This document has been translated from the Japanese original for reference purposes only. In the event of any discrepancy
between this translated document and the Japanese original, the original shall prevail. The Company assumes noresponsibility for this translation or for direct, indirect or any other forms of damages arising from the translation.

June 15, 2017
To our shareholders:Company Name:
Name of Representative:(Securities Code:Contact Information:

Kuroda Electric Co., Ltd.
Koichi Hosokawa, President
7517 First Section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange
Operating Officer, Business Planning Office,Business Planning DivisionKatsuhiro Sasano(+81)3-5764-5500

Our view on ISS report
In reference to the proposal (hereinafter, the “Proposal”) submitted by Reno, Inc. (hereinafter the “RequestingShareholder) to appoint an outside director to the Company’s Board of Directors (hereinafter, the “Board”) at ourordinary general meeting of shareholders that will be held on June 29, 2017 (hereinafter, the “General Meeting”),
recommendations made to institutional investors by two major US proxy advisory firms, Glass Lewis & Co. (GlassLewis) and Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS), have become known to us. Their evaluations andrecommendations indicate diametrically opposed views as follows:
Glass Lewis: Recommending against the Proposal
ISS: Recommending in favor of the Proposal
The evaluation made by Glass Lewis indicates that there is no problem with our governance or shareholder
return policy and that the only argument made by the Requesting Shareholder about management integration (M&Adeals) lacks concreteness and hence persuasiveness. Glass Lewis’ view is consistent with our view. On the other hand,in our view, the evaluation made by ISS lacks fairness and neutrality as explained below.
We have confirmed the fact that the Requesting Shareholder sent letters to some of our shareholders (only inJapanese) without disclosing them. The letter indicates a kind of public commitment, stating that the candidate would,“promptly after his appointment,” “plan to discuss the implementation of a share buyback of 3 million shares by theend of the current fiscal year” and “to proactively discuss management integration (business mergers) with othercompanies.” These statements are completely inconsistent with what ISS refers to as a statement made by Ms. AyaNomura, a joint holder of the Requesting Shareholder—“there will be a firewall between the Requesting Shareholder
and the candidate.”
Furthermore, the Requesting Shareholder, together with the joint holders, has continued to purchase shares ofour company with its voting right ratio exceeding 37.5% though it stated that it has no intention of controlling our1

company. Its words and behaviors must be deemed inconsistent. We must conclude that ISS’ recommendation in favorof the Proposal, which was made based on the interpretation that the Proposal is a mere appointment of one outside
director and the Requesting Shareholder does not intend to control the Board, overlooks the impact on our company
without fully considering the intention of the above-mentioned statements made by the Requesting Shareholder as wellas the Requesting Shareholder’s actual control with its 37.5% voting right.
The Requesting Shareholder has continued to pursue its intension while expressing these inconsistentstatements and behaviors and using mass media since April this year when Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami attended a meetingwith our company on very short notice.
When we had a meeting with ISS, we pointed out that the Proposal poses a high risk of deteriorating ourshareholders’ common interest, explaining the background of our position against the Proposal and chronology of ourdiscussions with the Requesting Shareholder and communicating our view on the actual situation of the Requesting
Shareholder and the gap between its intension and externally expressed standpoint. At that point, ISS made a pledge tous that they would evaluate the pros and cons of the Proposal only based on publicly disclosed information.
We must, however, interpret ISS’ evaluation concerning the Requesting Shareholder and the candidate director
suggested in the Proposal as an evaluation made based on verbal and unofficial statements (including the above-saidstatement by Ms. Aya Nomura) that were made at meetings and whose feasibility are questionable, as well as anevaluation made based on magazine articles.
Furthermore, in regard to our idea about M&As, we cannot help but interpret ISS’ recognition of theappropriateness of the Requesting Shareholder’s argument as an evaluation intentionally made based on ISS’ own
presumption about our management policy and inaccurate interpretation of our M&As and management policies thathave been publicly disclosed. We cannot help but interpret its recommendation in favor of the Proposal as based onsuch evaluation method.
We hereby sincerely ask shareholders to make considerable judgement on exercising voting rights at theGeneral Meeting by reference to information that we are publicly disclosing on our website.
-END-2