Perspectives on Global Risks: the 2nd JEF Global Risk Symposium 4

By James E. Hoare

Introduction: North Korean Experts
Are Rare Birds!
First a word of caution. Kim Jong Il, the leader of North Korea
from 1994 to 2011, told a group of visiting journalists from South
Korea in 2000 that anybody who presented themselves as an expert
on his country was a fool. Having studied the North since the mid1970s, visited several times, and lived there for 18 months in 20012, I am inclined to agree. Just when it seems obvious how things
work in the country, a new twist throws you off balance and thecertainties of yesterday are swept aside. It is not just me. The
number of predictions about the future policy or the chances ofsurvival of the country that have been proved wrong is legion. North
Korea is adept at allowing visitors to see only what it wants them tosee. It is not impossible to get around this. To do so, however, youmust keep your eyes and ears open. Do not take things at face value.
Probe as much as you can but do not be rude and do not break therules. What would cause no problems in most countries may not betreated with much tolerance in North Korea as some have found totheir cost.

Demonizing Is Easy
Demonizing North Korea is easy. For many commentators, it is thedefault mode. They do not analyze the country nor try to understandit. They know that it is evil, or that its policies are wrong. The most
famous exponents of this view were probably US President George
W. Bush and his senior colleagues, who famously did not negotiatewith evil, but, they said, destroyed it. Unfortunately for them, theneed to deal with the reality of the North Korean nuclear program
proved stronger than the unwillingness to negotiate. But Bush andhis men were by no means alone. North Korea arouses strong
emotions. The strength of those emotions can spill over into vitriolic
exchanges on social media, in conventional media and even inacademia. Nuance disappears, black and white prevails.
The process begins early. Few use the country’s official title – theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea – or even the abbreviation
DPRK. Some avoid the official usage because they do not want togive legitimacy to a state that, in their view, has no right to exist. To
them, there should be no division on the Korean Peninsula. Korea
was one for over 1,000 years. It should not be divided. Even theJapanese colonial administration did not do that. For many people
https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

Author James E. Hoarewith little knowledge of history, it is the North that is blamed for thedivision. But the process that saw the emergence of two separate
states on the peninsula started long before the Korean War. Outside
powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – carried out theinitial division. Their intentions were initially limited to taking theJapanese surrender. The Cold War intervened, and the two powers
oversaw the development of separate states on the peninsula. The
leaders of both states wanted unification. Each denied the other’s
right to existence. (To some degree, they still do, summit meetings
notwithstanding.) Belligerent noises and threats came from both.
The North struck first. Although the smaller in population, it had themeans to do so thanks to the Soviet decision to give it an army. The
US made a different decision. South Korea had a lightly armed superpolice force that proved no match for the forces from the North. If
there had been no outside intervention, the problem of Korean
unification would have been solved in 1950. But intervention there
was, and the war settled nothing. Now two even more hostile states
faced each other across the division line, initial hostility made worseby the bitterness of war.
Relations between the two Koreas were not helped by the rest of
the world. During the war, the United Nations had set up acommission – the UN Commission for the Unification andRehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) – that pledged to bring about the“rehabilitation and reunification of Korea” which followed on from its
1948 declaration that the South was the “only legitimate governmenton the Korean peninsula”. Although the wording did not say that it
was the only government on the peninsula, it acted as though thatwas what was meant, a position that Western countries went alongwith. Not until the early 1970s, with the first substantive contacts
between the two Koreas since the Korean War and the winding-up of
UNCURK, did the position change and Western countries begin toopen diplomatic links with the North.
From the war onwards, the default mode outside the North forreferring to the two Koreas was “Korea” for the South and “North
Korea” for the North. The implication, clearly, was that the South was
the real Korea. (Something similar happened in the case of divided
Germany and Vietnam.) The North was odd, an aberration. Of
course, there were ways in which the North contributed to thisimage. It was a tough totalitarian regime that maintained a fierce
independence. Few visited it. Even among the socialist states, it wasseen as a difficult partner; it was grasping and needy and it went its
own way as far as it could.
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Perspectives on Global Risks: the 2nd JEF Global Risk Symposium 4

Photo: Copyright 2011 J E Hoare

Pyongyang September 2018 - The show city

The Odd PlaceThe North was seen as a threat but also as a strange, bizarre place.
Both themes persist. Exaggerated claims about its military mightabound. Its rhetoric is indeed ferocious. Yet it is in reality cautious,
behaving like many small states surrounded by much bigger states,
all far better equipped. When not dealing with its alleged threat toworld peace, most press reports on the North are dominated by what
is seen as its weird nature. In recent years, these themes haveincluded the claim that the North believes in unicorns, or focused on
the strangeness of the leader’s hairstyle, while in July 2016 theBritish newspaper, the Daily Mail, reported that Kim Jong Un wasdevastated by international sanctions on luxury goods because of his
love of Swiss cheese and watches. We have had giant rabbits, catfish
and a regular diet of weird leaders doing odd things – all are jumbled
together whether true or not. To many it is the worst country in theworld in a host of areas from human rights (yet look at some Africanor Middle Eastern countries) to architecture (most former Soviet
cities could compete on that score).

But It Will Not Just Fade Away
A persistent theme is that the North is doomed to collapse any day
now. Even the failure of this to happen so far does not stop thepredictions. As with those who believe the end of the world is near, if
it does not happen at the predicted time, it will certainly do so nexttime – or the time after that. In 1949, the British Cabinet noted areport from the Seoul Legation that the North Korean army wasdisaffected, there was widespread starvation in the country, and thatthe regime was on the point of collapse. Forty years later, the British
commentator Aidan Foster-Carter wrote, following the collapse of theSoviet Union, that North Korea would be next, if not in two years,
certainly in five. When that did not happen, he twice more gave it five48 Japan SPOTLIGHT • March / April 2019

Photo: Copyright 2011 J E Hoare

Pyongyang Autumn 2001 - Also a show city, perhaps

years, then stopped predicting.
The fact is that the North has survived despite war, invasion, thelongest sanctions regime in the world, economic collapse and theend of its main trading partners, famines, floods and drought. Soviet
forces had liberated the north of the peninsula in 1945. The Soviet
Union may have enabled the Communist forces to dominate the area
and undoubtedly played a major role in the establishment of North
Korea. Dependence on Soviet guns to maintain its position wasended by 1949. It was China that saved it during the Korean War, notthe Soviet Union. Unlike the states of Eastern Europe, from the
1950s onwards it moved to a more independent position, drawing as
much on Korea’s historic past and even on the practices of theJapanese colonial administration to give the state legitimacy. The
collapse of the Soviet Union, which caused the collapse ofCommunism in Eastern Europe, worried the North, but it did nothave the same effect on it as it did on the European states.

Unification?
The complication for North Korea is in some ways similar to that
faced by the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in 198990. Once the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made it clear that theSoviet Union would no longer support their Communist leadership,
states such as Hungary or Poland could change government without
fear of challenge. East Germany, however, had until 1945 been partof a unified Germany. Its people had been exposed to the German
Federal Republic (West Germany) through radio, television and directcontact. Many wanted a return to a united Germany. There was some
opposition from other countries that had fought Germany in WorldWar II and feared a united Germany would be too powerful. This was
overcome, and the two German states merged into one. But an EastWest divide persists. Although they had not fought each other, as the
Koreas had, divisions had grown up between them that proved hard

Perspectives on Global Risks: the 2nd JEF Global Risk Symposium 4

to overcome. East Germany had a smaller population than the West.
Its economy, although widely regarded as the strongest in the former
Soviet sphere of influence, lagged well behind. Its industries were
old fashioned compared to the West. In some areas, it is true, it wasahead. Social security and health provisions were more evenly
distributed in the East, based on need rather than the ability to pay.
There was one other problem in the relationship. Suspicions of theEast in the now dominant West led to many job losses amongst
those who had worked for the East German regime. Some were triedand sentenced for having carried out state policies.
All this resonates with North Korea. The elite are aware of what
happened in East Germany, in Libya and Iraq. Some of that group are
well aware of the voices in South Korea that call, not forreconciliation, but for revenge. At best the senior leadership seesloss of status and loss of jobs. At worst they see the prospect of
being executed or imprisoned. It is preventing this outcome thatkeeps them loyal to the system and its leader, not the bottles ofbrandy or even the fast cars that Kim supposedly gives out from time
to time. To quote an old proverb, they hang together – stay united –or they hang separately.
Even if the worst did not happen, the North Korea leaders have had
clear indications over the years that there is a quasi-colonial attitude
towards their country in the South. This was made abundantly clear
during the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye presidencies. In South
Korea, companies and the government see the North, if not quite
virgin territory, as ready for exploitation. The South will help with
developing existing resources and looks forward to exploiting aliterate and obedient workforce. This does not bode well. Many willknow how hard it is for those from the North who have gone to theSouth to fit in, whether they are from the non-political classes orfrom the elite.
In the South too, there are doubts about the idea of reunification.
Back in 1989, the South witnessed a brief surge of enthusiasm forthe idea, as Eastern Europe was transformed. It was not long,
however, before doubts began to creep in. Having only just begun toreap the benefits of the economic development since the early
1970s, many looked askew at giving them up to pay for sorting out
the North. The famine years of the 1990s made things worse. It
became clear that the North was no paradise. Most of its muchvaunted achievements were well in the past, indeed if they had everexisted outside the pages of glossy magazines. Costs of reunificationin Germany proved far greater than anybody had expected.

Dealing with Reality Not Dreams
Unification thus seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Perhaps
one day, when all those who experienced the Korean War years havepassed on, and when the two sides get to know each other better, it
may happen. But there is a long way to go. So, there is little choice
but to deal with the North as it is, not as one might hope that it mightbe.
Here it would help if one got away from the overheateddiscussions on the threat from the North. Nobody would deny that
the North has been an irritant to its neighbors, but beyond the South
it is not a threat to their existence. Even in the case of South Korea,
2019 is not 1949. The balance of power has shifted in most mattersto the South. Even the possession of nuclear weapons does not givea real advantage. The use of such weapons on the peninsula would
not only lead to massive retaliation but could have an effect on the
North itself.
Photo: Copyright 2001 J E Hoare

Photo: Copyright 2004 J E Hoare

Militarism – Army First poster, Pyongyang

Less militarism – army and navy at Kaesong, Autumn 2001

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Perspectives on Global Risks: the 2nd JEF Global Risk Symposium 4

A real threat to the US or, even more unlikely, to Europe, seems
far-fetched. Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry pointed
out the huge discrepancy between the North and the US. If theformer were to use any of its tiny nuclear arsenal against the US, it
would face a counterattack that would certainly mean the end of theregime and possibly the complete destruction of the country. This
would be President Donald Trump’s fire and fury with a vengeance.
And while the North has shown that it will practice brinkmanship, it
has not shown itself suicidal.
Yes, Kim Jong Un has made threats and shown warlike scenes.
The armistice agreement has been denounced and declarations of
war are regularly flung about. But nothing happens. The North still
respects the armistice. There have been so many assertions that thisor that development is an act of war that it is hard to take them
seriously. Kim in the control room would look more authentic if thecomputers were plugged in and the telephones were connected. Oreven if the map on the wall did not look suspiciously like a blown-up
airline route map rather than the rocket trajectories against the US
that it claimed to be. What is forgotten is that such pictures areprimarily for internal consumption, designed to show a leader incontrol and standing up to the enemies of the North.

Pyongyang and raised the issue, I was told that North Korean law
would not permit this. We could have telephone and fax
communications, but no embassy or international organization could
have access to the Internet. The World Food Programme, whose
staff travelled all over the country, was particularly anxious for
improved communications but had been regularly turned down.
In our case, the standoff continued for a year. I raised the issue ona regular basis, and North Korean officials visiting London were also
bombarded with the same message. As I drew near the end of mytime in Pyongyang, I thought I would try a different tack. Since I wasgoing straight into retirement, I had nothing to lose! So one evening
at my apartment where they had come for dinner, I told the European
Department that they were running the risk that I would recommend
to London that we abandon the idea of a resident embassy since we
could not work as we were. The usual objections were aired but,perhaps by coincidence, a week later I was called aside at a party andtold that we could have our communications. The Note authorizing
this arrived the following day. As it happened, the budget wasoverspent so there was no change while I was there. But mysuccessors benefitted as did other embassies and internationalorganizations. And there has never been any attempt to go back on
the agreement.

You Cannot Trust Them!
What Should Be Done?
That North Korea does not stick to its treaties and agreements isby now a well-established mantra. It is certainly a tough negotiator.
Like other East Asian countries, it is usually more attached to thegeneral spirit of a document than to the precise text. If, however, it is
to its advantage to be more precise, it will be. What its negotiators
do expect is that there will be equal and mutual advantage. If there isbacktracking or a lack of reciprocity, to the North that excuses it frommeeting its side of the bargain. Essentially that is what happened
over the 1994 Agreed Framework. The North believed that it had
stuck to the agreement since it had capped and halted its plutoniumbased nuclear program. That was all that was covered in theagreement. When the US did not seem to be pursuing its side of theagreement – by 2002, it was estimated that it was eight years behindschedule, while the new George W. Bush administration was
showing signs of hostility – the North began pursuing an alternativeroute towards its original goal. If the administration had wanted, it
could have raised its concerns quietly under the terms of the Agreed
Framework, as the administration of President Bill Clinton had done.
But eager “to confront evil”, it chose a different path. It was not wise
since it opened the way to the situation we have today. Yet the lesson
was not learned, and agreements continued to founder because of awish to add new conditions or to change the terms.
The United Kingdom had a more successful, if minor, experience.
In the document establishing diplomatic relations signed in
December 2012, it was clearly stated that we would be allowed
secure communications as we did everywhere else. When I got to
50 Japan SPOTLIGHT • March / April 2019

For most of the period since 1945, North Korea has been seen as
an awkward nuisance at best or as a potential source of trouble atworst. Rather than engage with it in the hope of effecting change, theway to handle it was to isolate it. In the light of where we are today, I
find it hard to argue that such a policy was unsuccessful, especiallygiven what happened during the short period (1998-2002) whenSouth Korea and the US followed a different approach. Yes, it costmoney but there were real achievements. A nuclear program wascapped. The South began to build a new relationship with its
neighbor, as did the US and many other countries. Even Japan began
to benefit. Nobody got all they wanted from the better relationship,
but it was the start of a process. If the momentum had been kept up,
who knows where it might have led? The developments in 2018, themoving away from the threats and counter-threats of 2017, offer aglimmer of hope. Moving away from sanctions would benefit
ordinary North Koreans as would the development of trading andother links. Rather than isolating the North, some of the effort that
goes into implementing sanctions would be better used in providing
training and opportunities to see how things are done elsewhere.
Kim Jong Un has shown an interest in getting away from
confrontation. Perhaps we should build on that.
Dr. James E. Hoare has a Ph.D. in Japanese History and joined the Research
Department of the British Foreign Office in 1969. He was posted to Seoul,Beijing and Pyongyang. He now writes and broadcasts.