The Japanese Society for Aesthetics

Aesthetics No.21 (2018): 23-34

Ruskin’s Re-evaluation of the Concept of ‘Æsthetic’:Through Clues Found in his Art Lectures
OGINO Hajime

Oita Prefectural College of Arts and Culture, Oita

Introduction
In his earlier, most renowned publication Modern Painters, Victorian art critic John Ruskin(1819-1900) had disregarded the concept of ‘æsthetic’, as an inferior animalistic instinct or asensual pleasure without any appreciation or reverence towards God. However, during a seriesof Slade lectures called ‘The Æsthetic and Mathematic Schools of Art in Florence’ at Oxford in
1874, Ruskin offered a more favourable evaluation for the aesthetic school, which prioritises
impression rather than the accuracy of physical objects, in comparison to the mathematic school.
According to Ruskin, the aesthetic school referred to those artists who wished to show things asperceived by themselves, not only as an outward imitation of nature but also in a way that is
subjective and impressionable. As opposed to logical thinking stressed by the ‘mathematic’,Ruskin gave more weight to the concept of ‘æsthetic’ as an influencing factor of imagination, andthis line of thought then evolved from ideas presented in his works Pre-Raphaelitism and The
Stones of Venice.
This study aims to examine Ruskin's criticism of Renaissance intellectualism, which sought
to dissect art without relying on ‘perception’, ‘feeling’ or even ‘science of Essence’, and his
advocacy of ‘science of Aspects’, that is, the portrayal of an impression but with the same level ofobservation and attention for details demanded by science. The present study also attempts toreveal the truth behind Ruskin's theories in terms of the relationship between arts and scienceby comparing his critiques of both J.M.W. Turner, a master of ‘science of Aspects’, and John
Everett Millais, a founding member of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. In particular, this study
analyses how this change in Ruskin's evaluation of ‘æsthetic’ led to his diminished opinion ofknowledge, which was gradually replaced by an emphasis on primitive senses in his writings
during the 1850s.

1. The concept of ‘æsthetic’ as a physical sensation and the morality of recognising beauty
At the beginning of Modern Painters II (1846), Ruskin detached himself from thedescription and comparison of the works of the Old Masters and Turner and began exploring theform and perception of the beauty pursued by landscape painters. He described the capacity forrecognising that beauty, as follows:
Now the term “æsthesis” properly signifies mere sensual perception of the outward
qualities and necessary effects of bodies; in which sense only, if we would arrive at any

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accurate conclusions on this difficult subject, it should always be used. But I wholly denythat the impressions of beauty are in any way sensual; they are neither sensual nor
intellectual, but moral. (4:42)
The word ‘æsthetic’ is derived from the term ‘æsthesis’, which refers to the perception of theoutside world through the sensory organs. Being ‘the mere animal consciousness of thepleasantness’ (4:47), it is also regarded as a physical sensation shared by creatures of lower ranks.
As opposed to such animal instincts, ‘morality’ can only be achieved through a relationship with
God attained through the following stages.
First, some physical sensations can be considered gifts bestowed by God. At the mostprimitive level, physical sensations should be ‘subservient to life’ (4:32); for instance, whereas
an unpleasant feeling can be a warning of physical harm, an indulgence in pleasures could leadto the demise of the physical body. Although this type of sensual pleasantness is entirely different
from the impression of beauty, it is possible to rejoice in a special form of sensual pleasure
without risking self-destruction. In particular, this pleasure from beauty is obtained through theeyes and ears, which are considered superior sensory organs given to humans as a gift of life from
God. However, according to Ruskin, the impression of beauty is much more than just a sense ofpleasure for the eyes and ears.
For, as it is necessary to the existence of an idea of beauty, that the sensual pleasure
which may be its basis should be accompanied first with joy, then with love of the object,then with the perception of kindness in a superior intelligence, finally, with thankfulness
and veneration towards that intelligence itself; and as no idea can be at all considered as inany way an idea of beauty, until it be made up of these emotions, [……] and as these emotions
are in no way resultant from, nor obtainable by, any operation of the Intellect. (4:48-49)
In other words, in the second stage, beauty can only be conceived from the joy and love forthe subject and as a declaration of reverence toward God, the highest intelligent being. Morespecifically, the perception of beauty is a ‘moral’ applause for God’s grace that spans the natural
world. This faculty, which ‘is concerned with the moral perception and appreciation of ideas ofbeauty’, is first palpable as ‘Theoria’ (4:35). Ruskin further divided the beauty perceived throughthe faculty of ‘Theoria’ into ‘Typical Beauty’ and ‘Vital Beauty’, the former symbolising theattributes of God found in animate and inanimate objects and the latter representing a ripeningof the fruit of life or a continuity of the breath of life bestowed by God on living creatures (4:64).
Nonetheless, Ruskin’s notion of ‘morality’ should not be confused with his notion of‘religiosity’. It is true that Ruskin once described beauty being perceived through ‘Theoria’ as ‘thesignature of God upon His works’ (4:75), and he did not deny the existence of certain religious
qualities in ‘morality’ for ‘even the ordinary exercise of this faculty implies a condition of thewhole moral being in some measure right and healthy, and to the entire exercise of it there isnecessary the entire perfection of the Christian character’ (4:148). However, besides a criticism
of the ambiguity [1], the alternative meanings assigned to the word ‘morality’ by Ruskinfollowing Modern Painters II should also be examined, as can be seen in the appendix of The

Ruskin’s Re-evaluation of the Concept of ‘Æsthetic’25

Stones of Venice I (1851), shown below.
We may consider the entire man as made up of body, soul, and intellect [……]. Then,
taking the word soul as a short expression of the moral and responsible part of being, eachof these three parts has a passive and active power. The body has senses and muscles; thesoul, feeling and resolution; the intellect, understanding and imagination. The scheme may
be put into tabular form, thus:—

Body
Soul
IntellectPassive or Receptive Part.
Senses.
Feeling.
Understanding.

Active or Motive Part.
Muscles.
Resolution.
Imagination.

In this scheme I consider memory a part of understanding, and conscience I leave out,
as being the voice of God in the heart, inseparable from the system, yet not an essential partof it. The sense of beauty I consider a mixture of the Senses of the body and soul. (9:445)
Here, ‘feeling’ is seen as the part of the human ‘soul’ that deals directly with ‘morality’.
Further, in the absence of ‘conscience’, or ‘the voice of God in the heart’, it could also be assumed
that ‘feeling’ is not strictly associated with the notions of good and evil. Through these additional
connotations expressed in 1851, Ruskin differentiated ‘morality’ from ‘religiosity’ and ‘ethics’,
which had often caused misunderstandings by claiming morality to be the passive aspect of thesoul moved by spiritual motivation or sentiment rather than by intellect. However, this is not the
only section that should be noted. In the scheme above, Ruskin’s perception of beauty alsochanged as he no longer referred to the faculty of ‘Theoria’. In contrast to Modern Painters II, in
which the faculty of ‘Theoria’ was defined as the sensory organ of beauty within the soul, thescheme shown here attributed the sense of beauty to a mixed sensation of the body and soul. In
other words, Ruskin was beginning to acknowledge that physical sensation was a governing
factor in the perception of beauty, whereas five years earlier in 1846, he had unequivocallydenied its legitimacy by calling it ‘æsthetic’.
Let us retrace Ruskin’s arguments on the perception of beauty from Modern Painters II to
The Stones of Venice I. First, the perception of beauty was seen to be a ‘moral’ sensation which
incited reverence toward God through an object in the natural world. Second, such morality,
while also innate in human beings, was distinguished from intellect and the body itself. Although
the points mentioned above retained their basic framework even after Ruskin discarded theexpression ‘the faculty of Theoria’, there were some intrinsic changes; for instance, in the initialsnubbing of the physical sensations derived from the ‘æsthetic’. The concept of ‘æsthetic’ waslargely based on the sensations of lowly creatures; that is, a type of sensual pleasure notaccompanied by an appreciation of or reverence for God. By this time, however, the importanceof physical sensation was slowly gaining recognition. These newly emerging ideas appearing in
Ruskin’s works around 1850 were further revised again during the 1860s.

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2. The significance of ‘The Æsthetic and Mathematic Schools of Art in Florence’
After the completion of Modern Painters V in 1860, Ruskin’s attention momentarily shiftedfrom the arts to the study of social economics. As Ruskin never mentioned the word ‘æsthetic’ in
his more famous works around this period, namely Unto this Last (1862) and Sesame and Lilies(1865), it is difficult to gauge his attitude toward the concept at this time. It was not until 1870,
when he was appointed the very first Slade Professor of Fine Art at Oxford and began delivering
lectures on the arts, when Ruskin again returned to the concept of ‘æsthetic’. Most notable wasa series of lectures that took place in November and December 1874 called ‘The Æsthetic andMathematic Schools of Art in Florence’.
These lectures focused on the history of arts in Florence from the 14th to 16th century, anda century-long transition from one school to another was explained through the works of artists.
Ruskin claimed that the aesthetic school was reborn as Christian art from a revival of ancient
Etruscan art which had been instigated by a meeting of ‘Northern savage art’ from Norman andLombardy with ‘Southern savage art’ from the Byzantine region, stretching from Greece toArabia.
This blending of arts took place in the thirteenth century, and formed, about the year
1300, the perfect Christian school of art in Florence. That Christian school by its vivid virtue
and exercised senses was enabled to discern right from wrong, and beautiful from base, with
precision never before or since reached by the conscience or intellect of man. I have called
it, in the references made to it in this course of lectures, the Æsthetic School of Florence,
meaning that which had, by reason of use, its senses exercised to the discernment of goodfrom evil. (23:185)
In contrast, when the mathematic school emerged in the 15th century, Ruskin claimed: ‘now
the mathematic mind, requiring demonstration and examination, necessarily refuses both its
faith and its industry to visions of this nature, and therefore occupies itself necessarily withmaterial objects only, or with abstract theorems’ (23:212). Ruskin named the works of 16th
century artist Michelangelo as the pinnacle of ‘mathematic’ representation, which was generally
perceived as testable/verifiable scientific knowledge relying heavily on perspective and anatomy.
A ‘perfect school’ of thoughts (‘Final Efforts of Æsthetic Art in Florence’ [2]) was eventuallyformed to combine ‘the indisputable accuracy’ of the ‘mathematic’ and ‘the inexplicable grasp’ ofthe ‘æsthetic’ (23:213). However, under the growing dominance of the mathematic school, thisgroup remained a minority until Florence was engulfed by the salacious art of paganism, or as
described in The Stones of Venice, an era of corrupted Renaissance in the 17th century.
Let us examine the difference between mathematic and aesthetic expressions using ‘The
Deposition of Christ’ (Duomo of Lucca), a sculpture by Nicola Pisano, who was considered apioneer of the mathematic. Pisano’s depiction of a person holding a flower basket was so
meticulous that even the contents of the basket were accurately represented. Nonetheless, as the
sculpture is situated above eye level, it is difficult for viewers to see such detail. In other words,‘not depending much upon sight themselves, they [sculptors of the mathematic school] don’tRuskin’s Re-evaluation of the Concept of ‘Æsthetic’27

think the spectator should care about it either’ (23:225). The mathematic school believed that aslong as the sculpture was done correctly, no one would care if it was visible. On the contrary,
Had a sculptor of the true Æsthetic school done it, he would have sloped the basket
aside to let you see what was in it from below. That would have been mathematically wrong,but instinctively and naturally right. Such a naïve thing as this, however, could only occur
in a boy’s work. (23:225)
Therefore, to Ruskin, a true aesthetic artist was someone who prioritised a perceived
impression of the world over physical or factual accuracy. Even earlier, Ruskin had once
remarked that ‘the thing appears, we said, to the æsthetic and perceptive person to be so and so’
as opposed to the mathematic school (23:223). As far as Ruskin was concerned, the aesthetic
school involved those who only sought to make things visible to others subjectively without any
interest in imitating nature. However, he was not without criticism toward the mathematic
school, which he deemed lacking in ‘imagination’ compared to its aesthetic counterpart thatemphasised ‘seeing’ over ‘thinking’. His feelings were quite evident, as demonstrated below.
And so recognized, observe, just because, though apparently gifted with all faculty, they
were wanting, at least weak, in one, the most precious—imagination; for that is whollyæsthetic. (23:214)
Returning to Ruskin’s lectures, it can be understood that this lack of imagination enabled
the mathematic school to dominate European art and gain an overpowering authority. More
importantly, however, Ruskin’s use of the word ‘æsthetic’ no longer had the negative nuances so
evident in Modern Painters II. It is possible that his attitude toward the ‘æsthetic’ was alreadychanging, for he even declared himself a member of the aesthetic school in a lecture saying, ‘it
was very important for me, belonging wholly to the Æsthetic school, to see as much as I could’(23:225). This change also marked Ruskin’s renewed appreciation for the so-called primitive
sensations, which he had already acknowledged in his earlier works, along with a noticeable
comparative decline in his evaluation of knowledge. The next section discusses this point ingreater detail, when examining the association between science and the arts.

3. Art as a ‘science of Aspects’
Ruskin had already discussed the corruption of the High Renaissance in The Stones of
Venice. He believed that such corruption had been instigated by the rise of immoral elements
such as pride and impiety, and in particular, ‘Pride of Science, Pride of State, and Pride of System’(11:46). Of these, he regarded ‘Pride of Science’ as the ultimate pursuit for mathematic minds.
The science reflected in Renaissance art became a standard of excellence which required‘perspective, linear and aerial, perfect drawing and accurate light and shade in painting, and true
anatomy in all representations of the human form, drawn or sculptured’ (11:47). This so-called‘science’, not unlike the principles proposed by the mathematic school, was further systematised

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following the mastery displayed by Michelangelo and went on to become the dominant form ofknowledge in Europe until the 19th century. Here, note the time differences between theemergence of Florence’s mathematic school, which was during the 15th century, and theRenaissance era, which Ruskin placed around the 16th–17th century [3]. Further, from ‘TheÆsthetic and Mathematic Schools of Art in Florence’, it was quite clear that although fully awareof the potential hazards, Ruskin still saw mathematic school knowledge as a precondition for
perfecting the aesthetic school. In fact, of all his lectures on mathematic artists such as Filippo
Brunelleschi, Jacopo della Quercia and Lorenzo Ghiberti, he only expressed disapproval towards
Ghiberti’s theory. This was in stark contrast to his views in The Stones of Venice, where, in mostcases, science and the arts were seen as opposing disciplines. A good example of this can be foundin The Stones of Venice III (1853), where science and the arts are clearly categorised as mutually
exclusive concepts.
But the grand mistake of the Renaissance schools lay in supposing that science and art
were the same things, and that to advance in the one was necessarily to perfect the other.
Whereas they are, in reality, things not only different, but so opposed that to advance in the
one is, in ninety-nine cases out of the hundred, to retrograde in the other. (11:47)
Therefore, a person who wished to pursue the arts must do so by turning away from science.
Yet, if the evil of science must be separated from the practice of the arts, would it have beenpossible for Ruskin to champion a painter such as Turner, who was fervently faithful to thenatural world in a purely scientific sense? Further, Ruskin himself as a young man had also been
deeply intrigued by the sciences in areas such as geology, and it was this fascination with thenatural sciences that awoke his appreciation of landscapes, leading to the birth of Modern
Painters, which was a great contribution to the development of the picturesque.
Even as Ruskin’s ‘anti-science’ and ‘anti-knowledge’ sentiments became more pronouncedin The Stones of Venice, a hint of conflicting emotions was still evident. In an attempt to defend
Turner’s position, Ruskin proposed two types of ‘science’ as a way to reconcile the inner conflict
between his confidence in natural science and a fear of the subordination of the arts. As describedin Modern Painters III (1856), these were the ‘science of Essence’ and the ‘science of Aspects’.
Ruskin even named Francis Bacon and Turner representative figures of the two sciences (5:387),
despite the fact that three years before in The Stones of Venice III he had already defined the twodomains as ‘science’ and ‘arts’.
Science deals exclusively with things as they are in themselves; and art exclusively withthings as they affect the human sense and human soul. Her work is to portray theappearances of things, and to deepen the natural impressions which they produce uponliving creatures. The work of science is to substitute facts for appearances, anddemonstrations for impressions. Both, observe, are equally concerned with truth; the one
with truth of aspect, the other with truth of essence. Art does not represent things falsely,
but truly as they appear to mankind. Science studies the relations of things to each other:
but art studies only their relations to man: and it requires of everything which is submitted

Ruskin’s Re-evaluation of the Concept of ‘Æsthetic’29

to it imperatively this, and only this,―what that thing is to the human eyes and human heart,
what it has to say to men, and what it can become to them: a field of question just as much
vaster than that of science, as the soul is larger than the material creation. (11:47-48)
When stating ‘what that thing is to the human eyes and human heart’, Ruskin was making
allowances for the pursuit of ‘appearance’ and ‘impression’ by the aesthetic school, deeming it
just as instinctive as the pursuit of ‘fact’ and ‘demonstration’ by the mathematic school. Ruskin
then went on to argue that the truth of the ‘science of Aspects’ can only be reached through ‘moral’means, ‘evidently, and only, by perception and feeling, never either by reasoning or report’(11:49). It should be noted that despite a difference in methodology, Ruskin continued toemphasise the existence of a common truth in both the ‘science of Essence’ and the ‘science ofAspects’. In other words, he was of the opinion that it was perfectly acceptable for the arts to bepracticed in a scientific manner. As both were seeking to reveal the truth of nature, thisconvergence was seen to transcend the limitations of any conventional rules. Further, while thetruth of the ‘science of Aspects’ could be fathomed through ‘perception’ and ‘feeling’, it must also
be the result of a well-channelled ‘perception’.
In fact, after having evaluated the Pre-Raphaelites, who possessed a contrasting style toTurner, Ruskin concluded that this group of artists was adhering to the principle of ‘never either
by reasoning or report’ by concentrating solely on the description of matters that could be seen.
In Pre-Raphaelitism (1851), written around the same time as The Stones of Venice I, Ruskin
noted similarities between John Everett Millais, a founding member of Pre-Raphaelitism who
advocated a reversion to the more simplistic style before Raphael, and Turner. He stated thatwhile they varied in their approaches, both artists were actually seeking one universal truth‘whose inner principles and final aims are exactly the same’. To highlight the differences between
the two artists, Ruskin then attempted to identify the various shapes and forms within theirworks. Ruskin found that while ‘one of them is quiet in temperament, has a feeble memory, no
invention, and excessively keen sight’, ‘the other is impatient in temperament, has a memory
which nothing escapes, an invention which never rests, and is comparatively near-sighted’. As
such, Turner, the latter of the two, was seen to paint based on an overall impression further
augmented by imagination, while Millais, ‘abandoning at once all thoughts of seizing transient
effects, or giving general impressions of that which his eyes present to him in microscopicaldissection, chooses some small portion out of the infinite scene, and calculates with courage thenumber of weeks which must elapse before he can do justice to the intensity of his perceptions,or the fulness of matter in his subject’ (12:359).
However, as Millais then began displaying shortfalls similar to that of Pisano, his style wasinevitably condemned as being inferior to Turner’s methodology of the ‘science of Aspects’
through ‘feeling’. Ruskin’s slight was quite apparent in Modern Painters III when he stated that
‘Pre-Raphaelitism, as long as it confined itself to the simple copying of nature, could not take thecharacter of the highest class of art’ (5:188). In Modern Painters I (1843), Ruskin had evenclaimed that Turner was a truer portrayer of nature than Claude Lorrain or Gaspard Dughet as
he was blessed with scientific eyes that sought the ‘material truth’. Yet, that truthfulness ofexpression should not be confused with the closeness of imitation, because ‘the painter who

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really loves nature [……] will make you understand and feel that art cannot imitate nature; that
where it appears to do so, it must malign her and mock her’ (3:289). Thus, while mimicking
nature through canvas and paint brushes was seen as important training for young artists, thetruth of the ‘impression’ was often neglected or sacrificed for the lesser truth obtained throughdiligence. The true aspiration of the ‘science of Aspects’ should be to capture the impression ofthe ‘human heart’ with the same meticulousness that a scientist would apply to their subject.
Curiously enough, during the Renaissance, the ‘science of Essence’ and the ‘science of Aspects’
not only began to be blended in most peculiar ways, they also downplayed the need to observe
the subjects, an important principle shared by the two sciences. In other words, instead oflooking to their own ‘perception’ and ‘feeling’, artists were now governed by a knowledge
obtained through reasoning and reports—a methodology not endorsed by even the ‘science ofEssence’.
As described above, the ‘science of Aspects’ was not only Ruskin’s attempt to level arts with
science but also an endeavour to allow artists to borrow empiricism from science free from theinfluence of its purist idealism. Therefore, despite retaining the word ‘science’, the idea of art =the ‘science of Aspects’ actually referred to a reversion to the sensations and impressions before
the birth of science whilst maintaining the spirit of natural science. According to a passage inModern Painters III, while the primary benefit of science was turning ‘inactive reverie’ into
‘useful thought’, it could also desensitise the human heart and take away all the simple delights.
Ruskin believed that the ‘science of Aspects’ could rejuvenate the heart with ‘the love of beauty’(5:386-387). In this way, Ruskin’s earlier works could be regarded as a sign of a return of a new
aesthetic school after its initial brilliance had been eclipsed by the prolonged dominance of themathematic school in this cycle of art history.

4. Return to child-like feelings
This cycle of sensation and knowledge, as seen in the history of Florence and modern Europe,
could in fact be epitomised in its minimal form as a personal experience. For any individual, thevery first things they experience are the primitive, instinctive sensations of a child. In Modern
Painters II, this sensation was likened to the pure excitement a child may experience whenseeing the horizon, with ‘the most intense, superstitious, insatiable, and beatific perception ofher splendours’ (4:77). Nevertheless, although it had gained similar recognition to science andknowledge, such sensations were deemed no more than sentimental woes. As indicated by thepassage below, it was not until Modern Painters IV (1856), after the introduction of the ‘scienceof Aspects’, that this child-like feeling finally attained a high place on the cognitive experience
scale and was revived as a post-developmental stage of ‘mathematic’ knowledge.
But, the longer I live, the more ground I see to hold in high honour a certain sort ofchildishness or innocent susceptibility. Generally speaking, I find that when we first look at
a subject, we get a glimpse of some of the greatest truths about it: as we look longer, ourvanity, and false reasoning, and half-knowledge, lead us into various wrong opinions; but as
we look longer still, we gradually return to our first impressions, only with a full

Ruskin’s Re-evaluation of the Concept of ‘Æsthetic’31

understanding of their mystical and innermost reasons; and of much beyond and besidethem, not then known to us, now added (partly as a foundation, partly as a corollary) to what
at first we felt or saw. (6:66)
Therefore, rather than the ‘truth’ obtained on a first impression, or the truth appealing ‘tothe human eyes’, as practiced by the Pre-Raphaelites, it was the truth of aspects appealing ‘to thehuman heart’, that had the ability to navigate through misleading knowledge and false reasoning.
Ruskin’s assertion, which claimed that human sensations were heightened by stripping off thefalsehood of science and knowledge and returning to a child-like state, was reminiscent of theconcept of ‘Imagination Contemplative’ [4], or the recalling of emotions that had been bestowed
on a familiar subject. To understand this idea better, it is necessary to understand the differences
between a ‘chiaroscurist’ and a ‘colourist’ – both of whom were linked to the mathematic andaesthetic schools. The style of ‘chiaroscurist’ (Romans, Florentines) reduces everything to lightand shadow, or black or white, regardless of the subject’s local colour. This was practiced bymany artists who, because it was an unnatural way, believed and therefore thought it to be aphilosophical one. Some of the most renowned chiaroscurists were Raphael, Rembrandt andLeonardo da Vinci, who was not mentioned in Ruskin's lectures from the 1870s despite being
the best-known among his peers (6:63-65). ‘Colourists’ (Venetians) were known for their faithful
reproduction of colours which were applied like ‘any child or simple person’. Veronese, Titian,and Turner all belonged to this group [5]. Having said that, ‘you will find this, which seems achildish and simple way of going to work, requires verily a thousandfold more power to carry out
than all the pseudo-scientific abstractions that ever were invented’ (6:67).
In fact, there were two aspects to this child-like quality that were free from pseudo-science.
First was the presumption that this sensation was only feasible for someone who had just enteredinto the world or was in a state of pure visual stimulation without any pre-knowledge of the world.
The ability to organise colours without any preconception was the foundation of painting skills,
especially in terms of colouring. While even Ruskin himself admitted that putting such atechnique into practice was less than easy, he still valued the ‘innocence of the eye’ as the
pinnacle of art technique in The Elements of Drawing (1857), written a year after Modern
Painters IV.
The whole technical power of painting depends on our recovery of what may be called
the innocence of the eye; that is to say, of a sort of childish perception of these flat stains ofcolour, merely as such, without consciousness of what they signify,—as a blind man would
see them if suddenly gifted with sight. (15:27)
In contrast to the first aspect, the ability to establish relationships through visual andphysical means, the second aspect had more to do with internal activity. While the former wastechnique-related, the latter was described in The Stones of Venice III as a feature that separated
a ‘genius’ from the rest, a unique interpretation of emotions aroused by encountering new visions.
They look back to the days of childhood as of greatest happiness, because those were32

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the days of greatest wonder, greatest simplicity, and most vigorous imagination. And thewhole difference between a man of genius and other men, it has been said a thousand times,
and most truly, is that the first remains in great part a child, seeing with the large eyes ofchildren, in perpetual wonder, not conscious of much knowledge,―conscious, rather, of
infinite ignorance, and yet infinite power; a fountain of eternal admiration, delight, andcreative force within him, meeting the ocean of visible and governable things around him.
(11:66)
It is through such fresh bewilderment toward the unknown and the awareness of an infinite
power within ignorance that the ‘most vigorous imagination’ was conceived. Ruskin likened this‘imagination’ to a ‘fountain’ which was not only a source of admiration or delight but also a
stream of consciousness just like the ‘running waters in the sweet wilderness of things
unnumbered and unknown, conscious only of the living banks, on which they partly refresh andpartly reflect the flowers, and so pass on’. Moreover, these ‘running waters’, while indeed ameasure of ingenuity, were seen as a ‘creative force’ that should be acquired by all whether in‘rivulets or rivers’ (11:66).

Conclusion
A review of Ruskin’s works from 1850s revealed the position that an instinctive, ‘æsthetic’,and child-like feeling was essential to grasping the truth of aspects as long as it was 1) ‘for thehuman eyes’ with an innocent vision and 2) ‘for the human heart’ as a stream of consciousness
and imagination. Examining these feelings as a form of vigorous imagination also led to thediscovery of further clues from Ruskin’s art lectures in 1874, in which ‘imagination’ was defined
as a ‘wholly æsthetic’ quality. However, for the purpose of this study, such debate on imagination
is not discussed any further. Instead, an excerpt from ‘The Æsthetic and Mathematic Schools of
Art in Florence’ in which Ruskin again mentioned the word ‘æsthetic’ is presented here
concluding the argument.
To the school of Perception—that which depends on its instinctive sight and sense—
belongs necessarily the foundational discovery of the existence and true nature of things;
while to the demonstrative, instructive, or mathematic school belongs the comparison,discipline, arrangement, and correction of impressions received by the senses. I call theformer school “Christian Faithful,” because faith—the evidence of things not seen—is thehighest æsthetic. [……] I call the second school “Christian Classic” as that which ascertains
what is right, and determines it, by law.
It would be the most ludicrous, if it were not also the most terrible, error in the thoughts
of modern days to raise this correction and tutorial function of the Reason above the princely
dignity of the power which its duty is to defend and enthrone. Princely I have called it,
observe, not in vague magnifying, but in close definition, of the functions of the Senses,
bodily and moral. (23:249-250)

Ruskin’s Re-evaluation of the Concept of ‘Æsthetic’

33

Here, Ruskin based the concept of ‘æsthetic’ on what he called the faculty of ‘Theoria’, inwhich the importance of the body senses overrides reason, when in fact he should have denied
its relevance completely. The reason for such logic can be found in ‘The Range of Intellectual
Conception Proportioned to the Rank in Animated Life’, a theorem published by Ruskin in 1871.
In this critique of the idleness of the metaphysical ‘concept’, Ruskin argued that, as a common‘concept’ applicable to other animals also, it would become meaningless once detached from thesenses of concrete objects or forms; he had previously shared this view in Modern Painters II.
So, if imagination is the effect of such a ‘concept’, then for any painter, ‘the act of conception, or
imagination, with him, therefore, is merely the memory, simple or combined, of things that hehas seen or felt’ [6].
Ruskin insisted that all living creatures were ‘spiritual’ beings brought to life by God with arank affixed to each ‘anima’, with the boundary of ‘conception’ being set by such a ranking. By
sarcastically referring to himself as a lesser ‘anima’ to metaphysicians, Ruskin was adamant that,
unlike animals, humans were blessed with the ability to choose a ‘salutary Vision’. This ability,
in his own words, was the ‘power of accepting some, refusing others, perfecting the outlines andcolours of those we wish to keep, and arranging them in such relations as we choose’, ‘the plastic
force of voluntary thought’ [7]. In other words, the 1871 theorem testified to this ‘plastic forceof voluntary thought’ that enabled people to choose a ‘salutary Vision’, and a perception that was
the extension of animalistic qualities which should not be detached from concrete objects or
imagination as a cognitive function. He then summarised these two abilities as ‘æsthetic’ three
years later in ‘The Æsthetic and Mathematic Schools of Art in Florence’. While ‘imagination’belonged to the bodily senses, the ‘plastic force of voluntary thought’ was seen as a sense of‘Theoria’, a moral feeling. Hence, the ‘highest æsthetic’ was what was commonly known as faith,the ‘evidence of things not seen’. This was reminiscent of the explanation Ruskin offered on thenaming of ‘æsthetic school’ in the 14th century which stated ‘meaning that which had, by reasonof use, its senses exercised to the discernment of good from evil’ [8]. In addition, as faith itself
cannot be verified by evidence, one can only seek its existence empirically through a God-given‘anima’.
Therefore, Ruskin’s concept of ‘æsthetic’, as one concerning the human eyes and heart, wasan aspect discerned through both bodily and moral senses as well as an imagination built on
human experiences. However, unlike Ruskin’s other lectures, ‘The Æsthetic and Mathematic
Schools of Art in Florence’ was published only posthumously, and it is thus difficult to conclude
whether such a definition was well-known by the general public at the time. The fact that Ruskin
actually attributed imagination and faith to the concept of ‘æsthetic’ itself is more thanfascinating even without considering whether he had been aware of the trends in aestheticism
during 1870s. Further study shall be conducted to review the influence of Ruskin’s theories on
the aesthetes, along with a further evaluation of his concept of ‘imagination’.

Notes
References to Ruskin’s published works are taken from The Works of John Ruskin, Library Edition(1903-1912), ed. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, 39 vols, George Allen, London and Longmans,

34

OGINO Hajime

New York, unless otherwise stated. They are indicated by volume and page number in the text, thus:(4:42).
[1]
[2]

[3]

[4]
[5]

[6]
[7]
[8]

Please refer to the following essay: John Unrau, “Ruskin’s Uses of the Adjective ‘Moral’”, English
Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1971), pp. 339-347.
This expression was found exclusively in a lecture outline published by the campus paper on 16
October 1874 (23:183). When the lectures on this school commenced on 1 December, ‘æsthetic’and ‘mathematic’ were then referred to as ‘the apparently affected, but the only accurate,
expressions’, while the ‘æsthetic school’ and ‘mathematic school’ became known as ‘ChristianFaithful’ and ‘Christian Classic’, respectively (23:249) (This has been mentioned again in the‘Conclusion’). The lecture also referred to the school founded in the 16th century as ‘Christian
Romantic’, an integration of ‘Faith’ and ‘Knowledge’ (23:252); while it was immersed in theinterpretation and appreciation of religious truth found in a combination of accurate ‘knowledge’and the ‘æsthetic’ works of painters of that period, reference to the ‘mathematic’ was comparatively
scarce.
In The Stones of Venice I, Ruskin named Giulio Romano (1492-1546) and Nicolas Poussin (15941665) for painting and Jacopo Sansovino (1486-1570) and Andrea Palladio (1508-1580) forarchitecture as the leading figures of ‘the art commonly called Renaissance’ (9:45). However, his
definition of the ‘Renaissance’ can be quite obscure depending on the publication, sometimes eventaking on characteristics of Mannerism and Classicism.
Please refer to my paper for this particular concept: OGINO Hajime, ‘Rethinking John Ruskin’s“Imagination Contemplative”’, Studies in the Science of Literary Art, No. 9 (2005), pp. 23-39.
However, chiaroscurists and colourists were further divided according to the practice of ‘Line’ inLectures on Art (1870), and as a result, the members were reshuffled. The earliest schools of ‘Line’
were separated into Greek ‘Line and Light’ and Gothic ‘Line and Colour’, whose traditions were
inherited respectively by Leonardo’s ‘Mass and Light’ and Giorgione’s ‘Mass and Colour’. These
two schools later united to form ‘Mass, Light, and Colour’, to which Titian belonged (20:128).
Turner’s work in mezzotint has been regarded as typical chiaroscurist, alongside Leonardo(20:155-156). On the contrary, the works of the Venetian school, which primarily relied on colours,
has always been referred to as the ‘perfect art’.
John Ruskin, “The Range of Intellectual Conception Proportioned to the Rank in Animated Life”,
The Contemporary Review, Vol. 17 (1871), p. 425.
Ibid., p. 427.
This expression, also found in Chapter 5, Verse 14 of ‘Letter to the Hebrews’ in the New Testament,
is used to describe the quality of a matured Christian as opposed to an infant who could not discern
Christ’s words of righteousness. The ‘mature’, as described in the chapter, is someone who has leftthe elementary doctrine of Christ, such as eternal judgment, and is now feeding on the ‘solid food’,
a true understanding of the principles of God (Chapter 5, Verse 13－Chapter 6, Verse 2).

* This is the English version of my paper in London: Art and Technology, ed. YAMAGUCHI Eriko,
Chikurinsha, Tokyo, 2014, pp. 107-122.