡇࡢࡇ࡜ࡣࠊ⌧Ꮡࡍࡿࠊࡲ
ࡓࡣ₯ᅾⓗ࡞㈠᫆ᨻ⟇ࡀᐇ㝿࡝ࢇ࡞ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍ࠿ࢆ᭷ᶒ⪅࡟▱ࡽࡏࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࡣࠊࢩࣥ
ࢡࢱࣥࢡࠊᏛ⪅ࠊ࠾ࡼࡧ࣓ࢹ࢕࢔࡟ࡼࡿᗈሗࡀ㔜せ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ᫂☜࡟♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

⚟Ọဴ㑻Ặ⚟ỌẶࡣ᪥ᮏࡢ TPP ཯ᑐὴࡢ≉ᚩࢆ㆟ㄽࡍࡿࡇ࡜࠿ࡽጞࡵࡓࠋᙼࡣࠊTTIP㸦኱すὒᶓ
᩿㈠᫆ᢞ㈨ࣃ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮ࢩࢵࣉ༠ᐃ㸧㸭CETA㸦࢝ࢼࢲ EU ໟᣓⓗ⤒῭㈠᫆༠ᐃ㸧࡟཯ᑐࡍࡿ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃᶓ᩿ⓗ࡞㐠ື࡜ࡢ⯆࿡῝࠸㢮ఝⅬࢆ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ᣦ᦬ࡋࡓࠋ
ࡣࡌࡵ࡟ࠊ཯ TPP ࣮࢟ࣕࣥ࣌ࣥࡣ཯⡿ឤ᝟ࢆ฼⏝ࡋࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ཯ᑐὴࡣ TPP ࡀ᪥ᮏᩥ໬ࢆ◚ቯࡍࡿ࡜୺ᙇࡋࡓࠋ࣮࢟ࣕࣥ࣌ࣥࡢ୰ᚰⓗ࡞㒊ศࡣࠊࢯ࣮ࢩࣕࣝࢿࢵࢺ࣮࣡
ࢡࢆຠᯝⓗ࡟ά⏝ࡋ࡚ࡑࡢ฿㐩⠊ᅖࢆ๻ⓗ࡟ᣑ኱ࡋࡓࠕTPP ࠿ࡽ᪥ᮏࡢ㣗࡜ᬽࡽࡋࠊ
࠸ࡢࡕࢆᏲࡿࢿࢵࢺ࣮࣡ࢡࠖ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㐠Ⴀࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠕ⪃࠼࡚ࡳࡼ࠺㸟 TPP ࡢࡇ࡜ࠖ࡜࠸࠺࢙࢘ࣈࢧ࢖ࢺࡀᢸࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࠋḟ࡟ࠊTPP ࢆྲྀࡾᕳࡃᡓ࠸ࡣࠊ࠶ࡿព࿡࡛ࡣࠊ᪥ᮏ
♫఍࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏࡀእࡢୡ⏺࡟ᑐࡋ࡚᭦࡟㛤࠿ࢀࡿ࡭ࡁࠊ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣ࠶ࡲࡾ㛤࠿ࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࡞࠸࡜࠸࠺ࡼࡾ኱ࡁ࡞㆟ㄽࡢ௦⌮ᡓத࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋẸ୺ඪࡣ཯ᑐὴ࡟ᑐࡋࠊ47 ࡢ㒔㐨ᗓ┴࡛ࢱ࣮࣑࣮࢘ࣥ࣍ࣝࢸ࢕ࣥࢢࢆ㛤ദࡋࠊ᪥ᮏࡢ་⒪࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ᫂☜࡟ࡋࠊ㎰ᴗປാ⪅࡬ࡢᡤᚓᨭ᥼ࢆྵࡵࠊTPP ࡀᵝࠎ࡞᪥ᮏࡢศ㔝࡟ཬࡰࡍᙳ㡪ࢆ⦆࿴− 24 −

ࡍࡿᡭẁࢆㅮࡌࡿࠊ࡜ࡢᗈሗ࣮࢟ࣕࣥ࣌ࣥࢆᒎ㛤ࡋࡓࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊẸ୺ඪࡣ TPP ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ᭱⤊ⓗ࡞❧ሙࢆỴࡋ࡚᫂☜࡟ࡋ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ – Ẹ୺ඪᨻᶒࡣࠊᅜẸࡢ཯Ⓨࢆᜍࢀ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏࡢཧຍࢆ⣙᮰ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣᣄྰࡋࡓࠋ᪥ᮏࡀබᘧ࡟ཧຍࢆ
ỴࡵࡓࡢࡣࠊᏳಸ᫴୕Ặ⋡࠸ࡿ⮬Ẹඪࡀ 2013 ᖺ࡟ᨻᶒࢆᘬࡁ⥅࠸࡛࠿ࡽ࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋTPPࡣࠊᏳಸ㤳┦ࡢࠕ࢔࣋ࣀ࣑ࢡࢫࠖ➨୕ࡢᰕ࡜ࡋ࡚఩⨨࡙ࡅࡽࢀࠊ᪂㤳┦ࡢ஺΅⬟ຊ࡟ᑐࡍࡿಙ㢗ࡢࡶ࡜࡛᪥ࡢ┠ࢆぢࡓࠋᏳಸẶࡣࠊTPP ࡀ୍᪉ⓗ࡞㛵⛯᧔ᗫࢆ᪥ᮏ࡟ᙉせࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣࡉࡏ࡞࠸࡜⣙᮰ࡋࡓࠋ᪥ᮏࡢ᭷ᶒ⪅ࢆᏳᚰࡉࡏࡿຠᯝࡀ࠶ࡗࡓ⣙᮰࡛࠶ࡿࠋᨻ
ᶒ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᅜẸࡢಙ㢗ࢆ⠏ࡁୖࡆࡓࡇ࡜࡛ࠊᏳಸ㤳┦ࡣㄽதࡢⓗ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓ TPP ஺
΅࡟᪥ᮏࡣཧຍࡍ࡭ࡁࡔ࡜⮬Ẹඪෆࡸᅜෆࡢ཯ᑐໃຊࢆㄝᚓࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡓࠋ
ࡑࢀࡒࢀࡢ⮬⏤㈠᫆༠ᐃࢆ๓㐍ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊEU ࡜᪥ᮏࡣつไ⎔ቃࡢㄪ࿴࡟ྥࡅ୍ᒙ
ከࡃࡢࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࠊᑗ᮶ࡢᅜ㝿ᇶ‽ࢆタᐃࡍࡿࡢ࡟ᙺ❧ࡘࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ

࢖࣮࣭ࣖࣀ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮ࢤࣝ༤ኈ
ࣀ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮ࢤࣝ༤ኈࡣࣈࣞࢢࢪࢵࢺ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᢞ⚊ࡀ㈠᫆࡟㛵ࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺⪃࠼࡟㈶ྠࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋᐇ㝿ࠊᙼ࡜ⱥᅜேࡢྠ൉࡜ࡢヰࡢ୰࡛ࠊࣈࣞࢢࢪࢵࢺࡀ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝
⛣Ẹ๐ῶࡢࡓࡵࡢᢞ⚊ࡔࡗࡓ࡜࠸࠺Ⅼ࡛ᴫࡡྜពࡋࡓ࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜ࡔࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ࣏ࣆࣗࣜ
ࢬ࣒࡜㜚࠺ୖ࡛᰿ᮏⓗ࡞㞀ᐖ࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿࠋ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺࡢ㐠ື࡟ຠᯝⓗ࡟ᑐᢠࡍࡿ࡟ࡣࠊ
ఱࡀᐇ㝿ᙼࡽࡢ⾜ືࡢᘬࡁ㔠࡟࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿ࢆࡲࡎ⌮ゎࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ୙ྍḞࡔࠋࣀ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮ࢤࣝ༤ኈࡣࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉ኱⤫㡿ࡢᑵ௵ᮇ㛫୰ࠊ࣍࣡࢖ࢺࣁ࢘ࢫࡣᢅ࠸࡙ࡽ࠸ࣃ
࣮ࢺࢼ࣮࡟␃ࡲࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒࡢᨻ⟇࡟ṇ㠃࠿ࡽྲྀࡾ⤌ࡴࡇ࡜࡟཯ᑐࡋࡓࠋ௦
ࢃࡾ࡟ࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡀᐇ㝿࡟ᅜෆ࡟୚࠼ࡿຠᯝ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ᩍ⫱ࢆᨵၿࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ᭱ࡶຠࢆዌ
ࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋಖㆤ୺⩏⪅ࡢᨻ⟇୺ᙇࢆᔂࡍࡓࡵ࡟ࠊᖹᆒⓗ࡞᭷ᶒ⪅࡟ࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆
ࡀ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ᪥ᖖရࡢࢥࢫࢺࡀ࡝ࢀࡃࡽ࠸ቑ࠼ࡿ࠿ࢆ♧ࡍᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊࣀ࣮ࢺࢼ
࣮ࢤࣝ༤ኈࡀᑠ௻ᴗࡸ୰つᶍ௻ᴗ࡜ඹ࡟௙஦ࢆࡋࠊ⪺ࡁྲྀࡗࡓࢫࢱࣥࢫ࡛ࠊᙼࡽࡣࠊࣅ
ࢪࢿࢫࡀ⏕⏘ࢥࢫࢺࢆపࡃᢚ࠼ࡿࡓࡵ࡟⮬⏤㈠᫆༠ᐃ࡟࠸࠿࡟౫Ꮡࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ࢆᙉㄪ
ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊࡑࡢࡼ࠺࡞࣮࢟ࣕࣥ࣌ࣥࡣཝࡋ࠸㜚࠸࡜࡞ࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ⌧᫬Ⅼ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ
ྛᅜࡢᕷẸࡣ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢヲ⣽ࡼࡾࡴࡋࢁࡑࡢᇶᮏᴫᛕ࡟␲ၥࢆᢞࡆ࠿ࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸰㸫㉁␲ᛂ⟅ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 2 ࡟⥆ࡃ㉁␲ᛂ⟅࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒ࡟㛵ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟㉁ၥࡀ㞟୰ࡋࡓࠋ

− 25 −

ࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝ㅖẶࡣࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉ኱⤫㡿ࡣ⮬⏤㈠᫆࡟ᦆᐖࢆ୚࠼ࡿ୍᪉࡛ 1 ࡘࡢ⫯ᐃⓗ࡞ᡂᯝࢆୖࡆ࡚࠸ࡿࠊ࡜㏙࡭ࡓࠋࡍ࡞ࢃࡕࠊᙼࡀఱ༑ᖺ࡟ࡶཬࡪ⡿ᅜࡢ㈠᫆ᨻ⟇ࢆそࡋࡓࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃㅖᅜࡣࡼࡾ⤖᮰ࡋࠊ࠾஫࠸ࡸ EU ࡜ࡢ㛵ಀᛶࢆ෌⪃ࡏࡊࡿࢆᚓ࡞ࡃ࡞
ࡗࡓࠋ࠶ࡿࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝ࡢゝⴥࢆ೉ࡾࢀࡤࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉ኱⤫㡿ࡣ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃேࢆࡼࡾ࣮ࣚࣟ
ࢵࣃឡዲ࡟ࡋࡓࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ྠ᫬࡟ࠊࡑࡢᨻ⟇ࡀ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡞ࡶࡢ࡟࡞ࡿ࠿ࢆண ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣᅔ㞴࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊࡶࡓࡽ
ࡉࢀࡿᐇ㝿ࡢ⿕ᐖࢆホ౯ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ㞴ࡋ࠸ࠋࢺࣛࣥࣉ኱⤫㡿ࡢ㢳ၥࡣࠊࢼࢩࣙࢼࣜࢫࢺ
࡛ಖㆤ୺⩏⪅ࡢࢫࢸ࢕࣮ࣈ࣭ࣂࣀࣥẶ࠿ࡽẚ㍑ⓗᚑ᮶ᆺࡢ⤒῭άືඃඛࡢഴྥ࡟࠶ࡿࢪ
ࣕࣞࢵࢻ࣭ࢡࢩࣗࢼ࣮Ặ࡟⮳ࡿࡲ࡛ࠊ㈠᫆࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ᵝࠎ࡟␗࡞ࡿ❧ሙࢆ௦⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
࠶ࡿ᫬Ⅼ࡛ㄡࡢどⅬࡀඃໃ࡞ࡢ࠿ࠊࡑࡋ࡚࡝ࡢ᪉ྥࢆᨻᶒࡀ㏣ồࡍࡿࡢ࠿ࢆุ᩿ࡍࡿࡢ
ࡣ㞴ࡋ࠸ࠋ⌧ᅾࡲ࡛ࠊ⇕Ⅿ࡞ࣞࢺࣜࢵࢡ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒࡣ TPP ࠿ࡽࡢ
᧔㏥௨እ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝ఱࡶࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 3㸸ࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿ➇தຊࡢ⥔ᣢࢡࣜࢫࢳ࣭ࣕࣥࣔࣜࣥࢢ༤ኈ
ࣔࣜࣥࢢ༤ኈࡣࠊࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝ࡢ⤂௓࡛ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 3 ࢆ㛤ጞࡋࠊྛࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝㛫ࡢᑐẚࡀ㔜せ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜㏙࡭ࡓࠋ࠸ࢃࡺࡿఏ⤫ⓗ⏘ᴗࡢ௦⾲࡛࠶ࡿ᪥⏘⮬ື㌴࠿ࡽࡣᚿ㈡ẶࠋHERE Deutschland ♫ࡢࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶ㸦Mr. Bültmann㸧ࡣ᪂ࢹࢪࢱࣝ௻ᴗࡢ௦⾲ࠋࣜࣥࢣẶࡣ࢔ࣥࢤ࣭࣓ࣛࣝࢣࣝ㤳┦ࢆᢸᙜࡍࡿᨻ἞グ⪅࡛ࠊࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡜ࠕ࢖ࣥࢲࢫࢺ
࣮ࣜ4.0ࠖ࡟㛵ࡍࡿၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࢻ࢖ࢶᨻᗓࡢぢゎࢆࢥ࣓ࣥࢺࡍࡿࡢ࡟㐺௵࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋ

ᚿ㈡ಇஅẶ᭱ึࡢ 3 ࡘࡢ⏘ᴗ㠉࿨ࡣࠊ୍⯡኱⾗ࡢ⚟♴ࢆᨵၿࡍࡿ࡜ྠ᫬࡟♫఍ⓗ୙ㄪ࿴࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡗ
ࡓࠋ⵨Ẽࠊ኱㔞⏕⏘ࠊ㟁Ẽࡢฟ⌧࡟ࡼࡾࠊປാ㟂せࡀᛴⴠࡍࡿ୍᪉࡛ࣔࣀࡀᏳࡃ࡞ࡗࡓࠋ
࠿ࡘ࡚኱㔞ࡢປാຊࢆᚲせ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡓ௙஦ࡣࠊ✺↛ࠊᚲせ࡜ࡉࢀࡿሙྜ࡛ࡶࠊࡣࡿ࠿࡟
ᑡ࡞࠸ປാຊ࡛㛫࡟ྜ࠺ࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡗࡓࠋ⤖ᯝ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊྛ᪂ᢏ⾡ࡣࠊࡑࡢ฼┈ࡀ୍⯡࡟ホ౯ࡉࢀࡿ๓࡟ࠊ୍᫬ⓗ࡞♫఍ⓗΰ஘ࢆᣍ࠸ࡓࠋ➨ 4 ḟ⏘ᴗ㠉࿨࡛࠶ࡿࢹࢪࢱࣝ㠉࿨ࡶࡲࡗࡓࡃྠᵝ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬ࡣ⏕άỈ‽ࡢ኱ᖜ࡞ᨵၿࢆ⣙᮰ࡍࡿࡶࡢࡢࠊ࠸ࡗࡓࢇࡣ
Ᏻᐃࡋࡓ࡜ᛮࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡓከࡃࡢ㞠⏝ࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿ࡞࡝ࠊ๻ⓗ࡞ປാᕷሙࡢኚ໬ࢆព࿡ࡋ࡚
࠸ࡿࠋ
ᚿ㈡ಇஅẶࡣ 1976 ᖺ࡟᪥⏘࡟ධ♫ࡋࠊࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬ࡢືࡁ࡜➨ 3 ḟ⏘ᴗ㠉࿨࡜ࡢẚ㍑ࢆ
ㄽࡌࡓࠋᙼࡢពぢ࡛ࡣࠊ⏕⏘᪉ἲㄽ࡟㔜኱࡞ኚ໬ࡀ㉳ࡁࡓሙྜࠊၥ㢟ࡢ 1 ࡘࡣࠊ࠸࠿࡞
ࡿሙྜࡶ኱௻ᴗࡀᑠ௻ᴗࡼࡾࡶࡣࡿ࠿࡟ከࡃࡢ฼┈ࢆᚓࡿഴྥࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜࡛࠶

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ࡿࠋࡍ࡞ࢃࡕࠊᑠつᶍ௻ᴗࡣᡭసᴗ࡟㢗ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀከ࠸ࡓࡵࠊࡲࡓ኱௻ᴗࡀᣢࡘࡼ࠺࡞⏕⏘ᛶྥୖ࡟ᢞ㈨ࡍࡿ㈨ᮏࡀ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝࡞࠸ࡓࡵ࡟ࠊྲྀࡾṧࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࡀከ࠸ࠋ
᪥ᮏࡣ≉࡟ࠊࠕ⬺ᕤᴗ໬ࠖ㠉࿨ࡢᜠᜨࢆཷࡅࡿែໃࡀᩚࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ࡜࠸࠺ࡢࡶࠊ1 ࡘ࡟ࡣࠊ⌧ᅾ OECD ㅖᅜࡢ㛫࡛ࠊ᪥ᮏࡢ⏕⏘ᛶࡀࠊ࡜ࡾࢃࡅࢧ࣮ࣅࢫࢭࢡࢱ࣮ࡸ㎰ᴗࢭࢡࢱ࣮࡟࠾࠸࡚ప࠸࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜ࡀᣲࡆࡽࢀࡿࠋᐇ㝿ࠊ᪥ᮏࡢ㎰ᴗ⪅ࡢᖹᆒᖺ㱋ࡀ 60 ṓ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ⪃࠼ࡿ࡜ࠊ⌧ᅾࡢᙧ࡛᪥ᮏࡢ㎰ᴗࢭࢡࢱ࣮ࢆᣢ⥆ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ୙ྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࠋAI ᢏ⾡࡜ࣟ࣎ࢵࢺᢏ⾡ࡢ⼥ྜࡣࠊ㎰ᴗࢭࢡࢱ࣮ࢆ෌ᘓࡋࠊィ⏬⬟ຊ࡜ຠ⋡ࢆ㧗ࡵࡘࡘࠊྠ᫬࡟኱࠸࡟ồࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿປാຊࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࠋ
ࡶ࠺ 1 ࡘࡢ⌮⏤࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ࡛ࡣ࣍࣡࢖ࢺ࣮࢝ࣛࡢປാ⪅ࡣࣈ࣮࣮ࣝ࢝ࣛࡢປാ⪅ࡼࡾࡶ⏕⏘ᛶࡀప࠸ഴྥ࡟࠶ࡿࡀࠊ㠀⏕⏘ⓗປാ⪅ࡢゎ㞠ࡀ㞴ࡋࡃࠊၥ㢟ࡀᝏ໬ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡑࡋ࡚ࠊᖺຌᗎิࡢࡓࡵ࡟᭱ࡶ⏕⏘ᛶࡢప࠸ປാ⪅࡟᭱ࡶከࡃࡢ㈤㔠ࡀᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿࡇ࡜
ࡀከ࠸ࠋࣅࢵࢢ࣭ࢹ࣮ࢱࡣࡇࡢၥ㢟࡟ᑐᛂࡋࠊ௻ᴗࡢᵓ㐀࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㠀ຠ⋡ᛶ࡟↔Ⅼࢆᙜ࡚ࡓᑐฎࡀಁ㐍ࡉࢀࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ
ᚿ㈡Ặࡣࠊ᪥ᮏࡀࡇ࠺ࡋࡓᶵ఍ࢆά⏝࡛ࡁࡿࡼ࠺࡞㠉᪂ⓗ࡛㉳ᴗᐙⓗ࡞ᩥ໬ࡢⓎ㐩ࢆ㜼ࡴ 3 ࡘࡢၥ㢟Ⅼࢆᣦ᦬ࡋヰࢆ⥾ࡵࡃࡃࡗࡓࠋ➨ 1 ࡟ࠊ⌧ᅾࠊ᪥ᮏࡢ᪂⯆௻ᴗ࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࡣ
࡯࡜ࢇ࡝࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࠋ➨ 2 ࡟ࠊ᪥ᮏࡢປാ⪅ࡣࠊ᪂⯆௻ᴗ⎔ቃࡢண ୙ྍ⬟ᛶ࡟ៅ㔜࡟࡞ࡿഴྥࡀ࠶ࡾࠊᏳᐃࡋࡓண

ྍ⬟࡞⤒㊰ࡢ࢟ࣕࣜ࢔ࢆዲࡴഴྥࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࠋ᭱ᚋ࡟ࠊ᪥

ᮏࡢ᪂⯆௻ᴗ࡜኱Ꮫ࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢ༠ຊࡀ࠶ࡲࡾ࡟ࡶᑡ࡞ࡃࠊᑠつᶍ௻ᴗࡀⱝ࠸ேᮦࢆ⋓ᚓࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᅔ㞴࡟࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋ

࣐࢖ࢣ࣭ࣝࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶ2014 ᖺ௨᮶ HERE Deutschland GmbH ࡢ࣐ࢿ࣮ࢪࣥࢢࢹ࢕ࣞࢡࢱ࣮ࢆົࡵࡿࣅ࣮ࣗ
ࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶࡣࠊHERE ࡢ஦ᴗෆᐜࢆㄝ᫂ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࠿ࡽヰࢆጞࡵࡓࠋ㌴ࡢࢻࣛ࢖ࣂ࣮࠿
ࡽࡢࢹ࣮ࢱࢆྲྀᚓࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊHERE ࡣ௻ᴗ࡜ᾘ㈝⪅࡟࣐ࢵࣆࣥࢢ࡜㛵㐃ࢹ࣮ࢱࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿࠋ⌧ᅾࠊHERE ࡣࡇࡢ࣓ࢱࢹ࣮ࢱࢆ 200 ࢝ᅜ࡛཰㞟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᪥ᮏ࡟࠾
࠸࡚ HERE ࡣࠊ࠿ࡘ࡚࣮࣮࢝࢜ࢹ࢕࢜ᶵჾࡢ〇㐀࡛▱ࡽࢀࠊ⌧ᅾࡣࠕࣔࣀࡢ࢖ࣥࢱ࣮
ࢿࢵࢺ࡛ࠖ㔜せ࡞Ꮡᅾ࡜ࡶ࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࣃ࢖࢜ࢽ࢔࡜ᐦ᥋࡟༠ຊࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶ࡟ࡼࡿ࡜ࠊ⏘ᴗࡢᑗ᮶ࢆᙧసࡿ୺せ࡞ືྥࡣࠊᕧ኱㒔ᕷࡢྎ㢌ࠊୡ⏺
ேཱྀࡢ 95 ൨ே࡬ࡢቑຍࠊࣟ࣎ࢵࢺᕤᏛࠊேᕤ▱⬟ࠊ㔞Ꮚࢥࣥࣆ࣮ࣗࢸ࢕ࣥࢢࠊᣢ⥆ྍ⬟ᛶࡢ᥎㐍ࠊࢹ࣮ࢱศᯒࠊᣑᙇ⌧ᐇࠊ࠾ࡼࡧࢽ࣮࣭ࣗࣛࣝࢿࢵࢺ࣮࣡ࢡ࡞࡝࡛࠶ࡿࠋHEREࡣࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢ」ᩘࡢࢺࣞࣥࢻࢆྠ᫬࡟ά⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡘ࠸࡚◊✲ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ౛࠼ࡤ
ࣅࢵࢢ࣭ࢹ࣮ࢱࢆά⏝ࡋࠊ኱㒔ᕷᅪࡢ஺㏻῰⁫ࢆ⦆࿴ࡍࡿ࡜࡜ࡶ࡟ࠊ㍺㏦ࡢᏳ඲ᛶࡸຠ
⋡ࢆ㧗ࡵࠊ⎔ቃ࡟୍ᒙࡢ㓄៖ࢆࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡞࡝࡛࠶ࡿࠋ

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ࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶࡣࠊࡑࡢᚋࠊ඲యⓗ࡞⤒῭≧ἣࡢኚ໬࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࢥ࣓ࣥࢺࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊHERE ࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡓ஦ᴗ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ヲࡋࡃㄝ᫂ࡋࡓࠋHERE ࡣࠊ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢᬑཬࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ
ࢺࣞࣥࢻࢆྠ᫬࡟ά⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛ᡂຌࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㏫࡟ࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢࢺࣞࣥࢻࢆά⏝࡛ࡁ࡞࠸௻ᴗ㸦౛࠼ࡤࠊࢹ࣮ࢱ࡟࠶ࡲࡾᢞ㈨ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠊࡲࡓࡣࣉࣛࢵࢺࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࢆ᪩ᮇ࡟ᵓ
⠏ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᛰࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗ㸧ࡣࠊࡲࡍࡲࡍཝࡋ࠸❧ሙ࡟㝗ࡿࠋ⤖ᒁࡢ࡜ࡇࢁࠊࡇࢀࡽ
ࡢࢺࣞࣥࢻࡣࠊ௻ᴗࡀ౑⏝ࡍࡿ࠿࡝࠺࠿ࢆỴࡵࡿࡇ࡜ࡢ࡛ࡁࡿ᪂ࡋ࠸ࢶ࣮ࣝࢆ㇟ᚩࡋ࡚
࠸ࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ඲ࡃ᪂ࡋ࠸⤒῭ᵓ㐀ࢆ㇟ᚩࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡔࠋࡉࡽ࡟ࠊ➇த᮲௳ࢆᖹ‽໬ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆពᅗࡋࡓᅜෆつไࡣࠊ༴㝤࡛ணᮇࡋ࡞࠸⤖ᯝࢆᣍࡃྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ⤒῭ࡀࡲࡍࡲࡍ┦஫᥋⥆ࡍࡿ୰࡛ࠊ༢୍ࡢᅜࠊࡲࡓࡣ⤒῭ᅪෆ࡟఩⨨ࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡢࡳ࡟
ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍつไᵓ㐀ࡣࠊࡑࡢࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ࡞➇த┦ᡭࢆᨭ᥼ࡍࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊᆅඖ௻ᴗ࡟ᐖ
ࢆཬࡰࡍྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ
Ḣᕞ㐃ྜ㸦EU㸧ࡣࠊᚋ⪅ࡢⴠ࡜ࡋ✰ࡢ౛ࢆᣲࡆ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢ EU ㅖᅜ࡛ࡢࢹ࣮
ࢱ౑⏝࡟㛵ࡍࡿཝࡋ࠸つไࡣࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃࡢᾘ㈝⪅ࢆಖㆤࡍࡿࡼࡾࡶࠊࡴࡋࢁ࣮ࣚࣟࢵ
ࣃࡢࣅࢪࢿࢫࡢᡂຌࢆ㜼ᐖࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶࡣࠊEU ࡢࢹ࣮ࢱつไࡣ₯ᅾⓗ࡞฼┈࡜࠸࠺ࡼࡾࠊ₯ᅾⓗ࡞ᐖ࡟↔Ⅼࢆᙜ࡚࡚࠸ࡿ࡜㏙࡭࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀ࡜ࡲࡗࡓࡃᑐ↷ⓗ࡞ࡢࡀ⡿ᅜࡢࣅࢪࢿࢫᩥ໬࡛ࠊࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ₯ᅾⓗ࡞୙฼┈ࡼࡾࡶࣅࢵࢢ࣭ࢹ࣮ࢱࡢྍ⬟ᛶ࡟ࡼࡾ኱ࡁ࡞㛵ᚰࢆᐤࡏ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ࢔࣓ࣜ࢝ࡢ௻ᴗࡣ⌧ᅾࠊ࣮ࣚࣟ
ࢵࣃࡢ┦ᡭᅜ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚┦ᙜࡢඛ⾜⪅฼┈ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ௻ᴗࡣࠊከ࠿ࢀᑡ࡞
࠿ࢀᜏஂⓗ࡟⏘ᴗ⏺ࡢእ⦕࡟㏣࠸ࡸࡽࢀࠊࡉ࡯࡝ከࡃ࡞࠸ᕷሙ࡛ࡢࢩ࢙࢔ࢆ☜ᐇ࡟⋓ᚓࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊᕳࡁ㏉ࡋࢆᅗࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᙉ࠸ࡽࢀࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ

࢔ࣥࢻࣞ࢔ࢫ࣭ࣜࣥࢣ༤ኈ
ࣜࣥࢣ༤ኈࡣࠊᵝࠎ࡞㠃࡛ࠊࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶࡢࣉࣞࢮࣥࢸ࣮ࢩࣙࣥ࡜ࡣ཯ᑐࡢពぢࢆᥦ♧ࡋࡓࠋࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶࡢヰ࡛ࡣࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃࡸ᪥ᮏࡢ௻ᴗࡣ᪤࡟⡿ᅜ௻ᴗ࡟㈇ࡅ
࡚࠾ࡾࠊ௻ᴗࡢᡂ㛗ࢆಁࡍ⥭ᛴࡢᚲせᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺❧ሙࢆᙉㄪࡋࡓࡀࠊࣜࣥࢣẶࡣࡇࡢศ㔝࡟࠾ࡅࡿᨻᗓࡢ௙஦ࡢ」㞧ࡉ࡜ៅ㔜࡟㐍ࡴᚲせᛶࢆᙉㄪࡋࡓࠋ௻ᴗࡀ⮬ࡽࡢ⤒῭ⓗ฼ᐖ࡟඲㠃ⓗ࡟ᑓᛕࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ⮬⏤ࡔࡀࠊᨻᗓࡣ࠶ࡿᨭᣢᒙࡢࢽ࣮ࢬ࡜௚ࡢᨭᣢᒙࡢ
ࢽ࣮ࢬ࡜ࡢࣂࣛࣥࢫࢆ࡜ࡗ࡚ࠊྠ᫬࡟࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢ┠ᶆࢆ㏣ồࡋ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࠋࡼࡾ
ࢹ࣮ࢱ࣭ࣇࣞࣥࢻ࣮ࣜ࡞ࣅࢪࢿࢫ⎔ቃࢆ⫱ᡂࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ⡆༢࡟⪺ࡇ࠼ࡿ࠿ࡶࡋࢀ࡞࠸ࡀࠊ
ᨻᗓࡣປാᕷሙ࡜ࡑࡢᅜẸࡢᶒ฼࡟㛵ࡍࡿ₯ᅾⓗ࡞ᙳ㡪ࢆ⪃៖ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࣜࣥࢣ
Ặࡣࠊ௻ᴗࡀ⬺ᕤᴗ໬㠉࿨ࡢࠕ຾⪅ࠖ࡟࡞ࡿ࡭ࡃດࡵࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊᨻᗓࡣᩋ
⪅ࡢ⚟♴࡟ࡶὀពࢆᡶࢃ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆᣦ᦬ࡋ࡚ヰࢆࡲ࡜ࡵࡓࠋ
ࡘࡲࡾࠊࢻ࢖ࢶࡢ⤒῭ⓗᑗ᮶࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࠊ௒ᚋࡢ 10 ᖺ㛫ࡣࡁࢃࡵ࡚㔜せ࡜࡞ࡿࠋ࢔ࣥࢤ
࣭࣓ࣛࣝࢣࣝ㤳┦ࡣ 2013 ᖺ࡟࢖ࣥࢱ࣮ࢿࢵࢺࢆࠕฎዪᆅ㸦Neuland㸧ࠖ࡜࿧ࢇ࡛ლ➗ࡉࢀࡓࡀࠊ᫬ࡀᙼዪࡢゝⴥࢆ⿬௜ࡅࡓࠋࢹࢪࢱࣝ㠉࿨ࡣୡ⏺ࠊ≉࡟⤒῭ࢆ᰿ᮏⓗ࡟ኚ࠼ࡓࠋ

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ࢻ࢖ࢶ௻ᴗࡢ࠺ࡕࠊ᫬௦࡬㡰ᛂࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㐣ᑠホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣࠊ᪤Ꮡࡢࣅࢪ
ࢿࢫࣔࢹࣝࢆᏲࢁ࠺࡜࠸࠺⾪ື࠿ࡽ࠿ࠊ᫬ὶ࡟㡰ᛂࡋ࡞࠸௻ᴗࡣࠊ኱つᶍ࡞࢔࣓ࣜ࢝࡜
୰ᅜࡢ IT ௻ᴗࡢ༢࡞ࡿసᴗሙ࡟࡞ࡗ࡚ࡋࡲ࠸ࠊࡼࡾ኱ࡁ࡞ᅜ㝿ⓗ஦ᴗࡢ࠺ࡕࠊࡼࡾ㠉᪂ⓗ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸㸦ࡑࡋ࡚ࡼࡾ཰┈ᛶࡢప࠸㸧ᐇົࢆᢸ࠺ࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࢻ࢖ࢶ࡜᪥ᮏࡣᅜෆ࡛㠉᪂ࢆ⫱ࡴࡓࡵ࡟ࠊࡶࡗ࡜ከࡃࡢࡇ࡜ࢆࡋ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࠋࢻ
࢖ࢶ࡛ࡣࠊ௻ᴗ࡜ᨻᗓࡢ㊥㞳ࢆ⥔ᣢࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺ఏ⤫ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࣅࢪࢿࢫ⏺ࡢࢽ࣮ࢬ࡟㛵ࢃࡾࡢ῝࠸ᨻ⟇⎔ቃࢆ㔊ᡂࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࡣࠊࡇࡢఏ⤫ࢆኚ࠼ࡡࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸࡛࠶ࢁ࠺ࠋྠ᫬࡟ࠊ
ࡇࢀࡽࡢᅜࡢᨻᗓࡣࠊእᅜ௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡿ㈙཰ࢆ⤫ไࡍࡿつ๎ࢆ⪃࠼ࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ࠸ࡃࡘ
࠿ࡢ౛ࡢ 1 ࡘ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊࣜࣥࢣẶࡣࠊ2016 ᖺ࡟୰ᅜࡢ⨾ⓗ㞟ᅋ㸦Midea Group㸧࡟ࡼࡗ
࡚㈙཰ࡉࢀࡓࣟ࣎ࢵࢺ఍♫ KUKA ࢆᣲࡆ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᭷ᮃ࡞࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃࡢ᪂⯆௻ᴗࡣࠊ࠶
ࡿ⛬ᗘࡢᡂຌࢆ཰ࡵࡿ࡜ࠊእᅜࡢ኱௻ᴗ࡟㣗࠸Ⲩࡽࡉࢀ࡚ࡋࡲ࠸ࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃࡢ㠉᪂ⓗᩥ໬ࢆ୍ᒙᙅయ໬ࡉࡏ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 3㸫㉁␲ᛂ⟅ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 3 ࡟⥆ࡃ㉁␲ᛂ⟅ࡣࠊࣅ࣮ࣗࣝࢺ࣐ࣥẶ࠿ࡽࣜࣥࢣẶ࡬ࡢ㉁ၥ࡛ጞࡲࡗࡓࠋࠕHERE ࡣࠊ࡛࣋ࣝࣜࣥࢹ࣮ࢱ⛉Ꮫ⪅ 1,000 ேࢆ㞠⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊࡇࢀࡣ࢖ࣥࢲࢫࢺ
࣮ࣜ4.0 ࡀປാᕷሙ࡟ᐖࢆ࡞ࡍ࡜࠸࠺ࡼࡾࡴࡋࢁࠊᜠᜨࢆࡶࡓࡽࡍ࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜ࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸࠿ࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊࡼࡾࢹ࣮ࢱ࣭ࣇࣞࣥࢻ࣮ࣜ࡞ᨻ⟇ࡢᯟ⤌ࡳࢆ୺ᙇࡋ࡚࠸࡞
࠸ࡢ࠿㸽ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ෆᐜ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࣜࣥࢣẶࡣࠊẖᖺࡉࡽ࡟ከࡃࡢ௙஦ࡀ⮬ື໬࡜ேᕤ▱⬟࡟ྲྀࡗ࡚௦ࢃࡽࢀࠊࢹ࣮ࢱ⛉Ꮫ⪅ࡀ୍ே᥇⏝ࡉࢀࡿࡈ࡜࡟ࠊ௚ࡢศ㔝ࡢປാ⪅ᩘேࡀవ๫࡜࡞ࡿ࡜⟅࠼ࡓࠋࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ΰ஘ࡀ㉳ࡁ࡞࠸ࡼ࠺࡟ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࡣࠊᨻᗓࡣ෌カ⦎ࣉࣟࢢ࣒ࣛࢆྵࡵࠊࡇࡢΰ஘࡟ഛ࠼࡚ປാᕷሙࢆ㡰ᛂࡉࡏࡿᙺ๭ࢆᢸ࠺ᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ௚࡟ࡣࠊձ࣓ࣝࢣࣝ㤳┦ࡀ㠉᪂ࢆಁ㐍ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ᐇ㝿࡟࡝ࢀࡔࡅࡢࡇ࡜ࢆ⾜ࡗࡓ࠿ࠊղ㈠᫆࡟క࠺ΰ஘ࢆ㑊ࡅࡿࡓࡵ࡟࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬ࢆྲྀࡾᢅ࠺࡭ࡁ࠿ࠊ࡞࡝ࡢ㉁ၥࡀ
ฟࡉࢀࡓࠋ᭱ึࡢ㉁ၥ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ࣓ࣝࢣࣝ㤳┦ࡣᨻ⟇࢔ࢪ࢙ࣥࢲ࡟ࢹ࣮ࢱࢆ㏣ຍࡍࡿ
ࡢ࡟ከ኱࡞ດຊࢆᡶࡗࡓࡀࠊࢻ࢖ࢶᩥ໬ࡢ୰ࡢቨ࡟┤㠃ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊࢻ࢖ࢶࡣࢥ
ࣥࢭࣥࢧࢫ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ࠊᨻ⟇ࢆ⟇ᐃࡋࠊẚ㍑ⓗࡺࡗࡃࡾࠊࡌࡗࡃࡾ⪃࠼࡚஦ࢆ⾜࠺ഴྥࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ࢔࣓ࣜ࢝ࡢᨻ⟇ᩥ໬࡜ᑐ↷ⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ࢔࣓ࣜ࢝ࡢᨻ⟇ᩥ໬ࡣࠊ㎿㏿࡟
ᑐฎࡋࠊၥ㢟ࡀⓎ⏕ࡋࡓ࡜ࡁ࡟ゎỴࡍࡿഴྥ࡟࠶ࡿࠋࡶࡋࡃࡣࠊබⓗ࡞ㄝ᫂㈐௵ࢆ࡯࡜
ࢇ࡝క࠺ࡇ࡜࡞ࡃᨻᗓࡢᣦ௧ࡀฟࡉࢀࡿ୰ᅜࡢᨻ⟇ᩥ໬࡜ࡶᑐ↷ⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ2 ࡘࡵࡢ㉁ၥ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊᚲせ࡞ࡇ࡜ࡢ 1 ࡘ࡟㏱᫂ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ㈠᫆༠ᐃ஺΅࡟ࡘ࠸࡚᰿ᙉࡃ
ࡘࡁࡲ࡜࠺୙‶ࡢ 1 ࡘࡣ୙㏱᫂ᛶࡔࠋࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡜ࢹ࣮ࢱ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊࢹ࣮ࢱࡀ᭱ึ࠿ࡽ࡝
ࡢࡼ࠺࡟౑⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚࣮࢜ࣉࣥ࡟ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ୙ྍḞ࡛࠶ࡾࠊᾘ㈝⪅࡟㛵ࡍࡿࢹ࣮ࢱࡢ฼⏝࡟㝿ࡋ࡚ࠊᙼࡽ࡟⿵ൾࡍࡿᡭẁࢆぢࡘࡅࡿࡇ࡜ࡍࡽࡶᚲせ࡟࡞ࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ

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㛢఍ࡢ㎡ࢩࣝࢡ࣭ࢸࣥ࣌ࣝ༤ኈ
ࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣜࢮ࣮ࢩࣙࣥࡣᢈุࡉࢀ࡚ࡁࡓ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊ⏕άࢆᨵၿࡋࠊఱⓒ୓ேࡶࡢேࠎࢆ㈋ᅔ࠿ࡽᩆ࠸ฟࡋࡓࠋఱ༑ᖺࡶ⥆࠸ࡓࣔࣀࡢ⮬⏤࡞⛣ື࡟⥆ࡁࠊ௒᭱ࡶὀ┠ࡍ࡭ࡁၥ㢟ࡢ 1 ࡘࡣࠊேࠎࡢ⮬⏤࡞⛣ື࡛࠶ࡿࠋ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃㅖᅜ࡛ࡇࡇᩘᖺࠊ⛣Ẹࡢ⟶⌮ࡀ
ᵝࠎ࡞ᡂຌࢆ཰ࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒࡟ᑐᢠࡋࠊᅜ㝿⮬⏤⛛ᗎࢆಖㆤࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢࡼࡾ
኱ࡁ࡞ດຊࡢ୍⎔࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ≉࡟௒ᚋࡇࡢศ㔝࡛ࡉࡽ࡞ࡿ㆟ㄽࡀᚲせ࡜࡞ࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ

᪥ୗ୍ṇ఍㛗
᪥ୗẶࡣࠊ⏕⏘ⓗ࡞ࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘࡜࡞ࡗࡓࡇ࡜࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ཧຍ⪅࡟ឤㅰࡢពࢆ⾲ࡋࡓࠋ᪥ୗẶࡣࠊཧຍ⪅ྛ⮬ࡀࡇࢀࡲ࡛࡜ࡣ␗࡞ࡿពぢࢆᣢࡘࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘ࡢ
ᡂຌࢆព࿡ࡍࡿ࡜ࡋࠊ௒ᖺࡢ DGAP-JEF ࢧ࣑ࢵࢺࡢཧຍ⪅ࡀࡇࡢ᪥ࡢ 3 ࡘࡢࢭࢵࢩࣙ
ࣥ࠿ࡽᚓࡓ᪂ࡓ࡞㆑ぢࢆᣢࡕᖐࡾࠊ㈠᫆࡜ᡂ㛗࡟㛵ࡍࡿᑐヰࢆ௒ᚋࡶ⥅⥆ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᮇ
ᚅࡍࡿ࡜㏙࡭࡚ࠊࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘ࢆ⥾ࡵࡃࡃࡗࡓࠋ
᏶− 30 −

㸦ⱥㄒ㸧English Summary drafted by DGAP

Summary

Charting Choppy Seas:
The World Economy and the Future of Growth and Trade
3rd JEF-DGAP International Symposium
at DGAP, Rauchstr. 17/18, 10787 Berlin, Germany
Thursday, 18 May 2017

Welcome and Introduction
Dr. Sylke Tempel opened by welcoming guests to the third Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) International Symposium and introducing JEF
Chairman and CEO Kazumasa Kusaka.

Kazumasa Kusaka
Mr. Kusaka emphasized the fundamental changes underway in both Europe and Japan. In Europe,a wave of populism has swept aside many of the assumptions about the health and trajectory of theEuropean project; while the French presidential election, held ten days before the symposium,
ended in defeat for the isolationist Front National, the last year has seen the United Kingdom voteto leave the European Union and the United States elect a president who has promised to unwind
international legal and trade norms. This return to populism has been explained as a response to
the economic disruptions caused by globalization, even though there is significant evidence that
digitalization has done more to upend the traditional labor market.
Meanwhile, Japan is wrestling with the consequences of a shrinking and aging population. The
Japanese population is declining at roughly 1 percent per year, and many of the country's smaller
communities are struggling to stay economically viable in an environment characterized by lower
productivity and demand.
The three major themes laid out for the symposium were growth, innovation, and populism –especially how to use the first two to combat the trends responsible for the third. Among the major
challenges for Europe and Japan will be harnessing the changes under-way in the international
economic environment rather than falling victim to them, defending the international trading orderin the face of protectionist policies from both the United States and China, and developing industry
4.0 capacities in a way that ensures that the gains are felt equally, rather than concentrated among− 31 −

the wealthy. Mr. Kusaka emphasized the importance of deeper EU-Japan trading relations as one
important step.
Mr. Kusaka concluded his remarks by stressing the role that organizations like JEF and DGAP
must play in informing their respective populations. Paraphrasing Gresham's Law, which statesthat “bad money drives out good,” he noted the degree to which misinformation characterized theBrexit campaign and encouraged participants to contribute to this and other events as part of aneffort to provide the public with better information.

Session 1: Escaping the Low Growth Trap
Naoyuki Haraoka (Moderator)
Mr. Haraoka opened the first session by pointing out the seriousness of the growth problem today:
While the International Monetary Fund predicts global growth of 3.5 percent in 2017, an
improvement from 3.1 percent in 2016, the vast majority of this growth is to take place in developing
economies. Advanced economies are predicted to grow 2 percent – and even there, the lion’s shareis to come from the United States, which has had slightly more success recovering from the financial
crisis than the Eurozone. The euro area is forecasted to grow by only 1.7 percent; Japan by only 1.2
percent. In 2018, those numbers are predicted to shrink to 1.6 percent and .6 percent, respectively.
The EU and Japan are, however, facing different problems. At the moment, Europe is focused on
the future integration or disintegration of the political and trade union. In the aftermath of Brexit,
the EU’s main task will be ensuring that other member states do not follow the UK’s lead while
maintaining momentum for necessary structural reforms. Ja-pan, meanwhile, is combating ademographic shift long in the making: As of last year’s census, the country’s population is officiallyshrinking, going from 128 million in 2010 to 127 million in 2015. This decline brings commensurate
limitations to economic growth.
At the same time, both countries are operating in an uncertain trade environment. The Trump
Administration in the US has signaled its hostility to several international trade agreements andits interest in renegotiating others, and China, despite presenting itself as a defender ofinternational trade, has been erecting barriers to protect its own industries from competition.

Alexander Schönfelder
Mr. Schönfelder began by emphasizing the importance of growth to social stability. Steadily growing
productivity leads to increased wages, which, in turn, continuously increase standards of living.
Recently, however, growth in the developed world has not been accompanied by increasing
productivity. According to the OECD, multi-factor productivity – a measure that compares outputs
produced to inputs required – has slowed to a standstill in several G7 economies, and even retreated− 32 −

in Italy. At the same time, there has been less investment in machinery and equipment. The
combined effect of these two trends has led to an in-crease in labor utilization rates, meaning thateven the meager growth rates observed in developed countries have often been a result not of
increasing labor productivity, but rather of an increase in the number of hours worked – and thatthe workers filling these positions have often experienced little to no improvement in wages or
quality of life.
This employment paradox – everyone has a job but no one’s getting a raise – has helped fuelpopulism. While technological progress has been responsible for more job losses than trade, thepopulists are correct in their belief that the benefits of globalization have been unequally distributed.
To spur inclusive growth, a number of steps need to be taken. Competition and investment inproduction capacity needs to be encouraged at the policy level. This can be achieved through both
macroeconomic policy and government investment in training – Dr. Schönfelder emphasized both
quality traditional education and “upskilling,” or re-training employees in industries renderedobsolete to work in new fields. The startup sec-tor should also be supported.
Finally, trade has been stagnating for the past year for several reasons. First, many companies are
relocating their production capacity to be closer to their end markets. Second, more and morecountries have organized themselves into trading blocs, and trade agreements between these blocs
are more difficult to achieve than trade agreements between individual countries. Third, much of
the growth in international trade over the past decade may, in fact, have simply reflected the rising
economic importance of China – and as China's growth slows, the pace of international trade may
slow with it.

Prof. Mitsuhiro Fukao
While Japan's nominal GDP remains flat, its real GDP has been growing – a reflection of theJapan's deflation from 1997 to 2013, a trend that only ended when the Bank of Japan stepped in toexpand its money supply on a massive scale. Over the past two decades, the Japanese economy
suffered from deflation almost continuously as the country was hit by a financial crisis in the late
1990s and the global financial crisis of 2008-09. Now, using the “core-core” consumer price index(CPI), which includes all consumer goods except food and energy (which helps to remove volatile
global commodity price movements), Japan's rate of inflation is hovering between 0 and 1 percent,and its economy is operating at the potential GDP level. . Japan's deflation has ended and its labormarket is get-ting very tight.
Growth, however, is limited by Japan's shrinking population. Even if Japan were to achieve
productivity growth rate of 1.5 percent per annum which is comparable to that in the United States,− 33 −

the 1 percent annual population decline caps GDP growth at roughly .5 percent per year. The
shrinking population has meant a steadily decreasing labor supply – and with steadily diminishingdomestic demand, companies have had little incentive to invest in domestic production capacity,
meaning that the country cannot counteract diminishing numbers of workers with increasing
productivity per worker. In fact, potential labor input peaked in Japan in 1990, and has been
declining ever since.
Despite these obstacles, Japanese corporate profits are doing well, with the current profit-to-GDP
ratio 1.4 times the level it reached at the height of Japan's bubble in the late 1980s. The Nikkei 225
index is relatively low, in part because many of its components are larger and older companies thatare no longer growing quickly, but the market capitalization of Tokyo stock exchange is farily high.
To translate this economic health into sustainable growth, Japan needs to shore up its dwindlinglabor supply. Professor Fukao suggests that could be accomplished through lower barriers to
immigration: despite high demand for workers, Japan only accepts about 70,000 immigrants per
year. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has, in fact, suggested easing access to visas and residency
permits; these policy proposals could be revived.

Dr. Klaus Günter Deutsch
Dr. Deutsch opened with an overview of improvements in the global economy. While China has
reduced its 2017 growth projections to 6.5 percent, cyclical improvements in Europe and Japan
have made up some of the gap, for a global real growth rate of 3.5 or 3.6 percent. Part of this is dueto the work of the central banks, which generally responded effectively to the financial crisis.
However, this does not mean that all is well. US projections currently call for 2.5 percent growth in2017, but that is based on the assumption that the Trump Administration will successfully passfiscal policy and tax reforms, an assumption that could prove overly optimistic. The administration
itself is currently mired in a series of overlapping scandals concerning the relations of several of its
members with Russia, and the Republican-controlled Congress has already struggled to make goodon its promise to “repeal and re-place” the existing health care law, its first legislative priority – andcome summer, it will have to pass a new budget to fund government operations and address thelooming debt ceiling, a process that has become contentious in the past. And even if theadministration successfully passes any sort of structural reforms, the steps it has proposed so far
are not necessarily those that economists would recommend or prefer.
China, meanwhile, has taken steps at odds with its own rhetoric. While the country has pledged its
support for free trade – President Xi Jinping indicated at the January meeting of the World
Economic Forum in Davos that China would step into the United States’ traditional role as− 34 −

champion of free markets, saying that “pursuing protectionism is like locking oneself in a dark room”– its actual policies have moved in the opposite direction. The government has been supportingstate-owned enterprises to provide goods that would otherwise be imported, and has made it
extremely difficult for foreign-run firms to enter several sectors, notably the service sector.
Things have been slightly better in Europe. France has undertaken significant product market
reforms, Italy is reforming its judicial system and labor market, and the United Kingdom is talking
about investing more in the industrial and R&D sectors. At the EU level, several energy-sector
reforms have been discussed, though insufficient attention is being paid to financial markets andthe service sector.
Germany, however, is faced with a problem many countries can only dream of: it is saving too muchmoney. Germany has a huge current account surplus, but is investing far too little in infrastructure
maintenance and improvement, particularly in the IT sector; in fact, German companies are limitedin the productivity improvements they can undertake by IT infrastructure deficiencies. Germany
has only avoided productivity drops because of the influx of Eastern Europeans and refugees overthe past few years.
In the future, it will be essential that Berlin shifts its focus from a balanced budget – the so-called“Black Zero” policy advocated by Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble – to in-vestment in the
country’s industrial future. Dr. Deutsch recommends that 3.5 percent of GDP be devoted to R&D,
while more investment is directed to infrastructure improvement and taxes are restructured toincentivize modern manufacturing. At the same time, labor market policies should be tailored tointegrate refugees, immigrants, and low-wage workers.

Session 1 – Q & A
The questions asked of the first session’s speakers focused on what the G7 and G20 could actually
hope to accomplish, how to spur investment in startups and small businesses in Japan andGermany, and where further investment might come from considering present levels of European
and Japanese indebtedness.
On the first question, panelists agreed that one of the main goals of the G7 and G20 should be
simply preventing the United States – and, to a lesser extent, China – from doing anything to upset
the order of global trade. They agreed that these organizations were not likely to undertake any
ambitious new projects in the immediate future, and would instead focus on mitigating the damage
caused should the US decide to withdraw from international trade agreements or erect significant
barriers to trade. Work could be done, however, to further integrate Turkey and India.

− 35 −

On startups and small companies, it is difficult to say what the effects of specific policies actuallyare. Infrastructure improvement is one step that could encourage the creation of new companies,
but a larger concern may be that successful startups are frequently bought by larger American andChinese firms. Any discussion of how to respond to this would have to entail a larger discussion ofwhat it means for a company to be “Japanese” or “German” as opposed to American or Chinese –that is, given the globalized nature of production, whether ownership has as much economic impact
as the location of operations.
Finally, while some European countries are struggling with their debt loads, Germany is not; Berlin
has ample room to maneuver when it comes to investing in the country's future, especially if it deemphasizes the “black zero”. Japan, meanwhile, has a significant debt problem – it has used low
interest rates to take on significant amounts of debt, amounting to 250 percent of GDP in 2016 –but has resisted raising taxes despite a generally strong economy. Tax increases would probably betolerated, and inflation would ease the country's debt burden.

Session 2: Populism, Protectionism, and the Future of Free Trade
Dr. Henning Hoff (Moderator)
Dr. Hoff opened the session by stressing the importance of the nexus between populism,protectionism, and free trade to both Germany and Japan. Free trade has suffered a numberof blows over the past year, from the Brexit vote in the UK to Donald Trump's election aspresident in the US. However, despite leveling threats against China, Japan, and Germany
during his campaign, it is still unclear what Mr. Trump's trade policy will be – or how Japanand Europe can respond.

Dr. Claudia Schmucker
Dr. Schmucker presented a broad picture of the trajectory of international trade. After two
generations of steadily increasing trade, the tide is beginning to shift: due in part to slowing global
growth and increasing inequality, the benefits of free trade are being questioned in Europe.
Meanwhile, the Trump Administration is upending trade policy in the United States – his
withdrawal from TPP and his statement that the United States will not necessarily abide by WTO
dispute settlement mechanisms in the future raise the specter of a new era of protectionism. The
March G20 meeting at Baden Baden was not encouraging: the administration used one of its firstinternational summits to pressure international finance ministers to drop their traditional pledge
to keep trade free and open (and to fund efforts to combat climate change). In subsequent meetings,
Trump representatives said that the United States reserved the right to employ protectionist
measures as it saw fit.

− 36 −

These shifts will change the future of international trade in several ways. The focus of European
trade policy may shift East: with the United States no longer a reliable partner, the EU will work
even harder to solidify its trade agreements with China and Japan. The former may prove difficult– desperate rhetoric to the contrary, China's government maintains significant barriers to trade.
The latter relationship will prove much easier; over the past year, Chancellor Merkel and Prime
Minister Abe have stressed the importance of the EU-Japanese relationship and their interest in
ambitious new trade agreements. The EU may also look to other partners to strengthen theframework of international trade – Dr. Schmucker mentioned the importance of negotiations
already underway with Mexico and Mercosur.

Dr. Sota Kato
Dr. Kato began his discussion of the roots of populism by pointing out that, while economists
cannot understand why protectionism should exist, political scientists cannot understandwhy free trade should exist – that is, despite the economic benefits, free trade can carry suchhigh political risks that it is a constant temptation for politicians to restrict it strategically.
The trade barriers that arise are a nearly natural phenomenon, the points of friction between
economics and politics.
He went on to argue that populist movements do not necessarily lead to protectionist policies,
and that in fact protectionist policies do not necessarily originate in populist movements.
Many forms of protectionism can be traced back to the political efforts of particularly strong
interest groups; in these cases, small and well-organized groups have over-whelmed larger
but less committed publics, and the abstract politics of trade have had little salience. These
campaigns may use populism as a tool, tapping into general hostility towards trade to achieve
specific goals, but they are ultimately interested in the conditions of a certain subset ofentities within a specific sector rather than any broad philosophy of free trade orprotectionism. This sort of protectionism can actually be combated by populist appeals: when
traditional constituencies of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) opposed the TPP, Prime
Minister Abe was able to utilize his own high public approval rate to overcome theirobjections.
There are four reasons for populist movements that result in protectionist policies: trade may
create redistribution problems; voters may be uninformed; voters may be irrational; andeconomists may be wrong about the benefits of trade.
The first reason is one that has been better addressed in Europe than the United States. The
flip side of an open economy has to be a robust social welfare state, one that ensures that the− 37 −

gains from trade are relatively evenly distributed; in the absence of such a redistribution
mechanism, the benefits of free trade can be dramatically uneven, contributing to economic
inequality and populist anger.
The second and third reasons are related. In advanced democracies, voters generally havevery limited information and are “rationally ignorant” – given the impact of their individual
votes relative to the margins that decide policy questions or the makeup of governments,
most decide not to bother informing themselves. This was especially evident in the aftermathof the Brexit vote: among the top questions Googled immediately after the results wereannounced were “What is the EU?,” “What does it mean to leave the EU?,” and “What will
happen now we've left the EU?”
This means that voters are often unable to decide whether free trade or protectionism is more
beneficial for their economic well-being, rendering them vulnerable to politicians who would
employ protectionist rhetoric. This underlines the importance of think tanks, academics, andmedia outlets, which can help inform voters on the actual impact of real or potential trade
policies.

Tetsuro Fukunaga
Mr. Fukunaga began by discussing the characteristics of opposition to TPP in Japan. He pointed
out some interesting and similar aspects to what has been seen in movements across Europe
against TTIP/CETA.
First, the anti-TPP campaign utilized anti-American sentiment, with opponents arguing that
TPP would destroy Japanese culture; a central part of the campaign was the work of a website
called “Think about TPP!” operated by the “Network to Protect Japanese Food, Life, and Health,”which leveraged social networks effectively to dramatically expand its reach. Second, the fightsurrounding TPP represented, in a sense, a proxy fight for a larger debate within Japanesesociety about whether Japan should be more or less open to the outside world. The Democratic
Party of Japan responded to opposition with a public relations campaign, holding town hallmeetings in 47 prefectures and clarifying that Japanese health care would not be affected, andby taking up measures to mitigate the effects TPP would have on various Japanese sectors,
including income support for agricultural workers.
However, the DPJ never clarified its final stance on the TPP – successive administrations refused
to commit to Japanese participation out of fear of a public backlash, and it was only when Shinzo
Abe's Liberal Democratic Party took over government in 2013 that the country formally decided
to join. TPP was characterized as the third pillar of Abe's “Abenomics” platform, and benefited− 38 −

from confidence in the new prime minister's negotiating ability; Abe promised that TPP would
not force Japan to unilaterally eliminate tariffs, a promise that helped reassure domestic
constituents. By creating public confidence in his administration, Abe could convince theopposition within his own party and the country that Japan should join the disputed TPP
negotiations.
By moving forward with their own free trade agreements, the EU and Japan could do more toharmonize their regulatory environments, helping set international standards for the future.

Dr. Ilja Nothnagel
Dr. Nothnagel disagrees with the idea that the Brexit vote was about trade; in fact, in his
conversations with British colleagues, there has been general consensus that Brexit waslargely a vote to curtail immigration. This ties into a fundamental obstacle in combating
populism: To attack populist movements effectively, it is essential to first understand what
actually triggers them.
Dr. Nothnagel argued against addressing Trump Administration policies directly, saying that
the White House may simply remain a difficult partner for the duration of Trump's time inoffice. Instead, it might be most effective to improve education on the actual local effects offree trade – to undermine the appeal of protectionist policies, average voters need to be shownhow much the costs of everyday items would increase in the absence of free trade. This is a
stance Dr. Nothnagel has heard echoed in his work with small- and medium-sized businesses,
which stress how reliant their businesses are on free trade agreements to keep theirproduction costs low.
However, such a campaign may be an uphill battle. At this point, publics in various countries
are questioning the basic concept of free trade rather than the particulars.

Session 2 – Q & A
Questions following the second session focused on the Trump Administration.
The speakers said that, despite damaging free trade, President Trump can claim one positive
achievement. His reversal of decades of American trade policy has pushed European countries
closer together, forcing them to reconsider their relationship to each other and to the EU; in thewords of one speaker, he has made Europeans more pro-European.
At the same time, it is difficult to assess the actual damage his policies could do, as it is difficult− 39 −

to predict what those policies might be. Trump's advisers represent several different stances on
trade, from Steve Bannon's nationalist protectionism to Jared Kushner's relatively conventional
pro-business inclinations. It is difficult to tell whose viewpoint is ascendant at any given time,
and thus which direction the administration will pursue – to date, despite all its heated rhetoric,
the Trump Administration has done little beyond withdrawing from TPP.

Session 3: Staying Competitive Through Digitalization
Dr. Christian Mölling (Moderator)
Dr. Mölling opened the third session by introducing the speakers, noting that the contrast between
them was significant – Mr. Shiga from Nissan Motors represented, in a sense, traditional industry;
Mr. Bültmann from HERE Deutschland represented new digital enterprise; and Mr. Rinke, as apolitical correspondent covering Chancellor Angela Merkel closely, was well-placed to comment on
the German government’s perspective on questions of digitalization and “Industrie 4.0”.

Toshiyuki Shiga
The first three industrial revolutions simultaneously improved general well-being and led to social
discord. With the advent of steam, mass production, and electricity, goods be-came cheaper whilelabor needs plummeted – work that had once required significant manpower suddenly required
much less, if any. As a result, each new technology triggered a period of social disruption before its
benefits could be generally appreciated. The fourth industrial revolution, the digital revolution, is
no different: while digitalization promises vast improvements in standards of living, it has alsomeant dramatic changes in the labor market, including the elimination of many jobs once assumed
to be stable.
Toshiyuki Shiga joined Nissan in 1976, and can thus comment on how the movement towards
digitalization compares with the last industrial revolution. In his opinion, one of the problems withany significant shift in production methodologies is that large businesses tend to benefit much morethan small ones: because small businesses often rely more on manual labor, and because they rarely
have the kind of capital to invest in productivity upgrades that is available to larger corporations,they are often left behind.
Japan is particularly well poised to benefit from the “post-industrial” revolution. For one thing,
the country's productivity is currently low among OECD countries, particularly in the service andagricultural sectors – in fact, given that the average age among Japanese farmers is 60, theJapanese agricultural sector is unsustainable in its current form. A combination of AI androbotics technology could rebuild the agricultural sector, increasing planning ability and− 40 −

efficiency while simultaneously providing much-needed labor.
For another, white collar workers tend to be less productive than blue collar workers in Japan, aproblem exacerbated by the difficulty of firing unproductive workers – and, owing to their seniority,
the least productive workers are often paid the most. Big data could help address this issue, making
it easier to highlight and address inefficiencies in a corporation's structure.
Mr. Shiga concluded his talk by pointing to three problems preventing Japan from developing thekind of innovative, entrepreneurial culture that would better allow it to take advantage of theseopportunities. First, there is currently very little investment in Japanese startups. Second,
Japanese workers tend to be wary of the unpredictability of the startup environment, preferring
careers with stable, predictable trajectories. Finally, there is too little collaboration between
Japanese startups and universities, making it difficult for smaller companies to recruit young talent.

Michael Bültmann
Mr. Bültmann, managing director of HERE Deutschland GmbH since 2014, began by explaining
what HERE does: By capturing data from drivers, HERE provides mapping and related data tocompanies and consumers. It currently collects this metadata in 200 countries. In Japan, HERE is
working closely with Pioneer, a company once known for manufacturing car audio equipment that
now also has a significant presence in the “Internet of Things”.
According to Mr. Bültmann, the key trends shaping the future of industry will be the rise of
megacities, the increase of the global population to 9.5 billion, robotics, artificial intelligence,quantum computing, the drive for sustainability, data analytics, augmented reality, and neuralnetworks, among others. HERE works to harness several of these trends at once: it uses big data
to both alleviate traffic congestion in metropolitan areas and make transportation safer, more
efficient, and more environmentally friendly.
Mr. Bültmann then expanded on the work done at HERE to comment on changes in the economy
as a whole. HERE owes its success to a position that takes advantage of sever-al prevalent trends
at once. Conversely, companies that fail to take advantage of these trends – investing too little indata, for example, or neglecting to build out their platforms early – will find themselves inincreasingly difficult positions; these trends, after all, do not just represent new tools companies candecide to use or not, but entirely new economic structures. Further, national regulations intended
to level the playing field can have dangerous unintended consequences: in an increasinglyinterconnected global economy, any regulatory structure that only affects businesses located within
a single country or economic area has the potential to harm local businesses while helping theirglobal competitors.

− 41 −

The European Union offers an example of the latter pitfall. Strict regulations on the use of data inseveral EU countries do more to impede the success of European businesses than protect European
consumers; Mr. Bültmann described EU data regulations as focusing on potential harm, rather
than potential benefit. This is in sharp contrast to the business culture in the United States, which
Mr. Bültmann described as being more interested in the potential of big data than its possible
drawbacks. American companies now have a significant first-mover advantage against their
European counterparts, and European players may well be relegated more or less permanently tothe industrial fringes, forced to play catch-up to credibly contest even a relatively modest share of
the market.

Dr. Andreas Rinke
Dr. Rinke offered what was in many ways a counterpoint to Mr. Bültmann's presentation: while
Mr. Bültmann's talk stressed the ground European and Japanese firms have already ceded toAmerican companies and the urgent need to encourage their growth, Mr. Rinke emphasized thecomplexity of the government's task in this field and the need to proceed with caution. Whilebusinesses are free to focus entirely on their own financial interests, governments have to pursue
several goals simultaneously, balancing the needs of one constituency against those of others; as
simple as it may sound to cultivate a more data-friendly business environment, governments also
have to consider the potential ramifications on the labor market and the rights of their citizens.
Mr. Rinke summed this up by pointing out that while businesses can strive to be the “winners”
of the post-industrial revolution, governments have to see to the well-being of the losers as well.
That being said, the next ten years will be crucial to Germany's economic future. Chancellor
Angela Merkel earned derision for calling the Internet a “Neuland” in 2013, but time has borne
her out – the digital revolution has fundamentally changed the world, especially the economy.
German businesses that do not adapt, whether because they under-estimate the necessity of
doing so or out of an impulse to defend their existing business models, risk becoming merely theworkshops of the larger American and Chinese IT companies, handling the less innovative (andless profitable) implementation work of larger international concerns.
Germany and Japan have to do more to cultivate innovation domestically. In Germany, there is a
tradition of maintaining distance between business and government; this may need to change in orderto foster a policy environment that is more engaged with the needs of the business community. At thesame time, these countries' governments have to consider the rules in place governing foreignacquisitions. In several cases – Mr. Rinke mentioned KUKA, a robotics company bought by the Chinese
Midea Group in 2016 – promising European startups are cannibalized by larger foreign companies once
they achieve a certain level of success, further weakening the innovation culture in Europe.

− 42 −

Session 3 – Q & A
The questions following the third session began with one Mr. Bültmann directed to Mr. Rinke:
HERE employs 1,000 people in Berlin as data scientists, which would seem to argue that industry
4.0 benefits the labor market more than it harms it. Does this not argue for a more data-friendly
policy framework? Mr. Rinke responded that automation and artificial intelligence will replace
more and more jobs every year, and that for every data scientist employed, several workers inother fields will be rendered redundant. For digitalization not to be disruptive, government willneed to play a role acclimating the labor market to this disruption, including through retraining
programs.
Other questions included how much Merkel has actually done to spur innovation and how
digitalization should be handled to avoid the disruptions that accompanied trade. On the firstquestion, Merkel has done a great deal to put data on the policy agenda, but she faces an obstaclein German culture: Germans tend to craft consensus-based policy, and do so at a slower, moredeliberative pace. This is in stark contrast to American policy culture, which tends to move more
quickly and fix problems as they arise, or Chinese pol-icy culture, in which government directives
face less public accountability.
On the second question, one thing that is needed is transparency: one of the consistent complaints
about trade deals has been their opacity. With digitalization and data, it will be essential to beopen about how data is used from the beginning, possibly even finding ways to compensate
consumers for the use of their data.

Closing Remarks
Dr. Sylke Tempel
For all that globalization has been vilified, it has improved lives and lifted millions out of poverty.
Now, after decades of free movement of goods, one of the issues most in need of attention is thefree movement of people. Different European countries have had varying success managing
immigration over the past few years; further discussion will be needed in this area in the future,especially as part of a larger effort to combat populism and protect the international liberal order.

Kazumasa Kusaka
Mr. Kusaka thanked participants for a productive conference. He closed by describing a
successful conference as one that each participant leaves with their opinion changed, andhoped that the participants of this year's DGAP-JEF summit took away new insight from the
day's three sessions – and that the dialogue on trade and growth would continue in the future.
End of Symposium− 43 −

7. Ⓨ⾲㈨ᩱ
ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 1పᡂ㛗ࡢ⨜࠿ࡽ⬺ฟࡍࡿ࡟ࡣ
Escaping the Low Growth Trap῝ᑿ ගὒࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 2៞ᛂ⩏ሿ኱Ꮫྡ㄃ᩍᤵ㸭Ṋⶶ㔝኱Ꮫ⤒῭Ꮫ㒊ᩍᤵ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࠊಖㆤ୺⩏ࠊࡑࡋ࡚⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶
Populism, Protectionism, and the Future of Free Tradeࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ 3ຍ⸨ ๰ኴබ┈㈈ᅋἲேᮾி㈈ᅋ ᖖົ⌮஦㸭ᅜ㝿኱Ꮫᩍᤵ⚟Ọ ဴ㑻᪥ᮏᶵᲔ㍺ฟ⤌ྜ ࣈࣛࢵࢭࣝ஦ົᡤ㛗ࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿ➇தຊࡢ⥔ᣢ
Staying Competitive Through Digitalization
ᚿ㈡ ಇஅ᪥⏘⮬ື㌴ᰴᘧ఍♫ ྲྀ⥾ᙺ๪఍㛗− 44 −

セッション 1

深尾 光洋

慶應義塾大学名誉教授／武蔵野大学経済学部教授

&Karting Choppy Seas: The World Economy and the Future of Growth and Trade
3rd JEF-DGAP International Symposium

ESCAPING THE LOW GROWTH TRAPMay 18, 2017
Mitsuhiro Fukao
Professor Musashino University
Professor Emeritus, Keio University

1. Japan's nominal GDP has been flat but real GDP has been growing.
Billion yen
600,000

Real GDP 2000 Price

550,000
500,000
450,000
400,000

Nominal GDP

350,000
300,000
250,000

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

200,000− 45 −



2. Japan's GDP deflator had been declining since mid-1990s but it has started to rise in 2014.
110
105
GDP deflator unadjusted for
consumption tax hikes

100
95
GDP deflator adjusted for
consumption tax hikes

90
85
80

1980.1
1981.1
1982.1
1983.1
1984.1
1985.1
1986.1
1987.1
1988.1
1989.1
1990.1
1991.1
1992.1
1993.1
1994.1
1995.1
1996.1
1997.1
1998.1
1999.1
2000.1
2001.1
2002.1
2003.1
2004.1
2005.1
2006.1
2007.1
2008.1
2009.1
2010.1
2011.12012.1
2013.1
2014.1
2015.1
2016.175

3. Japan's deflation was caused by a large negative GDP gap due to financial crises.
4
Financial Crisis in Japan

Global Financial Crisis

2
0
-2
-4
-6
Core-core CPI inflation rate

-8

GDP gap
-10

2015

2014

2013

2012

− 46 −

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

Japan's core-core CPI excludes all food items and energy items and roughly corresponds to US core CPI.
Annualized CPI inflation rate is smoothed by 3-quater moving average.

4. Japan's low real GDP growth rate has been caused by declining labor supply.
6
5

Total factor productivity growth rate

4

Potential capital input
Potential labor input

3

Potental GDP growth rate
2
1
0
-1

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

-2

Each data series is smoothed by 3-quater moving average.

The TFP is calculated as a smoothed residual of Cobb-Douglas production function for Japan.

The production function is estimated with man-hour based labor

input and operating-ratio adjusted capital input.

5. Declining labor supply has been depressing the real growth rate.
10million man-hour/month

1,150
Actual Labor Input
1,100

Potentail Labor Input

1,050
1,000
950
900

2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973

850

Potential labor input is estimated by connecting the peaks of labor participation rates, overtime working hours, normal working hours, formale and female age groups.

− 47 −

− 48 −

2017.012016.012015.012014.012013.012012.01

2011.01

2010.01

2009.01

2008.01100

2007.012006.012005.01

2004.01

2003.01

2002.01

2001.01

2000.01

1999.01

1998.01

1997.01

1996.01

1995.01600

1994.01

1993.01

1992.01

1991.01

1990.01

1989.01

1988.01

1987.01

1986.012015.1

2014.1

2013.12012.1

2011.1

2010.1

2009.1

2008.1

2007.1

2006.1

2005.1

2004.1

2003.1

2002.1

2001.1

2000.1

1999.1

1998.1

1997.1

1996.1

1995.1

1994.1

1993.1

1992.1

1991.1

1990.1

1989.1

1988.1

1987.1

1986.1

1985.1

6. The current profit of Japanese companies is much higher than the bubble period in the late 1980s.
18

16

14

12

Current profit/GDP ratio

10

8

6

4

2

0

7. Although Nikkei 225 index is low, market capitalization of stock prices are also high

800
40000

700
35000

TSE 1st section
capitalization(lhs trillion yen)
30000

500

25000

400

20000

300

15000

200

10000

Nikke 225 index
(rhs)

5000

0

0

8. Conclusions(1) Japan showed no nominal growth since early 1990s due to mild deflation.
(2) Japan's deflation is mainly due to large deflationary gap under two financial crises.
(3) More recently, Japan has closed deflationary gap and inflation rate has become positive.
(4) Despite this cyclical recovery, the real grow rate remains low due to declining labor input.
(5) Female labor participation rate is rising but not enough to overturn the declining working hour per worker.
(6) Only way to improve the growth perspective of Japan is allow more inward immigration.
total inward immigration has been about 70,000 per year.

− 49 −

The current

セッション 2

加藤 創太

公益財団法人東京財団 常務理事／国際大学教授

1

Does Populism Lead toProtectionism?
Sota Kato
Tokyo Foundation and International University of JapanMay 18th, 2017

Why Protectionism? (1)“Economists cannot understand why protectionism
exists; political scientists cannot understand why
free trade exists.”− 50 −

2

Why Protectionism? (2)3Interest group protectionism
Small and well organized interest groups politicallyoverwhelm numerous but dispersed consumers.
Trade issue is not highly salient.
Why?: Free riding on public goods. Agency problem ofpoliticians and/or parties.

Populist protectionism
The majority or the median voter prefers protectionism
over free trade.
Trade issue is highly salient.
Why?: Limited information, limitations on redistribution,
irrational voters.

Recipes for Protectionism
Recipe for Interest group protectionism
Recipe for Populist protectionism− 51 −

4

Recipe for Interest Group Protectionism (1)5

Can Trump and Sanders shake their hands?

Recipe for Interest Group Protectionism (2)Trump;“The establishment, the media, the special interest, the lobbyists, thedonors, they’re all against me. I’m self-funding my campaign. I don’t owe
anybody anything, I only owe it to the American people to do a great job.
They are really trying to stop me.”

Sanders;“Today, we stand here and say loudly and clearly that enough is enough.
This great nation and its government belong to all of the people, and not toa handful of billionaires, their super PACs and their lobbyists.”

Populism can be, by its definition, a recipe for interest group protectionism.

− 52 −

6

Recipe for Interest Group Protectionism (3)7Japanese case for TPP:
Abe administration’s strong leadership.
Support for TPP constantly exceeded opposition in polls(mass support).
Abe Administration’s strong emphasis on public approval rate
allowed PM Abe to overcome special interest opposition fromtraditional LDP constituencies.
(In contrast, PM Abe postponed consumption tax hike twice inrow when he could not gain support from the mass public).

Recipes for Protectionism
Recipe for Interest group protectionism
Recipe for Populist protectionism− 53 −

8

Recipe for Populist Protectionism (1)9Economists’ puzzle for populist protectionism;
Free trade will increase overall welfare gain. Why
can’t voters understand?

Possible answers;
Redistribution problem (Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik
1998; Gozgor & Anjan 2015)
Voters are uninformed (Achen & Bartels 2016; Delli
Carpini & Keeter 1997)
Voters are irrational or even fool. (Converse 1964)
Economists are wrong.

Recipe for Populist Protectionism (2)Possible answers;
Redistribution problem (Katzenstein 1985;
Rodrik 1998; Gozgor & Anjan 2015)
Voters are uninformed (Achen & Bartels 2016; Delli
Carpini & Keeter 1997)
Voters are irrational (fool). (Converse 1964)
Economists are wrong.

− 54 −

10

Recipe for Populist Protectionism (3)11Open economies have bigger governments(Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1998).

Recipe for Populist Protectionism (4)Open trade and redistribution
Small European states “complement their pursuit ofliberalism in international economy with a strategy ofdomestic compensation.” (Katzenstein 1985)“[T]he social welfare state is the flip side of open economy.”(Rodrik 1997)

Even if a state can realize overall welfare gain by adopting
free trade, if the gain from trade is unevenly distributed, free
trade might not be able to earn mass support.
Free trade should accompany proper redistribution plan toearn mass support and overcome populist protectionism.

− 55 −

12

Recipe for Populist Protectionism (5)13Possible answers;
Redistribution problem (Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik
1998; Gozgor & Anjan 2015)
Voters are uninformed (Achen & Bartels 2016;
Delli Carpini & Keeter 1997)
Voters are irrational (fool). (Converse 1964)
Economists are wrong.

Recipe for Populist Protectionism (6)− 56 −

14

Recipe for Populist Protectionism (7)15

In any advanced democracies, careful empirical research reveals that
average voters have very limited amount of political information.
Voters are rationally ignorant (Downs 1957).

An average voter is unlikely to possess enough information to soundly
decide whether free trade or protectionism is good for her economic wellbeing.
Voter ignorance is a highly debated issue in political science. At least, thegovernment should not call a referendum for issues such as Brexit.
The role of parties, media, and thinktanks as an information mediator is

critical for democratic success.

Temporal Takeaways

16

Populism does not automatically lead to protectionism. Political power ofmass public from which populists’ power derives might even lessen

interest group protectionism.
Populist protectionism might prevail when trade issue becomes a highly
salient issues that bring about mass public’s attention.
Redistributing welfare gains from free trade to the median voter (or themass public) is critical to avoid populist protectionism.
The role of Information intermediaries such as parties, media, thinktanks,
and academics is crucial for the median voters to acquire enough politicalinformation to make sound decisions on trade issues.

− 57 −

セッション 2

福永 哲郎

日本機械輸出組合 ブラッセル事務所長

Brussels in 2016
On Rue de la Loi, European Area

At the electric scoreboard in front of DG Trade, European Commission

Five years ago in Tokyo, Japan

Source: gettyimages− 58 −

Source: gettyimages

Three key phenomena of “Stop-TPP” Actions in Japan¾ Provoked Anti-American sentiment“TPP will destroy Japanese culture”¾ Formation of Bipartisan Actions“Japan needs to open more” vs “Japan is already open”¾ Leverage of Social networks
Website called "Think about TPP!" operated by“The Network to Protect Japanese Food, Life and Health”
was the hub of the campaign

DPJ government addressed the situations by…
¾ Public Relations• Announcement on clarity of of TPP“Japan’s health care is not an issue for TPP”
• Dialogue with citizens: Town hall meetings in 47 prefectures¾ Mitigating Measures for Global Adjustment:• e.g., Consideration of Income Support for Agriculture→ DPJ could not decide to participate in TPP− 59 −

Game changer: Confidence in PM Abe¾ Regardless of LDP’s longstanding opposition on TPP…
¾ The PM changed his mind when he perceived that Abenomics had createdstrong confidence in his administration¾ TPP was even titled as the central policy of the 3rd arrow, structural reform,of his Abenomics¾ Abe-Obama deal created confidence in negotiation capability of the Abeadministration“Japan is not required to make a prior commitment tounilaterally eliminate all tariffs upon joining the TPP
discussions”
PM Abe “It became evident that the TPP is notpremised on tariff elimination without sanctuary”
March 2013
Source: the japan times

Latest trade policy developments in Europe

Reflection Paper on Harnessing
Globalisation, 10 May 2017

¾ “Globalization brings challenges”¾ EU is to pursue “fairer” trade rules

Whirlpool Factory, 26 April 2017
Source: Fox News World¾ Upgrading social security system by ”Flexicurity”¾ Adjustment of trade policy
䡚”Buy European?”ࠥ“Tougher control of trade and investment?”− 60 −

Japan’s New Trade Strategy
EU

Japan

US

TPP IIRCEP

EU-Japan: Strategic Partner in Global Trade Policy
Technical Harmonization through EU-Japan EPA/FTA will facilitate
global regulatory convergence
Landscape for Global Automotive Standard (Source: Originally JAMA and amended by JMC)
UN-R

EU-Japan
FMVSS

UN-R

ASEAN
MRA
UN-R

8

− 61 −

セッション 3

志賀 俊之

日産自動車株式会社 取締役副会長

Staying Competitive
Through Digitalization
May 18, 2017
Toshiyuki Shiga
Vice Chairman
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.
Chairman and CEO

Innovation Network Corporation of Japan

1

What will 4th Industrial Revolution bring us?
1st
Steam power

2nd

Mass production& Electricity

4th

3rd

Computer &Automation

IoT, Big data, AI
24H

Enrich people’s life

Accelerate environmental issues & disparate society& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 62 −

ᾎJapan’s lower Labor Productivity*Labor productivityᾌAdded value/Labor input

Labor productivity(MJPY/person)

22nd

18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

35 countries(All OECD)
22nd
ὉὉ

ὉὉ

Comparison of Productivity among OECD countries, Japan Productivity Center, 2016

& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

Labor productivity (Industrial section)
Agriculture‹

Service sector

Manufacturing

‹

Labor
productivity(MJPY/person)

10
5

0

2.5

5.3

11

System of National Accounts, Cabinet Office, 2006
& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 63 −

Labor productivity (Company Size in same sector)ᵠᶇᶅᴾᵡᶍᵌᵱᵫᵣᶑ

›(MJPY/person)
ᵏᵓ
ᵏᵎ

Ṵᵔᵎᵃ

ᵓ
ᵎ

ᵏᵐ

ᵓ

Investigation report , The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, 2015
& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG



Labor productivity (Department in company)ᵠᶊᶓᶃḗᶁᶍᶊᶊᵿᶐᴾᶕᶍᶐᶉᶃᶐ

ᵵᶆᶇᶒᶃḗᶁᶍᶊᶊᵿᶐᴾᶕᶍᶐᶉᶃᶐ

›
High

Low

& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 64 −



Salary

Labor productivity (Age groups in office)Class

Workload& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

4th Industrial Revolution brings us Productivity Revolution

Social Issues
SMEs
ServicesectorAgricultureAI
Industry

Robot

4th Industrial
Revolution
IoT, Big data, AI
ICTDigital marketing

Telecommuting

Working styleὸίTime, placeὸ& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 65 −



Agriculture × AI
AI predicts Cow’s Heat/Disease

Hokkaido& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG



SMEs × AI
Robotics make up for Labor Shortagein SMEs

https://www.yaskawa.co.jp/product/robotics& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 66 −

Small shop × AI

(Service sector)

AI analyzes Sales slump cause &improves sales& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG



Nursing-care Service × AI
AI creates an elder care programs
Investment
Management
supportCare Design Institute Inc.

Investment
Business
supportCare service
providerCreate New model
Other
enterprise& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 67 −

ᾜᾰᾹι῁ issues of venture eco system in JapanṞ Low investment for start-up
companies
ṟ Luck of EntrepreneurshipṠ Inactive collaboration b/w
Univ. /Start-up & Big Co.
& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHGṞ Low Investment for start-up companies
Total amount

Total number(BJPY)(Items)130

Venture white paper 2016, Venture Enterprise Center& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 68 −

ṟ Luck of Entrepreneurship
Total Early-Stage
Entrepreneurial Activity(TEA)Start

TEA (%)

Corporation

Goal

4.8
22 y/o60 y/o4.7

11.9

Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, METI, 2015

& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

Ṡ Inactive collaboration b/w Univ. & Big Co.
Exchange rate
1$=80JPY(2012) 100JPY(2013)1€=100JPY(2012) 130JPY(2013)(B JPY)

5

350

300

3.75

250

3.83

4
3

200

150
100
50

(%)

1.14

0.73 0.66

2
1.12

0

1
0

2013 20142012 20132012 2013

Digest of Japanese Science and Technology Indicators 2016, NISTEP& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 69 −

Ṡ Inactive collaboration b/w Start-up & Big Co.

Univ.
Basic study≓ÎσStart-up
CompaniesσÎ1

Start-up
Ecosystem

Big
Companies

1Î10

10Î100& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG



7KDQN\RXIRUJHWWLQJFRQQHFWHG& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 70 −

& &RS\ULJKW1,66$102725&2/7'$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG

− 71 −



8. ᡂᯝ
㸺άື㸼2017 ᖺᗘࡢ᪥Ḣࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࣛࡣࠊ࣋ࣝࣜࣥࡢࢻ࢖ࢶእ஺ホ㆟఍㸦 Die Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.: DGAP㸧࡜ࡢඹദ࡛ 5 ᭶ 18 ᪥㸦ᮌ㸧ྠホ㆟఍࡟࠾࠸࡚㛤ദࡉࢀࡓࠋ
ᙜ㈈ᅋࡣ 1980 ᖺ௦࠿ࡽḢᕞ࣭࢔ࢪ࢔࣭⡿ᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀࡀᣢ⥆ⓗⓎᒎࢆ㐙ࡆࠊࡦ࠸࡚ࡣୡ⏺⤒῭ࡢᣢ⥆ⓗⓎᒎ࡟㈉⊩ࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺ほⅬ࡛ࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀࡀᢪ࠼࡚࠸ࡿㄢ㢟ࠊᡂ㛗ᢚไせᅉࢆ࡜ࡾ࠶ࡆࠊࡑࢀࡽࡢゎỴ⟇ࡢⓎぢ࡜ゎỴ⟇ࡢᐇ⾜࡟ྥࡅ࡚ࠊᨻ἞࣭⤒῭࡞࡝」ྜⓗ࡞どⅬ࡛ࡢពぢ࣭᝟ሗ஺᥮ࠊ┦஫ࡢᏛࡧࢆᚿྥࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋḢᕞ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣ㏆ᖺࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ࡛ࡣ DGAPࠊⱥᅜ࡜ࡣ Chatham Houseࠊࡑࡋ࡚ࣇࣛࣥࢫࡣ Aspen Institutein France ࡢィ 3 ᶵ㛵ࢆࣃ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮࡜ࡋ࡚ẖᖺ rotate ࡍࡿᙧ࡛ࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࣛࢆ㛤ദࡋ࡚ࠊᑓ㛛ᐙ࡟ࡼࡿウ㆟ࢆᐇ᪋ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
௒ᖺᗘࡣࢻ࢖ࢶࡢ㡰␒࡟࠶ࡓࡿࠋDGAP ࡜ࡢඹദࡣ 2012 ᖺࡀึᅇ࡛ࠊ௒ᅇࡀ➨ 3 ᅇ┠࡛࠶ࡿࠋᙜࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࣛࢆ㛤ദࡍࡿ 5 ᭶༙ࡤ࡜࠸࠺ࢱ࢖࣑ࣥࢢࡣࠊࡇࢀ࠿ࡽࡢ EUࠊ᪥ᮏ࡜ࡢ㛵ಀࠊࡑࡋ࡚⮬⏤㈠᫆ࢆྵࡴࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣜࢮ࣮ࢩࣙࣥࡢ⾜᪉ࢆ㆟ㄽࡍࡿ࡟⤯ዲࡢࢱ࢖࣑ࣥࢢ
࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋ5 ᭶ࡢึࡵ࡟ࡣࣇࣛࣥࢫࡢ኱⤫㡿㑅ࡀ᭷ࡾࠊ9 ᭶࡟ࡣࡇࡢࢻ࢖ࢶ࡛ࡢ⥲㑅ᣲࠊࡑࡢ㛫࡟ⱥᅜࡢ⥲㑅ᣲ࡜ࠊẸពࢆၥ࠸᪂ࡓ࡞ mandate ࢆᚓࡿᶵ఍ࡀ⥆ࡃࠋࡑࢇ࡞୰࡛ࠊ
BREXIT ࢆึࡵ࡜ࡍࡿḢᕞࡢ⤫ྜࢆᕠࡿࢲ࢖ࢼ࣑ࢬ࣒ࠊ⡿ᅜࢺࣛࣥࣉᨻᶒࢆ⏕ࡳฟࡋࡓ⫼ᬒ࡟╔┠ࡋࠊ≉࡟ࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣜࢮ࣮ࢩࣙࣥࡀኻᴗࠊ᱁ᕪၥ㢟࡞࡝ࡢࠕㅖᝏࡢ᰿※ࠖ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮏᙜ࡟ࡑ࠺࡞ࡢ࠿ࠊୡ⏺⤒῭ࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡣ࡝࠺࡞ࡿࡢ࠿࡜࠸࠺ၥ㢟ព㆑ࢆ୰ᚰ࡟ᣢࡕࡘࡘࠊࣇ࢛࣮࣒ࣛ࡟ྲྀࡾ⤌ࢇࡔࠋࡑࡢ࣓࢖ࣥࢸ࣮࣐ࠕⲨᾏࡢᾏ㊰ࢆᶍ⣴㸸ୡ⏺⤒῭ཬࡧᡂ㛗࡜㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶㸭Charting
Choppy Seas: The World Economy and the Future of Growth and Tradeࠖࡢୗࠊ௨ୗ
ࡢ 3 ࡘࡢࢭࢵࢩ࡛ࣙࣥ᪥ᮏഃ 4 ྡࠊࢻ࢖ࢶഃ 6 ྡࡢ࣓࢖ࣥࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝ࡀⓎ⾲ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ⣙ 60 ྡࡢ⌧ᆅཧຍ⪅㸦㏵୰ཧຍࠊ㏵୰㏥ᖍࡶྵࡵࡿ㸧࡜࡜ࡶ࡟ࣛ࢘ࣥࢻ࣭ࢸ࣮ࣈ࣭ࣝ
ࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩࣙࣥࢆ⾜ࡗࡓࠋࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸯㸸పᡂ㛗ࡢ⨜࠿ࡽ⬺ฟࡍࡿ࡟ࡣ
Escaping the Low Growth Trap
ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸰㸸࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࠊಖㆤ୺⩏ࠊࡑࡋ࡚⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶
Populism, Protectionism, and the Future of Free Tradeࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸱㸸ࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿ➇தຊࡢ⥔ᣢ
Staying Competitive through Digitalization− 72 −

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸯㸸పᡂ㛗ࡢ⨜࠿ࡽ⬺ฟࡍࡿ࡟ࡣ
ၥ㢟ព㆑ࡣࠊձ᪥ᮏ࠾ࡼࡧḢᕞ࡟࠾ࡅࡿపᡂ㛗ᮇ࠿ࡽᏛ࡭ࡿࡇ࡜ࡣఱ࠿㸽 ղపᡂ㛗ࡢࡲࡲࡢ≧ែ࠿ࡽᢤࡅฟࡍ᪉ἲࡣఱ࠿㸽 ճ᫖ᖺࡢ G7 ࡛ᡴࡕฟࡋࡓᨵ㠉᱌ࡣఱ࠿㸽 մࡇࢀ࠿ࡽ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࢻ࢖ࢶ࡛ࡢ G20 ࡛ࡇࢀࡽࡢၥ㢟࡬࡝ࢇ࡞ᑐ⟇ࢆᡴࡕฟࡏࡿ࠿㸽࡜࠸ࡗࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡽࢆᛕ㢌࡟ࣉࣞࢮࣥࢸ࣮ࢩࣙࣥࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࠊ㆟ㄽࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓࠋ୺࡞ព
ぢࡣ௨ୗࡢ㏻ࡾࠋ
ໟᣓⓗ࡞ᡂ㛗㸦inclusive growth㸧ࢆಁ㐍ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࡣࠊ⏕⏘⬟ຊ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ➇த࡜
ᢞ㈨࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊᨻᗓ࡟ࡼࡿ⫋ᴗカ⦎࡬ࡢᢞ㈨࡜࣐ࢡࣟ⤒῭ᨻ⟇࡟ࡼࡾዡບࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ㉁ࡢ㧗࠸ᩍ⫱࡜⫋ᴗカ⦎࡟ࡼࡾ᫬௦㐜ࢀ࡟࡞ࡗࡓ⏘ᴗ࡛ാࡃᚑᴗဨࢆ᪂⏘ᴗ࡛ാࡅࡿࡼ࠺࡟ࡍࡿࠊࡲࡓࠊ᪂⯆௻ᴗࢭࢡࢱ࣮࡬ࡢᨭ᥼ࡶᚲせࠋ᪥ᮏࡢሙྜࠊேཱྀῶᑡ࡟ࡼࡾປാຊ౪⤥ࡶῶᑡࡍࡿ୍᪉ࠊ௻ᴗࡢᅜෆ⏕⏘⬟ຊ࡬ࡢ
ᢞ㈨࡟ᑐࡍࡿពḧࡀᙅࡃࠊ⏕⏘ᛶྥୖࢆᣢࡗ࡚ປാ⪅ῶᑡࢆ⿵࠼࡞࠸ࠋປാ⪅ῶᑡ࡟ࢸࢥධࢀࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ⌧ᅾ 7 ୓ேࡢ⛣Ẹࡢཷࡅධࢀࢆቑࡸࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸࠿ࠋ

ࢻ࢖ࢶࡣࠊ⤒ᖖ཰ᨭࡀᕧ㢠ࡢ㯮Ꮠ࡛࠶ࡿ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊ࢖ࣥࣇࣛᩚഛ࡜ᨵၿࠊ࡜
ࡾࢃࡅ IT ࢭࢡࢱ࣮࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࡀᴟ➃࡟ᑡ࡞࠸ࠋIT ࢖ࣥࣇࣛࡢ୙㊊࡛ࠊฟ᮶ࡿࡣࡎࡢ
⏕⏘ᛶྥୖ࡟㝈⏺ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ௒ᚋࠊࡇࢀࡽ࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࢆቑࡸࡍ࡜ྠ᫬࡟ࠊ㞴Ẹࠊ⛣Ẹࠊ
ప㈤㔠ປാ⪅ࢆά⏝ࡍ࡭ࡃປാᨻ⟇ࡢㄪᩚࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿࠋG7ࠊG20 ࡢ୺࡞┠ᶆࡢ୍ࡘࡣࠊ“⡿ᅜ➨୍୺⩏”ࡢ⡿ᅜࡸࠊཱྀ࡛ࡣ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࢆᶆᴶࡍ
ࡿࡀᨻ⟇ࡀ㏫᪉ྥ࡟࠶ࡿ୰ᅜࡀୡ⏺㈠᫆ࡢ⛛ᗎࢆ஘ࡍࡢࢆ㜵ࡄࡇ࡜࡟࠶ࡾࠊࡑࢀࡽ
ࡀ㉳ࡇࡗࡓሙྜࡢ⿕ᐖࡢ㍍ῶ࡛࠶ࢁ࠺ࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸰㸸࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࠊಖㆤ୺⩏ࠊࡑࡋ࡚⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶
ၥ㢟ព㆑ࡣࠊձඛ㐍ᅜ࡛ࡣࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ໬ࡸ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢ࣓ࣜࢵࢺ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚୙ಙឤࡀ㧗ࡲࡗ
࡚࠾ࡾࠊBREXIT ࡣࡑࡢ୍౛࡛ࡣ࡞࠸࠿㸽 ղ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢ⤒῭ࡢᖐ⤖ࡣఱ࠿㸽ୡ⏺ࡣಖㆤ୺⩏ࡢ᫬௦࡟ྥ࠿ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿㸽 ճ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒࡜ᆅᇦ⤫ྜࡣేᏑ࡛ࡁࡿ࠿㸽 մḢᕞࡢ TTIP ࡑࡋ࡚࢔ࢪ࢔ኴᖹὒᆅᇦࡢ RCEP ࡜ TPP ࡢᒎᮃࡣ㸽࡞࡝࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋࡇࢀ
ࡽࢆᛕ㢌࡟ࣉࣞࢮࣥࢸ࣮ࢩࣙࣥࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࠊ㆟ㄽࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓࠋ୺࡞ពぢࡣ௨ୗࡢ㏻ࡾࠋୡ⏺⤒῭ࡢᡂ㛗ࡀῶ㏿ࡍࡿ୰ࠊ୙ᖹ➼ࡀᣑ኱ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࡛ࡣ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢ
ᜠᜨࡀ␲ၥどࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ࡛ࡢ㈠᫆ᨻ⟇ࡣࠊᮾ᪉࡟ࢩࣇࢺࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ⡿ᅜࡀಙ㢗࡛ࡁࡿࣃ࣮ࢺࢼ࣮࡛࡞࠸࡜࡞ࢀࡤࠊ୰ᅜࠊ᪥ᮏ࡜ࡢ㈠᫆༠ᐃࢆᅛࡵࡿດຊࢆࡍࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋࡓ
ࡔࡋࠊ୰ᅜࡣࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࢆᶆᴶࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡀ㈠᫆㞀ቨࢆ⥔ᣢࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࠊ᪥ᮏ
࡜ࡢ㛵ಀࡀ㐍ࡵࡸࡍ࠸࡜ศ࠿ࡿ࡛࠶ࢁ࠺ࠋ

࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺࡢືࡁࡀᚲࡎࡋࡶಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ᨻ⟇࡟⧅ࡀࡿࢃࡅ࡛࡞ࡃࠊಖㆤ㈠᫆୺
⩏ᨻ⟇ࡀᚲࡎࡋࡶ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺ㐠ື࠿ࡽጞࡲࡗࡓࢃࡅ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ᪥ᮏ࡛ࡢ TPP ཯ᑐࡣ฼┈ᅋయ࡛ࠊ᪥ᮏࡢᅜẸࡢከࡃࡀ TPP ཧຍࢆᨭᣢࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࡇ࡜࡛ࠊᏳಸᨻᶒ
ࡣࡇࡢಖㆤ୺⩏ⓗ࡞฼┈ᅋయࡢ཯ᑐࢆᢚ࠼㎸ࢇࡔࠋ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᜠᜨࡣ๻ⓗ࡟୙ᆒ➼࡟࡞ࡾࠊࡇࢀࡣ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢫࢺࡢᛣࡾࢆᣍࡃࡢ࡛ࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆࡟ࡼࡿᜠᜨࢆẚ㍑ⓗᆒ➼࡟෌㓄ศࡍࡿ௙⤌ࡳࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ− 73 −

᭷ᶒ⪅ࡣ୍⯡࡟ࠊ㝈ࡽࢀࡓ᝟ሗࡋ࠿ᣢࡗ࡚࠾ࡽࡎࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆࡜ಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࡀࡼࡾ⤒῭ⓗ⚟♴࡟᭷┈࠿ࢆỴࡵࡽࢀ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊಖㆤ㈠᫆୺⩏ⓗࣞࢺࣜࢵࢡࢆ᥇
⏝ࡍࡿᨻ἞ᐙ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚↓㜵ഛࠋࢩࣥࢡࢱࣥࢡࠊ᭷㆑⪅ࠊ࣐ࢫ࣓ࢹ࢕࢔ࡀࡇࢀࡽ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚᭷ᶒ⪅࡟᝟ሗᥦ౪ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ㔜せ࡛࠶ࡿࠋEU ࡜᪥ᮏࡣࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆༠ᐃࢆ๓㐍ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡛つไ⦆࿴ࡢㄪ࿴࡟ྥࡅ୍࡚ᒙከࡃ
ࡢࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࠊᑗ᮶ࡢᅜ㝿ᇶ‽ࢆタᐃࡍࡿ࡟ᙺ❧ࡘࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ

BREXIT ࡣࠊ㈠᫆࡟㛵ࡋ࡚࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃ⛣Ẹ๐ῶࡢࡓࡵࡢᢞ⚊࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋ

ಖㆤ୺⩏⪅ࡢᨻ⟇୺ᙇࢆᔂࡍࡓࡵ࡟ࡣࠊᖹᆒⓗ࡞᭷ᶒ⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡀ࡞ࡅ
ࢀࡤ᪥⏝ရࡢࢥࢫࢺࡀ࡝ࢀࡃࡽ࠸ቑ࠼ࡿࡢ࠿࡞࡝ࠊᐇ㝿࡟ᅜෆ࡟୚࠼ࡿᙳ㡪ࢆᩍ⫱ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࢺࣛࣥࣉ኱⤫㡿ࡣࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛ࡢ⡿ᅜ㈠᫆ᨻ⟇ࢆそࡋࡓࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃㅖᅜࢆࡼ
ࡾ⤖᮰ࡉࡏࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃேࢆࡼࡾ୍ᒙ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃឡዲᐙ࡟ࡋࡓࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸱㸸ࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿ➇தຊࡢ⥔ᣢၥ㢟ព㆑ࡣࠊձ᪥ᮏࡸࢻ࢖ࢶ࡞࡝ G20 ཧຍᅜ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚➨㸲ḟ⏘ᴗ㠉࿨࡛ࡢࢳࣕࣥࢫ࡜
ヨ⦎ࡣఱ࠿㸽 ղḢᕞ࡜᪥ᮏࡣᢏ⾡㠉᪂ࠊຠ⋡ᛶྥୖࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚ࡢᡂ㛗ᶵ఍ࢆά⏝ࡍࡿ‽ഛࡀ༑ศ࡛ࡁ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿㸽 ճ⡿ᅜ࡞࡝ࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬ඛ㐍ᅜ࠿ࡽఱࢆᏛ࡭ࡿ࠿㸽࡞࡝࡛࠶ࡗ
ࡓࠋࡇࢀࡽࢆᛕ㢌࡟ࣉࣞࢮࣥࢸ࣮ࢩࣙࣥࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࠊ㆟ㄽࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓࠋ୺࡞ពぢࡣḟࡢ࡜࠾ࡾࠋࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬ࡣ᪥ᮏ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࡣࠊᜠᜨࢆࡶࡓࡽࡍవᆅࡀ኱ࡁ࠸ࠋ୍ࡘࡣࠊࢧ࣮ࣅࢫࢭࢡࢱ࣮ࡸ㎰ᴗࢭࢡࢱ࣮ࡢ⏕⏘ᛶྥୖࠊࡶ࠺୍ࡘࡣ࣍࣡࢖ࢺ࣮࢝ࣛࡢ⏕⏘ᛶྥୖ࡛࠶
ࡿࠋࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿࣅࢵࢢࢹ࣮ࢱࡀࡇࡢၥ㢟࡟ᑐᛂࡋࠊ௻ᴗᵓ㐀ࡢ㠀ຠ⋡ᛶ࡬ࡢᑐᛂࢆಁ㐍ࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ

௚᪉࡛ࠊ᪥ᮏ࡛ࡣࡇ࠺ࡋࡓᶵ఍ࢆά⏝࡛ࡁࡿࡼ࠺࡞㠉᪂ⓗ࡛㉳ᴗᐙⓗ࡞ᩥ໬ࡣࠊձ
᪂⯆௻ᴗ࡬ࡢᢞ㈨ࡀ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝࡞࠸ࠊղ᪥ᮏࡢᑵᴗ⪅ࡣᏳᐃⓗ࡛ண ྍ⬟࡞࢟ࣕࣜ࢔
ࢆᣦྥࡍࡿࠊճ᪂⯆௻ᴗࡣ኱Ꮫ࡜ࡢ㐃ᦠࡀᑡ࡞ࡃࠊⱝ࠸ேᮦࡢ⋓ᚓࡀᅔ㞴ࠊ࡜࠸ࡗࡓ⌮⏤࡛Ⓨ㐩ࡋ࡟ࡃ࠸ࠋ

EU ࡛ࡣࢹ࣮ࢱつไࡀཝࡋࡃࠊᾘ㈝⪅ࡢಖㆤ࡟ࡣ࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊࣅࢪࢿࢫࡢᡂຌࢆ
㜼ᐖࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀ࡜ᑐ↷ⓗ࡞ࡢࡀ⡿ᅜ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ₯ᅾⓗ୙฼┈ࡼࡾࡶࣅࢵࢢࢹ࣮ࢱ
ࡢྍ⬟ᛶ࡟㛵ᚰࢆᐤࡏ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ࣮ࣚࣟࢵࣃ௻ᴗࡣ⡿ᅜ௻ᴗ࡜ẚ࡭࡚୙฼࡟࡞ࡗ࡚࠸
ࡿࠋࢻ࢖ࢶࡣࠊᅜෆ࡛㠉᪂ࢆ⫱ࡴࡓࡵ࡟ࡍ࡭ࡁࡇ࡜ࡣከ࠸ࠋࢻ࢖ࢶ࡟ࡣࠊᨻᗓ࡜௻ᴗࡢ
㊥㞳ࢆ⥔ᣢࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺ఏ⤫ࡀ࠶ࡿࡀࠊࣅࢪࢿࢫ⏺ࡢࢽ࣮ࢬ࡟㛵ࢃࡾࡢ῝࠸ᨻ⟇⎔ቃࢆ㔊ᡂࡍࡿ࡟ࡣࡇࡢఏ⤫ࢆኚ࠼ࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡲࡓࠊࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡗ࡚వ๫ேဨ࡞࡝ࡢΰ஘ࡀ㉳ࡇࡽ࡞࠸ࡼ࠺࡟ࠊᨻᗓࡣ෌カ⦎ࣉࣟࢢ࣒ࣛࢆྵࡵປാᕷሙࢆ㡰ᛂࡉࡏࡿᙺ๭ࢆᢸ࠺ᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ− 74 −

㸺ᡂᯝ㸼௨ୖࡢ୍᪥ࡢ఍ྜ࡛ࡢ୺࡞ᡂᯝ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣ௨ୗࡀᣲࡆࡽࢀࡿࠋ
㸦㸯㸧ᙜ᪥ࡣࠊ᪥ᮏഃࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝4 ྡࠊࢻ࢖ࢶഃࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝6 ྡࡀ 3 ࡘࡢࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥࡢ
ሙ࡛ෑ㢌Ⓨ⾲ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ࣋ࣝࣜࣥᅾఫࡢᏛ⪅ࠊࣅࢪࢿࢫ࣐ࣥࡸࢪ࢙ࢺ࣭ࣟ࣋ࣝࣜࣥ
஦ົᡤࡢቑ⏣ᡤ㛗࡞࡝ࡢ᪥ᮏ㛵ಀ⪅㸦9 ྡ㸧ࡀ㆟ㄽ࡟ཧຍࠊྜィ 72 ே㸦㏵୰㏥
ᖍࠊཧຍ⪅ࢆྵࡴ㸧ࡢ఍ྜ࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋࡇ࠺ࡋࡓ኱ໃࡢཧຍ࡟ࡼࡾࠊάⓎ࡛ᚷ៸ࡢ࡞࠸ពぢ஺᥮ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࠊ㠀ᖖ࡟㉁ࡢ㧗࠸㆟ㄽࡀฟ᮶ࡓࠋ㸦㆟஦ࡢ࣏࢖ࣥࢺࢆࢻ࢖
ࢶእ஺ホ㆟఍ࡀⱥㄒ࡛ྲྀࡾࡲ࡜ࡵ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡇࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ྜࢃࡏ࡚㈨ᩱ࡜ࡋ࡚ῧ
௜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
㸧㸦㸰㸧᪥ᮏ࠿ࡽཧຍࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࡔ࠸ࡓࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝࡟ࡣࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢሙ࡛᪥ᮏ⤒῭ࡢ≧ἣࠊᡂ㛗ᡓ␎ࠊ࢔࣋ࣀ࣑ࢡࢫࠊ⮬⏤㈠᫆᥎㐍ࠊ➨ 4 ḟ⏘ᴗ㠉࿨ࡢ≧ἣࡸㄢ㢟࡞࡝࡟ࡘ࠸
࡚᪥ᮏࡢ❧ሙࡸ⪃࠼᪉ࢆ༑ศㄝ᫂ࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࡔࡁࠊࢻ࢖ࢶഃ࡜ࡢ┦஫⌮ゎࢆ῝ࡵࡿࡇ࡜ࡀฟ᮶ࡓࠋࡲࡓࠊࢻ࢖ࢶഃⓎ⾲ࠊࢥ࣓ࣥࢺ࠿ࡽ᪥ᮏࡀᨻ⟇㠃࡛Ꮫࡪ࡜ࡇࢁࠊ
ཧ⪃࡟࡞ࡿ࡜ࡇࢁࡶከ࠿ࡗࡓࠋ
㸦㸱㸧᪥ᮏࡢࢫࣆ࣮࣮࢝ࡢ᪉ࠎ࡟఍㆟࡟㛵ࡍࡿ‶㊊ᗘࢆఛࡗࡓ࡜ࡇࢁࠊᙜ㈈ᅋࡢ࢔ࣥࢣ
࣮ࢺ㸦‶㊊ᗘ 4 ẁ㝵᪉ᘧ㸧࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊᅇ⟅ࢆᐤࡏ࡚࠸ࡓࡔ࠸ࡓ 3 ྡ࠿ࡽ㧗࠸‶㊊ࡢᅇ⟅㸦᭱ୖ఩ 2 ྡࠊ➨ 2 ఩ࡢࡸࡸ‶㊊ 1 ྡ㸧ࢆᚓࡓࠋࡲࡓࠊ஦๓ࡢᮇᚅ࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ࡛ࡶࠊ3 ྡ࠿ࡽᮇᚅ࡟ࡓࡀࢃࡠࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡗࡓ࡜ࡢᅇ⟅ࢆᚓࡓ㸦ᮇᚅ㏻ࡾ 1 ྡࠊ
ᴫࡡᮇᚅ㏻ࡾ 2 ྡ㸧ࠋලయⓗ࡞ࢥ࣓ࣥࢺ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊࠕⓎ⾲⪅ࡢ㉁ࡣ㠀ᖖ࡟Ⰻ࠿ࡗ
ࡓࠋྛศ㔝ࡢ expert ࢆ㞟ࡵ࡚࠸ࡓࠋ
ࠖࠊࠕ㠀ᖖ࡟ࢸ࣮࣐ࡀⰋࡃࠊ㆟ㄽࡶ῝࠿ࡗࡓࠋࠖࡀ࠶ࡗࡓࠋ௚᪉ࠊࠕ㠀ᖖ࡟ᗈ࠸ศ㔝ࡢ㆟ㄽࡀ⾜ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊㄡ㸦࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡞
audience㸧ࢆࢱ࣮ࢤࢵࢺ࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿Ⰻࡃࢃ࠿ࡽ࡞࠸ࠖ
ࠊࠕฟᖍ⪅࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ᪥
⊂ඹ࡟ࡶ࠺ᑡࡋ⏘ᴗ⏺ࡢேࡀ࠸ࡿ࡜Ⰻ࠸࡜ᛮ࠺ࠋࠖ࡜ࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢺࡶ࠶ࡾࠊḟᅇ㛤ദࡢ␃ពⅬ࡜ࡋࡓ࠸ࠋ
㸦㸲㸧ࡲࡓࠊ᪥ᮏഃཧຍ⪅࡟ᙜ㈈ᅋ஦ົᒁࡢࣟࢪࡢ‽ഛ᣺ࡾࢆホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࡔ࠸ࡓ࡜ࡇ
ࢁࠊ඲ဨࡀ᭱ୖ఩ࡢ‶㊊࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋ
㸦㸳㸧ࢻ࢖ࢶഃཧຍ⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡶ‶㊊ᗘ࢔ࣥࢣ࣮ࢺࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ16 ྡ࠿ࡽᅇ⟅ࢆᚓࡓࠋ㸦⤖ᯝࡢ⥲⾲ࡣูῧࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㸧୺࡞⤖ᯝࡣࠊ఍㆟ࡢឤ᝿ࡣࠊ‶㊊ᗘ 4 ẁ㝵୰᭱ୖ఩㸦‶㊊㸧69%ࠊ➨ 2 ఩㸦ࡸࡸ‶㊊㸧25%
࡜ 94%ࡀࣉࣛࢫࡢ㧗࠸ホ౯࡛࠶ࡗࡓࠋ

ࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥࡢ୰࡛ࡣࠊࢭࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸯㸦పᡂ㛗ࡢⴠ࡜ࡋ✰࠿ࡽ⬺ฟࡍࡿ࡟ࡣ㸧ࡢ‶㊊ᗘࡀ㧗࠿ࡗࡓࠋࡲࡓࠊᮇᚅ࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ࡛ࡶࠊᮇᚅ௨ୖ 38%ࠊᮇᚅ㏻ࡾ 50%࡜ホ౯ࡀ㧗࠿ࡗࡓࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢ㆟ㄽࡢࢧ࣐࣮ࣜࡣࠊᙜ㈈ᅋࡢ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ࡟ᥖ㍕ࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊᐇ㝿࡟ࣇ࢛࣮ࣛ
࣒࡟ཧຍࡋࡓ᪉ࠎ࡟ຍ࠼࡚ࠊ௒ᚋከࡃࡢ᪉࡟ぢ࡚࠸ࡓࡔࡃࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾࠊἼཬຠᯝࡀᮇᚅ
ࡉࢀࡿࠋ− 75 −

9. ཧ⪃㈨ᩱ㸦ฟᖍ⪅࢔ࣥࢣ࣮ࢺ⤖ᯝ㸧ᅇ⟅ᩘ㸸16‫࣒࢘ࢪ࣏ࣥࢩی‬඲యࡢホ౯

‶㊊

ࡸࡸ‶㊊

ࡸࡸ୙‶

୙‶

ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ

11

4

0

0

1

ࡸࡸ‶
‶㊊

‶㊊ 69%

25%ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ 6%‫ی‬ᮇᚅ࡟ẚ࡭࡚ࡢᡂᯝ

ᮇᚅ௨ୖ
6

ᴫࡡᮇᚅ
࡝࠾ࡾ

ᮇᚅ௨ୗ

ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ

1

1

8

ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ 6%

ᮇᚅ௨
௨ୖ

ᴫࡡᮇ
ᮇᚅ࡝࠾ࡾ

38%

50%
%
ᮇᚅ௨ୗ 6㸣

‫ࣥࣙࢩࢵࢭی‬㸯 పᡂ㛗ࡢ⨜࠿ࡽ⬺ฟࡍࡿ࡟ࡣ

‶㊊

ࡸࡸ‶㊊

ࡸࡸ୙‶

୙‶

ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ

9

5

0

0

2

‶㊊ 56%

ᴫࡡ‶‶㊊
31%ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ 13%− 76 −

‫ࣥࣙࢩࢵࢭی‬㸰 ࣏ࣆࣗࣜࢬ࣒ࠊಖㆤ୺⩏ࠊ࠾ࡼࡧ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢᑗ᮶

‶㊊

ࡸࡸ‶㊊

ࡸࡸ୙‶

୙‶

ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ

7

8

1

0

0

ᴫࡡ‶㊊

‶㊊ 44%

50%ࡸࡸ୙‶ 6%‫ࣥࣙࢩࢵࢭی‬㸱 ࢹࢪࢱࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿ➇தຊࡢ⥔ᣢ

‶㊊

ࡸࡸ‶㊊

ࡸࡸ୙‶

୙‶

ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ

5

8

0

0

3

‶㊊ 31%

ᴫࡡ‶㊊ 50%ᅇ⟅࡞ࡋ 19%‫ی‬᮶ሙ⪅ࡢ⫋ᴗ
ࡑࡢ௚
13㸣

ᨻᗓ㛵ಀ⪅

◊✲ဨ
19㸣

12㸣

25㸣

6㸣

኱Ꮫᩍဨ

25㸣

࣓ࢹ࢕࢔㛵ಀ⪅ࣅࢪࢿࢫ࣐ࣥ

− 77 −

10. ඹദᅋయ

Japan Economic Foundation
The Japan Economic Foundation (JEF) was established in July 1981 to deepen
understanding between Japan and other countries through activities aimed atpromoting economic and technological exchange.
With this goal in mind, JEF engages in a broad range of activities; it provides
information about Japan and arranges venues for the exchange of ideas among
opinion leaders from many countries in such fields as industry, government,
academia and politics in order to build bridges for international communication andto break down the barriers that make mutual understanding difficult.
URL: www.jef.or.jp

The German Council on Foreign Relations
The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) has been Germany’s national
network for foreign policy since 1955.
As an independent, non-partisan, and nonprofit membership organization, thinktank, and publisher, the DGAP takes an active part in the political decision-making
process and promotes understanding of German foreign policy and international
relations.
More than 2,500 members – among them renowned representatives from politics,
business, academia, and the media – as well as more than 80 companies andfoundations support the work of the DGAP.
The DGAP’s goals are:x
to promote and contribute to the foreign policy debate in Germanyx
to advise decision makers from politics, business, and civil societyx
to inform the public on foreign policy questions/issuesx
to strengthen the German foreign policy communityx
to advance Germany’s foreign affairs status in the world
For more information please visit: www.dgap.org− 78 −

11. ஦ົᒁ
㸺᪥ᮏ㸼 ୍⯡㈈ᅋἲேᅜ㝿⤒῭஺ὶ㈈ᅋ㸭Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)ᡤᅾᆅ㸸ࠛ104-0061 ᮾி㒔୰ኸ༊㖟ᗙ 5-15-8 ᫬஦㏻ಙࣅࣝ 11 㝵㹒㹃㹊㸸03-5565-4824
㹓㹐㹊㸸http://www.jef.or.jpᢸᙜ㸸ᴗົ㒊㛗

ᅵᒇ 㝯

ᴗົ㒊

஭ୖ ┿ᘪ
ᮌᮧ ᬗᏊ

㸺ᴗົጤクඛ㸼 ᰴᘧ఍♫᪥ᮏ᪑⾜㸭Nippon Travel Agency Co., Ltd.
ᡤᅾᆅ㸸ࠛ105-0001 ᮾி㒔༊⹡ࣀ㛛 3-18-19 ⹡ࣀ㛛࣐ࣜࣥࣅࣝ 11 㝵㹒㹃㹊㸸03-5402-6401
ᢸᙜ㸸㹃㹁㹎Ⴀᴗ㒊 ᮌᮧ ோ㸺ࢻ࢖ࢶ㸼 DGAP Consulting GmbHᡤᅾᆅ㸸Rauchstraße 17/18, D-10787 Berlin, Germany㹒㹃㹊㸸+49-(0)30-2630-2065
㹓㹐㹊㸸http://dgap-consulting.com/de/start/ᢸᙜ㸸Mr. Stefan Dauwe, Managing Director, DGAP Consulting GmbH− 79 −