The American Jewish Year Book 2018
The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899
This Report derives from Chapter 8 of the American Jewish Year Book, 2018.
The American Jewish Year Book is "The Annual Record of the North American Jewish
Communities Since 1899." This volume is a very important and prestigious annual publication
because it has acted as a major resource for academic researchers, researchers at Jewish
institutions and organizations, practitioners at Jewish institutions and organizations, the media,
both Jewish and secular, educated leaders and lay persons, and libraries, particularly University
and Jewish libraries, for up-to-date information about the American and Canadian Jewish
communities. For decades, the American Jewish Year Book has been the premiere place forleading academics to publish long review chapters on topics of interest to the American Jewish
community.
Obtaining The American Jewish Year Book, 2018
Hard bound and Kindle copies are available at www.amazon.com.
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Table of Contents from the American Jewish Year Book, 2018
Part I: Review Articles
1

The Quality of American Jewish Life
Steven M. Cohen and Charles S. Liebman

2Forum on Contemporary American Jewry: Grounds for Optimism or Pessimism?
Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin with Steven Bayme, Mijal Bitton, Carmel U. Chiswick,
Steven M. Cohen, Sylvia Barack Fishman, Lawrence Grossman, Harriet Hartman, Samuel
Heilman, Bethamie Horowitz, Debra R. Kaufman, Shaul Kelner, Barry A. Kosmin, Laurence
Kotler-Berkowitz, Deborah Dash Moore, Pamela S. Nadell, Bruce A. Phillips, Riv-Ellen Prell,
Jonathan D. Sarna, Leonard Saxe, and Jennifer A. Thompson

3

Antisemitism in Contemporary America
Tom W. Smith and Benjamin Schapiro

4

American Jews and the Domestic Arena (April 2017 - July 2018): Politics, Religion,
Israel, and Antisemitism
Steven Windmueller

5

American Jews and the International Arena (April 2017 - July 2018): The Gap Between
American and Israeli Jews Widens as the One Between Governments Narrows
Mitchell Bard

6

United States Jewish Population, 2018
Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky

7

Canadian Jewish Population, 2018Charles Shahar
18World Jewish Population, 2018
Sergio DellaPergola
Part II: Jewish Lists

9

Local Jewish Organizations: Jewish Federations; Jewish Community Centers; Jewish
Human Service Agencies (Jewish Family Services, Jewish Vocational Services, Jewish
Free Loans); Directories of Synagogues, College Hillels, and Jewish Day Schools;
Israeli Embassies and Consulates
Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz

10 Jewish Museums and Holocaust Museums, Memorials, and Monuments
Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz
11 Jewish Overnight Camps
Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz
12 National Jewish Organizations
Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz
13 Jewish Press: National Jewish Periodicals and Broadcast Media; Local Jewish
Periodicals
Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz
14 Academic Resources: Programs in Jewish Studies, Holocaust and Genocide Studies,
Israel Studies, Professorships of Israel Studies, and Jewish Social Work; Major Books
on the North American Jewish Communities; Academic Journals in or about the North
American Jewish Communities; Scholarly Articles on the Study of the North American
Jewish Communities; Websites and Organizations for Research on North American
Jewish Communities; Major Judaic Research and Holocaust Research Libraries
Arnold Dashefsky, Ira M. Sheskin, and Pamela J. Weathers
15 Transitions: Major Events, Honorees, and Obituaries
Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, Ben Harris, Roberta Pakowitz, and Pamela J. Weathers
AJYB 2018 was produced with the generous support of:● The College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Connecticut (Interim Provost
Jeremy Teitelbaum and Interim Dean Davita Silfen Glasberg)● Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life at the University of Connecticut(Sebastian Wogenstein, Director)● The Sue and Leonard Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies (Haim Shaked, Director)
and its Jewish Demography Project (Ira M. Sheskin, Director); and The George Feldenkreis
Program in Judaic Studies (Haim Shaked, Director)● College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Miami (Dean Leonidas Bachas and Senior
Associate Dean Angel Kaifer)● Provost's Office at the University of Miami (William Scott Green, Senior Vice Provost and Deanof Undergraduate Education)2

● The Department of Geography at the University of Miami (Douglas O. Fuller, Chair)● Mandell "Bill" Berman (z"l) and the Mandell and Madeleine Berman Foundation
For more information about the American Jewish Year Book:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_jewish_year_book
http://www.springer.com/series/11193
Citing this Report
Springer is permitting us to post this Report on line with open access, but requests that the citation
be to the American Jewish Year Book itself:
Sergio DellaPergola. “World Jewish Population, 2018,” in Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin.
(Editors) The American Jewish Year Book, 2018, Volume 118 (2018) (Dordrecht: Springer) pp.
361-452.

3

World Jewish Population, 2018

Sergio DellaPergola
The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
Sergio.dellapergola@mail.huji.ac.il

4

Executive Summary
In this report, we review the demographic situation of world Jewish population paying attention to
the principal changes that have occurred since 1948—the year of Israel’s independence—andespecially since the 1980s. At the beginning of 2018, the world’s Jewish population was estimatedat 14,606,000—an increase of 98,400 (0.68%) over the 2017 revised estimate of 14,507,600—
slightly lower than the 14,511,100 original 2017 estimate (DellaPergola 2018). The world's total
population increased by 1.13% in 2017 (Population Reference Bureau 2018). The rate of increaseof world Jewry hence amounted to 60% of that of the total population.
Figure 1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and in the aggregate in
the rest of the world (the Diaspora)—as well as changes in the world's total population between
1945 and 2018. The world's core Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The core
Jewish population concept addresses a human collective whose identification is mutually exclusivewith respect to other subpopulations, while acknowledging that the number of persons who carry
multiple cultural and religious identities tends to increase in contemporary societies (Josselsonand Harway 2012) (see Section 1 below). While 13 years were needed to add one million Jews
from 11 million to 12 million after the tragic human losses of World War II and the Shoah(Holocaust) (DellaPergola et al. 2000), 40 more years were needed to add another million from 12
million to 13 million. While starting in the 1970s, world Jewry stagnated at zero population growth
for nearly 20 years, some demographic recovery occurred since 2000, mostly reflecting population
increase in Israel. It took about 14 years to add another million from 13 million to 14 million. In
historical perspective and based on the same definitions, world Jewish population has notrecovered its size on the eve of World War II—16.5 million—and it will take decades more to doso, if ever.
World Jewish population size reflects a combination of two very different demographic trends in
Israel and in the Diaspora. Israel's Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-halfmillion in 1945 and 630,000 in 1948 to over 6.5 million in 2018. The Jewish population of theDiaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable in number until the early 1970s,
when it started decreasing to less than 8.1 million in 2018. The world's total population increased
more than threefold from 2.315 billion in 1945 to 7.536 billion by mid-2017. Thus, the relative
share of Jews among the world’s total population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1,000 in 1945
to 1.94 per 1,000 currently—or one per every 515 inhabitants in the world.
Two countries, Israel and the US, account for 84% of the 2018 total, another 17 countries,
each with 18,000 Jews or more, account for another 14.7%, and another 79 countries, each with
Jewish populations below 18,000, account for the remaining 1.3%. Figure 2 shows the largest
core Jewish populations in 2018.
Israel’s Jewish population (not including 400,200 persons not recorded as Jews in the Ministryof Interior's Population Register but belonging to families initially admitted under the Law ofReturn) reached 6,558,100 in 2018 (44.9% of world Jewry by the core definition). This represented
a population increase of 112,000 (1.74%) in 2017. In the same year, the total Jewish population of
the Diaspora was estimated to have decreased by 13,600 from 8,061,500 to 8,047,900 (-0.17%).
Following the 2013 Pew Research Center study of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center2013), the US core Jewish population was assessed at 5,700,000 and we estimate it not to havechanged, constituting 39.0% of world Jewry in 2018. Core Jews in the US were estimated to haveslightly increased since the year 2000, following several years of moderate decline after probably
reaching a peak around 1980 (DellaPergola 2013a). Jews in the rest of the world were assessed
at 2,347,900 in 2018 (16.1% of world Jewry). Since all of the decline of 13,600 among Diaspora
Jews occurred in countries other than the US, that amounted to an annual loss of -0.58% in theaggregate for those countries.

5Fig. 1 World total population and core Jewish population, 1945-2018

Fig. 2 Largest core Jewish populations, 20186

Map 1 Countries where 99% of world Jewish population live

After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible toclaim that Israel hosts the largest core Jewish community worldwide. Some dissenting opinions(Saxe and Tighe 2013; Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume) are mostly based on different
definitions of the target population. Over the 70 years since Israel's independence in 1948,
demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and experience—
the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in Israel, their ancestral
homeland. This has occurred through daily, slow, and diverse changes reflecting births anddeaths, geographical mobility, and the choice of millions of persons to express or to deny a Jewish
collective identification, not subordinated nor on par with other explicit religious or ethnic
identifications. At the same time, Israel's growing Jewish population faces a significant
demographic challenge with its gradually diminishing majority status vis-á-vis the Palestinian Arab
population who live within the boundaries of the State of Israel as well as in the West Bank andGaza.
Israel’s current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects acontinuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility and a
relatively young age composition. These two drivers of demographic growth do not simultaneously
exist among any other Jewish population worldwide, including the US. Other than a few cases ofgrowth due to international migration (for example Canada and Australia and, until recently, theUS and Germany), and possibly some growth due to local natural increase (plausibly in the UK
and Mexico) the total number of Jews in Diaspora countries tends to diminish at varying rates.
7

The fundamental equation of demography is that a population size at a given time reflects anuninterrupted chain of events that change the size of that population from an earlier to a later date.
Of the three possible determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) thebalance of vital events (births and deaths) where low Jewish birth rates and an increasingly elderly
population generate higher death rates; and (b) the balance of international migration (immigrationand emigration). The third determinant consists of identification changes or passages (accessions
and secessions)—in this case to and from a Jewish identity—and applies only to subpopulations
defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific characteristic, as is the case for Jews.
Identification changes do not affect people’s physical presence but rather their willingness orability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturally-defined group.
All this holds true regarding the core Jewish population, which does not include non-Jewish
members of Jewish households, Jews who also hold another religious identification, persons ofJewish ancestry who profess another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry,other non-Jews with family connections to Jews, and other non-Jews who may be interested in
Jewish matters. (See further discussion in Section 1.) The detailed mechanisms and supporting
evidence of Jewish population change have been discussed extensively in previous issues of theAmerican Jewish Year Book (AJYB) and will not be repeated here (see DellaPergola 2015a).

Section 1 Assessing Jewish Population
Jewish population size and composition reflect the day-by-day interplay of various factors that
operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community. The continuing realignment of world
Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power
provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography(DellaPergola et al. 2005; DellaPergola 2017a).
The 2018 Jewish population data were updated from 2017 and previous years in accordancewith known or estimated vital events, migrations, and Jewish identification shifts. The world Jewish
population estimate results from the sum of national estimates. While individual country estimates
can be obtained from nationwide sources as well as from the sum of local sources, in the case of
the world's total, in the lack of a global population census, there is no alternative to the summationof local figures. In each of the country update procedures, when data on intervening changes wereavailable, empirically ascertained or reasonably assumed, effects of change were applied
accordingly and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence wasthat intervening changes balanced one another in a particular country, Jewish population size was
not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective over the years of our monitoring of world
Jewish population. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new
census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to
be on target. Otherwise, previous estimates were adjusted based upon newer, better evidence.
The research findings reported here tend to confirm the estimates reported in previous years
and, perhaps more importantly, a coherent and conceptually robust interpretation of the trends
prevailing in world Jewish demography (Bachi 1976; Schmelz 1981, 1984; DellaPergola 1995,
1999, 2001, 2011a). While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2018 population
estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identification factors
underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal
and international migration and increasing transnationalism, sometimes involving bi-local
residences and leading to double counting of people on the move or who permanently share theirtime between different places. In this study, special attention is paid to avoiding double counts ofinternationally and nationally mobile and bi-local persons. Even more intriguing can be the positionof persons who hold more than one religious, ethnic, or cultural identity and may periodically shift
from one to the other. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting thesecomplexities; hence, Jewish population estimates are far from perfect. Some errors can becorrected at a later stage, but analysts should resign themselves to the paradox of thepermanently provisional nature of Jewish population estimates.
8Definitions
Jewish population definitions obviously critically impact the numbers. A major problem with Jewish
population estimates produced by individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of
uniformity in definitional criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population is addressed atall. This problem is magnified when one tries to address the Jewish population globally, trying toprovide a coherent and uniform definitional framework for Jews who live in very different
institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic environments. For analytical purposes, it would not be
acceptable to use one definitional standard for one country, and another for another country,
although in the daily conduct of Jewish community affairs such differences do prevail acrosscountries.
In such an open, fluid, and somewhat undetermined environment, the very feasibility ofundertaking a valid and meaningful study of the Jewish collective—let alone by the use ofquantitative tools—generates debates between different intellectual stances facing Jewish
population studies (DellaPergola 2014d). In particular, the study of a Jewish population (or of any
other subpopulation) requires addressing three main problems:
1) Defining the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing
the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task initself;2) Identifying the group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishingand selecting the target group from the rest of the population—primarily by systematic
canvassing of populations and personally ascertaining personal identifications. Identificationis also often performed through membership lists, distinctive Jewish names, areas ofresidence, or other random or non-random procedures; and
3) Covering the target group through appropriate field work—through face-to-face interviews,
by telephone, by mail, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience ofsocial research, and contrary to ideal procedures, the definitional task is performed at thestage of identification, and the identification task is performed at the stage of actual
fieldwork.
It thus clearly appears that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies mostly on
operational, not prescriptive, definitional criteria. The main conceptual aspects, besides being
rooted in social theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility—not the least,
available research budgets. The ultimate empirical step—obtaining relevant data from relevant
persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In
recent years, as response rates and cooperation rates have significantly decreased in social
surveys (Keeter et al. 2017), the amount, content, and validity of information gathered have been
affected detrimentally. While response rates for Jewish surveys tend to be much better than
general surveys, the quality of the data is certainly impacted.
But no method exists to counter these decreases in response rates and cooperation rates.
Therefore, research findings reflect, with varying degrees of sophistication, only that which ispossible to uncover, namely the degree of indifference to or involvement with feeling Jewish byrespondents. Something that cannot be uncovered directly can sometimes be estimated throughvarious imperfect indirect techniques. However, there exist unsurmountable limits to what researchmethodologies can deliver. For example, large representative samples and small qualitative
studies are not interchangeable regarding the answers they can provide to specific researchquestions. Beyond that, we enter the virtual world of beliefs, hopes and fears, myths, andcorporate interests. No methodology exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of theseclaims—at least not within the limits of a non-fiction and non-public-agenda driven work such as
this.

9

Keeping these limits in mind, four major definitional concepts will be considered here to provide
serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography worldwide (Figure 3): (a) thecore Jewish population (CJP)—the group who consider Judaism their mutually exclusive
identification framework, subdivided among those who do see or do not see religion as a major
avenue for identification (Jewish only, religion: Circle 1 in Figure 3; Jewish only, no religion: Circle
2 in the Figure); (b) the population with Jewish parent(s) (JPP)—subdivided among those who
say they are partly Jewish because their identity is split between two or more different and relevant
identification frameworks (Circle 3), and those who say they are not Jewish but have Jewish
background in the form of at least one Jewish parent (Circle 4). Taken together Circles 3 and 4
may also be referred to as the “Jewish Connected” population; (c) the enlarged Jewish
population (EJP)—subdivided between others who say they have Jewish background but not a
Jewish parent (Circle 5), and all non-Jewish household members who live in households withJews (Circle 6); and (d) the Law of Return population (LRP) (Circle 7).
This typology is relevant because not only it does mark-off alternative population definition
approaches but it also delineates different analytic approaches grounded on alternative social
theories as well as different possible Jewish institutional strategies in designating the respective
catchment constituencies. More detail on these definitions is presented in the Appendix. It is
important to realize that the categories in Figure 3 are not static but continuous passages occur
across the different circles, from center to periphery and vice-versa, and from the whole
configuration outside, and vice-versa. Further definitional extensions (not shown in Figure 3) may
address those additional non-Jewish persons who feel some degree of affinity with Judaism,
sometimes because their more distant ancestors were Jewish or because of other personal
cultural or social connections with Jews. Moreover, some studies may have reached people
whose ancestors ever were Jewish regardless of the respondents' present identification. Several
socio-demographic surveys indeed ask about the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some
population surveys, however, do ask about more distant ancestry. Historians may wish to engage
in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived or of how many persons today are descendantsof those Jews—for example, Conversos who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle
Ages, or the descendants of Jews who lived during the Roman Empire, or the Lost Tribes (Parfitt
2002). The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent
studies of population genetics (Hammer et al. 2000; Behar et al. 2004; Behar et al. 2010; Tian etal. 2015). These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present study.
The adoption of increasingly extended definitional criteria by individual researchers and by
Jewish organizations tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on
population estimates beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical coredefinition. These decisions may reflect local needs and sensitivities, but tend to limit the actual
comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of different Jewish populations at one
given time. As noted, a more coherently comparative approach is followed here. The estimatespresented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, country, andmajor metropolitan area, are consistently anchored to the concept of core Jewish population. The
core definition is indeed the necessary starting point for any broader definition such as the
population with Jewish parents, the enlarged definition, or the Law of Return definition (see detailin the Appendix table).

10

Fig. 3 Configuring and defining contemporary Jewish populations, 2018
1-2 = Core Jewish population (CJP)
1 to 4 = Population with Jewish parent(s) (JPP)
1 to 6 = Enlarged Jewish population (EJP)
1 to 7 = Law of Return population (LRP)
Areas represented are not proportional to actual populations

Data Sources
The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported below reflect a prolonged andcontinuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data
collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars andinstitutions in many countries, including access to unpublished databases regarding current
estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of worldwide estimates for the
Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties (Ritterband
et al. 1988; DellaPergola 2014c and 2014d). The problem of data consistency is particularly acute,given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish
communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic
framework for Jewish population studies, data users should be aware of these difficulties and of
the inherent limitations of Jewish population estimates.
Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish
demographic picture have expanded significantly. These data consist of national population
censuses, national population registers, national and international public and private sponsoredsurveys, and national or Jewish community records of vital statistics, migration, and conversions.
Some of this ongoing data compilation is part of coordinated efforts aimed at strengthening Jewish
11population research by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute ofContemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This new evidence generally
confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions.
Jewish population projections undertaken by the author, in light of the latest data, also helpedin the current assessment. It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type ofsource about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either
mutual reinforcement of, or important critical insights into, the available data. A full list of the types
and quality of documentation upon which Jewish population estimates are based is reported in the
Appendix below.

Section 2 World Jewish Population Size and Distribution
World Jewry at the beginning of 2018 was assessed at 14,606,000 and constituted 1.94 per 1000of the world’s total population of 7.536 billion by mid-year 2017 (Population Reference Bureau
2018) (Table 1). Other existing estimates of total world Jewish population and of its geographicaldistribution (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012; Johnson and Zurlo 2014) provide findingsquite close to ours. Unlike our review of hundreds of local and international sources, the Pew
comparisons often rely on percentages of Jews from larger general studies. As Jews are usuallyan extremely small fraction of the total, the resulting Jewish population estimates may be affectedby large sampling errors.
According to our revised estimates, between January 1, 2017 and January 1, 2018, the Jewish
population increased by an estimated 98,400 persons, or 0.68%, versus 100,000 and 0.69% theprevious year. This compares with a total world population growth rate of 1.13%, versus 1.14% theprevious year. World Jewry continued to increase exclusively due to the population increase in
Israel (1.74%) overcoming actual decrease in the Diaspora (-0.17%). For the total population,
growth was 1.4% in less developed countries, and 0.1% in the more developed countries wheremost Jews live. Table 1 offers an overall picture of the Jewish population at the beginning of 2018as compared to 2017 by major geographical regions. The originally published estimates from the2017 American Jewish Year Book were slightly revised reflecting retroactive corrections due toimproved information. These corrections resulted in a net decline of 3,800 persons in the 2017
world Jewry estimate, comprising a subtraction of 4,900 from the previous estimate for Israel, anda net increase of 1,100 in the Jewish Diaspora total.
The number of Jews in Israel increased from the revised 6,446,100 in 2017 to 6,558,100 at the
beginning of 2018, an increase of 112,000, or 1.74%. In contrast, the estimated Jewish populationin the Diaspora decreased from the revised 8,061,500 to 8,047,900—a decrease of 13,600, or 0.17%. These changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU),
from France, from the small remnants of Jewish communities in Moslem countries, and from othercountries, and the internal decrease due to an excess of deaths over births typical of theaggregate of Diaspora Jewry. In 2017, of a total increase of 112,000 core Jews in Israel, 97,000
reflected the balance of births and deaths, and 15,000 reflected the estimated Israel-Diaspora net
migration balance (immigration minus emigration) and to a minor extent net conversion to Judaism(Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Fisher 2015; Nissim 2018). Israel's net migration balance
includes tourists who changed their status to immigrants, returning Israelis, and Israeli citizens
born abroad who entered Israel for the first time. Therefore, internal demographic change
produced 87% of the total Jewish population growth in Israel. According to the Jewish population
estimates reported here, almost all of the Diaspora’s estimated decrease is explained by anegative migration balance. This quite certainly fails to take into account the actually negative vitalbalance in most countries, resulting in higher than real population estimates for the aggregate of
Diaspora Jewry. Adjustments could be needed in the future.

12

Table 1 Estimated core Jewish population, by continents and major geographic regions, 2017 and 2018aJews per1000 total
Percentageb2017 Revised
2018
population
change2018
RegionEstimate
Percentc
Estimate
Percentc
2017-2018
World total
14,507,600
100.0
14,606,000
100.0
0.68
1.94
Diaspora, total
8,061,500
55.6
8,047,900
55.1
-0.17
1.07
US
5,700,000
39.3
5,700,000
39.0
=
17.52
Other
2,361,500
16.3
2,347,900
16.1
-0.58
0.33
Israeld
6,446,100
44.4
6,558,10044.9
1.74
745.52
America, total
6,470,600
44.6
6,469,800
44.3
-0.01
6.44
Northe6,090,100
42.0
6,090,600
41.7
0.01
16.81
Central, Caribbean
57,0000.4
57,000
0.4
0.00
0.26
South
323,500
2.2
322,200
2.2
-0.40
0.76
Europe, total
1,360,500
9.4
1,348,600
9.2
-0.87
1.63
European Unionf
1,081,400
7.5
1,077,500
7.4
-0.36
2.11
FSUg
241,100
1.7
233,500
1.6
-3.15
1.15
Other West20,6000.1
20,500
0.1
-0.49
1.43
Balkansg
17,4000.1
17,100
0.1
-1.72
0.17
Asia, total
6,481,700
44.7
6,593,000
45.1
1.72
1.49
Israeld
6,446,100
44.4
6,558,10044.9
1.74
745.52
FSU
16,7000.1
16,000
0.1
-4.19
0.18
Other
18,9000.1
18,900
0.1
0.00
0.00
Africa, total
74,0000.5
73,600
0.5
-0.54
0.06
Northernh
3,500
0.0
3,400
0.0
-2.86
0.01
Sub-Saharani
70,5000.5
70,200
0.5
-0.43
0.08
Oceaniai
120,800
0.8
121,000
0.8
0.17
2.88
a Jewish population: January 1. Total population: mid-year estimates, 2017. Source: United Nations Population Division (2017),
Population Reference Bureau (2018)b Corrections reflect newly available data for Israel (-4,900), Ireland (+1,000), Latvia (+100), Poland (+1,300), Moldova (-1,300). For
the original estimates see DellaPergola (2018)
c Minor discrepancies due to rounding
d Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
e US and Canada
f Including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania)
g Excluding the Baltic countries. Asian regions of Russian Federation included in Europe
h Including Ethiopia
i Including South Africa and Zimbabwe
j Including Australia and New Zealand

Recently, for sure, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or “return” to Judaism
can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from the FSU, Ethiopia,
some Latin American countries like Peru, and India. To some extent this same phenomenon of
return or first-time accession to Judaism occurs throughout Diaspora communities as well. The
addition of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons tends to contribute both toslowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to a minimal fraction of theincrease in the Jewish population in Israel (DellaPergola 2017c).
Reflecting these global trends, 83.9% of world Jews currently live in two countries, Israel andthe US, and 96.3% are concentrated in the ten countries with the most Jews. In 2018, the G8
countries—the world's eight leading economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
the UK, and the US)—constituted about 89% of the total Diaspora Jewish population. Thus, theaggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment ofworld Jewry’s total size and trends.
Over 44% of the world’s Jews reside in the Americas, with about 42% in North America (Table
1). Over 45% live in Asia, overwhelmingly in Israel. Asia is defined herein to include the Asian
republics of the FSU, but not the Asiatic areas of the Russian Federation and Turkey. Europe,
including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounts for over 9% of thetotal. Little more than 1% of the world’s Jews live in Africa and Oceania combined. Among the
13major geographical regions shown in Table 1, the number of Jews increased between 2017 and2018 in Israel (and, consequently, in Asia as a whole), and minimally in Oceania and in North
America thanks to continuing immigration to Australia and Canada. Jewish population size
decreased to varying degrees in South America, the European Union, other Western Europe, theBalkans, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and Africa.
As noted, in our present study we corrected previously published Jewish population estimatesin light of new information. The most significant recent upward correction of about 300,000 in the
US following the 2013 Pew study generated retrospective revisions of the whole annual series ofdata for the US, total Diaspora, and World Jewry since 2000. Table 2 provides a synopsis of world
Jewish population estimates for 1945 through 2018, as first published each year in the American
Jewish Year Book and as now retroactively corrected, also adjusting all revisions that had beensuggested in previous years. These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from theestimates published by other authors until 1980 and since 1981, by ourselves. Thanks to thedevelopment over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not necessarily thesame revised estimates that appeared annually in the AJYB in the past based on the informationthat was available on each date. It is possible that further retroactive revisions may become
necessary reflecting ongoing and future research.
The time series in Table 2 clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth
globally between the 1960s and the 1990s. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population
estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed byincreases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 282,000 in the
1990s. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, withan increase of 704,000 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel andIsrael's increasing share of the world total. Between 2010 and 2018, world Jewry increased by
772,000, but Israel's Jewish population increased by 854,000 while the total Diaspora Jewish
population decreased by 102,000. Table 2 also demonstrates the slower Jewish population growthrate compared to global population growth, and the declining Jewish share of the world population.
In 2018, the share of Jews among the world population (1.94 per 1,000) was 40.8% of the 1945
estimate (4.75 per 1,000).

Alternative definition frameworks
In Table 3 we evaluate the Jewish population's regional distribution according to several
alternative definitions, as outlined in Figure 3. Updated and revised core Jewish population
estimates (CJP in the table) are presented, along with the total of those who have Jewish parents
regardless of their current identity (JPP); the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of non-Jewish
household members (EJP); and the population eligible for the Law of Return (LRP). Detailed
country estimates are reported in the Appendix Table. The main purpose of these alternative
population boundary definitions is to promote and facilitate comparability across countries. In lightof the preceding discussion of definitions, it is clear that Jewish investigators and/or community
leaders in different countries sometimes follow local definitional criteria that may differ from thecriteria acceptable and used in other countries. This may help explain why Jewish population sizein the US or Canada is evaluated quite differently in the present study and in the US and Canada
reports in this series (Sheskin and Dashefsky; Shahar). In other words, criteria that may beunderstood or even preferred in one country may not be meaningful or acceptable in anothercountry. But in a global study like this, maximum comparability can be ensured only if the same
criteria are followed consistently for all countries. The prime choice unavoidably must fall on aminimum common denominator. However, by showing the implications of different definitions for
Jewish population evaluation, we offer readers an additional tool to better appreciate ongoing
population trends in their countries.

14

Table 2 World core Jewish population estimates: original and revised, 1945-2018
World Jewish Population
World Population
Jews per
Original
RevisedAnnual% Total
Annual %1000 totalYearestimatea
estimatebchangec(millions)d change
population
1945, May 1
11,000,000 11,000,000
2,315
4.75
1950, Jan. 1
11,303,400 11,297,000
0.57
2,526
1.76
4.47
1960, Jan. 1
12,792,800 12,079,000
0.67
3,026
1.82
3.99
1970, Jan. 1
13,950,900 12,585,000
0.41
3,691
2.01
3.41
1980, Jan. 1
14,527,100 12,819,000
0.18
4,449
1.81
2.88
1990, Jan. 1
12,810,300 12,868,000
0.04
5,321
1.74
2.42
2000, Jan. 1
13,191,500 13,150,000
0.22
6,127
1.42
2.15
2005, Jan. 1
13,034,100 13,460,000
0.47
6,514
1.23
2.07
2010, Jan. 1
13,428,300 13,854,000
0.58
6,916
1.20
2.00
2015, Jan. 1
14,310,500 14,311,600
0.64
7,236
0.91
1.98
2016, Jan. 1
14,410,700 14,407,600
0.67
7,336
1.38
1.96
2017, Jan. 1
14,511,100 14,507,600
0.69
7,436
1.14
1.95
2018, Jan. 1
14,606,000
0.68
7,536
1.13
1.94
a As published in the American Jewish Year Book, various years. Some estimates reported here as of Jan. 1 were originallypublished as of Dec. 31 of the previous yearb Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: The A. Harman
Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalemc Based on revised estimates, except latest yeard Mid-year estimates. Source: United Nations Population Division (2017), Population Reference Bureau (2018)
Table 3 Jewish population by major regions, core definition and expanded definitions (rough estimates), 1/1/2018
DifferenceCore
Population Enlarged
Law of
Percent
LRP – CJP
Jewishwith Jewish Jewish
Returnincrease
populationa parentsb
population populationd
Percent
LRP
Region
CJP
JPP
EJPc
LRP
Numberdistribution over CJPWorld total
14,606,000 17,794,400 20,687,800
23,472,400 8,866,400 100.0
61
North America
6,090,600
8,450,200 10,550,300
12,700,400 6,609,800 74.5
109
Latin America
379,200
514,900
627,800
707,000
327,800
3.7
86European Unione
1,077,500
1,317,200
1,581,300
1,855,800
778,300
8.8
72
FSU in Europee
233,500
440,700
612,500
844,000
610,500
6.9
261
Rest of Europe
37,60046,80053,20059,90022,3000.3
59Israelf
6,558,100
6,758,200
6,958,300
6,958,300
400,200
4.5
6
FSU in Asia
16,00027,20038,60053,30037,3000.4
233Rest of Asia
18,90023,60027,10030,40011,5000.1
61Africa73,60081,90088,90096,90023,3000.3
32
Oceania
121,000
133,700
149,800
166,400
45,4000.5
38a Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same
household, are identified by him/her as Jews, and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who
claim no current religious or ethnic identity
b Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish
parentc Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent;and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)
d Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identificatione The Former Soviet Union Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are included in the European Unionf Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

15

Starting from the core Jewish population estimate of 14,606,000 (CJP) in 2018, if we add
persons who state they are partly Jewish and non-Jews who have Jewish parents, a broader
global aggregate population estimate of 17,794,400 (JPP) is obtained. By adding non-Jewish
members of Jewish households, an enlarged estimate obtains of 20,687,800 (EJP). Finally, under
the comprehensive three-generation and spouse provisions of Israel's Law of Return, the total
Jewish and non-Jewish aliyah-eligible population can be roughly estimated at 23,472,400 (LRP).
The US holds a significantly larger enlarged (EJP) population living in households with Jews orother persons with Jewish background than Israel—roughly 10 million compared to 6,758,200,
respectively.
The results, though tentative, provide interesting indications about the total size andgeographical distribution of the populations more or less closely attached to the core Jewish
population. The global total of persons who have a Jewish parent (JPP) (17,794,400), regardlessof their own identification, stands 3,188,400 higher than the 14,606,000 core Jewish population.
The total number of household members with at least one core Jew in the household (EJP) isestimated at an additional increment of 2,893,400. Finally, the total eligible for the Law of Return(LRP) is roughly estimated at 23,472,400, an additional increment of 2,874,600. All in all, thedifference between the Law of Return population (LRP) and the core Jewish population (CJP) is8,866,400. Of these roughly estimated nearly 9 million partly Jewish, somewhat Jewishconnected, or otherwise included non-Jews, 74.5% live in North America, 8.8% in the EU, 7.3% in
the FSU Republics in Europe and Asia, 4.5% in Israel, 3.7% in Latin America, and 1.2% in othercountries.
The relative impact of the various population definitions linking the core Jewish population(CJP) and the Law of Return population (LRP) is quite different in the three main geographicaldivisions considered in Figure 4. Since the impact of intermarriage is much lower in Israel thanelsewhere, the extensions beyond the core in Israel are quite limited and primarily reflect
immigration of intermarried households and, more recently, births in Israel from these households.
In other communities outside the US and Israel, the graphic portrays the significant expansion of
population aggregates around the CJP. One finally notes that with the emigration—mainly to
Israel—of core Jews, the number of other people connected in some way to Judaism does notnecessarily diminish across world Jewish communities. Indeed, their propensity to change countryof residence may be lower than among core Jews, but they remain nonetheless as a more or lesssubmerged component of the global Jewish population configuration. On the other hand, with thepassing of time, as more core Jews pass because of aging, and more of those non-Jews directly
related pass too for the same reason, the more distant circles may eventually lose their linkage tothe core collective.
Greater detail is provided in Figure 5 on the respective weight of the different population
components within the broader Law of Return population in each of the 18 largest Jewish
populations worldwide. Countries where the core Jewish population constitutes a larger sharerelative to the Law of Return definition include South Africa, Australia, the UK, France, Belgium,
Mexico, and Chile. Countries where the core constitutes the lowest share of the Law of Return
definition include Ukraine, Russia, Hungary, Germany, and the US.

16

Fig. 4 Core and extended Jewish populations in the United States, Israel, and other countries, thousands, 2018

Fig. 5 Eighteen largest Core, Jewish Parentage, Extended, and Law of Return Jewish populations, percentage distributions, 201817

Section 3 Major Regions and Countries
The Jewish population in the Americas, estimated at 6,469,800 in 2018, is predominantly
concentrated in the US (5,700,000, or 88% of the total Americas), followed by Canada (390,500,6%), South America (322,200, 5%), and Central America and the Caribbean (57,000, 1%) (Table
1 and Appendix table). Since the 1960s, the Jewish population has been generally decreasing inCentral and South America, reflecting emigration motivated by recurring economic and security
concerns (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1985; DellaPergola 1987, 2008a, 2011b). Panama and
Mexico were the exceptions and absorbed Jewish migrants from other countries. In the Miami
Jewish community, the number of members of households containing a Jewish adult from Latin
American countries increased from roughly 18,000 in 2004 to 24,500 in 2014 (Sheskin 2015b). In
neighboring Broward County, the same measure increased from 5,300 in 1997 to 26,500 in 2016
(Sheskin 2017). Between 2001 and 2017, the total number of immigrants from Latin America to
Israel surpassed 25,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics), including many persons who arehighly educated and highly involved in Jewish life (Bokser Liwerant et al. 2015). However, outside
the mainstream of the established Jewish community, increased interest in Judaism has appeared
among real or putative descendants of Conversos whose ancestors converted to Christianity
under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth century. Some of these
Converso communities have been trying to create permanent frameworks to express their Jewish
identity, in part locally, in part through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In thelong run, such a phenomenon might lead to some expansion of the Jewish population, especiallyin smaller communities in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries.
Persons with such backgrounds are also migrating to Israel (Torres 2017).
The Jewish population in Europe, estimated at 1,348,600 in 2018, is increasingly concentrated
in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU). The EU, comprising 28
countries prior to the June 2016 secession vote of the UK (still not fully implemented), had anestimated total of 1,077,500 Jews in 2018 (80% of the continent’s total). The momentous politicaltransformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union brought aboutsignificant changes in the structure of Jewish communities in Europe. Some revitalization of
Jewish community life in the western countries occurred through immigration mainly from North
Africa and the Middle East but also from the FSU. But more recently, economic recession andrising perceptions of antisemitism across the continent have brought about growing Jewish
dissatisfaction and emigration (DellaPergola 2017b; Staetsky 2017; Staetsky et al. 2013;
European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013). Total emigration from the EU to Israel
reached 8,406 in 2015 but diminished to 5,570 in 2016 and 4,268 in 2017. In spite of the unifying
project and process, Europe is much more politically fragmented than the US, making it moredifficult to create a homogeneous Jewish population database. Nevertheless, several studies haveattempted to create such analytic frames of reference (Graham 2004; Kovacs and Barna 2010;
DellaPergola 1993, 2010b; Staetsky et al. 2013). The EU’s expanding format symbolized an
important historical landmark, now put under major stress after the 2016 exit of the UK from theEU (known as Brexit). Disagreement about the possible inclusion of Turkey, with its large Muslim
population and its mostly Middle Eastern location, reflect the unsolved dilemma of defining
Europe’s own cultural identity and geopolitical boundaries. The four former Soviet republics inEurope (excluding the three Baltic republics) have a Jewish population of 233,500 (17.3% of thecontinental total). The FSU is the area where in absolute numbers Jewish population has
diminished the most since 1991 (Tolts 2008, 2014, and 2015; Konstantinov 2007). Jewish
population decrease continued, reflecting emigration, an overwhelming excess of Jewish deaths
over Jewish births, high intermarriage rates, and low rates of Jewish identification among thechildren of intermarriages. The ongoing process of demographic decrease is being alleviated tosome extent by the revival of Jewish educational, cultural, and religious activities supported byAmerican and Israeli Jewish organizations (Gitelman 2003). Nevertheless, total migration to Israel
from the FSU steadily continued with 14,687 in 2015, 14,471 in 2016, and 16,122 in 2017 out of a
total of 26,333 (61%) new immigrants.
18

Our 2018 assessment of the total core Jewish population for the 15 FSU republics in Europe
and Asia was 258,600, of whom 242,600 are in Europe (including 9,100 in the three Baltic
republics already accounted for in the EU) and 16,000 are in Asia. Almost as many non-Jewish
household members created an enlarged Jewish population nearly twice as large as the core
(Tolts 2006, 2007, 2011, and 2015). A similar number of further eligible persons would probably
lead to a Law of Return population approaching 928,000 for the whole of the FSU. All other
European countries not part of the EU or the FSU, including Turkey, combined comprised 37,600
core Jews (3% of the European total).
The Jewish presence in Asia is mostly affected by trends in Israel which accounts for morethan 99% of the continental total. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of theother countries in Asia account each for less than one-half of one percent of the total. Clearly, thefast economic development in Southeast Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, andespecially China, is attracting Jewish professionals, businesspeople, and technicians. The
numbers are still small but growing.
The Jewish population in Africa is mostly concentrated in South Africa (about 94% of thecontinental total). Immigration continued to produce some increase in Jewish population in
Oceania where Australia accounts for 94% of the total.
Reflecting global Jewish population stagnation accompanied by an increasing concentration ina few countries, 99% of world Jewry in 2018 lived in the largest 22 Jewish communities, each
evaluated at 15,000 or more. Excluding Israel, 98% of Diaspora Jewry lived in the 21 largest
communities of the Diaspora, including 71% in the US (Table 4). Besides the two major Jewish
populations (Israel and the US), each comprising over five million persons, another sevencountries each had more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three were in Western Europe (France, theUK, and Germany); one in Eastern Europe (Russia); one in North America (Canada); one in SouthAmerica (Argentina); and one in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in
global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West's
relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances vis-á-vis the Jewish
presence.
The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed
Western countries is accompanied by the persistence of a higher share of Jews among the total
population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country's total population tends to be directly related tothe country’s level of development (Table 5). Regarding core Jewish populations in 2018, theshare of Jews out of the total population was 745.5 per 1000 in Israel (including Jews in East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bankand Gaza). Israel's population high rate of Jewishness obviously reflects its special positioning in
Jewish identity perceptions, but Israel also has become a developed country, and, as such,
attractive to prospective migrants. In the US, the core Jewish population represented 17.5 per1000 of total population; Jews comprised 3.7 per 1000 total population on average in the otherseven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 1.9 per 1000 on average in the other 13 countries with
15,000 or more Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries which comprise the overwhelming
majority (82%) of world population.

19

Table 4 Countries with largest core Jewish populations, 1/1/2018% of total Jewish Population
In the world
In the diasporaCore Jewish%
Cumulative%%
Cumulative%
Rank
Country
populationb
1
Israela6,558,100
44.9
44.9
2
United States
5,700,000
39.0
83.9
70.8
3
France453,000
3.1
87.0
5.6
4
Canada390,500
2.7
89.7
4.9
5
United Kingdom
290,000
2.0
91.7
3.6
6
Argentina
180,300
1.2
92.9
2.2
7
Russia172,000
1.2
94.1
2.1
8
Germany
116,000
0.8
94.9
1.4
9
Australia
113,400
0.8
95.7
1.4
10
Brazil
93,200
0.6
96.3
1.2
11
South Africa
69,000
0.5
96.8
0.9
12
Ukraine50,000
0.3
97.1
0.6
13
Hungary
47,400
0.3
97.4
0.6
14
Mexico40,000
0.3
97.7
0.5
15
Netherlands
29,800
0.2
97.9
0.4
16
Belgium
29,200
0.2
98.1
0.4
17
Italy
27,500
0.2
98.3
0.3
18
Switzerland
18,600
0.1
98.4
0.2
19
Chile
18,300
0.1
98.6
0.2
20
Uruguay
16,700
0.1
98.7
0.2
21
Turkey15,000
0.1
98.8
0.2
22
Sweden15,0000.1
98.9
0.2
a Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
b Not applicable

20

b

70.8
76.5
81.3
84.9
87.2
89.3
90.7
92.1
93.3
94.2
94.8
95.4
95.9
96.2
96.6
96.9
97.2
97.4
97.6
97.8
98.0

Table 5 Largest core Jewish populations per 1,000 total population and Human Development Indices, 1/1/2018
Core
Jews per
HDI
JewishTotal1000 total
ranka
Rank Country
population population
population
2015
1
Israelb
6,558,100
8,796,700
745.5
19
2
United States
5,700,000
325,400,000
17.5
10
3
France453,000
65,040,000
7.0
214Canada390,500
36,700,000
10.6
10
5
United Kingdom
290,000
66,400,000
4.4
166Argentina
180,300
44,300,000
4.1
45
7
Russia172,000
146,800,000
1.2
498Germany
116,000
83,100,000
1.4
49Australia
113,400
24,500,000
4.6
2Total Ranks 3-9
1,715,200
466,840,000
3.7
21.0
10
Brazil
93,200207,900,000
0.4
79
11
South Africa
69,00056,500,000
1.2
119
12
Ukraine50,00042,300,000
1.2
84
13
Hungary
47,4009,800,000
4.8
4314
Mexico40,000129,200,000
0.3
77
15
Netherlands
29,80017,100,000
1.7
716Belgium
29,20011,300,000
2.6
22
17
Italy
27,50060,500,000
0.5
26
18
Switzerland
18,6008,500,000
2.2
2
19
Chile
18,30018,400,000
1.0
38
20
Uruguay
16,7003,500,000
4.8
5421
Turkey15,00080,900,000
0.2
71
22
Sweden15,00010,100,000
1.5
14Total Ranks 10-22
469,700
543,100,000
0.9
48.9Rest of the world
163,000 6,191,660,300
0.0
± 100
a HDI The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education and income (measured as US dollar purchasepower parity) among the country’s total population. See: United Nations Development Programme 2016b Total Jewish population of Israel includes the Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Total
population includes all residents of Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but only the Jewish residents and nonJewish members of Jewish households of the West Bank
c Average HDI rank for group of countries

To further illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level ofsocioeconomic development of a country, Table 5 reports the latest available Human
Development Index (HDI) for each country (United Nations Development Programme 2016). The
HDI—a composite measure of a society's level of education, health, and income—provides a
general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does notnecessarily reflect the actual characteristics of the members of those Jewish communities. The
latest available HDI country ranks reported in the table are for 2015. Of the 22 countries listed, six
are included among the top ten HDIs among 188 countries ranked (Australia, Switzerland,
Germany, the Netherlands, US, and Canada). Another five countries are ranked 11th to 25th
(Sweden, the UK, Israel, France, and Belgium), five more are between 26th and 50th (Italy, Chile,
Hungary, Argentina, and Russia), five are between 51st and 100th (Uruguay, Turkey, Mexico,
Brazil, and Ukraine), and one (South Africa) occupies a lower rank (119th), pointing to lesser
development in the host society. For the two countries with the largest Jewish populations, the US
was ranked 10th and Israel, 19th. It is important to keep in mind that Jewish communities may
display social and economic profiles significantly better than the average population of theirrespective countries, but nonetheless the general societal context does affect the quality of life ofeach individual, Jews included. Remarkably, all of the 9 largest Jewish populations, amounting
together to 95.7% of world Jewry, live in countries whose HDI ranks among the top 50.

21

Time comparisons
The 70 years since the independence of the state of Israel witnessed dramatic changes in thegeographic, socioeconomic, and cultural profile of world Jewry. As an illustration of the interveningchanges, we report the world distribution of core Jewish population by major geographical regionsat three points in time: 1948, 1980, and 2018 (Figure 6).

Fig. 6 Core Jewish populations by major regions, 1948, 1980, 2018, thousands

Two opposing trends emerge from this temporal comparison: on the one hand, Israel’s Jewish
population increased from being marginal in 1948 to being the central component of world Jewish
population by 2018; and on the other hand, we see the decline, if not disappearance of, the major
Jewish population centers in Eastern Europe, the FSU, and the Islamic countries of the Middle
East and North Africa. Declines of a lesser scale also appear in Latin America and Southern
Africa. North America, and to a lesser extent Western Europe, maintained relatively stable Jewish
population sizes, although in the latter case through a significant turnaround of periods ofimmigration and periods of emigration. As already noted, the tendency over time was muchgreater consolidation of world Jewry in the two major centers in the US and Israel, versus a much
more dispersed Jewish population worldwide shortly after the end of World War II.
A more detailed picture of the changes intervening between 1980 and 2018 is illustrated inTable 6. Here we compare the numbers and ranks for the 24 countries with a Jewish population ofat least 30,000 Jews in 1980—based on revised estimates and using the list of countries extant
upon the breakup of the Former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and the former
Czechoslovakia. Striking changes occurred in the population sizes and rankings during the 38
years from 1980-2018. Quantitatively, the most remarkable was Israel's Jewish population
doubling from 3,282,700 to 6,558,100 (99.8%). The greatest percentage growth occurred inGermany (+236.2%). Absolute population increases were recorded in Australia (+62.0%), Canada(+26.8%), and Mexico (+14.3%). The US Jewish population remained about the same (+0.2%).
The other 18 countries witnessed Jewish population reduction, with five countries losing more than
90% of their 1980 population (the four former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan,and Moldova, and Ethiopia). An entirely different ranking of major communities consequently
22emerged. The top 5 in 1980 were the US, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, and France; in 2018 they had
become Israel, US, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Table 6 Largest core Jewish populations 1980 and 2018
Country
1980
Rank
2018
United States
5,690,000
1
5,700,000
Israel
3,282,700
2
6,558,100
Russia713,400
3
172,000
Ukraine634,420
4
50,000France535,000
5453,000
United Kingdom
390,000
6
290,000
Canada308,000
7
390,500
Argentina
242,0008
180,300
Belarus135,540
9
9,500
Brazil
110,000
10
93,200South Africa
108,000
11
69,000
Uzbekistan
100,070
12
3,200
Moldova
80,19013
2,000Australia
70,000
14
113,400
Hungary
65,00015
47,400Azerbaijan
44,34016
7,800
Uruguay
40,00017
16,700
Mexico35,00018
40,000Germany
34,50019
116,000
Belgium
33,00020
29,200Romania
33,000
21
9,100
Italy
32,00022
27,500Iran
32,000238,500
Ethiopia
32,000
24
100

Rank
2
1
7
12
3
5
4
6
25
10
11
37
44
9
13
29
17
14
8
15
26
16
28
78

% change
0.2%
99.8%-75.9%-92.1%-15.3%-25.6%
26.8%-25.5%-93.0%-15.3%-36.1%-96.8%-97.5%
62.0%-27.1%-82.4%-58.3%
14.3%
236.2%-11.5%-72.4%-14.1%-73.4%-99.7%

Ranks
-1
+1
-4
-8
+2
+1
+3
+2
-16
=
=
-26
-31
+5
+2
-13
=
+4
+11
+5
-5
+6
-5
-54

The geographical realignment of the world Jewish population reflects both their past sufferance
from political discrimination and persecution as well as to socioeconomic underdevelopment andlack of democracy in the various countries that lost Jewish population. The consequent massmigration from those countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, generated large
Jewish population decline. On the other hand, countries that offered a wider range of opportunities
and greater freedom witnessed steady Jewish population growth or at least stability. In theprocess, the correspondence greatly increased between a higher standard of human development
in a country and the share of Jews among the same country's population. Figure 7 demonstrates
the correlation and explanatory power of the Human Development Index (HDI) upon thepercentage of Jews in world countries in 1980 and in 2018 (expressed on a logarithmic scale forbetter graphical display, where each country is represented by one dot). In 1980, no significant
correlation existed, as shown by the amorphous cloud of country dots. HDI explains only 1.5% of
the variance in world Jewish population density per 1000 inhabitants. By 2018, Jewish population
had become largely adjusted to the global distribution of human development—the higher the HDI,
the higher the proportion of Jews in society arrayed along the regression (or trend line)—with HDI
explaining an impressive 44.2% of Jewish population density variance. These data andinterpretation also offer a promising key to predicting where Jewish populations might grow or
decline in the future following further developments in the global system of nations.

23

Fig. 7 World countries by Human Development Index (HDI) and number of Jews per 1000 of total population, 1980 and 2017

Major Cities
Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among
countries, but also significantly within countries, and have resulted in a preference for Jews to livein major metropolitan areas. Within metropolitan areas, too, Jews have manifested uniquepropensities to settle or resettle in specific neighborhoods that were more compatible with theirsocioeconomic status, and/or more attractive to them because of the vicinity of employment or
Jewish community facilities (DellaPergola and Sheskin 2015). Most metropolitan areas include
extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions ofurban areas vary by country. It is not easy to create a truly standardized picture of Jews in major
cities, as some of the available figures refer to different years and only roughly compare with eachother regarding Jewish population definitions and evaluation methods. For example, in the case ofa recent Jewish population study of the service area of UJA/Federation of New York (Cohen,
Ukeles, and Miller 2012), we subtracted about 100,000 individuals of the 1,538,000 that were
included in the Jewish population count because they were neither born Jewish nor had converted
to Judaism. We therefore did not consider them part of the core Jewish population. This correction
affected our estimate for the New York Combined Statistical Area (CSA). On similar grounds, we
introduced a correction in the Jewish population estimate for the San Francisco Bay CSA (Phillips2005). Note that elsewhere in this volume, Sheskin and Dashefsky did not use these corrections
as they rely mostly on the estimates resulting from definitions used by the local Jewish
federations.
24

The unequivocal outcome of the overwhelmingly urban concentration of Jewish populations
globally is shown by the fact that in 2018 more than half (54.2%) of world Jewry lived in only five
metropolitan areas (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume).
These five areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were TelAviv, New York, Jerusalem, Los Angeles, and Haifa (Table 7). Over two-thirds (66.9%) of world
Jewry lived in the five previously mentioned largest areas plus the following six: South Florida,
Washington/Baltimore, Philadelphia, San Francisco/San Jose, and Boston. Paris' position reflects
Jewish emigration from France. In 2018, the 17 largest metropolitan concentrations of Jewish
population, each with 100,000 Jews or more, encompassed 76.9% of all Jews worldwide.
Table 7 Metropolitan areas (CSAs) with core Jewish populations above 100,000, 1/1/2018% Jews% of world JewishCoreout ofpopulation
Jewishtotal
Rank Metropolitan areaa
Country population population %Cumulative%1

Tel Avivb

Israel

3,523,200

91.4

24.1

24.1

2

New York CSAc

U.S.

2,169,000

9.5

14.9

39.0

3
4
5

Jerusalemd
Los Angeles CSAe
HaifafIsraelU.S.
Israel911,000
686,000
621,300

72.7
3.6
67.2

6.2
4.7
4.3

45.2
49.9
54.2

6

South Florida CSAg

U.S.

536,300

7.9

3.7

57.8

7
8
9
10
11

Washington/Baltimore CSAh
Philadelphia CSAi
San Francisco/San Jose CSAj
Boston CSAk
Chicago CSAl

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

414,200
309,100
303,800
297,900
294,700

4.2
4.3
3.4
3.6
3.0

2.8
2.1
2.1
2.0
2.0

60.7
62.8
64.9
66.9
68.9

12

ParismFrance277,000

2.3

1.9

70.8

13

Be'er Shevan

Israel220,100

58.4

1.5

72.3

14

LondonoU.K.

195,000

1.0

1.3

73.7

15
16
17

Torontop
Buenos Airesq
Atlanta CSA

CanadaArgentina
U.S.

190,000
159,000
120,600

3.1
1.2
1.8

1.3
1.1
0.8

75.0
76.0
76.9

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions vary by country.
The US metropolitan areas are the Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs) as defined by the US Office of Management and Budget. A table of the
population of the top 20 CSAs can be found in the US Population Report. Some of the US estimates may include non-core Jews
b Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, and Ashdod Subdistrict. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikwa, Bat Yam,
Holon, Rishon LeZiyon, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000
c Our adjustment of original data based on core Jewish population definition. About 100,000 individuals who we see as part of the enlarged Jewish
population were subtracted from the original population estimates by Cohen et al. (2012). This is the New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT-PA Combined
Statistical Area, including much of southeastern NY, western CT, and northern NJ. Principal cities: New York, NY; White Plains, NY; Newark, NJ;
Edison, NJ; Union, NJ; Wayne, NJ; and New Brunswick, NJ
d Includes Jerusalem District and parts of the Judea and Samaria District. The geographic extent of the Jerusalem metropolitan area was redefinedin 2014, leading to a diminished population estimate.
e Includes Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana area, Riverside-San Bernardino and Ventura County areas
f Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District. The geographic extent of the Haifa metropolitan area was considerably reduced in 2014,leading to a diminished population estimate
g Includes Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Okeechobee, and Indian River Counties. Not including 57,100 part-year
residentsh Includes the District of Columbia, northern Virginia, Montgomery County, Prince George’s County, and the Baltimore-Towson area
i Includes Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington area (PA-NJ-DE-MD) and much of southern NJ,
j Our adjustment of original data based on core Jewish population definition. About 40,000 individuals who we see as part of the enlarged Jewish
population were subtracted from the original population estimates by Phillips (2005). Includes the San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward area, Napa, San
Benito, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, and Sonoma
k Includes Boston-Cambridge-Newton, Bristol, Worcester, southern New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and parts of east Connecticutl Includes Chicago-Joliet-Naperville area (IL-IN-WI)
m Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95
n Includes Beersheba Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District. The Beersheva metropolitan area was considerably reduced in 2014, leading
to a diminished population estimateo Greater London and contiguous postcode areas
p Census Metropolitan Areaq Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area A.M.B.A.

25

The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod
and surpassing 3.5 million Jews by the core definition, largely exceeded that in the New York
CSA, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, andPennsylvania, with 2.17 million Jews. Of the 17 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence,nine were located in the US, four in Israel, and one each in France, the UK, Canada, andArgentina. Nearly all the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations sharedistinct features, such as being national or regional capitals, enjoying higher standards of living,with highly developed infrastructures for higher education and hi-tech, and widespreadtransnational connections. The Tel Aviv area also featured the highest percent of core Jewish
among total population (91.4%), followed at distance by Jerusalem (72.7%), Haifa (67.2%), andBeersheba (58.4%). In the diaspora, the highest percent of Jews in a metropolitan area was in
New York (9.5%), followed by South Florida (7.9%), Philadelphia (4.3%). and San Francisco/San
Jose (4.2%),
Unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on
urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple
residences. Especially in the US, the differences may be quite significant, in the range of tens of
thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. The respective estimates of partyear residents were excluded from the estimates in Table 7. Part-year residency is related to bothclimate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also
increasingly occur internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also own or rent anapartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, or vice versa, and some may even commute weekly (Pupko2013).

Section 4 Major Determinants of Demographic Change
Changes in the size and composition of populations reflect a chain of interrelated factors each ofwhich in turn depends on a complex array of explanatory determinants. We briefly focus here on
two of these factors: international migration and age structure.

International Migration
Over the past decades, shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world wereprimarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, international migrationof Jews is quite imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants
as such by single country of origin (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Israeli data, compared over
several successive years, may provide, under certain conditions, a sense of the intensity ofparallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in thetiming, volume, direction, and characteristics of migrants (DellaPergola 2009a; Amit et al. 2010).
Some countries do have records of annual numbers of migrants from Israel, though notdistinguishing between Jews and non-Jews (US Department of Homeland Security 2013; Eurostat2015). Jewish organizations, like HIAS—formerly the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS 2013)
in the US or the Zentralwohlfhartsstelle in Germany, record Jewish immigrants on a yearly basis,but the global picture of Jewish migration remains incomplete.
Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the former Soviet
Union (FSU) opened its doors to emigration at the end of 1989. Of the estimated over 1.7 million
FSU migrants between 1989 and 2017 including non-Jewish household members, over one million
migrated to Israel, over 300,000 to the US, and over 225,000 to Germany. Israel's share of thetotal increased from 18% in 1989 to 83% in the peak years of 1990-1991. It then decreased to
41% in 2002-2004 and increased again to 71% in 2010-2012. The US significantly lost weight as adestination for FSU migrants since the onset of the 21st century, as was the parallel decrease in
the attractiveness of Germany since 2005. These remarkable increases and decreases reflect thechanging incidence of push factors in the FSU—as a whole and throughout its different regional
26

realities—during times of rapid geopolitical change and shifts in economic opportunities, as well as
real or expected disruptions in the societal environment affecting Jewish life. They also reflect thedifferent and significantly variable legal provisions related to migration and socioeconomic optionsin the main countries of destination.
Beginning with 1948, Israel was the main recipient of Jewish international migration. It
gathered 69% of all Jewish migration between 1948 and 1968, and about 60% between 1969 and2015 (Amit and DellaPergola 2016). Clearly migration, or rather a migration balance producing a
net surplus to Israel, decreases the Diaspora Jewish population and increases Israel's Jewish
population. Table 8 shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2016 and2017. The data reflect the Law of Return, not the core Jewish population, definition.
In 2017, Jewish international migration slightly increased versus the previous year. In recent
years, the volume of Jewish migration was far from the peaks of the past, due to the increasing
concentration of Jews in more developed countries and the decreasing Jewish population in themain areas of Jewish emigration. Overall, a clearly negative relationship prevails between thequality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to emigrate. At the same time, perceptions
and experiences of mounting antisemitism in some countries, particularly in France, havestimulated Jewish emigration. In the foreseeable future a continuation of moderate levels of
migration can be expected, provided that current geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions are
not seriously disrupted across the global system, especially in Europe. From this point of view, the2016 vote by the British to secede from the European Union might carry significant consequencesin the longer term.
In 2017, 26,333 new immigrants arrived in Israel from 91 countries and territories, compared to
25,010 in 2016 (a 5% increase), 27,850 in 2015, 24,066 in 2014, 16,882 in 2013, 16,557 in 2012,
16,892 in 2011, 16,633 in 2010, 14,567 in 2009, and 13,699 in 2008. Migration toward othercountries did not necessarily follow the same patterns of change over the years. Indeed, Israeli
immigration law (the Law of Return) allows for comparatively easier access and immediate
citizenship to Jewish migrants and their families, but the integration difficulties experienced in
Israel by some immigrants may have created a deterrent. One case in point is immigration from
France which, after an all-time peak in 2015 (6,627), declined to 4,147 in 2016 and 3,160 in 2017.
Russia was the main country of origin in 2017 (7,109 immigrants vs. 6,946 in 2016), followed by
Ukraine (7,027 vs. 5,737), France, and the US (2,568 vs 2,534). No other country had more than
1,000 migrants to Israel. Among countries with more than 100 immigrants, increases occurredfrom Belarus (952 in 2017 vs. 632 in 2016), Brazil (619 vs. 569), Turkey (369 vs. 233), South
Africa (282 vs. 213), Uzbekistan (208 vs. 196), Moldova (196 vs. 187), Germany (154 vs. 117),
Australia (140 vs. 101), and Venezuela (128 vs. 70). Declines were recorded from the UK (469 vs.
598), Argentina (247 vs. 248), Kazakhstan (131 vs. 152), Belgium (119 vs.168), Italy (115 vs.
159), Switzerland (86 vs. 104), and Ethiopia (43 vs. 106). Canada remained unchanged at 280. In
2017, immigration to Israel increased from North and South America, the European and Asian
republics of the FSU, Europe other than the EU and the FSU, Asia, Africa, and Oceania, while itdiminished from the EU and Central America. To these figures, one should add several thousand
immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad and entering the country for the first time) and of
returning Israelis, at a time when the Israeli economy was performing relatively better than many
Western countries. This made Israel a reasonably attractive option for international migration.
Figure 8 demonstrates the relationship between the HDI in world countries and the rate of
migration to Israel per 1000 Jews in the same countries. Keeping in mind that 88% of the world
Jewish Diaspora live in countries more developed than Israel and 12% in countries less developed
than Israel, the HDI-aliyah relationship is strongly negative, as shown by the country dots fairly
aligned with the trend line, with a high level of explained variance (32.8%). While it cannot be
disputed that the preference for Israel as a country of destination over competing countries issignificantly affected by Jewish norms and values, aliyah seems nevertheless to follow the logic ofglobal development.

27

Table 8 New immigrants to Israela, by last country of residence, 2016-2017
Country
2016
2017
Country
2016

2016

2017

GRAND TOTALb

25,01026,333

Greece18

9Tadjikistan

07America - Totalb
North America
CanadaUnited States

4,098
2,814
280
2,534

4,225
2,848
280
2,568

Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg

79
17
159
0

52
2
115
1

Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Other Asia
Cambodia

20
196
146
1

24
208
226
0

Central America

144

135

Netherlands

61

50

China

7

9

Bahamas
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Rep.

0
12
11
1

1
16
5
3

PolandPortugal
Romania
Slovenia

14
10
13
0

18
4
10
1

Hong Kong
India
Iraq
Iran

5
52
0
33

7
56
1
131

El Salvador
Guadeloupe
Guatemala

3
0
6

5
8
3

Slovakia
Spain
Sweden

2
72
22

1
88
28

Japan
Korea South
Nepal

0
5
0

2
2
1

14
0
82
15
1,140
248
2
569

1
1
76
16
1,242
247
4
619

United Kingdom
FSU in Europe
BelarusEstonia
LatviaLithuania
Moldova
Russian Federation

598
13,604
632
9
46
31
187
6,946

469
15,369
952
5
49
25
196
7,109

Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Syria
TaiwanThailand
Vietnam
Yemen

0
7
0
1
0
6
1
28

5
3
1
0
1
7
0
0

54
82
15
1
43
56
70

26
74
9
9
57
69
128

UkraineFSU unspecified
Other West Europe
AndorraGibraltar
MonacoNorway

5,737
16
115
2
1
3
3

7,027
6
87
0
1
1
1

Africa - Totalb
Northern Africa
Algeria
Congo
Ethiopia
Kenya
Morocco

409
191
1
0
106
2
68

432
146
0
3
43
0
57

Europe - Totalb

19,52620,197

Switzerland

106

84

Tunisia1443

European Unionc
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria

5,570
40
168
11

4,356
25
119
14

Balkans
Albania
SerbiaTurkey

237
0
4
233

385
5
11
369

SubSaharan Africa
Mauritius
RuandaNigeria

218
4
0
1

286
0
1
1

Croatia
CyprusCzech Republic
Denmark
FinlandFranceGermany

0
6
7
8
1
4,147
117

2
0
13
12
9
3,160
154

Asia - Totalb
FSU in Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan

867
721
29
115
172
152
37

1,001
775
48
131
205
131
21

Tanzania
South Africa
Zimbabwe
Oceania - Total
Australia
Polynesia
New Zealand

0
213
0
109
101
1
7

1
282
1
140
140
0
0

Honduras
Jamaica
MexicoPanamaSouth America
Argentina
Bolivia
BrazilChile
Colombia
EcuadorParaguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

2017

Countrya New immigrants and tourists changing their status to immigrant, not including temporary residents, returning Israelis, and immigrant citizensb Including country unknown
c Not including the Baltic countries
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data

On the other hand, Israel—in part because of its small market and the limits this imposes uponsome employment opportunities—is today probably the main single source of Jewish emigration,
mostly to the US and to other Western countries (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010; Rebhun et al. 2016).
The level of emigration from Israel is overall low, consistent with expectations for a country at
Israel’s level of human development (DellaPergola 2011c). These findings illustrate the primacy ofsocioeconomic determinants related to both the basic level of development of a country and its
current economic situation, along with variations in the stringency of regulations about immigrant
admissions. The effects of ideological, security, and fear-related factors are weaker determinantsof the volume and timing of Israeli immigration and emigration.

28

Fig. 8 World countries by Human Development Index (HDI) and number of immigrants to Israel per 1000 Jews in country of origin,
2017

Age Structures
The age composition of a population is a fundamental mediator between demographic processes
that precede a certain point in time and the processes that unfold after that point. Age structuresare sensitive to the composition of migrants which usually include some over-representation ofyounger adults and their children. In general, populations in the sending countries therefore tend
to become older as a consequence of migration, while populations in the receiving countries tend
to become younger. Exceptions occur when the immigrants include a large share of elderly
persons as has been the case for migration from the FSU to Germany over the past decades.
The birth rate, however, is the main determinant of the age composition of a population. Largecohorts reflecting years of high birth rates, as was the case in the US during the baby-boom years(1946-1964), produces a younger population. A persistent high birth rate, as in Israel, produces an
expanding population in which each cohort is followed by a slightly larger cohort producing agraphical image of a pyramid. Low birth rates produce smaller cohorts which sometimes are
smaller than those born several years before and in the extreme case may produce a graphic
image of an upside down pyramid. In Figure 9, we demonstrate four different age structures
among contemporary Jewish populations, reflecting different stages of demographictransformation. All data refer to the core definition.
Israel in 2016 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics) is the only case where each age group islarger than the one immediately older. The largest age group was 0-14. Israel actually is the only
country in the world with a high child dependency ratio (>45%) along with a relatively high old-age
dependency ratio (≥15%). It is included by the UN in the double dependency category (United
Nations Population Division 2017). At the opposite extreme, Germany in 2018
(Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2018) had an extremely overaged age
distribution, where the largest group is 65 and over. The US in 2013 (Pew Research Center 2013),
and the UK in 2011 (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2012), represent intermediatecases but with some important differences. Both the US and UK Jewish populations underwent
significant aging and had relatively low birth rates during the past 50 years. In the US, the effectsof the baby boom were visible, with the, by far, largest age group being those age 45-64 in 2013,born 1949-1968. There were significantly fewer children age 0-14 than young adults age 15-29. In
29

the UK, aging was significant as well, but the effects of the post-World War II baby boom weresignificantly less and there were more children than young adults in 2011. Such rejuvenationreflected the growing impact of Haredi Jews among the UK total Jewish population.
As a benchmark for future demographic change, these very different age structures portend
very different scenarios. Those countries with large elderly cohorts will likely experience somenumerical decline. Assuming no major future migrations, populations that are currently younger
will have, at least in theory, more of a chance to have children and possibly increase or at least
remain numerically stable.

Fig 9 Age structures of selected Jewish populations, 2011-2018, percentages

Section 5 Jewish Population in Major Countries
We turn now to a concise review of the information available and the criteria followed in updating
the figures for the largest Jewish populations worldwide. The countries are listed in decreasingorder of magnitude of the respective Jewish communities. Given the gradual and slow motion ofdemographic change, besides a few exceptions, we shall not repeat here the detailed descriptionsof sources and patterns that appeared in previous volumes of the American Jewish Year Book andrefer the reader to those previous volumes.

IsraelSince the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Israel is the country with the largest core
Jewish population in the world. It is also the only one displaying a substantial rate of population
growth—1.74% in 2017. With a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) above 3.1 children currently born per
Jewish woman, and a relatively young age composition (27% under age 15 and only 13% age 65
and over) as of 2016, Israel is in all likelihood the only country where Jewish population displays
above-replacement fertility and a number of children twice that of the elderly. Israel’s current
30Jewish fertility rate is higher than in any other developed country and twice or more the current
average of Jewish children among women in most Diaspora Jewish communities (sometimes
called the effective Jewish fertility rate). This reflects not only the large family size of the morereligious Jewish population component, but also a diffused and persistent desire for children
among the moderately traditional and secular, especially among the upwardly mobile(DellaPergola 2009c, 2009d, and 2015b). A moderately positive international migration balancealso helps to keep Israel's Jewish population increasing. Information on religion is mandatory in
official population data regularly collected by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and in
the permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Israel Populationand Migration Authority). Annual data derive from periodic censuses and detailed accountancy ofintervening events (births, deaths, entering the country including immigrants, exiting the country
including emigrants, and conversions). In the case of Jews and Judaism, the defining concept is acombination of religion and ethnicity according to rabbinic law (Halakhah). At the beginning of
2018, Israel’s core Jewish population reached 6,558,100, as against a revised total of 6,446,100 in
2017. A downward adjustment of -4,900 compared to last year's estimate reflects late entries ofdemographic events, including conversions and other revisions of personal status. The revisedcore population combined with the addition of 400,200 "Others"—non-Jewish members ofhouseholds who immigrated under the Law of Return or their Israel-born children—formed anenlarged Jewish population of 6,958,300 in 2018, of which these "Others" constituted 5.8% (Israel
Central Bureau of Statistics). We assume about half of the members of Jewish households who
are not recognized as Jewish by the Rabbinate have one Jewish parent. The Jewish Parent
population of Israel is thus estimated at 6,758,200. For the past several years, the main
component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an
excess of births over deaths. In 2017, 134,630 Jewish births—the highest ever in Israel's history—
and 37,601 Jewish deaths—not the highest ever—produced a net natural increase of 97,029
Jews. This represented 87% of Israel Jews' total growth in 2017. Figure 10 demonstrates thechanges in birth rates and death rates for Jews and Muslims in Israel between 1980 and 2017-18.
The two birth rate lines are in a sense specular, with increases in one population matched bydecreases in the other one and vice versa. A major adjustment toward lower natality occurredamong Israel's Muslims since the end of the 1990s, accompanied by some increase among Jews.
Besides different fertility levels, this largely reflected differences and changes in age compositionsof the respective populations. The latest figures points to a very slight birth rate increase among
Muslims and a tiny decline among Jews. Death rates tended to be low and decreasing among
both populations, but they were constantly lower among Muslims due to their much younger age
composition. These differences crucially affected the respective rates of natural increase with theconsequence that Muslim population growth continued to be significantly higher than that of Jews.
Some implications are discussed below.
At the time of this writing, the final data on all components of population change for 2017 were
not yet released. In 2016, 19,700 Jewish new immigrants and immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens
born abroad who entered the country for the first time) arrived in Israel, out of a total of 30,200(meaning 10,500 were not recorded as Jewish). The net balance of these minus the balance ofIsraelis leaving the country and Israelis returning to the country after a prolonged stay abroad was
14,300. Therefore, an estimated 5,400 Jews joined the number of those who permanently, or in
the long term, reside abroad. These data about Israel's international migration balance point to asteady if moderate level of immigration in comparison to other historical periods, but also to quite
low levels of emigration. In 2017, the total number of new immigrants increased slightly to 26,333
from 25,010 the previous year. The number of converts to Judaism remained only a tiny
percentage of the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent
immigrants (Fisher 2013 and 2015, Waxman 2013, Nissim 2018). In 2016, the net balance of
conversions to and from Judaism was 500, and the same number applied to conversions to andfrom Islam (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics).

31

Fig 10 Births and deaths per 1000 population among Jews and Muslims in Israel, 1980-2018

Turning now to the territorial aggregate of the State of Israel and of the Palestinian Authority,
Table 9 reports the numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members ofJewish households and Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, and foreign
workers, undocumented tourists, and refugees. Each group's total is shown for different territorial
divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, theWest Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the enlarged definition) in each division is also
shown. At the beginning of 2018, of the 6,558,100 core Jews, 5,912,200 lived within Israel's pre1967 borders; 218,500 lived in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem incorporated after 1967; 22,800
on the Golan Heights; and 404,600 lived in the West Bank.
Table 9 Core and enlarged Jewish population, Arab population, foreign workers and refugees in Israel and Palestinian Territory byterritorial divisions, 1/1/2018a

Area
Grand total
State of Israele
Thereof:Pre-1967 borders
East Jerusalemf
Golan Heights
West Bank
Palestinian Territory
West Bank

Others2
400,200

Core
Jewishandothersb
3
6,958,300

Arab
populationand others
46,227,000

Foreignworkersandrefugeesc
5232,300

Total
6
13,417,600

Percentof Jews
andothersd
7
51.9

6,558,100

400,200

6,958,300

1,838,400

232,300

9,029,000

77.1

5,912,200
218,500
22,800404,600

382,100
8,300
1,200
8,600

6,294,300
226,800
24,000413,200

1,470,500
341,700
26,200232,300-

i

i

i

7,997,100
568,500
50,200413,200
4,388,600
2,548,700

78.7
39.9
47.8
14.0h
-

Core
Jewishpopulation
1
6,558,100g

4,388,600
2,548,700

-

Gaza
0
0
0
1,839,900
1,839,900
0.0
a Rounded figures
b Enlarged Jewish populationc All foreign workers, undocumented residents and refugees were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders. Source: Israel
Population and Migration Authority (2018)d Column 3 divided by column 6e As defined by Israel's legal system
f Estimated from Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies (2018)g Included under Palestinian Territory
h Percent of Jews and others out of total population in the West Bank under Israeli or Palestinian Authority jurisdiction
i Included under State of Israel
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Israel Population and Migration Authority; PCBS Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics;
and author's estimates

32

Core Jews represented 74.6% of Israel’s total legal population of 8,796,700, inclusive of
1,838,400 Arabs and others, but excluding 232,300 foreign workers, undocumented tourists andrefugees (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel Statistical Monthly). The latter group comprised
88,171 legal foreign workers, 18,059 undocumented foreign workers, 74,000 tourists whose visas
had expired, 14,778 refuge seekers, and 37,288 illegal entrants (Israel Population and Migration
Authority 2018). Israel's enlarged Jewish population of 6,958,300 represented 79.1% of the State's
total legal population. Israel's Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights,
comprised 20.9% of the total legal population. As shown in Table 9, the enlarged Jewish
population represented 78.7% of total residents within pre-1967 borders (including foreign workers
and refugees), 39.9% in East Jerusalem, 47.8% in the Golan Heights, and 14.0% of the West
Bank's total population. Since 2005, no Jewish population remains in Gaza.
Regarding the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG), in November 2017
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) undertook a new Census which enumerated
4,705,600 persons in WBG, of which 1,875,300 live in Gaza and 2,830,300 live in the West Bank
including 281,200 in East Jerusalem. The Census results were about 250,000 lower than theestimated projection of 4,952,168 available from by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics'
web site (PCBS 2018). The PCBS Jerusalem's population estimate is clearly an undercountbecause of their limited access to the city (PCBS 2008, 2009a, 2009b, and 2018). This would
imply an annual rate of growth of 1.84% since 2007 in the West Bank and 2.84% in Gaza—asagainst 2.40% for Muslims in Israel during the same period (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics).
These growth rates were much lower than in the past and pointed to important process ofdifferentiation within the Arab/Palestine population. Recall that the total rate of growth of Israeli
Jews was 1.74% in 2017 with immigration, and 1.41% without immigration. The Palestinian
population's growth rate in WBG was decreasing as well due to net emigration. According toIsrael's IDF Civilian Administration in Judea and Samaria (2018), the total of Palestinians recordedin the West Bank population register approached 3 million, but this figure did not discountsufficiently for Palestinian residents permanently living abroad. Keeping in mind the data in Figure
10, probably both birth rates and death rates are somewhat higher in the Palestinian Territory thanin Israel and significantly higher than among the Jewish population. Our adjusted population
estimates for WGB at the beginning of 2017 is 4,388,600, of whom 2,548,700 live in the WestBank and 1,839,900 in Gaza. These figures are lower than the Palestinian census because they
discount for persons, students and others, who actually resided abroad for more than one year.
Other much lower estimates of WBG population (e.g. Zimmerman et al. 2005a and 2005b,
Feitelson 2013) rather than ascertained demographic criteria reflect a political stance and should
be dismissed (see also Miller 2015). The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which we haveincluded in Israel's population count, was assessed at 341,700 at the beginning of 2018, andconstituted 38.0% of Jerusalem's total population of 900,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics,
Choshen et al. 2010 and 2012, Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies 2015, Jerusalem Institute for
Policy Research 2016, DellaPergola 2008b). By summing the 1,838,400 Arab population of Israel,including East Jerusalem, and the 4,388,600 estimated Palestinians in WBG, a total of 6,277,000
Arabs obtains for the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, versus
a total enlarged Jewish population of 6,958,300. Table 10 reports the percentage of Jews,
according to the core and enlarged definitions, out of the total population of the combined territoryof Israel and Palestine. Such percent is conditional upon two factors: the definition of who is a
Jew, and the territorial boundaries chosen for assessment. Relative to this territorial grand total,
we demonstrate the potential effect on the existence and size of a Jewish population majority ofgradually and cumulatively subtracting from the initial maximum possible extent theArab/Palestinian population of designated areas as well as the foreign workers and refugees. The
result is gradual growth of the potential Jewish share of a total population which declines alongwith the hypothesized diminishing territorial and population configurations.

33

Table 10 Percent of core and enlarged Jewish population in Israel and Palestinian Territory, according to different territorial
definitions, 1/1/2018
Percentage of Jewsa
by definition
Area

Core

EnlargedGrand total of Israel and Palestinian Territory

48.9

51.9

Minus foreign workers and refugees

49.7

52.8

Minus Gaza

57.8

61.3

Minus Golan Heights

57.9

61.5

Minus West Bank

74.8

79.3

Minus East Jerusalem
77.8
82.6
a Total Jewish population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In each row, Arabs andothers of mentioned area are deducted and the percentages are recalculated accordingly
Source: Table 9

A total combined Jewish, Arab, and other population of 13,417,600, including foreign workers,
undocumented tourists and refugees, lived in Israel and the Palestinian Territory (WBG) at the
beginning of 2018. The core Jewish population of 6,558,100 represented 48.9% of this total
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, of which the State of Israel is part andparcel. Thus, by a rabbinic definition of who is a Jew, the extant Jewish majority not only isconstantly decreasing but actually does not exist any longer among the broader aggregate ofpeople currently found over the whole territory between the Sea and the River (DellaPergola
2003a, 2003b, 2007a, and 2011a, Soffer and Bistrow 2004, Soffer 2015). If the 400,200 Others(non-Jewish members of Jewish households) are added to the core Jewish population, theenlarged Jewish population of 6,958,300 represented 51.9% of the total population living legally orillegally in Israel and the Palestinian Territory—a tiny majority. If we subtract from the grand total,
the 232,300 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, the core and enlarged Jewish
populations rise to, respectively, 49.7% and 52.8% of the total population permanently resident inIsrael and the Palestinian Territory estimated at 13,185,300 in 2018. After subtracting the
population of Gaza, the total percentages of Jews rise to 57.8% core and 61.3% enlarged; after
subtracting the Druze population of the Golan Heights the percentages become 57.9% and 61.4%,
respectively; if subtracting the Palestinian population of the West Bank, they become 74.8% and79.3%, respectively; and if also subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem thepercentages rise to 77.8% and 82.6%. The rate of erosion of the Jewish majority is about 0.1% per
year. The same data are graphically presented in Figure 11.

Fig 11 Percent Jewish out of total population of Israel and Palestine by different territorial definitions, 201834

The United States
In the US, in the absence of official census documentation, Jewish population estimates must relyon alternative sources. These are now quite abundant, though of very unequal quality (Goldstein
1981, 1989, 1992; Sheskin 2015a). To assess the current number of Jews in the US one should
consider three issues: (1) The need to rely on reasoning and empirical evidence grounded indemographic concepts and research techniques (discussed above and elsewhere in greater detail,see DellaPergola 2005, 2010a, 2011a, 2012, 2014a, 2014c, 2014d, and 2014e); (2) The
definitional predicament already discussed above. To perform comparisons over time constantdefinition assumptions are needed. Given ongoing acculturation and assimilation trends in
America, but also new meanings attributed to Jewish identity or the rediscovery of submerged
identities from the past, group definitions today often may not be the same as past ones; (3) The
broader narratives within which one seeks to place the findings and their interpretations (Kaufman2014). Intriguingly, competing narratives and non-comparable empirical and definitional
approaches stand behind diverging US Jewish population estimates, with a high-low gap of nearly
two million individuals. Opposite interpretations circulate of current and expected trends: rapid
growth, stability, or slow decline. Previous to and following the 2013 Pew survey of Jewish
Americans, intense debate in and outside the social scientific community entails very different
implications at the cognitive level and for Jewish community service planning, matched by a lively
media discussion (Heilman 2005, 2013; Pew Research Center 2013; The Jewish Daily Forward2014). The quest for US Jewish population estimates relies on three major strategies(DellaPergola 2013a). The first is to bridge across numerous different national Jewish population
estimates available over the years by assessing intervening demographic changes: births anddeaths, incoming and outgoing international migration, and identification changes such asaccessions to and secessions from identifying as Jewish. In the US, several major sources of data
allow for a detailed reconstruction of nationwide Jewish population trends since the end of WorldWar II to date. For all purposes, the logic of working nationally to obtain a national population
estimate is the same logic that explains why, since 1790, a national population census was held in
the US (US Bureau of the Census). The second strategy, pursued since the beginnings of Jewish
population studies in the US in the early 1940s (Robison 1943), is to construct a national total froma compilation of existing local Jewish population estimates (Sheskin and Dashefsky in thisvolume). The third more recent strategy is to construct a national total through a meta-analysis ofa pool of national and local surveys periodically undertaken by public and private bodies, each ofwhich include a small subsample of Jews (Saxe and Tighe 2013). Of the three alternatives, only
the first was designed to determine nationwide Jewish population estimates. The second and third
methodologies were not but they do provide valuable grounds for comparative analytic work andin-depth multivariate analysis.
Serious attempts to monitor Jewish population size over time at the national level require areliable baseline figure and updates based on solid empirical research. Each of the existingsources is imperfect, but they do amount to an impressive body of evidence: from historicalassessment (Rosenwaike 1980), through the US Census of Religious Bodies (Schwartz et al.
2002), the 1957 Current Population Survey (CPS) (US Census Bureau 1958, 1968; Glick 1960;
Goldstein 1969), the 1971 National Jewish Population Study – NJPS 1971 (Massarik 1974;
Lazerwitz 1978), the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey – NJPS 1990 (Kosmin et al. 1991),
NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003) and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS)(Mayer et al. 2001). These various data sets fit well one with another when performing forwardbackward Jewish population projections as well as checking with all available data on internationalmigration, age composition, marriage, fertility, survivorship at different ages, and conversions toand from Judaism (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983 and 1988, DellaPergola et al. 1999 and 2000,
DellaPergola 2005 and 2013a, Perlmann 2007). NJPS 2000-01 yielded an initial estimate of
5,200,000 after imputation of persons in homes for the elderly, prisons, military bases, and otherinstitutional settings (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003). Further cohort analysis and projections
35

unveiled under-coverage of over 250,000 individuals born between 1950 and 1970 (Saxe et al.
2006a, 2007; Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). Evaluation of current migration, fertility, mortality,
accessions, and secessions provided revised estimates of 5,367,000 for 2000-01, and 5,425,000
for 2013—not including the institutionalized (DellaPergola 2013a). A rounded core Jewish
population estimate could thus be placed at 5.6-5.7 million around 2010, and this indeed was theestimate suggested by a 2007 Pew survey (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008). The 2015
Pew study of the US religious landscape confirmed the same orders of magnitude with a slightly
higher percent of Jews among the total US adult population (1.8% versus 1.9%), well within themargins of sampling error (Pew Research Center 2015b). The 2013 Pew "A Portrait of Jewish
Americans" (Pew Research Center 2013) found 4.2 million adults and 900,000 children, for a totalof 5.1 million Americans with Jewish religion (Jews by religion or JBRs) without other religious
identities. Another 600,000 persons—500,000 adults and 100,000 children—reported no religion
and Jewish (“Jews, no religion” or JNRs) without another identity, raising the total to a 5.7 million
mutually exclusive Jewish population. This 5.7 million estimate corresponded with a core Jewish
population concept relying on self-assessment and mutual exclusiveness between religious or
ethno-religious populations, and as noted, is fully consistent with the whole body of research on
US Jewry since 1957.
As against this quite impressive body of evidence, higher Jewish population estimates were
provided by research that instead of one national comprehensive source uses compilations ofmany different smaller databases. Based on their compilation of local estimates, Sheskin andDashefsky evaluate the US Jewish population at over 6.9 million (see US Population Report). This
would be an increase of 800,000 over a 1971 estimate obtained with the same method, but thepossible determinants of such increase are not explained. While local Jewish community studies
still are the most important tool for local Jewish community planning, the methodology of summing
local studies to obtain a national estimate is problematic, as the authors themselves recognize(Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007, 2010 and 2017; Sheskin 2008 and 2009). One should
acknowledge the diversity of databases and definitions, the lack of synchronization in time, andthe very uneven quality of the technical procedures followed, including sometimes embarrassing
skill gaps across different polling firms. When it comes to national Jewish population estimates,
which local studies were not designed to supply in the first place, local Jewish community
summations may risk cumulating significant errors and biases, including double counts ofgeographically mobile individuals (Rebhun and Goldstein 2006; Groeneman and Smith 2009).
The Brandeis Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) meta-analysis of a large set ofgeneral social surveys is an innovative and ambitious project in the social scientific study ofAmerican Jews (Saxe et al. 2006b; Tighe et al. 2005, 2009a, 2009b). The Jewish population
estimate suggested by SSRI for 2017 was 7.2 million. This figure implies that American Jewry
increased by 1.7 million, or over 30%, since 1990, as against 12% for the US total white nonHispanic population (US Census Bureau 2014). The same project estimated that at least 70,000
Jewish babies are born annually, and that the vast majority of US Jews do not adhere to any of the
known Jewish religious denominations (Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). These figures can be plausible
only if one shifts from a core concept of individually-identified Jews to an enlarged concept of thetotal population with Jewish background (as already anticipated by Tobin and Groeneman 2003).
Important caveats include: (a) the fact that Jews are over-represented in general sample surveys
because of their higher socioeconomic status and their scarce presence among people difficult tocover like the homeless or those without a functioning telephone; (b) using data for a sample of
US adults to represent estimates for total Jews and ignoring the lower percentage of children
among Jews; (c) projecting percentages of Jews among total population, hence population size
from percentage of Jewish households, ignoring multi-religious household composition and thus
factoring non-Jews into Jewish population estimates; or (d) using data on Jews by religion toestimate Jews without religion.
The latter point (using data on Jews by religion to estimate Jews without religion) is importantin view of attempts to estimate Jewish populations based in surveys which, as they do, include
Jewish as one option in a question on religious identity (Magidin de Kramer et al. 2018, Hackett36

2014). Those estimates may be quite accurate but the further attempt to extrapolate the "real"
number of Jews from sources that only deal with religion—instead of directly ascertaining themultivariate nature of Jewish identification—tend to be at best speculative. The 2013 Pew survey(Pew Research Center 2013) indeed found one million persons (600,000 adults and 400,000
children) who they reported as no religion and partly Jewish, thus reaching the total of 6.7 million
designated in the Pew report as the net Jewish population estimate. A further 2.4 million nonJewish adults with 1.5 million children, for a total of 3.9 million, reported a Jewish background. Of
these, about one-third had at least one Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013), thus raising
the total population with at least one Jewish parent (JPP) to about 8 million (6.7 + 1.3). The about
two-thirds with a Jewish background who did not have a Jewish parent, further expanded thecollective to 10.6 million. An additional 1.2 million non-Jewish adults reported some Jewish affinity,
raising the figure to 11.8 million, not including the children of the latter group. Some of thesebroader definitions better conform to the findings produced by local compilations and national
meta analyses.
The 2013 Pew study actually confirmed some well-known demographic patterns among US
Jews, namely postponed marriage, non-marriage, and small family size (Barack Fishman and
Cohen 2017; Hartman 2017). Intermarriage was assessed at 58% of the latest marriage cohorts
based on an extended Jewish population definition implying an increase from previous cohorts.
Identification with Judaism among children of intermarriages, though on the increase (Sasson etal. 2017), continued to fall below the 50% of all such children and younger adults nationally, which
would be the precondition to maintain demographic stability or even determine quantitative gains
from intermarriage (Rebhun 2013; Barack Fishman 2004; Dashefsky with Heller 2008; Phillips
2013 and 2018). Seven percent of the children raised in in-married households are being raised as
non-Jews (probably children from previous marriages) versus 67% among intermarried couples.
The current aging composition of US Jewry and other evidence about age-specific birth anddeath rates, based on standard demographic models, probably generates about 5,000 fewer
Jewish births (by the core definition) annually than the estimated number of Jewish deaths. The
Jewish death rate in the US is one of the least investigated topics in the field of Jewish
demographic research and it would be reasonable to try to assess it.
Jewish immigration to the US has nearly stopped from the FSU but continues from othercountries in Western Europe, Latin America, and, to some extent, other countries in the Middle
East and South Africa. The evidence for Israelis in the US shows a significant reduction in theinflux, largely compensated by returns to Israel (Gold and Phillips 1996, Cohen 2009, Rebhun and
Lev Ari 2010, Rebhun 2014, Gold 2002, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, US Department ofHomeland Security 2013). Accounting for unrecorded migration to the US, an annual net migration
into the US of 5,000 Jews (or slightly more) can be estimated. In other words, net immigration
balances the likely losses due to the excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births (stressing thecore definition). Shifts in lifetime religious preference in American society are comparatively more
frequent than in other countries. Different surveys have found that Jews, Catholics, and older
established Protestant denominations are tending to lose membership, while Evangelicaldenominations, Eastern cults, and especially the “religiously undefined” (none and not reported)
tended to gain (Kosmin and Lachman 1993; Kosmin et al. 2001; Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Smith
2009; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008; Pew Research Center 2015a). By the Pew 2013
survey, total secessions from Judaism were double the number of accessions; and by the 2015
Pew survey of the US religious landscape, the net balance of changes of religion resulted in a total
loss of 600,000 persons for the Jewish side (Pew Research Center 2015b). Based on several
comparable measures, the partly Jewish no-religion individuals, mainly the children ofintermarriages, look more similar to non-Jews with Jewish background than to the JNRs
(DellaPergola 2015a).
Following these observations, relying on the 2013 Pew survey and its subsequent updates,
stressing that the true predicament of American Jewish demography concerns population
definitions, and following the assumption that Jewish identity is mutually exclusive versus othercompeting religious and ethnic identities, our core Jewish population estimate remains stable at37

5,700,000 for 2018—the world's second largest. Broader definitional criteria naturally generatehigher estimates. Including the partly Jewish with no religion and the pertinent portion of non-Jews
with declared Jewish background, about eight million Americans have at least one Jewish parent.
The enlarged total population including non-Jews in Jewish households approaches ten million.
The Law of Return population probably approaches twelve million. By each of these expanded
criteria, the number of persons included is significantly larger than in Israel.

FranceFrance contains the largest Jewish community in Europe. A 2002 national survey suggested
500,000 core Jews, plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households (Cohenwith Ifergan 2003). Several follow-ups (Cohen 2005, 2007, 2013b) indicated a decreasing Jewish
population, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel, but also to Canada, the US, and othercountries. A new survey (Ifop 2015) addressed an enlarged definition of the Jewish population in
France but did not provide conclusive information about the size of the Jewish community.
Instead, it offered important insights about their past and prospective migration. In retrospect, 39%
reported they had relatives living in Israel compared to 31% who had relatives in another country(especially the US, Canada, and the UK). This would correspond to a migrant ratio of 65% toIsrael compared to 35% to other countries. Regarding possible future migration, 13% reported
they were seriously considering moving to Israel and another 30% had thought about it, thecorresponding percentages for migrating to other countries are 13% and 33%, respectively. A
previous survey of French Jewish adults age 18 to 40 about their expected country of residence infive years found that 33% expected to be living in France, 26% in Israel, 14% in another country,
and 27% were not sure (Cohen 2013a). Migration to Israel, after surpassing 2,000 annually forseveral years, actually increased to a historical peak of 6,627 in 2015, and lowered to 3,160 in2017, for a total of over 45,000 between 2001 and 2017. Jewish emigration was directed as welltoward other western countries and reflected the continuing sense of uneasiness in the face ofantisemitism, in part stemming from Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Assuming Israel
attracted two-thirds of the total who departed France, about 70,000 Jews and family members
have emigrated from France since 2001. Some of these may have returned to France in themeantime, thus reducing the impact of net migration. Currently more than half of Jews live in the
Greater Paris metropolitan region (Cohen with Ifergan 2003; Ifop 2015). Jews of Sephardi
ancestry, mostly first, second, or third generation immigrants from North Africa, clearly
predominate numerically over those of Ashkenazi origin who, until World War II, constituted themain component of the Jewish population. Considering these trends, our 2018 core estimate forFrench Jewry decreased to 453,000—the third largest Jewish population in the world.

CanadaIn Canada, the quinquennial Census, and more recently National Household Survey (NHS) data
on Jewish ethnicity—released in years ending with the digit 1 or 6—can be compared with data on
religion—released every decade in years ending with the digit 1 (Statistics Canada 2003a and2003b, Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014, Shahar 2015, 2016 and 2017). Information on religion andancestry was customarily collected through open-ended questions, where Jewish was one of theexamples provided as a possible response to the question. The 2016 NHS broke with this traditionand did not provide Jewish as an example. Probably as a consequence, the number of thosereporting a Jewish ethnicity collapsed to 143,665 in 2016 from 309,650 in 2011. This makes the
new data virtually unusable (see Canada Population Report). Since 1981, Canadians can declareeither a single or a multiple ethnic ancestry (up to four categories, one for each grandparent).
Ethnic Jews, as defined by the Canadian Census, can include persons who hold a non-Jewish
religion, but these persons are not included in the core concept used herein. On the other hand,
persons without religion who declare a Jewish ethnicity (single or part of a multiple choice) are
included in the core. The Jewish Federations of Canada-UIA defined this as the Jewish Standard
38

Definition (Torczyner et al. 1993, Shahar 2004). The newly suggested Revised Jewish Standard
Definition also accounts for: a) persons with no religious affiliation, but who are Israeli by ethnicity;b) persons with no religious affiliation, but with knowledge of Hebrew or Yiddish as a “non-official”
language; c) persons with no religious affiliation but who were born in Israel; and d) persons withno religious affiliation who lived in Israel in 2006 (Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014, Shahar 2014, 2015
and 2016). This definition provided an estimate of 391,665 in 2011. The latter figure is not strictly
comparable with the core Jewish population as it includes the fast increasing number of persons
for whom Jewish is only one among multiple ethnic identities, some of whom would better be
included among the enlarged Jewish population. In 2011, 329,500 Canadians declared they were
Jewish by religion (Weinfeld et al. 2012). Following Jewish ethnicity throughout the past decades
provides further clues on Jewish population and identification in Canada. A total of 293,175 ethnic
Jews in 1981 increased to a peak of nearly 370,000 in 1991, and has since decreased to 309,650
in 2011. Striking changes actually affected the distribution of Canadians and of Jews among them,by single and multiple ethnicities. The ongoing growth of a new Canadian ethnic identity from themerger of pre-existing ethnicities is parallel to the development of a new American ethnic identity
in the US (Lieberson and Waters 1988). In 1981, 90% or 264,025 of total ethnic Jews declared
Jewish as their single ethnicity, but this share decreased to 66% (245,580) in 1991, 53% (186,475)
in 2001, 43% (134,045) in 2006, and 37% (115,640) in 2011. Such sharp decrease in Jewish
ethnic identification can be explained by an increase in intermarriage which generates growing
multiple ancestries among descendants of Jews (Goldman 2009), but also indicates that therelevance of Jewish ethnic (unlike religious) identity is rapidly diminishing. Between 2001 and2011, 21,445 Jews by religion immigrated into Canada, mostly from the FSU, and were reported in
Canada in the 2011 NHS. Consequently, the Jewish population by religion which was perfectly
stable over the same ten years would have decreased by a similar amount (a potential decreaseof 6.5%) were it not for immigration. This, besides minor emigration, reflects a negative balance
between Jewish births and Jewish deaths, and passages of people from self-definition as Jews by
religion to self-definition with no religion. Assuming continuing immigration to Canada, but also
some internal attrition because of aging, we estimate the Jewish population to have slightly
increased to 390,500 in 2018—the world’s fourth largest Jewish community.

United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the 2011 Census, including regional totals for Scotland and Northern
Ireland, suggested a slight Jewish population increase, from 266,740 in 2001 to 269,282 in 2011(+1%) (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2002 and 2012, United Kingdom National
Records of Scotland NRS 2011, Miller et al. 1996, Kosmin and Waterman 2002, Graham et al.
2007, Graham and Waterman 2005 and 2007, Voas 2007, Graham and Vulkan 2007,
Graham2013a and 2013b, Boyd and Staetsky 2013, Graham and Caputo 2015). The 2001
national population Census included a voluntary question on religion for the first time since thenineteenth century and apparently somewhat underestimated the Jewish population, especially inareas inhabited by the more religious sectors of UK Jewry (Graham 2011). In 2011, the response
rate significantly increased in those areas (Graham et al. 2012). Those who did not report a
religion nationally rose from 23% in 2001 to 32% in 2011, but in view of the organized Jewish
community’s encouragement to participate in the Census, Jewish population was probably lessaffected by the increase in no religion and not reported. British Jewry is aging, but the higher
participation of Haredi Jews in the Census is reflected in a rejuvenating age composition, with anabsolute increase of 3% in the percentage under age 15 and a 1% decrease in the percentage
age 65 and over. Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews
Community Research Unit on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the
Census returns showing higher birth rates (The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community
Research Unit 2005, Vulkan 2012). Intermarriage was on the rise, too, though at moderate levels
compared with most other European and Western countries, from 11% of all couples in 1965-69 to
26% in 2010-13 (Graham 2016). Synagogue membership in the UK significantly decreased over39

time (Casale Mashiah and Boyd 2017). In 2016, 79,597 Jewish households across the UK held
synagogue membership, against 92,653 in 1995. While total Jewish households declined from147,349 in 2001 to 141,503 in 2016, the number of synagogues actually increased from 328 in
1983 to 454 in 2016. The denominational balance also significantly shifted. Between 2010 and2016, synagogue membership declined by 7.5% for the Central Orthodox, 4.1% for the Reform,
9.1% for the Liberal, and 21.4% for the Sephardi; membership grew by 15.5% for the Masorti, andby 18.4% for the Strictly Orthodox. Jewish education was growing, confirming the growing impactof the Haredi sector on the Jewish birth rate (Staetsky and Boyd 2016). Allowing also for some
immigration, we estimate the UK’s core Jewish population slightly increasing at 290,000 in 2018—
the fifth largest Jewish community in the world.

Argentina
Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Central and South America. Nearly 6,000 Jews
emigrated from Argentina to Israel in 2002—the highest number ever in a single year from thatcountry—following the bankruptcy of the country's Central Bank, dire economic conditions, andspecial incentives offered by Israel. Subsequently, the economic situation stabilized andemigration diminished (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). By 2014, 4,400 persons lived in Jewish
households in Miami in which at least one adult was Argentinian (Sheskin 2015b). A 2004 Jewish
population survey in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (AMBA) (Jmelnizky and Erdei 2005)
found an enlarged Jewish population of 244,000 as part of the over 300,000 who were identified
as in some way of Jewish origin or attached to a person of Jewish origin. Of the former, 64,000
were Christians and about another 20,000 reported some Jewish ancestry, but did not consider
themselves Jewish. Overall, 161,000 people in the AMBA considered themselves as totally or
partly Jewish. Other research suggested significant aging of the core Jewish population, reflecting
the emigration of younger households in recent years (Rubel 2005) and growing interreligious
couples (Erdei 2014). Argentina’s Jewish population was assessed at 180,300 in 2018—theworld’s sixth largest Jewish community.

RussiaIn the Russian Federation, Jewish population continued its downward course in the context ofa country whose general population had been diminishing for years and only recently started toslowly recover (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015). After the compulsory item on ethnicity (natsyonalnost) on
identification documents was canceled, and the Census ethnicity question became optional, the2010 Russian Census provided a core Jewish population estimated at 157,763, plus another
41,000 undeclared people who likely belonged to the core Jewish population, for a total of 200,600
in 2010 (Tolts 2011). The 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews, compared to our core Jewish
population estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003, extrapolated from a February 1994
Russian Federation Microcensus estimate of 409,000 Jews (Goskomstat 1994; Tolts 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007). Comparing the totals and main geographical distributions in 2002 and 2010 (adjusted
for under enumeration), the Jewish population diminished by 54,500 (21.4%) reflecting emigration,
aging, and a negative balance of births and deaths. About half of Russian Jewry was concentrated
in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and this basic configuration was not much altered throughemigration or vital events. The striking imbalance of Jewish births and deaths, and continuing
emigration generated an extremely elderly age composition and continuing population decrease,
only partially compensated by migration from other FSU republics and a moderate amount ofreturns of previous migrants to Israel (Tolts 2003, 2009 and 2015, Cohen 2009). We evaluatedRussia's Jewish population at 172,000 in 2018—the world’s seventh largest Jewish community.

Germany
In Germany, Jewish immigration, mainly from the FSU, brought to the country large numbers of40

Jewish and non-Jewish household members until 2005. This caused a significant boost in the
Jewish population that had previously relied on a few Shoah survivors and several thousand
immigrants mostly from Eastern Europe and Israel. This major immigration stream eventuallydiminished to a few hundred annually after the German government, under pressure because of
growing unemployment and a struggling welfare system, reduced the benefits to Jewish
immigration from the FSU (Cohen and Kogan 2005; Dietz et al. 2002; Erlanger 2006). In 2017,
760 new immigrants from the FSU were added to Jewish community membership(Zentralwohlfhartsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2018), versus a peak of 8,929 in 1999. The total
number of core Jews registered with the central Jewish community, after increasing consistently
since 1989 to a peak of 107,794 at the beginning of 2007, diminished gradually to 97,791 in 2018.
Most of the growth was in the Länders (states) of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)(West Germany). Because of the German national policy to decentralize the geographicalabsorption of immigrants, no specific area became dominant in Jewish population distribution. The
main regional concentrations were in the industrial area of Northern Rein-Westphalia (Düsseldorf,
Dortmund, Cologne), Bavaria (Munich), Hesse (Frankfurt), and Berlin. The community-registered
Jewish population in Berlin, despite wide reports of a huge increase, diminished from 10,009 at the
beginning of 2007 to 9,526 in 2018. There is, though, some evidence that Jews who are registeredelsewhere might in reality be now living in Berlin (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2012 and2015, Glöckner 2013, Rebhun et al. 2016). At the end of 2014, the number of officially recorded
Israelis in Berlin was 3,991 (plus 2,774 with dual citizenship) versus 3,065 in 2011. This does notaccount for Israelis and others who may have acquired German citizenship. Between 2000 and2010, 25,012 citizenship applications were submitted to the German consular offices in Israel(Harpaz 2013). German Jews are very aged. In 2017, 251 Jewish births and 1,505 Jewish deaths
were recorded by the German Jewish community, a loss of 1,254 Jews (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle
der Juden in Deutschland 2018). German Jewry surely enjoys new opportunities for religious,
social, and cultural life, but also significantly depends on welfare and elderly services (Schoeps,
Jasper, and Vogt 1999). Allowing for delays in joining the organized community on the part of new
immigrants and the choice by some Jews, including temporary migrants, not to affiliate, weestimate Germany’s core Jewish population at 116,000 in 2018—the world’s eighth largest Jewish
community.

Australia
Australia’s 2016 Census quite surprisingly recorded 91,022 Jews, a decline of 6.5% versus 2011.
The explanation is easily found in changes introduced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the
Census form. The option “No religion” was moved from the bottom to the top in the list of printed
options. The result was a dramatic increase by 45.5% in the number of all Australians reporting no
religion. Several other religions lost respondents: Anglicans 15.7%, Eastern Orthodox 10.7%,
Catholics, 2.7%, and Other Christians 4.7%. Judaism did not appear as a printed option in thequestionnaire but only as a write-in option. The 2011 Census had reported a Jewish population of
97,336, compared to 88,831 in 2006 and 83,993 in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002,
2007, 2012; Eckstein 2003; Graham 2012, 2014a, 2014b). In view of the general non-response to
the 2016 question about religion, but also in view of indications of a lower non-response in more
densely Jewish residential areas, adjusted figures suggest totals of 100,800 in 2001 and 112,000
in 2011, a ten-year increase of 11.2% (Graham 2014a). The Jewish population is highly
concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney, which in 2011 together comprised 85% of the total.
Intermarriage in Australia is less frequent than in most other Western large and medium-size
communities, but it is on the rise and affecting the Jewish birth rate. Accounting for such factors as
continuing immigration from South Africa, the FSU, and Israel, moderate but rising intermarriage
rates, but also the community’s rather old age composition (Eckstein 2009; Markus et al. 2009;
Markus et al. 2011; Forrest and Sheskin 2014; Graham and Markus 2018), we estimated the core
Jewish population at 113,400 in 2018—the world’s ninth largest.
41

Brazil
In Brazil, the 2010 Census reported a national total of 107,329 Jews, of whom 105,432 lived inurban localities and 1,987 in rural localities (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica IBGE
2010). The census classified Brazil's population by color, and among Jews, 94,575 were white,
10,429 brown, 1,690 black, 492 yellow, and 143 indigenous. By region, 79,910 lived in theSoutheast, 12,963 in the South, 4,266 in the Northeast, 2,367 in the North, and 1,394 in theCentral West (Instituto BrasiIero de Geografia e Estadistica 1991 and 2000; Decol 1999 and2009). The 2010 census found 51,050 Jews in São Paulo state—36% more than in 2000. Whilean upward adjustment is reasonable, a 36% increase is not. There also was a 2.5% increase in
Rio de Janeiro (24,451 in 2010) and a decrease of 8.7% in the rest of the Southeastern andSouthern states (overall 17,372 in 2010). What cannot be attributed to demography and likely
reflects new emerging identifications or misclassifications is a decennial increase of over 8,000
people (+125%) in the Northeastern, Northern, and Central-Western states. These growing
numbers in the least developed and more peripheral regions of Brazil, but to some extent also inSão Paulo, point to inclusion as Jews in the Census population of many thousands of persons who
in all probability belong to Evangelical sects and Jehovah's Witnesses, besides possible cases ofConverso Jewish ancestry. Census data for São Paulo were consistent with systematic
documentation efforts undertaken by the local Jewish Federation that found 47,286 Jews
(Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo FISESP 2002, Milkewitz et al. 2014). Allowing formoderate but growing emigration, our assessment of Brazil's core Jewish population stands at
93,200 in 2018—the world’s tenth largest Jewish community.

South Africa
According to the 2001 Census, the white Jewish population of South Africa was 61,675, out of a
total of 75,555, including nonwhites. Factoring in an evaluation of the national white non-response
rate (14%) and additional factors led to a revised estimate of 72,000 (Saks 2003). After the major
wave of departures just before the 1994 internal transferal of power from the apartheid regime to a
democratic government, South African Jewry was relatively stable, though slowly diminishing(Dubb 1994; Kosmin et al. 1999; Bruk 2006). Due to continuing moderate emigration to Israel andother countries, we estimated South Africa’s Jewish population at 69,000 in 2018—the world’s
eleventh largest Jewish community.

UkraineIn Ukraine, the December 2001 Census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews (Ukrainian Ministryof Statistics 2002; Tolts 2002). A new Census was planned in 2010, but was postponed. The
instability, deep internal cleavage, and civil war in Ukraine determined continuing Jewish
emigration and population decline. Looking at changes between 1989 and 2001, the Jewish
population, 80% of which were Russian speakers, diminished more sharply in the Western regions
where the share of Russians was relatively lower. Patterns of decline of ethnic Russians weresimilar. The overwhelming concentration of Ukraine's Jews in regions with a predominantly
Russian (and often pro-Russian) environment where the current war is being fought had obviously
negative consequences for the Jewish community. The 2001 census included 5,816 Jews in
Crimea, subsequently annexed by Russia and where in 2014 a special census found 3,374 Jews
(Rosstat 2014). Considering continuing emigration, we assess the 2018 core Jewish population at
50,000—the world’s twelfth largest Jewish community.

42

Other Central and South American Countries
In Mexico, the third largest Jewish community in Central and South America, the 2010 Census
reported a Jewish population of 59,161, plus another new category of 8,315 Neo Israelitas (NewJews), for a grand total of 67,476 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2012). Of these,
62,913—55,138 Jews and 7,775 New Jews, respectively, were age 5 and over. The 2000 Census
reported 45,260 Jews age 5 and over (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informatica
2002). Projecting the number of Jews age 5 and over to an estimate inclusive of children age 0-4,
the total Jewish population in 2000 would be about 49,000. An in-depth analysis of the 1970
Census (DellaPergola and Schmelz 1978) already had unveiled a significant presence, among
those defined as Jews, of persons adherent to other religious denominations, mostly located in
distant rural states or peripheral urban areas, with very low levels of educational attainment,
exclusive knowledge of local indigenous idioms, and reportedly shoeless (descalzos). The further
inclusion of a category of Neo Israelitas in 2010 leaves open the question of the attribution to
Judaism of a population possibly comprising followers of Evangelical sects or Jehovah’s
Witnesses, as well as descendants of Conversos. Jewish population surveys and other research
noted the general stability of the Jewish population at numbers similar to the Census reports
relating to a conventional definition for the Capital's metropolitan area (Comunidad Judía de
México 2015, Bokser Liwerant 2013, Comité Central Israelita de México 2006, Comité Central
Israelita de México 2000, DellaPergola and Lerner 1995). Our 2018 Jewish population estimate
was kept at 40,000—the world’s fourteenth largest Jewish community. In Chile the relatively
stable core Jewish population was assessed at 18,300 in 2018—the world's nineteenth largest—on the basis of the 2002 Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2003) and an earlier Jewish
population survey (Berger et al. 1995). Uruguay has experienced continuing Jewish emigration(Berenstein and Porzecanski 2001; Porzecanski 2006; Shorer Kaplan 2016). The Jewish
population estimate Uruguay was assessed at 16,700 in 2018—the world's twentieth largest
Jewish community.

Other European Union Countries
In Hungary, Jewish population trends reflect the unavoidably negative balance of Jewish births
and deaths in a country whose total population has been diminishing for several years (Stark
1995, Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa 2002, Kovács 2013a, Population
Reference Bureau 2018). A Jewish survey in 1999 reported a conspicuously larger enlarged
Jewish population than usually assessed (Kovács 2004). In the 2011 Hungarian Census, only
10,965 reported themselves as Jewish by religion, compared to 13,000 in 2001, clearly anunderestimate but indicative of a trend (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2003 and 2013). Our
core estimate for 2018 was 47,400 Jews, the world’s thirteenth largest Jewish community. In the
Netherlands, a survey in 2009 found high levels of intermarriage, a growing percentage of elderly,
and an increase in the number of Israelis (van Solinge and de Vries 2001, Kooyman and Almagor
1996, van Solinge and van Praag 2010, Tanenbaum and Kooyman 2014). Out of an enlarged
Jewish population of 52,000, 25% had a Jewish mother and 30% had a Jewish father. Accounting
for aging and assuming incoming migration tended to balance emigration, our Jewish population
estimate is 29,800 for 2018, the fifteenth largest Jewish community in the world. In Belgium, quite
stable numbers reflected the presence of a traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and thegrowth of a large European administrative center in Brussels that has attracted Jews from othercountries (Cohn 2003, Ben Rafael 2013). Some emigration reflected growing concerns about
Islamization, terrorism, and antisemitism. The Jewish population was estimated at 29,200 in 2018,
the world’s sixteenth largest Jewish community. In Italy, total Jewish community membership—
which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country’s Jewish population—
decreased from 26,706 in 1995 to 23,381 in 2017 (Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane 2002,
2010, 2017; Lattes 2005, Campelli 2013, Campelli 2016). Our 2018 estimate of 27,500—theworld’s seventeenth largest Jewish community—considers some increase of conversions to
43

Judaism and recent emigration. In Sweden, the Jewish population is estimated at 15,000 in
2018—the world’s twenty-second largest Jewish community, based on a local survey and on a
total estimate of the affiliated community of about 5,600 (Dencik 2003 and 2013). In Poland the2011 Census found about 2,000 persons who indicated Jewish as their only ethnicity and an
additional about 5,000 persons who indicated Jewish as their second ethnicity after another one,mostly Polish (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2012). Jewish community membership was reported at
1,222. Pending more detailed information we upwardly adjusted our estimate to 4,500 assuming
one half of those reporting multiple ethnicities would fall within the core Jewish population
definition. In Ireland, according to the 2016 census, there were 2,557 Jews, a 28.9% increase
from 2011 (Ireland Central Statistics Office 2012 and 2017).

Other European Countries
In Switzerland, in light of Census and emigration data, the estimate was updated to 18,700 in2018 (Statistik Schweiz 2005, 2012)—the world’s eighteenth largest Jewish community. In
Turkey, a 2002 survey in Istanbul indicated widespread aging in a community that since has
experienced growing emigration and population decline (Filiba 2003, Tuval 2004, Kubovich 2016).
Most of the Jews live in Istanbul's European neighborhoods. The 2018 estimate was 15,000
Jews—the world’s twenty-first largest Jewish community.

Section 6 Dispersion and Concentration
In 2018, 98 countries had at least 100 Jews (Table 11). Two countries had Jewish populations ofover 5 million each (Israel and the US), another seven had more than 100,000 Jews, three had
50,000 to 99,999, five had 25,000 to 49,999, eight had 10,000 to 24,999, nine had 5,000 to 9,999,
25 had 1,000 to 4,999, and 39 had less than 1,000. The 73 communities each with less than
10,000 Jews together accounted for 1% of world Jewry.
In only four Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1000 (0.5%) of the total
population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they
were Gibraltar (20.0 Jews per 1000 inhabitants), the US (17.6), Canada (10.8), and France (7.1).
The case of Israel is very different, with a core Jewish population that represents 74.6% of thetotal legal population, and an enlarged Jewish population that represents 79.1% of the total
population. In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population isdecreasing.
By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain thefollowing taxonomy of the 24 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel).
Three countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1000 total population: the US,
Canada, and France. Five more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000
total population: Australia, the UK, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany. Eleven morecountries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Ukraine,South Africa, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Chile, Uruguay, Sweden, Belarus,
and Panama. Five countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1000 total
population: Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, and Spain.
Over the past decades, the basic typology of size-and-density of Jewish communities
throughout the world did not change as much as the underlying changes witnessed by individual
countries. Table 12 shows the configuration of Jewish populations in 2018 as compared to 1984,
the first year for which such tabulation is available (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1986). The 1984
data are reported unrevised in the original format of the countries and territories that existed then.
The number of countries with at least 100 Jews indeed increased from 74 to 98, following thedevolution of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the addition of several countries withvery small Jewish communities that reached the 100-person threshold. The greatest increase wasin the number of countries with less than 1,000 Jews, from 23 in 1984 to 39 in 2018. At the top of44

the distribution, two countries in 2018 had more than one million Jews, versus three in 1984, due
to emigration from the USSR. The share of world Jewry in those countries only increased from
83% to 84% between 1984 and 2018, in part because the 1984 percentages ignore the break-up
of the FSU.
Table 11 World core Jewish population distribution, by number and proportion (per 1,000 total population), 1/1/2018
Jews per 1000 total population
Number of coreLess
Jews in country
Totalthan 1.0 1.0-4.9
5.0-9.9
10.0-19.9 20.0+
Number of countries
Total
98
69
24
1
3
1
100-99939
35
3
11,000-4,999
25
24
15,000-9,999
95
4
10,000-24,999
8
2
6
25,000-49,999
52
3
50,000-99,999
3
1
2
100,000-999,999
751
11,000,000 or more
2
1
1
Jewish population distribution (number of core Jews)
Totala14,606,000 287,300 1,215,800 453,000
6,091,100 6,558,100
100-999
10,400
8,700
1,100
600
1,000-4,999
55,50053,6001,900
5,000-9,999
65,20037,60027,60010,000-24,999
114,800
26,70088,10025,000-49,999
173,900
67,500106,400
50,000-99,999
212,200
93,200119,000
100,000-999,999
1,715,200
871,700
453,000
390,500
1,000,000 or more
12,258,100 5,700,000 6,558,100
Jewish population distribution (percent of world core Jewish population)
Totala
100.0
2.0
8.3
3.1
41.7
44.9
100-999
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
1,000-4,999
0.4
0.4
0.0
5,000-9,999
0.4
0.3
0.2
10,000-24,999
0.8
0.2
0.6
25,000-49,999
1.2
0.5
0.7
50,000-99,999
1.5
0.6
0.8
100,000-999,999
11.7
6.0
3.1
2.7
1,000,000 or more
83.9
39.0
44.9
a Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700 core Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.
Israel includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
Table 12 World core Jewish population distribution, by number of Jews in country, 1984 and 2018
Number ofPercent of world's
Number of Jews
countries
Jewish population
Jews
in country
1984
2018
1984
2018
1984
2018
Total
74
98 12,993,300 14,606,000
100.0
100.0
100-999
23
39
11,00010,4000.1
0.1
1,000-4,999
17
25
41,90055,5000.3
0.4
5,000-9,999
7
943,80065,2000.3
0.4
10,000-49,999
16
13
362,400
288,700
2.8
2.0
50,000-99,999
2
3
136,500
212,200
1.1
1.5
100,000-999,999
6
7
1,616,000
1,715,200
12.5
11.7
1,000,000 or more
3
2 10,751,700 12,258,100
82.9
83.9

Countries with between 100,000 and one million Jews comprised 12.5% of total Jewish
population in 1984 versus 11.7% in 2018. Of the 15 partitions of the FSU, only Russia had morethan 100,000 in 2018 when it was joined by two new entries: Germany and Australia. Brazil andSouth Africa had more than 100,000 Jews in 1984, but fewer in 2018. France, Canada, the UK,
and Argentina were included in the 100,000 and over category for both dates, but the gap between
Canada and Argentina had trebled, from 65,000 to 180,000.
Communities between 10,000 and 100,000 comprised 3.9% of world Jewish population in 18
countries in 1984, versus 3.5% and 16 countries, respectively, in 2018. Among the smaller Jewish
45

communities, those with less than 10,000 Jews comprised at both dates less than 1% of world
Jewry, but in 1984 they were distributed across 47 countries and in 2018 across 73 countries. The
stability reflected in a strong concentration of Jewish population in a few countries at the top of the
distribution and a wide dispersion of very small numbers in a large number of countries at thebottom was only apparent. The transition from a concentration of Jews in three dominant countries
to one based on two main locations actually reflected quite revolutionary changes in the profile ofworld Jewry as we moved from the 20th to the 21st century.

Section 7 Outlook
During the 70 years since the independence of the State of Israel, and more particularly since the1980s, the demography of world Jewry has undergone a planetary transformation. Not only did
population numbers change dramatically, but the social, economic and cultural environments of
the Jewish presence shifted irreversibly. Jewish population trends constitute a highly sensitive
indicator of broader political, socioeconomic, and ideological trends globally, regionally and inindividual countries. The use of Jewish demographic data for a wide range of analytic andplanning purposes is possible, therefore, only after acknowledging the global and transnational
nature of causal mechanisms and the significant dependency of Jewish upon general social anddemographic trends. Current data should be read in historical and comparative context, so as todetect the major underlying drivers of Jewish population change within the broader context ofworld society.
Accurate population data, as far as they can be estimated, should constitute a necessary toolin the planning of Jewish community life. Beyond the many and arguable problems related to thefluid and shifting boundaries of Jewish identification and to Jewish population definitions, andbeyond the imperfect availability and accuracy of data, it is important to recognize that powerfuland consistent trends constantly shape and reshape the demographic profile of world Jewry. The
recent momentum of Jewish population changes in the US and in most other countries—at best
tending to zero growth if the core definition is consistently adopted for comparisons over time—
contrasts with that of Israel—characterized by the continuation of very significant natural increase,strengthened by a minor net influx of new immigrants and a trickle of conversions to Judaism.
While the transition of Israel to the status of largest Jewish population in the world is grounded onsolid empirical foundations, the US constitutes a very large and dynamic Jewish population—
culturally and socioeconomically powerful, creative, and influential in Jewish life. The US also
constitutes a primary site of new modes of personal identification attachment—whether exclusively
Jewish or shared and combined with alternative identifications; whether through direct
genealogical linkage or by voluntary association with others who are Jewish; whether byadherence to traditional models or through voluntary adoption of hybrid models much affected byother civilizations. Some of these options may be shared or may be rejected by Jews in othercountries. These growingly indirect and increasingly individualistic modes of Jewish definition andidentification operate along, and to some extent compete with, the more conservative and mutually
exclusive Jewish family and identification patterns that continue to prevail in Israel. The only
possible option in a global assessment of Jewish population trends is that common and somewhat
more restrictive definition criteria are adopted as a core concept in all countries worldwide.
Both the American and the Israeli models of Jewish identification, of self-assessment, ofJewish institutional projection and influence, hence of Jewish population dynamics and structure(Pew Research Center 2013, 2016), generate widespread echoes across all other Jewish
communities worldwide. Powerful mutual influences, collaborative initiatives, and sometimes
tensions do exist between the two major communities. The aggregate demographic weight ofother Jewish communities globally—aside from their continuing cultural relevance and historicalmemory—is gradually decreasing. The Jewish world has become demographically more polarized
but also tends to become more eclectic and transnational reflecting pervasive trends incontemporary global society. In a global society where the old, plain Jewish/non-Jewish dichotomy
46

loses significance and empirical grounding (DellaPergola 2014e), the challenge of determining thesize and distribution of Jewish population becomes more complex with passing time. In order toovercome this challenge, observers should pay due attention to the need and quality of empirical
work without losing grip on the underlying meaning of Jewish identity.

Acknowledgments
Since inception, the American Jewish Year Book has documented the Jewish world and has given
significant attention to Jewish population issues. Since 1981, responsibility for preparing annual
population estimates for world Jewry was taken by the Division of Jewish Demography andStatistics of the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at The Hebrew University ofJerusalem. The Division was founded by Roberto Bachi in 1959, was headed by Uziel O. Schmelz
until 1986, by the present author until 2010, and by Uzi Rebhun since 2010. Jewish population
estimates appeared in the AJYB, then under the aegis of the American Jewish Committee, until
2008. Since 2010, our world Jewish population estimates appeared in the framework of the North
American Jewish Data Bank (now the Berman Jewish DataBank), and since 2012 within the
renewed American Jewish Year Book. World Jewish population estimates as of January 1, 2009
and as of January 1, 2011 were prepared for publication but not issued. The interested reader may
consult past AJYB volumes for further details on how the respective annual estimates wereobtained (especially Schmelz 1981 and DellaPergola 2015a).
The author expresses warm appreciation to the editors of AJYB during more than thirty yearsof a close collaboration: Morris Fine, Milton Himmelfarb, David Singer, Ruth Seldin and Lawrence
Grossman, and currently Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin. The author also gratefully
acknowledges the collaboration of many institutions and persons in various countries who supplied
information or otherwise helped in the preparation of this study. Special thanks are due to mycolleagues at The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at The Hebrew University ofJerusalem, Uzi Rebhun and Mark Tolts. I am also indebted to those who over the years provided
relevant information and advice at different stages of the present study (in the alphabetical order ofthe respective cities): Chris Kooyman (Amsterdam), the late Ralph Weill (Basel), Jim Schwartz(Bergen County, NJ), Olaf Glöckner (Berlin), Shmuel Frankel (Bne Berak), Marcos Peckel(Bogota), Simon Cohn and Claude Kandiyoti (Brussels), András Kovács (Budapest), Ezequiel
Erdei and Yaacov Rubel (Buenos Aires), Tally Frankental (Cape Town), Salomon Benzaquen andTony Beker de Weinraub (Caracas), Cathleen Falsani and Tom W. Smith (Chicago), Frank Mott
(Columbus, OH), Heike von Bassewitz and Ellen Rubinstein (Frankfurt a. M.), Frans van Poppeland Hanna van Solinge (The Hague), Ariela Keysar and Barry Kosmin (Hartford, CT), Maritza
Corrales Capestrany (Havana), Lina Filiba (Istanbul), Steven Adler, Benjamin Anderman, Margalit
Bejarano, Maya Choshen, Susanne Cohen-Weisz, Oren Cytto, Nurit Dovrin, Judith Even, Netanel
Fisher, the late Norma Gurovich, Shlomit Levy, Israel Pupko, Uzi Rebhun, Liat Rehavi, Dalia Sagi,
Marina Sheps, Maya Shorer Kaplan, Mark Tolts, Eduardo Torres, Emma Trahtenberg and Chaim
I. Waxman (Jerusalem), David Saks (Johannesburg), Roy van Keulen (Leiden), Jonathan Boyd,
Marlena Schmool and Daniel Staetsky (London), Pini Herman and Bruce Phillips (Los Angeles),Pinhas Punturello (Madrid), John Goldlust, Andrew Markus and Ran Porat (Melbourne), Judit
Bokser Liwerant, Susana Lerner, Mauricio Lulka and Yael Siman (Mexico City), Ira M. Sheskin(Miami), Rafael Porzecanski (Montevideo), Evgueni Andreev and Eugeni Soroko (Moscow), David
Bass (Neveh Daniel), the late Vivian Z. Klaff (Newark, DE), Steven M. Cohen, Laurence KotlerBerkowitz, Lucette Lagnado and Sarah Markowitz (New York), David M. Mizrachi (Panama City),Marcelo Dimentstein, Alberto Senderey, and the late Doris Bensimon-Donat (Paris), Allen
Glicksman (Philadelphia), Zbyněk Tarant (Pilsen), Yochanan Moran (Porto), Sidney Goldstein andAlice Goldstein (Providence, RI), Narciso Attía (Quito), Mustafa Khawaja (Ramallah), Orly C.
Meron, and the late Erik H. Cohen (Ramat Gan), Gloria Arbib and Alberto Levy (Rome), Lars
Dencik (Roskilde), David Saltiel (Saloniki), Alberto Milkewitz, Simon Schwartzman, and the lateRené Decol (São Paulo), Mordechai Abergel (Singapore), Arnold Dashefsky (Storrs, CT), Gary
Eckstein and David Graham (Sydney), Allie A. Dubb (Tel Aviv), Gustave Goldman (Toronto),47

Jeffrey Scheckner (Union, NJ), Thomas Buettner and Hania Zlotnik (United Nations, NY), R.
Fastenbauer (Vienna), Sylvia Barack Fishman, Leonard Saxe, Charles Kadushin, Benjamin
Phillips and Eizabeth Tighe (Waltham, MA), Barry R. Chiswick, Carmel U. Chiswick, Alan
Cooperman, Conrad Hackett and Greg Smith (Washington, DC), Melita Svob (Zagreb).

AppendixDefinitions
In most Diaspora countries, the core Jewish population (CJP—a concept initially suggested
by Kosmin et al. 1991) includes all persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey,
identify themselves as Jews, or who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same
household, and do not profess another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as aJew, reflecting subjective perceptions, broadly overlaps, but does not necessarily coincide, with
Halakhah (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does not depend on any
measure of that person’s Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs,
knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The core Jewish population includes people who
identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who do not identify by religion but see themselves as
Jews by ethnicity or other cultural criteria (Jewish only, no religion). Some do not even identify
themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold
another religious identity they should be included. All these people are considered to be part of thecore Jewish population which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well asother people who declare they are Jewish even without formal conversion and do not hold anotheridentity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as
are persons who state being partly Jewish along with another identity, and those of Jewish origin
who in censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group
without having formally converted. The core population concept offers an intentionallycomprehensive and pragmatic, mutually exclusive approach compatible with the analytic options
offered by many available demographic data sources.
In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic
surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on
religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to Ministry of the Interior rulings,
which rely on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court(Corinaldi 2001). In Israel, therefore, the core Jewish population does not simply express
subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, orconversion to Judaism, and not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person’s
Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.
A major research issue of growing impact is whether core Jewish identification can or should
be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities. In a much debated study—the
2000-01 US National Jewish Population Survey-NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003)—thesolution chosen was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included in the core
Jewish population definition under condition that the other identity was not a monotheistic religion.
This resulted in a rather multi-layered and not mutually exclusive definition of the US Jewish
population. A further category of Persons of Jewish Background (PJBs) was introduced by NJPS
2000-01. Some PJBs were included in the final Jewish population count and others were not,based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. (See further
comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013).
The 2013 Pew Research Center survey of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center 2013), byintroducing the previously not empirically tested concept of partly Jewish, helped clarify the
demographic picture, but also made the debate about definitions more complicated, and thecomparison of results more ambivalent. One intriguing issue concerns the status of the partly
Jewish as a standard component of the Jewish collective, as some analysts would have it.
Following a similar logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, have been48

included in some total Jewish population counts for Canada. As against this, other researchers
would suggest that the partly Jewish stand conceptually closer to the other Pew survey categories
of Non-Jews with Jewish background, or Non-Jews feeling some Jewish affinity. Recent researchexperience indicates that people may shift their identities over time across the different layers of
the core Jewish definition, and between different core and non-core statuses. It is not uncommon
to see those shifts across the boundary identifying as Jewish and as something else and viceversa in response to the particular context or moment when the question about identity is being
tested. At any particular moment, then, there will be a countable Jewish population, which is notnecessarily the same as the previous or the following moment.
Emerging from these more recent research developments, the concept of total population
with at least one Jewish parent (JPP) includes the core Jewish population plus anyone currently
not identifying as exclusively Jewish but with one or two Jewish parents. In the Pew 2013 survey,
the total population with Jewish parents besides the core comprised two sub-groups: (a) persons
who report no religion, and declare they are partly Jewish, and (b) persons who report not being
Jewish, and declare a Jewish background because they had a Jewish parent (Pew ResearchCenter 2013).
The enlarged Jewish population (EJP—a concept initially suggested by DellaPergola 1975)
further expands by including the sum of: (a) the core Jewish population; (b) persons reporting they
are partly Jewish; (c) all others of Jewish parentage who—by core Jewish population criteria—are
not currently Jewish; (d) all other non-Jews with Jewish background more distant than a Jewish
parent; and (e) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). Non-Jews
with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who haveadopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may also claim to be Jewish byethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent US and Canadian data;and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. It logically follows thatmost Jews who are identified in the Pew survey as partly Jewish or as PJBs who are not part of
the US core Jewish population, as well as many Canadians declaring Jewish as one of multiple
ethnicities, naturally should be included under the enlarged definition. For both conceptual andpractical reasons, the enlarged definition usually does not include other non-Jewish relatives wholack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households.
The Law of Return population (LRP) reflects Israel’s distinctive legal framework for theacceptance and absorption of new immigrants. The Law of Return awards Jewish new immigrants
immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and the Law of Citizenship apply
to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current,
amended version of the Law of Return (Gavison 2009), a Jew is any person born to a Jewish
mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative,
Reconstructionist, or Reform) who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel’s
Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently
identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for Law of Return purposes. Thus, all the
Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian non-Jews with Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion tobe eligible for the Law of Return. The law itself does not affect a person’s Jewish status—which,as noted, is adjudicated by Israel’s Ministry of Interior relying on Israel's rabbinic authorities—butonly for the specific immigration and citizenship benefits granted under the Law of Return. Articles
1 and 4A(a) of this law extend its provisions to all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren,
as well as to their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses. As a result of its three-generationand lateral extension, the Law of Return applies to a large population—the so-called aliyah
eligible—whose scope is significantly wider than the core and enlarged Jewish populations defined
above (Corinaldi 1998). It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the Law of Return
population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below.
Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the US—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel(JAFI), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and the major Jewish
Federations in the US—sponsor data collection and tend to influence research targets, rendering
them increasingly complex and flexible. Organizations enact their mission toward their respective
49

constituencies based on perceived interests rather than scientific criteria. The understandable
interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources may prompt them to expand
their reach strategies to Jewish populations increasingly closer to the enlarged and Law of Return
definitions than to the core definition.
Presentation and Quality of Data
Jewish population estimates in this Report refer to January 1, 2018. Efforts to provide the mostrecent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hencesome margin of inaccuracy. For example, a wealth of data about Israel's population becomes
available annually when the American Jewish Year Book is already in print. Some of Israel's data
here are the product of estimates based on the most recent trends, but may need adjustment
when the actual data are released. Indeed, where appropriate, we revise our previous estimates inlight of newly acquired information. Corrections also were applied retroactively to the 2017 totals
for major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2018
estimates. Corrections of the 2018 estimates, if needed, will be presented in the future.
We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident coreJews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental
totals. For each country, we provide in the Appendix an estimate of 1) mid-year 2017 total(including both Jews and non-Jews) country population (Population Reference Bureau 2018); 2)
the estimated January 1, 2018 core Jewish population (CJP); 3) the number of Jews per 1000 total
population; and 4) a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate. The last threecolumns provide rough estimates of the population with Jewish parents (JPP), the enlarged Jewish
population inclusive of all non-Jewish members in a Jewish household (EJP), and the Law ofReturn population (LRP). These figures were derived from available information and assessmentson the recent extent and generational depth of cultural assimilation and intermarriage in the
different countries. The quality of such broader estimates of the aggregate of Jews and non-Jews
who often share daily life is much lower than that of the respective core Jewish populations, andthe data should be taken as indicative only.
Wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries.
For many Diaspora countries, it might be better to indicate a range for the number of Jews
(minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate. It would be confusing, however, for thereader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional andworld totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood
as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective core Jewish populations. The
relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate. One issue ofgrowing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries.
Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counting. Wherever possible, we
strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-year
residents. (This is similar to the part-year resident, or “snowbird” issue in estimating the US Jewish
population in Sheskin and Dashefsky, in this volume.)
Jewish population data come from a large array of different sources, each with inherent
advantages and disadvantages. We report both the main type and the evaluated accuracy of thesources used in this study. In the Appendix table the main types of sources are indicated asfollows:(C) National population census. This in theory would be the best source, but undercounts andover counts do occur in several countries which need to be evaluated.
(P) National population register. Some countries, besides the periodical census, also keep apermanent population register which is constantly updated through detailed accountancy of
individual demographic events.
(S) Survey of the Jewish population, national or inclusive of the main localities, undertaken
most often by a Jewish community organization, and sometimes by a public organization.
50

(J) Jewish community register kept by a central Jewish community organization.
(E) Estimate otherwise obtained by a Jewish organization.
Our estimates reflect these sources, but the figures reported below do not necessarily
correspond exactly with those indicated in the given sources. When necessary, additional
information is brought to bear in deriving our estimates. The three main elements that affect theaccuracy of each country's Jewish population estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the basedata, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combinesthese elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the Appendix
table, as follows:(A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated
on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population change in the respective country
during the intervening period.
(B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data;
updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population change during the intervening
period.
(C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage ofa country’s Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative ofregional demographic trends.
(D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.
The year in which a country’s base estimate or important partial updates were initially obtainedis also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the initial basis for its attainment. An X isappended to the accuracy rating for several countries whose Jewish population estimate for 2018
was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.
One additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets ofdemographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at theInstitute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (DellaPergola et al.
2000b; and author's current updating). Such projections, based on available data on Jewish
population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected
Jewish population trends over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Even where reliable
information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connectionthat generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps
provide plausible scenarios for the developments that occur in the short term. Where better data
were lacking, we used findings from these projections to refine the 2018 estimates against
previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are shaped by a comparatively limited
set of assumptions and need to be constantly updated in light of actual demographic
developments.

51

Appendix Table. Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2018
Jews
per 1000 Source
Population Enlarged
Core
total
with Jewish Jewish
JewishTotal
Accuracy
parentepopulationf
populationb populaCountry
populationa
CJP
tion
Typec ratingd
JPP
EJP
World
7,535,797,000 14,606,000
1.94
17,794,400 20,687,800
America total
BermudaCanadaUnited States
Total North Americah
Bahamas
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
GuatemalaJamaica
MexicoNetherlands Antilles
PanamaPuerto Rico
Virgin Islands
Other
Total Central America,
Caribbean
Argentina
Bolivia
BrazilChile
Colombia
EcuadorParaguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela
Total South Americah

1,005,223,000

61,00036,700,000
325,400,000
362,223,000
400,000
4,900,000
11,300,000
10,700,000
6,400,000
16,900,000
2,900,000
129,200,000
324,000
4,100,000
3,400,000
105,000
29,371,000

6,469,800
100
390,500
5,700,000
6,090,600
300
2,500
500
100
100
900
200
40,000300
10,000
1,500
400
200

6.44
1.64
10.64
17.52
16.81
0.75
0.51
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.07
0.31
0.93
2.44
0.44
3.81
0.01

220,000,000
44,300,000
11,100,000
207,900,000
18,400,000
49,300,000
16,800,000
6,800,000
31,800,000
600,000
3,500,000
31,400,000
423,000,000

57,000180,300
500
93,20018,300
2,200
600
1,000
1,900
200
16,7007,300
322,200

0.26
4.07
0.05
0.45
0.99
0.04
0.04
0.15
0.06
0.33
4.77
0.23
0.76

Europe total
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
CyprusCzech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
FinlandFranceiGermany
GreeceHungary
IrelandItaly
LatviaLithuania
Luxembourg

826,674,000
8,800,000
11,300,000
7,100,000
4,100,000
1,200,000
10,600,000
5,800,000
1,300,000
5,500,000
65,040,000
83,100,000
10,700,000
9,800,000
4,800,000
60,500,000
1,900,000
2,800,000
600,000

1,348,600
9,000
29,200
2,000
1,700
100
3,900
6,400
1,900
1,300
453,000
116,000
4,200
47,4002,600
27,500
4,700
2,500
600

1.63
1.02
2.58
0.28
0.41
0.08
0.37
1.10
1.46
0.24
6.96
1.40
0.39
4.84
0.54
0.45
2.47
0.89
1.00

52

C
C
S

B 2016B 2011B 2013

E
J
S
E
E
S
J
C,S
C
S
J
E

D 1995
C 1993C 2013
D 2000C 1993
B 1999C 2010B 2010C 2016C 2012
C 2000D 2016
D 2016

S
J
C
C
S
J
C
S
J
S
S

B 2003
C 1999B 2010
B 2002C 2010B 2011
B 2002
C 1993
D 2000B 2013C 2012

C,J
J
C,J
C,J
E
C,J
S
C,P
P
S
J
J
C
C
S,J
C,P
C,P
J

B 2011
C 2002C 2011
C 2001
D 2012C 2011
C 2001B 2017B 2010B 2012B 2017B 2000C 2011B 2016B 2018B 2017B 2011
B 2000XX

Law ofReturnpopulationg
LRP
23,472,400

8,965,100200
450,000
8,000,000
8,450,200
500
2,800
1,000
200
200
1,200
300
45,000500
11,000
2,000
600
300

11,178,100
300
550,000
10,000,000
10,550,300
700
3,100
1,500
300
300
1,500
400
50,000700
12,000
2,500
700
500

13,407,400
400
700,000
12,000,000
12,700,400
800
3,400
2,000
400
400
1,800
500
65,000800
13,000
3,000
800
700

65,600270,000
700
120,000
21,000
2,800
800
1,300
2,300
400
20,00010,000449,300

74,200330,000900
150,000
26,000
3,500
1,000
1,600
3,000
600
25,00012,000553,600

92,600350,000
1,000
180,000
30,000
4,500
1,200
1,900
3,500
800
27,50014,000614,400

1,804,700
14,00035,000
4,000
2,400
200
5,000
7,500
2,600
1,600
530,000
150,000
5,500
75,0003,600
34,000
8,000
4,700
800

2,247,000
17,00040,000
6,000
3,000
300
6,500
8,500
3,400
1,900
600,000
225,000
6,000
100,000
5,000
41,00012,0006,500
1,000

2,759,700
20,00045,000
7,500
3,500
400
8,000
9,500
4,500
2,200
700,000
275,000
7,000
130,000
7,000
48,00016,00010,0001,200

TotalCountry
populationa
Malta
400,000
Netherlands
17,100,000
Poland38,400,000
Portugal
10,300,000
Romania
19,600,000
Slovakia
5,400,000
Slovenia
2,100,000
Spain
46,600,000
Sweden10,100,000
United Kingdomj
66,400,000
511,340,000
Total European Union 28
Belarus9,500,000
Moldova
3,600,000
Russiak
146,800,000
Ukraine42,300,000
202,200,000
Total FSU Republics
208,200,000[Total FSU in Europe]lGibraltar
35,000
Norway5,300,000
Switzerland
8,500,000
Total other West14,334,000
EuropehBosnia-Herzegovina
3,500,000
Macedonia
2,100,000
Serbia7,000,000
Turkeyk
80,900,000
Other
5,300,000
98,800,000
Total Balkans
Asia total
Israelm
West Bankn
Gazan
Total Israel andPalestineo[Total State of Israel]p
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Total former USSR in
Asiah
ChinaqIndia
Indonesia
Iran
Japan
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
SyriarTaiwanCore
Jewishpopulationb
CJP
100
29,800
4,500
600
9,100
2,600
100
11,70015,000290,000
1,077,500
9,500
2,000
172,000
50,000233,500
242,600
600
1,300
18,600Jews
per 1000 Source
Population Enlarged
totalwith Jewish Jewish
populaAccuracy
parentepopulationf
tionTypec ratingd
JPP
EJP
0.25
E
D 2012
200
300
1.74
S
B 200943,00052,0000.12
C,JB 2011 X
7,000
10,0000.06
CC 2001
800
1,000
0.46
C,J
B 2002
13,50017,0000.48
CC 2011
3,600
4,600
0.05
C
C 2003
200
300
0.25
J
D 2007
15,00018,0001.49
S
C 200720,00025,0004.37
C,S
B 2011330,000
370,000
2.11
1,317,200
1,581,300
1.00
CB 200918,00025,0000.56
CB 2014 X
5,700
7,500
1.17
C
C 2010320,000
440,000
1.18
C
C 200197,000140,000
1.15
440,700
612,500
1.17
456,000
634,400
17.14
C
B 2001
700
800
0.25
P
B 2010
1,500
2,000
2.19
C
B 201222,00025,00020,500
500
100
1,400
15,000100
17,100

1.43
0.14
0.05
0.20
0.19
0.02
0.17

4,411,900,000
8,383,400
2,961,900
1,840,000

6,593,000
6,153,500
404,6000

1.49
734.01
136.600.00

13,185,300
8,796,700
3,000,000
9,900,000
3,900,000
18,000,000
6,200,000
5,800,000
32,400,000

6,558,100
6,558,100
100
7,800
1,600
2,700
400
200
3,200

497.38745.52
0.03
0.79
0.41
0.15
0.06
0.03
0.10

88,000,000
1,394,800,000
1,352,600,000
264,000,000
80,600,000
126,700,000
105,000,000
5,700,000
51,400,000
18,300,000
23,600,000

16,000
2,800
4,900
100
8,500
1,000
100
900
100
100
100

0.18
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.01
0.00
0.16
0.00
0.01
0.00

53

Law ofReturnpopulationg
LRP
400
60,00013,0001,200
20,0006,000
400
20,00030,000410,000
1,855,800
33,00011,000600,000
200,000
844,000
874,500
900
2,500
28,00024,200
800
200
2,100
19,300200
22,60027,800
1,000
300
2,800
21,000300
25,40031,400
1,200
400
3,500
23,000400
28,500A 2018A 2018A 20186,809,000
6,349,300
408,900
0

7,024,000
6,545,100
413,200
0

7,042,000
6,545,100
413,200
0

C
C
C
C
C
C
C

B 2011
B 2009B 2014B 2009B 2009D 1995
D 19896,758,200
6,758,200
300
10,500
4,500
4,800
700
400
6,000

6,958,300
6,958,300
500
16,000
6,000
6,500
1,000
600
8,000

6,958,300
6,958,300
700
22,000
8,700
9,600
1,500
800
10,000

E
C
E
C
E
E
J
J
E
E

D 2015C 2011
D 2016B 2012
D 2015
D 2000C 2015C 2015
D 2015
D 200027,200
2,900
6,000
200
11,000
1,200
200
1,000
200
200
200

38,600
3,300
7,000
300
12,000
1,400
300
1,200
300
300
300

53,300
3,500
8,000
400
13,000
1,600
400
1,400
400
400
400

C
C
C
S,J

C 2001
C 1996
C 2001B 2016
D 2016

C,P
C,P
C,P

Country
Thailand
Other
Total other Asia
Africa total
Egypt
Ethiopia
MoroccoTunisia
Total Northern Africah
Botswana
Congo D.R.
Kenya
Madagascar
Namibia
NigeriaSouth Africa
Zimbabwe
Other
Total Sub-SaharanAfricasCore
Jewishpopulationb
Total
populationa
CJP
66,100,000
200
821,914,700
100
4,310,714,700
18,900Jews
per 1000 Source
total
populaAccuracytionTypec ratingd
0.00
E
D 20150.00
D 20160.00

1,250,000,000
93,400,000
105,000,000
35,100,000
11,500,000
334,800,000
2,300,000
81,500,000
49,700,000
25,500,000
2,500,000
190,900,000
56,500,000
16,600,000
489,700,000

73,600
100
100
2,150
1,050
3,400
100
100
300
100
100
100
69,000
200
200

0.06
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.09
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.04
0.00
1.22
0.01
0.00

915,200,000

70,200

0.08

J
S
J
J

C 2015C 2015C 2015C 2015

E
E
J
J
C
E
C,S
C

C 1993
C 1993
C 1990D 2016
C 1993
D 2000B 2011
B 2001
D 2016

Population Enlarged
with Jewish Jewish
parentepopulationf
JPP
EJP
300
400
200
300
23,60027,100Law ofReturnpopulationg
LRP
500
400
30,40081,900
200
500
2,500
1,200
4,400
200
200
500
200
200
200
75,000600
400

88,900
300
1,000
2,700
1,300
5,300
300
300
700
300
300
300
80,000800
600

96,900
400
2,500
2,900
1,400
7,200
400
400
900
400
400
400
85,0001,000
800

77,50083,60089,700Oceania total
42,000,000
121,000
2.88
133,700
149,800
166,400
Australia
24,500,000
113,400
4.63
C
B 2016125,000
140,000
155,000
New Zealand
4,800,000
7,500
1.56
C
B 20068,500
9,500
11,000Other
12,700,000
100
0.01
D 2016200
300
400
a Source, with minor adjustments: Population Reference Bureau (2018) and United Nations Population Division (2017). Mid-year2017 estimatesb Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same
household, are identified by him/her as Jews; and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who
claim no current religious or ethnic identityc (C) National population census. (P) National population register. (S) Survey of Jewish population. (J) Jewish community register.
(E) Estimate.
d (A) Base estimate derived from national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial
information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period. (B) Base estimate derived
from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population
movements during the intervening period. (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or less reliable or partial
coverage of country’s Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic
trends. (D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. In categories A, B, and C, the year in which thecountry’s base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate’s date but thebasis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2018
was not only updated but also revised in light of improved informatione Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons who are partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent
f Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent;and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)
g Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identificationh Including countries and territories not listed because fewer than 100 core Jews live in each of those countries and in all of thosecountries combined
i Including Monaco
j Including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man
k Including Asian regionsl Including the Baltic countries which are already included above in the EU
m Including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, not including the West Bankn Author’s revised estimates of total Palestinian population on 1/1/2018: West Bank (without East Jerusalem): 2,548,700; Gaza:
1,839,900; Total: 4,388,600. The West Bank also includes 404,600 Jews and 8,600 non-Jewish members of Jewish households,
for a total of 413,200 Jews and others. The reported West Bank total of 2,961,900 includes Palestinian, Jewish and other residents
o Not including foreign workers and refugees
p Israel's total permanent (de jure) population as defined by Israel’s legal system, not including foreign workers and refugees
q Including Hong Kong and Macaor Jewish population includes Lebanons Excluding Sudan and Ethiopia included in Northern Africa

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