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Asia’s Role in
Global Governance

By Sachiko Hirakawa
Asia as a Method
The concept of global governance emerged with the end of the Cold
War. Amid a new trend of globalization – the quick and massive
transnational circulation of money, goods, people, and ideas – the basic
concept was inseparable from the Cold War winners’ fundamentalvalues. As Francis Fukuyama wrote, Western liberal democracy wasdealt with as if it were “the end point of mankind’s ideologicalevolution” or “the final form of human government” (The End of History
and the Last Man, 1992).
At the turn of the 21st century, the advanced practice and enlarging
process of European integration was reasonably believed to be a rolemodel for future global governance. In fact, for former Eastern bloc
countries to accede to the European Union, the Copenhagen Criteria(1993) required strict conditions such as “democracy, the rule of law,human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence ofa functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope withcompetitive pressure and market forces within the Union”. Thus, the EU
essentially attempted to homogenize the new members in terms ofvalues by legal power.
We all know the reality. By the 2010s, the EU model was seriously
hamstrung and receiving a backlash. In particular, social and economic
frictions between new immigrants and old local inhabitants raised
fundamental questions. The original “European” peoples graduallybecame more anxious, frustrated, and antagonized by this mission touniversalize their liberal values, and gradually shifted toward“Euroscepticism” or “anti-globalism” sentiments, as now mostimmediately symbolized by “Brexit”.
Today, Asia is expected to take initiatives in leading global
governance against the background of its increasing economic power.
This reminds me of a famous remark of Takeuchi Yoshimi, a Japanesecritic of the postwar period. In 1961, in a lecture titled Hoho to shite noAjia (“Asia as a Method”), this China expert stated: “Contemporary Asia
can digest excellent Western values again and adjust them to Asiansociety in its favor in order to accomplish them on a larger scale, andthus the Eastern can proactively reform the Western. This rollback ofcultures and values can create universality.” Though Asia nations still
struggle with many challenges in their domestic economies on theirown, I would like to highlight in this essay the possibility of Asian
contributions to global governance.

ASEAN Diversity & Sustainability
It is interesting to note that ASEAN was formed in the same year as
the official birth of the European Communities (EC), the precursor ofthe EU. In 1967, the Brussels Treaty, signed two years earlier, came into
https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/Author Sachiko Hirakawa

force, merging the three executive bodies of the European Coal andSteel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community(Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) into the EC,
with 39 articles in 5 chapters. In contrast, the formation of ASEAN waslightly declared by five foreign ministers (not top leaders) with asignature paper of merely about 735 words. Unlike the EC, which
comprised similar political systems, economic levels, religion andculture, ASEAN started with very different countries of diverse
backgrounds. The founding members even included territorial
disputants with war memories still fresh. Indonesia’s national motto
Bhinneka Tunggal lka (“Unity in diversity”) was naturally applied to
ASEAN’s proposition.
In contrast to many expectations, ASEAN has successfully developed
into Asia’s oldest such institution, surviving the volatility in theinternational order. By 1999, all Southeast Asian countries including
former socialist countries had become members. ASEAN slowly but
surely evolved into a permanent institutional body and became a legal
entity with the ASEAN Charter (effectuated in 2008). In addition, in thepost-Cold War era, ASEAN actively proposed and engaged in broader
regional cooperation with external powers, sitting in the “driver’s seat”.
Frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM), ASEAN Plus Three, and the East Asia Summit(EAS) – even though often sarcastically called “initiative withoutthreats”, “rented tatami rooms” and “merely talk shops” – have enabled
extra-regional members to meet and associate with each other on a
global scale. Thus, ASEAN could be said to be more diverse andperhaps more sustainable than the EU, and it has contributed modestly
toward global governance.
Scholars of regionalism often compare the hard integration or rigid
institutionalism of the EU with the softer and looser approach ofASEAN. ASEAN’s traditional modus operandi, known as the “ASEANWay”, essentially consists of two historically indigenous customs:
consultation (musyawarah) and consensus (muafakat ). In fact, in 1963
when Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines first organized regionalcooperation to solve territorial disputes, the three countries of Malay
origin named their Greater Malay Confederation “musyawarahMaphilindo” and emphasized the native bonds by intentionally retaining
the Malay expression. (The organization dismantled a month later.)Consultation and consensus were traditional ways of decisionmaking practiced in Java Island villages. Its management style wastotally different from Western colonial ways which depended on force
or regulations. It was also distinct from Northeast Asia’s stablehierarchical structures based on Confucianism. In fact, its central idea isparticipation on the basis of equality for conflict prevention.
Consultation is a voluntary action of listening to different opinions inadvance, while consensus, with no apparent winners or losers,
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guarantees the sustainability of the decision made. They knew thatlosers would be potential enemies or avengers in the future. This
culture of local governance is basically a negation of the mechanism of
the majority vote, or Benthamism (“It is the greatest happiness of thegreatest number that is the measure of right and wrong”) in theWestern tradition.
Yet ASEAN methods also have risky elements. To achieve acompromise between different interests often relies on the personalqualities of leaders or intermediaries. This basically does not sit wellwith open legal procedures, transparent manners or accountability.
Rather, it easily shifts into a grey zone which generates possible
corruption. The key players need to be wise. Another weak point is thatconsensus-based decisions tend to merely produce low levels ofachievement and effectivity. Yet Asian pacifists tend to think “slow” isbetter than “conflictive” and accept gradualism as a safer way orproceeding.

House of Liberalism for Non-state Actors
People may think that Asia is full of nationalism, but we can also see
the region’s hidden liberalism from different perspectives. ASEAN is alegal entity and in fact a signatory of many treaties and agreements.
Asian regional architecture under the initiative of smaller Southeast
Asian countries’ union seems to support the liberal theory ofinternational relations that says states ultimately can cooperate rather
than compete.
Internally, ASEAN also embraces further liberal thinking. Even though
its traditional non-interventionist principle remains formally in place,ASEAN as a collective unit conspicuously stands as a “People’s ASEAN”
under the ASEAN Charter. Its guiding principles do cover liberal values
such as adherence to the rule of law, good governance, democracy,
human rights, and trade rules (ASEAN Charter, Article 2, especiallySection (h), (i), (n)). Thus, the existence of ASEAN is theoretically tofree people or individuals from the control of national sovereignty,
which is an idea similar to global governance.
Further evidence of Asia’s liberal nature is the unique presence ofTaiwan, which is diplomatically a “non-state” actor but functioning as areal “civil society”. No Asian country formally recognizes Taiwan’s
sovereignty, yet all its neighbors maintain substantial socio-economic
relations with Taiwan independently from mainland China. They haveacquired diplomatic techniques in a customized formula and China
flexibly tolerates Taiwan’s unofficial relations with foreign countries.
Despite consistent cross-straits controversy, bilateral relations between
Taiwan and mainland China through NGOs have advanced practically inthis region. Taiwan’s regional and global experience would suggest howa civil society can situate itself or function under a form of global
governance without governmental relations.
The presence of non-state actors such as ASEAN and Taiwan
symbolizes Asia’s essentially liberal nature. Without professional
wisdom in managing differences and difficulties, such unique non-stateactors could not have prevailed for such a long time. Japan’s postwar
diplomacy has also contributed significantly to this regional order.
Japan has always supported the liberal direction of ASEAN’s
institutional growth, especially after the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, in which
Japan openly promised to cooperate as an “equal partner” positivelywith ASEAN in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and52 Japan SPOTLIGHT • May / June 2019

resilience. And with Taiwan it first practiced such a formula bymaintaining substantial private relations even after the 1972 diplomatic
rupture between Taiwan and Japan after the normalization of JapanChina diplomatic relations that same year. Nevertheless, Japan
maintained substantive socio-economic relations with Taiwan in a nongovernmental capacity through private windows such as theInterchange Association (Japan side) and the Association of East AsianRelations (Taiwan side). This so called “Japanese Formula” was thenused as a model by other countries that switched official relations from
Taipei to Beijing. In fact, creating such “free and open” space in Asia
has been Japan’s goal for its own interests. For postwar Japan, a small
island pacifist trading nation with few natural resources, Asia’s peacefulstability and economic prosperity was fundamental to its survival andprosperity.

China-Japan Responsibility for Producing
Asian Method
Japan is not Asia’s economic frontrunner anymore. In the 2010s,
China started its own initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, while
openly questioning Western-value based institutions. Meanwhile,
however, it still struggles to formulate a definition of global governancebecause it must follow the interests of the Chinese Communist Party.
Fortunately, China is sufficiently aware of its own difference and has
consistently affirmed the traditional diplomatic principle of “peacefulcoexistence”. Yet, it still basically presumes a national sovereigntyoriented international governance. Other Asian nations will need toaccommodate China’s state-oriented approach with more liberalapproaches.
So what can Asia do for future global governance? I think SinoJapanese relations will be crucially important. If the two top Asian
economies can find or create ways to coexist beyond their big politicaland economic differences, it would be a very promising reference point
for global governance. Since the era of Deng Xiaoping, Japan has
remained engaged in relations with China. Even after the 1989Tiananmen Square bloodshed, Japan insisted on not isolating China
from the international community, while Western countries imposed
economic sanctions.
Japan today stands in a similar position. Unlike US Vice President
Mike Pence’s severe anti-China policy speech on Oct. 4, 2018 at theHudson Institute in Washington, D.C., Japan announced its consistentengagement policy by introducing the Japan-China Forum on Third
Country Business Cooperation. Japan’s responsibility is to carefully
bring out the wise and pragmatic dimensions of China and by doing soto show that Western liberal values could be adopted by China as well.
This would be an attempt to “embrace” Western values by the Asian
method and could lead to hybrid liberal values which are more globallyapplicable.
Helping China to maintain face, Japan should strategically prepare to
bring about the moment when, as the I Ching (“Book of Changes”)
says, “a wise man changes his mind, a fool never.”
Sachiko Hirakawa is associate professor at the Center for International
Education & lecturer at the Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, Waseda
University. She specializes in international politics in East Asia, Asian regional
integration, and Sino-Japanese relations.