Project Hakea
Criminal use of tracking and other surveillance devices in
NSW
June 2024

New South Wales
Crime Commission

OFFICIAL

Published by the New South Wales Crime Commission
Project Hakea: Criminal use of tracking and other surveillance devices in NSWFirst published June 2024

Acknowledgement of country
The New South Wales Crime Commission acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of the lands where
we work and live. We celebrate the diversity of Aboriginal peoples and their ongoing cultures andconnections to the lands and waters of NSW.
We pay our respects to the Elders, past, present, and emerging and acknowledge the Aboriginal andTorres Strait Islander people that contributed to this investigation.

Content warning and support
This report contains information that may be distressing to readers, including accounts of violence
and abuse. If you or someone you know is experiencing domestic violence, there are a range of support
services available, including 1800RESPECT (1800 737 732), the NSW Domestic Violence Line (1800
656 463), Lifeline (13 11 14), and 13YARN (13 92 76). In an emergency, always call Triple Zero (000).

Acknowledgements
The Commission would like to acknowledge the significant contribution and support provided by the
NSW Police Force, including the Security Licensing & Enforcement Directorate, the Domestic andFamily Violence Registry, and specialist squads within the State Crime Command. We also
acknowledge the valuable assistance provided by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research,
the NSW Domestic Violence Death Review Team, the Australian Federal Police, the Department ofHome Affairs, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), and those privateorganisations and individuals who shared their unique insights.

© State of New South Wales through New South Wales Crime Commission 2024.
This report has been prepared by the New South Wales Crime Commission and is subject to copyright. You may
download, display, print and reproduce this material provided that the wording is reproduced exactly, the sourceis acknowledged as the Project Hakea: Criminal use of tracking and other surveillance devices in NSW and the
copyright notice ‘© State of New South Wales through New South Wales Crime Commission’ is retained on alluses. Permission must be sought from the New South Wales Crime Commission to copy, adapt, publish,
distribute, or commercialise any part of this report.
Disclaimer: The information contained in this report is based on the knowledge and understanding of relevant
persons at the time of writing, June 2024. All persons using or accessing the information in this report should
ensure that the information upon which they rely is up-to-date and checked with the appropriate officer of the
New South Wales Crime Commission.

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NSW Crime Commission | Project Hakea

Contents
Executive Summary

4

Snapshot: NSW Tracker purchases reviewed

6

Findings

7

Recommendations

8

1

Introduction9

1.1

About the Commission

9

1.2

Tracking devices in criminal offending9

1.3

Project Hakea objectives

9

2

3

4

5

6

Definitions and legal framework

10

2.1

What is a tracking device?

10

2.2

Legal framework11

Use of tracking devices in serious organised crime

12

3.1

Organised crime violence

12

3.2

Drug importation, supply, and theft

14

3.3

Device acquisition and handling

14

Use of tracking devices in domestic and family violence

16

4.1

Prevalence of tracking devices in DFV offending

16

4.2

Stalking and intimidation

17

4.3

Coercive control

17

4.4

Under-reporting of tracking in DFV offending

19

4.5

Safety features of tracking devices

19

4.6

Nexus between organised crime and DFV offending

20

Tracking devices sold in NSW since 2023

22

5.1

Missing and false details provided by customers

22

5.2

Tracking devices purchased by people with criminal involvement

23

5.3

Referral of high-risk customers

24

5.4

General criminal history

24

5.5

Serious and organised crime offenders

24

5.6

Domestic and family violence offenders

25

5.7

Frequent and suspicious customers

27

The private investigation and ‘spy store’ industries

30

6.1

Irresponsible sales practices

30

6.2

Private investigators and ‘spy stores’ servicing customers with criminal history

32

6.3

Licensing and regulation of private investigators and ‘spy stores’

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7

8

9

10

11

3

Limitations and opportunities in the current legislative framework

35

7.1

Charge data under-represents actual offending

35

7.2

Licensing and regulation

36

7.3

Opportunities to strengthen legislation

37

7.4

Other opportunities to reduce criminal use of tracking devices

40

Analysis of charges laid under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW)

42

8.1

Relevant offences

42

8.2

Charges laid under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW)

42

8.3

Charge breakdown

43

8.4

Tracking device charges

44

8.5

Outcomes and sentencing

45

Genuine use and availability of tracking devices

46

9.1

Genuine use of tracking devices

46

9.2

Availability of tracking devices

46

9.3

Other common surveillance devices

47

Appendix A – Investigation methodology

48

10.1 Review of existing material and environmental scanning48

10.2 Consultation with law enforcement and industry bodies

48

10.3 Investigative powers

48

10.4 Data collection and analysis

49

10.5 Limitations

49

Appendix B – Terminology and definitions

50

11.1

50

Terminology relating to charge data

11.2 Definitions of surveillance devices

50

11.3 Referenced legislation

51

11.4 Abbreviations

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Executive Summary
Tracking devices are a growing enabler of serious and organised crime in NSW. Accessible,
inexpensive, and easily concealed – they are used by organised crime networks (OCNs) to monitor,
locate, and ultimately attack their rivals.
While tracking devices have been used in organised crime for over two decades, in recent years, the
NSW Crime Commission (the Commission) has observed a sharp rise in their use to facilitate serious
violent crime and drug trafﬁcking.
As a result, the Commission commenced Project Hakea to investigate the use of tracking and othersurveillance devices as an enabler of serious and organised crime in NSW.
An initial review of joint operations between the Commission and partner agencies identiﬁed frequentand increasing use of tracking devices to facilitate murders, public place shootings, kidnappings,
violent drug thefts, and drug trafﬁcking.
The Commission reviewed classiﬁed and open-source material, assessed existing legislative andregulatory frameworks, and deployed specialist capabilities and statutory powers to collectinformation that would be otherwise unavailable to law enforcement.
The Commission:•••collected and analysed sales of over 5,500 tracking devices to customers based in NSW since thebeginning of 2023
conducted eight coercive hearings to obtain evidence from witnesses in relation to the criminal
use of tracking devices
interviewed close associates of major OCNs to gain insights regarding the nature and scope of
criminal use of tracking devices.

Chapters 1 and 2 of this report provide an overview of Project Hakea and outline the current legislative
framework relating to tracking and other surveillance devices. Further contextual information isprovided in Chapters 8 and 9.
Chapter 3 describes how tracking devices are part of the standard toolkit for violent organised
criminals and sophisticated drug trafﬁckers. The evidence indicates tracking devices are amongst theﬁrst items procured when planning an organised crime murder and OCNs consider them key for the
success of each violent ‘job’. Tracking devices are often transferred between criminals via clandestine
exchanges in the same way as illicit drugs and ﬁrearms.
While the Commission set out to investigate the use of tracking devices by OCNs, our enquiries
highlighted frequent use of tracking and other surveillance devices by domestic and family violence
perpetrators. Chapter 4 provides insight into the way that domestic violence perpetrators use tracking
devices, often as part of a series of behaviours intended to intimidate, frighten, and control theirintimate partners.
Disturbingly, the Commission found signiﬁcant evidence of organised criminals using tracking devices
to monitor, control, and test the “loyalty” of their intimate partners. The nexus between organised crimeand domestic and family violence (DFV), which has long been observed by law enforcement
practitioners, was undeniable in this investigation.

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Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the sale of 5663 tracking devices, over an approximate 12 month
period, since 1 January 2023. Through an extensive data matching process, the Commission identiﬁed
and assessed 3147 customers, ﬁnding that:•

37% of customers were adversely known to the NSW Police Force for relevant criminal behaviour(as defined in Section 5.2)•

15% of customers were known to the NSW Police Force for involvement in serious and organised
crime activity•

25% of customers had a recorded history of domestic violence•

126 customers were Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) defendants at the time they purchased
a tracking device, including some customers who purchased a tracking device in the days after
an AVO was enforced.

The Commission deemed 391 customers to be particularly high-risk and referred these mattersindividually to the NSW Police Force and other agencies. While our dataset was too large toinvestigate every customer with criminal history, the Commission conducted targeted intelligenceprobes that led to the discovery of three drug supply syndicates that were previously unknown to law
enforcement.
Chapter 6 highlights a specific risk posed by some private investigators and specialist ‘spy stores’
who sell surveillance options to DFV perpetrators and other criminals. Our data analysis found that
40% of customers who purchased tracking devices from providers in this industry were known to the
NSW Police Force for domestic violence or organised crime involvement. Some providers openly
advertise the use of tracking and other surveillance devices for covert monitoring of intimate partners,
and sell discreet surveillance devices along with other products, such as purported ‘infidelity’ test kits.
Tracking and other surveillance devices are unregulated items, in the sense that there is norequirement for retailers to be licensed, to collect accurate customer details, or to record device
identifiers. The ramifications for law enforcement investigations and public safety are discussed in
Chapter 7, including an example where a tracking device used to facilitate a public place shooting
could not be traced back to a retailer or purchaser. This chapter also addresses limitations in thecurrent legislation that make the investigation and prosecution of criminal use of tracking devices
unduly difficult.
The Findings and Recommendations of this report call for actions that will encourage broad
community awareness regarding criminal use of tracking devices, create a regulatory framework forthe sale of tracking devices in NSW, and strengthen legislation to support law enforcement
investigations and to increase accountability for offenders.
The recommendations also seek to reduce access to tracking devices by serious criminal offenders
who are subject to AVOs, community-based sentences, and bail and parole conditions. Together,
these recommendations seek to promote a safer NSW by making the operating environment more
hostile to criminal offenders and networks.

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Snapshot: NSW Tracker purchases reviewed
5663

trackers
identified

4176

3147

transactions
reviewedcustomers
assessed

Of assessed customers:
37% were adversely known to police
25%

16%

had a domestic and family
violence background9%

had a serious and organised
15%
crime background

6%

6% had a different criminal
background
126

63%

6%

were AVO defendants at thetime of purchase

391 high-risk customers referred to policeIntelligence reports or warnings established for all referrals
Some customers remain under investigation
The top 100 customers who purchased the most devices were:

2xmore likely to be AVO
defendants or charged
with domestic andfamily violence

NSW Crime Commission | Project Hakea

2.4x

more likely to be known
for serious and organised
crime offending

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Findings
1.

Tracking and other surveillance devices are increasingly used to facilitate organised crime,
including murder, kidnapping, and drug trafficking.

2.

Tracking and other surveillance devices are frequently used by perpetrators of domestic andfamily violence (DFV) to stalk, harass, intimidate, and monitor victims, sometimes leading toviolent outcomes. One in four known individuals who purchased tracking devices since thebeginning of 2023 have a history of domestic violence.

3.

There is a strong nexus between organised crime and DFV offending, with organised criminals
using tracking devices to monitor and control their intimate partners.

4.

Tracking and other surveillance devices are widely available in NSW and can be easily purchasedfrom a range of local and overseas retailers, in person and online.

5.

Some private investigators and ‘spy stores’ promote the illegal use of surveillance devices andoffer illegal surveillance services to customers.

6.

Charges laid under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) significantly under-represent thetrue extent of offending involving tracking devices.

7.

Law enforcement efforts to investigate criminal offences and locate tracking devices used byhigh-risk individuals are frustrated because:7a.

there are no licensing or registration requirements for suppliers of tracking devices, andsuppliers do not have any due diligence, data collection, or mandatory reporting obligations;b.

there are no licensing or registration requirements for purchasers or users of tracking devices
in NSW; andc.

identifiers of tracking devices (for example, the IMEI) are not required to be recorded prior tosale and suppliers do not record such data.

NSW Crime Commission | Project Hakea

Recommendations
1.

2.

To reduce the malicious use of tracking devices, Government:a.

work with industry to build in safety features, such as anti-stalking measures, on tracking
devices; andb.

restrict the sale and use of devices without such safety features. (See Section 4.5).

In view of the evidence that criminals involved in serious organised crime and the perpetrators ofdomestic and family violence utilise tracking devices to commit offences, the Government reduce
access to tracking and other surveillance devices by serious offenders through existinglegislative frameworks, such as:a.

directing Government legal representatives appearing before courts, tribunals, or similarauthorities on Apprehended Violence Orders (AVOs), community-based sentences, and bailand parole applications, to make submissions in favour of the imposition of conditions
restricting the purchase, possession, maintenance, and monitoring of tracking devices;b.

amending the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) to explicitly providethat AVOs may include a prohibition on the possession and use of tracking devices; andc.

considering similar legislative amendments directed at offenders on community-based
sentences, bail, and parole. (See Sections 5.4, 5.6, 7.4).

3.

Having regard to the finding that some private investigators and ‘spy stores’ promote the illegal
use of surveillance devices and offer illegal surveillance services to customers, Government
ensure that the legislative and regulatory changes in Recommendations 4 and 5 below areparticularly applied to these industries. (See Chapter 6).

4.

Government regulate the sale of surveillance devices, including through:5.

a.

licensing for suppliers of surveillance devices;b.

recording of device identifiers;c.

recording of customer details;d.

mandatory reporting of suspicious purchases. (See Section 7.2).

Government strengthen legislation to:a.

remove the requirement to obtain the Attorney General’s consent to institute prosecutions
under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW), beyond the amendment contained in the Bailand Other Legislation Amendment (Domestic Violence) Bill 2024 (NSW);b.

prohibit the use of a surveillance device to facilitate serious criminal activity;c.

prohibit the use of a surveillance device to facilitate a domestic violence-related offence;d.

prohibit the monitoring of a surveillance device alongside the use, installation, andmaintenance;e.

prohibit the supply of a surveillance device with recklessness as to whether it will be usedunlawfully, such as encouraging unlawful use of tracking devices in advertising material; andf.

prohibit any activity that causes a surveillance device to be installed, used, or maintained
without consent (including instructing another person to do so). (See Section 7.3).

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1Introduction

1.1

About the Commission

The New South Wales Crime Commission (the Commission) is an independent law enforcement
agency established under the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) (CC Act). The purpose of theCommission is to prevent, reduce, and disrupt organised and other serious crime in NSW. It does sothrough the powers and functions given to it under the CC Act, and through the confiscation of
criminally derived proceeds under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW).
The Commission conducts investigations into serious and organised crime (SOC). It also furnishes
reports relating to organised and other crime and, where appropriate, makes recommendations forchanges in the laws of the State.

1.2

Tracking devices in criminal offending

For two decades, the Commission has been aware of the criminal use of tracking devices within a SOC
context. This use has escalated in recent years, particularly in organised crime violence since 2022.
In October 2023, the Commission commenced an examination into the use of tracking devices byreviewing its own investigation records and other law enforcement holdings. In March 2024, theCommission sought and obtained the Hakea reference from its Management Committee, toinvestigate the availability and criminal use of surveillance and counter-surveillance devices in NSW.
The Commission received information and assistance from other law enforcement and government
agencies, particularly the NSW Police Force, during the investigation.
The Commission applied many of the strategies used in typical criminal investigations, alongsidesignificant data collection and analysis. This included using the Commission’s powers under the CC
Act and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act), analysis of law
enforcement databases, and review of relevant academic and open-source material. Several mattersrelevant to our enquiries are subject of ongoing criminal investigations and cannot be discussed inthis report.
This report focuses on the criminal use of tracking devices, reflecting the particularly significant useof tracking technology to facilitate the most serious types of criminal activity – homicide, drugtrafficking, and other violent crime. Other surveillance devices such as optical and listening devices
are also used for criminal purposes and are addressed to a lesser extent in this report.

1.3

Project Hakea objectives

The objectives of Project Hakea are to:•collect information regarding the availability of surveillance devices in NSW;•

assess the nature and scale of criminal use of surveillance devices in NSW;•

disseminate intelligence to the NSW Police Force and other law enforcement agencies to informa broader understanding of surveillance and devices, mitigate risk, and investigate and disrupt
criminal activity enabled by surveillance devices; and•identify vulnerabilities in current legislative, regulatory and policy frameworks, and opportunities
for reform.

This report describes and analyses the criminal use of tracking and other surveillance devices in NSW
and recommends changes to laws that will contribute to a safer community.
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2

Definitions and legal framework

2.1

What is a tracking device?

The Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) (SD Act) defines a tracking device as ‘any electronic device
capable of being used to determine or monitor the geographical location of a person or an object’.
This encompasses a range of devices designed to track people, vehicles, personal items, and pets.
This report primarily addresses Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices that are designed
for monitoring the location of vehicles.
GPS tracking devices can be either battery-powered or hardwired. This report focuses on batterypowered devices, which are usually magnetic and can be covertly affixed to the undercarriage ofvehicles. Magnetic battery-powered tracking devices are particularly appealing for criminal use, as
they are easily concealed and do not require access to the inside of the vehicle to install. These
devices range from the size of a coin up to a small box weighing between 200 and 450 grams.
GPS tracking devices require a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card to connect to the internet, andto send and receive text messages. As a result, they also have an International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI). 1 Some tracking devices also have a remote listening capability, which is activated byplacing a phone call to the tracking device and listening to surrounding noise.
0F

Location data from GPS tracking devices can be viewed in real-time on online monitoring platforms,
which can be accessed via web portals and/or mobile applications. Most platforms also allow review
of historical data, usually for a period of up to six months. Some tracking devices also provide
locations via text message alerts.
Bluetooth tags (such as Apple AirTags, Samsung Smart Tags, and Tiles) are commonly used to track
personal items such as wallets, keys, and luggage. Bluetooth tags are also used for criminal purposes
and are noted in this report.
Background information regarding the availability and genuine uses of tracking devices is provided in
Chapter 9.

GPS tracking devices

Bluetooth tags and tiles

Purpose: Monitoring the location of vehicles, as wellas other personal items.

Purpose: Loss prevention for personal items such as
keys, wallets, bags, and luggage.

Size: Coin-sized to a small box.

Size: Small and easily fitted to keychains.

Technology: Location data is derived from Global
Navigation Satellite System technology.

Technology: Location data is derived from Bluetoothtechnology, which relies on a mesh network of
nearby Bluetooth devices.

Battery: Rechargeable battery that generally lasts
up to several weeks without charge.

Battery: Battery life can range between 1 and 3
years, with some brands offering replacement
batteries.

Identifiers: Serial number and IMEI.

Identifiers: A serial number can often be locatedunder the battery.

1

An IMEI is a unique 15 or 16 digit number which is used to identify devices connected to a mobile network.

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GPS tracking devices

Bluetooth tags and tiles

Features: Online or app-based monitoring platforms
can be accessed by anyone with login credentials.

Features: App-based monitoring, which sometimes
can be accessed by more than one person.

Anti-Stalking: No in-built anti-stalking mechanisms.

Anti-Stalking: Tags and tiles generally have antistalking mechanisms, including ‘unknown tracker’alerts.

Installation features: Magnetic or hardwired options
available.

Installation features: No in-built feature forattaching to items. However, they can be placed
inside small magnetic boxes.

2.2

Legal framework

The SD Act regulates the installation, use, maintenance, and retrieval of surveillance devices in NSW.
It provides law enforcement with a framework for the use of surveillance devices in criminal
investigations and prosecutions, while protecting against unnecessary intrusion into the privacy of
individuals. While this report focuses on tracking devices, the SD Act also applies to listening devices,
optical devices, and data surveillance devices (see definitions provided in Appendix B).
A general prohibition against the installation, use, and maintenance of tracking devices without
consent is provided in section 9 of the SD Act. There are similar prohibitions relating to the use of
optical, listening and data surveillance devices without consent. The SD Act also prohibits the
manufacture, supply and possession of a surveillance device with the intention for the device to be
used in contravention of the SD Act. All of these offences carry a maximum penalty of five years
imprisonment.
NSW Police Force records show that between 2010 and 2023, 96 individuals were charged with
unlawful use of a tracking device under section 9 of the SD Act, of which 90 were male. On 79
occasions the offence was domestic violence-related, on 14 occasions the offence was organised
crime-related, and the remaining instances did not fall in either category.
Limitations within the legislative and regulatory framework for surveillance devices are discussed in
Chapter 7, and an analysis of charges laid under the SD Act is provided in Chapter 8.
Law enforcement agencies lawfully deploy tracking and other surveillance devices pursuant towarrants issued under the SD Act and the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth). The findings andrecommendations of this report are not intended to report on, or impact the lawful use of surveillance
devices by law enforcement.

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3

Use of tracking devices in serious organised crime

Organised and other serious offenders widely and increasingly use commercially available tracking
technology to facilitate their crimes. Violent criminals deploy tracking devices to plan acts of targeted
violence, including murders, kidnappings, public place shootings, and home invasions. Organised
crime networks (OCNs) use tracking devices to facilitate the importation of illicit drugs and manage
onshore drug distribution.
The analysis in this section is supported by evidence given during eight coercive examinations ofindividuals who are members of, or directly associated with, OCNs in NSW. To protect the safety of
the witnesses, this section does not relay specific details from their evidence. The Commission also
conducted interviews with several close associates of OCNs to inform the investigation.

3.1

Organised crime violence

The investigation established that tracking devices have featured in at least 20 completed or
attempted acts of organised crime violence, including three murders, three planned or attempted
murders, one drive-by shooting, three kidnappings, five planned or attempted kidnappings, one homeinvasion, and four planned or attempted violent drug thefts since 2016. Fifteen of these 20 eventsoccurred since 2022, reflecting the increasing prevalence of tracking in organised crime violence.
OCNs generally deploy tracking devices on a target’s vehicle days or weeks prior to the planned
violent crime to identify their place of residence and monitor their movements. They use location datafrom tracking devices to devise a plan for where, when, and how to carry out the actual offence.
Occasionally, organised crime figures discover tracking devices on their vehicles prior to a planned
offence, which can lead to dangerous pre-emptive action.

Case Study 1
In 2023, the discovery of a tracking device allegedly caused a senior organised crime figure toorder a shooting that mistakenly targeted three innocent members of the public. The organised
crime figure discovered a tracking device that had been covertly affixed to his vehicle, leading him
to suspect that a rival OCN was planning to murder him. The crime figure recruited a crew to provide
protection of his residence. A member of the crew opened fire on two suspicious vehicles, whichwere in fact occupied by innocent members of the public. The alleged shooter killed one person
and injured another two.

Over the past year, the Commission has identified specific OCNs that have deployed tracking devices
in preparation for acts of violence. For example, an OCN reportedly deployed tracking and othersurveillance devices against a rival in early 2024 in preparation for a murder that was either aborted
or has not yet eventuated. This information was provided to relevant law enforcement and intelligenceagencies.

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In an interview with a criminal associate of an OCN, theCommission was told that OCNs involved in organised
violence consider tracking devices to be key for the
success of each ‘job’.
Case Study 2
Tracking devices were used to plan the murder of Alen Moradian in 2023. Moradian was a highprofile organised crime figure who was shot and killed as he entered his vehicle in the undergroundcarpark of his apartment building. Prior to the murder, a tracking device was placed on the vehicleof Moradian’s wife while she was visiting a family member. The OCN monitored the movements ofthe tracking device to identify the location of Moradian’s residence when his wife returned home.
The following evening, two alleged offenders tasked with conducting surveillance of Moradian’s
residence installed a second tracking device on the same vehicle. The murder was carried out twodays later.
The NSW Police Force investigation identified that the accounts for the online platform used tomonitor the tracking devices were created using fictitious details. Similarly, the mobile phones used
to access the online monitoring platform were fitted with SIM cards registered in false names. The
devices themselves were purchased by an associate of the primary offenders.

Tracking devices have enabled the emergence of ‘contract crews’, hired to carry out serious acts ofviolence. ‘Contract crews’ are specialised criminal groups who negotiate contracts with major OCNs
to undertake acts of violence, including murder, kidnapping, and drug theft. The Commission is awareof at least three major OCNs in Sydney that employ ‘contract crews’ of this nature.
Tracking devices are usually the first items purchased and deployed when contract crews accept a‘job’. Alongside tracking devices, ‘contract crews’ use a range of surveillance techniques, including
physical surveillance, online research, and drones. The Commission is aware that OCNs involved inorganised violence consider tracking devices to be key for the success of each job.

Case Study 3
A ‘contract crew’ operating on behalf of a Sydney-based organised crime figure carried out at least
two kidnappings during 2023 and were arrested while planning a third. While detained, the crew
subjected their victims to violent assaults to induce ransom payments from family and friends.
Members of the crew deployed tracking devices on the vehicles of prospective kidnapping victims
to monitor their movements and frequent locations. They also used the devices to identify the
optimal time to carry out the kidnappings. The crew removed the devices during the kidnappings in
an attempt to avoid them being discovered by law enforcement.

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3.2

Drug importation, supply, and theft

GPS tracking devices and Bluetooth tags are used by OCNs to facilitate the importation anddistribution of illicit drugs. OCNs commonly embed tracking devices within illicit drug packages andinstall devices on the vehicles used by drug ‘couriers’ employed to distribute illicit drugs. They review
the location data of tracking devices to coordinate drug deliveries to customers and to monitor
couriers to ensure they are not stealing the drugs. Tracking devices can also alert criminals tointervention by law enforcement or rival OCNs.
Tracking devices are sometimes embedded in illicit drug consignments to allow overseas and onshore
arms of the OCN to monitor the movement of consignments while enroute to Australia. Tracking
devices are also used to retrieve illicit drug importations from secure locations, such as ports,
container yards, and freight forwarders. Retrievals are often outsourced to specialised crime groups
who break into these locations and use tracking data to pinpoint the exact location of the drugconsignment.
It is common for OCNs to steal illicit drugs from rivals and such theft generally requires an OCN to
uncover the locations used by rivals to store their illicit drugs. The Commission is aware of numerous
instances where tracking devices have been installed on the vehicles of rival drug couriers to identify
the rival OCN’s storage location.

Case Study 4
In 2023, a specialist OCN attempted to retrieve a large commercial quantity of illicit drugs from ashipping container. The OCN was provided with the details of the shipping container. The intentionof the OCN was to intercept the container and retrieve the illicit drugs. Enquiries identified that a
tracking device was placed in the shipping container after it arrived in NSW. The OCN monitored
the movements of the tracking device to identify a suitable opportunity to break into the container
and retrieve the drugs. The OCN gained unlawful access to a location to examine the container, butfailed to retrieve the drugs.

3.3

Device acquisition and handling

OCNs adopt measures to create distance between themselves and tracking devices used for criminal
purposes. Criminals often purchase tracking devices using fictitious identification details or recruit
third parties to purchase devices on their behalf.
Despite tracking devices not being prohibited equipment, criminal networks sometimes transfer
tracking devices via covert exchange or dead drop – a procedure where an item is left in a prearranged location for the recipient to retrieve. These exchange techniques are commonly used toconvey prohibited items such as illicit drugs or weapons.
Falsely subscribed SIM cards are often installed in tracking devices used for organised crime activity.
OCNs can easily obtain SIM cards subscribed in fictitious or fraudulently obtained details, and these
are commonly installed in mobile phones or tracking devices used for criminal purposes.
The Commission reviewed a sample of 17 tracking devices that were used in organised crime violenceor seized by the NSW Police Force from organised crime figures, and found that none of these devices
had SIM cards subscribed in the name of the primary owner. Most of the SIM cards were registered infalse or fictitious details.
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Case Study 5
An investigation conducted by the NSW Police Force identified an offender who was involved inpurchasing and installing tracking devices on behalf of a Sydney-based OCN.
Tracking devices set up by the offender were installed on the vehicles of several individuals in 2023.
The deployment of these tracking devices facilitated serious violence offences, including a homeinvasion and a public place shooting. At least some of the devices were purchased by the alleged
offender under a fictitious name and were paid for in cash. The alleged offender installed falsely
subscribed SIM cards into the tracking devices and monitored the location data using a mobile
phone that was also registered in false details.
In 2023, the NSW Police Force charged the alleged offender with four offences relating to theunlawful use of tracking devices. The matter remains before the courts.

Finding 1
Tracking and other surveillance devices are increasingly used to facilitate organised crime,
including murder, kidnapping, and drug trafficking.

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4

Use of tracking devices in domestic and family
violence

While the Commission initially sought to investigate the use of tracking devices by OCNs, our enquiries
highlighted frequent use of tracking devices by domestic and family violence (DFV) perpetrators tostalk, intimidate, monitor, and harass victims. Location tracking is often used as part of a series ofmalicious behaviours which seek to control an individual within a relationship. These behaviours posea significant risk to the physical safety and mental health of DFV victims.

4.1

Prevalence of tracking devices in DFV offending

In 2020, the Second National Survey of Technology Abuse and Domestic Violence in Australia by the
Women’s Services Network (WESNET) reported an increased uptake of accessible digitaltechnologies by DFV perpetrators to control and monitor victims. 2 The report, which was based on anation-wide survey of frontline DFV practitioners, identified a 245% increase between 2015 and 2020
in DFV victims being tracked with GPS apps or devices.
1F

The Commission found evidence of frequent use of tracking devices by DFV perpetrators. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the Commission found that of the 96 offenders charged with unlawful use of
tracking devices between 2010 and 2023, 79 were charged in relation to a domestic violence event.
This represented 82% of offenders. Furthermore, as detailed in Chapter 5, the Commission identified
that nearly 25% of known individuals who purchased tracking devices since 2023 have a history ofdomestic violence.
There is a significant body of evidence that the most dangerous period for DFV victims is the period
immediately following a separation, with 58% of intimate partner homicides occurring after a plannedor actual separation. 3 , 4 The Commission found that 75% of offenders charged with DFV-related
tracking device offences under the SD Act started tracking the victim following a separation. For
nearly two-thirds of offenders in this subset, the tracking commenced within a 3-month period after
separation.
2F

3F

The Commission is also aware of two offenders who continued to monitor their partners while
incarcerated for domestic violence offences. This included monitoring the location of undetected
trackers using illegal phones and requesting third parties to contact and follow their partners. Bothwere charged for this subsequent offending.

82% of offenders charged by the NSW Police Forcewith unlawfully using a tracking device werecommitting domestic violence offences.
Woodlock, D., Bentley, K., Schulze, D., Mahoney, N., Chung, D., and Pracilio, A., (2020). Second National Surveyof Technology Abuse and Domestic Violence in Australia. WESNET.
3
A planned separation can include circumstances where a victim has informed the offender they are leaving or
taken steps to leave the relationship, such as looking for alternative accommodation or gathering items required
to leave an abuser.
4
Family, domestic and sexual violence: Domestic homicide: https://www.aihw.gov.au/family-domestic-andsexual-violence/responses-and-outcomes/domestic-homicide#separation, last accessed 17 June 2024.
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4.2

Stalking and intimidation

DFV perpetrators maliciously use tracking devices to gain information about the victim’s whereabouts
for the purpose of intimidating, stalking, or humiliating them – with many perpetrators making thevictim aware that they are being tracked. The Commission also reviewed cases where DFV
perpetrators used location data from tracking devices to threaten or carry out violence against theirpartner or their partner’s family.
The Commission reviewed more than a dozen NSW Police Force investigations that were initiated after
the offender directly told the victim they had placed a tracking device on their vehicle. All of theseoffenders were male. The offender often informed the victim that they were using a tracking device
to gather information about the victim’s new address or new partner, or that they intended to use thelocation data to defame the victim in Court or within their social circles. In other cases, the victim
discovered a tracking device themselves after growing suspicious that the offender appeared toconstantly ‘bump into’ them in public spaces.
Data collected by the Commission shows that DFV offenders demonstrated ongoing and persistent
stalking behaviours which were facilitated by tracking devices. DFV offenders often purchased
multiple devices to track the same victim, and many offenders charged under the SD Act were inpossession of numerous tracking devices at the time of their arrest.
Offenders also engaged in other stalking behaviours, such as physical surveillance, monitoring
location-based mobile phone applications, and using other types of surveillance devices to monitor
their victims. In some circumstances, offenders deployed tracking devices after alternative forms ofmonitoring were cut off, for example, when phone applications were disabled by victims.

Case Study 6
An investigation by the NSW Police Force identified a male with a recorded history of DFV offending
including using surveillance devices to monitor his former partner. NSW Police Force enquiries
established that the offender had purchased more than 15 devices from an online marketplace.
NSW Police Force officers found both a magnetic and a hardwired GPS tracking device installed in
the victim’s vehicle. The victim reported three other events during which she discovered devices onher vehicle and inside her home. The offender was convicted for stalking, illegally using
surveillance devices, and contravening an AVO. He received a Community Correction Order with nocustodial sentence.

4.3

Coercive control

On 1 July 2024, new laws criminalising coercive control will come into effect in NSW. The Crimes
Legislation Amendment (Coercive Control) Act 2022 (NSW) will amend the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) tocriminalise abusive behaviour directed towards current or former intimate partners. The definition ofabusive behaviour will include ‘behaviour that […] monitors or tracks a person’s activities,
communications or movements, whether by physically following the person, using technology or inanother way’. 5
4F

5

Section 54F(2)(e), Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)17NSW Crime Commission | Project Hakea

The use of tracking devices can play a key role in an offender’s controlling behaviour. The Commission
identified individuals who were charged for the use of a tracking device but who also clearly met thedefinition for other abusive behaviours defined under the coercive control legislation. In these
instances, the offender often used the tracking device to control the victim’s movements and harass
them during their day-to-day activities. Under the forthcoming laws, the use of tracking devices canform evidence of a coercive control offence.
Case Study 7
The victim and offender had been in a long-term relationship before separating. During therelationship, the offender had forced the victim to share her location via a mobile phone application.
The offender also engaged in other controlling behaviours, including threatening to distributeintimate photos of the victim. After separating, the offender sent messages to the victim indicating
he was tracking her location using GPS trackers attached to her own vehicle and a vehicle used bya family member. The offender was charged under the SD Act. This charge was later withdrawn,
but the offender was convicted for related offences and received both a Community Correction
Order and an Intensive Correction Order.

The use of tracking devices may indicate a significant risk of future violence, including lethal violenceagainst a DFV victim. Research conducted by Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s
Safety (ANROWS) indicates that 33% of offenders who committed intimate partner homicides were
‘fixated’ on their current or former partners. 6 These offenders were likely to exhibit controlling
behaviours, and to monitor the victim including through location tracking. A separate meta-analysis
also reported that stalking behaviour increased the likelihood of intimate partner homicide by 2.79
times. 7 The Commission is aware of domestic violence homicides in which tracking devices were used
as early as 2008. The NSW Domestic Violence Death Review Team provided the following case study
from 2016.
5F

6F

Case Study 8
A male offender shot and killed his wife in regional NSW before shooting himself. The couple had
been married for more than 25 years and were not known to law enforcement for any previous
domestic violence. Their relationship had been deteriorating for about four months before thehomicide and the victim had expressed a desire to leave the relationship. In the month before themurder, the offender had used a GPS tracking device, purchased from an instore automotive parts
retailer, to monitor the victim’s movements. This tracking occurred until at least the day before themurder, and the offender’s children and neighbour were aware the tracking was occurring. The
tracking appeared to form part of a series of behaviours that the offender used to prevent the victim
from leaving the relationship.

Boxall, H., Doherty, L., Lawler, S., Franks, C., & Bricknell, S. (2022). The “Pathways to intimate partner homicide”
project: Key stages and events in male-perpetrated intimate partner homicide in Australia (Research report,
04/2022). ANROWS.
7
Spencer, C & Stith, S. (2020) Risk Factors for Male Perpetration and Female Victimization of Intimate Partner
Homicide: A Meta-Analysis. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse.
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4.4

Under-reporting of tracking in DFV offending

The use of tracking devices in DFV offending is grossly under-reported and under-prosecuted. As
documented throughout this report, the number of charges laid under the SD Act in relation to
tracking is low. Beyond the findings of this report, publicly available reporting also indicates thattracking devices are frequently detected on the vehicles or other belongings of DFV victims. For
example, a security group recently stated that they find up to six ‘tile’ devices each week on vehicles
across Australia. 8
7FThis is consistent with the general under-reporting of both DFV offending and technology-facilitatedabuse. An ANROWS study published in 2022 found that one in three individuals who experienced
technology-facilitated abuse did not tell anyone about their experience, and more than 90% did notreport their experience to police. 9 Low rates of reporting of DFV were further noted during COVID-19
lockdowns, 10 and DFV peak bodies consistently find significant under-reporting of DFV. 11
8F

9F

10F

Finding 2
Tracking and other surveillance devices are frequently used by perpetrators of domestic and family
violence (DFV) to stalk, harass, intimidate, and monitor victims, sometimes leading to violent
outcomes. As identified below in Section 5.6, one in four known individuals who purchased tracking
devices since the beginning of 2023 have a history of domestic violence.

4.5

Safety features of tracking devices

Malicious tracking is often covert by nature and intended to be undetected by victims. Tracking
devices can be placed in inconspicuous areas where they are unlikely to be discovered, including theundercarriage of vehicles. GPS tracking devices are not equipped with safety or anti-stalking
mechanisms, meaning that there is no easy method to detect GPS tracking devices other than physicalinspection.
Bluetooth tags and tiles sometimes have anti-stalking mechanisms that alert people who are moving
in tandem with the device. While some anti-stalking systems are effective, their reliability andfunctionality vary significantly across brands. Most notably, Apple AirTags have two safeguards when
they are detected to be travelling with an un-paired device: a notification system that sends an alert
to the un-paired device, and a beeping sound emitted by the AirTag. The alert contains basic
information about the AirTag, including its serial number and the last four digits of the phone numberof the person who registered the device.
In May 2024, Apple and Google jointly announced the roll out of a capability that allows users acrossiOS (Apple) and Android (Google) to be alerted if an unknown Bluetooth device is moving with themhttps://7news.com.au/news/disturbing-ways-technology-is-used-to-control-and-track-domestic-violencevictims-c-14935486, last accessed 17 June 2024.
9
Powell, A., Flynn, A., Hindes, S. (2022). Technology-facilitated abuse: National survey of Australian adults’
experiences, ANROWS.
10
Carrington, K., Morely, C. Warren, S., Ryan, V., Ball, M., Clarke, J., Vitis, L. (2021). The impact of COVID-19
pandemic on Australian domestic and family violence services and their clients. Australian Journal of Social
Issues.
11
See for example: https://www.dvnsw.org.au/resources/domestic-family-violence-statistics, last accessed 17
June 2024.
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over time. 12 This cross-platform capability has been implemented in iOS 17.5 and Android 6.0+ devices.
For users to be alerted, Bluetooth tags must be compatible with an industry specification, called‘Detecting Unwanted Location Trackers’, which Apple and Google have publicly released. Separately,
there are a range of existing mobile phone applications available to both iOS and Android users, whichallow users to scan their surroundings for Bluetooth devices.
11F

Case Study 9
In late 2023, a male offender was reported to be engaged in stalking behaviour aimed towards afemale victim, who was his former partner. The victim reported seeing the offender drive past herhouse multiple times per day and received dozens of phone calls seemingly from the offender.
When the victim became suspicious that she was being physically tracked by the offender, sheutilised used an anti-stalking mobile phone application to find an Apple AirTag affixed to hervehicle inside a magnetic box. The offender was charged and received a 12-month Community
Correction Order.

Recommendation 1
To reduce the malicious use of tracking devices, Government:a.

work with industry to build in safety features, such as anti-stalking measures, on tracking
devices; andb.

restrict the sale and use of devices without such safety features.

4.6

Nexus between organised crime and DFV offending

This investigation identified a strong nexus between organised crime and DFV offending involving
tracking devices. The Commission found that one-third of offenders charged under the SD Act with
unlawfully using tracking devices were also associated with OCNs. The majority of these SOC
offenders were charged with deploying trackers as part of DFV offending, rather than for organised
crime activity.
The Australian Institute of Criminology reported that 40% of Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMCG)
members have been charged with a domestic violence offence. 13 OMCG members were also twice as
likely to have been charged with domestic violence offences than the general male offending
population. In joint operations undertaken by the Commission, it is not unusual for investigators toincidentally uncover serious DFV offending perpetrated by organised crime figures.
12F

Domestic violence perpetrators involved in SOC activity often use their criminal skillset against theircurrent and former partners. For example, an organised crime figure with a history of involvement inarmed robbery and prohibited drug supply allegedly used various surveillance devices against his
https://www.apple.com/au/newsroom/2024/05/apple-and-google-deliver-support-for-unwanted-trackingalerts-in-ios-and-android/, last accessed 17 June 2024.
13
Morgan, A., Cubitt, T., and Dowling, C. (2023), Outlaw motorcycle gangs and domestic violence, Trends & issues
in crime and criminal justice.
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intimate partner. Furthermore, information received by the Commission indicates it is common fororganised crime figures to track their partners as a means of testing their “loyalty”. Victims may be
fearful to report this abuse, as they may be perceived to be providing information to law enforcement
about the offender’s other criminal activity.

Case Study 10
A NSW Police Force investigation into the suspected drug supply activities of two male offenders
identified the offenders using a tracking device to monitor the movements of one of the offender’s
ex-partner. The female victim approached the NSW Police Force to report incidents of her being
stalked, tracked, and harassed. NSW Police Force officers examined her vehicle and located amagnetic GPS tracking device hidden underneath it. Both offenders were charged under the SD
Act.
At the time of offending, both offenders were subject to parole conditions relating to previous drug
supply offences, and one of the offenders was the defendant on an Apprehended Domestic
Violence Order (ADVO) protecting the victim of this offence.

Finding 3
There is a strong nexus between organised crime and DFV offending, with organised criminals
using tracking devices to monitor and control their intimate partners.

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5

Tracking devices sold in NSW since 2023

Tracking devices are widely available for purchase from local and international retailers, including
online marketplaces, electronics stores, automotive parts stores, specialty ‘spy stores’, 14 and private
investigators. There is no readily available, reliable data indicating how many devices are sold each
year.
13F

The Commission served a sample of 20 retailers with notices issued under section 29 of the Crime
Commission Act 2012 (NSW), that required the production of data relating to the sale of tracking
devices to NSW customers since 1 January 2023. 15
14F

The Commission received data for 4176 transactions. A total of 5663 tracking devices were sold
across these transactions, including 4287 magnetic tracking devices, 1222 hardwired tracking
devices, and 154 devices that could not be categorised due to unclear product descriptions. 16 The
Commission did not review data relating to the sale of Bluetooth tags and tiles. Further information
regarding this dataset is provided in Appendix A.
15FThis section contains analysis of sales and customer data associated with these 4176 transactions.

4176

5663

3147

transactions

trackers

customers assessed20
retailers

4287

1222

391

magnetic

hardwiredpolice referrals

Finding 4
Tracking and other surveillance devices are widely available in NSW and can be easily purchasedfrom a range of local and overseas retailers, in person and online.

5.1

Missing and false details provided by customers

In 194 transactions, the customer provided either no name (88 transactions), a partial name (28transactions), or a false name (78 transactions). Some customers provided their name as a randomphrase or string of letters. One customer who was based in Queensland, and therefore not includedin this dataset, falsely provided their name as ‘Bill Cosby’.

‘Spy stores’ are businesses that sell gadgets and software used for covertly monitoring other people.
Most retailers provided data from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023, although some retailers also provided
data from the first quarter of 2024.
16
The number of magnetic tracking devices exceeded the number of hardwired devices because theCommission prioritised approaches to entities known to sell magnetic devices.
14

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5.2

Tracking devices purchased by people with criminal involvement

Within the dataset, the Commission identified 3248 unique customers who purchased either magnetic
or hardwired tracking devices. Of these customers, 3147 were recorded in the NSW Police Force’s
Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) database. 17 The Commission reviewed data foreach of these 3147 customers dating back to 2010. 18
16F

17F

The Commission identified 1156 customers who had relevant adverse history on the COPS database,representing 37% of the customers reviewed. For the purpose of this analysis, the Commission
defined ‘relevant adverse history’ as any customer with at least one criminal charge, at least one
record of being the person of interest in a domestic violence event, or at least one intelligence report
relating to SOC activity. Individuals with adverse histories included serious domestic violence
offenders, drug traffickers, violent criminals, and many who were a combination of these. The
remaining 1991 customers did not have a criminal history, and may have been known to the NSW Police
Force only as a witness or victim of crime.

DFV background

16%
9%

63%

6%
6%

DFV & SOC background
SOC background
Other criminal backgroundNo criminal backgroundFigure 1: Criminal involvement of customers purchasing tracking devices

37% of customers who purchased tracking devices
were adversely known to the NSW Police Force.
Only two of the 3147 customers reviewed had been charged with offences under the SD Act – both in
2024. One customer was charged with unlawful use of a tracking device, and the other customer was
charged in relation to the use of a listening device that also contained GPS tracking capabilities. BothSD Act charges have since been withdrawn, but both offenders were also charged with domestic
violence offences in relation to these events.
COPS is an operational database which is used by the NSW Police Force to record information about offenders,
victims, arrests, and events and intelligence reports.
18
COPS database information prior to 2010 was not analysed due to data access limitations. The data in thissection is accurate as at 28 May 2024.
17

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5.3

Referral of high-risk customers

The Commission referred 391 customers, assessed as being ‘high-risk’, to the NSW Police Force andother relevant law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The Commission undertook a continuous
triage and referral process to mitigate safety risks to potential victims. In almost all cases, the factthat these individuals had purchased tracking devices was not previously known to the NSW Police
Force.
The Commission assessed customers based on their involvement in serious or recent DFV offendingor reported links to SOC activity. Many customers referred were defendants on enforceable ADVOs.
Of the 391 customers the Commission referred, 160 were known to the NSW Police Force in relation
to DFV offending, 42 were known for SOC involvement, and a further 189 were known for both DFVand SOC offending.
Some of the individuals the Commission referred were already under NSW Police Force investigationor came under investigation following the Commission’s referral. Where requested, the Commission
assisted investigating officers by providing additional information about the customer’s purchases.

5.4

General criminal history

Of the 3147 customers reviewed, 747 (approximately24%) had been charged on one or more occasion since2010. A total of 204 customers had been charged on fiveor more occasions, and 103 had been charged on ten or
more occasions. 19

24%

18F

Of the 747 customers with criminal history, 443
customers had been charged with at least one serious
indictable offence. 20 There were also 39 customers
charged with at least one offence carrying a penalty of
25 years imprisonment or more, and 16 charged with atleast one offence carrying a penalty of life
imprisonment, and 31 charged with at least one serious
personal violence offence. 21

76%

Criminal
history
No criminal
history

19F

Figure 2: Criminal history of customers
purchasing tracking devices

20F

5.5

Serious and organised crime offenders

Of the 3147 customers reviewed, 472 (15%) were recorded in the COPS database in relation to SOC
activity. 22 This includes several current and previous targets of joint investigations undertaken by theCommission and partner agencies into high-level OCNs.
21F

These figures refer to the total number of charge reference numbers or ‘H numbers’. See Appendix B for
further explanation.
20
Section 4 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) defines a ‘serious indictable offence’ as an indictable offence that is
punishable by imprisonment for life or a term of five years or more. 326 of these 443 customers had at least one
serious indictable offence proven in court.
21
The Commission has followed the definition of Serious Personal Violence Offence (SPVO) provided insubsection 16B(3) of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW).
22This calculation was based on intelligence reports in the COPS database that had an ‘associated factor’relating to SOC activity.
19

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15% of the people who purchased tracking devices in
NSW since 2023 were known to the NSW Police Forcefor their involvement in serious and organised crime.
Ninety-eight customers had been charged with at least one serious drug trafficking offence. 23 Of
these customers, 64 had at least one serious drug trafficking offence proven in court.
22F

Sixty-six customers had been subject to NSW Police Force action relating to firearms activity. Fortyone customers had at least one firearms-related charge, of which 19 had also been subject to a
Firearms Prohibition Order (FPO). A further 25 customers had been subject to an FPO, although had
not been charged with related offences.

98

Drug Trafficking
64

41

Firearms Related

At least one charge

29
0

20

At least one proven charge
40

60

80

100

Number of customers
Figure 3: Customers with serious crime charges

The Commission also conducted intelligence probes into a small number of customers linked to OCNs,
which resulted in the discovery of three drug supply syndicates that were previously unknown to law
enforcement. These matters are ongoing.

5.6

Domestic and family violence offenders

Domestic and family violence offenders constituted the largest criminal cohort within theCommission’s list of customers. Many customers the Commission referred to the NSW Police Force
had previously used GPS tracking devices, AirTags, or other means to stalk their current or former
intimate partners. Others were subject to reports by current or former partners who believed they
were being monitored, but whose concerns were unproven.
The criminal history of DFV offenders who purchased devices was often extensive. The Commission’s
review of these individuals regularly revealed DFV history spanning decades, including against
multiple partners or other relatives. Many had recent charges for domestic violence assault,
contravention of AVOs, and sexual violence.

The Commission has followed the definition of a drug trafficking offence provided in subsection 6(2) of the
Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW).

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Almost 25% of customers were adversely known to the
NSW Police Force for domestic violence.
A total of 770 identified customers had been recorded as the person of interest in at least one
domestic violence event, representing almost 25% of all customers. 24 Of these 770 customers, 169
had been recorded as the person of interest in five or more domestic violence events, and 80 had beenrecorded in ten or more events.
23F

No DV events

75%

25%

19%

3%

1-4 DV events

3%

5-9 DV events
10+ DV events

Figure 4: Customers recorded as persons of interest in domestic violence events

A total of 291 customers had been charged with at least one domestic violence-related offence,
representing 9% of all customers. 25 Of these, 17 had five or more domestic violence-related charges
proven in court.
24F

Of the 3147 customers reviewed, 126 were the defendant (person named) on an AVO at the time theypurchased a tracking device. 26 This included customers who purchased tracking devices in the days
after they became subject to an AVO that prohibited direct contact with the victim. A further 90
customers became defendants on AVOs at some point after they purchased a tracking device.
Together, these 216 customers represent 7% of all customers reviewed.
25F

126 customers were the defendant on an AVO at thetime they purchased a tracking device.
The Commission defined a domestic violence event based on the incident category or associated factor
assigned to the event. The person of interest (POI) in a domestic violence event is generally determined by thepolice officer/s who attend the scene or take the report.
25
The Commission has followed the definition of a ‘domestic violence offence’ provided in section 11 of the
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).
26
An ‘AVO’ can refer to either an ADVO, or an Apprehended Personal Violence Order (APVO); the type of whichis generally not specified in this analysis. However, the vast majority of the data represents ADVOs.
24

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26

OFFICIALThe Commission identified 110 customers who had been charged at some point with contravening an
AVO. 27 There were 46 customers who had been charged on three or more occasions with contravening
an AVO, and 20 who had been charged on five or more occasions. In one instance, a tracking device
was sold to a customer who had been charged on 13 occasions with contravening an AVO.
26F

Recommendation 2
In view of the evidence that criminals involved in serious organised crime and the perpetrators ofdomestic and family violence utilise tracking devices to commit offences, the Government reduce
access to tracking and other surveillance devices by serious offenders through existing legislative
frameworks, such as:a.

directing Government legal representatives appearing before courts, tribunals, or similarauthorities on Apprehended Violence Orders (AVOs), community-based sentences, and bail andparole applications, to make submissions in favour of the imposition of conditions restricting
the purchase, possession, maintenance, and monitoring of tracking devices;b.

amending the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) to explicitly provide that
AVOs may include a prohibition on the possession and use of tracking devices; andc.

considering similar legislative amendments directed at offenders on community-based
sentences, bail, and parole.

Further information relating to conditions on AVOs and other orders, and opportunities to reduce
criminal use of tracking devices, is outlined in Section 7.4.

5.7

Frequent and suspicious customers

The Commission identified many customers who purchased tracking devices on multiple occasions.
Some datasets also contained records of customers purchasing suspicious combinations ofsurveillance equipment, counter-surveillance devices, weapons, spyware, and privacy software.
The Commission applied triaging methods to identify customers exhibiting these behaviours andcompleted referrals to the NSW Police Force where necessary. The following table lists examples of
suspicious individuals who purchased a high volume of tracking devices.

All 110 customers had been charged with contravening an ADVO, while 35% also had charges for contravening
an APVO.

27

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Customer

Number of devices
purchased since 2023

Criminal history

Customer
3075

11(All magnetic)

Customer 3075 has never been charged in NSW and has
not been the defendant on an enforceable AVO.
However, Customer 3075 is subject of numerous
unproven reports relating to covert tracking and sexualassault of children.

Customer
1215

10(9 magnetic)

Customer 1215 is the defendant on an enforceable ADVO
and has a serious violent criminal history, as well as
involvement in organised crime activity in NSW andinterstate.

Customer
1087

10(All magnetic)

Customer 1087 has no criminal history, although theCommission identified highly suspicious behaviour
indicative of serious sexual offending. Customer 1087 is
now under active criminal investigation.

Customer
2810

9(All magnetic)

Customer 2810 is a close associate of a high-level
member of an OMCG. Further enquiries identified that
Customer 2810 purchased at least 12 more magnetic
tracking devices and numerous listening devices since
2020.

Customer
2340

8(All magnetic)

Customer 2340 is the defendant on an enforceable
ADVO. They purchased devices from multiple retailers
under fictitious names, consistent with an attempt toconceal their activities.

The Commission also found that customers who purchased a higher number of tracking devices
presented significantly elevated criminal risk. Over 40% of the top 100 customers (based on thenumber of devices purchased) were known to the NSW Police Force in relation to domestic violence,compared to 25% of the entire customer base. The top 100 customers were also twice as likely tohave been the defendant on an AVO, twice as likely to have been charged with a domestic violence
offence, and more than twice as likely to be known for SOC offending. Of interest, every known
customer who conducted seven or more purchases of magnetic tracking devices had an adverse
record in NSW Police Force holdings. 28
27F

28

This finding is based on the definition of ‘relevant adverse reporting’ defined above.

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Top 100 Customers

All 3147 Customers
41%

Known to NSW Police for DFV involvement

25%
27%

Currently or previously subject to an AVO

14%
18%

Charged with at least one DFV offence

9%
22%

Recent involvement in SOC activity

9%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Figure 5: Variation in NSW Police Force reporting of top 100 customers vs. all customers

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6

The private investigation and ‘spy store’ industries

Private investigators 29 and specialist ‘spy stores’ 30 sell surveillance services and devices to a rangeof clients. Several operators in this industry advertise covert and discreet surveillance options, making
them appealing to DFV perpetrators and other individuals seeking to deploy unlawful surveillance.
28F

29F

The Commission identified private investigators andspecialist ‘spy stores’ that illegally deploy tracking
devices and recklessly promote covert surveillance of
intimate partners.
While the Commission did not find evidence that illegal or reckless conduct is pervasive within theindustry, a thorough review of the industry was not within the scope of the investigation. The
Commission interviewed some private investigators who expressed their disapproval of competitorsand counterparts who deployed devices unlawfully, suggesting that this conduct was the exception
rather than the norm. Indeed, some private investigators also provide services to DFV victims,
including locating and removing surveillance devices deployed against them by offenders.
Nonetheless, it is clear that operators who break the law, or encourage customers to use surveillance
devices unlawfully, generally do so openly and without disruption.

6.1

Irresponsible sales practices

Open-source searches of phrases relating to ‘private investigators’, ‘spy stores’, and ‘cheating
partners’, return an array of companies that sell investigative services and surveillance devices. It isevident that ‘infidelity investigations’ are core business for some private investigators operating in
NSW.
Private investigators and ‘spy stores’ also sell tracking devices, hidden cameras, listening devices,
radio frequency detectors (commonly known as ‘bug detectors’), and phone and computer spyware.
These products are often advertised for use in covert monitoring of vehicles and people. A particulardrawcard of ‘spy stores’ is that they sell surveillance devices disguised as household items.
The Commission found that providers often failed to caution customers that it is unlawful to use
tracking, listening, and optical devices to monitor or record another person without their consent. Even
when such cautions were included, they were often in fine print and incongruent with promotional
material encouraging ‘covert’ and ‘discreet’ use of surveillance devices.

Defined in section 4 of the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW) as a person who is employed or engaged for the
purpose of investigation or surveillance of other persons.
30‘Spy stores’ are businesses that sell gadgets and software used for covertly monitoring other people. They
are not specifically regulated and are only required to hold a security licence if they sell certain items deemed
to be ‘security equipment’ under the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW) and the Security Industry Regulation 2016
(NSW). Tracking devices do not fall under the definition of security equipment.
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The offering of covert surveillance devices makes these businesses appealing to individuals seeking
to monitor or record other people without their knowledge. While some products have genuine uses,
such as business, home, and personal security, they are exploited by perpetrators of domestic abuse
and control.

Case Study 11
The Commission identified a private investigation company that sold over 200 tracking devices
across Australia in 2023. Almost half were sold to customers based in NSW. The company’s
brochure for the tracking devices promotes covert tracking of intimate partners and does not
caution that these activities are illegal if consent is not obtained.
The tracking devices were pre-installed with registered SIM cards, allowing customers to avoid
using a SIM card subscribed in their own details. The company offered discreet delivery options,with 27 deliveries conducted via a rideshare app to grocery stores, petrol stations, post offices, anda hardware store.
One in four of this company’s NSW-based customers were known to the NSW Police Force inrelation to DFV incidents, including six defendants on enforceable AVOs. Five customers purchased
tracking devices under names that appeared to be fictitious.
The Commission does not suggest that the company knew or should have known of the criminal
histories of their customers, but does allege that their sales and marketing practices attracted thistype of offender.

Case Study 12
A ‘spy store’ based in Sydney encourages customers to ‘shop by concern’, with one concern being‘suspect a partner is cheating?’. The website invites users to complete a questionnaire which asks
for their intentions and offers guidance on which products are most discreet.
The suggested items for customers seeking to catch cheating partners include GPS tracking
devices, hidden cameras, listening devices, as well as an ‘infidelity kit’ that purports to be able toidentify semen on any item of clothing in five minutes. When customers click on GPS tracking
devices, they are taken to a page that explains how the device works but are not cautioned thatpurchasing tracking devices to monitor other people without their consent is a criminal offence.
The same store also sells spyware that can be covertly installed on Android phones. The spyware
is marketed as ‘Android Parental Monitoring Software’, and includes live location tracking,keystroke logging, and remote monitoring of installed applications, internet history, images, andvideos. The webpage contains ‘legal considerations’, which state that ‘monitoring a device you own
or have permission to monitor is legal’, although ‘monitoring someone else’s device without consent
is illegal’. Incongruently, one of the advertised drawcards of this spyware is that it can be covertly
housed on the target’s phone, by appearing as an innocuous Android OS Updater icon on the homescreen.

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6.2

Private investigators and ‘spy stores’ servicing customers with criminal
history

Private investigators and ‘spy stores’ do not have any requirement to conduct due diligence on
customers prior to selling investigative services or surveillance devices. While operators may haverisk mitigation or due diligence processes, these are currently implemented at the discretion of each
operator. There is no enforceable industry standard for conducting due diligence, nor any criminal
offence for recklessly supplying surveillance devices or services to dangerous clients. In fact, it islikely some private investigators remain wilfully blind to their client’s criminal involvement andintentions.
The result of this lack of regulation is that private investigators and ‘spy stores’ provide services toindividuals with a criminal history. The Commission is aware of two instances of private investigators
who serviced customers with full knowledge of the clients’ criminal intentions or associations.
The Commission analysed records of 456 sales of tracking devices by private investigators and ‘spy
stores’ conducted since the start of 2023. From these sales, a total of 353 customers were recordedon the COPS database. Nearly 40% of these customers were known to the NSW Police Force for DFV
or SOC activity.

Nearly 40% of customers who purchased tracking
devices from private investigators and ‘spy stores’
were known to the NSW Police Force for DFV or SOC
activity.
Analysis of sales records provided by a Sydney-based ‘spy store’ identified that the business regularly
sold items to customers who exhibited highly suspicious purchase behaviour. This included highvolume repeat customers, as well as customers who purchased a range of covert tracking, listening,and optical devices in the same transaction. One domestic violence perpetrator purchased six
magnetic tracking devices across six transactions between July 2023 and December 2023, before
being charged under the SD Act in early 2024. A total of 31 sales by the business involved thepurchase of a tracking device alongside other surveillance or counter-surveillance devices.

A ‘spy store’ sold six magnetic trackers to a DFV
perpetrator between July 2023 and December 2023.
The customer was charged under the SD Act with
unlawful use of tracking devices in January 2024.

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Private investigators who specialise in infidelity investigations have been used by DFV perpetrators
seeking to locate or monitor their current or former intimate partners. The following case study wasprovided to the Commission by the NSW Domestic Violence Death Review Team:

Case Study 13
A male offender had a history of engaging private investigators to conduct surveillance of former
partners and his children. In July 2010, the offender hired a private investigator to locate his adult
daughter. The investigator identified her current name and residential address, and provided thisinformation to the offender who proceeded to stalk her. In December 2016, the offender hired aprivate investigator to establish whether his partner (the mother of the two children) had
commenced a new relationship. The offender soon after began stalking his partner at an exercise
studio, likely assisted by information provided by the private investigator. The offender had an
extensive history of domestic violence against numerous prior partners and his children.
In July 2018, the offender shot and killed his two school-aged children at the home where they lived
with their mother in metropolitan NSW.

The Commission also identified three cases where private investigators and ‘spy stores’ provided
guidance, customer support, and device repairs to customers who were seeking to use surveillance
devices for domestic violence or drug-related activity. In at least one case, the operator was awarethat the customer intended to use the surveillance device unlawfully.

Case Study 14
A female victim approached the NSW Police Force after finding a magnetic GPS tracking device
affixed to her vehicle. The victim reported being repeatedly contacted by her ex-partner, who wasseeking to find her location after she had moved with the assistance of a DFV organisation.
However, this contact had recently stopped, indicating that the offender found another way tomonitor her location. NSW Police Force officers identified that the tracking device was being
monitored by the offender and had been purchased from an Australian ‘spy store’. The store hadcommunicated with the offender on at least 10 occasions, including to discuss how to operate thedevice.
The offender was charged under the SD Act for the illegal use of a tracking device and wassentenced to an Intensive Correction Order.

The Commission identified at least three private investigators who have illegally deployed tracking
devices as part of their investigative services. Private investigators who engage in such conduct arehighly likely aware that their conduct is illegal but do so for convenience and to achieve a competitive
edge.

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Case Study 15
A private investigator was hired by a client to provide a range of protection and surveillanceservices. The client was affiliated with a Sydney-based OCN and paid the private investigator to
conduct surveillance on various individuals. As part of the services provided, the private
investigator installed a tracking device on the vehicle of a person known to the client. The
investigator provided daily updates to the client, including location data from the tracking device
and physical surveillance logs. Available information suggests the private investigator madeattempts to obtain a SIM card subscribed in fraudulently obtained details to install in the tracking
device. The investigator has since been charged under the SD Act.

Finding 5
Some private investigators and ‘spy stores’ promote the illegal use of surveillance devices and offer
illegal surveillance services to customers.

6.3

Licensing and regulation of private investigators and ‘spy stores’

Private investigators are regulated by the NSW Police Force Security Licensing & Enforcement
Directorate (SLED), which administers the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW) (Security Industry Act)and the Security Industry Regulation 2016 (NSW) (Security Industry Regulation). They are required tohold a Class 2E (Private Investigator) security licence in order to advertise or carry out paid
investigative activities and must be employed by a Master Licence holder. Private investigators do nothave any special authority and cannot engage in any activity that would be illegal for an ordinary
civilian, including the deployment of surveillance devices to monitor a person without consent.
Security operators, including private investigators, are subject to general eligibility requirements.
Eligibility can be impacted by several factors, including criminal history and prior dismissal from a
police force on the grounds of integrity. For private investigators, an offence under the SD Act is aprescribed offence. A security licence can also be refused on discretionary grounds, including if
granting the licence would be contrary to the public interest, or if the applicant is assessed to not bea fit and proper person.
Tracking devices and other household surveillance devices are not considered security equipment
under the Security Industry Act and the Security Industry Regulation, and therefore the sale of thesedevices is not classed as a security activity in NSW. ‘Spy stores’ and other businesses that sell thetypes of surveillance devices referenced in this report are therefore not required to be licensed, or
adhere to any certification or compliance regimes.

Recommendation 3
Having regard to the finding that some private investigators and ‘spy stores’ promote the illegal
use of surveillance devices and offer illegal surveillance services to customers, Government ensurethat the legislative and regulatory changes in Recommendations 4 and 5 below are particularly
applied to these industries.

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7

Limitations and opportunities in the current
legislative framework

7.1

Charge data under-represents actual offending

The number of charges laid under the SD Act significantly under-represents the true extent ofoffending relating to the criminal use of tracking devices. Only 34 offenders were charged with SD
Act offences relating to tracking devices in 2022 and 2023 – 17 offenders each year.
The low charge rate is incongruent with the evidence base provided in this report detailing theextensive criminal use of tracking devices. In this investigation, the Commission found tracking
devices are frequently used to facilitate organised crime violence, drug trafficking, and domestic
violence (Findings 1 and 2). The Commission also identified 1156 adversely known individuals who havepurchased tracking devices since the beginning of 2023 (see Section 5.2). Of these individuals, theCommission deemed 391 to be high-risk, including some who were subject to previous reporting
regarding unlawful use of tracking devices. Only two of these high-risk individuals have been charged
under the SD Act, both in 2024.
Beyond this evidence base, this report has highlighted qualitative reasons for the under-detection andunder-prosecution of criminal offending involving tracking devices. These include:•

the under-detection of offending due to the concealability of tracking devices and the fact thatcriminal tracking is usually intended to be covert;•

the under-reporting of technology-facilitated abuse in a DFV context (see Section 4.4);•

challenges with gathering sufficient evidence due to a lack of licensing and regulation within theindustry (see Section 7.2 below); and•the requirement to obtain Attorney General consent to institute charges under the SD Act, which
may present a barrier to charging (see Section 7.3.1 below).

Criminal use of a tracking device can also form part of the brief of evidence for another primary
offence and may not always be prosecuted under the SD Act. Most instances of organised crime
violence reviewed for the purpose of this investigation resulted in prosecutions for the primary
offence only. The Commission also identified 21 examples from 2022 and 2023 where an offenderused a tracking device in the course of domestic violence-related stalking or intimidation that wasprosecuted under section 13 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), but notunder the SD Act. It is not possible to assess the true extent to which tracking devices are detectedduring investigations into other offences.

Finding 6
Charges laid under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) significantly under-represent the true
extent of offending involving tracking devices.

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7.2

Licensing and regulation

There is no regulatory framework in NSW governing the sale of tracking and other surveillance
devices. The SD Act does not establish any licensing or record keeping requirements for sellers ofsurveillance devices, beyond the prohibition in section 13 of the SD Act against supplying, or offering
to supply, a surveillance device with the intention of it being used in contravention of the SD Act. While
the Security Industry Act requires sellers of security equipment such as alarms and Closed Circuit
Television (CCTV) systems to hold a security licence, tracking and other surveillance devices do notmeet the definition of ‘security equipment’ provided in the Security Industry Regulation.
Sellers of surveillance devices are not required to record customer details, itemised sales records, or
device identifiers. While most retailers approached by the Commission recorded customer details andsales records for invoicing purposes, these records had varying degrees of accuracy. Retailers
generally did not require customers to produce identification documentation, and sometimes
recorded partial or no customer details.
None of the retailers approached by the Commission recorded device identifiers, such as the serial
number or IMEI number. There also appeared to be a lack of understanding about the difference
between a serial number and an IMEI number. While both numbers uniquely identify the device, the
IMEI number follows an international telecommunications standard and can be used by law
enforcement to collect intelligence and evidence for investigations and prosecutions. The SIM card
installed in a tracking device can also hold information relevant for investigative and evidentiary
purposes; however, retailers do not commonly sell SIM cards along with tracking devices.
Case Study 16
A tracking device was seized by NSW Police Force officers during a search warrant at the home of
an offender who was charged in relation to an organised crime murder. The NSW Police Force also
located an instruction manual for the tracking device which contained the logo for a ‘spy store’ run
by a Sydney-based private investigator. The Commission approached the private investigator, who
was unable to produce a record of purchase for the device.

In several recent organised crime murders and kidnappings where tracking devices were recoveredby law enforcement, investigators were unable to identify the retailer or the purchaser of the tracking
devices. In other matters where OCNs were known to use tracking devices in criminal offending, thedevices could not be identified or located, limiting proactive investigative opportunities.
Case Study 17
A tracking device was used to plan an attempted shooting murder in 2023. During the investigation,
NSW Police Force officers seized the tracking device, and the Commission and NSW Police Forceundertook extensive enquiries to identify where and by whom the device was purchased. Despite
significant intelligence collection and the use of NSW Police Force and Commission powers, theseenquiries failed to identify the retailer who sold the device.

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Retailers have no due diligence or ‘know your customer’ requirements, nor do they have any obligationor specific mechanism to report suspicious purchases to authorities. There are no barriers to retailers
making police reports, but equally, no compulsion– and the Commission did not identify any instanceswhere a report was made. A requirement for businesses who sell tracking devices to be registered, torecord device identifiers and customer details, and to report suspicious purchases would improve theability of law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute offenders who unlawfully use
surveillance devices.
Finding 7
Law enforcement efforts to investigate criminal offences and locate tracking devices used by highrisk individuals are frustrated because:a.

there are no licensing or registration requirements for suppliers of tracking devices, andsuppliers do not have any due diligence, data collection, or mandatory reporting obligations;b.

there are no licensing or registration requirements for purchasers or users of tracking devices
in NSW; andc.

identifiers of tracking devices (for example, the IMEI) are not required to be recorded prior tosale and suppliers do not record such data.

Recommendation 4
Government regulate the sale of surveillance devices, including through:a.

licensing for suppliers of surveillance devices;b.

recording of device identifiers;c.

recording of customer details;d.

mandatory reporting of suspicious purchases.

7.3

Opportunities to strengthen legislation

7.3.1

Requirement to obtain the consent of the Attorney General to instituteprosecutions under the SD Act

Section 56 of the SD Act stipulates that the written consent of the Attorney General is required to
institute prosecutions under the Act. This approval has been delegated to the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP). On 6 June 2024, the NSW Parliament passed the Bail and Other Legislation
Amendment (Domestic Violence) Bill 2024 (NSW) which removes the requirement of Attorney Generalconsent for proceedings for an offence against section 9 of the SD Act (relating to tracking devices),
where the offence is domestic violence related. Attorney General the Hon. Michael Daley MP outlined
the rationale for this proposed amendment in his Second Reading Speech, noting technology as a“critical component” of the stalking behaviour exercised by perpetrators of domestic abuse. 31
30F

31

Legislative Assembly Hansard - 15 May 2024 - Proof (nsw.gov.au), last accessed 17 June 2024.

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This amendment, which is yet to commence, is a significant step toward strengthening the SD Act.
However, it does not encompass any tracking device offence that does not relate to domestic violence,
nor any offence involving other surveillance devices such as optical or listening devices.
Only 62 of the 219 offenders charged under the SD Act between 2010 and 2023 would have met thecriteria outlined in the June 2024 amendments for removal of Attorney General consent. This meansthat the NSW Police Force would still have been required to seek consent to institute a prosecution
in 72% of these cases, if they had been prosecuted after the commencement of the June 2024
amendments. This includes most of the case studies provided in this report.
Obtaining the Attorney General’s consent requires the prosecuting officer to submit a brief of
evidence to the DPP for approval. This process can cause a delay in instituting SD Act charges andmay contribute to the low charge rate.

7.3.2

Use of tracking devices to facilitate serious criminal activity

This investigation identified frequent use of tracking devices to facilitate serious violence and drugtrafficking offences. This often constitutes an offence under section 9 of the SD Act.
Even when the use of a tracking or other surveillance device does contravene the SD Act, offences
under the SD Act are not tiered according to the severity of the criminal activity facilitated by thesurveillance device.
Consideration should be given to prohibiting the installation, use, maintenance, or monitoring of a
tracking or other surveillance device with the intention of facilitating serious criminal activity of any
type, including both organised crime and domestic violence. This should carry a higher maximum
penalty than the standard offences established in the SD Act.

7.3.3

Monitoring of tracking devices

The SD Act does not specifically prohibit the monitoring of a surveillance device for unlawful purposes.
Monitoring of a tracking or other surveillance device can form a substantial part of criminal offending.
OCNs planning acts of violence may assign a particular syndicate member to monitor the location ofa tracking device that someone else installed.
Meanwhile, some perpetrators of domestic violence endeavour to constantly monitor their intimate
partners, sometimes over extended periods of weeks or months. In these instances, the severity ofthe offence should be associated with the frequency and length of monitoring of the device, rather
than the initial act of installing the device. In some circumstances, consent may have been provided
for the initial installation of a device but then withdrawn during the period of monitoring. In suchcircumstances, it is unclear whether the existing offences of ‘installing’, ‘using’, or ‘maintaining’ adevice would be sufficient to charge and prosecute offenders.
Similarly, certain surveillance applications – such as in-built vehicle location systems – may not be‘installed’, but rather accessed and monitored. The monitoring of these applications will amount tocoercive control from 1 July 2024, although only in circumstances where the victim is a current orformer intimate partner of the offender- see Section 4.3.
Prohibiting the monitoring of surveillance devices for unlawful purposes would better capture
malicious tracking activity in broader domestic violence and organised crime settings.

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7.3.4

Reckless supply of surveillance devices

There is currently no offence for reckless supply of a tracking or other surveillance device in NSW.
Section 13 of the SD Act prohibits supply of a surveillance device, but requires proof that the offenderintended for the surveillance device to be used in contravention of the SD Act.
The Commission identified numerous examples of tracking devices being transferred in covert
exchanges that were consistent with criminal use. This included, for example, the use of ‘dead drops’
where items are left in a particular location by one party and collected anonymously by another. In
these examples, even if the supplier was not specifically aware of the intended use of the device, theywould have recognised that the circumstances surrounding the handover were not consistent with
lawful use.
Establishing an offence that prohibits the supply of a surveillance device with recklessness as towhether the device will be used unlawfully would counteract the measures adopted by OCNs to
distance themselves from their offending, and would capture third parties who assist and enableserious offending to occur. Furthermore, the current legislation does not address irresponsible orreckless advertising and sales practices by retailers. For example, Chapter 6 identified that some
private investigators and ‘spy stores’ sell tracking devices that they advertise for use in covert
tracking. While these providers would not be aware of the specific intentions of each customer, thenature of their promotional material is consistent with illegal use of their product.

7.3.5

Causing the installation, use or maintenance of a tracking device

Section 9 of the SD Act only prohibits the installation, use, and maintenance of a tracking device
without consent. The Commission is aware of several examples – including at least one organised
crime murder – where an individual paid or instructed another person to install a tracking device. The
current legislation may preclude prosecution of the individual who caused the device to be installed.
Consideration should be given to the creation of an offence to prohibit any act that causes asurveillance device to be installed, used, maintained, or monitored without consent, including
directing or instructing another person to do so.
Recommendation 5
Government strengthen legislation to:a.

remove the requirement to obtain the Attorney General’s consent to institute prosecutions
under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW), beyond the amendment contained in the Bailand Other Legislation Amendment (Domestic Violence) Bill 2024 (NSW);b.

prohibit the use of a surveillance device to facilitate serious criminal activity;c.

prohibit the use of a surveillance device to facilitate a domestic violence-related offence;d.

prohibit the monitoring of a surveillance device alongside the use, installation, andmaintenance;e.

prohibit the supply of a surveillance device with recklessness as to whether it will be usedunlawfully, such as encouraging unlawful use of tracking devices in advertising material; andf.

prohibit any activity that causes a surveillance device to be installed, used, or maintained
without consent (including instructing another person to do so).

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7.4

Other opportunities to reduce criminal use of tracking devices

This investigation has identified individuals who purchased tracking devices while subject tocommunity-based sentences or civil orders such as AVOs. 32 Tracking devices were sometimes
purchased in the days following an interaction with NSW Police Force officers in relation to a domestic
violence event (see Section 5.6). Furthermore, the Commission found that of the 79 offenders who
were charged with a domestic violence-related tracking device offence under the SD Act between
2010 and 2023, over one third (27) were the defendants on ADVOs intended to protect the victim of
the offence.
31F

Case Study 18
A female victim separated from her male partner of two years. During the relationship, the offenderdemanded to know where the victim was at all times, and displayed behaviour consistent withcoercive control, including threatening animals and threatening self-harm. After separating, theoffender continued to harass the victim and an ADVO was sought by the NSW Police Force toprotect the victim. Shortly after, the victim identified a magnetic GPS device attached to hervehicle.
Investigation by the NSW Police Force confirmed her male partner was monitoring the device. The
NSW Police Force identified that the offender checked the location of the GPS tracking device
more than 500 times in a 7-day period. The offender was charged under the SD Act and was also
charged with contravening the ADVO. He received a 12-month Community Correction Order andhas since continued to offend against the victim.

There is currently no legislated requirement to address the purchase, possession, or use of tracking
devices within AVO, bail, parole, or community-based sentence conditions. While such conditions
relating to tracking and other surveillance devices could still be applied at the discretion of therelevant Court or Tribunal, the Commission is not aware of this occurring on a regular basis.
Including specific conditions relating to tracking and other surveillance devices would mitigate therisk presented by individuals who are subject to civil orders or serving criminal sentences in thecommunity. It would also provide more scope for intervention against individuals who continue topurchase and illegally use these devices while subject to orders.

Case Study 19
A male offender was charged under the SD Act in relation to the tracking of his former partner. The
offender had installed two tracking devices on the victim’s vehicle, which she provided to the NSW
Police Force. The victim also reported that over the previous two years, she had discovered andremoved over 15 tracking devices that had been affixed to her vehicle. Throughout the period of
offending, the offender was the defendant on an ADVO intended to protect the victim.

Community-based sentences refer to court orders which allow offenders to carry out their sentence within
the community, and not in a prison, such as Intensive Correction Orders and Community Correction Orders.

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OFFICIALThe SD Act charge was withdrawn, although the offender was sentenced to an 18-monthCommunity Correction Order for contravening an ADVO. The offender had previously been charged
with domestic violence offences relating to the use of a tracking device, for which he received afine.
He has since been convicted of further domestic violence offences and is currently serving both aCommunity Correction Order and an Intensive Correction Order.

Opportunities to reduce criminal use of tracking devices are outlined in Recommendation 2, asdetailed in Section 5.6.

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8

Analysis of charges laid under the Surveillance
Devices Act 2007 (NSW)

8.1

Relevant offences

There is a general prohibition against the installation, use, and maintenance of tracking devices,
provided in subsection 9(1) of the SD Act:
A person must not knowingly install, use or maintain a tracking device to determine thegeographical location of—(a) a person—without the express or implied consent of that person, or(b) an object—without the express or implied consent of a person in lawful possession or
having lawful control of that object.
The SD Act sets out similar prohibitions regarding listening, optical, and data surveillance devices.
There is also a general prohibition against the manufacture, supply, and possession of surveillance
devices provided in subsection 13(1) of the SD Act:
A person must not—(a) manufacture, or(b) supply or offer to supply, or(c) possess,a data surveillance device, listening device, optical surveillance device or tracking device with theintention of using it, or it being used, in contravention of this Part.
The offences regarding the installation, use, maintenance, manufacture, supply, and possession ofsurveillance devices all carry a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.

8.2

Charges laid under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW)

Between 2010 and 2023, the NSW Police Force charged 219 offenders under the SD Act, with a totalof 438 charges laid. 33 Around 30% of these charges related to the unlawful use of tracking devices,
as defined in Section 9 of the SD Act. A breakdown of charges is provided below.
32F

There has been a general increase in the number of charges laid over time. The introduction of theApple AirTag into the Australian market in April 2021 almost certainly contributed to this increase,with 14 offenders charged in relation to unlawful use of AirTags since this time.

33

The Commission reviewed data since 2010 due to limitations regarding access to data from before this time.

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84
80
27

60

52
43

40
26
17

20
25

0

5

6

15

22
20

27

26

30

28

30

8

6

14

22

22

12

34
18

31
16

16

34

22
57

13
21

30

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Other offences

Tracking device offences

Figure 6: Charges laid under the SD Act between 2010 and 2023

8.3

Charge breakdown

The following table provides a breakdown of the 438 charges laid under the SD Act between 2010
and 2023.

SectionLaw Part CodePrescribed Law Part Title

9(1)(a)66198

Install/use tracking device to locate person without
consent

92

7(1)(a)66194

Install or use etc listening device to record etc
private conversation not party to78

7(1)(b)66195

Install or use etc listening device to record private
conversation party to6410(1)(a)66200

Install/use optical surveillance device – entry
without consent

59

12(1)

66203

Possess conversation obtained by surveillance
devices43

9(1)(b)66199

Install/use tracking device to locate object without
consent

38

11(1)

66202

Publish etc conversation obtained by surveillance
devices25

43

Charges Laid

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Section

Law Part CodePrescribed Law Part Title

13(1)(c)66206

Possess supply surveillance devices intend unlawfuluse

17

8(1)(b)66197

Install/use optical surveillance device – interferewith vehicle/premises without consent

12

40(1)

66208

Intentionally etc publish or communicate protected
information

7

8(1)(a)66196

Install/use data surveillance device – entry without
consent213(1)(a)66204

Manufacture surveillance devices intend unlawful
use

1

8.4

Charges Laid

Tracking device charges

Between 2010 and 2023, the NSW Police Force charged 96 offenders with offences relating to theunlawful use of tracking devices under the SD Act. 34 One of these offenders was charged on two
occasions – once in relation to an organised crime event, and once in relation to domestic violence.
This brought the total number of criminal events to 97.
33F

The Commission reviewed each criminal event toassess the circumstances surrounding the crime.
This revealed a significant cohort of domestic
violence perpetrators. Of the 97 criminal events, 79
were DFV-related and 14 were related to organised
crime. The remaining four did not fall into either
category. Further insights regarding theseoffenders are provided below.
One additional offender was charged in 2010 withthe supply of a tracking device. Since then, there
has not been a single prosecution for supplying a
tracking device in NSW.

4%15%Domestic
Violence
Organised
Crime

81%

Other

Figure 7: Crime type relating to tracking device charges

Magnetic GPS tracking devices were the most common type reported in the events, followed byBluetooth tags (mostly AirTags), and then hardwired GPS devices. The device type was not specified
in around one-third of cases, although in most of these instances the corresponding charge narrativewas consistent with the device being a magnetic GPS tracking device.

34

These offenders were all charged under section 9 of the SD Act.

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Offender insights•

75% had been charged on at least one
other occasion.

•

65% were adversely recorded in NSW
Police Force intelligence holdings.

•

One in three had known links to OCNs.

Tracking device type

# of events

Magnetic GPS device

31

Unknown31

Bluetooth tag or tile

16

Hardwired GPS device

14

Other electronic device 35

5

34F

8.5

Outcomes and sentencing

The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) provided outcomes and sentencing data
regarding 109 charges under section 9 of the SD Act that were finalised between 2007 and 2023: 46%
were withdrawn, 40% were proven, and 3% resulted in a not guilty finding. The remaining 8% weredismissed or disposed of by the Court without any determination being made regarding guilt.
Of the 27 offenders where a finalised tracking device charge was the principal proven offence, 36 only
three resulted in a custodial sentence.
35F

This included items which have location tracking settings but are not solely GPS tracker devices, such as
phones or tablets.
36
A more detailed explanation of how a principal offence is determined can be found on BOCSAR’s website,
https://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Pages/bocsar_court_stats/court_glossary.aspx#P. The principal provenoffence is defined as the charge which received the most serious penalty.
35

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9

Genuine use and availability of tracking devices

While this report addresses the criminal use of tracking devices, the Commission found that they also
have substantial genuine use. This section identifies the main genuine uses of tracking and othersurveillance devices and provides an overview of their availability in NSW.

9.1

Genuine use of tracking devices

Tracking devices have a range of genuine uses, including fleet management, asset protection, andpersonal security. Businesses in the logistics, transport, mining, and car hire industries commonly use
tracking devices for real-time fleet management, theft recovery, driver conduct and safety, andmanaging maintenance requirements.
Tracking devices are also routinely purchased by small-to-medium sized businesses and individual
customers to secure vehicles, motorcycles, and machinery. Tracking devices are therefore often soldas ‘anti-theft’ devices. These devices may also be purchased for personal safety, in particular forindividuals driving in unfamiliar or rural locations.
Hardwired tracking devices are generally more reliable than battery-powered magnetic devices andare the recommended choice for genuine use. Hardwired devices offer more reliable location data
and do not have to be regularly replaced or recharged. Furthermore, hardwired devices often haveadditional features including engine immobilisation and vehicle diagnostics. Battery-powered devices
are only preferrable when hardwiring is not an option, such as for trailers or certain types of machinery,or when the device is only needed for a short period of time. Reflecting this preference, theCommission found that most major automotive parts retailers no longer sell battery-powered tracking
devices.
Bluetooth tags and tiles, such as Apple AirTags, have substantial mainstream use for tracking
personal items such as keys, wallets, and luggage. Tags and tiles are also sometimes marketed as
personal safety devices for children and elderly people. There is also a significant market for pet
tracking tags and animal collars with in-built tracking capabilities. A growing market also exists forfitness trackers, which include GPS location capabilities that allow athletes to track speed anddistance travelled.

9.2

Availability of tracking devices

GPS tracking devices are widely accessible in NSW and can be purchased through local and overseas
retailers. Locally, tracking devices can be purchased from electronics stores, automotive parts stores,
private investigators, ‘spy stores’, and security equipment businesses. Some of these retailers operate
as online-only businesses.
Large online marketplaces and e-commerce platforms also sell tracking devices, including Gumtree,
eBay, Facebook Marketplace, Amazon, and Ali Baba. While each of these platforms vary, mostfacilitate the sale of items from overseas sellers to local customers. Devices can also be purchased
directly from some overseas manufacturers, although these brands are also widely available on online
marketplaces.
The price of tracking devices varies substantially between retailers with devices being sold foranywhere between $30 and $350. Some tracking devices are sold cheaply but require a paid
subscription to access the online platform used to monitor the location of the device.

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Open-source searches identified a substantial number of businesses offering fleet management
packages that include hardwired GPS tracking devices and sophisticated monitoring platforms. Thesebusinesses likely appeal to larger companies that manage a high volume of vehicles and/or machinery,
and were not of interest to this investigation.

9.3

Other common surveillance devices

Optical and listening devices such as covert cameras and voice recorders are also widely available in
NSW. They may be purchased for genuine reasons including to secure residential and businesspremises. These devices can be purchased from online marketplaces, e-commerce platforms, private
investigators and ‘spy stores’.

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10 Appendix A – Investigation methodology
The Commission collected information through traditional law enforcement investigative methods,
reviewed open-source and academic material, and deployed statutory powers including production
notices and coercive hearings. The Commission also applied data analytics techniques to draw
insights from datasets obtained during the investigation.

10.1

Review of existing material and environmental scanning

The Commission reviewed data collected from its own criminal investigations and also had access to
information from the NSW Police Force, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre(AUSTRAC), the Department of Home Affairs, and the Australian Federal Police. This information was
obtained through existing access to external agency databases and requests for information. Most
information was used to inform the Commission’s contextual understanding of the matters underinvestigation. In cases where specific information was used in this report, authorisation was soughtfrom the relevant agency.
The Commission also reviewed open-source material, including media reporting, academic literature,and existing legislative frameworks. This included substantial review of public reports regarding
coercive control and technology-facilitated domestic abuse.
This investigation was also informed by open-source searches relating to tracking devices and othersurveillance technology. The Commission reviewed hundreds of online listings for tracking devices tobuild an understanding of the functionality and genuine uses of these devices. This process provided
significant insight into where and how tracking devices are purchased, as well as how they are
advertised to prospective customers. This information was used to inform future data collection andoffered the Commission insights into the current environment surrounding the availability and sale oftracking devices.

10.2 Consultation with law enforcement and industry bodies
The Commission consulted with a number of subject matter experts within industry and law
enforcement. This included retailers, law enforcement investigators, government policy teams, andexperts in technology-based domestic violence. These individuals provided unique insights regarding
the availability and criminal use of tracking devices, and discussed limitations in the current legislativeand regulatory framework surrounding tracking devices.
The Commission consulted with the NSW Police Force and other agencies to manage specific safety
risks uncovered during this investigation. The Commission sent intelligence referrals to the Australian
Criminal Intelligence Commission, Department of Home Affairs, NSW Healthcare Complaints
Commission, Queensland Police Service, Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission and Western
Australia Police Force. Some of these referrals resulted in criminal investigations that remain active.

10.3 Investigative powers
The following table summarises the Commission’s use of statutory and other law enforcement powers
during this investigation.

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Legislation

Section and purpose

NumberCC Acts 29: to obtain documents and things pertaining
to an investigation by the Commission

33

CC Acts 24: to summons a person to give evidence
pertaining to an investigation by the Commission

8

TIA Acts 178: historical data authorisations

62

TIA Acts 180: prospective data authorisations

7

The Commission also interviewed people involved in, or directly associated with, OCNs in NSW. These
individuals had specific knowledge about the use of tracking devices to further serious and organised
crime. Their insights contributed to support the analysis in this report.

10.4 Data collection and analysis
The Commission issued 33 compulsory production notices to 31 entities. Twenty-two of these notices,
issued to 20 retailers, specifically related to the production of tracking device sales data. These 22
notices required each recipient to produce to the Commission approximately 12 months of sales
records of GPS tracking devices since 1 January 2023. Recipients included electronics stores,
automotive parts stores, private investigators, ‘spy stores’, online marketplaces, and international
online retailers.
The data was then analysed to identify customers who had purchased tracking devices. These
customers were assessed against law enforcement databases, and a risk profile and referral option
was generated for each customer.

10.5 Limitations
The most significant limitation, identified primarily in Chapter 7, is the absence of regulation aroundthe sale and purchase of surveillance devices in NSW. This made it impossible for the Commission to
obtain a comprehensive dataset of tracking device sales. The quality of data varied across retailers,
as did the level of detail retained about customers and devices.
Since there are various genuine reasons to purchase tracking devices, there is often no way of easily
identifying whether a particular individual purchased a device for genuine or criminal reasons. It is
likely that some individuals who were flagged as ‘high-risk’ actually purchased tracking devices forgenuine reasons. Equally, it is likely that some individuals who purchased tracking devices for criminal
purposes were not identified during this investigation.
Due to the volume of potential data available, the Commission was deliberate about which retailers
were approached, and what information was requested from each retailer. The Commission prioritised
approaches to retailers that were known to have been used by, or assessed to be attractive, tocriminals. The Commission targeted data collection around the types of devices that were most likely
to be used to facilitate criminal offending. For example, the report lacks significant detail regarding
the genuine use of hardwired tracking devices for fleet management purposes, because theCommission did not approach businesses that specialise in such solutions.
Along with limitations in the data provided by retailers, gaps were identified within law enforcement
databases, including the absence of a mechanism to ‘flag’ instances where tracking or othersurveillance device were used in a criminal offence or crime event.

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11 Appendix B – Terminology and definitions
11.1

Terminology relating to charge data

The term ‘charge’ has different definitions across NSW government bodies. When a person is charged
in NSW, they are provided with a Court Attendance Notice (CAN) which contains details of the alleged
offence/s. The CAN includes a charge reference number that starts with the letter H, sometimes
referred to as an ‘H number’. Within the COPS database, each ‘H number’ is referred to as a single
charge comprising of one or more offences. This terminology is generally adopted by law enforcement
officers in NSW.
BOCSAR, who provide authoritative crime statistics for NSW, does not specifically measure H
numbers and instead refers to each offence within an H number as its own ‘charge’. To maintainconsistency in public discussion, this report follows BOCSAR’s terminology.

11.2

Definitions of surveillance devices

The following definitions are provided by the SD Act.
Surveillance device typeDefinition

Tracking device

Any electronic device capable of being used to determine or monitor
the geographical location of a person or an object.

Listening device

Any device capable of being used to overhear, record, monitor, or listen
to a conversation or words spoken to or by any person in conversation,
but does not include a hearing aid or similar device used by a personwith impaired hearing to overcome the impairment and permit that
person to hear only sounds ordinarily audible to the human ear.

Optical surveillance
deviceAny device capable of being used to record visually or observe an
activity, but does not include spectacles, contact lenses, or a similar
device used by a person with impaired sight to overcome that
impairment.

Data surveillance device

Any device or program capable of being used to record or monitor the
input of information into or output of information from a computer but
does not include an optical surveillance device.

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11.3

Referenced legislation

Full name of Act, Bill or Regulation
Bail Act 2013 (NSW)
Bail and Other Legislation Amendment (Domestic Violence) Bill 2024 (NSW)
Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) (‘CC Act’)
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Coercive Control) Act 2022 (NSW)
Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW)
Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW) (‘Security Industry Act’)
Security Industry Regulation 2016 (NSW) (‘Security Industry Regulation’)
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) (‘SD Act')
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (‘TIA Act’)51

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Abbreviations

Abbreviation

Meaning

ANROWS

Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety

ADVO

Apprehended Domestic Violence Order

AUSTRAC

Australian Transaction Reporting and Analysis Centre

AVO

Apprehended Violence Order

BOCSARNSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research

CAN

Court Attendance Notice

CCTV

Closed Circuit Television

COPS

Computerised Operational Policing System

DPP

Director of Public Prosecutions

DFV

Domestic and Family Violence

FPO

Firearms Prohibition OrderGPS

Global Positioning System

IMEI

International Mobile Equipment Identity

OCN

Organised Crime Network

OMCG

Outlaw Motorcycle Gang

WESNET

Women’s Services Network

SIM

Subscriber Identity Module

SOC

Serious and Organised Crime

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