Money, fiscal policy, and interest rates: A critique of Modern Monetary Theory
Abstract
This paper excavates the set of ideas known as modern monetary theory (MMT). The
principal conclusion is that the macroeconomics of MMT is a restatement of elementarywell-understood Keynesian macroeconomics. There is nothing new in MMT’s
construction of monetary macroeconomics that warrants the distinct nomenclature of
MMT. Moreover, MMT over-simplifies the challenges of attaining non-inflationary full
employment by ignoring the dilemmas posed by Phillips curve analysis; the dilemmas
associated with maintaining real and financial sector stability; and the dilemmas
confronting open economies. Its policy recommendations also rest on over-simplistic
analysis that takes little account of political economy difficulties, and its interest rate
policy recommendation would likely generate instability. At this time of highunemployment, when too many policymakers are being drawn toward mistaken fiscal
austerity, MMT’s polemic on behalf of expansionary fiscal policy is useful. However,that does not justify turning a blind eye to MMT’s oversimplifications of macroeconomic
theory and policy.
Keywords: modern monetary theory, money financed budget deficits, fiscal policy.
JEL reference: E00, E02, E10, E12, E24, E40, E58, E62, E63.
Thomas I. Palley
Independent Economist
Washington, D.C.
Mail@thomaspalley.com
January 2013
I Introduction
This paper excavates the set of ideas known as modern monetary theory (MMT).
MMT is a collection of thoughts about the origins of money, the source of value of fiatmoney, and the nature of the financial constraint on government. It also advances a
number of policy recommendations regarding use of money financed budget deficits,
interest rate policy, and having government act as employer of last resort (ELR). MMT issignificantly associated with economists Randall Wray, Stephanie Kelton, and Mathew

1Forstater of the University of Missouri at Kansas City, along with financier Warren
Mosler. Wray (1998) provides the most comprehensive statement of MMT.
The principal conclusion of the paper is that the macroeconomics of MMT is a
restatement of elementary well-understood Keynesian macroeconomics. There is nothing
new in MMT’s construction of monetary macroeconomics that warrants the distinct
nomenclature of MMT. Moreover, MMT over-simplifies the challenges of attaining noninflationary full employment by ignoring the dilemmas posed by Phillips curve analysis;
the dilemmas associated with maintaining real and financial sector stability; and thedilemmas confronting open economies. This tendency to over-simplify results in poorly
conceived policy recommendations, especially for developing countries. Furthermore,
MMT policy recommendations take little account of political economy difficulties.
At this time of high unemployment, assessing MMT is difficult. On one hand,
MMT’s policy polemic on behalf of expansionary fiscal policy is very useful at a time
when too many policymakers are being drawn toward mistaken fiscal austerity. On theother hand, one should not turn a blind eye to MMT’s oversimplifications ofmacroeconomic theory and policy.
II MMT and the origins and value of sovereign fiat money
The core of MMT concerns how government issued fiat money (i.e. sovereign fiatmoney) relaxes the financial constraint on government and opens space for policy. That
places sovereign fiat money at the center of the story.
The MMT approach to sovereign fiat money is the Chartalist approach developedby Knapp (1924), which was also accepted by Keynes (1930). Chartalist theory maintains

2

government issued fiat money has value because governments demand taxes be paid insovereign money, thereby creating public demand it.1
This idea that the demand for sovereign money is in part due to the obligation touse it to pay taxes is uncontroversial. For instance, James Tobin (1998, p.27), one of theforemost neo-Keynesians, writes in his textbook (co-authored with Steven Golub):2“By its willingness to accept a designated asset in settlement of taxes and otherobligations, the government makes that asset acceptable to any who have suchobligations, and in turn to others who have obligations to them, and so on.”However, in addition to accepting the Chartalist explanation of money, Keynes and Tobin
also accepted money derives value from its use as medium of exchange, unit of account,and store of value. These features supported the development of money, though money
was in turn was captured by governments as part of state building and tax collection.
Moreover, these features continue to impact the evolution of money, as reflected in thedevelopment of e-monies such as debit cards. From this perspective, state money is one
form of money that is in perpetual competition with other forms of money, and theboundary of use fluctuates with legal and technological developments. However, statemoney is the highest form of money in that it can be used to pay tax obligations and it isalso generally acceptable for discharge of private debts.
Unfortunately, MMT sets up unnecessary controversy by asserting that the
obligation to pay taxes is the exclusive reason for the development of money. Thus, Wray
(2012, p.2) writes dismissively of other arguments regarding the development of money:“We all know the usual approach to money, that begins with the fantasizedstory about barter, the search for an efficient medium of exchange,….”1
2

Wray (1998, chapter 2) provides a thorough and concise discussion of Chartalist theory.
Wray (1998) cites this quote but it is buried in the last footnote (number 16) of his chapter on Chartalism.

3

Indeed, he goes further to claim that the obligation to pay taxes is the only reason for thedevelopment of markets:“Why did markets develop? Not to barter what you have but don’t want, butrather to obtain the means of debt (tax) settlement (ibid., p.6).”
The critique of this extreme MMT perspective is succinctly stated by Rochon andVernengo (2003, p.57):“Sovereignty, understood as the power to tax and to collect in the token of
choice, is not the main explanation for the existence of money, even if modernmoney is ultimately chartal money”.
In many regards, these differences over the origins of money are peripheral to the mainarguments of MMT, especially as all agree state money is Chartal. That said, they reveal
two characteristics of MMT that hold for other issues. The first is the tendency to oversimplification. The second is a polemic whereby over-simplified re-statement of theory isrepresented as if it were new theory through the nomenclature of “MMT”.3
III MMT and the institutional arrangement between fiscal and monetary authorities
The central macroeconomic policy claim of MMT is that sovereign fiat moneychanges the nature of the financial constraint on government. In particular, there is noneed for government to raise taxes in advance of spending as spending can now befinanced in advance of taxes by having the central bank “print” (i.e. create) money. Thisability to print money also explains why governments that issue debt in their own
currency need never default. That is because central banks can always print money to pay

3

For instance, Michael Hoexter (2013), a leading contributor to the MMT website New Economic
Perspectives, writes: “One of the components of macroeconomic management recommended by Keynes
but theorized only later by Modern Money Theorists was ending the gold standard and transitioning to a
fiat currency…. Abba Lerner’s functional finance and later Modern Money Theory (MMT) have been thetheories of fiat currency which have as yet not been self-consciously utilized within government policy or
integrated into the mainstream economic teaching which still views money as a commodity among othercommodities and not what it has been now for many years, a fiat money monopoly.” MMT claims in thisvein are self-promoting and false.

4

debt interest and principal as government debt is just a promise to make predeterminedpayments of sovereign money.
Once again, all of these claims are widely understood and acknowledged. With
regard to the capacity to finance spending without recourse to taxes this is easily seen via
the government budget restraint given by(1) G – T = θ + β
G = government spending, T = net tax revenues after transfers and interest payments, θ =amount of budget deficit financed by issuing high-powered (sovereign) money, and β =amount of budget deficit financed by selling government bonds. This restraint is a flowstock accounting relationship and not a budget constraint of the sort confronted byhouseholds. The former is fundamentally different from the latter because households do
not have the option of issuing money that is accepted as the means of payment.4 For
instance, setting T = 0 and assuming zero bond financing (i.e. β = 0), yields G = θ.
The budget restraint was a key feature of neo-Keynesian analysis of fiscal policy(see for example Christ, 1969; Blinder and Solow, 1973, and Tobin and Buiter, 1976) andit shows clearly that governments which have the power to issue sovereign money canalways finance deficits without recourse to taxes. The critical question is not whether
government can finance spending without taxes. Everybody knows it can. Instead, thequestion is what are the macroeconomic consequences of doing so and should
government do so? MMT analysis is seriously deficient in answering these questions and

4

Neo-Keynesians were fully aware of this difference. For instance, Tobin and Haliassos (1990, p.899)
describe the language of “budget restraint” as a “misnomer” and they prefer to call it a “budget flow
identity”, reflecting its purely accounting character.

5constitutes an analytic step back compared to the earlier neo-Keynesian analyses ofBlinder and Solow (1973) and Tobin and Buiter (1976).5
As regards government’s ability to always repay debt if it so chooses, that too isclear from the budget restraint. Repaying debt implies βRepayment < 0, and this can always
be financed by setting θRepayment > 0 such that θRepayment + βRepayment = 0. It is not just neoKeynesians who understand this. For instance, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan (1997, p.2) writes:“That all of these claims on government are readily accepted reflects the factthat a government cannot become insolvent with respect to obligations in its
own currency. A fiat money system, like the one we have today, can produce
such claims without limit.”
Finally, the government budget restraint shows the accounting whereby
governments that issue sovereign money can, in principle, finance spending by printing
money. However, that also requires a particular institutional arrangement between thefiscal authority and the central bank. This institutional issue has been raised by Lavoie(2011) and Fiebiger (2012), and Lavoie terms it the “consolidation” assumption. Simple
T-accounting shows that the central bank must be willing to provide the government with
the initial money balances to finance its spending. In effect, that implies the fiscal
authority and central bank act as if they were a consolidated single actor.6
In my view, this is not the main issue in the critique of MMT, but it is still an
important issue. Many countries have chosen to separate their central bank and fiscal
5

Judging by the absence of citation references (see for instance, Wray, 1998), MMT-ers appear to be
unaware of this earlier neo-Keynesian literature.
6
Lavoie (2011) and Fiebiger (2012) focus on the fiscal authority - central bank relationship but there is also
the issue of monetary policy. Even when the central bank and fiscal authority are not consolidated, it canlook as if they are. The effect of budget deficits on the money supply and interest rates depends criticallyon the stance of monetary policy. Thus, if an independent central bank decides to fully accommodate fiscal
policy that will produce an outcome that looks as if the central bank and fiscal authority are consolidated.
MMT therefore implicitly assumes both consolidation and full accommodation by monetary policy.

6

authority. That separation involves complete and total independence in the case of theEuropean Central Bank (ECB). As regards the U.S. Federal Reserve, there is arms-length
decision making independence but the Federal Reserve is accountable to Congress. The
pendulum, regarding the degree of independence, shifts with the political and economic
times. Over the last thirty years, spurred by the political and intellectual dominance ofneoliberal economic ideas, it has swung toward increased independence. In the 1960s and1970s the Bank of England was directly under the control of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. In the 1990s that arrangement was changed and the Bank was given armslength decision making independence, subject to being accountable to the Chancellor andaiming for targets that are mutually agreed with the Chancellor.
The important point is institutional arrangements vary across countries owing todifferences in country choices. This is an important issue of political economy. MMT-ers
are dismissive of this political economy and simply assume there is and should be fullconsolidation of the fiscal authority and central bank.
My own preference is for greater consolidation and less central bankindependence, but I would stop short of full consolidation. Paraphrasing the words offormer Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin, it is difficult to take away
the punchbowl in the middle of the party. That is what the central bank must sometimes
do, and it is something politicians may find hard to do and therefore prefer to hand-off toothers.7 Additionally, politicians may have an incentive to use monetary policy forelectoral purposes, potentially giving rise to political business cycles (Nordhaus, 1975).
MMT’s dismissiveness of these political economy considerations is part of a general7

My suggested reform of the Federal Reserve System is described in Palley (2012a) and would give thePresident greater influence over the Federal Reserve.

7intellectual weakness regarding political economy that is also visible in its treatment offiscal policy and the ELR policy proposal, issues which are discussed below.
IV MMT and macroeconomic theory
MMT is in essence a restatement of well-understood accounting relations thatshow the potential to finance budget deficits by printing money. However, accounting
relations are not enough to guide policy. There is also need for macroeconomic theory
that explains the consequences of fiscal policy under alternative financing arrangements.
Here, MMT fails woefully. There is nothing new about its theory, and the theory it uses is
simplistic and inadequate for the task. Furthermore, MMT-ers have failed to provide aformal model that explicates their claims.
Given this lack of formal modeling, readers must fend for themselves and theimplicit model seems to be the simplest of income-expenditure models. That model isillustrated in Figure 1 which shows the standard Keynesian cross diagram. According tothis model, government can push the economy to full employment by increasing
government spending (G) or lowering taxes (T) to raise aggregate demand (AD) to a levelconsistent with full employment output (y*) so that(2) y = y* = AD(G, T)

ADG > 0, ADT < 0

There is no finance constraint on G because of the capacity to issue sovereign money.
However, once the economy reaches full employment output, taxes (T) must be raised toensure a balanced budget satisfying the condition(3) D = G - T(y*, t) = 0

Ty* > 0, Tt > 0

This balanced budget condition must be satisfied in order to maintain the value of fiatmoney. In a no growth economy, having the fiscal authority run persistent money

8

financed deficits will cause the money supply to increase relative to GDP, in turn causing
inflation.8

Figure 1. The macroeconomics of MMT (AD1 < AD2 ).

Aggregate demand, AD
AD = y
AD2

y*

AD1

y1

45o
y1

y*

Output, y

The policy control problem confronting the fiscal authority is to set its policy
instruments (G and t) so as to hit its two targets given by y = y* and D = 0. There are two
independent instruments (G and t) and two targets (y and D) so the control problem isfeasible.
Though not identified by MMT-ers, there is an interesting Tinbergen – Mundell
policy instrument assignment problem that requires G be assigned to the y target and t be
assigned to the D target. That is because the government expenditure multiplier is larger
than the tax multiplier. Consequently, assigning t to y could cause instability. For
instance, suppose t were assigned to y. A fall in autonomous demand would require lower
taxes, but that would cause a budget deficit requiring lower G, which would in turn lower
y and require yet lower taxes. The implication is taxes must be used to hit the budget
8

In a growing economy, the fiscal authority can run persistent money financed deficits and still maintain
price stability if the implied growth of the money supply equals the rate of growth of real output.

9

deficit target, while government spending must be used to maintain full employment
output.
This assignment requirement has unappreciated policy implications in the current
era of fiscal austerity. Many European governments, aided by the IMF, are seeking toreturn to full employment output with a budget deficit target. Broadly speaking, they
appear to be looking to cut taxes to stimulate output and reduce government spending tohit the budget deficit target. That assignment is unstable.
The income-expenditure model with a balanced budget condition (i.e. equations(2) and (3)) appears to constitute the implicit MMT macroeconomic model. We can now
turn to critique. The first thing to note is that sovereign money is absolutely central to
MMT analysis as it removes the financial constraint on government spending when
below full employment output. However, it is absent in the simple income-expendituremodel. Let us therefore begin to introduce it.
If the economy is initially away from full employment, assuming an appropriate
assignment of instruments, the government should engage in increased money financed
deficit spending. Simple Keynesian expenditure multiplier theory then shows that the
deficit must increase by(4) ΔD = [dD/dG]ΔG = [1 – t/m]ΔG > 0
m = 1 - b[1- t]. Increased government spending always increases the deficit and spending
increases do not pay for themselves through increased tax revenues. The only time they
pay for themselves is with balanced budget fiscal policy, but that is not the intent of the10

MMT which denies the need to finance deficits with taxes.9 In a static economy thatmeans the money supply would keep growing relative to output, causing inflation thatwould tend to undermine the value of money.
Is there a way out of this? The answer is yes and it is provided by the neoKeynesian stock – flow consistent ISLM analysis of Blinder and Solow (1973) and Tobin
and Buiter (1976). The key is adding a Pigou real balance effect to AD. The budget
deficit increases the real high-powered money supply (H/P), creating a real balance effectthat increases AD and eventually pushes the economy to full employment as illustrated in
Figure 2.10
Figure 2. The MMT macroeconomic framework with a Pigou
real balance effect (AD1 < AD2, H1 < H2 ).
Aggregate demand, AD
AD = yAD2 = D(G, H2 /P)y*AD1 = D(G, H1 /P)

y1

45o
y1

9

y*

Output, yKeynesian expenditure multiplier theory also shows that spending cuts must reduce the deficit, counter toclaims sometimes seen that they increase deficits. However, spending cuts only do so at massive cost interms of lost output. That is their true failing.
10
In terms of the Blinder and Solow (1973) and Tobin and Buiter (1976) models, the MMT experiment is
identical to a money financed budget deficit with a constant interest rate. Blinder and Solow (1973) andTobin and Buiter (1976) actually analyzed fiscal policy under more arduous conditions when the monetary
authority holds the high-powered money supply constant. Their analysis shows fiscal policy is still
expansionary (though Post Keynesian s would also argue this is a fictional experiment as monetary
authorities do not target the high-powered money supply). In both cases the economy settles at a stableequilibrium characterized by a balanced budget (D = 0). The MMT experiment adds the additional
requirement that the budget deficit only be balanced when the economy reaches full employment output (y= y*). However, there is nothing theoretically new.

11

There are several things to notice. First, the macroeconomics of MMT is aprimitive version of neo-Keynesian stock-flow consistent ISLM analysis. This ISLM
analysis of the effectiveness of fiscal policy is completely unacknowledged in the MMT
literature, which is essentially the reinvention of an inferior wheel. Stock – flow
consistent ISLM analysis captures almost everything MMT has to say regarding fiscal
policy.11
Second, introducing the government budget restraint also captures the notion thattaxes drive money.12 This can be seen from the following simple model of the money
market:(5) Hs = H(y - T, i, k)

HY-T > 0, Hi < 0, Hk > 0(6) Hs = H-1 + θ + γ(7) θ = G – T – β
i = nominal interest rate, k = bank reserve requirements, γ = open market injections of thecentral bank. Equation (5) is the money market equilibrium condition that has money

11

MMT-ers’ unawareness of this neo-Keynesian ISLM literature reflects a complicated sociology. First,
MMT-ers have tended to exhibit an aversion to mathematical modeling on grounds that such modeling is
an exercise in fiction. The stock – flow consistent ISLM literature is quite mathematical which may havediscouraged MMT-ers from reading it. A second reason is that MMT is an extreme wing of Post Keynesian
economics and many Post Keynesians have an allergy to ISLM analysis. MMT-ers suffer an extreme
version of that allergy. Rejection of ISLM analysis has become a near-litmus test among many Post
Keynesians. Such thinking is misinformed. Stock-flow consistent ISLM analysis is temporary equilibrium
analysis (like the income – expenditure model) conducted in output – interest rate space. ISLM’sarchitecture is fine but its detailed specification is subject to meaningful critique, particularly as regards theomission of endogenous money, inside debt, and inside debt effects on AD. This theological rejection of
ISLM has done great damage to PK economics by creating unnecessary schism with neo-Keynesians andblinding Post Keynesians to the merits of the ISLM model as a base on which they could have built.
Indeed, Post Keynesian economics is now unwittingly re-inventing the stock – flow consistent ISLM model
as evidenced by the much cited work of Godley and Lavoie (2007). The principal innovation in theirframework is the extension of the stock-flow consistent ISLM model to include endogenous money, inside
debt, and inside debt effects on AD.
12
The language of “taxes drive money” is very misleading. What MMT mean is that taxes positively affectthe demand for sovereign money. However, taxes are just one factor, not the only factor. Moreover, in an
endogenous money system in which the monetary authority targets the overnight interest rate, any demand
for sovereign money to pay taxes will be provided by the monetary authority. Consequently, there cannever be a shortage of sovereign money to pay taxes.

12supply equal money demand.13 Equation (6) describes the evolution of the money supply,
while equation (7) is a re-arrangement of the government budget restraint.
Substituting equations (6) and (7) into (5) and re-arranging yields(8) H-1 + G - β + γ = H(y - T, i, k) + T
The left-hand side of equation (8) represents the high-powered money supply which isdetermined by last period’s supply, government spending less that part financed by bondsales, plus open-market purchases of bonds by the central bank. The right-hand side
consists of private sector demand for high-powered money plus tax payments so that tax
payments increase (“drive”) money demand.
Third, the Blinder-Solow (1973) stability analysis of money-financed fiscal policyemphasizes the role of the Pigou real balance effect in closing the budget deficit.
Expansionary fiscal policy always increases the budget deficit. Unless policy is reversed,
closing the deficit requires increased AD that raises income and tax revenue. That isaccomplished via the Pigou effect that results from the increase in the money supply
caused by the deficit. However, as is now being shown by the slow response of theeconomy to the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing (QE) programs, this effect can bevery slow.14 Consequently, the increase in the money supply over the duration of the
return to full employment can be very large. That poses a significant policy challenge for
future financial stability and future inflation that MMT is dismissive of. The next section
discusses this and other issues.

13

The money demand function could also include T as a separate argument with HT > 0.

14

The Federal Reserve’s QE programs have directly monetized part of the budget deficit via government
bonds purchases. The Federal Reserve has also purchased agency-backed mortgage backed securities(MBS). Since such securities are very close portfolio substitutes for Treasury bonds, their purchase istantamount to deficit monetization.

13

V Further over-simplifications and omissions of MMT
The previous section explored the macroeconomic theory behind MMT andshowed there is nothing new. In fact, MMT is an inferior rendition of the analysis ofmoney-financed fiscal policy contained in the stock-flow consistent ISLM analysis of
Blinder and Solow (1973) and Tobin and Buiter (1976). This section explores some
additional critiques.
1. Prices and inflation.
The central policy assertion of MMT is the non-existence of financial constraints
on government spending below full employment. The claim is government can issuemoney to finance non-inflationary spending as long as the economy is below full
employment. However, though full of boilerplate disclaimers about the need to takeaccount of inflation (see for instance, Wray, 1998), MMT lacks an explicit theory of
inflation, how inflation impacts the economy, and how that impact complicates policy.
Once again, the lack of formal modeling requires reading between the lines to try
and intuit the MMT approach to inflation. That approach seems to be an “on-off” modelin which the economy is initially below full employment and then hits the full
employment barrier. That corresponds to an economy with an L-shaped aggregate supply(AS) schedule as shown in Figure 3. Below full employment, the inflation switch is “off”
and expansions of AD generate pure output gains with no price level or inflation effects.
At full employment, the inflation switch is “on” and expansions of AD generate pureprice level increases with no output effects.

14

Figure 3. The implicit MMT model of price level and output
determination (M0 < M1 < M2 < M3 ).
Price level

AD(G, M 3 )P

AD(G, M 2 )AD(G, M 0 )AD(G, M 1 )y*Output

The problem is this is not the way the macro economy works. Instead of a single
sector, the economy is better characterized as a multi sector arrangement with some
sectors at full employment and other below. In this case, the price and output effects ofexpanding AD depend on the mix of sector conditions. This is illustrated in Figure 4 forthe case of a two sector economy. The AS schedule is horizontal when both sectors are
below full employment: it is positively sloped when one sector is below full employment
and the other is at full employment; and it is vertical when both are at full employment.
The economy’s price level – output response therefore depends on the mix of sector
conditions.

15

Figure 4. The AS schedule for a two sector economy.
Sector 2
price level

Sector 1
price level

Aggregate
price level

AS

P2,1
AD2,1

P2,0

P1,0

AD2,0

AD1,0 AD1,1

Sector 2
outputSector 1
output

P1
P0
AD0

AD1
Aggregate
outputFigure 4 shows that both prices and output increase in response to increased AD
when one sector is below full employment and the other is at full employment. Exactly
when prices start to increase will depend on the distribution of sector conditions, andprices may start to increase when aggregate output is quite low if demand is very
asymmetrically distributed. This illustrates the difficulty of achieving full employment
using aggregate policy instruments.
When converted to a dynamic frame, the price level – output trade-off becomes an
inflation - unemployment trade-off captured by a standard Phillips curve of the form
(9) π = f(u) + λπe

fu < 0, 0 < λ < 1

π = inflation, u = unemployment rate, λ = coefficient of inflation expectations feedthrough, πe = inflation expectations.
The issue of the Phillips curve trade-off is central to macroeconomics and policy.
MMT analysis, based on an aggregate income-expenditure model, offers a false choice of16unemployment versus full employment with price stability. Though full of boilerplate
language about concern with inflation, MMT fails to address the dilemmas posed by thePhillips curve for budget deficit financing policy.
The significance of the Phillips curve is that inflation is not an “off-on”
phenomenon. Instead, it will be positive a considerable way away from policymakers’
employment target and it is likely to increase as employment approaches the target.
Policy needs to take account of this. That may mean changing the composition of deficit
financing and shifting away from money finance to bond finance.15 MMT ignores suchconsiderations.
2. Inflation and money financed budget deficits
Money financed budget deficits increase the supply of high-powered sovereign
money which embodies latent purchasing power. Even if not activated immediately on
issue, high-powered money may be activated at a future date and it can be difficult todeactivate it in non-disruptive fashion. Moreover, deactivating it is especially difficult
given that MMT advocates abandoning activist interest rate policy (about which more
below).
The Phillips curve can be augmented as follows to include the additional
inflationary dangers of excessive issue of high-powered money(10) π = f(u) + λ(h)πefu < 0, λh > 0, 0 < λ(h) < 1(11) πe = π(h)πh > 0h = H/y* = ratio of high-powered money to potential nominal GDP. Increases in the highpowered money ratio potentially impact inflation via two channels, both connected to15

Phillips curve analysis imposes a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. My own experience of
MMT-ers is they apply an extreme discount on inflation and view it as essentially costless economically. In
this regard, I have heard a leading proponent of MMT claim inflation below 40 percent is costless.

17

expectations. First, it may increase the coefficient of inflation expectations, leading togreater feed-through of inflation expectations into the Phillips curve inflation process.
Second, it may directly raise inflation expectations.
How powerful these expectation effects are is likely to be highly contextual. In
times of deep recession when there is significant excess supply, such effects are likely tobe relatively minimal. However, they are likely to become greater as the economy
strengthens. Furthermore, these expectation effects may be volatile and subject tounpredictable change associated with shifts of confidence, etc.
Equation (10) is only intended to be illustrative of how high-powered money
might affect the Phillips curve inflation process. Formally modeling and predicting
inflation is notoriously difficult and the role of liquidity in driving inflation is especiallydifficult because of the long and variable lags associated with the effects of changes inliquidity. Liquidity may lie inert for long periods and then suddenly become activated bychanges in psychology induced by small changes in economic activity.
That is not an argument against expansionary fiscal policy in times of recession,
but it is an argument against exclusive reliance on money-financed deficits. Instead, evenin times of recession, there are good reasons to use a combination of money- and bondfinanced deficits. The former injects high octane high-powered money, while the lattertakes advantage of lower interest rates resulting from recessionary conditions. Thatmeans government can finance deficits at relatively low cost and with reduced danger ofsubsequent liquidity blowback. As the economy moves out of recession, liquidity
blowback concerns become even more prominent, speaking to the need to shift thecomposition of deficit financing toward increased bond financing.

183. Financial instability and money financed deficits.
Future inflation has been the traditional concern of money-financed deficits thatgenerate large liquidity build-ups. The string of asset price bubbles in the 1990s and2000s that culminated with the financial crisis of 2008 has made economists andpolicymakers aware of the dangers of asset price bubbles and financial fragility. Those
dangers provide another reason for caution about financing deficits with money even intimes of weak economic activity, and especially in times of more normal economic
activity.
Whereas general price inflation is unlikely in times of weak economic activity,
asset price inflation can occur at any time. As with general price inflation, modeling therelation between liquidity build-ups and financial instability is extremely difficult. That
relationship is not mechanical or fixed in form. Instead, liquidity is akin to latent financial
energy that can accumulate, leading to greater danger of unanticipated combustion.
However, because the danger cannot be deterministically modeled, that does not mean it
should be ignored. Yet that appears to be the implicit recommendation in MMT’s policyof exclusive reliance on money financing of budget deficits.
4. Open economy considerations and money financed deficits.
As with discussion of inflation, MMT writing (again see Wray, 1998) contains
much boilerplate cover about the need to take account of open economy and exchange
rate concerns, but nowhere is there formal treatment of these considerations and how theymight constrain the use of money-financed budget deficits. The reality is, as with
inflation, that taking serious account of open economy considerations introduces
significant complexities and constraints regarding use of money financed budget deficits.

19Such deficits increase the supply of high powered money and the money createdmust be willingly held. Some of the increase in supply will be directed to the acquisitionof foreign money balances and purchases of imports, which will generate exchange rate
depreciation. That in turn can amplify inflation and inflation expectations, and also foster
financial instability.
With regard to real output effects, there is a long standing literature, initiated byKrugman and Taylor (1978), about the possibility of contractionary devaluation whereby
exchange rate depreciation lowers economic activity. The likelihood of such an outcome
depends on the characteristics of the economy such as the price elasticity of import andexport demands; the extent of reliance on imports; availability of substitutes for imports;
the nature and structure of domestic production; and the extent to which increased importprices feed through into domestic prices.
The exchange rate is also a critical determinant of inflation, especially in Latin
American economies that are highly dependent on imported inputs and capital goods. In
countries like Brazil, it is the exchange rate rather than capacity utilization that issystematically connected to inflation and inflation expectations. There is a high degree of
exchange rate pass-through into the domestic price level. Moreover, inflation
expectations tend to be weakly anchored so that exchange rate depreciation can quickly
trigger higher inflation expectations that destabilize both the economy and politics.
Furthermore, wages tend to be a casualty of such developments as nominal wages tend tolag prices.
Small open economies with histories of high inflation have also shown
themselves prone to the phenomenon of currency substitution or “dollarization” whereby

20domestic economic agents abandon the national money in favor of a more stable store ofvalue. Dollarization shows that the store of value property is an important property ofmoney, contrary to MMT denials of the significance of this property. From a publicfinance perspective, it is costly in terms of lost seignorage revenue. And from amacroeconomic perspective, it can fuel higher inflation via the process described by
Cagan (1956), with flight from domestic money in search of other stores of value driving
up the velocity money, and thereby generating faster higher inflation.
Finally, there is the problem of the balance of payments constraint on
expansionary fiscal policy, which applies to both developing and developed counties.16 If
fiscal policy succeeds in expanding AD and income, it will likely cause significant
deterioration in the current account. This can be financed via foreign borrowing, but thatis rejected by MMT because it exposes countries to future foreign debt problems. Absent
a way to finance the current account deficit, financial markets will put pressure on
countries to put a “stop” to their budget deficit “go” policies. Attempting to escape thebalance of payments constraint via exchange rate depreciation exposes countries to the
inflation and financial dislocation effects discussed above. Moreover, the problem is
amplified if all countries try to go that route as the result is global competitive
devaluation. Parenthetically, the balance of payments constraint was emphasized by
Cripps and Godley (1978) but their solution was import controls, which is rejected by
MMT.
In sum, the above adverse effects speak to the significant constraints on using
money financed budget deficits in open economies. These effects constitute a further

16

My thanks to Esteban Perez for pointing out the balance of payments constraint on expansionary fiscal
policy and Wynne Godley’s concern with it.

21critique of simplistic MMT claims about the ease of attaining non-inflationary full
employment.
5. Other reasons for bond financed deficits
In addition to the above macroeconomic arguments cautioning against exclusive
reliance on money financed deficits, there are also microeconomic efficiency arguments
for why government should also use bond finance. A first reason for bond financing is thecreation of a default-free financial instrument that can be used to price other privately
issued financial instruments. Inflation indexed bonds provide the ultimate risk-free
instrument as they are free of both default risk and inflation risk. Given these properties,
government bonds are useful to financial intermediaries and financial markets and they
help promote financial stability.
A second microeconomic reason for bond finance, implied in the work of Tobin(1961, 1969, 1982), is that bonds are a closer portfolio substitute for equities and private
capital than is high-powered money. The existence of widely-held bonds that the central
bank can deal in therefore provides the monetary authority with an effective channel for
influencing the cost of private capital without engaging in direct acquisition of private
capital. That is desirable as central bank purchases of private capital can easily become asource of subsidy for some and competitive disadvantage to others.
A third microeconomic reason for bond financing is that bonds provide a meansof transferring income from future to current generations.17 If future generations are
expected to be better off (i.e. have higher per capita real income) owing to technological17

That is because current generations own the bonds and will therefore receive payment made from somecombination of future taxes and future money issue.

22

progress, government bonds provide a way of sharing some of that future bounty with thecurrent generation.
A fourth and final microeconomic reason for bond finance is that much public
spending is long-lived. That includes spending on infrastructure, health care, andeducation. It may therefore make sense to finance such spending with long-term
financing that matches financial costs to the stream of benefits. Those who receive thefinancial benefits thereby contribute to covering the financial costs.
6. Fiscal policy over-optimism?
A last issue concerns the long-term effectiveness of fiscal policy. MMT-ers canbe labeled “fiscal policy optimists”. The same holds for neo-Keynesians. Both believethat expansionary fiscal can shift the economy to full employment and maintain it there,
regardless of factors such as the distribution of income. This fiscal policy optimism isopen to question.
For neo-Keynesians, counter-cyclical expansionary fiscal policy is viewed as atemporary expedient designed to offset temporary declines in private sector AD resulting
from shocks such as slumps in animal spirits. The assumption is animal spirits, perhaps
assisted by the pump-priming benefits of policy, will eventually bounce back. The same
logic holds for MMT’s confidence in fiscal policy.
Other macroeconomic perspectives are less optimistic. Kaleckian
macroeconomics emphasizes the significance of the functional distribution of income,and it can be augmented to include concern with the size distribution of income acrosshouseholds (Palley, 2012b). In the Kaleckian model, inappropriate income distribution
can produce demand shortage and unemployment. In the short-term, as in the Keynesian23

model, expansionary fiscal policy can increase demand and remedy the problem because
government spending is a perfect substitute for private spending. However, higher
government spending implies higher taxes to balance the full employment budget andthat may have adverse supply-side tax effects that are not present in either Keynesian or
Kaleckian models.
Another problem, that may express itself over a longer time period, is a tendency
for government spending to ratchet up (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961). Using money
financed government spending to offset macroeconomic fluctuations might amplify
tendencies in this direction, with potential attendant affects for growth and productivity.
These last two observations, about supply-side and ratchet effects, lead in the
direction of a deeper critique of both Keynesianism and MMT. In effect, MMT claims
money financed Keynesian fiscal policy can solve the problems of capitalism and deliver
full employment and price stability. Starting from a Kaleckian position regarding thecentrality of income distribution for full employment, I (Palley, 1998, 2012c) haveargued for a “structural Keynesian” approach. The argument is full employment requires
not just Keynesian demand management, but also structural policies that address labormarket bargaining power concerns and international economic concerns unleashed by
globalization. There are two aspects to the argument. First, if flawed income distribution
is the cause of the problem, then policy should tackle the underlying problem rather thanpaper it over with fiscal policy. Second, attempts to paper it over are unlikely to be
successful. Over time the problem of flawed income distribution will keep reasserting
itself, causing either a retreat into stagnation or an unstable cycle of fiscal intervention.

24

Finally, this structural Keynesian position has been criticized as too optimistic byFoster and McChesney (2010). They reiterate the argument of Magdoff and Sweezy(1983) that capitalism has an in-built genetic tendency to stagnation with unemployment
and inequality. From their analytic perspective, patches like fiscal policy certainly cannot
solve the problem, and nor can even more radical interventions such as those envisioned
in the structural Keynesian program. That said, the Magdoff – Sweezy position shareswith structural Keynesianism a skepticism about the ability of fiscal policy to solve deeprooted structural imbalances.
V MMT and interest rate policy
It is now time to turn to MMT’s interest rate policy recommendation that has
already been referred to. According to MMT (Wray, 1998, p.87) the natural rate ofinterest is zero. Moreover, Wray (2007, p.138) also writes that a monetary policy rule ispreferred to policy discretion and that central banks should “set the overnight rate at zero,and keep it there. A properly programmed “tin man” robot ought to do the trick.” This
claim regarding the natural rate of interest being zero has also been made by Mosler andForstater (2005).
The logic of MMT’s interest rate policy recommendation is as follows. First, as asovereign money issuer, government does not need to borrow money and pay interest to
finance the budget deficit as it can just issue money. In that case, why pay interest at all?
Instead, just set the interest rate equal to zero and park it there.
With the interest rate discarded, government uses fiscal policy to stabilize theeconomy. As discussed earlier, MMT’s implicit macroeconomic model is the income
expenditure model. Fiscal policy is therefore used to ensure that aggregate demand equals

25full employment output (AD = y*). If AD < y*, policymakers (who recognize theassignment problem discussed earlier) should increase G, financed by printing money. If
AD > y*, policymakers should reduce G, which reduces the budget deficit. Finally, if AD= y*, policymakers need to ensure a balanced budget to prevent the money supply fromcontinuing to increase and causing inflation. Policymakers (who again recognize theassignment problem) should raise taxes to close the deficit.18 In this fashion, the economy
is directed to full employment output with a zero interest rate. Ergo, the natural rate ofinterest is zero.
What is wrong with the story? First, as noted earlier, the MMT model lacks atheory of inflation and a Phillips curve. However, inflation will undoubtedly be positiveat full employment. With the short-term policy interest rate set equal to zero, that will
imply a significant negative real interest rate. That in turn will spur massive borrowing,particularly to finance asset purchases, unleashing more inflation and asset price bubbles.
A zero nominal interest rate at full employment is therefore likely to generate instability.
The reason it does not in the MMT model is MMT’s “on-off” theory of inflation whereby
the inflation “on” switch is only triggered beyond full employment.
Second, MMT’s “park it” policy approach to interest is likely to cause significant
dislocation and frictional unemployment. “Park it” policy puts the onus ofmacroeconomic stabilization on fiscal policy, and the assignment rule means stabilizationmust be done by variation of G. When AD > y*, government spending must be cut,causing unemployment among government workers and suppliers. Resources need to be
freed up and redirected to private sector use and that takes time. Activist interest rate
18

Ensuring AD = y* and D = 0 may requires a bit of fiscal fine tuning with both T and G going up.
Increased T closes the budget gap, while further increased G offsets any negative AD impact of increasedT.

26policy works differently. It reins back private demand so that there is no job loss. Reining
back demand is more efficient than cutting demand and relocating workers.
Third, a zero interest rate policy potentially undermines the feasibility of thewelfare state. Modern social democratic states require a huge chunk of GDP to coveroutlays such as governance, defense, infrastructure investment, healthcare, and education.
In times when private sector AD is strong, a zero interest rate could result in excess
demand requiring government spending cuts. Recall the MMT policy program requires y*= AD(G, T, i) and D = G – T = 0. A zero interest rate (i = 0) increases AD, requiring cutsin spending (G) and taxes (T). Assuming an interior solution exists, it could involve very
low G.
Fourth, MMT discards the interest rate as an instrument of policy and instead
relies on fine tuning of government spending to maintain full employment and taxes tomaintain budget balance. The assumption is that spending and taxes can be adjusted
rapidly and their effects kick-in quickly. Yet long ago, Milton Friedman (1961)
challenged the validity of these assumptions with his construct of inside and outside lags.
The former represent lags regarding time taken to decide and enact policy change: thelatter represent lags regarding time for the effects of policy to kick in. These inside andoutside lags may be particularly problematic for discretionary fiscal policy and provide
an important justification for using counter-cyclical interest rate policy to stabilize theeconomy. MMT opposes this with its zero interest rate “park it” rule.
Milton Friedman emphasized the technical (time to identify and enact) dimensionof inside lags. However, these lags can also be interpreted in political economy terms.
Fiscal policy is a politically contested terrain that can produce policy stalemate and delay27

(as shown by the 2012 “fiscal cliff” conflict). That makes it difficult to rely exclusively
on fiscal fine tuning to manage the economy. MMT embodies a naive political economy
that is blind to this problem.
Fifth, a zero interest rate policy could also pose problems in an open economy
context. As noted earlier, small open economies are vulnerable to inflation and negative
real income effects transmitted via exchange rate depreciation. Having a zero nominalinterest rate in a world of relatively mobile financial capital and in which other countries
have positive nominal interest rates, would likely expose economies to financial capitalflight and the possibility of damaging exchange rate depreciation.
A sixth reason for activist non-zero interest rate policy is that it provides anadditional instrument of macroeconomic policy. The seminal analysis of Poole (1970)shows interest rate policy helps protect the real economy from disturbances originating in
the financial sector. The logic is that financial disturbances affect interest rates and asset
prices which in turn affect the real economy. Targeting interest rates can therefore
prevent financial disturbances from spilling into the real sector. However, the Poolemodel only incorporates cost of capital impacts on AD. If wealth effects on AD are
included, there may be reason to adjust interest rates to offset the AD impact offluctuations in financial asset prices. MMT needlessly discards that policy instrument.
Finally, the MMT motive for setting interest rates equal to zero is the euthenasiaof the rentier. That is a good motive but setting the nominal interest rate at zero is not theway to go. Instead, income taxes provide a better route. Additionally, there is a case forasset based reserve requirements that are an implicit asset tax (Palley, 2000, 2003, 2004).

28

Asset based reserve requirements (ABRR) require financial firms to hold reserves
against different classes of assets, with the regulatory authority setting reserve
requirements on the basis of its concerns with each asset class. By forcing financial firms
to hold reserves, the system requires that they retain some of their funds in the form of
non-interest-bearing deposits with the central bank. The implicit cost of forgone interest
must be charged against investing in a particular asset category, and it reduces themarginal revenue from that asset type. As a result, by varying the requirement on each
asset class, monetary authorities can vary the return on each asset class and thereby
manage demands, prices, and yields across asset classes.
In effect ABRR add policy instruments that supplement and strengthen interest
rate policy, thereby enhancing policymakers’ ability to stabilize and manage financial
markets. Most importantly, policy can target specific asset classes by varying the reserve
requirement on that class. That enables policymakers to address concerns regarding
specific asset classes without raising the general level of interest rates. Moreover, from apublic finance perspective, ABRR are particularly desirable as they increase the demand
for reserves (i.e. government issued high-powered money). That creates more space forstable non-inflationary money financed budget deficits. MMT-ers should therefore
endorse adoption of ABRR.
VI MMT and the employer of last resort19
The final issue to be discussed is the MMT proposal for a government employer
of last resort (ELR) to ensure labor demand adequate for full employment. The ELR
19

Arguments in this section are based on an early critique of mine (Palley, 2001) of MMT and ELR.
Sawyer (2003) has also provided an extensive critique of ELR and he argues it is neither the macro nor
micro economically efficient way to reach full employment, and nor does it solve the problem of inflation
at full employment. Seccarecia (2004) has also offered a critique of ELR that focuses on the failure of ELR
to address the distributive problems of the existing system.

29scheme has government set an ELR wage and offer an ELR job at that wage to all who
want one. Figure 5 provides a partial equilibrium illustration of the ELR proposal. The
ELR agency has a perfectly elastic demand for labor at the ELR wage. Private sector
labor demand is constrained by inadequate AD and is equal to NPrivate. Private sector
employment is also assumed to be independent of the real wage. Labor supply is apositive function of the real wage. Given this labor market configuration, ELR
employment is equal to the difference between private sector employment and labor
supply at the ELR wage.

Figure 5. Partial equilibrium illustration of the ELR scheme.
Real wage, ωLD P rivateLSωPrivateωELR

LD ELRNELR
NP rivate

Emp loy ment, N
Labor supply, Ls

The ELR proposal rests on sound microeconomics, but there are problems
regarding its macroeconomics and political economy. With regard to macroeconomics,
MMT assumes that government can finance ELR by issuing money without consequencein terms of inflation, macroeconomic stability, or financial cost. The previous sections
have shown that this is not the case. There are macroeconomic consequences to issuingmoney. As regards financial cost, a prudent government is limited in the amount of30

money it issues, and that means ELR expenditures implicitly displace some otherexpenditures. That displacement may still be worth it but the opportunity cost is nonzero.
The greater concerns about ELR are political. A first political problem concerns
the relationship of ELR workers to public sector workers. The ELR wage is set below themarket wage in order to avoid drawing labor out of private sector employment andcontracting output. Under those conditions it is easy to imagine how anti-worker
governments might try to substitute ELR workers for public sector workers, thereby
undermining public sector unions and public sector pay. Moreover, weakening theposition of public sector workers would likely have adverse spillover effects on theposition of private sector workers. Lacking understanding of these effects, many voterswould likely support such measures on grounds that it is unjust that one type of public
sector worker be paid less than another. Indeed, indications of exactly this type ofpolitical outcome are apparent in the U.K. where the Conservative government has
recently proposed a variant of the ELR scheme.20
A second political problem concerns the relationship between the ELR wage andthe minimum wage. The minimum wage is a critical element of fair and well functioning
labor markets. The ELR wage must be below the minimum wage to ensure that theminimum wage is binding and that the ELR scheme does not draw labor away from theprivate sector. That introduces a political tension as to why government should employ

20

See “Million jobless may face six months’ unpaid work or have unemployment benefits stopped,” The
Guardian, Sunday 29 July, 2012. The Conservative’s proposed scheme requires unemployed workers totake ELR jobs in order to receive unemployment benefits so that the ELR weekly wage effectively equals
unemployment benefit. The Conservative proposal differs from the MMT proposal in that taking ELR jobs
is mandatory. In the MMT proposal accepting an ELR job is a voluntary choice and workers continue toreceive unemployment benefits even if they decline taking ELR jobs.

31

workers at less than the minimum wage, and that tension is likely to create pressure tolower the minimum wage to the ELR wage. That would hurt minimum wage workers;
hurt all workers by under-cutting the market’s wage floor; and contract private sector
output by putting minimum wage employment in competition with ELR jobs.
A third political problem is the possibility that ELR work could be used todiscredit government. To the extent that ELR work is similar to work done by public
sector workers, it increases the threat to public sector unions and wages. To the extent
that the work is significantly different, it is likely that it will partake of unproductive or
make-work activity. Such instances of make-work activity are then likely to be used byneoliberal politicians to attack government in general.
When it comes to policy there is always need to consider political consequences.
MMT is politically naive with regard to ELR. Balanced against that, it is important not to
let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Nor should fear of neoliberal reaction be a vetoon progressive policy. ELR involves difficult calls of political judgment. It is not the selfevident boon that MMT-ers assert it to be.
VII Conclusion: MMT as modern money tree economics
This paper has examined the theory and policy recommendations associated withmodern monetary theory. MMT analysis is based on the simple well-understood incomeexpenditure model with addition of a government budget restraint that has the central
bank finance the deficit. Its claims about the ease of attaining non-inflationary full
employment via money financed budget deficits ignore the challenges posed by Phillips
curve analysis, open economy considerations, and financial stability concerns. The oversimplification of the macroeconomic policy challenge is accompanied by an unwarranted32policy recommendation that central banks set the overnight nominal interest rate at zeroand hold it (park it) there. These theoretical and policy failings are compounded by naive
political judgment regarding the possibilities of fiscal fine tuning and the political
economy implications of ELR for public sector employment.
In the current moment of high unemployment, MMT makes a valuable
contribution as part of the rhetoric of advocacy for expansionary policy. However, as
regards macroeconomic theory, MMT adds nothing new warranting its own theoreticallabel. Instead, its over-simplifications represent a step-back in understanding. In physics,
the crank physicist is drawn to the idea of a perpetual motion machine that denies theeffects of friction. In economics, the crank economist is drawn to the idea of a money treethat voids financial constraints and macroeconomic trade-offs. MMT constitutes a formof modern money tree economics.

33

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