Insurance Law Alert

June 2017

In This Issue
New York Court Of Appeals Limits Additional Insured Coverage To Injury
Proximately Caused By Named Insured
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that an additional insured provision applies only to
injury proximately caused by the named insured and does not extend “broadly to any injury
causally linked to the named insured.” Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Authority, 2017 WL
2427300 (N.Y. June 6, 2017). (Click here for full article)“Simpson Thacher
is a premier firm in thisspace. The lawyers there
continue to do good workand they are commerciallyrespected.”–Chambers USA 2017,
quoting a clientWest Virginia Court Addresses Scope Of General Liability Coverage For
Wrongful Eviction
Addressing a matter of first impression under West Virginia law, a federal district court ruledthat an insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify claims alleging that a restaurant wrongfully
refused service to a disabled individual because such conduct does not constitute a “wrongfuleviction” under the policy. Grand China Buffet & Grill, Inc. v. State Auto Property & Casualty
Co., 2017 WL 2129307 (May 16, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Ninth Circuit Affirms That Insurers Have No Duty To Defend Spyware
Suits
The Ninth Circuit ruled that primary and umbrella insurers had no duty to defend suits
alleging that the policyholder secretly installed spyware programs on consumers’ computers.
Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2017 WL 2323440 (9th Cir. May 26, 2017).
(Click here for full article)

New Jersey Supreme Court Rules That Flood Limit Caps Policyholder’s
Recovery For Debris Removal
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that a policyholder’s coverage for flood and debris
damage was limited to the $1 million cap set forth in the flood endorsement, even though adebris removal clause contained a separate sublimit. Oxford Realty Grp. Cedar v. Travelers
Excess and Surplus Lines Co., 2017 WL 2290135 (N.J. May 25, 2017). (Click here forfull article)

Eighth Circuit Rules That Crime Policy Does Not Cover Loss Of Investment
Returns Caused By Ponzi Scheme
The Eighth Circuit ruled that a crime policy does not cover the loss of returns that thepolicyholder allegedly earned on certain investments but lost due to the fraud of its investment
advisors. 3M Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2017 WL 2347105 (8th Cir.
May 31, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

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New York Appellate Court Reaffirms That Good Faith, Reasonable Belief
In Non-Liability Excuses Late Notice
A New York appellate court ruled that a policyholder’s late notice is excused if it has areasonable, good faith belief that the underlying claims are outside of the scope of policy
coverage. Cohen Bros. Realty Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co., 2017 WL 2540546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t
June 13, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Tenth Circuit Dismisses Conspiracy And Monopoly Claims Against Blue
Cross And Blue Shield Association
The Tenth Circuit dismissed monopoly, conspiracy and common law tort claims against Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Association, finding that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege such
violations. Bristow Endeavor Healthcare, LLC v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Assoc., 2017 WL
2350204 (10th Cir. May 31, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Two Courts Rule That Earth Movement Exclusion Unambiguously Bars
Coverage
Addressing matters of first impression under West Virginia and Michigan law, two courts ruledthat earth movement exclusions unambiguously preclude coverage for rock-related damage,whether caused by natural or man-made events. Erie Ins. Prop. and Cas. Co. v. Chaber, 2017
WL 2415333 (W. Va. June 1, 2017); Home-Owners Ins. Co. v. Andriacchi, 2017 WL 2491886(Mich. Ct. App. June 8, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Texas Supreme Court Rules That Attorney Billing Information Of Party
Opposing Attorneys’ Fees Is Not Discoverable
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that attorney billing information is protected work-product,
and that a party does not waive privilege by challenging the opposing party’s fee request if it
does not use its own fees as a comparator or seek to recover any portion of its own fees. In re
National Lloyds Ins. Co., 2017 WL 2501107 (Tex. June 9, 2017). (Click here for full article)2

Additional Insured
Alert:New York Court Of Appeals Limits
Additional Insured Coverage To
Injury Proximately Caused By
Named Insured

Reversing an appellate court decision, the
New York Court of Appeals ruled that anadditional insured provision applies only
to injury proximately caused by the named
insured and does not extend “broadly to any
injury causally linked to the named insured.”
Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Authority,
2017 WL 2427300 (N.Y. June 6, 2017).

the proximate cause of injury. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed.
The additional insured endorsement
provides that the NYCTA and MTA are
additional insureds “only with respect toliability . . . caused, in whole or in part, by:
1. Your acts or omissions; or 2. The acts oromissions of those acting on your behalf.”
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that
this language requires BSI (the named
insured) to be the proximate cause of the
injury in order to trigger additional insured
coverage. The court rejected the argumentthat “caused, in whole or in part” means only
but for causation, such that additional insured
coverage is available so long as there is somecausal link between the named insured’s
conduct and the injury. In so ruling, thecourt expressly rejected the appellate court’s
finding that the phrase “caused by” does notmaterially differ from “arising out of.”Coverage Alerts:

West Virginia Court Addresses
Scope Of General Liability Coverage
For Wrongful Eviction

The New York City Transit Authority(“NYCTA”) contracted with Breaking
Solutions, Inc. (“BSI”) for tunnel excavation.
Pursuant to the contract, BSI obtained
liability insurance from Burlington, listing
NYCTA and the MTA as additional insureds.
When a NYCTA employee was injured during
the course of work, NYCTA sought defense
and indemnity from Burlington. Discovery in
the underlying personal injury suit revealed
that the injury was caused solely by NYCTA’s
negligence. Thereafter, Burlington denied
coverage, asserting that NYCTA and MTA
were not additional insureds under the policy
for the purposes of the injury at issue. In
ensuing litigation, a New York trial court
granted Burlington’s summary judgment
motion. An intermediate appellate court
reversed, ruling that additional insured
coverage was available because there was acausal link between BSI’s conduct and the
injury, even though BSI was not negligent or

Addressing a matter of first impression underWest Virginia law, a federal district court
ruled that an insurer had no duty to defend
or indemnify claims alleging that a restaurant
wrongfully refused service to a disabledindividual because such conduct does notconstitute a “wrongful eviction” under thepolicy. Grand China Buffet & Grill, Inc. v.
State Auto Property & Casualty Co., 2017 WL
2129307 (May 16, 2017).
Scott Ullom sued Grand China Buffet for
statutory and constitutional violations basedon the restaurant’s refusal to allow Ullomand his service dog into the restaurant. The
complaint sought damages for emotional
distress, embarrassment and humiliation.
Grand China Buffet thereafter sought adeclaration that State Auto, its generalliability insurer, was obligated to defend andindemnify the underlying claims. Finding nocoverage under the policy, the court grantedState Auto’s summary judgment motion.
The court ruled that Ullom’s claims do notallege “wrongful eviction” under the Personaland Advertising Liability section of the policy.
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Although “eviction” is not defined, the court
concluded that it requires the underlying
plaintiff to have a legal right to be on thepremises from which he was evicted (such asa tenant). The court reasoned that language
referring to “a room, dwelling or premisesthat a person occupies” indicates an intent
to limit the scope of eviction to situations inwhich the plaintiff has a right of occupation.
Because Ullom had no possessory interest inGrand China Buffet that gave him a right tooccupy the restaurant, there is no coverage
under the “wrongful eviction” provision. As
the court noted, courts in other jurisdictions
have issued mixed decisions in this context.
The court also concluded that the complaint
does not allege bodily injury under thepolicy. Under West Virginia law, purely
mental or emotional harm that lacks physicalmanifestation does not generally constitutebodily injury for coverage purposes when
the definition of “bodily injury” is limited to“bodily injury, sickness, or disease.”

Ninth Circuit Affirms That
Insurers Have No Duty To Defend
Spyware Suits
Our October 2015 Alert reported on a
Montana federal district court decisionholding that primary and umbrella insurers
had no duty to defend two suits alleging thatthe policyholder secretly installed spyware
programs on consumers’ computers. Am.
Econ. Ins. Co. v. Aspen Way Enters., Inc.,
2015 WL 5680134 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2015).
Last month, the Ninth Circuit affirmed theruling. Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 2017 WL 2323440 (9th Cir. May
26, 2017).
A class action suit alleged that Aspen Way
installed undetectable software on computersthat were leased or sold to customers.
According to the complaint, the software
allowed Aspen Way to take photographs withthe computer’s webcam, capture keystrokes
and take screen shots without the consumer’s
knowledge. The complaint alleged violationsof federal statutory law and the common law
right to privacy. The common law claims
were dismissed, leaving only the cause ofaction alleging a violation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act. Liberty agreed
to defend the suit under a reservation ofrights. A second suit was filed against Aspen
Way by the State of Washington alleging

violations of state statutory law. This suit was
resolved by a consent decree, under which
Aspen Way agreed to pay $150,000. Liberty
paid this sum on behalf of Aspen Way, but
reserved the right to seek recoupment upona declaration of non-coverage. Thereafter,
Liberty filed suit seeking reimbursement from
Aspen Way and a declaration that it had no
duty to defend either suit.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that coverage for theclass action suit was barred by an exclusion
relating to violations of statutes that address
the collection or distribution of material orinformation. With respect to the Washington
State action, the court concluded that Liberty
had no duty to defend because the complaint
did not allege “publication” of personal
information to third parties. Finally, the court
ruled that the insurers were entitled to recoup
defense costs, explaining that under Montana
law, Aspen Way “implicitly accepted” theirdefenses under a reservation of rights.

New Jersey Supreme Court
Rules That Flood Limit Caps
Policyholder’s Recovery For
Debris Removal
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled thata policyholder’s coverage for flood and debris
damage was limited to the $1 million cap set
forth in the flood endorsement, even thougha debris removal clause contained a separate
sublimit. Oxford Realty Grp. Cedar v.
Travelers Excess and Surplus Lines Co., 2017
WL 2290135 (N.J. May 25, 2017).
After Superstorm Sandy, Oxford submitted
a claim to Travelers under its surplus lines
policy claiming flood damage in excess of$1 million and debris removal in excess of$200,000. Travelers asserted that all damage
caused by the flood was subject to the $1
million limitation for a flood occurrence.
In ensuing litigation, a New Jersey trial
court granted Travelers’ summary judgment
motion, finding that the policy unambiguously
limited all flood damage to $1 million. An
appellate court reversed and remanded forentry of judgment in Oxford’s favor. The
appellate court held that the policy provided$500,000 of coverage for debris removal in
addition to the flood limit. The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed and reinstated thetrial court’s grant of summary judgment inTravelers’ favor.

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The flood endorsement provides that “[t]hemost [Travelers] will pay for the total of
all loss or damage caused by Flood in any
one policy year is the single highest Annual
Aggregate Limit of Insurance specified for
Flood shown in the Supplemental Coverage
Declarations.” The New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded that this language unambiguously
limits total recovery for all flood occurrence
losses to $1 million. The court further
explained that a separate clause “fortifies thishard cap by explaining that, even if multiple
Annual Aggregate Limits of Insurance apply
to flood damage, the Limit of Insurance
specified in . . . the Supplemental Coverage
Declarations is the most Travelers will pay.”
Thus, the court concluded that even though
the policy assigns a separate debris removal
sublimit of $500,000, it does not constitutea self-contained policy provision outside
the application of the $1 million flood limit.
Finally, the court declined to address Oxford’scontentions as to the doctrines of reasonable
expectations or contra proferentem in light of
its ruling that the policy is unambiguous.

3M argued that it was entitled to coverage
under an Employee Dishonesty provisionthat covers the loss of money, securities or“other property” caused by theft or forgery.
3M contended that the Employee Dishonesty
clause is not subject to the policy’s general“ownership” requirement because it refers
to “other property” (rather than “insured
property”). Rejecting this argument, thecourt explained: “Although the Employee
Dishonesty provision does not expressly state
whose other property is covered, it is entirely
unreasonable to interpret the provision asextending coverage under the Policy to otherproperty that is not insured property.”

Eighth Circuit Rules That Crime
Policy Does Not Cover Loss Of
Investment Returns Caused By
Ponzi Scheme

Notice Alert:

The Eighth Circuit ruled that a crime policy
does not cover the loss of returns that thepolicyholder allegedly earned on certain
investments, but lost due to the fraud of its
investment advisors. 3M Co. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2017
WL 2347105 (8th Cir. May 31, 2017).
3M invested its employee-benefit plan assets
in WG Trading Company. The investment was
structured as a limited partnership interest in
WG Trading. After it was discovered that WG
Trading’s founders had engaged in fraudulent
activity, 3M submitted a claim under acrime policy, arguing that 3M suffered a loss
because some of its capital had been invested
in legitimate vehicles and produced legitimate
earnings, which 3M never recovered.
National Union denied coverage on several
bases, including that 3M failed to establish“ownership” of those earnings, as requiredby the policy. A Minnesota federal district
court agreed and granted National Union’ssummary judgment motion. See October 2015
Alert. Last month, the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Alternatively, 3M argued that the ownership
requirement was satisfied because it had alimited partnership interest in WG Trading.
The court dismissed this argument as well,stating that “up until the point at which theearnings were distributed to the partners, thestolen earnings were property of WG Trading– not property of 3M.”

New York Appellate Court
Reaffirms That Good Faith,
Reasonable Belief In Non-Liability
Excuses Late Notice
A New York appellate court ruled that apolicyholder’s late notice is excused if it
has a reasonable, good faith belief that theunderlying claims are outside of the scope ofpolicy coverage. Cohen Bros. Realty Corp. v.
RLI Ins. Co., 2017 WL 2540546 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1st Dep’t June 13, 2017).
The coverage dispute arose out of a fatal
accident that occurred during constructionof a building managed by Cohen Bros.
Realty. On the day of the accident, Cohen
Bros. contacted its insurance broker andwas advised that because the accident wasa workers’ compensation matter, a generalliability policy issued by RLI would not apply.
The workers’ compensation carrier, State
Insurance Fund (“SIF”), agreed to defend
and indemnify Cohen Bros. Approximately 5months later, the decedent’s administratrix
obtained an order to show cause to conduct
discovery for the purpose of suing Cohen
Bros. Cohen Bros. notified RLI, which denied
coverage based on late notice. Cohen Bros.
5

retained its own counsel, partially fundedby SIF. The underlying litigation eventually
settled for $2.5 million. Cohen Bros. sought adeclaration that RLI was obligated to defend
and indemnify the underlying claims. A New
York trial court agreed and the appellate
court affirmed.
The appellate court ruled that the delay innotice was excused due to a reasonable, goodfaith belief that the accident was outside thescope of policy coverage. The court expressly
reaffirmed that Tesler v. Paramount Ins.
Co., 220 A.D.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st
Dep’t 1995), which held that late notice is
excused by reasonable belief of non-liability
based on incorrect advice of an insurance
agent, remains good law. Additionally, thecourt ruled that the voluntary payments
doctrine did not bar recovery, explainingthat by denying coverage and refusing to
defend, RLI “excluded itself from any aspectof the [p]laintiff’s defense . . . including thenegotiation of attorneys’ fees . . . and cannot
now be heard to complain.”

Further, the court addressed the amountof defense costs for which RLI was
responsible. RLI argued that the $150 per
hour contribution by SIF to the underlying
defense acted as a ceiling on defense fees for
RLI as well. The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that “[a]ny agreement between
SIF and plaintiff as to fees has no bearing on
RLI’s responsibility to provide a defense.”
However, the court declined to address how
defense fees should be allocated between SIF
and RLI, noting that such a determination
would be based, at least in part, on SIF’s
policy language.

Antitrust Alert:

Tenth Circuit Dismisses Conspiracy
And Monopoly Claims Against Blue
Cross And Blue Shield Association
The Tenth Circuit dismissed monopoly,
conspiracy and common law tort claims
against Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Association (“BCBSA”), finding that thecomplaint failed to sufficiently allege such
violations. Bristow Endeavor Healthcare,
LLC v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Assoc.,
2017 WL 2350204 (10th Cir. May 31, 2017).
Bristow Endeavor Healthcare, an operatorof medical facilities in northeast Oklahoma,
entered into an in-network provider
agreement with Health Care Service
Corporation (“HCSC”), a BCBSA company
in Oklahoma for some of its facilities. When
Bristow asked HCSC to add a new facility(CORE) to the existing provider agreement,
HCSC refused to do so, and the parties wereunable to reach a separate agreement as to
CORE. Thereafter, Bristow filed suit, alleging
that HCSC’s refusal to grant CORE in-network
status resulted from a conspiracy to restrain
trade with Hillcrest Healthcare System andArdent Health Systems, Bristow’s largest
competitors. Bristow claimed that the purposeof the conspiracy was to prevent CORE fromfully competing in the northeast Oklahoma
healthcare market, thereby allowing Hillcrest
to maintain and expand its market share inthat region. An Oklahoma federal district
court dismissed the complaint, and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that theSherman Act conspiracy claim was “areasonably close question” but concluded
that the complaint did not plausibly allege
a conspiracy. The court explained thatwhile Hillcrest and Ardent may have been
motivated to undermine Bristow as acompetitor, HCSC would be acting against its
own interest if it agreed to reduce competitionin the healthcare market. The court rejected
Bristow’s suggestion that HCSC acted at
Hillcrest’s behest because it wanted tomaintain Hillcrest’s business, noting that thecomplaint did not include specific allegations
that Hillcrest possessed market power
sufficient to compel HCSC to act against its
own interest. The court deemed insufficient
allegations that an Ardent representative
claimed he could “leverage his relationship6with HCSC to keep CORE out of network,”
explaining that the complaint lacked details
as to any such arrangement or conversation
between Ardent and HCSC.

Earth Movement
Alert:
Two Courts Rule That
Earth Movement Exclusion
Unambiguously Bars Coverage

Addressing matters of first impression
under West Virginia and Michigan law, twocourts ruled that earth movement exclusions
unambiguously preclude coverage for rockrelated damage, whether caused by natural or
man-made events.
In Erie Ins. Prop. and Cas. Co. v. Chaber,2017 WL 2415333 (W. Va. June 1, 2017),
Chaber sought property coverage from
Erie for damage caused by sliding soil androcks. Erie denied coverage based on anearth movement exclusion, which applies“regardless of whether any of the above . . . iscaused by an act of nature or is otherwise
caused.” However, Erie agreed to provide
coverage for the replacement of broken glass
pursuant to an ensuing loss exception, which
provides that “if Earth Movement . . . resultsin fire, explosion, sprinkler leakage, volcanic
action, or building glass breakage, we will pay
for the ‘loss’ or damage caused by such perils.”
A circuit court ruled that Erie was obligatedto cover the entire loss. The court reasoned
that the policy did not unambiguously exclude
damage caused by man-made events andthat Chaber could have reasonably expected
coverage for the loss at issue. The court
further found that the ensuing loss exception
was ambiguous and should be construed infavor of coverage. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed.
The court ruled that the exclusionary phrase“caused by an act of nature or is otherwise
caused” unambiguously encompasses earth
movement-related losses regardless ofwhether caused by natural or man-madeforces. In so ruling, the court noted that otherjurisdictions have deemed similar language
unambiguous. Having found no ambiguity,
the court ruled that the lower court’s

reliance on Chaber’s reasonable expectations
was erroneous.
The court also rejected the lower court’s
ruling as to the ensuing loss exception,
explaining that while an ensuing loss
provision provides “a narrow exception to
the exclusion” for certain losses, it “doesnot revive or reinstate coverage for losses
otherwise unambiguously excluded by thepolicy.” Thus, the court ruled that damages
caused by the earth movement were notcovered, but that the portion of loss caused
by glass breakage was covered by the ensuingloss exception.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in HomeOwners Ins. Co. v. Andriacchi, 2017 WL
2491886 (Mich. Ct. App. June 8, 2017),
similarly upheld a denial of coverage pursuant
to an earth movement exclusion. There, theexclusion applied to losses or damage caused
by “any earth movement (other than sinkholecollapse), such as an earthquake, landslideor earth sinking, rising or shifting.” The
policyholder argued that the exclusion was
ambiguous and should be construed to apply
only to earth movement caused by natural
events. More specifically, the policyholder
claimed that under the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, the term “earth movement” wasconstricted by the limiting descriptions
following the words “such as.” Because theexclusion identified only natural events,
Andriacchi argued that the exclusion did not
apply to earth movement caused by manmade activities.
The court rejected this argument, finding
the exclusion unambiguous on its face. The
court explained that the doctrine of ejusdem
generis (or any other canon of statutory
interpretation) is inapplicable where, as
here, policy language is clear. The court
reasoned that “any earth movement” is allencompassing and applies to every kind ofearth movement, regardless of cause. The
court noted that its conclusion is further
reinforced by policy language stating thatany damage caused by a listed excluded act
or event is “excluded regardless of any othercause or event that contributes concurrently
or in any sequence to the loss.” As thecourt noted, other jurisdictions are split as
to whether similar exclusionary language
is ambiguous.

7

Discovery Alert:

Texas Supreme Court Rules That
Attorney Billing Information Of
Party Opposing Attorneys’ Fees Is
Not Discoverable
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that attorneybilling information is protected work-product,
and that a party does not waive privilege bychallenging the opposing party’s fee request
if it does not use its own fees as a comparator
or seek to recover any portion of its own
fees. In re National Lloyds Ins. Co., 2017 WL
2501107 (Tex. June 9, 2017).
In this multi-district litigation, various
homeowners sued their insurers and claims
adjustors, alleging underpayment of property
damage claims arising from hail storms.
Among other damages, homeowners sought
attorneys’ fees incurred in prosecuting theirclaims. In connection with their fee claim,
homeowners sought discovery regarding
the insurer’s attorney billing information.
In arguing that such information was
relevant to their own attorneys’ fee requests,
homeowners noted that the insurer’s counsel
had previously provided expert testimony
stating that an opposing party’s fees wererelevant in determining a reasonable
fee award. The insurers argued that thediscovery request was overbroad and sought
information that was irrelevant and protectedby attorney-client and work-product privilege.
The court agreed that the records were
protected work-product and granted theinsurer’s mandamus relief.
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that arequest to produce all billing records invades
a party’s work-product privilege because“cumulatively, billing records constitute a
mechanical compilation of information that,at least incidentally, reveals an attorney’s
strategy and thought processes.” Additionally,
the court refused to require production of
redacted versions of the billing records,
noting that redaction would insufficiently
mask counsel’s thought processes and legal
strategies. The court explained that evenaggregate fee summaries reveal legal strategy
because, for example, a “dramatic increasein mid-litigation spending could imply
an upcoming filing or significant researchexpenditures related to elevated concerns
over recent litigation events.” The court
acknowledged that an opposing party may

waive privilege through offensive use of its
own billing records, but found that the insurer
did not do so here.
Privilege aside, the court also ruled thatinterrogatories that request hourly rates,
total amount billed and total reimbursable
expenses were objectionable, where, as here,
the opposing party did not use its own billingrecords as “yardsticks by which to assess
the reasonableness of those sought by the[requesting party].” The court explained that“an opposing party’s litigation expenditures
are not ipso facto reasonable or necessary;
indeed parties who are not seeking to shift
responsibility for their fees may freely chooseto spend more or less time or money thanwould be ‘reasonable’ or ‘necessary’ forparties who are.”Finally, the Texas Supreme Court foundthat the trial court erred in ordering the
production of the insurer’s billing records
pursuant to state discovery rules governing
expert witnesses. Under Rule 192.3, a party isentitled to discover facts known by a testifying
expert relating to “mental impressions andopinions formed, any bias of the expert
witness, and documents provided to orreviewed by the expert in anticipation of
testimony.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3. However,the party requesting information pursuant
to Rule 192.3 must use the specific discovery
methods set forth in Rule 195 – disclosures,expert reports and oral depositions. Because
homeowners sought discovery of billinginformation through interrogatories andrequests for production, the court ruled thatthe exception to work-product protection
under Rule 192.3 does not apply.

8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

David J. Woll
+1-212-455-3136
dwoll@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
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Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212455-2846 and Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
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Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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