Working Paper Series E-2009-01

Emerging EUs and their exchange rates
ex ante and ex post Sub -prime crisis

Keisuke AOKI (University of Nagasaki)
Kentaro KAWASAKI (Toyo University)Ⓒ2009 KEISUKE AOKI and KENTARO KAWASAKI. All rights
reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit is given
to the source.

Emerging EUs and their exchange rates ex ante and ex post Sub-prime crisis

Keisuke Aoki †Kentaro Kawasaki††

Abstract

Triggered by the failure of Lehman Brothers in fall, 2008, a global financial crisis attacked theEuropean countries. This paper discusses about challenges of the EU financial system exposed by thisfinancial crisis and problems of conventional growth strategy for the Central and Eastern European
countries.

Our empirical analysis using TAR/M-TAR unit root tests suggested that market participants’reactions to the foreign exchange market appeared to be different between appreciations anddepreciations in the Hungarian forint after mid-2007, while the Czech koruna and the Polish zloty
converged to the long-term mean symmetrically.

This means that once the monetary authority would

fail to manage the exchange rate movements and lose its reputation, an acceleration of depreciation could
become a trigger of a currency crisis.

Though the authorities to supervise financial institutions and tocarry out a fiscal policy are entrusted to each country in the EU, a financial policy such as liquidity
provision and adjusting interest rates is enforced unitarily by the ECB.

Therefore, the governments

practice countermeasures against the currency crisis in ‘the non-euro’ emerging EUs, it might cause thefinancial system in the EU to be destabilized because ‘one-size-fit-all’ monetary policies would not fit all
member states. As a result, this global crisis unexpectedly has increased a unifying force for the euro
adoption to non-euro countries.

†

School of Economics, University of Nagasaki, 123 Kawashimo-cho, Sasebo-shi, Nagasaki-ken
858-8580 Japan. Email: aoki@sun.ac.jp††
Faculty of Business Administration, ToyoUniversity, 5-28-20 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku,Tokyo 112-8606
Japan. Email: kawasaki-k@toyonet.toyo.ac.jp

1. Introduction: Background and Process of Monetary Crisis in 2008
The issue of subprime loan in U.S.A. which had come to the front in summer, 2007 caused an
unprecedented monetary crisis in 2008. As for the beginning, the delay of the interest payment or thedefault of the home loan by the burst of the U.S. house bubble had let the value of financial instruments
securitized subprime loans fall, therefore the management of financial institutions and investment firms
holding them turned worse. After that, the influence produced suspicion fear in the whole monetarysystem and it developed into a global monetary crisis. The process which led to the global monetary crisis
seems to have three main routes.
First, it is the short-term money market which financial institutions daily use to finance fromeach other.

The short-term money market had a malfunction and became paralysis as money supplierremarkably decreased because of mutual credit uncertainty of financial institutions and investors. Thatcaused from the aggravation of financing for financial institutions which suffered a financial loss andturned worse their management.

Therefore the sound financial institutions not holding securities related

to subprime loan became difficult to finance, and many of them faced to a liquidity crisis.
Secondly, the value of other securitized instruments with no related to subprime loan fell, andappraisal loss of financial institutions, investment companies and general companies holding those
instruments spread and the loss in weight of their assets value caused serious management difficulty.
Moreover, the risk of other loan credit covered with some financial instruments like CDS (credit defaults
swap 1) suddenly increased because of management uneasiness of insurance companies or investmentbanks. They sell CDS and undertake original risks. That also brought credit uncertainty of financial
institutions holding such loan credit.
The final route is below. Because of such financial uncertainty, the value of derivatives andany other financial assets such as stocks, corporate bonds, investment funds fell.

Besides instruments

related subprime or CDS, the decreasing value of various financial instruments caused deterioration offunctions of the whole capital markets. The financial panic that spread through these three routes
developed into a serious global financial crisis before long.
Financial institutions and investment companies in Europe were holding big amount of1

CDS is a credit derivative contract between two counter parties. The buyer makes periodic payments (premium leg)to the seller, and in return receives a payoff (protection or default leg) if underlying financial instruments or firms
default.

securitized financial instruments related subprime loans. There were some signs since before this problem
came to the front greatly in summer, 2007. In February, 2007, the UBS in Switzerland closed theirsubsidiary hedge fund, Dillon, Read & Co. because of the loss of subprime-related instruments. In July,IKB in Germany filed for a rescue fund to KfW2 because of the same loss.

In August, BNP Paribas inFrance suspended operations of three of its funds. In this phase, the European Central Bank (ECB)
injected cash into the financial system. The ECB lent 95 billion euros to meet banks’ needs after demandfor cash in the European money markets. In September, Northern Rock Bank in U.K. faced a run on thebank.

This bank did not hold subprime related instruments much, but the home loan ratio for theirbusiness profit was high, and it was highly dependent on the short-term money market for the fund.
Northern Rock Bank was eventually taken into state ownership in February, 2008. This event appearedthat subprime loan issue was widely regarded as the serious problem for general people and society.
However, at this point, it was still thought that every government of each country and each central bankcould handle such financial problems individually.
It was September, 2008 that the situation changed completely. A start was the failure ofLehman Brothers, a U.S. major investment bank. (They filed for Chapter 11, bankruptcy protection on
September 15.) That reduced the value of securitized instruments, corporate bonds, stocks and so on
greatly. Their creditor and partner financial institutions which had dealt with them for derivative businesslike CDS suffered a big loss. On the following day, September 16, the U.S. government announced to
inject a rescue fund to AIG, a U.S. major insurance company, of which the management uneasiness had
been worried. In this way, the monetary crisis originated in the U.S. has become serious. The U.S.
government announced Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 to purchase from financial
institutions a large amount of bad loans on September 19 and appealed to other countries for the sameaction, but most of European countries, such as Germany and France showed negative reactions.
However, at the end of September, the crisis for the failure of financial institutions began in Europe as
well. The governments of Benelux announced to inject capital for Fortis, a financial service company,
based in Belgium and the Netherlands.

After that, in U.K., Ireland and Germany, one after anotherfinancial institutions were nationalized or were injected public funds. (Table1.)

2

Refer to http://www.kfw.de/EN_Home/index.jsp .

Table 1: Trend of Monetary Crisis since mid-September 2008
EuropeSep.18.

Sep.28.

Sep.29.

Sep.30.

Oct.02.

Oct.03.

Oct.04.

・U.K. Lloyds TSB, takeover HBOSThe U.S.
Sep.07.
Sep.15.

・U.S. government, GSE support plan release・Lehman Brothers failure

Sep.16.

・FRB，bailout for AIG releaseSep.18.

・FRB, dollar swap agreement with BOJ,ECB,BOE etc

Sep.19.

・FRB, emergency loan for MMMF
・U.S. government, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of2008 release

Sep.21.

・Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley become traditional bankholding companies

Sep.24.

・FRB, spread swap line for each central bank

Sep.25.

・Washington Mutual forced to close by FDIC

・Benelux, Total 11.2bn euros to Fortis capital injection
・U.K., Bradford & Bingley（B&B）nationalized, takeoverby Spain Banco Santander・Iceland, Glitnir Banki nationalized, 75% stocks for 600
million euros
・Germany, Hypo Real Estate 35bn euros credit line fromthe government ＆ consortium of German banks.

・lower House, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of2008 rejectSep.29.

・FRB, TAF loans spread
・FRB, swap line agreement with central banks of Northern
Europe and Australia

・ Dexia, 64bn euro as capital injection by France ・Belgium・Luxembourg government & large stockholder
・Ireland, Deposit full guarantee(Domestic main 6 banks only)

・CITI, takeover Wachovia release（After that, purchased by Wells Fargo）

Oct.01.

・Senate, amended Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
2008 approve

Oct.03.

・lower House, amended Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act 2008 approve

Oct.06.

・PWG, appeal heeds for international cooperation for thecrisis・Greece, Deposit guarantee upper limit spread (for all
domestic banks)・ECB Executive Board, consider reduction in interest.
・U.K. FSA, Deposit guarantee upper limit spread・G4（G・F・I・U.K.）emergency summit, reject rescue
funds plan proposed by France
・Hypo Real Estate，credit line spread up to 50bn euros
・German, Personal deposit guarantee upper limit spread
・Sweden, Deposit guarantee upper limit spread

Oct.06.

・BNP Paribas, takeover Fortis’s Belgium, Luxembourg
section・Iceland, Act Providing for Special Powers in Exceptional
Financial Market Circumstances approve
S＆P, Iceland demote (A- to BBB)・EU Finance Ministers’ meeting, Deposit guarantee upper
limit spread, shelve rescue funds plan
・Spain, Greece, Austria, Netherlands, Deposit guarantee
upper limit spread

Oct.07.

・IMF, total loss of financial institutions estimate 1400bn
dollars in Global Financial Stability Report( amount changed to 2200bn dollars in Jan. 2009.)
Oct.07.

・Spain, funds for purchasing assets of financial farms plan
(up to 30~50bn euros)

・FRB, announce creation of Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF)

・Iceland, Landsbanki under official management

・Bernanke FRB Chairman, suggest reduction in interest rate

・Iceland, shift to fixed exchange rate system (renounced)
・Austria, Personal deposit full guarantee

Oct.08.

・Paulson, suggest public funds to Financial institutions

・U.K., 20bn pounds of capital injection for main banks.
(max 50bn pounds) 250bn pounds of government
guarantee for financial Institutions
Oct.08.

・FRB・ECB・BOE・Canada・Sweden・Swiss CBs cooperation reduction in interest rate. BOJ strongly support
・Iceland, Kaupthing under official management
・Italy, rescue plan for financial institutions release
・ECB, spread between lending and deposit facilities reduce
50bp

Oct.09.

・ECB, supply bid amount of money at the operations

Oct.10.
Oct.12.

・G7, action plan including capital injection by the governments
・Summit of the euro area countries, “concerted European
action plan”
・Germany, France etc, plan for the injection of public funds
and guarantee of banks debt

Oct.13.

Oct.13.

・U.S government, preferred stock of main banks acquisition

・ECB・EOE・Swiss bank, increase currency swap with FRB
and supply necessary total amount of dollar bid
・U.K., injection of public funds to 3 domestic main banks

Source： News, each government, central bank announcement.

2. Crisis spill over: Hungary, Just the First to fall?
From the U.S. to Europe, this financial crisis hit the developed countries first, and the publicfunds were injected to financial institutions in U.K., Germany, France, the Netherlands cf. The central
banks in the developed countries, the FRB, the BOE, the ECB and others, successively carried out
various measures, a concerted reduction in interest rates, purchasing assets of financial institutions, theunlimited provision of dollar liquidity and the easing the credit qualified threshold for collaterals. But thecrisis extended to emerging countries. Stock prices in Central and Eastern Europe countries all declined atnearly 30% a month in October 2008. Those currency also depreciated sharply. The Hungarian forint fell
13.6%, the Polish zloty -13.6% by the fourth week of October. The large amount of money flowed fromthese countries. The Hungarian forint fell 30% against euro, nearly 50% against dollar from the highest in
July 21 because the fundamentals of Hungary had been pointed out its weakness for some time. It might
be in the situation of the currency crisis.

2.1 Empirical Analysis for Recent Exchange rate movements in Central Europe
Here, we just take a look at the recent dramatic depreciations in the Central European
currencies against the Euro. To detect whether there exist the significant changes in properties of Central
European exchange rates movements against the Euro, we employ a usual unit root test framework.
We suppose that the country which belongs to the ERM II framework should keep theirexchange rate movements into the exchange rate band they have set, e.g. ±2.25 % or ±15%. As long as
their exchange rates against their central parity would not stay out ‘the snake band,’ the monetary
authority does not need to intervene explicitly. While these countries have allowed slight changes of theirexchange rates in the band, it is quite rare for those exchange rates to deviate from the band range under
the ERM II. Perhaps, most of the monetary authorities under the ERM II frameworks might often
intervene in the foreign exchange market to keep their exchange rates movements stable in the band as fortheir daily operations. Otherwise, the nominal exchange rates may possibly be fluctuating. Therefore,
only if the monetary authority is fully trusted under the ERM II framework, the exchange rates mightremain in the band.

Here, we assume that each nation’s monetary authority manages to eliminate deviations fromtheir central parity and keep their exchange rate stable at least in the band. We define the logarithm of
nominal exchange rate: st and its central parity against the EURO at the targeted exchange rate: s ,hence, ‘ultimate’ purpose of exchange rate policy for the ERM II country’s monetary authority should bethat the deviation from the long term mean of their exchange rates: ht would satisfy the conditions
below, then it would be the white-noise process:

(

)

( )
var ( h ) = var ( h ) = ! = "cov ( h , h ) = cov ( h , h ) = 0
E st ! s = E ht = 0ttwhere !

2
h

2
h

t!1

t!s

t! j

(2.1)

t! j!srefers to the variance of process ht
If the monetary authority could succeed to perfectly manage their exchange rate, the deviationfrom the central would converge to the zero-mean in the long run, then it would be expected to bestationary process. However, even if Equation (2.1) would not be satisfied and the deviations would be
non-stationary process, as long as the exchange rate fluctuations remain in the band, the targetingexchange rate policy seems to succeed at least. It is because there does not exist a factor for exchange
rates to stay out the exchange rate band.
On the other hand, the country which does not belong to the ERM II framework but is
expected to join the Euro in the future, may allow appreciations/depreciations to some extent in atransition for satisfying the conditions for the Euro participation. While the country allows slightappreciations/depreciations as following their economic growth, they might not have ‘explicit’ targetingexchange rates, namely a central parity: s , then, their nominal exchange rates could be non-stationary
process.
While most of the non-ERM II countries adopt the inflation targeting implicitly or explicitly,
it is said that emerging economies have incentives to manage their exchange rates.3 Hence, thesecountries may have an implicit target of “changes” in their nominal exchange rates against the Euro,
which it may accordance with other economic policy targetings such as GDP growth rates, changes in theprice, and so on. Therefore, while their exchange rate could appreciate/depreciate in a transition, thedrastic changes from the implicit targeting exchange rates might be eliminated by the monetary authority
as well. Here, we assume their ‘implicit exchange rate policy with an implicit targeting rule for exchange
rate movement: implicit exchange rate targeting. Following the nation’s economic policy, the monetary3

Mishkin (2000) pointed out the problems of adopting the inflation targeting monetary policy into the emerging
economies. Under those circumstances, the monetary authority in emerging economy may have incentives to adopt‘the managed float’ exchange rate policy with implicit targeted rate.

authority manages to control changes in exchange rate movements around their targeting rate: !!s . The
deviation from the targeting changes in their exchange rate as for their policy rule, might satisfy thefollowing conditions;

(

)

( )
var ( g ) = var ( g ) = " = #cov ( g , g ) = cov ( g , g)=0
E !st " !!s = E gt = 0ttwhere !

2
g

2
g

t"1

t"s

t" j

(2.2)

t" j"srefers to the variance of series gt . Since there are no exchange rate band, As binding

Equation (2.2), the monetary authority would be able to succeed to constrain massive fluctuations fromtheir targeting changes in exchange rates by their often interventions.
The well-known model to detect the process which could satisfy the conditions in Equations(2.1) or (2.2), is developed by the Dickey-Fuller (1979) test for a unit root. While detecting the stationary
process, we can estimate the implicit targeted changes of exchange rates: a0 for the non-ERM II
countries by the Dickey-Fuller model below;,yt = a0 + a1 yt!1 + " t ,(2.3)

where ! t denotes the white-noise process. Here, Series y are expected to be followed stationary data
generating process only if the null hypothesis: a1 = 1 could be rejected. Adopting yt = gt , if the null isrejected, the monetary authority of non ERM II country could succeed to manage their exchange rates
around at their implicit targeting policy role for exchange rate movements.
The problem here is that the Dickey-Fuller (DF) model or its augmented version (the ADF
model) assumes a linear adjustment process if the process do not contain a unit root. If the monetary
authority is fully trusted and its monetary policy is accordance with current economic fundamentals,
slight deviations of exchange rates from their implicit targeting change, namely, rapid appreciation or
depreciation, would be corrected which reverting process to the targeted value would be ‘symmetric.’
Hence, we might be able to employ the DF/ADF tests for detecting the symmetric reversion process. On
the other hand, if those unexpected deviations come from the persistency of unreconciled monetary or
economic policies or market gloom and doom, reverting process to the implicit targeting value byintervenes would become ‘asymmetric’ between appreciations and depreciations. The DF/ADF tests
might not be useful to detect an asymmetric reversion to the equilibrium in a non-linear model.
Enormous number of literatures has shown the non-linear adjustment process model which
considers the presence of an attractor. 4 Enders and Granger (1998) developed the methods of detecting
the non-linearity of adjustment process considering the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model as below;

4

See the details of the discussions in Pippenger and Goering (1993) and Balke and Fomby (1997)

p

(

) (

) (

)

!yt = I t "1 yt#1 # $ + 1# I t " 2 yt#1 # $ + & % i !yt#1 + ' t

(2.4)

i=1

$
&
It = %&'

1 if

yt!1 " #0 if

yt!1 < #,where ! is a threshold.
As far as we know exact value of the threshold: ! , asymmetric mean reversion process
could be detected in Equation (2.4).
On the other hand, if we do not know exact thresholds as nature of non-linearity in adjustment
process, Enders and Granger propose that the adjustment process depends on !yt"1 instead of yt!1 .
Hence, Equation (2.4) could be rewritten as the momentum threshold auto-regressive (M-TAR) model asfollows:p()!yt = I t "1 yt#1 + 1# I t " 2 yt#1 + % $ i !yt#1 + & t

(2.5)

i=1

$
&
It = %&'

1 if!yt"1 # 0

0 if!yt"1 < 0.

If estimated values of ! could not be rejected the null hypothesis of unit root: !1 = ! 2 = 0 ,the data generating process of series yt might follow the white noise process. Next, if the null of!1 = ! 2 could be rejected, the adjustment process might be asymmetric.
Here, we substitute yt ! " for the logarithm of exchange rates: ht . Equation (2.4) would be
rewritten as follows,

(

)

p

!ht = I t "1ht#1 + 1 # I t "2 ht#1 + % $ i !ht#1 + & t ,#%1 if
It = $
%
&0 if

(2.6)

i=1

ht!1 " 0,

ht!1 < 0where the threshold for ht should be zero. We use Equation (2.6) to detect stationary of exchange rates
movements for the ERM country. If the series ht in Equation (2.6) are confirmed as stationary process,there exist factors to differentiate adjustment process of depreciations from the central parity.
For the non-ERM country, their threshold is unknown. If we adopt exchange rate movementsof non-ERM into the methods of detecting the non-linearity of adjustment process, we should apply
Equation (2.5) as M-TAR model. We rewrite Equation (2.5) as follows;

(

p

)

!gt = I t "1 # gt$1 + 1 $ I t "2 # gt$1 + & % i !gt$1 + ' t ,$&1 if
It = %
&
'0 if

(2.7)

i=1

!gt"1 # 0,

!gt"1 < 0where a threshold for gt still be unknown. If the series gt in Equation (2.7) are confirmed asstationary process, there exist factors to differentiate adjustment process of ‘undesirable’ depreciations
from that of ‘acceptable’ appreciations.

2.2 The data
The daily nominal exchange rates of the Danish krona and selected emerging EU currencies:
the Czech koruna, the Hungarian forint, and the Polish zloty, against the Euro are obtained from
Datastream. Our sample covers from January 1 2004 to January 12 2009. While we consider the
existence of structural break related to ‘the sub-prime’ crisis, we set the sub samples; i) January 1 2004July 15 2008, ii) January 1 2007 - July 15 2008, iii) January 1 2008 - July 15 2008, and iv) July 21 2008 –January 12 2009. We supposed the date of break from a kink point of emerging EUs’ exchange rates
movements since the exchange rates of these three currencies had started depreciating dramaticallyagainst the EURO after hitting the record high at July 21 2008.

2.3 Empirical results
Table 2s show the empirical results applying the unit root test into the three Central European
countries and Denmark. While the most of coefficients in the ADF test showed insignificant, we can findthe coefficients which are statistically significant from the M-TAR unit root tests. This suggests the
M-TAR unit root could be able to solve the weak power in the usual unit root test as pointed in Enders
and Granger (1998).
Table 2a shows results for the Czech koruna. The changes in the Czech koruna to the Euro exchange
rates appeared to be stationary in the M-TAR unit root tests since the F-test statistics for the null
hypothesis: !1 = ! 2 = 0 suggested no unit roots from the ! M tables. On the other hand, we might
accept the symmetric adjustment process to the mean because the null of !1 = ! 2 could not be rejected.,
Through all sub sample periods, there exist attractors to revert symmetrically, Therefore we conclude that
the Czech koruna has been still under the control of the monetary authority of Czech Republic while they
have experienced huge depreciations and fluctuations.

Table 2b shows the empirical results for the Hungarian forint. We could not find muchdifferences between the case of Hungarian forint and that of the Czech koruna before July 21 2008. For
the period from July 21 2008 to Jan 12 2009, the F-test statistics for the null of !1 = ! 2 is 5.847794 with
0.017 probabilities. It suggests asymmetric adjustment process. This means that the monetary authority
might have been able to control massive fluctuations in exchange rate movements since there are no unit
root, however, market participants’ reactions to the foreign exchange market appeared to be different
between of appreciations and depreciations in the Hungarian forint. Once the monetary authority would
fail to manage the exchange rate movements and lose its reputation, an acceleration of depreciation in
Hungarian forint could become a trigger of a currency crisis.
Table 2c shows results for the Polish zloty. In some cases, we could have the coefficients
whose the t-test statistics for the null of unit root indicated statistically significant in the ADF tests. For
all sub sample period, we could find symmetric adjustment process in the M-TAR tests. Hence, we also
conclude that the Polish zloty has been still under the control of the monetary authority of Poland while
they have also experienced huge depreciations and fluctuations.
Table 2d shows the case of the Danish krona as for a ERM II country. We also applied the
TAR model defined in Equation (2.4). For the whole sample period and the period; May 1 2004 – Jul 15
2008, the coefficients indicated statistically significant in the TAR and the M-TAR unit root tests whichsuggest asymmetric adjustment process. But for the periods: Jan 1 2007 – Jul 15 2008, Jan 1 2008 – Jul
15 2008, and Jul 21 2008 - Jan 12 2009, we could not reject the null of unit root process while their levelof exchange rate movements still remained inside of upper and lower band of ERM II. This suggests that
there are no factors for exchange rate movements to deviate from the band. We suppose that the Danish
monetary authority could manage their monetary policy very well to keep their exchange rate to the Eurostable as a result.

Table 2a: The TAR, and M-TAR unit root test for the Czech koruna
Sample Period

Model

May 1 2004
ADF
-Jan 12 2009

DF
1223

Lag(s)
0 a(0)

Coeffcient (with S.E.)

F statisics (Probability)
H: Rho(+)=Rho(-)=0 H: Rho(+)=Rho(-)

0.000000216
0.000112208
a(1)0.03846701
0.028580728
M-TAR 1218
0 Rho(+)-0.949624441 ****
564.4459
0.194763
0.039743481
00.65906024
Rho(-)-0.974910661 ****
0.041272142
May 1 2004
ADF
1094
1 a(0)
0.000007389- Jul 15 2008
0.000088952
a(1)-0.966880165 ****
0.042385821
M-TAR 1089
0 Rho(+)-0.966246825 ****
531.2036
0.428262
0.043550112
00.51298132
Rho(-)-1.005898827 ****
0.042127154
Jan 1 2007
ADF
400
0 a(0)
1.444E-07- Jul 15 2008
0.00016257
a(1)0.061512011
0.049915328
M-TAR
400
0 Rho(+)-0.885322885 ****
177.68703
0.994678
0.072986383
00.31920454
Rho(-)-0.984987147 ****
0.068257561
Jan 1 2008
ADF
139
0 a(0)
5.181E-07- Jul 15 2008
0.00033547
a(1)0.030705088
0.084843454
M-TAR
139
0 Rho(+)-0.890248429 ****
66.17671
0.944532
0.117324657
00.33280327
Rho(-)-1.054727087 ****
0.121970777
Jul 21 2008
ADF
124
0 a(0)
1.9437E-06-Jan 12 2009
0.000759513
a(1)0.039353525
0.089649003
M-TAR
124
0 Rho(+)-1.023754436 ****
57.90275
0.506915
0.125937234
00.47781469
Rho(-)-0.896354647 ****
0.127115667
Note: a(0) and a(1) denote the coefficients a0 and a1 in Equation (2.3), Rho(+) and Rho(-) denote r1 and r2 inEquations (2.4) and (2.5) respectedely.

Table 2b: The TAR, and M-TAR unit root test for the Hungarian forint
Sample Period

Model

ADF
May 1 2004
-Jan 12 2009

DF
1223

Lag(s)
0 a(0)

Coeffcient (with S.E.)

F statisics (Probability)
H: Rho(+)=Rho(-)=0 H: Rho(+)=Rho(-)-0.000000026
0.000159853
a(1)0.046078952
0.028622311
M-TAR 1214
3 Rho(+)-1.056045343 ****
122.84998
9.521731
0.067848461
00.00207647
Rho(-)-0.878115518 ****
0.074103593
May 1 2004
ADF
1092
1 a(0)-0.000000943- Jul 15 2008
0.000132785
a(1)-1.0102189 ****
0.04145918
M-TAR 1088
1 Rho(+)-1.038477389 ****
300.84483
0.897807
0.048658506
00.34358088
Rho(-)-0.980989052 ****
0.054239948
Jan 1 2007
ADF
400
0 a(0)
6.082E-07- Jul 15 2008
0.000248041
a(1)0.020029003
0.050227537
M-TAR
400
0 Rho(+)-1.026983535 ****
191.3419
1.026827
0.068327273
00.31151756
Rho(-)-0.925012023 ****
0.073877643
Jan 1 2008
ADF
139
0 a(0)
6.6603E-06- Jul 15 2008
0.000501194
a(1)0.063568512
0.085413533
M-TAR
139
0 Rho(+)-0.999814889 ****
60.79286
0.720592
0.113257184
00.39740927
Rho(-)-0.853938683 ****
0.129243531
Jul 21 2008
ADF
124
0 a(0)
1.2037E-06-Jan 12 2009
0.001032309
a(1)0.009857021
0.090071525
M-TAR
124
0 Rho(+)-1.171368246 ****
66.20208
5.847794
0.11559757
00.01705033
Rho(-)-0.740173547 ****
0.135764146
Note: a(0) and a(1) denote the coefficients a0 and a1 in Equation (2.3), Rho(+) and Rho(-) denote r1 and r2 inEquations (2.4) and (2.5) respectedely.

Table 2c: The TAR, and M-TAR unit root test for the Poland zloty
Sample Period

Model

May 1 2004
ADF
-Jan 12 2009

DF
1223

Lag(s)
0 a(0)

Coeffcient (with S.E.)

F statisics (Probability)
H: Rho(+)=Rho(-)=0 H: Rho(+)=Rho(-)

0.000008171
0.000158991
a(1)0.06451117 ***0.028585388
M-TAR 1218
1 Rho(+)-0.962837079 ****
534.09011
0.957819
0.039481451
0.32793127
Rho(-)-0.906658357 ****
0.041668343
May 1 2004
ADF
1094
0 a(0)
8.0496E-06- Jul 15 2008
0.00012804
a(1)0.022772092
0.030166305
M-TAR 1088
1 Rho(+)-0.954141418 ****
240.42584
0.87323
0.051171584
00.35026992
Rho(-)-0.897582799 ****
0.05291851
Jan 1 2007
ADF399
1 a(0)
0.000000204- Jul 15 2008
0.000158671
a(1)-0.839605632 ****
0.069303195
M-TAR
399
1 Rho(+)-0.847746572 ****
73.40534
0.027989
0.084678774
00.86722058
Rho(-)-0.831153887 ****
0.085760224
Jan 1 2008
ADF
138
1 a(0)
0.000001029- Jul 15 2008
0.000276798
a(1)-0.82895173 ****
0.118711987
M-TAR
138
1 Rho(+)-0.84091857 ****
24.39782
0.025322
0.140512226
00.8737995
Rho(-)-0.814129195 ****
0.150890801
Jul 21 2008
ADF
124
0 a(0)
1.09102E-05-Jan 12 2009
0.001060215
a(1)0.084028539
0.089862417
M-TAR
124
0 Rho(+)-0.997749666 ****
52.69937
0.808382
0.127643429
00.37034179
Rho(-)-0.836674037 ****
0.125708344
Note: a(0) and a(1) denote the coefficients a0 and a1 in Equation (2.3), Rho(+) and Rho(-) denote r1 and r2 inEquations (2.4) and (2.5) respectedely.

Table 2d: The TAR and M-TAR unit root test for the Danish krona
Sample Period

Model

May 1 2004
ADF
-Jan 12 2009

DF
1223

Lag(s)

Coeffcient (with S.E.)

0 a(0)
a(1)

TAR

1223

1 Rho(+)
Rho(-)

M-TAR

1224

0 Rho(+)
Rho(-)

May 1 2004
ADF
- Jul 15 20081094

1 a(0)
a(1)

TAR

1094

1 Rho(+)
Rho(-)

M-TAR

1095

0 Rho(+)
Rho(-)Jan 1 2007
ADF
- Jul 15 2008

400

0 a(0)
a(1)

TAR

399

1 Rho(+)
Rho(-)

M-TAR

400

0 Rho(+)
Rho(-)Jan 1 2008
ADF
- Jul 15 2008139

0 a(0)
a(1)

TAR

138

1 Rho(+)

0.000000216
0.000112208
0.03846701
0.028580728-0.000097996 ***0.000038222
0.000027164
0.000018105
0.000054385 ***0.000022448-0.000052023 **0.000023888
0.000007389
0.000088952-0.966880165 ****
0.042385821-0.000080677 **0.000036417
0.000027697
0.000017599
0.00006072 ****
0.000021611-0.00005346 ***0.000023358
1.444E-07
0.00016257
0.061512011
0.049915328-0.000094229
0.000078346
0.000017391
0.000027102
0.000061445 *0.000034837-0.000059073
0.000037734
5.181E-07
0.00033547
0.030705088
0.084843454

F statisics (Probability)
H: Rho(+)=Rho(-)=0 H: Rho(+)=Rho(-)

4.40773
0.012377

8.749732
0.00315599

5.306280.00507509

10.53742
0.0012015

3.690230.02527756

7.175953
0.00749952

6.566390.00146291

12.874624
0.00034779

0.92895
0.39581998

1.812549
0.17896707

2.78084
0.06318546

5.506904
0.01942865-0.000113971
0.78208
1.537745
0.000111784
0.45947145
0.21705815
Rho(-)
0.000042954
0.000059263
M-TAR
139
0 Rho(+)
0.000070704
0.82208
1.607618
0.000071029
0.44164135
0.20694669
Rho(-)-0.000062983
0.000077924
Jul 21 2008
ADF
124
0 a(0)
1.9437E-06-Jan 12 2009
0.000759513
a(1)0.039353525
0.089649003
TAR
123
0 Rho(+)-0.000335141
1.249992.35140.000213767
0.29009259
0.12771806
Rho(-)
0.000017318
0.000084467
M-TAR
124
0 Rho(+)-0.000016989
0.085290.024743
0.000115872
0.91829729
0.87526406
Rho(-)-0.000041984
0.000108734
Note: a(0) and a(1) denote the coefficients a0 and a1 in Equation (2.3), Rho(+) and Rho(-) denote r1 and r2 inEquations (2.4) and (2.5) respectedely.

3. The Possibility of the Economic and Financial Crisis in Central and Eastern
European countries.
The MNB set the credit line for 5 billion euros with the ECB (10/16), and carried out anemergency rise of 3% in interest rates leading bank rate to 11.5% (10/22) in order to avoid the possible
crisis. The Hungarian government called for the support to the IMF. EU also applied the financial support
system (EC 332/2002) to Hungary, then, the emergency facility up to 25.1 billion dollars was provided
for Hungary.5 Stock prices rose from the day this support plan was applied on. The exchange rate offorint also showed a sign of recovering and the exchange rate market rallied much at the end of Octoberand has remained calm now. After that, the IMF gropes for the way to expand the short-term liquidity
support plan, and EU examines the increase of the amount of supporting money upper limit, so the rescue
package for remerging countries are filled up more.
However, the problems for Hungary have not settled yet. The deficit of current account, theforeign debt outstanding, the expanding of domestic credit, the government debt and the high inflation
rate, those fundamentals still remain bad. Moreover, there are some other countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, which have the same vulnerabilities as Hungary has. Thus it is far from the situation that we canbe optimistic about. In this paragraph, we make sure the present situation of Central and Eastern Europe
countries, and argue the backgrounds of economic and financial crisis in Hungary and the further
possibility to occur another crisis in this area.

3.1 Vulnerabilities of fundamentals in Central and Eastern Europe countries.
In Central and Eastern Europe, other than Hungary, vulnerabilities are outstanding in three
Barthes (Latvia Lithuania Estonia), Romania, Bulgaria, at the points of the current account, of the foreign
debt outstanding and of the expansion of domestic credit. As for the fiscal condition, those countries, but
Hungary, have generally no problem such as an annual budget deficit, a national debt. They satisfy thecriteria of SGP. (The reference value is, for annual government deficit to GDP is under -3%, for grossgovernment debt to GDP is within 60 %.) (see Table3.) The problems are about the GDP growth,
inflation rates and the method of financing for the current account deficit.

5

The items of the amount are following, IMF for 15.7 billion dollars，EU for 8.1 billion dollars (650 million euros)
and the World Bank for 1.3bn dollars. Applying the regulation (EC 332/2002) last time was for Italy in 1993.
6.5 billion out of 12 billion euros in total budgets were lent to Hungary.

Table 3: Transition and Prospect of Fundamentals in Central and Eastern Europe
Real GDP Growth (%)

Inflation Rates (CPI %)

2007
2008
2009
2007
2008
2009
Hungary
1.3
1.9
2.3
7.9
6.3
4.1
Poland
6.6
5.2
3.8
2.5
4.0
3.3
Czech
6.6
4.0
3.4
2.8
6.7
3.4
Slovakia
10.4
7.4
5.6
1.9
3.9
3.6
Latvia
10.3
-0.9
-2.2
10.1
15.9
10.6
Lithuania
8.9
3.9
0.7
5.8
11.3
6.2
Estonia
6.3
-1.5
0.5
6.6
10.2
5.1
Romania
6.0
8.6
4.8
4.8
8.2
6.6
Bulgaria
6.2
6.3
4.2
7.6
12.2
7.0
Note: real amount in 2007. The IMF prospect in 2008-2009
Source：IMF, Regional Economic Outlook (Europe) October 2008.

Current Account (of GDP %)Fiscal Balance (of GDP %)

2007
-5.0
-3.8
-1.8
-5.4
-22.9
-14.6
-18.1
-14.0
-21.4

2007
-5.5
-1.5
-1.6
-2.2
0.7
-1.9
3.0
-2.3
3.5

2008
-5.5
-4.7
-2.2
-5.1
-15.1
-14.9
-10.8
-13.8
-24.4

2009
-6.1
-5.7
-2.5
-4.7
-8.3
-8.7
-8.7
-13.3
-21.5

2008
-3.8
-2.0
-1.9
-2.2
-1.4
-1.6
-1.3
-2.3
4.2

In recent years, the emerging countries of Central and Eastern Europe have accomplishedremarkable growth as a European production foothold. They had proceeded in the typical development
process of the developing countries which they accepted the direct investment from Europe and acquired
the high technology, knowledge of management or know-how with the funds, moreover they imported
capital goods by the funds, and they manufactured from those capital goods and exported them to Europe.
These countries were relatively short of capital compared with West Europe, and they had cheap
abundant labor force. Once the route accomplished to the EU participation, a lot of foreign direct
investment flowed into those countries as very attractive investing countries. In this way, their economy
has developed, of course with their current account in red. If the foreign direct investment finances tothose deficit, there is not any problem. Such kind of money is relatively stable and not so fast to run away.
Thus, it is rare that a problem occurs as long as the deficit of the current account is financed by direct
investment.
But ratios of “other investment” occupying for capital inflow have begun to increase since2005, and in 2007, as much as 106.7 billion dollars of “other investment” flowed into Central and Eastern
Europe countries. It exceeded 74.8 billion dollars over “the foreign direct investment” in that year. As the
deficit of the current account was 120.7 billion dollars in that year, thus most of that deficit was financed
by “other investment” of that year. (see Table4.) The greater part of “other investment” is the long or
short-term lending from private financial institutions in the West European countries. If the lending
consists of particularly in short-term, that money has risk to be withdrew immediately when theyrecognize their deterioration of own balance sheet or the rising risk of their borrowers. Above all, we cansee that countries shown in Table 5 have not been able to finance by the direct investment recently andthat the ratio of “other investment” is growing up. Because of this financial crisis, the balance sheets ofthe financial institutions in the West Europe countries have turned worse. And with the global future

2009
-3.3
-2.3
-2.1
-1.7
-2.0
-0.7
-1.4
-2.8
2.7

economic uneasiness, it has come to the situation in which a credit crunch is easy to occur by collecting
short-term credit.

Recently, the Central and Eastern European counties have a big risk for financing

their current account deficit and such risk is still remaining.
As for the foreign debt, the ratio of the amount of import in foreign reserves (more than 3months) or the ratio of the foreign short-term debt in those (more than 1.0) is usually used for the aim of
the short-term ability to pay. If they have enough foreign reserves to cover the sort-term debt or theamount of imports, they are considered to have the short-term ability of pay. In Central and Eastern
Europe countries, all 3 Barthes do not satisfy the criteria of the short-term foreign debt, and Lithuania andEstonia as well as Hungary do not satisfy the one of the amount of imports, either. Hungary, 3 Barthes
and Bulgaria also have the high ratio for the foreign debt of GDP and that item compared to last year is
declined in most of the countries. We need to pay attention to the fact. (see Table6.)

Table 4: Transaction for current account deficit and its finance structures (billion dollars)
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Current Account

-31.4

-15.5

-23.1

-36.8

-57.6

-59.4

-87.7

-120.7-164.4-174.2

Private capital net
inflow

38.6

11.1

53.7

53.6

74.3

119.2

119.9

173.8

179.9

181.7

Direct investment

23.5

24.0

24.5

17.1

36.1

51.7

64.3

74.8

77.3

81.8

Securities
investment

3.8

0.9

2.1

8.0

28.4

21.5

9.9

-7.7

10.4

15.5

Other investment

11.4

-13.8

27.2

28.5

9.8

45.9

45.6

106.7

92.2

84.5

Public capital
net inflow

1.6

6.0

-7.5

-5.1

-6.0

-7.9

-4.7

-2.4

-2.4

-2.2

Foreign reserveschange

-6.2

-2.7

-18.1

-12.8

-14.7

-45.9

-22.8

-41.6

-22.9

-21.3

Note: IMF prospect after 2008.Current account deficit showed minus. Capital net inflow showed plus.
Capital net outflow showed minus. Other investments include both long and short terms. Foreign reserves change of minus
means the increasing. In definition, current account + private capital net inflow + public capital net inflow + foreign
reserves change = 0, but for errors and omissions, it is not always zero.
6
Source: IMF , World Economic Outlook, October 2008.

6

In the IMF definition, Central and Eastern Europe countries consist from 16 countries. Slovenia is not included.
Instead, Albania, Bosnia･Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are included otherthan EU participated countries. Their economic size is not so big except Turkey and Croatia.

Table 5: Conditions of financing for the current account deficit in each country
Hungary①Current Account(of nominal GDP)
②Foreign Direct
Investment (do.)

06① + ② (Pt)
①Current Account(of nominal GDP)
②Foreign Direct
Investment (do.)

07① + ②（Pt）

08/Q2①Current Account(of nominal GDP)
②Foreign Direct
Investment (do.)① + ②（Pt）

PolandCzech

LatviaLithuania

Estonia

Romania

Bulgaria

-7.6

-2.7

-2.6

-22.5

-10.6

-16.7

-10.4

-17.8

1.1

3.2

2.8

7.5

5.1

4.2

8.9

23.3

-6.5

0.4

0.2

-15.0

-5.6

-12.6

-1.5

5.4

-6.2

-4.7

-1.8

-23.8

-14.6

-18.1

-14.1

-21.8

3.2

4.2

4.5

7.1

3.6

5.3

6.0

21.8

-3.0

-0.5

2.7

-16.7

-11.0

-12.8

-8.1

0.0

-6.1

-4.9

-2.5

-19.7

-15.5

-14.1

-13.9

-24.2

3.0

3.3

4.7

5.2

2.8

5.4

6.7

18.5

-3.1

-1.6

2.2

-14.5

-12.7

-8.7

-7.1

-5.6

Note: The current account deficit of 08-Q2 is the average of last 4 terms. If ①＋② is plus, the deficit is financed by theforeign direct investment. The items in gray mean the cases not to be financed.
Source: Eurostat, each Central Banks

Table 6: The ability to pay for the foreign debt in each country.
Hungary

Foreign Reserves

PolandCzech

LatviaLithuania

Estonia

Romania

Bulgaria

27.2

79.4

37.7

6.3

7.2

4.0

39.4

19.7

The ratio of
the short-term debt
in foreign Reserves (times)

1.07

1.17

1.12

0.39

0.81

0.43

1.42

1.02

(U.S. billion )Changes from last year (Pt)

-0.39

-0.41

-0.63

0.03

-0.13

0.00

-0.10

-0.25

Foreign reserves／imports（months）

2.82

4.68

3.35

4.80

2.95

2.57

6.40

7.43

Changes from last year (Pt)

-0.05

0.43

-0.12

0.27

-0.68

0.18

-0.55

0.54

860

1443

550

183

199

147

522

220

82.7

42.3

39.1

86.0

64.3

91.9

40.9

69.9

+3.8

+3.3

+6.2

+5.9

+6.7

+6.0

+4.2

+11.8

Foreign debt outstanding（100million euros）
Foreign debt
(of nominal GDP)
Changes from last year (Pt)

Note: The data of the ratio of the short-term debt in foreign Reserves used 08.Q2. The data for Hungary and Estonia used 08.Q1.
Foreign reserves/imports, reserves in September, 2008, imports in 08.Q2. (the average of last 4 terms) Imports stands forgood, service and income payments. Foreign debt is in 08.Q2. The items in gray are “requiring attention”.
Source: Eurostat, IMF, JEDH, each Central Banks.

3.2 Borrowing dependence from the West European Banks
In Central and Eastern Europe, most of “other investment” in the private capital net inflow isdependent on borrowing from banks in West European developed countries. As the details shown in the
Table7, Hungary borrows much from Germany and Austria, some from Italy, Belgium and France.
Poland borrows from mainly Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. For Czech, Belgium, Austria andFrance are main lending countries. These Central European countries relatively have the big economic
size, and started to industrialize early. With their industrialization progressing, more companies in West
Europe have advanced to those countries, and many banks have increased their lending. For 3 Barthes,
Sweden is the mail lender country because of their deep connections with history.

Latvia and Lithuania

borrow nearly 60% of the total amount, and Estonia does more than 80%. Romania and Bulgaria in
Southern Europe borrow much from Greece, Italy and Austria because of the geographical reason.
As

well

as

in

Island,inmanycountries

ofCentralandEasternEurope,foreign-currency-denominated housing loans with low interests became popular, such as in Japanese yen
and Swiss franc, thus the increasing of household foreign-currency-denominated borrowing is beginningto be concerned. These countries have maintained the high economic growth rates so far, and theircurrencies have also been evaluated with the expectation of further growth. But the more such housing
loans increase, the more vulnerabilities against the currency devaluation increase. In the countries having
faced the big devaluation of their own currencies at this monetary crisis, the burden of paying interest will
be up and negative influences may be brought to consumption by households. Of course the increase of
the foreign debt outstanding by the currency devaluation may be going to cause the accumulated debt
problem. That is the big problem for the countries which have as much as 80~90% of GDP foreign debt atpresent.
The following factors are thought for the reason why the financial and monetary crisis
occurred in Hungary in October, 2008. In Hungary, not only vulnerabilities against fundamentals which
are concerned for a long time but also the high share of borrowing from overseas banks are pointed out.
The subprime loan problem which began to be concerned in 2007 caused financial institutions to change
their stance for the risk. Their risk against lending has just changed to the short-term from the long-term
when this global financial crisis occurred. Because of the financial crisis in their own countries, thosefinancial institutions decreased new lending in Hungary, moreover began to make the recovery ofshort-term loans at the same time. That is the main reason why the depreciation of forint and the severe
credit crunch occurred in Hungary.
The West European countries suffered big damage by this financial crisis could be said U.K.,
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Switzerland.7 The countries which have the high shareof borrowing from above countries are Hungary, Poland and Czech. As showed in Table7, the rate of theforeign debt outstanding of nominal GDP in Poland and Czech are both low, such as 42.3% in Poland and

7

They are the countries where the public funds were injected into the financial institutions. Because of that,uneasiness of the financial crisis was relatively big in those countries. And also in the research report of JETRO,
the influence of individual countries by this crisis is reported. Refer to JETRO (2008).

39.1% in Czech. The ratio of the short-term debt in foreign reserves of both countries is relatively high aswell. But Hungary has 82.7% for the former item and 1.07 times for the latter. The indexes of Hungary
are obviously far inferior to those of Poland and Czech.
As for 3 Barthes and the South-Eastern European countries, the financial institutions of West
Europe were handling their lending by themselves to both households and firms in those countries. This
point differs from Hungary. However, that is one of the factors those financial institutions did not makethe recovery of loans. The main reason is that 3 Barthes are borrowing mainly from Sweden and that
Romania and Bulgaria are borrowing from Italy, Austria and Greece. It was fortunate that those lending
countries were suffered relatively less damage than other countries such as Germany and so on.

Table 7: The amount of the foreign borrowing and the share of countries (billion dollars, %)Central Europe
Barthes 3
South-Eastern Europe

Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
Austria
SwedenGreeceU.K.
OthersTotal (EU)U.S.
The amountof borrowingof GDP (%)

Hungary

PolandCzech

Estonia

LatviaLithuania

Romania

Bulgaria

23.0
7.3
18.2
3.4
12.5
24.7
0.2
0.1
1.9
4.9
96.3
1.9
153.9

17.2
7.4
18.6
13.4
8.6
5.3
2.4
0.0
1.1
19.1
93.2
4.6
295.0

6.2
17.7
10.4
3.0
27.1
30.2
0.1
0.0
1.2
1.7
97.6
1.8
209.3

1.9
0.4
1.0
0.0
0.3
0.7
83.2
0.0
0.0
12.3
99.8
0.1
39.1

10.4
0.8
3.1
0.1
0.1
1.8
58.4
0.1
0.6
23.7
99.1
0.1
42.8

11.1
1.1
1.6
0.3
0.4
0.8
59.8
0.0
0.1
24.8
99.9
0.1
40.4

3.9
13.5
9.6
7.7
1.0
38.6
0.1
16.2
0.2
7.9
98.7
1.2
124.2

9.8
7.3
20.4
1.2
5.2
14.5
0.0
27.5
0.5
12.1
98.7
1.0
39.2

111.2

70.1

120.0

183.8

156.8

105.3

74.7

99.0

Note: Countries of lending in gray are suffered big damage. Items of share in gray are over 15%.
The data of the amount of borrowing is in June, 2008. The data for GDP is 2007.
Source: BIS, Banking Statistics.

4. Conclusion: The Outlook for the Future Crisis
The EU economic downturn has become clear because of the financial crisis of 2008. The
real GDP of the third quarter fell by 0.2% both in EU27 and in the euro area.

Actually, in the euro area,

negative economic growth showed for 2 consecutive quarters, and it is the first time for the euro area toput on record of 2 consecutive quarters since the introduction of the euro in 1999. Thus the euro area fell
into a recession for the first time. In the core countries, Germany and Italy showed -0.4% (08.Q2), and-0.5% (08.Q3). Estonia and Latvia also fell into the recession. U.K., Spain, Hungary showed negative
growth in 08.Q3.8 With the further economic downturn, the unemployment rate remains high in main

8

According to Eurostat. (Jan’, 8, 2008.) Estonia and Latvia showed negative growth for 3 consecutive quarters

developed countries, and even in emerging countries where the unemployment rate has been low
supported by the economic growth, it has begun to rise gradually. With needs for measures to the sales
slump and inventory accumulation, many companies are forced to production adjustment and it is very
difficult to predict the rapid recovery of EU economy in the near future.
The Central and Eastern Europe countries have accepted the large amount of private capitalfrom West Europe as a European production foothold since the affiliation with EU. With accumulating
technology, equipment and know-how of the management, they have accomplished remarkable growth.
The current deficit of those countries is mostly due to purchase of capital goods, technology and service.
The economies of many develop countries in West Europe including Germany have been supported bystrong external demand of the Central and Eastern European counties. In this way, the Central andEastern European countries and the West European countries have both developed with supporting theireconomies each other. It is the financial crisis of this time that brought the change to this situation.
The financial crisis originated from the U.S. was contagious to Europe by instant and made thefinancial systems closely connected to the global economy uneasiness immediately. The influenceextended to real economy and the whole EU economy is covered with a feeing of confinement now.
Uneasiness of the financial system and deterioration of economy in developed countries reduce capital
inflow to the Central and Eastern European countries and bring a shadow to their economy having
developed by the capital. And consequently it may bring negative influence to economy in developed
countries. As it was clarified in this paragraph, the key is whether financial uneasiness appears in lending
countries or not. If financial uneasiness occurs again in Germany, Belgium or the Netherlands, theinfluence will extend to Hungary, Poland and Czech. If contagion appears among developed countries
and uneasiness spreads to France, Italy and Austria, the influence will extend to Bulgaria or Romania, theSouth-Eastern European countries. Uneasiness in Sweden hits directly to 3 Barthes. Though the influenceof crisis depends on fundamentals of those countries, they all have chronic deficit of current account andthere are quite a few countries with problems of its financing. Once fell into crucial economic crisis andsuffered serious damage from it, emerging countries with small economic size need quite a long time toreconstruct. And if global investment money having functioned lively before starts to avoid risk thenreduces investment for other emerging countries, for example of Asia or South America, the developmentof those areas may be obstructed. And moreover, in the long-term view point, there is a possibility tochange growth strategy of emerging or developing countries which has been dependent on foreign capital.
It is same that the East Asian countries changed their growth strategy of depending on foreign capital.

since 08.Q1.

After the Asian currency crisis, they invest within domestic saving and keep the current account surplus
through foreign exchange interventions in the exchange market, so that they accumulate their foreign
reserves. It is unlikely that the Central and Eastern Europe countries adopt this strategy, because they areaiming to introduce euro in the future. But it is possible enough for other emerging or developing
countries that the outbreak of a new financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe promotes a change
from conventional growth strategy.
This crisis let non-euro area countries currency of EU drop suddenly. One of the reasons isthat investors or company managers who feared against the small size central bank touched off a capitaloutflow. The central banks of non-euro area opposed by raising interest rates but that might have the side
effect of eroding the domestic economy. With the introduction of euro from January, 2009 near at hand,the confusion of the currency did not occur in Slovakia of which the own currency, koruna, fixed to theeuro. Even if it was a small country, the stability of the money market could be secured as long as it wasunder affiliation of the euro. As a result, Denmark and Sweden announced their early introduction of euro,
and Poland officially announced to aim the introduction of euro in 2012. Even Hungary which fell into
the critical situation in this crisis is turning the stance of growth into an emergency response measure. In
Czech, from the industrial world to the government, a voice in search of euro introduction rose.
This crisis unexpectedly has increased a unifying force to euro and it seems to develop theway to further deepening of EU. From now, in addition to the precaution of a new financial crisis, theargument about the expansion of the euro area will attract our attention as well.

References
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Example Using the Term Structure of Interest Rates." Journal of Business and Economic
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European Union (2008), “European Union foreign direct investment yearbook 2008”.
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IMF (2008), Global Financial Stability Report, October.
IMF (2008), Regional Economics Outlook (Europe”, October..
IMF (2008), World Economic Outlook, October.
JETRO (2008), “The influence of the financial crisis originated from the U.S. to economic and business”,

Research Reports, December.
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Mizuho Research Institute, all kinds of research papers.