The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Modern dictatorships hold elections. The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores the manners in which dictators design elections and theconsequences of autocratic elections on political order. Dictators face a
trade-­off when designing elections: manipulated elections lose useful benefits that dictators can enjoy at the ballot box, but excessively transparent
elections make it difficult to win big. With this electoral dilemma in mind,
Higashijima argues that when the dictator has the capability of mobilizing
public support through economic distribution, elections are less likely to
be manipulated by blatant electoral fraud and pro-­regime electoral institutions. Furthermore, when the autocrat deviates from the equilibrium ofelection design in dealing with the electoral dilemma, elections destabilize
autocratic rule in the form of popular protests, coups d’état, and the opposition’s election victories. The theory of autocratic elections developed in thebook is tested on novel cross-­national data of autocratic elections; various
illustrations from autocracies around the globe; and structured, in-­depth
comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics—­Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan.

weiser center for emerging democracies
Series Editor
Dan Slater is Professor of Political Science,
Ronald and Eileen Weiser Professor of Emerging Democracies,
and Director of the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies (WCED)at the University of Michigan. dnsltr@umich.edu

The series highlights the leading role of the University of Michigan Press, Weiser Center for
Emerging Democracies, and International Institute as premier sites for the research and production of knowledge on the conditions that make democracies emerge and dictatorships endure.

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation,
Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies
Masaaki Higashijima
Opposing Power: Building Opposition Alliances in Electoral Autocracies
Elvin Ong
The Development of Political Institutions: Power, Legitimacy, Democracy
Federico Ferrara
Aid Imperium: United States Foreign Policy and Human Rights in Post–Cold War
Southeast Asia
Salvador Santino F. Regilme Jr.
Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age: The Yellow Shirts in Thailand
Aim Sinpeng
Normalizing Corruption: Failures of Accountability in Ukraine
Erik S. Herron
Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Stability: Duration, Financial Control, and Institutions
Victor C. Shih, Editor
Electoral Reform and the Fate of New Democracies: Lessons from the Indonesian Case
Sarah Shair-Rosenfield
Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies: Argentina in Comparative Perspective
Noam Lupu, Virginia Oliveros, and Luis Schiumerini, Editors

THE DICTATOR’S DIL E M M A
AT THE B ALLOT BOX
Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering,and Political Order in Autocracies

Masaaki Higashijima

University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor

Copyright © 2022 by Masaaki Higashijima
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ISBN 978-­0-­472-­07531-­7 (hardcover : alk. paper)ISBN 978-­0-­472-­05531-­9 (paper : alk. paper)ISBN 978-­0-­472-­90275-­0 (open access ebook)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11978139
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Cover image: © Yuji Baba, Dictator’s Speech, 2022.

To YukoContents

Acknowledgments

xi

List of Figures

xvii

List of Tables

xix

List of Abbreviationsxxi

Note on Translation and Transliteration

xxiiiPART I. PUZZLES AND ARGUMENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Twin Puzzles of Autocratic Elections1.2. Argument in Brief
1.3. Contributions1.4. Research Design, Key Empirical Findings, and theOrganization of the Book

3
3
6
11

Chapter 2. A Theory of Autocratic Elections
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Fundamental Problems of Autocratic Rule andthe Roles of Elections in Dictatorships
2.3. The Electoral Dilemma in Dictatorships
2.4. The Game of Autocratic Elections: The Dictator,
Ruling Elites, and the Opposition
2.5. The Dictator’s Tools at the Ballot Box: Electoral
Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering

32
32

24

34
36
40
47

viii

Contents

2.6. The Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities andAutocratic Election Design
2.7. Unintended Consequences of Autocratic Elections:Post-­Electoral Political Conflicts
2.8. Operationalization and Preliminary Analysis: Mobilization
Capabilities and the Correlates of Victory Margins
2.9. Conclusion

53
61
64
72

PART II. CROSS-­N ATIONAL EXPLORATIONS

Chapter 3. Blatant Electoral Fraud77
3.1. Variation in Blatant Electoral Fraud under Authoritarian
Regimes77
3.2. Literature on Electoral Fraud
80
3.3. Blatant Electoral Fraud and the Dictator’s Mobilization
Capabilities83
3.4. Cross-­National Statistical Analysis of Blatant
Electoral Fraud88
3.5. Conclusion
102
Chapter 4. Institutional Manipulation
103
4.1. The Puzzle of Electoral System Choice in Dictatorships
1034.2. Literature on Electoral System Design
107
4.3. The Costs and Benefits of SMD and PR in Authoritarian
Regimes1104.4. The Dictator’s Mobilization Capabilities and the Strategic
Choice of Electoral Systems
121
4.5. Cross-­National Statistical Analysis of
Institutional Manipulation
125
4.6. Conclusion
134
Chapter 5. Economic Maneuvering
5.1. Autocracies and Political Business Cycles
5.2. A Trade-­off between Electoral Manipulation andEconomic Maneuvering
5.3. Cross-­National Statistical Analysis of
Economic Maneuvering
5.4. Conclusion

137
137

Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box6.1. Popular Protests and Leadership Turnover in the
Aftermath of Autocratic Elections6.2. Literature on Post-­Electoral Political Order

159

142
146
157

159
162

Contents

6.3. Destabilizing Effects of Autocratic Elections6.4. Cross-­National Statistical Analysis of Post-­Electoral
Political Conflicts
6.5. Conclusion

ix

164
172
182

PART III. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

Chapter 7. From Electoral Manipulation to
Economic Maneuvering: Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan
187
7.1. Introduction
187
7.2. Limited Liberalization and Autocratization
188
7.3. Electoral Manipulation in Kazakhstan
194
7.4. The Strengthening of Nazarbaev’s Mobilization
Capabilities204
7.5. Economic Maneuvering in Kazakhstan221
7.6. Conclusion
227
Chapter 8. From Electoral Manipulation to
Autocratic Breakdown: Akaev’s Kyrgyzstan229
8.1. Introduction
229
8.2. From Electoral Democracy to Electoral Authoritarianism 231
8.3. Electoral Manipulation and Post-­Electoral Protests in
Kyrgyzstan236
8.4. The Weakening of Akaev’s Mobilization Capabilities
246
8.5. Economic Maneuvering in Kyrgyzstan
258
8.6. Conclusion
262
Chapter 9. Conclusion
9.1. The Main Findings
9.2. Policy Implications9.3. Future Research Avenues

264
264
267
269

Appendix

273

References

301

Index

325

Digital materials related to this title can be found on
the Fulcrum platform via the following citable URL:
https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11978139

Acknowledgments

This book is about elections in authoritarian regimes. It examines how
autocrats design elections and what consequences these elections may haveon political order. Theorizing about the relationship between electioneering strategies in modern autocracies, The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot
Box points to the possibility that relatively free and fair elections may be an
artifact of strategic decisions by autocrats who can surely win big without
relying much on electoral manipulation. An autocrat’s electoral advantage
in institutional design, however, may also easily turn into regime instability
when they fail to properly design elections.
The inception of this project dates back to my first visit to Almaty,
Kazakhstan and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in December 2008, when I was a graduate student at Waseda University. Despite their numerous similarities after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, both countries appeared to have drawn
distinct regime trajectories in the eyes of a researcher just starting postgraduate study: Kazakhstan successfully consolidated authoritarian rule via
elections, whereas Kyrgyzstan’s regime stability was seriously underminedby elections. I chatted with citizens in taxis, restaurants, and cafés during
my fieldwork to find that how they talked about their political leaders was
saliently different: Kazakh citizens often expressed positive sentiments
toward their president, while Kyrgyz citizens mostly complained about
their political leadership. These observations via the lens of controlled comparisons led me as a nascent comparativist to realize a paradox: Modern
dictators’ fates may not only hinge upon the use of coercive measures but
popular will might also be pertinent in explaining autocratic stability.

xii

Acknowledgments

With a kernel of this hunch cropped from the field, I started pursuing
my PhD in the fall of 2009 at Michigan State University. I came to realize that, beyond the two countries, it may be possible to systematicallystudy the causes and consequences of autocratic elections with the helpof rapidly growing research on autocratic politics and a variety of emerging cross-­national data. In this respect, this book formed indispensably
from my PhD dissertation that I submitted to the MSU Political Science
Department in 2015. Without the guidance of my dissertation committee,
this project could never have been completed. I sincerely thank Eric C. C.
Chang, Cristina Bodea, Christian Houle, and Ani Sarkissian. Eric is a wonderful mentor, adviser, coauthor, and friend who has rigorously helped mein accomplishing this project along each step of the way. When I defended
my dissertation prospectus, he cheered me up by saying “I am now more
excited about this than you are.” About ten years have passed since thenand he may not remember what he said at the time, but these were thewords that I would recall when I found myself stuck while writing.
I have also been very lucky to work with Cristina and Christian forvarious research projects over the last decade. In addition to their helpful
suggestions on the contents of this project, this book has also enormously
benefited from collaborations with them implicitly and explicitly. Ani has
been another fantastic mentor and role model for me in how I mentor students. Even after the defense of my dissertation, she closely read my bookproposal, provided helpful suggestions, and also offered invaluable advice
on the whole publication process. Also at MSU, I am grateful to Mike Bratton, Eric Freedman, the late Steve Kautz, Jeff Conroy-­Krutz, and Brian
Silver for their encouragement and advice, and to my friends Tolgahan
Dilgin, Sungmin Han, Dan Hansen, Brian Kennedy, Nicholas Kerr, Alon
Kraitzman, Jerry Lavery, Helen Lee, Chunho Park, Hsin-­Hsin Pan, Peter
Penar, Wen-­Chin Wu, and Fangjin Ye for fun times, wonderful thoughts,
and great feedback on the project.
Although it grew out of my dissertation at MSU, The Dictator’s Dilemma
at the Ballot Box is very much a product of my wonderful two-­year stay as avisiting scholar of the Center for Political Studies (CPS) at the Universityof Michigan between 2018 and 2020, where I drafted most of this book. I
would like to thank Rob Franzese for hosting me during my stay at Michigan. He generously allowed me to use his CPS office and occasionally took
me to lunch with lots of advice. It was also very fortunate for me to meet
Dan Slater when he visited Tokyo in the fall of 2017 and suggested that I
submit a book proposal to the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies(WCED) Series with the University of Michigan Press. After my arrival inAcknowledgments

xiii

Ann Arbor, he also offered me an opportunity to hold a book conference atthe WCED. The generous financial support of this conference by the CPS
and WCED enabled me to invite a wonderful lineup of comparativists who
provided lots of excellent feedback and helpful criticism in sharpening myarguments: Erica Frantz, Rob Franzese, Dustin Gamza, Mai Hassan, Allen
Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Yuki Shiraito, Dan Slater, Alberto Simpser,and Michael Wahman. At the University of Michigan, I also learned a lot
from Charles Crabtree, Iza Ding, Natalia Forrat, Hanisah Abdullah Sani,
Nahomi Ichino, Ken Kollman, Noah Nathan, Nick Valentino, and Yuri
Zhukov. Special thanks to Elizabeth Demers for supporting and guiding
this project at the Press, and to Kevin Rennells, Anne Taylor, and Haley
Winkle for expertly shepherding the book through copyediting and production. Shana Milkie did an amazing job with indexing, and Yuji Baba
designed wonderful cover art for the book.
On the other side of the Pacific, where I was first fascinated by comparative politics as well as where I started my professional career as acomparative political scientist, I am indebted to many people. I am mostgrateful to Hideko Magara, Takayuki Ito, Masaru Kohno, and Ikuo Kume,
my mentors at Waseda University. They all taught me how exciting andinteresting studying politics is in their own ways. I would also like to thankmy friends and colleagues at Waseda, especially Ryo Nakai, MasatakaOki, Shin Toyoda, Katsunori Seki, and Yuki Yanai, for their friendship andthought-­provoking (and often endless) discussions. My current affiliation,
Tohoku University, has been providing an ideal research environment since
I arrived in Sendai in the summer of 2016. Among others, I would like tothank my Tohoku colleagues Kazunori Kawamura and Yoshikuni Ono for
their earnest support. At the European University Institute, where I spent
the year of 2015–­16 as a Max Weber postdoctoral fellow, I obtained usefulfeedback from my cohort colleagues of the Max Weber Programme, as wellas Stefano Bartolini, Adrian del Rio, Phillippe Schmitter, and Jan Teorell.
This book has also been shaped and improved through numerous
conversations with many other scholars outside of the communities mentioned above. Hidekuni Washida and Joe Wright read the entire manuscript and provided excellent comments, which greatly contributed to
improving the analyses in the book. Yujin Woo also read earlier versionsof the manuscript a couple of times very carefully, provided great ideas ona diagram to effectively pinpoint my arguments, and helped me polish thebook to reach its final version, which I greatly appreciate. I also would liketo thank the two anonymous manuscript reviewers for providing excellent
and careful feedback, which has greatly helped improve the book into its

xiv

Acknowledgments

final form. Kangwook Han, Jia Li, and Austin Mitchell read several chapters of early drafts and provided great comments. This book also benefited
from comments, conversations, and encouragement from Faisal Ahmed,
Susumu Annaka, Ravi Bhavnani, Daina Chiba, Annette Fath-­Lihic, Rich
Frank, Naofumi Fujimura, Carolina Garriga, Masataka Harada, AiroHino, Kentaro Hirose, Yusaku Horiuchi, Takeshi Iida, Makoto Iokibe,
Yuko Kasuya, Takeshi Kawanaka, Marisa Kellam, Hirokazu Kikuchi,
Yoshiharu Kobayashi, Keiichi Kubo, Shuhei Kurizaki, Ellen Lust, Tom Le,
Yeonju Lee, Ko Maeda, Kenneth McElwain, Ferran Martinez i Coma, Lee
Morgenbesser, Masaru Nishikawa, Pippa Norris, Atsushi Ogushi, the late
Natsuko Oka, Elvin Ong, Dina Sharipova, Naoki Shimizu, Shane Singh,David Szakonyi, Atsushi Tago, Yuriko Takahashi, Aiji Tanaka, Masatomo
Torikai, Mary Stegmaier, Hiroki Takeuchi, Tomohiko Uyama, Junichiro
Wada, Matt Wilson, Matt Winters, and Masahiro Yamada.
This project has also received valuable audience feedback at numerous conference presentations and professional talks, including the annual
meetings of the American Political Science Association, Midwest Political Science Association, Southern Political Science Association, European Political Science Association, Japanese Political Science Association,
Japan Association for Comparative Politics, and the World Social Science
Forum, as well as the Hamilton Center at New York University, the Electoral Integrity Project’s pre-­conference workshops, Doshisha University,
Heidelberg University, Tohoku University, Yokohama City University,
European University Institute, Graduate Institute of Geneva, Fukuoka
University, Waseda University, University of Michigan, Institute of Developing Economies, Kobe University, Nazarbayev University, and the Tower
Center at Southern Methodist University. Parts of chapters 4, 6, 7, and 8
originally appeared as articles in Government and Opposition and in Contentious Elections: From Ballots to Barricades, edited by Pippa Norris, Rich
Frank, and Ferran Martinez i Coma. I thank Cambridge University Pressand Routledge for allowing me to include excerpts from these articles inthis book.
This book could not have been completed without generous financial
support from various institutions: National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant (#1323671), Japan Society for the Promotionof Science (JSPS) Grant-­in-­Aid (15H06682, 17H04779), JSPS Overseas
Research Fellowship, Fulbright Scholarship, Akino Yutaka Award, Tokyo
Foundation SYLFF Research Abroad Award, Suntory Foundation Research
Grant for Young Scholars, and Konosuke Matsushita Memorial Foundation Research Grant. During my stay in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, theAcknowledgments

xv

Department of Public Administration at KIMEP University in Almaty andthe Social Research Center at the American University of Central Asia in
Bishkek generously sponsored me in facilitating my fieldwork. I very muchappreciate those institutes for providing logistical support for this project.
During my fieldwork, I received frequent suggestions, advice, andresearch assistance. I would like to thank Ruslan Imanaliev, Seitek
Kachkynbaev, Meruert Makhmutova, Ellina Malina, Nurseit Niyazbekov,
Sovet Sadyrsson, and Medet Tiulegenov for offering useful insights about
the countries’ politics and economy as well as introducing me to numerous
politicians, researchers, and NGO activists. I also am grateful to the many
politicians, researchers, and opposition leaders who agreed to have interviews with me, as well as to the citizens of both countries who talked frankly
about what they think about politics in their countries. Kamila Mustafina,
Gulden Suleimenova, Aizhamal Sydykova, Bermet Zhumakadyr, and Kalys
Zhumakadyr provided valuable research assistance in the field. Outside of
the field, Jeremy Boo, Hisashi Kadoya, Asuka Kashiwase, and Takaaki Minamii helped me collect and double-­check cross-­national data on autocraticelections, for which I greatly appreciate.
Last but not least, I would like to express my deep gratitude for my family. My parents, Kumiko and Toshiharu Higashijima, have always believedin me and supported my intellectual interests and exploration even thoughpursuing an academic career involves lots of uncertainty. They also continue to be role models for a dad of two kids. I owe them more than thisnote can possibly express. My parents-­in-­law, Akiko and Takehide Goto,
have also been extremely supportive throughout this journey and have long
been looking forward to the publication of this book. I now feel relievedthat I can finally send a copy of this book along to them. My sons, Shuh andSoh, who were not yet born when I first flew to Central Asia, turned ten-­and eight-­years-­old already. They have always been my source of energy
as well as competent timekeepers who help me maintain a good balance
between work and rest. My final thanks are to my wife, Yuko, whose support and love have sustained me since I aspired to stay in academia sixteen years ago, as well as during the long process in the making of thisbook. Since we first met, she has always been much more optimistic thanme and whole-­heartedly supported and enjoyed every endeavor in Tokyo,
East Lansing, Almaty, Bishkek, Florence, Sendai, and Ann Arbor. I lovingly
dedicate this book to her.

Figures

1.1. Overview of the Argument
1.2. Democracies and Autocracies in the World (1946–­2010)
1.3. Elections in Authoritarian Regimes (1946–­2008)
2.1. Blatant Electoral Fraud and Electoral Margins in
Authoritarian Regimes
2.2. Institutional Manipulation and Electoral Margins in
Authoritarian Regimes
2.3. Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities and Choices ofElectioneering Strategies
2.4. Electoral Manipulation and Post-­Electoral Political Order
2.5. Correlates of Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Elections3.1. Violin Plots of Variation in Blatant Electoral Fraud
3.2. Conditional Marginal Effects of Natural Resource
Endowment on Blatant Electoral Fraud
4.1. Pro-­Regime SMD Seat Premiums in Parliamentary
Elections of Electoral Autocracy
4.2. Patterns of Electoral Systems in Electoral
Authoritarian Regimes
4.3. Pro-­Regime Seat Premiums and Ruling Parties’ Vote Shares
4.4. Electoral Systems and Predicted Probabilities ofPre-­Electoral Opposition Coalitions4.5. Time-­Series Change in the Effective Electoral Threshold
4.6. Natural Resources, Party-­Based Regimes, andElectoral System Choice

8
13
14
45
46
54
65
73
80
97
105
106
116
119
127
132

xviiiFigures

5.1. Violin Plots of Variation in Fiscal Policies
5.2. Competitive Elections and Economic Maneuveringin Dictatorships
5.3. Blatant Electoral Fraud and Economic Maneuveringin Dictatorships
5.4. Electoral Systems and Economic Maneuveringin Dictatorships
6.1. Gaps in Electoral Manipulation
6.2. Gaps in Blatant Electoral Fraud and the Likelihoodsof Leadership Turnover and Protests
6.3. Gaps in Electoral Systems and the Likelihoods ofLeadership Turnover and Protests
7.1. Increasing Dominance of Ruling Parties in Kazakhstan(1994–­2007)
7.2. Effective Electoral Threshold in Kazakh Parliamentary
Elections (1994–­2007)
7.3. Economic Growth and Fiscal Revenues in Kazakhstan(1993–­2008)
7.4. Electoral Performance and Natural Resource Wealthin Kazakhstan
7.5. Cohesiveness of Ruling Parties and Proportionof Independents
7.6. Time-­Series Change in Consumer Price Index in
Kazakhstan (1995–­2009)
7.7. Political Business Cycles, Incumbent and Opposition
Strengths, and Fiscal Resources
8.1. Seat Proportions of Pro-­Presidential and Opposition Parties
in Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2005)
8.2. Effective Electoral Threshold in Kyrgyz Parliamentary
Elections (1995–­2005)
8.3. Number of Post-­Electoral Protests in Kyrgyzstan(1995–­2005)
8.4. Time-­Series Change in Consumer Price Index in Kyrgyzstan(1995–­2010)

140
152
154
156
176
178
181
193
203
207
208
215
223
226
234
244
245
259

Tables

1.1. Scope Conditions of Cross-­National Statistical Analyses
25
1.2. Two-­Way (Time-­Series and Cross-­Sectional) Controlled
Comparison: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan28
2.1. Main Actors, Electoral Margins, and Electoral Manipulation
44
2.2. Electoral Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering51
3.1. Correlates of Blatant Electoral Fraud94
4.1. Pro-­Regime Seat Premiums in SMD Systems
114
4.2. Electoral Systems and the Formation of Pre-­Electoral
Opposition Coalitions in Electoral Autocracy
118
4.3. Electoral Systems and Voter Turnout in Electoral Autocracy
120
4.4. Determinants of Electoral System Choice inElectoral Autocracy
130
5.1. Competitive Elections and PBC in Dictatorships
151
5.2. Blatant Electoral Fraud and PBC in Dictatorships
153
5.3. Electoral Systems and PBC in Dictatorships
155
6.1. Post-­Electoral Protests and Leadership Turnover
161
6.2. Blatant Electoral Fraud, Leadership Turnover, and PopularProtests177
6.3. Electoral Systems, Leadership Turnover, and Popular Protests 180
7.1. Blatant Electoral Fraud in Kazakhstan (1995–­2007)
196
7.2. Electoral System Change and Effective ElectoralThreshold in Kazakhstan (1994–­2007)
202
7.3. Percentage of Central Government Transfers in Total
Revenues of Regional Governments
214

xx

Tables

7.4. Political Business Cycles in Kazakhstan (1995–­2008)
7.5. Electoral Cycles, Organizational Strength,and Fiscal Resources
8.1. Blatant Electoral Fraud in Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2005)
8.2. Electoral System Change and Effective Electoral Thresholdin Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2005)
8.3. Political Business Cycles in Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2010)

224
225
237
243
260

Abbreviations

AIST
BN
CA
CPI
DDK
DPK
DVK
EA
EET
EOP
FE
FIS
FLN
GDP
GMM
HDK
IEM
IMF
IRT
IV
KPK
MDC
MMD
NELDA

Agrarian-­Industrial Union of Workers
Barisan Nasional
closed autocracy
consumer price index
Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
electoral autocracy
effective electoral threshold
ethnic organizational power
fixed effects
Islamic Salvation Front
National Liberation Front
gross domestic productgeneralized method of moment
People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan
Index of Election MalpracticeInternational Monetary Funditem response theory
instrumental variable
Communist Party of Kazakhstan
Movement for Democratic Change
Mass Mobilization Data
National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy

xxii

Abbreviations

NGO
nongovernmental organization
NKK
People’s Congress of Kazakhstan
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-­operation andDevelopment
OLS
ordinary least squares
OSCE
Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe
OSCE/ODIHR	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
RightsOSDP
Nationwide Social Democratic Party
PAP
People’s Action Party
PBC
political business cycle
PBR
party-­based regimes
PEI
Perceptions of Electoral Integrity
PESAC
privatization and enterprise sector adjustment credit
PKK
Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan
PNEK
Party of People’s Unity of KazakhstanPRproportional representation
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
PZPR
Polish United Workers Party
QED
Quality of Elections DataRC
rehabilitation credit
RCPE
regular competitive parliamentary elections
RE
random effects
SDS
Union of Democratic Forces
SMD
single-­member district
SNEK
Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan
SPDK
Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan
SPK
Socialist Party of Kazakhstan
UMNO
United Malays National Organization
V-­DemVarieties of Democracy
V-­Party
Varieties of Party Identity and Organization
WDI
World Development Indicators
ZANU-­PF The Zimbabwe African National Union—­Patriotic FrontNote on Translation and Transliteration

In part III, comparative case studies, I transliterated Russian words by using
the simplified Library of Congress system where diacritics are omitted. In
addition, I transliterated Kazakh and Kyrgyz names from their Russian
spelling. All translations from Russian original documents and interviews
are my own.

PART I

Puzzles and Arguments

ONE

Introduction
Is it better to be loved than feared, or to be feared than loved?
—Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince

1.1. Twin Puzzles of Autocratic Elections

Modern dictatorships hold elections.1 In the early nineteenth century,
authoritarian regimes hardly held national elections. Since then, the number of autocracies with elections has steadily increased. By the early 2010s,
a vast majority of autocracies held either executive or legislative elections
or both. Furthermore, nowadays more authoritarian regimes allow opposition parties to participate in elections than ever before in history. Just before
the third wave of democratization, only one-­fifth of authoritarian elections
included opposition parties. By 2010, this type of electoral authoritarianregime proliferated, with approximately nine-­tenths of autocracies holding elections. Autocracies with elections have now become the dominantauthoritarian regime type, and authoritarian leaders take elections seriously in their bid to stay in power.
Amid the historic proliferation of autocracies with elections and particularly multiparty electoral competition, modern autocrats employ a vari1. This book uses the terms “autocracy,” “dictatorship,” “authoritarianism,” and “non-­democracy” interchangeably. By “dictators,” “autocrats,” and “authoritarian leaders,” I refer totop political leaders who hold de jure supreme authority in nondemocratic regimes. I use themale pronoun to refer to these leaders, given the fact that, according to Archigos Version 2.9,
99.7 percent of political leaders in authoritarian regimes since World War II have been male.

3

4

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

ety of electioneering tools to “win” elections.2 Under strong internationalpressure to hold elections, canceling or postponing elections involves significant cost. At the same time, not only losing elections but also winningwith only a small margin may destabilize authoritarian rule. Under thesecircumstances, authoritarian leaders manipulate election results in various
ways to win big.
The most typical tool of electoral manipulation is blatant electoral
fraud, which may include banning the registration of opposition parties
and candidates, rigging the ballot box, handpicking members of the electoral management body, and (non)violently intimidating voters and opposition candidates (Simpser 2013; Norris 2014). Even in the absence of suchblatant fraud techniques, autocrats can still tinker with election results tomake them more favorable by manipulating electoral institutions, throughelectoral system change, redistricting, and malapportionment (Lust-­Okar
and Jamal 2002; Diaz-­Cayeros and Magaloni 2001). Even without tilting election results using these measures, some authoritarian leaders takeadvantage of economic policy instruments to buy political support fromthe citizenry through the distribution of patronage and club goods (Magaloni 2006; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).
Although autocratic leaders enjoy greater discretion than their democratic counterparts over the employment of such electioneering strategies, an intriguing puzzle lies in the significant variation in the use of thesemanipulation techniques among authoritarian regimes. Following Machiavelli’s answer to the question in the epigraph, some autocrats attempt toovercome elections by “force and fraud,” using coercive, overtly fraudulent
measures and highly pro-­regime electoral rules to ensure their convincing
election victory. For instance, in the 2000s, Zimbabwe’s Mugabe resorted
to relentless, blatant electoral fraud and maintained majoritarian electoral
systems, both of which greatly contributed to his election victories. Similarly, Hafez al-­Assad of Syria held facade elections during his tenure, where
he did not allow opposition parties to participate in elections. In contrast,
others reject these methods and instead attempt to win big by cultivating
the “love and respect” of the people and by mobilizing resources to garnermass support. For example, in Indonesia, Suharto and his Golkar Party
shifted their major electioneering strategy from blatant electoral fraud toextensive patronage distribution in the 1980s, which helped the Suharto
regime to derive public support from large portions of the masses. Nursul2. This book employs such terms as “electioneering strategies (measures)” or “electoral
strategies” to refer to a series of strategies that autocrats use to increase their vote and seatshares (e.g., blatant electoral fraud, institutional manipulation, and economic maneuvering).

Introduction

5

tan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, whose regime used a variety of electoral
malpractices and pro-­regime electoral rules during the 1990s, became lessdependent upon blatant electoral fraud and even reformed the country’s
electoral system with high proportionality by the late 2000s. Why do dictators, who are essentially weakly constrained by horizontal and vertical accountability, often refrain from engaging in blatant electoral fraud and manipulationof electoral rules? Put differently, how can we understand different patterns andcombinations of electioneering strategies in contemporary authoritarian regimes?
This is the first puzzle explored in this book.
Dictators design elections differently,3 but autocratic elections also
bring about significantly different consequences.4 In some cases, autocraticelections help autocrats consolidate their rule (Gandhi and Lust-­Okar
2009), while, in other cases, autocratic elections induce political conflict
between the dictator and ruling elites on the one hand (Wig and Rod 2016)
and between the dictator and opposition forces on the other (Tucker 2007).
One major form of political conflict is popular protest, which often undermines authoritarian stability and, in some cases, leads to autocratic breakdown. For instance, the color revolutions in the post-­Soviet countries suchas Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan during the mid-­2000s all occurred
immediately after elections, ousting autocrats through mass revolt (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2010). The other form of post-­electoral political change is leadershipturnover, either through coups or election victories by the opposition (Wigand Rod 2016; Huntington 1991). For instance, Sri Lankan prime minister
Bandaranaike lost the elections in 1977 to increasingly popular opposition
parties by a large margin. Similarly, Algerian president Bendjedid called
the first multiparty election in Algeria’s history in December 1991. This
election brought a sweeping victory to the radical Islamic Salvation Front,
triggering a military coup that dragged the country into a full-­blown civil
war. Why, given that dictators have great discretion over their design, do auto3. Throughout this book, the manner in which dictators combine distinct electoral strategies (e.g., blatant electoral fraud, institutional manipulation, and economic maneuvering) is
succinctly referred as dictators’ “design” of elections.
4. In this book, I am interested in the effects of autocratic elections on political stability
and dictators’ survival but not on either autocratic regime breakdown (e.g., Knutsen, Nygård,and Wig 2017) or democratization (e.g., Lindberg 2006). Popular protests, coups, and sweeping electoral victories by the opposition all have the potential to induce political disorder andoust autocrats. However, I do not ask questions concerning whether the subsequent regime isruled by a member of a different ruling group (autocratic transition) or whether the autocratic
breakdown is followed by democracy (democratic transition) (cf. Geddes, Wright, and Franz2014).

6

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

cratic elections often pose risks to autocratic survival? Under what conditions do
autocratic elections pave the way for the political transformation that undermines
regime stability? This is the second puzzle addressed in this book.
In sum, the book explores the manner in which authoritarian leadersdesign elections and the impact of those elections on autocratic politicalorder. Identifying the electioneering strategies autocrats are inclined to use
illuminates the ways that autocrats take advantage of their elections. By
constructing a positive theory of autocratic elections, this book aims tohelp social scientists, policy makers, and the international election monitoring community to systematically understand how elections operate indictatorships. In addition, the consequences of autocratic elections cannot
be forecasted without studying how these elections are designed in thefirst place. Illuminating the causes and consequences of autocratic elections
through a unified theoretical framework provides a better understandingof how authoritarian politics works in contemporary autocracies where
holding periodic elections has almost become the norm.

1.2. Argument in Brief

To understand the manner in which autocrats design elections and theconsequences of these elections, I posit a theory of elections in dictatorships. I first suggest that autocrats face a dilemma with respect to howmuch manipulation to employ during elections. On the one hand, overt
electoral manipulation ensures winning big but undermines the credibilityof election results; on the other hand, more subtle approaches enhance
the benefits of elections but decrease the likelihood of scoring majorities.
Given the constraint arising from this electoral dilemma, I then argue that
dictators strategically decide their electoral strategies between electoral
manipulation and economic maneuvering. A successful utilization of these
two techniques increases the likelihood that elections will help to consolidate autocratic rule. A suboptimal combination of these methods paves theway for less stable authoritarian rule.
In authoritarian regimes where possibilities of political violence andrepression are ubiquitous, both the dictator and his potential opponents
face difficulties in forging peaceful relationships. For instance, in the presence of high political uncertainty, potential opponents may have trouble
in correctly estimating the dictator’s true intentions and capabilities. Thismay cause potential opponents to challenge the dictator in advance by, forexample, attempting his assassination, plotting a coup, or mobilizing pro-Introduction

7

tests (Tullock 1987). From the dictator’s perspective, high levels of uncertainty make it difficult to know the true preferences or capabilities of his
opponents (Wintrobe 1998). This may lead the autocrat to resort to indiscriminate violence in order to preempt threats. Furthermore, overt repression may also magnify citizens’ grievances against the regime, facilitatingcollective action by rebel groups (Goodwin 2001; Kalyvas and Kocher
2007). Put together, by relying on repressive measures alone, the dictator
is likely to face serious obstacles to the efficient governance of the country.
As a major institutional tool for dealing with these problems, autocratic leaders often take advantage of elections. By winning elections bylarge margins, autocrats demonstrate that the current regimes are backed
by public support, rendering political legitimacy to themselves (Magaloni2006). In addition, elections involve the counting of heads, providing dictators with an institutional opportunity to accurately gauge the geographical distribution of popular support and the competence of ruling elites
through election results (Cox 2009; Blaydes 2011). Furthermore, elections
force opposition parties to question whether to participate in elections,
often providing the dictator with the opportunity to create political divisions among the opposition (Lust-­Okar 2005).
Autocrats have difficult choices to make when designing elections. If
a dictator manipulates an election, he increases his likelihood of winning
big. Such manipulated elections, however, do not render the benefits that
dictators are expected to enjoy through the election process. Rather, excessively manipulated elections generate similar costs of repression as thosestated previously. However, a less manipulated election allows the dictator
to exploit the above-­mentioned advantages, although such elections also
decrease the likelihood that the dictator will enjoy a landslide win. The
failure to maintain an overwhelming victory in an authoritarian regime
credibly reveals weaknesses of the authoritarian ruler, which may threaten
regime stability. Simply put, authoritarian leaders face a trade-­off between
the certainty of winning big and the benefits of elections that come withless manipulation. I term this trade-­off the electoral dilemma.
Can autocrats win big without the help of electoral manipulation? This
book argues that the distribution of mobilization capabilities between the dictator and other political elites determines the manner in which autocrats design
elections (Phase I in fig. 1.1).5 Political elites are defined as domestic actors
5. This book does not consider when dictators begin to hold national elections. Beyond
the dictator’s strategic choice, the timing of initiating elections is often heavily constrainedby other factors and reasons, such as colonial heritage, the end of the Cold War, international
diffusion of election norms, and the onset of civil war or unrest (for a similar discussion, see

8

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 1.1. Overview of the Argument

who utilize their financial, organizational, and other forms of capital forpolitical purposes, in either ruling or opposition camps. They include legislators, ministers, local politicians, and opposition leaders and activists.
The distribution of mobilization capabilities refers to the extent to which
the dictator and other political elites hold resources, namely, abilities of
economic distribution, to realize voluntary and noncoercive compliance by
the general public. If the dictator is stronger than his potential opponents,that is, when a large gap exists between the dictator and other elites withregard to mobilization capabilities, the dictator can gain more supporters
in an election, thus achieving absolute victory while exploiting the benefitsof an election without manipulating the results. Conversely, if other political elites (ruling or opposition elites or both) possess greater resources
Simpser [2013: 26–­27]). An important scope condition of this book is a focus on authoritarianregimes that have already decided to hold elections. Taking this decision as a given, my theoryof autocratic elections illuminates when and why dictators engage in electoral manipulation
through blatant electoral fraud or institutional manipulation. Empirically, I handle possible
selection bias that might occur as a result of limiting the sample to authoritarian regimes
with (multiparty) elections. For instance, in an analysis of blatant electoral fraud in chapter 3,
I apply Heckman’s two-­stage model as a robustness check in which the first model predicts
whether an authoritarian country holds elections and estimation results are utilized to correct
for possible selection bias that could occur in the second-­stage model, explaining the extent of
blatant electoral fraud. The exploration of electoral system change in chapter 4 uses the same
methodology to resolve the potential selection issue.

Introduction

9vis-­à-­vis the dictator, the dictator may not be able to effectively organize
large-­scale mobilization of support via economic distribution. In such asituation, the dictator is incentivized to manipulate the election and secure
an overwhelming majority.
Dictators use a variety of measures to manipulate elections. Electoral
manipulation refers to the means by which dictators deviate election resultsfrom public vote preferences in favor of the regimes. This book identifies
two types of electoral manipulation: blatant electoral fraud and institutional
manipulation. Blatant electoral fraud involves coercive election-­
rigging
methods, including violent and nonviolent intimidation of voters andopposition candidates, extreme media bias favorable to the ruling party,
the deregistration of opposition parties, and so on. Institutional manipulation favors the ruling party’s share of parliamentary seats by influencing
seat-­vote elasticity through the manipulation of certain electoral institutions, such as electoral systems, electoral district boundaries, and districtmagnitude. For instance, in authoritarian regimes where the dictator andhis party have a very high level of incumbency advantages, single-­member
district (SMD) systems enable the ruling party to occupy a greater share ofseats with fewer votes. Such an institutional mechanism significantly biases
election results in favor of the regime. In contrast, proportional representation (PR) systems require autocrats to mobilize more regime supporters tosecure the same shares of parliamentary seats due to their proportionality.
My theory of autocratic elections anticipates that dictators with greater
mobilization capabilities are less likely to resort to blatant electoral fraud and more
likely to adopt electoral institutions that promote proportionality. Both blatantelectoral fraud and institutional manipulation bias election results in favorof dictators and their parties. Both electioneering strategies help autocrats
to score dominant victories, yet, to the extent that election results are artificially produced by force and fraud, the beneficial effects of elections arelikely to be lost. Dictators who can secure public support can hold “lessadvantageous” elections by abstaining from the use of blatant electoral
fraud in both presidential and legislative elections and by adopting proportional legislative electoral systems free from pro-­regime seat bias. By
designing such relatively free and fair elections, autocrats can effectively
elicit the benefits of autocratic elections.
Instead of relying heavily on electoral manipulation, dictators with highmobilization capabilities are more likely to manipulate macroeconomic policies
before elections, a process known as economic maneuvering. Dictators pursue
this strategy, where they can, because it enables them to secure a clear
victory while also ensuring the benefits of elections: demonstrating their

10

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

strengths, gathering information, and/or driving a wedge in the opposition
camp. These benefits are likely to be lost if an autocrat prioritizes electoral
manipulation over economic maneuvering. My theory of autocratic elections therefore predicts that dictators’ mobilization capabilities influence
the combination of electoral manipulation and economic maneuveringthat will appear as the equilibrium of autocratic election design (Phase II
in fig. 1.1).
How and when do these electoral strategies backfire on autocrats? This
book contends that when dictators deviate from the equilibrium of autocraticelection design in dealing with the electoral dilemma, authoritarian elections destabilize authoritarian rule. Two scenarios can emerge where elections destabilize authoritarian rule. In the first, a dictator engages in excessive electoral
manipulation to such a degree that it harms the benefits of elections. This
makes it difficult for opposition leaders to correctly estimate the dictator’strue strength and makes it easy to capitalize on popular grievance, provoking popular protest. In the second scenario, a dictator undersupplies
electoral manipulation according to his mobilization capabilities and theelection results reveal the weaknesses of himself. Updated information on
de facto regime weakness via election results, in some instances, encourages ruling elites to defect from the regime or stage a coup d’état and, inother instances, ends in a surprising electoral victory for the opposition(Phase III in fig. 1.1).
Exploring the origins and outcomes of autocratic elections under theframework of the electoral dilemma derives profound implications on our
understanding of authoritarian politics. On the one hand, given that dictators strategically design their elections, this book suggests that the dictator’s choice of electioneering strategies indicates the underlying status of
power distribution between the dictator and other political elites in opaqueauthoritarian politics. Therefore, analyzing electoral manipulation in dictatorships is useful not only for election monitoring observers who wish
to understand autocratic elections that have been recently increasing in
numbers but also for the broader international community and democratic
policy makers who wish to scrutinize the internal working of authoritarianregimes often masked by limited information.
On the other hand, beyond a naive, functionalist view of autocratic
institution building, this book also suggests that autocrats may face strategic uncertainty when they design autocratic elections. As a result of suchstrategic uncertainty, autocratic elections, for which dictators have great
discretion in institutional design, have the potential to undermine regime
stability. By emphasizing the importance of discerning the uncertainty ofIntroduction

11

institutional design in dictatorships, this book suggests that post-­electoralpolitical turmoil occurs due to the gap between the dictator’s actual mobilization capabilities and the designed elections. Thus, the key for the international society to forecast whether an autocratic election leads to post-­
electoral political turmoil is to accurately gauge the differences between
the dictator’s capabilities of deriving popular support and the manners inwhich he intends to design the upcoming election. Post-­electoral regime
instability is an artifact of strategic uncertainty in which autocratic elections are embedded.

1.3. Contributions

Besides the aforementioned broad implications that the theory of autocratic elections posits, this book contributes to three strands of politicalscientific literature: (1) authoritarian politics and institutions, (2) sourcesof regime performance, and (3) the menu of electoral manipulation. Here I
review extant research on these topics and situate my arguments alongsidethem.6
Authoritarian Politics and Institutions

Following the end of the Cold War, many countries in the developing world experienced regime transformation. The demise of the Soviet
bloc enabled the United States and other Western countries to actively
push authoritarian countries toward democratic transition. Internationalorganizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also assisted
in a wide range of international activities to promote democratization indeveloping countries. These activities included the provision of foreign aid
tied to political conditionality, election monitoring missions, human rights
watchdogs, and economic sanctions. Despite such growing internationalpressure to democratize, however, many authoritarian regimes have survived. This puzzle revived the study of authoritarian politics.
In distinguishing democracy and autocracy, this book takes a minimalist
approach by focusing on the existence of free and fair elections (Schumpeter 1950; Dahl 1972). Specifically, following previous studies on democratization and autocratic politics (Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003; Svolik
6. Regarding the book’s contributions to more specific literature on each electioneering
strategy and post-­electoral political order, see the literature reviews presented in chapters 3–­6.

12

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

2012; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014), I define an authoritarian country
as “an independent country that fails to satisfy at least one of the following
two criteria for democracy: (1) free and competitive legislative electionsand (2) an executive that is elected either directly in free and competitive
presidential elections or indirectly by a legislature in parliamentary elections” (Svolik 2012: 22).7
Based on this classification of democracy and autocracy, figure 1.2
presents time-­series changes in percentages of democracies and autocracies around the world between 1946 and 2010. Although the number of
democracies has grown since the late 1970s, more than 40 percent of all
countries are still under authoritarian rule. Figure 1.3 takes a closer look attime-­series changes in three types of authoritarian regime: autocracies withno elections, autocracies with noncompetitive elections, and autocracies
with ­competitive elections. The number of autocracies holding competitive elections increased rapidly after the end of the Cold War. Althoughsuch electoral autocracies made up approximately 20 percent of all authoritarian regimes in 1975, this figure grew up to 70 percent in 2008. At thesame time, autocracies with either noncompetitive elections or no elections
at all decreased during the post–­Cold War period. In 1975, each of these
two authoritarian regime types constituted 40 percent of all authoritarianregimes. However, the end of the Cold War saw the end of the dominanceof these two regime types. In 2008, only 17 percent of autocracies (the ninecountries of Eritrea, Swaziland, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United ArabEmirates, Oman, Myanmar, and China) did not hold elections, whereas
only 10 percent of authoritarian elections did not allow multiple parties
or candidates to participate in the electoral process (the five countries of
Cuba, Syria, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam).
Subsequent to the proliferation of the regimes referred to as “electoral
authoritarian regimes” (Schedler 2013) and “competitive authoritarianism”(Levitsky and Way 2010), scholars began to explore the roles of nominally

7. Throughout the empirical analyses presented in the book, I primarily use Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz’s (2014) Autocratic Regimes Dataset, which codes each regime as a democracy or dictatorship. Consistent with the aforementioned definition of dictatorship, Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz empirically identify countries as autocratic when “the following occurred
and the same basic rule and leadership group persist in subsequent years” (2014: 317): (1) an
executive achieved power through means other than free and competitive elections, such as acoup; (2) after free and competitive elections, the government changed the formal and informal rules in such a manner that subsequent free and competitive elections were limited; and(3) free and competitive elections were held to choose the government; however, the military
prevented one or more political parties from competing.

Introduction

13

Fig. 1.2. Democracies and Autocracies in the World (1946–­2010)
Note: The dichotomous distinction between democracy and autocracy is based on Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014: 317). According to their definition, a country is regarded as autocratic
if it satisfies the following three conditions: (1) an executive achieves power through meansother than free and competitive elections, such as coups; (2) after free and competitive elections,the government changes the formal and informal rules in such a way that subsequent free andcompetitive elections are limited; and (3) free and competitive elections are held to choose thegovernment, but the military prevents one or more political parties from competing.

democratic political institutions in these regimes.8 Many argued that parties, legislatures, and elections play significant roles in benefiting authoritarian rule.9 Among others, studies of autocratic politics have highlighted
8. Some scholars have focused on the politics of nondemocracies (Arendt 1951; Friedrichand Brzezinski 1965; O’Donnell 1973; Linz 1975; Collier 1979; Tullock 1987), yet their focus
was largely on non-­institutional aspects of autocratic rule. Important exceptions are Hermet,
Rose, and Rouquie (1978) and Friedgut (1979), who explored the role of elections in communist countries and other authoritarian regimes in Europe and Africa. Huntington and Moore(1970) focused on the one-­party rule that proliferated in the 1960s.
9. For exhaustive reviews on the roles of political institutions under dictatorships, see Gandhi and Lust-­Okar (2009), Magaloni and Kricheli (2010), Ezrow and Frantz (2011), Brancati(2014), and Frantz (2018). Besides elections and ruling parties discussed in this section, scholars have also studied the functions of legislatures in dictatorships. The legislature serves asa useful access point for political elites to various privileges, spoils, and policy concessions
conferred by the regime (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lust-­Okar 2008; Blaydes 2011). As aresult, such co-­optation mechanisms allow dictators to maintain a firm grip on power. According to Schuler (2021), single-­party legislatures help autocrats signal their dominance and14

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 1.3. Elections in Authoritarian Regimes (1946–­2008)
Source: Data from Svolik (2012); Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014).
Note: A country is regarded as holding ­competitive elections if either legislative or executive
elections allow multiple political parties and candidates. If legislative and/or executive elections
are held with only one single party or candidate, then the country is defined as an authoritarianregime holding noncompetitive elections. If a country holds neither legislative nor executive
elections, it is an authoritarian regime with no elections.

the role of elections in prolonging authoritarian rule. The literature points
to three major functions of autocratic elections. First, elections help dictators demonstrate the regime’s invincibility to potential opponents by winning big, or what this book refers to as the demonstration effects (Hermet,
Rose, and Rouquie 1978: 12; Geddes 2006; Magaloni, 2006; Weeden 2008;
Simpser 2013; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). A dictator can demonstrate that his regime is unshakable by winning elections while obtaining
an overwhelming majority, preventing potential opponents from launchingcoups, defecting from the regime, or leading popular uprisings. Researchers generally agree that winning big demonstrates regime strength, yet how
provide legitimacy. From the perspective of citizens, authoritarian parliaments may becomea channel of political accommodation and an important source of material favors (Lust-­Okar
2008).

Introduction

15

they conceive of this is different. Magaloni (2006) and Geddes (2006) suggest that scoring a supermajority through relatively “honest” elections freefrom blatant electoral fraud signals regime strength, as such electoral victories over the opposition reflect the ruling party’s popularity, and boosts
its political legitimacy. In contrast, Simpser (2013) argues that even large
electoral margins with excessive, blatant electoral manipulation help political leaders to consolidate power by signaling regime strength, as orchestrating blatant electoral manipulation requires costly mobilization efforts
and the coordination of various political actors within ruling coalitions.
Elections may also become an important source of information about
the competence and loyalty of ruling elites and the distribution of popularsupport, or what this book terms the information-­gathering effects. Election
results inform dictators of the local popularity of ruling elites, an important criterion for recruiting competent and loyal politicians (Blaydes 2011;
Malesky and Schuler 2010; Reuter and Robertson 2011). “Elections help
dictators overcome their problem monitoring local officials as well. . . . The
failure of local people to turn out or vote for ruling-­party candidates alerts
regime leaders to officials’ shirking or bad behavior and initiates investigation of local problems. By creating these incentives, local and legislativeelections partially substitute for monitoring local officials, with citizens’
votes serving as ‘fire alarms’” (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018: 141).
Furthermore, election results provide information regarding the distribution of public dissent against the regime and the popularity of opposition
parties (Ames 1970; Cox 2009; Herron 2011), thereby improving the efficiency of governance. For example, Miller (2015) presents cross-­national
evidence that falling regime support at elections tends to be followed byincreases in education and welfare spending by the regime to make policy
concession toward the citizenry.
Autocratic elections also provide dictators with the opportunity to
divide and conquer the opposition camp, termed as the divide-­and-­rule
effect (Lust-­Okar 2005). By formally allowing opposition parties and non-­regime-­sponsored candidates to participate in elections, autocrats preventthe opposition from coordinating their approach and action toward theregime. “By holding elections and setting rules regarding the legal eligibility of candidates and parties, dictators create ‘divided structures of contestation’ composed of outsiders who are not allowed to compete and insiders
who become more invested in the regime” (Gandhi and Lust-­Okar 2009:405). Divisions among opposition parties and leaders are manifested in
the opposition’s multiple decisions regarding whether to boycott elections(Beaulieu 2014), whether opposition parties should form a pre-­electoral

16

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

coalition (Gandhi and Reuter 2008), or whether to accept election results
without resorting to post-­election violence (Hafner-­Burton, Hyde, andJablonski 2014).
Although these studies of authoritarian elections have advanced ourunderstanding of authoritarian politics, they fail to adequately address atleast three problems. First, the literature fails to take into account, within asingle theoretical framework, the simultaneous costs and benefits of holding elections. Specifically, most of the extant literature does not consider
the trade-­off between the certainty of election victory and the credibility of election results. Although relatively free and fair elections enable
autocrats to reap the benefits, such elections may also decrease the likelihood that autocrats can win with large margins. On the other hand, excessively manipulated elections undermine the benefits of autocratic elections.
For instance, the demonstration and information-­gathering functions arelikely to be reduced if results are falsified through electoral manipulation
techniques. If dictators lose the informational benefits of elections due toelectoral manipulation, then elections become less useful tools to stabilize
authoritarian rule. Similarly, extensively rigged elections are more likely
to exclude the opposition, thus galvanizing the grievances of opposition
forces, giving them an opportunity to unite to challenge the government(Bunce and Wolchik 2010).
Rozenas (2016) makes an important contribution to this issue. He
focuses on a similar trade-­off in authoritarian elections and argues that
dictators whose security in office is threatened are more likely to hold lessmanipulated elections. Although the present book shares a similar view on
autocratic elections, it differs from Rozenas’s work in several important
respects. For one, the theoretical focus of this book extends far beyond
the determinants of blatant electoral fraud by taking into account the relationships between other electioneering strategies, such as electoral system change, economic maneuvering, and the consequences of autocraticelections on post-­electoral political order. Also, Rozenas (2016) focuseson pre-­election-­day manipulation. However, election-­day fraud is also
another important dimension of electoral chicanery, given that autocrats
face the same trade-­offs on election day. In fact, many studies suggest thatweak autocrats rely on election-­day fraud, such as ballot stuffing, as a lastresort to bias election results (e.g., Cheeseman and Klaas 2018: chap. 5).
This study explores blatant electoral fraud during both pre-­election andelection-­day phases, as both stages significantly influence the certainty oflarge electoral margins and the credibility of election results.
Second, due to an excessive emphasis in extant literature on the benefits

Introduction

17of elections, current autocratic election scholarship does not always identify the conditions under which authoritarian elections backfire on dictators. In fact, another strand of research strongly suggests that election periods pose a particularly serious threat to dictators by provoking coups andmass collective actions. For instance, observing the so-­called third wave
of democratization, Huntington (1991: 174) suggests that holding elections under authoritarian rule is an important first step for a dictatorshipin its transition to democracy. Brownlee (2009) also argues that competitive authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratize than either hegemonic or closed authoritarian regimes. In the meantime, elections not only
encourage democratization but also provoke popular protests, coups, andbloody civil wars. Tucker (2007) and Hafner-­Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski(2014) assert that fraudulent elections or acts of election violence are more
likely to be followed by popular protests. Wig and Rod (2016) argue thatin elections where opposition parties emerge in strength, ruling elites are
more likely to attempt a coup d’état to punish low-­performing incumbents.
Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (2017) and Lucardi (2019) find that election
periods allow the opposition to alleviate collective action problems and,
therefore, increase the likelihood of autocratic breakdown, compared tonon-­election periods.10 However, while pointing out various forms of post-­
electoral political conflict, these studies also do not necessarily offer a clarifying theory of when and what types of political conflicts are more likely
to occur after elections.
Third, the literature has mainly focused on the consequences of autocratic institutions, and specifically their effects on regime survival. As aresult, most analyses have not seriously considered the origins of these
institutions or their endogenous institutional building.11 As Pepinsky (2014:631) has rightly pointed out, “Institutions under authoritarian rule are vulnerable to manipulation because political actors believe that institutional
manipulation can shape political outcomes in their favor, then it is also truethat factors that explain the origins of (and changes in) dominant parties
also directly affect those political outcomes.” When it comes to autocraticelections, dictators may be willing to hold less-­manipulated elections thatgenerate beneficial effects only when they can survive those elections that
may also increase the likelihood of political risk. In sum, inferring the causal
10. Increased tensions during election time may lead to violent confrontations between
government and opposition and may even trigger a civil war (Snyder 2000; Cederman,
Gleditsch, and Hug 2012).
11. Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (2017: 140) also note this problem and adopt an instrumental variable approach to estimate the impact of autocratic elections on regime breakdown.

18

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

effects of autocratic elections without taking into account the likely factors
determining the origins of those elections leads to misleading conclusions
about the net effects of autocratic elections on post-­election political order.
To fill these gaps in the literature, this book proposes a new theory
that illuminates the causes and consequences of autocratic elections. My
theory of autocratic elections focuses on a dilemma faced by dictators when
designing elections: Although electioneering through overt electoral fraud
and pro-­regime electoral rules enables autocrats to achieve a large victoryat the ballot box, such elections lose the important benefits that elections
bring to the victor. Conceptualizing the dictator’s dilemma at the ballot
box allows us to theorize both the costs and the benefits of holding autocratic elections simultaneously. I then argue that, under the constraints ofthe electoral dilemma, the extent to which a dictator can mobilize popularsupport determines how heavily he relies on manipulating electoral processes and election rules. Endogenizing autocratic electoral design as afunction of the distribution of mobilization capabilities in an autocracy, mytheory of autocratic elections unravels the origins of electoral institutionsin authoritarian regimes. Finally, this book also suggests that elections are
more likely to destabilize dictatorial rule when autocrats deviate from theequilibrium of autocratic electoral design in dealing with the electoral
dilemma. Shedding light on the manners in which autocrats design elections, this book’s theory enables us to identify the conditions under which
autocratic elections backfire on autocrats in the form of coups, popular
protests, and the opposition’s stunning election victories.
Highlighting the importance of public support in authoritarian elections, my argument also speaks to broader authoritarian politics literature. Recognizing that the most imminent threat to dictatorships comesfrom inside, via regime elites, a large body of autocratic politics literature
has emphasized the importance of illuminating the relationship between
dictators and ruling elites (e.g., Tullock 1987; Svolik 2012; Blaydes 2011;
Magaloni 2006, 2008). Some scholars also take into account the relationship between the regime and the opposition (Gandhi and Przeworski
2007; Gandhi 2008; Lust-­Okar 2005). However, these recent studies do
not necessarily shed light on the possibility that dictators directly appeal tothe masses in order to weaken both internal and external threats. In contrast, classic literature on dictatorships drew attention to “the problem ofauthoritarian control” (Svolik 2012), namely, how dictators communicate
with the masses and control them through (mostly) coercive measures, suchas regime propaganda, state terror, and forced mass mobilization (Arendt
1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965; Linz 1975). While building upon

Introduction

19

recent literature that underlines interactions between dictators and political elites, this book also aims to bring the masses back into a theory of autocratic elections.12 Specifically, I argue that an autocrat’s ability to garnerpublic support through noncoercive means is key in designing autocraticelections. In other words, this study suggests that, in addition to directly
dealing with threats from the elite, garnering public support is importantfor dictators because, even in authoritarian regimes, it is from citizens that
dictators draw legitimacy (Dimitrov 2009; Guriev and Treisman 2020). By
solidifying public support, autocrats can effectively preempt threats fromboth ruling elites and the opposition.
Elections and Sources of Autocratic Regime Performance

Under what conditions can autocrats induce political compliance from
elites and citizens? To answer this pertinent question, comparativists havefocused on economic, institutional, and organizational factors affecting
regime performance. Here I discuss three strands of research related toregime performance and regime stability: (1) state resources, (2) organizational power, and (3) opposition strength, all of which are closely related tothe distribution of mobilization capabilities between the dictator and theelites, the core explanatory concept of this book in theorizing the causes
and consequences of autocratic elections.
Financial Resources
The amount of financial resources that dictators possess has been regarded
as an important factor of regime performance (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003). Greene (2007), for example, finds that the incumbent’s dramatic
resource advantages contributed to the long dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) while marginalizing opposition parties
in Mexico.
Previous studies have focused on natural resource endowments as amajor source of financial resources, finding that natural resources prolong authoritarian rule by enhancing a dictator’s ability to increase public
spending (Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007; Morrison 2009; Wright, Frantz, andGeddes 2013).13 The arguments and findings of this book are consistent
12. Recently, Guriev and Treisman (2020) have explored sources of mass support inauthoritarian regimes by utilizing cross-­national survey data.
13. Scholars have long debated the negative consequences of natural resources. A great
deal of literature on the resource curse has argued that natural resource wealth prolongs
authoritarian rule (Morrison 2009; Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2013), prevents democratiza-

20

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

with those of the oil curse literature: I emphasize that natural resources
are a primary source of dictators’ regime performance. However, connecting this literature to the design of autocratic elections, I argue that, due tothe very fact that dictators can buy extensive popular support through the
distribution of natural resource wealth, such windfall incomes ironicallypermit dictators to hold relatively “open” elections with PR systems andless blatant electoral fraud. In this sense, my argument resonates with therevisionist interpretation of the resource curse (e.g., Haber and Menaldo
2011; Paler 2013), which suggests that natural resources do not necessarily
harm political transparency. Since petroleum is a useful tool for dictators
to sustain public support via wealth distribution, authoritarian leaders cantake advantage of the benefits of relatively free and fair elections. Therefore, elections held in oil-­rich autocracies where dictators have an incentive
to distribute economic favors may stabilize autocratic rule, demonstratingthat the dictator is not feared by the people but loved by them.
Organizational Power
Scholars pointed to the importance of organizational power in the form ofstate and parties to explain autocratic regime performance (Levitsky andWay 2010; Slater 2010). By institutionalizing credible collective decision-­making and extensive grassroots party organizations, dominant parties
help autocrats mobilize electoral support and prolong authoritarian rule
(Huntington 1968; Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008; Svolik
2012; Boix and Svolik 2013). Resonating with these works, Morse (2019)argues that credible ruling parties, which are “generally quite large, institutionalized and autonomous, internally democratic, and [have] longstanding ties with broad segments of the population,” (18) help electoral autocrats to win big without cheating big. Similarly, strong states increase elitecohesion and effectively organize mass support for authoritarian regimes(Levitsky and Way 2010; Slater and Fenner 2011). Along this line, Seeberg(2021) contends that electoral autocrats with high levels of state capacitytion (Ross 2001, 2012), damages political transparency (Mahdavi 1970; Beblawi and Luciani1987), slows down economic growth (e.g., Sachs and Warner 1995; Ross 2012), undermines
state capacity, and fuels civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004;
Humphreys 2005). Much of this research concludes that natural resources negatively influence political and economic development in developing countries. Recent studies, however,make caveats to such resource curse arguments, suggesting that several conditions must
exist for natural resources to be a real curse, such as ownership structures (Jones Luong andWeinthal 2011; Andersen and Ross 2014), better information on how to use windfall revenues (Paler 2013), and the allocation of natural resource wealth in the state budget (Bodea,
Higashijima, and Singh 2016).

Introduction

21

can win elections because those rulers can rely on local agents and institutions by controlling the media and restricting election monitors.
While building upon these works, this book departs from broad discussions on organizational power and regime stability and unpacks the relationships between organizational power and electioneering strategies. At
the same time, going beyond the exclusive focus on blatant electoral fraudin the literature, I shed light on other prominent electioneering strategies that dictators employ, such as institutional manipulation and economic maneuvering. In doing so, I theoretically and empirically explore
the conditions under which strong organizational power leads to autocraticelections with less fraud and high seat proportionality. Specifically, I suggest that strong organizational power itself may not necessarily determine
the degree of electoral manipulation: How autocrats utilize those organizations for electoral support may be significantly different depending
upon financial resources that dictators possess. When they lack financial
resources to distribute, strong states and parties may become instrumentsof coercion and repression; when they hold a colossal amount of financial
resources, strong states and parties may turn into instruments orchestrating efficient material distribution. As Slater (2010: 11) succinctly noted,“The predictable provision of selective incentives or public goods requires
the prior existence of a robust political center.”
Opposition Strength
Previous research has also suggested that opposition strength is anotherkey factor affecting autocratic regime performance. In particular, a united
opposition puts strong pressure on autocrats not to manipulate elections,paving the way for the transition to democracy. In particular, researchers highlight the importance of pre-­election opposition coalitions. Howard and Roessler (2006) argue that competitive authoritarian regimes are
more likely to liberalize election outcomes when opposition coalitions areformed prior to elections. Donno (2013b) contends that pre-­election coalition making is positively correlated with the likelihood of democratization by elections in competitive authoritarian regimes. Magaloni’s (2010)
formal model of election fraud shows that endorsing a single presidential
candidate and coalescing makes free and fair elections more likely, leading
to democratic transitions.
My argument differs from these studies in two ways. First, my theory
does not seek to explain when democratization occurs in the wake of autocratic elections. In other words, asking whether autocrats hold relatively
free and fair elections is different from asking whether such elections suc-

22

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

cessfully lead to democratic transitions thereafter (Wahman 2013). As I
show in this book, relatively free and fair elections in autocracies may beheld precisely because autocrats are assured that they will win such elections rather than feeling threatened by opposition pressure. Furthermore,less-­manipulated elections and subsequent opposition victories may leadto the activation of coup threats, resulting in the emergence of anotherautocracy. Therefore, by carefully separating these two distinct questions, I
explore the conditions under which autocrats allow relatively free and fairelections in the first place. I then identify when autocratic elections backfire on dictators in the form of coups, opposition victories, and protests,
without asking whether such political change leads to democratization.
Second, for the most part, these studies focus on competitive authoritarian regimes where pre-­election opposition coalition making is frequently
observed and credible because coalition building significantly increases thelikelihood of opposition victory (Donno 2013a: 105). However, in competitive autocracies where opposition victory and democratization are more
likely than other authoritarian regimes (Brownlee 2009), opposition parties may have a strong incentive to form pre-­election opposition coalitions,as this may make a difference (van de Walle 2006; Wahman 2013). In otherwords, competitive autocracies may be “the most likely scenario” where theeffect of pre-­electoral opposition coalitions is observed. Furthermore, it isalso reasonable to assume that, under the electoral dilemma, hegemonicand closed authoritarian regimes also strategically calculate the extent towhich they need to manipulate elections, depending on the strengths ofthe opposition. For instance, when dictators believe that opposition parties
are too weak to gather even a small portion of votes, they may consider notplaying a heavy-­handed role in election manipulation, and closed autocracies may start to think about allowing the opposition to participate in
future elections. Focusing on opposition coalition making makes sense asa measure of opposition unity and strength in the context of competitive
autocracies. Yet, a more general measure of the opposition’s mobilization
capabilities may be useful in explaining electoral manipulation in a wider
sample of authoritarian regimes. My empirical analyses find that strong
opposition, measured by the recent history of anti-­government collective
action during non-­election periods, is positively correlated with the use ofblatant electoral fraud and electoral systems producing pro-­regime seatbiases. The results resonate with another prominent perspective that dictators resort to extensive electoral manipulation when the opposition threatens his electoral dominance.14
14. For instance, see Lehoucq and Molina (2002).

Introduction

23

The Menu of Electoral Manipulation

This book also contributes to the burgeoning literature on “the menu ofmanipulation” (Schedler 2002) by identifying what electioneering strategies authoritarian incumbents are more likely to employ and when they
will employ them. Autocrats hold a rich set of manipulation techniques invarious institutional areas such as courts, legislatures, local politics, media,
and associations (Schedler 2013). Also with regard to autocratic elections,scholars have revealed various electoral strategies that political leaders rely
on to extend their rule, such as electoral cheating, violent and nonviolent
intimidation, and election violence (e.g., Hyde 2007; Birch 2012; Kelley2012; Little 2012; Hafner-­Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Simpser 2013;
Rozenas 2016; Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2019); manipulation of electoralrules (Diaz-­Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; Pripstein Posusney 2002; Jones
Luong 2002; Lust-­Okar and Jamal 2002; McElwain 2008; Gandhi andHeller 2018), gerrymandering and malapportionment (Thomson 2013;
Boone and Wahman 2015; Ong, Kasuya, and Mori 2017; Washida 2018;
Wong 2019); and pre-­electoral economic distribution (Shi and Svensson 2006; Brender and Drazen 2006; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018),
including patronage provisions (e.g., Stokes 2005; Gonzalez-­Ocantos et al.
2012) and pork barrel spending (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit andLondregan 1996; Golden and Picci 2008).
Each of these studies draws attention to a single electioneering strategy
without considering the relationship between alternative strategies. However, it is reasonable to assume that autocrats should consider the advantages and disadvantages of each electoral strategy and choose an optimal
set of techniques to maximize the likelihood of holding onto power. To
fill this gap, scholars have recently begun exploring the conditions underwhich political leaders choose one electoral strategy over another. For
instance, regarding the relationship between overt electoral fraud andelectoral systems, Birch (2007) and Fjelde and Hoglund (2016) have foundthat majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to be accompanied byhigher levels of electoral cheating and electoral violence. Using a datasetof municipal elections in Russia, Szakonyi (2019) argues that deregistrationof opposition candidates is a substitute for more blatant forms of electoral
fraud, such as ballot stuffing. By engaging with these emerging studies on
the selection of electioneering techniques, this book focuses on the relationship between two broad categories of electioneering strategy: electoral
manipulation (i.e., blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation)and pre-­electoral economic maneuvering. Under what conditions arepolitical leaders inclined to rely on one rather than the other? By offering

24

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

an answer to this pertinent question, this book illuminates what electoral
strategies authoritarian leaders are likely to use to win big at elections andwhen they will use them.15 In so doing, this research contributes to scholarly discussions on electioneering in the developing world.

1.4. Research Design, Key Empirical Findings,
and the Organization of the Book

This book consists of three parts: theory (chap. 2), cross-­national statistical analyses (chaps. 3–­6), and comparative case studies (chaps. 7–­8). In thefirst part, chapter 2 presents a theory of authoritarian elections. This partof the book first details the electoral dilemma faced by autocrats and classifies autocratic elections according to degrees of electoral manipulationand electoral margins. Second, I then specify two important electioneering
strategies—­electoral manipulation (i.e., blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation) and economic maneuvering—­and clarify the advantages and disadvantages of each. Third, I go on to focus on the distributionof mobilization capabilities between the dictator and other political elites
as a key determinant influencing the design of authoritarian elections. In sodoing, I derive empirical implications that explain four important aspects ofauthoritarian elections: blatant electoral fraud, institutional manipulation,
economic maneuvering, and post-­election political conflict. This chapter
concludes with a preliminary cross-­national investigation demonstratingthat the distribution of mobilization capabilities is correlated with a dictator’s and his party’s electoral margins in presidential and parliamentaryelections. Specifically, I suggest that the distribution of mobilization capabilities can be empirically captured by (1) discretionary financial resources
available to the dictator (natural resource endowments), (2) disciplinary
political organizations that prevent ruling elites from exploiting financial
resources (dominant parties and ethnicity-­based networks), and (3) the
opposition elites’ capacity to mobilize the masses.
The second part of the book provides cross-­national evidence on elec15. Although which specific tools of electoral manipulation dictators use, and when they use
them, is an intriguing research program in its own right (e.g., when dictators prioritize ballot
stuffing over election violence), this book does not set out to explain the relationship between
those specific means within the category of electoral manipulation. Theorizing about the benefits and costs of two broadly defined tools of electioneering strategies—­electoral manipulation and economic maneuvering—­this book aims to explore the relationship between the two.
That said, an additional analysis of blatant electoral fraud in chapter 3 partially addresses thisissue by disaggregating electoral fraud into several specific methods.

25

Introduction
TABLE 1.1. Scope Conditions of Cross-­National Statistical Analyses
Chapter

Dependent
variable

Empirical
operationalization Sample

Election
type

2

Electoral margins

Victory marginsof the dictatorand his party

Autocracies withmultiparty elections (electoral
autocracies)

Executive and legislative elections

3

Blatant electoral
fraud

Latent measureof overt fraud

Autocracies withelections (bothclosed and electoral autocracies)

Executive and legislative elections

4

Institutional
manipulation

Electoral system
types (effective electoral
threshold)

Autocracies withmultiparty elections (electoral
autocracies)

Legislativeelections5

Economicmaneuvering

Fiscal surplus/
deficitAll autocracies

Executive and legislative elections

6

Post-­electoral
conflict

1. Popular
protests
2. Leadershipturnover

Autocracies withelections (bothclosed and electoral autocracies)

Executive and legislative elections

toral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and post-­
election politicalorder. Table 1.1 shows scope conditions and empirical foci of the book’s
cross-­national statistical analyses. This cross-­national analysis part primarily aims to test the external validity of my arguments by investigatingcorrelations between the dictator’s mobilization capabilities, electioneering strategies, and post-­electoral political order.16 Chapter 3 explores theconditions under which autocrats resort to blatant electoral fraud as a formof electoral manipulation. Based on my theory of autocratic elections, I
test whether the three elements of mobilization capabilities are correlatedwith blatant electoral fraud. The analysis includes both closed and electoral
16. Regarding the relationship between cross-­national statistical analysis and case studies, this book does not take the so-­called nested analysis approach (Lieberman 2005). In thenested analysis style of research design, researchers first conduct a cross-­national analysis andthen choose a single typical case or two to illustrate causal mechanisms assumed in theory.
By contrast, this book adopts a research design in which case studies are based on structured
comparisons with the most similar system design to demonstrate the internal validity of themain arguments. I then extend its empirical focus to other authoritarian countries via cross-­national statistical investigations to confirm the theory’s external validity (Rohlfing 2008;
Harbers and Ingram 2020: 1123–­24).

26

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

autocracies that hold any form of election, with a focus on both executive
and legislative elections.17 Specifically, my cross-­national statistical analyses
indicate that dictators with abundant natural resources and weak opposition permit elections to be freer and fairer by relying less on blatant electoral fraud, such as election violence, electoral cheating, and undemocratic
restrictions on electoral law. Furthermore, the negative impact of natural
resources on electoral fraud increases when dictators have dominant parties and large, less fractionalized dominant ethnic groups, both of whichenable autocrats to discipline ruling elites and streamline economic distribution to the masses.
In addition to committing blatant electoral fraud, autocrats can also
manipulate electoral institutions according to their political needs. Chapter 4 investigates the determinants of electoral system choice in parliamentary elections under electoral authoritarian regimes. I first discuss thebenefits and costs of both SMD and PR systems based upon the idea ofthe electoral dilemma in dictatorships, suggesting that SMD systems help
dictators maintain the certainty of winning big via pro-­regime seat premiums, whereas PR systems are useful to divide and rule the opposition
and improve voter turnout by improving the credibility of the electoral
processes. Based upon this trade-­off, I argue that dictators with abundantnatural resources or those facing weak opposition adopt PR systems tolock in autocrats’ dominance, whereas weak dictators rely on SMD systems to maintain overwhelming electoral victories. Using newly collectedcross-­national data on electoral systems in electoral authoritarian regimes(i.e., autocracies with multiparty elections), I demonstrate that both natural
resource wealth and a weak opposition increase the likelihood that dictators will choose PR systems. Furthermore, the correlation between natural
resources and PR systems becomes stronger if autocrats are supported bydominant parties.
Chapter 5 presents cross-­national evidence of the dictators’ economic
maneuvering, namely, political business cycles (PBCs). The theory of autocratic elections predicts a trade-­off between electoral manipulation andthe maneuvering of economic policy: autocrats who can mobilize public
support via the provision of pork and patronage rely less on manipulating
election results by blatant fraud and electoral rules producing pro-­regime
seat bias. Using a sample including all types of authoritarian countries (i.e.,
closed autocracies and electoral autocracies), I conduct cross-­national sta17. Closed autocracies are also included in this analysis, because excluding opposition parties is also an important method of blatant electoral fraud. I will discuss this in more detailin chapter 3.

Introduction

27

tistical analyses using original fiscal balance datasets and autocratic elections to test whether elections in autocracies relatively free from electoral
manipulation are positively correlated with fiscal deficits. Specifically, I
find that election year fiscal deficits are more likely to occur if autocraticelections (1) allow opposition parties to participate, (2) involve less blatantelectoral fraud, and (3) adopt PR systems.
Chapter 6 empirically investigates the political consequences of autocratic elections. Autocratic elections backfire when they deviate from theequilibrium of autocratic election design in dealing with the electoral
dilemma. I argue that there are two post-­election scenarios when autocratic elections backfire on the dictator. On the one hand, when autocrats
undersupply electoral manipulation, elections reveal de facto low popularity of the dictator, paving the way for ruling elites to launch a coup or for
opposition parties to unexpectedly win elections. On the other hand, when
autocrats oversupply electoral fraud relative to their mobilization capabilities, the quality of the election deteriorates, and thus the election cannot
work as a credible tool to demonstrate a regime’s strength, consequently
encouraging post-­election protest movements. In contrast, when an autocrat successfully gauges the extent of electoral manipulation according to
the amount of mobilization capabilities he possesses, autocratic elections
minimize both threats. Through cross-­national statistical analysis of autocracies with elections, I present two main findings: the more underused
electoral manipulation is, the more likely autocrats are to face leadershipturnover in the aftermath of elections; and the more overused electoral
manipulation is, the more likely autocrats are to face popular protests inthe post-­electoral period.
The third part of this book presents comparative case studies of two
Central Asian republics, Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan (1991–­2007) and Akaev’s
Kyrgyzstan (1991–­2005). These case studies provide a rare opportunity torigorously elucidate the causal links that my theory of autocratic elections
anticipates. Both countries share much in common with regard to history,society, international circumstances, economy, and political institutions.
However, the developments of their autocratic regimes followed distinct
paths, which offer an ideal laboratory to compare the two countries withthe method of differences (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Slater and Ziblatt2013).
Both countries are former Soviet republics, and this historical legacy
means that, at the time of independence, both had similarly autonomous
regional elites (Jones Luong 2002). In addition, both forged strong patron-­client relationships between politicians and citizens, known as “patronal-

28

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

TABLE 1.2. Two-­Way (Time-­Series and Cross-­Sectional) Controlled Comparison:
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

Presidential
vote share

Rulingparties’vote share

Blatant electoral
fraud (Kelley’s[2012] QED)

Chapter 7: Kazakhstan
1995
NA
1999
81.00%

52.20%
49.00%

6
9

2004

NA

75.00%

7

2005
2007

91.15%
NA

NA
100%

7
5

Chapter 8: Kyrgyzstan
1995
72.40%
2000
76.40%

22.00%
20.00%

7
8

2005

53.00%

9

NA

Electoral
systems(effective
electoral
threshold)37.5 (SMD)
33.5 (SMD +PR)
33.5 (SMD +PR)
7 (PR)
37.5 (SMD)
32.62 (SMD +PR)
37.5 (SMD)

Post-­electoral
protests
0
2
3
0
0
0
14
140 (autocratic
breakdown)

Note: Extent of blatant electoral fraud is measured based on Kelley’s (2012) Quality of Elections Data,with higher values denoting more extensive electoral fraud. Electoral systems are measured by the effective electoral threshold, with higher values indicating more majoritarian electoral systems. Post-­electoral
protests are derived from Daxecker, Amicarelli, and Jung’s (2018) Electoral Contention and Violence dataset,
which counts the number of popular protests after an election.

ism” (Hale 2015) and “patrimonial communism” (Kitschelt et al. 1999).
The societal makeup of both countries includes multiple ethnic groups, andpolitical leaders were forced to take ethnic problems seriously immediately
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, following independence, the two republics faced the daunting task of simultaneously engaging
in political reform and the transition to a market economy. Both countries
then implemented equally radical economic reforms, and both experienced
democratic backsliding after initial democratization efforts. Internationally,both countries have Russia and China as regional partners while also being
geographically distant from the West. A couple of years after independence,the political institutions of both countries were alike, with similar electoral
systems, very weak ruling party institutions, parliaments with active opposition parties, and de facto decentralized state structures. With both countries
taking similar turns toward authoritarianism in the mid-­1990s, their constitutions were revised through referenda and came to formally stipulate
strong presidential powers and weak parliaments.
However, elections in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan came to have strik-Introduction

29

ingly different consequences for post-­electoral political order by the middle of the 2000s. In Kazakhstan, elections helped Nazarbaev consolidate hisrule by widening electoral margins in the absence of large-­scale protests.
In contrast, elections gradually eroded Kyrgyzstan’s authoritarian stability,
and the 2005 elections eventually led to massive popular protests and thebreakdown of the Akaev regime.
Furthermore, the manner in which the dictators of these two countries
designed elections differed significantly. For example, the extent of blatantelectoral fraud in Kazakhstan prior to the 2007 elections was lower thanthat in Kyrgyzstan in the 2005 elections. This presents an intriguing puzzle
on how the government won big without increasing the level of electoral
fraud in Kazakhstan. In addition, prior to the 2005 legislative election,
Kyrgyzstan switched to a pure SMD electoral system, whereas Kazakhstan,
before the 2007 legislative election, reformed to a pure PR electoral systemwith a single nationwide electoral district. Table 1.2 shows differences inelectoral performance, electoral manipulation, and post-­electoral protests
between the two countries. How can we understand the variations in theuse of electoral manipulation techniques between the two countries?
In addition to exploring striking differences in elections and politicalorder between the two countries in the 2000s, each case study also involvesin-­depth within-­case comparative analyses. Analyzing each regime froma temporal perspective, we find that each country also exhibits intriguing over-­time variations in this book’s variables of interest. For instance,
during the 1990s, Kazakhstan experienced more extensive blatant electoral fraud, but by the middle of the 2000s, this became less salient. The
country also inherited an SMD-­based system from the Soviet Union andmade some modifications thereafter, but by 2007 it changed to a pure PR
electoral system. Kyrgyzstan experienced no post-­electoral protests during
the 1990s; however, protests emerged during the 2000 and 2005 elections,triggering the so-­called Tulip Revolution. Besides the cross-­sectional differences between the two countries, table 1.2 also documents intertemporal changes in electoral performance, electoral manipulation, and post-­
electoral protests within each country. Within-­case analysis provides anillustration of why these changes happened, while controlling for otherpossible country-­specific confounders that are difficult to eliminate in a
simple one-­shot cross-­sectional comparison between the two countries. In
sum, by combining the between-­and within-­case study perspectives via
the controlled comparison, the case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
deeply delve into the processes by which dictators’ mobilization capabilities shape the causes and consequences of autocratic elections.

30

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

These case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are based on thefieldwork I conducted in Central Asia between December 2008 and July
2014. I spent a total of eight months in Almaty and Astana in Kazakhstan
and in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to secondary sources and election monitoring reports from the two Central Asian republics, the casestudies use unique quantitative data gathered at the Statistical Agencies of
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, various local publications, and qualitative datacollected from thirty-­four semi-­structured interviews conducted with politicians, opposition leaders, NGO activists, and local researchers in bothcountries.
Chapter 7 investigates the case of post-­Soviet Kazakhstan, where a dictator successfully consolidated his regime by strengthening pre-­election
economic maneuvering in the face of less fraudulent elections and a proportional representation electoral system. During the 1990s, Kazakhstan
experienced numerous instances of electoral malpractice. However, by
the middle of the 2000s, President Nursultan Nazarbaev had become lessinclined to use blatant electoral fraud and even decided to switch froman SMD electoral system to a PR system. Focusing on growing natural
resource wealth, increasingly strong state and party organizations, andweakening opposition, I demonstrate that the president’s decision to shiftelectoral strategies from heavy-­handed electoral manipulation to extensive,pre-­electoral economic maneuvering was realized in order to achieve election victories with large margins.
In chapter 8, I present a case study of Kyrgyzstan to illustrate how the
failure to strategically manipulate elections leads to popular protests. In
stark contrast to Nazarbaev, President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan faced massive
popular protests during the 2005 parliamentary elections, and he was ultimately forced to leave office. Why did the 2005 elections backfire on thepresident? As with the case of Kazakhstan, I describe how the distributionof mobilization capabilities changed from independence until the collapseof the Akaev regime in 2005. I first show that, while Akaev was relatively
successful in mobilizing public support during the 1990s by using financial
resources and clan alliances under relatively free and fair elections, shrinking financial resources, decentralized political organizations, and growing
opposition all encouraged him to be more inclined to practice blatant electoral fraud by the early 2000s. I also show that excessive electoral manipulation and the announcement of the ruling party’s electoral victory in the2005 parliamentary elections sparked popular protests by opposition supporters who were united in a belief that the regime should not be strong
enough to earn such an overwhelming election win.

Introduction

31

In chapter 9, I discuss the broad implications of the book. While autocratic elections are not the only aspect of authoritarian politics, they area useful tool at the disposal of autocrats to consolidate their rule. In thischapter, I discuss how this book’s findings contribute to our understanding of the role of international society in improving electoral integrity andeconomic policy making in authoritarian regimes. Finally, this chapter suggests possible policy implications while addressing the limitations of thetheory. It concludes with recommendations on future research directions.

TWO

A Theory of Autocratic Elections
The essence of these tactics is some voluntary but irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice. They rest on the paradox that the power
to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself.
—Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict
The rich never fight, poverty dulls the wit.
—Japanese proverb

2.1. Introduction

Elections are a double-­edged sword for authoritarian leaders. Elections are
expected to mitigate fundamental problems in authoritarian rule, but theyalso generate crucial risks such that threats to autocratic rule are triggeredin practice. Given that no two autocrats have identical resources and capabilities for dealing with these risks, autocrats design elections differently
according to their needs and priorities. The varying methods that autocrats
use to manipulate election results lead to distinct outcomes on the post-­
electoral political order.
This chapter comprises two parts. The bulk of the chapter outlines thelogic behind the causes and consequences of autocratic elections. I begin
by reviewing some fundamental problems of authoritarian rule. I thenidentify the ways in which autocratic elections contribute to solving these
problems, while also suggesting that autocrats face an important trade-­off
between the certainty of winning big and the credibility of election results.
32

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

33

After highlighting this electoral dilemma, I then go on to argue thatthe extent to which authoritarian leaders can mobilize popular support via
noncoercive measures is key to explaining variations in electoral manipulation across dictatorships. I theorize about the advantages and disadvantages of two electioneering strategies, namely, electoral manipulation andeconomic maneuvering. My theory of autocratic elections anticipates that
dictators with high capabilities of garnering mass support via economic
distribution (what this book refers to as “high mobilization capabilities”)
are more likely to hold partly free and fair elections. Conversely, whensuch mobilization capabilities are low, autocrats cannot help but rely onelectoral manipulation, such as blatant electoral fraud and institutional
manipulation.
Some autocratic elections backfire on dictators and destabilize autocratic rule. I argue that autocratic elections destabilize political order when
dictators deviate from the equilibrium of autocratic election design. On
the one hand, when autocrats overestimate their capability to mobilize
the masses and consequently hold excessively free and fair elections, autocratic elections reveal the weaknesses of the regime, thereby leading to
the realization of within-­regime threats or a stunning election victory for
opposition parties. On the other hand, when autocrats underestimate theirmobilization capabilities and excessively employ electoral manipulation
methods, then autocratic elections provide the opposition with an opportunity to coordinate anti-­government collective action. In short, different
types of dictators’ mistakes result in distinct forms of political conflicts inthe aftermath of elections. By contrast, when authoritarian leaders successfully design elections based on accurate assessments of their mobilization
capabilities, they are able to maximize the benefits of authoritarian elections while minimizing the likelihood of post-­electoral political conflicts.
Last, the remaining part of this chapter provides an empirical assessmentof the correlates of the distribution of mobilization capabilities between
the dictator and other political elites. Specifically, I present cross-­national
evidence on the relationship between mobilization capabilities and electoral
performance. I propose that dictators’ mobilization capabilities vis-­à-­visother political elites are well measured by focusing on three components:(1) the dictator’s discretionary financial resources, (2) the regime’s formal
and informal organizations that discipline ruling elites and effectively reachthe masses, and (3) the opposition’s capability to mobilize mass support.
I demonstrate that these cross-­national measures for the distribution ofmobilization capabilities are useful indicators that adequately predict dictators’ margins of victory in both presidential and legislative elections.

34

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

2.2. Fundamental Problems of Autocratic Rule andthe Roles of Elections in Dictatorships

Scholarship has suggested that political leaders in dictatorships in which
repression prevails and political freedom is severely circumscribed face atleast three complications, which I term the fundamental problems of authoritarian rule. The first two problems result from information shortages,
whereby both the dictator and the potential opponents face challenges ingleaning the opposite side’s intentions and capabilities. From the dictator’s
point of view, the lack of political transparency makes it difficult to knowwhat people really think about the regime. In authoritarian regimes, both
elites and citizens are reluctant to reveal their true preferences because
doing so risks making them targets of state repression (Kuran 1991; Wintrobe 1998). However, without reliable sources of information, the dictator
experiences difficulties in achieving efficient governance.
From the perspective of the potential opponents, it is difficult to accurately gauge the autocrat’s true intentions and capabilities. Such uncertainty may encourage opponents to preempt threats by rebelling as a resultof miscalculating their relative strengths vis-­à-­vis the dictator, thus resulting in political turmoil. Strengthening the military is among the mostfrequently used measures to credibly demonstrate a dictator’s power topotential opponents; however, overheavy reliance on the sword threatens aleader’s tenure by enhancing opportunities for coups d’état (Svolik 2012).
Thus, this measure is not a perfect solution.1
The third problem derives from the possibility that repression and alack of political transparency will urge potential opponents to take radical
actions to achieve their goals. Without institutionalized channels throughwhich people’s demands and preferences are transmitted to decision makers, opponents may find it reasonable to employ violent, anti-­system measures as a last resort. Excessive reliance on repression and indiscriminate
violence may also fuel grievances among the population, which makes it
easier for the opposition to coordinate anti-­government collective actions(Goodwin 2001; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).
Taken together, excessively relying on violence and repression is nota smart option for dictators to hold onto power. With this in mind, theautocratic politics literature has identified various ways in which authoritarian leaders mitigate the fundamental problems of authoritarian rule. For
1. Regarding the causes and consequences of coercive institutions in dictatorships, see
Greitens (2016).

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

35

example, autocrats may relax their tight control over the media such thata partly independent media effectively monitors inner elites’ performanceand corruption and/or identifies citizens’ grievances, thereby improving
their hold on governance (Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009; Stockmann
2013; Lorentzen 2014); they may allow opposition parties to attend thelegislature so that they can remain informed about the opposition’s policy preferences and accordingly provide policy concessions (Gandhi andPrzeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008); and they may encourage loyal lawmakers in the parliament to raise important policy issues in their regions togauge citizens’ grievances (Truex 2016). Other possible measures include
institutionalizing a dominant party to facilitate credible power sharing
between themselves and ruling elites (Magaloni 2008; Myerson 2008; Boix
and Svolik 2013); exhibiting more tolerance of criticism against government policies while also censoring internet posts or other communications
calling for collective action (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013); or decentralizing governance as a means to more accurately grasp the preferences anddemands of local elites and the citizenry (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast
1994; Treisman 1999).
A major tool used by dictators to deal with the challenges generated
by authoritarian rule is to take advantage of elections. As reviewed in theprevious chapter, autocratic elections can mitigate such problems in thefollowing three ways. First, election results inform dictators’ strengths bydemonstrating their electoral mobilization (i.e., demonstration effects; e.g.,
Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). By scoring overwhelming election victories, authoritarian leaders send a signal that their regimes are invincible,
thereby deterring ruling elites from defecting, launching coups, and leading regime breakdowns. Second, election results are also useful for assessing the competence and popularity of ruling elites and the opposition (i.e.,
information-­gathering effects). Elections enable autocrats to gauge the ruling
elites’ competence as well as the opposition’s popularity by observing theirrespective abilities to mobilize constituents (Little 2012). Armed with suchelectoral information, autocrats are able to decide who among ruling elites
deserves to climb the ladder of career promotion within regimes (Blaydes2011), as well as where to best allocate state resources for reward andrepression purposes (Cox 2009; Miller 2015). Third, competitive, regime-­sponsored elections in autocracies may contribute to hindering coordination in the opposition camp, as the opposition must then decide whether
or not to participate in the elections, which often helps dictators drive awedge between moderate and radical opposition forces (i.e., divide-­and-­rule
effects; Diaz-­Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; Lust-­Okar 2004).

36

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Therefore, autocratic elections are expected to yield several important
benefits through which dictators can ameliorate the problems that arise
when they exclusively rely on heavy-­handed measures. However, autocraticelections also entail significant risks; consequently, dictators need to carefully design them depending on their needs and priorities. In the following
subsections, I theorize about the varying measures that authoritarian leaders strive to balance the above-­mentioned costs and benefits when designing autocratic elections.

2.3. The Electoral Dilemma in Dictatorships

The core benefits that dictators seek through elections may vary acrossauthoritarian regimes; however, regardless of which electoral benefits the
dictator emphasizes, the bottom line is that holding authoritarian elections
involves a significant trade-­off. Free and fair elections enable dictators
to make the most of the above-­mentioned benefits, which in turn help
mitigate the fundamental problems of authoritarian rule. However, free
and fair elections also decrease the likelihood of overwhelming victories
for autocratic leaders, which in turn reveals the weaknesses of the regime
and, thus, becomes another source of potential destabilization. In particular, revealing the weaknesses of a regime in this manner activates threats
from above (inner elites) in the aftermath of the elections. By contrast, if
autocrats are afraid to hold free and fair elections and, thus, extensively
manipulate the electoral process, then elections not only become uselessas a tool to solve the fundamental problems of autocracy but also increase
the likelihood of an eruption of post-­electoral mass protests. Simply put,
autocrats face a trade-­off between the certainty of winning big and the credibility of election results. Herein, I term this conundrum the electoral dilemmaof dictatorships, arguing that the design of autocratic elections is a manifestation of how autocrats address this problem.
On the one hand, electoral manipulation enhances the certainty of the
dictator’s electoral victories. Ceteris paribus, the likelihood that dictators
successfully obtain an overwhelming victory increases, as they manipulate
elections in extensive ways through measures such as violence, ballot stuffing, and manipulation of electoral rules. Electoral “misconduct increases
its vote share. The benefits of this are obvious in close electoral races withan uncertain outcome. But even in hegemonic contexts, cheating pays. . . .
It contributes to large margins of electoral victory, which in turn create
an aura of invincibility that deters future opposition challengers” (Donno

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

37

2013a: 33). Indeed, using cross-­national data on blatant electoral fraud andelectoral margins, Simpser (2013: 67–­72) showed that blatant electoral
fraud tends to yield larger margins of victory in developing countries.
On the other hand, electoral manipulation may undermine the credibility of election results. The likelihood that election results are perceived as
an accurate reflection of the dictator’s popularity decreases when authoritarian leaders resort to extensive electoral manipulation. When it is certain that the dictator’s overwhelming electoral victories largely result fromextensive electoral manipulation, elections are likely to lose some of thebenefits that I identified above. First, extensively manipulated elections
may no longer send a credible signal of the extent to which voters uphold
the regime, thus undermining the demonstration effects. For instance,
when dictators can easily obtain 100 percent of the vote (by not permitting opposition or using electoral violence and cheating), then the election
results do not reflect their true popularity. In such predetermined plebiscite elections, citizens become indifferent and/or cynical about the electoral process and its results, as in the Soviet Union (White 1988: 13; Tedin
1994). By contrast, if dictators can win by a large margin without resorting
to electoral manipulation, then the election results serve as a costly signalof their latent popularity, which effectively deters challenges from potential opponents. For instance, Norris (2014: chap. 6) demonstrated that blatant electoral fraud undermines people’s legal compliance and confidence
in governments. In addition to vote shares, electoral manipulation also
dampens voter turnout, which is another indicator of gauging the regime’s
electoral performance (Magaloni 2006; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018:141). If elections are no more than shams, then voters may be disincentivized to participate in the electoral process, whereas less manipulated elections are conducive to mobilizing voters. Consistent with this observation,
Birch (2010) empirically showed that high levels of electoral integrity are
positively correlated with citizens’ propensity to vote.
Second, committing extensive electoral manipulation hinders dictators’ ability to gather reliable information on other actors through election results, thus damaging the information-­gathering effects of elections.2
2. It might be possible for dictators to at first observe a “true” electoral performance via
elections and then manipulate it when they announce the results to the public through acentral election committee. However, such ballot box tampering methods are likely to undermine the image of regime invincibility and even spark popular protests, which are highly
dangerous for dictators (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Tucker 2007). For instance, Harvey
and Mukherjee (2020) show that administrative fraud, which is a relatively cheaper way ofelectoral fraud than voter intimidation and extra-­legal mobilization, is more likely to provoke
popular protests.

38

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

When electoral manipulation is used to bias the results in favor of the dictator, the results do not reflect the de facto distribution of political support
among the public. Such electoral manipulation makes it difficult to accurately glean voters’ preferences and gauge public support for opposition parties, thus undermining the basis on which they can reward or punish voters.3
Indeed, Seki (2015) demonstrated that elections boycotted by opposition
parties in Milošević’s Serbia were less likely to be followed by post-­electoral
allocations of public employment according to party strengths, indicatingthat less competitive elections hinder the information-­gathering function.
Candidates from ruling parties often compete in elections wherein governments prohibit the participation of opposition parties, such as the cases ofVietnam and Uzbekistan. Even in such facade elections, manipulation complicates the quality of electoral information by making it difficult to estimate the competence of ruling elites through election results. In this respect,
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018: 141) succinctly described the relationship among electoral fairness, local officials’ policy competence, and theinformation-­gathering function of autocratic elections:[Electoral] [c]ompetition thus puts pressure on local officials anddeputies to refrain from exploitation and brutality toward constituents and compete on behalf of their areas in the national scramble
for schools, clinics, paved roads, and whatever else is given out. They
need to deliver some benefits and provide some local public goods
in order to ensure turnout, votes for the ruling party, and participation in ruling-­party rallies. The need to deliver benefits to voters gives ambitious officials and candidates incentives to convey theneeds and problems of their districts to central leaders and build
clientele networks to reach the grassroots.
Third, manipulated elections weaken the divide-­
and-­rule functionof autocratic elections, as they encourage the opposition camp to agree
on taking anti-­system approaches. Noncompetitive elections completely
exclude opposition parties, thereby increasing their propensity to risk
radical actions, in contrast to multiparty competitions wherein some of
3. This is particularly true in the case of blatant electoral fraud, which obscures the true
distribution of votes (and seats in the case of legislative elections), thereby damaging theinformation-­gathering function. By contrast, institutional manipulation (i.e., electoral systemchange, gerrymandering, and/or malapportionment) that biases seat shares in the parliamentremains visible in the distribution of vote shares across political parties for the dictator (and
often for the opposition).

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

39

the opposition may decide to gain political influence through regime-­sponsored political institutions (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012). Indeed,
Gandhi and Vreeland (2004) demonstrated that authoritarian legislatures
lacking multiple parties contribute to the increased risk of violent conflict. Even when autocrats permit competitive elections, heavy relianceon electoral manipulation techniques increases their vote shares, while
reducing those of opposition parties. A broader spectrum of the opposition is tempted to abstain from excessively manipulated elections, as theysense that the costs of their participation outweigh the potential benefits.
Electoral manipulation may have an effect of unifying the opposition parties that decide to join the elections, as coordinating their campaigns is
one of the few strategies to secure seats in manipulated elections.4 Finally,
electoral manipulation may also often turn into a focal point on which
the opposition coordinates their collective action (Tucker 2007). In sum,
relying on excessive electoral manipulation may provoke large-­scale anti-­
regime collective action, which is often led by a unified opposition.
Taken together, excessive electoral manipulation undermines the beneficial effects of autocratic elections by damaging the credibility of theelection processes and election results. Specifically, electoral manipulation
impairs (1) the demonstration effects of conveying the dictator’s popularity toruling elites and the opposition, (2) the information-­gathering function that
informs the dictator of ruling elites’ and the opposition’s popularity, and (3)the divide-­and-­rule effects that make the coordination among the oppositiondifficult. These three effects are magnified as elections become freer andfairer. In contrast, elections become relatively useless when they are significantly manipulated because (1) both inner elites and the opposition areunable to accurately estimate the popularity of the dictator, (2) dictators
can no longer gauge the popularity and competence of ruling elites and the
opposition, and (3) the opposition is more likely to unite and take collective
anti-­regime action. Put differently, misinformation among political actors,
arising from electoral manipulation, increases the likelihood of politicalconflict (Beaulieu 2014): dictators may be inclined to think that it is easier
to quell public dissent than is possible in reality, and potential opponents
may be tempted to protest due to their underestimation of the dictator’s
strength.
Conversely, when dictators refrain from employing extensive electoral
manipulation and thereby increase the credibility of the results, elections
4. Related to this point, see chapter 4 regarding the effects of majoritarian electoral systems on forming opposition coalitions.

40

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

generate the expected effects that thereafter help autocrats mitigate thefundamental problems of authoritarian rule. For instance, using a global
sample, Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (2017) demonstrated that competitive
autocratic elections tend to make dictatorships resilient to regime breakdown in nonelectoral periods. However, partly free and fair elections also
set a higher hurdle to obtain an overwhelming majority, as dictators needto devise alternative means to produce the number of votes that could havebeen gained through electoral manipulation. The failure to craft an overwhelming election victory reveals regime weakness, which could lead toactivating the defection of ruling elites and the risk of coup (Wig and Rod2016), or excessively free and fair elections may bring stunning election
victories to opposition parties (Huntington 1991).

2.4. The Game of Autocratic Elections:
The Dictator, Ruling Elites, and the Opposition

With this electoral dilemma in mind, the theory of autocratic elections
centers on the interactions among three main actors: the dictator, ruling
elites, and the opposition. The dictator decides the extent to which an election is manipulated, which then produces a particular election result (i.e.,
the winner in presidential elections and the distribution of seats in legislative elections), following which ruling elites and the opposition decide
whether or not to revolt on the basis of the information gleaned from theelectoral manipulation and the election result.
Electoral Motivations of the Dictator

Dictators seek to stay in power. To maximize their prospect of politicalsurvival using elections as a tool, dictators consider two factors (Hafner-­
Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2018). The first consideration is to win elections. In particular, autocrats need overwhelming electoral victories, asmarginal election victories may not be sufficient for their political survival.
In authoritarian regimes that are upheld by the widespread belief that dictators and their parties hold extremely favorable resources and advantages,
election victories with very small margins let people update their belief
to conclude that the regimes are weaker than expected. In this light, as
Simpser (2013) forcefully argued, authoritarian rulers must win elections
with large margins so that they are able to project their might on bothelectoral processes and election results.

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

41

Second, autocrats may also aim to overwhelmingly win elections insuch a manner that electoral processes and voting results are not heavily driven by manipulation. Winning big with less electoral manipulation
makes it possible for dictators not only to simply survive the elections but
also to enhance the benefits of autocratic elections, which are useful for
mitigating the fundamental problems of authoritarian rule. By not resorting to extensive electoral manipulation, autocrats are able to exploit thethree benefits of autocratic elections; they can effectively discipline bothruling elites and the opposition on the basis of the demonstration effects(provided autocrats win big), streamline resource allocation on both ruling
elites and the opposition through the information-­gathering function, anddivide and conquer the opposition camp.
Electoral Motivations of Ruling Elites and Opposition Leaders

Authoritarian political leaders face two significant threats through which
they may be violently removed, which Svolik (2012) refers to as “the twin
problems of authoritarian rule.” The first threat derives from inner elites(“problem of authoritarian power sharing”), whereas the second is sourced
from below, namely, mass revolts, which are mostly led by opposition leaders (“problem of authoritarian control”). Under some conditions, election time has a potential of invigorating either (or both) of these threats.
Following elections, both ruling elites and opposition members decide
whether or not to revolt. To challenge the dictator, ruling elites launch acoup, whereas opposition elites organize mass protests.
Importantly, the motivations leading both actors to revolt after elections are strikingly different. For ruling elites, the dictator’s failure to
win big is consequential. Ruling elites consider whether they will be able
to enjoy rents under the current regime. When the dictator successfully
survives elections with large margins, then it is reasonable for the ruling
elites to continue supporting the incumbent because it is less likely thatthe regime will collapse in the foreseeable future. Conversely, when the
dictator only marginally wins elections or unexpectedly loses to opposition parties, inner elites are more likely to think that the autocrat will not
be able to sustain the current regime. Therefore, they have an incentive toplot a post-­electoral coup d’état to replace the incumbent (Wig and Rod2016). Here, by “coup d’état,” I refer to a forced removal of an authoritarian ruler by any regime insider (e.g., members of the dictator’s inner
circle, the government, or the security apparatus), not limited to military
coups (Svolik 2012: 4). For instance, in the 1982 Guatemalan presidential

42

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

elections, Ángel Aníbal Guevara, the hand-­picked successor of the former
unpopular president Romeo Lucas García, won the elections with only
scoring about 39 percent of total votes. The election results provided othermilitary officers with an opportunity to oust the new president by a post-­
electoral coup.
In contrast, opposition leaders care more about the extent of electoral
manipulation and organize mass protests when elections have been heavily
manipulated. The likelihood that opposition parties successfully gain political influence after elections increases as elections become freer and fairer;
for example, in legislative elections, opposition parties may be able to gain
some portions of seats through which they can derive policy concessions
from the dictator (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Even in presidential elections, a strong electoral performance makes them highly visible and subsequently increases their bargaining power within the regime. Therefore, abroader range of opposition parties may decide to participate in partly freeelections instead of organizing mass protests. Indeed, Trejo (2014) suggested that popular protests led by the opposition tended to decrease aselections became liberalized under the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s(PRI) rule in Mexico.
The opposition’s propensity to orchestrate popular protests increases
when elections are heavily manipulated for the three reasons related to thedemonstration and the divide-­and-­rule effects of elections. First, comparing their strength with an announced election result brought by electoral
manipulation, the opposition may update their belief that the regime has
become so weakened that the autocrat used electoral manipulation as alast resort to stay in power. This may reduce the demonstration effect ofelections and lead the opposition to take to the streets. Second, because
manipulated elections bias results extremely in favor of the dictator, elections no longer serve as an institutional channel by which to co-­opt some
portion of the opposition. Electoral manipulation stimulates a broader
spectrum of the opposition camp to conclude that it is preferable to taketo the streets for organizing anti-­regime mass protests than to carry out
election campaigns within the framework of regime-­sponsored elections.
Third, extensive electoral manipulation turns elections into a focal point
on which the opposition coordinates their anti-­regime collective actions
by denouncing the dictator’s excessive use of electoral manipulation. For
example, in Madagascar’s 2001 elections, the incumbent president Didier
Ratsiraka utilized massive electoral fraud against an increasingly popular
opposition candidate, Marc Ravalomanana, during the electoral process.
The incumbent’s announcement that he obtained a majority in the elec-A Theory of Autocratic Elections

43

tions sparked large-­scale popular protests, leading the country to the brinkof a civil war. Owing to these three reasons, extensive electoral manipulation increases the likelihood of mass revolt.
In sum, when electoral manipulation is limited, the dictator is able toexploit the benefits of elections while also decreasing their chance of winning elections in an overwhelming fashion. The ruling elites care more
about the dictator’s electoral margins than about the extent of electoral
manipulation, which implies that small electoral victory margins increase
their propensity to plot a coup d’état. By contrast, the opposition cares
more about the extent of electoral manipulation and decides to organize
mass protests when the dictator excessively employs that strategy.
Four Scenarios of Autocratic Elections

Classifying autocratic elections on the basis of the discussion above, table
2.1 summarizes four possible scenarios of autocratic elections. In the upper
right quadrant, where electoral margins are large with extensive electoral
manipulation, ruling elites’ threats are less imminent, mass revolts are more
likely, and the dictator cannot enjoy the benefits of elections (ScenarioI). In the lower right quadrant, where electoral margins are small despiteextensive electoral manipulation, marginal election victories activate coup
threats from ruling elites, mass revolts are also imminent, and the dictator
can neither survive elections nor enjoy their benefits (Scenario II).5 The
upper left quadrant denotes that the dictator scores an overwhelming victory without electoral manipulation, which enables the dictator to obtain
the benefits of elections as well as deter ruling elites from launching a coupand the opposition from protesting (Scenario III). In the lower left column, where electoral manipulation is limited but there is a small margin of
victory, coups are likely to occur after elections, whereas popular protests
are unlikely. In this case, the dictator experiences some challenges getting
through the election; however, upon surviving the election, he is likely to
enjoy some of the benefits that elections bring (Scenario IV).
A cross-­national comparison of autocratic elections corroborates theseobservations as well as the assumptions of the actors’ preferences. Figures
2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the distribution of autocratic elections across the four
different scenarios according to the level of fraud and the type of elec5. In this scenario, mass protests may be organized by opposition elites or former ruling
elites who defected from the extant regime. In addition, the occurrence of mass protests may
also increase the likelihood that ruling elites decide to launch a coup given the dictator’s highunpopularity further signaled by popular protests.

44

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

TABLE 2.1. Main Actors, Electoral Margins, and Electoral Manipulation
Electoral manipulation
Election margins

LimitedExtensive

Large

Dictator: Survive election;
benefits of election
Ruling elites: Stay in regime
Opposition: Not protest

Dictator: Survive election;
little benefits of election
Ruling elites: Stay in regime
Opposition: Protest

Scenario III

Scenario I

Dictator: Not survive election;
benefits of election
Ruling elites: Plot a coup
Opposition: Not protest

Dictator: Not survive election;
little benefits of election
Ruling elites: Plot a coup
Opposition: Protest

Scenario IV

Scenario II

Small

toral system, respectively. For two major forms of electoral manipulation,
namely, blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation (discussed
in the next section), autocratic elections are evenly distributed across thefour different quadrants (figs. 2.1a and 2.2a, respectively), thus validating
the classification of autocratic elections according to electoral margins andelectoral manipulation. Importantly, post-­electoral leadership turnover via
coups or stunning election victories tends to occur in cases of small election margins (below the mean, or approximately 45 percent margins), irrespective of the level of fraud or the electoral system (figs. 2.1b and 2.2b),
whereas post-­electoral popular protests are associated with extensive electoral manipulation (i.e., blatant electoral fraud and majoritarian electoral
systems producing pro-­regime seat bias; figs. 2.1c and 2.2c, respectively).
Of course, the worst-­case scenario for a dictator is when they fail to win
big despite engaging in extensive electoral manipulation (Scenario II). In
fact, figure 2.1 tells us that autocrats tend to experience both popular protests and leadership turnover in this scenario.
It is questionable which case would be preferable when the dictator can
only take either one of large margins with extensive electoral manipulation(Scenario I) or small margins with limited manipulation (Scenario IV). In
such cases, it is important to think which peril (within-­regime or opposition threats) is more imminent for the dictator. According to Svolik (2012:4–­5), approximately two-­thirds of dictatorships collapse from inside, thus
indicating that coup threats from ruling elites are generally more imminent than opposition threats. Therefore, dictators may be more tempted toincrease the level of electoral manipulation to “add” more votes to magnify

Note: The data include both presidential and parliamentary elections in electoral dictatorships. The horizontal axis represents the extent of blatant electoral fraud, with higher
values meaning more extensive fraud. The vertical axis stands for electoral margins (the difference in shares of votes between the winner and the runner-­up in executive elections
and the difference in shares of votes between ruling and opposition parties in the case of parliamentary elections). The reference lines represent the means of electoral margins
and blatant electoral fraud in the sample. Figure 2.1a suggests that autocratic elections are almost evenly distributed across the four quadrants. Figure 2.1b shows that leadershipturnover occurs when electoral margins are small, regardless of the extent of electoral fraud, whereas figure 2.1c indicates that protests happen in cases of extensive blatantelectoral fraud, irrespective of electoral margins.

Fig. 2.1. Blatant Electoral Fraud and Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Regimes

Note: The data include parliamentary elections in electoral autocracies. The horizontal axis represents electoral system types, with higher values meaning more majoritarian electoral
systems (the pure SMD system corresponds to EET = 37.5%). The vertical axis denotes electoral margins (the difference in shares of seats between ruling and opposition parties).
The reference lines represent the means of electoral margins and electoral system types. Figure 2.2a suggests that autocratic elections are almost evenly distributed across the four
quadrants. Figure 2.2b shows that leadership turnover occurs when electoral margins are small, regardless of electoral system types, whereas figure 2.2c indicates that protests
happen when electoral systems are more majoritarian, irrespective of electoral margins.

Fig. 2.2. Institutional Manipulation and Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Regimes

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

47

margins when they anticipate that they will not be able to achieve overwhelming election wins because the failure of winning big credibly reveals
the weakness of the regime to the ruling elites.
Most importantly, table 2.1 also suggests that authoritarian leaders canmake the most of elections in consolidating their rule when they win elections with large margins without resorting to extensive electoral manipulation (Scenario III). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 indicate that there are not asmall number of autocratic elections categorized into this type, and suchelections tend to not result in either post-­electoral leadership turnover or
popular protests. This leads us to a pertinent puzzle: How is it possible forautocrats to increase the prospect of winning big without employing extensive electoral manipulation?

2.5. The Dictator’s Tools at the Ballot Box:
Electoral Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering

Authoritarian leaders hold a variety of electioneering strategies. How
does it become possible for autocrats to win big without manipulating
vote counts? In providing the key to solving this puzzle of authoritarian
elections, I distinguish between two types of electioneering strategies that
authoritarian leaders may employ, namely, electoral manipulation and economic maneuvering. I then go on to argue that economic maneuvering, suchas pre-­electoral patronage and pork barrel distributions, contributes towinning big while losing fewer of the benefits of autocratic elections.
By electoral manipulation, I refer to a series of coercive and institutional
measures that favor the manipulator by making election results6 deviate fromthe aggregate of citizens’ vote preferences. Typically, electoral manipulation
takes the form of blatant electoral fraud, which involves coercion such aspolitical exclusion, repression, and overt fabrication of votes, thereby biasing election results in favor of the autocrats and their parties (chap. 3).
Examples of blatant electoral fraud are extensive, including the deregistration and exclusion of opposition parties from electoral processes; limits on
eligibility of running for elections by gender, ethnicity, and/or religion;
violent and nonviolent intimidation toward voters and the opposition; thepacking of election management bodies; ballot box tampering; and proxy
and multiple voting. Although the fraudulent methods used to rig elec6. This means winners in presidential elections and distribution of seats in legislative elections.

48

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

tion results vary, what all of these blatant electoral fraud measures have incommon is that coercion plays a major role in biasing election results infavor of the manipulators (Simpser 2013).7 In line with Simpser (2013), I
regard these fraudulent manipulation techniques as in the family of blatantelectoral fraud, to theorize about the relationship between this form ofelectoral manipulation and economic maneuvering,Electoral manipulation may also be manifested as the manipulation ofelectoral systems, boundaries of electoral districts, and district magnitude.
Institutional manipulation does not involve coercive means but nonethelessdeviates election results from the genuine summation of popular votes by
manufacturing the rules of seats-­votes elasticity in favor of the manipulators. For instance, single-­member district (SMD) systems allow dictators’
parties to boost shares of parliamentary seats relative to those of votes, incontrast to proportional representation (PR) systems wherein legislative
representation is allocated according to the proportions of votes that eachparty obtains (chap. 4). In so doing, autocrats are able to enjoy significant
seat premiums by adopting SMD systems. Dictators may also employ the
manipulation of electoral districts such that more seats are allocated togoverning parties. Gerrymandering is one such institutional manipulation
technique. By redistricting, dictators craft ruling party majorities in as manyelectoral districts as possible by splitting votes for opposition parties into
separate districts (Wong 2019; Washida 2018). By manipulating districtmagnitude, autocrats are also able to overrepresent their parties by disproportionally assigning seats to their strongholds. By enhancing the value ofvotes in the ruling party’s strongholds, high levels of malapportionment
help dictators win big (Boone and Wahman 2015; Ong, Kasuya, and Mori
2017). Ultimately, PR systems with a single nationwide electoral district are
the least likely to be manipulated through gerrymandering and high levelsof malapportionment, as seats are proportionally allocated on the basis of
votes and both electoral districts and the value of votes are not manipulable. As electoral systems become closer to pure SMD forms wherein the
average district magnitude is 1, dictators can more flexibly manipulate the
distribution of seats in the legislature through those measures.
In addition to blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation,
autocrats may use economic policies to win elections with large margins.
Economic maneuvering is the manipulation of fiscal policy instruments
prior to elections for the purpose of cultivating political support from the7. Other scholars have discussed possible differences between tools of electoral fraud. For
instance, Schedler (2013) differentiates between manipulation that is a clear violation of democratic norms and manipulation that is covert and less drastic.

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

49

citizenry (i.e., largely synonymous with political business cycles [PBCs]).
Economic maneuvering is also an electioneering strategy for dictators;
however, it significantly differs from electoral manipulation in the sensethat it does not fabricate numbers in election results but rather directly
affects citizens’ intentions to vote by distributing material benefits. Economic
maneuvering is a form of targeted benefits in the sense that it entails distributing benefits to certain social groups prior to elections; moreover, it ispolitically (electorally) motivated because it aims to increase electoral support from the members of the targeted groups. In these respects, economic
maneuvering is distinct from the distribution of national public goods andprogrammatic policies, which are mostly oriented toward policy needs and,thus, are implemented without favoring certain groups for the purpose of
earning votes (Hicken 2011).
At the same time, economic maneuvering can entail both clientelism/
patronage distribution and pork barrel politics/club goods provisions. Clientelism,or patronage, refers to targeted distribution in which the political leader“offers material benefits only on the condition that the recipient returns
the favor with a vote or other forms of political support” (Stokes et al.
2013: 13).8 A typical example is pre-­electoral salary increases and bonus
provisions for public employees while also using hierarchical relationships in workplaces to ensure their votes for ruling parties. Expanding thenumber of public employment posts, subsidy amounts, and other goods
prior to elections can be categorized as patronage distribution so long as it
premises effective monitoring mechanisms that enforce beneficiaries’ votes
for the governing party, including clientelistic linkages between landowners and peasants (Ziblatt 2009; Joshi and Mason 2011), corporations andemployees (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014), party cadres and the rank
and file (Zeng 2019), and/or ethnic entrepreneurs and their co-­ethnics(Wantchekon 2003). Election-­day vote-­buying practices involve exchangesof relatively small handouts and ballots between politicians and voters inmonitoring environments and, thus, are also viewed as clientelism patterns(e.g., Conroy-­Krutz 2017).
In contrast, pork barrel politics, or club goods provision, entails the distribution of goods and services to certain groups but does not presuppose
the quid pro quo relationship between material benefits and political support embodied in clientelism.9 That voters will give their political support
after pork delivery is not fully guaranteed; the politician merely expects
8. In this book, I use the terms “clientelism” and “patronage” synonymously.
9. In this book, I use the terms “club goods provisions” and “pork barrel politics” interchangeably.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

that “pork can add votes for the benefactor to the extent that the largess
boosts voter goodwill toward the candidate and party” (Stokes et al. 2013:12). The economic benefits of pork barrel and club goods provision are
directed to certain collectivities, such as geographic constituencies, ethnic
groups, and social classes. Examples include the provision of nonexcludable
goods, such as infrastructural improvements and expansion, new public
facilities (e.g., hospitals and schools), and other social spending (e.g., pension, education, and health), that target specific geographic areas and socialgroups without relying on credible patron-­client relationships. Goods
provisions listed above as examples of patronage (e.g., salary increases,
bonuses, and public employment) may also be sources of pork, unless they
are implemented with credible clientelistic linkages. The conceptual difference between these two types of goods provisioning is clear; however, in
reality, empirically distinguishing them is notoriously challenging (Golden
and Min 2013: 76), as the demarcation criteria rest not upon what goods
are delivered but rather upon the strengths of patron-­client relationships,
which are difficult to consistently measure across time and space.
Table 2.2 summarizes the features, subtypes, and specific examples ofelectoral manipulation and economic maneuvering. This categorization ofelectioneering strategies is an ideal type, and in reality the dictator’s use ofelectioneering strategies is often mixed depending upon the distributionof mobilization capabilities, as the next section will closely discuss. Two
dimensions are used to compare the characteristics of each electioneering
strategy: (1) the extent to which it benefits voters’ welfare and (2) the extent
to which it helps dictators retain the benefits of autocratic elections.
First, electoral manipulation does not materially benefit voters. Someforms of blatant electoral fraud might entail the provision of material
benefits to voters when hiring fraud brokers (e.g., election violence perpetuators and local agents organizing double voting). But, in contrast to
economic maneuvering techniques, electoral manipulation does not usually require large-­scale financial resources to mobilize by adopting expansionary macroeconomic policies. In cases of institutional manipulation,
political leaders may require consent from some ruling elites to change theelectoral rules; however, the decisions generally do not involve large-­scaleeconomic transactions with citizens.
Conversely, both clientelism and pork barrel politics center on theprovision of material benefits to voters, which presumes the manipulator’s
control of financial resources. Clientelism may enable manipulators toeconomize their resources for deriving public support due to its monitor-

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A Theory of Autocratic Elections
TABLE 2.2. Electoral Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering
Electioneering
strategy
Subtypes

Materially
Beneficial effects
benefit voters? of elections?

Electoral
manipulation

Blatant
electoral fraud

Less

Least

Institutional
manipulation

Least

Less

Clientelism
and patronage

More

More

Pork barrel
Mostand club goods
provision

Most

Economicmaneuvering

Specific examples
Exclusion of opposition
parties, limits on
voting rights, election
violence, intimidation,
packing election
management bodies,
ballot stuffing,
multiple voting, etc.
Electoral system change(SMD vs. PR),gerrymandering,malapportionment
Provisions of public
employment,
bonuses, goods, andservices (contingent
upon voting for the
benefactor)
Provisions ofinfrastructure,facilities (hospitals
and schools), andother public services
targeting certain
groups and regions(not contingent uponpolitical support)

ing structures; however, pork barrel and club goods provisions require the
distribution of more resources to yield a similar level of popular support
because the provisions are not contingent upon votes. Regardless of theapproach, economic maneuvering brings about tangible benefits to voters,
thereby contributing to enhancing mass political support.
Second, as discussed in the previous sections, electoral manipulation
undermines the benefits of autocratic elections. Blatant electoral fraud islikely to negatively influence all three beneficial effects of autocratic elections. Institutional manipulation creates a pro-­regime gap between sharesof seats and votes, which negatively affects both the demonstration and thedivide-­and-­rule effects.
Conversely, economic maneuvering is less likely to undermine the ben-

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

eficial effects of autocratic elections. By providing voters with patronage
and pork on the eve of elections, economic maneuvering mobilizes mass
support and thereby increases the likelihood that autocrats score an overwhelming election victory. Importantly, such a massive victory is achieved
with hardly any coercive and institutional measures directly manipulating electoral processes and fabricating election results. In such cases, theelection results manifest a more accurate reflection of public support thanthose with heavy electoral manipulation.
As pork barrel and club goods provisions do not involve a quid pro
quo relationship, the enhanced electoral support gained from those benefits derives from the most genuine mass support of all the electioneering
strategies identified in table 2.2. In other words, pork barrel beneficiaries
more or less voluntarily declare their political support for the autocrat.
In this context, the PBC literature contends that voters receive fiscal andmonetary policy manipulation as a signal of government competence and aclue for their voting decisions (e.g., Rogoff and Silbert 1988; Brender andDrazen 2005).
Electoral support produced through clientelism and patronage provisions might be a less accurate indicator of genuine mass support because it
involves some level of coercion (i.e., sometimes the relationship between
patrons and clients is so tight that clients who do not vote for patrons
may be marked for punishment). That being said, unlike in cases of blatantelectoral fraud, voters are still able to receive material benefits in exchange
for their political loyalty, which induces quasi-­voluntary compliance forautocrats. In fact, Kramon’s (2016) careful study revealed that even votebuying serves as credible information for African voters to glean politicians’ intentions to provide them with resources in the future. Patronage
enables dictators to win big with less need for electoral manipulation. In
so doing, patronage distribution contributes to improving the beneficial
effects of autocratic elections.
To summarize, the comparison between electoral manipulation andeconomic maneuvering suggests that there might be a trade-­off between
these two distinct electioneering strategies. When autocrats are able torely mainly on economic maneuvering, they are less likely to employ electoral manipulation. Conversely, when autocrats cannot afford to employ
economic maneuvering, then they turn to electoral manipulation to winbig, while sacrificing the benefits of autocratic elections. In this context,
the next important question to ask is, Under what conditions does economic
maneuvering become an attractive option for authoritarian leaders to mobilize
mass support?

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

53

2.6. The Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities
and Autocratic Election Design

The extent to which dictators are able to mobilize mass support by the
distribution of economic favors determines the degree of electoral manipulation, such as blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation.
By mobilization capabilities, I refer to actors’ resources and abilities to garnermass support through the combination of financial resources and organizational
strength. With this definition in mind, I argue that the distribution of mobilization capabilities in an autocracy is determined by the following threefactors: (1) the amount of discretionary financial resources that the dictators
have at their disposal; (2) the formal and informal disciplinary organizations
that enable the dictator to discipline ruling elites and thus streamline the
distribution of financial resources to the masses; and (3) the opposition’s capabilities to garner mass support, which in turn weakens the dictator’s mobilization capabilities. In other words, dictators’ mobilization capabilities are
not only determined by their own discretionary financial resources but also
influenced by their organizational relationships with ruling elites on the
one hand and with the opposition on the other.
Figure 2.3 outlines the relationship among the dictator’s mobilization
capabilities, electoral manipulation, and economic maneuvering. The distribution of mobilization capabilities is determined by the three aforementioned factors. The extent to which the dictator can mobilize mass support
through pork and patronage then influences their choice of electioneering strategies. Dictators with high mobilization capabilities become lessdependent upon electoral manipulation, and the resulting relatively free
and fair elections should produce a large pre-­electoral economic distribution. Conversely, dictators with low mobilization capabilities are obliged
to rely on electoral manipulation, and the manipulated elections do not
require economic maneuvering prior to elections. Note that here I do notassume binary choices of electioneering strategies—­electoral manipulation
or economic maneuvering—­but by assuming their extents as gradation I
explore continuous relationships between them. For instance, if autocrats
have intermediate levels of mobilization capabilities, they are more likely
to rely on mixed strategies of some electoral fraud, electoral systems withmoderate disproportionality, and a fair amount of pre-­electoral economic
maneuvering. Below, I discuss each subcomponent of the distribution ofmobilization capabilities to illustrate how each contributes to enhancing
or reducing the dictator’s mobilization capability.

54

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 2.3. Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities and Choices of Electioneering
Strategies

Discretionary Financial Resources

Dictators’ financial resources significantly affect their capability to engineer economic maneuvering. The extent to which financial resources
are available for dictators is assessed along two dimensions: amount andarbitrariness. Intuitively, we can expect that dictators with rich financial
resources are able to conduct economic maneuvering because they canafford to distribute goods prior to elections; however, resource volumes
do not solely determine their availability. Resources also need to be discretionary in the sense that dictators are able to use them for their own political purposes. For instance, fiscal revenues that are generated through taxation may be less available to autocrats because they are more likely to be afocus of close scrutiny by taxpayers who desire fair uses of their taxes andotherwise demand representation (Bates and Lien 1985; Levi 1988; Northand Weingast 1989). Similarly, foreign donors’ economic aid, which also
has the potential of enriching state coffers, is often tied to political reformconditions set by the donors, thus constraining dictators’ discretion overresource allocation (Dunning 2004; S. Bermeo 2011; Dietrich and Wright2014). Therefore, although foreign aid is one form of windfall income that
may remain obscured from citizens’ attention, its use needs to be more orless accounted by international donors. Conversely, natural resources suchas oil, natural gas, and minerals are more likely to serve as a source of free-­hand financial resources for autocrats. Because such revenues are financedby the sale of state-­owned assets, that is, natural resource wealth, they areless susceptible to either public or international pressures than tax revenues
and foreign aid. Owing to this feature, financial gains enriched by natural
resource wealth are also highly opaque; dictators often establish their own

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

55

national oil companies to secretly operate those resources (Ross 2012),
which makes it much easier for dictators to use natural resource wealth fortheir own political and electoral purposes.
Dictators with discretionary financial resources can afford to shift
their electioneering strategies from politically risky electoral manipulation to financially costly economic maneuvering. By mobilizing economic
resources for electoral purposes, autocrats are able to strengthen patronage
distributions to their potential supporters as well as provide pork targeting specific regions and social groups. By providing economic favors tovoters, economic maneuvering encourages citizens to declare support for
the autocrats. In particular, the marginal effects of economic maneuvering
on increasing public support increase when economic resources are channeled through clientelistic linkages, thereby making it easier for politicalleaders to ensure votes in their favor in return for patronage (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson 2007; Hicken 2011; Stokes et al. 2013). Even if economic
maneuvering takes the form of pork barrel distribution, it still contributes
to increasing public support for the autocrat by conveying a credible signalof regime competence and invincibility (Kramon 2016). Owing to the highlevels of public support, dictators can refrain from employing electoral
manipulation methods and rather rely more on economic maneuvering
techniques. In so doing, they are able to achieve a large margin of election
victory without sacrificing the benefits of autocratic elections.
Disciplinary Organizations

Autocrats’ discretionary financial resources are not the only factor affecting their choice over electoral manipulation and economic maneuvering.
Regardless of which electioneering strategy dictators rely on, they needagencies to which they can delegate the implementation of these electoral
strategies. For example, even if dictators hold abundant financial resources
and, thus, economic maneuvering is an available strategy, it may not always
be the case that the invested resources actually “trickle down” to the masses.10 In other words, after the dictator’s delegation of economic resources
to ruling politicians for the purpose of delivering benefits to citizens, thefunds may be embezzled by either those ruling elites or (particularly)
10. The same holds for electoral manipulation. When the autocrat holds a small amount of
discretionary financial resources, he must rely on electoral manipulation. However, to orchestrate nationwide blatant electoral fraud and implement electoral system reforms, the autocrat
needs brokers (i.e., ruling elites) who implement electoral fraud as agencies and/or may needconsent from them over the plan of the electoral system reform.

56

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

middle-­level politicians who work as brokers mediating between the dictator and the citizens. Furthermore, as previously discussed, dictators cannot
help relying on the distribution of pork or club goods when clientelistic
linkages are weak; however, these forms of economic maneuvering do notpresuppose the quid pro quo relationships whereby economic favors aredelivered in return for political support. In such situations, citizens may be
more tempted to free ride and vote for other parties or abstain from voting
altogether after receiving benefits. Put more simply, ceteris paribus, economic maneuvering may become more effective in mobilizing mass support when it is practiced in the form of patronage rather than pork.
The effectiveness of economic maneuvering is, thus, influenced by formal and informal organizations through which autocrats can ensure political exchanges between votes and goods.11 Autocrats are able to magnify themarginal effects of economic maneuvering on garnering political support
from the citizenry by taking advantage of those disciplinary organizations.
Building upon Levitsky and Way’s (2010: 54–­68) concept of organizational power, I propose that the strength of such organizations may beobserved along two dimensions, namely, cohesion and scope. “Cohesion”
refers to the level of compliance within the organizations. When cohesionis high, autocrats can be certain that their orders will be smoothly carried out by both high-­level officials and rank-­and-­file bureaucrats.12 Conversely, when cohesion is low, autocrats cannot be certain of compliance byeither high-­level officials or the rank and file. “Scope” refers to the effective
11. Here, by suggesting that disciplinary organizations may affect the dictator’s use ofelectoral manipulation and economic maneuvering, I do not posit a functionalist view arguing that autocrats can construct these disciplinary organizations to aim at changing theirelectioneering strategies. In fact, strengths of state capacity and ethnicity-­based networks areoften influenced by historical path dependency, and research suggests that the constructionof the dominant party needs significant commitments of the autocrat, ruling elites, and grassroots supporters (Reuter and Remington 2009; Reuter 2017; Meng 2021). What I suggest
here instead is that if these disciplinary organizations already exist, then these may result insignificant differences in how autocrats employ manipulation techniques by enabling them todiscipline both ruling elites and the masses.
12. This does not necessarily mean that when cohesion is high, the dictator always has“despotic power” whereby they can arbitrarily decide policy without consulting with otherruling elites. For instance, as in the case of dominant-­party regimes, collective decision-­making procedures embedded in the party may hinder the dictator’s ability to propose hismost preferred policy and thereby oblige the devising of an alternative that is acceptable forthe other ruling elites. The ruling elites of such collective leadership regimes also cannot
easily engage in predatory behavior and, therefore, accept the proposed policy and follow the
dictator’s orders. In other words, as previous literature has argued (Geddes 1999; Brownlee
2006; Magaloni 2008), collective leadership is better at managing elite conflict in dominant-­
party regimes, thereby enhancing the cohesiveness of ruling coalitions.

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

57

reach of the organizations or to the degree to which they penetrate into
the national territory and civil society, which is also referred to as “infrastructural power” in the autocratic politics literature (Mann 1984; Slater2003). When the scope is wide, organizations encompass a large proportion of the masses and usually have large memberships and activist bases,
which enables them to “maintain a permanent and active presence acrossthe national territory—­down to the village and/or neighborhood level—­and, in some cases, they penetrate the workplace and much of civil society” (Levitsky and Way 2010: 64). When dictators control such disciplinaryorganizations, they can streamline the distribution of goods and services,
thereby enhancing the effect of economic maneuvering on garnering public support and in turn reducing the need to employ electoral manipulation.
There are a couple of formal and informal disciplinary organizations
that possibly bring about high cohesion among ruling elites and a broad
scope encompassing a wide range of citizens. One such example of formal organizations in authoritarian regimes is the dominant party, whichplays two major roles (Bodea, Garriga, and Higashijima 2019). On the
one hand, the institutionalization of collective decision-­making within thedominant party enables autocratic leaders to make credible power-­sharing
deals with other ruling elites (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik2013): collective leadership prevents the dictator from abusing power andmonopolizing policy while simultaneously hindering the ability of otherruling elites to exploit state resources and policies for their own sake. In
this context, Gehlbach and Keefer (2012: 622) posited that “collectively-­organized supporters are better able to impose a variety of checks on leaders and to impose sanctions for predatory behavior that would not otherwise be possible.” Further, the institutionalization of a dominant party
lengthens governing elites’ time horizon through the provision of future
opportunities for career promotion (Magaloni 2008). In so doing, dominant parties contribute to the cohesion of ruling coalitions. On the other
hand, the dominant party’s extensive grassroots organizations enable dictators to reach the masses by utilizing its dense networks, thereby ensuringhigh levels of scope. In particular, when it controls highly institutionalized
mass organizations, the dominant party is able to effectively monitor party
members such that the organizations serve as relevant clientelistic linkages between the dictator and the masses (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010).
Together, dictators and dominant parties have enormous levels of organizational power (Levitsky and Way 2010).
The state apparatus is another example of a formal disciplinary organization. Indeed, Levitsky and Way (2010) regarded both ruling party strength

58

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

and state capacity as two significant dimensions measuring the dictators’organizational power.13 When the scope of the state apparatus is broad, thestate grasps the national population and its borders and penetrates deep
into the society through services such as social welfare, taxation, and security. When cohesion is high, state institutions, political appointments, andbudget structures are highly centralized such that ruling politicians in thecenter, local officials, and bureaucrats are all loyal to the dictator and follow
orders as the autocrat’s agents in their territories. Conversely, when cohesion is low, then these ruling elites are highly autonomous in their strongholds such that they may not necessarily adhere to the dictator’s orders
following the delegation of policy implementation. For instance, as chapter
7 explores, Kazakhstan had a relatively weak state apparatus during the
1990s, whereby local ruling politicians were highly autonomous actors, defacto fiscal decentralization was salient, and governor appointments wereprimarily determined by consideration of regional cleavages. However, by
the mid-­2000s, the country had become much more centralized: the president had deprived local officials of autonomous power, had rapidly maderegional governments dependent on fiscal transfers from the central government, and had appointed his close allies as governors.14
Dictators’ informal ethnicity-­based networks can also serve as disciplinary organizations.15 Dictators’ ruling coalitions often consist of certain ethnic groups, which are often referred to as “politically dominantethnic groups” (Wimmer, Min, and Cederman 2009).16 When the dominant ethnic group’s cohesiveness is high, autocrats’ ruling coalitions arecomposed of a smaller number of ethnic groups and their homogeneity
makes it easy for dictators to police opportunistic behavior among ruling
elites (Fearon and Laitin 1995). Conversely, dictators’ ability to discipline
ruling elites in other ethnic groups is blocked when ruling coalitions are
more diverse, thereby resulting in less cohesiveness. Ethnicity-­based networks with broader scopes cover a wider range of the national population; as dominant ethnic groups’ size is larger, it is easier for dictators to
13. Levitsky and Way (2010) primarily focused on the coercive roles of dominant parties
and state apparatus. However, in the context of elections, these organizations could also work
as organizations through which dictators streamline economic maneuvering to the citizenry.
14. Investigating the case of Kenya, Hassan (2020) shows that rulers utilized the strategic
management of state elites and bureaucrats to preempt internal and external threats.
15. Herein, I define the terms “ethnic group” and “ethnicity” as the nominal members(membership) of an ascriptive category, such as race, language, caste, tribe, or religion (Chandra 2004: 2).
16. Wimmer, Min, and Cederman (2009) define politically dominant ethnic groups as theethnic groups that occupy most senior political posts, such as legislators and cabinet members.

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

59

reach more citizens by utilizing extensive ethnic networks (Fearon 1999;
Chandra 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2008). Because ethnic diversity prevents
efficient goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Franck andRainer 2012), dominant ethnic groups with a broad scope may promote theeffectiveness of economic distribution.
Dictators who are armed with these formal and informal organizations
are able to streamline economic maneuvering, thereby amplifying its positive effects on popular electoral support. Because ruling elites are cohesive,
they are less likely to exploit the resources that the dictator delegates tothem to mobilize for electoral purposes. Owing to the broadness of organizational scope, the dictator can effectively reach potential supporters
while also ensuring that they vote for the autocrat and his ruling party.
Simply put, high levels of organizational power enable dictators to utilize the patronage-­type economic maneuvering rather than the pork type,which makes economic maneuvering more cost-­effective than electoral
manipulation.
However, note that dictators do not always use disciplinary organizations for the purpose of streamlining economic distribution. Althoughdisciplinary organizations contribute to magnifying the efficiency of economic maneuvering, dictators may be also able to use them to effectively
steal elections by way of electoral manipulation. For instance, as Levitsky
and Way asserted, “Strong parties help win elections. . . . Winning themusually entails some mix of voter mobilization and fraud, both of which
require organization. Mass parties provide an infrastructure for electoral
mobilization. . . . Parties also help steal votes. Ballot-­box stuffing and otherforms of fraud require coordination, discretion, and discipline among
numerous lower-­level authorities—­
which party organizations provide”(2010: 63; italics added). In particular, when dictators lack the financial
resources to mobilize sufficient public support, they have greater incentive to utilize disciplinary organizations to effectively manipulate election
results. In contrast, dictators who have abundant discretionary resources
to distribute are more incentivized to use such organizations for economic
maneuvering. Put differently, the purpose for which dictators use disciplinary organizations may be conditioned by the extent to which they possess
discretionary financial resources in the first place.
Opposition’s Capabilities for Mobilizing the Masses

Discretionary financial resources and disciplinary organizations are only
one dimension of dictators’ mobilization capabilities. The opposition’s

60

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

strength is another important factor in determining the distribution ofmobilization capabilities in an autocracy. Electoral competition in authoritarian regimes is usually tilted toward dictators and their ruling parties
because they have the resources and organizations to maintain overwhelming election victories. Therefore, opposition parties hardly win elections.17
However, the strength of opposition forces influences the electoral margins
by which dictators win elections. In this sense, the opposition’s strength
affects the dictator’s calculus over electoral manipulation.
Strong popular opposition has the ability to mobilize supporters. They
may have economic resources through which they can conduct effective
campaigning, hire party officers, and buy off public support for elections
and protests; they may have a broad organizational scope to lead large-­scaleprotests and demonstrations; or they may be cohesive in the sense that they
are unified as a monolithic opposition force in which leaders coordinate
popular movements and election campaigning. In contrast, weak opposition is unable to mobilize citizens. They may lack economic resources, they
may be seriously divided and fragmented into various opposition forces, orthey may encompass only a fraction of the society as party members.
When the opposition is strong, dictators are forced to complement
economic maneuvering with electoral manipulation in order to maintainoverwhelming election victories. Suppose that the dictator’s mobilization capabilities (i.e., the amount of discretionary financial resources andorganizational power) remain at a certain level. The level of economic
maneuvering needed to win big when the opposition is weak may be insufficient to secure the same level of election victory over a strong opposition
because opposition parties are likely to gain more votes. In this situation,dictators have greater incentives to complement the votes lost because of
the opposition’s strength with electoral manipulation in order to win elections by large margins. In other words, the stronger the opposition, themore dependent the dictator on electoral manipulation. Conversely, when
the opposition is weak, the dictator can allow relatively free and fair elections without heavily depending on electoral manipulation.
What the above subsections suggest is that, ceteris paribus, dictatorswith high mobilization capabilities vis-­à-­vis other political elites are lesslikely to employ electoral manipulation techniques such as blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation. Because autocrats with highmobilization capabilities can marshal public support through economic
17. For the conditions under which opposition parties stunningly win autocratic elections,see the next section and chapter 6.

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

61

maneuvering, they have fewer incentives to employ electoral manipulation
methods that could undermine the beneficial effects of autocratic elections.
In the resulting relatively free and fair elections, dictators with high mobilization capabilities are more likely to gear toward economic maneuvering
to win elections with large margins. Conversely, autocrats with low mobilization capabilities have no choice but to stick to electoral manipulationand sacrifice the benefits of autocratic elections. Economic maneuvering isless likely to occur in such manipulated elections.
Based on these predictions, I derive three empirical implications frommy theory of autocratic elections. Each implication is tested on cross-­national statistical analyses (chaps. 3–­5), and then causal links are illustrated through comparative case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan(chaps. 7 and 8).
Empirical Implication I: Dictators’ high (low) mobilization capabilities lead to a decrease (increase) in blatant electoral fraud (chap. 3).
Empirical Implication II: Dictators’ high (low) mobilization capabilities lead to proportional representation (majoritarian) electoral systems (chap. 4).
Empirical Implication III: Autocratic elections with lower (higher)
levels of electoral manipulation are more (less) likely to experience
economic maneuvering (chap. 5).
Now that we have derived testable hypotheses regarding the causes of
autocratic elections, the next section explores the other puzzle of autocraticelections: When do autocratic elections destabilize authoritarian rule?

2.7. Unintended Consequences of Autocratic Elections:Post-­Electoral Political Conflicts

My theory of authoritarian elections thus far has assumed that dictators appropriately determine the proportions of electoral manipulationand economic maneuvering in light of their mobilization capabilities. As
a result, a certain combination of electioneering strategies appears as anequilibrium of autocratic election design. However, history tells us that
not a few authoritarian leaders have deviated from such an equilibrium
when designing elections. Indeed, investigating the causes of democratictransitions, Treisman (2020) finds that 67–­85 percent of all the democratization cases since 1800 have been triggered by the dictators’ mistakes and62

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

misperceptions under political uncertainty. Although my focus here is noton democratic transitions, his observation is also relevant to post-­electoralpolitical conflicts in dictatorships. Some dictators overestimate their ability
to garner mass support and to hold free and fair elections, and then theyfind themselves failing to win big or even stunningly losing elections toopposition parties (Myanmar 1990), thereby inviting coups from membersof ruling coalitions (Bangladesh, 1978; Guatemala, 1981; Algeria, 1991)
or ending up conceding to democratization via elections (Poland, 1989).
Other dictators underestimate their mobilization capabilities and, thus,
excessively employ electoral manipulation, thereby provoking large-­scale
popular protests (e.g., the color revolutions in the post-­Soviet states in the
2000s and Madagascar in 2002).
I argue that when autocrats fail to match the level of electoral manipulation according to their mobilization capabilities, elections destabilize
authoritarian regimes. Such dictators’ mistakes may occur for at least two
reasons. First, autocrats make nonoptimal decisions in designing elections
from “a mistake of information” where autocrats “have incorrect or imprecise beliefs” based upon faulty information (Treisman 2020: 795). Due tosuch paucity of information, the dictator may be in strategic uncertainty
under the interaction with ruling and opposition elites. And such strategic
uncertainty makes it difficult to accurately gauge the de facto distributionof mobilization capabilities between the dictator and those elites, leading
to the undersupply or oversupply of electoral manipulation.
Second, dictators’ mistakes in designing elections may stem from “amistake of calculation” where, “despite accurate and precise beliefs, actors
optimize incorrectly” (Treisman 2020: 795). In other words, mistakes may
be brought about by the matter of agency: in spite of enough understanding on the distribution of mobilization capabilities, the dictator himself
dives into holding excessively free and fair elections that are likely to cause
leadership turnover or aggressively manipulate the electoral field that
results in provoking protests.
Despite these different sources of dictators’ mistakes, however, thefailure to strike a balance between electoral manipulation and economic
maneuvering under the electoral dilemma paves the way for authoritarian
instability. I suggest that there are two pathways through which autocraticelections invite regime instability. At one extreme, authoritarian leaders become so overconfident that they consider themselves to be highly
popular among the public. For instance, the military regime in Myanmar
held the first competitive elections in three decades in 1990. Leading up
to the election, “the ruling junta was confident that the status quo wouldA Theory of Autocratic Elections

63

remain in place. . . . There were 235 political parties and 2,209 candidates registered across the country. This led it to assume that the shareof votes for the opposition would be split, thus lowering the percentage apromilitary party needed for victory. . . . The opposition generally lacked
funds and organizational structures” (Morgenbesser 2016: 106). Assumingthat the opposition was too weak to be competitive with the ruling party,
the military regime held excessively free and fair elections in which voting
conditions were free from misconduct and the election management bodyaccurately counted, tabulated, and reported the votes. As a result of their
mistake under strategic uncertainty, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League
for Democracy achieved a shocking landslide victory, winning 392 of the485 contested seats in the National Assembly. After the opposition’s stunning election victory, the military regime refused to recognize the results
and either arrested opposition MPs or forced them into exile.
When dictators overestimate their mobilization capabilities and fail towin big in free and fair settings, autocratic elections increase the risk of
inner threats by ruling elites. As table 2.1 shows, low electoral performancein free and fair elections credibly reveals the dictator’s weaknesses, thus
encouraging ruling elites to suspect that the current regime cannot sustain
itself for long and spurring them to challenge the dictator. This is precisely
what happened in the 1991 Algerian elections and 1981 Guatemalan elections, when military officers ousted low-­performing incumbents who werereform minded and held excessively free and fair elections.
Another likely scenario of excessively free and fair elections is that astunning opposition victory leads to the incumbent’s replacement by a new
government. When the dictator accepts the election results and other ruling elites do not overthrow the losing regime by a coup d’état, autocraticelections turn into the moment that political power transitions to the winning opposition party. Not a few authoritarian regimes experienced stunning election results that paved the way for regime change, including Brazil (1974), Turkey (1983), Chile (1988), and Poland (1989). In this context,
Huntington (1991: 174) explained that “elections are the way democracy
operates. In the third wave they were also a way of weakening and ending
authoritarian regimes. . . . Democratization was brought about by authoritarian rulers who, for one reason or another, ventured to hold elections, andby opposition parties who pushed for elections and participated in them.”
At the other extreme, authoritarian leaders excessively manipulate elections, which increases the risk of rising opposition threats in the form of
mass protests. As discussed in the previous section (see table 2.1), excessive
electoral manipulation escalates the risk of post-­electoral mass protests in

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

two ways. First, because electoral manipulation decreases the likelihoodof the opposition gaining at least some political influence within the current regime through elections, a broad range of the opposition agrees toresort to taking more radical approaches, such as anti-­government protests. Second, the opposition can exploit the fact that the government
resorted to excessive electoral manipulation, which in turn makes it easierfor the opposition to overcome collective action problems and organize
popular protests under the banner of denouncing the dictator’s antidemocratic actions. In addition to these two mechanisms, excessive electoral
manipulation may also incite the opposition’s belief that the regime is so
weakened that the dictator cannot avoid using excessive electoral manipulation, thereby emboldening the opposition to challenge the dictator byorganizing mass protests.
Figure 2.4 summarizes the relationship between electoral manipulation and post-­electoral political order. On the one hand, dictators are more
likely to fail to win elections overwhelmingly when they undersupply electoral manipulation relative to their mobilization capability. The revelationof regime weaknesses in the elections increases the risk of internal threats
and, thus, triggers a coup, or excessively free and fair elections lead to the
opposition’s election victory. On the other hand, external threats are more
likely to be activated when dictators oversupply electoral manipulation.
The opposition is more likely to be unified to take anti-­regime actions,thus resulting in post-­electoral mass protests. When dictators manipulate
elections in accordance with their mobilization capabilities, they can minimize such post-­electoral risks and the political order is not destabilized
in the aftermath of autocratic elections. Therefore, the fourth empiricalimplication can be expressed as follows:
Empirical Implication IV: When dictators fail to properly face the electoral dilemma, elections backfire on them. Specifically, the oversupplyof electoral manipulation fuels popular protests, whereas the undersupply of electoral manipulation leads to leadership turnover throughcoups or the opposition’s stunning election victory (chap. 6).

2.8. Operationalization and Preliminary Analysis: Mobilization
Capabilities and the Correlates of Victory Margins

Before proceeding to subsequent chapters to test the empirical implications, I clarify the empirical operationalization of mobilization capa-

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

65

Fig. 2.4. Electoral Manipulation and Post-­Electoral Political Orderbilities in cross-­national analyses. I then explore an important link thatwill form the basis of the subsequent analyses: dictators’ mobilization
capabilities are positively associated with their margins of victory. Whileillustrating the correlations between the measures of mobilization capabilities and victory margins, I also discuss the validity of the measurement
approaches.
Measuring the Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities

The previous subsections identified the three dimensions that tap into the
dictator’s mobilization capability vis-­à-­vis the potential opposition: (1) the
dictator’s discretionary financial resources, (2) ruling organizations thatdiscipline ruling elites, and (3) opposition strengths. It is a daunting task tomeasure the distribution of mobilization capabilities between the dictator
and the potential opposition in authoritarian contexts. I use natural resource
wealth as a proxy for the dictator’s discretionary financial resources, and I
focus on dominant-­party organizations and ethnicity-­based networks todenote disciplinary ruling organizations. Opposition strength is measured
by the history of anti-­government collective action in non-­electoral periods. Let us first discuss the validity of these proxies of mobilization capabilities in the context of cross-­national statistical analyses.
Capital-­Intensive Natural Resources: Oil and Natural Gas
The first dimension of mobilization capability is the amount of the dictator’s discretionary financial resources. This book focuses on forms ofnatural resource wealth that require enormous capital to extract, such as
oil and gas, as a relevant proxy for this measurement.18 Although auto18. Although oil-­abundant countries are not a majority of authoritarian countries, 62 per-

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

crats may be able to mobilize other monetary resources, these natural
resources are the best proxy to capture the dictator’s discretionary financial resources for the following three reasons. First, it is well known that,ceteris paribus, oil and gas significantly improve the government’s ability to distribute pork and patronage to citizens. Numerous studies haveshown that natural resource wealth contributes to increasing the levelsof social spending and strengthening patronage distribution (Jensen andWantchekon 2004; Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009; Morrison 2009).
Because authoritarian leaders can use these natural resources to placate
citizens’ economic dissatisfaction, a large body of previous studies has
also demonstrated that abundant natural resources are conducive toprolonging authoritarian rule (Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007;
Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2013).19
Second, oil and gas are capital-­intensive resources and, thus, require
vast amounts of investments (i.e., property, plants, and equipment), which
is mostly possible only for the government to manage. In other words, thisfeature of oil and gas makes it difficult for nonstate actors such as the opposition and rebel groups to utilize them for their own political purposes, as
opposed to lootable natural resources, including minerals like diamonds
and gold (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005).
Third, the operations and budgets of these capital-­intensive natural
resources are highly opaque (Ross 2012), and thus it is advantageous for
dictators to use them for electoral purposes, in contrast to other sources ofrevenues, such as tax and international aid, which are subject to domestic
and international constraints. On the one hand, the use of tax revenues
tends to be more carefully monitored by citizens, and these revenues are,therefore, more difficult for political leaders to squander than revenues
generated by oil and gas. The secrecy of using natural resources allows
dictators to distribute them for their political gain (Ross 2012: 59–­62). On
the other hand, foreign aid is another form of nontax revenue that is not
exposed to the public views;20 however, autocrats need to be sensitive tocent of autocracies (1945–­2010) produce natural resources (i.e., oil and gas) and 22 percent ofthem have oil resources that value more than US$500 per capita.
19. Recent literature argues that natural resources neither undermine political accountability (Paler 2013) nor retard democratization (Dunning 2008; Haber and Menaldo 2011).
Although it still remains controversial whether petroleum is detrimental to political transparency, the bulk of cross-­national evidence at least demonstrates that resource abundance tends
to prevent authoritarian breakdown and helps incumbent dictators survive by subsequently
increased public spending.
20. Some studies show that foreign aid contributes to strengthening authoritarian rule

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

67

international reputation regarding how they utilize such funds to deepen
political and economic reforms (S. Bermeo 2011; Dietrich and Wright2014). Conversely, most natural resources are owned by state companies,
and their use is not constrained by international scrutiny.21 Such absence ofinternational monitoring makes it easy for dictators to dissipate oil and gas
money for short-­term electoral purposes.
Therefore, I expect that oil-­or gas-­rich countries should have alarger electoral margin compared to countries that do not produce theseresources. To measure a country’s natural resource wealth, this book uses
Ross’s (2012) oil-­gas value per capita, calculated by taking the product of acountry’s total oil/gas production and the current oil/gas price and dividing
it by the total population.
Disciplinary Organizations: Dominant-­Party and Ethnic Networks
The second dimension of voter mobilization is disciplinary organizations
with which dictators can increase the effectiveness of economic maneuvering. When autocrats have rich financial resources at their disposal, theytend to use disciplinary organizations to effectively distribute the resources
to citizens. To capture disciplinary organizations cross-­nationally, I focus
on (1) party organizations and (2) ethnic kinships. Resonating with thisreasoning, Levitsky and Way (2010: 60–­66) also concluded that rulingparty organizations and ethnic-­based identity are important aspects ofmeasuring dictators’ organizational power.
Strong party organizations enable dictators to engage in credible
power sharing with ruling elites (Magaloni 2008),22 which disincentivizes
the latter to exploit state resources. The party’s dense grassroots networks
also facilitate the ability of dictators to reach the masses (Greene 2009).
Through either or both of these mechanisms, dominant-­party organiza(Morrison 2009; F. Ahmed 2012); however, other research contends that foreign aid is positively associated with democratization, particularly since the end of the Cold War (Dunning
2004; Wright 2009; S. Bermeo 2011; Dietrich and Wright 2014).
21. According to Ross (2012: 37–­39), natural resources in developing countries began to benationalized in the 1950s, and the nationalization processes were completed by 1980. Natural
resource wealth is, therefore, a very good proxy to measure the dictators’ mobilization capability, particularly after the 1970s.
22. Relatedly, investigating a sample of autocracies including both party-­based and non-­party-­based autocracies, del Rio (2019) shows that ruling parties with old age and a fewer
number of ruling parties in the ruling coalition contribute to lowering the likelihood of ruling
elites’ defection from the ruling coalition. The results suggest that although dominant party
regimes also face elite defection (e.g., Reuter and Gandhi 2011), such defections are much lesslikely compared to other types of autocracies.

68

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

tions enable dictators to streamline patronage distribution to the rank
and file.23
To operationalize the presence of dominant-­party regimes, I use Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2014) dummy variable of party-­
based dictatorships. This measure of dominant-­
party regime is appropriate formy research purposes because it defines party regimes not according to
the number of political parties in the country but rather on the basis ofwhether ruling party organizations control the selection of officials, organize the distribution of benefits, and mobilize citizens to vote and show
party support (Geddes 2003; Wilson 2014), “though other parties may
exist and compete as minor parties in elections” (Geddes 2003: 51).24 Thismeasure enables us to identify authoritarian regimes with dominant parties, such as Mexico’s PRI, Senegal’s Socialist Party, Gabon’s Democratic
Party, Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Zimbabwe African National
Union—­Patriotic Front (ZANU-­PF), Taiwan’s Kuomintang, Cambodia’s
People’s Party, Malaysia’s United Malays National Organization (UMNO),
and Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP).
By ethnicity-­
based networks (or what I call “ethnic organizational
power,” or EOP), I refer to the scope and cohesion of politically dominantethnic groups. As previously discussed in this chapter, if an ethnic coalition consists of many ethnic groups, it is more difficult to monitor ruling
elites’ opportunistic behaviors through intra-­ethnic policing mechanisms(Fearon and Laitin 1995). Indeed, cross-­national studies demonstrate that
ethnically fractionalized ruling coalitions are more exposed to coup risk
(Wimmer, Min, and Cederman 2009; Roessler 2011). Furthermore, it iseasier for dictators to use extensive ethnic networks to distribute patronage
to a broader range of citizens than when such groups are less numerous(Fearon 1999; Chandra 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2007). Consistent withthis view, a large body of literature empirically shows that ethnic diver23. Some extant research suggests that oil-­rich countries are less likely to institutionalize dominant party regimes (Wright 2008; Reuter 2017) and promote the personalizationof autocratic politics (Fails 2020). In fact, my cross-­national data also show that 27.2 percent
of nondominant party autocracies possess above-­mean levels of natural resources (measuredby oil-­gas value per capita), whereas 16.3 percent of dominant party autocracies possess theabove-­mean levels of natural resources, meaning that there is about a 10 percent difference in whether a country is oil rich between party-­based and non-­party-­based autocracies.
That being said, given that not a few typical party-­based autocracies (e.g., Mexico, Malaysia,
Gabon, Senegal, and Angola) are armed with abundant natural resources, it is still important
to investigate what implications the combination of natural resources and dominant parties
may have on the menu of electoral manipulation.
24. Other datasets, such as those of Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Svolik (2012), focus
on the number of parties in the legislature to define dominant-­party regimes.

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

69

sity prevents efficient goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999;
Habyarimana et al. 2007; Franck and Rainer 2012). To simultaneously
measure the size and cohesiveness of dominant ethnic groups, I construct
an EOP index by multiplying the proportion of politically dominant ethnic
groups in the total population ( ∑ iN=1 PDEGi ) by the reversed fractionalization index of dominant ethnic groups (1 − ∑ iN=1 PDEGi2 ) :25
N

N

i =1

i =1

EOP index = ( ∑ PDEGi ) * (1 − ∑ PDEGi2 )where PDEGi is the share of a politically dominant ethnic group in the
total population. This variable has a lower value when ethnic groups inethnic coalitions occupy a smaller portion of the total population and when
ethnic coalitions are composed of a larger number of ethnic groups. In
my authoritarian regime sample, countries like Haiti, Mexico, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Cambodia, and the Philippines possess
relatively large dominant ethnic groups that are less fractionalized, leading
to high EOP scores. There are also authoritarian regimes where dominantethnic groups are large but they comprise multiple ethnic groups (e.g.,
Yugoslavia, Serbia, Gambia, Benin, Mauritania, Ghana, Cameroon, andMalawi), dominant ethnic groups are coherent but very small in size (e.g.,Togo, Mozambique, Sudan, and Syria), and dominant ethnic groups are
relatively small and also fractionalized (e.g., Sierra Leone, Central African
Republic, Republic of Congo, and Uganda). In these cases, the EOP index
tends to be low.
The Opposition’s Capabilities for Mobilizing the Masses
The third dimension is the opposition’s ability to mobilize political support. Unfortunately, we do not have a relevant cross-­national dataset thatmeasures the opposition’s financial resources and organizational strengths
in authoritarian contexts. As a suboptimal measure, I follow previous studies (Howard and Roessler 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010;
Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2014) and code “revolutionary threats” or anti-­
government collective actions. Challenging dictators is an extremely risky
political behavior because most anti-­regime protests are brutally repressed(Davenport 2007). However, once initiated, this costly action results incredibly showing the dictator that a considerable number of people are
25. The reversed fractionalization index is based on the Herfindahl formula and isexpressed as (1 − ∑ iN=1 PDEGi2 ) . To distinguish politically dominant ethnic groups from politically excluded ones, I rely on Wimmer, Min, and Cederman’s (2009) Ethnic Power Relations
dataset.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

extremely unsatisfied with the regime such that opposition leaders havesufficient mobilization power to lead citizens in taking to the streets(Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994; Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni 2011; Weiss
2012; Tertytchnaya and Lankina 2019).
To operationalize opposition strength, I count the number of occurrences of three types of anti-­government collective actions, namely, demonstrations, riots, and strikes, using Arthur Banks and Kenneth Wilson’s(2019) Cross-­National Time-­Series Data Archive.26 One possible problem
with this measure is that protests occurring in the immediate past may behighly correlated with those occurring in the present, and the observed
correlation between protests and electoral manipulation arises from thecorrelation between extensive electoral manipulation and post-­electoral
protests (Hafner-­Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014). In fact, the correlation
between post-­electoral protests (Hyde and Marinov’s 2012 NELDA29) andthe one-­year-­lagged collective action variable is quite high (r = 0.25) andstatistically significant, thus suggesting the possibility of reverse causality. Therefore, I use a three-­year moving average (one-­year lagged) of thenumber of collective actions (riots, demonstrations, and strikes) to better
capture the history of the opposition’s strength in non-­electoral periods.
When using the three-­year moving average, the correlation between thecollective action variable and post-­electoral protests becomes much lower(r = 0.09) and statistically insignificant, thus implying that this variable can
now better estimate the effect of collective action capabilities while also
mitigating the risk of reverse causality.27
26. Using parties’ seat or vote shares to measure opposition threats is problematic in thecontext of authoritarian regimes because these indicators are directly affected by dependent
variables in the current study, such as blatant electoral fraud and electoral systems.
27. Another issue related to the use of Banks and Wilson’s (2019) data is that the dataset
relies on news coverage offered by the New York Times. As a result, the dataset may underreport anti-­government collective action particularly in small countries. Although othercross-­national datasets, such as Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0)
(Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) and Mass Mobilization Data (MMD) (Clark and Regan 2016),
measure anti-­government public dissent with additional news sources, they have other problems that hinder their use for the purpose of this research. Although the NAVCO dataset has
the relatively long time span necessary for this research (1945–­2006), it primarily focuses on
campaigns aiming at “big goals,” such as regime change, anti-­occupation, and secession (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 416); however, opposition strength is also manifested in the formof anti-­government collective action over other issues like various state policies. The MMD
records anti-­government protests over smaller issues such as state policies. However, its timeseries (1990–­2018) is far shorter than that of Banks and Wilson (2019). While acknowledging
the potential problem of media reporting, I proceed to use the Cross-­National Time-­Series Data
Archive dataset as a primary measure of opposition strength to more comprehensively cover
the post–­World War II period with a variety of anti-­government collective actions.

A Theory of Autocratic Elections

71

Do the three subcomponents of mobilization capabilities relate to dictators’ electoral performance? Figure 2.5 shows kernel density plots tographically illustrate the relationship between dictators’ mobilization capabilities and electoral margins in presidential and legislative elections (1949–­
2010). I limit the analysis to electoral authoritarian regimes in which the
opposition is allowed to participate in elections because electoral margins
between ruling and opposition parties make sense only after the oppositionis allowed to join electoral competition. Of course, as electoral margins areat least partly influenced by the extent of electoral manipulation (particularly blatant electoral fraud),28 the distributions of electoral margins may
be exaggerated, especially when dictators are unable to rely on economic
maneuvering (i.e., in cases of low mobilization capabilities denoted by thedotted lines in fig. 2.5). In other words, if electoral margins are higher for
dictators with high mobilization capabilities than for those with low mobilization capabilities, then empirical investigations offer conservative tests
for my theoretical expectations. With this in mind, I compare the distributions of electoral margins in cases of high mobilization capabilities (solidlines) with those of low mobilization capabilities (dotted lines).
Dictators with capital-­intensive natural resources (i.e., oil and natural gas) as proxies for their discretionary financial resources tend to havelarger margins of victory (figs. 2.5a and 2.5b). This is clear in presidential
elections in which resource-­rich dictators have a peak of electoral margins
around 75 percent, whereas resource-­poor dictators’ electoral margins garner only around 20 percent. This pattern is less salient in legislative elections; however, resource-­rich dictators are more likely to score larger margins (median: 46.4 percent) than those of resource-­poor dictators (median:29.6 percent), for which the tail in the graph tends to spread out toward
negative margins. The results indicate that dictators with discretionary
financial resources are more successful at scoring large electoral margins.
Disciplinary organizations (i.e., dominant-­
party and ethnicity-­
based
networks or EOP) also seem to help dictators win big. The distributionof electoral margins leans toward 100 percent in executive elections when
dictators control both natural resource wealth and dominant parties; how28. See chapters 3 and 4 for more detailed empirical analyses on the relationship between
the dictator’s mobilization capabilities and electoral manipulation (blatant electoral fraud andinstitutional manipulation). These chapters suggest that measures of mobilization capabilities
are negatively correlated with the extent of electoral manipulation, which indicates that electoral margins in cases of high mobilization capabilities are not necessarily brought about byelectoral manipulation, whereas those in cases of low mobilization capabilities are more likely
to be due to electoral manipulation.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

ever, margins cluster between 0 percent and 25 percent of electoral margins when both are lacking (fig. 2.5c). Legislative elections exhibit a similar
pattern: the peak of electoral margins is approximately 30 percent when
dictators are armed with both oil and a dominant party, whereas margins
for dictators lacking both lean toward the left with a peak at around 0
percent of electoral margins (fig. 2.5d). We can again confirm a similar
pattern regarding ethnicity-­based networks, whereby strong EOP and richoil enable dictators to have a larger size of electoral margins in presidential
elections (fig. 2.5e). The pattern in legislative elections is not very clear;
however, electoral margins of strong EOP and rich oil are slightly larger(median: 39.5 percent) than those of weak EOP and no oil (median: 26.9
percent; fig. 2.5f). The overall results suggest that combinations of discretionary financial resources and disciplinary organizations contribute todictators’ large electoral margins.
Dictators who experience anti-­government collective action tend tohave smaller victory margins in both presidential and legislative elections.
In executive elections, larger sizes of electoral margins are more common
in the cases in which autocrats have not recently experienced any anti-­
government collective action, whereas victory margins tend to be smallerwhen the opposition is sufficiently strong to organize public dissent (fig.
2.5g). The shapes of electoral margin distributions in legislative elections
are similar; however, dictators not facing anti-­government collective action
tend to lean more toward the right and, thus, have larger electoral margins
than those experiencing such collective action (fig. 2.5h). The results suggest that strong opposition reduces the dictators’ margins of victory.
In sum, my preliminary empirical analysis suggests that the chosenmeasures of dictators’ mobilization capability (i.e., natural resource wealth,disciplinary organizations, and anti-­government collective action) are goodpredictors of dictators’ electoral performance. Given that dictators’ mobilization capabilities contribute to winning big, the next chapters explore
the logic of electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and the post-­
electoral political order through both cross-­national statistical analyses andcomparative case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

2.9. Conclusion

This chapter has presented a theory of autocratic elections. Autocratic
political leaders seeking to efficiently govern their countries face several
fundamental problems inherent to authoritarian rule. Although elections

Note: The solid lines indicate cases in which dictators have high mobilization capabilities (abundant natural resources, presence of disciplinary organizations [dominant-­party
regimes or large, cohesive dominant ethnic groups] plus natural resources, or the absence of anti-­government collective action). The dotted lines indicate cases in which dictators
have low mobilization capabilities (absence of natural resources and disciplinary organizations and presence of anti-­government collective action). I calculate victory margins inpresidential elections as differences in the shares of votes between the winner and the runner-­up in the first round of elections. For legislative elections, I calculate margins ofvotes, which are differences in the shares of votes between ruling parties and opposition parties.

Fig. 2.5. Correlates of Electoral Margins in Authoritarian Elections

74

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

help them solve these problems, for them to do so, authoritarian leadersneed to introduce some political transparency to the process. However, thedownside of partly free and fair elections is that they negatively affect thelikelihood of winning big.
With this electoral dilemma in mind, I have argued that dictators design
elections according to their ability to mobilize the masses through economic means. When autocrats are able to win big by effectively mobilizing
financial resources, they are more likely to rely on economic maneuveringrather than electoral manipulation, as increasing the level of public support by patronage and pork enables them to win big without damaging
electoral fairness through blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation. In contrast, when autocrats have low mobilization capabilities, theycannot help being dependent on electoral manipulation by sacrificing thebenefits of holding partly free and fair elections because failure to win big
is more likely to activate within-­regime threats as well as to pave the way
for political instability. Put more simply, my theory of autocratic elections
expects that economic maneuvering is a substitute for electoral manipulation. When dictators use electoral manipulation, they do not maneuver the
economy, whereas in cases when economic maneuvering is predominant,autocrats find it useful to not rely heavily on electoral manipulation.
The following chapters will empirically test the four implications
derived from my theory of autocratic elections. Chapter 3 will explore
the determinants of blatant electoral fraud, one major form of electoral
manipulation in dictatorships. In chapter 4, I will focus on institutional
manipulation, the other significant method of electoral manipulation,
which has been relatively overlooked in the autocratic politics literature.
Chapter 5 will test the trade-­off between electoral manipulation and economic maneuvering by focusing on the magnitude of PBCs in dictatorships. Chapter 6 will investigate what happens when dictators deviate fromthe equilibrium of autocratic election design in dealing with the electoral
dilemma by examining different forms of autocratic instability, including
coups, popular protests, and the opposition’s stunning election victories.
Chapters 7 and 8 will present in-­depth comparative case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In so doing, I will shed light on the causal links among
electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and post-­electoral political order in authoritarian regimes.

PART II

Cross-­National Explorations

THREE

Blatant Electoral Fraud
A somewhat cynical but not overtly exaggerated formulation of abasic norm in Argentine politics is this: I believe in elections as longas I can be sure that my opponents will not win.
—Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy

3.1. Variation in Blatant Electoral Fraud under Authoritarian Regimes

In authoritarian regimes, political leaders and their parties rarely lose elections to opposition parties. Why do incumbents in authoritarian countries
win most elections? A typical answer to this seemingly obvious question isthat autocrats are less constrained from employing fraudulent techniques
to bias election results. In advanced democracies, blatant electoral fraud
is too costly to risk undertaking: political leaders are strongly constrainedby institutional checks and balances. The media and independent election
management bodies closely monitor the electoral practices of politicians
and their parties. Such political constraints and transparency make it difficult for the incumbents to resort to blatant electoral fraud. By contrast, inauthoritarian regimes, both institutional constraints and third-­party actors
are far weaker or barely exist. The rule of law may also not be working
effectively, thereby providing political leaders with ample opportunities torig elections extensively. Therefore, a simple comparison between mature
democracies and dictatorships leads us to conclude that autocrats resort
to blatant electoral fraud by, for example, prohibiting opposition parties
from participating in elections, employing electoral violence, and tampering with the ballot box.
77

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Undoubtedly, dictators rig elections in some way or another. Autocrats are allowed to use fraudulent techniques to acquire large majorities
within systems exhibiting weak political constraints and a lack of politicaltransparency. However, an intriguing fact is that dictatorships are different in the extent to which leaders rely upon electoral fraud. On the one
hand, we know of numerous autocratic regimes wherein dictators resort
to whatever fraudulent measures they can use to secure an overwhelming electoral victory. For example, in Zimbabwe, when facing increasingly
powerful antagonism and protests organized by the opposition party—­
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)—­President Robert Mugabe
resorted to brutal election violence and widespread vote stuffing in the2008 presidential election. Consequently, the MDC presidential candidate,
Morgan Tsvangirai, withdrew from the presidential race, which resulted in
Mugabe’s victory with an astonishing 85 percent of the vote (Bratton and
Masunungure 2008: 41). Another example is the 2007 presidential electionin Uzbekistan, which was held within a tightly controlled political environment without voters having any real choice: the requirements of runningfor the presidential election were made more demanding; all contestants
publicly endorsed the policies of the incumbent president, Islam Karimov; the media that was broadcasting election campaigns was subjected tostrong government control; and widespread practices of proxy voting wereobserved by electoral monitors (OSCE 2007b).
On the other hand, there are not a few cases of autocratic regimes
where dictators are loath to commit electoral malpractices and evenwillingly make efforts to keep the electoral field less fraudulent throughelectoral reforms. For instance, in the heyday of Mexico’s Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), which was stunned by the fact that the main
opposition party boycotted the 1976 presidential election, the authoritarian government increased electoral transparency, thereby enabling opposition parties to gain some presence in Mexican politics (Eisenstadt 2004:
32–­44). Nursultan Nazarbaev, the president of Kazakhstan, announced
shortly before the 2012 election that he would “reform” electoral laws
so that moderate opposition parties could gain some seats in parliament(Mutlu 2012). A similar dynamic can be observed with Malaysia’s Barisan
Nasional (BN), which had continued to win multiparty elections without
blatantly rigging them since independence until the party eventually wasremoved from office via an electoral turnover in 2018.1 In Singapore, the
1. This does not necessarily mean that the BN did not employ other techniques of electoral

Blatant Electoral Fraud

79

People’s Action Party has enjoyed legislative supermajorities for the past
five decades, despite the fact that “unlike most electoral autocracies Singapore elections are not marred by ballot stuffing or overt electoral fraud”(Tan and Grofman 2016: 2). These vignettes, to name just a few, strongly
imply that contrary to the prevailing view that dictators rig elections extensively, some autocrats actually create distance from committing extensive
electoral fraud.
Cross-­national data further corroborate the insight that dictatorships
differ in the extent to which they undertake blatant electoral fraud. Figure
3.1 clearly outlines variations in blatant electoral fraud among Western
democracies, non-­Western democracies, and dictatorships.2 High values
indicate more extensive electoral fraud. As expected, Western democracies hardly exhibit differences in blatant electoral fraud and mostly holdfree and fair elections. The key point here is that the sample of dictatorships exhibits significant variations in the extent to which they fabricate
elections. Interestingly, the variance of blatant electoral fraud is slightly
higher in dictatorships than in non-­Western democracies, many of which
are newly democratized countries where free and fair elections have yet tobecome the norm. By carefully analyzing the data, we can see some authoritarian states where election violence, electoral cheating, and legal restrictions on electoral participation are not as severe. These include Gabon(1990s–­2000s), Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan (1980s–­1990s), and Kuwait.
On the other hand, in other autocracies including Zimbabwe (2000s),
Uzbekistan (1990s–­2000s), Togo (1990s–­2000s), Indonesia (1990s), andParaguay (1970s–­1980s), dictators used extreme fraudulent techniques tofabricate election results. What explains the significant variation in blatantelectoral fraud under dictatorships?
By applying the theory of autocratic elections put forward in chapter
2, this chapter empirically explores the puzzle of blatant electoral fraud
in dictatorships. I argue that dictators’ capabilities for mobilizing popularsupport significantly influence the extent of blatant electoral fraud. Before
proceeding to my testable hypotheses, I review the literature on electoral
fraud, one of the burgeoning topics in the field of comparative politics.

manipulation. For example, the party relied heavily on malapportionment and gerrymandering to manufacture party dominance (Washida 2018). Maintaining supermajorities throughmanipulation of electoral institutions will be investigated in chapter 4.
2. I will later give a detailed explanation on the measurement of blatant electoral fraud
used in this book.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 3.1. Violin Plots of Variation in Blatant Electoral Fraud
Note: The data come from Kelley’s (2012) Quality of Elections Data. The variable blatant electoral
fraud is constructed by applying ordinal item response theory to five subcomponents of electoral
fraud: (1) illiberal manipulation of electoral law, (2) pre-­electoral violence, (3) pre-­electoral
cheating, (4) election-­day violence, and (5) election-­day cheating. Higher values indicate higher
levels of blatant electoral fraud. The outer shape represents kernel density plots showing
distribution of blatant electoral fraud. The line inside stands for the values that occur 95% of thetime. The bar inside shows the values that occur 50% of the time. And the central dot represents
the median value.

3.2. Literature on Electoral Fraud

When exploring what exactly determines blatant electoral fraud in thedeveloping world, scholars have highlighted various features influencing
incentives and opportunities of political leaders. Broadly, these arguments
can be classified into three streams: (1) political, (2) socioeconomic, and (3)institutional and/or third-­party explanations. While briefly introducing theessence of these arguments, this section points out that the literature fails
to explore important differences in electoral fraud in autocracies. I do so by
taking into account costs and benefits that incur from using this coercive
electoral practice.
As a political explanation of blatant electoral fraud, many scholars have
explored the impacts of political competition and democratization on electoral malpractices. For example, Lehoucq and Molina (2002) argue thatthe more severely the parties compete, the more likely it is that electoral

Blatant Electoral Fraud

81

fraud arises since electoral stakes are higher for the competing parties. Illuminating the relationship between the dictator and local officials, Rundlett and Svolik (2016) contend that where a dictator is popular, their local
agents bandwagon his prospective election victory and thus rig elections
extensively in their electoral districts to demonstrate their loyalty, thereby
leading to an oversupply of vote fraud. Using data from the United States(1860–­1930), Kuo and Teorell (2017) show that the introduction of secretvoting methods reduced the practices of vote buying and voter intimidation, although it increased opaque forms of election fraud such as registration fraud and ballot stuffing. Focusing on five parliamentary elections
in Russia, Moser and White (2017) point to diffusion effects of electoral
fraud, finding that the existence of manipulated districts in a region strongly
influences the likelihood that other districts are likewise manipulated.
Second, socioeconomic factors have been regarded as crucial variables
in explaining the extent of blatant election fraud. Lehoucq and Molina(2002) argue that accusations of election fraud have a positive association with poor, less populated, and socioeconomically unequal provinces
because ballots are easier to be bought off or have high values undersuch conditions (see also Stokes et al. 2013; Fukumoto and Horiuchi
2011; Hidalgo and Nichter 2016). Ziblatt’s (2009) case study of Imperial Germany contends that the inequality of landholding is more likely
to increase the extent of election fraud because landed elites can capture
local institutions, whereas Mares (2015) argues that oligopolistic economic structures have a stronger impact on the pervasiveness of electoral
fraud in the case.
Third, various institutions and third-­party actors play important roles
in promoting and restraining electoral malpractice. Some scholars argue
that electoral institutions structure party competition, which in turninfluences levels of electoral fraud. For example, Birch (2007) argues thatsingle-­member districts (SMDs) under majority rule are more likely to be
exposed to electoral misconduct than proportional representation (PR)systems in the postcommunist countries. Echoing Birch’s (2007) findings,
Fjelde and Hoglund (2016) also show that electoral violence is more likely
in countries that employ majoritarian electoral institutions in sub-­SaharanAfrica.
Scholars contend that third-­
party actors, such as international anddomestic election-­monitoring entities, are effective in reducing blatantelection fraud. Exploiting a natural experiment in the 2003 Armenianpresidential elections where international election monitors were as-­if randomly assigned to polling stations, Hyde (2007) finds that the presence

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Boxof electoral monitors tends to reduce the vote share of the incumbent. By
conducting a field experiment in Ghana, Ichino and Schuendeln (2012)
show that electoral districts with domestic observers have fewer irregularities in voter registration. Similarly, by randomly assigning independent
election observers in the city of Moscow, Enikolopov et al. (2013) find thatthe presence of observers at the polling stations decreased the reported
vote shares of United Russia. Kelley (2012: chap. 7) confirms the effectof international monitoring on reducing electoral fraud through cross-­national statistical analyses.
As another third-­party explanation, the literature has also focused on
the structure of electoral governance. For instance, Hartlyn, McCoy, andMustillo (2008) provide evidence from nineteen Latin American countries, showing that independent, professional central election commissions
improve the quality of elections. Teorell (2017) also points to the importanceof professionalized bureaucracy, arguing that election fraud is most likely tooccur when political parties compete under a reformed bureaucracy.
Although these studies have fostered our understanding of blatant electoral fraud, at least three issues need to be addressed via further research.
First, the existing studies do not consider possible differences of theoretical scope conditions between democracies and autocracies. Cross-­national
studies include all the countries in their samples and assume that election
fraud should play the same role both in democracies and in dictatorships,that is, by producing a marginal victory in elections. However, as Simpser(2013) has suggested, the purpose of holding elections in dictatorships is
not only to get reelected but also to obtain an overwhelming victory. This
remarkable difference may very well change the motivations for committing electoral fraud when comparing democracies to autocracies.
Second, previous studies have also not taken seriously the electoral
dilemma in autocracies. The serious rigging of elections incurs a criticalloss of the important benefits of autocratic elections. For instance, rigged
election results may become less effective at transmitting information
regarding the distribution of public support and/or competence of ruling
elites. Fraudulent elections may also lead the opposition to invoke anti-­
system approaches. Furthermore, for autocratic elections to be able toeffectively convey their popularity through election results, they may needto win big without relying on heavy-­handed measures. Although dictators
are less constrained from employing blatant electoral fraud, they also havean incentive to rely less upon this practice as long as they can have reasonable certainty of winning overwhelmingly.
Finally, because extant studies disregard the electoral dilemma, they failBlatant Electoral Fraud

83

to consider the possibility that authoritarian leaders may adopt alternativeelectioneering strategies that are more cost-­effective than politically costly
blatant electoral fraud. For example, autocrats may be inclined to employ
economic maneuvering techniques that are preferable in terms of reducing the risk of electoral manipulation. Since previous studies have focusedon blatant electoral fraud without considering the relationships with otheravailable electioneering strategies,3 we know little about whether blatantelectoral fraud is a substitute or a complement for other election strategies.

3.3. Blatant Electoral Fraud and the Dictator’s
Mobilization Capabilities

The theory of autocratic elections developed in chapter 2 points to an
empirical implication: A dictator’s high (low) mobilization capabilities lead toa decrease (increase) in the extent of blatant electoral fraud. This theoretical
expectation includes several specific hypotheses with respect to blatantelectoral fraud. Before jumping to those hypotheses, I here briefly reiterate
my theoretical framework from which I derive them.
The dictator decides the extent to which he relies upon blatant electoral
fraud under the constraint of the electoral dilemma. Depending upon theextent of blatant electoral fraud and election results, two sets of politicalelites—­ruling elites and opposition elites—­determine whether or not to
revolt. Ruling elites plot a coup when the dictator fails to win big, while
opposition elites organize mass protests when the dictator relies heavily
on electoral fraud. Given these two threats, the dictator aims to achieve
an overwhelming majority in the most credible manner possible, thereby
minimizing those threats while maximizing the benefits of autocratic elections. When they are unable to win big in partially free and fair elections,
autocrats attempt to complement the votes they need with blatant electoral
fraud while sacrificing the benefits of autocratic elections precisely because
the failure to win big invites the internal threat, that is, the most imminentand serious threat in authoritarian regimes.
3. Important exceptions are Hyde and O’Mahoney (2011) and van Ham and Lindberg(2015). Hyde and O’Mahoney (2011) find that the presence of international election monitoring encourages political leaders to rely more on pre-­electoral public spending since election
monitoring makes it difficult to resort to blatant electoral fraud. Van Ham and Lindberg(2015) argue that as democratization proceeds, political leaders in Africa tend to shift theirelectioneering strategies from intimidation and manipulation of electoral administration tovote buying.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

The theory anticipates that the dictator’s capability for mobilizing public support influences the extent to which the dictator resorts to blatantelectoral fraud. If the dictator has a greater mobilization capability, compared to ruling elites and opposition parties, the dictator is backed up by alarge number of supporters who vote for him. Thus, the more capable thedictator is of mobilizing the masses, the more likely he is to enjoy the benefits of autocratic elections, that is, winning big without having to undertake
blatant electoral fraud. By contrast, if the elites possess greater capabilities
to mobilize their supporters vis-­à-­vis the dictator, he is not able to organize a large scale of electoral mobilization. As such, free and fair elections
are more likely to produce surprising election results, which the dictator
wishes to avoid; hence, the dictator has a strong interest in stealing suchelections.
To mobilize public support with less electoral fraud, dictators movetoward economic maneuvering.4 Strengthening pork barrel politics andpatronage distribution, authoritarian leaders can create public employment,
adopt tax exemption for party supporters and the poor, offer bonuses andservices to public employees, construct infrastructure in certain regions,and implement other forms of club goods provision.5 These methods of
economic maneuvering enhance political support from citizens. In fact,
numerous case studies have suggested that, in winning partially free and fairelections with large margins, authoritarian leaders have often manipulated
economic policies before elections (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004;
Magaloni 2006; Pepinsky 2007; Blaydes 2011). Relying more on economic
maneuvering and less on blatant electoral fraud, dictators can increase thecredibility of election results in the eyes of the public. This helps them tosend a clearer signal of regime invincibility; garner more reliable information on political parties’ popularities; and create an opportunity to makecoordination among opposition parties difficult. All of these are conducive
to mitigating the fundamental problems of authoritarian rule.
To be sure, dictators’ mobilization capabilities are notoriously difficult
to measure. That being said, this book is based upon the empirical analysisof the relationship between dictators’ mobilization capabilities and electoral margins (see chap. 2) and operationalizes the concept by shedding
light on the following three aspects: (1) discretionary financial resourcesthat dictators possess, (2) disciplinary political organizations that prevent
4. Chapter 5 empirically investigates the trade-­off between blatant electoral fraud and economic maneuvering by focusing on the determinants of political business cycles in dictatorships.
5. For a more direct test of political business cycles in dictatorships, see chapter 5.

Blatant Electoral Fraud

85

ruling elites’ opportunistic behavior and streamline economic distribution
to the citizenry, and (3) the opposition’s ability to mobilize the masses.
Discretionary Financial Resources

Dictators’ discretionary financial resources help them derive popular support through a large scale of economic maneuvering. In particular, wealthfrom natural resources such as oil and natural gas significantly enriches
state coffers without taxation and therefore becomes an important sourceof strengthening the distribution of pork and patronage in order to co-­opt
citizens (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009;
Morrison 2009).
Compared to other sources of revenues such as foreign aid and taxes,
natural resources can potentially be more useful in strengthening club
goods provisions and patronage distribution for electoral purposes. Thus,
dictators in countries with greater natural resources do not need to design
the electoral arena in ways that are extremely advantageous to them.
Hypothesis 3.1: If natural resources are abundant, dictators are less likely
to use blatant electoral fraud.
Disciplinary Organizations

Authoritarian leaders need to outsource everyday governance to the members of ruling coalitions, including ministers, lawmakers, bureaucrats,
and local politicians. Prior to deciding what electoral strategies they rely
upon—­economic maneuvering or blatant electoral fraud—­dictators firstneed intensive cooperation from their followers within ruling coalitions.
Autocrats then can have a strong command of blatant electoral fraud andpopular support mobilization via pork and patronage. If dictators cannot
get ruling elites to comply with deals, then ruling elites are more tempted
to abuse the authority delegated by the dictator, falling into a classicalprincipal-­agent problem (Haber 2006; Magaloni 2008).
Dominant parties and ethnic networks are two main disciplinary organizations. Dominant parties allow dictators to make intertemporal power-­
sharing deals credible (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik2013). Those disciplined elites work for the regime loyally, leading to theenhancement of the dictator’s mobilization potential (Wright and Escriba-­
Folch 2012). A coherent ethnic group (Fearon and Laitin 1995) also enables
dictators to police ruling elites. In African countries, when dictators face

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

strong coup threats from other ethnic groups, they allow only members of
their own ethnic groups in the ruling coalition (Roessler 2011).
The manner in which strong organizational bases help dictators win big
is determined by what tasks dictators assign to ruling elites. For instance,some party-­based dictatorships may rely heavily on systematic violence
and intimidation through party organizations, while others may be dependent on pork barrel distribution via party networks (Greene 2009; Bodea,
Garriga, and Higashijima 2019). The theory suggests that, as a condition
determining the way the dictator uses disciplinary organizations, the size ofa dictator’s discretionary financial resources is important. In other words,
these organizational bases may have starkly different implications on the
dictator’s eagerness to commit blatant electoral fraud through the following two mechanisms.
The first mechanism lies in the fact that organizational bases have disciplinary power constraining ruling elites. Against this backdrop, when the
dictator does not hold discretionary financial resources, he is more likely
to order loyal ruling elites to engage in blatant electoral fraud because hedoes not have sufficient resources to engineer economic maneuvering. In
such resource-­scarce scenarios, if dictators are equipped with strong political organizations, ruling elites may be more likely to follow orders loyallyand to engage in systematic electoral fraud within local strongholds (Levitsky and Way 2010: 63). For example, the 1988 Mexican presidential elections were marred by extensive electoral fraud under the PRI rule. In theelections, ballot stuffing was more likely to be observed in polling stations
where the ruling party was dominant and governors had strong ties withthe party (Cantu 2019). In Mugabe’s Zimbabwe in the midst of an economic crisis between 2000 and 2008, the ruling party Zimbabwe African
National Union—­Patriotic Front (ZANU-­PF) initiated a terror campaign
in which the party ordered security forces to “invade farms, burn downhouses, and incite other forms of violence, all to force the population intovoting for ZANU-­PF” (Bratton 2014: 89). Indeed, electoral violence was
extensive and systematically organized in the areas where the ruling party
ZANU-­PF reigned (LeBas 2006: 428).
Conversely, when the dictator has a large amount of discretionary financial resources at his disposal, he can delegate to disciplined ruling elites thetask of collecting popular support in locality through economic distribution. Under this condition, autocrats are able to use financial resources
more efficiently to garner popular support while preventing local ruling
elites from exploiting these resources for their own sake. For instance,
utilizing centralized party organizations of the Cambodian People’s Party,

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87

Hun Sen distributed state patronage in effective ways to the masses, which
contributed to cultivating loyalty from them (Morgenbesser 2016: 60–­79).
Chang and Golden (2010) cross-­nationally show that party-­based regimes
are less likely to experience political corruption than personalist regimes inwhich ruling coalitions are under-­institutionalized.
The second mechanism is that strong organizational bases also havehigh density of grassroots networks among their rank-­and-­file members,
allowing autocrats to reach out to a wide spectrum of society when undertaking electoral mobilization. This is done through party membership in
the case of party-­based regimes and through shared ethnicity in the caseof ethnic groups. For instance, in many party-­based regimes, “the party
controls land titles, fertilizers, subsidized housing, scholarships, food, construction materials, and many other privileges, which are distributed tothe most loyal members of the party” (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010: 128).
Dominant parties’ dense, large networks enable dictators to effectively
mobilize party members, thereby increasing the marginal effect of patronage distribution on regime support. Conversely, when autocrats are lacking financial resources to distribute, dense organizational networks may
become a useful instrument by which to force supporters to cooperate on
rigging elections (Levitsky and Way 2010).
Taken together, the disciplining of ruling elites and the effective mobilizing grassroots supporters create strong organizational bases that become
a conditioning factor strengthening the impact of financial resources on
reducing blatant electoral fraud. Therefore, I hypothesize that strong organizational bases enhance a dictator’s capability for mobilizing public support when he holds ample financial resources to distribute. Financial resources incombination with strong organizations greatly reduce the need for dictators to manipulate elections.
Hypothesis 3.2: The negative impact of natural resources on electoral fraud
becomes larger if dictators possess stronger organizational bases.
The Opposition’s Capabilities for Mobilizing the Masses

The strength of opposition groups is also an important aspect that determines the extent to which dictators rely on blatant electoral fraud. In
particular, the capability of opposition groups launching collective action
against authoritarian governments is a good proxy to observe the extent towhich they can mobilize their supporters against a dictator (Aksoy, Carter,and Wright 2014). I expect that frequent popular collective actions com-

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

pel dictators to think they may not be able to win big at the next election
without rigging the election extensively. In Zimbabwe, when facing growing power and protests organized by the MDC, President Mugabe used
extensive electoral fraud by resorting to election violence and ballot stuffing prior to the 2008 presidential election. Conversely, if opposition parties
are too weak to mobilize citizens and coordinate collective action, dictators
become willing to open the electoral field because it is certain that theycan easily win elections overwhelmingly in such circumstances. Prior to
the 2012 Kazakhstan elections, President Nazarbaev changed the electoral
law to make it easier for moderate opposition parties to obtain seats. Oneof his motivations behind this electoral reform was that opposition parties
were too unpopular among citizens to threaten his overwhelming victoryin the election. Despite the most “transparent” elections in over a decade in
Kazakhstan (Olcott 2012), the dominant party (Nur-­Otan) obtained 80.99
percent of total votes, whereas the main opposition (Nationwide Social
Democratic Party) gained a mere 1.4 percent of votes.
Hypothesis 3.3: The higher the opposition’s capability of collective action,
the more likely dictators are to use serious electoral fraud.

3.4. Cross-­National Statistical Analysis of Blatant Electoral Fraud
Dependent Variable: Blatant Electoral Fraud

This section performs a cross-­national analysis of blatant electoral fraud in
dictatorships. The unit of analysis is the country-­election-­year in authoritarian regimes. I identify authoritarian regimes by using Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz’s (2014) Autocratic Regimes Dataset. Using Judith Kelley’s (2012)
Quality of Elections Data (QED), my sample includes 354 elections in 88
authoritarian countries between 1977 and 2004.6
This study defines blatant electoral fraud as a set of coercive measuresthat deviate election results from voters’ initial vote preferences. As such,blatant electoral fraud biases election results in favor of the political leader
during election campaigns and on voting days. In light of this definition,
blatant electoral fraud consists of the following three subcomponents: (1)election violence, (2) election cheating, and (3) undemocratic restrictions
6. Descriptive statistics are found in appendix A3.

Blatant Electoral Fraud

89

on electoral law. Election violence is physical intimidation during electoral
periods exercised largely by incumbent parties (Straus and Taylor 2012;
Hafner-­Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014). Governments use electoral
violence to threaten and deter opposition candidates and citizens, thereby
undermining the effectiveness of oppositions’ campaigns and decreasing
the turnout of opposition supporters. Electoral cheating allows dictators toaffect the number of votes during campaign periods and election days with
nonviolent but still coercive measures, for example, the undermining of
oppositions’ freedom to campaign, media bias, ballot stuffing, and nonviolent intimidation (Kelley 2012). Restrictions regarding electoral law referto a series of regulations preventing citizens and electoral candidates frominfluencing politics, including, for example, the prohibition of opposition
parties from participating in electoral processes; limits placed on voting
rights according to certain social characteristics (i.e., gender and ethnicity); flaws in the complaints procedures; high thresholds for new parties to
get registered and gain seats; and constraints on the right to run for office(through language and educational requirements) (Kelley 2012). Thesefraud techniques, though considerably different in how they manipulate
elections, have a common feature in that they all involve more or less coercive means and also contribute to providing the dictator with a margin of
victory that would otherwise be impossible.
To measure blatant electoral fraud as defined above, this study relies on
the QED constructed by Kelley (2012).7 The dataset evaluates the extent
to which each election is characterized by blatant electoral fraud using
country reports published by the U.S. Department of State. In light of thedefinition of electoral fraud, I use the following five variables to measure
7. Other datasets also measure blatant electoral fraud in global terms: Birch’s (2011)
Index of Election Malpractice (IEM), Norris et al.’s (2016) Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI),
Hyde and Marinov’s (2012) National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA), andCoppedge et al.’s (2018) Varieties of Democracy (V-­Dem) dataset. IEM is similar to QED inmany respects yet only covers between 1995 and 2007. PEI evaluates 49 items concerning
electoral integrity by conducting expert surveys, yet it only covers the period after 2016.
NELDA covers a more extensive period (1945–­2010) yet focuses more on the competitiveness of elections and does not specifically measure more diverse aspects (i.e., timing andpatterns) of election cheating and election violence. Lastly, the V-­Dem project provides ameasure of clean elections covering the largest time period (1900–­2016) by aggregating various subcomponents such as voting irregularities, vote buying, voter registration, and election
violence through an ordinal item response theory (IRT). Some subcomponents of the clean
election index, however, include post-­electoral events and also do not fully take into accountpre-­electoral restrictions on an opposition’s entry to elections, such as prohibition of opposition parties and eligibility for elections.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

the extent of election fraud, all of which are measured separately from the
U.S. Department of State’s (often politically biased) assessment on whether
an election was acceptable (Kelley 2012: 186):8 (1) Was the legal framework not up to standards, were there limits on the scope and jurisdictionof elective offices, and were there unreasonable limits on who can run for
office, etc.? (“Legal problems”); (2) Were there restrictions on the freedom
to campaign, media restrictions, intimidations, and improper use of public funds? (“Pre-­electoral cheating”); (3) Was there any violence or unrest
before an election day? (“Pre-­electoral violence”); (4) Did any problems
occur related to vote processing (e.g., double voting), tabulation tampering,
voter fraud, vote buying,9 and intimidation on election day? (“Election-­daycheating”); and (5) Did any violence and unrest occur on an election day?
(“Election-­day violence”). Each variable takes a 4-­point scale between 0(no problems) and 3 (serious problems). I aggregate the five variables byapplying a rating scale model of the item response theory (IRT) and createa dependent variable, blatant election fraud.10 A higher value indicates more
extensive electoral fraud.

8. Using the overall evaluation on the quality of elections in the dataset is problematicfor this research for two reasons. First, the overall election assessment “captures whether
the State Department report, notwithstanding the level of problems, considered the election
acceptable” (Kelley 2012: 186), and thus it is likely to be biased by the United States’ politicalinterests in the assessed country. In contrast, the five measures coding specific instances ofelectoral manipulation are made distinctively from the U.S. Department of State’s evaluation,and therefore they are relatively free from such political biases (Kelley 2012: 186). Second,the overall evaluation includes election administrative capacities as a subcomponent measuring electoral fraud, yet this does not necessarily come from dictators’ eagerness to commit
electoral fraud but mostly stems from the quality of bureaucracy and central electoral management bodies (Teorell 2017).
9. This includes “vote-­buying” practices on election day, and thus one may wonder that
this might be overlapped with economic maneuvering. However, theoretically and empirically this concern is minor. Theoretically, vote buying recorded in this dataset is very narrowly defined and assumed to be an exchange between relatively small goods and votes onelection day. The concept of economic maneuvering is far broader and is implemented during the periods leading up to elections: it is usually delivered through pork barrel politics(club goods provisions like infrastructure and social spending targeted at certain regions andgroups) and patronage distribution (public employment or bonus increases). Empirically, if
the data include most of these economic maneuvering practices as election-­day vote buying,
the election-­day cheating variable should be positively associated with discretionary financial
resources. Yet, the oil-­gas variable is negatively correlated with the election-­day cheating variable, suggesting that the possible measurement errors are not serious.
10. The correlation coefficient between the IRT measure and the simple aggregation ofthese subcomponents of blatant electoral fraud is 0.992. Using the aggregation measure as thedependent variable, the overall results remain unchanged.

Blatant Electoral Fraud

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Independent Variables

To measure the distribution of mobilization capabilities, I follow the operationalization introduced in chapter 2. To test Hypothesis 3.1 about discretionary financial resources, I use Ross’s (2012) oil-­gas value per capita(measured in constant US dollars, baseline year 2000). The variable is calculated by multiplying a country’s total oil-­gas production by the current
oil-­gas price and then dividing by total population.
To test Hypothesis 3.2 about the conditional effect of discretionary
financial resources, I introduce an interaction term of Ross’s oil-­gas variable and dictators’ organizational bases. Organizational bases are cross-­nationally measured according to two variables: (1) party-­based organizations and (2) ethnicity-­based networks. I use a dummy variable basedon Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) to code party-­based regimes, whilesetting personalist regimes as the reference category.11
Ethnicity-­based networks are measured by the ethnic organizational
power (EOP) index. This variable has a lower value, as ethnic groups inethnic coalitions occupy a smaller portion of total population and giventhat ethnic coalitions are composed of more ethnic groups. The larger andless fractionalized the dominant ethnic groups are, the more likely discretionary financial resources are to reduce electoral fraud.
Regarding Hypothesis 3.3, I operationalize the opposition’s capabilities of gaining mass support. As discussed in chapter 2, I follow the extant
literature such as Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Howard andRoessler (2006: 372) and code “revolutionary threats” or anti-­government
collective action by counting the number of demonstrations, riots, andstrikes from Arthur Banks and Kenneth Wilson’s (2019) Cross-­National
Time-­Series Data Archive.
Control Variables

In addition to these main explanatory variables, I also introduce a hostof control variables in order to deal with confounding factors. These arebased on previous work on electoral fraud and regime change. Since electoral fraud is more likely in repressive authoritarian regimes and variables
11. Personalist regimes are the regimes wherein dictators are least likely to be constrainedby political institutions in credible ways (Geddes 2003; Wright and Escribà-­Folch 2012).
Therefore, this regime could work as a relevant reference category to investigate differencesin the conditional effect between dictators with disciplinary organizations and those without
such organizations.

92

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Boxof interest such as oil and anti-­government collective action are likely to
be correlated with political repressiveness within a particular country, estimating models without controlling for the degree of preexisting political freedom may bias estimates for the three hypotheses (Hafner-­Burton,
Hyde, and Jablonski 2014). Therefore, I introduce the Freedom House
Index as a control for the degrees of political rights and civil liberty in non-­electoral periods. This variable is transformed to facilitate interpretation
and, thus, ranges from 2 (least free) to 14 (most free), capturing the extent
to which civil liberties and political freedom are guaranteed. To mitigate
the risk that the measure will accrue electoral fraud and to capture theoverall trends in political openness, the variable is a three-­year moving
average lagged by one year. Furthermore, I also control for civil conflict(from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program) because civil conflict may affectboth the dictator’s mobilization capabilities and his use of blatant electoral
fraud.
Domestic institutional covariates serve as explanations of electoral
fraud and thus should be controlled for. Authoritarian regime types are
an important consideration along these lines. As Geddes (1999) has suggested, military dictators are more likely to step down and thus may allow
fair and free elections. Using Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), I introduce dummy variables for military and monarchy dictatorships. Independent, professional electoral management bodies may improve the qualityof elections (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2008). Kelley’s (2012) QED
measures quality of election governance in both pre-­electoral and election-­day phases. Aggregating the two variables of pre-­electoral and election-­dayadministrative capacities by using the IRT technique, I introduce election
administrative incapacities with higher values indicating lower quality ofelectoral governance. In elections that determine who will wield executive
power, authoritarian leaders may be more inclined to manipulate elections
when electoral stakes are high (Lehoucq and Molina 2002). To account for
this, I follow Simpser and Donno (2012) and include a dichotomous variable called main elections, which is coded as 1 for presidential elections inpresidential (or mixed) systems as well as parliamentary elections in parliamentary systems.
In addition to political institutions, international reputation is also a
crucial factor that authoritarian leaders have to consider when holding
elections. In particular, the international community may decide to cut
foreign aid following rigged elections (S. Bermeo 2011). I therefore introduce percentage of foreign aid relative to gross domestic product (GDP)(F. Ahmed 2012).

Blatant Electoral Fraud

93

The country’s level of economic development and economic expansion
may be correlated with oil production and anti-­regime collective actions
as well as the extent of electoral fraud (Lehoucq and Molina 2002). Therefore, I include logged GDP per capita and GDP growth to control for thelevel of (and change in) economic development (one year lagged).12
Estimation Method

The number of observations within each unit (i.e., a country) is very small,13and some of the independent variables rarely vary over time (e.g., the dominant party dummy and the EOP variable). For data with a small numberof within-­unit observations and sluggish independent variables, random
effects (RE) estimators yield lower variance than fixed effects (FE) estimators (Clark and Linzer 2015). Furthermore, the Hausman test does not
reject the null hypothesis (χ2 = 7.19; p = 0.516), suggesting that the independent variables are orthogonal to the unit effects and therefore RE estimators are unbiased. For these reasons, I adopt RE-­ordinary least squares(RE-­OLS) estimators that control for unit heterogeneity among countries
beyond the control variables mentioned above. Considering the likelihoodthat errors are correlated within each country, I adopt robust standard
errors clustered by country. I also include decade dummies (1980s, 1990s,
and 2000s) to deal with time-­specific unobservable heterogeneities.
Estimation Results

In table 3.1, Models 1 and 2 examine Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.3 with andwithout the basic set of controls mentioned above. The variable of oil-­gas
value per capita is statistically significant in both models and negatively
correlated with electoral fraud, supporting Hypothesis 3.1. Interpreting
the results substantively, oil-­abundant countries (i.e., the 75th percentile of oil-­gas value per capita = US$8,700) reduce blatant electoral fraud
by 0.174, which is about one-­third of the dependent variable’s standard
deviation. Given that the standard deviation of the dependent variable is0.63, the effects of being an oil-­producing country are modest. One possible interpretation of this medium effect of the oil-­gas variable is that the
12. As additional relevant controls, I include electoral systems (Birch 2007), presence ofinternational and domestic election monitors (e.g., Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012; Ichino andSchuendeln 2012), and trade openness (Birch 2011) to find that the results remain robust.
13. The average number of observations within unit (country) is 4, while the number ofunits is 88.

TABLE 3.1. Correlates of Blatant Electoral Fraud
Estimator
Oil-­gas value per capita($100)
Anti-­government
collective action
Party-­based regimes(PBR)
Ethnic organizational
power (EOP)
Oil*PBR

Model 1RE-­OLS

Model 2
RE-­OLS

Model 3
RE-­OLS

Model 4
RE-­OLS−0.0017***(0.0003)
0.034*(0.019)−0.321***(0.11)
0.0472(0.147)−0.002***(0.001)0.0353***(0.0131)−0.074(0.087)0.341**(0.136)−0.0018***(0.0005)
0.0331***(0.0128)−0.033(0.088)0.316**(0.129)−0.017***(0.0044)0.00475(0.00329)
0.0351***(0.0131)−0.0710(0.0858)
0.376***(0.142)

Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index(avg)
Election administrative
incapacity
Main elections−0.538***(0.128)−0.305***(0.111)

Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Constant
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
R-­squared
Observations
Number of countries

0.0907(0.157)
Yes
206.69***
0.194
354
88

−0.422***(0.0910)0.0385(0.119)−0.108***(0.0156)
0.149***(0.0484)0.0347(0.0369)−0.121**(0.0533)−0.008*(0.0044)−0.00721**(0.003)0.15(0.124)1.472***(0.429)Yes
312.62***
0.466
325
79

−0.421***(0.0907)0.0164(0.115)−0.114***(0.0156)
0.163***(0.0457)
0.0362(0.0371)−0.0989*(0.0520)−0.00953**(0.00481)−0.00787***(0.00296)
0.163(0.125)1.375***(0.416)Yes
547.17***
0.48
325
79

−0.0322**(0.0152)−0.422***(0.0910)0.0300(0.118)−0.111***(0.0155)
0.146***(0.0488)0.0362(0.0368)−0.114**(0.0527)−0.00777*(0.00447)−0.00756**(0.00297)
0.162(0.123)1.424***(0.424)
Yes
325.46***
0.47
325
79

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

Blatant Electoral Fraud

95

models do not consider the conditions under which dictators use natural
resource wealth for distributive purposes rather than members of rulingcoalitions pocketing oil money for themselves. This is what I examine as
Hypothesis 3.2.
Models 1 and 2 also show that the opposition’s collective action ispositively correlated with electoral fraud in a statistically significant way,
supporting Hypothesis 3.3. The more riots, demonstrations, and strikes
authoritarian leaders face during the three years before an election, themore extensively they rig elections thereafter. Interpreting the results, in
autocracies that frequently experienced anti-­government collective action
three years prior to elections (i.e., the 75th percentile of the collective
action variable = 14), the governments increased the extent of blatant electoral fraud by 0.494 (75 percent of the standard deviation of the dependent
variable), which is not substantively small.
Zimbabwe is a case in point. During the 1980s and 1990s, the extent of
blatant electoral fraud in the country was relatively modest: election violence was minor, electoral cheating was not extensive, and restrictions ofelectoral law were not serious. However, elections in 2000 and 2002 exhibited higher levels of blatant electoral fraud in all those three aspects. Oneof the contributing factors to the escalation of blatant fraud was the foundation of the main opposition, MDC. Backed up by escalating strikes andan increase in the price of petrol, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
led by Tsvangirai and other trade unionists founded MDC in 1999, whichbecame a real threat to the rule of President Mugabe and his ZANU-­PF(Alexander 2000: 385–­91; Bratton 2014: 75–­76). Other than Zimbabwe,countries such as Kenya (1992), Jordan (1997), Tajikistan (1995), Bangladesh (1986), the Philippines (1984), and Indonesia (1997) are all examples
where strong opposition movements forced the governments to resort toblatant electoral manipulation.
Both the party-­based regime dummy and the EOP have no statisticallysignificant impacts on electoral fraud in a consistent manner across themodels. These uncertain effects may indicate the possibility that autocrats
are utilizing these political organizations to systematically resort to blatantelectoral fraud in some cases and to streamline economic distribution inothers. The end result is the canceling out of their effects on blatant electoral fraud. Thus, how these relationships between political organizations
and fraud will change according to the amount of financial resources iswhat we will examine via empirical tests for Hypothesis 3.2.
Model 3 examines the impact of oil-­gas value per capita as conditional
upon the presence of the party-­based regime. The evidence here supports

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Hypothesis 3.2. In both models, the oil-­gas rent variable and its interaction term with the party-­based regime dummy are negative and statistically significant.14 Figure 3.2a graphically illustrates the difference in theimpact of natural resources on electoral fraud for party-­based and personalist regimes (the reference category). In personalist regimes, the least
institutionalized form of authoritarian regimes, natural resources reduce
electoral fraud minimally. If the country is a party-­based regime, however,
the impact of natural resources is about 10.4 times greater, which makes
the reduction effect of natural resources on blatant electoral fraud substantively large. For instance, oil-­producing countries (in the 75th percentileof the oil-­gas variable) with dominant party organizations reduce blatantelectoral fraud by a factor of approximately 1.63, which is about 2.6 times
higher than the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Under dominant party regimes that include Malaysia, Mexico, Tanzania, and Gabon,increases in oil and gas revenues have significantly lowered the extent of
blatant electoral fraud.
A case in point is the Suharto regime of Indonesia, which was backed upby the Golkar Party and state institutions. In the late 1970s and mid-­1980s,
Suharto enjoyed substantial oil revenues (US$305 per capita) because ofsurges in global oil prices (Smith 2007: 135–­37). “Oil exports, which had
been worth $641 million in 1973 rose to $6.9 billion in 1979 and $10.6 billion in 1980. Hence, the state’s capacity to extract resources and distributethem to political allies, both existing and desired, had grown exponentially”(Mietzner 2018: 89). As natural resource wealth grew, Suharto shifted hiselectioneering strategy from coercion to patronage distribution. Indeed,
parliamentary elections held in 1977 and 1982 were both relatively clean(i.e., the electoral fraud level was far below the mean), and the increased
focus on the regime’s patronage resources “made coercion less essential,
especially in elections” (90). After a significant drop in oil prices in the late1980s, however, the Suharto regime began to rig elections in multiple andextensive ways. In the 1997 parliamentary elections, when oil-­gas value percapita was just US$98, the level of electoral fraud reached the maximum
value in the sample.
Model 4 provides additional evidence for Hypothesis 3.2 from theother perspective—­the EOP. Interaction terms of the EOP variable andoil-­gas value per capita are negative and statistically significant.15 Figure
14. The same results hold if the model does not include the EOP variable. The results
remain unchanged if the model simultaneously introduces the interaction of the natural
resources variable and the EOP variable.
15. The same results hold if the model does not include the dominant party variable. The

(a) party-­based regimes(b) ethnic organizational power (EOP)

Fig. 3.2. Conditional Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Endowment on Blatant
Electoral Fraud
Note: The upper and lower graphs are based on estimation results of Models 3 and 4,
respectively. The dashed lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

3.2b depicts graphs illustrating how the coefficient of oil-­gas per capita
will change according to the values of the EOP. Where the EOP is weak
(0 to 0.17), as with situations like Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tunisia, and Syria, the impact of natural resource endowments is not statistically distinguishable from 0. As politically dominantethnic groups become more cohesive and expansive, the negative impactof natural resource endowments becomes larger. At the maximum value
where only one dominant ethnic group occupies 98 percent of the total
population (EOP = 0.98), the coefficient of oil-­gas rent per capita becomesapproximately 10 times larger than when the EOP is equal to 0.2. Interpreting the results, oil-­producing countries with the highest EOP (0.98)
are more likely to reduce blatant electoral fraud by 2.1 than oil-­producing
countries when the EOP is 0.2. Notably, this is 3.3 times higher than thestandard deviation of the dependent variable.
Hafez al-­Assad’s Syria is a case where a single, small dominant ethnic
group made it difficult to distribute financial resources widely and consequently maintained high levels of blatant electoral fraud. The regime’s dominant ethnic group was the Alawis, which occupied only 12.9 percent of thetotal population. “Alawi, largely underrepresented in government service
before the Ba’thist takeover, have certainly profited over-­proportionallyfrom the fact that key positions in the regime have been occupied by Alawi
officers since 1966” (Perthes 1995: 183). Within the Alawi population andinner circles of the president, a pyramid of dense patronage networks wasformed, which reached all levels of the community. Mostly targeting the
Alawi and several other regional political bases, the Assad regime utilized
redistribution strategy through electricity, schooling, and health services(Perthes 1995: 185; Van Dam 2011; De Juan and Bank 2015: 94). The limited scope of redistribution within the boundary of the dominant group,
however, made competitive elections highly risky for the regime, andtherefore elections were extremely fraudulent. Throughout the regime, theextent of blatant electoral fraud remained extensive (far above the mean in
the sample) even though the country consistently produced a fair amountof natural resources (US$260–­380 per capita): in presidential elections
only one candidate, Hafez al-­Assad himself, was allowed to run, whereas
in parliamentary elections real opposition parties were prohibited to participate in elections and voters could choose between a regime-­sponsoredunited front led by the dominant Ba’ath Party and individual independent
results remain unchanged if the model simultaneously introduces the interaction of the natural resources variable and the dominant party variable.

Blatant Electoral Fraud

99

candidates. In addition to the exclusion of opposition parties, the regime
resorted to rigging elections to help some candidates win the elections(Perthes 1992: 16).
Control variables have largely predictable directions of coefficients,
with some variables having statistically significant effects. Military regimes
tend to rely less upon blatant electoral fraud, in comparison with personalist dictatorships. This is consistent with the view that military regimes often
return to the barracks and allow political liberalization (Geddes 1999).
The Freedom House Index is negatively correlated with the extent of blatant electoral fraud, thus suggesting that regimes that are highly repressive during non-­electoral periods tend to commit blatant electoral fraud.16
Incompetence of electoral administrative bodies fuels electoral fraud in astatistically significant way. Both economic prosperity and high economic
growth contribute to reducing blatant electoral fraud. Finally, foreign aid
is positively correlated with electoral fairness, suggesting that aid-­receiving
autocracies are less likely to employ blatant electoral fraud.
Further Analyses and Robustness Checks

To further explore the specific relationships between mobilization capabilities and blatant electoral fraud, I have performed various additional
statistical analyses. The blatant electoral fraud variable includes different techniques in relation to election rigging, for example, undemocratic
restrictions on the electoral law, election violence, and election cheating.
To test which aspects of mobilization capability affect which specific methods of blatant electoral fraud, I disaggregate the electoral fraud variable
into three categories: (1) problems on electoral law (ranging from 0 to 3);(2) repression and violent intimidation (i.e., pre-­electoral and election-­day
violence, ranging from 0 to 6); and (3) nonviolent electoral cheating (i.e.,pre-­electoral and election-­day cheating, ranging from 0 to 6). Following
this, I run ordered logit models with robust standard errors clustered bycountry.
For all the different forms of blatant electoral fraud, natural resource
endowments consistently have negative correlations with the dependent
variables in statistically significant ways. Natural resources are negatively
correlated with both legal problems and election violence. Furthermore, its
16. The Freedom House Index accounts for roughly 15 percent of total variation in blatantelectoral fraud. Thus, political repression in non-­electoral periods is a strong predictor ofelectoral fraud in the upcoming elections. However, given that the adjusted R-­squared is 0.47
(Model 3), large variations remain explained by the other included variables.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

conditional effect with the dominant party dummy remains strong and statistically significant for both election violence and electoral cheating. This
result suggests that natural resources reduce any type of blatant electoral
fraud employed by dictators, be it legal problems, overt violence, and evenrelatively opaque cheating. By contrast, opposition strength is positively
correlated with election violence and fails to reject the null when electoral
fraud takes the form of legal problems and election cheating. This suggeststhat authoritarian governments may be more inclined to respond withrepression rather than nonviolent means when the opposition is strong.
The interaction effect with the EOP variable becomes uncertain in models with disaggregated models, suggesting that ethnicity-­based networks
impact less as an intervening variable in terms of specifying manipulation
techniques (appendix B3.1).
Blatant electoral fraud is also different in that it occurs at different phasesof the electoral process. In this regard, I distinguish pre-­electoral periods
from election-­day periods in order to investigate which factors of mobilization capability are better at explaining pre-­electoral and election-­dayelectoral fraud. I utilize the IRT technique to aggregate different methods of electoral fraud and measure the degrees of electoral fraud for pre-­electoral and election-­day periods, respectively.17 Following this, I employ
RE-­OLS estimators with robust standard errors clustered by country.
Again, natural resources are negatively correlated with both pre-­electoral and election-­day fraud in a consistent manner. Furthermore,pre-­electoral fraud tends to be reduced if the oil-­rich dictators are deeply
embedded within the dominant party organizations, while the oil-­rich dictators with strong ethno-­organizational powerbases are likely to be lessdependent upon election-­day fraud. The opposition strength variable has
positive associations with pre-­electoral manipulation strategies, yet its
coefficient does not reach the 10 percent level of statistical significance,
implying that collective anti-­government actions may not be a strong predictor in explaining the timing of blatant electoral fraud (appendix B3.2).
Finally, I conduct a range of sensitivity analyses. Robustness checks confirm that the main results are robust to important methodological issues,
such as (1) possible sample selection bias, (2) additional control variables,(3) possible endogeneity between oil and fraud, and (4) possible outliers.
First, it might be the case that the distribution of electoral manipulationis biased as a result of limiting the sample to autocracies only. Similarly, as
17. Legal problems of electoral laws are likely to influence both pre-­electoral and election-­day periods; hence, I include it for both periods.

Blatant Electoral Fraud

101

some oil-­rich countries like Saudi Arabia do not hold elections, the impactof natural resources on fraud may be biased due to the fact that autocracies
with no elections are excluded from the sample. To deal with these concernsof sample selection biases, I employ Heckman two-­stage selection models
to confirm that the main results remain unchanged (appendix B3.3).18 Furthermore, I include additional relevant covariates at the risk of reducing
the number of observations. The literature suggests that both domestic
and international election monitoring decreases the likelihood of blatantelectoral fraud (e.g., Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012). Additionally, research suggests that electoral systems influence the extent of blatant electoral fraud(Birch 2007). The inclusion of these additional control variables does notalter the main results (appendix B3.4).
Another point of note is that there is also a potential reverse causality problem between electoral fraud and natural resources since the freer
and fairer the elections, the more tempted authoritarian leaders may be to
exploit natural resources in advance. Following Haber and Menaldo (2011:23), I use three variables on proven oil reserves in each country as instrumental variables, each of which are highly correlated with oil-­gas value percapita, yet it is reasonable to assume that an oil reserve’s effect on fraud will
go only through oil-­gas value per capita (and therefore satisfy the exclusion
restrictions). These instrumental variables are jointly statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level in the first stage, suggesting that the instruments are good predictors of oil-­gas value per capita. Also, Hansen’s J testof the overidentifying restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis that
instruments are not correlated with the error term in the second-­stage estimation, suggesting that the instruments are valid. A two-­stage instrumental
variables estimation shows that the oil variable has a negative impact onblatant electoral fraud (appendix B3.5).
Last, as distributions of the natural resources and anti-­government
collective action variables tend to be skewed, the estimation results may
be sensitive to some outliers. To ensure that the results remain robust, I
conducted jackknife analyses by excluding countries one by one to findthat natural resource wealth remains negatively associated with blatantelectoral fraud whereas anti-­government collective action is still positively
associated in statistically significant ways.19
18. The first-­stage model estimates the likelihood of holding autocratic elections andcalculates the inverse Mills ratio, which is introduced in the second-­stage model where thedependent variable is blatant electoral fraud with the same set of predictors employed in themain analysis.
19. The estimation results are available upon request.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the logic of blatant electoral fraud in dictatorships. Dictators face the electoral dilemma of choosing between the certainty of winning big and the credibility of election results. Focusing on
the extent to which dictators can mobilize mass support through economic
maneuvering, I have argued that dictators with high mobilization capabilities are more likely to lower the extent of blatant electoral fraud because
they can mobilize public support through the distribution of pork andpatronage. Conversely, dictators with low mobilization capabilities tend toinevitably rely on blatant electoral fraud to hold onto power. Specifically,
I find that dictators with abundant natural resources and weak opposition
are likely to refrain from blatant electoral fraud. Furthermore, the negative
effect of natural resources on fraud tends to be magnified when dictators
have disciplinary organizations through which they can streamline economic distribution, that is, dominant parties and large, cohesive dominantethnic groups.
The findings of this chapter imply that the mere existence of relatively
free and fair elections does not necessarily lead to further democratization.
Specifically, authoritarian leaders may decide the extent of blatant electoral
fraud for their own sake and thus introduce less fraudulent elections when
they think they can win big by mobilizing regime supporters. If popular
dictators are likely to allow elections with less fraud, then evaluating acountry’s prospect of democratization through the practices of electoral
integrity may prove to be inadequate. In addition to tracking blatant electoral fraud, it is also necessary to closely investigate what are the fundamental sources of popular support in authoritarian regimes.
Dictators’ electioneering strategies, however, are not limited to thetechniques of blatant electoral fraud that this chapter has focused upon. In
addition to these coercive tactics of electoral manipulation, many authoritarian leaders also manipulate electoral institutions to bias election results,
including enacting electoral system reforms, redistricting for gerrymandering purposes, and manipulating district magnitudes to create high levels of malapportionment. The next chapter will unravel this alternatively
dominant form of electoral manipulation in dictatorships—­institutional
manipulation.

FOUR

Institutional Manipulation
Structuring the world so you can win.
—William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation

4.1. The Puzzle of Electoral System Choice in Dictatorships

Electoral rules significantly affect seat-­vote elasticity, specifically the manner in which scored votes are translated into shares of seats in the legislature (Rae 1971; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1998).
In particular, one of the few “laws” in political science research is the so-­called Duverger’s law, which proposes that single-­member district (SMD)
systems, where only one candidate is elected in an electoral district, lead toa high disproportionality in favor of large parties. In contrast, proportional
representation (PR) systems generally assign seats to parties in the legislature proportionally according to votes that they obtained, usually favorable
to small parties (Duverger 1954).
In democracies where political parties compete in free and fair elections, SMD systems often bring landslide election victories to major
opposition parties with a big swing. For instance, amid very low popularity
before the 1993 Canadian parliamentary elections, the ruling Progressive
Conservative Party reduced their seats from 156 to 2, losing to the biggest opposition party, the Liberal Party. In the Japanese 2009 lower houseelections, the increasingly popular main opposition party, the Democratic
Party, achieved a landslide victory by boosting their seats from 115 to
103

104

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

308, whereas the Liberal Democracy Party, which had long been in officemostly from 1955 to 2009, lost a substantial portion of their seats, goingfrom 300 to 119. Put simply, SMD systems in mature democracies favorlarge parties that emerge in strength, be they ruling or opposition parties.
However, in dictatorships with multiparty elections, SMD systems havea slightly different institutional mechanism. In most authoritarian regimes,
government turnover through elections is a remote possibility: The rulingparty occupies a hegemonic position and is mostly the only party large
enough to receive seat bias generated under majoritarian electoral systems.
For this reason, SMD systems produce a significant seat bias exclusive tothe ruling party, in what I term the pro-­regime seat premiums (bias) under
SMD systems.
Figure 4.1 provides the first-­cut cross-­national evidence corroborating
the pro-­regime seat premiums in SMD systems under electoral authoritarianism.1 Ruling parties under majoritarian electoral systems tend to receive
more seats than those under proportional systems: the distribution of seatshares leans toward 100 percent of seats, even though the share of votes isnormally distributed with having around 60 percent of votes as the peak.
Electoral authoritarian states like Georgia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Singapore are only a few examples where rulingparties enjoyed large seat premiums under SMD systems.2 In contrast, inlight of their shares of seats, opposition parties tend to be far more underrepresented in the legislature under majoritarian electoral systems than in
PR systems. Specifically, the distribution of opposition seats is extremely
skewed toward 0 percent of total seats in majoritarian electoral systems,
whereas seat shares tend to coincide with vote shares in PR systems. Opposition parties in the above-­mentioned country examples have indeed suffered from this pro-­regime seat bias and hence were extremely underrepresented under majoritarian electoral systems, relative to their vote shares.
Given that SMD systems generate significant, exclusive seat premiums
for dictators’ parties, one may be tempted to conclude that dictators’ natural choice of voting system is a majoritarian electoral system. However,reality paints a different picture. Figure 4.2 shows kernel density plots
depicting patterns of electoral systems in electoral authoritarian regimes
in general as well as those within each region. Here I use the effective
electoral threshold (EET) as the measure of electoral systems. EET mea1. The definition and operationalization of electoral authoritarian regimes is provided at
the beginning of section 4.5.
2. In the listed countries, ruling parties received more than 20 percent of seat premiumsin pure SMD systems.

Note: The data cover 83 electoral authoritarian countries from 1945 to 2010. Electoral authoritarian regimes are defined as autocracies wheremultiparty elections are held and certain degrees of pluralism and competition are allowed but wherein minimal democratic norms are severely
violated. Effective electoral threshold (EET) measures the proportion of votes that, for each electoral system, secures parliamentary representation
to any party with a probability of at least 50 percent (Boix 1999: 614). An EET of 37.5 percent is identical with the pure SMD system, and lower
values of EET indicate more proportional representation systems. Here, for descriptive purposes, I adopt EET = 10 as the threshold below which an
electoral system is categorized as a proportional system and otherwise a majoritarian system. Figures 4.1a and 4.1b represent ruling parties’ sharesof votes (straight line) and seats (dashed line), while figures 4.1c and 4.1d stand for those of opposition parties.

Fig. 4.1. Pro-­Regime SMD Seat Premiums in Parliamentary Elections of Electoral Autocracy

Note: The data cover 98 electoral authoritarian countries from 1945 to 2010. An EET of 37.5 percent is identical with the pure SMD system, and lower
values of EET indicate more PR systems.

Fig. 4.2. Patterns of Electoral Systems in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

Institutional Manipulation

107

sures the proportion of votes that, for each electoral system, secures parliamentary representation for any party with a probability of at least 50
percent (Boix 1999: 614), with higher values indicating more majoritarian
electoral systems (the maximum value is 37.5 percent, indicating the pure
SMD system).3
As the figures show, although the pure SMD system (EET = 37.5 percent) is a dominant form of electoral system, a significant portion of electoral autocracies also adopts PR systems (with low values of EET). Looking
at within-­region variations, electoral autocracies in Eastern Europe, Latin
America, North Africa, and the Middle East are more likely to adopt PR-­
based systems than those in sub-­Saharan Africa and Asia. Specifically, electoral authoritarian regimes including Mexico (1970–­2000), Guyana (1968–­
2006), Peru (1995–­2000), Brazil (1970–­78), Russia (2007–­14), Kazakhstan(2007–­), Burkina Faso (2002–­7), and Indonesia (1971–­97) represent only afraction of instances where some form of PR system was adopted and thus
election results were not tilted toward governing parties due to the pro-­regime seat bias.
The strong presence of the pro-­regime SMD seat premiums and dictators’ choice of PR systems posits an intriguing puzzle regarding electoral
systems in dictatorships: Why do some autocrats choose PR systems despite thefact that they are seemingly a suboptimal choice of electoral systems? Under what
conditions do authoritarian leaders change their electoral systems from SMD to
PR and vice versa? Before offering an answer to these puzzles of electoral
institutions in dictatorships, I first review what the literature has said about
determinants of electoral system reforms.

4.2. Literature on Electoral System Design

Scholars have accrued a sophisticated understanding of electoral systemchoice by mostly focusing on (1) political, (2) economic, and (3) historicalfactors based upon experiences of democratic countries. I suggest, however, that crucial differences between democracies and autocracies makeit difficult to directly apply the extant explanations to the authoritariancontext specifically.
Rokkan (1970) delivered the pioneering work on this matter. He proposed two political explanations regarding the adoption of PR in prewar
Europe. Rokkan’s first hypothesis argues that incumbents adopt PR systems
3. For more detailed discussions about the EET measure, see section 4.4.

108

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

to avoid a devastating electoral defeat in the face of socialist mobilization.
Boix (1999) advances this hypothesis and argues that ruling parties adopt
PR systems when they are seriously divided between the conservative andliberal camps. Rokkan’s second hypothesis, which has been taken up by
Calvo (2009), suggests that parties with a geographically concentrated distribution of votes enjoy more seats than those that have geographically dispersed votes under SMD systems. Therefore, the old parties with dispersed
votes prefer to shift to PR to moderate such seat biases.
Other scholars have focused on the distribution of economic interests. Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007) argue that whether right-­wing
parties adopt PR systems depends on the extent to which businesses andunions forge cooperative relationships through well-­established collective
bargaining. If right-­wing parties are embedded in cross-­class, consensus-­
based decision-­making processes, they can enjoy benefits from such regulatory politics, and thus the cross-­class alliances encourage governments tochoose PR systems. Rogowski (1987) argues that trade-­dependent countries are more likely to adopt PR systems. An open economy encourages
governments to resist protectionist pressures, maintain high efficiency, andretain high policy stability. In PR systems that tend to have larger electoral
districts, incumbents can contain regional and sectorial demands more
effectively, thus making governments in trade-­dependent countries preferPR systems.
Although these explanations are powerful in understanding the choiceof electoral systems in advanced democracies, it is difficult to directly apply
these insights to authoritarian contexts because all assume strong party
competition in democracies. Rokkan’s first hypothesis views strong socialist challenges as a driving force leading to the adoption of PR systems.4
Rokkan’s second hypothesis also assumes that strong party competition is
responsible for generating the seat bias. Similarly, the economic-­interest
explanation also presumes that distributional conflict among different
economic groups becomes severe in the face of strong party competition.
However, a crucial difference between democracies and autocracies is that
opposition parties in authoritarian states are mostly too weak to be a viable
alternative at elections. Put differently, these explanations are unable tooffer a compelling answer to the puzzle of electoral system change in dictatorships: why do some authoritarian leaders prefer PR systems despite
the fact that ruling parties do not need to worry about opposition parties?
4. Indeed, Boix recognized this, suggesting that his theoretical expectation is applicable
only to democracies (1999: 622).

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As a historical explanation, it has been argued that electoral systems
are highly path dependent. Especially in democracies, a dominant view isthat, once selected, electoral systems are surprisingly stable because thechoice of electoral system is strongly influenced by the stakes applicableto the preexisting parties (Cox 1998: 18).5 Certainly, electoral systems inelectoral authoritarian regimes also have such a path-­dependent characteristic. However, there have been significant reforms that changed electoral
systems in many electoral authoritarian regimes. This runs contrary to theexperience of mature democracies in which electoral systems have beenhighly stable. In autocracies, political leaders may have more discretion indesigning pliable electoral systems.6
Scholars have recently begun to explore the choice of electoral systems in authoritarian regimes.7 In their pioneering research, Lust-­Okar
and Jamal (2002) argue that the type of authoritarian regime shapes dictators’ preferences over electoral rules in the Middle East. Since monarchies
rely less on popular support and their political stability depends upon the
power balance among competing forces, monarchs prefer electoral systems
that allow them to remain in place as key arbitrators. By contrast, party-­
based regimes rely more directly on popular politics, and thus leaders in
5. For example, Tsebelis (1990) argues that extant electoral systems may shape the interestsof legislators within each party, which makes it difficult to change electoral systems, even if
an alternative electoral system is rational for parties as a whole. Based on this insight, recent
literature argues that ruling parties may change more specific and micro-­level electoral rulesin their favor. For instance, McElwain (2008) shows that incumbent politicians tended toenjoy advantages in elections by restricting the lengths of electoral campaign periods in Japan.
6. As another historical factor, researchers have focused upon the nature of regime transitions, contending that periods of democratic transitions render it problematic for electoral
systems to have expected institutional effects. Specifically, scholars have shown that electoral
system change in transitioning states does not lead reformers to gain benefits that they initially expected because the effects of electoral reforms are highly uncertain in those countries
where democratic institutions are still immature (Przeworski 1991; Remington and Smith
1996; Moser 2001; Andrews and Jackman 2005). In authoritarian regimes, however, electoral
institutions have high certainty about how they work, at least compared to those in transitioning countries. In stark contrast with the findings in new democracies, a large body of literature
on authoritarian elections demonstrates that electoral rules help dictators consolidate theirpower (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-­Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011). Specifically, in discussing
electoral systems in the Middle East, Lust-­Okar and Jamal (2002) note: “Both sides [incumbents and oppositions] know their preferences over the electoral rules. . . . PR and larger
member districts tend to increase the number of effective parties and the possibility of minority representation, whereas majoritarian systems and SMD tend to limit the participation ofsmaller parties. . . . Elites hold firm preferences over electoral laws when they negotiate witheach other” (345–­46).
7. Regarding differences in electoral systems between democracy and autocracy, Bielasiak(2006) finds that in the postcommunist world, democracy and semi-­authoritarian states tend
to adopt PR systems or mixed systems while more authoritarian states adopt SMD systems.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

these regimes have incentives to choose electoral rules that favor their party
while also keeping the opposition fragmented. Meanwhile, Diaz-­Cayeros
and Magaloni (2001) argue that Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party(PRI) shifted from a pure majoritarian system to a mixed-­member system,
because the PR portion reduces the incentive for the opposition to coordinate, while the SMD portion helps the PRI obtain a disproportionate
share of seats. Comparing Central Asian countries, Jones Luong (2002)
argues that political actors’ perception of power plays an important role indesigning electoral systems: when a political actor expects their power will
increase vis-­à-­vis other actors, they propose electoral rules that are favorable to themselves, and other actors are likely to accept them.8
This chapter expands upon these insights to increase our understanding of the origins of electoral institutions in autocracies. Theoretically, myargument builds on Lust-­Okar and Jamal’s (2002) and Diaz-­Cayeros andMagaloni’s (2001) contributions on the costs and benefits of different electoral systems as well as Jones Luong’s (2002) focus on the distribution of
power between a dictator and other actors within a given system. Specifically, by highlighting dictators’ differing abilities to derive public support
from the masses, I posit novel hypotheses for electoral autocrats’ choiceof electoral systems. Empirically, I expand the sample beyond the Middle
East, Central Asia, and Mexico to include virtually all of the world’s electoral autocracies.

4.3. The Costs and Benefits of SMD and PR in Authoritarian Regimes

To stay in power at the ballot box, dictators employ various techniques
to manufacture a landslide victory and deter potential challengers. As I
investigated in chapter 3, electoral violence, ballot stuffing, media bias,
voter intimidation, and the packing of election management bodies are all
examples of blatant electoral fraud. Autocrats may also engage in economic
maneuvering prior to elections, thereby engineering political businesscycles through the provisions of pork and patronage. This will be closely
examined in chapter 5.
8. In a recent review article, Gandhi and Heller (2018) offer useful information concerning elections and electoral rules in authoritarian regimes. They highlight various formal andinformal constraints under which dictators engage in electoral system designs. Particularly,
they argue that the frequent use of electoral coercion and manipulation in authoritarianregimes severely worsens the information problems, which in turn make it difficult for dictators to find the optimal electoral rule.

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111

One crucial—­yet less explored—­strategy of electioneering by dictators
is the choice of electoral system. Many studies have documented various
political and economic effects associated with different electoral systems.
For instance, in democracies, PR systems are more likely to lead to higher
turnout, less strategic voting, and higher government spending and deficits, as well as greater income equality (Persson and Tabellini 2004; Iversen
and Soskice 2006). Similarly, in authoritarian regimes, I posit that different
electoral systems have different effects that are pertinent to authoritarian rule. In other words, dictators strategically choose electoral systems tomeet their political needs and priorities.
Given the electoral dilemma found in dictatorships, autocrats consider
carefully the certainty of winning big and the credibility of election results.
SMD systems provide the pro-­regime seat premiums, thereby increasing
the likelihood of dictators winning elections overwhelmingly. That said,
the adoption of SMD systems is also accompanied by several side effects
that may undermine the credibility of election results. By contrast, PR systems proportionally allocate seats in parliament according to political parties’ share of votes, thereby increasing the credibility of election results.
This feature, however, makes it more difficult for governing parties to win
big at elections, because they are unable to receive any pro-­regime seatbias generated by institutional manipulation. Put differently, SMD systems
help dictators boost their ability to co-­opt ruling elites through legislature at the cost of electoral credibility, while PR systems’ proportionality
contributes to the dividing of opposition parties and the enhancement ofpolitical legitimacy of the regimes while sacrificing electoral margins.
Pro-­Regime Seat Premiums under SMD Systems:Co-­opting Ruling Elites through Legislature

SMD systems enable dictators to incorporate large portions of ruling elites
into the legislature as an institutionalized rent-­seeking mechanism. Specifically, SMD helps dictators co-­opt ruling elites by solving the commitment
problem, which appears when ruling elites suspect dictators will renege
on the rents and economic privileges given to them. As a way of making
a credible commitment to elites, dictators can institutionalize legislaturesto credibly guarantee a long-­lasting provision of rents from the regime(Lust-­Okar 2008). I add to this literature by emphasizing the advantages
derived from electoral systems. SMD systems allow dictators to retain
a larger pool of legislative seats for ruling elites due to high seats-­votes
disproportionalities.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

SMD systems generate the pro-­regime seat premiums through threemechanisms.9 First, essentially, Duverger’s (1954) well-­known mechanicaland psychological effects from majoritarian electoral systems yield a significant seat bias to the governing party in dictatorships. That is, expecting that a large portion of seats will not be guaranteed to opposition parties due to the high disproportionality of SMD systems (i.e., mechanicaleffects), voters may cast their ballot for the ruling party or abstain fromvoting altogether (i.e., psychological effects).
Second, SMD systems also allow authoritarian leaders to gerrymander electoral districts, leading to further generating seat biases in favor of
the ruling party. In SMD systems where governments are able to design
every single electoral district, dictators are more likely to engage in gerrymandering to favor the ruling parties. Conversely, in PR systems, districtmagnitude is large in number while the electoral districts tend to be geographically wide and are often fixed with administrative units. Therefore,ruling parties have less discretion to redistrict in these scenarios. Examples of extensive gerrymandering under majoritarian electoral systems are
too numerous to list. Ruling parties in mid-­nineteenth-­century Europe
resorted to redistricting to maintain electoral dominance under SMD systems (A. Ahmed 2013). In Hong Kong, the government redraws electoralboundaries that pro-­democracy opposition parties control as their strongholds (Wong 2019). The Kenya African National Union’s home provinces
enjoyed a large portion of parliamentary seats due to constituency gerrymandering under Daniel arap Moi’s rule, helping him hold onto power(Omolo 2002: 219). Washida (2018: chap. 7) demonstrates that Malaysia’s
Barisan Nasional (BN) tended to break apart overrepresented supportingbases to export their supporters to neighboring constituencies where theparty’s popular support was relatively weak.
Third, due to the leeway to commit gerrymandering and the vulnerability of small electoral districts to population change, SMD systems are
more likely to suffer high levels of malapportionment, leading to seat bias
in favor of the ruling party. Malapportionment, which is “the discrepancy
between the shares of legislative seats and the shares of population held by
9. In addition to the effects of electoral systems on national aggregates of parties’ voteshares, geographical distribution of public support for political parties may also matter for the
dictator’s calculus over electoral system choice. However, as the ruling party’s dominance is
far more likely to prevail across regions in dictatorships than in advanced democracies, SMD
systems are unlikely to induce strong partisan bias, as argued by Calvo (2009). Empirically,systematically collecting district-­level data on the distribution of votes and seats in dictatorships is highly intractable. For these reasons, I focus on the national-­level mechanisms ofelectoral systems in dictatorships.

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113

geographical units” (Samuels and Snyder 2001: 652), aids autocrats in winning elections overwhelmingly by increasing the value of a vote primarily
within the ruling party’s strongholds. By contrast, under PR systems, andin particular the ones with a nationwide electoral district, governing parties are unable to manipulate district magnitude according to numbers ofconstituents. Indeed, cross-­national analyses on malapportionment suggestthat whether a country adopts SMD systems is a strong predictor of highlevels of malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder 2001; Horiuchi 2004).
Electoral authoritarian countries are, in particular, more likely to suffer
legislative malapportionment than countries with advanced democracies(Ong, Kasuya, and Mori 2017). According to Boone and Wahman (2015),
African electoral autocracies with SMD systems, such as the Gambia andTanzania, have maintained malapportioned electoral districts by assigning
more seats to rural areas. Malaysia’s redistricting under the BN rule significantly inflated the electoral weight of regime supporters and reduced thevalue of a vote in the opposition’s support bases, contributing to generating
the pro-­regime seat premiums under an SMD system (Washida 2018).
Taken together, these three mechanisms aid SMD systems in biasing election results toward the ruling party in authoritarian regimes. The
pro-­regime seat premium under SMD systems is nicely illustrated by theexamples of Singapore, Malaysia, and Tajikistan. Between 1959 and 2008,
the People’s Action Party in Singapore and the BN in Malaysia obtained
87 percent of the total seats with only 63 percent of the total votes. Thanks
to the strong pro-­regime seat premium, both parties have remained electorally dominant since independence. In the same vein, Tajikistan’s 2015
parliamentary elections produced a significant seat premium to the ruling
People’s Democratic Party; although the ruling party obtained only 65.2
percent of votes in the portion of PR, the party secured 85.3 percent ofseats in the SMD portion, leading to an overwhelming election victorywith 81 percent of seat shares in total (OSCE 2015: 30).
Cross-­national analysis provides evidence on the pro-­regime seat premium in authoritarian regimes.10 Here, electoral system types are measured by the EET index originally proposed by Lijphart (1994). Since
Boix’s (1999) seminal study, scholars have adopted this measure to explore
the determinants of electoral systems. Conceptually, EET measures “theproportion of votes that, for each electoral system, secures parliamentary
10. I estimate random effects ordinary least squares (RE-­OLS), with robust standard errors
clustered by country. As the number of observations within a unit (country) is very small (mean= 3.7, maximum at 15), and models include sluggish independent variables (EET and logged
total seats), RE estimators yield lower variance than FE estimators (Clark and Linzer 2015).

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

TABLE 4.1. Pro-­Regime Seat Premiums in SMD Systems
Model 1RE-­OLS

Estimator
Dependent variable
Effective electoral
threshold (EET)
Share of ruling party votes
EET*Share of rulingparty votes
Share of independents
votes
Logged total seats
Constant
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
R-­squared
Observations
Number of countries

Model 2
RE-­OLS
Ruling party’s seatpremium

Model 3
RE-­OLS
Ruling party’s seatpremium

0.138(0.0864)0.143**(0.0705)−0.0496(0.0500)

0.0123(0.101)−1.629(1.300)20.94**(8.226)
Yes
16.36
0.083
309
83

0.118
(0.113)−0.765(1.144)7.682(7.145)Yes
31.41***
0.102
311
83

−0.162(0.197)−0.142*(0.0755)
0.00506(0.00313)
0.154(0.105)−1.061(1.111)14.77**(7.375)Yes
35.49***
0.119
311
83

Disproportionality

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables are available in appendix A4.

representation to any party with a probability of at least 50 percent” (Boix
1999: 614). Operationally,
EET =

75%
M+1

where M represents average district magnitude in a country-­year. As thecountry’s electoral system becomes more proportional, the value of EET
becomes smaller.11
As seen in figure 4.1, shares of votes and seats tend to coincide for ruling and opposition parties under PR systems, whereas under SMD systems,
seat shares are highly skewed toward 100 percent for ruling parties andtoward 0 percent for opposition parties. To provide more rigorous evidence, table 4.1 shows the results of regression analyses in which I test the
impact of SMD systems after controlling for relevant confounders.12 The
11. When EET is lower than the legal threshold that often exists in PR systems, I use thelegal threshold as the EET in the country.
12. Model specifications are based upon Lijphart (1994).

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115

findings corroborate the idea of the pro-­regime seat premiums in dictatorships with SMD systems.
Interestingly, when the dependent variable is the disproportionality
index that measures discrepancies between seats and votes of both rulingand opposition parties (Model 1), SMD systems do not have a statisticallysignificant impact.13 However, when the dependent variable measures gaps
between seats and votes of ruling parties, SMD systems are positively associated with the dependent variable (Model 2). For example, when a country
adopts the pure SMD system (EET = 37.5 percent), ruling parties obtain
4.64 percent more seats, compared to the scenario where a country adopts
a PR system with the 5 percent of legal threshold. These results suggestthat SMD systems bias election results only in favor of ruling parties.
Further analysis also shows that the pro-­regime seat premiums in SMD
systems have a positive feedback character, suggesting that dictators withhigh mobilization capabilities may not value the pro-­regime seat premiums. Namely, the more votes autocrats acquire, the more seat premiums
they receive. Model 3 in table 4.1 estimates an interaction model to show
how the effect of EET on ruling parties’ seats-­votes elasticity changes
depending on vote shares that ruling parties obtain at elections. The interaction term is positive, suggesting that the seat premiums become larger ifruling parties are able to mobilize a large number of supporters at elections(see fig. 4.3). For instance, if a dictator adopts an SMD system (EET = 37.5
percent) and the ruling parties obtain 65 percent of total votes in elections,then the ruling parties receive 5.3 percent more seats as compared to thescenario when it adopts a PR system with the 5 percent EET and the same
65 percent vote. In contrast, when ruling parties get more vote shares, say,
85 percent of total votes, SMD provides 8.54 percent more seats than a PR
system with the 5 percent of EET. This result suggests a possibility that
dictators who can mobilize a large number of regime supporters may notneed to adopt a majoritarian electoral system.
Figure 4.3 also provides additional evidence that SMD systems do notnecessarily bring a big swing in favor of opposition parties—­even if ruling parties are weak. The coefficient of the EET does turn negative if theruling parties’ vote share is less than about 30 percent, yet the effect is notdistinguishable from 0 at the 0.05 level, even when vote shares of ruling
13. In advanced democracies, majoritarian electoral systems are the most powerful predictor of high disproportionality (Lijphart 1994; Moser and Scheiner 2012). Disproportionality
is measured according to the disproportionality index in which both ruling and opposition
parties are included.

116

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 4.3. Pro-­Regime Seat Premiums and Ruling Parties’ Vote Shares
Note: The dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The estimation results are based onModel 3.

parties are located from 0 to 30 percent.14 The overall results again support
the theoretical assumption posited by my theory. Specifically, contrary to
Rokkan’s (1970) and Boix’s (1999) theoretical expectations, SMD systems
do not necessarily backfire on authoritarian rulers with high disproportionality in electoral authoritarianism. The evidence here suggests thateven if ruling parties are not capable of reaching the majority of total votes,
authoritarian rulers could contain opposition surges in elections by engaging in other institutional manipulation techniques such as gerrymanderingand malapportionment.
Benefits of PR Systems: Divide and Rule the Opposition
and Demonstrate Regime Invincibility

Although PR systems do not generate extra seats for the incumbent, they
contribute to improving the credibility of election results, which then gen14. Such countries include Ecuador (2002), Peru (1990), East Germany (1990), Albania(1992), Cyprus (1970), Russia (1995), Belarus (2000, 2004, 2008), Liberia (2005), Kenya(1992), Iraq (2010), South Korea (1950), and Pakistan (1985).

Institutional Manipulation

117

erates two benefits of autocratic elections identified in chapter 2: namely,
the divide-­and-­rule effects and the demonstration effects. As a result, PR
demands that dictators have higher levels of mobilization capabilities towin big, yet it is proportionality that brings these two benefits together
such that they contribute to stabilizing authoritarian rule.
The Divide-­and-­Rule EffectPR systems render the opposition’s coordination difficult and thus
improve the divide-­and-­rule function of autocratic elections. Since theopposition in authoritarian regimes can win seats with smaller voteshares under PR systems, they are more willing to participate in politics
within the existing institutional framework(s) than they are to adopt an
extremist or anti-­system approach. In this sense, PR renders dictators’
institutional co-­optation strategies toward the opposition even more
effective. Importantly, the opposition groups participating in elections
are less likely to coordinate their electoral campaigns to build a pre-­electoral opposition coalition precisely because of the seat-­vote proportionality. Barbera (2013) echoes this proposition and shows that PR tends
to increase the number of opposition parties in authoritarian countries.
Under SMD systems, however, opposition parties have stronger incentives to coordinate their election efforts in order to remain electorally
viable (Golder 2006). Even in an autocracy, SMD systems promote opposition coordination. For instance, in the 2003 Georgian election with apure SMD system, the two main opposition parties formed a coalition
prior to the election. In the midst of political apathy and discontent, thepre-­electoral coalition played an important role in successfully mobilizing protests against President Shevardnadze and ensuring the success of
the Rose Revolution (Welt 2006).
I explicitly test the validity of this relationship and examine whetherpre-­electoral opposition coalitions are less likely to emerge under PR
systems. Here, the dependent variable is whether a pre-­electoral opposition coalition is formed. I use Gandhi and Reuter’s (2013: 143) measure of
opposition coalition making, which is a dichotomous variable coded as 1
“if there was a significant pre-­electoral coalition among opposition parties,
and 0 otherwise.” The main independent variable is the EET.
Table 4.2 shows the results of random effects probit regression (REprobit).15 As expected, the EET is positively correlated with the proba15. Because the dependent variable is binary, I adopt a probit estimator. Employing fixed
effects probit regression drops a significant number of countries wherein the dependent variable does not vary over time, which risks sample selection bias. Given this, I estimate RE
probit to consider unit heterogeneity. For model specifications, I follow Gandhi and Reuter

118

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

TABLE 4.2. Electoral Systems and the Formation of Pre-­Electoral Opposition
Coalitions in Electoral Autocracy
Estimator
Effective electoral threshold(EET)
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Age of largest opposition
Number of opposition parties
Ruling party seat shares (lagged)
Parliamentarism
Ethno-­Linguistic
Fractionalization
Economic growth (lagged)
Logged GDP per capita (lagged)
Election violence
Opposition coalition(last election)
Constant
Time fixed effects
Region fixed effects
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Number of countries

Model 1
RE probit

Model 2
RE probit

0.0364**(0.0176)−0.0699(0.0580)0.148**(0.0577)
0.0699**(0.0329)0.0118(0.00828)−0.217(0.458)1.915**(0.855)0.0180(0.0269)−0.0795(0.146)−0.0610(0.311)0.0398***(0.0128)−0.0641(0.0523)0.169***(0.0488)0.0496(0.0399)
0.0220**(0.0103)−1.054**(0.436)
1.499*(0.772)−0.00636(0.0275)−0.00200(0.126)0.445(0.373)
1.486***(0.470)−7.051***(2.597)
Yes
Yes−43.96168
55−5.108*(2.754)
Yes
Yes−69.32
226
71

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Descriptive statistics of thevariables are available in appendix A4.

bility of pre-­electoral opposition coalition making in both models, suggesting that in PR systems opposition parties are less likely to form coalitions before elections. Figure 4.4 graphically illustrates this result basedon Model 2 in table 4.2. When the EET is 5 percent, the probability of(2013), the most comprehensive analysis on pre-­electoral coalition making in nondemocracies. Although their sample is all nondemocracies (1946–­2006), I limit the sample to electoral
authoritarian regimes. Based on Gandhi and Reuter’s (2013) model specification, I include
ethno-­linguistic fractionalization, number of opposition parties, parliamentarism, age of thelargest opposition parties, economic growth (one year lagged), logged total population (oneyear lagged), election violence, ruling party’s share of seats in the previous elections, natural
resource wealth (one year lagged), and five regional dummies.

Institutional Manipulation

119

Fig. 4.4. Electoral Systems and Predicted Probabilities of Pre-­Electoral Opposition
Coalitions
Note: The dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The graph is based on Model 1.

opposition coalition making is only 1 percent. When a country adopts an
SMD system (EET = 37.5 percent), the probability of coalition increases toa maximum level of 12.5 percent. This suggests that electoral systems arealso important when it comes to explaining how opposition coordination
functions in electoral authoritarian regimes.
The Demonstration Effect
The second advantage of adopting PR systems is that PR helps dictators
effectively legitimize elections and autocratic regimes, thereby enhancing
the demonstration effects of autocratic elections. In general, PR systems
are associated with higher turnouts, because they have low barriers of entry
into politics (Jackman 1987). Even voters in electoral autocracies have agreater incentive to vote in PR elections, since fewer votes are wasted; thatis, there is the sense that one’s vote will count in some way, albeit not necessarily directly. Importantly, high turnout is crucial for dictators, since
winning an election with high turnout reinforces the regime’s popularity
and underscores its invincibility (Magaloni 2006). De Miguel, Jamal, andTessler (2015: 1363) note that in the recent Egyptian elections, the election
had to be extended for an additional day to bolster turnout. According to120

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box
TABLE 4.3. Electoral Systems and Voter Turnout in Electoral
Autocracy
Estimator
Effective electoral threshold (EET)
Parliamentarism
Election violence
Ethno-­Linguistic Fractionalization
Opposition’s election boycott
Election fraud (NELDA11)
Logged GDP per capita (lagged)
Constant
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
R-­squared
Observations
Number of countries

Model 1RE-­OLS−0.183*(0.104)5.857**(2.690)−1.655(1.827)0.0436(6.316)−2.414(2.390)−2.233(1.900)3.013**(1.460)62.93***(13.63)
Yes
47.03***
0.15
314
82

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p< 0.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables are available in appendix A4.

news reports, many voters “stayed home due to political apathy, opposition
to another military man becoming president, discontent at suppressionof freedoms among liberal youth, and calls for a boycott by Islamists.” In
addition to increasing voter turnout, PR systems also significantly narrow
the gap between shares of votes and seats. All things being equal, this is
more likely to legitimize election results because election results represent
a more exact reflection of the dictator’s strength than those under SMD
systems, which produce pro-­regime seat biases. In short, by promoting
higher turnout and reducing the pro-­regime seat premiums, PR systems
render greater legitimacy to authoritarian regimes through election results
and, hence, deter not only mass countermobilizations but also politicaldivisions within ruling coalitions. Alternatively, SMD systems suppress
turnout: low turnout could further breed citizens’ apathy and discontent
toward the authoritarian regime.
To solidify this claim, I conducted a cross-­national analysis to test

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121

whether PR systems help dictators to mobilize voters at elections.16 As
expected, the EET is negatively correlated with voter turnout. The turnout model suggests that a 1 percent increase in EET decreases turnout by
0.18 percent (with the 10 percent statistical significance). This implies thatturnout in a pure SMD system (EET = 37.5) is 5.85 percent lower thanthat in a PR system with 5 percent legal threshold (EET = 5). In line withrobust findings in democracies (Jackman 1987; Blais 2006), PR systems
also boost voter turnout in electoral authoritarianism.

4.4. The Dictator’s Mobilization Capabilities and theStrategic Choice of Electoral Systems

The discussion so far suggests that different electoral systems provide different advantages for dictators. SMD systems help autocrats to acquire seatpremiums and facilitate co-­optation toward ruling elites, thereby improving the prospect of winning big. PR systems, conversely, equip dictators to
weaken the opposition and legitimize their regime by increasing the credibility of electoral processes and election results. Precisely because different
electoral systems offer different benefits, I argue that dictators strategicallyselect electoral systems based on their political needs and priorities.
Specifically, I contend that dictators’ optimal choice of electoral systems crucially depends on dictators’ capabilities of mobilizing public support. Autocrats who can mobilize public support do not need to rely on thepro-­regime seat premiums obtained by adopting SMD systems. Instead,they are more likely to prefer PR systems, because dictators with highpublic support can utilize PR systems to co-­opt the opposition and gain
greater political legitimacy while maintaining political dominance in thelegislature.
Dictators’ resources and capacity advantages can fluctuate over time.
While dictators may be able to gain a high level of public support on any
given day, they are likely to question themselves as to whether they canstill hold onto their influences and resources in the future. Under such
16. Given a short time series (the mean number of observations within unit [country] is
3.8 with the maximum being 14) and some independent variables that rarely change overtime, I employ a RE-­OLS estimator with robust standard errors clustered by country. For
model specification, I include half-­decade dummies and a host of other controls (i.e., parliamentarism, election violence, ethnic fractionalization, opposition boycott, election fraud, andlogged GDP per capita).

122

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

circumstances, dictators with high mobilization capabilities are incentivized to lock in their current political advantages by choosing PR systems.
In other words, autocrats use PR to project their current strengths tonon-­electoral periods all the way up to the next elections. They do so bycapitalizing on the ability of PR systems to divide the opposition parties(i.e., the divide-­and-­rule effects of autocratic elections). Furthermore, byincreasing turnout and winning big without the seat premiums, PR helps
dictators demonstrate their popularity, legitimize the regime, and, mostimportantly, preempt future challenges (i.e., the demonstration effects ofautocratic elections).
Conversely, autocrats who are unable to derive popular support are
more likely to adopt SMD systems to maintain legislative dominance,
because the failure to obtain an overwhelming majority in parliament may
reveal certain weaknesses of their regimes. Consider, for example, Zafy’s
Madagascar, where he lost a majority in the 1993 legislative elections undera PR system, allowing the opposition to challenge and defeat him in the1996 presidential elections. Levitsky and Way (2010: 63) also suggest thatlosing legislative control in authoritarian regimes can result in critical consequences for the dictator. In this respect, the pro-­regime seat premiums
under SMD systems help autocrats expand institutionalized rent-­seeking
opportunities for a broader range of ruling elites, which in turn is conducive to co-­opting ruling elites. Indeed, Svolik (2012) demonstrates that
more than two-­thirds of dictators are forced from power by ruling elites.
Under such circumstances, weak dictators have greater incentives to boost
their seat share by using SMD systems, given that these additional seats
grant those dictators extra bargaining chips by which they can co-­opt theirpotential challengers. In this regard, SMD systems ensure that ruling elites,
the most imminent threat to autocrats, remain loyal to the regime to thegreatest extent possible.
Based on my theory of autocratic elections, it is possible to derive an
empirical implication: A dictator’s high (low) mobilization capabilities lead to an
adoption of PR (majoritarian) electoral systems. In measuring the concept of adictator’s mobilization capabilities, I focus on three factors, in identical fashion to chapter 3: (1) discretionary financial resources, (2) disciplinary organizations, and (3) the opposition’s capabilities of mobilizing the masses.
Discretionary Financial Resources

A dictator has a high mobilization capability if he has discretionary financial resources enabling him to distribute goodies to the citizenry. Resource-­

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rich dictators are able to mobilize public support by engaging in the distribution of patronage and club goods (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Desai,
Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009; Morrison 2009). In contrast, it is more difficult for resource-­poor dictators to spend a lot on public expenditure due tobudgetary constraints; hence, they must find other ways to ensure an overwhelming election victory. Importantly, I argue that resource-­rich dictators
are incentivized to use PR systems, while resource-­poor dictators cannot
help relying on SMD systems. With their abundant resources to mobilize mass support, resource-­rich dictators can reasonably expect to win theelection with a large vote share. Under such circumstances, autocrats areless dependent on the seat premium produced by SMD systems. In otherwords, resource-­rich dictators can afford to employ PR because they canmanage to obtain a landslide victory and win enough seats to co-­opt ruling elites without the SMD’s pro-­regime seat bonus. Importantly, since
resource-­rich dictators are less dependent on the SMD seat premium, they
can take advantage of PR to divide and rule the opposition and enhanceturnout and regime legitimacy, which enable autocrats to project the current strength to the future.
Hypothesis 4.1: Resource-­rich autocrats are more likely to adopt PR systems.
Disciplinary Organizations

The extent to which autocrats are able and willing to provide patronage
and public goods to the citizenry may depend not only on the amount of
discretionary financial resources available but also on organizational bases
through which they can effectively “trickle down” goodies to the masses.
Strong organizational bases such as dominant party regimes or less fractionalized dominant ethnic groups may ensure dictators’ capabilities in making
effective provisions of patronage and pork in two ways. First, these politicalorganizations may be useful in disciplining ruling elites who are tempted totake opportunistic behaviors and put delegated resources in their pockets,once they are asked to allocate those resources to citizens. For example,
through incentivizing ruling elites not to undertake such opportunistic
behaviors by monitoring and/or institutionalizing merit-­based career promotion systems, well-­institutionalized ruling parties may enable dictators
to prevent ruling elites from engaging in political corruption and thereby
streamline economic distribution toward the populace. Second, politicalorganizations that have extensive networks at the grassroots level enableauthoritarian leaders to reach out to a wider range of regime supporters

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while using monitoring mechanisms that such networks may strengthen.
Thus, utilizing such networks, autocrats are able to effectively distributeresource wealth that they possess to potential regime supporters.
When resource wealth meets with such strong organizational bases,
authoritarian leaders are able to use discretionary financial resources tomobilize public support through the effective distribution of patronage.
Conversely, when autocrats have abundant natural resources but lackstrong organizational bases, natural resource wealth may become lesseffective in mobilizing public support because those resources are likely to
be exploited by middle-­level politicians and/or voters to free ride on theprovision of club goods without voting for the ruling party or by abstaining
from voting altogether. Importantly, I predict that autocrats who have bothnatural resource wealth and strong organizational bases are more likely
to prefer PR to SMD, compared to those with only rich natural resource
wealth. Armed with both abundant resources and disciplinary organizations, autocrats can mobilize public support much more extensively, lessening the needs for pro-­regime seat premiums as found under SMD systems.
To further consolidate their regimes, such autocrats are more likely to seek
the benefits of autocratic elections, that is, to divide and rule opposition
parties and enhance regime legitimacy by scoring high turnout.
Hypothesis 4.2: The likelihood that resource-­rich dictators adopt PR systems is likely to increase if they possess strong organizational bases.
The Opposition’s Ability to Mobilize the Masses

The extent to which autocrats are able to mobilize public support also
hinges on the opposition’s capabilities of gathering political support fromthe masses. When the opposition has a greater ability to mobilize votes
in multiparty elections, competing ruling parties are likely to reduce
vote shares in those elections. If opposition parties are strong enough tothreaten ruling parties’ overwhelming victories and thus ruling parties
expect that they are unable to maintain supermajorities in the current
electoral system, then dictators will consider adopting an alternative, more
majoritarian electoral system that will lead to a larger seat bonus in favorof ruling parties. Put differently, in electoral authoritarian regimes, when
the opposition is expected to obtain a relatively high level of political support from the citizenry, dictators may be inclined to adopt a majoritarian
electoral system.
Intriguingly, this theoretical expectation is starkly different from that in

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advanced democracies. The literature suggests that when opposition parties are strong, ruling parties are more likely to adopt a PR system thatprevents the opposition from achieving a landslide victory (Boix 1999). In
contrast, in electoral authoritarian regimes, SMD systems are more likely
to bring seat premiums exclusive to ruling parties, because in most cases
opposition parties are not strong enough to enjoy seat premiums generated
by SMD systems. In the situation where government alternation throughelections is a remote possibility, SMD systems are likely to serve as a safetyvalve for dictators to maintain their legislative dominance through the pro-­regime seat bias.
Hypothesis 4.3: Robust opposition threats encourage autocrats to adopt
SMD systems.

4.5. Cross-­National Statistical Analysis of Institutional Manipulation
Sample: Electoral Authoritarianism

To test the aforementioned three hypotheses, I focus on electoral authoritarian regimes from 1949 to 2009. From among the authoritarian regimes
identified by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), I limit my focus to electoral authoritarian regimes. Following Schedler (2002), I define electoral
authoritarianism as those autocratic states where multiparty elections areheld and certain degrees of pluralism and competition are allowed, butwherein minimal democratic norms are severely violated. I use two data
sources to identify electoral authoritarian regimes. The first source is the
National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA). Hyde and Marinov (2012) regard elections as minimally competitive if there is ex ante
uncertainty over election results. More specifically, elections are minimallycompetitive if (1) multiple parties are legal, (2) more than two candidates
are allowed to stand in electoral districts, and (3) the opposition is allowed
to participate in the election. I use these criteria to distinguish electoral
autocracies from closed autocracies on the spectrum of authoritarianregimes.
NELDA’s operationalization is useful because it provides us with a large
number of countries over an extensive time period. It does not include
countries where political parties are de jure illegal but rather where relevant political groups function as de facto political parties (e.g., Jordan,
Kuwait, Swaziland, and Uganda). I therefore complement NELDA with

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Svolik’s (2012) dataset on the concentration of legislative power in authoritarian systems. Using Svolik’s data, I count autocratic countries as electoral authoritarian if multiple political actors, including both partisan andnonpartisan opposition groups, compete in a legislative election. Taken
together, if a country meets the criteria in either one of the two datasets, I
regard the country as an electoral authoritarian regime.
Dependent Variable: Effective Electoral Threshold

As I briefly discussed in the previous sections, the core dependent variable, electoral system type, is measured by the EET index. As the country’s
electoral system becomes more proportional, the value of EET becomes
smaller. In our sample, EET ranges from 0.74 percent (Iraq, where districtmagnitude is 275) to 37.5 percent (e.g., Singapore [1968–­91] and Zimbabwe). When EET is lower than the legal threshold that often exists in PR
systems, I use the legal threshold as the EET in that particular country.
Figure 4.5 shows time-­series variations in EET found in both electoral autocracies and democracies. Interestingly, in the sample of electoral
authoritarian regimes, the average EET has been declining over time, indicating that more countries have adopted PR systems particularly following the end of the Cold War. Yet, the SMD system (EET = 37.5) is still
the dominant choice among electoral authoritarian countries. In contrast,electoral systems in democracies are more permissive and tend to be morestable over time. Upon closer examination, I also found that out of theninety electoral system reforms in electoral authoritarian regimes, fifty-­
two experienced shifts to more proportional systems, whereas thirty-­eightcases changed to more majoritarian systems.
Independent Variables

To reiterate, I argue that dictators’ optimal choice of electoral systems
depends on the extent to which they have resources and the capability toobtain mass support relative to the opposition, which is captured by (1)discretionary financial resources, (2) disciplinary organizations, and (3) the
opposition’s strength. To be consistent with the previous two chapters, I
use the same variables to operationalize these three subcomponents of the
dictator’s mobilization capabilities. To tap into the dictator’s discretionary
financial resources, I focus on natural resource wealth (Hypothesis 4.1).
To operationalize natural resource wealth, I use Ross’s (2012) variableof oil-­gas value per capita, calculated by taking the product of a country’s

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Fig. 4.5. Time-­Series Change in the Effective Electoral Thresholdtotal oil-­gas production and the current oil-­gas price and dividing by total
population.
To test Hypothesis 4.2, I introduce an interaction term of the oil-­gas variable and dictators’ organizational bases. In a careful review, Ross
(2015) concludes that abundant natural resources provide ruling elites
with opportunities to receive rents and thus engage in expropriating thoseresources. If that is the case, then the mere existence of natural resource
wealth may not guarantee that dictators are able to reach the masses withmaterial benefits. Echoing the analyses given in chapters 2 and 3, organizational bases are empirically assessed from two angles: (1) party-­basedorganizations and (2) ethnicity-­based networks. For party organizations,
I use a dummy variable based on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) tocode party-­based regimes, while setting personalist regimes as the reference category.17 I expect that dictators with natural resource wealth are
17. Personalist regimes are the ones where dictators are least likely to be constrained bypolitical institutions in credible ways (Geddes 2003; Wright and Escribà-­Folch 2012). Therefore, this regime works as the best reference category to investigate differences in the effectof natural resource wealth between dictators with strong political organizations and those
without such organizations. The dummy variable of monarchy regimes is dropped from theanalysis due to collinearity.

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more likely to adopt PR systems when dictators are armed with dominantparties. For ethnicity-­based networks, I use the size and cohesiveness of
dominant ethnic groups—­the EOP of dictators. The variable has a lower
value, as ethnic groups in ethnic coalitions occupy a smaller portion of total
population and as ethnic coalitions are composed of more ethnic groups. I
expect that resource-­rich dictators with larger, less fractionalized dominantethnic coalitions are more likely to adopt PR systems than those without
such ethnic coalitions.
I hypothesize that stronger opposition threats increase the likelihoodthat autocrats adopt majoritarian electoral systems in the contexts of electoral authoritarian regimes (Hypothesis 4.3). To be consistent with theanalyses in chapters 2 and 3, I use the number of anti-­government collective action events (riots, demonstration, and strikes) as a proxy for opposition threats. Anti-­regime collective actions, once successfully mobilized,
can be very threatening to authoritarian regimes. Based on Banks and Wilson’s (2019) Cross-­National Time-­Series Data Archive, I calculate a three-­year moving average of the number of riots, strikes, and demonstrations.
Control Variables

To control for confounders that may affect the relationship between electoral system choice and my independent variables of interest, I introduce
a couple of control variables. First, one may argue that an association
between natural resources and electoral system choice may have a spurious relationship with civil conflict. If an autocrat pockets all the windfall
incomes for his personal use, natural resources will increase the value ofholding office and incentivize rebel groups to initiate civil conflict (Bodea,
Higashijima, and Singh 2016). Furthermore, countries in a state of civil
war may adopt a PR system to reflect diverse interests of society for the
purpose of reaching a peace agreement (Bogaards 2013). Hence, civil war
may work as a possible confounding factor correlated with both electoral
system choice and natural resource wealth. Therefore, I control for civilwar (from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program).
Additionally, several studies emphasize the importance of uncertainty
in transitioning countries, showing that in new democracies strategic institutional designs do not necessarily allow reformers to reap the benefits
they had anticipated (Andrews and Jackman 2005). For instance, after
examining the cases of Eastern Europe, Ishiyama (1997) concluded that
substantial changes in electoral systems would have occurred if communist parties and oppositional forces had thought of their organizations as

Institutional Manipulation129

seat-­maximizing parties rather than as mass movements when they initiallychose the electoral system. I include the number of years since a given
country transitioned into an electoral authoritarian regime to control forthe effect of uncertainty.
The literature of democratic diffusion suggests that the spread of
democracy has a significant impact on the propensity to move toward
PR systems (Blais, Dobrzynska, and Indridason 2005). Following Li andReuveny (2003), I use the proportion of democratic countries in a given
region to operationalize the spread of democracy. Finally, following Boix
(1999), I add standard time-­varying controls such as logged total population and trade openness. All independent variables are lagged by one year.18
Estimation Results

The unit of analysis is country-­year from electoral authoritarian regimes.
In all models, I add a lagged dependent variable to control for time dependence or path-­dependent characteristics of electoral systems. I estimatetwo-­way fixed effects ordinary least squares (FE-­OLS) to account for country-­and year-­specific heterogeneities.19 The two-­way fixed effects modeling enables me to consider unobservable confounders as well as observable
time-­and space-­invariant variables (such as the British and French colonial
heritages) that may influence the dictator’s choice of electoral systems.
As a naive first test, I regress the variable of EET on the variables ofnatural resource wealth (Hypothesis 4.1) and opposition threats (Hypothesis 4.3) without including the control variables in table 1 (Model 1).20 The
result, which confirms the hypotheses, suggests that resource-­rich dictators
tend to choose PR systems, whereas opposition threats tend to encourage dictators to choose SMD systems. One may naturally suspect that
this simple bivariate result must be anomalous and reflects an association
between dictators’ strength and other confounding factors. Accordingly, I
next incorporate all of the control variables discussed above into our model
18. Descriptive statistics of the variables is available in appendix A4.
19. As the number of observations within unit (country) is long due to the country-­year
data structure (the average is 17 with the maximum being 50), the FE-­OLS estimators havelower variance than the RE-­OLS estimators. The Hausman test rejects the null (χ2 = 70.79;
p = 0.094; Model 2), suggesting that the FE estimators are unbiased and preferred to the RE
estimators.
20. Because the inclusion of the EOP and party-­based regime variables reduces by one-­
third the total number of observations, I do not include these variables in Models 1 and 2.
Nonetheless, introducing these variables does not change the effects of the natural resource
and collective action variables on EET.

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TABLE 4.4. Determinants of Electoral System Choice in Electoral Autocracy
Estimator
Lagged EET
Oil-­gas value per capita(100 USD)
Anti-­government
collective action
Party-­based regimes

Model 1FE-­OLS

Model 2FE-­OLS

Model 3
FE-­OLS

0.894***(0.0250)−0.0145***(0.00437)
0.189*(0.108)0.886***(0.0255)−0.0232*(0.0122)0.208*(0.112)0.771***(0.0717)0.00712(0.00862)
0.259*(0.138)−1.127(0.702)−0.130***(0.0321)−0.682(2.085)0.140(0.113)0.0102(0.00873)
2.619(2.580)0.0140(0.0268)
0.0366(0.182)
1.736*(0.910)−0.859(1.128)−34.85(39.14)
Yes
Yes
1,000
71

Oil-­gas*party
Ethnic organizational
power (EOP)
Oil-­gas*EOP
Trade openness

0.00188(0.00517)
1.167(1.174)−0.0114(0.0214)0.0735(0.136)1.014*(0.550)

Logged total population
Duration of electoral
autocracy (EA)
Regional democracy
Civil conflict
Military regimes
Constant
Time fixed effects
Country fixed effects
Observations
Number of countries

2.523***(0.791)
Yes
Yes
1,576
91

−14.20(17.40)
Yes
Yes
1,479
87

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

specification. As can be seen, the results in Model 2 corroborate our previous findings on the relationship between dictators’ natural resource wealth,
opposition threats, and dictators’ optimal choice of electoral systems.
From Models 1 and 2, we can see that the natural resource wealth variables are negatively correlated with the electoral system variable, whereas
opposition threats (operationalized as anti-­government collection action)
are positively correlated with the dependent variable. These results suggestthat dictators with abundant natural resources are more likely to adopt
PR systems by lowering EET, whereas autocrats facing strong opposition

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131

threats are more likely to adopt SMD systems by elevating EET. Model
2 indicates that a US$1,000 increase in natural resource income per capita lowers EET by 0.232. Given the fact that the average change in EET
ranges from −0.46 to 0.24, and one standard deviation of natural resource
wealth is US$3,318, the impact of natural resource wealth is large and substantial. To list a handful of typical cases, in the midst of growing natural
resource endowments, Mexico, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, Gabon, Kuwait,
Kazakhstan, and Indonesia manipulated their district magnitudes to favor
more proportional systems. Model 2 also demonstrates that an average one-­
unit increase in the number of anti-­government opposition collective actions(e.g., riots, strikes, and demonstrations) in the last three years elevates EET
approximately by 0.21. Given that one standard deviation of the opposition
threats variable is 1.14, the effect of opposition threats is also substantively
large. Facing a large number of anti-­government collective actions, electoral
authoritarian countries including Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, and Malaysia adopted or maintained SMD systems.
Model 3 introduces two interaction terms with natural resources—­party-­based regimes and the EOP—­to empirically evaluate Hypothesis
4.2.21 On the one hand, the interaction with the dummy of party-­based
regimes is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Graphing the conditional effect of natural resource endowments upon the presence of the dominant party, figure 4.6 draws comparison between party-­
based regimes and personalist regimes. As can be seen, when autocrats havedominant parties, natural resource wealth is negatively correlated with
EET, therefore suggesting that those autocrats are more likely to adopt
PR systems by lowering EET. When electoral autocracies are personalist
regimes, the effect of natural resource wealth is not distinguishable from0, therefore indicating that whether autocrats have strong political organizations that enable them to effectively mobilize public support throughpatronage may be important in explaining electoral system choice. On theother hand, I cannot find evidence that ethnic organization power conditions the impact of natural resource wealth on electoral system choice.
The interaction term is positive and not statistically significant. The results
suggest that ethnic networks may not be a relevant conditional factor inmediating the relationship between natural resource wealth and the adoption of PR systems in electoral authoritarian regimes.
Regarding control variables, the lagged dependent variable has a large,
statistically significant effect on electoral system choice. This suggests that
21. The results do not change by introducing the interaction terms individually.

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Fig. 4.6. Natural Resources, Party-­Based Regimes, and Electoral System ChoiceNote: The graph is based on estimation results of Model 3. The dashed lines are the 95 percent
confidence intervals.

although dictators often succeed in changing electoral systems, electoral
systems are themselves inherently highly sticky and influenced by theprevious electoral systems. This may be because in authoritarian regimes
electoral systems generate vested interests among ruling politicians, whichmakes it difficult to redistrict and/or change electoral systems flexibly
enough for the dictator’s own sake (Higashijima 2021). Nevertheless, theoverall estimation results suggest that after controlling for the stickiness ofelectoral systems in dictatorships, the remaining variation is well explainedby the extent to which dictators are able to mobilize public support fromthe masses. Other than the lagged dependent variable, the civil conflictvariable is positively associated with EET in statistically significant ways,
suggesting that autocrats under civil war tend to have majoritarian electoral systems.
Robustness Checks

To confirm that the estimation results are robust, I conduct sensitivity
analyses for (1) possible sample selection bias, (2) endogeneity problems,Institutional Manipulation

133(3) additional control variables, and (4) possible outliers. First, I analyze theset of electoral systems in autocratic regimes, but these observations may be
a self-­selected sample from all potential authoritarian countries that haveever considered institutionalizing elections in the first place. For instance,
Gandhi (2008) argues that dictators have greater incentives to establish
formal political institutions such as legislatures when they lack natural
resources to buy off the opponent. Indeed, some oil-­abundant countries
in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, do not even hold national elections. Likewise, some resource abundant autocracies do not allow opposition parties to participate in elections (e.g., Turkmenistan). To address
this issue, I estimate a Heckman selection model. The first-­stage model isbased upon Miller’s (2020) baseline model; however, it also adds the natural
resource variable to predict transitions from closed autocracies to electoral
authoritarian regimes. Following this, by introducing the inverse Mill’sratio calculated from the estimation of the first stage, I predict electoral
system choice in electoral autocracies.22 The results show that the inverse
Mill’s ratio is not statistically significant, indicating that selection bias is
not of concern. Most importantly, the selection model estimation does notalter my main findings (appendix B4.1).
Second, there may be the potential threat of endogeneity between
natural resource wealth and dictators’ institutional choices. A recent study
points out that weak institutions may incentivize political leaders to increasenontax revenues and buy off political support from elites (Menaldo 2016).
Following this line of reasoning, astute readers may question whether autocrats adopting PR systems may pump more oil prior to elections to maintain a supermajority. Consequently, I employ an instrumental variable (IV)estimation with country and year FE. As I did in chapter 3, I use three time-­varying variables on proven oil reserves—­proven oil reserves in billions ofdollars, proven oil reserves divided by country size, and proven oil reservesin each region—­as IVs. These instruments are ideal because oil reserves
in a given country and region are highly correlated with oil-­gas values per
capita. These variables satisfy the exclusion restrictions because proven oil
reserves will not increase as a result of autocrats’ policies and because theireffects on electoral systems should only run through the IVs (e.g., oil-­gas
value per capita). Moreover, these IVs are jointly statistically significant at
the 0.1 percent level in the first stage, suggesting that the instruments aregood predictors of oil-­gas value per capita. Also, Hansen’s J test of the overidentifying restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis that instruments
22. In addition to the predictors of electoral systems, I also add the variables included in
the first-­stage model to the second stage to consider the possibility that predictors for the
emergence of electoral autocracy may also influence the choice of electoral systems.

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are not correlated with the error term in the second-­stage estimation, suggesting the instruments are valid. Importantly, the IV estimation reaches
the same conclusion that dictators’ resource wealth is associated with the
adoption of PR systems in authoritarian regimes (appendix B4.2).
Third, I introduce additional covariates that potentially influence electoral system choice. The first covariate is the degree of blatant electoral
fraud. Autocratic elections with extensive fraud reduce the relevancy ofelectoral system choice because autocrats can win such elections without
strategically designing electoral systems. Furthermore, blatant electoral
fraud is positively correlated with SMD systems (Birch 2007). To measure electoral fraud, I use NELDA10 measuring as to whether there was astrong concern of extensive electoral fraud prior to the previous parliamentary election.23 The second covariate is international diffusion of electoral
systems: A country’s electoral system is often mimicked by its neighboring
countries (Bol, Pilet, and Riera 2015). To consider such diffusion effects ofelectoral systems, we control for regional means of EET. Including thesetwo variables does not alter the main results (appendix B4.3).
Finally, since the distributions of the natural resources and anti-­
government collective action variables tend to be skewed, I conduct jackknife analyses to make sure that the results are not sensitive to possible
outliers. In the jackknife analyses, I drop each country one by one to findthat the estimation results largely remain unchanged.24

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the choice of electoral systems in electoral
autocracies. I have argued that dictators who have the capacity to mobilize
citizens are incentivized to employ PR systems to reinforce and preserve
their political strengths, while dictators lacking such capacities tend to rely
upon the pro-­regime seat premium associated with SMD systems in order
to co-­opt ruling elites within the legislature. Using newly collected cross-­national data in electoral authoritarian regimes, my empirical analyses lend
strong empirical support for the theory of authoritarian elections. I also
explicitly tested a couple of theoretical expectations regarding the costs andbenefits of different electoral systems, showing that majoritarian systems
bias seat distributions in favor of ruling parties, foster a unified opposition,
23. The electoral fraud measure used in chapter 3 has a much shorter time span and a far
smaller number of observations. Hence, I do not use it.
24. The estimation results are available upon request.

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135

and lower voter turnout more so than PR systems in electoral autocracies.
This chapter makes several key contributions to the literature. First,
the current research contributes to the literature concerning electoral system choice. While acknowledging the importance of opposition threats(Boix 1999), partisan bias (Calvo 2009), and economic interests (Rogowski
1987; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007) in shaping the choice of electoral
systems in democracies, I highlight the limitations of these factors in electoral autocracies and posit a new theory for electoral autocracies’ choice ofelectoral system. By doing so, this chapter also connects to the emerging
literature rethinking the oil curse (Haber and Menaldo 2011). My empirical finding suggests that autocrats rich in natural resources may not necessarily alienate themselves from their citizens. Rather, I show that dictatorswith natural resource endowments tend to adopt PR systems and thereby
lower the barrier of entry and thus encourage political participation on thepart of citizens.
Second, by exploring the origins of electoral institutions found in
dictatorships, I add to the ongoing debate about the role of elections inauthoritarian politics. As discussed, scholars have identified various beneficial functions of authoritarian elections for authoritarian leaders. On theflip side, recent studies have begun to question the consolidating effects
of elections, suggesting that elections in authoritarian regimes can lead to
instability and even democratization (Reuter and Robertson 2015; Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig 2017). By taking into account the origins of electoral
systems, the current research argues that the effects of elections in dictatorships are likely to be endogenous to dictators’ rationale for selecting
electoral institutions in the first place. In this light, this chapter engages
in a direct dialogue upon the endogenous nature of political institutions
within authoritarian regimes. As Pepinsky (2014) has rightly argued, political institutions in autocracies are the least likely to be randomly assigned
and their designs are influenced by autocrats’ rational calculations and various socioeconomic factors that may directly influence the survival of an
authoritarian regime. By focusing on natural resource wealth, disciplinaryorganizations, and opposition strength, my theory of autocratic elections
illuminates the origins of electoral institutions within autocracies.
Third, I contribute to parallel scholarship on electoral manipulation(Simpser 2013) by highlighting an underexplored yet critically important
aspect of electoral maneuvering in dictatorships. This chapter suggests that
dictators, in addition to committing blatant electoral fraud—­investigatedin chapter 3—­can consolidate their rules by manipulating the electoral
formula.

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When taken together, the findings of chapters 3 and 4 allow us to derive
an additional implication of my theory of autocratic elections regarding an
economic effect of autocratic elections: namely, autocrats holding “open”
elections in terms of high electoral integrity and high proportionality canstrategically secure their power by manipulating economic policy instruments leading up to elections, specifically economic maneuvering. The
next chapter will explore the maneuvering of economic policy as an adverse
effect of holding relatively free and fair elections in authoritarian regimes.

FIVE

Economic Maneuvering
Tyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and thenobles for their enemies are more secure than those who have thepeople for their enemies and the nobles for their friends; because in
the former case their authority has the stronger support. For withsuch support a ruler can maintain himself by the internal strengthof his State.
—Niccolò Machiavelli,The Discourses on Livy

5.1. Autocracies and Political Business Cycles

This chapter investigates the conditions under which dictators resort toeconomic maneuvering prior to elections. Since the pioneering work by
Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978), a voluminous literature has investigated the logic of political business cycles (PBCs) by primarily focusing
on the experiences of advanced democracies. Earlier studies assumed that
voters decide whom to vote for based on the government’s pre-­electoral
economic performance. Governing parties implement expansionary fiscal
and monetary policies before elections to garner political support, resulting in real economic growth and increases in incomes during election time.
However, a large body of empirical studies did not find clear evidence on
this theoretical expectation (Lewis-­Beck 1988; Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992; Drazen 2000: 238–­39).
Another strand of empirical studies, however, finds that governments
in advanced democracies manipulate economic policies before elections,
137

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leading to the exacerbation of election-­year fiscal deficits and high inflation
after elections (Kohno and Nishizawa 1989; Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini
1992; Berger and Woitek 1997; Reid 1998). In other words, pre-­electoral
economic manipulation does not necessarily have a strong impact on real
growth rates, but governments do tend to exercise expansionary fiscal policy during election years, resulting in fiscal imbalances and post-­election
inflation. In providing a theoretical explanation of this puzzle, political
economists introduced the idea of “information asymmetries” between
voters and a government (Alesina 1987; Rogoff and Silbert 1988; Rogoff
1990). Since voters are unable to gather information on the government’s
de facto competence, they try to estimate it based on the government’s
policy performance in the past in order to decide whether to vote for thegoverning party.
Applying the signaling game framework, more recent studies shift
their empirical focus to developing countries and emerging democracies.
Scholars conclude that governments in these countries are more prone
to engineer electoral budget cycles than those in advanced democracies (Schuknecht 1996; Block, Ferree, and Singh 2003; Shi and Svensson
2006; Brender and Drazen 2005). Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi andSvensson (2006) argue that this is due to a lack of political information in
new democracies. It is more difficult for voters in new democracies to get
access to reliable, low-­cost information on governments since voters are
not accustomed to democratic politics and also the media are still underdeveloped. To gain an alternative source of political information, voters
are more inclined to estimate government competency by observing how
extensively the government can boost up the economy prior to elections.
The previous studies on PBCs in democracies have assumed thatparty competition is strong enough to cause government alternation. For
instance, Brender and Drazen (2005: 1274) contend that “if the politicalbudget cycle reflects the manipulation of fiscal policy to improve an incumbent’s re-­election chances, then it only makes sense in countries in which elections are competitive. If elections are not competitive, then the basic argument underlying the existence of a political business cycle loses much of its
validity” (italics added).
Recent research on autocracies, however, documents case study andregion-­specific evidence that reveals that autocrats spend a lot prior toelections, despite the fact that government alternation is a remote possibility. For instance, Ames (1987) analyzes seventeen Latin American countries
under military rule, uncovering election-­year surges in government expenditures. Block (2002) demonstrates that governments manipulate fiscal andEconomic Maneuvering

139

monetary policies on the eve of elections in sub-­Saharan Africa. Kruger
and Kuran (1993) find that the Turkish government created budget cycles
under authoritarian rule. Grier and Grier (2000), Gonzalez (2002), andMagaloni (2006) provide evidence that in Mexico the Institutional Revolutionary Party government had loosened fiscal policy and devalued thecurrency to prepare for elections. In Russia, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya(2004) find that local politicians are more likely to create opportunistic
PBCs in regions where media is not well institutionalized and civil liberty is underdeveloped. According to Blaydes (2011), the Mubarak regime
tended to suffer high inflation rates after elections. Pepinsky (2007), utilizing quarterly time-­series data from authoritarian Malaysia, shows that
the United Malays National Organization government exacerbated fiscal
discipline in election years.
Consistent with these anecdotes, my cross-­national data support theinsight that authoritarian governments change fiscal policies for elections. Figure 5.1 shows violin plots of changes in fiscal revenues (a), fiscal
expenditures (b), and fiscal balances at election years across three different
regime types—­Western democracies, non-­Western democracies, and dictatorships. The graphs suggest that non-­Western democracies are slightly
more likely to experience changes in fiscal revenues and expenditures inelection years than Western democracies: Non-­Western democracies’ variances in fiscal revenues and expenditures (and hence fiscal balances) arelarger than those of Western democracies. Most importantly, dictatorships
seem to have larger variances in those measures than these two types of
democracies. This simple comparison indicates that authoritarian governments also manipulate economic policies prior to elections at least as
much as their democratic counterparts do and that the manners in which
autocrats manipulate economic policy are also significantly different acrossauthoritarian regimes. This poses an important puzzle: Why do autocracies
manipulate economic policies according to electoral cycles despite the fact that elections are not fully competitive? Under what conditions do autocracies engage inpre-­electoral economic maneuvering?
A few studies have investigated electoral business cycles cross-­nationallyusing a global sample in the context of hybrid regimes and autocracies.
Including eighty-­one developed and developing countries (1975–­95), Shi
and Svensson (2006) find that governments in developing countries tend
to suffer budget deficits in election years. Because the rents that politicians
can enjoy by remaining in power are high and the share of informed votersin the electorate is low (in the developing world), these authors argue thatgovernments in developing countries are more inclined to manipulate fis-Note: The data come from Bodea, Garriga, and Higashijima (2019). Figure 5.1a shows the distribution of changes in fiscal revenues from pre-­election to election years,
whereas figure 5.1b shows those of fiscal expenditures. Figure 5.1c indicates changes in fiscal balances, which are created by (fiscal revenues + grants – expenditures). The
outer shape represents kernel density plots showing distributions of each variable. The line inside stands for the values that occur 95% of the time. The bar inside shows thevalues that occur 50% of the time. And the central dot represents the median value.

Fig. 5.1. Violin Plots of Variation in Fiscal Policies

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141

cal policy before elections to signal their competence. Geddes, Wright, andFrantz (2018) provide the first systematic analysis of PBCs in dictatorships.
They find that in election years authoritarian governments distribute to thegrass roots and thus increase fiscal expenditures, irrespective of opposition
participation in elections. They reason that, since even in noncompetitiveelections local candidates are judged regarding their competence by voter
turnout in their constituencies, they have incentives to distribute goodies
to citizens prior to elections. Han (2021) demonstrates that autocrats reallocate budgetary spending to redistributive policies prior to elections toderive public support.
Building upon these cross-­national studies of PBCs in dictatorships,
this chapter identifies the conditions under which autocrats engage in economic maneuvering depending on the extent of electoral manipulation.
Geddes, Wright, and Franz (2018) investigate whether opposition participation creates significant differences in the magnitude of PBCs, yet they
do not focus on other important conditions differentiating autocratic elections, for example, the extent of blatant electoral fraud and electoral system
types. While resonating with their argument that dictators also have incentives to engage in fiscal largesse during election periods, I derive a couple ofadditional observable implications from my theory of autocratic elections,arguing that relatively free and fair elections encourage autocrats to spend
more on manipulated elections.1 Furthermore, although most studies on
PBCs in dictatorships focus on the expenditure side, autocrats are also able
to engage in economic maneuvering on the revenue side for distributive
purposes by, for example, lowering tax rates and implementing tax exemptions before elections. This creates a distributive effect while decreasing
government’s fiscal revenues. Based upon a cross-­national dataset coding both government revenues and expenditures, this chapter empiricallyinvestigates PBCs in dictatorships.

1. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) also suggest a similar mechanism by focusing onwhether elections allow opposition parties. They argue that “if elections are a costly signal ofthe dictator’s invincibility, we would expect to see central government spending increases during election years as officials demonstrate their ability to organize and mobilize the masses.
If sending a costly signal was the only purpose of elections, however, we would expect to see
much higher spending during c­ ompetitive election years. On the other hand, if an importantfunction of elections is to incentivize local candidates to extend distribution to the grassroots,
we would expect to see high spending during all elections” (144; italics added). They also
found evidence in favor of the latter interpretation. One possible reason for their results isthat their expenditure measure includes fiscal spending of both central and local governments(i.e., general government spending). This measurement makes it difficult to identify the dictator’s signaling mechanism and favors the local candidate mechanism. To focus on the former
mechanism, I use the central government’s fiscal balance in my empirical analysis.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

5.2. A Trade-­Off between Electoral Manipulationand Economic Maneuvering

The theory of autocratic elections predicts that when deciding to holdless manipulated elections (i.e., those with less blatant electoral fraud andmore proportional electoral systems), dictators have a stronger incentive toengage in pre-­electoral maneuvering of policy instruments in the run-­up
to elections. This is because in less fraudulent elections, autocrats need tomobilize political support through the distribution of patronage and club
goods provisions. Based on my theory, this section derives several hypotheses on the relationship between electoral manipulation and economic
maneuvering.
As detailed in the previous chapters, autocrats have various tools at theirdisposal to manipulate election results, thereby allowing them to win big
at the ballot box. On the one hand, as chapter 3 has demonstrated, autocrats may resort to blatant electoral fraud to make up election results by,for example, excluding the opposition, strengthening repression and committing opposition intimidation, tampering with ballot boxes, and packing
electoral management bodies. On the other hand, autocrats may also relyon the manipulation of electoral institutions, as chapter 4 has revealed.
More specifically, SMD systems bias election results in favor of ruling parties through gerrymandering and malapportionment, as well as mechanicaland psychological effects of Duverger’s law as observed in dictatorships.
These methods of electoral manipulation, however, entail significant
costs in three ways by undermining the credibility of election results. First,
election results yielded through electoral manipulation work less effectively as a credible signal of a regime’s invincibility. The more manipulated
the elections are, the less likely the election results are to be the functionof de facto popular support. Second, electoral manipulation—­and in particular blatant electoral fraud—­could damage the information-­gatheringfunctions of elections. Blatant electoral fraud makes it difficult to discern
signals from noises in electoral information. Third, electoral manipulation
increases the cohesiveness of opposition forces and works as a catalyst tocoordinate their collective action. Fraud contributes to public discontent
and provides opposition elites with chances to mobilize their supporters.
Even an adoption of SMD systems increases the likelihood that opposition parties merge and form pre-­electoral coalitions (chap. 4, this volume;
Barbera 2013).
Due to these three drawbacks of electoral manipulation, authoritarianleaders may have an incentive to refrain from relying on it, as long as they

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143

are sure that they will be able to win big in upcoming elections. To enhance
autocrats’ certainty of winning big without resorting to electoral manipulation, one theoretical possibility is for autocrats to compete with the opposition over programmatic policy packages to attract voters. However, in
reality, it is very difficult for authoritarian governments to rely exclusively
on programmatic policy appeals to maintain popularity. In a society riddenwith dense patron-­client relationships and low levels of economic development (as seen in many dictatorships), most policy promises in elections areunlikely to be credible, and thus election campaigns based on programmatic policy packages are not a strong option for political leaders (Stokes
et al. 2013). As an alternative measure to reconcile the trade-­off between
the certainty and the credibility of election victories, autocrats have theoption of increasing the levels of pork and patronage to mobilize regime
supporters.
Against this backdrop, I argue that autocrats with elections that are relatively free from electoral manipulation (i.e., less fraudulent elections and/or PR systems) are more likely to engage in economic maneuvering. As theprevious chapters have shown, dictators with high mobilization capabilities
rely less upon electoral manipulation such as blatant electoral fraud andthe pro-­regime seat premiums under SMD systems. Therefore, one logicalconsequence of holding relatively free and fair elections in authoritarianregimes is that autocratic elections with little (much) electoral manipulation are
more (less) likely to experience economic maneuvering. Differences in electoral
manipulation of authoritarian elections influence the extent to which autocrats manipulate economic policy instruments prior to elections. I focus
on three subcomponents of electoral fairness to derive testable hypotheses.
Opposition Participation in Elections

Building upon Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018), I first focus on whether
autocrats allow opposition parties to participate in elections. In closed
authoritarian regimes, voters do not have relevant alternatives at the ballot
box other than the ruling party. Thus, elections are entirely noncompetitive. Where it is obvious that the dictator can win big by precluding opposition participation, elections do not convey a credible signal of regime
popularity, because election results are not an accurate reflection of the
dictator’s ability to derive political support from people. Furthermore, elections without choice do not offer information on popular support for the
opposition and increase the risk of the radicalization of opposition forces.
By trading these benefits of multiparty elections, autocrats can maintain an

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

overwhelming election victory, which minimizes the possibility that election results reveal regime weaknesses. All other things being equal, autocrats who are unable to mobilize public support via economic maneuvering
should exclude, a priori, opposition parties from the electoral process. As
a consequence, we should observe a reduced magnitude of PBCs in closed
authoritarian regimes.
By contrast, when autocrats permit multiparty competition in elections, election results become more credible, to the point where citizens
are able to estimate whether dictators can score an overwhelming majority,
not a slim victory, via elections. Voters recognize that elections in electoral authoritarian regimes are not truly competitive: even after allowing
for opposition parties to participate, authoritarian leaders can still resort
to a variety of electoral manipulation measures to prevent opposition
parties from winning elections and bias election results in their favor.
The unleveled electoral field makes electoral turnover to opposition parties a remote possibility. Yet, it may be also not an easy task for autocrats
to obtain 80–­90 percent of the vote in elections when competing against
opposition parties.
In such a scenario, authoritarian leaders turn to the manipulation ofpolicy instruments, which enhance the credibility of election results. Economic maneuvering enables them to score a large victory at elections without the exclusion of opposition parties. This serves as a credible means bywhich to signal the dictators’ popularity. Furthermore, multiparty elections
provide autocrats with other benefits, for example, gathering informationon the opposition and co-­opting them. In leveling the electoral field byallowing the opposition to participate, elections also better work as an
institutional device with which to divide and rule the opposition camp(s).
Consequently, authoritarian rulers in electoral authoritarian regimes are
more likely to distribute pork and patronage compared to those in closed
authoritarian regimes. This leads to a large magnitude of election-­year fiscal imbalance in electoral autocracies.
Hypothesis 5.1: Autocratic elections with opposition parties are more likely
to experience a larger size of PBCs than autocratic elections without choice.
Blatant Electoral Fraud

The second dimension to be considered is the relationship between blatant electoral fraud and economic maneuvering. As chapters 2 and 3 havealready shown, blatant electoral fraud enhances the certainty of winningEconomic Maneuvering

145

big at the expense of the credibility of election results. On the one hand,
massive electoral fraud loses important benefits of elections: overt electoral fraud may undermine the demonstration effect of election results,
taint the quality of electoral information, and encourage the opposition
to unify and launch collective action. On the other hand, making elections
free from fraud runs the risk of failing to obtain a landslide victory. My
theory of autocratic elections suggests that dictators with high mobilization power are less likely to engage in blatant electoral fraud. Similar to
opposition participation, I suggest that dictators who rely less on blatantelectoral fraud are likely to turn to the maneuvering of economic policy. In
so doing, autocrats can maximize the benefits of holding multiparty elections while minimizing the risk that partially free and fair elections expose
regime weaknesses.
The PRI’s authoritarian rule in Mexico serves as a good case to illustrate
the relationship between blatant electoral fraud and economic maneuvering. From the early 1970s until the 1982 debt crisis, the country was in the“populist period”: Aided by the oil boom and a massive scale of foreign
borrowing, the PRI government adopted expansionary economic policies
by increasing public expenditures, food and housing subsidies, and land
distribution, and these measures of economic maneuvering were further
strengthened in electoral periods (Magaloni 2006: chap. 3). Due to thesepolicies for economic maneuvering, the PRI’s electoral performance had
been overwhelming. “Before the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, whichmarked the beginning of more than twenty years of economic stagnation,
the Mexican PRI was able to win most elections by impressive margins ofvictory. Electoral fraud played such a minor role during those years” (Magaloni 2006: 5). Indeed, in 1977, the PRI started further electoral reforms toincrease the transparency of the electoral processes to encourage electoral
participation of opposition parties, which were discouraged by the PRI’selectoral dominance and which boycotted the 1976 presidential elections(Eisenstadt 2004: 38–­39). By contrast, in the “neoliberal period” after the1982 debt crisis, when the oil boom ended, the government accepted theInternational Monetary Fund’s (IMF) orthodox stabilization packages.
The opposition emerged in strength, and the ruling party became more
dependent upon various measures of blatant electoral fraud. Magaloni’s(2006) analysis of PBCs demonstrates that, after 1982, money growth,nominal wage increases, and inflation are all not systematically observed
during electoral periods. As a substitute for economic maneuvering, the
PRI resorted to extensive electoral fraud in the 1988 presidential elections
to maintain their electoral majority.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Hypothesis 5.2: Autocratic elections without blatant electoral fraud are
more likely to experience a larger size of PBCs than those with massive
electoral fraud.
Institutional Manipulation

Third, the types of electoral systems in electoral authoritarian regimes
affect the extent to which authoritarian leaders rely on the maneuveringof economic policy. As chapter 4 has demonstrated, SMD systems enabledictators to facilitate political dominance in the legislature through pro-­regime seat premiums. However, the adverse effects of adopting SMD
systems also exist: SMD systems undermine the demonstration effect of
autocratic elections by lowering voter turnout and also make it easier for
opposition parties to solve coordination problems. By contrast, autocrats
who are certain that they can maintain a supermajority without the pro-­regime SMD seat premiums are inclined to choose PR systems, which
deepen cleavages among opposition parties and also enhance politicallegitimacy by scoring higher turnout. In other words, autocrats who adopt
PR systems need to maintain electoral dominance without pro-­regime seatpremiums and thus are more likely to distribute patronage and engage inpork barrel politics on the eve of legislative elections, compared to thoseholding legislative elections under majoritarian electoral systems.
Hypothesis 5.3: Parliamentary elections with PR systems in electoral
authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience a larger size of PBCs
than those with SMD systems.

5.3. Cross-­National Statistical Analysis of Economic Maneuvering
Dependent Variable: Fiscal Balance

The remainder of this chapter tests these hypotheses by conducting cross-­national statistical analysis using a global dataset composed of fiscal balances. My dataset covers ninety-­seven authoritarian countries around theworld from 1950 to 2010.2
The dependent variable is fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP.3
2. Descriptive statistics are available in appendix A5.
3. Since I conceptualize economic maneuvering as the distribution of pork and patronage
broadly defined, I do not limit the empirical focus here only to “public goods provisions” like

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147

Different from previous studies on PBCs in dictatorships (e.g., Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz 2018), this study includes both revenues and expenditures to capture the dictator’s various sources of economic maneuvering.
Broadly, governments manipulate macroeconomic policy to engage in pre-­electoral economic distribution toward the citizenry in two ways. First,
they increase the levels of public spending by strengthening club goods
provisions targeted at certain regions, classes, and social groups (i.e., porkbarrel politics) or by increasing the levels of patronage distribution likepensions, salaries, and bonuses among public servants (i.e., clientelism).4
Second, governments are also able to affect incomes among the citizens
by proclaiming tax exemptions and lowering tax rates targeted at certainsocial classes like the poor and the elderly (another type of pork barrel),leading to the reduction of fiscal revenues in election years. To account for
both expenditures and revenues, I measure fiscal surpluses/deficits by subtracting expenditures from revenues plus grants. Excluding local government’s budgets, I focus on central government’s revenues and expenditures,
because the latter is more accessible for dictators as a primary source ofeconomic maneuvering. Based on Bodea, Garriga, and Higashijima (2019),
I extend and update the dataset on fiscal surpluses/deficits by referring torecent IMF Annual Country Reports.5
Independent Variables

To test whether autocratic elections with the opposition increase fiscal deficits (Hypothesis 5.1), I identify ­competitive elections by referring
to Hyde and Marinov’s (2012) NELDA dataset. According to Hyde andMarinov (2012), elections are minimally competitive if (1) multiple partiesare legal, (2) more than two candidates are allowed to stand in electoral
districts, and (3) the opposition is allowed to participate in the election. If
all three conditions are satisfied, the election is regarded as competitive;
infrastructure, health care, and education. For instance, in many authoritarian regimes, governments increase salaries and provide bonuses for public officials (i.e., patronage distribution). Also, economic maneuvering may take the form of tax exemption, and therefore exclusively focusing on the expenditure side does not allow us to take into account this possibility.
4. At the same time, governments may also adopt less restrictive monetary policies to boost
money growth (e.g., lower interest rates set by central banks or a larger size of government
borrowing) for the purpose of adopting expansionary fiscal policies (cf. Bodea and Higashijima 2017).
5. Bodea, Garriga, and Higashijima’s (2019) fiscal data are based upon Brender and Drazen(2005), the International Financial Statistics, the IMF Government Financial Statistics, andthe European Bank for Reconstruction and Development transition reports.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

otherwise, it is considered noncompetitive. Based upon the NELDA, I create two election dummies—­(1) competitive elections and (2) noncompetitiveelections. Non-­election years may not be identical between closed authoritarian regimes (autocracies without competitive elections) and electoral
authoritarian regimes (autocracies with competitive elections). Since mytheoretical focus is that electoral autocrats increase their spending in election years more than in non-­election years, I introduce a dummy variableof non-­election years in closed authoritarian regimes, while setting non-­election years in electoral authoritarian regimes as the reference category.6
I expect the competitive election-­year dummy to be negative and statistically significant on fiscal balance.
I also hypothesize that autocratic elections with less blatant electoral
fraud are negatively correlated with fiscal balance (Hypothesis 5.2). To
identify the extent of blatant electoral fraud, I use Kelley’s (2012) Quality ofElections Data (QED) used in chapter 3. The dataset evaluates the extent towhich each election is characterized by blatant electoral fraud. Consistent
with chapter 3, I use the following five variables: (1) Was the legal framework not up to standards, were there limits on the scope and jurisdictionof elective offices, and were there unreasonable limits on who can run for
office, etc.? (“Legal problems”); (2) Were there restrictions on the freedom
to campaign, media restrictions, intimidations, and improper use of public funds? (“Pre-­electoral cheating”); (3) Was there any violence or unrest
before an election day? (“Pre-­electoral violence”); (4) Did any problems
occur related to vote processing (e.g., double voting), tabulation tampering, voter fraud, vote buying, and intimidation on the election day occur?
(“Election-­day cheating”); and (5) Did any violence and unrest occur onan election day? (“Election-­day violence”). Each variable takes 4 values
between 0 (no problems) and 3 (serious problems). First, I aggregate thefive variables by applying a rating scale model of the item response theory.
Then, based on this continuous variable of blatant electoral fraud, I classify
autocratic elections into one of the following three groups to introduce
three dummy variables of election years: (1) relatively clean elections, (2)mediocre elections, and (3) dirty elections.7 Similar to Hypothesis 5.1, I
set non-­election years in electoral authoritarian regimes as the reference
category by including the dummy variable of non-­election years in closed
authoritarian regimes.
6. Even if I exclude authoritarian regimes without holding elections throughout theirautocratic rule (e.g., China and Saudi Arabia), the main results remain unchanged.
7. An autocratic election is coded as “relatively clean” if the continuous measure of blatantelectoral fraud is below the 25th percentile, as “mediocre” if the measure is between the 25thand 75th percentile, and as “dirty” if the measure is above the 75th percentile.

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149

Third, to empirically assess whether parliamentary elections held underPR systems increase fiscal deficits (Hypothesis 5.3), I introduce the interaction term “competitive parliamentary elections” and EET used in chapter 4. As detailed in chapter 4, EET is defined as the proportion of votes
that, for each electoral system, secures parliamentary representation to any
party with a probability of at least 50 percent (Boix 1999: 614). An EET of
37.5 percent is identical with the pure SMD system, and lower values of
EET indicate electoral systems that allocate seats more proportionally (i.e.,
PR systems). My expectation is that parliamentary election years become
more negatively correlated with fiscal balances as the country’s electoral
system is more proportional. To partial out the impacts of presidential elections and noncompetitive parliamentary elections in terms of fiscal balance, I introduce the dummy variables of competitive and noncompetitive
presidential elections and the interaction term between noncompetitive
parliamentary elections and EET.
Following Bodea, Garriga, and Higashiijma’s (2019) work on the determinants of fiscal policy in authoritarian regimes, I introduce logged GDP
per capita,8 GDP growth,9 trade openness,10 capital openness,11 population
over sixty-­five,12 and fixed exchange rate regimes13 as control variables.
Estimation Methods

I use cross-­sectional time-­series data, and the unit of analysis is country-­
year. For Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2, I adopt a two-­way (country and year)
fixed effects (FE) estimator by introducing country dummies to accountfor within-­country variations in fiscal balance and to control for country-­
specific time-­invariant heterogeneities,14 while including year dummies
to consider time-­specific heterogeneity. Furthermore, I calculate robust
standard errors clustered by country to consider heteroskedasticity within
8. The GDP per capita measure comes from Penn World Table (Version 7.1, https://www.
rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/?lang=en).
9. The growth variable comes from World Development Indicators (WDI).
10. Trade openness is measured as the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP, takenfrom WDI.
11. I use Chinn and Ito (2008) to operationalize capital openness.
12. This variable comes from WDI.
13. I use Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to control for fixed exchange rate regimes.
14. As the time series of the data is long (for models of competitive elections, they have22.7 years on average with the maximum value being 57 years, while for models of blatantelectoral fraud, they have 16.5 years with the maximum of 32 years) and the election variables
vary over time, FE models have lower variance than random effects (RE) models (Clark and
Linzer 2015). Further, the Hausman test rejects the null, suggesting that the FE estimator isunbiased and more preferable to the RE estimator.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

country. To take into account auto-­correlation, I introduce a lagged dependent variable (one year lagged fiscal balance).
For Hypothesis 5.3, I adopt a system generalized method of moment(GMM) estimator. The results of electoral system choice in chapter 4strongly suggest that electoral systems in dictatorships have a strong path-­
dependent character. Using FE models with the variables that change little within countries leads to highly inefficient estimation (Plümper andTroeger 2007). The system GMM estimator enables us to deal with thisproblem while accounting for fixed individual effects, potential heteroskedasticity, and auto-­correlation within countries (Roodman 2007).15 Further,
I include half-­decade dummies16 and regional dummies in the GMM estimator to consider time-­and region-­specific unobservable heterogeneity.
Estimation Results

Table 5.1 and figure 5.2 graphically present evidence for Hypothesis 5.1.
Figure 5.2 tests whether years of competitive elections are negatively correlated with fiscal balance, compared to non-­election years in electoral
authoritarian regimes. The coefficient of competitive elections is negativeand statistically significant, suggesting that autocracies allowing opposition
participation exhibit 0.68 percent more fiscal deficits (relative to GDP)
than non-­election periods. By contrast, years of noncompetitive elections
are also negative, but standard errors are too large to be statistically significant, indicating that noncompetitive elections do not lead autocrats tooverspend.17 The results thus offer supporting evidence on my theoretical
expectation that autocrats trade competitive elections with the manipulation of economic policy instruments.
Table 5.2 and figure 5.3 show the results testing Hypothesis 5.2: holding autocratic elections with less electoral fraud is negatively correlated
15. In the GMM regression, I use only up to the second lag of the variables for the regression in levels in order to reduce the number of instruments and the risk of overfitting the data.
Also, I report two standard specification tests: The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
tests the overall validity of the instruments, and failure to reject the null hypothesis gives
support for the model, including the choice of endogenous variables. The Arellano-­Bond test
for AR (2) in first differences tests whether the residuals from the regression in differences insecond order are serially correlated. Failure to reject the null hypothesis supports the model
specification.
16. Introducing year dummies leads to instruments proliferation in the GMM estimator.
Therefore, I introduce half-­decade dummies.
17. In the figure, the reference category is non-­election years in electoral authoritarianregimes. Setting non-­election years in closed autocracy as the reference category does notchange the results.

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Economic Maneuvering
TABLE 5.1. Competitive Elections and PBC in Dictatorships
SampleEstimator
Lagged fiscal balance
Competitive elections
Noncompetitive elections
Non-­election years in closed
autocracy (CA)
Logged GDP per capita

Model 1
Autocracy
FE-­OLS

Model 2
Autocracy
FE-­OLS

0.458***(0.0323)−0.550**(0.241)
0.319(0.951)−0.584(0.389)0.499***(0.0679)−0.682**(0.262)−0.560(0.664)−0.963*(0.523)0.408(0.962)−0.00421(0.0245)0.0137(0.0123)
0.255(0.911)
0.0651(0.337)0.0233(0.479)−3.779(6.662)
Yes
1,437
0.518
85

Economic growth
Trade openness
Capital openness
Population over 65
Fixed exchange rate regimes
Constant
Time fixed effects
ObservationsR-­squared
Number of countries−2.127***(0.457)Yes
2,079
0.331197

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

with fiscal balance in election year. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, “relatively clean” autocratic elections tend to have a negative correlation with fiscal balance in a statistically significant way. Specifically,
if autocratic elections are free from blatant electoral fraud, authoritarian
governments tend to worsen fiscal balance by 0.7 percent of GDP in election years, in comparison to non-­election years in electoral authoritarianregimes. Neither “mediocre” nor “dirty” elections, on the other hand, havea statistically significant impact on fiscal deficits. The coefficient of mediocre elections is smaller than that of relatively clean elections and does notreach the 10 percent level of statistical significance. Dirty elections have alarger negative coefficient, but standard errors are too large to reject thenull hypothesis. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 5.2.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 5.2. Competitive Elections and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships
Note: The estimation is based upon Model 2. The vertical axis represents fiscal balance (fiscal
revenues – fiscal expenditures) measured as a percentage of GDP. The dashed lines represent
the 95 percent confidence intervals. The reference category is non-­election years in electoral
authoritarian regimes.

Finally, table 5.3 and figure 5.4 examine the effect of autocratic elections on fiscal deficits according to different electoral systems in electoral
authoritarian regimes (Hypothesis 5.3). Here we distinguish competitive
legislative elections from noncompetitive ones because opposition parties
need to be allowed to participate in elections for electoral systems to influence election results. I also limit my analysis to legislative elections since
what I focus on here as the independent variable is electoral systems inlegislative elections.
Figure 5.4a shows the changing effect of noncompetitive legislativeelections on fiscal balance. The coefficient of elections does not changemuch and is statistically insignificant across different values of EET, suggesting that electoral systems do not matter in explaining variation in fiscal deficits in noncompetitive legislative elections. By contrast, figure 5.4b
presents the conditional effect of competitive legislative elections on fiscal
deficits depending upon electoral system types. The coefficient of elections
is negative and statistically significant (although it is at the 10 percent level)

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Economic Maneuvering
TABLE 5.2. Blatant Electoral Fraud and PBC in Dictatorships
SampleEstimator
Lagged fiscal balance
Clean elections
Mediocre elections
Dirty elections
Non-­election years in CA
Logged GDP per capita

Model 3
Autocracy
FE-­OLS

Model 4
Autocracy
FE-­OLS

0.420***(0.0397)−0.732**(0.329)−0.380(0.414)−0.538(1.344)−0.635(0.420)0.493***(0.0702)−0.703**(0.326)−0.615(0.441)−1.550(1.180)−0.960*(0.549)−0.0274(1.220)0.0153(0.0293)0.0152(0.0138)−0.211(0.907)0.328(0.429)0.0316(0.478)−1.997(8.517)Yes
1,241
0.507484

Economic growth
Trade openness
Capital openness
Population over 65
Fixed exchange rate regimes
Constant
Time fixed effects
ObservationsR-­squared
Number of countries

0.813**(0.343)Yes
1,567
0.316795

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

when EET is located between 0 and 20, that is, when electoral systems are
more proportional. For instance, when EET is 10 percent, fiscal deficits inyears of legislative elections are approximately −7.5 percent. As electoral
systems become more majoritarian, however, the coefficient of legislativeelections becomes positive and statistically non-­distinguishable from 0.
The overall results support Hypothesis 5.3: There is a trade-­off between
the adoption of majoritarian electoral systems and pre-­electoral economic
maneuvering.
Examining the control variables included in the models, we can see thatthe lagged dependent variable (fiscal balance) is positive and statisticallysignificant in most of the models, indicating that economic policy is highly

154

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 5.3. Blatant Electoral Fraud and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships
Note: The estimation is based upon Model 4. The dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals.
The reference category is non-­election years in electoral authoritarian regimes. The horizontal
axis represents the extent of blatant electoral fraud. An autocratic election is coded as “relatively
clean” if the continuous measure of blatant electoral fraud is below the 25th percentile, as“mediocre” if the measure is between the 25th and 75th percentile, and as “dirty” if themeasure is above the 75th percentile. The vertical axis represents fiscal balance (fiscal revenues +grants – fiscal expenditures) measured as a percentage of GDP.

path dependent. In some models, the coefficient of economic growth ispositive and statistically significant, suggesting that a strong economy
improves fiscal balance.
Taken together, the overall results suggest that autocratic elections create a larger size of economic maneuvering when elections are partially free
and fair: the magnitude of PBCs (election-­year increases in fiscal deficits)
becomes larger when elections allow opposition parties, are less fraudulent,
and adopt PR systems.
Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks

To validate whether the results are robust, I conduct a couple of additional
analyses. First, the timing of both elections and economic maneuvering
may be influenced by unmodeled confounders such as international shockTABLE 5.3. Electoral Systems and PBC in Dictatorships
SampleEstimator
Lagged fiscal balance
Competitive legislative elections (CL)
Effective electoral threshold (EET)
CL*EET
Noncompetitive legislative elections (NCL)NCL*EET
Competitive presidential elections
Noncompetitive presidential elections
Non-­election years in closed autocracy
Logged GDP per capita

Model 5
Autocracy
System GMM

Model 6
Autocracy
System GMM

0.223***(0.0458)−3.929(8.490)0.0319(0.379)0.165(0.304)
6.161(6.235)−0.192(0.266)−1.313(1.352)−2.510(4.171)−2.204(3.343)0.0535(0.111)−12.47*(6.427)0.373(0.329)0.503*(0.288)−2.130(9.452)0.182(0.380)−0.633(2.146)−1.698(2.464)−0.432(3.865)−10.50(8.373)0.240*(0.135)0.117(0.0994)−0.0176(9.919)3.672(6.488)0.606(4.583)71.80(78.26)
Yes
1,158
79
0.126
0.320

Economic growth
Trade openness
Capital openness
Population over 65
Fixed exchange rate regimes
Constant
Time fixed effects
Observations
Number of countries
Arellano-­Bond test for AR(2) (p-­value)
Hansen test (p-­value)

6.339(29.55)
Yes
1,552
90
0.330
0.425

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 5.4. Electoral Systems and Economic Maneuvering in Dictatorships
Note: The estimation is based upon Model 6. The dashed lines are the 90% confidence intervals.
The horizontal axis represents EET with higher values indicating more majoritarian electoral
systems. The vertical axis stands for fiscal balance (fiscal revenues + grants – fi
­ scal expenditures)
measured as a percentage of GDP.

and political instability. These factors may influence both a dictator’s calculus with regards to election timing and fiscal deficits. Put differently,
authoritarian leaders may violate scheduled dates of elections and postpone them as much as possible when their economic performance is notgood (i.e., due to economic recessions, revenues may be lowered and public
spending levels may become high to stimulate the economy). As a result,fiscal deficits before postponed elections may be not the consequence ofthe dictator’s economic maneuvering but rather the result of bad economic
performance in election time. To reflect upon these endogeneity issues, following Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018), I distinguish regularly scheduled elections from those that had been scheduled but then postponed.
Using Higashijima and Yanai’s (2019) data of election timing, I show that
regularly scheduled elections still have negative associations in statisticallysignificant ways with fiscal deficits for competitive elections, relatively
clean elections, and elections with PR systems. In contrast, in two out of
three models (models with opposition participation and electoral systems),
the coefficients of postponed elections are not statistically distinguishable
from the zero effect (appendix B5.1).
Second, the theory of autocratic elections predicts that as a result of his

Economic Maneuvering

157

high mobilization capabilities, the dictator can afford holding less manipulated elections, which then leads to worsening fiscal deficits as a resultof economic maneuvering. Yet, the correlations between less manipulated
elections and fiscal imbalance may be yielded through different causal
paths. For instance, the correlations may be, as a result, that “weak, incompetent” dictators who are unable to control both electoral manipulation
and an economy suffer from high levels of fiscal deficits in election years.
However, simultaneously modeling both levels of electoral manipulationand mobilization capabilities makes statistical modeling extremely complicated since it demands the inclusion of several of three-­and four-­way
interaction terms between election years, election fairness, and measuresof mobilization capabilities (i.e., natural resource wealth, dominant parties,
EOP, and opposition strength). Therefore, as an alternative test, I control
for the measures of mobilization capabilities in the PBC models to investigate whether the election variables turn statistically insignificant after
controlling for these variables of mobilization capabilities.18 If the election variables become statistically insignificant after controlling for mobilization capabilities, then the results serve as convincing evidence that theeffects of less manipulated elections on election-­year fiscal deficits mostly
go through those of mobilization capabilities. The estimation results showthat after controlling for the variables of mobilization capabilities, all theelection variables (competitive elections, relatively clean elections, andelections with PR systems) fail to reject the null, that is, are in support of
my theoretical expectations.19

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the conditions under which PBCs emerge underauthoritarian regimes. By using a new, global dataset of fiscal balance, thestatistical analyses have demonstrated that the magnitude of PBCs tends
to change depending on opposition participation in elections, blatant electoral fraud, and electoral system types: Fiscal deficits in election years exist
in statistically significant ways when dictators allow opposition parties toparticipate in elections, hold less fraudulent elections, and adopt PR systems. In autocracies with “open” elections, election results become credible, such that the opposition and citizens more generally gauge regime
18. I thank Carl Henrik Knutsen for suggesting me to conduct this analysis.
19. The estimation results are available upon request.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

strength and dictators receive additional benefits by holding those elections. The need to win big in relatively free and fair elections incentivizes
authoritarian governments to adopt expansionary fiscal policies in order togather public support, resulting in fiscal deficits in election years.
The analysis presented in this chapter has shed light on one particulardimension of distributive politics within dictatorships, yet it also leads tosome important implications for regime change in authoritarian countries.
The results suggest that in authoritarian regimes with open elections, dictators need to engineer a large portion of electoral business cycles simply
to sustain high levels of political support. This means that when authoritarian rulers are able to successfully distribute extensive economic favors tocitizens, authoritarian elections contribute to consolidating authoritarianrule by maximizing the benefits of autocratic elections. On the flip side,
however, if authoritarian leaders fail to engage in economic maneuvering
even though elections are relatively free and fair, election results may inturn credibly reveal the weakness of current regimes. The next chapter willconsider the political consequences of autocratic elections: Why do autocratic elections sometimes backfire on dictators?

SIX

Backfiring at the Ballot Box
Authoritarian rulers who sponsored elections to bolster legitimacy
were in a no-­win position. If they played the game fairly, they suffered a “stunning” defeat. If they stole the election, they lost legitimacy rather than gaining it.
—Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave

6.1. Popular Protests and Leadership Turnoverin the Aftermath of Autocratic Elections

Since the end of the Cold War, growing pressure from the international
community has made it difficult for authoritarian leaders to avoid holding periodical elections. Coinciding with the proliferation of autocracies
accommodating elections (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006; Levitsky andWay 2010), scholars of authoritarian politics began to focus their attention on elections’ role in authoritarian regimes. As discussed in chapter 1,
those scholars assert that authoritarian leaders may use elections as a tool
to consolidate their rule (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-­Okar 2009;
Blaydes 2011). However, a puzzling fact about autocratic elections is thatelections do not always benefit autocrats to the extent these studies suggest.
Ironically, some autocratic elections induce political conflicts like popular protests that have the potential to undermine authoritarian stability.
For example, the color revolutions in the post-­Soviet countries (Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan) during the mid-­2000s all occurred immediately
after elections (Tucker 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Bunce and Wol159

160

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

chik 2010). Likewise, after the Côte d’Ivoire 2000–­2001 elections, massive
protests erupted in favor of opposition parties, which subsequently ousted
the incumbent president, Robert Guéï. Post-­electoral protests allow the
opposition to send a clear signal of public dissent to the international community. Even if subdued by dictatorial governments,1 electoral misconduct
and the subsequent eruption of serious protests may undermine authoritarian stability in the long run, with international actors enforcing democratic norms by imposing material and reputational costs (Donno 2010;
Hyde and Marinov 2014).
Another form of post-­electoral political conflict is leadership turnoveras a result of the elections producing surprising results for the incumbent.
For instance, the unpopular incumbent Prime Minister Bandaranaike lostthe 1977 Sri Lankan elections by the largest margin in the country’s history to increasingly popular opposition parties (Samaraweera 1977: 1201).
Similarly, in December 1991, Algerian president Chadli Bendjedid called
the first multiparty national election in Algeria’s history. This election also
unexpectedly brought a sweeping victory to the radical Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS), triggering a military coup (Bouandel 1993). In the 1989 Polish elections, the opposition Solidarity movement obtained an overwhelming majority in both the lower and upper houses, paving the way for an
unexpected electoral turnover. These cases are distinct in the manner inwhich the incumbent stepped down from office (ruling elites’ coups or the
opposition’s election victories).2 However, they are very similar in the sensethat stunning election results revealed regime weaknesses and then led toleadership change.
Cross-­national data on post-­electoral popular protests and turnover3(1960–­2010) demonstrate that a small but significant minority of authoritarian leaders face either leadership turnover or popular protests after elections. During that time period, 7.1 percent of authoritarian elections expe1. For example, closely scrutinizing all seventeen cases of electoral revolutions since 1991,
Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) conclude that most electoral protests were unsuccessful at
unseating authoritarian leaders while the most successful cases where autocrats stepped down
did not result in democratization thereafter.
2. In this book, coups and the opposition’s electoral turnover are seen as two subtypes ofleadership turnover because both happen as a result of autocrats’ revelation of their weaknesses through elections, which is the theoretical focus of this book when dictators “over-­liberalize” elections.
3. The data draw from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012). Popular protests are measured by using NELDA29 (“Were there riots and protests after the election?”). Leadershipturnover is based upon NELDA39 (“Was the incumbent replaced after the election?”) after
careful recoding detailed in section 6.4.

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Backfiring at the Ballot Box
TABLE 6.1. Post-­Electoral Protests and Leadership Turnover
1960–­69

1970–­79

1980–­89

Total number of autocratic elections
188
218
228

1990–­99

2000–­2009

279

236

Number of post-­electoral protests (percentage of autocratic elections)
31 (16.4%)
39 (17.88%)
46 (20.1%)
49 (17.56%)
66 (27.96%)
Country examples
Haiti (1961)
Benin (1970)
Iran (1961)
Burkina Faso
(1978)
Malaysia (1969) Cambodia(1972)
Rwanda (1965) El Salvador(1978)South Korea
South Africa(1967)(1970)

Egypt (1987)
Mexico (1988)

Albania (1991)
Ghana (1992)

Peru (2000)
Georgia (2003)

Philippines(1986)
Senegal (1988)

Indonesia(1997)
Kenya (1997)

Zimbabwe(2002)
Iran (2009)

Taiwan (1989)

Zimbabwe(1995)

Serbia (2000)

Number of post-­electoral leadership turnover (percentage of autocratic elections)
11 (5.85%)
15 (6.68%)
17 (7.45%)
26 (9.31%)
14 (5.93%)
Country examples
Peru (1962)
Ecuador (1979)
Argentina
Bolivia (1978)(1962)
Laos (1960)
Dominican
Republic(1978)

Pakistan (1988)
Poland (1989)
Chile (1989)

Algeria (1991)
Guinea-­Bissau(1999)
Burundi (1993)

Senegal (2000)
Kenya (2002)
Mexico (2000)

Note: Post-­electoral protests were drawn from NELDA. The data of post-­electoral turnovers are also
drawn from NELDA, yet the coding rule was adjusted in light of theoretical interests of this book (explained in section 6.4).

rienced leadership turnover, whereas popular protests occurred in 19.6
percent of them. Political leaders in dictatorships like Indonesia (1997),
Cameroon (1993), Azerbaijan (2000, 2003), and Mexico (1988, 1994) experienced post-­election popular protests, whereas Uruguay (1984), Bolivia(1980), Chile (1988), Haiti (1995, 2000), Sri Lanka (1977), and Liberia(1997) saw their elections lead to leadership turnover via coups or the
opposition’s election victory. These variations in post-­electoral outcomesin authoritarian states present us with several important puzzles: Why do
authoritarian elections, which are expected to help autocrats stay in power, often
backfire? Specifically, why do autocrats face different types of threats—­popular protests, coups, and opposition victories—­after elections, and how can we understandthe sources of these distinct post-­electoral conflicts in dictatorships?

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

6.2. Literature on Post-­Electoral Political Order

Scholars have suggested that elections in autocracies often contribute topolitical change. According to this literature, elections increase the likelihood of regime change by stunningly bringing election victories to the
opposition and then the incumbent accepting the election results. For
instance, Lindberg (2006) and Teorell and Hadenius (2009) contend
that repetitive elections in multiparty contexts may contribute to further
democratization and improve the quality of democracy, because repeatedelections, although they are manipulated, form a basis of norms conducive to democratization. In a similar vein, Roessler and Howard (2009) and
Brownlee (2009) both assert that competitive authoritarian regimes are
more likely to democratize than are both hegemonic and closed authoritarian regimes. In this context, Huntington (1991: 174) notes that “the lessonsof the third wave [of democratization] is that elections are not only the lifeof democracy; they are oftentimes also the death of dictatorship.”
Other research also contends that autocratic elections may cause coups
and popular uprisings by overcoming coordination problems in rebellingagainst the incumbent. Potential opponents within ruling coalitions may
be unsure about the dictator’s strengths when aspiring to plot a coup d’état.
The opposition faces collective action problems when mobilizing theirsupporters. In such situations, elections serve as a focal point that permits
opponents to organize around election time. Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig(2017) argue that the effects of autocratic elections on regime durability
differ between electoral and non-­electoral periods: Authoritarian elections
increase the risk of regime breakdown immediately after elections. In thelong run, however, autocratic elections help dictators hold onto power bybringing informational and other benefits.
Taken together, previous studies suggest two different perspectives
regarding autocratic elections: stabilizing and destabilizing effects. In reconciling these different findings, scholars illuminate the background conditions altering authoritarian elections’ effects on post-­electoral politicalorder. With regard to regime change by elections, research suggests that
post-­electoral regime change is influenced by differences in opposition
strengths and international influences. For instance, Howard and Roessler (2006) find that election results become more open when opposition
parties succeed in forming coalitions and launching pre-­election protests.
Donno (2013b) also asserts that competitive authoritarian states democratize when domestic oppositions form coalitions and international actors
impose political and economic conditionality. Kelley (2012) finds that

Backfiring at the Ballot Box

163election observers are more likely to cause government turnover throughelections.
Post-­electoral coups d’état are also provoked by the incumbent’s weaknesses. When autocratic elections demonstrate regime strengths by rolling out impressive electoral campaigns and popular support, autocraticelections effectively deter internal elites’ coup attempts (Magaloni 2006;
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). Conversely, when the autocrats failto produce impressive election outcomes, elections convey a credible but
negative signal of a regime’s might, facilitating coups d’état. In fact, Wig
and Rod (2016) argue that, in elections where opposition parties emerge
in strength, regime elites engage in coup attempts to preempt opposition
threats while also punishing the low-­performing incumbent.
Some autocratic elections are followed by popular protests. Scholars find excessive electoral manipulation as important predictors of this.
Hafner-­Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2014) provide cross-­national evidence that pre-­electoral violence is positively associated with the probability of post-­
electoral protests. Fraudulent elections also provide an
opportunity for opposition parties and anti-­regime supporters to protest(Tucker 2007). Echoing these studies, Trejo (2014) contends that increasingly free and fair elections and a subsequent prospect of the opposition’s
election victories motivate opposition parties to discourage radical mobilization, leading to a reduction of popular protests. Although most protests
are repressively subdued, some post-­electoral manifestations of public dissent include large-­scale, anti-­government demonstrations. In some cases,
these demonstrations led to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, which
occurred in the Philippines (1986), the post-­Soviet countries (i.e., the color
revolutions, Tucker 2007; Thompson and Kuntz 2009), and Côte d’Ivoire(2000–­2001). Bunce and Wolchik (2010) emphasize that opposition parties
that can carry out sophisticated, energetic electoral campaigns successfully
lead political protests.
Resonating with these past studies, I also posit conditional hypotheses
about authoritarian elections’ effects on leadership turnover and popular
protests. This chapter contributes to the literature in three different ways.
First, by explicitly taking into account the costs and benefits of authoritarian elections, this chapter endogenizes the authoritarian leader’s calculus over electoral manipulation. Scholars are different in which aspects ofauthoritarian elections they emphasize—­the stabilizing or the destabilizing
effects of autocratic elections. However, most research estimates autocraticelections’ impact on post-­electoral political order without considering thatelectoral institutions are endogenously selected by autocrats in the first

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

place (Pepinsky 2014).4 Assuming that autocrats strategically decide on
a level of electoral manipulation, I argue that autocrats are likely to facepost-­electoral conflicts when they make mistakes on the extent of electoral
manipulation.
Second, I focus on two forms of electoral manipulation when I consider
the likely outcomes of the strategic failure of electoral design—­blatantelectoral fraud and institutional manipulation. The previous literature has
mostly focused on blatant electoral fraud. However, institutional manipulation also significantly influences election outcomes in dictatorships.
Empirically assessing the extent to which autocrats optimally design electoral systems, this chapter sheds new light on the impact of electoral systems on post-­electoral conflicts, as well as that of blatant electoral fraud.
Finally, I explain post-­electoral coups, opposition victories, and popular
protests in a unified theoretical framework by focusing on the relationshipbetween the electoral dilemma and dictators’ mobilization capabilities.
The literatures of electoral turnover, protests, and coups in authoritarianrule tend to be developed independently.5 However, in reality, autocrats
face these different types of threats simultaneously—­one comes from ruling elites and the other comes from the opposition (Svolik 2012)—­andthey are incentivized to minimize those threats. I argue that the optimal
design of autocratic elections enables authoritarian leaders to cope withthese risks simultaneously. Put differently, both popular protests and leadership turnover result from two different types of mistakes that autocrats
could make when designing autocratic elections.

6.3. Destabilizing Effects of Autocratic Elections

Elections have the potential to work as an institutional device to benefit
authoritarian rulers through three mechanisms—­the demonstration, information gathering, and divide-­and-­conquer functions. However, for authoritarian leaders to exploit those benefits of elections, they are required topermit less manipulated elections. It is precisely this process where autocrats face a trade-­off between the certainty of winning big and the credibility of election results.
4. One important exception is Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (2017), who adopt an instrumental variables estimator to mitigate the endogeneity threat.
5. Beyond electoral periods, some research suggests that protests go hand in hand withcoups. For instance, Casper and Tyson (2014) argue that, by understanding mass protests
as a public signal of popular dissatisfaction, inner elites are more likely to coordinate coups.

Backfiring at the Ballot Box

165

When an autocrat wins an election by a crushing margin, the total number of votes that he obtains consists of “honest” and “dishonest” parts. The“honest” part is the total number of real votes from his supporters. These
citizens vote for the dictator after positively evaluating his economic andpolicy performance. Specifically, authoritarian leaders’ popular support
depends on the breadth of economic distribution to the citizenry. Gaining
voluntary support is costly because governments must invest large amountsof financial resources to satisfy their citizens. Hence, although manipulation of policy instruments is also another form of electoral strategy for
autocrats, costly mobilization of citizens’ support through the distributionof pork and patronage contributes to making election results “honest”—­inthe sense that citizens vote for autocracy in return for receiving patronage
and club goods.
The “dishonest” element is the total number of votes resulting fromelectoral manipulation—­blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation. As already detailed in chapter 3, blatant electoral fraud deviates
election results from voters’ initial vote preferences, in favor of the political leader. As analyzed in chapter 4, SMD systems generate a significant
seat premium to ruling parties. Both blatant electoral fraud and electoral
system manipulation, though different, contribute to an electoral victorywith a margin that could not be achieved without such manipulations. In
the sense that these techniques of electoral manipulation distort election
outcomes away from citizens’ actual support level for the dictator, they
make election results less credible.
Making sense of his mobilization capabilities, if the autocrat matches
the extent of electoral manipulation with them, he can exploit as muchelectoral benefit as possible while maintaining an overwhelming majority. When this is the case, elections are likely to contribute to authoritarian stability. In fact, as chapters 3 and 4 have empirically demonstrated,authoritarian regimes with substantial discretionary resources, strong disciplinary organizations, and a weak opposition tend to have lower levels of
blatant electoral fraud and to adopt more proportional electoral systems.
These results imply that authoritarian leaders strategically manipulate
elections based on their ability to cultivate popular support through theeffective distribution of patronage and pork: dictators with high mobilization capabilities strategically open the electoral field, while those with low
mobilization capabilities manipulate elections by coercive and institutional
measures. Contrary to this, however, when the autocrat fails to adequately
deal with the electoral dilemma depending upon his mobilization capabilities, the elections are more likely to backfire on him. More specifically,

166

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

autocrats fail to deal with the electoral dilemma in two ways: undersupply
and oversupply of electoral manipulation.
“Undersupply” of Electoral Manipulation and Leadership Crisis

Stability may not be achieved when authoritarian leaders are overconfident
about their popularity and strengths, hold multiparty elections, and thenlose a supermajority (or even an electoral victory to opposition parties).
The failure to win big reveals the dictator’s weakness, activating within-­regime threats and increasing the likelihood of coups. Even if ruling elites
do not punish the low-­performing incumbent, excessively free and fair elections may lead to stunning opposition victories. Researchers have offered
substantial anecdotal evidence that autocrats’ mistakes stemming frommiscalculation and/or political uncertainty unexpectedly paved the way
for leadership turnover in, for example, Brazil (1974), Peru (1980), Uruguay (1980), Guatemala (1981), Turkey (1983), Pinochet’s Chile (1988),
Marcos’s Philippines (1986), Myanmar (1990), Algeria (1992), and Burundi(1993) (Huntington 1991: 174–­78; Diamond 2008: 53–­54). Observing theso-­called third wave of democratization, Samuel Huntington (1991) succinctly depicts the processes through which stunning election results led toinitiating leadership change in authoritarian regimes:
When their performance legitimacy declined, authoritarian rulers
often came under increasing pressure and had increasing incentives to attempt to renew their legitimacy through elections. Rulers sponsored elections believing they would either prolong their regime ortheir rule or that of associates. The rulers were almost always disappointed.
With very few exceptions, the parties or candidates associated withauthoritarian regimes lost or did very poorly in the regime sponsored elections. The results of these elections often surprised boththe leaders of the opposition and the leaders of the government. In
the first fifteen years of the third wave this “stunning election” pattern was a pervasive one. (175; italics added)
In Poland, for example, the communist government held multiparty
parliamentary elections in 1989 with virtually no blatant electoral fraud.
The preceding roundtable talks between the government and the opposition had decided that the country would introduce a new bicameral parliament. In the new bicameralism, senators would be chosen through freeelections, while in the Diet the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) andBackfiring at the Ballot Box

167

its allies were guaranteed 65 percent of seats and the remaining 35 percentof the seats were contested with opposition parties and independents. Prior
to the elections, the ruling communist party, the PZPR, did not doubt
its popularity, and the opposition Solidarity Party also did not expect its
eventual electoral triumph. “No one in the political elite anticipated thereplacement of a communist government by a Solidarity government. . . .
The purpose of . . . election procedures was to permit Solidarity to enter
Parliament but to preserve the continuation of communist rule,” said Lech
Walesa, the leader of Solidarity. He also declared, “It would be tragic andeven fatal if we attempted to . . . take over power” (Olson 1993: 417, 420).
In fact, he went so far as to publicly state that obtaining 20 percent of theseats in freely contested portions of the Diet could be seen as a victory for
Solidarity (Lewis 1990: 95).
Confident of election victory, the PZPR did not carry out visible election campaigns by, for example, actively advertising the party’s name andnationally endorsing their candidates (Olson 1993: 425–­26). Nevertheless,the outcome was stunning. After the vote count, Solidarity scored a sweeping electoral victory: It won 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate, and theremaining 1 seat was won by an independent, while all the 161 seats contested in the Diet also went to Solidarity (Wróbel 2010: 173). The PZPR
accepted the landslide victory by Solidarity without annulling it, resulting
in Poland’s transition to democracy.
Algeria’s 1991 parliamentary election exhibited similar characteristics tothat of Poland; however, partially free and fair elections there did not resultin an electoral turnover but a military coup and then a full-­blown civil war.
In the country, revenues from oil had plummeted since the global oil glutthat began in 1985. Owing to the lack of resources caused by nontax revenues, “the regime’s capacity to distribute services became constricted, dissatisfaction with the government’s performance began to grow in various
sectors of the society” (Mortimer 1991: 577). In the midst of the economiccrisis and shortages in jobs and food, the country had been experiencing
violent protests. For example, on October 5, 1988, a series of violent riots
erupted in the capital, Algiers, and then rapidly spread to other major cities
in the country, which killed and wounded more than four hundred people(Brumberg 1991: 59). Furthermore, during the economic crisis, Islamistgroups emerged in strength, while possessing a considerable organizational edge over their competitors in the opposition. As the numbers of thepoorly educated, unemployed, and badly housed swelled in the process, theFIS took hold and increasingly gained support from the masses.
In this situation—­where the ruling party lost mobilization capabili-

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

ties and the opposition gained their popularity—­President Benjedid madea self-­destructive decision for the regime and himself. He embarked onpolitical reform, expecting that steps toward political pluralism and competitive elections would help him buy popular support. Depriving the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) of its status as a single party, thepresident decided to amend the constitution in February 1989, which thenaccorded the right to form political parties. Importantly, President Benjedid also allowed the Islamists to participate in multiparty elections byrecognizing them as a political party. His decision to hold free and fair
multiparty elections seems to have been supported by his assessment of
the strength of the FLN, which he thought could at least remain at thestatus of a dominant party after elections. According to Mortimer (1991:580), the president “acknowledged the appeal of the Islamists and gambled on governing with them rather than against them. He may well havefurther calculated that the FIS could be neutralized by a proliferationof other parties that would leave the FLN in a dominant—­if no longer
hegemonic—­position.”
Leading up to national parliamentary elections in 1991, the country
held local elections in a free and fair manner in 1990. In the first transparent elections since independence, the FLN suffered a big loss: the rulingparty won only 28 percent of the popular vote, while the FIS obtained 54
percent of the total votes, taking control of about 850 of the more than
1,500 municipalities (Mortimer 1991: 584). However, the FLN’s big election loss in the local elections did not lead the president to rethink his commitment to political reform. Delayed from the originally scheduled date,
the national parliamentary elections finally took place on December 26,
1991. In the first round of the elections, the FIS emerged victorious with
87.7 percent of the total seats decided (Bouandel 1993: 13). Fearing therise of the radical Islamists ever since the local elections, the army finallyintervened in politics and annulled the election results, removing the president from power by having him announce his resignation as a “sacrifice inthe service of the higher interests of the nation” (Mortimer 1993: 40). This
military intervention then led to the civil war between the newly installed
government and Islamist rebel groups.
The Polish and Algerian cases suggest that when an autocrat does notincrease electoral manipulation to the extent that his de facto weakness
demands, election results could credibly reveal his regime’s weakness topotential opponents and lead to a leadership change. Revealed weakness inan election is likely to result in leadership turnover via electoral victory of
opposition parties, as with the cases of Poland (1989) and Chile (1988), or,Backfiring at the Ballot Box

169

like Guatemala (1981) and Algeria (1991), where the dictator’s weakness
may urge members of ruling coalitions to forcibly replace their leader via
a military coup.
As autocrats wield at least two kinds of electoral manipulation in
their toolbox—­blatant electoral fraud and electoral system reform, bothof which are expected to affect the electoral dilemma in dictatorships—­I
derive the following two hypotheses. The former hypothesis (Hypothesis
6.1a) is on the relationship between blatant electoral fraud and leadershipturnover, while the latter hypothesis (Hypothesis 6.1b) is about the relationship between electoral system reform and leadership turnover.
Hypothesis 6.1a: When an autocrat undersupplies blatant electoral fraud
relative to his mobilization capabilities, political turnover by opposition victory and coup d’état are more likely to occur after an election.
Hypothesis 6.1b: When an autocrat adopts excessively proportional electoral systems relative to his mobilization capabilities, political turnover by
opposition victory and coup d’état are more likely to occur after an election.
“Oversupply” of Electoral Manipulation and Popular Protests

Autocrats may likely face another type of post-­electoral political conflict—­
popular protests—­
after they use excessive electoral manipulation that
activates the opposition threats. Popular protests are more likely to occur
when dictators excessively manipulate elections in the following threemechanisms. First, excessive electoral manipulation widens a gap between
the opposition’s belief in their strength and revealed election outcomes,
which in turn may encourage opposition leaders to speculate that theregimes are weaker than they had previously thought. In cases of blatantelectoral fraud, after observing the extent of electoral misconduct and election results, opposition parties compare their mobilization capabilities
with revealed election results and conclude that the election results arelargely driven by the dictator’s electoral fraud rather than citizens’ genuine
support for the dictator. Therefore, the signals conveyed by the elections
to the opposition may in fact be mixed when it comes to comprehending an autocrat’s true popularity and strength, leading to challenging the
dictator by launching protests. In cases of electoral system manipulation,differences between shares of seats and votes for each party become visible after the vote counts, forming a basis for the opposition to claim thatthe elections were illegitimate. Specifically, previous studies suggest that“sticks” (electoral manipulation) without sufficiently accompanying “car-170

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Boxrots” (economic maneuvering) encourage the opposition to speculate thatthe regime is now too weak to hold up its anti-­regime collective action. As
Bunce and Wolchik (2010: 38) have noted, “While signals in the admittedly murky political environment of mixed regimes are always hard toread, repression can also be read as an indication that political leaders havebecome increasingly nervous about their hold on power.”
Second, excessive electoral manipulation unifies the opposition camp.
Pro-­regime electoral manipulation—­blatant electoral fraud and majoritarian electoral systems—­is more likely to prevent opposition parties fromgaining their legislative representation and political influence within theregime. The extreme pro-­regime bias in elections, however, undermines
the credibility of electoral processes and thus urges the opposition to unify
in adopting anti-­system approaches, including post-­electoral popular protests, rather than participating in regime-­sponsored elections.
Third, excessive electoral manipulation serves as a coordination mechanism for the opposition to overcome collective action problems andleads to protest movements in the aftermath of elections (Tucker 2007).
Organizing and joining mass protests runs the risk of state repression—­
especially when participants are uncertain about whether other people
would join them. In this context, as Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (2017: 108)
succinctly point out, “elections constitute an easily identifiable focal points
around which the expectations of different opposition actors, who otherwise cannot freely communicate, can converge. When first movers among
the opposition can coordinate, a collective action logic may generate further snowballing since the probability of success increases and the cost ofparticipation decreases as the number of participants grows.”
In fact, various studies show that both harsh repression and excessive
election cheating without accompanying sufficient goods provisions serve
to fuel the escalation of protests in authoritarian regimes. Both Bratton andvan de Walle (1997) and Wood (2000) argue that African autocracies (whenfailing to provide goods to citizens) have faced anti-­regime popular mobilization after deploying harsh state repression. Investigating the experiencesof Southeast Asian countries during the Cold War era, Goodwin (2001)
also asserts that political revolution is more likely to occur in the countries
where the government has relied on indiscriminate violence against anti-­
government forces. The color revolutions in post-­Soviet countries were all
preceded by fraudulent elections (Tucker 2007). In the Tulip Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan, violence perpetrated by state police—­as well as electoral fraud
exercised by incumbents—­fueled opposition forces’ grievances, which inturn activated anti-­regime mobilization against the Akaev regime (Jones
2007; chap. 8, this volume).

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171

Madagascar’s 2001 presidential election is a typical case of an electoral
authoritarian regime where blatant electoral fraud sparked a massive scaleof popular protests, taking the country to the brink of a civil war. Just a few
months prior to the December 2001 elections, the incumbent president
Ratsiraka had been seen as the only candidate who was virtually certain to
win another term of office among the other presidential candidates who
ran from fragmented opposition parties (Randrianja 2003: 314). However,the popular mayor of the capital and a leading businessman, Marc Ravalomanana, unexpectedly proclaimed he would run for president, whichtransformed the elections into highly competitive ones. Making full useof his religious and business networks in both rural and urban areas, hebegan carrying out intensive election campaigns, which caused the election
tide to gradually shift in his favor as the election approached (Marcus andRazafindrakoto 2003: 33–­35). For example, by early October, opinion polls
suggested that Ravalomanana was ahead of President Ratsiraka (Cornwell
2003: 2). In addition, major politicians, including a former prime minister
who withdrew from the race, leaders of other opposition parties, and evensome members of the governing coalition, declared support for Ravalomanana (Randrianja 2003: 314).
In the shadow of growing political support for Ravalomanana, thegovernment responded with a variety of methods to manipulate election
results. Prior to the elections, “candidates were only allowed to campaign
between November 25 and December 15, thereby significantly limiting
the exposure of lesser known rivals outside the capital. . . . The only news
allowed to directly cover the electoral process was comprised of journalists
chosen by the president. . . . No political advertisements could be associated with purchasable goods. The last edict was aimed directly at the candidacy of Marc Ravalomanana” (Marcus and Razafindrakoto 2003: 36). Election campaigning was marred by incidents of violence, and people were
worried about the accurateness of the electoral roll, which suggested thatthe number of registered voters on the island had declined inexplicably bysome two million in the past five years (Cornwell 2003: 2).
On December 28, 2001, the Interior Ministry released the preliminary
results showing that Ravalomanana had obtained 46.49 percent of thevote, while Ratsiraka had acquired 40.64 percent, suggesting that a second round would be necessary to identify the winner of the presidency.
With these results, the Ravalomanana camp claimed that the president’s
vote count had been fabricated by ballot stuffing, based upon their own
estimation that Ravalomanana had actually won 53.32 percent, which wasan absolute majority for him to get elected in the first round. As it turned
out, a recount by the election supervisory body made only minor adjust-172

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

ments to the released election results, and the High Constitutional Court
ruled that a second round would indeed be held. This triggered a series ofmassive protest rallies that erupted in the capital on January 28, 2002, andthat then escalated into violent confrontations that were on the edge of acivil war over the next six months. On July 5, President Ratsiraka flew into
exile in France, ending his twenty-­three-­year rule in the country.
The above discussion and the case of Madagascar suggest that when
autocrats oversupply electoral manipulation, elections are then more likely
to backfire on them in the form of popular protests. Therefore, I derive thefollowing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6.2a: When an autocrat oversupplies electoral fraud relative tohis mobilization capabilities, post-­election popular protests are more likely
to occur.
Hypothesis 6.2b: When an autocrat adopts excessively majoritarian electoral systems in light of his mobilization capabilities, post-­election popular
protests are more likely to occur.

6.4. Cross-­National Statistical Analysis ofPost-­Electoral Political Conflicts
Data and Modeling Strategies

To empirically test the two hypotheses, I conduct a cross-­national statisticalanalysis. The unit of analysis is country-­election-­year in authoritarian countries. Concerning blatant electoral fraud, I include authoritarian regimes
with any elections (both c­ ompetitive and noncompetitive elections), assuming that excluding opposition parties is also a blatant form of electoral
manipulation. For electoral system manipulation, I include only legislativeelections in electoral authoritarian regimes, since electoral systems vary
only in parliamentary elections and manipulating electoral systems makes
sense in elections where opposition parties are allowed to join.
To measure the gap between the extent of electoral manipulation andthe autocrat’s mobilization capability, I adopt two-­stage models based on
estimators and model specifications adopted in chapter 3 (on blatant electoral fraud) and chapter 4 (on electoral system change).6 The first-­stage
6. For example, a similar approach was taken by Wright (2008), who measures the autocrat’s time horizon by calculating predicted probabilities of leadership survival in a first-­stage
model. Using the predicted probabilities computed in the first stage, he tested the relation-

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173

models predict the levels of electoral manipulation that autocrats are
expected to use according to their mobilization capabilities. Hence, predicted values of the dependent variable in the first-­stage models are the“appropriate” extent of electoral manipulation if autocrats had strategicallydesigned elections given their abilities to mobilize regime supporters.7 Bycontrast, observed values of electoral manipulation on data are the reallevels of blatant electoral fraud and the EET that dictators actually utilized.
Using these two values of the extent of electoral manipulation, I calculate the gap between them (i.e., predicted values in these first-­stage models
and observed values of electoral manipulation [blatant electoral fraud or
the EET]). In the second stages, I regress these gap variables (i.e., observed
values—­predicted values) on the two dependent variables—­leadership turnover and popular protests. Capturing these gaps enables us to measure theextent to which dictators successfully match the extent of electoral manipulation with their mobilization capabilities. In other words, by adopting
these two-­stage estimations, we can empirically assess the extent to which
the electoral dilemma is resolved by autocrats. If the gap variables takemore positive values, then it suggests that the dictator is likely to supply
more electoral manipulation than he needs via blatant electoral fraud orpro-­regime seat bias through majoritarian electoral systems. My theoretical expectation is that excessively manipulated elections should be associated with a higher probability of popular protests and a lower likelihoodof leadership turnover. When the variables take more negative values, elections are less manipulated in light of the autocrat’s mobilization capabilities. Thus, I expect that leadership turnover is more likely to follow suchelections.
The First-­Stage Model: The Dictator’s Strategic Calculus
over Electoral Manipulation
As outlined above, there are two dependent variables for the first-­stage
models: (1) blatant electoral fraud and (2) electoral system types (i.e., fromthe pure SMD, or EET = 37.5, to PR systems, where the EET takes lower
values). Consistent with chapter 4, electoral system types are continuously
measured by the EET.
ship between the dictator’s time horizon and the likelihood of institutionalizing a legislature
in a second-­stage model.
7. Specifically, for blatant electoral fraud, the first-­stage model predicts the extent of blatant electoral fraud by adopting a random effects (RE) estimator. For electoral system change,
the first-­stage model predicts the magnitude of the EET by adopting a country fixed effects(FE) model.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

To cross-­nationally measure the distribution of mobilization capabilities in a country, this book focuses on three factors: (1) discretionary financial resources, (2) disciplinary political organizations, and (3) opposition
strength. Consistent with the previous chapters, I use oil-­gas value percapita to measure discretionary financial resources. Following this, the oil-­gas value per capita variable is interacted with the dominant party regime
dummy and the size and cohesiveness of politically dominant ethnic groups(the EOP index) to capture the efficiency of resource distribution to themasses. For the opposition strength, I use an indicator counting the number of demonstrations, riots, and strikes.8
In appendixes A6.1 and A6.2, I show statistical results of the first-­stage
models. For blatant electoral fraud, the oil-­gas value is negatively associated with blatant electoral fraud when autocrats have dominant parties ormore coherent, larger dominant ethnic groups. The collective action variable is positively correlated with the extent of electoral fraud. These results
suggest that dictators with high mobilization capabilities tend to refrainfrom using electoral chicanery. R-­squared is 0.471, suggesting that the firstmodel explains approximately 47 percent of total variations in blatant electoral fraud.
Concerning electoral system manipulation, abundant natural resources
decrease the likelihood that the autocrats adopt electoral systems withhigh EET (i.e., more majoritarian electoral systems), and this association
tends to become stronger if autocrats are armed with dominant parties.
Additionally, the presence of anti-­government collective action tends toincrease the likelihood that the autocrats adopt electoral systems with a
low EET, suggesting that weak autocrats vis-­à-­vis the opposition rely uponmajoritarian electoral systems. Here, R-­squared is 0.829, implying that themodel explains approximately 83 percent of total variations in the EET.
Based on these results, I compute predicted values of blatant electoral fraud
and electoral systems, which are shown in appendix figure A6.1.

8. In addition to these variables measuring the autocrat’s mobilization capabilities, I also
add control variables consistent with the model specifications in chapters 3 and 4. For blatantelectoral fraud, I introduce authoritarian regime type (military and monarchy regimes), political rights and civil liberties in non-­electoral periods (measured by Freedom House Index),
election administrative capacity (using Kelley’s [2012] QED), election types, logged GDP
per capita, GDP growth (World Development Indicators), and foreign aid (percentage of GDP).
For electoral system change, I introduce authoritarian regime type (military regimes), trade
openness (sum of imports and experts measured as a percentage of GDP), logged total population, duration of electoral authoritarian regimes, proportions of democratic countries, andcivil war.

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175

The Second-­Stage Models: Leadership Turnover and Popular Protests
To measure the dependent variable for Hypothesis 6.1a and 6.1b, leadership turnover, I use a variable capturing broadly defined post-­electoral leadership turnover from Hyde and Marinov (2012). This variable is coded as
1 if the incumbent leader is replaced after the election and as 0 otherwise(NELDA39). To accurately measure leadership turnover in light of myresearch interest, I adopt several modifications. First, the original variable in
NELDA does not include post-­electoral political turnover by coup d’état.9
Since my theory expects that revealed regime weaknesses due to the undersupply of electoral manipulation also invite coup d’état as well as stunning
opposition victories, I recoded the original variable by referring to Powell
and Thyne’s (2011) coup d’état dataset. Second, the original NELDA variable of leadership turnover includes leadership change brought by hereditary
successions and nomination of the next leader by the current ruler before anelection. As these types of leadership change are confirmed before the elections and thus do not relate to an incumbent’s electoral performance, I do
not count them as a form of leadership turnover. To do this, I refer to anothervariable from NELDA (NELDA23), which captures if a successor assumes
power after elections. Further, in both models, I do not count cases thatexperienced leadership turnover as a result of large-­scale popular protests(e.g., Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and Madagascar in 2002), because these leadershipchange cases are driven not by stunning election results but by protests.
The second dependent variable, popular protests, is also measured using
the NELDA dataset to test Hypotheses 6.2a and 6.2b. NELDA includes avariable indicating whether there were riots and protests after the election(NELDA29). If either riots or protests occur after the election, then thevariable is coded as 1. Descriptive statistics of both leadership turnover andpopular protests are found in appendix A3.
I calculate gaps in electoral manipulation using predicted values frommodels calculating the difference between predicted and real values offraud (i.e., real values − predicted values). Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of
the gaps. Using the gap variable as the main independent variable, I estimate a random effects (RE) probit estimator with robust standard errors,
which enables us to take into account unit (country)-­specific heterogeneity
as well as error correlation within a unit.10 My empirical tests consist of
9. Not including coups to the variable does not change the main results.
10. I do not employ country FE models because the FE estimator drops countries that do
not experience any change in the dependent variables in binary dependent variables models,
which risk sample selection bias.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 6.1. Gaps in Electoral Manipulation
Note: The plots indicate kernel density functions for the distribution of gaps in blatant electoral
fraud and effective electoral threshold (EET). The horizontal axis (a: blatant electoral fraud, b: EET)
is gaps in electoral manipulation, which measures differences between real values and predictedvalues of blatant electoral fraud and EET. Negative values indicate undersupply of electoral
manipulation given an autocrat’s mobilization capabilities, whereas positive values indicate
oversupply of electoral manipulation relative to an autocrat’s mobilization capabilities.

four parts: a protest model and a turnover model for blatant electoral fraud
and those for electoral system manipulation. To cope with the possibility
that the determinants of electoral manipulation also directly affect the consequences of elections, such as protests and turnover (Pepinsky 2014), thecontrol variables included in the second-­stage models are identical withthe first-­stage ones. To consider possible temporal dependence, time lapse
since the last turnover or protests and their time polynomials are included
in all models (Carter and Signorino 2010).
Estimation Results

Figure 6.2 and table 6.2 report the results of the probit analysis for blatant electoral fraud.11 In Model 1, where the dependent variable is lead11. As the protest variable from NELDA has a couple of missing observations, the numberof observations between the turnover and protest models is slightly different.

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TABLE 6.2. Blatant Electoral Fraud, Leadership Turnover, and Popular Protests
Estimator
Dependent variable
Gap in fraud
Military regimes
Personalist regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Constant
Time fixed effects
Time lapse and polynomials
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Number of countries

Model 1
RE probit
Turnover

Model 2
RE probit
Protest−0.878**(0.436)2.293***(0.681)0.468(0.768)0.119(0.103)−0.393(0.311)
0.186(0.249)−0.532(0.406)0.00405(0.0357)−0.0660(0.0459)1.678**(0.796)0.491(3.027)
Yes
Yes−95.52316
78

1.129***(0.275)−0.310(0.368)0.777*(0.400)0.0102(0.0656)
0.496**(0.208)0.172(0.148)−0.0916(0.237)0.0455*(0.0233)−0.0442(0.0297)−0.146(0.405)−2.021(1.839)Yes
Yes−112.96315
78

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Model specifications are
based upon the first-­stage model. The time lapse since the last turnover/protests and their time polynomials are included.

ership turnover, the fraud gap is negative and statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. This suggests that if autocrats do not increase thelevel of electoral fraud despite their need to do so, they are more likely toexperience political turnover through coups or the opposition’s electoral
victories following elections. Based on Model 1, figure 6.2a graphicallyillustrates the pattern in which a predicted probability of post-­electoralleadership turnover changes as the fraud gap variable increases. Whenthe gap variable takes more positive values, the predicted probability becomes closer to 0. In contrast, when the variable becomes morenegative, the probability of leadership turnover increases in a statistically significant way. When the variable is 1.35 (the maximum value), theprobability of turnover is about 5 percent and statistically insignificant,

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 6.2. Gaps in Blatant Electoral Fraud and the Likelihoods of Leadership Turnoverand Protests
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal axis stands forgaps in blatant electoral fraud. Zero indicates that authoritarian leaders match the extent ofelectoral fraud with their mobilization capabilities. Positive values indicate that authoritarianleaders overuse blatant electoral fraud, whereas negative values suggest that authoritarianleaders underuse it. The vertical axis in figure 6.2a is predicted probabilities of leadership turnoverthrough coups and opposition victories after the elections. The vertical axis in figure 6.2b ispredicted probabilities of post-­electoral popular protests.

whereas the probability increases to approximately 35 percent when the
gap variable is −1.2 (the minimum value). These results support Hypothesis 6.1a. If we look closely at the data, we can find that countries suchas Sri Lanka (1977), Bolivia (1980), Honduras (1981), Guatemala (1981),
Uruguay (1984), Zambia (1991), Azerbaijan (1992), Haiti (1995, 2000),
Liberia (1997), and Niger (1999) underused blatant electoral fraud intheir elections. This resulted in leadership turnover via coup d’état or
stunning election victories by opposition parties.
Model 2 then estimates the fraud gap’s impact on the likelihood of popular protests (Hypothesis 6.2a). In Model 2, the fraud gap has a positivecoefficient, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, meaningthat when elections are more exposed to excessive electoral manipulation

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179

relative to dictators’ mobilization capabilities, they are more likely to faceprotests in the aftermath of elections. Using estimation results of Model 2,
figure 6.2b shows the pattern in which the probability of protests changes
with the values of fraud gap. When the gap variable is more negative, thelikelihood of post-­electoral popular protests becomes smaller. However,as the variable gets more positive, the impact of the fraud gap on popular
protests also tends to increase. For instance, when the gap variable is −1.2
(the minimum value), the probability of protests is no more than 3 percent
and statistically insignificant, whereas when the gap variable is 1.35 (themaximum value), the probability increases up to approximately 43 percent.
Some examples in which overused electoral manipulation induced post-­
electoral protests include Haiti (1984), Senegal (1988), Kenya (1992, 1997),
Mauritania (1992), Cameroon (1992), Togo (1994), Indonesia (1997), Algeria (1999), and Côte d’Ivoire (2000–­2001).
The results so far suggest that the oversupply of blatant electoral fraud
fuels popular protests, while leadership turnover is likely to occur when
autocrats undersupply blatant electoral fraud. Simply stated, autocrats areable to reduce the two risks simultaneously when they successfully balance
the use of blatant electoral fraud in light of their mobilization capabilities.
What, then, about the other form of electoral manipulation, that is, institutional manipulation? Table 6.3 shows the results of the probit analysis forelectoral system manipulation. Model 3 tests Hypothesis 6.1b and showsthat the gap variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Figure 6.3a graphically shows predicted probabilities of leadership turnover depending upon gaps in the EET. It suggests that leadershipturnover is more likely to occur as the gaps in the EET turn more negative(i.e., electoral systems are too proportional in light of the dictators’ mobilization capabilities), which is consistent with Hypothesis 6.1b, yet change
in the effect is very small (although it is statistically significant across a wide
range of the horizontal axis). This suggests that gaps in electoral systems
may not be as pertinent as those in blatant electoral fraud when it comes
to explaining leadership turnover. One possible interpretation of this result
is that, as suggested in chapter 4, all other things being equal, opposition
parties in electoral authoritarian regimes may not be powerful enough toachieve stunning election victories even under highly PR systems. Furthermore, the analysis focuses on legislative elections and does not include
presidential elections, which may render leadership turnover more difficult. In particular, stunning election results may be unlikely to lead directly
to the opposition’s stunning election victories in legislative elections under

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TABLE 6.3. Electoral Systems, Leadership Turnover, and Popular Protests
Estimator
Dependent variable
Gap in EET
Trade openness
Population (log)Duration of electoral autocracy(EA)
Regional democracy
Civil conflict
Military regimes
Constant
Time fixed effects
Time lapse and polynomials
Log pseudolikelihood
Number of countries
Observations

Model 3
RE probit
Turnover

Model 4
RE probit
Protests−0.0256**(0.0119)−0.0139**(0.00695)−0.0939(0.254)−0.0262*(0.0154)0.0595(0.0482)

0.0597***(0.0204)−0.00574*(0.00348)
0.130(0.103)−0.000744(0.00568)
0.0173(0.0393)
0.138(0.427)−0.716(0.597)−2.741(1.783)
Yes
Yes−95.05
63
253

0.537
(0.390)0.525(4.139)Yes
Yes−15.2963
257

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Model specifications are
based upon the first-­stage model. The time lapse since the last turnover/protests and their time polynomials are included. The civil conflict variable is not included in Model 3 because the variable predicts failure
perfectly.

presidential systems where leadership is directly elected through presidential elections.
Model 4 estimates the impact of gaps in the EET on the likelihood of
popular protests (Hypothesis 6.2b). The gap in the EET is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Figure 6.3b visualizes changing
predicted probabilities depending upon different gaps in the EET. Whenthe gap variable is negative, the likelihood of post-­electoral popular protests tends to be low. This suggests that if an electoral system is too proportional in light of the dictator’s mobilization capabilities, then the electionis less likely to experience post-­electoral popular protests. But, the morepositive the gap variable is, the more likely elections are to provoke popular
protests. For example, when the gap variable takes the value of −15 (i.e.,
excessively proportional), the predicted probability that an election will
trigger popular protests is approximately 10 percent. By contrast, when
the gap variable is 15 (i.e., excessively majoritarian), then the predictedprobability that an election will generate protests is as much as 45 percent.

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181

Fig. 6.3. Gaps in Electoral Systems and the Likelihoods of Leadership Turnover andProtests
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal axis stands forgaps in the effective electoral threshold (EET). Zero indicates that authoritarian leaders matchthe size of EET with their mobilization capabilities. Positive values indicate that authoritarianleaders adopt excessively majoritarian electoral systems, whereas negative values suggest that
authoritarian leaders adopt excessively PR systems. The vertical axis in figure 6.3a is predictedprobabilities of leadership turnover through coups and opposition victories after the elections.
The vertical axis in figure 6.3b is predicted probabilities of post-­electoral popular protests.

This is consistent with Hypothesis 6.2b: excessive electoral manipulation
through majoritarian electoral systems fuels people’s grievances and radicalizes the opposition, leading to post-­electoral riots and demonstrations.
Countries that correspond to such cases are Belarus (2004, 2006), Georgia (2003), Côte d’Ivoire (2000–­2001), Sierra Leone (1977), Togo (1994,
1998), Congo (2002), Zimbabwe (2002), and Kyrgyzstan (2000, 2005).
Additional Analyses

The theory of autocratic elections that I put forward assumes that thethreat of coups becomes salient when electoral margins are small, whereas
the threat of popular protest turns imminent where electoral manipulation
is extensive. Put differently, it assumes that ruling elites care more about
the size of electoral margins than the extent of electoral manipulation,
whereas the opposition is more sensitive to the extent of electoral manipulation than the size of electoral margins. Given these two threats, autocrats
optimize the extent of electoral manipulation according to their mobiliza-

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

tion capabilities. The two-­stage models endogenize the dictator’s strategic
decision of electoral manipulation, based upon these assumptions of thethreats. Yet, one may wonder about the extent to which the assumptions
are valid. Specifically, protests may occur when electoral margins are small,especially in fraudulent elections, rather than as a result of people’s observations on the extent of electoral manipulation. To examine this, I conduct
several additional tests. First, I regress the extent of electoral manipulation and the size of electoral margins on leadership turnover and popular
protests.12 A model of leadership turnover shows that leadership turnoveris more directly associated with electoral margins than the extent of electoral manipulation (both blatant electoral fraud and majoritarian electoral
systems). In contrast, popular protests are correlated more with the extent
of electoral manipulation than electoral margins. Therefore, the results
suggest that electoral margins are important for the within-­regime threat,
while the extent of electoral manipulation clarifies people’s motivation forprotests. Second, I interact the electoral manipulation measures with electoral margins to examine conditional effects. In both models, interaction
effects are statistically insignificant. For the protest model, the effect ofelectoral margins on protests does not change according to the extent ofelectoral manipulation. Likewise, the effect of electoral fraud on leadership turnover is stable across different levels of electoral margins. These
additional tests confirm empirical validity of the underlying assumptions(appendixes B6.1 and B6.2).

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the determinants of two major forms of post-­
electoral political conflict: leadership turnover and popular protests. I haveargued that where autocrats successfully determine the extent of electoral
manipulation according to their mobilization capabilities, autocratic elections do not provoke either leadership turnover or popular protests. Whendictators are unsuccessful in fully comprehending the electoral dilemma,
however, autocratic elections backfire on them. On the one hand, when
autocrats undersupply electoral manipulation, it is more likely that they
fail to win big or that they may even lose elections to opposition parties,
12. For presidential elections, I calculate margins of victory as differences in shares of votes
between the winner and the runner-­up in the first round of elections. For legislative elections,
I calculate margins as differences in shares of votes between ruling parties and opposition
parties.

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183

both of which may increase the likelihood of a coup d’état. On the other
hand, when autocrats oversupply electoral manipulation, elections are
more likely to provoke protests. Cross-­national statistical analysis provides
strong supporting evidence for these hypotheses.
The analysis of this chapter produces several policy implications. First,
when dictators embark on reforming elections, one may need to draw
attention to the extent to which the regime has an ability to mobilize supporters using economic resources and political organizations, in order toaccess whether the subsequent free and fair elections are just and adequate
as the dictator’s tool to stabilize the regime or represent an opportunity
to legitimately further democratization. If political reform is being introduced without the backup of these resources, then autocratic elections may
constitute a significant chance of leadership turnover. Consequentially, thewider global community may prepare necessary assistance for the subsequent processes of political change.
Second, according to the manner in which autocrats fail to adequately
deal with the electoral dilemma, international assistance on post-­electoral
conflict may require adjustment. For instance, when a reform-­minded dictator begins liberalizing elections in an autocracy, opposition parties mayneed to credibly commit to a deal that they will protect ruling elites’ interests after the elections. Without such a deal, ruling elites may be tempted
to annul the election results via a coup, leading to yet another autocracy orviolent conflict. With the salience of internal threats in mind, international
assistance may better be directed to mitigating ruling elites’ concerns in thiscontext. On the contrary, when autocrats manipulate elections excessively,
the opposition is more likely to resort to organizing the masses: this may
well transform into a violent confrontation between the government andthe opposition or even into brutal state repression. Indeed, we have ample
evidence of this very process. Given that these two patterns of post-­electoralpolitical conflict stem from different threats and the decisions that dictators
make, election monitoring and democratization assistance need to be tailored differently according to each of these two different scenarios.
The four chapters in part II have investigated the causes and consequences of autocratic elections by cross-­national statistical analyses to
identify the correlations between the variables of interest. The next two
chapters in part III will conduct comparative case studies of Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan. Through the controlled comparison between the twocountries, I will posit qualitative and quantitative evidence on the causal
mechanisms assumed in the theory of autocratic elections.

PART III

Comparative Case Studies

SEVEN

From Electoral Manipulation
to Economic Maneuvering
Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan

7.1. Introduction

Kazakhstan experienced limited political liberalization for a couple of years
after its independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the nascent democratization efforts in the country were completely
reversed beginning in 1995. An intriguing puzzle here is that, although the
Kazakh government continued to permit opposition parties to participate inelections after the authoritarian turn, President Nursultan Nazarbaev successfully maintained his rule, overwhelmingly “winning” elections until his
abrupt resignation in 2019.1 Interestingly, electoral fraud had become lessblatant and Kazakhstan’s electoral system had become more proportional
over time between 1995 and 2007. This stands in stark contrast with Kyrgyzstan (see chap. 8), where elections were increasingly designed in a way thatyielded significant biases in favor of an authoritarian regime during almost
the same period. Why was Nazarbaev able to continue winning elections overwhelmingly despite the fact that he became less dependent on electoral manipulation?
1. To make structured and controlled comparisons with the Akaev regime (1991–­2005),
which will be examined in chapter 8, I limit the time scope of my case analysis of Kazakhstan
from its independence (1991) all the way up to 2007, when the Nazarbaev regime reached thepinnacle of power by the ruling Nur Otan’s complete occupation of the seats in the Mazhilis(the lower house).

187

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly illustrate political processes through which Kazakhstan experienced limited liberalization andtransformed into an electoral authoritarian regime. I then describe how
Nazarbaev became less dependent on blatant electoral fraud while pursuing the country’s electoral system reform wherein the government changed
electoral systems from majoritarian electoral systems to proportional representation (PR) systems from the middle of the 1990s to the late 2000s.
The third section posits my argument that electoral manipulation becameless blatant due to Nazarbaev’s ability to mobilize public support from theearly 2000s through the distribution of pork and patronage. He dramatically increased his abilities to distribute economic favors to citizens byutilizing natural resource wealth and incorporating local elites’ patronage
networks through political and fiscal centralization as well as the construction of the dominant party, Nur Otan. Furthermore, by the middle of the
2000s, the opposition had become too weak to be a real option for voters.
The fourth section provides systematic quantitative evidence of politicalbusiness cycles (PBCs) in Kazakhstan, demonstrating that the magnitudeof pre-­electoral economic maneuvering tended to become larger over timeas the government was able to enjoy abundant natural resources, strong
disciplinary organizations, and a weak opposition.

7.2. Limited Liberalization and Autocratization
Limited Liberalization

Kazakhstan declared independence in December 1991. The collapse of theSoviet Union and national independence prompted the Kazakh president,
Nursultan Nazarbaev, to implement political and economic reforms. President Nazarbaev took a series of measures to promote political liberalization. As he stated in a newspaper interview in October 1991, “I see Kazakhstan as a democratic, presidential republic, with a professional parliament,
elected on a multiparty basis, and with strong executive power in the centerand in the region” (Cummings 2005: 24).
The first constitution of Kazakhstan, which was adopted in January
1993, was indeed more liberal than those of other Central Asian countries
such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Although it gave the president decisive control over the local governments (Olcott 2002: 96–­101), it formallydivided the government into three branches: the executive, represented
by the large presidential staff; the legislative, embodied in the unicameral

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189

Kazakh Supreme Council, whose representatives were elected on a territorial basis; and the judiciary. Furthermore, the Supreme Council “enjoyeda wide range of formal rights including the right to approve the budget,
amend the constitution and elect the constitutional court” (Anderson 1997:307), and by utilizing the power of the parliamentary institution, legislators had the ability to challenge the president over the issue of economic
reforms.
Nazarbaev also allowed the formation of new political parties. For
example, the Nevada-­
Semipalatinsk Movement, Kazakhstan’s largest
noncommunist public organization during the Glasnost era, transformed
itself into an opposition party called the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan(NKK) in October 1991. Headed by a Kazakh writer and political activist,
Olzhas Suleimenov, the NKK received substantial financial support frombig sponsors and private businesses, which provided the party with an independent power base to challenge the president (Isaacs 2011: 58). Moreover,
the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan (SPK) was founded in August 1991 as the
successor to the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK), which had previously been dissolved by Nazarbaev. After dissolving the KCP, Nazarbaev
lost control of the successive party (Olcott 2002: 93), as the SPK consistedof many deputies in the Supreme Soviet anxious about radical economic
reforms (see, e.g., Isaacs 2011: 57). Given its large membership and powerful organizational base, the SPK emerged as the strongest oppositionalgroup. With the SPK having turned into the opposition, Nazarbaev himself launched a pro-­presidential party, the Union of People’s Unity of
Kazakhstan (SNEK)—­the precursor of the current dominant party, Nur
Otan—­and included ruling elites who would later play important roles insustaining his authoritarian rule in the country (Isaacs 2011: 57).
Various social movements were highly active before and after independence.2 For instance, the aforementioned Nevada-­Semipalatinsk Movement was formed in 1989 in an attempt to halt Soviet nuclear testing in thenortheastern region of Semipalatinsk (Uyama 2003: 49). The organizationencouraged more than a million people to sign petitions demanding to ban
nuclear tests in the country’s territory, and enormous crowds participatedin this group’s rallies (Olcott 2002: 90). Moreover, the Kazakh nationalist
group (and political party) Alash was established with the slogan “Islam,
Turkism, Democracy” and a political agenda supporting the exclusion of theRussians from Kazakhstan. In addition to Alash, three other Kazakh ethni2. For more detailed discussions on the social movements in Kazakhstan, see Zhovits(1999) and Uyama (2003).

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

cally based groups were launched, namely, the Azat (Freedom) movement,
the Zeltoksan (December) National Democratic Party, and the Republican
Party of Kazakhstan, each of which had a popular support base divided
between Kyzylorda, South Kazakhstan, and Zhambyl Oblasts, respectively.
In addition, at least six pro-­Russian groups with nationalist and federative
agendas were formed, including Edinstvo (Unity), Civic Contact, Democratic Progress, Russkaya Obshina (Russian Community), Russian Center,and Lad. These civic organizations’ main goal was the protection of Russian culture. The Russkaya Obshina and the Lad particularly carried out
active campaigns for bilingualism and dual citizenship, receiving the bulkof their popular support from North and East Kazakhstan Oblasts, respectively (Jones Luong 2002: 144). Last, minority ethnic groups such as the
Koreans and Germans had established cultural centers during Gorbachev’s
Perestroika era and were quite active and in constant communication withthe governments of their external national homelands (Oka 2003: 473).
By 1994, Kazakhstan had developed relatively free and fair media thatprovided legislators with opportunities to freely convey their opinions to
the wider public. Although the two largest official newspapers, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda and Vesti Kazakhstana, supported the government’s positions,they also reported on the speeches of opposition legislators. The othermajor independent newspapers were fully reporting the opposition’s political campaigns. The largest and most popular of these was Karavan, which
engaged in reporting corruption scandals. The other major independent
newspaper, Panorama, covered parliamentary maneuvering as well as socialand economic issues (Olcott 2002: 104). Furthermore, Kazakhstan had a
few independent radio stations and one large independent television company, the KTK, which also freely broadcasted these issues.
By 1993, Kazakhstan had come to be perceived in the West as one of
the least autocratic states in authoritarian Central Asia due to the presenceof substantial political competition, a relatively free press, and its commitment to rapid privatization. However, radical marketization policies introduced by Nazarbaev provoked a confrontation between the president andthe parliament, which led to the backsliding of the nascent Kazakh democracy. Confronted with increasing legislative resistance, the governmentpressured the city, raion (region), and oblast (state) soviets (councils) todissolve in November 1993. Nazarbaev then ordered the Supreme Council
to “voluntarily” dissolve itself in December and called for snap elections
for the new legislature in March 1994.
Nevertheless, the opposition movements in Kazakhstan were still highly
vigorous at the time of the 1994 parliamentary election. Facing strong

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191

opposition during the election campaigns, Nazarbaev resorted to various
undemocratic measures to preserve his hegemony. For example, the newparliament had only 177 seats (the Supreme Soviet had 270 seats; Olcott
1995: 263), of which 42 were to be filled from a “state list” from which thepresident selected legislators. Moreover, electoral districts were drawn in a
fashion to guarantee Kazakh pluralities wherever possible (278). Nonetheless, the election results showed that the opposition was still considerablystrong; the distinct opposition parties, NKK, SPK, Lad, Azat, and the newCommunist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK), occupied a total of 43 seats, which
was roughly equal to the number held by the pro-­presidential SNEK.
Immediately after the opening of the new parliament, an opposition
bloc called Respublika was formed largely by members of Azat, Lad, SPK,
and NKK, as well as a few members from the SNEK and the state list. In
all, the opposition group controlled at least 40 percent (69 seats) of theparliament and, by some estimates, a slim majority of 90 seats (Bremmer
and Welt 1996: 191).
Directing its criticisms toward the government, the members of Respublika particularly opposed the government’s radical economic reforms. The
opposition’s strength was very clear given that members of Respublika
passed a vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Sergei Tereshchenko,
a champion of radical economic reforms, with a majority of 111 to 28 in
May 1994. However, since the constitution did not provide for a vote ofno confidence, Nazarbaev declared that Tereshchenko would remain in his
position until privatization was completed, a decision that drew more members into the Respublika camp and led to the formation of an opposition bloc
called Otan-­Otechestvo (Fatherland), which similarly called for Nazarbaev’s
resignation (Olcott 2002: 103). By July 1994, the opposition succeeded inoverriding Nazarbaev’s veto regarding two consumer protection bills. Aftera scandal over the financial improprieties of two ministers in the Tereshchenko cabinet, Nazarbaev was forced to accept the resignation of the prime
minister and his government in mid-­October (104).
Autocratization since 1995

Since Nazarbaev established the second constitution in 1995, the government has strengthened its authoritarian rule. On March 1995, Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya, a journalist and failed candidate in the 1994 election,
claimed that the electoral districts had been disproportionately drawn, andlegislators therefore represented constituencies of vastly differing sizes.
Kvyatkovskaya also charged that the cross-­out voting method had enabled

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

vote counters to accept a single ballot for more than one candidate if thevoter had improperly marked his or her ballot. Indeed, more votes wererecorded than the number of voters in several districts (Olcott 2002: 110;
Cummings 2005: 26). Consequently, the Constitutional Court declared
the entire 1994 parliamentary election to be illegal and ordered the dissolution of the parliament.
Ironically, Kvyatkovskaya’s court appeal provided Nazarbaev with an
opening to redraft the constitution and thus avoid presidential elections.
While the parliament was dissolved, he held two nationwide referenda tostrengthen his powers and extend his tenure. In April 1995, the first referendum concerning the latter issue attracted a voter turnout of 91.3 percent, of which 95.8 percent voiced their support for extending Nazarbaev’s
presidential term until 2000 (Olcott 2002: 111). Nazarbaev presented an
entirely new constitution for vote in a second referendum held at the endof August of the same year, the result of which further bolstered the president’s power.
The second constitution arguably expanded presidential power at theexpense of the legislature and judiciary. First, the unicameral legislature
was transformed into a bicameral system composed of the Senate and theMazhilis (the lower house), both of which would be in the hands of Nazarbaev and his inner circle. The president himself would directly appoint
seven senators, whereas the remainder would be installed by the oblast
council that he controlled. The new constitution also stipulated that thelower house would not be able to initiate legislation and would have toterminate parliamentary deliberation on bills within a month, thus further
severely undermining legislative power. Second, the Constitutional Court
was abolished and replaced with the Constitutional Council, for which thepresident, the senate, and the lower house each would select two members
to form a total of six members. Moreover, any possibilities for the council todisplay independence were nullified by a simple tool, the presidential veto.3
After the adoption of the second constitution, ruling parties began
dominating the parliament by increasing the proportion of their seats all
the way up to 2007 (fig. 7.1).4 When parliamentary elections finally took
3. For more detailed descriptions of the second constitution, see, e.g., Bremmer and Welt
(1996: 193) and Cummings (2000).
4. Figure 7.1 illustrates time-­series changes in seat shares rather than vote shares of rulingand opposition parties. Detailed data on vote shares are not available for the 1994 and 1995
elections; thus, seat shares are more useful for the purpose of comparison between the elections. One may think that seat shares are easily biased through electoral systems, and this was
the case for Kazakhstan. However, even under SMD systems that bring seat premiums to rul-

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193

Fig. 7.1. Increasing Dominance of Ruling Parties in Kazakhstan (1994–­2007)
Source: Olcott (2002); Inter-­Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp)

place in December 1995, “candidates were arbitrarily banned; Russians
were underrepresented on the candidate list; and Nazarbaev supporters
dominated” (Bremmer and Welt 1996: 193). As a result, many opposition
parties decided to boycott the election due to accusations of electoral fraud(Bremmer and Welt 1996; Oka 2003: 474). The proportion of seats heldby pro-­presidential parties in the lower house gradually rose. In the 1995
legislative elections, the revamped SNEK, now called the Party of People’s
Unity of Kazakhstan (PNEK), and the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan(DPK) won 52 percent of all seats, a proportion more than two times thatof their seats in the 1994 election.
The ruling parties experienced some realignment between the 1995
and 1999 elections. The Otan Party was established by coalescing betweenpro-­presidential parties like the PNEK, the DPK, and others to support
Nazarbaev’s electoral campaigns in the 1999 presidential elections. Twoother new pro-­presidential parties, the Civic Party of Kazakhstan and theAgrarian Party of Kazakhstan, were also created before the 1999 parliaing parties, ruling parties in Kazakhstan could not be sufficiently dominant in the late 1990s,
thus suggesting that they were much weaker than those in the 2000s.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

mentary elections. However, despite those efforts, the ruling parties (Otan,
Civic, and Agrarian) occupied only the same total of seats in 1999 as in the
post-­1995 parliament (49 percent of all seats).
In 2003, the president’s daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva and her husband, Rakhat Aliev, launched a new pro-­presidential party called Asar (All
Together). After the Civic and Agrarian Parties formed a pre-­electoral coalition called the Agrarian-­Industrial Union of Workers (AIST) bloc, three ruling parties joined together prior to the 2004 parliamentary elections (Otan,
Asar, and the AIST bloc). Although the ruling parties suffered mutual competition within and between the parties in each electoral district, they dramatically increased their seats as a result of the 2004 elections (75 percent).
In September 2006, Otan merged with Asar. Three months later, theCivic and Agrarian Parties announced that they would also join the Otan
Party, which resulted in the foundation of the dominant party, Nur Otan,of which Nazarbaev proclaimed he would serve as the party leader. In theAugust 2007 parliamentary election, the newly established dominant party
occupied all of the seats in the lower house, thus completing the process ofgradual dominance of the legislature by ruling parties in the country.
In contrast, opposition parties had gradually lost their presence in the
Kazakhstan parliament. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, they obtained
as many seats as the ruling parties (24 percent); however, their proportionof seats was reduced from 24 percent to 10 percent in the elections of
the following year. In the 1999 legislative elections, the two main opposition parties, the KPK (led by the former presidential candidate, Serikbolsyn Abdildin) and the Republican People’s Party (led by the former prime
minister, Akezhan Kazhegeldin), obtained only three seats and one seat,
respectively, thus leading to further declines in their political influencein the legislature. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Ak Zhol Party(Bright Path), which had been created as a result of the strong opposition
movement Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) launched in 2002,
obtained a single seat in the parliament although there were several otheropposition parties participating in the elections. In the 2007 parliamentaryelections, which were the country’s first to be held under a pure PR systemwith a 7 percent electoral threshold, all opposition parties failed to obtaina sufficient number of votes to make it into the parliament.

7.3. Electoral Manipulation in Kazakhstan

As discussed in the previous section, party system formation in Kazakhstan was a process through which ruling parties gradually dominated theFrom Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

195

parliament and opposition parties incrementally lost their political influence. However, the electoral dominance of the ruling parties cannot simply be attributed to the authoritarian government’s exclusive reliance on
blatant electoral fraud. Nor can it solely be explained by the president’s
maintenance of electoral systems in favor of ruling coalitions. Kazakhstan is an electoral authoritarian regime in which elections fall far shortof international standards for democratic elections. Although the government has sometimes resorted to violent measures to repress oppositiongroups, the regime has become less contingent on repressive, fraudulent
tools to gain big election wins. Moreover, the president even changed thecountry’s electoral system from a single-­member district (SMD) based system (1994–­2006) to a pure PR system (2007), which resulted in bringing asmaller pro-­regime seat premium. As Schatz (2009) rightfully argued, theNazarbaev regime can be more accurately depicted as a “soft authoritarianregime” rather than a highly repressive, closed authoritarianism such as
those of neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Schedler (2013: 4–­5)
similarly referred to Kazakhstan as one of the typical electoral authoritarian regimes. In this section, I demonstrate that the government became lessdependent on blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation—­atleast in comparison to its reliance on these measures in the 1990s.
Blatant Electoral Fraud

Hyde and Marinov’s (2012) NELDA dataset shows that all Kazakhstan
elections since independence until 2007 were competitive in the sense that
opposition parties and multiple candidates were allowed to participate, thus
suggesting that the country was an electoral authoritarian regime during
the period. Table 7.1 depicts time-­series changes in the extent of blatantelectoral fraud in parliamentary and presidential elections between 1995
and 2007. The level of blatant electoral fraud in the 1995 parliamentaryelections, as the elections after limited liberalization, is relatively lower (6)than in the 1999 elections, which faced the most severe electoral manipulation (9). Since 1999, the degree of electoral fraud gradually became lessextensive up to 2007.
The 1999 elections were marked by the most extensive electoral fraud
during the time period under study.5 The elections were minimally competitive in the sense that ten political parties and 547 candidates were reg5. In table 7.1, I primarily rely upon OSCE final reports on elections, which are also often
referred to by the U.S. Department of State’s country reports, to qualitatively assess changes
in the extent of electoral fraud in Kazakhstan (1995–­2007). The 1994 legislative elections are
not included because neither of the above-­mentioned reports was available.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

TABLE 7.1. Blatant Electoral Fraud in Kazakhstan (1995–­2007)
1995 Par 1999 Pres 1999 Par 2004 Par 2005 Pres 2007 Par
Competitive elections
Election violencePre-­electoral cheating
Election-­day cheating
Problems on electoral law
Overall electoral fraud

Yes
0
1
2
3
6

Yes
0
3
3
3
9

Yes
0
3
3
3
9

Yes
0
3
2
2
7

Yes
0
2
2
3
7

Yes
0
2
1
2
5

Source: Kelley (2012); OSCE (2005, 2007); U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices (https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/countryreports-on-human-rights-practices/).
Note: Data for each election were accessed via Kelley’s (2012) Quality of Elections Data and the author’s
own coding for the 2005 and 2007 elections. Each component has four scales (0 = no problems; 1 = minor
problems; 2 = moderate problems; 3 = significant problems). I aggregated each component to assess overall
election fraud. “Par” represents parliamentary elections, whereas “Pres” stands for presidential elections.

istered for the single-­mandate constituencies; however, an OSCE report
identified extensive electoral fraud. First, electoral cheating was widely
observed during election campaigns; international observers found numerous practices of proxy voting among regime supporters particularly in rural
areas (OSCE 2000: 16). Official election activities were often mingled withelection campaigns conducted by the Otan Party (13). Unfair campaign
practices by ruling parties were closely associated with the government’s
domination of media. For example, Khabar, a large, state-­controlled TV
station operated by Dariga Nazarbaeva, played an important role in biasing
broadcasting in favor of the ruling parties. Otan, which obtained only 31
percent of seats in the 1999 parliamentary election, enjoyed nearly 60 percent of the media coverage (14). Election commissions had become more
effective in presiding over election processes compared with past elections,and electoral bias was also imposed through lower-­level election commissions, whose members were overrepresented by the ruling parties. As aresult, only 70 percent of polling stations were positively assessed for voting procedures and less than half were considered as fair in counting procedures (17–­18). As I will discuss later, these evaluations were much worse
than those for the elections during the 2000s.
Another irregularity in the elections was the widespread nonviolent intimidation of the opposition. For instance, former prime minister
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who had declared his intention to stand for thepresidential elections on the basis of his high popularity, was disqualified
as a candidate and detained in Moscow on dubious charges of money laundering and other criminal activities (Isaacs 2011: 68). As a result, his new
opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, was forced to withdraw

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197

from the party-­list PR section of the election and ended up obtaining only
one seat in a SMD in the parliamentary election.
Second, the government and ruling parties were highly repressive fromthe mid-­to late 1990s, during which time opposition parties were often violently intimidated and prevented from conducting effective electoral campaigns. One of Kazhegeldin’s secretaries was suddenly beaten by unknown
assailants during one campaign, and Kazhegeldin himself was also the subject of a failed assassination attempt (Furman 2006: 228). According to apolitical scientist,
These five years [1996–­2001] were really difficult, really nightmare
for the opposition in Kazakhstan. This was a time of stagnation. . . .
When they [opposition activists] wanted to organize protests in the1999 presidential elections, the activists’ doors of flats were not able
to open. This is how the regime was intimidating the opposition.
There were threats, and they [ruling parties] were even throwing
drugs to opposition figures’ houses in order to be able to prosecute them. This menu of intimidation, a tool to crack down on the
opposition, was so huge at that time that the regime was extremely
repressive by the end of the 1990s. (author’s interview with a political scientist [#11])
Likewise, looking back on the 1990s, an opposition political activist statedthat
he [Nazarbaev] was using administrative resources to threaten political movements on behalf of the government. . . . There were intimidations, not allowing to organize party meetings with voters. At
that time, it wasn’t always directly against opposition parties, butsometimes they employed repressive measures. I remember how
they switched off electricity in a building where we were gathering.
They were preventing opposition parties and groups from campaign
activities. They had a variety of methods to do that. (author’s interview with a political activist [#20])
Compared to those of the late 1990s, elections in the mid-­2000s becameless fraudulent when Kazakhstan held three national elections (2004 and2007 parliamentary elections and 2005 presidential elections). According
to table 7.1, total scores of electoral fraud in the 2004, 2005, and 2007
elections are 7, 7, and 5, respectively. First, the parliament’s adoption of

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

amendments of the electoral law in March 2004 was assessed by the OSCE
as embodying considerable progress, although further improvements
were required in order to align with international criteria on democraticelections (OSCE 2004a: 5). The legal framework in the subsequent 2007
parliamentary elections did not exhibit any significant progress in further
improvement of the 2004 electoral law (OSCE 2007: 7);6 however, it was
no worse than that of 1999. The Quality of Elections Data (QED) reflects the
improvements in the electoral law by evaluating the 2004 and 2007 parliamentary elections as 2 (intermediate fraud) in the section “legal problems
on electoral law,” which can be compared with 3 (major fraud) in the same
category for the 1999 parliamentary elections (see also OSCE 2004b: 1;
2007: 7).
Among the many improvements in the 2004 electoral law, importantchanges to prevent ruling parties from relentlessly using fraud included (1)the prohibition of undue interference by the authorities in the work of theelection commissions;7 (2) the prohibition of unauthorized persons at polling stations; (3) greater observer access to the entire election process andtheir receipt of relevant election documents; (4) posting of election results
protocols in precinct and district election commissions for public scrutiny;(5) stronger efforts to provide equal conditions for candidates during theelection campaign; (6) procedures for the compilation of voter lists andverification of their accuracy; and (7) expansion of the list of prohibited
activities that could interfere with the election process (OSCE 2004a: 5–­6).
Additional improvements in the electoral law were applied to the 2007
parliamentary elections. For instance, a previous provision banning public meetings between the end of electoral campaigns and the publicationof final election results was removed from the electoral law amended in
December 2006.
However, significant parts of the law remained out of accord with international standards of democratic elections. The electoral law still denied
the “suffrage right of a citizen ‘who has a prior conviction not cancelled orwithdrawn,’ regardless of the seriousness of the crime” (OSCE 2007: 7).
The revised constitution in May 2007 added a provision stating that eligible
electoral candidates must have been permanent residents in Kazakhstan for
6. The OSCE reported that “despite a constructive dialogue with the authorities since2006, recommendations to improve the legal framework made by the OSCE/ODIHR (OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) were, in general, not addressed by theamendment of June 2007.”
7. Local authorities’ interference in electoral commissions in each oblast was among themost serious problems in the 1999 elections (OSCE 2000: 2).

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199

at least ten years. “Such a long time period can constitute an unreasonable
restriction on the right to seek public office” (8). Moreover, improvements
on paper in the electoral law did not necessarily mean that pro-­presidential
parties and the government abided by the law without any infringements.
In fact, there were considerable degrees of pre-­electoral and election-­daycheating in the 2004, 2005, and 2007 elections. That being said, the QEDand the U.S. Department of State country reports suggest that levels ofelectoral meddling still decreased over time (total cheating scores of the2004, 2005, and 2007 elections are 5, 4, and 3, respectively).
First, media outlets were still significantly biased toward the ruling parties in all the elections, and far from equal media access was stipulated in
the electoral law, although unlike in the past, there were no reports thatmedia outlets were shut down or journalists were prosecuted in any of
the three elections. Moreover, media provided all party leaders with more
opportunities to debate political issues during electoral campaigns (OSCE
2004b, 15). In this respect, the OSCE’s analysis of media coverage provides evidence indicating that the dominance of media by ruling parties
tended to be less heavy-­handed and the government was less inclined toresort to intimidation against the opposition media in comparison withthe previous elections. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the major statechannel, Kazakhstan TV (Kazakhstan-­1), devoted 64 percent of its politicalnews coverage to Otan and 9 percent to the other ruling parties (the AIST
bloc and Asar). Likewise, the other well-­known station, TV Khabar, aired
44 percent and 31 percent of political news favorable for Asar and Otan,
respectively (14–­15). In contrast, in the 2007 parliamentary elections, thenewly established dominant party, Nur Otan, was covered by only 20 percent on TV Khabar and 17 percent on Kazakhstan TV (OSCE 2007: 18).
However, unlike the 2004 elections, these media outlets broadcast political news about the government and the president (30 percent in total),
which generated additional bias in favor of the dominant party, given that
it was heavily fused with the government (as I discuss later). Even withthat in mind, the total media coverage for the dominant party was still
significantly less than in previous years at about 50 percent. Consideringthat Nur Otan was already a far larger party in size and had stronger organizational bases than the preceding Otan and Asar Parties, the difference inmedia coverage suggests that despite its continuing bias, the government
refrained from relying exclusively on media bias to make election results
favorable to the ruling parties.
Second, both the voting and counting procedures of all three elections
were more positively assessed by the OSCE compared with those of the

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

1999 elections. The proportions of polling stations where voting procedures were positively assessed were 87 percent (2004 elections), 92 percent(2005 elections), and 94 percent (2007 elections), all of which were significantly improved over the 70 percent positive assessments in the 1999
elections (OSCE 2000, 2004b, 2005, 2007; Bader 2012: 53). Moreover,the percentages of polling stations where counting procedures were positively assessed were 72 percent (2004), 72 percent (2005), and 61 percent(2007). Although the figure for the 2007 elections is somewhat worse thanthose for the other two years, they were still better than the proportions
recorded for the 1999 elections, in which more than half of polling stations
were negatively evaluated in terms of vote counting (OSCE 2000).
The registration and participation of the main opposition parties went
very smoothly and do not appear to have been highly problematic, thus
representing a stark contrast with the experience of Akezhan Kazhegeldin’s
Republican People’s Party, an opposition party in the 1999 elections thatwas exposed to various obstacles in electoral participation and campaigns.
It is true that the government prevented the main opposition from carrying out effective campaigns; however, such cases were relatively rare. Activists from the DVK were detained by police only three times in Almaty
city and Pavlodar Oblast, and local authorities inhibited opposition parties
from holding campaign events in only a few instances (OSCE 2004b: 11).
Main opposition parties like the DVK and the Communist Party in the2004 elections and the Nationwide Social Democratic Party (OSDP) andNaghyz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path) in the 2007 elections were all registered without any problems. There were hardly any complainants from the
opposition parties, and no appeals were filed concerning the registration
process (OSCE 2004b: 10; 2007: 14). Nonetheless, according to one of myinterviews with a political analyst, the Ak Zhol Party had actually obtained25–­30 percent of total votes; however, the official election results totaled
just 12.8 percent, thus indicating continued electoral falsification by thegovernment (author’s interview with a political analyst [#8]).
Finally, extensive electoral violence against opposition parties declined
significantly. No such incidents were observed during the 2004 parliamentary elections.8 Although election-­time violence was exercised toward pres8. This does not mean that the government did not use violent repression during non-­election times. The regime sometimes used violent repression and intimidation against opposition leaders and arrested them, although they tended to be detained for relatively shortperiods of time. However, the repression was not sufficiently severe to label the regime as oneof closed authoritarianism. Furthermore, electoral violence has clearly been reduced in the
2000s, thus indicating that the government may be reluctant to use overt repression duringFrom Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

201

idential candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay during his 2005 campaign, thiswas a relatively isolated occurrence. And the government did not resort toviolent measures or intimidate the opposition parties in the 2007 elections(author’s interview with an opposition activist [#20]).
Institutional Manipulation: From SMD to PR

Meanwhile, the Kazakh government had changed electoral systems in thelower house elections a couple of times since independence. Specifically,
the government changed from the SMD-­based structure characterized bya high effective electoral threshold (EET) to a lower-­threshold PR system (table 7.2 and fig. 7.2). As previously discussed, the first constitution
adopted in 1993 provided a 177-­seat parliament in which 135 lawmakers
were elected based on SMDs and the remaining 42 were not subjected toelectoral competition but rather selected by the president from a “state
list.” In September 1995, the president issued a presidential decree on theelectoral law in which the number of seats in the lower house was reduced
to 67 and all the lawmakers would be elected under the SMD system. In
May 1999, Nazarbaev changed electoral rules by introducing a mixed-­
member majoritarian system in which 67 lawmakers would be elected insingle-­mandate constituencies whereas an additional ten members would
be determined through a party list via a national PR system with a 7 percent electoral threshold. The 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections were
held under that electoral system. In June 2007, subsequent to the substantial amendments to the constitution made in the previous month, Nazarbaev again revised the electoral law. He initiated a significant change
in Kazakhstan’s electoral system whereby the government adopted a fullPR system by a nationwide party list with the same 7 percent electoral
threshold. In sum, the EET in Kazakhstan had decreased since 1994 from37.5 percent (1994 and 1995; SMD with a state list for the 1994 elections),
through 33.5 percent (1999 and 2004; mixed-­member majoritarian system;
7 percent threshold for the ten additional members), to 7 percent (2007; apure PR system with a 7 percent threshold).
Importantly, majoritarian electoral systems significantly protected thepresident from losing elections with a landslide to opposition parties. The
government designed the 1994, 1995, and 1999 elections such that ruling elites would be able to maintain a dominant position in the legislaelection, when the international community scrutinizes the country more closely (Bhasin andGandhi 2013).

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

TABLE 7.2. Electoral System Change and Effective Electoral Threshold in
Kazakhstan (1994–­2007)
1994 elections 1995 elections 1999 elections 2004 elections 2007 elections
SMD
PR

76%
0%

Notes:

24% appointed
by the president

100%
0%

87%
13%

87%
13%

0%
100%

Electoral
Electoral
Electoral
threshold (7%) threshold (7%) threshold (7%)

Note: In the 1994 elections, 24 percent of lawmakers in the lower house were selected by the president
via a “state list.”

ture. Selecting forty-­two legislators via no electoral competition (in the1994 parliamentary elections) and electoral manipulation (particularly inthe 1999 elections) did contribute to preventing landslide victories for the
opposition camp during this period (author’s interview with a political analyst [#4]). Owning to the pro-­regime seat premium under SMD systems,
the ruling elites side received more seats than vote shares. Although voteshares for each party and candidate in the 1994 elections were not formally
documented and published, the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan published vote shares of elected candidates in each electoral districtof the 1995 elections, which enables us to estimate the extent to whichruling elites received seat premiums (Tsentralnaya Izbiratelnaya Komissiya
Respubliki Kazakhstan 2010). According to the data, average vote sharesof elected candidates were 61 percent in the 1995 elections, whereas theruling camp (including pro-­regime independents) occupied approximately
80 percent of parliamentary seats, thus indicating that the government
was enjoying an approximately 19 percent seat premium under the SMD
system.
The SMD portion of the electoral system also provided large seat premiums to ruling elites in the 1999 parliamentary elections. The rulingparties and independents who were mostly pro-­presidential (Olcott 2002:252) obtained 80.6 percent of seat shares with 61.7 percent of vote shares,
whereas the main opposition party, the KPK, obtained only 3.9 percent ofseat shares despite earning 17.7 percent of total votes (Nohlen, Grotz, andHartmann 2001: 420–­23). Thus, the SMD systems appear to have undercounted opposition parties’ votes when translating votes into seats in theparliament.
In the 2004 elections, the ruling parties and pro-­regime independents
became stronger and increased their vote shares to 79 percent under theFrom Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering203

Fig. 7.2. Effective Electoral Thresholds in Kazakh Parliamentary Elections (1994–­2007)

SMD system,9 thus resulting in the occupation of all the seats determined
under SMD. Moreover, ruling parties received 21 percent more seat sharesthan their vote shares, which is a considerably large seat premium.
After the adoption of the PR system ahead of the 2007 legislative elections, the gap between shares of votes and seats decreased significantly.
This suggests that PR systems brought smaller pro-­regime seat premiums
toward the governing parties. Having obtained all of the seats determinedby the elections (98 seats), Nur Otan scored an overwhelming electoral
victory with 88.41 percent of total votes.10 Even under the pure PR system,
the dominant party received a favorable bias toward its seat shares (11.59
percent); however, the bias was only half that of the previous elections. The
gap between votes and seats in the new electoral system derived more fromthe fact that, in contrast to the 1999 and 2004 elections, when some oppo9. The calculation is based on district-­level election data from Nurmukhamedov andChebotarev (2005: 47–­49). As I could not find vote shares of the second-­round voting, I used
proportions of vote shares obtained by the three ruling parties and independents.
10. The figure was taken from the website of the Central Election Commission of the
Republic of Kazakhstan (election.kz).

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sition parties had succeeded in meeting the 7 percent electoral threshold,none of them, whether radical and moderate, were able to do so in the 2007
elections.
However, the PR system also yielded several positive effects that could
be considered beneficial for the regime. First, voter turnout in parliamentary elections increased after the adoption of the PR system, enhancing thedemonstration effects of elections. Although voter turnout in the first election after independence was relatively high with 73.5 percent, the numbers later decreased, including 62.5 percent and 54.29 percent turnouts
in 1999 and 2004, respectively (Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 2001: 420;
Nurmukhamedov and Chebotarev 2005:11). Interestingly, once Kazakhstan switched to the PR system, voter turnout bounced back dramatically,reaching 68.41 percent in the 2007 election. According to Nazarbaev himself, the PR system “provided a real reflection of the distribution of political forces and the valid will of the population” (Isaacs 2011: 90).
Second, the opposition built a pre-­electoral coalition to compete inelections under the SMD system. For instance, in the 2004 elections, twooutright opposition parties, the KPK and the DVK, forged a bloc to coordinate their election campaigns (Isaacs 2011: 89–­90). However, prior to
the 2007 elections under the new PR system, serious internal divisions had
emerged in the opposition camp, and opposition parties failed to unite forthe elections, which then resulted in the failure of obtaining seats in thelegislature. Although a couple of factors seemingly contributed to the failure of opposition coordination in the 2007 elections (discussed later), theelections with the PR system did not observe a robust pre-­electoral opposition coalition.

7.4. The Strengthening of Nazarbaev’s Mobilization Capabilities

The previous sections have shown that, although Nazarbaev became lessdependent on electoral manipulation techniques—­both blatant electoral
fraud and institutional manipulation—­between 1994 and 2007, he successfully maintained overwhelming victories and kept most ruling elites in linewith the regime after the elections. As numerous extant studies on politics
in Kazakhstan have clarified, the regime continued to employ blatant electoral fraud to a certain extent. Particularly in the late 1990s, the government relied heavily on the disproportionality feature of the SMD system,
as well as extensive electoral cheating, blatant election violence, and themanipulation of the electoral law. However, given that the extent of blatantFrom Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

205

electoral fraud gradually declined and the government switched electoral
systems from a pure SMD system to a full PR system, electoral manipulation tactics alone are unable to explain the dictator’s electoral dominance inthe country. This poses important puzzles concerning authoritarian elections: Why did the president become less reliant on blatant electoral fraud? Why
did the regime give up the seat premiums under SMD systems and decide to adopt
the PR system?11
I argue that an answer can be found in President Nazarbaev’s successful enhancement of his mobilization capability, which cements politicalsupport from ruling elites and the citizenry. Since the 1995 parliamentary elections, ruling parties increasingly improved their vote shares in thelower house (fig. 7.4a). In particular, from 1999 until 2007, the growing
mobilization capabilities of ruling parties can be well observed by comparing vote shares in the PR portion of the electoral systems in the 1999,
2004, and 2007 legislative elections. As the PR part is under a nationwide
electoral district without any gerrymandering and malapportionment, voteshares are relatively comparable. That the mobilization capability of rulingparties during the 1999 parliamentary elections was still weak is well illustrated by the fact that vote shares of the ruling parties were smaller under
the PR portion (ten seats). They obtained only 54.75 percent of total votes
under the PR system (Ashimbaev and Khlyupin 2008: 840): Otan scoredjust 30.89 percent, whereas the other two ruling parties, Agrarian and
Civic, garnered 12.63 percent and 11.23 percent, respectively. In the 2004
parliamentary elections, the three ruling parties (Otan, Asar, and the AISTbloc) obtained 79.06 percent of total votes under the PR system determining ten seats, thus suggesting that ruling parties significantly enhanced
their mobilization power by approximately 25 percent compared with the
11. One alternative explanation might be that, because by the late 2000s Kazakhstan had
already been a closed authoritarian regime in which opposition forces were severely repressedby the government, Nazarbaev no longer needed to rig elections. The government’s continued use of some repressive measures during non-­electoral periods in the 2000s contributed to weakening opposition parties. However, it has also been argued that Kazakhstan isfar from being a highly repressive authoritarian regime like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,where opposition parties are barred and completely excluded (e.g., Schatz 2009; Hale 2015).
During the period under study, elections had formally provided multiple options other thanruling parties, which is an important criterion to define electoral authoritarianism (Hyde andMarinov 2012; Kinne and Marinov 2013). In this circumstance, I suggest that in addition to
the role of state repression, the opposition’s strategic failure to coordinate their actions before
elections contributes to explaining variations in electoral manipulation in the country. Moreover, in addition to opposition strengths, there are other important factors such as financial
resources and the government’s organizational strengths to explain electoral manipulation.
I also consider the government’s strategy of buying off people’s support through such “soft”
measures.

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1999 elections. In the 2007 legislative elections, Nur Otan achieved an
overwhelming victory with 88.41 percent of total votes, thus indicatingthat their mobilization power had increased by about 10 percent. Given
the aforementioned findings that blatant electoral fraud tended to be lessextensive, growing vote shares in the portion of PR systems suggest thatthe president had successfully gained higher, nationwide mobilization
capabilities from 1999 to 2007.
How did Nazarbaev succeed in improving his mobilization capability? This section demonstrates the process in which that became possible
by focusing on the president’s mobilization capabilities through extensive
economic distribution. In particular, I focus on the following three elements that are closely related to the president’s mobilization capabilities,
namely, (1) natural resource wealth, (2) centralizing disciplinary organizations, and (3) the opposition strength. I argue that the president was able toreduce the need for manipulating elections with blatant electoral fraud andthe adoption of SMD systems during the aforementioned period because
he was able to rely more on the efficient distribution of material benefits
toward citizens over time.
Natural Resource Wealth as a Source of Economic Maneuvering

Similar to the other postcommunist countries, Kazakhstan had suffereda serious economic decline in the immediate years after the collapse of
the Soviet Union. To recover from the recession, the Kazakh government
adopted a major economic strategy to liberalize its trade policy and become
part of the international market. Particularly after 1995, when most firms
except for large corporations had been privatized,12 the country began tolower tariffs and export natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals at
higher volumes. Subsequent to 1999, when the international oil price rapidly increased, natural resource sectors substantively boosted the economy,
which allowed the country to keep almost two-­digit economic growth until
2007 (Pomfret 2006: 7). Figure 7.4b shows that oil-­gas value per capita
grew by fourteen times between 1998 (US$207) and 2008 (US$2,975).
This drastic increase in natural resource wealth was largely driven by a
rapid surge in international oil prices during the same period (fig. 7.4c).
The economic recovery induced by exporting natural resources greatly
enhanced the state resources available to the president. Figure 7.3 shows
12. On the processes of economic reform in Kazakhstan, see Pomfret (2006).

From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

207

Fig. 7.3. Economic Growth and Fiscal Revenues in Kazakhstan (1993–­2008)
Source: International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report (1993–­2008); World Development
Indicators (1993–­2008, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators).
Note: The left vertical axis denotes revenue (million US$), whereas the right vertical axis
represents economic growth (%).

that the government increased fiscal revenues with impressive speed
between 1995 and 2008, when they reached US$10 billion, or five times
the total revenues in 1995. Growing financial resources, mostly achievedby rich natural resource wealth, dramatically enhanced the government’s
ability to extensively distribute pork and patronage to voters.
During nascent years after independence, the president was not fullyin charge of these resources, as the country’s energy sector, including thestate oil and gas company Kazakhstanmunaigaz, was the prerogative of the
Ministry of Oil and Gas (Hoffman 2000: 281). Most natural resources in
Kazakhstan are concentrated in the western regions, and local elites maintained considerable control over natural resource management (Ostrowski

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 7.4. Electoral Performance and Natural Resource Wealth in Kazakhstan
Source: Author data; Ross (2011).
Note: Oil-­gas value per capita is calculated by multiplying the country’s total oil-­gas production by
the constant 2000 oil-­gas price and dividing it by total population.

2010). The failure to seize control of the country’s natural resources, aswell as their relative shortages in earlier periods, made it difficult for thepresident to use oil money for the purpose of sufficient distribution.
Nazarbaev was under pressure from the internal elites in both the ministry and the oil-­rich western regions, who aspired to seize full control of theindustry and increase their political influence in the central government.
In particular, ruling elites, who had ascended their career ladders within
the oil industry during the Soviet era and thus were closely connected toindigenous oil enterprises and the ministry, attempted to strengthen theirgrip on natural resource sectors. A case in point is the appointment anddismissal of Ravil Cherdabaev as the minister of oil and gas. Born in oil-­rich Atyrau Oblast into a family whose members had worked in oil enterprises since the beginning of the twentieth century, Cherdabaev was oneof the most influential “oil men.” Having taken over the Ministry of Oiland Gas, he planned to create a vertically integrated oil company, which

From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

209

he would monitor. “This plan, if successfully executed, would spell a significant degree of control over the republic’s most important industry andallow the ministry to regain the authority” (Ostrowski 2010: 37). Fearing
the growing influence of Cherdabaev, Nazarbaev forced him to step downin October 1994.
To better exploit this source of wealth, Nazarbaev began to centralize
the management of natural resource sectors, thereby facilitating the efficient distribution of patronage for his political purposes. To prevent theindigenous “oil men” from dominating the industry, Nazarbaev accelerated
the privatization of the oil sector by introducing foreign direct investment.
As a result, “by the end of the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry nolonger reflected its indigenous roots” (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010:259). Prominent politicians such as Kazhegeldin, as well as wealthy businessmen, emerged in strength as a result of the large profits yielded by
the privatization of state-­owned companies and also helped to establish
the DVK. In an attempt to contain strong opponents without harming theprivatization process, Nazarbaev decided to take charge of the oil sector
himself. In March 1997, he signed a decree dissolving the Ministry of Oiland Gas and other related state committees and established in their place
KazakhOil, the national oil and gas company (Ostrowski 2010: 47–­48). By
transferring many of the ministry’s functions to KazakhOil, which presided
over contracts with foreign companies, Nazarbaev successfully strengthened his control over the country’s oil industry (a sector that provides anestimated 37 percent of state revenues), taking it firmly within his own
presidential apparatus and away from the executive powers of Prime Minister Kazhegeldin (Hoffman 2000: 282).
In making KazakhOil work as a political machine through which he wasable to cement political support for himself, Nazarbaev began to constructdirect patron-­client relationships with other ruling elites and his family
members within the newly founded national oil company. Nazarbaev’s
close ally Nurlan Balgimbaev was installed as the president of KazakhOil,
and Nazarbaev’s son-­in-­law Timur Kulibaev became a financial director
and vice president (Ostrowski 2010: 49). Nazarbaev also recruited many
young technocrats to the oil company who did not have close connections
with the oil-­rich regions and thus were loyal to the president (49–­50).
President Nazarbaev and his ruling parties were able to spend vast
amounts of oil money for electoral purposes by utilizing the centralized management of the oil industry and dramatically increasing natural
resource wealth after 2000. Analyzing the 1999 elections, Hoffman (2000:

210

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box287) succinctly points out the likely connection between oil resources andelectoral processes in the elections when suggesting the importance of
KazakhOil as an informal political organization:
Kazakhoil’s political importance stems not only from the strategic
nature of petroleum in Kazakhstan; the organization also serves
an important budgetary role for the Presidency. Politically prioritized projects, such as the construction of Kazakhstan’s new capital,
Astana, and the financing of early presidential elections, require hugeamounts of capital, yet are not officially funded from the republican budget. It is widely rumored that Kazakhoil has been used as atool for redirecting state financing to such off-­budget items. If true,
this would help to explain not only the funding sources of these
activities, but the reluctance by top oil officials to open Kazakhoil
to privatization, which would require more transparent operations
and bookkeeping. It may also serve as a partial explanation for why
Kazakhoil through October 1998 had only returned a total of $2.3
million to the state budget—­fully 14 times less than the anticipatedamount.
In the mid-­1990s, both central and local authorities possessed a very
limited ability to finance pensions, utilities, health care, and other fiscal
policies because serious economic decline a couple of years after the collapse of the Soviet Union had significantly deprived the government of
its fiscal power (author’s interview with a political activist [#29] who had
been working in a local government during the 1990s). However, a great
deal of anecdotal evidence indicates that the government and ruling parties
distributed economic favors to voters in the 2000s when natural resources
dramatically enriched state coffers (author’s interview with an officer of theSoros-­Foundation [#2] and a political analyst [#9]). Rakhat Aliev, a son-­in-­law of Nazarbaev who fell from power and defected from the regime
in 2007, criticized the president and alleged that Nur Otan used US$10
billion from a “secret fund” to carry out electoral campaigns prior to the2007 legislative elections.13
Large-­scale pre-­electoral economic maneuvering does not necessarilymean that the government alleviated economic inequality among citizens
13. Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty. “Aliev Urges Election Ban For Kazakh Presidential
Party” (17 August 2007, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/1078211.html).

From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

211

by engaging in extensive public goods provisions covering every citizen
in an equal manner. However, it is also difficult to deny that widespread
popular support derived from the provision of pork and patronage that
played a crucial role in the electoral victories of the ruling party along withblatant electoral fraud and manipulation of electoral systems. Sharipova(2018) concluded that access to state resources such as public jobs, high-­
quality public hospitals, and state housing was largely determined by close
connections with powerful and wealthy people.14 The government mainly
targeted those who were most likely to vote for the ruling parties after
having received various economic benefits from the government, including government officials; doctors in public hospitals; staff, teachers, andprofessors in public schools; and elderly people dependent upon public
pensions. The government also encouraged heads of schools, hospitals,
and universities to mobilize votes for the ruling parties, often in return forincreases in salaries, bonuses, pensions, and various other accommodations(author’s interview with a political analyst [#4]). For example, one opposition activist, who had been working as a deputy in a local legislature, succinctly described the system:
I myself was a deputy and I know this process. . . . The thing is
administrative resources. Let’s say we’re holding an election in a village. This is especially true in small villages, home to 1,000 people. . . . Before the election, the mayor of the village collects headmasters, all who work in the state budget section, as doctors, or insmall and medium-­sized businesses and those who can get access tocredit and tax commitments. And, they hold meetings and say, “weneed to ensure people will be participating in the election and also
they have to vote for us.” (author’s interview with a political activist[#20])The Kazakh government employed several distribution strategies
before elections to garner votes from citizens,15 and those who voted forthe governing parties received various types of material benefits. First, thegovernment increased public spending by raising salaries for public officials and by implementing new education and social policies prior to elections to buy off their support (Kendall-­Taylor 2012). For example, the cen14. Sharipova (2018) used survey data taken in 2013 and conducted qualitative case studies
on health care and housing policy in Kazakhstan.
15. I provide systematic quantitative evidence of these PBCs in Kazakhstan in section 7.5.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

tral government allocated US$2 billion to raise salaries for more than one
hundred thousand professionals at central and local governments before
the 2012 parliamentary elections, which resulted in an increase in wages
by about 20–­30 percent countrywide (author’s interview with an economist[#25]; Tengri News, December 26, 2011). In the run-­up to the 2007 legislative elections, the government announced that they would increase wagesof public servants, and real wages had indeed annually increased by 30 percent in the election year, which was about twice as large as wage increases
in the preceding nonelection year in 2006 (17.3 percent) (OECD 2011).
Second, the government often raised pensions in election years as ameans to appeal to elderly people. For example, pensioners, who made up
an eighth of the country’s total population of sixteen million, continuously
enjoyed annual pension increases from 2009 to 2011. In nonelection years(2009 and 2010), pension increases were 25 percent, whereas they wereraised to 30 percent in the 2011 election year—­the presidential election
was held in April 2011 and the parliamentary election was held in January
2012 (author’s interview with an economist [#25]). “It is the retired people
that support Nur Otan because they think this is the party doing something beneficial for them. They think the leader of Nur Otan, Nazarbaev, isthe only person who can keep political stability in Kazakhstan. . . . Because
many in the old generation as well as the middle-­aged generation still
believe that Nazarbaev brings stability, they also think Nur Otan is a real
powerful instrument to keep stability and development” (author’s interview
with a political analyst [#4]).
Third, as many people became more dependent on state resources interms of salaries, pensions, and loans, it became difficult for them to not
vote for the governing parties. Beneficiaries knew that if they did not votefor the governing parties and such behavior was detected by the authorities, they would likely be deprived of income sources such as public jobs,
tax exemptions, and pensions (author’s interview with a political activist[#18]). As a political analyst who had been working in a public university
pointed out:
Public employees—­teachers in schools, professors in universities
and doctors in hospitals—­are mobilized to vote for ruling parties.
During election campaigns, these institutions not only ask their staff
to vote for Nur Otan, but sometimes they threaten employees bysaying “if you do not vote for Nur Otan, then there would be somemeasures, some implications for you, even being fired from yourinstitution.” (author’s interview with a political analyst [#4])From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

213

Increasingly Strengthened Disciplinary Organizations

Kazakhstan was highly decentralized in real terms until the end of the
1990s; however, the country subsequently began to become more centralized financially and politically. A first dimension is fiscal centralization. Although the second constitution stipulates that Kazakhstan has acentralized government, de facto fiscal decentralization was advanced in
the 1990s, as decision-­making power on economic and social policies wastransferred from the central government to local governments in orderto enhance their ability to respond to the demands of local populations.
Moreover, although the central government officially had the sole authority to collect tax, regional governments in fact seemed to have wielded
considerable discretionary power in tax collection during the 1990s (Jones
Luong 2004). Having interviewed state officials in regional governments at
the end of the 1990s, Jones Luong (188–­89) reported that directives fromregional governments tended to be prioritized over those of the central
government when the two conflicted.
However, the tide of fiscal decentralization began to be reversed in
the 2000s (author’s interview with an economist [#6] and a political analyst [#9]), as the central government tightened fiscal control over regional
governments via government transfers (Dave 2013). Makhmutova (2005:287) showed that the central government tended to withdraw more moneyfrom Almaty city and oil-­rich Mangistau and Atyrau Oblasts to poor, pro-­presidential regions such as South Kazakhstan Oblast by 2004. Table 7.3
depicts time-­series changes in central government transfers to regional
governments between 2001 and 2009. As it shows, regional governments
received most of their revenues by taxing local populations in 2001, andonly 19.34 percent of total revenues derived from government transfers.
However, the amount of the central government transfers had dramaticallyincreased by 2009, when 59.83 percent of regional governments’ revenues
were subsidized by the state. Their increasing fiscal dependence on thecentral government encouraged regional governments to be more loyal tothe president (author’s interview with a political activist [#29]). As Sharipova (2018: 51) cogently explained, “The main problem of the regions istheir dependence on the center. The hands and legs of every single akim
(local governor) are tied. . . . If an akim is ‘good,’ then he receives financial
resources; if he is not good and if he does not manage to regulate social
tension, then he does not receive money from the center. To be a goodakim means to be loyal and provide the right and ‘appropriate’ indicators ofsocio-­economic development. The functions of akims then are to squeeze

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

TABLE 7.3. Percentage of Central Government Transfers in Total Revenues ofRegional Governments
Region

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

AktobeAtyrauAkmolaEast Kazakhstan
JambylKaragandy
Kostanai
Kyzyl Orda
Mangistau
North Kazakhstan
PavlodarSouth KazakhstanWest Kazakhstan
Astana City
Dependence on central government

13.81
–­
38.58
9.43
43.5
0.65
7.12
17.73
–­
31.79
4.9
48.29
0.04
16.21
19.34

14.05
12.04
47.77
19.06
56.69
0.62
25.56
47.53
–­
39.42
2.54
43.3
6.12
16.16
25.45

15.21
8.96
58.34
46.54
66.07
27.28
47.13
52.17
7.09
61.99
20.54
62.91
33.4
50.54
39.87

27.42
25.44
61.75
54.72
68.68
34.62
55.9
66.19
18.93
67.34
31.72
67.06
45.44
61.39
49.04

44.82
24.41
73.21
68.73
81.56
53.37
69.67
68.34
26.8
77.3
47.97
82.05
42.51
76.89
59.83

Source: Sharipova (2018: 51).

money from the center rather than to develop the region.” Although
regional governments had discretionary power over expenditures such as
education, health care, and local economic policies, the center’s strong grip
on revenues limited the real options that were available to akims.
A second dimension is de facto political centralization. Although the
1995 constitution had already conferred strong presidential powers (as discussed before), a great deal of evidence indicates that Nazarbaev was not asstrong in the 1990s as he became in the 2000s. First, the ruling parties tended
to be weaker and fractionalized until Nur Otan was founded in December
2006. Figure 7.5 shows the decreasing fractionalization of the ruling parties
between 1995 and 2007. The PNEK, the then pro-­presidential party that
Nazarbaev seemingly aspired to make the dominant party, could not obtain
the dominant position amid so many other ruling parties as well as opposition parties in the parliament. In February 1999, eight months before thelegislative elections, Otan was established as a result of the merger between
the PNEK and several pro-­presidential parties, although three other ruling parties remained outside this conglomeration—­Asar and the Agrarianand Civic Parties. In fact, these political parties were not necessarily satellite parties completely subject to the president, and they engaged in fierce
political competition with each other (Dave 2004: 9). For instance, pointing to this interparty competition in the 2004 parliamentary elections, theleader of the Civic Party, Azat Peruashev, noted that “leaders from Otan

From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

215

Fig. 7.5. Cohesiveness of Ruling Parties and Proportion of Independents
Note: Fractionalization of ruling parties is computed by using the Herfindahl index, whereseat shares of ruling parties are squared and then summed up. Higher scores indicate more
fractionalized ruling parties.

called me up and said ‘deal with your candidate in the region—­he is trying to compete with the Otan candidate.’” (Isaacs 2013: 17). However, theruling parties failed to coordinate their candidates and put more than two
candidates per district in 38 out of 67 electoral districts (56 percent of allelectoral districts).16 Asar, which was directed by the president’s daughter
Dariga Nazarbaeva and her husband Rakhat Aliev, was not only subject
to their father but also acted as a powerful independent force arguing for
democratic reform (Isaacs 2013: 17). As I detail later, however, Nazarbaev
had successfully merged all the ruling parties by December 2006 andfounded Nur Otan, the dominant party in the country.
Second, independent politicians had been thriving throughout the
1990s until the mid-­2000s; however, they disappeared prior to the 2007
legislative elections. As most independent politicians in Kazakhstan werepro-­presidential (Olcott 2002: 252), it would be more accurate to regard
16. This is the author’s calculation based on electoral district data in Nurmukhamedov andChebotarev (2005).

216

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

them as members of the ruling coalition. Nonetheless, independent politicians had their own patron-­client networks in their strongholds and thus
retained more autonomous power than lawmakers affiliated with rulingparties. Figure 7.5 shows that the proportion of independent legislative
politicians changed from 1995 to 2007. The percentage of legislators in thelower house who did not belong to any political party tended to decreaseover time. Even in the 2004 parliamentary elections when ruling parties
became stronger than in the past elections, 14 of the 18 self-­nominatedcandidates who won seats ran for elections from the regions where they
were born and/or started their political careers.17 Such figures indicate that
self-­nominated politicians had strong, independent support bases built
upon informal connections with local populations via kinship or clan ties
(Dave 2004). By the time of the 2007 parliamentary elections, the newelectoral law and the adoption of the PR system encouraged independent
politicians to be affiliated with political parties, and most joined the dominant party, Nur Otan.
Third, the center-­periphery relationship had also changed in the sensethat the center tightly controlled regional governments. Since independence, the president has reserved the right to appoint and dismiss akimsof oblasts. However, a couple of years after independence, the president
began appointing elites from regions as akims in an attempt to achieve abalance of power between the political elites in the center and periphery.
For instance, Cummings (2005: 106) reported that in 7 out of 20 cases,
former regional executive First Secretaries from the Soviet period became
akims soon after independence, and Jones Luong (2002: 287–­88) documented that 35 out of 71 akims, or about 50 percent, were regional elites
who held a political position in the same region. Schatz (2004) similarly
argued that during the 1990s the president appointed regional as well as
central elites, focusing much attention on maintaining a good balanceamong three Zhuz, or clans.
In the early 2000s, however, the president began to centralize akim
appointments via several strategies. First, beginning around 1997, moremembers of the national elite, who had spent through their careers in thecentral government, were parachuted into regions as akims than ever before(Cummings 2005: 107), whereas regional elites were appointed to central
government positions or elected as legislators. Such “national-­regionalcrossovers,” combined with the frequent reshuffling of akim appointments
17. This is the author’s calculation based on Tsentralnaya Izbiratelnaya Komissiya Respubliki Kazakhstan (2010), Ashimbaev (2012), and Nyrmukhamedov and Chebotarev (2005).

From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

217

every two or three years (e.g., Cummings 2005; Junisbai 2010), enabled thepresident to effectively weaken local elites who had strong support basesin their home regions. Second, it seems that the president implemented
not only crossovers between the center and periphery, but also “parallel appointments” of akims between regions (Siegel 2014). By employing these strategies, the president successfully tightened his control overregional governments in order to use them as a political machine for his
own purposes.
Lastly, Nazarbaev successfully constructed a dominant party thatenabled him to incorporate local elite networks to streamline the technique of economic maneuvering.18 Built upon the government’s fiscal andpolitical centralization, the dominant party Nur Otan was founded in
December 2006 as a result of the merger between Otan and three otherpro-­presidential parties, the Asar, Civic, and Agrarian Parties. Even at its
inception, the party’s organization was more extensive than the previously
existing ruling parties. Currently, it officially claims to have approximately
835,000 party members,19 a large representation for a country of 17 million
people. As of January 2015, the party had 225 regional branches and 5,605
primary party organizations across all the oblasts and the two cities Almaty
and Astana.20
At the time of its inception, the dominant party did not have strong
power independent of the president, but rather served more as an instrument by which Nazarbaev aimed at incorporating various patron-­client
networks of local elites into a centralized political structure peaked by himself as the president. Therefore, the party’s strength derives directly fromits close fusion with the centralized government. The party mobilizes supporters using various “administrative resources.” As of January 2015, akims
in most regions other than Almaty and Karaganda Oblasts also serve as thechairmen of the Nur Otan’s regional branches.21 It is a well-­known factthat akims have become main actors in localities and mobilize supporters
18. The Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-­Party) (Lührmann et al. 2020)
dataset indicates that, compared to the preceding Otan, the Nur-­Otan Party increased localorganizational strengths (v2paactcom, the degree to which party activists and personnel permanently are active in local communities) while also increasing the personalization of party(v2paind). This suggests that while the party did not have the collective decision-­making
mechanism among ruling elites, it had been strengthening the grassroots-­level party organizations (mostly fused with the state apparatus).
19. The number was drawn from “Baibek obyavil o priostanovke priema v Nur Otan,”
Tengri News, September 11, 2020, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/baybek-obyyavilo-priostanovke-priema-v-nur-otan-413855/ (accessed March 1, 2021).
20. The numbers were taken from the website of Nur Otan, http://nurotan.kz/ru/regions
21. From the website of Nur Otan, http://nurotan.kz/ru/regions

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

on the eve of elections by using financial and other kinds of administrative
resources in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the party and the president (author’s interviews with political analysts [#8] and [#9]). Mobilized by
the akims, both high and low ranks of state officials in oblasts are strongly
encouraged to work for the party during election campaigns, with the possibilities of salary reduction and/or losing their jobs being strongly implied
if they do not comply with their bosses’ orders (author’s interview with apolitical analyst [#4]). As discussed above, similar mobilization structures
can be also found in public hospitals and schools;22 local government officials are entitled to appoint the deans of these public organizations, who
are then encouraged to work as brokers of electoral mobilization in theirworkplaces (Del Sordi 2012).
Although all of these strategies certainly existed before the foundationof Nur Otan, the efficiency of political mobilization increased enormously
after the party successfully integrated previously informal networks into asingle-­pyramid system administered by the president at the top (author’sinterview with a political analyst [#22]). Using these hierarchical mobilization structures, the president succeeded in effectively using the state’s
financial resources to mobilize large numbers of supporters nationwide
before elections. As Isaacs (2013: 132) astutely pointed out, “Nur Otan’s
preponderance, which was achieved primarily through its relationship withthe president and other state executive actors, means that it is the dominantchannel between society and the state. Nur Otan, however, is also the personal political vehicle for the president to establish greater control of formal political institutions. It is not a channel to articulate societal interests.”
Weakening of the Opposition

As discussed in the previous sections, opposition movements were relatively stronger and retained considerable mobilization capabilities during
elections in the 1990s. Particularly before 1995, opposition activities andethnic movements were highly powerful and differences in mobilization
capabilities between opposition and ruling parties were more balanced.
22. Nur Otan also organized a youth wing called Zhas Otan, the members of which carriedout intensive election campaigns mainly at public universities to encourage students to votefor Nur Otan (Del Sordi 2012). Many of them became party officials after graduating andaspired to climb the career ladder to become party cadres, which gave them strong incentives
to work hard for the party in the youth organization (author’s interview with a student [#19]).
In a broad sense, they collectively were also an important political actor, mobilizing potential
supporters for Nur Otan in return for benefits.

From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

219

This near parity was among the most important factors that prompted thepresident to resort to blatant electoral fraud, make a “state list” to selectpro-­presidential legislators in the 1994 legislative elections, and adopt pure
SMD systems in the 1994 and 1995 elections.
Even after 1995, opposition parties remained popular—­at least amongcity voters. For instance, bolstered by his popularity and rich independent
resources as the former prime minister, Kazhegeldin challenged Nazarbaev
by establishing the opposition Republican People’s Party and declaring that
he would run for the 1999 presidential elections. As a political activist who
had defected from the regime, Kazhegeldin criticized President Nazarbaev
and the growing nepotism within the government, critiques that werehighly compelling and appealing for a large number of citizens because he
had until recently served in the second position and was thought to be wellacquainted with the internal workings of the government (author’s interview with a political activist [#24]). Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the chairman of
the KPK, also garnered high political support, particularly from the urban
poor, and ran for the 1999 presidential elections as a strong candidate fromthe opposition.
In the run-­up to the 1999 elections, Nazarbaev responded to these tworeal opponents with repression, harassment, and ultimately extensive rigging. Kazhegeldin, the most serious contender of the president, was barredfrom running for the presidential elections due to dubious accusations ofmoney laundering in Belgium as well as his participation in an unregistered political meeting for the Movement for Honest Elections (Cummings 2005: 28). Although permitted to participate in the electoral battles,
Abdildin and his Communist Party were exposed to a variety of electoral
manipulation in both the pre-­electoral period and the election days. The
election results were allegedly seriously falsified against Abdildin and theCommunist Party (author’s interview with an opposition politician [#16];
Olcott 2010: 121).
In November 2001, a significant number of ruling elites defected fromthe regime and announced the foundation of the DVK. This opposition
movement has been described as the largest and most serious organized
dissent within the regime since independence. The party had rich, independent financial resources to carry out effective electoral campaigns because
the party cadres such as Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, Mukhtar Ablyazov, andNurzhan Subkhanberdin had come from key business sectors, held important government positions closely related to business people financing the
opposition movements, or both (see Junisbai and Junisbai 2005; Junisbai
2010; Chebotariev 2009).

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Due to political infighting, as well as a series of repression and harassment efforts exercised by the government, some members of the DVK
defected and established the Ak Zhol Party in March 2002. As a politicalactivist who had participated in the DVK before joining Ak Zhol explained,“The movement was so spontaneous that leaders in the movement had notbeen well prepared for how to lead this new opposition party. We launchedthe opposition movement to demand more political transparency, but ourviews on how we could achieve this goal were diverse, which led some people to prefer a moderate course and defect from the DVK” (author’s interview with a political analyst [#8]). The division among opposition leaders
seriously harmed the unity and strength of this new opposition movement
before the 2004 parliamentary elections. First, the financial resources ofthe opposition were dispersed, thus making it difficult for them to carryout effective electoral campaigns (author’s interviews with a political analyst [#8] and an opposition activist [#29]).
Second, although the Communist Party had made a pre-­electoral opposition coalition with the DVK, the Ak Zhol Party did not coordinate its
candidates and electoral campaigns with the two parties, which helped ruling parties win seats in SMDs. The DVK-­KPK bloc and the Ak Zhol Party
fielded candidates in forty-­eight electoral districts out of sixty-­seven. In
twenty-­one electoral districts, they fielded a candidate from each party inthe 2004 parliamentary elections.23 Due to the lack of coordination among
opposition parties and the increasing mobilization capability of the rulingparties using rich oil resources, the DVK-­KPK bloc and the Ak Zhol Party
failed to win any seats in the parliament and obtained only 3.44 percent and12.04 percent of total votes in the party list, respectively. There was also
blatant electoral fraud that undercounted the votes for the opposition parties; however, its scale was smaller than in the 1999 elections. It is said that
Ak Zhol would have obtained 25–­30 percent of votes if the elections had
been free and fair (author’s interview with a political activist [#8]), and theCommunist Party claimed to have cleared the 7 percent electoral thresholdwith 9 percent of total votes (Dave 2004: 9). However, even if the elections
had been completely free and fair, the ruling parties and pro-­presidential
candidates would still have scored more than just a simple majority, thus
suggesting that the regime was becoming increasingly stronger, despite thestill fragmented ruling coalitions divided between several governing parties and many independent politicians.
23. These figures are based on electoral results reported in Nurmukhamedov and Chebotarev (2005).

From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

221

The opposition forces had suffered further divisions and realignments
prior to the 2005 presidential and 2007 parliamentary elections. In April
2005, the Ak Zhol split due to its leaders’ disagreement over whether
they would participate in a pre-­electoral opposition coalition (For a Just
Kazakhstan) with the KPK and the DVK,24 and the defectors formed the
Naghyz Ak Zhol. In addition, the OSDP was founded in September 2006
by Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, the former chairman of the lower house andan opposition candidate in the 2005 presidential elections. Although the
Naghyz Ak Zhol decided to join the OSDP two months before the parliamentary elections in August 2007, the KPK decided not to participate
in the election and thus did not make a pre-­electoral coalition with the
OSDP, which resulted in gaining only 4.54 percent of votes and therefore
failing to secure any seats in the parliament. Many analysts have acknowledged that the opposition camp had become much weaker than ever before
by the time of the 2007 elections due to factors such as extremely low levels of political support in the rural areas, the highly fragile nature of theirnationwide organizational networks, and the absence of financial resourcesto achieve effective electoral mobilization (author’s interviews with opposition activists [#15, #30] and political analysts [#3, #22]).

7.5. Economic Maneuvering in Kazakhstan

The previous section argued that the president was able to become lessdependent on electoral manipulation to massively win elections because
he increased his mobilization capabilities vis-­à-­vis opposition parties. The
qualitative case illustration also suggests that the president distributed
more economic favors in various fashions as the country increased its natural resource wealth and developed disciplinary organizations.
This section tests the existence and size of economic maneuvering,
namely, the PBCs, by using original monthly economic data of Kazakhstan
from 1995 to 2008. I use three indices as dependent variables, all of which
capture economic maneuvering from different angles. The first measure is amonthly-­specified consumer price index (CPI). Setting the CPI at December 1994 as 100, I calculate the CPI between January 1995 and December
2008. As many studies on the PBC have argued, post-­election inflation canbe interpreted as strong evidence that governments have adopted expan24. Ibragim Aibekov, “Kazkahstan’s Leading Opposition Party Faces Split,” United
Nations High Commission for Refugees, https://www.refworld.org/docid/46c58edc1c.html(accessed March 1, 2021).

222

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

sionary fiscal policies in the pre-­election period. Second, the unemployment rate, which is also monthly variant data, is a valuable measure to check
whether opportunistic budget cycles can be observed. Because the National
Bank of Kazakhstan does not make the unemployment rate publicly available in monthly units, I calculate the unemployment rate by dividing thenumber of unemployed workers (using monthly data from Statisticheskii
Byulleten [Statistical bulletin]) by the annual total number in the working
population (taken from Regiony Kazakhstana [Regions of Kazakhstan]).
Finally, the PBCs can be observed by focusing on real wage increases prior
to elections. The anecdotes presented in the previous section indicate thatthe government increased wages of public employees before elections. A
statistical analysis using the variable of real wage increases enables me topresent systematic evidence on pre-­electoral economic maneuvering. Since
the National Bank of Kazakhstan reports the quarterly average nominal
wage for workers, I transform those amounts into average real wages bydividing nominal wage by the CPI. Data sources for all indices are takenfrom Statisticheskii Byulleten, which is published monthly by the National
Bank of Kazakhstan.
Figure 7.6 plots time-­series changes in the CPI.25 A visual inspection
reveals some seasonal fluctuations among the CPI’s general patterns, andthe figure enables us to roughly grasp the tendency of the index to experience a certain amount of variation around election times. For instance,
inflation appears to have increased immediately after elections; the country was exposed to higher inflation rates after the elections in 2004, 2005,
and particularly 2007. To confirm whether there are significant differences
between (pre-­and post-­) electoral and non-­electoral periods for the threevariables, I conducted simple t-­tests to find that four out of six differenceswere in the predicted directions.26 Controlling for seasonal effects andcoping with problems accompanied with time-­series data, I also perform
ordinary least squares time-­series regressions with the three dependent
variables.27
25. Graphs on unemployment rate and real wage increases are available upon request.
26. (1) Inflation tends to increase around elections. (2) The unemployment rate tends to be
mitigated before elections and then to increase after elections. (3) Real wages are more likely
to grow before elections and shrink thereafter.
27. Because Dickey-­Fuller tests revealed that all dependent variables are nonstationary, I
took the first difference to transform them into stationary data. In addition, because both theBreush-­Godfrey and the Durbin-­Watson tests suggested that CPI and the unemployment
rate involve autocorrelation, I adopted the AR (1) process through the Prais-­Winsten method.
Monthly dummies (reference category is December) are included for CPI and the unemployment rate to control for seasonal effects. For real wage, I use quarterly dummies (the refer-From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

223

Fig. 7.6. Time-­Series Change in Consumer Price Index in Kazakhstan (1995–­2009)

Models 1–­3 (table 7.4) estimate the effect of (pre-­and post-­) electoral
periods on the three dependent variables. Model 1, in which the CPI isregressed, shows that the inflation rate increased by 1.31 percent at the
5 percent significance level in the first six months after elections. Model
3 confirms that real wages were more likely to increase before elections.
Even after controlling for seasonal effects, the rise in salaries is statisticallysignificant at the 5 percent level (534 Tenges per quarter before elections).
By contrast, Model 2 shows that there is no correlation between elections
and unemployment rates with any statistical certainty. Although unemployment rates tended to decrease before elections, the change is not statistically significant. These results suggest that the PBCs is not observed in real
economic outcomes but rather as the manipulation of policy instruments.28
The statistical results presented thus far demonstrate the existenceence category is the fourth quarterly). I set six months (for real wage, three quarters) before/
after elections as electoral periods (1); otherwise the months were coded as non-­electoral (0).
28. By manipulating policy instruments before elections, the government might try to

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

TABLE 7.4. Political Business Cycles in Kazakhstan (1995–­2008)
Dependent variablePre-­electoral period (six months)
Post-­electoral period (six months)
Seasonal dummies
Number of observations
Adjusted R-­squared
Durbin-­Watson testρF-­value

Model 1CPI

Model 2
Unemployment rate

Model 3
Real wage

0.707(0.56)
1.31**(0.53)Yes (month)
167
0.184
2.029
0.596
3.91***−0.0008(0.02)−0.015(0.02)Yes (month)
141
0.546
2.00
0.735
14.08***

534.78**(238.50)
178.89(244.60)
Yes (quarter)
55
0.1663–­–­3.19**

Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Durbin-­Watson test was
performed after correcting serial autocorrelation through the AR(1) process.

of the PBCs in Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan. What then are the relationships
among disciplinary organizations, financial resources, and the size of
the PBCs? According to Models 4–­7,29 inflation rates tended to increasearound elections under highly centralized governing institutions or richfinancial revenues (table 7.5). Model 4 introduces the cumulative numbersof pre-­and post-­elections periods experienced since 1995 as two independent variables in order to investigate whether the size of electoral budget
cycles became larger as the country experienced more elections.30 Given
that President Nazarbaev had gradually and consistently centralized thegovernment while accumulating financial resources since 1995, the size of
the PBCs should have a positive association with the cumulative numberof elections. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant below
a 1 percent probability of error, which means that, whereas the inflation
rate increased by just 0.425 percent after the 1995 election, post-­electoral
inflation escalated to 2.55 percent at the sixth election in August 2007. The
adjusted R-­squared of Model 4 has improved by about 4 percent comparedwith that of Model 1, thus indicating that the former is better at explaining
the variation in inflation rates than the latter.
demonstrate their “competence” of economic management to their constituencies (Rogoff
and Silbert 1988; Drazen 2000: 228–­46).
29. The dependent variable in these models is the first difference of CPI.
30. There were a total of six elections between January 1995 and December 2008. I coded
the electoral period variable as follows: December 1995 parliamentary election = 1; January
1999 presidential election = 2; October 1999 parliamentary election = 3; September 2004
parliamentary election = 4; December 2005 presidential election = 5; and August 2007 parliamentary election = 6.

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From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering
TABLE 7.5. Electoral Cycles, Organizational Strength, and Fiscal Resources
Dependent Variable
Cumulative pre-­electoral periods
Cumulative post-­electoral periods
Pre-­electoral period (six months)

Model 4CPI
0.08
(0.14)
0.425***(0.13)

Post-­electoral period (six months)
Difference in seat proportion ofruling and opposition Parties(DIFF)
Pre-­election*DIFF

Model 5CPI

3.18***(1.02)−1.96*(1.40)
2.715***(0.85)−4.99***(1.79)
4.68**(2.20)

Post-­election*DIFF
Revenue (log)Pre-­election*Revenue
Post-­election*Revenue
Seasonal dummies
Number of observations
Adjusted R-­squared
Durbin-­Watson testρF-­valueYes
167
0.22351.984
0.548
4.7***

Yes
167
0.33681.96
0.49
6.30***

Model 6CPI

24.15
(19.00)−29.15*(18.27)0.0875***(0.03)−1.06(0.85)
1.339*(0.82)
Yes
167
0.25722.06
0.572
4.61***

Model 7
Real wage
116.84**(59.02)
56.03(59.66)Yes
55
0.1618–­–­3.12**

Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10. For details, see fig. 7.7. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The Durbin-­Watson test was performed after correcting serial autocorrelation through the AR(1) process.

Models 5 and 6 test the interaction effects of incumbent and opposition strengths/state resources and elections on CPI more directly. I operationalize incumbent and opposition strengths by calculating the difference
between shares of parliamentary seats occupied by ruling parties and opposition parties. Given that the centralization of government institutions
coincided with the strengthening of the ruling party and the weakening of
the opposition in the context of Kazakhstan, the gap between the seat proportions of ruling and opposition parties serves as a good proxy to measure
their strengths. To operationalize government resources, I use logged staterevenue (annual data from International Monetary Fund country reports).
Model 5 examines how the impact of elections changes according to
the level of incumbent/opposition strengths. Figure 7.7a illustrates that

Note: The straight line denotes inflation rates six months after elections. The dotted lines represent the 90 percent confidence intervals.

Fig. 7.7. Political Business Cycles, Incumbent and Opposition Strengths, and Fiscal Resources

From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering

227

post-­election inflation became more extensive as ruling parties occupied
more seats in the parliament (confidence intervals are at the 90 percent
level). Notably, when the proportional difference between the parties ismore than 0.6, the government is more likely to have manipulated theeconomy around election times. Model 6 tests the marginal effect of post-­
electoral periods on the CPI conditional upon the logged state revenue.
The coefficient of the post-­election dummy changes from −0.3 (whenlogged state revenue takes the minimum) to 1.8 (when logged state revenue is maximum) and becomes statistically significant when the logged
revenue becomes more than about 22.5 (fig. 7.7b).
Model 7 estimates how the real wage increased as the country experienced more elections. The coefficient of the pre-­election variable ispositive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that
distributive policy before elections became more extensive as the autocratic regime became armed with disciplinary organizations and held moreabundant financial resources. In sum, all the results support my argumentthat strong incumbent strength, a weak opposition, and discretionary fiscal resources are three important factors increasing the magnitude of pre-­electoral economic maneuvering.

7.6. Conclusion

This chapter empirically examined the causal linkage posited in the theory
by conducting an in-­depth case study of Kazakhstan. The case of Kazakhstan provides us with an intriguing puzzle on electoral manipulation andauthoritarian stability: Although President Nazarbaev seems to havebecome less dependent on blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation to achieve massive wins, he nonetheless successfully maintained
overwhelming victories during elections, which stabilized the regime andled to Nur Otan’s perfect dominance of the parliament in 2007. I exploredthis puzzle of authoritarian elections by focusing on the dictator’s mobilization capabilities. The case study presented a series of qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrating that Nazarbaev strengthened economic
maneuvering, which helped him score an overwhelming majority without
employing extensive electoral fraud and relying on the seat premiums of
SMD systems. Further, I also demonstrated that Nazarbaev succeeded instreamlining pre-­electoral economic distribution by constructing centralized and hierarchical political organizations such as the dominant party,
political and financial centralization of the government, and a top-­down

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

national oil company. In contrast, the opposition parties, which had been
powerful in the 1990s, suffered financial difficulties and internal divisions.
Their decline reduced the need for the president to employ blatant electoral fraud and to continue to adopt a SMD system that would bring aseat premium to his ruling coalition. The case of Kazakhstan suggests that
dictators have incentives to not rely completely on electoral manipulation,
so long as they can garner political support from the citizenry throughextensive distribution of pork and patronage.

EIGHT

From Electoral Manipulation to
Autocratic Breakdown
Akaev’s Kyrgyzstan

8.1. Introduction

The previous chapter investigated Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan as a positive
case to illustrate the processes whereby high mobilization capabilities
enable the dictator to gather mass support at elections, which then contribute to consolidating authoritarian rule. In this chapter, I explore Akaev’s
Kyrgyzstan (1991–­
2005) as a negative case wherein the dictator’s low
mobilization capabilities lead to excessive use of electoral manipulation.
Centering on the electoral dilemma and the dictator’s mobilization capabilities in authoritarian regimes, the theory of autocratic elections expects
that excessive electoral fraud and majoritarian electoral systems are more
likely to spark popular protests. With that theory in mind, this chapter
focuses on the case of Kyrgyzstan to illustrate causal links where the dictator’s shrinking financial resources, weak disciplinary organizations, anda strong opposition all contributed to escalating electoral manipulation,
which eventually resulted in provoking large-­scale mass protests during
the 2005 elections.
Kyrgyzstan experienced a political trajectory very similar to that of
Kazakhstan after independence: early political liberalization efforts werereversed by the middle of the 1990s. However, different from Nazarbaev’s
Kazakhstan, where the government ultimately relied less on electoral
229

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

manipulation and elections helped the dictator consolidate the regime,
the Akaev regime gradually strengthened its electoral manipulation andaccordingly faced a larger scale of post-­electoral mass protests over time.
Ultimately, the 2005 elections sparked massive popular mobilization,
which led to the breakdown of the Akaev regime. Despite many commonalities between the two regimes, why did elections in Kyrgyzstan destabilize authoritarian rule?
To offer an answer to this question, this chapter focuses on Akaev’s mobilization capabilities vis-­à-­vis the opposition: Akaev was not able to maintaindiscretionary financial resources for dissemination and also failed to construct strong disciplinary organizations to streamline economic distribution,
whereas the opposition gained power as a result of the defections of prominent politicians from the regime. Under these conditions, Akaev could not
help relying on electoral manipulation schemes such as blatant fraud andmajoritarian electoral systems. An excessive level of electoral manipulation
ended up provoking popular protests after the 2005 elections.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly illustrate the political processes whereby Kyrgyzstan transitioned from anelectoral democracy to an electoral authoritarian regime by the middle ofthe 1990s. Then, I describe time-­series changes in two types of electoral
manipulation—­blatant electoral fraud in both presidential and legislativeelections and institutional manipulation (i.e., electoral system change)in legislative elections. In so doing, I demonstrate that President Akaev
became more dependent upon blatant electoral fraud as well as majoritarian electoral systems. I also show that Akaev’s increasingly excessive reliance on electoral manipulation led to an increasing scale of post-­electoral
popular protests over the years, eventually leading to the Tulip Revolution
in the aftermath of the 2005 elections. In section 8.4, I explore how the dictator’s mobilization capabilities related to the extent of electoral manipulation and post-­electoral protests in the country. I demonstrate that President Akaev’s mobilization capabilities gradually decreased over time. I thengo on to argue that President Akaev faced massive protests after the 2005
parliamentary elections due to excessive manipulation rooted in his expectation that he would not collect extensive voter support otherwise. Given
the extreme unpopularity of the Akaev regime, such excessive manipulation and overwhelming election victories exposed the regime’s weakness tothe opposition. Last, similarly to the case study of Kazakhstan, I conduct
time-­series analyses of the PBCs in Kyrgyzstan to investigate time-­series
patterns of economic maneuvering throughout the regime. The statisticalanalysis suggests that PBCs did not exist in a systematic fashion through-From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown231

out the period of the Akaev regime and that their magnitude tended todecrease over time as Akaev’s mobilization capabilities decreased.

8.2. From Electoral Democracy to Electoral Authoritarianism

Much like President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Askar Akaev also
embarked on political liberalization after winning the presidential election of the Republic of Kyrgyz in October 1991. Akaev’s democratization
efforts were more extensive than those initiated by Nazarbaev, and theWestern media admiringly broadcasted that Kyrgyzstan was an “island of
democracy” in authoritarian Central Asia. Indeed, during the first coupleof years after independence, the country was viewed as an electoral democracy that satisfied the procedural definition of democracy. First, Akaev
had ascended to the presidency in free and fair presidential elections in
October 1991. Although the parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) had banned theCommunist Party from participating, no other candidates were prohibited,
and Akaev and his backers did not intimidate opposition parties. Positively
assessing Akaev’s consensus-­based, multiethnic approaches, which he had
begun taking after the ethnic riots in Osh in June 1990 (Spector 2004:8),1 both democratic activists and the opposition Democratic Movementof Kyrgyzstan (DDK) strongly supported Akaev and did not even offer
alternative candidates. Despite the lack of an actual contest, the elections
were widely recognized as free and fair both within Kyrgyzstan and abroad(Collins 2006: 179).
The separation of powers between the executive and the legislature was
guaranteed in the constitution. Since independence, there had been a longprocess and much debate among various political actors over the constitution, which was established in May 1993 after numerous intragovernmental and public discussions.2 Although Akaev sought to endow the president with strong powers to implement political and economic reforms,
he simultaneously pursued a constitutional framework in which executive
power would be checked by the legislature and judiciary. Some politicalfigures in the presidential office such as Felix Kulov wanted a strong president and a weaker legislature; however, Akaev himself rejected the idea ofadopting such a “super-­presidential” system (Collins 2006: 182–­83).
1. Before the 1991 presidential election, Akaev had served as the president of the Kyrgyz
Soviet Socialist Republic for one year.
2. Regarding detailed political processes on the 1993 constitution, see, e.g., Anderson(1999: 25–­27) and Collins (2006: 179–­81, 182–­84).

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Political parties and social movements grew before and after the declaration of independence. In February 1991, Akaev signed an act on socialorganizations, which created a framework for the activities of associations,interest groups, and political parties. In practice, the law paved the way
for people to create various voluntary associations. By February 1993, theMinistry of Justice had registered 258 social organizations, including 15
political movements or parties, 31 professional bodies, 21 national-­cultural
centers or organizations, 41 sporting bodies, 11 children’s and young people’s groups, and five women’s organizations; the total number was further
increased to nearly 1,000 by the summer of 1997 (Anderson 1999: 31).
Twelve political parties were registered for the 1995 presidential and parliamentary elections, including the Erkin Kyrgyzstan and the Ata Meken(Fatherland) Socialist Party.
Last, free media emerged during this democratization period. Immediately after October 1990, when Akaev was approved as the president of
the Kyrgyz Socialist Republic in the parliament, the official media such as
Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (later renamed Slovo Kyrgyzstana) began to develop an
independent tone and informatively explored a variety of political issues,
followed by numerous newly established newspapers and other media outlets (Anderson 1999: 29; Collins 2006: 186–­88). Among the most criticalnewspapers was the parliamentary paper Svobodnye Gory, which came toseverely criticize the president. Res Publika, another weekly newspaper, also
reported corruption scandals of government officials (Anderson 1999: 30).
For about two years after independence, the parliament and president
forged cooperative relationships due to Akaev’s tactful co-­optation techniques toward legislators (Huskey 1997: 256–­57). However, as the country’s economic crisis deepened, different views on radical economic reforms
contributed to heightening tension between the two branches. Similar to
Kazakhstan, members of the assembly began to challenge President Akaev
by criticizing alleged practices of political corruption over privatizationand foreign trade among government officials.3 The communists in theparliament went on the offensive against the president because most ofthem were expected to lose their seats due to the new constitution, which
stipulated that the total seats in the two new chambers would be reduced
from 450 to 300 in the next elections (Spector 2004: 19; Collins 2006:
227). Amid the increasingly tense confrontation between the parliament
and the presidential palace, Prime Minister Tursunbek Chyngyshev was
3. For a detailed analysis on economic reforms such as privatization and foreign trade, seePomfret (2006, chap. 5).

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

233

forced to resign in January 1994 after an investigation over the sellingof mining rights at the Kumtor goldmine to the Canadian firm Cameco(Huskey 1997: 257). This is again very similar to the case of Prime Minister Tereshchenko of Kazakhstan, who presided over privatization processes
and ended up resigning after facing privatization scandals. Chyngyshev’s
resignation impressed upon people that the opposition in the parliament
had been enhancing political pressures on the president.
Facing increasing pressures from the parliament, Akaev began to takemore draconian measures by late 1994 and turned the country into an electoral authoritarian regime (Huskey 1997; Anderson 1999; Spector 2004;
Collins 2006). To overcome the impasse between the assembly and theexecutive branch, Akaev strengthened presidential power through illiberal measures. In September 1994, some members in parliament refused
to attend the opening session of the fall legislature. However, the 1993
constitution stipulated that the president is entitled to dismiss the parliament when it fails to satisfy a quorum, and President Akaev took advantageof this opportunity to dismiss the parliament and call for new elections(Collins 2006: 227). Moreover, during the parliamentary boycott, Akaev
convoked a referendum to call for a new, smaller bicameral parliament witha total of only 105 seats (the upper house: 35 deputies; the lower house: 70
deputies) as well as changes in the electoral law that would reduce the parliament’s power and strengthen presidential power (Collins 2006: 227–­28).
Later, despite the 1993 constitution’s prohibition on making constitutionalchanges via referendum, Akaev convoked another referendum in 1996 inwhich he made amendments that further strengthened the presidency’s
formal powers (Human Rights Watch 1997: 227).
Media and social movements also started to be exposed to government
intimidation in the mid-­1990s. Harassment toward the media and opposition became more severe over time during the Akaev regime. In June
1994, the government began to restrict media freedom by closing down
two newspapers, including the independent and highly critical parliamentary paper Svobodnye Gory. In the spring of 1995, the president launched acriminal prosecution for defamation against Zamira Sydykova and Tamara
Slashcheva, the editors of the independent newspaper Res Publika (Huskey 1997: 258). In addition to these direct measures, during the period
1995–­97, the government pressured state-­run newspapers to engage inself-­censorship and pushed other media to replace their editors (Anderson
1999: 57). Pluralism in the country was severely threatened as the numberof incidents of intimidation against opposition leaders and religious activities increased (56–­59). By the late 1990s, the West’s optimism regarding

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

the prospect of democracy in Kyrgyzstan had rapidly faded; an electoral
authoritarian regime much like that of Kazakhstan had emerged. The 2003
referendum, which Akaev suddenly announced only two weeks before theactual vote, aimed at further strengthening institutional bases of his power:
Approved by a 77 percent vote, the referendum for further constitutional
amendments extended his tenure for an additional two years until 2005,
greatly increased the president’s power vis-­à-­vis the parliament and theconstitutional court, and reduced the number of legislators in the newly
established unicameral parliament.4 This constitutional referendum washeavily criticized by the international society and boycotted by both the
opposition and international observers (Toursunof 2004).
Independent politicians were predominant throughout the Akaev
regime, and political parties (whether opposition or ruling parties) played aminimum role in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, investigating the country’s party
system may not provide equal evidence to that in Kazakhstan to assess theextent to which Akaev furthered autocratic consolidation in the country.
With that in mind, I proceed with looking at data that suggest that pro-­presidential political parties strengthened parliamentary dominance, particularly at the fraudulent 2005 parliamentary elections, while opposition
parties decreased their seat shares in the parliament (fig. 8.1). Opposition
parties competed well with the pro-­presidential camp in the 1995 parliamentary elections; nonetheless, pro-­presidential parties such as the Social
Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SPDK) and the Asaba Party took 22
percent of the seats in the legislature. In contrast, the opposition parties(including the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan [PKK], which was led
by Absamat Masaliev, a former leader of Communist Kyrgyzstan) occupied
only 14.5 percent of total seats, thus resulting in a 7.5 percent seat gap
between the pro-­presidential and the opposition parties.5
Prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections, pro-­government politicians
founded the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), which was an electoral
alliance of four pro-­government political parties, namely, Asaba, the Unity
Party of Kyrgyzstan, the SPDK, and the Party of Economic Revival of the
Kyrgyz Republic. Gaps between pro-­presidential and opposition parties
4. Detailed data and descriptions are available through the International Foundation forElectoral System’s Election Guide at http://www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=315(accessed March 1, 2021).
5. Distinctions between pro-­presidential and opposition parties in the 1995 and 2000
parliamentary elections were made based upon Abazov (2003: 549–­51), Nohlen, Grotz, andHartmann (2001: 441–­42), and various issues of the Political Handbook of the World (1994, 1995,
1998, 2000, and 2001).

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

235

Fig. 8.1. Seat Proportions of Pro-­Presidential and Opposition Parties in Kyrgyzstan(1995–­2005)
Source: Nohlen et al. (2001: 447); Sjoberg (2010: 201–­2); and Kurmanov (2005).

became slightly widened during those elections, as pro-­presidential parties
such as the SDS and My Country took 20 percent of total seats, whereas
opposition parties such as the PKK, Ata Meken, and Erkin Kyrgyzstan
received only 10.5 percent of total seats, thus resulting in approximately a10 percent gap in seat shares in favor of the pro-­presidential camp.
After Akaev failed to nurture the SDS into a strong “party of power,”
Alga (Forward) Kyrgyzstan was formed in 2003 by allying small pro-­government parties and then merging with another in 2004. Aspiring to bea dominant party like United Russia and Kazakhstan’s Otan, Alga Kyrgyzstan was chaired by Akaev’s daughter Bermet Akaeva and set up regionaland district party offices backed up by state resources (Kurmanov 2004:
14). Alga Kyrgyzstan secured twelve seats in the first round and an additional twenty-­four seats in the second round of the 2005 parliamentaryelections for a combined total of 48 percent of the seats.6 Including an
additional four seats won by the other pro-­presidential party, Adilet, the6. The figure for the first round is based upon Sjöberg (2011: 201–­2), whereas that in thesecond round comes from Kurmanov (2005).

236

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

pro-­presidential camp took an absolute majority in the parliament (53 percent of total seats).7 By contrast, opposition parties gained only two seats inthe first round and an additional four seats in the second round (8 percent
of total seats after the second round). As a result, the 2005 parliamentaryelections produced a 45 percent seat gap between the pro-­government andopposition parties.

8.3. Electoral Manipulation and Post-­Electoral Protests in Kyrgyzstan

As discussed in the preceding section, the Akaev regime became increasingly authoritarian. Coinciding with this authoritarian turn, Akaev also
became more dependent upon forms of electoral manipulation such as
blatant electoral fraud and institutional machination. The more rigged
the elections, the larger the scale of popular protests Akaev faced afterward. Extensive electoral manipulation in the 2005 parliamentary elections
resulted in the massive popular protests that ousted Akaev and led to thebreakdown of his regime. In this section, I show evidence that the Akaev
regime (1) became more dependent upon blatant electoral fraud comparedto earlier elections, (2) relied upon single-­member district (SMD) based
systems to bias election results in favor of the regime, and consequently (3)experienced a larger size of post-­electoral protests in later elections.
Hyde and Marinov’s (2012) NELDA dataset demonstrates that elections during the Akaev regime were all competitive in the sense that opposition parties and multiple candidates were allowed to participate. However, table 8.1 shows time-­series changes in the extent of blatant electoral
fraud at parliamentary and presidential elections between 1995 and 2005.
The extent of blatant electoral fraud during the 1995 parliamentary elections was relatively lower (7) than during the 1999 and 2005 elections (8).
In other words, based on the definition in the forms of electoral violence,election cheating, and legal problems regarding electoral law, blatant electoral fraud grew more extensive leading up to the 2005 legislative elections.
Although some electoral fraud and irregularities were observed in the
1995 elections (both parliamentary and presidential), the OSCE positively
assessed their democratic characters (OSCE 1995; Huskey 1997: 261). An
OSCE report indicates that election cheating was at most sporadic and was
not systematically exercised by the national government:
7. When counting the number of pro-­government independents, a report suggests that the
Akaev camp secured more than the two-­thirds majority after the second round (Weinstein2005).

237

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown
TABLE 8.1. Blatant Electoral Fraud in Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2005)
Competitive elections
Election violencePre-­electoral cheating
Election-­day cheating
Problems on electoral law
Overall electoral fraud

1995 par1995 pres2000 par2000 pres2005 par

Yes
0
2
3
2
7

Yes
0
2
3
2
7

Yes
0
3
3
2
8

Yes
0
3
3
2
8

Yes
0
3
3
3
9

Source: Kelley (2012); U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-humanrights-practices/).
Note: Each election was accessed by Kelley’s (2012) Quality of Elections Data and the author’s own coding
for the 2005 elections. Each component has four scales (0 = no problems; 1 = minor problems only; 2 =moderate problems; 3 = serious problems). I aggregated each component (pre-­electoral and election-­day
violence) to assess overall electoral fraud.

The performance of the local election officials in the polling stations
visited by the Commission staff was quite mixed. In one instance,
they allowed two young men to get on the supplementary voters
list without passports or any other documents. Elsewhere, however,they staunchly refused to let people vote for others or vote without
the proper documents. (OSCE 1995: 9)
Anderson (1996: 532) argued that “although critics claimed substantive degrees of fraud, it should be noted that the results which suggested
substantive regional variations may indeed have reflected popular opinion
and a traditional tendency to support existing leaders.” Similarly, according
to Collins (2006: 224–­25), “despite some minor violations—­far more circumscribed than had been expected, given Akaev’s uncertain chances—­theelections were given a pass by the OSCE and other international observers.” Specifically, although certain types of blatant electoral fraud were
frequently observed, such as multiple voting and nonviolent intimidation
in some electoral districts, such cases were not widespread, and many electoral irregularities were attributed to the low quality of bureaucracy andan inexperienced electoral management body in charge of operating theelections. Practices of ballot stuffing were also observed, and many complaints emerged about such overt fraud; however, Akaev closely investigated these allegations by establishing an independent public commission(OSCE 1995: 9).
It was said that the presidential candidate Masaliev, who was thefirst secretary of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic and the strongest
opposition candidate at that time, did not succeed in scoring even a slim

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

majority in the Osh Oblast, where he held a strong support base. This
failure was likely due to Akaev extensively stuffing the ballot box in theregion by appointing akims in Osh and Jalal-­Abad loyal to him (author’sinterview with a political activist [#32]; Collins 2006: 236). However, thegovernment neither eliminated strong candidates by deregistering themin advance nor seriously biased media in favor of the president and theirpro-­presidential candidates, all of which were typical methods of electoral
fraud employed in the later elections. Although there was some intimidation of the media, independent media remained active, and Akaev did not
attempt to install powerful outlets broadcasting political views in favor of
the president. Last, the OSCE report and other sources suggest that bothpre-­electoral violence and election-­day violence were absent during the
1995 elections.8
Akaev first resorted to extensive blatant electoral fraud in the 2000 legislative and presidential elections (U.S. Department of State 2001). Indeed,
the Quality of Elections Data by Kelley (2012) coded that the 2000 elections were more fraudulent than the 1995 elections. Observing numerous and widespread election irregularities, the OSCE similarly concluded
that both the legislative and the presidential elections were extensively
manipulated and thus fell short of international standards of democraticelections (OSCE 2000b, 2001): “The pre-­election period was marred bya high degree of interference in the process by state officials, a lack of
independence of the courts, resulting in a selective use of sanctions against
candidates, and a bias in the state media” (OSCE 2000b: 1). According to
Abazov (2003: 545), “Pressure on the opposition before the elections andirregularities during polling were so blatant and widespread that even thepro-­government intelligentsia condemned them as . . . a bad job in the best
Soviet traditions.”
First, pre-­electoral cheating was combined with the new pro-­regime
election law, which resulted in much more rampant electoral fraud. Leading up to the legislative elections, Akaev introduced new and controversial changes to the election law, which required political parties to register at least twelve months before the elections in order to be eligible
for participation (Abazov 2003: 547). Two major opposition parties—­Ar
Namys (Honor) and Bei Bechara (Party of Poor People)—­both of whichwere formed by powerful opposition politicians who had defected from thegovernment, Felix Kulov and Daniyar Usenov, respectively, were barred
8. The Electoral Contention and Violence Data does not report any pre-­electoral violence inany of the elections throughout the Akaev regime.

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

239

from registering for the election on the grounds that they had not satisfied
the new requirement of electoral registration. Four other parties were also
prohibited from participating on legal grounds, including the oldest andmost influential of the 1990s, the DDK. The latter exclusion was the resultof a local Bishkek court hearing a complaint against the Central Electoral
Commission’s decision to register the DDK (OSCE 2000: 6).
In addition to coercion against political parties, numerous opposition figures were intimidated by pre-­electoral de-­qualification as election candidates, abrupt deregistration during election campaigns, and/or
post-­electoral arrest. Kulov himself ran for the parliamentary elections
and obtained the largest vote shares in the first round of votes; however,his votes decreased for unknown and unexplainable reasons in the second
round, and he lost the elections (Uyama 2006: 47; Abazov 2003: 551). Afterthe elections, he was indicted for embezzlement and jailed until the end of
the Akaev regime. On the grounds that he had not disclosed all his properties, Usenov was also suddenly disqualified as a candidate after he won aplurality in the first round and was imprisoned after the elections. Eightother candidates were also disqualified between the first and second roundsof the elections based on allegations of irregular financial declaration andillegal vote buying.
Second, pro-­regime media bias during election campaigns became far
more extensive than it had in previous years. State-­owned newspapers suchas Slovo Kyrgyzstana and Kyrgyzstan TV broadcasted political news in favorof leading pro-­presidential parties, such as the SDS and the Democratic
Party of Women, as well as the president, while exhibiting clear negative
tendencies toward opposition candidates such as Felix Kulov and Daniyar
Usenov (OSCE 2001: 9). For instance, state-­owned radio and television
station KTR provided approximately 21 percent of its legislative election
coverage to a ruling party, the SDS, with mostly positive tones, whereas
the two main opposition parties, Ar Namys and Bei Bechara, received only
5.6 percent and 2.8 percent of the coverage, respectively, characterized bylargely negative tones (OSCE 2000b: 12). In the presidential elections,
KTR allocated Akaev 99.2 percent of air time, the vast majority of which
was positive in tone, while the remaining 13 percent was neutral. Similarly,
Slovo Kyrgyzstana devoted more than 75 percent of its total political space
to Akaev, with 73 percent of coverage being positive, whereas Tekebaev, themain opposition candidate, received only 10 percent, of which 75 percent
was negative (OSCE 2000c: 9).
Third, election-­day cheating was prevalent in the form of voter intimidation, double voting, and vote count problems. For instance, the manipu-

240

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

lation of student votes was employed as a major technique of voter intimidation in Bishkek and Jalal Abad. As the OSCE reported:
In Bishkek students from the Agricultural University, located inDistrict number 5, had been sent home to collect the passport numbers of three persons each, to be added to voter lists and vote forthe head of the university. . . . On election day, there were indeed
many additions to the voter lists. Also students turned up at the same
“allocated” time and some even acknowledged to observers that they
were under pressure to vote for their university head or a specificcandidate. This situation was largely replicated during the second
round. In District 3 in Bishkek, students acknowledged . . . that theirvote was checked. If they failed to vote, then access to cheap university accommodation would be jeopardized. In District number 9 inJalal Abad, . . . the EOM [Election Observation Mission] observed
students with multiple, pre-­marked ballots during the second round.
(2000b: 14)
International observers reported strong suspicions of multiple voting,proxy voting, family voting, and ballot stuffing, particularly in but not limited to electoral districts where the opposition was strong. In 68 percent
of polling stations visited by observers, voters were newly added on voter
lists on election day due to inadequate preparation prior to the elections.
Such additional lists provided ample opportunities for regime supporters
to engage in multiple voting. In particular, systematic electoral fraud andballot stuffing were widely observed in District 44, where Felix Kulov ran
as a candidate, including a massive increase in the number of advance voters, premarked ballots, and illegal vote buying (OSCE 2000b: 15). Similar ballot stuffing footprints were indicated in the presidential elections inOsh, Chui, and Jalal Abad (OSCE 2000c: 12–­13).
The incumbent also extensively rigged the 2005 legislative elections,which provoked massive popular protests leading to the Tulip Revolution.9 The OSCE (2005) reported that the parliamentary elections wererelatively competitive on election day in the sense that multiple candidates
were contesting in a large number of districts. However, they also documented that prior to the elections, Akaev had resorted to extensive, blatantelectoral fraud to bias election results in favor of pro-­presidential candi9. The first-­round voting was held on February 27, whereas the second-­round voting
occurred on March 13.

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

241

dates as well as the two ruling parties, Alga Kyrgyzstan and Adilet. First,
although the government had revised the election law more than ten times
since the 2000 elections and some of the amendments had the potential
to make progress in free and fair electoral processes, the OSCE and otherelection observers emphasized that significant shortcomings remained in
the election law, including (1) restrictions on candidates’ rights, including
the possibility of suspension and cancellation of the mandates of electedcandidates; (2) the possibility of deregistering candidates on minor technical issues; (3) a lack of pluralism in the compositions of election commissions (due to close cooperation between local election commissions andlocal state administrations); (4) no clear distinction between public information/government resources and ruling parties’ campaign resources; and(5) unclearly defined complaints and appeal processes on electoral malpractices (OSCE 2005: 5; Kartawich 2005: 8; Kurmanov 2005: 9–­10).
Second, taking advantage of loopholes in the electoral law, deregistration, and intimidation of powerful opposition candidates were again
employed as major techniques of pre-­electoral cheating to secure the rulingparty’s election victory. For example, Roza Otunbaeva, a former diplomat
who had resided in Moscow and famous opposition leader, was barred fromrunning because she did not meet the permanent, in-­country residency
requirement of five years prior to candidate nomination. Because former
diplomats had not faced any of these problems in registration in previous
elections, the denial of her registration was claimed to be politically motivated. Eleven other candidates were rejected from registration due to similarly minor technical violations such as missing information in campaign
materials, “even though in numerous other cases candidates received only
a warning for having committed similar or more serious violations such as
vote-­buying and intimidation of voters” (OSCE 2005: 10).
Third, other types of election-­day cheating by pro-­presidential candidates were frequently documented by election observers. Similar to the2000 elections, election monitors also confirmed other problems of election cheating such as multiple voting, family voting, and inadequate voter
lists, which undermined public trust in electoral integrity (OSCE 2005: 9).
Fourth, public media outlets remained exposed to extensive control by the government. “Most media monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR
failed to provide impartial and fair coverage of the campaign. Almost all
media paid extensive attention to the authorities, mainly to the President”(OSCE 2005: 16). For instance, the newly created pro-­presidential party
Alga Kyrgyzstan could use the major newspaper Vecherny Bishkek and TV
channels run by the Akaev family free of charge (Kurmanov 2005: 10).

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

During election campaigns, state-­owned KTR television and radio respectively provided Akaev with 33 percent and 46 percent of prime-­time news
with exclusively positive or neutral tones while negatively referring to the
opposition (OSCE 2005: 16). In contrast, the government intimidated the
independent and pro-­opposition media. For instance, in December 2004,
the opposition-­affiliated newspaper MSN was abruptly indicted for allegedmonopolistic activities with a penalty up to five years in prison (14). Fivedays before the first round of the elections, reporting at the only independent printing house in Bishkek, which offered service to pro-­opposition
newspapers like MSN and Res Publica, was suspended after its electricity
was suddenly cut off by an involvement of the state-­owned Severelektro company (14). Similarly, the state Kyrgyz telecom suddenly stopped
broadcasting independent Azattyk radio, which provided more balanced
coverage, on February 24, three days before the elections. As a result, “atthe end of the campaign and during significant public protests in rural
areas, broadcasting of the Azattyk signal was sharply limited to a few urban
areas. This restricted voter access to an independent information source ata critical time of the campaign” (OSCE 2015: 15).
Institutional Manipulation: Continuation of SMD systems

In addition to blatant electoral fraud, the government utilized electoral system changes as another tool of manipulation. The Akaev regime reformed
the electoral systems of both the upper and lower houses several times.
Interestingly, in stark contrast to Kazakhstan, where a full proportional
representation (PR) system had been adopted prior to the 2007 election,
Akaev switched the country’s electoral system back to a pure SMD system
prior to the 2005 elections after utilizing a mixed system for the 2000 legislative election (table 8.2 and fig. 8.2). In the 1995 parliamentary election, allof the 105 seats in the lower and upper houses were decided by SMD systems. Based on the second constitution adopted in 1996 and the electoral
law amended in 1998, the 2000 parliamentary elections were held under amixed system: 15 out of 60 seats in the lower house were decided by a PR
system with a 5 percent electoral threshold, whereas the rest of the 45 seatsin the lower house and all the 45 seats in the upper house were electedunder a SMD system. Then, when Akaev shifted the country’s electoral
system back to a fully SMD system prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections, the number of seats in the new unicameral parliament was reduced to75, all of which were decided by SMDs with an absolute majority system.
To put it simply, although the country experienced several reforms in the243

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown
TABLE 8.2. Electoral System Change and Effective Electoral Threshold in
Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2005)
1995 elections

2000 elections

2005 elections

SMD
PR

100%
0%

85%
15%

100%
0%

Notes:

Both upper house andlower house adopt a fully
SMD system (absolutemajority)

All the seats in upper
Unicameral legislaturehouse are decided byadopts a fully SMD system
SMD (absolute majority). (absolute majority)
Lower house adopts amixed system.

system, the government maintained electoral rules under which most of
the seats were allocated by majoritarian methods.
In addition to blatant electoral fraud, Akaev utilized majoritarian electoral systems to bias election results in favor of ruling parties and pro-­presidential independents. Under the SMD-­dominant electoral system,
seat distribution in the 2000 legislative elections was biased in favor ofpro-­presidential politicians. As a result, the opposition camp (the PKK,
Bei Bechara, Erkin Kyrgyzstan, and Ata Meken) obtained 40.4 percent ofvotes nationwide in the PR segment,10 while gaining only 21.8 percent of
total seats occupied by party-­affiliated candidates in the SMD segment.11
In contrast, the pro-­presidential parties (SDS, My Country, etc.) occupied
more than 53 percent of total seats with 49.2 percent of votes nationwide.12
Due to blatant electoral fraud and a pure SMD system, election resultsin the first round of voting in the 2005 parliamentary election were highly
favorable to pro-­presidential candidates. Utilizing candidate-­level quantitative data on the 2005 parliamentary elections, Sjöberg (2011: 92) reported
that candidates nominated by the biggest ruling party, Alga Kyrgyzstan,were 66 percent more likely to win seats under the SMD system. Importantly, the seat premium allowed Akaev to buy off politicians in the legislature. Being a legislator provided ruling elites with various privileges such
10. Because vote proportions obtained by political parties in SMD systems are not available, I used vote shares of each party in the party-­list PR portion as a proxy.
11. As I will discuss later, the largest share of seats (69 percent of total seats) was occupied
by independents in the 2000 legislative elections. To compare ruling and opposition parties,
I use the total number of seats occupied by party-­affiliated candidates as the denominator.
12. These figures were calculated by referring to Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann (2001:447) and Abazov (2003: 551). In reality, many independent politicians were pro-­presidential,
so the pro-­regime bias should have been much more significant when including those pro-­presidential candidates.

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Fig. 8.2. Effective Electoral Threshold in Kyrgyz Parliamentary Elections (1995–­2005)

as immunity from prosecution, access to illegal transactions through law-­
making influence, and protection of their property from special interests(Engvall 2016: 78). By shifting back to the pure SMD system, Akaev wasable to count on enjoying the pro-­regime seat premiums, which allowed
him to co-­opt regional elites and thereby maintain his rule. Out of 75 seatsin the legislature, 32 electoral districts decided winners, only two of whichwere won by the opposition, whereas the remainder were taken by pro-­government or independent politicians (Radnitz 2010: 136). Competition
was rife even among pro-­presidential candidates, thus signaling the president’s and ruling parties’ poor control of their camp (Uyama 2006: 49).
For instance, when Akaev’s daughter Bermet Akaeva ran for the elections
in Bishkek, she only obtained 45 percent of the vote despite enormouspressure on students and restrictions on the campaigns of her opponents(Lewis 2008: 138).
Post-­Electoral Popular Protests

The elections in the three periods (1995, 2000, and 2005) differed not
only in terms of the extent of blatant electoral fraud and the types of electoral systems but also in the magnitude of post-­electoral popular protests.

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245

Fig. 8.3. Number of Post-­Electoral Protests in Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2005)

Using the Electoral Contention and Violence Data (Daxecker, Amicarelli,and Jung 2019), figure 8.3 graphically illustrates the number of post-­
electoral anti-­government protests under the Akaev regime. Whereas no
post-­electoral popular protests were observed in the 1995 legislative andpresidential elections, five opposition protests accusing the incumbent ofelectoral fraud occurred after the 2000 parliamentary elections, and nine
popular protests were organized by supporters of presidential candidate
Omurbek Tekebaev in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential elections.
However, these did not develop into a large, nationwide scale of anti-­
government protests.
In contrast, the 2005 parliamentary elections sparked popular protests
in some electoral districts immediately after the first round of voting on
February 27, and these escalated into national-­level mobilization followedby the second round of voting on March 13 after the Central Election
Commission declared that pro-­presidential candidates had obtained an
overwhelming majority of seats.13 Protesters, many of whom came from
13. For detailed descriptions of the Tulip Revolution, see, e.g., Uyama (2006), Marat(2006), Cummings (2010), and Radnitz (2010: chap. 6).

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

local places and were therefore mobilized by local elites, set out to the capital at Bishkek and held meetings to demand Akaev’s resignation and called
for another election on the grounds that the government employed extensive electoral manipulation. By March 24, the number of protesters had
reached between fifteen thousand and twenty thousand, and they clashedwith pro-­presidential supporters as well as the police (Marat 2006: 7). Aftera few such skirmishes, anti-­government protesters stormed the presidential
palace, only to discover that Akaev had already escaped from there a few
hours earlier: Akaev’s fourteen-­year rule ended with this dramatic post-­
electoral popular mobilization.

8.4. The Weakening of Akaev’s Mobilization Capabilities

Like Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan, Akaev’s Kyrgyzstan also experienced autocratization during the same period. However, the temporal dynamics ofelectoral manipulation were starkly different between these two regimes:
Whereas Kazakhstan became less reliant on such techniques over time,
Kyrgyzstan experienced more extensive, pro-­regime electoral manipulation in the forms of blatant electoral fraud and the adoption of SMD systems. Furthermore, elections served as a focal point of popular protests in
Kyrgyzstan, whereas such post-­electoral mobilization hardly occurred in
Kazakhstan and elections worked as an opposite focal point in which elites
and citizens declared their political support for the dictator. Why did Akaev
become more dependent upon electoral manipulation and thereby experience themore intense post-­electoral protests that eventually led to the breakdown of his
regime?
In this section, I suggest that the key to solving this puzzle lies in significant differences between the two regimes on temporal changes in thetwo dictators’ mobilization capabilities. I then go on to argue that thesedifferences led to the contrasting impacts of authoritarian elections onpolitical order—­massive protests and authoritarian breakdown after the2005 elections in Kyrgyzstan and post-­electoral authoritarian consolidation of the Nazarbaev regime in the 2000s. As discussed in chapter 7, Nazarbaev primarily succeeded in enhancing his mobilization capabilities vis-­
à-­vis other political elites with the help of growing natural resource wealthfrom the early to late 2000s, thereby reducing the need to use extensive
electoral manipulation. Conversely, Akaev deteriorated his mobilization
capabilities over time, which left him little choice but to resort to extensive electoral manipulation to secure electoral victories. Facing decliningFrom Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

247

capabilities to mobilize the masses, he could not help using extensive election fraud such as the majoritarian electoral system for the 2005 elections.
However, excessive electoral manipulation consequently triggered massive
popular protests, which were mobilized by opposition elites who perceived
the weakness of the regime. As I compare the situations in Kyrgyzstan andKazakhstan, I examine Akaev’s decreasing power of mobilization by focusing on the three factors highlighted in the theory of authoritarian elections:(1) small and shrinking discretionary financial resources, (2) the weakeningof organizational bases, and (3) the emergence of the strong opposition.
Small and Shrinking Financial Resources: Gold and Aid

Although Akaev initially possessed financial resources stemming fromgold and foreign aid, their amounts were essentially small. Furthermore,
although gold was an important source of discretionary financial resources,
foreign aid was much less discretionary in nature, and the Kyrgyz government’s use of foreign aid had been closely monitored and accessed according to democratic progress by international organizations and donor
countries. As a result, financial resources that Akaev was able to distributedeclined from the mid-­1990s up to the 2005 legislative elections, which
negatively affected his mobilization capability.
Unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan does not possess rich natural resources
such as oil and gas.14 One of Kyrgyzstan’s main sources of natural resource
wealth is Kumtor, the country’s biggest gold mine, which accounted fornearly 50 percent of industrial output in Kyrgyzstan between 1996 and2000. An indication of the enormous dependence of the country’s economy
on this gold mine is that GDP growth dropped to zero when a landslide
occurred in 2002 and the accident shut down the gold mine (Pomfret2006: 80). However, gold wealth did not necessarily contribute to improving Akaev’s mobilization power for two main reasons. First, the mineralincome per capita in the country was too small to contribute to enhancing
the dictator’s discretionary financial resources to garner political support.
Gold income per capita accounts for only 1 percent of GDP per capita, farless than the average of 15 percent of GDP per capita occupied by Kazakhstan’s natural resource wealth between 1995 and 2005.15
Second, particularly from the early 2000s, gold wealth was put into high
14. According to Ross (2012), oil-­gas value per capita only accounted for US$3.9 on average between 1992 and 2005.
15. I made this comparison of people’s dependence on natural resource wealth by using
Haber and Menaldo (2011).

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

officials’ pockets for their personal use without being used as a source ofgoods or provisions for the citizenry. The exploitation of the Kumtor gold
mine began as a joint venture of the Kyrgyz government and Canadianmining and energy giant Cameco in 1992, with operations ensuing in 1997
after a period of preparation. In 2004, a financial restructuring of the joint
venture created a new company called Centerra, which was listed on theToronto Stock Exchange. However, the company was politically controversial because high-­ranking government officials were accused of enjoying a vast amount of rents from its proceeds (Pomfret 2006: 80). Basedon an audit report submitted to the Kyrgyz government in 2013, Doolot
and Heathershaw (2015: 98) documented how the financial restructuring
brought about political corruption within the inner circle of the Akaev
regime:The report alleges that a US$4 million bribe was paid to Kyrgyz
officials in 2002, one year prior to the restructuring. The report also
identifies the offshore vehicle that received the payment as Eckerd
Ltd, registered in the British Virgin Islands, “whose real owners
were presumably linked to former President Akayev. . . . Eckerd Ltd
was later used to divert some US$11 million from the state-­owned
holding company Kyrgyzaltyn. The restructuring led to a reductionin the share of the Kyrgyz state in the Kumtor venture from 67%
to 28.8%. While the first government report is a judgment by the
new regime on the old regimes, the fact that the restructuring of
the Kumtor project disadvantaged the public purse while enrichingcertain individuals is indisputable.”Due to Kyrgyzstan’s scarce natural resources, Akaev attempted to fill
the gap by turning to foreign aid and stabilization loans from internationalorganizations and Western countries. One of his motivations behind therapid political and economic reforms implemented after national independence was to appeal to the international community to receive financial
assistance (Tordoff 1995: 96). Akaev “took the view that only by adopting
such a pro-­reform position in advance of many neighboring states could
his country hope to attract investment and economic support from theoutside world” (Anderson 1999: 75–­76). Responding to the radical political and economic reforms, international organizations agreed to provide
extensive financial support to Akaev; the IMF provided over US$60 million to back up the introduction of the Kyrgyz som in May 1993; theWorld Bank offered a number of substantial credits to support the reform

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

249

programs; and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the Asian Development Bank also provided large amounts of financial assistance to smooth privatization processes (Anderson 1999: 76). In
sum, foreign aid from Western countries had increased dramatically fromless than US$25 million in 1992 to more than US$275 million in 1995
(McGlinchey 2011: 89).
However, foreign aid serves much less as discretionary financial resources
for dictators compared with natural resource wealth. First, the amount offoreign aid flowing into Kyrgyzstan became stagnated in response to thecountry’s growing autocratization. Specifically, as Akaev turned into an
authoritarian leader and thereby strengthened his rule, financial assistancefrom the international community stagnated, thus resulting in shrinking discretionary financial resources from the early 2000s. Foreign aid,
which had been maintained at US$230–­300 million between 1995 and1999, decreased to less than US$200 million between 2000 and 2003. For
instance, the World Bank had rated the implementation of the country’sloans offered by the bank as “highly satisfactory” when it offered US$60
million as “rehabilitation credit” (RC) and “privatization and enterprise
sector adjustment credit” (PESAC) in 1994; however, these ratings weredowngraded to “marginally satisfactory” by 2002. McGlinchey (2011: 92)
attributed this downgrading to Akaev appointees engaging in intermediary exploitation as brokers between international donors and the central
government:
RC’s rating was lowered because its funds were used to finance inefficient state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the technical assistance(TA) component had little government management and was under-­managed by IDA [the World Bank’s International Development
Association]. The outcome of PESAC was considered only marginally satisfactory because the objective of attracting strategic investors was not realized, serious corporate governance issues were notaddressed, negligible enterprise restructuring followed privatization, and many of the loss-­making enterprises intended to be liquidated or restructured continue to drag on the economy. In short, themoney was distributed according to the logic of the Kyrgyz politicalmarket, not the economic free market.
Second, financial resources stemming from foreign assistance are moredifficult to use directly for a dictator’s political purposes than natural
resource wealth because international actors pay close attention to how the

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central government uses such aid. As stated by a legislator in Kyrzygstan’s
parliament who had been working in the agency of state budget during
the Akaev regime: “Akaev and his government were unable to use foreignassistance for electoral purposes through fiscal policies due to internationalorganizations’ monitoring budget of the country” (author’s interview witha deputy [#33]). The case of the Akaev regime strongly indicates that foreign aid does not function as discretionary financial resources.
In the wake of the Afghanistan War in 2001, the Kyrgyz government
decided to supply the air base at Manas to the United States, which resulted
in generating unexpected windfalls for the Akaev regime. It is estimatedthat the air base provided the Akaev government with average revenuesof US$40 million for fuel subcontracts and US$2 million in rental fees, aswell as US$7,000 each time a U.S. military plane took off from Manas from2003 to 2005. However, none of these payments ever passed through official Kyrgyz accounts. Rather, the Akaev family was alleged to have put themoney into their pockets without using it to buy off political support, asfamily members controlled companies operating the Manas International
Airport (McGlinchey 2011: 98). Therefore, fiscal revenues from the U.S.
air base did not contribute to the president’s ability to distribute economic
favors to the masses.
Weak Disciplinary Organizations

In stark contrast with President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, who gradually succeeded in centralizing and institutionalizing a state apparatus and adominant party, President Akaev was unable to build centralized politicalorganizations to streamline the distribution of economic resources. On thecontrary, economic reform and privatization promoted de facto financial
decentralization in the country. Decentralized economic structures served
as a significant factor greatly promoting de facto political decentralization,
which enabled local elites to retain power in their strongholds and also madeit difficult for Akaev to construct a strong ruling party organization. Overall, these mechanisms ultimately contributed to weakening the disciplinaryorganizations necessary to streamline economic distribution to the citizenry.
Unlike Nazarbaev, who always carefully dealt with the risk of fiscal
decentralization and controlled the processes of privatization for fear of
opposition forces, Akaev allowed high levels of financial decentralization.
As discussed, Akaev had no choice but to implement radical economic andpolitical reforms to attract foreign capital and international aid in order forthe resource-­poor country to take off. According to Jones Luong (2002:

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

251115), Akaev was “convinced that a significant degree of influence over the
economy must be decentralized in order for the transition to the market tosucceed. He was hesitant to design an economic reform agenda from thecenter without careful consideration of local conditions, which he believed
regional leaders were in the best position to determine.” His decision todelegate economic decision-­making to local governments resulted in generating independent businessmen and strong local elites who held discretionary economic resources independent of the central government. Thus,
land privatization did not empower ordinary farmers but rather benefitedcollective farm directors, most of whom were local strongmen, because
they could exert control over privatized land by utilizing personal connections with regional governments (Bloch and Rasmussen 1998, 125; Radnitz
2010: 62–­63). Local businessmen who had launched their companies amid
privatization often ran for legislative elections using their strongholds as abase and employing their own local networks and independent resources
to gain parliamentary seats (Radnitz 2010). For example, according to Sjöberg’s (2011: 72) analysis, forty-­six out of the top one hundred wealthiest
people in the country ran for the 2005 legislative elections, making up 12
percent of the candidates.
In stark contrast with Kazakhstan, where the central government rapidly strengthened financial centralization via fiscal transfers and thereby
tightened control over local elites, in Kyrgyzstan seven oblast (regional)
and two major city (Bishkek and Osh) governments remained less financially dependent on the central government throughout the Akaev regime,
and their regional elites wielded great power. Akims, or regional governors, were entitled to decide their own budgets particularly in autonomous
oblasts. Immediately after independence (1993), only 17.67 percent of local
governments’ revenues derived from fiscal transfers from the central government (Tordoff 1995: 502). In particular, southern regions such as Osh
and Jalal-­Abad, the opposition’s strongholds critical of Akaev, tended not
to receive government transfers (0 percent and 16 percent, respectively).
The high autonomy of regional governments was never reduced by thepresident, and their strong power was maintained until the collapse of the
Akaev regime in 2005 (Radnitz 2010). In the early to mid-­2000s, government transfers stayed at similar levels (2002: 26.8 percent; 2003: 19.5 percent; 2004: 12.8 percent; Taranchieva 2007: 29). Given that governmenttransfers to regional governments reached 40 percent of local budgets in
Kazakhstan by the mid-­2000s, the Kyrgyzstan figures suggest that local
governments continued to hold independent sources of revenues in the last
couple of years of the Akaev rule.

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Political decentralization went hand in hand with fiscal decentralization. “At this time [November 1990], and especially after his popular elections as the first president of independent Kyrgyzstan the following October, Akaev had the opportunity to decrease or at least impose greater limits
on regional akims’ growing authority. Yet, he did little to halt the ‘spontaneous’ devolution of power, and instead, supported policies that directly
contributed to this process” (Jones Luong 2002: 108). In March 1992, hesupported amendments to the Law on Local Self-­Governance and Local
Administration in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which strengthened therole of akims in decision-­making and the implementation of policies at the
local level (108–­9). Akims were empowered to decide public policies suchas those related to housing, communal and health services, local education,and social insurance, and they were also given strong formal and informal
disciplinary power in their regions. Formally, they supervised departmentsin their oblast governments, serving as the personal and political representatives of the head of governments. Informally, taking advantage of theirlocal authority, they also had extensive local networks that “held together
bonds of friendship and loyalty, [while exercising] extensive patronage”(Tordoff 1995: 500).
Substantively, regional elites took advantage of akims’ discretion,
which contributed to magnifying decentralized structures of politicalpower. Between 1992 and 1995, seven out of eight akims came from thesame oblasts (Jones Luong 2002: 290), thus indicating that the centrifugal tendency of political power had been much more advanced than thatof Kazakhstan during the same period. It was very difficult for Akaev toparachute his own favorites to such positions, as a newly appointed akim
would not be able to garner support from local elites and their followers inregions where he lacked local networks of clientelism. In fact, Siegel (2014)
documented that only twelve out of seventy-­eight akims between 1991 and2014 had “slid” from an akim of one region to that of another, thus suggesting that the center needed to consider autonomous regional power inthe cadre rotation of akims.
It is not hard to imagine that in a country where regional elites werevery strong vis-­à-­vis the president, its party system was also not well institutionalized. The underdevelopment of national party systems made thepresident’s organizational base extremely weak because he could not use theparty organization to discipline ruling elites. The under-­institutionalizationof national party systems was manifested by the following two factors:(1) frequent realignments and fragmentation of political parties and (2)From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

253

proliferation of independent politicians who held political and financial
resources independent of political parties (Hale 2006).
Numerous political parties emerged in Kyrgyzstan immediately after
independence; however, most of them were initiated by powerful regional
leaders and/or strongmen in localities and thus attempted to represent
only local interests in parliament (Jones Luong 2002: 112–­14; Collins
2006: 231–­40): “Parties did not serve the function that they do in Western democracies, aggregating the interests of society and translating those
preferences into public policy. Instead, parties were vehicles for ambitious
elites to gain or retain a seat in the parliament. They were regionally concentrated and weakly rooted in society, and had little organizational capacity” (Radnitz 2010: 71). Eleven political parties competed and obtained
at least one seat in the parliament in the 1995 elections (Nohlen, Grotz,
and Hartmann 2001: 447), thus demonstrating the extremely fragmented
nature of the party system. In fact, surveys taken in 1999 show that 33 percent of respondents could not name even one party in the country, and 45
percent answered that none of the political parties represented their interests (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2002: 530). Moreover, their support bases
were concentrated in certain regions. For example, Erkin Kyrgyzstan, an
opposition party led by Topchuibek Turgunaliev, had its main supporters in Osh Oblast, whereas Ata Meken, which was formed when it split
from Erkin Kyrgyzstan, had Jalal-­Abad Oblast as its main support base. In
the 2000 legislative elections, in which a party list with a nationwide district was introduced for fifteen seats out of sixty to make the party system
more nationalized, nine political parties gained at least one seat, and theirregional concentrations of supporters were still salient (Nohlen, Grotz,
and Hartmann 2001; Abazov 2003: 548; Collins 2006: 240). Overall, theKyrgyz party system failed to achieve nationalization and remained highly
fractionalized during the Akaev regime, which is strikingly different fromthe case of Kazakhstan, where pro-­presidential parties turned less fractionalized over time during the same period.
Independent politicians also proliferated in elections, and the proportion of independents remained stable during the Akaev regime. Because
the country was highly decentralized both politically and financially, independent politicians, many of whom were businessmen, had large amountsof discretionary financial resources for their own election campaigns intheir districts and maintained close relationships with autonomous akims
and other local “notables” (Collins 2006: 237–­38). For example, in the
1995 legislative elections, 63.8 percent of elected legislators were inde-

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The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

pendents. In the 2000 legislative elections, the proportion of independents
in the parliament increased slightly to 69.5 percent (Nohlen, Grotz, andHartmann 2001: 447), thus suggesting that election campaigns were notparty centered and were largely driven by the resources and reputation ofself-­nominated politicians. This also marks a clear contrast with the caseof Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan had a large number of independents
during the 1990s, Nazarbaev succeeded in gradually incorporating these
independents into ruling parties.
Importantly, Akaev was unable to successfully construct a dominantparty amid the fractionalized party system and regionally dispersed networks of local elites. In the 1995 legislative elections, the pro-­presidential
party SDPK marked only 13.3 percent of total seats. Also in the 2000 legislative elections, the two pro-­presidential parties, the SDS and My Country, obtained 15.2 percent of total seats, which was far from a majority(Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 1999: 447; Abazov 2003: 551). These pro-­presidential parties scored only 25.1 percent in the party list PR portionof the 2000 elections (Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 1999: 445), whichindicates a very weak mobilization capability of the regime given that thiswas achieved only after Akaev resorted to extensive electoral manipulation.
Two years before the 2005 parliamentary elections, Akaev created Alga
Kyrgyzstan by merging the existing pro-­presidential parties, seemingly
mimicking dominant parties like Russia’s United Russia and Kazakhstan’s
Otan. However, given that Alga Kyrgyzstan failed to merge with the otherpro-­presidential party and incorporate numerous pro-­presidential independent candidates prior to the 2005 elections, it is safe to conclude thatthe party did not play the role of integrating ruling elites very well (Uyama
2006: 49).16
The evidence thus far strongly suggests that Akaev failed to build
strong disciplinary organizations with which he could have mobilized his
supporters. If this is the case, one may wonder why Akaev was able to win
the presidential and parliamentary elections in relatively free and fair ways
(albeit limited) in the middle of the 1990s. As discussed in the subsectionof section 8.4 on discretionary financial resources, one plausible factor
is the relative existence of financial resources shared among ruling elites
and their supporters: the shared material resources derived from gold andforeign aid allowed Akaev to maintain a certain level of political support
16. The V-­Party dataset indicates that although Alga Kyrgyzstan had stronger local organizational strength (measured by v2paactcom) and the prevalence of local party office (measured by v2palocoff) compared to the preceding pro-­presidential SDS, the scores are much
lower than Kazakhstan’s Nur-­Otan.

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

255

from local elites. Another relevant answer to this puzzle is that by sharing patronage resources with other ruling elites, he was able to successfully mobilize local elites’ networks by making cooperative relationships
with akims and other local bosses. A couple of years after independence,
he managed to maintain stable ruling coalitions to keep a grip on power.
As McGlinchey (2011: 94) succinctly pointed out, “Paradoxically, the diffuse nature of economic and political reform aid—­the fact that reform aid
is distributed not directly to the president but to ministers, regional andlocal governments, members of parliament, even NGO activists—­forces
leaders like Akaev to pursue the very wealth redistribution policies that are
most likely to sustain autocratic rule.” In exchange for financial resources
drawn from the president, members of the ruling coalition then mobilized
supporters in their own electoral districts by utilizing their local patronage
networks and resources, which was very effective in bringing electoral victories to Akaev in the 1995 elections (Huskey 1997: 258–­59; Collins 2006:
231–­40). Indeed, there were many practices of distribution during election
campaigns in rural areas: as Huskey (1997: 261) reported, “In some districts campaign vodka flowed like a river.” However, this informal alliance
between Akaev and ruling elites was not stable in the long run because
Akaev monopolized shrinking financial resources in later periods. Thatsaid, Akaev could manage to derive support from local elites at least during
the earlier phase by sharing sources of patronage extensively among theruling elites, even amid the serious economic decline in the 1990s.
Growing Opposition

Coinciding with the processes in which Akaev became unable or unwillingto maintain financial resources to share with other actors and cement political compliance via disciplinary organizations, opposition leaders began
to challenge him. After the 1995 elections, political elites who had local
networks in the southern regions began to dissent against the president.
Two lawmakers, Omurbek Tekebaev and Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, played
important roles in forming the opposition in the south, followed by Usen
Sydykov, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (Radnitz 2010: 74).
As popular support for Akaev declined, the opposition became far stronger,
and several prominent politicians began organizing anti-­government protests as well as opposition election campaigns prior to the 2000 elections,while also involving elites in Akaev’s northern support base. In particular,
powerful ruling elites who had obtained their important positions in thegovernment due to prior support for Akaev defected from the regime and256

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launched opposition parties while taking advantage of their dense patronage networks with local populations. For instance, Felix Kulov, who camefrom the north and had served in various important posts in the government, including the mayor of Bishkek in 1998–­1999, formed the opposition party Ar-­Namys in 1999 and declared his intention to participate in
the 2000 legislative elections. Daniyar Usenov, another famous politician
from the north, also turned into opposition and proclaimed his run for the2000 presidential elections as an opposition candidate.
Although the 2000 elections were more extensively rigged than the
1995 elections, they did not lead to nationwide opposition protests likethose of the 2005 elections. As discussed, the 2000 elections were followedby occasional protests in support of defeated opposition candidates, butthey did not develop into larger ones (Kulov 2008: 117). Why did the 2000
elections not provoke large-­scale post-­electoral protests? First, the opposition forces were not unified at that time, and some prominent opposition
candidates were able to gain some seats. Both the deep division within
the opposition camp and co-­optation of opposition figures in the parliament may have led opposition parties to speculate that electoral manipulation, even if it was implemented, would not be too extensive to completely
crowd out the opposition parties (Kulov 2008: 120). In fact, the divide-­and-­
conquer tactics worked: although the most powerful opposition leaders,such as Kulov and Usenov, were repressed by the government and exposed
to blatant electoral fraud, other figures, such as Adakhan Madumarov,
Azimbek Beknazarov, Ismail Isakov, and Omurbek Tekebaev, could secureseats in the 2000 elections by mobilizing their local networks to gather
votes. Different understandings of the extensiveness of electoral manipulation among opposition leaders may have made it difficult for them to unite
after the elections. Second, although Akaev’s financial resources had been
decreasing, he still did not monopolize state resources to squander themfor his family as he did after the 2000 elections (McGlinchey 2011: 86–­88).
Up through the 2000 elections, the opposition forces had been seriously divided without investing much effort into coordination (Lewis
2008: 125–­26). The turning point was a riot in 2002 in the southern village of Aksy. This event became “a focal point that cemented alliances
between new and old oppositionists and pushed fence-­sitters into the
opposition camp” (Radnitz 2010: 74). Azimbek Beknazarov, a nationalist
parliamentary deputy born in and elected from Aksy, was arrested on dubious charges relating to an affray that had occurred several years earlier.
However, Akaev actually ordered his arrest because Beknazarov planned to
impeach Akaev in parliament on the grounds that Akaev had agreed with

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257

the Chinese government to transfer a remote territory in eastern Kyrgyzstan to China (see, e.g., Lewis 2008: 127). To contest the president’s abuseof power, Beknazarov mobilized his local supporters, and they began tothrow stones at the police, who then opened fire onto them and killed fiveunarmed demonstrators. Subsequent anti-­government protests cemented
a network of opposition politicians by encouraging a wide range of participation regardless of regions. Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was serving as theprime minister at that time and later became the president of Kyrgyzstan
following the collapse of the Akaev regime, resigned to take responsibility
for this Aksy incident and then defected from the regime and joined the
opposition camp. In sum, the opposition forces had become much stronger
leading up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, marking a clear contrast
with the case of Kazakhstan, where the opposition camp became weaker by
the middle of the 2000s.
To remain in power, the emerging opposition urged Akaev to resort toextensive electoral manipulation through blatant electoral fraud and theadoption of the pure SMD system. However, the excessive use of electoral manipulation was accompanied by significant side effects, which theninvolved him in the spiral of post-­electoral protests that resulted in autocratic breakdown. Specifically, Akaev’s activities encouraged the opposition
to unite for electoral purposes as well as damaged regime legitimacy. First,
on the eve of the 2005 elections, the opposition succeeded in building pre-­electoral opposition coalitions. The most visible and extensive opposition
coalition was the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan (HDK), which was led
by Kurmanbek Bakiev and represented nine opposition parties across theideological spectrum (Kulov 2008: 342). The HDK then “formed an alliance with three other opposition coalitions with the potential to projectsignificant strength . . . from the union of individual opposition figuresfrom both the north and south of the country” (Radnitz 2010: 135).
Second, blatant electoral fraud and the switch to the pure SMD system also significantly suppressed voter turnout, thereby further undermining citizens’ trust toward democratic practices of the regime. The second
round of the 2005 elections had only 51 percent turnout (Marat 2006), thecountry’s lowest since the first elections in 1995. Moreover, after the election, only 22 percent of citizens answered that they believed the election
was fair in a post-­election survey (Sjöberg 2011: 70); most considered theelection to have been biased in favor of ruling parties and pro-­presidential
candidates.
Given that the united opposition actively campaigned amid serious electoral manipulation by the government, their devastating loss in the 2005

258

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

elections was highly surprising for many opposition supporters. In addition, people generally perceived that the Akaev regime was highly unpopular due to growing nepotism and corruption within the government, as
the previous sections illustrated. Motivated by this large gap between theunpopularity of the Akaev regime and the overwhelming electoral victories
of pro-­presidential candidates, opposition leaders, most of whom were losing their races, found it easier to mobilize their supporters to denounce
the electoral manipulation by the government. As Henry Hale (2015: 196)
pointed out, “When the first round of voting indicated that Akaev’s supporters were winning far more seats than the regime’s popularity level
made credible, when major opposition figures like Roza Otunbaeva weredisqualified, and when Akaev’s relatives . . . appeared to be headed to parliamentary seats . . . , losers of the formal counts rallied their forces andquickly joined efforts, with southern network leading the way.” After theirdefeats, opposition candidates began mobilizing their supporters to protest against the president’s electoral manipulation. Once large protests
occurred in some electoral districts, they rapidly spread to other districts
and regions, which reduced the costs for people to join the public dissents
and thus escalated into national-­level mobilization.17 In the second roundof the elections, opposition parties gained only four seats, while the ruling parties secured the majority of the seats. This outcome further fueled
public dissent. In what is known as the Tulip Revolution, local opposition
elites mobilized protesters from various regions and protested in Bishkek,
leading to the collapse of the Akaev regime.

8.5. Economic Maneuvering in Kyrgyzstan

This section examines political business cycles (PBCs) in Kyrgyzstan underthe Akaev regime. I have shown that Akaev increasingly became dependent upon electoral manipulation as he lacked mobilization capabilities via
financial resources and disciplinary organizations. An additional observable implication of the theory of autocratic elections is that Akaev shouldin turn rely less on the techniques of economic maneuvering such as the
distribution of pork and patronage over time. In fact, the narratives in theprevious sections suggest that the Akaev regime shared financial resources
with a wide range of ruling elites during the 1990s; however, shrinking
17. The dynamics of protests in the Tulip Revolution are well depicted by Marat (2006),
Cummings (2010), and Radnitz (2010).

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

259

Fig. 8.4. Time-­Series Change in Consumer Price Index in Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2010)
Note: The long-­dashed lines stand for elections under the Akaev regime, the dotted lines standfor elections under the Bakiev regime, and the short-­dashed lines stand for elections under theinterim government.

financial resources and the regime’s increasing nepotistic tendencies madeit difficult to distribute patronage outside the president’s inner circle inlater years. Throughout the Akaev regime, the distribution of economic
goodies did not take the form of large scales of expansionary fiscal policies
such as salary and pension increases (such as those observed in the caseof Kazakhstan), but rather it was limited to the exchange of small goods
between politicians and voters during election days (Radnitz 2010: 133–­
34). To quantitatively test this theoretical expectation, I conduct a time-­
series analysis of the PBCs.
For the purpose of comparison, my analysis includes two regimesthat were established after Akaev—­the Bakiev regime (2005–­10) and theinterim government led by Roza Otunbaeva (2010–­11). To remain consistent with the analysis of the PBCs in Kazakhstan, I use the monthly specified consumer price index (CPI) as the dependent variable. The data comefrom the Bulletin of the National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic. Setting the CPI
at December 1994 as 100, I calculate the CPI between January 1995 andDecember 2010. As many studies of the PBCs have argued, inflation afterTABLE 8.3. Political Business Cycles in Kyrgyzstan (1995–­2010)
Dependent
variable

Model 1CPI

Model 2CPI

Election typeAll elections
Post-­election
4.742***
periods (6(1.32)
months)Post-­election
periods (Akaev,
6 months)
Post-­election
periods(Bakiev)
Post-­election
periods(interim)
Post-­
parliamentary
1995 (Akaev)
Post-­
parliamentary
2000 (Akaev)
Post-­
parliamentary2005 (Akaev)
Post-­
parliamentary(Bakiev)
Post-­
parliamentary(interim)
Post-­presidential
1995 (Akaev)
Post-­presidential
2000 (Akaev)
Post-­presidential(Bakiev)
Post-­referendum
1996 (Akaev)
Post-­referendum
1998 (Akaev)
Post-­referendum
2003 (Akaev)
Post-­referendum(Bakiev)
Post-­referendum(interim)
Seasonal
Yesdummies

All elections

Model 3CPI

Model 4CPI

Model 5
CPI

Parliamentary Presidential

Referendum

1.991(1.552)
6.555***(2.048)15.44***(4.932)
3.509(3.496)−0.0232(3.468)−1.301(3.468)12.06***(3.424)15.38***(4.779)2.504(4.070)1.896(4.066)−0.473(2.960)

Yes

Yes

Yes

4.399
(3.537)
3.56(3.499)−0.515(3.537)9.998***(3.499)15.15***(4.805)Yes

From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

261

TABLE 8.3.—Continued
Dependent
variable

Model 1CPI

Model 2CPI

Model 3CPI

Model 4CPI

Model 5CPI

N
Adjusted R-­
squared
Durbin-­Watson
testF-­value

192
0.56

192
0.53

192
0.54

192
0.48

192
0.56

1.93

1.91

1.87

1.94

1.87

17.55***

13.90***

11.68***

11.48***

12.69***

Note: ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Durbin-­Watson test is performed after
correcting serial autocorrelation through the AR(1) process. The results of pre-­electoral periods dummies are notreported in the table due to space constraints.

elections is interpreted as good evidence that governments adopt expansionary fiscal policy before elections.
Figure 8.4 plots time-­series changes in CPI. The vertical lines represent the months when elections were held (long-­dashed lines, Akaev
regime; dotted lines, Bakiev regime; the short-­dashed, the interim government). Examining post-­electoral changes in inflation rates under the Akaev
regime, it seems elections do not induce big spikes in inflation rates.
Table 8.3 shows the estimation results using the identical time-­series
ordinary least squares regression models (i.e., the first difference Prais-­
Winsten regressions) with the equivalent set of control variables used forthe analysis of the PBCs in Kazakhstan.18 Model 1 confirms that Kyrgyzstan also tended to experience a post-­electoral surge in inflation rates by
4.7 percent, thus indicating that in general the Kyrgyz government loosened fiscal policies during election periods in 1995–­2010.
Interestingly, differentiating elections into the ones held under thethree different regimes (the Akaev, Bakiev, and Otunbaeva administrations),
Model 2 shows that while elections under the Bakiev and the interim government had strong and statistically significant impacts on post-­election
surges in inflation rates, those under the Akaev regime were not exposed topre-­electoral economic maneuvering; its coefficient is much smaller thanthose in the subsequent regimes, and the results are not statistically signifi18. Because visual inspection and the Dickey-­Fuller test revealed that the CPI data are
nonstationary, I take the first difference to transform the dependent variable into stationary
data. In addition, because the Durbin-­Watson test suggests that the CPI involves autocorrelation, I adopt the AR (1) process through the Prais-­Winsten method. Monthly dummies areincluded for the dependent variable to control for seasonal effects. I set six months before/
after elections as electoral periods; otherwise, the months were coded as non-­electoral periods.

262

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

cant. This result suggests that the Akaev regime did not adopt the strategy
of economic maneuvering prior to elections.
Closely looking at three different types of elections under the Akaev
regime (parliamentary elections in February 1995, February 2000, and February 2005; presidential elections in December 1995 and October 2000;
and referendums in February 1996, October 1998, and February 2003),
Models 3–­5 suggest declining patterns over time on the post-­electoral
increases in inflation rates, although all the estimation results fail to reject
the null hypothesis even at the 10 percent significance level. For instance,in the 1995 parliamentary elections, inflation rates after the election were
3.5 percent. But they became almost 0 percent in the 2000 elections andturned negative in the 2005 parliamentary elections, which triggered thepost-­electoral protests and the subsequent breakdown of Akaev regime.
The similar patterns can be observed from presidential elections and referendums. Overall, the quantitative analysis of the PBCs is consistent with
the qualitative case illustration offered in the previous sections.

8.6. Conclusion

This chapter explored the case of Kyrgyzstan as a negative case for mytheory of autocratic elections. In the 1990s, the Akaev regime shared financial resources derived from international assistance and mineral resources
with members of ruling coalitions, which enabled the president to outpace
opposition leaders and mobilize a relatively large number of supporters
without relying heavily on extensive electoral manipulation. However, as
financial resources became reduced and Akaev primarily used his highly
limited resources to maintain loyalty from his family and cronies in sustaining his regime, he became more inclined to use extensive electoral manipulation such as blatant fraud and the pure SMD system, which helped the
dictator bias election results. In the 2000 elections, a high degree of blatantelectoral fraud under the SMD-­dominant system continued to effectively
sustain the regime without provoking large-­scale post-­electoral popular
protests because the opposition was still weak and divided. However, as the
opposition united on the eve of the 2005 parliamentary elections, Akaev
resorted to far more extensive electoral manipulation (blatant electoral
fraud and a switch back to the pure SMD system), thereby generating alarge gap between the regime’s perceived popularity and pro-­presidential
candidates’ electoral performance in the first and second rounds of voting.
The gap sparked massive opposition protests immediately after the firstFrom Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown

263

round of voting, and the results of the second round of voting further escalated the anti-­regime collective action. My analysis also suggests that themore heavily elections are tampered with through blatant fraud and institutional manipulation, the less governments employ economic maneuvering techniques prior to elections. The case of the Akaev regime also provides compelling evidence supporting my argument that excessive electoral
manipulation encourages people to take to the streets, thereby threatening
the stability of authoritarian regimes. The case of Kyrgyzstan resonateswith the argument made by Levitsky and Way (2010), who argued thatthe combination of low organizational power and high international leverage (i.e., foreign aid) leads to unstable authoritarianism. While in line with
their argument about the sources of authoritarian instability, this chapter
more closely traced the links between mobilization capabilities, electoral
manipulation, economic maneuvering, and post-­electoral protests to investigate the causes and consequences of autocratic elections.

NINE

Conclusion

This book has explored the causes and consequences of authoritarian elections. Autocrats have to deal with a dilemma at the ballot box: to maintaintheir rule, they need to win big in elections, yet the manipulation of election results sacrifices the useful benefits of authoritarian elections, suchas demonstrating regime strength, gathering information, and driving awedge within the opposition camp. Under the constraint of the electoral
dilemma, authoritarian leaders decide ways of designing authoritarian
elections through three methods—­
blatant electoral fraud, institutional
manipulation, and economic maneuvering. Designed elections then haveimportant implications for post-­electoral political order in autocracies.
In the concluding chapter, I first summarize the main findings of thisbook. Then I derive policy implications of transitions from authoritarianrule in general and elections in authoritarian countries in particular. Last, I
propose future research avenues.

9.1. The Main Findings

In this book, I have argued that under the constraints of the electoral
dilemma, the degree to which autocrats are able to mobilize mass support through noncoercive means influences the design of authoritarian
elections. Dictators with high mobilization capabilities, who can mobilize
regime supporters by distributing pork and patronage effectively, have an
incentive to avoid electoral manipulation that involves blatant electoral
264

Conclusion

265

fraud and adoption of majoritarian electoral systems. By refraining frommanipulating election results through fraudulent and institutional measures, authoritarian leaders can take advantage of authoritarian elections
to mitigate the fundamental problems of autocratic rule, such as information shortages and the radicalization of the opposition. Conversely, dictators with low mobilization capabilities are likely to rely more on electoral
manipulation, because revealing their de facto weakness at the ballot box
activates threats from inner elites, the most imminent threat in authoritarian rule.
To test the empirical implications of the theory of autocratic elections,chapters 3 and 4 explored electoral manipulation in dictatorships. Chapter
3 examined the determinants of a major form of electoral manipulation—­
blatant electoral fraud—­by conducting a cross-­national data analysis.
Employing cross-­national data covering eighty-­eight authoritarian countries, I found that dictators with rich natural resource wealth and a weak
opposition are less likely to manipulate elections: Autocrats become lessdependent on election violence, election cheating, and undemocratic
restrictions on electoral law under these conditions. Furthermore, the data
analysis also found that natural resource wealth further reduces blatantelectoral fraud if autocrats are armed with strong disciplinary organizations, such as dominant parties and large and coherent dominant ethnic
groups.
Chapter 4 turned to the logic of institutional manipulation—­electoral
system changes in electoral authoritarian regimes. Choosing single-­
member district (SMD) systems, dictators can enjoy a larger seat bias
with fewer votes, which enables dictators to win big with low mobilization
capabilities. Yet, SMD systems turn an election result into a mixed signal, conveying both regime strength and an opportunity to form a unified
opposition. In contrast, proportional representation (PR) systems require
dictators to obtain a larger number of votes to win elections overwhelmingly. In so doing, they can send a costly signal of their regime strengthand also can divide and rule the opposition by disincentivizing opposition
parties to unify due to the electoral system’s high proportionality. Using
original cross-­national data of electoral system changes in ninety-­one electoral authoritarian countries, I found that dictators with abundant natural
resource wealth and a weak opposition tend to choose PR systems. Furthermore, similar to that of blatant electoral fraud, the effect of natural
resources on adopting PR systems is galvanized if authoritarian countries
are party-­based regimes.
Chapter 5 examined the conditions under which autocrats gear toward

266

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

the other type of electioneering strategy—­
economic maneuvering. In
committing to hold relatively free and fair elections, authoritarian leaders
have to win elections with large margins without relying much on electoral
manipulation, such as blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation. To do so, autocrats need to gather political support from the masses.
The manipulation of economic policy enables dictators to win overwhelmingly without electoral manipulation, such that economic maneuvering
makes it possible for them to win big with credible election results. Usingan original dataset of fiscal revenues and expenditures, my cross-­national
statistical analysis demonstrated that the magnitude of economic maneuvering becomes larger in relatively free and fair elections. Specifically, I
found that authoritarian governments tend to worsen election-­year fiscal
deficits when elections (1) allow opposition parties and multiple candidates
to participate, (2) are free from blatant electoral fraud, and (3) involve PR
systems in parliamentary elections.
Chapter 6 investigated the determinants of post-­electoral political conflicts in dictatorships—­coups, stunning opposition victories, and popular
protests. The theory provides implications for political order after authoritarian elections. If the dictator is unable to strategically manipulate elections in dealing with the electoral dilemma, then authoritarian elections
backfire on him. More specifically, there are two causal pathways throughwhich elections threaten authoritarian stability. If the dictator employs
excessive electoral manipulation, then he is more likely to face popular
protests because electoral manipulation provides a focal point for collective
action and also political elites find difficulty in making sense of the de facto
strength of the regime. On the contrary, if the autocrat is overconfident
about his election victory and fails to optimize electoral manipulation, thenelection results reveal the weakness of the regime, leading to leadershipturnover via a post-­electoral coup or the opposition’s landslide election
victory. Using a two-­stage statistical estimations, my cross-­national analysis
rendered supporting evidence on these theoretical expectations.
Chapter 7 then provided an in-­depth case study of Kazakhstan, where
President Nazarbaev consolidated his rule despite the fact that he gradually became less dependent on blatant electoral fraud and the seat premiums under SMD systems. My case study demonstrated that during the
1990s, when Nazarbaev was still too weak to mobilize a wide range ofpolitical support from citizens, he was apt to manipulate election resultsby committing blatant election fraud and maintaining SMD systems. As he
became armed with rich natural resources and centralized political organizations, however, he became more inclined to use pre-­electoral economic

Conclusion

267

maneuvering rather than blatant electoral fraud and also decided to change
the country’s electoral system to a pure PR system with a single nationwide
electoral district. As a result of tactfully designing elections according to
his mobilization capabilities, Nazarbaev was able to use elections as a relevant tool to consolidate autocratic rule.
Chapter 8 investigated the case of Kyrgyzstan, where President Akaev
faced massive protests after the 2005 elections, the so-­called Tulip Revolution. During the 1990s, he managed to maintain his regime and held
relatively free and fair elections by using financial resources and maintaining regional alliances with local elites. From the early 2000s, however, hebecame more inclined to use blatant electoral fraud and shifted the country’s electoral system to a pure SMD system, as he increasingly sufferedfrom a lack of monetary resources and faced a strong opposition. Furthermore, he failed to centralize both state and party organizations, and local
elites maintained autonomous power in their strongholds, which made itdifficult for Akaev to engage in economic maneuvering in an effective way.
Despite people’s suspicions and concerns over the regime’s weakness andunpopularity, the 2005 SMD parliamentary elections exhibited an evenhigher level of blatant electoral fraud and led to an overwhelming electoral
victory of the president and his ruling parties. The oversupply of electoral
manipulation sparked popular protests by opposition leaders, resulting in
the collapse of the Akaev regime.

9.2. Policy Implications

The theory and the empirical findings in this book lead to important policy
implications for election monitoring entities and international assistancefor transitions from authoritarian rule. First, this book’s findings suggestthat policy makers may need to provide international assistance for elections under careful consideration over the conditions of domestic politics
in authoritarian regimes, particularly the dictator’s mobilization capabilities. If the dictator possesses rich discretionary financial resources andstrong disciplinary organizations to stand up with relatively free and fairelections, then international election monitoring and subsequently liberalized elections might help the dictator legitimate his rule by winning big
and consolidate his regime by exploiting the benefits of elections. Conversely, if strong opposition exists and the dictator suffers from a shortageof resources to distribute, international pressures to hold free and fair elections may pave the way for destabilizing the country’s political order by

268

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

revealing the dictator’s weakness. In other words, which distinct outcomesinternational assistance facilitates depends on the dictator’s mobilization
capabilities (which are often difficult to be influenced by international election observers). Strong international pressures without taking into accountthe distribution of mobilization capabilities in authoritarian countries may
bring “unintended consequences” to policy makers, such as the consolidation of autocracy through relatively free and fair elections or the demise ofpolitical order in the wake of an excessively free election.
Second, the inadequacy of international election monitoring may becomplemented with other channels of international support that are notdirectly related to electoral institutions. For example, this book analyzed
natural resource wealth as a major source of a dictator’s discretionary financial resources, because natural resource wealth is mostly state owned andits budget is highly opaque (as in the case of Kazakhstan). By increasing thebudgetary transparency of natural resources in oil-­rich countries throughinternational channels, the international society may be able to constrain
authoritarian governments from engaging in economic maneuvering, on
the one hand, and then to prevent dictators from committing electoral
manipulation through election monitoring, on the other. In so doing, autocratic elections may be able to promote transitions from authoritarian rule.
That being said, we also need to be cautious about such a “democratization
by election” scenario through multiple international pathways, because
the dictator’s failure to win big in an election may simply facilitate coups,
civil conflict, and ultimately continued autocratic governance rather than apeaceful democratic transition.
Third, this book also provides evidence that the mere existence of relatively free and fair elections and PR systems does not necessarily contribute to further democratization in authoritarian countries. The main findings of the current research suggest that dictators strategically optimize
elections according to their mobilization capabilities. It implies that dictators who monopolize rich financial resources and successfully centralize
political organizations can afford to hold relatively free and fair elections
while disguising their regimes as democratic to appeal to the international
community and the domestic audience. For elections to be democratic,
however, they need to have a real potential of achieving a peaceful government alternation through free and fair elections. To do so, internationalorganizations may need to also strengthen their support for non-­electoral
aspects of democratization, such as cultivating the rule of law, preventing
the government from monopolizing financial resources, undermining the
dictator’s centralized mobilization structures, and helping opposition forces

Conclusion

269

unite. When effectively combining these measures with international election monitoring, elections are more likely to provide citizens with a real
choice of selecting their political leaders. By ensuring circumstances where
elections lead to peaceful leadership change, international assistance may
become more effective in democratizing authoritarian countries.

9.3. Future Research Avenues

Although the current research sheds new light on the logic behind thecauses and consequences of autocratic elections, it also clarifies several avenues for future research that may further advance our knowledge. First,
future research should make clear under what conditions authoritarian rulers might make “mistakes” on the use of electoral manipulation. Although
there are numerous examples in which authoritarian elections turn out tobe stunning ones, systematic theoretical explorations on why some authoritarian leaders face such elections were not adequately undertaken in thisbook. This book elucidated the existence of the electoral dilemma and thus
derived empirical implications that should be observed if the dictator fails to
strategically manipulate elections. Yet, theorizing about the determinants ofthe dictators’ mistakes should be highly relevant when it comes to making
a better prediction on a country’s odds of post-­electoral political conflicts.
Second, although this book treats blatant electoral fraud and institutional manipulation as an electioneering strategy belonging in the family ofelectoral manipulation, some autocrats may prefer to use blatant electoral
fraud to institutional manipulation, while others may be more capable ofresorting to institutional manipulation rather than blatant electoral fraud.
For instance, Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional significantly increased their seatshares by adopting SMD systems but without relying much on blatantelectoral fraud. In Russia, the dominant party, United Russia, had been
adopting a PR system until recently, yet in Russian elections the extent of
blatant electoral fraud is far more extensive than in some other autocracies
such as Malaysia. Although several previous studies suggest that both SMD
and blatant electoral fraud tend to go hand in hand, more research should
be done to illuminate the conditions under which autocrats prefer blatantelectoral fraud to institutional manipulation and vice versa. Theorizing
about the pros and cons of electoral manipulation and economic maneuvering, this book spent much effort in identifying a trade-­off between these
two electioneering strategies rather than finding differences within eachstrategy.

270

The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Third, while this book uses discretionary financial resources, disciplinary organizations, and the opposition’s collective action capabilities asproxies to measure the distribution of mobilization capabilities between
the dictator and other political elites, it is worth noting that the distribution of mobilization capabilities in dictatorships could stem from various
other sources. To be sure, my analytical focus echoes the notion of incumbent capacity advanced by Levitsky and Way (2010). At a broader level,
my conceptualization of dictators with high mobilization capabilities also
parallels with what Svolik (2012) refers to as the “established autocrats”
who “have acquired so much power that they can no longer be credibly
threatened by their allies.” On the other hand, weak dictators are similar
to what Svolik refers to as the “contested autocracy,” where “politics is oneof balancing between the dictator and the allies” (2012: 6). Therefore, itwould be useful, both theoretically and empirically, to move beyond theparsimonious focus on these proxies and paint a fuller picture of different
types of dictators.
Fourth, the framework of this book can be extended to international
dimensions of autocratic politics, while identifying donor networks andinternational democracy promotion efforts as explanatory variables influencing the acuteness of the electoral dilemma as well as the methods ofelectoral manipulation. In fact, scholars have studied international influences on electoral manipulation in developing countries, finding that thepresence of international election monitoring observers and dependence
on foreign aid are positively associated with free and fair elections (Hyde2008; Kelley 2012; Dietrich and Wright 2014). In particular, Morse (2019)
Saharan Africa and found that international
analyzed cases from sub-­engagement with electoral authoritarian regimes (e.g., democracy assistance, conditionality, and diplomatic pressure from democratic countries)
encourages autocrats to hold relatively free and fair elections. Also therecent literature on democratic backsliding and autocratization suggeststhat the increasing pressures of democracy promotion efforts since the endof the Cold War have forced the dictators to rely less on blatant measuresand more on ambiguous forms of manipulation (Bermeo 2016; Frantz2018). With regard to electoral system types, researchers emphasize theimportance of diffusion mechanisms, arguing that political leaders often
emulate the electoral rules of their neighbors (Bader 2014; Bol et al. 2015).
How these factors relate to the dictator’s dilemma and subsequent repertories of the dictator’s electioneering strategies would be a highly promisingresearch avenue in future research.
Finally, it may be possible for future research to add other election-

Conclusion

271

eering strategies to the menu of manipulation and to theorize on the
dynamics of electioneering tools. For instance, autocrats may strategicallydetermine election timing to produce election results in favor of themselves (Higashijima and Yanai 2019). Similarly, the recent development ofsocial networking seems to have added fake news to the dictator’s toolbox
for manipulating election results (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018). Despite
investigating diversifying techniques of electoral manipulation in modern
autocracies, scholarship has yet to investigate much about the roles these
new methods play in consolidating autocratic rule and their relationships
with old-­fashioned electoral manipulation techniques.1 Furthermore, theexisting theories of electoral manipulation are mostly based upon a “one-­shot game” assumption of electoral manipulation where both autocrats andthe opposition will not learn the manners of electoral manipulation fromtheir past experiences. Yet, if it seems likely that dictators learn to manipulate elections based on lessons of the past, theories of autocratic elections
should also reflect the dynamic nature of electoral manipulation. Relatedly,
some research also suggests that electoral manipulation and electoral competition shape the leader’s organizational strengths, which then influence
the battlefield in the next elections (Slater 2008; Gehlbach and Simpser2015). By theorizing such dynamics, it becomes possible to refine ourunderstanding of autocratic elections and develop effective ways of truly
liberalizing elections in authoritarian regimes in addition to the more lofty
goal of democratizing them.

1. One important recent attempt is carried out by Morgenbesser (2019), who investigates
the evolving nature of the dictator’s governing strategies in Southeast Asian autocracies.

Appendix

This appendix contains descriptive statistics and additional analyses used
for chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. Following these data tables is a list of interviews
conducted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that form the information presented in chapters 7 and 8.

273

274

Appendix

Chapter 3
Appendix A3: Descriptive Statistics
Number ofobservations

Mean

Standard
deviation

Maximum

Minimum

354
354

0.38
2.93

0.64
20.29

−0.95
0

2.37
357.97

354

0.98

1.87

0

15.66

354

0.45

0.49

0

1

354

0.4

0.31

0

0.98

354
354
325

0.17
0.05
6.18

0.38
0.23
2.25

0
0
2

1
1
12.33

325

0.21

0.72

−0.31

2.24

325
325

0.48
7.56

0.5
0.79

0
6.07

1
9.49

325
325
325

2.6
0.06
7.29

6.41
0.24
8.55

−24.04
0
0.007

19.87
1
62.36

315
312

0.16
0.19

0.368
0.396

0
0

1
1

Blatant electoral fraud
Oil-­gas value percapita ($100)
Anti-­government
collective action
Party-­based regimes(PBR)
Ethnic organizational
power (EOP)
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index(avg)
Electionadministrative
incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per
capitaEconomic growth
Civil conflict
Foreign aid (% ofGDP)
Leadership turnover
Popular protests

Appendix B3: Additional Analyses
B3.1. Different Techniques of Electoral Fraud
I. Election Violence Models
Estimation method

Model 1
Ordered logit

Model 2
Ordered logit

Model 3
Ordered logit

Dependent variable

Violence

Violence

Violence

Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)−0.108**(0.0470)0.210***(0.0533)
0.150(0.338)−0.0424(0.0516)0.204***(0.0526)
0.328(0.360)−0.0893(0.0858)
0.211***(0.0530)
0.148(0.338)Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)

Estimation method
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*PBR

Model 1
Ordered logit

Model 2
Ordered logit

Model 3
Ordered logit

0.669(0.665)0.646(0.687)−0.154(0.0967)

0.713(0.670)Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Electoral cheating
Legal problems
Cut point 1
Cut point 2
Cut point 3
Cut point 4
Cut point 5
Cut point 6
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Number of countries

0.833*(0.499)−0.717(0.689)−0.126(0.114)−0.0441(0.219)0.127(0.146)−0.481(0.371)0.00110(0.0224)−0.0512**(0.0220)
1.910***(0.721)
0.136(0.110)−0.467***(0.146)−3.215(2.262)−2.775(2.249)−1.951(2.237)−0.182(2.261)0.399(2.214)0.849(2.209)Yes
113.86***−419.34
325
79

0.820
(0.501)−0.690(0.698)−0.137(0.116)−0.0354(0.221)0.108(0.146)−0.458(0.375)0.00140(0.0224)−0.0518**(0.0222)1.807**(0.717)0.142(0.112)−0.493***(0.147)−3.058(2.281)−2.613(2.267)−1.785(2.255)−0.0210(2.280)0.556(2.235)1.004(2.228)Yes
109.03***−417.88325
79−0.0421(0.173)0.836*(0.496)−0.715(0.688)−0.126(0.112)−0.0529(0.228)0.127(0.146)−0.484(0.364)0.00163(0.0223)−0.0513**(0.0219)
1.925***(0.732)0.136(0.110)−0.466***(0.146)−3.212(2.256)−2.771(2.243)−1.947(2.230)−0.176(2.257)0.406(2.210)0.857(2.205)Yes
114.32***−419.31325
79

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

II. Election Cheating Models
Estimation method
Dependent variable
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Ethnic organizational Power (EOP)
Oil*PBR

Model 1
Ordered logit
Cheating

Model 2
Ordered logit
Cheating

Model 3
Ordered logit
Cheating−0.019(0.016)0.01(0.0582)−0.329(0.289)1.392***(0.473)−0.012***(0.002)0.00582(0.0607)−0.191(0.296)1.370***(0.451)−0.0748***(0.0148)−0.0104(0.0269)
0.00999(0.0583)−0.326(0.289)1.437***(0.505)

Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Electoral violence
Legal problems
Cut point 1
Cut point 2
Cut point 3
Cut point 4
Cut point 5
Cut point 6
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Number of countries−2.529***(0.373)−0.610(0.405)−0.184**(0.0723)
0.998***(0.201)0.0495(0.167)−0.277(0.233)−0.0359(0.0235)−0.00733(0.0146)−0.438(0.356)0.162(0.0994)
0.439***(0.153)−3.859**(1.597)−2.629(1.618)−1.107(1.597)−0.146(1.617)0.557(1.613)2.284(1.643)
Yes
221.73***−493.96325
79−2.552***(0.371)−0.725**(0.367)−0.208***(0.0729)
1.037***(0.200)0.0639(0.166)−0.215(0.236)−0.0403*(0.0223)−0.00907(0.0152)−0.464(0.359)0.146(0.103)0.421***(0.159)−3.671**(1.629)−2.428(1.651)−0.897(1.630)0.0737(1.651)0.785(1.654)2.524(1.686)Yes
309.23***−491.34325
79−0.0353(0.0934)−2.528***(0.375)−0.623(0.399)−0.186**(0.0728)
0.992***(0.204)0.0532(0.168)−0.274(0.233)−0.0354(0.0237)−0.00781(0.0148)−0.423(0.351)0.160(0.0999)
0.439***(0.154)−3.829**(1.598)−2.600(1.620)−1.079(1.601)−0.117(1.619)0.587(1.616)2.315(1.646)
Yes
228.45***−493.89
325
79

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

III. Models of Electoral Law Restriction
Estimation method
Dependent variable
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*PBR

Model 1Model 2Model 3
Ordered logit
Ordered logit
Ordered logit
Legal problem Legal problem Legal problem−0.00719*(0.00381)−0.0922(0.0789)−0.130(0.339)−0.0831(0.576)

Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Electoral violenceElectoral cheating
Cut point 1
Cut point 2
Cut point 3
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Number of countries−1.276**(0.637)1.807**(0.704)−0.639***(0.0930)−0.103(0.254)0.0728(0.197)0.232(0.274)−0.0200(0.0243)−0.0281(0.0193)−0.681(0.700)−0.358***(0.0987)
0.263**(0.116)−2.865(2.347)−1.919(2.380)−0.0193(2.338)Yes
176.62***−322.06
325
79−0.00717*(0.00378)−0.0924(0.0794)−0.126(0.345)−0.0853(0.584)−0.00220(0.0197)−1.278**(0.636)1.803**(0.712)−0.640***(0.0936)−0.100(0.266)0.0729(0.197)0.234(0.280)−0.0202(0.0250)−0.0281(0.0192)−0.681(0.700)−0.359***(0.0989)
0.262**(0.120)−2.856(2.354)−1.910(2.385)−0.0108(2.345)Yes
211.88***−322.06
325
79−0.00722(0.0242)−0.0922(0.0789)−0.130(0.338)−0.0833(0.577)0.000177(0.112)−1.276**(0.638)1.807**(0.712)−0.639***(0.0939)−0.103(0.254)0.0727(0.202)0.232(0.275)−0.0200(0.0246)−0.0281(0.0193)−0.681(0.693)−0.358***(0.0976)
0.263**(0.116)−2.865(2.352)−1.919(2.384)−0.0196(2.340)Yes
203.87***−322.06
325
79

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

278

Appendix

B3.2. Timing of Electoral Fraud
I. Pre-­Electoral Fraud
Estimation method
Dependent variable
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*PBR

Model 1RE-­OLS
Pre-­electoral
fraud

Model 2
RE-­OLS
Pre-­electoral
fraud

Model 3
RE-­OLS
Pre-­electoral
fraud−0.00247***(0.000632)
0.0179(0.0123)
0.0123(0.0796)0.151(0.147)−0.00228***(0.000565)
0.0158(0.0122)0.0540(0.0798)
0.124(0.140)−0.0181***(0.00472)−0.00512(0.00420)
0.0180(0.0123)0.0111(0.0798)
0.138(0.154)

Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Constant
Time fixed effects
Wald χ22
R-­squared
Observations
Number of countries−0.290***(0.0935)
0.0637(0.105)−0.136***(0.0153)0.00514(0.0538)
0.0124(0.0408)−0.0101(0.0561)−0.00967**(0.00407)−0.00714**(0.00364)−0.112(0.103)0.880**(0.444)Yes
268.18***
0.44
325
79

−0.293***(0.0939)0.0402(0.102)0.124(0.140)−0.141***(0.0157)
0.0159(0.0508)0.0151(0.0411)0.0141(0.0544)−0.0111**(0.00470)−0.00757**(0.00371)
0.761*(0.428)Yes
346.08***
0.46
325
79

0.0126(0.0198)−0.290***(0.0930)
0.0674(0.105)0.138(0.154)−0.135***(0.0157)
0.00603(0.0537)0.0117(0.0408)−0.0131(0.0562)−0.00985**(0.00408)−0.00703*(0.00364)
0.901**(0.443)
Yes
275.78***
0.44
325
79

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

II. Election-­Day Fraud
Estimation method
Dependent variable
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*PBR

Model 1RE-­OLS
Election-­day
fraud

Model 2
RE-­OLS
Election-­day
fraud

Model 3
RE-­OLS
Election-­day
fraud−0.00142**(0.000655)
0.00416(0.0203)−0.125(0.111)0.319**(0.127)−0.00142**(0.000638)
0.00403(0.0205)−0.123(0.115)0.317**(0.127)−0.000901(0.00543)

0.00982*(0.00504)
0.00332(0.0203)−0.121(0.108)0.376***(0.134)

Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative Incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Constant
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
R-­squared
Observations
Number of countries−0.504***(0.136)
0.298*(0.154)−0.0809***(0.0192)
0.225***(0.0432)
0.0218(0.0338)−0.124*(0.0638)−0.00646(0.00568)−0.00397(0.00351)
0.124(0.155)1.472***(0.489)Yes
222.05***
0.42
325
79

−0.504***(0.136)
0.297*(0.154)0.317**(0.127)−0.0812***(0.0196)0.226***(0.0441)0.0219(0.0338)−0.122*(0.0649)−0.00653(0.00579)−0.00399(0.00354)
1.466***(0.492)
Yes
252.02***
0.42
325
79

−0.0534**(0.0238)−0.506***(0.135)0.282*(0.152)−0.0844***(0.0194)
0.222***(0.0435)0.0243(0.0338)−0.112*(0.0631)−0.00577(0.00576)−0.00440(0.00351)
0.130(0.151)1.389***(0.479)Yes
237.71***
0.43
325
79

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

279

280

Appendix

B3.3. Heckman’s Selection Model
I. First-­Stage Model
Estimation method
Dependent variable
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growthInternational organizations
Trade openness
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Constant
Time fixed effects
Region fixed effects
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Number of countries

Model 1
Probit
Autocratic elections−0.193(0.147)0.00896*(0.00489)−4.034***(0.999)0.00317(0.00221)−2.54e-­03(2.61e-­05)
3.681***(1.272)
Yes
Yes
176.97***−2493.39
4,922
141

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,*p < 0.1. All variables are one year lagged.

II. Second-­Stage Model
Estimation method
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*PBR

Model 1RE-­OLS

Model 2
RE-­OLS

Model 3
RE-­OLS−0.00203***(0.000680)
0.0409***(0.0141)−0.0716(0.0884)
0.361**(0.145)−0.00182***(0.000560)
0.0389***(0.0139)−0.0339(0.0896)0.331**(0.140)−0.0166***(0.00441)

0.00475(0.00333)
0.0407***(0.0141)−0.0691(0.0871)
0.397***(0.152)

Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Inverse Mill’s ratio
Constant
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
R-­squared
Observations
Number of countries−0.400***(0.0912)0.0538(0.123)−0.106***(0.0170)0.147***(0.0476)0.0302(0.0373)−0.121**(0.0585)−0.00879*(0.00469)−0.00707**(0.00325)
0.103(0.135)−0.00844(0.179)1.434***(0.437)
Yes
323.4***
0.47
315
76

−0.405***(0.0907)0.0271(0.115)−0.112***(0.0167)
0.163***(0.0449)
0.0307(0.0375)−0.0990*(0.0557)−0.0101**(0.00510)−0.00784**(0.00324)
0.129(0.136)−0.00284(0.173)
1.346***(0.422)
Yes
550.78***
0.48
315
76

−0.0322**(0.0155)−0.401***(0.0912)0.0457(0.121)−0.109***(0.0168)
0.145***(0.0481)0.0315(0.0373)−0.114**(0.0578)−0.00835*(0.00474)−0.00744**(0.00331)
0.119(0.134)−0.00627(0.181)1.390***(0.432)
Yes
337.1***
0.47
315
76

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

281

282

Appendix

B3.4. Additional Controls
Estimation method
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*PBR

Model 1RE-­OLS

Model 2
RE-­OLS

Model 3
RE-­OLS−0.00284***(0.000636)
0.0282*(0.0151)−0.0649(0.0920)0.337**(0.131)−0.00261***(0.000449)
0.0264*(0.0149)−0.00385(0.0888)0.298**(0.120)−0.0235***(0.00458)

0.00274(0.00324)
0.0279*(0.0151)−0.0601(0.0916)0.369***(0.135)

Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Domestic election monitoring
International election monitoring
Effective electoral threshold
Constant
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
R-­squared
Observations
Number of countries−0.415***(0.0937)
0.143(0.125)−0.108***(0.0162)0.143**(0.0566)
0.0173(0.0355)−0.149***(0.0515)−0.0146***(0.00486)−0.00861**(0.00374)
0.0325(0.141)0.00213(0.107)0.0339(0.107)−0.00668**(0.00275)
1.955***(0.457)Yes
329.29***
0.46
297
72

−0.407***(0.0939)0.119(0.116)−0.113***(0.0159)
0.166***(0.0525)0.0194(0.0359)−0.125***(0.0481)−0.0174***(0.00512)−0.00981***(0.00372)
0.0430(0.139)−0.0249(0.106)0.0176(0.105)−0.00748***(0.00251)
1.888***(0.434)
Yes
712.99***
0.48
297
72

−0.0265*(0.0147)−0.412***(0.0938)0.136(0.123)−0.109***(0.0163)
0.142**(0.0569)
0.0189(0.0356)−0.143***(0.0512)−0.0143***(0.00489)−0.00887**(0.00381)
0.0400(0.140)−0.00183(0.107)0.0359(0.108)−0.00657**(0.00271)
1.910***(0.452)
Yes
344.68***
0.46
297
72

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

283

Appendix

B3.5. Instrumental Variables Estimation (IV-­GMM)
Model 1
(first model)
Dependent variable
Oil-­gas reserves (billion USD)
Oil-­gas reserves/country size
Oil-­gas reserves in region
Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative incapacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Time fixed effectObservations
Number of countries
F-­test on the instruments in first stage
Hansen J statistics of over-­identifying
restrictions

Oil-­gas value per capita
0.124(0.068)−187804***(10893.4)
0.005(0.005)−0.47(0.281)−0.744(1.08)−7.53(5.82)−0.096(1.04)−0.049(2.71)
0.273(0.354)0.511(0.507)0.199(0.213)5.77(3.15)−0.226(0.128)0.074(0.04)−1.26(0.979)Yes
316
76
115.5**
0.511

Model 2
Electoral fraud−0.00259***(0.000692)
0.0258(0.0252)−0.237(0.185)−0.151(0.453)−0.272*(0.149)−0.971**(0.391)−0.0647***(0.0235)0.118***(0.0403)
0.0526(0.0473)−0.0630(0.169)−0.00868*(0.00500)
0.00233(0.00524)−0.280**(0.119)Yes
316
76

Note: The Model 1 column shows the results of the first-­stage estimation, where the dependent variable
is oil-­gas value per capita. Instrumental variables are (1) proven oil reserve in billion dollars, (2) provenoil reserve divided by country size, and (3) proven oil reserve in regions (Haber and Menaldo 2011). The
Model 2 column is the second-­stage estimation where instrumented oil-­gas value per capita is used to predict blatant electoral fraud. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

284

Appendix

Chapter 4
Appendix A4: Descriptive Statistics
I. Pro-­Regime Seat Premium under SMD

Disproportionality
Ruling party’s seatpremium (seatshares – voteshares)
Effective electoral
threshold (EET)
Share of rulingparty votes
Share ofindependents
votes
Logged total seats

Number ofobservations

Mean

Standard
deviation

Maximum

Minimum

309
311

15.39
9.68

12.3
11.83

0
−31.7

52.75
46.64

311

20.58

15.01

0.271

37.5

311

58.96

19.82

0.12

100

311

7.58

13.06

0

98.98

311

4.88

0.746

3.17

6.4

Maximum

Minimum

Note: Unit of analysis is country-­election year.

II. Pre-­Electoral Opposition Coalitions

Pre-­electoral
opposition
coalition
Effective electoral
threshold (EET)
Oil-­gas value percapita ($100)
Age of largest
opposition
Number of
opposition
partiesRuling party seatshares (lagged)
Parliamentarism
ELF
Economic growth(lagged)
Logged GDP per
capita (lagged)
Election violence(NELDA)

Number ofobservations

Mean

Standard
deviation

226

0.172

0.37

0

1

226

22.09

14.21

1.02

37.5

226

1.56

5.6

0

58.33

226

2.24

3.27

0

18

226

4.86

4.06

0

23

226

71.1

20.86

0

100

226
226
226

0.376
0.523
2.2

0.48
0.27
5.6

0
0.003
−29.67

1
0.922
18.08

226

15.9

1.56

12.89

19.12

226

0.238

0.42

0

1

Note: Unit of analysis is country-­election year.

285

Appendix
III. Voter Turnout

Voter turnout
Effective electoral
threshold (EET)
Parliamentarism
Election violence
ELF
Opposition’s
election boycott
Election fraud(NELDA11)
Logged GDP per
capita (lagged)

Number ofobservations

Mean

Standard
deviation

Maximum

Minimum

314
314

69.03
21.08

16.63
14.41

23.84
0.925

98.7
37.5

314
314
314
314

0.369
0.27
0.52
0.232

0.483
0.445
0.269
0.423

0
0
0.003
0

1
1
0.922
1

314

0.519

0.5

0

1

314

7.965

1.009

5.178

10.84

Note: Unit of analysis is country-­election year.

IV. The Choice of Electoral Systems

Effective electoral
threshold (EET)
Oil-­gas value percapita ($100)
Change in anti-­
government
collective action
Trade openness
Logged total
population
Duration ofelectoral
autocracy (EA)
regimes
Regional
democracy
Civil conflict
Party-­based
regimes
Military regimes
Ethnicorganizational
power (EOP)

Number ofobservations

Mean

Standard
deviation

Maximum

Minimum

1,576

22.45

14.33

0.74

37.5

1,576

4.99

22.94

0

411.09

1,576

0.02

1.11

−14.66

15.33

1,479
1,479

80.75
15.84

59.48
1.5

5.51
12.3

440.43
19.13

1,479

16.63

15.32

1

85

1,479

−0.71

3.37

−6.09

7.3

1,479
1,000

0.052
0.537

0.223
0.498

0
0

1
1

1,000
1,000

0.072
0.464

0.26
1.17

0
0

1
0.905

Note: Unit of analysis is country-­year.

286

Appendix

Appendix B4: Additional Analyses
B4.1. Heckman’s Selection Model
I. First-­Stage Model
Estimation method

Model 1
Logit

Dependent variable

Electoral autocracy

Oil-­gas value per capita ($100)
Regional electoral autocracy (EA)
Regional democracy
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Recent coup
Recent irregular turnover from below
Recent regular turnover
Urbanization
ELF
Logged population
Prior EA spells
Prior democratic spells
Year
Constant
Time fixed effects
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Number of countries−0.00672(0.00748)
0.978(0.821)0.125**(0.0525)0.0190(0.243)−0.00782(0.0173)
0.797*(0.472)0.239(0.256)−0.141(0.375)0.00794(0.00812)−0.0804(0.555)−0.0859(0.0848)0.820***(0.163)−0.0474(0.112)0.0197(0.0123)−42.39*(24.90)Yes
18.59***−322.842,102102

Note: Model specification in the first stage is based on Miller (2017). Country cluster-­robust
standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

II. Second-­Stage Model
Estimation method

Model 1FE-­OLS

Dependent variable
lagged EET
Oil-­gas value per capita
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)

Model 2FE-­OLS

EET

EET

EET

0.888***(0.0264)−0.0151***(0.00462)
0.199*(0.115)0.873***(0.0246)−0.0972**(0.0431)0.208*(0.111)0.00131(0.00604)
1.662(2.142)−0.00246

0.760***(0.0754)0.00499(0.0408)0.244*(0.128)−1.364*(0.751)−0.799(2.772)−0.143**(0.0546)
0.0954(0.122)−0.914(1.265)0.0111(0.00958)
1.897(2.651)−0.00370(0.0231)1.420*(0.851)0.925*(0.548)11.90*(7.053)11.04*(6.326)0.366(0.597)−0.0895(0.0538)
7.522(4.865)2.257(1.602)−1.773(1.066)0.140**(0.0689)−75.47**(40.43)
Yes
Yes
1,345
83

(0.0320)
0.0967(0.862)
1.892**(0.940)0.530(6.959)2.714(6.186)1.099(0.899)−0.00737(0.0614)0.345(4.854)−0.553(1.728)−0.520(1.223)0.0263(0.0713)−34.47(53.74)
Yes
Yes
993
70

Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*PBR
Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Trade openness
Logged population
Duration of electoral autocracy (EA)
regimeRegional democracy
Civil war
Inverse Mill’s ratio
Regional EA regime

0.0758(0.645)

Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Recent coup
Recent irregular turnover from below
Recent regular turnover
Urbanization
Constant
Country FE
Time FE
Observations
Number of countries

Model 2FE-­OLS

1,376
82

Yes
Yes

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

288

Appendix

B4.2. Instrumental Variables Estimation (IV-­GMM)

Dependent variable
Oil-­gas reserves (billion USD)
Oil-­gas reserves/country size
Oil-­gas reserves in region
Oil-­gas value per capita
Lagged EET
Collective action
Trade openness
Logged population
Duration of electoral autocracy (EA) regimes
Regional democracy
Civil conflict
Time fixed effects
Observations
Number of countries
F-­test on the instruments in first stage
Hansen J statistics of overidentifying
restrictions

Model 1
(first model)
Oil-­gas value per capita−0.127(0.097)373744.5***(16721.8)−0.001(0.0069)−0.066(0.138)−0.057(0.083)−0.001(0.012)
12.75(12.58)−0.021(0.042)0.703(0.931)−0.54(0.91)
Yes
1,316
86
207.32***0.309

Model 2EET

−0.0294***(0.00586)
0.871***(0.0300)
0.255**(0.114)−0.000538(0.00592)
0.776(1.144)−0.0101(0.0221)0.150(0.151)
1.057*(0.558)
Yes
1,316
86

Note: The Model 1 column shows the results of the first-­stage estimation, where the dependent variable
is oil-­gas value per capita. Instrumental variables are (1) proven oil reserve in billion dollars, (2) provenoil reserve divided by country size, and (3) proven oil reserve in regions (Haber and Menaldo 2011). The
Model 2 column is the second-­stage estimation where instrumented oil-­gas value per capita is used to predict EET. Cluster-­robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

289

Appendix

B4.3. Additional Control Variables
Estimation method
Dependent variable
Lagged EET
Oil-­gas value per capita
Anti-­government collective action
Party-­based regimes (PBR)

Model 1FE-­OLS
EET

Model 2FE-­OLS
EET

0.870***(0.0150)−0.0163*(0.00941)
0.210***(0.0768)

0.765***(0.0711)0.00774(0.00875)
0.258*(0.140)−1.101(0.700)−0.760(2.066)−0.125***(0.0332)0.147(0.103)−0.710(1.180)0.0123(0.00873)
2.291(2.454)0.0109(0.0267)
0.0734(0.183)1.640*(0.895)0.473(0.625)0.0736(0.0877)−31.44(36.38)
Yes
995
0.622
70

Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*PBR
Oil*EOP
Military regimes
Trade openness
Logged population
Duration of electoral autocracy (EA) regime
Regional democracy
Civil war
Electoral fraud
Regional EET
Constant
Time fixed effects
ObservationsR-­squared
Number of countries

0.00605(0.00441)
1.330(1.116)−0.0232(0.0170)
0.146(0.104)
0.973**(0.492)0.171(0.274)0.166***(0.0628)−20.06(16.96)
Yes
1,461
0.763
86

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

290

Appendix

Chapter 5
Appendix A5: Descriptive Statistics

Fiscal balance
Competitiveelections
NoncompetitiveelectionsNon-­election years
in CA
Clean elections
Mediocre elections
Dirty elections
Effective electoral
threshold (EET)
Logged GDP per
capitaEconomic growth
Trade openness
Capital openness
Population over 65
Fixed exchange
Rate regimes

Number ofobservations

Mean

Standard
deviation

2,079
2,079

−1.99
0.18

7.8
0.38

−201.41
0

68.67
1

2,079

0.07

0.25

0

1

2,079

0.49

0.5

0

1

1,567
1,567
1,567
1,552

0.086
0.12
0.01
25.5

0.28
0.33
0.1
13.61

0
0
0
0.61

1
1
1
37.5

1,437

7.84

1.04

5.19

10.84

1,427
1,437
1,437
1,437
1,437

4.77
74.55
0.35
4.07
0.64

5.8
56.24
0.31
2.16
0.47

−30.14
6.32
0
1.34
0

39.48
430.35
1
14.66
1

Maximum

Minimum

291

Appendix

Appendix B5: Additional Analyses
B5.1. Regular vs. Postponed Elections
I. Competitive Elections
Estimation method
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Lagged fiscal balance
Regular competitive elections
Postponed competitive elections
Noncompetitive elections
Non-­electoral year in CA regime
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Trade openness
Capital openness
Population over 65
Fixed exchange rate regimes
Constant
Time fixed effects
Observations
Number of countries
R-­squared

Model 1FE-­OLS
Opposition participation
Fiscal balance
0.499***(0.0679)−0.626**(0.284)−0.727(0.683)−0.542(0.656)−0.946*(0.510)0.403(0.962)−0.00410(0.0245)0.0139(0.0123)
0.262(0.914)0.0655(0.337)0.0231(0.479)−3.783(6.663)
Yes
1,437
85
0.518

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are one year lagged.

292

Appendix

II. Blatant Electoral Fraud
Estimation method
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Lagged fiscal balance
Dirty elections
Mediocre elections
Regular clean elections
Postponed clean elections
Non-­election years in CA
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Trade openness
Capital openness
Population over 65
Fixed exchange rate regimes
Constant
Time fixed effects
Observations
Number of ccodeR-­squared

Model 2FE-­OLS
Electoral fraud
Fiscal balance
0.492***(0.0703)−1.561(1.177)−0.617(0.441)−0.566*(0.338)−1.592*(0.842)−0.962*(0.548)−0.0172(1.220)0.0153(0.0292)
0.0149(0.0138)
0.332(0.429)−0.213(0.909)0.0203(0.479)−2.128(8.521)
Yes
1,241
84
0.507

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are one year lagged.

Appendix

293

III. Electoral Systems
Estimation method
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Lagged fiscal balance
Regular competitive parliamentary elections (RCPE)EET
RCPE*EET
Regular noncompetitive parliamentary elections (RNCPE)
RNCPE*EET
Postponed competitive parliamentary elections (PCPE)
PCPE*EET
Postponed noncompetitive parliamentary elections (PNCPE)
PNCPE*EET
Competitive presidential elections
Noncompetitive presidential elections
Non-­election years in CA
Logged GDP per capita
Economic growth
Trade openness
Population over 65
Fixed exchange rate regimes
Capital openness
Constant
Time fixed effects
Observations
Number of countries

Model 3
System GMM
EET
Fiscal balance
0.0177(0.133)−11.45**(4.906)−0.0739(0.0717)0.482**(0.213)−8.529(6.415)0.413(0.263)51.40(77.04)−1.609(2.484)147.6(206.6)−4.398(6.133)−1.199(1.201)−0.883(1.577)0.705(1.034)3.042***(0.878)0.00640(0.0519)0.0112(0.00897)−0.00748(0.214)0.528(0.833)−1.108(1.602)−28.25***(8.081)
Yes
1,158
79

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All variables are
one year lagged.

294

Appendix

Chapter 6
Appendix A6: First-­Stage Model
A6.1. First-­Stage Model Predicting Blatant Electoral Fraud
Model 1
Fraud
Oil-­gas value per capita
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Oil*PBR
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*EOP
Anti-­government collective action
Military regimes
Monarchy regimes
Freedom House Index (avg)Election administrative capacity
Main elections
Logged GDP per capita
GrowthForeign aid (% of GDP)
Civil conflict
Constant
ObservationsR-­squared
Number of countries

0.00336(0.00332)−0.0339(0.0866)−0.0160***(0.00393)
0.344**(0.136)−0.0246(0.0155)
0.0330***(0.0128)−0.422***(0.0905)
0.0114(0.114)−0.115***(0.0157)
0.160***(0.0463)0.0373(0.0370)−0.0950*(0.0515)−0.00911*(0.00487)−0.00805***(0.00302)
0.170(0.123)
1.342***(0.413)
325
0.482
79

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

295

Appendix

A6.2. First-­Stage Model Predicting Effective
Electoral Threshold (EET)
Model 1Country FE
EET
Lagged EET
Oil-­gas value per capita
Party-­based regimes (PBR)
Oil*PBR
Ethnic organizational power (EOP)
Oil*EOP
Anti-­government collective action
Military regimes
Trade openness
Logged population
Duration of electoral autocracy (EA) regimes
Regional democracy
Civil conflict
Observations
Number of countries
R-­squared

0.771***(0.0717)0.00712(0.00862)−1.127(0.702)−0.130***(0.0321)−0.682(2.085)0.140(0.113)0.259*(0.138)−0.859(1.128)0.0102(0.00873)
2.619(2.580)0.0140(0.0268)
0.0366(0.182)
1.736*(0.910)
1,000
71
0.843

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

296

Appendix

Fig. A6.1. Predicted Values of Electoral Manipulation

297

Appendix

Appendix B6: Additional Analyses
B6.1. Effects of Electoral Fraud and Electoral Margin on
Protest/Turnover
Model 1
RE probit
ProtestModel 2
RE probit
Turnover

Model 3
RE probit
ProtestModel 4
RE probit
Turnover1.150***(0.276)0.000301(0.00545)−1.313(0.919)−0.0394**(0.0177)−0.359(0.676)
Personalist regimes
0.837*(0.494)
Freedom House Index (avg)
0.242**(0.107)
Election administrative
0.830***
incapacity(0.316)Main election−0.116(0.233)
Logged GDP per capita−0.163(0.349)Economic growth0.0572**(0.0275)
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
−0.0258(0.0377)
Constant−3.518(2.467)
Time fixed effects
Yes
Time lapse and polynomials
Yes
Log pseudolikelihood−65.68Observations
222
Number of countries67

2.147*(1.208)−0.445(0.835)−0.140(0.133)−0.320(0.565)
1.348**(0.642)−0.773(0.633)−0.0302(0.0398)−0.0363(0.0563)4.089(4.550)
Yes
Yes−52.82222
67

1.837***(0.560)0.00966(0.00934)−0.0153(0.0106)−0.155(0.633)0.980*(0.515)0.268**(0.105)0.817**(0.319)−0.0970(0.228)−0.112(0.347)0.0656**(0.0279)−0.0247(0.0365)−4.570*(2.574)
Yes
Yes−64.09222
67−1.207(1.030)−0.0384**(0.0189)−0.00391(0.0134)
2.163*(1.191)−0.417(0.856)−0.138(0.132)−0.348(0.566)1.373**(0.636)−0.767(0.635)−0.0272(0.0395)−0.0366(0.0561)
3.955(4.641)
Yes
Yes−52.79222
67

Estimation method
Dependent variable
Electoral fraud
Electoral margin
Fraud*margin
Military regimes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Model specifications are
based upon the first-­stage model. The time lapse since the last turnover/protests and their time polynomials are included.

298

Appendix

B6.2. Effects of Electoral Systems and Electoral Margin on
Protest/Turnover
Estimation method
Dependent variable
EET
Electoral margin
EET*margin
Trade openness
Population (log)Duration of electoral
autocracy (EA)
Regional democracy
Civil war
Military regimes
Constant
Time fixed effects
Time lapse andpolynomials
Log pseudolikelihood
Observations
Number of countries

Model 1
RE probit
ProtestModel 2
RE probit
Turnover

Model 3
RE probit
ProtestModel 4
RE probit
Turnover0.0232***(0.00773)
0.00245(0.00361)−0.0115(0.00946)−0.0131***(0.00411)−0.00134(0.00235)
0.250**(0.112)0.00170(0.00762)−0.0231(0.0518)0.556(0.446)−0.320(0.463)−5.594***(1.885)Yes
Yes−0.00277(0.00263)
0.105(0.120)−0.0376***(0.0102)0.0545(0.0397)−0.625(0.778)−0.300(0.469)−1.718(1.908)Yes
Yes

0.0306***(0.00797)
0.00811(0.00503)−0.000252(0.000201)−0.00163(0.00227)
0.231**(0.112)0.00315(0.00752)−0.0236(0.0521)0.538(0.450)−0.299(0.463)−5.479***(1.896)
Yes
Yes−0.0149(0.0100)−0.0185**(0.00887)
0.000270(0.000320)−0.00167(0.00254)
0.117(0.127)−0.0385***(0.0104)
0.0493(0.0404)−0.696(0.800)−0.315(0.479)−1.914(2.061)
Yes
Yes−88.25248
65−37.7425165−87.70248
65−37.45251
65

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Model specifications are
based upon the first-­stage model. The time lapse since the last turnover/protests and their time polynomials are included.

Appendix

299

Chapters 7–­8 Appendix

The comparative case studies in this book draw upon a number of interviews conducted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan during May–­July 2014.
List of Interviews in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan#1 Officer of the Soros Foundation–­
Kazakhstan, May 5, 2014,
Almaty, Kazakhstan#2 Officer of the Soros Foundation–­
Kazakhstan, May 5, 2014,
Almaty, Kazakhstan#3 Political analyst, May 6, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#4 Political analyst, May 7, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#5 Officer of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human
Rights and Rule of Law, May 12, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#6 Officer of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human
Rights and Rule of Law, May 12, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#7 Officer of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human
Rights and Rule of Law, May 12, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#8 Political analyst, May 14, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#9 Political analyst, May 14, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#10 Political scientist, May 15, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#11 Political scientist, May 15, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#12 Political scientist, May 16, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#13 Political activist, May 26, Almaty, Kazakhstan#14 Political activist, May 27, Almaty, Kazakhstan#15 Political activist, May 27, Almaty, Kazakhstan#16 Political activist, May 28, Almaty, Kazakhstan#17 Political analyst, May 28, Almaty, Kazakhstan#18 Officer of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human
Rights and Rule of Law, May 29, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#19 Student of KIMEP, May 29, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
#20 Political activist, May 29, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#21 Political scientist, May 30, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#22 Political analyst, June 3, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#23 Journalist, June 6, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#24 Political activist, June 6, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#25 Economist, June 7, 2014, Almaty, Kazakhstan#26 Ak Zhol official, June 9, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan#27 Nur-­Otan official, June 10, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan

300

Appendix#28 Ak Zhol official, June 12, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan#29 Political activist, June 16, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan#30 Political activist, June 18, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan#31 Political scientist, July 2, 2014, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan#32 Political activist, July 4, 2014, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan#33 Deputy of Ata Zhurt, July 7, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan#34 Senior government official, July 9, 2014, Bishkek, KyrgyzstanReferences

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IndexNote: Page numbers in italics refer to the illustrations and tables.
262–­63; growing opposition against,
255–­58; institutional manipulation by,242–­44, 262, 263; media coverage of,239, 241–­42; popular protest against,
244–­46; privatization initiatives,
232–­33, 249, 250–­51; shift to electoral
authoritarianism, 233–­36; shrinking
discretionary financial resources, 247–­
50, 254–­55. See also Kyrgyzstan
Akaeva, Bermet, 235, 244
Akhmedov, Akhmed, 139
Aksy incident (2002), 256–­57
Ak Zhol Party (Kazakhstan), 194, 200,
220, 221
Alash (Kazakhstan), 189
Alawi population, in Syria, 98
Alga Kyrgyzstan, 235, 241, 243, 254
Algeria: Bendjedid electoral loss, 5, 63,
160, 168; leadership turnover in, 166;
military coup and civil war in, 167–­68,
169; popular protest in, 179
Aliev, Rakhat, 194, 210, 215
Ames, Barry, 138Anderson, John, 237
anti-­government collective actions. Seecollective anti-­government actions
Armenia, election monitoring in, 81–­82

Abazov, Rafis, 238
Abdildin, Serikbolsyn, 194, 219
Ablyazov, Mukhtar, 219
Adilet Party (Kyrgyzstan), 235, 241
Africa: effect of international engagement on elections, 270; ethnicity-­
based networks in, 85–­86; malapportionment in, 113; popular protest in,
170; shift in electioneering strategies,
83n3; SMD vs PR system prevalence,
106, 107. See also specific countries
Agrarian-­Industrial Union of Workers(AIST) bloc (Kazakhstan), 194, 199,
205
Agrarian Party (Kazakhstan): merger
into Nur Otan, 217; parliamentaryelections of 1999, 193–­94, 205; political competition, 214
Akaev, Askar: blatant electoral fraudby, 236–­42, 262, 263; breakdown ofregime, 230, 246, 258, 267; decline
in mobilization capabilities, 229, 230,246–­47, 262–­63; democratization
efforts, 231–­32; disciplinary organization relationships, 250–­55; economic
maneuvering by, 230–­31, 258–­62;
electoral manipulation by, 30, 230,

325

326
Ar Namys Party (Kyrgyzstan), 238, 239,
256
Asaba Party (Kyrgyzstan), 234
Asar Party (Kazakhstan), 194, 199, 205,
214, 215, 217
Asia: perception of power in electoral
system choice, 110; popular protest
in, 170; SMD systems in, 106, 107. See
also specific countries
Asian Development Bank, 249
Assad, Hafez al-­, 4, 98–­99
Ata Meken Socialist Party (Kyrgyzstan),
232, 235, 243, 253
Aung San Suu Kyi, 63
authoritarian regimes: defined, 12, 12n7;
fraud in democracies vs., 77; fundamental problems of autocratic rule,34–­36, 40; review of, 11–­18, 13, 14;role of legislatures in, 12–­13n9; typesof, 12–­14, 14, 92; variation in use ofelectoral fraud, 77–­79, 80. See also
specific countries
autocratic elections: costs and benefitsof, 5–­6, 7, 16, 27, 35–­36, 39–­40;
destabilizing effects of, 164–­66;
four scenarios of, 43–­47, 44, 45, 46;
functions of, 14–­16; historic proliferation of, 3–­4; interactions amongplayers in, 40–­43; lack of research on,
17–­18; minimally competitive, 125;
multiparty competition in, 3–­4; needfor large margins of victory, 40–­41;
timing of, 7–­8n5, 156; types of, 12,14; varying effects of electioneering
strategies, 51–­52, 51. See also theory of
autocratic elections
Autocratic Regimes Dataset, 12n7
autocrats, electoral motivations of,40–­41
Azat movement (Kazakhstan), 190, 191
Azerbaijan: leadership turnover in, 178;
popular protest in, 161
Ba’ath Party (Syria), 98–­99
backfiring elections. See leadership turnover; post-­electoral popular protest
Bakiev, Kurmanbek, 257, 259, 261–­62
Balgimbaev, Nurlan, 209
Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, 5, 160

IndexBangladesh: blatant electoral fraud in,95; coup d’état in, 62; ethnicity-­based
networks in, 69
Banks, Arthur, 70, 91, 128
Barbera, Pablo, 117
Barisan Nasional (BN), 78, 78–­79n1,
112, 113, 269
Bei Bechara Party (Kyrgyzstan), 238, 239
Beknazarov, Azimbek, 256–­57
Bendjedid, Chadli, 5, 160, 168
Benin, ethnicity-­based networks in, 69
Bielasiak, Jack, 109n7
Birch, Sarah, 23, 37, 81, 89n7
blatant electoral fraud, 77–­88; administrative fraud effects, 37n2; defined, 4,9, 47, 88–­89; dishonest portion of votefrom, 165; economic maneuvering
influenced by, 144–­46, 148, 157–­58; aselectioneering strategy, 16, 23, 47–­48,
102, 134; four scenarios of autocraticelections, 43–­47, 45, 46; gaps between
predicted and observed values, 173–­74, 175–­76, 176; hypotheses on use of,85, 87, 88, 91; in Kazakhstan, 29, 195–­
201, 196, 266; in Kyrgyzstan, 29, 230,
236–­42, 237, 262–­63, 267; leadershipturnover influenced by undersupplyof, 176–­78, 177, 178; literature review,
80–­83; mobilization capabilities and,83–­88, 102; motivations of democracies vs. autocracies, 82; natural
resources impact on, 26, 85, 87, 91,
93, 95, 99–­101, 265; overview, 25–­26;
popular protest influenced by oversupply of, 169–­72, 177, 178–­79, 178;
reduced information-­gathering effects
from, 38n3; regime strength signaledby, 15, 37; research recommendations,269; variation in, 51–­52, 51, 77–­79, 80
blatant electoral fraud, cross-­national
statistical analysis, 88–­101; datasets
measuring, 89, 89n7; disaggregationof electoral fraud variable, 99–­100;
estimation method choice, 93; results,
26, 93–­99, 94, 97, 265; robustness
checks, 100–­101; timing of electoral
fraud, 100; variables for, 88–­93
Blaydes, Lisa, 139
Block, Steven A., 138

IndexBodea, Cristina, 147, 149
Boix, Carles, 108, 113, 116, 129
Bolivia, leadership turnover in, 161, 178
Boone, Catherine, 113
Bratton, Michael, 170
Brazil: opposition victory in, 63, 166; PR
systems in, 107
Brender, Adi, 138
Brownlee, Jason, 17, 162
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 91
Bunce, Valerie, 163, 170
Calvo, Ernesto, 108, 112n9
Cambodian People’s Party, 68, 86
Cameco, 248
Cameroon: ethnicity-­based networks in, 69;
low impact of natural resource endowments, 98; popular protest in, 161, 179
Casper, Brett, 164n5
Centerra, 248
Central African Republic, ethnicity-­
based networks in, 69
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania), 68
Chang, Eric, 87
cheating, electoral. See election cheating
Cherdabaev, Ravil, 208–­9
Chile: leadership turnover in, 161, 166,
168; opposition victory in, 63
Chyngyshev, Tursunbek, 232–­33
Civic Party of Kazakhstan, 193–­94, 205,214–­15, 217
civil conflict, as control variable, 92, 128,
132
civil liberties, as control variable, 92
clientelism. See patronage distribution/clientelism
closed authoritarian regimes: inclusion
in analysis, 26n17; reduced magnitude
of political business cycles in, 143–­44
club goods provision. See pork barrel
politics/club goods provisioncoalition making, by opposition candidates and parties: electoral manipulation influence on, 142; influence on
regime performance and stability,21–­22; in Kazakhstan, 191, 204, 220;
in Kyrgyzstan, 257; in proportional
representation systems, 117–­19; in
SMD systems, 119327

cohesion: in ethnicity-­based networks,
68, 69, 98, 128; in Kazakhstan, 214–­16, 215; as measure of organizational
power, 56–­59
collective anti-­government actions:blatant electoral fraud correlated with,22, 39, 87–­88, 91, 95, 174; electoral
system choice influenced by, 128, 131,
174; in Kyrgyzstan, 256–­57, 263; inmeasurement of opposition strength,69–­70, 70n27, 91, 128; victory margins correlated with, 72, 73
Collins, Kathleen, 237
color revolutions, post-­Soviet countries:
popular protest effects, 62, 117, 163;
post-­election occurrence of, 5, 159,
170; Tulip Revolution, 5, 29, 159, 170,
230, 240, 258, 267
Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK):
coalition making, 204, 220, 221; election results, 191, 194, 200; electoral
manipulation effects on, 219, 220; in
the Soviet era, 189; vote share vs. seatshare, 202
competitive authoritarianism, defined,
12
competitive elections: benefits ofrepeated elections, 162; effects on
fiscal balance, 152–­53, 156; identification of, 147–­48; increasing prevalenceof, 12
Congo, ethnicity-­based networks in, 69
consumer price index changes: inKazakhstan, 221–­27, 223, 224, 225,
226; in Kyrgyzstan, 259–­62, 259,
260–­61
contested autocracy, as term, 270
Coppedge, Michael, 89n7
Côte d’Ivoire, popular protest in, 160,
163, 179, 180
coups d’état: after opposition victories,
17; conditions for, 22, 41–­42, 43;
literature review on, 163; popular
protest associated with, 43n5, 164n5;
from small electoral margins, 44,
45, 46; by strengthened militaries,
34; from undersupply of electoral
manipulation, 8, 10, 266. See also
leadership turnover

328

Index

credibility of election results: noncompetitive elections, 143, 144; trade-­offwith certainty of victory, 16; trade-­offwith electoral manipulation, 6, 7, 142,165
cross-­national statistical analyses: blatantelectoral fraud, 26, 88–­101, 94, 97,
265; economic maneuvering, 26–­27,
146–­57, 151–­56, 266; four scenariosof autocratic elections, 43–­47, 45, 46;
institutional manipulation, 26, 125–­34,
127, 130, 132, 265; overview, 24–­27;
post-­election political order, 27, 172–­82, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 266; scopeconditions, 25, 25
Cross-­National Time-­Series Data Archive(Banks and Wilson), 70, 91, 128
Cummings, Sally, 216
Cusack, Thomas, 108
Dahl, Robert A., 77
defeat, electoral. See opposition victories
de Miguel, Carolina, 119democracies: autocracies vs., 11–­13, 13;economic maneuvering in, 137–­38,
139; opposition strength influenceon choice of electoral system, 125;
proportional representation systemchoice in, 107–­9, 109n7, 111; single-­
member district system effects, 103–­4,
115n13
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan(DVK): coalition making, 204, 220,
221; formation of, 209, 219–­20; participation in elections, 200; strengthof, 194
Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan(DDK), 231, 239
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DPK),
193
democratic transitions: autocrats’ mistakes role in, 61–­62, 63; elections rolein, 17; opposition strength role in, 21–­
22; popular support for dictators rolein, 102; post-­Cold War regimes, 11;
shift in electioneering strategies with,
83n3; uncertainty in electoral reform
effects, 109n6, 128–­29
democratization: diffusion of electoral

systems, 129, 134, 270; importanceof investigating sources of popularsupport, 102; leadership turnover during, 166, 167, 183; limited liberalization in Kazakhstan, 188–­91; limited
liberalization in Kyrgyzstan, 231–­32;
policy implications of the theory of
autocratic elections, 267–­69; role ofelections in, 17, 63, 162, 166; tailoringof international assistance with, 183demonstration effects of elections:benefits of, 35; defined, 14–­15; electoral manipulation causing reductionin, 16, 37, 39; in Kazakhstan, 204;
opposition-­led popular protest and,42; in proportional representation
systems, 119–­21, 121demonstrations, in measurement of
opposition strength, 70, 70n27, 128.
See also post-­electoral popular protest
design of elections. See electoral design
Diaz-­Cayeros, Alberto, 110
dictatorships. See authoritarian regimes
diffusion of electoral systems, 129, 134,270
dilemma of autocrats. See electoral
dilemmadisciplinary organizations: blatant electoral fraud use influenced by, 85–­87,
91, 95–­99, 97, 265; electoral systemchoice influenced by, 123–­24, 127–­28;
in Kazakhstan, 213–­18, 214, 215; inKyrgyzstan, 250–­55; measurementof organizational power of, 67–­69;
role in distribution of mobilization
capabilities, 54, 55–­59; role in strategic choice of electoral manipulation,
174; victory margins correlated with,71–­72, 73
discretionary financial resources: blatantelectoral fraud use influenced by,
85, 86, 91; electoral system choice
influenced by, 122–­23, 124, 126;
influence on regime performance andstability, 19–­20; in Kyrgyzstan, 230,247–­50, 254–­55; oil-­gas value percapita as measurement of, 65–­67, 91,
174; role in distribution of mobilization capabilities, 24, 33, 53, 54–­55, 54,Index65–­67, 85, 174; victory margins correlated with, 71, 72, 73. See also natural
resources
dishonest portion of vote, 165
disproportionality index, 115, 115n13
distribution of mobilization capabilities:
defined, 8, 53; factors determining, 24,
33, 53, 174, 270; influence on electoraldesign, 7–­9, 8, 18, 53–­61, 54, 74;
measurement of, 65–­72, 174, 174n8.
See also disciplinary organizations;discretionary financial resources;
mobilization capabilities; opposition
strengthdivide-­and-­rule effects of elections: benefits of, 35, 124, 144; defined, 15–­16;
electoral manipulation causing reduction in, 38–­39, 51; in Kyrgyzstan, 256;
opposition-­led popular protest and, 42;
in proportional representation systems,
26, 117–­19, 118, 119, 122, 123, 265
dominant parties: blatant electoral fraud
use influenced by, 85–­87, 91, 95–­99,
97; collective leadership in, 56n12;electoral system choice influenced by,109–­10, 123–­24, 127–­28, 131, 132;
influence on regime performance andstability, 20–­21; in Kazakhstan, 192–­
94, 193; in Kyrgyzstan, 252–­54; media
coverage of, 199; organizational powerof, 57, 58n13, 67–­69; strategic choiceof electoral manipulation influenced
by, 174; victory margins correlated
with, 71–­72, 73
Donno, Daniela, 21, 92, 162
Doolot, Asel, 248
Drazen, Allan, 138
Duverger’s law, 103, 112
Eastern Europe: post-­communism
electoral system choice, 128–­29; PR
systems in, 106, 107. See also specificcountries
Eckerd Ltd, 248
economic maneuvering, 137–­46; defined,
9, 48–­49, 146–­47n3; distribution ofmobilization capabilities and, 53, 54;
as electioneering strategy, 4, 47–­52,
51, 74; election monitoring effects

329

on, 83n3; hypotheses on use of, 144,
146; international constraints on, 268;
in Kazakhstan, 30, 221–­27, 223, 224,
225, 226, 228, 266–­67; in Kyrgyzstan,
230–­31, 258–­62, 259, 260–­61; organizational power role in, 21; overview, 26–­27; political business cycles,137–­41, 140, 157–­58; trade-­off withelectoral manipulation, 6, 8, 10, 52, 84,142–­46, 149, 152–­54, 155, 156, 266;
vote buying vs., 90n9
economic maneuvering, cross-­national
statistical analysis, 146–­57; estimation
methods, 149–­50; results, 26–­27, 150–­
54, 151–­56, 266; robustness checks,
154–­57; variables for, 146–­49
effective electoral threshold (EET):
defined, 104, 107; influence on fiscal
balance, 149; in institutional manipulation cross-­national analysis, 126, 127;
in measurement of pro-­regime seatpremiums under SMD systems, 113–­14
Egypt: ethnicity-­based networks in, 69;
voter turnout, 119–­20
Election Administrative Incapacities
control variable, 92
election cheating: in blatant electoral
fraud measurement, 80, 90, 99; correlation with opposition strength, 100;
defined, 89; economic maneuvering
analysis, 148; in Kazakhstan, 196,
199, 204; in Kyrgyzstan, 236; natural
resource endowments negatively correlated with, 99–­100; popular protest
fueled by, 170. See also election-­daycheating; pre-­electoral cheating
election commissions: in Kazakhstan,
196, 198; in Kyrgyzstan, 241; qualityof elections influenced by, 82
election-­day cheating: in blatant electoral fraud measurement, 80, 90, 99;
economic maneuvering analysis, 148;
in Kyrgyzstan, 239–­41; as last resort,
16; vote-­buying practices, 49, 90n9.
See also election cheating
election-­day violence: in blatant electoral fraud measurement, 80, 90, 99;
economic maneuvering analysis, 148.
See also election violence

330

Index

electioneering strategies: overview, 47–­
52, 51; research recommendations,83, 269, 270–­71; types of, 4, 6, 8. See
also economic maneuvering; electoral
manipulationelection governance quality, as control
variable, 92
election monitoring: as control variable,
93n12; in Kyrgyzstan, 240; policy
implications, 267–­68, 269; post-­
election political order influenced
by, 163; reduced electoral fraud with,81–­82, 83n3, 270; tailoring of, 183
elections. See autocratic elections
election violence: in blatant electoral
fraud measurement, 80, 88, 89, 90, 99;
defined, 89; economic maneuvering
analysis, 148; in Kazakhstan, 197, 200–­
201, 204; in Kyrgyzstan, 236; natural
resources negatively correlated with,99–­100, 265; obstacles to governancefrom, 6–­7; opposition strength correlated with, 100; popular protest fueledby, 17, 163, 170; in Zimbabwe, 78, 86,
88, 95. See also election-­day violence;pre-­electoral violence
electoral authoritarianism, defined, 12,125electoral defeat of autocrats. See opposition victories
electoral design: defined, 5; electoral
dilemma role in, 36–­40; equilibrium
deviation effects, 8, 10, 33; influenceof mobilization capabilities distribution on, 7–­9, 8, 18, 53–­61, 54, 74;
Kazakhstan vs. Kyrgyzstan, 28, 29;
strategic uncertainty in, 10–­11
electoral dilemma: constraints imposedby, 18; defined, 7, 8, 36; electoraldesign influenced by, 36–­40; need formore research on, 82, 270; overview,
6; relationship with mobilization capabilities, 164
electoral fraud, blatant. See blatantelectoral fraud
electoral law problems: in blatant electoral fraud measurement, 80, 90, 99,148; defined, 89; economic maneuvering analysis, 148; in Kazakhstan, 198,

204; in Kyrgyzstan, 236, 238, 241;
natural resources negatively correlated
with, 99–­100; opposition strength correlated with, 100
electoral manipulation: Akaev’s shift
toward, 30, 230, 262–­63; benefits ofanalysis of, 10; brokers for, 50, 55–­56,
55n10; defined, 47; dishonest portionof vote from, 165; as electioneering strategy, 4, 47–­52, 51, 74; future
research recommendations, 269, 271;
loss of election benefits with, 16, 36,
37, 39, 41, 264–­65; Nazarbaev’s shift
away from, 30, 227–­28, 266–­67; oversupply effects, 27, 64, 169–­72, 183,
266; role in the electoral dilemma,36–­40; trade-­off with credibility ofelection results, 6, 7, 142, 165; trade-­
off with economic maneuvering, 6, 8,
10, 52, 84, 142–­46, 149, 152–­54, 155,
156, 266; types of, 9, 23–­24; undersupply effects, 27, 64, 166–­69, 182–­83,
266. See also blatant electoral fraud;institutional manipulationelectoral system changes. See institutional manipulationelectoral systems: as control variable,
93n12; economic maneuvering influenced by choice of, 152–­54, 155, 156,
157–­58; literature review on choice of,107–­10; origins of, 135; path dependence of, 109, 109n5; puzzle of choiceof, 103–­7, 105, 106, 110–­11; strategic choice of, 121–­25, 134–­36, 165.
See also proportional representation(PR) systems; single-­member district(SMD) systems
electoral victory for autocrats: credibility of results vs. certainty of, 16,
36, 37, 143–­44; demonstration effects,
14–­15, 35. See also margins of electoral
results; opposition victories
elites. See political elites
El Party (Kyrgyzstan), 243
Enikolopov, Ruben, 82
Erkin Kyrgyzstan, 232, 235, 243, 253established autocrats, as term, 270
ethnic groups, defined, 58nn15–­16
ethnicity, defined, 58n15

Indexethnicity-­based networks: blatant electoral fraud use influenced by, 85–­87,
91, 95–­99, 97, 100; as disciplinaryorganizations, 58–­59; electoral systemchoice influenced by, 123–­24, 127–­
28; measurement of organizational
power of, 67–­69; strategic choice ofelectoral manipulation influenced by,174; victory margins correlated with,71–­72, 73
ethnic organizational power (EOP)
index: defined, 69; interaction withoil-­gas value per capita, 96, 97, 98;
strategic choice of electoral manipulation influenced by, 91, 128, 131,
174
European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment, 249
financial resources. See discretionary
financial resources
fiscal balance: competitive election year
negatively correlated with, 150, 151,
152; as dependent variable, 146–­47;
economic strength influence on,153–­54; effects of different electoral systems, 152–­54, 155, 156; lesselection fraud negatively correlated
with, 27, 150–­51, 153, 154, 157–­58;
proportional representation systemelections, 149
Fjelde, Hanne, 23, 81
foreign aid: constraints on, 54, 66–­67,
66–­67n20; as control variable, 92, 99;
in Kyrgyzstan, 247, 248–­50, 254–­55;
reduced electoral fraud with, 270
Frantz, Erica: identification of
authoritarian regimes, 12n7, 88, 125;
information-­gathering effects of elections, 38; measure of dominant-­party
regime, 68, 91, 127; opposition participation in elections, 143; politicalbusiness cycles, 141; regime types, 92;
timing of elections, 156
fraud, electoral. See blatant electoral
fraud
Freedom House Index, 92, 99
future research recommendations,269–­71

331

Gabon: lesser use of electoral fraud, 79,96; shift to proportional system, 131
Gambia: ethnicity-­based networks in,
69; malapportionment in, 113
Gandhi, Jennifer, 39, 110n8, 117, 117–­
18n15, 133
Garriga, Carolina, 147, 149
GDP per capital and GDP growth, as
control variable, 93
Geddes, Barbara: identification of
authoritarian regimes, 12n7, 88, 125;
information-­gathering effects ofelections, 38; measure of dominant-­
party regime, 68, 91, 127; opposition participation in elections, 143;
political business cycles, 141; regime
strength, 15; regime types, 92; timingof elections, 156
Gehlbach, Scott, 57
generalized method of moment estimators, 150
Georgia: color revolution in, 5, 159;
opposition coalition making, 117;
popular protest in, 180; pro-­regime
seat premiums, 104gerrymandering: as institutional
manipulation technique, 48; in SMD
systems, 112, 142
Ghana: election monitoring in, 82;
ethnicity-­based networks in, 69
Golden, Miriam, 87
gold resources, in Kyrgyzstan, 247–­50,
254–­55
Golkar Party (Indonesia), 4, 96
Gonzalez, Maria de los Angeles, 139
Goodwin, Jeff, 170
Greene, Kenneth, 19
Grier, Kevin B., 139
Grier, Robin M., 139
Guatemala, leadership turnover in, 41–­
42, 63, 166, 169, 178Guéï, Robert, 160
Guevara, Angel Anibal, 42Haber, Stephen, 101
Hadenius, Alex, 162
Hafner-­Burton, Emilie, 17, 163
Haiti: leadership turnover in, 161, 178;
popular protest in, 179

332

Index

Hale, Henry, 258
Han, Kangwook, 141
Hansen’s J test, 101
Hartlyn, Jonathan, 82
Harvey, Cole J., 37n2
Hausman test, 93
Heathershaw, John, 248
Heckman’s two-­stage model, 8n5, 101,
101n18, 133
Heller, Abigail, 110n8
Herfindahl formula, 69n25
Hoffman, David, 209–­10
Hoglund, Kristine, 23, 81
honest portion of votes, 165
Howard, Marc, 21, 91, 162
Hun Sen, 87
Huntington, Samuel, 17, 63, 159, 162,
166
Hyde, Susan: election monitoring, 81;
elections in Kazakhstan, 195; elections
in Kyrgyzstan, 236; identification ofcompetitive elections, 89n7, 125, 147,
195; leadership turnover measurement, 175; popular protest, 17, 163
Ichino, Nahomi, 82
IMF (International Monetary Fund),
248
IMF Annual Country Reports, 147
independent parties and candidates: inKazakhstan, 215–­16, 215; in Kyrgyzstan, 253–­54
Index of Election Malpractice (IEM), 89n7
Indonesia: blatant electoral fraud in, 79,
95, 96; patronage distribution in, 4,
96; popular protest in, 161, 179; PR
systems in, 107, 131
inflation changes: in Kazakhstan, 221,
222, 224–­27, 225, 226; in Kyrgyzstan,259–­62, 259, 260–­61
information asymmetries, in politicalbusiness cycles, 138
information-­gathering effects of elections: benefits of, 35; defined, 15; electoral manipulation causing reductionin, 16, 37–­38, 39, 110n8, 142
information shortages, as fundamental
problem of autocratic rule, 34
infrastructural power, as term, 57

institutional manipulation, 103–­25;
defined, 4, 9, 48; dishonest portion ofvote from, 165; economic maneuvering influenced by, 6, 8, 10, 146, 149,
152–­54, 155, 156; as electioneering
strategy, 48, 51–­52, 51; four scenarios of autocratic elections, 43–­47,
45, 46; gaps between predicted andobserved values, 173–­74, 175–­76, 176;
hypotheses on use of, 123, 124, 125;
in Kazakhstan, 201–­4, 202, 203, 227;
in Kyrgyzstan, 230, 242–­44, 243, 244,
262–­63; leadership turnover fromundersupply of, 164, 166–­69, 179–­80,
180, 181, 182–83; literature review,107–­10; natural resources influenceon, 26, 124, 126–­27, 129–­34, 132, 135,
174, 265; need for research on choiceof, 17–­18, 269; organizational powerrole in, 21; overview, 26; popular protest from oversupply of, 164, 169–­72,
180, 180, 181, 183; PR system costs
and benefits, 111, 116–­21, 118, 119,
120; puzzle of electoral system choice,103–­7, 105, 106, 110–­11; SMD systemcosts and benefits, 111–­16, 114, 116;
strategic choice of electoral systems,
121–­25, 134–­36, 265; trade-­off withcredibility of election results, 6, 7, 142,
165; visibility of, 38n3
institutional manipulation, cross-­national statistical analysis, 125–­34;
results, 26, 129–­32, 130, 132, 265;robustness checks, 132–­34; sample
selection, 125–­26; variables, 126–­29,
127
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI):
dominance of, 19; economic maneuvering by, 139, 145; electoral fraudby, 86, 145; electoral reforms by, 145;
liberalization efforts, 42, 78; shift tomixed-­member system, 110international assistance: policy implications, 267–­68; for post-­electoral
conflict, 183; regime change influenced by, 162
international diffusion of electoral systems, 134, 270
inverse Mills ratio, 101n18, 133

IndexIsaacs, Rico, 218
Isakov, Ismail, 256
Ishiyama, John, 128
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Algeria), 5,
160, 167
item response theory (IRT), 90, 148
Iversen, Torben, 108
Jablonski, Ryan, 17, 163
Jamal, Amaney Ahmad, 109, 109n6, 110,
119
Japan: electoral campaign restrictions,
109n5; opposition victory in 2009
lower house election, 103–­4
Jones Luong, Pauline, 110, 213, 216,250–­51
Jordan: blatant electoral fraud in, 95;
de facto political parties, 125; lack ofelections in, 12
Karimov, Islam, 78
KazakhOil, 209, 210
Kazakhstan, 187–­228; autocratizationin, 187, 191–­94, 193; blatant electoral fraud in, 195–­201, 196, 227,
266; case study overview, 27–­30;
centralization in, 58, 213–­14, 214,216–­17, 224, 225, 227–­28; disciplinary organizations in, 213–­18, 214,
215; economic maneuvering in, 30,
221–­27, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228,266–­67; institutional manipulationin, 201–­4, 202, 203, 227; limited
liberalization in, 187, 188–­91; mobilization capabilities overview, 204–­6;
natural resources wealth in, 30, 188,
206–­12, 207, 208; opposition participation in elections, 88; repressive
measures, 205n11; shift to proportional system, 29, 107, 131, 195, 267;
Soviet republic legacy in, 27–­28;
temporal analysis, 29; time-­series
and cross-­sectional comparison with
Kyrgyzstan, 28; weakening of the
opposition in, 194, 218–­21, 228. See
also Nazarbaev, Nursultan
Kazhegeldin, Akezhan, 194, 196, 197,
200, 209, 219
Keefer, Philip, 57

333

Kelley, Judith, 82, 88, 92, 148, 162–­63,
238
Kenya: blatant electoral fraud in, 95;
cohesion in, 58n14; gerrymanderingin, 112; popular protest in, 179; SMD
systems in, 131
Kenya African National Union, 112
Knutsen, Carl Henrik, 17, 40, 162, 170
Kramon, Eric, 52
Kruger, Anne, 139
Kulibaev, Timur, 209
Kulov, Felix, 231, 238, 239, 240, 256
Kumtor gold mine, 247–­48
Kuo, Didi, 81
Kuomintang, 68
Kuwait: de facto political parties, 125;
lesser use of electoral fraud, 79; shift
to proportional system, 131
Kvyatkovskaya, Tatyana, 191–­92
Kyrgyzstan, 229–­63; Aksy incident,
256–­57; blatant electoral fraud in,
230, 236–­42, 237, 262–­63, 267;
breakdown of regime, 5, 29, 159, 170,
230, 240, 246, 258, 267; case study
overview, 27–­30; decentralization in,
250–­55; disciplinary organizations in,250–­55; economic maneuvering in,
230–­31, 258–­62, 259, 260–­61; electoral manipulation in, 230, 262–­63;
financial resources decline, 247–­50,
254–­55; institutional manipulation in,
230, 242–­44, 243, 244, 262–­63; Manas
air base, 250; mobilization capabilities
overview, 246–­47; opposition strengthin, 255–­58, 262; popular protest in,
180, 229–­30, 244–­46, 245, 256, 258,
263, 267; shift from electoral democracy to electoral authoritarianism,
231–­36, 235; Soviet republic legacy
in, 27–­28; temporal analysis, 29; time-­
series and cross-­sectional comparison
with Kazakhstan, 28. See also Akaev,
Askar
Lad (Kazakh pro-­Russian group), 190,
191
Latin America: economic maneuveringin, 138; PR systems in, 106, 107. See
also specific countries

334

Index

leadership turnover: factors determining,
41–­42, 166–­69, 182–­83, 266; as formof post-­electoral political change, 5, 8,
10, 22, 160–­61, 161; four scenarios of
autocratic elections, 43–­47, 44, 45, 46,
63, 65; hypotheses on, 169; literature
reviews on, 17, 162–­64; modelingstrategies, 172–­76, 176; results ofcross-­national statistical analysis,
27, 176–­80, 177, 178, 180, 181, 266;
validation of cross-­national statisticalanalysis, 180–­82. See also coups d’état;opposition victories
legal problems. See electoral law
problems
legislative elections: disciplinary organizations correlation with victory
margins, 72, 73; natural resources correlation with victory margins, 71, 73;
opposition strength correlation withvictory margins, 72, 73
legislatures, role in autocracies, 12–­13n9
Lehoucq, Fabrice, 80, 81
less advantageous elections, as term, 9Levitsky, Steven, 56, 57, 59, 67, 122, 263,
270
Li, Quan, 129
Liberia, leadership turnover in, 161, 178
Lijphart, Arend, 113, 114n12
Lindberg, Staffan, 162
Lucardi, Adrián, 17
Lucas García, Romeo, 42
Lust-­Okar, Ellen, 109, 109n6, 110
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 3, 4, 137
Madagascar: electoral fraud in, 42,
171–­72; proportional representation
system in, 122
Madumarov, Adahan, 256
Magaloni, Beatriz, 15, 21, 110, 139, 145
majoritarian electoral systems. See
single-­member district (SMD) systems
Makhmutova, Meruert, 213
malapportionment, in single-­member
district systems, 48, 112–­13, 142. See
also gerrymandering
Malawi, ethnicity-­based networks in, 69
Malaysia: dominant parties in, 68, 78,
112, 269; economic maneuvering in,

139; gerrymandering in, 112, 113;
lesser use of electoral fraud, 78, 79, 96;
SMD systems in, 104, 113, 131, 269
Manas air base (Kyrgyzstan), 250
manipulation, electoral. See electoral
manipulation
Mares, Isabela, 81
margins of electoral results: four scenarios of autocratic elections, 43–­47,
44, 45, 46; mobilization capabilities
and correlates of, 64–­72, 73; opposition strength influence on, 60; regime
strength signaled by, 7, 15, 36–­37, 40,
41, 43
Marinov, Nikolay, 89n7, 125, 147, 175,
195, 236
Masaliev, Absamat, 234, 237–­38
Mass Mobilization Data (MMD), 70n27
Mauritania: ethnicity-­based networks in,69; popular protest in, 179
McCoy, Jennifer, 82
McElwain Mori, Kenneth, 109n5
McGlinchey, Eric, 249, 255
media: in Kazakhstan, 190, 199; in Kyrgyzstan, 232, 233, 239, 241
Menaldo, Victor, 101
Mexico: economic maneuvering in, 139,
145; electoral fraud in, 86, 96, 145;
financial resources of the incumbent,
19; increased electoral transparency in, 78, 145; popular protest in,
42, 161; PR systems in, 107; shift tomixed-­member system, 110; shift toproportional system, 131
Middle East: influence of regime type onelectoral system choice, 109, 109n6;
PR systems in, 106, 107. See also specificcountries
military regimes: as control variable, 92;lesser use of electoral fraud, 99Miller, Michael, 15, 133
Milošević, Slobodan, 38
minimally competitive elections, defined,
125
Ministry of Oil and Gas (Kazakhstan),
207, 208–­9
mobilization capabilities: Akaev’s decline
in, 229, 230, 246–­47, 262–­63; blatantelectoral fraud influenced by, 83–­88,

Index102, 174; defined, 53; economic
maneuvering influenced by, 157;
electoral manipulation influenced by,264–­65; Nazarbaev’s strengthening of,204–­6, 227, 266–­67; outcomes frominternational assistance influenced by,267–­68; relationship with electoral
dilemma, 164; strategic choice of electoral systems influenced by, 9, 121–­25,
134–­46, 165. See also distribution ofmobilization capabilities
Moi, Daniel arap, 112
Molina, Ivan, 80, 81
monarchies: as control variable, 92;
electoral system choice, 109
Morse, Yonatan, 20, 270
Mortimer, Robert, 168
Moscow, Russia, election monitoringin, 82
Moser, Robert, 81
Movement for Democratic Change(MDC), 78, 88, 95
Mozambique, ethnicity-­based networks
in, 69MSN (newspaper), 242
Mubarak, Hosni, 139
Mugabe, Robert, 4, 78, 86, 88
Mukherjee, Paula, 37n2
multiparty elections. See competitiveelectionsMustillo, Thomas, 82
Myanmar: lack of elections in, 12; leadership turnover in, 62–­63, 166
My Country (Kyrgyzstan), 235, 243, 254
Naghyz Ak Zhol (Kazakhstan), 200, 221
National Elections across Democracy and
Autocracy (NELDA) (Hyde and Marinov): elections in Kazakhstan, 195;
elections in Kyrgyzstan, 236; electoral
fraud measurement, 89n7, 134; identification of competitive elections, 125,147–­48; leadership turnover measurement, 175; popular protest measurement, 175
National League for Democracy (Myanmar), 63
National Liberation Front (FLN, Algeria), 168

335

Nationwide Social Democratic Party(OSDP, Kazakhstan), 88, 200, 221
natural resources: blatant electoral fraud
influenced by, 26, 85, 87, 91, 93, 95–­101,
97, 102, 174, 265; institutional manipulation influenced by, 26, 124, 126–­27,
129–­34, 132, 135, 174, 265; in Kazakhstan,30, 188, 206–­12, 207, 208; in Kyrgyzstan,247–­48; measurement of, 65–­67; nationalization of, 67n21; opacity of spendingon, 54, 66–­67, 66n19, 268; party-­based vs.
non-­party-­based autocracies, 68n23; assource of discretionary financial resources,19–­20, 19–­20n13, 54–­55, 65–­67, 268; victory margins correlated with, 71, 72, 73
Nazarbaev, Nursultan: centralization
efforts, 214, 216–­17, 224, 227–­28;
decreased dependence on fraud, 5, 78,
88, 187, 266–­67; limited liberalization measures, 188–­89, 191; natural
resources utilization, 206–­12; Otan
Party formation, 215; overwhelming electoral winning margins, 187;
redrafting of the constitution, 192; shift
from electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering, 30, 227–­28, 266–­
67; shift to more proportional system,
187, 195, 201–­2, 204; strengthening ofmobilization capabilities, 204–­6, 227,266–­67. See also Kazakhstan
Nazarbaeva, Dariga, 194, 196, 215
nested analysis research design, 25n16
Nevada-­Semipalatinsk Movement(Kazakhstan), 189
noncompetitive elections: effects on
fiscal balance, 152, 156; identificationof, 147–­48; lack of credibility of, 143;
radical actions inspired by, 38
Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns andOutcomes (NAVCO) dataset, 70n27
Nordhaus, William, 137
Norris, Pippa, 37, 89n7
Nur Otan (Kazakhstan): campaign funding, 210; dominance in elections, 88,
194, 203, 206, 227; as dominant party,
217–­18; formation of, 194, 214, 215,
217; independents affiliated with, 216;
media coverage of, 199; public support
for, 212; youth wing, 218n22

336

Index

Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv, 17, 40, 162,
170
oil and natural gas resources: blatantelectoral fraud use influenced by, 93,
95; in Kazakhstan, 206–­12, 208; party-­
based vs. non-­party-­based autocracies,
68n23; as proxy for discretionary
financial resources, 65–­67, 91, 174
oil curse, as term, 20
oil-­gas value per capita: blatant electoral
fraud use negatively correlated with,93, 95; conditional marginal effectsof, 95–­99, 97; electoral system choice
robustness check, 133–­34; as independent variable in institutional manipulation cross-­national analysis, 126–­28;
role in strategic choice of electoral
manipulation, 174
opposition candidates and parties: challenges to regime stability by, 6–­7, 17,21–­22; coordination benefits of elections, 162; decision to participate inelections, 7; deregistration of, 23; difficulty accessing oil and gas resources,
66; divide-­and-­rule effects on, 15–­16,
35, 117–­19; economic maneuvering influenced by, 143–­44, 157–­58;
electoral manipulation influence on
actions by, 38–­39, 63–­64; electoral
motivations of, 41–­43; exclusion fromelections, 16, 38; information on
popularity of, 15; information shortages, 34; interactions with autocratsand elites, 40–­41; mixed signals fromoversupply of electoral manipulation,
169–­70; popular protest leadership by,
163, 169–­70; post-­election politicalconflict involvement, 183; role indistribution of mobilization capabilities, 24; share of seats in SMD vs. PR
systems, 104. See also coalition making,by opposition candidates and parties;
specific candidates and parties
opposition candidates and parties,
Kazakhstan: boycotting of 1995
election, 193; consumer price index
changes and strength of, 225, 225,
226, 227; lack of coordination, 204,205n11; limited liberalization period,
189, 190–­91, 200–­201; repressionof, 196–­201; weakening of, 194, 204,218–­21, 225, 228
opposition candidates and parties, Kyrgyzstan: blatant electoral fraud usedagainst, 238–­42; growing strengthof, 255–­58, 262, 267; institutional
manipulation used against, 242–­44;
weakening of, 234–­36, 235
opposition strength: blatant electoral
fraud influenced by, 87–­88, 91, 95,
100, 174, 265; coup d’état attempts
related to, 163; electoral system choice
influenced by, 124–­25, 129–­32, 174,
265; in Kyrgyzstan, 255–­58, 262, 267;
measurement of, 69–­70, 174; regimechange influenced by, 162; role in distribution of mobilization capabilities,
54, 59–­61; victory margins correlated
with, 72, 73
opposition victories: as form of post-­
electoral political change, 160,
166–­69; literature review on, 162;
single-­member district system effects
in democracies vs. autocracies, 103–­4;from small electoral margins, 44, 45,
46; from undersupply of electoral
manipulation, 8, 10, 62–­63, 266. See
also leadership turnoverorganizational power: cohesion andscope of, 56–­59; influence on regime
performance and stability, 20–­21;role in distribution of mobilization
capabilities, 24. See also disciplinaryorganizations
Organization for Security and Co-­
operation in Europe (OSCE), 196,
198, 199–­200, 236–­37, 238, 240, 241
Otan-­Otechestvo (Kazakhstan), 191
Otan Party (Kazakhstan): formation of,
193–­94, 214; increasing vote shareof, 205; media coverage of, 196, 199;
merger into Nur Otan, 217; politicalcompetition, 214–­15
Otunbaeva, Roza, 241, 258, 259, 261–­62
party-­based regimes. See dominantpartiesIndexParty of Communists of Kyrgyzstan(PKK), 234, 235, 243
Party of Economic Revival of the Kyrgyz Republic, 234
Party of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan(PNEK), 193, 214
patrimonial communism, as term, 28
patronage distribution/clientelism:
as electioneering strategy, 49–­52,
51; in fiscal balance measurement,
147; honest portion of votes from,
165; in Kyrgyzstan, 255; mobilizing
public support with, 84, 143; natural
resources utilization, 54–­55, 66, 209–­
12; overview, 27–­28
patronalism, as term, 27–­28
People’s Action Party (Singapore), 68,
79, 113
People’s Congress of Kazakhstan(NKK), 189, 191
People’s Democratic Party (Tajikistan),
113
People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan(HDK), 257
Pepinsky, Thomas, 17, 135, 139
Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI)(Norris), 89n7
personalist regimes: natural resources
influences, 68n23, 96, 131, 132; as reference category, 91n11, 127, 127n17
Peru: leadership turnover in, 166; PR
systems in, 107
Peruashev, Azat, 214–­15
Philippines: blatant electoral fraud in,95; leadership turnover in, 166; popular protest in, 163
Poland, opposition victory in, 63, 160,
166–­67, 168
policy implications of the theory of
autocratic elections, 267–­69
Polish United Workers Party (PZPR),
166–­67
political business cycles: hypotheses on,
144, 146; in Kazakhstan, 221–­27, 223,
224, 225, 226; in Kyrgyzstan, 230–­31,
258–­62, 259, 260–­61; literature review
on, 137–­41; overview, 26–­27. See also
economic maneuvering
political elites: access to privilege via

337

legislatures, 12n9; addressing concerns of, 183; blatant electoral fraud
influence on actions by, 83; cohesionin, 58, 59; in collective leadership
regimes, 56n12; defined, 7–­8; distribution of mobilization capabilitiesof, 7, 8–­9; electoral motivations of,41–­43; information-­gathering effects
of elections, 15, 35; interactions with
autocrats and opposition, 40–­43; inKazakhstan, 208, 216; in Kyrgyzstan,
243–­44, 250–­58, 267; power sharing with, 67, 67n22; pro-­regime seatpremiums under SMD systems, 111–­
16, 114, 116, 122; role in electoral
manipulation, 55n10; threats from,18–­19, 63
political freedom, as control variable, 92
politically dominant ethnic groups,
58, 58n16. See also ethnicity-­based
networks
popular protest. See post-­electoral popular protest
pork barrel politics/club goods provision: as electioneering strategy, 49–­52,
51; financial resources for, 54–­55;
in fiscal balance measurement, 147;
honest portion of votes from, 165;
in Kazakhstan, 209–­12; mobilizing
public support with, 84, 143; oil andnatural gas resources supporting, 66
post-­election political order, 159–­72;
destabilizing effects of autocraticelections, 5–­6, 18, 36, 62, 164–­66;
forecasting of, 11; hypotheses on, 169,
172; literature reviews on, 17, 162–­64;
oversupply of electoral manipulation
effects, 8, 10, 61–­64, 65, 169–­72, 183,
266; overview, 27, 33; policy implications, 183; types of, 5, 8, 159–­61, 161;
undersupply of electoral manipulation
effects, 8, 10, 61–­64, 65, 166–­69, 182–­
83, 266. See also leadership turnover;post-­electoral popular protest
post-­election political order, cross-­national statistical analysis, 172–­82;
modeling strategies, 172–­76, 176;
results, 27, 176–­80, 177, 178, 180, 181,
266; robustness checks, 180–­82

338

Index

post-­electoral popular protest: administrative fraud considerations, 37n2;
coups d’état associated with, 43n5,
164n5; factors determining, 42–­43,
169–­72, 182–­83, 266; as form of
post-­electoral political change, 5, 8,
10, 22, 159–­61, 161; four scenariosof autocratic elections, 43–­47, 44, 45,
46, 63–­64, 65; hypotheses on, 172; inKyrgyzstan, 180, 229–­30, 244–­46, 245,
256, 258, 263, 267; literature reviews
on, 17, 162–­64; modeling strategies,172–­76, 176; policy implications, 183;
results of cross-­national statisticalanalysis, 27, 176–­80, 177, 178, 180,
181; validation of cross-­national statistical analysis, 180–­82
Powell, Jonathan, 175
PR. See proportional representation(PR) systems
pre-­electoral cheating: in blatant electoral fraud measurement, 80, 90, 99;
economic maneuvering analysis, 148;
in Kyrgyzstan, 238. See also election
cheating
pre-­electoral violence: in blatant electoral fraud measurement, 80, 90, 99;
economic maneuvering analysis, 148;
popular protest associated with, 163.
See also election violence
proportional representation (PR) systems: costs and benefits of, 111, 116–­
21, 118, 119, 120, 122; in democracies,107–­9, 109n7, 111; Duverger’s law
effects on, 103; fiscal deficits under,
149; greater need for voter mobilization with, 9; in Kazakhstan, 29, 30,
131, 195, 201–­4, 267; lesser use ofgerrymandering in, 112; literature
review on choice of, 107–­10; natural
resources wealth correlated with, 26,123, 124; political business cycle sizein, 146; resistance to institutional
manipulation, 48, 81; strategic choiceof, 26, 122, 135, 265; trade-­off witheconomic maneuvering, 146, 153pro-­regime seat premiums (bias):
defined, 104; under SMD systems, 48,
111, 114, 116

protest, popular. See post-­electoral
popular protest
public employment: economic maneuvering with, 49, 50, 84; in Kazakhstan,211, 212, 222
Quality of Elections Data (QED), 88, 89,
92, 148, 198, 199, 238
Ratsiraka, Didier, 42, 171–­72
Ravalomanana, Marc, 42, 171–­72
real wage changes, in Kazakhstan, 222,
223, 224, 225, 227
Republican Party of Kazakhstan, 190
Republican People’s Party (Kazakhstan),
194, 196–­97, 200, 219
research recommendations, 269–­71
resource curse, 19–­20n13, 20
Respublika (Kazakhstan), 191
Res Publika (newspaper), 232, 233, 242
restrictions on electoral law. See electorallaw problems
Reuter, John Ora, 117, 117–­18n15
Reuveny, Rafael, 129
revolutionary threats. See collective anti-­
government actions
Riker, William H., 103
riots, in measurement of opposition
strength, 70, 70n27, 128. See also post-­
electoral popular protest
Rod, Espen Geelmuyden, 17, 163
Roessler, Philip, 21, 91, 162
Rogowski, Ronald, 108
Rokkan, Stein, 107–­8, 116
Ross, Michael, 67, 91, 126
Rozenas, Arturas, 16
ruling elites. See political elites
Rundlett, Ashlea, 81
Russia: blatant electoral fraud in, 23, 81,
269; economic maneuvering in, 139;
election monitoring in Moscow, 82;
PR systems in, 107
Russkaya Obshina (Kazakhstan), 190
Sadyrbaev, Dooronbek, 255
Schatz, Edward, 195, 216
Schedler, Andreas, 125, 195
Schelling, Thomas C., 32
Schuendeln, Matthias, 82Index
Schuler, Paul, 12n9
scope: in ethnicity-­based networks, 68,
69, 98, 128; as measure of organizational power, 56–­59
seat-­vote elasticity: electoral rules influence on, 103; institutional manipulation of, 9, 48
Seeberg, Merete Bech, 20
Seki, Katsunori, 38
selection bias, correcting for, 8n5Senegal: popular protest in, 179; shift toproportional system, 131
Serbia: ethnicity-­based networks in, 69;
opposition boycott of elections, 38
Sharipova, Dina, 211, 213
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 117
Shi, Min, 138, 139
Siegel, David, 252
Sierra Leone, ethnicity-­based networks
in, 69Simpser, Alberto, 15, 37, 40, 48, 82, 92
Singapore: lack of overt election fraud,78–­79; pro-­regime seat premiums,
104, 113
single-­member district (SMD) systems:
as choice of resource-­poor autocrats,
123; costs and benefits of, 111–­16,
114, 116; Duverger’s law effects on,
103, 112; EET of, 126; factors inchoosing, 26; institutional manipulation of, 9; in Kazakhstan, 30, 201–­4,266; in Kyrgyzstan, 29, 242–­44, 243,
244, 267; opposition strength influence on choice of, 124–­25; politicalbusiness cycle size in, 146; pro-­regime
seat premiums from, 48, 104, 105;
strategic choice of, 122, 265; susceptibility to electoral misconduct, 81;
voter turnout in, 120–­21, 120
single-­party legislatures, role in autocracies, 12–­13n9
Sjöberg, Fredrik, 243, 251
Slashcheva, Tamara, 233
Slater, Dan, 21
SMD. See single-­member district (SMD)
systems
Smith, Alastair, 91
Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan(SPDK), 234, 254

339

Socialist Party of Kazakhstan (SPK),
189, 191
soft authoritarian regime, as term, 195
Solidarity movement (Poland), 160, 167
Soskice, David, 108
Sri Lanka: Bandaranaike electoral loss, 5,160; leadership turnover in, 161, 178;
pro-­regime seat premiums, 104; SMD
systems in, 131
state capacity: influence on regime
performance and stability, 20–­21;
organizational power of, 57–­58,
58n13
statistical analyses. See cross-­national
statistical analyses
strikes, in measurement of opposition
strength, 70, 70n27, 128. See also post-­
electoral popular protest
Subkhanberdin, Nurzhan, 219
Sudan, ethnicity-­based networks in, 69
Suharto, 4, 96
Suleimenov, Olzhas, 189
Svensson, Jakob, 138, 139
Svobodnye Gory (newspaper), 232, 233
Svolik, Milan, 41, 44, 81, 122, 126, 270
Swaziland: de facto political parties, 125;
lack of elections in, 12
Sydykov, Usen, 255
Sydykova, Zamira, 233
Syria: blatant electoral fraud in, 4, 98–­
99; ethnicity-­based networks in, 69,
98–­99; noncompetitive elections in, 12
Szakonyi, David, 23
Taiwan: dominant parties in, 68; lesser
use of electoral fraud, 79
Tajikistan: blatant electoral fraud in,95; pro-­regime seat premiums under
SMD systems, 113
Tanzania: blatant electoral fraud reducedby natural resources in, 96; dominantparties in, 68; malapportionment in,
113; pro-­regime seat premiums,
104
tax revenues, constraints on, 54, 66
Tekebaev, Omurbek, 239, 245, 255, 256
Teorell, Jan, 81, 82, 162
Tereshchenko, Sergei, 191, 233
Tessler, Mark, 119

340

Index

theory of autocratic elections, 32–­74;
correlation of mobilization capabilities
and victory margins, 64–­72, 73; distribution of mobilization capabilities,
53–­61, 54, 74; electioneering strategies, 47–­52, 51, 74; electoral dilemmain autocracies, 36–­40; elements of theargument, 6–­11, 8; empirical implications of, 61, 64, 83; four scenarios of
autocratic elections, 43–­47, 44, 45, 46;
fundamental problems of autocratic
rule, 34–­35; interactions among autocrats, ruling elites, and the opposition,
40–­43; overview, 32–­33; policy implications, 267–­69; post-­election politicalorder, 61–­64, 65; role of elections in
autocracies, 35–­36; simultaneous costs
and benefits of elections, 18, 35–­36
third-­party factors in blatant electoral
fraud, 81–­82
Thyne, Clayton, 175
Togo: ethnicity-­based networks in, 69;
extreme use of electoral fraud, 79;
popular protest in, 179, 180
trade openness, as control variable,
93n12
Treisman, Daniel, 61
Trejo, Guillermo, 42, 163
Tsebelis, George, 109n5
Tsvangirai, Morgan, 78, 95
Tucker, Joshua A., 17
Tufte, Edward, 137
Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan), 5, 29,
159, 170, 230, 240, 258, 267
Turan, Ilter, 139
Turgunaliev, Topchuibek, 253
Turkey, leadership turnover in, 63, 166
turnout. See voter turnout
Tuyakbay, Zharmakhan, 201, 221
Tyson, Scott, 164n5
Uganda, ethnicity-­based networks in, 69
Ukraine, color revolution in, 5, 159
uncertainty, political: autocrats’ mistakes
under, 62; challenges to regime stability under, 6–­7; as control variable,
128–­29
unemployment rate changes, in Kazakhstan, 222, 223, 224

Union of Democratic Forces (SDS, Kyrgyzstan), 234, 235, 239, 243, 254
Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan(SNEK), 189, 191, 193
United Malays National Organization(UMNO), 68, 139
United Russia, 82, 269
Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan, 234
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 92
Uruguay, leadership turnover in, 161,
166, 178
U.S. Department of State, 89, 90, 90n8,
199
Usenov, Daniyar, 238, 239, 256
Uzbekistan: closed authoritarianism in,
195; extreme use of electoral fraud,79; noncompetitive elections in, 38,
78, 205n11
van de Walle, Nicholas, 170
Varieties of Democracy (V-­Dem)(Coppedge et al.), 89n7
victories. See electoral victory for autocrats; opposition victories
violence, electoral. See election violence
vote buying: economic maneuvering vs.,90n9; election-­day fraud, 49
voter turnout: electoral manipulation
effects on, 37; in Kazakhstan, 204; inKyrgyzstan, 257; PR vs. SMD systems,
119–­21, 121
Vreeland, James, 39
Wahman, Michael, 113
Walesa, Lech, 167
Washida, Hidekuni, 112
Way, Lucan, 56, 57, 59, 67, 122, 263, 270
White, Allison, 81
Wig, Tore, 17, 40, 162, 163, 170
Wilson, Kenneth, 70, 91, 128
Wolchik, Sharon, 163, 170
Wood, Elizabeth, 170
World Bank, 248, 249
Wright, Joseph: identification of
authoritarian regimes, 12n7, 88, 125;
information-­gathering effects of elections, 38; measure of dominant-­party
regime, 68, 91, 127; opposition participation in elections, 143; politicalIndexbusiness cycles, 141; regime types, 92;
timing of elections, 156
Yanai, Yuki, 156
Yugoslavia, ethnicity-­based networks
in, 69Zafy, Albert, 122
Zambia: leadership turnover in, 178;
pro-­regime seat premiums, 104
Zeltoksan National Democratic Party(Kazakhstan), 190

341

Zhakiyanov, Galymzhan, 219
Zhas Otan (Kazakhstan), 218n22
Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 139
Ziblatt, Daniel, 81
Zimbabwe: electoral violence in, 86;
extreme use of electoral fraud, 4, 78,
79, 88, 95; popular protest in, 180;
SMD systems in, 104, 131
Zimbabwe African National Union—­
Patriotic Front (ZANU-­PF), 68, 86,95