Insurance Law Alert

March 2019

In This Issue
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules That Complaint Alleges Potentially
Covered Advertising Injury, Triggering Duty To Defend
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a liability insurer was obligated to defend an insured
against various federal and common law claims based on the improper distribution of medical
supplies, finding that such claims were potentially covered under the “personal and advertising
injury” provision. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ixthus Medical Supply, Inc., 923 N.W.2d 550(Wis. 2019). (Click here for full article)“Able to handle
both direct insurance
and reinsurance matterswith equal flair, and also adept
at handling the most complex
of disputes regarding insurers’
business practices.”– Chambers USA
2018

Oklahoma Supreme Court Finds Earth Movement Exclusion Ambiguous,
While Mississippi Supreme Court Enforces Its Terms
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma deemed earth movement and water exclusions ambiguous
based largely on the absence of verbiage relating to man-made causes, whereas the Mississippi
Supreme Court ruled that a different earth movement exclusion was enforceable. Oklahoma
Schools Risk Mgmt. Trust v. McAlester Public Schools, 2019 WL 350385 (Okla. Jan. 29, 2019);
Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Smith, 2019 WL 1072117 (Miss. Mar. 7, 2019).
(Click here for full article)

Finding Collapse Provision Ambiguous, First Circuit Rules That Policy
Covers Collapse Of Ceiling
The First Circuit ruled that a collapse provision that covered damage caused by “decay” wasambiguous and must be interpreted in the policyholder’s favor. Easthampton Congregational
Church v. Church Mutual Ins. Co., 2019 WL 851191 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2019). (Click here forfull article)

Late Notice And Resulting Prejudice Warrant Dismissal Of Suit, Says
Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit ruled that an insurer has no indemnity obligation because the policyholder
failed to provide timely notice of the underlying claims, resulting in substantial prejudice to theinsurer. Founders Ins. Co. v. Richard Ruth’s Bar & Grill LLC, 2019 WL 852137 (4th Cir. Feb.
21, 2019). (Click here for full article)

California Court Rules That Policyholder’s Late Notice Forfeits D&O
Coverage For Whistleblower Action
A California federal district court ruled that an insured was not entitled to coverage for awhistleblower action or Department of Justice subpoena under consecutive D&O policies
because it failed to comply with a condition precedent notice requirement. PAMC, Ltd v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2019 WL 666726 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2019).
(Click here for full article)
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP1

First Circuit Rules That Untimely ERISA Appeal Is Not Excused By
Substantial Compliance Doctrine Or Notice-Prejudice Rule
The First Circuit ruled that an ERISA plan participant failed to timely appeal a terminationof benefits and that neither the substantial compliance doctrine nor the notice prejudice rule
applied. Fortier v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 916 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2019). (Click here
for full article)

New York Court Dismisses Suit Based On Breach Of Notice Provisions,Finding No Reasonable Excuse For Delay
A New York federal district court dismissed a policyholder’s suit against its liability insurer,
finding that the policyholder breached the notice provisions and that there was no valid reason
for the delay. K.B.K. Huntington Corp. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2019 WL 1230408 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
14, 2019). (Click here for full article)

Georgia Supreme Court Rules That Insurer Did Not Breach Duty To Settle
The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that an insurer did not act unreasonably in failing toaccept a settlement offer before it was withdrawn because the offer did not include a deadline
for acceptance. First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Hughes, 2019 WL 1103831 (Ga. Mar. 11,2019). (Click here for full article)

Second Circuit Rules That Email Hyperlink Did Not Provide Adequate
Notice Of Arbitration Clause
The Second Circuit denied a motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the arbitration clause
was not part of the operative contract because an email hyperlink did not provide sufficient
notice of the clause. Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2019). (Click here forfull article)

Ninth Circuit Rules That Removal Statute Clock Begins When Insurer, Not
Designated Agent, Receives Pleading
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the thirty-day clock for statutory removal begins when the insurer
receives notice of a pleading, not when an insurer’s designated agent receives such notice.
Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2019 WL 1086998 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2019).
(Click here for full article)

STB News Alert
Click here for news relating to Simpson Thacher’s insurance practice.

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Duty To Defend
Alert:

Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules
That Complaint Alleges Potentially
Covered Advertising Injury,
Triggering Duty To Defend
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that aliability insurer was obligated to defend an
insured against various federal and common
law claims based on the improper distributionof medical supplies, finding that such claims
were potentially covered under the “personal
and advertising injury” provision. West Bend
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ixthus Medical Supply,
Inc., 923 N.W.2d 550 (Wis. 2019).
Abbott Laboratories sued Ixthus, a medical
supply company, along with more than 100
other defendants, for allegedly distributing
in the United States blood glucose strips
that were intended only for international
markets. The complaint alleged trademark
infringement, Lanham Act violations, anddeceptive business practices, among otherclaims. West Bend refused to defend, arguingthat there was no coverage under the personal
and advertising injury provision of its policy,
and that two exclusions barred coverage. A
Wisconsin trial court ruled in West Bend’sfavor, finding that the claims fell within
the initial grant of coverage, but that theknowing violation exclusion barred coverage.
An appellate court reversed, ruling that theexclusion did not eliminate West Bend’s
duty to defend because several underlying
claims did not require a showing ofintentional conduct. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court affirmed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected West
Bend’s assertion that “Ixthus was not reallyan ‘advertising’ defendant—but instead a‘distributing’ defendant who did not advertiseor sell products directly to end users.” Thecourt explained that the underlying complaint
sufficiently alleged a covered advertising
injury as to Ixthus because it alleged that
“Defendants” engaged in advertising activities
that resulted in financial harm to Abbott.
In addition, the court held that the knowing
violation exclusion did not eliminate West
Bend’s duty to defend because certain of
the underlying claims (e.g., trademark

dilution, deceptive business practices) could
be established without proving intentional
conduct or a “knowing violation” of Abbott’s
rights. The court applied the same reasoning
to the criminal acts exclusion and notedthat state law was unsettled as to whether
the exclusion requires a policyholder to beconvicted of a crime or merely charged.
Ultimately, the court held that resolution ofthat issue was unnecessary because at least
some underlying claims were not dependent
upon criminal conduct.

Property Damage
Alerts:Oklahoma Supreme Court Finds
Earth Movement Exclusion
Ambiguous, While Mississippi
Supreme Court Enforces Its Terms
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma deemed
earth movement and water exclusions
ambiguous based largely on the absenceof verbiage relating to man-made causes.
Oklahoma Schools Risk Mgmt. Trust v.
McAlester Public Schools, 2019 WL 350385(Okla. Jan. 29, 2019).
A school sustained property damage resulting
from the rupture of an underground water
pipe. In turn, an insurance cooperativesought a declaration of no coverage basedon exclusions relating to earth movement
and water damage. A trial court granted theinsurer’s summary judgment motion, andan appellate court affirmed. The appellate
court found that the property damage wascaused by two excluded risks: water andearth movement.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed,
deeming the exclusionary language
ambiguous. The court noted that the earth
movement exclusion listed several naturally
occurring events, such as earthquakes andlandslides, but did not include “unnatural
events,” such as pipe ruptures. With respect
to the water exclusion, the court noted thatthe language did not address natural vs. manmade causes. Further, the court emphasizedthat unlike other policy exclusions, the two
at issue did not include the phrase “however
caused.” The court stated: “[g]enerally when3

an insurer creates specificity in one clause ofa policy and then omits it in a similar context,
the omission is considered purposeful andshould be given meaning.” Finally, the court
relied on cases in other jurisdictions thathave deemed earth movement exclusions
ambiguous in the absence of references to
man-made or universal causation.
In a case that involved a different earth
movement exclusion, the Mississippi
Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion
applied to any earth movement, regardless ofcause. In Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 2019 WL 1072117 (Miss.
Mar. 7, 2019), the earth movement exclusion
expressly applied “regardless of any othercause or event contributing concurrently orin any sequence to the loss,” including earth
movement “caused by or resulting fromhuman or animal forces or any act of nature.”
Deeming this language unambiguous, theMississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial
court’s decision and granted the insurer’ssummary judgment motion.

opined that over time, the nails’ connection
to the ceiling jousts progressively weakened,
resulting in the eventual collapse. In ensuing
litigation between the church and its insurer,a Massachusetts federal district court granted
the church’s summary judgment motion.
The district court ruled that the damage wasat least partially caused by “hidden decay,”which was covered under an “Additional
Coverage-Collapse” provision. The First
Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds.
It ruled that “decay” was ambiguous as towhether it includes only organic rot, or
whether it also encompasses progressive
decline of construction materials. Interpretingthe provision in favor of coverage, theFirst Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of
the church.

Notice Alerts:

Late Notice And Resulting Prejudice
Warrant Dismissal Of Suit, Says
Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit ruled that an insurer
has no indemnity obligation because thepolicyholder failed to provide timely notice of
the underlying claims, resulting in substantial
prejudice to the insurer. Founders Ins. Co.
v. Richard Ruth’s Bar & Grill LLC, 2019 WL
852137 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2019).

Finding Collapse Provision
Ambiguous, First Circuit Rules That
Policy Covers Collapse Of Ceiling
The First Circuit ruled that a collapse
provision that covered damage causedby “decay” was ambiguous and must be
interpreted in the policyholder’s favor.
Easthampton Congregational Church v.
Church Mutual Ins. Co., 2019 WL 851191 (1stCir. Feb. 22, 2019).
A church sought coverage for damage caused
by a ceiling collapse. The insurer’s inspector
concluded that the collapse was caused by“withdrawal” of nails used to secure ceilingmaterials. More specifically, the inspector

The coverage dispute arose out of a
September 2012 bar fight that left a patronin a permanent quasi-vegetative state. In
November 2012, the injured patron’s attorneysent a notice of representation to the bar,which the bar forwarded to its insurer. In
December 2012, the patron sued the bar. In
February 2013, a state court entered a default
judgment. In May 2013, the bar’s insurer
received copies of the underlying summonsand complaint. The insurer retained counsel
to defend the bar and unsuccessfully sought
to set aside the default judgment. A final
judgment of $5 million was entered against
the bar.
A South Carolina federal district court
ruled that the insurer had no duty to
indemnify because the bar failed to provide
timely notice of the underlying suit. The
district court further held that this breach
substantially prejudiced the insurer. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed.
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The policy required the bar to provide noticeof any claim or suit “as soon as practicable”
and to “immediately send [the insurer] copies
of any demands, notices, summons or legal
papers.” The Fourth Circuit held that the bar
unequivocally breached these provisions,rejecting the contention that it compliedwith the notice requirement by forwarding
the injured patron’s letter of representation.
The injured patron, as assignee of the bar’s
insurance rights, argued that the letter ofrepresentation put the insurer “on notice of apotential claim.” The court disagreed, statingthat “[e]ven where an insurer has actual
knowledge of a potential claim or occurrence
triggering coverage under the policy, theinsured is not relieved of his contractual
obligation to provide the legal papers to theinsurer unless the insurer waives that policy
provision.” Finally, the Fourth Circuit heldthat the insurer was substantially prejudicedby the breach of the notice provision because
it was denied the opportunity to investigate
the case, defend the suit, or negotiate
a settlement.

California Court Rules That
Policyholder’s Late Notice Forfeits
D&O Coverage For Whistleblower
ActionA California federal district court ruled thatan insured was not entitled to coverage fora whistleblower action or Department ofJustice (“DOJ”) subpoena under consecutive
D&O policies because it failed to comply witha condition precedent notice requirement.
PAMC, Ltd v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, PA, 2019 WL 666726 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 12, 2019).
National Union issued several consecutive
one-year D&O policies to PAMC. The policies
require notice of a claim to be provided
during the policy period or within ninety days
after the policy period ends. Additionally,
the policy limits coverage to claims “firstmade against the insureds during the policy
period” and states that such notice is a“condition precedent” to coverage. Basedon these provisions, National Union denied
coverage for a whistleblower action and DOJ
subpoena. National Union argued that theapplicable policy was the one in effect fromFebruary 2015 through March 2016 because
the subpoena was served in June 2015 andbecause PAMC allegedly learned of thewhistleblower action in March 2016. National
Union argued that PAMC’s notice in 2017
was therefore untimely. The court agreed anddismissed PAMC’s coverage action.
Emphasizing that notice provisions in claimsmade-and-reported policies are strictly
enforced under California law, the court
rejected several arguments asserted by PAMC.
First, as to PAMC’s argument that the policy“allow[ed] for the possibility” of coveragenotwithstanding a failure to comply with thenotice provisions because the Declarations
page stated that coverage is “generally”
limited to claims first made and reported
during the policy period, the court explainedthat “use of the word ‘generally’ . . . does notnegate the reporting requirements otherwise
plainly and conspicuously included inthe [P]olicy.”
Second, the court rejected PAMC’s contention
that the consecutive policy periods shouldbe treated as one continuous policy period.
The court explained that successive policy
renewals have “no relevance to Plaintiff’s
reporting requirements under the 20152016 Policy.”
Third, the court rejected PAMC’s assertion
that notice of the subpoena was timely
because it was “not legally able” to disclose
its existence until January 2017, when the
DOJ indicated that its investigation wascomplete. The cover letter that accompanied
the subpoena stated that “this Office requests
that you not disclose the existence of orcompliance with the subpoena . . . until the
Office notifies you that the investigation has
been completed.” The court held that thecover letter did not prohibit PAMC fromdisclosing the subpoena to third parties
and that, in any event, PAMC could haverequested permission to notify its insurer ofthe subpoena.
Finally, the court dismissed the contention
that even if notice was untimely, it should
be excused under the notice-prejudice
rule, noting that “California courts haveconsistently declined to extend the noticeprejudice rule to claims-made policies”
and that the factual record did not, in any
event, present any equitable justification for
excusing a violation of a condition precedent
to coverage.

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First Circuit Rules That Untimely
ERISA Appeal Is Not Excused By
Substantial Compliance Doctrine
Or Notice-Prejudice Rule
The First Circuit dismissed a disability
benefits suit against Hartford, finding thatthe plan participant failed to timely appeal atermination of benefits. The court rejected theparticipant’s argument that any untimelinessshould be excused by ERISA’s substantial
compliance doctrine or New Hampshire’s
notice-prejudice rule. Fortier v. Hartford
Life and Accident Ins. Co., 916 F.3d 74 (1stCir. 2019).
Hartford notified Theresa Fortier that her
long-term disability benefits would expire
because she had not demonstrated eligibility
for a continuation of those benefits. Hartford
also informed Fortier that any appeal must be
filed within 180 days of her receipt of notice.
Fortier filed an appeal approximately twomonths after this deadline expired. When
Hartford refused to consider her appeal,
Fortier sued under ERISA, seeking benefit
reinstatement. A New Hampshire federal
district court ruled in Hartford’s favor, findingthat Fortier had not timely appealed andthus had not exhausted her administrative
remedies. The First Circuit affirmed.
The First Circuit rejected Fortier’s assertion
that the 180-day time frame started at thedate of termination of benefits rather thanthe date of notice. The court emphasizedthat the relevant ERISA provision statesthat claimants have 180 days “following
receipt of a notification of an adverse benefit
determination within which to appeal.”
The court also ruled that Fortier’s untimely
appeal was not excused by the “substantial
compliance” doctrine that applies in limited
contexts. The court explained that this
doctrine is intended to foster prompt review
of benefits denials, not to excuse a claimant’s
failure to meet exhaustion requirements.
Finally, the court rejected application of New
Hampshire’s notice-prejudice rule to Fortier’s
delay, noting that to do so would createinconsistency in the ERISA framework andlikely result in increased costs and delays. As
the court noted, its holding is consistent with
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ rejectionsof the application of a common law noticeprejudice rule to ERISA appeals.

New York Court Dismisses Suit
Based On Breach Of Notice
Provisions, Finding No Reasonable
Excuse For Delay
A New York federal district court dismissed a
policyholder’s suit against its liability insurer,
finding that the policyholder breached thenotice provisions and that there was no valid
reason for the delay. K.B.K. Huntington
Corp. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2019 WL 1230408(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2019).
In October 2003, the Department ofEnvironmental Conservation (“DEC”) issued
a Notice of Claim to the policyholder, a
dry cleaning business, about the potential
existence of hazardous waste conditions.
In March 2012, the DEC issued a Record ofDecision identifying the policyholder as apotentially responsible party (“PRP”) for thecontamination. In May 2016, the policyholder
sent a notice of a claim to its insurer. The
insurer denied coverage based on late notice.
Thereafter the policyholder brought suitseeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
A New York district court dismissed theaction, finding that the policyholder breachedpolicy provisions requiring notice of an
occurrence “as soon as practicable” and noticeof any claim “immediately.” The court ruledthat an “occurrence” happened in October
2002, when the policyholder received a Noticeof Claim from the DEC and that a “claim” wasmade, at the very latest, in March 2012, whena Record of Decision was issued. Although
the Second Circuit has not expressly held thatreceipt of a PRP letter constitutes a claim, thecourt noted the “litany of lower court cases”
treating such letters as claims.
The court further held that the length ofdelay—four years as to notice of claim andthirteen years as to notice of occurrence—
was unreasonable and that there was no
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valid basis for excusing such delay. The
policyholder argued that the untimely
notice should be excused based on its lack ofknowledge of the policy’s existence and thepoor health of the dry cleaning business’s
owner. Rejecting these arguments, the court
noted that the policyholder did not begin
looking for an insurance policy for more thanten years after learning of potential liability
and therefore failed to “exercise the minimal
diligence necessary” to discover the policy
sooner. The court further explained thatwhile a medical emergency might justify adelay in certain cases, “a person who chooses
to continue operating a business over a long
period of time, despite affliction from healthissues, cannot use their situation as a shield
against the basic responsibilities arising in theordinary course of business.”

Settlement Alert:
Georgia Supreme Court Rules
That Insurer Did Not BreachDuty To Settle

The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that aninsurer did not act unreasonably in failingto accept a settlement offer before it waswithdrawn because the offer did not include a
deadline for acceptance. First Acceptance Ins.
Co. of Georgia v. Hughes, 2019 WL 1103831(Ga. Mar. 11, 2019).
The coverage dispute arose out of a car
accident that resulted in the death of Ronald
Jackson. Jackson’s automobile insurer was
advised that several other individuals wereseriously injured by the accident, including
Julie An and her daughter. First Acceptanceretained counsel and notified all injured
parties that it hoped to “reach a global
settlement.” Thereafter, An’s counsel sent
two letters to First Acceptance. The lettersexpressed interest in attending a global
settlement conference or settling for policy
limits. First Acceptance inadvertently misfiled
those letters. Forty-one days after sending
the letters, An revoked the settlement offerand sued Jackson’s estate. Thereafter, First
Acceptance offered to settle An’s claims
for the $50,000 policy limit, which she
rejected. A trial court later awarded An andher daughter $5.3 million. Jackson’s estateadministrator sued First Acceptance, alleging
negligence and bad faith failure to settle.
A Georgia trial court granted First
Acceptance’s summary judgment motion. The
Court of Appeals reversed on the failure-tosettle claim, finding there were issues of factas to whether An’s settlement offer included
a thirty-day deadline for responding, andwhether First Acceptance breached its duty tosettle by failing to respond within thirty days.
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed.
Addressing a preliminary matter, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that an insurer’s
duty to settle arises only when an injured
party presents a valid offer to settle withinpolicy limits, not when an insurer knows orreasonably should know that a settlement ispossible. Turning to the factual record, thecourt concluded that First Acceptance did
not act negligently or in bad faith in failingto accept An’s settlement offer. The court
ruled as a matter of law that the settlement
offer was not expressly subject to a time limit
for acceptance. Although one of the lettersrequested insurance information within
thirty days, it also stated that any settlement
would be conditioned upon receipt of that
information. The court therefore held thatFirst Acceptance was not put on notice thatits failure to accept the offer within a specifictime frame would constitute a refusal.
Further, the court held that First Acceptancecould not have reasonably known that itneeded to respond within 41 days or risk
exposure to a judgment in excess of policy
limits, particularly given that An expressed
willingness to attend settlement conferencesin the offer letters.

Arbitration Alert:
Second Circuit Rules That Email
Hyperlink Did Not Provide
Adequate Notice Of Arbitration
ClauseThe Second Circuit denied a motion to compel
arbitration, ruling that the arbitration clause
was not part of the operative contract because
an email hyperlink did not provide sufficient
notice of the clause. Starke v. SquareTrade,Inc., 913 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2019).

7

Adam Starke purchased a protection planfrom SquareTrade for a product he purchased
online. In a putative class action, Starkealleged that SquareTrade violated consumer
protection laws. SquareTrade moved tocompel arbitration, which a New York district
court denied. The court ruled that Starke did
not have reasonable notice of or manifest his
assent to the arbitration clause. The Second
Circuit affirmed.
Under New York law, a party to a contract isbound by its terms, even if he does not haveactual notice of certain contract terms, if heis on inquiry notice and assents to the terms
through conduct that a reasonable person
would understand to constitute assent. New
York courts look to whether a term is obvious
and called to the party’s attention.
The Second Circuit concluded that Starke did
not have reasonable notice of the arbitration
provision, which was included in a “Terms &Conditions” document provided via hyperlink
in an email sent to Starke. The court notedthat Starke had received several confirmation
emails from Amazon and SquareTrade,but none put him on notice that a “Service
Contract” would come in a hyperlink.
Further, the court emphasized that the email
containing the hyperlink was cluttered withtext displayed in multiple colors, fonts, andsizes and that the hyperlink itself was in thesmallest font at the very bottom of the email.
Finally, the court noted that the email did not
direct Starke to click on the link or inform
him that the link contained contract terms towhich he would be deemed to agree.
The court emphasized the fact-specific natureof its holding, stating:
we in no way hold that the termsof a contract may not be provided
by a hyperlinked document. So
long as the purchaser’s attention isadequately directed to a conspicuous
hyperlink that is clearly identified
as containing contractual terms towhich the consumer manifests assent
by completing the transaction . . . a
hyperlink can be an effective device for
specifying contract terms.

Jurisdiction Alert:

Ninth Circuit Rules That Removal
Statute Clock Begins When Insurer,
Not Designated Agent, Receives
Pleading
Addressing a matter of first impression, theNinth Circuit ruled that the thirty-day clock
for statutory removal begins when the insurer
receives notice of a pleading, not when an
insurer’s designated agent receives such
notice. Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 2019 WL 1086998 (9th Cir. Mar.
8, 2019).
Federal statutory law requires notice ofremoval to be filed “within 30 days after thereceipt by the defendant, through service orotherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading.” 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). In this coverage dispute,the policyholders argued that the thirty-day
clock began when the insurer’s designatedin-state agent received notice of the pleadings.
In contrast, the insurer contended that receipt
by the insurer starts the removal clock. The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the insurer, notingthat allowing delivery to a designated agent
to begin the removal clock would thwart thegoals of uniformity and consistency. The court
stated: “if delivery to a statutorily designatedagent began the removal clock, the effective
time a defendant had to remove would
depend not only on differences in state law,
but also on the efficiency of state agencies ineach instance.” As the court noted, the Fourth
Circuit has similarly held that notice to an
in-state agent does not begin the removal
clock. See Elliott v. Am. States Ins. Co., 883
F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 2018).

STB News Alert
Simpson Thacher’s Insurance Litigation
Practice was named the National PracticeGroup of the Year at Euromoney’s Benchmark
Litigation 2019 Awards Dinner. This is
the seventh consecutive year the Firm hasreceived the Insurance Firm of the YearAward. In addition, Mary Beth Forshaw was
shortlisted for the Insurance Lawyer of theYear, which she won in 2016.

8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Daniel J. Stujenske+1-212-455-2419
dstujenske@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552846 and Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
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Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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