The Japanese Society for Aesthetics

Aesthetics No.23-24 (2021): 14-26

Remaking an Ancient Poetic Theory into a Modern
Aesthetic Thought:
Girolamo Mei’s System of the ArtsTSUGAMI Eske
Seijo University, Tokyo

This paper deals with the classification of the arts that appears in Mei’s letter no. 28, written
to Vettori on January 20, 1560. We first discuss in what context and with what intention it wascomposed, then describe its characteristics as a system of the arts. However, we must make it
clear in advance that this theory of Mei’s is independent of its contemporaneous and subsequent
trends of thought. Moreover, the letter that contains it probably had no reader other than its
addressee, Pier Vettori, who does not seem to have used it to develop his own theory.

1. The modern concept of “art”
In order to be able to identify the characteristics of Mei’s classification of the arts, we mustfirst ensure a standard of comparison. In his landmark essay on the modern system of the arts, P.
O. Kristeller defines it as consisting of painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and poetry. He
applies it as a diachronic standard for gauging how many writers from antiquity to the eighteenth
century approached the modern conception of art.1 To us present-day scholars, who know thediverse conditions of today’s art, this model looks historical, because few will now agree to speakof a system of the arts. We must remember that Kristeller wrote this essay in the mid-twentiethcentury, however, when this traditional concept of a system of the arts was still considered
trustworthy. That is why he refers to eighteenth-century theories as simply discussing “the systemof the arts.”
Some points about this model for a “system of the arts” need to be considered. First, theinclusion or exclusion of certain genres in such a system will depend on the general artistic
conditions of the period or geographical area, as well as the particular situation of each genre.
Apart from the obvious omission of cinema from theories of art prior to the twentieth century orof Japanese ikebana (flower arrangement) from most European ones, some genres (such as
theatre) may be less prevalent than others (such as dancing) in certain parts of the world. Suchfluctuations may result in these genres’ inclusion or exclusion. Even in Batteux, the formulatorof the modern system of the arts, the quasi-inclusion of rhetoric among the beaux-arts comesfrom the historical conditions of his day, in which rhetoric was considered more or less* This paper is based on the Japanese version printed in Bigaku LXIX, No. 1 (2018): 13-24, published by theJapanese Society for Aesthetics.
1
Kristeller (1951, 1952) 497. In a more recent study, Shiner (2001) approaches the same subject. It offers ahighly interesting point of view in which the conceptual history of art is linked with that of social systems.

Remaking an Ancient Poetic Theory into a Modern Aesthetic Thought

15autonomous or practiced for its own sake. Moreover, some theorists consider the theatre to be a
separate genre from (dramatic) poetry, and others do not. Thus, there is no unconditional
comparison of art genres between different periods and areas. Some adaptation of each theory isnecessary, in order for it to be compared according to a common diachronic standard.
Second, even if one genre is included among the arts, not all its sub-genres will automaticallybe. If we distinguish between mythico-historical painting and landscape or still life, between
verse and prose literature, between vocal and instrumental music, or between mimetic and formal
dancing, only the one part, say, mythico-historical painting or mimetic dancing, may be included
in a system of the arts and the other not. Even if imitation, which Batteux regards as the key
concept in grouping the beaux-arts, somehow applies to vocal music, much explanation will beneeded for the inclusion of instrumental music, since it is far from easy to imagine a reasonable
justification of how and what formal dancing imitates. In such cases, if we speak of dancing ormusic at large, we are relying on the rhetoric of pars pro toto, which is logically false. Suchinexactitude or flexibility is inevitably involved in a model of the arts.
Third, in contrast to the second point, what appears from one point of view to be one andthe same activity may be divided into two separate genres from another. Poetry is an apt example.
It is evident that what Kristeller calls poetry includes prose literature. Even within poetry proper,
the epic, which in antiquity was usually recited with instrumental accompaniment and even therhapsode’s gestures, had much in common with tragedy, except for its basic form of performancein narration (διήγησις) as distinct from impersonation (μίμησις). Both fell under the same
category of poetry in antiquity, whereas they may belong to different genres today, one toliterature and the other to the theatre. In such cases, we must find as much agreement as the modelin question can have with Kristeller’s model.
The method of examining the genres grouped together as an indicator of the establishedsystem of the arts must cope with such difficulties. We must remember any such system is atheoretical abstraction or even simplification of actual artistic activities. Yet, in view of such asystem’s great convenience for comparison, we may be justified to use it as a theory.
One remarkable feature of Kristeller’s model is the equal ontological status that each genre
shares in the system. No one genre subsumes or is subsumed by another. This results from themodel’s unitary principle of classification, that is, the medium. The genus art is distinguished into
species or genres of art by the differentia of the mediums they employ. Painting is the art madeby means of line and color, sculpture of swelling and hollowing out, music of scale notes, etc.
Modern discussions of the arts from Laokoon to medium specificity have also taken this for
granted.
To conclude our preliminary survey of the modern concept of art, let us have a glimpse of
its intension or connotation. In the Principles of Art, published in 1938, R. G. Collingwood
defines art as something by which artists become conscious of what they wanted to express inorder to free themselves from their emotional charge, only when they have succeeded in
expressing it.2 In this conception, artistic expression is not only free from any external end but isalso from any fixed plan: expression is for expression’s sake both teleologically and strategically.
2

Collingwood (1938) 274 etc.

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However, this full-grown, fully autonomous view of art put forward towards the expiry of theconcept better applies to romantic art than classical art, which more or less follows someestablished forms. Strategical autonomy is thus optional for the modern concept of art, whereas
teleological autonomy is mandatory.

2. Mei’s Classification of the arts
In the aforementioned letter to Vettori, who asks if χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι (by colors andshapes) in Poetics 1 (1447a18-19) can be taken as a reference to sculpture and painting (We shallhenceforth refer to these two as sculpture-painting.), Mei answers in the negative.3
Now this [sc. that Aristotle does not refer to painting and sculpture] resulted because these
sorts of imitation [sc. sculpture and painting] do not in any case agree with poetry, because
sculpture and painting are imitations primarily of the body and accidentally of the action,
while all the aforenamed imitations [sc. the epic, tragedy, comedy, dithyramb, and the auletic
and kitharistic arts] in which poetry is mixed imitate oppositely, or, if you like,ἀντεστραμμένως [conversely], because they imitate actions as their principal object andaccidentally τοὺς πράττοντας [persons in action]. In short, the former imitations [sc. sculpture
and painting] represent directly to the sense, be it the sense of vision or of touch, and in thesecond place, to intellect via imagination, while the latter [sc. the epic etc.], on the contrary,
have intellect as their direct object and accidentally [represent] to the sense, be it the sense ofhearing when heard and said, or the sense of vision when read and represented. Since theformer [sc. sculpture and painting] therefore have nothing altogether in common with poetry
but are totally different and as [different] as the body is from the soul, it would have been
excessive to include these too. Aristotle therefore left aside all those sorts of imitation,
because they are different in genus and manifestly do not have any correspondence butἀναλόγως [analogically].4
By “aforenamed imitations” he refers to the genres of poetry which Aristotle cites in Poetics
1 (1447a13-15), namely, the epic, tragedy, comedy, dithyramb, the auletic and kitharistic arts.
Mei has listed these in the preceding passage. Likewise, τοὺς πράττοντας [persons in action] is a3

Palisca (1977) 44-45, Palisca (1985) 335-337, and Restani (1990) 176-178 are the only scholars who havediscussed this passage, both providing the diagram of classification of the arts but no in-depth analysis.
4
Mei’s Letter 28, BL MS Add. 10268, fol. 206v 5-19=Tsugami (2015) 194: hor questo nacque perche` queste
maniere d’ imitazionj non conuengon’ in caso alcuno con la poesia . perche` la scultura e’ la pittura son’ imitazionj
propriamente de’ corpi , e` accidentalmente de’ l’ azzione : doue tutte l’ imitazioni soprannominate tra` le quali e`
mescolata la poesia imitano contrappostamente o` uolete ἀντεστραμμένωσ. perche` esse di principal’ intento imitanol’ azzionj e’ accidentalmente Τοὺσ πράττοντασ. e’ insomma quelle imitazionj si rappresentano dirittamente al sensoo` de` la uista o` del tatto e` nel secondo luogo per immaginazione a` l’ intelletto . doue queste per contrario hanno
per loro intento dirittamente l’ intelletto , e’ per accidente al senso o` de` l’ udito ne` l’ esser’ ascoltate e’ dette , o` de`la uista nel leggerle o` esser’ rappresentate . Non communicando addunque queste in modo alcuno con la poesia, maessendo diuersissime al tutto e’ di tanto quanto e` dal corpo a` l’animo , sarebbe stato di superchio abbracciare anche
queste . lascio` addunque Aristotile da` parte quella tutte maniere d’ imitazionj per esser’ differenti di genere , e’manifestamente non hauer’ conuenienza insieme senon ἀναλόγωσ.

Remaking an Ancient Poetic Theory into a Modern Aesthetic Thought

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pointed reference to 1448a1. What stands out is the ambiguous expression “in which poetry is
mixed.” He probably had in mind Aristotle’s inexact expression “most [part] of the auletic andkitharistic arts” (1447a14-15). Although the Philosopher counts these among the genres of poetry,the reason for this is far from clear, especially as only a few lines later (1447a23) they are named
as examples of the arts that use tune (ἁρμονία) and number (ῥυθμός) alone, without words.5 The
ambiguity of the expression “in which poetry is mixed” seems to have been Mei’s way of
avoiding such a difficulty.
He says “analogically” because both sculpture-painting and poetry are concerned with the
body and action (mind), and with the sense (body) and intellect (mind). While a strict analogy forthis would read (sculpture-painting) : (poetry) = (body/mind) : (body/mind), the actual words run(sculpture-painting) : (poetry) = (body/mind) : (mind / body). However, if an inverse proportion
is a kind of proportion, this analogy holds. This can be expressed as the following table.
Diagram 1. Body and mind in sculpture-painting and poetry

Diagram 1. Body and mind in sculpture-painting and poetry

body

sculpture-painting

poetryprimary object of imitation

accidental object of imitation↓←inverse→↑

action (mind)

accidental object of imitation

primary object of imitation

sense (body)

direct target of representation

accidental target of representation

intellect (mind)

accidental target of repr.

↓←inverse→↑

direct target of representation

Next, Mei develops this theory into the following diagram, subsequently referred to as the“Classification (of the arts).”
Diagram 2. Mei’s Classification of the arts6

5

For this obscurity and Mei’s interpretation, see Mei’s Letter 27, BL MS Add. 10268, fol. 203r10-17=Tsugami(2015) 182.

TSUGAMI Eske

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Before analyzing this Classification, we should remember that this appears in the context of
Mei’s interpretation of χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι (1447a18-19). In the right-hand block of “[the arts]
imitative of actions,” or the narrative arts, he is concretizing Aristotle’s discussion of the meansof poetry in Poetics 1.
In this diagram, the first stage of distinction (productive of things themselves /imitative ofthings) results from the different natures of arts, the second (imitative of bodies /imitative ofactions) from their objects of imitation, and the third (with clear-obscure of colors /with relief ofmaterial; with rhythm only /with speaking only /with harmony only /with rhythm and harmony/with rhythm and speaking /with rhythm and harmony /with rhythm, speaking, and harmony)from their means of imitation. Further, sculpture, casting, plastics, and bas-relief are enumerated
as the arts that are “imitative of bodies” “with relief of material.” A double meaning of scultura
is at work here. Sensu stricto, it denotes the art of caving (scolpire), but sensu lato, it embraces
the whole solid representation including casting, plastics, and bas-relief. It stands to reason that
Mei keeps to the former usage, because he is distinguishing the means of imitation. While this
could be designated as the fourth stage of classification, it rather defines the wide extension of
sculpture sensu lato within the framework of the three-staged distinction, since suchspecifications of the means of imitation as present in the third stage (with clear-obscure of colors
or with rhythm only, etc.) are lacking here. We shall henceforth refer to the sum of sculpture,
casting, etc., as simply “sculpture.”
So far, the species of the art of imitation have been identified as painting, sculpture, dancing,prose, kitharistics and its like, poetry, and tragedy and its like. As seen in Chapter 1, we must
adapt these to conform to the diachronic standard of the arts. First, imitation in prose or prosestory can be subsumed into Kristeller’s inclusive category of“poetry” together with poetry inverse. Second, “kitharistics etc.,” which Mei describes as using rhythm and harmony withoutwords, may be categorized into modern instrumental music, because the kithara is a guitar-likestringed instrument. It is true that we have scruples about taking kitharistics as “music”
unconditionally, especially considering Mei’s sixteenth-century context in which instrumental

6

Mei’s Letter 28, BL MS Add. 10268, fol. 209r11-25＝Tsugami (2015) 214-215.

Remaking an Ancient Poetic Theory into a Modern Aesthetic Thought

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music was only first becoming a new genre and was hard to compare with vocal music. However,where vocal music is placed next to and distinct from poetry in a classification of the arts, it ought
not to be seen from the aspect of the words, but of the pitch and value of tones, just like
instrumental music. For this reason, and due to our aim to conform to Kristeller’s system, we mayhere consider “kitharistics etc.” to correspond to “music.”
Similarly, what Mei calls “dancing (orchestica)” needs to be commented on, because it issaid to imitate human actions with rhythm only and without music. Modern dancing, which is
performed to music and in regular steps, is not captured by this concept. We thus count Mei’s“dancing” as a separate species of art, in deference to him.
Finally, “tragedy, dithyramb, etc.” is said to use “rhythm, speaking, and harmony.” Since
these three means are substantially the same as dancing, words, and melody, this species ofimitation corresponds to the modern opera or musical. We could categorize it separately as thetheatre, disregarding the part that overlaps with music, but we would rather fit it into Kristeller’ssystem and label it as drama in the wider sense, which is a part of poetry.
Through such an adaptation, five species of art appear in this classification: painting,sculpture, poetry, music, and dancing. It contains no other species. They correspond to
Kristeller’s five species, except that Mei’s Classification contains dancing instead of architecture,
which Kristeller’s does. Next, we see what Mei’s Classification owes to tradition and what is
novel to it.
The first distinction of the “productive arts” into those “productive of things themselves”
and those “imitative of things” is no doubt based on Plato. In the Sophist 265a-268d, he sorts thehuman “productive art (ποιητικὴ τέχνη)” into that “of making the thing itself (αὐτοποιητικόν)”like “the art of building (οἰκοδομική)” and that “of forming images (εἰδωλοποιικόν)” like “the artof painting (γραφικἠ)” or the art “of imitation (μιμητικόν)” in its narrower sense of mimicry.
Regarding the second stage, poetry (including the epic and tragedy) is often paraphrased in
the Poetics as an “imitation of the action (μίμησις πράξεως).”7 A comparison of poetry withpainting appears in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1371b6-7 as “that which imitates, like painting, sculpture,and poetry,” as well as in many passages of the Poetics.8 The next question, what painting andsculpture imitate, has been answered with “the body” by, if not an ancient author, Benedetto
Varchi.9 This answer is important, because the definition of sculpture-painting qua imitation ofsomething secures it a position in the Classification analogous to poetry qua imitation of actions.
At the third stage, painting is identified on the left-hand side of the diagram, among the arts
“imitative of bodies,” as the one using bright and dark colors (chiaro e’ scuro dê colori). This
pictorial technique originated in thirteenth-century Italy and was conceptualized in the fifteenthcentury theories of art. Alberti spoke of “oscuro e chiaro” of colors in the Italian edition of his

7

Cf. Kassel (1965) index graecus, s.v. πρᾶξις.
Cf. ibid., s.v. γράφειν, γραφεῖς, γραφή, γραφική.
9
Varchi (1549) 113-114 brings out the contrast between poetry and painting as between an imitation of theinside or the soul (anima) and an imitation of the outside or the body (corpo). Cf. Lee (1967) 60. His expression“pare che sia tanta differenza fra la Poesia, e la pittura quanta è fra l’anima e’l corpo” is close to Mei’s “essendo
diuersissime al tutto e’ di tanto quanto e` dal corpo a` l’animo.” According to Kristeller (I951) 511. n. 92, Castelvetro
conceived poetry as taking part in the soul, as distinct from the body, in 1576.
8

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Della pittura (1435), section 910, and Leonardo frequently used the expressions “lume e ombre(light and shade)” and “oscuro e chiarore (dark and light)” in his Trattato di pittura, vol.1.11 The
first printed book to contain this term is Castiglione’s Il corteggiano, 1528, 1, fol. G. iiij.
Why does Mei resort to such a modern concept, especially shortly after he mentions Plato’s
locus classicus (Cratylus 423D-424A) in the same letter (28:207v13) to the effect that the painterimitates by color (χρῶμα) and shape (σχῆμα)? We must again keep in mind the context in which
the Classification appears. Mei is arguing against Vettori, who wants to understand χρώμασι καὶσχήμασι in Poetics 1 (1447a18-19) as a reference to painting. A concession to this would cause
damage to Mei’s interpretation of ῥυθμός (rhythm) as dancing, which would in its turn affect thewhole group of the narrative arts on the right hand of the Classification. Thus, he is forced torelate color and shape to some other genre and find another means to classify painting. This is
why he utilizes this modern concept. Viewed in this way, this somewhat surprising choicesupports his whole Classification.
Sculpture is listed next to painting, as the art that uses relief of the material. Leonardo
observes in his aforementioned book that sculpture “has relief that produces dark and light byitself.”12 Moreover, Crusca reports, “we talk of the statue as a figure in relief”13 and the wordὄγκοι (bulk or bodies) occurs in Aristides Quintilianus (De musica, II, 4, 56, 26) in connection
with sculpture. It is clear from all this that Mei depends on conventional theories regarding
sculpture.
On the right-hand side, the classification of the arts “imitative of actions” according to thethree means of poetry (rhythm, words, and melody) and their combinations, based on Aristotle’s
statement in Poetics 1, results in seven species. By eliminating the two that the Philosopher does
not mention and that Mei does not think exist, five are individually identified with the existing
genres. Mei bases this on the detailed analysis of Aristotle’s words that he has made in the same
letter (28:207v18-32=Tsugami (2015) 202-204).
Mei names, with the reservation “though [it is only] in my opinion (secondo pero` il giudiciomio),” “dancers (saltatorj)” as the performers of the art using “rhythm only,” which thePhilosopher calls “the art of the dancers (ἡ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν).” Likewise, Mei cites “kitharistics etc.”(in distinction from poetry) as the art using “rhythm and harmony” (without words), while
Aristotle is ambiguous about whether he considers “the auletic and kitharistic arts” (1447a24) tobe part of poetry (with words) or separate arts (without words). Finally, the art using “speaking
only” (1447a28-29) is designated as prose, whereas the Philosopher leaves it unnamed. Thus,
where Mei looks prima facie as if he were faithfully following the discussion of Poetics 1, he isactually developing it according to his own interpretation.
It is to be noted that the arts that are “imitative of actions” are not called “poetry.” Although
Mei could have used “poetry” in its wider sense to subsume various poetic genres, he does not.
This is important because “poetry” in this sense would include dancing and what we consider to10

Alberti (1568) 80.
The most typical expression is “varî colori, cioè chiaro e scuro” (Leonardo (1947) 1, §39).
12
Leonardo (1947) 1, §35.
13
Crusca (1612) s.v.
11Remaking an Ancient Poetic Theory into a Modern Aesthetic Thought21

be music (“kitharistics etc.”), thus subordinating music and dancing to poetry. This interfereswith what we have observed as a characteristic of Kristeller’s system, namely, the equal
ontological status of the genres.14 On the contrary, all the genres recognized in this classification
share an equal, mutually independent ontological status. Besides, Mei restricts himself to themedium of imitation as the sole criterion for his third division, unlike Aristotle in Poetics 3, who
also uses the object of imitation to distinguish between tragedy and comedy. We can conclude
from this that Mei’s Classification also agrees with Kristeller’s in its unitary principle ofclassification.
The ontological independence of the genres corroborates Mei’s view of ancient tragedy. As
I have argued elsewhere,15 he thinks it had a strong emotional effect on the audience because it
involved music and dancing. If, then, these are ontologically independent from poetry, they will
be endowed with separate powers. That is why, in his opinion, ancient tragedy as it was performedon stage with music and dancing affected the audience greatly.
It is worthwhile to consider why Mei lists the genres of art not in words but in a diagram.
His Classification resembles a family tree, in that lines connect each member to the members on
the next lower level, and these members to those on the following level, etc. Such a family tree
makes clear not only that member X and member Y descend from the same ancestor, but also
whether they belong to the same generation, as in the case of siblings, cousins, or second cousins
and, if they do not, at how many removes there are. The Classification plainly shows that poetry,music, and dancing are siblings and that they are cousins of painting and sculpture, all being of
the same “generation”—that is, ontological status. One other great advantage of the tree-like
representation lies in its emphasis on the methodical derivation of the members, leaving nouncertainty about their inclusion or exclusion. A closed group in which the members are clearly
connected to each other is a system. With the Classification in diagram, Mei is presenting asystem of the arts.
When he, in the second stage of classification, describes what we consider to be five arts as“imitative of things,” he is defining them by their intension of being imitative. In what way does
this relate to the modern concept of art, whose intension or connotation we have identified as
expression for expression’s sake? Since imitation is set in contrast with the actual production ofthings in the Classification, it does not produce usual things that serve external ends. It serves
ends that are intrinsic in the art itself. Put differently, imitation is teleologically, if not strategically,autonomous. Thus, Mei’s description of the imitative arts also agrees with the modern concept ofart in regard to its intension.
Summarizing these considerations of the Classification, we can point out the following five
points: (i) imitation of bodies is placed on the same level as imitation of actions, (ii) four out offive genres of modern art are included, with dancing in place of architecture, (iii) these genres
have an equal ontological status, (iv) the nature of the system is discernible, and (v) they aredefined by teleological autonomy. We may conclude from these that Mei’s Classification can

14

According to Kristeller (1951) 511, Castelvetro (1576) 13 actually regards music and dancing as part ofpoetry.
15

Tsugami (2016) Chapter 1.

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22safely be considered a modern classification of the arts.

3. Mei’s view of the work of art
In the same letter, Mei presents a remarkable conception of the work of art itself. He argues
as follows.
That is because when the philosopher [that is, Aristotle] considers the work of the poet not asa work but as something that exists for some end, that is, imitation, it becomes all together,both its material and form, an instrument. But when he speaks of it as a work of art, this [sc.
instrument] does not intervene, but it [sc. the work] is considered according to the nature of[its] essence distinctly as a material and form.16
We can ascertain that the term opera had, roughly in Mei’s day, the meaning of “work” inthe sense of a piece of composition, as distinct from that of labor, from Crusca (1612), whichcites from Boccaccio its usage for a writing or building.17 Three points stand out in the quoted
passage.
(1) The expression “work of art (opera dell’arte) ” is used.
(2) The poet’s work has imitation as its end.
(3) The “work of art” can be regarded as a substance (material plus form), independentlyof any teleological consideration.
This view seems to agree with the modern conception of art, in which the work of art is anautonomous entity free from the teleological or utilitarian nexus. Since we have seen in theprevious shapter that the imitative arts are given a teleologically autonomous status in Mei’s
Classification, our next task is to verify that he actually thinks of the end of imitation as inherent
in the work. A significant comment follows the passage quoted above.
For the sculptor makes his imitation in marble, in bronze, in wood, or in others [which heuses] as his material and leaves it made in them; the poet [makes his imitation] in verses andleaves it made in them.18
Let us pay close attention to the expression “leaves it made in them.” In this phrase, “it (la)”16
Mei’s Letter 28, BL MS Add. 10268, fol. 207r22-27=Tsugami (2015) 200: Perche` quando il filosofo
considera l’ opera del poeta non come opera , ma come cosa che sia a` qualche fine , cio` e` a` l’ imitazione , tutto
insieme tanto la materia quanto la forma d’ essa seco diuenta strumento : doue quando egli ne parla come opera de`l’ arte , questo non interuiene, ma si considera secondo la natura de` l’ essenza distintamente per materia e’ forma.
17
Crusca (1612) s.v. opera: “E OPERA a qualunque cosa fatta dall' operante, come: scrittura, fabbrica, e simili.
Lat. opus.”
18
Mei’s Letter 28, BL MS Add. 10268, fol. 207r30-32=Tsugami (2015) 200: perche` lo scultore fa` l’ imitazione
sua in marmo , in bronzo , in legnio o` in altro come in sua materia e’ in quellj la lascia fatta ; e’ il poeta nê’ uersi , e’in quelli la lascia fatta.

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refers to “his imitation” and “them (quellj)” to materials. What is the “imitation” that is left in thematerial? It can only be the form. Thus, the phrase undoubtedly describes the situation in which
the artist gives form to the material, and imitation is, after all, the action of forming a work.
However, there is more to understand from the expression “leaves it made.”
Because the sculptor or poet “leaves” his imitation in the material in the state of having been
“made,” the work contains in itself the action of imitating as carried out. At first glance, thisseems true of all kinds of production. When, for example, a carpenter builds a house, the actionof building is left in the house qua product. This is certainly an action of giving form to thematerial. However, in this case, the form given is not self-determining, but subservient or
instrumental to an external purpose, such as the safety or comfort of the inhabitants. Even themost sophisticated form would not be accepted, if these inhabitants did not judge it to be useful.
In this case, form does not constitute the completion of the production. On the other hand, in thecases of sculpture and poetry, the action of imitating is finished as long as the work resembles its
model in its form. The completed form qua the end of imitation is “left” in and as the work. Thisconsideration allows us to add one more characteristic of Mei’s view of the work of art:(4) It is teleologically autonomous. His conception of the arts thus agrees with the modern
conception also in regard to intension.

4. Mei in the history of the concept
Our final consideration about Mei’s Classification of the arts is historical—namely, what
position should it occupy in the history of the concept of art? In the absence of contemporaneousinteractions and later reverberations, as noted at the beginning of this paper, we can focus
exclusively on the Classification’s novelty.
Palisca, the first scholar that introduced it to the academic world, states it is “the clearest andearliest grouping of the imitative arts known to me” (Palisca (1985) 335). This calls for a revisionof Kristeller’s view that “hardly anyone among them [sc. people in the second third of thesixteenth century] is trying to establish the ‘imitative arts’ as a separate class” (Kristeller (1951,52) 512). This statement was perhaps reasonable in 1951, when the name of Mei was only
beginning to be known in musicological studies. However, in his criticism of Kristeller (1951,52),
Young (2015) maintains that the ancients, including Aristotle, already had some systems of thearts akin to Batteux’s, and that such sixteenth-century authors as Glarean (1547), Vasari (1550),
Bartoli (1567), and Castelvetro (1576) refer to all or some of the five species of art. Nevertheless,these writings are far less sophisticated than Mei’s, because they provide no justification for thelists they contain, and recent research by Liberti (2016) does not name any historical thinkers
with systems comparable to Mei’s. We may thus conclude that Mei’s Classification was far aheadof his time. In that case, when is it that a comparable theory finally appeared? The most likely
candidate is the theory by Charles Batteux, often considered to be the first formulator of themodern concept of art.19 In his 1746 book Les Beaux-arts réduits à un même principe, which
19

Kristeller (1952) 20 describes him as “the first to set forth a clear-cut system of the fine arts.”TSUGAMI Eske24

was enormously influential across Europe through its repeated reprints and translations into many
languages, he defines the arts in the following way.
It is easy now to define the arts of which we have been talking so far… We shall define
painting, sculpture, and dancing [as] imitations of beautiful nature that are expressed by colors,
by relief, or by attitudes; and music and poetry [as] imitations of beautiful nature that are
expressed by tones or by metrical discourse.20
This is similar to Mei’s Classification in many ways. First, both consider the fine arts tocomprise the arts of imitation. Second, in the first stage of distinction, they divide the arts into
two categories. Third, they list the same species of arts, excluding architecture.21 Fourth, they
distinguish the arts according to the means of imitation. Fifth, they grant ontologically equal
status to each species.
However, there are also some dissimilarities. First, Batteux groups dancing with painting
and sculpture to form what we may call the “visual arts,” whereas Mei groups it with the narrativearts. Second, while Batteux explains his exclusion of architecture and rhetoric through theessential nature of their utility (103-104), Mei is totally silent about them. Third, Batteux uses theterm “sculpture” for several things that Mei considers separately, that is, sculpture, casting,plastics, and bas-relief. Fourth, unlike Batteux, who defines les beaux-arts as having pleasure as
their end, Mei emphasizes the autonomous character of the work in the fine arts.
As soon as we allow for the necessary adaptations seen in Chapter 1, however, the trivial
nature of these dissimilarities is clear. For the most part, the first difference results from thehistorical change in artistic practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when dancing
began to be accompanied so exclusively by musical instruments and performed with such regularand abstract motions that its connection with words was no longer obvious. The second difference
results from the non-imitative nature of the excluded genres (namely, architecture and rhetoric),
no matter whether this exclusion is explained (by Batteux) or not (by Mei). In any case, this has
nothing to do with the extension or denotation of the genus art. The third point has already been
discussed in Chapter 2. Regarding the fourth difference, making something for pleasure—not tobe confused with the pleasure obtained from the product, in which case the action of making
affords no pleasure in itself—is equivalent to making for making’s sake, which is another namefor autonomy.
Viewed in this way, Mei’s Classification clearly contains nearly all the factors that Batteux
presents in his definition of the arts. In addition, its diagram form shows that it is a system. Thismeans Mei’s Classification is a “system of the arts” in a fuller sense than Batteux’s.22 This isastonishing. Batteux was so blessed with knowledge of earlier theorists such as Crousaz, Du Bos,

20

Batteux (1746) 41-42.
According to Kristeller (1952) 23, architecture was first included among the species of art by D’Alembert in
his Encyclopédie (1751-72).
22
Referring to Morin (1995) 129, Di Liberti (2016) 30 stresses the necessity for a system to be integrated intoa larger system, as in Batteux’s case, in which the system of the arts is part of the system of aesthetics or the
Newtonian system of nature. In Mei’s case, this larger system is probably the Aristotelian system of knowledge.
21Remaking an Ancient Poetic Theory into a Modern Aesthetic Thought

25

and Voltaire, to name a few 23 , and with social conditions such as the establishment of the
Academies in France, that the conditions seem to have been ripe for him to develop the systemof the arts. In contrast, Mei had few such external helps to invite him to such a system, apart fromthe sporadic and incomplete lists of the arts that Weinberg details.24 With hindsight, Mei looks
as if he were foreseeing what to come in two centuries.
He constructed a modern theory, not only by basing it on classical theories, but also by
supplementing them with additional ideas, both ancient and modern. The result is a system
marked by the high intelligibility that characterizes his theories.

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TSUGAMI Eske

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*An early abridged version of this paper, entitled “Two Centuries Ahead of Batteux: Girolamo
Mei’s System of the Arts,” was read at the 20th International Congress of Aesthetics held in Seoul,
2016 and contained in the E-book Proceedings of ICA 2016, Seoul National University, 2017, pp.
469-473. A slightly different text of the present paper forms Chapter 8 of my book: Girolamo
Mei: A Belated Humanist and Premature Aesthetician. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2021, ISBN 978-4326-80063-6.