Japan and Korea in China–US Relations
Core working group workshop: 17-18 December 2019
National Library of Korea, SeoulOverview
Japan–Korea relations have of late been attracting international attention in their intensifying clash
over history that has spilled over to the economic and security sphere, notably over GSOMIA. Yet, theimpact of deteriorating Japan–Korea relations is perhaps not properly appreciated outside theregion, as the international community’s interest in this bilateral relationship is cursory at best, moreoften than not eclipsed by developments in China–US relations. While no-one (in the West) would
question the global importance of China–US relations, in the hierarchy of other important bilateralrelations Japan–Korea relations is perhaps underrated and under the radar when it should warrant
more critical attention.
There has always been a significant interest and knowledge gap about the political and security
situation in Northeast Asia in the Atlantic community-driven discourse on international security
compared to, for example, the situation Middle East, as the different handlings of Iran and North
Korea’s nuclear programmes demonstrate. While there are various historical and geopolitical factorsthat contribute to this situation, to the extent that most newsworthy stories coming from East Asia
have been about economic development and success, perhaps such lack of attention is inevitable.
Moreover, after the Cold War, East Asian nations also nurtured the idea that increasing economic
interdependence among states would allow for peaceful inter-state relations to eventually prevail inthe region. Casting our eyes to this economic sphere, however, China’s rise has been both a blessing
and a bane to the other three (and for the region as a whole), which brings us to the challenges
associated with China’s sabre-rattling in the last decade, its hostile outlook toward the West and thepost-war status quo in Asia, that is the US-led liberal order and the San Francisco system. On theother hand, the inability of China, Japan and Korea to reconcile over history after more than 70 yearsof war and colonisation (despite some earnest attempts) is in no small measure due to the divisive
San Francisco system that has not allowed these three countries to bring closure to the past together.
Instead, each country is now in throes of memory politics, chasing historic missions separately: Chinawith its “100 years of humiliation”, Korea revisiting the 1965 agreement with Japan, and Japan withthe revisionist history of denial.
The idea of regional peace through economic interdependence has not materialised. Rather theopposite is beginning to happen, with China’s unwillingness to be part of the liberal order (whilebenefitting from it) and revanchist claims on maritime territories, a situation compounded by thechallenges of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and the future of the Korea Peninsula. (What isperhaps astonishing is that in late 2017, military tension over North Korea rose suddenly in a rapid
escalation akin to the Cuban missile crisis. The case spoke vividly of the failure by all parties torecognise—or address—the problem of lacking any confidence building steps to prevent such anescalation.) As the situation with North Korea deteriorated, the inherent fragility of Japan–Korea
security relations within the US hub-and-spokes system also became harder to ignore.
However, while the weakness of Japan–Korea relations as a vital component of US strategy in Asia iscertainly worrying it is not the only problematic aspect in the international politics of Northeast Asia.
That the bilateral relationship is bogged down by inward looking nationalist policies and unsettled
scores in history also has external systemic causes. The asymmetry of power among the countries
constantly informs Northeast Asian international politics, where the Japan–Korea axis may be apotential fault line. But neither Japan nor Korea is in full control of its own actions or destiny in thelarger power politics taking place between China and the US. Moreover, looking at the five bilateral
IAFOR RESEARCH CENTRE, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
1-31 Machikaneyama-machi, Toyonaka-shi, Osaka, Japan
https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/iaforresearchcentre/

parts (China-US, China-Japan, China-Korea, Japan-US, Korea-US, Japan-Korea), it is difficult to dismiss
the fact that they are all changing in ways that are not necessarily for the better. Even though some
may still hope for the Japan-US security alliance to maintain its position as the “pillar of stability” inEast Asian security, it would also be unrealistic to treat Japan–US relations as any more stable thanthe other bilateral relationships just because of Japan’s high dependence on the US for its nationalsecurity. In the post-Cold War world, cumulative US influence on Japanese politics is becoming
precisely the problem that may unravel the alliance. Similar situation may be observed in Korea’srelations with the US, but in Korea’s case its willingness to cultivate closer relations with China is a
cause of concern for Japan and the US.
China and the US are each influential in the domestic politics and international outlook of Japan andKorea, and are significant factors shaping how Japan and Korea perceive and treat each other at theboth political and societal levels. The intertwined, entangled and asymmetrical nature of thequadrilateral relationship between China, US, Japan and Korea (that in turn shape Japan–Korea
relations) makes it extremely difficult to stabilise Northeast Asia’s international politics and security,
let alone build peaceful relations based on mutual trust. Here again, the Japan–US relations may
appear to enjoy a time-honoured level of trust, but whatever trust in the alliance that wasaccumulated over the Cold War decades is fast depleting, especially since President Donald Trump’s
reckless management of US commitments overseas severely undermining the basis of being allied tothe US but also through the Bush and Obama years when the US policy toward China failed to quell
regional anxieties toward a rapidly expanding Chinese influence. As the edifice of the Cold War
alliance structures appears to be crumbling away, Northeast Asia’s post-war international relations
are informed more than ever by layers of history and memories attached to relations or systems lying
underneath it.
Given the complexities of the international environment surrounding Japan and Korea, policies,
measures and actions aimed at improving the bilateral relationship alone are clearly inadequate.
They will not even achieve the intended goal of improving relations. Without changing the dynamics
of the other relationships, and designing a quadrilateral forum can revisit the idea of an East Asian ina meaningful way, Japan–Korea relations will continue to be beholden to the quadrilateralrelationship dominated by the exigencies and demands of China and the US and will not be able torealise the potential to play effective leadership roles in global politics.
Workshop timeline and agenda
The primary objective of this two-day workshop is to identify topics to be address in the symposiumplanned for mid-March 2020 in Osaka and also to discuss preliminary ideas and topics for thebook/journal special issue project planned for the year 2020-21 (funding from Korea Foundationpending).
Timeline: This workshop in Seoul gathers participants based in Korea. Seoul workshop will befollowed by a short workshop via Skype or television conference connecting 3 other participants
based in Singapore (Nanyang Technological University) and Tokyo (Waseda University) in mid-January
or early February, possibly linking the East Asia Institute/NUS.
At the end of the symposium in Osaka, we will compile a short policy report based on the discussions
that will be separate from the individual articles/chapters to be written in the course of the next year.
We may also discuss the possibility of organising a panel at the AAS-in-Asia 2020 in Osaka in June 2527, the Association of Asian Studies’ conference leg in Asia that was originally going to be hosted bythe Chinese University in Hong Kong.
IAFOR RESEARCH CENTRE, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
1-31 Machikaneyama-machi, Toyonaka-shi, Osaka, Japan
https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/iaforresearchcentre/

Topics for the workshop:
Please prepare short talking points (about 10 mins each) on the following points from (1)-(3). The
sub-topics/questions are only intended as guidelines.
Tuesday 17 December (10:00-13:00)
1)The future of the international liberal order:—Are China’s global strategy and America’s global strategy fundamentally at odds with each other? Ifso (or otherwise), what are the roles of Japan and Korea to both China and the US?
—Democracy versus authoritarianism or something else? (Where are Japan and Korea in the values
debate?)—Global economy and the future of free trade—Beyond bandwagoning versus balancing, and the world in binaries.
2) Multilateralism, functional cooperation and SDG:
—Beyond institutionalism versus informal networks (EU versus the East Asian/ASEAN model)—UN and global governance: alignment with which part of the P-5?
—Peacebuilding and human security: spill-over effects of functional cooperation
Wednesday 18 December (10:00-13:00)
3) San Francisco system, its legacies and limitations—Positive and negative legacies of the San Francisco system (who benefits from maintaining thesystem)—Revisiting and reforming the San Francisco system: confronting history, open archives, andreconciliation—The Asian century of China-Japan-Korea cooperation in the making?
4) Discussion: East Asian modernity and the global history perspective

IAFOR RESEARCH CENTRE, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
1-31 Machikaneyama-machi, Toyonaka-shi, Osaka, Japan
https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/iaforresearchcentre/

Directions to the Research Information Services of the National Library of Korea (RINK)For full details on public transportation and parking: http://www.nl.go.kr/english/c1/page7.jsp
Directions for access to the RINK Seminar Rooms 1 & 2:
1.

2.
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4.

Signing in: Please bring a government-issued photo-ID to access the library. In exchange ofthe ID, you will be given an access card to enter the main gate and the RINK seminar rooms
on the 3rd floor. You need not register as a member, but will need to sign in at the front deskfor both days (17th and 18th) on the 1st floor of the Main Building. A list of names of theattendees has already been submitted to the RINK and the front desk concierge at theNational Library of Korea.
After passing through the gate, please take either the stairs or the elevator to the 3rd floor.
Proceed towards the end of the corridors past the Periodicals Room and the restrooms. TheSeminar Rooms 1 and 2 are housed within the Research Information Services Room on the 3rdFloor.
Leaving: When you leave the main building, please remember to retrieve your photo-IDs andreturn the access cards on the 1st floor after passing the main gate.

Tips on facility use at the National Library of Korea:
1. Wireless computer connection to the large full HD display (1080 pixels) powered by VIA
Connect PRO (Kramer AudioVisuals) is available. If you wish to present your slides, you could
connect your computer or mobile device to the large screen regardless of OS type, or bring itin a USB.
2. Coffee is available for purchase at Grazie Café on the 1st floor and can be carried into theseminar rooms if it is covered with a lid. There is a bigger Grazie Café outside the mainbuilding towards the main road along the giant staircase.
3. Meals are available for purchase at the Book Restaurant and there is also a CU convenience
store next to it outside the Main Building.
IAFOR RESEARCH CENTRE, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
1-31 Machikaneyama-machi, Toyonaka-shi, Osaka, Japan
https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/iaforresearchcentre/