47

Japan’s New Initiative for REDD+ Results-based Financing:
Opportunities and Challenges
Makino YAMANOSHITA1,2*, Hiromitsu SAMEJIMA1and Henry SCHEYVENS1
1Natural Resources and Ecosystem Services Area, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies(IGES),
2108-11, Kamiyamaguchi, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0115, Japan
2
Asian Natural Environmental Science Center, The University of Tokyo
1-1-1, Yayoi, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-8657, Japan*e-mail:yamanoshita@iges.or.jp

Abstract
Article 5 of the Paris Agreement specifies implementation of REDD+ (reducing emissions fromdeforestation and forest degradation) through results-based payments. Currently, however, REDD+ resultsbased financing is insufficient for incentivizing full implementation of REDD+ by developing countries. In
this article, we examine how a new bilateral initiative of Japan called JCM REDD+ could contribute to
REDD+ results-based financing. JCM REDD+ is unique as a CDM-like mechanism providing ex-ante
funding to project-based REDD+ activities and issuing credits later for emission reductions achieved which
can be used for both countries’ NDCs. The features of JCM REDD+ would complement other existing
payment-on-delivery mechanisms. JCM REDD+ supports activities on the ground which directly affectdrivers of deforestation. It also has the potential to exploit financial sources from the private sector, in which
involvement in REDD+ remains low. JCM REDD+, however, would have no significant positive influences
immediately on the landscape of REDD+ results-based financing, as its scale of implementation is restricted
in terms of number of projects in the pipeline and available funding sources. To maximize the potential of
JCM REDD+, modalities and guidelines for transparency and accounting relevant to REDD+, Nationally
Determined Contributions and internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should be clarified under theParis Agreement. At the same time, we find it is crucial to consider policy designs in developed countries
that would enhance investment in REDD+.
Key words: internationally transferred mitigation outcome (ITMO), Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM),
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (REDD+), results-based payment

1. Introduction
Article 5 of the Paris Agreement clearly states that theparties should take action to conserve and enhance thefunction of forests as sinks and reservoirs of greenhousegases. It also encourages the parties to implement andsupport REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestationand forest degradation), the framework for which was
adopted in 2013 as the Warsaw Framework for REDD+
as a result of a decade of negotiations at the UNFCCC(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Chante). One distinctive feature of REDD+ under the
UNFCCC is that it employs results-based payment for
financing. Results-based financing is a financing approach
where payments are made only after a quantified outcome
has been verifiably achieved (Voigt & Ferreira, 2015). In
the context of the UNFCCC, results-based financing
generally refers to payments made for REDD+ activities
Global Environmental Research
21/2017: 047–052
printed in Japanthat demonstrate real reductions in emissions from theforestry sector, as well as consistency with otherperformance criteria such as the REDD+ safeguards(Wilder, 2014).
The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ specifies therequirement for developing countries to implement
REDD+ to access results-based payments. It requires
them to establish a national strategy or action plan for
REDD+, national forest reference emissions level and/or
forest reference level, national forest monitoring systemand safeguard information system. To help developing
countries meet these requirements, REDD+ has adopted aphased approach, which is another prominent feature of
REDD+ . In the first phase, a country prepares toimplement REDD+, for example by developing a national
REDD+ strategy and capacity building for monitoring,
reporting and verification (MRV) for REDD+. The second
phase is for more advanced readiness, focusing on©2017 AIRIES

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M. YAMANOSHITA et al.

REDD+ implementation with demonstration activities,
and in the third phase, the country is compensated for its
REDD+ activities through results-based payment (WertzKanounnikoff & Angelsen, 2009). The phased approachallows countries at different levels of capacity toparticipate in REDD+ and ultimately access REDD+
results-based financing.
International financial support for REDD+ has to be inline with the phased approach to materialize this concept.
The Warsaw framework for REDD+ affirms thatdeveloped country parties are urged to support
development of the first and second phases throughmultilateral and bilateral channels from public and private
sectors, which provide adequate and predictable support
for all phases (Wilder, 2014). Financial support has been
provided in parallel with negotiations on the rules for
REDD+ at the UNFCCC. Donor countries pledged
US$5.0 billion through bilateral agreements between
2006 and 2014 and US$3.2 billion through six multilateralfunds targeting REDD+
and sustainable forest
management between 2008 and 2014, and 58% of thefinance has been channeled to readiness activities such as
capacity building, training workshops, strengthening of
in-country institutions and development of national
REDD+ policies and strategies (Norman & Nakhooda,2014). As a result of this readiness support, we note a listof 25 countries who have submitted their forest reference
levels to the UNFCCC, one of the requirements foraccessing REDD+ results-based payments (UNFCCC,
2017a). On the other hand, results-based funding forPhase 3 to date is still at an initial stage and its scale isstill limited. Adequate, predictable and sustainablefinancing will be crucial for full implementation of
REDD+ and scaling up of the REDD+ results-based
financing is required.
Japan is the 5th largest donor to REDD+ following
Norway, the US, Germany and the UK and has provided
REDD+ support mainly through bilateral channels forthe purpose of promoting REDD+ readiness amongdeveloping countries, especially in building capacity formonitoring, reporting and verification (Norman &Nakhooda, 2014). There is a new unique initiative underdevelopment in Japan to support REDD+ in an approachsimilar to results-based payments. This article examines
Japan’s new initiative, called the JCM (Japan Crediting
Mechanism) REDD+ , for its positive influence on
REDD+ results-based financing. We first review theinitiative, then discuss its opportunities and challenges.

2. Review
2.1 Current Landscape of REDD+ Results-based
Financing and Japan’s Contribution
The funding for the results-based payments of
REDD+ remains at 42% of the total pledge to REDD+ as
mentioned above. Norway has made a significant
contribution, providing over US$3 billion of its pledge,
which is more than 70% of its total pledge, throughbilateral channels (Norman & Nakhooda, 2014). Norway

signed agreements on payment for emission reductions
with Brazil, Guyana and Indonesia. We have to say,however, that the scale of financing for REDD+ resultsbased payments in Phase 3 is not sufficient. For example,
Brazil, one of the largest emitters in the forest sector andthe pioneer of REDD+, reported to the UNFCCC in their
Biennial Update Report that the emission reduction fromtheir REDD+ activities in the Amazon during the period
from 2006 to 2010 was 594 million CO2 eq per year
(UNFCCC, 2017b). To compensate fully for theachievement of this one country, it would cost about
US$3 billion per year based on simple estimations using
the unit price negotiated between the Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund and developing
countries (approximately US$5/CO2 eq). Recently, there
have been other bilateral pledges for results-based
REDD+ at the Climate Summit in New York in 2014.
Germany, the UK and Norway pledged US$5 billion in
total between 2016 and 2020 through multilateral andbilateral channels and they notably utilize the REDD
Early Movers program (REM), an initiative under
Germany’s official development assistance (ODA) with afund size of EUR€65 million (Ehringhaus & Streck,
2015; Germany et al., 2016; NDC Partnership, 2016).
REM is a program to reward the emission reduction
performance of countries who are already taking theinitiative themselves in REDD+ (GIZ, 2012).
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is considered themain funding source within the UNFCCC. Forty threestate governments have made a pledge of US$10.3 billion
in total to the GCF (GCF, 2017b) but it is not yet clear
how much will be allocated to REDD+ results-based
funding. Discussions on developing funding modalities
for REDD+ results-based funding are still underway at
the GCF board meetings as of June 2017 (GCF, 2017a)
and it is expected to start calling for proposals by late
2018 at the earliest (Leonard, 2017). Outside of the
UNFCCC, the FCPF Carbon Fund of the World Bank
has initiated results-based funding for REDD+ , withcapital of about US$390 million (FCPF, 2013a). It
provides payments for verified emission reductions from
REDD+ activities in countries which have madesignificant progress in their REDD+ readiness endeavors(FCPF, 2013b), and has selected four programs in Chile,
Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Mexico for its portfolio, with 15 programs in thepipeline (FCPF, 2017).
Japan has been supporting REDD+ mainly throughODA projects conducted by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and providing technicalcooperation to 12 countries (Shishido, 2015). From 2006
to 2016, the government of Japan reported that theamount of aid provided for REDD+ has reached US$1.7
billion (FAO, 2017). Through multilateral channels, Japan
contributed US$14 million to the FCPF’s Readiness Fund,
US$60 million to the Climate Investment Funds’ Forest
Investment Program (FIP) and US$3 million to UN-REDD(Government of Japan, 2017a). So far, Japan has neversupported results-based REDD+ but has been developingJapan’s new initiative for REDD+ results‐based financing

a new scheme for results-based funding. It seems atpresent that this scheme is the sole instrument Japan has
for contributing to results-based REDD+ financing andthat there are no other options like the German
government’s REM utilizing ODA for REDD+ resultsbased payment under consideration.

2.2 JCM REDD+
The government of Japan is promoting a bilateralmechanism called the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM),
which is implemented under a bilateral agreement
between Japan and partner countries. As of May 2017, 17
countries have signed the agreement. The purpose of the
JCM is to facilitate diffusion of leading low-carbon
technologies as well as to implement mitigation actions,contribute to sustainable development in developing
countries and use those emission reductions or removals,
appropriately evaluated in a quantitative manner, toachieve the emission reduction targets of the countries
involved (Government of Japan, 2017b). In the firstnationally determined contribution (NDC) of Japan it
was stated that “the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) is
not included as a basis for bottom-up calculation ofJapan’s emission reduction target, but the amount ofemission reductions and removals acquired by Japan
under the JCM will be appropriately counted as Japan’s
reduction.” This is expected to achieve 50 to 100 million
tCO2 eq of emission reduction by 2030 through JCM
programs undertaken within the government’s annual
budget (Government of Japan, 2015).
Under the JCM, private companies in Japan together
with local companies jointly implement a project bytransferring low-carbon technology, then conservatively
calculate the emission reduction achieved following the
JCM guidelines and issue JCM credits. The JCM is ascheme similar to the Clean Development Mechanism. A
Joint Committee (JC) consisting of representatives fromboth countries takes a role like that of the CDM
Executive Board such as developing rules and guidelines,
approving methodologies and project registration, anddeciding the amount of credit to be issued (Governmentof Japan, 2017c). The governments of both countries
issue credits based on notifications from JC and establish
and maintain a registry. There were 16 projects registered
to the JCM and 105 projects in pipeline as of May 2017.
As business investment costs are the major burden for acompany starting a project, Japan’s government provides
several subsidy programs. One program under the
Ministry of the Environment (MOE) named “JCM Model
Projects” supports a maximum of 50% of the initialinvestment for a JCM project and requires the subsidized
project to deliver back more than 50% of the credit
issued by the project to the government (Asakawa, 2016).
The MOE prepared approximately US$60 million for
FY2017 for this program. REDD+ is within the scope of
the JCM, and guidelines for JCM REDD+ are underdevelopment and to be agreed upon with partnercountries. There were two subsidized projects among the
JCM Model Projects in Laos and Indonesia in 2016.

49

They were the projects with the largest estimatedemission reductions in the subsidy program (Koakutsu etal., 2016).
The distinctive feature of JCM REDD+ is that it
adopts a project-based approach rather than the national
approach that the JCM have followed in the wake of the
CDM. The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and related
decisions in the UNFCCC recognize that REDD+ is
implemented at a national scale, and subnational
activities can be implemented as an interim measure(UN-REDD Programme, 2016). Most of the resultsbased payment mechanisms currently implemented
prefer to adopt a national or jurisdictional (e.g.,
provincial) scale for implementation in line with
UNFCCC decisions. In the cases of JCM REDD+ Model
Projects in Laos and Indonesia, the project proponents
provide technical support for local households in the
project area for changing current agricultural practicesuch as slash and burn cultivation, which was identified
as a deforestation driver. The project areas cover 30,000
ha and 89,000 ha, respectively (GEC, 2016a, 2016b). The
Japanese government’s methodological guidelines draft
for JCM REDD+ provides methods for setting projectspecific reference levels and calculating achieved
emission reductions, although it also accepts national or
sub-national reference levels and monitoring systems if
the partner country submits them to the UNFCCC(Government of Japan, 2017c). The timing of thepayment is a notable point. The JCM provides up-front
payment for the costs of REDD+ activities while otherresults-based payment mechanisms pay for outcomes thatare monitored and verified ex-post. Another remarkablefeature of JCM REDD+ is that the scheme issues credits
and Japan’s government intends to use the credits
allocated to it based on the level of contribution, toachieve Japan’s emission reduction target (NDC). Other
bilateral funding schemes have no intention of issuing or
receiving credits in return.

3. Discussion
3.1 JCM REDD+ Opportunities
JCM REDD+ is based on the CDM scheme andwould be classified as a results-based financing scheme
providing ex-ante payment via market mechanisms. It
supports the initial costs of implementing REDD+
activities. With payment-on-delivery schemes such as the
FCPF Carbon Fund, the host country has to initiate andcover the cost of REDD+ activities. That might lead to
non-participation of lower-income countries or
impoverished subnational regions or socioeconomic
groups (Wong et al., 2016). In an interview we conductedwith a government officer in a country participating in
the FCPF Carbon Fund we learned that it was very
difficult to secure domestic funding for the activity
implementation they had listed in the proposal they had
submitted to the Fund.
The FCPF Carbon fund sets a fixed price for reduced
emissions through negotiations for a purchase agreement

50

M. YAMANOSHITA et al.

with the recipient country in advance, but it would be
difficult to set the price adequately, as the cost ofemission reductions varies even within the same country.
When the set price is low, the REDD+ activities will be
implemented only in areas where the cost is lower thanthe price, and this will often be where forests are least
threatened (Wong et al., 2016). On the other hand,through the JCM REDD+ approach, a project can target
forests with high conservation value or areas that will
create co-benefits from forest protection such as
livelihood improvement for local communities. It is
possible, however, for the emission reduction amountachieved in the project to be much lower than expected.
The investors have to take the risk of emission reduction
activity underperformance, unlike in the case of resultsbased financing with ex-post payment.
Supporting activity implementation on the ground for
REDD+ through projects is important. Even a developed
country can improve and develop legislation andinstitutional arrangements for REDD+ through pastnational level readiness support that may previously
have been insufficient as a measure to prevent
deforestation, especially when the deforestation driver
was linked to livelihood practices of local communities.
For example, if the newly established limits reduce thearea for shifting cultivation per household, direct action
for the local community is absolutely necessary, such as
capacity building for alternative livelihoods and this iswhere JCM REDD+ would be able to contribute. A mix
of up-front and ex-post payment will be required forfinancing of REDD+ (Angelsen, 2017).
Funding sources for results-based REDD+ from thepublic sector have been limited, but JCM REDD+ has
the potential to enhance investment from the private
sector for REDD+. It was reported that 94% of US$30
million in transacted forest carbon offsets to buyers in2015 in the voluntary market was from the private
sector, who rely on a positive reputation to do business(Goldstein & Ruef, 2016). These private companies might
prefer to invest in individual projects rather than be oneof many investors in a large-scale fund for national-scale
REDD+, because it enables them to explain clearly that
their investment contributes to emission reductions
as well as conservation of important forests andimprovements to local society as part of their corporatesocial responsibility.

3.2 Challenges of JCM REDD+
We classified JCM REDD+ as a scheme using market
mechanisms in the previous section, but JCM credits are
not currently tradable (Government of Japan, 2017b),
though discussions to make them tradable are ongoing
among JCM partner countries. Even if they become
tradable, it seems there is no market existing for trading
them, as private Japanese companies have not set any
GHG emission caps. The accelerated progress of JCM
development seems to be backed up by the attractivenessof the government subsidy program, which supports
initial business investments for introducing energy

efficient equipment and requests a share of the credits
generated by the project in return. On the other hand, theREDD+ project has high potential for large emission
reductions but it is not directly linked to companies’
business. Thus, companies’ interest in JCM REDD+
seems to remain rather low. In addition, the subsidy
prepared for JCM REDD+ is limited because the main
source of the subsidy program is the global warming tax,
the use of which is restricted to emission reduction
activities in the energy sector.
Internationally under the UNFCCC, the market
mechanism is recognized as a necessary tool to meet the“2 degree Celsius target,” and Article 6 under the Paris
Agreement allows for the creation of an international
carbon market. The JCM is a cooperative approach
under the article, meeting its important criteria, namely
involvement of internationally transferred mitigation
outcomes (ITMOs) towards NDCs (Koakutsu et al.,2016). The rules for operationalizing Article 6 arecurrently under negotiation, including on their scope,accounting and the nature of the ITMOs (Marcu, 2017).
In terms of REDD+, and JCM REDD+ as well, although
the necessary rules and guidance for implementation
have been determined under the Warsaw Framework for
REDD+ and results-based payment is allowed in Article
5 of the Paris Agreement, it is not yet clear how REDD+
will be treated in discussions on the ITMOs. Future
decisions on the broader architecture of the Paris
Agreement, including NDC accounting and transparency
and cooperative approaches, will have a significant
impact on REDD+ and that is why both developing anddeveloped countries hesitate to mainstream REDD+ intheir climate change policies, especially using resultsbased payment (Graham, 2017). A country like Indonesiathat has a clear, ambitious emission reduction
commitment in the NDC and identifies forest
management as an important sector for reducing
emissions would inevitably be careful about acceptinginternational support for REDD+ involving transfer of
REDD+ outcome. Indonesia, in fact, has yet to sign theletter of intent for the FCPF Carbon Fund, which is thefirst step in the fund’s emission reduction purchaseagreement (FCPF, 2017).
The challenge for developing countries involved in
the ITMOs after relevant decisions are made will beshaping their domestic policies and taking actions toprevent the risk of double counting at the national level.
The JCM has taken measures to prevent such risks in its
scheme by establishing rules, guidelines and a registrysystem. If there are plural mechanisms, however, inwhich some transfer credits within the country and some
do not, the national government has to be able to manage
a centralized registry for reporting their NDCs
adequately. Moreover, registry management may
become complex if the mechanisms adopt different
methodologies. The methodologies of JCM REDD+ and
the FCPF Carbon Fund will differ, for example.
Diversity in approaches to supporting full
implementation of REDD+ will be important. To

Japan’s new initiative for REDD+ results‐based financing

leverage complementary relationships among different
funding schemes, further studies will be required to
identify and compare the strengths and weaknesses ofeach approach and lessons learned from past experience.
That would help identifying the role of JCM REDD+
and ways to coordinate with other financing schemes.

4. Conclusions
The “2 degree Celsius target” will be unachievable if
emission reductions from deforestation remain
unaddressed (Goldstein & Ruef, 2016). More than 100
countries have mentioned REDD+ in their NDCs
(Leonard, 2017), but results-based REDD+ has not yet
been fully operationalized and REDD+ results-based
financing must be scaled up. From our review of
REDD+ in this article, we have to conclude that there
are few contributions JCM REDD+ would immediately
make toward changing the landscape of REDD+ resultsbased financing at the current stage. At the same time,
however, we have also identified the possibility of JCM
REDD+ complementing the existing results-based
funding with payment-on-delivery as it supports theinitial costs of activities linked directly to deforestation
drivers on the ground. As it seeks a market-based
approach, JCM REDD+ has a potential to open up
sources from the private sector. The involvement of theprivate sector has been widely recognized as animportant source of funding for REDD+ but concreate
breakthroughs have yet to occur. To maximize thepotential of JCM REDD+, modalities and guidelines fortransparency and accounting relevant to REDD+ , the
NDCs and ITMOs should be clarified under the Paris
Agreement, and these should not force developing
countries to choose between whether they receive
international support or show ability to comply with
their NDCs. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider new
policy designs in developed countries to enhanceinvestment for preventing deforestation in developing
countries and to scale up REDD+ financing, which has
not been actively discussed in the ODA-dependent
REDD+.
The limitation of this study is that our discussion goesno further than the potential opportunities and challengesof JCM REDD+ as its implications are still undernegotiation with certain JCM partner countries. Further
study on its actual impact will be necessary once theJCM REDD+ project is operationalized.

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Makino YAMANOSHITADr Makino Yamanoshita has been involved inresearch on forest and climate change mitigation.
She developed a forest carbon project (A/ R
CDM) with local villagers in Vietnam. She
analyzed the complicated mechanism thatprevented participation of local communities in
the project and resulted in increased risk of nonpermanence. She is currently interested in REDD+ and supporting theJapanese government in international REDD+ negotiations.

Hiromitsu SAMEJIMA
Dr. Hiromitsu Samejima has worked for Natural
Resource & Ecosystem Services Area at theInstitute for Global Environmental Strategies since2015. His main research areas are ecology oftropical forests, sustainable forest management, andREDD+ . He got his doctorate in science from
Kyoto University in 2005 and has worked for theMuseum of Nature and Human Activities, Hyogo Prefecture; the Center for
Ecological Studies, the Graduate School of Agriculture and the Center forSoutheast Asian Studies, all at Kyoto University; and the Graduate School ofEngineering at Kyushu University.

Henry SCHEYVENS
Dr. Henry Scheyvens holds a Ph.D. in Political
Science from Monash University and a M.Phil. in
Development Studies from Massey University. He
has taught at several universities in New Zealand,
Australia and Japan. He joined IGES in 2004,
where he now leads the Natural Resources andEcosystems Services Area. His research interests
center around poverty, livelihoods and rights issues. In the past few years, his
research has focused on timber legality and sustainability, participatory forest
mapping and monitoring, REDD+ readiness, and inclusive financial services.

(Received 3 July 2017, Accepted 31 August 2017)