Foreword
The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question”
in the Russian Empire(Introduction to A. Erkinov’s Publication)1

A. Erkinov’s publication presented here includes a number of original sources,
namely, works of eminent poets of Central Asia from the late 19th to the early 20th
century. Such works are very rarely studied as original historical sources.
However, local poetry, as a genre, provided the most complete reflection of thereligious-ethical standards of the era, particularly with regard to the mostsignificant events of the time, such as the Andijan uprising, which occurred
during a rather peaceful period. The author begins his article with a brief analysis
of a change in views toward the Andijan uprising and other similar uprisings thattook place in Central Asia. Erkinov shows how the evaluation of these eventschanged in Soviet historiography, depending on the ideological clichés of a given
period, and the level of “ideological attentiveness” (marginality) of a particularresearcher. The survey of opinions from the period of independence regarding thesame uprising and attempts to present the uprising’s leader as one of the fighters“in the long-lasting struggle for independence,” is quite interesting. Not without
irony, Erkinov notices that now a reassessment of the same events is sometimes
performed by literary critics, who in old times amicably supported another
ideology and its “scientific” approaches.
To the observations of the author I would add the following. It seems thatthe historical evaluation of the advance of the Russian empire in Central Asia
(which proceeded partly as annexation2 and partly as conquest with subsequent1

I would like to express my thanks to proff. Devin DeWeese, Hisao Komatsu and Sergey Abashin
for useful comments and discussions.
2
It should be remembered that the Kirghiz / Kazakh zhüzes (hordes) were incorporated into theRussian Empire on the basis of mutual agreements, e.g., Small and Middle Hordes. For detail see:Крафт И. И. “Судебная часть в Туркестанском крае и степных областях.” New ed.:Ешмухамбетов C., Жакеев C. (сост.) Из истории казахов. Алматы: Жалын, 1999. С. 330-339.
One of the older works on the subject: Demko G. The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan (Uralic

The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

colonization) will be influenced for a quite long time by the political realities ofthe present day, which have arisen after the disintegration of the USSR. The
present reconsideration of history in the countries of the region predominantly
comes with an ideological coloring, continuing the pattern established in Soviet
times which fostered, especially in the “marginal” (or “provincial”) republics, thedevelopment of hypertrophic national narratives that led to isolated to the“national privatization of history,” in the Central Asia countries.3 Moreover, inthe vast majority of the countries in the region the official authorities determine
the vector of historical reassessments of the past, especially regarding thecolonial and Soviet periods, by considering history as the most convenient way
for “consolidation of the nation” (in perceptions of modern ideologists andpoliticians of the countries in the region). Post-colonial “patriotism” (in thedefinition given by politics and a significant part of the marginal intelligentsia)
bursts into “modern history” and forms paradigms for the next “reconsideration”
of history. This political (nationalist) ideology, by the way, is a product of theformer Soviet provincialism and hidden opposition of “the Soviet Eastern sister
republics,” which already then (in their own ways) had begun in a concealedmanner to challenge the results of national delimitation.4 Such realities to one
extent or another politicize today’s process of the reconsideration of one’s own
history, which even without this is already so politicized that the occurrence ofeven more or less objective studies induces an ambiguous evaluation among
researchers, who were once unified (shackled) within the uniform political andideological system.
What is indisputable is that the conquest and colonization, and especially“membership in the country of the Soviets” (or, “semi-centennial apologetics” asdefined by S. Dudoignon, the French researcher5) for a long time left a deep mark,and particularly influenced the minds of historians of the senior and middle
generations in the former “southern republics” of the USSR. The “mark” was so
deep that the anti-colonial and anti-Soviet rhetoric frequently published now iscouched in well-known Soviet stylistic formulas and clichés.6 Moreover, as has
and Altaic). New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.
3
See interesting remarks on methodology of studies in post-colonial Central Asian countries:Горшенина C. “Извечна ли маргинальность русского колониального Туркестана, или войдётли постсоветская Средняя Азия в область post-исследований?” Ab Imperio, 2007. № 2. С.
242-245.
4
The classical example is a famous book “Tadzhiki (The Tajiks)” by B.Gafurov (the latest edition– Dushanbe: Irfon, 2002), in which the author, according to attestation of eyewitnesses, wrote noneof the lines. See comments to the Internet-version of the recent speech of the President of the
Republic of Tajikistan on the occasion of B. Gafurov’s Jubilee celebrations: Э. Рахмонов.
Бобожон Гафуров и национальная самобытность таджиков. 26.12 2008 (Permanent link tothe site of the speech and comments: http://www.centrasia.ru/news).
5Дюдуаньон C. А. “Кадимизм: элементы социологии мусульманского традиционализма втатарском мире и в Мавераннахре (конец XVIII – начало XX вв.)” Дюдуаньон C. А., Исхаков
Д., Мухаметшин Р. (ред.) Панорама-форум. 1997. № 12. спец. вып. Ислам в татарском мире:история и современность. Казань: Панорама, 1997. С. 69.
6
See also the above-mentioned article by S. Dudoignon: Dudoignon S. A. “Changements
2

The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

been said, the “reassessment” is more often done by just those historians whothemselves obtained a decent Soviet education, and once with a fair share ofemotions (expressing the same loyalist moods, but to the red banner) proved the
all-round advantage of “Annexation of Central Asia to Russia,” and one-sidedly
convicted those “bourgeois scholars,” who wrote at that period about expansion
or colonization, and so on. The reaction of some Russian scholar appears not lessemotional and not entirely scientific; they also diligently try to argue the facts
that the colonization of Central Asia did not bring benefits to the Crown of theRussian Empire and that it was precisely the local peoples who gained moreadvantages from colonization.7
Similar problems (in particular, as far as it concerns Islamic studies)
existed and still can be seen today among western researchers (taking into
account the conventionality of this geographical term). The significant part ofwestern research was and still remains under, as defined by Devin DeWeese, thecaptivity of “Sovietological Islamic studies” (“Sovietological Islamology”),
which is not interested in any other aspects of complex processes, aside from thespecial influence of Soviet ideology and the regime on the Islamic heritage
within the framework of the creations of the history of new nations.8 Certainly,
the limitation of both the “Soviet” and “Sovietological” schools is conditioned byrealities of the “Cold War,” the former common borders, limited access tosources, language barriers, and the like – problems, which, it seems to me, still
persist, especially among the post-Soviet researchers of Central Asia. Though thepresent isolation of research in many respects repeats the problems ofSovietology, with the same ideological schemes (of anti-Soviet and sometimes
anti-Russian orientation), and is amazingly similar to the approaches of theSovietological school, but in a more primitive form.9 It is quite clear that thedebates among historians in the post-Soviet era – of what was “better” for theregion, whether its annexation to the Russian empire, or “everything remaining
unaltered” - are absolutely unproductive, and, as noted, they simply reflect theideological and partly political realities of the post-Soviet period.10
politiques et historiographie en Asie Centrale (Tadjikistan et Uzbekistan, 1987-1993).” Cahierd’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien. № 16, 1993. pp. 100-110.
7
In this sense, the most characteristic work is the above-mentioned publication: Литвинов П. П.
Государство и ислам в Русском Туркестане (1865–1917) (по архивным материалам). Елец:Елецкий государственный педагогический институт, 1998. С. 122-123, 140-142. Also see workby the same author: Литвинов П. П. Органы департамента полиции МВД в системе
“военно-административного” управления Русским Туркестаном (по архивным, правовым ииным источникам). Елец: Елецкий государственный университет, 2007.
8
DeWeese D. “Islam and the Legacy of Sovietology: A Review Essay on Yaacov Rói’s Islam in
the Soviet Union.” Journal of Islamic Studies. Vol. 13. № 3, 2002. pp. 298-330.
9
See also: Горшенина C. “Извечна ли маргинальность...,” C. 234-235.
10Time and again we hear (not only in everyday life, or in the propagandistic press, but also
among venerable scholars) that if it had not been for the periods of colonization and Sovietization,
today there would not be any difference between the region of CA and Afghanistan. This reminds
me of a similar “what if” interpretation of the “great mission of Amir Temur,” who won the fightwith the Turkish sultan Bayazid I, and thereby saved Europe (I wonder, what he saved it from?).
3

The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

In any case, these two extreme estimations can only have scholarlyinterest (for example, in terms of studying the post-Soviet [post-colonial]
reassessments of history, their links with political realities, the professional levelof researchers, etc.).11 Apparently, the best way out of such peculiar “dead ends”
in debates is to publish original sources, and Erkinov does this rather
productively and in a professional manner.
The evaluation (self-estimation) of approaches used in Soviet time is anespecially sensitive issue among post-Soviet scholars. Self-justificatoryreferences of some СА researchers to “the ideological dictatorship of Moscow”
in discussions of publications or dissertations, particularly covering the Timurid
period, and especially the period of colonization, look interesting (if not to say
amusing).12 Also repeating ourselves, we say that the same type of reassessment(alas, not always objectively) occurs among some modern Russian researchers
who are held captive by the series of fundamental works from pre-revolutionary
and partly post-revolutionary periods. 13 However, in Russia the idea of a“civilizing mission” was regularly revived and made its way into popular
publications in the past as well. Such is the case with a series of articles that
obviously served to justify the elimination of the Kokand / Khoqand Khanate(February 1876).14 It was precisely in that period, when, in a manner of speaking,Regarding the latter example, the wording used by the experts in Timurid studies, for example, ofUzbekistan, are surprisingly similar to the respective expressions of the Soviet historian
Academician B. A. Rybakov, who advanced the argument about the extraordinary role of Medieval
Russia, which redeemed Europe from the Mongols. Here we can see how deep the influence ofSoviet historiography was, and how convenient it was in the formulation of apologetic views on
history.
11
The historical collisions are discussed in considerable detail (in the context of the views of
western, Russian, and to a lesser extent Central Asian scholarship) in the above-mentioned articles
by S. Gorshenina and S. Abashin.
12
Moreover, works of local scholars were quite often stamped with notorious “ideologicalmarking” by their own colleagues because of scholarly competition, which (due to the system
existing since Stalinist times) could be hidden by that very marking based on the “ideologicalimmaturity of the submitted work.” However, based on my knowledge of examples of such casesand publications, I dare to conclude that the inner self-censorship of “ideological loyalty” among
the Soviet scholars of СА functioned much more effectively than a “peremptory shout from
Moscow.” Besides, there are still many living scholars in Central Asian countries, whose
dissertations on topics mentioned above, or similar areas, were once not accepted by the local
Academic Councils and were “dismissed” with the familiar stamp of “ideological immaturity.”
However, practically all of them defended their theses precisely in Moscow, where scholarly
institutions were highly ideologized, though not so much (especially in later Soviet times) as in anyof “Southern republics” of the former Soviet Union. See also the observations in: Dudoignon S. A.
“Changements politiques et historiographie...,” pp. 100-110.
13
A fairly detailed analysis of contemporary condition of the post-colonial studies in Russia (withanalysis of the sources of influence, reanimated old paradigms and others) is provided by S.
Gorshenina in her two works: Горшенина C. “Извечна ли маргинальность...,” C. 39-43;
Горшенина C. “Крупнейшие проекты колониальных архивов России: Утопичность тотальной
Туркестаники генерал-губернатора Константина Петровича фон Кауфмана.” Ab Imperio, 2007.
№ 3. C. 60-63).
14
See, for example: “Кокан(д)ское ханство.” Грамотей, 1876. № 3. C. 55-67 (От редакции).
4

The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

the “civilizing missions” formula of colonization, and the blessings brought tothe subject peoples by the “civilizers,” were actively discussed again.15
Most likely, for the military leadership and politicians of Russian
Turkestan, the rhetoric of the “educating and civilizing mission” served only as anecessary accompaniment to the quite pragmatic goal of the “subjugation of thefrontiers,” or, according to S. Gorshenina, a way of “politically legitimizing” theconquest.16 That position appeared and began to be introduced in political andeven in military lexicon (alongside with such words as “reconciliation,” “gain,”“advance”), chiefly in the days of the first “Organizer of the territory” K. P. vonKaufman.
Self-inspired estimations of this sort frequently looked like
self-justifications as well, and in the course of time they eventually generated thesense of a “high civilizing and educating mission,” even though the mission was
accomplished with the help of force and contrary to the will of the local peoples.
Such self-estimation, to one extent or another, provided a guiding principle or areference point for many Russian researchers of the territory, for example, N. P.
Ostroumov (1846-1930) and, in part, V. P. Nalivkin (1852-1918). It should be
mentioned however, that the position of the latter moved in the opposite direction
as a result of the influence of numerous circumstances, including some of apersonal nature. 17 In fact N. P. Ostroumov showed great diligence in “theeducation of aborigines,” but in such a form that he and his like-minded fellows
understood it.18
In the present paper, I do not intend to make inferences about views on
Russian colonization, or on the correlation of imperial, national or historicalnarratives in works of modern researchers - a subject of bibliographic and

15
Thus, for instance, one of the anonymous authors (probably from military-political circles) ofthat time, in an attempt to prove the rightfulness and appropriateness of the elimination of the
Kokand Khanate, writes, “therefore it is desirable that force serve the actual (p)reservation of ourdomain [in Central Asia], which is possible only when European culture penetrates into these ...
steppes, if force will be found to be a blessing for that civilization for which it would serve as aprotector. (The Russian people) possess the ability to master and attract (to) themselves foreign
ethnic groups, or at least those that stand at lower stages of educational [development]” (italics
mine – B. B.). Санкт-Петербургские ведомости, 1875. № 224.
16Горшенина C. “Крупнейшие проекты...” C. 46.
17
For more detail see: Абашин C. Н. “В. П. Наливкин: «…будет то, что неизбежно должно
быть; и то, что неизбежно должно быть, уже не может не быть…». Кризис ориентализма вРоссийской империи?” Суворова Н. Г. (ред.) Азиатская Россия: люди и структуры империи.
Омск: Издательство ОмГУ, 2005. C. 43-96.
18
The activity and views of N. P. Ostroumov in the capacity of the “expert-orientalist” and in thecontext of Russian “orientalism” and colonialism are discussed in the article by A. Khalid: Khalid
A. “Russian History and the Debate over Orientalism.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian andEurasian History. Vol. 1. № 4, Fall 2000. рр. 691–699. See also: Алексеев И. Л. “Н.
П. Остроумов о проблемах управления мусульманским населением Туркестанского края.”Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и науч. ред.) Сборник русского исторического общества. Т. 5 (153).
Россия и Средняя Азия. Москва: Русская панорама, 2002. C. 89-95.

5

The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

methodological disputes of the last 10 or 15 years.19 I am mainly interested in
responses of Russian experts and politicians to the Andijan uprising, andespecially in the responses of those who worked in Central Asia, and in their own
way stimulated a new wave of discussions on “the Muslim question” inassociation with that uprising, as has been mentioned already by someresearchers. 20 This question is also closely related to historiographical andmethodological debates on colonialism, Russian “orientalism” (including thewell-known concept of “power and knowledge”), and the status of Russian
experts. These debates are naturally associated with the idea of Russian Mission
and attempts to bring the “aborigines” into the “civilizational space,” as it wasunderstood by some experts and politicians. However, the existence of thepersonal, sometimes rather very friendly, contacts between the “regional experts”
of Russian Turkestan and the “aborigines” requires substantial corrections the
widely discussed question of the status of the Russian colonial expert (within theframework of the evaluation of “Russian orientalism”), and requires more
complex concepts than those offered by some researchers.21 However, to speak
about “patriarchal colonialism” as some Russian researchers (see above) try to dois also irrelevant.
Nevertheless, jumping ahead, we should note that the majority of Russian
experts working in the region could not overcome estrangement from the
autochthonous population in spite of the fact that some of them (for example, V.
P. Nalivkin) were inclined toward just that. On the other hand, I was alsointerested in the attitude of the local population toward the colonizers, as thedegree of estrangement of the local population was much more extensive, and19

See the brief review in the above mentioned articles by S. Gorshenina. One more article on thesubject (written in French and intended mainly for western readers) is being prepared in
co-authorship with S. Abashin.
20
See, for example: Brower D. Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire. London and New
York: Routledge Curzon, 2003. pp. 88-90; Crews R. D. For Prophet and Tsar. Islam and Empire in
Russia and Central Asia. London: Harvard University Press, 2006. pp. 287-289, 343-347; Komatsu
H. “Dār al-Islām under Russian Rule.” Tomohiko U. (ed.) Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central
Eurasia. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007. pp. 9-18. These papers
contain brief bibliographical reviews.
21
See, for example, the discussion on this subject, which was spurred by publication of N.
Knight’s article proposing to applicability of Edward Said’s concepts to Russian “orientalism”:
Knight N. “Grigor’ev in Orenburg, 1851–1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?”
Slavic Review. Vol. 59. № 1. Spring 2000. pp. 74-100. In a corresponding article A. Khalid provides
further justification for applying the Said’s concept to Russian “orientalism,” on the example of therenowned N. P. Ostroumov’s activity: Khalid A. “Russian History...” In the same issue of thejournal “Kritika,” N. Knight publishes a response to A. Khalid’s publication: Knight N. “On
Russian Orientalism: A Response to Adeeb Khalid.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and EurasianHistory. Vol. 1. № 4, Fall 2000. рр. 701–715, while M. Todorova adds her comments on theirdebates: Todorova M. “Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul?” A Contribution to the
Debate between Nathaniel Knight and Adeeb Khalid. Kritika: Explorations in Russian andEurasian History. Vol. 1. № 4, Fall 2000. pp. 717–727. Later, the Russian researcher S. Abashin
proposed his assessment of the colonial history of Turkestan. See: Абашин C. Н. “В. П.
Наливкин…,” C. 44-46.
6

The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

could hardly be surmounted “as soon as possible,” as wished by V. P. Nalivkin,
whose liberal position, it is necessary to say, could not gain dominance in thegeneral colonial policy in the south of the Russian Empire. In any case, the“Russian vision,” or more precisely, Russian “orientalism,” has been studied for along time and there are more works on the topic than works that analyze theviews emanating from the South (“The East”).
There is no need to prove that it was unusual for the majority of uprisings
among the discontented masses in the period of colonization to have open
political demands. However, the uprising of Dūkchī Īshān22 was undoubtedly
political, though some of his followers were guided by different motivations, atleast at the initial stages of involvement in the Īshān’s “organization.” Deliberate
political engagements (including those of an obvious anti-colonial nature) were
not extraneous to local peoples, and especially to the intelligentsia, as well as to
Bukhara and Khiva Khanates.23 In this sense the major action was demonstrated
by the various reformers and, particularly, by their (relatively) left-wing elements– the Jadīds, and later (during the period of the two last Russian revolutions) by
the opponents of Jadīds – the so-called “qadimists.”24
Again looking at the Andijan uprising, we repeat that it should definitely
be considered as an action of a purely political nature (though a local one), andone clearly targeted against the colonial authorities.25 At that time it had beentaken precisely in this spirit both by the local colonial administration and by thecenter of the Empire. This is confirmed by the appearance of a flood of
publications in the Russian press, which expressed reactions (sometimes with anextremely aggressive attitude) to the Andijan uprising, and thus this gave rise to a
new discussion of “the Muslim (Mohammedan) question” and “dervishism.”26
22
For more detail on the uprising see our previous publication: Бабаджанов Б. М. “Дукчи Ишани Андижанское восстание 1898 г.” Абашин C. Н., Бобровников В. О. (сост.) Подвижники
ислама: Культ святых и суфизм в Средней Азии и на Кавказе. Москва: Восточная литература,2003. C. 251-276.
23
It will suffice to mention Aḥmad Dānish, Dāmullāh Ikrāmcha, Ṣadr-i Ḍiyā, who in fact became
the precursors of the Young Bukharans’ movement. In this respect the last quarter of the 19th
century in Khorezm remains uninvestigated and it appears that Young Khivans’ movement was the
product of external influence, not an indigenous movement.
24
The most comprehensive analysis using this approach has been recently accomplished byProfessor S. Agzamkhodjaev: Агзамходжаев C. История туркестанской автономии
(Туркистон мухторияти). Ташкент: Тошкент ислом университети, 2006 (the chief sources andbibliography are discussed there).
25
This is true despite the fact that the ideological motivations for the uprising came from religious
paradigms, with a vague appeal to the Turkish Sultan (as the “Caliph of the Muslims”). Of
particular interest is the fact that just before the uprising Dūkchī Īshān, according to the old
tradition, was “raised and hailed as a khan,” thus giving the uprising a political color in a moststriking manner.
26
In my earlier paper I have already discussed the “Sufi constituent” of the Andijan uprising. See:
Babadžanov В. M. “Dūkči Īšān und Aufstand von Andižan 1898.” Kügelgen A. v., Kemper M.,
Frank A. (eds.) Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th
Centuries. Vol. 2. Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998.
pp. 167-191. I think speaking about the Andijan uprising in terms of “Sufi movement” is absolutely

7

The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

A very distinct assessment of this uprising and of “the Muslim question”
in general was made by the local colonial administration of Central Asia. In thisrespect, “The report written and presented with unquestioning obedience andveneration by faithful and loyal subjects” signed by S. M. Dukhovskoy, theGovernor-General of Turkestan of that time (March 1898-1901), is particularlyinteresting.27 From the first words of the report, it becomes clear that it was
precisely the Andijan uprising that motivated writing the document andaddressing it to Nikolay II (1894-1917). The report perceives the uprisingexclusively as “a secret plot... of the Muslims kindly treated by the Russianauthorities” and indicates that “the impulses among the Muslims to uprisings
similar to the Andijan uprising are possible in the future, as well.”28
Taken as a whole, the document represents the distinctive quintessence of
the inconsistent attitudes toward “the Muslim question” that reigned in the moodsof the region’s so-called “practical specialists in Islamic studies” (experts), whowere the actual authors of the document; thus, the document reflects theirpersonal observations, investigations, and, most importantly, their apprehensions
and fears.29 Certainly, their views in one way or another influenced the formationof the positions of some politicians, military leaders and representatives of theadministrative system, both in the colony, and in the capital.
The position toward “Muslims,” or “Islam and natives,” expressed in the
document, was dual to some extent. On the one hand, we see “fatherly love andcare” (in a rather political and messianic sense) toward the Muslim “masses of
beloved sons,” and a sincere aspiration to destroy the “walls and chasm” between
the Russians and the local people.30 On the other hand, Islam is perceived as“clearly hostile to Christian culture and it excludes any possibility of full moral
inappropriate, taking into consideration the serious transformations that took place in Sufism. It isclear that the documents mentioned here initiated the discussion of the Andijan uprising in terms of“dervishes’ ghazawāt,” and included as a parallel to Shamil’s uprising in Chechnya (absolutely
incomparable uprisings both in scope and organization!). Compare: Crews R. D. For Prophet andTsar..., pp. 288-289.
27“Ислам в Туркестане, Доклад туркестанского генерал-губернатора С. М. Духовского, 1899
г.” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт. вступ. ст., предис. и коммент.) Императорская Россия имусульманский мир. Москва: Наталис, 2006. С. 138-178.
28“Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 142-143.
29
According to the editors (А. Yu. Arapov and E. I. Larina), V. P. Nalivkin, the distinguishedethnographer and expert of the local territory, played a significant role in the preparation of thereport (Introduction to the edition, P. 139-140). In our opinion, N. P. Ostroumov, played no smallrole in drawing up the “investigatory” part of the document (particularly, regarding the informationon academic institutions), because the parts of the document concerning “aboriginal education”
were obviously borrowed from his publications (alongside with the ideas of V. P. Nalivkin). See:Остроумов Н. “Колебания во взглядах на образование туземцев в Туркестанском крае(Хронологическая справка).” Кауфманский сборник, изданный в память 25 лет, истекших содня смерти покорителя и устроителя Туркестанского края генерал-адъютанта К. П.
фон-Кауфмана I-го. Москва, 1910. C. 139-160. However, the exact list of the group of authors isstill an open question.
30“Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 162.
8

The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

assimilation with us by the present Muslim subjects.”31
This sharp estrangement was decisive in defining the main direction of
the policy towards “Mohammedanism” (Magometanstvo), which was alsooffered in the document – the politics of force (power) in combination with theidea of “moral / cultural assimilation” through educational establishments of thecolonial administration (first of all, Russian-native schools).32
With regard to the first part, i.e. resolving issues with the Muslims byforce, the most typical remark of the document (inter alia) is the following: “The
Turkestani natives over the course of many centuries became accustomed to theunrestrained autocracy of their former governors... and respect brute force.”33
Building on this message, the document persistently calls for demonstration to
the local population of the constant readiness to resolve “any discontent” with thehelp of the active armed forces of the tsarist military and to consider thedemonstration of force as the most effective means of “suppression andpacification.”
When it comes to the question of “cultural assimilation of the native
population,” the document as we can see presents complaints about the failure of
the “campaign” and testifies to the Muslims’ fidelity to their religious
authorities.34
The other documents, to which I want to draw attention, were created by
S. M. Dukhovskoy’s administration and offer special significance to the Andijan
uprising and to “the Muslim question” raised in association with it. These are
secret documents reported by the colonial administration (in Tashkent) under thetitle: “The General Rules of the Commission on the Question of a Muslim
Religious Directorate in the Turkestani Territory” with Appendices (Draft of the31Там же. С. 155.
On the experience of organizing Russian-native schools in the Volga-Ural region, see: Geraci R.
P. Window to the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia. Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 2001. pp. 116-158. The researcher states that these schools (at least when
famous Turkologist V. V. Radlov administered them) were not so much agents of Russianization
and Christianization as instruments of education for citizenship and secularization: Ibid. p. 157. S.
Abashin (with reference to the work by R. P. Geraci) believes that “The policy of establishingRussian-native schools in Turkestan was apparently correlated with the politics of establishingRussian-Tatar schools”: Абашин C. Н. “В. П. Наливкин... ” C. 77, note 87. However, the curriculaof the Russian-native schools in Turkestan (both in Russian Turkestan, and in the khanates) wereclearly different from the Tatar ones. In order to attract children of the local Muslims (on theinitiative of N. P. Ostroumov), the major portion of schools’ curricula was represented byintroductory-level religious (Islamic) sciences, and the Russian language, whereas the ideas of
citizenship and moreover, of secularity were not publicized at all: Sulaymonov S. Russ-tuzem
maktablari va ularning o’quv dasturlari. Magistrlik malakaviy ish. Toshkent: Toshkent Davlat
Sharqshunoslik Instituti, 2006. 20-34-b.
33“Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 155.
34
See the following quotation: “The Russian administration has in hand the most insignificant
means for cultural struggle against the Muslim religion, and for weakening that influence which
Muslim schools, qāḍīs, īshāns and so forth exert...” “Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 154.
32

9

The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

Directorate’s Staff and Draft of “On Muslim educational institutions”).35 The
General Rules were accompanied by a cover letter from the General headquartersof the (Asian) Military Ministry, which contained a revised version of several
articles of the Regulations “On the organization of a Directorate for the Religious
Affairs of the Muslims in Turkestan” (as a replacement of the 1886 edition ofRegulations).36 It is clear as evidenced by the drafts of the General Rules and thecover letter that the Andijan uprising stimulated debates on the legitimacy of thepolicy of “ignoring Islam by the Russian administration” and on the forms of“supervisory control of the religious affairs of the Muslims.”37 The colonialadministration of Turkestan insisted on putting an end to the former policy of“non-interference into the religious affairs of the Muslims of Turkestan,” having
submitted the results of the work of their own experts on amendments andadditions into the former “Regulations on the administration of the Turkestani
territory,” produced earlier by the Count Ignatiev’s Commission.
The most important issue, which drew objections from some experts who
lived and worked in the southern frontiers of the Empire and were involved in thecreation of the above-stated document, was resistance to the emerging proposals
for the creation of a Religious Directorate in Turkestan following the example of
the Religious Directorates in Ufa and the Caucasus. The documents suggest thecreation of a Directorate that would be under direct military-and-administrative
control (without any intermediary role for the Muslim elite, such as muftis) over
the appointment of mullahs over the opening of mosques, madrasahs, andmaktabs, and over supervision of waqf properties. In the opinion of the authors of
the Cover Letter and of the commentators from the Military ministry, theestablishment of Religious Directorates in Russia and the delegation of powers to“administer their religious affairs,” created conditions for the unification ofpreviously “scattered and separated Muslims” and enabled them “to manage andregulate the affairs of Muslims in an even stronger Muslim spirit,” providing“enabling conditions for the rallying of more Mohammedans.” Should a similarorgan (i.e., Religious Directorate) be established in Turkestan, the Russian State
would lose the ability to wage a struggle against “the hardcore Mohammedans,”and it would create an undefeatable wall, “through which it will be difficult for
Russian culture and ideas of assimilation to penetrate,” etc.38 As a consequence,35“«Необходимость неотложного принятия мер для направления в духе государственных
интересов духовного строя мусульман», Проект устройства управления духовными делами
мусульман Русского Туркестана, 1900 г.” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт. вступ. ст., предис. икоммент.) Императорская Россия и мусульманский мир. Москва: Наталис, 2006. С. 194-221.
36
Там же, С. 194-201.
37
Там же, С. 198, 200, 202-204.
38
Там же, С. 195, 202-205. In the above-mentioned Report of the General Dukhovskoy, theReligious Directorates of the Muslims of the Empire were blamed for “anti-Russian andanti-Christian propaganda”: “Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 147-148. It was precisely because of thisnotion that the authors proposed (even before writing the Report) to establish an “Administrative
Religious Directorate” subordinate to an administrator (most likely chosen among the experts of theterritory).
10

The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

as the compilers of the documents remarked in dismay, “the conversion ofMuslims to Christianity occurred in exceptional occasions, while reversion to the
Muslim faith by those who had once departed from it became rather common.39
Another question that deeply worried the Turkestani experts (and,accordingly, military officials and administrators of the territory) was theIslamization, by Tatar mullahs, of the nomadic and especially the settled “Kirgiz”(i.e., the Qazaqs) 40 who were considered the most convenient target for
assimilation because of they remained “indifferent in matters of religion.”41 The
same idea in similar phrases was worded in General S. M. Dukhovskoy’s
Report.42
The publishers believe that both S. M. Dukhovskoy’s Report and theNote of the Commission “had been put into cold storage” and had no practicalconsequences. 43 This may correspond to reality, because, at a minimum,
strong-arm tactics in relation to the so-called “Muslim frontier regions” wereresisted by relatively authoritative state figures such as S. Yu. Vitte, then Ministerof Finance.44 He accused General Dukhovskoy of extreme measures and of a“negative attitude toward the Muslims and to Islam,” and stated that the Andijan
events invoked a ghost of “Pan-Islamism.”45
Meanwhile, General Dukhovskoy remained as governor for three years
and managed to implement a significant part of his own proposals. He punishedwith utmost severity not only the participants in the Andijan uprising, but
innocent people as well, thus demonstrating exactly the kind of “firmness andstrength” which he suggested in the documents mentioned above; he proposedthat such an approach be raised to the level of a general policy of the Empire withregard to “the Muslims favored by the Russian authority.”
39“«Необходимость неотложного принятия мер...»...” C. 202. Presumably, the point is about the“falling away” (renewed Islamization) of baptized Tatars. See.: Загидуллин И. “Причины
отпадения старокрещенных татар Среднего Поволжья в мусульманство в XIX в.” Дюдуаньон
C. А., Исхаков Д., Мухаметшин Р. (ред.) Панорама-форум. 1997. № 12. спец. вып. Ислам втатарском мире: история и современность. Казань: Панорама, 1997. C. 34-56 (Ibid.
bibliography).
40
See: Франк А. “Татарские муллы среди казахов и киргизов в XVIII-XIX веках.” Культура,искусство татарского народа: истоки, традиции, взаимосвязи. Казань, 1993. C. 124-132.
41“«Необходимость неотложного принятия мер...»...” C. 202-203.
42“Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 152.
43
Introductions to the edition: “Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 141; “«Необходимость неотложного
принятия мер...»...” C. 193 (in the first instance – with reference to the above-mentioned work by
P. P. Litvinov).
44“Записка C. Ю. Витте по «мусульманскому вопросу», 1900 г.” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт.
вступ. ст., предис. и коммент.) Императорская Россия и мусульманский мир. Москва:Наталис, 2006. С. 242-261. The “Note” was composed in a style of strong criticism (of using force,as suggested by S. M. Dukhovskoy) with argumentative and rational warning. According to theeditor’s statement, the document was prepared by experts knowledgeable in Islam andwell-informed of state of affairs with “Mohammedanism” in the Russian Empire (Editor's foreword,
С. 242).
45“Записка C. Ю. Витте...,” C. 253-255.
11

The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

As it relates to the cultural and legal assimilation of local Muslims, themain vector of activity suggested in the aforementioned documents was tointensify the so-called “Russian-native” education and to attempt to legitimize
civil courts in the region, which already functioned in other Muslim areas of the
Empire. However, the local experts with undisguised disappointment wrote that itwas not possible to open such schools on a wide scale and that the number ofMuslim educational institutions (disseminating “fanaticism and obscurantism,”according to concepts of that time) was much bigger than the number of theRussian-native ones.46
Thus, the Andijan events again had revived the political, missionary andpartly research interest in Islam, or, using the formula of that time, in “theMohammedan / Muslim question,” thus stimulating the number of publications
and assessments by the academic researchers and politicians (I will speak about
them below).
Reading the aforenamed documents and especially local publications
triggered by the Andijan events leaves the impression that this burst of debates
and information was incited by those colonial experts (including N. P.
Ostroumov) who radically disagreed with the policies of “consistently ignoring
Islam” and “non-interference into their religious affairs,” established by von
Kaufman, the first Governor-General of Turkestan.47 The Andijan uprising wasmost likely used to invoke the artificially created “Islamic threat” in order tolobby for the idea of toughening administrative control in the “Muslim question.”
A more sober estimation, both of the uprising, and of the scale of the“Islamic threat,” in our view, was proposed by S. Yu. Vitte, whose opinion was
most likely formulated by the academic researchers of the St. Petersburg Schoolof Oriental Studies. In the “Note” signed by S. Yu. Vitte, uprisings similar to the
Andijan uprising are characterized as “small outbursts of religious fanaticism”;
the “Note” concludes that “it is unlikely to be correct to consider them ascharacterizing the attitudes of all Muslims toward the Russian authorities:
uprisings owing to ignorance... happened even among the native Russian
population.”48 S. Yu. Vitte also quite reasonably believed that the measuresoffered by S. M. Dukhovskoy could engender hostile attitudes toward Russia not
only within СА, but also in the entire Muslim world.49
In fact, Vitte’s accusations of extreme views were aimed not only, and46“Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 154, 156, 163. Issues of the “correct education” (certainly, in
Russian understanding) of the natives were discussed also by S. Yu.Vitte, a famous minister andpolitician, who gave a reasoned estimation of the Andijan uprising and governmental measures on
the “Muslim question” (see below).
47
About these policies see: Рыбаков C. Г. “Устройство и нужды управления духовными
делами мусульман России (1917).” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт. ввод. ст., коммент. и прилож.)Ислам в Российской империи (законодательные акты, описания, статистика). Москва:Академикнига, 2001. C. 293-297.
48“Записка C. Ю. Витте...,” C. 249-250.
49“Записка C. Ю. Витте...,” C. 254-255.
12

The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

not primarily, at S. M. Dukhovskoy. His accusations directly concerned also
those who were involved in the drawing up of the aforenamed document.
Obviously, they were experts similar those who put together then well-known
publication on Islam, “The Collection of Materials on Muslims.”50 The critical
Report of Abdulaziz Davletshin (his Muslim name is ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Dawlat-shāh),a famous Muslim officer in imperial service, is much less known.51 Here theauthor (he was a captain then) also makes a gentle hint that the ghost of the
Andijan events became the reason for the one-sided views of the authors
regarding Islam and the Muslims. A. Davletshin, by the way, had openly
recognized conventionalism (“routinism”) and the sluggishness of the minds ofthe majority of the Muslims of that time, including the stagnant forms of Muslim
education in СА. However, he called for the separation of the historicallydeveloped forms of Islam from “stratifications of the latest interpreters” or from“additions and explanations of the latest interpreters.”52 He most categoricallyobjected to the thesis in the “Collection” that “the Muslims are the mostirreconcilable enemies of Christianity, and that Islam teaches hatred toward allother religions and prescribes the extermination of Christians whenever an
opportunity occurs.”53 A. Davletshin reasonably stated that characterizations of
this kind (without proper knowledge of the fundamental principles of Islam)would arouse mistrust and hostility towards the “natives” of CA. Meanwhile such
judgments about their religion lead Muslims to have a “feeling... of deep insult,and promotes an even greater increase in historically developed discord.”54
Approximately ten years later, discussion of the “Muslim question” wasagain revived, and this time it was associated with the name of the Minister ofInternal Affairs and Chairman of the Council of Ministers (since 1906) P. A.
Stolypin. In this case, discussions were stimulated by new challenges to theintegrity of the Empire (such was the opinion in the top echelons of power) posed
by “Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism.” Without looking too much into thedetails of the corresponding documents (published in the aforementioned
collection “Imperial Russia...” and addressed to the Council of Ministers), weemphasize the following statements, which are of interest for our purposes.55
50Сборник материалов по мусульманству. Том 1. Санкт-Петербург, 1899; Том 2. Ташкент,1900. The “Sbornik (Collection),” however, included rather neutral and informative articles by V.
L.Vyatkin, S. Lapin, V. P. Nalivkin (Editor of Том 2).
51“Доклад капитана Давлетшина по содержанию «Сборника материалов помусульманству»” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт. вступ. ст., предис. и коммент.) Императорская
Россия и мусульманский мир. Москва: Наталис, 2006. С. 233-237.
52“«Желательно, чтобы ознакомление с мусульманством велось без крайностей, более
спокойно и разносторонне», Генерал Абд-ал-Азиз Давлетшин и его труды по«мусульманскому вопросу», 1911 г.” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт. вступ. ст., предис. и коммент.)Императорская Россия и мусульманский мир. Москва: Наталис, 2006. C. 236.
53Там же. С. 236.
54Там же. С. 236-237.
55
Published by D. Yu. Arapov under title “Записки П. А. Столыпина по «мусульманскому
вопросу», 1911 г.” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт. вступ. ст., предис. и коммент.) Императорская
13

The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

The statements here repeat in a weakened but expanded form the provisions andproposals of the above-named documents signed by General Dukhovskoy (evenwith direct reference to them). We note two important points, which wereemphasized in the documents.
1. The documents de facto suggest abandoning the politics of “ignoring
Islam,” given the growing threat of “Pan-Islamism,” as the compilers believed
this would be to the state’s interest. According to Russian diplomats andgendarme services, this ideology came from Turkey, and partly from India.
2. P. A. Stolypin’s message on the surface calls for abandoning“missionism” and suggests a cautious and tactful attitude toward Muslims thatwould not touch their religious feelings. However, most of the actions andmeasures proposed by Stolypin’s experts (first of all, by А. Н. Kharuzin) de facto
still bear the spirit of “missionism” and are based on the idea of “accelerating
cultural assimilation.”56
It appears that due to P. A. Stolypin’s death as a result of a terrorist
attack in Kiev (September 1911), the implementation of his Notes was notrealized in full. The positive consequence of the second “raising of the Muslim
question” was a revival of research in Islamic studies at a higher academic level,
and the launching of projects on establishing special courses on Islamic studies aswell as the foundation of a journal.57
Thus, the new spate of discussions, at the turn of the century, about the“Mohammedan / Muslim question” actually began as a kind of reaction to the
Andijan uprising. Turkestani experts such as V. P. Nalivkin and N. P. Ostroumov
also ignited interest and discussions.58 The first of them, along with his personalparticipation in preparing the above-mentioned “Report” to General Dukhovskoy,wrote an “independent expert” note concerning the “Muslim ghazawāt” thatostensibly threatened Russia.59 In general, one can sense that in his approach toРоссия и мусульманский мир. Москва: Наталис, 2006. C. 313-337. The author shows that both
documents were actually written by the Russian ethnographers (and later government officials), thebrothers А. N. and N. N. Kharuziny and their sister V. N. Kharuzina (Introduction to the edition, C.
316).
56
Там же. С. 327-331, 335-336.
57Там же. С. 337-342.
58
See A. Erkinov’s remarks regarding the articles on the “Islamic threat” collected by N. P.
Ostroumov.
59“Записка о возможных соотношениях между последними событиями в Китае и усилением
панисламистского движения (Compiled by [V. P. Nalivkin] on the request of S. M.
Dukhovskoy). ” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт. вступ. ст., предис. и коммент.) Императорская
Россия и мусульманский мир. Москва: Наталис, 2006. C. 181-190. The author states that it wasnecessary to “anticipate the Muslim ghazawāt, vigilance, remaining calm and giving full
attention”: Там же. C. 171; and in clear “Huntington” style it continues that the ghazawāt “bywhich Islam today threatens European civilization will inevitably break out as soon as theMuslims ... manage to unite and strengthen to the point when they can give us a new solid
revanche”: Там же. C. 188. In his later works of 1913, V. P. Nalivkin renounces his ideas,
criticizing even the “mission” endeavors and aspirations of his compatriots: Наливкин В. П.
“Туземцы раньше и теперь.” Арапов Д. Ю. (ответ. ред.) Мусульманская Средняя Азия:14

The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

and estimation of the “Islamic threat,” V. P. Nalivkin (at least, for that time) had adual attitude toward Islam and Muslims. On the one hand, we see interesting
publications by this outstanding researcher in which one could sometimes findrelatively kind treatment of certain “morals and customs” of the local
population.60 On the other hand, we see that V. P. Nalivkin closely participated increating the expert notes that chiefly called for the politics of force against
Muslims, or indicated the danger of Muslims to Russians, and to Christians andEuropeans at large. However, in his many other (later) works, when V. P.
Nalivkin took the side of the socialists’ platform, he openly regreted being
involved in creating the image of “the dangerous natives.” As S. Abashin
reasonably noted, the example of V. P. Nalivkin’s activity and thetransformations (sometimes complete about-faces) in his attitude toward Muslims
and Islamic culture suggests that the position and estimations of Russian“orientalists” were going through a rather complex (sometimes psychological)
metamorphosis.61 However, the question regarding the degree of influence of theliberal V. P. Nalivkin (and other individuals similar to him, if any) on real policy
in Turkestan still remains open.62 In any case, here and below, our discussions
concern chiefly the period before and right after the Andijan uprising, which had
an enormous influence on the positions of many Russian experts of the region.
Judging by the above-mentioned documents and by the quantity of the
published material concerning the Andijan uprising, it is obvious that local
experts of the Turkestani colony (so-called “practical experts in Islamic studies”)
intentionally approached both Shar‘īat and other Islamic sciences as alien (and attimes as hostile) “rules and standards of life and religion of the natives.” Such an
attitude of “mission” (and among certain experts, such as N. P. Ostroumov, aliterally missionary approach), as registered in popular publications, and even insome documents of that time, could hardly add to mutual trust or to sympathy
and good feelings.63 Specific characteristics and definitions of the autochthonous
people and their way of life (such as “savagery,” “Asiatic barbarians,” “Muslim
fanatics,” “foreigners,” “aborigines” and so forth) used in the documents andpublications of that time had programmed an estrangement which also in nosmaller degree generated mistrust and even a hostile attitude toward Islam andMuslims. And such an attitude was again “heated-up” by the Andijan uprising.
Традиционализм и XX век. Москва: Институт Африки РАН, 2004. C. 60-62, 64, 77, 82-83,
102-103.
60
See, for example, his interesting work written in co-authorship with his spouse: Наливкин В. П.,Наливкина М. В. Очерк быта оседлого туземного населения Ферганы. Казань, 1886. The full
bibliography of V. P. Nalivkin (including references to the unpublished works) see in theabove-mentioned work by S. Abashin: Абашин C. Н. “В. П. Наливкин...”
61
Ibid.
62
Compare the groundless statements of P. P. Litvinov claiming that V. P. Nalivkin had managed
to lower anti-Russian moods and feelings among the “aborigines / tuzemtzev”: Литвинов П. П.
Государство и ислам в Русском Туркестане... C. 122–123, 140–142.
63
See, for example, the above-stated A. Davletshin’s reaction to the publication of the first issue of
The “Сборник материалов по мусульманству”
15The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

At the same time, the so-called “practical experts in Islamic studies” hadrather casual knowledge of Islam’s canons and especially of its legal andtheological origins. However, they had an excellent knowledge of the practicalobedience or non-obedience of the society to these canons and could observe thelocal forms of practicing Islam, ceremonialism, etc. However, above all, thiscohort of experts presumably remained for a long time under the influence of
estrangement stemming from the attitude of “mission” implanted by universitiesof that time, or mostly by courses in military schools, where the same messianic
ideas of Russian people having an educational mission for “wild frontiers”
clearly reigned, as they did within educated society. Moreover, the presumptionof the “barbarity of Mohammedans” that was also present for a long time did not
help to overcome such alienation. And only the country-wide influence ofliberal-populist and later of socialist ideas seriously changed the positions ofTurkestani experts,64 including their considerations of the “Muslim question,”
although they too led to the same idea of “the rapid enlightenment of the darkmasses of natives.” Certainly, neither V. P. Nalivkin, nor even the missionary N.
P. Ostroumov assumed the absolutely unreal task of the “Christianization” ofMuslims. They spoke about education (enlightenment) and “civilization” as they
understood them. Quite another matter was that they failed to deliver theirunderstanding to local people. The governmental support and appropriate
resources were required for this purpose. It is worth noticing, however, that noteven the attempts of the Jadīds to “educate” the people were met with enthusiasm
by ordinary believers, who always looked suspiciously upon everything new.
In any event, the lengthy residence of Russian experts (such as N. P.
Ostroumov) in the very midst of “Mohammedans,” and close contacts anddialogue with them, obviously added no enthusiasm, but rather strengthened theidea among many of them that it was impossible to bring the inert masses of“Mohammedans” to “civilization” (as viewed by Russian experts). The majorityof those experts could not overcome alienation, whether their own, or,conditionally speaking, that of the objects of their research and of their failed
experiments in cultural assimilation (assimilation was not as large-scaled as they
wished then). Perhaps as a result of living in the “alien” environment a specific(most likely psychological) phenomenon emerged: many Russian experts were
irritated by the “stubbornness” of the local society, which with difficulty yielded
to “cultural assimilation,” did not understand “its blessing,” and remained
estranged and even hostile.65 To judge from the aforementioned documents andpublications of that time (the period before and just after the Andijan events),
local experts and the administration had clear perceptions (which were very often
quite true) that although the Russian people brought peace to the Turkestani
inhabitants (by stopping internal wars and collisions between the khanates), the“ungrateful natives” did not give adequate appreciation, and even resorted to
64
65

16

Абашин C. Н. “В. П. Наливкин...” C. 95-97.
See, for example, the above-mentioned works by А. А. Semenov and N. P. Ostroumov.

The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

uprisings.66
Disappointment, in the possibility of a “peaceful mission to enlighten thenatives,” perhaps, strengthened the very idea of forcing the process through, as,for example, with a cardinal reformation of the educational system. Also, it
seems that another outcome was the emergence of proposals that called for more
active cultural assimilation. However, the tradition of ignoring the religious lifeof Muslims adopted since K. P. von Kaufman’s times clearly created an obstacle
to the implementation of such proposals. It appears that the Andijan uprisingprovided local experts and the administration with the “well justified reason” toformulate and submit to the highest authorities their own point of view on theforms of overcoming estrangement, which they experienced most severely
because they lived in that milieu, while the natural inertness and conservatism of
the locals caused a continuous psychological and, probably, somewhat
ethno-confessional, discomfort.
Obviously, there were also other reasons for V. P. Nalivkin’s or N. P.
Ostroumov’s mistrust67 of Muslims after the Andijan events. As judged by their
publications and confidential notes, they were seriously alerted (if not frightened)by the articles of Islamist and reformers from Turkey and India that expressed
their reaction to the colonial policy of Europe and partly of Russia. V. P. Nalivkin
openly writes about them in the aforementioned “Note,” anxiously stating thatthe distribution of such journals among Russian Muslims, who were also writing
anti-colonial articles, was increasing. It is our opinion, however, that the threat ofan “All-Islamic ghazawāt” as seen by the Central Asian “experts in Islam” insuch publications could hardly gain the expected magnitude. If we consider thereal picture of the Islamic world, which was then torn apart by contradictions, thecontrived “religious-sacral” enthusiasm of the articles and appeals of theIslamists could not provide sufficient reason to believe in the “unification ofMuslims” and, thereby, in the increasing strength of the “Islamic threat.” Itshould be noted that “modernism” (of “pan-Islamists” and “pan-Turkists”) was
perceived with extreme hostility even within Muslim society and especiallyamong the traditionalists of Central Asia. Moreover, there were no reasons tobelieve that there was a threat of Muslims coming together under the aegis of thecollapsing Turkish Empire.
As a whole, the movements of the “Young Turks”, Tatar “Islahchiler” andother similar religious organizations and communities (in one way or anotherinfluencing Turkestan), not quite rightfully referred to as “pan-Islamism” or“pan-Turkism” (or more recently “Jadidism”), never was a unified political or
religious movement (it was not destined to become a unified movement after all),and remained an abstract and utopian idea. Moreover, its political potential and66

See the aforementioned “Note” by V. P. Nalivkin, who obviously was affected by the outburst ofindignation among the Russian inhabitants of Turkestan caused by the Andijan uprising (see note59).
67
See his position in the “Muslim question” in his article mentioned above: Остроумов Н.
“Колебания во взглядах…”
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The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

significance, obviously, were strongly exaggerated, as mentioned already, by V.
V. Barthold.68 Meanwhile, the intellectual ferment and discontent with the policyof the agonized Empire was typical not only among the “Muslim frontier
regions,” but even among some political elites of St. Petersburg and Moscow.
The more active and really dangerous were other (“populist,” socialist and other)
movements, which murdered not one, but many city administrators, ministers andeven the Emperor.
In any case, the majority of “practical experts in Islamic studies” (or“orientalists”) failed to develop a deep understanding of the fact that the Russians
had clashed with a culture that was in critical condition (as was suggested bysuch orientalists and Islamic studies experts as V. V. Barthold, the archeologist
and orientalists V. L. Vyatkin, and later I. Yu. Krachkovsky and V. P. Nalivkin),
but was still “different” and “dissimilar.” The indoctrinated view that the cultureof people “standing on a lower step of development” should be replaced with“higher” culture was never given up.
However, estrangement (natural and historical) was not limited to asignificant portion of the Russian “experts of the region,” particularly those who
were in “the midst of Mohammedans.” Starting from as early as the first stages of
the Russian colonization and the “conquest of the territory,” local Muslim
communities were certainly not going to accept dispassionately the fact of theseizure of their territories. Opposition to the Russians was viewed as a sacral
response to “the non-believers, who attacked first” the territory of Islam, and,hence, legitimized jihad, even without its official, so to say, declaration by theimām / khalīfa. At the initial stages the region saw exactly this kind of reaction
and here we can recall the movement of the ghāzīs (chiefly young madrasah
students) who participated in the confrontation with the Russians in Bukhara,69
or the armed protests against Khudāyār-Khān before the liquidation of the
Kokand Khanate (for example, the “uprising” of Āftābachī 70 ), and others.
However, these movements were not a serious threat, and never reached a broad
scale; indeed, they never could have become such because the ideology of Islam,and Islamic institutions had been deeply weakened as a result of the deep
political and moral crisis of the khanates, which then were torn apart by internaland external wars.
68Бартольд В. В. “Панисламизм.” Сочинения. Vol. VI. Москва: Наука, 1966. С. 402.
These uprisings were described by Aḥmad Dānish: Aḥmad Dānish. Tarjimat al-aḥwāl-i amīrān-i
Bukhārā-i sharīf az amīr Dāniyāl tā ‘asr-i amīr ‘Abd al-Aḥad (Biography of amīrs of holy Bukhārāfrom amīr Dāniyāl to amīr ‘Abd al-Aḥad). Manuscript of IO AS RUz. № 2095. ff. 22а-23b; 29а-b;Семенов А. [А.] “Покоритель и устроитель Туркестанского края генерал-губернатор К. П.
фон Кауфман 1-й (материалы для библиографического очерка).” Кауфманский сборник,изданный в память 25 лет, истекших со дня смерти покорителя и устроителя
Туркестанского края генерал-адъютанта К. П. фон-Кауфмана I-го. Москва, 1910. С. XX,
LI-LXII (the Collection cited above).
70
See more about him in the composition: Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim ibn Dāmullā Mīrzā Raḥīm
Tāshkandī. Аnsāb al-salāṭīn va tawārīkh-i khawāqīn (The genealogy of Sultans and the history of
Khaqans). Manuscript of IO AS RUz. № 7515. ff. 134а-150b, cited in more detail below.
69

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The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

It was very unreasonable to expect that the local Muslims would extend
an unconditional welcome to the colonizers. We should bear in mind that theconquest was accomplished by force (though it had some positive consequences
for the local population), and moreover there was a centuries-old isolation andestrangement in the region, which could hardly be eliminated in just a few
decades. Later on, however, when the policy of “non-interference” and “ignoring
the religious life of Muslims” had been put in place, the majority of the local‘ulamā recognized the territory of Turkestan “as the land of concord / peace withunbelievers” (dār al-‘ahd, dār al-ṣulḥ), and by doing so they achieved a muchgreater stability (according to the former wording – “pacification”) than the local
administration achieved by undertaking some questionable actions (such as
making an inadequate response to the Andijan uprising.)71
It should be noted that in the early stages of colonization the perception
and recognition of Russian dominion in Turkestan and attempts at assimilation(including legal assimilation) to some measure resembled the perceptions by the
Tatar world of Russian domination – i.e., as a system and law spreading
exclusively religion (Christianity). 72 Similar to what happened in the Volgaregion, persistent attempts at assimilation (frankly speaking, ineffective attempts)
pushed local communities to resort to self-isolation and to strengthening the roleof the Shar‘īat in daily life as the only way of resisting cultural assimilation,
which could hardly appear as legitimate (even with requiring the Russian
language in madrasahs, or unpopular Russian-native education, etc.).73
As mullās among the Tatars and Bashkir (ethnoses that were for a longtime targets for Christianization) became very active, it is legitimate to claim thatthe long-term missionary work of the Orthodox Church (which was less active
than the Catholic Church) ended in a fiasco. In subsequent periods the Imperial
authorities carried out a more considered policy in missionary attempts byforbidding, at least, forced proselytizing. Given these conditions, sermons(da’wā) of Tatar and Bashkir mullāhs in the Steppe were much more successful;
this is explained not only by affinity of their languages to the Turkic-speaking
peoples living there, but also by the fact that people of the Steppe identified
themselves (according to the rule “iqrār bi-lisān”) for a long time as Muslims. At
the same time we should give credit to the Russian empire for its state policy
which often regarded appeals by administrative organs in the “Muslim frontiers”
71
See also our article: Babadjanov B. “Russian Colonial Power in Central Asia as Seen by Local
Muslim Intellectuals.” Eschment B., Harder H. (eds.) Looking at the Colonizer. Cross-Cultural
Perceptions in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Bengal, and Related Areas. Berlin: Ergon Verlag,
2004. pp. 80-90.
72Compare: Дюдуаньон C. А. “Кадимизм...” C. 59.
73
It was not by accident that it was exactly “Tatars,” who went to “Kirgiz-Kaysak Steppe” in orderto “Islamize” the local peoples and gained, as several researchers think, some success: Франк А.
“Татарские муллы среди казахов и киргизов...” C. 124-132. The authors of the “Notes”
anxiously speak about this indicating it could possibly lead to strengthening of Islam in Turkestanin the context of confrontation with Russia.

19

The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

for assimilation merely as permissible rhetoric (which could appear in articles
expressing the “mission” spirit and the like). Although such a (relatively tolerant)
position did not destroy mutual estrangement, it nevertheless bought relative
tolerance into everyday life.
Returning to what was said before, we should note that Russiancolonization of СА led to the strengthening of Islamic (and to some extent,
ethnic) identity among the local people (first of all among traditionalist ‘ulamāand other ordinary believers close to them), which developed as a defense
reaction.74
It appears that in the steppe areas, this process was really are-Islamization of the nomads. The compilers of the mentioned documents
openly wrote about it too, expressing fears that the Russian Muslims could be
adding another 5 million actively Islamized “Kirghiz / Kazakhs of the steppe”(see above). Overall though, such anxiety on the part of the Russian experts andpoliticians seemed to be seriously exaggerated, insofar as the Tatar mullāhs had
not managed to carry out really large-scaled and full-fledged Islamization of
the Kazakhs and Kirghiz. Moreover, partial Islamization did not create“anti-State moods” in these tribes as expected by the Russian experts.
Appeals for “strengthening Islam and the Shar‘īat,” although in otherforms, were also observed in the so-called “settled” or “semi-nomad” areas ofTransoxiana, particularly after the liquidation of the Kokand Khanate (1876).
This could be seen also in the production of religious works. For example, thecompilation and mass copying of elementary theological compendia in the local
languages explaining the basic requirements of the Shar‘īat and the required
ritual norms (farḍ) became considerably more widespread (in comparison withthe period of khanates) among the Muslim ‘ulamā’ in Turkestan. These
compendia were designed for ordinary believers. In the rather uniform“forewords” (muqaddima) of these compositions, the motives of the authors(frequently anonymous), who complained of existing difficult conditions “forpreservation of the pure faith” (mainly in association with more frequent andclose contacts of some Muslims with “Russian Christians”), gained particularemphasis. The loss of pure faith, they suggested, would bring the “doomsday”(ākhirat zamān) and therefore, to prevent it, “such-and-such” an author was
obliged to remind people again about the religious and moral duties of the true
believer.
One such compendium (among the largest, with 92 sheets / 184 pages)
74
As early as the beginning of colonization (prior to the liquidation of the Kokand Khanate in1876), the corrupt practice of the local colonial administration led to the “animosity of the local
population,” and with the foundation of the Governor-Generalship (1865), many inhabitants of
Kokand moved to Chinese Turkestan / Xinjiang (Kashgar, Yarkend and others). See: Семенов А.
[А.] “Покоритель и устроитель Туркестанского края...” C. X-XI. Later, when in accordance with
К. P. von Kaufman’s initiative a more deliberate policy of “respect for rights of the natives andnon-interference into the religious life of the Muslim population” was launched, the refugees
voluntarily started coming back to the territory of Turkestan: Там же. С. LXXVI.

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The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

belongs to the pen of the renowned historian Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim ibn MīrzāRaḥīm Tāshkandī. 75 In the foreword, the author directly connects the“weakening of Islam and Muslims” with the liquidation of the Kokand Khanateby the Russians.76 In his other historical essay, he puts even greater emphasis on
the negative (from the author’s point of view) consequences of the Russians’
arrival. 77 Incidentally, in his “History,” compiled several years after thesimplified theological compendium mentioned earlier (before 1886), he has asimilar foreword in which he gives an apocalyptic interpretation of the “arrival of
the Russians.” Most interestingly, the critical review of political and interethnic
squabbling (as religiously illegitimate mutinies - fitna) of the time of khanates
ends with a quite expected conclusion: the Russians were sent by Allah as
punishment for continuous disorder under the khans and direct infringements of
the Shar‘īat.78
Meanwhile, the author served at the royal court of Khudāyār-Khān, thelast khan of Kokand, and witnessed all the political and interethnic disorders(among the Turkic tribes) during the period of the khan’s rule (1865-1875)79. For
instance, he witnessed the uprising of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Āftābachī (the former
adviser and the confidant of Khudāyār-Khān), which was cruelly suppressed byGeneral Skobelev’s army. This event had seriously affected the author’s attitudeand caused enmity toward the Russians. However, the author, being favored by
Khudāyār-Khān, forgot to add that actually the khan himself called in the Russianarmy “for assistance,” as the chief rhetoric of the rebels was associated with
anti-Russian slogans and waging ghazawāt against the non-believers.80
Mullā ‘Ālim believes that imitating the Russians (in behavior or clothes),and even borrowing their things is a symptom of losing the faith and of theoncoming Apocalypse. 81 At the same time, the traditionalists of that time
regarded the emergence of modernist movements among the local Muslims (thesame “Jadidism” in different forms), and particularly, their proposals to adopt
certain things from the Russians, as “a religious split or cleavage” and as anothersign of the nearing “end of the world.”82
It is obvious that the fears of authors such as Mullā ‘Ālim about “losing
Islam” should be viewed as a position of traditionalists (and a majority ofordinary believers, who followed them), who were afraid of the potential loss of75

Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim ibn Dāmullā Mīrzā Raḥīm Tāshkandī. Hidāyat-i mu’minīn (The righteous
pathway of the faithful). Maniscript of IO AS RUz. № 9379.
76
Ibid. ff. 1b-2а.
77
Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Аnsāb al-salāṭīn va tawārīkh-i khawāqīn. He is known for his phrase“mu’min-u tarsā aralash” (Christians and the faithful got mixed).
78
Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Hidāyat-i mu’minīn. ff.158a-b.
79
For more detail see: Набиев Р. Н. Из истории Кокандского ханства (феодальное хозяйство
Худаяр-хана). Ташкент: Фан, 1973. C. 10-11.
80Набиев Р. Н. Из истории Кокандского ханства... C. 83-85. See also: Семенов А. [А.]“Покоритель и устроитель Туркестанского края...” C. LVIII-LX.
81
Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Hidāyat-i mu’minīn. The author’s verses at ff. 152а-153b.
82
See the introductions to both compositions of Mullā ‘Ālim.
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The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

the only understandable, clear and sacral, i.e. religiously and morally legitimate
instructions, and the order of life. Judging by his works (particularly his“History”), we can say that he perceived new conditions as extremely
uncomfortable both morally and “ethnically,”83 as the new-sprung (Russian /Christian) alternative showed its political and economic superiority by managing
easily enough to liquidate the Kokand Khanate, by attracting the religious andeconomic elite (īshāns, qāḍīs, mullās and bāys), and by gaining the favor of thecorrupt tribal aristocracy.84 This superiority was perceived by traditionalists as achallenge. The only answer to this challenge, in the opinion of the author, was to
avoid “blending with the Russians” (first of all, in a religious sense). In otherwords, here we see a direct demand from Muslims to preserve their religious
identity, i.e., in fact to maintain their former confessional isolation. The generalatmosphere of anticipation of the Messiah (Mahdī) became strong among the
traditionalists of Russian Turkestan, as had happened in other parts of the Muslim
world which, having no real power for resistance, fell under the colonization of
the Europeans. Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim himself could not refrain from such feelings,
and even named the “exact date” of the Mahdī’s arrival - 1304 / 1886-87 - when
the pitiless Messiah would free the Muslims from the unbelievers (kāfirlārdīn
musulmānnī khalāṣ ītar).85
Incidentally, Dūkchī Īshān’s composition «‘Ibrat al-ghāfilīn» is made in83

Of course, the ethnic identity of the authors of similar writings (particularly, Mullā ‘Ālim)entails peculiarities, and does not coincide with the modern one. Nevertheless, in the beginning of
his work: Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Hidāyat-i mu’minīn. ff. 2а-b. Mullā ‘Ālim turns to the sacral historyof the Uzbeks (!), describing their “sacred genealogy,” which goes back to the Old Testament
Prophets and at the same time, identifies the “best tribes” of the Uzbeks and the “worst of them”:
Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Hidāyat-i mu’minīn. ff. 4b-17b, 77а-b.
84
Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Аnsāb al-salāṭīn va tawārīkh-i khawāqīn. ff. 153 а-b. Incidentally, someinnovations (for instance, more comfortable houses and many “Russian things”) were gladly andreadily used by many aristocrats in the Kokand Khanate (before its liquidation) and even by
Khudāyār-Khān himself, for which they received great criticism from the major part of the clergy,
which saw in it the signs of “departure from the faith”: Набиев Р. Н. Из истории Кокандского
ханства… C. 81. The author of “Аnsāb al-salāṭīn va tawārīkh-i khawāqīn,” however, does notinclude his patron Khudāyār-Khān in the list of those who are “departing from the faith” (for theiradherence to “things, clothes and the way of life of the non-believers”) and claims just the opposite– that with the arrival of the Russians and the signing of the enslaving agreements with General vonKaufman, the Khan started to “adhere to the Shar‘īat and respect the ‘ulamā’ and mullās evenmore”: f.113а. Probably, such behavior (and appropriate rhetoric) could be instructed by the“ideological measures” of Khudāyār-Khān in order to mitigate the negative responses for his“contacts with the Russians and evident politeness toward them». Khudāyār-Khān, however, having
been enthroned by the Bukharan Amīr Naṣr Allāh during his third reign, lost Bukhara as a source of
external guarantee for his throne against growing opposition from the Qipchaqs. As judged bycorrespondence with the Russians: Набиев Р. Н. Из истории Кокандского ханства… C. 78-80,
he saw the Russian troops as a new guarantee for saving his throne and took extremely unpopularmeasures to fill up the treasury in the economically exhausted Khanate. As a result of Russian
support for the unpopular khan, the local people, in the words of A. P. Khoroshkin, an outstanding
expert on then-current affairs, began to “scold us (=the Russians) to our face and make our ears
burn” (cited from: Набиев Р. Н. Из истории Кокандского ханства… C. 83).
85
Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Аnsāb al-salāṭīn va tawārīkh-i khawāqīn. f. 155а.
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The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

the same spirit, and therefore it is possible and necessary to consider his work inthe same line of the aforenamed compendia of traditionalists, who appeal toordinary Muslims in an attempt to “save their faith.” The composition is written
in a fairly traditional fashion and very easy-to-understand poetic form. Here we
see that the author, with the same motives as those of Mullā ‘Ālim, harshly
criticizes the religious aristocracy, bāys, and others “corrupted by the Russians.”
86

In fact, the clichés used by both authors in criticism of the religious
aristocracy and the political elite are well known from “admonitory literature,”
poetry and even historical works written before Russian colonization (forexample, Aḥmad Dānish’s writings, or the works of Ḥakīm-khān, an eminent
historian-chronicler).87 After the Russian conquest (partial colonization and theestablishment of a protectorate over two khanates), criticism found “a second
breath” and much a clearer external trigger.88 This time the religious puritan
rhetoric among the traditionalists became amplified, and all precedents of “badmorals and manners” were linked with the Russians (“aliens,” “non-believers”),
or with the religious aristocracy and the khans “corrupted by the Russians.”
In any case, an intensification of this sort of rhetoric during the earlydays of Russian colonization can be seen as a specific reaction to the arrival of
the “foreigners,” and as an understandable and legitimate attempt at
self-preservation (of course, in a sense as it was understood by the majority of“traditionalists” and other ordinary Muslims, who were under their influence). As
a result, this particular reaction, obviously, could only create more reasons foropen estrangement from the “disbelievers,” and this estrangement could not be
eliminated in just a few decades, as the colonial authorities and particularly the
Russian experts in the “Muslim question,” wished.
Strengthening and even restoring the functions of the Islamic institution
can be directly and indirectly attributed, surprisingly, to the colonial authorities.
First of all, internal civil strife and the khans’ mutual raids, which at the end wereleading to a decline of the majority of Muslim institutions, were eliminated. The
most affected institutions were the traditional establishments (like mosques,
maktabs and madrasahs), and their number, despite being somewhat ignored(and possibly due to that) by the colonial administration, multiplied during
Russian colonization (particularly in provinces).89 The same could be said about86Бабаджанов Б. М. “Дукчи Ишан и Андижанское восстание...” C. 257-264.
See, for example: Мухаммад Хакимхан [тура] ибн Ма‘сумхан [тура]. Мунтахаб
ат-таварих. Мухтаров А. (Подготовка факсимильного текста, введение и указатели). В 2книгах. Книга вторая. Душанбе: Дониш, 1985; Muntakhab al-tawārīkh, Selected history, Vol. 2,
by Muḥammad Ḥakīm khān, Kawahara Yayoi and Haneda Ko’ichi (eds.). Tokyo: Research Institutefor Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa. 2006.
88
See other early examples: Allworth E. “The Changing Intellectual and Literary Community.”
Allworth E. (ed.) Central Asia: a Century of Russian Rule. New York-London: Columbia
University Press, 1967. pp. 349-396.
89Остроумов Н. “Колебания во взглядах...” C. 146.
87

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The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dūkchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

the qāḍī courts, which were preserved in old fashion, though with some control
by colonial authorities, and which even managed to spread their influence on
poorly Islamized Turkic tribes of the Ferghana valley like Qipchaqs, Qurama and
the Qirghiz.90
Later however, as a more cautious and considerate policy toward the
local population continued (despite separate attempts by some experts andofficials to strengthen control over the sphere of the “Muslim question,” and withrelation to the Andijan uprising), the quantity of “anti-Russian works” written by
the traditionalists, decreased sharply. On the contrary, we see emergence ofcompositions in which the authors speak of the necessity to use the achievementsof the Russian people and call for more frank and open contacts with them.91
Moreover, some traditionalists started praising the “White Tsar” in their khuṭbas,while others still spoke against him92.
However, one additional point is indisputable. The Andijan uprising, withall its tragic consequences (because of its artificially inflated “threat”), remained
a local event, even in terms of the Ferghana valley (Andijan and its vicinity), andno one in the colony or in the khanates gave substantial support to it. On thecontrary, we see quite numerous accusations that “illiterate Īshān from among thecommon people” had broken the existing “peaceful fatwā with the White tsar.”
Most importantly, as we have stated in our previous publications, 93 suchcharacteristics came out of the mouths of historians and statesmen, who could not
be suspected of their sympathy to the Russians. Most likely, these developments
were the result of the rather sound policy initiated by K. P. von Kaufman (which
also addressed, in its the widest sense, the “Mohammedan” question, as the sorest
point.)The Andijan uprising, nevertheless, triggered in many Russian experts ofTurkestan and the colonial administration another surge of mistrust toward theMuslims (despite the influence of liberalism in the understanding of that time),
and reignited earlier fears; for a long time it was mentioned in numerous
scientific and particularly in popular publications as a clear example of the“unreliability of Muslims,” their wrong reaction to the “high mission of Russia,”
etc. The responses of the majority of Muslims, on the other hand, were quite
different, but by no means servile. As judged by many verses selected andpresented by Erkinov here, such reaction fully corresponds to an old tradition
which recommended against irritating a stronger opponent, and praised searchingfor compromise with him (“fatwā with the White Tsar”). The violation of acompromise was perceived as a religiously illegitimate action.
90Бакиров Ф. Казийские суды в Туркестане до Октябрьской революции 1917 года(unpublished article, Library of IO AS RUz, 1968).
91
See our aforementioned article: Babadjanov B. “Russian Colonial Power in Central Asia...” Andcertainly, the Jadids’ publications are a special case.
92
Erkinov A. Praying For and Against the Tsar: Prayers and Sermons in Russian DominatedKhiva and Tsarist Turkestan. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004 (ANOR 16).
93Бабаджанов Б. М. “Дукчи Ишан и Андижанское восстание...” C. 277.
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The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

And the last point. Although the plans of cultural assimilation of Russian
Turkestan were not implemented on a large scale due to many reasons, thepolitical (imperial) integration of the local elite of all levels was accomplished toa certain extent. For example, the feeling of being a part of Russia led toemergence, among the majority of the local believers, of specific way of naming
themselves (for instance, the “Russian Muslims,” and then the “Soviet
Muslims” 94 ). Moreover, during two Russian revolutions a lot of politicalmovements and parties (both Islamic and nationalist in orientation) included intheir political programs calls for a different degree of autonomy (including one
with an independent army and currency), but none of them, at least from theterritory of Turkestan, demanded full withdrawal from Russia (the RSFSR in that
period).95
Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov
Institute of Oriental studies, AS RUz,
Tashkent

94

In the Soviet period there was a journal “Sovet Sharq musulmonlari” (“Muslims of the Soviet
East” – since 1947) with translation (since 1965) into different languages.
95Агзамходжаев C. История туркестанской автономии... C. 18-42 and further. The inertia of
the political integration with Russia appeared quite long-lasting and continued practically until thelast years before the collapse of the USSR. When M. Gorbachev initiated a nationwide referendum
asking whether to maintain the USSR (1989), the largest number of affirmative votes came fromthe southern Soviet republics. Even the former Central Asian Islamic High Council for the Affairsof Religion, Muslim Spiritual Authority (SADUM headed then by the new mufti – the deputy to theSupreme Soviet of the USSR Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf) called the believers to poll
their votes for preservation of the State of the Soviets, adding, however, a requirement for greater
freedoms for believers.
25