Petroleum Association of Japan - Oil Spill Symposium 2010‘REALITY and FORMALITY’Paper presented by Dr. Karen Purnell, Managing Director, ITOPF on:
Oil Spill Preparedness and Response : Expectations & Realities

Introduction
For the first time since ITOPF began collating tanker spill statistics, no major oil spills
were recorded from tankers in 2009. Defined as 700 tonnes or greater (> 5,000 bbls),
the number of major spills from tankers has consistently been reducing over recent
years such that the average number of major spills for the decade (2000-2009) is only
three. This is less than half of the average for the 1990s and just an eighth of theaverage for the 1970s. The same is true for medium sized spills from tankers (7-700
tonnes, or 50 – 5,000 bbls) where the average number of spills occurring in the last
decade was fourteen, half of that experienced during the previous decade.
Consistent with the reduction in the number of oil spills from tankers, the volume of oil
spilt also shows a marked reduction. In some cases, the total quantity of oil spilt in thelast decade was less than had been spilt previously in a single year. Last year thevolume of oil spilt, at 100 tonnes, was the lowest in ITOPF’s history of collating statistics
on tanker spills. This reduction can largely be attributed to the combined efforts of
the oil and shipping industries and governments to improve safety and pollution
prevention.

Figure 1: The Number of Major Oil Spills (>700tonnes) from Tankers from 1970 - 20091

Nevertheless, these reductions should not suggest that there is reason to view the‘job as done’ and to become complacent when considering the preparedness andresponse to oil spills. There exists considerable annual variation in the incidence of oil
spills and the amounts of oil lost and a single major incident can severely distort thestatistics for a particular year. Indeed, already the recent collision between a tanker
and a vessel towing barges in Texas, USA, means that the record for 2009 will not be
maintained; such is the unpredictable nature of accidents.
Against a background of reducing oil spills from tankers, maintaining oil spill
preparedness and response is a challenge. Historically, effort expended on
preparedness and training has tended to fluctuate in response to actual incidents,
with a flurry of activity typically taking place after an incident. A more sustainablelevel of preparedness is more likely to be maintained by realistically assessing therisks and then focussing on issues where problems have typically occurred. This isespecially the case when one realises that the oil spills that are occurring most often
around the world arise from incidents involving non-tankers and involve persistent
fuel oils. This paper highlights the evolution of expectations and realities in
preparedness and response over time.

The origin of ITOPF
In the 1960s, it was the shipyards in Japan that took advantage of advances inengine design and improved steel quality to build tankers of record-breaking size. In
1966, the record for the largest tanker built went to the ‘IDEMITSU MARU’, which wasbuilt at Yokahama and had a dwt of 206,000, and so began the era of the Very
Large Crude Carrier, the VLCC. It was then only a matter of time before one of the
new breed of supertankers would unleash pollution on a scale not previously seenfrom a ship, and so stimulate international demand for comprehensive changes in
the law to address compensation for pollution damage.1
When the tanker, the TORREY CANYON, ran aground off the south-west coast of the
UK in 1967, there was no system of strict liability for damage caused by oil pollution inexistence and claimants needed to establish fault before being able to receive
compensation for lost income. In fact, it was in Tokyo in 1969 that some of the first
discussions concerning the establishment of a system of fault-based liability andcompulsory insurance for the shipowner and/or cargo owner took place.
Concurrently, the oil and shipping industries debated their own voluntary schemes inwhich tanker owners and the oil industry would pay compensation for pollution
damage and so minimise the risk that governments would introduce unilateralsolutions while waiting for an international system to be developed and to enter into
force. The shipping industry established an agreement known as the Tanker Owners
Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) and this was tobe administered by a new entity established for this purpose, the International
Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd (ITOPF), also known simply as ‘the Federation’.
The intention was also that ITOPF would supplement its administrative role byestablishing a technical department, able to provide expert advice and assistancein the response to oil spills. In December 1968 ITOPF was formally established with the
1 Shipping and the Environment, 2nd Edition, Colin de la Rue, Charles B. Anderson. Publishedby Informa, London 2009, ISBN 978 1 84311 3232.

2

support from the oil companies, independent tanker owners and P&I Clubs. The
voluntary system that was subsequently established by the oil and shipping industry
bore many similarities to the current 2-tier international system of compensation thatis in place today, namely the CLC and Fund Conventions.2 For almost 30 years, thevoluntary schemes served their purpose by providing a system of compensation(and technical support through ITOPF) during the period when these international
conventions gained support and entered into force. The voluntary schemes were
eventually terminated on 20th February 1997 to make way for widespread ratificationof the CLC and Fund Conventions. However, the provision of 24/7 emergency
support to the oil and shipping industry and their insurers, together with the wealth ofexpertise and practical knowledge that had been assimilated by the Federation,
ensured the continuation of ITOPF beyond this date and into the future.

The Role of ITOPF in spill response and preparedness: operation and co-operation
ITOPF is a not-for-profit making organisation. Over 90 per cent of its income comesfrom subscriptions paid by Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurers on behalf of their
shipowner members, who they enrol in ITOPF as either Members or Associates. This
gives them access to the Federation’s full range of technical and information
services, usually at no cost. ITOPF’s Membership comprises over 5,980 tanker owners
and bareboat charterers, who between them own or operate about 10,500 tankers,
barges and combination carriers with a total gross tonnage of about 301 million GT.
This represents virtually all the world’s bulk oil, chemical and gas carrier tonnage andso it is extremely rare for the owner of any such ship engaged in international trade
not to be a Member of ITOPF. Associates comprise the owners and bareboat
charterers of all other types of ship, currently totalling some 495 million GT. This
reflects ITOPF’s increasingly important role in recent years in responding to bunker
spills from non-tankers.
ITOPF’s activities are overseen by an international Board of Directors representing theorganisation’s independent and oil company tanker owner Members, its Associates
and P&I insurers. Since its establishment in 1968, ITOPF has evolved into the maritime
industry’s primary source of objective technical advice, expertise and information on
effective response to ship-source pollution. ITOPF has observer status at both theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) and regularly contributes to discussions on
matters relating to ship-source pollution.
Response to Marine Spills
Responding to ship-source spills of oil or chemicals is ITOPF’s priority service and isnormally performed, without charge, at the request of one of its Members or
Associates and their P&I insurers. The IOPC Funds also usually call on ITOPF’s
technical services for oil spills with which they are involved. To date, ITOPF’s technical
2 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, (CLC); International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for oil Pollution
Damage (Fund Convention)3

staff have responded to some 634 ship-source spills in 99 different countries in orderto give objective advice on clean-up measures, environmental and economic
effects, and compensation.
ITOPF’s first task on being advised of a new spill is to evaluate the probablebehaviour, fate and impact of the oil or chemical, and the local capability toorganise an effective clean-up response. At the same time as essential information
about the incident and the type of oil or chemical involved is being obtained, ourstaff will be referring to internal information on environmental and economic
resources likely to be at risk in the affected country, as well as on the nationalarrangements for spill response. Internal databases on the availability of clean-up
equipment and materials, local surveyors and other experts will also be consulted
and guidance sought from our experience of previous spills in the same region. If theevaluation of the spill indicates that it is likely to pose a serious threat to coastal
resources, a member of the ITOPF technical staff will probably be asked to attend
on-site immediately. The role of the ITOPF technical staff member at the site of a spill
varies according to the circumstances but is always advisory. It normally includes
one or more of the following activities:¾ advising and assisting all parties on the most appropriate clean-up response,with the aim of mitigating any damage;¾ helping secure equipment and organise the clean-up when there is a needto supplement the local response capability;¾ monitoring the clean-up, in order to provide subsequent reports of events andof the technical merit of actions in relation to claims for compensation;¾ investigating any damage to the environment and to coastal resources suchas fisheries and mariculture.
In all cases the aim is to co-operate and work closely with all parties involved in aspill, and to reach agreement on measures that are technically justified in theparticular circumstances. This not only helps ensure that the clean-up is as effective
as possible and that the minimum of damage is caused, but also that subsequentclaims for compensation can be dealt with promptly and amicably.
Damage Assessment and Claims Analysis
Assessment of the technical merits of claims for compensation is a natural extensionof our on-site attendance at the time of a spill. It usually involves assessing thereasonableness of cleanup costs and the merits of claims for damage to economic
resources. The assessment of damage to fisheries,
especially mariculture facilities, is a particular area of specialisation which often
requires the detailed analysis of complex claims, frequently in conjunction with otherspecialists who have in-depth knowledge of the affected area and the economics
of its particular fisheries.
Our advice is also regularly sought on environmental damage caused by spills, andon the feasibility and technical justification of proposed restoration measuresdesigned to enhance natural recovery.
4

ITOPF’s role in damage assessment and claims analysis is limited to providing advice
on the technical merit of claims. The final decision on settling any claim rests withthose who will pay the actual compensation, usually a P&I insurer and/or the IOPC
Funds.
Contingency Planning and Advisory WorkA major spill of oil or chemicals presents those in charge with a range of complex
problems and prompt decisions are needed if an effective response is to be
mounted. There is a greater likelihood that this will happen if effort has been
devoted beforehand to the preparation of a contingency plan that is bothcomprehensive and realistic.
Using their extensive practical experience of spill response around the world, ITOPF
staff often advise governments, industry, international agencies and otherorganisations on the preparation of contingency plans and related matters.
Training and Education
Regular training is vital if personnel are to implement a contingency plan effectively
and mount an efficient response to an incident. ITOPF organises and participates innumerous training courses and seminars for government and industry personnel
around the world, and frequently assists with spill drills and exercises conducted byshipowners and other groups.

Maintaining spill response capability and expertise in ITOPF
Figure 1 on page 1 clearly illustrates the dramatic reduction in the number of major
spills from tankers over the last four decades. Similarly, the volume of oil spilt in thetanker incidents attended by ITOPF more recently is markedly reduced in contrast
with the 1970’s and 1980’s (figure 2].

5Figure 2: Tonnes of oil spilt (1970 – 2009)

In spite of this, the breadth of ITOPF’s combined membership ensures that its
technical staff are regularly called upon to respond to spills of bunker fuel, chemicals
and bulk cargoes from other types of ship. As is shown in figure 3, the proportion of
spills attended by ITOPF originating from non-tankers has steadily grown and, in 2009,
only a fifth of all the spills that ITOPF attended involved tankers.

Figure 3: Number of tanker and non-tanker spills (1970 -2009)

Today, ITOPF attends both tanker and non-tanker incidents where the volume of oil
spilt may only be a few tonnes, whereas in past years such low volumes would nothave generated significant concern or interest. This change reflects the growing
intolerance towards spills of almost any size and the growing demands andexpectations of those affected by a spill. Now, even a small spill can result in claims
for substantial damages and require ITOPF’s involvement, sometimes for many years,
to establish the extent of real loss. As a consequence, ITOPF has not experienced a
reduction in demand for its services and a comparison of the number of incidents inwhich ITOPF has been involved over the last two decades (figure 4) shows only amodestly decreasing trend, averaging 23 to 24 incidents each year.

6Figure 4: The trend in number of incidents attended by ITOPF over time (1990 – 2009)

During periods when spills are less frequent, ITOPF’s technical advisers maintain their
momentum by sharing and building upon their spill experiences with colleagues
during in-house presentations and informal discussion. As a matter of good practice,
ITOPF’s staff meet regularly to review the cases that they are working on and toensure consistency of technical advice. Even during periods of relatively few
incidents, the shipowners and insurers recognise the value of retaining a not-for-profit,
24/7 group of experts with practical experience of spills in a multitude of different
countries as they appreciate that much of the foundation of effective spill response
is laid during ‘peace-time’, such as through visits to government agencies,
conferences, seminars, training courses and the like. They are also aware that evenone major incident, such as the MT HEBEI SPIRIT in Korea in 2007, may have significant
and far-reaching consequences for the industry and are reassured by ITOPF’s
involvement, which provides for consistency of approach and the benefit of anestablished core of expertise.

Preparedness and Response: Expectations and Realities
ITOPF has found that there is sometimes a mis-match between expectations andreality when it comes to preparedness and response to incidents. Understandably,
governments have many issues on their agenda that may result in contingency
planning being less of a priority. Placing the onus to respond on shipowners may
seem like an attractive option in such circumstances. This may work in somesituations, such as when ships are destined for the country (rather than passing theircoastline) and the organisation and support of a shipowner-led response is in place.
However, in ITOPF’s experience it is more often the case that valuable response time
is lost. This is because the ship is often not destined for the country in which the spill
occurs and the shipowner is therefore unfamiliar with the local arrangements.
Frequently the shipowner is unable to co-ordinate rapidly with the local authorities in
the country affected due to lack of clarity over who may be ‘in charge’ of the7

response. He may also be unaware of the location of spill response resources
primarily because his day-to-day work is running ships, not responding to oil spills.
Similarly, governments may be tempted to rely on the oil industry to respond to any
and every oil spill because they have resources and the expertise. Many oil industries
and terminals are usually able to provide some level of support in these situations.
However, governments sometime place too much reliance on the oil industry, notrecognising the fact that oil companies and terminals are frequently obliged toretain a certain amount of equipment for their own use and are unable to release it
for response or, that in the case of spills from non-tankers or spills not involving them,an oil company may not wish to become associated with the incident for fear of
reputational damage or for fear of incurring expenditure that they may be unable
to recover.

The challenge of maintaining national/regional response capability
Contingency planning is essential if countries are to respond to oil spills promptly andeffectively. Experience has shown that where a country has fully implemented therequirements of the OPRC Convention3 and has contingency plans in place with acomplementary programme of training and exercises, a pragmatic and confident
approach to the handling of a casualty is more likely. Many countries ratify
Conventions without a proper understanding or application of their inherent
obligations. Consequently, when an incident occurs they are unprepared, often
without the infrastructure or equipment necessary to mount a prompt or effective
response.
A national contingency plan should reflect a government’s policy in an incident andclarify the roles and responsibilities of the different players involved; it should also
identify the capabilities that are in place to prepare for these events and thestrategy to be followed. Where bilateral or regional agreements are in place, orwhere arrangements are in place to pool government and industry resources, themechanism to put these arrangements into effect should be described. The
importance of clear, assertive leadership of government and clarity of the roles andresponsibilities of the different parties involved during a response cannot be overstated and this is the area that has been found most wanting in many countries.
A government-led response is more likely to be prompt and effective and will avoid
the delay and confusion that can easily result from imposing a shipowner-led
response, especially in cases where the ship was in transit and not destined for a port
in the country. This tried and tested approach recognises the duty of care thatgovernments have for their citizens and the obligation they have for implementing
the strategies identified in their national contingency plan. This approach also builds
on the intent that is embodied in the text of the international preparedness andcompensations conventions. The ‘polluter pays’ principle is realised insofar as the
shipowner and his insurer is expected to ‘pick up the bill’. However, that is not to saythat the shipowner should not contribute in a more active sense to the response.
The OPRC Convention places an obligation on Member States to ensure that ships
flying their flag have onboard a pollution emergency plan (Shipboard Oil Pollution
3

The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC)

8and Emergency Plan, SOPEP) to deal specifically with an oil spill. But it should be
remembered that the SOPEPs are primarily intended to enable the crew to takepractical measures to control and minimise a spill from the ship under different
scenarios. It would be unrealistic to expect the crew to be in a position to do
anything more than is required of them to minimize the risk of a release as their focus
will be on their safety and not on responding to any release away from the confinesof the ship. However, in a few countries, such as Canada, Japan and the USA,shipboard emergency plans are more extensive and include requirements toprovide specific response capabilities beyond the required shipboard equipment
through local spill response contractors.
The tiered approach to responding to spills has proven to be an effective andflexible mechanism for scaling the response according to the need. The concept ofa local response using local resources (Tier 1) escalating to involve neighbouring
government or industry-shared resources for spills beyond local capabilities (Tier 2),
through to the mobilization of resources beyond Tier 2 capability to respond to a spillof national significance (Tier 3) is one that many countries have adopted. In ITOPF’s
experience, the use local resources and shared national resources have proven to
be more effective than reliance on resources coming from outside of the country.
This is primarily because local responders are better equipped to deal with local
issues (such as internal transportation, internal labour issues, internal politics) anddelays are minimized. Ensuring adequate preparedness at the local level is therefore
a key criterion for achieving an effective response.

Maintaining preparedness at the local level
As mentioned earlier, undoubtedly, those organisations that maintain a programmeof regular training and exercises are better able to provide a prompt and effective
response to an incident. However, maintaining momentum and an adequate levelof preparedness and response against a background of reducing spills is achallenge, particularly for organisations that have been established specifically for
emergency response and especially if their services are established solely for the
benefit of the oil companies, rather than shipping in general, and are restricted thelarger incidents. One approach to keep momentum may be to focus on problems
arising in other incidents and to consider how to avoid them. From ITOPF’s
experience the following are issues that have arisen on several occasions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities
Lack of an assessment of the risks of an oil spill
No contingency plan or a ‘paper only’ contingency plan, i.e. not put into
practice
Over-reliance on external response equipment or personnel
Inadequate logistical/customs support (e.g. over-flights, dispersant use,
external resources)
Insufficient consideration and integration of local resources, e.g. fishermen,
villagers etc.
Inadequate consideration of waste reception/disposal options
Insufficient documentation and support of subsequent claims forcompensation9Thus, reflecting on the extent to which a response organisation is able to addressthese issues, preferably in conjunction with government agencies, could be
beneficial.
A good example of how the risk of a spill occurring and preparedness has beencombined is provided by the PAJ stockpiles of response equipment. These stockpiles
have been placed in strategic locations in accordance with the major shipping
routes. The system that is in place to make these stockpiles available irrespective of
the origin of the oil spill renders the stockpiles more useful than those dedicated only
to certain circumstances. ITOPF has recommended their use on several occasions.
Nevertheless, if PAJ wished these stockpiles to be used more frequently, it may
consider promoting them more widely among the spill response community andgovernments.

Summary
Despite the reduction in oil spills worldwide there is no doubt that concern about theeffects of oil on the marine environment continues to increase making even thesmallest of spills unacceptable to many. ITOPF continues to play a significant role on
behalf of the industry and its insurers and anticipates this role being maintained in
the future. Large incidents have the ability to shape legislation and thereby to havea lasting and far-reaching affect on the industry. Consequently, preparedness andresponse to incidents need to remain high on the agenda for both industry andgovernment. Mechanisms to share responsibility as envisaged by the preparedness
convention, OPRC, are likely to be more effective and organisations that continue
to invest in training and exercises will be better able to demonstrate a competentand pragmatic response. Learning from past incidents and anticipating the
problems may enable response organisations and governments to focus their efforts
on realistic objectives or to diversify.

10