241

Defense Cooperation Among Japan,
the United States, and the ROK:
Dealing with the DPRK
Ohara Bonji242 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

This chapter is about how Japan prepares to respond to provocations from North Korea. As
background factors, we need to consider how Japan is altering its security policy, how it isassessing the capacities and intentions of the DPRK and also China, and how it is evaluating
the role of China on the Korean Peninsula and of defense cooperation with the United States
and the ROK. Unlike the responses of Washington and Seoul to possible provocations from
Pyongyang, Tokyo is not focused on direct military involvement. It is emphasizing thebroader context while recognizing its limitations in responding militarily.
In July 2014 the Japanese government decided on a fundamental change in security policy. The
Shinzo Abe cabinet altered the interpretation of the Constitution, allowing Japan to exercise
the right to collective self-defense even in peacetime.1 The reason cited for this decision isa “change in the security environment” around Japan. The government emphasized a “rapidchange in the global power balance,” noting that the security environment around Japan has
become increasingly severe, as represented by the nuclear and missile development programsof North Korea.2 Japan recognizes that a DPRK missile attack with a nuclear warhead is amajor threat, but this is not the primary reason for the change in Japanese security policy.
More fundamental is that the “rise of China” has created a perception of a confrontation
between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific region. Even if there is not now
an equivalence of power between the two, the image of confrontation has taken root, withcountries around China speaking of a “China threat.” Inside Japan, efforts are ongoing to
identify both China’s military capabilities and its intentions—efforts that are proving to bequite difficult.
There are quantitative indicators of capability,3 but numbers alone do not tell the whole story.
Today’s fighting capacity is also determined by intelligence gathering, based not only on
systems but also on networks and big data management. It is difficult from the outside toassess the level of such capacity. Even if the capacity is there, without the intention to use it,
there is no threat.
Whereas it takes a long time to build a country’s capacity, its intentions can change overa short time, even in opposite directions. Therefore, while continuing to analyze capacity,
we must also pay attention to intentions and strive to deepen mutual understanding. With
that in mind, Japan and China in December 2014 reopened their consultative dialogue ona “maritime communication mechanism.”4 Both seek to avoid unexpected collisions on thesea and in the air, or an an escalation of conflict. To realize this objective they are conducting
talks to establish necessary procedures. We can see from this that China is a state that seeks
to avoid accidental collisions and is willing to work toward that end through discussions.
The challenge with the DPRK is different. It prefers to conceal everything, not just its
military capabilities. This makes it extremely difficult to grasp its intentions. Moreover, it
intentionally makes irrational moves as a way of threatening others. People grow fearful when
they confront something they do not understand. Neighbors doubt that issues can be rationallyresolved through direct talks;, so they must be prepared in case North Korea irrationallydecides to take military action, including the use of nuclear weapons. This situation forces
Japan to doubt that the DPRK shares an intention to avoid military confrontation.

Ohara: Japan, U.S., ROK Defense Cooperation | 243

Dealing with the DPRK and
the Role of China
In this situation of not being able to understand the DPRK’s intentions, Japan recognizes
that a multilateral framework is the most effective way of dealing with the country. Japan,
the United States, China, Russia and, naturally, the ROK are concerned with stopping the
DPRK’s program of developing nuclear weapons. These countries view such weapons as amatter that directly concerns their security and exerts a large influence on the regional security
environment. They have tried through dialogue to stop its development of nuclear weapons,such as through the Six-Party Talks, an experience that has not gone smoothly. They talksis
wereas launched after the DPRK withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with thefive other countries aligned against its hardline tactics.5 However, after the Six-Party Talks
began, North Korea, defying criticism from international society and sanctions, continued to
conduct missile launches and nuclear tests. In response to the April and May 2009 launches andtests, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1874, which applied additional sanctions
against North Korea.6 Afterwards, the DPRK declared that it would process highly enricheduranium, and in 2011 it revealed the existence of a plan for a light-water reactor and theoperation of a uranium enrichment facility. Moreover, the DPRK, sank the Cheonan7 on March
26, 2010, and on November 23, 2010, fired on Yeonpyeong island, killing civilians as well asSouth Korean military personnel,8 going beyond threatening conduct and actually launching
military attacks. Given this abnormal North Korean attitude, it became difficult to reopen the
Six-Party Talks after 2008.
Despite strong opposition from neighboring states, the DPRK persists in developing nuclear
weapons and missiles. Among other aims, it seeks direct dialogue with the United States andconducts missile and nuclear tests to intimidate neighboring countries. The United States andother countries have applied economic sanctions on North Korea, but if even a single country
moves out of step, the sanctions will lose their effectiveness. China holds the key to whether
they will work or not, since until now it has supported the DPRK. However, this was whenbilateral relations were good. China has changed its attitude toward North Korea and opposes
the DPRK program of developing nuclear weapons, as do the other countries. One reason isthat through the proliferation of nuclear weapons the regional security environment would bedestabilized. But what also worries China is that in case of Korean reunification, a united Korea
will not necessarily limit itself to maintaining an alliance with China. China will not permit astate to have nuclear weapons so close to its borders.
China wants North Korea to act as a buffer zone between it and the United States.
Destabilization within the DPRK is, therefore, not desirable, as it could exert an influence
directly on China. Conditions could arise where starving North Korean troops cross theborder, stealing the livestock and grain kept by Chinese farmers. When after the death of Kim
Jong-il on December 17, 2011, a fierce power struggle appeared possible, and the politicalsituation in the DPRK became unstable, China sent PLA troops to the border to stand guard.9
And in 2013, when the new leader, Kim Jong-un, executed Jang Song-thaek, the number two
figure in the regime and his uncle-in-law, China’s leadership dispatched as many as 300,000
troops to the tense Sino-DPRK border.10 This was because deepening instability in North
Korean society resulting from the power struggle was recognized as a negative influencethat would extend to China. However, it is extremely difficult to correctly understand what
occurs inside North Korea, leading to various speculations regarding the execution. China is244 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

definitely not thinking about directly confronting the U.S. military on the Korean Peninsula.
This is why China has always supported the DPRK, even though other countries—led by
the United States—have criticized this approach. Limited as China’s influence may be atpresent, it is the only state that can influence North Korea’s policy decisions. The reality,
though, is that China has not intentionally left North Korea to fend for itself; it has simply
been unable to control events there.
Kim Jong-un has not yet paid a visit to China, which has presumably become irritated by
the young leader’s behavior. Some Chinese officials say that the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) would no longer defend the DPRK if a military clash were to break out between it
and the ROK and the United States. Chinese society is less inclined to support the dispatchof Chinese soldiers. China may need North Korea as a country, but it is not concerned
about protecting any particular leader. When China joined the economic sanctions, theireffectiveness was greatly enhanced; the reduced export volume of oil to the DPRK wasparticularly damaging, for which China took credit. However, North Korea recognizes that
China is not hostile. It knows that China will not drive it into a corner, and China willcontinue to take steps so that North Korea is not destabilized. A China that is trying to control
North Korea through economic sanctions may not be a reliable partner, but it continues tobe a useful partner. This means that China has a major role to play on the matter of North
Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, but its influence over the transformation of thatcountry will be limited.

The U.S.-ROK Alliance and JapanThe two sides of the peninsula have not yet concluded a peace treaty, and this means that the
Korean War has not ended. North Korea repeatedly asserts that if there is no agreement to end
hostilities, military actions will continue to be taken against South Korea. ROK forces aremodernized and well-equipped. Their capability is high enough to win a conventional war
with the DPRK. But nuclear weapons are the choice of the weak, and they give Pyongyang
bargaining power. Mao Zedong had also focused on developing nuclear weapons when
the PLA was not strong enough, recognizing that only nuclear weapons could serve as abargaining chip against the superpowers.
The United States, along with South Korea, demonstrates its intention not only to prepare
for a military assault by North Korea but to fight against it if the DPRK should employ
nuclear weapons. The joint U.S.-ROK military exercises are effective as a means to makethis intention clear. North Korea intensely expresses its opposition each time these exercises
are conducted, which stems from its understanding of the significance of the presence of the
U.S. military. Of the countries active in Northeast Asia, only the United States can act as adeterrent against North Korea. Even now, North Korea provocatively threatens to launch
missiles and test nuclear weapons. These “madman tactics” are the only way it can attract
the attention of the United States, but one should not make light of such moves. In case
North Korea feels excessively pressured by other countries, the chances are not zero that
it would actually take aggressive action, including the launching of missiles tipped with
nuclear weapons. That is the reason that China tries to maintain the economic sanctions
at manageable levels. The scenario that China is most eager to avoid is the possibility that
North Korea would be eliminated as a state as a result of it undertaking a military attack andthen suffering military defeat at the hands of the United States and South Korea.

Ohara: Japan, U.S., ROK Defense Cooperation | 245

The United States and South Korea have limited means to deal with North Korea because theyrealize that there is a low possibility that the North will give up its development of nuclear
weapons, but neither can they assent to such development. Of course, they do not have theoption of a first strike against North Korea. In this case, there is no option but to pressure
North Korea through economic sanctions and to prepare for the North’s extreme reactions.
Under conditions where one cannot conduct constructive negotiations with North Korea, it
is necessary to prove to the North that its threats are ineffective so that it will stop thinking
about taking extreme measures. To this end, the United States and South Korea, as well asJapan, must convince the North that they will cooperate closely to forge a military force thatcan render ineffective a North Korean attack—even one including nuclear weapons.
These countries have to march in lockstep with regard to economic sanctions and security
cooperation. The U.S. and ROK navies can conduct MIOs (Maritime Interception/
Interdiction Operations), which are aimed at preventing enemy smuggling by routinely
boarding and checking merchant vessel traffic to make sure nothing illegal comes from orgoes to the enemy. The U.S. Navy has conducted MIOs during the Iraq War and Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The former was conducted in enforcing Security Council
Resolutions 661, 665, 678, and 986 and involved stopping and boarding ships transiting
the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to search for oil and weapons. U.S. naval vessels
kept conducting the latter with other navies to prevent terrorists from getting weapons andammunition and also to stop the smuggling of narcotics, which is a source of money for theterrorists.11 This operation was conducted by a multinational force with the U.S. Navy at
the core. Japan sent the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) to the area to support
anti-terrorism operations until 2010, but its operations were limited strictly to conducting
replenishment at sea and intelligence.12
Japan sometimes follows its own diplomatic course toward the DPRK because it has its
own abduction problem with that country. Especially for the Abe administration, bringing
home the remaining abductees is a high-priority issue.13 As for military cooperation, Japan
has been able to offer only limited cooperation because it is unable to take military action
unless it confronts a planned, organized, large-scale military attack. This limitation is dueto the constitutional interpretation the Japanese government has followed until now, which
prohibits the use of military force in peacetime and is very restrictive in terms of preparing
for contingencies. Even if a military conflict were to erupt on the Korean Peninsula involving
the United States and the ROK, Japan would be unable to participate. However, the situation
may change in the near future. Japan has begun to consider the use of the Self-Defense Forceseven in peacetime, as reflected in the July 2014 cabinet decision expanding the cases underwhich Japan may exercise its right of self-defense. Even so, it would be difficult for Japan toplay a major role in the event of an incident on the Korean Peninsula. In that case, what kindof role could Japan play in responding to North Korea through security cooperation with theUnited States and South Korea?

Japan’s New Role
Abe emphasizes the importance of security cooperation, saying, “In the current world, nonation can maintain peace and security on its own. International society expects Japan toplay a more positive role for peace and security.”14 Based on this perception, he declared246 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

that Japan would make a “proactive contribution to peace based on a spirit of international
cooperation,” which has become Japan’s basic principle for international security. Actually,
Japan has already offered considerable peace cooperation for the Middle East and otherregions,15 but it had never spoken of supporting countries that are participating in military
operations against specific terrorist groups. Japan had hitherto mainly limited its support tohumanitarian assistance.
Japanese support programs differed from the approaches of most Western countries to theMiddle East and fulfilled a unique and important role in preventing terrorism. Such support
contributed to preventing people in vulnerable circumstances from joining terrorist groups,
enabling them to develop their lives within international society. Abe promoted this changed
meaning of Japanese support in his January trip to the Middle East, especially in his speech in
Egypt.16 “Proactive contribution” has been interpreted to mean that Japan will take measuresagainst terrorism, along with the United States and Western European countries, but Abe’s
thinking does not necessarily correspond to that of these countries. For example, Abe hassought to establish closer ties with Russia on some matters in spite of the fact that European
countries were seriously concerned about Russia’s threat.17 At conferences on security when
there are discussions concerning the future of security with NATO personnel, for example,
they invariably speak of the Russian threat. And in spite of the fact that the United States isseeking improved relations with China and South Korea, Abe has not necessarily prioritizedthese ties.
Although Japan established a National Security Council on December 4, 2013, adopted
a National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 17, 2013, and announced new National
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), also on December 17, 2013,18 it is not prepared touse the SDF in peacetime. This requires further debate both among the Japanese people
and in the Diet to create a law concerning a change in security policy, and many do not yet
sufficiently understand the meaning of this shift.
The transformed Japanese security policy will have some effect against the DPRK andin cooperating with the United States and South Korea, giving Japan a new role. When a
U.S. naval vessel that proceeds together with a MSDF vessel is subject to a missile attack,the Abe administration at the time of the incident can exercise the right of collective selfdefense, which it has advocated. This means being able to fire a return missile in place of
the U.S. vessel. Japan has deployed Aegis ships in order to defend against ballistic missiles
fired by North Korea, for there is a real chance of North Korea firing anti-ship missiles. If
the MSDF could assume the burden of anti-air warfare in place of the U.S. Navy, it could
help to counter North Korean missiles. Although it cannot join in combat against North
Korea on the peninsula, Japan can conduct some military operations in cooperation with
the United States and South Korea at sea. Japan’s “Ship Inspection Operations Law” allows
it to conduct operations in territorial waters, contiguous zones, and international waters incase of “military emergencies in areas around Japan.” The law imposes strict limitations onship inspections, requiring a Security Council resolution and permission from the country
with which the ship is registered as well as from the ship’s captain before boarding. These
conditions for Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) are bound to limit its effectiveness,but the JMSDF can conduct Replenishment at Sea operations, for which it already has someexperience during Operation Enduring Freedom, and contribute to operations by the UnitedStates and South Korea.

Ohara: Japan, U.S., ROK Defense Cooperation | 247

The new security policy would allow the JMSDF to join inspection operations. This policy,
which the LDP proposed to coalition partner Komeito on February 27, 2015, allows Japan to
conduct ship inspections without a Security Council resolution or permission of the countryof registration or ship captain.19 Weapons can be used in order to force the ship’s crew toaccept the inspection. The JMSDF had already started training crews on ships and aircraft toconduct MIOs from the 1990s, learning from the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard through joint
exercises. Japan does not have sufficient tracking information, which is crucial to an MIO,
and must find a way to share intelligence with the United States and South Korea.
In actual naval operations, when ships are in fleet formation, it is difficult to determine
which ship is the target of an attack. The commanding officer or other officer in the fleet
must consider how to defend the fleet and then coordinate a response that takes into accountthe capabilities of each of its ships. It is unrealistic for each ship to decide on its own how
to respond to an attack on the fleet. Japan’s security policy can be said to allow for realistic
military operations. Because the Aegis ships with which the MSDF is equipped can connect
to the U.S. Navy’s Aegis network, joint military action in response to a North Korean
missile is easy. They can share the track/target information and the command/control/
communications in the system. The Aegis system on Japanese ships, too, has already started
adding the ballistic missile defense function. The U.S. Navy, with Japan’s Aegis vessels, canconduct NIFC-CA (Navy Integrated Fire Control - Counter Air)20 and other network-centric
operations, opening systematic possibilities.
A third newly permitted behavior is information sharing, which is best achieved by sharing
the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance) system and networks. The JMSDF systems would have to be built
into U.S. Navy networks. Some Japanese are worried that Japan would be drawn into a war
automatically if the SDF forces and equipment are incorporated into the U.S. naval systemand that room for Japan to decide on its own what it should do would be lost in the courseof joint operations. Actually, this thinking is correct, because today’s warfare increasingly
is headed in the direction of excluding human judgment due to the rapid improvements in
missile technology. There is no time to wait for such judgments in responding to an attack.
Therefore, U.S. forces are promoting what is called C5ISR, originally C4ISR, in which the
new “C” refers to Combat System.
The kill-chain of NIFC-CA consists of E-2C “Hawkeye” early warning aircraft, JLENS(Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor), CEC (Cooperative
Engagement Capability), the Aegis system, and the SM-6 standard missile. An enemy
missile will be detected, identified, targeted, and shot down by a decision completely within
the network. In order to counter North Korean missiles, in case Japan dispatches an Aegis
vessel, the most suitable position that ship occupies will be decided by the Aegis system
network. In the future there is even a possibility that Japan’s Aegis ships will be incorporated
into the U.S. Navy’s NIFC-CA, whose expansion the Navy will be testing, and it will nolonger be possible for each ship to decide what to do. According to Japan’s new security law,in the event of a North Korean missile attack, there is a possibility of proceeding as part ofa joint operation with the U.S. Navy. Japan will have to deliberate and decide in advanceof an operation how it will participate. Limiting the discussion to Japan-U.S. cooperation,
however, overlooks the fact that cooperation with South Korea will also be necessary,
because it is on the Korean Peninsula where an incident could occur.

248 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Cooperation
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) sees the object of collective self-defense extending
to South Korea and Australia, as well as the United States. In consultations on a security law
that began between the coalition partners on February 13, 2015, the LDP proposed to the
Komeito party that these three countries be the object of collective defense, which recognized
the reality that U.S.-Japan cooperation could lead to Japan-ROK and Japan-Australia
cooperation. South Korea possesses Aegis ships as well. If these and Japan’s ships wereconnected to the U.S. Navy Aegis network for conducting fighting operations, there would
automatically be trilateral cooperation. However, incidents on the Korean Peninsula need not
be limited to North Korea firing a missile. The possibility exists of military operations onland or in nearby waters. What would Japan’s response be then?
The JMSDF has consistently promoted mobilization since the end of the Cold War, as
in the deployment of Osumi-class tank landing ships and DDH Hyuga-class helicopter
carriers, built for sending troops/vehicles immediately to an area where there is a militaryconfrontation. They are based on intelligence anticipating situations that might arise, whichis also the direction that U.S. forces are taking. JMSDF has the capability to transport land
troops on the Korean Peninsula, maintaining interoperability with the U.S. Navy.
For two reasons, however, it is unrealistic that Japan would send its SDF to military operations
on the Korean Peninsula should a situation arise there. First, the Japanese people are strongly
opposed to dispatching the SDF to another country. Second, the Korean people are strongly
opposed to Japanese forces entering their territory. It is thus unimaginable for that to happen
under present circumstances. Yet, there are still situations on the peninsula that Japan could
face, such as assistance for or the evacuation of its citizens. There are many Japanese living
in and visiting South Korea who may need to be evacuated if North Korea attacks South
Korea. The Self-Defense Force Law Article 84-3 limits the JSDF to land, maritime, and airtransportation of Japanese nationals. The LDP is trying to change this to allow the JSDF to
conduct rescue operations. Although the two ruling parties are discussing such evacuation
operations, it is inconceivable that the government would allow the JSDF to conduct rescue
operations in an armed conflict zone.21 Komeito is opposed to an operation that would leave
Japanese dead and injured and seeks a guarantee of the safety of JSDF personnel. This would
probably limit SDF involvement to evacuation operations before North Korea commences
firing, even after the changes in Japanese security policy are finalized.
Given the current deterioration in bilateral relations, the possibility is low that the ROK would
permit Japanese forces to enter the country. Japan would then have to ask U.S. naval vessels
for protection to evacuate its citizens; however, it is unlikely that the United States would
prioritize saving Japanese nationals in Korea. Therefore, Japan needs to proceed on its own torescue them. The cooperation of the Korean government is indispensable. Whether for saving
Japanese or for joint operations, Japan must first improve relations with South Korea.
To date, Japan has only considered cooperating with the United States in regard to its own
security, downplaying multilateral security cooperation. Yet, as the security environment
has changed, Japan must consider other options. One factor is the relative decline of
U.S. influence. Not only in the event of an incident on the Korean Peninsula but also in
response to events impacting Japan’s security elsewhere, there is new awareness that the
U.S. alliance does not suffice.

Ohara: Japan, U.S., ROK Defense Cooperation | 249

After Japan establishes its new security policy, limits on the use of the SDF will remain.
Even so, it will be necessary to consider security cooperation with countries other thanthe United States. Especially in regard to security in the East Asian region, cooperation
with South Korea is indispensable. Although the leading role of the United States in
Asia-Pacific security will not change, U.S. allies will have to strengthen their relations
with each other. The Japan-U.S. alliance is the nucleus of Japan’s security policy, and the
U.S.-ROK alliance serves a similarly important role for South Korea. These two alliances
provide favorable conditions for security cooperation between Japan and South Korea,
including interoperability with the United States, on which cooperation in the use of force
centers. Even if the SDF could not participate in joint operations or information sharing, abasis for Japan-ROK cooperation has been established. South Korea has already signed acontract to purchase four Northrop Grumman RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 30 high-altitude
long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at a cost of $800 million.22
Japan’s Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) similarly has decided to introduce them. This UAV
system will provide real-time intelligence concerning threats posed by the DPRK. It would
help all three countries to understand the DPRK’s intentions if they can share intelligencegathered by the drones. Japan and the ROK could cooperate in operations because they
will operate the same UAV system. Although it is unrealistic to think that Japan could fly
its UAVs over the Korean Peninsula, it could gather intelligence in nearby areas. Not only
Aegis ships but also P-3 reconnaissance aircraft are possessed by both Japan and South
Korea. There is a lot of intelligence to share, including surface pictures and anti-submarineknow-how. Such cooperation, which began between the two countries in the mid-1990s,
would contribute greatly to regional security. All that remains is political determination.

Conclusion
It is not easy to specify how Japan is preparing to respond to provocations from North Korea
for two reasons. First, the government has not yet decided on the content of its new security
policy. Although the LDP has entered into discussions with Komeito, the Abe administration
will not make public what Japan can do until May.23 Some Japanese officials believe that
the United States and European countries expect too much of Japan’s military contributions.
Second, the strained relationship between Japan and South Korea means that Japan will not
be allowed to conduct any kind of military operations over Korean territory in the event ofa crisis involving North Korea. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs removed the reference
to Japan and Korea being “important neighbors that share basic values such as freedom,democracy, and a market economy” on its website. It now simply notes, “South Korea is oneof the most important neighbors of Japan.”
When one thinks about security in the East Asian region, there is no doubting the importanceof Japan-ROK-U.S. cooperation, despite the difficult relationship between Japan and South
Korea. The only way for the two countries to cooperate is through their respective allianceswith the United States. The U.S. rebalance to Asia will result in the allocation of 60 percent
of U.S. air and naval forces to Asia by 2020, mainly to counter the “rise of China.” Countries
in the region have adopted security policies based on their own images of China’s rise andcuts in the U.S. defense budget, potentially leading to a U.S.-China equilibrium or a powertransition. But Washington’s Asian policy is not simply in opposition to China, and the viewthat U.S. influence is in decline is too pessimistic. The United States has allies in the Asia-

250 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

Pacific region, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia, which can complement eachother, forming a network of bilateral security cooperation that goes beyond the hub-andspoke configuration of the past. Thus, the United States, together with its allies, can avoid arelative decline in the region.
There has been criticism that Japan has received a “free ride” on security, but Japan can
and is ready to lessen the burden of the United States in the region. If Japan and the ROK,
as U.S. allies, can cooperate in confronting the North Korean threat, this would lighten
the U.S. burden and make deterrence more effective. The United States provides military
support, as Japan and South Korea alone cannot maintain the security environment in the
East Asian region. U.S. allies, in turn, must continue to supplement U.S. capabilities in theregion. The hub-and-spoke structure is not strong enough. There are uncertainties in South
Korea, as seen in the March 5 knife attack on U.S. Ambassador Mark Lippert by a South
Korean nationalist demanding an end to U.S.-ROK joint military drills and in the outrage inSouth Korean society over U.S. Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman’s remarks a few
days earlier on historical issues. Although the South Korean government was eager to repair
relations, history looms in the background with the United States as well, not only in JapanROK relations.
As Japan changes its security policies, concern has arisen in some neighboring states that
it is turning to the far right and reverting to militarism. In striving to strengthen security
cooperation with South Korea, Japan must secure Korean understanding of its intentions. To
reduce lingering distrust and improve security cooperation, the United States has a central
role in the discussions. It should be made clear that Japan’s shift in security policy andcooperation with South Korea is to lessen the U.S. burden. In order to achieve cooperation it
is important that each country’s cooperative intentions be well understood.

Endnotes
1.

“Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s
Survival and Protect its People,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1, 2014, http://www.mofa.
go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html.

2.

“Japan’s Security Policy” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 2015, http://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/security/.

3.

Frank Kendall, the deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, told
lawmakers “the U.S. military’s technological superiority is being challenged in ways that I
have not seen for decades, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region,” “China challenging U.S.
military technological edge—Pentagon official,” Reuters, January 29, 2014, http://in.reuters.
com/article/2014/01/29/usa-defense-china-idINDEEA0S00B20140129http://in.reuters.com/
article/2014/01/29/usa-defense-china-idINDEEA0S00B20140129.

4.

“Japan-China Summit Meeting,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 10, 2014, http://www.
mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000151.html, “Press Conference by Foreign Minister Fumio
Kishida,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 26, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/
kaiken/kaiken4e_000132.html#topic2.

5.

“Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards” IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/
dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards.

6.

“Resolution 1874 (2009),” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1874(2009).

7.

“‘North Korean torpedo’ sank South’s navy ship—report,” BBC NEWS, May 20, 2010, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/10129703.

Ohara: Japan, U.S., ROK Defense Cooperation | 2518.

“North Korea shells South in fiercest attack in decades,” Reuters, November 23, 2010, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/23/us-korea-north-artillery-idUSTRE6AM0YS20101123.

9.

“China Orders Troops and Tanks to North Korean Border,” International Business Times,
April 26, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-north-korea-military-pyongyang-beijingborder-461724.

10.

China Keeping Close Eye on North Korea,” The Diplomat, December 13, 2013, http://
thediplomat.com/2013/12/china-keeping-close-eye-on-north-korea/.

11.

“New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established,” U.S. Navy, January 1, 2009, http://www.navy.
mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=41687.

12.

“Replenishment Operations,” Ministry of Defense, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/data/refueling/refueling.html.

13.

“Is Shinzo Abe Headed to North Korea?” The National Interest, July 7, 2014, http://
nationalinterest.org/feature/shinzo-abe-headed-north-korea-10808.

14.

“Nihon no anzen hosho seisaku—sekkyokuteki heiwashugi,” Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Brochure.

15.

We can see an example of Japanese support to the Middle East in “JICA’s Cooperation in Jordan,”
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency, http://www.jica.go.jp/jordan/english/activities/
activity02.html, and “JICA’s Cooperation for Water Sector in Jordan,” JICA, Brochure.

16.

“Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Abe at the Joint Meeting of the Japan-Egypt BusinessCommittee,” Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, January 17, 2015, http://japan.kantei.
go.jp/97_abe/statement/201501/17egypt.html.

17.

“Why is Japan’s Abe Seeking Better Ties with Russia’s Putin?” Voice of America, February
12, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/why-is-abe-seeking-better-ties-with-russiaputin/1850393.html.

18.

“Japan’s Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 2015, http://www.mofa.
go.jp/policy/security/, and “National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense
Program,” Ministry of Defense, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html.

19.

“Abe aims to formally authorize SDF ship inspections beyond Japanese waters,” The Japan
Times, February 27, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/27/national/politicsdiplomacy/government-aims-expand-ship-inspections-sdf-part-support-foreign-forces/#.
VQ7J8pWJjb0.

20.

“Naval Integrated Fire Control–Counter Air Capability Based System of Systems Engineering,”
U.S. NAVSEA-Naval Sea System Command, Briefing Slides, November 13, 2014.

21.

“Gov’t sounds out ruling bloc about SDF’s rescue operations abroad,” Mainichi Japan, March 22,
2015, http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150227p2g00m0dm072000c.html.

22.

“US Will Sell Global Hawks—Will South Korea Buy?” Defense Industry Daily, November 3,
2013, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/report-us-agrees-to-sell-global-hawks-to-southkorea-05032/.

23.

Since March 2015, when KEI held its Academic Symposium, the Japanese Diet has enacted
a new security policy in September 2015 that marks a departure from previous interpretationsof the Japanese post-war pacifist constitution, “Diet enacts security laws, marking Japan’s
departure from pacifism,” The Japan Times, September 19, 2015, http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2015/09/19/national/politics-diplomacy/diet-enacts-security-laws-marking-japansdeparture-from-pacifism-2.