Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook
Considerations for Force Development and Employment
1 June 2018
Version 1.1

Purpose: This paper is a concept handbook produced to inform force development, and solicit
ideas for the further conceptual development, naval integration, materiel requirements, andoperational employment of the EABO concept. Elements of this paper may also inform future
updates to the official naval concept, as well as EABO functional concepts of support. The
information contained herein is designed to supplement that contained in the inter-service
document and will be iteratively updated in accord with lessons learned through wargaming,
experimentation, and the suggestions of warfighters and functional experts. The author
welcomes critique, and solicits additional information, corrections, or refinements to thispaper. To meet its intended purpose and benefit from open debate, this paper is unclassified.
Contributions to the EABO Handbook that require higher levels of classification will be included
in a classified annex.
Contact: Art Corbett (arthur.corbett@usmc.mil; arthur.corbett2@usmc.smil.mil) Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab, Concepts & Plans Division (703) 432-8565

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TABLE OF CONTENTSSECTION

TITLE
Readers’ Guide
Executive Summary

1.0
2.0
2.0.1
2.0.2
2.0.3
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.1.5
2.1.6
2.1.7
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.3
3.0
3.0.1
3.0.2
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.1.1
3.2.2
3.2.2.1
3.2.2.2
3.2.2.3
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.4
3.5
3.5.1
3.6
3.6.1
3.6.2
3.6.3
3.6.3.1
3.7
3.7.1
3.7.2
3.7.3

Concept Objectives, Purpose, And Scope
Strategic Considerations: The Case For Change
Towards A Unifying Operational Vision
Paradigm Shift
Changed Assumptions
Consequences Of A2AD On The US Joint Force: Understanding The Nature Of The
Challenge
Forward Posture Imperiled
Partnering Becomes Problematic
Proximity Is Lost
An Efficient But Brittle Force
Risk Aversion
Cost Imposition
Placing The Joint A2AD Challenge In Context
The Nature Of The Naval Challenge
Close Sea Challengers
The Mass Or Persistence Dilemma
Capability Vs. Capacity Mismatch
Joint And Naval Conceptual Alignment
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
New Assumptions: Resilient, Dual-Postured, And Regionally-Aligned
Naval Warfighter Challenges
Central Idea
Concept Components And Definitions
Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EABs)
EAB Hosting Requirements
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)
Example EABO Missions
EABO Optimized Capabilities
Seize Or Occupy, And Defend
Characteristics Of EABs
Resiliency, Capacity, And Proximity
Innovating Towards A Balanced ForceEABO Missions
21st Century Naval Operational Art
Preparation, Deterrence, And Defense
EAB Forces
The Integrated Maritime Defense-In-Depth
The Role Of Marines In EABOThe Role Of The Navy In EABOThe Role Of The NECC In EABOEABO In A Notional Campaign
Pre-Conflict Shaping
Deterrence
Gaining The Initiative

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3.7.4
4.0
4.0.1
4.0.2
4.0.3
4.0.4
4.1
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
4.2.4
4.2.5
4.2.6
4.2.7
4.2.8
4.2.9
4.2.104.2.114.2.124.2.134.2.14
4.3
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.1.1
4.4.1.2
4.4.1.3
4.4.1.4
4.4.1.5
4.4.1.6
4.4.1.7
4.4.2
4.4.2.1
4.4.2.2
4.4.2.3
4.4.2.4
4.4.2.5
4.4.3
4.4.3.1
4.4.3.2
4.4.4
4.4.4.1
4.4.4.2
4.4.4.3
4.4.4.4
5.0

Sustained Combat Operations
Considerations For Force Development
Holistically Designed
Functionally Complete
Fully Integrated
Mutually Supporting
New Operational Imperatives
Tenets Of EABO
Enable Economy-Of-Force
Plan, Prepare, And Preposition
Expand Capacity With Partner Capability
Invert Cost Imposition
Relative Economy
Leverage Partner Proximity
Make Austerity A Virtue
Minimize Signature
Balance The Force
Conserve Assault Shipping And Fleet Support Assets
Promote Operational Resiliency
Naval Task Organization
Mutual Support
Calculated Risk
Creating The Inside Force And EABO Capabilities
EABO Conceptual Requirements By Function
Fires
Horizontal Dispersion, Vertical Concentration
Mobility
Passive Defense
Dual Use
Naval And Joint Fires Integration
Aviation Fires
Unmanned Platforms
Logistics
Precluding Culmination
Deployment, Distribution, And Delivery
Trade-Offs: Resiliency And Efficiency
Austere Vs. Exquisite
Logistics Infiltration
Command And Control
EAB C2EABO C2
Aviation
Offensive Air Support (OAS)
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)
Aerial ReconnaissanceElectronic Warfare
Conclusion

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READERS’ GUIDEThe EABO Handbook is designed to be more comprehensive than concise, and to provide anever-expanding repertoire of knowledge gleaned from conceptual innovation, wargaming, andforce experimentation with EABO-related topics. To help readers find the information relevantto their own particular inquiry, the following guide is offered:Interested in a short read to gain a fundamental understanding of the EABO Concept?
The Executive Summary and 3.1 Central Idea
To understand the focus, scope, limits, assumptions, and intent of the concept:
1.0 Concept Objectives, Purpose, & Scope
To understand the strategic challenge that informs EABO:
2.0 Strategic Considerations: The Case for Change
To understand other concepts that EABO supports and enables:
2.3 Joint and Naval Conceptual Alignment
To understand EABO requirements and how the concept informs future force development:
4.0 Considerations for Force Development
To differentiate EABs and EABO:
3.2 Concept Components and Definitions
To understand what is conceptually new, and the concepts of Integrated Maritime Defense-InDepth and Vertical Integration:
3.6.1 The Integrated Maritime Defense-in-Depth

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Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook
Executive Summary:
EABO is a future naval operational concept that meets the resiliency and forward presence
requirements of the next paradigm of US Joint expeditionary operations. The concept isadversary-based, cost-informed, and advantage- focused. The EABO concept is designed todefeat adversary attempts to execute counter intervention and fait accompli strategies thatmight otherwise inhibit a credible US response to aggression against treaty allies and economic
partners. EABO creates a more resilient forward force posture that circumvents the efforts andobviates the investments of aspiring peer competitors employing long-range precision fires
directed at dislodging US forces dependent upon legacy bases, fixed infrastructure, and large
targetable platforms. By enabling persistent presence and a more resilient force posture, EABO
offers the opportunity to conduct expeditionary operations to defeat an adversary’s strategy
without the requirement to destroy all of his forces.
EABO is conducted by low-signature naval and joint forces with operationally relevant sea
control and denial capabilities—in particular, the ability to offensively target and strikeadversary naval and air platforms, and defensively form the nucleus of an active integrated
maritime defense-in-depth. EABO is premised on the creation of an alternative forward force
posture based on a more difficult to target, low-signature, and dispersed forward-basing
infrastructure. The lethal, yet resilient, combination of low-signature forces operating from amore amorphous forward-basing infrastructure will enable US naval and joint forces to persist,
partner, and operate within range of adversary long-range precision fires--particularly ballistic
and cruise missiles designed to attack critical joint, fixed, forward infrastructure, and large
platforms.
EABO supports the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) and fleet commanders
in the fight for sea control, by exploiting the opportunities afforded by key maritime terrain,
particularly in close and confined seas. The EABO concept is framed within the dual-posture
context of a persistent “inside force” established by the Joint Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons (JAM-GC) concept, and consequently is a foundational enabling capability forother naval and joint concepts, such as Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE)
and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) that require persistent forward presence toachieve advantage. EABO advances, sustains, and maintains naval and joint sensor, shooter,and sustainment capabilities of the inside force to leverage the decisive massed capabilities ofthe outside force with enhanced situational awareness, augmented fires, and logistical support.
The EABO concept enables US naval forces to exercise 21st century naval operational art, meet
new enemy anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threats with new capabilities, and operate andthrive in and around close and confined seas. When confronting aspiring regional hegemonsand peer competitors, the EABO concept provides future strategic decision-makers with5

coercive sea denial options that do not promote vertical escalation. EABO enables JFMCC tosecure the complementary advantages of the strategic offense and tactical defense. By
occupying key maritime terrain adjacent to adversary seas, JFMCC can secure the strategic
initiative. EABO then creates a robust, active, maritime defense-in-depth—exploiting thestronger form of contemporary battle to deter adversary aggression, or achieve
disproportionate result in combat.

1.0 Concept Objectives, Purpose, And Scope1.0.1 The EABO Concept Seeks To:
Describe the growing strategic challenge that emerging peer competitors and potential A2AD
adversaries have imposed on the US joint force,
Detail how the A2AD challenge operationally impacts US joint and naval forces conducting
expeditionary operations with current methods and means
Propose a new naval operational concept that will ameliorate the impositions created byadversary advances, restore advantage, enable persistent forward presence and create theconditions necessary to initiate the next paradigm of US joint expeditionary operations inaccord with JAM-GC, DMO, LOCE and fleet design
Provide sufficient details of the EABO concept in terms of method and means to guide futurenaval force development and supporting functional concepts and capabilities
1.0.2 EABO Must Generate Advantage And Expand Options
EABO is a future naval operational concept for the conduct of the next paradigm of joint
expeditionary operations. As an operational concept it must meet several expectations toachieve credibility and influence future force development and naval operations. Just as theoperational level of war coordinates the details of tactics with the overarching goals of strategy,
so, too, must a credible future operational concept describe how new tactics, units, andcapabilities can be coordinated to better achieve campaign objectives and generate newstrategic options. Effective strategy is predicated on creating an advantageous alignment ofends, ways, and means. Consequently, a credible future operational concept must describe insufficient detail how new methods of thought and action can better achieve strategic ends, andhow new capabilities can better secure operational advantage within the constraints ofallocated resources. An important part of the ‘how,’ or method, of a credible operational
concept is how it makes more advantageous use of limited resources to achieve strategic ends.
While EABO may be pulled into supporting contemporary operations, it is primarily designed toprovide future decision-makers with better operational and strategic options.

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1.0.3 EABO Must Be Cost-Informed
It is readily evident that more resources might create greater advantage when applied in thesame general method. Clear indication of a failing operational method would be theapplication of additional resources without a concomitant increase in relative advantage. The
growing realization that additional investment in the current methods and capabilities of thejoint force will not yield new operational advantage contributes to our current dilemma. For
EABO to be credible, it must demonstrate how the application of the new operational method,with a similar level of resource investment, can generate additional advantage relative toanticipated adversary methods and capabilities.
1.0.4 EABO Must Establish New Assumptions
The EABO concept makes the bold assertion that it represents the foundation for a broad
paradigm shift in the American approach to expeditionary operations. This assertion is foundedon the understanding that the EABO concept is not based upon incremental changes inmethods and means, but is predicated on changes to the fundamental assumptions that
underlie the dynamic character of war. The fundamental assumptions of presumptive sea andair control that currently support the long-evolved American Way of War, are waning fast. The
new assumptions identified in EABO must undergird and shape the next paradigm ofexpeditionary operations.
1.0.5 Scope
EABO proposes a naval concept that enables US forces to persist forward with allies andpartners, and operate against peer and near-peer competitors who have initiated fait accompli
and counter intervention strategies that incorporate A2AD capabilities into their operational
design. The EABO concept is particularly applicable to the close and confined seas fight.
Each potential adversary is unique in terms of strategy and geography, and each requires
unique application of a general methodology in a particular way. EABO proposes a genericmethod for dealing with a fast evolving A2AD military challenge by peer competitors employing
counter-intervention strategies. The concept will use the most populous, robust, and rapidly
advancing of our potential adversaries as the ‘pacing threat,’ but the concept is designed to be
applicable against all A2AD-equipped adversaries operating in the vicinity of contested closeand confined seas.
The alternative force posture and structure identified in the EABO concept is foundational tomaintaining credible forward presence against peer competitors with developed precision
strike regimes. Consequently, while EABO is an operating concept in its own right, it can also be
regarded as an enabling concept to support other joint (JAM-GC) and naval concepts (LOCE &DMO) that require persistent forward presence as a precondition.
EABO is immediately applicable to ameliorate the current challenge from rising A2AD near-peer
competitors, but the concept as described in this paper is future focused. Combatant7commanders responsible for fight tonight contingencies will grasp at the operational
advantages of EABO, and appropriately adapt current capabilities to meet immediate
operational demands in a short term ‘bubble gum and bailing wire’ approach. The draft EABO
concept is already informing fleet experimentation. However, a far more optimized inside force
capability set is necessary for the concept to meet anticipated requirements against a peercompetitor. It is important to distinguish necessary short-term adaptations to fight tonightfrom the more resilient and optimized inside force capabilities required to fight right in the near
future.
As the intended purpose of EABO is to provide the conceptual and material foundation for the
next paradigm of expeditionary operations, efforts to exploit EABO to extend archaic
investments are of dubious value and outside the scope of the concept. The opportunity cost of
maintaining vestigial systems is significant, but specifically what legacy capabilities should be
divested or retired to create opportunity space is similarly beyond the scope of this paper.
The resilient capabilities required to implement EABO are needed soonest, but, in order tocogently join conceptual ambitions with temporal realities, this concept paper assumes desired
capabilities that can be credibly delivered within the complexities of the evolved acquisition
process in 5-10 years. (The urgent need for acquisition reform informed by the competitive
nature of information age warfare exceeds the scope of this paper.)1.0.6 Naval Concept In A Joint Framework
The applicably of EABO to joint expeditionary operations will be apparent, and this concept
paper will make allusions to the many advantages that can be achieved by incorporating joint
forces and capabilities. The EABO concept is overtly aligned with the JAM-GC concept, and canserve as a basis for other joint concepts and initiatives. However, the formal naval concept was
directed by the Naval Board and is focused on the conduct of naval operations to persist andoperate within the arc of long-range enemy fires, particularly in the vicinity of contested closeand confined seas. It will describe how naval forces will advance, host, and persistently
maintain naval and joint sensors, shooters and sustainment capabilities to partner and operate
forward despite robust adversary A2AD investments. While the EABO concept is naval indevelopment, it will be inherently joint in application, as all elements of US military andnational power will be required to deal effectively with rising peer competitors and aspiring
regional hegemons. However, a fully coordinated joint EABO concept represents future work.
In light of the above, for the EABO concept to serve as a vision for future naval force
development and employment, it must describe what must change, why it must change andhow changes in assumptions, means and method can lead to new operational advantage. The
concept must describe how to restore the strategic initiative and mitigate the adverse
consequences of the operational challenges currently imposed by advances in enemy strategy
and capabilities. Most importantly, the EABO concept must describe how an artful integration

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of anticipated future means with the described method offers relative operational advantage tofuture naval and joint force commanders.

2.0 Strategic Considerations: The Case For Change
The EABO concept is a naval operational concept that anticipates the presence and resiliency
requirements of the next paradigm of joint expeditionary operations. The concept ispredicated on the increasingly obvious need for US naval and joint forces to adapt the method
for conducting expeditionary operations in light of significant adversary advances in thecapability and capacity of their long-range precision fires. Many open press sources andmilitary journals have documented the growing long-range precision strike capabilities ofAmerica’s most likely future antagonists and the counter-intervention strategies andcapabilities they have developed. Aspiring regional hegemons have worked hard and fruitfully
to discern and target the military center of gravity of America’s expeditionary capabilities. The
global ‘democratization of technology’ has enabled formerly second-rate powers to rapidly
acquire sophisticated long-range weapons systems that imperil the forward-basing
infrastructure and capital assets that have long enabled the global reach and influence of the
US joint force. If the United States is not content to become a North American power, then the
US joint force must make rapid and decisive change to restore its long held expeditionary
advantage. For naval forces to remain relevant to the joint fight, they must extend persistent
naval power into and from contested seas.
Before discussing conceptual change requirements, it is important to note how potential
adversaries have expanded their options at the expense of our own. First, they have done acredible assessment of our ‘center of power and movement,’ and have discerned the critical
relationship of US forward-basing infrastructure to power projection capabilities. Joint force
global power projection and sustainment capabilities provide the military credibility that
undergirds the assurance the US gives to treaty allies and economic partners. A credible andassured military response guarantees America’s leadership position within the evolved world
economic order. To displace American leadership, aspiring regional hegemons understand theneed to defeat, dislodge, or discredit the utility of American forward based forces bythreatening the critical infrastructure they rely upon.
Next, aspiring military competitors developed a capacious long-range precision strike capability
to imperil the well-developed, long used and relatively concentrated forward-basing
infrastructure that supports the long evolved American method of conducting and sustaining
expeditionary operations. Potential adversaries realized that they could change the regionalbalance of power if they could transform America’s center of gravity into a critical vulnerability
via long-range precision fires. A force dependent upon fixed forward-basing could not long
persist or effectively partner if it’s most valuable military capabilities were based on readilytargetable and highly vulnerable locations.

9Currently, in disparate corners of the world different competitors are testing their growing
military parity with new regional strategies and increased military adventurism. The repetitive
fait accompli strategies that the Russians have worked to achieve territorial expansion in
Eastern Europe have been noted and emulated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in theSouth China Sea. Both nations have pursued successive ‘salami slicing’ initiatives at theexpense of US regional partners and American global credibility. Recently, even the Houthis
have exploited anti-ship missiles to interdict US naval forces seeking to transit the Red Sea.
Recognizing a dramatic shift in the correlation of force relative to regional contenders, US
military leaders must provide national decision-makers with credible new options for effectively
deterring further adversary adventurism.
The artful combination of fait accompli military strategies and innovations in both the quality
and quantity of adversary anti-access and area denial (A2AD) weapons systems havecontributed to this seemingly abrupt, but in reality long simmering shift in strategic balance.
Identifying the strategic and operational disadvantages this novel combination of new ways andinnovative means has imposed on the joint force is the first step toward understanding ourstrategic predicament. Once we understand the nature of the adversary challenge we can begin
to offer practical methods and means to counteract the rapidly deteriorating correlation offorce. Optimally, our new concept will not only rectify our current dilemma, but will also offer
new opportunities to secure advantage and restore the strategic initiative.
Much analysis has gone into understanding the nature and characteristics of the A2AD threat.
EABO credits the validity of our intelligence analysis, acknowledges the change in the relative
correlation of forces and synthesizes a new operational method to create a new means of
securing naval operational advantage.
2.0.1 Towards A Unifying Operational Vision
Our strategic dilemma is disquieting because our waning position is clearly not due to lack ofeffort, and we regress despite our considerable economic investments, endless technicalinnovation, unequalled research and development and world-wide alliances. Our force
development processes are robust in seeking improvements, but appear to lack a unifying
vision to describe how America will continue to find expeditionary advantage amid the many
options to influence the character of future war. A credible, affordable and unifying
operational vision is required if our technical innovations are to be focused, generate mutual
support and enable operational advantage. The EABO concept asserts that it can create theconditions and be the ‘sand in the oyster’ for a credible operational concept that initiates andsupports the unifying joint vision articulated in JAM-GC.
2.0.2 Paradigm Shift
For over 70 years the US has perfected a paradigm of expeditionary operations and power
projection that has ensured the peace and security of its allies and fostered unparalleledeconomic growth and prosperity. Begun in World War II and refined by successive generations
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of military professionals, the American Way of War has proven to be a winning formula for
American power, international security and enduring global prosperity. The American Way of
War methodology exceeded the bounds of a mere operational concept and by dint of
permanence and repetition became the ambient paradigm for how American warriors think
about and conduct war.
The problem with paradigms is that the assumptions that underlie them are so fundamental, so
integral to our observed experience and so basic to our understanding, that when they arechallenged by the innovation of others the result is often a deeply disquieting dislocation of theestablished order. We can easily credit our potential adversaries with stealing a technologicalmarch or generating unforeseen economic potential, but what we have been slow to realize isthat they have initiated the next paradigm in the ever dynamic character of war, a new andaggressive paradigm that boldly challenges the long evolved American Way of War anddefiantly confronts our ability to adapt. The changes in the character of war that our mostaggressive competitors have initiated invalidate the fundamental assumptions upon which wehave built the joint force. The challenge is significant and cannot be met by simply refining ourcurrent methods and capabilities.
Paradigm shifts bring discontinuous change and impose significant institutional discomfort tothose who opt to compete. New paradigms are intellectually disorienting and often physicallydislocating. They challenge our ability to adapt and compete, and often are the precursors ofhistoric inflection points that change the relationships among dominant powers. Invariably,
new paradigms threaten old assumptions and demand new means, new method and newcompetencies. Paradigm shifts can abruptly reduce the utility of past investments in humancapabilities, material goods and military infrastructure. Sometimes new paradigms take years
to dominate and displace the old—for many years the horse and internal combustion engine
shared the same roads. Sometimes paradigm shifts are as abrupt as Montezuma confronting
the cold Toledo steel of the Conquistadores. Paradigm shifts create new winners and losers.
2.0.3 Changed Assumptions
The subtly of paradigm shifts renders them sinister and enables surprise. Our adversaries havenot chosen to suddenly attack our known strategy, but to slowly erode the fundamental
assumptions that undergird it. The three assumptions upon which the US has built thecontemporary joint force—presumptive or readily achieved sea control, air superiority andassured communications have all been invalidated by fielded adversary force development
initiatives associated with long-range precision fires. The changes in fundamental assumptions
regarding sea and air control necessitate concomitant changes in the posture, character,structure and qualities of the joint force, but the immediacy of these change requirements haslong gone unrecognized. That is not to say that our deteriorating military advantage is not
acknowledged, nor that progress is not being attempted, but these efforts are largely
improvements in current competencies and capabilities and do not acknowledge therequirement for significant and fundamental change foisted upon us by adversaries who have11

crafted the next competitive paradigm. Many contemporary efforts at innovation hold great
promise, but those that have been institutionally accepted amount to relining the field, notchanging the game.
The legacy joint force structure that comprises most of today’s joint force capabilities weredeveloped within a strategic context of presumptive or readily achieved sea control, airsuperiority and assured communications. The evolved joint force is designed to achieveadvantage by exploiting the enhanced operational reach and logistics support afforded by the
global US forward-basing infrastructure acquired during WWII and sustained throughout theCold War. The contemporary ‘American Way of War’ has evolved to a high state of operational
competence, reach and efficiency, but the foundational assumptions of sea and air control,
assured communications, geographic access and forward-basing that undergird the current
paradigm of joint expeditionary operations are fast eroding and no longer valid.
The presumption that the United States had, or could rapidly achieve, forward sea and aircontrol were fundamental assumptions in the creation of the modern joint force. When the sea
is sanctuary, it is prudent to build a comparatively small number of large, expensive, exquisite
and remarkably efficient ships and platforms that enable technical overmatch and support
persistent power projection from a short distance off an enemy coast. Efficient ships wereenabled by sophisticated systems, concentrated crews, multiple weapon systems, effective
defenses and numerous aircraft, missiles or munitions on a single platform. But an efficient
fleet becomes brittle and un-risk-worthy when confronted by an aggressive adversary
determined to contest our sea control with ample long-range, land-based precision fires andmany small risk-worthy platforms with adequately lethal payloads. Particularly troublesome areadversaries who can take advantage of short interior lines of communications, make a virtue ofrisk and overwhelm our expensive joint capabilities with relatively inexpensive but capacious
systems of adequate lethality. Comparatively cheap but capacious anti-access and area denial(A2AD) systems impose disproportionate cost and risk on forces equipped with exquisite andexpensive systems and platforms. Similar asymmetries in capability and risk afflict our forward
bases and infrastructure. Deep water ports, long runways, big ships and fixed infrastructure are
increasingly brittle, and all are readily targeted by adversary long-range precision fires toincreasingly extended distances.
Foundational to the new assumptions that must guide our approach to developing the next
paradigm for expeditionary operations is the need to displace our past appreciation for
platform and installation efficiency with a new fascination for operational resiliency. Overemphasis on force efficiency has led to an exquisite but brittle force. The lack of operational
resiliency is fast eroding the traditional expeditionary advantages enjoyed by the US joint force.
The cunning combination of A2AD counter intervention military systems and a fait accompli
military strategy to achieve hegemonic territorial ambitions is playing out well for our
adversaries, not only because of their observable gains, but because of the potential loss of US
credibility among our allies and partners. Potential adversaries and aspiring regional hegemons12were oft thwarted or deterred by the global power and reach of the American militaryenterprise and identified the forward-basing infrastructure and large platforms from which the
US supported expeditionary operations as the center of gravity of US power projection. They
appear resolved to turn our source of strength into a critical vulnerability via ambitious
development and fielding of long-range rocket forces, extended range cruise missiles and thesurveillance/targeting architecture that supports them. While our current anti-access area
denial anxieties are largely centered on peer and near-peer competitors, it is reasonable toexpect that these lethal long-range capabilities will quickly proliferate among second and lower
tier actors, as evidenced by the recent actions of the Houthis against the 5th Fleet at the BAM.
Although the United States continues to wield great naval and air might from its forward-basing
infrastructure, advances in the development of precision long-range munitions by potential
adversaries imperils these facilities and makes the current paradigm of expeditionary
operations of fast waning advantage. Posturing great capabilities in increasingly vulnerable
locations compromises their deterrent value and places major assets at risk in the event ofstrategic surprise or during routine combat operations once hostilities have commenced.
Valuable lessons learned at Pearl Harbor and Clark Air Base in WWII need not be repeated.
By dint of insight, innovation and investment, America’s military competitors are striving tocreate a strategic dilemma for the United States and compel a choice between mutually
undesirable alternatives: The United States can continue to risk our most valuable military
assets in increasingly vulnerable forward locations, or we can step back from our forward based
posture and risk losing credibility among treaty allies, who accept our assurances of military
protection because they are insured by our continuous presence. If we continue to play theboard as currently set, the US forward based posture will constrain rather than expand political
options.
Wittingly, and with commendable malice of forethought, our most likely adversaries havestolen a march on America’s strategic position in the world. The ‘democratization oftechnology’ may have accelerated both the ambitions and capabilities of our strategiccompetitors, but it was inevitable that this dilemma would ultimately be foisted upon us.
History has not ended and humanity thrives on competition. Arguably, the ‘fork in the road’decision point for maintaining competitive advantage is now far behind us. But this argument,
and the pessimism that surrounds it, is predicated on passively allowing our competitors toboth change the character of the military competition and dictate the next paradigm of war.
Change is now an imperative. At question is “who will drive it, and where?”
A2AD adversaries will drive legacy US forces off of our current forward based infrastructure. At
issue is where US naval forces will go. If all retreat, then the credibly of the force to maintaintreaty commitments is immediately compromised. But if part of the force just steps off the
prepared X ring of fixed targets and persist forward with a different force posture, structure
and capability set—then we initiate the next paradigm before enemy initiatives can bear fruit.
13

Leading and managing change is the business of military professionals in peacetime.
Historically, and throughout the Cold War, the US had an adversary based force development
process that creatively adapted to the constantly changing character of war. More significantly,
the United States initiated several modern paradigm shifts with conceptual and technicalinnovations, such as nuclear weapons and the PNT architecture. It is imperative that the naval
services resume an adversary (vice own capability) based force development process andinitiate the next paradigm of expeditionary operations to properly focus our innovation andinvestments. A force development process predicated on rectifying current capability gaps
instead of discerning future operational advantage is clearly not a winning formula.
Recognizing that the evolved ways and means that brought the US to the pinnacle of global
military might will not enable us to retain our competitive position is the first step towardeliminating the institutional inhibitions to change. The sword that we have long honed to a
sharp edge will not adequately serve in the gun fight our most enduring and determined
adversaries have prepared. New ways and means, both concepts and capabilities are required.
New assumptions concerning capacity, resiliency, proximity, cost imposition and the relativevalue of investments in platforms and payloads must be adopted. Minor DOTMLPF corrections
to the current force will prove inadequate and more fundamental changes to posture, force
structure, organization and capabilities will be required.
The salient and most essential challenge for the US joint force is the requirement to standforward—within the ever-growing arc of adversary long-range precision fires. The A2AD
capability set that our enemies have conjured is focused on achieving ‘counter intervention’against US forces that can contest their hegemonic military fait accompli gambits. If the US
joint force cannot persist forward or get to the fight, adversaries win by default. If the cost andrisk to meet our treaty obligations is prohibitively high, allies question resolve. The Achilles’
heel of the evolved American Way of War is the growing vulnerability of our fixed forwardbasing infrastructure and the large platforms that enable power projection. The EABO concept
is designed to undercut this fundamental assumption in our adversary strategy. A2AD can work
both ways. We too can attack our adversary’s assumptions. EABO is a small, but criticalconcept in a wider joint vision for restoring competitive advantage and strategic initiative.
2.1 Consequences Of A2AD On The US Joint Force: Understanding The Nature Of The
Challenge
The virtues of the EABO concept are best appreciated in light of the steep challenge thatadversary A2AD initiatives have imposed on the joint force. To understand the appropriate
solution, it is necessary to have a considered appreciation of the nature of the problem.
A frank and perhaps unflattering appraisal of the current state of international militarycompetition is a necessary first step toward devising an effective counter strategy, envisioning a
new operational approach, and generating the tactical capabilities required to avoid marching
onto the ground our adversaries have long prepared. The A2AD challenge to the US strategic
14

posture is designed to create new advantages, leverage new technologies, exploit regional
geography, incite partner apprehension, inhibit US intervention and preclude American theater
access. Specific nations have specific goals, but in general, their military strategy is apt,
advantageous and appropriately aligned with political objectives. Their investments are inaccord with their strategy and their resource allocation and force development is increasingly
formidable. Most significantly, potential adversaries are actively seeking to change the strategicorder and have initiated a far more holistic approach to international competition that makes
the American five phased approach to operations appear naive. Future military competitors are
already active in establishing theater conditions for future success and have induce A2AD
anxiety on the US joint force by successfully challenging the assumptions that underpin theAmerican Way of War. All, while being careful to not to cause conflict that would wake thegiant and make US conceptual and material deficiencies overtly apparent.
Yet our potential adversaries are not ten feet tall. Adversary forces are the creation of despotic
regimes, and consequently offer myriad points of dysfunction and fracture by their very nature.
A2AD can work both ways and our competitor concepts of future operations are as vulnerable
to our initiatives as ours has proven to be to theirs. We need only chose to compete effectively.
There is no need for pessimism among willful and creative nations and people.
How US forces perform defending US vital interests in the future depends upon how we think,invest and prepare today. The US continues to exercise huge advantages in terms of humaningenuity, treaty allies, trading partners, natural resources and the economic efficiencies
inherent to a free and energetic people. To effectively leverage our strengths to full advantage,
it is necessary to observe the current state of the military competition with a professional eye
and discern the particulars of the adversary strategy that our new concepts and operational
paradigm must off-set.
2.1.1 Forward Posture Imperiled
The most obvious and immediate problem created by adversary A2AD systems is the challenge
they pose to US forces postured on a forward-basing infrastructure centered on large runways,
deep water ports and large capital ships. The size and concentration of our bases and platforms
now render them a self-optimized target set when positioned within the arc of ample adversary
long-range precision fires, such as IRBMs and long-range cruise missiles. The core of our A2AD
anxiety is rooted in the knowledge that our most valuable capabilities are increasing based on
and dependent upon highly vulnerable locations and platforms. The active measures to defend
and harden these installations is cost imposing, and the forces necessary to defend them would
absorb all available forces and capabilities, enabling adversaries to achieve their territorial
hegemonic ambitions unimpeded. Long evolved US concepts for conducting expeditionary
operations are heavily dependent upon forward-basing infrastructure. Once a critical enabling
capability, our forward-basing infrastructure is increasingly a critical vulnerability. In a majorwar, long-range enemy fires will fix or destroy fprward-deployed US forces and preclude theopportunity to take advantage of exterior lines of operation. While it is possible to develop
15

plans that might withdraw or move vulnerable forces upon credible indication and warning,
retreat is clearly not a favorable deterrence option that will inspire allies and partners, or aneffective indication of American resolve.
To be effective, our forward strategic posture must enable joint forces to rapidly move to anadvantageous operational stance amid credible indication and warning. Our posture must be
enduring and sustainable, without undue risk to force or mission in the event of conflict or
surprise enemy action, and support cost effective capabilities to deter and coerce potential
adversaries. Without the ability to position and sustain credible forces forward, deterrence iscompromised and myriad other problems afflict the joint force. An advantageous forward force
posture must be durable, sustainable and resilient.
2.1.2 Partnering Becomes Problematic
It is difficult to partner with treaty allies and economic partners without the ability to persist
forward within range of an expanding arc of enemy precision operational fires. The ability topersist and partner forward with operationally relevant capabilities to support and defend US
interests and those of our allies is essential to meeting treaty obligations. The crux of ourcurrent operational dilemma is the unambiguous requirement to maintain a forward posturewith an increasingly brittle force.
2.1.3 Proximity Is Lost
Proximity matters. Regionally aligned platforms and payloads that do not have to cross oceans
to be deployed are far less expensive and can be produced in much greater numbers to rectify
the capacity advantage now enjoyed by regional competitors. Proximity is not only animperative for partnering, but essential for reducing the cost and expanding the capacity ofjoint force capabilities that can be brought to bear.
Situational awareness is proximity dependent and persistent surveillance and reconnaissanceforward is indispensable to precluding surprise and maximizing warning times. The US joint
force cannot afford to allow adversaries to exploit A2AD capabilities to leverage US forces outof operational proximity. Persistent presence, not episodic visits, are integral to maintaining
the proximity advantage afforded by treaty allies.
Partner proximity also offers the opportunity to preposition the capabilities and logistics
support assets that enable forces to persist forward in sufficient capacity to be operationally
relevant for an extended period of time. Effective use of partner proximity early in a conflict
will preclude the exponential cost in blood and treasure required to regain lost ground.
2.1.4 An Efficient But Brittle Force
Forces primarily designed for efficiency can take advantage of presumptive or readily achieved
sea control and air superiority to concentrate essential support functions and take advantage ofthe efficiencies of economy of scale. Efficient forces can exploit proximity and increase relative16

capability to reduce capacity requirements. These efficiencies enable investments in a
relatively slender number of highly exquisite and expensive capabilities that overmatch
adversary capacity with technological capability. However, when the sea and air spacebecomes contested, efficient forces become brittle, with numerous single points of failure thatdefy graceful degradation. The high relative cost of exquisite capabilities reduces the numberthat can be acquired and they become too few and expensive to risk in peripheral operations.
Adversary advances in long-range precision fires have made resiliency and efficiency alternative
virtues. In peacetime we appropriately value efficiency, but in war we lust for resiliency.
Inevitably, the joint force will be compelled to sacrifice some elements of efficiency to achieve
the resiliency that is now a warfighting imperative.
2.1.5 Risk Aversion
Forces once deemed agile become brittle when positioned within reach of adversary long-range
precision fires. Brittle forces render decision-makers risk adverse. Abiding by Clausewitz’s
rational calculus of war, competent decision-makers seek engagements where the forces
placed at risk are proportionate to the military objective. Forces composed of a slendernumber of hyper expensive and exquisite capabilities exacerbate risk aversion even among themost aggressive commanders, as the calculations in calculated risk become increasingly one
sided. When every ship is a capital ship, and every capability is a large percentage of a criticalnational asset, risk acceptance becomes problematic. Risk acceptance is a military virtue. The
ability to calculate risk and act in the face of a dangerous enemy is the essence of the moral
quality of command. Commanders need risk-worthy forces to exercise effective combat
command and battle management. Every time a sentry is posted, a combat outpost isestablished or an advance guard is sent forward commanders exploit the qualities of riskworthy forces to preclude surprise and avoid destruction of the entire force. Like agile chessplayers, capable commanders exploit risk-worthy, lethal, forward positioned capabilities tocreate favorable conditions, shape battle and defend critical assets. When virtually all of ourforward-deployed forces are dependent upon a few readily targeted forward bases the force
becomes inherently brittle and commanders lack the force resiliency necessary to shapeconditions and accept battle on favorable terms.
2.1.6 Cost Imposition
Adversary strategy benefits from the disproportionate cost it imposes on the joint force.
Defensive capabilities to shoot down incoming precision munitions are many times more
expensive than the offensive missiles themselves. Potential enemies have invested in a
relatively large number of comparatively less expensive platforms and payloads. Because they
intend to control and deny sea and air space in proximity to their own shores, their capabilities
need not be trans-oceanic and are less expensive and more numerous. They have created acapability – capacity mismatch that works decidedly in their economic favor. Consequently, a
conventional system versus system scheme to rectify the imbalance might quickly break the
bank.
17

Just as judo uses the strength and weight of an opponent against himself, the cunning behind
adversary initiatives is how they exploit the expensive and exquisite nature of US systems toimpose disproportionate cost. For this reason, the operational solution to the problem requires
the joint force to change from a system versus system approach primarily rooted in what wefight with, to a more fundamental operational approach that changes how we fight. By
adopting a new operational method the highest hurdle toward achieving the next competitive
expeditionary paradigm becomes conceptual, not financial.
Once focused on a cogent alternative posture that obviates adversary investment in long-range
precision fires and precludes his strategic ambitions, the relative cost and necessary
investments are far less cost imposing than conventional means. New and improved weaponand sensor systems remain important, but they must support a fundamentally moreadvantageous concept. A cost informed approach toward rectifying the current capabilitycapacity mismatch must be a cornerstone of the next paradigm of US joint expeditionary
operations and is a foundational tenet of EABO.
2.1.7 Placing The Joint A2AD Challenge In Context
The strategic and operational consequences of adversary A2AD force development initiatives
enumerated above are strategically significant, operationally disruptive, cost imposing andtaken together constitute a disadvantageous paradigm shift in the character of war. The extent
of the challenge and requisite changes in fundamental assumptions are disorienting to a nation
long accustomed to presumptive military superiority. Significant changes in the relative
correlation of force compels the US to re-think our force posture, structure, platforms,
capabilities and operational concepts in light of new vulnerabilities, and to conduct a realistic
appraisal of current and anticipated adversary capability, capacity, activities and intentions.
2.2 The Nature Of The Naval Challenge
US naval forces share in the overall joint force challenges imposed by A2AD equippedadversaries, but there are appreciable and distinct differences in both threats andopportunities. As a naval concept, EABO is focused on how naval forces can counter adversary
initiatives and invalidate adversary assumptions to restore advantage to the joint force. To doso, naval strategists must first understand how aggressive adversary A2AD initiatives haveimperiled the conventional approach to naval operations.
2.2.1 Close Sea Challengers
Relative to other elements of the joint force, the Navy enjoys some unique advantages in termsof its durability in the face of A2AD threats. Deep water ports are as vulnerable as large
airfields, but the mobility inherent in ships make them more difficult to target at range andtheir defenses are close, sophisticated and robust. Fleets at sea are difficult to surprise withlong-range precision fires, and while not immune, ships on the high seas require a high level ofeffort and longer duration of time to effectively target. There is little doubt that in an open
18

ocean fight, the superior competence and capability of the US Navy can readily overmatch any
two other navies in the world today. For this reason the US Navy is not contested on the highseas, and the most credible threats to US naval dominance are found in close and confined seasin relatively close proximity to adversary territory. The Navy would do well to avoid the dangers
of narrow seas, but treaty allies and economic partners draw us there, and US interests require
access and persistent forward presence to maintain an effective deterrence posture.
The confined sea fight is a formidable challenge for naval forces. It is difficult to find a moreaggressive naval commander than Admiral Horatio Nelson, but his admonition that “A ship is afool to fight a fort” is even more relevant today than it was when he uttered it. The asymmetricadvantage between land and ship has grown as land-based ISR, weapon systems and aircraft
have greatly increased range and massed capacity compared to ships. Moreover, the ‘hider/finder’ competition between asymmetric forces greatly favors the land-based defender. The‘fort,’ once a defended location of highly concentrated fire power, can now be disguised anddispersed over a wide area and still provide lethal massed fires to extended ranges at sea.
Land-based aviation assets, particularly regiments of long-ranged bombers with hundreds ofsimilarly extended range anti-ship cruise missiles can overwhelm robust seaborne defenses atgreat distance.
Historically, and still today, inferior fleets will back into ports or confined seas whereconcentrated land-based capabilities can be brought to bear to off-set enemy naval superiority.
Dominant fleets expand their range and influence by preemptively controlling key naval terrainthat enables access, control or denial of close and confined seas. British control of Gibraltar isan enduring historic example.
The crux of the A2AD challenge for naval forces is that the enemy will avoid a force on force
navy to navy challenge on the high seas and judiciously employ their fleet under the umbrellaof a capacious mix of land-based and airborne long-range precision fires. It is the expanded
range and magazine depth of land-based rocket forces and bomber borne anti-ship missilesthat generates the disproportionate threat to Navy surface forces. In close and confined seas
the US Navy will not only have to fight the enemy surface and sub-surface naval forces, they
will be simultaneously beset by the abundant and concentrated fires of the enemy joint force.
In the era of long-range precision weapons, the tactical maritime defense is the stronger form of
battle and the greatest challenge to sea control need not come from the sea itself.
2.2.2 The Mass Or Persistence Dilemma
Historically, dominant naval powers have created the conditions for sea control throughmassed firepower and persistence on station. To extend naval influence and endurance Mahonand other naval theorists advocated advance bases and ‘coaling stations.’ In the recent past
naval forces could loiter indefinitely off an adversary coast with massed firepower and power
projection forces to deter, coerce, defeat or compel political decision-makers. However,contemporary peer and near pear adversary long-range weapons and persistent ISR makes
19mass and persistence alternative virtues for large surface naval platforms with definedmagazines. The range, precision and massed capacity of land-based systems makes extended
naval persistence perilous. When a ship is run Winchester on defensive missiles defending
itself, it becomes a large target on an open expanse of water. Persistence with massed
firepower defined the salient advantage of naval power in the 20th Century, but naval forces
today must operate elusively on the high seas and become more vulnerable when confined to adefined sea space. A2AD capabilities foist an inelegant dilemma on conventional naval forces,
compelling them to choose between persistence and mass.
The dilemma facing the joint force is significant. Our traditional forward bases lack resiliency.
Most of our exquisite land-based air superiority and strike platforms require long and hardened
runways that are of limited number, predictable location and are easily targeted via space
based assets. Dispersal locations, while more numerous, face similar challenges and are asapparent to enemy planners as they are to ours. Potential adversaries have ample munitions todestroy or degrade numerous bases tethered to readily identifiable and predictable runways.
Similarly, the limited number of ports suitable for reloading missiles on ships and supporting
fleet operations forward makes sustaining naval forces forward in the face of a determined
adversary problematic. Our combat platforms are remarkably capable, but are rendered brittle
by infrastructure requirements that are highly vulnerable to evolved enemy capabilities.
2.2.3 Capability Vs. Capacity Mismatch
Discussion of the operational A2AD dilemma often focuses on the rapidly diminishingqualitative edge we hold over competitors in terms of weapons range and precision. The closing
capability gap is a worthy concern, but the more significant and less addressed problem is thegrowing numerical capacity of potential adversary platforms and missiles. Our exquisite
operational capabilities remain technically superior, but their cost is prohibitive and theireffectiveness is belied by their limited number, since adequately lethal adversary systems canreadily outnumber US defenses near enemy home waters. In short, US naval forces are far
more likely to be overwhelmed than overmatched. A growing capability / capacity mismatch isat the core of our A2AD anxiety and renders naval forces more brittle, since a determinedenemy willing to accept risk can numerically overwhelm US ability to stand forward and fight at
strategic distance in support of American interest and treaty allies.
The nature of the sea control challenge is both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitatively,
potential adversaries are rapidly developing and fielding new long-range precision strikecapabilities designed to replicate, or in the case of anti-ship ballistic missiles, surpass our own.
Quantitatively, adversaries are looking to build on the relative strengths of fighting on interiorlines in home waters to mass sufficient forces of adequate lethality to ensure success. If wechoose to respond to greater adversary capacity with greater technological capability alone, thecost imposition will be prohibitive. The naval force development challenge is to devise a broad
naval operational concept that will advantageously enable more resilient naval forces to persist
and prevail forward in defense of US interest and those of our allies. As described, the EABO
20

concept is designed to enable naval forces to posture and persist forward and supports otherfuture naval concepts.
As a consequence of aggressive adversary force developments, a long era of presumptive US
sea control has ended. The growing operational challenge to sea control must be appreciated asa critical inflection point in naval force development. With longstanding allies, treaty
obligations, national interests and trading partners situated within the growing arc of potential
adversary long-range fires, it is imperative that US naval forces develop new methods andcapabilities to continue to prevail forward across the range of military operations.
Sea power is the primary enabler of joint expeditionary operations. Only through enduring sea
power can the United States bring the logistical sinew of the joint force to bear. How we
contest control of the sea will determine America’s relative position in the world. Potential
adversaries have demonstrated commendable initiative in reducing the access and influence ofthe legacy joint force, but to paraphrase Captain John Paul Jones, we have only begun to think.
2.3 Joint And Naval Conceptual Alignment
2.3.1 Joint Concept For Access And Maneuver In The Global Commons (JAM-GC)
The JAM-GC was designed to serve as a joint framework for approaching the A2AD challenge. It
is a cogent document with a credible vision for how to defeat the strategy of A2AD equippedadversaries and frustrate their expansionist fait-accompli gambits. The JAM-GC concept leaves
plenty of room for service initiatives within its broad framework, while shaping a common andunified joint vision. The most substantive contribution JAM-GC makes toward framing a joint
operational solution is articulating the need for a dual-postured force. JAM-GC uses the terms
inside and outside forces relative to the threat posed by enemy long-range precision weapons
to distinguish the character and qualities of inside and outside forces.
As discussed above, US legacy forces postured on legacy infrastructure have become a selfoptimized target set for long-range precision weapons. To persist forward naval forces must
create a new force posture that can survive and operate with operationally relevant capabilities
within the range of adversary long-range precision weapons. This EABO concept details hownaval forces can be based and employed to create operational advantage despite adversary
A2AD capabilities. In accord with the JAM-GC framework, EABO inside naval forces provide
persistent presence and continuous partnering forward. Legacy outside forces will continue tobe the force of decision and provide maneuverable massed fires and capabilities, but theirlimited magazine depth will make their fleet actions iterative and episodic and their continuingrequirement for deep water ports and developed airfields will necessitate eventual withdrawal.
Future 21st century naval operational art will depend on the creative ability of a common naval
commander to leverage the persistent capabilities and low-signature qualities of the insideforce with the maneuverability and mass of the outside force to create competitive advantage.

21

EABO incorporates the JAM-GC inspired dual-posture into the conceptual design. By creating,
maintaining, and optimizing both inside and outside forces, EABO enables naval forces to
episodically converge and re-acquire the virtues of both persistence and mass without placing
any portion of the force at disproportionate risk. Fundamentally, EABO is about how to create
and employ a persistent, resilient, and survivable forward naval force posture that can operate
within the arc of adversary long-range precision fires in support of the overall joint force
commander (JFC) /JFMCC / fleet commander’s scheme of maneuver. As such, EABO becomes afundamental enabling concept for other naval concepts designed to deal with rising peercompetitors that require persistent forward presence. EABO is incorporated within LOCE, andis aligned with, and supports DMO and the Fleet Design initiative.
2.3.2 Littoral Operations In A Contested Environment (LOCE)
LOCE calls for greater naval integration among Navy and Marine forces. EABO provides anotheroperational context for regarding naval forces as a holistic blend of land and sea-based forces
focused on sea control and sea denial activities in contested seas.
2.3.3 Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO)
DMO refocuses the Navy on peer and near-peer competitors that will demand fleet level
engagement in major combat operations. It posits more integrated command relationships, andadvocates for mission command and calculated risk acceptance in application. EABO creates amore viable forward force posture and operational conditions that ameliorate otherwise
disproportionate risk to force, and enables calculated risk in pursuit of mission objectives. EABO
complements DMO, and asserts that Marine units are integral Fleet Forces that support fleet
commanders and JFMCC in the sea control and denial fight. As such, Marines must be
integrated into the overall naval scheme of maneuver. EABO encourages both the Marine
Corps and Navy to develop optimized inside force capabilities to serve within the overall DMO
construct. EABO extends the distribution of naval forces landward, and takes advantage ofpartner proximity to advance persistent naval and joint sensors, shooters, and sustainment
capabilities.
2.3.4 Alignment
EABO seeks to influence future Fleet Design and Marine Corps force development to create
viable inside forces with new capabilities that are both low-signature and operationally relevant
contributions to the sea control and denial mission. The EABO concept creates the ability andrequirements to position flotillas, UXX squadrons, land-based anti-ship missiles, logistics
support, and other innovative Navy capabilities forward to enable persistent naval presence
and influence. EABO advocates some regionally-aligned Navy forces, as they are essential togenerate the persistence and capacity necessary to deal with determined A2AD adversaries inthe vicinity of close and confined seas.

22

The EABO concept has broad applicability for future integrated naval operations, and is overtly
designed to influence future naval force development and support all joint and naval concepts
that can benefit from persistent presence and active partnering. This EABO handbook should
inform and be informed by other evolving naval concepts.
EABO has utility across the range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief (HA/DR) to major combat operations, and throughout the joint campaign operational
phases. EABO is designed to support the wider naval DMO concept premised on a fleet
balanced with risk-worthy inside force capabilities that can persist forward and accept risk inmajor combat operations against a peer competitor. EABs are crux to proliferating costeffective and lethal naval and joint capabilities at the leading edge of the joint campaign toensure persistent presence, restore competitive advantage, and ameliorate the growing
capability / capacity mismatch that characterizes the force development aspirations of ourlikely adversaries. EABO enables JFMCC to secure the complementary advantages of thestrategic offense and tactical defense.
EABO is conceived with a full appreciation of how the extended range of modern weapons haschanged the relative advantage between the offense and defense at the tactical level withlegacy forces. EABO enables JFMCC to secure the complementary advantages of the strategic
offense and tactical defense, while informing future force development to achieve new areas ofcompetitive advantage.
While many of the benefits of EABO will be realized in the future, there is significant advantage
to be gained from developing and accelerating this capability in the near term. The ability toleverage complex littoral terrain to impede an adversary fait accompli strategy with forward,
capable, persistent, and distributed naval forces will support a wide variety of stratagems,
operational concepts, and current capabilities, both naval and joint.

3.0 Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations
3.0.1 New Assumptions: Resilient, Dual-Postured, And Regionally-Aligned
The fundamental operational assumption underlying the EABO concept is the new requirement
for force resiliency to persist and operate within range of adversary precision long-range fires.
Since most of our current force continues to require legacy fixed infrastructure, this assumption
leads to the requirement for a dual-postured force. By simultaneously operating two distinctly
postured naval forces, one forward-positioned and focused on persistent presence andpartnering, and the other legacy-based to generate decisive mass and maneuver, the naval
commander can converge the fleet at the time of his choosing to achieve advantage.
As currently postured, joint and naval forces cannot maintain persistent forward presence andpartnership without suffering disproportionate risk to both mission and force in the event ofmajor war with a peer competitor. Legacy forces, constructed under the now invalidated
assumptions of presumptive sea and air control, are large, signature-rich, expensive, to defend
23and heavily dependent upon easily targeted, fixed, forward infrastructure. These characteristics
render legacy platforms and capabilities highly vulnerable, and induce risk aversion whenpostured within range of adversary precision fires. Nevertheless, current US joint and naval
forces are remarkably powerful when fielded, and have the qualities of mass and maneuvernecessary to be decisive in battle.
In order to generate the necessary qualities of both persistence and mass, the joint force must
create two distinct force postures. The legacy force, or in JAM-GC terminology-- the outside
force, will be the force based outside the range of adversary long-range fires that maneuvers
massed capabilities forward for decisive episodic engagements. Outside forces will remain
dependent on vulnerable infrastructure that must remain out of reach, or heavily defended
against adversary long-range massed fires. By advancing maneuverable outside forces
episodically, and leveraging the persistent situational awareness generated by the inside force,
the JFMCC or the fleet commander can achieve superiority at the decisive time and place.
The inside force is optimized to persist and partner within range of adversary long-range fires
with minimum signature, wide distribution, and acceptable risk. Inside forces move tactically toenhance survivability and enable local defense, but are more restricted in operational
maneuver than outside forces. The qualities of the inside force enable persistent presence toconduct robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, control or denysea and air space, and enhance situational awareness. EABs are optimized to host lowsignature inside force capabilities on a more amorphous, distributed, and hard-to-target
infrastructure that complements the low-signature of inside forces and enables EABO.
A second new assumption is the requirement for a portion of naval forces to be regionallyaligned and specific threat-focused. There is great utility in a trans-oceanic naval force that is
globally deployable and can mass and disperse throughout the world as required. However, therequired range and seakeeping capabilities for a surface force optimized for trans-oceanic
global deployment is necessarily composed of large ships. To create the resilient, lowsignature, low maintenance, and larger quantity of lower capacity platforms optimized forinside force employment by EABO, some portion of the naval force must be better optimized
for localized persistence than global mass and maneuver. Many of the new innovative naval
capabilities that are currently under development will well answer this requirement.
3.0.2 Naval Warfighter Challenges
The naval warfighter challenges are the new operational imperatives in terms of how the naval
services must posture, structure, and operate differently in response adversary A2AD
initiatives. From a force development perspective, the naval warfighter challenges arefoundational considerations that underlie all inside force requirements. The legacy capabilitiesof the outside force already exist, but the naval services now have the opportunity to create amore optimized inside force that conforms requirements to achieve the new operational
imperatives identified below.
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The Persistent Inside Force Must:
Generate the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration
Create a more dispersed, resilient and hard to target forward-basing infrastructure
Create a more resilient continental United States (CONUS) / sea base-to-shore sustainment
infrastructure capable of supporting distributed forces and operations
Win the hider / finder competition
These generic naval warfighter challenges must guide future naval force development,
particularly as they pertain to the inside force. They are described broadly, so that all types offorces can interpret them relative to their own combat capabilities or functional support role.
3.0.2.1 The first, Generate the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration,reflects the need to distribute force assets, but retain the ability to mass fires and integrate
capabilities. It has implications for how and how fast we must maneuver distributable forces.
(The term distributable forces is used in preference to distributed, as it implies that the posture
is not necessarily fixed, but can mass and disperse advantageously.) EABO introduces theconcept of horizontal dispersal and vertical integration to meet this challenge.
3.0.2.2 The second, Create a more dispersed, resilient and hard to target forward-basing
infrastructure, enables naval forces to persist forward, and is the reason for creating EABs.
3.0.2.3 The third, Create a more resilient CONUS / sea base to shore sustainment infrastructure
capable of supporting distributed forces and operations becomes critical, since deep water
ports and large runways are vulnerable targets inside the range of enemy fires. More resilientmeans and methods of logistical transport and sustainment must be devised that are notdependent upon fixed vulnerable infrastructure like large ports and airfields.
3.0.2.4 The last, Win the hider/finder competition, will be the most pervasive and salient
requirement of the inside force. The ability to see first enables the ability to shoot first, and in
naval warfare there is significant advantage to shooting first in the salvo competition. The
inside force should be replete with resilient ISR capabilities to provide a robust, full spectrum,
all domain understanding of the battlespace to JFMCC and the fleet commander. Equallyimportant is the ability to confound the enemy’s understanding of our force disposition andintentions. Signature management is a crux capability of all inside forces.
3.1 Central Idea
EABO is a future naval operational concept that enables naval forces to persist and operate
forward within range of adversary long-range precision fires, in order to contest, control ordeny sea space. EABO supports the JFMCC, JFC, or fleet commander’s scheme of maneuver,particularly in the vicinity of close and confined seas where control of key maritime terrain
supports sea control and denial operations. EABs are designed to host, secure, sustain, and25

maintain warriors and their weapons systems on a more amorphous and difficult to target
forward-basing infrastructure. Resilient EABO forces and capabilities maintain situationalawareness and persistent forward presence with operationally relevant sea control and denial
capabilities in order to deter enemy fait accompli gambits and reassure treaty allies. Persistent
EABO forces deter the ambitions or defeat the strategy of adversaries conducting counterintervention operations with A2AD capabilities, and enable restoration of the strategic initiativein the face of hegemonic aggression. The EABO concept is threat-based, cost-informed andfuture-focused. The concept is framed within the common joint operational vision of a resilient
dual-postured force articulated in JAM-GC, and informs a more integrated vision of future naval
operations and force development. EABO employs risk-worthy naval assets that are designed
to be cost-informed, resilient, low-signature, operationally relevant, and optimized to meet
inside force requirements. In concert with legacy outside force capabilities, EABO supports fleet
operations in major combat operations, provides the alternative force posture and structurenecessary to initiate the next paradigm of naval expeditionary warfare, and provides new
operational and strategic options for future decision-makers.
As an integrated naval operational concept, EABO calls for the distinct qualities and optimized
capabilities of dual-postured inside and outside forces to be united and employed under acommon naval commander. The varied qualities and dual-postured capabilities of inside andoutside forces provides the operational commander with a broad pallet of new tactical options
to artfully weave into an advantageous naval scheme of maneuver that can adapt as
circumstances and opportunity dictate. EABO enables JFMCC to secure the complementaryadvantages of the strategic offense and tactical defense.
The inside force provides persistent presence to assure partners of our strategic commitment,
and leverages partner proximity, forces, and local logistical means to deter aggression or
support the combined campaign. The inside force sets and maintains conditions of sea control
and denial from key maritime terrain adjacent to contested straits and waters, and provides
continuous situational awareness so that the outside force never need advance into a situation
where the risks are unknown. The inside force is designed to be inherently resilient andpassively defended, enabling risk acceptance, and imposing new costs on the enemy. In major
combat operations, a well-designed and executed inside force posture allows JFMCC / JFC toseize the strategic initiative by securing key maritime terrain early and then exploiting thecontemporary advantages of the maritime defense-in-depth to achieve operational result
disproportionate to investment.
The outside force brings high volume fires and massed capabilities at the critical time and place
to force decision, and compel enemies to accept battle on unfavorable terms. The inside force
enables the fleet commander to shape the battlespace, and can cover and mask the advanceand withdrawal of the outside force as it iteratively reduces the enemy in decisive
engagements. Accepting calculated risk, the inside force extends and exhausts enemy ISR,
munitions, and forces through persistent presence, movement, and limited engagements. The
26

overall operation is under the common command of the fleet commander, who focuses allnaval forces and resources to create an advantageous synergy of different platforms, arms, andcapabilities to achieve common purpose. When circumstances dictate, mission command
allows for inside and outside forces to self-coordinate for mutual support, and to create
advantageous tactical opportunities.
To survive and operate within range of adversary long-range fires, the joint and naval personnel
and capabilities required to create a persistent, distributed, credible, and operationally relevant
inside force must be based and sustained on a more amorphous and difficult to target forwardbasing infrastructure that clouds, rather than clarifies, the locations, capabilities, and intentionsof our forces. EABs are designed to meet the requirements for resilient forward-basing.
EABs support persistent operations within the arc of enemy long-range fires and sensors
systems. They are intended to make austerity a virtue, and to minimize the need for fixed
infrastructure. To the degree possible, EABs use passive defenses and rely upon mobility,
deception, and concealment to compound the adversary targeting problem. EABs support thedispersal and concealment of key assets to preclude providing a lucrative target. EABs aredesigned to persist, but, as required, can be rapidly established, disestablished, and displaced
to support the advance of the joint campaign. EABs are forward postured to support a wide
variety of naval and joint capabilities, and enable the joint force to gain proximity advantage
within the joint operations area (JOA). The JFMCC or JFC can create many EABs to hostnumerous and varied weapon systems to mitigate adversary capacity advantages.
Conceptualizing and creating new weapons and surveillance systems optimized to meet insideforce capability requirements is integral to the concept.
3.2 Concept Components And Definitions
The EABO concept has several constituent parts that require definition and distinction. It is
important to differentiate 1) EABs from 2) EABO, and to describe the preferred or more
optimized 3) inside force capabilities that EABs are designed to host and EABO would employ.
3.2.1 Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EABs)
An EAB is established to secure, support, and sustain warriors and their weapons andsurveillance systems within range of A2AD adversary long-range fires.
EABs are capable of hosting and sustaining regionally-aligned naval forces and platforms.
EABs are designed to create a more amorphous and difficult to target forward-basing
infrastructure that clouds, rather than clarifies, enemy situational awareness and postures, andsupports distributed expeditionary capabilities forward.
EABs are not specific places. They are a collection of distributed support functions that, inaggregate, provide the essential security and support capabilities required to host, sustain, andmaintain inside forces and their combat and combat support capabilities. An EAB may be27

mobile, using trucks, barges, ferries, etc. to provide mobility and continuity of mission support
from different locations. For example, a mobile forward arming and refueling point (FARP) using
fuel barges and fast domestic ferries to move equipment. Alternatively, an EAB might beestablished in a broad area to support several different missions or functions. Its support
functions may be mobile, covered, concealed, or a mixture of means and methods that make ita difficult or inopportune target for long-range fires.
EABs are designed to PERSIST forward, and enable HOSTED forces and capabilities toaccomplish on-call missions, or to create enduring conditions. Traditional missions, such as
artillery raids and episodic FARP sites, that involve unique mission profiles, have a planned
withdrawal, and do not require persistent support services, are not part of the EABO profile.
An EAB is designed to provide the essential functions of a traditional base with a far lessvulnerable and more resilient support infrastructure. Signature management is an essentialfunction of EABs and EABO. Decoy capabilities are within the scope and requirements of EABO.
EABO requires EAB commanders to have an ‘own signature’ detection and management
capability.
Some EABs may require active protection measures beyond local security due to the nature of
the capabilities they host, but to minimize cost, footprint, and signature, EABO is preferentiallyconducted while exploiting passive security options, and maximizing cover, concealment,
decoys, and deception.
EABs prize resiliency over efficiency. They enable force dispersal, and consequently lack the
economy of scale and efficiencies that can be developed and sustained in conventional bases,
where singular support assets can be concentrated to serve many similarly concentrated hosted
forces. Dispersion is inherently inconvenient and inefficient, but essential to resiliency andsurvival in future war. EABs should disperse redundant support capabilities, and divide
sustainment items to avoid single points of failure in the event of an attack.
EABs make a virtue of austerity, and encourage logisticians to forage forward for as many
support components and classes of supply and sustainment as practical to reduce the burden
on the logistics tail and transport systems. 21st century foraging involves contracting noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and credit cards. When practical, EABs can conserve unused
resources in dispersed iron hills that might sustain the force should lines of communications(LOCs) become temporarily interdicted without inviting the attention of enemy fires as
traditional iron mountains would. Future logisticians will provide assured continuity of support
with information about asset location vice asset stockpiling.
When hosting an operational force in being, EABs can preclude uncontested fait accompli
gambits, and serve as a significant complication to enemy time lines, risk calculations, level ofeffort, and munitions expenditures. EABs are not invulnerable, and are designed to accept risk
and invert the cost and effort curve of enemy strikes on fixed forward infrastructure. When
EABs are passively absorbing enemy ISR efforts, drawing enemy forces into defensive fires, and28

depleting the enemy quiver of long-range fires, they are highly effective in creating significant
impositions on enemy costs, timelines, and risk calculations.
A single EAB can host multiple combat units, combat functions, and combat logistics
capabilities. Consequently, their naming conventions should avoid using hosted mission
capabilities as designators.
3.2.1.1 EAB Hosting Requirements
EABs are designed to support, sustain, and maintain warriors and their weapon systems. Some
EABs can be optimized to host the unique requirements of regionally-aligned naval forces andplatforms. Hosted forces might expect EABs to provide:
Security – Marines and host nation forces
Food – Meals-ready-to-eat (MREs), rations contracted, or purchased from host nation
Water – Marine / Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) reverse osmosis water
purification unit (ROWPU), contracted or purchased from host nation
Shelter – Tents or local improvised billeting
Fuel – For aircraft, vehicles, prime movers, generators
Power – For basic equipment
Medical – First-aid, casualty stabilization, and evacuation
C2 – Intra-EAB communications for coordination, external communications for common
operating picture (COP), targeting, etc.
Mobility –Sufficient mobility to effect internal coordination, force distribution, and defensive
maneuver
CCD – Cover, concealment, and decoys to manage signature
Contracting – 21st century foraging
3.2.2 Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)EABO is the tactical operations and operational support activities conducted by forces hosted
on EABs.
As required by the JFMCC scheme of maneuver, EABO is capable of generating a dynamic
tactical maritime defense-in-depth to secure or deny key maritime terrain, and to exploit thecontemporary stronger form of naval battle.
EABO is conducted in the air, land, sea surface, sub-surface, and electro-magnetic spectrum(EMS) by resilient, low-signature platforms and forces that opportunistically disperse29horizontally and concentrate vertically to achieve tactical advantage. EABO platforms are
optimized to coordinate across the physical domains at the leading edge of battle.
EABO is network optional, leveraging networks when available, and executing mission orders
when not.
EABO is conducted in support of ISR, sea control and sea denial missions, JFC/ JFMCC/ fleet
scheme of maneuver, defense of allied or partner territory, or to control or exploit the controlof key maritime terrain.
Preferably, EABO is conducted by low-signature capabilities that are designed, optimized, or
adapted to operate and persist within the arc of adversary long-range fires.
EABO is tactical actions focused on advancing sensor, shooter, and sustainment capabilities thatare operationally relevant to fleet commanders, JFMCC, and the JFC in conducting ISR andsupporting sea control and denial operations.
Inside naval forces, operating from EABs, conduct EABO. Optimally, EABO sets conditions andshapes battle in support of outside force maneuver and engagement.
3.2.2.1 Example EABO Missions
Surveillance and reconnaissanceAir interdiction and missile defense
Sea control and sea denial
Integrated, active, maritime defense to close straits to enemy maritime traffic
Land-based rotary-wing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) pouncers
Flotilla force operations
Swarm missions
Mobile FARPs
UXX operations of all types
Electronic warfare (EW), information operations (IO), and cyber
Decoy and operational deception activities
Fleet support activities, battle damage repair, and rearming and refueling of surface ships andflotilla forces30

3.2.2.2 EABO Optimized Capabilities
EABO capabilities are operationally relevant—they have the ability to conduct and influence
operations well beyond the tactical space they occupy.
EABO enables naval forces to exploit key maritime terrain, to control or deny sea space,support the fleet scheme of maneuver, or conduct ISR.
Some legacy capabilities can be adapted to serve as inside force capability sets if theirsignature, cost, or vulnerability can be appropriately reduced.
Optimally, inside forces are resilient, risk-worthy, redundant, and cost-informed. They degrade
gracefully, and avoid creating single points of failure.
EABO optimized capabilities exploit partner proximity to preclude the need for large, expensive
platforms that must self-deploy over trans-oceanic distances. EABO exploits the proximity
advantages of regionally-aligned forces to reduce platform size, cost, and signature, and enable
greater distribution and larger numbers of platforms at lower cost.
EABO capabilities place greater emphasis on lethal payloads than exquisite platforms, and relyon the Fleet Tactical Grid to integrate targeting data between networked sensors and shooters.
EABO enables large numbers of sensor and lethal capabilities to be proliferated forward atcompetitive cost to ameliorate the capability / capacity mismatch the adversaries currently
enjoy.
EABs will vary in specific purpose, size, general location, and composition relative to themissions of hosted units and requirements of the JFC and JFMCC. Naval forces, largely
composed of Marine and NECC units, create the dispersed, resilient, minimal signature
infrastructure that hosts and secures the forces and capabilities that conduct EABO. EABs hostthe sensor, shooter, and sustainment capabilities of the inside force. EABO is the tacticalactivities and actions conducted from EABs. EABO capabilities and systems are designed tocomplement the resilient, minimal signature, and dispersed nature of EABs, so that EABs, theforces and capabilities they host, and the operations they support, can all persist forward
within range of ample adversary long-range precision fires.
3.2.2.3 Seize Or Occupy, And Defend
EABO can be advantageous in a wide variety of circumstances across the range of military
operations, from humanitarian relief to major combat operations. EABs can be situated far
inland to gain proximity to objectives and extend operational reach, or on an island orarchipelago to support JFMCC’s efforts to secure sea control. It is this latter purpose thatmakes EABO novel in contemporary and future naval operations. When necessary, bases can beseized (amphibious assault) by a naval task force with an embarked Marine air ground task
force (MAGTF) to overcome enemy resistance, and establish a secure operating area for hosted
capabilities. When required to seize enemy-occupied terrain to establish an EAB, the size and31task organization of the MAGTF will be dictated by anticipated resistance and other mission,
enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time (METT-T) factors. However, when practical, thepreferred means of establishing EABs is to simply occupy friendly or undefended terrain withtask-organized naval forces.
Optimally, treaty allies and partners will create opportunities for the advance reconnaissance,
selection, survey, and preparation of EABs, and, in some cases, prepositioning of EABO assets
and sustainment. Adequate preparation and robust prepositioning of fuel, munitions, andmission-purposed vehicles is critical to timely response. Likewise, exercising combined defense
plans with prepositioned asset is critical to assuring the ability of US forces to meet treaty
obligations, particularly when defending allies and partners that are already within reach of
long-range threat weapon systems. The judicious use of the pre-war phase of operations todevelop a persistent, lethal, EABO capable and ready inside force will be the greatest deterrent
to war, and the greatest assurance of effective combined operations in the event of conflict.
In all cases, EABO should free other naval forces to maneuver. Initially, an amphibious naval
task force may be required to seize an EAB and defend it until it becomes self-sustaining anddefendable. When conducting tactical maritime defense-in-depth, multiple mutuallysupporting EABs will greatly contribute to the survivability and resilience of each. Ultimately,
the EAB should allow JFMCC to assert a greater degree of sea control or denial, while enabling
the fleet to maneuver opportunistically to provide an advantageous combat synergy between
land and sea-based capabilities.
The proven power of an afloat MAGTF to compound uncertainty and compel the enemy
commander to self-imbalance, hesitate, or poorly dispose his force in anticipation of anamphibious landing, is the reason fleet commanders should avoid the gratuitous use of theready fleet amphibious ready group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) assets to secureand sustain EABs. When it is possible to simply occupy an EAB without opposition, a Special
Purpose MAGTF built around a company or battery landing team, and deployed by alternativemeans, may be adequate to the initial task of securing critical terrain and infrastructure toenable follow-on naval forces and capabilities. The initial EAB occupying force may becomposed of only security forces and functional Marine and Navy experts to make assessmentsthat will influence the composition and sequencing of subsequent EAB-hosted units andsupport requirements. Many variables should influence decisions regarding EAB force
composition, and it will be JFMCC responsibility to determine the purpose, size, and capabilities
hosted by each EAB. EABs will likely be multi-purpose, hosting various capabilities with distinct
missions or functional support responsibilities. EABs will be naval in character, and capable ofadvantageously exploiting the sea space in archipelagos and confined seas, but may also host
joint capabilities, and be in direct support of joint task force (JTF) missions as required. EABs
may be likened to a versatile tool bag that expands, contracts, and episodically relocatesdepending on the capabilities hosted within.

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3.3 Characteristics Of EABs
EABs are not similar to the forward operating bases (FOBs) Marines and Sailors are familiar withfrom experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead of a tight well-defined perimeter designed toenhance security from penetration by sappers and infiltrators, EABs are designed to hide anddisperse critical capabilities to defy adversary long-range targeting. Although attacks byamphibious and special operations forces against EABs are clearly possible, such threats are
more difficult and less likely than enemy long-range precision fires, and will require local site
security rather than wide perimeter security. A distributed posture is more resilient against
long-range fires and will greatly enhance survivability of forward-based units. However, thiswider distribution of forces will not enjoy the economies of scale of traditional bases and will
necessitate significantly more intense and innovative logistics and functional coordination
measures to maintain operational effectiveness. Likewise, local security for many sites may
require more personnel from both US and host nation forces.
In order to enhance speed of deployment and minimize infrastructure and logistical support
requirements, EABO will exploit passive defenses to the degree prudent and practical.
Dispersion, decoys, cover, camouflage, and concealment will all be maximized to preclude
effective enemy targeting of EAB-hosted assets. Smaller, more numerous, adequately lethal,
but less expensive capabilities create an unfavorable ‘cost to loss’ exchange ratio to deter
enemy attack, and enhance survivability and operational resilience in the event they are
targeted. Active defense measures are not precluded, and active defenses may well be part of aparticular EAB’s profile to defend critical assets, but passive measures should be fully exploited
to enhance the speed, simplicity, and deployability of the force. Emerging directed-energy
weapons, such as rail guns, lasers, and high-powered microwave systems hold promise of
mitigating enemy fires capabilities without imposing significant cost, and may make future
active defenses more viable.
Historically, advanced naval bases have frequently been found astride straits or on islands. It isappropriate to think of future EABs being similarly situated, but the expeditionary advanced‘base’ is purposefully ill-defined in terms of its perimeter and specific geographic location.
‘Amorphous’ is an apt description of how we wish EABs to appear to adversaries. Contributing
to the amorphous nature of EABs is the potential for many of the capabilities or supporting
functions hosted by EABs to remain afloat on barges, ferries, and small craft. By keeping someassets, such as fuel and munitions stockpiles, afloat on barges, we might significantly mitigate
their vulnerability as fixed targets and avoid restrictions on storing ammunition ashore due toexplosive arc safety concerns. Future directed-energy weapons systems and their power
generators might also be mounted on barges to benefit from the ready access to afloat
refueling, and the ease and economy of maneuvering by water, yet still be in relative proximity
to the capabilities they are designed to defend.
There is great economy and efficiencies in moving large volumes of heavy materials, such asammo, fuel, long-range weapons, and repair items by water. Should the enemy choose to33

target smaller and less costly platforms, like barges, with expensive missiles, we bend the cost
curve in a favorable direction. The logistical benefits of afloat support in proximity to shorebases will be discussed in greater detail later. What is important to note in characterizing EABO
is the distributed capabilities hosted or provided by the EABs may be located on mobile
platforms, or afloat in inland or contiguous waters, to enhance resiliency and better enablelogistical sustainment. The amorphous nature of EABs contributes to their passive defense
posture. Redundant capabilities distributed both ashore and afloat can also contribute to force
resilience.
3.3.1 Resiliency, Capacity, And Proximity
A fundamental premise that underlies EABO is the growing joint requirement for resiliency.
Throughout the joint force, there is a compelling need to achieve greater balance at the lower
end of the platform mix with a greater number of affordable, risk-worthy, and lethal platforms
and capabilities that can restore numerical advantage, and rectify the evolved capability /capacity mismatch long cultivated by potential regional competitors. Greater relative economy
and capacity can be realized by reducing platform cost to expand their number. Closer basingproximity to the joint operational area (JOA) and contested seas can greatly reduce operational
range and sea-keeping requirements, and consequently reduce platform cost. Though reduced
in range, these platforms can leverage the proximity of EABs to gain and maintain a numericaladvantage. EABs enable more, and more affordable, capabilities to be distributed across more
locations, potentially contributing to greater resilience, capacity, and ultimate operational
advantage. The exquisite capabilities concentrated on our decreasing number of expensive
capitol ships can be complemented by more numerous smaller, manned and unmanned
platforms carrying sophisticated weapons that are advantaged by the wider reconnaissance,
surveillance, target acquisition/command and control (RSTA/C2) network and the Fleet TacticalGrid.
3.3.2 Innovating Towards A Balanced Force
An overarching concept for naval resiliency has yet to emerge in detail, but alternative force
structures and affordable options are predicated on a low-signature fleet better balanced at thelow end with small, fast, durable, more numerous and risk-worthy surface platforms,
complemented by numerous widely distributed manned and unmanned aviation, surface andsub-surface assets. To achieve economy and resiliency, it is likely that many innovations will
involve single-mission platforms operating in networked swarms with diverse, but
complementary, capabilities to detect and destroy adversary ships and aircraft in and aroundcomplex littoral terrain. Smaller minimally manned and unmanned platforms provide anaffordable means to proliferate sensors and shooters with relative economy and acceptablerisk. Smaller platforms, with smaller radar cross sections (RCS), are far from impervious toattack, but their greater number of dispersed capabilities allows them to degrade gracefully andmaintain a lethal force in being in the complex littoral environment.
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Resilient and lethal platforms with the required low-signature characteristics needed to
optimize the inside force are at various stages of technical readiness and experimentation at US
corporate, Service, and national labs. These game-changing capabilities hold great promise ofgenerating tactical advantage, but they require a concept of employment that provides theproximity to the enemy that their smaller size demands. These emerging capabilities provide
advantage in terms of cost, number, and capability if deployed, recovered, and maintained
from forward bases. EABs will provide the required support infrastructure to support these
new capability sets, and EABO should synergize their differing capabilities into a cogent,resilient, and lethal combined arms and capabilities force, optimized to find and destroy enemy
forces that venture into close and confined seas.
Future naval flotilla forces will enable persistent presence without exposing capital ships todefeat in detail in dangerous littoral regions. Their small size enables concentration of lethal
payloads on inexpensive and relatively expendable platforms. They can be assigned to specificmissions, such as surveilling or closing a strait, or patrol opportunistically awaiting enemy
offensive forces to wade into the web of fires they can create. Flotillas may be surface or subsurface, manned, minimally manned, or autonomous; some may incorporate mannedunmanned teaming (MUT) capabilities to leverage the qualities of both warriors and theirmachines. Some surface platforms can be optimized to work at high speed in shallow water toexploit the complex terrain of littorals, particularly archipelagos where dash and shoot tactics
are optimal.
Regionally aligned against specific threats, new capabilities can be optimized to task andenvironment, and employed in advantageous numbers and combinations. Some may be
optimized for hunting and targeting, others for lethality or mission kills on radars and C2
systems. Swarms of inexpensive, but adequately lethal, capabilities can be unleashed fromsemi-submersibles that are difficult to detect and efficient to maintain in austere locations. The
reduced size and signature that optimizes naval platforms for the close sea fight is likely to
reduce their ability for global deployment. However, some regionally-aligned forces will be
critical to creating the naval force required to fight and win in confined seas.
A dual-postured force is premised on an understanding of the tradeoffs noted above. A
singular-postured force must choose between alternatives, while a dual-postured inside andoutside force can achieve greater overall capability and balance in the missile age.
A balanced fleet will require forward-basing within the JOA for these more numerous and riskworthy assets to persist forward. The enhanced survivability and credible lethality of both theplatforms and the EABs themselves will assure allies, deter adversaries, maintain readiness, andallow fleet commanders to dictate operational tempo and conditions early in the fight.
Forward- based naval expeditionary platforms will balance the fleet and be networked toleverage capital ship sensor capabilities and those of the wider joint network to ensure local sea
control at the decisive time and place. EABs are designed to meet the future basing
requirements for low-signature naval platforms, as well as host joint inside force capabilities
35

that can support the Navy’s fight for sea control. Strategically placed, EABs can also deny criticalsea space, such as straits, to adversaries, and support a variety of JFMCC or JFC-assigned insideforce missions.
3.4 EABO Missions
Naval Expeditionary Forces advance and extend the joint line of operations by securing
advantageous islands, archipelagos, and key terrain in proximity to close and confined seas tosupport JFMCC sea control and sea denial missions. Example EABO missions andcharacteristics:
Naval expeditionary forces secure (seize or occupy) forward bases to advance and distributejoint sensors, shooters and sustainment capabilities.
Maximize use of permissive terrain and passive defense / force protection. (Mobility, cover,concealment, decoy, and deception)
When practical, establish mutually-supporting strongpoints adjacent to close and confined seas
to conduct tactical maritime defense-in-depth of key maritime terrain.
Establish rotating FARP sites for fixed-wing, rotary-wing, & unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
operations.
Lend resiliency to the joint force by proliferating mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missiles,
anti-air missiles, anti-ballistic, and ballistic BM missiles that are difficult to target by enemy
long-range precision fires systems.
Integrate landward sensor and fires systems with Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
under JFMCC C2. Close coordination to advantage fleet with land-based fires capability, range,
and capacity.
Provide secure advance locations for rearming of combatant ships, exchange of surface
combatant modules, and basing of missile/torpedo/swarm boat flotillas.
EABO enables persistent Scouting, Fires, Protection, and Sustainment
3.5 21st Century Naval Operational Art
Effective employment of EABO in major combat operations is dependent upon the wider
appreciation for how land-based naval capabilities can be brought to bear in the fight for seacontrol. History is rich with examples of the artful and advantageous integration of land andsea-based forces in campaigns directed toward achieving strategic ends. It has been many
decades since the Navy and Marine Corps worked closely together to achieve and advance sea
control over the Central Pacific in pursuit of strategic objectives against a peer competitor.
Arguably, naval operational art reached its apogee with the US Navy in WWII and Nimitz’s
march across the Pacific. Conscious of logistics, operational reach, lines of communication,36

scouting, aviation capabilities, and the myriad other elements of operational art, Nimitz’s
campaign was a masterful integration of sea and land-based capabilities that enabled persistentadvantage and maintained the strategic initiative. Of necessity, expeditionary basing wasclosely integrated into the campaign objectives and the operational scheme of maneuver.
In recent decades, the United States Navy and Marine Corps forces have cultivated acomplimentary relationship that assumed presumptive sea control and focused on power
projection. The battlespace was distinctly divided by the high water mark, and command
relationships were agreeably de-conflicted in commander amphibious task force(CATF)/commander landing force (CLF) relationships. The advent of potential adversaries withlong-range integrated A2AD capabilities has ended the long era of presumptive sea control, andgenerated prudent interest in the effective integration—vice mere de-confliction-- of Marine
and joint capabilities into the naval fight for sea control. The future role of naval forces in joint
operations is dependent upon how practitioners of naval operational art effectively integratenew, persistent inside force capabilities, land-based near key maritime terrain, with legacy fleet
capabilities, to achieve temporal sea control in support of joint operations.
Naval operational art is a sub-component of joint operational art that includes theadvantageous planning, integration, and engagement of those joint and naval capabilities
present at the leading edge of a joint expeditionary campaign, when operations are largely
naval in character, to achieve JFMCC assigned missions. This is an inherently complex
enterprise that involves sequencing of events, maneuver of forces, timely engagement ofdissimilar weapons platforms and systems, as well as the logistical sustainment and support ofthe entire force. JFMCC’s ability to achieve success, optimized in terms of the expenditure oftime and resources, is heavily dependent upon the judicious application of naval operationalart, and the integration of all naval capabilities.
War is more art than science because the fog of uncertainty that shrouds military operations
masks enemy intention and precludes linear calculation of cause and effect. Consequently, thebiggest, and materially best, forces often do not win. Much of the art of war involves the ability
to lure the enemy into disadvantageous maneuver, and induce him to self-imbalance to achievefavorable, hopefully even disproportionate, results in battle. Naval operational art is particularlycomplex, as a consequence of the many variables across multiple domains that contribute toachieving sea control and denial. Sea control remains a necessary temporal condition forexpeditionary operations and power projection, and involves mastering the forces andplatforms that can influence the sea from the sea surface, subsurface, air, and land domains.
The electromagnetic spectrum and space are also significant contributors to the growing
complexity of sea control operations. At the tactical level on the open ocean, naval
engagements may largely involve ships and afloat capabilities, but, at the operational level ofwar, in the vicinity of confined seas, JFMCC’s resources for achieving sea control can be greatly
expanded. Artfully employed, these many diverse forces, and emerging capabilities, can provide
the decisive edge in close contests.
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Traditional bases will remain essential to support the outside force, but, they represent staticand increasingly vulnerable hubs in otherwise dynamic joint operations. EABs are designed tosupport forces maneuvering at the edge of the advancing joint campaign, and are themselves
moveable entities that contribute to more resilient and advantageous maneuver.
Much of America’s success in war can be attributed to military culture. Modern US militaryculture has evolved to favor material overmatch and tactical excellence. Our habitual victorymechanism is closely linked to an extravagant expenditure of material resources to support
tactical actions with a surfeit of mobility, range, lethality, protection, and firepower. US ability
to exploit complex C2 and ISR systems to minimize risk and achieve an advantageous synergy
among many joint capabilities is admirable. However, the evolved American paradigm of war,
where air and sea control are presumptive rather than contested, is fast waning. The evolving
paradigm of naval operational art will demand greater synergy among a broader range ofincreasingly scarce and expensive operational capabilities that must be closely integrated fromforces operating inside and outside of the adversary threat range. There is a significant
professional leap from proficiency at fleet and MAGTF tactics to the broader competency ofnaval operational art. Reclaiming the ambition and ability to conduct naval operations thatclosely integrate forces and capabilities that are best employed from land with those that are
optimally sea-based, is essential to realizing the potential of EABO. Naval leaders mustrejuvenate the competencies that enable the agile and advantageous application of naval
operational art from diverse capabilities operating throughout the battlespace.
3.5.1 Preparation, Deterrence, And Defense
The context of the US approach to expeditionary operations is conditioned by the historic
events of the Pacific campaign in WWII and the Allied invasion of Europe, where US forces
began at home and moved into enemy-occupied territory. That context was established after
the initial failure of US and Allied forces to defend the Philippines and Europe necessitated along and bloody sequel. As in WWII, and all wars since, the first battles of the next major war
will be fought ‘over there,’ and will likely involve US attempts to meet treaty commitments tomaintain the territorial integrity of treaty allies and economic partners against hegemonic
gambits by regional peer competitors. Understanding the complexity and cost of offensive
expeditionary operations makes deterring or winning first defensive battles the infinitely more
prudent military strategy. This is especially true in the current era, where long-range, observed,
precision fires and innovative undersea threats make the maritime defense the far stronger
form of battle.
Inchon well demonstrated the exceptional advantage of employing amphibious forces to redimension the battlespace, but regaining lost territory by amphibious assault is extravagantly
expensive in blood and treasure. Every prudent effort to meet our treaty commitments
without loss of allied territory is ultimately less costly. Military deterrence pays. In the current
era, the maritime defense is disproportionately advantaged. Once potential aggressors are
assured that US forces can, and will, mount a credible and enduring defense to meet our treaty
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commitments, the likelihood of conflict is significantly diminished. It is imperative that the US
develop the conceptual methodology and deploy the requisite means to demonstratecommitment to both friends and enemies. For this reason, deterrence is greatly enhanced as
US and partner nations create the conditions that will enable the EABO concept to be employedin combined operations. Prepositioning of forces and materiel, developing relationships withpartner forces and local vendors, exercising EABO skill sets, and integrating inside and outside
force capabilities before conflict, is essential to ultimate success.
3.6 EAB Forces
A wide variety of naval forces may be involved in preparing, securing, developing, defending,sustaining, and operating from EABs. EABs may host different capability sets depending on
assigned missions, but, in aggregate, a capable inside force will have a full array of resilient
operational, functional, and support capabilities essential to supporting the JFMCC concept ofoperations. Future naval force development should focus on optimizing these capabilities tomeet the low-signature characteristics required by the inside force. Marine forces are suited formany of these missions, but Marine forces alone will be inadequate to develop, man, andoperate the full range of EABO capabilities. Crux naval capabilities for the establishment,
maintenance, and operation of EABs are found in the NECC. The construction, small craft, andmany other expeditionary capabilities of the NECC are integral to EABO. Navy and joint
personnel involved in operational and functional support activities can be expected to support
and operate from EABs. Not to be overlooked are the considerable capabilities and naval
competencies of the US Coast Guard that can contribute to EABO.
As previously discussed, the optimized naval inside force capabilities necessary for sea control
and denial operations are currently under development, and are the centerpiece of naval
research and innovation efforts. These smaller platforms will be greatly advantaged by
employment from EABs situated on partner territory in proximity to close and confined seas.
As they are fielded, we can anticipate that more Sailors will be forward-postured ashore to
maintain and operate these forward-deployed and employed naval capabilities.
In addition to naval forces, the US Army has robust small craft and ships optimized for littoral
operations; and USAF experience and expertise in fixed-base defense and resilience can beleveraged in support of EABO development. As aforementioned, EABO is a naval concept withbroad joint implications, and is designed to incorporate and host all joint capabilities that can
support the C/JFMCC and JFC scheme of maneuver. In practice, EABO will require innovative
leaders capable of leveraging all available resources, joint, combined, and host nation, toadvantage.
Host nation forces will be critical to maintaining the security and effectiveness of EABO.
Whenever possible, host nation security forces should be incorporated into the EAB security
plan as the outer security cordon. To preclude misunderstandings and frictions, host nation
forces should interface with the local populace to the degree practical. Perhaps more important39

is the ability for host nation forces to expand the capacity of US forces with their own platforms
and capabilities to achieve a coordinated and combined defense. Logistical sustainment can beextended and enhanced by purchasing or contracting host nation resources, and manytransportation assets are already available from the host nation economy to support naval
maneuver and landward movement. In archipelagic environments, contracted ferries, barges,
and small coastal ships have great potential to support EABO.
3.6.1 The Integrated Maritime Defense-In-Depth
New operational concepts and capabilities should offer future strategic decision-makers new
and more viable options. Future strategies designed to compel nuclear capable peercompetitors will be better optimized when naval and joint forces can generate militaryconditions that are adequately coercive, but not vertically escalatory. By developing the EABO
capabilities necessary to conduct a dynamic, integrated maritime defense-in-depth at straits
adjacent to partner territory, naval forces can take advantage of partner geography astride
close seas to turn a competitor’s near-seas into mutually-denied space. Such conditions arehighly coercive and take advantage of the stronger form of contemporary battle, the tacticalmaritime defense; yet employed defensively in close proximity to partner national territory,
they are neither unduly provocative nor vertically escalatory.
Demonstrating to regional partners and competitors alike that the US has both the means andmethod to stand forward and meet its treaty obligations will reassure allies and greatly assist
US diplomatic efforts to ensure continued regional access. The ability to generate an
integrated, active maritime defense-in-depth at key maritime terrain from EABs will serve as acredible forward deterrent force. Integrated naval defenses astride key maritime terrain canreadily incorporate the capabilities of regional partners to expand US capacity, and be thecornerstone of mutual defense agreements.
EABO capabilities can be optimized to meet the requirements of an integrated maritime
defense-in-depth. Naval forces can readily control access to adversary near-seas with minimalrisk to force and mission by integrating ample ISR and sensors, numerous unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs), both manned and unmanned surface and air capabilities, landbased fires, and other inexpensive, low-signature, high-lethality capabilities to block confinedstraits. This strategy would enable US forces to restore the strategic initiative by quickly
occupying EABs adjacent to key maritime terrain, and then allow them to fall back on thetactical maritime defensive, exploiting the stronger form of contemporary naval battle to deteror defeat enemy attempts to breakout. Compounding the adversary problem, varied anddiverse EABO platforms and capabilities would be able to disperse horizontally at EABs, andconcentrate vertically at the point of decision to generate disproportionate result in battle.
The concept of vertical concentration is based on the anticipated ability to simultaneously mass
smaller, low-signature, and more risk-worthy platforms on the sea surface, sub-surface, and air,and then cover them with land-based fires and EMS effects to provide a persistent, high density
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network of integrated lethal capabilities. Since risk-worthy, low-signature platforms areconcentrated over/under adversary platforms and can deliver payloads simultaneously, they
are effectively massed, but their horizontal distribution makes them significantly lessvulnerable.
To create new and better military options for future strategic decision-makers, exploiting theunique opportunity EABO presents to generate the advantages of vertical concentration as partof an active integrated maritime defense-in-depth should be a primary objective of naval force
development. The offensive and defensive merits of vertical concentration will be detailed as aseparate concept.
3.6.2 The Role Of Marines In EABO
The formal mission to establish EABs arises from the enduring operational requirement tosupport and sustain forward-deployed naval forces. In recognition of the enduring nature ofthis naval mission, it has been formally included within the Marine Corps’ Title 10
responsibilities:
The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces ofcombined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure
or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may beessential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

Long before Title 10 was envisioned, the US Navy and embarked Marines were engaged inseizing and defending advanced naval bases. The first American naval expedition was tocapture British munitions for the Continental Army from British bases in Bermuda, anexpeditionary mission that was naval in character, but joint in purpose. During World War II the
Marine Corps formed Defense Battalions with the mission of defending the advanced basesthat Marines had occupied or seized and subsequently defended against Japanese counterattack—such as at Wake and Guadalcanal, where Marines manned shore-based naval guns.
During the Wake Island battle, the Marines sank the first Japanese surface ship of the war withland-based naval gunfire. The requirement for EABs is nothing new; what will be new are theadvanced systems and low-signature, resilient capabilities they will host and support, and thenew options they will give national decision-makers.
While EABs are clearly not new from a historical perspective, EABO will be new to a generationof naval officers and naval theorists who have had the luxury of largely focusing on power
projection from the sea. Presumptive sea control since the end of WWII has allowed Marines
to focus almost exclusively on power projection, crisis response, and small wars. Yet, Marines
are first and foremost naval forces, and it is imperative that Marines join efforts with the Navyto support JFMCC and fleet commanders in the fight for sea control, particularly in the vicinityof close and confined seas. If the joint campaign is to be expeditionary, sea control will be afirst, and necessary, condition for subsequent power projection.

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For over 70 years, Marines have fought with the luxury of sea control assured by the US Navy.
Consequently, Marines refined and optimized their organization, kit, and ships for offensive
power projection operations from the sea. The last time Marines fought with the Navy for sea
control was at Guadalcanal during the WWII Solomons campaign, where land-based naval
aviation assets from Henderson Field were integrated with fleet actions afloat by a common
naval commander. The Solomons campaign serves as a valuable historic metaphor that
illustrates the operational advantage of maintaining both an inside and outside force posture.
Now that the sea is again a contested space, Marines must return to fighting for and from thesea. Two old imperatives are new again:
Marines must develop a new line of operations and force development to support JFMCC andfleet commanders in the fight for sea control. Marines are essential to successful sea control
and denial missions in close and confined seas. Marines fight for and from contiguous landmasses that enable control of the sea—especially close and confined seas.
Marines are Fleet Marine Forces—an integral naval asset in fleet sea control and denial
operations, and must be incorporated into the overall fleet scheme of maneuver by the naval
commander. Effective maritime defense-in-depth integrates land and sea-based capabilities.
Marines know how to make a virtue of austerity, and together with the NECC, and other Navy
assets, can create the optimized inside force capability set. At the same time, other Marines
formed as MAGTFs afloat on amphibious ships will also be part of the weighted outside force,and their employment will be coordinated with wider fleet actions. The Marine Corps will havea role as both inside and outside forces in future naval battles.
It is often and aptly stated that Marines must return to their naval roots. However, as Marines
return to their naval roots, they must not go back to being the naval force they were before
going into the desert to fight the war on terror. Our most agile and aggressive enemies have
moved forward and invalidated the fundamental assumptions upon which the legacy force wasbuilt. Marines must move forward to become the new expeditionary naval force the nation and
the Navy need. The institutional ability to adapt to new realities with new capabilities,
competencies, organizational structures, and operational concepts, are essential to institutional
agility and enduring relevance. The Nation revers the United States Navy and Marine Corps forour history, but Congress only invests in our potential.
3.6.3 The Role Of The Navy In EABO
Due to size and signature, most of the Navy’s surface combatants are optimized outside forcesthat are noteworthy for their maneuverability, massed fire power, and offensive and defensive
capabilities. Legacy outside forces will provide the battle-winning mass and maneuver forces forthe foreseeable future. Until ships evolved to meet the threats posed by long-range precision
weapon systems can be acquired, legacy platforms and their support infrastructure will venture
into close and confined seas with great trepidation. Creative naval commanders will exploit the42persistent situational awareness and distributed capabilities of the inside force to leverage themass and maneuverability of outside naval forces at reduced risk to force and mission.
As the inside force evolves to incorporate today’s R&D platforms into tomorrow’s Navy,
progressively more Sailors will become part of the inside force to man and maintain the flotillasof new lethal, yet low-signature, capabilities that modern warfare demands. Regionally-aligned
Navy forces with emergent capabilities will be employed and sustained from EABs. These newcapabilities will include classic flotilla forces of missile and torpedo boats, an array of
unmanned, and minimally manned, platforms on the sea surface, sub-surface, and air, thatcooperatively scout, maneuver, and engage enemy platforms with missiles, torpedoes, andmobile mines. Some may deploy lethal swarms, while others tag and track enemy platforms for
subsequent engagement. Land-based Sailors servicing and maintaining sea control and denial
capabilities from barges and small craft will be part of a more balanced future fleet.
Submarines are the ultimate inside force capabilities, combining both stealth and lethality on
platforms that can persist forward. Submarine demand will far exceed capacity in a major
combat operation against a peer competitor. To achieve a larger submerged capability
inventory in a fiscally sound manner, consideration should be given to the cost and tacticaladvantages of unmanned underwater systems (UUSs) and non-nuclear boats operating in
confined and shallow seas. EABO could support the ASW fight as part of the overall sea control
and denial effort by deploying and supporting UUVs, underwater sensors and replenishingsubmarine stores and munitions forward.
Long-range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) that require long runways, are not well suited forforward-basing. Fixed-wing MPA might be refueled forward at FARPs and serve to search forenemy submarines deep into the ocean, but, for closing straits, rotary-wing and UAS pouncers
hosted on EABs can quickly prosecute enemy submarines when detected by underwater
sensors, freeing more capable, but less combat resilient, MPA assets to defend the SLOCs.
EABO platforms and capabilities must be connected as nodes in the Fleet Tactical Grid tooperate as an integral part of the fleet. EABO will be coordinated with the inside and outside
forces to support DMO. This may include ISR, sea denial and control activities, torpedo andmissile reloads, refueling, critical repair parts, and other support. The availability of EAB support
capabilities in proximity to the fight will extend surface combatants time on station byminimizing the transit time to otherwise obtain support from fixed bases outside the range ofthe enemy’s long-range fires. EABs must be capable of self-defense so that vulnerable surface
combatants will not be required for their defense and will be available to conduct other highpriority missions.
3.6.3.1 The Role Of The NECC In EABOThe NECC has robust capabilities that will be required to establish and sustain EABs. Just as
Navy construction battalions were critical to the creation of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal,
so, too, will today’s NECC assets be integral to the planning, preparation, establishment, and43

successful operation of EABs. Like Marine forces, the NECC will require force development
initiatives to better optimize its capabilities to win the hider/finder competition and support
inside forces. The diverse competencies of NECC Sailors and units can be task-organized with
Marines to create low-signature infrastructure, and enhance services and security for EABs. In
addition to the renowned construction battalions, the NECC has competencies in port security,
small craft and patrol boat operations, and underwater construction and demolition, which willbe essential to establishing, maintaining, and securing EABs.
3.7 EABO In A Notional Campaign
EABO is designed to host and employ joint and naval capabilities in a dynamic future joint
campaign. The capabilities and activities related to EABO will change as the campaign
progresses. Some common, albeit notional, missions and activities that might be directed by
JFMCC or JFC during the campaign are discussed below to illustrate the concept:
3.7.1 Pre-Conflict Shaping
Theater support and cooperation (TSC) activities and investments can be tailored to prepare
host nation infrastructure to better support future operational requirements for humanitarianrelief operations or military conflict. TSC activities build relationships with regional allies andpartners, develop partner capabilities, and expand infrastructure capacity to foster deterrence
and enable future interoperability. Interoperability exercises not only develop greater ability
for coherent combined operations among partnered forces, but enable US forces to develop
greater familiarity with forward operational environments. Exercises can be used to build
enduring infrastructure (such as FARP sites, roads, and water access ramps), and to preposition
equipment that has relevance for both disaster relief and future conflict. Likewise, contingency
contracts can be researched and let for local equipment or infrastructure critical to future
operations, minimizing the time and cost impositions associated with transporting assets from
CONUS. Most importantly, the military-to-military relationships that engender trust in bothpeace and war can be fostered by fprward-deployed forces to reassure allies and build
interoperability. Well-considered advance work done pre-conflict can provide decisive
advantage in future war. While we must be careful not to telegraph our intentions concerning
the locations of EABs, subtle improvements that require long lead or construction time merit
particular consideration in how we can work to shape and prepare for future conflict.
3.7.2 Deterrence
Active deterrence activities include moving combat capabilities from the permanent forward
bases where US regional forces are strategically postured to more proximate positions where
they can assume a ready and operationally advantaged stance. These visible actions
demonstrate resolve, and are designed to reassure allies, as well as deter aggressors. Today,
the movement of forces from their accustomed strategic posture to a more forward and readyoperational stance enables the US to better exploit its significant investment in comparatively
short-legged tactical aviation assets. However, by so doing, it may also place critical joint assets
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within the range of enemy ballistic missiles directed at high-value targets and permanent
infrastructure. In the future, advance inside forces will exploit the opportunities created by
improved / dispersed positions and mobile infrastructure developed pre-conflict. Quickly
established, mutually-supporting EABs will host the advance of numerous joint sensor and fires
capabilities that can be tactically dispersed in proximity to operational decisive points. EABO
will threaten enemy critical vulnerabilities, constrain enemy movement and maneuver,compound enemy uncertainty, and greatly slow or stop enemy ability to achieve operational
objectives. Quickly established EABs will be particularly important when the adversary’s
strategy is based on a well-calculated bid to rapidly create fait accompli military events andconditions that lead to a favorable political conclusion. Effective deterrence against an A2ADequipped adversary will be dependent on a credible dual force posture, prepositioning, andquickly executable deployment plans that generate readiness and indicate resolve.
Demonstrated ability to close or constrict confined seas with an integrated maritime defense isa strong deterrent.
3.7.3 Gaining The Initiative
Joint and combined operations will likely initiate in response to adversary aggression, hence,
the initiative will originate in the enemy’s court and may be compounded by surprise.
However, a dual-postured force with proper preparation and prepositioning will prove far more
resilient than the contemporary force, and better insulated from enemy attempts to threaten
or create a catastrophic strike.
By quickly occupying EABs situated on key maritime terrain, US naval expeditionary forces canquickly turn the table and seize the strategic initiative. The expanded range of precision fires in
the missile age means the tactical defense is again the stronger form of naval battle. By rapidly
occupying key maritime terrain astride close seas, US naval forces can gain the strategic
initiative, and then require the enemy to assume the far more vulnerable tactical offensive.
Military minds conditioned to reflexively assume the tactical offense may well miss theopportunity this change in modern warfare presents. Selecting objectives that generate
opportunity for strategic offense and tactical defense may be central to early advantage in 21 st
century naval operational art.
The defense has many strengths in the missile age that can be leveraged by the judicious
application of operational art. To exploit key maritime terrain, naval forces at the leading edgeof the advancing joint line of operations seize or occupy EABs in proximity to critical sea lines ofcommunications or anticipated areas of contested sea control. These advanced expeditionary
bases may be mutually-supporting islands in critical archipelagoes, or mainland bases near key
maritime terrain or decisive points. EABs may be actively defended, or passively rely on theirremote and isolated nature for all but close security. Alternatively, they may be defended byindigenous allied / partnered forces. An adversary’s attempts to effectively strike capabilities
aboard EABs with long-range ballistic and cruise missiles are mitigated by dispersion andpassive protection activities such as decoys, cover, concealment, and frequent displacement.
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The time and cost imposition involved in reducing numerous mutually-supporting EABs isfundamental to their purpose, and contributes to the passive nature of their defense.
Operational requirements and calculated risk must guide the disposition, composition,
deployment, and defense of the capabilities placed on EABs.
The relative ease and speed of moving personnel compared to materiel suggests that early
actions to seize the initiative should rely on rapidly integrating deployable personnel withprepositioned equipment to augment permanently stationed forces. EABs are not envisioned
as locations for conducting reception, staging and onward movement and integration of forces(RSO&I), but once personnel are integrated with their equipment, EABs must be ready tosupport EABO.
EABs can be used to simply advance sea denial capabilities, or to extend naval and joint ‘sensor
and shooters’ as far forward as practical. In the near term, sensors, such as land-based radars(ground/air task-oriented radar (G/ATOR)) and manned and unmanned aviation assets,
combined with vertical/short take-off and vertical landing (V/STOVL) aircraft will extend thedetection capabilities of the JFMCC and the JTF. Existing fires capabilities (such as high mobility
artillery rocket system (HIMARS) and Army tactical missile system (ATACMS)) may also include
aviation combat element (ACE) aircraft bounding forward from land-based FARPs andexpeditionary runways. These current adaptations of current capabilities will serve until more
optimized low-signature inside force capabilities can be designed and procured.
Future conceptual capabilities include shore-based operational-level fires to enhance EAB
defense, contribute to sea denial, and complement naval operational maneuver with longrange anti-air and anti-ship missiles. Land-based missile systems might be designed for greatercommonality with naval sea-based missile systems. Mobile, concealed, and dispersed longrange missile systems can disproportionately contribute to the sea control and sea denial
mission, are relatively inexpensive to operate, and are more difficult, and less lucrative, totarget than sea-based systems. Mobile land-based missiles lack the extensive maneuver
capabilities of navy ships, but can compensate for the inherent limitations of sea-based missiles
in range and capacity, and can be dispersed to ensure that even successful enemy strikes have
limited consequences. Land-based missiles are not constrained by the dimensions of shipvertical launching system (VLS) tubes, and can be created in the length and diameters necessary
to ‘out-stick’ enemy weapons. Weapons and sensors engaged in the sea control/denial mission
are commanded by JFMCC and controlled via CEC. The differing, but complementary,advantages of resilient land and maneuverable sea-based systems offer more lethal
combinations, and provide additional means for the joint commander to exercise operationalart.
By quickly deploying forces to man prepositioned materiel and conduct EABO, US naval forces
can compel adversaries to assume the tactical offensive. Forward-positioned and dualpostured forces, complemented by strategic maneuver and tactical defense, will create thegreatest advantage from available time, resources, preparation, and positioning in future naval
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battles in close and confined seas. Advancing large ships across an expanse of exposed andtechnically observed water in the missile age is not an enviable prospect.
A modern fleet engagement against a peer competitor will place great demands on the capacityof missile magazines of forward-deployed ships. Volleys of enemy missiles will quickly diminish
the defensive capacity of capital ships and their defending escorts. Transit time for ships to go
to fixed ports to reload missiles will detract from the forces needed forward to maintainoffensive operations. With new rearming technology on afloat fleet replenishment platforms,
ships could more quickly rearm missiles in protected anchorages in the operational lee ofmutually-supporting advanced expeditionary bases, and return to station far sooner than if
required to rearm at distant ports. Likewise, damaged ships requiring in extremis repairs could
find respite in proximity to self-protecting EABs. EABs are not invulnerable to enemy action andraid forces, but to the degree that they compel the enemy to distribute resources, time, andattention, they reverse the A2AD challenge, and add significant resilience to the joint force.
Missiles are not the only means to destroy ships. Small diameter torpedoes are highly effective
and difficult to detect and interdict. New alternative means of reducing enemy ships withswarm technologies deployed by unmanned systems, and similarly unmanned mobile
minefields and other innovative systems, will be optimally deployable from EABs. The newcapabilities of a credible inside force are at the cutting edge of readily achievable innovationand technical possibility. They are in various stages of technical readiness levels in our Service
and national research laboratories. These capabilities are smaller and make better use ofenergetics, autonomy, artificial intelligence (AI), power, swarms, and stealth. They will be more
deployable, hide-able, preposition-able, lethal, and affordable, than legacy systems, and will
greatly enhance the combat power of EABO and the inside force.
To achieve the advantages of the strategic offense and tactical defense, the JFMCC must act
quickly early in the joint campaign to establish EABs at forward locations. The deployment andemployment of these forces will be inherently risky, as JFMCC will move and maneuver forcesin close proximity to a hostile and aggressive enemy similarly bent on shaping the close seas
battle to his own advantage. The tempo of operations in this phase will be important, and will
set the opening conditions that will shape subsequent events. The ability of expeditionary
forces to hold a “foot in the door” will preclude the need for more sanguine operations later to“kick the door in” with an amphibious assault.
Besides competing with the enemy for temporal advantage, JFMCC will be in competition withthe rest of the joint force for scarce air and sea mobility resources. Other component
commanders, who are more heavily dependent upon sophisticated fixed infrastructure andlengthy airfields, will be simultaneously attempting to defend themselves, disperse combat andsupport assets, and support forward-deployed forces. Reliance on already stressed andtenuous joint mobility assets will prove imprudent; all commanders will want C-17s to moveforces and assets out of ballistic missile range. Consequently, JFMCC should look to transport
EAB assets on less optimized, but more practical and prolific, platforms. The use of commercial
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assets available forward and already in theater, such as barges, ferries, and container carriers
may prove a more pragmatic option that will not compete with the support and sustainment offorward-deployed fleets and MAGTFs. Austerity, an inherent characteristic of expeditionary
operations, will similarly characterize EABs, and enable the rapid transport of materiel with an
optimized tooth-to-tail ratio.
3.7.4 Sustained Combat Operations
In this phase, naval forces continue to hold or extend the joint line of operations to accomplish
JTF campaign objectives. As operational requirements dictate and terrain permits, JFMCC
artfully integrates the complementary capabilities of land and sea-based forces to maintain theinitiative, secure sea control, and achieve operational advantage. While the particulars of eachcampaign will be unique, EABs will enable creative commanders with agile forces to present theadversary with a growing array of operational capabilities that will generate new dilemmas,
complicate his calculations, and compound friction. Naval forces that can exploit littoral terrain
to advantage with EABs will be better able to persist forward, sustain fprward-deployed forces,
and integrate more capabilities with greater resiliency, capacity, and acceptable risk.
Quickly established and capable of self or mutual defense, EABO inside forces will free fleets tomaneuver while constraining enemy options by denying sea-space. Designed to be inherently
resilient, EABs can absorb enemy fire and maintain continuity of operations while dissipating
enemy combat power, and extending the enemy’s operational time line. Quickly deployed andartfully executed in conjunction with fleet operations, EABO can enable JFMCC to dictate tempo
and create advantageous conditions for decisive engagements.
Risk-worthy EAB-hosted ISR assets will project forward to discover and maintain contact withenemy forces and platforms and diminish uncertainty for JFMCC. Decoys ashore and afloat will
confound enemy situational awareness and generate mis-perception.
In the near term, shore-based aviation from expeditionary airfields and FARP sites can be
employed to complement fleet actions in the fight for sea control. Land-based fires capabilities
can deny or restrict air and sea space, give range and depth to missile capacity, and defend
sanctuaries for naval assets to quickly reload, replenish, refit, and reengage. SLOCs can bebetter defended, and critical sea lanes interdicted, when naval forces are supported by EABO.
The operational resiliency and tactical advantages EABO achieves through passive defenses anddispersion are at the expense of the ease and efficiency of functional support and logisticalsustainment at conventional bases. Dispersion of assets inevitably reduces the economy of scalethat makes conventional basing logistically efficient. All combat support functions will
experience increased friction when operating dispersed. Sustained combat operations willplace great demand on logistical infrastructure and materiel stockpiles. Traditional combat
support ships will be stressed to provide adequate combat sustainment and logistical service
and support to the fleet. Consequently, EABO will require a new concept of logistical support48

and sustainment, and demand innovative platforms to execute novel distribution and delivery
requirements.
As the joint campaign advances toward strategic goals, EABs may need to displace forward tomaintain operational synergy with the joint force. The minimal use of fixed infrastructure andausterity of EABs should diminish the difficulty of displacing assets, and, to the extent thatmany capabilities may be maintained afloat, on barges, ferries, and small craft, the speed ofdisplacement can be greatly enhanced.
In major combat operations, EABO provides an alternative force posture and structure thatenables naval forces to persist, partner, and operate within the arc of adversary long-range
fires—but these qualities and capabilities must be woven into the fabric of the overall fleet
scheme of maneuver if they are to develop the combat power needed to confront and defeat
modern adversaries. The inside force enables persistence, the outside force generates massand maneuver. With foresight in force development and creative application in battle, the US
Naval Services can initiate the next paradigm in naval warfare.

4.0 Considerations For Force Development
The naval services will require new types of forces, organizational structures, and capabilities topersist, partner, and fight within range of adversary long-range fires in accord with the EABO
concept. Many of these force capabilities and characteristics are apparent today; otherrequirements will evolve through wargaming, experimentation, functional force development,
and the innovation of creative and determined warriors. It is imperative that the new EABO
inside force capabilities be holistically designed, functionally complete, fully integrated, andmutually supporting.
4.0.1 Holistically Designed
A robust inside forces must be capable of exploiting all physical domains of the common battle
space to advantage. Some capabilities may be optimized to operate in a specific battle spacedomain, others to create asymmetries and advantage from an adjacent domain, or to move
more seamlessly between them. Each new capability expands the pallet of options for theoperational commander to create new lethal combinations of ‘sensors and shooters’ thatenable temporal advantage, persistent surprise, and the ability to accomplish assigned missions
with a variety of unpredictable operational patterns.
4.0.2 Functionally Complete
EABs must possess the full array of security and functional support services to sustain warriors
and their machines. EABO is predicated on a mission- appropriate complement of cross domain
sensor arrays and weapons systems that are integrate-able on a common C2 architecture—the
Fleet Tactical Grid. In aggregate, a number of mutually supporting EABs should provide for acomprehensive suite of local defense capabilities that can serve to defend key maritime terrain,
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ensure force persistence, and leverage proximity to advantage the outside force, and support
the JFMCC/JFC scheme of maneuver.
4.0.3 Fully Integrated
Optimized EABO inside force capabilities are largely still under development. As they are
fielded they must avoid the interoperability challenges currently faced by the legacy force.
New EABO capabilities must be designed from the start to meet common naval and joint
interoperability standards for data, targeting, and communications systems. Currently, Marine
and Navy forces de-conflict the battle space and C2 arrangements based on the high watermark and CATF/CLF protocols. EABO will require a more fully integrated naval battle space if
we are to observe, orient, decide, and act at the near ‘machine speed’ demanded by future
battle.
4.0.4 Mutually Supporting
As we distribute forces we must take great care not to create a posture that is ripe for rapid
defeat in detail. Depending on METT-T circumstances, EABO should enable mutual support
among EAB-hosted capabilities. EABO should leverage the capabilities of the afloat fleet andnot tax outside forces for self-defense. Most importantly, naval forces should leverage thesignificant tactical advantage that the defense holds in modern naval warfare to ensure thepersistence of forward postured forces.
4.1 New Operational Imperatives
The aforementioned naval warfighter challenges comprise the new operational Imperatives
that describe broad operational requirements for the EABO enabled inside force, and are
repeated below, as they are fundamental to guiding the force development process in creating
future inside force capabilities.
1. Generate the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration
2. Create a more dispersed, resilient and hard to target forward-basing infrastructure
3. Create a more resilient CONUS / sea base-to-shore sustainment infrastructure capable ofsupporting distributed forces and operations
4. Win the hider/finder competition
4.2 Tenets Of EABO
To maximize the utility of EABO, certain tenets should guide our approach to force
development. The EABO tenets describe desired force qualities and characteristics.

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4.2.1 Enable Economy-Of-ForceThis principle of war is well served by EABs that host sea control / denial capabilities that freeships and other fleet assets to maneuver and accomplish missions elsewhere. EABO can be
employed to disproportionately draw enemy forces.
4.2.2 Plan, Prepare, And Preposition
The strategic competition has already begun. Advance work to set the theater before armed
conflict will greatly contribute to deterrence and ultimate success. Creating an advantageous
force posture that incorporates allied territory and forces exceeds the authority of the Defense
Department, and must include other diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements
and international partners in developing future strategy. Speed of response is critical to future
success, and prepositioning is critical to speed of deployment. Preparation, particularly forsustainment and support activities, is an EABO prerequisite in any future expeditionary
scenario.
4.2.3 Expand Capacity With Partner Capability
To the degree possible, inside force capabilities that can be shared with partners to expand
capacity are preferable.
4.2.4 Invert Cost Imposition
The requirement to defend legacy infrastructure and platforms imposes huge costs on the joint
force. The inside force must invert this imposition and extend the enemy’s relative cost in time,
expense, and level of effort required to find, fix, target, and destroy EABO capabilities.
4.2.5 Relative Economy
Nothing expended in war is inexpensive, but understanding that much of the brittle nature of
the current joint force is compounded by exquisite weapons of great cost and slender supply,
EABO should be designed to enhance relative economy to gain additional capacity. The term
economy has many permutations, but innovative systems that enable less manpower, reduce
maintenance and infrastructure requirements, and enable greater resiliency in austereenvironments, are particularly desired enablers for EABO.
4.2.6 Leverage Partner Proximity
Use more proximate allied and partner basing options to enhance persistence and reduce sizeand cost of capabilities. All ISR efforts are enhanced by closer proximity.
4.2.7 Make Austerity A Virtue
The inside force must thrive in austere conditions amid adequate, but comparatively
underdeveloped, infrastructure. Robust, user maintained, logistics-light capabilities, andhearty, mission focused forces are critical to maintaining persistent presence.
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4.2.8 Minimize Signature
The ability to minimize and manage signature is critical to winning the enduring hider/finder
competition on EABs. EAB commanders will need ‘own force’ signature detection andmitigation ability.
4.2.9 Balance The ForceFor EABO, a larger number of smaller capabilities that are inherently resilient and risk-worthy
are preferred to a smaller number of singular, expensive, exquisite, and maintenance intensive
capabilities. Exquisite platforms that cannot persist forward in austere conditions are suboptimized for EABO.
4.2.10 Conserve Assault Shipping And Fleet Support Assets
Some EABs may need to be seized by a sea-based MAGTF, and initially supported by afloat
MAGTF assets and supplies. However, to the degree possible, EABO will strive to use
capabilities and platforms that conserve expenditure of the forward-deployed MAGTF assets,
and limited and vulnerable amphibious shipping.
4.2.11 Promote Operational Resiliency
For forces to operate and thrive in conditions of austerity within range of enemy long-range
fires they must be resilient. Capabilities that degrade gracefully are preferred to those withsingle points of failure. Redundant systems and capabilities that are interoperable are preferredto those characterized by brittle “kill chains,” where destruction of one link in a system induces
mission failure. Qualities that contribute to winning the hider/finder competition are
particularly valuable. For example, capabilities that can be transported and operated incontainers greatly compound the enemy target location problem as the ubiquity of thecontainer enables capabilities to be hidden in plain sight. These ‘pea under the cup’ and manyother creative methods of achieving a more austere, low-signature, and resilient force posturewith minimal infrastructure should guide our approach.
4.2.12 Naval Task Force Organization
EABs may host MAGTF elements, but fundamentally they are designed to free MAGTFs andfleets to fight elsewhere. While primarily naval in character, they may also host many joint
capabilities and forces. We can anticipate that many, if not the majority of forces in somecases, may be Navy personnel from the NECC, or Sailors to replicate traditional fleet capabilities
from innovative unmanned or minimally manned platforms that are launched and sustained
ashore. Capabilities such as decoys, C2, ISR, ASW, and many repair and support functions may
necessitate placing Sailors on EABs ashore. Marines and Sailors operating under an agile
command arrangement can support JFMCC as a unified naval task force.

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4.2.13 Mutual Support
EABs may achieve greater security and resiliency by being situated to provide mutual support.
A series of proximate and well-sited EABs with complementary capabilities can provide
significant operational advantage. In other cases, the ability of the EAB to interact
advantageously with the afloat fleet or other joint force capabilities will determine its resiliency
and value. Well distributed capability sets will need to join or concentrate to develop tacticalsynergy. For example, a surface flotilla of missile boats may require an advance screen of UAVs
to detect and identify targets for engagement. To minimize signature, these capabilities may bebased separately and join at sea. Likewise, the fires or ISR capabilities of one base may provide
support for another. In all cases, the EAB is designed to be an interactive entity that indirectly
supports and sustains the JFMCC and JFC concept of operations and scheme of maneuver
through the forces and capabilities that it hosts.
4.2.14 Calculated Risk
Risk is the moral challenge of command. Battle demands the risk and expenditure of precious
blood and treasure. As noted by John Paul Jones “...those who dare not risk cannot win.” EABO
must provide better options for commanders to make and take calculated risks. Many smaller,
yet lethal forces that degrade gracefully and are not single points of failure will help restore risk
as a military virtue.
4.3 Creating The Inside Force And EABO Capabilities
For the most part, the optimized inside force capabilities necessary to conduct EABO are notextant today. By adapting current capabilities we can create viable surrogates until force
development meets actual future force requirements, but we should not allow future force
development focus, funding, and bandwidth to be consumed by near-term adaptations tocurrent sunset capabilities at the expense of an overall more optimized future force. Clearly,
there will be tensions between the alternative needs to both fight tonight and fight right in thenear future, but the sooner our procurement processes reflect the paradigm shift in thecharacter of war, the sooner our expenditures will become relevant and enduring investmentsthat reflect future requirements against peer competitors.
Similar tensions between expenditures for legacy force maintenance and future force
requirements will also occur. As the nation’s 911 force, naval forces have readiness
requirements for immediate on-call missions, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HADR) and contingency response in the war on terror, for which legacy naval capabilities
are well optimized. However, the future requirements for meeting more existential threats are
significantly different from those of the recent past, and we must plan to transition our force
posture, structure, and capabilities without dropping any of the naval missions currently being
juggled.

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The transition from legacy force structure to inside force requirements will be as significant as
the transition from sail to steam, and from horses to internal combustion engines. Nations that
appreciate the new opportunity and capability requirements and act first will enjoy significant
advantage, while late adopters will be punished in the crucible of battle. John Boyd’s“Destruction and Creation” theory and Darwinian realities all apply to the current
circumstances. These theories are well-known, and their applicability is self-evident; what
history adds to the dynamic is the realization that change is difficult, and, that even in the faceof obvious evidence and warning, military institutions are loath to self-destroy what has
become habitual--even when patently archaic, in favor of what is clearly advantageous. Billy
Mitchell’s convincing demonstration of the vulnerability of the battleship was as evident on 6
Dec 1941 as it was on 8 Dec 1941. Pearl Harbor only provided the catalytic force ofembarrassment and defeat to precipitate change. Once again, the naval services are offered
the opportunity to create new sources of advantage before adversary action becomes thedebilitating catalyst.
What we disinvest in will be as important as discerning new requirements. The need todisestablish and destroy conventional capabilities to create the opportunity space for change
and growth is where military services often flounder. Although the paradigm shift can be
attributed to technological opportunity, the challenge will be met or bobbled on the moral
force of visionary leaders. By advocating a dual-postured force, the EABO concept seeks toameliorate the fight tonight vs. fight right dilemma by providing the opportunity to begin
investment and experimentation in new inside forces, while exploiting the still viable, but fastwaning capabilities of the legacy outside force. Eventually, as the range and precision of longrange fires grows ever further and more lethal, all forces need to meet the ‘new imperatives’that characterize the inside force, but there is near-term opportunity to create an elegant andadvantageous transition with a dual force posture.
An analysis of why the gestation period for new military capabilities from concept to fielding
has expanded into decades is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a competent force
development and acquisition process is integral to the overall strategic military competition, of
which EABO is but a part. Nevertheless, EABO capability requirements will both drive andbenefit from technological innovation. Many legacy naval capabilities are invested in ships-large, highly durable platforms that are now produced at few domestic locations in small
numbers at predictable rates. Most of the world’s ships are built in competitor nation yards at
far higher rates of production. A major combat operation that might require the risk,
expenditure, and replacement of ships would not be fought in conditions that are advantageous
to the United States. The industrial base for legacy ships is no longer a source of US advantage.
In contrast, the inside force capabilities and platforms required for EABO are dependent upon
the growing innovation base that remains highly competitive for US industries.
By preferentially developing and investing in inside force capabilities, the naval services candrive the future character of war toward US advantage. The technical qualities and operational
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characteristics of the inside force will not only provide commanders better military options, butwill foster and cultivate a new competitive space for force development and production.
For most of the last century, military requirements led technical innovation, and provided
daring challenges for industry and research laboratories to meet. However, it is now clear thatmilitary innovation lags significantly behind industry in exploiting rapidly evolving technologicalopportunities. Naval force development has progressed with linear improvements, while
industry has clearly demonstrated that technological opportunity is both exponential andemergent. The inside force will be more effective sooner if we break this trend and design EABO
capability requirements that anticipate where technology will be in five years. Industry andresearch laboratories are capable of generating new capabilities with ever increasing speed thathave the characteristics needed for the inside force. To remain competitive, current militarycompetencies must be constantly rejuvenated, or even displaced, by new capabilities andmethods. By anticipating the trajectory of technology as we identify EABO requirements wemight steal a march in force development, and better invest in more relevant future force
requirements.
The exponential rate of technological change is well reflected in common items, such as cell
phones. To remain competitive with the rate of change in technology, today’s phones aredesigned to be replaceable sooner. No one is willing to pay for long durability in acommunications platform that both manufacturers and customers expect to be archaic in but a
few years—or months. This accelerated pace of change must be anticipated in military
hardware and platforms as well. Many low cost, technologically advanced, relatively
inexpensive, and adequately lethal platforms, payloads, and systems, can make the integrated
maritime tactical defense formidable and disproportionately difficult to reduce in terms ofenemy blood and treasure. The opportunity to lead the next revolution in military advantage isripe now.
Computer-aided design (CAD), combined with additive manufacturing, enables new methods ofrapid prototyping. Developers can ‘fail faster’ and learn faster with cheaper prototypes thanever before. The relative value of large, durable, expensive, multi-mission platforms versus
small, replaceable, and mission-optimized platforms is clearly moving toward the latter, andthis reality will contribute to creating EABO capabilities that are not only better optimized topersist and fight, but to be more affordable as well. Autonomous and semi-autonomous
systems will greatly extend the range and duration of ever smaller and more capable systems
that withstand temperatures, pressures, and g-forces that far exceed the tolerances of thehuman body. Autonomy will promote greater risk acceptance and enable new lethal
capabilities, such as swarms amid an unlimited variety of UXX platforms. Autonomous
capabilities will facilitate man-unmanned teaming of platforms and sensors to multiply the
combat power of warriors forward. The ability of AI to aid distributed forces to effectively planand coordinate without large staffs will make EABO achievable sooner. Augmented reality (AR)will provide remote control of both reconnaissance and lethality systems and make economical
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use of personnel resources to assist distributed forces. When combined with ongoing advances
in material science and integrated in novel ways, these and other new technological trends
assure a future battlespace rife with new threats and opportunities. The next paradigm of
warfare will be characterized by exponential change and emergent capabilities that offer
unlimited potential for technical surprise.
The legacy force is dependent upon large platforms with long design, development and life
cycles. Even legacy platforms that are not necessarily large, like airplanes and submarines,
share increasingly lengthy development processes, and their exquisite nature makes themremarkably expensive. What was innovative on the drawing board is archaic upon delivery. In
contrast, the types of risk-worthy capabilities required for EABO are best when simple, cheaper,
more numerous, adequately lethal, and, in many cases, expendable. Rather than concentratingrisk in a few high-signature platforms, EABO capabilities should distribute risk over manysmaller, less expensive, and adequately lethal platforms that degrade gracefully, accept
obsolescence and depreciation in lieu of more expensive manpower intense maintenance, andpromote force resilience.
Nothing promotes coherent force development better than a cogent shared vision of how toadvantageously shape the future character of war. What is increasingly apparent is that thetactical maritime defense is the far stronger form of contemporary battle, and US forces havefew capabilities designed to exploit this growing asymmetry. Rapid investment and innovationin the development of offensive and defensive EABO capabilities will provide disproportionate
advantage and return on investment in terms of both deterrence and warfighting potential. The
science and technology (S&T) community and innovative American industries are poised andready to design and deliver EABO force requirements. National military advantage lies in acogent vision of a future inside force that capitalizes on the vast potential of America’s
innovation base.
4.4 EABO Conceptual Requirements By Function
EABO is an operational concept that will require new functional support concepts andcapabilities to be viable. Among the purposes of the base EABO concept is the intention to
guide the development of future concepts of functional support with fundamental tenets,
principles, and a common understanding that promotes effective collaboration between
functional force developers of both naval services. The actual EABO functional concepts will be
written by functional experts, but this EABO Handbook is designed to be a living document thatfurthers cross-functional integration.
Effective concepts anticipate future operational conditions to generate new opportunities foradvantage. The better we can envision how the concept would be applied against particularadversaries, the better we might discern new opportunity. For example, if we believe that
EABO might be particularly effective in archipelagic environments among volcanic islands wemight discern unique opportunities for new and creative aquatic and subterranean capabilities.
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Or, equally significant, we might recall historic lessons that can be updated to serve in a modern
EABO context.
For example, during WWII, the Japanese Army provided ample evidence of how porous volcanic
rock can be easily tunneled to provide superb cover, concealment, and deception
opportunities. Precedent suggests that boring capabilities ought to be added to EABO
engineering requirements. Likewise, ‘flying boats,’ such as the US Navy PBY, British Sunderland,
and Japanese Kawanishi H8K, were used throughout the Pacific theater throughout WWII to
conduct a wide variety of critical missions, from search and rescue (SAR), reconnaissance, andmovement of key personnel to ASW, logistics, and medical evacuation. The logistics advantage
of flying boats diminished after WWII when more efficient land runways were built virtually
everywhere. However, now that runways are pinpoint targets for long-range precision
weapons, the resilience afforded by large capacity aircraft that can land ashore, or afloat on‘self-healing’ runways in a theater where water is ubiquitous makes their utility an obvious andcompelling requirement.
The dispersion of critical capabilities on EABs can reduce the vulnerability of inside forces andtheir assets, but solving the resiliency challenge by distributing the combatants creates aninelegant trade-off with every support function, which lose efficiency and economy of scalefound on traditional bases. Resolving the resiliency/efficiency dilemma is a problem common
to all areas of functional support. Current force organizational structures promote efficiency bysharing critical functional assets. For example, the battalion aid station concentrates physician
level medical care at the battalion level, making wider distribution of forces below that levelproblematic in terms of medical risk. Future functional support planners must understand thisinherent dilemma and devise new means to ameliorate the risks currently associated withsingle source support.
New means of moving or associating parts, tools, personnel, and information can provide
distinct advantage in future war. Journeyman skills can be leveraged to produce craftsmanlevel work when maintenance personnel are mentored in real-time by maintenance video
libraries and reach-back expertise. Single-skill warriors are a relic of an industrial age approachto personnel management that produces vast inefficiencies, and contributes to a cognitively
brittle force. Instead of assigning defined and narrow MOS skills for naval personnel, the naval
services should devise incentive programs for ambitious Sailors and Marines to broaden theirskill sets to provide the wider base of militarily relevant skills that a more distributed force will
require. Computer and easily deployed AR trainers can condense the time previously required
to create a better trained and educated force.
As we discern the functional support requirements for EABO, we must approach the challengewith the same entrepreneurial mindset that extends the paradigm shift in how we fight toinclude how we support the warfighter. Industrial age habits and methods are unlikely to serve
well in the information age. Innovations in the means and methods of providing functional
support are essential to achieving the full potential of EABO.
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4.4.1 Fires
Among the most significant and obvious additions to the future capabilities needed for EABO tobe successful is the requirement for Marine forces to acquire all domain, shore-based,
operational-level fires. The occupation of key maritime terrain by Marines with conventionalcrew-served infantry and artillery weapons might enable close tactical dominance, but Marines
will be operationally irrelevant without the ability to exploit the advantages of the maritime
defense, defend EABs, and deny sea and air space. Limited anti-ship and anti-air capability
already resides with Marine aviation, but generating redundancy and depth of both offensive
and defensive operational-level capabilities reflects prudent military judgment, and makes
acquisition of shore-based, long-range fires an immediate imperative. Robust fires capabilities,
once an integral part of USMC force structure, atrophied during the years of overwhelming US
sea and air control. The end of presumptive US sea control must be understood as a strategic
inflection point that demands a critical rethink of operational responsibilities and corecapability sets. Acquiring long-range anti-air fires, and developing a shore-based anti-ship
capability, will enable Marines to demonstrate that A2AD works both ways, and provide JFMCCwith shore-based naval forces to deny sea and air space.
Offensive and defensive sea denial capabilities are critical for the EABO concept to meet its
operational potential. By supporting economy-of-force missions, such as closing a strait, EABO
enables fleet assets to maneuver elsewhere to accomplish missions better done by ships. The
economy-of-force aspects of EABO are critical to surmounting the capacity challenges the joint
force faces against likely competitors. To serve this role, EABs must host credible sea control /denial capabilities—capabilities similar to those of the forces they free up to fight elsewhere.
Hosted offensive fires capabilities should be optimized to the mission and might include antisubmarine assets. New, lethal, shore-based capabilities must be included among naval fires
requirements, as they will be critical capabilities in creating an integrated maritime defense.
EABs cannot replicate the operational maneuver capabilities of ships. However, by hosting riskworthy sensor platforms and operational fires capabilities appropriate to mission, EABs can
assist in freeing other high demand assets, like ships and aircraft, to mass and maneuver
opportunistically. Several mutually-supporting EABs astride a strait should provide sufficientcombat capability to interdict a critical sea lane, greatly constrain enemy commerce and naval
maneuver, generate coercive military conditions, or free US and partner ships to better support
the JFMCC main effort.
The EABO concept broadens our current understanding of ‘fires’ to include new innovations inlethality from numerous, low-signature, low cost, expendable platforms with advanced
payloads. Flotillas of manned and unmanned platforms with new lethal and disabling
capabilities will be launched, serviced, directed, and supported from EABs. Some platforms,
designed to extend range and duration will unleash traditional missiles and torpedoes, others
will distribute lethal swarms, disable props, or seed mines. The forward position of EABs may
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provide unique opportunities to interdict and attrite enemy aviation with ground-based
missiles, UASs, or forward based aviation assets.
Broadening our understanding of fires capabilities, to include low-signature lethal platforms,
will generate greater dependency on a wider C4ISR infrastructure for target detection andengagement, and much of that infrastructure may also be hosted on, or supported by, EABs.
Usually, the employment and integration of EAB-hosted capabilities into the wider operational
scheme will be at the direction of JFMCC, who has overall responsibility for sea control anddenial operations. Developing the Fleet Tactical Grid that will enable the integration of landbased fires and ISR assets into the wider JFMCC and JTF C2 structure is crux to maximizing thepotential of EABO.
The aforementioned naval warfighter challenge to ‘win the hider / finder competition’ is notintended to imply that the shore-based missile systems on EABs need necessarily be small andshort-ranged. Unconstrained by the inherent size limitations of ship-borne missile systems withdefined numbers of VLS tubes of fixed diameter, EABO fires can be optimized in size, location,and terrain, to hide long-range missile systems using a wide variety of schemes to conceal theirlocation and minimize vulnerability. The ability to support the fleet and augment afloat missile
salvo density with long-range land-based capabilities is well within the envisioned capabilities
and mission profile of EABO.
To maintain the many advantages of a low-signature and austere expeditionary posture, more
optimum fires systems will be characterized by:
4.4.1.1 Horizontal Dispersion, Vertical Concentration
To meet the requirements of the first naval warfighter challenge, “generate the virtues of mass
without the vulnerabilities of concentration,” EABO offers new tactical opportunities. These
opportunities are particularly rich for naval forces, which can operate in the air, land, sea
surface, and sub-surface. By dispersing low-signature platforms horizontally and concentratingthem vertically, naval forces can generate sufficient mass to detect, close with, overwhelm, anddestroy adversary forces.
4.4.1.2 Mobility
Fires systems must be sufficiently mobile to be moved/emplaced and maintained without
revealing targetable information. Some hosted fires systems will be capable of routinely
displacing to confound enemy targeting. Longer-ranged systems might benefit from creative
concealment and hardening. Traditional transporters, erectors, and launchers (TELs) might beless preferred than innovative systems built into truck-mobile shipping containers that can hidein plain sight and defy specific identification by overhead ISR amid the ubiquity of containers in
the littorals. Although land-basing offers far more opportunities for concealment than the
open ocean, many fires capabilities can take advantage of the complexity of the littorals andarchipelagos to store, transport, and fire munitions from afloat platforms. New forms of59

lethality, such as swarming, will require new means of delivery that can take advantage of theproximity of EABs to unleash overwhelming surface, sub-surface, and airborne swarms.
4.4.1.3 Passive Defense
As mentioned above, fires systems that can avoid or confound detection are preferred. Systemdecoys are desirable, as are camouflage, concealment, and signature-minimizing capabilities
that allow for EMS emissions to be reduced or narrowly focused. Physical cover, in the form of
bunkers, tunnels, or revetments, which can provide protection but avoid detection are useful,particularly if they can be built in sufficient quantity to create a ‘pea under the cup’ dilemma forenemy targeting.
4.4.1.4 Dual Use
When practical, the tenet of dual use makes preferable those systems that can be used for both
power projection and sea control missions. However, other considerations might include
commonality of naval ammo and weapons across air, surface, and shore-launch platforms.
Proposals include adapting the current HIMARS launchers for anti-ship / air missiles, oralternatively adapting Navy missiles for ground launchers in order to have commonality ofmunitions for air, surface, and land launchers. Because of the cost and inevitable demand forthese weapons, alternatives are well worthy of focused analysis.
4.4.1.5 Naval And Joint Fires integration
As discussed above, EABs host assets for JFMCC and JFC tasking. Integral to the fires
requirement is the ability for all ‘sensor and shooter’ assets to contribute to the situationalawareness and fires solutions of the joint force. Inside forces will be numerically disadvantaged
and dispersed; close integration of all capabilities will be essential to gain comparativeadvantage.
4.4.1.6 Aviation Fires
Aviation will be discussed as a separate topic, but air and missile defense (AMD) fires are readytoday to be hosted by EABs. Land-based missiles can augment, or serve as economy-of-force
assets to free aviation assets for other missions. The integration of all fires, to include aviation,in achieving the JFFMCC missions is necessary to maximize the combat potential of EABO.
4.4.1.7 Unmanned Platforms
UAV, USS, and UUV development is proceeding at a very rapid pace. Many of these capabilities
are currently directed at ISR, but the advent of ‘killer drones’ is indicative of the lethal fires
capabilities these platforms can support on land, air, sea, and sub-surface. EABs are optimized
to host and service unmanned platforms from a forward stance that will enable them to form
an integrated maritime defense of critical straits, or support fleet actions at the leading edge ofthe joint campaign. The ability to launch, recover, and sustain these risk-worthy and relatively
60inexpensive platforms from forward positions without elaborate and readily identifiableinfrastructure is an important EABO/inside force capability.
4.4.1.8 Distributing operational-level fires and low-signature fire support platforms on EABs to
exploit key naval terrain will mark a distinct addition to the JFMCC operational tool kit, and be a
critical resource to exercise advantageous naval operational art to control or deny close andconfined seas. Not only can EABO help rectify the capacity mismatch central to the A2AD
dilemma, but it can serve as an economy-of-force effort that will enable JFMCC to fix adversary
forces while allowing JFC to concentrate other naval and joint capabilities at the decisive timeand place. Without operational-level fires, EAB-hosted forward capabilities would need to be
defended by fleet assets. With shore-based operational-level fires and hosted navy fires
platforms, EABs become sea control / denial strongpoints that can be advanced to support thejoint campaign, free other afloat fleet assets to maneuver, and take advantage of the strengthof the maritime defense to maintain persistent presence and assure allies and partners.
4.4.2 Logistics
The proliferation of long-range precision fires in the future battlespace will significantly impact
logistics as well as operations. WW I metaphors of an extended ‘no man’s land’ are worthy
descriptions of what should be anticipated. Forces that remain within the enemy long-range
weapons engagement zone (WEZ) will have to actively plan passive defenses to remain
effective, and will be dependent upon logistics service support and supply systems that are
equally active and resilient. A fully integrated, active maritime defense-in-depth will be able toinflict disproportionate result on adversary forces, but that defense will consume vastquantities of ordnance in intense battles of indeterminate duration. In effect, a race will takeplace between a willful adversary attempting to mass forces at the point he chooses as decisive,
and the ability of defensive forces to supply munitions, relieve forces, and support services tothe defenders.
4.4.2.1 Precluding Culmination
In short, we must recognize that logistical culmination is a defeat mechanism, and that
precluding culmination in the future battlespace will require significantly different logisticalmeans and methods than in the recent past. There is a case to be made that our militaryfascination with lethality at the muzzle end of our effort, often obscures how we will continue
to feed the breech. The nature of expeditionary operations—fighting ‘over there’—places far
greater logistical onus on the force fighting the away game. When dealing with adversaries thatwillfully make a virtue of capacity, any inattention to the dangers of culmination are potentiallydisastrous, and any new concept of how to fight naval forces not complemented by an equally
innovative new concept for how to sustain the force is fatuous.

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4.4.2.2 Deployment, Distribution, And Delivery
The current paradigm for deploying naval forces involves ships—big ships, with Marines
deployed from ships, and Sailors fighting from them. Large ships will create heroic but shortbattle histories in future war, and of necessity, sea control and denial capabilities will shift tosmaller and more persistent and survivable platforms tactically dispersed throughout the inside
battle space. These platforms will be arrayed in depth around key maritime terrain, covered byland-based fires, and supported from EABs. Optimally, equipment, platforms, munitions, andother hard to transport items will be prepositioned, and the rapid transportation of troops into
the area of operations will enable US and allied forces to quickly seize the strategic initiativeand field integrated naval and joint forces forward. Less optimally, US forces will have to use
littoral maneuver from cooperative partners to laterally maneuver force to achieve positional
advantage. Should success in future war against a peer competitor with ample A2AD
capabilities be predicated on the ‘transportation of things’ from CONUS under combat
conditions, then the US must devise an entirely new method of deploying them, as the use ofdeep water ports and large runways will be highly problematic.
A resilient distribution of forces will compel a robust and equally resilient logistics distribution
and support system. It is here that the revolution in military logistics will be most profound, as
linear concepts of singular lines of operations and communications evolve into far more
dynamic means and methods to sustain widely distributed forces. Logistical distribution
centers and intermodal transportation hubs are potential single point of failure facilities thatwill operate best outside of the range of enemy long-range fires. Moving commodities from
distribution hubs, be they afloat or ashore, across contested seas directly to EABs supporting
distributed naval forces, is the crux of the new logistics challenge. Many smaller autonomous
platforms moving to shallow water marinas or piers in close proximity to the EAB-supported
units will help meet the challenge. Many smaller craft are less efficient than single large ships
in moving commodities, but much of the loss in efficiency in crossing the sea is ameliorated bygreatly reducing the delivery problem once ashore, since in an archipelagic environment, nounit is far from water. Once autonomous small craft arrive at their destination, designated EAB
logistics personnel from using units can take delivery.
By moving common commodities by smaller platforms, such as semi-submersibles, barges,
Pipe-fish, etc., the logistics train becomes far more resilient, and inefficiencies in transit due toreduced cargo size are compensated for by reduced requirements for final overland delivery,
since the many shallow water piers or marinas where the commodities are delivered are incloser proximity to the unit of issue. By placing and delivering commodities, like fuel, on slow
energy conserving autonomous platforms afloat, logisticians can create a supply chain that also
serves as an in-route storage facility. By loitering commodities in transit, or diverting andaccelerating their delivery to critical points, we can use the information we know about thelocation and category of supply to replace the classic iron mountain ashore. Sea planes cansecure the entire afloat logistics train from the air—especially when they move into littoral62

regions, and flying boats can be used to move time sensitive parts, personnel, casualties, andmunitions. Flying boats, such as the Japanese US-2, will prove to be as versatile in employment
and ubiquitous in demand as the WWII PBY.
In a near-term fight tonight scenario, the greatest demand on the logistics and supply chain is
likely to be aviation fuel, parts, and maintenance. As we develop more optimized EABO
platforms, we can expect that ordnance and parts will become the most challenging
commodity, since other classes of supply can be readily contracted or foraged. Platforms thatwere developed under the assumption that their fuel and maintenance would be provided bylarge ships or fixed infrastructure will disproportionately burden EABO operations until they canbe replaced with more economical capabilities that have far greater endurance with lessmaintenance requirements than current platforms. EABO capabilities and concepts ofoperations and logistics must be fully integrated.
4.4.2.3 Trade-offs: Resiliency And Efficiency
Advantage in war is often achieved by making opportunistic trade-offs. Most of the trade-offs
that advantage dispersed basing operations come at the expense of functional logistics support.
Traditional bases offer efficiencies by maximizing economy of scale, so that a single functional
capability can serve many dissimilar organizations. Mess halls and medical facilities offer
obvious examples, but similar economies are found among all logistics and combat service
support functions hosted on traditional bases. Logistical lines of communications areconsolidated and security is concentrated on legacy bases, freeing most functional support
personal to focus on primary responsibilities, vice auxiliary tasks such as route and perimetersecurity. Distributed basing will significantly challenge logistics and other support functions todeliver adequate functional support without the benefits of classic economy of scale. Loss of
economy of scale, and the inefficiency associated with a far wider distribution of effort, is aninevitable consequence of dispersed basing, further exacerbated by the distribution of forces
and functional support on EABs themselves. In choosing to elevate the relative importance of
resiliency to achieve operational advantage, there is a necessary and inevitable decrease in thefundamental efficiency of logistical sustainment and support. Force distribution introduces
new frictions to operations, or viewed more optimistically, offers new opportunities andcompelling necessity for innovative solutions.
4.4.2.4 Austere Vs. Exquisite
EABO attempts to ameliorate this additional friction by making a virtue of a necessity andembracing austerity as a vital mission enabler for expeditionary operations. Chow halls are
obviated by MREs, buildings with tents, generators with energy harvesting, and local security
with indigenous forces and the ‘every Marine & Sailor a rifleman’ ethos. While these austerity
measures are practical and prudent, they do not fully account for the many functional
challenges of EABs.

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The logistical challenges associated with EABO functional support will demand critical thinking
and innovation to achieve traditional ends by new and creative means. Solutions to resolving
some of the myriad logistical challenges of EABs may be found in the nature of the environment
itself. When much of the area of operations is composed of littoral and archeologic waters, theability to exploit the sea for transport, storage, and dispersal of capabilities and resources
cannot be overlooked. Indeed, creative use of the sea, lagoons, and inland waterways as partof EABs and their logistical support network will enable naval forces to enjoy the traditional
logistical advantages of sea-basing at the tactical / retail level.
The large signature of L-class shipping, and the need to conserve amphibious forces for otheroperations, make the use of these platforms and associated ship-to-shore connectors highly
problematic for transporting, storing, and sustaining EABs. Preferably, EABO should use
forward-procured commercial shipping, boats, ferries, and barges to serve as intra-theatertransport, weapon and sensor platforms, fuel and ordnance storage, and asset dispersal. By
not tasking traditional assets necessary for fleet and MAGTF operations, EABO can provide an
economy-of-force effort that enables limited fleet and MAGTF assets to maneuver elsewhere.
Sea and river barges offer particular advantages as components for transporting EAB forces,
and for hosting the capabilities and commodities required to operate and support them.
Barges are relatively inexpensive platforms capable of moving or hosting large quantities offuel, ordnance, or particularly heavy capabilities—like rail guns and future directed-energy
weapons that require significant logistics support to sustain them. Barges are inherently
mobile, and can be locally moved inside the enemy long-range targeting cycle even if detected.
Barges are not the sort of target to draw the attention of enemy cruise and ballistic missiles.
Should they be targeted, we have significantly inverted the cost-imposition adversaries
previously placed on us.
It is advantageous to expand options and minimize predictability by developing diverse means
and methods of achieving all aspects of logistical sustainment and support. For example, it isprudent to explore the use of indigenous fast ferries and other shallow draft commercial craftthat can rapidly load and unload combat and logistics vehicles that can support EAB capabilities,
such as missile TELS, mobile aviation logistics support, fuel trucks, and maintenance teams.
Expanding logistical options is fundamental to enhancing resiliency.
Supporting distributed naval forces over vast ocean distances despite observed enemy firecapabilities necessitates fundamental and significant changes to naval logistics. Water is aremarkably economical and efficient medium for the movement of commodities. However,since large ships are optimal targets for long-range precision strike systems, innovating new
ways to move materials on smaller or reduced signature platforms becomes a naval logistics
imperative. Options for how to create a harder to target and more inherently resilient logistics
train are many, and it is far too early in the research and experimentation process to down
select any single method. Indeed, it is likely to be the combination of different methods thatwill produce the most viable and resilient all round solution. Current ideas under consideration
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include the use of cheaper platforms, such as towed barges, dracones, and indigenous shipping.
Also worthy of consideration are smaller platforms, such as reduced-size prepositioning ships;
and faster platforms, such as high speed vessels. Options to reduce signature include
submersible and semi-submersible vessels. The latter have proven to be agile contenders for
drug cartels moving contraband across the Gulf of Mexico, and hold great promise for
infiltrating logistics to distributed forces operating within the arc of adversary long-range fires.
4.4.2.5 Logistics Infiltration
The metaphor of infiltrating logistics may prove apt. The exquisite, large signature, fuelgulping, maintenance intensive platforms of the legacy force are poor candidates for infiltrated
logistics, but if forces are to persist inside the WEZ of future adversaries, a new concept
supporting infiltrated logistics combined with 21st century foraging and contracting may wellserve an operational force that is more focused on economically proliferating many resilient
and lethal payloads than resource intense platforms.
In all cases, our new logistics concepts must support forces that are distributed throughout thebattlespace, avoid single points of failure, operate in an EMS-contested environment, andpreclude culmination at the decisive time and place that may well be of the enemy’s choosing.
Once specific EABO logistics requirements are determined, the innovation base of America’s
military research and development (R&D) facilities and leading industries are ready to delivercreative solutions that take advantage of the fast advancing technical revolution in power
generation and storage, additive manufacturing, autonomy, AI, electric engines, energy
harvesting, and a host of other new technical and scientific endeavors that can be focused on
innovation in the field of military logistics. Success belongs to the nation that has the national
will, innovative creativity, and clarity of vision to capture and field the next generation oflogistics capability sets.
4.4.3 Command And Control (C2)
4.4.3.1 EAB C2
An EAB commander is primarily concerned with providing hosted units with services andsupport functions necessary to sustain warriors and their weapons systems. Additional
responsibilities would include developing and enforcing a signature management plan thatwould preserve security from long-range fires, as well as the local security plan for force
preservation and protection. Hosted forces and capabilities supported by the EAB can expect toanswer to external naval and joint functional commanders coordinating other inside force
assets in support of the naval scheme of maneuver. When an EAB might need to fight todefend itself, the EAB commander may need to coordinate all local and adjacent EAB
capabilities to mount a coordinated defense. Agile command relationships will enable EABO toflex and adapt in accord with fluid mission requirements.

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Like any base, the ability of EABs to effectively host myriad and dissimilar capabilities is criticalto success. However, the manner in which the hosted functions perform their missions can be
critical to the resiliency of the EAB. The EAB commander may be required to enforce standardsof camouflage, signature reduction, and local security to ensure overall success, as well as
provide base support for distributed functions, such as water purification and power
generation.
EABs must be capable of supporting all necessary naval logistical functions, albeit under austere
and minimalist conditions. The need to distribute basing functions over a wider area will
challenge logisticians and functional support units, so it is important that alternative means ofachieving functional support are developed that will reinforce resiliency. It will be theresponsibility of the EAB commander to creatively design and continuously improve on the
security, resiliency, redundancy, and signature management components of the EAB. By
developing close relations with host nation forces and people, the EAB commander canbroaden the network of support activities to preclude establishing exploitable patterns or being
limited to single sources of support.
EABs will support forces ashore, afloat, airborne, sub-surface, and those designed to exploit the
EMS. Most of these capabilities will be naval, but many will be joint. Consequently, EABs will
require inter-service task organization. As new inside forces are developed and proliferated,
new capabilities and requirements for support will be discerned, and new opportunities forcreative and effective C2 will arise. How EABs are commanded will be dependent upon the
missions and capabilities of hosted units. Consideration for how to command and control EABs
should follow from understanding how to fight from them.
4.4.3.2 EABO C2
EABO can support many different naval missions from forward EABs, but, in the future, themost likely and strategically important mission will be the ability to control key maritime
terrain, particularly straits, with an integrated maritime defense-in-depth. The commander forsuch a mission is likely to be ashore in the vicinity of the strait and have command ofinterdiction assets from multiple EABs. His task will be to integrate diverse, all-domain
capabilities into a coordinated and lethal defense-in-depth that will preclude a determinedenemy from transiting the strait, thus creating military coercive conditions, or shaping theoperational battlespace in support of the fleet scheme of maneuver. EABO capabilities thatshould support this mission include: Mines, fixed and mobile sensors, minimally manned andunmanned surface flotilla forces, unmanned UUS and UAS sensors and shooters, rotary-wing
pouncers, non-lethal capabilities for engaging uncertain targets, EW and cyber support systems,
decoy and deception capabilities to ‘win the hider/finder competition,’ and land-based missile
systems to cover all of the above with ample shore-based fires.
All the platforms, manned, semi-autonomous, and autonomous, are deemed risk-worthy, andare arrayed in depth on, below, and above the sea to enable a vertical concentration of66

platforms at predetermined time-on-target (TOT), assigned by the first platform or sensor todetect the target. Platforms are networked, both to the common headquarters and to eachother, enabling network optional systems that take advantage of centralized networks whenavailable, and form opportunistic networks among available platforms at the edge of battle
when cut off from higher authority. Trans-modal communications buoys (either actual or
metaphoric) will enable surface and aerial platforms to communicate and coordinate with subsurface systems as they vertically mass and simultaneously engage enemy platforms withnumerous payloads to overwhelm their defenses.
Hypersonic weapons and autonomous systems will demand decisions made at machine speed,and commanders will rely on AI and sophisticated algorithms to reduce cognitive burden andaccelerate human decision-making. Electronic warfare assets and deception efforts will work to
generate uncertainty among enemy decision-makers, slow their decision cycles, and cause amisappreciation of the situation. Clearly, the combined Navy, Marine, and likely joint assets
required to fulfill these mission requirements will require an innovative inside force taskorganization not found in traditional command arrangements. Battlespace decision-making willitself undergo a profound change as human-machine interfaces expand options and compress
decision time. Tempo will be profoundly consequential, and the need to hide better, see first,
mass faster, and engage first with sufficient munitions to overwhelm the target’s defenses will
be central to future naval C2.
Integral to the Fleet Tactical Grid must be a common C2 communications architecture thatenables all systems to interoperate. This system should be network optional, and service
agnostic. All inside force EABO systems and units must be interoperable and utilize low
probability of detection and intercept communications. Emerging technologies, such as freespace optics, hold great promise of creating a new spectrum for secure, high bandwidthcommunications. New systems to ensure timely communications with sub-surface platforms
will allow them to be integrated into the scheme of maneuver vice merely de-conflicted bybattlespace.
4.4.4 Aviation
Mobile EABs can support expeditionary airfields and FARPS, and consequently support allfunctions of naval aviation. Mobile EABs persist forward and are capable of providing
continuous mission support from different locations. Because mobile EABs are associated withhigh-signature forces or capabilities, they must accomplish assigned missions and begin
movement within the adversary detection, targeting, and engagement cycle. Movement can befacilitated by vehicles ashore or vessels afloat, or some combination of both. To maintaincontinuity of support, some critical support capabilities may require dual sets of equipment, sothat while one team is providing operational support, the other is moving. The large size,
signature, runway, fuel, and maintenance requirements of conventional manned aircraft makes
their support from EABs problematic. The shorter runway requirements of V/STOVL aircraft67

makes them better optimized as inside forces, but in all cases the risk of attracting enemy longrange precision fires will be a persistent threat.
The more minimalist airfield requirements for launching and retrieving UAVs can greatly
contribute to signature reduction and passive defense while providing the inside force withcritical aviation functions. By exploiting the distributed posture, low-signature, and variablelocations of EABs, manned and unmanned aircraft can maximize the range, reach, and dispersalof naval and joint aviation assets without providing a lucrative target for enemy long-range
fires. ‘Tail sitter’ UAVs take off vertically from small landing and launch pads and greatly reduceground signature and support requirements. Most importantly, they enable US forces todisassociate with the long, hardened runways that readily identify traditional air bases andrestore a crucial degree of uncertainty to enemy calculations.
Rotary-wing platforms do not have the predictable runway restrictions and requirements offixed-wing assets, and consequently are more optimized inside force assets. Keeping in mind
how the Doppler effect from rotary-wings lights-up long-range sky wave radar, ground tow
vehicles and heavy equipment transporters can be used to move, disperse, and hide helicoptersand tail-sitters once they have landed.
The most innovative and operationally significant inside force aviation capability involves the
re-introduction of amphibious aircraft--seaplanes and flying boats, which can take advantage ofboth conventional land and ‘self-healing’ water runways, the littoral battlespace. By breaking
the ‘fixed runway’ paradigm, amphibious aircraft greatly expand the aviation functions that canbe performed by inside forces. SAR, ASW, aerial refueling, medical evacuation, mass casualty
and survivor rescue, ordnance delivery, movement of critical parts, and delivery of mail,personnel, and maintenance teams could all be performed in more places with significantly
reduced risk by amphibious aircraft. Larger UAS can also use water vice runways, greatly
expanding their utility without the risks associated with landing on easily identified airfields.
Breaking the runway paradigm is critical to winning the hider/finder competition and to thecontinued utility of manned aviation as an inside force capability. The need for amphibious
aircraft is as urgent as it is obvious.
4.4.4.1 Offensive Air Support (OAS)
When close air support (CAS) is forward-based, response time is reduced, and time on station issignificantly increased, by the ability to reload and refuel much closer to the tactical edge.
Proximity increases sortie rates and on station time, and keeps aircraft from burning time andfuel flying back to mother ships or permanent bases. Expeditionary airfields with FARPs canmake turnaround times even faster. The two missions underneath the umbrella of deep air
support (DAS), air interdiction and armed recce, are both well supported by the extended
operational reach afforded by expeditionary airfields and FARPS. Other missions, not currently
associated with Marine aviation, but integral to naval aviation, such as ASW and maritime
patrol, can be facilitated forward or in closer proximity to objective areas when supported and68sustained by expeditionary airfields. Of course, not all expeditionary airfields are necessarily
designed to persist forward within the ballistic and cruise missile range of peer and near-peer
competitors. For EABO to support offensive air support missions with current platforms,
considerable force development will be required to ensure a persistent, resilient, sustainable,
and survivable offensive capability.
4.4.4.2 Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)In the near term, forward-based F-35Bs supported by FARPs can facilitate offensive anti-air
warfare (OAAW) by providing more resilient platforms in closer proximity to objectives. Other
joint commanders may be provided with air interdiction assets to target enemy airborne C2,tanker and bomber capabilities from forward EABs.
4.4.4.3 Aerial ReconnaissanceEvery aviation asset provides sensor opportunities. EABO pushes those sensors further forward
and brings tactical UAVs and other sensors closer to the fight. Since EABO capabilities aredesigned to be more risk-worthy and expendable, commanders can be more aggressive in theirreconnaissance activities.
4.4.4.4 Electronic Warfare
When conducting electronic reconnaissance, persistence and proximity matters. EABs may hostinside force EW capabilities to both push and pull information and intelligence from forward
locations. Forward-basing traditional electronic attack (EA) assets, and newer UAS payloads to
exploit the EMS, will support JFMCC efforts to wage electronic maneuver warfare. Cyber
payloads that require proximity to be delivered can take advantage of the proximity of EABs
and to the degree authorities allow, cyber capabilities should be incorporated into EABO force
development.
Of note, many current characteristics of naval aviation do not meet the inside force
requirements for reduced signature, minimal infrastructure support, and cost inversion. Sunk
costs in legacy aviation platforms must not inhibit the development and acquisition of the more
optimized aviation capabilities that inside forces will require.

5.0 Conclusion
For EABO to achieve its potential as a future operational concept that provides new and better
options to future decision makers, there must be significant force development guided by acogent operational vision for how EABO can be employed in support of future naval strategy.
How we answer the question, “EABO to do what?” is critical to creating the compelling visionnecessary to guide naval force development—both Navy and Marine Corps-- towards acommon operational purpose with distinct, but integrated, tactical capabilities.

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The low-hanging fruit, and most compelling operational requirement, for such a vision involves
the ability to exploit EABO to create an integrated maritime defense-in-depth at key maritime
terrain. This capability will enable US naval forces to turn close and confined seas to geographic
advantage, reap the disproportionate advantages of the maritime defense, and enable
persistent forward presence and partnering anywhere US interests are threatened.
Advancing the common naval vision, are the four EABO naval warfighting challenges, as well as
new tactical concepts of employment, such as vertical concentration, that will both guiderequirements, and dare innovators to create the next paradigm of naval warfare and the newopportunities it will unleash. The future naval force will be focused on payloads more thanplatforms, resiliency more than efficiency, signature more than size, and the requirement tofight and win in close and confined seas where the United States is increasingly challenged.
EABO enables the next paradigm of joint and naval expeditionary operations that will permit
naval forces to survive and thrive within the arc of enemy long-range fires to preclude
adversary fait accompli gambits, partner with allies, and win the future fight for sea control.
The EABO concept challenges the Marine Corps to develop another line of operations,complementary to, but distinct from, power projection, devoted to supporting JFMCC and fleet
commanders in the fight for sea control. Likewise, it challenges Navy leadership to incorporate
landward-based naval capabilities into the fleet scheme of maneuver to support sea control
and denial missions in close and confined seas. Consequently, EABO requires neworganizational and functional concepts, and should uncork the opportunity for broad
innovation and greater integration throughout the naval services. EABO challenges theoperator, the innovator, and the force developer to regain and maintain operational advantage.
Nimitz’s admonition to abide by “the principle of calculated risk” will be essential to success, as
there should be no sea where US naval forces cannot operate to defend American interests andthose of our allies.

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