3

Remaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period
under the Paris Agreement
Yasuko KAMEYAMANational Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)
16-2, Onogawa, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8506, Japane-mail:ykame@nies.go.jp

Abstract
This paper aims at examining key issues that should be prioritized and dealt with by academic experts
in the next three to five years, particularly for the purpose of supporting effective implementation of the Paris
Agreement in the post-2020 period. The paper starts off with a section briefly illustrating the overallarchitecture and provisions of the Paris Agreement, followed by a section mapping out major themes underwhich remaining issues exist that should be overcome before countries start taking actions under Paris
Agreement rules after 2020, and how researchers could contribute to resolving these remaining issues.
Among the remaining issues, this article takes up the dimension related to governance of the Paris
Agreement, covering agendas related to equity and transparency. Other major elements should be further
elaborated by other articles in this special issue. The paper concludes by presenting recommendations to a
Japanese audience as to how Japan should proceed in the post-2020 period under the Paris Agreement. There
are two ways of looking at the world. The first is the traditional image of the 20th century, where the economy
is grounded in a stable fossil fuel supply, and emission reduction seems costly. The second is a new image ofthe 21st century, where emission reduction is considered an opportunity for change. The paper argues thatJapanese stakeholders and researchers are affected by the former image of the world, but they need to beaware of the transition, and start taking action today.
Key words: climate change, governance, Japan, nationally-determined contribution (NDC), Paris Agreement

1. Background
The Paris Agreement has opened a new door for theworld to respond to climate change. Adopted on the final
day of the Twenty-first Conference of the Parties(COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 2015, theagreement took less than a year to enter into force inNovember 2016. While the Paris Agreement has been
hailed as a historic diplomatic success (Kinley, 2016),
there are loads of remaining issues that need to be
tackled for the agreement to be most effectively
workable. Many of the remaining agendas require expert
knowledge and inputs from the scientific community.
This paper aims at examining key issues that should
be prioritized and dealt with by academic experts in thenext three to five years, particularly for the purpose of
supporting effective implementation of the Paris
Agreement. The first section briefly illustrates theoverall architecture and provisions of the Paris
Agreement. The second section maps out major themes
under which remaining issues exist, that should beovercome before countries start taking action under
Paris Agreement rules in the post-2020 period, and how
Global Environmental Research
21/2017: 003–010
printed in Japan

researchers might contribute to resolving theseremaining issues. Among these remaining issues, thisarticle takes up the dimension related to governance of
the Paris Agreement, covering agendas related to equity
and transparency. It discusses how Japanese stakeholders
are engaging in this aspect. Other major elements of theParis Agreement are further elaborated by other articles
in this special issue. This article concludes withrecommendations to a Japanese audience as to how
Japan should proceed in the post-2020 period under theParis Agreement.

2. Architecture and Provisions of the Paris
Agreement
The Paris Agreement is the outcome of a four-year
negotiation process that was initiated by a decision called“Durban Platform,” that had been agreed to in 2011 at
COP17 (Bodansky, 2016). The countries involved under
the Durban Platform decided “to launch a process todevelop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed
outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to
all Parties” (UNFCCC, 2011). The process was to include
in its work elements related to “mitigation, adaptation,©2017 AIRIES4

Y. KAMEYAMA

finance, technology development and transfer, transparencyof action, and support and capacity-building.” Thus, thestructure and provisions of the Paris Agreement fullyreflect the scope set by the Durban Platform.
2.1 Long-term Goals
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which set legal
obligations on countries to limit or reduce theirgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to targets clearly
indicated in the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement
merely obligates each country to periodically prepare
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that it
intends to achieve. The agreement does not ensure thatthe aggregated amount of all countries’ NDCs issufficient to avoid dangerous consequences of climatechange to human beings as well as ecosystems as
described in Article 2 of the UNFCCC. The Paris
Agreement sets a long-term goal of partially overcoming
this deficit. Its Article 2 states, “Holding the increase in
the global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit thetemperature increase to 1.5° C above pre-industrial
levels” would significantly reduce the risks and impactsof climate change. Article 4 follows by further stating,“Achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions
by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs in the second
half of this century” should be aimed for to achieve thelong-term target set out in Article 2. The COP decisioninvites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) to provide a special report in 2018 on theimpacts of global warming of 1.5°C and related global
GHG pathways.
2.2 Mitigation
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement obligates eachcountry to “prepare, communicate and maintainsuccessive NDCs that it intends to achieve.” Thesuccessive NDCs are to represent progression beyond
the country’s then current NDC and reflect its highest
possible ambition. Developing countries are urged tocontinue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide
absolute emission reduction targets, while developing
countries are encouraged to continue enhancement of
mitigation efforts. Many of the first NDCs had alreadybeen submitted before COP21, setting targets for years up
to around 2025 or 2030. All Parties must also strive toformulate long-term low GHG emission development
strategies and communicate them by 2020. Countries may
voluntarily use market mechanisms such as emissions
trading schemes to achieve their NDCs (Article 6).
2.3 Adaptation, Loss and Damage
Both the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol put
more weight on mitigation than adaptation, but it has
become clear that adverse impacts of climate change are
already occurring. Thus, the Paris Agreement aims at
striking a balance between mitigation and adaptation. Its
Article 7 establishes a global goal also for adaptation toenhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience andreduce vulnerability to climate change. Countries are toengage in adaptation planning processes and implement
actions, including the development or enhancement ofrelevant plans, policies and/or contributions. Countries
should submit and periodically update adaptation
communications in ways that mitigation actions should
be communicated.
The concepts of loss and damage already existedfrom the time of the UNFCCC, but were enshrined as anindependent article in the Paris Agreement (Article 8).
The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss andDamage associated with Climate Change Impact shallbe subject to the authority and guidance of the meetingof the Parties of the Paris Agreement (CMA).
2.4 Finance
Finance has always been one of central issues ofcontention in the climate regime. Several financial
mechanisms have been established, but financial flows
have been insufficient for responding to all the financial
needs in developing countries. The Paris Agreement
requests not only developed countries but also othercountries to voluntarily provide financial resources tohelp developing countries take actions under the Paris
Agreement (Article 9). One COP decision that was
adopted with the Paris Agreement states, “Developed
countries intend to continue their existing collective
mobilization goal through 2025,” and “Prior to 2025 the
CMA shall set a new collective quantified goal from afloor of US$100 billion per year.”
2.5 Transparency
Now that countries’ central obligation for the post2020 period is to set NDCs and update them
periodically, it has become more important to verify
whether countries are making enough progress toachieve their NDCs. A transparency framework foraction has thus become a necessary component of theParis Agreement in order to build mutual trust andconfidence. On the other hand, a series of processes
have already been established under the UNFCCC thatare related to monitoring, reporting and verification(MRV). Article 13 of the Paris Agreement therefore aims
at making the best use of these existing processes in themost efficient manner. Existing reporting requirements
are focused mainly on mitigation actions, but with newcommitments of the Paris Agreements, actions related toother elements, notably adaptation and finance, should
also be subject to the MRV process.
2.6 Global Stocktaking
Global stocktaking is a process inserted into the Paris
Agreement to assess the collective progress towards
achieving the long-term goals. Countries’ NDCs arenationally determined, which does not ensure reaching
the ultimate long-term goal. The first global stocktaking
is to be held in 2023, but the procedures’ details have yet
to be determined. Somewhat related to the stocktaking
process is a facilitative dialogue among countries to beRemaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period under the Paris Agreement

held in 2018 to take stock of the collective actions, as
described in the COP decision. This is an important
process because this is just about the only avenue forcountries to assess sufficiency of their own and othercountries’ efforts to curb global GHG emissions towards
reaching the long-term goals.
2.7 Differentiation
Both the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol categorizedcountries into two distinctive groups called Annex I and
non-Annex I. The Annex I group consisted of developed
countries and countries in transition into a market
economy, such as former Soviet Union countries.
Countries that achieved economic development were
expected to shift from non-Annex I to Annex I. This
categorization became outdated as the distinction
between the two groups became vague. The Paris
Agreement precluded categorization of countries and set
common commitments for all countries. This does notnecessarily mean all countries face same level ofstringency. Within each element of commitment such as
mitigation, adaptation and finance, all countries are
expected to take the same actions, but at differentiatedlevels. The level of actions is to be determined nationallyand voluntarily.
2.8 Legal Nature of the Agreement
The Paris Agreement takes the form of a treaty. During
the negotiation process, there was a disagreement over thename of the agreement. Some countries wanted it to becalled a “protocol,” while others preferred “agreement” or“implementing agreement.” The legal nature of theagreement is determined not by how it is named, but by
the clauses that form parts of the agreement. Articles on
signing (Article 20), ratification (Article 20), entry into
force (Article 21), and depositaries (Article 26) fulfill
necessary conditions for the agreement to be aninternational treaty with official legal status.
2.9 Non-state Actors
The roles of non-state actors are not explicitly statedin the Paris Agreement itself, but are securely embeddedin the founding basis of the agreement. The Paris
Agreement does not have any teeth in the sense that it
does not determine countries’ GHG emission targets in a
top-down manner. This means that any additionalemission reductions need to occur voluntarily,
independent of national governments’ initiatives. The
COP decision “welcomes the efforts of all non-Party
stakeholders to address and respond to climate change,
including those of civil society, the private sector,
financial institutions, cities and other subnational
authorities.” The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate
Action platform (NAZCA) was established at COP20 tosupport various actions taken by the non-state actors.

5

3. Remaining Issues to be Solved with Support
from Academia
Multilateral agreements usually take at least several
years from adoption to entry into force. The Kyoto
Protocol took eight years for enforcement. The Paris
Agreement was an extraordinary case that entered into
force within eleven months after its adoption. This is agood sign that the world is supporting the transition intode-carbonization, but countries had been expecting
several years at least to negotiate detailed rules toconfidently proceed in the post-2020 period. Among
those are elements that require input from scientificexperts.

3.1 Long-term Goals and Emission Budgets
The first set of research questions is related tolong-term emission trajectories and levels of near-termemission reduction targets. The IPCC has already started
preparing the 1.5°C special report. On the other hand,monitoring data by NOAA (National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration) and NASA (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration) have indicatedthat the year 2016 was the warmest year on record(NASA, 2017). The mean global surface temperature
has already risen more than 1.0°C from the pre-industrial
period, leaving very little room for the world to staywithin the 1.5°C warming path.
“Carbon budget,” or “emission budget,” is a notionthat expresses the amount of carbon, or GHGs, that
could be emitted while aiming to achieve a long-term
temperature goal. If we were to achieve the long-termgoal of 2°C, the total carbon budget since
pre-industrialization would be about 840 GtC of CO2. We
have already emitted about 530 GtC in the past up to 2011
(IPCC, 2014), so there is only about 310 GtC that could
be emitted by future generations in order to keep thetemperature under 2°C. The future budget will be evensmaller if we are to achieve the 1.5°C goal. Calculating acarbon budget is not an easy task. The amount will
depend on how much CO2 can be sequestered by various
sinks and reservoirs. Emissions of non-CO2 gases also
affect the budget. How much of the carbon budget would
be left for the future world at the global level if we wereto reach the 2.0 or 1.5° C goal? How will it change
according to changes in assumptions regarding levels ofdeforestation and CCS (carbon capture and storage)
technologies? These are remaining questions that need to
be answered by researchers.
While global emission pathways are discussed,
others need to focus more on national emission
pathways. Many developed countries have already set
long-term emission goals for the year 2050 at thenational level. This is in line with declarations in 2008
and 2009 among the Group of 8 (G8) member countries
that have called for halving global GHG emission by
2050. In order for these countries to reach deep cuts inemissions such as 80% reduction by 2050, they would
have to make good progress at reducing emissions in the6

Y. KAMEYAMA

years 2030 and 2040 as well. Questions such as “whichis the most economically efficient emission pathway forreaching the long-term goal” need to be answered toenable the world to conduct an effective facilitative
dialogue in 2018 and global stocktaking process in 2023.

3.2 Mitigation: Hard and Soft, Involvement of
Non-state Actors
The second set of research questions is on mitigation
over the short to medium term. It is clear that total
amount of countries’ NDCs for the years between 2025
and 2030 is insufficient to reach the long-term goal
(UNFCCC, 2016). More needs to be done in the area of
mitigation to further deepen the targets, and actuallyreach the targets. But how? There is some opposition to
the long-term temperature goals as too idealistic or
unrealistic (Pielke, 2009). These opposing views stemfrom pessimism regarding plausibility of GHG emission
reductions. It is true to say no one can live without
energy. Energy must continue to be supplied even under
the trajectory towards the long-term goals (Rogeli et al.,2015). Carbon dioxide from fossil fuels should becompletely phased out by mid-century either by shiftingenergy sources to renewable energy or nuclear energy,
or by using CCS technology alongside fossil fuel power
plants. In addition, non-CO2 GHGs such as methane andfluorocarbons needs to be reduced as much as possible.
Remaining emissions should be counterbalanced bysequestration of CO2 in forests.
While making an energy shift towards de-carbonizedsources, the energy demand side also needs to make ahuge transition into a less energy-intensive society.
Urban planning and infrastructure require more than
three decades to make a transition. We need to start
making changes from today if we are to complete therestructuring of our cities by mid-century. Buildings andpeople’s dwellings are also a sector that needs along-term view to reduce their GHG emissions. Thinking
in the long term, we need to take into account various
technologies and means that could totally change ourway of living. As for transportation, for instance, current
automobiles with engines might become a thing of thepast. People could continue enjoying mobilization using
smarter and lighter vehicles with electric motors. It isthus insufficient to argue against stringent emission
targets using only the technologies we have today.
Issues related to mitigation include not only
engineering, or the “hard” aspect, but also policy, or the“soft” aspect. Infrastructure and technologies would notexist without relevant policy implementation. All
countries have already implemented a wide variety ofclimate mitigation policies, including regulations,market-oriented mechanisms, and information-oriented
tools such as labeling. These policies should be further
strengthened and implemented in a speedy manner.
Although many policy analyses have already been
conducted (Höhne et al., 2017), it is still at too early astage to conclude which policy instruments are more
effective than others. The effectiveness of policies will

greatly depend upon each country’s national
circumstances, other relevant non-climate policies, andits share of sectors in terms of emission sources.
Engagement of non-state actors in climate change
mitigation activities is a prerequisite for achieving deep
emission cuts. Technological breakthroughs are achievedby private companies’ R&D. Urban city development isdetermined by local governments and citizens. The roleof policies and measures is to develop enough incentives
for these various actors to voluntarily shift to lesscarbonized behavior. Fossil fuel divestment is amovement that started from NGOs and university
students, to divest their holdings of fossil fuel stocks infavor of other climate-friendly alternatives (Ayling &Gunningham, 2016). More research is needed toinvestigate ways to involve investments by the private
sector, as well as actions by local governments.

3.3 Adaptation and “Loss and Damage”
Adaptation and “loss and damage” is the third pillarof work remaining to be tackled under the Paris
Agreement. Adaptation actions are mainly rooted in eachcountry or even further at each local level. As adverse
impacts of climate change become more evident,
however, the need for more precise estimations of futureplausible damage becomes stronger.
As the COP decision accompanying the Paris
Agreement requested the IPCC to publish a special
report on 1.5°C, climate researchers have already started
to elaborate on plausible climate impacts that are
expected to occur under the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios,and how much damage the world could avoid by seeking
the higher ambitious temperature goal (Hulme, 2016).
This exercise is necessary for comparing the costs
required to reduce GHG emissions to reach the 1.5°C
goal and the cost required to adapt to a warmer world by
2° C or more and damage associated with higher
temperatures. Currently, researchers are making a great
effort to estimate the future impact of climate change.
Mean precipitation and temperature are the mostcommonly acknowledged parameters affected by climatechange, but it is also important for local people tounderstand extreme precipitation or temperature events
locally in a shorter timeframe.
As for loss-and-damage-related debates, the key will
be finding ways to prove direct damage-and-loss
consequences from climate change and those considered
to be associated with climate change. Attribution of
extreme weather patterns and the damage they cause to
climate change is a new frontier in climate science.
Climate security is a notion that aims at finding potential
links between climate change and armed conflict, but
few studies have resulted in robust results so far (Ide,2017). From the legal aspect, responsibility and liability
for loss and damage are still under debate (Lees, 2017).
3.4 Finance, and Involvement of Non-state Actors
Finance has always been an issue at stake in climatechange negotiation. Three types of financial mechanisms

Remaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period under the Paris Agreement

were established in 2001 at COP7: the Special Climate
Change Fund and Least Developing Countries Fund,both under the UNFCCC, and the Adaptation Fundunder the Kyoto Protocol. Establishment of thesemechanisms was supported by developing countries, butdissatisfaction was soon raised by the same countries,
because the amount of financial flow was too meager tofulfill all their needs. To respond to these serious
financial demands, the Copenhagen Accord, adopted in2009 at COP15 included a quantitative target of “US$30
billion for the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation
between adaptation and mitigation” as short-term
finance, and “US$100 billion a year by 2020” in the longterm (UNFCCC, 2009). The funding sources were notlimited to official assistance, but included both public
and private, and bilateral and multilateral types offinance. A significant portion of such funding was toflow through a newly established financial mechanism
called the Green Climate Fund. The short-term financial
goal was reached through huge financial contributions
from developed countries. The long-term financial goalis yet to be achieved but the amount of financial flow iscertainly on the rise. Much of the growth owes toinvestment by private companies (CPI, 2015). The
Copenhagen Accord only set financial goals up to 2020,
and the COP decision in 2015 supplemented the Paris
Agreement by stating that developed countries intended
to continue their existing collective mobilization goal
through 2025, and that a new collective goal from afloor of US$100 billion per year would be agreed uponprior to 2025.
It goes without saying that the amount of financial
flow makes a crucial difference in making effective
changes towards de-carbonization in both developed anddeveloping countries, but merely talking about quantity
is not enough. Financing should be directed towards themost effective technologies and investments. In reality,
however, it is difficult to track all financial flows, andthere is no assurance that all the financial resources arebeing used either to mitigate climate change or to adapt
to the changing climate (Clapp et al., 2012). Studies areneeded to monitor how financial resources havecontributed to actual emission reductions or adaptation.
There have been a number of studies that elucidated
the financial amounts needed for developing countries totake action against climate change (Kameyama et al.,2016; Bowen et al., 2017). In many cases, most of thefinancial burden required to make substantial emission
reductions occurred at the time of initial investment.
Once the facilities were entirely installed, the investors
could profit from energy saving for the next two to four
decades. Loans and mortgages that leveraged the initialinvestment cost and avoided costs later on could
motivate citizens to invest in less energy-intensive
infrastructure and renewable energy.

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4. Governance
4.1 Equity: Two Contrasting Images of the WorldThe Paris Agreement was absolutely successful inattracting most countries to be Parties to the agreement.
Nevertheless, the real engagement of countries and othersub-national stakeholders starts today. The agreement
does not force countries to reduce GHG emissions to alevel indicated by any third-party institutions that takeequity into consideration. This means the equity
dimension of the climate change problem is notinstitutionally embedded in the agreement. It is up toeach country how much it will consider its own
responsibility to respond to the climate change problem
and take action voluntarily. This system is completely
different from how many researchers used to consider
equity—or burden-sharing rules—to determine emission
reduction targets for countries (Höhne et al., 2014).
There are two distinctive ways to look at the game ofclimate change politics. Traditional debates related toequity in the realm of climate change politics are basedon the idea that reducing emissions is costly (Barrett,2006). On one hand, countries agree to reduce GHG
emissions globally because they understand climatechange is likely to harm all. On the other hand, however,they oppose setting stringent emission reduction targets
at the national level, insisting that deep emission cuts
would negatively affect their economy. A country that
does not participate in the emission reduction regime,
often called a “free-rider,” will still be able to enjoy
alleviation of adverse impacts of climate change, thanks
to other countries’ efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
Equity considerations are particularly important undersuch conditions to avoid allowing countries to become
free riders. Burden-sharing rules are investigated to see
if any rule could be agreeable to all nations. Emissions
per capita and emissions per GDP are major equity rulesthat have been proposed by countries and researchers(Kameyama, 2004). The Kyoto Protocol’s emission
reduction targets were set after long debates on equity.
This image is, so to say, the “20th century image” of theworld—a fossil-fuel-based economy.
The second way of looking at the game of politics is
to see climate-related investment as an opportunity
rather than a cost. Fossil fuel is a non-renewable natural
resource that will eventually deplete. Coal reserves are
relatively large, but oil production could peak out
sometime within the next few decades. It is therefore
necessary for all countries to start investing in newsources of energy in one way or another for the purposeof energy security. Climate change mitigation has
worked as motivation for the private sector to invest in
renewable energy and other technologies that would
contribute toward moving away from fossil fuel use. The
faster companies develop new technologies, the morecompetitive they become and able to profit bydominating markets. Under the free market of climate
investment, countries will not need to compare NDCs
across countries or make persistent efforts in the equity

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Y. KAMEYAMA

dimension of the agreement. Rather, countries would
voluntarily implement policies to lead companies toinvest in R&D in the area of energy and efficiency, andset ambitious goals, giving incentives. This image is, so
to say, the “21st century image” of the world, making
huge investments in renewable energy.
Assessments of the effectiveness of the Paris
Agreement largely depend on how individuals see
today’s status quo, whether it is closer to the former orthe latter.
The agreement will have negligible effectiveness in
mitigating climate change if the world continues to havethe former image of the world. Many developing
countries were unhappy about abolishment of the Annex
I – non-Annex I division in the Paris Agreement. During
the negotiations at COP21, developing countries
continuously underscored the importance of thehistorical responsibility of developed countries forcausing climate change and called for the agreement to
be based on equity and common but differentiatedresponsibilities (CBDR) (Ajit, 2015). Developed
countries also accepted differentiation, except that they
insisted that it be reflected in a dynamic manner, since
the world has changed since the time the UNFCCC was
adopted. The agreement was still considered fair bymost countries, because it was agreed upon by thedeveloped countries that a further financial commitment
would be made by the developed countries in the post2020 period. Efforts to reduce GHG emissions by
developing countries are dependent on the amount offinancial resources transferred to the developing
countries, as well as efforts by developed countries toreduce their own emissions. Now that the current U.S.
Trump administration is against the Paris Agreement andoverall emission reduction policies at the federal level, it
is not likely that developing countries will receive apositive message from the richest and second largest
GHG-emitting country in the world.
On the other hand, the Paris Agreement could beconsidered a level playing field for all stakeholders to
shift towards a de-carbonized world, if we could see theworld as the latter image. There have already been a lotof signs of the world being steered in this direction. For
example, Chinese President Xi Jinping is said to bestrongly committed to the Paris Agreement and otherclimate change mitigation efforts, even if the UnitedStates pulls out of the agreement (Phillips, 2017). Saudi
Arabia, the largest oil producer, has been making hugeinvestments in solar and wind power plants, with further
plans to develop almost 10 gigawatts of renewableenergy by 2023 in its vast northwestern desert. It is
expected that new development of renewable energy
could replace the equivalent of 80,000 barrels of oil a
day now burned for power (Dipaola, 2017). In the
United States, many judge that coal production will not
regain profitability even with full support from President
Trump in eliminating all of the regulations set by theformer Obama administration, because the falling priceof natural gas is the primary reason for the plunge in useof coal by utility companies. Renewable energy sources,
such as wind and solar, are also becoming morecompetitive (Isadore, 2017).
The two images of the world co-exist today and will
stay that way in the next decade. It is likely, however,that the first image will slowly fade away. Not only
because of climate change, but also because fossil fuel isa depleting resource and from a sustainable development
point of view, we should not depend on non-renewablesources.

4.2 Transparency: Tracking Efforts
Countries’ actions will be assessed by the transparency
mechanism set up under the Paris Agreement, but theprocess is yet to be discussed. Reliable information on
mitigation, adaptation and financing is the key to ensuring
the agreement’s effectiveness. Many developing countries
lack basic data, including GHG emissions and energy
consumption. One of the remaining tasks for researchers
is to introduce simple ways to collect these data
periodically with the simplest methodology.
The transparency system is important for different
reasons, depending on the image of the world, eachrequiring different types of information. In the case of
the traditional image of the world, transparency isimportant because all countries need to be watched tomake sure they are really doing what they promised to
do. The transparency system should put much effort into
tracking actual emission trajectories, and agree on rules
in case of noncompliance. In addition, countries need tostart discussing possibilities to increase the level ofambition of their future NDCs. This will be a laborious
process because no country wants to set stringent
emission reduction targets. Developing countries will
look at developed countries with an eye on how muchthe rich countries have adopted “common but
differentiated responsibility.”
Meanwhile, in the latter case, transparency isimportant for sharing information on best practices andperformances. Information to be submitted under thetransparency mechanism, the verification processes andcompliance procedure as a consequence would differ
according to which world we assume we are living in.
The transparency system could collect various
information, such as GDP growth data and policies
implemented, to find high-performance policies. Successstories could be duplicated in other countries to enhance
best practices.
A number of reporting and verification processes
have already been established under the UNFCCC
regime, and it has been widely acknowledged that theprocess should be as simple as possible for all countries
to comply with. Some studies have proposed new
methodologies to assess countries’ efforts for mitigation
by grasping the policies implemented in those countries(Kameyama & Kawamoto, 2016; New Climate Instituteet al., 2016). More studies are needed to assess policy
packages that result in maximal emission reductions
while also striking a balance with healthy economic

Remaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period under the Paris Agreement

growth.

4.3 Japan’s Case
In Japan, many government officials and industries
welcome the universal coverage of the Paris Agreement,
officially stating that the agreement is “fair” just because
it achieved more or less universal participation (MOFA,
2015). Meanwhile, the same individuals also stress thatJapan does not necessarily have to endeavor seriously toachieve its NDC, as the commitments elaborated in theAgreement are voluntary and there will be no penalty
even if Japan does not achieve its target. Although thisinterpretation is correct in legal terms, it should be notedthat it is based on the traditional image of the world.
One of the events that have been attracting muchattention worldwide is the inauguration of President
Trump of the United States. He himself has been
unwilling to take action against climate change, andintends to pull out of the Paris Agreement (Worland,2017). Japanese stakeholders also pay much attention tochanges in the United States. People who are unwillingto take action to reduce GHG emissions in Japan will
welcome President Trump’s actions―or inaction―that
almost cancel out what his predecessor, former President
Obama, introduced both inside and outside the UnitedStates to tackle climate change.
Nevertheless, there are others that see signs of thenewer, more proactive image of the world (Kiko
Network, 2017). They feel that Japan should be the front
runner in a race towards decarbonization for manyreasons other than climate change. Foremost, Japan does
not own any extraction or production industries within
its territory related to fossil fuels and is currently almost
totally dependent on energy sources imported fromoverseas. Nevertheless, the share of fossil fuel within the
total primary energy supply was almost 94.6% in 2013,higher than that of most countries around the world(United States: 83.3% , China 88.1% ) (Agency for
Natural Resources and Energy, 2016). Replacement offossil fuel by renewable energy would contribute to
reduced payments to overseas countries for fossil fuelimports.
Actions to reduce energy consumption are likely tocontribute also toward adaptation to a rapidly aging
society. The elderly share of society (ages above 65) islikely to reach almost 40% by 2050 (IPSS, 2012). The
size of the Japanese population, currently around 120
million, is expected to decrease to less than 100 million
by 2050. As the number of elderly lacking support offamily or relatives is likely to expand, more people will
be willing to dwell close to each other, with shops andcommunity buildings within walking distance. Less
driving of automobiles and more use of public
transportation will be welcomed by these people. Energy
consumption per person is expected to be much smallerwhen people live in housing complexes than individual
houses (NIES, 2016).
Japan’s NDC for the year 2030 is a “26 percent
reduction from 2013.” Although there are controversies

9

over the degree of ambition of the target, it should beachievable if Japan were to aim at an 80% reduction by
2050, as has been indicated by the Global Warming
Mitigation Plan adopted as a Cabinet Decision in 2016.
Japan needs to start moving in the direction of adecarbonized community by investing in infrastructure
and buildings that can last for more than three decades(Central Environmental Council, 2017).
In the international arena at meetings under the
UNFCCC, countries are discussing ways for countries todeepen their emission targets. Japan should undertake
additional cooperation with other countries, specificallyin Asia, and develop effective projects for reducing
emissions jointly. One such Japanese initiative is amechanism called the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM).
The JCM develops GHG emission reduction projects indeveloping countries and uses Japanese financial
assistance to install facilities to reduce emissions and at
the same time enhance sustainable development (JCM,
2017). Seventeen developing countries have signed onto
partnership agreements with Japan on JCM projects. The
effectiveness of the mechanism is yet to be seen, butsome projects initiated by the JCM could flourish to
become bigger and more effective projects in the future.

5. Conclusion
We see today evidence of increasing temperaturesand more frequent extreme weather patterns. Even if any
scientific uncertainty still remains, there is nearly aconsensus that climate change and its impacts are humaninduced at a level serious enough for all countries tostart taking action. The Paris Agreement should not be
another excuse for delaying actions just because theachievement of emission reduction targets is not legallybinding, or because the level of the targets could be set
according to each country’s preference. Rather, the Paris
Agreement should be the founding basis for wider
cooperation among countries, local governments, thebusiness community, and citizens. That said, researchers
are expected to supply the various stakeholders withdata sets and information to enable them to find the best,
most effective and least costly solutions obtainable, that
also invite other co-benefits related to sustainability.
Japanese stakeholders should not confine themselvesto the traditional way of looking at the world, assuming
stable prices, with the prices of fossil fuels continuing attheir current level into the future, thinking emission
reduction to be costly. People should be aware that GHG
emission reduction actions bring about opportunities toinvest in reconstructing new ways of living in the 21st
century.

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Yasuko KAMEYAMA
Dr. Yasuko Kameyama is deputy director of theCenter for Social and Environmental Research,
National Institute for Environmental Studies. Her
background is international relations. Her work has
focused mainly on studies of international
negotiations related to global environmental
problems, the institutional dimension of climatechange policies, and implementation. She has authored many publications inboth Japanese and English. One of her latest publications is Climate Change
Policy in Japan: From the 1980s to 2015 (Routledge, 2017)(Received 24 May 2017, Accepted 31 August 2017)