Insurance Law Alert

May 2021

In This Issue
Second Circuit Dismisses Privacy Suit, But Rules That Claimants Can Sue
For Increased Risk Of Identity Theft From Data Breach
The Second Circuit ruled that individuals have Article III standing to sue over the unauthorized
release of their personal information, even if they have not yet been the victims of identity
theft. Nevertheless, the court dismissed the class action suit seeking damages based onan “increased risk” of identity theft, finding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of
establishing injury-in-fact. McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs., LLC, 995 F.3d 295 (2d Cir.
2021). (Click here for full article)“Market leader for
insurer representation,offering unmatched ability
in handling bet-the-company
litigation and arbitration
proceedings.”– Chambers New York
2021

Forgery Or Alteration Provision Does Not Cover Losses Arising From
Fraudulent Wire Transfers, Says Pennsylvania Court
A Pennsylvania federal district court ruled that losses stemming from fraudulent wire transfers
initiated by hackers were not covered by a forgery or alteration provision in a commercial
liability policy. Ryeco, LLC v. Selective Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1923028 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2021).
(Click here for full article)

Supreme Court Of Illinois Rules That Insurer Must Defend Biometric
Information Privacy Act Suit
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that an insurer must defend a suit alleging violations of the
Biometric Information Privacy Act, finding that the underlying complaint alleged a publicationof information in violation of the claimant’s right to privacy and that a “violation of statutes”
exclusion did not apply. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co. v. Krishna Schaumburgh Tan, Inc., 2021
WL 2005464 (Ill. May 20, 2021). (Click here for full article)

Kentucky Court Rules That Insurer Has No Duty To Defend Opioid Suit
A Kentucky federal district court ruled that a general liability insurer had no duty to defend orindemnify opioid-related claims against a pharmaceutical distributor because the underlying
complaint failed to allege damage “because of bodily injury.” Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Quest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2021 WL 1794754 (W.D. Ky. May 5, 2021). (Click here forfull article)

Bucking Trend, Three Federal Courts Deny Insurers’ Motions To Dismiss
COVID-Related Coverage Suits
While the majority of courts continue to dismiss claims seeking coverage for business losses
incurred during government-mandated shutdowns, a few courts have allowed such claims toproceed. Treo Salon, Inc. v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1854568 (S.D. Ill. May 10,2021); Serendipitous, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1816960 (N.D. Ala. May 6, 2021);
Cinemark Holdings, Inc. v. Factory Mutual Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1851030 (E.D. Tex. May 5,2021). (Click here for full article)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

Insurer Entitled To Recover Defense Payments From Another Insurer
Following Policy Rescission, Says Third Circuit
The Third Circuit ruled that an insurer was entitled to reimbursement of defense costs it
incurred prior to the rescission of its policy from an insurer that provided coverage to the same
policyholder. Berkley Assurance Co. v. Colony Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1625521 (3d Cir. Apr. 27,2021). (Click here for full article)

South Carolina Supreme Court Rules That Insurer May Depreciate Labor
Costs In Calculating Actual Cash ValueThe South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that where a property policy does not define “actual
cash value,” an insurer is entitled to depreciate the costs of embedded labor in the calculation.
Butler v. Travelers Home and Marine Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1900088 (S.C. May 12, 2021).
(Click here for full article)

Eleventh Circuit Reverses Dismissal Of Negligent Procurement Claims
Against Brokers, Notwithstanding Ruling That Policy Was Void
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a Georgia district court improperly dismissed a policyholder’snegligent procurement claims against insurance brokers, ruling that such claims were notprecluded by a finding that the insurance policy was void ab initio. Gen. Star Indem. Co.
v. Triumph Hous. Mgmt., LLC, 2021 WL 1921851 (11th Cir. May 13, 2021). (Click here forfull article)

STB News Alert
Click here to read about the Firm’s insurance-related publication.

2

Cyber Alerts:
Second Circuit Dismisses Privacy
Suit, But Rules That Claimants Can
Sue For Increased Risk Of Identity
Theft From Data Breach
The Second Circuit ruled that individuals
have Article III standing to sue over theunauthorized release of their personal
information, even if they have not yet been
the victims of identity theft. Nevertheless, thecourt dismissed the class action suit seeking
damages based on an “increased risk” ofidentity theft, finding that the plaintiffs had
not met their burden of establishing injuryin-fact. McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs.,
LLC, 995 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2021).
An employee accidentally sent an email
to approximately 65 other employees that
included a spreadsheet containing sensitive
personal information of more than 100
current and former employees. Thereafter,
three employees filed a class action suitagainst the company, alleging negligence andstatutory violations. While the complaint did
not allege any instances of fraud or identity
theft as a result of the email, it claimed
that the employees were at an increased
risk of identity theft and had incurred costs
associated with the cancellation of credit
cards and the purchase of credit monitoring
services, among other things. A New Yorkfederal district court dismissed the suit basedon a lack of Article III standing, finding thatthe plaintiffs had failed to allege any “concreteand particularized” injury. The Second
Circuit affirmed.
Addressing this matter of first impression,
the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff canestablish standing based on a risk of future
identity theft stemming from an unauthorized
disclosure of personal information. It
recognized that other federal circuit courts
have held that actual misuse following a data
breach is not necessary to establish standing.
However, the court ruled that here, plaintiffs
had not adequately alleged facts sufficientto establish standing based on an “increasedrisk” theory, noting that the complaint did notallege any “impending” injury or “substantial
risk that the harm will occur.” The courtemphasized that the data-compromise was
not the result of a targeted, purposeful act andthat none of the employees’ data had actually
been misused.

Finally, the court ruled that costs incurredby the plaintiffs in taking measures toprotect themselves from future identity
theft did not constitute an injury-in-fact.
The court explained that “where plaintiffs‘have not alleged a substantial risk of future
identity theft, the time they spent protecting
themselves against this speculative threatcannot create an injury.’”

Forgery Or Alteration Provision
Does Not Cover Losses Arising
From Fraudulent Wire Transfers,
Says Pennsylvania Court
A Pennsylvania federal district court ruledthat losses stemming from fraudulent wiretransfers initiated by hackers were notcovered by a forgery or alteration provision in
a commercial liability policy. Ryeco, LLC v.
Selective Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1923028 (E.D. Pa.
May 13, 2021).

Hackers accessed Ryeco’s computer system
and instructed the company’s bank to wiretransfer more than $1 million to the hackers’
accounts. The hackers sent fraudulent emails
and fraudulent wire transfer authorization
forms that contained the signatures of thecompany’s officers, which had presumably
been copied from prior, legitimate wiretransfer forms. Ryeco sought coverage from
Selective Insurance under a policy provisionthat covered loss “resulting directly from‘forgery’ or alteration of checks, drafts,
promissory notes, or other similar written
promises, orders or directions to pay a sum
certain in ‘money.’” Selective denied coverage
and Ryeco sued, alleging breach of contract
and bad faith. The court granted the insurer’ssummary judgment motion.
As the court noted, numerous other courts
have rejected policyholders’ attempts to3

obtain coverage under forgery or alteration
provisions for wire transfer losses stemmingfrom phishing schemes or other incidents
of cyber fraud. Those courts have reasoned
that fraudulent emails that contain wiretransfer instructions do not constitute acheck, promissory note or other “similar
written promise” to pay a sum certain. Ryeco
argued that those cases were distinguishable
because the fraudulent instructions at issue
were conveyed in emails as well as official
wire transfer authorization forms. The court
rejected this assertion, explaining that theforms were “like an email” and not the typeof negotiable instrument listed in the forgery
and alteration provision.
In addition, the court emphasized that
Ryeco declined fund transfer fraud coverage,
which both parties conceded would haveapplied to the losses at issue. That provision
expressly applied to written instructions“other than those described in the [forgery or
alteration] provision.”

Right To Privacy
Alert:
Supreme Court Of Illinois Rules
That Insurer Must Defend
Biometric Information Privacy Act
Suit
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled thatan insurer must defend a suit alleging
violations of the Biometric Information
Privacy Act (“BIPA”), finding that theunderlying complaint alleged a publicationof information in violation of the claimant’s
right to privacy and that a “violation of
statutes” exclusion did not apply. West Bend
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Krishna SchaumburghTan, Inc., 2021 WL 2005464 (Ill. May
20, 2021).
A tanning salon customer sued the salon
alleging BIPA violations based on thecompany’s alleged disclosure of thecustomer’s fingerprints to a third-party
vendor. West Bend sought a declarationthat it had no duty to defend the suit. West
Bend argued that there was no coverage
under the policy’s personal and advertising
injury provision because the disclosure of
personal information to a single party is

not a “publication of material that violatesa person’s right of privacy,” as required by
the policy. Additionally, West Bend claimed
that coverage was barred by a “violation of
statutes” exclusion. An Illinois trial court
rejected both assertions and granted thesalon’s summary judgment motion. An
intermediate appellate court and the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that thesalon’s sharing of biometric information withthe vendor was a “publication” under thepolicy. The court explained that “publication”
can reasonably mean communication to thegeneral public at large or disclosure to a single
party. Construing this ambiguity in favor ofcoverage, the court concluded that the salon’s
communication with a single vendor satisfied
the publication requirement. The court
further held that “right to privacy” includes
the right to keep biometric identifiers (e.g.,fingerprints, retina scans, voiceprints) secretfrom disclosure to others.
The court rejected West Bend’s assertion
that a “violation of statutes” exclusion
barred coverage. The exclusion applied topersonal injury
arising directly or indirectly out of any
action or omission that violates . . . (1)The Telephone Consumer Protection
Act . . . or (2) The CAN-SPAM Act of2003 . . . or (3) Any statute, ordinanceor regulation, other than the TCPA or
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, that prohibits
or limits the sending, transmitting,communicating or distribution ofmaterial or information.
West Bend argued that the phrase “otherthan” indicates that the exclusion applies toany statute that prohibits the communicationof information. Dismissing this argument,
the court held that the exclusion applies
only to statutes that regulate methods of4

communication, such as telephone calls, faxes
and emails. The court concluded that the
BIPA is not within this category of statutes
because it regulates the collection, use andhandling of biometric information, which thecourt deemed “fundamentally different” fromthe regulation of modes of communication.

Opioid Alert:
Kentucky Court Rules That Insurer
Has No Duty To Defend Opioid Suit
A Kentucky federal district court ruled that ageneral liability insurer had no duty to defend
or indemnify opioid-related claims against
a pharmaceutical distributor because theunderlying complaint failed to allege damage“because of bodily injury.” Motorists Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Quest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2021
WL 1794754 (W.D. Ky. May 5, 2021).

Quest was sued in 77 lawsuits brought by
cities, counties and private entities seeking
to recover economic costs incurred due toQuest’s allegedly improper distribution of
opioids. Quest’s insurer sought a declarationthat its policies did not cover the underlying
claims, which the court granted. The court
ruled that the complaint did not seek damages
because of bodily injury, rejecting Quest’s
assertion that the economic losses would nothave been incurred without the bodily injury
suffered by individuals who used opioids. The
court distinguished cases involving policy
language that requires damages “arising outof” bodily injury, noting that “arising out of”
has been construed broadly under Kentucky
law, whereas “because of bodily injury” hasbeen construed to mean “for bodily injury.”
Applying this standard, the court concluded
that the complaint did not allege damages forbodily injury because none of the underlying
plaintiffs sought damages for any bodily
injury they suffered.

COVID-19 Alert:
Bucking Trend, Three Federal
Courts Deny Insurers’ Motions To
Dismiss COVID-Related Coverage
Suits
While the majority of courts continue todismiss claims seeking coverage for businesslosses incurred during government-mandated
shutdowns, a few courts have allowed suchclaims to proceed.
In Treo Salon, Inc. v. West Bend Mutual
Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1854568 (S.D. Ill. May
10, 2021), an Illinois federal district court
ruled that a putative class action complaint
sufficiently alleged coverage under aCommunicable Disease Business Income
endorsement. The provision applied toloss incurred as a result of a suspensionof operations “due to an outbreak of‘communicable disease’ . . . at the insured
premises.” The insurer argued that the
government shutdown was not “due to”
a communicable disease at the insured
premises, but rather was based on the
COVID-19 pandemic in general. In denying
the insurer’s motion to dismiss, the court
noted the absence of a factual record
indicating whether or not the virus was
actually present on the insured premises. The
court also declined to rule on whether theendorsement was ambiguous.
An Alabama federal district court also denied
an insurer’s motion to dismiss a suit broughtby several restaurants seeking coveragefor business losses incurred in the wake of
COVID-related shutdowns. Serendipitous,
LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2021 WL
1816960 (N.D. Ala. May 6, 2021). The policy
defined “loss” as “accidental physical loss
or accidental physical damage.” The court
reasoned that use of the disjunctive “or”
indicated that loss meant something otherthan damage. The court further explainedthat physical loss may be established when
the insured “has lost possession of and been
deprived of insured property.” The court
ruled that the restaurants sufficiently pledphysical loss because the complaint alleged
5that they were unable to use their premises
and tables during the mandated closuresand restrictions.
The Eleventh Circuit, applying Florida law,reached a contrary decision in Mama Jo’s
Inc. v. Sparta Ins. Co., 823 Fed. Appx.
868 (11th Cir. 2020) (see September 2020
Alert). However, the Serendipitous court
deemed that decision non-binding anddistinguishable. In particular, the courtemphasized that Mama Jo’s was decided ona summary judgment motion rather than amotion to dismiss, and that unlike the present
case, the Mama Jo’s complaint did not allege
that employees tested positive for COVID-19.
Finally, a Texas federal district court denied
an insurer’s motion to dismiss, ruling that amovie theater sufficiently alleged a claim forcoverage under an all risk policy. Cinemark
Holdings, Inc. v. Factory Mutual Ins. Co.,
2021 WL 1851030 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2021).
The complaint alleged that more than 1700
Cinemark employees had tested positive foror were exposed to or displayed symptoms of
COVID-19, forcing the company to close its
theaters. Factory Mutual denied coverage on
the basis of a contamination exclusion and theabsence of alleged physical loss or damage toinsured property.
In denying Factory Mutual’s motion todismiss, the court emphasized that thecomplaint alleged property damage based on
the actual presence of the virus and altered
air content. The court also noted that thepolicy expressly covered loss and damage
caused by “communicable disease.” The court
acknowledged that another Texas federal
district court recently dismissed COVID19-related business loss claims in Selery
Fulfillment, Inc. v. Colony Ins. Co., 2021
WL 963742 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021), but
distinguished Selery on the bases that (i)the policyholder in that case did not allege
that the virus entered the property and(ii) the governing policy did not include a
communicable disease provision.
The Cinemark decision appears to be an
outlier. A New Jersey federal district court
recently granted Factory Mutual’s motion todismiss in Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Factory
Mutual Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1904739 (D.N.J.
May 12, 2021), rejecting the arguments set
forth in Cinemark. In particular, the court
ruled that the alleged “presence” of the virus
in or near the policyholder’s stores did notconstitute actual or imminent physical loss
or damage to property. The court also ruledthat the coverage claims were barred by thepolicy’s contamination exclusion. Further,
the court dismissed the policyholder’s claim
for coverage under the communicable diseaseprovision based on the lack of actual (rather
than suspected) viral presence at a covered
location. Other federal district courts have
likewise rejected policyholder arguments thatcoverage is triggered by the alleged presenceof the COVID-19 virus and/or available
under a communicable disease provision.
See Mohawk Gaming Enterprises, LLC v.
Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1419782(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2021); Out West Rest.
Grp., Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 2021 WL
1056627 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2021).

Equitable
Subrogation Alert:
Insurer Entitled To Recover
Defense Payments From AnotherInsurer Following Policy
Rescission, Says Third Circuit
The Third Circuit ruled that an insurer wasentitled to reimbursement of defense costs it
incurred prior to the rescission of its policy
from an insurer that provided coverage to thesame policyholder. Berkley Assurance Co. v.
Colony Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1625521 (3d Cir.
Apr. 27, 2021).
The dispute arose from a building demolition
that killed and injured several individuals.
The building owner was insured under apolicy issued by Colony, and was also listed
as an additional insured under a policy issued
by Berkley Assurance to the demolition
company. Colony’s policy contained an“other insurance” provision that madeit secondary to any other insurance thatprovided coverage. When the injured victims
and decedents’ estates filed suit against thebuilding owner, Berkley agreed to defend
under a reservation of rights. While theunderlying litigation was pending, Berkleysought a declaration that its policy was void
ab initio based on misrepresentations in theapplication. A state court granted Berkley’s
motion, finding that rescission was warranted.
Thereafter, Berkley sued Colony for equitable
subrogation and unjust enrichment, seeking
6payment of the defense costs it incurred
before the Berkley policy was rescinded. A
Pennsylvania federal district court granted
Berkley’s summary judgment motion and theThird Circuit affirmed.
Colony argued that Berkley was precluded
from seeking equitable subrogation because
Berkley had a legal duty to defend, or
alternatively, because Berkley voluntarily
paid the defense costs. The court rejectedboth assertions. The court explained that once
Berkley’s policy was void ab initio, the insurer
was relieved of all rights and responsibilities,
both prospectively and retroactively. As such,
Berkley had no duty to defend the suit. In soruling, the court distinguished Pennsylvania
precedent which holds that an insurer is
not entitled to reimbursement of defense
costs incurred during the period in which a
declaratory judgment action regarding theduty to defend is pending. In those cases,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explainedthat allowing reimbursement “would amountto a retroactive erosion of the broad duty to
defend.” However, the same policy concerns
are not raised where a policy is declared voidfrom inception.
The Third Circuit also rejected Colony’s
contention that Berkley was barred fromseeking equitable contribution because it
acted as a “volunteer” in paying defense costs.
The court explained that Berkley “was actingout of a concern that it would be subject to abad faith suit” if it did not pay defense costs.
Finally, the court rejected Colony’s argumentthat the equitable subrogation claim failed
because Colony never breached its duty to
defend. The court stated that the “proper
inquiry is whether someone else discharged
an obligation for which Colony is primary
liable” and that once the void ab initio order
was issued, “Colony retroactively became theprimary insurer from the date of loss.”

Property Insurance
Alert:South Carolina Supreme Court
Rules That Insurer May Depreciate
Labor Costs In Calculating ActualCash Value
Answering a certified question, the South
Carolina Supreme Court ruled that wherea property policy does not define “actual
cash value” (“ACV”), an insurer is entitledto depreciate the costs of embedded labor in
calculating ACV. Butler v. Travelers Homeand Marine Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1900088 (S.C.
May 12, 2021).
The operative insurance policies provided
replacement cost value coverage in theevent of property damage. Additionally, thepolicies permitted the policyholder to receive
ACV instead of replacement cost value if thepolicyholder opted not to immediately repair
the damaged property. The policyholders
opted for ACV coverage, which Travelers
calculated by using replacement cost lessdepreciation. The policyholders allegedthat Travelers improperly depreciated bothmaterials and the labor component of the costof repair or replacement. The court disagreed.
The court noted that “embedded laborcomponents” reflect labor costs that are “nolonger separable from the costs of materials”(e.g., the cost of a new roof reflects boththe materials and embedded labor costsof removing the old roof and installing thenew one). The court therefore held that it
is “impractical, if not impossible, to include
depreciation for materials and not for labor todetermine the ACV of the damaged property.”7

As reported in previous Alerts, courts acrossjurisdictions have issued mixed decisions as
to whether labor costs may be depreciatedin calculating ACV. See July/August, April,
March 2020 Alerts, April 2019 Alert, March2017 Alert. This month, the Illinois Supreme
Court heard oral arguments on this issue inSproull v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.
126446 (Ill. May 19, 2021).

Broker Alert:
Eleventh Circuit Reverses Dismissal
Of Negligent Procurement Claims
Against Brokers, Notwithstanding
Ruling That Policy Was Void
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a Georgia
district court improperly dismissed a
policyholder’s negligent procurement claims
against insurance brokers, ruling that suchclaims were not precluded by a finding thatthe insurance policy was void ab initio. Gen.
Star Indem. Co. v. Triumph Hous. Mgmt.,
LLC, 2021 WL 1921851 (11th Cir. May
13, 2021).
General Star Indemnity sought to rescinda policy issued to Triumph, a property
management company, based on alleged
misrepresentations in the application.
Triumph filed a third-party complaint against
two brokers, alleging negligent procurement.
In particular, Triumph alleged that it
requested blanket coverage for its structures,but instead was issued scheduled coverage.
Triumph and General Star Indemnity reacheda settlement, and in a consent order, thecourt dismissed all claims between those twoparties and declared the policy void ab initio.
The brokers moved to dismiss Triumph’s
third-party claims, which a Georgia district
court granted. The Eleventh Circuit reversed.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the brokers’
argument that the appeal was moot based on
the district court’s order declaring the policy
void ab initio. The court explained: “Whether[the brokers] procured inadequate coverage
or no coverage at all, a live controversy
remains as to whether they were negligent for
failing to procure the coverage that Triumph
requested.” In addition, the court rejected thebrokers’ contention that Triumph’s thirdparty claims must fail because there wasno finding of liability against the first-party

defendant and because third-party claims arenecessarily derivative of first-party claims.
The Eleventh Circuit also ruled that Triumph
sufficiently alleged its negligent procurement
claims, notwithstanding its failure to readthe policy. The court explained that while aninsured’s failure to exercise ordinary diligence
typically precludes a negligent procurement
claim, an exception exists where, as here,
the insured allegedly did not receive a copyof the policy and thus could not assess any
potential discrepancies between the coverage
it requested and the coverage actuallyprovided. In such instances, “the pivotal
question is whether the remaining facts
alleged in Triumph’s third-party complaint
support an inference that Triumph exercisedordinary diligence to find out the terms of
the policy.” Noting that the district court
failed to consider that question, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims.
The Eleventh Circuit also ruled that Triumphshould be permitted to amend its thirdparty complaint to include allegations that itsought, but did not receive, information about
the scope of coverage under the policy fromthe brokers after it was issued.

STB News Alert
Bryce Friedman and Daniel Feder authoredan article published by the New York Law
Journal titled, “Retroactive Insurance
Coverage for COVID-19 Losses.” The article
examines the constitutional concerns relating
to proposed New York legislation which would
have retroactively rewritten commercial
insurance policies to provide coverage tobusinesses interrupted by the spread of
COVID-19 and government attempts to curtailit. The article also addresses the body of New
York case law indicating that commercial
property insurance policies do not provide
insurance coverage for such business losses.

8Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Joshua Polster+1-212-455-2266
joshua.polster@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Jonathan T. Menitove+1-212-455-2693
jonathan.menitove@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Isaac M. Rethy+1-212-455-3869
irethy@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

This edition of the Insurance Law
Alert was prepared by
Mary Beth Forshaw / +1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com andSusannah S. Geltman / +1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com
with contributions by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
9SimpsonThacherWorldwide

UNITED STATESEUROPE

SOUTH AMERICANew York
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017+1-212-455-2000

LondonCityPoint
One Ropemaker Street
London EC2Y 9HUEngland+44-(0)20-7275-6500

São Paulo
Av. Presidente Juscelino
Kubitschek, 1455
São Paulo, SP 04543-011
Brazil+55-11-3546-1000

Houston
600 Travis Street, Suite 5400
Houston, TX 77002+1-713-821-5650
Los Angeles
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067+1-310-407-7500
Palo Alto
2475 Hanover Street
Palo Alto, CA 94304+1-650-251-5000
Washington, D.C.
900 G Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001+1-202-636-5500

ASIA

Beijing
3901 China World Tower A
1 Jian Guo Men Wai Avenue
Beijing 100004
China+86-10-5965-2999
Hong Kong
ICBC Tower
3 Garden Road, Central
Hong Kong+852-2514-7600
Tokyo
Ark Hills Sengokuyama Mori Tower
9-10, Roppongi 1-Chome
Minato-Ku, Tokyo 106-0032
Japan+81-3-5562-6200

10