Report
Côte d’Ivoire: Ethnicity, Ivoirité and
Conflict

By: Geir Skogseth – Regional AdviserCÔTE D’IVOIRE: ETHNICITY, IVOIRITÉ AND CONFLICTLANDINFO – 2 NOVEMBER 2006

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CONTENTS

1.

2.

Contextualisation: Ethnicity in Côte D’ivoire ................................................. 5
1.1

The ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire......................................................................... 5

1.2

Ivorian migration flows .......................................................................................... 7

1.2.1

Migration flows during the colonial period and after independence............................. 7

1.2.2

On migration flows from abroad.................................................................................... 8

1.3

Religion ................................................................................................................ 10

1.4

Naming traditions, religion and ethnicity ............................................................. 11

1.5

On the expression Dioula ..................................................................................... 11

Ivoirité and political conflict in Côte d’Ivoire................................................ 13
2.1

From independence in 1960 until the mid 1980s ................................................. 13

2.2

From the mid-1980s until the late 1990s .............................................................. 13

2.2.1

Crisis in the world market for agricultural produce .................................................... 13

2.2.2

Democratisation and further financial crisis ............................................................... 14

2.2.3

Houphouët-Boigny dies ................................................................................................ 14

2.2.4

The ivoirité question..................................................................................................... 15

2.2.5
1999

Increased political tension, and consequences of the military coup on 24 December...................................................................................................................................... 15

2.2.6
From the presidential election campaign of 2000 until the coup attempt on 19
September 2002 .......................................................................................................................... 16
2.2.7

3.

The situation after the 2002 coup attempt ..................................................... 19
3.1

The situation in key areas of the country.............................................................. 21

3.1.1

Abidjan ......................................................................................................................... 21

3.1.2

The “Wild West” .......................................................................................................... 22

3.1.3

The situation in the FN-controlled north ..................................................................... 22

3.2

4.

The coup attempt on 19 September 2002 and the immediate aftermath ...................... 17

The ID-documents issue ....................................................................................... 23

Political structure............................................................................................. 24
4.1

The main political parties ..................................................................................... 24

4.1.1

PDCI ............................................................................................................................ 24

4.1.2

FPI................................................................................................................................ 24

4.1.3

RDR .............................................................................................................................. 25

4.2

The secondary political parties ............................................................................. 26

4.2.1

PIT................................................................................................................................ 26

4.2.2

UDPCI.......................................................................................................................... 26CÔTE D’IVOIRE: ETHNICITY, IVOIRITÉ AND CONFLICTLANDINFO – 2 NOVEMBER 20063

4.2.3

MFA.............................................................................................................................. 27

4.2.4

UDCY ........................................................................................................................... 27

4.3

FN political wings ................................................................................................ 27

4.4

Shifting alliances between political blocs............................................................. 28

4.4.1

Three main political blocs............................................................................................ 28

4.4.2

The political elite and ethnicity .................................................................................... 28

4.4.3

Shifting alliances from independence to 2002 ............................................................. 28

4.4.4

Political alliances since 2002....................................................................................... 29

4.5

Other organisations with a political role since 2002 ............................................ 30

4.5.1

The “patriot galaxy”.................................................................................................... 31

4.5.1.1

FESCI ............................................................................................................................... 31

4.5.1.2

COJEP .............................................................................................................................. 31

4.5.2

Groups associated with northerners ............................................................................ 32

4.5.2.1

4.5.3

5.

RJDP................................................................................................................................. 32

Reconciliation groups .................................................................................................. 32

References ......................................................................................................... 33CÔTE D’IVOIRE: ETHNICITY, IVOIRITÉ AND CONFLICTLANDINFO – 2 NOVEMBER 2006

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1.

CONTEXTUALISATION: ETHNICITY IN COTE D’IVOIRE
Like most countries in West Africa, Côte d’Ivoire is a country with a large number of
ethnic groups. Very few reports on the current situation in the country give any
detailed information on this fundamental issue, but as it is central for today’s
political impasse, it deserves to be presented in some detail.

1.1

THE ETHNIC GROUPS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Usually, 60 ethnic groups are listed as indigenous to Côte d’Ivoire;1 these belong tofour main ethnic clusters with common linguistic and cultural traits:•

Mandé
o Mandé north Bambara, Dioula, Gbin, Malinké, Nigbi
o Mandé south Gagou, Gouro, Mona, N’gain, Ouan, Toura, Yacouba (Dan),
Yaourè•Gouro Birifor, Degha, Gondja, Gouin, Kamara, Komono, Koulango, Lobi,
Lohron, Nafana, Samogho, Sénoufo, Siti, Toonie•

Krouo Ahizi, Bakwé, Bété, Dida, Gnaboua, Godié, Guéré (Wè), Kodia,
Kouya, Kouzié, Kroumen, Neyo, Niédéboua, Oubi, Wané, Wôbè•Kwa
o Akan Abron, Agni, Baouléo Laguna groups
 Abbey, Abidji, Abouré, Adjoukrou, Alladian, Appolo, Akyé,
Avikan, Ébrié, Ega, Ehotilé, Essouma, Krobou, M’batto

Before the internal and regional migrations in modern times, mainly taking placesince France colonised the area from 1893 onwards and continuing after Côte
d’Ivoire got its independence from France in 1960, these ethnic groups had thefollowing geographic spread:2

1

Taken from CNCCI 1999. The ortography of the names of the ethnic groups given here is the one common in
French, used by most Ivorians.

2Note that the ortography used here in some cases differs from the French commonly used by Ivorians. Some of
the 60 ethnic groups usually mentioned are split up in subgroups here, as they speak distinct dialects. Map takenfrom Gordon 2005.

CÔTE D’IVOIRE: ETHNICITY, IVOIRITÉ AND CONFLICTLANDINFO – 2 NOVEMBER 2006

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It is important to stress that West Africa has seen extensive regional migration overhundreds of years, and it differs how long the ethnic groups have dominated in theareas attributed to them on the map. Still, the map represents a close approximationof the local consensus of traditional core areas for the different ethnic groups. The
ethnic clusters Kwa and Krou are generally established in the subtropic areas along
the coast, whereas Mandé and Gour ethnicities have their origin in the savannah
region in the northern part of the country.

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None of the main four clusters of ethnic groups are only found in Côte d’Ivoire, allhave strong linguistic and cultural ties with groups in neighbouring countries: theKrou ethnic groups with ethnic groups in eastern Liberia; the Kwa groups withgroups in southern Ghana (as well as into southern Togo and Benin); while Mandé
ethnic groups are found in Guinea, north-eastern Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali andBurkina Faso; and Gour groups in Mali, Burkina Faso, northern Ghana and northern
Togo.3 Some ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire may feel stronger cultural, religious andlinguistic attachment to ethnic groups in neighbouring countries than to ethnic
groups than to groups inside Côte d’Ivoire – also within a single ethnic cluster.
Ivorian citizens according to ethnic clusters – 19984
Ethnicity

AbidjanCôte d’Ivoire (including
Abidjan)Mandé

27,4 %

22,4 %

Gour

9,3 %

20,8 %

Krou

17,4 %

11,7 %

Kwa

44,8 %

44,2 %

Other

1,1 %

0,9 %

1.2

IVORIAN MIGRATION FLOWS

1.2.1

Migration flows during the colonial period and after independence

During the French colonisation, new migration patterns evolved due to the economic
development of the southern part of the country. This led to two main migration
flows:
1. Urbanisation and rapid population growth in Abidjan fed by extensive migrationfrom the whole country (as well as neighbouring countries – especially Burkina
Faso, Mali and Guinea). Thus, Abidjan has grown from a tiny village to a city ofmore than three million in less than a century.
2. Expansion of the plantation economy in the south-western part of Côte d’Ivoire
led to the movement of large numbers of farmers from the north and southeastern regions (as well as the neighbouring countries mentioned above –especially Burkina Faso).

3

As is common all over Africa, several ethnic groups live across borders, and may be known under different
names in different countries. For example, the Guéré/Wè are known as Krahn in Liberia, and the Yacouba/Dan
are known as Gio.

4

Figures from the 1998 census published in 2001, found in Loucou 2002:132.

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The migrants going to Abidjan mainly work in commerce, transport, industry and as
artisans, whereas the migrants moving to the southwest mainly work in agriculture –either as farmers or working on plantations. Most migrants from outside today’s Côte
d’Ivoire came from neighbouring French colonies – Burkina Faso was evenadministered together with Côte d’Ivoire as a single entity. Comparatively few
migrants came from Liberia (independent in principle, but under strong American
influence) or from the British colony Gold Coast (Ghana since independence). The
migration to Côte d’Ivoire from other French colonies was encouraged by the Frenchauthorities, and this policy was continued by president Houphouët-Boigny after
independence.
People with Kwa origin, especially Baoulé, were given preference in the colonialadministration, the bureaucracy and in the plantation economy, and this situation
continued after independence. A smaller migration flow in numbers, but with great
political importance, consisted of educated Baoulé and other southerners who moved
from the southeast to other parts of the country to take up administrative posts – inthe educational system, as civil servants and as administrative staff on plantations.
1.2.2

On migration flows from abroad

As mentioned above, the migration from outside Côte d’Ivoire has been substantial,
and roughly a quarter of the population of Côte d’Ivoire are people with origin inneighbouring countries. Relatively few of these migrants have been naturalised, notthe least since this generally was a non-issue until the end of the 1980s. Only thendid a serious debate evolve on whether there should be a difference in rights between
Ivorian citizens and others living in the country. During the colonial period and thesingle-party system under president Houphouët-Boigny, there was no difference inrights to speak of between Ivorian citizens and immigrants, accordingly immigrants
had little incentive to apply for naturalisation, and very few did.
Most of these immigrants originate in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea, countries thatshare a common past as French colonies – and a shared administrative language,
court system, school system, etc. Immigrants from these countries are generally of
Mandé and Gour ethnicity. The immigration from Liberia and Ghana has been
comparatively small.
In addition to immigrants from countries bordering Côte d’Ivoire, there are also
smaller groups of immigrants from other countries in the subregion – including
Senegal, Niger, Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Cameroon. Finally, Côte d’Ivoire has had afairly large number of migrants from Europe (especially France) and Lebanon –especially in comparison with other countries in the region. The European minority –some of them second and third generation immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire by the end of
the 1990s – has dominated in the private sector since independence, especially asadministrative staff in international companies, while the Lebanese community –present since the 19th century – dominate international commerce networks.

CÔTE D’IVOIRE: ETHNICITY, IVOIRITÉ AND CONFLICTLANDINFO – 2 NOVEMBER 20068

Foreigners living in Côte d’Ivoire according to citizenship – 1975 and 19885
Country

1975

1988

Number%Number%Burkina Faso

77385052,51565085

51,5

Mali

35523424,171416523,5Guinea98758

6,7224886

7,4

Ghana

47168

3,2

167145

5,5

Benin

38324

2,6

85092

2,8

Nigeria

42746

2,9

51663

1,7

Liberia

4422

0,3

6078

0,2

Other Africancountries

82544

5,6

191457

6,3

The rest of the world

16214

1,1

33429

1,1

1474000

100

3039000

100

The immigrant population compared to the total population of Côte d’Ivoire
Total population of Côte
d’Ivoire
Immigrants – number
Immigrants – percentage

1965

1975

1988

1993

4 118 000

6 700 000

10 854 000

13 240 000

700 000

1 474 000

3 039 000

3 310 000

17 %

22 %

28 %

25 %

5

Tapinos et al 2002:389, based on census figures from Ivorian authorities. The category «The rest of the world»
mainly includes French and Lebanese nationals. Other sources set the number of Lebanese at around 100 000.
This possible discrepancy between official figures and actual numbers may also concern other nationalities.

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1.3

RELIGION
Historically, all ethnic groups with origin in the region were animists, where therelationship to a parallel spiritual world with influence on the visible world isgenerally important for religious beliefs and worldviews. The differences between
the religious views and traditions of different groups may be considerable, but there
are also several common denominators – both within ethnic clusters and between
them. Islam expanded into the Sahel region (the savannah belt dividing the Sahara
desert and the forest coastal region) from the west and the east during the 16th
century. Today, around 23 % of Ivorians are Muslim – mainly people of Mandé and
Gour origin. Christianity arrived in Côte d’Ivoire with European missionaries in the
19th century, and expanded from the coast into the country. Still, only some 12 % of
the population are Christians today – largely people of Krou and Kwa origin. Both
Muslims and Christians in Côte d’Ivoire may incorporate aspects of animist religion
in their religious practice. Marriage between persons with different religious beliefs
is common, especially among the educated in urban areas.
The Christians in Côte d’Ivoire were mainly Catholics until the 1970s-1980, butcharismatic Pentecostal congregations are growing rapidly here as elsewhere in theregion – both among Catholics and animists. These Pentecostal congregations areoften closely tied to American mission movements.6 The Muslims in Côte d’Ivoire
are generally sunni, of the maliki law school.7 Sufi brotherhoods dominate, whereas
modern Middle East-inspired islamist groups seem to have little influence.

6

Both the current president Laurent Gbagbo and his wife Simone are members of a Pentecostal congregation
with close ties to such movements in the USA.

7

The Lebanese Muslims are both sunni and shi’a.

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1.4

NAMING TRADITIONS, RELIGION AND ETHNICITY
People’s names often convey a lot of information on ethnic and religious affiliation.
Muslims often have Muslim first names. However, many of these may differ strongly
from their Arabic origin, due both to local pronunciation patterns and Frenchorthography. Thus Abdullah becomes Abdoulaye, Fatima becomes Fatou, Ahmad
becomes Amadou, Muhammad becomes Mamadou, al-Hasan becomes Alassane,
Abdalrahman becomes Dramane, etc.8 Similarly Christians often have first nameswith origins in Christian tradition (either Biblical names or names of Catholic saints),
but then in normal French orthography – Jules, Laurent, Simone, etc. Among
Christians it is common to combine a Christian first name and an African one, like
Bernadette Akissi, and in such cases it may differ whether the person in question
uses either or both names. Among Muslims it is more unusual to combine Muslim
first names with African or European names, but it does happen. Persons who areneither Christian nor Muslim often have African first names, but not necessarily.
There are also Christians and Muslims with only African first names. However, it isvery unlikely that a Muslim would have only a Christian first name,9 or a Christian aMuslim first name. In cases where children have parents with different religions,
their first names may well indicate within which religion they are raised.
Ivorians are usually able to place one another in an ethnic group according tosurname, at least within a larger ethnic cluster. Coulibaly, Diabaté, Diarra, Keita,
Sangaré, Touré and Traoré are common Mandé family or clan names; while Koffi,
Konan and Nguessan are common Kwa surnames10 – and Doué, Gbagbo and Kessy
are Krou surnames.
The order of first name and surname is not fixed, the surname may well be written
before the first name. Many follow French practice in writing surnames in capitals,
like SORO Guillaume.

1.5

ON THE EXPRESSION DIOULA
The word dioula means trader in Bambara. Ivorians generally use the expression
Dioula for anyone with a Mandé or Gour origin. Dioula is also a local lingua franca,very closely related to Bambara (an important language in neighbouring Mali).
Someone being called a Dioula does not necessarily use the language Dioula as a
lingua franca.11 The use of Dioula as lingua franca stems from it being a language of
trade in the entire subregion, and not only among Mandé or Gour people – it is also
widely spoken by Kwa and Krou people in the coastal region and cities.

8
This is of course not unique to the region, but parallel to how Biblical names have developed in European
languages. Even relatively few Scandinavians are aware that the common first name Pål is the Biblical Paul(us).
9

As mentioned, some Muslims do combine a Muslim and a European first name. In such cases the Europeanname may be of Biblical or Catholic origin, but is probably interpreted as a «modern» European name with noreligious connotations.

10

See Koffi 2001 for a thorough presentation of Baoulé naming traditions (relevant also for other Akan ethnic
groups both in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana).

11
To add to the confusion, there is also a proper ethnic group called Dioula, a Mandé group with origin in
northeastern Côte d’Ivoire, east of Ferkessédougou close to the border with Burkina Faso. Their language is also
called Dioula, but is in many ways different from the lingua franca Dioula, though the two languages are related.
See also IRB-CISR 2005.

CÔTE D’IVOIRE: ETHNICITY, IVOIRITÉ AND CONFLICTLANDINFO – 2 NOVEMBER 200611

Dioula used as a lingua franca by people who have a first language which is not close
related to it, is usually considerably less complex grammatically and uses moreloanwords from French than i.e. the Dioula of the ethnic Dioulas, Bambara-speakers,
Malinké-speakers, etc.12
When someone presents him-/herself as Dioula, s/he usually means s/he has origin in
the north of Côte d’Ivoire and/or in the neighbouring countries Guinea, Mali or
Burkina Faso. S/he will generally also be able to pinpoint his/her ethnic origin(s)more specifically. Ethnicity is generally patrilineal, but persons with parents ofdifferent ethnicities will generally be aware of both parents’ ethnic affiliation.

12

See LeBlanc 2000:469 n17.

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2.

IVOIRITÉ AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE13
Reports written since the attempted coup on 19 September 2002 commonly assume acertain knowledge of the modern history of Côte d’Ivoire before this event. A
relatively short summary of the political development in the country since
independence follows, to serve as a backdrop for today’s conflict.

2.1

FROM INDEPENDENCE IN 1960 UNTIL THE MID 1980S
From the 1960s until the mid 1980s, the southern regions of Côte d’Ivoire
experienced phenomenal economic growth in the agricultural sector – especially inthe cultivation of cocoa, coffee, pineapple, coconuts and palm oil. This led many tocall Côte d’Ivoire “Africa’s economic miracle”, and the income generated by the
agricultural sector led to large scale investments in infrastructure, the evolvement ofa local middle class and urban development – especially of Abidjan.
Related to the five year plan for the period 1970-1975, president Houphouët-Boigny
declared that farmland belonged to the farmer exploiting it, and this resulted in large
scale competition between different ethnic groups, both indigenous groups andimmigrants, for the control of existing farmland and forest areas suitable forfarmland – especially in the southwest. By the end of the 1970s, around one million
Burkinabè immigrants were established as farmers and agricultural labourers in thisregion, in addition to migrants from other parts of Côte d’Ivoire.

2.2

FROM THE MID-1980S UNTIL THE LATE 1990S

2.2.1

Crisis in the world market for agricultural produce

Through the 1980s, the market for the agricultural goods exported from Côte
d’Ivoire gradually becomes saturated, as more and more countries expand theirproduction of the same goods – especially cocoa and coffee. Côte d’Ivoire also
increases its production of these goods, which leads to world markets prices
collapsing. The country faces a steadily decreasing national income, and both thestate and the agribusiness take up large loans. By 1987 the country is almost
bankrupt, and financial crisis is unavoidable – with the problems in the agricultural
sector affecting the entire society.

13

Fabrice Mignot’s French-language reports La question dioula et la partition de la Côte d’Ivoire (Mignot 2004)
and Les Baoulé, Henri Konan Bédié et la crise ivoirienne (Mignot 2005) have been instrumental in the writing of
this section.
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2.2.2

Democratisation and further financial crisis

The wave of democratisation in the late 1980s has huge implications all over Africa,
not the least in the former French colonies in West Africa, and comes simultaneouslywith the financial crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. After political tension as a result of thefinancial situation and popular pressure for political opening, president HouphouëtBoigny has to implement a multiparty system, and allow other parties to competewith PDCI,14 which until 1990 was the only legal political party in the country. Still
Houphouët-Boigny is re-elected president with an 80 % majority, and PDCI ends up
with 163 of the 175 mandates in the parliament. The opposition mainly votes for
FPI,15 led by Laurent Gbagbo, who is also their candidate for president. The nowdominant student organisation at the University of Abidjan-Cocody, FESCI,16 was
founded by FPI while the party was still in exile, and during this period, it becomesan increasingly important tool for FPI.17
After the election, FPI is the main opposition party, and focuses on claims presented
by Ivorians of Kwa and Krou background that the authorities had granted Ivorian IDcards to immigrants from neighbouring countries to the north in order to securepolitical support for PDCI in the elections. After large-scale demonstrations in
Abidjan in February 1992 that deteriorate into riots, hundreds of FPI-activists(including Laurent Gbagbo) are arrested. FPI starts accusing Alassane Ouattara (thena member of PDCI) of being anti-Ivorian, and claims he cannot be Ivorian, but
Burkinabè, as his father was buried in Burkina Faso.18
2.2.3

Houphouët-Boigny dies

The economic situation continues to deteriorate through the 1990s, with students,
civil servants and soldiers protesting on different occasions because of inflation anddiminishing value of scholarships and wages. President Houphouët-Boigny dies in
December 1993, and this leads to a competition for power within the PDCI between
prime minister Alassane Ouattara and parliamentary spokesman Henri Konan Bédié,who is appointed interim president until election are held in 1995. Bédié receives
support from the Baoulé-dominated PDCI leadership, Ouattara is appointed vicepresident of the International Monetary Fund and moves to Washington DC – in themeantime, Ouattara’s supporters are removed from positions of power in PDCI, andthis group breaks out of the party and creates the new party RDR.19

14

Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire – The Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire. A presentation of the main
political parties in the country follows later in the report.

15

Front Populaire Ivoirien – The Ivorian People’s Front.

16

Fédération des Étudiants et Scolaires de Côte d’Ivoire – The Côte d’Ivoire Federation of Students andScholars.

17

See Mignot 2006 for a very thorough report on the role of FESCI in the conflict.

18

Ouattara’s mother died in December 2005, and was buried in Côte d’Ivoire. See IRIN News 2005c.

19

Rassemblement des Républicains – Rally of the Republicans.

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2.2.4The ivoirité question

After the PDCI split which results in the founding of RDR, FPI enters into an uneasy
alliance of interest with PDCI to stop Ouattara from taking the power in the 1995
presidential election. A national debate evolves on the question of ivoirité(ivorianness) and the criteria for being a “real” Ivorian citizen. A lot of the focus of
the debate is to disqualify Alassane Ouattara from running for president, but still it
contributes to questioning whether people of Mandé and Gour origin in general are
sufficiently Ivorian – including internal north-south migrants of such background.
Bédié wins the presidential election.
While the ivoirité debate evolves, the three large political parties in Côte d’Ivoire
assume a progressively ethnic character. PDCI becomes dominated by people of
Kwa origin, especially Baoulé and Agni, and Bédié expresses the opinion that people
with this ethnic background are more able to rule the country than others because ofinherited historical and political structures developed in Baoulé communities (withroots in the Ashanti-kingdoms in Ghana, claimed to have ties all the way back to theancient Egyptian civilisation). FPI’s supporters are increasingly Krou-dominated,while people of Mandé and Gour origin largely support RDR.
The ivoirité debate hides a conflict over which ethnic cluster is “more Ivorian”, andthus has legitimacy to rule the entire country – clearly a controversial question in acountry with considerable ethnic diversity, where no ethnic group is in absolutemajority. At the same time, all political parties accuse each other of acting on behalfof narrow ethnic interests in disregard of the interest of the nation.
2.2.5

Increased political tension, and consequences of the military coup on 24
December 1999

Through 1999, the political situation becomes increasingly tense, with large-scaledemonstrations in Abidjan. One factor behind the increased tension is the judicial
process against Alassane Ouattara for allegedly having presented false documents inorder to prove his Ivorian citizenship and ivoirité. This process worries many people
with Mandé and Gour origin, from northern Côte d’Ivoire and/or neighbouring
countries to the north both, as harassment and intimidation of northerners during
random checks by police and armed forces of their ID-papers becomes common.
Christmas Eve 1999 general Robert Gueï leads a military coup conducted by juniorofficers recently returned from a mission in the Central African Republic. President
Bédié goes into exile in France, while Ouattara returns to Côte d’Ivoire. Higher
ranking military officers take the power after the coup, whereas the junior officers
who originally did the coup to a large extent end up as leaders of criminal gangs
which contribute to increased crime and tension in the country, especially in
Abidjan.

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2.2.6

From the presidential election campaign of 2000 until the coup attempt on 19
September 2002

General Gueï wishes to run as PDCI’s presidential candidate, but the party refuses(not surprisingly, as the party was ousted from power through his coup less than ayear before). He founds his own party, UDPCI,20 as base for his own presidential
ambitions. Another coup attempt is stopped in September 2000, led by Ibrahim ’IB’
Coulibaly together with other officers of northern origin. Several senior officers witha northern background are dismissed, general Gueï declares a state of emergency andoutlaws political activity until the approved list of presidential candidates ispublished. The election campaign is reduced to a debate on whether Alassane
Ouattara is eligible to stand as candidate for RDR. A coalition of anti-Ouattara
forces, among them FPI, FESCI and LIDHO,21 arranges a demonstration in front of
the presidential residence in the Abidjan suburb Cocody on 28 September.
Thousands of Burkinabè immigrants take refuge in the coastal town San Pedro after
conflicts with “indigenous” Krou ethnic groups.
On 6 October, the High Court, on instructions from Gueï, declares that Ouattara isbarred from being RDR’s presidential candidate for having submitted questionable
documents to prove that both his parents are Ivorian. Five of the possible presidential
candidates forwarded by PDCI, including former president Bédié, are also barred onformal grounds. The High Court approves five candidates:•

General Gueï (UDPCI)•

Laurent Gbagbo (FPI)•Francis Romain Wodié (PIT22)•

Mel Eg (UDCY23)•

Nicolas Dioulo (independent)

PDCI chooses not to participate in the election, but some PDCI politicians declaretheir support for Gueï. RDR asks its supporters to participate in a peaceful boycott of
the presidential election.
The election is held on 22 October. On 24 October general Gueï declares himself
winner. Laurent Gbagbo encourages “democrats” to take to the street, and there areclashes between civilians and the armed forces several places in Abidjan. On 25
October Gueï flees Abidjan in a helicopter, and Gbagbo declares himself winner ofthe election. On 26 October RDR supporters demand a re-election during
demonstrations, and clash with FPI supporters, gendarmes and police. Gbagbo
assumes the position as president.

20

L’Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire – The Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte
d’Ivoire.

21

Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l'Homme – The Ivorian Human Rights League.

22

Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs – The Ivorian Labour Party.

23

L’Union Démocratique et Citoyenne – The Democratic Citizen Union.

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In the weeks leading up to the election and the days after, there was generally a lot ofviolence – not the least in Abidjan. On 27 October, the bodies of 57 young men who
have been shot are discovered in a forest close to the Abidjan suburb Yopougon.
Most of them had been detained as suspects of being RDR supporters, and the rest
were detained by gendarmes to carry the corpses of the ones killed in the Abobo
Gendarme camp as revenge for the killing of a gendarme by RDR supporters. The
porters were also executed after carrying the bodies of the others. In addition to this,eighteen others were found dead in the Ébrié Lagoon (mainly FPI supporters) and yet
six others in the Blocosso suburb. More violence took place around the elections in
December 2000. According to Human Rights Watch, some 170 people died inpolitical violence in October 2000, and 42 during December the same year.24
RDR also boycotts the legislative elections on 10 December 2000 and 14 January
2001 (election districts in the north of the country), but still receives votes enough to
win a few seats in parliament:•

FPI – 96 seats•

PIT – 4 seats•

PDCI – 94 seats•

Independent candidates – 22 seats•

RDR – 5 seats•

Other parties – 2 seats

All major parties participate in local election held in March 2001. RDR wins the
majority in the largest number of municipalities, followed by PDCI and FPI. Tension
increases during the summer of 2002 before regional elections on 7 July. Ouattara isissued proof by a judge on 30 June 2002 that he is indeed an Ivorian citizen, which
contributes to the tense situation. FPI and PDCI win a majority in 18 départements
each, RDR wins the majority in 10 and UDPCI in 3.
On 4 January 2000, general Gueï invites all political parties except PDCI to sharepower in a national unity government. FPI soon pulls out and withdraws its four
ministers as twelve of the twenty-two ministerial posts go to persons who are either
RDR politicians or assumed to be RDR supporters. FPI is given two additional posts,
and rejoins. Two coup attempts are stopped on 15 May and 4 July the same year.
RDR is thrown out of the unity government, but still Ouattara issues a joint
declaration together with general Gueï, PDCI and FPI which expresses unity on a
new national unity government following the presidential elections planned for 2000,
no matter the victor.
2.2.7

The coup attempt on 19 September 2002 and the immediate aftermath

On 19 September 2002, in the early morning hours, armed rebels attack government
structures in Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo. In the turbulence that follows, some 400
people lose their lives, among them general Gueï, his wife and members of his
entourage. The attempted coup fails after forces loyal to president Gbagbo stop therebels, but the northern region of the country is soon in rebel hands.

24

For more details, see HRW 2001.

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17

Map © BBC News

French forces, stationed in Abidjan since independence according to a FrenchIvorian defence pact, are stationed along an armistice line dividing the country in
two from east to west. In the early days, it is difficult to tell who the rebels are andwhat political interests they represent, but on 1 October they declare themselves torepresent an organisation called MPCI.25 The organisation is accused of having
strong ties to the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. At a later stage, twomore rebel groups appear in the west, both supported by Liberia’s president Charles
Taylor (whose relationship with Laurent Gbagbo is very tense26), MPIGO27 andMPJ.28 The three rebel groups later enter into an alliance called FN.29 With time, thepolitical influence of rebels from MPIGO and MPJ becomes increasingly limited.

25

Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire – The Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire.

26
Laurent Gbagbo is of the Krou ethnic group Bété, which has strong historic, cultural and linguistic ties to the
Liberian Krahn and their political leadership fighting against Charles Taylor.
27

Mouvement Ivoirien pour le Grand Ouest – The Ivorian Movement for the Large West.

28

Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix – The Movement for Justice and Peace.

29

Forces Nouvelles – New Forces.

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3.

THE SITUATION AFTER THE 2002 COUP ATTEMPTThere have been relatively few exchanges of fire between the rebels in FN and theloyalist30 armed forces in FANCI31 since the armistice following the coup attempt in
2002. The French forces placed along the armistice line were enforced with soldiersfrom African countries, and later with UN forces. Numerous rounds of negotiations
have been held between the two sides, where representatives from France, theAfrican Union, ECOWAS,32 the UN and several regional leaders have been involved
as mediators. After the first agreement, signed in Linas-Marcoussis (a suburb of
Paris) at the end of January 2003, there was cautious optimism, but soon a clear
pattern was established for the relationship between the two parties and how they
behave during and after negotiations: The two sides sit down at negotiations led by
one or several of the mediators mentioned above, and reach an agreement which isusually rather vague. When the agreement is duly signed, everyone goes back home,
and a few days later, both parties start declaring their respective interpretations of thevaguer parts of the agreement, which are then categorically dismissed by the otherside. The whole process then degenerates into reciprocal accusations of hidden
motives, active sabotage and a profound lack of interest in reconciliation. This isoften followed by claims of bias on the part of the mediator(s). Already in 2004,
Crisis Group, which closely monitors the development in Côte d’Ivoire and theregion at large, pointed out that the political leadership on both sides haveconsiderable financial interest in maintaining impasse and a low-key conflict:To get to the heart of Côte d'Ivoire's problems, it is necessary to understandtheir economic dimension, and in particular, in terms of the old dictum, to"follow the money". The political impasse is exceptionally lucrative foralmost everyone except ordinary citizens. Major government figures havebeen accused of using state monies, especially from the Enron-like maze ofinterlinked institutions within the cocoa marketing system, for personalenrichment, purchasing weapons, and hiring mercenaries. Members of theForces Nouvelles have been accused of monopolising lucrative economic
activity, including the trade in cotton and weapons. (Crisis Group 2004:i)

30

In an Ivorian context, loyalist is generally implied to mean loyal to president Gbagbo.

31

Les Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire – The National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire.

32

The Economic Community of West African States. The French acronym is CEDEAO – Communauté
Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.

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19

Ordinary Ivorians tend to become more and more pessimistic with regards to thesituation, and even though both sides are able to mobilise considerable support in the
population, cynicism about the motives of political leaders is also widespread. At thesame time, the financial situation in the country is far from improving, somethingwhich is strongly felt by everyone – with the exception of the elite. Large funds thatused to be channelled more transparently through the state coffers “disappear”,
foreign investment in local industry and agribusiness has to a large degree dried up,
and the expatriate community in Abidjan, working in the private sector, thediplomacy and international organisations,33 has mostly left the country – which has
resulted in many people becoming unemployed. Because the country is divided in
two, and the crossing of the dividing line involves large bribes for transporters ofgoods and people, the landlocked neighbouring countries Mali and Burkina Faso
have shifted a lot of their exports to ports in Senegal, Ghana, Togo and Benin, whichmeans diminished income for the port in Abidjan – the largest in the region.
Another worrying aspect of the situation is the appearance of a large number ofarmed militia groups, especially in the southern part of the country – so-called jeunes
patriotes (young patriots). These groups often consist of unemployed orunderemployed young men, they set up roadblocks in the areas controlled bypresident Gbagbo (both roads in the countryside and thoroughfares in Abidjan andother cities) – allegedly to stop rebels from creating trouble and smuggling weapons
into this region. By placing youth who are easily manipulated in armed positions of
power, the circle around president Gbagbo has created a tool which may become
difficult to control, and which undermines the efforts of more moderate forces on a
ground level – like village councils and similar structures traditionally used for
mediation in conflicts between different groups on a local level in the countryside.
These have to a large extent become marginalised by more radical and in some cases
conflict-seeking militia groups, with ready access to firearms.34 In Abidjan, thejeunes patriotes to a large extent originate with the sections of the student
organisation FESCI loyal to president Gbagbo at the University of Abidjan-Cocody.
The dominant leader for the loose association of these groups in Abidjan, Charles
Blé Goudé, was the leader of FESCI 1998-2001. Interestingly, his predecessor as
leader of FESCI was none other than Guillaume Soro Kigbafori, central in the FN
leadership.35 In addition to the unruly nature of these militia groups, it is important tostress that they are also the sole source of income for a large number of young
unemployed men. People passing these roadblocks/checkpoints have to pay
relatively large bribes, and this creates considerable tension in Abidjan andelsewhere. Especially drivers with a northern origin feel singled out and harassed bysuch militias, and to a lesser extent from soldiers, gendarmes and police officers.

33

The evacuation of the African Development Bank from Abidjan to Tunis in 2002, led to thousands of
expatriate foreigners leaving Abidjan and Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, many diplomats and UN expatriate staff haveleft the country during turbulent periods since 2002, especially in November 2004.

34

See Chaveau & Bobo 2003.

35

See Konate 2003.

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20

3.1

THE SITUATION IN KEY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY
The actual situation on the ground differs widely between different parts of thecountry, especially with regards to security and open conflict. It must be stressed that
although most people in Côte d’Ivoire feel the consequences of the impasse in their
daily lives, the situation in many areas has been mostly calm since the attempted
coup 19 September 2002.

3.1.1

AbidjanAbidjan remains the most important city in Côte d’Ivoire, despite Houphouët-Boigny
declaring his village Yamoussoukro capital in 1983. More than a quarter (maybe as
much as a third) of the population of the country lives in Abidjan, and most
government institutions, public administration, private companies, internationalorganisations and diplomats are found here.36 The city remains the focus of thepolitical struggle between southerners and northerners, and a main arena fordemonstrations and open conflict between supporters of different political factions.
Groups loyal to president Gbagbo – especially south-easterners – have been more
active in staging demonstrations and during riots in Abidjan, but oppositional groups– especially northerners – have also staged demonstrations and become more active
since March 2004 (until then, they had generally kept a lower profile since
September 2002).
The crime level in Abidjan has been rising since well before the attempted coup in
2002, although with a considerably calmer period from the curfew that was in placefrom then until May 2003. Since then, crime has increased again, fuelled by thegrowing number of arms in circulation. According to the consultants of Mercer
Human Resources Consulting, Abidjan is the second most dangerous city in theworld for expatriate personnel, only Baghdad is worse.37
A large everyday problem for the population of Abidjan is the checkpoints along
thoroughfares all over the city, present most of the time since 19 September 2002.
These checkpoints are manned by police, gendarmes, soldiers and jeunes patriotes,
and especially people of Mandé and Gour origin are subject to checks of IDdocuments (mainly by soldiers, gendarmes and police), shake-downs for bribes andharassment. The checkpoints increase in number during the night and in periods oftension, and during these times more people have to pay bribes to be allowed to pass(including southerners). Drivers of taxis, buses, minibuses and lorries are especiallyvulnerable, as they pass such checkpoints many times every day and because most ofthem are of northern origin. Conflicts at checkpoints have sometimes resulted indeaths, and on at least one occasion, professional drivers have gone on strike.38

36

In June 2006, president Gbagbo stated in Jeune Afrique that he wished to turn Yamoussoukro into a real capital
due to the overcrowding of Abidjan, but even though the issue seems to have broad political support, it remains
to be seen whether this project will be implemented. See Gbagbo 2006.

37

See IRIN 2005b.

38

Personal experience from working at the Norwegian Embassy in Abidjan February-July 2003. Information
about the strike among professional drivers the autumn of 2003 was given by former colleagues at the embassy.
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21

3.1.2The “Wild West”

Whereas Abidjan is the main focus of tension and conflict around the question ofpolitical participation and influence for northerners, the southwest is the area mostaffected by conflicts over land resources between indigenous groups and migrants.
Such conflicts have been latent since the 1980s when land started becoming scarcedue to population increases, both among indigenous groups and migrants. Since
1999, armed conflicts between the two sides have erupted on several occasions,
resulting in considerably larger numbers of dead and displaced than elsewhere in the
country. The escalation of the situation from 1999 onwards was to a large extent theconsequence of new legislation on ownership of rural land resources introduced in
1998, which privileged Ivorian citizens, the state and public cooperatives, excluding
farmers of foreign origin, foreign companies and Ivorians without ID-documents(Mignot 2005:IV). These regular eruptions of violence and the involvement of
Liberian fighters in the armed conflicts have earned the region the moniker the “wildwest”.
The indigenous groups involved in these conflicts are generally of Krou background,
one of the more important being the Bété – president Gbabgo’s ethnic group, but also
the Guéré/Wè. The Bété and related groups are most often in conflict with farmers of
foreign origin (Burkinabè and Malians), but also with migrants from other parts ofCôte d’Ivoire (both Baoulés from the southeast and northerners). In addition to this,
there is also conflict between the Guéré/Wè (Krou) and the Yacouba/Dan (Mandé),with the Guéré/Wè on the loyalist side and the Yacouba/Dan on the rebel side.39
3.1.3

The situation in the FN-controlled north

There are very few indications that the discrimination many northerners experiencein the south on the basis of ethnic background is mirrored in the northern zone, withpeople of southern origin being singled out as Gbagbo loyalists on basis of ethnicity
alone. Examples of such problems may well take place, but it seems not to be aphenomenon of the same scale as seen in the southern zone. This, however, may well
be related to the southern zone being more ethnically mixed than the north: themigration from the south to the north has mainly been limited to civil servants,
teachers, etc. Villagers of Baoulé origin in the eastern part of the north (which is partof the Baoulé heartland) have according to some reports complained that they havebeen subject to extortion from rebel forces, but this appears to be fairly wide-spreadall over the FN-controlled north, and not limited to Baoulé villages in the east.

39

There is a clear link to the conflict in Liberia here, as the Guéré-Yacouba conflict mirrors the armed conflict
between the same groups in Liberia – there called Krahn and Gio respectively. The Krahn-dominated militia
MODEL was supported by loyalist Ivorian funds and military support in its struggle against the Gio-dominated
NPLF forces led by Charles Taylor (who is of Gio origin on his mother’s side). Charles Taylor on his side
supported two of the Ivorian rebel militias – the Yacouba-dominated MPIGO as well as MPJ.
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22

There has been a very clear deterioration of the situation in the north regarding
public services and infrastructure since the de facto partition, especially in the
education sector and health service. However, even with this abrupt fall in standards,
I feel it is important to state that the humanitarian situation in the northern zone
today is not unlike the normal conditions in provincial areas of neighbouring Burkina
Faso, Mali and Guinea (admittedly among the poorest countries in the world). Now
that this situation has lasted more than four years, there are both positive andnegative signs. The redeployment of civil servants in the north, the reopening ofschools and holding of important school exams on several levels are clearly positive
developments, whereas the rapidly deteriorating physical infrastructure – water pipes
and electricity lines especially – is very negative.
3.2

THE ID-DOCUMENTS ISSUE
Possessing ID-documents that prove someone’s ivoirité has been at the heart of theconflict in Côte d’Ivoire since the mid-1990s. The continued struggle Alassane
Ouattara of RDR has faced with the court system to be recognised as an Ivorian
citizen is highly symbolic for the population with Gour and Mandé background, andit mirrors their everyday problems with getting hold of necessary ID papers, andtheir safekeeping in tense times (there are numerous cases of northerners’ ID
documents being intentionally destroyed, both before and after 19 September
200240).
2006 saw this issue finally being addressed in practice, with ambulant government
hearings intended to provide the some 3.5 millions who are without ID-documentswith such papers. Trial hearings started on 18 May, and these trials went fairly well,
despite some tension around the hearings in government-controlled areas. However,when the actual hearings started on 17 July, this came after FPI’s president Pascal
Affi N’Guessan 13 July summons to all Ivorians to oppose the hearings “by allmeans”. First, this led to groups of jeunes patriotes disrupting hearings in Divo andGrand Bassam, not far from Abidjan, during July. Then on 6 August, president
Gbagbo held a televised speech where he redefined the terms of the entire
registration process, turning it into something quite different from what was
originally agreed between the parties.41 During negotiations in Ouagadougou on 26
September, president Gbagbo reaffirmed his current position that only the courts arein a position to issue proof of citizenship.42

40

See IRIN 2005a and HRW 2001.

41

See Crisis Group 2006:4-9 for a detailed account of this issue until early September 2006.

42

See Seck 2006. In the same article, Burkina Faso’s president is quoted in posing the relevant question ”Howlong would it take for the judges to go through the cases of millions of people?”CÔTE D’IVOIRE: ETHNICITY, IVOIRITÉ AND CONFLICTLANDINFO – 2 NOVEMBER 2006

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4.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

4.1

THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIESThe political landscape in Côte d’Ivoire is dominated by three major parties, eachorganising a large segment of the population.

4.1.1

PDCI
Name in full

WebsiteParti Démocratique de la Côte d’IvoireRassemblement Démocratique Africain

http://pdci.ahibo.com/

Newspaper

Youth organisation

Nouveau RéveilJPDCI (Jeunesse du PDCI); JUPDCI(Jeunesse universitaire du PDCI)PDCI was founded in 1946, well before Côte d’Ivoire was granted independence
from France. Since independence in 1960, it was the only political party with
Houphouët-Boigny as its uncontested leader. Under him, Baoulés were overrepresented in the party structure, but he also incorporated other ethnic groups in the
structure – not the least northerners who benefited from the encouragement tomigrate to the south-west. Significantly, little difference was made between
immigrants and Ivorians when it came to political and economic rights in this period.
With the death of Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993, an internal power struggle
broke out in the PDCI over the question of his successor – the main protagonists
were Henri Konan Bédié and Alassane Ouattara. It is during this power struggle overthe Houphouët-Boigny legacy43 that Bédié launches the concept of ivoirité todiscredit Ouattara.
PDCI continues to have strong popular support among people of Kwa background,especially Akan subgroups, whereas popular support among people of Mandé and
Gour origin to a large extent was lost with the secession of PDCI politicians ofnorthern background and the foundation of RDR in 1994.
4.1.2

FPI
Name in full

WebsiteFront Populaire Ivoirien

http://www.fpi-ci.org/

Newspapers
Notre voie, Le Courrier d'Abidjan

Youth organisation
44

JFPI (Jeunesse du FPI)

43

As will be shown below, evoking loyalty to an vaguely defined legacy of Houphouët-Boigny and presenting
oneself as his symbolic successor is still common in Ivorian politics.
44

The government daily Fraternité Matin has to a large extent been an FPI mouthpiece since Gbagbo assumed
power.
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FPI was founded in 1982, but was an illegal opposition party until 1990, when
Houphouët-Boigny was forced to open up for a multiparty system in the country. In
its early days, it was mainly a vehicle for intellectual opposition to the politicalestablishment inside PDCI and ideologically socialist/social-democratic in character(it is still a member of the Socialist International, and until November 2004, hadstrong ties to the French Parti Socialiste45). It has been a long-time critic of Frencheconomic dominance in Côte d’Ivoire, which party officials see as a continued
colonisation after independence. Prominent activists within the party, like parliament
speaker Mamadou Koulibaly, claims the coup attempt on 19 September 2002 wasorchestrated by France together with Burkina Faso in order to oust FPI from power,as Gbabgo’s government wanted too much economic independence from Frenchstate and business interests.46
Although FPI does include activists from different ethnic backgrounds, it has become
increasingly nationalist and is today the foremost force for promoting the idea of
ivoirité. It mainly has popular support from people of Krou ethnic background (notthe least president Gbabgo’s ethnic group Bété), and to some extent othersoutherners.47
It is important to note that opposition to PDCI has been strong in Bété circles since
the late 1960s. An attempt in 1970 to found an opposition party led to strong
reactions from the government, with 4000 Bétés massacred in Gébié (Mignot
2005:III).
4.1.3

RDR
Name in full

WebsiteRassemblement des Républicains

http://www.le-rdr.org/

Newspaper

Youth organisation

Le Patriote

RJR (Rassemblement des Jeunes
Républicains)

RDR was founded in 1994, after the secession of political allies of Alassane
Ouattara. These were not all of a Mandé or Gour origin, but the party’s main politicalprojects soon became the political participation of northerners and the rejection of anarrow definition of ivoirité. Since then, its main popular base has been amongpeople of northern origin.

45

Though the PS formally broke ties with FPI after the riots in Abidjan targeting French nationals and businessinterests in November 2004, FPI still links PS among its partis amis on its official website.

46

See Koulibaly, Ahua & Busch 2003.

47

It is my personal impression that laguna subgroups of Kwa ethnic background are somewhat more favourable
to the ivoirité concept than Akan subgroups, perhaps because they are generally assumed to have “longer
historical roots” in the south than the Akan groups – especially the Baoulé, who stress an origin in today’s
Ghana.
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4.2

THE SECONDARY POLITICAL PARTIES
There is a large number of political parties registered in Côte d’Ivoire, the ones
included here are parties which are included in different reconciliation negotiations,which have representatives in parliament, which presented presidential candidates in
the 2000 election and/or which have held seats in government since the 2000
elections.

4.2.1

PIT
Name in full

WebsiteParti Ivoirien des Travailleurs-

Newspaper

Youth organisation

PIT was founded in 1990, among the first new parties in Côte d’Ivoire after
Houphouët-Boigny was forced to open the political arena for other parties. It has
been characterised as “a party of the intellectual elite in favour of ivoirité” (Mignot
2004:6), and is currently an allied satellite of FPI. Its leader Francis Romain Wodié
was among the few presidential candidates allowed to stand in the 2000 election.
4.2.2

UDPCI
Name in full

WebsiteUnion pour la Démocratie et pour la Paix en
Côte d’Ivoire
Newspaper

Youth organisation

UDPCI was founded in 2000 to serve as a political vehicle for general Gueï when
PDCI rejected his initiative to become the PDCI presidential candidate, and wascreated by mainly Yacouba supporters of general Gueï. UDPCI seems to be very
marginal in today’s political landscape since Gueï’s death during the attempted coupon 19 September 2002.48 Close to RDR politically, and with ties to the rebel group
MPIGO.

48

Thus the party is very similar to many political parties in neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone, which aremainly local strongmen’s tools for achieving political position. Such parties tend to implode when its main leader
leaves the political stage.

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4.2.3

MFA
Name in full

WebsiteMouvement des Forces de l’Avenir
Newspaper

Youth organisation

MFA is a small party with little popular support. It is close to RDR politically.
4.2.4

UDCY
Name in full

WebsiteUnion Démocratique et Citoyenne
Newspaper

Youth organisation

UDCY is a result of a secession from PDCI in 2000. It has little popular support.
4.3

FN POLITICAL WINGSIn the days and weeks following 19 September 2002 it remained very unclear who
was behind the coup attempt,49 and only in early October did the main group emerge
with a name – MPCI.50 Later in the year, two more rebel groups emerged – MPIGO
and MJP. The leader of MPIGO stated to BBC in January that the two groups had
fused,51 but there are still references to the groups as separate entities.
These groups have participated in a number of negotiations along with establishedpolitical parties on both sides, but with the loyalist side often questioning theirlegitimacy as political actors. As the formal status of these groups is very vague, andthere already is an established political party on the scene in RDR, it can seem thatthe separation between FN and RDR can be interpreted both as rivalry between
competing political figures wanting to represent northern political interests, and as an
attempt to avoid RDR being discredited as coup plotters.
In any case, the FN today is more or less synonymous with MPCI – with MPIGO
and MJP being more or less incorporated into MPCI.52

49

See Doyle 2002.

50

See Jaffre 2002.

51

See Welsh 2003.

52

This is a result of many factors. An important one is that they never seemed to have any political agenda
distinct from MPCI, another is that their supporter Charles Taylor has been fairly absent from the regional
political scene since 2004, concentrating more on influencing the presidential election in Liberia since he wassent to Nigeria in exile in August 2003.
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4.4

SHIFTING ALLIANCES BETWEEN POLITICAL BLOCS

4.4.1

Three main political blocs

To a large extent, the political landscape in Côte d’Ivoire is divided between threemain blocks: Northerners (Mandé/Gour) represented by RDR, south-easterners(Kwa, especially Akan subgroups53) represented by PDCI and south-westerners(Krou) represented by FPI. The trinity of today’s main political blocs to a certain
extent also reflects three important socio-political groups:

4.4.2

•

Civil servants and other government workers (where Akan groups areoverrepresented) oriented towards PDCI•

Traders, transport and construction section workers (dominated by Mandé and
Gour groups) oriented towards RDR•

Rural and urban groups considering themselves “extra indigenous” in thecompetition with internal migrants and immigrants (dominated by Krou andKwa>Laguna groups) oriented towards FPI

The political elite and ethnicity

Another important feature of the power struggle in Côte d’Ivoire, which is easy tooverlook with a focus on ethnicity, is the fact that the political elite of the country is
considerably more ethnically mixed than society as a whole. Within the political (andeconomical), social standing and formal education level are often very importantfactors. Marriages, close friendships and other alliances across ethnic and religiouslines are more common than in other social groups, and the individual members of
the elite have often known each other personally since the school days. Shifting
alliances, rivalries and personal antagonism within this fairly small circle is also
important for the current power struggle.
The shared social background of the political elite also explains why the leadershipof the political parties and blocs tends to be more multi-ethnic than their support
bases. Seen in this light, the fact that Mamadou Koulibaly, one of the most hardliner
FPI politicians, is actually a Muslim Sénoufo and that the Bété Louis André
Dacoury-Tabley has left FPI and is today an FN political activist perhaps becomesless surprising.
4.4.3

Shifting alliances from independence to 2002

Before 1990, most groups were co-opted within PDCI, but the scepticism towards
Baoulé dominance and calls for more democracy and a multiparty system wereincreasing until a political opening was forced through in 1990. During the early
1990s, before the PDCI schism which resulted in the founding of RDR, northern andsouth-eastern politicians were generally allied within PDCI, against the southwestern opposition of FPI. It has to be stressed that the ethnic character of thepolitical were a lot less pronounced in this period.
53

As mentioned above, the Kwa laguna subgroups seem more oriented towards a narrow definition of ivoirité,
and thus may have more in common with south-westerners than other south-easterners when it comes to politicalorientation.
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The power struggle between Henri Konan Bédié and Alassane Ouattara for the
position as “natural” successor to president Houphouët-Boigny after his death in late1993, resulted in the above mentioned split in PDCI into a more south-easternoriented PDCI and the new party RDR, which rapidly became the main vehicle forthe political interests of northerners. It is during this power struggle that Bédié
launches the concept of ivoirité to discredit Ouattara, and by this opens a Pandora’s
Box where the loyalty and political rights of roughly half the population of thecountry becomes subject to question. With this, the three main blocs are established,
but while FPI adopts the ivoirité concept wholeheartedly, this does not result in a defacto alliance with PDCI.
The period 1994-1999 is characterised by a rivalry for full political power between
FPI and PDCI, where both parties have incentives to attempt to exclude RDR fromthe political scene by all means – as RDR would possibly be able to rally more votersthan FPI and PDCI combined, should all northerners be registered as voters.
The 1999 coup was done by young officers of northern origin, but was soon
dominated by general Gueï and other higher ranking officers who had been squeezed
out of position within the PDCI hierarchy as the party became increasingly Baouléorientated. Gueï’s clear antagonism towards PDCI, and its subsequent rejection of
his bid to become its presidential candidate, led to him creating UDPCI, but thisparty has never been able to mobilise any significant number of supporters outside
his own ethnic group – and the founding of UDPCI meant little for the politicaldevelopment.
Gueï used the courts as a tool to keep his main political rivals from presenting
themselves as presidential candidates in the 2000 election, and only allowed people
he may have assumed would not be much competition to stand – that is, excluding
Henri Konan Bédié and Alassane Ouattara, but allowing Laurent Gbagbo to run. In
hindsight, it seems clear that he miscalculated, as the result was Gbagbo assuming
power after the elections.
With FPI securing the presidency, and 96 of the seats in parliament, RDR called for
new elections; whereas PDCI chose to enter into a coalition government with FPI(PDCI got 94 seats in parliament54). Shifting coalition governments uniting FPI,PDCI and smaller parties continued to rule the country in the tense period which
culminated with the 19 September 2002 coup attempt.
4.4.4

Political alliances since 2002

The coup attempt of 19 September 2002 resulted in a de facto partition of the country
in two. RDR continues to represent the north politically, but now in an uneasy
alliance/competition with the Forces Nouvelles. Ouattara goes into exile, and RDR’s
political work in the south becomes considerably more difficult due to its association
with the FN.

54

As a result of the RDR call for boycott of the elections, the party only got 5 seats in the 2000-2001
parliamentary elections.
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The new partition splits the Baoulé heartland in two, and this has consequences for
PDCI’s position. With the northerners dominating the northern half, and FPI
monopolising the political life of the south, PDCI and Bédié keeps a relatively low
profile during the first 18 months after the coup attempt – participating in the shifting
unity governments, but to a large extent sidelined by the struggle between FPI andthe growing number of groups in the so-called patriotic galaxy on one side, andnorthern political interests articulated by both FN and RDR on the other.
From spring 2004 and onwards, the relationship between PDCI and FPI becomesincreasingly uneasy, and culminates in the formation of a formal political coalition in
May 2005, the RHDP.55 As the name of the coalition implies, it attempts to draw
legitimacy on the political heritage of Houphouët-Boigny – and interestingly,
manages to ally the rivals Bédié and Ouattara. UDPCI and MFA are also part of thecoalition. This coalition unites the established political parties of the more informal
alliance called the G7, which includes these four parties and the three political wingsof the FN – MPCI, MPIGO and MJP.
On the loyalist side, this coalition is mirrored by a pro-Gbagbo alliance of politicalparties and organisations called CNRD,56 led by his wife Simone Gbagbo.57
4.5

OTHER ORGANISATIONS WITH A POLITICAL ROLE SINCE 2002
In addition to the established political parties, and the new movements which form
the FN, a myriad of other groups has entered the political scene since 2002, andsome which were established many years before (notably FESCI) have become evenmore important in the political landscape since the coup attempt. These groups
include the infamous militias which operate all over the south (especially in urban
areas, but also on the roads) and west (everywhere – also on a village level), but also
women’s groups, student groups and indeed all NGOs which have taken side in thecurrent conflict.58 The list includes only the more active groups and umbrellaorganisations. Note that this kind of activity is considerably more widespread in thesouth than in the north, and especially so in the “wild west”.

55

Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix – Rally of Houphouetists for Democracy andPeace.
56

Congrès National de la Résistance pour la Démocratie – National Resistance Congress for Democracy.

57

See Panapress 2006.

58

It seems fairly difficult for Ivorian NGOs to avoid taking sides. This phenomenon also extends to Ivoriandiaspora NGOs organising Ivorian migrants abroad.
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4.5.1The “patriot galaxy”

The “patriot galaxy” is a common term for groups in the south and the west loyal topresident Gbagbo. Most of these groups are fairly informal militias grouping
unemployed or underemployed young men from a local area, usually ethnically
based, but not strictly so. Some militias have a clear hierarchy and an almost militaryorganisation; others have a considerably looser structure. Their income comes fromcontributions from local people (everything from voluntary donations to extortion for“protection money”), extortion (mild to severe) of passing traffic at checkpoints, etc.
Many militia groups have received both arms and training from the loyalist armed
forces, and some sources claim they receive direct funding from FPI backers andpeople in president Gbabgo’s entourage (HRW 2005:17). Some have stated that thepresident’s wife Simone Gbagbo (an important hardliner FPI politician in her own
right) has very strong ties to these militias.
4.5.1.1

FESCIIn the current situation, the FPI-associated student organisation FESCI to a large
extent functions as a militia – especially in Abidjan. I refer to Mignot 2006 for athorough presentation of FESCI’s important role in the conflict around the questionof ivoirité.
4.5.1.2

COJEP

COJEP59 is an umbrella organisation gathering a large number of youth groups,
militias and other patriots. It is led by Charles Blé Goudé, a Bété former FESCI
leader with close personal ties to president Gbagbo and his wife Simone. Blé Goudé
is on the UN travel ban list for the following reasons:repeated public statements advocating violence against United Nations
installations and personnel, and against foreigners; direction of andparticipation in acts of violence by street militias, including beatings, rapes
and extrajudicial killings; intimidation of the United Nations, theInternational Working Group (IWG), the political opposition andindependent press; sabotage of international radio stations; obstacle to theaction of the IWG, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, (UNOCI),
the French Forces and to the peace process as defined by resolution 1643
(2005). (SCCCI 2006)
The close ties between groups organised by COJEP and president Gbabgo’s
entourage seem well established, and to many observers, the groups’ role indemonstrations and riots – especially in Abidjan – seems directly orchestrated bypeople close to Gbagbo, if not the president himself.60 This is, however, repeatedly
denied both by president Gbagbo and Blé Goudé. Analysing the behaviour of militiasin Abidjan during the riots of November 2004, Crisis Group has pointed out thefollowing:

59

Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes et Patriotes – Panafrican Congress of Youth and Patriot. Their website can befound at http://www.cojep.org.
60

See Crisis Group 2003:44.

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The fact that no French citizen was killed during the violence from 6 to 9
November seems to indicate that the “patriots” who committed these acts
received strict guidelines. However, the rape of a number of French women,
as well as the murder of the French Radio France Internationale (RFI)
journalist Jean Hélène in November 2003 by an Ivorian soldier, leads one tothink that the ones encouraging this kind of violence are not always in fullcontrol of their troops. (Crisis Group 2005:3, note 9)
From this, it seems the militias are generally behaving according to the instructions
they receive, but that they sometimes act outside of these instructions.
4.5.2

Groups associated with northerners

As the conflict around citizenship, ID documents and political participation forpeople of Mandé and Gour origin is mainly taking place in the south, the FNcontrolled north has generally not seen the large number of grassroots level politicalgroups or militias common in the south. Whereas youth supporters of RDR and otheropposition-oriented youth were very active and visible in Abidjan in the turbulent
years leading up to the 19 September 2002 coup attempt, they have generally kept a
lot lower profile since then. To the extent that opposition supporters are organised,
this mainly seems to be through organisations that were established before the coup
attempt, with very few new groups visible on the scene, at least in Abidjan. The main
exception is local self defence groups formed among migrant villagers in the west.
4.5.2.1

RJDP

Several established party youth movements, including RDR’s RJR and the youth
organisations of PDCI and UDPCI have gone together in the umbrella organisation
RJDP.61 This organisation seems less coordinated than COJEP, probably a result of itgrouping organisations that agree less on political aims than the organisations withinthe “patriot galaxy” which generally adhere to the political aims forwarded byhardliner FPI politicians.
4.5.3

Reconciliation groups

From time to time, groups calling for reconciliation and national unity have been
formed, but their importance for the peace process and negotiations between the
Gbagbo loyalists and FN has been very limited.
One of the more important of such organisations is RPP,62 launched by former PDCI
General Secretary Laurent Dona-Fologo in May 2003. The initiative was met withconsiderable scepticism at the time, interpreted by many as an attempt by DonaFologo to launch a new political party, which in turn could serve as the vehicle forhis own presidential ambitions as yet another ”natural” successor of HouphouëtBoigny.63 RPP has since realigned itself in the pro-Gbagbo camp as part of CNRD.

61

Rassemblement des Jeunes pour la Démocratie et la Paix – Rally of Youth for Democracy and Peace.

62

Rassemblement Pour la Paix – Rally For Peace.

63

Views presented by other diplomats I talked to during the official launch ceremony of RPP at Hôtel Ivoire in
Abidjan 7 May 2003.

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