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www.voiceork.cc

70 %

2025

70 %

70 %

Good
Purchasing
Practices

2026

2024

a cocoa barometer consultation paper

Good
Purchasing
Practicesa cocoa barometer consultation paper
Introduction
Many of the holistic interventions necessary in cocoa are long-term processes thatwill lead to change over time. However, (extreme) poverty is a daily reality for the vast
majority of cocoa farmers. They cannot afford to wait until long-term processes – suchas diversified income, higher productivity, or a better rural infrastructure – have cometo pass. Many good purchasing practices do not require collective sector-wide action,
nor do they require a long development process; they can be implemented on arelatively short term, by individual corporate actors.
It’s not rocket science; if companies care about the poverty of cocoa farmers, theyshould pay farmers more. Besides fair pricing, the risk cocoa farming households facemust be shared more equitably.
Concretely, companies must introduce the practice of paying living income reference
prices at farm gate level, i.e. paying farm gate prices that would enable median farmer
households to earn a living income from the sales of their crop. Similarly, companies
must also provide farmers with long-term asymmetrical contracts (providing farmers
more rights, while putting more responsibilities on the shoulders of the purchasing
companies) and be transparent and accountable about their purchasing practices.
Three imperatives to achieve a living income
Living income is a moral imperative, a business imperative, and a legal imperative.
Firstly, living income is a human right in and of itself. As such, Living Income deservesa centred position in any conversation around the changes needed from a rightsbased perspective. Ensuring a living income is therefore a moral imperative.

2

In addition, farmer poverty is a driver of just about every other problem in the cocoa
sector; deforestation, child labour, and gender inequality are all made so muchharder to tackle if cocoa household incomes are not raised significantly. Providing
a living income makes sense from a perspective of achieving Environmental, Socialand Governance (ESG) targets. Furthermore, long-term sustainability also enables

greater security of supply: fair and sustainable value chains are future-proof. In thatsense, ensuring a living income is therefore also a business imperative.
With several major sustainability regulations coming into force1, the voluntary natureof tackling farmer poverty will soon be an idea of the past. Ensuring a living income
for smallholders in the supply chain will also become a legal imperative within theforeseeable future.
Business as usual
There is significant evidence that current approaches to raise farmer income
have marginal impact at best. There is an insignificant correlation between higher
productivity and net income. In some cases, there is even a negative correlation.2
In fact, recent research shows that labour intensive approaches to alleviate farmer
poverty – such as increased productivity or diversified production – lead to higher
incidence rates of child labour.3
Nevertheless, most cocoa and chocolate companies continue to operate under abusiness-as-usual scenario: company programmes aimed at improving livelihoods
are focused on higher yields, farmer training, and income diversification.4 Moreover,company interventions more often than not take the form of pilots, placed next toor even outside the current supply chains of companies, and seldom target thebuying practices of these same companies. With the notable exception of Tony
Chocolonely’s Open Chain approach, no large chocolate or cocoa companies arepaying higher prices at farm gate level – whether through a direct farm gate priceor through premiums high enough to offset compliance costs. The companies’
purchasing divisions strive to buy cocoa as cheaply as possible, and farmer poverty is
not taken into consideration in their daily practice.
Under normal circumstances, this would already be severely problematic. However,
the Covid 19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have triggered a cost-of-living crisis inWest Africa, where most of the world’s cocoa is grown. This is further exacerbated bysevere inflation in Ghana, the world’s second biggest cocoa producer.
Current market dynamics
Though at present world market prices are temporarily at high levels, this is primarily
due to bad harvests caused by the El Niño weather pattern. As soon as El Niño isover, the market is expected to be back at a structural oversupply, and therefore
structurally low prices.5 At present, market actors are baulking at the high prices.
1

In 2023, the European Union’s Deforestation Regulation and the German Lieferkettengesetz came into
force, the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is expected to be introduced in thecourse of 2024, the French Loi de Devoir de Vigilance has been in place for several years, and several
other countries in major cocoa consuming regions are developing supply chain regulations.

2

For example, the 2021 IDH Farmer Field Book Analysis report of some of the major cocoa and chocolatecompany’s projects on fertiliser use shows that there is no positive correlation between higher productivity and net income. And in some cases, it shows there is a negative correlation. Oxfam recently did a
study in Ghana with similar outcomes.

3

See this recent study by the Royal Dutch Tropical Institute (KIT).

4

An earlier draft of this paper was shared with several cocoa and chocolate companies. Several statedthat one of the reasons that some of these interventions failed, was because the targeted productivity
increase wasn’t achieved. As we have written in the Living Income Compendium and in the 2022 Cocoa
Barometer, if there is no business case for higher productivity, farmers are not incentivised to spend thetime and risk to increase yields. This business case is made by a combination of decent infrastructureand governance on the one hand, and on good purchasing practices on the other. If the purpose of
projects is to raise productivity, higher prices are likely to be a very effective tool to achieve that purpose.

5

ICCO World Cocoa Market Forecast September 2023.

3

Furthermore, farm gate prices in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana – the world’s two largest
cocoa producing nations – are set through a forward selling controlled system.
Though this reduces risk in the case of downward price shocks, it creates a 12-to-18month delay from the world market. The lack of transparency in this forward sellingsystem also leads to lower farm gate prices6. As such, farm gate prices in the twoleading cocoa producing nations are lower than the current world market.

Good harvest
Low prices

Bad harvest
High prices

United Nations guiding principles on business and human rights
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights clearly statethat the corporations’ responsibility to protect human rights “exists independentlyof States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations anddoes not diminish those obligations”. In other words, even when governments are
not doing what they should, this cannot be an excuse for companies not to do what
they can.
Good purchasing practices
The current world market system is designed to make the weakest link in the supply
chain – smallholder farmers – compete among themselves, driving prices down
and risks up. Civil society organisations have been insisting for decades on theneed for companies to pay better prices at farm gate, therefore requiring themto engage in good purchasing practices7. However, the industry often resisted
discussion on how their purchasing practices are affecting farmers in their supply
chains. Recently, as the topic has been gaining traction, there has beena noticeable shift in the cocoa sector: from resistance, the response ismoving more towards ‘how?’8 This consultation paper is an attempt tooutline what these good purchasing practices could and should look
like for cocoa and chocolate companies.
Scope
There is a lot to say about the role of terminal markets, the roleof governments in rural development policies, transparencyof taxes and investment, the importance of supply
management, as well as the role of the financial sector inproviding credit systems. There is also a lot to say about
the importance of good agricultural practices, and theefforts farmers themselves can make to increase their
net income.

4

6

In years of low prices, this price stabilisation is generally regarded as a boon to cocoa farmers.
However, there is not enough transparency and accountability by the Ivorian and especially Ghanaian
cocoa boards in how these prices are set.

7

See also the 2022 Cocoa Barometer and the 2022 Living Income Compendium.

8

An earlier draft of this document was shared with several cocoa and chocolate companies. One company stated that it was ‘a stretch’ to say ‘for decades’, “given that it is only in the past twelve months that
this topic has really come to the forefront.” We are happy that companies are starting to listen to the call,but that does not mean the call is recent.

Only focusing on price will not solve the issue, in the same way that only focusing one.g. supply management, development policies, or yield gains is equally insufficient.
Holistic approaches are needed: approaches that look at governance policies, Good
Agricultural Practices, and purchasing practices. Within that context, cocoa andchocolate companies are so far sorely lacking in tackling their responsibility for theirown purchasing practices.9 This paper deals specifically with the purchasing practicesof companies at farm gate and farmer cooperative level.
Though the majority of the examples in this paper will focus on the situation in the
two largest cocoa-producing countries, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, the principles
around remuneration, risk, and accountability are the same regardless of sourcing
area. In fact, these principles would largely be appropriate to most agricultural
production regardless of crop and country.
Sphere of control
Often, companies complain that civil society asks are about topics that are outsideof their control or even outside of their sphere of influence, such as government
policies. However, the way in which companies buy their ingredients is 100% within
their sphere of control. The living income gap for the cocoa sector is around $10
billion dollar per year10. Though this is a large sum, chocolate companies give theirstockholders far more.11
Purchasing - not sustainability programmes
Some approaches take a broad view of purchasing practices, to include topics suchas value distribution, freedom of association, collective bargaining, and worker
organisation, as well as investments in community building and infrastructure. These
are important topics that need to be addressed, to be sure. However, after twenty
years of the cocoa sustainability debate focussing on programmes, it is importantthat we also address the core business of cocoa and chocolate companies, which isthe buying and selling of cocoa products. It is in this core business that purchasing
practices need to change, which is why we are focusing on that in this paper. Within
the context of sustainability, it is important that purchasing practices focus on theimpact on the farmers, not just on the compliancy efforts of the multinational: rather
than looking at whether there is a change in how a company does procurement,
companies should be looking at whether the farmer is actually being helped throughlower risks and higher prices. Responsible purchasing practices are about supporting
farmers in their ability to earn a living income from their core business.
Immediate impact of purchasing
While many of the programme/development-based approaches described above
are important, their impacts are often on the longer term. Companies that improve
the purchasing practices in their supply chain can have immediate and highly
significant impact, both individually and collectively. Moreover, sustainability
programmes and development-based approaches are heavily impacted by
9

The entirety of chapter 8 of the 2022 Cocoa Barometer goes into depth into the relationship between
Good Agricultural Practices, the role of governments in ensuring Good Governance Policies, and the
responsibility of companies to engage in Good Purchasing Practices (pp 106 and further).

10 Kiewisch, M., & Waarts, Y. R. (2020). No silver bullets: Closing the $10 billion income gap in cocoa calls forcross-sector action. Wageningen Economic Research.

5

11 The Ferrero family pays itself an annual dividend of up to half a billion euros per year. Between 2014
and 2020, the Mars’ family wealth increased from $60 billion USD to $94 billion USD. Between 2010 and
2020, Nestlé bought back $46 billion USD in shares. Living Income Compendium, 2022, p 11.

farmer poverty, and as such require good purchasing practices for their effective
implementation.
Three elements of purchasing practices
Companies wishing to implement good purchasing practices must address three
separate elements: remunerative prices (building on the core of a farm gate pricethat is sufficient for a living income), risk sharing (including long-term asymmetriccontracts), and transparency and accountability (public communication bycompanies that can be independently verified).
This paper explores these three elements in more detail, provides suggestions
for companies on how to start, and raises further questions for exploration. Where
possible, the paper outlines suggested purchasing practices for both traders withdirect relationships to farmer cooperatives, as well as to brands that operate further
downstream in the supply chains. Where necessary, these recommendations are
adapted to national circumstances for the two major cocoa-producing nations, Côte
d’Ivoire and Ghana.

Good purchasing practices, quite simply,
are remunerative prices, at acceptablerisk, transparently communicated.

6

PRICE

Living Income gap
Current prices
Farmgate prices paid ...

... are too low to make a living income

Living Income
Reference Price
A Living Income Reference Price ...

Current prices

A living Income Reference Price(LIRP) is a farm gate price that is
sufficient to bridge the living
income gap for an average cocoa
farming household.

... enables a living income
A Living Income Reference Price is calculated
based on the household needs - including
costs of labour, inputs, etc. and supplements
the going farm gate price with additional
payments (such as premiums) when necessary.

ASKS OF COMPANIESRemunerative priceTransparent calculation

Every company – retailer,
brand, trader – should have acalculation of the living income
In many commodities there is a gap between what farming households
actually
gap of median
farmersearn
in their
12 supply chain, and a timeboundThis
iscalled
the
and
the
level
of
incometheyneedtoachievealivingincome.
Living Income Reference Pricegender-sensitive commitment
livingincome gap. Any cocoa or chocolate company that is serious
about bridging
to close this gap.
Retailers and brands must commit to requiring a
this
gap
needs
ensureits theyefforts
are aligned with its purchasing practices.
publicly
available
LIRPtofromthe traderssourcefrom and must be willing to pay for this. Traders must
Review
commit to paying a publicly available LIRP. ThisAll actors need to regularlycommitment must include transparent calculations ofreview their income approaches
how the farm gate price they pay is sufficient to closewith a gender lens to ensure
the remaining gap and must be applicable to the
Living Income
interventions actively combat
majority of the Living
cocoa farmers
inthesupplychain,
not
Income gap
ReferencePriceinequality, rather thangenderjust some outliers.
exacerbate it.

Farm gate price

Farm gate price

Income effects of non-purchasing-based interventions (such as community investments, cash transfers,
and payments for environmental service) must be
Premiums should be transparently
LivingIncome Reference Prices
communicated transparently and based on the net
broken down into three distinctThe
coreof any goodpractices is acomponents:
farm gatecost
livingincome reference
incomegender-sensitiveeffect purchasing
on the farmer, notof compliance,13
on the costto theThecompany.
cooperativeand goveris supplemented
price(LIRP).
principle of a LIRP is that the basefarmoperationgate pricenance costs, and net additional
by additional
payments direct to farmer that bridge
the remaining living income gap.
+ premium
income for farmers.
net premiumThis LIRP should be the outcomeof a calculation of realistic variables such as costcooperative
Farm
gate
price
complianceof production, yield per hectare,farm size, other sources of income, household size,
and the relevant living income benchmark. The level of a LIRP should be regularly
Assumptions

Reality

12 All of the major cocoa-producing nations have regularly updated living income benchmarks, which are
made available on the website of the Living Income Community of Practice.

7

13 The farm gate price often differs from the world market price set at the terminal markets. This chapter
deals with the price paid at farm gate, not the world market price or other prices that are set further
downstream in the supply chain.

Living income
Reference Pricereviewed and amended when circumstances change.14 Though there are differences
between various living income reference price calculations, it is clear that without
implementing a reference price, companies cannot claim sustainability, because they
simply don’t know if their farmers are forced into poverty pricing.

A living income reference price is a farm gate pricethat is sufficient to bridge the living income gap foran average cocoa farming household. It is calculated
based on actual household needs and supplements
the farm gate price with additional payments.
Liberalised and regulated markets
In many cocoa-producing countries, there is a liberalised market and farm gate
prices change from day to day. In the two biggest cocoa-producing countries, farm
gate prices are set once or twice a year through national cocoa marketing boards.
As farm gate prices in both situations – liberalised or regulated farm gate prices –generally fall far below the threshold of a LIRP, in either case mechanisms need to be
developed by companies to ensure a LIRP is reaching farmers.
Flexible premiums
The 2017 Cocoa Barometer consultation paper on Raising Farm Gate Prices alreadycalled for the implementation of “flexible premiums”, to top up the difference
between current farm gate prices and the necessary level to reach a living income.
Both in regulated and liberalised origin countries, calculations should be made – atleast on an annual basis – to determine what the level of the flexible premium should
be to bridge the living income gap for farmers. This calculation should be based on
the system described above.
In the cocoa sector, some companies are already using a variation of a flexible
premium leading to a LIRP, including Tony Chocolonely’s “Tony’s Open Chain”
model, the Fairtrade Living Income Reference Price, as well as the models of Oxfam
Belgium’s “Bite to Fight”, and Colruyt.
Realistic variables
Any LIRP should be calculated on the basis of realistic current agronomic variables.
This means that it needs to be guided by realistic costs of sustainable cocoa
production15, current actual yields, available labour and labour costs16, and actual
14 The Cocoa Barometer made a comparison between various Living Income Reference Prices in 2020. According to our calculations, a credible living income reference price would be $3,166 per tonne in Côte
d’Ivoire and $3,116 in Ghana. During interviews for this paper with farmer-based organisations in Côte
d’Ivoire in October 2023, several farmers came up with a calculation of around $3,200 per metric tonne.
These numbers are directional, companies could have different outcomes, but this would need to becoupled with a very transparent calculation method, criteria for which are set forward in this paper.
15 Including the costs of compliance to sustainability requirements, both mandatory (i.e. EUDR, national
legislation, etc.) as well as the costs of compliance to sustainability programmes.

8

16 Though consensus is starting to form around some variables – average current yields, household size,
farm size, other income streams – on other key variables there are still too many unknowns, especiallyaround labour costs and other costs of production. The currently available data suggest it would takeabout 130-150 labour days, and ca 250kg fertiliser per hectare to achieve a yield of 550 kg. At present, current yields are realistic between 450-550 kg per hectare average. These data are based on a
Practitioners Workshop, organised by the VOICE Network and Südwind Institut in February of 2023. This
two-day workshop was aimed at identifying key variables around farm income and labour costs and wasattended by a wide range of data experts. First steps are being undertaken to synthesise the vast amountof data currently being held by industry players, but the information needed for defining these variables
is still too often kept out of the public domain.

farm sizes, instead of ambitions of yields to be achieved in the future. Furthermore,
LIRP calculations need to account for realistic production costs (including labour17
and inputs) needed to achieve the stated yield rates.18
Outliers vs median farmers
Many of the calculations on approaches to increase farmer income are based on bestcase examples of cocoa farming, often with an ideal combination of farm size, yield,
and household composition, with access to extension services and infrastructure.
The result is that approaches are often only realistic solutions for a small percentageof the cocoa farmers in a company’s supply chain. A LIRP – and other interventions –needs to be based on the median farmer in a supply chain and should be designed
to help the majority of farmers in a company’s supply chain achieve a living income,not a small selection of best-performing households in ideal circumstances.
Sustainability premiums
The flexible living income premiums described above differ considerably from thecurrent sustainability premium systems, which are generally a black box that claim
to do more than they can19, regardless of whether they are run by certification
systems or within company sustainability programmes. Furthermore, sustainability
premium systems are not calculated on the basis of household needs; instead, they
are based on what a company or a certification system feels they can afford while
Living Income
LivingIncomegapshare. Additionally,
maintaining
theirmarketmost
premiums are currently paid at
ReferencePriceeither the cooperative or community level, and so only partly reach the farm gate.
Farmgate price that are currently
Farm
price
Finally, many
premiums
ingateplace
largely serve to cover the costsof compliance for various sustainability programmes, such as a certification or acompany programme.20+ premium

net premium
cooperativecomplianceFarm gate price
Assumptions

Reality

Sustainability premiums can only count to bridge the living income gap to theextent that costs of compliance and operating costs for the cooperative are alreadydeducted.21 Any sustainability premium that is claiming to improve farmer income
Living income

17 Hired labour should be Reference
calculated atPriceliving wage levels, otherwise smallholder poverty alleviation
strategies would be based on exploitative hired labour. The 2022 Südwind Institut “Poverty Trap” paper
provides a detailed analysis why labour costs are so important and are insufficiently (if at all) taken into
Farm gate priceconsideration in current poverty alleviation approaches.
18 It is important to note that most LIRP systems in place, including those of Fairtrade and the Tony’s Open
Chain system of Tony’s Chocolonely, currently are based on desired yields of 800 kg per hectare. As weargue in the 2022 Cocoa Barometer (on pages 22-23) data suggests that beyond ca 550-650 kg per
hectare any income effects of further yield increase are countered by increased costs of production.

Interventions: PES, Cash transfers, etc

19 Premiums simply aren’t high enough premium paid to cover costs of compliance to the farmer, pay for
Living income Reference Premium
the running costs of the cooperative, as well as create a significant net income boost to farmers.

9

20 For the development of this paper, consultation workshops were held with civil society and farm-based
Farm andgateinpriceorganisations in Côte d’Ivoire
Ghana. Cooperatives indicated that the costs of running the cooperative can be around $150 to $200 per tonne. This leaves very little of the premium for distribution tofarmers.
21 Please note that this paper does not argue against premiums at cooperative or community level; theseare vital income streams for the functioning of cooperatives. In fact, in some standards, community pay-

Living income

premium

Living Income gap

Reference Price

Farm gate price

Farm gate pricemust demonstrate how it reaches the farm gate22. Any premium that claims to
reduce the living income gap can only count to the amount that goes above theamount necessary for covering compliance costs for sustainability programmes –including the additional costs for productivity increase or adoption of nature-friendly
production practices, such as labour costs, input costs, etc.

+ premium

net premium
cooperative
Transparencyof premiums
Farmgate pricecomplianceTo that purpose, we recommend that premiums be split into three separate
components; a part dedicated to the cooperative (based on realistic costs of running
Assumptions
Realitya cooperative); a second part dedicated to cost of compliance (based on realistic
costs of compliance); and a third part, a living income premium that tops the current
price up to a LIRP.
Gender
If a LIRP intervention is not designed through a gender lens, there is a real riskthat it will contribute to further gender inequality, by empowering male farmers
Living income
only. Genderinterventions must also differentiate between wives of male heads ofReference Pricehouseholds and households with a female head. Interventions for the former could
include ensuring
Farm gatepartpriceof the payment goes to the women, that women also haveaccess to training, etc. For the latter, this could also ensure land tenure security
measures, access to market drives, and more.
Living income reference price system
Interventions:
PES, Cashtransfers,
etcto a time-bound, gender-sensitive, action
Concretely,
all companies
must
commitLiving theincomeReference
Premium
plan to bridge
livingincomegap, which includes the implementation of a living
income reference price system. This living income reference price system must be
gate averages
pricebased on Farm
realistic
and must provide a clear breakdown between that partof the premium that goes to cover the farmer’s living income gap, and those parts
that cover compliance costs and running of the cooperatives.

Living income
Reference Pricepremium
cooperativecomplience

Farm gate priceNon-purchasing interventions

Beyond pricing, it is possible for non-purchasing interventions to reduce the living
income gap. Such interventions could include activities aimed at increasing access or
reducing costs, such as reducing post-harvest losses, increasing access to educationand healthcare, etc. Collective efforts (such as village savings and loans associations),
as well as interventions such as cash transfers, can further reduce the living income
gap.

ments and community decision making on how premiums are spent are mandatory, and often rightly so.
This paper argues that in addition to collective premiums, care needs to be taken that these premiums
are not double counted: they cannot be spent collectively and at the same time count as individual
income.

1022 In fact, while much of the debate about the merits of traceability has been focusing on tracing cocoa volumes from farm to traders and further downstream, tracing premium payments in the opposite direction(i.e. up the supply chain from traders to coops to farm gate) is equally of critical importance to reforming
the cocoa sector.

Considering the current reality of cocoa farming, there still is an almost certainty
that the living income gap will not be closed by these interventions alone. Thoughadditional interventions can be valuable extra components to a company’spurchasing practices and reduce the living income gap, they cannot be a substitutefor what is the core of the issue: a remunerative price at farm gate level that bridges
the remaining income gap.23
Living Income
Cash transfers
Price
Cash transfers can provide Reference
a valuablemeans to decouple – at least in part – poverty
interventions
fromapurelymarket-based
approach.24 This is necessary because
Farm gate price
Farm gate pricepoverty is measured in people per household, not in the tonnage of production.
Furthermore, especially for those segments of cocoa farmers that grow less cocoa
or have a weaker economic position – such as households with smaller plots, more
dependents, and/or female-headed households – interventions are needed thatare not just based on volumes of cocoa sold. As such, not all poverty can be tackled
through a market dynamic. If companies can prove that cash transfers add to the+ premium
net premium
net income of a cocoa
household – or reduce their costs – the added net income
cooperative
and/orreducedcosts
canbe subtracted from the living income gap. Cash transfers
Farm gate pricecompliance
have proven to work well in many agricultural and non-agricultural programmes
throughout
the world. However, they are tools to reduce the living income gap, not
Assumptions
Reality
to bridge it completely. Even when cash transfer programmes are successful at scale,companies will still need to review their pricing as part of a purchasing practices
strategy.25
Living Income gap

Payment for environmental services
Another way that farmers can receive a higher farm gate remuneration isthrough payments for environmental services (PES), such as reforestation and
Living income
forest protection
reducing the use of harmful agrochemicals, andReferenceprogrammes,
Price
encouraging biodiversity conservation. If PES are to make a meaningful contribution
to reducing
thelivingFarm
gate
price income gap, then these schemes must ensure the payments
are high enough to bear the cost of compliance and loss of earnings incurred by
implementing actions the environmental services.
Interventions: PES, Cash transfers, etc
Living income Reference Premium
Farm gate price

Additional interventions

Though it is clear that purchasing practices of companies must include a living
incomereference pricepremium
model, this will not solve all of the problems. In fact,
Livingincomecooperative
ReferencePrice farmer poverty
approaching
through purchasing practices brings in several
complience
unresolved issues that will require further thought and additional interventions.
Farm gate price23 Increasingly, industry is saying that there needs to be a smart mix of interventions in order to bridge theincome gap; this implies that pricing must be part of the mix.
24 Such as Nestlé’s Income Accelerator programme.

11

25 In specific circumstances where cash transfers are sufficient to bridge the living income gap, there still
remains the requirement to companies to transparently communicate how this is achieved. In essence,
the living income reference price systems still remains valid, with the additiona premium per tonne being zero.

Averages vs segmentation
A LIRP enables an average household to earn a living income. However, many
farming households will require additional interventions to bridge the income
gap, such as gender-specific interventions, land tenure security, financial literacy
education, access to credit, and other structural changes. Beyond averages, farmer
segmentation can help to design additional interventions based on specific types ofhousehold needs. Cash transfers can be useful interventions to help more vulnerable
segments, as these are generally not based on the tonnages of cocoa produced.
The fact that a LIRP helps well-performing farmers more than the poorer-performing
farmers is increasingly used as an argument not to pay a LIRP. This position is only
tenable if the aim is to keep every farmer at the edge of poverty, rather than allowing
outliers to become affluent.
GenderSegmentation becomes especially relevant when it comes to gender equality.
Female-headed households are strongly overrepresented in more vulnerable
segments of cocoa growers. In addition to higher prices, a gender lens is needed.
This can include literacy and numeracy programmes for both adult females and girls,
land tenure security for female-headed households, access to training and markets
for women, and many more.
Traders, brands, and retailers
Though all companies should incorporate the payment of a living income reference
price at farm gate, not all companies have direct relationships with all the farmers
supplying to them, either directly or through cooperatives. Traders tend to havemore direct relationships with farmer cooperatives and play a pivotal role as enablers
towards both ends of the supply chain. Traders usually have long-term contracts
with brands, yet they do not pass this long-term on to the cooperatives. Every cocoa
trader should have a published living income reference price per cocoa sourcing
region and should have time-bound action plans in place to ensure this price isdelivered at farm gate level.
At the same time, brands and retailers tend to put price pressure further upstream.26
Therefore, both brands and retailers should equally have in place a public policythat requires the payment of a living income reference price. This requirement must
be coupled with a clear commitment to paying for this service to their upstream
suppliers. Too often, brands tend to point towards the traders to solve the problem,
whilst simultaneously trying to undercut their suppliers.
Scale
Although living income reference prices are starting to be rolled out increasingly
in the cocoa sector, the tonnage of cocoa sourced with the use of these principles
is still marginal compared to the size of the global cocoa production. However,the principles are applicable regardless of the size of the cocoa or chocolatecompany. Collaborative sector-wide efforts could likely increase the speed andscale of potential uptake. Additionally, flanking policies – such as rural development
frameworks, supply management policies, income diversification projects, etc. – will
be required to combat potential deforestation and waterbed effects towards othercommodities.

12

26 The fact that downstream actors such as brands and retailers are always kicking the cost of compliance
can up the supply chain towards the traders should show that it is actually in the industry’s interest to
require good purchasing practices as part of a mandatory regulatory requirement.

Enabling environment
Though companies don’t need to wait for the necessary enabling environment tostart acting on the requirements above, an enabling environment would speed up
action, and create the necessary level playing field to counteract free riders. To that
purpose, these purchasing practices should be enshrined in regulations in major
consumer countries. Verifiable transparency systems on both products and finances
would be extremely helpful, as would systems to contract directly with cooperatives.
Verifiable transparency systems for finances would require the ability to trace
payments made not just to the cooperative level but to the farm gate level.

Summary

The core of any good purchasing practices is a farm gate living income reference
price (LIRP). Companies must commit to a time-bound, gender-sensitive, action
plan to bridge the living income gap, which includes the implementation of a living
income reference price system. This must be based on realistic averages and must
provide a clear breakdown between that part of the premium that goes to cover the
farmer’s living income gap, and those parts that cover compliance costs and runningof the cooperatives. Beyond pricing, it is possible for non-purchasing interventions to
reduce the living income gap, such as cash transfers and payments for environmental
services, but they cannot be a substitute for a LIRP.

Primary asks of companies
Living Income Reference Price
Retailers and brands must
commit to requiring a publicly
available LIRP from the traders
they source from and must be
willing to pay for this. Traders
must commit to paying apublicly available LIRP. This
commitment must include
transparent calculations of how
the farm gate price they pay issufficient to close the remaining
gap and must be applicableto the majority of the cocoa
farmers in the supply chain, notjust some outliers.

Transparent calculation
Every company – retailer,
brand, trader – shouldhave a calculation of
the living income gapof median farmers intheir supply chain, anda timebound gendersensitive commitment toclose this gap.

Review
All actors need toregularly review theirincome approacheswith a gender lens toensure interventions
actively combat genderinequality, rather thanexacerbate it.

Secondary asks of companies

13

Income effects of non-purchasingbased interventions (such as community
investments, cash transfers, and payments
for environmental service) must be
communicated transparently and based on
the net income gender-sensitive effect on
the farmer, not on the cost to the company.

Premiums should betransparently broken down into
three distinct components: costof compliance, cooperative
operation and governancecosts, and net additional
income for farmers.

RISKS

Contract
breaches
Climate change
Good

Bad
harvests(Un)manageable farmer risks

Manageable company risk

Input costs

Insurances
Fluctuating
pricesPests &
diseasesHedging
FuturesLow offtake

ASKS OF COMPANIES

70 %

70 %

Acceptable risk
70 %Although price is a key
element of purchasing practices, it is by no means the only2026
aspect. Good2025
purchasing practices also require redressing the unequal distribution
2024
of risks. At present farmers bear practically all the risks, but do not reap the rewards.
In cocoa, the weakest shoulders bear the heaviest burdens. These risks include
Asymetric long-term contracts
uncertainty of volume and price of sales, uncertainty of input costs, vulnerability
Respect the contract
Traders, retailers and brands, should implement
inlong-term
the faceof stronger buyers, pests and diseases, climate change, as well asasymmetrical contracts within aContracts and volumes must bethevolatilityof including
marketrealistic
pricesand weather, which hassignificant impact on thisspecific
timeframe,
volumes,
respected, and effective complaint
the living income
reference
price, renegotiation
agricultural
crop.
Furthermore,
farmers often have todeal withand complex
mechanisms
withunclear
real consequences
mechanisms, and clear rights and responsibilifor
noncomplianceshouldbein place.
contracts(in terms of tonnage, price, timing of delivery), contracts that moreoverareties for buyers and farmers.
often not respected. Long-term asymmetric contracts coupled with standardised
contracts and accessible grievance mechanisms are key elements in reducing the
The development of strong andrisk for farmers.
democratically run cooperatives shouldStandard, sector-wide contracts for trading at
be supported as a key mechanism tofarmer/cooperative level should be implemented,
reduce risks for farmers
Standard
contractsthat provides clarity and assurance to farmers andAfarmerfirst organisations.
simple step in reducing risk and creating clarity and assurance for farmers

is the adoption of standard contracts at cooperative/farmer level. A wide range ofdifferent contracts are the cause of confusion and exploitation towards farmers.27
A standard contract would solve a lot of difficulties here already, where farmers orcooperatives would only have to ensure that the key variables are filled in properly(such as volumes, expected quality, price, payment terms, delivery date). Especiallyin regions with lower literacy and numeracy rates, standardised contracts provide
significant improvements. Though this is not the key ask of this paper, it would be a

14

27 One example provided at a consultation workshop for this paper in October 2023 was the fact that a
missing signature on page 12 of a contract was used as a reason to reduce the premiums. Though thisis anecdotal, examples of this were rife during conversations the authors of this paper held with farmerorganisations in West Africa.

fast and easy win for all parties involved. The cocoa sector is very used to working
with standard contracts, as further downstream virtually the whole trade is based onstandardised contracts that are formulated by the Federation of Cocoa Commerce(FCC). There is no reason not to continue this to farmer level.28

The case for long-term contracts

Chocolate brands generally know how much cocoa they will need on a year-to-yearbasis – their forecasting departments tend to have a pretty clear understandingof how much cocoa they will need several years in advance. Often, chocolate
brands already have long-term contracts with the traders that supply them. These
traders, however, do not have similar contracts with cooperatives and farmerorganisations. Brands should require the same length of contracts to be provided tothe cooperatives that supply their traders. In return, traders should require brands
to engage in risk sharing. When contracts are long-term and trust is built, it provides
assurance on consistency of volumes for the buyers and comfort of income flow for
the farmers. In effect, long-term contracts could contribute to a better function of themarket in the long-term.
Benefits to farmers
Long-term contracts29 provide key benefits to buyers and producers, including
lower total transactional costs and improved profitability. They would allow farmers
and cooperatives to invest in their infrastructures, farms, and sustainable practices,and could play a key role in driving more sustainable agriculture30, particularly inthe face of climate change and more resilient food systems. They would also open
the possibility of spreading payments throughout the year – as prepayments, not as
delayed payments – creating a healthier cashflow situation for households.
Benefits to companies
This is not just a risk-sharing effort. It will also be beneficial to the buyer: long-term
contracts ensure security and quality of supply and also enhance traceability andtransparency. Long-term contracts often have a built-in mechanism for addressing
multi-year issues like sustainability goals.31 Furthermore, long-term, transparent
MOUs and higher prices are rewarded by farmer cooperative with stronger buyer
loyalty over many years. As a brand’s sustainability goals get more ambitious andimpactful, achieving them will likely become more difficult, and new tools will be
required. Long-term contracts can be a key tool for buyers and producer groups todrive change and set specific dates for completion.

Asymmetrical contracts

Being tied to a single buyer can be a double-edged sword for farmers and farmer
cooperatives as it can create dependencies and prevent them from taking advantage
of higher prices elsewhere. There is a clear power imbalance between the various
actors in the chain. In the current system most risks (on volume, price, delivery) are
28 Or at the very least to cooperative, farmer organisation, and/or purchasing clerk level.
29 The name of such an agreement can differ per country. In Ghana, contracts are with the CMC/Cocobod,
and supplier agreements are signed with traders. In that context, one would speak of long-term supplier
agreements.
30 Long-term contracts could also potentially help to reduce incentives for overproduction, as farmers/cooperatives with a contract for a fixed amount of cocoa paid at reference price would have less incentive
to grow more if extra production would only be sold at much lower prices. This hypothesis needs further
validation and research, however.
31 How Long-Term Contracts Can Help Drive More Sustainable Agriculture, Jason Clay, Dec 2018

covered for the buyer, but farmers find themselves often waiting for a selling contract
resulting in them accepting hunger prices. This means that long-term contracts need
to be asymmetrical in nature, providing farmers more rights, while putting more
responsibilities on the shoulders of the purchasing companies.
Concretely, an asymmetric contract needs to commit buyers to buy a minimum
tonnage of cocoa at an agreed-on price, but the farmer needs to be free to sell to adifferent buyer if they can get better conditions.32 Price renegotiation clauses shouldbe part of such long-term asymmetric contracts, to allow farmers to take into accountfluctuations of the prices of raw materials and cost of living.
Minimum requirements
Long-term asymmetrical contracts should cover some key elements, including a
specific timeframe (3 years or more), (realistic) minimum volumes, the living income
reference price, as well as a renegotiation mechanism in case of unexpected events
like a global pandemic, cost of living crisis, or crop failure due to pests or weather.
Quality premiums, certification premiums, and any other relevant payments should
be clearly distinguished within these contracts. They should also include mutually
expected/required sustainability and governance efforts as well as payment terms
that ensure a healthy cash flow for the farmer. Additionally, they may include further
benefits like access to services (schooling, healthcare, contributions to pension
schemes) and banking products.

Enabling environment

Respect the contract
At present, there is a big discrepancy between what traders announce (or put indraft contracts) to cooperatives (total volume and share of certified), and what isreally bought at the end of the harvest (at which point the contract is formalized or
updated with final real figures). Contracts are often not respected, or the unclarity ofcontracts is abused. As a result, many cooperatives are left with volumes to sell on
the “informal” market, or with certified cocoa that has to be sold at the bulk price,
resulting in lower prices. To avoid these malpractices of market power, penalties
should be included in contracts for traders not respecting their commitments andcontracts. Companies should have effective, accessible complaint mechanisms inline with the UN Guiding Principles that allow farmers to raise & resolve such issues
at a higher level within the company and with external arbitrators. These mechanisms
should be transparent and accessible to farmers.
Organised vs. unorganised farmers
Long-term asymmetrical contracts – as well as credible and transparent LIRP
payments – will require long-term, functioning farmer organisation structures.
Indeed, there is a wide spectrum of quality of farmer cooperatives, some of which
are more democratically run than others, and some of which have real problems
with corruption and finances not finding their way to the members. There is alsoa large difference between self-organised farmers and trade-organised farmers
such as those in the Licensed Buying Company model in Ghana. More than a few
cooperatives operate more as shell companies for cocoa extraction by traders thanas organisations that are operating in the best interest of their members.

16

32 This should be a first right of refusal contract, not a first right to offer, as the latter would still make thefarmer vulnerable to refusal of contracts.

In that light, it is of importance to increase the amount and quality of bottom-up
initiatives of self-organised and democratically organised farmer organisations.33
There is probably a minimum size of the cooperative (either in members or in
tonnage) to be able to provide efficiency of scale or buying/selling power. Partof a solution to the challenge for farmers and farmer organisations could be thatcompanies make supplier commitments to communities, and those communities
then choose one or more cooperatives through which they want to commercialize. To
this end, company codes of conduct should explicitly recognise the right of farmers
to organise collectively. More discussion on this topic is needed going forward.
Size of companies
For effective risk mitigation, it may be necessary to define different buyer categories:
when a small buyer embarks on a multiyear contract, their business may collapse
when consumer demand drops, while they still must buy cocoa. However, large
multinational companies and traders are in a different ballpark. Over the past
decade, the tonnages of the large brands and traders have remained quite stable. It
should be possible to oblige large companies to embark on multi-year contracts fora large percentage of their current purchasing volume, for example, to set 70% of
their bean purchases in long-term contracts for the next 3 years. Ironically, it’s often
small companies who do more risk-sharing with farmers. It should be the opposite!
The larger the company, the more the company should be willing to reduce or
mitigate the risks for farmers.
Supply management
Long-term contracts and living income reference pricing don’t solve all problems,and solutions will need to be found for what to do with the surplus production
in bumper years. It could be argued that the key to that problem lies in ruraldevelopment policies and supply management, both of which are largely the remitof government actors, not of the private sector.

17

33 Throughout the world and throughout history, one of the clearest guarantees for improvement of sales
criteria has been for farmers to self-organise. This is clearly also the case for cocoa, although this falls
outside the scope of the present paper.

Summary

Although price is a key element of purchasing practices, it is by no means the only
aspect. Good purchasing practices also require redressing the unequal distributionof risks. Long-term asymmetric contracts coupled with standardised contracts andaccessible grievance mechanisms are key elements in reducing the risk for farmers.

70 %

2025

70 %

70 %

Primary asks of companies

2026

2024

Asymetric long-term contracts
Traders should implement long-term
asymmetrical contracts with farmerorganisations, within a specific timeframe,
including realistic volumes, the living
income reference price, renegotiation
mechanisms, and clear rights andresponsibilities for buyers and farmers.

Respect the contract
Contracts and volumes must
be respected, and effective
complaint mechanisms with realconsequences for noncomplianceshould be in place.

Retailers and brands should require longterm asymmetrical contracts of traders,
whilst being willing to pay for complianceto the contracts.

Secondary asks of companies
Standard, sector-wide contracts for
trading at farmer/cooperative level shouldbe implemented, that provides clarity
and assurance to farmers and farmerorganisations.

18

The development of strong anddemocratically run cooperatives
should be supported as a key
mechanism to reduce risks forfarmers.

Contracts

TRANSPARENCY

01 01 1010 01 01
Policy01 01 10
Results
10 01 01
01 01 1001 01 1010 01 01
10 01 01
01 01 1001 01 1010 01 01
10 01 01
Certification 01 01 10
10 01 01
01 01 1010 01 01

Companies
Companies should share key information about
their purchasing practices, including the data theygather and the impacts of their interventions.

Farmers
This must be clear and available to thosethat need to hold companies accountable

Consumers, NGOs,
governments

ASKS OF COMPANIESTransparency & accountability
Credible living income approaches that include effective purchasing practices are
not just a moral imperative; with the advent of Human Rights and Environmental Due
2024
Diligence regulations at European and national levels, they will become
part
of a
2026
2025
business andlegalimperative.
Publisha time-boundpolicyIt will become increasingly important for companies
to be ableCompanies
to communicate
crediblyand transparently about their purchasing
should publish
a time-boundliving income
policy, andannually report as well as to ensure farmers
practices, bothto ensureaccountability
properly
Reporton how the living income gap is closed,
understandtheir rights and obligations. Furthermore, in orderto properly
address
Companies
should publicly
including a gender-disaggregatedreportannually
on responsible
purchasing
practicesoverthemediumtolong-term,
they
will
have
to
becomepart ofmeasurement.
purchasing KPIs, including on
a level playing field, meaning they will have to be explicitly stipulated
regulation.
volumes and in
farmgate prices
paid.

Transparency and accountability
should also lead to a cycle of continuous
Farmers should be paid for their data
improvement in purchasing
practices.
are several elements that will aid
sharing and ensure they There
have accessandownership.
transparency and in turn, increase accountability on purchasing practices.
Living income policy
The first prerequisite is that every company should publish a time-bound living
income plan34 that explicitly includes purchasing practices as a key component inensuring sustainable cocoa. All strategies and action plans that are detailed in this,such as pricing and risk-sharing strategies, need to be supported with calculations
and transparency about the variables that inform those calculations.
Responsible purchasing KPI monitoring
As part of this living income plan, companies should have internal responsible
purchasing KPIs that are directly linked to their sustainability goals, and that are19
34 A good example of such a living income policy is that of Chocolat Halba.

linked to their financial incentive systems. These KPIs should be annually reported
on, as well as progress in closing LI gaps – disaggregated by gender. Progress should
not only be assessed on how many farmers are earning a LI but also what the relative
income improvements have been made, to avoid the risk that companies simply
consolidate their supply chains and only source from better off farmers. This problem
will not be solved by simply kicking the poor and the weak out of the cocoa supply
chain.
Indirect sourcing
Indirect sourcing is incompatible with sustainability. Either a company knows where
it is sourcing from, and therefore knows which challenges it is facing and which
solutions are needed to bring to the table, or it doesn’t. As such, there is no place forindirect sourcing in good purchasing practices. National traceability systems can play
an important role in this. However, they have been promised for many years, and still
not delivered. There is hope that the upcoming EUDR regulation will speed up theprocess of this development.
Data transparency
Transparency on aggregated agronomic data such as average yields, farm size, costsof production and required labour should become standard practice. This data is key
to designing targeted support for the most vulnerable farmers, including women,
and reducing gaps in income, connectivity, and market access. This transparency isalso expected on all sustainability initiatives that can help to understand what works
well or not, and where, to avoid inefficiencies and ensure under-addressed regions
can also be targeted.
Data ownership
The cost and burden of data collection and disclosure should not be borne byfarming households. As such, farmers should be rewarded for sharing data – coupledwith contractual assurances that sharing data does not lead to disengagement. If
done well, these processes can facilitate strong feedback loops between farmers
and companies. Rather than being treated as data providers and forced to comply
with unilateral requirements from purchase agreements, farmers can be mutually
beneficial partners to other supply chain actors, provided the correct incentives
are in place. At present, farmers are often mapped several times every few years bydifferent companies – and required to help in the process35 – while still not owning
their data. This is both inefficient and unethical. Farmers and farmer organizations
should be remunerated adequately to capture and manage data from their members
so that they can own it36 and use it to facilitate feedback not only with companies but
their members as well.
Contract details
Together with the introduction of standard contracts, it should be possible to publish
data, at the very least at an aggregated level, on contract length, price guarantees,
premiums to be paid and penalties for non-compliance. This should be broken down
into farm gate price, quality premiums, certification premiums, and any other relevant
differentials. This should also be coupled with transparency on the costs side;certifications costs borne by the traders and what is deduced from the cooperatives’
payments.

20

35 Sometimes even being required to house and feed the staff of the mapping companies for lengthy
periods of time, or even purchase the equipment required.
36 Farmers could, for example, refuse cooperation if there is no ownership of data.

Payment recording
Verifiable payments are an important part of increasing transparency. Companies
should make available the traceability of the invoices, the points of purchase, thebuyers (cooperatives or individual buyers), the place of purchase, and the plantationof origin of the purchased product. Other elements that could be helpful are
keeping a record of the follow-up of the annual purchase invoices and keeping an
up-to-date list of the approved and non-approved buyers. These verifiable payments
could also help farmers and cooperatives comply with EU traceability requirements
as defined in the newly adopted EU Deforestation Regulation.37
Digital payments
Stimulating measures to include farmers in the digital money system will aid
traceability and transparency, and lower fraud, violence, and exploitation. It also
brings farmers out of the ranks of the unbanked, so they can more easily accesslines of credit etc. This must be done sensitively and consultatively so that it neverpenalizes the farmer but is a net win for them. The costs of digital transactions should
be in addition to and not deducted from the income of farmers. This could also be
designed in such a way as to allow farmers to hold cooperatives accountable.
Sector-wide reporting
Ideally, there would be a sector-wide consensus on reporting formats on purchasing
practices, to ease comparability and facilitate areas of collaboration. Attempts forthis have been made – generally at a less-than-ambitious scale – in the textile sectors
regarding a living wage.38 Care should be taken that competition law is complied
with, but within for example the various national Initiatives for Sustainable Cocoa(ISCO) commitments there should be space for more transparent, accountable, andcomparable reporting.

21

37 A best-in-class example of farm gate pricing transparency can be found in fine flavour cocoa trading
company Uncommon Cacao, who for many years already have been publicly disclosing farm gate pricing on all their cocoa purchases in their annual Transparency Report. Though this would require a different scale for bulk cocoa traders, the principle remains the same.
38 Including the Common Framework for Responsible Purchasing Practices, the ACT on Living Wage, andthe self-assessment of the textile sector facilitated by the IMVO Convenant in the Netherlands.

Summary

It will become increasingly important for companies to be able to communicate
credibly and transparently about their purchasing practices, both to ensureaccountability as well as to ensure farmers properly understand their rights
and obligations. Transparency and accountability should also lead to a cycle ofcontinuous improvement in purchasing practices. Companies should develop a timebound living income policy, and annual publicly report on responsible purchasing
practices KPIs.

Primary asks of companies

2024
2025

Publish a time-bound policy
Companies should publish a timebound living income policy, andannually report on how the living
income gap is closed, including agender-disaggregated measurement

Secondary asks of companies
Farmers should be paid for their data
sharing and ensure they have access andownership.

22

2026

ReportCompanies should publicly reportannually on responsible purchasing
KPIs, including on volumes and farm
gate prices paid.

Conclusion
The daily reality for the vast majority of cocoa farmers is (extreme) poverty. In
addition to changes in governance policies, and in order to provide a businesscase for improved agricultural practices, companies must change their purchasing
practices. This is not dependent on sector-wide collective action but can be
implemented by individual companies almost directly.
Current business practices largely focus on agronomic approaches and will not
suffice to reach a living income. Though there is a role for governments in dealing
with these issues, that is not an excuse for companies to not do what they can. This
paper focusses on what companies can do better in their core business; the buyingof cocoa.
The core of any good purchasing practices is a farm gate living income reference
price (LIRP). Companies must commit to a time-bound, gender-sensitive, action
plan to bridge the living income gap, which includes the implementation of a living
income reference price system. This must be based on realistic averages and must
provide a clear breakdown between that part of the premium that goes to cover the
farmer’s living income gap, and those parts that cover compliance costs and runningof the cooperatives. Beyond pricing, it is possible for non-purchasing interventions to
reduce the living income gap, such as cash transfers and payments for environmental
services, but they cannot be a substitute for a LIRP.
Although price is a key element of purchasing practices, it is by no means the only
aspect. Good purchasing practices also require redressing the unequal distributionof risks. Long-term asymmetric contracts coupled with standardised contracts andaccessible grievance mechanisms are key elements in reducing the risk for farmers.
It will become increasingly important for companies to be able to communicate
credibly and transparently about their purchasing practices, both to ensureaccountability as well as to ensure farmers properly understand their rights
and obligations. Transparency and accountability should also lead to a cycle ofcontinuous improvement in purchasing practices. Companies should develop a timebound living income policy, and annual publicly report on responsible purchasing
practices KPIs.

1

70 %

2025

Pay a fair price

2026

2024

Share the risks

23

70 %

70 %

2

3
Be accountable

Colophon
Text: Antonie C. Fountain, VOICE Network
Additional contributions: the text of this draft of the consultation paper is theresult of several rounds of consultation with the Cocoa Barometer Consortium
members and other stakeholders in the cocoa sector.
Design: Roelant Meijer (Tegenwind.eu)
Citation: Fountain, A.C. (2023): Good Purchasing Practices in Cocoa, a Barometer
Consultation Paper
Published by: the Cocoa Barometer Consortium
Administered by: the VOICE Network
The Cocoa Barometer Consortium consists of: ABVV/Horval, Action against
Child Exploitation (ACE), Alisos, Be Slavery Free, EcoCare, European Federationof Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT), Fern, Freedom United,
Global Labor Justice/International Labor Rights Forum, Green America, IDEF,
Inades Formation, INKOTA-netzwerk, Mighty Earth, Nature and Development
Foundation, Oxfam America, Oxfam Belgium, Oxfam Ghana, Oxfam Novib, Public
Eye, Roscidet, Rikolto, SEND Ghana, Solidaridad Europe, Solidaridad West Africa,SÜDWIND Institut, Tropenbos International, Tropenbos Ghana, WWF Belgium,
WWF France.
Contact
Requests for information can be addressed to: antonie@voicenetwork.cc
Copyright
The 2022 Cocoa Barometer is available as an interactive publication online, as adigital download, and as a hardcopy printed publication. The infographics used inthis document can also be downloaded separately. We encourage the use of thisdata in other publications, provided proper references are given. Published under
Creative Commons License Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
www.voicenetwork.cc

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