Montara Wellhead Platform Incident
Toby Stone - General Manager - Marine Environment Division
Maritime Emergency Response Commander
Australian Maritime Safety Authority

Montara Wellhead Platform Incident
X Introduction
X The Incident
X Aerial Surveillance & Modelling
X Dispersant Spraying
X Mechanical Recovery & Disposal
X Enquiries & Reports
X The Future5.30am Western Australia Time Friday 21 August 2009.
Montara Wellhead Platform, West Atlas Drilling Rig, 140 miles NWAustralian coast . Uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from well.
Initial estimates 64 tonnes per day. Owner PTTEP Australasia.

Divisions of responsibility …
Statutory Agency► Designated Authority
RIGS, PLATFORMS & PIPELINES– Relevant oil company

Combat Agency► Operator

Combat Agency Transfer► Agreed protocol
OUTSIDE 3 NAUTICALMILES - AMSAWITHIN
3 NAUTICAL MILES– State/NT Authority

Initial response actions
Incident occurred 0730 EST 21 August
AMSA notified 1000 EST
Within two hours:► AMOSC notified► Modelling commenced (received 1130)► Dispersant aircraft contract activated► Surveillance aircraft tasked

Initial response continued …
Approx 1200 EST oil spill
confirmed
PM 21 AAugust:t► 50m3 dispersant moved fromAMOSC► 2 transport aircraft chartered► Response team deployed toDarwin and Truscott► C130 from OSR Singapore► 1st dispersant aircraft arrives► AMSA assume coordination
di tiInitial response continued …
22 August 2010:►Truscott operations baseestablished►

Dispersant transferred toTruscott►2nd dispersant aircraft arrived
approx midday►

C130 arrives in Darwin PM►

Additional surveillance flights

23 August 2010:►Dispersant spraying commenced

Montara crude
Confusion - crude oil or condensate
Non-persistent oil defined by:“Definition of non-persistent (US EPA):
At lleastt 50% bby volumeldistil
di til att 3400C.
CAt least 95% by volume distil at 3700C”
Montara crude:► “59% at 3400C► 71.3% at 3700C”► Group 3 Oil
Important to get right for:► Modelling► Weathering predictions► Selection of strategies► Selection of equipment

Initial modelling …
Different models
Settingg the responsepobjectivej
Deciding on actions

Natural phenomena (coral spawn or algal blooms)

Dispersants …
Critical issue“Were Ashmore/Cartier Reef Marine
Reserves and the Western Australiancoastline the most important features”

Logistics
gControl
SafetyTransition from aircraft to vessels
184,000 litres applied over 68 days

Hercules C130 from Oil Spill Response – Singapore
Sprayed 12,000 litres over 2 days

Montara well head platform – Dispersant summary
Notes:
Dispersants used to date are Slickgone NS
NS, Slickgone LTSWLTSW, Ardrox 6120
6120, Tergo R40
R40, Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527
9527.
Only dispersants that pass a specified minimum level of effectiveness and a specified maximum level of acceptable toxicity to two temperate andtwo tropical test species are approved for use in Australian waters. For more information go to:
http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/National_Plan/General_Information/Dispersants_Information/index.asp

12000

10000

L itres o f D isp erssan t

8000

6000

4000

2000

0

DateHercules

AMSA dispersant spray aircraft

Surface vesselsWaste management …
844,000 litres of oil/watercollected.
Towable storage ineffective
Where to dispose?

Relief Well Drilling Operations
14 Sep Drilling commenced with West Triton Rig (25 days since blowout)
06 Oct First attempt (missed by 44.55 m)
13 Oct – 24 Oct 2nd,3rd&4th attempt (missed by 0.7m, 0.53m, whipstock stuck)
01 Nov H1 well intercepted,pheavyy mud ppumped
p in (73( daysy since blowout))
01 Nov Fire broke out on WHP
03 Nov Flow of Hydrocarbons stopped after 3,400 barrels of kill weight mud
03 Nov Fire extinguished at 0348
13 Jan Operations to plug and secure H1 well complete
Salvage operation to refloat and tow West Atlas Rig

Termination Plan (3 December)► ESC advice that there were no recoverable tar balls, slicks, orsheens threatening Ashmore Reef and Cartier Islet;► Extensive eight day aerial surveillance program (21 November
2009 – 28 November 2009) confirmed no sighting of visible
sheens or oil/wax patches threatening the reefs;► No significant patches of floating oil sighted in the open water
during this period;► Surface vessels maintaining surveillance within the area ofoperations did not sight oil during this period;► Shoreline cleanup on the cays was not required during theresponse; and► Dispersant spraying operations were not required from 1November.

In summary - the numbers
105 – days of response
300 – approx number of
personnel directly involved
9 – number of aircraft involved>130 – surveillance flights
51nm – closest oil observed toIndonesia (21 September)
19 – nm closest
lt oilil observed
bd totAustralian coastline (5November)
161,800 – litres of dispersant
used (43,900 from aircraft,117,900 from vessels)

844,000 litres of productrecovered (493,000 litres oil)
29 bi
birds
d iimpacted
d (22 didied)d)0 oil detected in fish sampled
0 reports
t off iimpacted
t d whales
h l ordolphins
Manyy reportspof oil actually
ynatural phenomena
0 impact reported on coastline
or offshore reefs

Post-incident …

Independent Incident Analysis Team► Eight recommendationsp► AMSA response

Commission of Inquiry (Borthwick)► Reported to Government► Draft Government responseMontara Wellhead Platform – Incident Analysis TeamAMSA formed Incident Analysis Team (IAT) to assess
adequacy of response and identify any lessons
Debriefings and meetings in Canberra, Melbourne andPerth.
Questionnaire was circulated to all National Response
Team (NRT) members and others who attended theresponse
8 recommendations

Incident Analysis
Recommendation 1:
AMSA to review its existing emergency response procedures.
Recommendation 2:
AMSA to consider how it will resource its combat agency role in the future.
RRecommendationd ti 3:
3
AMSA to prepare clear procedures for the provision of environmental advice,
wildlife response and monitoring for a spill where AMSA is the lead agency.
Recommendation 4:
AMSA, with DRET, to develop cost recovery arrangements for the offshore
Petroleum sector.
sectorIncident Analysis continued ..
Recommendation 5:
AMSA should resolve any ambiguity with its governing legislation torespondp
to oil spills
pfrom sources other than ships.
p
Recommendation 6:
DRET should ensure that AMSA have formal involvement in theassessment of oil spill contingency plansplans.
Recommendation 7:
The National Plan Review should assess preparedness arrangements fornorth-western
tht
AAustralia.
t li
Recommendation 8:
The offshore petroleum sector should be the first option for Combat
Agency for spills from offshore installations.

Montara Commission of Inquiry

On 5 November 2009,, the Minister for
Resources and Energy announced theestablishment of an independent
Commission of Inquiry into theMontara incident.
Mr David Borthwick AO PSM wasappointed as the Commissioner.

Montara Commission of Inquiry
Report released 24 November 2010 100 findings and105 recommendations
Concluded that the source of the blowout was theresult of the primary well control barrier failing
Compounded by only 1 of the 2 planned secondary
well control barriers being installed
Inquiry also examined the environmental response
7 findings
g and 13 recommendations on environmentalissues

Montara Commission of Inquiry“It is apparent that the overall response objective ofpreventing oil from impacting on sensitive marine
resources …was largely achieved.”“The Inquiry
q y has concluded that the use of dispersantspwas appropriate…”“TheThe Inquiry considers that AMSA responded
exceptionally well to an incident that was beyond its
first hand experience and in a remote and difficult
location. AMSA should be commended.”Montara Commission of Inquiry & Draft Government Response
The Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (RET) willdevelop an incident management and coordination frameworkfor dealing with incidents involving the offshore petroleum
industry
Broad review of Commonwealth legislation to address several
id tifi d “legislativeidentified“l i l ti gaps””
Equitable cost sharing arrangements between the offshore
petroleum and shipping
ppp g industries for both spill
p preparedness
p pand response capability
Single National Regulator
Role of National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority expansion

Montara Commission of Inquiry & Draft Government Response

Comprehensive consultation on approval of oil spill
contingency plans for offshore facilities
Assessing the risks associated with offshore oil andgas exploration
Recognising the importance of prompt implementationof scientific monitoring
Clarify responsibility for provision of scientific advice
Minimum Standards

The future ….
10 year review of the National
Plan and NMERA arrangements
taking specific account of:► Pacific Adventurer► Montara► Deepwater Horizon

Risk assessment
Capability/Adequacy
Cbili /Adassessment
Completion before end 2011

Montara Wellhead Platform Incident
Toby Stone - General Manager - Marine Environment Division
Maritime Emergency Response Commander
Australian Maritime Safety Authority