Building a Safe, Secure, andCredible NATO Nuclear Posture
Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose,
Hans M. Kristensen, and Simon Lunn

Foreword by Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn

ABOUT THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVEThe Nuclear Threat Initiative works to protect our lives, environment,
and quality of life now and for future generations. We work to prevent
catastrophic attacks with weapons of mass destruction and disruption(WMDD)—nuclear, biological, radiological, chemical, and cyber.
Founded in 2001 by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist
Ted Turner, who continue to serve as co-chairs, NTI is guided by aprestigious, international board of directors. Ernest J. Moniz serves
as chief executive officer and co-chair; Des Browne is vice chair; andJoan Rohlfing serves as president.
www.nti.org

Cover: A Dutch F-16 takes off from Leeuwarden Airbase in
the Netherlands in 2011.
PHOTO BY ROBIN UTRECHT/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Building a Safe, Secure, andCredible NATO Nuclear Posture
Steve Andreasen
Isabelle Williams
Brian Rose
Hans M. Kristensen
Simon Lunn

Foreword by
Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn

January 2018

The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect
those of NTI, its Board of Directors, or other institutions with which the authors are associated.
© 2018 Nuclear Threat Initiative
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,or otherwise, without written permission of the publisher and copyright holder.

Contents
ABOUT THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
iv

Acknowledgmentsv

Abbreviations and Definitions

1

FOREWORD: Toward a New NATO Nuclear Posture
Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn

4

KEY FINDINGS

7

CHAPTER 1: What Is NATO’s Nuclear Posture?
Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

15

CHAPTER 2: Challenges for Maintaining NATO’s Nuclear Posture:
Risks, Credibility, and Cost
Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

23

CHAPTER 3: B61-12 Guided Nuclear Bomb
Hans M. Kristensen

29

CHAPTER 4: Supporting the DCA Mission
Hans M. Kristensen

35

CHAPTER 5: B61-12 Integration on Allied Aircraft
Hans M. Kristensen

41

CHAPTER 6: NATO Nuclear Sharing: Consultation
Simon Lunn

47

CHAPTER 7: NATO Nuclear Sharing: Operational Factors and Procedures
Simon Lunn

51

Endnotes

59

About the Authors

Acknowledgments
We are grateful to NTI CEO and Co-Chair Ernest J. Moniz, Co-Chair Sam Nunn, Vice Chair
Des Browne, President Joan Rohlfing, and Executive Vice President Deborah Rosenblum
for their leadership in reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and for their guidance andsupport in the development of this report.
We owe a special thank you to the experts who contributed their thoughts, suggestions,and experiences to this project, and we have made every effort to ensure that this reportreflects their collective wisdom. We would especially like to thank Simon Lunn and Hans
Kristensen for contributing chapters and for their invaluable input into the report as awhole, and we thank Ian Kearns and Jon Wolfsthal for their review of the report.
Finally, we are indebted to all our colleagues at NTI who have contributed to thisproject. In particular, we are grateful to Mimi Hall, Carmen MacDougall, and Samantha
Pitts-Kiefer.

STEVE ANDREASEN
National Security Consultant
Global Nuclear Policy Program
Nuclear Threat Initiative
ISABELLE WILLIAMS
Senior Advisor
Global Nuclear Policy Program
Nuclear Threat Initiative
BRIAN ROSE
Program Officer
Global Nuclear Policy Program
Nuclear Threat Initiativeiv

ABBREVIATIONS
CMX

Crisis Management Exercises

DCA

dual-capable aircraft

DDPR

Deterrence and Defense Posture Review

DOD

U.S. Department of Defense

ERI

European Reassurance Initiative

GAO

U.S. Government Accountability OfficeGPSglobal positioning system

HLG

High Level GroupINF

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty)

MUNSS

Munitions Support Squadrons

NAC

North Atlantic Council

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NNSA

National Nuclear Security Administration

NPG

Nuclear Planning Group

NPR

Nuclear Posture Review

NSNWs

non-strategic nuclear weapons

RAP

Readiness Action Plan

SACEUR

Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SIOP

Single Integrated Operational Plan

SNOWCAT

Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics

STMS

Security Transportable Maintenance System

STRATCOM

U.S. Strategic Command

TNWs

tactical nuclear weapons

WS3

Weapons Storage and Security System

DEFINITIONS
The terms “tactical nuclear weapons” and “non-strategic nuclear weapons”
typically describe either short-range nuclear weapons or those weapons thatare not covered by bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control agreements. The terms
are equally problematic in describing the U.S. B61 gravity bombs deployed inEurope as these weapons are also fit for deployment on dual-capable strategic
bombers. Moreover, the yield of several U.S. B61 variants is not distinct fromthose weapons described as having a “strategic” purpose.
SOURCE: See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, 2012,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 5 (2012): 96–104, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
pdf/10.1177/0096340212459040.

v

Foreword
TOWARD A NEW NATO NUCLEAR POSTURE
Ernest J. Moniz and Sam NunnThe negative political dynamic between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation today is the frame for any
discussion of NATO defense policy and posture, including NATO’s nuclear
posture. Within this frame, unity within the alliance takes on a special meaning.
NATO is averse to taking steps that might create controversy or suggest a lackof cohesion in the face of a newly aggressive Russia, and the United States must
be resolute in its commitment to the defense of NATO. This stance especially hasbearing today given the uncertainty that has engulfed the Trump administration’s
relationships with NATO and with Russia.

The principle of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
is essential, and any changes to NATO’s defense policy and posture must be seen
through that lens; however, the current security environment should not preclude
Washington and NATO from reviewing NATO’s nuclear posture. In fact, NATO’s
security requires a hard look at and new approaches to NATO deterrence anddefense through the prism of reducing the risk of nuclear use. Forward-deployed
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe increase the risk of accidents, blunders, or catastrophic terrorism and invite pre-emption. Given these added risks, it is past time torevisit whether these forward-based weapons are essential for military deterrence
and political reassurance. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy
of December 2017 commits to this continued deployment without p­ resenting theconsidered analysis that would emerge from a hard look.
The chapters in this report, written by experts and practitioners in European
security and nuclear weapons, provide a foundation for that hard look. The reportunderscores the strong arguments for NATO to move to a safer, more secure, andmore credible nuclear posture without forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe. The challenge is how to advance current thinking about the military andpolitical dimensions of alternative nuclear postures.

1Regarding the military side of the ledger, it seems clear that consolidating U.S.
nuclear weapons now stored in Europe back to the United States would not diminish U.S. and NATO nuclear capabilities. A number of former senior U.S. officials andmilitary leaders have made the point that U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe
have virtually no military utility, primarily because of the extremely demanding
scenario for conducting a nuclear strike
mission using NATO dual-capable aircraft(DCA). In addition to the complicatedprocedures for decision making related to
Forward-deployed nuclear
nuclear use, any attempt to employ those­weapons in Europe have
weapons will be further complicated by the
military liabilities, and they may,visibility of the many actions required toin fact, increase the risk of
prepare the aircraft, weapons, and crews forsuch an attack—all of which undercut their
nuclear use in a crisis.
survivability and plausible use. Moreover,those factors make forward-deployed
nuclear weapons potential targets in theearly phases of a conflict, perhaps triggering a chain of events that the United States and NATO would want to avoid: early
nuclear use.

“”

In short, forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe have military liabilities,
and they may, in fact, increase the risk of nuclear use in a crisis. These dangers
also apply to Russia’s forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Taken together, theseshorter-range weapons in western Russia and in Europe are a clear and present
danger to both Russia and NATO, particularly in an era of tensions, but also in an
era of possible nuclear terrorism.
What remains true and credible is that the United States has a robust strategic
nuclear deterrent that is capable of being employed deliberately anywhere on
the globe in defense of U.S. interests and U.S. allies—and it is, and should be,
understood by any potential (and rational) adversary to NATO, including Russia, inexactly this way. In any crisis involving NATO, U.S. nuclear capabilities would also
be on stage with the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France. Indeed,as NATO has repeatedly stated, “The supreme guarantee of the security of theAllies is provided by the strategic forces of the Alliance.” This position has been,and remains, the credible foundation for any plausible scenario for employing U.S.
nuclear weapons.
On the security side of the ledger, although returning forward-deployed nuclear
weapons to the United States would not diminish NATO nuclear capabilities, it

2Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn

would unquestionably reduce the risks from a potential terrorist incident or political instability—both of which are inherent in a posture that stores nuclear weapons
at multiple sites across multiple countries. It is a reality that terrorists with global
reach seek nuclear capability and have operated at NATO’s border and withinsome NATO countries as well as Russia.
Finally, the financial side of the ledger is harder to calculate, complicated by anumber of assumptions related to absolute and marginal costs for Washington and
its NATO allies. Any savings that might be accrued by removing forward-­deployed
B61s from Europe and reducing the overall purchase of B61s present only modest marginal costs for the United States. For NATO allies of the United States,
however, the marginal costs of procuring and maintaining DCA—and supporting
U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe—may be relatively larger. That said, any
reduction in costs associated with the nuclear mission could free up resources
for NATO to focus on other urgent tasks, including conventional reassurance andcyber defense, depending on decisions made by NATO member countries about
their national defense budgets.
One thing is certain: although leadership cannot come from Washington alone, U.S.
leadership is the essential prerequisite to a reexamination of NATO nuclear policy,
beginning with a compelling reaffirmation by the president of the principle of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Washington mustalso take steps to work with allies to sustain, adapt, and perhaps enhance NATO’s
current procedures for nuclear sharing and consultations, consistent with a safer,more secure, and more credible nuclear deterrent. Such steps will not preclude
the B61-12 life extension program (which also has a role in U.S.-based strategic
forces) or plans by some NATO allies to purchase F-35 aircraft. Maintaining somedual-capable aircraft and trained pilots in Europe, along with a residual support
infrastructure for nuclear weapons, should also be part of the overall NATO nuclear
deterrence review.
The implications of sustaining or removing U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe are serious. Now is the time and the opportunity to ask whether
those weapons are more of a security risk than an asset to NATO and whether
they increase or reduce the risk of nuclear use. We hope that this report will help
stimulate and inform such a review.

Foreword: Toward a New NATO Nuclear Posture3

Key Findings
CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER 2

What Is NATO’s Nuclear Posture?

Challenges for Maintaining
NATO’s Nuclear Posture:
Risks, Credibility, and Cost

Approximately 150 U.S. nuclear ­weapons
are reportedly stored in Europe. They
are deliverable by U.S. and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Both theaircraft and warheads are undergoingmodernization and replacement as part of acomprehensive plan to recapitalize the U.S.
nuclear arsenal.
NATO’s status as a nuclear alliance does
not depend on the presence of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe. The strategic forces of
the alliance, particularly those of the UnitedStates, are the supreme guarantee of the
security of the member states.
Governments of some NATO member
states, including those that participate
in the nuclear mission, have expressed
concern over the security risks, ­credibility,and financial and political costs of thecurrent posture.
Internal divisions and continuing public
sensitivity to nuclear weapons, coupledmore recently with Russian regional
coercion and improved conventional andnuclear capabilities, have dulled incentives­ uclear posture or toto revise NATO’s ndebate ­alternatives.

4

Assumptions about the safety and securityof U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe
have been called into question by recent
terrorist attacks and political instability. Itshould be assumed that they are targets forterrorism and theft.
The credibility of NATO’s current nuclear
posture has significant operational flaws.
The threat of a limited U.S. responsewith strategic forces would be at least as
credible, if not more so, than a responsewith DCA from European territory.
The political complexities of the NATOdecision-making process also raise doubtsthat member states could reach consensus
on nuclear signaling or use in a crisis.
The United States and NATO member
states will incur several upfront costs
to retain a forward-deployed nuclear
capability in Europe. Those costs include
more than $10 billion to upgrade the B61
gravity bomb.
The cost of procuring and maintaining
DCA—and any savings that could beincurred in the absence of U.S. nuclear
weapons based in Europe—are moredifficult to calculate. They will by definition
be viewed asymmetrically by NATO DCA
members with substantially smaller defense
budgets than the United States has.

Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 4

B61-12 Guided Nuclear Bomb

Supporting the DCA Mission

The B61-12 bomb is planned to replace thecurrent U.S. gravity bombs that are forward
deployed in Europe.

The Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey havedecided to replace their existing aircraftwith the F-35A, Germany has so far been
replacing its aircraft with the Eurofighter,

Production of the B61-12 has already been
delayed, and costs have more than doubled
to nearly $10 billion. Further delays andincreased costs are likely.

and Belgium is currently undecided.
The latest batch of F-35As cost
$94.6 million each, and the total costto make the F-35As nuclear capable is

The B61-12 will combine enhanced
accuracy with low-yield options. This
capability has led some to question
whether the weapon lowers the thresholdfor nuclear use.

estimated at $350 million.
The extensive work for DCA capability
planning, design, testing, and certificationmeans that it likely will be the mid2020s before the F-35A becomes
nuclear certified.
Significant support costs are associatedwith making the aircraft nuclear capable
and with forward deploying the nuclear
weapons in Europe. Information about
support costs, however, is hard to find andoften inconsistent.

Key Findings

5

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 7

B61-12 Integration on
Allied Aircraft

NATO Nuclear Sharing:Operational Factors andProcedures

Each NATO host country is expected to
upgrade its current DCA in the early- to
mid-2020s. Only the F-35A is currently
planned to be nuclear capable.
If this upgrade is agreed on, it is unclear
whether the United States or hostcountries will be responsible for the costs
to enable replacement DCA to carry nuclear
weapons.
The nuclear-sharing mission is not
popular among certain parliamentarians
and members of the public, and basing
countries try to avoid public debate on
this issue. To date, no hosting country has
publicly confirmed its plans for enabling
replacement aircraft to carry nuclear
weapons.

The operational dimension of forwarddeployed U.S. nuclear weapons in NATOcountries has become increasingly
secondary to political factors.
NATO’s engagement in conventional “outof area” operations during the past two
decades reduces operational attention to
the nuclear mission. That situation also
raises nuclear readiness challenges.
Despite concerns about Russian nuclear
policy and programs, the reticence of many
NATO members to draw public attention to
nuclear policy will remain strong.

CHAPTER 6

NATO Nuclear Sharing:Consultation
For years, nuclear issues have received
little high-level attention within NATO.
NATO mechanisms for nuclear sharing
stem from the Cold War and are in need ofreview. Questions continue as to whether
such mechanisms remain adequate today.

6

Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture

CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS NATO’S NUCLEAR POSTURE?
Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian RoseN

uclear weapons have played a key role in the collective defense policy of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1954 and are seen as
the alliance’s ultimate deterrent to aggression.

The arsenal committed to NATO includes forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe; U.S. strategic nuclear forces that compose the nuclear triad(i.e., land-, sea-, and air-based); and U.K. strategic nuclear weapons deployed atsea. Similar to most assets committed to NATO, the U.S. and U.K. nuclear forces
are nationally owned and are under national command and control. In addition,
France’s independent strategic nuclear forces “have a deterrent role of their own”
and “contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”1
There are approximately 150 forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons storedin Europe for use on U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA).2 The weapons
assigned to U.S. aircraft in Europe are under U.S. control and may only be usedfollowing presidential authorization. The weapons assigned to allied aircraft
may only be used following their release to NATO by the U.S. president.3 These
capabilities and the accompanying supportive force structures, infrastructure, andexercises come under a long-established NATO nuclear consultation, planning, anddecision-making framework (outlined in chapters 6 and 7). Although the UnitedStates has a leading role, allied participation and burden sharing remain central tothe concept of NATO collective defense and nuclear deterrence.
NATO’s nuclear posture, therefore, consists of the following:
 U.S. and U.K. nuclear weapons committed or made available to NATO U.S. and allied DCA and supporting infrastructure NATO’s nuclear doctrine and declaratory policy
 NATO’s consultation and decision-making process

7EUROPEAN DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFTGERMANYNETHERLANDS
Current DualF-16A/B
Capable Aircraft

Current DualPA-200
Capable Aircraft

Replacementa

F-35A

Replacementa

Eurofighterb

BaseVolkel AB

Base

Büchel AB

2022–2027

Est. Transition
Period2025+?

Est. Transition
PeriodITALY

BELGIUM
Current DualF-16A/B
Capable Aircraft

Current DualPA-200
Capable Aircraft

Replacementa

TBD

Replacementa

F-35A

Base

KleineBrogel AB

Base

Ghedi AB

Est. Transition
Period2022–2027

Est. Transition
Period2023–2027

TURKEY
Current DualF-16C/Dc
Capable Aircraft
Replacementa

F-35A

Base

Balikesir AB

Est. Transition
Period2022–2027

SOURCE: Dual-capable aircraft countries, sites, and estimates by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris.

a. As of April 2017, though some countries have decided on the platform, no host country has publicly confirmed its
plans for enabling the replacement aircraft to carry nuclear weapons.
b. Germany is replacing its PA-200 Tornados with the Eurofighter in most missions but has not announced whether itplans to make the Eurofighter nuclear capable or if it will purchase some number of nuclear certified F-35As for theNATO nuclear-sharing mission.
c. According to Hans Kristensen, the extent to which Turkey participates in the NATO nuclear mission is unclear, though
it currently maintains nuclear-capable F-16s.

8

Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

Related procedures and exercises that ensure the readiness and capability ofNATO to carry out the nuclear mission

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN EUROPE
The foundation for NATO’s current nuclear posture was laid during the Cold War,when the United States deployed thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe. The
purpose was to underscore the political solidarity between the United States andEurope and to provide a military capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat thenumerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies.

U.S. AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Since the end of the Cold War, the alliance has reduced the number of nuclear
weapons stored in European bases by more than 97 percent, from a peak of
approximately 7,300 in 1971 to an estimated 150 that remain today. According toHans Kristensen and Robert Norris, the weapons reportedly are stored at six U.S.
and European air force bases in five countries: Belgium (Kleine Brogel), Germany(Büchel), Italy (Aviano U.S. Air Force, Ghedi-Torre), the Netherlands (Volkel),and Turkey (Incirlik U.S. Air Force).4 Those remaining B61 gravity bombs can bedelivered by U.S. and European DCA, which are designed for either conventionalor nuclear missions. DCA currently deployed by the United States and NATO
host countries include the F-15E Strike Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, and Panavia
PA-200 Tornado.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon, along with the F-15E Strike Eagle, and the Italian Panavia PA-200 Tornado constituteNATO’s forward-deployed dual-capable aircraft.

What Is NATO’s Nuclear Posture?

9

DAVE BEZAIRE & SUSI HAVENS-BEZAIRE, WIKIMEDIA COMMONSA B61 nuclear bomb on display at the Pima Air & Space Museum. The current variants of the B61 are being
consolidated into a single weapon design, the B61-12, as part of an ongoing life-extension program.

As part of a comprehensive plan to upgrade its nuclear forces, the United Stateshas begun the process of modifying the existing B61 nuclear gravity bomb by
consolidating all five current variants into a single weapon, the B61-12. Today, somecurrent B61 variants can be delivered only by tactical DCA, whereas others can bedelivered only by long-range strategic bombers. The new B61-12 will be deliverable by both, thereby increasing the weapon’s flexibility and interoperability but
also potentially blurring the distinction between tactical and strategic missions.
Production of the new B61-12 is planned to begin in 2020, with the first weapons
ready to deploy to Europe in the early 2020s (see chapter 3).
Concurrently, the inventories of DCA owned by NATO countries hosting the U.S.
B61 are reaching the end of their original service lives. These countries are therefore making (or have already made) decisions regarding replacement aircraft andthe investments necessary to retain the DCA mission and nuclear weapons on theirsoil (see chapters 4 and 5).

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIA
Today, Russia’s nuclear arsenal of approximately 4,300 warheads is estimatedto include approximately 1,850 so-called non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons.5 These weapons, as well as ongoing improvements in Russia’s conventional­capabilities, are often cited as a core justification for retaining NATO’s current
nuclear posture.
Moscow increased reliance on its nuclear forces as a cost-effective counter to thetechnological breakthroughs achieved by the United States in advanced conventional arms in the 1990s—demonstrated repeatedly in the airpower-­dominated10

Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia—and to the corresponding r­ eductions
in Russian conventional capabilities after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, the expansion of NATO to the Russian border caused concern about
NATO political and military encroachment.6
Since then, Russia has refined its military doctrine a number of times. In early 2000,
Russia adopted a new military doctrine, which some interpreted as providing for
limited use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of “de-escalation” of a conventional
conflict. Adjustments to Russian doctrine in 2010 and the current 2014 doctrine
placed greater emphasis on the deterrent capabilities of its conventional forces andsoftened the language slightly on possible nuclear use.
Existing Russian doctrine states that Russia relies on nuclear forces to deter both
nuclear and conventional conflicts and to deter threats to the existence of thestate.7 There remains considerable ambiguity, however, regarding the role of nuclear
weapons in local or regional conflicts. Russia’s nuclear rhetoric surrounding its
activities since 2014 in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, interpreted by some as a more“aggressive” nuclear-use posture, as well as its modernization and deploymentsof dual-capable systems along NATO’s eastern border and in Syria, contribute tothis uncertainty. Furthermore, it is unclear how Russia defines existential threats.
Russia is currently modernizing all aspects of its nuclear arsenal. As in its strategic weapons modernization program, Russia appears to be phasing out older

REGULATING TACTICAL AND NON-STRATEGICNUCLEAR WEAPONS
Although tactical and non-strategic nuclear weapons constitute large
percentages of the arsenals in some nuclear weapon states, they are theleast-regulated category of nuclear weapons. In the U.S.-Russian context,
these weapons are subject only to an informal regime agreed to by the UnitedStates and Russia in 1991, consisting of unilateral, parallel declarations. The
informal nature of the agreement has resulted in considerable uncertainty
regarding implementation, as well as what is estimated to be a large disparity
in numbers. Their small size, mobility, dispersed storage, and perceived(by some) usability at lower thresholds of conflict make the existence of
these weapons in national arsenals a risk to global security. This security
risk is especially problematic as more nuclear weapons states develop
tactical systems.
SOURCE: Adapted from Nikolai Sokov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW),” Nuclear Threat
Initiative, May 1, 2002, www.nti.org/analysis/articles/tactical-nuclear-weapons/.

What Is NATO’s Nuclear Posture?

11

Soviet-era weapons in favor of a smaller force of new systems. According to one
comprehensive assessment of Russian nuclear forces, recent advancements andincreased reliance on Russia’s conventional precision and stand-off capabilities
appear likely to drive further reductions across all categories of Russian nuclear
forces in the near-to-medium term, “with or without an arms control agreement.”8Some systems do raise concerns. The Russian Navy is fielding a new class of
nuclear attack submarines, and a new dual-capable cruise missile has been
demonstrated in ship- and submarine-launched strikes in Syria. The Russian Air
Force is also fielding a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile. Another new system, the ground-launched SSC-8 cruise missile, may be tied to U.S. accusations
that Russia is violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by allegedly
flight-testing a new ground-launched cruise missile in excess of the range limits onsuch ­capabilities.9 The missile was reportedly deployed in early 2017.10

U.S. POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE
For over 60 years, the United States has maintained a policy of extended nuclear
deterrence, providing a nuclear umbrella over its allies via “the strategic forces of
the U.S. triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons forward deployed in key regions,and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that could be deployed forward quickly to meetregional contingencies.”11
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—the most recent high-level U.S. government policy document regarding U.S. nuclear forces—concluded that the UnitedStates will retain the capability to forward deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical­fighter-bombers and strategic heavy bombers and will continue and expand consultations with NATO allies and partners to ensure the credibility and effectivenessof the U.S. extended deterrent. The NPR, therefore, made clear that the UnitedStates will consult with NATO regarding future basing of nuclear weapons in
Europe and is committed to the consensus-based NATO process.12 Additionally,
the NPR states that the unique nuclear-sharing arrangements of the alliance are
central to extended deterrence. These plans include participation by non-nuclear
member states in the nuclear planning process and the operation of DCA by somehost countries (outlined in chapters 6 and 7). The Trump administration’s Nuclear
Posture Review is anticipated to be released in February 2018.

NATO POLICY AND DOCTRINE
According to the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué, several fundamental
principles of NATO’s nuclear policy have remained largely unchanged: First, “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

12

Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose Second, “the strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the UnitedStates, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.” Third, NATO resolves to ensure a credible deterrent and defense through “anappropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities,”
as a core element of its overall strategy, although what constitutes anappropriate mix is still an open question.13
However, the two most recent NATO summits, the 2014 Wales Summit and the 2016
Warsaw Summit, demonstrate how the post–Crimea/Ukraine security environmentand strained NATO-Russia relations have shifted the narrative on NATO policy
from crisis management to deterrence and defense. The Warsaw Communiqué
states that although NATO remains open to partnership with Russia, there canbe no “business as usual” until NATO observes a “constructive change in Russia’s
actions that demonstrates compliance with international law and its international­obligations and responsibilities.”14
Regarding peacetime basing of nuclear weapons, the communiqué explicitly
underscores that nuclear deterrence “relies, in part” on U.S. nuclear weapons“forward deployed in Europe.” This language had been dropped in the 2012 NATO
Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) and was left out of the 2014 Wales
Summit Communiqué. The Warsaw Communiqué further states the importance ofa responsive posture, noting, “NATO must continue to adapt its strategy in linewith trends in the security environment . . . to ensure that NATO’s overall deterrence
and defense posture is capable of addressing potential adversaries’ doctrine andcapabilities, and that it remains credible, flexible, resilient, and adaptable.”15
Perhaps because of basing country sensitivities, there is no explicit reference in the
Warsaw Communiqué to NATO DCA, but rather to “capabilities and infrastructure
provided by Allies concerned.” Perhaps for the same reason, the language relating
to nuclear burden sharing is also somewhat vague (and closer to the 2012 DDPR
language): “The Alliance will ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies
concerned in their agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.”16This evolution in language, however, should not be read as either a decisive trend
or the last word: there were allies that wanted to further emphasize NATO’s nuclear
deterrence in the document and allies that did not want to make any change toprevious language, underscoring the ongoing challenge of establishing consensus
among 29 member states.

THE POLICY DEBATE
Although there is broad consensus in NATO documents and U.S. policy regarding
the continuity of NATO as a nuclear alliance, a debate over the risks, credibility, andWhat Is NATO’s Nuclear Posture?

13

costs of maintaining NATO’s current nuclear posture continues.17 Some allies view
forward-deployed nuclear weapons as a central component and visible symbol of
the ongoing political commitment of the United States to defend NATO and deter
Russia. Others have expressed concerns about the military utility of the current
posture and the political, security, and economic costs of the weapons. Thoseinternal differences, coupled with Russian regional coercion and harsh nuclear
rhetoric directed at NATO member states, have dulled incentives to revise NATO’s
nuclear posture.
Although much of this report addresses the technical and operational aspects ofnuclear policy and posture, it is important to stress the political context in which
NATO’s nuclear policy is set and which frequently represents a barrier to change.
This context derives from the traditional
public opposition to nuclear weapons inmost countries and the consequent preference by most governments to avoid
Internal differences, coupledpublic discussion of nuclear weapons polwith Russian regional coercionicy. Within NATO, this reticence means thatand harsh nuclear rhetoric
nuclear weapons policy is pushed into thedirected at NATO member states, shadows, and more pressing matters offer
a convenient distraction. The preference
have dulled incentives to revise
for a low profile on nuclear weapons policy
NATO’s nuclear posture.
has been reinforced by the tendency ofalliance members to rely on U.S. leadership(although perspectives on U.S. leadershipare changing across European countries forseveral reasons). The consequence is a reluctance on the part of some European
NATO members to consider alternative approaches regardless of whether thecurrent nuclear posture still meets deterrence and defense requirements in thecontemporary security environment.

“

”

14

Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

CHAPTER 2
CHALLENGES FOR MAINTAINING
NATO’S NUCLEAR POSTURE: RISKS,CREDIBILITY, AND COST
Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian RoseM

aintaining NATO’s current nuclear posture poses several challenges interms of security risks, credibility, and costs. These challenges and tradeoffs must be balanced against NATO’s overall deterrence and defense
requirements and the preservation of NATO cohesion.

SECURITY RISKS OF THE POSTURE
At each of the U.S. and NATO air bases that are thought to store U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, a combined force of U.S. and European NATO personnel is assigned
to retain custody and provide security of U.S. nuclear weapons. The weapons are
stored in underground, hardened storage vaults inside protective aircraft shelters
at each storage base. Custody, repair, and improvements to the weapons andthe storage vaults are the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force. Perimeter security(fences, monitors, and motion detectors) and controlling access to the storagesites are the responsibility of the host nation.
These sites present targets and opportunities for both insiders and outside groups
to disrupt or gain access to the facilities and, potentially, the weapons themselves.
In 2009 and 2010, an incident occurred that underlines this point. A group of activists entered a suspected NATO storage site in Belgium and walked freely for morethan an hour before being detained by base security.18
More recent events have led to increasing concerns regarding the security ofNATO bases and European nuclear facilities. The aftermath of the Brussels terrorist
attacks in March 2016 revealed what appears to have been a credible threat to
Belgian nuclear power plants.19
At about the same time as the Brussels attacks, the Pentagon ordered militaryfamilies out of southern Turkey, including the Incirlik Air Base, because of ISISrelated security concerns.20 Then, in July 2016, following an attempted coup to15

topple the Turkish government, the Turkish commanding officer at Incirlik wasarrested for his alleged role in the plot. If reports are accurate—that Incirlik is amajor NATO installation hosting U.S. forces that control one of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons in Europe (see Chapter 5)—this event shows just how
quickly assumptions about the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons stored
abroad can change.21 Continued political instability over the past year, including

SECURITY RISKS IN TURKEY
Political instability exacerbates the risks of storingan estimated 50 U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey.

1

2

SPRING 2016

Pentagon orders militaryfamilies out of southernTurkey, including the Incirlik
Air Base, because of ISISrelated security concerns.

3

JULY 2016

Attempted coup to topple
the Turkish government.
Turkish commanding officer
at Incirlik arrested for his
alleged role in the plot.

Continued politicalinstability, including massarrests within Turkey andtensions between Turkey andthe United States and NATO.

Black Sea

Bosphorus

ONGOINGGEORGIAGREECEARMENIA

Ankara✪TURKEY

IRAN

Incirlik
TurkeySYRIACYPRUS

IRAQ

Mediterranean Sea
LEB.

SOURCE: Julian Borger, “Turkey coup attempt raises fears over safety of US nuclear stockpile,” The Guardian,

July 16, 2016.

PHOTOS: (1) U.S. AIR FORCE, (2) GETTY IMAGES, (3) MAURICE FLESIER, CREATIVE COMMONS

16

Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

mass arrests within Turkey and tensions between Turkey and the United States andNATO, are less than reassuring.
Even before these events, deficiencies in the security of U.S. nuclear weapons
stored in Europe were cited in a 2008 study by the U.S. Air Force, which concluded
that most sites in Europe “require additional resources to meet [U.S. Department of
Defense] standards,” and found “inconsistencies in personnel facilities and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation.”22 A former senior NATO
official, retired U.S. Air Force Major General Robertus Remkes, who commanded
the 39th Wing at Incirlik Air Base and later J5 United States European Command,
wrote in 2011 of the ongoing security risks associated with storing U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe and the severity of the political and security consequences forNATO of any infiltration of a site, whether or not the attackers gained access to theweapons themselves.23
Although the United States and NATO have undertaken considerable efforts toimprove the physical security of nuclear weapons stored in Europe since the U.S.
Air Force study, it should be assumed that those weapons remain potential targets
for terrorist attacks. Storing nuclear weapons at locations throughout Europe toreassure some allies or as leverage in a future arms control deal with Russia, therefore, comes with the increasing risk of vulnerability to an evolving and deadlier
terrorist threat (in contrast, nuclear weapons in the continental United States are
secured in central storage facilities that are easier to protect than dispersed underground vaults inside aircraft shelters across multiple bases in Europe). Russia,
too, may be vulnerable, with an estimated 1,850 non-strategic nuclear weapons­reportedly kept in central storage facilities throughout the country.24

HOW CREDIBLE IS THE POSTURE?
Questions regarding the credibility—in military terms, the sum of capability andintent—of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe should also be central to the debate
on the future composition of NATO’s nuclear posture. Deterrence and reassurance
are two sides of the same coin, and as such, credibility matters to alliance members.25 As former U.K. defense minister Denis Healey once remarked, “One only
needed five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but­ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”26

Alliance Strategic and Conventional Forces vs. U.S. and European
Dual-Capable Aircraft
The argument that forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe serve a military function not already addressed by alliance conventional forces or the strategic
nuclear forces of the three nuclear NATO members—particularly, the large andChallenges for Maintaining NATO’s Nuclear Posture: Risks, Credibility, and Cost17

flexible capabilities of the United States—has been consistently refuted by current
and former defense officials.27
Some U.S. strategic weapons today are highly flexible and accurate, and they
possess low or variable yields, making the threat of a prompt, tailored strategic
response to a limited nuclear strike highly credible. NATO itself has consistently
underscored that the “strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of theUnited States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.”28 Indeed, it
is possible that the threat of a limited U.S. response with strategic forces would be
at least as credible, if not more so, as a response with dual-capable aircraft (DCA)
from European territory.
The application of strategic forces for extended deterrence is not without precedent. During the Cold War, NATO’s requirements were coordinated with the U.S.
Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), and NATO targeting was the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). In a crisis, SACEUR
was able to call on a number of U.S. strategic warheads carried on U.S. Poseidon
submarines and already allocated under the SIOP to fulfill the NATO mission.
Today, America’s extended nuclear deterrent in Asia continues to rely solely on
U.S. strategic forces. The “Asian model” includes less robust nuclear information
sharing and consultation than NATO uses. In a European context, such mechanisms
would ­necessarily be retained.29
In response to aggressive Russian actions in Ukraine, the United States and NATOcountries have taken steps to improve and strengthen NATO conventional deterrence through the establishment of programs such as the European Reassurance
Initiative (ERI) and the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), both discussed later inthis chapter in more detail. Additionally, the United States has supplemented its
already formidable conventional deterrencein Europe with the deployment and sale of
new capabilities such as the conventional
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile to
It is hard to envision theEuropean allies and partners.30
circumstances under which“

a U.S. president would initiate
nuclear use for the first time inmore than 70 years witha NATO DCA flown by
non-U.S. pilots delivering
a U.S. B61 bomb.

”
18“Seven Consecutive Miracles”
It is hard to envision the circumstances
under which a U.S. president would initiate
nuclear use for the first time in more than 70
years with a NATO DCA flown by non-U.S.
pilots delivering a U.S. B61 bomb. Moreover,as Karl-Heinz Kamp and Robertus Remkes
argued in 2011, even if ordered, the political and operational constraints involved in

Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

U.S. ARMY

U.S. Army soldiers participate in a live-fire exercise in January 2016 with Polish allies in support of Operation
Atlantic Resolve, a multinational demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to NATO collective security.

carrying out a nuclear strike with NATO DCA make the success of the mission far
from certain.31
Kamp and Remkes describe the challenges of nuclear strike planning using NATO
DCA. These challenges include (1) surviving a first strike; (2) receiving the orders
and authorization from the U.S. president to conduct a nuclear strike; (3) successfully taking off and proceeding to the target; (4) achieving successful command,
control, and refueling in flight; (5) surviving air defenses; (6) locating and correctly
identifying the target; and (7) carrying out the strike itself with the weapon working as designed. Additionally, once the weapon is delivered, it is far from certainthat the strike crews will make it home.32 Despite significant advancements in U.S.
and NATO reconnaissance and air strike capabilities, each of these challenges
underscores the difficulties created by the visibility of the many actions required
to prepare and deliver a nuclear weapon to its target that must take place to claim
an effective and credible operational capability. Kamp and Remkes argue NATOcohesion and credibility through information sharing, consultation, common planning, and common execution (including of the nuclear mission) are much more
important than the basing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.33

Consensus for Nuclear Use at 29?
Advocates of maintaining NATO’s existing nuclear posture argue that the DCA’s
most useful contribution is the highly visible example of alliance unity and resolve—

Challenges for Maintaining NATO’s Nuclear Posture: Risks, Credibility, and Cost

19

including allies having operational roles in planning and execution. 34 One former
senior U.S. official and member of the U.S. High Level Group delegation noted,“the B61 and DCA fleet is the most strategic capability we have in this strategic
environment that does the most potent signaling of our Allies to stand with us.”35
However, NATO is a consensus-based organization of 29 members. It is also highly
diverse, with a range of threat perceptions and views on nuclear use among its
members. That diversity could potentially be a major source of vulnerability in acrisis, because differences in views could lead to stalled decision making or lackof consensus, thereby undercutting one of the fundamental purposes of the NATO
deterrent—to promptly signal alliance unity and resolve in a crisis. A nuclear-use
scenario with only partial backing of the member states could lead to visible divisions within the alliance—a condition on which a potential adversary would becertain to capitalize.36 The current DCA posture, reliant in part on burden sharing
through delivery by European aircraft, inevitably exacerbates those issues.

BALANCING PRIORITIES WITH COSTS
The financial costs to maintain forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
should also be factored into considerations about NATO’s future nuclear posture,even though costs can be difficult to calculate and are likely to change.
The United States and NATO member states will incur several upfront costs toretain a forward-deployed nuclear capability in Europe. Current plans to upgrade
the B61 nuclear gravity bomb (to the B61-12) are expected to cost the United States
an estimated amount of more than $10 billion. Regardless of the future of NATO’s
nuclear posture, a portion of these weapons will likely be produced for delivery
by U.S. strategic bombers—which are also tasked with supporting U.S. European
Command requirements that support NATO deterrence and defense priorities. In
this context, independent estimates suggest that approximately $2.5 billion could
be saved by canceling only the procurement of B61-12s intended for delivery by
DCA.37 Overall, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office estimates that, over the
30-year period 2017 to 2046, tactical nuclear forces will cost the United States $25
billion, or an average of about $1 billion per year.38
Costs are already accumulating for integration work currently underway to makethe B61-12 compatible with the existing F-15E, F-16, and Tornado aircraft. The new
F-35A, which is expected to be the principal nuclear delivery platform for mostNATO countries with a role in the nuclear mission, is now estimated to cost nearly$100 million per unit. Although projections for F-35A orders by DCA countries vary
widely, those countries could incur anywhere from $8.5 billion to $23 billion topurchase new F-35A aircraft equipped to support the nuclear mission.39 Less clear
is whether F-35A orders would be reduced should the DCA mission be disbanded.

20

Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

ESTIMATED COSTS OF NATO’S NUCLEAR POSTUREWARHEADS
ITEM

COSTa

WHO PAYS?

Total estimated cost of a B61-12$10 billion

b

U.S.

DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT
ITEM

COSTa

WHO PAYS?

Estimated cost of an F-35A$94.6 millionc

All F-35 customers

Total estimated cost of F-35A B61-12
integration$350 million

U.S.

Total estimated cost of B61-12
integration for other NATO DCA

Unknown

Unknown

Estimated cost to replace DCA
with F-35A (current orders only)$13–33 billiond

U.S. and NATO
DCA countries

SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
ITEM

COSTa

WHO PAYS?

Annual cost to maintain
nuclear weapons in Europe$106.7 million/yeare

U.S.

Annual cost for facilities in DCA countries

Unknown/year

DCA host countries

Site security and infrastructure
improvements paid for by NATO$300 million +NATO common
funding

Site security and infrastructure
improvements paid for by the U.S.

~$100 millionf

U.S.

Replace specialized weapons
maintenance trucks$26.7 million

U.S. and NATOcommon funding

Upgrade WS3 nuclear weapons vaults
in Europe$36.5 million

U.S.

a. Costs not cumulative.
b. Includes all costs for B61-12 modifications in support of both the NATO nuclear mission and the U.S. strategic
mission.
c. The per unit cost of a Lot 10 order of F-35As in 2016/2017.
d. This calculation is adapted from aircraft estimates by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and NTI,
and assumes a low of approximately 140 to a maximum of approximately 320 U.S. and NATO F-35A dualcapable aircraft. Dual-capable aircraft support both the nuclear mission and other conventional NATO missions.
It includes the $350 million for B61-12 integration. It is unclear if and to what extent eliminating forwarddeployed nuclear weapons would affect allied procurement of DCAs.
e. Based on 2011 estimate of approximately $100 million per year to support forward-based weapons in Europe,adjusted for inflation. Includes USAF provided Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS).
f. Estimate based on 2014 testimony by then Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Weber, who indicatedthat the $300 million NATO paid toward B61 storage security infrastructure and upgrades was approximately
75 percent of the total cost.
SOURCES: Cost estimates compiled from FAS, Arms Control Association, NNSA, GAO, CBO, andother sources.

Challenges for Maintaining NATO’s Nuclear Posture: Risks, Credibility, and Cost

21

Any cost savings could be marginal if DCA countries still purchase about the same
number of aircraft.
The F-35A would require both hardware and software modifications to carry theB61-12. The total cost to design and develop these modifications across the entire
fleet is estimated to be approximately $350 million.40 Once the modification is
made, a nuclear capability is presumed to be an option for all subsequent aircraftwith a role in the nuclear mission.41 Although it is unclear whether these upgrades
will be incorporated into the final unit cost for NATO members, they would be
minimal when spread across the entire fleet.
The ongoing costs for the United States to secure NATO’s nuclear weapons inforward-deployed bases in Europe are estimated at approximately $100 million
per year. DCA host countries also incur costs for NATO nuclear support missions,personnel, and equipment; however, information on annual costs to DCA countries
to carry out that mission is not publicly available.
The cost of procuring and maintaining DCA—and any savings that could be incurredin the absence of U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe—will by definition beviewed asymmetrically by NATO DCA members with substantially smaller defense
budgets than the United States. Even with the uncertainties, savings of even a few
billion dollars could be viewed as substantial, particularly for those countries that
seek to improve their conventional contributions to NATO collective defense.
Finally, there are opportunity costs to consider, in particular concerning conventional forces. The United States has taken some steps to improve and strengthen
NATO conventional forces through the establishment of the ERI in 2014, whichseeks to assure NATO allies and partners of the U.S. commitment to the security
and territorial integrity of NATO through the increased presence of American
air, ground, and naval forces in Europe.42 The 2017 U.S. defense budget included$3.4 billion for the program in support of the increased forward presence of U.S.
forces in Europe and of more frequent bilateral and multilateral training exercises.
NATO has responded similarly with the launch of the RAP at the Wales Summit
in 2014. The RAP was initiated to ensure that the alliance was ready to respondswiftly and firmly to new security challenges from the east and the south.43
Resource requirements to sustain these and other initiatives will need to be considered in addition to programs to accommodate growing responsibilities in areas
such as counterterrorism, cyber operations, and other regional security priorities.
And all of those priorities will need to be balanced with the resources necessary to
improve the nuclear forces and delivery systems in Europe.

22

Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose

CHAPTER 3
B61-12 GUIDED NUCLEAR BOMB
Hans M. KristensenT

he United States is in the early stages of a comprehensive effort to modernize its nuclear forces—both strategic and tactical. Modernization plansinclude a new land-based intercontinental ballistic missile, a new strategic
nuclear submarine, a new strategic bomber, a replacement for its nuclear cruise
missile, and upgrades to nuclear warheads and to supporting infrastructure.
The cost of maintaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear forces is projected to cost$400 billion during the next 10 years and more than $1.2 trillion across 30 years.44

As part of this plan, the U.S. Air Force will replace all five variants of the B61 nuclear
gravity bomb with one new type: the B61-12, the U.S. arsenal’s first guided nuclear
gravity bomb. That change means that the current B61 gravity bombs stored at six
U.S. and European air force bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, andTurkey all will be upgraded in 5–10 years. The new weapons will presumably be
brought in and the old ones moved out at the same time (there are enough weapons in storage in the United States with key components needed for productionof the B61-12 so that the weapons in Europe do not have to be brought home forconversion first).
Plans for this upgrade to a more accurate weapon have been at least a decade in
the making, and production could take close to a decade more. Design development began in 2008, and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review decided to proceedwith full-scope development. In 2016, the National Nuclear Security Administration(NNSA) authorized production engineering, the final developmental phase before
actual weapons production, now set to begin in 2019. The first production unit isscheduled for March 2020, three years later than was initially planned, followed byfull-scale production of an estimated 480 B61-12s by 2025.
Initially, the B61-12 was said to replace only the B61 versions that had yields
ranging from 0.3 to 360.0 kilotons. But in 2013, the Department of Defense andDepartment of Energy informed Congress that the B61-12’s unique combination23

of increased accuracy and lower-yield options also would allow for the retirementof both the 400 kiloton B61-11 variant and the 1,200 kiloton B83-1.45 In terms ofnumbers, the planned retirement of existing B61 types and the B83-1 will result ina reduction of the total inventory of nuclear gravity bombs by nearly 50 percent
by the mid 2020s.46
It will not be a simple process. The B61-12 program actually consists of two components: the bomb assembly and the guided tail kit assembly. The NNSA is responsible
for the bomb assembly, including the warhead, use-control, and assembly features,and the U.S. Air Force is responsible for the guided tail kit assembly (produced byBoeing) that enables the bomb to be employed with greater accuracy than current
gravity bombs. According to Bruce Walker, vice president of Weapons Engineeringand Product Realization at Sandia National Laboratories, the program is “the mostcomplex program we’ve ever done . . . the largest nuclear weapon program in my
35 years at Sandia.”47
Production of the B61-12 has already been delayed three years and has more thandoubled in cost to nearly $10 billion. NNSA concluded in 2016 that the production
plan could be met only by compressing schedules, which in turn would make itharder to address future difficulties.48

THE B61 FAMILY OF NUCLEAR BOMBS
U.S. NUCLEAR GRAVITY BOMBS, 2017
GRAVITYBOMBYIELDS(KILOTONS)AIRCRAFT

USER

B61-3

0.3, 1.5, 60, 170

F-15E, F-16, PA-200

U.S., NATO

130

B61-4

0.3, 1.5, 10, 50

F-15E, F-16, PA-200

U.S., NATO

130

B61-7

10–360

B-2A, (B-52H)

U.S.

350

B61-100.3, 5, 10, 80

F-15E, F-16, PA-200

U.S.

40

B61-11

400

B-2A

U.S.

30

B83-1

Low–1,200

B-2A, (B-52H)

U.S.

200

INVENTORY

Total

~900
TOTAL INVENTORY FOLLOWING CONSOLIDATION, MID 2020sGRAVITYBOMBYIELDS(KILOTONS)

B61-12

0.3, 1.5, 10, 50

AIRCRAFTUSER

F-15E, F-16, F-35A,
PA-200, B-2A, B-21

U.S., NATOINVENTORY480

SOURCE: Warhead yields and inventory estimates by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris.

24

Hans M. Kristensen

The B61-12 will be assigned for use with both current and future strategic bombers (B-2 and B-21) and tactical fighter-bombers (F-15E, F-16, F-35A, PA-200). But
unlike today, where different aircraft have to use different weapon types for different ­targets, the B61-12 will enable the U.S. Air Force to attack all gravity bomb
targets with one weapon type that is usable by all nuclear-capable aircraft.
Eventually, the B61-12 will be replaced by the B61-13, another nuclear gravity bomb
currently scheduled to begin development in the late-2030s.

B61-12 DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING
Since 2010, the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories and the U.S. Air Force haveconducted a host of B61-12 tests to develop and verify performance of its various components. Before 1992, developing the B61-12 would have required one orseveral live underground nuclear tests. Since then, however, the United States hasdeveloped a range of facilities that allow development and simulation of nuclear
weapons without live nuclear test explosions. For the B61-12 program, this effort
has included several non-nuclear tests, with more tests planned to verify changed
non-nuclear components, performance, and safety.49

B61-12 COST ESTIMATES
The initial B61-12 cost estimate provided by NNSA in 2010 was approximately$4 billion.50 By May 2012, the estimate had increased 50 percent to $6 billion,51
and by July 2012, the Pentagon’s Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation Office
informed Congress that the cost would be
about $10 billion.52“

Production of the B61-12
has already been delayed
three years and has
more than doubled in cost tonearly $10 billion.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office(GAO) reported in February 2016 that the
total cost estimate by the NNSA and the
U.S. Air Force (as of September 2015) was$8.9 billion, including $7.3 billion for NNSA
work and $1.6 billion for the Air Force’s
development of the tail kit. However, theGAO noted that much of the B61-12 work
“remains to be executed, with the largest
share of program spending yet to come.” The report found that as of September
2015, only $1.6 billion had been spent and that, in addition to the $8.9 billion,$800 million would be required for other program elements, including radar development costs.53 The GAO overview, therefore, indicated a total development andproduction cost on the order of $9.7 billion.

”

B61-12 Guided Nuclear Bomb25

Today, only about a quarter of the expected program cost has been spent.
Extensive component development and production are still under way, and aircraft
integration flight tests must be conducted with U.S. and NATO aircraft for the
program to be able to deliver the first B61-12 bombs to the U.S. Air Force and basesin Europe by the early 2020s.54

B61-12 MILITARY CAPABILITIESThe B61-12 will be the first guided nuclear gravity bomb in the modern U.S. arsenal.
It will operate in one of two modes, depending on the delivery aircraft. Digital
aircraft (F-15E, F-35A, B-2A, B-21) will be able to use the full guided capability withincreased accuracy; older analog aircraft (F-16 and PA-200) will drop the B61-12
in an unguided ballistic mode with less accuracy. The F-16 and PA-200 will not be
upgraded to use the increased accuracy because both aircraft will be replaced by
the digital F-35A in the near future.
In 2013, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander General Robert Kehler
explained to Congress that the B61-12 was part of a deliberate strategy to givelower-yield weapons greater accuracy to increase military flexibility and provide
attack options with less radioactive fallout: “[W]e are trying to pursue weaponsthat . . . would have less collateral effect if the President ever had to use them.”55
The increased accuracy is provided by the guided tail kit, which steers the bomb
toward its target. The system does not use the global positioning system (GPS) but
an internal guidance unit that is hardened against radiation effects. The accuracyof the B61-12 is secret, but a video of a fully guided test drop in October 2015 shows
the bomb hitting well within a circle with a radius of approximately 30 meters(100 feet). That test result indicates an accuracy roughly three times better thancurrent B61 versions.56 The increased accuracy will allow strike planners to selectlower-yield options to destroy targets that today require higher-yield options.

HANS KRISTENSEN, FAS

The October 2015 video also shows that the B61-12 appears to have a limited
earth-penetrating capability in soil. The combination of increased accuracy andRadius: ~98 feet (~30 meters)

Author’s reproduction of an NNSA image of a B61-12 accuracy test at Toponah Test Range in October 2015. The
author assesses the accuracy of the B61-12 to be a significant improvement over current B61 variants.

26

Hans M. Kristensen

U.S. AIR FORCEA U.S. F-16 prepares to drop an inert B61-12 nuclear bomb during a flight test at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, inMarch 2017. The test is part of an ongoing life-extension and consolidation program for current B61 variants.

earth penetration would significantly enhance the targeting capability against
underground targets.57
The unique effect of the B61-12’s increased accuracy is that it will combineenhanced lower-yield options and the military capability currently provided bymuch higher-yield weapons into one bomb. And instead of those different capabilities necessitating use of different types of aircraft, the B61-12 will be available
on all aircraft—whether tactical or strategic. The B61-12 will, in other words, be amuch more flexible and versatile weapon.

IMPLICATIONS OF A MORE ADVANCED WEAPON
Former STRATCOM Commander and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General James Cartwright in 2016 acknowledged the implications: “What if I bringreal precision to these weapons? Does it make them more usable? It could be.”58
Cartwright made a similar statement in 2015: “If I can drive down the yield, drive
down, therefore, the likelihood of fallout, etc., does that make it more usable in theeyes of some—some president or national security decision-making process? And
the answer is, it likely could be more usable.”59
In 2014, former Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz also said theincreased accuracy would influence the way military planners think about how to

B61-12 Guided Nuclear Bomb27

use the B61-12: “Without a doubt. Improved accuracy and lower yield is a desired
military capability. Without a question.”60
However, not everyone agrees with the desirability of a more “usable” nuclear
weapon (see box below). In 2015, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert
Work said, “Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of
nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire. Escalation is escalation, and nuclear
use would be the ultimate escalation.”61
The increased accuracy and lower-yield capabilities of the B61-12 will play animportant role in the future adjustment of regional nuclear escalation scenarios innortheast Asia and Europe.
NATO allies hosting these U.S. weapons also will need to consider what, if any,
political costs will be associated with hosting modernized weapons with new military capabilities. If the public is aware of the upgrade, it could result in significant
backlash and could open debates about whether the new weapons affect any
existing agreements or commitments. For example, the 2010 Strategic Concept,
a statement of NATO’s principles, declared that the alliance would “seek to create
the conditions for further reductions in the future . . . of the number and relianceon nuclear weapons.”62 Increasing the capability of NATO’s nuclear posture might
appear to contradict that pledge.

MORE LOW-YIELD WEAPONS?
There are increasingly vocal demands in the United States and Russia for thecreation of new, low-yield nuclear weapons. Such weapons would by definition
be less destructive, which could make the decision to use them psychologicallyand operationally easier. If the two leading nuclear powers continue to consider
tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons essential and focus on making themmore “usable,” others could emulate this example, increasing the global risk of
nuclear use.
SOURCE: Adapted from Nikolai Sokov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW),” Nuclear Threat
Initiative, May 1, 2002, www.nti.org/analysis/articles/tactical-nuclear-weapons/.

28

Hans M. Kristensen

CHAPTER 4SUPPORTING THE DCA MISSION
Hans M. KristensenT

he U.S. Air Force is planning to integrate the new B61-12 gravity bomb onto
six different aircraft: two strategic (B-2 and B-21) and four tactical (F-15E,
F-16, F-35A, and PA-200). European NATO host countries currently operate
two types of nuclear-capable aircraft—the F-16 and PA-200—which are reaching
the end of their service lives. The Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey have decided toreplace their existing aircraft with the F-35A; Germany is replacing its aircraft with
the Eurofighter; and Belgium is currently undecided.
Countries that host U.S. nuclear weapons and participate in the nuclear-sharing
mission must, therefore, make or sustain decisions relating to costly replacement
aircraft and the investments needed to retain the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) mission and nuclear weapons on their soil (see chapter 5). Those decisions will lockNATO into its current nuclear posture for the next several decades.

F-35A LIGHTNING II
In the United States, the F-35A Lightning II is scheduled to eventually take over the
nuclear strike role from all other fighter-bombers. Several other countries, including the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey, also have placed orders for the F-35A. The
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Operational Requirements Document calls for the F-35A
to have the capabilities and provisions for DCA operations with up to two B61-12s
carried internally.63
The extensive work for DCA capability planning, design, testing, and certificationmeans it likely will be the mid 2020s before the F-35A becomes nuclear certified.
However, exactly when the F-35A will be cleared to carry the B61-12 is uncertain
because a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) review in December 2016 concluded
that the program as currently planned is “not executable.” Proceeding with the29

“current unrealistic plan . . . would be to completely ignore the costly lessons
learned” from previous programs and the F-22 fighter program, the review said.64

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT TESTING
Flight testing involving the B61-12 on F-15E, F-16, and B-2 aircraft has been under
way for several years. An F-15E bomb drop test in 2015 showed a significant accuracy and an apparent earth-penetrating capability.65
In 2016, flight testing expanded to the PA-200 bomber currently used by Germany
and Italy. This testing included an eight flight-test series conducted over fourweeks in the United States. The series was a key step toward ultimately certifying
the PA-200 to be capable of carrying the B61-12 nuclear bomb in wartime.66 The
PA-200 is scheduled to continue B61-12 integration activities until 2020.
Flight testing on the F-35A is scheduled to begin in 2018 with the Block 4 upgrade,which is the follow-on modernization that includes nuclear capability. The GAO
reported in April 2017 that the Block 4 program might be delayed and be more
expensive.67

INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITIES

U.S. AIR FORCE

When the F-35A was first declared combat ready in August 2016, the U.S. Air Forceboasted that it “will be the most dominant aircraft in our inventory, because it cango where our legacy aircraft cannot.”68 According to Lockheed Martin, the F-35A
will be eight times “more effective” in air-to-ground missions than the F-16.69

The F-35A Lightning II has been selected to eventually take over the nuclear strike role from other U.S. andNATO dual-capable aircraft.

30

Hans M. KristensenIn addition to the increased military capabilities provided by the new guided tail kitof the B61-12 itself, the F-35A is a stealth aircraft with significant new features. In
particular, an F-35A with internal B61-12 carriage has significantly greater capacity
to penetrate air defenses and get to its targets without being seen (or at least seen
too late).
It is not clear what impact this capability will have on crisis stability in the EuroAtlantic, but it could further escalate tension with Russia, leading to a new cycle ofdangerous provocations and nuclear competition.70

NUCLEAR SUPPORT COSTS
In addition to the cost of procuring weapons
and aircraft, there are significant support
costs associated with making aircraft nuclear capable and with forward deploying
nuclear weapons in Europe. Information
about support costs, however, is hard tofind and is often inconsistent. Adding to theconfusion is that different costs are coveredby different countries that do not have thesame reporting or accountability requirements as the U.S. government.

“
In addition to the cost of­procuring weapons and aircraft,there are significant support
costs associated with making
aircraft nuclear capable andwith forward deploying nuclear
weapons in Europe.

”

The Congressional Budget Office projected
in 2013 that it would cost about $350 million to make the F-35A nuclear capable.71
So far, the Pentagon has budgeted $316.48 million for nuclear capability work on
the F-35A through 2022,72 with several more years of work planned after that. The
costs to upgrade the other NATO allies’ aircraft to carry the B61-12 is unknown.
In addition to those costs, the DOD informed Congress in 2011 that the Pentagon
was spending about $100 million per year to support forward-based nuclear
weapons in Europe.73 Adjusted for inflation, that amount is approximately$109.1 million today. Part of the cost includes the 130-person-strong Munitions
Support Squadrons (MUNSS) at each of the four national bases at an annual operating budget of approximately $232,000 each.74 Host countries pay for the MUNSS
facilities, but those costs are unknown.
NATO and the United States have also increased spending on security at thenuclear bases after an internal U.S. Air Force investigation concluded in 2008 that“most sites” used to store nuclear weapons in Europe did not meet U.S. security
requirements.75 At the time, U.S. and NATO officials publicly denied there were

Supporting the DCA Mission31F-35A: FUTURE NATO DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT
NATO currently relies on F-16 or Panavia Tornado strike
aircraft to fulfill the nuclear mission. As these platforms
approach retirement, many countries are evaluating the
F-35A as a potential successor.
The F-35A is the only aircraft
UNIT COST
currently slated to complete
nuclear certification, thoughrising costs are a driving factor
for several NATO DCA countries.

1763

$94.6
million100

U.S.

Turkey

60

37

Italy

Netherlands

PLANNED TOTAL INVENTORY

Belgium

Germany

POTENTIAL FUTURE BUYERS

SOURCES: For an assessment of NATO countries that play a role in the dual-capable mission, see Hans M.

Kristensen, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (Special Report No. 3), Federation of American Scientists. May
2012, p. 31. For country profiles and estimated F-35 inventories, see Lockheed Martin Corporation, “F-35 Fast
Facts,” 2018, https://www.f35.com/about/fast-facts.

problems, but DOD later informed Congress that NATO would spend $63.4 million
on security upgrades in 2011–2012 and another $67 million in 2013–2014.76
Then, in March 2014, DOD reported that NATO had invested more than $80 million
in infrastructure improvements since 2000 to store nuclear weapons in Belgium,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Another $154 million was planned
for security improvements so that the sites would meet stringent new U.S. standards.77 And in April 2014, Andrew Weber, then assistant secretary of defense fornuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs, told Congress that “NATOcommon funding has paid for over $300 million, approximately 75 percent of theB61 storage security infrastructure and upgrades” in Europe.78
Elaine Bunn, then deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, added that because host base facilities are funded through32

Hans M. Kristensen

individual national budgets, “it is not possible to provide an accurate assessmentof exactly how much NATO basing nations have contributed in Fiscal Year 2014
toward NATO nuclear burden sharing, although it is substantial.” Bunn provided
additional information that showed funding of security enhancements andupgrades as well as funding of infrastructure upgrades (investment) at the specific
European weapon storage sites. This funding, she explained, is provided throughthe NATO Security Investment Program, and there have been four NATO upgrades
related to weapons storage (Capability Package upgrades) since the original NATOCapability Package was approved in 2000.79
Some of the security upgrades are clearly visible on commercial satellite photos. In 2015–2016, a new security perimeter was built at Incirlik Air Base aroundthe so-called NATO area that contains the aircraft shelters with the undergroundnuclear weapons storage vaults known as Weapons Storage and Security Systems(WS3s). The upgrade followed a similar security perimeter upgrade at Aviano Air
Base in ­northern Italy.80

U.S. AIR FORCE

Smaller security upgrades are also under way at some of the national nuclear
bases, including a new WS3 vault support facility and a MUNSS Operations
Center-Command Post at Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium, as well as a WS3 vault

U.S. Air Forces in Europe Commander General Roger Brady is shown B61 nuclear weapon disarming procedures
on an inert training warhead in an underground Weapons Security and Storage System (WS3) vault in 2008.

Supporting the DCA Mission

33

U.S. AIR FORCE

A Dutch F-16 returns from a training mission at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands. According to the author, U.S.
nuclear weapons are stored in underground storage vaults inside hardened aircraft shelters similar to this one atseveral bases across Europe.

support facility at Ghedi Air Base in Italy. The cost for each of these upgrades isaround $1 million.
In addition to these types of expenses, NATO is in the process of replacing the special weapons maintenance trucks with a fleet of new trucks known as the Secure
Transportable Maintenance System (STMS). NATO provided $14.7 million for the
program in 2011, and in July 2012, the U.S. Air Force awarded a $12 million contract
to five companies in the United States to build 10 new STMS trailers for delivery
by June 2014.81
Finally, the U.S. Air Force is planning a multiyear upgrade of the WS3 nuclear
weapons vaults at the European bases. The upgrade will modernize the alarm
data system and underground cables. The $36.5 million contract was awarded in
September 2016, and the work will be completed in October 2020,82 in time for thearrival of the first B61-12 bombs in Europe a few years later.

34

Hans M. Kristensen

CHAPTER 5
B61-12 INTEGRATION ON ALLIED AIRCRAFT
Hans M. Kristensen

Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands store U.S. B61 nuclear bombs on
one national base each with a fully nuclear-certified fighter-bomber wing.
There is some uncertainty about whether, or to what extent, Turkey is stillpart of the NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement. Turkey has a much lower aircraft
readiness and no weapons deployed at Turkish bases. (There are up to 50 B61-3/
B61-4 bombs stored in Turkey at Incirlik Air Base for use by U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers, but no nuclear-capable aircraft permanently stationed at the base.)
The nuclear-sharing mission is not popular among certain parliamentarians andmembers of the public, and basing countries try to avoid public debate on thisissue. As a result, as of October 2017, no hosting country has publicly confirmed its
plans for enabling replacement aircraft to carry nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is notclear who will pay the additional costs to make the aircraft dual capable (e.g., thehost country, NATO, or the United States). Of the aircraft being considered by hostcountries to replace their currently deployed aircraft, at present only the F-35A
could be modified to make it nuclear capable with the modernized B61-12, ensuring that countries maintain their nuclear commitment. This situation, therefore,raises questions about the future role for Germany and possibly Belgium—both ofwhich have not decided to purchase the F-35A—in the nuclear mission.

BELGIUM
The Belgian Air Force uses the F-16A/B in the NATO nuclear strike mission. Its­nuclear-capable F-16s are part of the 31st Squadron of the 10th Tactical Fighter Wing
at Kleine Brogel Air Base. There are an estimated 10 to 20 B61-3/4 nuclear bombs
at the base, stored in 11 underground vaults inside protective aircraft shelters.
The Belgian government has not yet decided which aircraft it will buy to replace
the F-16s, which will be upgraded to carry the B61-12 until a new aircraft is acquired.
Belgium is reportedly considering buying 34 new aircraft, the bulk of which would35

be delivered in 2023 and enter service two years later. A request for proposals was
issued in 2017.83 A decision is expected in 2018 or 2019.
The F-35A is a strong contender, and Belgium might follow the decision of its
Dutch neighbor. Other contenders include the European Eurofighter, the U.S. F/A18F Super Hornet, the French Rafale, and the Swedish Gripen. Only two of thoseaircraft are nuclear capable, and an unnamed industry source told a journalist in2015 that continuing the nuclear mission would favor the F-35A.84 If so, Belgian
F-35As would probably take over the nuclear mission from the F-16s in the mid- tolate-2020s.

GERMANYThe German Air Force uses the PA-200 Tornado in the NATO nuclear strike mission. The nuclear-capable aircraft are operated by the 33rd Fighter Wing at Büchel
Air Base, which like Belgium stores an estimated 10 to 20 B61-3/4 nuclear bombsin 11 underground vaults inside as many protective aircraft shelters.

U.S. AIR FORCE

Germany is replacing some of its PA-200 Tornados with the Eurofighter in somemissions but has not announced a decision to make the Eurofighter nuclear capable. It is unclear how long the German Air Force will continue to operate the

A German Panavia PA-200 Tornado undergoes post-flight inspections after a training mission in the UnitedStates. The PA-200 is one of three aircraft certified for the NATO nuclear mission.

36

Hans M. Kristensen

PA-200 Tornado in the nuclear role before the aircraft becomes obsolete. The
German government told parliament in 2012, “It is planned to use the Tornado
weapon system beyond 2025 in reduced numbers.”85 B61-12 integration flights on
the Tornado began in 2016.
Equipping the Eurofighter with nuclear capability would require the aircraft togo through the lengthy integration program that the other nuclear aircraft havealready started. That process would be expensive and likely face strong oppositionin parliament. It would also mean that the Eurofighter would not become nuclear
certified until well after other NATO aircraft had been upgraded. If it does not makethe Eurofighter nuclear capable or buy a small number of F-35As, then Germany
will likely leave the nuclear-sharing mission sometime in the late 2020s.86
It was therefore noteworthy when the chief of the German Air Force, Karl Mullner,
recently stated that the Air Force is currently studying which aircraft should
replace the Tornado: F-15, F-18, F-35, or the Eurofighter. Mullner made it clear that
only the F-35A meets the Air Force’s requirements for a next-generation aircraft.87
The German Parliament and government would still have to agree and approve an
F-35A program for the German Air Force, potentially by 2020.

ITALY
The Italian Air Force also uses the PA-200 Tornado in the NATO nuclear strike
mission. The nuclear-certified PA-200s are part of the Sixth Wing (Stormo) basedat Ghedi Air Base in northern Italy. This base also stores an estimated 10 to 20 B613/4 nuclear bombs in 11 underground vaults inside protective aircraft shelters.88
B61-12 i­ntegration flights on the Tornado began in 2016.
Italy plans to replace the PA-200 with the F-35A in the nuclear mission by themid-2020s. A total of 90 F-35s of all types are planned (down from 131), of which
60 will be the F-35A version. If approved, some 15 to 30 of them would probably
be assigned to the nuclear mission.
The first two operational F-35As were delivered to the Italian Air Force in December
2016, making the Italian military the first non-U.S. military to receive operational
F-35As. The two aircraft were delivered to the 32nd Wing (Stormo) at Amendola
Air Force Base, where they will be part of the newly created 13 Squadron (Gruppo).
The last of the 90 F-35As will be delivered in 2027. The two aircraft now in service
are not nuclear capable. Italy has a unique position in the international F-35 program because it is the location of the final assembly and check-out) at Cameri innortheast Italy. This factory will also assemble Dutch F-35As.

B61-12 Integration on Allied Aircraft

37

The possible dual-capable role of the F-35A is rarely debated by the Italian publicor government. The budget currently approved for the aircraft does not specify
whether part of the funding will be dedicated to adapting the F-35A to a nuclear
mission. It is likely that any parliamentary debate on the nuclear role of the mission
and costs will raise opposition.

THE NETHERLANDS
The Dutch Air Force currently uses F-16A/Bs from the 312nd squadron of the 1stFighter Wing at Volkel Air Base in the NATO nuclear strike mission. As at the otherbases, there are 11 vaults with an estimated 10 to 20 B61-3/4 bombs at the Volkelbase. B61-12 integration flights on the F-16 have been underway for several years.

U.S. AIR FORCE

The Netherlands plans to buy a minimum of 37 F-35As to replace its F-16s. Twotraining aircraft have been delivered, and another eight were ordered in March
2015 for delivery in 2019. Two aircraft were sent briefly to Leeuwarden Air Basein May 2016 before they were returned to the United States for more testing andevaluation. In addition to Leeuwarden Air Base, the Dutch F-35As will be based at
Volkel Air Base, where, if approved, they will take over the nuclear mission fromthe F-16s beginning in the mid-2020s.

A pilot from the Royal Netherlands Air Force taxis to the runway for the first flight of a Dutch F-35 Lightning II
in 2013. According to the author, the Netherlands is one of five European countries reported to have a role in theNATO nuclear sharing mission.

38

Hans M. Kristensen

The Dutch F-35A program is in a unique situation because when it approved thepurchase of the F-35A in November 2013, the Dutch parliament also approved aresolution stating that “the replacement for the F-16 should not have a nuclear
mission.”89 The Dutch government did not explicitly reject the motion but instead
responded that the mission was part of a broader NATO posture and that it would
seek to create the conditions in Europe so that the aircraft no longer need to havea nuclear mission—essentially ignoring the resolution.90

TURKEYThe Turkish Air Force plans to purchase 100 F-35As to replace its fleet of F-16s.
Unlike the other four countries in the NATO nuclear-sharing program, Turkey does
not have an active nuclear wing with U.S. nuclear weapons present at the base.
(There are nuclear weapons only at Incirlik Air Base, which is considered a U.S.
base.) As a result, there is some uncertainty about whether, or to what extent,
Turkey is still part of the NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement.
In early 2010, General Ergin Celasin, who was commander of the Turkish Air Forcein 1999–2001, reportedly said that the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons at Incirlik
Air Base were not linked to the Turkish military because the Turkish Air Force’s rolein NATO’s nuclear contingency plans came to an end with the withdrawal of U.S.
nuclear weapons from Turkish air bases in the 1990s.91
Until 1996, the United States deployed nuclear bombs at Akinci Air Base andBalikesir Air Base for use by Turkish F-16s. But that year, the two U.S. Air Forceunits that had maintained custody of the weapons were withdrawn, and the 40bombs were moved to Incirlik Air Base. By late 2000, those 40 bombs were still
earmarked for use by Turkish aircraft.92 The 40 bombs were probably withdrawn
around 2005, leaving up to 50 bombs at Incirlik for use by U.S. jets.
Yet in 2010, in a coordinated response from the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Strategic
Command, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the U.S. Congress, theU.S. Air Force stated, “Turkey uses Turkish F-16s to execute their nuclear mission.”
And some of the F-16s would be upgraded to be able to deliver the B61-12 until the
F-35A could take over the nuclear strike mission in the 2020s.93
The reason for this disparity between General Celasin’s statement and the U.S. Air
Force’s response to the U.S. Congress is unclear. There is no doubt that the Turkishrole in the nuclear strike mission is much less active than that of the other four
nuclear-sharing countries. The reason might be that the Turkish role is dormant
and aircraft are no longer certified at the operational level, but that the F-16s arestill equipped to deliver nuclear bombs if necessary and that the F-35As will be
nuclear capable as well.

B61-12 Integration on Allied Aircraft

39

“Recent events in Turkey...
have raised concerns about
the security and the futureof the B61 weapons stored
at Incirlik.

”

Turkey bought its first two F-35As in 2014
and another four in 2015. Turkish pilots werescheduled to arrive at Luke Air Force Basein the United States in March 2017 to begin
training with American pilots to prepare
for delivery of the first operational aircraftin 2019. In January 2017, Turkey reportedly
decided to order another batch comprising
24 aircraft, about a quarter of the 100 aircraft it plans to buy as part of a $16 billion
program. The second batch will be deliveredin 2021–2022.

Recent events in Turkey, including the uncertain relationship between Turkey andthe United States and other NATO allies, the ongoing conflict in Syria, and proximity to ISIS territory, have raised concerns about the security and the future of the
B61 weapons stored at Incirlik (see chapter 2).

40

Hans M. Kristensen

CHAPTER 6
NATO NUCLEAR SHARING: CONSULTATION
Simon LunnF

or decades, the United States has had forward deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in some European countries, and NATO allies have participated in the
preparation and execution of the nuclear mission. Engagement in the nuclear
planning process takes place primarily through two formal mechanisms—the
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the High Level Group (HLG). However, there areserious questions about whether the Cold War–era structures are working today
and whether NATO nuclear issues are receiving an adequate level of consideration
given today’s security and political environment.

THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP
The NPG is the main body through which the United States informs and consults all allies, with the exception of France, on nuclear policy. Established in 1966,
the NPG was designed to meet allied requests to increase NATO involvement

FR ANCE AND NATO NUCLEAR POLICYFrance does not participate in either the Nuclear Planning Group or High Level
Group. Nevertheless, France has an input into NATO nuclear policy by virtue
of its membership in the North Atlantic Council and has crucially participatedin the drafting and approval of all Strategic Concepts since the end of theCold War. According to one official, “France joins discussions on policy, notposture.” Others suggest that the issue of meeting at 28 or 29 NATO membersin specific nuclear planning meetings (i.e., with or without France) raises
questions concerning the appropriate format for nuclear decision making,particularly in crisis situations.
SOURCE: Author’s personal communications with NATO officials.

41

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

in nuclear planning and decision making. The NPG covers“a broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the safety,
security and survivability of nuclear weapons, communications
and information systems, aswell as deployment issues.”94 It
also covers broader nuclear issues, including arms control and­nuclear proliferation.
During the Cold War, the NPG
met twice yearly at the defense
minister level and more regularly at the ambassadorial level.
However, in the post–Cold War
period, the nuclear dimension
assumed a lower profile in NATO
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford (right)
meets with his Turkish counterpart at a NATO military conference
affairs, and meetings becamein 2016.
much less frequent. NATO ambassadors have apparently not met formally in NPG format for 15 years (althoughaccording to one official, ­nuclear-related issues can “pop up” in regular meetings).
The work of the NPG is prepared at NATO by the Nuclear Planning Directorate andthe NPG staff group that constitutes the “in-house” group dealing exclusively with
nuclear matters. The directorate coordinates the work of the NPG and is staffedby members of NATO’s International Staff—normally personnel with backgrounds
in national nuclear affairs either at the operational or policy level—recruited fromnational capitals.95 The NPG staff group offers continuity and institutional memoryin NATO nuclear policy. The director of the group is traditionally an American.
The NPG staff group meets weekly and is attended by representatives from thenational delegations based at NATO who have nuclear affairs among their responsibilities. The degree of familiarity and expertise of these national representatives
in nuclear matters varies from country to country, frequently depending on thenumber of other NATO issues and responsibilities in their individual portfolios.
It is important to note that the nuclear-sharing consultations developed in the
NPG do not depend on the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. If theweapons were withdrawn to the United States, consultations would continue,
although there would be discussion about whether and how to adapt the relevantmechanisms accordingly.

42

Simon Lunn

THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP
The work of the NPG is supplemented—and some would say bypassed—by the
HLG, which is chaired by the United States and attended by designated senior officials from national capitals. The HLG was created in 1977 after U.S. officials grew
concerned that nuclear consultations through the normal NATO machinery gave
insufficient attention to nuclear matters at senior levels in national capitals.96 The
United States was particularly concerned about the capacity of the North Atlantic
Council (NAC), the principal political decision-making body for the alliance, todeal with the key nuclear decisions anticipated during the ongoing review of thisperiod. In the words of one official, it was important to “involve the people whowrite the instructions, not those who read them.”97
The HLG has remained a special body parallel to the NPG and is used by the UnitedStates to brief on nuclear developments of interest to the allies. Some examples
are the development of the B61 nuclear bomb, as previously noted, or U.S. assessments of Russian nuclear developments. Although the HLG meets regularly, thefrequency of meetings is largely at the discretion of the group’s chair. Reports
prepared by the HLG are typically distributed directly to defense ministers rather
than through the NAC.

NATO NUCLEAR CONSULTATION AND
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSThe willingness of the United States to keep allies informed about nuclear issues
and the willingness of allies to contribute to a common deterrence effort underpin
the nuclear consultation process within NATO.
At the same time, the decision to initiate the use of a nuclear weapon madeavailable to NATO rests with the U.S. president or the British prime minister. If adecision were made to use a U.S. forward-deployed warhead and have it delivered by NATO dual-capable aircraft (DCA), the decision to release the warhead
would lie with the U.S. president; the use of a DCA would require the assent of the­relevant host country.
Although not required, it is widely assumed that such a decision would be madein close consultation with all allies, and it would be reasonable to expect that the
NAC, in permanent session, would play a central role.98 France also would be alikely participant, despite not being part of the NPG.
The history behind the political guidelines for use of nuclear weapons by NATOis complex and has always involved reconciling the very different perspectives
among members. The 1962 Athens Guidelines required consultation “time andNATO Nuclear Sharing: Consultation

43

“NATO nuclear issues still
do not receive adequate
high-level political attention
within the alliance either
because attention is frequently
focused on more pressing
problems or because nuclear
posture-related issues get lostin the bureaucracy.

”

circumstance permitting.” 99 However, given
the diverse views among allies, it was soon
clear that this rudimentary principle had
to be fleshed out. Seven years later, in
1969, Provisional Political Guidelines forthe tactical use of nuclear weapons wereadopted, outlining the criteria that NATOministers should take into account duringconsultations.100 The guidelines were further amended in 1986 into General Political
Guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons
in the defense of NATO.101 It is unclear when,or whether, those guidelines have been
updated.

INFORMAL GROUPS

The formal structures of NATO—the NAC and the NPG and HLG—provide thebasis for NATO’s regular formal nuclear consultation and political decision making. However, consultation is NATO’s lifeblood, and consultation on NATO nuclear
matters—and efforts to reach consensus—extend beyond the formal groups andhierarchy to include informal groups. Those groups include the influential Quad (i.e.,
United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany);102 those members pushingfor disarmament and arms control (including several of the basing countries); andcertain groups with specific regional perspectives (most notably today, the allies
in closest proximity to Russia). Whether exerting direct or indirect influence on
alliance nuclear policy, this informal network provides an important backdrop to
the formal decision-making process.

CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING MECHANISMS
Despite those formal and informal structures for consultation and decision making, NATO nuclear issues still do not receive adequate high-level political attention
within the alliance either because attention is frequently focused on more pressing
problems or because nuclear posture-related issues get lost in the bureaucracy. As
an example, most recently, there has been little discussion of the consequences of
the introduction of the B61-12 and its advanced capability.
Underpinning allied participation is the acceptance of U.S. leadership in NATO’s
nuclear affairs. However, in a partnership of shared risks, this dominance creates
questions of its own about the appropriate level and degree of consultation, as
well as the degree of assertiveness by allies.

44

Simon Lunn

This state of affairs raises a host of questions around (1) whether the HLG provides the right level and degree of political involvement, (2) what the role of U.S.
leadership should be, (3) what the difference between information and consultation is, and (4) the degree to which allies are willing to challenge U.S. policy
prescriptions.103 There also are questions regarding whether the body merelyreflects what it believes the United States wants to hear—or simply avoids thechallenging issues.104

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

More broadly, the current components for nuclear-sharing consultation all stemfrom the Cold War and have yet to be adapted for today’s security and politicalenvironment. The enlargement of NATO does not appear to have changed thisdynamic. Some of the more recent members have insisted that NATO’s nuclear
policy and posture need greater credibility. However, officials also note that themore recent members lack the experience and knowledge of older members
regarding NATO nuclear policy. As a result, as one official noted, they “tend toparticipate in consultations as concerned spectators interested in information andreassurance rather than the process of consultation itself.”105 For the most part, theparticipation of allies continues to be passive rather than active.

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis hosts a joint news conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at
NATO headquarters in Brussels in 2017.

NATO Nuclear Sharing: Consultation

45

With regard to nuclear decision making more broadly, the procedures and considerations agreed to in the Provisional Political Guidelines were followed regularly
during the Cold War. However, as one NATO official noted, “they have been largely
forgotten in the post–Cold War period.”106 The 2012 Deterrence and Defence
Posture Review referred to the need for planning guidance “aligned with 21st-­
century requirements,” but it is not clear what the requirements would entail andwhere planning guidance stands.107

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Simon Lunn

CHAPTER 7
NATO NUCLEAR SHARING: OPERATIONAL
FACTORS AND PROCEDURES
Simon Lunn

S

ince the end of the Cold War, the operational dimension of forward-­deployed
NATO nuclear forces has become increasingly secondary to political factors.108 This trend began with dramatic changes in the 1990s, in particular thewithdrawal of Russian forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the collapseof the Soviet Union, which led to the substantial reduction by NATO of its U.S.
non-strategic forces. Although reductions began with ground-launched systems,
NATO later announced a reduction in air-delivered weapons, leaving only several
hundred gravity bombs in Europe.109
Those weapons are the basis for the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) mission. Unlike
Cold War nuclear planning that matched NATO capabilities against anticipatedSoviet and Warsaw Pact conventional and nuclear targets, the size and dispositionof this legacy NATO force is not driven by operational factors.110 DCA were retainedin part for their ability to strike targets in Russia, but the size of the force today islargely the result of political factors—namely an emphasis on allied nuclear sharing
and a visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to NATO.
With the changing post–Cold War security environment and the onset of “outof area” missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Libya, NATO’s
nuclear posture inevitably assumed a lower profile. Indeed, aircraft that wereassigned to the DCA mission increasingly were used for conventional strike
operations in diverse theaters, including Afghanistan and Libya. Key NATO documents continued to emphasize nuclear weapons, but they were given minimum
attention.111 Reductions and (in some cases) complete withdrawals of air-delivered
weapons continued in NATO basing countries, albeit at a slower rate than in theearly 1990s. However, in the absence of a U.S. initiative to withdraw the remaining
weapons to the United States, the official preference in many basing countries
remained the status quo—with the less attention, the better, because the European
public was not enthusiastic about the nuclear mission.

47

U.S. AIR FORCE

Two Polish F-16s fly in formation during a NATO exercise in 2017.

By 1999, the weapons took on an even more limited role. The 1999 NATO Strategic
Concept formally announced that NATO’s nuclear forces no longer targeted any
specific country, consistent with the view that “NATO and nuclear allies can emphasize that they are responsible nuclear players that envisage nuclear weapons as
weapons of last resort under extreme circumstances.”112 Furthermore, officials
noted that Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)113 no longer plannedtargets and that NATO no longer exercised against Russia. DCA missions assumed
a generic regional nature—referred to as “scenario independent options”—andceased to be target specific as they were during the Cold War.114
However, although it remains the policy of NATO not to target its nuclear forcesat any specific country, the policy does not preclude the possibility (or evenlikelihood) that contingency plans exist. Recent NATO documents suggest that
NATO must “signal to Russia, or any other potential nuclear adversary, that theuse or threat of use of nuclear weapons involving the Alliance would immediatelytransform the nature of [a] crisis.”115 More recently, General Paul Selva, U.S. Air
Force, chief of staff, testified before Congress that “[t]he stated purpose of thoseweapons in Europe is to deter the Russians from escalating to nuclear warfare, inorder to prevent a ­conventional attack from going nuclear.“11648

Simon Lunn

NATO policy today is to retain the current force posture, including the retention
and modernization of NATO DCA and the B61 nuclear bomb.117 A renewed interestin the credibility of the DCA mission has reportedly led to proposals from NATO’s
military to simulate the capability of the DCA to penetrate Russian air defenses.
That said, NATO’s increasing involvement in out-of-area operations presents
additional readiness challenges. An increased and sustained NATO operational
tempo that includes the use of DCA in conventional strike missions has had aneffect on the DCA’s nuclear readiness status, which is now said to be a minimumof 30 days.118 The Baltic air policing mission, ongoing since 2004 to guard airspaceover Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, places an additional strain on DCA availability.
Operations to practice the various support activities needed to enable the DCA
mission, such as air refueling or electronic warfare, are held periodically and allow
the participation in the mission of other members that are not basing countries.119

EXERCISES
NATO nuclear exercises have also declined in regularity, causing some allies toargue for reversing the inevitable reduction in readiness.120 During the Cold War,
the procedures for nuclear decision making were practiced regularly in exercises
designed to familiarize key participants at
all levels with the considerations that would
NATO nuclear exercises haveunderpin the use of a nuclear weapon. The
also declined in regularity,
initiation of nuclear use was normally thecausing some allies to argue
last stage of an exercise using conventional
for reversing the inevitable
forces.

“reduction in readiness.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO exercises have mainly involved interventions
and crisis management.121 Since the accession of new member states in 1999, NATOat the headquarters level has exercised a conventional defense scenario only threetimes.122 These procedural exercises held at the level of the North Atlantic Council
are known as Crisis Management Exercises (CMX). They have not, as during theCold War, taken NATO to the point of exercising a nuclear release from U.S. to
NATO command and custody.123 NATO members also conduct annual Steadfast
Noon exercises for DCA to practice the employment of the U.S. B61s deployedin Europe.

”

Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO officials expect that collective defense
CMX, involving Article 5 scenarios (the premise that an armed attack against one
member constitutes an attack against all allies) involving Russia, will once again

NATO Nuclear Sharing: Operational Factors and Procedures49

become the norm rather than the exception. According to NATO officials, practices
during post–Cold War exercises have not included procedures involving nuclear
release as it would scare the public.124
It remains to be seen whether traditional reticence to draw attention to nuclear
policy and deployments will endure or whether a more visible demonstrationof NATO’s nuclear capabilities will gain support in light of NATO’s newfoundemphasis on collective defense and deterrence. Some members’ concerns about
Russian nuclear activities may lead to increased pressure for a return to more
serious nuclear planning and exercises, including a transition from conventional
to nuclear conflict.

50

Simon Lunn

Endnotes

1. NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence andSecurity of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Lisbon: NATO, 2010),
www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.
2. DCA are fighter aircraft tasked and configured to perform either conventional or theater
nuclear missions. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in
Europe, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no. 1 (2011): 64–73, www.tandfonline.com/doi/
pdf/10.1177/0096340210393931.
3.

Ibid.

4. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2017,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 1 (2017): 48–57, www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/
00963402.2016.1264213; Norris and Kristensen, “US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe.”
5. See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian nuclear forces, 2017,” Bulletin of theAtomic Scientists 73, no. 2 (2017), 115, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2
017.1290375?needAccess=true.
6. This section is adapted from Nikolai Sokov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW),” Nuclear
Threat Initiative, May 1, 2002, www.nti.org/analysis/articles/tactical-nuclear-weapons/.
7. President of the Russian Federation, “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 2014,
Section 3, paragraph 27, https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s2014-Military-Doctrine.pdf.
For a comprehensive look at the evolution of Russia’s nuclear posture and the role ofnuclear weapons in Russian strategy, see Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of Russia’s Lowered
Nuclear Threshold,” War on the Rocks, September 22, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/
the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/; and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic
Deterrence,” Survival 58, no. 4 (2016): 7–26, http://www.iiss.org/-/media//silos/survival/2016/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-august-september-2016/58-4-02-ven-bruusgaard/58-402-ven-bruusgaard.pdf.
8.

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian nuclear forces, 2017,” 123.

9. Ibid., 124. See also U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.” U.S. Departmentof State, Washington, DC, 2014, 8–10, www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf.
10. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “This Is the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile that
Russia Has Reportedly Just Deployed.” The Washington Post, February 15,
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/15/
this-is-the-ground-launched-cruise-missile-that-russia-has-reportedly-just-deployed/.
11. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review
Report (Washington, DC: April 2010): 31–32.

51

12. The “Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States,” released June 19, 2013
(three years after the NPR), states, “This analysis did not set out to address weapons forward
deployed in Europe in support of NATO. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO was examined aspart of the last year’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which affirmed Allies’ support for
further U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions, and underscored that any changes in NATO’s nuclear
posture must be an Alliance decision.” This statement is consistent with the NPR. See the WhiteHouse Fact Sheet on this topic at obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/
fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states.
13. NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, July 9, 2016, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/­official_texts_133169.htm.
14. Ibid. See also NATO, “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,” Lisbon, May 20, 2012,www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm.
15. NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué.
16. Ibid.
17. Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams, “Bring Home U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons from
Europe,” in 10 Big Nuclear Ideas for the Next President, edited by Tom Z. Collina and Geoff
Wilson (Washington, DC: Ploughshares Fund, 2016), 29–31; Karl-Heinz Kamp and Robertus
C. N. Remkes, “Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements,” in Reducing Nuclear Risks in
Europe: A Framework for Action, edited by Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams (Washington,
DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011), 76–95; Cristina Varriale, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, NATOand Deterrence: Are NATO’s TNW Actually a Threat to the Credibility of Its Own Deterrence?,”
British American Security Information Council, London, November 2015.
18. Jeffrey Lewis, “Activists Breach Security at Kleine Brogel,” Arms Control Wonk, February 4,
2010, www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/202614/activists-breach-security-at-kleine-brogel/.
19. Steven Mufson, “Brussels Attacks Stoke Fears about Security of Belgian Nuclear
Facilities,” Washington Post, March 25, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/brussels-attacks-stoke-fears-about-security-of-belgian-nuclear-facilities/2016/03/25/­7e370148f295-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html.
20. Barbara Starr, Ryan Browne, and Elise Labott, “Pentagon Orders Military Families out
of Turkey Due to ISIS Threat,” CNN, March 29, 2016, www.cnn.com/2016/03/29/politics/
pentagon-orders-military-families-to-leave-southern-turkey/.
21. Simon Lunn, Isabelle Williams, and Steve Andreasen, “Warning Bells around Tactical
Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 21, 2016, www.nti.org/analysis/articles/­warning-bells-around-tactical-nuclear-weapons-europe; Steve Andreasen, “Let’s Get Our
Nuclear Weapons Out of Turkey,” Los Angeles Times, August 11, 2016, www.latimes.com/opinion/
op-ed/la-oe-andreasen-nuclear-weapons-turkey-20160811-snap-story.html.
22. Hans Kristensen, “USAF Report: ‘Most’ Nuclear Weapon Sites in Europe Do Not Meet US
Security Requirements,” Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, June 19,
2008, fas.org/blogs/security/2008/06/usaf-report-most-nuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-­donot-meet-us-security-requirements/; Robertus C. N. Remkes, “The Security of NATO Nuclear
Weapons: Issues and Implications” in Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action,edited by Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative,
November 2011), 66–75.
23. Remkes, “Security of NATO Nuclear Weapons.”
24. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of theAtomic Scientists 72, no. 3 (2016): 125–134, 131.
25. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981),
96; D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” American
Journal of Political Science 35, no. 2 (1991): 305–34, 305.
26. Denis Healey as quoted in David S. Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,”
International Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009): 755–780, 768.
27. Kamp and Remkes, “Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements,” 94.
28. NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué.

52

Endnotes29. Kamp and Remkes, “Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements,” 88–90.
30. Philip M. Breedlove, “Credible Deterrence in Europe and Its Future Challenges,” presented at
the Warsaw NATO Summit and Beyond: The Value of U.S. Alliances in the 21st Century, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, June 29, 2016, www.csis.org/events/warsaw-nato-summit-and-beyond-value-us-alliances-21st-century. See also Dave Majumdar, “Can
America Crush Russia’s A2/AD ‘Bubbles’?,” National Interest, June 29, 2016, nationalinterest.org/
blog/the-buzz/can-america-crush-russias-a2-ad-bubbles-16791.
31. Kamp and Remkes, “Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements.”
32. Ibid., 81–82.
33. Ibid., 77, 90–94; 83–90.
34. David S. Yost, “The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence,” International Affairs 87, no. 6(2011): 1436–38.
35. Brad Roberts, remarks at the seminar, “The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21stCentury,” Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 19,
2016, cgsr.llnl.gov/event-calendar/2016/2016-05-19.
36. Ibid.; See also Robert Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory,” International Security 27, no. 4(2003): 86–118.
37. Barry Blechman and Laicie Heeley, “B61 Life Extension Program: Costs and Policy
Considerations,” Issue Paper, Stimson Center, Washington, DC, August 2016, 4, www.stimson.
org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/B61-Life-Extension-Program.pdf.
38. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear
Forces, 2017 to 2046,” October 2017, p. 20, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-­
congress-2017-2018/reports/53211-nuclearforces.pdf
39. This calculation is based on estimates by both the Nuclear Threat Initiative and theFederation of American Scientists (see chapters 4, and 5) and assumes a low estimate of
approximately 85 to a high of approximately 230 NATO dual-capable aircraft.
40. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014–2023,”
December 2013, p. 16, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/
reports/12-19-2013-nuclearforces.pdf
41. Nuclear certification for the F-35A is expected to be part of a larger aircraft modernization
program, known as Block 4. The Block 4 upgrade is expected to both add new capabilities
and correct deficiencies in current and future F-35 aircraft. No official cost estimate has beendeveloped for Block 4, but a March 2016 U.S. General Accountability Office report states thatthe Defense Department budget request for fiscal year 2017 indicates that it expects to spend
close to $3 billion in six years on the upgrades—one of which is expected to be compatibility
upgrades for the B61-12. See the written testimony of Michael J. Sullivan, Director of Acquisition
and Sourcing Management, U.S. General Accountability Office, before the House Subcommittee
on Tactical Air and Land Forces, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Preliminary Observations on Program
Progress,” GOA-16-489T, March 23, 2016, www.gao.gov/assets/680/676012.pdf.
42. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. European Command Public Affairs Office, European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI) Fact Sheet, January 5, 2017, www.eucom.mil/media-library/
document/35544/eri-fact-sheet.
43. NATO, Readiness Action Plan, September 21, 2017, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/­
topics_119353.htm.
44. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017–2026,”
February 2017, 1, www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52401-­
nuclearcosts.pdf; Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint, “The Trillion Dollar Nuclear
Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization over the Next Thirty Years,” James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, January 2014, 4, www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/140107_trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad.pdf.
45. Letter, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Energy Secretary Ernest J. Moniz, to Senator
Dianne Feinstein, November 6, 2013.

Endnotes

53

46. See the prepared statement of Arthur T. Hopkins, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, before the Senate Armed
Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee on Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request
for Nuclear Forces, February 9, 2016, 4, www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Hopkins_02-09-16.pdf.
47. “Sandia VP, Chief Weapon Engineer Bruce Walker Talks about Sandia’s ‘Very Substantial’
Role in B61 LEP,” Sandia Lab News 65, no. 17, September 20, 2013, 4, www.sandia.gov/news/
publications/labnews/archive/_assets/documents/labnews09-20-13.pdf.
48. NNSA Production Office, “Consolidated Nuclear Security, LCC, Performance Evaluation
Report,” NNSA, Washington, DC, November 15, 2016, 8, nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/
multiplefiles/fy_2016_cns_fdo_memo_publicly_releasable_per.pdf.
49. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Has a New Approach
to Managing the B61-12 Life Extension, but a Constrained Schedule and Other Risks Remain,”
GAO-16-218, February 2016, 23, www.gao.gov/assets/680/674960.pdf.
50. NNSA, FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan: Report to Congress(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, April 2011), 70, fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/
nuclearweapons/SSMP-FY2012.pdf.
51. Hans M. Kristensen, “B61 Nuclear Bomb Costs Escalating,” Strategic Security Blog,
Federation of American Scientists, May 9, 2012, fas.org/blogs/security/2012/05/b61cost/.
52. Hans M. Kristensen, “B61-12: NNSA’s Gold-Plated Nuclear Bomb Project,” Strategic Security
Blog, Federation of American Scientists, July 26, 2012, fas.org/blogs/security/2012/07/
b61-12gold/.
53. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Nuclear Weapons,” 3–4. The NNSA estimate of$7.3 billion is from the Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. But theplan lists both a high total and a low total (the $7.3 billion estimate is close to the low total).
The average between the high and low is $8.5 billion. See NNSA, Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan: Biennial Plan Summary—Report to Congress (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Energy, March 2016), 4–31, nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/
inlinefiles/FY17SSMP%20Final_033116.pdf.
54. GAO reported in April 2017 that the date of the first production unit could slip byanother two years to 2022 and cost more money. U.S. Government Accountability Office,“National Nuclear Security Administration: Action Needed to Address Affordability of Nuclear
Modernization Programs,” GAO-17-341, April 2017, 25, www.gao.gov/assets/690/684310.pdf.
55. See the testimony of General Robert Kehler, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before
the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, hearing on Nuclear
Weapons Modernization Programs: Military, Technical, and Political Requirements for the B61
Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy, October 29, 2013 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2014), 12–14. www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86075/html/
CHRG-113hhrg86075.htm.
56. Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie, “Video Shows Earth-Penetration Capability of
B61-12 Nuclear Bomb,” Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, January 14,
2016, fas.org/blogs/security/2016/01/b61-12_earth-penetration/.
57. Ibid.
58. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, ‘Smaller’
Leaves Some Uneasy,” New York Times, January 11, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/science/
as-us-modernizes-nuclear-weapons-smaller-leaves-some-uneasy.html.
59. “America’s Nuclear Bomb Gets a Makeover,” PBS Newshour, November 5, 2015, www.pbs.
org/newshour/bb/americas-nuclear-bomb-gets-makeover/.
60. Hans M. Kristensen, “General Confirms Enhanced Targeting Capabilities of B61-12 Nuclear
Bomb,” Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, January 23, 2014, fas.org/
blogs/security/2014/01/b61capability/.
61. See the statement of Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Admiral James
Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the House Committee on Armed

54

Endnotes

Services, June 28, 2015, 4, docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20150625/103669/­HHRG-114AS00-Wstate-WorkR-20150625.pdf.
62. NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence, paragraph 26, subparagraph 2.
63. U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Budget
Estimates, Air Force Justification Book Volume 3a of 3, Research, Development, Test &Evaluation, Air Force, Vol-III Part 1,” May 2017, 381, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/
documents/Air%20Force%20Research,%20Development,%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20
Vol-IIIa%20FY18.pdf?ver=2017-05-23-160118-157.
64. U.S. Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2016
Annual Report, December 2016, 57, 58, www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2016/pdf/other/­
2016DOTEAnnualReport.pdf.
65. Kristensen and McKinzie, “Video Shows Earth-Penetration Capability of B61-12 Nuclear
Bomb.”
66. Sandia National Laboratories, “Nuclear Weapons Engineering,” Lab Accomplishments,
March 2016, 5, www.sandia.gov/news/publications/lab_accomplishments/_assets/documents/
lab_accomplish_2016.pdf.
67. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Needs to Complete
Developmental Testing before Making Significant New Investments,” GAO-17-351, April 2017, 16,
17, www.gao.gov/assets/690/684207.pdf.
68. Air Combat Command Public Affairs, “AF Declares the F-35A ‘Combat Ready,’” U.S. Air
Force, August 2, 2016, www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/885496/air-forcedeclares-the-f-35a-combat-ready.aspx.
69. Lockheed Martin, “F-35 Fast Facts,” n.d., www.f35.com/assets/uploads/documents/
NetherlandsFastFacts.pdf.
70. It should be noted that Russia is also modernizing its tactical nuclear weapons, including its
fighter-bombers, but details are scarce.
71. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to2023,” December 2013, 16, www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/
reports/12-19-2013-NuclearForces.pdf.
72. U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President’s Budget Submission, Air Force
Justification Book Volume 3a of 3, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Air Force, vol. III,
part 1, February 2016, 435. www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY17/AFD-160208-052.
pdf.
73. See the testimony of James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
before the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, hearing on The
Current Status and Future Direction for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Posture, November 2,
2011 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/­­CHRG112hhrg71527/html/CHRG-112hhrg71527.htm.
74. The amount is adjusted for inflation. See “701st Munitions Support Squadron,” Rally Point,
https://www.rallypoint.com/units/701-munss-701st-munitions-support-squadron-kleine-brogelab-belgium/about; U.S. Air Force, Spangdahlem Air Base, “701st Munitions Support Squadron
Factsheet,” http://www.spangdahlem.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=8419 (originalcitation no longer available).
75. Kristensen, “USAF Report.”
76. Miller, testimony, House Armed Services Committee.
77. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Construction Program: FY 2015 Budget—North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program, March 2014, 6, comptroller.defense.
gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/budget_justification/pdfs/11_NATO_Security_
Investment_Program/NSIP_FY15_J-Book.pdf.
78. See the testimony of Andrew Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Programs, before the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces
Subcommittee hearing on Fiscal 2015 Budget Request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities andEndnotes55

Nuclear Forces Programs, April 8, 2014, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg88452/html/
CHRG-113hhrg88452.htm.
79. See the testimony of Elaine Bunn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Missile Defense Policy, before the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, hearing on Fiscal 2015 Budget Request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities andNuclear Forces Programs, April 8, 2014, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg88452/html/
CHRG-113hhrg88452.htm.
80. Hans M. Kristensen, “Upgrades at U.S. Nuclear Bases in Europe Acknowledge Security Risk,”
Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, September 10, 2015, fas.org/blogs/
security/2015/09/nuclear-insecurity/.
81. Hans M. Kristensen, “Italy’s Nuclear Anniversary: Fake Reassurance for a King’s Ransom,”
FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, June 30, 2014, fas.org/blogs/
security/2014/06/ghedi/.
82. U.S. Department of Defense, Contracts, Release no. CR-174-16, September 9, 2016, ­www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/939786.
83. Gareth Jennings, “Belgium Formally Launches Fighter Replacement Effort,” IHS Jane’s
Defence Weekly, March 29, 2017, 14.
84. “Belgium Forced to Buy F-35 If Nuclear Strike Mission Maintained,” Defense Aerospace, April
19, 2015, www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/162912/no-alternative-to-f_35-ifbelgium-keeps-nuke-mission.html.
85. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/10875, as cited in Otfried Nassauer, “Germany’s
Tornado Nuclear Weapons Carrier,” BITS, January 2013, 46, bits.de/public/unv_a/orginal-­
tornado_eng.htm.
86. If Germany does not equip the Eurofighter with nuclear capability and ends thenuclear-sharing arrangement with the United States, it can still participate actively in theNATO nuclear strike mission via the so-called SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations
with Conventional Air Tactics) program, where non-nuclear countries support the nuclear
mission with non-nuclear military assets. In fact, today more NATO countries participate in the
SNOWCAT program than participate in the nuclear-sharing mission.
87. Gareth Jennings, “Germany declares preference for F-35 to replace Tornado,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, November 8, 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/75511/germany-declares-preferencefor-f-35-to-replace-tornado; “‘F-35’ fur die Bundesvehr? Luftwaffe benennt Anforderungen an‘Tornado’-Nachfolger [‘F-35’ for the armed forces: Air Force calls requirements on ‘Tornado’
successor],” Der Spiegel, November 8, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/f-35-­
luftwaffe-aeussert-wuensche-zu-tornado-nachfolge-a-1177071.html.
88. In addition to the B61 stockpile at Ghedi, Italy also hosts an estimated 20 to 40 B61 bombs
at the U.S. Air Force base at Aviano.
89. Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Subcommittee on Future of the Armed Forces, Session
2013–14, Kamerstuk 33763, no. 14, motion by Member of Parliament Jasper van Dijk, November
6, 2013, zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33763-14.html.
90. Niels Haarsma, “Taking Off the Wedding Ring: The Consequences of the Netherlands’
Choice to Forgo a Nuclear Capable F-35,” Air War College, U.S. Air University, February 17, 2015,
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/2015_haarsma.pdf.
91. For General Celasin’s statement, see Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and Shared
Responsibilities,” in Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate(Cambridge, MA: American Academy for Arts and Sciences, 2010), 24–27, ­carnegieendowment.org/files/saganInside.pdf.
92. Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post–Cold War Policy,
Force Levels, and War Planning,” Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, February
2005, 9, www.nukestrat.com/pubs/EuroBombs.pdf.

56

Endnotes

93. Hans M. Kristensen, private communication with officials in the U.S. Congress and U.S. Air
Force, May–June 2010.
94. NATO, “The Nuclear Planning Group: One of NATO’s Key Defence Decision-Making Bodies,”
October 27, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_50069.htm?selectedLocale=uk.
95. The international staff members shed their national identities and, in theory at least,
become neutral facilitators in the consensus-building process. Their views, when expressed in an
institutional capacity, should reflect positions agreed to by all NATO members.
96. This suspicion was confirmed by the crisis over the enhanced radiation/reduced blast
warhead (ERBW) in 1977–1978; production was cancelled by President Carter in 1978 when
European leaders could not guarantee deployment of the warhead in Europe. Despite a seriesof briefings to the North Atlantic Council on the development and planned deployment of the
ERBW, there had been insufficient recognition among European leaders of the ramifications andpotential for public concern. The ERBW was known colloquially in the media at the time as thebomb that “kills people and leaves buildings intact.” As a result of last-minute “wobblings” byEuropean leadership, President Jimmy Carter decided to cancel the planned deployment.
97. Personal communication with a senior U.S. official closely involved with the creation of
the HLG.
98. It should be remembered that the military input to the NAC is provided by the chairmanof the Military Committee with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe also in attendanceas required.
99. At the 1962 NATO ministerial session of the NAC, sections of various bilateral agreements
between the United States and European allies on sharing of nuclear weapons were codified inwhat became known as the Athens Guidelines.
100. These criteria would include the sorts of targets, collateral damage considerations,geographic areas, political objectives, and so on. The emphasis was on controlling use andexamining options.
101. Beatrice Heuser, “Alliance of Democracies and Nuclear Deterrence,” in War Plans andAlliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, edited by Vojtech Mastny,
Sven S. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), 195.
102. The Quad consists of the nuclear three plus Germany. They meet informally before mostmeetings of significance. Their prior agreement on key issues of NATO policy frequently provides
an essential basis for eventual consensus but is often resented by other members.
103. Discussions about NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons during the post–Cold War period
were often inconclusive. U.S. officials, confident in existing U.S. strategic assets, would ask their
allies, “What do you want?” The reply was “Tell us what we need.” This exchange is sometimes
compared to the Alphonse and Gaston cartoon routine “After You.” Within the context of theregular NATO nuclear forums, officials refer to an informal hierarchy consisting of the two NATO
nuclear powers, the United State and the United Kingdom, the four DCA countries, and Greece
and Turkey, followed by other members with various degrees of involvement in the SNOWCAT(Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics) operations. France is not in theNATO nuclear hierarchy as its nuclear forces are totally independent. France’s nuclear forces are
not assigned to NATO and France is not, therefore, part of the NPG.
104. In their contributions to the development or reevaluation of NATO’s nuclear strategy, thestarting point of allies was always the 1999 Strategic Concept; See Simon Lunn, “NATO Nuclear
Policy,” in Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action, edited by Steve Andreasen
and Isabelle Williams (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2011), 24–51.
105. Personal communication with a NATO official.
106. Ibid.
107. NATO, “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,” Lisbon, May 20, 2012, paragraph 11,
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm.

Endnotes

57108. Camille Grand, “Nuclear Deterrence and the Alliance in the 21st Century,” NATO Review, 2016,
www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/nuclear-deterrence-alliance-21st-century-nato/
EN/.
109. The announcement was made at the NPG meeting at Taormina, Italy, in 1991.
110. There was no need for the operational flexibility that had underpinned Flexible Response.
111. The Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 echoed the traditional need for European-based
U.S. warheads. Such statements were dropped from the 2010 Strategic Concept only to return in
the language of the Warsaw Summit 2016.
112. Grand, “Nuclear Deterrence and the Alliance in the 21st Century.”
113. The SACEUR is responsible to NATO’s highest military authority, the Military Committee,
for the conduct of all NATO military operations. The SACEUR is traditionally a U.S. commander,dual-hatted as Commander of the U.S. European Command. See NATO’s website at www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_50110.htm for more information.
114. Officials have referred to this type of generic mission as “to whom it may concern”
deterrence.
115. Grand, “Nuclear Deterrence and the Alliance in the 21st Century.”
116. See the statement of General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before
the House Armed Services Committee hearing on Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence
Requirements, March 8, 2017.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. These activities are known as SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional
Air Tactics) operations. They exercise NATO support for nuclear operations with conventional air
tactics.
120. This information is based on the author’s conversations with NATO officials.
121. According to Sir Adam Thompson, former U.K. permanent representative to NATO, “Since
the end of the Cold War, NATO has done conventional exercising and nuclear exercising, both, but
not the transition from one to the other.” See Kingston Rief, “NATO Weighs Nuclear Exercises,”
Arms Control Today, November 2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_11/News/
NATO-Weighs-Nuclear-Exercises.
122. This information is based on the author’s conversations with NATO officials.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.

58

EndnotesAbout the Authors

Steve Andreasen is a national security consultant to NTI and teaches courses on
National Security Policy and Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs at the Hubert H.
Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. Previously, he served
as director for defense policy and arms control on the U.S. National Security Council
at the White House. He was the principal advisor on strategic policy, nuclear arms
control, and missile defense to the national security advisor and the president. His
articles and opinion pieces have been published in Foreign Affairs, the Washington
Post, the Los Angeles Times, Politico, Arms Control Today, the Guardian, and manyother international publications.
Hans M. Kristensen is director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federationof American Scientists in Washington, D.C., where he is responsible for researching and documenting the status and operations of nuclear forces of the nine
­nuclear-armed nations. He is coauthor of the bimonthly FAS Nuclear Notebook
column in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the World Nuclear Forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook. He is a frequent advisor to the news media on thestatus of nuclear forces and policy. Before his current position, Kristensen wasa consultant to the Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council
in Washington, D.C., and a program officer at the Nautilus Institute in Berkeley,
California.
Simon Lunn is a senior associate fellow for the European Leadership Network, asenior fellow at Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, anda consultant to NTI. He served as secretary general to the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly from 1997 to 2007 following eight years as the deputy secretary general.
He previously served as head of plans and policy on NATO’s International Staff,
was a member of the High Level Task Force on preparations for the Conventional
Forces in Europe negotiations, worked at the U.S. Congressional Research Service

59writing reports for Congress on NATO strategy on the 1979 intermediate-range
nuclear forces decision, and was director of the North Atlantic Assembly’s Defence
Committee. He has a BA (Honors) in history from the University of Wales and an
MA in war studies from Kings College, London University. He attended the Royal
Military Academy Sandhurst from 1960 to 1962 and subsequently served as an
officer in the British Army.
Ernest J. Moniz is co-chair and CEO of NTI. He served as United States Secretaryof Energy (DOE) from 2013–2017. As Secretary, he advanced energy technology
innovation, nuclear security and strategic stability, cutting-edge capabilities for
the American scientific research community, and environmental stewardship.
Previously, he served as DOE Under Secretary (1997–2001) and Associate Director
for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy (1995–1997). As Under
Secretary, he led a comprehensive review of nuclear weapons stockpile stewardshipand served as the Secretary’s special negotiator for disposition of Russian nuclear
materials. He was a member of the President’s Council of Advisors on Scienceand Technology and of the Defense Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (2009–2012). He also served on the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Futurethat provided advice to the president and the secretary of Energy, particularly on
nuclear waste management. Before entering government, Moniz was a memberof the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) faculty and is now the Cecil
and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems emeritus and Special
Advisor to the MIT President. He was the Founding Director of the MIT Energy
Initiative (MITEI) and Director of the Laboratory for Energy and the Environment.
From 1991–1995 and in 1997, he was head of the Department of Physics, and he
was director of the Bates Linear Accelerator Center from 1983–1991. He is a non-­resident Senior Fellow at the Harvard Belfer Center.
Sam Nunn is co-chair and former chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat
Initiative. He served as a United States Senator from Georgia for 24 years (1972–1996)
and is retired from the law firm King & Spaulding. He is a distinguished professor in
the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech and chairman emeritus of the board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington,
DC. During his tenure in the U.S. Senate, Nunn served as chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
He also served on the Intelligence and Small Business Committees. His legislative
achievements include the landmark Department of Defense Reorganization Act,
drafted with the late Senator Barry Goldwater, and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program, which provided assistance for more than 20 years to
Russia and the former Soviet republics for securing and destroying their excess
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

60

About the Authors

Brian Rose joined NTI in 2016 as a program officer with NTI’s Global Nuclear Policy
Program, where he works on deterrence, strategic stability, Euro-Atlantic security, emerging technologies, and U.S. nuclear modernization. Before joining NTI,
Rose served in analytical, program management, and outreach positions at theLawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the United States Institute of Peace, theU.S. Department of State, and The George Washington University. From 2008–2009, he served on the staff of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States, which informed the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.
Rose holds a bachelor’s degree from St. Mary’s College of Maryland and a master’s
degree from the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington
University.
Isabelle Williams joined NTI in 2007 and serves as senior advisor to the Global
Nuclear Policy Program, where she helps coordinate the international strategy ofthe program and works on Euro-Atlantic security and multilateral disarmament
efforts. She previously managed the next-generation non-proliferation program for
the Partnership for Global Security, was a research associate at the Chemical andBiological Arms Control Institute, and held successive positions at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London. She has a BA and an MA (Honors) ininternational studies from the University of Leeds, United Kingdom.

About the Authors

61

Additional NTI Resources
NTI Co-Chair and CEO Ernest J. Monizon Global Nuclear Risks
In a January 2018 speech at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, NTI Co-Chair and CEO Ernest J. Moniz warned of the growing
risk that miscalculation, accident, mistake, or terrorism will lead tonuclear use. He urged leaders to reexamine strategic policies on the
U.S. nuclear arsenal, force posture, and doctrine in light of these 21st
century risks.

Speech text and C-Span video available atwww.nti.org/MonizNuclearPolicy

February 2017

Pathways to Cooperation

Pathways to Cooperation: A Menu ofPotential U.S.-Russian Cooperative Projects
in the Nuclear Sphere
By Andrew Bieniawski and Anton Khlopkov

A Menu of Potential U.S.-Russian
Cooperative Projects in the
Nuclear Sphere

Developed by NTI and the Russia-based Center for Energy and Security
Studies (CENESS), this new report offers an alternative to the acrimonythat has recently characterized U.S.-Russia relations. Building on the
success of bilateral cooperation to destroy Syria’s chemical weaponsand cooperation on the Iran nuclear agreement, the report offers
policymakers a menu of dozens of projects on nuclear security andsafety issues that could be implemented in the near term and as political
relations improve.

NTI Paper
DECEMBER 2016

Rising Nuclear Dangers:
Steps to Reduce Risks in theEuro-Atlantic Region
SUMMARY
International statesmen Des Browne, Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, andSam Nunn call on Western and Russian leaders to take immediate steps toreduce the risk of a dangerous military confrontation. This report offers
recommendations to avoid accidents, enhance predictability, and build
confidence.

Foreword by Des Browne, Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, and Sam Nunn
By Robert E. Berls, Jr., and Leon Ratz

Rising Nuclear Dangers: Steps to Reduce Risks
in the Euro-Atlantic
By Robert E. Berls, Jr., PhD and Leon Ratz
In the foreword, international statesmen Des Browne, Wolfgang Ischinger,
Igor Ivanov, and Sam Nunn call on Western and Russian leaders to take
immediate steps to reduce the risk of a dangerous military confrontation.
The report offers specific recommendations to avoid accidents, enhance
predictability, and build confidence between the West and Russia.

Copies of the papers available atwww.nti.org/NuclearSecurityResources

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