2nd David Farber Prize for Undergraduate Student Essay
First Prize
Edited 05. 2021

Digital Contact Tracing and the Rise of Big BrotherYuto Yamaguchi, Keio University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law
Just over a century ago, the deadliest

concerns. Information Management expert Frantz Rowepandemic in human history shook the world. With nodescribes the technology as follows:

vaccine to protect against influenza infection, the world. . . the adoption of the [contact tracing] app

was tragically exposed to the H1N1 virus. Despite thegenerates important risks to our informational

efforts of authorities to enforce isolation, quarantine andprivacy, surveillance, and habituation tolimited public gatherings, etc., the number of deaths

securitycame to about 500 million people.

discrimination, distrust, and generate otherpolicies.

It

also

may

createFast-forward to a hundred years later, withhealth problems such as addiction as 5G

humans now confronting COVID-19. Over the decades,

technology continues to be deployed without

scientists have developed powerful weapons to fight theprior impact studies. (Rowe, 2020)

flu. Although the pandemic has not yet come to a halt,

Rowe’s observation is in line with the traits of Big

the number of deaths are nowhere near that of the flu in

Brother in the book 1984 by George Orwell. Big

1918. Medical advances are indeed indispensable, but

Brother is the totalitarian figurehead who manipulates

there is also a new form of technology arguably

and monitors citizens with constant surveillance to keep

contributing to fighting the pandemic ―society orderly.

digitalcontact tracing. Digital contact tracing, often based on

It isn’t very often that we see nations all overmobile devices, is a method to determine the contacts of

the world tackle the same issue with similar types ofan infected user. While some argue that the technology

technological solutions. Therefore, this unprecedented

helps cope with the situation, it comes with

event calls for further investigation. The aim is tocontroversies.

answer the following question: Is digital contact tracing

Deployed by approximately fifty nations,contributing to creating the equivalent of the modern-digital contact tracing has aroused discussions regarding

day Big Brother? This paper will first introduce theprivacy on a global scale. The utilization of contact data

objectives for obtaining contact data; second, it will

has caused a split of opinion concerning the policy ofstudy several cases of how the contact tracing

data disclosure, the fundamental architecture of theapplications are being used; third, it will analyze theapplications involved, and other aspects. Even thoughchange in state power as a consequence of performing

the outbreak of the pandemic goes back a while, healthdigital contact tracing. Finally, it will discuss how theauthorities are still engaged in exploring the ideal

new technology, like a contemporary Big Brother,balance between controlling the spread of the virus andacquires great influence over our everyday life.

preserving privacy rights. Moreover, the threat of digital

Phenomena

contact tracing is not necessarily limited to privacy

technology will affect or even standardize our future1

surrounding

digitalcontact

tracingapproaches toward privacy. Thus, it is important toFigure 1. Objectives of Health Care Policy.

acknowledge what digital contact tracing is capable of

Objective 1 refers to policies aimed at changing

and determine its limits before we unknowingly create

users’ voluntary behavioral patterns, such as by wearinga real modern-day Big Brother.

masks, taking the PCR test, staying home, etc. The alert
function of the contact tracing applications belongs inContact Tracing Data Usage

this category. The application notifies users and

The absence of a unified goal complicates theencourages them to take the PCR test if they have been

discussion on digital contact tracing. Due to its low

in contact with an infected patient. Policies with these

diffusion rate, health officials cannot accurately

objectives are designed to benefit users by protecting

measure the performance of the emerging technology.

them from health threats. However, action on the users’

Oxford University’s epidemiological model shows, “ifpart is not mandated. Therefore, it is at the discretion of

60% of the population used the digital contact tracing

each user to decide if they want to offer their contact

app, it would lead to a reduction in the number of cases”

information. Importantly, whatever their decision, they

(University of Oxford, 2020). However, no nation has

are held responsible for it. However, this can only work

reached 60%. In Iceland where the penetration rateon the premise that citizens possess sufficient device

reached 40%, one of the highest in the world, officials,

and application literacy.

in an interview with the MIT Technology Review,

Objective 2 demonstrates the usage of contact

concluded that the contact tracing app was not a “game-

trace data for research. The data acknowledges thechanger” (Johnson, 2020). Consequently, the intentions

current health status of citizens, and constitutes a baseof collecting contact data remain ambiguous, creatingcompass for brainstorming suitable follow-up measures.

divergence in its usage among nations. This section will

For example, some nations have collected GPS data to

describe the objectives behind the acquisition of contact

analyze trends in both the movement of their people andtracing data. Collecting data is a process of obtaining

the spread of the infection (discussed further below).

insights, and there is always a reason why one needs

Such research data directly contributes to thethem.

development of health studies in general, while also
Figure 1 is a diagram that categorizes the usage ofproviding direct benefits to the users involved. Due tohealth data and those who benefit from it. The purpose

its universality, the considered use of such data forof conducting digital contact tracing can be subdivided

research purposes resides within legal boundaries. In

as follows: 1) to change the voluntary behavior oforder to accelerate measures that are produced in thiscitizens, 2) to research their current health status, and 3)

category, specifying regulations such as throughto mandate behavior restrictions.

medical law and privacy law will be of highest priority.
Objective 3 refers to actions that forcibly restrict
or mandate the behavior of citizens. Lockdown is aprominent example. There are other measures such as
mandating the download of the contact tracing app.
These actions help to preserve social policies, benefiting
users in a roundabout way. Yet, approaches based on
Objective 3 are rather debatable due to their2authoritative manner. Arguments regarding theseof false diagnosis reports (Veale, 2020). Based on theactions consist not only of scientific evidence but also

three objectives introduced in the previous section, let’sreflect political ideology and social opinions. At least in

now look at the case examples of what can be done witha democratic state, it is desirable that the impact of suchcontact data.

measures is discussed at a public level before

Japan’s “COCOA” is one example of theimplementation.

decentralized model. COCOA only keeps encrypted

As stated above, there is wide divergence indata that flags phones that have been in contact. It does

objectives of using contact data. Those who do or, on

not store personal information such as location data,occasion, do not benefit from the submission of contact

name, gender, etc., and its only function is to notify thedata vary according to the range of objectives theuser when the device had contact with a person who

authorities have. Keeping this factor in mind, the next

tested positive (Byfird, 2020). Given this specification,section will investigate actual contact tracing cases fromit can be inferred that changing a user’s voluntary

four countries.

behavior is the only function the app is capable of. Since
it doesn’t store any other data, it is difficult for COCOA

Case Studies

to be used as evidence for either health level research or

What can be retrieved from contact data depends

behavior restriction.

on the model which different nations implement in their

Qatar’s “EHTERAZ” is made of the centralized

contact tracing applications. There are two types ofmodel, activating live location tracking of all users ormodels in deploying this application: the centralized

specific individuals. The government of Qatar makes it

model and the decentralized model. The centralized

mandatory to download the app, and any violation willmodel extracts anonymized ID and the codes collectedlead to fines or even criminal charges (Al Jazeera, 2020).

from phones to a centralized database when the user

The app also requests permission to access photo

reports a positive test. The decentralized model gives

albums on the phone, which seems quite irrelevant inusers more control over their information by providing

fighting the pandemic (The World, 2020). Whilenothing but the user’s anonymized ID (Kelion &EHTERAZ possesses certain leverage in changing the

Criddle, 2020). The decentralized approach is the initialuser’s voluntary behavior, it relies on the assumption

model that Google and Apple built and for which theythat its service is mainly used for the better, namely

disclosed its APIs. It is supported by 600 scholars

research and restriction purposes.

through the Contact Tracing Joint Statement. 1 The

In South Korea “The Coronavirus Disease-19

main reason why some nations use a centralized model

Website” uses the centralized model. The government

over a decentralized one is that the former provides

discloses user information to the public, including

authorities with more insights due to its rich volume ofgender, nationality, age, diagnosis, date, hospital, andprivate information. In fact, several nations claimed theeven his or her location trail (though removed in thenecessity of the centralized model considering the risk

latest version) (Sun, 2020). This function makes people

KU LEUVEN. (n.d.). Contact Tracing Joint Statement

https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/sites/contact-tracing-

1[Press release]. Retrieved August 30, 2020, fromjoint-statement/3

refrain from visiting spots near the location of patients.

extreme in the pre-coronavirus period. If nations took

While helping the health authorities in insightful healthadvantage of the current situation, to what extent could

level research, it does cause privacy issues (discussed

it advance national capabilities? Stated below are three

below).

examples of increased powers that nations were seen to

Unlike

EHTERAZ,

the

South

Koreanapplication cannot directly mandate citizens to take any

exercise throughout the pandemic.

particular action. However, it is capable of attaching a(1) Mass Surveillance. Since the outbreak of thesocial reputation risk to users that can eventually lead tovirus, the idea of a nation gathering location data of its

regulating the behavior of citizens.

citizens has become rather common. Nearly ten nations,“Hamagen” provided by the Israeli Ministry of

about a quarter of the countries with an official app, are

Health uses the decentralized model. It merely confirms

collecting location data from contact tracing software

location data on the user’s phone but leaves it in the(O’Neill, 2020). Bahrain, Kuwait, and Norway’s contact

internal memory of the device (France-Presse, 2020).

tracing apps use GPS data and allow for real-time

Therefore, it can be said that the app’s main objective is

tracking of their users. Amnesty International judged

to change people’s voluntary behavior. With the consent

these three applications to be “highly invasiveof the diagnosed user, the Health Ministry can acquire

surveillance tools which go far beyond what is justified

user data for research purposes and also can release hisin efforts to tackle COVID-19” (Amnesty International,or her location trails to the public. This seems to be a2020). Given its ban of the application, Norway’s healthreasonable approach because the users have the option

official FHI director has claimed in an interview withto disclose their information or not. In this case, the

POLITICO: “Without the app, we are less equipped toefficacy of associated research will rely upon theprevent new outbreaks that may occur locally or

number of people who decide to share their information,nationally” (Manancourt, 2020). Countries such as

which might delay new insights from getting discovered.

Doha and Bahrain mandate citizens to install the app,

Gradation can be spotted between the level of awith those who do not download it being fined (France-

potential threat and the performance of the contact data

Presse, 2020). It is noteworthy that Norway is causing

contributing to health. The examples above show that

controversial outcomes alongside Middle Eastern

digital contact tracing is NOT a binary choice between

countries which are famous for their rigorous network

mass surveillance vs the uncontrolled spread ofrestrictions. Norway’s precedent shows that European

coronavirus. In other words, deploying digital contact

countries known for their thorough defense of humantracingmass

rights aren’t exceptions. There is no assurance that thesesurveillance; there are a number of levels in between.

measures won’t escalate into acquiring more sensitive

The most important point is to determine the appropriate

data. If location tracking or other forms of surveillance

relationship with the digital tool and find reasonable

tools proved to be favorable, constant extraction ofsteps toward it.

personal data might become a basic principle of life

does

not

automatically

lead

to

even after the pandemic goes away.
Change in State Power(2) Social Pressure. A new form of social

While the pandemic presents a challenge toconcern has arisen as a consequence of contact data. In

all nations, it can also act as a justification forJapan, numerous cases of bullying of Covid patients

conducting policies that might have been judged as too

were reported. The Ministry of Education had to make4

a statement to students and school staff to refrain fromit. Mishandling of contact tracing data can generateharassing those who were tested positive (Ito, 2020).

discrimination and/or hate, leading to a division of

Also, students of Kyoto Sangyo University, where

society beyond repair.

group infection had occurred, were mistreated. They

(3) Legitimacy. The legal responsibility for thereceived hate speeches, were suspended from their part-use of personal data remains ambiguous in mosttime jobs, and some teachers’ children were denied

countries. However, in the current emergency, it is not

daycare services. (Tsujita, 2020). These series of events

rare for health officials to make legal exceptions in cases

signify the possibility of discrimination when theof transfer and viewing rights of certain sets of data. In

contact data is mishandled. South Korea’s “TheMarch 2020, the South Korea Centers for Disease

Coronavirus Disease-19 Website” exemplifies how state

Control and Prevention launched the COVID-19

power can put social pressure on citizens. Using

Epidemiological Survey Prompt Support System. Thislocation data and credit card records, the application

system enables prompt delivery of data relevant todiscloses

Identifying

infected individuals or those suspected to be infected.

locations including those of LGBTQ communities and

The data is handed to epidemiology investigators

love hotels, movement logs can reveal personal secrets,

immediately after requisite data are collected from thepotentiallypublicpolice, mobile carriers, and credit card companies, etc.,

disapproval. Besides, bars, restaurants, or any otheron a near real-time basis. The legal basis of this change

venues that the patient has visited could fall intois the Contagious Disease Prevention and Control Act

disrepute due to misinformation. In fact, regarding(CDPCA). With the amendments made during the 2015privacy, one lawsuit was brought by a coronavirus

MERS outbreak, the CDPCA was given the authority topatient in Busan against the National Human Rights

override certain provisions of the Personal Information

Commission of South Korea (Denyer & Kim, 2020).

Protection Act and other privacy laws (Park, 2020).

Furthermore, digital contact tracing also revealed thePolitical/legal responses to expand state discretion

segregation of a minority community. Some of the alerts

regarding personal data will likely increase during theinformed on LGBTQ-friendly corners in certain

pandemic. Where are the boundaries in data sharing?

neighborhoods, leading to public intimidation. In an

What parties are credible enough to give data to?

interview with The World, Todd Henry, a Korean studies

Without doubt, agile data transfer and prompt dataexpert at the University of California San Diego, says

analysis are important. However, it is equally importantthat “the coronavirus epidemic has unearthed deep-

to constantly question and review whether enough time,

seated anxiety about sexual minorities” (Strother, 2020).

thought, and resources have been allocated to debating

He also states that “If their off-the-radar communities

these policy changes sufficiently.

patient

earning

movement

patients

history.

considerable

are being put under surveillance by COVID[-19], there

Based on the analysis above, digital contact

is no space or room for LGBT[Q] people to move andtracing has been found to have a significant effect onnavigate in Korean society” (Strother, 2020). The

citizen behavior by lending itself to mass surveillance

disclosure of contact data could force minorities all overand the exertion of social pressure. While the legitimacy

the world to confront hidden discrimination. Socialof such developments remains unanswered, it is clear

pressure and reputation can become uncontrollable, andthat features of digital contact tracing could be

if damage occurs, it is often very hard to recover fromunderstood in the sense of a modern Big Brother. As yet,5

this type of technology doesn’t quite fulfill Big Brother

Minutes Hate” and “Doublethink,” the beliefs ofconditions due to the lack of uniformity across countries.

citizens are amalgamated into a single monolithic

However, it can be said that digital contact tracing has

standard. The peer to peer surveillance relationshipthe potential to meet the requirements for a totalitarian

between citizens gives rise to a feeling of personal guilt

figurehead.

unable to challenge this standard. This mob mentality
phenomenon keeps Big Brother and his beliefs

Reflections of 1984

immoveable.

Now that we understand how nations can gain

(3) Legitimacy. There isn’t much in terms of

power through high-tech mechanisms such as digital

legitimacy that can be deduced from 1984, because law

contact tracing, let us reflect on how its features

as such does not exist in Oceania. People are arrested

introduced in the foregoing section are portrayed in

not based on legitimacy but on the going moral

Orwell’s 1984.

principles of the authorities, no matter how repugnant.

(1) Mass Surveillance. The citizens of Oceania

The difference between legal principles and moral ones

are monitored by ubiquitous posters displaying Big

is ambiguous, but such considerations exceed theBrother with the slogan “BIG BROTHER IS

objectives of this essay and are not discussed here.

WATCHING

YOU.”

ThroughtelescreensandGiven the information above, it can be said thatnumerous hidden devices, the Thought Police can crossthe worrisome features found in the real world of digital

the personal boundaries of citizens and seize them forcontact tracing are also seen in Orwell’s dystopian“wrongdoings.” Not only are citizens monitored byscience fiction. Aside from the question of legitimacy,

devices, but they are also surveilled by each other. Theremass surveillance and social pressure form the basis ofare a few instances in the book where family members

the society of Oceania.

were even reported by their children. Though Big

It is notable that the power of Big Brother far

Brother does not appear directly in the story, his

exceeds that listed above. His ability to manipulate

inescapable presence is symbolized by the panopticonstatistics, language, and even history are far beyond thatof these devices and eyes.

of real-world authorities. However, as described by the(2)SocialPressure.

Socialpressureismain characters Winston and O’Brien, the biggest

conspicuous in the world of 1984. Computer science

difference lies in how the people acknowledge him:scholar Bahalul Haque analyses the book as follows.

At the apex of the pyramid comes Big Brother.

In the Book, 1984, the writer assumed a

Big Brother is infallible and all-powerful. Everysurveillance state where each and every

success, every achievement, every victory, every

aspect of human emotion is controlled by thescientific discovery, all knowledge, all wisdom,

ruling state. The key factors of our life likeall happiness, all virtues, are held to issue

language, emotions are controlled anddirectly from his leadership and inspiration.

monitored by the state. People don‘t have

(Orwell, 1983, Page 169)

anything to say anything as they are being

You hate him. Good. Then the time has come formanipulated psychologically to abide by the

you to take the last step. You must love Big

rules and regulations (Haque, 2019).

Brother. It is not enough to obey him: you must

As an outcome of the daily inculcations such as “Twolove him. (Orwell, 1983, Page 233)
6

The quotes above tell us to what extent the people oftriggering social discrimination. Thus, I conclude, it is

Oceania are devoted (or expected to be devoted) to Big

reasonable to say that digital contact tracing has theBrother. The most distinctive difference between Big

potential to accelerate the creation of a Big Brother

Brother in Orwell and its modern-day counterpart lies inframework.

the mental orientation of the citizens. The good news for

In terms of comparing the modern Big Brotherus is that residents of the real world have the right towith its literary equivalent, several differences can bequestion and object to what the authorities are up to, atpointed out. The lack of abilities such as manipulating

least to some extent.

facts distinguishes the digital contact tracing from the

Much would remain to be considered if Big

figurehead in the book. The potentially bad apple behind

Brother was emerging as a reality in our society.

contact tracing is the designer of the app who may

However, the novel hints at the characteristics of aoblige higher powers that harbor sinister intent. Therein

future society where such a reality comes into being. It

lies the danger. In this sense, the seeds of the core

would be naïve to say that such features are completely

elements such as relentless mass surveillance and theirrelevant to our future, and it is important to educate

ability to apply social pressure can be felt throughout

ourselves and to raise questions as to current

the digital contact tracing process. If these measuresdevelopments.

were to contribute massively to wipe out the disease,
their seeds might grow into creating the world that we

Conclusion

all thought only to exist in the novel. As this global

So, is digital contact tracing contributing topandemic brings change to society, we need tocreating a modern Big-Brother? This essay studied theacknowledge the potential outcome of novel policies

essence of digital contact tracing and the potential threat

and keep them under vigilant observation.

of it by extending into the world of 1984. Although theapp was implemented in fifty countries, the innovation
remains ambiguous in terms of its impact and its

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9