Religion, Intellectual Property, and Innovation
Alireza Naghavi
University of Bologna

Giuseppe Pignataro
University of Bologna

Abstract
This chapter discusses the consequences of informal intellectual property (IP) protection through religious rules on innovation. As religiosity is not necessarily accompanied by high levels of morality,
the lack of formal IP institutions can be detrimental for technological progress. This fallacy is best visible in the case of Islam, which incorporates the protection of IP in its doctrine. Islamic societies arecharacterized by weak IP protection regimes, high rates of piracy, and low levels of innovation. The
legal enforcement of IP rights is hence beneficial in the absence of trust in the society and cannot be
substituted by religious beliefs.

Keywords: Intellectual property, Religion, Legal institutions, Licensing, Technologicalinvestment, Islamic Law, Property rights protection, Expropriation, Morality
JEL Classification: O34, Z12, K42

Email addresses: alireza.naghavi@unibo.it (Alireza Naghavi), giuseppe.pignataro@unibo.it (Giuseppe
Pignataro)

1. Introduction
Religion is often viewed as a cultural trait, and can influence innovation in various
ways. The interrelation between religion and innovation is not straightforward. Different religions may for instance have alternative perspectives towards different professions, wheresome promote and others impede innovation. Religion could create incentives by supporting
the self-sacrifice required in the effort to provide a public good through innovation. It has
also been used historically as a tool to block technological progress that could undermine thesovereignty of the religious elite. In addition, innovation could itself be considered both a service to the society and a mechanism related to material concerns and wealth accommodation.
One of many ways in which religion can affect innovation in a heterogeneous manneris the extent to which it respects and recognizes the value of intellectual property (IP). Several of the great religious traditions have long histories of thought about property rights andobligations that may be applied fruitfully to IP regarding ownership, creativity, justice, andfairness (Berg, 2013). Yet, the relationship between religion and IP is rarely observed or discussed in today’s society as IP rights are considered a legal matter and dealt with through an
independent formal enforcement mechanism. In fact, globalization and the worldwide harmonization of IP culture have contributed to the increasing debates about the crucial role of
IP protection for efficient business development and technological progress. Increased worldwide competition has raised the stakes in disputes over IP, leading to evaluating the benefits
and potential costs of strict regulation through the lenses of microeconomic theory. Over thelast two decades, many countries have formally complied with the international standards set
in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement.
Given a relatively unified worldwide understanding and enforcement mechanism of
IP rights, how does it mediate the impact of religion on innovation? A key aspect throughwhich IP rights are successfully protected is the separation of the enforcement system from thereligious doctrines. A pronounced exception is Islam . While Islam is a bundle of religious,
political, and economic rules regulating most aspects of life (Greif, 2006), other monotheistic
religions such as Christianity draw boundaries because they flourished in states where laws
and social codes were already in force (Greif, 2001; Platteau, 2008). This coincides with thestylized fact provided later in the chapter that Muslim countries observe high piracy rates,and suffer from negligible innovation rates.
In this chapter, we aim to highlight the idea that when a religion encompasses all aspectsof social behavior, it reduces incentives to introduce an official legal system to monitor issues
1such as the protection of IP. This could however have an adverse effect in terms of innovation
if an explicit enforcement mechanism is not outlined in the religious dogma. The analysis
is motivated by the existence of the Sharia containing rules that draw connections between
IP and Islamic law, though lacking an enforcement mechanism. This seemingly overlapping
jurisdiction, or the lack thereof, creates ambiguity in the source of IP protection. Islamic countries may not see the necessity for an external state source of IP protection, relying on thelaws prescribed in Sharia as sufficient, and viewing legal institutions as redundant means ofenforcement.
The message being conveyed is that the lack of formal enforcement brought about by the
inclusion of IP rights in religious law leaves its protection to social behavior and is driven bymoral values. Trust, or in general morality, can in this case be a critical driver of IP production
and is of particular relevance in a world where enforcement takes an informal form without
endorsing a punishment device (Guiso et al., 2008). Morality induces innovation by reducing
innovators’ concern about not reaping the benefits of their investment. In the absence of trust,
religion can therefore have detrimental effects on innovation.
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

In short, the aim of the chapter is to provide an overview to explain the fallacy of theexistence of IP protection in religious law, leaving enforcement to informal means. Islam isan appropriate example as encourages IP protection, but does not punish its expropriation .
Muslim societies must hence rely on morality and loyalty to religious rules as opposed to legal institutions to enforce IP rights. The conceptual framework is depicted in Figure 1, andsheds light on the relationship between religion and innovation by studying the implications of reliance on religious institutions as means of IP enforcement to induce innovation.
It shows that the heterogeneity of agents in terms of religious or moral values can be one
2channel among several explanations that show how religion and culture interact with economic, legal, and political institutions to create a basis for technological progress (see also
Chapter: Religion and Institutions ).
The next three sections delve into the link between the nodes of interest in the conceptual framework that determine the outcome in terms of innovation, namely IP rights andinnovation, religion and IP rights, and finally religion and moral values. This is followed by
the core discussion on the fallacy of IP protection in religious law and the role of trust in theeffect of religion on innovation.
2. Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation
The fact the IP rights protection is a fundamental prerequisite to innovation has a long
history in economic literature starting from seminal study of Helpman (1993). These works
provide the baseline theory in an international context on how the recognition of IP rights creates the necessary incentives to innovation. Granting temporary market power to innovators
allows them to earn monopoly profits to recoup their research and development investment.
Firms therefore take into account the strenght of the IP rights regime in countries with which
they engage in trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). While the literature initially assumed that only firms from technologically advanced countries (North) can innovate, later
works such as Grossman and Lai (2004) extended these models to look at situations where
also the emerging or the developing world (South) can undertake innovation activities.
While the literature generally finds that stricter enforcement of IP rights encourages
greater innovation at the global level, it may decrease welfare in the South. In fact, it may
suggest the level of IP protection tends to increase monotonically with the level of economic
development as more innovation potential increases the demand for protection. This monotonicity has however been challenged by Diwan and Rodrik (1991). In a context where only
Northern firms innovate, they show that when the market size of the South is small, the country is better off protecting IP in order to give incentives to the Northern firms to produce
innovations best suited to their needs. As a result, while rich countries enforce IP rights toprotect their innovations, poor or small countries do so in order to stimulate innovation inrich countries and trade to gain access to superior technologies. Chen and Puttitanun (2005)
empirically confirm this non-linearity (U-shape) between IP rights enforcement and a country’s wealth as measured by GDP per capita.
In support of the strong link between IP rights and trade, the empirical works initi-

3ated by Maskus and Penubarti (1995) establish that weak enforcement of IP rights createsbarriers to North-South trade. Also Smith (1999) reinforced the mechanism of this regularity by showing that stronger IP rights have a market expansion effect for US firms particularly in countries with a strong capacity for imitation . This has led to the inclusion of IP
protection in the TRIPS agreement of the World Trade Organization and the global harmonization of standards, in exchange for legitimate technology transfer to the South. IP protection can be beneficial to less developed countries as a tool to attract trade and FDI and trigger technology transfer (Markusen, 2001). Javorcik (2004), for example, shows how FDI cancause technology spillovers from multinational to local firms in the South. One can conclude
that the link between IP protection and innovation is not confined to advance economies, but
is global in nature.
3. Religion and Intellectual Property Rights
Creations of the mind have always been valued highly throughout history. Poets, for example, were deeply respected during the medieval era and enjoyed an enhanced social standing whereas some lesser poets who resorted to free-riding and stealing of original ideas weregenerally cast from cultural society (Malkawi, 2013). Cultures and attitudes towards the protection of IP, however, differ across religions. Confucius ethics perceive IP as a communal
good and copying as a legitimate means of learning and sharing (Yang and Sonmez, 2007).
Creations belong to the public, motivation for creativity is the esteem that results from thecreator (fame) rather than materialistic rewards. Christian work ethic principles emphasize
individual achievement and legality, and together with Judaism express ambivalence abouthuman ownership of information or ideas. The Catholic intellectual tradition has been ambivalent about individual property ownership in general, seeing it not as an ultimate ideal but
as a necessary response to “a fallen world in which acquisitive humans compete for resources
and take from each other” (Griffith, 2013). They recognize the role of IP laws in support ofintellectual and artistic work in a “degraded world in which [it is] . . . otherwise likely to get
short shrift” (Griffith, 2009). On Judaism , Stern (2013) examine why Jewish law has neverclearly approved IP rights: “most rabbis today hold that Jewish law proper does not forbid
using a pirated copy of Windows or downloading music through Torrent.” The reason why
Jewish law never accepted IP rights as such is primarily attributed to the fact that it treats
thought and intellect as spiritual, even divine, features. Jewish law prohibits charging fees for
spiritual teaching, and if all wisdom is “divine” wisdom, then the development of IP rights,

4which “allow for thoughts to be owned, traded, and restricted” becomes “inconceivable.”
The perspective proposed in Islamic law towards this right is in notable contrast to that
under Judaism. Early Muslim-Arab society is known to have broadened the practices of the
pre-Islamic period with regard to works of the mind. Sharia law includes several considerations whose effects are similar to those of modern IP laws. For example, the Caliphs – religious
and political leaders who are successors of the Prophet Muhammad – would buy books they
considered important and make copies of them after paying an adequate compensation to
the author (Malkawi, 2013). Although Islamic law does not explicitly regulate IP rights per
se by having detailed and precise rules, such as in the case of spiritual duties or inheritance,
the different sources of law in Sharia contain many rules and examples that help in drawing
connections between IP and Islamic law.
Islam is a centralized religion of laws in every dimension and addresses matters ranging
from the timing of daily prayers to marriage, inheritance, and commerce. Legal principles
regarding property rights in Islamic law fall under three categories: (1) The recognition of theconcept of private property, (2) the creation of title by creative endeavor (ownership throughthe appropriation of unused property), and (3) the divisibility and separability of various
property rights. Under Sharia, ownership of real property is possible through contractual
agreements or by appropriation . Under the appropriation right, one may receive title tovacant real property by developing it and making it productive. Ownership is rewarded to anindividual who exerts efforts in developing materials, entitling him to the fruits of his labor.
There are no provisions in the introductory texts of Sharia that limit ownership to tangible objects. It therefore associates IP protection with incentives and rewards for labor, in linewith offering an economic incentive to IP owners by entitling them exclusive right to enjoy
the benefits of their creativity. Nevertheless, one may ask whether an author or inventor canrecover more than the initial investment on his work under Sharia. An author or inventor
should recoup the initial investment to create the work, but could also accumulate wealthexcessively. Under Sharia, gaining profits without exerting efforts over extended periods is
considered riba (usury, in the sense of acquiring an unlawful, excessive profit) and is prohibited (see also Chapter: Islamic Finance ). What is unacceptable is therefore not an increase in
assets per se, but obtaining it without exerting effort or being exposed to business risk. Clearly,
IP holders invest time and money and are thus entitled to reap a financial return.
Regarding the divisibility and separability of property rights, Sharia allows a titleholder
to divide ownership and use by granting a third party the right to use the property without

5

transferring ownership. Ownership and use of a property is conceptually divided in the samemanner the physicality of an object is from its intellectual value. This bears strongly on IP
rights in situations where the owner of a good that embodies knowledge wants to retain ownership rights but allow a third party to exploit it economically (Beltrametti, 2009). The concept
parallels the current practice of licensing IP rights. The central idea of licensing patented
matter is that the patent holder retains the patent and licenses the use of the property, theknowledge, to another. The concern arises because both parties must know the value of the
IP and the requirements must be spelled out, i.e. full information about the technology. This
creates uncertainty as a party to the contract may not wish to disclose information before thecontract is signed because once the information is revealed the incentives to sign the contract
are nullified. For example, once the licensee gets a functioning copy of a program before transaction is set then it may choose to copy the program and forgo the deal. Formal enforcementof IP rights through functioning legal institutions avoids this problem (Jamar, 1992).
Muslim judges use Qiyas in dealing with IP rights piracy and many fatwas tackle IP
rights piracy, implying that piracy is prohibited by Islam (haram), though without a clear punishment such as that for material theft. The distinction of physical property from ideas inIslam in noted in the Hedaya, mentioning that one does not amputate the hand of a thieffor stealing a book because a thief does not intend to rub the physical material of the book
(paper), but the ideas embodied in the book, which is not tangible property (Al-Marghinani,1791). This creates a gray area when enforcement is left in the hands of religiosity, and has
economic consequences for business relationships and investment incentives that are key fordevelopment in the society. The outcome would in this case depend on the characteristics ofthe society, which is decided by the degree of religious adherence and abidance by laws interms of morality.
4. Religion and Moral Values
In a general context, the argument on the role of morality in the society relate to theresults obtained in Cervellati and Vanin (2013), who study the interaction between externalsanctions and moral self-punishment. They similarly argue that many religions attach moral
sanctions to prohibited and formally illegal actions. Interestingly, their findings suggest thatprohibitions regulated by morality involve a lower exposure to temptation than those enforced through external punishments . Guilt triggered by moral values can bring higher
individual utility for agents with self-control problems (in this case motivated by economic

6

incentives) when exposed to external punishments. However, that the advantages of a system
based on moral sanctions is not sustainable if a majority share of the population do not adhereby the laws informally prescribed in the religious commandments.
Levy and Razin (2014) suggest how preferences and institutions can be provided by religion, making it possible to make analogies between this chapter and recent works on morality, temptation, and institutions. For example, Greif and Tabellini (2017) show how cities
rely on institution due to looser morality, whereas clans who possess stronger moral values
self-commit to the enforcement of the clan’s principles. Interestingly, Carvalho (2013) further shows that compulsory religious laws such as veiling in Islam could lead to a decline inreligiosity. IP rights are strongly encouraged in the Sharia, but are not compulsory, i.e. nopunishment is imposed upon deviation . Could this in itself follow the conception in Carvalho (2013) and lead to the postulation that including formal IP enforcement in religious
texts or imposing it by religious states could reduce the self-will to renounce expropriation in
the absence of legal enforcement?
From a broader perspective, the connection between religion and innovation with IP
protection as the mediating channel falls within the literature on the impact of culture, and inparticular religion, on economic outcomes, with particular interest being the connection between religious traditions and the rule of law (Kuran and Rubin, 2018). Market relations often take place in environments afflicted with asymmetric information and limited contractual
enforcement. Given their own religious beliefs, agents experience intrinsic motivations in actions with different ethical implications (see also Chapter: Religion and Economic Preferences ),once again highlighting the role of moral values on the outcome.
5. Trust and the Fallacy of Intellectual Property Right Protection in Religious Law
The essential role of IP protection for innovation and the fact that it is encrypted in or atleast dealt with in different religious doctrines raises a fundamental question: can we rely on
religious beliefs in a society regarding IP rights and the incentives to innovate? This would,
in principle, be the case if religion nurtures trust among individuals in a society as it should
mitigate immoral infringement or piracy activities. Trust is in turn known to create social
interaction and economic exchange in a society (Guiso et al., 2008, 2009), and can promote
cooperation and boost economic development (Putnam, 1993).
Religion includes a set of moral principles , rules of conduct, or ethic values when an
individual must make a decision that relates to moral principles. Scholars like Schlessinger

7

(2007) view attitudes towards trust to be intrinsically linked to religion in a way that moral
behaviors stem from some form of religious attitude or belief in God. This would suggest apositive correlation between the degree of religiosity and trust in the society. If so, religion canpromote moral values that would discourage the violation of IP rights and thereby stimulateinnovation. However, this remains an issue that elicits different perspectives among scholars
and people of diverse orientations. For example, the Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics
states that religiosity can be harmful, neutral, or complementary to morality depending on
the conflicting interpretations of the ethical principles found in religious dogmas.
Figure 2: Trust and Religious Attitudes across societies

Correlation between trust variation and the attendance of Places of Worship across religions (left panel) and theBeliefs in God (right panel). Source: World Value Survey 2000.

Figure 3: Trust and Religious Attitudes across societies

Correlation between trust variation and the frequency of Praying weekly (left panel) and the self-evaluation of
Religious Person (right panel). Source: World Value Survey 2000.

The World Value Survey can be used to provide some suggestive evidence on the relationship between trust and religion. In particular, the standard question on trust, namely
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?, and the four religion variables of attendance of worship places, beliefs in god, frequency

8

of praying weekly and self-evaluation of a religious person can be adopted to identify trust
and account for several indicators of religiosity. A significant negative correlation between
trust and religiosity across countries emerges in Figure 2 when looking at worship places (leftpanel) or beliefs in god (right panel). The result are also valid when looking at the other proxies of praying weekly or the self-consideration of a religious person as proposed in Figure 3.
Therefore the notion of religiosity cannot necessarily be extended to mutual trust (see also
Chapter: Religion and Trust ).
Do these stylized facts suggest that by not providing a sound trustful IP environment
religiosity can have an adverse effect on innovation? This line of reasoning is compatible
with Bénabou et al. (2021), who document a negative relationship between religiosity and innovation, where the latter is measured by the (log) patents per capita. The authors further
provide a theory to show how states, particularly theocratic ones can block discoveries andinnovation due to the fear that the latter may erode religious beliefs. A more concrete confirmation of the existence of a negative impact of reliance on religion on economic outcome,however, requires further investigation to single out situations where rules are embedded ina religion and property protection is left to self-enforcement through religious beliefs .
Among religions discussed in section 3, Islam is a unique case that allows us to confirm
this hypothesis because it is the only religion that contains codes in its institutional complex
that explicitly spell out property rights regulations. With protection embedded in the doctrine, it is the most likely case where religion can play the role of legal institutions as a formof informal enforcement through religious beliefs. This would especially be the case if theaforementioned Muslim states are not complemented by a form of formal legal IP rights enforcement mechanism. A point-wise observation of Figures 2 and 3 reveals many Muslimmajority countries to be located in the bottom-right area, implying a high degree of religiosity
accompanied by low levels of trust.
Recall that Islamic law is derived from religious norms based on the Quran and the Hadith and is believed to be God’s law and a main ingredient of the belief system. Nonetheless,very high rates of piracy are observed in Islamic countries, see El-Bialy and Gouda (2011).
On the contrary, countries with high individualism or large populations with Christian faithtend to have lower piracy rates (Yang and Sonmez, 2007). Islamic countries lack formal institutions to protect IP rights and instead rely on religion and morality. Sharia generally considers IP rights violations unethical and forbidden. The feeling of guilt and the fear of shamein the society would determine people’s actions based on their level of adherence (see also9Chapter: Economics of Sin Tax ). Wagner and Sanders (2001) for example show how religion
and ethical decision-making tend to be related when someone considers buying pirated software. Hence, a religion that views IP rights piracy as a malevolent act can only replicate theformal enforcement process of IP rights laws in the presence of high adherence by the majorityof the society. Otherwise, a divergence of formal and informal institutions due to the lack of
the former and reliance on religious loyalty may result in the failure of IP rights enforcement.
This gives morality a crucial role if religion is the only basis of IP laws, as in the absence offormal protection, effectiveness of enforcement depends on whether it is approved in theeyes of the society. As explained by El-Bialy and Gouda (2011), the law is said to be implemented efficiently in case pirates conform to it, otherwise benefits of piracy are greater thancosts that include feelings of guilt and the probability of getting caught.
Figure 4: IP protection and Innovation in Muslim Societies

Variation of log of IP enforcement index in 2000 (l i2000) and log of patent applications per capita per million
persons in 2000 (l p2000) on Muslim adherence % in 2000 (MUSLIM00). Source: Authors’ own calculations basedon Park (2008) and Barro (2003), and WIPO IP Statistics Data Center (https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/index.htm)

Figure 4 illustrates IP rights enforcement (left panel) and innovation potential in termsof patent applications per capita (right panel) in Muslim countries (bottom right circles) withrespect to non-Muslim countries (top left circles). It is immediately evident from the figure that
Muslim majority countries mainly from the Middle East and North Africa (e.g. Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco, and Bangladesh)
indeed suffer from a poor IP rights environment. Note that Turkey is the only country that belonged to this group in 1995, but substantially improved its IP rights regime in 2000, the effectof which clearly does not immediately translate into more innovation activities, as observablein the figure. It is important to mention that the figures do not intend to display a causal impact of trust on innovation and religion. The investigation is instead meant to emphasize the10necessity of trust when a formal mechanism does not characterize a society at a conceptual
level. The example of the Islamic countries serves as a relevant case as it combines the lack ofenforcement with religious prescriptions.
If morality was a reliable alternative to formal IP protection, the aforementioned countries would not exhibit a lack of incentives to engage in innovation projects and backward
technological progress. However, the same group of countries have the least number of patentapplications per capita compared to the rest of the world with other major religious denominations. Interestingly, countries with an intermediate proportion of Muslim population suchas Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Bosnia, andAlbania also have an intermediate level of patent applications per capita. Muslim majority
countries suffer from high piracy rates and little innovation. Lack of perfect morality and thepresence of asymmetric information in the society can therefore make reliance on religious
rather than legal protection of IP detrimental to a sound business environment. It is therefore
worthwhile studying how and under which circumstances the elimination of the fallacy bymeans of introducing formal IP enforcement could improve the profitability of investing ininnovation and encourage business startups in these countries.
A generic setting of imperfect information can help better understand the link between
religion and the protection of IP without an enforcement mechanism. An example of such system could be a business interaction that involves the licensing of technology to agents with different moral backgrounds and the related elaboration of intellectual research by the IP owner.
Islamic societies motivate the recognition of IP rights by leaning on religious fundamentals.
The greater moral sense regarding property rights in Islamic countries should in principle
guarantee the prevention of IP infringement that would occur in its absence. However, religion in this case may overshadow legal institutions and the formal enforcement of IP rights.
There is the presumption that individuals who share the same religious beliefs feel protectedby the state and engage in business practices that respect IP rights. This would increase effort in the society and thereby incentives to innovate (see also Chapter: Trust in Institutions ).
However, adverse effects may follow as amoral agents try to exploit the informal nature of IP
protection embedded in religious faith, resorting to the expropriation of IP.
6. Summary
In most backgrounds, emerging ideas are often qualified as IP and moral rights are
granted to their inventors . Muslim scholars in particular do not observe IP law as an inde-11pendent discipline since no distinction between “legal” and “religious” existed in early Islam.
Informal support for the protection of intangible assets could however create a gray area thatat times discourages research investment and technological progress. Ambiguity arises in theinterpretation of religious laws and their enforcement. Unjust enrichment and illegal appropriations are to be held in trust for the legitimate owner and damages caused by infringement
should be. The fact that Sharia sees property as sacred should compel governments to provide
for remedies for the theft or infringement in connection with people’s private property rights.
Nevertheless, in the case of intangible assets enforcement is left to the morality of the society
and their religious beliefs, i.e. trust in the society.
The chapter has shown the economic value of legal institutions in such societies for the
purpose of protecting IP rights and successfully advancing with innovative projects. The message is that that formal enforcement of IP rights is beneficial in the absence of morality andtrust in the society and cannot be substituted by religious beliefs. Under such circumstances,
it could be a source of gains for the IP owner by avoiding expropriation by amoral agents
when imitation is substantial threat for business relationships in the industry. Leaving IP
protection to self-enforcement through religious outlines such as the Sharia would therefore
lead to inefficiency or the breakdown of technology-related partnerships. This leaves roomand hopefully stimulates further studies on the missing links between religion, morality, legal
enforcement, and innovation. One avenue of research would be to study the factors that contribute to the endogenous formation of morality in the context of IP protection and innovation
with or without legal institutions.
7. Acknowledgement
Responsible Section Editor: Dr. Olga POPOVA. The article has benefited from valuable comments of the editors and anonymous referees. Financial support by PRIN2017 - PI
Naghavi is gratefully noted. The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

12References
Al-Marghinani, B. (1791). The Hedaya: C. Hamilton Translation. T. Bensley, London.
Barro,

R.

(2003).

Religionadherence

data.

availableathttps://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data.
Beltrametti, S. (2009). The legality of intellectual property rights under islamic law. In et al.,T. M., editor, The Prague Yearbook of Comparative Law, pages 55–94. The Prague Centre forInternational and Comparative Law, Prague.
Berg, T. C. (2013). Intellectual property and religious thoughts. University of St. Thomas Law
Journal, 10:579–589.
Bénabou, R., Ticchi, D., and Vindigni, A. (2021). Forbidden fruits: The political economy ofscience, religion, and growth. Review of Economic Studies. forthcoming.
Carvalho, J. (2013). Veiling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128:337–370.
Cervellati, M. and Vanin, P. (2013). Thou shalt not covet: Prohibitions, temptation and moral
values. Journal of Public Economics, 103:15–28.
Chen, Y. and Puttitanun, T. (2005). Intellectual property rights and innovation in developing
countries. Journal of Development Economics, 78:474–493.
Diwan, I. and Rodrik, D. (1991). Patents, appropriate technology, and north-south trade. Journal of International Economics, 30:27–47.
El-Bialy, N. and Gouda, M. (2011). Can shari’a be a deterrent for intellectual property piracy
in islamic countries? The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 14:441–466.
Greif, A. (2001). What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response. Harper Collins,
New York.
Greif, A. (2006). Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Greif, A. and Tabellini, G. (2017). The clan and the corporation: Sustaining cooperation inchina and europe. Journal of Comparative Economics, 45:1–35.
Griffith, P. J. (2009). Intellectual Appetite: A Theological Grammar. Catholic University of America
Press, Washington DC.
13

Griffith, P. J. (2013). The natural right to property and the impossibility of owning the intangible: A tension in catholic thought. University of St. Thomas Law Journal, 10:590–602.
Grossman, G. and Lai, E. (2004). International protection of intellectual property. American
Economic Review, 94:1636–1653.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2008). Trusting the stock market. Journal of Finance,
LXIII:2257–2600.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2009). Cultural biases in economic exchange? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124:1095–1131.
Helpman, E. (1993). Innovation, imitation, and intellectual property rights. Econometrica,
61:1247–1280.
Jamar, S. D. (1992). The protection of intellectual property under islamic law. Capital University
Law Review, 21:1079–1106.
Javorcik, B. (2004). Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms?
in search of spillovers through backward linkages. American Economic Review, 94(3):605–627.
Kuran, T. and Rubin, J. (2018). The financial power of the powerless: Socio-economic status
and interest rates under partial rule of law. Economic Journal, 128:758–796.
Levy, G. and Razin, R. (2014). Rituals or good works: Social signalling in religious organizations. Journal of European Economic Association, 12:1317–1360.
Malkawi, B. H. (2013). Intellectual property protection from a sharia perspective. University of
St. Thomas Law Journal, 16:87–122.
Markusen, J. R. (2001). Contracts, intellectual property rights, and multinational investment
in developing countries. Journal of International Economics, 53:189–204.
Maskus, K. and Penubarti, M. (1995). How trade-related are intellectual property rights? Journal of International Economics, 39:227–248.
Park, W. G. (2008). International patent protection: 1960-2005. Research Policy, 37:761–766.
Platteau, J. P. (2008). Religion, politics, and development: Lessons from the lands of islam.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68:329–351.

14

Putnam, R. (1993). ”Making Democracy Work”, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Schlessinger, L. (2007). Views of religion and morality. In 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey.
Pew Research Center Project.
Smith, P. (1999). Are weak patent rights a barrier to us exports? Journal of International Economics, 48:151–177.
Stern, J. (2013). Spiritual property, ’intellectual’ property, and a solution to the mystery of ip
rights in jewish law. University of St. Thomas Law Journal, 10:603–617.
Wagner, S. C. and Sanders, G. L. (2001). Considerations in ethical decision-making and software piracy. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-2:161–167.
Yang, D. and Sonmez, M. (2007). Economic and cultural impact on intellectual property violations: A study of software piracy. Journal of World Trade, 41:731–750.

15