Insurance Law Alert

November 2014

This Alert addresses several recent reinsurance decisions, including a New
York appellate court decision dismissing tort and contract claims by an
original insured against a reinsurer. In addition, we report on rulings relating
to an excess insurer’s duty to indemnify settlements, the viability of unfair
and deceptive practices claims against an insurer that has fully compensatedits policyholder, and the scope of a title insurer’s duty to defend. Finally, we
discuss decisions relating to arbitration, privilege and the discoverability ofother policyholder claims in a property insurance dispute.
New York Appellate Court Dismisses Policyholder’s Claims Against
Reinsurer
A New York appellate court dismissed a policyholder’s claims against a reinsurer and claims
administrator, citing the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties. OneBeacon
Am. Ins. Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 2014 WL 5431369 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t Oct. 28,
2014). (click here for full article)“Unanimously
acknowledged as thecountry’s premier
insurer-side practice.”–Chambers USA 2014

Two Courts Rule That Reinsurance Limits Cap Both Indemnity andExpenses
An Illinois appellate court and a New York federal district court ruled that policy limits
in reinsurance certificates unambiguously create an overall limitation on both losses andexpenses. Continental Casualty Co. v. Midstates Reinsurance Corp., 2014 IL App (1st)133090-U (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 4, 2014); Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 6:13cv-1178 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2014). (click here for full article)

Fully-Compensated Policyholder Can Bring Unfair/Deceptive Practices
Claim Against Insurer, Says Massachusetts Supreme Court
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a policyholder may state a claim
under an unfair and deceptive practices statute even if the policyholder did not suffer an
uncompensated loss. Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 469 Mass. 813, 17
N.E.3d 1066 (2014). (click here for full article)

Excess Insurer Is Liable for Underlying Settlements Despite Lack ofConsent
A Michigan federal district court ruled that an excess insurer is liable for underlying
settlements that exhausted the policyholder’s primary coverage notwithstanding the excess
insurer’s lack of consent to the settlement. Stryker Corp. v. XL Ins. Co., Inc., 2014 WL 5493195(W.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2014). (click here for full article)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

Seventh Circuit Holds That Illinois “Complete Defense” Rule Is Not
Applicable to Title Insurers
The Seventh Circuit ruled that a title insurer’s contractual limits on its duty to defend were
enforceable under Illinois law and that the insurer was required to defend only claims coveredby its policy rather than the entire underlying suit. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chicago
Title Ins. Co., 2014 WL 5858965 (7th Cir. Nov. 13, 2014). (click here for full article)

Michigan Court Refuses to Seal Arbitration Award
A Michigan federal district court denied a motion to file under seal a final arbitration award
and portions of a brief in support of a motion to confirm the award. Amerisure Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Everest Reinsurance Co., 2014 WL 5481107 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2014).
(click here for full article)

Seventh Circuit Affirms That Assignee of Ceding Insurer’s Rights May Not
Enforce Arbitration Provision
The Seventh Circuit affirmed that a non-party to a reinsurance agreement who acquired theceding insurer’s rights to collect amounts due under the contract may not enforce the contract’s
arbitration provision. Pine Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado,
2014 WL 5786951 (7th Cir. Nov. 7, 2014) (click here for full article)

Iowa Court Rules That Reinsurer Communications Are Not Privileged
A magistrate judge’s discovery order requiring an insurer to produce reinsurance
communications was not clearly erroneous, an Iowa federal district court ruled. Progressive
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 2014 WL 4947721 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 3, 2014).
(click here for full article)

Insurer Not Required to Produce Evidence Relating to Other
Policyholders’ Claims, Says Texas Supreme Court
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that a trial court abused its discretion in ordering an insurer
to produce documents relating to claims of other policyholders. In re National Lloyds Ins. Co.,
Realtor, 2014 WL 5785871 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2014). (click here for full article)

2

Reinsurance
Alerts:New York Appellate Court
Dismisses Policyholder’s Claims
Against Reinsurer
A New York appellate court dismissed a
policyholder’s claims against a reinsurer andclaims administrator, citing the absence of acontractual relationship between the parties.
OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Colgate-PalmoliveCo., 2014 WL 5431369 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st
Dep’t Oct. 28, 2014).
OneBeacon issued primary and excess policies
to Colgate-Palmolive. Asbestos-related losses
under the policies were reinsured throughan indemnity agreement with National
Indemnity Company (“NICO”). OneBeaconalso contracted with NICO to provide certain
claim services for the reinsured policies.
NICO, in turn, contracted with its affiliate,
Resolute Management, to provide those claim
services. A dispute arose between OneBeaconand Colgate as to which party had the rightto control Colgate’s defense in underlying
asbestos litigation. Colgate joined NICO
and Resolute as counterclaim defendants,
alleging, among other things, breach ofcontract, tortious interference and violation ofa Massachusetts deceptive practices statute,
Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A. A New York trial court
granted in part and denied in part NICO and
Resolute’s motion to dismiss. The trial court
dismissed the tortious interference claim
against NICO, finding that NICO was at all
times acting as OneBeacon’s agent and thatan agent “cannot be held liable for inducing[its] principal to breach a contract with a third
person.” However, the trial court declined
to dismiss several counterclaims, including
tortious interference and violation of Mass.
Gen. L. c. 93A against Resolute, and breachof contract and breach of the covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing against NICO.
The appellate court reversed, dismissing theremaining counterclaims as a matter of law.
The appellate court ruled that Colgate’scontract claims alleging that NICO and
Resolute breached the OneBeacon insurance
policies failed as a matter of law due to alack of privity between the parties. The court
explained that the reinsurance agreement
between OneBeacon and NICO was “separate
and distinct” from the underlying OneBeacon

policies. Therefore, Colgate could not assert
a breach of contract claim against NICO
and Resolute, which were not parties tothe underlying insurance policies. The
court also rejected Colgate’s assertions that
OneBeacon had “assigned” contractual rights
and obligations to NICO, or that NICO had“assumed” obligations under the insurance
policies. In this context, the court found that
NICO’s role as claims administrator for thepolicies did not establish a direct contractual
relationship between Colgate and NICO
because OneBeacon “remains fully andsolely responsible for the performance of its
obligations under the Policies even if NICO

and Resolute are performing those obligations
on its behalf.” The court rejected Colgate’sargument that liability could be imposed
based on a third-party beneficiary theory,
noting that the NICO-Resolute contract
expressly stated that the parties did notintend to confer any rights on third parties.
The court also dismissed Colgate’s tortious
interference claim against Resolute, rulingthat “no action for tortious interference canlie against an agent acting within the scopeof its duties on behalf of the principal.” Thecourt explained that Resolute acted as adesignated agent because the reinsurance
agreement authorized NICO to act as
OneBeacon’s agent with respect to the polices
and, under the claim services agreement,
OneBeacon authorized Resolute to act as a
sub-agent. Finally, the court held that the3Massachusetts deceptive practices statute,
Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A, was inapplicable where,
as here, New York law governed the breachof contract claim. NICO and Resolute arerepresented by Simpson Thacher partners
Mary Beth Forshaw, Bryce Friedman andMichael Garvey.
The decision serves as an important reminderthat absent specific language in a reinsurance
agreement indicating the reinsurer’s intent
to be held directly liable to the policyholder,a reinsurer typically has no obligations to theoriginal insured.

Two Courts Rule That Reinsurance
Limits Cap Both Indemnity andExpenses
An Illinois appellate court ruled that“reinsurance assumed” provisions in several
reinsurance certificates unambiguously
created an overall limitation on both losses
and expenses. Continental Casualty Co. v.
Midstates Reinsurance Corp., 2014 IL App(1st) 133090-U (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 4, 2014).
Continental sought coverage forenvironmental liabilities under facultativereinsurance policies issued by Midstates.
Midstates argued that its payments toContinental met the limits provided by thereinsurance certificates. Continental allegedthat Midstates breached the reinsurance
contracts and sought a declaratory judgmentthat the certificates did not include limits
on expenses. An Illinois trial court granted
Midstate’s motion for judgment on thepleadings. The appellate court affirmed.
The appellate court ruled that “the certificatesprovided a clear policy limit, inclusive ofexpenses.” The court relied primarily on the“Bellefonte principle,”—based on a body ofcases following Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 903 F.2d 910(2d Cir. 1990)—which holds that “facultativereinsurance certificate limits cap reinsurance
for both indemnity and expenses.” In
Bellefonte, the court explained that “anyother conclusion would effectively eliminate
the stated limitation on the reinsurer’s
liability.” The court further noted that noneof the reinsurance provisions relied upon by
Continental “can be said to remove expenses
from the overall liability cap provided in Item
D, reinsurance assumed.” The court deemed
it irrelevant that only some of the certificates
included the language “inclusive of expenses,”
while other certificates were silent on theissue, finding that “this inclusion clearly
appears to be an abundance of caution rather
than an intention to exclude expenses fromthe liability cap.”
A New York federal district court reached
the same conclusion in Utica Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 6:13-cv1178 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2014). Citing to
Bellefonte, the court ruled that the limits offacultative certificates issued by Clearwaterto Utica included both indemnity costs
and expenses. Utica argued that because
the certificates did not specifically use theword “limit,” Bellefonte was inapposite. The
court disagreed, explaining that although
Clearwater’s liability was described as apercentage share, “it logically follows that apercentage share of a policy limit is itself alimit on liability, despite the absence of theword ‘limit.’” The court likewise rejected
Utica’s contention that the certificates’ limits
did not apply to expenses by virtue of afollow-the-form provision or claims clause.

4Bad Faith Alert:

Fully-Compensated Policyholder
Can Bring Unfair/Deceptive
Practices Claim Against Insurer,
Says Massachusetts Supreme Court
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled that a policyholder may state a claim
under an unfair and deceptive practices
statute even if the policyholder did not suffer
an uncompensated loss. Thus, a policyholder’s
acceptance of full reimbursement of its
expenses from its insurer does not preclude aclaim under Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A. Auto Flat
Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 469
Mass. 813, 17 N.E.3d 1066 (2014).
The case arose from Hanover’s refusal todefend or indemnify Auto Flat in underlying
environmental litigation. Auto Flat funded
its own defense and remediation and thensued Hanover alleging breach of contractand unfair/deceptive practices under
Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A, §11, based on Hanover’s
refusal to defend. After a court ruled inan actual amount of damages, and there wastherefore no predicate for calculating multiple
damages under §11. The court rejectedboth contentions.
Although an unfair or deceptive practiceclaim under §11 requires the policyholder tosuffer “a loss of money or property,” the court
concluded that a showing of uncompensatedloss is not required. Rather, “a plaintiff
who can establish that it has sustained suchconcrete monetary or property loss will
have satisfied the actual damages elementof §11, without also having to prove that theloss remains uncompensated.” The court
went on to explain that where a plaintiff
has already been compensated for its loss
prior to resolution of the §11 claim, suchcompensation should be treated as an offset
against any damages ultimately awarded,
rather than as a bar to recovery. The court
also ruled that §11 does not require a priorjudgment establishing amount of damages
as a prerequisite to recovery. Although thestatute allows a monetary judgment to be
the basis for calculating penalty damages,
the court concluded that the absence of ajudgment does not preclude recovery under§11. Where no judgment has been entered,“all foreseeable and consequential damages
arising out of conduct which violates thestatute” are recoverable.

Excess Alert:

Excess Insurer Is Liable for
Underlying Settlements Despite
Lack of Consent

Auto Flat’s favor on the duty to defend,
Hanover reimbursed all of Auto Flat’s legal
and remediation expenses, plus interest.
Notwithstanding this payment, Auto Flat
pursued its breach of contract and statutory
claims against Hanover. Hanover argued
that because Auto Flat had been fullycompensated, its claims failed as matter oflaw. In particular, Hanover asserted that Auto
Flat could not establish the requisite “lossof money or property” under §11. Hanoverfurther argued that the §11 claim should bedismissed because no judgment established

A Michigan federal district court ruled thatan excess insurer is liable for underlying
settlements that exhausted the policyholder’s
primary coverage notwithstanding the excess
insurer’s lack of consent to the settlements.
Stryker Corp. v. XL Ins. Co., Inc., 2014 WL
5493195 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2014).
The dispute arose from defective kneereplacement claims brought against Stryker.
XL insured Stryker under a primarypolicy with a $15 million limit (above a $2
million self-insured retention) and TIG
also insured Stryker under an excess policy
with an attachment point of $17 million. XLdeclined to defend or indemnify Stryker,
and Stryker settled the claims on its own.
5A court later determined that XL was liable
for those settlements. In a related andsubsequent matter, a New York court ruledthat Stryker had an obligation to indemnify
Pfizer (from whom Stryker purchased
the knee replacement manufacturer)
for losses stemming from the defective
products. Stryker sued XL and TIG, seeking
indemnification for both the direct underlying
settlements (approximately $7.6 million)
and amounts owed to Pfizer (exceeding $18
million). XL ultimately agreed to pay Pfizer
over $17 million, thereby exhausting its
policy. Stryker then sought reimbursementfrom TIG for its direct settlements. Although
TIG stipulated to the reasonableness of
Stryker’s settlements, it refused to pay on
the basis that it had not consented to thesettlements. Stryker moved for summary
judgment, arguing that TIG’s policy did
not require Stryker to obtain TIG’s consent
because at the time the settlements werereached, the settlement amounts were
exclusively within the XL primary layer ofcoverage. The court agreed.
TIG’s policy provided coverage for“Ultimate Net Loss” in excess of underlying
insurance, defined as “claims for which theinsured is liable, either by adjudication orcompromise with the written consent of[TIG].” TIG acknowledged that it typicallydoes not require consent for settlements
below its coverage layer, but argued that“the policy does require consent if thosesettlements are offered to TIG for payment.”
In contrast, Stryker argued that the policy
requires consent only for settlements within
TIG’s policy layer, and that the underlying
settlements were completely within theunderlying XL layer when executed. The

court concluded that under the “unusual”
facts of this case, the consent provision
was ambiguous. Applying Michigan law,the court construed the ambiguity in favorof the policyholder, reasoning that “it isbetter to place the risk of this unanticipateddevelopment on TIG rather than on Stryker.”
Importantly, this decision does not hold thatconsent provisions, which are common inexcess policies, are ambiguous across theboard. Rather, the court expressly limited
its holding to the “unique circumstances” of
the case, which raised the unusual questionof whether an excess policy’s consent
provision applies to settlements that wereentered into before the underlying insurance
was exhausted.

Duty to Defend
Alert:

Seventh Circuit Holds That Illinois“Complete Defense” Rule Is Not
Applicable to Title Insurers
Addressing a matter of first impression under
Illinois law, the Seventh Circuit ruled that atitle insurer’s contractual limits on its duty
to defend were enforceable and thus that theinsurer was required to defend only claims
covered by its policy rather than the entire
underlying suit. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.
v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 2014 WL 5858965(7th Cir. Nov. 13, 2014).
In coverage litigation between a policyholder,a general liability insurer (Philadelphia
Indemnity) and a title insurer (Chicago Title),
6

a dispute arose as to the scope of the title
insurer’s duty to defend underlying suits.
Chicago Title maintained that its defense
obligation was contractually limited to claims
potentially falling within the title policy’s
coverage. Philadelphia Indemnity argued
that this limitation was unenforceable under
Illinois’s “complete defense” rule, which
generally requires an insurer to provide acomplete defense in a suit against its insured
even if only some claims are potentiallycovered. An Illinois district court agreed andruled that Chicago Title owned a defense of all
claims in the underlying action. The Seventh
Circuit reversed.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that thecomplete defense rule was limited to thegeneral liability insurance context. Although
the Illinois Supreme Court has not addressed
this issue, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that unlike the “broad defense promise instandard general liability policies,” title
insurance imposes “much narrower” defense
and indemnity obligations. The court notedthat title policies typically define defense
obligations in terms of particular causes ofaction, rather than in terms of defending“suits” or “actions,” as is the case with mostgeneral liability policies. As the court noted,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached
the same conclusion in GMAC Mortgage, LLC
v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 985 N.E.2d 823(2013).

Arbitration Alerts:
Michigan Court Refuses to Seal
Arbitration Award

In an unusual ruling, a Michigan federal
district court denied a motion to file underseal a final arbitration award and portionsof a brief in support of a motion to confirm
the award. Amerisure Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Everest Reinsurance Co., 2014 WL 5481107(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2014). The reinsurance
arbitration was conducted pursuant toa confidentiality agreement between
the parties. The agreement, containing
language that is consistent with the standard
confidentiality agreement on the ARIAS-US
website, provided that the “final award andany interim decisions, correspondence, oral
discussions and information exchanged inconnection with the proceedings will be

kept confidential.” The agreement further
provided that “all submissions of Arbitration
Information to a court shall be sealed.”
Relying on these provisions, Amerisure
moved to seal the final arbitration award andportions of its brief in support of a motion
to confirm the award. Although Everest
opposed the motion in part, it acknowledgedthat the final award contained “certain
information that is properly subject to sealing
under the standards applied in this Circuit.”
In particular, Everest did not contest theappropriateness of sealing the portions of
the award containing non-party testimony or“reflect[ing] substantive rulings of the panel
majority.” Notwithstanding, the court deniedin part Amerisure’s motion.
While the court agreed to seal the portions of
the award that identified non-parties to thearbitration, noting their legitimate privacy
interests, it declined to seal portions of theaward containing “discrete substantive
rulings,” finding that controlling Sixth Circuit
law did not warrant such action. The court
specifically rejected the contention thatsealing was warranted to avoid citation of theaward in future litigation, noting that this
precise kind of harm is insufficient to justify
entry of a protective order.

Seventh Circuit Affirms That
Assignee of Ceding Insurer’s Rights
May Not Enforce Arbitration
Provision
Our July/August 2013 Alert reported on an
Illinois district court decision holding thata non-party to a reinsurance agreement
who acquired the ceding insurer’s rights
to collect amounts due under the contract
may not enforce the contract’s arbitration
provision. Pine Top Receivables of Illinois,
LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 2013
WL 2574596 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013). This
month, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pine
Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Banco deSeguros del Estado, 2014 WL 5786951 (7thCir. Nov. 7, 2014).
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court that the purchase agreement between
the original ceding company and Pine
Top, rather than the reinsurance treaties,
controlled the scope of the Pine Top’s rights,
and that the purchase agreement did not7

convey the right to compel arbitration.
The court rejected Pine Top’s contentions
that (1) the right to compel arbitration wastransferred via the Uniform Commercial
Code; (2) that parol evidence indicated thatthe parties intended to transfer the right tocompel arbitration; and (3) that the reinsurer
was estopped from refusing to arbitratebecause it had relied on other reinsurance
policy provisions to deny coverage.
The court also addressed whether thereinsurer, a foreign entity wholly ownedby the country of Uruguay, was required
to post pre-answer security under Illinois
statutory law. The reinsurer argued that theForeign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”),
which states that certain foreign entities“shall be immune from attachment arrest
and execution,” precluded the imposition of
prejudgment security. The Seventh Circuit
agreed. In so ruling, the court rejected
Pine Top’s argument that the prejudgment
security was not an “attachment” under the
FSIA. Additionally, the court rejected thenotion that the reinsurer had waived its FSIA
immunity by transacting reinsurance businessin Illinois or by virtue of a reserves clause in
the reinsurance contracts.

Discovery Alerts:

Iowa Court Rules That Reinsurer
Communications Are Not Privileged
A magistrate judge’s discovery order
requiring an insurer to produce reinsurance
communications was not clearly erroneous,an Iowa federal district court ruled.
Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Federal

Deposit Ins. Corp., 2014 WL 4947721 (N.D.
Iowa Oct. 3, 2014).
In a dispute relating to coverage under adirectors and officers liability policy issued
by Progressive, a magistrate judge ordered
the production of redacted communications
between Progressive and its reinsurers. The
magistrate judge found that the redacted
materials were not protected by attorneyclient privilege or work-product doctrine.
An Iowa federal court upheld the ruling,finding that it was not “clearly erroneous” or“contrary to law.”With respect to work-product protection,
the court held that the relevant inquiry was
whether the documents were prepared in
anticipation of litigation, as opposed to theordinary course of business. In concludingthat the materials at issue fell within thelatter category, the court noted that workproduct protection is not established simply
because documents were prepared by ortransmitted to claims attorneys. Similarly,
an “internal use” notation is not equivalent
to “in anticipation of litigation,” the court
noted. The court agreed with the magistratethat the materials at issue were largely“business planning documents” (such as caseupdates) and did not include legal advice or
litigation strategy. With respect to attorneyclient privilege, the parties disputed whether
the “common interest” doctrine applied,such that privilege would not be waived
if Progressive shared documents with its
reinsurer, with whom it allegedly shared a“common interest.” Although Iowa courts
have not addressed the issue, the court
agreed with the magistrate that the “common
interest” doctrine serves as an exception to
waiver of privilege if the two parties share8

a common legal interest and the materials
are shared in the course of formulating acommon legal strategy. The court held thatthe shared obligation of Progressive and its
reinsurers to pay Progressive’s losses was
a common commercial/financial interest,
rather than a common legal interest. The
court also concluded that the existence of acontract provision authorizing the reinsurers
to participate in litigation with Progressive
did not establish a common legal strategy
between the parties.
As discussed in our May and September
2014 and our March 2011 Alerts, most courts
recognize the “common interest” doctrine, but
the particular requirements for invoking thedoctrine vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Insurer Not Required to Produce
Evidence Relating to Other
Policyholders’ Claims, Says Texas
Supreme Court
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that a trial
court abused its discretion in ordering an
insurer to produce evidence relating to claimsof other policyholders. In re National Lloyds
Ins. Co., Realtor, 2014 WL 5785871 (Tex. Oct.
31, 2014).
A homeowner alleged that her property
insurer undervalued storm-related claims in
bad faith. During discovery, she requested
production of all claim files from recent
years involving the same adjusters that wereassigned to her claim, as well as claim files
from the previous year for nearby properties
involving the same adjusting firms. The

insurer objected to the requests as overbroad,
unduly burdensome and not calculated to leadto the discovery of admissible evidence. A trial
court limited the requests in minor respects,
but largely ordered the production of thematerials sought. The insurer petitioned fora writ of mandamus with an intermediateappellate court, which denied relief. The
insurer then successfully sought mandamus
from the Texas Supreme Court.
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide fordiscovery of “any matter that is not privileged
and is relevant to the subject matter of thepending action.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(a).
Although this statute is broadly construed,
the court noted that “even these liberalbounds have limits.” The court concluded

that production of claim files relating toclaims made by other policyholders was notreasonably calculated to lead to the discoveryof relevant evidence. In particular, the court
explained that an insurer’s “overpayment,
underpayment or proper payment of theclaims of unrelated third parties is [not]probative of its conduct with respect to [the][ ] undervaluation claims at issue in thiscase.” The court noted that there are “manyvariables” associated with each specific claim
and reasoned that “[s]couring claim files
in the hopes of finding similarly situatedclaimants” is “at best an ‘impermissible
fishing expedition.’”As Lloyds National illustrates, even whena policyholder’s claim file requests arereasonably limited in scope by time andlocation, they may nonetheless be deemed
undiscoverable.

9Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.
Barry R. Ostrager+1-212-455-2655
bostrager@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Mary Kay Vyskocil+1-212-455-3093
mvyskocil@stblaw.com

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+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Andrew S. Amer
+1-212-455-2953
aamer@stblaw.com

Linda H. Martin+1-212-455-7722
lmartin@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

David J. Woll
+1-212-455-3136
dwoll@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw(mforshaw@stblaw.com/212455-2846) and Bryce L. Friedman(bfriedman@stblaw.com/212-4552235) with contributions by
Karen Cestari(kcestari@stblaw.com).

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
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