The Great Society, Reagan’s Revolution, andGenerations of Presidential Voting
Yair Ghitza*

Andrew Gelman†

Jonathan Auerbach‡October 17, 2019

Abstract
We build a model of American presidential voting in which the cumulative impression leftby political events determines the preferences of voters. This impression varies by voter,depending on their age at the time the events took place. We ﬁnd the Gallup presidential
approval rating time series reﬂects the major events that inﬂuence voter preferences, with themost inﬂuential occurring during a voter’s teenage and early adult years. The ﬁtted modelis predictive. It explains more than ninety percent of the variation in voting trends over thelast half-century. The ﬁtted model is also interpretable. It divides presidential voters into ﬁvemain generations: New Deal Democrats, Eisenhower Republicans, 1960s Liberals, Reagan
Conservatives, and Millennials. We present each generation in context of the political events
that shaped its preferences, beginning in 1940 and ending with the 2016 election.

* Chief Scientist, Catalist† Departments of Statistics and Political Science, Columbia University‡ Departments of Statistics, Columbia University

We study generational voting in American presidential(Converse, 1976; Glenn, 1976; Markus, 1983). Perfunctory

elections by modeling voter’s partisan preferences as a run-attempts to estimate all three require parameter constraints

ning tally of impressions left by the political events they livethat are difﬁcult to interpret and cannot be validated fromthrough. When ﬁt to data, the tally is weighted heavily by

the data (Fienberg and Mason, 1979).

events that occur in a voter’s teenage and early adult years.

We resolve the age-period-cohort problem by directly mod-For example, the Obama-era shift among young voters is ex-eling the inﬂuence of major political events that researchers

plained by events that disproportionately inﬂuence the pref-typically interpret as cohort effects.2 The Gallup presidential

erences of young voters. After early adulthood, voter prefer-approval rating time series is ideal for capturing these events

ences become consistent, and political events hold consider-for three reasons. First, the president is the most public andably less weight. The ﬁtted model is predictive—explaining

notable in American politics. The position is prominently as-

nearly all of the macro-level variation in voting trends over thesociated with major political events, even when those events

past half-century—and interpretable—dividing voters into

are unrelated to the presidency. Second, presidential elec-

ﬁve main generations.

tions are among the most salient events in American politics.

Our model builds on a substantial literature in political sci-

By a wide margin, presidential turnout is higher than any

ence, sociology, and social psychology, beginning with theother form of political participation. Lastly, the series contin-

theory of “political socialization” (Hyman, 1959) and devel-uously measures the public’s evaluation of the president since

oped through seminal works on American political behavior,

the 1930s.

such as The American Voter. To summarize brieﬂy, these works

Because presidential approval ratings reﬂect the politicalused panels of high school students to establish the micro-level

events that inﬂuence presidential voting, we need only esti-

determinants of political attitudes and behaviors. For exam-

mate the age-speciﬁc weights that determine the impressionple, Campbell et al. (1964) found party identiﬁcation, the ba-

left by those events—along with a relatively small number

sis of political attitudes and voting behavior, is formed earlyof additional parameters discussed in the following sections.

in life and is inﬂuenced primarily by parents.1

This economy of parameters, along with our massive dataset,

However, these works were unable to agree on the determi-

vastly improves the precision of our estimates, allowing us tonants of macro-level trends. Researchers observed, for exam-

quantify generational trends with accuracy unprecedented inple, that older voters were more likely to identify as Republi-

the literature. Our three main ﬁndings are:can. Some argued this was the effect of aging: a social or psy-

First, the events forming partisan preferences occur largely

chological process pushed individuals towards a conservative

between the ages of 14-24, and a generation’s preferred party

viewpoint later in life. Others argued the effect was genera-

is essentially locked-in by 40. These weights vary by race andtional: the shared political events of their birth cohort skewed

region. They are strongest among non-Southern whites andthese voters Republican. Much ink was spilled attempting torelatively weak among minorities, suggesting considerable dif-disentangle the two. Crittendon (1962) emphasized age ef-

ferences in the political socialization process.
Second, the Gallup presidential approval rating time se-

fects, while Cutler (1969) and Glenn and Hefner (1972) em-

ries, together with the age weights, delineate ﬁve distinct gen-phasized cohort effects.

2 We use a “running tally” model, a Bayesian learning model in which voters

Scholars soon discovered the problem of distinguishing be-choose their partisan identiﬁcation by evaluating each party’s performanceover their lifetime (Fiorina, 1981; Achen, 1992). In the simplest version,
each evaluation has equal weight regardless of age or recency. That is, political events early in life are no more or less important than those later on.

tween age, period, and cohort effects, the second of whichrefers to short-term inﬂuences of political attitudes that fail toleave a lasting impression. The parameters are not identiﬁed

Several papers generalize the “running tally” model, for example see Gerber and Green (1998). Independent of our work, Bartels and Jackman(2014) combine age-speciﬁc weights with period-speciﬁc shocks. Both are
estimated from the American National Election Study (ANES) cumulative
dataset. While these parameters are not underidentiﬁed, see footnote 17,(Bartels and Jackman, 2014: pg 14), the model is statistically underpowered.
The age-speciﬁc weights oscillate between negative and positive. The uncertainty bounds are large, and almost none are statistically distinguishable
from zero.

because age, period, and cohort are collinear: a voter’s age
and cohort uniquely determine the period in which they vote
1 Reviews of the early literature include (Niemi and Sobieszek, 1977; Delli

Carpini, 1989; Niemi and Hepburn, 1995). Of particular note is Jennings
and Niemi (1981), which summarizes many of their substantial contributions.

1erations. For example, consider white voters born in 1952

age and presidential vote choice in the three panels of Fig-and socialized during the Kennedy and Johnson administra-ure 1. We limit the data to white voters for ease of presen-tions. These voters are consistently 5-10 percentage points

tation. We also combine all of the data sources without con-more likely to support Democratic presidential candidates

sideration of omitted variables. The model presented in thethan those born in 1968, who came of age during the presi-

following section formally estimates the relationships shown

dencies of Carter, Reagan, and Bush I. We name these gen-here and adjusts for omitted variables.

erations: New Deal Democrats, Eisenhower Republicans,

The left panel shows age and vote choice for the 2012 elec-

1960s Liberals, Reagan Conservatives, and Millennials.

tion. Each bubble is a single year of age. The y -axis indicates

Third, despite our focus on generations, period effects

the level of Republican support, and the size of each bubble

are still important. However, these effects alone are insuf-

indicates the sample size. The curve is a locally weighted re-ﬁcient for explaining voter preferences within race/regions.

gression (LOESS).

Our model explains more macro-level variation than a sim-

Republican vote share is clearly related to age, but the pat-ple model of only period and race/region effects, especiallytern is not particularly interpretable. The youngest whitefor non-Southern white voters. This suggests a single deﬁn-voters slightly supported Romney, the Republican candidate.

ing political event is less important in the formation of voter

Voters around the age of 24 supported Obama, the Demo-preferences than the prolonged impression left by a lifetime

cratic incumbent. Romney’s vote grows steadily with age un-of events.

til 45, only to reverse direction until 60. It then climbs one
last time to 70, before ﬁnally ﬂattening.

We present the details and additional ﬁndings in the following four sections. We begin by describing the data and the

The center panel overlays curves for all presidential elec-

model. We then demonstrate how the ﬁtted model is inter-tions between 2000 to 2016. We remove the bubbles for clar-

preted. Next, we provide a narrative of presidential approval

ity. As with the left panel, the patterns in each election areover the past half century, using the ﬁtted model to quantify

not particularly interpretable. Moreover, no common trend

how political events left differential impressions on ﬁve gener-

is observed across elections.
It is only in the right panel—when we lines the curves up byations of American voters. Finally, we conclude with a briefbirth year instead of age—that a strong pattern emerges. The

discussion.

ﬁve curves align almost perfectly: the peaks and valleys coincide, and, with the exception of the 2008 election, all curves

Data and Preliminary Evidence

are essentially on top of each other. This is especially true for

We assemble a massive dataset from ﬁve sources: (1) the

voters born between 1940 and 1970, where the bulk of the

ANES cumulative dataset covering elections (1952-2016); (2)data lie.

Gallup presidential polling data from the Roper Center’s iPoll

Two peaks occur around the birth years of 1941 and 1968,

database (1952-2016); (3) the Annenberg National Election

with a pro-Democratic valley around 1952. This relationshipStudies (2000, 2004, and 2008); (4) Greenberg Quinlan Ros-is consistent over 16 years, measured across multiple surveys

ner Research’s internal campaign polls (2012 election cycle);

conducted by different organizations, and unaltered by any

and (5) CNN/ORC and Pew polls (2016 election cycle). We

complicated statistical model. It is no statistical artifact.
The 2008 curve is lower for almost all birth cohorts. Re-

only use presidential election years for the ANES and Gallup
datasets. There are 318,482 observations after removing

call the overall vote totals for each election4 . Whereas 2000,

missing data.3

2004, 2012, and 2016 were all decided by small margins, in

The combined data provide clear evidence of generational

2008, Obama won by a wide margin. The nature of “uniform

voting. To demonstrate this, we plot the relationship between

swings” in presidential voting is well known (Ghitza and Gelman, 2013), and the data show a widespread, if not uniform,

3 Variables of interest are presidential vote choice, ethnicity, state of residence,

4 The Democratic two-party vote share for the 2000-2016 elections were, inand age (or, equivalently, birth year, deﬁned here as the year of the survey
response minus age). Throughout this paper, white refers to non-Hispanic
white.

order, 50%, 49%, 54%, 52%, and 51%. These totals are for the full electorate, not for white voters only, as is shown in Figure 1.

2

Figure 1: Raw data and loess curves, indicating the relationship between age and presidential voting preferencesamong non-Hispanic white voters for the 2000-2016 elections. (L) The relationship is non-monotonic andquite peculiar in 2012; instead of a linear or even quadratic relationship, the curve changes directions multiple
times. (C) Non-monotonicity characterizes other elections as well. No clear pattern is apparent from this graphalone. (R) The true relationship emerges when the curves are lined up by birth year instead of age. The peaks
and valleys occur at almost identical locations, indicating a generational trend.

Figure 2: The Gallup Organization’s presidential approval rating time series, 1937-2016. The data reﬂects
political events that inﬂuence voter’s partisan preferences.
swing in 2008.

plore in the next section.

In sum, the data strongly suggest a generational voting

In addition to individual survey responses, we use themodel. Period effects also appear necessary. These effects,

Gallup Organization’s long-running presidential approvalthough temporary, need not be uniform, a feature we will ex-

rating time series, displayed in Figure 2. Recall that in the as
3

Figure 3: After removing survey respondents born before 1937, the analysis includes 213,566 survey respondents in total, here displayed by election year and year of birth. The data, and thus the analysis, have a strongemphasis towards the most recent four elections, and may be interpreted as weighted towards the contemporary political climate. The data encompass generational cohorts deﬁned by their individual birth year from 1937-1998,
with at least 1,000 responses for each birth year until 1986.
yet informally described model, voters keep a “running tally”

their birth year cohort c ∈ C = {1937, 1938, . . . , 1998},

of their impression from past political events. The Gallup(2) the election year in which they responded t ∈ T ={1960, 1961, . . . , 2016}, and (3) their race/region g ∈ G =One limitation of Gallup’s approval ratings is that, despite {non-Southern white, Southern white, and minority}. Ttime series captures these political events.

being one of the longest-running time series available for the

includes non-election years—voters continuously form theirstudy of American political behavior, it is “only” available

preferences even though they only express those preferencesfrom 1937 onward. Because this analysis examines the for-in presidential election years5 . Minorities form a single group.

mation of preferences over a voter’s entire life cycle, and due

Although it is preferable to separate African Americans, His-

to the importance of early life political socialization indicatedpanic Americans, Asian Americans, etc, the data does not dis-in the literature, we discard observations for which we do nottinguish consistently between minority groups in early years.

have presidential approval data over the respondents’ entire

The index, j , partitions respondents into J mutually ex-

life span. That is, we drop respondents born before 1937,

clusive cells so that each cell represents a unique combinationleaving 213,566 responses. The data are plotted by electionof the three identiﬁers, (c, t, g) 7→ j . The birth year cohort,

year and year of birth in Figure 3. They cover the 1960-2016

period, and race/region group of the respondents in cell j iselections and sixty-one birth-year cohorts (1937-1998), withdenoted by c[j], t[j], and g[j], respectively.

at least 1,000 responses for any individual year.

For each cell j , yj denotes the number of respondents preferring the Republican candidate, and nj denotes the num-

Statistical Modelber indicating a Republican or Democratic preference (unde-

We model the partisan preferences of each birth year cohort
over the 1960-2016 presidential elections by race and region.

5 This distinction is theoretical since we only use responses from presidential

We index each survey respondent by three identiﬁers: (1)election years.

4

cided voters are discarded). We modelyj ∼ Binomial (nj , logit θj ) ,We smooth them with an AR-1 restriction:wi ∼ Normal (wi−1 , 0.0025) ,(1)

where θj is the quantity of interest: the proportion of Re-(3)

with no prior expectation on w1 .

publican presidential support within cell j . To deﬁne θj , we

The β ’s control the extent to which the socialization

introduce additional notation.

process implied by the age weights is different for each

Let i[j] denote the age of the respondents in cell j , i ∈race/region group. A priori, we expect minorities to have

I = {1, 2, . . . , 70}. The identiﬁer i is redundant sincea smaller β because (a) African Americans consistently sup-i[j] = t[j] − c[j] for every j , but the notation is useful for port Democratic candidates, and (b) a large number of Hisdistinguishing between the age of the cohort at period t[j]panic American immigrants did not experience the politicaland the age of the cohort during which past political events

events that strongly inﬂuence white voters who have lived inoccurred.

the United States for their entire lives. No prior is imposedon the β ’s, however, so that the ﬁtted model can be used toWith this in mind, let i′ denote an arbitrary age, i′ ∈ I =investigate this claim.

{1, 2, . . . , 70}. For each cell j , xj,i′ denotes the Republican-

We represent election-by-election period effects withdirectional presidential approval rating when the j th respon-

αt,g ∼ Normal(0, σα ). While the α’s are indexed by t and g ,we also allow their inﬂuence to vary by i through the interac-dents were age i′ . It is calculated by (1) subtracting 50% fromthe Gallup presidential approval rating in the year c[j] + i′ ,tion terms λg[j] ∼ Half-Normal (0, σλ ). These parametersand (2) multiplying the resulting number by −1 if the sitting

combine to produce the ﬁnal period effect Aj for cell j :president was a Democrat. The rating is positive under two
conditions: a Republican president had ratings above 50%, or

Aj = αt[j],g[j] + λg[j] wi[j] αt[j],g[j]()= 1 + λg[j] wi[j] αt[j],g[j] .

a Democratic president had ratings below 50%. Conversely,
the rating is negative under a popular Democratic or an unpopular Republican president.

(4)
(5)

The interaction of period effects by age is plausible since,

For example, consider the cohort born in 1959. That is,

if generational effects vary according to the impressionability

c[j] = 1959. In 1960 (age = i′ = 1), the average approval of the voter, so might period effects. Like the β ’s, we impose
rating for the Republican president Eisenhower was 71%, so

no prior on the λ’s.

xj,1 = (71 − 50) = +21%. In 1961 (age = 2), the presi-

Adding (2) and (5) together

dency ﬂipped to Democratic president Kennedy, who had an
average rating of 88%, yielding xj,2 = −1 × (88 − 50) =θ j = γ j + Aj

−38% Note that the x are top-censored at age 70 because
few approval ratings are observed above that age.

(6)

completes the model.
We ﬁt the model using Stan (Stan Development Team,We now deﬁne the generational effect on a particular cell:2013) and R (R Core Team, 2012). Stan runs a No U-Turnγj = βg[j]i[j]∑wi′ xj,i′ ,(NUTS) sampler (Hoffman and Gelman, 2014), an extension(2)

to Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling (Duane et al.,i′ =11987), which is itself a form of Markov Chain Monte Carlo

where wi′ indicates the age-speciﬁc weight at age i′ , and βg[j](Metropolis et al., 1953). We generate 4 chains for 5000 itera-reﬂects the importance of the age-speciﬁc weights for eachtions. The ﬁnal 2500 iterations of each chain converge as in-race/region group. To identify the model, the former are con-dicated by post-modeling diagnostics such as Gelman-Rubin

strained to the simplex, and the latter are constrained to beR̂ (Gelman et al., 2004). We ensure satisfactory posterior pre-positive.

dictive model performance (Gelman et al., 2004) before using
sample means (for estimates) and sample quantiles (for credi-

The age weights, w, are the primary foci of the analysis.
5ble intervals) in the following section.

by the events of 1981 must have been when the respondent
was 14 in order to explain the voter’s choice 31 years later, in

Model Results

2012.

We now describe the ﬁtted model with a series of graphs. Fig-

Importance by Race and Region

ure 4 shows the foci of our analysis: the generational trends from

The right-hand panel of Figure 4 displays the importance of thethe ﬁtted model, while Figure 5 shows the election-by-election

age curve in forming the generational effect (βg in Equation

period effects from the ﬁtted model.

(2)). The generational effect is found to be over twice as large
for non-Hispanic whites as for minorities as a whole. The

Age Weights

estimates for each group—non-Southern whites, Southern

The left side of Figure 4 shows the estimated age-speciﬁc

whites, and minorities—are 11.1, 9.5, and 3.8, respectively.

weights w, along with 50% and 95% credible intervals. They

This ordering was expected but not imposed on the model.

quantify the formative years of political socialization with pre-Recall African Americans are consistent Democratic voters,

cision unprecedented in the literature. If, as our model posits,and Hispanic American immigrants may not have been inpresidential voting is a running tally of impressions left by po-

the United States during peak socialization and therefore notlitical events, then events around the age of 18 are nearly threeexperienced the political events captured by the Gallup series.

times as meaningful as than those later in life.

In addition, naturalized citizens may self-select into political

At a very young age, political events leave virtually no im-participation based on the salience of political activity amongpression. The weight at age 1, w1 , is essentially zero. This

their community (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001).

makes sense since one would be hard pressed to ﬁnd a baby

We reason the political socialization process for white vot-

even remotely aware of political events. The weights then in-

ers does not apply for minorities. However, a rigorous inves-crease steadily, peaking around 14-24 and gradually decreas-

tigation would separate minority subgroups, which, unfortu-

ing thereafter.

nately, we are unable to do from the data.

The importance of adolescence and early adulthood forpolitical socialization is supported by an enormous literature.

Period Effects

For example, Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) also ﬁndpolitical events have the largest impact at age 18-19 and de-

The left side of Figure 5 shows a time series plot with 50%

crease thereafter. Yet despite this decline—and the fact thatand 95% credible intervals.

a generation’s preferred party is all but locked-in by 40—werace/region, quantifying the polarization of political eventsﬁnd political events continue to inﬂuence voter preferences.

over the past 50 years. Minorities are consistently more likely

The age-weights never return to zero, their value at age one.

to vote Democratic, and Southern whites, Republican.

The period effects vary by

No children were interviewed, leaving one to perhaps won-

The right side shows a transformation of the λ’s from Equa-

der how the model can determine the impression left by po-

tions (4) and (5). Recall that these parameters reﬂect the varia-

litical events that occurred during childhood. To understandtion of period effects by age, allowing us to determine whether

how this is possible, consider a year in a respondent’s child-the period effects are more pronounced during the formativehood, say, at 14 years old. We know the age the respondentyears shown in Figure 4. However, interactions like the λ’s

was interviewed and therefore the year in which the respon-

are difﬁcult to interpret (Gelman and Hill, 2007), and we dodent was 14. From this we can obtain the political events at

not examine them directly. Instead, we display the period ef-

that time, as captured by the presidential approval rating. Forfect ratio: the numerator of the ratio is the period effect for

example, a 45-year old who was interviewed in 2012 would

an 18-year old voter (one of the most impressionable ages as

have been born in 1967 and 14 years old in 1981. Then-

determined by the peak of the age-weight curve). The denom-president Ronald Reagan had an average approval of 66% in

inator is the effect at age 70 (one of the least impressionable

1981. This is enough to “back out” what the impression left

ages as determined by the nadir).
6

Figure 4: Estimates of the generational effect. (L) We ﬁnd the 14-24 age range is most import for the formationof long-term presidential voting preferences. Political events before 14 have little impact. After 24, the age weights
decreases. (R) These weights, and the political socialization process implied by them, are substantially more
important for non-Hispanic whites than for minorities as a whole.

Figure 5: Estimates of election-to-election period effects. (L) Minorities are consistently more likely to vote for
Democratic presidents, and Southern whites have steadily trended pro-Republican over the past 50 years. (R)Period effects are similar between young and old minority voters and in the South. The evidence is inconclusive
for non-Southern whites.

7

Figure 6: The model accounts for 91% of the macro-level variance in voting trends over the past half century,
more than the simpler model incorporating only period/group effects. The model ﬁts considerably better within
race/region groups, particularly among non-Southern whites.
We ﬁnd no clear evidence that period effects vary by age.

ties and non-minorities, and between elections.

For Southern whites and minorities, the mode of the ratio

When the sample R2 is calculated within race/region

gathers at the boundary 1.0, implying no difference. For non-groups, our model is found to explain considerably moreSouthern whites, however, the effect is rather uncertain, cen-variation—although the improvement is not equal across all

tering around 1.14 and having substantial mass from 1.0 togroups. For non-Southern whites, the ﬁt increases nearly

1.4. That is, the model indicates that period effects for non-twenty percentage points, from 51 to 69%. For Southern

Southern whites are between 0% and 40% greater for young

whites, it improves a modest seven, from 47 to 54%. For mi-

voters than old voters.

norities, there is little difference.

Explanatory Powertion of the variation in presidential voting over the last half

We now demonstrate the explanatory power of the model. We

only period and race/region, suggesting a single deﬁning po-

calculate the sample R2 , weighted by the size of the J cells.

litical event is less important in the formation of voter pref-This statistic measures the percent of the variation explained

erences than the prolonged impression left by a lifetime ofby the model.

events, at least for non-Hispanic white voters.

We conclude that our model accounts for a substantial porcentury. It is a demonstrable improvement over a model with

The overall results are shown in black. The model explains
91% of the variance in the data. Much of this variation, 89%,

Generations of Presidential Voting

is also explained by a simple model incorporating only period
and race/region effects. However, that merely reﬂects the

We now demonstrate how the model aids the study of elec-

enormous difference in voting preferences between minori-tions. We provide a narrative of the presidential approval8

time series, recounting pieces of the historical record fromability to help the country through this difﬁcult period, andthe 1940s to present day. The purpose of this narrative is

as children and young adults they saw the country recover

not to simply describe presidential history. Instead, we ex-under the Democrat FDR. This was followed immediately

amine events through the lens of the model. We describeby the greatest war in world history, where they saw FDR

how major political events formed the preferences of ﬁve dis-guide the country through and emerge as one of the world’s

tinct generations: New Deal Democrats, Eisenhower Repub-

superpowers. To this generation, then, the United States be-licans, 1960s Liberals, Reagan Conservatives, and Millenni-

came the leaders of the free world under Roosevelt’s watch.

als. Each are epitomized by birth years: 1930s or earlier (pro-These events surely had an impact on their presidential voting

Democrat), 1941 (Republican), 1952 (Democrat), 1968 (Re-preferences, and those preferences remain to the present day.

publican), 1980s or later (Democrat).

Recall Figure 1, where these now elderly voters continue tohave comparatively pro-Democratic preferences through the

The political socialization of minorities is an important

2000-2016 elections.

topic. However, we focus exclusively on non-Hispanic whites,
due to the noted strength of the model among whites and rel-

For voters born in the 1930s, their exposure to FDR was

ative lack of strength among minorities.

limited compared to the earlier group. Their formative years
occurred mostly after the country recovered from the Depression, and, for many, even after World War II. They were

New Deal Democrats

exposed to FDR’s later years, though, and therefore experi-

For the ﬁrst generation, born in the 1930s or earlier, we areenced the tail end of his presidency, which remained enor-

short-handed in descriptive capabilities. First, this is a large

mously popular. Most of their peak years are spent with Tru-and widely diverse group. Within the dataset, the earliest

man at the helm. Truman had mixed and limited popularity

were born in 1855, so when considered as a whole their po-

over his two terms, ending his presidency at 36% approval.

litical life experiences are quite varied. Second, the analysis

As such, this group’s long-term voting preferences are mixed.

intentionally excluded the vast majority of this group, due tothe lack of presidential approval data available for much of

Eisenhower Republicans

their lives. As a result, the model is not formally appropriate
for this particular generation. With these caveats in mind, we

From this point forward, quantitative data can be used to aid

can still take the general principles learned from the modelthe discussion. The Approval series is available for the full life-and speculate as to how they might have affected this group.

span of the remaining generations, so we apply the model in

In regards to understanding voting patterns in the latter

full. The ﬁrst graph is shown in Figure 7. This type of graphwill be shown for each of the remaining four generations.

half of the twentieth century, we can focus the narrative onto
people born from roughly 1910-1940, because people born

The top panel shows the Approval series, now high-before 1910 comprise only a small minority of voters over thislighted to emphasize generational impact of each time pe-period. Fortunately, this makes the analysis relatively straight-

riod. The series is colored red to blue, with red reﬂecting

forward. There is a single towering ﬁgure that could have af-

pro-Republican approval ratings, blue as pro-Democrat, andfected this group’s presidential evaluations: Franklin Delano

shades of grey in between6 . The width of the series reﬂects

Roosevelt. FDR’s achievements are monumental. He guided

age-speciﬁc weights w, determined by the model. The graphthe country through the Great Depression and World War

thus emphasizes the peak formative years, where the events

II, and in the New Deal he laid the foundation for the mod-reﬂected in the Approval series were most powerful for thisern American welfare state. He served as president for twelve

particular generation.

years, being elected four times, both more than any president

The bottom panel integrates over the weighted Approvalin American history.

series and is thus reﬂective of the cumulative generational ef-

For voters born in the 1910s and 1920s, their peak forma-

fects from time of birth. This curve represents the sum presi-

tive years were spent during the Great Depression and World

6 This coloring scheme perfectly reﬂects Republican-directional presidential ap-

War II. They experienced Republican president Hoover’s in-proval, as was included in the model and described earlier.

9Figure 7: Presidential approval, and the cumulative generational effects, for Eisenhower Republicans born in
1941. The graph emphasizes peak years of socialization, according to age weights found by the model. Blue
indicates pro-Democratic years, red for pro-Republican, grey in between. This generation missed most of the FDR
years and was socialized through 10 straight pro-Republican years (Truman and Eisenhower). Their partisan
voting tendencies were drawn back towards the neutral grey line by the pro-Democratic 1960s, and they reacheda rough equilibrium by the end of the Nixon presidency.
dential voting tendencies of the cohort, at each particular age,ers were too young to remember FDR’s many accomplish-

as marked on the x-axis. The series starts on the middle greyments, instead entering their years of peak socialization inline, because there have been no events to alter generationalanti-Democrat or pro-Republican times. In Figure 7 andtendencies at age 0. Election-to-election period effects are in-those to follow, the most important times are the ones re-tentionally excluded—this graph is not meant to be reﬂective

ﬂected with the darkest and widest bands. In this graph, theof voting in particular elections, rather it encompasses the gen-ﬁrst such moment occurs when this generation is roughly 10

eral partisan tendencies of the cohorts, independent of the par-years old, in 1951. Truman, who had barely won reelection

ticulars of each speciﬁc race.

three years earlier, had sent American troops into Korea, andthe war was turning into a disaster. After the unconditional

With these data as the starting point, we can examine thevictory of World War II, Americans were unaccustomed toroots of the 1941 cohort’s presidential preferences. These vot10

1960s Liberals

the apparent stalemate in Korea, and Truman’s popularity
plummeted.

We turn to the 1960s, a decade ﬁlled with highly dramatic
political events with long-lasting impact. According to the

When Eisenhower assumed ofﬁce in 1953, his approval rat-

model, the generation most inﬂuenced by these events were

ing was enormously high, starting at 91%. Most presiden-

those we generically refer to as 1960s Liberals, and they in turntial terms start out with high ratings (Erikson, MacKuen andare epitomized by voters born in 1952.

Stimson, 2002), but unlike most, Eisenhower remained pop-

As can be seen in Figure 8, the Eisenhower years occurred

ular over the entirety of his presidency. The heroic Worldtoo early in their lives to have long-lasting inﬂuence. Instead,

War II general had promised to end the Korean War during

they came of age during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon

his campaign and quickly did so, ushering in an era of rel-years. Kennedy, like Eisenhower, began his presidency with

ative peace. Although he did not end the Cold War, as heimmense popularity, reﬂected in his 92% approval rating.

desired, all international conﬂicts over his tenure were rela-

He came into ofﬁce at a time when the political mood of

tively minor. On the domestic front, the 1950s were a time of

the country was at a liberal high-point (Stimson, 1991), andeconomic prosperity and progress.

his bold “New Frontier” agenda reﬂected that mood. His

The most prominent dip in Eisenhower’s popularity camedomestic policy goals were wide-ranging and reﬂected opti-

around 1957-1958. The country was in recession, the Soviet

mism in America’s abilities in the post-World War II era—anUnion had launched Sputnik and appeared to be winning the

expanded government role in combatting poverty, increased

space race, and Eisenhower was forced to send federal troops

federal aid to improve education, medical care for the elderly,

to Little Rock to enforce a federal desegregation policy, in-progressing the cause of civil rights, and more. Famously,

dicative of a wider tension over civil rights across the country.

Kennedy emphasized the importance of science and technol-

Yet his approval ratings dipped only a short while, reaching a

ogy and committed to sending a man to the moon by the end

bottom point of 57% in March, 1958, and rebounding quicklyof the decade. At the same time, his short presidency wasback to the 70-80% range. Eisenhower was able to navigate

characterized by an unusually tumultuous series of foreign

these problems, and in sum had an enormously popular pres-policy events. He was at the helm during the failed Bay ofidency, leaving ofﬁce with a 69% approval rating.

Pigs invasion, and the Cuban Missile Crisis was perhaps theclosest the world came to seeing the Cold War turn hot.

The 1941 generation, then, had experienced 10 straight

Though he succeeded in passing a number of his domes-

years of pro-Republican presidential evaluations, muchtic policy initiatives and averting war, Kennedy’s short pres-within the peak years of socialization. The impact of this pe-

idency was by no means an irrefutable success. Many ques-

riod on their long-term presidential voting preferences is ap-

tioned his strength as a leader in the face of the Soviet Union,

parent in the bottom panel of Figure 7. The curve ascends

and his liberal agenda was at times stalled in Congress. His

steeply, peaking at the end of the Eisenhower administra-

approval ratings are thus characterized by a steady decline

tion. Continuing on this curve, the Kennedy and Johnson

over his three year presidency, interrupted by a short positive

years (described next) moderate their voting tendencies to a

burst following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Indeed, when an as-

degree. The cumulative generation effect comes to a roughsassin’s bullet ended his presidency near the end of 1963, his

equilibrium by the end of the Nixon presidency, with remain-

approval ratings were at their lowest point at 66%. Ironically,ing events having relatively little impact.

in some sense the tragic end to the Kennedy presidency may
have helped cement his legacy. Historical counterfactuals are

The 1941 cohort can thus best be described as Eisenhower

always a dubious proposition—but perhaps Kennedy would

Republicans, though we should not take the term too literally.

have been a relatively unpopular president, shackled with aThis generation and others are not the byproduct of a single

declining approval rating, struggling to pass the remainderyear or of a single president. Rather their preferences reﬂectof his policies. Instead of this unﬂattering portrait, Kennedy

a weighted summation of their full life experience.

is widely remembered for his charisma, his beautiful and so11

Figure 8: The generation we refer to as 1960s Liberals are best epitomized by those born in 1952, whose
presidential political events are emphasized here. Too young to be highly inﬂuenced by the Eisenhower years, theyexperienced an intense period of pro-Democratic sentiment during the 1960s. After 1968, however, roughly 25
years of near-consistent pro-Republican events neutralized their presidential voting preferences.
phisticated family, and his optimistic vision of the future. For

Washington insider, to achieve Kennedy’s goals in the namethis generation, born in 1952 and roughly 11 years old at theof the fallen president. Building from Kennedy’s “New Fron-time of his assassination, surely these are the stronger lastingtier,” he wanted to not only pass a set of discrete policy pro-memories.

posals, but to build America into a Great Society, alongside awide set of new programs.

Quantitatively, Kennedy’s assassination drove a unique occurrence in the Approval time series—two enormous popu-

He passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting

larity spikes in less than a three-year time span. When John-

Rights Act of 1965—the foundational pieces of federal leg-son took the helm at the end of 1963, a second Democratic

islation of the civil rights era—outlawing discriminatory poli-president jumped above the 90% range, this time to 97% ap-

cies in schools, public places, and the voting booth. He estab-proval, the highest in the series. Johnson took this oppor-

lished landmark programs to aid low income families and thetunity, along with his singular abilities as the quintessential

elderly—Medicare and Medicaid, the federal food stamp pro12

gram, the Department of Housing and Urban Development

There are two responses. First, we do not claim that the(HUD), and others. He focused on education through pro-model perfectly captures all aspects of presidential history,grams such as Project Head Start, expanded student loans,

only that the Approval series and the associated age weights

increased federal funding to universities, and the nongovern-

are a good approximation to the historical events that shaped

mental Corporation for Public Broadcasting. And he passed

long-term preferences. In this regard, despite this apparent

legislation to protect the environment, regulating pollution

weakness in the model, the ﬁnal results still seem on target,

through the Water Quality Act and Air Quality Act, and es-

with this generation ending up relatively pro-Democratic.

7

tablishing the national wilderness, rivers, and trails systems .
In sum, his legislative accomplishments were gargantuan, andSecond, the Vietnam War and this generation’s response

the legacy of those programs is felt to this day.

to it is rather complicated. In 1967 and 1968, Vietnam wasJohnson enjoyed immense popularity for an extended pe-

Johnson’s war. But moving into the 1970s it became Nixon’s

riod of time, as reﬂected in his high approval ratings and land-

war to many, and the protests shifted from anti-Johnson toslide election victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964. John-

anti-Nixon. It is plausible that this shift was pronounced

son’s presidency and legacy, however, were marred by theamongst the 1952 generation. They were not yet 18 years old

Vietnam War and increasing racial and social tension in theunder Johnson and were thus at highest risk of being draftedlate 1960s. By 1967, his approval ratings had fallen, and by

by Nixon. And when Nixon won the 1968 election by speak-

1968 the once powerful president decided against running foring to the “silent majority,” he did so by explicitly denouncing

reelection.

the political concerns of these particular voters, young people
who protested in the 1960s (along with minorities).

It is illuminating to reﬂect on how these events shaped thepresidential voting tendencies of the 1960s Liberals generation,
as described here. The majority of these events actually took

The implications of this can be seen in part in Nixon’s 1972

place before their years of peak socialization. The strong pro-reelection campaign. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment had

Democratic years were 1961-1966, when these voters were

just passed, setting the national voting age to 18. According

roughly 9-14 years old. Although this is just before the peakto the data, white voters under the age of 25 (ﬁrst-time voters

years, recall from Figure 8 that these events still had a substan-in 1972) supported Nixon at 53%, in comparison to 70% fortial cumulative impact on their presidential voting tendencies.

white voters 25 or older. This 17 point gap is by far the largest

As we stated earlier, the ages of 14-24 are the strongest, but

in the dataset, never exceeding 9 points in any other election.

they are not the only years that matter. The relatively large
weights from age 9-14, in combination with the particularly

Despite this anti-Nixon sentiment, the cumulative curve ofhigh Democratic approval ratings of that era, were enough toFigure 8 suggests that 1968 was the high point of this gener-sway these voters for many years to come.

ation’s pro-Democratic feelings. Nixon was a popular presi-

The years after Johnson’s decline, from 1967 onward, re-dent for a time, and the start of his administration ushered inmain instructive. This was a particularly interesting time, es-roughly 25 years of almost entirely pro-Republican presiden-

pecially for young people, due to the anti-Vietnam protest

tial performance. Four of the next ﬁve presidents were Re-

movement and the rise of the counter-culture. Johnson’s ap-

publicans, and with a few short-term exceptions, all of thoseproval rating “only” fell to about 50% at that time, imply-

years were in the Republicans’ favor. As a result, the cumula-ing, in the model, barely any positive or negative change intive curve features a slow and steady incline over that period.

long-term presidential voting preferences. Thinking outside

By the time Bill Clinton came into ofﬁce in 1992, this cohort,the model, though, it seems unquestionable that young peo-

at 40 years of age, had reached a steady state slightly above theple had negative feelings towards Johnson at the time. How

neutral grey line. Since then, their general leanings have been

can we account for this?

essentially neutral. This is in contrast to both the Eisenhower

7A

list of these policies
www.presidentialtimeline.org.

werepulledfromtheRepublicans, described earlier, and the generation we describe

websiteas Reagan Conservatives, to which we turn next.
13

Figure 9: The Approval series as seen by the generation we call Reagan Conservatives, best epitomized by thoseborn in 1968. This generation missed the Kennedy and Johnson years entirely, and their peak socialization
fell under the popular Republican presidents Reagan and Bush I. By the time the Democratic president Clinton
reached his peak popularity in the late 1990s, they were already roughly 30 years old.

Reagan Conservatives

little impact.

Their political socialization seems to havestarted with president Carter. He began with high popularIt is, in some sense, a coincidence that the next generation

ity, but his ratings quickly dwindled as adverse political eventsof voters is best described by those born in 1968, the year ofovertook his presidency. By the time he left ofﬁce, an energy

such turmoil and change for the 1960s Liberals. On the othercrisis, stagﬂation, and the Iran hostage crisis, among other

hand, this particular birth year ensures no inﬂuence of theevents, left him in the 30-40% range.

Kennedy and Johnson years on this Republican cohort’s longterm voting preferences, under the model. Their Approval

This led into Reagan’s campaign and his optimistic visionseries is shown in Figure 9.

of America as a shining city on a hill. Though his early years

For this generation, both the polarized Nixon presidency—

were deﬁned by a lack of economic recovery and the Repub-

characterized by years of high popularity followed by thelicans’ defeats in the 1982 midterm elections, Reagan’s popu-

depths of Watergate—and the middling Ford presidency had

larity dipped below 50% for only a short period. The recovery
14

hit full swing shortly thereafter, and Reagan, whose campaign

these voters were only 9 years old. They entered their peakfamously declared that it was “Morning in America” again,socialization years in 1999—the federal deﬁcit had been erad-

was reelected in a landslide. This powerful imagery and theicated, the country was experiencing a period of immense

apparently overwhelming support of the American people noeconomic growth and prosperity, and America remained the

doubt had a powerful impact on the young cohort, who, 16

leader of the free world and the globe’s lone superpower. De-

years old at the time, were squarely in the middle of their peakspite his impeachment and the Monica Lewinsky scandal,

years of socialization. Despite the Iran-Contra scandal andClinton had garnered positive approval ratings for roughly

ballooning deﬁcits near the end of his second term, Reagan’s

four straight years, and he kept his popularity through the re-“Revolution” ended with his presidency at a 68% approval

mainder of his term, ending his presidency with a 67% rating.

rating.

In 2001, the Republican Bush II took ofﬁce, and thus be-

President Bush I’s presidency seems to have extended pro-gan one of the most turbulent presidencies in American his-

Republican sentiment in ways that are perhaps underesti-

tory. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 drove his popularity tomated in the collective public memory. From a foreign policy

94%. But after these heights, he experienced a steady andperspective, Bush was enormously successful. The fall of thecalamitous decline. On the foreign policy front, his adminis-

Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War both came under

tration undertook costly and unpopular wars in two countries.

his watch, not Reagan’s, and Operation Desert Storm was aThough some supported the president’s vision of America as atestament to the power of American leadership in the post-

crusader for democracy around the world, others considered

Cold War era. As a result of these successes, Bush’s ratings

his policies, particularly the war in Iraq, as deeply problematic

rarely fell below 80% for over 2 years, only dipping below

ventures which cost American lives and treasure, weakened

50% right near the end of his term. But economic problems

America’s standing in the world, and produced little, if any,

at home doomed his presidency. The Clinton campaign de-gains. In terms of domestic policy, Bush II’s most notableclared, “It’s the Economy, Stupid,” and with this as their fo-

accomplishment—his 2001 tax cuts—ultimately resulted incus, they won the presidency in 1992, ending over a decademassive federal deﬁcits. On top of this, the end of his presi-of nearly continuous pro-Republican sentiment. The pro-dency was headlined by the largest ﬁnancial crisis the country

Democratic Clinton years neutralized this generation’s long

had faced since the Great Depression. Despite passing effec-

term preferences to a certain degree, but they were roughly

tive eleventh hour legislation in the form of the Troubled Asset

30 years old, past the age of peak socialization, by the time

Relief Program (TARP) to avert the crisis, many still lay thisClinton reached his peak popularity in the late 1990s.

calamity at his feet.
Quantitatively, these problems are clearly reﬂected in his

Millennials

approval ratings. Bush II ﬁrst fell below 50% approval in May

For the last group, born in 1985, there is only 31 years of polit-of 2004. He barely won reelection that year, and in doing

ical experience by the 2016 elections, the latest in the dataset.

so received only a slight bump to his ratings. Falling below

But in Figure 10, the presidential inﬂuences that have shaped

50% again in March 2005, only two months after his second

their voting preferences thus far are seen clearly. If the re-inauguration, his ratings stayed in negative territory for thesults of the model hold, it is likely that these years will remain

remainder of his presidency—almost an entire four years, by

inﬂuential over the remainder of their lives.

far the longest such stretch in the series. His approval hit its

For this generation, the uncertainty of the Cold War is long

low point of 26% in October of 2008, in the midst of the ﬁ-gone, and the foreign policy successes of the Reagan and Bushnancial crisis, and was slowed, it seems, only by his departure

administrations are memories of other generations’ lives, notfrom ofﬁce three months later.

of their own. Indeed, the ﬁrst president to substantially inﬂu-

This brings us to the Democratic president Barack Obamaence their voting patterns is the Democratic president Clin-and to the end of the series. Obama, like the other presidents,

ton. Clinton’s biggest political defeat, in the face of the Re-

began with a high 76% rating—less than the 90% levels frompublicans’ Contract with America, took place in 1994 whenearlier in the series, but in line with the more recent presidents
15

Figure 10: The Approval series as seen by the last generation, the Millennials. Their experience had only lasted
31 years by the 2016 election, but the model indicates that these years should remain highly inﬂuential over the
rest of their lives. Their formative years have been primarily characterized by the popular Democratic president
Clinton and the unpopular Republican Bush II, resulting in their relatively strong pro-Democratic sentiment.
Clinton and Bush II. His popularity quickly declined, dipping

quential time periods, and thus they were socialized mainly

to 50% in February of 2010, and he remained slightly above

during the relatively even Obama years (and now during theor below 50% for the remainder of his presidency.

fairly unpopular Trump years). Referring back to Figure 1,
we can see that they trended Republican compared to their

For the last generation of voters, their presidential voting

slightly older counterparts, but their ultimate life-long voting

preferences thus far seem to mostly reﬂect the popular Demo-patterns remain to be seen.

crat Clinton and the deeply unpopular Republican Bush II,
driving them to be the most Democratic group we’ve seen

The Changing White Electorate

thus far. But consider the youngest voters, born in 1998 and18 years old during the 2016 election. They were barely

Now that we have described each of the ﬁve generations sep-

alive during Clinton’s presidency and were only ten years

arately, we examine their impact on the white vote overall.

at Obama’s election, essentially missing both of these conse-

Figure 11 plots each of the cumulative generation curves from16

Figure 11: The cumulative preferences of each generation is shown, along with the weighted summation of thefull white electorate. The generations are loosely deﬁned so that the entire electorate can be plotted at once. The
width of each curve indicates the proportion of the white electorate that each generation reﬂects at any given time.
The model—in this graph reﬂecting only the approval time series and the age weights—explains much of thevoting tendencies of the white electorate over time.
the earlier ﬁgures on a single graph, with a few modiﬁcations.

a smaller and smaller portion, and by 2016 all ﬁve generations
are represented.

Earlier, it was helpful to follow the birth year most emblematic of each group. Now, we broaden each generation to theInstead of plotting each generation’s full curve from age

scale of decades, allowing us to monitor the entire electorate

zero onward, we only plot the curves from their ﬁrst entry

at once. The basic narratives remain the same—and indeed,

into the voting electorate. That is, from their ﬁrst election on-

overly speciﬁc deﬁnitions of generations are not supported byward. We have also included the New Deal Democrats and older

the evidence. The changing widths of each curve reﬂect thevoters in this graph, despite the fact that the statistical model

proportion of the electorate that each generation represents

did not explicitly include them8 .

at any given time.
8 To construct this group’s curve, we apply the statistical model for the years

At the start of the series, the oldest generation comprises

covered by the time series, and apply an additional correction to accountfor the period of socialization that is not covered by the model.

the entire white electorate. As time marches on, they become17Discussion

From this graph, we observe the inﬂuence of each generation. The tendencies of the full white electorate are shown

We built a generational model of American presidential vot-in black. Before the 1960s, the white electorate (around 90%

ing in which voters form their preferences from the cumu-

or more of the voting population at that time) moved backlative impression left by the political events they have lived

and forth between Republican and Democratic, in response

through. The size of the impression varies by voter, depend-

to the popularity of Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower.

ing on their age at the time the event took place. We demon-

The Kennedy/Johnson years moved the white electorate backstrated the ﬁtted model is both predictive—explaining a sub-down towards Democrats over the course of the 1960s. Thus

stantial portion of the voting trends observed over the last

began the long period of Republican ascendancy—slightly

half century—and interpretable—dividing presidential voterstrending upward through the Nixon and Ford years, slowed

into ﬁve main generations.

in part by the entry of the 1960s Liberals. But the onset of

We believe our approach is an effective solution to thethe Reagan administration moved all generations upward—

age-period-cohort problem, which continues to challenge re-the New Deal Democrats were too old at that point to have asearchers despite its discovery nearly half a century ago. For

large change, but the remaining generations, especially theexample, consider a variant of the problem, which puzzled

Reagan Conservatives, moved dramatically, with the black curvepollsters after the 2012 presidential election: In 2008, 55% ofcrossing the 50% boundary line in late 1984. Those same

white voters aged 18-29 voted for then-Democratic candidate

Reagan Conservatives—now deﬁned as a group going until the

Obama. In 2012, that advantage ﬂipped to 54% in favor ofbirth year of 1980—neutralized a bit under the Clinton pres-

Republican candidate Romney. Why did this happen? Was

idency, but that change was not meaningful enough to largely

this a temporary shift in the preferences of young voters? Or,move the electorate as a whole. Bush II’s 9/11 spike moved allwould young white voters support the Republican candidate

groups slightly, and his slow and steady decline also served toin 2016?

move most groups once again. The New Deal Democrats are the

Our model provides a clear answer. Heading into 2008,

one group not affected by the 9/11 spike. By this point, theyoung, impressionable voters had only experienced the pop-

main change for this generation is a result of the older peopleular Clinton and unpopular Bush II years. The winds were inin the group, more likely to be Democratic, dying over time.

Obama’s favor. By 2012, however, the years of poor Bush II
performance that had swayed the young voters of 2008 were
replaced by the more recent, mediocre ratings of Obama him-

This graph does not in fact represent the complete opin-

self. This shift of young, white voters to the Republican party

ion trends of each of these generations. After all, the model

was not temporary. In fact, our model predicted this in 2012,

does not ﬁt 100% of the variance in the data. But it does in-and it was conﬁrmed by the 2016 election.

dicate that this relatively simple model can explain quite a bit

We could paint these events in a positive light for theabout the voting character of the white electorate. Indeed,

Democrats. The year 2008 was special, similar to 1972, inthe graph is entirely driven by the presidential political events

that a strongly pro-Democratic cohort entered the electorate

represented in the Approval series and the age weights. The

following a deeply unpopular Republican president. The im-

white electorate moves in meaningful ways, and the familiarpression left by the Clinton and Bush II years may be strong“parallel lines” of public opinion, in which different groups re-enough to keep an entire generation of voters pro-Democratic

spond to political events in similar ways, are apparent (Pagethroughout their entire lifetime. Moreover, the Gallup presi-

and Shapiro, 1992). In the model, changes which are in somedential approval rating time series suggests 2020 will be simi-

senses “small” seem to have a big impact on policy and on

larly special year for the Democrats.

the overall character of the electorate—the black curve, rep-

In general, the ﬁtted model suggests that, when we think

resenting the full white electorate, spans only 10 percentage

about generations of presidential voting, it is important not topoints altogether. In the grand scheme of presidential politics,

think about a single deﬁning political event. Rather, gener-

however, a consistent 10 point swing is important.

ations are formed through prolonged periods of presidential
18

excellence. FDR and the New Deal, Eisenhower, Kennedy

Fienberg, Stephen E and William M Mason. 1979.

and Johnson’s Great Society, the Reagan/Bush conservative“Identiﬁcation and estimation of age-period-cohort

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Sociological methodology 10:1–67.

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