INTERNATIONAL
POLITICSANDTHE SEARCH
FOR

PEACE

KÔSAKA Masataka
Foreword/Editorial Supervision

TADOKORO Masayuki
Translated by Carl FreireINTERNATIONAL
POLITICSANDTHE SEARCH
FOR

PEACE

INTERNATIONAL
POLITICSANDTHE SEARCH
FOR

PEACE

KÔSAKA Masataka
Foreword/Editorial Supervision

TADOKORO Masayuki
Translated by Carl Freire

Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for CultureNote on the translation
The original Japanese version of the present work was published as a shinsho volume, an
inexpensive paperback aimed at a general readership. Most books of this sort are publishedwithout citations and only minimal bibliographies. The translation team—project supervisor (and student of Professor Kōsaka) Professor Emeritus Tadokoro Masayuki of Keio
University, translator Carl Freire, and translation checker Emily Shibata-Satō—madeevery effort to find any existing English versions of the passages cited by Professor Kōsaka.
The endnotes that resulted from this effort are entirely new to this translation. This bookfollows the Hepburn system of romanization, with long vowels indicated by macrons. The
tradition of placing the family name first has been followed for Japanese names.

International Politics and the Search for Peace
Kōsaka Masataka. Foreword and editorial supervision by Tadokoro Masayuki.
Translated by Carl Freire.
Published by
Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture (JPIC)
2-2-30 Kanda-Jinbocho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0051, JapanFirst English edition: March 2023
© 1966, 2017 Inoue Masanobu
English translation © 2023 Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture
Foreword © 2023 Tadokoro Masayuki
This work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives Licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits copying andredistribution in the original format for non-commercial purposes, provided the original
work is properly cited.
For details, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
This book is a translation of Kokusai seiji: Kyōfu to kibō Kaihan (Chūōkōron Shinsha,2017), the revised edition of the original published in 1966.
English publishing rights arranged with Inoue Masanobu.
Book design: Miki Kazuhiko, Ampersand Works
Printed in Japan
hardcover ISBN 978-4-86658-066-1
ebook (PDF) ISBN 978-4-86658-095-1
https://www.jpicinternational.com/

Contents
Foreword 6
Preface 11
INTRODUCTION: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics ................ 15

I. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power 16
II. The Three Levels of International Politics 25
CHAPTER 1 ARMS AND PEACE ............................................................................................. 33

I. The Balance of Power 34
II. Disarmament 48
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament 62
CHAPTER 2 ECONOMIC EXCHANGES AND PEACE ............................................ 85

I. Economics and Power Politics 86
II. Separating Power Politics and Economic Exchange 99
III. Egoism and Mutual Interests 112
CHAPTER 3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE .................127

I. The Challenge of Enforcement 128
II. The Power of Public Opinion 144
III. The Significance of the United Nations 157
CONCLUSION: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Order ........................... 181

I. International Society and Domestic Regimes 182
II. Coping with Reality 195
Notes 206
Bibliography 210
About the Author, Editorial Supervisor, and Translator 215

Foreword

When Kōsaka Masataka published this volume, he was still only a
32-year-old associate professor at Kyoto University. Yet, he had alreadybecome widely known as a member of a new generation of public
intellectuals. An article he had written four years prior titled “Genjitsushugi-sha no heiwaron” (A Realist’s View on Peace) had attracted
much public notice. In it, he strongly criticized the argument forunarmed neutrality advocated by a prominent idealist author, not somuch for its utopianism as for its dogmatic intellectual attitude, which
did not allow for a flexible dialogue between means and goals. For
more than three decades thereafter, Kōsaka remained actively engaged
as a leading thinker in the heated debates over contemporary Japanese
foreign policy issues until his rather premature death in 1996.
For many readers of this volume today, the Japanese intellectual
mood of the 1960s must be hard to imagine. After the devastating
defeat in World War II and the US Occupation that followed, politics
in postwar Japan were the purview of conservatives but academic andjournalistic circles were dominated by Marxists and progressive idealists. Although the two groups had different ideological foundations,they shared in common a strong objection to a Japanese postwar foreign policy that was based on an alliance with the US and accompanied by moderate rearmament.
Readers of this English translation may find it helpful to consider
the parallels with the British intellectual mood after World War I.
6

Traumatized by the destructiveness of World War I, many British intellectuals who were socialized and educated in its aftermath sought alternatives to the traditional mode of conducting foreign policy based on
the search for a balance of power. One way was Marxism, which gave aradical blueprint for achieving ultimate peace through communist revolution. This attracted many elite intellectuals of the day. During theinterwar years, some would even go on to participate in the international communist movement by actively spying for Moscow, a tendency
that would reach its apotheosis during World War II with the infamous
Cambridge Five. The alternative way to escape power politics-based
foreign policy was progressive idealism, which E. H. Carr later labeled
utopianism. This replaced concern for the balance of power with a reliance on rational projects such as the League of Nations, internationallaw, and disarmament as the means for achieving lasting peace. In interwar Britain, this thinking would even lead the Oxford Union debating society to famously renounce military action by declaring it would“under no circumstances fight for its King and Country.”
In post–World War II Japan, progressive idealism and revolutionary Marxism all the more readily found common cause because of the
fresh memories of oppressive militarism followed by a catastrophic
war, spurred further by the postwar presence of US military bases thatJapan now had to host as a US ally. It was within this intellectual topology that the author of this book was widely labeled a “hawk,” a “rightwinger,” or even a “reactionary.” It is true that he dared to describe
himself a “realist,” a largely unpopular label in postwar Japan. Still, in
reading this book, some may wonder if the author really was a realist.
It is true that he never dismissed the importance of power or the role ofmilitary forces. But he also pays careful attention to the role of international institutions for the rational pursuit of interests. He even speaks
7
Forewordof norms and how they are created. It is obvious that his realism is
not one that seeks to explain a complicated world through some parsimonious theoretical model that reduces international politics to power
struggles. Rather, his realism lies in his appreciation of political prudence based on a recognition of the limitedness of human nature bothin terms of intellectual and moral capability. While he values political
wisdom based on a healthy skepticism, he also rejects cynical attitude
that says one simply has to skillfully work one’s way through the meandering trail that is power politics.
Although it is always difficult to translate nuances of the originaltext into a foreign language, it must be clear to readers that Kōsaka’s
approach is very far from “scientific” or even “academic.” In fact, healways preferred accessible and informal ways of expressing his views
over the use of technical jargon. This preference was particularly
noticeable in his spoken Japanese. Speaking in a thick Kyoto accent,he offered sharp observations that were always presented in a plain language that was rich in nuance and humor. This intellectual style should
be discernible in this volume as well. His approach was highly eclectic
rather than theory-based. His insights were derived mainly from history and works by classical European political thinkers. This approachremained the same throughout his professional career. Despite his fluency in English and his varied international experiences including two
years spent doing research at Harvard from 1960–1962, he was largely
indifferent to the new theories about international relations that had
been developed in North America. Rather than framing his arguments
based on whatever abstract and formal theories were then current, he
preferred instead to read and write about history while still actively
commenting on the heated issues of the day.
It is also interesting to note that this book has been an exceptional
8
Foreword

long-seller in Japan, having first been published in 1966 and subsequently in 2017 in a revised edition. To date about 174,000 copies
have been produced across 56 different print runs. It is now widely
regarded as a classic in its field. This suggests that, despite Kōsaka’s
unpopularity among the Japanese intelligentsia during a time of sharp
ideological confrontation in postwar Japan, his position still had solid
supporters not only in the small foreign policy community but also
more broadly in Japanese society. As the influence of Marxism andprogressivism gradually waned, his works have steadily become more
widely accepted in what turned out to be his final years.
Kōsaka’s situation is somewhat analogous to that of RaymondAron’s in French intellectual circles. Although the French author
enjoyed a distinct reputation, he was no match for Jean-Paul Sartre interms of popularity among French intellectuals in the Quartier Latin.
It was only toward the end of Aron’s life that his works became widely
accepted, and it was only after his death and the end of the Cold War
that his intellectual authority became firmly established.
Is this work that you hold in your hands, written more than 60
years ago by a young Japanese thinker of international politics, still relevant today? Many things have happened since then. The end of theCold War. Globalization. The emergence of US unipolarity. The “Waron Terror.” And, above all, the revival of Great Power confrontations,
as illustrated by China’s aggressive behavior and Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. It is now abundantly clear that the rose-tinted post–Cold
War era of Western triumphalism is over and liberal democracies now
must face up to certain stark geopolitical realities that give us a feelingof déjà vu.
But if the message of this book still has any meaning, it is not
because the geopolitical environment has reverted to what seems to
9Foreword

be another Cold War. Rather, it is because the tragic reality of the conditions in which humans live is unchanged. Namely, we humans, allcoping with immensely different political, economic, and social conditions, still have to live together on this small planet despite an absenceof the shared basic norms and institutions that would ensure our coexisting peacefully with decency and dignity.
War may be an incurable disease and eternal peace may be an impossible dream, but human beings must continue making efforts to solvethese conundrums just the same. Kōsaka Masataka devoted his entire
professional career to fighting against dogmatism of all types, whether
it be revolutionary Marxism, utopian idealism, or ultra-nationalism.
He chose to close this book by bringing up Chekhov’s story about aphysician attempting to treat an incurable patient. Summing up thelesson for international politics that he drew from that story, he wrote,“Although we cannot help but be skeptical, we must not despair.” It is
his challenge to everyone, and one that we must still meet today.
Tadokoro Masayuki
September 2022

10
ForewordPreface

Writing involves forming a clear position and developing a commitment to that position. I felt this to be particularly true when I was
writing this book.
In the past, I wrote on my thoughts concerning specific issues inJapan’s foreign and security policies. Of course, these thoughts weredeveloped from my own basic way of thinking, which then became
firm convictions through discussions with others. It would be fair tosay that my thoughts on international politics have been shaped bythat process. Still, as I once again thought about international politics
in general while reconfirming basic points I had made earlier, it mademe think more deeply about points that had been left vague. Since I
ordinarily tend not to think in conceptual terms, that was a demanding process, but I have learned a lot from it.
For example, it is possible to lay out the pros and cons of possessing
a military force in given situations without necessarily having to lay
out one’s own fundamental attitude towards it, because one can stillcomment about a current event by saying what one thinks is happening and what the results will be in a given situation. Observers havelong employed the logic that “current conditions demand that we use
armaments” and “military forces are a necessary evil.” In contrast, byspecifying our basic principles on peace and the use of military force,
we will be compelled to not make excuses that are dependent on circumstances and instead be forced to clearly state our own position that11

should be applicable in any situation.
The reader will discover that this book does not advocate any specific measures as a credible pathway to peace. Instead, it argues that nosuch thing exists. This does not change the fact that in this book I havemade my own positions clear. Indeed, I take up and explore several
specific measures for achieving peace. I have reached the conclusionthat all of them are, in the end, inadequate, and that we should treat
each of them with strong reservations rather than simply praise them.
When we talk about peace, we seem to think about it in the
abstract. We pin our hopes on this abstract peace, and contrast thatpeace with our fears of the real world. Peace, however, does not exist in
the abstract. Every instance of peace has required conditions attached
to it. This places us in a difficult situation. But we have a duty to face
up to the difficulties.
As I was writing this book, I reflected on the studies and debates I
have joined, and what I have tried to say each time. These reflections
have provided the framework for this book, but they have also highlighted certain inadequacies, which I have tried to correct.
This process also made me realize—much to my delight—that myresearch and ideas have been built upon certain unwavering principles,and I owe a debt of intellectual influences to many people. It is mypleasure to acknowledge them here. First, I am indebted to Hagihara
Nobutoshi, Nagai Yōnosuke, and Tominaga Ken’ichi, who all havedone so much for me through our many discussions in recent years. In
particular, Mr. Hagihara taught me how deeply confused Japanese politicians were after World War I. Also, while writing this book I gleaned
numerous ideas from actual examples of European diplomacy, and I
need to express my deep gratitude to Taoka Ryōichi, who repeatedly
advised me on the importance of research on European diplomatic
12
Prefacehistory ever since I finished my undergraduate studies. I am alsoindebted to Inoki Masamichi for developing my ability to look at historical sources from a variety of angles—including the angle of confirming the authenticity of the history that the materials portray—andto engage in free thoughts about those materials.
The list of people to whom I owe thanks is endless; it is one that
I could even take back to my childhood. For example, I have been
blessed by having had exceptional teachers from elementary school
through senior high school. And I owe much to my father, Kōsaka
Masaaki. Things he told me made me see Immanuel Kant as difficult,and stirred my interest in Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I believe that thetastes I developed then remain with me today.
Finally, the fact that I had the chance to meet with George F. Kennan and have a friendly chat with him about Anton Chekhov is due
to an invitation I received from Matsumoto Shigeharu, and I wish to
express my thanks to him as well.
Kōsaka Masataka
August 196613
PrefaceINTRODUCTION
Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

civilization cannot exist“[R] eal
in the absence of a certain
play-element, for civilization presupposes
limitation and mastery of the self, theability not to confuse its own tendencies
with the ultimate and highest goal, but tounderstand that it is enclosed within certain bounds freely accepted. Civilization
will, in a sense, always be played according to certain rules, and true civilization
will always demand fair play.” Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the PlayElement in Culture, 19381

15
I. The Transformation of the Struggle for PowerI. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power“Complex Mysteries”“Complex mysteries” (fukuzatsu kaiki)—with this well-rememberedphrase, then-prime minister Hiranuma Kiichirō and his cabinet
resigned at the end of August 1939, following the news that Germany
and the Soviet Union had entered into a Non-Aggression Pact (commonly known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). The fact that Germany, which with its strongly anti-communist ideology had served as
the fortress protecting Europe from communism and had concluded
the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan—now formed this alliance with
its former arch enemy, threw both Japan’s government and its people,
neither of which were capable of understanding the world in terms of
power politics, into a state of complete confusion.
At the risk of overstatement, the failure of Japan’s prewar diplomacy
manifests itself in the particular turn of phrase: “complex mysteries.” It
is a matter of course for international politics to comprise a bundle ofcomplex mysteries. This is not particularly surprising, and it certainly
would not amount to something that, for example, constitutes legitimate grounds for a cabinet to resign.
At that time, however, nearly every Japanese was baffled by the “complex mysteries” of international politics and had no idea what Japan asa nation should do. Consequently, the Japanese government could notdevise an adequate response to cope with the vicissitudes of international
politics of that time. After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was concluded,
16
Introduction: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

the Japanese government initially made a knee-jerk attempt to approach
Great Britain and the United States. However, this fell through in theface of a chilly response from the United States. Then in the wake ofGermany’s eye-opening victories in Europe, Japan vacillated and again
sought to strengthen bilateral ties with Germany. Just one year after Berlin and Moscow launched their pact, Japan and Italy joined with Germany in signing the Tripartite Pact to create the Axis Powers.
Thus, the fact is that Japan, without any firm intentions one way
or the other, had been swept up in developments without fully understanding what was happening, and this is one of major reasons why it
stumbled into war.
Of course, the causes of the Pacific War, like those of any war,should not be oversimplified. As many scholars have pointed out,
there is no doubt that the chief reason why Japan led itself into war
is because it was unable to keep in check the two forces driving thenation in that direction: the distinctive character of Japan’s military;
and its social system, which made it unclear where ultimate responsibility lay. Nonetheless, it is also true that developments in international politics prior to World War II were highly complex, and the
responsibility for engaging in war is not limited to the Japanese leaders
who were mistaken in their forecasts.
Even Josef Stalin himself, so proficient a schemer, mistakenly
thought that Adolf Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union. But thefact is that when it came to deception, Hitler was a real genius. The
dramatic changes then occurring throughout the world were whatmade such deceptions possible. Therefore, we should first acknowledge just how difficult it was to weather those changes.
Also, we would be wrong to think that the people who spoke about“complex mysteries” were simple and ignorant. That turn of phrase has
17
I. The Transformation of the Struggle for Powerthe flavor of a graybeard worldliness that deals with failure without
assigning blame to any of the parties involved. Furthermore, turning
to domestic power politics, “complex mysteries” presented Japanesepoliticians with a convenient opportunity to take advantage of how
baffled people were by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and use thatsituation to make changes in domestic politics. For better or worse,
Japanese politicians certainly didn’t take a back seat to anyone when it
came to political plotting. However, the undeniable fact is that Japan’s
politicians, whose approach to domestic politics is very much of apower-politics type, were incapable of adapting to that type of politics
in the international arena.
Peculiar Perceptions of International Politics
This discrepancy is due to the difference in the assumptions that Japanese make when observing domestic politics in contrast to international politics. When people look at the world, they do not do so froma blank slate. They do not deal with issues free from their preconceived
attitudes. People take notice of certain facts, and have assumptions
that influence how they decide what those facts mean. Present realities
are seen through the lenses of such assumptions.
However, people’s assumptions regarding domestic politics andinternational politics clearly differ. They naturally expect the complex
power struggles that unfold in domestic politics. They do not unpackage these assumptions even when they talk about law and justice.
However, Japanese tend to see international politics through the lenses
of assumptions that are simpler and more abstract. Naturally, such
simpler assumptions get undercut by how international politics actually unfold. And as international politics develop people get confusedand cannot adapt to what happens. “Complex mysteries” is indeed the18
Introduction: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

archetypical verbal description of this situation. International politics
usually is regarded as a complex mystery. The reason why that is thecase is because the people who observe such politics do so based on
simplistic assumptions. The failure of prewar Japanese diplomacy wasrooted in the gap between Japanese assumptions about international
politics and the realities of how such politics actually played out.
As observers have often noted, no such gap existed during the Meiji
period (1867–1912). In those days, Japanese politicians acted basedon an acute awareness of power politics in international society. Thisis how a small country like Japan was able to survive the vicissitudesof power politics from the end of the nineteenth century through thestart of the twentieth century.
That said, merely praising Meiji-period politicians and censuring
as mediocre those who immediately followed them does not enable
us to understand either the tragedy of the Pacific War or the difficulties of international politics. The changes that caused the difficulty
occurred in international politics, not in the attitudes or behavior ofJapanese politicians.
The Transformation of International Politics
The nature of international politics clearly was transformed afterWorld War I. Put simply, following that conflict, states began to discuss the problems of international politics in terms of “peace.”
When Japan joined international society in the mid-nineteenth
century, naked and brazen power politics was the norm and it was so
up until World War I. Each state tried to pursue its national interest by
skillfully balancing powers. Wars were legitimate means of foreign policy. Major powers agreed on spheres of influence over, and at the expenseof, small nations in the name of maintaining the balance of power.
19
I. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power

It is not correct to assume that international politics at the time
was merely an arena without any order, ruled only by violence. Nakae
Chōmin, in his famous work Sansuijin keirin mondō (A Discourse by
Three Drunkards on Government), criticized such notions as “overthinking” (karyo). While international politics is, at its core, power
politics (that is to say, a struggle for power), the struggle takes place
under certain rules and within a certain framework. However, it is alsoa fact that international politics in the pre–World War I period took as
their basic principles considerations of power and national interests.
In contrast, the Soviet Union and the United States—the two
exemplars of the “new diplomacy” of the post–World War I period—
applied different concepts and principles to their thinking about
international politics and decisions about their behavior. Although
Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson were the political leaders
responsible for their respective countries, both clearly rejected power
politics. Both called out to the general public in ideological language.
Moreover, what they were saying was not mere propaganda. This wasvery confusing for those who had lived through the era when power
politics were being pursued so nakedly.
Perhaps the diary of Privy Council member Itō Miyoji, publishedas Suiusō nikki (Diary of the Green-rain Villa), can give us a glimpse of
how confusing the American “new diplomacy” was for Japanese politicians. The members of the Japanese government’s ad hoc Advisory
Council on Foreign Affairs (Rinji Gaikō Chōsa-kai, commonly known
as the Gaikō Chōsa-kai), established in 1917 to deal with the emerging situation in international politics after World War I, were unable
to get an adequate grasp of this new international situation, although
they did recognize that US diplomacy was disrupting the conventional
pattern of international politics. An example of this bewilderment can
20
Introduction: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

be seen in Itō’s remarks in regard to the Siberian Intervention, namely,
Japan’s part in the joint intervention by the Allied Powers into the Russian Civil War after the revolution.
The fact is that there are fundamental differences in thinking
between Japan and the United States. [emphasis in the original]
Therefore, it is of no surprise that there are differences in our
respective attitudes. That said, these differences in thinking do
not exist solely between Japan and the United States. They also
exist between the United States and the Allied Powers. A shortlist would be:First, the United States is single-mindedly obsessed by thepossibility of hurting Russian national sentiments.
Second, due to that concern over Russian sentiments, Americans claim they cannot afford to devote any time to considering
what is at stake in terms of their own national interests. (Fornow, we will set aside the question of what their true intentions
are here.)Third, based on that attitude, the United States skillfully
avoids labeling their dispatch of troops on Vladivostok as an“intervention,” even though it is clearly an intervention of a sort.
However, the question was exactly how Japan was to cope with the
new conditions of international politics. For example, people suchas Shidehara Kijūrō, the noted early-twentieth century diplomat andlater the prime minister of Japan, saw this new diplomacy on thepart of the United States to be the diplomacy of peace and naively
supported American initiatives as the basic guideline for Japanese
foreign policy. But Shidehara did not fully realize that even though
21
I. The Transformation of the Struggle for Powerinternational politics was being discussed in terms of peace, this did
not mean that power politics had come to an end. Also, he did not pay
sufficient attention to the ideological implications of peace diplomacy.
Conversely, there were also those who tried to deal with this change
in international politics as though it was no change from the power
politics of the earlier age. As Itō Miyoji said, whatever one may call it,intervention is intervention. By no means was this an inappropriate
way of looking at the situation. For military strength, after all, is theultimate tool of international politics. However, the observers wound
up ignoring the change in how that power was used.
Therefore, Japanese views of international politics split into two
extreme schools of thought, with one group talking about peace andthe other continuing to engage in power struggles.
Moreover, the Russian Revolution introduced an ideological element that obscured the distinction between international and domestic politics. Fundamentally, the Soviet Union had an ideology thatcalled for solidarity among the workers of the world. At the same time,
it positioned itself as the motherland of that ideology. This posed an
extremely difficult problem in terms of the relationship between how
other countries dealt with the Soviet Union as an independent stateand how they dealt with the expansion of communism. Some tried todeal with the Soviet Union as a sovereign state, and accordingly treated
it as a power in international politics, while others attempted to deal
with it essentially as the proponent of an ideological movement. Japanese politicians saw communism as something that itself was inseparable from the Soviet Union. Thus, Japanese tended to attribute any
Soviet moves to its ideology. This assumption was greatly shaken by
the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact.

22
Introduction: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

Where the Problem Lies
Although the basic conditions of the world changed considerably afterWorld War I due to a strong pacifist sentiment and the rise of communist ideology, neither the Japanese people nor politicians possessed
any intellectual framework that allowed them to correctly understandinternational politics. This divided Japanese national opinion and led
to the coining of the phrase “complex mysteries” (fukuzatsu kaiki). Perhaps this shortcoming continues to exist even today. At the very least,
the new circumstances of international politics that emerged afterWorld War I still persist. Are we intellectually better prepared to understand international politics today? Is it possible that we are repeating
the same mistakes by trying to interpret international politics throughsome simple schema, or by giving up on trying to understand international politics and merely talking about its “complex mysteries?”
I become apprehensive when I see issues such as power politics,
peace movements, and ideology being discussed as if they were completely unrelated. People seem to think that aspirations toward peace
have no connection with power politics. Furthermore, most people
seem to think that ideology and peace movements are different matters
altogether. However, the desires for peace that exist today are ideologically colored to some degree and are supported by one power or another.
This is because the aspirations for peace and one or another ideological worldview both aim toward achieving a certain kind of international order. The peace diplomacy of the United States is colored by its
specific ideology. The reason communist ideology is attractive to people
is related to the fact that it offers one possible path toward peace. Bothsets of aspirations for peace are rooted in their respective ideologies.
Until World War I, diplomats did not seek a universal order, but weresatisfied with an incomplete international order provided by a balance
23
I. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power

of power. However, for various reasons, after that war they came towant a more firmly established order.
Still, one should expect that any order would be underpinned bya specific value system (ideology) and by specific powers. That is why
power struggles arise in the quest for order.
Of course these new struggles differ from traditional ones. In conducting foreign policy, no country can ignore its own beliefs, which
limit the scope of its actions. The current realities of international politics are not consistent with the nineteenth-century worldview that
accepted the naked conduct of power politics. However, this does notmean that nations now eschew power politics in their practice of international politics. Power struggles take place in the form of questioning
what sort of peace is being sought.
Accordingly, regardless of the subjective intent of the person raising such questions, talking about peace is inevitably connected to thestruggle for power. What we can say is that our understanding of present-day international politics begins and ends with our understandingof its complexity.

24
Introduction: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

II. The Three Levels of International Politics

The Good Egg/Bad Egg Theory
The question of peace has always been perceived in an overly simplisticmanner. Perhaps it is due to our intellectual laziness. The good egg/
bad egg way of thinking posits that peace can be achieved by discovering the motives for a specific power’s decision to go to war and theneliminating that motive or motives. This premise is a key reason why
intellectual laziness exists even if we work hard on our ability to takeaction. Humans have adopted exactly the same attitudes since antiquity whenever they face a difficult situation. At such times, we look
for the “bad egg”—someone or something to blame—and satisfy ourselves by punishing them.
This does away with the burden of hard thinking in two ways. First,
it is clear and straightforward. Second, it allows people to live without
having to make any changes. Needless to say, this approach does not
actually solve any problems. The passion to eradicate bad eggs does,
however, incite our fighting instincts and encourage us to take action.
Outright conflict does break out occasionally between good and bad.
Fighting is intoxicating because it leads us to believe that our problems
will be solved through victories. It is also true that conflicts can solve
problems to some extent by delivering societies a jolt.
This pattern of behavior has manifested itself repeatedly when
the risk of war threatens us, and we wish to avoid it. This tendency
is all the more apparent when we discuss the question of peace. This
25
II. The Three Levels of International Politics

is because the concept of peace is abstract and hard to grasp. In theeighteenth century, monarchs and nobility were cast in the role of bad
actors. Wars were thought to arise at the caprice of such personages.
This is expressed well by the following well-known anecdote of thetime. François-Michel le Tellier, Marquis of Louvois and a minister ofstate to King Louis XIV, had built the Trianon palaces at Versailles forthat monarch. However, the king did not like the shape of the windows. Accordingly, or so the story goes, as a way to turn Louis XIV’s
attention to other matters, Louvois started a war with Austria.
Whether this story is apocryphal or not is not the issue here. The
fact is that this sort of anecdote is a good illustration of the general wayof thinking in that era. This led people to think that having representatives of the people, who could restrict the authority of monarchs,
would be the road to peace. A proposal made by the noted Frenchthinker Nicolas de Condorcet (1743–1794) is a prime example. He
was certain that the people loved peace, and he believed that wars
would not occur if the will of the people was directly represented. In
fact, he came up with a detailed procedure wherein, in the event ofenemy attack, any declaration of war would have to be approved by
the legislature while starting a war could only be approved by a newly
elected legislature.
In the nineteenth century, the landed aristocrats and landowners
were generally believed to be bad actors. It was widely believed thenthat peace would prevail with the introduction of free trade, which
would eliminate barriers among nations. Furthermore, some people
believed that peace would come if free trade, which had the potential
to eliminate all barriers among nation-states, were comprehensively
instituted. In fact, Richard Cobden (1804–1865), a leading figure in
the free-trade movement, was convinced that it would produce peace
26
Introduction: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

and prosperity for every nation. When he learned that Napoleon III
had rejected complete free trade in his negotiations with the UK, hethought at first that the report was an error. He then even insisted ongoing to France in an attempt to persuade Napoleon III in person.
This episode illustrates how sincerely he believed in free trade.
In the twentieth century, the roles of bad actors have been assigned
one after another; after one was done away with another was created.
Kaiser Wilhelm and Germany’s militaristic system, Hitler and fascism, capitalism, and the new imperialism of communism have all
been treated as bad eggs, and the self-avowed good eggs have foughtwars with them. Wars of this century have been all the more intenseand bloody because they have been regarded as ones between goodand evil. Thus, one country after another has been branded as a bad
egg. But since the good eggs that defeated the bad eggs turned out tohave their own failings, the credibility of this Manichean way of thinking came to be questioned. Even so, this way of thinking is so deeply
rooted in human nature, it continues to implicitly influence our attitudes toward questions of war and peace.
Simplifying the Problem
In addition to this Manichean “good egg/bad egg” attitude, we cannot ignore how the structure of international politics is oversimplified.
Discourse on international peace is generally based on a surprisingly
simple view of the structure of international politics. In this regard,
the most typical view is that peace can be achieved by doing away witharmaments. This thinking is grounded in the perception that states arein a staring contest with weapons in hand. If people did not think thatway, then they would never be so certain that peace could be attained
just by getting rid of weapons.
27
II. The Three Levels of International Politics

The idea that peace can be achieved through the United Nations
likewise rests upon a similar understanding of current realities. It follows for some that it would be best if all countries gave up their military capabilities, created a world federation, and had that federation’s
police force maintain order. Such a way of thinking would be correct
if each nation were simply a unit of power, and if international politics
was an arena in which these units of power simply existed side by side.
However, the reality is that nations are not simple units of power. A
nation is both a system of interests and of power. It is the most important unit for the economic activities of its population. Certainly, international trade is conducted across national borders and the household
and the workplace are the most directly tied to people’s lives. But itis the nation that provides the framework for these varied economic
activities, including the flow of money and goods. It is also within theframework of the nation that economic plans are developed and economic policies are adopted for the welfare of its members.
Japan’s prosperity is directly linked to the standard of living ofJapanese people. In contrast, although the prosperity of the UnitedStates or China or Korea may actually be connected to how we Japanese live, the connection with the prosperity of each of those nations is
incomparably smaller. Each nation comprises a system of interests thatsometimes harmonize with and sometimes conflict with the interestsof other nations. It is simply impossible to separate questions about
international peace from the interests involved. We cannot argue
about the problem of peace without considering the interest relationships among nations.
Moreover, nations also comprise systems of values along with systems of powers and interests. Each of us makes our own decisions andchooses how to live our lives. We can do so without causing chaos in a
28
Introduction: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

society because we are tied together by invisible threads such as sharedpatterns of behavior and systems of values. Institutions ranging fromstates to families are not sustainable without these invisible threads.
“Justice” Is Defined by Common Sense
Our patterns of behavior and value systems have been shaped by our
histories. Thus, they are more deeply rooted in our identities than wenormally realize. These are not universally shared but are distinct anddifferent from country to country. Hence, what separates countries
from each other are not arbitrarily drawn borders, but rather the differences in norms for behavior and value systems as embodied in language and customs. One could say in short that Japan, like every othercountry, has its own version of common sense.
Let me illustrate this with an example close at hand. When aJapanese person wants to urge someone to eat a dish that they have
prepared, they often humbly say, “This might not be up to yourexpectations.” An American, in contrast, more likely will directly say,
“I worked hard cooking this, so please enjoy it.” This is a hackneyed
example on a trivial matter, so perhaps some readers will wonder whatconnection this has to international politics. The point is that it offers
a tip-of-the-iceberg glimpse at the differences between what comprisessocial practices in Japan, where people usually do not strongly assert
themselves, and such practices in the United States, where people
often do.
This is why Japanese working abroad often become perplexed by
the different assumptions about what is common sense. One sometimes hears Japanese talking about how they are not good at being
assertive or at arguing by using logic and reasoning like non-Japanesedo; in saying this they are talking about the same sort of issue that29
II. The Three Levels of International Politics

arises in international politics. Put simply, Japanese find it easy to workin Japan; it is comfortable for them. That is largely because virtually
all Japanese share the same versions of common sense and the sameguidelines regarding behavior.
In a different vein, many examples can also be found around theworld of people who have different versions of common sense but who
have tried forcibly to create a nation, only to have their efforts fail. For
example, before Singapore was split off from Malaysia, Malaysia had
been a nation in which Malays and ethnic Chinese lived in roughly
the same numbers. But relations between the two groups did not go
well, resulting in the separation of Singapore. Regarding this, someone
said: “It’s only natural that relations between people who eat pork andpeople who do not would not go well.” Chinese like to eat pork, as canbe seen from a look at their cuisine. In contrast, Malays, as Muslims,
are forbidden to eat pork. Eating or not eating the meat of the pig is arelatively trivial matter, and is an issue related to the Islamic precepts
that ban that practice. However, setting aside the question of whether
eating pork is right or wrong, Islam has a crucial impact in providing many people with behavioral norms and a value system (common
sense). The overseas Chinese likewise live based on their own common
sense, and this is extremely important to them. They cannot simply
discard what they believe to be common sense.
Of course, common sense can change and it can be assimilated.
However, when it suddenly changes due to external forces, the people
affected will feel like their world is coming apart, like startled birds
whose flock has been scattered in all directions. Thus, common sense
regulates our daily behavior. Although we are normally unaware of it,
it is extremely important. When thinking about actual internationalsociety, it is no overstatement to say that there is not just one common
30
Introduction: Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

sense, but many. The existence of varied languages is one manifestationof this.
To put it another way, there are many kinds of justice in international society. Therefore, when someone refers to justice in the international arena, they are merely referring to their version of justice. It is
hardly unusual for one country to think itself just while being regarded
as unjust from the point of view of another country. Here, too, it ispossible for tensions and conflict to arise.
Each sovereign country comprises a system of power, a system ofinterests, and a system of values. Accordingly, relations among nations
are complex ones in which these three levels of relations are intertwined. It is this complex interaction on these three levels that makes
understanding the question of war and peace among nations difficult.
Nevertheless, we have long focused on only one of them in any discussions about peace.
In this volume, I want to examine questions of war and peace byviewing the relationships among nations from the perspectives ofpower, interests, and justice. This approach will clarify challenges ineach area and show us how they are related to one another. It will also
provide us with some basic guidelines for understanding questions of
war and peace as well as establish some fundamental assumptions forframing our views and attitudes regarding international politics.

31
II. The Three Levels of International Politics

CHAPTER

1

ARMS AND PEACE
insist on maintaining views“Youthatboth
are poles apart . . . Your main ideas
may seem as incompatible as ice and hotcoals, but I think that you share a common
disease—excessive anxiety. You have bothseen the powerful nations of Europe maintaining a million strong soldiers, building ten
million battleships, biting and grappling witheach other, and coming frequently to wreak
havoc on Asia. You have thus become overly
concerned that these powerful Europeans
will surely invade [us] someday, equippedwith a hundred or a thousand battleships.
This explains why you hold such extreme
views.” Nakae Chōmin, Sansuijin keirin mondō(A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government), 18872

I. The Balance of PowerThe Sources and Character of Balancing Strategies
United States president Woodrow Wilson, upon his return from Versailles after the end of World War I, told the American people that“the day we [have] left behind us . . . was a day of balances of power.”3
Setting aside whether his words correctly described reality, Wilson’s
remarks set the main agenda for international politics after the war.
In fact, a search was going on for something to replace the balanceof power principle. The principle had been the core and guiding idea
in diplomacy up to that time, but the experience of World War I had
shown how completely inadequate it was. Consequently, not only idealistic thinkers and scholars, but also the so-called realists as well as
diplomats began questioning its shortcomings. In fact, one could evensay that there are hardly any texts on international politics today that
do not bring up the problems associated with balance of power.
From the outset, the balance of power principle was adopted out ofnecessity. The idea emerged in Italy amid the confused circumstancesof the start of the early modern period, when the medieval order had
collapsed, and shared norms had disappeared. The ruthless methods
proposed by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) in The Prince (Il Principe) reflected the chaos that people of that time had to live through.
In a situation where city-states recognized no form of higher authority
nor laws that might restrain them, there existed no method for stabilizing conditions other than to find compromises between mutually34
Chapter 1: Arms and Peaceopposed desires and interests—and balances between mutually warring powers. The collapse of the medieval order eventually affected thewhole of Europe and led to the emergence of similarly chaotic conditions. As a result, the notion of a balance of power spread throughout
the continent. The religious conflicts that had driven Europe to theextremes of chaos in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries finallycame to an end in the form of a balance among contesting powers.
This, too, was seen as common sense at the time. The idea of balance was applied not only to international politics but also to domestic
politics. It was further applied in economics and medicine. Humans
were thought to be healthy only when the organs that comprise theirbodies were in balance. Meanwhile, for the economy to be out of balance meant that all manner of damage would result. And in politics, it
was the balance of the many elements that comprise society that provided the foundations for a political structure, as expressed in Montesquieu’s tripartite distribution of power, and the fundamental principle
for the system of checks and balances in the United States Constitution. This concept of balance treated the diversity in human society,along with the competition and conflicts that this diversity stirred
up, as natural and even desirable. At the same time, this concept wasconcerned with preventing a state of anarchy. Likewise, balance (ofpower) in international politics was expected to serve the dual purposeof maintaining the independence of all nations, and avoiding chaotic
situations, particularly total war.
Thus, diplomats were charged with two missions: to actively pursue the interests of their own countries and to find a middle groundthat avoided any fundamental destruction of international society.
The word “diplomacy” first appeared at the start of the eighteenth
century, and since that time “power” and “interests” have been clearly
35
I. The Balance of Powerrecognized as the two factors that guide how diplomacy is conducted.
Interests are thought to determine what a foreign policy should promote, while power is thought to be that which allows a nation toachieve its interests. Therefore, in order to avoid any tests of strengththat would inflict damage, it became necessary to correctly understandthe intricately entangled interests and relationships between the various nations. This became the number one task for diplomacy. Thus,
there were frequent debates over not confusing “true” interests with“superficial” ones while also arguing that “permanent” interests should
not be sacrificed for “temporary” ones.
Diplomats were certainly not satisfied with the mechanical operations of the balance of power. However, they did not think it was possible to achieve order in international society by any means other thanby the balance of power and interests.
For example, Charles-Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743), came up with a proposal for achieving “perpetual peace,” urging the creation of an international court to mediate between states.
Responding to this, the diplomat and philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz (1646–1716) wrote, “I have seen something of the project of
M. de St. Pierre, for maintaining a perpetual peace in Europe. I am
reminded of a device in a cemetery, with the words: Pax perpetua; forthe dead do not fight any longer: but the living are of another humor;
and the most powerful do not respect tribunals at all.”4 Leibniz further
went on, toward the end of the seventeenth century, to counter SaintPierre’s proposal by compiling the world’s first collection of treaties andpublic documents (Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus, 1693). He didso because he believed that, given the importance of power in international politics, it would be more effective to study each of the various
specific agreements that had been reached based on power relationships,
36
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacethan to consider whatever laws or theory that might or might not apply
to international politics in general. Thus, balance of power became theguiding principle for foreign policy just as modern international society
came into being, and it continued to be so thereafter.
Flaws in the Balance of Power Principle
However, this principle was at best a means to an end, and little morethan sound common sense. It could not guarantee peace without turmoil. To begin with, no one could clearly define what it meant for
powers to be in balance. Power itself is nebulous and difficult to grasp.
In fact, the problem of what power is had long vexed many scholars.
For example, the English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626)
spoke of it as follows:
The greatness of an estate, in bulk and territory, doth fall undermeasure; and the greatness of finances and revenue doth fallunder computation. The population may appear by musters;
and the number and greatness of cities and towns by cards andmaps. But yet there is not anything amongst civil affairs more
subject to error, than the right valuation and true judgment concerning the power and forces of an estate.5
Turning to recent history, in the final stages of World War II, US strategists thought that it would be Great Britain and the Soviet Union thatwould oppose each other in postwar Europe. At the same time, as thewar was coming to an end, US policymakers could not foresee that
the UK would become completely exhausted after the war while theSoviet Union would become more powerful, even though both suffered heavy damage from the war. Thus, because the United States had
37
I. The Balance of Powermisjudged the postwar power relationships it made the mistake of rapidly withdrawing its forces from Europe. Such errors are easy to makewhen evaluating power.
It is even more difficult to accurately gauge the relative power ofnations in an alliance and to forecast just how reliable the alliance will
be. This is because a given nation might suddenly make peace or evencooperate with a former enemy. Consider, for example, the situationin the mid-eighteenth century, when European powers had been warring both for possession of the New World and at the same time forpre-eminence and domination in Europe itself. Although during the
War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748), Great Britain and Austria
were allies fighting a French-Prussian alliance, these alliance relationships flipped during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), when France
allied with Austria and Russia, while Great Britain helped Prussia.
Moreover, when Great Britain accomplished its main objective ofachieving dominance in the New World, it limited its involvementin the conflict and stopped providing Prussia with assistance, leaving
Prussia on its own. Perhaps it was only natural that Frederick the Great(1712–1786), who lived during this era and spent his entire life manipulating the balance of power, wrote in his Political Testament of 1752,“Take good care not to place your trust in the number and good faith ofyour allies; count only on yourself; then you will never deceive yourself.”
Examples of this sort are not limited to the eighteenth century.
Great Britain allied itself with Japan during the Russo-Japanese War(1904–1905)—though it did not actually take part in the fighting—and provided aid to Japan. But two years after that war, Britain joinedwith Russia to form the Anglo-Russian Entente. A similar shift wasseen in the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact concluded on the eveof World War II, as discussed in the Introduction.
38
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

The difficulty in balancing power is more than just a matter of the
difficulty of correctly gauging the power that exists. There are numerous factors in international politics that prevent accurate measurementof the balance of power. First, nations may talk about achieving balance, but they are actually trying to obtain a balance tilted in theirfavor. This is because if a nation has sufficiently greater power thanits peers, any failures in calculation or action will not result in significant damage, thus making the more powerful nation feel all the moresecure. Meanwhile opposing nations try to do the exact same thing toguarantee a favorable balance. Any balance favorable to one is unfavorable to the other, thus one of them will be dissatisfied with the actual
balance of power. Accordingly, the cases in which a stable balance ofpower will be achieved are in fact very limited. Generally speaking, astable balance can only be achieved when a nation with advantage does
not abuse its advantage to establish a superior status while a nation
with disadvantage does not dare challenge the status quo.
Furthermore, the motivation to gain “greater” power is not based
solely on rational calculations. This is clear when we consider human
psychology. As expressions such as “the grass is always greener on theother side of the fence” demonstrate, people tend to envy others.
Similarly, nations tend to overestimate the military strength of othernations. On top of that, humans are quite insensitive when it comesto the threat they may pose to others while very suspicious of any
aggressive intentions that others may have. British Nobel Prize-winning nuclear physicist Patrick M.S. Blackett referred to this as “moral
asymmetry,” and pointed out that such a danger is inherent in all strategies. Consequently, this created the idea that an opposing party willtake whatever opportunity it has to attack us, and so we must prepare
for that. In this respect, the strategies of the Soviet Union, the US, and
39
I. The Balance of Power

China all resemble one another to a surprising degree. The armaments
held by other nations are seen as threats, while one’s own weapons areseen merely as defensive tools to counter those threats.
Powers were also constantly overestimating the possibility of a surprise attack. For example, US strategists were greatly concerned that
the Soviets might launch a first strike even if it meant losing a quarter of their own population, while forgetting that their own nation
was capable of doing the same thing. Any attempts to achieve a balance of power pose the risk of an arms race. Every nation will expand
its military capabilities to tilt the balance in its favor. Technologicaladvances in particular have made it possible to upset the balance without ever having to set foot in another nation’s territory. The intensityof the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union since
the end of World War II is historically new. Such a flaw in balanceof power thinking becomes particularly obvious in a crisis. People
become unable to make dispassionate assessments and decisions or to
see the full range of what is possible.
This is why those involved end up seeing the situation in black andwhite terms: one must either doggedly argue for one’s own position,or step back and accept defeat. This is not a failure of the balance ofpower way of thinking per se but is rather a danger that underlies any
way of thinking, especially when rigid opinions are held. It cannot
be denied that emphasizing the role of power tends to lead people tothink in terms of confrontation.
The Character of World War I
The outbreak of World War I seems to have been caused by the accumulated defects in the balance of power approach discussed thus far.
Of the three sets of strained relationships in place on the eve of that40
Chapter 1: Arms and Peaceconflict, the first one, the uneasy relationship between France andPrussia, had existed ever since the 1870–1871 war between those
two powers, while the other two unsettled relationships emerged outof a gradual accumulation of fears over states that had been newly
increasing in strength. One of these was Great Britain’s worries overGermany’s sudden rise, which grew particularly strong after Germany
began to build up its navy. The other was based on concerns held byAustria-Hungary and Prussia regarding the fact that Russia, a vast agricultural nation, was now industrializing. Austria-Hungary’s worries
in particular were reinforced by fears that its own multiethnic empire
would be overthrown from below by nationalism in the Balkans.
Austria-Hungary, which was in the weakest position of all thosepowers, tried to take advantage of Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination

Moscow

Great Britain
LondonBerlinRussiaGermany
Paris
ViennaBudapest

FranceAustria-Hungary
Italy
Balkans

Stand OffInvasion

Figure 1. Europe’s Tense Relationships Prior to the Outbreak of World War I

41
I. The Balance of Powerin order to restrict nationalist movements in the Balkans. This canbe seen as black-or-white decision-making: either pull back or moveahead. Then Austria-Hungary made two miscalculations when it
adopted a hardline stance. The first mistake—which Prussia also
made—was to see Russia as having neither the will nor the ability towage war. The second was to think that Great Britain was unlikely
to participate in the conflict. Edward Goschen, London’s ambassador to Berlin at that time, reported that the German government
thought—to the very end—that Britain would remain neutral.
Goschen also wrote that the French ambassador had criticized Britain’s
ambiguous stance, and he argued that the only way to prevent a general war would be for Great Britain to declare that it would stand andfight alongside Russia and France. It is clear from this that there wereconsiderable doubts about what Britain’s stance would be. It is safe to
say that Austria-Hungary thought that it was time to push its position
strongly, and that doing so would involve no risk. This thinking propelled Austria-Hungary into aggressive diplomacy. In fact, however,Russia showed that it had the will to fight, and it began preparing forwar. When Prussia and Austria-Hungary responded by launching apreemptive strike, Great Britain entered the war.
Nobody expected or wished for World War I to happen, but it
did. The war likewise developed in unexpected ways. Many thoughtthat the war would be over within a matter of months. But in fact,
it went on for several years. Forecasts about how much destruction
would result from the fighting were also completely mistaken. The war
struck a blow that was nearly fatal to European civilization. The hugescale of damage shook the raison d’être of the balance of power principle to its core. The idea of a balance of power, which was expected
to serve the dual purpose of maintaining the independence of nations
42
Chapter 1: Arms and Peaceand preventing disorder, assumed that the costs of warfare would be
limited. Not many considered absolute peace to be the goal of international politics.
For example, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) defined the state ofnature as “the war of all against all,” and he argued that great power,
which he likened to a monstrous Leviathan, was the means to escapefrom this intolerable situation. However, he did not go so far as toapply this image of the state of nature to the international level. He did
not see international society as an arena in which a war of all against
all could occur even if there was no dominant power, and for that reason he did not see any need for supranational institutions. He reasoned
that although struggles between individuals could result in the loss oflife, struggles between nations would not result in the death of nations.
There may be casualties and victims, but for the state as a whole this isa minor price to pay. At the same time, if the state forces the people to
make more than minor sacrifices, they will not cooperate. Thus, Hobbes
thought, so long as conflicts among nations were limited in scale they
could gauge their mutual interests and find peace through compromises.
Similarly, Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), the famed specialist on international law, thought that a balance of power that guaranteed each nation’s independence was desirable, given that conflicts
among nations were limited. He saw this as giving a nation the ability
to preserve its freedom, and for that reason he thought that a world
government would not be necessary. Meanwhile, Charles-Louis deMontesquieu (1689–1755), author of The Spirit of the Laws, spoke ofinternational politics as a matter of unstable peace rather than as endless war.
The wars of the eighteenth century most certainly were limited
ones. The power of governments was limited both in terms of raising
43
I. The Balance of Powerfunds and mobilizing manpower. Soldiers were extremely valuable.
Accordingly, it was desirable to wage war with a minimum of casualties. For example, the French general Maurice de Saxe (1696–1750),
a leading military man of the eighteenth century, said “I am not infavour of giving battle, especially at the outset of a war. I am even convinced that a clever general can wage war all his life without having
to fight one.”6 This is why wars were frequently likened to a game ofchess. Both sides try to win by achieving the advantage through howthey formed and maneuvered their armed forces. Once a side founditself in a disadvantageous position, it made more sense to quickly
withdraw or accept defeat and pay appropriate compensation.
A war was a game with its rules and its stakes . . . The loser paid, but
a just proportion was always kept between the value of the stakeand the risks to be taken, and the parties were always on guard
against the kind of obstinacy which makes a player lose his head.
They tried to keep the game in hand and to know when to stop. It
was for this reason that the great eighteenth-century theorists of
warfare urged that neither justice, nor right, nor any of the great
passions that move a people should ever be mixed up with war.7
If this is what war is, then the balance of power would have a good raison d’être as a principle that would allow nations to achieve their two
objectives: maintain independence and avoid a chaotic internationalsituation. However, the power of nations has grown over the course ofmodern history, and with it so have their destructive capabilities.
In particular, the technological developments that have accompanied the advance of industrial civilization since the nineteenth century
have provided states with even more powerful weapons. At the same
44
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

time, industrial civilization has facilitated the organizing of the population, which has resulted in the expansion of both the human andmaterial resources that a state can mobilize. It has become possible toincorporate the general public as soldiers, and to mobilize practicallythe entire population to support military action. World War I produced casualties on a scale unimaginable to what had been “common
sense” before. The fact is each state was able to keep fighting for several
years by continuing to spend astronomical amounts on their militaries. This also would have been inconceivable without the above-mentioned historical developments. The French statesman General Charlesde Gaulle (1890–1970) accurately described the character of that war:
The accumulation of changes that had taken place over many
years suddenly appeared [as] one great change. Over the courseof several generations, popular elections, compulsory education,industrialization and urbanization, newspapers, political parties, labor unions, and sports had nurtured a collective mentality. The mass movements and mechanization in which we havecome to partake due to our modern way of life laid the groundwork for mass mobilization, and prepared people to withstandthe sudden shock and cruelty that distinguishes a war of the
populace. (France and War)The result of this is that the costs of war—even for the victor—were
far and away greater than its benefits. George F. Kennan was correct tohave pointed out that if, in fact, during the early stages of a war one or
the other warring parties would accept the enemy’s conditions as is, thatnation would suffer far less than by continuing the fight and achieving
victory. At the start of the modern era, thinkers believed that states
45
I. The Balance of Powerwould not be struck by any fatal blow in conflicts among them, andthis assumption justified the quest for a balance of power. But now
that premise has collapsed.
A Fully Mobilized People
Moreover, the fact that the costs of war had dramatically risen was not
the only problem. In order to mobilize populations and get them tokeep fighting, politicians began to appeal to the passions of the public. When Germany was tarred with the epithet “militarist,” it struck
back with “reactionary Russia,” “decadent France,” and “hypocritical Britain.” “The war to end all wars” was bandied about as a slogan. These slogans unquestionably motivated people. However, as theeighteenth-century theorists of warfare had feared, it proved difficult
to end a war that was being fought based on passions. Those passions
caused World War I to drag on long enough to completely ruin several
nations despite numerous attempts to negotiate peace. There was noroom for the dispassionate calculation of interests.
World War I was hardly the only conflict to be driven by the passions of the masses. This is due to the nature of mass society, which is amajor feature of our contemporary world. This poses enormous challenges to diplomacy, which in principle calls for a correct understanding of national interests and the actions guided by that understanding.
Today’s diplomats must do their work in an extremely difficult environment. For even if diplomats are able to reach reasonable compromises between opposing interests, they then need to worry whether therespective peoples of their countries will accept them. In many cases,a result that is appropriate from the perspective of national interests
will end up being criticized because the populace has prejudices or a

46
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacemistaken understanding of the facts, and/or because of some ideology.
These days, the premise of peace based on the balance of poweris being challenged. In particular, the emergence of nuclear weapons
has greatly increased the cost of war. Now it is possible for a nation to
be completely annihilated. At the same time, technological advancesthat facilitate public relations and propaganda efforts, combined with
ideological competition, have made it impossible to strike deals based
solely on the calculation of interests. In the past, military force could
be brought to bear in the game of international politics without stirring too much alarm, but this undeniably is no longer the case. The
effectiveness of using interest calculations to guide diplomacy has now
come into question. Consequently, we have been in search of an alternative to the idea of seeking a balance of power.

47
I. The Balance of PowerII. Disarmament

Agreement in Theory but No Action in Practice
The most radical alternative for peace based on a balance in military
power is peace without military power. This alternative envisages allnations disarming themselves completely and an international army
being created to maintain global order. After the two world wars, disarmament became the central program for those focused on peace.
Of course, such ideas are hardly new. The dangers of having too
many weapons and the need to do away with them is a problem thathas vexed humanity for millennia. Even in the eighteenth century
when nations having standing armies was the norm, the talk was of
how to abolish those powerful forces.
Two works by a pair of eminent philosophers who wrote about
peace at the end of the eighteenth century—the 1795 essay “Perpetual
Peace” by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and the 1789 article “A Plan
for an Universal and Perpetual Peace” by Jeremy Bentham (1748–
1832)—also proposed abolishing standing armies. Likewise, some
one hundred years later—after a century that saw a dramatic increasein the destructive capability of weaponry due to the invention of themachine gun and improvements in explosives—writers began to issue
forewarnings of the misery of wars to come. For example, the Polishwriter Ivan. S. (Jan Gotlib) Bloch correctly prophesied in his 1896
work, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations, how World War I would unfold:
48
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

At first there will be increased slaughter—increased slaughter on
so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push
the battle to a decisive issue. They will try to, thinking that they
are fighting under the old conditions, and they will learn such alesson that they will abandon the attempt for ever. (p. xvi)
The outward and visible sign of the end of war was the introduction of the magazine rifle . . . needle gun . . . smokeless powder . . . [and] higher explosives. (pp. xvii–xxiv)
The first thing every man will have to do . . . will be to dig ahole in the ground, and throw up as strong an earthen rampart
as he can to shield him from the hail of bullets which will fill
the air. . . . All digging work is slow work, and when you must
dig a trench before you can make any advance, your progress isnecessarily slow. Battles will last for days, and at the end it is very
doubtful whether any decisive victory can be gained. (p. xxvii)
Every great State would in time of war be in the position ofa besieged city, and the factor which always decides sieges is thefactor which will decide the modern war. Your soldiers may fightas they please; the ultimate decision is in the hands of famine.
(p. xlix)8
The warnings and proposals from these writers impressed everyone
and won general approval. That said, by no means were these proposals implemented. However, they were at least taken up by politiciansand even became the subject of debate among diplomats. For example,
Czar Nicolas II of Russia (1868–1918) was moved by Bloch’s work. He
suggested that an international conference be held to discuss the peacequestion—the First Hague Conference of 1899—at which he argued
for setting limits on armament. Attendees easily found accord over the49
II. Disarmamentprinciple that setting limits on military spending was extremely desirable. However, when it came to implementing this idea, all they wereable to do was to declare that they “might examine the possibility of anagreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of
war budgets.”9 Regardless of this declaration, each country’s militaryspending continued to rise, and at the Second Hague Conference, heldin 1907, they did nothing more than come to the same sort of agreement. A similar process occurred again after World War I, then again
after World War II. Governments emphasized the necessity of disarmament, and declared the seriousness of their intent. However, they were
not able to achieve concrete results. Very few disarmament efforts havecome to pass, including even minor ones that might be expected to beeasier and more realistic first steps on a path to complete disarmament.
In fact, there has always been a hint of complacency and hypocrisy in the attitudes of idealists in their disarmament proposals. Somehave merely repeated these proposals simply because they were convinced that they were just, but they do not seriously reflect on why
those efforts bear no fruit. Others, aware that such a feat is impossible,
instead take the irresponsible and hypocritical approach of not venturing to express their opposition and instead let the realities of life provethat eliminating armaments is impossible. As a result, efforts to obtainpeace without military power—in place of peace based on a balanceof such power—have left behind a large and impressive record of proposals, agreements in principle, and remarkable attempts—but total
failure in practice.
The Difficulties of Equitable DisarmamentThis failure is unsurprising, for there are numerous obstacles to disarmament. In the first place, the criteria for “disarmament” need to be50
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacein place. This may not be a problem if the goal is total disarmament,
but given the impossibility of eliminating all weapons in a single strokesome sort of criteria—even if provisional—will be needed to regulate the process. Trying to set the ratios among the arsenals of various
nations is even more difficult. The two arms-control conferences held
between the two world wars demonstrate this well.
First, the Washington Naval Conference (1921–1922) was one of
the few successful examples of an attempt at arms reduction. Under
its terms, Japan agreed to an inferior position in a 5:5:3 ratio of capital
ships compared to the United States and Great Britain, a decision thatwas criticized by Japanese hard-liners. In fact, however, this ratio wasfavorable to Japan. Considering the vast difference in the economic
power of Japan and the United States at that time, if the race to build
battleships had continued without the Washington Naval Treaty,
either the gap between the United States and Japan would have growneven larger or Japan’s economy would have collapsed. The UnitedStates, given its industrial strength, could easily have achieved a 5:1
ratio vs. Japan. (At the time, Japan was spending 7.72 percent of its
national income on the military, while the United States was spending
no more than 2.26 percent). Nonetheless, the United States decided tocompromise on the 5:3 ratio. Katō Tomosaburō, Japan’s navy ministerand chief negotiator at the Washington conference, was quite aware ofthis fact and decided to accept the 5:5:3 ratio.
However, there were few in Japan who were as insightful andlevelheaded as Katō. The average Japanese would look only at Japan’s
inferior ratio and end up indignant over the affront to their country’s prestige. In this context, Japan’s insistence on a 7:10 ratio at the
London Naval Conference of 1930 was not the product of rational strategic calculation but rather the reflection of a vague sense of51
II. Disarmamentdissatisfaction. One piece of evidence comes from a remark made by
Matsudaira Tsuneo, Japan’s ambassador to Great Britain, in preliminary talks with his US counterpart Charles G. Dawes, in which hetold the latter, “Having the 5:5:3 ratio applied to non-battleships is
not something we will be able to accept if we also take Japanese public
opinion into account. Therefore, I am asking you before we formallymeet to keep this in mind.” It can be assumed that the Japanese Naval
General Staff’s strong and repeated unreasonable opposition to the
London Naval Treaty was also due to this vague sense of dissatisfaction.
The greatest obstacle was how to evaluate all the various types ofarmament. It was still possible to achieve an agreement at the Washington Naval Conference because the ratio of capital ships was the
only issue there. However, the London Naval Conference took into
account all other types of vessels and made the task more difficult.
This is because the countries involved all made claims for their various
respective interests.
The same difficulty arose with arms-reduction negotiations between
the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. For example, in negotiations held since the mid-1950s, the biggest stumbling
blocks have been how to assess US overseas bases, and the USSR’s
secrecy regarding military bases on its own territory. The fact that
US bases encircle the Soviet Union gives the United States an advantage beyond a simple comparison of the sizes of their forces, in that it
makes it more difficult for the Soviet Union to defend itself. However,the Soviet Union is not an open country, and it is easy for it to protect
its military secrets. This not only gives it a military advantage, but also
brings with it the psychological pressure that other countries experience from not knowing the USSR’s true capabilities. For these reasons,both countries have overestimated one another’s military advantages.
52
Chapter 1: Arms and PeaceIn June 1954, the Soviet government proposed to the United
Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) that all
countries remove their military bases from other countries, and sincethen has repeatedly made similar proposals. The following year, theSoviet Union returned full control of its base at Port Arthur (Lüshun)
to China, and the next year transferred its base at Porkkaa Udd back to
Finland. It took each of these opportunities to intensify its demands
that the United States withdraw its own bases from other countries.
One of the reasons why the Soviet Union decided to recognize nonaligned nations was because doing that would serve the purpose ofpromoting the Soviet policy of increasing the area of land around its
territory with no US bases.
In response, at the July 1955 summit meeting of the “Big Four”
powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet
Union—held in Geneva, Switzerland, US president Dwight D. Eisenhower made inspection, including his “Open Skies” proposal for aerial
surveillance, the core of the nation’s arms-reduction proposal. On
October 11, 1961, US secretary of state Dean Rusk made it clear thatthe arms-reduction proposal that the US had submitted to the UN
General Assembly at the end of September was premised on a control
system being in place. He argued that while the Soviet Union might
accept inspections in principle, they would do so only after the disarmament process had been completed. In his view, this would render
the whole idea of controls and inspection meaningless.
Of course, the problem is that both the United States and the Soviet
Union are demanding in the name of disarmament that the other party
is the one that needs to cut back on its forces. Moreover, even if bothare sincere about their desire for parity, it still leaves the delicate problem of evaluating such matters as secret bases and restricted territory.
53
II. Disarmament

Viewed in terms of overall military potential, if one side reduces its
military force to a greater degree than the other side does, the effectwill be to make the other side stronger. That, accordingly, can be easily
understood as a result equivalent to one side having won the arms race.
For example, if the Soviet Union allowed the United States to inspect
its territory, the US could learn what the Soviet Union’s true militarystrength was and this would therefore put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage. Conversely, if the two parties agreed only to eliminate US
bases in foreign countries, the Soviet Union could reduce US superiority or perhaps even gain an advantage. In such ways, disarmament canchange any existing balance of power.
The Ramifications for the Struggle for Power
Moreover, while individual disarmament efforts may not change agiven balance of power on their own, they can still affect the overall
struggle for power. This is another obstacle to achieving disarmament,
because any restrictions or reductions of arms would be carried out
based on existing levels. That in turn would lead to solidifying whatever power relationships that existed at that moment—that is to say,it would entrench whichever party happened to be more dominant intheir place. Many of the reductions and restrictions on armament thathave been achieved to date fall into that category. If the weaker party
is unwilling to accept this status quo, disarmament will not take place.
This is the fundamental reason why the Baruch Plan failed. In
March 1946, the United States proposed what came to be known as
the Baruch Plan. Among the tremendous number of arms-reduction
proposals after World War II, this one seemed to be the least self-serving. Although tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union were then growing, the relationship had not yet settled into
54
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

what we now think of as the Cold War, and the United States was
deeply anxious about just how destructive atomic bombs could be.
Accordingly, the United States offered to relinquish its nuclear
monopoly and place its nuclear capabilities in the hands of a supranational organization. In exchange, this supranational organization—specifically, the erstwhile International Atomic Development
Authority (IADA)—would have been given centralized authority to
manage, monitor, and license all activities relating to atomic power,
including nuclear fuel and related nuclear refinery facilities. Moreover,while this would be created under the umbrella of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC), the United States argued that UNSC
members should not be allowed to exercise their veto to prevent the“immediate, swift, and sure punishment” that the Baruch Plan provided for dealing with violations. In exchange for those conditions, thePlan proposed that the United States would destroy its nuclear weapons and transfer serviceable nuclear materials to the control of thissupranational organization. The United States made no mention of theSoviet Union’s enormous ground forces when it offered this proposal.
At that time, the United States was quickly demobilizing following
World War II. Accordingly, when it came to standing military forces,
the United States was overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Soviet
Union, whose forces the US nuclear capability was meant to keep incheck. Under such conditions, transferring US nuclear weapons tointernational control would only seem to put the US at a disadvantage.
The impression it left was that the US was only seeking to transfer control of this horrifying weaponry that it had developed, without giving
deep thought to the balance of military strength on the whole.
However, even when human beings do not think deeply enough,they do not forget their own interests. We protect our interests, even55
II. Disarmamentunconsciously. The same could be said about the United States here.
The Baruch Plan protected US national interests in two respects at thevery least. For one, the plan was advantageous to the United States,
due to how it entrenched the status quo of US superiority.
US superiority after the end of World War II took three forms.
First, its ability to have its way in the United Nations was overwhelming. Second, the United States also had enormous industrial capacity
to back that up. Added to this was the third form of superiority, thefact that United States had already developed nuclear weapons. Even
if the nuclear weapons it already possessed were all destroyed, theUnited States would still have a monopoly on how to produce them.
The Soviet Union, in contrast, would have faced a situation in which
it would not be able to develop nuclear weapons, because such development would end up under the control of that supranational international organization. As a consequence, in terms of the crucial elementof national power represented by knowing how to make nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would have been put in a position inferior tothat of the United States for a long time.
Thus, contrary to appearances, the Baruch Plan would function in
a way that would entrench the reality of US superiority, and for thatreason the Soviet Union came to oppose it. The Soviets bought time by
dragging out the negotiations, during which they made a concentrated
all-out effort to develop their own nuclear weapons. From the Soviets’
viewpoint, such a tactic would not seem surprising.
Both the plan’s underlying motive of entrenching the status quo
and the resistance to the plan itself were made plain by the issue of a
nuclear test ban. Halting nuclear testing unquestionably would have
served to ease tensions. But viewed more realistically, it would have
had the effect of freezing the development of nuclear weapons. Since
56
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacethe late 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union had come tothink that a test ban would be in their respective interests by both stabilizing the nuclear stalemate between them and maintaining their
nuclear monopoly. However, France and China began to develop
their own nuclear weapons, and naturally neither of these countries
would have agreed to a halt in testing that would have hindered themin that regard. France expressed its intent to oppose such a ban at thearms-control conferences, while China, which did not have a seaton the DCSC, vehemently protested to the Soviet Union regardingthat issue. In autumn 1963, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
and the United States concluded the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(PTBT) and invited other nations around the world to sign, but neither France nor China agreed to do so.
Thus, whenever nations were talking about disarmament or arms
limitations, they still always had the struggle for power in the backs of
their minds. In short, disarmament is another aspect of power politics.
Controlling and Safeguarding Nuclear Weapons
The second point on which the Baruch Plan was favorable to theUnited States had to do with the control of nuclear weapons. The
supranational body that would control all the world’s nuclear power,
and to which the United Sates would transfer its own, would largely beunder US influence. Moreover, the United States would be destroying
its nuclear weapons and transferring nuclear materials to that supranational organization only after it was created. Accordingly, even if control of a nation’s nuclear capabilities were entrusted to an internationalorganization whose members (including the US) lacked veto power,
the United States would still be able to indirectly control those capabilities through that organization.
57
II. Disarmament

The United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly at the time that it
thought it would retain for at least another five years, so it saw the proposal as fair. The Soviet Union, however, believed that all of its activities would be strictly monitored under any such international bodywhile the US would preserve its nuclear monopoly, even if this wasmeant to be a transitional situation. As is often the case with politicalphenomena, there is no way of determining how long such a “transitional period” may last. It is understandable that the Soviet Union
believed that to accept the Baruch Plan would mean accepting a system in which the United States would perpetuate its monopoly on
atomic weapons. As the Soviet Union saw it, the Baruch Plan was control without disarmament.
Conversely, the Soviet Union in its “Gromyko Plan” led with prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. This was to be followed with prohibitions on producing and stockpiling them, and then with destroying
those weapons that had already been produced. However, it was natural for the US to be concerned that a secretive country like the Soviet
Union—which does not allow the freedom of movement and expression—could build nuclear weapons in secret. This is why control arose
as an issue with respect to disarmament. This is the third obstacle toeliminating or reducing armaments—one that had manifested itself
repeatedly throughout the course of arms-reduction negotiations.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain—while not opposed todisarmament in principle—held the view that it would be naïve to bothbelieve the pronouncements of other countries about reducing theirarmaments, and consequently to base the defense of their country onsuch pronouncements. The problem of control arose between the twoworld wars as well. France initially wanted to establish an inspection
body, while Germany was opposed to controls without disarmament.
58
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

The dilemma that this problem presents has further deepened in
the nuclear age. This is due to the enormous destructive capability of
nuclear weapons. In particular, the development of rockets has madeit possible to deliver nuclear weapons in an extremely short time. For
that reason, the gains that could be achieved by violating such agreements have been extremely large. Without an effective controlling
body, one or another country could potentially dominate the world
if it still secretly possessed hundreds of nuclear bombs and missiles
after every other country had eliminated theirs. In fact, just having
had a nuclear weapon in the past may be enough, even if that country no longer has any. What matters is perception. Believing thatsomeone is secretly developing nuclear weapons can be enough to
disrupt the peace.
But conversely, for any country to be subjected to an inspection
mechanism of some sort would be roughly the same as yielding to someform of disarmament, and that would weaken that country’s position.
As interwar Germany and the post–World War II Soviet Union argued,
any disarmament prior to the creation of some controlling body would
mean entrusting the security of one’s own country to others.
Hobbesian FearThus, we can see how in the event of any extreme scenario, the rootsof disarmament contain the dilemma that British historian Herbert
Butterfield labeled the “Hobbesian fear.”10 As Hobbes so brilliantly
analyzed, people act out of fear when no authority exists to control
their behavior. Butterfield detected the same sort of problem in therelations among nation-states.
The situation here is essentially that of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Twopeople who do not like each other are locked in a room, and each has a
59
II. Disarmament

pistol. Both parties know that they could avoid the worst-case scenario
of killing one another by both throwing their pistols out the window.
However, they don’t know how to achieve this. If one party throws their
pistol out the window first, the other party would still be safe if theydecided to not throw out their own pistol, and so they might break
the promise and keep it instead. If both parties promised to throw out
their pistols at the same time but only one followed through and kept
it, the party who didn’t throw out their pistol would be vulnerable. It’s
also always possible that both parties might throw out a pistol but one
still has another pistol hidden in their pocket. It’s also always possiblethat neither has a pistol but one or both suspects that the other does.
What’s more, it is conceivable that the other person might still suspect
the same sort of betrayal. Thus, while both parties might recognize thatthe best option would be to throw out their pistols, neither are willingto do so, and hence the situation remains uncertain.
Disarmament in essence involves the same sort of dilemma. Butterfield argued that this Hobbesian fear is what caused the failure of theefforts toward peace that humans in their wisdom had attempted up tothat time. Disarmament has never been the sole objective for nations.
Even if it were, such an objective would still be unachievable.
One shouldn’t spend too much time mulling over such an overly
simplified hypothetical scenario. Speculation ultimately is still merely
speculation, and international politics cannot be reduced to the simple
situation of two people with pistols. However, such speculations teachus an important lesson in that they direct our attention to the rationale that creates a correlation between mutual fear and the building up
of armaments. We normally think of reason as something that stands
in contrast to conflicts among humans. We think that reasoning willsolve such problems. However, under the conditions that I postulated
60
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

above, in a situation in which two parties fear each other, human reasoning does not help us to escape the situation, but rather hinders such
efforts. For while humans can predict the future, for that very reason
we can also imagine a situation in which the opposing party has not
thrown away their pistol even though we have. If humans were just alittle simpler, it would be easy for us to throw away our pistols, and theconditions of Hobbesian fear would not arise. Unfortunately, however,thanks to our capacity for reasoning, we humans cannot be so simple.
In short, given their ability to predict possible futures, in situations
where humans might fear one another—that is to say, when one party
is capable of harming the other and has the intention to do so—they
are unable to eliminate their fear of one another by simply eliminating
their capacity to harm one another. We must not forget that having theability to harm one another creates a fear of one another, and this hinders efforts to reduce the capabilities that are the source of those fears.
The idea that the main way to achieve peace is to eliminate armaments is based on the idea that armaments are fundamentally what
produce tension and conflict, thus eliminating them would put an
end to that tension and conflict. However, our discussion thus far
shows that where strong political tensions exist, it is impossible to single-mindedly push forward on disarmament alone.

61
II. Disarmament

III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

The Sansuijin keirin mondō Dilemma
The American journalist and essayist Walter Lippmann once said
that for the foreseeable future, humankind would be trapped in alimbo between unwinnable wars and unattainable peace. In short, heargued, between a war we could not win and a peace we could not
attain. Lippmann experienced the first half of the twentieth century in
its entirety, with all of its dramatic and enormous changes, and this is
how he chose to depict the post–World War II world.
In all likelihood, he was correct. As we have already seen, given
the essential nature of international society with coexisting sovereignstates, it is impossible to single-mindedly carry out disarmament. Thatsaid, the development of nuclear weapons and the emergence of masssociety has shaken balance of power as a guiding principle for diplomacy. However, we should not begin by overemphasizing how unprecedented the situation confronting us today is. In the past, when people
were faced with a difficult situation, they too almost always asserted
that it was without precedent. Most of the time, they were merely
comforting themselves.
We should not overlook the fact that the eminent Japanese
thinker Nakae Chōmin pointed out the same difficulties some eighty
years ago. In his magnum opus Sansuijin keirin mondō (A Discourseby Three Drunkards on Government), Nakae presents the arguments
offered first by the Gentleman of Western Learning, who advocates
62
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacedemilitarization, and then those of the Champion, who advocates
preparing an arsenal sufficient to stave off the Western powers and toconquer weaker nations. These are then followed by the words of theillustrious Master Nankai:
Mr. Gentleman’s ideas derive from theoretical musing, bothspoken and written, brewed in the minds of European scholars. But these points have not yet been put into practice in theworld. They are like dazzlingly attractive clouds. Mr. Champion’s ideas, on the other hand, are what ancient leaders actually put into practice once in a hundred or a thousand years.
Through them, these leaders achieved their fame. But such ideas
are no longer practical and have become mere tricks of politicaljugglers. Dazzling clouds show great promise for the future, butthey can only be enjoyed from afar. Political machinations are arelic from the past rarely seen, and they are amusing only when
we meet them in history books.11
Master Nankai’s two visitors express disappointment at his critique of“peace without weapons” and “peace through power,” judging it banal.
“We’ve heard that Master’s ideas are unusual,” they tell him. “But ifthey are what you’ve just said, they’re not at all unusual. Nowadays,
even children and servants are familiar with them.”12 Master Nakai
did not agree with the argument for demilitarization. He also did
not approve of acquiring great power of the sort that one need not
fear anyone. He said only, “[A] sound diplomatic policy is based on
maintaining peaceful and friendly relations with every nation of theworld, adopting a defensive strategy when it is absolutely necessary.”13
Of course, when it comes to summarizing the message of this eminent
63
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

work, the point is not that sound diplomatic policy is banal. What is
important is that the dilemma between peace without weapons andpeace through power is nearly impossible to overcome. As a consequence, the people caught in this dilemma can make only the mosttrite responses, no matter how much they agonize in their thinking.
Moreover, this might be not a dilemma between the past and thefuture, either as depicted by Nakae Chōmin or as we might vaguely
imagine today. This dilemma, which existed eighty years ago, still
exists today, and it is likely to continue to exist in the foreseeable
future. We might therefore conclude that this dilemma is inherent ininternational politics itself, rather than being something between thepast and the future. We are not the only ones who are troubled bythis problem. Everyone who has ever tried to deal seriously with international politics has had to address this problem. But the wisdom of
those who came before us, which was a product of their own efforts todeal with international politics, can, at the very least, protect us fromthe intellectual arrogance and laziness that would otherwise have us
ignore that wisdom as anachronistic.
With the development of nuclear weapons, whose destructive capability goes far beyond that of anything seen before, people have been
driven to one of two extreme views: peace through power or peace byeliminating weapons. However, as the many dangers of peace throughpower and the infeasibility of peace without weapons became clear,based on a recognition of the difficulty of the problem and much intellectual brooding, a new way of thinking emerged.
Dulles’ Doctrine of Massive Retaliation
John Foster Dulles’ doctrine of massive retaliation is the representative
example of the peace-through-power idea. It was based on a moralistic
64
Chapter 1: Arms and Peaceview of international politics and a simplistic way of thinking about
military power. Dulles viewed the communists who were challenging the United States as nothing other than pure evil, and he thoughtthat power was the only means for preventing the influence of thatevil from spreading. He believed that “power is the key to success indealing with the Soviet leadership.”14 Because he had a simplistic belief
in the enormous power of the atomic bomb, he concluded that theUnited States could halt any aggression by demonstrating its determination to use that power. From this he developed his doctrine of massive retaliation, and this led to brinksmanship.
However, it became clear that “peace through power” in reality
meant a “balance of terror” or “peace through fear.” “Balance of terror,” a famous turn of phrase coined by Winston Churchill after theSoviet Union had developed its own nuclear weapons, captures theimpossibility of the US and the Soviet Union fighting a war when any
all-out conflict between the two would result in extraordinary destruction for both. That said, the fact is this was the case even before theSoviet Union had developed its nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union
would have been able to almost completely destroy Europe with its
conventional ground forces, because the US nuclear force at the endof the 1940s was not powerful enough to dictate the outcome of any
war. Even if the US managed to win, Europe would still be completely
destroyed. For that very reason, the UK and France desperately tried
to constrain the US whenever it adopted a confrontational posture
toward the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union’s development of nuclear weapons made the balance of terror all the more complete. Subsequently, the levels of terror grew greater and greater as the United States and the Soviet Union
increased their nuclear arsenals. However, a balance of terror is not
65
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmamentsomething that always develops when certain conditions exist, andeven not after those conditions have been satisfied.
First, each nuclear state must be aware that the damage from a total
war will be far greater than whatever they might gain by defeating theiropponent. At the same time, each must also feel confident that theiropponent shares that belief. Each must also believe that their opponent
will not attack them out of paranoia or behave irrationally. Moreover,this concern is based on the fear that if a nuclear-capable state’s lifeor-death interests were threatened and it launched an all-out attack, it
could expect an all-out retaliation that would certainly include nuclear
weapons. But these two conditions do not go together. This is to say,a nuclear state must be convinced that another will definitely not use
such weapons outside of a worst-case scenario, but also that they will
do so in such a scenario. Furthermore, it will by no means be clear as
to whether a given scenario is actually a “worst-case scenario” or not.
Further criticisms of the balance of terror concept were put forth.
One was based the idea of total unilateral disarmament, which stands
at the opposite end of the spectrum from the massive-retaliation strategy. This is the simplest form of the idea of a peace without weapons.
The people who hold this view see that it is impossible to get rid of
nuclear weapons through treaties, and hence they argue that theUnited States and the Western camp should engage in unilateral disarmament. If that were to occur, then the Communist camp would haveno choice but to follow along and reduce its armament as well.
The premise in such a case is that the opposite party has goodintentions. Given that the fear comes from the fact that the two sides
are confronting one another with weapons of enormous destructive
potential, one might think that these weapons are the source of tension. Thus, if one side were to discard the weapons that are the source
66
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

of those fears, tensions would ease, and eventually the other party also
might reduce its weapons.
This clearly is too simplistic. It completely ignores any possible
intentions the other party might have to achieve dominance. It also
ignores the possibility that the other party might take advantage of its
nuclear monopoly through more subtle means without starting to disarm itself or launch a unilateral attack. In fact, there is a relatively large
number of proponents of unilateral disarmament in the UK. They callfor the UK to destroy its nuclear weapons and leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They might better be described as
neutralists. If it was the US that took such steps, this would constitutegenuine unilateral disarmament. However, there are hardly any proponents for such moves there.
Thus, we can see that neither the massive-retaliation strategy nor thedoctrine of unilateral disarmament provides any satisfactory answer tothe difficult question of how to maintain peace in the nuclear age. Theoretically speaking, both the massive-retaliation and unilateral-disarmament theories oversimplify the intentions of human beings and theroles of military power; both theories are deficient in that they fail tounderstand the complicated relationship between the two.
Mutual Self-Restraint in Arms
Once the futility of the massive-retaliation and unilateral-disarmament became clear, what gradually emerged was the idea of “armscontrol.” Growing out of serious examinations of the complicated roleof armaments in today’s world, arms control focused on the correlation between military power and human intentions. At the same time,
while bearing that correlation in mind, the idea of phased unilateraldisarmament came into being. This aims to gradually achieve peace
67
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

without armaments, while also acknowledging to some degree the rolethat military power plays.
Arms control is based on two criticisms of the massive retaliation
doctrine. The first is the realization that while the balance of terror
may have made total war impossible, it does not prevent all types of
military conflict. Limited wars and revolutionary conflicts remain possible. In fact, even after nuclear weapons appeared, conventional wars
have been fought in various places (see Table 1). Relatively few of theseconflicts have been interstate wars, but they still make up one-quarter of them, or a total of ten. The rest, whether civil or colonial wars,
were fought within a single country. However, around ten or so ofthese conflicts involved significant outside influence. This means thatinterstate confrontations also took the form of civil wars. This is all themore evident if we include all the numerous coups d’état. For strategists like Henry Kissinger, how to handle limited wars of this sort in
the nuclear age has been the primary focus of their theories on warfare.
Their answer was to reaffirm the links between military affairs and politics, and to select types of military power appropriate to given political conditions.
In actual armed conflicts the use of force is inevitable. However, insuch cases the role of nuclear weapons should be limited to deterring
the opponent’s own use of such weapons. Conventional forces must be
the primary means for settling conflicts. International conflicts havenever been settled through rational calculation and diplomacy alone.
Rather, they have been settled by the belief that cooperation in one’s
own interest is linked to a fear of the consequences of stubborn behavior. Makers of the first criticism believe this remains the case.
The other criticism of the massive-retaliation doctrine came fromthose who highlighted the instability of the balance of terror from a
68
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacestark strategic perspective. The problem, they argued, was that not
only had nuclear weapons become tremendously destructive, missiles
had made it possible for both the US and the Soviet Union to strike
one another in thirty minutes or less and this meant that launchinga preemptive strike would present a notable advantage. In an article
titled “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” published in the January 1959
issue of Foreign Affairs, the American strategic theorist Albert Wohlstetter raised this issue for the first time by pointing out that just having nuclear weapons was not enough to offer adequate deterrence. The
following conditions would also have to be met, including “the ability (1) to survive enemy attacks, (2) to make and communicate thedecision to retaliate, (3) to reach enemy territory with fuel enough tocomplete their mission, (4) to penetrate enemy active defenses, thatis, fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and (5) to destroy the target inspite of any “passive” civil defense in the form of dispersal or protective construction or evacuation of the target itself.”15 However, these
conditions did not exist at the start of the 1960s. Accordingly, warned
Wohlstetter, there was danger of an accidental war occurring due
either to one side or the other carrying out a preemptive strike thatwould lead to total war, or to a miscalculation based on the suspicion
that the other party might launch such a strike.
Since then, people have talked about the problem of how to prevent a preemptive strike or sneak attack, and discussed what the best
way is to achieve credible and stable deterrence. This was the genesis ofarms control. It first acknowledges that disarmament by mutual agreement is impossible when international tensions are high. As we haveseen earlier, disarmament without a control body is not feasible: it ishampered by the fear that you might be put at a disadvantage by disarming, or by the sense that the other party might betray you.
69
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

Table 1. Major Post–World War II Conflicts
Location
Indonesia
China
Indochina
GreeceKashmir
Burma

Year(s)1945–1947
1945–1949
1945–1954
1946–1949
1947–1949
1948

Parties Involved
Type
Independence movement vs. Holland×
Red Army vs. Nationalist Army△Việt Minh vs. France
×
Government army vs. Communist guerillas△*◦
India vs. Pakistan
Government army vs. Communist guerillas and eth△*
nic minorities◦
Israel1948–1949
Israel vs. Arab states
The Philippines 1948–1952
Government army vs. Hukbalahap movement△*
Malaysia
1948–1954
Great Britain vs. Communist guerillas△ (×)
The Koreas
1950–1953
UN Forces and South Korean army vs. North Korean◦ (△)
and Chinese armies◦×
Tibet
1950–1959
China vs. Tibet
Kenya
1952–1953
Great Britain vs. the Mau Mau
×
Guatemala
1954
Guatemalan exiles and the United States vs. Govern△*ment army
Cyprus1955–1959
Great Britain vs. the EOKA army
×
◦
Suez
1956
Israel, Great Britain, and France vs. Egypt
Hungary
1956
Soviet Union vs. Hungarian revolutionary forces△*
Algeria
1956–1962
National Liberation Front vs. France
×
Iraq
1958
Government army vs. Ethnic minorities△
Cuba
1958–1959
Castro-allied forces vs. Government army△Laos
1959–present Government army vs. Pathet Lao△*◦
Himalayas
1959–1962
China vs. India
South Vietnam 1959–1973
United States and South Vietnam government vs.
△*Viet Cong and North Vietnam
Angola1960
Portugal vs. Independence movement
×
Colombia
1960
Government army vs. Insurgents△Congo
1960–1962
Government army and UN forces vs. Insurgents
△
Cuba
1961
Government army vs. Cuban exiles and United States △*Goa
1961
India vs. Portugal×
West Irian
1962
Indonesia vs. the Netherlands
◦ (×)
Yemen
1962–1970
Government and Egypt vs. Royalists△*◦
Algeria
1963
Algeria vs. Morocco◦
Malaysia
1963–1966
Great Britain and Malaysia vs. Indonesia
Congo
1964
Government army vs. Simba rebels△
Dominican
1965
Government army and United States vs. Insurgents△*
Republic
Kashmir
1965
Pakistan vs. India△
Indonesia
1965
Army vs. Communist Party△*
Peru
1965–present Government army vs. Insurgents, various move△ments◦: Conventional war among nations△: Civil war
×: Post-colonial war of independence△*: Civil war with significant foreign-country involvement(Trans. note: Select conflict types have been slightly revised.“Present” is as of the writing of
this book.)

70
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

However, there is clear danger in a situation where states with enormous amounts of weapons that are engaged in an arms race confront
one another. The arms control approach acknowledges that states havethose weapons and seeks to reduce the possibility that they will be used,solving the problem by establishing or recovering trust in one another.
Even without trust or goodwill, this approach might reduce the possibility that force will be used and such a reduction might even be a firststep toward recovering trust. Accordingly, the best thing to do would
be to make it clear that using arms will result in losses by both sides.
It is also important to reduce the possibility of accidental war. Furthermore, outbreaks of unrestrained arms races must be kept in check.
Such are the objectives of arms control.
The first step is to create invulnerable deterrence capabilities. This isaccomplished by setting up early warning systems, strengthening command and control of armed forces, and ensuring that one’s retaliatory
capability can survive a preemptive strike by stationing missiles underground or at sea on Polaris missile submarines.
Thus, if a preemptive strike is not seen as offering an advantage,
the possibility of carrying out a premeditated preemptive strike, or of
war breaking out due to fears of such a strike, or of an accidental war
occurring due to the need for rapid retaliation will disappear. Science
fiction works depicting nuclear war often include a scenario in which
one side interprets a blip on the radar screen as indicating a missile,causing that side to launch missiles aimed at the enemy’s homeland,
resulting in a total nuclear war. The reason for this is the urgency withwhich a critical decision must be made. If, however, our deterrence
capability is invulnerable, we can take enough time to gather sufficientevidence to decide. Therefore, it will no longer be possible for an accidental war to break out.
71
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

Second, it is necessary for states to refrain from provoking others
and raising tensions by arming themselves more than they need for
deterrence. Examples of such moves would be to start large-scale civilian-defense preparations or to develop anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs).
The reason is because any such step would upset the balance achievedby the fact that both sides have deterrence capabilities. If one side built
a large-scale civilian-defense system with enough bomb shelters that it
could keep most of its people safe, that side would not have to worry
about a nuclear strike from the opposite party. In short, it would upset
the balance by rendering the other side’s deterrence capabilities ineffective. Introducing ABMs would have similar effects. However, such steps
would invite countermeasures, which could trigger an arms race or evenencourage a suicidal preemptive strike. Such steps must not be taken.
Arms control can be undertaken unilaterally, as well as by mutual
agreement. Even if one side acts unilaterally, there is still the expectation that the other party will reciprocate; if this does not happen,
then the side that took the initiative will reconsider its position. Thus,
it might be better to say that the first party’s acts are based on a tacit
understanding. The Soviet Union’s declaration of a nuclear-testing
moratorium 1958 would be a good example of this.
To push that principle even further, it would be possible for bothsides to rid themselves of those portions of its arsenal that are not needed
as a deterrent. The proponents of arms control say that such controls would also include disarmament. Even if tensions unfortunately
increased and an armed conflict occurred, it would be possible to avoid
total war through restraints on the use of weapons. Current US strategy
as espoused by Robert S. McNamara is a good example of this thinking.
In international politics, when an armed conflict occurs, the countries involved will be forced to decide whether to use force to impose
72
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacetheir will or yield to their opponent’s will. If one country has not managed to impose its will on its opponent after having used a certain
amount of force, it must then decide whether to use more force or toaccede to its opponent’s will. However, if even greater force is still ineffective, or if it only results in greater damage to itself, then it will end
up acceding to its opponent’s demands.
This understanding about the relationship between the use ofarmed force and its effects is basic to current strategic theories, suchas those of McNamara and of the French strategist André Beaufre.
Based on this understanding, McNamara first came up with the ideaof creating a versatile force—covering everything from an invulnerable
nuclear-strike force to special warfare capabilities for dealing with guerilla wars—that would be able to respond to all situations and then,to the extent possible, segmenting the stages at which each level offorce would be used.16 This approach would make it possible to use
whatever force was appropriate to the challenge that needed to be dealt
with. Next, McNamara aimed to have a stronger force than any potential opponent at each of these stages. This would strengthen the US
position, making it possible for the United States to prevent escalation
by an opponent, and in a worst-case scenario would enable the UnitedStates to escalate on its own. The “option” that is the core concept of
McNamara’s strategy is no less than the attempt to have a wide-ranging
capability to handle a variety of situations by always being ready todeter and to escalate.
To give a specific example, when the Soviet Union brought missiles
into Cuba, the United States engaged in the limited use of force byblockading the island. The United States applied pressure by raising thepossibility of escalation, i.e., the missile bases in Cuba would be attacked
if the Soviet Union did not withdraw its weapons (see Figure 2).
73
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmamentescalation

Control and pressuring
escalation through naval power
UnitedStatesnaval
blockademissiledeployment

SovietUnion
yield

Figure 2. The Cuba Example
The Soviet Union avoided the danger of escalation andyielded.
© CHUOKORON-SHINSHA, INC.

Simultaneously, the United States preempted Soviet escalation throughits overall military superiority, including the naval forces surrounding
Cuba. This is why the Soviet Union had no choice but to yield.
In contrast, in the case of South Vietnam, the United States was
unable to deal with the guerilla war when it limited its involvement
to dispatching advisers to the South Vietnamese army. The UnitedStates did not wish to yield, and therefore it chose to escalate—that is,
it deployed ground forces and launched airstrikes against the North. In
this case, too, the total superiority of the United States prevented any
escalation by its opponents.
However, this is not to say that the United States could escalate
without limit, nor do so frivolously. There are tangible and intangible
costs to any use of force, and those costs increase as escalation continues. Accordingly, the military power of both strong and weak countries
must be evaluated in terms of the costs and effects of its use. Althoughto yield to one’s opponent is a loss, the use of force also comes with74
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacelosses, and those that come with escalation are even greater. However,the use of force might inflict even greater losses on the opponent thanif that party were simply to yield, and those losses would be still greaterin the event of escalation.
Accordingly, the least bad option will be chosen after having compared (1) the costs of yielding to the opponent, (2) the costs of the useof force and its expected effects, and (3) the costs of the use of force
and its expected effects at the next stage. Thus, military power can beseen in this sense as a means by which you choose the least evil option.
Interactions between States in Confrontation
Viewed this way, it is evident that the approach of arms control, whichassumes that two parties will use their forces carefully and practiceself-restraint, is characterized by its focus on the correlation between
armament and the intentions of one’s opponent. Creating versatilecapabilities and maintaining a stable and reliable retaliatory capability
based on invulnerable deterrence represent two ways to create a systemthat enables the use of force with self-restraint. Both the construction
and the use of armament should be decided by paying attention to theintentions of one’s opponent. It is not enough for armament simply to
be powerful. It must also be deployed in a way that will minimize thepossibility that either side will use force. Even when the use of force
becomes inevitable, such use must be kept to a minimum—the minimum level required to have the desired effect on one’s opponent.
To achieve this, communications between rivals must be established. When a conflict unfortunately intensifies, there is a clear needto limit one’s own objectives while encouraging one’s opponent toaccept one’s objective however grudgingly. At the same time, evenduring an armed conflict, communications must be maintained with
75
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

one’s opponent so as to facilitate concessions or compromise. If thatis not accomplished, restricting the use of armament will not be very
meaningful. Maintaining such communications is a matter of common sense, and quite conventional wisdom. It is widely known thatfrom the moment the Russo-Japanese War began, Japan’s leaders werealready wondering how to end the war. They kept channels for negotiations open and made an effort to take advantage of any sign of abreakthrough. People laud them for this as a demonstration of their
wisdom, but the fact is that it is just the way that traditional diplomacy
was regularly conducted.
Thus, arms control is built upon two pillars: mutual self-restraint
in armaments and keeping channels of communication open. In the
aforementioned case of the Cuban blockade as well the United States
exercised self-restraint in its use of military power and maintained adequate communications through exchanges of letters between US president John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. This
both prevented any miscalculations that could have led to war, andhelped the two to reach a compromise.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the product of a Soviet attempt tochange a balance of power that had been favorable to the US. After
having foiled this attempt, Kennedy focused on stabilizing the balance with the Soviet Union. This led to the conclusion of the Partial
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which prohibited the developmentof ABMs.
As noted earlier, if either side had developed an anti-ballistic missile the balance of terror would have been disrupted. However, once
atmospheric testing became impossible as a result of the PTBT, thedevelopment of anti-ballistic missiles also became impossible. Tensions eased because both the United States and the Soviet Union
76
Chapter 1: Arms and Peaceconfirmed that neither had any intention to change the balance intheir existing forces. The establishment of a direct phone connection
between the United States and the Soviet Union made communications much easier. Although both sides still had nuclear weapons, thepossibility of their use had been reduced. Thomas Schelling, a leading
theorist on arms control, describes such control as comprising “all theforms of military cooperation among potential enemies,”17 and statesthat thanks to the PTBT an arms control system had come into being.
Thus, arms control had already had a significant effect.
Since arms control acknowledges the role of military power ininternational politics, possessing such power and using it appropriately
is a necessary condition for maintaining peace. Thus, it amounts to“peace through power.” And yet one could still say that it is underpinned by human wisdom in that it has a structure that encourages
self-restraint in the use of that power.
China’s Development of Nuclear Weapons
Though it might be somewhat softer, arms control has its limits as aform of peace through power. Its shortcomings cannot be overlooked
in a world where nuclear weapons exist. First, it is a strategy best suited
to an antagonistic bipolar system where two superpowers, such as theUnited States and the Soviet Union, dominate all other nations. It
stabilizes this status quo. The status quo is currently favorable to theUS; thus, stabilization implies consolidating that balance in favor of
the US. Earlier, we saw how reducing or restricting armament in reality serves to consolidate the status quo; arms control functions in thesame way. In fact, the reason why tensions between the United States
and the Soviet Union were eased by arms control is that throughout
the Cold War after World War II both parties have acknowledged the77
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmamentfutility and impossibilities of attempting to change the status quo, andthe Soviet Union had given up on building up an advantageous position in that balance between these two nations.
Accordingly, when something challenges this peace between the
United States and the Soviet Union, the status quo—which had beenstabilized temporarily by arms control—could be disrupted by one orboth expanding its military. The most realistic possibility now is that
the United States might respond to China’s development of nuclear
weapons by trying to develop an ABM system. Given its strong suspicions of China, instead of acknowledging mutual deterrence the US
might use its enormous economic power to create an ABM system.
This would allow the US to maintain the situation in which it could
launch a nuclear strike without any fear of Chinese retaliation. However, any US ABM system would pose a grave problem for the Soviet
Union as well because it would render the Soviet deterrent ineffective.
The Soviets probably would also attempt to develop similar weapons.
There is sufficient risk of a renewed arms race. The problematic aspectof the balance of power—i.e., that any attempt by a country to preserve its advantage will generate instability—unsurprisingly is problematic for arms control, too.
In addition, even if the turmoil caused by China’s possession of
nuclear weapons is solved, some other country might also come tohave them. As the number of nuclear states rises, instability also
grows. As we have seen before, communications among nuclear states
are indispensable for arms control. However, such communications
become all the more complicated and difficult when the number ofsuch states increases.
Despite all these challenges, there is no way to stop nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapon states lack the legitimacy to tell non-nuclear
78
Chapter 1: Arms and Peacestates that they cannot go nuclear; all they can do is try to pressure
them not to.
Second, arms control can create a precarious peace at best, which
will be a serious problem in the long run. For one thing, arms control does not eliminate small-scale armed conflicts; furthermore—to
be more precise—the more that the danger of an all-out nuclear war
is reduced by arms control, the less concerned people might become
about the risk of escalation in exercising force in limited wars. In fact,
numerous limited wars have broken out since the end of World War II.
How to reduce such conflicts will be a big issue for decades to come.
To address this, it has been suggested that the major powers stop
dragging small countries into their confrontations, that weapons sales
be banned, and that military assistance and alliances be forbidden.
However, there are great difficulties when it comes to implementing
such proposals in today’s world, where nations are increasingly interdependent and where, aside from military relationships, economic andideological influences also are at work. The efforts that a small country may take to balance pressure from one major power by turning
to another for help cannot be denied. Thus, it is highly doubtful that
limited wars can be eliminated through arms control.
The Psychological Dangers of Arms Control
More importantly, eliminating nuclear weapons is not the objective ofarms control. The objective is to reduce the possibility of arms being
used by treating deterrent capabilities as something meant to be reliable and stable. Hence, it does not fundamentally eliminate fear anddoubt. As Schelling has said, the situation of two confronting parties
each having deterrents sufficiently powerful to keep one another hostage resembles the hostage exchanges used in the past.18 That is to say,
79
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

the situation is such that should total war break out the invulnerable
deterrent capabilities of each side make it certain that each would suffer tremendous casualties; therefore, no matter how much enmity they
may feel neither side can resort to total war. However, keeping one
another hostage in this way may be the only way to keep the peace, but
the problem is this is a peace full of fear and doubt. Social psychologist
Erich Fromm has spoken of the long-term effects that such a peace
has on human psychology. He argues that when the threat of destruction is constant, most humans will present certain neurotic symptoms
including fear, hostility, and apathy. This leads to a disinterest in thevalues that we hold most dear, and turns us into savages with very
advanced weaponry.
Thus, even a stable balance of terror stills contains the danger thatone side might eventually decide to use conventional nuclear weapons.
Living for a long time with such fear and doubt is not healthy for thehuman spirit.
The dangers of arms control are vanishingly slight in the short-term,
but as they build over time there is the potential for a major catastrophe to result. Furthermore, arms control does not contain the means
for turning an uncertain peace into a stable one. Theoretically, arms
control measures might include disarmament, but ridding the worldof weapons is not its goal. Arms control proponents themselves admitthat it does not have a well-defined ultimate objective. They argue that
there is no way to solve the problems of war, peace, and international
conflict in a single stroke, and that everlasting vigilance and determination will be needed to maintain peace at each stage of the reduction
process, including after total reduction has been achieved. There iscertainly much truth to this. However, without a clearly defined goal,
even partial disarmament or tension-easing measures seem impossible.
80
Chapter 1: Arms and PeaceWe need not only to find our way through a world of uncertain peace,but also make that world better.
This leads to the issue of phased unilateral disarmament. Its proponents recognize that it is not useful to try to simply reduce arms ina politically tense international relationship. However, they argue, itwould also be a mistake to take it for granted that the tensions and mistrust will be permanent. Undeniably, having weapons raises tensions
and reducing them helps to relieve tensions. Disarmament does ease
political tensions to some degree, or at least provides an opportunity
to take steps in that direction. The more that tensions are eased, thegreater the possibility of eliminating weapons. Proponents of phased
unilateral disarmament thus argue that attempting to create such a virtuous cycle should be the fundamental objective of disarmament.
The Difficulty of Phased Unilateral Disarmament
These proponents criticize the traditional view that disarmament isonly possible by mutual agreement. They argue that if one party takes
unilateral steps to reduce weapons to a degree that it poses no danger
to itself and the other party’s response is favorable, the first party will
be inclined to take a second step. This first stage is a symbolic one.
The first party shows it is trying to ease tensions by declaring its newpolicy, ceasing to make hostile statements, and cooperating to avoid
any accidental wars. If these measures succeed and tensions ease, bothparties then remove any punitive restrictions on travel and trade they
may have imposed, stand down their armed forces, and start making
cutbacks on their conventional weapons. Finally, they reduce their
nuclear stockpiles based on the principles of reciprocity and balance.
This is like a game or a strategy in that at each stage each party observes
the impact each measure has on its counterpart while gradually disarming
81
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

in a way that does not leave it at a decisive disadvantage. The game calls
for clearing numerous stages to achieve one’s objective. The players refrainfrom rushing headlong toward the goal and use various means to try to
influence the intentions (psychology) of their opponent. They observe
their opponent’s responses and come up with further measures. The process calls for cool calculation; it is not a matter of simple idealism. Asidefrom the fact that tension-easing measures are the only means for carrying out phased unilateral disarmament, the process for each party to
try to change the other’s mind is the same as it is for arms control. Bothcall for the same sequence of moves: first Party A takes a step, then Party
B responds in kind, after which Party A takes a step based on Party B’s
response, and so on back and forth. It is an approach to disarmament thatincorporates strategic thinking.
However, there is still the question of how far this more realistic
approach to disarmament can go. The difficulties increase markedly
when going from the second to third stages. Once again, it is unlikelythat disarmament can be achieved without some kind of control mechanism. Both sides probably would agree to disarm once such a bodywas in place, since tension-easing measures would already have been
pursued to create it. That said, getting the parties to agree on what sortof control mechanism is needed would not be easy. As already noted,
one reason why the Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan in 1946
was because they did not trust the control mechanism that was to becreated. It is only natural that the Soviet Union would not trust any
mechanism powerful enough to control disarmament whose principles were not consistent with its own. Moreover, numerous other guiding principles can be found throughout the world. Thus, this issue ofwhat a control mechanism is and how it works must be addressed inorder to achieve any truly meaningful disarmament.
82
Chapter 1: Arms and PeaceGiven the time that would be needed to create such a mechanism
owing to the difficulties involved, there will be a transitional period
where arms control will be the most realistic approach. Arms control
overlaps considerably with phased unilateral disarmament, and teaches
us various methods for coping with those times when tensions are sadly
again on the rise. There is no guarantee that tension-easing measures
will solve all conflicts. Tougher measures such as a limited use of force
at times may be necessary. Therefore, states will need to be flexible andgo back and forth between tension-easing measures and tougher ones
while watching how their opponents respond. They will need to act
wisely and aim at moderating and ultimately easing those tensions.
Certainly, as Schelling has argued, if humans have the ability to
first reduce armaments and then perpetually avoid any future arms
races, then it could be argued that they also have the ability to sustain
a world with armaments without using them. Though the peace that
arms control provides may be an uncertain one, that this peace can beachieved just by managing armaments is the best that can be expected.
To single-mindedly emphasize ridding the world of armaments ismeaningless and impossible. It is an extreme example, but even if all
nuclear weapons could be destroyed, the possibility of nuclear war
would not go away. Since we already know how to make such weapons, if any armed conflict broke out humans might make them again.
Of course, military power is dangerous, and, as with all formsof power, it is particularly so when it is not used wisely. It must be
wielded with the greatest of care and with as much wisdom as possible. However, in the end it is not weapons that create tension—it
is tension that makes weapons necessary. It is an inconvenient reality,
but those tensions are not produced by some specific evil person or
influence. It is we humans who are the source of tensions. To show
83
III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmamenthow this is the case, in the next chapter I will address the relationshipbetween economic activities and international politics, and in particular the problems of trade and human interactions. At a glance these areunquestionably peaceful activities, but if we look closely we can findthe very sources of tensions even within them.

84
Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

CHAPTER

2ECONOMIC EXCHANGESAND PEACE
child’s first tears are prayers,“Thebeware
lest they become commands; he begins by asking for aid,
he ends by demanding service. Thus
from his own weakness, the sourceof his first consciousness of dependence, springs the later idea of ruleand tyranny.” (emphases added) JeanJacques Rousseau, Emile, 176219

85
I. Economics and Power Politics

I. Economics and Power Politics

The Optimism over Free Trade
It has long been believed that economic exchange among nations is
the most fundamental means for creating a peaceful world. This view
remains widely accepted today. Nations are linked through four kindsof economic activity: foreign trade, international investment, international finance, and immigration. It is therefore assumed that if political factors could be ignored these activities would reach over borders tocreate links among national economies. In foreign trade, people would
seek out the highest quality goods, and trade would ceaselessly grow.
Both international investment and international finance are based on
the quest for the most favorable conditions. Immigration is based on
the quest for higher standards of living. It was thought that these activities would make people’s lives richer and that, at the same time, conflict among nations would naturally disappear.
The eighteenth-century physiocrats were the first to develop thisidea in a coherent fashion. They opposed the mercantilist policies thatstrictly limited trade between nations, and called for the unrestrictedflow of goods. They argued that this would make nations more interdependent and lead to greater prosperity for all. Physiocrats saw allnations as sharing the same interests. In their view, there was nothing to be gained from territorial expansion, and once goods could flow
freely there would be no need for war. They described their policies as“economic” ones, and distinguished them from the power politics of86
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peacethe day. They believed their policies to be based on the “correct economic principles” of free trade. In the words of eighteenth-century
theorist Nicolas Baudeau:
The essence of power politics consists of divergence of interests;
that of economic policy of unity of interests—the one leads towar, frustrations, destruction, the other to social integration,
cooperation, and free and peaceful sharing of the fruits of work.20
Although Baudeau’s near-contemporary the eminent Immanuel Kant
did not see the connection between trade and peace in such simple
terms, he did argue that trade could produce mutual benefits andthereby bring peoples closer together. Nature might urge people toseparate themselves based on differences in language and religion, hesaid, but it would unite them based on “mutual self-interest” and specifically through the spirit of commerce.
The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner orlater it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces
which lie at the command of a state, the power of money isprobably the most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled—not, it is true, exactly from motives of morality—tofurther the noble end of peace and to avert war, by means ofmediation, wherever it threatens to break out, just as if they had
made a permanent league for this purpose.21
As noted, in the early nineteenth century free trade was seen as providing the greatest hope for peace. It was believed that with free trade,any increase in the wealth of one nation would result in an increase87
I. Economics and Power Politics

in the wealth of all nations. Free trade’s proponents believed this sostrongly that they remained confident it would be so even to the endof the nineteenth century when nations began to adopt protectionist
policies. Anyone who had even a basic understanding of modern trade,they argued, should recognize that any nation that adopted protectionist policies would lose to those that did not.
Some still think the same today. Raymond Aron, who defines thepresent as the age of the industrial civilization, speaks of an imbalance
between developed and undeveloped countries.
[P]rogress made in one area may help with progress in another.
Some people may find that surprising, but take Brazil for an
example. The northeastern part of Brazil is desolate and undeveloped, but the state of São Paulo to the south is developed andrelatively affluent. Now, does the northeast owe its poverty to
the south? If the northeast develops, will São Paulo inevitably
decline? Clearly, such is not the case.22
The idea that trade creates “mutual interests” is as old and as deeply
rooted as ideas about disarmament.
The Twofold Function of the Wealth of Other Nations
However, as with arms reduction, the track record of free trade as ameans for achieving peace is not a particularly encouraging one. Tradeamong nations never became free, and it did not create a peacefulworld. Certainly, in the latter half of the nineteenth century both tradeand international investment grew phenomenally. A considerable
number of countries adopted free trade, and movement across borders
became freer. Unquestionably, Europe in the nineteenth century was
88
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peaceunprecedented for the openness of its economies and the freedom of
movement for goods and peoples across borders.
However, not all nations adopted free trade. For example, theUnited States, which was seen as being like a part of Europe despite
being located across the Atlantic, erected a high tariff wall against foreign goods though it did welcome foreign investment. Prussia likewise
had been protectionist since the middle of the century, based on thetheories of the talented and fiercely nationalistic economist Friedrich
List (1789–1846). List believed that the goal of a national economy
should not be to maximize exchangeable value or the total volume of
products as measured in price terms for international trade. Rather, hebelieved the goal for a national economy should be broad development
so that the nation’s productive capabilities did not become distorted.
The economic activities of individuals, meanwhile, could be focusedon obtaining as much exchangeable value as possible through the division of labor. However, individuals and nations are different. Nations
must prioritize unity and independence. Otherwise, there will be no
security, welfare, progress, or culture for its constituent members.
To satisfy these goals, he argued, a nation’s industrial capacity must
be developed in many sectors. In addition, although many countries
had adopted free trade, it generated not only mutual interests but alsomutual competition and antagonism. In fact, the revival of protectionism in the 1870s was brought about by such competition and antagonism. Economists had persuasively argued that increasing the wealthof one nation would eventually increase the wealth of all nations.
However, neither politicians nor the person in the street found thisargument easy to accept.
The difficulty lay in the fact that the scale and structure of a nation’s
economy are basic components of national power, and consequently
89
I. Economics and Power Politics

they strongly impact how international power politics play out. Generally speaking, wealth has a twofold function. Even a proponent oflaissez-faire economics like Adam Smith (1723–1790) recognized this.
The wealth of a neighbouring nation, however, though dangerous in war and politics, is certainly advantageous in trade. In astate of hostility it may enable our enemies to maintain fleets
and armies superior to our own; but in a state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to exchange with us to agreater value, and to afford a better market, either for the immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchasedwith that produce. (emphases added)23
This dual nature led Smith to criticize the mercantilist view that any
gains made by other nations were a loss to one’s own nation. This was
surely correct in the historical context of the times. However, while
the wealth of neighboring nations might be beneficial to one’s own intimes of peace, in wartime it might present a danger; so long as wars
and the struggle for power play significant roles in international society, a nation cannot afford to simply welcome the wealth of its neighbors without being cautious.
As the term “Pax Britannica” suggests, for the half-century fromthe 1815 Congress of Vienna to the end of the 1870s, Great Britain
was preeminent and led all other nations in its success with industrialization and its near-monopoly status in global economics. To takethe example of steel production, which was regarded as an indicator ofnational power, from 1870 to 1874 Britain manufactured 6.4 million
tons of steel every year on average. This amount far exceeded the 5.2
million tons of the combined total production of Germany, France,
90
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peaceand the United States. Britain held similarly overwhelming dominancein the coal and cotton-spinning industries. It was literally the “world’s
factory.” Furthermore, Britain provided capital to many other countries, and it had near-monopoly status in shipping as well.
Of course, wealth alone does not in itself furnish the power todominate other nations. The fact is, during the peaceful first half ofthe nineteenth century Britain’s wealth also benefited other nations.
The crucial point here is that Britain made clever use of its economic
dominance. Moreover, because it was a naval power with little in theway of ground forces, it did not pose a direct threat to other European
countries. In addition, Britain had to import most goods. It always
ran a trade deficit. This adverse trade balance was offset by the interest
payments on its foreign investments and by income from the shipping
industry as well as technology exports, which was based on the smooth
flow of capital and afforded other nations enough economic opportunities of their own.
Nevertheless, Great Britain played the role of the world’s factory
while other states provided raw materials and food. This division oflabor may have been economically advantageous to Britain, but it waspolitically satisfying to other countries from the perspectives of theirstatus in international power politics and preserving national independence. The structure of the international economy at that time may
have seen some degree of cooperation, but unquestionably other countries were highly dependent on Britain. Needless to say, such dependency can easily lead to the dependent nations being dominated.
Rousseau’s Pessimism
Rousseau was critical of the optimistic view that economic exchange
would create peace. His chief argument was based on that point. He
91
I. Economics and Power Politics

pointed out that the human need for interdependence cannot be separated from the development of dominant-dependent relationships. In
an impressionistic passage from Emile, he wrote the following:
The child’s first tears are prayers, beware lest they become commands; he begins by asking for aid, he ends by demanding
service. Thus from his own weakness, the source of his first consciousness of dependence, springs the later idea of rule and tyranny. (emphases added)
Here, Rousseau is talking about children. Although he famously said,“A child is not a small adult,” his observation still applies to humans ingeneral. In short, there is no guarantee that the need humans have forother humans will create friendly relations between them. The same
holds true when it comes to relations among nations. Increased interdependence often results in one nation being controlled by another.
Accordingly, the quest in international politics for each nation toachieve self-sufficiency arises from more than just a narrow understanding of its own circumstances; self-sufficiency is important for
maintaining national independence. However, while every nation
aspires to remain independent, they do not take the independence ofother nations as seriously as they do their own. Also, it is difficult for
any one nation to be completely self-sufficient. This was all the more
so in the nineteenth century as industrialization steadily progressed.
Thus, in its quest to free itself from dependence on the British economy, Germany attempted to quickly expand its own economic
sphere by subordinating other countries. In essence, its prayers for
self-sufficiency quickly led to command over others. Other nations
also sought to expand their respective economic spheres of influence.
92
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peace

These quests to expand national economic spheres of influence led tointernational conflicts.
Industrialization and Power Politics
Just as Britain’s industrialization ahead of other nations in the earlynineteenth century had a significant impact on the structure of power
politics, the industrialization of other European powers such as Franceand Germany in Britain’s wake in the middle of the century likewise
had a considerable impact of its own.
First, the growing power of a unified Germany based on its successful industrialization upset the existing balance of power on the continent. Neither the unification of Germany nor the growth of its power
could have been possible without its successful industrialization. Thisis represented by the development of the railroad. When Italy became
united in 1860 people had spoken of how the railways would sew up
the peninsula’s long boot, but that remark was all the more apropos
with regard to Germany.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Germany was aconfederation of numerous independent feudal principalities. Its subsequent unification was achieved thanks to the railways and the flourishing of economic exchange within Germany itself. Friedrich List, infact, had stressed railway construction and was also one of the leading
advocates of establishing the Zollverein (German Customs Union).
History has proven his advocacy to have been correct.
But before German unification the European balance of power
had been maintained by the fragmentation of the vast ethnically German population and its relative impoverishment. It is well known
that then-Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich (1773–1859)
had made serious efforts at the Congress of Vienna to keep Germany
93
I. Economics and Power Politics

Table 2. Comparisons and Trends in the Volumes of Coal (top) and Pig Iron (bottom) Production (in millions of tons)
Germany
Austria-Hungary
FranceGreat Britain
RussiaUnited States

1860
12.0
2.3
8.3
0.9
81.0
3.9
0.15
3.4
0.8

1870
34.0
1.3
8.6
0.4
13.3
1.2
112.0
6.0
0.75
0.40
10.0
1.7

1880
59.0
2.5
15.0
0.5
19.4
1.7
149.0
7.8
3.2
0.4
64.9
3.9

1890
89.0
4.1
26.0
0.7
26.1
2.0
184.0
8.0
6.0
0.9
143.0
9.4

1900
149.0
7.5
39.0
1.5
33.4
2.7
228.0
9.0
16.2
2.9
244.0
14.0

1910
222.0
9.5
47.0
2.0
38.4
4.0
268.0
10.0
24.9
3.0
356.0
27.0

1914
277.0
14.7
47.0
2.0
40.0
4.6
292.0
11.0
36.2
3.6
455.0
30.0

divided. What did happen, however, is that Germany did become unified and then became prosperous thanks to the hard work and outstanding organizational skills of the German people. This upset theEuropean balance of power.
The development of railways also turned the geographical factorsthat had put Germany at a military disadvantage into an advantage.
Previously, Germany’s location in the center of Europe made defending
its borders virtually impossible. Official German documents make itplain that border defense was a constant source of concern. However,the development of a railway network made it possible for Germany
to dispatch its army quickly to anywhere along its borders. That not
only made it possible for Germany to defend all of its borders, butalso to attack along all of them. In other words, Germany had beentransformed from a nation that any country could defeat into one that
could take on all challengers and win.
Second, Europe’s countries expanded to all corners of the world,
overwhelmed all they encountered, and established dominance.
Of course, Europe had already been expanding since the start of the94
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peaceearly-modern period. European dominance became decisive in the latter half of the nineteenth century once industrial civilization—as represented by the steamship and the railway—had been established. The
1853 arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry’s so-called “black ships” inJapan, which left the latter with no choice but to open its borders, wassymbolic. Japan had been able to keep the Westerners who had comethere on sailing ships at the start of the seventeenth century at a distance by adopting a policy of seclusion, but this was no longer possible
when their successors came by steamship.
Nations that had industrialized could boast of their overwhelming strength over those that had not. Furthermore, modern industrial
civilization was extremely self-assertive. This assertiveness arose out ofa cycle that began with the human desire to see visible progress, followed by the creation of an ideology of industrialism. The power ofthat ideology in turn stirred up the desire to achieve further improvements. Speaking of Europe’s global expansion—that is to say, imperialism—Hans Kohn appears to have been correct in his observation,“Inequality in the level of civilization and civilizing energy are of thevery essence of imperialism.”24
Europeans were also confident that they were providing the world
with their superior civilization. Critic of imperialism John Hobson
made it plain just how widely held that belief was.
So far, we have established two tentative principles. First, that
all interference on the part of civilised white nations with “lower
races” is not primâ facie illegitimate. Second, that such interference cannot safely be left to private enterprise of individual
whites. If these principles be admitted, it follows that civilised
Governments may undertake the political and economic control
95
I. Economics and Power Politics

of lower races—in a word, that the characteristic form of modern Imperialism is not under all conditions illegitimate.25
Thus, the two aforementioned changes can be seen as industrialization having caused power to expand in two directions, which in turnprovoked all-out struggles for power. In short, industrialization caused
power to expand both vertically and horizontally. It also made it possible for political power to mobilize domestic resources more effectively.
The Mobilization of the Masses Due to Industrialization
From a political perspective, these developments made it possible formore people to participate in politics, which then allowed states tomobilize their power. This caused a remarkable growth in the politicalpower of states. Technology played a major role in this phenomenon.
The development of advanced technology—particularly in theareas of transportation and communications—made it easier for astate to govern. It therefore became possible to allow people to participate in politics while still governing them. Previously, mass participation in politics was technologically impossible. Any attempt to obtain
mass participation likely would have resulted in uncontrollable chaos.
Consequently, given these limitations on actual participation, most of
the populace were in a political sense mere objects. Inasmuch as it is
impossible to take advantage of a population’s full potential throughthis form of political power, the power obtained can never be great.
Owing to the new technologies, it became possible to allow theentire nation to actively participate in politics while still maintaining order. Consequently, states were now in a position to fully mobilize the potential of the entire nation and dramatically increase theirown political power. Hence, the processes of democratization and the96
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peaceexpansion of political power have been inextricably linked. The German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) spoke of “the fundamental democratization of society.” He saw participation in politics bypeople who had previously not done so and the expansion of politicalpower as two sides of the same coin. From an economic perspective,
this change was tantamount to establishing a national economy andexpanding its importance; viewed in psychological terms, this can beseen as the growth of nationalism and the increased identification of
the individual with the state.
The horizontal expansion of political power grew into the phenomenon of imperialism. Imperialism saw Europe extend its dominanceover the world, and it also encouraged the quest to create even larger
political units. As Kohn had observed, the nations of Europe were able
to expand globally due to “differences in the levels of civilization andcivilizing energy,” and that was thought both to be good and also to benecessary. The 1860s was a period in which these imperialistic sensibilities grew stronger. The Italian unification (the Risorgimento), thereunification of the North and the South at the end of the Civil War
in the United States, and the unification of Germany were important
stimuli here. These developments were taken as evidence that large
political units had become necessary.
What’s more, the predictions made some thirty years earlier by
French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) that theworld of the future would be ruled by the two enormously powerfulnations of the United States and Russia, have proven to have a ring oftruth. For that reason, both scholars and politicians alike in Europe
in the mid-1860s argued over and over that their countries needed
to claim more colonies in order to avoid descending to “third-rate”
status. This was the same whether one is discussing Britain, France,
97
I. Economics and Power Politics

or Germany. Such ideas were the driving force for the imperialistic
advances of the late-nineteenth century.
Thus, the expansion of power that industrialization producedchanged the structure of global power politics, and laid the groundwork for the further changes that led to the two world wars of thetwentieth century. German historian Ludwig Dehio brilliantly
described this process in his Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century. He observed that while Germany became a dominant
player in Europe around 1890, in view of the development of theUnited States and Russia, Germany knew that this dominance was notdestined to last. Accordingly, Germany wanted to turn the European
power balance into a global one in which Germany would hold an
important position. However, doing so would set Germany on a collision course with Great Britain and other powers.
World War I began under such circumstances. That war made theneed for even larger political units all the more obvious. The outcomesof major wars would depend upon the economic power of the nations
in conflict. When Germany was blockaded, it lost its ability to fightthe United States and Great Britain, which were able to use resourcesfrom around the world. Accordingly, after World War I, each nation
made frantic efforts to expand its respective sphere of influence. Germany attempted to create its Lebensraum (“living space”), while Japan
worked to fashion a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” This
eventually brought about World War II.
Thus, rather than bring peace to the world, the interdependence produced by industrialization itself proved to be the cause of a major war.

98
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peace

II. Separating Power Politics and Economic Exchange

The US and Soviet Spheres of Influence
The bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union thatdeveloped after World War II is the product of the long historical process described above. Both countries possess enormous amounts of territory and varied populations, both have been successful at integrating
them, and both have great power. National income is another indicatorof overall national capabilities. As of 1962, there was a marked difference
between the United States, with a national income of US$450.3 billion,
the Soviet Union at US$170 billion, and third-ranked West Germany at
US$68.3 billion. That gap had been even greater immediately following
World War II. In terms of military strength, both the United States andthe Soviet Union, as victors of that conflict, had armed forces incomparably greater than those of any other nations. Hans Morgenthau, whocoined the term “bipolarity,” argued that the power of other nations had
no influence on the balance between the United States and the Soviet
Union. It was in this sense that he used “bipolarity,” which was certainly
appropriate at least when it came to military strength.
The United States (and also Western Europe) and the Soviet Union
reformed the political, economic, and social structures of the territories they occupied based on their respective sets of principles. It is wellknown that the Soviet Union imposed communism on the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the United States similarly
engaged in the democratization of Japan and West Germany and—in
99
II. Separating Power Politics and Economic Exchange

concert with Great Britain—created systems more to its own liking in
Italy and Greece. The situation was somewhat different when it cameto France, but it is highly doubtful that France would have been able
to create a system of any type that did not agree with American wishes.
Of course, it would be incorrect to say that considerations of power
politics were the only factor behind the reform of the systems in occupied territories; American idealism also played a role, as, for example
we have experienced here in Japan. However, there is no doubt thatthese changes have implications for power politics.
Soviet leader Josef Stalin responded candidly at the Potsdam Conference to Western demands for free elections in Central and Eastern
European countries by saying that freely chosen governments in any ofthese countries were likely to be anti-Soviet and that the USSR could
not accept this. Similarly, Great Britain was worried that the National
Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, EAM) would
gain control over Greece’s political life and so it applied relentlesspressure to prevent this. As was observed in retrospect, Great Britain’s
primary and most important interest was for the Greek government
to stay friendly toward Britain. The people who shaped British policy
toward Greece in the later years of World War II were convinced that
an EAM government would not be friendly.
Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union put their respective
blocs under the influence of their power. We should note however thatthese postwar spheres of influence differed in character from those that
had come before, in that the strong did not exploit the weak through the
naked use of force. This is the fundamental difference between the imperialism of the past and the US and Soviet spheres of influence of today.
Under the imperialism of the past, colonized territories were
exploited by the colonizer. However, aside from one or two exceptions,100
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peacethere has been no outright exploitation in the United States’ and theSoviet Union’s spheres of influence. Of course, at the end of WorldWar II the Soviet Union exploited the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the form of reparations, and in its subsequent economic
relations with those nations it clearly imposed on them conditions
favorable to itself. For instance, it frequently engaged in trade at prices
vastly at odds with the prevailing prices in international markets (forexample, coal that sold for US$15 to US$16 per ton on the world market was exported from Poland to the Soviet Union for a mere US$1 perton). For its part, US capital completely controlled and exploited the
Cuban economy. US interests owned more than 90 percent of Cuba’s
telephone- and electric power-related businesses, 50 percent of its railways, 40 percent of Cuba’s raw-sugar production, and nearly all of theisland’s livestock ranches and tourism facilities.
The End of Dominance and Dependence
However, the one-sided relationships described above would not belasting ones unless they were backed by coercion applied through theactual use of force. Today the constraints on the use of military power
are quite strong. For one thing, because the destructive capability ofsuch force has become so great, the dangers of its actual use have likewise grown. This is not to say that it is impossible for any wars to befought. Military power is still a source of leverage based on the possibility that it could be used, and in that sense, it remains a decisive
factor in international politics. However, it cannot be denied that suchforce can no longer be wielded very easily.
Second, the power of public opinion in international politics hasgrown. I will later come back to why this is so and how such powerfunctions, but in any case, it is an undeniable fact that the greater
101
II. Separating Power Politics and Economic Exchangeimportance of public opinion has constrained the use of military
power. Of course, public opinion is not binding, but there is no mistaking that a nation will find no advantage in choosing to act contrary
to public opinion.
After the Cuban Revolution occurred and Fidel Castro took ahardline stance toward the United States, the US could have applied
various sorts of pressure on Cuba, but it could not take direct action
to bring down the new Cuban government. The US was also worried
that similar revolutions would occur throughout Central and SouthAmerica, and it started to take the interests of those nations more seriously by working through the Alliance for Progress and similar initiatives. The Soviets adopted essentially the same stance toward Central
and Eastern Europe. The exploitative approach that the Soviet Union
used initially generated great dissatisfaction among those nations; that
dissatisfaction was itself the biggest factor behind the crisis the Soviet
bloc faced in Hungary in 1956. Even as it used considerable militaryforce to put down the Hungarian Uprising, the Soviet Union vastly
increased the loans it gave to Central and Eastern Europe (loans to
the nations there for 1956 and 1957 totaled more than US$1.2 billion, which was more than the US$1.1 billion total for the previous
decade). Furthermore, the Soviet Union allowed those nations to tradewith developing countries and—together with Western Europe—
assisted in their economic development. At the same time, the Soviets
strived to achieve economic integration of the Eastern bloc throughthe Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).
Meanwhile, the elements of dominance and dependence in therelationships between the superpowers and the nations in their spheresof influence weakened and at times became almost invisible. Although
the US and the Soviet Union still had the greater power and hence the102
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peace

ability to weigh in and have their way, those relationships nonethelesstook on a more cooperative tone.
This change was all the more apparent with regard to Western Europe.
Generally speaking, by the mid-1950s Europe had recovered from thewar and had started to develop economically. The European Economic
Community (EEC)’s success at regional economic integration gave it araw power not inferior to that of the US economy. Accordingly, both theUnited States and the Soviet Union realized that they would no longer
be able to change the status quo through brute strength, and thus they
put their confrontation on hold. Given that in terms of military strength
Western Europe remained inferior by far to both the United States andthe Soviet Union, it still had to rely on the United States for military
support. However, the easing of tensions between the two superpowers
reduced the region’s need to rely on that support.
For these two reasons, Western Europeans have gradually been able
to become more independent. NATO remains in place and discussions of all sorts continue. In other words, the character of the relations
changed from one of dominance-dependence to one of cooperation. A
similar change can be seen in the relationship between Japan and theUnited States. Likewise, as Romania’s recent behavior shows, Central
and Eastern Europeans are displaying greater independence in theirrelationship with the Soviet Union.
While notable, these changes are hardly surprising. To maintain asphere of influence around itself for a long time, a superpower needs
to keep its client nations within that sphere without resorting to naked
force. To manage this, it needs those client nations to find the dependent relationship to be in their own interest.
This situation can be seen in all types of power-related phenomena.
When a ruler uses naked force to gain power, he at first thinks only
103
II. Separating Power Politics and Economic Exchange

of pursuing his own interests. However, because that ruler wishes toremain in power, he finds he must look beyond the narrow pursuit ofself-interest and provide those he rules with a portion of the gains. The
same sort of natural law appears to have operated with respect to thepostwar US and Soviet spheres of influence. These spheres as they exist
today are not systems for exploitation based on brute force wieldedby the strong against the weak. They are systems useful to the mutualinterests of those involved. If anything, the fact is that the rulers haveto share benefits with those who are ruled.
Raymond Aron has written as follows on this point.
If one wants to prolong the pillage one must appropriate without payment, or at very low prices, the raw materials, producer
goods, and manufactured goods of the conquered people. The
Soviet rulers, imprisoned in an ideology in which they believe
after a fashion, aimed, in instituting régimes modelled on thatof Imperial Russia, to promote what they call socialism, and inany case, to establish a heavy industry and to develop naturaland human resources. In the long run, the combination of these
two undertakings—exploitation by the parent state and a highrate of investment—results in an intolerable reduction of thestandard of living in the satellite states. Since 1956 the Soviet
Union has been obliged to aid those countries which she hascolonized. That domination is costly instead of being profitable
is a new fact and derives from the conditions of industrial society. It cannot but influence international relations.
Analogous phenomena, only even more pronounced, haveappeared in the Western world. The hegemony exercised by
the U.S.A. was at once reflected in unprecedented budgets for
104
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peaceforeign aid. Since the end of the Second World War, the European nations have expended in their colonies, empires, or overseas possessions, however one chooses to call them, as much or
more than they have received from their American protector. . . .
In this century the glory of governing has to be its own reward.26
Thus, if we do not recognize that the nature of spheres of influence haschanged, it will not be possible to get a sense of how stable and strong
the US and Soviet spheres are. For example, although Japan cannot
make any moves that run explicitly counter to US wishes, it still does
have some degree of influence to constrain US behavior. Even if theirrespective degrees of influence over one another differ, the relationshipbetween these two nations is basically a cooperative one and useful totheir mutual interests. The United States gains from bilateral cooperation, and so, too, does Japan.
Cooperation or Dependence?
As industrialization progresses, industries break up and diversify incomplex ways. For that reason, the energy, raw materials, and equipment that those industries use likewise diversify. Similarly, demandalso becomes more diverse. Producing all of this within the bordersof one nation becomes impossible due to natural, economic, technological, and other conditions. Furthermore, there is no longer an
economic advantage to using only domestic human and material
resources. As a result, foreign trade grows in importance as industrialization progresses. In addition, increased industrialization makes mass
production more profitable, meaning that markets must also expand.
For these reasons, the need for economic exchange grows as industrialization proceeds. Economic integration and regular dialogue are
105
II. Separating Power Politics and Economic Exchange

necessary for this to occur smoothly. In fact, pressed by such needs, thealliances of both the East and the West are gradually becoming moreakin to systems of economic cooperation. Many no doubt alreadyrealize to some extent that economic cooperation may now be more
important than military cooperation for alliances.
However, we cannot draw any optimistic conclusions about thegeneral effect of the growth and changes in the nature of regional economic exchange. First, it should not be forgotten that exchange makes
it easy to create dependence, and dependence easily produces control.
This in fact has occurred within both the Soviet and US spheres ofinfluence. Like it or not, in negotiations with superpowers like theUnited States and the Soviet Union—or more generally speaking,between major and minor powers—the quality of a minor power’s government appears to be of decisive importance when it comes to protecting the minor power’s national interests. Both the Cuban regime of
Fulgencio Batista and the Hungarian regime of Mátyás Rákosi failed
to protect the interests of their respective peoples.
Naturally, given the qualitative differences in power between the
United States and the Soviet Union, the ways in which the Cuban andHungarian governments failed were somewhat different. The UnitedStates has not flexed its muscle through direct government intervention; rather, its power extends beyond its borders mainly through theactivities of private entities and other organizations. Governments
seek only the frameworks necessary for such activities—for example,
maintaining property rights, preserving law and order, and the like.
Consequently, the issue is whether the governments of minor powers
are up to the task of protecting their national economies through suchmeasures as taxing foreign investment, establishing tariffs, and rejecting irrational concessions.
106
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and PeaceIn contrast, the Soviet Union has extended its power to other countries through the political means of manipulating its connections withlocal communist parties. Given that the economies of communist
countries are highly regulated through planning, decisions about thoseeconomic plans are extremely important. Accordingly, for Soviet-bloc
nations such as Hungary, the issue becomes one of whether the communist parties that rule those nations are loyal to Moscow or to theirown people. Thus, although it takes somewhat different forms between
the two blocs, what matters is whether or not there are governmentsthat are trying to defend their own national interests.
At any rate, one must not forget that both the United States andthe Soviet Union have some influence over how governments are organized in the countries within their respective spheres of influence. If
nothing else, it is undeniable that any nation within either sphere of
influence would find it impossible to adopt any system of governmentthat differed from that of their respective superpower. I have alreadytouched on how the United States and the Soviet Union had largely
imposed their respective systems of government on the areas theyoccupied at the end of World War II. However, in 1956, Hungary
crossed the Soviet Union’s red line. When Hungary began to change
its political regime, the Soviets staged a large-scale intervention andblocked the change. Similarly, the United States discreetly but effectively intervened in the Italian elections of 1948 through the threat ofwielding its economic power. It also intervened in Central and SouthAmerican countries to prevent them from going communist, as exemplified by its attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba and its
dispatches of troops to Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
However, both the United States and the Soviet Union can usually prevent the emergence of political regimes they find unacceptable
107
II. Separating Power Politics and Economic Exchangewithin their respective blocs without such blatant interventions
because the relationship among the members of each bloc is useful totheir shared interests. In fact, from the end of World War II to today,
only three nations—Cuba, Yugoslavia, and Albania—have broken
away from the US and Soviet spheres of influence. It should also be
noted that each breakaway state has gone through great difficulties
since their respective separations. In light of how much leverage thesuperpowers have on the nations within their respective blocs, one
therefore cannot deny the possibility that the superpowers might usethat leverage to dominate and even oppress. That may have been thecase especially when the government of the minor power has rested on
weak foundations and has been particularly frail.
The Struggle for Economic Integration
Second, such attempts at regional integration can lead to rivalry withother such attempts. The more successful one attempt at integration is,
the greater the threat it inherently poses to those excluded from thatgroup. Conversely, as in the case of the European Economic Community (EEC), the presence of a threat makes integration that mucheasier. The nations of Europe—particularly France and Germany—
had frequently come into conflict, but the emergence of the common
Soviet threat opened the door for them to embark on regional integration. Of course, it would be incorrect to criticize all forms of regional
integration on that basis. The world is in many respects too large andtoo divided to achieve integration on a universal and global scale. Still,
it is clear that there are limits to regional integration.
The connection between economic integration and cooperation on
the one hand and their implications for power politics on the otheris the primary issue for international politics today when it comes to108
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peacerelations with developing countries. I have already discussed the US
and Soviet spheres of influence. Once those superpowers had clearly
defined the boundaries of their spheres, their interest shifted to thedeveloping countries. Starting in roughly the mid-1950s, both the
US and the Soviet Union began devoting much of their attention to
the question of how such countries would develop. The superpowers
spoke of the importance of providing those countries with models fordevelopment and in that connection began offering them economic
assistance. The following table suggests how closely US and Soviet economic aid has been tied to political objectives.
That said, while both the United States and the Soviet Union
have attempted to influence the construction of the economies inTable 3. Primary Recipients of Aid from the United States and the Soviet Union
and China
United States
Breakdown(distribution percent)Soviet Union and China
Breakdown(distribution percent)Total: US$4.665 billion (1962)
India
17.9%
Pakistan
9.4%
United Arab Republic (Egypt)
4.8%
Chile
4.6%
Brazil4.3%
South Korea
4.3%
Turkey4.1%South Vietnam
3.3%
Mexico
3.1%
Ghana
2.8%
Yugoslavia
2.5%
Congo
1.8%
Total: US$1.25 billion (1954–1962)
India
20.0%
Egypt
15.9%
Indonesia
12.1%
Afghanistan
12.1%
Cuba
8.1%
Iraq
8.1%
Syria
8.1%
Ghana
4.0%

Source: Ichimura Shin’ichi, Sekai no naka no Nihon keizai [Japan’s Economy in the World] (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1965).

109
II. Separating Power Politics and Economic Exchangedeveloping countries, neither has turned to the use of actual force forthat purpose. Accordingly, there has been no imminent threat of conflict between the two superpowers over economic development in suchcountries. In contrast, China’s having stepped into the picture with
its calls for popular uprisings and revolutions in developing countries
may bring political tension back into the world. This shows that economic relations cannot be separated from power politics.
The US and Chinese stances toward developing countries are polar
opposites. China sees these peoples as “oppressed” and wants them tobesiege advanced countries through revolutions. For example, consider the comments of General Lin Biao, drawn from his experiencesin China’s guerilla war and applying them to the world situation:
Looking at problems from a global perspective, if North America and Western Europe can be called “the cities of the world,”
then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute “the rural areasof the world.” . . . In a sense, today’s global revolution presents
a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the
final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on therevolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of theworld’s population.27
The striking thing here is that the US also uses this way of talking
about “cities” and “villages,” but the meaning assigned to it is completely the opposite. For the US, the advanced industrialized countries
of North America and Europe are expected to transmit industrial civilization to the world’s villages as the cities of old did to rural provinces.
Communism is seen as a passing illness that can readily afflict society
110
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peacein the process of great change. Accordingly, the US believes it needs topreserve the stability of developing countries in ways that would allow
them to industrialize without being impeded by that illness.
Thus, the United States and China view the great changes that are
taking place in developing countries in contrary ways. Although howmuch of a difference this will make is as yet unclear, the manner inwhich development unfolds—an issue that currently is of great interest—unquestionably could become embroiled in the great struggle
for power between the United States and China. Moreover, the Soviet
Union is not disinterested, and the advanced industrialized powers ofWestern Europe have not lost interest in their former colonies.

111
II. Separating Power Politics and Economic ExchangeIII. Egoism and Mutual Interests

The North-South Problem
These days, the greatest challenge to the stance that economic
exchange will produce peace is the North-South problem, i.e., theenormous economic gap between advanced countries in the Northand developing ones in the South. A quick look at national income
data reveals that, in comparison with the nearly US$3,000 in income
per year per capita for the United States, and around US$1,000 for
the EEC nations, the average for countries in the “South”—i.e., Asia,
Africa, and Latin America—is just slightly over US$100. Around onethird of the world’s population consists of people in countries whose
national incomes are US$100 or less per year. This enormous gap verymuch dims the optimistic view that an increase in the wealth of one
nation produces increases in the wealth of others.
To a certain degree, this is an aftereffect of imperialism. Setting
aside the question of whether imperial powers gained or lost from having colonies, there is no mistaking that at the very least those powers
benefited far more than their colonies did. Moreover, as I will discusslater, colonial rule left grave, invisible wounds on the nations of Asia
and Africa.
Basically, however, it would be better to think of this gap not as the
product of intentional human behavior, but rather the result of a long
historical process beyond human control. Civilization has not progressedin a uniform fashion in all parts of the world. On the contrary, at a time
112
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peacewhen new technologies gave humans in western Europe great energy
and new modes of transport that enabled them to move people rapidly,
other parts of the world remained uncivilized or had stagnated for various reasons. This great gap is not one that can easily be closed even byhumans of great wisdom and with the best of intentions. Whatever thereason, the fact is a gap does exist between the North and the South.
Furthermore, this is not a gap that will close naturally on its own byleaving it in the hands of economic exchange and the workings of themarket. To the contrary, they make it more difficult to close the gap forreasons inherent in economic phenomena. When all is said and done,
those who are economically stronger will have the advantage.
These days, the violent exploitation of the weak by the strong israre. The Portuguese colony of Angola and places like South Africa andRhodesia that are under a modified form of colonial rule are exceptional cases. Certainly, as Raymond Aron says, mutual benefits havebecome the more salient feature of economic exchanges. Even so, we
cannot look to economic exchange with optimism. Even if we separate
the struggle for power from economic exchange, the position of theeconomically stronger party remains unchanged: they will still have theadvantage. For example, while major corporations and their smaller
counterparts may compete in making exactly the same product, thereality remains that the smaller corporations stand no chance in such acontest. This is the same between nations. Thanks to artificial materials
such as synthetic rubber, nylon, and plastics, the degree of dependence
on raw materials has been declining. For that reason, even as the production of primary goods grows in developing countries, the demand
for those goods does not grow at the same rate. Given that developing countries produce and export raw materials and other such primary commodities, they will see either a decline in the volume of their113
III. Egoism and Mutual Interests

exports or a reduction in their export prices. In addition, price volatility for primary goods also puts developing countries at a disadvantage.
For these reasons, even if economic growth in advanced and developing countries does not come at one another’s expense but rather isbeneficial to both, it is still true that advanced countries are growing
faster than developing ones. Taking the 1950s as an example, the rateof development for advanced nations was 2.7 percent per year on average, while it stood at 2.1 percent annually for Asian countries excluding Japan and China. This means that special efforts would be required
to close the gap between advanced and developing countries. Suchefforts might include providing assistance to developing countries andestablishing a trade system that would help them to develop.
Economists such as Jan Tinbergen of the Netherlands and Gunnar Myrdal of Sweden have been arguing this point for years. Myrdal
spoke of applying the principles of the welfare state beyond the boundaries of any single nation and of the need to create a “welfare world.”28
He said that while Karl Marx’s prediction that society will divide into
the few rich and the multitude of poor might have missed its markwhen it came to societies within nations, on the much larger scale ofthe entire world it was possible to think that Marx’s prediction might
be gradually becoming a reality. The gap between the few rich and themultitude of poor is formidable and even continues to grow. For thisreason, Myrdal says, the welfare state model that has been used forsolving the problem of wealth and poverty in capitalist societies must
be applied to the world as a whole.
That said, as Myrdal also acknowledges, a welfare world would be
far more difficult to achieve than a welfare state. Welfare states developed within the framework of existing nation-states. However, no
comparable framework exists upon which to build a welfare world.
114
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peace

Specifically, in the case of nation-states there were shared interests that
could provide the foundations upon which to create a welfare state,
and there were institutions for making such a state a reality based on
an awareness of those common interests. On a global scale, though,even if there are shared interests, they are not recognized as such. No
institutions exist for making those shared interests a reality.
The Issue of Self-Esteem
In this last case, the egoism of each nation creates difficulties forrealizing global interests. People work because they want to become
wealthy; they do not work for the sake of others. More precisely, people work to make themselves better off than others, and for that very
reason no matter how wealthy they become they still want to become
even wealthier.
This is the second point made by Rousseau in his criticism of theview that economic exchange would produce peace. Rousseau divided
human appetites into self-love (amour propre) and self-esteem (amourde soi). Self-love is the spirit of attempting to preserve one’s own life,
and it is a natural good. It is interested only in the self, and therefore
it will be satisfied solely by meeting its own requirements. However,humans also have a sense of self-esteem that leads them to compare
themselves with other humans. Self-esteem is never satisfied; in fact,
there is no way it can ever be fully satisfied. The only sentiment withwhich children are born is self-love. However, as a child expands his or
her connections with other humans, the desire for self-esteem arises.
Then the child becomes masterful, jealous, deceitful, and vindictive. If he is not compelled to obedience, when he does not see
the usefulness of what he is told to do, he attributes it to caprice,
115
III. Egoism and Mutual Interests

to an intention of tormenting him, and he rebels. If people givein to him, as soon as anything opposes him he regards it as rebellion, as a determination to resist him; he beats the chair or tablefor disobeying him.29
Unfortunately, people being what they are, nations operate based not on
self-love but on self-esteem. Writing elsewhere, Rousseau described thesource of the never-ending struggle for power among states as follows:
The State . . . always feels weak as long as there are other statesthat are stronger than itself. Its security, its defence, demand thatit try to appear more powerful than its neighbours . . . Its power
thus being purely relative, the political body is forced to compare itself without stopping to know itself. It depends on its surroundings, and must take an interest in all that happens there.
For it would seem useless simply to keep to oneself without having anything to gain or lose. Whether a state becomes small or
great, weak or strong, depends on whether its neighbour expands
or pulls back, adds to its forces or reduces them.30
Rousseau’s discussion here about strength and weakness largely refers
to military power, but it also applies to economic power—though thetensions the latter causes may be somewhat less serious. Still, it is economic competition that has perhaps become the primary focus in international politics for all nations since World War II. Egoism of this sortmakes it difficult for us to provide assistance to developing countries.
That is to say, the fact that advanced countries are in fierce competition with one another has become an obstacle to assisting developing countries. In light of that competition, it would not be possible
116
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peaceto provide assistance from an entirely humanitarian motivation. If wethink in an abstract way about advanced and developing countries, it
quickly becomes apparent that economic assistance is both necessary
and desirable. For developing countries to become rich is not only necessary for reducing the gap between the rich and the poor and providing political stability; it is also desirable in that markets will expand.
Certainly, there are mutual interests.
But when we think more concretely about how much assistance tooffer and to whom, we can easily see that a nation would sustain losses
if it offered ruinously larger amounts of assistance. Take Japan as an
example. If we take into consideration the wealthier countries withwhich Japan is fiercely competing, we can see that its willingness toprovide assistance of its own will be quite limited.
The same is true for all advanced countries. The actual scale of economic assistance has been limited to a level that does not damage thedonor’s own prospects for economic growth. Rather, it has been set
to levels that are politically and economically useful to the donor’s
own interests. The total amount of assistance, too, has not grown asmuch as one might expect. The non-binding target of one percent ofan advanced country’s national income is a modest sum when it comesto what will meet the needs of developing countries. Yet, even that has
not been met. Also, advanced countries prefer bilateral aid packages
and pay little more than lip service when it comes to aid channeledthrough international organizations. The aid that is channeled throughthe United Nations does not amount to even five percent of the total
assistance provided by the United States and the Soviet Union.

117
III. Egoism and Mutual Interests

Nationalistic Attitudes and Institutions
Furthermore, nation-states today find it easier to intellectually andemotionally understand and accept their own national interests overthose they share with other nations. Thanks to advances in communications, we are inclined to believe that we are knowledgeable about
international affairs and can view the situation from a broad international perspective. But the fact is, our views are colored to a surprisingdegree by our national prejudices. Today’s welfare state has tightened
the links between states and the populations they govern. Also, as
Myrdal observes, the stronger a sense of national solidarity becomes,
the more a sense of international solidarity weakens. Today’s politics are
based on the nation-state as their fundamental unit. This means thenational interests of individual countries are reflected well but reflecting
the interests of other nations and international perspectives is difficult.
This presents a great obstacle to changing the trade policies ofadvanced countries to ones that would be more favorable to developing countries. Repeated discussions have taken place on how changing economic policies, including those related to trade, would be far
more effective than economic assistance when it comes to promoting economic progress in developing countries. At the first meetingof the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, heldin Geneva from March through June of 1964, developing countries
issued strong demands for mechanisms to expand trade. First, theyargued, in relative terms, the scale of trade is far greater than that ofaid. Foreign-currency earnings from exports by developing countries
total approximately US$30 billion annually, while, in contrast, assistance and investments are merely one-quarter of that amount. Furthermore, international trade would provide greater direct stimulus to
the industries of developing countries than aid would. Aid might be
118
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peace

wasted, while international trade would certainly encourage industries
to produce goods for commerce.
Accordingly, advanced countries need to import primary goods
regularly from developing countries while offering assistance or financial facilities to cover risks resulting from price fluctuations. It is also
necessary to expand consumption and to eliminate trade barriers, sothat the export of primary goods will grow. Also important is purchasing manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from the industries
that developing countries are fostering.
Unfortunately, although the need for such sweeping changes in
economic policies is widely recognized, the actual performance of theadvanced countries has been even worse than their economic assistance. This is because this sort of change in policy requires institutionalchanges within the advanced nations themselves. For example, handing over the market for simple manufactured goods like shirts to developing countries would require keeping the dissatisfaction of workers
producing the same goods in advanced countries in check by guaranteeing their livelihoods while retraining them for new jobs. This without question is likely to generate strong resistance and demand a major
readjustment in economic policies. For these two reasons, changing
trade policy is more difficult than simply increasing economic assistance. Thus, while the further development of developing countries
may be in the common interest, it comes up against the stiff barrier ofnational egoism.
The Preconditions of Economic Development
However, even if advanced nations provide enough assistance andadjust their trade to match the needs of developing countries, that will
not solve the North-South problem. Economic development is not
119III. Egoism and Mutual Interestsmerely a problem of economics; first and foremost, the prerequisite
for development is a mature society. Given the absence of such maturesocieties in the developing world today, societal changes need to happen together with or even prior to economic development. When economic development started to become a major issue a decade ago, it
was optimistically assumed that merely supplying capital would leadto development. However, simply pumping money into developing
countries often resulted in inflation or the building of iron mills andaluminum factories that had little direct impact on the lives of the people and failed to become a core of economic development.
Gradually, the complexities of economic development became better understood. For example, it was recognized that a nation’s choice ofthe sector on which to concentrate its development efforts had to takemultiple factors into consideration, including the size of the nation
undergoing development, its resources, and its population. It was also
realized that the level of the population’s education was of great importance, and greater still was the stability and effectiveness of its government. Since the societal transformations that economic development
requires are harsh and extreme, strong political power is indispensable
to weathering the disruption that will result.
For a developing country to accumulate capital, its people will haveto work even harder than ever. They will have to produce more goods,
while at the same time maintain consumption at its current levels. That
will call for a fundamental change in the attitudes of that nation’s populace, and that process will be harsh. This is why the government must
be a powerful one trusted by its people. If a primitive accumulationof capital were to occur in a society over an extremely long period oftime, as it did in Western Europe—especially in Britain—this change
would come about naturally. However, today’s developing countries
120
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peacemust develop quickly. Furthermore, since these countries are caught
in a vicious cycle of poverty with their populations leading a hand-tomouth existence, they must be aggressive about capital accumulation.
That will require mobilizing tremendous political power.
For example, land reform has often been discussed as a necessary stepfor economic development. Land reform frees labor for development.
Farmers in developing countries suffer low standards of living. The main
reason is that too many farmers are working on small plots of land,
which means that individual farmers are not productive enough. For thatreason, even if the number of farmers on such densely populated arable lands is reduced, there would be no change to the amount of output
obtained from the land. Thus, reducing the number of farmers would
free up labor for manufacturing or for road and dam construction. If theremaining farmers who have now become more productive consume theresults of that increased production themselves, they will not accumulate
any capital. They would have to continue supplying foodstuffs to the
new industrial workers. In other words, they would need to live frugally,
even if they needed to be forced to do so. Otherwise, it will not be possible for that developing country to accumulate capital.
It is clear that land reform can provide an extremely effective means
for achieving these changes in the composition of rural and industrial
workforces. Land reform does not mean simply redistributing to thepeasantry the land held by landowners, as that does not increase productivity. Rather, the intention of land reform is to accumulate capitalthrough increasing agricultural productivity by grouping small plotsof land into larger ones, diverting labor away from agriculture to othersectors, and forcing those who remain on the land to be frugal.
The collectivization that was carried out in communist countries isprobably the most thoroughgoing method toward achieving the two
121
III. Egoism and Mutual Interests

goals of diverting labor and accumulating capital. It is well known
that Stalin collectivized agriculture very aggressively in order to extract
capital from farmers for industrialization. The people’s communes in
China had the same objective. Given the strong attachment that every
human has to their traditional way of life, and also taking into accountthe strong resistance to change in the traditional institutions of landownership due to how they are bound up with existing socio-politicalsystems in general as well as the emotional attachments of farmers totheir land, it is obvious that any attempt to achieve the above-mentioned goal would face vehement opposition. Collectivization of agriculture is an extremely harsh way to accumulate capital.
The Conundrum of State Formation
No matter how gently agricultural collectivization advances, it cannot
avoid producing great social tensions. For that reason, any government
seeking to collectivize must be able to mobilize sufficient power toovercome the challenges collectivization poses. However, it is unlikelythat any developing country will have such a strong government
because none is a nation-state as yet in the modern sense of the term.
Some have only just been freed from colonial rule, while others did
not even have states when they came under colonial rule. Their peoples
are distinctly divided into several tribes or classes, and those peoples
are not physically or psychologically attached to a single nation. Developing countries are still in the process of state formation.
The state formation process is an extremely difficult one that takes
time. The process by which it unfolded in Europe, too, was a long andarduous journey. The process included central governments working
to assimilate ethnic minorities, revolts by those minorities, and theirsuppression by those governments. There also were fierce conflicts
122
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peaceamong feudal lords and monarchs, and these frequently led to revolts.
Furthermore, because there were places where various ethnic groups
lived among one another, it was not necessarily possible for a given
ethnic group to build its own state, and so problems involving ethnic
minorities regularly recurred.
The emerging countries of Asia and Africa now face the burden of
having to quickly work their way through the time-consuming anddifficult process that advanced countries have already experienced.
Most of these developing countries lack effective states. Many of theborders between them are there simply because that they were drawnthat way by former colonial masters. Some of these nations are merely
a hodgepodge of different ethnic groups with no connections among
them, while others are aggregations of groups traditionally hostile toone another whose acrimonious relationships may have been aggravated further through the manipulations of their colonial rulers.
Moreover, the communication networks that ought to be a tool forstate building are underdeveloped, and many of these states do nothave a single, common language. Considering all these factors, state
formation in developing countries is an extremely difficult undertaking. For that reason, it seems likely that developing countries will bebeset by tensions and intermittent unrest for quite a long time.
When it comes to state building, the damage caused by imperialism
is most evident. Imperialism destroyed the value systems of colonizedpeoples without offering any alternative. This is because a people’s system of values—their beliefs, customs, and traditions—comprise theframework for interpreting the world. Therefore, imposing a value
system nurtured in a completely different environment could neverbe sufficiently powerful to inspire the local populace. Rather, it would
destroy the foundations of the local society and leave it deracinated.
123
III. Egoism and Mutual Interests

Exchanges between different civilizations may be to their mutual
benefit, but that is true only when both sides assimilate elements of adifferent civilization by their own volition; the effects are purely negative if the values are imposed from the outside. Imperialism either
completely destroyed or significantly damaged the nationhood of thecolonized peoples.
This is how colonialism deprived the colonized peoples of their
spirit of independence. This is what Mahatma Gandhi feared themost. At the court hearing held after he was arrested for his pro-independence activities, he said:
I am satisfied that many Englishmen and Indian officials honestly believe that they are administering one of the best systems
devised in the world and that India is making steady though slow
progress. They do not know that a subtle but effective system ofterrorism and an organized display of force on the one hand,
and the deprivation of all powers of retaliation or self-defence on
the other, have emasculated the people and induced in them thehabit of simulation.31
His words remind us of the enormous handicap that developing countries face today in their efforts to build states. They also clarify what
the fundamental problem of economic development is for them. Froma purely material standpoint, colonies gained more from their empires
than they lost. However, those gains did not give colonies the ability todevelop by themselves; to the contrary, they destroyed that ability. Former colonies will never develop unless they can create the capacity to do
so on their own.
Thus, the North-South problem is not easily solved. If it were just
124
Chapter 2: Economic Exchanges and Peace

a matter like balancing the levels of water in two ponds by connecting them, then it would be simple. When thinking about disparities
in wealth, the issue is not just how much wealth is at hand. Wealth isproduced every day and is consumed every day. The problem is thatthe ability of individual nations to produce wealth is very different.
Basically, only each nation can develop its own capacity to produce its
own wealth. And this is a long process.
When we think about both advanced and developing countries inconnection with the North-South problem, at first glance there seems
to be a paradox. Namely, a state regulates economic life, which is oneof the most important activities to human existence. In advanced
countries, the problem is that the state is too strong, while in developing countries the problem is that it is too weak. This suggests that,while nationalism should not be allowed to go unchecked, developing
countries undeniably need to have an effective state. In the absence ofthe system of values that a state provides, a nation’s population will not
be able to realize its full potential.
This is the fundamental reason why it is impossible to achieve peaceby trying to establish a universal order, as I will explain in the next
chapter.

125
III. Egoism and Mutual Interests

CHAPTER

3

INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE
move without knowing“Don’twhere to put your foot next, anddon’t move without having sufficientstability to enable you to achieve exactly
what should be the next step. One who
is really serious in his determination toreach the top does not gamble by impatiently accepting bad footholds and poor
grips.” Dag Hammarskjöld, former secretary-general of the United Nations32

127
I. The Challenge of Enforcement

I. The Challenge of Enforcement

The Dilemma of International Organizations
At present, international society lacks institutions that realize the common interest. This has created difficulties when it comes to making
steady progress toward peace, whether the issue is disarmament or
economic assistance. This is why international organizations matter.
The basic condition of international politics is one of anarchy, since
all sovereign states exist equally side by side. According to one view, toresolve this state of anarchy nations must transfer some or all of theirsovereignty and create some sort of international federation.
Theoretically, such a development would be a natural one. And
while the idea may date back to ancient times when all states wereequally sovereign, it remains at the core of pacifist thought today. In
fact, first the League of Nations and then the United Nations were created in succession after the two world wars of the twentieth century
with proclamations that they would be followed by a brighter world
without conflict.
In fact, however, given the excessive trust that has been placed ininternational institutions, we now see the unusual phenomenon thatthe criticisms of such organizations by thinkers from the past are being
misinterpreted as approval. For example, though Rousseau was criticalof the idea that peace could be achieved through international organizations, he has been seen as a proponent of them. This misunderstanding can be found in everything from college textbooks to high school
128
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacereaders. Setting aside the reasons why, we are left with fact that the ideaof peace being achieved through international organizations has yet to
be properly tested.
The fact is, advocating ideas that have yet to be adequately considered theoretically remains a conspicuous weakness when it comesto any discussions about peace. In light of the failure of the Leagueof Nations and what we have seen in the two decades-plus of theUnited Nations, few have any remaining naive expectations for international organizations. They know that the United Nations has only
limited power. And yet, these largely uncritical expectations for international organizations as an ideal remain. It is simplistically thoughtthat eternal peace will be upon us once some perfect internationalorganization is created. That may be so. However, any idealism that
does not seriously consider what possible obstacles might lie in the way
and what the greatest shortcomings of such a peace might be is not somuch a conviction as it is a vague yearning for some ideal.
Proposals for peace through international organizations were first
formulated systematically during the seventeenth and early-eighteenth
centuries. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, who has already been mentioned,
and William Penn, the famous Quaker, were two noted proponents ofsuch an idea. Both proposed establishing international organizations
whose members would promise to not use force to solve conflicts, andthat would punish violators. These were the archetypes of the pacifist
thought that have since reappeared over and over.
Rousseau was attracted to Saint-Pierre’s peace proposal, but at
the same time he did not overlook its fundamental shortcomings.
Rousseau’s first point of criticism was that sovereign states would not
approve of an international organization of the sort that Saint-Pierre
proposed. The problem was not that states were somehow malevolent
129
I. The Challenge of Enforcement

and would be unwilling to assent. Rather, the issue was the difference
between the interests of international society as a whole and the interests of each state.
Even if states understand that peace would be guaranteed by aninternational organization, this would be in the general interest andnot necessarily in the interests of individual states. However, thegeneral interest is difficult to recognize because of its very generality. Because humans are ruled by their sense of self-esteem, they view
their own interests in comparison with those of others; self-esteem is a
far-stronger driver of human beings than is the general interest.
This led Rousseau to conclude that we have to think like the
Abbé de Saint-Pierre, that if the sovereigns and their ministers are
well-intentioned (and that is no certain thing), then they will easily
discover a favorable opportunity to put this project into action. That
is to say, Rousseau argued, in order to implement this project, the sum
total of their individual interests should not be greater than that of
their shared interests. Each nation should believe that the general welfare of all nations was greater than their individual interests. However,this would require many humans being wise enough to realize this andagreeing that it is in their interest; it is not something that could be
produced by chance. But, in the absence of such spontaneous agreement, the remaining default position is the use of force; and then thequestion is no longer to persuade but to compel; not to write books
but to raise armies.
In short, Rousseau was focused on the dilemmas that impede peacefrom being established. The structure of an international society wheresovereign states stand side by side is what causes wars. Although aninternational organization is the only solution, it is exactly this structure that prevents the establishment of such an organization. Although
130
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peaceit may not be possible to solve this dilemma in a single stroke, it might
be possible to resolve it at the end of a long historical process. Certainly, Rousseau might have depicted the difficulty of this problem too
vividly and therefore too simplistically.
However, he was aware of another great difficulty and danger: aswith all ideals, this one, too, could be used as a tool in the struggle forpower. Rousseau used the second half of his essay “Judgement on Perpetual Peace” to illustrate how the ideal of an international organization
had been used as such a tool, referring to the “Grand Design” of Henri
IV of France that had served as a prototype for Saint-Pierre’s plan.
Early in the seventeenth century, Henri IV, who had put a stopto the religious conflicts in France and established the French state,
thought of uniting fifteen countries to create a European federation (the “Christian Commonwealth”). It was to be administered bysixty-some representatives from the participating countries, with eachposition open for reelection every three years.
This idea for an international organization was not just the productof abstract thinking; it was a plan for creating an international order for
Europe after France had upended the Habsburgs’ ambitions. Although
the empire was in decline during Henri IV’s time after its attempt todominate the whole of Europe had suffered setbacks including thedefeat of its Armada in the late sixteenth century, Habsburg Spain still
remained the strongest state in Europe.
Henri IV stood opposed to that dynasty, and he came up withhis Grand Design as a means for achieving a French hegemony over
Europe. It is interesting that his Habsburg rivals mobilized Catholicism as a powerful ideology. The Grand Design could be seen as an
ideology meant to counter this. Henri’s foreign minister, Maximilien
de Béthune, the Duke of Sully and a capable diplomat, twice went to131
I. The Challenge of Enforcement

London, eventually leading Great Britain to conclude an alliance withFrance to relieve pressure from Spain. The other states that joined thisalliance also sought to improve their respective individual interests.
The German princes joined it in order to oppose Austrian influence;
Sweden did so to win Pomerania; the Duke of Savoy did so to win
Milan; and even the Vatican, leery of Spanish dominance, was promised the Kingdom of Naples as spoils of war. Henri IV prudently did
not seek self-serving gains for France.
However, this prudent monarch did not overlook the fact thathe could gain more than other countries by not seeking anythingfor his own. Even if he could not get something for his country,
if he could weaken just one other country stronger than his thatwould be enough for his country to become the strongest. It isclear that he exercised every precaution in order to achieve success, while he did not forget to take steps that would result in his
dominance in the organization that he tried to create.33
That is the kind of international organization that can exist given thereality of international politics. This is why Rousseau left us with theseironic, if not cynical, words in his “A Lasting Peace” essay concerning
Saint-Pierre’s work.
Beyond doubt, a lasting peace is, under present circumstances, aproject ridiculous enough. But give us back Henri IV and Sully,
and it will become once more a reasonable proposal. Or rather,while we admire so fair a project, let us console ourselves for its
failure by the thought that it could only have been carried out
by violent means from which humanity must needs shrink.34
132
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

Multiple Ideas of Justice
Immanuel Kant also raised the possibility of creating an international organization for ruling the world. Kant thought that the first
dilemma Rousseau had pointed out would be resolved by long processes of history, but he acknowledged that the second shortcoming
would remain. Kant was opposed to the idea of a supranational bodythat would have coercive powers; he argued rather for the necessity of
having an international confederation that, by the nations involved
voluntarily submitting to it, would create a legal status (status juridicus) among states. This is simply because Kant feared that some great
power would attempt to subjugate the world and establish a tyranny
under the pretense of creating an international state. Furthermore,
Kant spoke plainly of how the situation would not be appealing even if
this federation were to be established.
The idea of international law presupposes the separate existence of a number of neighboring and independent states; and,
although such a condition of things is in itself already a stateof war . . . yet, according to the Idea of reason, this is better
than that all the states should be merged into one under a power
which has gained the ascendency over its neighbors and gradually become a universal monarchy. For the wider the sphere of
their jurisdiction, the more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism, when it has choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into
anarchy. (emphasis added)35
Thus, Rousseau and Kant drew on two reasons for their arguments that it
would not only be impossible but also undesirable to have a peace basedon an international organization that had enforcement capabilities. One
133
I. The Challenge of Enforcement

is that any attempt to establish such an organization would in fact lead toone powerful nation subjugating all the others. The other reason is thateven if such an order were actually established, it would lack the rule oflaw, and on the contrary would invite anarchy. Although at first glance
it might seem that these two reasons are separate matters, if we consider
them more deeply we see that they both come down to the same point.
The fact is order in international society cannot easily be achieved bysimply concentrating all power into one organization.
As mentioned above, all forms of order comprise both a system ofpower and a system of values. This applies to nations, too; a nation
does not simply define the scope or boundaries within which some
central authority extends. The very fact that the members of a given
nation share the same basic value system is what leads to the creationof order. If power is applied without a basic value system, the result
will be either the tyranny that Kant describes or a state of anarchy.
Only after people have been joined together by the invisible threads ofshared patterns of behavior and value systems can they create nations
and other institutions. However, this is not to say that order can becreated just by nurturing a shared system of values. The fact is, thecoercion that derives from authority and power is a necessity. Moreaccurately, a shared value system will not be created without the coercive support that comes from power.
This is clear, too, if we consider the process of nation-state formation in Europe. One aspect of that was the process in which sharedvalues took shape that were based on ethnic-group identity, language, culture, geography, history, customs, and the like. John StuartMill defined this as peoples “united among themselves by common
sympathies . . . [who] desire to be under the same government, . . .”36
Unquestionably, the development of those “common sympathies”
134
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

was indispensable to the process of forming a nation-state. However,as historical studies of this process have shown, both subjugation andassimilation by sovereign authority were major contributors to the formation of the nation-state. When we also consider legislative, administrative, and judicial systems, we must not forget that the mechanismsof one-man governments under kings gradually became the basis fornation-states. Thus, we can see that all types of political order are compound systems of authority and of values, and their formative processes are complex and extend over long periods during which thosecompounds are created.
And yet, the value system needed to provide such a foundation
does not exist in international society. What do exist are the different
value systems respective to each country. Not only do multiple sourcesof power stand side-by-side in international society, but so, too, domultiple systems of values and, accordingly, multiple ideas of what
constitutes justice. Under such conditions, any attempt to concentrate
power in a single place is certain to fail. Even if power could successfully be concentrated in one place without the backing of some sharedconcept of legitimacy, the result would be one country claiming legitimacy being dominated by another country also claiming legitimacy.
Consequently, at least when viewed from the perspective of the country being dominated, the situation that results is tyranny.
Considering this reality, it is evident that the fact that sovereignstates do not agree to the establishment of a powerful internationalorganization is not due merely to simple egoism or to some malicious
or foolish inability to accept the general interest. For example, avoiding total war is clearly in the general interest, and politicians today areaware of this fact. However, as we have already seen, the imperative of
avoiding total war did not convince nations to disarm or to endorse
135
I. The Challenge of Enforcement

the creation of a governing body to make sure that disarmament iseffective. Even if nations of their own volition control arms, strive
to reduce tensions, and reduce the dangers of total war, they will not
agree to disarm under some control system. This is because whatever
the control system might be, it will not embody a system of values ofthe sort to which all sovereign states involved would be able to entrust
their fate. There is no such internationally shared idea of justice, andthat is the core of the problem.
The Enforcement Capabilities of International Organizations
The actual history of international organizations supports these theoretical considerations. First, several unsuccessful attempts have alreadybeen made at creating an international organization with enforcement
authority. For example, the League of Nations attempted to createa system for collective security. Article 11 of its Covenant provided:“Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of theMembers of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern
to the whole League.” Furthermore, Article 16 stated: “Should any
Member of the League resort to war . . . it shall ipso facto be deemed
to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the
League.” Consequently, all members were compelled to participate if
sanctions were imposed in response to an act contrary to those articles.
However, looking at the interpretive resolutions that were meant
to further solidify these provisions, it is clear that in fact this collective security system did not exist. One resolution of 1921 provided,“The unilateral action of the defaulting State cannot create a state ofwar: it merely entitles the other Members of the League to resort toacts of war or to declare themselves in a state of War with the covenant-breaking State.” This was followed by interpretative wording
136
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacestating, “It is the duty of each Member of the League to decide foritself whether a breach of the Covenant has been committed.” Inother words, it was left up to each member of the League to decide if a
breach had occurred.37
If a breach did take place, the member states were obliged to
impose sanctions. However, they were free to determine for themselves
whether a breach had occurred. This meant that such an obligation
was merely nominal. As to the timing and method for imposing sanctions, the League’s Council could only admonish the offender; thus,
in the end, even carrying out sanctions was entrusted to each member state. As a matter of fact, when Italy attacked Ethiopia in 1935,
the Assembly did urge that economic sanctions be imposed. However,member states were free to choose the actual method for doing that,and implementation was likewise voluntary, so that in the end theeffectiveness of those sanctions was extremely weak.
Due to the failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations
was created with the aim of being an international organization withmuch-stronger authority. Its founders attributed the League’s failure to
maintain peace to its lack of enforcement capabilities. The founders of
the United Nations adopted the principle of majority rule for its General Assembly instead of the League’s model of unanimous consent.
Also, the UN Security Council was given the power to enforce peaceand security.
Specifically, the Security Council was given the power to “determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act ofaggression” and to decide on whatever measures would be taken in
response (UN Charter, Article 39), based on a resolution approved byseven of its eleven constituent members, including the five permanent
members. (Starting in 1965, approval by nine of its fifteen constituent
137
I. The Challenge of Enforcementmembers was required, again including the permanent five.) The UN
Charter provides that decisions and recommendations are binding on
its members. Furthermore, the Charter also states that the Security
Council may take enforcement action to maintain international peaceand security, and that armed forces may be made available to the Council through special agreements with member states (Articles 40 through49). The UN’s founders described the body as a “League of Nations
with teeth,” a turn of phrase that illustrates their intentions well.
However, insofar as enforcement is concerned, the provisions of the
UN Charter have become almost a dead letter. Although in principle
the Security Council is based on majority rule, in reality the five permanent members—the United States, the Soviet Union, the Republicof China, France, and Britain—have veto powers. Consequently, thesemajor powers have the ability with their respective votes to completely
bury a resolution they believe to be contrary to their own interests.
As a result, the veto power itself has become an object of criticism. Such criticisms were particularly loud for several years after the
UN was founded. Critics had argued that veto power would prevent
the Security Council from functioning, and that it would be unable
to carry out its responsibilities to “maintain international peace andsecurity.” In short, veto power amounted to an unfair prerogative of
the great powers. However, it is wrong to assume that an internationalorganization with enforcement capabilities can be established only if
it has no veto power. The fact is, without veto power there would havebeen no United Nations.
This is evident if one reviews the process that led to the creation of
the UN. During the August 1944 discussions of the draft UN Charter that took place at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union argued that resolutions of a Security Council
138
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacewould need to be endorsed by all of its permanent members. In particular, it argued, even if a resolution involved one or another of the permanent members, that member state would still have the right to vote.
Great Britain and the United States opposed this as unreasonable, but the Soviet Union would not change its position. As a result,no decision was made on Security Council voting methods at theDumbarton Oaks meeting. But at the Yalta Conference in February
1945, President Roosevelt acceded to the Soviet position. The result
was the veto power as it currently stands. Without this, the Soviet
Union would not have agreed to join the United Nations.
We can understand why a United Nations that lacked veto powers
would have been unachievable if we remember the fate of the Baruch
Plan. While the Plan’s proposed control system might have been
limited to those cases that involved international administration of
nuclear power, nations signing on to it would not have had veto power.
Moreover, the resulting organization would have had powerful authority over such matters as managing inspections. Such a body would
truly have been an international organization with coercive powers. It
is not surprising that the Soviet Union—which had argued so forcefully for creating veto power—would reject the proposed supranational organization for that reason. The fact is, the Soviet Union had
an unshakeable distrust of Western Europe. Naturally, this distrust was
mutual. Both sides had bitter memories of the aftermath of the Russian Revolution regarding such matters as post-revolution diplomacy,interventionist wars, the Munich Agreement, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
However, the roots of these feelings of mistrust unsurprisingly lay
in the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the West
and, accordingly, in their different ideas of justice. As is well known,
139
I. The Challenge of Enforcement

ideological differences led to opposing views on the postwar settlementin Europe.
The countries of Western Europe believed in the legitimacy of a system based on freedom of speech and free elections. It would not be
possible for them to recognize the communist regimes of the Central
and Eastern European countries as legitimate governments. Meanwhile, from the Soviet perspective “bourgeois democracy” itself lacked
legitimacy. It was therefore only natural that the Soviet Union in its
minority position could not leave its fate in the hands of an international organization in which the majority of its members held a different concept of legitimacy. Still, even if the Soviet Union technicallywas in the minority, it thought of itself as representing “the peopleof the world” and accordingly it saw itself as being in the majority.
Andrey Vyshinsky, the Soviet representative to the United Nationsin the early 1950s, would argue on behalf of his government that theminorities in the United Nations from a public opinion perspective infact accounted for a majority. The minorities in the United Nations are
the majority of the world’s peoples who wish for peace however many sacrifices it may require, who oppose warmongers, and who seek a means
for guaranteeing peace throughout the world. However, he argued, in
the United Nations there exists a majority who ignore the views of theminority. Consequently, he concluded, it is the duty of the minority to
express their position in a way that the people who are outside of thisplace where the General Assembly meets can hear their true voices.
If the Soviet Union were to be true to its own beliefs, it would nothave allowed itself to submit to a majority in the UN. Viewing this fromthe perspective that there are multiple ideas of justice, the nature of theUnited States’ moves in the UN is undeniably that of power politics.
Although at first glance the Baruch Plan does not appear to have
140
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacebeen useful to US interests, US dominance would have been established
if the Plan had been implemented. However, just as Rousseau had said
with respect to Henri IV’s Great Design, the United States, by not seeking anything for itself, could gain more than other countries could.
The Lessons of the Korean War
When the United States fought to repulse North Korea’s attack, itjustified its action as an enforcement measure taken by UN forces torepel aggression. When the Korean incident occurred in June 1950,
the Security Council was able to pass a resolution only because theSoviet Union absented itself from that meeting. Formally, the result
was military action undertaken by the United Nations, but in fact it
was military assistance to South Korea provided by the US. Of thetotal military strength of the UN forces, the United States supplied
91 percent of the ground forces, 93 percent of the naval forces, and99 percent of the air forces. The reins were handed to a commander
appointed by the US government, and although nominally it was theUnited Nations Command, in fact responsibility for those forces was
entrusted to the president of the United States. The United Nations
had virtually no power to administer those forces.
In fact, it was due more to the United States’ international superiority than to some resolution passed by the United Nations that it
was possible to create these UN forces. Accordingly, calling them “UNforces” did little more than to lend legitimacy to the US military. In
this case, too, the reality was that an international organization provided a means for one country to acquire hegemony in the real world.
Although this example was an extremely special and accidental
one, it must be interpreted as providing an important, general lesson. In today’s world where different values, interests, and powers
141
I. The Challenge of Enforcement

compete with one another, any enforcement measures undertaken bya potential international organization—even when it is actually implemented—will have the character of justice that has been imposed by
one of the competing parties.
In view of the specific conditions surrounding the United Nations at
the time, the decision to send in UN forces and grant them the authority they had was justifiable. The UN recognized that North Korea had
invaded the South, and a resolution was passed to recommend enforcement measures. The UN General Assembly had previously proposed
the idea of holding an election covering the whole of Korea that would
be monitored by the UN, and it was North Korea that rejected that
idea. From that perspective, to put all of Korea, including areas northof the 38th parallel, under the control of UN forces would be a legitimate act. However, from the Soviet and Chinese perspectives, this was
simply the unilateral imposition of America’s will.
Measures with which one or another of the opposing groups within
the UN dissents completely will come to be seen not as a UN action
but rather as a unilateral action undertaken using the UN’s name.
Some might criticize any attempts to generalize from the Korean
incident. They argue that in those days the communist countries
were always in the minority in the UN, but that the balance has since
shifted in their favor. Thus, they claim, at the time the UN did notaccurately reflect global opinion.
Does the United Nations today accurately represent global public opinion? Bluntly speaking, is it at all possible to build an international organization that truly reflects global public opinion? It is hardto answer, “Yes.” Thus, we should keep in mind how the experienceof the UN forces during the Korean incident offers us a lesson about
the unavoidable dangers that will accompany attempts to equip any
142
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peaceinternational organization realistically possible in today’s world with
enforcement capabilities.
Both theoretical and empirical studies show that establishing aninternational organization with enforcement capabilities is neither
possible nor desirable. In reality, international organizations havedeveloped in very different directions. For example, the League of
Nations found Article 11 to be the most useful part of its Covenant
for settling conflicts. The Covenant provided that “the League shalltake any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard
the peace of nations” if a war occurred or was threatening to occur,and that the League’s Council could be convened at the request of any
member of the League. This, to borrow from James Leslie Brierly, ascholar of international law, is based on the idea that statesmen shouldbe allowed to practice their craft and act on their own discretion. It
is plainly obvious that practically the same thing is taking place withrespect to the United Nations.
The United Nations of today is by no means a powerless body.
However, its power does not come from powers of enforcement as thedrafters of the UN Charter had expected. What, then, is the powerthat the United Nations has?

143
I. The Challenge of Enforcement

II. The Power of Public Opinion

The United Nations as a ForumThe power that the United Nations has needs to be critically analyzed
in order to avoid another common mistake—that is, believing uncritically in the power of public opinion and making simplistic assumptions about how it functions. It is generally held that the UN has
evolved into a forum centered on the shaping of international public
opinion, with the General Assembly at its core, rather than becoming
an enforcement mechanism centered on the Security Council. Thisview is not inaccurate. The character of the United Nations certainly
has changed. Initially, political problems were frequently deliberated
within the Security Council, but gradually the General Assembly
became the venue for such debates. Also, the United Nations was initially dominated by the West, and the Soviet Union was always in theminority. However, as a result of numerous Asian and African nations
joining the body, it has become a more neutral venue for debate. Oncethe People’s Republic of China and the two Germanies are added as
members, the United Nations will become even more complete asa forum. Especially for small countries, this has made the General
Assembly an extremely important organization that provides themwith opportunities to make their voices heard. That Indonesia lostmuch and gained nothing by withdrawing temporarily from the bodyin 1965 is good proof of this. (Indonesia rejoined in 1966.) Thus,
through the deliberations that take place nearly year-round at the144
Chapter 3: International Organizations and PeaceUnited Nations, something that we might call “international public
opinion” takes shape.
Perhaps more important is that through the debates in the General Assembly there emerge shared ways of seeing and evaluating
matters—in short, a consensus. The debates over the need for disarmament, respect for human rights, and efforts to solve the NorthSouth problem are examples of such attempts to build consensus. The
debates do not directly produce results, but by laying the groundworkfor reaching common understandings and establishing benchmarks
for evaluating issues, they will be deeply meaningful in the long run.
Any representative of a member state who seeks to assert their national
interests would no longer be able to ridicule or object to any of the values agreed upon through these debates. To borrow the words of Philip
C. Jessup, US representative to the United Nations, “[Y]ou cannot
secure the sympathetic support of the General Assembly by ignoringmoral values.”38 In addition, when it comes to more critical problems,too, public opinion expressed through the United Nations has played
a considerable role. This has garnered great success in some cases, suchas the Suez Crisis, while at other times, such as during the Hungarian
Revolution, it has ended in complete failure. Its efficacy varies, but inmost cases it has unmistakably had some role to play.
However, public opinion is not strong enough to keep the peace;it does not work that way. We must take care to avoid the all-toocommon mistake that belief in the correctness and effectiveness of
public opinion is somehow diametrically opposed to the belief thatpeace may be achieved through some international organization with
enforcement capabilities. For example, Jeremy Bentham, who strongly
believed in the power of public opinion, rejected the need for an international organization and advocated instead for setting up a court for145
II. The Power of Public Opinion

arbitrating disputes. Moreover, he thought there was no need for somepower to enforce the decisions of this court. He believed that if there
was freedom of the press to publish the facts, the power of public opinion would enforce the decisions of the court. His optimism manifests
itself clearly at the opening of his essay, “A Plan for an Universal andPerpetual Peace” (1789):
The object of the present Essay is . . . a plan for an universal and perpetual peace. The globe is the field of dominion to which the author
aspires, the press the engine, and the only one he employs, . . .39
The founders of the League of Nations inherited Bentham’s optimism.
This is evident from the following words in the address that Lord
Robert Cecil, one of the League’s boosters, delivered at the openingof that assembly.
It is quite true that by far the most powerful weapon at the command of the League of Nations is not the economic weapon or thematerial weapon or any other weapons of material force. By far
the strongest weapon we have is the weapon of public opinion.40
As E. H. Carr contended in his masterwork, The Twenty Years’ Crisis
1919–1939, this deification of public opinion itself was a major factor
that rendered diplomacy ineffective during the interwar period. We
must therefore closely examine how public opinion functions, particularly international public opinion.

146
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

The Power of Public Opinion versus Actual ForceFirst, let’s consider the efficacy of public opinion. Specifically, whena crisis occurs, to what extent can public opinion help to solve it? Insome cases, public opinion alone has produced the solution. For example, the repeated debates in the General Assembly in the autumn of1957 regarding the tensions along the border between Syria and Turkey led the Turkish army to end its troop build-up along that frontier.
Likewise, in the 1958 border conflict between Sudan and Egypt, thefact that the Security Council deliberated the issue induced both countries to change their policies, and as a result the crisis abated. In contrast, however, there also have been cases in which public opinion as
expressed through the United Nations has been completely ineffective.
For example, despite the fierce censure to which the Soviet Union’s
actions were subjected when it intervened to suppress the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Moscow achieved its objective. Still further,between 1946 and 1963 the General Assembly passed twenty-eightresolutions demanding that South Africa’s policy of apartheid bechanged, but as of this writing they have had no effect.
The clearest conclusion that can be drawn from these examples isthat, in the end, conflicts are solved based on whatever power relationship lies behind them. This can be readily understood if one compares
the Hungarian uprising with the Suez Crisis that occurred almost
simultaneously. The UN General Assembly adopted largely the samestance in both cases; however, although the Anglo-French forces ceased
hostilities without achieving their objective in the Suez, in Hungary theSoviet Union was not restrained in any way by the negative opinions
that were expressed at the UN. This is plainly due to the differencesin power between the British and the French on the one hand and theSoviet Union on the other. In addition to the pressure exerted on them147
II. The Power of Public Opinion

by international public opinion, Britain and France did not have sufficient power to withstand either the economic sanctions imposed by
the United States or the strength of the US Sixth Fleet, nor could theystand up to Soviet threats of troop movements or hints that the USSR
would use missiles. It was foreseen that if the military action in Egypt
were to continue, and if actual force in one form or another were to be
applied, Britain and France would be dealt a major blow.
In contrast, only the United States would have been capable ofwielding the actual power to halt the Soviet Union from continuing
the actions it took in Hungary—a nation within the Soviet sphere of
influence—and the only means available to the US was total war. The
crucial factor here is that the Soviet Union’s conventional forces werevastly more powerful than those of any other country, as far as Central
and Eastern Europe are concerned. Thus, it was not possible to applypressure on the Soviet Union with only limited use of military force. It
is also why the Hungarian crisis differed from the Cuban blockade of1962 where such measures were possible. So long as the United States
or any other country was not willing to risk total war with the Soviet
Union, the text of any UN resolution could not help but wind up being
futile in light of the lack of a determination to stop Soviet intervention.
That is to say, in those cases where the power relationship is completely
lopsided, public opinion will not be able to resolve the situation.
In fact, cases where the power of public opinion alone was able toresolve the situation—the tensions between Syria and Turkey, and theborder conflict between Egypt and Sudan—were quite exceptional.
Even with respect to the Suez Crisis, where, as I have already said, public
opinion played a considerable role, this does not mean that public opinion alone is what resolved the issue. Deliberations in the United Nations
cannot be an alternative to power politics backed by actual force.
148
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

The Two Functions of the United Nations
This is not to say that the United Nations and the role of public opinion expressed through that body are wholly futile. Assuredly, they have
two important roles to play. The first is that the United Nations always
provides a line for communications among states, especially between
states that are in conflict with one another. In particular, this function
has been useful for easing tensions between the United States and theSoviet Union. First, at the start of the 1950s, relations between these
two superpowers were extremely poor. The Soviet Union continuallyabsented itself from meetings of the Security Council and there waslittle communication between Washington and Moscow. Furthermore, given that China was not in the UN and had no diplomatic
relations with the US, contact between these two nations was practically nonexistent. The fact that the Korean War was fought underthose conditions made the crisis that much more severe.
Consequently, it was of immense significance that India adopted
a policy of nonalignment and a stance of not supporting either bloc,
and also that India made efforts to bring together other nonaligned
countries and use the prestige of the United Nations to serve as anintermediary. India did not contribute militarily to the UN forces in
the Korean War. It opposed their crossing the 38th parallel on September 30, 1950, and as those forces neared the Yalu River it warned
that China would intervene if the advance continued. Likewise, after
China did intervene, India called upon the advancing Chinese army
not to cross that parallel and for the Chinese and North Korean forces
to cease hostilities. On January 22, 1951, China used India as anintermediary to issue its proposed formula for a temporary cease-fire.
India afterward continued its activities as a liaison linking the UnitedStates with China and the Soviet Union. The effectiveness of Indian149
II. The Power of Public Opiniondiplomacy cannot be known with precision, but there is no mistaking
the fact that the existence of a line of communications through Delhi
was one factor that made a cease-fire possible.
The activities of the United Nations during the Cuban crisis were
all the more impressive. They created the opportunity that started
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. On
October 24, 1962, after the US had blockaded Cuba and the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union seemed imminent, UN
secretary-general U Thant proposed that the two superpowers begin
discussions aimed at solving the problem. He called for a two-tothree-week moratorium on both the Soviet Union’s arms shipments
to Cuba and the US blockade of ships bound for Cuba. In response,
the following day Soviet premier Nikita Khruschev welcomed U
Thant’s efforts and agreed to halt the arms shipments. This served as
the trigger for negotiations. At first, there was a direct exchange of letters among US president John F. Kennedy, Khruschev, and U Thant,
and then one between just Kennedy and Khruschev. The result wasthat the Soviet Union backed down and halted the arms shipments.
Of course, the substantive negotiations in this case were those thattook place between the US and Soviet leaders. The power relationshipbetween the United States and the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere and throughout the world is what determined the results of thosenegotiations. More than anything else, what made Khruschev backdown was the fact that the United States had superior military strength
both locally and globally. Backed by that power, Kennedy maintained aresolute stance while leaving the way open for compromise. However,considering that without an intermediary they would not have been able
to seize an opportunity for negotiations, it can readily be understood thatthe role played by U Thant and the United Nations was indeed crucial.
150
Chapter 3: International Organizations and PeaceIn addition, the role the UN played during the Cuban crisis went
beyond simply providing an opportunity for negotiations. It createdan overall atmosphere for seeking peace and created the possibility
for the Soviet Union to make concessions. This in itself is the second
major function played by the United Nations. Khruschev might wellhave pulled back Soviet transports bound for Cuba, but what madethat backdown possible was that it took the form of responding to acall from the United Nations. Accordingly, he was able to do so whilemostly saving face. When he accepted Kennedy’s demand that theSoviet missiles be withdrawn, he was able to save face again by declaring that it was peace-loving global public opinion that had won the
Cuban crisis. A similar development occurred in 1956, when AngloFrench forces jointly attacked Egypt. Great Britain was left isolated in
the face of opposition from global public opinion and inevitably wasforced to yield before pressure from the United States and the Soviet
Union, among others. However, Canadian foreign minister Lester B.
Pearson’s proposal to deploy UN peacekeepers to monitor a cease-firemade it easier for the Anglo-French forces to halt combat operations
and withdraw.
The fact that calls for peace are being made through public opinion,
and that such opinion is being expressed through an authoritative institution like the United Nations, has served greatly to keep the rhetoric
used and goals demanded in check in times of crisis. Criticism cannot
be lodged without the rationale that the peace has been disrupted, andmoreover that in such cases the goal being sought will necessarily be
the restoration of peace. That provides a broad framework for dealing
with conflicts. Furthermore, given that the goal of conflict resolution
is being pursued in the form of restoring the peace, even the side thatmakes concessions can find ways to make an “honorable retreat.”151
II. The Power of Public Opinion

Sensitivity to Public Opinion
So, does that mean that public opinion is completely incapable ofbending states to its will? It would clearly be a mistake to believe so.
If public opinion had no power, it would theoretically be impossible to explain the important (if secondary) role that it plays. In fact,
public debates on international problems are meaningful in the sensethat they function as a means for applying pressure for resolving those
problems. From the perspective of problem-solving, as many critics have pointed out, such public debates have only negative effects.
A diplomatic negotiation is a transaction that calls for compromise
between different positions. This is not easy to accomplish underpublic scrutiny. Although it is necessary for the parties involved in agiven transaction not to adhere to their original positions, making any
changes to them in public will be difficult. There will always be thestrong temptation to criticize others rather than reach an agreement.
This is what led Hans Morgenthau to declare that diplomacy had
degenerated into propaganda strategies. Many others, such as George
Kennan and Winston Churchill, have argued that negotiations shouldbe held in the traditional secrecy. We should note that the late UN secretary-general Dag Hammerskjöld also said the following:
The best results of negotiation cannot be achieved in international life any more than in our private world in the full glare of
publicity with current debate of all moves, unavoidable misunderstandings, inescapable freezing of positions due to considerations of prestige and the temptation to utilize public opinions
as an element integrated into the negotiation itself.41

152
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

In fact, both open discussions and closed negotiations are used in combination in the UN today. Although open discussion lacks merit as ameans for reaching agreements, it is recognized as an important way
to carry out diplomacy. The pressure it creates is sufficiently effective
to force member states to examine and solve whatever issues may beat hand. But the questions are: how strong is that pressure? And how
does it function?
To think about this, we first need to explore an example in which
public opinion could not play the role that people expected of it.
Namely, was the censure of the Soviet Union’s intervention in Hungary expressed by international public opinion truly useless? Certainly,
if we look at the situation from a narrow short-term perspective, public opinion critical of Moscow was of no use whatsoever. However,from a broader, long-term perspective, although the Soviets may haveachieved their objective of suppressing the Hungarian Revolution,
we can see that for that achievement they paid unseen costs. This isclear if one considers how Moscow’s cruel suppression of that revolution served to completely disillusion those around the world who were
sympathetic toward the Soviet Union; that move totally demolishedany rosy images of the Soviets.
To have let the Hungarian Revolution take its course would havedealt the Soviet Union too great a blow. As has already been noted,
the Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe was ina state of confusion. The Hungarian Revolution not only overthrew
an administration “friendly” to the Soviet Union, but the new government then announced it would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact tobecome a nonaligned state, and would adopt a multiparty system athome. That represented an attempt to do away with the two pillars of
the Soviet sphere: being allied with Moscow and having a communist
153
II. The Power of Public Opinion

regime. If the revolution had been allowed to follow its course, theother nations of Central and Eastern Europe would naturally havebeen influenced by it, and that development could have led to the collapse of the Soviet sphere. Of course, Moscow likely was aware thatsuppressing the Hungarian Revolution with military force would haveits drawbacks; however, when compared to the grave costs that the collapse of its sphere of influence would present, the Soviet Union had
to suppress that revolution, even if doing so had the disadvantage ofdrawing censure in the court of public opinion.
The same could be said about the United States’ moves beginningin the spring of 1965 to intervene in Vietnam. This is not to say thatthe two situations are completely the same, but the US action resembles the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in several
respects. Both were efforts to suppress a nationalist revolution. Not
unexpectedly, public opinion on the whole has been critical of theUnited States. The US government itself knew that it would be criticized for intervening in South Vietnam. However, Washington seems
to have judged that idly standing by while the South Vietnamese government was overthrown would have greater disadvantages than being
the target of public criticism. This is why the United States intervened.
Thus, when the stakes are not too big, both the United States andthe Soviet Union can be moved by the pressure of public opinion. The
Soviet response to the Iran crisis of 1946 is an example. During WorldWar II, for tactical reasons the Soviet Union had deployed troops in
Iran. However, when the war ended the USSR made no moves towithdraw those forces. According to the Iranian government, Moscow
was also high-handedly attempting to seize oil rights and was stirring
up anti-government forces in the northern Azerbaijan region. This led
the Iranian government to appeal to the UN Security Council in an
154
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peaceeffort to solve these problems. Although the Security Council did not
adopt any anti-Soviet resolution, Iran skillfully used the opportunitythat these debates provided to pressure the Soviet Union and eventually succeeded in getting the Soviet troops to withdraw.
In addition, not all cases where the pressure of public opinion was
ineffective can be explained solely by power relationships. For example, as of this writing the pressure of public opinion has not produced
any results regarding the Republic of South Africa’s policy of apartheid. This ineffectiveness cannot by any means be explained in termsof power relationships. South Africa was and is by no means a major
power. However, Johannesburg is completely untroubled by how it
is regarded by global public opinion. It has completely ignored thetwenty-eight resolutions that have been passed up to 1966 concerning this matter. The same can be said about Portugal—which continues to rule Angola as a colony—and with respect to Rhodesia as well.
Those nations are utterly insensitive to global public opinion, and forthat reason they have been able to challenge that opinion despite being
minor powers.
Thus, one factor when it comes to making public opinion effectiveis whether a given country respects public opinion. We could describe
this as its sensitivity to public opinion. The primary factor for determining such sensitivity is the nature of a country’s political regime. Clearly,
those countries that recognize freedom of expression and allow theircitizens to criticize the government will be much more sensitive thanthose that do not. Even during the Suez Crisis, Britain’s Labour Party
and many among the British public opposed the government’s dispatch of troops. Even some members of the Conservative Party withdrew their support. Undeniably, all this put enormous pressure on the
British government. In contrast, Moscow did not really need to worry
155
II. The Power of Public Opinion

about domestic opposition. This difference, along with the difference between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in terms of national
power, is of great significance.
However, it would be incorrect to isolate and emphasize thefree-speech factor alone. Even freedom of expression does not guarantee that a nation will be highly sensitive to global public opinion.
For example, the United States was severely criticized in the court ofinternational public opinion for sending troops to the Dominican
Republic. However, Washington continued its action without being
constrained by negative international public opinion, and it achieved
its objective of not allowing a radical government to be formed in thatcountry. There was domestic opposition in the US as well, but the
government was able to ignore it. Recognizing freedom of speech is anecessary condition for monitoring and constraining a government’s
actions, but that does not mean the government will always be constrained where there is free speech. This is because in today’s mass societies where conformist attitudes are prevalent, freedom of expression
may sometimes rally the people around the government’s position andstrengthen its power.
The fundamental reason why the United States and the Soviet
Union have, despite their own great strength, been quite respectful ofinternational public opinion probably lies in the fact that being subjected to negative public opinion would represent a great loss in therealm of power politics. Thus, we must ask in what ways the power
politics of today differ from those of the past. This will also help us tomore clearly define the significance of the United Nations.

156
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

III. The Significance of the United Nations

The Change in Power Politics
The nature of power politics changed tremendously after World War
II. The goal of previous power struggles had been to obtain more territory, but that is no longer the case. As is often said these days, power
politics is now a struggle for hearts and minds. However, we should
not dismissively think of this as little more than a propaganda competition. Rather, the struggle now is between two powers with different
political ideologies who seek to increase the numbers of their “friends,”
i.e., other countries who share the same ideologies. Although using
military force remains the ultimate option, the struggle usually takes
place through displays of power and wealth meant to impress the peoples of other countries with how excellent their respective systems are.
This change in the character of the struggle for power has developedin parallel with the two-dimensional expansion of political power, ahistorical process that was laid out in Chapter 2. That is, in order tomobilize the potential of large numbers of people, nations must motivate their people to participate in politics. Simply ruling a passive populace is no way to make full use of that populace’s potential. That, as
Raymond Aron says, may come down to the distinguishing characteristic of industrial society:
Enslavement in our times is no longer profitable. For labor to
produce profits, it must be skilled, and for it to be skilled the157
III. The Significance of the United Nations

worker must be given a minimum of education. However, slaves
cannot be taught without their acquiring a desire to escape fromtheir slavery.42
Thus, in order to wield the power of the masses, it is necessary to control public opinion and capture their minds.
If enslavement at home is pointless, enslaving the people of othercountries is all the more so. Another factor is at work here—that ofnationalism. Nationalism is a recurring leitmotif in the history of themodern era. The principle of nationalism won victories in Europe
in the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century those victories extended to Asia and Africa. In the nineteenth century, Europe
brought nationalism together with its civilization to the countries thatit colonized in Asia and Africa. In short, the Europeans brought withthem the seeds of that which would undermine their own colonial rule.
However, just as resistance to territorial expansionism grew more
intense due to these changes in international politics, the historical
processes that demanded the creation of even larger political units
reduced the need to rule through military power. Economic power
had become more important as a driver of public opinion. In classical international politics, the various sovereign states were politicallyand economically independent entities (this was what it meant to bea sovereign state). Military power was used sparingly to settle conflicts
among sovereign states, and there was little communication. However,increased economic interdependence and more advanced means ofcommunication made it possible to use economic relations and propaganda to manipulate public opinion in and the behavior of other countries. As pointed out by Kamiya Fuji, professor of international politics
at Osaka City University, it would be safe to say that international
158
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacepolitics now involves more than just the elite-to-elite relationships ofthe past. Namely, it also encompasses people-to-people diplomacy, or
popular diplomacy (i.e., mass-to-mass relations), as well as what has
been termed “diagonal diplomacy” (i.e., relations between the general
populace of one nation and the elites of another). Schematically, international relations that had once been formed through contacts along
a single, two-way channel are now taking shape across four such channels (see Figure 3). It is clear from developments such as the exchangeof trade delegations and cultural envoys that international relations has
become complex.
Thus, appealing to public opinion in international politics has also
become an extremely important act of power politics. And yet, suchappeals are not restricted to using reason as a means of persuasion.
Nineteenth-century thinkers like Bentham could still believe public
opinion to be something that was rational and logical, and for thatreason they were able to believe that the strength of public opinion
would guarantee peace. In fact, however, as the power of public opinion grew, people could not help but notice that it certainly was neither
rational nor logical. This could be seen, for example, in how the term“prestige” started to be used more frequently from around the middleof the nineteenth century.

AB

eliteselitesthe masses

the masses

Figure 3. A Quadrangular Model of International Relations

159
III. The Significance of the United Nations

The great man of letters Thomas Carlyle scorned this new term“prestige” as a “bad newspaper word.” For an Englishman who believedthat a state’s power was not something that should be flaunted, butrather should be naturally acknowledged by other people, there wascertainly no mistaking that “prestige” amounted to a “corrupt journalistic term.” However, the way history unfolded from the end of thenineteenth century into the twentieth century vividly demonstrated
the necessity and effectiveness of flaunting that power.
In particular, Hitler’s success delivered a crushing blow to thosepeople who believed in the rationality of public opinion. Rational persuasion crumbled away in the face of Hitler’s National Socialist movement, which hinged on displays of power and the use of symbols. At
the end of the nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud argued that humanbehavior was governed not by the conscious mind but rather by its
irrational dimension, which he called the subconscious. In politics,
sociologist Vilfredo Pareto said the most important factor was what
he termed nonrational behavior as represented by myths. History has
validated their theories.
The Policies of Prestige and the Policies of Systems
These days, countries keep their prestige in mind when contemplating their actions. For example, the first launch of an artificial satellite,
Sputnik, boosted Soviet prestige to a remarkable degree. In contrast,
the failure of Moscow’s agricultural policies reduced it. Military power
is not used only with objectives such as defeating an enemy or occupying its territory in mind, but rather with thoughts about one’s
own prestige. In October 1962, China battled with India in the twocountries’ border area. After defeating the Indian forces, the Chinesearmy voluntarily withdrew to within its border. Its objectives had been
160
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peaceto secure one or two crucial strategic points and to diminish India’s
prestige. The United States, throughout its Cold War with the Soviet
Union, has continued to assert that it would defend West Berlin to thelast, though such a stance is inexplicable from a military perspective.
The explanation is not to be found in the securing of a route for people
to flee from East Berlin to the West, either. The commitment to defend
West Berlin was meant to express Washington’s determination to notbudge in the face of attempts to change the status quo in Europe byforce. West Berlin was simply seen as providing the most dramatic setting for such a display. That the citizens of this isolated island of West
Berlin did not yield to the pressures exerted on them surely helped toboost the prestige of the West.
That said, the Soviet Union likewise seems to have been fully awareof the symbolic meaning of West Berlin. It was for that reason that
Moscow used a variety of methods to try to change that city’s status.
However, the citizens of West Berlin continued to stand firm, contrary
to the prognostications of Soviet leaders, who soon wound up having
to build a wall around the city. That represented a defeat for the USSRin the important game of prestige.
Alongside these competitions over prestige, the main form thattoday’s power struggles take is for nations professing to uphold certain
universal principles to seek to expand the area where those principles
apply. Force is used today mainly for that purpose. In global politics
today, the decision about which politico-economic system to adopt is
by no means an entirely internal affair; rather, it is one that has a considerable impact on power relations among states as well.
Relations between nations that have different political and economic systems are inevitably far weaker than those between nations
whose systems are the same. US power and Soviet power differ in both161
III. The Significance of the United Nations

character and function. For one thing, US influence can be extended
through several channels, while in the Soviet Union the Communist
Party has near monopolistic control over a single channel. This springs
from the fact that the United States is a pluralistic society, while Soviet
society is under one-party rule. Specifically, the multilayered economic
channels created in the US by various private enterprises are more
effective, and so US hegemony has taken on an economic character.
For the Soviet Union, in contrast, since this dominance is channeledthrough communications between communist parties, it will be very
political in nature.
As a result, US power is unruly. Even if something is recognized asgoing against the national interest, it is difficult to control its exploitation by private enterprise. In the case of the Soviet Union, the government can act in such a way that all its efforts promote politicalobjectives. However, the fact that there are multiple channels for projecting US power can work in the United States’ favor when relations
among its allies have soured; the Soviet side, in contrast, has only one
channel through which to work.
This is clear if one compares Franco-US relations with Sino-Soviet
ties. Franco-US relations may deteriorate on occasion but the relationship does not become adversarial because there are many unofficial
channels alongside the official ones; any worsening in official ties canbe offset by the strength of the unofficial ones. In contrast, with China
and the Soviet Union, it seems that the lack of channels other thanthe official ones is what led to the collapse of the bilateral relationship.
These examples illustrate well how US and Soviet power differ in bothcharacter and function.
In light of what has been said, it seems that having more countries
that share the same systems gives each of the respective superpowers
162
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacegreater scope for action. Viewing this more generally in terms of how
the major powers relate to minor ones, it indicates that the major powers can extend their influence more deeply into those minor countries
that share the same system than those which do not. Thus, rather thanbeing an issue that is separate from power politics, ideological conflictis at their very core.
The United Nations as an Arena for Politics
If this is what power struggles are like today, it is clear that the United
Nations provides an important arena for them. The UN is not afriendly forum where people set power politics aside and talk about
peace. The member states engage in heated debates and strike deals
based on cool-headed calculations of the national interests involved.
International power politics today are conducted with the objective of seizing people’s minds, and the United Nations provides one
important stage for those efforts. However, this does not in any way
subtract from the value of the UN. To the contrary, what prevents the
UN from becoming useless is the very fact that it is not detached frompower politics. Examples from history also prove this. The atmospherein the League of Nations created after World War I was far and away
more friendly. F. P. Walters, author of the retrospective A History of the
League of Nations, an examination of that body’s heyday in the 1920s,
wrote that French foreign affairs minister Édouard Herriot and German chancellor Gustav Stresemann preferred the tranquil atmosphereof Geneva to domestic politics with its fierce back-and-forth struggles
with opposition parties. The power struggles went endlessly on inother arenas during these years. As a result, as early as 1932 Winston
Churchill found he had to criticize those politicians who kept referringto the words of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
163
III. The Significance of the United Nations

I cannot recall any time when the gap between the kind of words
which statesmen used and what was actually happening in many
countries was so great as it is now.43
The atmosphere in the United Nations is very different. Just as thetranquil summer-retreat atmosphere of Geneva differs from that ofbustling and crowded big-city New York, the UN is more worldly thanits predecessor. Varied entanglements related to stakes, power, andideas materialize there. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
have made efforts to promote their positions in the UN, and they
have attempted to use that body’s authority accordingly. For example,
during the first several years of the UN’s existence, the United States
submitted resolutions that the Soviet Union could not accept relating
to the Greek and Berlin crises, forcing the Soviet Union to use its vetopower, which focused criticism on the Soviets. The Soviet Union, too,
seized opportunities such as the United States’ 1961 proxy invasion of
Cuba with Cuban exiles to criticize the US.
However, that such manipulations take place does not make theUnited Nations meaningless. Criticism predicated on appropriate
reasons—Soviet aid to communist guerillas in Greece, for example, or
US assistance to anti-Castro elements in Cuba—expressed in debatesat the UN gave that criticism both rules and weight. The UN also
has its harmonious side to go along with its confrontational one. If
that were not the case, it would not be able to serve as a venue forpolitics. To begin, the arrangement provides a framework for examining problems. As has already been noted, when each member stateargues its position, it cannot do so in a blatantly self-serving manner.
It must assert itself in the name of international interests and peace.
The fact that representatives of each nation are gathered together in
164
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

one place and maintain regular discussions means that the UN facilitates communications among nations. In particular, when the General Assembly is in session, it becomes possible for the leaders andforeign ministers of all nations to gather in New York and to contact one another informally. That is useful for resolving conflicts.
For example, in the autumn of 1961, when the United States andthe Soviet Union were at loggerheads over Berlin, President John F.
Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk held informal talks with
Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who was also sitting in the
UN General Assembly at that time, which helped to prevent the crisis
from deepening.
More important is the fact that the United Nations itself forms a
distinctive space consisting of the member states’ representatives andthe UN’s administrative staff. The UN Secretariat has a large staff
working at jobs that include handling administrative tasks, collecting information, and creating materials that are accurate and neutral,to ensure that the organization operates smoothly. If we include thestaff of the UN’s various special agencies, the total number of people involved is considerable. The organization’s role is not limited todealing with conflicts. As nonpolitical links among member states
increase, it organizes international cooperation through such bodies as
UNESCO and the World Health Organization.
The work of the UN’s administrative staff is indispensable intoday’s complex international society. They are truly international
beings. They may come from different countries and have different
customs and values, but they are deeply committed to their shared
missions such as peacekeeping and promoting international cooperation. Through this, they learn how to work with colleagues who do notnecessarily share the same customs and values.
165
III. The Significance of the United Nations

The representatives of the member states dispatched to the United
Nations do not share common ground to the same degree. Theirduties, of course, are to argue for their countries’ respective positions.
However, over time even they develop a sense of collegiality by working together in this shared venue. They eventually become linked by
the shared desire to solve problems peacefully within the UN framework rather than worsen them. The relationships among the representatives are not those of friends, but they still develop personal feelings
that lead them to speak of each other with such familiar terms as “mydear friend,” “my old rival,” and “my dear old colleagues.”
Adlai Stevenson, a US ambassador to the UN, is said to have gone
through a difficult time due to being caught between the US positionon the Vietnam War and his sense of mission as an ambassador. Before
his sudden death, he was clearly exhausted. He was well-regarded asa representative to the UN because he was more than someone who
merely represented the official US position.
However, the shared bonds in the United Nations remain stubbornly limited, and, in contrast, the differences in positions remain
stubbornly immense. As with all venues for politics, the UN has
aspects of both confrontation and harmony, but of the two confrontation holds the lion’s share. This is the fundamental reason why therole of the UN has been limited to a passive one. When hostilities
have occurred, although the UN has been able to bring them to anend, keep the conflict localized, and keep the hostile parties apart, itcannot undertake enforcement measures of its own accord to penalize
the parties that have violated the UN Charter. Moreover, even if theUN manages to deescalate armed conflicts, it cannot solve problems or
eliminate the root causes of a dispute.

166
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

The Cease-Fire LineThe various cease-fire lines that stretch out in places around the world
are symbolic of the United Nations’ roles and their limitations. All
major armed conflicts since World War II have been brought undercontrol through cease-fires. In one form or another, these have beenmonitored by the UN. However, the job of monitoring has notextended to settling any of these conflicts through the conclusion oflasting peace treaties. The prime example of this is the war between the
Arab nations and the state of Israel created in Palestine. In 1947, theUN deliberated the opposing arguments of the Arab and Jewish peoples over the desire to create an independent country in Palestine. Various proposals were put forth, but the UN was unable to come up witha formula that would satisfy both parties. In the meantime, Israel acted
on its own and declared its independence; simultaneously the surrounding Arab states attacked it. When Israel repulsed these attacks,
the UN made efforts to arbitrate, and it managed to get both parties
to agree to cease hostilities. The UN soon arranged for a cease-fireagreement, and a multinational team that included UN observers was
set up to monitor its implementation. However, despite subsequentefforts, no permanent peace treaty has been concluded. To the contrary, what happened was that in 1956 Israel and a joint Anglo-French
force attacked Egypt. During this crisis, again the UN took measures
to end hostilities in a form that would reinstate the status quo ante andthen sent UN peacekeepers to monitor the cease-fire line.
The United Nations’ record with respect to the Kashmir conflict issurprisingly similar. The contest between India and Pakistan over thepossession of Kashmir—along with the desire of considerable numbers of Muslims in Kashmir who prefer affiliation with Islamabad over
New Delhi—has to date given rise to two major bouts of hostilities.
167
III. The Significance of the United Nations

Both the 1947–1949 war and the conflict in the summer of 1965
were ones that involved hundreds of thousands of soldiers. In bothinstances, the United Nations succeeded in working out a cease-fire
and then sending observers to monitor the cease-fire line.
However, when it came to the question of who had jurisdiction
over Kashmir, the Indian and Pakistani claims were fundamentallyat odds, and consequently all attempts at a resolution failed. Holdinga referendum to establish jurisdiction would in effect be a complete
acknowledgement of Pakistan’s position on the issue, which in light ofKashmir’s economic and military importance, India would not accept.
A similar historical legacy remains in Korea as well. The division of
the peninsula into North and South began at the end of World War
II when the Soviet Union occupied the former and the US occupied
the latter. The two halves remain at odds, and the division continues
to this day with no resolution of any sort in sight. The US and thecountries of Western Europe have proposed holding free elections on
the unification issue monitored by the UN, and some ten resolutions
have been adopted to that effect to date. The Soviet Union and communist countries, however, are adamant that Korean unification mustbe accomplished based on an agreement between the two governmentson the peninsula. Behind their stance are such factors as South Korea’s
larger population, which would favor it in any election, and the complete difference in views about political regimes.
With efforts to reach a political solution failing, North Korea (theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea) tried to achieve unification
by force. The North Korean attempt failed. The UN forces led by theUnited States then attempted to do the same, but they, too, failed.
Eventually, with the status quo ante largely restored and the fighting
on the front at a deadlock, a cease-fire agreement was reached through168
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacethe efforts of a committee set up by the UN General Assembly forthat purpose.
Thus, these three different cease-fire lines—between Israel andEgypt, Pakistan and India, and North and South Korea—symbolize
the limits on the power of the United Nations.
The Limits on the Power of the United Nations
Having limited power is extremely unsatisfying. However, the development of the United Nations has not been based on attempts to
expand that limited power. To the contrary, the UN’s history seems toindicate that its development has been driven by using what power it
has wisely while recognizing its limits.
The decisions of today’s international organizations are effective
only to the extent that the minority approves or tacitly accepts them.
Attempts to go beyond that limitation and increase those organizations’ powers have only produced adverse effects. The UN attempt tounify the Koreas failed because the Soviet Union and China counteredit with force; it even created the risk of another world war.
Of course, the line between tacit approval and open opposition isa fine one. This is an extremely important point if we look at today’s
international organizations. The dispatch of UN forces in response to
the 1960 Congo Crisis provides us with a good example of how finethat line can be.
Almost immediately after the Republic of the Congo was created as an independent country in June of 1960, an uprising rooted
in anti-Belgian sentiment erupted. In response, Belgium dispatchedparatroopers to protect its citizens in that country. The Congolese government asked the United Nations for military assistance to counter
Belgium’s “external aggression.” The UN dispatched a force to restore
169
III. The Significance of the United Nations

law and order and to create a chance for the Belgian military to withdraw. Up to this point, the member countries of the UN were broadly
in approval.
However, at that very time, mineral-rich Katanga Province, backed
by Belgian capital, declared itself to be the independent State ofKatanga. The Congo was thus now in a state of civil war. The Congolese government responded by asking for the support of UN forces,
and, with that assistance, put down the Katanga uprising. This request
was supported both by such radical African countries as Ghana andGuinea, and by members of the communist bloc, including theSoviet Union. But the capitalist countries opposed intervention in
the Congo’s internal dispute. In a sense, this was the opposite of what
had occurred in Korea. The communist countries called for the UNforces to take action in the Congo, while the liberal countries stood
opposed. We must also not overlook the facts operating behind thisstate of affairs: namely, the communist countries supported the radical
regime of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo while the West rejected it.
In any case, the UN forces did not take action to suppress the Katanga
uprising. Naturally, Ghana and Guinea were angered, as was the Soviet
Union. Moscow even said that it would send a volunteer army to help
the Congolese government, though dispatching such a force in theface of US opposition was strategically impossible.
Shortly thereafter, Congolese president Joseph Kasa-Vubu dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba on the grounds that he was drawing
close to communism. In response, Lumumba sought to strip KasaVubu of his authority, and the Congo fell into a state of total chaos.
In the end, Lumumba was captured and brutally executed, and similar
bloody encounters were repeated between supporters and opponentsof the slain prime minister.
170
Chapter 3: International Organizations and PeaceUnder such conditions, fulfilling even the passive role of maintaining order in the country was extremely difficult for the UN forces. In
particular, in a situation where there are competing claims for legitimacy
among warring factions, the UN faces the tough question of deciding
what sort of relationship it should have with each. In other words, theUN had no choice but to decide who represented the Congo.
The United Nations, which at first had limited its actions to justcalling for the factions in the Congo to resolve their dispute, eventually recognized President Kasa-Vubu as legitimately representing thenation. After nearly one year of anarchy, a Congolese government
was formed under Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. Based on that new
government’s decision to banish from the country Belgians and otherforeign military and paramilitary personnel, political consultants,
mercenaries, and the like, it suppressed and defeated the separatist
Katanga forces that Britain and Belgium had backed.
Undeniably, the UN forces’ efforts discouraged foreign intervention in the Congolese chaos. If the UN had just stood by, those Africanand European countries with stakes in the Congo would have actively
intervened. In that case, the Congo would have become the setting forinternational conflict; there is no doubt that this in turn would havebeen reflected by other conflicts erupting elsewhere around Africa. In
view of this, the UN forces served their peacekeeping purpose. However, the solution to the Congo Crisis was certainly unsatisfactory forradical African countries and the communist bloc. The UN’s refusal
to send forces to suppress the Katanga rebellion and its recognition of
President Kasa-Vubu as the Congo’s legitimate leader during the standoff within the country’s government particularly stirred up Soviet distrust of UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld. Moscow proposed
replacing the office of secretary-general with a three-person directorate
171
III. The Significance of the United Nations

(the so-called “troika” system). It even refused to pay its assessed contributions for the UN forces dispatched to the Congo.
Furthermore, although the UN forces did not respond to Lumumba’s bid to put down the Katanga uprising, they wound up fightingwith the insurgents for the purpose of restoring order. This certainly
was inconsistent behavior. It is true that acceding to Lumumba’s initial
request would have meant making an abrupt intervention in the Congo’s internal affairs. This should not be seen as the same as unavoidably having to suppress the separatist Katanga uprising after a year
and a half of attempts to settle the crisis through negotiations. Also,
Lumumba was thrown out and killed due to intra-Congo rivalries; theUN forces were not responsible for the collapse of his regime. Probably it can be said that on each occasion the UN forces chose the best
option available to them.
However, we must pay attention here to the fact that support for
the UN forces, which most members states offered at the start, waned
as time went by. On the other hand, as that support ebbed the authority of the UN forces expanded. They were initially dispatched against
a backdrop of public opinion opposed to Belgium’s intervention withparatroops in the Congo; they were sent to facilitate a withdrawal of
those Belgian forces. That objective was clear and unopposed, but thatwas not the only problem afflicting the Congo.
On the one hand, the separatist movement in the Congo had beenlaunched thanks to Belgian support, which was in effect an infiltration.
On the other hand, divisions emerged within the Congolese government that can best be thought of as civil war pure and simple. When the
UN forces were first put together, they were not given the mandate todeal with these two developments, neither the infiltration nor the civil
war. It is open to question as to whether a UN force would have been
172
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peaceput together if the infiltration and civil war had already begun without
the open intervention by Belgian forces. Judging what constitutes aninfiltration or a civil war requires having shared criteria for what makesa political regime legitimate. In today’s world, there is no such thing.
It is difficult to determine if an infiltration is something that has
started as a result of foreign influence or if it is indigenous. Regarding civil war, the problem rests in deciding which side represents thelegitimate government. However, the UN forces that were dispatchedunder a different mandate to the Congo were obliged to step into thiscomplicated situation in order to fulfill their objective of restoring
order. Yet when they did so, their authority expanded. Naturally, withthe change, the initially unanimous support of the member states for
the UN force disappeared.
The Soviet Union and the radical African nations were dissatisfied
with the measures taken by the United Nations, but they were not able
to counter them with force as had occurred in Korea. It was for thatreason that the UN forces in the Congo were eventually able to accomplish their mission of restoring order locally. However, it is undeniable
that the limited support for those forces was something that reduced
their prestige.
The UN Presence Formula
In contrast, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) that was organized
during the Suez Crisis was the most successful example of such a
UN dispatch, in that it had objectives that could be clearly defined.
Namely, its mission was limited to protecting the cease-fire line set
down following the withdrawal of the foreign forces that had invaded
Egypt. Beyond that, their duties were nothing more than secondary,such as clearing waterways and overseeing exchanges of prisoners.
173
III. The Significance of the United Nations

Both the dispatch of this UN force and its activities were premisedon the agreement of the countries concerned, specifically the country
that was to host them. The force’s activities were based on the principles of respecting host nation sovereignty and not intervening in its
internal affairs. That is, in regard to the force’s functions, the emphasis
was placed on its noncoercive nature. The international character ofthat force was ensured by putting it under the command of the secretary-general. Its impartiality was carefully maintained by bringing
together forces from countries that were seen as neutral with respect
to the conflict. As this fundamental character of the force suggests, theUN’s Suez goals were limited to reinstating the status quo that existed
prior to the incursion by the Anglo-French forces, and then to monitoring that reinstatement. Due to these limits, the UN’s activities
during the Suez Crisis were successful.
Thus, the past record shows that the United Nations is able only
to localize and neutralize a conflict without being able to settle it. In
Korea, its efforts to settle the conflict failed, while its efforts in Suez,
where its objectives were limited, were successful. All that the UN can
do is attempt to localize and neutralize disputes. Preventive diplomacy
based on a UN presence—the organization’s core function today—isgrounded in recognizing this. It is an attempt to employ more broadly
and as preemptively as possible the UN’s capacity to localize a conflict. It was late secretary-general Hammarskjöld who coined the term
“preventive diplomacy.” According to his definition, the objective ofpreventive diplomacy is to prevent major powers from intervening by
proxy through the UN when a local conflict erupts that would jeopardize international peace. The UN’s intervention will take the formof some body or organization whose actual form will vary dependingon the circumstances. The UN body will not necessarily be a military
174
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peaceforce, but could also comprise mediators, an investigative team, acease-fire monitoring group, or other type of person or group.
This formula has its origins in the UN’s success during the Suez
Crisis, and it came to be used preemptively and actively after the1958 Lebanon Crisis. Since then, preventive diplomacy has been
employed in such forms as the 1959 Subcommittee Established by
Security Council Resolution 132 (1959) on the Laos Question, the1960 Operation in the Congo, the 1962 Security Force in West New
Guinea (West Irian), the 1963 Yemen Observation Mission, and the1964 Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
Thus, although the United Nations cannot resolve a conflict, it cankeep it from developing into an armed one. Should such an armed
conflict occur, the UN can still help to neutralize and localize it to prevent it from escalating.
Of course, even just these limited functions cannot be performed
in all cases. The Congo experience demonstrates just how difficult it isto prevent an internal conflict from being internationalized. As I havealready said, most of the wars since World War II have been intranational conflicts, and potential future wars will be the same. It is difficult for the United Nations to intervene effectively in an exclusively
internal conflict. In that sense, one could say that the sending of UN
forces to Cyprus was an extremely important test case.
When the parties involved in an internal conflict are determined
to continue fighting, in all likelihood the United Nations will be
powerless. For example, there was no discussion about the possibilityof sending UN forces at the time of the Algerian War. That conflict
merely stirred up public opinion, which put pressure on France. Furthermore, the internal conflict in Algeria did not become international
because France did not attack certain targets that were deemed off
175
III. The Significance of the United Nations

limits despite being known as conduits for aid from outside parties.
If France had attacked such areas, who can say what would have happened? In particular, when outside parties who are not seen as legitimate “infiltrate” into an internal conflict—as Belgium did with its
support for the State of Katanga in the Congo—the problems that
result will be extremely difficult.
However, if it is possible to find ways through such difficult situations, and if a local conflict is contained long enough, the underlying
confrontation might eventually be resolved. In any case, there is noother way to accomplish this.
The Authority of the United Nations
To expect that the United Nations will have limits on the roles it
plays is not just a matter of needing to be realistic. It is also necessary
from the perspective of how the UN will develop in the future. This isbecause the UN’s ability to localize conflicts is based on its authority.
To take the UNEF in the Suez Crisis as an example, that unit was nota military force in the usual sense of the word. If one or another country attempted to break the agreement that was in place through brute
force, the UNEF had neither the capacity nor mandate to repel theattempt. A UN force with barely 6,000 soldiers is not ready to engage
in combat. UN forces have been permitted to use weapons only whenabsolutely necessary for self-defense. Those restrictions have applied to
all UN forces except for the mission that was sent to the Congo.
Accordingly, it is little trouble to attack these units with armed
force. However, despite their limited power and mandates, UN forces
play a major role in guaranteeing agreements because the presence ofsuch a force lends the authority of the United Nations to the agreement between the parties involved. Attacking UN forces is easy, but to176
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacechallenge the authority of the UN by doing so would certainly draw
fierce criticism, which could even lead to the actual use of force. Suchconsiderations serve as major constraints on the parties involved.
Superficially, the way the Suez Crisis was settled seems no different
from how it might have been worked out through traditional diplomatic negotiations. The parties involved endorsed a cease-fire and a
return to the status quo that existed prior to the start of hostilities.
The presence of UN forces was based on the consent of the countries
involved. Israel rejected their presence, so they were deployed only on
the Egyptian side.
However, the UN’s authority was attached to this consent, and that
did more than just guarantee the agreement. If there had been no guarantee, there is no saying whether there would have been any agreement
at all. As has been said, diplomacy is based on the power of individual
countries. Parliamentary diplomacy draws its influence from the morenuanced and ineffable power of international society. Challenging theexistence of the United Nations would not be taken as the disdain forthe power of any one country, but rather as disdain for the authority ofinternational society as a whole.
However, what is authority? Unquestionably, it is subtle and difficult to grasp. Obviously, neither a majority obtained by manipulating
the mechanisms of the UN nor any power wielded by such a majority
constitutes actual authority. Nevertheless, some UN resolutions andactions are indeed backed by the institution’s authority. Even among
those matters that appear similar, there are some backed by such
authority and others that are not. This nuanced and seemingly ineffable aspect to “authority” most likely can be attributed to the fact that
authority is rooted in the multifaceted ways in which the objects andthe subjects of that authority relate to one another.
177
III. The Significance of the United Nations

The word authority and the word author share the same root; if
you have authority, people will go along with what you say. The utterances of someone seen as having authority regarding a certain mattercarry greater weight than those of the average person. In this case, that
authority is to a certain degree underpinned by the status of the person
making that utterance. Whatever “authority” that may exist in humansociety has been institutionalized in the forms of universities, courts,
and so forth. People heed the words of those who are associated withsuch institutions. Governments are the greatest examples; the difference between them and other institutions is that they are backed bycompelling force.
However, from a different perspective, the reason why the masses
go along with whatever those who are supposedly “in authority” sayis because the masses simply accept the “fact” that those people haveauthority. “Authority” is wholly dependent on whether it is or is not
accepted and acknowledged.
Accordingly, as Hannah Arendt, one of the prominent philosophers of our age, has said, authority is neither a matter of coercion norof persuasion. It is something that perhaps lies in between. Force isused because people do not comply with authority. In other words, thevery fact that actual force is used shows that authority has been lost. To
put this in a present-day context, if a given country uses armed force
to oppose a decision by the United Nations, and the UN must carryout that decision through the use of actual force, it can be assumed
that the UN lacks sufficient authority to follow through. In contrast,
a UN resolution that is passed with the agreement of the interested
parties would have such authority. In international politics as pursued
today, sovereign states are not prepared to comply with any decisions
made by an international organization that are contrary to their own
178
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peacewishes. They became UN member states of their own volition, andtheir compliance with UN decisions is likewise understood to be onthat basis. Each member state has granted authority to the United
Nations within those limits. Accordingly, it is within those limits thatthey comply with UN decisions.
That said, complying with authority is not the same as agreeing
with it. From time to time, states may accept decisions with which they
do not specifically agree. A small minority may be dissatisfied with one
or another UN decision, but so long as they do not express their dissatisfaction by force the UN’s authority may be somewhat damaged
but will still remain substantially intact. Perhaps the actions of the UNforces in the Congo lay along this subtle boundary. The Soviet Unionand radical African nation-states criticized the UN’s activities in theCongo, but they did not try to change them by resorting to actualforce. That is why the UN forces in the Congo were able to complete
their missions. However, we must not forget that if authority is repeatedly impaired, in the end it will be lost.
Thus, the authority of the United Nations reflects the attitudes
that its member states have toward the organization itself. Given that“authority” is something that is based on the reciprocal relationshipbetween “having” it and “sensing” it, and at an international level
between those nations who act as though they possess it and those
who feel as though they are compelled by it, it is something thatcan only increase—even if only little by little—as time passes. With
respect to the idea that creating the ideal international organization
will produce peace, the following words of early-nineteenth-century
British foreign secretary Lord Castlereagh (Robert Stewart) remain as
appropriate as ever:179
III. The Significance of the United Nations

The Problem of a Universal Alliance for the Peace and Happiness of the world has always been one of speculation and of
Hope but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an
opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can; but
you may in practice approach towards it.44
Trying to settle issues by having an international organization whose
purpose is to create peace is infeasible. Such an approach will collidewith the same hard wall that the universalist modes for reaching peace
we have examined here have encountered. Nations cannot simply
abandon their own values and interests. If that is the case, then it could
be that nations cannot act in ways meant to strengthen the authority
of international organizations while protecting their own interests andvalues. Thus, having examined several universal modes of resolving
issues, in the end we come back to the specific issue of how individual
nations behave. What kind of nation could act toward the goal of creating a peaceful world?

180
Chapter 3: International Organizations and Peace

CONCLUSION
The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Order

have not“Men,yet unfortunately,
reached the point where
they have no further occasion or
motive for killing one another. If tolerance is born of doubt, let us teacheveryone to doubt all the models
and utopias, to challenge all theprophets of redemption and the heralds of catastrophe.” Raymond Aron,
The Opium of the Intellectuals, 195545

181
I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

Imperialism
What is a peaceful state? The inquiry is hardly new. To the contrary, it’sa long-standing one—and extremely fundamental. Since ancient times,
when thinkers have grappled with the problem of peace, this issue has
been central. The answers those thinkers reached have, in popularized
forms, laid the foundations for how we think about peace. For example, criticisms about militaries were not expressions of the simplistic
idea that peace would result if only militaries were eliminated; rather,
they were meant as a caution that simply having a military could lead anation toward militarism.
Since antiquity, there have always been concerns about those whose
profession is to wage war. Such a profession requires leading a way oflife that is very distinct from the norms of everyday life. The greatest
concern has always been that the presence of such a militaristic group
could transform the behavior of society as a whole, and lead it down
the road of war.
However, today the most well-known theory about the relationshipbetween peace and the nature of a national regime is that of imperialism,in its several variants. Of course, it is easy to criticize these theories, whichattempt to generalize the lessons of history from the late-nineteenth
century through the twentieth. Imperialism itself has now become
an epithet used in political propaganda, as is evident from how political adversaries use “imperialist” as a pejorative against one another.
182
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International OrderNevertheless, imperialism remains relevant not because of how the word
is bandied about, but rather because the concept itself provides us witha theoretical framework for explaining why states turn to expansionism.
As described in Chapter 2, the theories that attempted to draw general lessons from the wars of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be divided into two broad categories. One group comprises
the economic theories that see the origins of imperialism in the flaws
of capitalism. The other group comprises the sociological theories
that see its origins in the social phenomena arising during the transition to industrial society. John A. Hobson (1858–1940) and Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) both expounded economic theories that are
strikingly similar. Both saw the roots of imperialism in the inequitable
distribution of wealth in a capitalist society. Wealth is concentrated
in the hands of a minority, while the majority are left impoverished.
Under capitalism, not all products can be sold, and not all capital canbe invested. Critics of capitalism contend that the surplus goods andsurplus capital necessarily seek outlets, and that therefore a capitalist
society cannot avoid seeking to acquire colonies.
But there is one major difference between Hobson and Lenin.
Lenin held that imperialism would inevitably develop under capitalism. Hobson, in contrast, believed that imperialism could be avoided.
He did not believe that imperialism was a rational means of solving
the problems of surplus products and surplus capital. He held that,
because such surpluses result from the misdistribution of purchasing
power, they had to be dealt with by expanding the domestic marketplace through economic reforms such as more equal distribution, theexpansion of purchasing power, and elimination of excessive saving.
Sociological theories of imperialism came from Joseph Schumpeter(1883–1950) and Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929). They saw the roots
183
I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

of imperialism as lying in the stage when industrialization was still
underway, when the holdovers from preindustrial society were connected to the technologies of industrial society.
Schumpeter did not see capitalism as aggressive or belligerent; tothe contrary, he thought it was anti-imperialist. This was because if
one looked at the modes of living under capitalism, it would be seenthat the people who played leadership roles—the bourgeoisie, industrialists and financiers, intellectuals, lawyers, physicians, and the like—
had jobs with no connection to war. Given that they compete among
themselves, they could not avoid directing all their energies toward
economic activities. Even the energy that had earlier been devoted to
war would now need to be dedicated to labor. Naturally, those people
would come to think of wars of conquest and foreign adventurism as
burdensome obstacles. However, in capitalist society, the mechanisms
for war that existed in the society that preceded it and the class that had
been oriented toward war, in other words the nobility, still remained.
These, Schumpeter argued, are what gave rise to imperialism.
Veblen, drawing on the same way of thinking, argued in 1900 thata combination of feudal morals, the power provided by modern technology, and military prowess gave birth first to Japanese imperialism
and soon thereafter to German imperialism as well.
The prototypes for Schumpeter’s and Veblen’s way of thinking are to be found in the work of the nineteenth-century thinkers
Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903).
Both believed in the progress of human society. According to Comte,
progress was leading human society from a theological and militaristic
society, where the chief duty had been conquest, toward a scientificand industrial society, where the primary interest would be production. This transitional period of development would be one in which
184
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Orderindustry would be highly valued and protected primarily as a means ofwar. However, industrial society would ultimately become dominant,and all social relations would become guided by the terms of industry.
At this point, Comte thought, industrial society would reject conquest
and war, and would make production the only normal goal.
Both Schumpeter’s and Veblen’s theories remain true to a considerable degree. Veblen’s theory certainly would seem to explain bothworld wars. Schumpeter’s theory held that although the institutions
that were created for waging war inevitably also cause wars, thoseinstitutions are inherently alien to modern industrial society. They
will eventually be selected out as industrialization proceeds. While thelatter part of this argument is doubtful in light of present-day realities, the former part is clearly correct. It also cannot be denied that theinequitable distribution of wealth and the surplus products and capitalthat the system generates were among the reasons for Western Europe
expansionism. Neither Western Europe nor Japan were able to resolve
the contradictions that arose from industrialization, and those selfsame
contradictions became the driving force for imperialist expansionism.
However, even if this explains imperialism to a certain degree, itdoes not explain everything, let alone answer the question of what isa peaceful nation. These theories might have uncovered some of thefundamental reasons why nations turn to aggression, but they aren’t
the only reasons. Hence, even if those reasons are eliminated, it is still
not certain that all nations will become peaceful. But in all likelihood,the theorists’ optimism about industrialization led them to believe thatpeace would be achieved once the root causes of imperialism had been
discovered and eliminated. They believed that all ideally industrializedsocieties would be peaceful. This is evident in Comte’s and Spencer’s
thought. Hobson’s thinking, too, was founded on the optimistic view
185
I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

that free economic exchange between nations would produce mutual
benefits that would make war and conquest unnecessary, and hence
produce peace.
Marxism, however, is not so simply optimistic; in particular, it takes
an unforgiving view of capitalist society. Nonetheless, it is optimistic
in its belief that a utopia will result after capitalism is overthrown. Raymond Aron calls this visionary optimism.
Hence, these thinkers did not examine the crucial problem of how
exactly to control the power that industrialization provides. Rather,
they sought to determine what exactly made a nation act aggressively.
They thought that peace would result if that factor was renounced
and eliminated.
This way of thinking led them to make an error in their logic. The
factor that they point out certainly is one cause of war. However, to
say that factor “A” causes war does not mean that all wars are caused
by factor “A.” This error is particularly conspicuous when it comes topopularized theories of imperialism. There is a danger that this blinkered optimism will only stir people’s emotions to eliminate the specified causes of war, and will lead to war being fought in the name ofpeace. If the theories that see capitalism as the cause of war are applied
simply and narrowly to our current world, it is clear that a war to eliminate capitalism as the cause of war would be waged.
A Spencerian optimism is at work when the American economic
theorist Walt Rostow defines communism as the easily caught, fleeting
illness of a society in transition from an old, traditional society to anindustrial society. His emphatic assertion of the need to protect underdeveloped countries from that illness suggests that the United States
would engage in a veritable holy war to do so.

186
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Order

The Reality of a Peaceful Nation
Although it might be theoretically possible to work out a concept of a“peaceful” nation in complete isolation from international politics, if
such a nation were placed amidst the fierce power struggles of international politics, the result may be very different from what is expected.
In modern history, we have seen at least three instances of nations that
initially declared themselves to be peaceful but, as they were caught up
in international power struggles, turned into regular players no different from any other.
First, there is the example of the United States. It set out to be anew, peaceful nation, isolated from Europe which was the hotbed of
power politics. The US was created by European immigrants; when
they left Europe behind, they thought they had also left behind thebad habits of power politics. In fact, throughout the nineteenth century the US did not participate in the political wheeling and dealingof the European countries. Most Americans said that this was because
their country had peaceful democratic institutions. However, as Alexisde Tocqueville acutely pointed out in Democracy in America (1835),
the causation between democracy and isolation was the other way
around. The US was able to survive with a weak central government
and a weak standing army because it did not engage in international
power politics. Eventually, however, as the US became embroiled intheir maelstrom, it was forced to develop its capabilities to competewith other countries, and now the US has the most powerful military
in the world. It would be premature to conclude from that fact alonethat the US is bellicose, but nonetheless it is clearly wrong to see theAmerican political regime as simply a peace-loving one.
The French Revolution that followed soon after the American one
likewise dramatically transformed France’s stance on foreign relations.
187
I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

France was thought to have become peaceful thanks to the creation ofa political regime in which decisions about peace and war would bemade directly by its citizens. Their way of thinking was strongly coloredby the eighteenth-century optimism that held that war was the province of kings and nobles and that if politics reflected the will of ordinary people there would be no wars. Title 6 of the French Constitutionof 1791 gave voice to this optimism: “The French nation renounces
the undertaking of any war with a view of making conquests, and it
will never use its forces against the liberty of any people.”46
However, the moves to intervene in the French Revolution bynations with long-established regimes such as Austria and Prussia
changed the situation completely. French politician Lazare Carnot(1753–1823) came up with the idea of conscription, and he called
upon all citizens to help France achieve its war aims. The revolutionthat had been the first in history to reject war ended up becoming thefirst in history to produce a military draft. The counterargument that
France likely would have remained peaceful internationally if foreigncountries had not intervened is unconvincing. Although interventions
do not always take such a conspicuous form, the fact remains thatthey occur. In any case, the French Revolution, partly because of theneed to fight revolutionary wars, produced the military dictatorshipof Napoleon Bonaparte, and Napoleon went on to launch an unprecedented war of conquest. The French citizens who had once rejected
war were stirred up by Napoleon’s conquests and now sang its praises.
The history of the twentieth-century Russian Revolution largely
followed the same course. The Soviet Union, too, thought of itself asa regime of peace, as did many Marxists. However, whatever the character of a socialist regime may be in the abstract, real socialist regimes
found themselves locked in fierce struggles with other countries. The
188
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International OrderSoviet Union had to survive wars of intervention. The need to sustain the war effort made the newly born dictatorial regime even more
oppressive and drove the country into Stalinism. Stalin’s foreign policyin actual fact was no different from those of other countries. In particular, his policies toward Eastern Europe at the end of World War II
were much the same as those that had been pursued by the czar. Thus,
the history of Soviet foreign policy unfolded in ways that disillusioned
those who had sincerely believed that countries with socialist regimes
were naturally peaceful. The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 were just the mostnotable of many disappointments. Here, as with the American and theFrench revolutions, it is wrong to argue that these “essentially peaceful regimes” were forced to become more belligerent due to conflicts
with other countries. Conflicts are a fundamental element of international politics that can never be ignored when we discuss the questionof peace. To say that a country can be a peaceful one if countries are
not aggressive is the same thing as saying that peace can be achieved if
there are no conflicts in international society. It is simply tautological.
Although the characters of the countries that comprise international society are important factors for determining the nature of thatsociety, they are not independent factors. To the contrary, the natureof international society itself also influences the character of individual countries; it follows that the relationship between the international
and the national is an interactive one. This can be readily understood
if we consider the foreign policy that a country pursues when it is atpeace and when it is being belligerent.
Under what sorts of international environments have the following
two contrasting images of diplomacy developed? One—as suggested
by seventeenth-century British politician Henry Wotton’s definition
189
I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

that “an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth”—is that diplomacy is a matter of working out a strategy
to achieve one’s own objectives while duping the other party. The otherconception rejects such methods and instead holds that the proper
approach to diplomacy is to discover mutual interests.
Under what international conditions did the following two concepts of diplomacy emerge? The first pattern—what we might callstratagem-based diplomacy—was practiced by both the Byzantine
Empire from late antiquity to the Middle Ages and the Italian citystates during the early years of the European international system.
These were times of extreme chaos. The Eastern Roman (Byzantine)
Empire—which was situated between the multiethnic Balkan Peninsula and the Near East, where Muslims were growing in power—lasted
a thousand years after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. The
reasons for its longevity were its advanced civilization (the eastern areasof the Roman Empire in its dying days had a higher level of civilization
than the western ones) and the fact that it had to call on both superb
military technology and ruthless diplomatic skills. Conventional wisdom in the Eastern Roman Empire held that it was only natural toattack a foe who naively responded to a cease-fire proposal by carelessly
relaxing their defenses. Diplomats handed out bribes, set neighboring
countries against one another, and duped their enemies. Such techniques were later implemented in Italy where similar chaos reigned,
and they were exploited ruthlessly there as well.
However, when the object of one’s diplomacy is not necessarily an enemy, any gains made through deception will not be lasting
ones. Lasting diplomatic relationships must be built on mutual interests. In light of this fact, European diplomacy shifted from the stratagem-based model to the second, more harmonious one. Of decisive
190
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Orderimportance here is the fact that while the Eastern Roman Empire’s
diplomatic partners represented different civilizations, the European
states were linked through a shared civilization. This is crucial because
under such conditions permanent interests are more important than
temporary ones and therefore can be prioritized.
Thus, the international environment and the type of diplomacythat nations pursue are interrelated. Disorder in international politics
requires stratagem-based diplomacy. However, such diplomacy canmake a disordered situation worse and create a vicious cycle. Dictators
have long used threats from abroad as an excuse to expand their power
and maintain peace at home. Such expansions of power threaten othernations, forcing them to respond. This turns potential foreign threats
into actual dangers, and leads the despot to expand their power further. Hence the cycle.
“Wickedness Comes from Weakness”
Accordingly, the fundamental issue for all the nations that makeup international society becomes how to redirect this vicious cycle
between the international political environment and the nature of
the diplomacy of these nations from a bad direction to a good one.
The domestic regime of each country may be the primary condition.
However, as already discussed, both the optimistic view that peace will
follow once that condition is satisfied, and the deterministic one that
only a single type of regime satisfies that condition, must be firmly
rejected. Eighteenth-century thinkers did not make these mistakes,
and consequently they gave us crucial insights into what makes domestic regimes peaceful and international environments orderly.
Rousseau argued that world peace could be achieved only if allnations were independent and separate from one another with only
191
I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

limited interaction. Clearly, such an idealized state is unlikely intoday’s world. However, if we consider the dangers created by various
interactions as we saw in Chapter 2, such as how the North-South
problem will not be solved by integrating different nations but rather
by restoring or sustaining their independence, then Rousseau’s ideal
world could indeed become a reality.
Also, as Chapters 1 and 3 showed, denying the sovereignty ofnations cannot solve the problem of how to achieve peace among
them. In other words, the most important conditions for having apeaceful nation are for it to solve its own problems at home and for it
to not envy other nations. Rousseau says the following in Emile:
All wickedness comes from weakness. The child is only naughty
because he is weak; make him strong and he will be good; if we
could do everything, we should never do wrong.47
Certainly, countries that cannot manage their own economies or protect
their independence have always been sources of disorder and war despite
their inability to actively do harm to others. This is true even today. Of
course, isolated independence is out of the question today. However,countries can be independent even when they are interdependent.
That said, in order to maintain independence in an interdependentworld, the power to protect independence must be restricted. Kant
examined the conditions under which independence can be maintained while being interdependent. He set forth “The civil constitution of every state shall be republican” (emphasis added) as his First
Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace.48 Its purpose was to restrict thepower of states. Just how important Kant considered this condition
to be is obvious from his insistence that all states must be republican,
192
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Orderthough he did find it acceptable and even desirable for each nation tochoose its own political institutions.
For Kant, republicanism is not about who holds power. In his
usage, it is about the way that power is wielded and how governanceis provided. For him, republicanism stood opposite to despotism. In arepublican system, there are limits on how political power is wielded.
He held the unique features of republicanism to be (1) a freedom
prescribed by laws that protects the rights of the individual (without
depending on a majority), (2) the separation of powers, and (3) representative institutions (associated with free elections). Setting aside thequestion of whether this would produce sufficient restraints on power,
the key point is Kant distinguished democracy from republicanism.
Kant was aware that a tyranny of the majority could arise under democratic governments. And he clearly had no naive optimism about
how public opinion worked. The view that Kant had a blind belief
in the power of public opinion arose later through mistaken and vulgarized interpretations of his analysis. As Chapter 3 made plain, thepolitical regimes that make international organizations meaningful
are not the ones where public opinion is powerful but rather where its
power is regulated.
Viewed this way, our investigation in this book into three distinct
attributes of nations can be summed up as providing us with the following lessons about what conditions make a peaceful nation. A
peaceful nation must have military capabilities sufficient to preserve its
independence, but it must not yield to militarism or lose control overthose capabilities. From an economic perspective, neither a nationthat is forced to submit to the domination of some other nation, nor anation that dominates others, can be peaceful. Finally, political power
must be limited. Lack of free speech, the tyranny of the majority, and193
I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

fanatical devotion to one or another ideology must be rejected as they
will make it extremely difficult to limit political power.
Such criteria unquestionably provide some guidelines for behavior.
However, these are not enough. As already noted, satisfying these criteria in isolation from other relevant conditions is simply impossible.
We still need to ask about how to survive under the disorderly international conditions that we face today.

194
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Order

II. Coping with Reality

The Absence of International Norms
The disorderly state of international politics is a source of immense difficulties for all nations. That disorder cannot be attributed to the presence of a single, wicked nation, nor can it be explained by human moral
degeneracy. It is a consequence of a weakening in the norms that rule thebehavior of nations, which in turn causes confusion and mutual distrust.
Norms prevail under stable conditions. International law is theprime example. The question of whether “international law” actuallyqualifies as law has frequently been discussed. International law is notbacked by enforcement power and is undeniably incomplete in nature.
But it is also true that international law has served as a guideline forhow states should behave.
Let’s take the example of settling borders between nations, which isone of the most critical functions of international law. National borders serve as the foundation for the principle of non-interference, andas such have provided the basic framework for the behavior of nationsin the modern international system. National borders define the scopeof sovereign jurisdiction. The modern international system consists ofsovereign states that have the power to exclusively control subjects intheir respective territories. States are therefore not allowed to interfere
in one another’s internal affairs. National borders are the basic institution that sustains this principle of non-interference. So long as thisprinciple holds, international power struggles will take the form of
195
II. Coping with Reality

competition between states over territorial control. The results of thesestruggles are made manifest as new borders recognized by international
treaty. A nation seeking to change recognized national borders would
be seen as one that is expansionist. Any attempt to change particularly important borders represents a threat to other nations. Thus, fixing borders, coupled with the principle of non-interference, provides aframework for the power struggle among states.
The laws of war are another example. The laws are based on theidea that, while war itself may be an accepted instrument for the power
struggles among states, the acts undertaken in those wars should
be restricted. Neutrality as an institution is a notable example. By
acknowledging that some nations have no direct involvement with aconflict and guaranteeing their rights and obligations, neutrality limits
the scope of acts of war. If some nations avoid direct involvement in awar, they can retain the power to moderate the acts of the belligerents
and prevent the conflict from ending in a one-sided victory.
Such rules are not guaranteed by enforcement powers. However,
the rules are likely to be observed when breaking them would result in
losses that would outweigh any possible gains. Thus, the laws of war
came to generally serve as guidelines for state behavior.
These days, however, such rules are far removed from the reality ofinternational politics. For that reason, it has become extremely difficult to accept and comply with these rules, and hence they have ceased
to be effective guidelines for behavior. For example, it is impossible
to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants when wars arefought through guerilla campaigns and missile exchanges. In this ageof total war, the acts of belligerent parties are not easily constrained.
Getting nations to follow the rules of war is extremely difficult when
breaking them has come to offer so many benefits.
196
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International OrderSome may still believe that the acts of war undertaken since WorldWar II have in fact been largely regulated by international law. Evenso, however, this raises the important question of whether or not it isenough to restrict the acts undertaken in a war while still accepting
war itself as a legitimate means for carrying out power struggles. Perhaps the current approach is the correct one after all: all wars are illegal other than those for self-defense or those military actions provided
for under the UN Charter. It is true that this would put many acts of
war outside the rule of law. At present, however, there are no norms
acceptable to all nations that, if they were adhered to, would ensurethat peace would be preserved.
Furthermore, the combination of settling national borders andhonoring the principle of non-interference can no longer serve as theinstitutional framework for containing international power struggles.
This is because, strictly speaking, non-interference is impossible.
World War I demonstrated this in dramatic form. Germany lost
despite having prevented enemy armies from entering its territory. One
reason for this was an economic blockade. Today, the survival of every
country depends on economic exchanges that are conducted beyond
their borders. By manipulating economic relations, in particular by
imposing an economic embargo, Germany’s enemies could wield tremendous power without ever crossing its borders. Propaganda is anotherfactor. In World War I, all the warring powers engaged in fierce propaganda warfare. While its primary objective was to fan nationalism athome, it also targeted the populations of enemy nations. In fact, British
and French propaganda did have some impact on the German people.
In addition, the fundamental dilemma of international politics—
the existence of different versions of legitimacy—manifested itself asa fierce conflict between two ideologies. With two competing versions
197
II. Coping with Reality

of legitimacy, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs wasmade moot. Liberalism postulates the conditions for democratic legitimacy to be parliamentarism, free and confidential elections, majority
rule, independence of the judiciary, freedom of speech and thought,
and the like. Meanwhile, communism, in contrast, held that democracy is impossible so long as society is divided into one class thatpossesses the means of production and another class that lacks thosemeans and instead has to sell its labor.
Accordingly, communism rejected the idea that an assembly or government chosen through elections represents the people; it regarded
any government created on that basis as nothing more than democracy
in form only. However, from a liberal perspective, communism does
not meet the criteria for a democracy. Thus, with two conflicting ideas
about legitimate political regimes, coupled with closed transnational
communication, non-interference in the strictest sense of the word has
become impossible in practice.
So long as different concepts of legitimacy are in fierce conflict, it
is clear that any attempt to create shared rules for behavior will fail.
Even if an attempt is made to outlaw war by working out a formula forpeacefully settling conflicts, opinions will remain divided about whatthat formula for achieving peaceful settlements should be. Given thatthe concepts of legitimacy differ to begin with, views regarding what
constitutes a civil war will likewise never be the same.
Thus, international law—which had laid out the guidelines for
how nations should behave within the modern state system—has been
shaken at its very foundations. It is extremely difficult for a nation to
restrain its own behavior by trusting in the behavior of others. It isthese factors and not the wickedness of one or another power that are
the causes of disorder in international society today.
198
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Order

The Realist Position
Two kinds of approaches are taken to deal with the disorderly state ofinternational society. One is to make direct attempts to bring order.
When one or another great power is not involved, proponents of thisapproach seek to strengthen the United Nations and international law.
However, such a solution is impossible because international society
by its very nature is decentralized. I have already discussed how any
attempts to expand the power of the United Nations would be neither
desirable nor feasible. The same is true for international law.
Because international law is not backed with any enforcement
capabilities, it is impossible to create any international law that goesbeyond generally agreed principles. Even if such a law were created, it
is certain that it would be violated. To borrow the words of Rousseau,
this is an “inconceivable” project. Conversely, any attempts at enforcement backed by force wielded by one or another major power are conceivable. However, as already discussed, that would simply result in amodern-day Crusade.
Accordingly, the only thing possible would be to indirectly restore
order. As I have already pointed out throughout this work, there is no
single indirect means for accomplishing this, but rather many. Be thatas it may, the typical approach involves the freezing of situations where
powers and competing versions of justice are in conflict. This process
starts by abandoning the attempt to eliminate the causes of the conflict.
Conflicts in the present-day world occur because of competition between
different versions of justice and a lack of rules to restrict the actions ofnations. However, any attempts to directly eliminate the causes of theseconflicts are either meaningless or simply exacerbate the disorder.
The realist approach tries to deal with existing conflicts amongstates as if they were simply power struggles. It is based on an awareness199
II. Coping with Reality

that the current difficulties stem from the core nature of international
politics today. Based on this appreciation of the difficulties involved,
realists deliberately set aside the root of those difficulties, i.e., theconflict among the different versions of justice, and instead focus on
measures aimed solely at dealing with the power struggles that haveemerged from those conflicts. Realism is not content with just doing
something about struggles for power. Its position is based on theawareness that not only is it impossible to solve the core difficulties
directly in isolation from managing the power struggle aspect, but also
that, if anything, it would be counterproductive.
In international politics, searching for the root causes of conflicts
and trying to solve them leads only to endless debates and no solutions. It would be wiser to deliberately ignore what lies beneath thesurface, focus only on the actual conflict, and concentrate one’s efforts
on dealing with it at that level.
This resembles symptomatic treatment in medical science. Whenphysicians do not know the cause of an illness, or if they are unable
to immediately eliminate the cause, they work to treat the symptoms.
They do so because it is by no means easy to quickly discover the fundamental cause(s) for an abnormality in something as complex as thehuman body. Even if physicians can determine the cause(s), they are
limited in what they can do to eliminate it/them. And even if they
could eliminate the fundamental cause(s) of an abnormality, it is verymuch open to question as to whether doing so would have a net positive effect on the human body. In addition, it is possible that even if
the fundamental cause(s) were eliminated, another abnormality might
appear because of some other cause(s).
For these reasons, to physicians there are considerable justifications for relying on the symptomatic-treatment approach. Pushing a
200
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Ordermetaphor too far is usually dangerous, but this example of symptomatic treatment in medical practice offers hints about how to deal withproblems in other areas.
In fact, freezing the status quo in the power struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union worked well, at least for the bilateral confrontation between the two. As already mentioned, when theyfound it impossible to change the front lines between their spheres ofinfluence, tensions between the two gradually began to ease. Similar
developments have taken place in the past, as illustrated by theorist ofinternational law Emer de Vattel (1714–1767):
A general truce, made for many years, differs from a peace inlittle else than in leaving the question which was the original
ground of the war, still undecided. When two nations are wearyof hostilities, and yet cannot agree on the point which constitutes the subject of their dispute, they generally have recourse tothis kind of agreement. Thus, instead of peace, long truces only
have usually been made between the Christians and the Turks,—sometimes from a false spirit of religion, at other times because
neither party were willing to acknowledge the other as lawful
owners of their respective possessions.49 (emphasis added)
Based on similar thinking, Winston Churchill, at the start of the Cold
War, advocated making efforts to permanently stabilize the borders
between the two spheres of interests, saying:
It is better to have a world united than a world divided; but it
is also better to have a world divided, than a world destroyed.
Nor does it follow that even in a world divided there should not
201
II. Coping with Reality

be equilibrium from which a further advance to unity might
be attempted as the years pass by. Anything is better than thisceaseless degeneration of the heart of Europe.50
That said, freezing a struggle is but a first step. When it is done skillfully, it may prevent a vicious cycle developing between a deteriorating international environment and more conservative foreign policies.
However, it cannot turn that cycle into a more virtuous one. To thecontrary, measures to freeze the status quo can also trigger a vicious
cycle if they are too dependent on a stratagem such as the containment
policy. It is always necessary to remain focused on creating a more lasting international order to prevent this kind of misstep.
Addressing power struggles is little more than the first step for dealing with international conflicts. While managing the power struggles,
there must always be the hope that managing those struggles will leadto an eventual solution to the root causes of the conflicts. Realism is
not an exhortation for power politics made out of despair, but rather itis prudent political wisdom based on an appreciation of the difficultyof the problems at hand.
To further illustrate this point, let us take restoration of the statusquo ante as a principle for settling every armed conflict. This principle
has much in common in attitude with the approach of freezing thestatus quo. Adhering to it has practically become customary in the diplomatic space, including at the UN. It is unquestionably inadequate,in the sense that this approach does not eliminate the causes for why
armed force may be used. And yet, the principle is adhered to because
any attempt to remove those causes is expected to, if anything, makethe situation worse. At the same time, it is hoped that this principle ofrestoring the status quo ante will gradually be established as a norm
202
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International Orderobserved by the members of international society. In addition, adhering to this principle does not mean abandoning hope that some othermeans will be found to solve the causes of conflicts.
In sum, it is recognized that when managing power struggles, theefforts pursued must encourage the development of international
norms. As should be clear from my discussion up to this point, theroles of international law and the UN should be appreciated forserving as the pumps and valves that power virtuous cycles developing between the international political environment and patterns ofstate behavior. At this juncture of history, however, neither is powerfulenough for any nation to rely on them completely.
Consequently, the only way open is for each nation to work out
international laws and strengthen the authority of the UN throughtheir practices while protecting their own ideals and interests bythemselves. When international law is not sufficiently binding andthe authority of the UN is easily challenged, some state could makeexorbitant gains by pursuing its goals through reprehensible means.
However, this will clearly create a vicious cycle. Statesmen today are
required to make choices in ways that will not spur a vicious cycle,
and if possible that will promote a virtuous cycle in the pursuit of thenational goals of their countries. This is the minimum moral imperative demanded even for realists who are driven primarily by power
and interests.
Despair and Hope
It is by no means easy to act in the way described. Those who are
directly engaged in international politics are frequently forced tochoose between this minimum moral imperative and the demands oftheir national interests. For that reason, they who must directly deal in203
II. Coping with Realityinternational politics cannot help but be skeptical. Yet, they also must
not disregard the moral imperative out of despair. This moral choice isa subtle one, but it is very consequential.
This moral dilemma has tormented humankind across the ages.
For example, George Kennan had to frequently cope with this difficult
choice as he planned US foreign policy during the Cold War. He had
to somehow find a way to counter the Soviet Union, a great power witha completely different system of justice. It was utterly impossible tosolve the root causes of this conflict, but it was equally impossible forhim to avoid the challenge. For that reason, he did what he could while
hoping that, someday, what could not be done would become doable.
In this context, I note that Kennan deeply appreciated the work of
the writer and physician Anton Chekhov (1860–1904). He identified
with Chekhov’s depictions of persons who struggle in situations where
they are forced to solve impossible problems. He particularly liked the1898 short story, “A Doctor’s Visit.” The physician protagonist of thisstory sets out to visit a sick person at a factory. The patient is the daughter of the factory owner. She is afflicted with a psychologically induced
heart ailment due to the grim atmosphere of the facility. It is an illness
that he cannot cure. The physician cannot help but sense the limits of
his powers.
Similar things do happen in international politics. In American
Diplomacy 1900–1950, Kennan quoted historian Herbert Butterfield
as follows:
Behind the great conflicts of mankind is a terrible human
predicament which lies at the heart of the story: . . . Contemporaries fail to see the predicament or refuse to recognize its genuineness so that our knowledge of it comes from later analysis.
204
Conclusion: The “Peaceful Nation” and the International OrderIt is only with the progress of historical science on a particularsubject that men come really to recognize that there was a terrible knot almost beyond the ingenuity of man to untie.51
However, we must not stop hoping. In fact, we human beings often
do not stop hoping even when there is no rational foundation for ourhope. The physician in “A Doctor’s Visit” knew he was helpless; but, at
the request of the insomniac daughter, he nonetheless stayed the nightat the house and talked with her.
Your sleeplessness does you credit; in any case, it is a good sign.
In reality, such a conversation as this between us now would
have been unthinkable for our parents. At night they did nottalk, but slept sound; we, our generation, sleep badly, are restless, but talk a great deal, and are always trying to settle whether
we are right or not. For our children or grandchildren that question—whether they are right or not—will have been settled.52
War is perhaps an incurable disease. However, we must nonethelesscontinue making efforts toward treating it. In short, although we cannot help but be skeptical, we must not despair. This is the duty of physicians and diplomats, and of human beings.

205
II. Coping with Reality

Notes1.

Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture(Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 211. Originally published as Homo
Ludens: Proeve ener bepaling van het spelelement der cultuur (Haarlem:
Tjeenk Willink, 1938).

2.

Nakae Chōmin, A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government, trans.
Tsukui Nobuko (Tokyo & New York: Weatherhill, 1984), 129–130.
Originally written as Sansuijin keirin mondō in 1887.

3.

Inis. L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 81.

4.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Letter 11 to Grimarest: Passages Concerning the Abbe de St. Pierre’s ‘Project for Perpetual Peace’ (June 1712),”in Leibniz: Political Writings, trans. and ed. Patrick Riley (1972; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 243.

5

Francis Bacon, The Essays, or Counsels, Civil and Moral, of Francis Bacon,
Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, ed. George Herbert Clarke (1905;
New York: Macmillan, 1923), 101.

6.

Guglielmo Ferrero, Peace and War, trans. Bertha Pritchard (London: Macmillan,1933), 6–7. https://archive.org/details/peaceandwar033126mbp/page/n21/mode/2up.

7.

Ibid., 7.

8.

Ivan S. Bloch [Jan Gotlib Bloch or Jean de Bloch], The Future of War in
Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations, trans. R. C. Long (Boston: Ginn, 1903), https://archive.org/details/futureofwarinits00blociala/page/xvi/mode/2up.

9.

A. Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International
Conferences Concerning the Laws and Usages of War: Texts of Conventions with
Commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 42. https://archive.org/details/haguepeaceconfer00higguoft/page/42/mode/2up.

10. Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (New York: Scribner, 1950),
89–90. https://archive.org/details/christianityhist00butt/page/88/mode/2up.
11. Nakae, A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government, 122.
12. Ibid., 137.
206

13. Ibid., 136.
14. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 16.
15. Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37,
no. 2 (January 1959): 216. This quotation has been slightly adjusted forreadability.
16. “Text of McNamara’s Statement to the Platform Group,” New YorkTimes, August 18, 1964, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/08/18/
archives/text-of-mcnamaras-statement-to-platform-group.html.
17. Thomas C. Schelling, “The Future of Arms Control,” Operations Research9, no. 5 (September–October 1961), 723.
18. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960; repr. with a new
preface by the author, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980),
135–136.
19. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. Barbara Foxley (London: J. M.
Dent & Sons, 1911), 33. Originally published as Émile, ou de l’éducationin 1762.
20. Felix Gilbert, History: Choice and Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), 330–331.
21. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, trans. M. Campbell Smith (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1903), 157. Originallypublished as Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Königsberg: Bey Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795). https://www.gutenberg.org/
files/50922/50922-h/50922-h.htm.
22. The original English edition of Raymond Aron’s “The Epoch of Universal
Technology” could not be sourced for quotation. The English here is atranslation from the Japanese “Tekunorojī no jidai,” trans. Naoi Takeo,
Jiyū (December 1965), 132.
23. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776; London: Ward, Lock,and Taylor, 1812), 386. https://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.
html?chapter_num=28#book-reader.
24. Hans Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East (London:
George Routledge and Sons, 1932), 62.
25. John Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York: James Pott, 1902),
244–245.
207
Notes

26. Raymond Aron, War and Industrial Society, trans. Mary Bottomore(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 34–35.
27. Lin Biao, Long Live the Victory of People’s War!: In Commemoration of the20th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against
Japan (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965). https://www.marxists.
org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/index.htm.
28. Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International Implications (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960; New
York: Bantam Books, 1967), 147.
29. Rousseau, Emile, 174.
30. Grace G. Roosevelt, “A Reconstruction of Rousseau’s Fragments on theState of War,” History of Political Thought 8, no. 2 (Summer 1987), 239.
31. Mahatma Gandhi, “The Great Trial” in The Law and Lawyers (Gujarat:
Navajivan, 1962). Mahatma Gandhi One Spot Information Website,
Gandhian Institutions-Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal & Gandhi Research
Foundation. https://www.mkgandhi.org/law_lawyers/25great_trial.htm.
32. Quoted in Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy(New York: Oceana Publications, 1961), 21.
33. Summarized by the author from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “A Lasting
Peace through the Federation of Europe,” trans. C. E. Vaughn (London:
Constable, 1917), Online Library of Liberty, https://oll.libertyfund.org/
title/rousseau-a-lasting-peace-through-the-federation-of-europe-andthe-state-of-war/.
34. Ibid.
35. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 157.
36. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 1861.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5669/5669-h/5669-h.htm.
37. “Article 16: General Obligations” (report submitted to the League of
Nations), C.363.M.245.1937.VII, September 10, 1937.
38. Philip C. Jessup, “Parliamentary Diplomacy: An Examination of
the Legal Quality of the Rules of Procedure of Organs of the United
Nations,” in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law,
vol. 89 (1956), 236.
208
Notes

39. Jeremy Bentham, “The Principles of International Law,” Jeremy’s Labyrinth:
A Bentham Hypertext, Classical Utilitarianism Website, https://www.laits.
utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/pil/pil.e04.html.
40. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the
Study of International Relations (1939; London: Macmillan, 1946), 35.
41. Charles W. Freeman, Jr., ed., The Diplomat’s Dictionary (Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), 250.
42. Aron, War and Industrial Society, 33.
43. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 30.
44. Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, eds., Foundations of British
Foreign Policy: From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 45.
45. Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (London: Secker &Warburg, 1957; New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), 324. Originally published as L’Opium des intellectuels (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1955).
46. “The Constitution of 1791, National Assembly,” HistoryWiz, https://
wp.stu.ca/worldhistory/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/07/
French-Constitution-of-1791.pdf.
47. Rousseau, Emile, 33.
48. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 120.
49. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, trans. Thomas Nugent, edited andwith an introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (London:
G. G. and J. Robinson, 1797; Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), 619.
50. Winston Churchill, “United States of Europe: Statement of Aims.” Houseof Commons, 5 June 1946, CS, VII 7353-54, https://winstonchurchill.
hillsdale.edu/churchill-britain-and-european-unity/, footnote 11.
51. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 65–66. The original passage can be found in
Herbert Butterfield, “The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict,” The Review of Politics 12, no. 2 (April 1990): 151.
52. Anton Chekhov, “A Doctor’s Visit,” trans. Constance Garnett, 1917,
https://archive.org/details/ladywithdogother00chekrich/page/46/
mode/2up.
209
Notes

Bibliography
Akashi Yasushi. Kokusai Rengō [The United Nations]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1965.*
Aron, Raymond. The Opium of the Intellectuals. Translated by Terence Kilmartin. New York: W. W. Norton, 1962.
———. Paix et guerre entre les nations. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962.*———. “Tekunorojī no jidai” [The Epoch of Universal Technology]. Translated by Naoi Takeo. Jiyū, December, 1965.
———. War and Industrial Society. Translated by Mary Bottomore. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1958.
Bacon, Francis. The Essays, or Counsels, Civil and Moral, of Francis Bacon, Lord
Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, edited by George Herbert Clarke. New York:
Macmillan, 1923. First published in 1905.
Bentham, Jeremy. “The Principles of International Law.” In Jeremy’s Labyrinth:
A Bentham Hypertext, Classical Utilitarianism Website. https://www.laits.
utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/pil/pil.e04.html.
Bloch, Ivan S. [Jan Gotlib Bloch or Jean de Bloch]. The Future of War in Its
Technical, Economic, and Political Relations. Translated by R. C. Long.
Boston: Ginn, 1903.
Butterfield, Herbert. Christianity and History. New York: Scribner, 1950.
Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Studyof International Relations. Second ed. London: Macmillan, 1946. First
published in 1939. Translated by Inoue Shigeru as Kiki no nijūnen. Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1952.*
Chekhov, Anton. “A Doctor’s Visit.” In The Lady with the Dog and Other Stories.
Translated by Constance Garnett. London: Chatto & Windus, 1917.
Churchill, Winston. “United States of Europe: Statement of Aims.” House ofCommons, 5 June 1946, CS, VII 7353-54. https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/churchill-britain-and-european-unity/.
210

Claude, Inis. L., Jr. Power and International Relations. New York: Random
House, 1962.
“The Constitution of 1791, National Assembly.” HistoryWiz, https://wp.stu.ca/
worldhistory/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/07/French-Constitutionof-1791.pdf.
De Vattel, Emer. The Law of Nations. Translated by Thomas Nugent, edited
and with an introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008. Based on the English edition published in
1797 by G. G. and J. Robinson (London).
Dehio, Ludwig. The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power
Struggle. Translated by Charles Fullman. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1962.*
Dulles, John Foster. War or Peace. New York: Macmillan, 1950.
Eguchi Bokurō et al. Reisen: Seijiteki kōsatsu [Cold War: Its Political Studies].
In Iwanami kōza gendai 6. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963.*
Ferrero, Guglielmo. Peace and War. Translated by Bertha Pritchard. London:
Macmillan, 1933.
Freeman, Charles W., Jr., ed. The Diplomat’s Dictionary. Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1994.
Gandhi, Mahatma. “The Great Trial.” In The Law and Lawyers. Gujarat:
Navajivan, 1962. Mahatma Gandhi One Spot Information Website,
Gandhian Institutions-Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal & Gandhi Research
Foundation. https://www.mkgandhi.org/law_lawyers/25great_trial.htm.
Gilbert, Felix. History: Choice and Commitment. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1977.
Grodzins, Morton, and Eugene Rabinowitch, eds. The Atomic Age: Scientists
in National and World Affairs. New York: Basic Books, 1963. Translatedby Kishida Jun’nosuke and Takagi Takashi as Kaku no jidai. In Gendaishi
sengohen 24. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1966.*
211
Bibliography

Higgins, A. Pearce. The Hague Peace Conferences and Other International Conferences Concerning the Laws and Usages of War: Texts of Conventions with
Commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909.
Hinsley, Francis H. Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the
History of Relations between States. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1963.*
Hobson, John A. Imperialism: A Study. New York: James Pott, 1902.
Hoffmann, Stanley, ed. Contemporary Theory in International Relations. New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960.*
Huizinga, Johan. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture. [translator unknown]. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
Ichimura Shin’ichi. Sekai no naka no Nihon keizai [Japan’s Economy in theWorld]. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1965.
Itō Miyoji. Suiusō nikki [Diary of the Green-rain Villa]. Meiji hyakunenshi
sōsho, vol. 8. Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966.*
Jessup, Philip C. “Parliamentary Diplomacy: An Examination of the Legal
Quality of the Rules of Procedure of Organs of the United Nations.” In
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 89 (1956),
181–320.
Kamiya Fuji. Chōsen Sensō: Bei-Chū taiketsu no genkei [The Korean War: The
Origin of the US-China Confrontation]. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1966.*
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay. Translated by M.
Campbell Smith. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1903.
Kawata Tadashi. Kokusai kankei gairon [Introduction to International Relations]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1958.*
Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy 1900–1950. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951.
Kohn, Hans. Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East. London: George
Routledge and Sons, 1932.
212
Bibliography

League of Nations. “Article 16: General Obligations” (report submitted to the
League of Nations), C.363.M.245.1937.VII, September 10, 1937.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. “Letter 11 to Grimarest: Passages Concerning theAbbe de St. Pierre’s ‘Project for Perpetual Peace’ (June 1712).” In Leibniz:
Political Writings, translated and edited by Patrick Riley. Second ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. First published in 1972.
Lin Biao. “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!” In Commemoration of the20th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against
Japan. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965. https://www.marxists.org/
reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/index.htm.
Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. London: Parker,
Son, and Bourn, 1861.
Miller, Richard I. Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy. New York: Oceana
Publications, 1961.
Mutsu Munemitsu. Kenkenroku. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1933. Translated byGordon Mark Berger as Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-JapaneseWar, 1894–1895. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1982.*
Myrdal, Gunnar. Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International Implications. New York: Bantam Books, 1967. First published in
1960, Yale University Press.
Nakae Chōmin. Sansuijin keirin mondō. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965. Translated by Tsukui Nobuko as A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government.
Tokyo & New York: Weatherhill, 1984.
New York Times. “Text of McNamara’s Statement to the Platform Group.”
August 18, 1964. https://www.nytimes.com/1964/08/18/archives/text-ofmcnamaras-statement-to-platform-group.html.
Nicolson, Harold. Diplomacy. London: T. Butterworth, 1939. Translated by
Fukaya Mitsuo and Saitō Makoto as Gaikō. Tokyo: University of Tokyo
Press, 1965.*
Roosevelt, Grace G. “A Reconstruction of Rousseau’s Fragments on the Stateof War.” In History of Political Thought 8, no. 2. (Summer 1987): 225–244.
213
Bibliography

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Emile. Translated by Barbara Foxley. London: J. M.
Dent & Sons, 1911.
———. A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe, and the State of War.
Translated by C. E. Vaughn. London: Constable, 1917.
Schelling, Thomas C. “The Future of Arms Control,” Operations Research 9,
no. 5 (September–October 1961): 722–731.
———. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1960. Reprinted with a new preface by the author, 1980.
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
London: Ward, Lock, and Taylor, 1812. First published in 1776, W.
Strahan and T. Cadell.
Tabata Shigejirō. Kokusaihō [International Laws]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1956.*
Temperley, Harold, and Lillian M. Penson, eds. Foundations of British Foreign
Policy: From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938.
Walters, Francis Paul. A History of the League of Nations. London: Oxford
University Press, 1952.
Wohlstetter, Albert. “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2(January 1959): 211–234.

Note: Sources marked with an asterisk are from the original Japanese editionof this book.

214
Bibliography

About the Author, Editorial Supervisor, and Translator
Kōsaka Masataka (1934–1996)
Kōsaka Masataka taught international politics at Kyoto University from 1959 until his
passing in 1996. The son of eminent scholar of German philosophy Kōsaka Masaaki,
Masataka graduated from Kyoto University Law School and studied at Harvard University from 1960–1962. His 1963 article “Genjitsushugisha no heiwaron” (A Realist’sView of Peace) had a major impact on the discussion of diplomacy in postwar Japan.
His numerous works include Saishō Yoshida Shigeru [Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru](Tokyo: Chūōkōron Shinsha, 1968), Sekai chizu no naka de kangaeru [Thinking within
the Map of the World] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1968), Kotengaikō no seijuku to hōkai[Maturity and Collapse in Classical Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūōkōron Shinsha, 1978),and Fushigi no Nichi-Bei kankeishi (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1996), which is available in
English as The Remarkable History of Japan-US Relations (Tokyo: JPIC, 2019).

Tadokoro Masayuki
Tadokoro Masayuki (b. 1956) is a professor at International University of Japan anda professor emeritus of Keio University. In 1979, he graduated from Kyoto University
where he was a student of Kōsaka Masataka. He also studied at the London School of
Economics and has held visiting positions at various other institutions in the US, theUK, and Japan. He also serves as chief editor for the intellectual journal AΣTEION.
His publications include Kokusai seiji-keizaigaku [International Political Economy](Nagoya: University of Nagoya Press, 2008) and Ekkyō no kokusai seiji [International
Politics of Immigration] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2018). His publications in English include
Japan as a ‘Normal Country’?: A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), edited with David Welch and Soeya Yoshihide.

Carl Freire
Carl Freire is a translator based in Tokyo. A graduate of Oberlin College and the University of Michigan, he pursued doctoral studies in modern Japanese history at the Universityof California, Berkeley. He has also worked as a journalist in Osaka and Tokyo and ispresently an English advisor to the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records. Amongother works, he has translated Nakamura Tetsu’s Ten, tomo ni ari [Providence Was withUs, 2020] and was one of the translators for Hatano Sumio’s Nihon gaikō no 150 nen[One Hundred Fifty Years of Japanese Foreign Relations, 2022], both published by JPIC.

215

（英文版）国際政治：恐怖と希望

改版

International Politics and the Search for Peace
2023年3月27日 第１刷発行
著
者
英訳監修
訳
者
発 行 所

高坂正堯
田所昌幸
カール・フレイレ
一般財団法人出版文化産業振興財団〒 101-0051 東京都千代田区神田神保町 2-2-30
電話 03-5211-7283
ホームページ https://www.jpic.or.jp/

印刷・製本所

大日本印刷株式会社

本作品はクリエイティブ・コモンズの表示—非営利—改変禁止 4.0 国際ライセンス（CC BY-NC-ND 4.0） に よ っ て 許 諾 さ れ て い ま す。 ラ イ セ ン ス の 内 容 は https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.ja にてご確認ください。

© 1966, 2017 Inoue Masanobu
Printed in Japan
hardcover ISBN 978-4-86658-066-1
ebook (PDF) ISBN 978-4-86658-095-1