The Acquisitionof Structural and Pragmatic Constraints
on PronominalReference
Keiko Murasugi
The University of Connecticut
andTsuda College

I. Introduction
The central concern of GenerativeGrammar is to investigatethe knowledgeof language: its aspectsof form and meaningwhich are determinedby the languagefacultyor LanguageAcquisition Device (LAD), which is endowedinnately in the human mind,
yielding a particular language through interaction with experience. Chomsky (1986)
raisesthree basic questionsthat arise in the study of knowledgeof human language:(i)What constitutesknowledgeof language? (ii) How is knowledgeof languageacquired?
and (iii) How is this knowledgeput to use? The first questionconcernsthe specificationof the nature of the languagefaculty, which has been the subject matter of the theoryof generative grammar that aims to capture the principles of human language.This
theory is called UniversalGrammar; it representsthe initial stateof the languagefaculty.
The secondquestionconcernsthe specificationof the principlesof Universal Grammar,
and an explanation of the iearnability issue often referredto as Plato's Problem: How
and why can children attain the final state on the basis of poor and degenerateinput
stimuti? The third question concernsa theory of how the knowledge of languageattained entersthe use of language.
The purpose of the present paper is to study the acquisition of anaphora in theframework of the Government and Binding (GB) theory, which attempts to ansrverthe
questionsmentionedabove. In particular,I wiil focus on the phenomenonof "backwards anaphora".t The goal of this paper is to seek support for the hypothesis thatchildren have innate knowledge of Universal Grammar (UG). According to this hypothesis,coreferencerelations are determinedby structural conditions. This position iscontrastedwith the view that coreferencerelationsare crucially determinedby pragmatic
context. The main purpose of this study is to investigatewhether or not the structural
constraintshave an important function for interpretation of pronominal reference,evenfor young children, and to evaluate the hypothesis that children do not "learn" thestructural conditions in question,but know them a priori, thereby trying to provide apartial answerto the secondquestionChomsky raised,as discussedabove.
Anaphora has been investigatedfrom both syntactic and pragmatic points of view.
The purpose of this study is to assesschildren'sgrammaticalknorvledgeof binding condition C, which is assumedto be part of Universal Grammar. Our secondaryaim is to
identify the pragmatic factors which may sometimes override children's structural
knowledge. Specifically,we choseto explorea pragmaticlactor that may causechildren
to permit coreferencein simple sentencesuch as (l).
(1)
I

He is looking at the pictureof Santa.

The term 'backwards anaphora- refers to the anaphoric relation in which a pronoun
antecedent in surface structure. and is coreferential with iL

precedes its

92

１
１
ｌ
Ｊ
岨
１
■

Supposethat in the context correspondingto (l), there are two characterswhich
could be candidatesfor the antecedentof the pronoun /re: Santa and Incredible Hulk.
Although structural constraints prohibit coreference between he and Santa, several
studies have found that children allow coreferencebetweenhe and Santa in (l) in certain
tasks. This has been taken as evidencefor the existenceof an intermediate stage ingrammar icquisition at which childrenviolate condition C. We will offer an alternative
explanation,in terms of pragmatics,and we provide empiricalsupport for this viewpoint.
Our experiments used a truth judgement technique with 20 English speaking children, 3
to 5 years-old. In this study, sentenceslike (l) were presentedin two situations. In one
context, Santa was looking at a picture of himseli but the Incredible F/u/k was notlooking at anything; he slowly walked away from the picture of Santa. In this case,children tended to accept he and Santa as coreferential. A second context had the 1zcredible Hulk looking at a picture of Kermit. In this context, children did not allow theungrammatical reading, rejecting (l) as incorrect. We interpret this differenceas evidenceof a pragmatic factor, which we call 'plausibledenial'.

■
■
Ｊ
目
■
■
日
■
Ｊ
■
﹁
■
■
︲
Ｊ
■
ョ
燿
■
■
１
爛
増

The hypothesis of 'plausible denial' maintains that unlessthe characterwho is notnamed in-the sentenceii occupiedin some salient activity which makes it clear why thesentenceis false, children allow pragmaticsto override their syntactic knowledge. The
effect of 'plausibledenial' is to bias children to pursue the ungrammaticalreading when
the context fails to satisfy the presupposition of the grammatical interpretation.
Interestingly, a group of 20 adult control subjectsalso showed'the effect of 'plausible
denial', though to a lesserextent than children. Unlesspragmatic factors like 'plausible
denial' are controiled,children'ssyntacticknowledgemay not be properly assessed.By
controlling for 'plausible denial', however,young children who know the relevant constructions are shown to adhereto binding condition C. Our data, together with the results of 'earlier studies,are interpretedas evidenceof the early emergenceof structural
knowledge,as anticipatedby current linguisticstheory.

コ
層
ョ
ー

2. Structural Conditions on Backwards Anaphara瑚In this paper,we follow the definition of binding presentedin Lasnik and Uriagereka(1988: 33): A binds B if and only if (i) A c-commandsB and (ii) A and B are coindexed.
As for the structural relation of c-command, we follow the definition of Reinhart(1976:V6): Node A c-commandsnode B if neither A nor B dominatesthe other and thefirst branching node which dominates A dominates B. Condition C of the Binding
Theory expiainswhy backwardsanaphorais permissiblein (3a), but not in (3b).

■Binding Theory:a. An anaphor is bound in its governingcategoryb. A pronoun is free in its governingcategoryc. An R-expressionis free

■■ 彎

(2)

１ １

The most detailed explanation of anaphora is given by the Binding- Theory ofChomsky (1981: 188). Tha Binding Conditions are summarizedas follows.

１

In the generativeframework, the theoretical study of the linguistic phenomenon of"anaphora" has been investigated since the late 1960's. Extensive work has been
undertaken to investigate the proper formulation of the structural conditions governing
pairs (e.g. Ross (1967), Lakoff (1968), Langacker(1969), Postal
anaphor-antecedent(1969),Wasow (1972),Lasnik (1976),Reinhart(1976),Chomsky(1981),Lasnik (1981),
Lasnik and Uriagereka(1988)). Within this framework, the linguistic antecedentsfor
anaphoric elementsare determinedby syntactic configurations.

１ １

Before starting the discussionof acquisition, let us briefly review structural constraints on pronominal referencein the adult grammar.

03

ａ ・
ｂ

( 3)

When hei*Hei read

was sick,
JohLl read a book.
a book when Johni was sick.

(3a) is grammatical under the reading where the NP "John" is coreferential with thepronoun "he" becausethe pronoun is coindexedwith the name and the pronoun does
not c-commandthe name;however,(3b) is not grammaticalunder the readingwhere theNP "John" is coreferentialwith pronoun "he" because,in this case, the pronoun iscoindexedwith the name "John" and the pronoun c-commands"John". The Binding
Theory prohibits coreferencebetweena pronoun and a lexical NP (such as a name) inthesecircumstances.

3. Experiment on "Plausible DeniaY and Coreference
3.0. Introduction
This section explores the nature of pragmatic inlluences on the acquisition ofanaphora,in order that we may control for them and thereby reveal children'ssyntactic
knowledge. I focus on casesin which pragmaticfactors do influencechildren'sresponses
on experimentson the acquisition of the binding conditions. We thus reconsiderthe
nature of pragmatic influenceson the determinationof coreferencejudgements. This isan experiment of "plausible denial", in which I examine a pragmatic factor that may
interact with children's syntactic performance. This would show that this factor must
be controlled for in any task whose purposeis to assesssyntacticcompetence.
3.1. Purpose and Hypotheses
The purpose of this experimentis to assessthe grammaticalknowledge of Binding
Condition C in English-speakingchildren and to investigatethe nature of a potential
pragmatic factor in experimentalmethodologywhich I call "plausible denial" that inJluencesthe determinationof coreferenceiudeements.

Our hypothesisconsistsof the following two sub-hypotheses:(4)(a) Innateness of UG
The Binding Condition C, a condition which is part of UG,
is not ttlearned" but is given a priori.
(b)

Pragmatic Satisfaction of "Plausible Denial"
Unless the pragoatic demandsare satisfied so that
it is reasonable for the subject to say "no" in response to
the intrasententialreference reading of coreference,children's demonstration of their syntactic knowledge of
the Binding Conditions may be masked.

The hypothesis of "plausible denial" predicts that unless the characterwho is notnamed in the sentenceis occupiedin some salient activity which makes it clear why thesentenceis false, children may allow pragmaticsto overridetheir syntacticknowledge.

93(3) a. l{hen hei was sick, Jo}rn1read. a book.
b. itHei read a book when Johni was sick.
(3a) is grammatical under the reading where the NP "Jobn" is coreferential with thepronoun "he" becausethe pronoun is coindexedwith the name and the pronoun does
not c-commandthe name;however,(3b) is not grammaticalunder the read'ingwhere theNP "John" is coreferential_rvith pronoun "het because,in this case, the ironoun iscoindexedwith the name "John" and the pronoun c-commands'John-. The Binding
Theory prohibits coreferencebetweena pronoun and a lexical NP (such as a name) ii
thesecircumstances.

3. Experiment on "Plausible DeniaY and Coreference
3.0. Intyoduction
This section explores the nature of pragmatic influences on the acquisition ofanaphora,in order that we may control for them and thereby revealchildren"ssyntactic
knowledge. I focus on casesin whichpragmatic factors do influencechildren'sresponses
on experimentson the acquisition of the binding conditions. We thus reconsiderthe
nature of pragmatic influenceson the determinationof coreferencejudgements. This isan experiment of "plausible denial", in which I examine a pragmatic ?actor that may
interact with children's syntacticperformance. This would ii,o"' that this facror musrbe controlled for in any task whosepurposeis to assesssyntacticcompetence.
3.1. Purpose and Hypotheses
Tl". purpose of thil experimentis to assessthe grammatical knowledge of Binding
Condition
C in English-speakingchildren and to investigatethe nature Jf a potentia-i
pragmatic factor in experimental methodology which I cail "plausible denial" that infiuencesthe determinationof coreferencejudgements.
Our hypothesisconsistsof the following two sub-hyporheses:( 4)(a) Innateness of UG
The Binging condition c, a condition which is part of uG,
is not ttlearned" but is given a priori.
(b)

Pragmatic Satisfaction of "plausible Denial"
Unless the pragnatic denands are satisfied so that
it is reasonable for the subject to say "no" in response to
the intrasententialreference reading of coreferencl,
children's demonstration of their syntactic knowledge of
the Bindj:rg Conditions may be masked

The hypothesis of "plausible deniai" predicts that uniess the characterwho is notnamed in the sentenceis occupiedin some salient activity which makes it clear why thesentenceis false, children may allow pragmaticsto overridetheir syntacticknowledge.

ti
The hypothesis(4b) ties in with the claim that unlessthe context provides enoughinformation to meet with the presuppositionof the target test sentence,the subject
cannot deny the coreferencerelationship between a pronoun and an R-expressionin thesentence. On the other hand, if the context providesproper information for both possible antecedentsfor the pronoun in the target sentence,then the subject can judge thenon-coreferencerelationship betweena pronoun and an R-expression. It is hypothesized that the plausible denial problem arisesin the former case. As Hamburger andCrain (1982) suggested,unless the presuppositionsof a sentenceis satisfied,then it isvery hard for the children to understandit. After each protocol, the target sentenceis
pronounced. In one context, the target sentenceincludesa predicatewhich corresponds
to only one predicate in the sentenceused in the protocol. That is, only one toy is'looking' or 'covering' -- hence that toy is the only possibleantecedent. For example,
in the sentenceof (l), Santawas looking at a picture of himself,but the IncredibleHulk
was not looking at anything; he slowly walked arvay from the picture of Santa. In thiscase,children tended to accepthe and Santaas corefergntial. In the other situation, on
the other hand, the grammatical antecedentof the pronoun in the target sentenceis
clearly occupied in the action describedby the target sentence. This context had theIncredibleHulk lookjng at a picture of Kermit. So the child can judge whether the correct antecedentis doing what the sentencesays. In this context, children did not allow
the ungrammatical reading, rejecting (l) as incorrect. We interpret this difference asevidence of a pragmatic factor, which we call 'plausible denial'.
The hypothesis of 'plausible denial' maintains that unless the character who is notnamed in the sentenceis occupiedin some salient activity which makes it clear why thesentenceis false, children allow pragmatics to override their syntactic knowledge. The
efFectof 'plausibledenial' is to bias children to pursue the ungrammaticalreading when
the context fails to satisfy the presuppositionof the grammaticalinterpretation. Here,it is hypothesized that some of those children who can interpret the pronominal reference extrasententially,accordingto their knowledgeof grammar, in the latter situation,
might not be able to correctlyjudge the samesentencein terms of pronominal reference,in the former situation. The barrier covering their grammatical knowledge is the pragmatic factor concerningthe experimentalmethodology. Those children who can detect
the grammatical coreferencerelations in the pragmatically proper situation, might bebiased to selectonly one readingwhen the context does not provide them enough information regardingpresuppositionfor the target sentenceto corectly be judged concerning the coreferencerelationshipbetweenthe pronoun and the R-expression,
This bias could be related to a focus effect. Howard Lasnik has pointed out to me
that plausible denial might involve sentencefocus. Children could mistakenly have accepted sentence(l) with the first situation (the more yague situation), becausethe
background information which should be provided in order to focus on the object NP"a picture of Santa" is not present in the context.
i.2. Method
In this experiment, a truth-judgement task was used to test the eflect of pragmatic
factors on children's coreferencejudgements for backrvardsanaphora. In order to examine whether or not the hypothesesgiven above are borne out, a cross-sectionalexperiment was conducted with 20 three- to six-year-old children. The subjectswere lrom
middle-upper classhomes. These twenty children are divided into two groups. GroupI contains ten childrenwhoseagerangedfrom 3;7 to 4;6. Group II containsten chiidren
whose age ranged from 4;7 to 6;2. The experimentswere held at Children's World andUConn Child Labs in Connecticut,U.S.A. Ten adults whose native languageis English
were also tested as a control group. These adult subjectsare all students of the University of Connecticut,U.S.A.

Bcrore discussing the test sentences,I brieny summarlze the truth iudgement task.
In this task,on cach trial one experilnenter(Experlmenter I)manipulates the toys in the
expettental fleld,acting out the situations lⅣhich correspond to one lnterpretation ora target scntence. Expe
enter II controls a puppet. The subject and the puppet watch
the event that is staged by Expe
enter I. Then,the puppet which is controued byExperlmenter II says、 Ⅳhat he″ thought″ happened,using a target sentence,which in―cludes a pronoun and an R‐ expressiono On hearing the sentence,the subieCt iS asked toreed the puppct a cookie,if he says the right thing about a story;a rag,i「 he says thewrong thing。
In this task, then, both an utterance and a meaning arc provided by the exper‐
lrnentersi the meaning is provided by Experilnenter l,who stages the situation by ma‐nipulating toys:the utterance is provided by Expe
enter II,who controls the puppet。
In this sense,it is difRrent rrom other comprehension tasks,c.g。,the act‐out task. In
the act―
out task,the utterance is given by the expettenter;and the children themselves
are in charge ofthc llneaning. For the ambiguous utterances,as、ve sa、v,this task cannot
be used t6 sce if cllildren know more than one rneaning, On the other hand,the truth―t in being capable ofclearl17 assessing knowledge ofalternative
iudgement task has a rne
mearkngs by aζ king childrcn to iudge Whether or not one utterancc‐
meaing pa
thcexpe menter presents is
ght or wrong. This task has a second vtttuc from amethodological standpoint. Sincc the child has Only to iudge the truth valuc ofthe ut‐
terancc and mea
ng pair,he/she has a rFmimal requirement ofplanning in attail■ ing thematching of utterance and rneattg pairs. Finally,the task seems fun for children. It
ア
a1lo、
s us to test 3‑to 5,year old childrcn for about twenty test sentences,which takes
about 30 1nmutcs to complete in one expeFlmental session. For these reasons,this task
scems to be a good task to attest the linguistiこknowledge of ambiguous sentences,in‐cluding sentences with pronouns.
The test sentences consist oft、
vo parts: One is the Prc̲test;and the other is the pviah
Session. In the Pre‐test,the relevant syntactiC COnstructions used in the lain Session
are tested in Order to provide a control,so as to be able to exanune the acquiSiti6n Of
l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e o f U G . T h e Ptrees―t aims to sec whether or not the subieCt knows
the relevant structure flrst of au. The sentenccs in the Pre―
test do not contaln pronouns。
In the Main Scssion,the sentence type of back、 vards ahaphora where・ the RL―
cxpression
does not c‐corrlmand the pronoun,but the R― cxpression is c‐commanded by the prO̲noun,is tested. In these sentences,the pronoun precedes the name. This Pvlain session″
exarnlnes the enbct ofplausible denial″with the sentences includhg backwards
anaphora which are out by Binding Condition C. Furthe.1.lore,aCcording to the context
prescnted by the protocol of the expe
enter, test scntences were divided into t、
vogroups:(a)the pronoun in the target sentence takes external reference, and theanapho c relation is corresponding to the presented situation(511: 1,2,3,5,6,7);(b)the pronoun takes sentence external reference,and the anaphoc relation isκθr corre―
sponding to the presented situation(511:4,8).The Sentences tcsted are the following:(s)
I.

Pre-test1.
2.

Smurf is looking at the picture of Teddy Bear.
Cabbage patch doll covered Mother.

ム︶
０´

II.

Main Session

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

He covered Garfield.
She washed Sister Bear.
She.snelled Strawberry Short Cake.
Teddy Bear. (control
sentence)
IIe tickled
She is standing on the drawing of Minnie Mouse.
of Santa.
He is looking at the picture
He is playing with the mask of Donald Duck.
(controlShe is reading a book about Gurnny Bear.

sentence)

The Main session contains two syntactic types of sentences. Type I (i.e., (5 II: 1,2,
3, 4)) is a simple sentence structure in which there is no NP-node between the pronoun

and the R-expression. Type 2 (i.e., (5 II: 5, 6, 7, 8)) is a simple sentencestructure inwhich there is structuraily an NP which is commonly called a "picture noun phrase" between the pronoun and the R-expression. The S-structuresof the sentencesof Type I
and Type 2 are diagramed below:2(5) (a)IYpe 1:

NP

VP

ヽ
NP

V

￨
N

￨
he

coveredGarfield(b) Type 2:

ノ

ヽ

ヽ
VP
/

NP

ヽ

／

′

Ｖ ヽ

′

／

P

/
′

he

is

looking

at the picture

Ｉ
ヽ熙Ｉ Ｎ

′

Det N

of Santa

2 The details of the internal strucnrre of AUX and Tense are not expressedin the tree diagram, becauseit
is irrelevant to our present concern.

Further, there are two contexts correspondingto sentence(5, II), which I call Situation I and Situation 2. All subjectswere given all 8 sentencesin Situation I first (thesentencesgiven in random order), and then ail 8 sentenceswere given in Situation 2.
For example,for the sentence6 in (5, II), the following two situations are set up.
(7)

He*i/j<Situation

at a picture

looking

is

1>:

a.
b.

of Santal

Santa is looking at a picture of himself.
Bat Man is not doing anything.

( Protocol )Santa and Bat Man walk along and go in opposite directions.
Santa comes to his own picture and looks at it to see it :t'Bat
Man! Look what I found! "Bat Man slowly walks a$ray.

<Situation

2>z

a.
b.

Santa is looking at a picture of himself.
Bat Man is looking at a picture of Kermit
the Frog.

( Protocol)
Santa and Bat Man walk along and go in opposite directions.
Santa comes to his ovrn picture and looks at it to see it :tt
"Bat Man! Look what I found!
Bat Man says:
I an looking"I cantt see from way over here.
at the picture of Kermit! "In Situation 2, the fwo possible antecedents are looking at different things. Thus, thecontrast between the action of the 'correct' antecedent and the 'incorrect' antecedent isclear in the fieid of the experiment. In Situation l, however, only one of the two possible
antecedents is doing the action mentioned in the sentence;but the other character, who
could be the antecedent of the pronoun is not performing the kind of action mentioned
in the sentence. Therefore, this might be a casewhere the child chooses the answer, noton the basis of his syntactic knowledge, but because he cannot see why the sentence isfalse. If so, we cannot deduce that the child does not know the structural constraints
on pronominal reference; rather, the reason could be due to this pragmatic factor. To
sununanze:(8)

Test Sentences
Situation allows
extra-sentential
Reference(Response:yes)
SentenceTvoe
Situa onl
Situa on2

Situationdoesnot
extra-sentential
Reference(Response:no)Type lTvpe 2

Tb7pe lT57pe 2

4

8

5, 6,7

4

8

1,2,3
1,2,3

5, 6,7

In order to focus on the eflect of "plausible denial", the Main Sessioncontrols thefollowing factors. First, the test sentencesinclude only the backwardsanaphora where
the grammar predicts that the corelerencerelationship is not allowed between the R-expressionand the pronoun. Moreover, the fact that the test sentencesinclude only
backwards anaphora entails that the linear order of antecedent-pronounis controlled.
Furthermore, the context provided by Experimenter I with the protocol consistently
ends up with the story about the character(referredto as an R-expression)which isdifferent from the one mentionedin the sentence.That is, taking the hypothesisof Lust
et al. (1980) into consideration,the last mentionedperson in the protocol in this Main
Sessionis alwaysthe name,whichis predictedby the granmar as the antecedentfor the
pronoun in the target sentence.This is for the control of a pragmatic factor. By observing the discourseprinciple as well, which might concern the determination of pronominal reference,we aim to see the eflect of plausible denial.3Thereby, it is testingwhether or not the phenomenonof "plausible denial" is observedin the experiment on
acquisition of pronominalization,in the situation where the discourseprinciple as wellas the grammar in the narrower senseare controlied consistentlyto direct the subjectto
choose the extrasententialantecedentreading, and thus, leads himlher to judge target
sentenceslike (5 II: 1,2, 3, 5, 6,7) as "No". That is, it testswhether or not children
judge the coreference relation between the R-expression and the pronoun
intrasententiallyfor sentenceslike (5 itr: I - 8) in the situation where the discourseprinciple as well as the grammar in the narrower sensedrive the subject to determine theantecedentof the pronoun extrasententially,thereby,testing the existenceof the "plausible denial" phenomenon in the acquisition of structural constraints on pronominalreference.
All subjects\Meretested first with sentences(randomly ordered)in Situation l, followed by Situation 2. Then, in the follow-up experiment,nine subjectswho shorvedan
effect of the phenomenonof "plausibledeniable"were re-testedrvith the samesentences,
this time, in Situation 2 frst, foliorvedby Situation l: five subjectsfrom Group I, andfour subjectsfrom Group II were tested. The follow-up test aimed to test whether or
not the phenomenonof "plausibledenial" was found even in reverseorderedsituations.
As a control group,ten adultswere also tested.
The prediction of Experiment of "plausible denial" is as follows. In Situation 2,
corelerencejudgementsby the child should reflect the knowledgeof his/her grammar.
Thus, the grammar (and, possibly, discourseprinciples)yields that the reading for the
pronoun in those test sentencesmust be extrasentential.However, in Situation l, where
the problem of plausibledenial arises,children'sresponseswill be affectedby the pragmatics of the situation. Since the context does not contain an action that makes thesentencefalse,there will be a bias for letting the children acceptthe sentencein the incorrect context. Even if'the discourseprinciple as well as the grammar tell them to say"no", the linguistic kncwledge is overridden by the pragmatic condition concerning"plausible denial", and thus, in the truth judgementtask, the meaning of the target sentence is judged to be "yes". In this case,the child's competenceis not, thus, properly
being attested. Rather, what I show is the difficulty one has in seeingwhy the sentence
is false.
3.3. Results
This sectionsummarizesthe results. Ali the subjectsin the three age groups passed
the Pre-Test. The results of the Main Sessionare surnmarizedin the tables (9) through(12). Theseresultsinclude only subjectswho passedthe control sentences(5 II: 4,8).
r

It should be noted that there are only two R-expressions which could be candidates for the antecedent of
the pronoun in t}te experimental field. Therefore, whether Q) the subject tells directly on the basis of his
grammar (and discourse principle) that the extrasentential object is coreferential with &e pronoun, or (i)the subject deduces from both context and his knowledge of grammar that the name in the sentence is
not coreferential with the pronoun, the result observed in this lruth-judgement experiment ends up withthe same answer: "yes' or 'no-.

UU

That is, the correctresponses(5 ll 1,2,3,5,6,7)are summarized.
forthe testsentences(9) and (10)-shorvtheresultsof the experimentwith Situation I lirst (the main Experiment). In (9), the resultsof Situation I are given; in (10), the results of Situation 2-areglven.

(e)Situation I First
Percentageofcorrect responsesfor Situation I
SentenceType
Age GroupGroup | (3;7-4;6:N: l0)
Group II (5;7-6;2:N: l0)
Group III (adults:N: l0)

Type IT,pe 276.7(%)

36.6(%)

8s.8(%)

s7.1s(%)

100(%)

94.?(%)(10)
Situation I First
Percentage
ofcorrect responses
lor Situation2
Type IT,pe 2e6.6(%)

Group II

l0o(%)
100(%)

Group III100(%)

r00(%)

SentenceT.vpe
Age GroupGroup I

100(%)(ll)_and (12) show the resultsof the experimentwith Situation2 first (the follow-uptgtt). (ll) is a table showingthe percentageof correctresponsefor Siruation l; (12),Situation 2. Notice that all the subjectswho were given the experimentwith Situation
2 frst were among those who showedthe phenomenonof "plausible denial" in the experiment with Situation I first.
(11)
Situation 2 First
Percentageofcorrect responsesfor Situation I
SentenceType

Type I

Type 2

Group I (3;7-1;6:N: 5)Group II (5;7-6;2:N:4)

86.7(%)

71.4(o,'o)100(%)

73.3(%)

Group III (adults:N: l0)100(%)

100(%)Age Group

10 0

(r2)
Situation 2 First
Percentageofcorrect responses
for Situation2
SentenceType

Type I

Tソpe 2e3.3(%)

e2.e(%)

lo0(%)
100(%)

100(%)Age GroupGroup IGroup IIG r ou pIII

100(9'o)3.4. Analysis
Analyses of children's judgementerror types provide evidencethat plausible denial
has a strong effect on children. Analyses of variance shows that the effect was statistically significant(p < 0.001).
First let us look at the results concerningsentenceType l, that is, simple sentenceswith no NP-node intervening betweenthe binder and the bindee. In Situation l, thesituation where the characterwhich should be an antecedentin the adult grammar was
not occupiedin the salient activity, sentenceType I was correctly answeredby 76.70/oin Group I; 85.8% in Group II. The most errorswere found for sentence3, in which
the verb "smell" was the head of the VP predicate. (The reasonfor this will be discussed
later.) In Situation2, on the other hand, whereboth characters(possibleantecedents)
were occupiedin the actions introduced by the verb, 100 oh of the children in both age
groupscould interpretthe bindingrelationsbetweenpronoun and R-expression
as adult
subjectsdo.
Second,let us look at the resultsconcerningsentenceType 2, that is, simple sentencesincluding a picture NP. In Situation l, where the characterwhich should be anantecedentin the adult grammar was not occupiedin the salient activity, sentenceType
I was correctlyansrveredby 36.6% in Group I and 57.l5ohin Group II. In Situation
2, on the other hand, where both characters(possibleantecedents)were occupiedin theactions introduced by the verb, 96.6 Y, of the children in Group I and 100 % of thechildren in Group II could correctlyinterpret the binding relationsbetweenpronoun andR-expression.In the testsof both sentenceType I and sentenceType2, there wereno
children who said "yes" in Situation 2 but said "no" in Situation l. That is, there were
no children who interpreted the anaphoric relation as intrasentential,violating Binding
Condition C, in Situation 2; whiie interpreting pronominal referenceextrasententiaily,
observingBindingCondition C in Situation l.
The eflectivenessof "plausibledeniai" is strongly supportedby the follow-up experiment. As the resultsgiven in (11) and (12) show, the eflect of "plausibledenial"wasobservedlessoften in the casewhere Situation 2 was presentedprecedingSituation I for
the same sentence. Unlike the experimentwith Situation I frst, the presenceof thespecificactions for the extrasententialreferencein the fust cycle of the experimentsignificantly aidedthe interpretation successin all age groups, sincethe anaphoricrelations
for the test sentencewas more clearly sholvn in the experimentalfield. Therefore,wecan speculatethat for some subjects,after finishing one sessionwith Situation 2, thecontext for the correct anaphoric relations was retained in the subject'smental image,and that the fact that the clearercontext was presentedprior to the vaguecontext pro-Finally, we summarizethe effect of age difference. The results on the truth judgementtask with children revealedno significanteffect of age in sentenceType l, but they did
show a signilicant effect in sentenceType 2. The phenomenonof plausible denial wasobservedjust in caseof Situation I with sentenceType 2 evenin adult controls, though
to a lesserextent than children.
i.5. Observational Data
In this section,I introduce some anecdotalcommentsthat were made by subjects
after they were provided the context with the protocol and the target sentence.4
In the experiment, the effbct of plausible denial was also observedin children's
cornment. According to the protocol (Appendix 3), the samesentencewas presentedin
two different situations. As was predictedin many cases,the samesubjectgave different
judgementsfor the samesentence:in Situation 1, "yes";in Situation2,"no". The experimenters elicited corrrmentsfrom those children who showed the phenomenon ofplausible denial, by asking what those children thought happenedin the story and why
they judged the test sentence the Kermit the Frog (Experimenter II) said wasright/wrong. Thereby, the experimentersinterpreted the reason why the pronoun isjudged to be coreferential/noncoreferential
with the R-expressionin each situation.
First, let us look at the cornmentgiven by RC (3;7) for both situationsafter the protocol
was given by ExperimenterI, to seehow the phenomenonof plausibledenial was observedin the experiment. (For the protocol, seeAppendix 3). In the example shorvn
below, for the sametest sentence,RC givesthe oppositejudgements:"yes" for Situationl'. "no" for Situation 2.5

The data was recorded by Sony Cassette-corderTCM-5000 EV.
In the observational data, -S' denotes'subject'; "E1", Experimenter I; 'E2-, Experimenter II.

１ 一

︵ ﹀

vided the subjectan indirect cue for another cycle of the test of the samesentencewith
Situation I, in which no specificaction of the antecedentforextrasententialreadingwas
given in the context. Thus, those who made some 'mistakes'in the test with Situation
I first, followed by Situation 2, made no mistakesin the follow-up test with Situation 2
Iirst followed by Situation l. This eflect was also true for some of the children in theyounger group (Group I). It shouldbe rioticed,however,that in this younger group, the"plausibledenial" phenomenonwas also observed.In this follow-up experimentalso,forboth sentencetypes Type I and Type 2, there were no children who said "yes" in Situation 2 but said "no" in Situation l. The children who did not make any different
judgementsfrom adults' in the test with Situation I first also did not make any in thetest with Situation 2.

\42
(l3)
RC (3;7)(Situation 2 First)
6.

at the picture

IIe is looking
a' ttt""tt::-:;

of Santa.

s: Right. (gives a puppet a cookie)
EZz Yeaa. . Cookie! yttm. . .
E1: What happened in the storY, RC?
Picture of Santa. )E2z hm. the picture.
2:

Ｓ

b. Situation

２
Ｅ
ｌ
Ｅ
Ｓ

7.

He is playing with
1:a. Situation
EZz
E1:

E2z
El:
S:
E2:
S:
E2:
b. Situation

Wrong.. (gives the puppet a rag)
0h, no. lfhat really happened?
What really happened, RC?
to Bat Man) was looking
He (pointing
pictureof Kermit the Frog.
at thethe nask of Donald Duck.

Right?
RC, who was playing with the mask ofDonald Duck Donald Duck Donald Duck?
RC, could you teach Kernit the Frog who wasplaying with Dona1d Duck Donald Duck Donald Duck?
Kerroit, what did you saY?
I said he is playing with the nask of Donald Duck
Donald Duck Donald Duck.
RC?
Is that what happened in the story'(nodding)
Is that what happened in the story?
(nodding)
0K.

2:Wrong. (gives a puppet a rag)
What happened in th9 storY?
lfrong?
to the Papa Smurf) was playing
He (pointing(pointingto the nask of Mickey Mouse)that mask
E2z Isntt that what I said?
S : (shake head)E2z Did I say that somebody else was playing withthat mask?

S:
E 1:
S:

Next, let us considerthe responsesof AD (a;6). He also showedthe phenomenonof plausibledenial. In his case,the phenomenonwas also observedin the test sentencesof Type 2: sentencesincluding picture noun phrases. The Situation I was given first,
followed by the Situation 2.

'∩

0

(14)
▲D (436)5。 She is standing on the picture of Minnie Mouse。
(SituatiOn l):‐¨‐―> S: I dOntt know.
El: Kermit the Frog has to eat something, thOugh.
What did you say, Kermit?
E2: I will say it again.

t the Frog.
・s: :1:11311:nt。
i:。 :milie:1:;uI:n?[
I:F・
on here (pOinting to the picture of Minnie Mouse)..
So, eat this (gives a puppet a rag)!

(Situation2)z
S: I don't think so。
El: You don't think so?
S: She (Pointing to Smurfotte)isntt.
Eat this (giveS a puppet a rag)。

6.

He is 190king(SituatiOn l):‐at the picture

‐

‐

‐

‐

― >

of Santa.

S: Yes!

(SituatiOn 2):
‐

― >

―‐‐‐>

‐

ア.

‐

‐

‐ >

He is playing(SituatiOn l):

S: Hin (point-to
Bat Man), or him (point to the
Santa Claus)?
El: lfhat did you say, Kermit the Frog?
E2z I said he is looking at the picture of Santa.
S: Again... rag. (gives a puppet a rag)
E1: lfhy was he wrong?
S: Because he (pointing
to the Bat Man) was over here
and he was over here (pointing
to Santa).
with

――‐‐>

the mask of Donald Duck.

S: Yes!

(SituatiOn 2):
―

―

‐ >

S:
E1:
S:
El:

Him (pointing
to Papa Smurf)?
Is that what happened in the story?
I think...
a rag!
Sorry, Kermit.

Further, this subject showed the same phenomenonof plausible denial even when
Situation 2 was presentedbefore Siruation l.

6. He is looking(Situation
1):

at the pictureof Santa.

S: Yes. (gives a cookie. )EL: What did Kermit say?
S: He said (pointing
to Santa) Santa is
at the picture of Santa.
(Situation

looking2)z
S: No.
El: What happened really?
S: Santa is looking at the pictureof Santa.

7. He is playing with the mask of Donald Duck.
(Situation
1):
S: Yes. (gives a cookie)
E1: What did Kermit say?
S:
E1: What did you say, Kermit the Frog?
S: He is playing with the mask of Donald Duck.
E1: Who is b.e?
S: Donald Duck.
(Situation2)z
S: No. (gives a puppet a rag)
E1: What happened really?
S: He (point to Donald Duck) played with that(point to the mask of Donald Duck) andhe (point to Papa Smurf) played with that(point to the mask of Mickey Mouse).

These anecdotesprovide supporting evidencefor the phenomenon of plausibie denial. In Situation 2, where the context contains actions that make the sentenceeither
true or false, the children's cornmentsreveal the grammatical knowledge of Binding
Condition C. However, in Situation l, where the context did not contain a specificaction that makes the sentencefalse, children's cornmentsshow a bias for the overacceptanceof senter:ces.
Further, the foilowing anecdotesprovide supporting evidencefor the phenomenonof plausible denial. There were two chiidren who judged"no" in both situations, but
gave different cornmentsfor both situations. For example,RC (3;7) gave the following
judgementsand conxnents.

．
躍 Ｉ 目 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 日 ■■遍ョ題 亀 鳩 弩︲

一

■■

■せ

︵︶

(ls1

1 ntr ,( 1o;1.

He covered Garfield.
a. ( Situat j.on 1):
S: ... (gives a puppet a rag)
E2: l{rong? Oh. . .
E1:What happened in the storyb. (Situation

EZz 0h, 0K. Garfield covered hisself?
S: (nod)2):
S: Wrong. (gives a puppet a rag)
E2t Wrong? 0h.... what rea1ly happened, RC?
E2: Oh. That's
attention.

2.

really?

right.

Actually,

I wasn't paying

She washed Sister Bear.
a. ( Situation
1):
S: No... (gives a puppet a rag)
E2: No? 0h no... what rea1ly happened, RC?
She (pointing to Sister Bear) washed her face.
E2: 0h... She washed her face"b . (S ituation 2):
S: (gives a puppet a rag)
E2: No? 0h, I am wrong?
What happened really, RC?
And Sister Bear washedherself.
E2:. 0h, she washed the dishes!
And Sister Bear washedherself.
Although the subjectjudged the pronominal reference,as the adults do, in both situations,the commentsshegave showedthe effectof plausibledenial. In Situation l, shecommentedthat the sentenceis wrong becauseit is not a grammaticalantecedent,but
the character r.vhichis not a grammatical antecedent,who is doing the action whichcorrespondsto presuppositionof the target sentence.In Situation2, she commented,
on the other hand, that the sentenceis wrong becauseaction that the grammaticalantecedentis doing does not meet with what happenedin the context. This example
showsthat some children could correctly deny a sentencelike (l) with both situations,but they reject it by diflerent reasons. In the first (the more vague) situation, they rejected the sentencebecausethe presuppositionalinformation which should be provided
in order to focus on the objectNP is not presentin the context;in the secondsituation,on the other hand, they rejectedthe sentencebecausethe focus of the target sentence
does not meet with the provided context, while the the presuppositionalinformation
provided by the head of the predicatein order to focus on the grammaticalantecedentis met. This comment can also be interpretedas another caseof plausibledenial.
Examining the results,however,it was found that the correct responsefor Situation
2 with sentenceType 2 in Group I rvasnot 100%;but 96.6%. Does this meanthat there
were some cascswhere the subjectdid not follow the Binding Condition C where thepragmaticconditionsare met? Here we show the observationaldata of GL (4;0),who
is one of the examplesthat did not give the judgementthat observesthe Binding Condition C. GL, who admitted intrasententialreading for some sentenceswhich should

t t lh

not be allowed in the adult grammar (as shown in the adult control test in this experiment) in Situation 2, made the following comments. Notice here that in Situation l,
he always allowed the intrasentential reading for the case where the intrasentential
reading was judged to be allowed in Situation 2. In his case,there was observedalso atendency 0f plausible denial, aithough his judgement in the experimentwas not crystal
clear in the sensethat he did not give a clear-cutjudgement. However, the comments
he made after eachtest for.severalType 2 sentencesin the Situation 2have somedistinct
characteristicswhich show that it was signilicantly harder for him to decide theintrasententialreferencereadingthan that for the samesentencein the (Situation 1).
( 1 7)G L (4;0)
3.

She smelled Strawberry Short Cake.
a' (situatiolrt)t
s: yes. cookie.
b' (situatiolr')t
s: y e s . . . T h a t , s h a rd .
(repeat the protocol)
El: We11, so rather, which one do you want tofeed the Kermit, a cookie or a rag?
Which one is closer, cookie ox a rag?
S: (giving a puppet a cookie)

5.

She is standing on the drawing of Minnie Mouse.
1):a. (Situation
A cooki e...
good.

b. (Situation

E1: y ea...
2):

to S murfette)
S he? (poi nti ng
w hat di d you say, K ermi t the Frog?
on the drawing of Minnie
I said she is standing
Mouse.
(gi ves a puppet a cooki e. )(p ause)yes.

E1: Wel l ,
F' .

S:

1 A'7

6.

of Santa.
He is looking at the picture1):a. (Situation
S: Yes.
2)zb. (Situation(pause).. Yes.
S:
E1: Yea?
S: Because I don't know which one.
0K.
El:
Because they're both boys'
S: thatrs too hard.
0K?
boYs
El: 0h, are botha girl Al'lD a boy.
need
S: No. Because I
E1: 0h.
S: Because if they can mixed up. -. if they can nixed
up, :uryone could be like that.
That one was too hard.
E1: Oh, that one was too hard?
1{e11... Let ne tell you the story again.
2))(repeat the protocol of (Situation
Santa.
ofpictureattheE2: He is looki.ng
that's a ... that's not a bo..S:
because, Santa is a boy, and Santa is looking
I
and I don't know which one is'
at hinself....,
good
EZz That's a
Point.
S: Ttrat's a hard one for everyone.
E2: Yes, that's especially hard for me.
E1: Because he doesn't know our words.

7,

He is playing with the mask of Donald Duck't);,a' (ttt"::::l(gives a puppet a cookie)b' (ttt"::i:3');, This kind is confusing, too. see?
the nask of Donald Duck" ' I reallv don't
!---,
ffi:s
(repeat protocol)
E2z He is playing with the nask of Donald Duck'I

Tlxatts hard' too.

I'hat's hard, too'In Situation l, GL did allow coreferencebefweena pronoun and an R-expression
intrasententially without any hesitation. On the other hand, in Situation 2, GL seemedto know that the grammatic;l antecedentcan be the character(R-expression)introduced
only in the conteit. He also noticed that the p_ronou1lcan_be used deictically. Thus, the.o*1n.nt, given above are interpretedas the following. In the former case,GL denied
the extrasententialreadingsfor the target sentencesbecauseof the problem of plausible
denial. In the latter cas"l on the othei hand, becausethe condition of plausibledenial
was satisfied,GL's granrmaticalknowiedgewas revealedin the experiment.6
6 Here, a problem arises. lVhy didnt GL deny coreferentialrelation between the pronoun and the Rexoressionin the seniencein'situation 2? Foithis question,the following two possibleanalysescould beF'6st analysisis that GL rememberedthai he judged the same target sentencein almost in the"ii"ia"a.
ur 'oriong' in Situation l, interpreting the coreferentialrelation as intrasentential- This is;;;;;trJ;"
the reason why he ga*r"ihe comments shown ibovel Second analysis is that if the pronoun is acquiredwhy;; d"i*ir first""folloiled by as anaphora, the child was in the intermediate stage. This is the reason

10 3
3.6. Further Discussion
In this section,we will discusswhy the phenomenonof plausibledenial takes place.
In the protocol of Situation l, the action of the extrasententialreferent is always
describedby a verb different from the verb for describingthe action of the referent thatis mentioned in the target sentence,and the verb used t tne target sentence. On theother hand, in Situation 2, the two possibleantecedentsare occupiedin the action describedby the predicatewith the sameverb, but with a different object NP. The plausible denial problem arisesin the former case.
There are severalpossibleexplanationslor this diflerence. The reasonfor this plausible denial phenomenon(at least in part) could be attributed to the lexical meaning ofsuch verbs as "smell"; which is contrastedwith the verb "cover". Recall that one childacceptedthe sentence(1) in the pilot study with the cornmentthat the Incredible Hulk
might have looked at the picture of Santa,but that IncredibleHulkwas pretendingthat
he did not look at it. This observationseemedto suggestthat the vaguenessof the lexical meaning of the verb as rvell as the vaguesituationpresentedin the experimentalfieldcoveredthe children'slinguistic knowledgc. In the experiment,in order to look at thisphenomenonmore closely,the verbs"smell"and "look", whoselexicalmeaningdoesnot
necessarilyrequire the agent'sintention were used in some of the sentences,in order todescribe the action of the extrasententialreferencewhich should be a grammaticalantecedent. There was only one child who commented,after allowing the sentencein (5 iI: 3), as follows:internal coreference( 18)
0T (4;6)
E1:
Here is Strawberry Short Cake and Minnie Mouse.
Strawberry Short Cake said, "I smel1 something very nice.
Hmnm. That's me. I snell so sweet."
Minnie Mouse is just looking at Strawberry Short Cake.
E2: She smelled Strawberry Short Cake.
(pause) Yes.
---> S:
E1: So, what does Kermit eat?
S: Cookie!
E2: Thank you. Yr:n yur...
El:
0T, what happened in the story?
---> S: Minnie Mouse smelled Strawberry Short Cake.
EI:
0h, really?
Let me see... in this story,
Strawberry Short Cake said, "I smell very nice,"
and...
S: She (pointing
to the Minnie Mouse) can smell, too.

What's that?

It seemsthat this could be sometimesinterpretedas a casefor the phenomenonof
olausibledenial.
GL could not give a clear-cut judgement on the basis of Condition C. The first analysis can be tested bypresenting Situation 2 first, followed by Situation I with the same sentences. The second analysis can betested by holding the pretest of "lexical Test', examining whether or not the subject knows that the pronoun can be used as anaphora as well as deixis.

109
A related suggestion was proposed by Stcphen Crain(p.C。
)。He Suggests that con‐texts which do not orer the chance for plausible denial were ones in which the correctinterpretation ofa sentence has an uFlmet presupposition. In this circumstance,the childm a y n o t b e a b l e t o d o w h a t L e w i s ( 1 9 7 9 ) s u g g e s t s a d u l t d o , ′ a c c o r r m o d a t e ′t h epresuppositional failure,by lnentally flxing things up so that the presuppOsition is lnet

(Hamburger and Crain,1984:133).Hamburger and Crain(1984)claim that aCCOmmo―
dating presuppositional failure is a siglliflcant cognitive achievementdren.
for ch」′
H o w e v e r , t h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l c h i l d r e n yw h ″oαgrresaθ■οノt h e s i t u a t i o n a n d y e t a c ‐cepted the sentences(511:5,6,7)。 For example,as the examples(13),(14)and(15)show,

there were some children who corFmented on the pronomlnal
rence reゃror several sen‐tences by revealing their reading as intrasentential rererence.
The reason for the plausible denial efFect,as wc have discussed ln 3.2,mlght also in―volve scntence focus. Children could lnistakel■ y have accepted sentence(1)With Situ̲
ation l,because the presuppositionヽ ″hich should be provided in order to focus on theobicct NP″ a picture of Santa″ is not present in the context.7 As thereヽ 「as only one

referent(by the htrasentential reading)that Can
the satis″
presupposition of the target
sentence, the intrasentential reading forたι,which can function deictically as weu asanaphorically,mght have been taken for a sentence like″Hexi/ぅiS 106king at a pictureof Santai″by the chidren.
The present writer observed in the cXpenment that there were several subicctS WhO
were looking at the extrasentential rererent when
th(ッ
heard
sentences like(5H:5,6,7)
in Situation l,but thought fbr ″a、hile,looked at the other character,and then concluded
by accepting the sentence internal reference reading,giving the corrment or″
Yes,hewas.″ In this case,〃ot as an anaphor. 卜〔T(3;4),ヽ″hO did
he″is used deictically,but■
not a1low sentence inteHlal reference in Situation 2 anowed it in Situation l,with tho
vingこornments.
Follo、(19)
MT (334)El:

MT, in this story, heFe is Smurfette,
ng of Minn■e Mouse.
Minn■ e MOuse and a draw■
Smurfette and Minnie Mouse look at this drawing (point).
Minnie Mouse says: ' I like this drawing. But l have to stand1■t better。
on ■t to see
Smurffete is」ust 100king at Minnie Mouse.
E2: She is standing on the drawing of Minnie Mouse.
――‐> S: Yes! (gives the puppet (Exp. II)a cookie)
El: Can you tell Kermit why he was right?
E2: I said a right thing! yum yum ...
‐……> S: Because, she (pointing to Minnie)Was standing on thispicture.

On the other hand,this subiect gave the rollowing corrlments with the same sentencewlth Situatlon 2.

?

Here, it should be noted that the last mentioned name in the pragmatic lead (h the protocol) should also
direct the subject to choose the extrasentential reading.

1ln
A IV

( 20 )
E 1:

E2z- -- > s :E2:
E1:-- -> s :lff, in this story, here is Smurfette,
Minnie Mouse. Here is a drawing of Minnie Mouse.
Here is a present.
At first,
Smurfette and Minnie Mouse look at this drawing (point).
Minnie Mouse says: " I like this drawing.
But I have to standttl
on it to see it better.tt
Smurfette said,
dontt thinka good idea to sta:rd on the drawing of Minnie Mouse.
it's
I think I will stand on the present! "She is starrding on the drawing of Minnie Mouse.
No... (gives the puppet (Exp. II) a rag)
No? 0h... yucky rag!
Can you tellKermit why he was wrong?
Because, she (pointing
to Smurfette) was standing on thispresent, and she (higher pitch) was standing on the

picture.
E2z 0h, I see.
E1: Wel1, so what did Kermit say before?
--->E2: She is standing on the drawing of Minnie Mouse.
--->E1: lfT, who is "she"?
---> S: Smurfette.
This subject also showed the relevancyof the phenomenon of plausible denial in thefollow-up test where two situations were given in the opposite order from the Main
Session. There were severalchildren who gave cofirmentsin the sameline. Thus, here
we concludethat the plausibledenial strongly aflects the experimentalstudy on Binding
Condition C.
Here arisesanother problem. Examining the data closely,we found that the statistical analysisof varianceshoweda moderatelysignificanteffect of the variable of "Sentence Type" (p < 0.08). The percentageof the accuracy of sentencetype 2 including"picture NPs" was also lower than that of sentencetype I in both situations. Furthermore, the interaction between the variables of "SentenceType" and "Situation" wasstatisticallysignificant(p<0.01). That is, the effect of the differenceof situations on thesentencecontaining a complex NP was greaterthan that on the sentencecontaining asimple NP. The other factors being controlled, the oniy differencebetweenType I andType 2 sentencesis, syntactically,whether or not there is an intervening NP-node between the subject NP and lower NP in the predicate.tThis result suggeststhat someother factor besidesthe pragmatic conditiort of plausibledenial is concernedto derive
the subjectto allorv the violation of Binding Condition C for the casewhere an NP-node
is intervening betweenthe binder (in this case,a pronoun) and the bindee (in this case,a R-expression)much strongerthan for the casewhere there is no NP-node intervening
between the binding NP and bound NP. I offer the following higNy speculativeanalysist

It should be noted here that the tense and the aspect of the Type I sentences are different from those ofType 2. The reasons are summarized as follows. First, it was because of the naturalness of the sentencet
due to the natures of the verb and the picture NPs. The selected verbs tiat can take a picture NP as direct
object were judged to be more natural with the progressive form in the experimental context in question
by native speakers of English. For example, it was considered that test sentence I would be interpreted
natural with past tense; the test sentence 5 would be interpreted natural with present progressive. Further,
we tried to avoid the repetition of using fte same pattern of the verb forms. The other variables, for example, the type of situation, the structure of the test sentence and the linear order of pronoun-name in thetarget sentence are all controlled. Therefore. the protocol as well as the target sentences might sound to
the subjects always in the same pattern, causing a loss of attention. In order to control the inconsistencyof form of verbs in sentences of Type I and Type 2, the tense and the aspect of the verbs in the Pre-Test
were designed to correspond to those of the verbs used in the test sentences in the Main Session.

．
４ ︸ ＾ 一 一 ︲︐・ ︐ｔ ︐ ． ´ ヽ
． ． ． ． ． ． ． ● ● ● ● ● 一

!rr

´ 一
＾ Ｖ

for this problem. The upper NP in the predicate,or the picture NP, makesone semantic
unit, and the inner stnrcturewithin the upper NP is invisibleto those chiidren(and, evenfor some adults) and it, therefore,makes them admit the coreferentialrelationship between the subjectNP and lower NP in the predicate. So, the upper NP makes an 'island', and the lower NP can thus be coreferentialrvith an outsideNP. In this paper,this
explanation would be calledan hypothesisof "anaphoricisland",For the alternativehypothesis,the following explanation could be also given. The
reason why the lower NP is an invisible R-expressioncould be due to the fact that Rexpressionsin a picture NP are different from other usual R-expressions. That is, theR-expressionof lower NP in picture NPs and that of upper NP belong to different semantic classes.e
This is because,although the R-expressionin a picture NP is describing
the image of the referent,it doesnot directly refer to the NP in the actual world as it is.
It could be roughly statedthat the R-expressionin picture NPs is an R-expressionwhichrefers to the denotation in the imaginary possibleworld of the speaker/reader,while theusual R-expressionrefersto the denotation in the actual world.
Then, how does this distinction of R-expressionsaccount for the fact that some of
the younger group of children(and even someadults)fail to rule out sentenceslike (23)?
My conjectureis that it may be easierto put an index to a more "referential"NP, since
the unmarked use of an index is to indicatea real entity in the actual world, as the name"referentialindex" suggests.Thereforethe upper NP as the noun referring to the actual
object in the world is easierto get an index'asan R-expression,and thus functionsas acandidatefor a bindee. However, "he" and "a picture of Santa",for example,are interpreted as semanticallyanomalouswhen they are assignedthe sameindex, becauseof thedifferencein gender. On the other hand, the lower NP which is also a name but which
does not refer directly to the referentin the actual world, cannot get an index, at least,
for some adults and children,becauseit is not a usual R-expression.
Whichever analysisis true, the following scenariorvould be provided to explain r.l'hy
the accuracy of sentencetype 2 including picture NPs was lower than that of sentence
type I in both situations. In the experiment,the pragmaticsof the experimentsupports
the intrasententiaireading. First, the plausibledenial entersin this case. In the experimental field, for example,the situation where Donald Duck is playing with the rnask ofDonald Duck is acted out using the actual toys of the mask of Donald Duck and the dollof Donald Duck. Then, the subjecthearsthe target sentence"He is playing with the maskof Donald Duck." The presentedcontext providesthe subjecta visual input that Donald
Duck rs playing with the mask of Donald Duck. The pronoun 'he' can be used deicticallybecauseof its lexical property. Further, the lorverNP 'Donald Duck' is invisible for thechildren (and evenfor someof the adults) as a bindeeto get an index with the preceding
pronoun, and the upper NP also gets a different index, for the semantic or syntactic
reason. Thus, the subjectmight have concludedon the basisof thesecomputationsthat
the target sentenceis describingthe situation correctly; thus, the subject's answer is"yes". If the pronoun'he'can be used deictically,then, truly,'he'is playing with"themask of Donald Duck".
Therefore,evenif the child knows the structurairelationshipsof c-corrlmand,and irrespectiie of their noticing that "Donald Duck" functions as a noun and the pronounc-cornmandsthe R-expressionin the target sentence,the Binding Condition C does not
apply in this casebecauseit is not coindexedwith the pronoun. In other words, theactual situation and the linguistic knowledgethat (i) there are two main characteristicsof R-expressions,(ii) the R-expressionin the picture NP is different from usual Rexpressionsand (iii) a pronoun can be useddcicticallyas well as anaphorically,lead thee This suggestion ties in with the new proposal of 'there are two kinds of 'R-expressions".

L].2
chiidren to the'incorrect' answerin the presentexperimentaltask. Notice, however,that
this explanation does not directly concern the question of whether or not the Binding
Condition C is acquiredin those children, becausethis condition is not applied. Before
the condition of UG is applied, children (and even someadults) have some problems inthe sentenceincluding pronoun and picture NP to detect that the lower NP inside thepicture NP can be an R-expressionwhich can be a bindeein the target sentence.
So far, we discussedtwo possibleanalyses:the explanation of "island" and that of"tmage". Howard Lasnik pointed out to me that NPs with the genitivecould be usedin(21) has two
as in (21). The sentenceorder to disentanglethesetwo possiblehypotheses,
readings,as shownin (2la) and (2lb).

︱︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ＝ ＝ ＝ １ ｌ ｌ ＝ １ １ １ □ □ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ︱ ■ ■ 巳

ikHet is looking at Johnlrs picture.

(2L)
a.
b.

Ben is looking at the picture
Ben is J-ooking at the pictureof John (i.e. , the image of John. )draqrn by John.

According to the "island" explanation,the upper NP is "visible" but the the lou'er NP isnot. Therefore,if this analysisis correct,then, the sentence(21) shouldbe acceptedby
the subjectsrvhicheverreading they give ic (2la) or (2lb). That is, the subjectswouldinterpret the pronominal referencein (21) intrasententiallyregardlessof the reading.
However, supposethe "image" hypothesisis correct. Then, the subjectswho acceptthereading (2la), would not acceptthe reading(2lb). If the subjectinterpretsthe sentence(21) with (21a) reading,then, accordingto this hypothesis,the lower NP is invisible becauseit is not a usual referentialexpression;rather, it describesan image. It is interpreted with the reading of (2lb), however,the lower NP is not invisible becausea lower
NP as well as an upper NP belongto the samesemanticclassof R-expression.Therefore, if the experimentalcontext ieadssubjectsto choosethe reading in (2lb) when sentence (21) is presented,accordingto the "image" hypothesis,reference"is true, then, thepronominal referencein (21) would be interpretedextrasententially.In this way, the two
possibleanalysescould be disentangled.This project remainsfor future study.
Further, in order to test the "image" hypothesis,the following small experimentrvas
held using trvo subjectswho had shorvedthe effect of plausible denial in the previous
experiment. Those subjectswere testedwith the sentence"She is reading a book about
Gummy Bear", a sentencewhich was used as a control test h the previous experiment
to test whether or not the subject can acceptthe intrasententialreading. Howard Lasnik
pointed out to me that the sentenceshown above is different from others testedin theMain Session.GummyBear tn the book about Gummy.Beardenotesa characterin theactual world r,vhereas
Santa in a picture of Santa, merely describesan image. In thisexperiment,we used the sametechniqueas was usedin the experimentof "piausibledenial", to test whether or not those subjectswho showedthe plausible denial effect inother sentenceswould also acceptthe intrasententialreadingfor this sentence.
The result of this small experiment showed the those two subject could allow theextrasententialreading without showing the plausibledenial phenomenon. In the context of Situation l, those subjectsanswered"no" for the target sentencegiven in thecontext where grammaticalantecedentshould not be the R-expression(GummyBear,in
this case)in the adult grammar. The subjectsallowedthe intrasententialreadingin othersentences,but did not aliow the intrasententialreading in such a sentenceas "She isreading a book about Gummy Bear", in which the lower NP in the picture NP is more
"R-expression-like"than the other lower Nps in the tests. This result providessupport
for our "\mage" hypothesison rvhy it is more diJlicult to detect that Binding Condition
C appliesto the lower NP than the other simplerNPs.

11J

4. Concluding Remarlcs
Linguistic theory has sought to explain how and why children make the transition
from the initial state of languageto the final state on the basis of the primary linguistic
data. It is commonly assumedfurther that the data availableto the learner are highly
limited in character. For one thing, negativedata -- evidencethat certain sentencesare
ill-formed -- are not availablefor the acquisition of grammar. Chomsky (1986) terms
this 'Plato's Problem': How is it that we can know so much given that we have such
limited evidence?The rules that concernthe interpretationof anaphoric elements,which
are pervasivein many natural languages,are a part of languagewhich is not "learned".
Despite the absenceof negativedata, childrenbecomeable to tell the anaphoric relationsin (3a) from the disjoint relerencein (3b).
On the basis of theseassumptions,this study has proposedto test whether the eflectsof the plausible denial in the experimentaflect responsesregarding coreferencejudgements. Examining theselactors in the Main Session,we aimed to study the acquisitionof structural constraintson pronominal reference,trying to examinewhether or not theprediction that "once the children know the the relevant syntactic structure, the innate
knowledge of structural constraints may emerge"was true. Thus, by noticing the importance of pragmatic factors, we studied the condition in which pragmatic factors
override children's syntactic analyses. In particular, we presentedevidencethat, undercertain pragmatic circumstances(which we call "plausible denial") children override
Binding Condition C, and allorv backwards coreferencein structure which should be
prevent it. However, when this pragmatic conditions are controiled, children consistently respond accordingto structural constraints. Moreover, adult controls also show
(though to a lesserextent) the effect of plausibledenial. The experimentsused a truth
judgement task with 20 English-speakingchildren 3 to 5 year-olds. Our data, together
with the results of earlier studies,are interpretedas support for the early emergenceof
structural knowledge,as anticipatedby current linguisticstheory.
In passing,we consideredthe possibilityof dividing "R-expressions"
into trvo subclasses,thereby trying to capture the nature of picture NPs which behave syntacticallyin a different way from other NPs.
In the presentstate of our knowledge,remarks of this sort could only be suggestiveof the many, largely unexploredways in which the (adult and) child grammar on pronorninal referenceis studied. It is desiredthat this study wiil be one of the steppingstonesfor further researchon the nature of picture NPs in generaland the structural aswell as pragmatic conditions on pronominal reflerence.r0

I I would like to express my appreciation to Stephen Crain, Diane Lillo-Martin, Howard Lasnik andShuji Chiba for their helpful comments. I also wish to thank the teachers and children in Children's Worldin Tolland and UConn Child Labs for letting the present writer hold the experiments interrupting theirschedules. Thanks go to Stephen Crain, Diane Lillo-Martin, Elisabeth Goodell, Jaya Sarma and Rosalind
Thornton for helping with the experiments.

114

/PP

αた r

SEⅣ rENCEs

I. Pre-Test
l. Smurf is looking at the picture of Teddy Bear.
2. Cabbagepatch doll coveredMother.
II. Main Sessionl. He coveredGarfield.
2. She washedSisterBear.
3. She smelled Strawberry Short Cake.
4. He tickled Teddy Bear.
5. She is standing on the dralving of Minnie Mouse.
6. He is looking at the picture of Santa.
7. He is playing with the mask of Donald Duck.
8. She is readinga book about Gummy Bear.

Appendk 2
PROTOCOL (Pre-Test)
Here is a Teddy bear. He has a flower-patternedbag.
On the other side,there is a picture of Teddy Bear.
Smurf came along, went to the direction where Teddy Bear was standing
and said, "Oh, Teddy Bear,you have a pretty bag.
I like it very much! hmmm, wonderful."
Here is CabbagePatch Doll.
Here is Mother.
Mother is sick, today.
Mother said to CabbagePatch Doll, "Could you pleasetuck me in?"CabbagePatch Doll said, "OK", and goeslike this. (CabbagePatch
Doll coversMother.)t_ 1J

Appendix 3

PROTOCOL (Main Session)l. (Situation 1)
Here is Garfield and Arnie.
Garfield is sleepy,and goesto bed.
"Arnie, will you pleasetuck me in?"
But Arnie says: "You are too big for me to tuck you in.
Do it yourself." And Garfield covershimself.
Arnie is just standinghere.
(Situation2)
Flere is Garfield and Arnie. And here is Snow White.
Garfieldis sleepy,and goesto bed.
"Arnie, could you pleasetuck me in?"
But Arnie says,"No, you do it by yourself."
So, poor Garfield covershimself.
Then Arnie found Snow White sleepingwithout any blanket.
"I will tuck you in. Is that warm?"(Situation l)
Thereis a Mother and SisterBear.
SisterBearwoke up and said,"Mother, lvlother,could you wash
my face?"
But Nlothcr said,"No. You are six yearsold.
You can do it by yourself. Do it by yourself."
So, SisterBear washesthe face by herself.
Nlother is just standingover there.
(Situation 2)
Thereis a Mother and SisterBear.
SisterBearwoke up and said,"Mother, Mother, could you wash
my face?"
But Mother said,"No. You are six yearsold.
You can do it by yourself, Do it by yourself."
So, SisterBear washesthe face by herself.
Then Mother said," I have to wash the dishes."
And Mother washesthe dishes.
3. (Situation l)
Here is StrawberryShort Cake and Minnie Mouse.
StrarvberryShort Cake said,"I smell somethingvery nice. What's that?
Hmmm. It's me. I smell so sweet."
Minnie Mouse is just standingover there.
(Situation2)
Here is StrawberryShort Cake and Minnie Mouse.
And here is a beautiful flower.
Smell StrawberryShort Cake. Smell the flower.
(Aren't they smellnice?)
StrawberryShort Cake said,"I want to smell somethingnice.

IIO

Hmmm. Oh, I smell very nice. How nice it smells!"
Minnie Mouse said, "I don't think so.
Hmmm. Here is a beautiful flower. This flower smells
so sweet."
4. (Situation 1)
Here is Teddy bear and Mickey Mouse.
Mickey Mouse feelslike tickling somebody. Mickey Mouse foundTeddy Bear, and ---- tickle tickle tickle. (Mickey Mouse tickled
Teddy Bear.)(Situation 2)
Here is Teddy bear, Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse.
Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse are very good friends,you know.
One day, the nasty Teddy Bear tickled Minnie Mouse.
Tickle, tickle, tickle. Mickey Mouse look at that, and got upset.
"Teddy Bear is tickling my best friend!"
So, Mickey lvlousegoeslike this.
---- tickle tickle tickle. (Mickey Mouse tickled Teddy Bear)
5. (Situation l)
Here is a picture of Minnie Mouse.
Smurlette and Minnie Mouse look at the picture.
Minnie Mouse savs:" I like this drawine. But I have to standon it to seeit better."Smurffeteis just looking at Minnie Mouse.
(Situation2)
Here is a picture of Minnie Mouse.
Smurfetteand Minnie Mouse look at the picture.
Minnie Mouse says:" I like this drawing. But I have to standon it to seeit better."Smurffetesays: "I don't think it is a good idea to stand on thedrawing of Minnie Mouse. I think I will stand on the present."6.

(Situation l)
Santa and Bat Man walk atrongand go in oppositedirections.
Santa comesto own picture and looks at it to seeit :"Bat Man! Look what I found! It's me!"Bat Man slowly goesaway.
(Situation 2)
Santa and Bat Man walk along and go in oppositedirections.
Santa comesto his own picture and looks at it to seeit :"Bat Man! Look what I found! It's me!"Bat Man says: "I can't seefrom way over here. I am looking
at the picture of Kermit!"

7.

(Situation 1)
Here is a mask oFDonald Duck.
Donald Duck and Papa Smurf are looking at the mask.
Donald Duck says:"I like this mask very much.
I want to play with it."
But Papa Smurf is just standingby the mask.
(Situation 2)

117

■uri

nald Duck。
s big and mce。
.It′

.
m叙
驀鷲縦樹選戦I「

7onder WOman.
lund a big boOk
Slrrassing。lt′

ilぽ∬.WhtЮ ad aOkb。
vcry intereStlng.″。
k abOut
risab。
オ1lyt[二il:1)智l:::t:ヨξ∫薔
fi:ilililttF薔

LSXlき
(11:サ
med
around.
ア
踊
ど
lII:」
鷺
round a big boOk

L think SO.I WanttO read a b00k
very iniereSting.″

References
Binding. Dordrecht,Holland:Foris,
N. 1981. Lectureson Governmentand
Chomsky,-^-----i6tdrecht.
N'Y'
1986. Knowledgeof Language'Praeger'
C r ain ,S.andC.Mckee.1985._ , Ch ild reil:n , s-M;Giu
a d h 9 1 euniversitv'
1 9 e ' t o s t ' ru
c t u ra lre s8't n c t ro n s o nNovemberNE;Scoreference.j'p;;;; ;i;i--.lg87b.,Chiidren,sun d e rs t a n d in g g lc o re |e 30'
re n c e : A p ra g ma t ic v s . a s t r u c at LSA' December
tur;r.*pr'*uti;;';-i{;;tiad

andS teedman.lgss . , o n n o t b e in g le d , u pf".po*tl',, t h e g a rdKartiunen
e n p a t h : . tandh e uZwicky
seoftfi;;;;..itot.'
corlrext by the psychologicaluniversity Press' cambridge' pp'
purrt"gl'iu;*d;;(eds.),Naturai Language
320-58.
,Relativeacquisition.,In A. Kuczaj (ed.), Langrrage
Hamburger,H. and S. Crain. 1982. 'unJ-S"*utititt'
Lawrence Eilbaerm Assocrates'
SyntaxDevelopmJntl-uJl,
Hilldale, NJ. PP' 245-'14'

--

118

1984. Acquisition of cognitivecompiling.' Cognition 17. pp. 245-74.
Kuno, S. 1987. Functional Syntax: Anaphora, Discourse and Empathy. Chikago:
University of Chicago Press.
'1968.
'Pronouns and reference.' In J. D. McCawley (ed.) 1976. Syntax and
Lakoff, G.
Semantics. vol. 7. Academic Press. N.Y. pp. 275-335.
Langacker,R. W. 1969. 'On pronominalizatin and the chain of command.' In Reibel
D.A. and S.A. Shane. ((eds.)) Modern studies in English readings intransformaitonal grarnmar.EnglewoodCliffs. N.J. pp.l60-86.
Lasnik, H. 1976. 'Remarks on coreference,'LinguisticAnalysis2. pp, l-22.
. 1981. 'On two recent treatment of disjoint reference.'Journal of Linguistic---Esearchl. pp. 48-58.
. 1986. 'On necessityof binding conditions.' unpublishedpaper. University
o-fConnecticut. (Talk given at the Princeton Workshop on C6mparativeGrammar, March2T-29.)---fmpty

and J. Uriagereka. 1988.A Coursein GB Syntax: Lectureson Binding andCategorGs. Cambirdge,MA: MIT Press.-

Lewis,D. 1979. 'Scorekeeping
in a languagegame.' J. Philos.Logic. 8. pp. 339-59.
Lust, B. 1981. 'Constraints on anaphora in child language:A Prediction for a universal.' In S. Tavakolian (ed.), .LanguageAcquisition and Linguistic Theory.
Cambridge,Mass: MIT.
. 1986.'Introduction.' In Lust (ed.) Studiesin the Acquisition of Anaphora.
Vol. I. Reidel. Dordrecht. pp. 3-103.
. K. Loveland and R. Kornet. 1980. 'The developentof anpahora in first--language:.' Linguiitic Analysii 6, 359-91.
Syntacticand pragmatic Constraints
Otsu, Y.
1986. 'Eliciting .grammatical information from young children.' In
Mombusho-Grant for SpecialPromoted Project Research(l) "Theoretical andempirical studies of the properties of Japanesein terms of linguistic universalsl'
pp.65-7.
. 1987. 'Daimeishi to sono senkoushini kansuru Kouzoujyoken to Eibunpou
no Kakutoku' (Structural Conditions on Pronominal Refeilnce and Languige
Developmentin English-SpeakingChildren.) In Otsu (ed.), Kotoba kara mita
Kokoro (The mind viewed through Language.) Tokyo University Press,Tokyo.
pp.79-96.
Postal, P. 1970. 'On coreferentialcomplement subject deletion.' Linguistic inquiry t.
pp.439-500.
Reinhart, T.1976. The Syntacticdomain of anaphora. Doctoral dissertation,MIT.
1983. Anaphora and semanticinterpretation. Croom Helm. London.
. 1986.'The Grammar of anaphora.' In Lust (ed.), Studiesin the AcquisitionofAnaphora. Vol. I. Reidel. Dordrecht, pp. 123-50.

119

Ross,J. R. 1967.Constraintson variablesin syntax. Ph. D. dissertation,
MIT.
Wasow,T. 1972. Anaphoricrelationsin English. Ph. D. dissertation,MIT.
---f,-f. 1986.'The grammarof anaphora.'In Lust (ed.) Studiesin the Acquisition
enaphora. VoL I. Reidel. bordrecht. pp. iOl-ZZ.