COVER STORY • 1

Roundtable with Prof. Shinichi Kitaoka, Prof. Nobukatsu Kanehara, Prof. Chisako T. Masuo, Prof.
Nobuhiro Aizawa & Masakazu Toyoda (May 31, 2024)H

ow to Rebuild anInternational Order inChaos

By Japan SPOTLIGHT

Participants: Prof. Shinichi Kitaoka, Special Advisor to the President, Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA)
Prof. Nobukatsu Kanehara, Professor, Doshisha University
Prof. Chisako T. Masuo, Professor, Kyushu University
Prof. Nobuhiro Aizawa, Professor, Kyushu University
Moderator: Masakazu Toyoda, Chairman & CEO, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

ParticipantsProf. Shinichi Kitaoka

Prof. Nobukatsu KaneharaProf. Chisako T. Masuo

Introduction
Toyoda: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created a menace to theexisting international order. But it seems also to have unintentionally
exposed the major limitations of the post-World War II international
order. On the international political front, the United Nations seems
dysfunctional, in the sense that the Security Council itself is divided
and unable to stop violations of the UN Charter. The United States,
while supporting Ukraine, is restricting the capability of the weapons
it provides to Ukraine to prevent excessive confrontation, including a
nuclear war with Russia. The G7 is acting together on economic
sanctions against Russia, but it has not gained enough support from
China and the global South. So I think it must be said that thesemeasures are not very effective.
To this situation was added the conflict between Israel and Hamas
in Gaza. The G7 was basically pro-Israel, but now there are voices of
support for Palestine within their respective countries, and I think it
is fair to say that Israel is becoming isolated. The International Courtof Justice has ordered an immediate halt to military operations in
8 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

Prof. Nobuhiro Aizawa

Masakazu Toyoda

Rafah, but Israel has not stopped its attacks.
The same is true on the trade and financial fronts: the disputesettlement function of the WTO, which consists of a two-tier system,
is not functioning, as members of the WTO’s Appellate Body havenot been appointed; as for the WTO’s legislative function, theunanimous consensus approach has set the Doha round adrift and it
is no longer expected to be concluded except for a few pluriagreements. On the international financial front, the regulation to
exclude Russia from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT), an international network for moneytransfers and settlements by US dollars among banks, which wasintroduced soon after the Ukraine crisis, has not been fully effective.
In fact, there has even been an emerging alternative network bycompeting currencies.
As described above, unfortunately, it appears that “the rule of law”
has been forgotten in an age of multipolarity, both in international
politics and in trade and finance, and that we have moved into theage of power games. We are joined today by four experts ininternational politics, and we would like to discuss the following
https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/three points. First, why has the international order entered thisperiod of turmoil? Second, what kind of international order should
the world seek? Third, what role is expected of Japan, which has no
power, and can it even play a role?
I would like to introduce Prof. Emeritus Shinichi Kitaoka of the
University of Tokyo, who chairs the Future International Order Study
Group organized by our foundation and who has served asambassador and deputy permanent representative of Japan to theUnited Nations and special advisor to the president of the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Then Prof. Nobukatsu
Kanehara of Doshisha University, who was originally at the Ministryof Foreign Affairs and he for many years as deputy chief of the
National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat. And thenProf. Chisako T. Masuo of Kyushu University who specializes in
Chinese political diplomacy, and Prof. Nobuhiro Aizawa of Kyushu
University, who studies trends in the Global South, includingSoutheast Asia.

Factors in the Disruption of the International
Order
Toyoda: I would like to begin our discussion by asking why the
disruption of the international order has occurred. First, I would liketo ask Prof. Kitaoka. The US, which until now has prided itself on
being the world’s policeman, has become extremely inward-looking.
Moreover, even within the US, the Republican Party and the
Democratic Party differ to a considerable extent in their opinions.
Some even call it a split in national opinion. There is a theory that themain cause is the change within the US itself, but what do you think
about this?
Kitaoka: The Cold War was over, but the Cold War was, in a sense,
an international order. The US and the Soviet Union had a tightcontrol on their respective camps, the capitalist camp and socialist
camp. Although there were minor conflicts, they managed to avoid
major clashes. This order was over.
There were two consequences from the end of the Cold War. One
was that the world became dominated by the US, and the US nolonger needs to control its own camp carefully in the exercise of its
leadership. At the same time, though the US used to pay muchattention to the UN because it was in conflict with the Soviet Union
there, this approach has disappeared now and disrespect for the UN
has been increasing. Meanwhile, there has been the spread ofIslamic extremism, including 9/11. This is not coming from a nation
state, but from extremist terrorism. There is no easy way to deal withthis. In war, all that is needed is for the other side to surrender, but
terrorists do not surrender. The US, having insisted on saying that
this must be the war against terrorists, has tried to fight againstthem too much. And I think that has caused their failure to build trustwith the Muslim nations.
Meanwhile, in the 1990s, globalization made significant changes
to the economy. The end of the Cold War, along with thedevelopment of technology, having encouraged globalization, hascreated many gigantic billionaires in the US. But the lives of those
who are not so rich are not getting better, and even their average life
expectancy is not increasing. It is often said that the lower-middle
class, especially those who are not highly educated, thus tend tobelieve that their standard of living is getting worse and that whatthreatens it comes from the excessive US involvement ininternational affairs and the increased numbers of immigrants fromoverseas. Thus, there emerges a significant divide between the richand the poor, or elites and non-elites, which has been a vital cause ofdomestic political disruption in the US.
Toyoda: Prof. Kanehara, having been involved in foreign policy for along time, from a bird’s eye view, what do you think has changed?
Kanehara: For the first time, the relative size of the G7 economies isbeginning to shrink. Leading the G7 has been the US. The US alone
used to account for half of the world’s GDP, but it is now at 25%,
and the G7 economies accounted for roughly 70% to 80% in their
heyday, but now account for less than 50%. Unfortunately, the newly
emerging nations do not yet have much sense of responsibility tosupport this liberal international order together.
Then there are two countries that have turned their backs on thisliberal international order. One is Russia, which has left the G8 andturned its back on it completely. President Vladimir Putin’s “antiWest” stance has become a value in itself for him, and he wants toreturn to 19th century-style power politics and once again have
Russia take on the status of a major power on the Eurasiancontinent. But I believe the war in Ukraine will now take a dark turnfor Russia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has started to saythat he will allow Ukraine to use US weapons to attack Russian
territory, and the course of war will change again.
The other is China. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations
with Japan and the US in 1972, China has come into the West andhas grown larger by absorbing the capital and technology that theWest has. The Chinese economy, which was the same size as theJapanese economy at the beginning of the administration of latePrime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2012, is now four times that size.
China has begun to turn its back on the liberal international order.
I think the Chinese realize that they grew up thanks to the open
Western economy, but President Xi Jinping is beginning to think thatliberalism is an ideology that will kill the communist dictatorship. I
think Xi is completely wrong in thinking in that way, but he has
established an absolute personal dictatorship, and that will last
Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 20249

another 10 years and more.
Respect for freedom and democracy was an Enlightenment idea
born in Europe, but since the American Revolution, the US has
embodied it as an actual nation and has vigorously promoted its
ideals on a global scale. Until the first half of the 20th century,
however, because of racism and colonialism, Western liberalism anddemocracy were not universal at all, but local ideas with limited
application only in Europe and the North American continent. It was
Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and President Nelson
Mandela who greatly expanded the universal values of today –freedom, democracy and the rule of law – to all human society in thelatter half of the 20th century.
When Europeans and Americans hastily insist on respect forhuman rights, freedom, and democracy, newly emerging countries
that have now gained power will respond by saying, “You are theones who did terrible things to the colonies.” In response to theirviews, Japan would stand up and need to say, “In World War II, wetook up arms and raged against the injustice of the international
order such as racism and European domination of Asia, but nothing
good came out of it. Humans grow ethically and justice prevails in
the end. You can rise in this liberal international order as much as
you want if you work hard and honestly in it. Postwar Japan
succeeded in doing so.” We need to get a message out from Japanthat the liberal international order is a fair system with universal
values, so let’s support this system globally together.
By the way, emerging developing countries are more interested ineconomic development than in issues of values, as they want tomake money and prosper first. I believe that Japan has an importantrole to play here as well. That is the promotion of free trade. It isnecessary to properly say that it is in the free trade system thatdeveloping countries can find a way to succeed. Since the beginningof this century, Japan has helped to create huge free trade zones andmega trade zones, such as the RCEP, CPTPP, and the EU-Japan EPA.
Japan is the only country that has done this in this century. Under
the free trade system, capital and technology are transferred toemerging countries in the form of direct investment. Whiledeveloped countries will suffer from declining birthrates, aging
populations, and industrial hollowing out, emerging countries will
grow, and the world economy as a whole will grow even more. I
believe that Japan must become a leader of free trade and tellemerging and developing countries that we will work together within
this free trade system.
Toyoda: I would like to ask Prof. Masuo what she thinks about theview that the change in the international order has been brought
about by China’s remarkable high growth or by China’stransformation?

10 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

Masuo: Xi often says, “What is going on in the world today is atransformation that has never happened in the past 100 years.” I
believe he mentions this with the international system since theIndustrial Revolution in mind. It is often asked whether China’stransformation has brought about changes in the international order.
But perhaps the international order is not so rigid in nature. From a
realist point of view, the international order gets universallytransformed when the old power structure that supports it from theground is changed.
Xi thinks that we are now experiencing the deepest level oftransformation since the Industrial Revolution. I myself believe thismay be true to some extent. In short, I believe we are now facing aninternational regime change at a point in history where the Westernruling regime that has continued for several hundred years may
collapse due to the impact caused by China, a non-Western rising
power. My understanding is that the current change in theinternational order has certainly been triggered by China, but thiswould have happened at some point eventually and cannot all be
attributed to China.
However, when we consider how it is actually occurring, it is stillclosely connected with the situations on the Chinese side. If we cast
our eyes at China, I must say that the Xi generation is very special
even in China. They were the very people who, during the Cultural
Revolution, worked as Red Guards and engaged in revolutionary
activities to destroy the existing system. Xi, for example, did noteven graduate from middle school because he stopped studying at
the second grade when the Cultural Revolution broke out. In
Confucian Chinese society that generally favors and respects higher
education, this is a generation with unusually low level of education.
China usually has a strong tradition of elite-leading politics. But
since they spent their youth as Red Guards, they are nationalistic andinclined to populism. They tend to move collectively and go
extremes. They also had a strong antipathy to the existing system. It
is this special generation that are now in charge of China.
Thus, the global power shifts and Chinese internal power shifts are
joining together to form a new international current at this moment.
China is a socialist country founded on Marxism, which is basically amaterialist ideology. The idea is that politics is built on economic
foundations. Therefore, the Chinese naturally expect changes inpolitical structures will occur on the basis of global tectonic change,
caused by China’s economic rise. In other words, they believe that
China’s economic rise may finally overturn the Western dominanceof the world, and that it must be the mission of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to make this happen. In order to realize the“common destiny for mankind” – a political slogan of the CCP –China must overturn the rule of the West at all costs and come tohold power over the international order, or else there will be no
beautiful future for mankind. The Xi administration has been creatingthis narrative domestically and spreading it to the world. It also
seems that not a few countries actually agree with it. This is because
many people have been dissatisfied with the West’s centuries-longgrip on the mainstream of international relations.
Toyoda: Prof. Aizawa, from the perspective of the Global South, suchas Southeast Asia, how do you see the Ukraine crisis or the conflictin Gaza? Why doesn’t the Global South join in sanctions against
Russia? I would like to know more about this issue.
Aizawa: The term “Global South” is basically a term for a politicalmovement, and while I think it is relevant to say “We in the Global
South” as a political statement, it is still misleading to talk about the
Global South as a unit of analysis, especially in our strategic
conversation. This is because the strategic locations and socioeconomic realities among the countries categorized in theterminology are too different from each other. It is not justmisleading, but we will lose our strategic edge if we avoid
articulation. In this roundtable talk, therefore, on the question of the
Global South, I would like to limit my answer to Southeast Asia, inwhich the strategic diversity in itself is already wide enough to risk
irrelevancy.
I think that the war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza, from theperspective of Southeast Asia, raise primarily the issues of justice.
The main reason for most Southeast Asian countries not joining insanctions against Russia is to object to the international trend injustifying economic sanctions. Without question, they are with theinternational rules and principles, adhering to the inviolability ofterritory. But on the other hand, there is a strong objection to thejustification for collective economic sanctions in terms ofenforcement. Southeast Asian countries have been subjected toeconomic sanctions in the past, so they know the harsh reality of
being on the receiving end of them. In addition, if they are part of thecollective economic sanctions this time, it will be difficult for them todefend themselves when they are faced with a similar situation that
may eventually happen to them. So, in addition to the principle ofjustice, I think there is also a strategic rationale behind the decision.
There is another justice issue regarding the war in Gaza as well. It
is the issue of colonialism. Many countries in Southeast Asia haveexperienced colonial rule, and the issue of Gaza is connected to theissue of international norms regarding self-determination. Israel’s
expansion of its settlements is recognized as a colonial act, and the
US and other countries that fall short in stopping Israel’s expansion
and remain silent have been seen as not upholding the international
norms of self-determination. Thus, while condemning the attack by
Hamas as violating international principles, countries that haveexperienced colonial rule will be firm in rejecting Israel’s position.
With regard to the Ukraine crisis, there is an economic issue

besides justice. For Southeast Asian countries that need to growtheir economies in a speedy manner, the war will cause a crisis infood and energy supplies and a rise in international prices, which will
indirectly deprive them of opportunities for economic growth. Inorder to minimize the negative impact of the war on their own
economies, Southeast Asia is clearly expressing its position that an
immediate ceasefire is a priority over a long-term war for thecomplete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.

What Kind of International Order Should
We Seek?
Toyoda: The next major theme is also one that I would like to ask
you to discuss: what kind of international order should the world
seek? I would like to hear from Prof. Kanehara. Next year will mark80 years since the end of World War II. The long era of peace seems
to be coming to an end. Has the era of rules ended and the era ofpower arrived? Japan is also moving forward to double its defense
spending. Does this mean that Japan is preparing for an era ofpower? In addition, in the midst of rising geopolitical risks, thediscussion of economic security has come up, but how should wethink about this in the overall context?
Kanehara: The international community is a decentralized one. Since
there are no fools who will kill each other forever, in the end people
instinctively seek stability and peace by managing power relations. It
is just like the balance of factions in a company. If the major actors
in international politics change and the power relations change, it is
only natural that the balance will change, so we must think about
how to create a new stable balance.
Japan unfortunately became ideologically and politically divided
within the country during the Cold War, with the Socialist Party
supporting Beijing, the Communist Party supporting Moscow, andthe members of the Diet who thus became part of the East holding
more than one-third of the seats. There is no such country in theWest. In the West, both the ruling party and the major opposition
parties were members of the West. As Dr. Henry Kissinger astutely
pointed out in his book The World Order, in reality Japan was notpart of the Cold War. Since it has been 30 years since the end of theCold War, the Japanese people have completely forgotten the harshdomestic and ideological divisions of that era.
That does not mean that the Japan-US alliance was ineffective. In
particular, the military bases that Japan offered to the US were vitally
important. Without the Japan-US alliance, the defense of South
Korea would not have been possible in the Korean War. Without the
US-Japan alliance, the defense of the Philippines and Taiwan would
collapse in any future Taiwan contingency. Without Japan, the US
military cannot protect these countries and regions.
Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

11

The peace and prosperity of East Asia as a whole rests on theregional stability supported by the Japan-US alliance. Today, China’s
rise is remarkable, and the situation over the Taiwan Strait is
becoming increasingly tense. In order to maintain the deterrence of
the Japan-US alliance, I believe that Japan’s conventional forcesmust be drastically increased and enhanced. The efforts should be
extended to new fields such as outer-space, cyber-space andcognitive warfare.
The other issue is free trade. China’s economic power is attractive
to emerging and developing countries. However, as long as free
trade spreads the wealth of the West to the South, everyone will
follow the West. The economic power of the West as a whole is still
twice that of China, so as long as we are not only strong andprosperous but also united, we should be able to continue to take theleadership.
What is worrisome is that the US is beginning to reverse thecourse from free trade. The US seems to be returning toprotectionism and isolationism. I think it will get worse if Donald
Trump becomes president again. This is where I believe Japan needs
to support free trade. Japan was maligned as a “bastion ofprotectionism” in the last century and only in this century is it being
recognized as a “leader of free trade”.
A recent argument to complement free trade is economic security,
aimed at regulating free trade from the national security perspective.
The US is not saying “regulate all trade with China”, but it is sayingthat it will not allow the export of cutting-edge technology to China,
because it can be used in a war that results in the deaths of US
soldiers. In particular, they are asking that the export of cutting-edge
semiconductors and their manufacturing equipment to China be
stopped at all costs. They are going to build a high wall around theexport of cutting-edge semiconductors, and those semiconductors
only. I think this is the right approach.
In the world of naval law, there is a rule that allows belligerents toregulate the cargoes of neutral countries. This is a system known as“contraband”, and I think it can be said that this argument is now
seeping out a bit into peacetime with regard to cutting-edge
semiconductors, but this is only a correction of free trade, not a
distortion of the free trade system itself.
There is one more thing that must be done in Japan’s particularsituation. In other countries, the government puts huge amounts ofmoney into companies and universities for the development of
national security-related technologies. There is a common
understanding that if a technology is state-of-the-art in any areas ofbasic research, applied research, and R&D, it is national securityrelated technology, and the national security-related technologies are
not understood as just narrow military technologies. In Japan,
however, both academia and industry remain strongly anti-militaryand pacifist in ideology, and have long shunned anything related to
12 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

national security. This is why Japanese industry has lost out in theworld. The Pentagon has a science and technology budget equivalent
to 10 trillion yen for research institutes in industry, government, andacademia. In the Japanese private sector, the military sector is small,and even in the defense industry, the civilian sector accounts forabout 95%. Academia has completely turned its back on defense
cooperation with the government. Industry leaders are also largely
reluctant to be engaged in business related to national security.
There is no other country in the world like this.
If we can properly utilize the talents of Japan’s excellent civilian
engineers for national security, Japan can be included in the AUKUS
and cooperate in defense technology as a real part of the West. From
now on, I believe that Japan must bring national security into thecore of its industrial policy-making process.
Finally, there is the question of values and leadership. As I
mentioned earlier, there is still a dark anger of anti-colonialism
burning in the guts of the nations of the Global South. Japan did not
become a colony and has only been subjected to racism, so I don’t
think we really know what their anger is about. After hundreds ofyears of being discriminated against because of the color of theirskin and forced to work as slave labor in colonial farms and mines,
their anger is not easily released. It is up to Japan to unleash thatanger and nurture the emerging nations as leaders of theinternational liberal order.
Medium-sized countries like South Korea and Australia should beallowed to join the G7 in the future. It may be still too soon for South
Korea to join the G7, because if the opposition Democratic Party of
Korea (DPK) comes back to power, it will turn ideologically antiAmerican, anti-Japan, pro-China, and pro-North Korea again. I hearthat Canada is being mean to Australia and saying it will not let her
in, but I think this is a typical example of sisters quarreling when
they grow up.
The main contenders in East Asia are India and Indonesia, andthey will grow very rapidly. ASEAN as a whole and India will overtake
Japan’s economy in 10 years, so it is important to capture them. But
India and Indonesia, as well as Brazil, are large, have strong egos,
and will not always listen to the US. How to build up the newleadership of a multipolar international liberal order in this century isa big problem. The US probably would not like to include India andBrazil in the G7.
Although we are talking about the Global South, what we actuallymean by it is the second wave of the industrial revolution worldwide.
The countries that are riding this huge wave are becoming emerging
powers. How to incorporate these new powers into the liberalinternational order is a major issue, and Japan must take the lead inbringing them together. Especially in the Asia-Pacific region, there isno single powerful leader, so I think we have to bring the leading
Asia-Pacific nations together. At the same time, we must seriouslyconsider how to restrain China and Russia from using force
unilaterally, how to enable Ukraine to win, and how to keep China
from going to war over Taiwan.
Toyoda: I would like to ask Prof. Masuo the next question. The Xi era
has been seen as challenging to the extent that it has been called“wolf-warrior diplomacy”. Amid the escalation of the US-China
confrontation, there was the recent China-Japan-Korea summit.
While there are concerns about armed reunification with Taiwan by
China, the summit agreed on “commitment to the international orderthrough the rule of law”. But what does China really think of a rulesbased order?
Masuo: You have indicated an important point. I myself believe that“wolf-warrior diplomacy” was made because Chinese diplomats wereordered to protect Xi’s domestic authority, which had been damagedby the pandemic. On the other hand, how China thinks about the ruleof law is an important issue. Simply saying, China is hostile to the“rules-based order” advocated often by the West gets us nowhere. In
Chinese, it is always written in brackets. In other words, the Chinese
authority judges it to be “a fake without substance”. In the SinoRussian joint statements of March 2023 and May 2024, the twocountries even argued that the countries implementing hegemony
were advocating it.
The portion of the Joint Statement of the recent Trilateral Summit
mentions, “We reaffirmed our commitment to the purposes andprinciples of the Charter of the United Nations and to an international
order based on the rule of law and international law.” Perhaps thiswording itself was the outcome of the negotiations between the
diplomats of the three countries. Here, for China, it is important that
it was able to place the UN Charter before the “rule of law”, which
Japan emphasizes. China, at least on the surface, is UN-oriented. It
considers itself an authentic permanent member of the Security
Council, having been part of the UN since its formation (actually, thePeople’s Republic of China participated in the UN Security Council
only in 1971; prior to that, the Republic of China was its member
representing all China). After World War II, Japan replaced theJapanese word for the UN from rengo-koku to kokuren to conceal its
hostility toward itself, but in truth they are the same group ofcountries with the Allied Powers. In other words, for China, advocacyof the UN Charter coincides with its insistence that its own vested
interests as a founder be defended. If the UN Charter is implemented“correctly” according to China’s wishes, China is happy. Nor is China
totally opposed to the “rule of law”, though China’s interpretation of
it actually differs greatly from that of the West. But I don’t think
China understands this.
The Sino-Russian Joint Statement issued the week before this
Trilateral Summit is a very interesting document. Here the twocountries state that “countries that espouse hegemony and power
politics seek to replace and subvert the universally acceptedinternational order based on international law with a ‘rules-basedorder’.” It presents a distorted worldview in which the Western
powers are showing nothing but menace to the world order.
Another very interesting point in the statement, which is related toJapan, is the very end of the first section. Here it states that “Bothsides remain resolutely committed to upholding the outcome of thevictory in World War II and the postwar world order as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations, and oppose the denial, distortion,and falsification of the history of World War II.” It goes on to
specifically pledge that both countries will “educate people to acorrect view of history” and even states that “both sides plan tosolemnly celebrate the 80th anniversary in 2025 of the Chinese
people’s anti-Japanese war against Japanese aggression and theSoviet Union’s victory in the Fatherland Defense War, and jointly
promote a correct view of World War II history.”
What is of concern here is that since 2023 there has been a fairly
active discourse in China that the San Francisco Peace Treaty should
be revised. At the “Future of Asia” conference held by Nihon Keizai
Shimbun in May 2023, Yang Bojiang, director of the Institute ofJapanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who
was appointed by the Chinese Embassy in Japan to attend theconference, made such a bold statement unapologetically. The San
Francisco Peace Treaty was, of course, concluded by Japan with theAllied Powers. But due to international circumstances at the time,
China and the Soviet Union did not sign it. Recently, there has been agrowing perception in China that the Chinese were the victors inWorld War II, having defeated Nazism, Fascism, and Japanesemilitarism, and should therefore have a better position in the UN. In
the latest Sino-Russian Joint Declaration, China invites Russia to callfor the same. And in order to promote such new claims, it isactivating a new historical issue of World War II and the UN.
To put this abstract argument into a more realistic perspective,
China is very concerned about reinforcement of the US-centeredalliance network in the Indo-Pacific region, especially the actions
taken by Japan and the US to strengthen the defense alignment inJapan’s southwest islands and integrated operations to keep an eye
on Chinese military activities throughout the Pacific region, not justaround Taiwan. Living in Fukuoka, I can clearly see that China has
been rapidly strengthening its approach toward dissidents in
Okinawa recently, mainly through the Chinese Consulate General in
Fukuoka. China does not have a consulate in Okinawa, so theConsulate General in Fukuoka is in charge of Okinawa issues within
the Chinese bureaucracy. China sends its agents, sometimes
masquerading as academics, to Fukuoka and Okinawa under thecover of academic exchange. And it is the Consulate General that isorchestrating them.
Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 202413

In short, to bolster its security against the strengthened
US-centered alliance network in the Indo-Pacific, China is pumping
up a new history issue and infiltrating other country’s domestic
politics to offset its weak points. Under the cover of spreading acorrect historical view of World War II around the world, it wants toreassert its position in the UN as a permanent member and create asystem that will not allow others to challenge it. And in doing so,
China will try to bring developing countries onto its side.
For Japan, this means that the Chinese have been trying tooverthrow the existing international order that we have enjoyed since
the end of the World War II. We have also learned that its new target
for operating this strategy is summer 2025. We should increase ourvigilance over it.
So, to sum up the whole thing, from China’s point of view, the“rules-based order” is nothing but a deception, and it is even against
the idea of adhering to it. That is how difficult it is to achieve the“rule of law” with China.
Toyoda: Prof. Aizawa, what kind of international order is Southeast
Asia seeking?
Aizawa: I think there is at least a very charged sense of danger andcrisis about the current international order. Perhaps, consideringhistory since 1945, we may represent it as a peaceful period in thesense that there were no world wars, but from the perspective of the
Global South or Southeast Asia, wars have been going on for a longtime. The period known as the “Cold War” was a time of war inSoutheast Asia, starting with the Vietnam War. When the US became
the sole superpower, the war on terror was fought in the Global
South all over the world, and now we have the problems in Ukraine
and Gaza. It is the arrogant historical view of the G7 that theinternational order that has been created has been a peaceful era sofar, and from the perspective of the rest of the world, excluding thedeveloped countries, the previous international order did notguarantee peace.
This has been reaffirmed by the Syrian crisis in particular, and I
believe that a major characteristic of the current situation is that it isfilled with frustration over the dysfunctional nature of global
governance and the deceptiveness of managing conflicts between
major powers at the expense of peace in specific regions and small
and medium-sized countries.
The question, then, is what kind of international order can becreated to seek peace and stability for such countries. What we cando, at least as a group of nations inferior in military and economic
power, is to raise our voices and try to make the international
community more decentralized so that political legitimacy in theinternational community is not formed exclusively by the major
powers. Specifically, we should try to foster political legitimacy
14 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

through regional institutions, and the best approach is to be involved
as much as possible in setting the stage whenever there arenegotiations on rulemaking or power coordination that may result ina transformation of the regional order.
If Southeast Asia seeks a new international order, the biggest
problem it will face is disparities in various aspects. In particular, I
think of disparities in access to science and technology. This isbecause science and technology will play an increasingly importantrole as a factor in shaping the new order. If advances in science andtechnology are accessible to people all over the world, they may
reduce global disparities, but today science and technology havecome to define national interests in great power competition. If morescience and technology is viewed as a strategic resource and its
fruits are monopolized by a few countries that have the funds
available to develop it, the difficulties that countries had in accessing
vaccines during the recent pandemic disaster are likely to occur
more frequently in the future. Southeast Asia, and other countries in
the Global South, are concerned that access to science andtechnology will become a lever in the formation of the security orderand that they will be shut out of the tools.
Therefore, how do we manage science and technology? I believethat the core of a stable international order will be to create amechanism to make science and technology not a tool for national
security but a global commons, an international public good.
Toyoda: Prof. Kitaoka, you were ambassador and deputy permanent
representative of Japan to the UN, so you know it well. There is asense of powerlessness in the air about the UN, but in this age ofrules the UN really needs to function. Japan has long sought to be apermanent member of the UN Security Council, but what do you
think the UN should be, including that point?
Kitaoka: The UN is by nature, powerless, because it has no military
power and no economic power of its own. It cannot even run apeacekeeping operation without cooperation with the member
countries. In fact, to run any military force, you need something likea general staff headquarter, which operates 24/7. But the UN has nosuch thing.
Though the UN was designed to maintain the world order, five
permanent members were appointed to take special responsibility forpeace and security in the world. However, these five were soon in
conflict with each other, which brought about the Cold War, andalthough there had been tension during the Cold War, the UN had
been able to serve as a kind of balancer in the conflict between thetwo camps. As such, in the independence of many Asian and Africancountries, the UN played a relevant role.
So, what can the UN do now? It is still important as a venue toprovide a forum to mobilize international public opinion becausethere is no organization of this kind in the world other than the UN.
In this regard, I think Japan should stay on the Security Council as a
non-permanent member as long as possible. So far, Japan has beenon the council longer than any other country, but when Japan’s term
ends at the end of this year, Japan will take the next nine years off,
as announced by the government. This would be the longest break
Japan has ever had. I think this is truly to be avoided. Because now
that Japan is on the Security Council, when there is an incident in
Palestine, for example, Japan can make a statement like the othermembers of the Security Council, and the global media may carry
this message. The world will know about it, and it will be carried inJapan. If Japan were not a member of the Security Council, it could
happen that no one would know what Japan thinks about what
happens in Gaza. I think we should work more on educating theJapanese public and communicating to the world Japanese views oninternational affairs, and we should seek a way of staying longer in
the Security Council for that purpose.
To this end, there were two proposals in 2005, Model A and Model
B. Model A is, in essence, for Japan to become a permanent
member. Model B is to get a semi-permanent position, for example
for a term of about four years, with the possibility of re-election. In
other words, if elected, Japan would serve for four years, and if
re-elected, Japan would serve for eight years. So, I think we shouldseek a direction to stay longer by introducing Model B after taking a
break for four years. Model A is not possible because even in 2005,
when Japan’s financial contribution to the UN was much larger andopposition from Russia and China was not so strong, it was notpossible. We should change our strategy to Model B as soon as
possible.
There is very strong public antipathy against the permanent
members of the Security Council having veto power. If a resolution
were to be proposed to limit the veto power at the Security Council, I
believe that almost all the member countries except for the US,
China, and Russia, might agree to it. One way to do this would be toabolish the veto completely, but even if that is impossible, it could be
logically possible, though extremely difficult, to change the vetosystem so that any veto would have to be supported not by one
country alone but by around two countries together. Also, thesecretary general’s capacity and authority are seriously declining
now, and in order to deal with this, I think it is possible to add amore powerful staff around the secretary general.
In addition, Japan has no friends in the UN. Unless a country has
its friends, its presence in the UN is limited. Europe has about 30
members, so it has a certain voice. Even the small countries ofSingapore, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Jordan, and Costa Rica haveformed a group called the S5, and when they speak as the S5, people
listen to them a little. I think Japan should make a little more effort tocommunicate as a big mass by establishing a group with Southeast

Asian countries and Pacific Island countries.

Next Steps for Japan
Toyoda: I would now like to ask you to talk about what Japan should
do in these times. Many people are concerned about China trying toreunify with Taiwan by military force. I think this must not happen,
but is it possible to avoid a Taiwan conflict? Prof. Masuo, whatshould Japan do to prevent this?
Masuo: I believe that the situation surrounding Taiwan is still
uncertain and that we cannot confirm an emergency will definitely
happen. There should be a way to prevent it. If China could invade
Taiwan, when and under what conditions would this occur? One
possibility is if China views itself to be capable of doing so. This
includes both military and economic capacity. This condition would
be met if the invasion is expected to succeed at a relatively smallcost, or if the countermeasures taken by the Western powers,
particularly by the US and Japan, would not impact China that much.
I believe that Japanese experts have discussed a lot about our
national defense capability in relation to China. To strengthen
deterrence, Japan has been boosting integrated military operations
together with the US and facilitating other ways of cooperation.
Perhaps a little more consideration will be given to its economic
strength.
China itself is no doubt concerned about its own economic
problems. It appears to have been preparing for war-time economic
control over the past several years, putting so much emphasis on
food security. If such preparations progress and a situation arises inwhich China sees its own economic development as continuing even
if its supply chains are cut off from those of the West, while Japan’s
economic strength is considered insignificant by them, it will be an
incentive for them to initiate an invasion over Taiwan. Reestablishing
Japan’s robust economy is very important for increasing Japan’s
attractiveness to China. I believe that more can be done in this effort.
Another important factor that impacts China’s invasion is thedesire of the regime. The Xi administration has not yet firmly decided
to “liberate” Taiwan. China does not actively want to reunify Taiwan
by force. Many pundits have said that this is a last resort, and I
believe the administration is of the same view. China is more likely to
invade if the Taiwanese independence movement accelerates and its
friction with the West becomes so extreme that Beijing believes it nolonger needs to fear a breakdown of relations with the West. The
likelihood of an invasion also increases when internal politicalconditions become so desperate and the Xi regime believes it needs
to bolster domestic nationalism at any cost. These are all fairly
extreme cases.
On the other side, I am concerned about the recent sharp decline
Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 202415

in exchanges between China and the rest of the world, especiallywith the West. In Hong Kong, the National Security Ordinance waspassed in March, and we have already seen the first arrests based on
this. Perhaps it has already become dangerous for us to go to Hong
Kong and Macau. I often exchange views with Western researchers,
but discussions between them and China are also rapidly decreasing.
So there has been almost no real discussion among the experts ofthe true feeling that “No, we don’t really want this to happen, but wecan’t help it because your country is doing this to us.” Chinese
researchers have no choice but to write reports based on information
they can get on the controlled Internet that asserts “Westerncountries are trying to encircle China to continue their domination.”
Their judgment of the situation has become biased unfortunately.
The recent Sino-Russian Joint Statement does not logically explain
why Xi would support the Russians to that extent. Unlike Russia,
China is not at war, has deep economic exchanges with the freeworld, and is a beneficiary of the existing international order. It is not
in China’s interest to depart from the current international order by
being on the side of Russia. I guess the number of people within
China, who have a proper understanding of the situation overseas,
who can write fair reports and make rational policy
recommendations to the top, has been decreasing.
I think Japan could make a little more effort on these issues inrelation to information flows. Recently, the government has beenvery negative about joint research with China, and bilateral exchange
programs have almost disappeared. However, this is precisely theright moment that we should make the effort to invite Chinese
researchers to discuss things over drinks in Japan. It is muchcheaper and easier than purchasing defense equipment. I believe thatsuch a steady exchange is now desperately needed.
Toyoda: I believe that Japan has a long history of cooperation with
Southeast Asia. Prof. Aizawa, is it possible for Japan to walk with thepeople of the Global South in Southeast Asia?
Aizawa: It is essential that we walk together, and not only walk
together, but build a deeper relationship. Rather than a de facto
alliance or a security alliance, we must work together with theintention of forming a social alliance with Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, I would even propose that Japan should seek to join
ASEAN. If we are to leverage the trust between ASEAN countries andJapan, that has been fostered by the long-standing cooperative
relationships cultivated by our predecessors, this ambitious proposal
could show and prove the political will in building up a new
relationship, a relationship no longer relying heavily on economic
cooperation and direct investment, as has been the case in the past.
Frankly speaking, we should seek a relationship in which Southeast
Asia can help Japan with its economic and social challenges, and we
16 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

should be prepared to change Japan’s domestic legal and customary
settings to demonstrate our earnestness and seriousness in thisregard.
One bold idea to showcase this point is to reform foreign language
selection in university entrance examinations. Currently, theStandard university entrance exam includes German and French, aswell as Chinese and Korean. I think it would send a strong message
if we could make language choices such as Vietnamese andIndonesian as well. If Japan is serious about seeking humanresources from Southeast Asia, this would be a very significant
positive signal giving strong social legitimacy to the linguistic
background of such human resources. I believe that such a decision
would demonstrate Japan’s seriousness and willingness to form asocial alliance, and would be the foundation for building a new
relationship of trust in the coming years.
Remember, it is not only Japan that is trying to attract Southeast
Asia. The same is true everywhere else in any region, including theUS, which is looking for talents in Southeast Asia. Therefore, if Japanremains idle, it will soon lose out in this competition in attracting
Southeast Asian talent. At the moment, Japan has a relationship oftrust with Southeast Asia. That is why Japan must now take fulladvantage of its existing relationships with Southeast Asia andchange.
The last thing I must say is that there is not much time left forJapan to further tighten relations with Southeast Asia. If anyone inSoutheast Asia can think positively about forming a social alliancewith Japan there, it is probably people in their 40s today, the groupof people who were born in the 1980s and grew up in the 1990s,
who at least knew Japan when it still had power, are just now in their
40s and now becoming political and economic leaders. If this groupis taken over by the younger generation, and Japan’s perspective on
Southeast Asia does not change, I believe Japan’s credibility andattractiveness will continue to decline. I think there are only 3-10
years left for Japan to send a signal that it wants to build a stronger
relationship with Southeast Asia, and for this signal to be sociallyand politically effective.
Toyoda: I would like to ask Prof. Kitaoka if, looking at the current
situation which could turn into a clash of powers, it is possible forJapan to uphold the rule of law? Also, with reference to your bookpublished a few years ago titled “A Western-Pacific Union: Japan’s
New Geopolitical Strategy”, what kind of role could this WesternPacific Union play in the new international order?
Kitaoka: As far as the rule of law is concerned, the international
community is an anarchical society because there are no police or
courts. Meanwhile, it is the developed countries that are leading therule of law today; the rule of law that the EU and other countries areadvocating for is too far advanced from the point of view ofdeveloping countries. Take, for example, the issue of gender. Genderequality is one of the fundamental principles, but such equality will
not be immediately accepted in the Muslim world.
For example, people believe that women must be protected andare not allowed to go afar. As a result, they cannot go to school,
leaving the literacy rate very low for woman. What do we, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) do in Pakistan? Rather thancriticizing this belief straightforwardly, we build small schools in theneighborhoods of villages to encourage women’s education. Insteadof simply advocating for law and criticizing the developing nations
for their lack of law, we should take a more long-term, indirect andconciliatory approach to compromise with the developing nations’culture, and I think it should be the responsibility of developed
countries not to provoke antipathy from the developing countries bysimply advocating for the rule of law while being reluctant to improvetheir social, political and economic system. I believe that Japan is the
only developed country that has not done such a thing.
Another thing I find very regrettable in relations with developing
nations is the actual lack of academic and scholarly exchanges with
China. Everyone thinks that if you go to China and speak too frankly
about any international political issue, which could be interpreted as
criticism against the Chinese government, you may be arrested by
the Chinese authorities and not be able to come back home. So, we
have to discuss it outside of China. We should be able to openly andvigorously discuss about what China is doing in the world. For
example, in the UN Charter, it says “national self-determination”.
This means that Taiwan should not be threatened by force. And thereis the Uyghur issue on alleged violations of human rights, and China
also has many areas where it could be severely criticized. These
things should be discussed with Chinese scholars. I often say thatthe mainland Chinese political authorities did not actually rule Taiwan
for that long. The longest period was from the beginning of the 17th
century, and it was only for two decades or so that they effectively
controlled the mountainous areas and even the west coast of Taiwan.
These facts should be discussed properly with Chinese scholars.
Now, the Western-Pacific Union you are asking about is a concept
I came up with six or seven years ago. To have a big voice in theinternational community, you must have a group. Japan is part of the
JUSCANZ group (Japan, US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand),but this is a group that listens to what the US says. If we have aconflict with the US, the US will leave the group, so in the end
JUSCANZ will not be the right venue to express our voice. It is with
Southeast Asian countries that we can express our opinions mostfrankly. I used to think that Japan should join ASEAN. I think it would
be better for Japan to work together with each of the ASEAN
countries to the point where we are on equal relations.
Basically, we have common interests. After all, Southeast Asia isalso afraid of China, but does not want to become a subordinate of
China. To some extent, Southeast Asia know that the US militarypresence in this region is necessary in this regard. But Southeast
Asia would not trust either China or the US. They believe that Japanis the one they can trust. Therefore, it is important for Japan tocreate special relationships with Southeast Asia in various places.
We should build the social alliance that Prof. Aizawa mentioned with
Southeast Asia. For example, Japan is supporting the creation ofcoast guard agencies in various countries in Southeast Asia. Since
the Japan Coast Guard is not a military force, JICA can cooperatewith them. This can serve as a kind of deterrence to China andimprove information sharing among us.
Also, several years ago, when Indonesia experienced a major
earthquake and people from all over the world rushed to help. During
the second phase of reconstruction assistance, the Indonesian side
decided, “We can’t get together with various leaders to think aboutreconstruction, so we’re going to ask Japan to do this; we’re goingto ask JICA to do this.” I hope we can somehow create such a
relationship. What is important to deepen our relationship with theseSoutheast Asian countries is closer interaction. I would like to see a
special study abroad program, for example, the creation of a
graduate university with Southeast Asian students as its core, andmore frequent dialogues among young researchers.
I myself have participated in various dialogues with Japan and
China, Japan and the US, Japan and the United Kingdom, Japan andGermany, Japan and France, but very few with Southeast Asia. It is
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry that is interacting with
Southeast Asia. We need to expand and deepen this to the academic
level. Southeast Asia has several countries that are now among theprime, emerging economies. Indonesia, of course, but also Thailand,
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are among them. We must try
to attract these to the democratic side, the internationalist side, asmuch as possible. It is important not to let them go to the Chineseside, and there is a tug of war here. I think it is important to guidethem in the direction of joining the OECD, not the BRICS.
Toyoda: In closing on this matter, I would like to ask Prof. Kanehara
how Japan should approach the restructuring of the international
order, especially with regard to the Global South.
Kanehara: For the first time in 200 years, the advanced industrial
democracies are shrinking in proportion. The countries of the firstwave of the industrial revolution are beginning to shrink, and a hugesecond wave is emerging like a tsunami. We call those emerging
countries growing on this second wave the Global South. How toincorporate new countries in our liberal international order tomaintain the balance of power relations to our advantage isextremely important. For Japan there is no alternative to the JapanJapan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 202417

US alliance. However, the Japan-US alliance alone is no longer
sufficient to cope with the rise of China, so the question is what to do
now. South Asia, starting with India, which is gaining strength, andSoutheast Asia are important partners for Japanese diplomacy in theimmediate future.
Since the Meiji Era, Japan has only looked up to the developed
countries of the West. Finally, now our eyes are beginning to lookdown toward the South, but then we know nothing about thosecountries, neither about the history of Indonesia nor about thehistory of Vietnam, for example.
Today, a large number of Southeast Asians are entering Japan as
foreign workers. For Japan, which is experiencing a population
decline of several hundred thousand every year, it is inevitable tobring them into the labor market. There are 2.5 million foreign
residents in Japan today, and this number will probably increase toabout 10 million, or 10% of the population.
From now on, we must engage in earnest and serious diplomacy
with Southeast Asia. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also
sending its most talented ambassadors to Southeast Asia and West
Asia. I think we have to deal with Southeast Asia and Western Asiawith the same weight as we once did with Europe and the US.
Let me say a few words about the rule of law. The term “rule oflaw” involves values. The countries of the Global South now thinkthat what the West says about the rule of law, democracy, andliberalism is a double standard. The countries of the Global South
think, “Don’t lecture us now about the ‘rule of law’ as if you werealways behaving respectably. You were discriminating against us in
the past.” It is true that in the 19th century, the liberal international
order was centered on the West and was a local and partial orderwith clear regional and racial limits, but in the latter half of the 20th
century, thanks to the efforts of people such as Gandhi, who helped
lead India to independence, King, who spearheaded the civil rights
movement, and Mandela, who overthrew apartheid, the liberal order
has spread and become universal on a global scale.
There is no order that can replace the liberal international order.
The core principle is that we are all equal and free, have a right to life
and to pursue happiness and realize ourselves, and that we establish
a government for that purpose and its legitimacy is based upon
peoples’ free will and consent. This principle can very well go alongwith Asian political tradition. Nobody is against this except dictators.
Therefore, I think we need to tell the emerging countries that wemust support this together.
Europe and the US are radical, and when it comes to human rights
and democracy, they are quick to impose sanctions, which iscounterproductive. As in the case of corporal punishment in schools,
students who are beaten resent it more than they feel remorse.
Japan must be responsible for persuading Asian and African nationsof the value of liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law, as these18 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2024

are ideas that are commonly associated with the traditional values ofAsians; they are universal, not just European. Only the Japanese, as
Asians, can say that these ideas have been held by Asians for
centuries. I think we need to continue to issue such a message.
Finally, I would like to mention the actual generational divisions
within Japan, since it is because of these divisions that Japanesediplomacy has not been as effective as it could have been. People ofthe older generation beyond their 90s who knew about the Japanese
Empire believe that the racial attitudes and colonial histories of thewhite democracies embodied a double standard. Then came theleftist generation in their 70s and 80s steeped in radical socialist andcommunist ideology. A liberal generation like ours, in our 50s and
60s, followed and we are the generation now responsible for Japan.
We need to look squarely at our values and say out loud that Japanhas practiced modern democracy, liberalism, and the rule of law fora long time now and has helped the liberal international order tospread on a global scale. In order to do so, I think we must quickly
overcome the generational divisions within our country.
One last thing about Taiwan, if you look at international power
relations as a whole, especially in terms of the size of the economy, it
is two to one between the West as a whole and China, and the Westis still strong right now. If we stay united, I do not think China will
start an adventurous war. It is vital that the West does not become
divided. I don’t think China is yet strong enough to start a Taiwan
war and win in the end, but it can anyway start one. Once a war
breaks out, there is no other way but to push back with militaryforce. The human and material damage that would result from a
Taiwan contingency is beyond imagination, so it is very important
not to let it start.
The Taiwanese, who had lived in Taiwan before the end of WWII,
are known as “native Taiwanese”. They are people who lived a very
different history from that of mainland China for 150 years. They arebrave people. After the Sino-Japanese War ended and Taiwan wasceded to Japan, the native Taiwanese fought bravely against theJapanese, though the Qing soldiers swiftly returned home. After
Chiang Kai-shek tried to move to Taiwan, they again rioted. Eachtime, tens of thousands of people died. For the indigenous
Taiwanese people, Chiang Kai-shek was after all a tyrannical intruder.
Their feelings of national self-determination came to the fore in theconstitutional amendments and free elections of 1994 and 1996. The
native Taiwanese people still have a complicated fractured identity,
but the growth of the “Free Taiwan” identity has not stopped.
The freed Taiwanese people aspire to national self-determination.
On the other hand, a situation is being set up where China can invade
Taiwan with its massive military power. In this context, the status
quo must be maintained. Japan must say to Taiwan, “We must avoid
a war,” and clearly say to China, “We support the status quo.” Thetension over the Taiwan Strait will continue until China becomes ademocracy one day. And I think we have no choice but to resolve tohang on for maybe 100 years.

Conclusion
Toyoda: Finally, I would like to ask each of you to briefly state what
you value most.
Kitaoka: Since power is necessary to maintain order, I believe weshould enhance our deterrence capability and be careful not toprovoke China, while at the same time strengthening our power sothat if something happens, we will not remain silent. It would take along time. When the US came to Japan in 1945, its first goal was tomake Japan a country that would never again be able to produce theZero fighter. That still lingers today.
Many products are today dual-use, military and civilian. To be or
not to be a weapon is an almost impossible boundary. The
strengthening of Japan’s industrial capacity by collaboration among
universities, the private sector and the government will lead to thestrengthening of its military and deterrence. I believe we should
strengthen our military power while making it clear that we will notuse it first.
Kanehara: I believe that the cornerstone is to maintain a militarybalance with China by building up Japan’s conventional forces more
and more, based on the Japan-US alliance.
In terms of the economy, we need to stop thinking in terms of anational economy, but instead think first and foremost about thewealth of rising Asia as a whole in the context of free trade. We needto change our thinking so that Japan can absorb the growing wealthof Asia. We also need to correct the 80-year postwar mistake of not
utilizing the technological capabilities of academia and the business
community for national security at all. Our military, industry, andacademia are too much divided. This is not good. We need to take itto the next level, such as producing all semiconductors for making
cutting-edge weapons domestically. I think there are still big barriersin the way of industry-academia-government cooperation for security
technology, such as the Science Council of Japan.
Finally, back to values again, I think we need to explain freedom
and democracy in Japan’s own words. John Locke and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau are important, but what is it that the Japanese have been
seeking for 150 years after the Meiji Era? Wasn’t it freedom anddemocracy? If we cannot explain in our own words what we havestruggled to achieve since the Meiji Era, no one in the Global South
will come closer to us. If Japan cannot talk about freedom,democracy, and the rule of law in its own words, it will be difficult forJapan to become an international leader in the enhancement of
universal values.

Masuo: There are many things that can be done, but I think the mostimportant thing is to develop human resources that can work well incontributing to the international community as a whole. The next 10
years will probably be the most difficult period for the international
community. But after that, a new generation will be reproduced.
Japan has a good number of human resources who can engage with
Western society, but this is not enough in times of change. It is
crucial for us to develop a large number of people who understandthe various positions of developing countries, and who can discussand negotiate issues on equal terms with Russia and China that havecompletely different worldviews.
Aizawa: I still think that Japan must design and articulate our newmodel of the social contract: in other words, a social contract that
pursues prosperity, security, and freedom, all three at the same time.
Also, this social contract is not only for the Japanese but also for
those who come to and live in Japan. I agree with Prof. Kaneharathat it is very important to explain freedom in Japan’s own language
and terms.
We are now in a time when the relationship between state andsociety is being transformed by digital technology. This is not only atime of change in the international order, but a time of change insocial order and both are intertwined. Each country, therefore, islooking at others to see what kind of society and state relationshipeach will create. I believe Japan must create a model that othercountries can subscribe to – a new type of social contract that issuitable for this era. I think that this approach, dealing with social
order as an international order, will have a great geopolitical effect.
Toyoda: Thank you very much for your views in this discussion.

Written and translated by Naoyuki Haraoka, editor-in-chief of Japan SPOTLIGHT,
with the cooperation of Tape Rewrite Co.

Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 202419