Democratization and Linguistic Complexity
The Effect of Franchise Extension on Parliamentary
Discourse, 1832–1915
Arthur Spirling∗
Short title: “Democratization and Linguistic Complexity”∗

Associate Professor of Politics and Data Science, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY, 10012.
arthur.spirling@nyu.edu

1Abstract
We consider the impact of the Second Reform Act, and the doubling of the electorate
it delivered, on the linguistic complexity of speeches made by members of parliamentin Britain. Noting that the new voters were generally poorer and less educated thanthose who already enjoyed the suffrage, we hypothesize that cabinet ministers hadstrong incentives—relative to other members—to appeal to these new electors withsimpler statements during parliamentary debates. We assess this claim with a data
set of over half a million speeches for the period between the Great Reform Act andGreat War, along with methods for measuring the comprehensibility of texts—which wevalidate in some detail. The theorized relationship holds: ministers become statisticallysignificantly easier to understand (on average) relative to backbenchers, and this effectoccurs almost immediately after the 1868 election. We show that this result is not an
artifact of new personnel in the House of Commons.

keywords: parliament, Westminster, British Political Development, text-as-data, methodology

Replication information for all figures and tables in the published paper are available in the JOP Data
Archive on Dataverse http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop. Supplementary materials are available
in an online appendix. Contact the author for replication information pertaining to the online appendices.

2

1

Introduction

Few topics have featured as prominently in applied political science research as the causes
and consequences of democratization (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1968; Przeworski et al.,
2000; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Of particular interest is the(optimistic) notion that with franchise extension and competition comes increasing political responsiveness and accountability for citizens (e.g. Bartolini, 2000; Przeworski, 2009).
And within this large literature the changes to Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century have captured a great deal of scholarly attention (e.g. Bagehot, 1873/2011; Seymour,
1915; Trevelyan, 1922; Gash, 1952; Woodward, 1962), with primary focus on the passing of
the relevant legislation in 1867 (e.g. Himmelfarb, 1966; Smith, 1967; Walton, 1996; Moser
and Reeves, 2014) and its effects on politicians and voters (e.g. Cox, 1987; McLean, 2001;
Berlinski and Dewan, 2011; Camp, Dixit and Stokes, 2014). In part, this is because the‘Westminster system’ that resulted has been widely emulated for its stability and decisiveness (e.g. Lijphart, 1999; Rhodes and Weller, 2005), and there is thus a natural interest in
uncovering its development and possibly charting its future course. This is especially true of
its characteristic institutions of ministerial responsibility and fierce frontbench competitionin parliament and in the electorate.

In keeping with this interest, in the current paper we seek to understand how suffrage extension affected the behavior of backbench members of parliament (MPs) relative to ministers
during the Victorian period. Our central idea is that members of the governing executive—
the cabinet—had new incentives after the expansion of the electorate: they were required,as leaders of their parties, to appeal to a poorer, less educated median voter. We contend
that they did so, in part, via simpler linguistic expressions in their parliamentary speeches.
Meanwhile, because backbenchers increasingly understood that citizens were “voting for the3

party, rather than for the man” (Cox, 1987, 136), we argue that these MPs were underconsiderably less pressure to adjust their speaking style.

We are hardly the first to investigate the new incentives for legislators and their principals introduced by voting reform. In the long term, the eventual rise of the parliamentary
Labour party as an electoral force representative of working-class interests (see, e.g., Thompson, 1963; Cox, 1997), along with the commensurate decline of the Liberals (Searle, 2001),
is probably the best known consequence of a larger franchise (when considered alongsideother reforms such as the introduction of the secret ballot). By contrast, and with some
exceptions (see, e.g., Hurst, 1965, on the effects of the secret ballot in Ireland) analysts
find relatively little evidence of immediate change to other markers related to MP activity:
these include roll call cohesion (Eggers and Spirling, 2014c), Liberal vote share (Berlinski
and Dewan, 2011), the socioeconomic backgrounds of cabinet personnel (Berlinski, Dewan
and Van Coppenolle, 2014) and party orientation in the electorate (Cox, 1987). On the one
hand, these null findings are surprising: the almost doubling of the electorate via the Second
Reform Act to include poorer, less educated voters was certainly predicted (or feared) bycontemporaneous actors to have consequences for the nature of both substantive and descriptive representation (see,e.g, McLean, 2001, for a discussion of the ‘Adullamites’). On theother hand, scholars of the period do not typically have access to the kinds of fine-grained
data that makes investigating possibly subtle shifts in behavior straightforward. Compare
this situation, for example, with the study of American politics—in particular regardingthe ‘Homestyle’ of Members of Congress, where researchers can either follow contemporary
members and record their interactions (e.g. Fenno, 1978), experiment on them (see Grose,
2014, for an overview) and their constituents (e.g. Larson, 1990), or work with the large
amounts of text produced by such elected officials in communication with their constituentsand others (e.g. Grimmer, 2013). Similarly, researchers interested in Comparative politics
4

for the contemporary period can utilize manifestos (e.g. Budge et al., 2001; Benoit, Laverand Mikhaylov, 2009), parliamentary speeches (e.g. Slapin and Proksch, 2008), and detailed
election studies with roughly similar questions across nations to estimate the degree to which
different systems and different times respond to voter needs (e.g. Powell, 2000). Thus, while
we have very strong priors for this vital period in the Westminster system’s history, testing our hypotheses is prohibitively difficult, and our empirical findings look ambiguous atbest—and confusing at worst.

Diagnosing the problems with extant studies of the effects of democratization is not difficult; solving these maladies is far from trivial. Put crudely, scholars are typically restrictedby limited data on elite–i.e. MP—responses to suffrage expansion: studies are either intensive with coverage of short time periods (e.g. Schonhardt-Bailey, 2008; Berlinski and Dewan,2011), or more extensive in terms of numbers of observations but necessarily less fine-grainedin terms of both the information and inferences that are possible (e.g. Cox, 1987). In theformer case, researchers face the obvious difficulty that suffrage expansion may not have
immediate consequences for politician behavior—perhaps because some degree of ‘learning’
must take place. In the case of the broad studies, though impressive in scope they arelikely to miss subtle, small changes to the way that individual agents perceive the situations
they face and adjust their actions accordingly. In both cases then, there is a danger that
effects that do exist are ‘missed’. Putting aside these specific issues of study scope, it is far
from obvious where we should look for evidence of new incentives and behaviors: ideally, we
would have a large number of observations from which we can plausibly measure ‘responsiveness’ directly and in a way that allows us to compare both across individuals and across time.

In this paper, we make progress where other attempts have faltered and show evidence
consistent with our contention of a differential behavioral affect on ministers versus back5

benchers. We do this in a way made possible with an analysis of a data set of hundredsof thousands of speeches—along with MP covariates—from the House of Commons between
1832 and 1915 (see Eggers and Spirling, 2014b). We focus on speeches as outputs precisely
because they allow politicians to respond instantly to changing circumstances, without thevarious implementation lags one must allow when studying policy or party-system shifts.
Further, in contrast to the 24-hour news cycle politics of the present day, parliamentary
speeches (and reports on them) were the primary way that voters of the time monitored
the actions of their representatives. Speeches have another advantage: they are an equitable resource insofar as, subject to recognition rules in the Commons, anyone can (and did)undertake them, allowing us observations for essentially the entire population of MPs. In
summary then, speeches are very much a key place, if not the only place, where we mightsee democratization having an immediate and noticeable effect.

Our innovation methodologically is to measure the ‘comprehensibility’ (or complexity) of
the utterances using well known metrics from education research, that take into account the
number of syllables relative to the number of words found in documents (see Flesch, 1948).
These are straightforward to calculate, and have been used elsewhere in the study of speech(e.g. Lim, 2008), albeit not on so many texts. These scores are combined with techniquesthat allow multiple individuals, making multiple speeches, to be compared over time as theirroles in the chamber change. In particular, we show that almost immediately after the Second Reform Act, cabinet ministers altered their speech in a way that made those speeches
simpler to understand for the median member of the electorate—that is, someone poorer andless educated than had previously voted. This finding provides crucial support for earlier
hypotheses regarding the leadership role that cabinet members increasingly played (relative
to backbenchers) in appealing directly to popular opinion, such that their parties could win
national elections (Cox, 1987; Jenkins, 1996; Rush, 2001). In terms of point predictions,6

our estimates imply that, controlling for length of speech and other member-level variables,
being a minister after 1868 was equivalent to moving from around the 48th to the 60th percentile of comprehensibility in the chamber as a whole: with predicted values approximately
ten percent larger than backbenchers. This finding is robust to the usual standard error
corrections, and to alternate specifications and measurement strategies. Importantly, we
are able to rule out the possibility that the change in language is due to new personnel arriving in the House over time: rather, it is the result of new incentives for those already there.

Although the techniques we use here are not new, we are applying them to a large data
set and in an innovative way. With that in mind, we spend some time below exploring theirdetails and validating their use, before moving to our results and conclusion. Prior to that,
however, we set the substantive scene for our study: the advent of the Second Reform Act
in 1867.

2

Appealing to the Newly Enfranchised

The Representation of the People Act of 1867—colloquially known as the Second Reform
Act—has attracted much scholarly attention on its origins and passing (e.g. Himmelfarb,
1966; Smith, 1966; Cowling, 1967; McLean, 2001; Moser and Reeves, 2014), its details andits effects (e.g Laski, 1928; Smith, 1967; Canandine, 1999; Aidt, Daunton and Dutta, 2010;
Berlinski and Dewan, 2011). The features of interest for our purposes are two-fold: first,
the massive expansion of the franchise from around one to two million men. Second, thereduction in the property requirement needed for voting (see, e.g. Walton, 1996, for detailsof the change). In practice, and importantly for our work here, the Act “brought substantial
The Act itself dealt with English and Welsh matters; Scotland and Ireland saw reforms via the Representation of the People (Scotland) Act and Representation of the People (Ireland) Act, both of 1868
For reference, the 1871 census recorded a total population of around 26 million for England, Scotland
and Wales combined. Around 12.6 million were males (of any age).

7

working-class majorities to the electoral registers of almost all the boroughs” (Walton, 1996,35), and in this way suffrage expansion was disproportionately greater in urban areas thanelsewhere. Indeed, using figures from Bowley (1937) and Mackenzie (1921), Berlinski and
Dewan (2011, 7) note that “it is clear that the extension of the franchise gave the vote tourban unskilled workers.”

A salient feature of these new voters was that they were, on average, less educated (andless literate) than pre-existing holders of the suffrage. To see this, consider calculations from
Mitch (1992), who obtains a large sample of marriage certificates for the period 1869–1873,
and measures male literacy from the ability of grooms to sign their own names. The classstatus of the men is inferred from their father’s occupation, listed on the same certificate. In
the Mitch (1992, 24–25) approach, there is a hierarchy of five socioeconomic classes, the latter
three of which are characterized as “petty shopkeepers, skilled manual trades, mining, mosttransport occupations”, “semi-skilled manual labor”, and “unskilled labor” respectively. In
Table 1 we provide figures for all five of these groups, in terms of the number of individuals
recorded as literate and illiterate in each. As can be seen from the table, the top occupation
class (I and II) have very few individuals (around 1%) who lack literacy skills. By contrast,
grouping the lower three classes together, we see illiteracy rates at around 20%. These proportions are statistically significantly different (p < 0.01).

For completeness, class (I) are those occupations types which are “titled, high public office, military
officers”, class (II) are “professions, commerce, clerical, farmers”.
Calculated from Table 2.3 in Mitch (1992).
This result is robust to including class (III) as one of the ‘prior voter’ groups; separately, it is robust to
dropping class (V) from the analysis altogether.

8

Occupational Class
I

II

III

IV

V

literate

144

383

1625

536

513

illiterate

0

8

229

78

343

| {z } |{z}
new voters
prior voters
Table 1: Number of literate and illiterate men in Mitch (1992) sample, by occupational class.. The ‘priorvoters’ are those classes likely already enfranchised prior to the Second Reform Act; the ‘new voters’ arethose classes more likely to be part of the newly extended franchise.

If we interpret the lower labor classes as being comprised of those joining the suffrage asa result of the Second Reform Act (which accords roughly with the distinctions made by
Berlinski and Dewan (2011)), we have clear evidence that these ‘new voters’ were less educated and less literate than those already part of the franchise. Although we cannot observe
this directly, it seems safe to further assume that those that were literate in classes of low
overall literacy had lesser proficiency in reading and writing that the literate in classes ofwidespread literacy. That is, we suppose that the binary indicator of literacy hides continuous variation whereby literate voters prior to 1868 were on average better able to readthan the literate who joined the franchise after the Second Reform Act. This matters forour causal story below, in which speeches are reported to electors mostly in written (i.e.
newspaper report) form: thus we require that the literate among the new voters struggle
with complex linguistic expressions more than the literate who were already voting.

2.1

Ministers as the Focus of Electoral Competition

A related consequence of the franchise expansion was the development of new political behavior by electors; in particular, “voting for the party, rather than for the man” at the ballot box,

9

with citizens increasingly “using their votes to determine what did matter: party control ofthe executive” (Cox, 1987, 136). Whether or not the rise of the ‘party orientated electorate’
was caused simply by the expanded suffrage per se is debatable (see Cox, 1987, 94–95), butthere is little doubt that it focussed attention on the cabinet and its members as the key
actors in politics, and the ones responsible for winning (or losing) elections. Commensuratewith this new role as the locus of voter choice was an ongoing increase in partisan cohesion(beginning in the 1850s) in roll call voting, with leaders in the House of Commons able
to discipline their troops at levels approximately equal to those in modern British politics(see Eggers and Spirling, 2014c). Crucially for our account, backbenchers had much weaker
incentives than ministers to adjust their language. This is because, at a time when national
party appeals began to matter more than local connections or family name, those without
cabinet rank were no longer as important as they previously had been for winning their own
seats: it was their leaders on the frontbenches who would be the deciders of election successor failure for everyone in their party. Of course, this does not mean that backbenchers did
not make any attempts to curry favor with their local electors; rather, our position is that as
the franchise expanded, such individual MP efforts were (a) less effective than they once had
been as voters increasingly responded to leaders at Westminster and their ‘brands’ (b) much
more costly—perhaps prohibitively so in some seats—than previously. To clarify further,
the claim here is not that backbenchers were utterly unaffected linguistically by the Reform
Act; instead, our theory predicts that their rate and total magnitude of change would beless than their leaders.

Our central idea is that these forces—new, less educated voters, and the “triumph of partisan politics” (Jenkins, 1996, ch 6) in the electorate and in parliament—meant that the
See Camp, Dixit and Stokes (2014) for discussion of the US and UK in comparative perspective on thispoint.

10

Westminster executive was faced with fresh challenges and opportunities. In particular, thecabinet was required to adopt strategies such that it could appeal to electors and compete
successfully for power at the ballot box. While others have investigated these strategies as
they pertained to election spending (e.g. Hanham, 1978; Camp, Dixit and Stokes, 2014), andsome have specifically investigated the emergence of early manifesto-style addresses such as
in the Midlothian Campaign (see Kelley, 1960; Matthew, 1997), we turn our attention to
the changing nature of speeches in the House of Commons itself.

2.2

Observational Implications

Our hypothesis is two fold: first, that cabinet members reduced the linguistic complexity of
their speeches after the Second Reform Act; second, that the average change in complexity for ministers was larger than the average change for those not serving in the cabinet.
Ministers altered their speech to ensure that the newly increased electorate—with its lower
average educational level—could understand and be convinced by executive speeches. Put
more crudely, democratization resulted in the ‘dumbing down’ of rhetoric and argument by
ministers in a way designed to win votes at the ballot box. Whether this proposed mechanism
is convincing depends on the plausibility of several links in the causal chain. First, readers
may question the extent to which parliamentary speeches were in fact disseminated to the
public at large. For the period under study, this is not a concern: indeed, Victorian Britain
was notable for “universal press coverage” of Commons activity and “the explosive expansion of the press in the middle of the century” (Cox, 1987, 54–55). This press penetration
extended to poorer voters, especially after the repeal of taxes that had kept prices artificiallyhigh until the middle of the century. Thus, by 1861 the cheapest of the weekly sheets, including those aimed specifically at working-class voters such as Lloyd’s Newspaper and Reynold’sNews had circulations of 412, 000 and 150, 000 respectively (Hewitt, 2013, 105). FurtherWe give an explicit ‘difference in differences’ formulation of the problem below.

11more, there is little doubt that parliamentary speeches did indeed make the news. To get asense of political reporting, we inspected archived copies of The Penny Illustrated Paper, an
inexpensive pictorial publication produced from 1861 to 1913. We looked specifically at thefirst sixth months of 1886, a period in which Prime Minister Gladstone attempted to pass
the first Irish Home Rule Bill before resigning when he failed to do so. Searching the recordsfor ‘Gladstone’ as a keyword returns results (see Online Appendix A for more details) inwhich the Prime Minister’s speeches from the dispatch box are quoted verbatim (January
30, April 17, April 24) along with utterances from Irish Nationalist Parnell (April 17) and
Liberal Unionist Joseph Chamberlain (June 19). Separately, the paper carried information
regarding the composition of Gladstone’s cabinet (February 6), MP John Bright’s views on
the bill (March 27), and Gladstone’s subsequent ‘manifesto’ on the proposed fate of Ireland(June 19). The fact that newspapers relayed political debate was not lost on politicians of
the day: for example, commenting on the implications of a discussion regarding women’s
suffrage in 1873, radical MP John Bright opined from the backbenches that “The substanceof this debate will be carefully reported in the newspapers, the report will go to every town
and village in the United Kingdom, and to every English-speaking country under British
rule. . . ” (cited in Jenkins, 1996, 18).

Second, it is clear that members themselves were acutely aware that the expansion of the suffrage would bring less educated (if not necessarily illiterate) voters into the electorate: Robert
Lowe, leader of the ‘Adullamite’ Liberal MPs skeptical of the Second Reform Act noted thatthose who would be newly enfranchised exhibited “venality. . . ignorance . . . drunkeness” andwere in general “impulsive, unreflecting and violent people” (cited in Saunders, 2011, 206).
Among more sympathetic MPs, the debate was not over whether the pool of voters to
Available via library subscription to the Gale Digital Collection. Neuberg (1977, 224) notes that it hada circulation of around 200, 000 by 1885, while Martin (2006, 23) points out that it “targeted the working
classes and tended to cover the kind of information that interested them”.

12whom politicians must appeal would change, but rather the extent of those changes (see e.g.
McLean, 2001, 66–67 on the ‘rating’ required for enfranchisement). Third, there is evidence
that party leaders were aware of the need to appeal to these new voters, albeit in somewhat
limited ways that did not alienate other members of the electorate. Thus Disraeli—or atleast his Home Secretary Richard Cross—embarked on a series of union and labor reforms in
the 1870s (St John, 2010, 151–153) while Salisbury actively pursued the ‘respectable’ suburban but working class “villa vote” (see Shannon, 1996). On the Liberal side, the party madeearly, if perhaps ineffectual, attempts in some cities to “recruit candidates with workingclass appeal” prior to the 1868 election (Moore, 2006, 25) and the rise of “New Liberalism”
thereafter is a specific example of an ideology that sought to embrace new voters and theirconcerns (Sykes, 1997).

All told then, senior politicians on the government side of the House of Commons hadstrong reasons to adapt their policies and language in the aftermath of the Second Reform
Act in a way that was less true of their backbench colleagues in their own party and among
the opposition. We should thus expect that any change towards simpler speech was larger
in magnitude for ministers than it was for others. Assessing this claims requires that weinvestigate their speeches over time. It is to our data on this that we turn before explicating
our measurement strategy.

3

Data

Our data consists of speeches made in the House of Commons between 1832 and 1915. Thus,
the Second Reform Act of 1868 occurs approximately half way into our time series, allowing alarge window before and after in which to assess any effects on speech style. The speech data
See also Jennings (426 1962) on Chamberlain’s ‘Radical Program’ for the 1885 General Election.

13

is matched to individual MPs, which is then matched to various covariates including party ofelection, cabinet status, and competitiveness of constituency elections. These measures andthe data are described by Eggers and Spirling (2014a) (which draws on Craig (1989, 1974);
Cook and Keith (1975); Butler and Butler (1994)). For the data set in its original form,
there are 860, 192 speeches for 4233 MPs, with an average of 203 speeches per member. For
our analysis below, we restrict ourselves to members running for either the Conservative or
Liberal party in elections, excluding various idiosyncratic versions of those labels, along withnationalist parties and the (early) Labour party. What remains are 675, 997 speeches, from3613 members, for an average of 187 speeches per MP. We are confident that restricting ourdata is appropriate for at least two reasons: first, because only the Liberals or Conservatives
could plausibly form the cabinet during the period under study and thus these parties constitute the key actors for our work; second, our findings below are robust to including thoseother parties as part of the opposition. We make very few further ‘adjustments’ to our data
set. In particular, we impose no minimum length on speeches (empirically, the minimum
number of words is 1, the maximum is 11, 000, with a mean around 248) and remove only one
session from our analysis: the very short (just 129 speeches) first session after the indecisive
1892 general election, at which time Salisbury awaited a no confidence vote before resigning
as Prime Minister. In some cases, we have covariate cases missing for (multiple observationson) MPs, and we drop those cases from our regressions, giving N = 670091.

In time-series terms, our data is divided into parliamentary ‘sessions’ each of which lastapproximately one year and which collectively comprise ‘parliaments’ (which begin aftergeneral elections). In the period under study, different sessions within the same parliament
have different parties in cabinet because Victorian politicians did not always go to the country for a new popular mandate after their Prime Minister resigned or lost the confidenceof the House. An example of this would be the ascension of Disraeli (who followed Lord
14

Derby to the premiership) after Lord Russell’s Liberal government fell in 1866—without any
intervening election. Because ministers (then as now) could leave office at any time with nomore general consequence for the session itself, our measurement of who is a minister in any
given session is relatively inclusive. That is, the metric includes anyone who served at least
one day in the cabinet during that session.

Having described our data, our next task is to provide a metric for measuring, and comparing,the comprehensibility of speeches made in the House of Commons.

4

Methods and Measurement

Starting at least with Sherman’s (1893) “Objective Study of English Prose and Poetry”,
scholars of literature and education have been interested in the notion that texts could
be statistically analyzed and their “readability” measured. Although this key quantity ofinterest has been variously defined—depending in part on the relevant researcher’s motivation(e.g. Dale and Chall, 1949)—at its core, readability refers to the comprehensibility of atext; literally, the ease with which it may be understood by a reader with varying levels of
education. A number of metrics have been proposed for assessing comprehensibility (e.g.
Lively and Pressey, 1923; Dale and Chall, 1949; Gunning, 1952; McLaughlin, 1969) withthat of Flesch (1948) being the most famous and widely used (Klare, 1963). Flesch’s (1948)
formula, given in Equation (1) yields a score for any given body of text that is known as theFlesch Reading Ease (FRE) statistic. In the original application from which it was derived,
the value of the statistic was found to have lower bound of 0, and an upper bound of 100,though this need not be the case in other data sets. Though we will use the score directly
The formula results from a study undertaken by Flesch in which he regressed the average grade level ofschool children who could answer at least 75% of multiple choice questions regarding comprehension of texts
they read on a constant and the two bracketed variables in the equation. In that context, a score of 100
means that the document could be understood by a student with a fourth grade education and thus could15

in what follows, we note that educational researchers typically convert this output to a(minimum) number of years of US schooling—known as a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level—thata student would require to find a given document comprehensible (see Kincaid et al., 1975).

206.835 − 1.015

total number of words
total number of sentences− 84.6

total number of syllables
total number of words

(1)

Inspection of Equation (1) suggests that the Flesch score is not difficult to calculate using
modern processing programs, assuming some machine-readable version of the text exists.
As can readily be seen, for a fixed number of words in a document, increasing the numberof syllables of those words, and grouping the words into fewer sentences both increase thecomplexity of the text in question.

Guidelines for interpreting the statistic may be found in several sources (including Flesch,1949, 149–150); Cann, Goelzhauser and Johnson (2014, 663) give the following: “Texts with
FRE scores ranging from 0 to 30 are considered very difficult to read, 31 to 50 are difficult, 51 to 60 are fairly difficult, 61 to 70 are standard, 71 to 80 are fairly easy, 81 to 90
are easy, and 91 to 100 are very easy.” To anchor these categories conceptually, note that
Cann, Goelzhauser and Johnson (2014) place the average academic political science article
at around 33, on a par with judicial opinions, while the New York Times has a mean FRE of
about 48 and childrens’ books such as Peter Pan and The Wind in the Willows have FREscores approaching 80. Giving context for these scores outside of the school setting, Dalecki,
Lasorsa and Lewis (2009, 6) calculate that “85 percent of Americans today can read at the
50–60 reading ease level, 72 percent at the 30–50 level, and 28 percent at the lowest (0–30)
level”.
be described as “barely functionally literate” (Flesch, 1948, 225).
Indeed there are several online calculators for this task, and it is included as standard in some word
processing software. Here we use the implementation given by Rinker (2013) for the R statistical environment.

16

As suggested by the citations above, this paper joins a literature in social science thatmakes use of Flesch scores. It is also not the first piece to make the assumption that tools
designed originally for measuring ease of reading can be meaningfully applied to texts thatwere spoken. For example, Jansen (2011) considers the clarity of central bankers answers
to questions at legislative hearings. Closer to the subject matter of the current paper, Lim(2008) considers the evolution of rhetoric in Presidential speech-making since the foundingof the republic. As a practical matter of course, the most common method by which parliamentary speeches would come to the attention of voters at the time would be via written
reports in newspapers.

4.1

FRE Scores for Parliamentary Speeches

Applying the formula implied by Equation (1) to the parliamentary speeches for our study
requires some preliminary preprocessing decisions on how to deal with the texts. While we
do not stem the documents, or remove stop words, we do convert some parliamentary termsof art that contain period punctuation: thus, ‘Hon.’ becomes ‘Honorable’ , ‘Rt.’ becomes‘Right’, ‘Mr.’ becomes ‘Mister’ and so on. This allows more accurate calculation of thenumber of sentences in a speech, since it avoids miscounting periods. We then split eachspeech into sentences using the usual punctuation marks plus semi-colons and vertical bars,
which are used in the early periods of our data to break up long utterances. Finally, we
strip whitespace (other than single spaces), and drop speeches that contain no alphabetic
characters (these typically arise when members give answers as numbers).

We also drop some terms with periods, like ‘St.’
Subsequent inspection suggests this decision makes no difference to the relative distribution of speechscores, outside of some outliers for non-cabinet members. And, in any case, our main results are robust to
the removal of outlier speeches.

17

minimum-301.80first quartile
42.59

median
52.25

mean
52.63

third quartile
62.14

maximum
205.80std dev
19.94

2500000100000Frequency

−100
−300

FRE

100

Table 2: Summary of FRE statistics for speeches in our data.

−300−100 0100

Figure 1: Distribution of FRE statistics for parliamentary data: boxplot and histogram.
The x-axis for the later is the FRE statistic of the speech. Note that the bulk of the FRE
statistics are between 0 and 100.
Looking over the entire period, the distribution of FRE statistics for our speeches is given
in Table 2. We note that mean and median are both around 52, with a standard deviation
around 20. We note that the minimum (-301.80) and maximum (205.80) imply a range larger
than in the original Flesch (1948) study, although the boxplot (left) and histogram (right)
in Figure 1 suggest that such values are outliers: note that the bulk of the distribution is
between 0 and 100.

In Figure 2 we report the (by session) mean speech comprehensibility for cabinet (squarepoints) and non-cabinet (circular points) MPs over the period under study. We also include
smoothed loess lines to capture general trends. The main observation is that, somewherearound the 1860s, the average cabinet speech becomes more comprehensible than the averagenon-cabinet one, whereas prior to that time the means had been very similar. Immediately
then, we have some (albeit) crude evidence in favor of our hypothesis above.

18

60
54
46

48

50

52

FRE

56

58

cabinetnon−cabinet

1832_1 1837_4 1847_1 1852_4 1859_4 1868_2 1874_5 1880_6 1886_7 1895_5 1900_6

Figure 2: Flesch Readability Score (mean) over time, for both cabinet and non-cabinet MPs.
Solid lines are from loess regressions.

The source of these patterns is naturally of interest. We know from Equation (1) that
the FRE score for a given speech is increasing in two (non-constant) components: one pertaining to the average sentence length and one pertaining to the average number of syllables
per word. For our preliminary finding above—that cabinet speeches became relatively (andabsolutely) less complex after the Second Reform Act—we considered only the aggregate(i.e. combined) effect of changes to these quantities. To get a sense of what drives theunderlying patterns, consider Figure 3 where, for our historical period, we plot the (mean)
average number of sentences for cabinet and non-cabinet speeches and the (mean) average
number of syllables per word for the same.

An immediate observation from the figure is that, somewhere around 1868, the mean sentence length for ministers fell from around 27 words to around 21 words by the mid-1880s.
While there was also a decline for backbenchers, it was not nearly so precipitous. The minis-

19

30

mean sylls per word
1.51
1.53

mean sent length
22 24 26 28

1.49

20

cab
noncab
1832_1 1841_6 1857_3 1868_4 1880_6 1895_3 1906_4

cab
noncab
1832_1 1841_6 1857_3 1868_4 1880_6 1895_3 1906_4

Figure 3: (Mean) sentence length and (mean) syllables per word, cabinet vs non-cabinet.
terial decrease does not appear to only be a function of sentence length, however. Studying
the right panel, we see a decline in average syllables per cabinet word too. This recovers somewhat by the turn of the century, while the trend for the backbenchers is generally
upwards. All in all, the patterns here suggest that ministerial speech got simpler because
cabinet sentences got shorter, while backbencher words (almost simultaneously) had moresyllables. This latter fact adds some credibility to our underlying claim that non-cabinet
MPs became harder to understand in a relative sense, although we will return to the notionof possible ‘new roles’ for parliamentarians after our more formal results section.

Given the length of the period under study, it would be surprising if speeches had notchanged in ways other than their comprehensibility and composition. In fact, they becameon average shorter: cabinet and non-cabinet speeches had a mean length of around 500 words
in the immediate aftermath of the First Reform Act, and were reduced in length in a fairlysmooth and consistent fashion over time. By the turn of the 20th century, both cabinet
and non-cabinet speeches reach a low of around 150 words (on average). Figure 4 displaysthese trends clearly. A natural concern might be that any changes to comprehensibility ofspeeches (measured by the FRE statistic) are an artifact of this shortening. On inspection,
we doubt this is the case: the correlation between speech length and reading ease is very
weak, at around 0.04. This is true regardless of whether we include ‘outliers’ (as identified
20

in the boxplot of Figure 1) in the calculation. In any case though, we include speech length

cabinetnon−cabinet

100

300

500

700

as a variable in some of our regressions below.

1832_1

1837_4

1847_1

1852_4

1859_4

1868_2

1874_5

1880_6

1886_7

1895_5

1900_6

Figure 4: Average length of speeches for cabinet and non-cabinet MPs over time. The y-axis
is the (mean) number of words per speech.

4.2

Validation

An obvious concern about the use of Flesch scores is that though they are well validated
outside of this application, they do not measure linguistic complexity for our period. In Table 3 we a range of scores for speeches occurring in the first session of 1885. While the first
three speeches are made by non-cabinet members, the last two are utterances from ministers.
Though this is in no way a test of our general propositions above, we see that the ministers
here—who are responding to queries raised by others—tend to be ‘punchier’ and more pithyin their speech. Furthermore, one can well imagine that working class voters would find it
easier to follow the simpler speeches than the longer ones.

21

word
count
44

sentencecount1syllables

score

role

speech86-3.18

noncabinet

28

1

45

45.45

noncabinet

30

1

39

66.41

noncabinet

11

2

15

85.89

cabinet91

10103.70cabinetasked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Whether Her Majesty’s Government have arrived at
any practical decision with regard to the establishment of emigration bureaux for the purpose of promoting, as promised early in the Session, a systematic system of State-directed emigration?
Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House any
information as to when the Royal Commission on
the Depression of Trade is likely to report on thissubject?
said, he wished to know how many years ago thesebayonets were made, and whether the name of thefirm and the date of their manufacture were stamped
upon them?
I will consider that. I think there will be no objection.
That I cannot say till I have seen it.

Table 3: Samples of speeches, from the first session of 1885, with a variety of comprehensibility scores: from the least to the most easy to understand.
Another way to assess the validity of our approach is to consider the scores given to contemporaneous texts that are specifically not parliamentary speeches (and thus not in our data)
but are aimed at voters in general. To the extent that the relative scores given to those documents are in line with our priors regarding their intended audiences, we have evidence thatthe metric is a reasonable one. Here, we look at two members serving over approximately
the same period: Keir Hardie, a Labour MP (with intermittent service between 1892 and1915) and Arthur Balfour, a Conservative member (between 1874 and 1922). For Hardie,
we use the text of eight books that he wrote between 1905 and 1911 published primarily
by the (then) Independent Labour party, and presumably aimed at working class voters.
For Balfour, we use (seven) essays for mid-brow magazines and lectures given to various
The focus of our analysis below are Liberal and Conservative members and, consequently, Hardie is notin the parliamentary speech data. We make use of him here precisely because we know that as a Labour
member he wrote for an (almost) exclusively working class audience during this period, whereas a Liberal
member might well have been appealing more broadly in class terms, in keeping with that party’s supposed
electoral appeal at this time. Thus Hardie provides a purer validation test here.

22university audiences between 1882 and 1891, presumably aimed at a more middle class audience. For each of the works, we calculate the Flesch scores and report their distributionsin Figure 5. As can readily be seen, Balfour’s writings with a median score of around 46 areconsiderably more complex than Hardie’s with a median of approximately 61. Parametric

55
45

50

score

60

65

and non-parametric tests of means (p < 0.01) confirm this observed difference.

BalfourHardieFigure 5: Boxplot showing difference between complexity of works by Keir Hardie (Labour
party) and Arthur Balfour (Conservative party).

5

Results

We begin with our estimation of the session-by-session regressions. That is, for each time period in our data, we regress the comprehension scores for the speeches on the cabinet statusof the MP in question (a binary variable) with a series of controls—party, competitivenessof constituency and the word count of the utterance itself. Our estimated coefficients on
Bibliographical details of the texts can be found in Online Appendix B.
In passing, we note that Charles Dickens’ fiction of this period has a mean score of around 77, suggestingthat the politicians in question were writing and speaking in a considerably more complex way.
For each given session, we are estimating a regression of the form
FREi = α + β1 cabineti + γZ + i
where FREi is the FRE score of the ith speech, cabineti is the cabinet membership status of the MP making
the ith speech; Z refers to a set of control variables—party, competitiveness of seat and word count—for23

cabinet are displayed (with 95% confidence intervals) in Figure 6. The solid horizontal line
marks zero. Our first observation from the figure is that the point estimates begin below
zero, and around the 1860s rise into positive territory and stay there for the remaining time
periods in the data. In words, being a cabinet minister is initially associated with making
speeches that are (on average) more difficult to comprehend than those of other members;
subsequently, cabinet speeches are easier to understand. Obviously, in many cases, the confidence intervals cross the zero line, but a general pattern is apparent.

15
10

^
β5
0
−5
1832_1

1837_3

1841_61852_1

1857_3

1859_7

1868_4

1874_6

1880_6

1886_6

1895_3

1900_3

1906_4

Figure 6: Estimated β̂ on cabinet status in session-by-session linear regressions [with 95% confidence
intervals]. Solid horizontal line marks zero. Note the general rise in coefficients from below, to above zero,around 1868.

To clarify the timing of the change, we use the session-by-session coefficients on cabinet status and regress these on their session numbers (with the first session of our data being session‘1’, the second being session ‘2’ and so on) while simultaneously estimating the breakpoints
in this relationship in the sense of Bai and Perron (2003) (as implemented by Zeileis et al.
2002). Using standard defaults, we obtain one breakpoint as the optimally fitting modelwith that break dated at the first session of 1868—in line with our theory. We consider
which γ is the set of coefficients and i is an error term. Because members make multiple speeches persession, we cluster the standard errors at the MP level.
See Online Appendix C for the full model comparison table.

24the robustness of change point in more detail after introducing our ‘main’ regression results
below.

This prima facie evidence is helpful, and is in line with our main hypothesis. Nonetheless readers may reasonably object that it is inefficient and possibly misleading to break up
the data on a session-by-session basis, especially if subsequent structural break tests ignore
the estimation uncertainty in the coefficients—as they do here. A more philosophically appropriate test then is to combine all the sessions and assess the possibility of time-specificeffects directly. With that in mind, we now re-estimate the regression with the inclusion of
an interaction term involving the product of a member’s cabinet status and a dummy thattakes the value ‘1’ for any session after the 1868 election—the point at which we hypothesize the change occurred. We do this with and without the controls. The results of thoseregressions, with standard errors again clustered by MP, are presented in Table 4.
To clarify, the regression being estimated has as its dependent variable the FRE score of the ith speech
and may be written as:
FREi = α + β1 cabineti + β2 reformi + β3 (cabineti × reformi ) + γZ + i
where cabineti is the cabinet membership status of the MP in the ith observation, reformi is a dummy
pertaining to whether the MP is speaking before or after the 1868 election, and (cabineti × reformi ) is
simply the interaction of the two; Z refers to a possible set of control variables for which γ is the coefficientand i is an error term. Written this way, the regression may be interpreted as a ‘difference in differences’,in the sense that attention focusses on comparing the magnitude of change in cabinet behavior before andafter the reform with the (presumably smaller) change in non-cabinet behavior over the same period.
Note that we do not use MP-level fixed effects due to the fact that only 3% of our MPs ever change
roles: that is, the cabinet variable takes one value for almost all MPs at all times meaning that fitting fixed
effects would generally not allow one to estimate the effects of cabinet vs non-cabinet status.

25

Reform Act Interaction
51.3976∗∗∗(0.2176)−0.8189∗(0.4176)
0.7172∗(0.3371)5.3060∗∗∗(0.7195)

With controls

51.5920∗∗∗(0.5634)
Cabinet member−0.7803(0.4271)
Reform Act dummy
0.5172(0.3591)
Cabinet× Reform Act
5.2251∗∗∗(0.7172)
Liberal MP
0.4511(0.3785)
word count−0.0013∗∗∗(0.0001)
competitiveness0.0230(0.3705)
N
670091
670091
R2
0.00840.0103
adj. R2
0.00840.0103
Dependent variable is comprehensibility of speech. MP clustered standard errors in parentheses∗
p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01; ∗∗∗ p < .001
(Intercept)

Table 4: Table of estimates for regression of comprehensibility of speech on cabinet status andtime dummy (for Second Reform Act) and interaction between the two—with and without
controls.
For completeness, we begin with the version with the controls (second column). Notefirst that there is no statistical significance attached to the ‘Liberal MP’ variable: that is,
the party identification of the member does not seem to be systematically associated withcomplexity. The same goes for ‘competitiveness’ of constituency, which is a measure of theaverage number of candidates running in a seat at the general election (and has a meanof around 1.5 for our period). We observe that the coefficient on ‘word count’ (literally,
the number of words in the speech) is statistically significant, but negative: that is, longer
speeches are (on average) easier to comprehend than shorter ones. Before getting to themain variables of interest, we note that the two models have essentially identical fit statistics: the adjusted-R2 of the restricted model is 0.0084 while adding the extra variables on theright hand side pushes this only to 0.0103. We thus focus on the simpler version—without
26

controls—for interpretation purposes since those extra variables add little to the analysis(implying that our main finding below is reasonably robust).

Putting aside the uncertainty estimates for the moment, we see that the point predictions
are as we would expect given our hypothesis. A minister prior to the Second Reform Act
has a lower average comprehensibility (ŷ = 50.6) than one serving after that date (ŷ = 56.6),
and the difference is around six points on the FRE scale. By contrast, the difference for abackbencher between serving before (ŷ = 51.4) and after (ŷ = 52.1) is around 0.7 of a pointon the scale. Clearly, in both absolute and relative terms, cabinet members went througha larger positive shift in their linguistic behavior than their non-cabinet colleagues and theimplied difference in differences is around five points. To get a sense of the substantive effectof the reform, consider a hypothetical backbencher promoted to the cabinet in the first session of 1868. The coefficients imply that he would make his average speech ceteris paribus
around eight percent easier to understand (on the FRE scale) relative to his colleagues stillon the backbenches. This is non-trivial, corresponding with a change from around the 48th
to the 60th percentile in the score distribution (for speeches made after the 1868 election).

Returning to uncertainty estimates, in Figure 7 we provide an estimated marginal effectplot (taking into account the standard error clustering) and we see that our priors find support: while ministers—if anything—are slightly less comprehensible relative to backbenchers
prior to reform, they are clearly more understandable after.

27

4
2
0

Est marginal coef on Cabinet

beforeafter
Reform Act

Figure 7: Estimated marginal effect of cabinet membership on speech comprehensibility,
before and after the Second Reform Act.

5.1

Robustness: Timing and Data Quality

Above we showed that when looking session-by-session, the immediate period after the 1868
general election was a break point (indeed, the only break point) in the time series. We
conducted several further tests on our data—described in some detail in Online Appendix
C—to corroborate this claim and to rule out possible ‘pre-trends’ in the time series. First we
re-estimated our ‘main’ regression model based on data ‘local’ to the hypothesized change
point initially using five sessions before and after the first session of 1868, and then ten
sessions before and after. The central findings on the difference in the differences between
cabinet and non-cabinet MPs remains intact. Second, we estimated a simple regression of
FRE on cabinet status for all data prior to the first session of 1868: the results implied that,
if anything, cabinet speeches tended to be less comprehensible than non-cabinet speeches
prior to the Second Reform Act. Finally, we perform an explicit ‘placebo’ test by treating
the last session of the 1865 parliament (i.e. prior to the electoral reform) as a proposedchange date. The regression that resulted had a similar but lower adjusted-R2 than theoriginal model, thus leading us to conclude that it does not offer a more plausible period forany break in the data generating process that occurred.
28

A separate issue for our analysis is the fact that FRE scores are, in general, much morevariable for short speeches than long speeches. This is unfortunate from a statistical perspective because it is presumably the shorter speeches that contribute most to key differences
we observe between ministers and non-cabinet members, while simultaneously these are theobservations about which we are least certain in a sampling sense. With this in mind, we
conduct four further versions of our ‘main’ regression to verify that our conclusions regarding
the impact of the Second Reform Act are robust. In the first two, we limit ourselves to shortspeeches (fewer than one hundred words) and then long speeches (more than one hundred
words). In the third specification, we use only speeches that are not outliers. Finally, we
estimated a weighted regression where the weights are simply the length of the speeches. In
Online Appendix D, we report the results of these enquiries in more detail: it suffices here tonote that the implied difference in differences between ministers and non-ministers is robustin terms of the hypothesized direction.

5.2

Ruling out ‘new types’

Thus far, an implicit assumption for our work has been that the change to cabinet ministers’
utterances was (primarily) a product of individuals responding to new incentives in the electorate. An alternative hypothesis is that, in fact, the Second Reform Act introduced new‘types’ of individuals to the House of Commons with different latent features and that it thechanging make-up of the chamber that yields the results we saw above. There are at least
two ways to investigate this possibility, to which we now turn.

First, we consider all individuals who served in a cabinet position at least once after the
A speech’s length is an outlier if it is great than the upper quartile multiplied by 1.5 times the interquartile
range, or less than the lower quartile multiplied by 1.5 times the interquartile range.

291868 election: i.e. after the Second Reform Act took effect. Using a paired t-test withministerial office as the treatment, we compare their mean speech comprehensibility when in
the cabinet with their average when serving as a backbencher. The mean difference uncovered is (an increase of) 2.58 on average, which is statistically significant (p < 0.01). Since
this test keeps the individuals themselves constant, and combined with the fact that cabinet
ministers serving in this period are not disproportionately more likely to have been electedto parliament after 1868 relative to backbenchers they serve alongside, it provides strong circumstantial evidence that cabinet office (after 1868) had some effect regardless of the fixedcharacteristics of the MPs involved.

To put this finding on even surer footing, we now turn to a more systematic study of fixed
effects. In particular, restricting the data to cabinet members, we regress the session mean
comprehensibility score on a session dummy, and then on a session dummy plus fixed effects
for the MPs. The idea here is that if the regression with the MP fixed effects has different
coefficients for the time dummies, we may conclude that the latent features of individual
cabinet members are important for explaining the data we saw. In Figure 8 we present aplot of the coefficient on the session dummies for both regressions, with their 95% confidence
intervals. The broken lines represent the intervals for the fixed effects case, and the solidlines are those without member effects. In every case, these intervals overlap: that is, wehave no evidence that adding member fixed effects matters relative to the more general time
dynamic portrayed above.
To clarify, we potentially have confounding here if ministers in the post-1868 period are more likely thancontemporaneous backbenchers to have been elected in or after the 1868 election. This is not the case: ifanything, the reverse is true—67% of the cabinet ministers had their first session in parliament after the1868 election, compared with 93% of those not serving in the cabinet.
To verify that, in fact, joining and leaving the cabinet had the expected effect on a given (well known)
individual, we investigated the case of William Gladstone—who spent six decades in the House of Commons.
Our findings for Gladstone are generally in line with our theory, especially after the Second Reform Act. See
Online Appendix F for more details.

30

20
10

estimate

0−10

w/o fixed effs
fixed effs
1832_2

1841_6

1857_2

1868_2

1880_3

1892_3

1900_5sessionFigure 8: Comparing model with and without member fixed effects; y-axis is β̂ on the relevant
session dummy; x-axis denotes session. Vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

5.3

Ruling out ‘new roles’

Another plausible mechanism for the decreasing relative complexity of cabinet speeches—separate to any pressure from voters—is that ministers began to operate in a new legislativeenvironment incidental to the Second Reform Act, and that changes to the nature of ministerial speech are an artifact of these fresh organizational imperatives. It is certainly truethat the historical literature has discussed the nineteenth century as a period in which theCommons’ agenda altered. On the other hand, those events do not line up with 1868 as achange point: indeed, it the 1880s onwards that are typically emphasized. For example, until
the 1880s, questions to ministers came before all other business, but from 1881 questions to
the Prime Minister came at the end of the day (Jones, 1973). Furthermore, 1882 saw theadvent of a new Speaker power to ‘close’ debate in response to Irish obstructionism at that
31

1.0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

cabinetnon

1832_1

1837_3

1841_61852_1

1857_3

1859_7

1868_4

1874_6

1880_6

1886_6

1895_3

1900_3

1906_4

Figure 9: Proportion of all speeches in House of Commons made by cabinet and non-cabinet
members over time.
time (Dion, 1997, e.g.). By the turn of the century, government dominance of the agenda
was essentially in its modern form as a result of Balfour’s ‘railway timetable’ reforms (seediscussion in Chester and Bowring, 1962).

One way to assess possible changing roles for the cabinet—including more agenda control—isto analyze their relative share of speeches in the House of Commons over time. In Figure 9
we do just that. There the thick solid line is the proportion of speeches made by the cabinet; the broken line corresponds to those made by backbenchers. We would be concerned
if, around 1868, there was a sudden and permanent increase or decrease in these relative
quantities. This is not the case. Indeed, examining the time series for change points (inthe sense of Bai and Perron, 2003) reveals that if there is a break in the data generatingprocess, it occurred at the first session of 1885. Visual inspection of the figure suggests thesame finding: one can readily see that the cabinet enjoys more ‘air time’ after that session.
While this is heartening news for the originally proposed causal mechanism and its origins
in the Second Reform Act, it may nonetheless be the case that this late century uptick isdriving the main post-reform act result from our regressions. To check this, we exclude alldata from the first session of 1885 onwards and rerun our analysis for the shorter period.
Comfortingly, the results are essentially identical to those from our ‘main model’ above, andare displayed (with clustered standard errors) in Online Appendix E.
32

A second way to assess a possibly ‘new’ role for ministers immediately after 1868 is toconsider the order of speeches, in terms of the types of members making them, around thetime in question (see Eggers and Spirling, 2014a, for a similar approach). We estimate aseries of logistic regressions with each speaker’s (binary) cabinet role predicted by the previous speaker’s role. We then calculate the predicted probability that a minister speaks
after a non-minister for each session. If this probability changes in a ‘once-and-for-all’ way
after the Second Reform Act, this implies that ministers are fulfilling a different role: either
engaging somewhat more or somewhat less in floor debate than previously. Fortunately, thisis not what we find: in Figure 10 we report the predicted probabilities and their confidence
intervals for the period between the 1852 and 1880 general elections. Crucially, the sessions
before and after the 1868 election have very similar point estimates, with confidence intervals
that often overlap.

0.30

0.25

0.20

1852_1
1852_2
1852_3
1852_4
1852_5
1857_2
1857_3
1859_1
1859_2
1859_3
1859_4
1859_5
1859_6
1859_7
1865_1
1865_2
1865_3
1868_1
1868_2
1868_3
1868_4
1868_5
1874_1
1874_2
1874_3
1874_4
1874_5
1874_6
1874_70.15

Figure 10: Probability that a minister speaks immediately after a non-minister for the period
between the 1852 and 1880 general elections.

33

All told then, we find little evidence—historical or empirical—of contemporaneous changes
to ministerial roles that render as spurious our ‘main’ results above.

6

Discussion

Observers of modern democracies speak anxiously of the ‘dumbing down’ of political discourse (Lim, 2008). They fear that important yet subtle debates and distinctions are increasingly lost and that elected officials no longer lead opinion in a thoughtful way. A more
optimistic take on recent trends is to regard the simplification of political language as helpful(or perhaps vital) for the engagement of citizens with increasingly constrained time budgets
and interests outside of governance (e.g. Temple, 2006). Whatever the truth, as politicalscientists we have strong reasons to hope and to believe that politicians respond to votersas much as voters respond to their representatives. This is true in both theory (e.g. Meltzer
and Richard, 1981) and in empirical work (e.g. Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002) thatstresses the importance of congruence between the preference held by constituents and theactions taken by politicians. A natural consequence of this logic is that when new types ofcitizens join the electorate—in the modern period, typically via immigration (e.g. Tam Cho,
1999)—officeholders will compete for their support and alter their platforms in a way thatreflects this underlying change.

Here we studied this very broad phenomenon for an historically important period: the Victorian age of democratization in Britain. Unlike other studies that relied on shorter periods orcoarser data at higher levels of aggregation, our findings were unambiguous: cabinet members, after a doubling of the electoral roll in 1867, began to make parliamentary speecheswith different properties than before. In particular, entirely in fitting with predictions fromthe literature, their utterances became easier for the median member of the electorate to34

understand. This median voter was a man of the working class, with less access to education(and literacy) than had previously been the case in the electorate. As far as we know, ourpaper is the first to provide systematic evidence of a ‘reform effect’ on the language used inparliament. Crucially, we noted that this change was not due to new types of MPs—withdifferent priorities or experiences—entering the Commons after electoral reform. Indeed,
our auxiliary analysis suggested that it is the same members acting in new ways upon finding their way to the frontbench that is responsible for the decrease in complexity in speeches.

As is inevitable with observational data, it is no easy task to be confident about the causal
process that undergirds an empirical pattern. Certainly, our findings are not artifacts of superficial changes to speech records: for example, it is not simply that ministers make shorter
speeches over time which is then picked up (artificially) in our complexity metric. Furthermore, we have reason to believe that incentives to simplify presentation are strongest forcabinet members: in Westminster systems they are held accountable for government policy,
and their performance—especially on the economy—is the best predictor of future generalelection success. Unsurprisingly then, it is ministers who most sought to appeal to voters.
On the other hand, showing evidence consistent with a theory is not the same as showingthat the theory is correct. In particular, we do not know whether ministers consciously
altered their linguistic style and what, precisely, the impetus for this was: perhaps Prime
Ministers such as Disraeli and Gladstone, who seemed acutely aware of the new electoral
calculus (see, e.g., McLean, 2001, on Disraeli’s introduction of a new dimension to British
politics), took the lead and advised their colleagues to speak more simply (or promoted thosefrom the backbenches that could). No doubt there was a period of ministerial ‘learning’ as
the effects of the Reform Act in the constituencies became clearer over time. Alternatively,
the stimulus may be been less direct—perhaps a result of civil service professionalisationand the increasing role of the bureaucracy in serving and advising ministers in terms of their35

relationship with the House. Finally, it is possible that the relative decline in ministerial
complexity is a consequence of a more direct and aggressive ministerial questioning dynamic
as the opposition frontbenches employ interrogatives which are inevitably longer than the‘punchy’ answers they receive. Understanding the precise mechanism requires more finegrained data than we have here, though studying modern speech-writing and speech-givingby politicians may help us understand how they think about the audience to which theymust appeal.

Moving beyond the United Kingdom, similar methods might useful for studying, say, thedevelopment of the ‘Second Party System’ (see, e.g., Jenkins and Stewart, 2012) and ‘Jacksonian Democracy’ in the United States with its new emphasis on voters over political elites.
In particular, researchers might explore whether the latter increasingly spoke in ways comprehensible to the median elector at this time. Of course, the tone or complexity of speeches
is only one part of what it means for parliamentarians to be ‘responsive’ to voters. More
important for material welfare is policy. Here, the extent of linguistic complexity is likely
less helpful than a study of both topics of debate (as in Quinn et al., 2010), and of bills that
became acts (relative to those that didn’t). Again, textual methods can be helpful, and the
speeches and related data we have used provide the beginnings of a resource to get at such
quantities of interest. We leave such efforts for future work.
Richard Crossman, for example, argues that ministers dealing with their civil servants find themselves
constrained in terms of the plausible policy choices they may chose (and presumably then present to theelectorate) (see Crossman, 1975).
We do not mean that the simplification of language by cabinet members is a mere ‘artifact’ of the rising
importance of questions-and-answers: rather, the intended inference is that this new speech dynamic allowed
central actors to appeal to the new electorate and in so doing rewarded shortened, simplified, robust partisan
points over more long-winded, philosophical inquiries.
Including membership information for the Shadow Cabinet, which was not recorded during the Victorianperiod.

36

Acknowledgements
Thanks to Laura Bronner, John Marshall and Raphael Heuwieser for comments on an earlier draft. Audiences at the Harvard Political Economy Workshop and Toulouse Institutefor Advanced Study provided helpful suggestions. Three referees and the Editor provided
extremely valuable feedback on both content and style.

37

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Biographical Statement
Arthur Spirlng is an Associate Professor at New York University, New York, NY 10012.

46

Online Appendix A

Examples of Political Reportingfrom The Penny Illustrated Paper (1886)

Article Title/Headline

Date

Notes

MR. GLADSTONE’S DICTUM ON IRELAND

Jan 30quotes Gladstone in Commons

MR. GLADSTONE’S SPEECH.

Jan 30quotes Parnell in Commons

News in a Nutshell

Feb 6

reports (new) Gladstone Cabinet

March 27

reports John Bright’s views of

MR. BRIGHT AND MR. GLADSTONE’S PLAN.

Gladstone’s Ireland Bill
MR. GLADSTONE’S PLEA FOR IRELAND.

April 17quotes Gladstone in Commons

MR. PARNELL ON MR. GLADSTONE’S MEASURE.

April 17quotes Parnell in Commons

Our Illustrations.

April 17quotes Gladstone in Commons

MR. GLADSTONE’S NOBLE EFFORT TO ARREST

April 24

quotes Gladstone in Commons

June 19

quotes Chamberlain in Com-HEARTLESS EVICTION IN IRELAND.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN’S RIGID STAND AGAINST THE
GLADSTONE POLICY OF RECONCILIATION WITH

mons

IRELAND.
MR. GLADSTONE’S NEW MANIFESTO IN FAVOUR

June 19

quotes Gladstone ‘manifesto’

OF A REAL UNION BETWEEN BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

Online Appendix B

Validation: Texts from Hardie andBalfour

The Balfour texts are from Balfour (1893) and are as described in Table 5. The Hardie texts
are as described in Table 6.
47

Date

Title

Notes

1887

The Pleasures of Reading

Address at St Andrews University

1883

Berkeley’s Life and Letters

National Review

1887

Handel

Edinburgh Review

1882

Cobden and the Manchester School

Nineteenth Century

1885

Politics and Political Economy

National Review

1891

A Fragment on Progress

Address at Glasgow University

1888

The Religion of Humanity

Address at Church Congress, Manchester

Table 5: Texts by Arthur Balfour, used for validation of FRE statistics.

Date

Title

Notes

1909

My Confession of Faith in the Labour Alliance

Published by ILP

1905

Can a Man be a Christian on a Pound a week

Published by ILP

1910

Common Good

Published by National Labour Press

1908

ILP and All About It

Published by ILP

1909

India: Impressions and Suggestions

Published by Home Rule for India League

1905

John Bull and His Unemployed

Published by ILP

1911

Killing No MurderPublished by ILP

1910

Karl Marx: the man and his message

Published by ILP

Table 6: Texts by Keir Hardie, used for validation of FRE statistics. “ILP” refers to the
Independent Labour Party.

48

Online Appendix C

Robustness of 1868 as a Structural
Break

To begin, in Table 7 we report the results of the Bai and Perron (2003) test for structural
breaks in terms of the relative model fit (residual sum of squares and BIC) for different
numbers of breaks as performed on the session-by-session regression coefficients. Clearly,
one break is optimal. The optimal timing of that break is the first session of 1868.
number of breaks

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

RSS

181.15144.35128.89115.96107.56107.36111.36BIC

321.49315.32318.94323.21

330.11

343.31359.83

Table 7: Optimal number of breaks: residual sum of squares and BIC suggest 1 break.
We checked the robustness of the first session of 1868 as a break point in several ways.
First, we re-estimated our ‘main’ regression model based on data ‘local’ to the hypothesizedchange point. In particular, we re-run our regression using data only from the five sessions
before and after the first session of 1868, and then using data only from the 10 sessions
before and after the first session of 1868. The idea here is that our central findings should
be robust when we look only at the immediate vicinity of the Reform Act: if not, it suggeststhat there are ‘pre-trends’ occurring (well) prior to 1868 that dictate the relative difference
between cabinet and backbenchers; alternatively, non-robust results might suggest that it ischanges (well) after the franchise extension that are driving the findings.

The good news, from the perspective of the original findings, is that the central findingson the difference in the differences between cabinet and non-cabinet remains intact. We
give the coefficients and clustered standard errors in Table 8. Notice that the first column—
dealing with the five sessions before and after the reform—implies a change to the predicted
49

Table 8: ‘Main’ regression of FRE on variables, restricting data to five and ten sessions
around the first session of 1868.
Five Sessions Ten Sessions(Intercept)
51.17∗
51.60∗(0.26)(0.25)
Cabinet member
0.28
−0.01
(0.50)(0.37)∗
Reform Act dummy−1.73−1.89∗(0.29)(0.28)
Cabinet× Reform Act
1.38
2.46∗
(0.96)(0.84)
N
76736
149666MP clustered standard errors in parentheses∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

outcome for cabinet ministers of −0.35, while for other members it is −1.73. Although thesedifferences are not in the hypothesized direction in absolute terms (i.e. our aggregate findings above suggest complexity actually decreased over time), the relative differences are as
expected. Looking at the second column, which deals with the ten sessions pre and post
reform, we once again see the expected results: the implied change for the average cabinet
member is 0.57 points on the FRE scale, but for a backbencher it is −1.89 points.

We do further checks on our proposed change point. First, we estimate a simple regressionof FRE on cabinet status for all data prior to the first session of 1868. The coefficient on
ministerial status is negative (-0.82) with a clustered standard error (0.417) implying that, if
a speech score difference exists between those in the cabinet and those outside, it is negative
prior to the hypothesized break. This is again suggestive evidence that pre-trends are notof fundamental concern. Finally, we perform an explicit ‘placebo’ test by treating the lastsession of the 1865 parliament (i.e. prior to the electoral reform) as a proposed change date.
The regression that results has a similar but lower adjusted-R2 (0.0083) than the originalmodel (0.0084), thus leading us to conclude that it does not offer a more plausible period50

Figure 11: FRE scores (y-axis) as a function of speech length (x-axis): note the heteroscedasticity.
for any break in the data generating process that occurred.

Online Appendix D

Flesch Reading Ease scores as afunction of speech length: heteroscedasticity

To get a sense of the variability of the FRE as a function of speech length, consider Figure 11
There, for the entire corpus, we plot the lengths of the speeches (x-axis) and their calculated
FRE score (y-axis). Of note is the obviously larger variance of scores when speeches areshort (especially at less than 100 words or so), and the relatively consistent range of scoresas speeches get longer (in passing, note that the median speech in the corpus is around 69
words long, while the mean is around 248 words).

This heteroscedasticity implies that it is short speeches that provide much of the variance inthe data. From a sampling perspective unfortunately, these are precisely the speeches about
which we are least certain—in terms of their FRE scores. With this in mind, we conduct
four further regressions to verify that our conclusions regarding the impact of the Second
Reform Act are robust. In the first two, we limit ourselves to short speeches (fewer than51

Table 9: Robustness of FRE results as a function of document length
< 100
> 100
No outliers Weighted
53.53∗
49.16∗
51.73∗
50.10∗(0.20)(0.25)(0.19)(0.25)
Cabinet Member
1.47∗−2.74∗−1.25∗−2.41∗(0.39)(0.53)(0.35)(0.59)
Reform Act
0.64
−0.55
0.36
0.22
(0.37)(0.31)(0.26)(0.30)
Cabinet× Reform Act
4.10∗
3.11∗
3.35∗
2.55∗
(0.73)(0.69)(0.52)(0.84)
N
409662258696630946670216
Clustered standard errors in parentheses∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05
(Intercept)

Model
< 100
> 100
No outliers
Weighted

Cabinet before
54.99446.41550.48147.687

Cabinet after
59.73248.97654.19650.457

Others before
53.52849.15851.73050.102Others after
54.16648.61252.09650.321diff-in-diff
4.100
3.106
3.350
2.551

Table 10: Implied difference in differences from regressions in Table 9
one hundred words) and then long speeches (more than one hundred words). In the third
specification, we use only speeches that are not outliers. Finally, we estimated a weighted
regression where the weights are simply the length of the speeches. In each case, we use(MP) clustered standard errors. The results are reported in Table 9. In Table 10 we report
the implied difference in differences (via the ŷs from the regressions) for cabinet members
relative to non-cabinet MPs for the various models. Importantly, the predictions are similar
to our ‘main’ regression above (where the implied difference in differences was around 5
points): in particular, the Second Reform Act led to an increase in FRE scores for ministers
above and beyond any increase for backbenchers.
A speech’s length is an outlier if it is great than the upper quartile multiplied by 1.5 times the interquartile
range, or less than the lower quartile multiplied by 1.5 times the interquartile range.

52Online Appendix E

Second Reform Act and changes
to Cabinet Speech Roles

Table Online Appendix E is our ‘main’ regression run only on the data prior to the firstsession of 1885. Note that this version of the findings predicts speeches by the cabinet
increase on the FRE scale by around 3.45 points (on average), while speeches from othermembers decrease on the scale by around 0.09 points.
Pre-1885 data, only
51.40∗(0.04)
Cabinet Member−0.82∗(0.11)
Reform Act Dummy−0.09(0.07)
Cabinet× Reform Act
3.54∗(0.16)
N
334631
Standard errors in parentheses∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05
(Intercept)

Table 11: Regression of FRE reading ease on cabinet status, reform dummy and interaction
for data prior to the first session of 1885.

Online Appendix F

Gladstone’s Career in and out of
CabinetIn Figure 12 we report William Gladstone’s median FRE for every session he served during
his six decade career in the House of Commons. The solid lines and points denote periods inthe cabinet; the open points and broken lines denote his service outside the cabinet. Noticethat in line with our ‘main’ regression above, prior to the Second Reform Act (prior to thevertical line), Gladstone in cabinet is not obviously higher scoring on the FRE scale thanGladstone outside of ministerial office. Note however, that after the 1868 election the find53

ing we assert above generally holds for this MP. In particular, consider his move from Prime
Minister in the final session of the 1868 parliament to losing that office at the 1874 election:clearly, his median FRE score moves downwards, before recovering somewhat. Coming backto power in 1880 as Prime Minister, his median FRE score shifts upwards (as predicted) before dropping sharply when he resigns and the Liberal government collapses in the summerof 1886.

55

50

45

1832_1
1832_2
1835_1
1835_2
1835_3
1837_1
1837_2
1837_3
1837_4
1841_1
1841_2
1841_3
1841_4
1841_51841_61841_7
1847_1
1847_2
1847_3
1847_4
1847_51852_1
1852_2
1852_3
1852_4
1852_5
1857_1
1857_2
1857_3
1859_1
1859_2
1859_3
1859_4
1859_5
1859_6
1859_7
1865_1
1865_2
1865_3
1868_1
1868_2
1868_3
1868_4
1868_5
1874_1
1874_2
1874_3
1874_4
1874_5
1874_6
1874_7
1880_1
1880_2
1880_3
1880_4
1880_5
1880_6
1885_1
1886_1
1886_2
1886_3
1886_4
1886_5
1886_6
1886_7
1892_2
1892_4cab
noncabFigure 12: William Gladstone’s (median) FRE for speeches made as backbencher and cabinet
minister. Solid vertical line denotes session immediately after the 1868 General Election.
A second implication of our theory is that opposition leaders—such as Gladstone in the 1870s
and late 1880s—ought to seek to speak in simpler ways than their backbenchers after theSecond Reform Act. With this in mind, Figure 13 plot Gladstone’s FRE scores over timeagain with the solid line demarcating his cabinet service and the broken line representing his
non-cabinet periods. This time, a gray line has been added to demarcate the median FRE of
Liberal backbenchers serving at the same time. Note here the sample differs to that used forthe plot above insofar here we restrict speeches to 200 words or fewer here simply to ensure
Gladstone and his colleagues are directly comparable: he tended to make unusually longspeeches. The main point is that, when Gladstone is the leader of the opposition after heloses the 1874 election to Disraeli, it can be readily seen that his median FRE score (for this54

sample) soars above and beyond the median Liberal. And, indeed, this pattern continues forsome time afterwards. This is exactly in keeping with our expectations about the opposition
frontbench.
80

Gladstone: cab
Gladstone: noncab
noncab70
60

1832_1
1832_2
1835_1
1835_2
1835_3
1837_1
1837_2
1837_3
1837_4
1841_1
1841_2
1841_3
1841_4
1841_5
1847_1
1847_2
1847_3
1847_4
1847_51852_1
1852_2
1852_3
1852_4
1852_5
1857_1
1857_2
1857_3
1859_1
1859_2
1859_3
1859_4
1859_5
1859_6
1859_7
1865_1
1865_2
1865_3
1868_1
1868_2
1868_3
1868_4
1868_5
1874_1
1874_2
1874_3
1874_4
1874_5
1874_6
1874_7
1880_1
1880_2
1880_3
1880_4
1880_5
1880_6
1885_1
1886_1
1886_2
1886_3
1886_4
1886_5
1886_6
1886_7
1892_2
1892_450

Figure 13: Gladstone’s median FRE score in cabinet (unbroken black line) and out (brokenline), relative to his median backbencher (unbroken gray line). Data restricted to speechesof 200 words or less.

55