Working Paper No.284

Families, States and Militaries:
Changes in Relations and Conditions
Astuko Fukuura and Eyal Ben-Ari eds.

March 2019

Families, States and Militaries: Changes in Relations and Conditions
This collection is the product of a workshop held at the Faculty of Economics of Shiga
University on November 18, 2018. The workshop sought to explore the transformations
that military families are undergoing introducing cases from the Philippines, Portugal,
South Korea, The Netherlands, Israel, and the United Kingdom, the United States andJapan1.
The rationale for the workshop centered on developing previous work in the social
scientific study families and the state. Much of this scholarly literature on states andfamilies has focused on official policies (say for welfare or childrearing), the practices
by which states shape and encourage family types, or the intervention of stateauthorities in problem families. A smaller number of research projects has focused on
workplace dynamics of state employees (for example, administrative staff, managerial
personnel, workers in state medical institutions or individuals’ laborers in stateindustries), that is their conditions at work, their careering structures or decisionmaking. Yet almost no investigations have been carried out on the families of such
employees. The one fascinating exception are military families.
These families are especially interesting: they are both similar to and different fromthe families of employees in other large state organizations thus allowing scholars to
explore their unique characteristics. They are also different from other such families inthat the organization that they belong to is an especially "greedy institution" (one thatmakes great demands on individuals in terms of commitment, loyalty, time, and energy)1This workshop was supported by Shiga University International Conference Foundation and theAlumni Association Ryosui-kai of the Faculty of Economics Foundation.

1

thus putting unusual pressure on the employees and creating tensions with theirfamilies. Moreover, in the military there is a chance - like in fire-fighting - thatmembers will become casualties thus adding a dimension not usually found in otherorganizations. Finally, while military families may be likened to those of commercial
sailors where a key member may be away for long periods of time, since they are
identified with state-mandated meanings and missions their dynamics may differ insignificant respects.
Given these similarities and differences the chapters focused on following
questions:First, what characterizes the families of state workers, and especially military personnel,
as opposed to the families of members of other large organizations? This question seeks
to chart out the unique traits of such kin groups.
Second, what kind of state-mandated organizational arrangements are there for taking
care of families (like housing, medical care)? This question is aimed at understanding
the special role of the state in intervening in and shaping of the families of theiremployees and in our case military families.
Third, what kind of changes have these characteristics and arrangements undergone
during the past decades? This question is centered on the major changes that haveoccurred in light of the changes in the state itself.
We hope that the individual chapters and the volume as a whole will provide good
opportunities for further discussion.
Atsuko Fukuura and Eyal Ben-Ari, editors

2The Promotion of Military Family ReadinessWithin the United States Armed Forces

Christopher Udell
Combat Stress Platoon, Marine/ Okinawa

There have been wars since the dawn of human civilization. Wars require fighting
forces. Until the 20th Century there was no concept of military family readiness. The
financial circumstances, child education, and emotional well-being of family membersof those fighting in conflict were of little concern to warring tribes or nations. For thatmatter, the care of soldiers was also frequently unaddressed or could not be addressed
due to the lack of resources. It has been estimated that during the Revolutionary War,
one-third of George Washington’s troops didn’t even have shoes despite the months
they spent camped out at Valley Forge in frigid temperatures1. Thoughts about specialty
pay, plans for the use of their G.I. Bill (i.e., educational assistance to service members),
or calculations about how many Leave days they have remaining for vacation mostly
likely did not pass through their minds.
Approximately 16 million Americans served in World War II and compared to theirpredecessors they were better equipped and supported, though not adequate by today’s
standards. Over 99% of them were male and about 61% were drafted into the war2. The
majority of these men were single because those who were married before they received3

a draft notice had the option of deferring service3. Very little is known about thedemographic characteristics or service needs of the military spouses and children of
WWII. The focus was on preparing the war fighter, and not on taking care of thefighter’s family. But as was the case for most if not all nations involved in WWII, thepeople back home (including the spouses and children of service members) were active
participants in the war on some level, whether in manufacturing plants or service
industries, or by rationing resources needed for the war. There were two notableoutcomes of U.S. entry into WWII that would ignite change for women and children.
Prior to WWII, about 25% of women (generally unmarried women) worked outside thehome, but were restricted to typically ‘feminine’ lines of work such as typing or
sewing4. By 1945, 36.1% of the civilian labor force was female, and 22.5% of married
women were working outside the home5. Moreover, they were employed in skilledlabor professions that until the start of WWII had been restricted largely to men. Afterthe war ended service men returned to the jobs they left and women once again
confronted obstacles to gaining employment, but the landscape had forever changed—
women were capable of performing the same jobs as men and expectations about
women working outside the home had been transformed.
The second notable outcome of WWII was the recognition of the need for child carecenters. As indicated above, over 20% of married women, along with an unknown
percentage of single mothers, entered the work force. Suddenly there was an immediateneed for childcare services. Nurseries and other childcare facilities existed prior to
WWII. However, as early as the 1890’s reform efforts were in place because thesefacilities were in poor shape on account of their reliance on insufficient donations andprivate funding6. Mothers who were the only source of income in the home and who

4were forced to work in low paying jobs risked leaving their children in conditions where
those children were exposed to neglect, sickness, and hazardous conditions. During
WWII, Eleanor Roosevelt (and wife of then President Roosevelt) lobbied for the
opening of more daycare centers and funding for these centers. By 1944 there were
3,000 childcare centers serving 130,000 children. The number of centers by no means
met the needs of the roughly two million children needing care. But it represented amajor shift from pre-WWII and a spark was lit that would impact awareness for thesocietal and governmental role in development and education of American children.
The U.S. armed forces comprised over 12 million personnel at the end of WWII.
Although the U.S. has been engaged in armed conflict with other nations for much of
the last 73 years since the end of WWII, as of 2018 the active duty force was 90%
smaller than it was in 1945. That trend toward a smaller military was continuous acrossthe Korean War, Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and the two most recent
conflicts of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Though the sizeof the U.S. military has reduced, recognition for the influence of the service member’sfamily on the service member has expanded. The earliest of these efforts can be traced
to the Secretary of War’s implementation of the private, non-profit organization Army
Emergency Relief (AER) in 1942. The purpose of AER initially was just to collectfunds to assist U.S. Army soldiers and families in need. The AER adopted the slogan:“Army Takes Care of Its Own.” After WWII ended it was decided that AER should
continue to exist to provide financial assistance, and soon enough other programs cameinto existence including housing assistance and healthcare benefits. By the early 1960s,
military family members outnumbered service members and the U.S. Army’scommitment to families led to the establishment of the Army Community Service

5

(ACS) program, which became an umbrella organization for managing a diverse range
of family service programs.
In a 1983 White Paper, the Army Chief of Staff wrote: “A partnership exists
between the Army and Army Families (p. 16)” and “The Army recognizes a moral
obligation to its soldiers and their families. Because of this, soldiers and their families
must be able to enjoy the benefits of the society which they are pledged to defend (p.
13).7” The paper references needs assessments conducted in the early 1980’s which
revealed that the services families most requested included employment assistance,
higher quality grade schools, more youth programs, better healthcare, andimprovements in quality and availability of childcare facilities. In 1985, the Departmentof Defense (DOD) mailed out questionnaires to service members and spouses across theArmed Forces8,9. The condition and functioning of the military family was believed to
impact force readiness, but there was a lack of data to confirm this other than literatureaddressing spouse support as a significant factor in a member’s decision of whether toremain in the military10. The 1983 White Paper had called into question whether thefamily readiness services offered over the previous twenty years were actually meetingfamily needs and whether those services were the best use of resources.

In examining

data from the 1985 surveys, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral andSocial Sciences (ARI) posited that three variables contribute to force readiness:
personnel, equipment, and training11. Of those three variables, personnel readiness is theone most affected by family readiness. By personnel readiness, they were referring toelements such as physical and mental health of the service member, preparedness for
deployment, and motivation to serve.

6

The size of the active duty force was 2.15 million personnel in 1985. About 10% of
personnel were female and whereas 1/3rd of enlisted identified themselves as an ethnic
minority, only 1/0th of officers did. About 60% of officers were married and hadchildren, while 43% of enlisted reported the same. U.S. service members were also
young: 16% of officers and 60% of enlisted were age 25 or under. Approximately
70,000 enlisted personnel, 19,000 officers, and 44,000 spouses responded to the survey
questionnaires, yielding response rates of 77% for officers, 70,% for enlisted, 71% forofficer spouses, and 52% for enlisted spouses. The survey revealed some remarkablefindings. Only 26% of enlisted personnel had a written will and that figure did not rise
substantially higher (38%) for those enlisted personnel who were married withchildren. Most personnel (65% of enlisted, 70% of officers) did not prepare a power ofattorney. Both of these findings should raise eyebrows in the context of military family
readiness. Personnel without a written will or power of attorney put their families atgreat risk in the event that they are killed or an emergency occurs while the member isdeployed.
Respondents identified dependent care arrangements as the biggest obstacle toreadiness if they were to be unexpectedly deployed. Approximately 15% of all enlisted
members reported having no dependable child care available, while 33% of spouses
were dissatisfied with the quality of child care available. Additional findings
concerned satisfaction of employment, housing, schooling, and services. Almost
25% of enlisted spouses and 17% of officer spouses complained of not being able tofind employment. As for military housing on base, 76% of spouses described it as ‘lessthan good.’ Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) schools were rated as
dissatisfactory by 20-25% of spouses. Satisfaction rates for services were the lowest

7

for single-parent services (21-29%), sexual assault victim counseling (32-37%),
assistance for people with disabilities (38%), and child/spouse abuse counseling (4348%). A sizable percentage of responding spouses (46% of enlisted spouses, 42% ofofficer spouses) rated alcohol as either ‘somewhat of a problem’ or ‘a serious
problem,’ and satisfaction rates for drug/alcohol counseling were correspondingly poor
(46-49%).
In 1993 the ARI reviewed over 100 scientific documents and briefings that followed
the 1985 White Paper’s call for further research investigating the relationship between
family readiness and personnel readiness12. Findings from this report were: 1) unit
readiness was most impacted by the extent to which soldiers felt that unit leaders
supported their families, 2) soldier families who utilized family readiness programs
reported stronger perceptions of support from leadership than families who did not, 3)families’ difficulties in adapting to military life were reduced through support programs,4) support from the spouse influenced retention in the service, and 5) a negative
correlation was found between separation from family for duty obligations and member
retention in the service. The report recommended to Army leadership that soldierretention can be increased by demonstrating support to soldier families, soldier
readiness can be increased by being attentive to problems identified by soldier families,
and unit readiness can be increased by engaging soldier families in unit activities.
In 2008 the U.S. Congress established the DOD Military Family Readiness Council
to review and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding policies
and plans of the DOD’s military family readiness programs. The Council is chaired by
the Under Secretary of Defense and attending members include the Vice Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army; Vice Chief of Staff of Naval Operations; Vice Chief of Staff, US Air Force;
8

Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corp; senior enlisted advisors of the Army,
Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps (or their wives who may attend in their absence);
and members appointed from the National Military Family Association, the Tragedy
Assistance Program for Survivors, and the Armed Services YMCA (Young Men’s
Christian Association). The Council must meet at least twice annually and provide anannual report to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees that
includes 1) an assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of family readinessprograms, and 2) recommendations on actions to take to ensure that these programs
meet the needs of military families.
The first of these reports was submitted in December 200913. Among the findings,
the report cited data indicating increased stress on spouses and children, and that thiswas most profound for younger families. The Council determined that insufficient
information was available about factors that hinder participation in family service
programs. However, some of the programs received positive feedback from families:
Military Family Life Consultants (MFLC), Military OneSource, and MWR (Morale,
Welfare and Recreation). MFLCs are licensed mental health professionals who provide
short-term counseling for a wide variety of issues including relationship distress, stressmanagement, grief, and adjustment problems. The MFLC program started in 2007 after
a two-year pilot-test that was driven by high demand for mental health services that
could not be not be met with existing services. Unlike traditional mental health services
in the military, visits are completely confidential and no records are kept. Moreover,visits can be held in a location convenient for the family member or service member,whether a library or coffee shop. Military OneSource, established in 2004, is a website
and 24/7 call center that offers information, assistance, and referrals on practically every

9aspect of military life. Through Military OneSource military families can receive
financial advice, access educational and employment opportunities, prepare for duty
station moves, obtain discounts on travel and entertainment, and request to speak to acounselor online, by phone, or face-to-face. MWR provides free entertainment andleisure activities to military personnel and their families. MWR also operates a varietyof on-base facilities including fitness centers, pools, bowling centers, golf courses,
restaurants, movie theaters, videogame arcades, conference centers, and cateringbusinesses.
The 2016 Annual Report to the Congressional Defense Committees on the
Department of Defense Policy and Plans for Military Family Readiness provides a
glimpse into how far the U.S. military has come in developing and maintaining family
readiness programs14.

In 2016, the Active Duty component of the U.S. military was

1.30 million personnel15. Its composition has changed over the past 70 years, with
15.5% of personnel female and 31.3% identifying themselves as a minority (in 2010 the
Office of Management and Budget determined that Hispanics were no longer aminority—they represented 11.8% of personnel in 2016). Military family members
continued to outnumber personnel, with 641,639 spouses, 1.08 million children, and10,268 adult dependents. Fifty-nine percent of personnel were either married, married
with children, or single with children. The U.S. military was young; 72% were age 30 or
below and 50.3% were age 25 or below. Spouses were also young, with 51% age 30 oryounger and 26% age 25 or younger. And the military children were also young; 74%
were age 11 or below, and 42% were age 5 and below.
The 2016 Annual Report assesses family readiness programs across four primaryareas: 1) Children and youth, 2) Spouse education and career opportunities, 3) Financial
10well-being, and 4) Personal and family life. As of 2016, the DOD was operating morethan 700 Child Development Centers (CDC) in 230 locations worldwide, serving about
180,000 children daily. CDCs are on-base (or near-base) child care centers that offer
full-day or part-day hourly care for children while personnel and spouses are at work orin school. These CDCs were not only meeting the demand accommodation goal of 80%,
but were also hitting the quality metrics of accreditation rate (goal of 98%) andcertification rate (goal of 100%). Accreditation rate refers to the percentage of CDCs
that met standards of quality set by nationally-recognized accreditation bodies, whilecertification rate refers to the percentage of CDCs meeting DOD inspection
requirements. As of 2016, the DoDEA was operating 168 grade schools in 11 countries,
seven states, Guam, and Puerto Rico, serving more than 73,000 children.

Most Active

Duty military children attend public or private schools in the U.S., so DoDEA schools
generally cater to the children of families stationed overseas, though schools are also
located near U.S. bases on the American east coast. Multiple performance-based
assessments are administered to students annually to ensure that DoDEA schools aremeeting standards of excellence. The DOD was also managing about 140 youth andteen centers worldwide serving more than 1 million Active Duty and Reserve
Component adolescents. The purpose of these programs is to foster leadership traits,
healthy life skills, physical fitness, artistic interests, and mentoring. The DOD partneredwith organizations such Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Big Brothers Big Sisters,
National 4-H Council, and the YMCA to provide educational and developmental
programs, and the DOD runs summer camps specifically targeting children of deployedpersonnel to support them through the deployment cycle.

11

DOD created the Spouse Education and Career Opportunities Program (SECO) in2010 to promote education and employment for military spouses. Through the Military
OneSource SECO Career Center, spouses can speak with career counselors to assist
them in identifying career fields that align with their skill sets, background, and goals.
During 2016, SECO counselors received more than 177,000 calls from spouses.
Military Spouse Employment Partnership (MSEP) was launched in 2011 to connect job
seeking spouses with employers. As of 2016, more than 335 employers had pledged torecruit, hire, and train spouses. Over 5.5 million jobs had been posted to the MSEP
Career Portal online, leading to 105,000 spouses receiving job offers. DOD provides
MyCAA (Military Spouse Career Advancement Account) scholarships of up to $4000
to spouses for education or training. In 2016, more than 32,000 spouses set up MyCAA
accounts online and more than 22,000 received scholarships.
The DOD launched the Financial Readiness Campaign in 2003 to provide financial
education and promote responsible financial management. The impetus for this effort
was survey data from 2002 revealing that 26% of junior level personnel (i.e., ranks of
E-1 to E-4) were struggling financially and almost 35% of these personnel or theirspouses either failed to make a monthly bill payment, bounced a check, obtained a highinterest loan to offset expenses, or filed for bankruptcy in the previous 12 months.
Financial stress can significantly impact personnel readiness. DOD-wide efforts were
strengthened to teach financial literacy and encourage budgeting. Financial counselors
were made readily accessible to meet with personnel. In 2006 at the urging of the DOD,
Congress approved the Military Lending ACT (MLA) which authorized the federal
government to protect service members from high interest lenders such as payday andvehicle title loan companies. In 2013 that authority was expanded to allow Consumer

12

Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to take legal action against payday and vehicle title
lenders who target military personnel and their families. All of these efforts appear tohave made a difference: in 2016 the same financial assessment survey administered in
2002 and annually ever since then found that 9% of junior personnel were struggling
financially and 17% of junior personnel or their spouses failed to make a monthly bill
payment, bounced a check, obtained a high interest loan, or filed bankruptcy within theprevious 12 months.
Regarding the fourth area in the Annual Report assessing personal and family life, during
2016 Military OneSource counselors provided more than 152,000 50-minute face-to-face nonmedical counseling sessions. MFLCs provided more than five million therapy sessions andbriefings/presentations in 2016. MWR hosted a summer reading program at 215 of the libraries
it manages around the world. That program facilitated over 38 million minutes of reading time
to children during the summer of 2016. MWR libraries also offered more than 227,000 live
tutoring sessions to military children. MWR provides free wireless access in base facilities
worldwide to ensure that military personnel are able to maintain contact with their families
when separated from them. During 2016, MWR installed wireless connectivity in on-base cafes
across Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East.

The heavy emphasis the U.S. military today places on service member and family
member readiness could not have been envisioned by George Washington’s starving,poorly equipped men in 1777. But what about the challenged posed by the Army Chiefof Staff in his 1983 White Paper? Over these last few decades of implementing family
readiness programs, what have we learned about their impact on personnel readiness?
In 2017 the U.S. Army’s Research Facilitation Laboratory released a report that drewfrom 380 research articles on military family readiness published between 2007 and132017. The conclusions from this report are clear: military family readiness programs not
only make a considerable impact on the emotional, physical, social, occupational, andacademic functioning of the family, but also the service member’s combat readiness,interpersonal functioning within his/her unit, and mental resilience. Although this report
was specific to the U.S. Army, the findings are applicable to all of the U.S. Armed
Forces and their families.

References
1

Gingrich, N., & Forstchen, W. R. (2010). To Try men's souls: A novel of George
Washington and the fight for American freedom. New York: St. Martin’s
Griffin.

2

The National WWII Museum. (n.d.). Research starters: US military by the numbers.
Retrieved from https://www.nationalww2museum.org/studentsteachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-militarynumbers.

3

World War 2.0. (n.d.).

Married men to get draft deferment—for now. Retrieved fromhttps://blogs.shu.edu/ww2-0/1942/06/26/married-men-to-get-draft-defermentfor-now/
4

Khan Academy. (n.d.). American woman and World War II. Retrieved fromhttps://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/rise-to-world-power/uswwii/a/american-women-and-world-war-ii

14

5

Metropolitan State University of Denver. Women & WWII. Retrieved fromhttps://msudenver.edu/camphale/thewomensarmycorps/womenwwii/

6

Michel, S. (2011). The history of child care in the U.S. Social Welfare History Project.
Retrieved from http://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/child-care-theamerican-history/

7

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1983). White paper 1983: The Army family. Washington,
DC: Department of the Army.

8

McCalla, M. E., Rakoff, S. H., Doering, Z. D., & Mahoney B. S. (1986). Description of
officers and enlisted personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985. A report basedon the 1985 DOD survey of officer and enlisted personnel. Arlington, VA:
Defense Manpower Data Center.

9

Griffith, J. D, Doering, Z. D., & Mahoney, B. S. (1986). Description of spouses ofofficers and enlisted personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985. A report basedon the 1985 DOD survey of officer and enlisted personnel.

Arlington, VA:

Defense Manpower Center.
10

Jones, A. P., & Butler, M. C. (1980). A role transition approach to the stresses oforganizationally induced family role disruption. Journal of
Marriage and the Family 42(2), 367-376.

11

Pliske, R. M. (1988). Families and readiness: An examination of the 1985 DOD

15

survey of enlisted personnel.

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institutefor the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
12

Segal, M. W., & Harris, J. J. (1993). What we know about Army families. Alexandria,
VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

13

Department of Defense Military Family Readiness Council (2009). Military family
readiness policy and plans for the Department of Defense for the support ofmilitary family readiness.

14

Department of Defense (2017). Annual Report to the Congressional Defense
Committees on the Department of Defense Policy and Plans for Military
Family Readiness.

15

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community andFamily Policy. (2015). 2015 demographics: Profile of the military community.

16

Hawkins, S. A., Condon, A., Hawkins, J. N., …Jackson, T. (2018). What we know
about military family readiness: Evidence from 2007-2017. Monterey, CA:
Research Facilitation Laboratory.

16

The Role of Parliament in Developing Family Support Programs forJapan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)

Saya KIBA
Komatsu University, Japan

1. Introduction
In the past decade, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) has developed Family Support
Programs for two possible circumstances. The first is to support families of JSDF
members who are deployed abroad for Peace Support Operations (PSO). The second is
to mobilize the resources of JSDF-related volunteer associations (such as veterans’
associations) in order to ensure the survival of JSDF family members in the event of
massive disasters in Japan’s homeland.
This study hypothesizes that the Family Support Program of the JSDF has beendeveloped through the efforts of key persons in the parliament who can be a bridge
between Japanese political society and JGSDF members and their families. Throughtext mining of all records of the National Diet of Japan, the study shows how the JSDF
family has been mentioned as a political category. First, lawmakers have proposed
particular support programs for JSDF families, conveying their expectations after theGreat East Japan Earthquake in 2011, which prompted the deployment of more than
107,000 soldiers for relief efforts. Second, however, no tangible support programs
related to overseas deployment for PSO have been proposed. After the 2015 Defense

17Legislation Reform, lawmakers claimed that family members expect politicians to be
more accountable and explain the risks in the field, while the implicit expectations of
JSDF families remain unclear.

2. JSDF families (taiin-kazoku) and Family Support Programs
While JSDF is not a military organization under domestic laws, JSDF members
and families have also experienced the same dynamics shifts indicated by Moelker(Moelker et al. 2015). Since it first dispatched its UNPKO unit to Cambodia in 1992,
Japan has sent the JSDF and civilian experts to 13 UN missions through 2017 (Cabinet
Office, Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2019). Japan
has also deployed the JSDF to several non-UN missions (Indian Ocean to refuel US,
British and other vessels operating in Afghanistan, and Iraq for humanitarian andengineering activities in the Samawa region). A larger part of the public is still skeptical
about the use of the military in foreign countries, and such anxiety is sometimes
exposed by JSDF members through media.
JSDF was established in 1954, transforming from the National Police Reserve
established by the U.S. in the wake of the Korean War. Just after that, JSDF family
members organized voluntary associations concurrently in different prefectures ofJapan. Different groups emerged as JSDF Family Association, Jieitai Fukei-Kai, which
was renamed as Jieitai Kazoku-Kai in 2015 (Jieitai Kazoku-Kai 2017). The Association
organized dialogue with Japan Defense Agency, which was re-organized as Ministry of
Defense in 2007. It also holds public workshop and vents to publicize JSDF activities.

18However, there were little discussion on Family Support Programs in Parliament
for more than a decade. Arrangement for the during-deployment support for the families
whose spouses were deployed overseas for 6 months for PSO, was discussed among
JSDF and Ministry of Defense. Ground Staff Office created Family Support Desk in
Ichihara headquarter in 2007.
After Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, JSDF gradually shift its focus onpeace-time family support. Due to the fact that more than 100,000 JSDF personnel
involved in the largest-ever domestic disaster relief operation in the history of JSDF,
JSDF were fully aware of growing operational needs for family support. Family Support
Program is not just a welfare program to more emphasis on operational readiness andeffectiveness- such idea was share among the JSDF and Ministry of Defense.
The 2014 National Defense Program Guidelines first mentioned Family Support
Programs to enhance a new concept of “dynamic joint defense force,” creation of toughand resilient JSDF.” The guideline states that Family Support is the basis for operational
effectiveness. However, as public support programs and self-help are not enough, JSDF
has search for further mutual help in collaboration with civilian or veteran SDF support
networks including JSDF Family Association (Kawano and Fukuura 2015).
2011 Earthquake was indeed a trigger. However, when the Family Support
Program was officially discussed and launched? Is there any public debate among
policy makers, JSDF members, and families? This study hypothesizes that the Family
Support Program of the JSDF has been developed through the efforts of key persons in
the parliament who can be a bridge between Japanese political society and JGSDF
members and their families.

193. Methodology and Data-sets
The author used text mining to explore how JSDF family and the Family Support
Programs were mentioned and discussed in Parliament through Digitized Parliamentary
Database (kokkai gijiroku service, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/), an online database ofminutes of all parliamentary deliveries, both in House of Councilors and House ofRepresentatives. The author extracted all the minutes including particular words (JSDF
Family (taiin kazoku), JSDF + family support, JSDF + family + disaster and read allfrom the context to eliminate unrelated discussions. As a result, only 26 minutes were
hit as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 JSDF Family (taiin kazoku), JSDF + family support,
JSDF + family + disaster: 26 Hit
Year
2001

Context

Dates and Committees

Family support programs for JSDF members

December 4

who join PSO

Committee on Foreign Affairs andDefense, House of Councilors

2004

Regarding the website of Asahikawa City,

February 18

indicating family support program for JSDF

Committee of Anti-terrorism andmembers who are deployed to Iraq

Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq,
Security, House of Representatives

2007

Family support programs for JSDF members

March 23

who are deployed to Golan Heights

Security Committee, House ofRepresentatives

2011

Support for family member of a JSDF soldier

April 5

who died during disaster relief operation in

Committee of Security, House of

TohokuRepresentatives

Sympathy to JSDF members who continue

April 13disaster relief operations while their own

Committee of Legal Affairs, House offamily members were affected by the same

Representatives

disasterNeeds for childcare facilities for JSDF

April 2920

members who continue disaster relief

Committee of Appropriation, House ofoperations

Representatives

Mental health of JSDF members who

May 10continue disaster relief operations

Committee on Health, Labor, andWelfare, House of Councilors

2013

Housing and safety assurance for JSDF

March 7families

Committee of Appropriation, House ofRepresentatives

Effective use of JSDF housing

December 3
Committee on Foreign Affairs andDefense, House of Councilors

Effective use of JSDF housingsMarch 17
Committee on Foreign Affairs andDefense, House of Councilors

2014

Compensation for JSDF members who died

July 15in the line of duty

Committee of Appropriation, House ofCouncilors

2015

Risk management and compensation for

February 25

JSDF members who died or got injured inCommittee of Appropriation, House of

the line of duty

Representatives

Security situation in Iraq indicated in a log

July 13

bookSpecial Committee for Defense
Legislative Reform, House ofRepresentatives

Mental health care for JSDF families after

August 3

the Defense Legislative Reform 2015

Special Committee for Defense
Legislative Reform, House of Councilors

Government’s accountability to JSDF

October 12

families after the Defense Legislative

Committee of Appropriation, House of

ReformRepresentatives

2015 increase of risky missions

abroad2016

Compensation for JSDF members who diedFebruary 25

in the line of duty

Committee of Appropriation, House ofRepresentatives

Government accountability to JSDF families

September 29

regarding security situation in South Sudan

Plenary, House of Councilors

21

Government accountability to JSDF families

October 12

regarding security situation in South Sudan

Committee of Appropriation, House ofRepresentatives

Government accountability to JSDF families

November 22

regarding security situation in South Sudan

Committee on Foreign Affairs andDefense, House of Councilors

2017

Government accountability to JSDF families

November 28

regarding security situation in South Sudan

Plenary, House of Councilors

Government accountability to JSDF families

March 10regarding security situation in South Sudan

Committee of Security, House ofRepresentatives

Government accountability to JSDF families

March 14regarding security situation in South Sudan

Plenary, House of Representatives(regarding “combat” related situation in
2016)
2018

Video message of Prime Minister Abe

January 24

regarding Constitutional amendment

Plenary, House of Representatives

Compensation for JSDF members who diedFebruary 14

in helicopter accident

Committee of Appropriation, House ofRepresentatives

Re-employment, death benefit, andMarch 22

insurance for JSDF members those who are

Committee of Security, House of

deployed abroad

Representatives

Security situation in South Sudan indicatedMay 11in a log book

Committee of Foreign Affairs, House ofRepresentatives(From January 1, 1992 to October 30, 2018)

4. Analysis
1) 1992-2010
As seen in Table 2, it was only 2015 when “JSDF families (taiin-kazoku)” was firstmentioned in the Parliament.

22

Table 2 JSDF families (taiin-kazoku): 5 hit(From January 1, 1992 to October 30, 2018)
Year
2015

Context

Dates and Committees

Mental health care for JSDF families after

August 3

the Defense Legislative Reform 2015

Special Committee for Defense
Legislative Reform, House of Councilors

2016

Government accountability to JSDF families

November 22

regarding security situation in South Sudan

Committee on Foreign Affairs andDefense, House of Councilors

2017

Government accountability to JSDF families

November 28

regarding security situation in South Sudan

Plenary, House of Councilors

Government accountability to JSDF families

March 10regarding security situation in South Sudan

Committee of Security, House ofRepresentatives

2018

Compensation for JSDF members who diedFebruary 14

in helicopter accident

Committee of Appropriation, House ofRepresentatives(From January 1, 1992 to October 30, 2018)

2) Triggered by Great East Japan Earthquake: 2011-2014
Table 3 clearly shows that, “family support” for JSDF members was hardly
mentioned until the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. The word was mentioned
only four times in 18 years- since 1992, when Japan started to JSDF members abroadfor PSO, until 2010, just before the earthquake. Among four, concrete support programs
were discussed just once in 2007, when JSDF Ground Staff Office set up Family
Support Desk.

23

Table 3 JSDF + family support: 5 Hit
Year
2001

Context

Dates and Committees

Family support programs for JSDF members

December 4

who join PSO

Committee on Foreign Affairs andDefense, House of Councilors

2004

Regarding the website of Asahikawa City,

February 18

indicating family support program for JSDF

Committee of Anti-terrorism andmembers who are deployed to Iraq

Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq,
Security, House of Representatives

2007

Family support programs for JSDF members

March 23

who are deployed to Golan Heights

Security Committee, House ofRepresentatives

2015

Security situation in Iraq indicated in a log

July 13

bookSpecial Committee for Defense
Legislative Reform, House ofRepresentatives

2018

Security situation in South Sudan indicatedMay 11in a log book

Committee of Foreign Affairs, House ofRepresentatives(From January 1, 1992 to October 30, 2018)

However, members of the parliament start mentioning JSDF families in relation todisaster relief activities after March 11, 2011. Just after a Staff Sargent who was
engaged in relief operation passed away on April 1, a congressman from Liberal
Democrat Party asked Ministry of Defense about rotation system and mental health careof the JSDF members.
On April 13, Congressman Kiuchi, who visited Matsushima Airbase, which wasseverely damaged by disaster, first mentioned the fact that JSDF members also lost theirown family. On April 29, Hashimoto, a representative from disaster-affected Miyagi
Prefecture, disclosed a story he heard from Gen. Kimizuka, Commander of the North24

Eastern Army who led Joint Task Force - Tohoku, a massive 100,000 soldier relief
effort coordinated with American forces in Operation Tomodachi. Kimizuka told
Hashimoto that JSDF members have hard time to look for childcare facilities while theyleave home for months for relief operation- particularly in case that couples are both inactive duty. Minister Kitazawa, then answered that the Ministry prepared childcare
facilities inside the camp, and will increase budget for family support.
It was May 10 when mental health of JSDF members and families was first
discussed.
In 2014, Councilor Uto, upper house member and retired air captain, mentionedthat around 480 JSDF members lost their families but had to continue the operation. He
insisted that the JSDF housing was a base to encourage self-help efforts among the
JSDF families during that time. Another upper house member Sato, former commanderof the 1st Iraqi Reconstruction Support Unit, questioned to Prime Minister Abe, about
death benefit, compensation, and awarding.
While total hours of discussion were not very long, it is notable that, 2011
Earthquake triggered comprehensive discussion of JSDF’s family support programs
including concrete measures for mental health, housing, childcare, and even sensitive
issues such as death benefit.
3) Icon of “lack of accountability?” After 2015 Defense Legislative Reform“JSDF family” is mentioned in different context after 2015.
Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet passed a Cabinet resolution in 2014 to allow the
JSDF to take action in support of the US when the ally comes under attack. The bill to25

legalize such mobilization of the SDF, the controversial security legislation (ampohosei) was submitted to the parliament in 2015. The bill approved by the parliament on
September 19 after 4-month debate and massive demonstration against the move. Afterthe passage of the bill, opposition lawmakers often mentioned JSDF families as an iconof uncertain future risk of JSDF, anxiety of the nationals, and lack of government
accountability.
For instance, on September 29 2016, upper house member Ichida of Communist
Party of Japan mentioned security risk in South Sudan. “There is no more reason why
JSDF join the UN-PKO mission South Sudan, where there is ongoing conflict. The
government… JSDF families says it drives them crazy to consider their sons join thewar. They never forgive Prime Minister Abe for sacrificing their sons and daughters.
How do you answer them, Prime Minister?”
On March 10, 2017, Congressman Masuta criticized Minister of Defense, for notdisclose security information in South Sudan. He read out voices from JSDF families in
his own constituency quoted in a local newspaper article “JSDF families distrust the
government.”

5. Conclusion
There is a consensus among JSDF members- both officers and noncommissioned
officers- that there is high needs for Family Support Programs not as a welfare program,but to enhance defense effectiveness after 2011 earthquake. The analysis above makes
clear that lawmakers have proposed and discussed concrete measures how to officially
support JSDF families. Such concern was widely shared beyond political parties.
26

Lawmakers who has experience in JSDF played particularly important roles to deliver
sensitive issues such as death compensation.
On the other hand, however, no tangible support programs related to overseas
deployment for PSO have been proposed. After the 2015 Defense Legislation Reform,
lawmakers claimed that family members expect politicians to be more accountable andexplain the risks in the field, while the implicit expectations of JSDF families remain
unclear.
Mentioning risk of death in PSO is still a big taboo in Japan. Changing thissituation seems to depend on whether and to what degree the Japanese population canaccommodate the nature of JSDF not as a disaster relief organization, but as a defense
force which plays a crucial role in the international political environment of today.
However, this study suggests that the public opinion and parliamentary debate on
JSDF is not always staunch. Unexpected events can eventually encourage public debate
on risk, death, and support programs. Such discussion is becoming ever more importantand thus necessary in Japan. Improving the well-being of JSDF members and solving
issues in recruitment and retention, and care for military families will prove key indeveloping the militaries and security for the foreseeable future.
References
Carreiras, Helena. and Celso Castro. (2012) Qualitative Methods in Military Studies:
Research Experiences and Challenges. Routledge.
Forster, Anthony. (2006) “Breaking the Covenant: Governance of the British Armine
the Twenty-First Century,” International Affairs 82(6): 1043-57.

27

Fukuura, Atsuko. (2012) Getting Involved: Relocation, Overseas deployment andSpouse clubs for Japan Self Defense officers. Working Paper Series，Faculty of
Economics, Shiga University, No. 173.
Jieitai Kazoku Kai. (2017) 40-years history of JSDF Family Association. (original in
Japanese: 自衛隊家族会（2017）『公益社団法人自衛隊家族会 40 年史』)
Kawano, Hithoshi. and Atsuko Fukuura. (2015) “Family support and the Japan SelfDefense Forces: Challenges and developing new programs,” in Moelker, Rene. et al.
eds. Military Families and War in the 21st Century: Comparative perspectives.
Routledge.
Levy, Yagil. (2003) “Social Convertibility and Militarism: Evaluations of theDevelopment of the Military-Society Relations in Israel in the early 2000s.” Journalof Political and Military Sociology. 31(1): pp.71-96.
―――. 2010. “How the Military’s Social Composition Affects Political Protest: The
Case of Israel.” Peace & Change. 35 (1). pp.123-145.
Lomsky-Feder, Edna. and Ben-Ari, E. (2013) “Managing Diversity in Context: Unit
Level Dynamics in the Israel Defense Forces,” Armed Forces & Society. 39(2): 193–
212.
Martinsen, Kåre Dahl. (2013): Soldier Repatriation. Ashgate.
Segal. Mady Wechsler. (1986) “The Military and the Family As Greedy Institutions,”
Armed Forces & Society. Vol. 13, Issue 1.
Moelker, Rene. et al. eds. (2015) Military Families and War in the 21st Century:
Comparative perspectives. Routledge.

28

Preparing for family support for (future) deaths in the Japan SelfDefense Force — Learning from the German Experiences

Atsushi Yasutomi1
Miyazaki International College / Japan

1. Introduction
Japan has yet to experience any combat-related casualties amongst the Japan SelfDefense Force (JSDF) during missions abroad including the United Nations peacekeeping
operations (UNPKO) and other peace support operations.2
Legal reforms in 2015 expanded the scope of JSDF missions beyond their conventional
engineering functions, enabling JSDF soldiers, for example, to approach and fight local
armed groups to rescue Japanese nationals as well as military personnel from othercountries participating in UNPKO. Accordingly, the 2015 reforms have relaxed
restrictions on the JSDF’s use of weapons during missions abroad.

1

This research is partially sponsored by the 2018 International Program of Collaborative Research,
CSEAS, Kyoto University, “Treatment of Military Deaths and the Impacts of Security Policy:
Comparative Studies of Selected States in Southeast Asia”, 2018-2019. The author wishes toexpress his gratitude to these programmes. The author also wishes to thank all the interviewees in
the Bundeswehr and its related institutes and organisations who warmly welcomed him andprovided with a number of useful information and ideas. The author also wishes to express his
personal gratitude to Col. K. Kuwahara, (then Defense Attaché of the Embassy of Japan inGermany), who provided generous assistance in realising the visits and interviews in Germany
required for this research.

2

One soldier from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force died in a traffic accident during the joint
military exercise among the US, the Philippines, and Japan on 2 October 2018, making it the first
instance of a JSDF soldier dying abroad (Kyodo, 18 December 2018). However, as it was a traffic
accident, this case, though it was the first such case outside Japan for the JSDF, will not be
considered as a combat-related death.

29

Since its withdrawal from UNMISS in May 2017, Japan has not sent JSDF troops to
UNPKO. 3 At this point, no specific plan is being made for deployment to UNPKO
missions in the imminent future. Risks of military casualties in UNPKO have diminished
for the time being. Still, the risk of combat-related casualties remains, as Japan has
deployed a nearly 400-member strong unit to Djibouti for anti-piracy missions in the Gulfof Aden, including air patrol and vessel escorting activities near the Somali coast.4 Future
PKO deployment is also possible.
Under these circumstances, the JSDF has yet to be ready to accept and honour combatrelated casualties amongst the JSDF soldiers from a number of aspects, including legal
frameworks and protocols for honouring such deaths.5 This article argues that the sameis true for the current family support systems for the same purpose and that a number ofexperiences can be learnt from the practices in the German Federal Armed Force(Bundeswehr). To this end, this paper will examine the Bundeswehr’s services andsupport systems for the soldiers and their families that are directly and indirectly
associated with the loss of soldiers during missions abroad.

3

Since the withdrawal from the UNMISS mission in May 2017, Japan has dispatched two staff
officers to UNMISS for one-year routines. See, Cabinet Office of Japan,<http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/pko_main_e.html> (last access on 10 January 2019).

4

The base was set up in the northwestern section of Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport in June
2011. The JSDF leased the land for the mission from the Republic of Djibouti. See, Ministry of
Defense at < http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no23/topics01.html> (last accessed on 10 January 2019).
The base can also be used for temporary shelter for Japanese nationals in times of crisis, as it wasused for accommodating a few Embassy staff evacuated from Juba, South Sudan, when the
security deteriorated in July 2016. See, “Japan to expand SDF base in tiny but strategicallyimportant Djibouti”, The Japan Times, 19 November 2017.

5

Atsushi Yasutomi, “Combat-related Death of Soldiers and Public Support for Military Missions
Abroad: a case of Japan”, Comparative Culture, Miyazaki International College, 2009,
forthcoming.

30

2. Literature review
There are few (if not at all) theoretical studies on military families directly associatedwith deaths of soldiers. The following two sets of studies, however, help us understandthe relationship between the two.
The first set of studies discuss the significance of the presence of legitimacy of
military death amongst the public. The scholars in this field argue that, in order toovercome and justify deaths of soldiers who lost their lives during their contribution tointernational peace, there must be a strong sense of legitimacy over deaths of soldiersboth within the military and amongst the members of the society.
Ben-Ari focuses on the social rites following combat deaths. He argues that a “gooddeath” can achieve legitimisation through a symbolic victory over the sense of
meaninglessness and helplessness associated with a soldier’s loss in combat.6 Ben-Ari
claims that public acceptance hinges on retrieving the body, an official (and/or military)commemoration accompanied by informal rites of remembering, and psychological carefor the families and next-of-kin left behind.7 By providing public and official rites tocommemorate fallen soldiers, the deaths become social deaths—they become the subjectsof public mourning and political discourses. This process demonstrates to the public thatthe soldiers are granted the military organisation’s respect. It honours the soldiers’
ultimate commitment to serving their community and symbolises that the militaryorganisation remains committed to the individuals in death as well as in life.8 For Ben-

6

Eyal Ben-Ari, “Epilogue: A ‘good’ military death,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 31, No. 4,
Summer 2005, pp. 651-664.

7

Ibid., p. 660.

8

Ibid.

31

Ari, even the minutia surrounding the handling of soldiers’ deaths—the ceremonies,
burials, funeral, family support, psychological care, and administrative compensation—
helps cement the effect of a “good death.” Furthermore, they help to restore the militaryorganisation’s legitimacy, as well as troop morale and cohesion, after they are tarnishedby the loss of soldiers’ lives.9
In their article, “Casualties and Civil-Military Relations: The German Polity between
Learning and Indifference,” Kümmel and Leonhard analyse the Bundeswehr’s casualties
during out-of-area missions since 1992.10 During 15 years of military missions abroad,the Bundeswehr has suffered a total of 108 soldiers killed (including those killed in
accidents and exchanges of fire). Kümmel and Leonhard observe that Germany has
experienced social learning while justifying the deaths of soldiers engaged in specificmissions. They also argue that functional indifference—a corroborated sign of social
learning—has increased over the years even though deaths of soldiers continue during its
foreign missions. Over time, the “functionally indifferent” public pay less attention to
information (particularly in the media) on soldiers’ deaths. In modern Germany, they find,the public has taken the position that the death of soldiers is largely a concern for politicalactors and the military, not the society as a whole.11 For social learning (and functional
indifference) to be present, they conclude, an unquestionable sense of the legitimacy ofthe military mission must be fostered in the public. In other words, the public must feel9

Ibid., p. 661.

10

Gerhard Kümmel and Nina Leonhard, “Casualties and Civil-Military Relations: The German
Polity between Learning and Indifference,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 31, No. 4, Summer
2005, pp. 513-516.

11

Ibid., p. 530.

32

that it is adequately informed and agree with the proposition that meeting international
peacekeeping responsibilities may lead to the loss of lives.12
These scholars do not necessarily mention family support in relation to the legitimacy
of soldiers' death, however, the discussions can be understood in the way that sufficientfamily support needs to be present and functioning in order to reach the point where thestrong sense of legitimacy becomes solidified and well-established both in the military
and the society. The fact that there is a strong sense of legitimacy can also be understoodas the reflection from the military and the society that sufficient and functioning family
support structures were present. In this way, family support could be understood both as
the condition for and the consequence of such legitimacy.
Another set of literature is a case study of JSDF families. The scholars in this fieldcommonly emphasize the vivid lack of practical structure for family support, particularly
for the military wives, and thus alerting that such a system needs to be strengthened.
Atsuko Fukuura (2012) contributed another perspective in her 2012 article “Getting
Involved: Relocation, Overseas deployment and Spouse Clubs for Japan Self Defense
Officers.” Fukuura sheds light on the wives of JSDF soldiers, presenting ethnographic
details about a number of spouses of soldiers serving abroad, with a focus on the JSDF’s
informal dimensions of assistance (in addition to the institutional support provided) tomilitary families.
In her article, “Ambiguous Positioning of Military Wives: Exclusion and RelianceTechniques in Japan,” Atsuko Fukuura (2017), based on her interviews with a number of

12

Ibid.

33

wives of JSDF members, analyses the relations with their husbands experiencing mental
health issues suffered during the services.
The issue of mental health in relation to the military and society is also studied indetail by Hitoshi Kawano (2013). His article, “Studies in clinical sociology on the JSDF's
Overseas Activities”, compares the US, UK, and Japanese systems for mental healthtreatment for the soldiers and their military families serving abroad. He argues that, whilesome US and UK examples should be learnt and followed, more extensive measures arenecessary to accommodate the specific circumstances suited to the JSDF requirements.
Although the scholars of military families above do not directly touch upon the issueof deaths of soldiers, their unanimous warnings to the readers of the permanent andconstant absence of family support in general imply that family support structure fordeaths of soldiers needs to be also strengthened likewise.

3. The Bundeswehr’s experiences
The rationale for studying German experiences
This section argues that many of the experiences and practices in the Bundeswehr canbe learnt for preparation for Japan’s family support in case of deaths in overseas missions.
The rationales for examining the German cases are at least four-fold. First, since its
establishment in 1955, the Bundeswehr has gone through democratisation after WWII
and has committed itself to building its democratic armed forces that actively contributeto international peace and stability. Secondly, as in the case in Japan, after some
controversies in the Parliament, Germany sent the Bundeswehr to its first UNPKO

34

Briefing
mission to Cambodia in 1992, conducting engineering activities such as repairing roads

German Military Casualties in Military Missions Abroad since 1

and buildings. The stark difference is that the Bundeswehr experienced its first casualty
amongst the members in UNPKO. Military•

Suicides•Afghanistan•

Kosovo27•

Bosnia & Hercegovina

19

related deaths as well as accidents and suicides —

•
•
•
•
•

Mali
Cambodia
Georgia
Iraq
Adriatic Sea

2
1
1
1
1

reached 108 to date (table 1), whereas Japan has

•

Total

casualties continued in the Bundeswehr’s activities
in its UNPKO and other out-of-area missions andthe total of deaths of soldiers — including combat-

experienced no casualties in foreign missions.
Forth, as will be examined below, there are a

22.08.201722
Combat-Related
Other

35
21

108

Bundeswehr Center of Military History and Social Sciences

Table 1. Number of soldiers’ deathin the Bundeswehr’s missions
abroad (source: the Bundeswehr
2017)

variety of support systems offered directly andindirectly to the families that experienced or have any concerns of death (or any kind ofanxieties and stresses) of soldiers during their deployment outside Germany.

German Armed Forces Centre for Military Mental Health (Psychotrauma Centre)13
The Trauma Centre is a part of the Military Hospital14 (Bundeswehrkrankenhaus)
which belongs to the Ministry of Defense. The Pscyhotrauma Centre hosts several
effective programmes for psychological support for the Bundeswehr soldiers deployed to13This section is based on the author's interviews with the psychologists, psychiatrists, and othermental health programme officers at the German Armed Forces Centre for Military Mental
Health, Berlin, 2 May 2018. The information in this section is also based upon the unpublishedmanuscripts delivered at the time of the interviews mentioned above. These include the following:
Antje Bühler, “Parallel Process: In case of death or wounded soldiers”, Bundeswehrkrankenhaus
Berlin , 2 May 2018; Ulrich Wesemen, “Psychological Fitness”, Bundeswehrkrankenhaus Berlin,
2 May 2018; Ulrich Wesemen, “Evaluation of a Technology-based Adaptive Learning andPrevention Program for Stress Response – Charly” Bundeswehrkrankenhaus Berlin, 2 May 2018;
and Gerd Willmund, “Deployment Related Disorders: Treatment/Research Approaches”,
Bundeswehrkrankenhaus Berlin, 2 May 2018.

14<http://www.sanitaetsdienst-bundeswehr.de/> (last accessed on 15 January 2019)35

foreign missions and their family members. It conducts programmes in each of the predeployment, post-deployment, as well as during the deployment to foreign countries.

Technology-based PTSD prevention programme for pre-deployment soldiers
Amongst its pre-deployment programmes is the technology-based prevention of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological problems for soldiers. A
software specifically designed for this service named “Charly” can identify soldiers who
are more likely to have potential risks of psychological problems such as PTSD in the
future out-of-area missions. “Charly” contains games and virtual reality programmes thatemulate real-time combat and other difficult situations that require the soldiers' stressful
reactions.15 The programme shows the soldiers’ some stressful photos that were actuallytaken during the past foreign missions, including the scenes in fire-exchange combat,
dead bodies, a number of wounded civilians and soldiers covered in blood and their bodyparts violently damaged. It also contains other stress moments such as the one in which
they are being placed in a tense patrol duty at the frontline and the one in which their unit
companion is being killed in front of them. The Centre used it for the soldiers scheduled
to be deployed to Afghanistan under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
for six months.

Group consultation on “Why go, why not go”
Another service provided by the Psychotrauma Centre is a psychological consultation
with soldiers to be deployed abroad. Such soldiers typically ask themselves questions
regarding the rationale for serving overseas and their family issues. The Centre reveals
15

Author’s interview, Trauma Centre, Military Hospital, Berlin, 2 May 2018.

36

that their common consultation topic is not simply that they are preoccupied with theirfamily members and partners left behind during their foreign service, but rather that theyoften contemplate the real value in serving abroad while sacrificing their loved ones
behind with risk of damaging the relationship with them. The Centre also offers
consultations for those who have declined to serve foreign missions for various personalreasons (e.g. family and health issues). They come to discuss whether their decision to
decline was correct as they sometimes find themselves guilty albeit their fully legitimate
excuses.
During deployment, the Centre dispatches military psychologists in the deployedunits making them accessible for any time necessary. The Centre has a standard protocolin case of soldiers’ death and serious wound. The Centre has an agreement with the media
to hold at least for the first two hours before any broadcast of news about deaths andserious wound of soldiers. This is to prevent the news from reaching their family members
prior to first formal incident reports directly to their family from the unit. Anothercharacteristic feature about the Centre's protocol is cooperation with the military police.
The military police together with the Centre produce investigative reports detailing thecauses and processes of the death of soldiers at a particular scene in the mission field.
Such reports are useful not solely for the incident accountability purpose but also for theCentre's consultation services at a post-deployment stage. The Centre also explains that,in the event of deaths or severe wound, the surviving companion soldiers typically ask
themselves their personal responsibilities for the event and feel guilty for any of their
mistakes they might have made even in the (most) cases in which the events have no
direct causal relations.

37

Post-deployment face-to-face consultations play vital roles for the soldiers that haveexperienced difficulties in the mission theatres. Those that the Centre consulted so far
include a driver affected by improvised explosive devises (IED) in Afghanistan where theblast killed his team member. The Centre also explains that a military medical officer
who once suffered from the psychological difficulties after facing a combat situation in
Afghanistan decided to return to his Afghan mission after its psychological consultation
at this Centre.

Tour to the site where soldiers fell
Another essential support provided by the Centre is a “tour” to the location of thedeath of soldiers. The Centre escorts, if any request is placed, family members andpartners of the deceased soldiers to the site of the mission where the soldiers lost theirlives. By using the information collected during the aforementioned incident report, theCentre details to the family as to exactly where and how the death occurred. This kind oftour already took place in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The psychologists in the Centre
unanimously agree that this activity has proven highly effective for the bereaved family
members to accept the deaths by actually experiencing and sharing the time and placeposthumously, through which they gradually absorb and understand the reality of thetragedy. For this reason, the Centre is to continue with this programme for future missions
abroad.

38

Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre (Zentrum Innere Führung)16
The Leadership Development and Civil Education Centre (Zentrum Innere Führung)was first established in 1957 and has been relocated in Koblenz since 1981.17 This centre(hereafter “ZIF”) hosts a number of training and educational programmes aimed atdeveloping military discipline, philosophy, and integration, to better serve the state andthe society. Each year the ZIF hosts more than 250 seminars and events designed todevelop soldiers' ethics, leadership, philosophy, and disciplines, in which a total of 12,000
soldiers visit and learn annually (figure 1). The ZIF also offers various support
programmes related to deaths of soldiers in overseas missions.
The ZIF hosts a programme to provide a license to
be a “peer”, a status in the Bundeswehr soldiers of aconsulting “mate” for other soldiers of pre- and postdeployment as well as during their deployment. The
license lasts five years and can be renewed upon re-

Figure 1. “Peer” leadershiptraining programme. Source:
Zentrum Innere Führung, 2017.

training. The “peers” are often met by their fellow
soldiers before and after the foreign deployment for consultations on common topics suchas risks of marital relationships, legal procedures required to take long-term leaves ofabsence from the service. The “peers” also organise group consultations with thosesoldiers feel necessary particularly after the foreign deployment, called Post-Deployment
Seminars (PDS). Distinct from the specialised consultation provided by the above-

16

This section is based on the author’s interview and unpublished manuscripts published at the
Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre (Zentrum Innere Führung), Koblenz,
Germany, 3 March 2018.

17

Its local offices are located in Hamburg and Strausberg.

39mentioned Psychotrauma Centre, the PDS is held in a more relaxed, open atmosphere toencourage freer exchanges of feelings and ideas. The common topic brought by the postdeployed soldiers is the question about the meaning and value of their service away fromhome. They typically start asking, “What was our deployment about anyway?” It is
important, the officers in the ZIF emphasises, that these soldiers never talk about theseissues to their family members, but they do so actively when they gather around the “peers”
who had experienced through the same or similar challenges. It is thus crucial for the
post-deployed soldiers to have such opportunities and spew out their inner emotions,questions, concerns and frustrations and share with other colleagues under the leadershipof the “peers”.
United Nations Training Centre for the Bundeswehr (Vereinte Nationen
Ausbildungszentrum der Bundeswehr)18
The

UnitedNations

CentrefortheBundeswehr(Vereinte

Nationen

Ausbildungszentrum der Bundeswehr) (hereafter “UNTCB”) is located at Hammelberg,
Bavaria, and is a multinational training facility centre for pre-deployment soldiers to
missions abroad. The UNTCB is specialised in providing these actors with practical,
action-based training particularly in hostile circumstances in foreign missions. Due to thevery nature of the purpose of this training centre, there are a number of programmes
directly related to deaths of soldiers particularly during combat in missions abroad.
Hostile environment awareness training
First, the UNTCB offers hostile environment awareness training not only to the
Bundeswehr soldiers but also to other civilians such as the police, journalists, government
18This section is based on the author’s interviews at the United Nations Training Centre for the
Bundeswehr, 4 May 2018.

40

officers, and non-governmental organisation workers. This training gives them
opportunities of being placed under heavy fire exchanges and being taken hostage by amilitant group and trains how to survive in such hostile situations. It also provides training
on landmine awareness, surveillance techniques, and patrolling skills. The training servesopportunities for civilians, particularly journalists, to be more familiar with hostile andcombat situations through which the participants come to have more understandings
about the details of the deployed soldiers’ procedures particularly in a crisis case. An
officer reveals that journalists who attended this training tend not to make groundlesscriticisms about the military particularly in the events of soldiers’ death or wound, whileothers easily question the responsibility for the Bundeswehr’s appropriate actions toprevent tragic events.

Body-undertaking course
Another characteristic training that the UNTCB offers is a body-undertaking course.
It is a 10-day voluntary participating class — open to any interested soldiers from theArmy, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Military Police — and contains training subjects
such as corpse hygienic care, body transportation, legal issues involving undertaking, andstress control for handling corpse and wounded (figure 2). It uses both photographic
images as well as real corpses. The actual undertaking classes are held in cooperation
withaprivateFigure 2. Tools
used for bodyundertaking
processes.
Source: United
Nations Training
Centre for the
Bundeswehr,
2017.

41

Figure 3. Tools
used for bodyundertaking
processes.
Source: United
Nations Training
Centre for the
Bundeswehr,
2017.

Figure 4.
Coffins readyto be shippedto theBundeswehr’s
mission areas.
Source: United
Nations
Training Centre
for theBundeswehr,2017.

undertaking and funeral academy on an annual contract basis. Bodies are leased andoffered voluntarily from the families wishing to contribute to the UNTCB so that thetrainees are able to feel the authentic touch, smell, and other feelings in handling the deadbodies. They also learn how to lay the corpse into a coffin after implementing hygienic
and cosmetic treatment (figure 3). An undertaking trainer explains that the course evolved
from the past mistake where the Bundeswehr soldiers found themselves without evencoffins, equipment and knowledge of treating and transporting four fallen soldiers in
Afghanistan back to Germany. This course also teaches how to prepare so-to-speak a “gopack” where every unit needs to carry for preparation of deaths of soldiers when they are
deployed abroad. This package typically contains coffins in which necessary items suchas a flag, helmet, and easel are stored. (figure 4).

42Apart from the technical perspective, the significance of this specific course ismanifold. First, during the practice, some soldiers get to know their personal
psychological limit to which they can handle corpses (which by no means failure to thiscourse). This helps identify those who are and those who are not capable of facing thedead. This trainer explains that it is an important process for the soldiers to understandand accept deaths in their own term either by being able or not being able to confront thetreatment of the corpse. Second, through the exercise, the participating soldiers could
develop a feeling of integrity and a kind of “buddy” spirit. This means that they begin tofeel they will treat their colleague's remain if something happened to him/her. Third, theirundertaking skill helps develop trust with the communities of the mission theatre. Several
German soldiers deployed in Afghanistan treated a deceased child, who was a son of agovernor, which resulted in building good cooperative relations with the German forces
later. Finally and more importantly, the undertaking skills can eventually protect thesoldiers themselves from the families of the dead soldiers and the media when any kindsof misunderstandings and accidents were involved.

Military chaplaincy19
Approximately 100 Roman Catholic priests and 75 Protestant pastors are registeredas a military chaplain in the Bundeswehr. This means there is at least one chaplain isavailable for every 1,700 soldiers. The Bundeswehr chaplains are deployed in every
mission abroad; 2 were sent to Afghanistan, and one deployed to Mali. With regards todeath of soldiers, chaplains' roles include pre-deployment discussions on being killed and19This section is based on the author’s interview with a Bundeswehr chaplain, Berlin, 22 August
2017.

43

killing. The discussions do not necessarily relate to theological, but the pre-deployment
soldiers are given opportunities to talk freely. Nevertheless, pre-deployment consultations
and discussions with chaplains usually tend to focus on such topics as family issues andpartners. The deployed embedded chaplains in the mission fields are not given any
military rank so that the soldiers from any ranks feel comfortable to approach.
In the event of death of soldiers, chaplains are required to arrive at the site of theincident before the arrival of the media and other civilians outside the military. While themost significant share of the military chaplains' roles in this incident is to organise andconduct memorial services in the mission area as well as in Germany, equally importantis the post-funeral grief care for the families. According to a military chaplain, most of
the colleagues of the deceased soldier hardly talk about their grief and other emotions
partly because they believe doing so is considered to be weak. Nevertheless, they do begin
to expose their emotions when they gather in a small group for this purpose organised bya military chaplain purposely dressed in a civilian costume. This chaplain evaluates that
this is another important and necessary step for the surviving soldiers to understand andovercome the deaths of fellow soldiers. The chaplains also provide some practicalsuggestions and requests to the Bundeswehr based on their experiences in treating thedead. For example, the chaplains observed a number of media groups rushed to the airport
when the coffin of the first casualty arrived from the Cambodian mission, photographingand video-taking the arrival of the remain and interviewing the families. Witnessing these
events too disturbing to the bereaved families, the chaplains requested the Bundeswehr toisolate the media in this specific moment and give a separate occasion for official
interview sessions in the absence of the devastated family members.

44

Ombudsman group20
Approximately 60 ombudsmen are working as “parliamentary commissioners” in theombudsman group for the Bundeswehr. The group was set up to safeguard the interests
and the rights of the Bundeswehr soldiers. It receives various complaints and requests
from any Bundeswehr soldiers — COs or NCOs, regardless of their service areas — for
any issues concerning the soldiers' work and living environment in missions inside andoutside the country. The complaints and requests are often equipment-related. The
Ombudsman group receives approximately 6,000 such complaints annually. Some
serious cases include those that alarm that the field soldiers are told to use badly
maintained equipment due to budget constraint causing severe safety issues in the field.
The ombudsman group may dispatch an investigative tour to the site of the incidents andproblems in mission field outside Germany. The Ombudsman’s parliamentarycommissioners are required to produce an annual report which is to be publicised on theinternet openly. Further, they are given authority to speak in the national parliament.
Based on the reports, the commissioners are given authority not only to inform as well as
question the Defense Minister and other related ministers in the parliamentary hearings.
While most of the concerns are related to technical issues such as difficulties ofaircraft spare parts in meeting NATO standard, some complaints on the serving
conditions in foreign missions proved to increase the safety of the soldiers. The
Ombudsman group found that tanks and other equipment used in the earlier missions in
the Balkans were not re-painted appropriately to match the desert in Afghanistan,increasing the risk of the soldiers being exposed to armed groups. Also, a complaint was
20

This section is based on the author’s interview with the members of the ombudsman group,
Berlin, 21 August 2017.

45

placed to the Ombudsman group on the use of unarmed military convoy bus for the
deployed soldiers in Afghanistan when it was severely attacked by a terrorist group,causing four deaths of soldiers and 31 injuries. The complaint was not only about thequality of the convoy bus itself but also about the unit's overconfidence of the German
unit that it believed it won sufficient local trust from the residents that led to perceive aterrorist attack unlikely.

Military Union (Deutscher Bundeswehr Verband)21
The purpose of the military union for the Bundeswehr soldiers is to protect their workrelated rights. With regards to death of soldiers, the Union’s role has caught many
soldiers' attention when the first soldiers lost their lives in the foreign missions in
Cambodia and Afghanistan since the Union assisted their families in many aspects. First,
the Union helped the families with a number of necessary legal issues necessary to receive
insurance and other financial compensation. The Union also lobbied to the Ministries of
Defense and of Finance for legal reforms for support for the surviving families. Moreover,it also lobbied the Ministry of Defense to expand more opportunities for the soldiers who
seriously injured (e.g. amputated soldiers) during the foreign missions but wish tocontinue serving in the military. Further, it also assisted in defending the surviving
soldiers and families from the series of media inquiries and interviews after the death
incidents in the mission field that negligently seek personal accusations over the incident.

21

This section is based on the author’s interview with the members of the Military Union in chargeof public relations, Berlin, 21 August 2017.

46

The Bundeswehr Museum of Military History22
There are two Bundeswehr military museums in Germany: one is located in Dresden
and the other in Gatow near Berlin. The former exhibits a number of collections related
to the loss of the Bundeswehr soldiers during foreign missions starting from Cambodia
in 1993. It exhibits materials including uniform worn by the fallen soldiers, damaged
vehicles (real object) by bombs, diaries and personal letters, the chalice and corporal used
for the on-site ceremony conducted by the military chaplain, together with a number ofphotos demonstrating the damages of the attack when the fallen soldiers were involved(figure 5). It also displays near-real human body wax effigies in various combat fields
emulating the soldiers’ injuries leading to death.

Figure 5. Two
examples from theexhibitions at the
Bundeswehr
Museum of Military
History. Missal tools
used at the on-site
ceremony (left),
Vehicle attacked in
Afghanistan mission(right) Source:
Bundeswehr
Museum of Military
History

The curator, who himself served in the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, explains thatthe exhibiting articles are either donated or borrowed from the bereaved families in thehope that museum visitors could feel more directly by looking at the items left behind thefallen soldiers and better understand what it means to lose soldiers' life in the military.
The same curator also reveals that military families often visit the museum to remember

22This section is based on the author’s interviews with curators and archivists, at Bundeswehr
Museum of Military History, Berlin-Gatow, 8 March 2017, and at Bundeswehr Museum of
Military History, Dresden, 18 August 2017. The details of the Museum can be seen at its official
website at <www.mhmbw.de/> (last access on 1 January 2019).

47

the dead. Other curators emphasise the significance of the military museum, particularly
the one in Dresden, in the context of family support for deaths of soldiers. The museum
has a solid exhibiting policy of intentionally uncovering all possible exhibitions of articles
related to the past deaths of the Bundeswehr soldiers so as to provide opportunities forthe visitors to ask themselves about each incident and the values of the soldiers'
contribution. They point out that the Military Museums play a role of projecting importantquestions to the society about the significance — whatever the visitors’ politicalorientations may be — of the Bundeswehr’s contribution to international peace and that
contribution often accompanies human costs.

Forest of Remembrance (Der Walt der Erinnerung)23
The Forest of Remembrance (Der Walt der Erinnerung) is located in Potsdam and isa part of the Bundeswehr facility specifically dedicated to all who died during theBundeswehr’s missions abroad. The Forest is situated in a remote area, giving a spacious
and quiet atmosphere. The facility is not a cemetery but a place for personal mourning
open to the public in general. It consists of several sections including the one in which
cenotaphs are erected that specify the names of the fallen soldiers and the mission, andthe one displaying photos of the on-site memorial services for the fallen soldiers (figure6). Another unique site in this Forest is that a portion of the grove is open to the bereaved
families where they are allowed to designate one specific tree and decorate with items of
personal memories such as the soldier's nameplate, photo, flowers, and personal messages,
nailed to the tree (figure 7). A Bundeswehr officer in charge of the Forest explains that

23This section is based on the author’s interview at Der Walt der Erinnerung, 22 August 2017.

48

the surviving families pay a regular visit to the Forest, particularly to the specific tree. He
adds that official visits from both German and foreign militaries and other guests are heldin this Forest in commemoration of the soldiers who lost their lives during the missions
abroad. The same officer emphasises that the Forest is one of the significant places forthe bereaved families that provides them with direct, personal, and emotional contacts
Figure 6. One of
the cenotaphs
with the names,
mission of thefallen soldiers
inscribed (left),Photosdisplaying thedeath incidents
in the missions
abroad. Source:
Der Walt derErinnerung,photographed by
the author

Figure 7. Trees
decorated by the
bereaved militaryfamilies inremembrance ofthe fallen soldiers.
Source: Der Walt
der Erinnerung,photographed by
the author

with their loved ones where they can re-recognise the value of the soldiers’ life
contribution to the missions. The designated tree also has specific significance for thefamilies as the tree is personifying their loved one that symbolises his/her attachment to
the Bundeswehr as a significant contributor yet resting in the tranquil nature.

49

Community Family Support Centres
There are 31 Community Family Support Centres throughout Germany. This centre
provides support for the military families particularly where their family member is being
deployed outside Germany. More than 90% of such families join the centre’s network.
Each centre is typically staffed by two commanders and three civilians with someexperiences in the military. Its typical support activities include such activities asweekend BBQ, visit to a local zoo, and information-sharing on community events. It also
shares basic information about the whereabouts of the mission fields where their member
soldiers are being deployed. The families are given opportunities to learn basic knowledge
about the field information, living and service conditions of the soldiers in the field.
In any event of death of soldiers, this centre assists, if requested, in preparing
ceremony arrangements, such as decorations, cascades, photos, and other equipment
necessary for both military and civilian funerals. The centre also helps coordinate griefconsultations with a local military chaplain and civilian counsellors. Often appreciatedassistance is financial support temporarily necessitated for funeral and post-funeralarrangements for the bereaved families. Another assistance that has proven efficient andhelpful by the surviving soldiers and families is that of offering links to a civilian PTSD
and other psychological counsellors for those who have mental challenges after the deadly
event. The surviving soldiers and families often find themselves difficult to arrange
consultations with military psychologists as they are often occupied. For this reason, thecentres keep available information network for psychologists and other mental clinics andcounsellors who could well-suit this specific case.

50

4. Conclusion
Japan has yet to prepare itself for treating deaths of soldiers in missions abroad,particularly for the ones fallen during combat-related incidents in the future. The existing
literature related to military death suggests that inadequate understanding of soldiers’
sacrifice amongst the public leads to a decline for public support for missions abroad,particularly for combat-related tasks in out-of-area missions. The existing studies alsosuggest that support for military families in Japan faces constant short of services andthus requires urgent improvements. Under these circumstances, Japan needs to prepare
itself for establishing family support services in case of any death incidents in foreign
missions. A number of such practices and services can be learnt from the Bundeswehr.
First, the German experiences offer opportunities for the soldiers to enhance their own
understandings of deaths and sacrifice in a foreign mission. Individual as well as groupconsultations and discussions specifically designated for this purpose allow them to
explore and develop their own philosophical, spiritual, and psychological dimensions ofmilitary deaths. The Psychotrauma Centre's consultation can prevent and cure those whohave PTSD and other mental difficulties caused by death-related incidents in the combat
fields. Discussions and consultations held under the leadership of the Bundeswehr
chaplains and the “peer” leaders trained by the ZIF provide the soldiers — in a more
informal atmosphere — with more room to explore and rediscover their consciousness ofdeaths as well as clarifying legal and the practicalities concerning the casualty-related
formalities for their families. The training hosted by the UNTCB give realistic
experiences through the life-threatening crisis awareness courses and the bodyundertaking skill classes, which the participating soldiers and other civilians (in the caseof the latter) can face deaths in a most direct form.

51Second, the German experiences also demonstrate the richness of the practical family
support services that can deliver direct care to bereaved families. The Psychotrauma
Centre's initiative to bring the surviving families to the site of the soldier's death has
proven a potent instrument for them to accept and justify the death of their loved ones.
Post-mortem grief care given by the military chaplains as well as financial and otherpractical assistance for funeral arrangements provided by the community family support
centres is vital hands-on help schemes required immediately after the death while thefamily members have fallen devastated in confusion.
Third, the German services offer assistant that helps cement spiritual and emotionalties amongst the fallen soldiers, their surviving colleagues and families, and theBundeswehr as a whole, encouraging the public’s consciousness of remembrance of thedead. The Bundeswehr Military History Museums display a number of photos andsometimes disquieting authentic post-incident objects informing and questioning themuseum visitors of the meanings of human sacrifice in contribution to international peace.
The role of the Forest is similar but more directly appealing to the visitors. The place is
specifically dedicated to the fallen in foreign missions, and their names are inscribed. The
official ceremonies taken place around the monuments provide the families and the publicwith the Bundeswehr’s vigorous gesture of remembrance of their contribution.
Fourth, the German practices also reveal the significance of institutionalised support
infrastructure for any soldiers and their families who may have to face death in a varietyof aspects of their life. Lobbying activities by the military union as well as the
Ombudsman group to protect the soldiers’ rights have been proven feasible and effective
because the support structures are legally guaranteed, allowing the requests are formally
filed, monitored, and evaluated. In the same token, the support activities offered by the52

Community Family Support Centres are carefully programmed and organised withprofessionals in the fields of family and health cares in many aspects designed to better
match the needs of the families.
It is not to say that all these services and activities can be simply imitated to the casein Japan, but careful examinations must be made for future implementation to best fit theunique Japanese legal, cultural, financial and other circumstances. Nevertheless, theexamples from the Bundeswehr need to be considered as effective references for a starting
point for any initial step for improving family support services for future death of JSDF
soldiers in missions abroad. Should bereaved families feel treated insufficiently after theirmember’s death, they would gradually lose trust towards the JSDF. This may wellcontribute to a lack of public support for any high-risk military activities home and abroad,
eventually further contributing to discouraging the JSDF’s recruitment policy in the longrun.
In the near future, Japan will have to confront itself with an inevitable necessity toembark on family support services and programmes for these specific purposes. Failure
to prepare for them may well inflict this chain of the vicious circle.

53

54

A Study on the ROK Armed Forces’ Military Family Support Policy--- From Private Domain to Public Domain

Youngju Lee
Korea Military Academy / Republic of Korea

Men who are over 20 years old in Korea and who do not have health problems should all
be obligated to serve the national defense. That is why before sons are sent to the army,mothers prepare and read the following books, Majesty's Military Life Guide or The
Military Story, both of which mothers and sons should know before military enlistment.
Accordingly, in Korea, it is rather difficult to find a family that does not have relatives in
the military. But in this presentation, we are targeting military professionals, not soldiersworking in the military for only about 22 months.
The military has a different character than other organizations. Despite the opinion
that it is being transformed into an occupational organization, the military still demands
devotion and self-sacrifice, and soldiers acknowledge this. In short, the military can be
described as a “greedy institution”.1 In particular, it is a problem that this organization
demands devotion and sacrifice not only from soldiers but also from their families. To
fulfil the demands of the military, the military family as well as military professionals
need to adapt themselves to peculiar military circumstances. However, there are

1 Lewis A. Coser: Greedy Institutions: PATTERNS OF UNDIVIDED COMMITMENT, New Yo

rk: Free Press, 1974, pp.166.
55

exceedingly few studies on military families in Korea. The paucity of research on the
military family is partly due to the unique role of the Korean military in the nation’s geopolitical situation and partly due to confidential security-based reasons. Certainly, many
world-class forces in other national contexts already recognize military families as partof the national army. We must also, therefore, pay attention to the support of them as they
form the basis for the influx of talented people and for military welfare.

I. Challenges of a Military Family
According to the Military Welfare Basic Act of 1997, the military family includes, first,
the spouse; in the next category, the direct continuity of the relevant person and the
spouse; and in a broad sense, the lineal descent of the person and the spouse. As we havementioned above, the military needs more sacrifice and support from the family than otherjobs. In this chapter, I try to analyze the practical difficulties experienced by militaryfamilies. The characteristics of the military family are described in the following section.

1. Sharing of Responsibilities and Burden
Military Families have joint responsibilities and joint burden-sharing. Soldiers performtheir duties with their lives at stake, such as participating in combat or dangerous fighting.
They live with the possibility that they may face a situation in which they have to sacrifice
their lives for the nation and the people, and such a burden is shared by their families.
When a soldier dies or is seriously hurt, the normal life of the soldier's family very soon
becomes difficult. The soldier’s family has a sense of obligation to live through suchanxiety and worry.

56

2. Frequent Movements and Isolation
Due to Korea’s security situation and military unique situation, most soldiers live inremote backwoods or battlefront areas, and most serve in poor surroundings, such as
operational missions and emergency stand-bys. According to the research, the average
number of Change of residence in the military life of a soldier is 16.2 times. For thisreason, their families also have to live an isolated life and are separated from generalsociety for a long period. This isolation causes problems such as in the matters ofchildcare, education, housing, and welfare. The families also have a hard time to adjust
to new environments due to frequent movements. They suffer from the shortage ofcultural facilities and daily necessities. Especially, discontentment about their educational
environment is high, particularly among those military families with children in middle
school or higher levels. In addition, frequent moves aggravate their economic hardshipand ensure that the military communities that are formed are only temporary. Moving
locales usually occurs once a year, and the process costs a good deal both through direct
and indirect causes.

3. Irregular Working Patterns and Working Hours
Other major stress factors are long working hours and irregular work schedules. Irregular
official work and frequent recalls make a serviceman unable to regularly help in any
family work that is related to household tasks and to childcare with the result that mostof it has to be done by the wife. The wives regret that their husbands cannot share theexperience of childbirth because of duties. Until recently, however, wives did not
typically regard this circumstance as unfair because most other military families in othernational contexts were living in the same situation. But, currently, roles between husbands

57and wives—between men and women—are becoming unclear; this means that wives andchildren are demanding more and more roles and responsibilities for their husbands andfathers.

4. Transformed Family Type Focused on One Parent
This is why child-centered families with high educational aspirations are voluntarilychoosing to live separately. The rigidity of the educational administration in Korea gives
them no other choice. These factors hinder stable family life. This transformed family
type, in which all the responsibilities and roles of one parent are transferred to the otherparent, has become solidified. Because most of the soldiers are men, their wives’ roles
have expanded. Soldiers' wives require abilities in variety of areas when their husbands
are not available due to the peculiarities of their job requirements. Regular absences ofhusbands demand strong emotional stability and the ability to endure loneliness. Somecouples form a separate life pattern firmly when the absence is prolonged. So, when theirhusbands return home, they have a hard time adjusting to the reunion.
Lydia Sloan Cline's book Today`s Military Wife, which has already been published in
the seventh edition, is recognized as a guide for wives with husbands who have such a
special military career.2 The book prescribes for soldiers’ wives patience, “elbow grease(the effort used in physical work)”, courage, tolerance, and a dash of adventure. 3
According to her, in order to become a good soldier’s wife, a positive attitude is needed
2 Vgl. Lydia Sloan Cline: Today`s Military Wife. Meeting The Challenges of Service Life, Stackpole

Books 1989.: Recipe for a Military Wife -1 1/2 spoons patience, 2 tablespoon elbow grease, 1 pound
courage, 1 cup tolerance, dash of adventure Marinate frequently with salty tears and pour off excess
fat. Sprinkle ever so lightly with money, kneading dough well until payday. Season with international
spices. Bake for twenty years or until done. Serve with pride!

58

to understand the job of a soldier first and then to positively discover the benefits that asoldier can receive. It is based on the belief that the “strong forces of [the] US Army startat home.” In modern society, however, the family is dominated by a couple of nuclear
families and the power relations of the couple are equalized. Therefore, in this type offamily where one parent is absent for a long time, the role of the other, mainly the wife,
becomes excessive, and that leads to serious marital problems. This can also cause
problems with child development.

5. An Economic Burden
In addition, a majority of soldiers are discharged from the service at between 45 and 56
years of age, having spent the greatest part of their lives in service due to the rank-based
retirement system, and they are under enormous economic pressure. Also guaranteeing
stable housing conditions is extremely important for soldiers who are required to movefrequently and to work in remote areas. Therefore, for families that cannot move into
military residences, it is necessary to borrow money to buy a house. In this case, they
have to pay the loan back over a long period of time.
Military families must cope with many difficulties: living in an isolated environment
with worse living conditions; experiencing frequent moving, poor housing, lack ofsupport for child education and care, limited medical services, and lack of leisurefacilities; and having fathers serving on 24-hour stints as commanders, administrators,
and instructors. The problem of the military family turns out to be more severe thancivilians can imagine. It is suggested that the military administration should be more
flexible in multilateral ways—considering the individual needs of the military family andspecific circumstances around them.

59II. The Function of Military Family
1. The Link between Military and Society
In Korea, military families have different functions compared to families of otherorganizations. Until now, the Korea military has been relative “unsociable” due to security
reasons, and its relationship with the general public and its accessibility for civilians havebeen limited as well. In such circumstances, military families are the primary group thatconnect the military with the general public. Therefore, understanding the military familyis the basic foundation for the understanding and improvement of civil-military relations.

2. Affect the Combat Readiness of the Military
In addition, the stable life of the military family is closely related to national security
issues that directly affect the combat readiness of the military because intangible elements
impact the combat power of soldiers, such as morale, military discipline, and solidarity,
all of which can be derived from their families to a great degree; that is, the stability of
the family leads to the stability of the soldiers and also to the security of the military andthe nation, in turn.

3. Image Enhancement Function for the Military
The military has been transformed from a public organization based on previously held
values such as patriotism or loyalty to a professional model based on economic rewards
and professional stability. This will become the case even more if the current atmosphereof peace in Korea continues. As the military becomes more occupational, the military willcompete with civilian organizations for a good workforce. Among the incentives that the
military can or should present, the compensation system for the soldier himself and his

60

family will work as a prime factor.
In this sense, understanding and closely analyzing the unique characteristics ofmilitary families and their difficulties and needs are necessary. The military and themilitary family are one and the same community. The family also serves. They, as amilitary partner, help soldiers keep to their duty and accomplish the original mission.
Military servicemen and their family members experience not only normal life stress but
also specific job-related stress. Support and social services for military family arenecessary, not optional.

III. Development Process of Korean Military Welfare
1. Changes in the Korean Welfare System
The spouses and children of soldiers live with heavy burdens. But a while ago, Koreansociety did not consider the actual difficulties experienced by military families, such as
moving homes and child education, to be the families’ problems. However, more people
have sympathy for the distinctiveness of military families, and the Korean military is
pushing ahead with an action plan, the [Second Basic Plan for Soldier Welfare] that wasestablished in 2013, so as to expand its support for military families. We can see thechanges in the Korean Welfare System, historically, from the establishment of the ROK
to the current development of National Defence Position.

61

period

welfare policy

the 50s○ A level of urgency to keep a living (payment-in-kind)the 60s○ The beginning of the welfare system○ The expansion of welfare benefits

the 70s- School fees exemption for children; applications available for family
medical insurance; a duty-free goods system; recreation-area constructions○ The establishment of partial mid-term plan

the 80s- 5-year planning for construction of official residences○ The establishment of the Military Mutual Aid Association (1984)○ Military Welfare Fund Act (1995)

the 90s○ The National Pensions Act (2000)○ The expansion and maintenance of official residences○ The implementation of a customized welfare system~ 2016○ Care for soldiers’ couples
In order to solve the housing problem of soldiers, the ministry of national defense(MND) recently sold private apartments to soldiers in collaboration with the Housing
Corporation. In addition, the customized welfare system has made it possible for bothsoldiers as well as their families to buy insurance at low prices. In terms of childeducation, the MND has also established a system to provide incentives to the children ofsoldiers for entering the university. Welfare for military couples is also being considered.

2. Current Military Family Support Policy
It is necessary to develop comprehensive, continuous, further expanded, careful family

62support services based on an objective evaluation of existing support measures. To
improve this, the MND has proposed a large framework for military family support in the
Defence White Paper in 2016.

2.1. Implementing an Effective Military Residence Support Program
In 2016, the MND established the “comprehensive plan for the development of military
housing policies” so as to ensure stable housing conditions for service members, while
reducing its financial burden at the same time. The MND plans to utilize private housing
to a greater extent, thus moving away from the traditional system of the military having
to build its own residences; the MND thus intends to manage military residential
accommodations more efficiently by managing them by region in an integrated manner
rather than by units. This can also stimulate the link between the military and civil society.

2.2. Vitalizing the Maternity Protection System
The MND has implemented policies related to pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare
policies to help career service members attain a good work-family life balance. Startingin 2015, leave of absence due to infertility and subfertility has been guaranteed, and bothmale and female service members can take leave. The duration of the leave has also been
extended to up to two years, and the portion of salary paid during leave has been raised.
In 2016, the MND expanded the eligible members for exemption from night duty due topregnancy and childbirth to include female military civilians, while it raised the allowancepaid during maternity leave to 200,000 won. The military will maintain its efforts to fostera family-friendly military culture by continuously improving the relevant systems
together with the related publicity activities and education.

63

2.3. Expanding Military Childcare Facilities
The MND has secured childcare facilities phase by phase in conjunction with the militaryresidence construction plan in order to improve the military’s challenging childcare
environment. The military now operates 105 military day-care centers (as of October2016), and it plans to build an additional 172 by 2021. The military is striving to reducechildcare blind spots in forward areas by adjusting the requirements for the installation ofa day-care center. Day-care centers were previously available to units with 100 or moremilitary households but are now available to units with 15 or more children who require
day-care. In areas where childcare centers cannot be installed, the MND has establishedthe “cooperative childcare space” concept in coordination with the Ministry of Gender
Equality as well as family and private-sector firms.

2.4. Enhancing the Educational Environment for Military Children
Career service members have long faced the challenge of providing good quality
education for their children as they frequently relocate and often work in remote areas. In
order to assist the education of children who face challenges stemming from the frequent
relocations of their parents, the military is providing support. The military offers thesechildren scholarships and interest-free loans for university tuition fees. The MND has
established the Hanmin High School, a boarding school which provides a stable study
environment for military children. The foundation of a boarding school has boosted themorale of career service members and has helped the military to secure talents sincechildren who are admitted to the Hanmin High School can focus on their studies without
having to transfer to another school because of their parent’s relocations, while theirparents can focus on their military career thanks to the alleviated educational burden.

64

However, there is the drawback that only a small number of children can use theseschemes.

IV. Suggestions for Development
It is true that welfare policies targeting today's military families have become diverse anddelicate. However, it is also true that it is difficult to pursue an integrated and continuous
welfare policy because the welfare policy establishment and enforcement system is still
scattered among various institutions. Also, these measures are focused more on the
hardware part that is centered on food, clothing, and shelter; an in-depth welfare system
has not yet been established yet. In terms of welfare environment, the welfare facilities
operated by the military itself should be opened, and the facilities of civil society should
be shared with each other and closely interacted with each other. This extended welfare
project should create a mutually friendly relationship between ordinary citizens andmilitary families. The military should focus on building a healthy family and its
community to raise the morale and to improve the combat power of the armed forces. The
major direction can be described as follows.

1. An Integrated Support System
First, an integrated support system should be established to promote welfare policies witha specialization in relation to soldiers and their families. There are no dedicateddepartments or agencies in Korea to support military families. The welfare policies which
was until now conducted are mainly carried out under the Ministry of National Defense's
personnel welfare office with other policies. Therefore, it is difficult compared to otherpolicies to be prioritized and to provide systematic support. Specialist groups, dedicated65support organizations, and support systems should be established so that material,
emotional, and psycho-social support can be provided through accurate nvestigation,
analysis, and evaluation of military families.

2. The Housing problem
Second, from the residential perspective, we must escape a residential operation that isdependent on the military official residence. Instead, large-scale integrated residential
complexes and cooperation with communities and exchanges should be formed. In
addition, a more efficient system should be provided to help military families prepare for
their homes so that they can live a stable life after retirement.

3. The Education Problem
Third, educational issues should not be regarded as private concerns. It must also betransformed into a form of coexistence with society away from finding solutions solely
within the military. Furthermore, a system should be established to encourage and support
the education of children as well as other families, typically wives. This can alleviate theisolation of military families and inspire pride as a “family of soldiers.” Through this, theindependence of the military family can be solved, and self-reliance and economic power
can be acquired. If you are interested in going back to school, the Education Center canhelp. Here you can get applications for graduate exams and information on programs,
curricula, and degrees. Out-of-state colleges are contracting with the armed forces to set
up at military installations. You can attend their classes and receive a diploma without
ever having set foot on the main campus.

66

4. Family Service Center
Fourth, military family welfare should be extended to health and medical care as well as
psychological and social support. It is necessary to have a management center, forexample, a family service center, that can solve and control the problems such as transfers,
housing, family problems, and so forth. The mission of the Family Service Center cangive help in both everyday living and in crisis situations so as to make your life lessstressful. Family Service Center provide also role as Legal Aid. Most installations have alegal office. Here one can get free legal advice and assistance. Services offered include
the drawing up of wills, powers of attorney and bills of sale, tenant problems, and theinterpretation of leases, domestic relations, civil rights, and so on.

5. Flexible Working Place and Time
Fifth, the autonomy of working hours and working places will be of great help in securing
the stability of military and military families while aiming to achieve more flexible andefficient performance. For example, teleworking provides flexibility for military
personnel through greater sovereignty in the choice of place of work and working time.
In the case of teleworking, the work is partly carried out at the home workplace at agreedupon attendance times and within the framework of self-determined working hours.
Applications from family and disability workers should, however, be given priority in thisrespect. “Location-independent work” aims to improve the compatibility of family
emergencies and business needs for all of Korea’s military personnel. For example, in
situations where family members of military personnel are unable or insufficiently caredfor or where the temporary presence of commuters is mandatory at home, the specificfamily interest may, under certain conditions, be linked to the needs of the service.

67

However, provision should be made without bureaucratic hurdles for the short-term
application of these needs.

V. Conclusion
The military is an organization that was created for the purpose of maintaining the state.
The characteristics of the organization, such as the absoluteness of purpose, classauthority, and group cohesion, are not only difficult for soldiers but also for militaryfamilies. Since the stability and happiness of the military family is directly connectedwith the stability of the military, the nation, and the people, customized welfare benefits
should be provided for the military families that meet the changes of society. Throughthis, soldiers and military families can live with pride without being tired of their militaryoccupation. Currently, the ROK Armed Forces should carry out a detailed military family
welfare policy under the slogan "state and social stability comes from the health andhappiness of soldiers and their families."

68

The Intention-Realization Discrepancy:
An Anthropological Study of Marriage Hunting with the JSDF
Officials

Atsuko Fukuura
Shiga University/ Japan

１Introduction
This study principally aims to discover the relationship between marriage and military
institutions. For this purpose, based on an anthropological investigation, I focus on
marriage hunting with the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel, especiallycombination on a male member of the JSDF and a female civilian applicant. If marriage
is a new life of two independent persons, it would be an intimate sphere; however, if a
JSDF official is married, it will be affected the institutional logic of a government
agency, in the public sphere.
In Japan, the arranged marriage ratio continues to decline. In around 1950 it was
54%, and in 2015 it was 5.5% [IPSS 2017: 38]. However, in this survey, we cannot
know their chance of coupling, how to know each other. Marriage hunting parties arepeople searching for a marriage partner. It’s popular in Japan, however marriage
hunting party on the JSDF personnel is a kind of targeted marriage measures. The Staff
Office of the JSDF has not concerned about it officially, however the NCO associationin each base has cooperated with it.

69

The JSDF as military institutions shows concern for the marriage, I’ll focus to thesignificance to get marry for the military institutions. According to the Ground SDF,
57% of members are married. The ratio of female members in the JSDF is 6.5% (JSDF
2018). Over 90% of these female members are married. This shows the JSDF is thecentral focus on married man, however they try to turn a single man centered or
rejuvenated on NCO. From 2014, the number of new enlist in the JSDF is decrease andfalls below planned fixed total number. After October 2018, they have expanded tothose enlisted from 26 years of age to 32 years of age. One of the reasons is thedeclining birth rate, besides that there are salary cuts of civil service, civilian companies
extend their hiring of new graduates, and 2015 Japanese military legislation.
In the other research I investigated about marriage hunting in other metropolitanarea, there were many major industries, local people were able to choose many stable
occupations other than JSDF. Mostly female applicants also came from same area.
According to the private marriage hunting agency, after enactment of the 2015 Japanesemilitary legislation civilian female applicants have decreased on this agency (Fukuura inprint). In the 5-metropolitan area, depending on the economic situation and historicalbackground, in some areas the JSDF is still important industry and employer. This time
I focus on such areas.
I present two questions, (1) what were their motives to attend or hold a party? (2)What does the organizer expect from JSDF officials and civilian women applicants?

70

2 Previous studies about civil-military relationships in anthropological andsociological studies
Research on the relationship between family and military careers characterized themilitary institution as greedy: “…two societal institutions—the military and thefamily—intersect. Both make great demands of individuals in terms of commitments,
loyalty, time, and energy; they, therefore, have some of the characteristics of what
Coser calls “greedy” institutions” (Segal, 1986).
After the twenty-first century, research on family functions in the military has
increased, for example, Melvin et al.’s (2015) research on high-functioning army
couples: “The military lifestyle and planned deployment separations create bothchallenges and opportunities for preventive interventions pre- and post-deployment.
…The couples’ strategies of ‘go with the flow’ and ‘open your heart,’ when combinedwith the family strategy of ‘normalizing schedules,’ describe the construction of aflexible framework for building family relationships (Melvin et al. 2015:15).”
Spouses support military member’s domestic lives and the formation of their careers
in military institutions. Recently, many scholars reported that trauma in the militaryfamily heavily influences service member’s deployments, and spouses still havemultiple roles (cf. Spera 2009; Warner 2009; Brockman et al. 2016).
Many scholars have investigated the relationship between families and thefrequency of deployment, considering military family stress and the number and lengthof deployments, parenting, child adjustment, and family readiness (Gewirtz et al. 2017;
Meadows et al. 2017; Pexton & Yule2018).

71

Lundquist and Xu studied marriage and military institutions, stating that “themilitary plays an explicit role in this linking process because it depends upon spousal
support roles to operate. … The military is innately structured to encourage earlymarriage among its recruits so that it can function efficiently. This is seen most clearly
in its provision of a vast safety net and springboard for its members and its formulationof policies specifically intended to make it more convenient to marry than remain
single” (2014: 1066, 1076-1077). Consequently, military institutions expect and compel
member families to adjust to the institutional context; in the other words
reinstitutionalize family. As seen, the military was populated by single males
historically; however, recently the military has expected some family involvement intheir make-up.
In anthropological research on the JSDF, it has been shown that one of thecharacteristics of this institution is using equivocal expressions to obscure a state ofviolence which military institutions have. Following WWII, the military tried to avoid
unfavorable comments from Japanese society.
Ben-Ari and Frühstück mentioned these concrete expressions and methods (Ben-Ari
2011; Frühstück 2008). Furthermore, I researched marriage hunting parties and theirconnection with the local area and JSDF male personnel and female spouses (Fukuura
2019 inprint). In previously mentioned research, I have not yet investigated thesignificance of a marriage hunting for each actor as an organizer and participant. This
paper discusses each actor’s expectation for marriage hunting activities, seen from theperspective of military members and families.

72

Consequently, in this paper, I discuss the relationship between the military
institution and marriage, whereby I explore interactions through organizational
principles as a national public service in which civilians participate.

3 Method
I conducted a semi-structured interview from 2017–2018 for this paper. The subjects
were two female civilian applicants, one male personnel applicant, and four NCO
organizers. One of the female civilian applicants was married to an NCO in a marriage
hunting party, and I interviewed her after she married. Both female civilian applicants
were in their 30s and lived in the metropolitan area. The male personnel applicant wasalso in his 30s, lived in a provincial town, and was affiliated with the same institution.
Of the four NCO organizers, one lived in the metropolitan area, and three lived in aprovincial town; they were in their 40s–50s.

4 Case study about marriage hunting parties
4-(1) Organizers
There are three types of organizers of marriage hunting parties, one is an NCO, thesecond is a joint host organizer, and the third is an individual organizer. Joint hostorganizers include three types: civilian and NCO associations, civilian and OB
associations, and quasi-JSDF organizations assisting the JSDF activities hosting with
NCOs. Parties are generally held in the welfare facility on their institution’s site.
Civilian organizers have held parties in restaurants or outside hotels.

73

Central staff officers do not order the local division to hold parties, but most of thebase host parties. Superior officers order personnel to attend marriage hunting parties. In
the metropolitan area, fewer civilians gathered. After a new mid-term plan for the JSDF,
dynamic internal transfer began in the Ground JSDF; many NCOs also transferredbeyond the jurisdiction control area for four or six years. These mostly single officials
willingly attend marriage hunting parties when they move to a provincial area.

4-(2) Feature of parties
Parties in a metropolitan area…case1
Case one: a party was held in one of the five metropolitan areas, and this city’s
population was about 3 million1. The population is increasing despite the declining
birthrate and age growth, the employment rate of couples is lower than the national
average, the marriage rate is higher, the civil income is lower, the service industry holds
over 30% within industrial structure, and the gross prefectural product is sluggish(Cabinet Office 2017; NIPSSR 2017). The JSDF has become one of the main
businesses in this area.
NCO-A was in his 40s, and he organized marriage hunting parties several times in
the restaurant outside the base. The participants of these events included 30–80 people.
According to NCO-A, the local people understood the JSDF well, and the relationshipbetween local people and the JSDF was moving in a good direction.

1

For example, the Tokyo metropolitan area’s population is about 37 million.

74

He said, “I want to let the young members join a marriage hunting party, my main
target is young NCOs. I hope as many young members as possible will participate withthis . . . [the] General District Commander submitted an order. Fewer and fewer
member[s] come to join the NCO association’s activities, that’s institutional intention, I
think. This association also supports special school students to get around town inwheelchairs”.
This NCO’s association carried out many activities: fruit picking, riding on ahouseboat, watching fireworks, and kimono-wearing classes for the WAC. He said, “thecommander wants to promote our members to volunteer work on their day off. That is
the Commander’s wish.” The NCO’s explained his philosophy behind these activities:“Marriage makes us able to concentrate on working. For this purpose, I try to create aworkplace environment, to increase their willingness to work. I think a stable homeenvironment lets them concentrate on working.”
Every time he gives notices about parties on the website of his base, he provides
applicants with his phone number. Generally, reservations from female civilians are
fully booked before the deadline, and some are in a waiting list. NCO-A explained that,a few years ago, there were very few civilian female applicants, the program at that time
was not popular because of a curling game (played on ice).
When the attendees come to the parties, they filled out profile cards for exchange.
Commonly listed items were name, age, address, academic background, family
members, and hobbies, etc. Female attendee filled in items related to their cooking
specialties and regular days off; while male attendees filled in their annual income,75

whether they had a car, rank in the JSDF, and their birthplace. Gender gaps appeared in
the items which applicants and organizers expected.

Parties in a provincial city…case2
The next case is in the provincial city, where the population is about 40,000, but an
NCO as organizer said one quarter was the person concerned. The population here isdecreasing like in other provincial towns in Japan. In addition to the NCO organizing
marriage hunting parties, there is also an OB association which organizes parties.
Marriage hunting parties with the help of civilian agencies in this base began in2013 and are held twice a year. Assistance from the OB association began in 2015 andare held once a year. The civilian agency invites female civilian participants on their
web site, NCOs ask First Sergeants to call out male participants. According to the NCO
in his 50s, in the beginning, the civilian agency asked to assist in holding marriage
hunting parties, because civilian women tend to believe that JSDF personnel havesteady, official positions, it would be more likely to this tendency in such a suburban
city.
In 2017, the base twice held parties with a civilian agency. At the first party, there
was no limit of the number of male applicants (61 people attended), then they divided
into two sessions per day. Fifty-three women attended, and their age was between 20
and late 40s. The first session included people under the age of 30, and the second
session was for those 30. Some men attended both sessions. At each table seven men
and seven women alternately introduced themselves for one minute, then the men
moved one person along. After this, they played games, chatted freely, then the number
76corresponding to their favorite person on paper. The NCOs collected the papers andcombined matched numbers.
The NCO in his 50s listed three significance of these parties: (1) to prevent the
decline in birthrate; (2) to revitalize their workplace; and (3) to assist soldiers to devote
themselves to their duties by meeting a reliable partner. The NCO in his 40s said, “somepersonnel think about their job as a means for the next step in their career. I don’t intend
to keep them back, but I expect if these personnel meet a partner in this city, they will
try their best to do their job as JSDF personnel.” These two NCO came from otherprefectures, their wives were locals, and they bought their own houses where they lived.
They contributed to the local growth in population.
The OB association believe that marriage with local women is positive. However,this association worked hard to secure female civilian applicants in 2016 and 2017. In
2017, there were 35 male applicants, though the number of females was below therequired figure. The NCO in his 40s explained that the advertisement method wasinappropriate as the OB made announcements on their lesser-known website.
In any case, the NCO intended for marriage hunting parties was to allow personnel
to devote themselves to their jobs after marriage and improve their sense of belonging
to the institution.
At this base in case 2, I also interviewed one NCO in his 30s, who attended amarriage hunting party where he met a partner in 2014 whom he married in 2016.
Before this party he was invited to attend by the first sergeant, the entrance fee for men
was 5,000-yen and 4,500-yen for women. This included a buffet party; 20 men and 20
women were attended. Afterward, he kept company with his prospective partner for 1877months. Their first date was the base as his workplace. His girlfriend did not have any
information about the JSDF, he thought he should introduce her his work. Before theirdate, she also tried to understand his job by reading PR magazines, after they got
married, he knew about it.
When their parents and relatives met for the first time, he wore his uniform torepresent his character and help others understand his job. After they married, he told
his wife that, if anything happened in future, he could be dispatched on duty. She said,“I’m ok as long as you don’t leave me alone.” He meant that he could be killed or
injured on war or dispatch, actually his work would not involve such a fatal job,however in case natural disaster he should dispatch. He expected to obtain wife’s
understanding on this matter, he was not sure she realized this meaning.

Female civilian applicants from the metropolitan are…-case3
Ms. D is in her 30s. When she applied to join a marriage hunting party she lived in a
metropolitan area, where 12 million people lived. In 2017, she attended a party held bycivilian agents and an NCO association outside the base. There were more than 120
participants, and her future husband was present. She has no relatives who are JSDF
personnel. She graduated from university, worked in a private company, then went tostudy abroad. After returning to Japan, she re-visited this foreign country with hermother as tourists. At that time, they came across a kind of revolution in this foreigncountry, unfamiliar foreign countries soldiers protected them under an unstable politicalsituation. Since coming back to Japan, Ms. D attended a marriage hunting with JSDF

78

personnel. Afterward, her opinion about soldiers changed, and she elected to join amarriage hunting party for the JSDF.
Ms. D attended several marriage hunting parties with the JSDF. In the spring of
2016, she met her future husband, and they went out for six months before marrying.
Before marriage, she lived in another metropolitan area, then moved his house, which
he had bought when he was single. After they lived together, he took some insurance,and said, “if something happened, you will be alone but able to make a steady livingwith my insurance.” She told me, “at first I thought he was a careful person, however, I
heard it repeatedly, I began to worry about the possibility.”
Ms. D felt a need for protection by big things from when she was small. Before
attending marriage hunting, she often got on the train and went to see big naval vessels
on her holiday. She explained that maybe her unconscious thoughts led to a hope tomarry military personnel.
One more case is Ms. E in her 30s, who was born and raised in a metropolitan area,
as was Ms. D. She also has no relatives in the JSDF. She began marriage hunting with
JSDF personnel because her favorite actor played the lead in the Airforce SDF story,“Flying Public Relations” on the TV drama. This programme followed a young JSDF
man who built his career under the advice from his senior in the PR division. The
leading character got to know an ordinary woman on the story, at first this woman held
an unfavorable opinion of the JSDF, then they came closer gradually. After the TV
drama series finished, she was very interested in the JSDF and attended the basefestival. Consequently she tried to seek of collecting information and visited several
bases. She then attended marriage hunting parties.

79

5 Conclusion
The male applicants were invited to attend marriage hunting by their superiors in eachaffiliated post. Their base commander guided the representative NCOs. They sponsoredmarriage hunting parties so personnel could meet female partners for marriage, todedicate themselves more fully to their duties, and to reinforce their sense of belonging
to the JSDF.
From the perspective of NCOs, they expected prospective spouses would understandthe collective values of the JSDF as a military institution, would support domestic work,and be prepared for the worst.
For personnel, marriage hunting parties are an opportunity to meet ordinary civilian
women. They are also an opportunity to experience tender attention from these women.
In other words, marriage hunting parties are a chance to build a sense of belonging tomilitary institutions, and to ensure the JSDF has a fair and positive view from society.
This process is similar to the male body construct to the military power, and it
embedded is in masculinity, as Ben-Ari has discussed (cf: Ben-Ari 2017).
One female civilian applicant yearned for military men, and another was affected bytrends in a consumer society, influenced by a TV drama to attend a JSDF marriage
hunting party. Marriage as a local activity influenced global processes.
Conversely, an OB association in a provincial city studied in this paper on the case 2that organized a marriage party over two years did not attract female civilian applicants.
The JSDF personnel are not always well known in their area. Thus, I should investigate
in greater detail about the economic situation, historical background, and specificconditions in each area.
80Each actor’s intention for marriage hunting differed. Military institutions are total
institutions; however, they need to incorporate spouses from outside their structure. In
this sense, marriage is a kind of frontline.

References
Ben-Ari, Eyal. (2011). Public Events and the Japan Self-Defense Forces: Aesthetics,
Ritual Density and the Normalization of Military Violence. Six-Hohenbalken, Maria& N. Weiss eds., Violence Expressed: An Anthropological Approach. Surrey &Burlington: Ashgate, pp.55-69.
Ben-Ari, Eyal. (2017). Weapons as (Lethal) Things: The Body, Emotion and PersonalFirearms in the Military. Japanese Review of Cultural Anthropology. 18(1): 115-127.
Brockman, Callie, James Snyder, Abigail Gewirtz, et al. (2016). Relationship of Service
Members’ Deployment Trauma, PTSD Symptoms and Experiential Avoidance to
Postdeployment Family Reengagement. Journal of Family Psychology. 30 (1): 5262.
Frühstück, Sabine. (2008). Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory and Popular Culture in
the Japanese Army. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fukuura, Atsuko. (In print). Marriage Hunting and Civil-Military Relations in Japan.
Sørensen, R. Birgitte & Eyal Ben-Ari. Eds. Civil-Military Entanglements:
Anthropological Perspectives. New York: Berghahn.
Gewirtz, H. Abigail, D. Degarmo, O. Zamir. (2017). Testing a Military Family Stress
Model. Family Process, 10: 1-17.

81

JSDF. (2018). Defense of Japan 2018. Tokyo: Urban Connections.
Lundquist, Jennife Xu. (2014). Reinstitutionalizing Families: Life Course Policy andMarriage in the r and Zhun Military. Journal of Marriage and Family, 76: 10631081.
Meadows, O. Sara, T. Tanielian, B. Karney, T. Schell, et al. (2017). The Deployment
Life Study: Longitudinal Analysis of Military Families across the Deployment Cycle.
Rand Health Quarterly, 6(2): 7.
Melvin, C. Kristal, J. Wenzel and Bonnie M. Jennings. (2015). Strong Army Couples: A
Case Study of Rekindling Marriage after Combat Deployment. Research in Nursing& Health. 38: 7-18.
Pexton, S. Farrants & W. Yule. (2018). The impact of fathers’ military deployment onchild adjustment. The support needs of primary school children and their families
separated during active military service: A pilot study. Clinical Child Psychology &Psychiatry, 23(1): 110-124.
Segal, Mady. (1986). The Military and the Family as a Greedy Institutions. Armed
Forces & Society. 13(1): 9-38.
Spera, Christopher. (2009). Spouses’ Ability to Cope with Deployment and Adjust to
Air Force Family Demands: Identification of Risk and Protective Factors. Armed
Forces & Society. 35 (2): 286-306.
Warner, H. Christopher, George N. Appenzeller, et al. (2009). Psychological Effects of
Deployments on Military Families. Psychiatric Annals. 39 (2): 56-63.

82

government statistics
Cabinet Office 2017.
https://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/data/kakuhou/files/2017/2017annual_report_e.html(Accessed 14 November 2018)

e-Stat Statistics of Japan. https://www.e-stat.go.jp/dbview?sid=0003149249 (Accessed
14 November 2018)

NIPSSR National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. Population
Statistics of Japan 2017. http://www.ipss.go.jp/p-info/e/psj2017/PSJ2017.asp(Accessed 14 November 2018)

IPSS (The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research). 2017. Annual
Population and Social Security Surveys. www.ipss.go.jp/psdoukou/e/doukou15/Nfs15R_points_eng.pdf (Accessed 14 November 2018)

83

84

Love and the Greedy Institution

René Moelker and Manon Andres
Netherlands Defense Academy/ Netherlands

For those who are at times far away and yet so close

Introduction: love under stress of deployment induced separation
In this study we explored the politics of relations that are under stress, negotiating
military and family life. When love is under stress, tensions can be resolved by trying tokeep the relationship as good as it can be. A practical resolve at the micro individuallevel comes from ‘dating from a distance’, meaning that couples can balance the power
relations between them by relatively simple techniques of communication. Althoughsimple, they are grounded in complex insight into the changes that define modern love.

International research has shown that relations do deteriorate whence they shift into
being long distance relationships, caused by deployment-induced separation. The
statistics indicate that 40 per cent of all long distance relationships break up; four and ahalf months is the average time a long distance relationship breaks up if it is not going85

to work.1 From this data we may tentatively extrapolate that the time halfway to threequarters of a military deployment is the most difficult. Later on in the deployment, there
might be ‘channel fever’, the anticipatory stress one experiences in the anticipation ofhomecoming. In the British and Dutch navies, passing the channel meant that one isalmost home, hence the name ‘channel fever’. At this stage, people (including spousesback home) are nervous, but they are not breaking up. On the contrary, they will soon
enter the phase of marital reconciliation. Sometimes, a deployment makes a relationshipstronger, but more often relationships deteriorate. Longitudinal research among
deployed military personnel and their spouses shows that relationship satisfaction after
the deployment is significantly lower than before the deployment; 18 per cent of therelationships deteriorate considerably, whereas 11 per cent improved significantly(Andres, 2010). In all stages, couples negotiate and renegotiate their relationshipbecause it is always in flux, ever changing and not always for the best. So how to makethe best of it? How to make each other’s lives a little bit happier?

The answer also depends on negotiations at the level of the state and theorganization for it is a political process at three intertwined levels with always three ormore actors involved (see framework presented in chapter 1). The bargain is sometimes
formal or informal, explicit or implicit, and more or less trades of care provisions andremuneration against loyalty, support and labor. At the state level, modernizing
processes result in a shift from institutional to occupational types of covenant. At theorganizational level, one can observe a variety of arrangements that sometimes strongly
1

https://deesdatingdiary.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/making-a-long-distance-relationship-work-

infographic.jpg (Accessed 28 November 2018).

86rely on self-help on the one hand, whilst they may depend on traditional family support
systems on the other. At the individual level, we observe a development from command
households to negotiation households (Swaan, 1982).

First we will discuss what modern love looks like and especially how long distance
relationships can be managed within the framework of the negotiation household.
Secondly we will discuss the implications of changes in political negotiation regarding
the state and organization level in an effort to get beyond the concept of the greedy
institution.

Keeping up the romance during deployment in a networked society

Love
Falling in love is the easiest thing. For example, the New York Times published a 36questions interview schedule that future partners can use during dating. The questions
rise in difficulty level. Examples are
What would constitute a ‘perfect’ day for you?... What do you value most in afriendship?… What is your most treasured memory?… Share with your partner anembarrassing moment in your life… Tell your partner something that you like
about him/her.
After 36 questions either it works or it is perfectly clear it is never going to work!
The session ends with staring at each other’s eyes for four full minutes. Extremely
difficult to do, but it enhances the empathic moment. Falling in love is thus only a87

projection of empathy onto the other and basically these are our own desires andemotions that we project. Falling in love is only a narcistic projection of one’s own
desires onto the other, onto the wished for relationship in hope for reciprocity andempathic mutual identification. But the narcistic projection is a precondition for manythings, amongst others for direct gratification, for getting to know each other, and fordeveloping enduring relationships. Without self-love, love is impossible. Thus love
follows its own cycle (Hofstede, 1991) which can also be applied to the love affair
between two countries having to work together in a military headquarters (Moelker etal, 2007) because it is all about two parties negotiating about a working relationship.
The cycle describes the politics of collaboration between two partners and that is notmuch different from a love affair. During the first stage high expectations result infeelings of mutual sympathy, butterflies and even some kind of excitement andeuphoria. In the next stage, however, mutual sympathy will decrease, because bothparties increasingly see each other’s weaknesses and problems. This may even result inwhat is commonly known as a ‘culture shock’ or ‘reality check’ realizing the other isdifferent. During the following acculturation phase, routinization and normalization will
occur. Partners negotiate positive and negative experiences, they are being balanced andfinally (in phase four) they come to a new equilibrium. This new equilibrium, however,is seldom higher than during the first phase of euphoria but this is what we normallydescribe as the stage where there is ‘love’ between the two parties. There are many
definitions of love, popular and scientific, but one that is both classic and still valid isgiven by Erich Fromm (1956):

88Love means to commit oneself without guarantee, to give oneself completely inthe hope that our love will produce love in the loved person. Love is an act offaith, and whoever is of little faith is also of little love.
For being in love Fromm deems care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge to berequired essentials. Without care a relationship dwindles. Partners take responsibility
for each other. Partners have to know and respect one other boundaries. Respect is not
the same as adoration. Adoration often is temporal, whilst respect can persist in the longrun.

Modern love in a networked society

Most servicemen during separation fear that their partner will find another lover. We
cannot count on relationships being cast in concrete tied together with golden bands for“Your partner never belongs to you. At best he/she is on loan with an option to renew”(Perel, 2017). Thus soldiers and partners fear infidelity and soldiers sometimes erect a‘Wall of Shame’ on which the pictures of the infidel partner are posted. They dread the
day they receive a ‘dear John’ or ‘dear Mary’ e-mail. Most people in a long distance
relationship discover that they are always worried they are being cheated on but it also
happens that soldiers start affairs amongst themselves, with translators or with someone
from the indigenous population. They sometimes cheat on their relation back home.
Since you don’t want to lose that person because you feel comfortable, you will start tolose touch with reality and the people who are right there for you.
The greedy family concept is still valid (DeAngelis and Segal, 2015) but it is inneed of elaboration or else we need to go beyond it. From the side of the family, three89

revolutions about reproduction (Perel, 2017) have impacted the politics regarding
relationships. In the first revolution, sex is separated from production. The 19th century
division of labor caused a separation from homework and factory work and also caused
children to be recognized as children instead of miniature adults who could also be
productive workers. This reduced the importance of the patriarchate as a system,
because the family no longer was the primary production unit. The second revolution in
the sixties and seventies separated sex from reproduction. Contraceptives (the pill) gaveback to women the control over their bodies. They could have children if and when theywanted. The third revolution in the 21st century relates to gender being dissociated from
biology. Gender now becomes a matter of choice. This revolution coincides with theadvent of the network society.

Women have gained power because of all these revolutions. The power is multiplied
because in a network society all someone has to do to coerce power in a relationship isto block the other from communication. Power balances are shifting tremendously.
Boyd and Ellison (2008: 211), define social networks as:
web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public
profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whomthey share a connection, and 3) view and traverse their list of connections andthose made by others within the system.
In all countries, social networks play a central role in communication. Whereas informer times, telephone communication and traditional mail contact were the only or
most frequently used communication media during deployments (though not used on adaily basis; e.g., Ender, 1995; Schumm, Bell, Ender, and Rice, 2004), in more recent

90deployments, e-mail and text messaging have become popular means of staying intouch, in addition to phone calls (e.g., Andres and Moelker, 2010; Carter et al., 2011;see also chapter 18 in this book). Facebook is also frequently used.
Networked relationships promote and enable communication and make dating
during separation feasible. But there are risks to dating from a distance. One can too
easily defriend a disappointing or deceitful partner from Facebook, Instagram, or othersocial media. Internet communication empowers both partners in the relationship, but
power must be utilized with velvet gloves or preferably not at all because there are more
effective ways of dialogue. The Internet equalizes power in the relationship, but
although the spouses have much power one should be careful in using it. Blocking theother out from communication is the last resort, for it is the lifeline of the relationship.
Use communication not to punish your loved one but to discuss matters and to further
understanding in case of unclarity.

Staying in love: politics of communication

Modern demands set high standards on our partners. The ideal partner, also during
deployment induced separation, is empathic, caring, sexy, attentive, a good dad and/or
mum and a good conversationalist… most important, not possessive. But how toachieve all those objectives if one only has long distance communication tools
available? For example: what should one tell and what should one not tell?

Coyne and Smith (1991) introduced the constructs of active engagement (supportive
communication) and protective buffering as forms of relationship management.

91

Whereas “active engagement is a matter of involving the partner in discussions,inquiring how the partner feels, and other constructive problem solving”, they
conceptualized protective buffering as “a matter of hiding concerns, denying worries,
and yielding to the partner to avoid disagreements” (Coyne and Smith, 1991: 405).
Protective buffering is applied if the other is perceived to be under stress and in need ofprotection because it is feared that the information might do more damage than good.

However, findings from our Dutch Navy study (chapter 18) reveal that supportive
communication is a healthy strategy, in particular for non-deployed partners, as it ispositively associated with well-being and relationship quality, whereas protective
reticence was not, which confirms earlier research findings in different contexts (e.g.,
Coyne & Smith, 1991; Joseph and Afifi, 2010; Suls et al., 1997). Researchers agree on
the importance and benefits of supportive communications among romantic partners inmaintaining well-being and relationship quality, especially in times of stress andseparation. The findings of our study suggest that supportive communication isparticularly beneficial for the perceived well being and relationship quality of partners
at the home front, whereas protective reticence seems to have more disastrous
implications for deployed service members.

Tips and tools for dating from a distance

Nowhere in academic literature of in scholarly teaching we discuss how to improve
communication and keep up the romance. Strangely, in pre-deployment courses neither
relationship skills nor sex is discussed. However, providing tips and tools could very92

much contribute to relationship quality and one only has to use one’s imagination. Here
we provide some examples that serve as illustration only, but the list should be tailor
made and fitted to the relationship.
•

Compile a ‘Missing You Emergency Box’. When you are really missing
him/her, you can choose something from the box.

•

Record and send him/her a tape of songs that remind you of him.

•

Make a screensaver with pictures of the two of you and send a copy to him/her.

•Learn to say I Love You in several foreign languages, and write those to eachother.

•

Pretend you are stranded on a desert island and write him a love letter. Place themessage in a bottle and send it to him.

•

Write a book or a chapter in a book together.

•Make a batch of his favorite cookies and send them to him/her.

•Share some of your goals for the next five years.

•

Do not cut yourself off from others: go to social meetings and have fun.

•Do not avoid problems: discuss with others and your loved one.

•

Keep sexual intimacy alive: have flirty video chats.

•

Prepare the homecoming together.

•

Plan a holiday / time together.

Getting beyond the ‘Greedy Institution’

The concept of the greedy institution is still valid (DeAngelis and Segal, 2015), but
regarding the politics of military families the concept does need elaboration. Basically,93

the greedy institution concept is a double dyadic concept. There are tensions between
the armed forces organization and the soldier and there are tensions between the soldier
and the family. The soldier is caught between these institutions and has to find ways toresolve the tensions. It is a functionalist construct since the tensions need to be resolvedin order to further the well-functioning of the armed forces, the soldier, and the family
but the construct does not well enough explain change in the system since it is focusedon regaining equilibrium. The double dyadic concept is too much dichotomous to catchthe complexities of present day military families. The construct wants to better thesystem, but it does not challenge the system and that is why we need to go beyond
dyadic concept and move on to triadic modeling of military families.

In the book Politics of Military Families we discussed triads at societal,organization, and family level. At societal level, state, the armed forces, and the homefront are bounded together by tensions that make one big balancing act. At theorganization level, the stakeholders are the soldier, the work organization, and themilitary family. At the family level, the military parent, the parent, and the child are therivaling (or collaborating) parties. Politics and agency (who gets what, when and how)lend the triads their dynamic potential for change.

Three different axes of tensions

Moreover the levels are interconnected and the interconnectedness is revealed bycomparative analyses of military families worldwide, an analysis that is provided for in94the chapters of this volume. Three axes connect and/or intersect the levels of analysis.
These are:•

Institutional versus occupation•

Self-help versus familiar arrangements•

Command versus negotiation households

The actors negotiate formal and informal contracts with each other that are picturesof temporary equilibrium. The formal contract regulates mutual obligations, work forremuneration, formal rights and duties, fringe benefits and so on. The informal contract
is not spelled out, and contains amongst others moral obligations, allegiance andloyalty, informal care arrangements, social support. In the United Kingdom, the semiinformal macro contract is archaically denoted ‘the covenant’. At the family level andthe organizational level, we often refer to the informal unwritten contract as the‘psychological contract’. When the contract is broken, or feels broken, the fault lines are
revealed to the public eye. Strife and political agency will then give a certain dynamic tothe systems until the actors have obtained their objectives (some will be ascending,winning, others will lose) and again a kind of agreement evolves.

The first axis is derived from Moskos’ (1977) opposition of institution versus
occupation. The armed forces have always been an instrument of state formation and in
this respect contributed to national identity. Often but not always conscription was partof state building. In this respect it makes sense that armed forces and military families
were institutionalized. In a comparative endeavor, such as presented in this book, one
can clearly demonstrate the evident differences between countries. Brazil, for example,
is more institutional compared to Portugal and many other Western countries that have a95

more occupational upmake. Differences in geography, in risk perception and tasking of
the military define the contours of this institution-occupation divide. Finland and theBaltic states because the imminent threat of a neighboring country do also show
institutional tendencies, albeit, just as in South America, in modern forms. Therefore
relocation of servicemen is, as discussed in the chapter on Finland, a source of tensions.
Sweden on the contrary is highly occupational in upmake and the implication for
military families goes so far that ‘military families’ do not exist. In Sweden there arefamilies of soldiers, but no military families. Swedes don’t identify with the ‘militaryfamily’ concept. Care provisions are within the normal arrangements the welfare statealready provides so the armed forces do not have to and are not allowed to act like theold fashioned patriarch. The axis institution versus occupation thus works out
differently on the family triads in all these different countries. The interplay between thethree levels society, organization, family is thus also constituted differently. The
resulting micro, macro, meso contracts are thus also different.

The axis self-help versus family arrangements does not necessarily correlate withthe axis institutional versus occupational. In some countries the state and/or theorganization provides support as part of the tripartite contract between families, thearmed forces and state. In some countries people resort to their families. In others it is
up to individual initiative to take care for one self. Culture, tradition, geography andinfrastructure do play a role in the differences between countries, but also the fact that insome countries the armed forces are peripheral or core institutions. Negotiations along
this axis determine the outcomes. Some countries have, despite appearances, mixed
models. The United States of America and Canada are both individualist countries

96where individual responsibility is the credo, but they do acknowledge and valuecommunity service and local leadership stepping in into care arrangements that often
also are private community initiatives. Along this axis we also elaborated on theconcept of work-family conflict and support arrangements. One of the findings is thatthe tensions between military and family not only result from time, strain, or behavior,
but also, as Masson explains, from deeply rooted beliefs on gender roles. This isexemplified in the chapters on fatherhood and child rearing.

The third axis ‘command’ versus ‘negotiation households’ refers to a generaldevelopment whereby families cannot automatically be coerced, nor can family
members be bossed around at will. Violence in the family, as described in theAustralian case, is legally banned in all nations in our sample. Like the French-Russiancomparison pointed out, the work that is being done by army wives is still ‘free labor’
and the logic of exploitation still applies, but things gradually are changing. The
experience South American soldiers had with peace keeping in Haiti still proves that theburden of emotion work lies on families who are supporting the deployed soldiers. But
all this is less and less taken for granted. Negotiation with the family is outside the chainof command, so there is always the question how families are co-opted into the system,
or not. The United Kingdom and the United States of America still provide military
housing and thus still have a strong impact on family life, but even though this is thecase, more subtle ways of political work are required. Command households andcoercion no longer enjoy legitimacy and states and organizational authorities will haveto succumb to seduction.

97

Seductive capital

Bourdieu coined the concept of symbolic violence and Connell that of the gender
regime. Concepts like these, and especially the manner in which Elias defined habitus assecond nature, help us understand why the greedy institutions concept, although stillvalid in essence, is no longer sufficient as a tool in understanding military families.
Politics of Military Families analyses the political processes of negotiation and contract
forging that results in a figuration where the occupational, the self-help arrangement,
and the negotiation household seem to point in the direction of the emergent structuringof modern military families. Spruce (in the book Politics of Military Families) rightly
remarks “The power relationships could change once partners become aware and use
their unrecognized power, and rather than just being a victim of symbolic violence they
could become a reciprocal source” of symbolic capital. Modern love is accommodated
within these structures and all agents within the triad are seduced to play their part withor without knowing what that part exactly is, what the larger structure is and how they
are exploited to serve the objectives of state and military organizations. Since coercion
has lost legitimacy, cooperation, consciously or unconsciously is brought about by
cooption and seduction. Those who hold more seductive capital (benefits, kindliness,
support) are able to bestow existing systems, i.e. the military family as auxiliary to thearmed forces organization, its sustainability. The nice and friendly organization is
helping out military families, but the help is not altruistically motivated. It serves theorganization’s interests.

98References
Andres, M. D. and Moelker, R. (2010). Sweethearts or strangers? Couples’
reconciliation following military deployment. In M. Andres, Behind family lines.
Family members’ adaptations to military-induced separations (Doctoral
dissertation, pp. 147–176). Breda, Netherlands: Broese & Peereboom.
DeAngelis, K. and Segal, M. (2015). Transitions in the military and the family as
greedy institutions: Original concept and current applicability. In R. Moelker, M.
Andres, G. Bowen, and P. Manigart (Eds.) Military families and war in the 21st
century. Comparative perspectives (pp. 22-42). London: Routledge.
Boyd, D., and Ellison, N. (2008). Social Network Sites: Definition, History, andScholarship. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13, 210-230.
Carter, S. P. and Renshaw, K. D. (2016). Communication via different media during
military deployments and post deployment relationship satisfaction. Military
Behavioral Health, 4(3), 260–268.
Coyne, J. C. and Smith, D. A. (1991). Couples coping with a myocardinal infarction: A
contextual perspective on wives’ distress. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 61, 404-412.
Ender, M. G. (1995). G.I. phone home: The use of telecommunications by the soldiersof Operation Just Cause. Armed Forces & Society, 21, 435–454.
Fromm, (1956). The Art of Loving. New York: Harper and Row.
Hofstede, G. H. (1991) Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind. McGraw
Hill, London.

99

Joseph, A. L. and Afifi, T. D. (2010). Military wives’ stressful disclosure to theirdeployed husbands: The role of protective buffering. Journal of Applied
Communication Research, 38, 412–434.
The 36 Questions That Lead to Love (NYT)
Moelker, R., Soeters, J., and Hagen, U. vom (2007). Sympathy, the cement ofinteroperability. Findings on ten years of German-Netherlands military cooperation.
Armed Forces & Society, 33, 496-517.
Moskos, C. (1977). From institution to occupation: Trends in military organization.
Armed Forces & Society, 31(1), 388-401.
Perel, E. (2017). The state of affairs: Rethinking infidelity. London: Hodder andStoughton General Division.
Suls, J., Green, P., Rose, G., Lounsbury, P., and Gordon, E. (1997). Hiding worries
from one’s spouse: Associations between coping via protective buffering anddistress in male post-myocardial infarction patients and their wives. Journal of
Behavioral Medicine, 20(4), 333–349.
Schumm, W.R., Bell, D.B., Ender, M.G., & Rice, R.E. (2004). Expectations, use, andevaluation of communication media among deployed peacekeepers. Armed Forces& Society, 30, 649–662.
Swaan, A. de (1982). Uitgaansbeperking en uitgaansangst. Over de verschuiving van
bevelshuishouding naar onderhandelingshuishouding. [A ban on going out may leadto fear for the streets. The shift from command household to negotiation household],in A. de Swaan (ed.), De mens is de mens een zorg. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 81115.

100

Military and Family in Transition:negotiating symbolic boundaries

Manon Andres and René Moelker

Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defense Academy / Netherlands

Introduction“Once it was simple: men worked and most women stayed at home to raise thechildren.”1 The new reality is more complex. Social, demographical, and technologicaldevelopments have contributed to changes in both the family and work domains andbring new challenges and pressures in the work-family interface (see, for instance,
Andres, Moelker, and Soeters, 2011; De Angelis and Segal, 2015; Moelker, Andres,
Bowen, and Manigart, 2015). In the context of these changes, this paper 1) briefly
discusses power dynamics in and between the family and the military, 2) explores how
military personnel manage the boundaries of work and family life and 3) considers thechallenge of initiatives that aim to support personnel in navigating work and family
life.
Power dynamics in and between the family and the military
In many countries, we witness social, demographical, and cultural changes that affect101family structures and dynamics. Women accounting for an increasing proportion of thelabor force, a growing number of dual-income families, an increasing role of men in
the domestic sphere, an increasing number of people combining paid labor with thecare for minor children and elderly parents (the sandwich generation), and morediverse family structures (including single-parent families, ‘blended’ or ‘patchwork’
families, and families based on same-sex unions), are but a few developments thatshape and alter negotiation processes within the family domain. We witness a shift
from command households to negotiation households (De Swaan, 1982), which
represents shifting power dynamics, from ‘father’s will is law’ to family members (notonly partners but also children) being more equal political agents in the family
diplomatic system (Moelker, Rones, and Andres, in press). Often with two careers
taking into account, family members negotiate the conditions and boundaries of workand family life. In that respect, families of military personnel may not be different
from any other family, were it not for the fact that they face unique challenges in theirconnectedness to the military.
The military, with its socialization processes, culture, and hierarchy, represents
unique power structures. Among other things, the military exerts power in controlling
employees’ careering structures, and decisions pertaining to who to deploy, or who torelocate when and where – which affect employees and families in various ways,
including their decisions where to live, spouse employment, family plans,
relationships, and well-being (Moelker, Andres, and Rones, in press). In combination
with the nature of the job, performed in unusual circumstances, with real risks to get(physically or mentally) injured, the military profession differs from other occupations.
Moreover, the military can legitimately withdraw leave and demand the presence of102

their employees; and in some countries such as in the Netherlands, unlike civilian
employees, military personnel are not allowed to go on strike. It reflects a ‘contract ofunlimited liability’ between service members and the state (Dandeker, Wessely,
Iversen, and Ross, 2006).
For its performance, the military is dependent on its members and their families.
Inherent to all relationships, the mechanism of ‘give and take’ (reciprocity) plays apowerful role in the military-employee-family triad. 2 Military personnel are willing to
make sacrifices (e.g., being away from their family for a period of time), they negotiate
what sacrifices are acceptable for the family, but – in accordance with the principles ofsocial exchange theory– they do want something in return, such as recognition and support. Costs andrewards will be evaluated, and a positive outcome will maintain the status quo.
Tensions, or perceptions of imbalance, may result in changes to the status quo; forinstance, military personnel may attempt to restore the balance and attain a morepositive outcome for the family by leaving the military. According to the familyrelatedness of work decisions (Greenhaus and Powell, 2012), family members play animportant role in individuals’ decisions to stay in or leave the job; among otherthings, their power lies in their attitudes and support (e.g., Pluut and Andres, in press).
Tensions in the military-employee-family triad have shown to affect not only
organization outcomes, but also employee well-being and outcomes in the family
domain (e.g., Andres, Moelker, Soeters, 2012a/b; Moelker, Andres, and Rones, inpress).

103

Negotiating the boundaries of family and military life
The struggle to reconcile work and family life seems a universal phenomenon
nowadays but may even be more pronounced among military personnel and theirfamilies because of the unique set of demands and challenges they face. Whereas workand family have long been considered separate domains in life, their boundaries havebecome more symbolic and blurred, which creates new challenges. Technologicaldevelopments, such as smartphones and constant email and internet connection, allow
people to be available anytime, anywhere; for work and the family, withoutboundaries. Although this may provide individuals more flexibility in reconciling workand family life (e.g., bringing the kids to school, do some work in the evening or
weekend), it also makes it difficult to unplug from work or family responsibilities andmay create pressures of permanent availability, which leads to a greater struggle tonegotiating the boundaries of work and family life (e.g., Hislop et al., 2015; Major andGermano, 2006). Questions how individuals handle availability across the boundaries
of life domains and how they maintain, negotiate, and transition across “the sociallyconstructed lines of demarcation between work and family” and reconcile these
domains in life have gained interest in science and practice (Allen, Cho, and Meier,2014: 100).
Boundary theory (Nippert-Eng, 1996) suggests that individuals manage theboundaries of work and family life through processes of segmenting and/or integrating
the domains, referring to the degree to which one domain (e.g., work) is kept separate
from the other domain (e.g., family) (Kreiner 2006). Some individuals prefer that workand family life are kept separate (or segmented) and construct boundaries to ensure104

that the domains remain separate from one another (e.g., they refrain from discussing
work-related problems with their partner at home or sharing family matters withcoworkers). Others construct boundaries that are not as strong so that the domains canbe interconnected, or integrated (e.g., handling family matters while being at work or
engaging in work-related email communication after work hours). Modern
communication technologies have provided new means of managing work andpersonal life boundaries. Central to boundary management is the idea of individuals’
agency to continually shape and manage the boundaries, taking into account the specificcharacter of the work and home domain. Whereas segmentation may provide clarity
between the domains (e.g., now it’s works time), it may hinder smooth transitions
between the domains (e.g., being confronted with family issues while being at work, orfamily-reintegration processes after returning from deployment). Integration may
facilitate smoother transitions between work and family life, but the domains also
become more blurred, which may result in constantly juggling work and family
responsibilities (e.g., Ashforth, Kreiner, and Fugate, 2000). Many variations exist on
the segmentation-integration continuum.
Literature on this topic in a military context is scarce (or even non-existent). As
suggested earlier, the struggle to reconcile work and family life may be more
pronounced among military personnel and their families because of the unique set of
demands and challenges they face. How do they balance and manage the boundaries ofwork and personal life? Even when military personnel are physically separated fromtheir family (e.g., in times of deployment), through (modern) communication
technologies, family life is likely to intrude the military arena, while military life enters
the living room (Moelker et al, 2015).

105

Empirical findings from a survey among Dutch Navy personnel being deployed atsea (N = 351) reveal that, in general, the deployed service members report moderatelevels of segmentation/integration preferences and behaviors (mean segmentationpreferences = 2.96 (on a 1 – 5 scale), SD = 0.68, mean segmentation behaviors = 2.93,

SD = 0.61).3 The scores of 32% indicate higher integration preferences, 28% indicate
higher segmentation preferences, and 40% reside somewhere in between. Interestingly,
lower proportions of deployed military personnel seem to (be able to) put theirpreferences into practice, as the scores of 23% indicate higher integration behaviors(compared to 32% indicating higher integration preferences), the scores of 17%
indicate higher segmentation behaviors (compared to 28% indicating higher
segmentation preferences), and 60% reside somewhere in between.
Deployed service members’ boundary management strategies – representing theiragency to shape and manage the boundaries of work and family life, within theparticular conditions – were correlated with their communication with their homefront
and family-to-work interference while being deployed. Those who preferred to keep
work and family life separate (i.e., whose scores indicated higher segmentationpreferences and behaviors) communicated significantly less frequently with their homefront (by all means of communication) compared with those who favored more
integration between work and private life. Moreover, those who preferred to keep workand family life separate, were more likely to engage in protective reticence while
communicating with their homefront, that is, they were more likely not to share
everything with their homefront and leave work at work (Andres and Moelker, inpress). Further, those who scored higher on segmentation preferences and behaviors
reported less family-to-work interference, thus less spillover from family to work.

106Challenging the work and family myths
At the macro and meso level, governmental and organizational attempts are made tosupport employees (and their families) in navigating and managing work and family
life.
For instance, in September 2016, the European Parliament adopted the resolution‘Creating labor market conditions favorable for work-life balance’,4 which stresses thatreconciliation of professional, private and family life needs to be guaranteed as afundamental right for all people. 5 In their intentions to enable social and professional
well-being and to be supportive in navigating work and family life, manyorganizations have developed policies, programs, and benefits, including, among otherthings, flexible working arrangements and a variety of family-related types of leave(e.g., maternity leave, paternity leave, parental leave, and carers’ leave).

In addition, and with variations between countries, military organizations offer
support to military employees and their families as part of the military covenant (seeMoelker et al., 2008 and Moelker, Andres, Bowen, and Manigart, 2015 forinternational descriptions and comparisons on ‘military family support’). Countries
adopted Veterans Initiatives (e.g., U.K) or a Veterans Law (the Netherlands) that guideand dictate initiatives aimed to support (former) military personnel and their families
and facilitate their ability to manage work-family issues.
However, developing policies to comply with government regulation is not
sufficient; structural changes only work in concert with cultural change and107

challenging the taken-for-granted myths and logics, including “the hegemony of theideal worker who is expected to place the work role ahead of the family or personal liferole at all times” (Kossek, Lewis, and Hammer, 2010: 5; Rapoport et al., 2002). In thecontext of the (social, demographical, technological) changes, mentioned earlier,support needs, expectations, and preferences will be diverse and in constant change.

Conclusion
With the boundaries of work and family becoming more symbolic and blurred,negotiating these boundaries and managing the pressures of permanent availability (forwork and family) seems a common challenge in modern societies, but may even be
more pronounced among military personnel and their families because of theparticularities of military life. While being deployed at sea, Dutch Navy personnel
showed diverse boundary management strategies (ranging from and between
segmentation and integration preferences and behaviors; representing their agency toshape and manage the boundaries of work and family life, within the particularconditions). Their boundary management strategies were correlated with theircommunication with their homefront and perceived spillover from family to work.
Whereas attempts are made to support employees (and their families) in navigating andmanaging work and family life, interventions will only be effective in conjunction with
cultural change and challenging the taken-for-granted myths and logics. Moreover,support needs, expectations, and preferences are diverse and in constant change.
Different forces and (power) dynamics at the micro, meso, and macro level play arole.6108

References
Allen, T.D., Cho, E., and Meier, L.L. (2014). Work-family boundary dynamics. Annual

Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 1, 99-121.
Andres, M. and Moelker, R. (in press). What happens on board stays on board? The
political game of communication between deployed military personnel and their
loved ones. In Moelker, R., Andres, M., and Rones, N. (Eds.) The politics ofmilitary families. Tensions between state, work organizations and the rise of thenegotiation household. London: Routledge.
Andres, M., Moelker, R., and Soeters, J. (2011). Behind Family Lines. Res Militaris,

2(1), 2011.
Andres, M., Moelker, R., and Soeters, J. (2012a). A longitudinal study of partners of
deployed personnel from the Netherlands’ Armed Forces, Military Psychology,

4(3), 270-288.
Andres, M., Moelker, R., and Soeters, J. (2012b). The work-family interface andturnover intentions over the course of project-oriented assignments abroad.

International Journal of Project Management, 30(7), 752-759.
Ashforth, B.E., Kreiner, G.E., and Fugate, M. (2000). All in a day’s work: Boundaries
and micro role transitions. The Academy of Management Review, 25(3), 472-491.
Dandeker, C., Wessely, S., Iversen, A. and Ross, J. (2006) What’s in a name? Defining
and caring for ‘veterans’: the UK in international perspective, Armed Forces &Society, 32(2), 161–77.
De Angelis, K. and Segal, M. (2015) Transitions in the military and the family as greedy
institutions: Original concept and current applicability. In Moelker, R., Andres,
M., Bowen, G., and Manigart, P. (Eds) Military families and war in the 21st109

century. Comparative perspectives. London: Routledge, pp. 22-42.
Doward, J. (21 January 2017) Men and women struggle to get on at work and find time

for their families. The Observer/The Guardian. Retrieved fromhttps://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/jan/22/fatherhood-penalty- balancework-family-life-millennial-men.
Greenhaus, J.H. and Powell, G.N. (2012). The family relatedness of work decisions: A
framework and agenda for theory and research. Journal of Vocational Behavior,

80, 246-255.
Hislop, D., Axtell, C., Collins, A., Daniels, K., Glover, J., and Niven, K. (2015).
Variability in the use of mobile ICTs by homeworkers and its consequences forboundary management and social isolation. Information and Organization, 25(4),222-232.
Kossek, E.E., Lewis, S., and Hammer, L.B. (2010). Work-life initiatives andorganizational change: Overcoming mixed messages to move from the margin to
the mainstream. Human Relations, 63(1), 3-19.
Kreiner, G.E. (2006). Consequences of work-home segmentation or integration: A
person-environment fit perspective. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27 (4),
485–507.
Major, D.A. and Germano, L.M. (2006). The changing nature of work and its impact
on the work-home interface. In Jones, F., Burke, R.J., and Westman, M. (Eds.),

Work-life balance: A psychological perspective. New York, NY, US: Psychology
Press., pp. 13-38.
Moelker, R., Andres, M., Bowen, G., and Manigart, P. (Eds) (2015) Military families

and war in the 21st century. Comparative perspectives. London: Routledge.

110Moelker, R., Andres, M., Bowen, G., and Manigart, P. (2015). Introduction. In Moelker,
R., Andres, M., Bowen, G., and Manigart, P. (Eds) Military families and war in

the 21st century. Comparative perspectives. London: Routledge, pp. 3-21.
Moelker, R., Andres, M., and Rones, N. (Eds.) (in press) The politics of militaryfamilies. Tensions between state, work organizations and the rise of the negotiation
household. London: Routledge.
Moelker, R., Poot, G., Andres, M., Jelusic, L., Juvan, J., Parmar, L., and Tomforde, M.
(2008). News from the home front: Communities supporting military families. In:
Caforio, Kümmel, Bandana (Eds.). Armed forces and conflict resolution:

Sociological perspectives. Bingley, UK: Emerald, pp. 187-214.
Moelker, R., Rones, N., and Andres, M. (in press). Introduction: The politics ofmilitary families and the rise of the negotiation household. Tensions between state,work and families. In Moelker, R., Andres, M., and Rones,N. (Eds.) The politics of military families. Tensions between state, workorganizations and the rise of the negotiation household. London: Routledge.
Nippert-Eng, C. (1996). Home and work: Negotiating boundaries through everyday

life. London: University of Chicago Press.
Pluut, H. and Andres, M. (in press). The influence of work-family experiences during
deployment on organizational outcomes. In Moelker, R., Andres, M., and Rones, N.
(Eds.) The politics of military families. Tensions between state, workorganizations and the rise of the negotiation household. London: Routledge.
Rapoport, R., Bailyn, L., Fletcher, J.K., and Pruitt, B.H. (2002). Beyond work- familybalance: Advancing gender equity and workplace performance. London: Jossey
Bass.

111

Swaan, A. de (1982). Uitgaansbeperking en uitgaaansangst. Over de verschuiving van
bevelshuishouding naar onderhandelingshuishouding. [A ban on going out may
lead to fear for the streets. The shift from command household to negotiation
household], in A. de Swaan (ed.), De mens is de mens een zorg. Amsterdam:
Meulenhoff, pp. 81-115.

Notes

1 Doward, J. (21 January 2017) Men and women struggle to get on at work and findtime for their families. The Observer/The Guardian.
2 A triadic approach is proposed as a framework for understanding modern militaryfamilies, see Moelker, Andres, and Rones (Eds.), in press.
3 Among other things, those with higher segmentation preferences and behaviors do

not like family matters to enter their work domain, want to keep their family life athome, try to keep work and family life separate, and report a clear distinction in
their life between work and their role as family member.
4

https://eyf2014.wordpress.com.

5

http://www.europarl.europa.eu.

6

See proposed framework in Moelker, Andres, and Rones (Eds.), in press

112

Far from the Frontlines: Locating intersections between gender,
ethnicity and family in the Philippine Army

Rosalie Arcala Hall
University of the Philippines Visayas/ Philippines

Introduction
The Philippine military, as a predominantly male and Christian all-volunteer force,reflects much of the traditional moorings of Philippine society from which it gets
recruits. Focused on internal security tasks, its personnel are mainly deployed for long
periods of time to confront Muslim and secessionist threats in far flung areas. Militaryfamilies were seen by the institution primarily in terms of their legal connections to themilitary personnel, for purposes of determining eligibility for government mandatedbenefits and pensions. Beyond this, the social network of military dependents andfamilies rests on the AFP Officers Ladies Club Inc. (and their branch equivalent), whichorganizes events and disseminates information to dependents. Patterned along
traditional gender lines (male military personnel and female spouse) and mimicking themilitary hierarchy in terms of leadership, the Ladies Club ran and operated a private
primary school near the main camp in Manila, in the absence of military-provided
educational facilities.
With the opening of regular commissions and the recruitment of enlisted women in
1994, progressive changes have been made equalizing admission, training, promotion

113between males and females, at the same bringing the military institution to the same
standards in matters of marriage and maternity benefits as other government civilian
agencies. Some years after, the army integration program, which was one of thecomponents of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Philippine government andthe Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was carried out. The integration scheme
involved the individual-based absorption of 5,750 ex-MNLF combatants and theirproxies to Army units that were primarily deployed in the Mindanao Bangsamoro
theatre. The program substantially increased the number of Muslim officers andenlistees, and provided grounds for the Army to adopt a more culture-sensitive training
and personnel policy.
This article examines how military families interact with the Philippine armed
forces as an institution, by outlining relevant policies and describing the practices ofArmy officers and enlistees who are married, have children or plan to have a family. It
draws from findings of research projects undertaken by the author: Toyota Foundation
Southeast Asian Research and Exchange Program (SEASREP)-funded study on Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Falintil integrees into the Philippine and East
Timorese security forces in 2008-2009; East Asian Development Network (EADN)funded project on women in the Philippine army and police in 2010-2011; andPhilippine Army-commissioned project on the status of army women integration in
2017-2018. The first project featured data form interviews of key military and MNLF
officers involved in drawing up and implementing the integration scheme and 2 focus
group discussions with MNLF integree officers and enlisted men from the 6th Infantry
Division in Maguindanao province. The second project generated data through 16 focus
group discussions (FGD) with female Army officers/ enlisted women/ Women

114

Auxiliary Corps and female police commissioned and non-commissioned officers in
Mindanao-based army and police units. The third project entailed 12 interviews of
personnel/operations and commanding officers at battalion, brigade and general
headquarter levels, and 32 separate FGDs with male and female officers and enlisted
personnel from the Army headquarters, special forces and select infantry units
throughout the country.

Military Families: Some Conceptual Handles
The nature of military work places demands on its personnel’s families. Long periods ofseparation on account of deployment, frequent travels and relocation and risks fromcombat are said to produce conflicts with their families (Franke 2006, 6: Andres,
Moelker & Soeters 2012, 754; Smith & Rosenstein 2017; Wadsworth & Southwell
2011, 170). This work-family conflict is said to influence decisions by military
personnel to quit (Andres et al., 2012, 754), puts families to high risks for negative
outcomes in terms of health and well-being (Wadsworth & Southwell 2011, 166) and is
an exogenous source of family stress (Trail et al. 2017, 2133; Burrell et al. 2006; Vuga
& Juvan 2013, 1070). The military is seen as a greedy institution placing exceptional
demand on family members (Vuga and Juvan 2013, 1060). Spouses in particular are
adversely affected because they could only get part-time jobs, unable to pursue theircareers to the fullest, unable to put on community roots, and without support network
for reporting or addressing abuse (Burrell et al., 2006). It is also gendered because it ismore challenging to military women who wants to be married and have children (Smith& Rosenstein 2017, 261). The intensity of work-family conflict is said to vary115

depending on the frequency and period of time the military personnel is separated from
his/her family, but also becomes less of a problem once both parties adjust to thelifestyle (Cadigan 2006, 13).
Given this crucial link, measures are necessary to reduce work-family conflict.
These include: providing good communications between the military personnel and thehome front, family-friendly culture in the work space, and social support from family
and friends (Andres, Moelker & Soeters 2012). Formal institutional support provided by
the military institution (hence, funded) are as important as informal institutional support
from friends (Vuga & Juvan 2013, 1070). Along this line, the US Department of
Defense pro-vides an array of family-friendly compensation packages to entice recruits(Cadigan 2006). These include allowances that offset housing and relocation costs due
to travel and deployment, commissary privileges and family service support centers,
including infra-structure such as child care and schools (Lietz et al. 2013, 187).
Equivalent family support services are also provided by states for reserves who are
deployed (Harrion 2006, 562). Because these packages are linked to family status, thepolicy encourages more members to take on family obligations, further driving up
government expenditure.
The gendered aspects of work-family conflict are pronounced. Military women, tothe extent that they adhere to a traditional gender ideology, delay marriage and having
children as they try to advance their careers, or quit the military to start a family (Smith& Rosenstein 2017, 274). The results of the study by Smith & Rosenstein (2017),
however pointed out that no relationship exists between gender attitude of military
women and years of intended service, nor with decision to having more children. The
explanation for this is that women who join the military already understand the116organisation's hierarchical and masculine culture, and thus able to strategies their way
into reaching their career goals and reckoning with their planned family life. Those who
do not, self-select and choose other jobs. Family benefits where provided bygovernment are also based on a normative family type of a male military personnel andfemale spouse (Smith & Rosenstein 2017, 274). Military men of traditional gender
ideology therefore are privileged by these institutional arrangements.

Military Families and the Philippine Military: An Ambiguous RelationshipIn the Philippine context, studies on the link between military and families focus on theconsequences of integrating women and ex-rebels into the armed forces. While theproportion of female officers and personnel have changed little compared to the prior
Women Auxiliary Corps (1%-2% of the force), the entry of women as regular officers
and enlistees prompted serious reforms in the military’s human resource policies. As
more military women are taken in, the organization had to deal with personnel fill-up
and rotation challenges for those in maternity leave. While the Philippine military
maintains in-paper that all occupational specialities are open to women (including
combat) and that women personnel could be deployed in frontline units, in practicemost women are given combat roles, nor readily assigned to field units due largely tocommander’s discretion (Hall, 2017). Female enlistees who are integrees into thePhilippine Army self-select into the military profession understanding its highly
masculine culture, but also do not plan to stay long if they intend to have a family (Hall2016). The absorption of Muslim integrees into the army creates parallel pressures. The

117

army has to amend its rules on beneficiaries to take into account multiple marriages andchildren from these marriages by Muslim army personnel.
The military’s break from an exclusively male organization (with females as
auxiliaries) to having females as regulars came about as a legal imperative. In line with
the Women in Development Act (Republic Act 7192) and Magna Carta for Women(Republic Act 9710), the Philippine military opened its regular commission and enlisted
personnel to women, and institutionally, commit to a minimum recruitment threshold
and to progressively increase the number (up to a target of 20%) in the future. As thelaw covers all government agencies, the military has to benchmark its progress ingender mainstreaming by guaranteeing equality of treatment (entry requirements,
training, promotion, etc.) and ex-tending protection to women personnel, particularly
against sexual abuses. This is magnified further by the government requirement that 5%of the military’s budget must be spent for gender and development, a task which took tomean a lot of catch-up in providing facilities such as toilets, billeting and child care.
Under the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Code of Ethics, families are seen
as integral part of the soldiers’ and officers’ lives. In its Creed, the family is identified
as one of the key social institutions:

Family Life – The AFP shall recognize that its members are human being withthe same family obligations as other people. It shall therefore support activities
that will strengthen husband-wife, parents-children, and family-community
relationship; provides facilities conducive to a wholesome home and community

118

life and protect military dependents especially minors, from exploitation anddrug abuse (section 2.1.1.)

Along this line, the recognition of families as indispensable elements to military
career milestones, deployments/return or deaths are captured in the following sections:
Welcome/Farewell Tendered to a Newly Assigned/Departing Officer – A newly
assigned officer is tendered a welcome party while prior to the departure of an officer
from his station on a change of assignment, a farewell party is tendered. Other suitable
unit function is usually given by the unit’s officers and ladies in honor of the newly
assigned/departing officer and his family (section 4.10); Survivor Assistance to
Bereaved Family – When any member of a unit dies, an officer is immediately
designated by the commanding officer to render every possible assistance to thebereaved Family. A family courtesy may be tendered, if desired, in the case of death ofa member of any personnel’s family (section 4.23.).
The Code of Ethics contains references to families in the context of corruption. The
following actions involving families are deemed corrupt: Allowing/tolerating military
spouses and dependents or dummies to deal or participate and any form of transactions
with the AFP including but not limited to biddings and the like. (section 4.4.5.);
Utilization/disposition/employment of AFP material resources for personal/family use
including but not limited to vehicles, office supplies, POL products and the like (section
4.4.7.).
Similarly, under the Guidelines in the Disposition of Domestic Related Offenses of
AFP Personnel, “…the AFP commits itself to maintain an environment free from any

119form of domestic related offenses involving its personnel. This can be achieved throughthe AFP’s active endeavor to resolve all domestic/marital cases promptly for the
reservation of the sanctity of the family and the career of its personnel. [italics mine].
The Philippine Army Manual 1 -15 (2014) reiterates rules covering military
personnel family in the contexts of corruption, domestic violence and domestic/maritalcases of abandonment or non-support. Examples of such rules are:

1. Personnel are prohibited to receive, directly or indirectly, any gift “regardless ofvalue” in any occasion, given by reason of their official position, regardless ofwhether or not the same is for past favors or favors or the giver expects to receivea favor in the future from the personnel concerned in the performance of his/her
official functions. The prohibition includes receiving of parties or entertainmentsfrom private individual or entity to include parties and entertainment intended for
personnel’s family members or immediate relative. [italics mine]
2. All personnel shall avoid conflict of interest at all times.They shall refrain fromany activity which may place their positions and personal interests in conflict withthat of the Army’s interest/mission. Disclosure shall be made to PA or its
Units/Offices if personnel or any of their immediate family members [italicsmine] has or acquires property, benefits or interest by gift, inheritance from any
supplier or who has an interest in supplier’s business or is performing services infavor of any supplier. Such relationship shall be avoided as it has an appearance ofpotentially influencing personnel’s judgments or activities.

120

The aforementioned discussion points to a bifurcated view of military families as
essential support to military personnel and an insidious entity that can lead them astray.
Military families are organised independently (e.g. Ladies’ Club) to provide social support, with no funding from the military institution.
In practice, the military institution’s dealing with personnel families extended only
to matters of dispensing benefits (i.e. death, retirement and disability) and less onproviding key infrastructure or services to them. This treatment is informed by cultural
views which assumes traditional gender roles, i.e. the male military personnel is thebreadwinner and the spouse is a female dependent. The family is also seen as a societal
force impinging upon the task of effective soldiering, thereby the prohibitions on colocating families in camps outside of key cities. Where family housing is provided,
these usually are limited in number and only in the General Headquarters in Manila, in
key Regional Commands or Infantry Divisions. Education and health services are only
provided to personnel, and not to their families.
There are two offices which act as lynchpins in the military’s interface withpersonnel families:

Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA)and the Office of Army Gender and Development (OAGAD). OESPA comes up withrules regarding family in the contexts of corruption, domestic violence anddomestic/marital cases of abandonment or non-support. Its tasks unit commanders to
enforce such rules. OAGAD deals with the implementation and monitoring of theorganization’s protocols on sexual harassment; and services for uniformed personnel
and family welfare (i.e. health and educational referrals, child care). OAGAD also
conducts Gender Sensitivity Training (GST) and is the anchor agency for ensuring that
5% of Army budget is spent for gender and development. These two offices are121relatively new and are playing catch up with the myriad of family-related issues
confronted by its personnel.

Women and Nuancing Military Families
Since the integration of women into the Philippine military in 1994, policy changes
were made which has a bearing on families. In line with the “equality” mandate of thetwo laws previously mentioned, female members were given the same terms formaternity leave/benefits as civilian government employees in 1995. The 3-year
marriage ban for women was rescinded in 2008 (Memorandum from Chief of Staff
dated 26 March 2008). In a 2006 memorandum, female line personnel were given equalclassification (AFP Occupational Specialty, AFOS or Military Occupation Specialty,
MOS) as the males; were allowed to be employed in administrative duties as well ascombat, combat support, com-bat support service and security related activities; and tobe assigned jobs in line with their chosen field of specialization including intelligence,
Civil Military Operations (CMO), psychological operations, information systems andother fields. In principle, military women must now go through the same careermilestones and hurdles as their male counter-parts, including mandatory rotation for
officers and multi-year posting in frontline units such as those in the Army Infantry andArmor.
After 1994, there had been more women recruited into the force although the overall proportion of female’s personnel remain low (2.6% of total strength, with a higher
pro-portion among officers at 9.7%, than enlistees at 2%). With the rescinding of the 3year marriage ban for women in 2008 (Memorandum from Chief of Staff dated 26

122

March 2008), many military women marry within 5 years of their entry. Because
women are left to care for their children, this has put pressure on the military institution
to provide family services, e.g. housing and co-location with husbands also in the
military service. While uniformed women in principle can be assigned jobs in combat,
combat support and combat support service, the dearth of adequate housing facilities in
the frontline has prevented many from taking on assignments or for commanders to takethem in. As a result, many uniformed women end up at posts in Division headquarters,
Philippine Army Headquarters in Manila or in training schools located in urban centers,
where housing options are avail-able.
The exodus of married military women officers to safe posts is reflected in thestaffing patterns. Data provided by Philippine Army Personnel Management Unit
(PAMU) reveal that the distribution of female officers is eschewed, with more placed inunits that are stationed in the General Headquarters or in garrisons. Most female officers
are at the Army Reserve Command (in Manila) while the highest proportion of enlisted
women are in Civil Military Operations Group (16%), and Army Support Command(11.9%), both in Manila, and Training and Doctrines Command (13.9%) based in
Capas, Tarlac (an urban regional center).
Why women officers and enlistees gravitate towards posting in Manila or big urban
centers is partly brought about by the dearth of family housing within Army camps. The
Philippine Army being deployed for internal security missions, no family housing isavailable in frontline units below Infantry Division headquarters. Family housing has
only been made available in large numbers at the Philippine Army Headquarters in Fort
Bonifacio, Manila and in Tarlac and Nueva Ecija following the relocation of army units(the military estate in Manila was sold) beginning late 1990s. There is also a standing123

regulation prohibiting civilian housing within or in nearby military camps, for security
reasons. The old pattern of male officers and enlistees rotating among these mission
areas without their families also did not create any demand. In some Divisions visitedby the author in line with research projects, there was a female officer with her child,and child care provider who were housed in a dorm-type facility (one room for them);
others are staying at Army transient quarters. The author has only visited one Division
headquarters, where there were about 50 family-type housing (townhouses) forenlistees, built with the initiative of a previous commander.
The tendency for uniformed women to locate themselves in safe posts is also related
to access to educational services for their children. Because the Army does not provide
for educational services for the children, uniformed women have to seek these services
independently. There is one elementary school in the Philippines Army headquarters ran
by the Ladies Club, and child-minding centers for pre-school children (mandated bylaw). The institution of a Philippine Army Office of Gender and Development (PAOAGAD) has only recently made these issues visible to the Army Command. In 2017,
the PA OAGAD completed a family needs survey of personnel in Infantry Divisions tosurface these issues.
Once married and with children, the utilization of female personnel becomes more
subject to commander discretion. At their Divisional posting (initial for officers; permanent for enlistees), how the females are utilized depends in large part on thecommander’s discretion. Beyond the mandatory maternity and parental leave, it isentirely under the commander’s discretion whether to assign female officers to lead an
Infantry unit or assign them staff positions; to give field assignment or pull the females
out from the field (on ac-count of pregnancy or if they were caring for an infant or a124little child). In the research project, the author encountered at least 4 different
articulations of this discretionary power by commanders themselves. There areconservative types who thinks females should be protected and away from danger; thepatriarchal type who only considers women appropriate for certain stereotyped jobs;
the risk-averse who is worried about implications to his career if the female in fieldposting is killed or wounded; or the liberal kind who is open to assigning females to
non-traditional tasks in mixed gender groups as short-term experiments. The
commander’s disposition towards family demands of his/her female personnel isnuanced by these mindsets.

Between a rock and a hard place: dealing with work-family conflicts
The gendered reality of task assignment and locational positing is something that manyfemale officers interviewed for the project are very much aware about. At the beginning of their career, many already are aware about informal career restrictions andpotential bottlenecks and strategize accordingly. This include planning when to marry,
have children and raising them within the career requirements of rotational posting andextend-ed deployments. There is also the pressure for “career alignment”— that one
goes through the checklist of QRS within reasonable time. The enlisted women subjects
did not appear to be as motivated about becoming non-commissioned officers andstaying long in the army. Many are married or looking forward to marrying. Among
those interviewed for this project, the primary consideration appears to be their civil
status or family condition, not career advancement per se. Depending on where they get

125assigned (comfortable Divisional headquarters or operational units) seem to also
influence career prospect.
The succeeding discussion illustrates the key decision points to a military woman’s
career. The officers initial posting in one Division lasts from 5-7 years, which also
coincides with the period when they marry and have children (23-29 years old). Once
married or have children, they exercise greater agency with respect to posting or unit
assignment. Many female officers mentioned that “baby project” was a top priority for awhile, necessitating greater effort to co-locate with the husband as much as possible.
After having children, the next key decision was where to “set up house,” with childcare being a critical need. Because reassignment is normal within 3-5-year cycles,
agency in decision making becomes more complicated as the female married officer has
to also look out further considerations like educational institutions for children, etc. Not
surprisingly, many of the officers interviewed for the project were in practice, single
mothers in care of their school-age children; the husbands are invariably not co-located.
As such, when the female officers are in the lookout for next reassignment, they want to
be in units situated in big camps near an urban center. As a rule of thumb, these havebetter billeting facilities and off-camp options, but the quality goes down in operational
units (Brigade down).
Given these challenges, most female officers endure or make do. Many interviewed
say it’s a “sacrifice”; of those who are unable to be with their children, they feel guilty
or conflicted. A key impetus to seek reassignment elsewhere is co-location withhusband or with children. Given the Army’s standing “guidance” against unit colocation (of married personnel and spouse both in the Army), one has to gamble oncommander’s discretion for a reassignment elsewhere which is a matter of officer-fill126

up requirement. In practice, the burden is placed on the personnel to request for a swap,
i.e. to switch unit assignments provided that she finds somebody who will willingly takeher place in the unit (male or female). For the female, assignment and geographicalrotation takes on a more burden-some aspect precisely because they are in custody of
their children. For enlisted women, there is less agency. With a stronger operational
tempo, they must be assigned where they are needed. To illustrate, the First Scout
Regiment downloads its enlisted women to battalions. However, there are more severe“reputational costs” to a lone unmarried female in a field unit than for a young female
officer. According to one male Scout officer, many enlisted women in operationsinclined units are incentivised to marry soon and get out.
Family well-being is a key concern for many of the female officers and enlisted
women. Decisions (tentative) on staying put in the Army is typically broken down in
10-year segments, and the 25-year minimum retirement threshold. Having a child, andschool-age children under their care mediate that decision. Many of those who are close
to the 25-year service minimum say that they want to quit in order to spend more timewith their family.

The Army Integrees: Military Families from a Cultural Lens
In 1998, the army integrated 5,000 ex-Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
combatants and proxies as part of the peace agreement. While they comprise less than
3% of the force, the absorption of this influx of mostly Muslim integrees requiredchanges in the guidelines for accessing family benefits, as under Philippine law,
Muslims are allowed to have more than one wife. Given that most integrees are males

127and are assigned to Mindanao-based home units, reconciling personnel data housed at
the Infantry Divisions, with a centralised claims system has been quite a challenge.
As the Philippine Family Code also recognises legal claims by children borne outside of marriage (provided duly recognised by their fathers), the Philippine Army also
has to adjust its rules accordingly to provide claims for child support and death benefits
to children of army personnel. The internal deployment of army personnel makes illicit
liaisons likely, thus producing added burden to the Office of the Adjutant General,
which must address competing claims. This matter has been approached by theinstitution as a question of moral failure and a general weakening of the family unit
among armed personnel. Division-based family values seminars and the like are being
conducted by the OAGAD office to address these concerns.
The centrality of families among MNLF integrees is illustrated in narratives about
their recruitment and motivation (Hall 2009). Many of the male Army integrees were
proxies- sons, nephews or relatives- of MNLF combatants. Amongst those interviewed
for the project, they articulate a distinction between themselves, whose MNLF families
made “blood contributions” to the cause and those who became integrees by purchasing
integration slots but whose families have no connection to the MNLF. The integrees
also express pride over their status as soldiers and what they have accomplishedmaterially (for their family) as a result of that. Being a soldier or having family
members in the armed forces or police is also a source of family prestige.
Among the sub-set of female integrees (also proxies), the family’s approval andkeen support for them to join the Army was crucial in light of the traditional genderrole-expectations of their culture (Hall 2016). Twenty-eight (28) enlisted women were128

recruit-ed among ex-MNLF as part of the program only in 2008. Of the 11 female
integrees inter-viewed for the project, many revealed the undue influence of theirfathers and uncles with ties to the MNLF. They have come into the profession because
they originate from families who already have male members in the armed services(police or army) or have sufficient family connections to enable them to get covetedslots for entry. The Muslim integrees face more daunting challenges compared to theirnon-Muslim cohorts. Muslim women had more trouble adjusting to Army life as the
Army requires women members to subscribe to certain social behavior which a woman
brought up as Muslim may find dis-concerting, such as manner of dressing. Like otherenlisted women, many said they plan to quit the Army (a) upon marriage; (b) once they
pay up their salary loan; or © when they acquire license to practice another profession(e.g. teaching).

Conclusion
Historically, the Philippine military treated families along the axis of traditional genderrole templates— the male military personnel as income earner and the female spouse(plus children) as dependents. Family dependents are dealt by the institution in terms ofeligibility for benefits and claims attached to the male military personnel. As officers
and soldiers are deployed over long periods of time, and have multi-year rotations invarious geographic regions of the country, their families are never co-located with them.
Compounding this is the Army’s policy against housing families in frontline units.
Where housing is provided, it is in limited number in major camps in Manila and urban
centers. The families, to the extent they are conspicuous, are present in the activities of129

the Ladies Clubs in Camp Aguinaldo, Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Airbase which runsocials and provide services such as child care and schools in these major camps. The
Ladies Clubs are not funded by the military but vital informal links as its female
spouses’ leadership parallel the military hierarchy.
Treating military families from an arm’s length stem partly from the armed forces’
perspective that families influence individual personnel performance and motivations.
The Code of Ethics articulates families as a source of corruption and moral failure. The
strong influence of family in military career choice is illustrated among the Muslim
army indegrees. Their MNLF-connected families were their ticket to enter the Army;that their being a soldier is a source of family prestige and therefore shape expectationsof how their networks within the organization can be used to advance family goals. The
military institution also bears the pressure of dealing with demands from abandoned andextra-marital families— children born out wedlock and their mothers.
The entry of military women in bigger numbers compelled the institution to makemodifications in its personnel policies, as required by national legislation. These,
however, were limited to policies dealing with maternity leave, equality of treatment(for benefits and claims) and guarantees for protection against sexual abuse in theworkplace. Even with the 5% mandatory gender and development spending, expanding
services for families/dependents is not a military priority (with the exception ofproviding day care ser-vices, which is required under the law). Because the military
women themselves embody traditional gender ideology, their role as mothers andnurturers strongly inform decisions to remain or quit in the service. There isdifferentiated agency among female officers and enlistees. Female officers strategize byplanning career requirements and timing their mar-riage and childbearing/child rearing130

with spouse co-location and posting in units located at urban centers. Female enlistees,
given their field unit posting, have fewer agency and therefore tend to quit early forfamily plans.
Substantial inroads have been made towards increasing the number of women in thePhilippine Army, and providing them equal opportunities to pursue a career and moveup the ranks. However, as most women recruited into the military subscribe to
traditional gender roles (i.e. with desire to marry and have children), they face greatchallenges be-fore an institution which historically is designed for deployed militarymen, and uncolocated female spouse and dependents. The military’s ambivalent stancetowards families (as providing social support versus a corrupting influence for thetroops) further limit the kind of institutional commitment. The military does not fundfamily services beyond member-based benefits and pensions, and will likely remain thatway given the pervasive-ness of the traditional gender template among its personnel.

References
Andres, M., Moelker, R., and Soeters, J. (2012). The work–family interface andturnover intentions over the course of project-oriented assignments abroad.
International Journal of Project Management. 30: 752–759.
Burrel, L. M., Adams, G. A., Durand, D, D. B, & Castro, C. A. (2006). The impact of
military lifestyle demands on well-being, army, and family outcomes. Armed
Forces and Society. 33,1: 43-58.

131

Cadigan, J. (2006). The impact of family-friendly compensation: an investigation of
military personnel policy. Review of Public Personnel Administration. 26, 1: 3-20.
Franke, V. (2006). The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in stability
operations. International Journal of Peace Studies. 11: 2, 5-25.
Hall, R.A. (2017) The Integration of Women in the Army: Twenty-three Years Hence.
The Philippine Army Journal. 11,2: 16-29.
Hall, R.A. (2016). Muslim Gender Narratives in the Philippine Army. Res Militaris.
Special ERGOMAS Issue n°2. Women in the Military (February).
http://resmilitaris.net
Hall, R.A. (2009). From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and East
Timorese Policy Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front and Falintil
Combatants into theArmed Forces. Paper presented at the American Political
Science Association Meeting. Toronto, Canada. September 3-6, 2009.
Harrion, D. (2006). The role of military culture in military organization’s responses towoman abuse in military families. The Sociological Review. 54,3: 546-574.
Lietz, C. A., Stromwall, L. K., and Carlson, B. E. (2013). Women service members andfamily reintegration. Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Social
Services. 94,3: 186-193.
Smith, D. G., and Rosenstein, J. E. (2017). Gender and the military profession: early careen influences, attitudes, and intentions. Armed Forces & Society. 43,2: 260-279.

132

Trail, T. E., Meadows, S. O., Miles, J. N., and Karney, B. R. (2017). Patterns ofvulnerabil-ities and resources in US military families. Journal of Family Issues. 38,
15: 2128-2149.
Vuga, J. and Juvan J. (2013). Work-family conflict between two greedy institutions –the family and the military. Current Sociology. 61(7): 1058-1077.
Wadsworth, S. M., and Southwell, K. (2011). Military families: Extreme work and extreme”work-family” The Annals of the American Academy. 636: 163-183.

133

134

Masculinity of Single/Married Soldiers:
The Cases of British Soldiers in Colonial India in the 19th Century

Taeko Uesugi
Senshu University/ JapanI.

Introduction

The military force is said to be an institution which is based on the construction ofsoldiers’ masculinity (Enloe 2000:16). However, masculinity as recognized or expectedin the military is varied and not only related to combat potential or sexual orientation.
Many heroes who are renowned as superhuman combatants or in intelligenceagencies are not married. Real military forces also employ young and single men by
preference. It is supposed that marital status is among the constituents of masculinity on
which military forces rely.
Is it only single soldiers that the military forces regard as desirable? Is soldiers’
marital status relevant to the roles or the specific type of masculinity which is expectedin the military force? If yes, what is the background for the relevance?
In order to clarify soldiers’ marital status and the masculinity which is expected in the
military forces, I examine the case of British soldiers in colonial India in the nineteenth
century. Since there are many studies regarding Britons’ marriage and family life in135

colonial India, I would like to describe and analyse soldiers’ marital status andmasculinity by re-examining these secondary materials.

II.

The Military Favours Single Soldiers

1.

The British Army and colonial rule
It was the military force of the colonies, especially the Indian Army, which

determined the fate of the British Empire (Tan 2005:23). The Friends of India (1874)
reported that sixty thousand among one hundred and thirty thousand Europeans living inIndia were servicemen (Mizutani 2011:18-19)

2.

The regulation of soldiers’ marriage and the realities of married life
The British Army had already recognized in the middle of the Napoleonic Wars at theend of the eighteenth century that soldiers’ families were a very important factor for
manning and acquisition of staff, so they started welfare policies targeted at soldiers’
families (Lin 2000). However, marriages were strictly regulated. Married soldiers
without marriage permission were also dealt with as single soldiers, whose number was
unknown (Hyam 1998[1990]:170).
Further, the social service in the nineteenth century was insufficient by contemporary
standards. Military forces did not care the welfare of soldiers’ wives and children verymuch. They were regarded as camp followers. Since garrisons with married quarters
were so limited, even permitted wives often lived in barracks for single soldiers together
with their husbands (Burroughs 1994:173). During transportation to colonies, the army
did not take care of families, so it was not rare that they died of illness on the way.
136

Permission for marriage was limited, and social services were insufficient, so many
soldiers were obliged to be single in colonies. It was not only ranks and file whosemarriage permission was limited; officers’ marriages were also limited.

3.

Disorderly conduct of single soldiers
Single soldiers had native lovers or wives. Or they indulged in paid sexual service orhomosexuality. Some soldiers committed rape.
The army adopted licensed prostitution from the mid-1850s until 1888 in 25 garrisons inIndia (Ballhatchet 1980:89, Hyam 1998[1990]:171).

III.

Why Did the Army Limit Soldiers’ Marriage?

1.

Social and institutional backgrounds
The essential background aspect of the regulation of soldiers’ married lives was thefinancial stringency of the British Army. Because of a lack of financial resources, theBritish Army cut down on personal expenses and welfare cost.
Due to the low pay, the army could not get desirable recruits easily.
As a result, the army became a refugee for dropouts or villains and the army eveninduced them to join in the army through liqueur or deception (Burroughs 1994:168).
On the other hand, most officers were from the nobility and gentry. The nobility andgentry could buy officers’ rank, so obviously some these officers were not fit for
military service.

137

Between officers from the upper class and ranks and file from the lowest class, there
was an insurmountable social gap. High-ranking officials regarded that these ranks andfile lacked the moral and intelligence necessary for self-restraint due to their lowest
social backgrounds (Ballhatchet 1980:162).

2.

Military backgrounds
Another aspect of marriage regulation was that the army believed that single soldiers

had much value from a military viewpoint; it was believed that single soldiers werehighly effective (Ballhatchet 1980:35; Hyam 1998[1990]:170). Firstly, single soldiers’
loyalty was not so divided between their families and units. Secondly, it was thoughtthat the combat potential of single men exceeded that of married men. Thirdly, the army
saw boyishness as quality to be praised.

IV.

The change in gaze on soldiers’ marriage

1.

Reforms of the British Army
Military study accomplished remarkable progress in the nineteenth century. As aresult, the officers’ professionalization was developing in the nineteenth century(Caforio 2006:17). The traditional ‘heroic’ type personifying martial spirit and personalbravery has been progressively flanked by the managerial type, who reflects thepragmatic and social dimensions of modern warfare (Caforio 2006:17).
However, reforms were not carried out until the middle of the century (Burroughs
1994: 161-162, 178). It was after the great wars such as the Crimean War (1853-1856),

138the Indian Mutiny (1857-1859), and the Boer War (1899-1902) that the necessity ofradical reforms was fully recognized.
In the Crimean War, the development of communication technology enabled themass media to instantly report on the war situation and the circumstances of the armyback home and provoke general concerns on the war (Streets 2004).
The public came to know about incompetent officers of the noble class and criticised
the occupation of power by the class (Burroughs 1994:183). The mass media also
reported on soldiers’ paid sex and their families’ wretched life circumstances. As aconsequence, the conservative army became the target of social reform movements.
Within the army also, as the necessity for an effective army was felt strongly, theprocess of reform started (Gibson 2012:12). It was especially significant to develop
officers with high professional military knowledge. In 1871, the purchase and sale ofofficers’ rank was prohibited (Spiers 1994:188).

2.

Recognition of masculinity of married soldiers
In the second half of the nineteenth century, a new type of soldiers came to be praised

as a hero, married officers from the middle class who received a professional education.
Among all of them, Major General Sir Henry Havelock distinguished himself during thecapture of Lucknow in 1857.
What was the background for the appearance of new heroes? Firstly, theprofessionalism of the military had been established, as cited above. Secondly, the new139

norm of a ‘modern family’ appeared among the bourgeoisie and educated citizens.
Domesticity became one motif of a new type of hero adventure stories (Dawson 1994).
The army also started to evaluate married soldiers’ masculinity. The evaluation of
married men as having qualities of dependability, good and conventional morality, andfitness for promotion to greater authority over their fellows had become common. The
new type of officers was expected to show paternal concern toward privates’ legal andcommon-law wives and children.

3.

‘Racial degeneration’ and single soldiers
It is often said that the colonial rule was justified by social evolutionism, which put

the whites at the top of the hierarchy of human sociocultural evolution and emphasised
the concept of whites’ noble obligation to civilize non-whites.
However, in colonial India, there were phenomena which could invalidate thelegitimacy of the colonial rule. They were so-called ‘racial degeneration’ which wasthought to have been brought about by the appearance of ‘poor whites’, Domicile
Europeans, Eurasians and ‘Indians’ (European women who got married to Indian men,and their descendants).
British privates were involved with all these phenomena. British privates stationed incolonies were from the urban poor class, and their paid sex and rape brought ‘discrediton the ruling race’ (Ballhatchet 1980:140). The local elites despised the poor whites(Mizutani 2011:54).

140

Since not-permitted widows and orphans were given no pensions, they would fall into
the social category of the poor whites. They could not afford to pay travel expenses
back to the UK, so they remained in India and constituted a part of Domicile Europeans.
Some widows became barmaids at beer halls, which Indian men also visited, got
married to Indian men, and became ‘Indian.’
Soldiers who were not permitted marriage or accompanied service had sexual
relationships or interracial marriage with native women in the colonies. Theirdescendants were called ‘Eurasians’.
After all, unintentionally, the army continued to reproduce poor whites, Domicile
Europeans, ‘Indians’, and Eurasians by sending soldiers from the poor and being
reluctant to permit marriage. The army’s policy destroyed the ‘homogeneity of [the]European community’ (Mizatani 2011) and made a sociobiological boundary between
the ruler and the ruled, which the Britons thought to have to exist, an unclear one.

V.

Ranks and File Continued to be Single
As described above, in the second half of the nineteenth century, reforms in the army

were started, married soldiers were praised, and ‘racial degeneration’ caused by single
soldiers became a matter of concern.
However, these changes influenced soldiers’ marriage only to a limited extent.
Although the purchase and sale of officers’ rank were prohibited and professionallyeducated officers gradually increased after the Crimean War, the social background of
the officers changed little in the nineteenth century. The reason was that officers had tobear huge costs on account of their small salary, they could not serve without an extra
141source of income. The social backgrounds of low-rank privates did not change either
due to low pay. Thus, there remained a huge gap in social background between officers
and privates.
Although marriage regulation was slackened in 1876, the slack differed by rank. The
received wisdom was as follows: ‘Subalterns may not marry, captains may marry,
majors should marry, and colonels must marry’ (Gould 1999:221). High-ranking
officials or policy makers did not regard privates from the poor as deserving marriage
and the resultant financial burden on the army.

VI.

Conclusion

I discussed the marital status of soldiers and masculinity by taking the example of the
British Army in colonial India in the nineteenth century.
The British Army in colonial India maintained strict marriage regulation of soldiers
for financial and military reasons until the first half of the nineteenth century. However,in the second half of the 19th century, the approach of the army and the mainlandsociety brought about relaxation in regulations.
Consequently, in the army, the distinction of officers who were expected to getmarried and privates who were expected to be single occurred. Partial relaxation meantthat a plural type of masculinity was recognized in the army: masculinity of husbands orfathers and masculinity of single men. The plural masculinity corresponded to soldiers’social standing and the structure of ranks and appointments in the army.

142

The relaxation of marriage regulation was also related with the occurrence of a new
type of officers – the managerial type. The change in role structure in the modern
military forces advanced in relation to the coexistence of plural types of masculinity
engendered by married status.
For military forces, soldiers’ marriage and reproduction related to not only personalaffairs but also to the forces’ finance, rank structure, effectiveness, civil-military
relations, and family norms.

Reference
Ballhatchet, Kenneth. (1980). Race, Sex and Class under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes
and Policies and Their Critics, 1793-1905. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Burroughs, Peter. (1994). ‘An Unreformed Army? 1815-1868.’ In The Oxford Historyof the British Army, edited by David Chandler and Ian Beckett, pp. 161-186. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Caforio, Giuseppe. (2006). ‘Some Historical Notes,’ Giuseppe Caforio ed. Handbook of
the Sociology of the Military, pp.7-26, New York: Springer.
Enloe, Cynthia. (2000). Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s
Lives. Berkeley: University of California.
Gibson, Clare. (2012). Army Childhood: British Army Children’s Lives and Times.
Oxford: Shire Publications.

143

Gould, Tony. (1999). Imperial Warriors: Britain and the Gurkhas. London: Granta
Books.
Hyam, Ronald. (1998[1990]). Sekushuariti no teikoku: Kindai Igirisu no sei to shakai,Translated into Japanese by Takehiko Honda. Tokyo: Kashiwa-shobo. (Empire andSexuality: The British Experience.)
Lin, Patricia Y. C. E. (2000). ‘Citizenship, Military Families, and the Creation of a New
Definition of ‘Deserving Poor’ in Britain, 1793-1815.’ Social Politics, spring 2000:646. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Spiers, Edward. (1994). The Late Victorian Army 1868-1914. In David Chandler and
Ian Beckett eds. The Oxford History of the British Army, pp.187-210. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Streets, Heather. (2004) Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British
Imperial Culture, 1857-1914. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Tan, Tai Yong. (2005). The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society inColonial Punjab, 1849-1947. New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

144

The military family as a social and political category. Brazil andPortugal in comparative perspective

Helena Carreiras
ISCTE-University Institute of Lisbon/ Portugal

Introduction‘Military family’ is a concept that has been extensively used in the social scientific studyof the military. Not inadvertently however, in the academic context the plural has been
dominant: ‘military families’, with a very concrete empirical referent: military members
and their families. The changing missions of the armed forces, with multinational peace
support operations becoming core to most western militaries, has brought a renewed
attention to the topic. Increased international missions have meant frequent separations
between military personnel and their families. The downsizing and restructuring ofmilitary organizations, with significant personnel shrinking, has meant for most soldiersintense pre-deployment training periods and high deployment load. Separation from andsupport to military families have become critical issues for military forces effectiveness.
Academic attention to the topic has followed its greater relevance in social practice(Moelker, et. al, 2015).
However, the concept has also traveled to, and been framed within, the social context
of the military and the defense policy-making sphere. Here, the meanings attached to thiscategory have not always been so clearly defined. The empirical referent has sometimes
shifted from a grammatically and socially plural reality – military families – to agrammatically and epistemologically singular one: the military family, referring to all the145members of the military institution, including their families, gathered under one single
umbrella category: one family. In this case, ‘military family’ has been defined as anentity that transcends individuals, where the strong bonds of family ties link the institution
and all its members –including family members. Under this frame, the military family
comes to embody the core of military identity and values.
Between these two ideal types, however, some nuances exist in the concrete
appropriation and uses of the category in different socio-historical contexts. This paper
focuses on patterns and differences that have been detected in the institutional andindividual narratives that appropriate the category of military family in Portugal andBrazil.

1. Exploring the uses of a social category: a methodological framework
One first requirement to researching the various appropriations of military family as anempirical category, out of the scientific field, is to take into account the analytical levelthat is targeted.

Different analytical levels often imply different research questions,require different research methodologies, data and sources. Therefore, it is not irrelevantto the research of the social and political appropriation of the category of military family,
whether the focus is put on macro structures, organizational levels or inter-individual
dynamics. Here, the macro analytical level refers to political/institutional policy
discourses and practices; the meso level to group collective action and organizational
narratives, and the micro level to social interaction patterns and identity formation.
Each of these levels implies different research questions: 1) to what extent has theconcept of ‘military family’ been incorporated into the official defense policy discourse?

1462) to what extent has it been mobilized at the organizational and collective action level?
3) How has it been used as a marker of identity by military personnel and their families?
Likewise, the empirical referents are different: the macro level focuses on statepolicies and MoD orientations, the meso level on the armed forces as an organization orcollectively organized sub-groups (such as trade-unions or professional associations), andthe micro level brings attention to military members and their families, their interactions
and identity. Each level will consequently be informed by different sources anddominantly require different type of data: laws, policies and political discourses for themacro level, organizational documents, interviews and other type of visual and audio data
for the meso level and interviews, life documents, observational/ethnographic data for the
micro level (Table 1).

147

Tabel 1 – Methodological framework for analyzing uses of military family

ObjectMacro level

Meso level

Micro level

Defence policies

Organizational

Social interaction

narratives

Identity

Collective action
ActorsGovernment

Armed Forces

Military personnel

MoD

Professional

Families

associations
Trade-unions
Data/sources Laws andOrganizational

regulations

documents

Policy measures

Interviews

Political

Audio and visual data

discourses

Interviews
Life documents
Observation data
Audio and visualdata

2. The uses of ‘military family’ in Portugal and Brazil: a comparative perspective
2.1 Portugal: ‘military family’ between absence and politicization
In Portugal ‘military family’ is a rather absent category, both at the macro level of defense
policy discourse and action, and at the micro level as an identity category for military
personnel. In 2013, almost two decades after the Portuguese armed forces started to send148their soldiers in international peacekeeping missions, there was no specific program orpolicy aimed at supporting military families. Both from the institutional perspective andfrom the more informal dimension of social networks, soldiers’ families were invisible
components of the military social landscape (Carreiras, 2015).
In what concerns state support policies, this absence has been considered puzzling.
Unlike many other nations, Portugal knew a rather uncommon pattern of family
involvement in military life during the colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and GuineBissau, from 1960 to 1974, when thousands of wives with children followed theirhusbands to long commissions in Africa. Considering the dominant institutional modelof the Portuguese armed forces at the time, as well as the requirements of a war context,
it would have been expectable to see families, and especially spouses who became
isolated from their previous social networks, being given more institutional attention andbeing more integrated than they actually were into the military environment andorganizational life. At present, with new focus on international missions, a significant
number of soldiers deployed, and the perceived importance of family relations for qualityof life during missions, again very little specific institutional initiatives (and certainly nota policy) have been developed with the aim of providing social support to soldiers andtheir families.
At the micro-level of interaction and identity, research has pointed to a detachmentfrom the idea of a military family as a referent for identity: on the contrary, the focus has
been much stronger on separation between the worlds of the family and the military. Data
from a study of a Portuguese battalion in Kosovo showed that in what regards the topic
of institutional support to families, there was among soldiers a rather restrictive
understanding of what that support should be, generally equated with facilitating
149

communication and intervention in case of critical incidents. The lack of need for support
was rooted on the idea that the military and the family should be two different spheres,two ‘separate worlds’, as in the following statement:“I separate the two worlds; when I’m working, I completely forget mypersonal life, otherwise it would affect my work; when I leave work, I
am in my space, I totally forget work because if I don’t, it would
negatively affect my personal life. (…) If we don’t do that, we will
create very complicated situations for ourselves and those that surroundus in both professional and personal life.”1
In addition, the idea was put forward that the military cannot fulfill the true needs ofthe family, either because it lacks resources or because it cannot provide for the type ofneed at stake. Sometimes, an institutional intervention could even be felt as intrusive:“I agree [that support should exist] but I also ask: why? Ok, we camehere and everything that is done to help those who stayed back home isOK, but help them with what? I think that the only support they need,
the one thing they miss, which cannot be replaced is ourselves. Should
they put somebody else in our place?2
According to Carreiras, “one way to read these results is that families became rather
invisible components from the military institutional space not only but also because they
have been, and still are, the backbone of an informal social support system that the armed
forces have never been pressured or required to institutionalize” (Carreiras, 2015)”.
1

Lieutenant M., Platoon commander.

2

First Sargent G, personnel.

150

However, during the past decade, we have witnessed the category ‘military family’
emerge as a significant anchor in military collective action.

Military professional

associations, namely the three associations for each of the ranks,
Oficiais das Forças Armadas (officers)

Associação dos

Associação de Sargentos (NCO’s), or

Associação de Praças (enlisted) have periodically used the category to advance theirclaims for labor and social security rights. Since military trade unions are forbidden bylaw, the military have organized around professional associations that aim atintermediating the interests of their members close to the political system.

It has beenin the name of the military family, and because family members were the only ones that
could be publicly mobilized, that allowed forms of social protest took place. The marches
were explicitly named ‘the military family parade’. The wellbeing of the military family– ambiguously defined between a singular entity and the plural military family members
conception – was invoked in at least two major occasions in 2012 and 2014, to legitimate
a fight over rights .

151« If the obligations and demands ofthe military are different from thoseof other citizens, then rights must also
be different »« The military are not civil servants »Source: http://aofa.pt/
These demonstrations integrated military family members - wives, children and otherrelatives - as well as retired military personnel, claiming for changes in social security,salaries and benefits for the military and their families. One of the marches also included
protest against the closing of an all-female college, originally aimed at educating the152daughters of military personnel. If the analytical scope of the I/O thesis is taken into
account (Moskos, 1977), what we see here is the activation of a category that can betraced back to a clear institutional frame, to legitimate occupational concerns. The
discursive focus is on differentiation from other state bureaucracy agencies and agents,
with the most repeated sentence being ‘we are not civil servants’.

2.2 Brasil: military family as a native category and an anchor of identity
In Brazil, we find a rather different picture with regard to the uses of the military family
category and metaphor. Recent work on the topic (Castro, 2018) documents extensively
the salience of the category at both the organizational and social interaction levels.
In organizational terms, the military family has been the object of a very different kind of
appropriation. Unlike Portugal, here it seems to have been instrumental to strengthen
institutional identity, by underlining the unique characteristics of the military and theshared values that hold it together. It was explicitly constructed through the (re)creationof a historical narrative and various ceremonial moments, with the main aim ofunderlining the community linkages of the military and their families, under theprotective umbrella of the institution.
The designation of a patron for the military family, Rosa da Fonseca, as well as thecreation of the military family day – on the patron’s birth date, 18th September - are twoof the events that confer symbolical density to this social construction.
In June 2016 the Army declared D. Rosa da Fonseca (1802-1873) patron of themilitary family, as a recognition of the “importance of the spirit of sacrifice and fight,
which allows army personnel to reach professional and personnel success, with thefeeling of accomplished duty, whatever the mission”. Mother of seven military sons, of153which three died at war and other became relevant officers and politicians, D. Rosa daFonseca, “was not chosen by chance”, as mentioned in the army web page. She was said
to be of ‘manly spirit’ and an example of patriotic love. Her bust was displayed at the
Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais (EsAO) in the patron’s alley of the military vila
in Rio de Janeiro, the biggest military garrison in Brazil. She also became the patron of
the first class to integrate women at the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras in 2018.

Source: https://www.sangueverdeoliva.com.br/
This official recognition puts emphasis on the role of military wives to the career of
their husbands, but, more than that, “it stimulates the feeling of belonging to one family”(Castro, 2018).

The military family day is now regularly celebrated by the army indifferent units around the country.

154

From the point of view of social interaction and the concrete experiences and identity
building at the micro-level, existing data confirms the intense mobilization of the category
as an anchor of identity. The work developed by Brazilian researchers shows that unlike
Portugal, the ‘military family’ is for the Brazilian military and their families a truly native
category, embodying representations of an idealized family. This goes hand in hand withthe predominance in Brazil of the traditional military family, that is, situations in which
wives play a supporting and complementary role to their husbands’ career, assuming the
responsibilities of caring for the nuclear family, but simultaneously participating as full
members of the 'military family'. Celso Castro's analysis of autobiographical narrativesof military wives shows very well how the reinforcement of the "olive-green family" isdone by way of a deep immersion in the military world and its differentiation from thecivilian world, but simultaneously by way of the husband's career being assumed as acentral project for the whole family. This inextricable association and compromise
between domestic and professional values is also reported in other works that document
in detail the identification process that leads to the reproduction of the military order,
values and hierarchies among military wives. Taken together, in a movement not without
conflict, all these dimensions thus strengthen the totalizing project of the institution (Silva,
2018, Chinelli, 2018).
However, even if still dominant, this is not a monolithic portrait. Social andinstitutional transformations have started to challenge it, namely the tensions arising fromchanges in the professional role of women and family patterns. Adão stresses thatdifferent levels of wives' adherence to the careers of their husbands are a function ofdifferent temporalities, and the development of more or less individualizing projects starts
to take place (Adão 2018); Pinto underlines a certain dissent in the women's discourses

155about the military, the borders and diversities they draw against the doxa of the militaryfamily (Pinto, 2018); Monnerat illuminates the tensions, contradictions and conflicts thatthe real experiences of military women in the conciliation between family life andinsertion in the labor market represent to an idealized vision of the military family(Monnerat, 2018).
However, the type of institutional dynamics that characterize the Brazilian army, its
territorial implantation and the high mobility that it involves, seem to justify the existenceof an elective affinity with a traditional family model: one that is characteristic of an
institutional model of military organization. The ‘military family’ still remains an anchor
of identity for the military and their families.

Concluding remarks
The observed differences in the uses of the ‘military family’ category, from an empiricalreferent to a metaphor, in Portugal and Brazil, are due to both structural and culturalcharacteristics regarding the military and its relations with society in both countries. On
the one hand, there are notorious structural differences in the place and relevance of themilitary in the state bureaucracies. In Brazil, the historical heritage of the authoritarian
military regime still accounts for a defensive reaction of the military against prejudice on
the part of various sectors of civil society. The need for differentiation and separationfrom the civilian world is strong and the reinforcement of the military family is part ofthat process. Furthermore, the military have kept a high degree of insulation from society,with high levels of self-recruitment (around 60% in the 1990’s) and spatial mobility
patterns that reinforce this isolation. In Portugal, the active role of the military in the156

democratic cup of 1974, as well as the professionalization of the armed forces haveprompted greater civil-military convergence. While the Portuguese military have lost
weight, decreasing its quantitative presence and its social outreach, the relevance of themilitary has been kept, if not increased in Brazil. The nature of missions, the compulsory
military service system, the territorial spread of the Brazilian military, with its wellidentified military communities and vilas, are in contrast with a much less visible social
presence of the Portuguese all-volunteer force, spatially more concentrated and withsignificant recruitment and retention problems in the enlisted categories. Erosion ofmaterial conditions (social security schemes, pensions, health support) in Portugal,
following a more general fiscal crisis of the welfare state, also seems to contrast with theprevalence of an ample benefits’ scheme in Brazil.
On the other hand, occupational and institutional value orientations highlightdivergent paths, with a clear institutional character still dominant in Brazil and an evergrowing occupational value orientation gaining ground among certain categories of thePortuguese military.
In many respects Brazil and Portugal are thus representative cases of very different
contextual causal configurations that explain the relative salience of the military family
category as well as its uses in social and political practice.

ReferencesAdão, Maria Cecília de Oliveira (2018), Projeto e Individualismo: considerações sobre aadesão das esposas ao projeto profissional dos oficiais do Exército Brasileiro, inCastro, Celso (ed.), A Família Militar no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.

157

Carreiras, Helena (2015), “The invisible families of Portuguese Soldiers. From colonial
wars to contemporary missions”, in Moelker, R. Andres, M., Bowen, G. Manigart, P.
(orgs.) Military Families and War in the 21st Century, London, Routledge, pp.261277.
Castro, Celso (ed.), (2018), A Família Militar no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.
Chinelli, Fernanda (2018) Família militar: apontamentos sobre uma comunidade
performada, in Castro, Celso (ed.), A Família Militar no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.
Moelker, R. Andres, M., Bowen, G. Manigart, P. (orgs.) Military Families and War in
the 21st Century, London, Routledge.
Monnerat, Sílvia (2018), Estrangeiras em terras desconhecidas: esposas de oficiais do
exército, transferências territoriais e inserção no mercado de trabalho, in Castro,
Celso (ed.), A Família Militar no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.
Moskos, Charles C. (1977), ‘From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military
Organization’ Armed Forces & Society, 4(1): 41–50.

Pinto, Werusca de Sousa (2018), Construção da subjetividade de mulheres de militares:
discursos e contextos, in Castro, Celso (ed.), A Família Militar no Brasil, Rio deJaneiro, FGV.
Silva, Cristina Rodrigues da (2018), Famílias na fronteira: experiências de esposas demilitares na selva brasileira, in Castro, Celso (ed.), A família Militar no Brasil, Riode Janeiro, FGV.

158

Military families in Israel –Characteristics and processes of continuity and change

Uzi Ben-Shalom
Ariel University, Department of Sociology and Anthropology / Israel

Introduction
The topic of military families was of interest for Israeli sociologists, especially since thelast decade of the 20th century. Around this time the tension between the military
institution and the civilian society drew much more attention to the role of the family inthe military service in Israel. Military families in Israel were usually studied using
general sociological perspectives, as in other area of research (Rosenhek, Maman &Ben-Ari, 2003).). As a result, there is not enough information about the peculiarities of
the Israeli case. For example, the concept of “Greedy Institution” was often used to159

describe the detrimental tensions between the institutions of the military and the family(Desivilya & Gal, 1996; Eran-Yona, 2011). The aim of this chapter is adding acomplementary information about military families that will suggest additional viewson the nature of the Israeli case of military families and the development of this concept
over time. In addition, my contention is that the Israeli case is largely shaped byfundamentals of the Israeli security agenda.

The “Old Formula” and functional coexistence of military and family
The “old formula” of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is a description of the Israeli
military culture or its “way of war” (Cohen, Bacevich & Eisenstadt, 1998). It includes
the principles of Israel’s miniature size, its general location between greater Arabnations and its difficulty in supporting a large standing army. As a result, Israel build alarge citizen soldiers army with two components: Massive component of compulsory
service and reserves and relatively small component of professional volunteers who
serves for longer period. I claim that the bulk of the characteristics of the Israeli casestudy of military families result from this structure. For example, a significant part of
the research on military families is interested in family separation and coping following
overseas deployment of spouse (Andres, Moelker & Soeters, 2012). Contrary to that thefocus of the Israeli case is the separation of a child for mandatory conscription which inmany cases is not so far from home, due to Israel’s miniature scale. The other casebeing short term duty of a reservist (Milgram, & Bar, 1993).
The bulk of experiences of Israeli military families relate to the first component –namely: Parenting of compulsory soldiers or military families in which one part – in thepast usually a husband - is a member of a reserve unit. The miniature experiences relate160to military families of permanent career soldiers. It is peculiar to note that the bulk ofsociological research on military families in Israel relate to the second type of careersoldiers’ families. One possible explanation for this peculiarity is that an institutional
support is required for this topic of research. The research and publication is dependent
upon funding and allowing of publication. The issue of career service was perceived asa fundamental manpower challenge and therefore research was invested as part of theefforts to meet its challenges.
The foundations of the “Old Formula” are largely still in existence today andimplies that most military families in Israel are either families of compulsory conscripts
or wives – in greater numbers today of husbands – of reservists. One of the foundationsof the Old Formula was a mutual existence of the military and family. Such coexistence
and mutual dependency resulted in a functional coexistence in which the willingness forenlistment by future compulsory soldiers was relatively high and the support from theirfamilies was considered by authorities as a given fact. Even radical changes in the
manpower resources for military service due to massive immigration waves in the 50s,
70s and 90s or shortages of manpower in the first decade of 2000 did not change thecoexistence of military service and the Israeli families. The manifestation of thefunctional action was a firm support by parents in their drafted children and therelatively low level of protest or refusal to obey the law of compulsory service (Katriel,1991).
Katriel (1991) showed how military families are coopted with the military andcontinue supporting their children, now under arms, by unique practices: Supporting
their basic needs – even in a miniature and symbolic scale – by visiting their camps on
the weekends with comforting food; providing home for vacations with food, laundry
161

and subsidiary equipment (“Hashlamat Ziud”). “Israeli Compulsory Military Families”
constitute an economical and emotional “safe haven” during the prolong and arduous
service. Kayriel (1991) argued that by doing so military families avoid the moral
questions arises during the occupation of the Palestinians Territories which become anincreasingly questionable during the 80s’, especially following the first Intifada (19861990). The complimentary actions of the drafted children could be described as a“protracted childhood” in which the children, now under arms, remain as “children”
while postponing their autonomy, not living their parents’ “nest”. The literaturesuggested that this pattern of delayed autonomy is sometimes compensated by journeys
abroad for a long duration. Long voyages to locations in South America or East Asia
after compulsory service are balancing the period of being part of the “Compulsory
Military Family” before committing to an independent professional or livelihood venue.

Challenges to the Old Formula and the research agenda on military and family
The challenges to the "Old Formula" grew following debated inside the Israeli
society concerning the occupation of the Palestinian territories. These conflicts wereaccompanying by the gradual increase in the material and technological superiority by
Israel against its rivals. Indeed, the last major war commenced by Israel was the 1982
“First Lebanon War” and the last existential war is the1973 “Yom Kippur War”. As aresult of these two fundamental processes a question of resources aroused concentratingon the need for the sacrifice of lives in combat and the justification of budget required
for the supporting of the massive IDF (Ben-Shalom, 2018). The result of theseprocesses had their toll on the Old Formula and eventually shaped the relationship162

between families and the military in Israel. While the IDF remained patriarchic to alarge extent it does both change and being changed by its societal environment (Ben-Ari& Levy-Schreiber, 2001). The sociology of the military family in Israel became much
more aware of contradictions between the military and families. In addition, many new
forms of military families could be identified to be different then the prototypical“Compulsory Service Military Family”.
The social movement against the occupation of Southern Lebanon was marked by
the actions of “The Mothers Four” movement eventually had a greater effect in thedecision to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000 (Lemish & Barzel, 2000). But thecleavages were apparent in many other cases especially concerning families of fallen
soldiers and families of POWs. Additional aspect was the preferences of families that
their children will be accepted to a high-tech unit which has the premises of greater
material advantages following service as compared to combat soldiers. As a result of
these tensions military sociologists focused their attentions to issues as understanding
the views of military families of compulsory service soldiers and their role on the
motivation of young Israelis to enlist (Ben-Shalom & Fox, 2009).
The IDF gradually become more and more reliant of its professional component.
The contest over high quality servicemen (and women) against the prosperous Israeli
market led to serious concerns of the IDF human resources branch. This contradiction
was immanent in the current material and hedonistic Israeli consumeristic society(Levy, 2003). One of the main areas of action was identified as the military and family
contradiction. As a result, research projects were launched on the complexities of careersoldiers’ families. The following citation in one of the leading Israeli sociologists of this
topic is a good example:163

“… I know and feel that I am only 15% of myself and what I can potentially givein my relationship with Anat and as a father… and so frustrated about it”… My
real fantasy is to be a good family man and the clash between the fantasy andmy work create so much confusion, tensions and cutoffs… “ (Battalion
Commander, Regular, cited in Eran-Yona, 2015).
This quotation is far more typical for a Western Army military family then to thecitizen soldier tradition of the IDF. It implies the stresses of being tied to the “Greedy
Institutions” of being a parent and a combat battalion commander. It also implies theprocess of professionalization of the IDF and the motivation to invest resources in thisstudy by the human resources branch.
The contradictions inside the Israeli society had their effect on the structure ofmilitary families. On the one hand, religious families continue support the military
service, especially the arduous combat service. On the other hand, secular andespecially left-wing families were more than ever critical on military service. It seems
that this difference may had an effect on the style of motivations that “Compulsory
Military Families” endorsed. Such a diversity seems like a recent change in the natureof the Israeli family. This diversity is also augmented by the fact the IDF recruit
numerous soldiers from minorities as Druze and Bedouin. Such families are largely
under researched. In the near future perhaps, such families will be accompanied bycompulsory service from Christian and Muslim minorities and also from children of
migrant workers. Such diversity to the interest of the Israeli case study of militaryfamilies since in these cases it is the male who usually serves while in the bulk of thesecular Jewish population there is a tendency towards equality and de-gendered
conscription and service.

164

Future research
In my view the future of research on military families in Israel will result from thefundamentals of the “Israeli Way of War”. I assume that the fundamentals of thisculture will remain the same but some of its social components may undergo changes.
The research agenda on military families will have a mixture of continuity and change.
On the one hand research topics as families of career soldiers will continue to be ofgreat interest for military sociologists. Especially those who are working for the
military. It is likely that the IDF will continue to support only the research efforts thatwill assist his challenges, for example leveraging the supply-demand of quality
manpower. Should the professional component of the IDF continue to shadow thecitizen soldier component then military families could become the backbone of the IDF.
Such a closure model will drive the IDF towards commonalities with Western nations
and future research in Israel could duplicate their prototypical military families. The
tendency to avoid risks, now characterizes Israel, will have an effect on the research
agenda as well. Coping of families with loss of spouse or children in service. Family
support in the military service and especially combat service will likely to be of greatinterest to military sociologists in the “post heroic” Israeli Society (Ben-Shalom, 2018).
On the other hand, the allocation of manpower that constitute the IDF could befurther changed. If it will indeed be the case, the result is likely to yield research on
different types of military families. Such examples could be a growing interest in thecases of single parents’ family, military families in diverse minority groups including of
Ultra-Orthodox Jews. Another example will be of families in which the women has apermanent military career – including in the combat arms (Ben‐Shalom, Lewin &Engel, 2019).

165

References
Andres, M., Moelker, R., & Soeters, J. (2012). A longitudinal study of partners of
deployed personnel from the Netherlands' armed forces. Military Psychology, 24(3),270-288.
Ben-Ari, E., & Levy-Schreiber, E. (2001). Body-Building, Nation-Building : Gender and
Military Service in Israel, Democratic Culture, 4-5, 99-130 (Hebrew).

Ben‐Shalom, U., Lewin, E., & Engel, S. Organizational processes and gender
integration in operational military units–an IDF case study. Gender, Work &Organization.
Ben-Shalom, U. (2018). Introduction: Israel’s post-heroic condition. Israel Affairs. 1-3.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1478783
Ben-Shalom, U., & Fox, S. (2009). Military psychology in the Israel Defense Forces: A
perspective of continuity and change. Armed Forces & Society, 36(1), 103-119.
Cohen, E. A., Bacevich, A. J., & Eisenstadt, M. J. (1998). 'Knives, Tanks, and Missiles':Israel's Security Revolution. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Desivilya, H. S., & Gal, R. (1996). Coping with Stress in Families of Servicemen:
Searching for “Win‐Win” Solutions to a Conflict between the Family and theMilitary Organization. Family process, 35(2), 211-225.
Eran-Jona, M. (2015). Organizational culture and military families: The case of combat
officers in the Israeli Defense Forces. In Military families and war in the 21st
century (pp. 65-78). Routledge.
Eran-Jona, M. (2011). Married to the military: Military-family relations in the Israel
defense forces. Armed Forces & Society, 37(1), 19-41.

166

Katriel, T. (1991). Picnics in a military zone: Rituals of parenting and the politics ofconsensus. Communal Webs: Communication and Culture in Contemporary Israel,
71-92.
Lemish, D., & Barzel, I. (2000). Four Mothers' The Womb in the Public
Sphere. European Journal of Communication, 15(2), 147-169.
Levy, Y. (2003). Social Convertibility and Militarism: Evaluations of the Developmentof Military-Society Relations in Israel in the Early 2000s1. Journal of political andmilitary sociology, 31(1), 71.
Milgram, N. A., & Bar, K. (1993). Stress on wives due to husbands' hazardous duty or
absence. Military Psychology, 5(1), 21-39.
Rosenhek, Z., Maman, D., & Ben-Ari, E. (2003). The study of war and the military in
Israel: An empirical investigation and a reflective critique. International Journal of
Middle East Studies, 35(3), 461-484.

167