Directors’ Du�es
Regarding Climate
Change in Japan
February 2021
byDr. Yoshihiro Yamada
Dr. Janis Sarra
Dr. Masafumi
Nakahigashi

Oxford Sustainable Finance Programme
Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment
University of Oxford
South Parks Road
Oxford, OX1 3QY
United Kingdom
Email: enquiries@smithschool.ox.ac.uk
Telephone: +44 (0)1865 614963
Cover: Liam Burne�-Blue on Unsplash

Founders

PartnersDirectors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanby
Dr Yoshihiro Yamada, Dr Janis Sarra, and Dr Masafumi Nakahigashi
Executive Summary
Japan’s primary prudential regulator, the Bank of Japan, has acknowledged that climate change posesa systemic risk to the Japanese economy and financial system. There is now overwhelming scientificand financial evidence of the material impacts of climate change on businesses. Since climate change
has been recognized by governments, courts, and investors as a material issue affecting thesustainability of almost all companies, corporate directors need to recognize their obligation to address
climate-related risks and opportunities.
Directors in Japan have three primary duties, a duty of loyalty, a duty to be in compliance with all laws,
regulations, and ordinances, and the company articles, and a duty of care. Directors’ duties are set out
in the Companies Act of Japan, the articles of incorporation, and the Civil Code. The obligation of
directors to consider the implications of climate change risk is grounded in the duties each director
owes to the corporation they serve. In their oversight of management of climate risks, directors mustmeet the objective standard of what a reasonably prudent person would do in comparable
circumstances.
The Companies Act of Japan specifies that the directors of large companies must develop the systems
necessary to ensure that execution of their duties complies with laws and regulations to ensure theproper operations of a stock company. The Regulation for Enforcement of the Companies Act requires
directors of these companies to develop systems related to management of the risk of loss to the stockcompany and any of its subsidiaries. In such companies, a director’s duty of care will not be effectively
performed without a proper internal control system, and directors can be found personally liable if theybreach these statutory requirements. These requirements mean that climate governance should beembedded in a board committee responsible for risk management or sustainability. Directors must
establish effective proper internal control and risk management systems to support exercise of their
duty to supervise business operations. Directors must have sufficient capability to scrutinize climate
risks to the company and then interact with management and the board to oversee management ofthese risks. The committee with responsibility for risk management needs to be able to assess andanalyze both the physical risks and transition risks associated with climate change. Where directors lackclimate-governance expertise and that expertise is not available among the executives of the company,
directors would hire outside professional expertise that can support their climate-related risk
management decisions in the best interests of the company.
Even though directors have broad discretionary decision-making authority to design their board
committees, arguably directors could be held liable under the Companies Act and the Regulation for
Enforcement of the Companies Act for failure to establish a climate risk management system with
sufficient capabilities to perform their responsibilities to oversee and manage climate-related financial
risks and opportunities. Depending on the size and kinds of business lines, the system adopted needs
to be capable of performing the required proper controls in light of the likelihood and magnitude ofclimate risks to the company. If directors of a large stock company fail to establish a proper internal
control system that appropriately addresses climate-related risks, they could be found personally liable
for breach of their duty of care.

1Directors in Japan have a duty of care, to act as a mandatary in the best interest of the company.
Directors who neglect their duties are jointly and severally liable to the company for any resulting
damages; and where they are grossly negligent or knowingly fail to perform their duties, they are also
liable to shareholders or third parties for resulting damages. Since climate change is affecting almost
all businesses, failure by corporate directors to recognize their obligation to address climate-relatedrisks and opportunities could result in personal liability for failure to act with due care and in the bestinterests of the company. This liability for breach of their duties is in addition to their potential personal
liability for failure to meet the requirements of any statutes or ordinances.
For duly diligent directors, the Supreme Court of Japan’s recognition of a business judgment rule may
offer a defence to specific actions to address climate mitigation and adaptation, when hindsightinformation suggests that the directors should have made a different decision. However, the businessjudgment rule does not offer a safe haven to directors that fail to act on climate-related risk. Japanesecourts have been clear that they will examine not only the process used to reach the business decision,
but also undertake a review of the duty of care, from an objective standpoint, to assess whether adirector acted unreasonably at the time of the decision. Where directors neglect to undertake
reasonable research and analysis of the relevant facts, fail to get expert advice on climate-related risk
management, and fail to exercise due care in respect of climate risks, the courts are unlikely to defer totheir business judgment because directors will have failed to exercise any judgment at all or failed toengage in a reasonable assessment of the risks.
The Japanese Government has signalled to companies that climate change is a material financial riskthat they must address. The Ministry of Environment has advised companies to engage in scenario
analysis to assess the resilience of their business in the face of global warming in line with therecommendations of the Financial Stability Board’s Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures.
Japan’s Climate Change Adaptation Act and its Act on Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures,
read together, create regulatory expectations that all sectors of Japanese society must make efforts tocontrol climate change through mitigation and adaptation. A company must make efforts to realize thegovernment’s climate policy, although these statutes currently impose no legal liabilities on directors
for non-compliance.
In contrast, financial services law in Japan, both the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law andsecurities listing regulations published by the securities exchanges, require disclosure of material risks
and strategies to address such risks. Climate change is now viewed by investors globally as a material
risk.
Finally, the Corporate Governance Code, which is non-binding, also offers strong normative guidancefor directors to effectively manage material climate-related financial risks and opportunities. The
impact of soft law such as the Corporate Governance Code has the potential to be instrumental in
shifting climate governance, as the principles adopted by companies form part of their fundamental
rules of operation.

2

About the Authors
Dr Yoshihiro Yamada is Vice Dean and Professor of Law, College of Law, Ritsumeikan University, Japan.
Dr Janis Sarra is Professor of Law, University of British Columbia Peter A. Allard School of Law, Canada,
Principal Co-Investigator of the Canada Climate Law Initiative (ccli-info@allard.ubc.ca), and a directorof the Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative, Oxford UK.
Dr Masafumi Nakahigashi is Vice President of Nagoya University, Professor of Law at the School of Law,
Nagoya University, and Vice Director, Sustainable development with realization of a carbon-free
economy, Nagoya University Applied Social System Institute of Asia, Japan.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ellie Mulholland, Asahi Yamashita, Peter Barnett, Raphael Soffer andthe anonymous reviewers for their comments on the draft of this report. We also thank Sonia li Trottier
for the cover design and Mariko Baba and her team at A&E Communications (Translation) Inc for thetranslation of this report into Japanese.
About the Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative
The Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative (CCLI) is a legal research and stakeholder engagement
initiative founded by Oxford University Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, ClientEarth,and Accounting for Sustainability (A4S). The CCLI examines the legal basis for directors and trustees tomanage and report on climate change-related risk and climate mitigation and its research is at theforefront of the intersection of climate and biodiversity risks under existing companies and securities
laws. Founded to focus on four Commonwealth countries: Australia, Canada, South Africa, and theUnited Kingdom, the CCLI has expanded its remit to the United States, Hong Kong, India, Singapore,
Japan and Malaysia. The CCLI leverages the inter-disciplinary and cross-jurisdictional perspectives
provided by its global experts from academia and the legal, accountancy, business, and scientific,
communities.

3

Table of contents
Executive Summary.................................................................................................................................. 1
About the Authors ................................................................................................................................... 3
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................. 3
About the Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative ............................................................................ 3
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................... 6
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Context - Climate Change as a Material Financial and Health Risk...................................... 8
A. Physical Risks ........................................................................................................... 8
B. Transition Risks ...................................................................................................... 10
i. Market Risks ............................................................................................. 10
ii. Policy and Legal Risks .............................................................................. 11
iii. Technology Risks ..................................................................................... 14
iv. Reputational Risks................................................................................... 14
2. OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE BOARDS IN JAPAN .................................................................................. 14
2.1 Options for Corporate Governance Structures .................................................................. 15
3. DIRECTORS’ DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND ADHERENCE TO THE LAW ...................................................... 17
3.1 Duty of Loyalty ................................................................................................................... 17
3.2 Directors’ Duty to Obey Specific Laws, Regulations, and Ordinances, and the Corporate
Articles ..................................................................................................................................... 18
3.3 Application of these Duties to Climate Change ................................................................. 19
4. DIRECTORS’ DUTY OF CARE ................................................................................................................ 19
4.1 Duty of Care Owed to the Company .................................................................................. 21
4.2 Application of Due Care and Diligence in a Climate Risk Context ...................................... 22
4.3 The Duty of Care for Public Companies is Reinforced by Japan’s Corporate GovernanceCode......................................................................................................................................... 22
4.4 Duty of Care to Other Stakeholders ................................................................................... 25
4.5 Institutional Investors’ Fiduciary Obligations Have an Impact on Corporate Directors’ Duties................................................................................................................................................. 26
4.6 Deference to Business Judgment of Corporate Directors .................................................. 26
5. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT ................................................................ 28
5.1 The Growing Number of Climate-related Shareholder Proposals ..................................... 29
6. DUTY OF DISCLOSURE ........................................................................................................................ 31
6.1 Disclosure and Reporting Requirements ........................................................................... 32
4

6.2 Financial Instruments and Exchange Act Disclosure .......................................................... 32
6.3 Ministry of the Environment Practical Guide for Scenario Analysis in Line with the TCFD
Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 34
6.4 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's (METI’s) Guidance for Collaborative Value
Creation ................................................................................................................................... 34
6.5 Japan’s TCFD Consortium .................................................................................................. 35
6.6 The Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure ....................................................................... 36
6.7 Disclosure by the Japan Government Pension Investment Fund ...................................... 37
6.8 Conclusion - Director Liability and Disclosure of Material Climate-related Risks .............. 38
7. LOOKING AHEAD ................................................................................................................................ 40
APPENDIX I
THREE FORMS OF ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT OF
JAPAN ..................................................................................................................................................... 42
APPENDIX IIRELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE ......................... 48

APPENDIX III
DUTIES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN RESPECT OF CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS ANDOPPORTUNITIES ..................................................................................................................................... 50

5Abbreviations
C

degrees CelsiusCEO

chief executive officer

ESG

environmental, social and governance

FIEA

Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Japan

GHG

Greenhouse gas

GPIC

Government Pension Investment Fund, JapanIASBInternational Accounting Standards Board

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

JPX

Japan Exchange GroupKPI

key performance indicators

METI

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan

MOE

Ministry of Environment, JapanNGFS

Network for Greening the Financial System

SASB

Sustainability Accounting Standards Board

SSE

Sustainable Stock Exchanges

TCFD

Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures

TSE

Tokyo Stock Exchange

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nationso

UN PRI United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing
US

United States

6Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

1. INTRODUCTION
Globally, climate change has been recognized as an existential threat to humanity and a serious threat
to economic activity. 1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), comprised of more than
800 scientists representing 150 governments, has concluded that at 1°C (Celsius) above pre-industrial
temperatures, which is what Earth is experiencing currently, 4 per cent of global land area isundergoing transformation of ecosystems with long-lasting impacts. 2 At 2°C warming, there will beirreversible serious consequences for human and ecological systems. 3 There is now broad scientificconsensus that global emissions must drop by 50 per cent over the next decade for the world to haveany chance of staying below 1.5°C. 4 Even at 1.5°C warming, there will be irreparable damage to assets,
operations, and ecosystems. Thus, the goal must be net-zero carbon emissions as soon as reasonably
possible. Investors, companies, and governments are grappling with ways to effectively address therisks of climate change and implement strategies to decarbonize economic activity in order to save theplanet.
Japan is particularly susceptible to the physical risks of climate change, particularly sea-level rise,inundation into fresh water sources, sustained heat waves, and increased typhoon frequency andintensity. It also faces economic transition risks as global investors increasingly signal that they will shift
capital to decarbonized sustainable investments.
Japan has started to respond to these impacts. Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, in his first general policy
speech to both Houses of the Diet in October 2020, committed Japan to working to meet the goal of
net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050. 5 He stated:
My administration will devote itself to the greatest possible extent to bring about a green
society, while focusing on a virtuous cycle of the economy and the environment as a pillar of
our growth strategy. We hereby declare that by 2050 Japan will aim to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to net-zero, that is, to realize a carbon-neutral, decarbonized society. Addressing
climate change is no longer a constraint on economic growth. We need to adjust our mindset
to a paradigm shift that proactive climate change measures bring transformation of industrial
structures as well as our economy and society, leading to dynamic economic growth. 6
As the world's third largest economy, this announcement aligns Japan with major economies
committed to building a sustainable, carbon neutral, and resilient world. 7

1
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Global warming of 1.5°C – An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global
warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context ofstrengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty,(October 2018) IPCC <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/>.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid, European Union Technical Expert Group, 2020.
5
The speech in provisional English version is available at Prime Minister of Japan, ‘Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the203rd Session of the Diet’, (28 October 2020), https://japan.kantei.go.jp/99_suga/statement/202010/_00006.html.
6Ibid. See also Nikkei staff, ‘Suga vows to meet Japan's zero-emissions goal by 2050’, Nikkei Asia (26 October 2020),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Suga-vows-to-meet-Japan-s-zero-emission-goal-by-2050 .
7
United Nations Secretary General, ‘Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on Japanese Prime
Minister Suga’s net-zero announcement’, (26 October 2020), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-1026/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-%E2%80%93-japanese-prime-ministersuga%E2%80%99s-net-zero-announcement.

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

1.1 Context - Climate Change as a Material Financial and Health Risk
Climate change is a systemic risk. The Bank of Japan, as Japan’s primary prudential regulator, has
acknowledged that climate change poses a systemic risk to the Japanese financial system. 8 It reportsthat asset prices could fall substantially as climate-related risks materialize, and misevaluation ofclimate risks can lead to the misallocation of resources. 9 The Bank states that when physical risks andtransition risks materialize, the financial system is affected through both direct channels and indirectchannels, with interrelated impacts on the real economy and financial system. 10
The Financial Stability Board’s Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) was
commissioned by the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors out of their concern for the
disruptive changes due to climate change across economic sectors and industries in the near to
medium term, with implications for the global financial system, in terms of avoiding financial
dislocations and sudden losses in asset values. 11 The TCFD reported that the two principal types ofclimate-related risk, physical risks and transition risks are inextricably linked. Within transition risks,
there are a number of related sub-risks, as briefly discussed below.
A. Physical Risks
Physical risks resulting from climate change can be event driven (acute) or longer-term shifts (chronic)
in climate patterns. Acute physical risks refer to increased severity of extreme weather events, such as
cyclones, hurricanes, or floods; and chronic physical risks refer to longer-term shifts in climate patterns,
such as sustained higher temperatures that may cause sea level rise or chronic heat waves. 12
Scientists attribute a recent acceleration in global sea-level rise to global warming, resulting in more
severe storms in Japan. 13 The Union of Concerned Scientists has reported that a sea-level rise of 1
metre could place 4.1 million people in Japan at risk of flooding and inundate more than 2,339 square
kilometers of land in major cities. 14 It reports that the city of Osaka, population 2.5 million people, hasover $200 billion worth of assets threatened by sea-level rise. 15 For example, in July 2018, adevastating downpour in western Japan forced 2 million people to evacuate their homes due toflooding, claiming over 200 lives. 16 In the aftermath of the event, experts agreed that the intensity ofthe storm was exacerbated by climate change. 17 Continued coastal flooding and storm surges are likely

Bank of Japan, Bank of Japan joins the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS)’ (28 November 2019),
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2019/rel191128a.htm/. See also Kakuho Furukawa, Hibiki Ichiue andNoriyuki Shiraki, ‘How Does Climate Change Interact with the Financial System?’, Bank of Japan Working Paper (24 December2020), https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/wps_rev/wps_2020/wp20e08.htm/ (hereafter Bank of Japan working paper).
9Bank of Japan working paper, ibid at 5.
10
Ibid at 9.
11
TCFD, ‘Final Report: Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures’ (June 2017), at iii,
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/final-recommendations-report/; Japanese translation at: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/TCFD_Final_Report_Japanese.pdf.
12Ibid at 6.
13
Union of Concerned Scientists, ‘Climate Hot Map’, https://www.climatehotmap.org/global-warming-locations/osakajapan.html#end9#end9#end9#end9#end9#end9.
14
Ibid.
15
R J Nicholls, S Hanson, C Herweijer, N Patmore, S Hallegatte, J Corfee-Morlot, J Château, and R Muir-Wood, ‘Ranking port
cities with high exposure and vulnerability to climate extremes. Environment working paper no 1’, (2008) Paris: Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development,
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf?cote=ENV/WKP%282007%291&doclanguage=en (hereafter
Nicholls et al).
16
The Climate Reality Project, ‘How the Climate Crisis Impacts Japan’, (2020), https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/howclimate-crisis-impacts-japan.
17
Ibid.
8

8

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanto put millions of people and valuable assets in Osaka and other cities at risk. Another study documents
Japan’s high exposure to asset damage due to more frequent, higher winds. 18
Global warming also has chronic impacts on Japan. Its temperature is rising at a faster rate than the
global average. The number of days with a maximum temperature of 30°C to 35°C or above isincreasing. 19 In 2018, Japan’s temperature record was broken by a heatwave that peaked at a 41οC
(106ο Fahrenheit), a heat wave that the Japan Meteorological Agency declared a natural disaster,
hospitalizing over 30,000 and claiming at least 80 lives. 20 The Japan Government’s synthesis report on
climate impacts observed that the projected number of cases where heat illness patients will be carriedby ambulance will increase nationwide in the period between the present and mid-21st century (20312050), projected to at least double in eastern and northern Japan. 21
Inundation of sea water into freshwater and sustained heat may also place agricultural production ofrice, a key staple of Japanese diet, at risk. 22 The Japanese government reported the impacts of climatechange on rice yield and quality:
Cases of white immature grain (high temperature or other damaging condition causes
insufficient starch production in the grain, making it look milky white), cracked grain (hightemperature causes cracks in the grain) and other degraded quality rice have already beenreported throughout Japan. Some cases of reduction in yield have also been reported in
specific areas or in extremely warm years. 23
Another impact of climate change on agriculture in Japan is that high temperatures, solar radiation,and decreased precipitation in the summer are negatively affecting fruit production, including causing
sunburn damage. 24 Temperature rise during the summer is also negatively affecting Shiitake mushroom
production due to the increased generation of pathogens and decreased generation of the edible parts,
requiring further research. 25 The problem of abandoned bamboo forests, primarily in western Japan,
means intrusion into mixed-use forests, which will possibly cause adverse effects on local ecosystems
and biodiversity, as well as rural landscape management. 26
With the increase in ocean temperature caused by climate change, spawning and feeding grounds ofmarine organisms in offshore and coastal areas of Japan, as well as migration routes, are likely to change,
causing a direct impact on their distribution. 27 In shallow waters, areas for seaweed cultivation andtidal flats may be reduced or species diversity may decline or disappear due to global warming, causing
concerns about the impact on industry. 28
Nicholls et al, supra note 15 at 37.
Japan Government, Synthesis Report on Observations, Projections and Impact Assessments of Climate Change, 2018 Climate
Change in Japan and Its Impacts, Ministry of the Environment Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Japan Meteorological
Agency at3, https://www.env.go.jp/earth/tekiou/pamph2018_full_Eng.pdf (hereafter Synthesis Report).
20
Jason Samenow, ‘Japan soars to its highest temperature ever recorded: 106 degrees’, The Washington Post, (23 July 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2018/07/23/japan-soars-to-its-highest-temperature-everrecorded-106-degrees/?noredirect=on.
21
Synthesis Report, supra note 19 at 6.
22
Kenji Washio, ‘The Prediction of Climate Change and Rice Production in Japan’ (2013) Rice Research,https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/the-prediction-of-climate-change-and-rice-production-in-japanjrr.1000e103.php?aid=23457, finding that the reproductive phase of rice is highly sensitive to high temperature, and hotter
conditions lead to increasing sterility.
23
Synthesis Report, supra note 19 at 3.
24
Ibid at 3.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid at 4.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
18
19

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Physical risks and impacts due to climate change have financial implications for companies, such as
direct damage to assets and indirect impacts from supply chain disruption. 29 Direct damage to assets
leads to reduction of the value of collateral and write-downs on balance sheets, which can negatively
affect annual revenues. It can increase the costs of raising capital, particularly where the company islocated in areas such as coastal shorelines where the physical risks are higher. When physical risksmaterialize, fixed assets such as factories and equipment are damaged, leading to economic loses from
irreparable assets or loss of production time, deterioration in the company’s creditworthiness andability to borrow, all of which, in turn, affect both companies’ and banks' balance sheets. 30
Both acute and chronic physical effects can also negatively affect the cost and availability of insurance.
Companies’ financial performance may also be affected by changes in water availability, sourcing, andquality. Extreme temperature changes can negatively affect organizations’ premises, operations,transport needs, and employee safety. 31 When companies have inadequate information about thephysical risks, there is risk that they have mispriced assets and misallocated capital. 32 Changing weather
patterns also have indirect impacts, such as changes in natural ecosystems and impacts on fisheries,
which can cause a wide variety of secondary effects on industrial and economic activities. 33
In summary, unabated climate change will continue to have a negative impact on short-, medium-, andlong-term economic performance.
B. Transition Risks
Japan is also vulnerable to transition risks. In its trade relationships with foreign nations andinvestments in other countries, businesses in Japan are dealing with different legal regimes andstandards for reporting on climate change or meeting scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions reductions targets.
Policy uncertainty in some jurisdictions and liability risk for investee companies in countries like theUnited States (US) are also becoming evident. The time horizons for climate-related risk are not only
manifested over the long term; climate change is disrupting businesses today. Thus, oversight andmanagement of climate-related risks must become embedded in governance processes for risk
management, strategic planning, and financial reporting in the short, medium, and long term. Withintransition risks are numerous types of financial risks, including market risks, legal and policy risks,technology risks, and reputational risks.
i. Market Risks
As institutional investors shift to net-zero carbon emissions investments, there is risk of shifting awayfrom Japan as a market unless investee companies demonstrate that they are effectively managing
climate risk. As investors shift their investment priorities, there are direct impacts on supply anddemand for different products, services, and commodities, with investors increasingly taking accountof climate-related risks and opportunities. 34
Companies’ failures to act to address market pressure to engage in climate mitigation and adaptation
strategies are likely to increase the cost of capital or reduce its availability. The chief executive officer(CEO) of the world's biggest institutional asset manager BlackRock, Larry Fink, sent a letter in 2020
TCFD, supra note 11 at 6.
Bank of Japan working paper, supra note 8 at 10.
31
TCFD, supra note 11 at 6.
32
Ibid at 1.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid at 6.
29
30

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

addressed to all its investee companies, including a number of Japanese companies, warning thatclimate change is a financial risk that could shake the stability of economic growth and the financial
system, and asking companies for disclosure based on the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board(SASB) standards and the TCFD recommendations, stressing that companies need effective disclosure
so that investors can ascertain whether they are properly managing sustainability risks andopportunities. 35
Also in 2020, Hiro Mizuno, then Executive Managing Director and Chief Investment Officer of Japan’s
US$1.4 trillion (¥151 trillion assets) Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) issued a letter, signed
also by two other global asset managers, pointing out that climate change alone has the potential todestroy US$ 69 trillion in global economic wealth by 2100 and calling on companies to develop
sustainable long-term strategies to address climate-related risks and to consider the environment,
employees, and society in their business strategies. 36 GPIF has stated that it iscommitted to fulfilling our fiduciary duty to secure adequate retirement funds for both current
and future beneficiaries. We believe that improving the governance of the companies that weinvest in while minimizing negative environmental and social externalities – that is, ESG(environment, social and governance) integration – is vital in ensuring the profitability of theportfolio over the long term. 37
A study by Choi, Gao, and Jiang recently found that financial institutions around the world have reduced
their exposure to stocks of high-emission industries since 2015, and firms in such sectors haveexperienced lower price-to-earnings and price-to-book ratios, which make equity financing costlier. 38
At the same time, they have increased research and development capital expenditures, suggesting thathigh-emissions firms are investing in methods to reduce emissions. 39 The authors observe thatdivestment by financial institutions exerts pressure on companies to adopt climate-friendly policies
and decrease their carbon footprint. 40
ii. Policy and Legal Risks
Policy risks can include government policy actions aimed at constraining company actions that
contribute to the adverse effects of climate change and policy aimed at promoting mitigation andadaptation. Examples include implementing carbon-pricing mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions,shifting energy use toward lower-emission sources, adopting energy-efficiency measures, andencouraging greater water efficiency and sustainable land-use practices. 41 For example, a carbon tax
introduced to reduce GHG emissions may result in the market value of fossil fuels such as oil and coal
dropping substantially, leaving companies with stranded assets that are no longer able to earn an
economic return, in turn, negatively affecting the balance sheet. 42
There are increasing expectations by Japanese regulators that companies will address climate-related
financial risks. Japan’s Ministry of the Environment (MOE) Climate Change Policy Division has reported
Larry Fink, BlackRock, ‘A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance’, Letter to CEOs, (January 2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter.
36
Hiro Mizuno et al, ‘Our Partnership for Sustainable Capital Markets’ (March 2020),
https://www.gpif.go.jp/en/investment/Our_Partnership_for_Sustainable_Capital_Markets.pdf (hereafter Mizuno et ai).
37
Government Pension Investment Fund, ‘For All Generations, ESG Report 2019’, at 2,
https://www.gpif.go.jp/en/investment/GPIF_ESGREPORT_FY2019.pdf.
38
Darwin Choi, Zhenyu Gao, Wenxi Jiang, ‘Global Carbon Divestment and Firms' Actions’ (29 May 2020), SSRN 358995, at 9, 13,
14, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589952.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid at 3.
41
TCFD, supra note 11 at 5.
42
Bank of Japan working paper, supra note 8 at 10.
35

11

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanthat climate-related risks can result from reassessment of the value of a large range of assets with alarge volume of GHG emissions during the process of adjustment towards a lower carbon economy. 43
It has issued guidance on disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities in line with the TCFD,
discussed in part 6.3 below. Given that the TCFD framework includes guidance on the robust climate
governance processes that necessarily underlie the disclosures, it is an indication of growing regulatory
expectations that directors should put in place effective climate governance mechanisms.
Japan’s Financial Services Agency reports that ‘2019 marked a major shift in the way Japan addressed
the challenge of the climate emergency.’ 44 These policy shifts have encouraged a substantial increasein the number of Japanese firms committed to reporting their approach to climate change using TCFD
recommendations, growing from 44 to 223 in 2019. 45 In addition, 23 per cent of Japanese TCFDsupporting companies disclosed the results of their climate-related scenario analysis in 2019. 46
Another example of regulatory policy likely to impact Japanese companies is Japan’s Climate Change
Adaptation Act, enacted in 2018. 47 It is aimed at promoting climate change adaptation throughestablishing necessary measures such as formulating plans for adaptation to global warming andproviding information on climate change impacts and adaptation in order to contribute to the healthand cultural life of the Japanese people, both now and in the future. Article 3 requires the national
government to promote the enhancement of scientific knowledge on climate change, its impacts andadaptation, and to use this knowledge to comprehensively establish and promote policies for climatechange adaptation. 48 Article 4 directs local governments to endeavor to promote policies for climatechange adaptation in accordance with natural, economic, and social factors in their region, providing
information on measures and policies to promote climate change adaptation. Governments at all levels
are to help promote business activities that contribute to adaptation. 49‘Climate change impact’, as defined in the Climate Change Adaptation Act, means impact by climatechange that negatively affects human health and the living environment, causes a decline inbiodiversity, and impacts daily life, society, economy, and the natural environment. 50 ‘Climate change
adaptation’ means ‘reacting to the climate change impact so as to prevent or reduce damage, and tocontribute to a stable living environment, sound development of a society and economy, and topreserve the natural environment.’ 51
While the term ‘mitigation’ and references to GHG are not mentioned in the Climate Change
Adaptation Act, article 1 makes reference to article 2(1) of the 1998 Act on Promotion of Global

43
The Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan Climate Change Policy Division, Practical Guide for Scenario Analysis
in line with the TCFD recommendations, 2nd edition (March 2020), at 1-5,
http://www.env.go.jp/policy/policy/tcfd/TCFDguide_2nd_EN.pdf (hereafter Japan MOE); Japanese version available at: TCFD を活用した経営戦略立案のススメ ～気候関連リスク・機会を織り込むシナリオ分析実践ガイド～, 気候関連リスク・機会を織り込むシナリオ分析実践ガイド_0318v2 (env.go.jp).
44
Satoshi Ikeda, Chief Sustainability Officer, Financial Services Agency, Japan, ‘Why Japan is leading the TCFD wave’,
Commentary, London School of Economics Grantham Research Institute, (March 2020),
https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/news/why-japan-is-leading-the-tcfd-wave/.
45
Ibid, citing TCFD 2019 Status Report.
46
Ibid.
47
Climate Change Adaptation Act, Act No 50 of June 13, 2018, 気候変動適応法 平成 30 年 6 月 13 日法律第 50 号, at article
1, English translation, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=3212&vm=04&re=01. Please note, fortranslation of Japanese laws generally, see the website of Japanese Law Translation http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/?re=01>.
48
Ibid, article 3(1).
49
Ibid, articles 3(1) and (2).
50
Ibid, article 2(1).
51
Ibid, article 2(2).

12Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Warming Countermeasures. 52 That article expressly refers to global warming affecting the planet as awhole, and the increasing concentration of GHG in the atmosphere as a result of human activity. Article
2(2) of the Act on Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures discusses ‘global warming
countermeasures’ to control GHG emissions and to maintain and improve the absorption of GHG, aswell as other measures to take in international cooperation for the prevention of global warming. The
two statutes read together clearly indicate that adaptation measures include measures to reduce
emissions, referred to as ‘mitigation’ internationally.
The Climate Change Adaptation Act specifies that businesses must endeavor to adapt to climate changein accordance with the content of their business activities, and in cooperation with national and local
governmental programs for climate change adaptation. 53 The Act sets out the obligations of national
and local governments, the private sector, and citizens to promote climate change adaptation efforts.
One challenge in respect of enforcing the goals of the Act is that the direction to businesses is not
expressly enforceable; the Act does not, by itself, provide a legal basis for directors’ duties in respectof climate change.
Another policy signal is that the Bank of Japan has joined the Network for Greening the Financial System(NGFS), a group of central banks and supervisors concerned with the systemic risks of climate change
to the financial system. 54 Other member banks, such as in the United Kingdom (UK), the European
Union, and Australia, are now requiring stress-testing of domestic and cross-border financial
institutions, which indicates where the Japan’s central bank may be moving in the near future.
The Japan Government’s synthesis report on climate impacts also discusses the opportunities thatclimate change presents. It uses, as examples, businesses developing information technologies, suchas agriculture support services and services to project and assess risks from disasters; technologies toimprove the heat-tolerance environment and the comfort of buildings and houses; as well as financial
instruments that provide insurance or a hedge against possible damage due to abnormal weather
events. 55 All of these government policy reports reveal that there are risks to Japanese directors thatfail to read regulatory signals in respect of the need to manage climate-related financial risks and thatfail to disclose the effectiveness of measures taken.
Regulation from other jurisdictions will also impact Japanese businesses. For example, automobile
emission regulations introduced in Europe effective 2021 have resulted in some Japanese companies
expressing concern that they may not be able to achieve emissions reductions targets, which could
result in substantial fines and loss of business. 56

52

Article 2(1), Act on Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures (Act No. 117 of 1998, 地球温暖化対策の推進に関する法律 平成 10 年法律第 117 号 (japaneselawtranslation.go.jp). English translation can be found at
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=97&vm=&re. Article 1 states: In recognition of the serious impact of
global warming on the environment of the entire planet, and the importance of efforts on the part of all humankind to actively
and voluntarily address the universal issue of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at levels where
human interference does not pose a danger to climate systems, the purpose of this Law is to promote global warming
countermeasures by formulating a plan for attaining targets under the Kyoto Protocol and taking measures to promote thecontrol of greenhouse gas emissions due to social, economic, and other activities, thereby contributing to the health andcultural life of the Japanese people, both now and in the future, as well as contributing to the wellbeing of all humankind.
53
Climate Change Adaptation Act, supra note 52, article 5.
54
Bank of Japan, supra note 8.
55
Synthesis Report, supra note 19 at 7.
56
Nikkei Business Newspaper, Nihon Keizai Simbun morning edition, (8 September 2020) (in Japanese only). The title of thearticle in English is ‘Climate change risk, disclosure 4 times, 264 companies in the previous term（気候変動リスク、開示 4 倍
前期 264 社).

13

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Another important risk is litigation or legal risk. Globally, there has been a huge increase in the numberof climate-related lawsuits, which include claims by investors in respect of breaches of directors’ duties,
securities law claims regarding the failure of companies to disclose climate-related risks and financial
impacts, and lawsuits commenced by regional and local governments and public interest organizations
against companies that are major GHG emitters. 57 As companies and financial institutions experience
more financial losses due to climate change, the risk of litigation for directors’ failure to act is also likely
to increase.
iii. Technology Risks
Technologies are rapidly developing to respond to the risks created by climate change, aimed at shifting
businesses and economies to more sustainable and climate-friendly economic activities. Disruptive
technologies can pose either risks or opportunities for Japanese companies. As the TCFD observed, tothe extent that new technology displaces old systems and disrupts some parts of the existing economic
system, winners and losers will emerge from this ‘creative destruction’ that is inevitable, even though
the exact timing is still uncertain. 58
There is growing interest in investing in new technologies that are energy efficient, use renewableenergy sources, and reduce GHG emissions. Innovations in battery storage, energy efficiency, andcarbon capture and storage will affect the competitiveness of many companies, their production anddistribution costs, and demand for their products and services from end users. 59
iv. Reputational Risks
The TCFD has also identified climate change as a source of reputational risk tied to changing customer
or community perceptions of an organization’s contribution to or detraction from the transition to a
low-carbon economy. 60 Consumer trends and civil society pressure to develop a serious path todecarbonization can affect the company reputationally, and thus financially, if the directors fail torecognize and act on climate-related risks and opportunities. Also, with a growing number of
institutional investors endorsing the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals, there is a
growing social risk to companies in terms of their reputation and ‘social licence’ to operate. 61
Having briefly canvassed the context in Japan regarding climate change and its attendant risks, the next
part gives an overview of corporate directors’ duties in Japan and the various options that companies
have in terms of type of company and governance structure.

2. OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE BOARDS IN JAPANDirectors’ duties in Japan are set out in the Companies Act and in the companies’ articles. 62 Publiclylisted stock companies are also regulated by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, 63 andJanis Sarra, From Ideas to Action, Governance Paths to Net Zero (2020, Oxford University Press), chapter 7.
TCFD, supra note 11 at 6.
59
ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Sarra, From Ideas to Action, Governance Paths to Net Zero, supra note 57; United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/.
62
Companies Act of Japan, Act No 86 of July 26, 2005 (会社法 平成 17 年 7 月 26 日法律第 86 号), English translation at
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2035&vm=04&re=02 (hereafter Companies Act of Japan).
63
Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (FIEA), https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fiel/, The Act for the Amendment of the
Securities and Exchange Act, etc (Act No 65 of 2006) and the Act for the Development, etc of Relevant Acts for Enforcement of
57
58

14

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japansecurities listing regulations published by the securities exchanges, as well as the Corporate
Governance Code, the latter of which is non-binding guidance. 64 The governance structures of Japanesecompanies arise from a deep history of cross-shareholdings and cultural norms regarding therelationship between directors and the myriad interests implicated in the corporation’s activities. 65 The
evolution of corporate law in Japan, particularly in the past decade, has begun to focus on directors’
duties, particular in respect of ensuring that proper governance and internal control systems are inplace. 66
A ‘stock company’ (kabushiki kaisha) pursuant to the Companies Act of Japan includes all privately-heldand publicly-listed companies that are incorporated and have issued shares. 67 A ‘public company’ isdefined as any stock company, the articles of incorporation of which do not require, as a feature of allor part of its shares, the approval of the stock company for the acquisition of such shares by transfer. 68
Stock companies, whether privately-held or public companies, have options, pursuant to Japanese
corporate law, to organize their governance structures in a number of ways. Of note, is that ‘company’is defined in the Companies Act more broadly than stock companies and includes a general partnershipcompany, limited partnership company, or limited liability company. 69 A limited liability company does
not issue stock. As of 2018, 93.8 per cent of Japanese corporate entities are kabushiki kaisha (stockcompanies). 70
2.1 Options for Corporate Governance Structures
The structure of corporate boards in Japan differs from many countries in that most of Japan's largest
publicly-listed companies have been overwhelmingly dominated by corporate insiders, with very few
outside or independent directors. 71 Nakahigashi and Puchniak observe that even when the Companies
Act of Japan was amended to allow companies the option of more US-style corporate boards and theTokyo Stock Exchange Listing Rules were amended in 2010 to require all listed companies to have atleast one independent director or statutory auditor (kansayaku), 72 the vast majority of corporateboards in publicly-listed Japanese companies remain insider dominated. 73 That situation has started tochange with the issuing of the Corporate Governance Code, as discussed in part 4.3 below, although
the majority of directors continue to be inside directors.
Effective May 2015, companies in Japan may choose one of three main forms of organizational structure
under the Companies Act of Japan: a ‘Company with Kansayaku Board’ (audit and supervisory board);
the Act for the Amendment of the Securities and Exchange Act, etc (2006 Act No 66), promulgated on 14 June 2006. Translationof the Act is available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=3538&vm=04&re=01&new=1.
64
Tokyo Stock Exchange, ‘Japan’s Corporate Governance Code Seeking Sustainable Corporate Growth and Increased Corporate
Value over the Mid- to Long-Term’ (as revised 1 June 2018) at 16, https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/b5b4pj000000jvxratt/20180602_en.pdf (hereafter Corporate Governance Code). For a discussion of early corporate law, prior to themodernization of company law, see Janis Sarra and Masafumi Nakahigashi, ‘Balancing Social and Corporate Culture in the
Global Economy: The Evolution of Japanese Corporate Culture and Norms’ (2002) 24 Law & Policy 4 at 299-354.
65
Sarra and Nakahigashi, ibid.
66
See for example, article 348(4), Companies Act of Japan.
67
Companies Act of Japan, article 25.
68
Companies Act of Japan, article 2(v).
69
Ibid, article 2(i).
70
Katsuyuki Yamaguchi, Kaoru Tatsumi, and Mamiko Komura, ‘Corporate governance and directors' duties in Japan: overview’(1 May 2020), Thompson Reuters Practical Law, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-5020177?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true (hereafter Yamaguchi et al). Kabushiki kaisha are
generally classified according to the transfer restrictions imposed on their shares.
71
Dan W Puchniak and Masafumi Nakahigashi, ‘Case No. 21: Corporate Law – Business Judgment Rule – Derivative Action –Supreme Court, 15 July 2010’, in Moritz Bälz et al eds, Business Law in Japan ---- Cases and Comments （Kluwer Law
International; 2012) at 215-226 (hereafter Puchniak and Nakahigashi).
72
Tokyo Stock Exchange, Securities Listing Regulations Rule 436-2; Tokyo Stock Exchange, Enforcement Rules for Securities
Listing Regulations Rule 436-2. English translation at <http://www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/regulations/>.
73
Puchniak and Nakahigashi, supra note 71 at 10.

15

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japana ‘Company with Three Committees’ – a nomination, audit, and remuneration committee; 74 or a‘Company with Supervisory Committee’. 75 The latter two forms of organizational structure under theCompanies Act are similar to companies in other countries where committees are established underthe board and assigned certain responsibilities with the aim of strengthening oversight and monitoring
functions. 76 All three forms of company governance structures have a board of directors. The
differences in governance structures are discussed in more detail in Appendix I; however, the key
governance and director oversight features are summarized here.
For a Company with a Kansayaku Board, the Companies Act allocates specific governance functions tothe board of directors, the kansayaku (auditors), and the kansayaku board, the latter of which musthave three or more auditors. Thus, under this governance model, listed companies are required to have
two boards, a board of directors and a board of kansayaku. The kansayaku audit the performance of
duties by directors and the management and have investigation powers by law. The kansayaku board
decides audit policy and the execution of each kansayaku’s authority. However, the kansayaku board’s
decision may not preclude kansayaku from exercising their authority. 77 The kansayaku serve an
oversight function over the directors and the board of directors. In the exercise of their audit powers,
the kansayaku can bring a lawsuit against directors seeking an injunction or damages for director
misconduct. 78
No one can be elected as director and kansayaku at the same time. In order to ensure independence
and high-level information gathering power, not less than half of kansayaku, as appointed at the generalshareholder meeting, must be outside kansayaku, and at least one full-time kansayaku must be
appointed.
A Company with Three Committees must appoint one or more shikkoyaku (executive officers) fromdirectors or non-directors, by a resolution of the board, and delegate business administration andcertain kinds of business decisions to the shikkoyaku. 79 The board can delegate substantial decisionmaking authority over the management of the company to the executive officers. The board must
appoint one or more ‘representative executive officers’ from among the executive officers, who have
responsibility for carrying out decisions made by the board or the executive officers, and have authority
to represent the company. As of May 2020, only 76 of the approximately 3,700 publicly-listedcompanies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) had the three-committee structure. 80
A Company with Supervisory Committee has only one board, and it is represented by the representative
director. If independent directors do not comprise a majority of the board, the Corporate Governance
Code recommends, as best practice, establishing an independent advisory committee under the board,in which independent directors approve remuneration and some executive hiring decisions. 81
All three forms of companies can create a position with the title of shikkoyaku or shikkoyakuin for
persons who are delegated by the board to exercise a specified range of decisions regarding businessadministration. 82

Yamaguchi et al, supra note 70.
Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64.
76
Ibid.
77
Article 390(2), Companies Act of Japan.
78
Articles 385, 386, Companies Act of Japan.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid, Supplementary Principle 4.10.1.
82
Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64 at 16.
74
75

16

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in JapanThe 2019 amendments to the Companies Act of Japan now require public companies to have at least
one ’outside director’. 83 Outside director, in this context, does not mean ‘independent’ within themeaning of the TSE rules. Publicly-listed companies that are not large companies defined by Companies
Act are not required to have at least one outside director, but the number of such listed companies inJapan is small. 84 Article 2(15) of Companies Act defines the standard of ‘outside’ director, but makes noreference to independence. The TSE adds a requirement of ‘independent director’, but does not makethe criteria of independence clear in the Securities Listing Regulations. Publicly-listed companies set
their own criteria regarding the independence of directors and must disclose that criteria. However, theTSE may publicly announce or impose a listing agreement violation penalty if a company’s criteria does
not satisfy TSE requirements of independence in accordance with the TSE ‘Guidelines Concerning Listed
Company Compliance’. 85 Rule 436-2(1) states that directors are independent if they are unlikely to haveconflicts of interest with general investors, 86 giving the TSE authority to impose a listing violation
penalty on them for failure to comply.
No matter which of the three types of corporate board structures permitted in Japan have been
adopted, all companies have directors and all the directors have duties pursuant to corporate law and,
where they are publicly-listed, pursuant to financial services law.
Directors in Japan have three primary duties, a duty of loyalty, a duty to be in compliance with all laws,
regulations, and ordinances, and the company articles, and a duty of care to act with the care of aprudent manager, 87 discussed in detail in the next three parts. Japan is a civil law country, and thus thestatutes set out the legal basis for the scope of directors’ and officers’ duties.

3. DIRECTORS’ DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND ADHERENCE TO THE LAW
3.1 Duty of Loyalty
The Companies Act of Japan sets out the duty of loyalty that directors owe to the company. Articles 355
specifies:
Duty of Loyalty
Article 355 Directors shall perform their duties for the Stock Company in a loyal manner incompliance with laws and regulations, the articles of incorporation, and resolutions ofshareholders meetings. 88
In general, the duty of loyalty includes a duty on directors to avoid conflicts of interest and self-dealingtransactions. However, article 355 of the Companies Act of Japan requires directors to perform theirduties for the company in a loyal manner; so article 355’s duty sets out not only a duty to avoid conflictsof interest and self-dealing transactions, but also a duty of care in their oversight and management of
the company. The duty of loyalty is not distinguished from a duty of care in Japan, 89 and most directors’
duties in respect of oversight and management of climate change are likely to arise under the duty ofCompanies Act of Japan, article 327-2.
Companies Act of Japan, Article 2(vi), see Appendix I for a definition of large companies.
85
TSE, ‘Guidelines Concerning Listed Company Compliance’, Part III. See Appendix I for more discussion.
86
Securities Listing Regulations Rule 436-2. https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/rulesparticipants/rules/regulations/tvdivq0000001vyt-att/securities_listing_regs1-826_20190716.pdf.
87
Civil Code of Japan, Act No. 89 of April 27, 1896, as amended, article 644, 民法 明治 29 年 4 月 27 日法律第 89 号);
Companies Act of Japan, article 355.
88
Ibid.
89
24-6 Saikosaibannsyo Minjihanreisyu 625, Japanese Supreme Court’s decision June 2 of 1970.
83
84

17

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

care part of article 355, as well as article 330 of the Companies Act and article 644 of the Civil Code, as
discussed in part 4.
Directors also have a duty to report any information that is likely to harm the company. Article 357(1)specifies that if directors detect any fact likely to cause substantial detriment to the stock company,
they shall immediately report such fact to the shareholders, or, for a company with auditors, to thecompany auditors. Article 357(2) states that for the purpose of application of article 357(1) to acompany with a kansayaku board, the report is to be made to that board. 90
3.2 Directors’ Duty to Obey Specific Laws, Regulations, and Ordinances, and the Corporate Articles
Note that Article 355 above specifies that in being loyal to the company, directors shall perform theirduties in compliance with laws and regulations, the articles of incorporation, and resolutions ofshareholders meetings.
The Companies Act of Japan specifies that the directors of large companies must develop the systems
necessary to ensure that the execution of duties by the directors complies with the laws andregulations and the articles of incorporation, and other systems prescribed by ordinance necessary toensure the proper operations of a stock company. 91 This statutory obligation is reinforced by Article
100 of the Regulation for Enforcement of the Companies Act, which requires directors to develop
systems related to management of the risk of loss to the stock company and any of its subsidiaries. 92 It
thus requires the board of directors of a large stock company to establish a proper internal control andrisk management system to support directors’ duty to supervise business operations. 93 In suchcompanies, a director’s duty of care to supervise the business will not be effectively performed without
a proper internal control system.
Companies in a corporate group should each act in their own interests. Where transactions enhance
the interests of the whole of group, they are permissible; however, directors of a company in a
corporate group should not make decisions if they are not in the interests of the entity of which they
are directors.
The duty to obey laws and regulations is straightforward. Statutes set out the standards, and if a
director violates specific provisions that require a corporation to act, it is a breach of the director’s
duties, as well as a breach of statutory obligation by the company. Various Japanese laws impose civil,
criminal, and administrative penalties or other liabilities both on the corporation and on directors as
the decision-makers. A number of environmental laws, such as the Soil Contamination

Companies Act of Japan, article 357(2).
Companies Act of Japan, article 348(4), referencing also 348(3)(iv), specifies that directors of a company without a board of
directors must develop a system of internal controls if it is a large company, a decision that cannot be delegated to a single
director. The obligation is reinforced by Article 98 of the Regulation for Enforcement of the Companies Act. Article 362(5),referencing (4)(vi) of the Companies Act of Japan specifies that board of directors of a company with Kansayaku Board must
develop the system if it is a large company. The obligation is reinforced by Article 100 of the Regulation for Enforcement of theCompanies Act. Article 399-13(2), referencing (1)(i)(c) of the Companies Act of Japan specifies that board of directors of acompany with supervisory board must develop the system. The obligation is reinforced by Article 110-4 of the Regulation for
Enforcement of the Companies Act. Article 416(2), referencing (1)(i)(e) of the Companies Act of Japan specifies that board of
directors of a company with three committees must develop the system. The obligation is reinforced by Article 112 of theRegulation for Enforcement of the Companies Act.
92
Regulation for Enforcement of the Companies Act, article 100(ii), Japanese Law Translation 会社法施行規則平成 18 年 2 月
9091

7 日法務省令第 12 号 Ministry of Justice Order No 12 of February 7, 2006,
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=1&dn=1&x=52&y=13&co=01&ia=03&ja=04&ky=companies+act+enfor
cement+regulation&page=9.
93Large company is a defined term under Article 2(vi) of the Companies Act of Japan.

18

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in JapanCountermeasures Act 94 and the Water Pollution Prevention Act, 95 regulate the actions of the company;and directors who violate environmental and health and safety laws can be subject to both civil andcriminal liabilities. 96
3.3 Application of these Duties to Climate Change
Directors’ duty of loyalty to the company means that they are required to act in its best interests.
Arguably, best interests includes the long-term sustainability of the company. As noted above, theClimate Change Adaptation Act requires that businesses endeavour to adapt to climate change inaccordance with the content of their business activities, and to cooperate with governments at all levels,
so directors have a duty to endeavour to adapt.
The MOE has advised companies to engage in scenario analysis to assess the resilience of their businessin the face of global warming. As the World Economic Forum has observed, as stewards for long-term
performance and resilience, the board of directors should determine the most effective way tointegrate climate considerations into its structure and committees. 97 It suggests that regardless ofboard structure, ‘the approach to embedding climate considerations should enable sufficient attention
and scrutiny to climate as a financial risk and opportunity.’ 98 Moreover, it is important to rememberthat the board of directors as a whole retains legal responsibility for addressing climate-related financial
risks, notwithstanding any allocation of risk management or disclosure of climate-related risks to a
specific board committee.
Even though directors have a broad business discretion to design board committees, arguably directors
could be held liable under articles 423(1), 348(4), 362(5), 399-13(2), and 416(2) of the Companies Act
of Japan and articles 98, 100, 110-2, and 114 of the Regulation for Enforcement of the Companies Act
for failure to establish a climate risk management system with sufficient capabilities to perform their
responsibilities to oversee and manage climate-related financial risks and opportunities, including both
physical and transition risks. Depending on the size and kinds of business lines, the risk management
system adopted needs to be proper and sufficiently capable of performing the above-mentioned
responsibilities in light of the likelihood and magnitude of climate risks to the company.
In the future, any strengthening of statutes that would require companies to set targets towards
decarbonization or that require companies to disclose governance, strategy, risk management, andmetrics in line with an international framework would add those duties to other duties of directors.

4. DIRECTORS’ DUTY OF CARE
Japanese directors also have a duty of care in their oversight and management of the company. Thisobligation is both a positive obligation of exercising due care in the performance of their duties and adefence to personal liability where directors have acted with due care. 99 These duties apply to all stock

Soil Contamination Countermeasures Act, Act No 53 of May 29, 2002, as amended.
Water Pollution Prevention Act, Law No 138 of 1970, as amended by Law No 75 of 1995, 水質汚濁防止法 昭和 45 年 12 月
25 日法律第 138 号.
96
Yamaguchi et al, supra note 70.
97
World Economic Forum, How to Set Up Effective Climate Governance on Corporate Boards: Guiding principles and questions,(19 January 2019), principle 3, https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/how-to-set-up-effective-climate-governance-oncorporate-boards-guiding-principles-and-questions.
98
Ibid at 13.
99
Companies Act of Japan, examples of where due care are a defence include article 52.2(2)(ii), article 120.4(4), and article
213.2(2)(ii).
94
95

19

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

companies, regardless of whether they are publicly- or privately-held. The duties are set out in articles
355 and 330 of the Companies Act of Japan and article 644 of Japan’s Civil Code.
The statutory requirement that directors of a large stock company establish a proper internal control
and risk management system means that climate governance should be embedded in a board risk
management committee or a sustainability committee. The committee allocated with this responsibility
must have directors that have sufficient capability to scrutinize climate risks to the company and thento interact with the management and the board to manage and oversee management of these risks.
More specifically, such risk management committee needs to be able to assess and analyze both thephysical risks and transition risks of climate change discussed in part 1. Where directors lack theexpertise and that expertise is not available among the executives of the company, directors should
hire outside professional expertise that can support their climate-related risk management decisions in
the best interests of the company.
Directors have a broad business discretion to design internal control and risk management systems.
Where they determine that a separate risk management committee is necessary, they can embed
oversight of climate risk in that committee. With or without a separate risk management committee,
the board of directors as a whole still has the overall responsibility to ensure that the company isidentifying and addressing material climate-related financial risks and opportunities. The duty of carein the context of climate change mitigation and adaption can be derived from articles 355 and 330 of
the Companies Act of Japan and article 644 of the Civil Code duties to act in the company’s bestinterests.
Under corporate law, for example, directors can be found personally liable under their duty of care if
they did not respond to changes in law in a timely and effective manner. 100 One example would be a
failure to comply with articles 348, 362(5), 399-13(2), and 416(2) of the Companies Act, as discussed
above. If directors of a large stock company fail to establish a proper internal control system thatappropriately addresses climate-related risks, they could be found personally liable for breach of their
duty of care.
The financial risks of climate change are so broadly acknowledged by governments, scientists, financial
institutions, companies, investors and civil society, that it is no longer a defence for directors to saythat they were unaware of the risks. Failure to manage climate-related financial risks is likely to befound to be a failure of directors’ duty of care. Some scholars have suggested that Japanese courts will
look to outcomes more often than process to assess whether directors have met their duty of care. 101
In this respect, there may be heightened risk of Japanese directors being found in breach of their dutyof care if they fail to act on climate change, as compared with other jurisdictions, as discussed in part4.6 below on the business judgment rule.
Legal opinions in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have all concluded that the duty of care ofcorporate directors includes a duty of oversight and effective management of climate-related risks andopportunities. 102 In the Canadian legal opinion, Carol Hansell opines:
100
Janis Sarra and Masafumi Nakahigashi, ‘Kigyo No Shakai-Teki Sekinin: Challenges for Corporate Social Responsibility in Japan’(2012) 45:3 UBC Law Review 779 at 828.
101
J Mark Ramseyer and Masayuki Tamaruya, ‘Fiduciary Principles in Japanese Law’ (2017) Discussion Paper No. 935 09/2017
Harvard Law School, at 8, 10, citing [No names given], 2063 Hanrei jiho 138 (Sup. Ct. 27 November 2009). The Supreme Court
similarly used an ex post analysis of the outcome to declare loans by the Hokkaido Development Bank to a troubled real estate
firm to constitute a duty of care violation in [No names given], 1997 Hanrei jiho 143 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 28, 2008);
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_935.pdf.
102
Noel Hutley SC and Sebastian Hartford Davis, ‘Climate Change and Directors’ Duties, Supplementary memorandum ofOpinion’ (26 March 2019), Australia Centre for Policy Development; Noel Hutley SC and Sebastian Hartford Davis, ‘Climate
Change and Directors Duties, Memorandum of Opinion’ (7 October 2016), commissioned by the Future Business Council andthe Centre for Policy Development, <https:// cpd.org.au/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2016/ 10/ Legal- Opinion- on- Climate-

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Since there can be little doubt that directors are aware of climate change risk, they must
inform themselves of the risk that climate change poses to the corporation and how that risk
is being managed. If this information is not already included in management reports to theboard, the board should direct management to deliver the necessary information to them . . .
As is the case for any disclosure, misrepresentations about climate change risk can expose thecorporation, its officers and its directors to both regulatory and civil liability. In respect ofpotential civil liability, an important factor for directors is that investors need not be aware ofa misrepresentation about climate change to seek damages based on it; securities law deems
them to have relied on the misrepresentations. Directors should also be aware that theirdecisions about disclosure are not protected by the business judgment rule. 103
Similarly, directors in Japanese companies may have such a duty, given some of the similarities between
Canada’s and Japan’s corporate governance systems. Directors’ duties in Japan are set out in the
Companies Act of Japan, 104 the Civil Code of Japan, 105 and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act(FIEA). 106
4.1 Duty of Care Owed to the Company
The duties of care and diligence are set out in Japan’s Companies Act article 330 and the Civil Codearticle 644. Companies Act article 330 specifies that the relationship between a stock company and its
officers or accounting auditors shall be governed by the provisions on mandate, including Civil Codearticle 644. The Civil Code specifies:
Duty of Care of Mandatary
Article 644 A mandatary shall assume a duty to administer the mandated business with thecare of a good manager in compliance with the main purport of the mandate.
A ‘mandatary’ in the corporate context is one that has been given a mandate to oversee or manage theaffairs of the company. Article 644 thus requires directors to exercise the care that a good manager
would exercise. Article 355 of Companies Act of Japan also sets out a duty of care in their oversight andmanagement of the company as mentioned Part 3.1. Directors are to act with due care; and proving
due care is a defence to liability for a number of directors’ actions. 107 Equally, where directors are
negligent in the performance of their duties, they can be personally liable for the misconduct. Article
429 of the Companies Act provides for directors’ monetary liability where they are ‘withknowledge or grossly negligent in performing their duties’ to the third party, and article 423 sets out
directors’ liability to the company:
Liability of Officers to Stock Company for Damages
Article 423(1) If a director, accounting advisor, company auditor, executive officer or financial
auditor (hereinafter in this Section referred to as "Officers, Etc.") neglects their duties, they
are liable to such Stock Company for damages arising as a result thereof. 108
Change- and- Directors- Duties.pdf> ; Chapman Tripp, ‘Climate Change Risk— Implications for New Zealand Company Directors
and Managed Investment Scheme Providers’ (October 2019) Legal Opinion; Carol Hansell, ‘Putting Climate Change Risk on the
Boardroom Table’, https://law-ccli-2019.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2020/06/Hansell-Climate-Change-Opinion.pdf.
103
Hansell, ibid at 21.
104
Companies Act of Japan, article 355.
105
Civil Code, article 640.
106
Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, supra note 63.
107
Companies Act of Japan, article 52(2)(i), including for actions in the incorporation of a company, liabilities of directors incase of shortfall in value of property contributed, and liability where shares are acquired in response to demand for purchase
108
Articles 423 (2), (3), (4), Companies Act of Japan, relate to interested transactions and potential director conflicts of interest
and are not relevant for this paper.

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Directors in Japan have a duty of care, to act as a mandatary in the best interest of the company, its
shareholders and stakeholders. Directors who neglect their duties are jointly and severally liable to thecompany for any resulting damages; and where directors are grossly negligent or knowingly fail toperform their duties, such directors are also liable to third parties or shareholders for the resulting
damages. 109 However, if directors can demonstrate that they did not fail to exercise their duty of carein the performance of their duties, they will not be held liable. 110
4.2 Application of Due Care and Diligence in a Climate Risk Context
Since climate change is affecting almost all businesses and has been recognized by governments,
courts, and investors as a material issue affecting the sustainability of the company, corporate directors
need to recognize their obligation to address climate-related risks and opportunities. Directors could
be found in breach of their duties and found personally liable for failures of the duty to act with due
care in the best interests of the company in failing to address climate-related risks and opportunities.
This liability for breach of their duties is in addition to their potential personal liability for failure tomeet the requirements of any statutes or ordinances.
Examples of breach of the duty of care would be a complete failure to engage in oversight of the
management of climate-related financial risks; failure to set up appropriate risk management
committees or other governance mechanisms to manage risks pursuant to article 348 of the Companies
Act; failure to make relevant enquiries to management regarding physical and transition risks to thebusiness due to climate change; or failure to seek outside expertise where the directors do not possess
the knowledge or expertise to devise a strategy to address climate risk. Other examples might include
failure to robustly assess the assumptions underlying revenue/cost projections for climate-related
disruption, and failure to ensure assets and supply chains are resilient to foreseeable physical climate
risks.
In Canada and the UK, directors’ duty of care is assessed by an objective standard, as has also beensuggested by the Supreme Court of Japan. 111 The obligation of directors to consider the implications ofclimate change risk is grounded in the duties each director owes to the corporation he or she serves. In
their oversight of management of climate risks, directors must meet the objective standard of what areasonably prudent person would do in comparable circumstances. 112 As Hansell as observed:
Among other things, directors must put aside their own preconceptions about the reality or
imminence of climate change risk. They may not demure to management and simply wait for
presentations to be made to them. Directors must put climate change on the board agenda.
They must require reports and recommendations from management and external sources asnecessary, and be satisfied that the corporation is addressing climate change risk
appropriately. 113
This insight arguably also applies in the Japanese corporate context.

Yamaguchi et al, supra note 70.
Ibid, see the discussion below on the business judgment rule.
111
Please see the discussion in part 4.6 of this report.
112
See for example, the Supreme Court of Canada judgments in Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68
at para 63 and BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 44.
113
Hansell, supra note 102 at 1.
109
110

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4.3 The Duty of Care for Public Companies is Reinforced by Japan’s Corporate Governance CodeJapan's Corporate Governance Code, published by Tokyo Stock Exchange, requires publicly-listedcompanies to address ESG and other sustainability issues proactively. 114 The Corporate Governance
Code specifies that ‘Companies should take appropriate measures to address sustainability issues,
including social and environmental matters’ and that ‘given the increasing demand and interest withrespect to sustainability issues in recent years, the board should consider addressing these matters
positively and proactively’. 115 The Corporate Governance Code states that ‘while the quantitative partof financial statements of Japanese companies conform to a standard format and therefore excel withrespect to comparability, qualitative and non-financial information, such as financial standing, businessstrategies, risks and ESG (environmental, social and governance) matters, is often boiler-plate andlacking in detail, therefore less valuable’. 116 The board should actively commit to ensuring that
disclosed information, including non-financial information, is as valuable and useful as possible. 117
The Corporate Governance Code is non-binding on companies, but it does strongly influence
governance norms. Since climate-related financial risks and opportunities are part of ESG, the Codesupports directors’ efforts to effectively manage climate change impacts. The Corporate Governance
Code has the potential to be instrumental for certain companies, particularly in light of the fact thatmany companies are voluntarily adhering to it. The impact of soft-law and its appreciation by the Japan
Financial Services Agency is influenced by developments in the UK by financial services regulators, andJapan can draw on the experiences of regulators internationally. For example, New Zealand and the UK
have announced that TCFD disclosure will become mandatory for companies subject to theirjurisdiction, and the UK is moving towards mandatory disclosure of company efforts to reach net-zeroemissions. 118
Arguably, the principles of the Corporate Governance Code that are adopted by a company should betreated as ‘fundamentally important internal rules’ of the company such that directors have a duty ofcare not to ignore these principles. A stock company listed on the TSE may choose to comply with eachprinciple of the Corporate Governance Code or explain the reasons why it is not complying. However,once the company, through its legitimate decision-making process, has chosen to comply with specified
principles of the Code, directors, officers, and employees must adhere to the company’s decision andhave no freedom to choose to comply or not.
Adoption of the Corporate Governance Code is communicated to the TSE in a statement. While it does
not create a new contractual obligation, the company has committed to board governance practices
that comply with the principles endorsed. Failure to comply with the principles adopted could
jeopardize the company’s listing. Thus, any failure to meet the commitments the company has madeto the listing exchange would be assessed as part of the directors meeting their statutory duty of careto act in the best interests of the company. The obligations owed to the company are to comply withall the adopted principles, unless the board subsequently decides to officially change its decision fromcompliance to non-compliance by explaining their reasons for the change.

Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64.
Ibid, Principle 2.3, at 10.
116
Ibid at 13
117
Ibid.
118
Ministry for the Environment, Government of New Zealand, Climate Related Financial Disclosures, (21 September 2020),
https://www.mfe.govt.nz/climate-change/climate-change-and-government/mandatory-climate-related-financial-disclosures;
HM Treasury, Chancellor sets out ambition for future of UK Financial Services, (9 November 2020),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-sets-out-ambition-for-future-of-uk-financialservices?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=f1fb3a3a16EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_11_09_05_28&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-f1fb3a3a16-190626680.
114
115

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in JapanThe Corporate Governance Code principles chosen by corporate boards determine the fundamental
governance structure of the company together with the company articles. Given the fundamental
nature of the governance principles chosen, arguably all the directors of the company owe a duty ofcare not to simply ignore the principles chosen by the company for compliance. The decision of theboard on which principles to adopt is examined through the lens of the business judgment rule. If a
non-compliant director is trying to persuade the board to change the company’s official decision, that
action would also be assessed in terms of whether or not the director has met his or her duty of care.
Principle 2.1 of the Corporate Governance Code states that ‘Guided by their position concerning social
responsibility, companies should undertake their businesses in order to create value for all stakeholders
while increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term. To this end, companies should draft andmaintain business principles that will become the basis for such activities.’ 119 The setting of corporate
goals and strategic direction is a major aspect of directors’ responsibilities. 120 Principle 4.5 of the Codespecifies that the fiduciary responsibilities of directors and kansayaku require that they ‘secure theappropriate cooperation with stakeholders and act in the interest of the company and the common
interests of its shareholders.’ 121 In order to promote sustainable corporate growth over the mid- tolong-term, the directors are to set corporate strategy, and carry out effective oversight of directors andthe management from an independent and objective standpoint, regardless of the form of corporate
structure. 122
In the application of these basic principles to climate governance, of note is that the TSE reports that
almost all of the principles have been adopted by companies listed on its exchange. Therefore,
practically, it would be near-impossible for a non-compliant director to convince the board to switchfrom compliance to non-compliance of the Code as part of their duties of care and loyalty. As a result,
it would be possible to argue that failure to consider climate risks and opportunities over the mid-tolong term in determining strategies for the company’s sustainable growth constitutes a breach of dutyof care. 123 For instance, directors of a company with very large fossil fuel positions in their business orinvestment portfolio are arguably obligated to create a mid-to-long term strategy to reallocate businessresources from fossil fuels to new opportunities to achieve sustainable growth, embedding thatstrategy in their mid-term business plan. 124
In addition to their articles of association, publicly-listed Japanese companies normally have a numberof internal rules such as board meeting rules, risk management rules, and rules regarding operation ofboard committees, all of which directors must comply with. Internal approval processes tend to beformal based on such internal rules. 125 A company can change any internal rule if directors find it isunreasonable or impractical. Equally, a director can be held personally liable for a breach of duty of carewhen violating an important internal rule. 126

Ibid at 10.
Ibid, Principle 4.1.
121
Ibid, Principle 4.5.
122
Ibid Principle 4.
123
Similar analysis has been undertaken in the UK, Canada and Australia, see Sarah Barker and Ellie Mulholland, Directors’
Liability and Climate Risk: Comparative Paper – Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (CCLI 2019),
https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CCLI-Directors%E2%80%99-Liability-and-Climate-Risk-ComparativePaper-October-2019-vFINAL.pdf (hereafter Barker and Mulholland).
124
Mid-term business plans (chuuki keiei keikaku) for Japanese companies are typically 3-year plans. Corporate Governance
Code, supra note 64.
125
The terms Kessai and Ringi refer to a Japan-specific internal procedures to decide some issues in a company, and they are
not relevant in the climate context as they do not relate to issues of the binding power of directors’ decisions.
126
In a Tokyo High Court judgment dated May 21 in the 20th year of Heisei, a director who executed a derivative transaction incontravention of the internal risk management rule was held liable for damages in breach of duty of care, Yakult Honsha co, Ltd.
Case, 1281 Hanrei jiho 274 (Tokyo High Ct, 21 May 2008).
119
120

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Similarly, the Corporate Governance Code principles adopted should be treated as important internal
rules of the company. While there are not yet any Japanese court precedents in which any principles
have been applied to a director’s duty, since the Corporate Governance Code’s early introduction, it
has been aimed at making directors’ duty of care and duty of loyalty effective in practice by providing
an important framework. 127 For example, the notes to principle 4 state:
the reasonableness of the decision-making process at the time of the decision is generally
considered an important factor in determining whether or not the management and directors
should owe personal liability for damages. The Code includes principles and practices that are
expected to contribute to such a reasonable decision-making process, and promotetransparency, fairness, timeliness and decisiveness as well. 128
The Corporate Governance Code offers an important framework and standards of objective
reasonableness that are helpful in determining directors’ duty of care and duty of loyalty. It will likely
be relied on in any lawsuit seeking a director’s personal liability for damages.
The Corporate Governance Code also contains principles for independent directors, notwithstandingthat they are not currently the norm, linking their activities to sustainable growth. 129 As noted above,
the Corporate Governance Code is non-binding, but it may have created some normative pressure on
corporate directors to identify and oversee material ESG risks and opportunities, including climate
related-financial risk. If ESG factors are part of the key performance indicators (KPI) of the company’s
mid- and long-term business plan and are indicators of medium-to-long-term performance-linked
compensation, directors would have the obligation to make efforts to promote climate change
mitigation and adaptation. 130 Almost all listed stock companies make mid- and long-term business plans
and set non-financial factors as KPI. Several companies make ESG factors indicators of directors’
performance-linked compensation, and management of climate-related risks and opportunities istherefore part of their mandate.
The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing organization (UN PRI) has observed that Japan’s
Corporate Governance Code should result in improved disclosure of key ESG issues, including in crossshareholdings, and should enhance corporate governance expectations. 131 In 2017, it concluded thatJapan lagged in understanding that ESG integration refers to the systematic and explicit inclusion ofmaterial ESG factors into portfolio analysis and investment decisions. 132
4.4 Duty of Care to Other Stakeholders
There is currently no express duty of care to stakeholders set out in Japan’s corporate legislation.
However, Japan’s corporate governance structure has a long history of concern for stakeholders beyond
shareholder interests, situating the activities of companies within an elaborate framework ofintercompany crossholdings and an understanding of the company as embedded in the community,with strong relationships with employees, customers, and stakeholders that are part of the company’s
supply chain. 133 Given this extensive history, normatively, directors should be thinking about the socialand consumer risks of climate change, as discussed in part 1 above.

Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64, preamble.
Ibid at 17.
129
ibid, Principle 4.5. See Appendix II.
130
See the discussion of compensation in Appendix I.
131
United Nations PRI, ‘Fiduciary duty in the 21st century: Japan roadmap’ (25 April 2017), https://www.unpri.org/fiduciaryduty/fiduciary-duty-in-the-21st-century-japan-roadmap/262.article.
132
Ibid at 6.
133
For a discussion, see Sarra and Nakahigashi, supra note 64.
127
128

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Directors have a responsibility to consider mid- and long-term interests of the company. Directors areallowed to consider stakeholders’ interests, but in Japan, this consideration should contribute to longterm success of the company and thus ultimately to shareholders’ benefit. In most cases, directors,
who consider stakeholders’ interests important will be protected by the business judgment rule,
discussed below in part 4.6.
When shareholders’ interests come into conflict with the other stakeholders’ interests, directors must
make decisions in the best interests of the company because they legally owe duties to company andshareholders. Their climate governance decisions must either arise out of their legal obligations tomanage risks to the company or out of shareholder decisions amending the company articles toexpressly embed policies such as targets to move to net-zero carbon emissions. As in many countries,
leadership by the corporate board will be essential to managing climate-related risks and opportunities
and to embedding consideration of stakeholder interests into climate governance.
The Corporate Governance Code, while stating that companies should ‘take appropriate measures tofully secure shareholder rights and develop an environment in which shareholders can exercise theirrights appropriately and effectively’, also states:
Companies should fully recognize that their sustainable growth and the creation of mid- tolong-term corporate value are brought as a result of the provision of resources andcontributions made by a range of stakeholders, including employees, customers, business
partners, creditors and local communities. As such, companies should endeavor toappropriately cooperate with these stakeholders. The board and the management should
exercise their leadership in establishing a corporate culture where the rights and positions ofstakeholders are respected and sound business ethics are ensured. 134
The Code also states that the ‘appropriate actions of companies based on the recognition of theirstakeholder responsibilities will benefit the entire economy and society, which will in turn contributeto producing further benefits to companies, thereby creating a virtuous cycle.’ 135 Although the Code is
not part of the statutory directors’ duty of care, it creates best practice norms that support
management of climate-related financial risks and opportunities, and, as noted above, may ground anaction in respect of the duty of care where the principles have been adopted by the company and a
director has failed to comply.
4.5 Institutional Investors’ Fiduciary Obligations Have an Impact on Corporate Directors’ Duties
Institutional investors also have fiduciary obligations to address climate-related risk, as discussed inAppendix III. The fact that institutional investors are increasingly acknowledging that their fiduciary
obligations include investing in companies that are reducing their carbon footprints and are developing
innovative technologies for climate mitigation and adaptation means that investee companies are
directly affected by these decisions shifting investment portfolios towards climate-mitigating activities.
If company directors fail to recognize these strong shifts in capital markets activity, they may be inbreach of their duty of care.
4.6 Deference to Business Judgment of Corporate Directors
It is only in the past ten years that the Japanese courts have recognized a ‘business judgment rule’ thatgives deference to the decisions of directors in appropriate circumstances. 136 In the Apamanshop case,
Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64, Principle 2.
Ibid at 9.
136
Puchniak and Nakahigashi, supra note 72.
134
135

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanthe Supreme Court of Japan overturned a High Court judgment finding that directors had breachedtheir duty of care in agreeing to a deal carried out for the purpose of making a partially-owned
subsidiary a wholly-owned subsidiary of Apamanshop as a part of the corporate group's restructuringplan. 137
The Supreme Court of Japan held that ‘so long as there are no significantly unreasonable aspects
involved in the process and content of such decisions, it should be understood that the directors will
not violate their duty of care as directors’. 138 In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court placed
considerable weight on the directors' reasonable deliberations of the relevant facts at the board
meeting and on the directors' decision to seek and follow a lawyer's opinion. 139 The Court cited several
specific factors, such as the short time period since the partially-owned subsidiary's public offering, therange in the value of its unlisted shares, the essential nature of the affiliated shops, the relationshipbetween the entities, and the corporate group's future business, concluding that the content of thedecision was not ‘significantly unreasonable’. 140
The decision was the first time that the business judgment rule was explicitly applied by the Supreme
Court of Japan, particularly significant because of several judgments in the period prior that expressly
did not defer to business judgment. 141 The framework used by the Supreme Court suggests that
directors’ managerial decisions should be protected from liability by the business judgment rule when:(1) the decision was based on reasonable research and analysis of the relevant facts; and (2) thedecision was not irrational or inappropriate in comparison to what a reasonable manager in the specificbusiness environment would have decided. 142 Thus deference to the directors’ business judgment
depends on the directors actually turning their minds to an issue. Courts are unlikely to defer todirectors where there has been inaction on climate change or failure to exercise oversight ofmanagement of climate-related financial risks.
Puchniak and Nakahigashi observe that the willingness of courts in Japan to engage in a detailed
examination of the reasonableness of the content of directors' decisions distinguishes the Japanesebusiness judgment rule from the business judgment rule in the US. 143 Unlike the US rule, directors inJapan are unlikely to be released from the duty of care or duty of loyalty under the Japanese businessjudgment rule solely by their state of mind, eg, acting in good faith or in their belief for the best interestof the company. The Supreme Court of Japan’s reasoning appears closer to the business judgment ruleas defined by Canadian courts.
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that many decisions made in the course of business, althoughultimately unsuccessful, are reasonable and defensible at the time they are made; and that provided
the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness, courts are unlikely to substitute their opinion
for that of the board, even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s
determination. 144 However, the Canadian Supreme Court has also held that the courts ‘are capable, on
the facts of any case, of determining whether an appropriate degree of prudence and diligence was
Ibid at 220.
Supreme Court of Japan Decision, Part 4, para 2.
139
Ibid, Part 4, para 3.
140
Puchniak and Nakahigashi, supra note 72 at 8.
141
Ibid at 222, citing M Kitamura, ‘Hi-jôjô-kaisha no kabushiki no kaitori to keiei-handan-no-gensoku’ [Purchase of Shares in
Unlisted Corporations and the Business Judgment Rule], in Juristo 1420 (2011) 139; and R Kobayashi, ‘Hi-jô-jôkaisha no kaitori
kakaku no kettei to torishimariyaku no zenkan-chui-gimu-ihan no umu’ [Decision of Purchase Price of Unlisted Companies andthe Existence of Directors’ Breach of the Duty of Care], in Hanrei Select 2010 [II] (2010) 18. For the Kitamura article in Japanese,
非上場会社の株式の買取りと経営判断の原則. For the Kobayashi article in Japanese, 非上場会社の買取価格の決定と取137
138

締役の善管注意義務違反の有無.
142
Puchniak and Nakahigashi, supra note 72 at 223.
143
Ibid at 9, 11.
144
BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 39, (2008) 3 SCR 560 at para 64.

27

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanbrought to bear in reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business decision at the time it was
made’. 145 The specificities of the elements necessary to find a breach of the duty of care in Japan may
facilitate a finding by a court that directors breached their duty of care.
Given the scientifically predictable nature and magnitude of climate change risks, arguably directors
are required by their duty of care under the Companies Act of Japan to be educated by appropriate
external experts, to have the skills and information to appropriately assess material risks andopportunities to the company and maintain command of climate-related risks and opportunities. If they
do not have climate expertise on the board, directors need to ensure that they have that expertise
within the company’s management or to hire external expertise. 146
For duly diligent directors, the Court’s recognition of a business judgment rule may offer a defence tospecific actions to address climate mitigation and adaptation, when hindsight information suggests thatthe directors should have made a different decision. However, the business judgment rule does notoffer a safe haven to directors that fail to act on climate-related risk. Japanese courts have been clearthat they will examine not only the process used to reach the business decision but also undertake anobjective review of the duty of care to assess whether a director acted significantly unreasonably froman objective standpoint at the time of the decision-making. This objective assessment by the courts is
also reflected in case law in Canada, the UK, and Australia, 147 and if anything, is likely to be an evenmore stringent test applied by Japanese Courts.
The contours of Japanese courts’ deference to business judgment are likely to develop further in the
future. However, it seems evident that with respect to climate change, where directors neglect toundertake reasonable research and analysis of the relevant facts, fail to get expert advice on climaterelated-risk management, and fail to exercise due care in respect of climate risks, the courts are unlikely
to defer to their business judgment, because directors will have failed to exercise any judgment at allor will have failed to engage in a reasonable assessment of the risks.
Litigation is a less-used strategy for holding Japanese corporate directors accountable for breaches of
their duties of care, loyalty, and adherence to the law. However, Japanese corporate law does allow forderivative actions by shareholders, which may offer an avenue for future litigation in respect of
directors’ failure to manage climate-related risks. 148 Shareholders who have continuously held sharesfor more than six months may demand that the company sue its directors, and if the company does not
file the lawsuit within 60 days of the demand, the shareholders may bring a derivative action on behalfof the company. 149 Assuming the lawsuit is well-founded, a derivative action can overcome financial
barriers to holding directors accountable as it can be funded from the company’s assets.
Shareholder engagement with investee companies is another avenue to hold directors and officers
accountable for their management and oversight of climate change risks and the next part turns toshareholder proposals as a growing corporate engagement strategy.

Ibid.
See international authorities such as the World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2020, (2020),
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020 and TCFD Final Report, supra note 11.
147
See for example, Janis Sarra, Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change (CCLI, 2018)
janis-cover.pdf (ubc.ca); Sarah Barker, Directors’ Liability and Climate Risk: Australia - Country Paper (CCLI 2018),
https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CCLI-Australia-Paper-Final.pdf; and Alexia Staker and Alice Garton,
Directors’ Liability and Climate Risk: United Kingdom - Country Paper (CCLI April 2018), https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/CCLI-UK-Paper-Final.pdf.
148
Companies Act of Japan, article 847.
149
Ibid. Shareholders of a parent company may also file a derivative suit against directors of wholly owned subsidiaries if such
subsidiary does not file the lawsuit within 60 days of the demand against the subsidiary by the parent company’s shareholders.
145
146

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5. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS UNDER THE COMPANIES ACTIn Japan, a shareholder can bring a shareholder proposal to the company’s management to amend thearticles of incorporation. A shareholder proposal that receives a majority of two-thirds or more of thevotes of the shareholders present at the meeting is binding on directors. 150 Note that it is the votes
exercised by shareholders present and voting at the meeting; it does not include any unexercised votes.
To amend the articles of incorporation, a special resolution by shareholders’ meeting is necessary,
which can be approved by the same majority or the corporate articles can specify a higher threshold of
votes required before the corporate articles can be revised. 151 Article 355 of the Companies Act of Japanrequires directors and officers to obey resolutions of shareholders’ meetings that receive the requisite
level of shareholder support, similar to corporate legislation in the UK and elsewhere. 152
Amendments to the Companies Act in 2019 included changes to the rules governing shareholder
proposals. Only shareholders that hold at least 1 per cent of total votes (usually one unit of 100 shares)or 300 votes can make a shareholder proposal. 153 Pursuant to the amendments, shareholders are now
limited in the number of proposals that they can make each year. The amendments will come into effect
1 March 2021, with some amendments, such as providing shareholder meeting materials through theinternet, not in effect until 2023. 154
5.1 The Growing Number of Climate-related Shareholder Proposals
If a resolution is passed at a shareholder meeting amending articles of incorporation by the requisite
majority stating that the company must promote climate change mitigation and adaptation, directors
and managers would have an obligation to comply in accordance with article 355 of Companies Act.
Failure to comply could result in personal liability.
In Japan, shareholders that hold the requisite votes can propose agenda items, including amending thecorporate articles to require consideration of ESG matters, including climate change. However, to date,institutional investors interested in ESG do not constitute the majority at shareholders’ meetings inJapan, so it is difficult for them to have the articles of incorporation amended to state that the company
must set targets for decarbonization and climate change mitigation and adaptation. That situation is
likely to change as climate change becomes even more urgent.
Shareholder activism is starting to draw attention to the need for climate-related risk management. For
example, in June 2020, a shareholder proposal at Mizuho Financial Group, Japan’s third largest bank,proposed amending the articles of incorporation to state: ‘Noting the company's support for the Paris
Agreement and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), the company shalldisclose in its annual reporting a plan outlining the company's business strategy, including metrics andCompanies Act of Japan, article 309 (2).
Ibid, article 309 (2)(xi) and Chapter 5, article 466.
152
See for example, the Barclay’s resolution. Resolution 29, setting the goals of Barclays to be net zero by 2050 and commits it
to a strategy, with targets, for alignment of its entire financing portfolio to the goals of the Paris Agreement; Barclays PLC
Notice of Annual General Meeting 2020, Letter from Group Chairman (2020), at 1, 4, 13,
https://home.barclays/content/dam/home-barclays/documents/investor-relations/reports-and-events/AGM2020/NOM2020.PDF. See also Barclays, ‘Update on Barclays’ ambition to be a net zero bank by 2050’ (30 November 2020),
https://home.barclays/society/our-position-on-climate-change/highlights/.
153
Companies Act of Japan, article 303(2). Usually one unit of 100 shares gives one vote to the shareholders, therefore the Act
indicates number of votes (not number of shares). Listed companies are requested to make one unit by 100 shares by Tokyo
Stock Exchange and/or other domestic stock exchanges. ‘Standardization of Trading Unit’,
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/improvements/unit/.
154
Yamaguchi et al, supra note 70.
150
151

29

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japantargets, to align its investments with the goals of the Paris Agreement’. 155 This resolution garnered 34.5
percent of votes cast, short of the two-thirds required to pass, but was supported by a significant
number of global investors and two major proxy advisory services. 156
Electric power companies, who operate coal-burning power plants, have received shareholder
proposals (titled ‘bill’ with a number assigned) to add a ‘forbidden clause’ that would amend thecorporate articles to prohibit the company from operating coal-burning power plants in order to adapt
to climate change. An example is the general shareholder meeting of Chubu Electric Power Co, Inc on
25 June 2020, in which 28 shareholders with an aggregate of 428 votes proposed adding a clause to thecompany’s articles to prohibit operating coal-burning power plants for the purpose of adapting toclimate change. 157 The proposal was rejected, although it received 191,056 votes (3.3 percent of total
votes) in favour. 158
Similar proposals submitted to the annual general shareholder meetings of Tokyo Electric Power
Company Holdings, Inc and The Kansai Electric Power Co, Inc in 2020 lost the vote, but garnered
550,632 and 225,715 votes in support respectively. 159 Two municipal governments, Osaka City and
Kyoto City, which hold 724,965 votes in Kansai Electric Power Co, proposed (Bill No 29) adding a clause
to replace atomic-power plants with renewable energy power plants for the purpose of building asustainable electric supply service. 160 They called on other shareholders to support their proposal, andwhile it was rejected, it received 1.32 million votes in favour, about 18.7 per cent of total votes. 161 In
Mizuho Financial Group , ‘Mizuho Financial Group Convocation Notice of the 18th Ordinary General Meeting of
Shareholders’, (20200 at 55, https://www.mizuhogroup.com/binaries/content/assets/pdf/mizuhoglobal/investors/financialinformation/stock-information/meeting18_1_eng.pdf.
156‘Mizuho investors reject Japan's first shareholder climate resolution’, The Japan Times (25 June 2020),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/25/business/corporate-business/mizuho-investors-reject-shareholder-climateresolution/#:~:text=Mizuho%20investors%20reject%20Japan%27s%20first%20shareholder%20climate%20resolution,Sorry%2C%20but%20your&text=Mizuho%20Financial%20Group%20Inc.,investors%20rejected%20a&text=The%20resolution%2C%20which%20its%20sponsor,aligned%20with%20the%20Paris%20Agre
ement.
157
Chubu Electric Power Co, Inc, Dai 96 kai Teijikabunushisoukai Syousyu-go-tuchi [Notice of Calling of 96th general Shareholders
Meetings] No 8 bill [in Japanese],https://www.chuden.co.jp/resource/ir/ir_kabunushi/ir_sokai/ir_sokai_96_01.pdf.
158
Chubu Electric Power Co, Inc, Rinji Houkokusyo [Extraordinary Report requested by Financial Instruments and Exchange Act]
(2020/06/26) [in Japanese],https://www.chuden.co.jp/ir/ir_siryo/yukashoken/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/06/26/96rinzihoukokusho_3_1.pdf.
159
Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc, general shareholder meeting on June 25th of 2020. No 4 bill, 215 shareholders
who totally have 1753 votes proposed to add a forbidden clause to operate coal-burning power plants for the purpose ofadapting climate change to the articles of incorporation. Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc, Dai 96 kai
Teijikabunushisoukai Syousyu-go- tuchi [Notice of Calling of 96th general Shareholders Meetings] No 4 bill [in Japanese],https://www4.tepco.co.jp/about/ir/stockinfo/pdf/200526_1-j.pdf. This bill proposing a clause forbidding operation of coalburning power plant was rejected, although 550,632 votes, about 2.12 per cent of the total votes, supported it. Tokyo ElectricPower Company Holdings, Inc, Rinji Houkokusyo[Extraordinary Report requested by Financial Instruments and Exchange Act]
(2020/07/02) [in Japanese]
https://www4.tepco.co.jp/about/ir/library/securities_report/pdf/200702-j.pdf. The Kansai Electric Power Co, Inc, The 96th
general shareholder meeting on June 25th of 2020, No 8 bill; 28 shareholders who totally have 424 votes suggested to add aforbidden clause to operate coal-burning power plants for the purpose of adapting climate change at the articles ofincorporation.
160
Osaka City, Kansai Denryoku Kabusikikaisya nitaisteno Kabunushiteian [The shareholder’s proposal to the Kansai ElectricPower Co., Inc.](2020.06.30) [in Japanese],https://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/kankyo/page/0000264358.html#r020427. The Office of Adopting Global Warming at the Bureau
for Environmental Policy of Kyoto City, Datsu Genpatu Syakai no Jitsugen he [Getting out from depending Nuclear Plant](2020.06.11)[in Japanese],https://www.city.kyoto.lg.jp/kankyo/cmsfiles/contents/0000271/271137/R2koho.pdf; The Kansai Electric Power Co, Inc, Dai 96
kai Teijikabunushisoukai Syousyu-go-tuchi [Notice of Calling of 96th general Shareholders Meetings] No 8 and No 29 bills [inJapanese], https://www.kepco.co.jp/ir/stockholder/meeting/96kai/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/05/26/96_syosyu.pdf. It received
225,715 votes, about 3.2 per cent of total votes.
161
The Kansai Electric Power Co, Inc, Rinji Houkokusyo [Extraordinary Report requested by Financial Instruments and ExchangeAct] (2020/06/26) [in Japanese](2020/06/29),
155

30

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanthese examples, the company directors opposed the shareholders’ bills (proposals) because they did
not want a narrowing of their managerial discretion. The case of the Kansai Electric Power Co differsfrom the other two cases, as many shareholders agreed with the shareholder proposal to embed ESG
in the articles of incorporation. In this case, there were two separate shareholder proposals thatreceived different levels of support.
In electric power companies, local governments are influential shareholders. Osaka City has 7.64 percent of issued shares of the Kansai Electric Power Company, and is its biggest shareholder. The mayorof Osaka, Ichiro Matsui, submitted the shareholder proposal (No 29 bill) with Kyoto City as cosponsoring shareholder. 162 Even though the proposal did not succeed at the shareholder meeting, it
sent messages to management of the Kansai Electric Power Co and citizens of these municipalities.
Osaka City will continue to pursue its efforts to make Kansai Electric Power Company take positive
action to replace atomic-power plants with renewable energy power plants, a particularly importantsafety issue after the Fukusima nuclear accident in 2011. 163
Climate change is increasingly a financial issue for companies. As noted in part 1, investors have madeit clear that climate change is a financial risk that needs to be managed, placing these proposals
squarely within the duties of directors to undertake oversight and management in the best interests ofthe company.
There is growing interest in implementing climate mitigation and adaptation strategies utilizing
shareholder proposals, and shareholders are increasingly persuaded that companies should act on
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Given the binding nature of successful shareholder
proposals, shareholders could eventually require companies to amend their articles of incorporation torequire specific actions on climate change risk management, including disclosure of their action plans
and measurable targets to decarbonize.
Increasing shareholder engagement has also resulted in direct meetings between institutional investors
and corporate boards. The Climate Action 100+ network, which includes 540 investors responsible forover $52 trillion in assets under management, is engaging companies on improving climate change
governance, cutting emissions, and strengthening climate-related financial disclosures. 164 It is seeking
commitments from corporate boards to Implement a strong governance framework that clearly
articulates the board’s accountability and oversight of climate change risk; to take action to reduce GHG
emissions across the value chain, moving towards net-zero emissions by 2050 or sooner; and to provide
enhanced corporate disclosure in line with the TCFD and sector-specific Global Investor Coalition on
Climate Change Investor Expectations on Climate Change guidelines. 165 Climate Action 100+’s ‘Net-Zero
Company Benchmark’, developed in 2020 in collaboration with EY and almost 50 signatory investors,
investor network experts, and leading climate research and data non-governmental organizations,urges companies to establish assessment indicators that are robust, fair, and applicable to local markets
and across sectors. 166

https://www.kepco.co.jp/ir/stockholder/meeting/96kai/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/06/29/report_20200629_1.pdf
162
The Mayor of Osaka is one of joint representative leaders of the national political party, Nihon Ishin no Kai [Japan Innovation
Party], which is a nongovernmental party, but on several political issues, it cooperates with national government.
163
Osaka City, Kansai Denryoku Kabusikikaisya nitaisiteno Kabunushiteian [The shareholder’s proposal to the Kansai ElectricPower Co., Inc.](2020.06.30) [in Japanese], https://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/kankyo/page/0000264358.html#r020427.
164
Climate Action 100+, https://www.climateaction100.org/about/.
165
Climate Action 100+, ‘The Three Asks’, (2020), https://www.climateaction100.org/approach/the-three-asks/.
166
Climate Action 100+ Net-Zero Company Benchmark, (2020), https://www.climateaction100.org/progress/net-zero-companybenchmark/.

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

6. DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
It is in the area of disclosure that Japan is moving most rapidly to identify and manage climate-relatedrisks, generally as part of ESG factors that companies and investors are increasingly identifying asimportant. The 2018 revised Corporate Governance Code calls for companies to disclose non-financial
ESG information in a valuable and useful way. The Code also states that listed companies should
disclose information on governance in a corporate governance report. What is less clear is the extent
to which Japan has recognized that many climate risks are financially material, not just non-financial
risks. While the obligations under financial services laws are obligations of the company, the directors
are responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the company’s financial reporting, and both companies
and directors can receive fines or other sanctions for failing to comply with the law.
6.1 Disclosure and Reporting Requirements
The duty to disclose is embedded in the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (FIEA), which, in 2006,
replaced the former Securities and Exchange Act, the Law Concerning Foreign Securities Firms, and the
Law Concerning the Regulation of Investment Advisory Services Relating to Securities. 167 As of October
2020, there has been no express direction by Japan’s securities regulators that companies must disclose
the breadth and nature of climate-related financial risks. However, the FIEA requires disclosure ofmaterial business risks, which means material business risks arising from climate change. To date, it isoften reported as ‘non-financial information’ in annual reports. The Japan Stock Exchange has alsostrongly endorsed ESG disclosure, including disclosure of climate-related risks, as discussed in part 6.6
below.
There have been a number of recent regulatory and guidance developments aimed at enhancing thedisclosure of ESG risks and opportunities, including climate-related risks and opportunities.
6.2 Financial Instruments and Exchange Act Disclosure
The FIEA was enacted to enhance fairness and transparency, and to restore confidence in the Japanese
capital markets. 168 The ‘Fair Disclosure Rule Guidelines’ specify that ‘material information’ refers to the‘undisclosed material information about the operations, business, or assets of the listed company, etc,
which has a material influence on investors' investment decisions’. 169 The provisions of Article 27-36 of
the FIEA, generally referred to as the ‘fair disclosure rule’, were introduced to ensure fair disclosure of
information to investors. 170 The rule is applicable to information of a precise nature that, if it weredisclosed, is likely to have a material influence on the value of securities. 171 Where the relevant
information falls under the category of material information, the listed company must promptly
disclose it. 172

Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, supra note 63.
Financial Services Agency, Japan, ‘New Legislative Framework for Investor Protection - Financial Instruments and Exchange
Law’, https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fiel/20061010.pdf.
169
As provided in Article 27-36, paragraph (1) of the Act. Planning and Coordination Bureau, Financial Services Agency, ‘Points
to Note Regarding Article 27-36 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (Fair Disclosure Rule Guidelines)’, (April 2018),
translation at https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/laws_regulations/disclosure/20180206-2.pdf. It specifies: ‘These guidelines are notbinding on determinations made by investigative authorities and judicial decisions including the application of penal provisions.
In addition, these guidelines do not guarantee that the Financial Services Agency (FSA) will make the same interpretations as
those shown in these guidelines in the future.’
170
Ibid at 5.
171
Ibid.
172
Ibid at 6.
167
168

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Introduction of the fair disclosure rule was aimed at promoting early disclosure of information by
issuers and enhancing dialogue between issuers and investors. 173 Listed companies that are subject toapplication of the rule are expected to actively disclose information in light of the purpose andsignificance of the rule.
In terms of future-oriented information, the ‘Fair Disclosure Rule Guidelines’ specify that:when specific details of the plan concerning operating profits or net profits that are planned
to be disclosed as the contents of the medium-term management plan are pieces of
information which, in themselves, can be used for making investment decisions and are likely
to have a material influence on the value of securities if they were disclosed and when suchdetails of the plan are to be provided to the investors immediately prior to the disclosure of
the medium-term management plan, the provision of such pieces of information may
constitute provision of material information. 174
In January 2019, Japan’s Financial Services Agency issued a Cabinet Office Ordinance on Disclosure of
Corporate Affairs, which sets out new securities law filing requirements requiring disclosure of businessrisks. 175 This amendment is critically important as it significantly expands previous mandatory
disclosure requirements from disclosing material facts and information to now include requirements todisclose material ‘forward-looking risk’. The amendment requires the company to disclose:










material risks that the management recognizes have the potential to impact thecompany’s financial condition or the cash flow status, together with the explanation of
the degree of possibility and time of the occurrence of the risk, and details of the impact
the risk will have on operating results if it materializes;
countermeasures the company is taking against the risk;material risks are to be described in an easily understandable way, taking into
consideration the materiality of a risk and its degree of relevance to the business policies
and strategies;
the degree of impact that the material risk will have on corporate value, operating results,financial condition, etc;with regard to operational and financial issues, companies are required to explain mattersthat management recognizes as possibly having a material impact on operating results,
such as changes to laws and systems that may greatly impact business; andin disclosures of the analysis and examination of the cash flow status as well as
information on sources of funds and capital liquidity, companies are required to provide
a specific, understandable description of the management’s awareness of market trends
in capital demands, including funding methods and state of affairs and major uses ofcapital. 176

Ibid at 3.
Ibid at 5.
175
企業内容等の開示に関する留意事項について （企業内容等開示ガイドライン）,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/kaiji/200501_kaiji.pdf. Amendment in January 2019 to Cabinet Order concerning
Corporate Disclosure (“Corporate Disclosure Order”), Filing Form No 2, Chapter 2 “Corporate Information,” Section 2.2 (31)disclosure of “business risks, etc. Cabinet Office Order related to disclosure of corporate contents after amendment inaccordance with Cabinet Office Order No 3 of 2019 (announced and enforced on January 31, 2019). An English translation is
not yet available, but a discussion can be found in Japan Financial Services Agency, Principles Regarding the Disclosure of
Narrative Information, (19 March 2020), https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2019/20190606-3/01.pdf; and Financial Services
Agency, ‘Points to Note Regarding Disclosure of Corporate Affairs (Guideline for the Disclosure of Corporate Affairs)’ (April2020), https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/kaiji/200501_kaiji.pdf.
176
Financial Services Agency, Principles Regarding the Disclosure of Narrative Information, ibid.
173
174

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

While there is no express reference to climate change in the Ordinance, these new requirements alignclosely with the TCFD framework for disclosure of governance and management of financial risks intheir obligation to disclose material risks and their management in the short, medium and long term.
It sets the stage for more effective climate governance and disclosure, because once climate risk
becomes material, directors need to meet these new requirements.
Also of note is that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are one of four permitted financial
reporting frameworks in Japan. 177 For companies that use IFRS for accounting and financial reporting,the IFRS Foundation has recently issued guidance that states that material climate-related financial
information should be reported under many of its standards, including IAS 1 Presentation of Financial
Statements, IAS 2 Inventories, IAS 12 Income Taxes, IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment, IAS 38
Intangible Assets, IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent
Assets, IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures, IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, and IFRS 13 Fair Value
Measurement. 178 In addition to this specific disclosure, the IFRS states that it is important forcompanies whose financial position or financial performance is particularly affected by climate-related
matters to provide overarching disclosure. 179 Directors of companies using IFRS need to ensure theirfinancial reporting meets these standards.
6.3 Ministry of the Environment Practical Guide for Scenario Analysis in Line with the TCFD
Recommendations
In March 2020, the MOE issued updated guidance on scenario analysis in line with the TCFD
recommendations, expressly recognizing that climate change can present clear risks and opportunities
for business management. 180 Its ‘Practical Guide for Scenario Analysis in Line with TCFD
Recommendations’ offers practical examples from 12 companies and useful materials for scenario
analysis. 181
The Practical Guide also sets out the financial opportunities relating to adoption of effective climate
governance, including reduced operating costs through efficiency gains; increased production capacity,
resulting in increased revenues; increased value of fixed assets such as highly rated energy-efficientbuildings; increased revenue through demand for lower emissions products and services; andincreased reliability of supply chain and ability to operate under various conditions. 182 It reports that
financial impacts from moving to more efficient renewable energy include reduced exposure to future
fossil fuel price increases; reduced exposure to GHG emissions and therefore less sensitivity to changes
in the cost of carbon; returns on investment in low-emissions technology; increased capital availability;
and reputational benefits resulting in increased demand for goods and services; and a better
competitive position to reflect shifting consumer preferences, resulting in increased revenues. 183 As of
February 2020, 61 financial companies and 161 other companies in Japan were reporting in alignment
with the TCFD recommendations. 184
The others are Japanese GAAP, Japan’s Modified International Standards (JMIS), and US GAAP; IFRS Foundation, ‘Japan’(2020), https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/japan/.
178
IFRS, ‘Effects of climate-related matters on financial statements’, (20 November 2020), at 1, https://www.ifrs.org/news-andevents/2020/11/educational-material-on-the-effects-of-climate-related-matters/.
179
Ibid.
180
Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan Climate Change Policy Division, The Practical Guide for Scenario Analysis
in line with the TCFD recommendations, 2nd edition (March 2020), at 6,
http://www.env.go.jp/policy/policy/tcfd/TCFDguide_2nd_EN.pdf.
181
MOEJ, ‘Practical Guide for Scenario Analysis in Line with TCFD Recommendations, published in March 2019(https://www.env.go.jp/en/headline/2396.html) and 2nd Edition (https://www.env.go.jp/en/headline/2439.html) in March
2020.
182
Ibid at 1-13.
183
Ibid.
184
Ibid at 1-8.
177

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

6.4 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's (METI’s) Guidance for Collaborative Value Creation
The Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's (METI’s) ‘Guidance for Collaborative Value
Creation’, published in 2017, discusses ESG factors as an important part of a company's sustainability
and sustainable growth, highlighting effective governance as core to the entire process of value
creation. 185 The Guidance observes that often there have been complaints about a lack of disclosure
concerning information on management strategies and their interrelationship with ESG matters,
information that is often the basis for long-term investment decisions. 186 It suggests principles forcommunicating a company's values, business model, strategy, and governance to investors in an
integrated manner, linking ESG and strategy. 187
The Guidance proposes a basic framework for promoting dialogue between companies and investors
and for enhancing the quality of information disclosure, serving as a guideline to assist corporate
directors to comprehensively communicate key information to investors, including business models,
strategies, and governance systems. The Guidance is also designed to be used as a framework forinvestors to monitor investee companies and conduct engagement activities to fulfill their stewardship
responsibilities.
6.5 Japan’s TCFD Consortium
As noted in the introduction, the TCFD proposed a comprehensive framework for climate governance,
strategy, risk management, and disclosure of targets and metric. 188 As of September 2020, support for
the TCFD governance and disclosure framework has grown to over 1,500 organizations globally,
representing a market capitalization of over US$12.6 trillion. 189 As of July 2020, there are 290 Japanesesupporters of the TCFD recommendations, making up more than 20 per cent of the total number of
supporting organizations worldwide. 190 Japan’s Financial Services Agency and the Japan ExchangeGroup have endorsed the TCFD framework.
In 2019, a Japanese ‘TCFD Consortium’ was launched as a platform for debate on how to make company
disclosure based on the TCFD recommendations more effective, and how to make sure that it leads tomore appropriate investment decisions from financial institutions. 191 The Financial Services Agency, the
METI and MOE supported the establishment of this industry-led TCFD consortium. 192 METI had
established the ‘Study Group on Implementing the TCFD Recommendations for Mobilizing Green
Finance through Proactive Corporate Disclosures’ to consider methods of disclosure in accordance with
the TCFD recommendations, leading to the development of the TCFD Consortium’s guidance for
185
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) ‘Guidance for Integrated Corporate Disclosure and Company-Investor
Dialogues for Collaborative Value Creation - ESG integration, non-financial information disclosure and intangible assets into
investment’ (29 May 2017), https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2017/pdf/0529_004b.pdf (hereafter METI Guidance).
186
METI, ‘Kachi kyōsō no tame no sōgōteki kaiji/taiwa gaidansu – ESG/hizaimujōhō to mukei shisan tōshi’ (2017); METI,‘Guidance for Integrated Corporate Disclosure and Company-Investor Dialogues for Collaborative Value Creation - ESG
integration, non-financial information disclosure and intangible assets into investment’, (2017)https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2017/pdf/0529_004b.pdf.
187
Ibid.
188
TCFD Final Report, supra note 11.
189
TCFD, ‘TCFD Supporters’ (September 2020), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/tcfd-supporters/.
190
TCFD Consortium, Japan, ‘Guidance on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 2.0’, (July 2020) at 3, https://tcfdconsortium.jp/pdf/en/news/20081201/TCFD_Guidance_2_0-e.pdf (hereafter TCFD Consortium, 2.0 report).
191
TCFD Consortium Japan, ‘Guidance for Utilizing Climate-related Information to Promote Green Investment’,
https://tcfdconsortium.jp/en/news_detail/19100802) and https://tcfd-consortium.jp/en. SASB has also published a TCFD
Implementation Guide (https://www.sasb.org/knowledge-hub/tcfd-implementation-guide/) in co-operation with the Climate
Disclosure Standards Board, and has translated this guide into Japanese (https://www.sasb.org/knowledge-hub/tcfdimplementation-guide-japanese/).
192
UN PRI, Final Report on Fiduciary Obligation in the 21st Century, at 43, https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=9792.

35

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanutilizing climate-related information to promote green investment. 193 In July 2020, the TCFD
Consortium released Guidance on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 2.0. 194
The TCFD Consortium reports that the organizations that have become TCFD supporters are also playing
a major role in reducing national GHG emissions. Pursuant to the Act on Promotion of WarmingCountermeasures, companies whose GHG emissions are above a certain level are required to report
the emissions through a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Accounting and Reporting System (SHK system). 195
While only 3 per cent of the approximately 12,000 companies reporting to the SHK system have become
TCFD supporters, their emissions account for more than 40 per cent of the emissions by all of thereporting companies, encouraging earlier emissions reductions in these companies. 196
6.6 The Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure
The Japan Exchange Group, Inc and Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc in March 2020 published a ‘Practical
Handbook for ESG Disclosure’, aimed at supporting listed companies in their efforts to improve ESG
disclosure, recognizing that many of the global frameworks for sustainability disclosure have not beentranslated into Japanese. 197 ‘Environmental’ includes climate change, resource depletion, waste,
pollution, and deforestation. 198 It draws on the work of the Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) initiative,‘Model Guidance on Reporting ESG Information to Investors’, 199 the METI’s ‘Guidance for Integrated
Corporate Disclosure and Company-Investor Dialogues for Collaborative Value Creation - ESG
integration, non-financial information disclosure and intangible assets into investment’; 200
recommendations of the TCFD, and the SASB standards. 201The Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure
proposes four steps:
Step 1: ESG Issues and ESG Investment
Understand ESG issues and the current situation around ESG investment.
Step 2: Connecting ESG Issues to Strategy
Decide on what ESG issues are material to your company’s strategy.
Step 3: Oversight and Implementation
Put in place an internal structure for oversight and implementation of ESG issues and set
metrics/targets, to enable steady progress on ESG activities.
Step 4: Information Disclosure and Engagement
Having linked ESG issues to corporate value, disclose ESG information so it can be used forinvestment decisions, aiming for mid- to long-term corporate value creation by actively
seeking dialogue with investors and other stakeholders. 202
193
TCFD Consortium, 2.0 report, supra note 190; TCFD Consortium Japan, ‘Guidance for Utilizing Climate-related Information to
Promote Green Investment’, ibid. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's Guidance for Climate-related Financial Disclosures,https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/1225_006.html.
194
TCFD Consortium, 2.0, supra, note 190.
195
Ibid at 3-4.
196
Ibid at 3-4.
197
Japan Exchange Group, Inc and Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc published a Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure, (31 March
2020), [English translation 25 May 2020], at 17, https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/corporate/sustainability/esginvestment/handbook/index.html (hereafter Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure).
198
Ibid at 9.
199
Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) Initiative, ‘Model Guidance on Reporting ESG Information to Investors’,
https://sseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/SSE-Model-Guidance-on-Reporting-ESG.pdf (hereafter SSE Model
Guidance).
200
METI Guidance, supra note 185.
201
Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure, supra note 197 at 5.
202
Ibid at 7.

36

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in JapanThe Handbook recommends that identification and discussion of ESG issues should take place at theboard of directors, given its oversight role, and should include outside directors. 203 It notes that theboard of directors is responsible for oversight of whether the response to ESG issues is being suitably
carried out and leading to corporate value creation; thus, there must be a process for reporting to theboard. ESG issues should be included as part of discussions on strategy, risk management, and businessplanning, and the board should monitor and oversee progress towards targets related to ESG
activities. 204 It also recommends that listed companies disclose and provide their ESG information in
English so that overseas investors can easily access the information, taking into account what
proportion of the company’s investors are overseas. 205
The Handbook recommends setting suitable metrics to measure progress on GHG emissions reductions,emissions intensity, energy usage, intensity and mix, water usage, environmental operations andoversight, and climate risk mitigation, in line with the company's strategy or ESG action plan. 206 Suitable
metrics should be set based on where and in what way the chosen material issues will affect thecompany's business, recommending use of SASB and other metrics already established. 207 In terms of
how to set specific targets, the Handbook recommends that each company should use a process
suitable for their circumstances, but in general, they should calculate future predictions by looking at
past achievements and set targets by looking to targets set by domestic or overseas organizations,‘backcast’ as endorsed by the TCFD recommendations. 208
The Handbook cites the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) that ‘Information is material
if omitting, misstating or obscuring it could reasonably be expected to influence the decisions that the
primary users of general purpose financial statements make on the basis of those financial statements,
which provide financial information about a specific reporting entity. 209
The Handbook also commends the Guidance issued by the World Federation of Exchanges that there
should be a board statement setting out material issues are identified and embedded in its strategy,
and how the board reviews progress against targets. Boards should make clear how their selected ESG
issues link to value creation/destruction; companies should explain to investors how they identify theirmaterial issues; and they should ensure that their reporting is accurate, timely, and follows one of theinternationally recognized reporting standards. 210
6.7 Disclosure by the Japan Government Pension Investment FundJapan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) has provided leadership in disclosure of climaterelated financial risk. 211 All of its ¥151 trillion assets under management are now being tracked based

ibid at 33.
Ibid at 33.
205
Ibid at 48.
206
Ibid at 45.
207
Ibid at 36. SASB has published standards for 77 industries, SASB Standards, https://www.sasb.org/standardsoverview/download-current-standards/.
208
Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure, supra note 197 at 36.
209
The Japanese Financial Services Agency (JFSA) writes that ‘materiality of narrative information should be judged based on 18
IFRS, whether or not it is material to investors’ investment decisions; Handbook at 19, citing Japan Financial Services Agency(2019) ‘Principles Regarding the Disclosure of Narrative Information’.
210
Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure, supra note 197 at 67, citing WFE ESG Guidance and Metrics can be downloaded fromthe WFE website. https://www.world-exchanges.org/news/articles/world-federation-exchanges-publishes-revisedesgguidance-metrics, and the Global Reporting Initiative Standards, https://www.globalreporting.org/standards. Japanese:
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-translations/gri-standardsjapanese-translations-download-center/.
211
Japan Government Pension Investment Fund, ‘GPIF Publishes the ‘Analysis of Climate Change-Related Risks andOpportunities in the GPIF Portfolio’’ (2 October 2020),
203
204

37

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanon ESG factors. Its assets under management tracking ESG indexes is ¥5.7 trillion, and its investment ingreen, social and sustainability bonds issued by multilateral development banks is approximately ¥440
billion. 212 It has an A+ rating from the UN PRI. In its FY2019 ESG Report released in August 2020, forthe first time, GPIF has quantified the physical and transition risks and opportunities of climate change
inherent in its portfolio in terms of the potential change in the value of these securities. 213
GPIF expanded on the information it disclosed the previous year in line with the TCFD
recommendations, now including a comprehensive assessment of climate change-related risks andopportunities across all major asset classes in the fund's portfolio. 214 It used three global climatechange data and analytics firms to compile a climate change analysis that utilizes cutting-edge climatechange assessment techniques. Given the space limitations in its ESG report, it issued a supplementary
report in October 2020 on climate change specifically. 215
The climate change report measures the carbon footprint and GHG emissions per unit of revenue (value
added) for its investee companies, examining scope 1, 2 and 3 carbon emissions, setting out its
methodology in great detail. 216 It measures carbon intensity of its portfolios by asset. 217 Compared tothe prior fiscal year, GPIF reduced the carbon intensity and the carbon footprint of its portfolios by 15.3
percent. 218 GPIF reports that two main drivers affected its carbon footprint in the past year – changes
in the quantity of GHG emissions by investee companies and changes in the types of investment held
in investees. 219 It also discloses in detail the challenges due to inadequate reporting by investee
companies of their carbon intensity, planning to accelerate its seeking accurate information. 220
GPIF invested in the S&P/JPX Carbon Efficient Index. It conducted scenario testing under 1.5οC, 2οC, and3οC scenarios, finding 1.5οC scenario had the highest positive effect on its equity portfolios. 221 Its fixedincome portfolio had the opposite effect under the scenarios tested. It conducted a ‘portfolio potential
warming’ analysis regarding the future potential contributions of investee companies to global warming,and potential fossil fuel exposure, as well as risks and opportunities in its government bonds
portfolio. 222 It details the emissions in its sovereign bond investments, explaining its methodology forcalculating carbon footprint. 223 It undertakes predictive analysis regarding investments in newtechnologies and potential value diminution in sectors with high traditional environmental impacts andenergy needs. GPIF also introduced a ‘transition pathway initiative management quality score’(developed by FTSE), which measures the extent to which investee companies manage GHG emissions
and how they respond to risks and opportunities in the transition to a lower carbon economy. 224
6.8 Conclusion - Director Liability and Disclosure of Material Climate-related Risks

https://www.gpif.go.jp/en/investment/esg/gpif_publishes_the_analysis_of_climatechangerelated_risks_and_opportunitiesin_the_gpif_portfolio.html.
212
Ibid at 4.
213
Government Pension Investment Fund, ‘For All Generations, ESG Report 2019’,
https://www.gpif.go.jp/en/investment/GPIF_ESGREPORT_FY2019.pdf
214Japan, ‘Analysis of Climate Change-Related Risks and Opportunities in the GPIF Portfolio’, Supplementary Guide to GPIF ESG
2019 Report’, https://www.gpif.go.jp/en/investment/GPIF_CLIMATE_REPORT_FY2019.pdf.
215
Ibid.
216
Ibid at 11 – 13.
217
Ibid at 15.
218
Ibid at 4.
219
Ibid at 16.
220
Ibid at 20-22.
221
Ibid at 4.
222
Ibid at 5.
223
Ibid at224
Ibid at 5.

38

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Climate change presents a foreseeable financial risk in the short, medium and long term. Financial
disclosure is critically important for companies, investors, and regulators, and for effective functioningof capital markets, and directors and their corporate boards have a responsibility to disclose materials
risks. For privately-held stock companies in Japan, that obligation is to shareholders in the form ofreporting the financial statements to annual shareholder meetings.
For public companies in Japan, that disclosure requirement is both periodic and continuous pursuant
to financial services law. Since it is directors that have the overall responsibility for ensuring thecompany’s financial disclosures are accurate, they may be primarily liable for misleading disclosures
made to the market. 225 Both companies and directors may be subject to sanctions under financial
services legislation for failure to comply with disclosure requirements. Unlike general director duties
under company law, disclosure pursuant to financial services law is not subject to the businessjudgment rule, as the requirements are clearly set out in law.
As has been observed for other countries:
Directors and fiduciaries must now approach their governance of climate change in the same
way as they would any other financial matter. The only safeguard against liability exposure
will be a proactive, dynamic and considered approach to the impact of climate change on
strategy, risk management oversight and reporting.
...
There are a number of disclosure omissions that are amongst those most likely to present arisk of misleading disclosure in practice, particularly for companies in those sectors highly
exposed to physical or economic transition risks associated with climate change withinmainstream investment and planning horizons. These include: a failure to disclose material economic transition risks or physical risks to a company’s
financial prospects, especially in the narrative portions of the annual report…
 the denial or material understatement of risk exposure or material overstatement ofstrategic preparedness or risk management of relevant climate-related financial
risks, as expectations of the content of disclosures increase to mirror the evolving
standards of directors to identify, assess and manage climate related financial risks;…
 an inconsistency between internal assessments on climate risk and external
disclosures, such as where internal reports from management and experts indicate
the impact on the business of a proposed regulation to implement the goals of theParis Agreement would be severe, but disclosures deny that the company is able toassess those impacts; and a high-level boilerplate forward-looking risk statement about the predicted impacts(or lack of impacts) of climate change on the company’s operations and assets,
including a statement of opinion or belief, that is not supported on reasonablegrounds or not accompanied by adequate, specific disclosures on the limitations or
uncertainties that materially impact on the achievement of the statement. 226
Disclosure of management of climate-related risks is likely to generate enhanced corporate governanceas institutional investors increasingly insist that their investee companies report their management andmetrics relating to decarbonization.

225
Janis Sarra, Audit Committees and Effective Climate Governance, A Guide for Boards of Directors (CCLI December 2020),
https://law-ccli-2019.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2020/12/CCLI-Guide-for-Audit-Committees-on-Effective-Climate-Governance.pdf.
226

Barker and Mulholland, supra note 123 at 6, 14-16.

39

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

Nikkei Business Newspaper has reported that disclosures related to climate change increased four-foldin the past year, companies reporting that the disclosure is in response to investor pressure. 227 Of 2,484
companies for which Takara Printing submitted securities reports for the fiscal year ended March 2020,
264 now disclose climate change and global warming as a risk to their businesses and financial
performance, up from 71 companies the year prior. By sector, the largest increase in disclosure was in
the banking and chemical sectors. 228

7. LOOKING AHEAD
Awareness of climate-related financial risk as part of ESG governance is growing in Japan. The
Government Pension Investment Fund signed the UN PRI in 2015 and the number of Japanese UN PRI
signatories exceeded 80 in January 2020, where institutional investors acknowledge their duty to act in
the best long term interests of beneficiaries and affirm their belief that ESG issues can affect theperformance of investment portfolios 229 The amount of Japanese assets allocated to ESG investment
more than tripled between 2016 and 2018, from US$ 0.5 trillion US$ to 2.1 trillion. 230 A survey by the
METI showed that of 97.9 per cent of investors surveyed who were practicing ESG investment aimed at
reducing risks, 87.5 per cent adopted ESG to increase returns, and 83.3 per cent reported wanting tocontribute to society. 231 A growing number of companies in Japan have recognized the seriousness ofclimate-related financial risk in their securities law annual reports. 232
At the same time, the corporate culture in Japan is more one of relationship than litigation, and recent
innovations in corporate and financial service law have not really changed that dynamic. Relationshipand presenting one’s best face may mean that it is difficult for outsiders to assess the dynamics of theboard’s oversight of climate risk, although all of the above-mentioned advances in corporate disclosure
are likely to increase transparency.

Nikkei Business Newspaper, Nihon Keizai Simbun morning edition September 8, 2020 (in Japanese only), English translationof title: ‘Climate change risk, disclosure 4 times, 264 companies in the previous term’（気候変動リスク、開示 4 倍 前期

227

264 社，環境規制言及、投資家の圧力強く。）.
Ibid. For example, Mitsubishi Chemical HD disclosed as a risk that ‘if carbon taxes and climate change gas emission
regulations are introduced in each country where we do business, it will affect our business performance.’ Mitsubishi UFJ
Financial Group said, ‘If it is considered that we are not fulfilling our responsibilities to society due to insufficient efforts andinformation disclosure, it will lead to damage to corporate value’ against the background of increasing investor pressure.
229
Practical Handbook for ESG Disclosure, supra note 197 at 9-10.
230
Ibid at 9.
231
Ibid at 11.
232
See for example, Ricoh Company, Ltd., Annual Securities Report, (The 120th Business Term) From April 1, 2019 to March 31,
2020, https://www.ricoh.com//Media/Ricoh/Sites/com/IR/financial_data/securities_report/pdf/AnnualSecuritiesReport_120th.pdf, which discusses the need
to identify medium- to long-term sustainability risks and opportunities as well as material issues faced by the corporate group,
including investment decisions on risks and opportunities related to climate change recommended by the TCFD; supervise andadvice on sustainability strategies, material issues, and progress against ESG targets for each business division throughout theentire Group 4. Identify sustainability issues to be submitted for discussion at the Board of Directors and report them to theBoard of Directors and the Head of the Sustainability Management Division; and reviewing its greenhouse gas reduction goals
and stepping up efforts in that regard while sharing information better in keeping with the TCFD recommendations. See also
Komatsu Ltd., Annual Securities Report From April 1, 2019 to March 31, 2020 (The 151st Fiscal Year), which observed: Komatsu
is investing a significant proportion of its management resources, such as research and development expenditure, to comply
with environmental and other related regulations and to respond to climate change issues. If Komatsu is required to incur
additional expenses and make additional capital investments due to future revision of environmental regulations or future
impacts of climate change, or if its development, production, sales and service operations are adversely affected by such
revised regulations, Komatsu may experience an unfavorable impact on its business results,
https://home.komatsu/en/ir/library/annual-securityreport/sir_info_02/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/07/06/151th_q4_houkokusyo_e.pdf
22840

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

In Japan, over 100 companies, local governments, research institutions, and non- governmentalorganizations have established the Japan Climate Initiative, a network committed to strengthening
communication and exchange of strategies and solutions among all actors that are implementing
climate actions in Japan. 233
In 2017, Japan Exchange Group (JPX) joined the Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) Initiative, and in June
2019, it published a Japanese translation of the SSE Initiative's Model Guidance on Reporting ESG
Information to Investors. 234
Electric companies are now verifying their achievements in each fiscal year by referring to the CO2
emission factor (CO2 emissions per kWh of power consumption) that reflects their efforts. 235 As of July
2015, the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, together with J-Power, JAPC and 23 power
producers and suppliers, established a new voluntary framework for achieving a low carbon society,formulated the Action Plan for the Electricity Industry for Achieving a Low-Carbon Society, setting a CO2
reduction target for the entire electricity industry for FY2030 and expanding use of non-fossil energy
sources. 236
Japanese companies are also looking at upside opportunities related to climate change. For example,
MS&AD Insurance Group Holdings Co, Ltd and MS&AD InterRisk Research & Consulting, Inc, incollaboration with Jupiter Intelligence, have started providing a service known as ‘Climate Change
Impact Assessment Service for TCFD’, having ‘developed a next-generation climate risk analytics systemfor predicting multi-hazard risks such as floods and windstorms caused by climate change’, the firstJapanese insurance/financial group able to provide a global climate change impact assessment by
simulating various catastrophe indicators and financial impacts for different climate scenarios, time
axes, and return periods based on data from the latitude and longitude . 237
Finally, Japan has embraced what is generally considered to be the next stage of decarbonization, themove to a circular economy, in which there are net-zero emissions or climate positive emissions. METI
has released its ‘Circular Economy Vision 2020’ that urges a shift to new business models with higher
circularity; is aimed at acquiring appropriate evaluation from the market and society; and that resultsin early establishment of a resilient resource circulation system to present Japan’s basic policy
directions for a circular economy. 238
As all these developments unfold, corporate directors will be expected to stay current and exercise
effective oversight of climate-related financial risks and opportunities.

Japan Climate Initiative (2019), https://japanclimate.org/english/.
SSE Model Guidance, supra note 199 at 4.
235
The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Efforts for Preventing Global Warming,
https://www.fepc.or.jp/english/environment/global_warming/index.html.
236
Ibid.
237
MS&AD, ‘Launching Climate Change Impact Assessment Service for TCFD with Jupiter Intelligence -Global impact assessmentof natural catastrophe risk from climate change’ (7 July 2020), https://www.ms-ad-hd.com/en/news/irnews/irnews5593844501232751076.html.
238
METI, ‘Circular Economy Vision 2020’, (22 May 2020), https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2020/0522_003.html; inJapanese: 循環経済ビジョン 2020（概要）https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2020/05/20200522004/20200522004-1.pdf.
233
234

41

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

APPENDIX I
THREE FORMS OF ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT OF JAPANThis appendix supplements the discussion in part 2 with additional details on Japanese corporate
structures. As noted in part 2, effective May 2015, companies in Japan may choose one of three main
forms of organizational structure under the Companies Act: a Company with Kansayaku Board (audit
and supervisory board); a ‘Company with Three Committees’ – a nomination, audit, and remunerationcommittee; 239 or a ‘Company with Supervisory Committee’. 240 The latter two forms of organizational
structure under the Companies Act are similar to companies in other countries where committees are
established under the board and assigned certain responsibilities with the aim of strengthening
oversight and monitoring functions. 241
For a Company with a Kansayaku Board, the Companies Act allocates specific governance functions tothe board of directors, the kansayaku (auditor) and the kansayaku board. 242 Thus, under thisgovernance model, listed companies are required to have two boards, a board of directors and a boardof kansayaku. The kansayaku audit the performance of duties by directors and the management andhave investigation powers by law. 243 In order to ensure both independence and high-level information
gathering power, not less than half of kansayaku, as appointed at the general shareholder meeting,must be outside kansayaku, and at least one full-time kansayaku must also be appointed. Article 335(3)of the Companies Act specifies: ‘A Company with Board of Company auditors shall have three or morecompany auditors, and the half or more of them shall be Outside Company Auditors.’ Article 390(3)states: ‘Board of company auditors shall appoint full-time company auditors from among the company
auditors.’ The kansayaku are allowed to excise their power quite independently, compared withmembers of committees in a ‘company with audit and supervisory committee’.
All stock companies can appoint shikkoyaku or shikkoyakuin, as discussed in part 2. Company withThree Committees must appoint one or more shikkoyaku (executive officers) from directors or nondirectors, by a resolution of the board, and delegate business administration and certain kinds ofbusiness decisions to the shikkoyaku. 244 The board must appoint one or more representative executive
officers from among the executive officers, and they are responsible for carrying out the decisions madeby the board or the executive officers, and have authority to represent the company. The board candelegate substantial decision-making authority over the management of the company to the executive
officers. 245 As of May 2020, only 76 of the approximately 3,700 listed companies on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange had the three committees structure. 246
A Company with Supervisory Committee has one board, but can create positions with the title ofshikkoyakuin for persons who are delegated by the board to exercise a certain range of discretion
regarding business administration. 247 If independent directors do not comprise a majority of the board,
the Corporate Governance Code recommends, as best practice to strengthen the independence,
Yamaguchi et al, supra note 70.
Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64.
241
Ibid. The Code’s footnote states: ‘There are cases where a Company with Kansayaku Board or a Company with Supervisory
Committee creates positions with the title of “shikkoyakuin” for persons who are delegated by the board a certain range of
discretion regarding business administration. Unlike shikkoyaku in companies with three committees (nomination, audit andremuneration), shikkoyakuin is not a statutory position’, ibid.
242
JPX’s provisional English translation looks a bit confusing with comparison to the original Japanese version, which states “ACompany with kansayaku Board is a system unique to Japan in which certain governance functions are assumed by the board,kansayaku and the kansayaku board’, Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64 at 16-17, Notes to General Principle 4.
243
Ibid.
244
Ibid.
245
Yamaguchi et al, supra note 70.
246
Ibid.
247
Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64 at 16.
239
240

42

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

objectivity and accountability of the board on the matters of nomination and remuneration of thesenior management and directors, that the company seek appropriate involvement and advice fromthe independent directors; for example, by establishing an optional independent advisory committee
under the board, in which independent directors approve remuneration and some executive hiring
decisions. 248
As noted in part 2, pursuant to the Companies Act, a company is defined as ‘any Stock Company(kabushiki kaisha), General Partnership Company, Limited Partnership Company or Limited Liability
Company’ and a foreign company is defined as ‘any juridical person incorporated under the law of aforeign country or such other foreign organization that is of the same kind as the Company or is similar
to a Company.’ 249 A public company means ‘any Stock Company the articles of incorporation of which
do not require, as a feature of all or part of its shares, the approval of the Stock Company for theacquisition of such shares by transfer’. 250
The 2019 amendments to the Companies Act now require listed companies to have at least one ’outside
director’. 251 Article 2 (xv) specifies:
Outside Director means a director of any Stock Company who is neither an Executive Director(hereinafter referring to a director of a Stock Company listed in any item of Article 363(1), andany other director who has executed operation of such Stock Company) nor an executive
officer, nor an employee, including a manager, of such Stock Company or any of its Subsidiaries,
and who has neither ever served in the past as an executive director nor executive officer, nor
as an employee, including a manager, of such Stock Company or any of its Subsidiaries.
Outside director, in this context, does not mean ‘independent’ within the meaning of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange rules. Listed companies that are not large companies defined by Companies Act article 2 (vi)are not required to have at least one outside director, but the number of such listed companies in Japan
is small. 252 ‘Large Company’ means any stock company which satisfies any of the following
requirements: (a) that the amount of the stated capital in the balance sheet as of the end of its mostrecent business year, referring to the balance sheet reported to the annual shareholders' meeting
specifically ‘referring to the balance sheet under Article 435(1) in cases where the first annual
shareholders' meeting after the incorporation of the Stock Company has not yet been held) is
500,000,000 yen or more; or (b) that the total sum of the amounts in the liabilities section of thebalance sheet as of the end of its Most Recent Business Year is 20,000,000,000 yen or more’. 253
Article 2(15) of Companies Act defines the standard of ‘outside’ director, but makes no reference toindependence. The TSE adds requirement of ‘independent director’, but does not make the criteria of
independence clear in the Securities Listing Regulations. Listed companies set out their own criteria
regarding the independence of directors and must disclose that criteria, but the TSE may publicly
announce or impose a listing agreement violation penalty if a company’s criteria does not satisfy TSE’S
requirements of independence in accordance with the TSE ‘Guidelines concerning Listed Company
Compliance’, part III. 254 For example, III-5-(3)-2 of the TSE’s Guidelines sets out a definition of
independent director for purposes of exchange listing:Ibid, Supplementary Principle 4.10.1; this advice also applies to a Company with a Kansayaku Board.
Companies Act of Japan, article 2. For example, Article 593(1) Partners who execute the business shall have the duty toperform their duties with due care of a prudent manager.
250
Ibid.
251
Companies Act of Japan, article 327-2.
252
Companies Act of Japan, Article 2(vi).
253
Ibid.
254
TSE, ‘Guidelines Concerning Listed Company Compliance’, III. ‘Examination Pertaining to Ensuring Effectiveness (Measuresagainst Violation of Code of Corporate Conduct) 5. In the case of a violation by a listed company of the provisions of Chapter 4,
Section 4, Sub-section 1 of the Regulations, a decision on public announcement pursuant to the provisions of Rule 508,
248
249

43

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in JapanThe status of a person(s) who is reported to the Exchange as being an independent
director(s)/auditor(s) by the issuer of a listed domestic stock pursuant to the provisions of Rule436-2 of the Enforcement Rules when such person falls under any of the following a. to d.;a. A person for which said company is a major client or a person who executes business forsuch person, or a major client of said company or a person who executes business for suchclient;b. A consultant, accounting professional or legal professional (in the case of a group such as ajuridical person or association, including persons belonging to such group) who receives a large
amount of money or other asset other than remuneration for directorship/auditorship fromsaid company; orc. A person who has recently fallen under any of the following (a) or (b);c-2. A person who fallen under any of the following (a) or (b) at the time within ten years prior
to assuming office;(a) A person who executes business for a parent company of said company (including
a director who does not execute business or an auditor in cases where said company
designates its outside auditor as an independent director); or(b) A person who executes business for a fellow subsidiary of said company.
d. A close relative of a person referred to in any of the following (a) to (f) (excluding those of
insignificance);(a) A person referred to in a. to the preceding c.;(b) An accounting advisor of said company (limited to cases where the outside auditor
thereof has been designated as an independent auditor. When said accounting
advisor is a corporation, any member thereof who is in charge of such advisory affairs
is included; the same shall apply hereinafter);(c) A person who executes business for a subsidiary of said company (including a
director who does not execute business or an accounting advisor in cases where
said company designates its outside auditor as an independent auditor);(d) A person who executes business for a parent company of said company(including a director who does not execute business or an auditor in cases where
said company designates its outside auditor as an independent auditor);(e) A person who executes business for a fellow subsidiary of said company; or(f) A person who has recently fallen under (b) or (c), or a person who executedbusiness for said company (in cases where an outside auditor is designated as anindependent director, meaning a director who does not execute business). 255
Rule 436-2(1) states that directors are independent if they are unlikely to have conflicts of interest withgeneral investors. Securities Listing Regulations Rule 436-2 specifies:
Securing Independent Director(s)/Auditor(s): For the protection of general investors, an issuerof listed domestic stocks must secure at least one independent director/auditor (meaning an
Paragraph 1 of the Regulations, as well as a decision on whether or not to impose the listing agreement violation penalty
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 509 of the Regulations, shall be made in comprehensive consideration of (i) the mattersprescribed in the classifications referred to in the following (1) to (8) and (ii) the details, the background, the cause, and theactual state of affairs relating to said violation, as well as the state of implementation of measures such as a regulatory action
taken by the Exchange in response to said violation and any other circumstances’. https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/rulesparticipants/rules/regulations/tvdivq0000001vyt-att/listed_company_compliance_guidelines_20150501.pdf
255
Ibid.

44

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japanoutside director (meaning an entity falling under an outside director prescribed in Article 2,
Item (15) of the Companies Act who is an outside director/auditor prescribed in Article 2,
Paragraph 3, Item (5) of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Companies Act (the Ordinanceof the Ministry of Justice No. 12 of 2006)) or outside auditor (meaning an entity falling underan outside auditor prescribed in Article 2, Item (16) of the Companies Act who is an outside
director/auditor prescribed in Article 2, Paragraph 3, Item (5) of the Ordinance for
Enforcement of the Companies Act) who is unlikely to have conflicts of interest with generalinvestors; hereinafter the same. 256
The Tokyo Stock Exchange may impose a listing agreement violation penalty on them. However, it isunclear whether the ‘independent director’ is likely to have conflicts of interest with general investors.
In case of failure to elect outside directors, the resolution of the board of directors risks being found tobe void, because the board’s structure and decision process would be in violation of the Companies Act
and thus illegal. In contrast, where there has been a failure to elect independent directors, theresolutions of the board of directors be still valid (not void), because the election of independent
directors is not required by Companies Act (statutory law), only requested by soft law, eg, the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. The 2019 amendment comes into force on 1 March 2021.
In companies with a Kansayaku board (audit and supervisory board) and companies with a supervisorycommittee, directors’ compensation is fixed by a resolution at a shareholders meeting if such matters
are not prescribed in the articles of incorporation. 257 In companies with three committees, theremuneration committee sets directors’ compensation in accordance with the regulation onCompensation Policies for Directors. 258 Therefore, making ESG factors indicators of directors’
performance-linked compensation means that shareholders have agreed that the company should
promote climate change adaptation, and directors have the obligation to make effort to fulfill thatobligation.
One example is the electrical components maker OMRON corporation, where compensation to
directors is set based on medium-to-long-term performance, including return on investment andmeeting sustainability objectives, the latter evaluated by a third-party organization and based on the
Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI). 259 The DJSI are a series of ESG indices that include companies
evaluated and selected based on long-term shareholder value perspective, reflecting economic,
environmental, and social factors comprehensively. Another example is Kao Corporation, a producer ofhuman health care, skin care, cosmetics, and fabric and home care, where long-term incentive
compensation is paid in accordance with several indicators including the World’s Most EthicalCompanies indicators evaluated by Ethisphere Institute. 260

Securities Listing Regulations Rule 436-2, https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/rulesparticipants/rules/regulations/tvdivq0000001vyt-att/securities_listing_regs1-826_20190716.pdf.
257
Companies Act of Japan, article 361.
258
Compensation Policies for Directors, Regulation for Enforcement of the Companies Act, article 121.
259
OMRON corporation, Business report for shareholders meeting, at 40-41,
https://www.omron.com/global/en/assets/file/ir/shareholder/convocation_notice_for_the_83rd_ordinary_general_meeting_of_shareholders.pdf .
260
Kao Corporation, Integrated Report 2020 at 79, https://www.kao.com/content/dam/sites/kao/www-kaocom/global/en/investor-relations/pdf/reports-fy2020e-all-008.pdf. See also Kirin Holdings Company, Limited, in which longterm incentive compensation is calculated by financial evaluation and non-financial evaluation, the latter including progress
and achievement in four key areas including the environment,
https://www.kirinholdings.co.jp/english/ir/governance/conpensation.html.
25645

Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in JapanOne reason few companies have medium-to-long-term performance-linked compensation to directors
evaluated by ESG indicators is the Corporation Tax Act of Japan. 261 Costs of payments of performancelinked compensation to directors evaluated by ESG indicators are excluded from deductible expenses,
when calculating the amount of income of the domestic corporation for each business year. Only
payments of performance-linked compensation to directors evaluated by the market price of the sharesor indicators of company profit, including the amount of sales, are included deductible expenses. 262 If
the Corporation Tax Act were reformed, many more companies would have performance-linked
compensation to directors evaluated by ESG indicators.
Shareholder proposals, if approved by the requisite majority of votes, are binding on the corporate
directors and officers. In Japan, a shareholder proposal that receives a majority of two-thirds or moreof the votes of the shareholders present at the meeting is binding on directors. 263 Note that it is vote
exercised by shareholders present and voting at the meeting; it does not include any unexercised votes.
To amend the articles of incorporation, a special resolution by shareholders’ meeting is necessary,
which can be approved by the same majority, or the corporate articles can specify a higher thresholdof votes required before the corporate articles can be revised. 264
As discussed in part 5, amendments to the Companies Act of Japan were promulgated on 11 December
2019, including changes to the rules governing shareholders' meetings, virtual provision of meeting
materials, and a restriction on the number of shareholder proposals. Only shareholders that hold atleast 1 per cent of total votes (usually one unit of 100 shares) or 300 votes can make a shareholder
proposal. 265 Pursuant to the amendments, they are now limited in the number of proposals that they
can make each year.
Prior to the 2019 amendments, there had been instances of a single shareholder submitting more than
100 proposals, and the amendment is aimed at making governance more manageable. For example,
in 2012, Nomura HD received over 100 proposals from one shareholder, and the other several
companies have faced the same issues over the past 10 years. 266 It should not affect the ability to makea shareholder proposal related to managing climate-related risks, although the 1 per cent vote or 300
vote threshold can pose a barrier to shareholders with smaller investments to bring climate-related
issues to the attention of the corporate board. The amendments will come into effect 1 March 2021,
with some portions, such as providing shareholder meeting materials through the internet, coming into
effect by June 2023. 267
Shareholders' Right to Propose
Article 303 (1) Shareholders may demand that the directors include certain matters(limited to the matters on which such shareholders may exercise their votes. The same shallapply in the following paragraph) in the purpose of the shareholders meeting.

Corporation Tax Act, Act No 34 of March 31, 1965, 法人税法 昭和 40 年 3 月 31 日法律第 34 号 amended by No 4 ofMarch 31, 2017. English translation of Amendment of Act No. 23 of 2008 prior to the amendment by No 4 of March 31, 2017 isavailable at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=&vm=2&id=53. English translation of this paper isrevised referring English translation of Amendment of Act No. 23 of 2008.
262
Corporation Tax Act, article 34(3)(a).
263
Companies Act of Japan, article 309 (2).
264
Ibid, article 309 (2)(xi) and Chapter 5, article 466.
265
ibid, article 303(2). The shareholders have to have 1 per cent of votes or 300 votes. Usually one unit of 100 shares gives one
vote to the shareholders, therefore the Act indicates number of votes (not number of shares). Listed companies are requested
to make one unit by 100 shares by Tokyo Stock Exchange and/or other domestic stock exchanges. ‘Standardization of Trading
Unit’, https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/improvements/unit/.
266
See ‘Frustrated Shareholder Proposes Nomura 'Hunker Down'’, Wall Street Journal ( 1 June 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-JRTB-12184.
267
Yamaguchi et al, supra note 70.
261

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, at a Company with Board of
Directors, only shareholders having consecutively for the preceding six months or more (or, incases where shorter period is prescribed in the articles of incorporation, such period or more)
not less than one hundredth (1/100) (or, in cases where lesser proportion is prescribed in thearticles of incorporation, such proportion) of the votes of all shareholders or not less than
three hundred (or, in cases where lesser number is prescribed in the articles of incorporation,such number of) votes of all shareholders may demand the directors that the directors include
certain matters in the purpose of the shareholders meeting. In such cases, that demand shallbe submitted no later than eight weeks (or, in cases where shorter period is prescribed in thearticles of incorporation, such period or more) prior to the day of the shareholders meeting.

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APPENDIX IIRELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE
This appendix adds some detail to the discussion in part 4.3. Japan's Corporate Governance Code,published by Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2015, requires listed companies to address social, environmental
and other sustainability issues positively and proactively. 268 The Corporate Governance Code is nonbinding on companies, but it does strongly influence governance norms. Since climate-related financial
risks and opportunities are part of the ‘environmental’ in ESG, the Code supports directors’ efforts toeffectively manage climate change impacts.
Principle 2.1 of the Code states that ‘Guided by their position concerning social responsibility,
companies should undertake their businesses in order to create value for all stakeholders while
increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term. To this end, companies should draft and maintainbusiness principles that will become the basis for such activities.’ 269 The board should view theestablishment of corporate goals (business principles, etc) and the setting of strategic direction as one
major aspect of its roles and responsibilities. 270
Principle 4 of the Corporate Governance Code sets out the responsibilities of the Board:
4. Given its fiduciary responsibility and accountability to shareholders, in order to promotesustainable corporate growth and the increase of corporate value over the mid- to long-termand enhance earnings power and capital efficiency, the board should appropriately fulfill its
roles and responsibilities, including:(1) setting the broad direction of corporate strategy;(2) establishing an environment where appropriate risk-taking by the senior
management is supported; and(3) carrying out effective oversight of directors and the management (including
shikkoyaku and so-called shikkoyakuin) from an independent and objective
standpoint.
Such roles and responsibilities should be equally and appropriately fulfilled regardlessof the form of corporate organization – i.e., Company with Kansayaku Board (wherea part of these roles and responsibilities are performed by kansayaku and thekansayaku board), Company with Three Committees (Nomination, Audit andRemuneration), or Company with Supervisory Committee.
Principle 4.5 of the Corporate Governance Code specifies that the fiduciary responsibilities of directors
and kansayaku requires that they ‘secure the appropriate cooperation with stakeholders and act in theinterest of the company and the common interests of its shareholders.’ 271
The Corporate Governance Code also contains principles for independent directors, notwithstanding
they currently they are not the norm, linking their activities to sustainable growth. It recommends:
Principle 4.7 Roles and Responsibilities of Independent Directors
Companies should make effective use of independent directors, taking into consideration the
expectations listed below with respect to their roles and responsibilities:

Corporate Governance Code, supra note 64.
Ibid at 10.
270
Ibid, Principle 4.1.
271
ibid, Principle 4.5.
268
269

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japani) provision of advice on business policies and business improvement based on theirknowledge and experience with the aim to promote sustainable corporate growthand increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term;ii) monitoring of the management through important decision-making at the board
including the appointment and dismissal of the senior management;iii) monitoring of conflicts of interest between the company and the management orcontrolling shareholders; andiv) appropriately representing the views of minority shareholders and otherstakeholders in the boardroom from a standpoint independent of the management
and controlling shareholders.
Principle 4.8 Effective Use of Independent Directors
Independent directors should fulfill their roles and responsibilities with the aim of contributing
to sustainable growth of companies and increasing corporate value over the mid- to longterm. Companies should therefore appoint at least two independent directors that sufficiently
have such qualities. Irrespective of the above, if a company believes it needs to appoint atleast one-third of directors as independent directors based on a broad consideration of factors
such as the industry, company size, business characteristics, organizational structure andcircumstances surrounding the company, it should appoint a sufficient number of
independent directors.
Since its early introduction, the Code has viewed directors as fiduciaries of shareholders and has been
aimed at making directors’ duty of care and duty of loyalty effective in practice by providing animportant framework, as evidenced by the preamble of the 2009 Code. With respect to the Basic
Principle 4, the current Corporate Governance Code states “…the reasonableness of the decisionmaking process at the time of decision is generally considered an important factor in determining
whether or not the management and directors should owe personal liabilities for damages. The Codeincludes principles and practices that are expected to contribute to such a reasonable decision-making
process…” The Code expects that it provides standards for a reasonable decision-making process in a
lawsuit seeking a director’s personal liabilities for damages.
The Corporate Governance Code has influenced the number of independent directors on publicly-listedcompany boards. Nicholas Benes has observed that the percentage of large Japanese corporations withindependent director representation has expanded significantly since the Corporate Governance
Code’s launch, also reflecting pressure from external investors. 272 He reports that 80 per cent ofcompanies listed on tier 1 level of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE1) now have two or more independent
directors on their boards, according to ascertainable criteria for ‘independence’, almost four times thepercentage recorded prior to the Code. 273 Benes reports that for almost 23 per cent of TSE1-listed firms,
independent directors make up one-third or more of the board. 274 However, he also points tocontinuing issues of the competence of boards, suggesting that investors will have to apply somepressure to have meaningful governance reform. 275

Nick Benes, ‘Corporate governance in Japan now’ https://ethicalboardroom.com/corporate-governance-in-japan-now/.
Ibid.
274
Ibid.
275
Ibid.
272
273

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Directors’ Duties Regarding Climate Change in Japan

APPENDIX III
DUTIES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN RESPECT OF
CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIESThe United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) Final Report on Fiduciary Obligationin the 21st Century specifies that the fiduciary duties of investors require them to incorporate ESG issues
into investment analysis and decision-making processes, consistent with their investment time
horizons; to encourage high standards of ESG performance in the companies or other entities in which
they invest; to understand and incorporate beneficiaries’ and savers’ sustainability-related
preferences, regardless of whether these preferences are financially material; to support the stability
and resilience of the financial system; and to report on how they have implemented thesecommitments. 276 Commitment to these UN PRI duties regarding responsible investment has grown toover 2,500 signatories, investing US$ 90 trillion. 277
The Japan Financial Services Agency is the financial regulation oversight agency, ‘responsible for
ensuring stability of Japan’s financial system, protection of depositors, insurance policyholders andsecurities investors, and smooth finance through such measures as planning and policymaking
concerning the financial system, inspection and supervision of private sector financial institutions, andsurveillance’. 278 The FSA has specified that fiduciary duties include the duties of prudence and loyalty,
requiring institutional investors to avoid conflicts of interest and provide services and advice in the bestinterests of their beneficiaries. 279 Institutional investors need to consider the intergenerational impactof their investment decisions. 280
Japan’s ‘Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors Stewardship Code’ was revised effective 24
March 2020, setting out principles for best practice for institutional investors in fulfilling theirstewardship responsibilities with regard for their clients, beneficiaries, and investee companies. 281 The
amendment to the Stewardship Code emphasizes promoting sustainable growth and consideration of
ESG factors when making investment decisions. 282
The Stewardship Code emphasizes the need to monitor investee companies’ governance, strategy,
performance, capital structure, business risks, and opportunities, including arising from climatechange, and to monitor and assess how the companies address them. 283 The Code specifies that a partof stewardship responsibility is purposeful dialogue with companies based on in-depth knowledge ofcompanies, and consideration of medium- to long-term sustainability, including ESG factors consistent
with their investment management strategies.
As of 30 April 2020, approximately 280 institutional investors have endorsed the Stewardship Code;and many institutional investors are now actively monitoring corporate governance. 284 A growing
number are publishing their principles of corporate governance. While prior to 2017, engagement withUN PRI, Final Report on Fiduciary Obligation in the 21st Century, https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=9792.
UN PRI, ‘ESG incorporation is an investment norm’, (2020), https://www.unpri.org/pri/fiduciary-duty-in-the-21st-centuryfinal-report/4998.article.
278
Japan Financial Services Agency, ‘The Role of the FSA’ (2020), https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/about/pamphlet_e.pdf.
279
UN PRI and Baker Mackenzie, ‘Recommendations of Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures , review of local
relevance JAPAN’ at 7, https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=1406.
280
Mizuno et al, supra note 36 at 1.
281
Council of Experts on Japan’s Stewardship Code, Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors ≪Japan’s StewardshipCode≫ (24 March 2020), https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20200324/01.pdf.
282
Ibid. It also and establishes a new principle regarding the provision of appropriate services to institutional investors byservice providers, such as proxy voting advisors and investment consultants.
283
Ibid at 10.
284
Ibid.
276
277

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investee companies tended to be conducted primarily by overseas investors (in 2017 around 30 per
cent of tier one JPX equities were internationally owned), in the past three years Japanese asset
managers have been building their stewardship capacity and commencing engagement with investee
companies on climate and other ESG issues. 285
The UN PRI observes that a growing number of Japanese institutional investors now view considerationof ESG factors when making investment decisions as an important part of fulfilling their fiduciary duty
and accountability as investors. 286 They also understand the importance of reporting this process andits results to beneficiaries. 287 The UN PRI report on Japan notes that institutional investors in Japan are
increasingly understanding and creating capacity to act upon the stewardship responsibilities within
their fiduciary duties. 288 However, it also highlighted an important aspect of Japan’s corporate
governance:
Central to engagement with Japanese corporations was an understanding of the culture andhistory of each corporation and taking the time to build the trust upon which effective
engagement depended – an expectation highlighted in Principle 7 of the Stewardship Code. 289...
Our stakeholders consistently raised cross-shareholding or “allegiance shareholdings” as a
critical issue in Japanese corporate governance, which could erode shareholders’ ability toengage with corporations on ESG issues. Japanese corporations often view such arrangements
as a natural and expected feature of the business environment. However, they result in very
different accountability dynamics for Japanese corporations as these shareholdings canaccount for a significant slice of a corporation’s shareholder base, though divided among
many small holdings by corporations. Investors have several concerns about crossshareholdings:• lack of transparency on the rationale for such holdings;• their effect on capital efficiency;• conflicts of interest;• dangers for “pure” minority shareholders;• anti-takeover effects;• emerging evidence that the size of cross-shareholding is negatively
correlated with corporate performance. 290
Thus the growing recognition by institutional investors globally that their fiduciary obligation includes
considering how their portfolio investing is addressing climate-related financial risk is likely to result in
an increasing number of Japanese institutional investors becoming active in oversight of how theirinvestments are reducing their carbon footprint or carbon intensity or both. Many global investors now
use ESG factors in financial reporting, as part of the financial statements and the management
discussion and analysis (MD&A).
Effective climate governance is likely to increase as institutional investors press investee companies todecarbonize and develop sustainable business strategies.

UN PRI, supra note 276 at 9-10.
Ibid at 10.
287
Ibid at 10.
288
Ibid at 8.
289
Ibid at 10.
290
Ibid at 12.
285
28651